

Cameron's Conservatisms and the Problem of Ideology

Matthew Lakin

Oriel College, Oxford

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford.

October 2014

Word count: 100,331.

The thesis is the result of my own work. Material from the published or unpublished work of others which is used in the thesis is credited to the author in question in the text. No part of this thesis has been previously submitted for a degree in the University of Oxford or any other university.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

Cameron's Conservatisms and the Problem of Ideology

Matthew Lakin, Oriel College, DPhil Politics, August 2014

Abstract

The central aim of the thesis is to investigate the myriad ideological 'thought-practices' of Cameronism by placing the composition and content of Cameronism in the context of the problem of Thatcherism's legacy. This problem is namely a problem of the gap between intentions and outcomes. The thesis identifies three discreet, but also overlapping, ideological developments that take root in the late 1980s/early 1990s: (1) the steadfast commitment to reducing the size and scope of the central state; (2) the recognition that neo-liberal economics is a *necessary* but *insufficient* precondition for the delivery of wider Conservative outcomes; and (3) the rediscovery and commitment to the renewal of civil society as an alternative to state intervention in response to the perceived failures of neo-liberalism. The thesis examines the application of these ideological developments in Cameronism, both in theory and practice. Furthermore, it examines the political-thought practices of Cameronism in the context of the Coalition Government. Finally, the thesis analyses a serious Conservative ideological threat to Cameronite Conservatism, concluding that Cameronism is a distinct, decodable and distinctive Conservatism, which has been quickly eclipsed by other Conservatisms, namely the Conservatism of the New New Right, which is much closer to the Thatcherism that Cameronism was resolutely trying to adjust. British Conservatism has thus come full circle: the market society vision of Thatcherism, which Cameronism was trying to ideologically supplement, has been restored as the best and surest way to achieve the Conservative aim of a limited conception of politics.

Acknowledgements

The thesis was prepared, researched and written in Oriel College and the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. First, I would like to express my deep gratitude and intellectual indebtedness to Michael Freeden. Michael has been a generous, gracious and supportive supervisor, and without his moral and intellectual guidance, the thesis would not have been possible.

The DPhil would not have been possible without the support in the form of funding from the Department of Politics and International Relations. Nor would it have been possible without the academic, personal and social support of Oriel College. The support from my family - notably my parents, Helen and Mark; and also Richard Lakin and Caryl Woolley - throughout my studies has been essential.

The thesis has benefited from the advice, comments and questions, amongst others, of James Armstrong, Richard Black, Theo Brainin, Ahmad Butt, Alasdair Campbell, Vincenzo Coppola, Joseph Cregan, Matthew Cropper, Alexander Blake Ewing, Jonathan Greenacre, Matt Hann, Colin Heywood, John Hintze, Alan Johnson, Chloé Lakin, Jonathan Lloyd, George Mawhinney, Marius Ostrowski, Joseph Root, Jon Smith, Søren Lund Sørensen, Thomas Walsh, and especially Caroline Heywood for her sustained love and support.

I am also indebted to the help and advice from, among others, Matt Beech, Phillip Blond, Andrew Crines, Gidon Cohen, Jon Cruddas, Andrew Denham, Maria Dimova-Cookson, Richard Hayton, Mathew Humphrey, Ben Jackson, Danny

Kruger, Kwasi Kwarteng, Simon Lee, David Leopold, Jeremy Mcllwaine, Mark Philp, Marc Stears, Polly Toynbee, Elizabeth Truss, David Willetts, and Stewart Wood.

Chapters five and six, albeit in shorter length, have appeared as journal articles in *British Politics* and *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought* respectively.

Matthew Lakin

(Oriel College, Oxford, August 2014).

Table of Contents

Abstract ii

Acknowledgements iii

Table of Contents 1

Introduction: Cameron's Conservatisms and the Problem of Ideology

1. Identity Crisis 5
2. Michael Freeden and the 'Interpretive Turn' in Political Theory 13
3. Macro-Meso-Micro Concepts in Political Ideologies 25
4. Is Conservatism Dead? 30
5. Cameron's Conservatisms, or Cameron's Conservatives? 32
6. Chapter Outline 38

Part One: Antecedents of Cameronism

Chapter One: Situating Cameronism: Recovering Intentions and Tensions in Thatcherism

1. Introduction: Retrodicting Thatcherism 39
2. Mind the Gap: Thatcherite Outcomes and Intentions 42
    a. Thatcherism and Its Outcomes: Free Market Radicalism 45
    b. Thatcherism and Its Intentions: A Restoration of Tory Statecraft 51
    c. Political Ouroboros: Thatcherite Tensions 59
3. Rediscovering Thatcherism: The Intentional Theory of Thatcherism 68

a. The Immanent Core and the Conduit Core 68

b. The Importance of Intention in Ideological Analysis 70

4. Conclusion 74

Chapter Two: Situating Cameronism: Thatcherism, the Market Society and the Promotion of Limited Politics

1. Introduction: The Dual-Core of Thatcherism: The Market Society and the Promotion of Limited Politics 76

a. The Market Society 77

b. The Dethronement and Limitation of Politics: The Strong State and Libertarian Individuals 91

2. Conclusion: Old Bottle, New Wine? 116

Part Two: Cameronism

Chapter Three: The Ideology of Cameronism: Prisoner of an Ideological Past?

1. Introduction: Paradise Lost? After Thatcher and the Politics of Paradox 122

2. State Retrenchment: Conservatism and the Enabling State 131

3. Recognising Insufficiency: From 'Roll-Back' to 'Roll-Out' Neoliberalism 145

4. Ideological 'Backpeddling': Civil Renewal and the Road to the Big Society 173

5. Conclusion: 'Bring on the Scrutiny' 189

Chapter Four: Austerity and the Big Society: Cameronism in Practice

1. Introduction: Cameronism in Practice 191

2. The Big Society: Applied Civic Renewal and

Pro-Social Conservatism 192

3. Austerity: TINA updated? 205

4. Austerity and Its Counter-Response 217

5. Austerity and the Big Society: Contradictory, Parallel or Consanguineous Relations? 227

a. Austerity and the Big Society as Contradictory Concepts 227

b. Austerity and the Big Society as Parallel Concepts 235

c. Austerity and the Big Society as Consanguineous Concepts 237

6. Conclusion: The Ends and Means of Cameronism 240

Chapter Five: The Ideologies of the Coalition: More 'Muscular' than 'Liberal'?

1. Introduction: Cameron's Coalition? 243

2. Cameronite Conservatism 246

3. Cleggite Liberalism 251

4. Freedom, Fairness and Responsibility: The Conceptual Commitments of the Coalition 255

a. Fairness 256

b. Responsibility 259

c. Freedom 263

5. The Language of the Coalition 265

6. The Big Society: The Coalition's Core Concept 270

7. Conclusion: The Two Dimensions of Cameronism 276

Part Three: Challenges to Cameronism

Chapter Six: After Cameronism? The New New Right and the Unchaining of Britannia

1. Introduction: A Conservative Coalition 279

2. Mapping Coalition Conservatisms: Old New Right, Cameronism and the New New Right 282

3. The New New Right 296

a. The Rejection of the Rhetorical De-neoliberalisation of British Society 297

b. Free Market Anti-Socialisation 310

c. Postmodern Libertarianism? Reversing the Social State and Promoting Thin Rights 318

4. Responsibility: ‘Master-Super-Concept‘ 323

5. Conclusion: Conservative Languages 325

Conclusion: W(h)ither Cameronism? 331

Bibliography 341

Introduction: Cameron's Conservatisms and the Problem of Ideology

'The age in which we live, far from being post-ideological, is one of ideological experimentation, of the resurrection of past principles combined with new attitudes'[1]

1. Identity Crisis

Britain is undergoing profound and far-reaching change. Since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC hereafter) in 2007-2008, Britain's political, social, economic and cultural values have changed in considerable, curious and important ways. A central contributor to, and factor of, this change is the role of David Cameron's Conservative Party, and the Coalition Government formed with the Liberal Democrats in May 2010. Despite this, and with over four years in office, Cameron's Conservatives have not been given sufficient scholarly attention. There has been some scholarly attempts that deal with, for example, the biographical detail of key personnel, or the central government institutional changes administered by the Cameron Government. Other studies have focused on the electorally-extraordinary circumstances in which Cameron's Conservatives entered government, or aspects of its foreign policy.[2] Yet, there has been a noticeable and regrettable absence of scholarship on Cameron's Conservatives *and* its relationship to ideology. When you consider that when the Thatcher and Blair governments were in their fourth year of government, scholarly and

---

[1] M. Freeden. 1999. 'The Ideology of New Labour', *Political Quarterly* 70 (1): 43.

[2] See M. Beech. 2011. 'British Conservatism and Foreign Policy: Traditions and Ideas Shaping Cameron's Global View', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 13 (3): 348-363.

investigative works detailing their ideological practices were well underway. The Cameron Government shares differences and similarities to both the Thatcher and Blair governments, but it is as deserving of ideological scrutiny as any government, era, or period of politics. An investigation into the *ideologies* that inform the *practice* of Cameron's Conservatives has been absent from serious analysis hitherto. Ideological investigation and analysis, although typically complex, are fascinating, and essential for understanding contemporary British Conservatism; the collective thoughts and objectives of the contemporary Conservative Party; and the so-called 'modernisation' of the Conservative Party. The Conservative ideologies of, and under, the Cameron era are remarkably important and have considerable bearing on the political rationale and struggle over issues ranging from the desired, and future, size of the British state, to the proper limits of markets, to the role of civil society. Ideas matter and they have consequences. The intersection between the ideas and praxis of Conservatism under Cameron is a classical proof of this. This thesis has one central aim and ambition: to uncover the *ideological thought-practices*[3] *of Cameronism* by interrogating its *immediate antecedents*, its various *formulations*, and its ideological *struggles* and *challenges*. Cameronism is a study of ambiguity. The thesis is a shift from the prevailing, and necessary, tendency to focus on *Cameron's Conservatives* (i.e. the personnel and the processes of government and the institutions that house them) to *Cameron's Conservatisms* (i.e. the thought-practices that emerge from the Conservative Party, (elite) politicians, political thinkers, think-tanks, etc.). It is a bracing, exciting and overdue study.

---

[3] 'The term 'thought-practices' will be used throughout the thesis to denote the intricate intersection between thought and praxis in ideologies. M. Freeden. 2013. *The Political Theory of Political Thinking: The Anatomy of a Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 73.

In attempting to elucidate the central proposition of the thesis, the introduction must attempt to satisfy three demands. First, to detail both the *problems* the thesis aims to resolve and the *problems* of the nature of the thesis. Second, defend, explain and outline the *methodological choices* employed and outline their implications and limitations. Third, outline the argument with a brief survey of each chapter.

Before answering these questions a deep and crippling problem remains pertaining to Conservatism and its relationship with ideology. Abraham Lincoln once asked, 'what is Conservatism?'[4] The question still remains, to a degree, unsatisfactorily unanswered.[5] In part this is because the question is too capacious a question to be answered within one study alone or even a collection of studies. Moreover, the student of Conservatisms, for there is no monocratic Conservatism, faces a distinct category of problems in answering Lincoln's question, which other modes of political thinking do not encounter in other lines of political enquiry, whether that be in political philosophy, political thought or political ideology. First, and perhaps the most intrinsic problem *of* and *for* Conservatism, advocates and practitioners frequently disclaim its association from ideology. Michael Oakeshott's shadow casts far and wide over this problematic eschewal of ideology. Oakeshott was opposed to 'rationalism', which he saw as a

---

[4] The thesis uses 'Conservatism' as a denotation of the ideology and the lower-case 'conservatism' as a denotation of disposition.

[5] For impressive attempts to investigate the nature of Conservatisms see A. Aughey, G. Jones and W. T. M. Riches. 1996. *The Conservative Political Tradition in Britain and the United States*. London: Pinter Press; M. Freeden. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 317-416; R. Scruton. 2001. *The Meaning of Conservatism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; A. Vincent. 2010. *Modern Ideologies*. 3rd edn. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 56-82; L. Allison. 1986. *Right Principles: A Conservative Philosophy of Politics*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; A. Heywood. 2012. *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*. 5th edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 65-96; R. Eccleshall. 2003. 'Conservatism', In *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*. 3rd edn. London: Routledge, 47-72; N. O'Sullivan. 2013. 'Conservatism', In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, edited by M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent, and M. Stears. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 293-311.

programmatic form of politics that tried to design and order the world in accordance with abstract principles derived from reason. It was this design and *a prior* reasoning that Oakeshott, and Conservative thinkers and practitioners before and after him, attached to the term ideology. Oakeshott insisted that conservatism was 'not a creed or a doctrine, but a *disposition*'.[6] Dispositional conservatism elevated experience over reason. For Oakeshott, there were still value-preferences in Conservative modes of political thinking insofar as there was a belief in a 'political economy of freedom';[7] the demonisation of the socialist state as a 'sanatorium'[8] (and the 'enterprise association'),[9] and famously a preference for the 'familiar', 'tried', 'fact', 'actual', 'limited', 'near', 'sufficient, 'the convenient' and 'present laughter' in mirror-image to the 'unknown, 'untried', 'mystery', 'possible', 'unbounded', 'distant', 'superabundant', 'perfect' and 'utopian bliss' respectively.[10] But these preferences were not ideological for Oakeshott. Oakeshottian conservatism is therefore an explication of 'conceptual scepticism':[11] sceptical of rationalism and the 'knowledge of technique', in favour of experience and 'practical knowledge'.[12]

The second problem, albeit less critical and intrinsic, is the comparative lack of interest in Conservatism within academia in comparison to studies of other dominant ideologies, say socialism or liberalism, or the newer, 'thin' ideologies

---

[6] M. Oakeshott. 1962. *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays*. London: Methuen & Co, 407 (emphasis added).

[7] Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics*, 37-58.

[8] J. W. Müller. 2011. *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe*. New York Press: New Haven and London, 224.

[9] M. Oakeshott. 1948. 'Contemporary British Politics', *The Cambridge Journal* 1 (8): 474-490.

[10] Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics*, 408.

[11] Allison, *Right Principles*, 2.

[12] Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics*, 12, 15.

that transform and/or dilute convention political ideologies, such as nationalism, feminism or ecologism.[13] The link between ideology and other political traditions, whilst contested by exponents, practitioners and critics of those political traditions, is far more widely accepted than the link between ideology and Conservatism. As mainstream twentieth century Anglo-American political philosophy became more analytical employing a 'technical' and 'professional language',[14] it could not, with the legacy of Burkean and Oakeshottian hostility to abstracting reasoning, include Conservatism as part of its analysis.[15] When Conservatism was considered by scholars, it carried the negative and pejorative connotations of ideology inherited from Marxist theory, and Conservatism was thus evaluated as a veiled form, and defence, of inegalitarianism,[16] and/or the ideology of the ruling class.[17]

The third problem relates to the contemporary condition of British Conservatism. Conservatism is said to have been 'undone', 'hollowed-out' and rendered a 'zombie concept' by the forces of modernity, secularism and neoliberal economics. Scholars like John Gray and Mark Garnett, and politicians like Ian Gilmour, accepted the notion that British Conservatism, because of the Conservative Party's dalliance with Thatcherism in the 1980s, had been destroyed

---

[13] The trend is changing however. See for example C. Robin. 2011. *The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin*. New York: Oxford University Press; K. O'Hara. 2011. *Conservatism*. London: Reaktion Book; E. H. H. Green. 2004. *Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[14] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 41, 52.

[15] A notable exception includes G. Brennan and A. Hamlin. 2004. 'Analytic Conservatism', *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (4): 675-691.

[16] See T. Honderich. 2005. *Conservatism: Burke, Nozick, Bush, Blair?* London: Pluto Press; P. Dorey. 2011. *British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality*. London: I. B. Tauris; K. Hickson. 2005. 'Inequality', In *The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945*, edited by K. Hickson. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 178-194.

[17] S. Huntington. 1957. 'Conservatism as an Ideology', *American Political Science Review* 51 (2): 454-473; R. Eccleshall. 1977. 'English Conservatism as Ideology', *Political Studies* 25 (1): 62-83.

and displaced by economic liberal ideology.[18] Even though Garnett was critical of Gray's understanding of Conservatism, both scholars interpret Thatcherism as an ideological rupture departing from Conservatism's piecemeal and pragmatic origins.

All three of the identified problems *of* and *for* Conservatism share a central misunderstanding: they have a commitment to a *narrow*, *negative* and/or *pejorative* conception of ideology. In trying to resolve the *problem of ideology*, three questions must be asked relating to each of the three problems. First, in view of the long-standing Conservative claim that Conservatism is distinct from other modes of political thinking insofar as it does not suffer the affliction of being ideological and is instead pragmatic, the question has to be asked what is the boundary of ideology? What does Conservatism evince that makes it non-ideological? Second, is inequality or a defence of ruling elites at the core of Conservatism? Third, if Conservatism has been supplanted and displaced by other ideologies, notably economic neoliberalism, is there not the possibility that Conservatism has incorporated these ideas into its broader framework? These questions are resolved by the methodology employed throughout, namely the approaches to political theory of Michael Freeden, including the morphological approach to political ideology,[19] and his more recent work on the features of

---

[18] J. Gray. 2007. *Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Enlightenment*. London: Routledge, 131-179; I. Gilmour and M. Garnett. 1996. 'Thatcherism and the Conservative Tradition', In *The Conservatives and British Society, 1880-1990*, edited by M. Francis and I. Z. Bargielowska. Cardiff: Cardiff University, 78-95.

[19] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*; M. Freeden. 2003. *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 51-55; M. Freeden. 2004. 'Ideology and Political Theory', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11 (1): 3-22; M. Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology', In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, 115-137. Editorials of *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 1996-present day.

political thinking.[20] In answering the three questions pertaining to the problem of Conservatism, I hope to explicate the thesis's chosen methodology and relate it to the specific problem the thesis addresses, namely the ideologies of Cameron's Conservatisms and how they relate to the *problem of ideology*.

The final problem is of a different order to the problems identified so far and will be addressed here. This problem pertains to the inherent riskiness of the subject matter in the thesis. The riskiness takes form in the contemporariness and proximity-problem of the study. The problem of proximity refers to the denied privilege of historical distance. There is, for example, the problem of contemporary history's not knowing the future insofar as it is unknowable what political historians will say about the subject matter, discussed in the thesis, in the future. Indeed, prediction of any kind is very hard, especially about the future! This may account for the dearth of serious studies of Cameronism. This is indeed a challenge, but not an insurmountable one. First, there is the lasting legacy of substantial and serious studies of political thought-practices and ideological discourses being undertaken as those very same ideological and political practices are unfolding.[21] These studies have not only been valuable *ipso facto*, but they have influenced later studies. Second, the work of conceptual historian, Reinhardt Koselleck, has dealt with the problem of representing immediate 'layers of

---

[20] M. Freeden. 2005. 'What Should the 'Political' in Political Theory Explore?' *Journal of Political Philosophy* 13 (2): 113-134; M. Freeden. 2008. 'Thinking Politically and Thinking about Politics: Language, Interpretation and Ideology', In D. Leopold and M. Stears eds. *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 196-215; Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*; M. Freeden and A. Vincent. 2012. 'Introduction: the study of comparative political thought', In *Comparative Political Thought: Theorizing Practices*, edited by M. Freeden and A. Vincent. London: Routledge, 1-23; M. Freeden. 2014. 'Editorial: The 'political turn' in political theory', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 19 (1): 1-14.

[21] Two such accounts are Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques' pioneering work on Thatcherism, which was published in 1983, and Steven Fielding's important 2003 study of New Labour. S. Hall and M. Jacques eds. 1983. *The Politics of Thatcherism*. London: Lawrence and Wishart; S. Fielding. 2003. *The Labour Party: Continuity and Change in the Making of 'New' Labour*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

time' (the 'space of experience'), which necessarily interact with the unknown and ever-expanding 'horizon of expectation'.[22] This has been referred to as the notion of the *contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous*.[23] There is therefore an acknowledged constant and indeterminable movement and contest over the semantic meaning of concepts that persistently attempt to capture positions of influence over the social determination of meaning itself. This is an ongoing process. The question is at what point do you examine an ongoing process. Further temporal distance from a set of issues does not in any way guarantee a qualitatively superior analysis. The kind of ideological analysis employed in this thesis, the detail of which will be dealt with later in the Introduction, are not in themselves time-sensitive. A student of ideological analysis is looking for patterns and sequences much like a comparativist political scientist is looking out for ongoing and contemporary trends in voting or other forms of democratic participation. Indeed, a study with close proximity and a study of such contemporaneity, such as this, follows Clifford Geertz's instruction that, ''Political theory...needs to get a firmer grip on the hard particularities of the present moment''.[24]

2. Michael Freeden and the 'Interpretive Turn' in Political Theory

---

[22] R. Koselleck. 2004. *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. and introduction by K. Tribe. New York: Columbia University Press, 259-262.

[23] See J. F. Sebastián eds. 2011. *Political Concepts and Time: New Approaches to Conceptual History*. Santander: Cantabria University Press.

[24] Clifford Geertz quoted in Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 310.

An influential and now discredited thesis arose that the world had reached the 'end of history'[25] because the grand Cold War-era ideological tussle between Western free market liberal democratic constitutionalism and Soviet totalitarianism had collapsed in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union. The spirit and sentiment of the end of history echoed a previous sentiment in the 1950s when American political scientists, believing that the worst excesses of totalitarianism of the Left and Right were firmly deposited in the 'dustbin of history', pronounced that we were at the 'end of ideology' as 'liberal pragmatism' had prevailed.[26] The pronouncement of the 'end' of history and ideology was slowly followed by the pronouncement of the 'death of political theory' because it 'was neither history, philosophy, science nor sociology; and the world was passing it by'.[27]

Freeden's work is a repudiation of all of these myths. Freeden's work constitutes a reassertion of the importance of interpretation in the field of political theory and political ideology by looking back and updating Max Weber's *Verstehen*.[28] For Freeden, the researcher acts 'as a decoder of thought-practices...without maintaining that a single code is revealed at the conclusion of the deciphering process'.[29] This interpretive approach avoids the 'ontological

---

[25] The 'end of history' was declared before by Hegel at the Battle of Jena in 1806 when Napoleon's armies defeated the Prussian monarchy, which signified the triumph of the ideals of the French Revolution. F. Fukuyama. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Penguin, 64.

[26] See D. Bell. 1960. *The End of Ideology*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Alasdair MacIntyre observed that the 'end of ideology' trope was itself an expression of the ideology of the time and place in which it arose. A. MacIntyre. 1971. *Against the Self-Images of the Age*. London: Duckworth, 5; I. Mészáros. 1986. *Philosophy, Ideology and Social Science: Essays in Negation and Affirmation*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1-5.

[27] C. Condren. 1974. 'The death of political theory: The importance of historiographical myth', *Politics* 9 (2): 46-49.

[28] Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 12. For a map of the contemporary analyses of the study of ideologies and a contextualisation of Freeden's approach, see J. L. Maynard. 2013. 'A map of the field of ideological analysis', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18 (3): 299-327.

[29] Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 10.

upgrading and downgrading of different perceptions of political reality which characterizes [the] ideological thinking' of other approaches.[30] Freeden's interpretive approach is a riposte to Karl Marx's epigrammatic thesis in *Theses on Feuerbach* in which Marx writes famously, 'Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it', by reasserting the importance of interpretation and indeed challenging the notion that interpretation doesn't involve changing the world.[31] Freeden argues that 'interpretation is an intervention in discourses as well as a comment on them....interpretation is at the very least an intervention in specialized conversations about politics - with its own recommended maps attached...'[32] Freeden's work signals a departure from both Marxist perspectives on ideology and (Anglo-American) political philosophy insofar as it is an inclusive approach to political theory. Marxist approaches to ideology are centred on the underlying and hidden realities of socio-political reality, endeavouring to uncover the economic substrata upon which this illusory reality exists.[33] Marx and Engels purported that 'in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura*'.[34] Ideology obscured and inverted the material world. Less 'naive and epistemologically meretricious' contemporary developments in Marxism,[35] such as the disparate but conceptually overlapping branches of critical theory of poststructuralism, post-Marxism and

---

[30] N. O'Sullivan. 1989. 'The Politics of Ideology', In *The Structure of Modern Ideology: Critical Perspectives on Social and Political Theory*, edited by N. O'Sullivan. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 188.

[31] Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 10.

[32] Ibid, 11-12.

[33] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 2.

[34] K. Marx and F. Engels. 1964. *The German Ideology*, trans. by S. Ryazanskaya. Moscow: Progress, 37.

[35] L. McNay, 'Contemporary Critical Theory', In *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, 139.

agonistic pluralism, hold to Marxist ideology critique; 'sceptical about analyses of ideology that refrain from exposing its manipulative and oppressive aspects',[36] of which Slavoj Žižek's Lacanian emphasis on the illusory nature of ideologies and the need to unveil 'spectres';[37] and the work of theorists such as Axel Honneth, Lois McNay, Ulrich Beck, Hans Joas, Selya Benhabib, Thomas McCarthy and Nancy Fraser, are representative of contemporary critical theory. Freeden's morphological approach to political ideologies does not have an underlying critique function as Marxist conceptions of ideology have; it is 'appraisive rather than descriptive' by imposing 'selective maps instead of reproducing existing contours'.[38] Whereas Marxist approaches are negative (Jon Elster) and pejorative (Žižek), the morphological (and interpretive)[39] approach to ideology is inclusive: 'it approaches ideology as a ubiquitous and permanent form of political thinking, irrespective of whether it is for good or evil'.[40] It is consequently 'bereft of the automatic exploitative or dissimulative charges leveled' against ideology.[41]

Freeden's inclusive approach to ideology deviates from the dominant mode of political thinking in Anglo-American political philosophy because it recentres 'the political', *contra* ethical and/or philosophical enquiry, at the heart of

---

[36] Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology', 133.

[37] S. Žižek. 2012. 'The spectre of ideology', In S. Žižek ed. *Mapping Ideology*. London: Verso, 1-33.

[38] Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology', 133.

[39] Freeden is not alone in his 'interpretive turn' and inclusive study of political ideologies. See Vincent. 2010. *Modern Ideologies*; Heywood. 2013. *Political Ideologies*; V. Geoghegan and R. Wilford eds. 2014. *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*. 4th edn. London: Routledge; M. Seliger. 1976. *Ideology and Politics*. London: Free Press; D. McLellan. 1995. *Ideology*. 2nd edn. Buckingham: Open University Press; M. Humphrey. 2012. 'Getting 'Real' About Political Ideas: Conceptual Morphology and the Realist Critique of Anglo-American Political Philosophy', In *Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeden*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, edited by B. Jackson and M. Stears, 241-258.

[40] Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology', 116.

[41] M. Freeden. 2007. 'Ideology and Political Theory', In *The Meaning of Ideology: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives*, edited by M. Freeden. Oxford: Routledge, 11.

political enquiry. For Freeden, Anglo-American political philosophy is preoccupied with the refining and contesting of concepts, looking for nuances of meaning and understanding to assess its rigour against *moral* and *ethical* schemes. Its closeness to ethics and moral philosophy is a feature of its conceptual priorities and, in doing so, it abandons *the political*. For example, political theory, since the publication of John Rawls *A Theory of Justice* in 1971, has been dominated by the Rawlsian family of theorising, abstract thought-experiments and 'ideal-typing', which tends to abandon and dispense with empirical evidence. The legacy has been a highly abstract form of philosophising independent from context.[42] The problem of this context-independence is palpable to see. There is a discrepancy, for example, between the success of Rawlsian liberalism in political philosophy and the decline of this variation of liberalism in contemporary Western societies. In Rawls's *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, Rawls shows an awareness that, since the early 1970s, American society has moved further away from the idea of 'justice as fairness'. At no point does Rawls interrogate or interpret what had happened; it is simply taken for granted. Instead, Rawls simply restates and refines the argument of his *Theory of Justice* thesis.[43] It fails to engage with the non-liberal accounts of politics because it is a self-contained, normative account of liberalism, detached from actual political thinking and ill-equipped for fighting its opponents, unwilling to invoke emotion through claims to history, tradition or mythology and unprepared to insist on the practicalities of its political claims. Freeden and Marc Stears reaffirm this point by arguing that 'no major democratic society appears to have moved further towards the ideals as laid out in Rawlsian

---

[42] Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 19.

[43] See J. Rawls. 2003. *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, edited by E. Kelly. Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

liberal political philosophy in recent years and no major political parties have successfully adopted a Rawlsian liberal political philosophy as an electoral device'.[44] Similarly, David Miller has called the discrepancy between the (egalitarian) ideals of political philosophers and the 'world outside', "*political philosophy as lamentation*".[45] Freeden departs from this 'grandly systemic' form of political theorising: a distinctive feature of which is the privileging of particular concepts, 'master-concepts' like justice, freedom and equality,[46] over and above the consideration of other concepts, because these concepts conform to the normative presuppositions of a particular philosophical schema in a way that others do not. Freeden's critique of Anglo-American political philosophy moreover is that it makes synchronic universal claims, and is unencumbered from its conceptual universalism because it is unconstrained by the actual political world, enabled by its exclusion of cultural and historical considerations, and is articulated in a highly specialist, semi-private professional language unwilling to analyse and include vernacular languages into its analysis.

Freeden's morphological school of political ideologies departs therefore from Marxist ideology critique and Anglo-American political philosophy. Conceptual morphology intersects at various levels with parallel contemporary approaches in political theory however,[47] which similarly critique the 'ideal theory' of Anglo-American political philosophy and analytical Marxist political philosophy: namely the conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*) school of

---

[44] M. Freeden and M. Stears, 'Liberalism', In *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, 342.

[45] D. Miller. 2013. *Justice for Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4 (emphasis added).

[46] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 2; Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 18.

[47] See A. J. Norval. 2000. 'The Things We Do with Words: Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology' *British Journal of Political Science* 30 (2): 313-346.

Koselleck;[48] critical theory approaches found in the poststructuralism of Jacques Derrida; the agonistic pluralism of Bonnie Honig, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe,[49] and post-Marxism; discourse analysis; the 'Cambridge School' of intellectual history, and especially the foundational theory and methods of Quentin Skinner,[50] and ('interpretive')[51] 'realist' approaches to political theory.[52] All do interpretive work but there are significant differences.[53] Freeden's academic niche is to carve out a space, alongside political theory, political philosophy and the history of political ideas, for the inclusive and morphological study of political ideologies. Freeden stresses what Andrew Vincent calls 'positive segregation' between the various sub-disciplines of the study of politics, 'namely where each is seen to make a valuable, if distinct, contribution'.[54] Freeden states that, 'political theory must include within its ambit the understanding, mapping, and analysis of concrete patterns of political thought, through ideologies and their

---

[48] O. Brunner, W. Conze and R. Koselleck eds. 1972-1996. *Geschichliche Grundbegriffe* 8 vols. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta; Koselleck, *Futures Past*; R. Koselleck. 2002. *The Practice of Conceptual History*, trans. by T. Presner, K. Behnke and J. Welge. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Also see M. Freeden. 1997. 'Editorial: Ideologies and Conceptual History', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 2 (1), 3-11.

[49] B. Honig. 1993. *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; E. Laclau and C. Mouffe. 2011. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. 2nd edn. London: Verson; C. Mouffe. 2005. *The Return of the Political*. London: Verso.

[50] J. H. Tully. 1983. 'The pen is a mighty sword: Quentin Skinner's analysis of politics' *British Journal of Political Science* 13 (4): 489-509; Q. Skinner. 2002. *Visions of Politics: Volume 1: Regarding Method*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 27-56.

[51] M. Freeden. 2012. 'Editorial: Interpretive realism and prescriptive realism', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 17 (1): 1-11.

[52] See R. Geuss. 2008. *Philosophy and Real Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; J. Tully. 2008. *Public Philosophy in a New Key. Vol I: Democracy and Civic Freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; B. Williams. 2005. *In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. See J. Floyd and M. Stears eds. 2011. *Political Philosophy versus History? Contextualism and Real Politics in Contemporary Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

[53] Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology', 132-134.

[54] A. Vincent. 2007. *The Nature of Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 71.

segments'.[55] Ideologies should be considered as a major genre of political thought rather than a poor relation of political philosophy. Freeden argues that, 'studying ideology cannot be disentangled from studying politics: ideologies are not optional extras or 'externalities' but rather the codes that organize all political practices - *the DNA of praxis*'.[56]

Freeden has developed a complex, detailed and adaptable methodology of inquiry into political ideologies. Ideologies are 'a distinguishable and unique genre of employing and combining political concepts', and each ideological family is composed of a 'distinctive configuration of political concepts'.[57] Political concepts are the fundamental building blocks of political thought. Ideologies constitute a product of the human mind that can be ascertained through a threefold process in Freeden's work: (1) employing the conceptual analysis that political theorists have been trained to handle; (2) utilising the type of empirical and contextual enquiry in which historians practice; and (3) appreciating the morphological patterns which contribute to the determination of ideological meaning. 'The result', Freeden asserts, 'is the study of political ideas and utterances within frameworks of cultural, temporal, spatial, and logical constraints, frameworks that optimize the richness of information and the depth of understanding that can be elicited from political thought'.[58]

There are four elements of Freeden's conceptual apparatus in exploring the morphology of political ideologies: (1) the permeability of boundaries between ideologies emphasises the intersecting of ideological positions, which

---

[55] Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 30.

[56] M. Freeden. 2005. 'Confronting the chimera of a 'post-ideological' age', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 8 (2): 262 (emphasis added).

[57] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 48, 4.

[58] Ibid, 14.

acknowledges ideologies are not discrete entities but overlapping and criss-crossing substantive ideational projections; (2) family resemblances focuses on the micro-structures of different ideologies in order to reveal the various patterns and conceptual combinations capable (i.e. conceptual combinations which position equality in a different temporal-spatial-cultural relationship to liberty to one another). It reinforces the comparative study of political ideologies therefore. Freeden comments that, 'The family of liberalisms...mutates into that of socialisms on many parallel dimensions, and is not a mutually exclusive relationship with the latter';[59] (3) ideologies evince a core-adjacent-periphery conceptual internal arrangement, with the core concepts in ideologies as ineliminable elements (its absence would render the ideology obsolete and/or incoherent) of that ideology, adjacent concepts providing support to the core concepts, and periphery concepts which are the circumference concepts of ideologies acting as the interface between the internal logic of the ideology and a specific-idea or policy-proposal; and (4) decontestation presupposes the 'essentially contested'[60] nature of political concepts, which refers to the irresolvability of the meaning of words. Influenced by Wittgenstein and semiotic theory's emphasis on language and symbols, Freeden argues that ideologies are mediated through language and symbols, but in political ideologies language and symbols are controlled: 'Ultimately, to the extent that political thinking is focused either on conserving or changing public political vocabulary, its conceptual

[59] Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 116.

[60] W. C. Gallie. 1956. 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56: 167-198; W. Connolly.1993. *The Terms of Political Discourse*. 3rd edn. Oxford: Blackwell, 9-44; Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 76; M. Freeden. 2004. 'Editorial: Essential Contestability and Effective Contestability', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9 (1): 3-11; D. Collier, F. D. Hidalgo and A. O. Macluceanu. 2006. 'Essentially contested concepts: Debates and applications', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11 (3): 211-246.

patterns assume the mantle of competing over the *control of political language*'.[61] Decontestation therefore refers to the ideological practices of trying to *fix* and *finalise* meanings of words, in a context of political struggle, thus removing contestation and competition over meaning. An ideology uses decontestation in order to close down meaning: '"This is what justice means, announces one ideology, and "that is what democracy entails"'.[62] This is the applied semiotic focus of ideology.[63] This apparatus, or features of the morphological approach to ideology, helps measure and analyse different features of a particular ideology: the *proximity*, *priority*, *permeability* and *proportionality* of political concepts in relation to one another and of the ideology as a whole.[64] Ideologies decontest, order, allot relative weighting and importance to a concept, and they include/ exclude concepts as well as components of a concept from a semantic domain. In conceptual morphology however, concepts are not considered in isolation, but in relation to surrounding concepts.

The implications for the subject of the thesis are considerable. First, conceptual morphology ridicules the claim that Conservatism is *un-ideological* or *non-ideological*. The notion that Conservatism is distinct from other political thought patterns insofar as it shuns or eschews ideology has proliferated in Anglo-American politics, despite the explicit ideological self-awareness of prevailing, and on occasion electorally-successful, Conservative movements in the

---

[61] Freeden and Vincent, 'Introduction: The study of comparative political thought', 13 (emphasis added).

[62] Freeden, *Ideology*, 54-5. Manfred B. Steger argues that this ideological form of closing down or fixing meaning is prefigured by French linguist Michael Pecheux and intellectuals associated with the French semiotic journal *Tel Quel*. M. B. Steger. 2013. 'Political Ideologies in the Age of Globalization', In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, 228fn.

[63] A. Vincent, 'Political Ideology and Political Theory: Reflections on an Awkward Partnership', In *Liberalism as Ideology*, 177.

[64] Freeden, *Ideology*, 60-66.

1980s, 1990s and 2010s, and has thrived in the 'end of history' epoch in which ideology is an 'anti-word' in contrast to the promised land of pragmatism.[65] One of the noticeable and consistent features of Conservative ideological thought-practices is the reference to *pragmatism*, *custom*, *practice*, *circumstance*, *habit* or *experience* to legitimise their value-preferences as being somewhat more *natural* and *organic* than other competing political world views. Conservatives are like 'political magpies, picking and choosing between ideas to suit the moment, ruthlessly appropriating their opponents' most popular themes, and discarding hitherto fervent beliefs once they cease to be expedient'[66] Whilst this is a clever (ideological) ploy, it is not unique to Conservatism. The conceptual (synchronic) and historical (diachronic) transitoriness, and the conceptual selectiveness and historical resourcefulness of ideologies, with varying degrees of success in terms of *typicality* of thought; *influence* on a wider audience; *imaginative* and *creative* presentation; and the lucidity and power of *communication*, is true of all ideologies.[67] Therefore the Conservative injunction to be pragmatic and devoid of ideology is absurd. Freeden persuasively argued that pragmatist tropes, such as 'the facts speak for themselves' or 'each case should be judged on its merits', are 'self-deluding statements that disregard the ways in which *we* speak for the facts or *impose* merits on the case'.[68] Pragmatism therefore 'represents a point of view and conceals principled positions often unintelligible to their promoters' and to judge 'something 'on its merits' implies preposterously that self-evident merits

---

[65] P. Minford. 1990. 'Ideology and Pragmatism in Economic Thatcherism', In *Ideas and Politics in Modern Britain*, edited by J. C. D. Clark. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 191.

[66] J. Norman. 2010. *The Big Society: The Anatomy of the New Politics*. Buckingham: The University of Buckingham Press, 86.

[67] Freeden, *Ideology,* 126-128.

[68] Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 10.

simply leap out of concrete cases for all to see, rather than that they are read into those cases by the so-called pragmatists themselves'.[69] The rejection of this *practice-first* view of Conservatism goes with the grain of some contemporary scholarship on British Conservatism. Julia Stapleton perceptively notes, 'Scholars are much less inclined to separate Conservative practice from theory than they were in previous decades'.[70] Therefore, Conservatism is an identifiable ideology 'exhibiting awareness among its producers and amenable to intelligent analysis' and the very notion that Conservatism is not ideologically constituted is itself 'an ideological ploy by those sympathetic to the doctrine'.[71] Conservatism is not distinct from other formulations of political thinking in regard to its exclusion of ideology, but is distinct in its unique assemblage of political concepts and the way in which these political concepts are decontested. Robert Eccleshall has called Conservatives 'discreet decontestants' because Conservatives are 'more reluctant than their rivals to provide a social blueprint', and 'have often misled commentators with regard to what they are about'.[72]

There is one potential problem with Freeden's inclusive conception of political ideologies however, which has implications for the study and analysis of the subjects in the thesis. The problem pertains to the problem of relativism insofar as the morphological approach to ideology denudes the study of ideology of its critique function. The problem is illustrated consummately by the Hungarian sociologist Karl Mannheim, who is an influence on Freeden's reading of

---

[69] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 18. See also M. Pécheux. 2012. 'The Mechanism of Ideological (Mis)recognition', In *Mapping Ideology*, 141-151.

[70] J. Stapleton. 2014. 'T. E. Utley and Renewal of Conservatism in Post-War Britain', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 19 (2): 207.

[71] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 318.

[72] R. Eccleshall. 2000. 'The doing of conservatism', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 5 (3): 284.

ideology.[73] Mannheim, in *Ideology and Utopia*, moved away somewhat from Marx's theory of ideology by advocating 'relationism': ideas must be judged and assessed in relation to one another, conceptually and historically. Indeed, Mannheim's search for a 'sociology of knowledge' was dependent on this insight. One of the intriguing elements of Mannheim's theory is that ideologies could only be objectively accessed by 'free-floating intelligentsia' (*freischwebende Intelligenz*), as they had a unique capacity to rise above their class and historical biases to evaluate ideologies clearly. Like Weber's *grand rentier*, Mannheim's free-floating intelligentsia remained detached, which Mannheim thought would guarantee their objectivity.[74] There is a problem however. First, Vincent argues that the Mannheimian approach to ideology, assimilating 'active political ideology into the sanitized academic discipline of sociology', leads to the loss of emotive ideological debate, in which forward-looking values can be promoted.[75] The second problem of Mannheim's view is what Clifford Geertz called the 'Mannheim Paradox': how does one understand an ideology from inside one? Is it plausible for a rootless intelligentsia to be free from their class and social origins? [76] Paul Ricoeur argues insightfully that, 'We think from its [and ideology's] point of view rather than thinking about it'.[77] Mannheim's movement away from Marxist ideology critique, even though deeply invested in the Marxist conception of ideology by his association with Georg Lukács, to a more inclusive conception

---

[73] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 26; Freeden, *Ideology*, 12-19.

[74] See C. Berry and M. Kenny, 'Ideology and the Intellectuals', In *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, 251-270.

[75] Vincent, *Modern Political Ideologies*, 8.

[76] D. Ketler, V. Meja and N. Stehr. 1990. 'Rationalizing the irrational: Karl Mannheim and the besetting sin of German intellectuals', *American Journal of Sociology* 95 (6): 1441-1473.

[77] P. Ricoeur. 1984. 'Ideology and Ideology Critique', In *Phenomenology and Marxism*, edited by B. Waldenfels, J. M. Broekman and A. Pažanin. trans by J. C. Evans. Boston, MA: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 137.

of ideology, poses a challenge to the morphological approach in relation to the problem of relativism. The response to the challenge is simple and convincing. It moves beyond Mannheim's invocation of relationism as a defence to the charge of relativism. Conceptual morphology is not a relativistic approach. It is better understood as a form of 'constrained relativism' because indeterminacy, contingency and unpredictability are crucial elements of politics, and thus 'a number of things go', not 'anything goes'.[78] Ideologies can be assessed on Freeden's aforementioned criteria. The approach, for example, can maintain that ideologies exhibit better and worse conceptual arrangements, and evaluate them on the work that its practitioners are charged with accomplishing and these include, although not exhaustively, the following measurements that assess the quality and efficacy of an ideology:

> 'Communicability, persuasiveness, electoral success, popular support, intellectual soundness (to include minimal logical coherence and affinity with an empirically-observable world), affective identification, imaginative creativity, the durability of problem-managing, [and] adaptability'.[79]

Morphological analyses of ideology therefore do have a critique function, not on the Marxisant formulation of right or wrong (epistemic reasons), or good or bad (science-ideology distinction), but on a much broader and fruitful range of criteria.

3. Macro-Meso-Micro Concepts in Political Ideologies

---

[78] Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 72.

[79] Freeden, 'The Morphological Analysis of Ideology', 133.

Employing Freeden's morphological analysis of political ideologies and political theory, Conservatism is understood as an ideology like any other, as an ideology exhibiting awareness among its producers and amenable to intelligent analysis. The second problematic question relates to the *ideological identity* of Conservatism. The tendency for uncovering the identity of Conservatism, from those that countenance Conservatism as being intelligible to ideological analysis, resort to two errors: (1) associating Conservatism with a 'master concept',[80] reducing all the issues around Conservatism, across time and space, to that concept; and relatedly, (2) reading Conservatism through hostile spectacles, often influenced by the remnants of Marxian analyses of ideology. In addressing these two questions, I hope to evince a corrective new conceptual scheme for the understanding of contemporary Conservative ideological thought-practices.

Freeden contends that 'if core', in relation to what Freeden calls a 'core concept', 'refers to a single constituent concept, ideologies do not have cores'.[81] The attachment of one core idea or concept to an ideology is commonplace. In relation to Conservatism, similar concepts are held up as universal and univocal core concepts. As mentioned, inequality is held up as a core concept by numerous scholars and writers of Conservatism, as is the 'positional conservatism' of Samuel Huntington, which argued that Conservatism was merely the ideology of the ruling class and a defence of the status quo. Others such as Noel O'Sullivan and Anthony Quinton argued that Conservatism's core concept was the belief in

[80] Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 18, 65.

[81] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 84.

the inherent imperfectability of the human condition.[82] These are 'fixed-list approaches' to finding the core of Conservatism. Other proposed core themes could be listed:

> '...an insistence on concrete rights rather than abstract natural ones; an organic conception of society as an eternal partnership between past, present and future; history as an accumulated wisdom of all generations; the natural inequality of human beings, and hence their status or property; respect for authority and its institutional manifestations, law and religion; and...the acceptance of gradual change within a framework subservient to the other apparently core concept'.[83]

The fixed list approach is wrong because (1) it assumes as timeless that a particular conceptual and historical response is appropriate and possible, and (2) that the core concepts proposed in fixed-list approaches are not universally agreed upon by all Conservatives.[84]

'To ransack conservatism for substantive core concepts', Freeden argues '...such as liberty, reason or welfare, is looking in the wrong place'.[85] Freeden argues that a core concept 'is itself a cluster of concepts'.[86] They are also 'non-

---

[82] See N. O'Sullivan. 1976. *Conservatism*. London: Dent; A. Quinton. 1978. *The Politics of Imperfection: the Religious and Secular Traditions of Conservative Thought in England from Hooker to Oakeshott*, London: Faber & Faber; P. Viereck. 1950. *Conservatism Revisited: The Revolt against Revolt 1815-1949*, London: John Lehmann; Allison, *Right Principles*.

[83] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 331.

[84] Exemplars of this approach include F. J. C. Hearnshaw in which twelve principles of Conservatism are detailed; the eminent American historian Russell Kirk included six essential 'canons' of Conservatism; C. W. Dunn and J. D. Woodward mentioned ten tenets of Conservatism; and Clinton Rossiter detailed a total of twenty one central themes of Conservatism. F. J. Hearnshaw. 1933. *Conservatism in England: An Analytical, Historical and Political Survey*. London: Macmillan, 22fn; R. Kirk. 1953. *The Conservative Mind*. Chicago: H. Regnery Co, 7-8; C. W. Dunn and J. D. Woodward. 1996. *The Conservative Tradition in America*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 48; C. Rossiter. 1962. *Conservatism in America*. New York: Vintage, 64-6.

[85] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 333.

[86] Ibid, 84.

specific' allowing for a diverse range of decontestations to be attached to them in different periods of time.[87] Freeden identifies three core concepts within the ideologies of Conservatism in order to solve Conservatism's 'morphological puzzle': (1) even though Conservatism, *contra* Huntington, is not an ideology of the *status quo*, it is an ideology '*concerned* with *the problem of change*: not necessarily proposing to eliminate it, but to render it safe';[88] (2) a belief in the *extra-human origins and sanctification of the social order*, which refers to social order founded on laws that are insulated from human control: 'God, nature, history, biology, and economics are some of the more common anchors to which conservatives resort',[89] and (3) a *mirror-image mechanism* that *swivels* in order to react to competitor ideologies: 'Equality is...matched by natural hierarchy; a developmental individuality by the sobriety of existing cultural norms; a regulatory state by a retreat into civic associations. Revolution is criminalized, utopianism ridiculed'.[90] Freeden's three core concepts of Conservatism influence the analysis of the developments of contemporary Conservative ideological thought-practices in the thesis.

In relation to the arrangement of concepts into core, adjacent and periphery positions, the thesis does not depart. Nevertheless, the thesis proposes to make a corrective to Freeden's conception of core concepts by breaking core-concepts into three levels of analysis: *macro-core*; *meso-core*, and *micro-core* concepts. The description, and interpretation, of a core concept, as a 'single

---

[87] Ibid, 84-85.

[88] Conservatism is ontologically present and past-oriented. As such, the 'impending future is seen to threaten a valued inheritance'. This is what H. B. McCullough calls the Conservative 'politics of delay'. D. Manning and Y. Carlisle. 1995. 'The Ideologies of Modern Politics', *Political Studies* 43 (3): 485. H. B. McCullough. 2010. *Political Ideologies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 46.

[89] Freeden, *Ideology*, 88.

[90] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 333-334; 341; Freeden, *Ideology*, 88-89 (emphasis added).

constituent concept', is a description that pertains 'primarily to the actual thought-behaviour, as expressed verbally and in writing, of the adherents of the ideology in question'.[91] This is profoundly important as I am interested in the articulation of Conservative thought-practices, which are mediated through the writings, speeches, papers and debates of Conservative politicians and writers. They articulate and express the features of Conservatism. This can be addressed with regard to the breakdown of core concepts into three layers. The *macro-core* concepts are those adumbrated by Freeden. They act and behave as *framers* or *qualifiers* of what Conservative concepts can be. The *meso-core* concepts refer to the articulation of these higher, macro-core concepts. It mediates, realises and illuminates Freeden's macro-core concepts. They behave as *conduit* concepts, which filter and clarify the macro-core concepts for a historical time period. They connect the macro-level of the core to the micro-level. The *micro-core concepts* are, similar to the perimeter function of periphery concepts insofar as they 'straddle the interface between the conceptualization of social realities and the external contexts and concrete manifestations through which those conceptualizations occur', an *ephemeral* and *temporary* conceptual and historical expression of the priorities of the macro-core alone, mediated and filtered through meso-core concepts. In the post-Enlightenment period of Conservatism, the macro-core concepts are mediated and realised in O'Sullivan's observation of the meso-core concept of Conservatism: 'a defence of limited politics'.[92] The meso-core concept of Conservatism's commitment to a limited conception of politics[93]

---

[91] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 84.

[92] O'Sullivan, *Conservatism*, 11-12; 'Conservatism', 293-311.

[93] For Conservatism as a limited conception, or scepticism, of politics, see Allison, *Right Principles*; M. Cowling. 1993. *The Nature and Limits of Political Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For a classical exposition of the limited conception of the political, see Q. Hogg. 1947. *The Case for Conservatism*. London: Penguin, 11-12.

is articulated and enumerated by a panoply of ephemeral and short-term micro-core concepts, which are more historically-specific and conceptually-relevant: Margaret Thatcher and Thatcherism's commitment to the *market society*; 1990s Conservatism's commitment to *active citizenship* and *Citizen's Charters*; and the Cameronite themes of *localism*, *social responsibility* and the *Big Society*. This compartmentalisation of core concepts into a *macro-meso-micro* structure does not exclude the use and importance of adjacent or periphery concepts. Adjacent and periphery concepts merely perform different functions to these meso-micro core concepts. Adjacent concepts give logical and cultural coherence/support to macro-core concepts. Periphery concepts, like meso- and micro-core concepts support the macro-core concept aims of an ideology, but they also support the meso and micro core concepts. Micro-core concepts integrate practices and institutions into the macro-structure of an ideology in the name of that ideology.

Propositions that propose Conservatism has one single concept or propose a fixed-list of concepts are found wanting. Freeden's macro-core concepts provide Conservatism with coherence but also flexibility in defining what Conservatism is, spatially and temporally. With the added correctives to Freeden's approach in relation to the breakdown of core concepts into three layers, the morphological approach can better address the ideological thought-practices of contemporary British Conservatisms.

4. Is Conservatism Dead?

The third problem relates to the so-called 'death' of Conservatism, which refers to the undoing of Conservatism by other ideologies. Freeden talked about the possibility of 'ideological snapping': 'if completely alien meanings of concepts

are hastily injected into a particular ideology, its structures may snap'.[94] Conservatism, as practiced in Britain in the 1980s onwards, did not so much *snap* but *bend*.[95] This notion of the 'death of Conservatism' is developed in great length in chapter three, so a brief summary will suffice here. Commentators in the 1990s observed that there was a 'crisis' of British Conservatism. A crisis, centrally, that argued that Thatcherism's free market radicalism had 'snapped' traditional Conservative values, and thus Conservatism had been replaced, variously, by economic liberalism, libertarianism and/or neoliberalism. The Conservative Party therefore was no longer practicing Conservatism. Of course, much of this depends on definitions. This ideological confusion was impacted further by the ostensible ransacking of liberal social values under the leadership of David Cameron.[96] The central problem pertains to the natures of Conservatism and neoliberalism, and the degree to which they are conceptually contradictory or compatible. Neoliberalism is an 'unfortunate term',[97] as it implies a new liberalism. Freeden argues that neoliberals are nothing more than 'liberal pretenders', rendered liberals by 'mistaken identity' because of their 'overemphasis on negative liberty at the expense of other known liberal values'.[98] Indeed, to place neoliberalism, squarely and unproblematically, into the liberal family of ideologies is a misnomer. I argue that Conservatism is not undone, or indeed dead, for two reasons: (1) Conservatism is an ideology with a wide *raison d'etre*, namely the

---

[94] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 82.

[95] For counter view see E. H. H. Green. 2006. *Thatcher*. London: Hodder, 50, 193.

[96] M. Beech. 2011. 'A Tale of Two Liberalisms', In *The Cameron-Clegg Government: Coalition Politics in an Age of Austerity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, edited by S. Lee and M. Beech, 267-279.

[97] M. Freeden. 2014. 'Progress and Progressivism: Thoughts on an Elusive Term', *Political Studies Review* 12 (1), 71.

[98] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 311.

problematisation of change and the decontestation of social order as organic and beyond human volition by articulating political formulations along the theme of limited conceptions of politics; and (2) neoliberalism is a *para-ideology* (or an assistant ideology) that is used by its *host ideologies* ('thick' ideologies that contain 'thin' and 'new' ideological developments i.e. social democratic liberalism; liberal Conservatism, etc). In Conservative thought-practices, both in Thatcherism and Cameronism, neoliberalism, which refers to market-oriented practices penetrating every aspect of society, has served as the *means* to Conservative *ends* to deliver a narrower, minimal and more limited conception of politics. Neoliberalism is also a feature of liberal ideology.[99] However, like Conservatism, liberalism is a much too complex and rich an ideology to be straightforwardly equated with neoliberalism or a revival of classical economics, given its associations with emphasising welfare theory, developmental individualism, theories of social reform, conceptions of poverty, standards of legitimacy and democratic practices. Neoliberalism has a very different function in Conservatism than liberalism: it privileges market freedoms and deregulation in the former and individual freedoms and choice in the latter. Conservatism is therefore alive. Neoliberal ideas have simply assisted Conservatism's ideological ends.

5. Cameron's Conservatisms, or Cameron's Conservatives?

[99] Freeden identifies 'five layers of liberalism', in which 'the second layer of liberalism' was transformed as an ideology being 'a vehicle for expressing individual preferences that were not to be interfered with by others. That transformation took the shape of elevating markets to the prime area of liberalism practice'. M. Freeden. 2014. 'Is liberalism on the road to perdition?' *John Milton Fellowship Annual Lecture*, February. Also see R. S. Turner. 2008. *Neo-Liberal Ideology: History, Concepts and Policies*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

The application of the morphological approach to ideologies in relation to British politics is well-established.[100] The application to the studies of Conservatism, let alone the Conservative Party, are non-existent. The literature on the ideological study of Conservatism, with the exception of the works on Thatcherism, is thin.[101] Ideological considerations have been superseded in the ranking of academic priorities behind elections, political parties, pressure groups, constitutions and parliaments.

Peter Kerr et al wrote in 2011 that, 'the challenge of defining and theorising Cameronism will be one that will preoccupy scholars of British politics for some time to come'.[102] This call has been responded to with silence. There are two explanations for this silence to consider. First, since 2011 remarkably little has been produced on Cameronism. With the exception of Peter Kerr, and writers such as Matt Beech, Stephen Evans, Garnett and Stuart McAnulla,[103] little has been written on Cameronism. Instead, focus has settled on 'statecraft'

---

[100] See Freeden, 'The Ideology of New Labour', 42-51; S. Griffiths and K. Hickson eds. 2010. *British Party Politics and Ideology after New Labour*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; A. Sandry. 2011. *Plaid Cymru: An Ideological Analysis*. Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press; J. Atkins. 2011. *Justifying New Labour Policy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

[101] For the exemplary text see Green's *Ideologies of Conservatism.* The work of Matt Beech, Andrew Crines, Andrew Denham, Peter Dorey, Stephen Evans, Andrew Gamble, Mark Garnett, Simon Griffiths, Richard Hayton, Kevin Hickson, Stuart McAnulla, and Kieron O'Hara have also contributed to the ideological understanding of post-Thatcher British Conservatism.

[102] P. Kerr, C. Byrne and E. Foster. 2011. 'Theorising Cameronism', *Political Studies Review* 9 (2): 206. Also see P. Kerr. 2007. 'Cameron Chameleon and the Current State of Britain's Consensus', *Parliamentary Affairs* 60 (1): 46-65.

[103] M. Beech. 2009. 'Cameron and Conservative Ideology', In *The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?* edited by S. Lee and M. Beech. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 18-30; Beech,'A Tale of Two Liberalisms', 267-279; S. Evans. 2008. 'Consigning its Past to History? David Cameron and the Conservative Party', *Parliamentary Affairs* 61 (2): 291-314; S. Evans. 2010. "Mother's Boy': David Cameron and Margaret Thatcher', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 12 (3): 325-343; M. Garnett. 2010. 'Built on Sand? Ideology and Conservative Modernization under David Cameron', In *British Party Politics and Ideology after New Labour*, 107-118; S. McAnulla. 2010. 'Heirs to Blair's third way? David Cameron's triangulating conservatism', *British Politics* 5 (3): 286-314; S. McAnulla. 2012. 'Liberal Conservatism: Ideological Coherence?' In *Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition Government*, edited by T. Heppell and D. Seawright. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 166-180.

approaches[104] to explaining the Conservative Party's governing strategy, or explaining the elements and implications of coalition-formation for Cameron's Conservatives.[105] The implicit view has been that Cameron 'doesn't think in conceptual terms' and Cameron's resort to 'practical Conservatism', and his explicit eschewal of ideological attachment, is unwisely taken as self-evident.[106] The towering book in the studies of the Conservative Party of the current generation, and which follows this trend, is Tim Bale's *The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron*.[107] Bale is to Cameron what Andrew Gamble's *The Free Economy and the Strong State*[108] was to Thatcher. There is a big difference however. Unlike Gamble's ideology-engaged text, and despite Bale's comment that a 'satisfying explanation has to capture the interplay between *ideas*, institutions and interests, as well as individuals', Bale's tome almost completely ignores the role of ideas.[109] Kevin Hickson has argued that Bale evinces 'little serious evaluation of what the ideological configuration of Cameron's Conservatives is', and that there is 'scope for further research'.[110] Bale has set the standard for works on the Conservative Party and that standard marginalises the importance of ideas.

---

[104] The 'statecraft' approach's origins are in Jim Bulpitt's celebrated essay, see J. Bulpitt. 1986. 'The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher's Domestic Statecraft', *Political Studies* 34 (1): 19-39. Applied to Cameron see Heppell and Seawright eds. *Cameron and the Conservatives*; T. Heppell. 2014. *The Tories: From Winston Churchill to David Cameron*. London: Bloomsbury.

[105] See R. Hazell and B. Yong. 2012. *The Politics of Coalition: How the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Government Works*. London: Hart.

[106] Interview with Samuel Brittan, 15 August 2008; D. Cameron. 2005. 'Practical Conservatism', Sir Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture. Centre for Policy Studies, 10 March; A. Rawnsley. 2005. "I'm not a deeply ideological person. I'm a practical one', *The Observer*. 18 December.

[107] See T. Bale. 2010. *The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron*. London: Polity Press.

[108] A. Gamble. 1994. *The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism*. 2nd edn. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

[109] Bale, *Conservative Party*, 366 (emphasis added)

[110] K. Hickson. 2011. 'Review', *Parliamentary Affairs* 64 (3): 584.

The second relates to the first. Cameronism is seen as less ideologically-dominant than Thatcherism and New Labour,[111] and, as such, Cameronism has been interpreted variously as a mere 'cypher' for the broader neoliberal project[112] or a 'delusion'.[113] When the 'contrarian' political journalist Christopher Hitchens was asked what he thought about Cameron he replied, 'He doesn't make me think', [114] and he earlier commented that Cameron was 'content-free'.[115] President Barack Obama allegedly thought Cameron was a 'lightweight'; [116] and Anthony Giddens, the ideological guru of New Labour's early flirtation with the Third Way, thought Cameron was 'insubstantial'.[117] The intellectual thinness, transparent opportunism, chameleonism and seemingly endless 'u-turns' of Cameron's politics give credence to these criticisms. The two reasons for the inattention accorded to Cameronism are connected. The lazy assumption that Cameronism is non-existent or ideologically-thin causes academics to look elsewhere, and the *in vogue* academic priority for statecraft and governance fails to produce work that discounts the 'content-free', 'master pragmatism' portrayals of Cameronism.[118]

There are a small group of academics who have considered the ideological nature of Cameronism, but these accounts have remained too unspecific and too

---

[111] A. Gamble. 2010. 'New Labour and Political Change' *Parliamentary Affairs* 63 (4): 639-652.

[112] See R. Seymour. 2010. *The Meaning of David Cameron*. London: 0-Books.

[113] See P. Hitchens. 2010. *The Cameron Delusion*. London: Continuum.

[114] Quoted in M. d'Ancona. 2011. 'David Cameron must now pass the Christopher Hitchens test', *The Daily Telegraph*, 17 December.

[115] C. Hitchens. 2007. 'A Kinder, Gentler Tory Party: Whatever happened to Britain's Conservatives?' *Slate*. 27 February.

[116] R. Winnett. 2010. 'WikiLeaks: Barack Obama regarded David Cameron as 'lightweight'', *The Daily Telegraph*, 30 November.

[117] A. Giddens. 2007. *Over To You, Mr Brown: How Labour Can Win Again*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 202-203.

[118] See A. Seldon with P. Snowden. 2015. *Cameron at 10*. London: HarperCollins (forthcoming).

generalisable. Beech argued that 'Cameronite Conservatism is not yet an identifiable strand of Conservative ideology' in 2009,[119] but in the same year Hickson argued Cameronism was 'Thatcherite-influenced One-Nation Conservatism'.[120] Both argued that Cameronism is a rich *melange* of Conservatisms, and in Coalition it has had to accommodate, and make concessions to, the Liberal Democrats, a Party representing disparate ideological positions of its own.[121] Nevertheless, a core contention of the thesis is that Cameronism is congruent with the ideologies of Conservatism as it occupies the same semantic field as its Conservative predecessors. The study addresses these topics by applying Freeden's morphological approach, which has implicitly liberal commitments that allows the approach to consider a wider and richer array of research materials. There are two distinct ways in which the morphological approach is *liberal*: (1) as stated, the morphological approach applies 'constrained relativism' in the wake of the abandonment of epistemological monism, with its presumption of ideological diversity, multiplicity, differentiation, pluralism and flexibility; and (2) it is a methodology which requires interpretation and the elucidation of political thought-practices, its features, its grammars, and its rationales. It explores new angles, perspectives and views by reading, probing, and accumulating knowledge from a distance, with a flexible and mutable disposition. Despite Cameronism being an *elite* enterprise insofar as its thought-practices are proposed and refined by a cluster of politicians and thinkers at the

---

[119] Beech, 'Cameron and Conservative Ideology, 30.

[120] K. Hickson. 2009. 'Conservatism and the Poor: Conservative Party Attitudes to Poverty and Inequality since the 1970s', *British Politics* 4 (3): 360.

[121] Beech, 'Cameron and Conservative Ideology, 18-30.

exclusion of party members,[122] Freeden's approach is distinctly *aelitist*. It includes and upgrades 'the common place and average' modes of political articulation, quite distinct from the principal preoccupation of political philosophy, alongside academic elite modes of political articulation.[123] Ideological investigation includes the 'trivial' and 'insignificant' alongside the 'consequential'.[124] This is reflected in the sources and material utilised in the thesis. The chief sources used, apart from academic works, include memoirs and (auto)biographies of politicians; broadsheet journalism; archival material of pamphlets; and political speeches. All the sources have their defects as well as their strengths. Memoirs offer a reflective and personal insight onto their interaction with the past, but they are all too often self-adulatory and laced with recriminations against former colleagues. Broadsheet journalism proffers a good account of *surface* tensions, ideas and policy positions, but rarely have the time, space or inclination to go deeper. Speeches often condense the thoughts and feelings of a political tribe or group, but they lack philosophical clarity and require critical reading. The aim is to interrogate the various levels of articulation of an ideology across space and time. The thesis also makes use of elite interviews with Conservative politicians, Conservative thinkers and critics of Conservatism. It is necessary to appreciate the importance that elites play in communicating a coherent ideological message via the government of the day. John Vincent's advice was 'the way to study Conservatives is to meet

---

[122] For the elite nature of Cameronism, F. Elliott and J. Hanning. 2012. *Cameron: Practically a Conservative*. London: Fourth Estate, 188, 264, 271, 419.

[123] Freeden, 'Ideology and Political Theory', 13, 7-8.

[124] It is essential for the student of political ideologies to go beyond the familiar 'canonical' texts of political philosophy to include non-elitist manifestations of political thought. S. Hazareesingh and K. Nabulsi. 'Using archival sources to theorize about politics', In *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches*, 150-170.

Conservatives', and the thesis has taken Vincent's heed.[125] It adds an extra layer of understanding in the attempt to answer *What is Cameronism?*

6. Chapter Outline

The thesis has a six chapter structure. The opening two chapters aims to 'situate Cameronism' in relation to the problematic legacy and politics of Thatcherism. Cameronism is a response to the 'gap' between the intentions of Thatcherite ideologies and its outcomes. Chapter three looks at the emergence of Cameronism and the ways in which Conservative ideological thought-practices responded to Thatcherism. Chapters four and five look at 'Cameronism in practice' in relation to: (1) the development of its two core concepts in government, the Big Society and the austerity programme; and (2) the ideology of the Coalition Government. Chapter six concludes with an overview of the biggest internal ideological challenge to Cameronism's attempt to handle the problematic legacy of Thatcherism within the Conservative Party, i.e the emergence of the New New Right.

A comprehensive and serious treatment of the ideological thought-practices that animate, and provide the contributory *raison d'etre* for, the Coalition Government is a necessary and timely study.

---

[125] John Vincent quoted in A. J. Davies. 1995. *We, The Nation*: *The Conservative Party and the Pursuit of Power*. London: Little, Brown and Company, 4.

Part One: Antecedents of Cameronism

Chapter One

Situating Cameronism: Recovering Intentions and Tensions in Thatcherism

'While dreaming of creating a Britain fit for her father, Alderman Roberts, to live in, Mrs Thatcher has left us a Britain fit for the likes of her son Mark to live in'[1]

1. Introduction: Retrodicting Thatcherism

Cameron's Conservatism is considerably affected by the politics of Thatcherism. Margaret Thatcher's death and funeral on April 2013[2] had a powerful politico-psychological affect on the Conservative Party, and prompted a moment of national introspection.[3] This moment of solemn reflection, especially for Conservatives, drew uncomfortable comparisons between the Tory triumphalism and ideological certainties of the 1980s with the politically pixilated and comparably confused Conservatism of the Coalition 2010s. It was an acknowledgement of diminution. The Conservatives, unlike in the 1980s, had lost its ability to win elections.

An argument has raged however, pertaining to the degree to which the ideological legacy of Thatcherism is a factor contributing to the Conservative Party's inability to win elections. Cameron's politics embodied, at the beginning of his leadership, an *ostensible* break with Thatcherism. However, Cameron's

---

[1] P. Worsthorne. 2005. 'Preface', In *Margaret Thatcher's Revolution: How it Happened and What it Meant*, edited by S. Roy and J. Clarke. London: Continuum: xvi.

[2] See L. Hadley. 2014. *Responding to Margaret Thatcher's Death*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

[3] See M. Garnett. 2013. 'The Conservative Party, David Cameron and Lady Thatcher's Legacy', *Contemporary British History* 27 (4): 514-524.

political association with Thatcherism, especially after the GFC, is more one of ambiguity than outright rejection. A feature of Cameronism has been the *ostensible* ambiguity about Thatcherism, the achievements of the Thatcher Governments, and above all, the legacy of Thatcherism.[4] On occasion, Cameron has been proud to call himself the 'son of Thatcher', and on the day of her funeral, appearing to include the entire nation, claimed that 'we're all Thatcherites now'.[5] Sometimes, Cameron has behaved as if this label applies to all apart from himself, claiming that even though a 'Thatcher fan...I don't know whether that makes me a Thatcherite'.[6] Cameron also stated that he had 'problems with the Thatcher legacy'.[7] In this frame, it is not Thatcherism that influences Cameron therefore, but Thatcher herself: 'I'm going to be as radical a social reformer as Mrs Thatcher was an economic reformer'.[8] Thatcherism is not so much dumped but historicised. George Osborne, whilst celebrating Thatcher as the 'greatest' prime minister because of her 'belief in the superiority of free markets', thought the ideological legacy she, and her ideology, bequeathed to the Conservatives was not unproblematic: 'she was on the right side of history', Osborne wrote, yet her legacy 'risks being overpowering for the two generations of politicians who have come after her, including my own. Whatever we try to achieve and whatever parliamentary battles we fight, all seem to shrink in size alongside the struggles

---

[4] See R. Hayton. 2012. *Reconstructing Conservatism? The Conservative Party in Opposition, 1997-2010*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

[5] R. Watson. 2013. 'Cameron salutes a great moderniser and says 'we're all Thatcherites now'', *The Times*, 18 April. A point more ominously echoed by Peter Mandelson in 2002 in order to qualify New Labour's Thatcherite attitudes to 'capital, product and labour market flexibility', P. Mandelson. 2002. ''There's plenty of life in the 'new' Third Way yet', *The Times*, 10 June.

[6] 'Cameron: Tories need new identity', *BBC News* 17 November 2005. On other occasions, when he was asked if he was a Thatcherite, Cameron answered, 'no'. E. Mills. 2013. ''I have problems with the Thatcher legacy'', *The Sunday Times*, 28 April.

[7] David Cameron quoted in Mills,''I have problems with the Thatcher legacy".

[8] Cameron quoted in D. Jones. 2010. *Cameron on Cameron: Conversations with Dylan Jones*. London: Fourth Estate, 315.

and triumphs of Margaret Thatcher'.[9] It is this dual celebration and acknowledged need to escape Thatcherism's shadow[10] that has been one of the defining and distinguishing ideological and historical hallmarks of Cameronism's ideological narrative. Indeed, Sunder Katwala perceptibly commented that, 'Cameron on Thatcher remains a masterclass in shades of political ambiguity'.[11] What is unavoidable however, is that Cameron's politics, like that of New Labour before it, is a politics situated within a context of coming to terms with Thatcherism's legacy by managing what I argue is integral to understanding *the* vital ideological antecedent of Cameronite Conservatism: that is the political management of the 'gap' between the 'intentional theory of Thatcherism' and the outcome of Thatcherism. This gap is important. David Marquand stated that this gap constituted 'a central theme of British history for more than a generation'.[12] This gap, it is argued, accounts for the acute ideological contortions evident in the thought-practices of the Conservative Party in post-Thatcherite and (pre-) Cameronite Conservatism.

The chapter has three arguments and claims. (1) The chapter argues that Thatcherism has been understood in two overarching ways: (i) the outcome of Thatcherism as free market radicalism, and (ii) the intention of Thatcherism as a restoration of Tory statecraft. The chapter argues that the former's outcome undermined the latter's intention. (2) The chapter argues that intentions matter as much as outcomes.[13] As such, intentions of Thatcherism provide the key to the

---

[9] G. Osborne. 2013. 'How Thatcher restored Britain's optimism', *The Times*, 12 April.

[10] R. Heffernan. 2009. 'The Continuing Shadow of the Thatcher Governments', *British Politics Review* 4 (1): 8-9.

[11] S. Katwala. 2009. 'In Maggie's Shadow', *Public Policy Research* 16 (1): 7.

[12] D. Marquand. 2014. *Mammon's Kingdom: An Essay on Britain, Now*. London: Allen Lane, 190.

[13] Outcomes are amply dealt with in S. Farrall and C. Hay. eds. 2014. *The Legacy of Thatcherism: Assessing and Exploring Thatcherite Social and Economic Policies*. Oxford: The British Academy.

puzzle of Thatcherism, and, more importantly, intentions of Thatcherism help better understand Cameronism's ambiguity about the relationship it has with Thatcherism: both updating and rejecting Thatcherism *pari passu*. (3) The chapter concludes that the gaps between the outcome and intention of Thatcherism have bestowed a problematic legacy to and for Conservative ideology.

2. Mind the Gap: Thatcherite Outcomes and Intentions

S. E. Finer, a supporter of Thatcherism, fairly recognised that 'Thatcher evokes admiration and detestation for one identical reason: she is 'big''.[14] Indeed, she is 'big'. Thatcher's death, 23 years after her deposition from power, spawned a series of biographies and memoirs.[15] Even before this output, the literature on Thatcherism was considerable. There are multiple 'narratives of Thatcherism' but '[t]here is no monolithic, unified notion of Thatcherism'.[16] What is 'monolithic' however, is that Thatcherism, and the analysis thereof, is problematic. Problematic primarily in its association with ideology. Fundamentally, Thatcherism's departure from the ideologies of Conservatism is not its ideological character or ideologisation of Conservatism. Thatcherism did not ideologise, or bring ideology to, Conservatism because it was already ideological. Conservatism was never non-

---

[14] S. E. Finer. 1987. 'Thatcherism and British Political History', In *Thatcherism: Personality and Politics*, edited by K. Minogue and M. Biddiss. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 140.

[15] See J. Aitken. 2013. *Margaret Thatcher: Power and Personality*. London: Bloomsbury; I. Dale ed. 2013. *Memories of Margaret Thatcher: A Portrait by Those Who Knew Her Best.* London: Biteback; R. Harris. 2013. *Not For Turning: The Life of Margaret Thatcher*. London: Bantam; C. Moore. 2013. *Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume One: Not For Turning.* London: Allen Lane. The best biography however, remains John Campbell's two-volume work. See J. Campbell. 2000. *Margaret Thatcher: Volume One: The Grocer's Daughter*. London: Jonathan Cape; and his later volume published in 2003, *Margaret Thatcher: Volume Two: The Iron Lady*. London: Jonathan Cape.

[16] For an excellent survey see M. Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes. 1998. 'Narratives of 'Thatcherism', *West European Politics* 21 (1): 97, 97-119.

ideological or unideological. The departure instead is constituted in *Thatcherism's ideological self-awareness* in contrast to the near ubiquitous rhetorical eschewal of ideology in pre- and post-Thatcherite Conservative commentary and practice. Thatcher, unlike Balfour, Baldwin, Macmillan, Heath, Major or indeed Cameron, stated that the Conservative Party 'must have an ideology' because the Labour Party have an 'ideology they can test their policies against', and as such, '[w]e must have one as well'.[17] Whilst Thatcherism's ideological character, and the analysis thereof, is problematic, which Thatcherism we choose to analyse is problematic too.

One of the problems identified is the gap between the outcomes and intentions in Thatcherism, and the resultant tensions that arise. The essence of Thatcherism is a collection of *seeming* paradoxes. Thatcher called herself a Tory,[18] but led the most *radical* government in Britain since 'the rule of the Saints during the English civil war'.[19] Her governments believed in a programme of restoration and rediscovery, taking Britain *forward to the past*, yet the post-war British trend towards larger government, integration both in the European Union and the globalised world economy not only continued but accelerated. The Thatcher Governments rhetorically believed in the preeminence of *market discipline* and *economic realism* (i.e. the deflationary budgets of the early 1980s) over *state control* and *social integration*, yet the moral laxity and indiscipline of markets in

---

[17] Thatcher quoted in Davies*, We, The Nation*, 54.

[18] Friedrich von Hayek remarked that Thatcher told him, '"I know you want me to become a Whig; I'm not, I am a Tory."' S. Kresge and L. Wenar. 1994. *Hayek on Hayek: An Autobiographical Dialogue*. London: Routledge, 141.

[19] D. Marquand. 2008. *Britain Since 1918: The Strange Career of British Democracy*. London: Phoenix, 284; Marquand, *Mammon's Kingdom*, 111.

the late 1980s created an amoral casino capitalism. *Ancestral virtues*[20] found in the rhetoric of the New Right, which twinned *social control* and *market freedom* together, were supposed to revive a morally-upright Christian society, yet the 1980s saw a continuation of the late-1960s 'permissive society', with rising divorce, abortion, illegitimacy and drug-taking rates.[21] Thatcher's Conservatives restored the rule of law and the executive and parliamentary autonomy of decision-making, yet oversaw large-scale riots and a rise in extra-parliamentary activity across the decade.

I propose a new topography, erecting three differences between the outcome and intentional theories of Thatcherism, in order to evince the indissoluble 'gap' between outcome and intention theories of Thatcherism. This does not serve as a review of the analysis of Thatcherism, but is intended merely to illustrate the argument. The literature thus falls into two categories: outcome-oriented and intention-oriented accounts of Thatcherism. Both accounts talk past each other on three variables: (1) novelty; (2) outcome; and (3) intention. A substantial proportion of the literature focuses on the *outcomes* of Thatcherism.

Table 1.

---

[20] Ancestral virtues refers to the Thatcher government's, especially Sir Keith Joseph and Thatcher, interest in early-modern English social history, Victorian, Georgian inter-war and/or post-war 1950s virtues. Ewen Green identified the emergence of Thatcherism, 'a radical strain of Conservatism', in his work on the 'crisis' of Edwardian Conservatism. See P. Clarke. 2006. 'Obituary: EHH Green', *The Guardian*, 29 September; E. H. H. Green. 1996. *The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the British Conservative Party, 1880-1914*. London: Routledge; P. Middleton. 1986. 'For "Victorian" Read "Georgian"', *Encounter* 67 (2): 5-9.

[21] M. Durham. 1991. *Moral Crusades: Family and Morality in the Thatcher Years*. New York: New York University Press, 179. J. U. Isaac. 1990. 'The New Right and the Moral Society', *Parliamentary Affairs* 43 (2), 209. D. Edgar. 1986. 'The Free or the Good', In *The Ideology of the New Right*, edited by R. Levitas. Cambridge: Polity Press, 55-79.

Variables of Thatcherism	Outcome-oriented explanations of Thatcherism	Intention-oriented explanations of Thatcherism
Novelty	Yes	No
Intention	Secondary	Primary
Outcome	Primary	Secondary

a. Thatcherism and Its Outcomes: Free Market Radicalism

Marquand stated simply that 'the more I contemplate the phenomenon' of Thatcherism 'the more protean and elusive I find it'.[22] Freeden referred to this elusiveness and puzzlement that lay at the heart of Thatcherism: the discrepancy between the ideology 'produced' and 'consumed'.[23] Indeed, the *locus classicus* on Thatcherism, Andrew Gamble's *The Free Economy and the Strong State*, erects a paradox between the strong state ideology produced and the free market ideology consumed.[24] Gamble's 'gap', as opposed to the gap presented here, consummately focused on the discrepancy between the ambition and achievement of Thatcherism. This tension, whilst correct in observation, is not sufficiently 'novel': 'the title of...Gamble's study could entitle a study of Conservatism in any period since Sir Robert Peel's premiership'.[25] The novelty resides instead in the

---

[22] D. Marquand. 1988. 'The Paradoxes of Thatcherism', In *Thatcherism*, edited by R. Skidelsky. London: Chatto & Windus, 159.

[23] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 412.

[24] See Gamble, *Free Economy and the Strong State*; A. Gamble. 1989. 'Privatization, Thatcherism, and the British State', In *Thatcher's Law*, edited by A. Gamble and C. Wells. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1-20.

[25] A. Adonis. 1994. 'Transformation of the Conservative Party in the 1980s', In *A Conservative Revolution: The Thatcher-Reagan Decade in Perspective*, edited by A. Adonis and T. Hames. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 147.

conceptual core constitution of Thatcherism found in its intention, and the weakening of this core intention by the outcomes of Thatcherism.

Outcome theories of Thatcherism focus, albeit not exclusively, on 'consumption Thatcherism': the ideology that was consumed. The focus on consumption focuses on (1) the novelty of Thatcherism in terms of 'rupture', (2) intentions are interpreted as a secondary importance, and (3) they contend that outcomes are of central and primary importance. The outcome accounts of Thatcherism are mistaken on the question of novelty and intentions, but, unlike intentional accounts, they broadly and properly account for the outcomes.

(1) *Outcome accounts of Thatcherism* focus on novelty through the form of 'rupture'. Ruptures are difficult to locate and finding consensus for the identification of a rupture is even more difficult. Jacques Rancière refers to rupture in political theory: rupture in his conception of politics, *le politique* as against a less 'pure' form of politics, *la police*. Politics, *la police*, is associated with bureaucracies, parliaments, courts and governments; *le politique* is opposed to such politics of administration and instead advocates a purer form of politics.[26] Ruptures break from the norm by extending beyond *la police* to *le politique*. Thatcherism's rupture is the reverse: the rupture of *le politique* (purer, more participatory and progressively transformative politics) to *la police* (the return to parliamentary supremacy and the paramountcy of the rule of law). Thatcherism's 'rupture' derives from the emphasis on 'turning points' at which Thatcherism rejected the *so-called* prevailing macro-ideological post-war consensus. Writers like Louisa Hadley and Elizabeth Ho think the 'magnitude of the break' of

[26] See S. A. Chambers. 2011. 'Jacques Rancière and the problem of pure politics', *European Journal of Political Theory* 10 (3): 303-326.

Thatcherism is integral to its understanding.[27] Dennis Kavanagh has contended that Thatcherism marked the end of the consensus of political ideas, consisting of the rejection of Keynesian demand management that was a central component of 'consensus ideology from the early 1950s onwards', thus constituting the end of one consensus and the attempt to build a new one.[28] Thatcherism, thus, 'reversed the direction of previous post-war administrations' and 'the Thatcher government has created a *new agenda*'.[29] Gamble argued that Thatcherism marked 'a radical change of direction'.[30] Similarly, Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques thought Thatcher and Thatcherism was not just another political episode in the British soap opera, but a lasting phenomenon insofar as it 'constructed' and remade 'common sense' in what Hall called a 'new hegemonic project'.[31] Outcome theorists also emphasise the importance of 1979, the year of the Conservative Party's election victory, which is asserted as a 'Conservative counterrevolutionary' inflection point, one which Christian Caryl believed marked the revival of the 'twin forces of markets and religion'.[32] What constituted this 'radical change of direction' and 'reversal' of the *chimerical* post-war consensus[33] was a flourishing of ideas that had not been in vogue since the Second World War. 'Why should a set of

---

[27] L. Hadley and E. Ho. 2010. 'Introduction: "The Lady's Not For Turning": New Cultural Perspectives on Thatcher and Thatcherism', In *Thatcher and After: Margaret Thatcher and Her Afterlife in Contemporary Culture*, edited by L. Hadley and E. Ho. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2.

[28] D. Kavanagh. 1987. *Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 34.

[29] Ibid, 209; 302 (emphasis added).

[30] Gamble, *Free Economy and the Strong State*, 223.

[31] S. Hall and M. Jacques, 'Introduction', In *The Politics of Thatcherism*, 10.

[32] C. Caryl. 2013. *Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century*. New York: Basic Books, xiii.

[33] For my views on post-war consensus see M. Lakin and M. S. Ostrowski. 2014. 'Ideology in the Age of the Coalition: The Strange Rebirth of British Centrism', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 19 (1): 29-33.

arguments,' Marquand pondered, 'which had seemed intellectually discredited and politically irrelevant for the first three decades after the Second World War, suddenly experience a miraculous rebirth in the fourth and fifth?'[34] Others focused on particular policy changes as indicators of Thatcherism's rupture from the preceding ideo-paradigmatic consensus, or settlement, on trade unions;[35] economic policy;[36] and the welfare state.[37] Bob Jessop criticised Hall et al's Gramscian theory of Thatcherite hegemony, the notion that the New Right is attributable to the failure of socialism; the success of responding to real needs and experiences in a way in which the Left failed to do; and the creation of a successful hegemonic project so that 'we are all Thatcherites now', because it amounted to a 'celebration of Thatcherism'.[38] This, and other outcome glorifications of Thatcherism, similarly amount to a 'celebration of Thatcherism' by accentuating novelty in Thatcherism, and by referring to its 'rupture' from the politics that preceded and, to a lesser degree, succeeded, it. These critiques therefore are 'underpinned by their main mistaken judgement, that Thatcherism was a dogmatic ideological project which represented a departure from the party's traditions'.[39]

(2) *Outcome accounts of Thatcherism* posit *intentions* as *secondary* to the *primacy* of *outcomes*. Thatcherism for Ian Gilmour, the whiggish 'One Nation'

---

[34] D. Marquand. 1996. 'Moralists and Hedonists', In *Ideas That Shaped Post-War Britain*, edited by D. Marquand and A. Seldon. London: Fontana, 16.

[35] See D. Marsh. 1992. *The New Politics of British Trade Unionism: Union Power and the Thatcher Legacy*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

[36] See W. Keegan. 1984. *Mrs Thatcher's Economic Experiment*. London: Penguin.

[37] See E. Papadakis and P. T. Gooby. 1987. *The Private Provision of Public Welfare: State, Market and Community*. Sussex: Wheatsheaf.

[38] See B. Jessop, K. Bonnett, S. Bromley and T. Ling. 1988. *Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations*. Cambridge: Polity.

[39] B. Evans and A. Taylor. 1996. *From Salisbury to Major: Continuity and Change in Conservative Politics*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 230.

Conservative who refused to 'dance' with Thatcher's 'dogma', abandoned the 'principle of continuity' and the 'principle of consensus',[40] in favour of an 'enterprise association' built in the image of Manchester Liberalism.[41] Conservatives, for Gilmour, 'travel light' and their intentions are largely unknown and unknowable because it is a politics which is constituted by responses to *ad hoc* events that are not informed by 'systems', 'abstract ideas' or 'ideology'.[42] Ben Pimlott's argument is more critical still. Gilmour recognised the impact and uniqueness of Thatcherism by focusing on outcomes, outcomes of which would have been presumably different had Tory Centrists like himself been at the helm in the 1980s. Pimlott however, argued that Thatcherism's intentions were completely marginal as the 'developments' that constituted Thatcherism 'would have happened anyway, albeit with different rhetoric, under Labour'.[43] Peter Riddell thought Thatcherism was a 'product of circumstance',[44] and as such the *ad hoc* nature of Thatcherism lent itself to concentrating on policy responses that emerged over the course of the 1980s that indicated a gradualist change of direction. The departures were not derived from intention or inner conviction therefore; they constituted a contingent response to events that produced, presumably on Pimlott and Riddell's readings, certain inevitable outcomes. Outcome theories thus demote the importance, if not completely marginalise, intentions, as they stress the contingent nature of Thatcherism: in different conditions Thatcherism would not have been Thatcherism.

---

[40] I. Gilmour. 1977. *Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism*. London: Hutchnson & Co, 97.

[41] I. Gilmour. 1992. *Dancing with Dogma: Britain under Thatcherism*. London: Simon & Schuster, 8.

[42] Gilmour, *Inside Right*, 109, 111.

[43] Ben Pimlott quoted in A. Seldon. 1996. 'Ideas Are Not Enough', In *Ideas That Shaped Post-War Britain*, 276.

[44] P. Riddell, 'Ideology in Practice', In *A Conservative Revolution?* 19.

(3) *Outcome accounts of Thatcherism*, as the name would suggest, focus on *outcomes*. These accounts are largely critical, culminating in an indices of despair. In the process of Thatcherism's 'dismantling of old structure and old priorities',[45] many outcome accounts focus on the soaring of socio-economic inequalities, the increased visibility of the homeless, the widespread coarsening of society, and the development of a hyper-populist authoritarian nationalism on homosexuals, women, single mothers and foreigners. Tony Judt thought that 'Thatcher did serious harm to the fabric of British public life' as '*society*...suffered meltdown, with catastrophic long-term consequences...by vociferously insisting upon an individualist ethic that discounted any unquantifiable assets'.[46] Had Thatcher never existed, Will Hutton argued, Britain's:

> 'politics would be less disfigured, its society less unequal, its public services less run down...[i]t would be more at peace with Europe and with itself. She was the high priestess of prejudice, breaking the back of her own party and the principles of the Labour party alike'.[47]

Trenchant critiques observed, as Clement Attlee had observed in Conservative languages forty years before, that Thatcherism suffered from an internal paradox: it used a libertarian language which provided freedom for the rich and servitude for the poor.[48] It all amounted to what Tam Dalyell called a 'sinister pattern of deceit'.[49] Such indices of despair are a common feature of outcome accounts of Thatcherite ideology and/or public policy. Even if intentions are recognised, the

---

[45] Gamble, *Free Economy and the Strong State*, 223

[46] T. Judt. 2007. *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*. London: Pimlico, 543.

[47] Will Hutton quoted in E. Evans. 2005. *Thatcher and Thatcherism*. 2nd edn, Oxford: Routledge, 140.

[48] See C. R. Attlee. 1946. *Purpose and Policy: Selected Speeches*. London: Hutchinson.

[49] See T. Dalyell. 1987. *Thatcher: Pattern of Deceit*. London: Cecil Woolf.

outcomes that emerged overshadowed everything else. The work of Hall is a case in point. Honoured with coining 'Thatcherism',[50] Hall argued that Thatcherism's 'authoritarian populism', the contradictory confluence of free market, strong state and populist rhetoric, inaugurated a 'neoliberal revolution' that fueled a consensus around the promotion of 'self-interest', 'possessive individualism' and 'anti-statism' in British politics from Thatcher to Cameron.[51] Whilst Hall's work suffers from readily identifying contrasts as opposed to continuities in British politics and ideological discourses, Hall's percipience resides in his observation that there was something contradictory about the Thatcherite hegemonic project.[52] The location of contradiction is not in the 'hegemonic project' however.

b. Thatcherism and Its Intentions: A Restoration of Tory Statecraft

An integral part of understanding an ideology is to understand its intention. In the *Oxford English Dictionary* 'intention' is defined as 'purpose', 'design' 'volition which one is minded to carry out', 'meaning', 'significance', 'import' and the 'straining and directing' of 'mental application or effort'.[53] Intention therefore refers to the course of action that one *intends* to purposively follow. Intention has been neglected, and the original purpose and meaning of Thatcherism has been almost lost in the study thereof. It is of fundamental importance for studies of contemporary Conservatism, and the Conservative Party, because these intentions

---

[50] J. Proctor. 2004. *Stuart Hall*. London: Routledge, 98.

[51] S. Hall. 2011. 'The Neo-Liberal Revolution', *Cultural Studies* 25 (6): 705-728.

[52] Also see E. Hobsbawm. 1995. *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991*. London: Abacus, 412.

[53] 'intention, n.'. OED Online. March 2014. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/97492?rskey=L7y7VT&result=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed May 14, 2014).

were recovered by a number of post-Thatcherite Conservatives and most notably by Cameron himself. Intention theories of Thatcherism focus, albeit not exclusively, on 'intentional Thatcherism': the ideology that was intended. The focus on production focuses on (1) the congruity of Thatcherism within the (Conservative) political tradition, (2) intentions are paramount, and (3) they contend that outcomes are less important.

(1) The *intentionalist thesis*, in contradistinction to outcome theories, strongly understate or explicitly *refute the novelty of the Thatcherite rupture* by focusing on: (1) the continuity of its intentions in the *longue durée* of British political history, and (2) thus by identifying the post-war era from 1945 (or 1940) to the mid-1970s as the rupture, Thatcherism can be seen not as rupture but as a programme of Tory restorationism.[54] Whilst intentionalists like Julius Gould and Digby Anderson recognise that '[i]t is no simple task to 'situate' Thatcherism within the 'structure' of contemporary British society',[55] they subdue the importance of novelty, decontested as rupture by outcome theories, partly because intentionalists are largely, albeit not exclusively, drawn from supporters of Thatcherism. Rupture implies a fracture or severance from a pattern or sequence of preceding thought-practices. Which thought-practices? If Thatcherism is a rupture, it implies somehow that it is incongruent with the Tory tradition's defiance of change. Intentionalists, in an effort to give Thatcherism historical

---

[54] J. Ramsden. 1998. *A History of the Conservative Politics, 1900-1996.* Basingstoke: Macmillan, 201-239.

[55] J. Gould and D. Anderson, 'Thatcherism and British Society', In *Thatcherism: Personality and Politics*, 49.

anchorage, argued that Thatcherism is only a novelty in the *courte durée*.[56] The 'Peterhouse Right' of Thatcherite loyalists thought Thatcherism was a 'monstrous invention'[57] because it merely amounted to a 'radical rhetoric to give intellectual respectability to what the Conservative Party had always wanted'.[58] Nigel Lawson argued that '[o]ld lessons have had to be painfully relearned' in the 1980s, and '[a]ll that is new' in Thatcherism is 're-educating people in some old truths'.[59] 'To the extent that new Conservatives turn to new sages', Lawson argued, 'such as Hayek and Friedman...is partly because...those writers are...avowedly reinterpreting the traditional wisdom of Hume, Burke and Adam Smith in terms of the conditions of today'.[60] Thatcher contended that 'Thatcherism is much older than I am', and that her politics was a mere recreation of those ideas associated with Burke and Smith.[61] Burke, like Thatcher, was a defender of the aristocratic and commercial order which could be represented as at once natural and defended by reference to civilised manners and virtuosity. In the *longue duree*, the relearning of 'old lessons', for which Lawson had the relearning of pre-Keynesian economics specifically in mind,[62] was essential because of the post-war 'divagation from the Conservative tradition', Robert Blake argued, which had

---

[56] Among the sceptics include P. Kerr. 2001. *Postwar British Politics: From Conflict to Consensus*. London: Routledge; P. Kerr and D. Marsh. 1999. 'Explaining Thatcherism: Towards a Multidimensional Approach', In *Postwar British Politics in Perspective*, edited by D. Marsh, J. Buller, C. Hay, J. Johnston, P. Kerr, S. McAnulla and M. Watson. Cambridge: Polity Press, 168-188; D. Marsh and M. Hall. 2007. 'The British Political Tradition: Explaining the Fate of New Labour's Constitutional Reform Agenda', *British Politics* 2 (2): 215-234.

[57] T. E. Utley. 1986. 'Monstrous Invention', *The Spectator*, 9 August

[58] M. Cowling. 1990. *Mill and Liberalism*. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, xxviii.

[59] N. Lawson. 1992. *The View of No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical*. London: Bantam Press, 1054.

[60] Ibid, 1041.

[61] M. Thatcher. 1999. 'Interview for The Age', 4 August 1988, In *Margaret Thatcher: Complete Public Statements 1945-1990 on CD-ROM*, edited by C. Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press; M. Thatcher. 1990. 'Joint Conference with Hungarian Prime Minister', 19 September.

[62] N. Lawson. 1980. 'The New Conservatism', Speech to the Bow Group. 4 August.

'occurred in the two decades after the Second World War'.[63] All Thatcherism was trying to do was return to Toryism's ancestral virtues 'prior to the contamination by the 'socialist' ideals of the welfare state'.[64] Privatisation, a distinctive feature of Thatcherism, for the intentionalists is continuous and not discontinuous from pre-Thatcherite hostility to nationalisation.[65] Nor was the Thatcherite conception of the strong state a rupture. If Britain did 'have a strong state', Martin Holmes wrote, 'then it predates Mrs Thatcher', and the Attlee Government's use of troops to break the 1949 dock strike, or the Heath Government's five states of emergency are cases in point.[66] For the intentionalists therefore, far from incepting a sectarian spirit into Conservatism, Thatcherism reaffirmed traditional Tory values and reinforced a new coalition of voters around those values. It was a 'new elite' with an 'old ideology' practicing Tory statecraft.[67]

Contemporary scholarship has further supported the intentionalist case for Thatcherite continuity. Historical studies have been much more sober in their assessments of the degree to which Thatcherism marks a significant departure in the governing-practices and ideologies of Britain.[68] These assessments would not disagree with Freeden's assessment that Thatcherism 'occupies fundamentally the

---

[63] R. Blake. 1985. *The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher*. London: Fontana, 367

[64] Ibid, 347fn. Also see P. V. Elst. 1975. 'Radical Toryism - The Libertarian Alternative', *Political Quarterly* 46 (1): 65-72.

[65] D. Windsor. 2003. 'Reprivatising Britain: Thatcherism and Its Results', In *The Political Legacy of Margaret Thatcher*, edited by S. Pugliese. London: Politico's, 127.

[66] M. Holmes. 1989. *Thatcherism: Scope and Limits, 1983-87*. Macmillan: Basingstoke, 13. R. Eccleshall. 1990. *English Conservatism Since the Reformation*. London: Allen & Unwin, 9-18.

[67] For example Patrick Joyce identifies Thatcherism as belonging more to the tradition of 'late-nineteenth century Tory aristocratic anti-statist individualism than with civically conscious, liberal "Victorian values"'. P. Joyce. 2013. *The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4.

[68] See Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*; B. Harrison. 2010. *Finding a Role? The United Kingdom, 1970-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; B. Jackson and R. Saunders eds. 2012. *Making Thatcher's Britain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

same semantic field as its predecessors'.[69] The ostensible rupture from past Conservative thought-practices in Thatcherism is thus misplaced as the radicalism of Thatcherism is for Freeden an 'illusion':

> 'The illusion of radicalism was thus simply created by the fervour and scope of *Thatcherite reactionary counter-reformism*. The idea is a reactive one: not the creation of new institutions or new forms of social behaviour, but - in parallel with Marxist argument - the negation of the negation. It assumes all the while that the true nature of human beings and of society, on whatever culturally adjacent conservative version now current, will re-emerge after a massive, one-off, government intervention'.[70]

Thatcher aspired to change Britain by reviving values of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries such as competition, a stable currency, self-help, free enterprise, and law and order. She wanted to change the existing system, but calling it 'radical' is anomalous. Caryl has argued similarly that Thatcher is a 'strange rebel' because her ostensible radicalism and break from the past is not radical but 'counterrevolutionary'.[71] Ronald Butt, sympathetic to Thatcherism, agreed when he observed that, '[i]f 1945 represented a constitutionally achieved revolution in political structure, 1979 began a constitutionally achieved counter-revolution'.[72] Like the intentionalists, Caryl and Freeden observed that Thatcherism was a backward-looking ideology, but one that used the past to go forward. 'The idea of looking back', Emily Robinson noted, 'in order to go

---

[69] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 384.

[70] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 411 (emphasis added).

[71] Caryl, *Strange Rebels*, xiii, xiv.

[72] R. Butt. 1986. *The Unfinished Task: The Conservative Record in Perspective*. London: Centre for Policy Studies, 13.

forwards is a constant theme in Thatcher's rhetoric'.[73] Its founding intention was to move *forward to the past*.

(2) *Intentions* are integral to the understanding of Thatcherism in thought and practice, as intentionalist accounts and I contend. A fuller explication of the core of Thatcherite intentions is the focus of chapter two, so the aim is to be brief. As a logical consequence of undervaluing the novelty of Thatcherism, intentionalists stress the revivalist and restorationist character of Thatcherism. But what restoration? What is it that Thatcherism wanted to restore? In line with the argument of the chapter, intentionalists have recognised the moral character of Thatcherism. The restoration of Britain sought by Thatcherites is found in the belief that the market-place is the nation's saviour from the perils of too much government, the welfare dependency culture and the hedonistic legacy of the 1960s. The Thatcherite emphasis on markets is something both outcome and intention theories of Thatcherism recognise, with the former emphasising its ruinous contradictions and the latter emphasising its laudability. Nevertheless, outcomes theories ignored the Thatcherite belief in the moral underpinnings of markets. Markets would, for example, lower inflation, dismantle the corporate state and reign in the trade unions, which were not merely economic imperatives but moral necessities. The market, dismounting 'discord' with 'harmony', and with its ability to incentivise individuals by withdrawing the state from its activities, would wash away the class rhetoric and open up spaces in which civil society and its institutions could flourish in the Thatcherite universe. The commitment to civil society is doubly serviced in Thatcherism by lifting the restriction on competitive individualism whilst restoring the foundations of

[73] E. Robinson. 2012. *History, heritage and tradition in contemporary British politics: Past politics and present histories*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 110.

organic communities. The Tory response was to withdraw from social ties; privatising life by arranging the locus of responsibility, self-discipline and welfare on individuals and their families; and buttressed by an attachment to Burke's 'little platoons': an amalgamation of Thatcherite institutions, 'registers of market information',[74] like the enterprise zones, commercial urban spaces and new commercial communities,[75] and the Tory institutions of Church, Queen, Country and the ancient shibboleths of Middle England. The ambition, for Thatcherites, was for the inseparability of national culture with the market society and a stronger but just as traditional Tory state.[76]

Market economics, or neoliberalism, acted in concert with civil society in 'seeking to restore and reproduce an English individualist culture that is our historical inheritance' and thus *natural*.[77] Neoliberalism provided the means - the celebration and widening of market principles supervised and superintended over by a strong, administrative state designed with the task of effecting and protecting a legal, social, economic and cultural regime that best promotes market efficiency - to creating, as its end, a civil society inseparable from market values.[78] Under Thatcherism, the civil society and the free market economy became interchangeable. This is why I argue that Thatcherism decontested, and displaced, civil society with a market society. In order to 're-create conditions which

---

[74] Green. *Ideologies of Conservatism*, 81.

[75] For discussion of commercial communities see Harrison, *Finding a Role?* 101.

[76] R. W. Johnson. 1985. *The Politics of Recession*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 234.

[77] J. Gray, 'Conservatism, Individualism and the Political Thought of the New Right', In *Ideas and Politics in Modern Britain*, 91; see J. Gray. 1989. *Limited Government: A Positive Agenda*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

[78] Marquand calls this the 'state-imposed enterprise culture'. Marquand, *Mammon's Kingdom*, 177.

will...permit the forward march of *embourgeoisement*',[79] as Joseph prophesied, the market economy had to be unleashed, civil society marketised and *embourgeoised*, and the state rolled back and strengthened to superintend on this market society in order for these newly created Thatcherite, libertarian individuals to realise their 'vigorous virtues'. It was a vision for a limited conception of the political.

(3) Intentionalist accounts of Thatcherism underestimate the outcomes of Thatcherism. Unlike outcome accounts, it amounts to ignoring any discrepancies in the ideology. They emphasise the marginality of its impact. Maurice Cowling, at the end of the Thatcher decade, thought Thatcher's legacy was modest: 'All she has done is *marginally* reverse the frame of mind which believes in the desirability of governmental involvement in the economy'.[80] John Vincent, a Tory historian like Cowling, argued that the Thatcher administration had changed or achieved very little, commenting that Thatcher has been 'administering the inheritance of Mr Attlee except in *marginal* areas like privatisation'.[81] It can't be helped but to notice that there is a shared disappointment with the outcomes of Thatcherism. Outcome theories largely focus on the increase in private selfishness, cult of acquisitiveness and the age of greed in business and economic ethics, and a shrill and populist authoritarianism on social morality. Intentionalists, disappointed presumably by its relative failure, ignore or don't recognise these outcomes. Partly because Thatcherism never constituted a rupture, its outcomes for intentionalists were never going to have a big impact.

---

[79] K. Joseph. 1975. *Reversing the Trend: A Critical Re-Appraisal of Conservative Economic and Social Policies: Seven Speeches*. London: Barry Rose, 57.

[80] Maurice Cowling quoted in N. Attallah. 1990. *Singular Encounters*. London: Quartet Books, 139.

[81] J. Vincent. 1987. 'Margaret Thatcher: her place in history', *Contemporary Record* 1 (3), 23-24.

c. Political Ouroboros: Thatcherite Tensions

Ouroboros is the ancient symbol that depicts a serpent or dragon eating its own tail. It refers to cyclicality and recreation. It also refers to contradiction as something self-defeating. In both senses, Thatcherism's contradictions and tensions are similar. Scholars and commentators of Thatcherism have focused on both outcomes or intentions. Few individuals have recognised gaps between 'commitments' and 'accomplishments',[82] and 'ambitions and achievements'.[83] Thatcherism is, in all probability, a complex mixture of intention and outcome; commitment and accomplishment; and ambition and achievement. The particular gap the chapter has chosen to focus on is the gap between ideological intention: a *moral rejuvenation* with a commitment to creating the market society and the concomitant reconceptualisation of the political, and the ideological outcome: an *economic enterprise association* that had created the market society and successfully reconceptualised the norms of British politics, but had unleashed a counter-moral ethic undermining the moral rejuvenation of its intention. The societal economism desired and intended by Thatcherites had not delivered the restoration of Tory values in accordance with its professed intention. Instead, it largely served to undermine the Conservative belief in a limited conception of politics. There are four disparate voices that give credence to this argument. John Gray elucidated the discrepancy most forcefully and thoroughly, with Peregrine Worsthorne, Ewen Green and David Green, in different registers, giving succour

---

[82] D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes. 1992. 'The Implementation Gap: Explaining Policy Change and Continuity', In *Implementing Thatcherite Policies: Audit of an Era*, edited D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes. Buckingham: Open University Press, 170-187.

[83] See Gamble, *Free Economy and the Strong State*.

to the idea that the Thatcherite intentions produced outcomes that produced a revolution which devoured its children![84]

Gray's work reflected the disjunct between Thatcherite intentions and outcomes *in excelsis*. Gray, more than any other thinker, had successfully excavated the intentions of Thatcherism. Gray's original enthusiasm and support for Thatcherism drew upon his interest in individualism in relation to the Conservative political tradition. Drawing on the idea that individualism was part of the English character,[85] Gray argued that Thatcherism's effort to limit government and revive the civil association was one that conformed to the ancient English tradition of individualism. Neoliberal market economics was a service economy, which supported the broader cultural Thatcherite goal of scaling back government intervention in the economy and the revival of the civic realm in 'seeking to restore and reproduce an English individualist culture'.[86] Critically, however, Gray asserted that the uniqueness of Thatcherism was located in its attention to the historical conditions and inheritance which sustained English culture. Neoliberal economics was just one part, albeit an important part, of the ideological mosaic providing essential means to the ideological ends of Thatcherism.[87] In protecting civil society and spreading market values, the state needs to be strong, decontested as a state whose functions are few, insofar as it is 'strong enough to defy collusive interest groups...face down over-mighty sectional

---

[84] J. Gray. 1997. *Endgames: Questions in Late Modern Political Thought*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1-10.

[85] See A. Macfarlane. 1978. *Origins of English Individualism*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

[86] Gray, 'Conservatism, Individualism and the Political Thought of the New Right', 91.

[87] See F. S. Braithwaite. 2012. 'Neo-liberalism and Morality in the Making of Thatcherite Social Policy', *The Historical Journal* 55 (2): 497-520; C. Hay and S. Farrall, 'Interrogating and conceptualizing the legacy of Thatcherism', In *The Legacy of Thatcherism*, 3-30.

interests and to uphold the rule of law'.[88] The strong state was essential in performing as the instrument of the Thatcher Governments to restrain those institutions; controlling the big-city local authorities, privatising monopoly nationalised industries, and 'democratising' trade unions, in civil society that were resistant to the renaissance of market values. In Thatcherism, the strong state is an essential precondition of the free market and so of a flourishing civil society.[89]

In addition to his attentiveness to the cultural context of individualism, the civic association and English tradition, Gray fashioned himself as a devotee of Friedrich Hayek's conception of 'market-based organicism'. In his three-volume work *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, Hayek argued that the market order could only flourish if the values appropriate to it prevailed, and in the mid-to-late twentieth century societies those values were in retreat. Hayek, preempting and influencing eventual Thatcherite 'practice',[90] takes aim at the enemies of the market order: social justice, 'the wasteful apparatus of para-government' like trade unions, and the exercise of 'social' aims.[91] What Gray gauged in Hayek was that cultural change is a precondition for market values to succeed and percolate through civil society. Gray also, like Hayek, thought the state suffered epistemological shortcomings, which the market was ridden of: the market is the only able transmitter of information, prices, supply, demand and income, which economic

---

[88] J. Gray. 1993. *Beyond the New Right: Markets, Government and the Common Environment*. London: Routledge, 35.

[89] Karl Polanyi, in his economic 'substantivist' critique, observed that the operation of the free market economy depended on an assertive state fending off competing ideological socio-economic visions. K. Polanyi. 1957. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 139.

[90] M.Thatcher. 1979. 'Letter to Friedrich Hayek', 18 May.

[91] F. A. Hayek. 2013. *Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy*. London: Routledge, 125, 135, 169-341; 356; F. A. Hayek. 1991. 'The weasel word 'social'', In *Conservative Thoughts: Essays from The Salisbury Review*, edited by R. Scruton. London: Claridge, 49-54.

actors need in Hayek's 'catallaxy'. Hayek, and Thatcherism, purported that '*government intervention in the economy generates failures in market co-ordination which would not otherwise occur*'.[92] Government overload and the hypothesis of ungovernability at the end of the 1970s for Gray and Hayek was attributable to the state's 'end-dependent rules of organisation', in which the state behaved as if it could determine outcomes. Not only is that a breach of liberty, but it is also for Hayek epistemologically impossible for the state to take account of the totality of things. The 'end-independent rules' of the *organic* market order rely on the market as a transmitter of information: the state's lack of knowledge about the circumstances of widely differing individual citizens meant that it was inherently unable to cater to their needs as well as the market could, since the latter was inevitably more responsive to individual circumstances.

As the 'Thatcher experiment' wore on however, Gray saw a discrepancy between the intentions and outcomes of Thatcherism. Soon after he published *Hayek on Liberty* in 1984, he became increasingly sceptical and critical of neoliberalism and by extension Thatcherism.[93] Thatcherism had not strengthened civil society but 'actively denied...the dependency of civil society on the resources of common currency'; it was sacrificed on the alter of economism with its narrow concerns of the 'calculus of exchange'.[94] Thatcherite policies, for Gray, 'collaborated with the most powerful forces of the age to do away with the social order in which Tory statecraft could be effective'.[95] In Hayekian thought, so Gray

---

[92] J. Gray. 1990. 'Hayek on the Market Economy and the Limits of State Action', In *The Economic Borders of the State*, edited by D. Helm. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 131.

[93] G. Newey. 2007. 'Gray's Blues: Pessimism as a Political Project', In *The Political Theory of John Gray*, edited by J. Horton and G. Newey. Oxford: Routledge, 159.

[94] Gray, *Beyond the New Right*, viii.

[95] J. Gray. 1997. 'Conclusion', In *Is Conservatism Dead?* by J. Gray and D. Willetts. London: Social Market Foundation, 158.

supposed, limited government had a strong commitment to the intermediary institutions in which individual identities are formed and the place where people find meaning. What went wrong? 'The Thatcher era', Gray argued, 'began as a response to local difficulties'.[96] Gray added that he liked the 'Bolshevik aspect' of Thatcherism in its determination 'to shake up the whole of Britain quite fundamentally'.[97] In the end however, it produced 'another political religion' in which it suffered from a 'delusion...that you could change everything and everything would remain the same'.[98] In a debate with David Willetts, the 'Hayekian polity' that Gray had expounded at the high-point of Thatcherism was now dismissed as a 'mirage'. Rolling back the state in the name of the market economy had been the 'undoing of Conservatism': a 'Maoism of the Right' and a 'permanent revolution of unfettered market processes' had become the by-products of Thatcherism undermining its beginnings as a moral ideology aimed at restoring the cultural verities of markets, virtues and civil society.[99] Willetts, Gray's former student, argued that the 'implied antithesis between Thatcherism and conservatism' that Gray erected was 'false', and Thatcherism therefore was not exceptional because, like previous generations of Conservatism, it attempted to marry 'free markets with a recognition of the importance of community'.[100]

Gray, and Thatcherites too, discounted the degree to which the revival of a market order would require social engineering equivalent to the social engineering of collectivists and planners of the 1960s: '...the destruction of the 1960s had to be

---

[96] J. Gray. 2010. *Gray's Anatomy: Selected Writings*. London: Penguin, 3.

[97] W. Self. 2002. 'John Gray: Forget everything you know', *The Independent*, 3 September.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Gray, *Enlightenment's Wake*, 131-132.

[100] D. Willetts. 1992. *Modern Conservatism*. London: Penguin, 47, 92-108. D. Willetts. 1997. 'Civic Conservatism', In *Is Conservatism Dead?* 90-102.

replaced by a new construction' as one leading exponent of Thatcherism formulated it.[101] Nevertheless, this does not discount Gray's most pertinent and unacknowledged contribution to the study of contemporary Conservative thought. Despite Gray's political peregrinations from Thatcherite champion to Third Way communitarian to post-human sceptic, his insights on the discrepancy and gap between early Thatcherism and later Thatcherism are both insightful, important and critical in understanding the ideological odysseys of Conservatism from the earliest days of Thatcher's attempt to build a market society to Cameron's fusion of fiscal austerity and the Big Society.

Others have recognised the gap too. Peregrine Worsthorne thought the revival of market values was done for the 'very best of reasons' and was sympathetic to Thatcherism.[102] Worsthorne admired the strong state side of the Thatcherite ledger, and the attendant themes of family, patriotism and nationalism. Consistent with his high Toryism, Worsthorne as early as the late 1970s was concerned that the market liberalism of Thatcherism undermining the key pillars of Tory Britain, notably the professions, the Bank of England, the older universities and the senior civil service, as much as Labour Britain.[103] Thatcherism's 'capitalist triumphalism', Worsthorne concluded fifteen years after the end of Thatcher's premiership, 'can *unintentionally* seriously damage a body politic's moral health'.[104] Similarly, Marquand argued that the 'moral activism' of early Thatcherism was disabled by the 'passive hedonism' of later Thatcherism.[105]

---

[101] M. Portillo. 1993. *The Blue Horizon*. London: Centre for Policy Studies, 6.

[102] Worsthorne, 'Preface', vii.

[103] P. Worsthorne. 1978. 'Too Much Freedom', in *Conservative Essays*, edited by M. Cowling. London: Cassell, 141-154.

[104] Ibid, xvi (emphasis added).

[105] See Marquand, 'Moralists and Hedonists', 5-28.

Ewen Green argued simply that 'Thatcherism can be viewed as perhaps the ultimate expression of Conservative belief in the agencies of civil society as the fulcrum of social life' and it 'sought to roll back the State in part to allow room for spontaneous, voluntary, civic associations to flourish'.[106] Green nevertheless, with the privilege of historical retrospection, thought that the possible '*mismatch* between *intention* and *outcome*' in Thatcherism was responsible for having '*stretched organicism to breaking point*'.[107] The Hayekian 'game of catallaxy' and the Thatcherite belief in the market order did not give a full account of politics.[108] That was, in part, the attraction for Thatcherism as Hayekian economics involved the dethronement and surrender of politics to spontaneous market forces. The Thatcherite reliance on Hayekian insights delivered an unanswered problem: how and to what extent the state might choose to interfere in the market order when threatened? Green argued that this created a vacuum and veil of uncertainty about the limits of markets, and the market society didn't strengthen but weakened Thatcherite intentions. David Green thought there was a similar 'mismatch' of intentions and outcomes to the ones identified by Gray and Green. The language of Thatcherism, for Green, was too economistic and materialistic. In celebrating the vigorous virtues - self-sufficiency, energy and adventurousness - necessary for halting economic decline, Thatcherism undermined, not strengthened, 'civic virtues', which included '[g]ood character, honesty, duty, self-sacrifice, honour, service, self-discipline, toleration, respect, justice, self-improvement, trust, civility, fortitude, courage, integrity, diligence,

---

[106] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, 278; *Thatcher*, 50.

[107] E. H. H. Green, *Thatcher*, 50 (emphasis added).

[108] Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, 234.

patriotism, consideration for others, thrift and reverence'.[109] Thatcherism's intention of reviving the civic space was undermined by the Thatcher Governments, and the ideology that informed them, because it did not attend to the preconditions for community and individual cooperation.

The chapter purports that the legacy of Thatcherism is problematic insofar as there are two Thatcherisms.[110] The first refers to its intentions: to strengthen the powers of the central state, by paradoxically privatising and contracting out periphery functions, in order to build a free enterprise economy insofar as the economic activity of the state was rolled back, and in combination, this would create Thatcher's market society. The intention was more ambitious further. At the core of Thatcherism is an attempt to diminish the preeminence of politics as a decision-making method for social problems: the political and administrative conception of politics was replaced by one that emphasised the private world of individual choice and voluntary action.[111] The second refers to its outcomes: a morally-rejuvenated market society underpinned by a new conception of politics furnished with libertarian and morally-upright citizens, which never came to fruition. Why didn't Thatcher's vision ever come into being? First, there was little evidence that the proliferation of market-oriented values had spread across the British electorate.[112] Conservative electoral dominance owed more to the electoral system than any widespread popularity or ideological resonance. The Thatcherite

---

[109] D. G. Green. 1993. *Reinventing Civil Society: The Rediscovery of Welfare Without Politics*. London: IEA, viii.

[110] See C. Hay and S. Farrall. 2011. 'Establishing the Ontological Status of Thatcherism by Gauging Its 'Periodisability': Towards a 'Cascade Theory' of Public Policy Radicalism', *The British Journal of Political and International Relations* 13 (4): 439-458.

[111] N. P. Barry. 1987. *The New Right*. Kent: Croom Helm, i.

[112] I. Crewe. 1988. "'Has the Electorate become Thatcherite?"' In *Thatcherism*, 25-49; I. Crewe. 1989. 'Values: The Crusade That Failed', In *The Thatcher Effect*, edited by D. Kavanagh and A. Seldon. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 239-250.

state, strong but narrow, was meant to merely superintend and remove obstacles to the realisation of the market society; instead it became just as interventionist as the post-war state. Second, Thatcherism's moral vision of the country depended on an ethic that had largely disappeared. Britain had become a more secular society exposed to decades of social democratic and Left-leaning political rhetoric. Brian Harrison fairly concludes that 'she could not hope to provide the one-time moral and religious underpinning for wealth'.[113] Organs of moral rejuvenation, typically supportive of Tory attitudes, did not support Thatcherism's moral vision. The Church of England, for example, was distinctively liberal and reformist, resistant to the politics of Thatcherism. What we did not see in the 1980s was the revival of a moral ethic, or Thatcher's heralded 'Victorian values',[114] convivial to traditional Tory attitudes.[115] Family and the nation-state, the institutional limits of markets for Thatcherism, did not sufficiently compensate for the dynamic destruction of Conservative capitalism because the very intention of Thatcherism to embolden markets by retrenching politics undermined them.

Nevertheless, despite the intentions largely being undermined by the outcomes of Thatcherism, Cameronism, with some success, has politically rediscovered the core of that intention. The vision of a market society and the redrawing of the boundaries of politics, albeit decontested differently from that of the Thatcher era, animates the core of modern Conservative ideologies as it is the most contextually appropriate expression of a limited defence of politics.

---

[113] Harrison, *Finding a Role?* 138.

[114] See R. Samuel. 1992. 'Mrs Thatcher's Return to Victorian Values', In *Victorian Values: Joint Symposium of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and the British Academy*, edited by T. C. Smouth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9-23; C. Auer. 2014. 'Margaret Thatcher's "Victorian Values": A Reappraisal'', In *The Victorian Legacy in Political Thought*, edited by C. Marshall and S. Guy. Bern: Peter Lang, 233-246.

[115] Durham, *Moral Crusades*, 179. For contrary view see G. Peele, 'Culture, Religion and Public Morality', In *A Conservative Revolution?* 67-88.

3. Rediscovering Thatcherism: The Intentional Theory of Thatcherism

a. The Immanent Core and the Conduit Core

Ideologies have both producers (the elite and gatekeepers protecting the intention(s) of ideologies) and consumers (the political publics receiving the produced ideologies). The intentionality of Thatcherite Conservatism is in the domain of political elites and the consumption is for both elites and the populace. As discussed in the introduction, I propose a magnification and correction to Freeden's treatment of core concepts insofar as there are three layers which comprise a core concept: (1) the *qualifying* macro-core concepts that Freeden refers to; (2) the medium-term historical and conceptual realisation of these macro-core concepts: the meso-core commitment to a limited conception of politics; and (3) the *realised*, *ephemeral* micro-illustrations of a core concept. In Freeden's arrangement of concepts within ideological families, peripheral concepts are found at the edge of an ideology in its historical, geographical, and cultural context. The periphery is composed of both a margin and perimeter component. The 'perimeter' straddles 'the interface between the conceptualization of social realities and the external contexts and concrete manifestations in and through which those conceptualisations occur'.[116] Freeden is correct to critically dismiss the identification of one central concept to an ideological family. The corrective proposed to Freeden's treatment of core concepts does not reverse Freeden's admonition of attempts to search for a single concept. Freeden's core

[116] M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 79.

concepts are immanent, framework-based and qualifying core concepts. First, a concept is designated as core as it is an immanent feature of an ideology insofar as it is both intrinsic and ineliminable: present in all known cases of a particular ideological family, and indispensable to the coherence and identification of the ideology. Second, it is a framework: it is capacious and big enough to be *realised* in different ways. Third, it qualifies what the possible realisations of the ideologies core concepts could be. The realisations of Freeden's core, immanent, framework-based and qualifying concepts are called *macro-core concepts*. They realise and manifest the features of an ideology's immanent core. They are not merely periphery to the ideological family because they, for a historical period or diachronic slice of time, are indispensable to the success, coherence and logic of the ideology. Meso-core concepts therefore are capable of being sensitive to the permutations and vicissitudes of historical and contextual change. As discussed in the introduction, the 'master-concept' of post-Enlightenment Conservatism is a macro-decontestation of the political: what O'Sullivan called a *defence of limited politics*.[117] This 'master-concept' is a long-standing conduit core. Thus, meso-core concepts are qualified conceptually by the conceptual straitjacket imposed upon them by the immanent core concepts outlined by Freeden.[118] An immanent core component concept, for example, for socialist ideologies is equality. Equality will be decontested in multiple ways (examples often include formal equality, equality of opportunity, equality of outcome, social justice, etc), giving rise to different conceptions of the conceptual and historical constitutive meaning of equality. New Labour, for example, decontested equality as 'equality of market

---

[117] O'Sullivan, 'Conservatism', 293.

[118] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 332-347.

opportunity': endowing individuals with rights and responsibilities underpinned and 'enabled' by a skills and training agenda to both guard against welfare state dependency and to harness the excesses of market behaviour for (vulnerable) individuals.[119] However, ephemeral and fleeting this conception is, it features as the conduit core and brings to fruition the realisation of the socialist core of equality. Similarly, in order to sketch-out the realization and concrete manifestation of the Thatcherite 'dual-core' concepts, a focus on the intentionality of Thatcherism is necessary therefore.

b. The Importance of Intention in Ideological Analysis

Chapter two will analyse the core of intentional Thatcherism, which will endeavour to illustrate and outline the considerable degree of ideological continuity there is between the (intentional) politics of Thatcher and Cameron. Intention is important as it provides, and contributes to the uncovering of, an insight into the intentions and thought-actions of individual agents at various levels of articulation of a particular ideology. Intention is conveyed through rhetoric, speech, text, silence and performance. Ideological investigations of intention are indebted to the culturally-sensitive historical and conceptual analysis of political languages fostered by historians such as John Dunn, J. G. A Pocock, and Skinner, and political theorists like William Connolly and James Tully.[120] They emphasised the importance of language and context in the analysis of political ideas. Skinner was influenced by the linguistic theory of J. L. Austin and

---

[119] E. Shaw. 2007. *Losing Labour's Soul? New Labour and the Blair Government 1997-2007*. London: Routledge, 60-79.

[120] See Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse*; J. Tully eds. 1988. *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

the relationship between intention, utterance and speech-acts.[121] Austin talked about the 'performative utterance' or the 'illocutionary act': the language process of ordering, warning, informing, undertaking and securing, involved in the construction of a particular sentence.[122] Austin's notion of illocutionary speech has been embraced by Skinner in order to decode the meaning of political speech-acts in terms of the intentions of the authors of political treaties, and placing these intentions within a context.[123] Skinner's usage of an 'illocutionary act' contends that an utterance performed by a speaker 'will be equivalent to understanding their primary intentions in using their utterance'.[124] In the analysis of the 'saying', 'doing' can be inferred. This is not a universally-accepted approach. The emphasis on the authorial intentionality for textual interpretation has been attacked from various intellectual schools of thought, most notably from post-structuralism.[125] Skinner argued that approaches that 'discount the statements of intention...would impair the coherence of the author's system'.[126] Even though Skinner and the 'Cambridge School' were focused on the texts of the professional author (political philosophers), the word 'author' could be substituted for 'politician', as importance can be accorded to intention speech-acts outside academic texts as well as within them. Beyond Skinner and the Cambridge School however, the

---

[121] Q. Skinner. 1971. 'On performing and explaining linguistic actions', *Philosophical Quarterly* 21 (82): 1-21.

[122] J. L. Austin. 1962. *How to Do Things With Words.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 116.

[123] Q. Skinner, ''Social Meaning' and the Explanation of Social Action', In *Meaning and Context*, 83-4.

[124] Skinner, *Visions of Politics*, 98.

[125] R. Barthes. 1979. 'From Work to Text', In *Textual Strategies*, edited by J. V. Harari. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 73-81; J. Derrida. 1997. *Of Grammatology*, translated by G. C. Spivak. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 6-100; M. Foucault, 'What is an Author?', In *Textual Strategies*, 141-60.

[126] Q. Skinner. 1969. 'Method and Understanding in the History of Ideas', *History and Theory* 8 (1): 18-19. Skinner has shifted away from recovering authorial intention as the source of textual meaning towards the text as a unit of analysis, thus intertextuality is the source of meaning. See Q. Skinner, *Hobbes and Republican Liberty*,

student of ideology, as Freeden outlined, can 'accord equal respect both to 'face-value' reproduction of intent *and* to unconscious structural or psychological symbols that refer to further aspects of thought and conduct not apparent to the agent or the agent's society'.[127] Hermeneutic approaches to meaning provide a framework to decode meaning, which is external or secondary to the primary intentional meaning of a particular utterance. Paul Ricoeur called this the 'surplus of meaning': meanings of acts of intentional discourse is always open to new interpretations, meanings are always open to the multiplicity of meanings over any given meaning, and the very context in which interpretation occurs itself changes.[128]

The difficulty of uncovering meaning within verbal or written utterances or even psychological symbols is compounded by a further problematic feature. In the social sciences, there is a longstanding debate concerning whether agency has primacy over structure or the reverse. Agency, the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices, and structure, recurrent patterned arrangements, which influence or limit the choices and opportunities available, both determine aspects of social life. In the practice of ideologies, both agency and structure participate and neither supersedes the other. In morphological analysis, conceptual and historical analysis share joint privilege: they intersect horizontally and vertically and even though agency and structure are still distinguishable, they are inseparable. Intentions are therefore important but they are not necessarily obvious. Furthermore, because ideologies are both action-oriented and group-oriented, intentional aspects of ideologies are interpreted by

---

[127] M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 101.

[128] P. Ricoeur. 1976. *Interpretation Theory*: *Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning*. Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 55.

consumers of that ideology: in the interpretation of intention in the analysis of ideologies therefore, students of ideology reconstruct the 'comprehension of the idea-audience'.[129] This largely determines the outcome however. The outcome of a particularly ideology is contingent and dependent on a collection of variables for its success.[130] That is not to say that intentions are isolated, but intentions of the producers of an ideology can be understood and inferred from consistent patterns in the use of their language, and the decontested meanings of concepts in their language separate from the outcome of the ideology.

Ideology reflects on the deepest level of intention. Intentions are arguably much easier to identity and detect than outcomes. Producers of ideology are far smaller, especially if the ideology is successful in practical or action-orientation terms, than its consumers. It does not however, necessarily require an implementation into practice; it is rather a 'thought-practice'. Scholars or academics, for example, provide an account, commentary or critique of a particular aspect of an ideological practice and/or theory without ever expressly putting that thought-practice into practice. Intentions in the analysis and interpretation of ideologies are more myriad than other sub-disciplines of politics and political theory, as it is necessary to consider the intentions and thought-actions of individuals agents and collectivities at various levels of articulation of a particular ideology. Ideologies are not, in contradistinction to political philosophy, in the sole dominion of discipline-trained professionals however. Ideologies are produced and consumed by others that have an impact on the dissemination and formation of an ideology, which include journalists, politicians, public policy

---

[129] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 109.

[130] See page 25.

chiefs, protest groups, and other sections of civil society, especially entrepreneurs and conventional millionaires in the case of Thatcherite Conservatism. The chapter is interested in the producers of Thatcherism, as the intentions of an ideology reside with its producers.

The articulators and producers of Thatcherism are largely, and unsurprisingly for an ideology maneuvered by the British Conservative Party, composed of an intricate and tightly interconnected plethora of elites.[131] Elites are the typical 'codifiers' of ideologies: sharing their mental maps to 'help navigate their complex political environments' in the hope that they 'are embraced by significant groups in society'.[132] Thatcherism was an especially successful example of communicating general principle into practical example. Thatcherites - Thatcher, Lawson and Geoffrey Howe - had an inimitable ability to situate each decision and policy within a broader ideological strategy. To refocus the analysis away from outcomes, and towards the intentions, of an ideology, I recommend an analysis of the core concepts of Thatcherism. Unearthing the intentions of Thatcherism are particular ripe for analysis as its chief progenitor, Thatcher, had what Jonathan Raban observed as, an 'insistently, aggressively demotic' language, both easily consumable and decodable.[133] Unearthing the core of Thatcherism, the very essence of the intentionality of Thatcherism, requires more work.

4. Conclusion

---

[131] See Cowling, *Mill and Liberalism*, xi-xlviii; B. Harrison. 1994. 'Mrs Thatcher and the Intellectuals', *Twentieth Century British History* 5 (2): 206-234; J. Ranelagh. 1992. *Thatcher's People: An Insider's Account of the Politics, the Power and the Personalities*. London: Fontana.

[132] Steger, 'Political Ideologies in the Age of Globalization', 216.

[133] J. Raban. 1989. *God, Man and Mrs Thatcher*. London: Chatto & Windus, 4.

The ‘crisis of Conservatism’ that emerged in the 1990s onwards is chiefly attributable to the gap between Thatcherite intentions and outcomes. Nevertheless, the acknowledgement of the gap is the beginning point for understanding Cameronism. The Cameronite response was, and is, to maintain the substantive intentionalism of Thatcherism whilst adjusting the language and conceptual configuration of Conservatism in order to manage the difficult outcome of Thatcherism.

Chapter Two

Situating Cameronism: Thatcherism, the Market Society and the Promotion of Limited Politics

'...we have drifted from having a market economy to being a market society...A market economy is a tool - a valuable and effective tool - for organizing productive activity. A market society is a way of life in which market values seep into every aspect of human endeavor. It's a place where social relations are made over in the image of the market'[1]

1. Introduction: The Dual-Core of Thatcherism: The Market Society and the Promotion of Limited Politics

Ideologies rarely have one core concept. Freeden identifies 'five concepts or conceptual themes' in the ideologies of socialism.[2] Manfred B. Steger contended that globalization exhibits a 'dynamic' set of 'six core claims that play crucial semantic and political roles.[3] Thatcherism displays a dual-core conceptual arrangement. The chapter investigates the *intentional theory of Thatcherism* by focusing on the conceptual 'dual-core' of Thatcherism: (i) the decontestation of civil society as a 'market society',[4] constituted by morally-upright communities

---

[1] M. Sandel. 2013. *What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets*. London: Penguin, 10-11.

[2] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 425-438.

[3] M. B. Steger. 2005. 'Ideologies of Globalization', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 10 (1): 11-30.

[4] The term 'market society' is an umbrella term for the practices of commercial and post-mercantile European economies from the late eighteenth century onwards. The market society for Thatcherism has a particular definition and function, which refers to the use of commercial and neoliberal practices to shore up the Conservative priority of achieving a limited scope for politics. See B. S. Butcher, J. Paton and D. Cahill. 2012. *Market Society: History, Theory, Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; L. Herzog. 2013. *Inventing the Market: Smith, Hegel & Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

composed of individuals invested with the 'vigorous virtues', which is underpinned, and mutually supported by (ii) a 'civic', 'formal', 'minimalistic', 'nomocratic' and 'non-programmatic' conception of politics. Essentially, Thatcherism was a moral enterprise, which placed 'economic realism' conceptually prior to social integration. This however, was never fully realised because of the largely unintended ideological outcomes of the Thatcherite political economy. The chapter therefore offers a short conceptual analysis of the core of intentional Thatcherism, which situates the considerable degree of ideological continuity there is between the politics of Thatcherism and Cameronism. The market society is the *positive* side of the core: the *entrenchment* of market practices located in civil society that is the means of bringing about the *remoralisation* of British society sought after by Thatcherites. The *retrenchment* of politics is the *negative* side of the core: it is an attempt to remove the obstacles to the creation of the market society. It is a complex and highly distinctive ideological social vision, which has animated Conservative political thought-practices from Thatcher to Cameron, and potentially beyond.

a. The Market Society

Society is decontesed in Thatcherism as a *market society*.[5] It is a highly selective decontestation of civil society, which departs from popularly-conceived European conceptions of civil society. In the nineteenth century, civil society was used to refer to the social sphere between the domestic and the political. In Hegel's work,

[5] K. Joseph. 1976. *Stranded on the Middle Ground? Reflections on Circumstances and Policies*. London: Centre for Policy Studies, 68.

similarly, civil society connected the family to the state.[6] The Thatcherite ideal is predicated on the idea that civil society thrives dually when the state withdraws from intervening in the economy and when the state plays a strong custodial role of supervising the successful transformation of civil society into a market society.

Society, or specifically civil society, goes back to Aristotle's *koinōníak politikḗ* in *Politics*, and is derived from more familiar Latin phrases, *societas civilis* or *communitas*, meaning an association or a union. Twentieth century thinkers, from R. G. Collingwood, F. A. Hayek, and Oakeshott on the liberal and Conservative side, to Charles Taylor, John Keane, Perry Anderson, Andrew Arato, Jean Cohen and Agnes Heller, on the more radical side. Civil society occupies an ominous place in the ideologies of British Conservatism. Against the popular argument that attitudes to the role and scope of the state, in relation to the economy and civil society, occupies the nucleus of twentieth century British (Conservative) thought,[7] Green argued persuasively that 'the primary focus should instead be on Conservative views of the effectiveness of agencies of the civil society'.[8] Civil society, for Green, refers to 'forms of social association which are not part of the apparatus of the State and are not directly sponsored or organized by the State'.[9] Green's argument that civil society takes centre stage in the politics of the Conservative Party is not without criticism. Susan Pedersen's critique is that in trying to generate 'a theory of Conservative behaviour', Green collapses 'Conservative ideas' and 'Conservative economic ideas together'. Thus, a highly

---

[6] G. W. F. Hegel. 1967. *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 122-126.

[7] W. H. Greenleaf. 1983. *The British Political Tradition: Volume 2, The Ideological Heritage*. London: Methuen, 189-346.

[8] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, 241.

[9] Ibid, 261.

economistic account is produced that exclusively focuses on Tory political economy.[10] This criticism is unfair. Green does indeed focus on political economy, but the case-study approach Green employed in the analysis of Conservative ideas does evince other interests, such as the importance of the Tory grassroots and the importance of social visions in Toryism. Green's focus on economics chimes with a central contention of the chapter's argument: Thatcherism's decontestation of civil society is adorned with particular meaning; it is a *market* civil society.

Green does not however, adequately account for Thatcherism's highly distinctive and idiosyncratic conception of society. All Tories before[11] and after[12] Thatcher celebrated Burke's 'little platoons'; the 'subdivisions' in society that individuals form attachments to.[13] The free market in Conservatism has been routinely decontested as natural, or what Adam Smith called the 'contrivance of nature'.[14] Green correctly detailed Thatcherism's distinctiveness, in relation to this Burkean tradition, insofar as Thatcherism questioned whether 'these 'little platoons' were fit for duty'.[15] Thatcher illustratively argued:

> 'Government apart, the strengths of a civilised nation depend on the natural authority of the family, the school, the Church and our great institutions. It is when the authority weakens - and it has weakened - that nations turn to the power of the state'.[16]

---

[10] S. Pedersen. 2004. 'Review: Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century', *Twentieth Century British History* 15 (4): 438-440.

[11] Hogg, *The Case for Conservatism*, 29.

[12] See D. Willetts. 1994. *Civic Conservatism*. London: Social Market Foundation.

[13] E. Burke. 2009. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. London: Penguin, 47; M. Thatcher. 1990. 'Scottish Conservative Party Conference Speech', 12 May.

[14] Herzog, *Inventing the Market*, 17-40.

[15] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, 263.

[16] M. Thatcher. 1985. 'Conference Speech', 11 October.

But the detail of what was being questioned, and what was to replace the pre-Thatcherite little platoons, is left absent.

Associating Thatcherism with the 'ultimate expression' of civil society is ostensibly incredible. Thatcher had repeatedly derided society: '[s]ociety is not anyone';[17] '[w]hat an earth is civil society?'[18] and, in a much-publicised interview that echoed the harsh accents of Jeremy Bentham,[19] Thatcher told *Woman's Own* in 1987 that too many people were 'casting their problems on society': '"I have a problem, it is the government's to cope with!" "I am homeless, the government must house me!"' Thatcher wanted to know 'who is society?' for which she answered that, '[t]here was no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families'.[20] She repeated this sentiment further, seeming to encapsulate *outcome Thatcherism,*[21] '[t]here is no such thing as society'![22] One clumsy remark given to an obscure lifestyle magazine aimed at women became the epigram of and for Thatcherism. 'That statement', wrote Patricia Holland and Georgia Egelzou, 'has become part of cultural history, fusing the image and the very person of Margaret Thatcher with the policies she was pursuing'.[23] It implied that Thatcher, corroborating her detractors' worst predictions, wanted to abnegate society. The phrase did pull together many aspects of cultural attitudes and social policy in the Conservative 1980s however: a shrunken deconstestation of

---

[17] M. Thatcher. 1985. 'TV Interview for Yorkshire Television Woman to Woman', 2 October.

[18] Thatcher quoted in Green, *Thatcher*, 44.

[19] J. Bentham. 2007. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Mineola, NY: Dover, 3.

[20] M. Thatcher. 1987. 'Interview for Woman's Own', 23 September.

[21] See A. McSmith. 2011. *No Such Thing As Society: A History of Britain in the 1980s*. London: Constable

[22] Thatcher, 'Interview for Woman's Own'.

[23] P. Holland and G. Eglezou, '"There is no such thing!": On Public Service, Broadcasting, the National Health Service and "people" in the 1980s', In *Thatcher and After*, 29.

'society' and its responsibilities; the withdrawal of government from society, and the evocation of 'families' and family responsibilities. 'Backpeddling' subsequently became the hallmark of post-Thatcher Conservatism in regards to Thatcher's 'no such thing as society' remark.[24] With amendments, corrections, revisions and reappraisals, the comment was given some ideological context so as to soften the sentiment. Willetts argued that it 'did not mean that we had no responsibilities to others', nor did it mean that an individual 'could lead any meaningful existence outside of society'.[25] Instead, it was rebuke to those who wanted to 'pass the buck to some abstraction'.[26] Thatcher's memoirs clarified that she did believe in *a* society of a 'living structure of individuals, families, neighbours and voluntary associations', but not an 'abstract society' where 'the answer to every criticism was for the state to spend and intervene more'.[27] Later Thatcher corroborated: 'I...never minimised the importance of society, [I] only contested the assumption that society means the state rather than other people'.[28] When Cameron eighteen years later, in attempting to distance himself from the negative outcomes of Thatcherite neoliberalism, declared that 'there is such thing as society, it's just not the same thing as the state',[29] Thatcher had beaten him to it: 'The error to which I was objecting was the confusion of society with the state'.[30]

---

[24] See pages 173-189 in chapter three.

[25] Willetts, *Modern Conservatism*, 48.

[26] M. Thatcher. 1996. 'Foreword', In *Conservative Realism: New Essays on Conservatism*, edited by K. Minogue. London: HarperCollins, xiii.

[27] M. Thatcher. 1993. *The Downing Street Years*. London: HarperCollins, 626.

[28] M. Thatcher. 1996. 'Liberty and Limited Government', *Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture*, 11 January.

[29] D. Cameron. 2005. 'Leadership Victory Speech', 6 December.

[30] Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 626.

Thatcherism's denunciation of the abstract, welfare, state-centric dependence-oriented conception of society was just one mirror-image of its market society. Thatcher disliked what she called the 'spectator society',[31] where individuals did not take part and saw society as a spectacle and abstract notion. Thatcherites, especially Norman Tebbit, railed against the 'permissive society'. The permissive society, the society that allegedly came into being during the 1960s,[32] compounded the weakening of economic self-discipline and self-responsibility, which the post-war political arrangement produced. Consequently, the 'permissive society' was decontested as the 'anything goes society', the 'couldn't care less society' and the 'violent society'.[33] The term 'permissive society' was used elastically by the Thatcherites to encompass a society diverted from the disciplines of the market economy and the traditional Judaeo-Christian morality that underpinned it. Thatcherites also disliked what R. H. Tawney called the 'decent society': the politics that believed in the *beneficence* of the state in shaping social and economic outcomes. The source of objection of the ethic of the decent or caring society for Thatcherites was the 'grand passion' on the part of the state to transform society, 'in terms of an idea, rationalizing it, tidying it up, above all, making it fit a version'.[34]

What the 'spectator', 'permissive' and 'decent' society visions have in common is a positive conception of politics. It dictates that the state can 'tidy' and improve the conditions in society by consulting and including major groups in

---

[31] Thatcher, 'TV Interview for Yorkshire Television Woman to Woman'.

[32] For a corrective see M. Jarvis. 2004. *Conservative Governments, Morality and Social Change in Affluent Britain, 1957-64*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

[33] N. Tebbit. 1986. *The Values of Freedom*. London: Conservative Political Centre, 5.

[34] K. Minogue, 'Introduction: The Context of Thatcherism', In *Thatcherism: Personality and Politics*, xi. For the opposite view see R. Eccleshall. 2003. 'Conservatism', In *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*. 3rd edn. edited by R. Eccleshall, A. Finlayson, V. Geoghegan, M. Kenny, M. Lloyd, I. MacKenzie and R. Wilford. London: Routledge, 66.

society on important issues. Thatcherites thought this was a dangerous conflation of society and state. This dangerous conflation and politicisation of society inserted *purpose* into society. Hayek and Oakeshott, the two sages of Thatcherism, argued that society 'in the strict sense', in order to distinguish it from the apparatus of government, must be deprived of 'specific purpose' in order for people to pursue their own goals.[35] The Tory state was 'restricted to the enforcement of universal rules of just conduct' and not the 'achievement of particular purposes'.[36] According to Gamble, Oakeshott thought there was no 'inconsistency' between libertarian attitudes in commercial and civic life, and applying Conservative principles to the role of the state.[37]

The attempt to ascribe a design, intention or purpose to society for Hayek was associated with the *politics of the social*. The 'use of the term 'social'', for Hayek, was 'virtually equivalent to the call for 'distributive justice''.[38] Calls for *social* democracy or *social* justice for Hayek, and in the practice of Thatcherism, were projections of purposes that were the obstacles to the very maintenance of society: '[s]ocial should really be called 'anti-social'.[39] Hatred of the social or 'Labspeak', in Thatcherite thought-practices, was manifested in her attitudes towards sociological categories. Sociology had the tendency to categorise economic and occupational groups into classes or other abstract notions. These were the very propositions Thatcherites denied. Social or sociological explanations for developments in society undermined Thatcherites belief in a

---

[35] Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, 228; M. Oakeshott. 1975. *On Human Conduct*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 313-314.

[36] Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, 287.

[37] A. Gamble. 2012. 'Oakeshott's Ideological Politics: Conservative or Liberal?' In *The Cambridge Companion to Oakeshott*, edited by E. Podoksik. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 165.

[38] F. A. Hayek. 1988. *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism*. London: Routledge, 118.

[39] Ibid.

'society centred on individuals and families'.[40] Thatcherism's decontestation of the units composing the market society were *personal* not *social* units: redefined as 'you and me' the 'next door neighbour' and 'everyone you know in town, school or business'.[41] It was a provincial and thin conception of society in mirror-image to the societies that attached an abstract, permissive and/or caring conception of the state to it.

Thatcherism was not a denial of society, but a market conception of society repudiating abstract, permissive and/or caring conceptions of society. Michael Sandel contends too that Thatcher inaugurated into Britain the market society, one where 'social relations' were 'made over in the image of the market'.[42] Mike Harris described Thatcherism as the "great market re-transformation".[43] It differed from the idea of the market economy however, which delineated more clearly the boundaries between the areas of life compatible and traditionally associated with economics, and non-economic spheres of life. Under Thatcher, this demarcation disappeared. Over time, Britain 'drifted from *having* a *market economy* to *being* a *market society*'.[44] It had happened because of a conscious adoption of marketisation on the part of Thatcherism: 'the introduction of market mechanisms and market norms into activities hitherto run on non-market lines'.[45] To dismiss Thatcherism as a libertarian ideology, with

---

[40] J. Lawrence and F. S. Braithwaite, 'Margaret Thatcher and the Decline of Class Politics', In *Making Thatcher's Britain*, 146. P. Schumaker. 2008. *From Ideologies to Public Philosophies: An Introduction to Political Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell, 68.

[41] M. Thatcher. 1988. 'Radio Interview for BBC Radio 2 Jimmy Young Programme', 27 July.

[42] Sandel, *What Money Can't Buy*, 10-11.

[43] M. Harris. 1998. 'The New Right', In *New Political Thought: An Introduction*, edited by A. Lent. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 53.

[44] Sandel, *What Money Can't Buy*, 10-11 (emphasis added).

[45] Marquand, *Mammon's Kingdom*, 110.

heartless individualism at its heart, is to misunderstand its intention however.[46] As stated, Thatcherism *first* and *foremost* was a *moral ideology*. A fundamental insight into the moral underpinnings of the market society is the Thatcherite belief that morality is contained within individuals and their families in contradistinction to the 'permissive', 'spectator' society, in which morality is purportedly formed in an abstract collective (i.e. the conflation of society with the state) that did not, for Thatcherites, exist. The market society required the reallocation of the source of morality away from the abstract collectives to individuals and their families. Even though Thatcherites spoke panegyrically about the ethical and moral virtue of individualism, insofar as they wanted to 'get every person a capitalist', its conception of the individual was not conceptually consanguineous with classical liberal atomism.[47] When Thatcherites talked about individuals they were decontested as families.[48] In addition, families had a particularly distinctive decontestation. When Thatcherites, and John Major as Prime Minister in the 1990s, talked about family values, it equated to the socio-political beliefs of the nuclear family.[49] Freeden similarly observed that 'the family and the individual' were 'frequently mentioned in the same breath, so that individualism is underpinned by and interpreted through a 'natural' group framework which is institutionally constraining and morally directive', and thus family and the individual were 'the two complementary units of society' in Thatcherism.[50] The

---

[46] O. Letwin. 2003. *The Neighbourly Society: Collected Speeches 2001-2003*. London: Centre for Policy Studies, 43.

[47] M. Thatcher. 1978. 'Wales Conservative Conference Speech', 10 June.

[48] Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite quoted in M. Grimley, 'Thatcherism, Morality and Religion', In *Making Thatcher's Britain*, 89.

[49] M. David, 'Moral and Maternal: The Family in the Right', In *The Ideology of the New Right*, 136-168.

[50] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 390.

ultimate operative unit of a *stable* market society was the family and not the individual. The invocation of families was always used in Thatcherite rhetoric when appealing to a sense of community or talking about the importance of society. Family constituted the 'basic ties' and 'the very nursery of civic virtue', which lay 'at the heart of our society':[51]

> 'Personal effort doesn't undermine the community: it enhances the community. When individual talents are held back the community is held back too...A parent's success is shared by his family, a pupil's success by his school, a solider's by his regiment. A man may claim Everest for himself, but at the summit he plants his nation's flag'.[52]

This is an observation of fundamental importance as the Thatcherite conception of society postulated that with an atrophied social state, families would be stronger *viz* cohesion in the wider community would be stronger. The family imagined was the family rooted in Thatcherism's ancestral roots - 'private, often hierarchical, groups where the father governs over his family'[53] - discrepant with many of the families that existed during the 1980s. Marc Mulholland argued that Thatcherism did not just restore family and social solidarity to its 'rightful locale: civic society', but in remoulding the state, as the strong supervisor of private individuals, it aimed to 'encourage the development of a family-based workforce' , the place where everyone was privy to the disciplines of the market.[54] Society was an archipelago of private governments called families. Thatcherites wanted to mobilise the family as the unit through which, individuals in the market

---

[51] M. Thatcher. 1988. 'Speech to General Assembly of the Church of Scotland', 21 May.

[52] M. Thatcher. 1988. 'Conference Speech', 14 October.

[53] Robin, *The Reactionary Mind*, 16.

[54] M. Mulholland. 2012. *Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear: From Absolutism to Neo-Conservatism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 258.

society could become volunteers, consumers, parents and owner-occupiers in the effort to remoralise British society.[55]

As families, composed of private groups or governments of individuals, were the repository of morality, this had consequences for other features of the market society. The market society was 'a moral society' for Thatcher, where 'people are free to make choices, to make mistakes, to be generous and compassionate', as against the 'society where the state is responsible for everything, and no one is responsible for the state'.[56] The Thatcherite market society, unleashing and spreading commercial values, was a manifestation of the bourgeois civil society. According to Mulholland, Thatcherism's market society was a 'terrain structured by commercialism but not reducible to sheer economic calculation'.[57] Families are the capsules of morality for Thatcherism and the place where bourgeois opinions are formed, which support the growing commercialisation of social life.[58] Everything else however, was reducible to economic calculation. Institutions were 'registers of market information',[59] which allowed free individuals to opt in or out of enterprise. Institutions that facilitated the market were created such as the Enterprise Zones, the Urban Development Corporations, Training and Enterprise Councils, and those institutions, which were the enemies of Thatcherism's 'enterprise culture', were traduced.[60] The

---

[55] Campbell, *Iron Lady*, 498.

[56] M. Thatcher. 1977. 'Speech to Zurich Economic Society', 14 March.

[57] Mulholland, *Bourgeois Liberty*, 7.

[58] See D. N. McCloskey. 2006. *The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.

[59] Green, *Thatcher*, 81.

[60] See W. Grant. 1989. 'The Erosion of Intermediary Institutions', *Political Quarterly* 60 (1): 10-21; see A. Thornley. 1991. *Urban Planning under Thatcherism: The Challenge of the Market.* 2nd edn. London: Routledge.

support for institutions of enterprise were used in concert with families to try to rejuvenate 'commercial communality'. Harrison argued that Thatcherism produced new enterprise communities, which were not necessarily less cohesive than the industrial working class communities that disappeared in the 1980s. These new communities,[61] with the Thatcherite decontestation of families as the *medius* of morality, were supported by new commercial institutions:

> 'Restaurants catered for the family eating out, suburban supermarkets encouraged family shopping expeditions, garages serviced the family car in its role as the home's detachable mobile room, caravan parks house the family's mobile home. In the age of the telephone and the car, distance between relatives and friends did not necessarily mean separation, only a freer choice of association, with the concept of community spreading over a much wider area'.[62]

These new commercial, transient and diversified communities and institutions were the infrastructure or architecture of the market society. Labour decontestations of community as one of working-class solidarity pivoted around trade unions; or Liberal conceptions of community around devolution of political power and community politics, that grew out of the new pressure group politics of the 1960s, were discrepant from this Thatcherite social vision. Thatcher's market communities, with a new nexus of enterprise institutions, supplanted the alternative association of community with affective ties of trust and solidarity: 'markets are living, bustling, spontaneously generated communities'.[63] The

---

[61] Some Thatcherites thought there was a difference between society as 'a framework of interests' and community as the 'focus for loyalties'. Communities in Thatcherite thought are indistinguishable from the Thatcherite conception of society. R. Harris. 1989. *The Conservative Community: The Roots of Thatcherism - and Its Future*. London: Centre for Policy Studies, 34.

[62] Harrison, *Finding a Role?* 101.

[63] Freeden, *Ideology*, 95; Thatcher, 'Speech to Scottish Conservative Party Conference'.

Thatcherite decontestation of community was rooted and given expression in the interconnection of ‘‘family, private market, and voluntary sector’’.[64]

Thatcherism, as discussed, had reduced the size of the social state and rolled forward the market economy as the two essential preconditions of creating a market society. Communities, albeit changed, survived but these were commercial communities integrated by institutions that were marketised and supportive of the Thatcher Government’s social market vision. The size of economic as well as social units were scaled down: the welfare state was broken down into hospital trusts and big comprehensives into self-governed state schools. The corporate economy of the 1970s was privatised, in the name of ‘popular capitalism’, into units by entrepreneurs operating within a smaller, but stronger, state. Thatcher and her band of Thatcherite Tories had recreated the commercial society expounded by Burke, Adam Smith and Conservatives down the ages: one where a traditional and commercial order ‘could be represented as at once natural and progressive and defended by reference to a system of civilized manners’.[65] It was the amalgamation of economic liberty and social conventionalism. It was only to *some degree* however, that the market society Thatcherites envisaged came to pass. As discussed, thinkers like John Gray and David Green had observed the tension between intention and outcome in Thatcherism. One problem was the market society’s notion that the family was the cradle of morality. The family was not necessarily invested with the ‘vigorous virtues’ and ‘conservative individualism’ envisaged by Thatcherism.[66] Even though the market society was

---

[64] Malcolm Wicks quoted in J. Lewis. 1989. ‘‘It All Really Starts in the Family...’: Community Care in the 1980s’, In *Thatcher’s Law*, 83.

[65] J. G. A. Pocock. 1985. *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays in Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 209.

[66] See S. Letwin. 1978. ‘Conservative Individualism’, In *Conservative Essays*, edited by M. Cowling. London: Cassell, 52-68.

more pervasive than the market economy, insofar as it penetrated areas of life that had remained non-market, a boundary did, in theory, exist between the moral family and the institutions of the market society. Families in Thatcherism - and the traditional values they theoretically harboured - 'were to compensate for any damage capitalism might be inflicting on individuals and the lifeworld - a kind of consolation through pleasing aesthetics'![67] However, the boundary between the market and non-market sphere of the family was not properly policed. The economics of Thatcherism and the ethic of the market society, in part because of an absence of the vigorous virtues and the stubborn presence of what Green called 'civic virtues',[68] undermined many families. Indeed, important ceremonial and contractual family glue was weakened, such as tax and benefit changes, which positively discriminated against marriage.[69] Institutional enervation and transition from state provision to family provision contributed to the weakening of the social fabric, and the collapse of some communities in the face of the promotion of competitive self-interest necessary for the moral underpinning the market society. This is not to discount social trends prior to Thatcherism. Thatcherite ideas, like all political concepts, are constrained in an idea environment: birth control, flexible labour markets, 'assortive mating', market deregulation, divorce law reform, secularisation, the post-Fordist economic structure, female entry into the labour market and the proliferation of suburban self-sufficient living, were all prior and parallel contributions to Thatcherism, to the weakening of traditional communities. The hallmarks of Britain's old communities - churches, chapels, pubs, tea-shops, public lavatories, public baths, public transport and public phone-

---

[67] Müller, *Contesting Democracy*, 213.

[68] Green, *Reinventing Civil Society*, viii.

[69] Campbell, *Iron Lady*, 250.

boxes - were all in decline just when Britain's new communities were growing and flourishing.

Despite the market society's partial success in terms of the ideology produced, the other part of Thatcherism's dual core conceptual arrangement, the shrinking of the political, was much more successful. The market society was to fill the void created by the retrenchment of politics; replacing the coordinative and interventionist categorical decisions of the state with the spontaneous processes of the market. The market society's moral base was not finished. As Harrison noted, 'Conservatives were by no means unconcerned at the situation'.[70] Over the next two decades, and beyond, Conservatives have been grappling with this conceptual and ideological conundrum. The market society's incompletion, or failure, still presents a challenge to the Conservatives under Cameron.

b. The Dethronement and Limitation of Politics: The Strong State and Libertarian Individuals

The market society was only one prong of Thatcherism. The other was more dramatic - but conceptually co-reliant on the efflorescence of the market society: namely, the overwhelming re-coordination of the political. This Thatcherite conception of the political - whilst conforming to past attempts to decontest the political in a less maximalist and progressively-transformative way, which are distinct from the ideologies of liberalism (contingent injustices) and social democracy (immanent critique) - has been interpreted variously as: 'civic',

[70] Harrison, *Finding a Role?* 94.

'formal', non-programmatic',[71] 'minimalistic',[72] 'thin' and 'nomocratic'.[73] The features of its limited conception of politics, anti-political or depoliticised politics[74] are: the retrenchment of the *social state* in order for the market society to thrive,[75] and the rolling back, but parallel contained strengthening, of the *qualitative*[76] and *nomocratic* state. These features served as the two essential preconditions for a Thatcherite conception of politics. My specific formulation of this vision resides in the 'Oakeshottian civil society state':[77] a 'strong state' or a neoliberal rule-based state functioning as the best mechanism for the narrowing of the conception of citizenship in line with the parallel proliferation of market languages and practices, which superintend on a society of libertarian individuals in a market society, restrained by a renascent collection of moralistic vigorous virtues. In order to realise the manifold features of the Thatcherite reorientation of the political, the chapter considers the 'political thinking' of Thatcherism. Fundamentally however, the Thatcherite narrowing of politics is as political as the politics it is trying to emasculate. Carl Schmitt wrote that 'the political is the total,

---

[71] O'Sullivan, 'The Politics of Ideology', 189.

[72] R. Plant. 1991. *Modern Political Thought*, Oxford: Blackwell, 248-251; D. Özsel. 2014. 'The Conservative Minimum: Historical and Transcendent Subject', *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought*. Doi: 10.1080/23269995.2014.933054.

[73] R. Plant. 2010. *The Neo-Liberal State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 16. Hayek refers to the 'nomocratic society' in relation to his conception of the 'spontaneous order', In Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, 182.

[74] For a definition of depoliticisation operating in contemporary British politics see M. Flinders and J. Buller. 2006. 'Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools', *British Politics* 1 (3): 293-318.

[75] Peter Burnham argues that the post-war governments before the Thatcher Government used a 'discretion-based' approach, which effectively 'politicised' economic and monetary policy-making. See P. Burnham. 2007. 'The Politicisation of Monetary Policy-Making in Postwar Britain', *British Politics* 2 (3): 395-419.

[76] C. Schmitt. 1998. 'Strong State and Sound Economy: An Address to Business Leaders', In *Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy* by R. Cristi. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 212-232.

[77] Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, 201, 313-314, 318.

and...any decision whether something is *unpolitical* is always a *political* decision'.[78] Thus, the attempt to limit the scope of politics amounts to a political performance intended to limit a certain conception of politics and replace it with another.

Freeden's most recent scholarship advocated a 'political turn' in political theory: the enthrallment and centrality of politics, in contradistinction to ethical and philosophical turns in political theory, in the investigation of *actual* and *real* thought-practices.[79] Freeden's approach is to analyse the process of 'political thinking', in which six core features can be identified: (1) ultimate-decision making and the regulation of social affairs; (2) ranking collective priorities; (3) the mobilization of support for groups or withholding it; (4) the conceptualization of social order/stability and disorder/instability; (5) projecting future visions and constructing plans for society; and (6) engaging the power aspects embedded in language, by means of reason, rhetoric, emotion or menace.[80] Freeden's six features of 'political thinking' perform as a yardstick by which to evince this distinctive decontestation of a retrenched conception of the political in Thatcherism. Thatcherite 'political thinking' applies to the entire host of concepts both adjacent - such as the individual; authority; citizenship rights; nationhood; responsibility - and periphery - incentives, privatisation; debureuacratisation; personal responsibility, justice as reward, sanctity of private property, democracy as capital and property-ownership; and choice as economic freedom. All of these adjacent and periphery concepts in Thatcherite ideology, in line with Freeden's

---

[78] C. Schmitt. 2005. *Political Theology*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2 (emphasis in the original).

[79] Freeden, 'Editorial: The 'political turn' in political theory', 1-14.

[80] Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 33-36.

criteria of 'political thinking', constitute the second core concept of Thatcherism. Alongside the *positive* attempt to elevate the importance of civil society as the locus for the elevation of market values, it is mutually supported by a *negative* attempt to remove the obstacles to the creation of a market society, which required more than just a freer market and a stronger state, but a retrenchment of the political sphere as part of its statecraft.

(1) Thatcherism has been skewed by interpretations that align its practice with a *particularistic* conception of statecraft. Gamble commented that, 'Thatcherism is much better explained as statecraft than ideology'.[81] Statecraft refers, vaguely, to the *practice* of governing, making decisions and the regulation of social affairs.[82] Statecraft more specifically therefore is a chosen method of governing, or chosen political arrangement and the concomitant conception of the role, size and capacity of the state, which enables political parties in government to find policy positions to problems that allow for the greater easement of governing. Indeed, a source of Thatcherism's political strength was the success of its translation of abstract notions into codifiable, practicable and, on occasion, popular policies and positions.[83] 'The Thatcherite outsiders of 1974-79', Brian Harrison wrote, 'were the utilitarians of the 1830s: the essential men who in a crisis could translate policy into action'.[84] Thatcherite success, in the translatability of its ideas into policies and positions, is an example of an accomplished *action-orientation* of ideology, in which, statecraft is a component

---

[81] Gamble, *Free Economy and the Strong State*, 141. Also see Hay and Farrall, 'Interrogating and conceptualizing the legacy of Thatcherism', 3-30.

[82] M. Thatcher. 2002. *Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World*. London. HarperCollins, xvii.

[83] See G. Peele. 1988. 'British Conservatism: Ideological Change and Electoral Uncertainty', In *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism*, edited by B. Girvin. London: SAGE, 13-34.

[84] Harrison, 'Mrs Thatcher and the Intellectuals', 214.

concept. Statecraft is an integral part of Thatcherism, but it is a subsumable aspect of its overall ideology. Statecraft is thus not so much an approach, but a concept that is incorporated into its ideological family of concepts. Gamble and Jim Bulpitt see the relationship in reverse: Thatcherite statecraft, in the 'art of winning elections, insulates 'high politics' from the collision of class interests within the market order by 'depoliticising' issues, which would undermine the 'governing' competence of Tory administrations. Statecraft is better understood therefore as belonging to the aspect of 'the political', which Freeden defines as the regulation of social affairs and ultimate decision-making.

Ideology, for Bulpitt, is instrumental in relation to statecraft: ideology is merely another feather in the Thatcherite statecraft bow. This interpretation of statecraft is very particularistic and contestable. Statecraft, as stated, is better understood as a concept; a concept, which like all concepts, is 'essentially contested'. Statecraft is conducive to ideological analysis; there is not *a* concept of statecraft, but conceptions of statecraft. Thatcherite statecraft is a governing strategy that has a particular, idiosyncratic conception of the political distinct from, in the context of Britain in the 1980s, from a presumable Kinnockian or a Steelian-Owenite statecraft, which would have had different intentions and produced different outcomes.

Oakeshott's 'reconceptualisation of statehood' is integral to the Thatcherite conception of the state, and thus integral to understanding the 'political thinking' of Thatcherite decision-making. Oakeshott's vision of a civic association, or civil society, it is argued here, 'came down to earth in the practice of Margaret Thatcher'.[85] Contrastingly, Paul Franco and Timothy Fuller argued respectively,

---

[85] J. Hart. 1993. 'The Civilised Imperative', In *The Achievement of Michael Oakeshott*, edited by J. Norman. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co, 83.

that Oakeshott was not the 'philosophical *éminence grise*' nor the 'guru of Thatcherism'.[86] It is true that Oakeshott was not the *éminence grise* or the guru of Thatcherism, and nor was he the philosophical favourite of Thatcherites. However, essays by Oakeshott that appeared in *Rationalism in Politics* and his later work, *On Human Conduct*, rejected what he called the 'enterprise association' (*universitas*), as it imperilled the political economy of freedom and limited government, which Oakeshott implicitly supported. This resonated with Thatcherism. The enterprise association, which Hayek similarly critiqued in his notion of the end-dependent or teleocratic state, was an association with specific, state-driven aims (i.e. social justice). Oakeshott compared the enterprise state, which he saw in the post-war social democratic/paternalist state, to a 'sanatorium', which treats all as sick and suffering, and eventually the condition of the state itself becomes sick and suffering.[87] The enterprise association was a teleocratic state; a government with a mission. Oakeshott in his 1949 essay, 'The Political Economy of Freedom', chiming with the anti-collectivism of Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* and John Jewkes's *Ordeal of Planning*, argued implicitly against the Attlee Government's attempt to create a new society by cultivating an enterprise state alien to traditional British politics.[88] Oakeshott argued that collectivism, in the form of nationalisation, state planning and wealth redistribution, threatened the 'civic association' (*societas*), which protected the independent institutions and ancient traditions of British civil society. The Oakeshottian decontestation of the civic association, in contrast, was government

---

[86] P. Franco. 2004. *Michael Oakeshott: An Introduction*. New York/London: Yale University Press, ix; T. Fuller, 'The Poetics of the Civil Life', In *The Achievement of Michael Oakeshott*, 68.

[87] Müller, *Contesting Democracy*, 224.

[88] Oakeshott also thought that post-1945 Conservatism had accepted rationalist and state-centric politics. See Oakeshott, 'Contemporary British Politics', 474-490.

as a ‘neutral umpire’, administering rules of behaviour, within which citizens pursue their own goals. In the *societas*, individuals relate to each other, not because they share a concrete goal, but in that they acknowledge the authority of the jurisdiction under which they live. ‘People are associated’, Oakeshott argued, ‘not because they share the same substantive wants, but because they accept the same conditions in seeking to pursue their own goals as they believe best’.[89]

The Oakeshottian vision of a civil association chimed with Thatcherism. In order to have a set of conditions which are accepted by all, the state had to be stronger in fewer areas. Rebuilding the authority of government required a limiting of the areas of its responsibility and a cultural shift in the electorate’s expectation of the role, scope and responsibility of the state. For Thatcherites, the enterprise association, with its specific, end-dependent teleocratic goals, was in evidence in the 1970s with the problems of ‘overload’, ‘ungovernability’, inflation and welfare dependency. Its intention therefore was to restore the authority of the rules and arrangements of the state by narrowing the scope of politics: government had overloaded itself with a whole paraphernalia of wage policies, price controls, pay boards, national plans and corporatist deals, which were undermining the effectiveness of the economy. In trying to manage overload and overcome the ‘stalemate state’, Thatcherites argued Britain was becoming ungovernable. Thatcherism had various remedies that shrunk the scope of politics: ‘the largest programme of privatisation’ in British history,[90] and the deregulation, liberalisation and contracting-out of existing government regulations; restrictions and services to deal with overload; the centralisation of autonomous decision-

---

[89] Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, 313-314.

[90] M. Thatcher. 1985. ‘Speech to Joint Houses of Congress’, 20 February.

making of the executive from below (i.e. local government, Greater London Council), above (i.e. European Community), and outside (i.e. trade unions), to deal with ungovernability; the restoration of a pre-Keynesian economics in readjusting the primary duty of government away from full employment to maintaining the value of currency and monitoring the money supply to deal with inflation;[91] and the rescaling of the welfare state and the 'freeing' of the individual in the economic sphere, by reducing taxes, liberalising the labour market and deregulating economics to deal with welfare dependency. All of this, including Bulpitt's link between statecraft and monetarism, amounted to restoring the authority of the state in order to re-create the market. Oakeshott wrote:

> 'The office of government is not to impose other beliefs and activities upon its subjects, not to tutor or educate them, not to make them better or happier in another way, not to direct them, to galvanize them into action, to lead them or coordinate their activities so that no occasion of conflict can occur; the office of government is merely to rule'.[92]

Oakeshott was not the only intellectual influence on the Thatcherite determination to rescale the political by restricting decision-making to the central executive and reconceptualising the state's primary duty to superintend and regulate the social affairs of the market society. Hayek, the other influence, believed the role of the state ought to be negative, never affirmative of any positive outcomes or ideal patterns of production or distribution. The state was to be limited to a merely supervisory function. Hayek however, was influenced by 'the Crown Jurist of the

---

[91] Lawson, 'The New Conservatism'.

[92] Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics*, 186-187.

Third Reich', Carl Schmitt.[93] Schmitt argued that the strong state alone could make possible the task of decentralising economic decisions, securing the autonomy of intermediate social institutions, and depoliticising areas of society. 'A state that is to bring about this new order', Schmitt wrote, 'ought to be...extraordinarily strong'.[94] Like Bulpitt, Schmitt decontested the strong state, not in the *range*, *scope, volume*, or *quantity* of the state, but in regard to the state's 'qualitative' strength (in terms of *quality* and *energy*).[95]

Oakeshott, Hayek and Schmitt recognised that the limitation of politics and the rolling forward of the free market depended on a strong state. The Thatcherite belief was, that in the regulation of social affairs, a stronger state was required: Thatcherism showed that 'overload and ungovernability...were related. By trying to do too much, governments ended up achieving very little. More did indeed mean less'.[96] The 1979 Conservative manifesto complained that the state in, '[a]ttempting to do too much, politicians have failed to do those things which should be done'.[97] 'The crisis of state authority in the 1970s', Gamble critiqued, 'was blamed on the extended state of social democracy, which has weakened rather than strengthened the state by overburdening it with responsibilities it could

---

[93] J. W. Müller. 2003. *A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 40; W. E. Scheuerman. 1997. 'The unholy alliance of Carl Schmitt and Friedrich A. Hayek', *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory* 4 (2): 172-188.

[94] Schmitt quote in Cristi, *Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism*, 33-34.

[95] Schmitt, 'Strong State and Sound Economy', 218; D. Held. 1988. 'Liberalism, Marxism and the Future Direction of Public Policy', In *Rethinking Socialist Economics*, edited by P. Nolan and S. Paine. Cambridge: Polity Press, 16.

[96] Willetts, *Modern Conservatism*, 51

[97] 'The Conservative Manifesto 1979', 2000. In *Conservative Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997*, edited by I. Dale. Oxford: Routledge, 266.

not discharge'.[98] The problem of the discrepancy between the ideology consumed and produced in Thatcherism arises again. Against the 'neoliberal *lingua franca* of the restoration of *laissez-faire*', Thatcherism was a 'judicious balance between market freedom and social control'.[99] The Thatcherite diminution of the volume of the state in economics affairs allowed it to concentrate the power and capacity of the state in fewer areas: the maintenance of the *Rechtsstaat*, strict control of money, civil order and the proliferation of markets in civil society, which had been vacated by the retreat of the state. A 'limited' government did not mean an impotent or feeble one. The Thatcherite conceptualisation of social regulation and decision-making revived the Salisburyite conception of the state: 'superintending the institutions of civil society, and occasionally supplementing them, but not as being in the business of managing the economy'.[100] Thatcherism's assault and replacement of the weak, overextended or quantitative state, with a strong, condensed and qualitative state, is derived from Oakeshottian insights on the state and civil society. For this reason, Kenneth Minogue correctly argued that Oakeshott 'supported much that was done by Margaret Thatcher's government after 1979'.[101] The first element of 'political thinking' in Thatcherism, making decisions and the regulation of social affairs, is exemplified in its defence of a strong, centralised state disengaged from society.

(2) Thatcherism's overall ranking of collective priorities places economic priorities ahead of social priorities. Nevertheless, the privileging of economics had

---

[98] Gamble, *Free Economy and the Strong State*, 171. The Conservative manifesto of 1979 argued that the rule of law had been undermined by the Wilson-Callaghan Governments of 1974-79, and included rising levels of crime and public disorder during industrial disputes (i.e. the 'winter of discontent' in 1978-79), political demonstrations and violence at sporting events, into a singular problem of a *weak* and *overextended* state.

[99] Lakin and Ostrowski, 'Ideology in the Age of the Coalition', 21.

[100] Gray, 'Conservatism, Individualism and the Political Thought of the New Right', 91.

[101] K. Minogue, 'Three Conservative Realists', In *Conservative Realism*, 154.

profound implications for social priorities. Thatcherism argued that *economic realism*, as the precondition of any desirable element of *social integration*, must come first.[102] The ranking of collective priorities had been the obverse of the post-war era, in which Britain had, according to one Thatcherite, 'long been lost to a kind of narcissism by attending to the luxuries of social integration'.[103] Social integration had wrongheadedly been placed in *prior* importance to economic realism for the Thatcherites. Social integration was essentially a by-product of prosperity generated by a market economy.[104] This reconceptualisation of 'political thinking', regarding the arrangement of collective priorities, was profound in intention: tax cuts, predominantly for higher income groups, were rhetorically more important than increases in public expenditure; inflation-targeting was more important than government programmes designed to ameliorate the scourge of 'concealed' unemployment;[105] the private sector was seen as the rescuer of the nation and the public sector as part of the 'British disease',[106] decontested as social democratic welfarism; and the displacement of the language of social choice with market choice in civil society, public service provision, conceptions of citizenship and the relationship between the state and the individual, and between individuals.[107]

---

[102] Minogue, 'Introduction: The Context of Thatcherism', xvi

[103] Ibid.

[104] When asked about 'social cohesion', Thatcher retorted: 'Social cohesion? It is not a phrase I ever use!' M. Thatcher. 1988. 'Interview for The Times', 25 October.

[105] P. Lilley. 1989. *Thatcherism: The Next Generation*. London: Centre for Policy Studies, 11.

[106] 'The Next Moves Forward: The Conservative Manifesto 1987', In *Conservative Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997*, 314.

[107] D. S. King. 1987. *The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 79; W. R. Louis. 1998. *More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain*. London: I. B. Tauris & Co, 295.

The ‘preeminence’ of economics in Thatcherism’s ideological arrangement serves a wider purpose in its political thinking: the demotion of ‘maximalist’ politics. Maximalist (similar to what Oakeshott called ‘rationalist’) approaches, so defined by Raymond Plant, is characterised by *positive freedom* in which the realisation of particular ends and goals is fulfilled by elaborating patterns and maps for particular and fundamental needs, desires, capacities, opportunities and resources in society.[108] Minimalist approaches, based on the idea of general means to freedom, avoid the need for elaborate conceptions of needs, desires, capacities, opportunities and resources. Thatcherite political minimalism is located in its reification of the state as an umpire of rules, and the designation of the free market economy as the location for the extra-human origins of social order, which is not manipulable by the volition of individual agents. Thus the market society is the ground where these two conceptions of the political minimum converge: ‘[t]he ‘naturalness’ of these two tendencies defines both the source of the social order and the paths of its possible modification’.[109] Even though Plant articulated this maximalist/minimalist division in relation to conceptions of freedom, it should be applied to the broader category of *the political* in the instance of Thatcherism.

In moving from social integration to economic realism as the primary objective in its ranking order, Thatcherism was intent on extinguishing the *problem of guilt*. The ‘pursuit of equality was a mirage’, Thatcher and Joseph thought.[110] It was ‘“bourgeois guilt”’[111] defined as, ‘that sense of guilt and self-criticism that affects those...who cling to a relatively comfortable life while

---

[108] Plant, *Modern Political Thought*, 248-251.

[109] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 414.

[110] See K. Joseph and J. Sumption. 1979. *Equality*. London: John Murray.

[111] M. Thatcher. 1975. ‘Speech to the Institute of SocioEconomic Studies’, 15 September.

feeling a troublesome pang of conscience because there are others less well off'.[112] There were multiple origins of societal guilt: the political penitence of poverty in the age of industry; memories of the hardships endured during the Great Depression of the 1930s; apologies for Britain's imperial past; and the moral questionability of the nuclearisation of international politics. Brought together, it constituted a rolling-out of politics, or the politicisation of British society. As discussed, the overarching feature of the post-war years, after World War Two, was the supereminence of politics as a decision-making method for social problems.[113] Areas of social life became politicised: 'subject to categorical decisions binding on the community as a whole, rather than left to spontaneous processes'.[114] Thatcherism wanted to return to an 'older realism', or an era in which politics was minimalistic and secondary to the spontaneous civil and market orders. Thatcherites argued that this older realism had been 'obscured' by an 'entire culture of guilt', and as such the 'repudiation of collective guilt',[115] was the underlying moral imperative for the Thatcherite reordering of economic realism before social integration in its political thinking.[116]

Economic realism, as being conceptually prior to social integration, is an illustration of the disarranging of the collective priorities of the political thinking of Thatcherism in line with its overarching commitment to diminishing the scope and sphere of politics. The ascendence of economics altered the conception of

---

[112] M. Thatcher. 1977. *Let Our Children Grow Tall: Selected Speeches, 1975-77*. London: Centre for Policy Studies, 4.

[113] Barry, *The New Right*, i.

[114] Ibid, 113.

[115] Thatcher expressed this sentiment potently in 1979 when she wrote in a note, there is "no such thing as a collective conscience, collective kindness, collective gentleness, collective freedom". Thatcher quoted in McSmith, *No Such Thing as Society*, 5.

[116] K. Minogue, 'The Emergence of the New Right', In *Thatcherism*, 137, 125.

citizenship too. Minimalism is applied to Thatcherism's conception of citizenship. T. H. Marshall's famous study of citizenship traced the development of citizenship rights in three stages: civil, political and social rights. It was the latest stage of social rights - equating them to the exponential growth of economic and welfare rights including guarantees beyond the 'national minimum', such as certain educational rights, free health care, old age pensions, economic security and public welfare - that was targeted for retrenchment.[117] Thatcherites argued that social rights and its search for equal entitlements, stimulated and pursued by organisations such as the trade unions and the Labour Party, lead automatically to increased state intervention in the economy, higher public spending and vast bureaucracies in order to satisfy these expanded citizenship rights. Social rights eroded the family's traditional role as provider of support against hardship, enfeebled the (economic) responsibility of rich individuals, and infantilised poor ones. Rights could be exercised in the economic sphere to the extent that choice was decontested narrowly as economic, both so as to check state power and strengthen the family.[118] Social rights therefore were subordinated to economic rights in the Thatcherite ranking of rights, which was congruent with the overall ranking of collective priorities in Thatcherism. The 'wider ideal of social citizenship', therefore, was 'deeply antithetical to the maintenance of a free market economy' desired by Thatcherites.[119] One of the most successful aspects of Thatcherism's recalibration of the ranking of rights, in relation to citizenship, was the redefinition of language itself: 'replacing "state-citizen" relations with

---

[117] M. Ignatieff. 1989. 'Citizenship and Moral Narcissism', *Political Quarterly* 60 (1): 63.

[118] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 392.

[119] R. Plant. 1990. 'Citizenship, Empowerment and Welfare', In *The Alternative: Politics for a Change*, edited by B. Pimlott, A. Wright and T. Flower. London: W. H. Allen, 35.

"provider-client" ones'.[120] This coincided in the 1980s with the prevalence of enterprise values: the 'student', 'patient' or 'client' was now a *consumer*, and meeting the demands of the 'sovereign consumer', was now the overriding institutional imperative of Thatcher's market society.[121] Freeden observed correctly that 'value', in Thatcherism, 'is decontested as 'value for money'', the very fuel of Thatcher's entrepreneurial market society.[122]

(3) Thatcherism vividly employed Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction in the mobilisation of 'friends' and the withholding of support to its 'enemies'. The 1980s was one of the most politically polarised decades in British politics since the 1930s. Even though Thatcher wanted to replace 'discord' with harmony' and 'despair' with 'hope'[123] (not withstanding the divisions of the 1970s), the lowering of inflation, the dismantling of the corporate state, and the *rhetorical* debureaucratisation of the public services,[124] 'Britain was a more divided nation in 1990 than it was in 1979'.[125]

Hayek argued that the weak, extended and quantitative state created a friend/enemy frontier *ad infinitum*, because collectivism and 'collaboration presupposes common purposes, people with different aims are necessarily enemies who fight each other for the same means'.[126] The restoration of the strong state, theoretically, served to contain and restrain these enemies. When the state is

---

[120] M. Freeden. 2005. *Liberal Languages: Ideological Imaginations and Twentieth-Century Progressive Thought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 191.

[121] R. Keat. 1991. 'Introduction: Starship Britain or Universal Enterprise?' In *Enterprise Culture*, edited by R. Keat and N. Abercrombie. London: Routledge, 2-3.

[122] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 393.

[123] M. Thatcher. 1979. 'Remarks on becoming Prime Minister (St Francis's Prayer)', 4 May.

[124] See S. Jenkins. 1996. *Accountable to None: The Tory Nationalization of Britain*. London: Penguin.

[125] Green, *Thatcher*, 196.

[126] Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, 270.

threatened, for Thatcherites, so is authority and with it the entire edifice of civil society. Roger Scruton argued that it was essential for there to 'be provision against sedition, laws which enable the power of the state to reassert itself against antagonists'.[127] Like Thatcher and the Thatcherites, Hayek argued that, supervised by the strong state, 'only the introduction of barter [markets] made it possible for the different individuals to be of use to each other without agreeing on the ultimate ends'.[128] The winners of the post-war settlement were those that wanted to expand politics and concomitantly regulate markets. They included the unions, the public services, higher education, the civil service and the climate of opinion consonant with liberal social democracy. They constituted the broad spectrum of losers in the process of the Thatcherite assertion of the strong state and the free market economy. This winner/loser distinction is analogous to Schmitt's friend/ enemy distinction. Politics involves groups that face off as mutual enemies.[129] The employment or withdrawal of support to groups in civil society is the manifestation of this friend/enemy distinction, and the mobilisation for and against these groups respectively was decided by the Thatcherite strong state. The rhetoric of Thatcherites employed Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction, insofar as politics was articulated between 'our people' and the 'enemy within', and the 'enemy without'. Thatcher mobilised support in different ways. Thatcher invoked the One Nation tradition of Toryism, but, unlike Macmillan or Heath, her decontestation of one nation Toryism was narrowly defined as 'wider property-owning democracy'.[130] When Thatcher talked about 'our people' she did not mean

---

[127] Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, 91.

[128] Ibid.

[129] C. Schmitt. 2004. *The Concept of the Political*. trans. by J. Seitzer. Durham: Duke University Press, 28-29.

[130] M. Thatcher. 1987. 'Interview for BBC Panorama', 8 June.

the British, or even the English; she referred to the people who thought like her and who shared her 'vigorous virtues': self-sufficiency, energy, independent mindedness, adventurousness, loyalty to friends and hardiness in the face of enemies.[131] Green noted that the phrase 'our people' was particularly significant in the Tory lexicon because, since the 1950s, it was 'shorthand for the party's core, middle-class constituency': Thatcherism attached this idea of 'our people' with a test of ideological purity, asking, is (s)he 'one of us'?[132]

Thatcherism had both an exclusive conception of her supporters and, in turn, the people Thatcherism supported. The 'enemy within' - immigrants, the 'militant' leaders of the trade unions, welfare claimants, the Scots, university academics, local government and liberal clergymen - and the 'enemy without' - international socialism and later the social Europe vision, with its attendant ideas of regulating workers' rights, a new web of taxes and corporatist style governance, promulgated by the European Commission[133]- both constituted groups inside and outside Britain that obstructed Thatcherism's vision of a market society. Thatcher infamously remarked that immigrants 'swamped' Britain with their 'different culture'.[134] 'Militant' trade unions substituted 'the rule of the mob for the rule of the law',[135] and destroyed, not created, employment. Welfare payments discouraged initiative and disincentivised work, and as such, supplementary benefits were cut. The Scottish, another nemesis of Thatcherism, were wedded to the 'democratic republican tradition of civic engagement' and a

---

[131] S. R. Letwin. 1992. *The Anatomy of Thatcherism*. London: Fontana, 32-36.

[132] Green, *Thatcher*, 20.

[133] M. Thatcher. 1989. 'Speech to Nottingham European Election Rally', 12 June.

[134] M. Thatcher. 1978. 'Interview for Granada World in Action', 27 January.

[135] M. Thatcher, 1984. 'Remarks on Orgreave picketing', 30 May.

moral economy, which to the ire of Thatcher, was discrepant with Thatcherism's centralisation of power in Westminster and her belief in the market society.[136] A majority of academic opinion, with some notable exceptions such as Geoffrey Elton, Elie Kedourie, A. L. Rowse and the 'Peterhouse Right',[137] possessed everything from anti-Tory feeling in the 1980s, in part because of mooted proposals to privatise higher education,[138] and the abolition of academic tenure in 1988, to pure revulsion, with Mary Warnock representatively describing Thatcherism as, 'deep philistinism, amounting not just to a failure to understand but a positive hatred of culture, learning and civilisation'.[139] Local government reform, such as the abolition of the Greater London Council and the Metropolitan counties, was a byproduct of Thatcherism's dislike for corporatist arrangements and its attendant high levels of public spending rather than to achieve administrative modernisation as Heath had sought in 1974. Moreover, local government for Thatcherism was not merely economically profligate, but the agents of 'loony left' permissiveness, which undermined the entire social order of Tory Britain: 'Labour = 'excessive' local government = high rates = permissiveness = radical blackness, queerness, feminism = erosion of the entire social order'.[140] The Church of England, far from being 'the Tory Party at prayer', was distinctively liberal and reformist in contrast to the Christian methodism of self-help, work ethic and wealth creation expounded by Thatcher.[141] The external

---

[136] Marquand, *Britain since 1918*, 325.

[137] Harrison, 'Mrs Thatcher and the Intellectuals', 206-234.

[138] See D. Lal. 1989. *Nationalised Universities: Paradox of the Privatisation Age*. London: Centre for Policy Studies.

[139] M. Warnock. 2000. *A Memoir: People & Places*. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co, 176.

[140] A. M. Smith. 1994. *New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality: Britain, 1968-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 184.

[141] Thatcher, 'Speech to General Assembly of the Church of Scotland'.

Soviet threat was denounced as 'totalitarian socialism', with its 'interpretations of equality and state legitimacy...countered with an appeal to constitutionalism and the respect for individual liberties'.[142] Thatcherism saw the social vision of Europe in the late 1980s as an attempt to reimpose state intervention and a new bureaucracy at the 'European level'.[143]

It is widely commented that Thatcherism had good ideological enemies both personally, General Galtieri, Arthur Scargill, Neil Kinnock, the 'two Davids' of the Alliance and the wets in the Tory Party, and intellectually, liberal humanism, pluralism, the welfare state, the social sciences, Marxism and social democracy. Thatcherism was also fortunate in its supporters. It was a coalition of voters dispossessed or disaffected from various quarters, which traversed class boundaries. Indeed, Thatcher decontested class as 'a communist concept', which 'groups people as bundles and sets them against each other'.[144] Thatcherism's hatred of class allowed them to project an *ostensibly* classless politics. Despite her hatred of class, Thatcherism and its electoral prioritisation of 'our people' was a proxy for class rhetoric. Thatcherism used what Jon Lawrence and Florence Braithwaite-Sutcliffe called a 'diffuse, mutable language of 'ordinariness', hard-working respectability and family-centred individualism' to describe her supporters, which she contended were 'near-universal values deep-rooted in the national psyche'.[145] Furthermore, the Thatcherite coalition of the Right constituted what could be called a *new class*, which would bring about Joseph's dream of the

---

[142] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 397.

[143] M. Thatcher. 1988. 'Speech to the College of Europe ("The Bruges Speech")', 20 September.

[144] M. Thatcher. 1992. 'Don't Undo My Work', *Newsweek*, 27 April.

[145] Lawrence and Braithwaite, 'Margaret Thatcher and the Decline of Class Politics', 135.

'forward march of *embourgeoisement*'.[146] The Thatcher government conferred support on several and disparate groups: the 'aspiring' lower middle class;[147] the 'C2' skilled working class; the emerging service sector workers; business and commercial interests;[148] Conservative traditionalists; managers and entrepreneurs.[149] Support for the social, the collective and the political was withdrawn, and support for the economic, the individual and the private was advanced. Thatcherism was an exemplification of an ideology that utilisises binaries between friends and enemies to shore up other aspects of its ideological field.[150]

(4) Thatcherism's conception of social order was particularly stark in its political thinking. Marquand argued that Thatcherism belonged to the Tory nationalist tradition on his ideological map, because it 'stood above all for authority'.[151] Authority in the conceptual morphology of Conservative ideologies is a 'service concept' however, sured up to maintain and preserve a Conservative social order.[152] It was the threat to the authority and the ability of the state to discharge authority, which gave the Thatcherite decontestation of social order its distinctiveness. Freeden and Scruton, in different registers, have talked about the core component of Conservatism as protecting a pre-existing social order.

---

[146] See pages 57-58.

[147] See R. King and N. Nugent. eds. 1979. *Respectable Rebels: Middle Class Campaigns in Britain in the 1970s*. Kent: Hodder and Stoughton.

[148] See N. Rollings. 2013. 'Cracks in the Post-War Keynesian Settlement? The Role of Organised Business in Britain in the Rise of Neoliberalism Before Margaret Thatcher', *Twentieth Century British History* 24 (4): 637-659.

[149] Thatcher called the latter 'wonderful people'. Thatcher quoted in R. Eccleshall. 1990. *English Conservatism since the Restoration: An Introduction & Anthology*. London: Unwin Hyman, 13.

[150] Thatcherism constructed other binary opposites: private sector 'good'/public sector 'bad'; wealth creators/downward wealth redistribution; small state/big state; liberty/equality; workers/ shirkers, and individualism/collectivism.

[151] Marquand, *Britain since 1918*, 283.

[152] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 388.

Thatcherism's pre-existing social order was however, from its perspective, tainted by the interventionist whims of government and trade union indiscipline - and as such the social order of Thatcherite political thinking was one that revived the authority of the state so as to protect the *organic* market order against the *artificial* (nationalised industries), *harmful* (trade unions) and *politicised* (local government) practices of its enemies.

Thatcherism's social order and authority was utilised in two different ways to confront the forces of disorder and chaos. First, the traditional promotion of patriotism, nationalism and authoritarianism against its enemies (i.e. the urban rioters in 1981; the Battle of Orgreave against striking miners in 1984 and the treatment of the victims of Hillsborough disaster in 1989). Second, the state was rolled back in order for the market economy to roll forward. One of the more interesting conceptual innovations in Thatcherism is the decontestation of markets, not *contra mundum* instruments of freedom but, as sources of *impersonal discipline and order*.[153] For example, even though many industries and companies were privatised, much of the public sector remained tax-payer funded in the 1980s. Disciplines and techniques borrowed from New Public Management were implemented into the public sector: audits, targets, internal markets, performance indicators and emphasis on outputs.[154] In terms of the wider use of markets outside of the public services, markets were used to emancipate the entrepreneur, but discipline those that did not conform to the market order. Contrary to Hayek's own protest,[155] his thought is derived from, and included within, Conservative

---

[153] Müller, *Contesting Democracy*, 225.

[154] See P. Pierson. 1994. *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[155] F. A. Hayek. 2006. *The Constitution of Liberty*. London: Routledge, 397-414.

ideology[156] in part because his conception of market order is underpinned by a similar decontestation of markets as mechanisms of discipline. With the same contempt Thatcherites had for socialists, Hayek thought those who were 'alienated or estranged from a society based on the market order are not bearers of a new moral', but are instead deemed 'non-domesticated or un-civilized'.[157] Richard Vinen argued convincingly that a 'concern for 'order'...was discernible in almost everything the Thatcher governments did and...this concern transcended the division between economic and non-economic policies'.[158] Thatcherism uses the authority of the state and the laws of free enterprise to appeal to the extra-human origins of social order, which minimised the role of politics as both the laws of free markets and the unchallengeable authority of the central state were presented as natural and unchangeable facts.

(5) The fifth element of Freeden's thesis on 'political thinking' refers to the projection of future visions and the construction of plans for society. This feature of the political features as the other core component of Thatcherism, the market society. Thatcher, in a pregnant phrase, stated in 1981 that '[e]conomics are the method; the object is to change the soul' in the political project of Thatcherism.[159] The *method* was doubly to liberalise and free up the economy, and to shrink the social state as a consequence. In proceeding with the rolling back of the social state, Thatcherism strengthened the authority and centralised the power of the state. In essence, the *free economy* and the *strong state* were the means to bring

---

[156] J. Gray. 1993. *Post-liberalism: Studies in Political Thought*. London: Routledge, 32-39; R. Scruton. 2006. 'Hayek and conservatism', In *The Cambridge Companion to Hayek*, edited by E. Feser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 208-231.

[157] Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, 304.

[158] R. Vinen. 2009. *Thatcher's Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the Thatcher Era*. London: Simon & Schuster, 276.

[159] R. Butt. 1981. 'Interview with Margaret Thatcher', *The Sunday Times*. 1 May.

about the *end* or *object* of the *market society*. The means also brought about the reorientation of political thinking, in which the market society was the social vision of Thatcherism. The market society, quite different from the market economy, pervaded almost all aspects of British life.[160] It included, within it, a deeply hostile attitude towards politics, where markets and communities were decontested as healers in mirror image to the way that 'politics divides'.[161] The Thatcherite state agitated, galvanised, encouraged and cajoled the acceptance of the market values of choice, competition and consumer within the infrastructure of civil society: namely, institutions, individuals and their families. Gamble recognised that Thatcherism's reform of the state and civil society meant that the state needed to be strengthened in order to reduce government responsibilities, distance itself from interest groups, and discipline the public sector. The strong state would change attitudes and behaviour towards the free market by changing the 'market economy' to a 'market society'. The market society was something that unified Thatcherites and the broader Thatcherite coalition of the Right. It restored a political settlement conducive to the electoral and ideological interests of Conservatism insofar as the market society, with its combination of social control and market freedom, brought about the desired *organic* forward movement to the past.

(6) Language and politics are inseparable. The limits of language are the limits of politics. The six features of political thinking refers to the engagement of power aspects in politics embedded in language, by means of reason, rhetoric, emotion or menace. The morphological analysis of political ideologies

---

[160] Sandel, *What Money Can't Buy*, 3-15.

[161] R. Scruton. 2006. *England: An Elegy*. London: Continuum, 125.

interrogates, or attempts to interrogate, the many layers of ideological articulation, from the vernacular to the expert. Conservatism, like all ideologies, rehearses a 'discursive ensemble', which refers to language as networks of meanings, concepts and values.[162] The power aspects of Thatcherite language were defiant, 'the lady's not for turning';[163] conclusive, 'there is no alternative';[164] sanctioning, 'one of us'; and menacing, 'no, no, no!'[165] One of the successful aspects of Thatcherism, as stated, was the articulation of complex ideas into a simpler, demotic idiom. The arcane and impenetrable money targets of monetarism, for example, and its emphasis on M3 (coins, notes and all sterling bank deposits), M1 (coins, notes and current accounts), M0 (coins and notes) and NIBM13 was a language with a 'scientific air' of reason.[166] Monetarist theory translated more rhetorically as the quantity theory of money. In its most simplistic and demotic form, Thatcher alluded to the ''housewives' budget'.[167] In all six aspects of political thinking, Thatcherism has a negative and minimalist conception of politics. Each Thatcherite had their own linguistic emphasis: Lawson used cerebral rhetoric to explain the return to the pre-Keynesian consensus and the economic sense of privatisation; Michael Heseltine orated rousingly about the sale of council houses; Kenneth Baker demonised Labour-controlled local government councils as 'loony'; Nicholas Ridley was messianic about the power of markets;

---

[162] M. Foucault. 1984. 'The order of discourse', In *Language and Politics*, edited by M. Shapiro. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 122.

[163] M. Thatcher. 1980. 'Conference Speech', 10 October.

[164] Moore, *Margaret Thatcher*, 480.

[165] M. Thatcher. 1990. 'Statement to the House of Commons', 30 October.

[166] P. Jenkins. 1989. *Mrs Thatcher's Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era*. London: Pan Books, 153-154.

[167] M. Thatcher. 1979. 'Speech at a General Election Press Campaign', 25 April; M. Thatcher. 1979. 'Radio Interview for London Broadcasting', 28 April.

and Tebbit was zealous about the virtues of Victorianism.[168] The languages were various: economic, monetarist, moral, nationalist, populist, libertarian, Conservative, restorationist, radical, visionary and authoritarian. Thatcherism's political thinking was conveyed, articulated and expressed into what Hall called a 'language of experience, moral imperative and common sense', in which economics and the politics of anti-statism was translated easily into a 'compulsive moralism'.[169] The effective employment of the power aspects in politics embedded in language, by means of reason, rhetoric, emotion or menace, was one of the most successful aspects of Thatcherism. Conceptual change is the partner of any reconstitution of the political world. In Thatcherism, some older concepts were restored, others expired and others were entirely refurbished. Hayek complained:

> 'Under the influence of socialist agitation in the course of the last hundred years the very sense in which many of the key words describing political ideals are used has so changed meaning that one must today hesitate to use even words like 'liberty', 'justice', 'democracy or 'law', because they no longer convey the meaning they once did'.[170]

Hayek lamented the move away from his macro-decontestation of political vocabulary. As a barometer of success, by the end of the Thatcher period, much of the language, in part as a consequence of effectively employing the power aspects of language, was decontested in a way that would have achieved the approval of Hayek.

---

[168] Marquand, *Britain since 1918*, 315.

[169] S. Hall, 'The Great Moving Right Show', In *The Politics of Thatcherism*, 28-29.

[170] Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, 469.

2. Conclusion: Old Bottle, New Wine?

Thatcherism was the new wine to the Conservative Party's old bottle. Thatcherism was, in line with intentionalist arguments, congruent with the past thought-practices of British Conservatism. Thatcherism wanted to restore the *status quo ante bellum*: before Whitehall-led economic Keynesianism, cultural liberalism and political social democracy reigned supreme. Thatcherites argued erroneously that the Conservatives had been complicit in this settlement from Winston Churchill's war-time Coalition to Edward Heath's defenestration in 1975. It lead Joseph to announce that, '[i]t was only in April 1974 that I was converted to Conservatism. I had thought that I was a Conservative but now I see that I was not really one at all'.[171] Joseph and Thatcher's 'conversion', 'more psychological than ideological',[172] to 'Conservatism' has not been fundamentally challenged since. As the vocabulary and conceptual tapestry of the post-war social democratic-liberal-One Nation centrist paradigm collapsed, the Conservatives recaptured domination over the political vocabulary of many of the dominant ideas in British politics, and this remains unchanged under Cameron's Conservative-led Coalition Government. Indeed, despite there being a New Labour 'interregnum' of thirteen years between two periods of Tory government, and despite their being a paradigm-challenging financial crisis in 2007-08, the prevailing political climate is still, *grosso modo*, Thatcherite. The intention of Thatcherism to restore Tory statecraft through its dual-core conceptual arrangement, the market society and the retrenchment of the political, has animated Conservative opinion for five decades, and shows no signs of abating. It is the Thatcherite and post-Thatcherite

---

[171] Joseph, *Reversing the Trend*, 4.

[172] A. Denham and M. Garnett. 2001. *Keith Joseph*. London: Acumen, 252.

expression of Freeden's core qualifying concepts,[173] and the contemporary articulation of the macro core of the ideologies of Conservatism, namely the expression of a limited form of politics.

Pertinently, Ivor Crewe, at the end of the Thatcher decade, argued that there had 'been no Thatcherite transformation of attitudes or behaviour among the British public'.[174] Even more pertinently, since Thatcher's defenestration from Number 10, and with it the death of 'high Thatcherism', Thatcherite values, according to British Social Attitude surveys, have grown in popularity.[175] Whilst Crewe is correct in arguing that there was never remotely a majority for Thatcherism in the 1980s, nor in the Cameron era, Thatcherism was successful in redefining the key norms of British politics.

Cameron's leadership of the Party has not constituted a departure from Thatcherism. It is however, an attempt to wrestle with the tension or gap between the intention and outcome of Thatcherism. The problematic outcome of Thatcherism, whilst attended to in chapter one and three, is important to restate for the purposes of the rest of the thesis. The lacunae of Thatcherism were, and are, various. First, the permanent retrenchment of the state was always going to be difficult to achieve with the backdrop of the nineteenth and twentieth century expansion of the modern state.[176] Second, because of the expansion of the modern state, the smorgasbord of values attached to the market society, Conservative individualism, competitiveness, self-reliance and economic choice, had been

---

[173] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 317-347.

[174] Crewe, 'Values: The Crusade That Failed', 241.

[175] P. Curtis. 2010. 'Britain 'more Thatcherite now than in the 80s' says survey', *The Guardian*. 13 December.

[176] Something Cameron aspires to achieve. D. Cameron. 2013. 'Lord Mayor's Banquet Speech', 11 November.

weakened and intellectually marginalised in the years after the Second World War. Third, the libertarian outcomes of Thatcherism had a damaging, both practical and theoretical, effect on communities and traditions, the very traditions dear to Conservatives. Third, the Thatcher period has been a remarkable period of British history, in which Conservatism was hegemonic. Tory think-tanks in the 1980s roared that 'Labour will never rule again'[177] and others, with the renascence of market values in the mid-1980s, called the Thatcher period the 'New Enlightenment'.[178] As stated at the start of this chapter, the politics that subsequently followed Thatcherism, all seemed to shrink in size alongside the struggles and triumphs of Margaret Thatcher. Fourth, Thatcher thought she had created 'the generous society' and not 'the selfish society'.[179] Thatcherites believed markets were intrinsically moral: markers operate in *real communities* and can only function on the basis of already existing communal institutions, in the main widespread ownership of private property, the acceptance of the rule of law and positive but limited government control. Markets are thus interpreted as social relationships and quasi-communal institutions dependent on trust and self-interest that give form to the expression of (Christian) morality.[180] By bringing moral markets into society, into its communities and institutions, Thatcherism envisaged a new age of charity, giving and philanthropy. Indeed, there was a

---

[177] J. Gray. 2008. *Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia*. London: Penguin, 107. Thatcher later wrote that the Callaghan Government was 'the last Labour Government and perhaps the last ever'. Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 4.

[178] See D. Graham and P. Clarke. 1986. *The New Enlightenment: The Rebirth of Liberalism*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

[179] Thatcher, 'Conference Speech of 1988'.

[180] See B. Griffiths. 1983. *The Moral Basis of the Market Economy*. London: Conservative Political Centre; 1984. *The Creation of Wealth*. London: Hodder & Stoughton; 1985. *Monetarism and Morality: A Response to the Bishops*. London: Conservative Political Centre; 1989. *Morality and the Market Place: Christian Alternatives to Capitalism and Socialism*. London: Hodder & Stoughton; and R. Harris. 1986. *Morality and Markets*. London: Centre for Policy Studies.

proliferation of charity in the 1980s, from Comic Relief, to the London Marathon, to Red Nose Day, and to Live Aid in 1985. Thatcherism's belief in tax cuts, as part of a wider attempt to minimise politics and spread markets, was intended to encourage the 'generous society' by switching from compulsory high income confiscation to charity voluntarism. Instead, a particularly acute outcome of Thatcherism, in part a consequence of tax cuts and the reduction of the size of the state as a percentage of spending from 42.75% to 35.23%,[181] was the exacerbation of income and wealth inequality, and an attendant ethic of selfish individualistic acquisitiveness and an age of conspicuous consumption.[182] The middle moved away from the bottom and the top moved away from the middle. Between 1945 and 1979, the share of the nation's wealth received by the top 1% fell from 6.8 to 4.7%; in the next ten years, it rose to 7.1%.[183] Whilst the problem of the 'underclass' was attributed by Thatcherites to the legacy of state interventionism and the attendant problem of welfare dependency,[184] their plight became more acute in the late 1980s. Thatcherism delivered overall prosperity with the average real income of British families rising between by 27% between 1979 and 1992. However, the real incomes of the poorest 10% declined by 18%, while those of the richest 10% increased by 61%. The uneven distribution of wealth was something Thatcher regretted. Indeed, according to Frank Field, Thatcher regretted this particular outcome of the ideology that she gave a name to: ''I cut

---

[181] See http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/ (accessed 20 November 2013); C. Moore. 2011. 'I'm starting to think that the Left might actually be right', *The Daily Telegraph*, 22 July.

[182] D. Dorling, 'Mapping the Thatcher Legacy: The Human Geography of Social Inequality in Britain Since the 1970s', In *The Legacy of Thatcherism*, 240-272.

[183] J. Hills, et al, 2010. *An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK: Report of the National Equality Panel*. London: Government Equalities Office, 27, 41.

[184] Gray, *Beyond the New Right*, 33; C. Murray. 1990. *The Emerging British Underclass*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1-2.

taxes as I thought it would generate a giving society. It didn't''.[185] As Marquand reflects, 'inequality was a by-product, not the aim of the exercise'.[186] Furthermore, when Maurice Saatchi revealed to Thatcher that the share of the biggest five banks constituted 80% of all financial transactions, she replied aghast, 'That's impossible'.[187] Thatcher herself 'became increasingly worried about the caricature that all she stood for was individualism, selfishness, and the profit motive'.[188] Thatcherism underestimated the degree of moral change that Britain had undergone since the 1930s. Society, and specifically families as the locus of morality, has been transformed by social transformations Thatcherism ignored (i.e. secularisation) or exacerbated (i.e. the bureaucratisation of the public services and the moral anomalousness of the City). Lastly, and most profoundly for the argument of the thesis, Thatcher had given the Conservative Party an ideological self-awareness. Major and his successors inherited 'a party of notions, just like the Labour Party...a party of doctrines, of theories, and...the party of a Utopia'.[189] They couldn't again, with any seriousness or hope of pretending otherwise, posture a non-ideological politics.

Cameron, more so than his post-Thatcher predecessors, has deployed an ideological response to Thatcherism, rooted in the Tory tradition, that has attempted to solve the problems of Thatcherism's outcome. Cameronism maintains the substantive intentionalism of Thatcherism whilst adjusting the

---

[185] F. Field. 2013. 'Mrs T would have reined in the wealthy', *The Times*, 18 April.

[186] Marquand, *Mammon's Kingdom*, 139.

[187] M. Saatchi. 2014. 'A radical policy to set small businesses free', *The Daily Telegraph*, 16 June.

[188] D. Willetts. 2004. 'Renewing Civic Conservatism', In *What's Right Now: Conservative essays on the role of civil society, markets and the state*, edited by J. Tate. London: Social Market Foundation, 27.

[189] D. Marquand, *Britain since 1918*, 324-325.

language and conceptual configuration of Conservatism in order to manage its difficult and largely self-defeating outcome.

Part Two: Cameronism

Chapter Three

The Ideology of Cameronism: Prisoner of an Ideological Past?

'I believe that the fundamental job of government is to secure security of the country and prosperity for its people, in that order, and that in general, is pursued through...less state and more society'[1]

'Ours has been a voyage of connection. Not just with the modern world and the challenges of the hour. But with the rich heritage of our political tradition - that strand of Conservatism that celebrates the local, the civic and the social. We have strengthened our liberalism and rediscovered our Conservatism building a movement that isn't just about the individual, but about the community not just about the 'me', but the 'we', not just about the market, but about society too. That's what we've achieved, and we can be hugely proud of it'[2]

1. Introduction: Paradise Lost? After Thatcher and the Politics of Paradox

Cameron, in the early days of his leadership, made concerted efforts to place political space between his own politics and the political outcomes of Thatcherism. 'At the next election', Cameron reasoned in January 2006, 'a whole generation of people will be voting who were born after Margaret Thatcher left

[1] This was Cameron's reply, sometime in 2011, when asked what Cameronism is. Interview with Stewart Wood, 4 November 2013.

[2] D. Cameron. 2009. 'The Age of Austerity', Speech, 26 April.

office'.[3] For this reason, and more importantly because of the problematic post-Thatcher legacy pertaining to the gap between intention and outcome in Thatcherism, Cameron argued that, 'when it comes to tackling the big challenges our society faces, I won't be the *prisoner of an ideological past*'.[4] Although never holding sway with a majority of the British population, the 1980s was, ideologically, a decade of unassailed Thatcherite Conservatism. It was, for many Conservatives, the heroic apotheosis of Conservative hopes and dreams. With the market society and the scaling back of the scope of politics at its heart, Thatcherism utilised and realised Conservatism's macro-core concepts, with the effect of producing an election-winning and ideology-dominating Conservatism.

Thatcherism casts a long ideological shadow over British politics, the Conservative Party and the thought-practices of British Conservatism. Ideological explicitness and ideological self-awareness however, waned after Thatcher's forced departure from office in November 1990. At the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century, ideological certitude gave way to ideological doubt. The 'heroic age of the conservative revolution' of the 1980s was making way, ostensibly, to a 'managerial phase' in the 1990s.[5] Ideology was not dropped, but it was readjusted. Discreet and concealed Conservative decontestations of concepts, under Major and beyond, resumed.[6] Immediately after Thatcher's departure, Conservatives were unsure of what to do with Thatcherism. Whilst the devotees of Thatcherism, notably in the 'No Turning Back' Group', saw

---

[3] Cameron quoted in N. Morris. 2006. ''I'm no prisoner of Thatcherism', *The Independent*, 2 January.

[4] Ibid (emphasis added).

[5] Riddell, 'Ideology in Practice', 33.

[6] Eccleshall, 'The doing of conservatism', 284. S. Hogg and J. Hill. 1995. *Too Close to Call: Power and Politics - John Major in No. 10*. London: Little, Brown and Company, 83.

Thatcherism as a 'permanent' crusade or revolution;[7] other Conservatives argued, that Thatcherism was a diachronically-sealed ideology designed to deal with a specific set of problems and, as such, was history.[8] Indeed, Oliver Letwin, who became a leading thinker of Cameronism, later argued that to ask as to whether a politician is a Thatcherite in the twenty first century is a 'meaningless question'.[9] Neither the approach to simply repeat or reheat Thatcherism for the 1990s, nor the approach to historicise Thatcherism, was satisfactory. The problem of Thatcherism was unavoidable.

More problematic was the unravelling and undermining of Thatcherism's *moral* objectives in the 1990s. Indeed the market society had been partially created and the complexion of politics had changed considerably. However, Thatcherism, post-Thatcher, devoured its children. Most revealingly was the punctuation of 1980s prosperity in the early 1990s. Job insecurity, for example, during the recession of 1991-92 reached the portion of voters supportive of the Conservatives in the 1980s, unsettling family units. Gray wrote bleakly:

> 'The core institution of any stable society, the family, has been subjected to all the stresses of unchannelled economic change, leaving it fractured and resourceless in communities themselves rendered fragile and impotent by a form of public policy in which social life is reduced to a series of exchanges'.[10]

---

[7] See Lilley, *Thatcherism*.

[8] Thatcher herself shared this view stating that 'the policies we followed in the 1980s were...those required by the practical circumstances of the time'. M. Thatcher, 'Reflections on Liberty', In *The Political Legacy of Margaret Thatcher*, 3.

[9] Oliver Letwin quoted in Katwala, 'In Maggie's Shadow', 7.

[10] Gray, *Endgames*, 102.

Furthermore, the deregulated labour markets engineered by Thatcherism in the eighties, undermined the job security of the upwardly mobile social groups. This plight was reinforced by the deregulation of financial institutions, which in the late eighties flooded the economy with easy money and caused asset values to float to unsustainable heights. One of the downsides, which spawned from the new financial instruments such as personal pensions and endowment mortgages, was a significant surge in household repossessions.

The central disappointment for Conservatism and Conservatives alike was that the rolling back of state responsibility and its cognate replacement with the 'vigorous' market values of Thatcherism's newly 'active citizens' was an intention not matched by outcomes. Thatcherism's whole market society vision was being questioned, despite the Conservative elites continued complicity with the vision. The *9th British Social Attitudes* survey reported, 'that the British psyche has emerged remarkably unscathed from a decade of Thatcherite rule'.[11] The report summarised that traces of the 'enterprise culture' are rare.[12] The *7th* survey corroborated that from all their findings, the 'results *do not* support the idea that since 1983 Britain has experienced a renaissance of an entrepreneurial spirit'[13] John Rentoul found that the market individualism Thatcherism wanted to inculcate into British society had not succeeded.[14] Further evidence suggested that the tax cuts for the wealthy in the 1980s did not foster 'aspiration', but instigated

---

[11] F. Cairncross. 1992. 'The Influence of the Recession', In *British Social Attitudes: The 9th Report*, edited by R. Jowell, L. Brook, G. Prior and B. Taylor. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 46.

[12] Ibid.

[13] D. G. Blanchflower and A. J. Oswald. 1990. 'Self-Employment and the Enterprise Culture', In *British Social Attitudes: The 7th Report*, edited by R. Jowell, S. Witherspoon, L. Brook with B. Taylor. Aldershot: Gower, 135 (emphasis added).

[14] J. Rentoul, 'Individualism', In Ibid, 176.

'resentment'.[15] Indeed too, post-Thatcher, Britain's attitudes towards business were, at best, 'lukewarm'.[16] On the role of the state, Thatcherism's ideological success could be even more closely questioned. 'Most people believe that the state should guide the market economy', Frances Cairncross observed, 'with a heavy hand and look after those who cannot fend for themselves'.[17] By the 1990s, social scientists detected in the surveys, questionnaires and data, that there was a rising tide of support for government intervention in the economy. The *9th* report even suggested that there was widespread and *increasing* support for price and import controls. This complemented the British desire for a 'centralised, tax-financed state welfare', which was supported by 'more state spending, even if it means more taxes', as was clear throughout the attitude surveys in the 1990s.[18] Births outside of marriage continued to rise through the 1990s, and marriage breakdown increased exponentially. In addition, the growing acceptance of sex before marriage, the disillusionment with marriage, the softening of attitudes towards homosexuality, the growing acceptance of the right to an abortion among the British population, and female gender equality all indicated social trends moving in 'a more permissive direction', one discrepant with the intentions of Thatcherism.[19] Britain was generally becoming less authoritarian on social

---

[15] Cairncross, 'The Influence of the Recession', 28, 47.

[16] M. Johnston, 'What price profits?' In *British Social Attitudes: The 9th Report*, 134

[17] Cairncross, 'The Influence of the Recession', 46.

[18] G. Stoker, 'Social Welfare: The Unkindest Cuts', In *British Social Attitudes: The 7th Report*, 2; P. T. Gooby. 1991. 'Attachment to the Welfare State', In *British Social Attitudes: The 8th Report*, edited by R. Jowell, L. Brook, B. Taylor with G. Prior. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 41; Cairncross, 'The Influence of the Recession', 39, 41 (emphasis added); D. Lipsey. 1994. 'Do we really want more public spending?' In *British Social Attitudes: The 11th Report*, edited by R. Jowell, J. Curtice, L. Brook, D. Ahrendt with A. Park. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1.

[19] A. Heath and D. McMahon, 'Changes in Values', In *British Social Attitudes: The 9th Report*, 123-124; J. Scott, 'Women and the Family', In *British Social Attitudes: The 7th Report*, 61-62.

affairs,[20] and more social democratic on economic affairs.[21] Most disturbingly, for British Conservatism however, was the moral underpinnings of the market society were not only not flourishing, but they were actively rejected. Conservatives such as Douglas Hurd, John MacGregor, John Patten and Ian Taylor talked of the 'active citizen' in the late 1980s and 1990s.[22] Unfortunately, the Conservative conception of citizenship as active, buccaneering and self-reliant, in the attempt to replace the ostensibly passive citizens of a bygone dependency culture, did not materialise. *British Social Attitudes* surveys found that the attachment to socio-economic collectivism underwritten by taxation remained a resonant ideological paragon, and, as such, the notion of individual and community self-sufficiency was roundly rejected.[23] Steven Barrett and Susan Saxon-Harrold concluded, 'The moral responsibility arguments of active citizenship that were pursued by Mrs Thatcher...does not appear..to have happened to any marked degree'.[24]

The fallout of Thatcherism therefore produced a 'politics of paradox' in the 1990s.[25] First, the neoliberal political economy had *not* sufficiently delivered the moral restoration so desired by Thatcherism. The delivery and success of economic Thatcherism was not matched by the delivery of what Thatcher called

---

[20] D. Ahrendt and K. Young, 'Authoritarianism Updated', In *British Social Attitudes: The 11th Report*, 83.

[21] Lipsey, 'Do we really want more public spending?' 1-12.

[22] D. Hurd. 1988. 'Citizenship in the Tory Democracy', *NewStatesman*. 29 April, 14; D. Hurd. 1989. 'Freedom will flourish where citizens accept responsibilities', *The Independent*. 7 September. J. Patten. 1988. 'Launching the active citizen', *The Guardian*, 28 September; I. Taylor. 1990. *Releasing the Community Spirit - A Framework for the Active Citizen*. London: Tory Reform Group.

[23] S. Barnett and S. S. Harrold, 'Interim Report: Charitable Giving', In *British Social Attitudes: The 9th Report*, 198, 202.

[24] Ibid, 207.

[25] H. Berrington. 1998. 'Britain in the Nineties: The Politics of Paradox', In *Britain in the Nineties: The Politics of Paradox*, edited by H. Berrington. London: Frank Cass, 1-27.

'Social Thatcherism'.[26] Second, the state, for Conservatives, was still too big, and thus the scope of politics needed to be shrunk further still. Third, there was a growing realisation, albeit latent at best and complete denial at worst, in Conservative political thinking, that civil society suffered under Thatcherism. Thatcherism's decontestation of civil society as a market society embraced what Shirley Letwin called the 'vigorous virtues' at the *expense* of 'civic virtues'.[27] In combination, the problematic legacy of Thatcherism amounted to what critics in the 1990s called the 'crisis of Conservatism'.[28] The crisis of Conservatism thesis, even though tended to throughout the chapter, refers to the ostensible disruptive effects of free and unfettered market economics on the lives of communities and the institutions and values on which Conservatism is politically, electorally and ideologically reliant on. Willetts, the Tory seer, and the 'only person who can be considered a distinctively 'post-Thatcherite' thinker at a senior level in the Conservative Party',[29] noted that, 'The 1980s were an exciting, breathless time, with *dragons to slay* and the world at our feet. In the 1990s we realised that we didn't have all the answers but that became self doubt and uncertainty about what the Tories stood for'.[30] Gray, Willetts' great adversary on the question of the viability of Conservative ideologies during the 1990s, argued that, the 'historical

---

[26] Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 147; Campbell, *The Iron Lady*, 555.

[27] See Green in C. Ellis, 'Mutualism and the Reinvention of Civil Society: A Conservative Agenda?' In *British Party Politics and Ideology after New Labour*, 145.

[28] See Gray, *Enlightenment's Wake*, 131-179 ; A. Gamble. 1995. 'The Crisis of Conservatism', *New Left Review* 214 (1): 3-25; S. Walters. 2001. *Tory Wars: Conservatives in Crisis*. London: Politico's; M. Garnett and P. Lynch eds. 2003. *The Conservatives in Crisis: The Tories after 1997*. Manchester: Manchester University Press; N. Fowler. 2008. *A Political Suicide: The Conservatives' Voyage into the Wilderness*. London: Methuen; G. Wheatcroft. 2005. *The Strange Death of Tory England*. London: Allen Lane.

[29] M. Garnett and K. Hickson. 2009. *Conservative Thinkers: The Key Contributors to the Political Thought of the Modern Conservative Party*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 155.

[30] D. Willetts. 2005. 'A New Conservatism for a New Century', Speech to the Social Market Foundation. 2 June (emphasis added).

possibility of serious intellectual conservatism has been *closed off* by the policies' of Thatcherism.[31] Thatcherite Conservatism may have been 'exciting' and 'breathless' in slaying its dragons, but it had, for proponents of the crisis of Conservatism thesis, gone onto immolate and slay the ideology from whence it came. Therefore the crisis of Conservatism was primarily a crisis of ideological viability and ideological identity.

Just as one of the chief architects was exiting the stage, Thatcherism was faltering. Even though there was an impasse, there was a renewal of Conservatism, which developed a coherent and consistent narrative. 'Even if the New Right project of the 1980s did unsettle society', Robert Eccleshall correctly argued, 'there is no compelling reason to suppose that conservatives have been deprived of a context for constructing plausible narratives'.[32] In Conservative discourses however, the phenomena of the crisis of Conservatism mentioned, was unattributable to the problem of Thatcherism *in toto*. Conservatism from Major to Cameron adapted, but did not reject, Thatcherism. Conservative adaptivity to Thatcherism is in part why commentators of Cameron's politics in particular have called his relationship with Thatcherism a 'study of ambiguity'.[33] The term hit upon to describe this process, by practitioners and theoreticians alike, was 'modernisation'. Modernisation was the catch-all watchword for Tony Blair's attempt to 'market' the 'New' Labour 'brand' by employing the language of public relations.[34] Modernisation does not however, sufficiently capture the process of

---

[31] Gray, *Endgames*, 10 (emphasis added).

[32] Eccleshall, 'Conservatism', 70.

[33] See T. Bale. 2008. 'A bit less bunny hugging and a bit more bunny boiling?' *British Politics* 3 (3): 270-299; Evans, 'Consigning its Past to History?' 291-314; Evans, ''Mother's Boy', 325-343; McAnulla, 'Heir to Blair's Third Way?' 286-314.

[34] N. Fairclough. 2000. *New Labour, New Language?* London: Routledge, 19.

ideological renewal, which took place in the case of Blair in the 1990s, and it certainly does not capture the renewal of post-Thatcher Conservative and Cameronite attempts to restructure Conservatism. Modernisation is 'more of a disposition than a doctrine'.[35] Modernisation is too indiscriminate as to have any precise meaning. When Cameronism is viewed through the banal prism of modernisation, it is easy to agree with Richard Hayton that Cameron's modernisation of British Conservatism 'was devoid of real depth'.[36] Instead of vague allusions and references to modernisation, Conservative ideological renewal and reconstruction, once placed in the context of the crisis of Conservatism, pertains properly to three *substantive* distinguishing and formative features of post-Thatcher Conservatism: (1) the commitment to reducing the size of the state beyond the reductions made by Thatcherism; (2) a slow acceptance that the neoliberal political economy was a *necessity* for the perpetuation of Conservative ends, but it was ultimately *insufficient*; and (3) *civic renewal* is both (i) an integral part of post-Thatcher Conservatism decontested as a better response to the problem of the *insufficiency* of neoliberalism than *state intervention*, and (ii) civil society in post-Thatcher Conservative semantics, reaching its zenith in Cameronism, shares the ideological stage as a free-standing concept (i.e. not conceptually-fused as it was in Thatcherism) alongside the market as a significant mirror-image of the state. The further aim of sketching out these formative features is to illustrate that the thought-practices of Cameronism are continuous, and not discontinuous, from the Conservatism of the 1990s onwards, insofar as

---

[35] R. Wade. 2013. *Conservative Party Economic Policy: From Heath in Opposition to Cameron in Coalition*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 163.

[36] R. Hayton. 2014. 'Reply: The strange survival of Tory conservatism', *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought*. Doi: 10.1080/23269995.2014.914827, 4.

Cameronism is trying to recreate and renew Conservatism by widening its ideological agenda and appeal.

2. State Retrenchment: Conservatism and the Enabling State

The 'first strand' of post-Thatcher Conservatism was a commitment to 'rolling back the state'.[37] Indeed the commitment to *further* reductions and retrenchments, in the scope and size of the state, was a steadfast and consistent commitment of Conservatism from Thatcher to Cameron. New mirror images were enlisted to this cause. New prominence was given to policy areas which expressed continued anti-statism. From Major to Cameron, the spectre of the federal and socio-bureaucratic vision of Europe was counteracted by a nation-centric, intergovernmentalist, market Europe vision with an adjunct, often virulent, hostility to political interference from Brussels. The other consistent mirror-image, giving ballast to anti-statist sentiments, was the *supposed* burden and incentive-sapping nature of the welfare state. Another was the Conservative resistance to New Labour's constitutional reforms, in which Majorism matched New Labour's 'devolution' with a commitment to the Westminster model by preserving its 'knowledge, experience and history';[38] and in Cameronism, once

---

[37] Willetts, 'A New Conservatism for a New Century'.

[38] 'You can only be sure with the Conservatives: The Conservative Manifesto 1997', In *Conservative Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997*, 457.

New Labour had devolved myriad decision-making powers to the non-English regions of the United Kingdom, 'localism' checked Blairite 'regionalism'.[39]

Post-Thatcher Conservatism's anti-statism went beyond Thatcherism. Jesse Norman argued that Thatcherism had achieved only a '*selective retrenchment* in the 1980s', and then 'centralised what remained'.[40] Indeed, Norman asserted that one of the central features of Cameronism is both the desire to reduce and need to contain the size and scope of the state.[41] Cameronism would, from this view, complete Thatcherism's unfinished business and succeed where it failed. Simon Jenkins goes further in arguing that Thatcherism, contra the languages of laissez-faire market individualism, was tantamount to a 'Tory nationalization of Britain'.[42] Thatcherism, according to Jenkins, had centralised political decision-making and regulated the newly privatised industries and companies so much that it was comparable to the highly statist societies Thatcherites rhetorically invected. Thatcherism, from this angle, had established a 'regulatory state': an expansion of market practices underpinned by ever-greater state-backed regulatory frameworks.[43] The context for state retrenchment therefore was ripe for Conservative manipulation. It is also important to note that public expenditure did not fall under Thatcher, 'although it did decrease as a

---

[39] The Cameron Government abolished New Labour's Regional Development Agencies in 2010. Willetts, giving political support to the abolition, argued that, 'We are not a regionalist country. We are a country of local neighbourhoods, local communities, of small towns'. D. Willetts. 1998. *Who Do We Think We Are?* London: Centre for Policy Studies, 12; D. Willetts. 2003. 'The New Contours of British Politics', In *There Is Such a Thing as Society: Twelve Principles of Compassionate Conservatism*, edited by G. Streeter. London: Politico's, 57.

[40] Norman, *The Big Society*, 26.

[41] Interview with Jesse Norman, 22 September 2009.

[42] See Jenkins, *Accountable to None.*

[43] See M. Moran. 2010. 'The Rise of the Regulatory State', In *The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government*, edited by D. Coen, W. Grant and G. Wilson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 383-403.

proportion of GDP'.[44] Majorism was no 'keeper of the Thatcherite flame' in regard to this *form* of anti-statism. Like Cameronism, Majorism was interested in taming, regulating, measuring, and restraining the power and muscle of the state. Eric Evans, and Chris Cook and John Stevenson, argue that public expenditure, 'expressed as a percentage of GDP, edged inexorably upwards - from 39 per cent in the last year of the Thatcher government to 44 per cent in 1997'.[45] This is why, along with other factors, Majorism's anti-statism has been called 'Thatcherism with a human face', insofar as the state was not reduced in terms of public expenditure, but it was reduced in other ways. Thatcherite Conservatives' GDP conception of state miminalism meant that many thought Majorism was a departure from Thatcherism's anti-statist preferences. Measuring state shrinkage, in terms of proportion of state activity in the economy, became a less important indicator of Conservatism's anti-statist credentials after Thatcher. Nick Boles, an ultra-Cameronite who tends to emphasise state minimalism to the detriment of civic renewal, argued that, 'Thatcherite Conservatives have tended to focus on the size of the state, as measured by the percentage of GDP consumed by public spending and tax'.[46] Contrastingly, Cameronite Conservatism is 'more interested in the power of the state and its lack of accountability'.[47]

Majorism was described by Kenneth Clarke as 'Thatcherism with a human face'.[48] Major professed that he wanted to build a 'classless society' and a country

---

[44] Moore, *Authorized Biography*, 475.

[45] E. Evans. 2013. *Thatcher and Thatcherism*. 3rd edn. Oxford: Routledge, 134; C. Cook and J. Stevenson. 2000. *The Longman Companion to Britain since 1945*. 2nd edn. Harlow: Pearson Education, 177.

[46] N. Boles. 2010. *Which Way's Up? The Future for Coalition Britain and How to Get There*. London: Biteback, 37.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Quoted in D. Willetts. 1999. 'Reviving Civic Conservatism', In *The Social Market and the State*, edited by A. Kilmarnock. London: Social Market Foundation, 28.

'at ease with itself'.[49] Thatcherites equated Major's emollience with a lack of commitment to the continued scaling back of the state. The evidence suggests the contrary insofar as Majorism has state reduction, albeit articulated differently, as one of its key features. Major was 'post-, rather than non-Thatcherite' therefore.[50] The Major Government, according to Stephen Dorrell, reduced the central state to its 'inescapable core'.[51] One of the loadstars of Majorism, disarming the view that Major 'bore no ideological label' and corroborating Dorrell's point,[52] was the commitment to the 'Citizen's Charter'. The Citizen's Charter was billed as the 'centrepiece' of Majorite Conservatism.[53] The Citizen's Charter, in the Conservative search for mechanisms other than privatisation to 'empower' and 'liberate' people through shrinking the state, was a theory, transacted into policy, about redressing the grievances of the 'users', 'taxpayers' and 'consumers' of public services.[54] The 'Citizen's Charter White Paper' in 1991 talked about 'standards', 'information and openness', 'choice and consultations', 'courtesy and helpfulness' and 'value for money'.[55] Public services would be subject to performance pay, greater information on performance, widespread auditing and competition. In one sense, the Citizen's Charter is a fairly prosaic philosophy of administration, interested primarily with the improvement of 'services',

---

[49] J. Major. 1999. *The Autobiography*. London: HarperCollins, 214-215.

[50] D. Butler and D. Kavanagh. 1992. *The British General Election of 1992.* London: Macmillan, 83.

[51] S. Dorrell. 1992. 'Redefining the Mixed Economy', Speech to the Centre for Policy Studies. 23 November. See R. A. W. Rhodes. 1994. 'The Hollowing Out of the State: The Changing Nature of the Public Services in Britain', *Political Quarterly*, vol. 65, no. 2, (1994), 138-151.

[52] I. Crewe. 1996. '1979-96', In *How Tory Governments Fall: The Tory Party in Power Since 1783*, edited by A. Seldon. London: Fontana Press, 416.

[53] J. Major. 1991. 'Conference Speech', 11 October.

[54] D. Kavanagh. 1994. 'A Major Agenda?' In *The Major Effect*, edited by D. Kavanagh and A. Seldon. London: Macmillan, 9-10.

[55] Cabinet Office. 1991. *The Citizen's Charter: Raising the Standard*, Cm 1599. London: HMSO.

competition between 'service-providers' and greater 'choice' for 'consumers'.[56] Major argued that the Citizen's Charter was about 'market-testing' and '[w]idening choice and competition' in areas where 'the market cannot fully operate'.[57] It constituted what John Patten called a 'middle-sized idea'.[58] In another sense however, the Citizen's Charter was fundamentally important. It was Majorism's anti-statist tool to deal with the 'inescapable core' of the state, which it could not, or was so electorally unpalatable that they would not, privatise. It was part of a broader ideological phenomena, which was interested in the 're-invention of government'.[59] William Waldegrave, another Tory intellectual in the Major era and preempting Cameronism's attitude towards government, claimed that the need to re-invent government, and apply Citizen's Charters to public services was not to do with '*more* or *less* government', but '*better* government'.[60]

The all-pervasive Charters in the 1990s were principally therefore designed to monitor the 'operation of newly marketized public services' within the 'inescapable core' of the state.[61] However, beyond what was deemed the inescapable core of the state, Majorism followed the Thatcherite methods of retrenching the state with gospel fervour. Majorism presented a 'coherent and practical programme for limiting the role of the state, by privatisation and by a

---

[56] Kavanagh, 'A Major Agenda?' 10.

[57] J. Major. 1992. 'The Next Phase of Conservatism: The Privatisation of Choice', *The Adam Smith Institute*, 16 June.

[58] J. Patten. 1995. *Things to Come: The Tories in the 21st Century*. London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 20.

[59] D. Gaebler and T. Osborne. 1993. *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. New York: Plume, 22-24.

[60] W. Waldegrave. 1992. 'Conference Speech', 6 October (emphasis added).

[61] Gray, *Endgames*, 1.

philosophy of choice'.[62] At the twilight of the 1980s, the 'next generation' of Thatcherites like Peter Lilley desired more privatisations, in which 'the presumption in every case must be that [nationalised parts of the economy]...should be restored to the private sector unless there are good reasons for retaining them in the public sector'.[63] Majorism agreed with the Thatcherites, that the neoliberal instruments of Thatcherism, privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation, should be extended in the task of whittling down the state further still. The Major Governments carried out extensive privatisations of the British economy, which included the privatisation of the management of prisons (1991); the controversial and unpopular privatisation of British Railways between 1992 and 1997; the privatisation of British Coal (1994); the extension of 'GP fundholding' and creeping privatisations of dentistry and optical treatment; the privatisation of laundry, cleaning and food in the NHS; the privatisation of the Stationary Office (1996); the privatisation of the Crown Agents, and the proposed, but never executed, privatisation of the Post Office outlined in the 1994 Queen's Speech.[64] Anyone who thought Majorism's anti-statism was based on pragmatic considerations, *contra* Thatcherism's dogged dedication to ideology, was disabused of this line of thinking when one looked to the 'uncompromising Conservatism' of railway privatisation, which Cameron later apologised for.[65] In short therefore, Majorism had a 'philosophical commitment to reducing the size of

---

[62] W. Waldegrave. 1994. 'Conservatism offers Practical Policies for the 1990s', Speech to the Conservative Political Centre Summer School. 1 July.

[63] Lilley, *Thatcherism*, 8.

[64] Even not achieved, a fifth-term Conservative government promised to privatise the Royal Mail in its 1997 manifesto. 'You can only be sure with the Conservatives', 442. Lamont also wanted to give operational independence - effective privatisation - to the Bank of England too, something New Labour eventually achieved in the early days of the Blair Government in May 1997. N. Lamont. 1993. 'Resignation Speech'. 9 June; N. Lamont. 1999. *In Office*. London: Little, Brown and Company, 275.

[65] R. Griffiths, 'The Perils of Principle', In *Conservative Realism*, 73.

the State',[66] and was 'at the forefront of cutting the state down to size''.[67] Brendan Evans and Andrew Taylor argued that, 'It is the decline of the central state and local state...that Major leaves his mark'.[68]

The problem however, was that the 'smaller state' vision of the Conservatives was conflated successfully, by Labour, with the 'uncaring state', in which the state encouraged a 'devil-take-the-hindmost' approach to economic affairs.[69] After the 'Great Tory Rout of May 1st', the landslide election victory of New Labour and 'cataclysmic defeat' of the Conservatives in 1997, it was pronounced that Conservatism was dead. Gray argued that not only had 'the Conservatives ceased to be a credible national party in 1997', but that the election defeat meant that 'Tory Britain is gone for good' and 'the future of conservatism' has gone with it.[70] New Labour's victory was partly built on associating Conservatism with a profound hostility towards the state. Indeed, New Labour erected a clever dichotomy between public spending, decontested as 'investment', and its opposite, tax cuts, decontested as 'Tory cuts', as the surest route to 'Dickensian squalor'.[71] Investment would ensure that Britain goes *forward* to the 'progressive century', and not *back* to the 'Conservative century' of the twentieth

---

[66] W. Waldegrave. 1996. 'The Politics of Public Spending', Speech to the Conservative Political Centre. 10 October.

[67] W. Waldegrave. 1994. 'John Major has shown how to cut the State down to size', Speech. Bristol West Conservative Association, 29 July.

[68] Evans and Taylor, *From Salisbury to Major*, 261.

[69] M. Portillo. 1997. 'Think Twice about Labour's Doublethink', The Alan Palmer Lecture. 13 March.

[70] Gray, 'Conclusion', 163; P. Dunleavy. 1997. 'Introduction: 'New Times' in British Politics', In *Developments in British Politics 5*, edited by P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, I. Holliday and G. Peele. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 7.

[71] M. d'Ancona, 2013. *In It Together: The Inside Story of the Coalition Government*. London: Viking, 42.

century.[72] New Labour presented a conundrum for the Conservative Party.[73] To illustrate, Major himself thought the language of New Labour, most notably in the case of 'stakeholding', was a deception in order to help them 'increase the role of the state'.[74] However, on other occasions, Conservatives expressed annoyance that, despite the language of New Labour being 'first-rate', it was a 'second-hand', derivative outfit of the Conservatives.[75] The inconclusive evaluation of New Labour's political ideology was mirrored in New Labour's ideology itself, especially on the question of the size and role of the state. New Labour never bought into Thatcherism's macro-social vision however. Martin Smith correctly interprets that 'the reality of 12 years of Labour government', especially after 2001 in which the Blair Government increased spending on schools and health, 'was a considerable expansion in the size and functions of the state'.[76] Cameron argued that New Labour's spending after 2001 was the beginning of 'the most significant extension of the state...since the immediate post-war period'.[77] The post-1997 Conservative response to New Labour's indecision, and inability to have a fixed position, on the size and role of the state deepened Conservatism's

---

[72] T. Blair. 2005. 'Preface' In *Britain Forward not Back: The Labour Manifesto 2005*. London: Labour Party, 5.

[73] This conundrum is further brought to attention by the various theorisations of New Labour's ideological orientation. See C. Hay. 1999. *The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring under False Pretences?* Manchester: Manchester University Press; R. Heffernan. 2001. *New Labour and Thatcherism: Political Change in Britain*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; S. Lee. 2009. *Boom and Bust: The Politics and Legacy of Gordon Brown*. Oxford: Oneworld; Fielding, *The Labour Party*; S. Meredith. 2006. 'Mr Crosland's Nightmare? New Labour and Equality in Historical Perspective', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 8 (2): 238-255; M. Beech. 2008. 'New Labour and the Politics of Dominance', In *Ten Years of New Labour*, edited by M. Beech and S. Lee. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1-16; M. Bevir. 2000. 'New Labour: a study of ideology', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2 (3): 277-301.

[74] J. Major, 'Foreword', In *You can only be sure with the Conservatives*, 422.

[75] Major, *The Autobiography*, 214.

[76] M. J. Smith. 2010. 'From Big Government to Big Society: Changing the State-Society Balance', *Parliamentary Affairs* 63 (4): 819-820.

[77] D. Cameron, 'The Big Society', Hugo Young Lecture, 10 November 2009.

crisis of ideological identity. Maurice Cowling argued that the only option for Conservatism was to position itself to the 'Right of the political spectrum' in relation to 'Blairism'.[78] With little deviation,[79] the Conservatives did as Cowling instructed: on the role of the state, in relation to the economy, they consistently positioned themselves to the Right of New Labour and remained sworn enemies of the state. The Conservative Party, under William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard, leaders of the Conservative Party after Major and before Cameron, steadfastly maintained the Thatcherite view of the state. One of the central promises of Hague's 'common sense revolution', for example, was the 'tax guarantee', in which a prospective Conservative government would reduce the proportion of national income taken in taxation.[80] On the role of the state, in the Hague-Duncan Smith-Howard years, Conservatism was 'schizophrenic':[81] Conservatives were even more overtly hostile to the state than Thatcher, but this was wed to a moral populism of augmenting the state, for example, in building more prison places and greater state monitoring of sexual ethics.

Mark Garnett correctly argued that Cameronism would be partly determined and shaped by this 'problem of 'path dependency'', insofar as Cameron inherited, when becoming Conservative Party leader, three decades of broadly Thatcherite attitudes towards the role of the state.[82] Continuity better characterises change when it comes to Conservative attitudes towards the role of

---

[78] See M. Cowling. 1997. *A Conservative Future*. London: Politeia.

[79] Peter Lilley's R A. Butler speech in April 1999 was an amazing exception. P. Lilley. 1999. 'Butler Memorial Lecture'. 20 April.

[80] See Conservative Party. 2001. *Time for Common Sense: The Conservative Manifesto, 2001*. London: Conservative Party

[81] M. Garnett. 2004. 'The Free Economy and the Schizophrenic State: Ideology and the Conservatives', *Political Quarterly* 75 (4): 367-372.

[82] Garnett, 'Built on Sand? 117.

the state from Thatcherism to Cameronism. There is however, an influential and fashionable view, that Cameronism cedes ideological ground on the role and size of the state to New Labour. Damaged by Cameron's alleged claim that he was the 'heir to Blair' in October 2005, Cameronism was meant to have converged with New Labour on the state between December 2005 and September 2007. Cameronism's inchoate political economy in this period was referred to as 'sharing the proceeds of growth' between higher investment in the public services and lower taxes, and has been used as evidence for such convergence.[83] Sharing the proceeds of growth, ideologically, signified that: (1) Cameron's Conservatives sought to compete with Labour by pledging to match its public expenditure targets in areas, such as education and the NHS, where it had a political reputation for cutting; and (2) it emphasised a 'break with Thatcherism'.[84] However, there were differences. First, was the Cameronite commitment to lower taxes. Osborne illustratively asserted that, 'Over the economic cycle, the state would consume a smaller share of national income'.[85] Second, Cameronism was consistently critical of New Labour's 'faith in legislation, regulation and bureaucracy', as a response to solving social problems.[86] Third, New Labour's central commitment was to promote *the primacy of the economy* in concentrating spending priorities on *social investment* within the context of an *active welfare state*.[87] Cameronism departed from this vision of using proceeds from the City of London to fund New Labour's

---

[83] D. Cameron. 2007. 'Speech to the LSE', 10 September.

[84] P. Dorey. 2009. ''Sharing the Proceeds of Growth': Conservative Economic Policy under David Cameron', *Political Quarterly* 80 (1): 260.

[85] G. Osborne. 2006. 'A tax policy that puts stability first', Speech. 1 June.

[86] D. Cameron. 2006. 'Speech on Modern Conservatism', 30 January.

[87] T. Blair and G. Schröder. 2000. 'Europe: the Third Way/die Neue Mitte', In *The Politics of the New Centre*, edited by B. Homback. Oxford: Blackwell, 157-177.

social investment state.[88] If there was convergence between the Blairite and Cameronite conception on the role of the state before the financial crisis, it was a *lip service convergence*. Where New Labour looked Left to social investment and state activism, Cameronism looked Right to decentralisation, deregulation and the promotion of commercial competitiveness.[89] Steve Buckler and David Dolowtiz write that Cameronism's alleged claims to New Labour's centrism 'combined uneasily with more specific ideological markers linking trust and responsibility to the idea of a rolling back of state activity in favour of greater localism and voluntary action'.[90] What was truly distinctive about Cameronism's anti-statism, between the end of 2005 and September 2007, was that it appeared not just to limit the *maximum* role of the state, but also emphasised the limits of state minimalism (i.e. the pledges to maintain New Labour levels of public expenditure going to the public services). Emphasising this point, Cameron argued that the Conservative Party was '*not* an anti-state party':[91] 'We Conservatives recognise that often the state fails but we shouldn't react with glee when it does'.[92] Illustratively, Willetts argues that, in the past, ideologies of the Right have equated government and the state as a 'necessary evil', but Cameronism, not subscribing to this view, wants to merely 'limit government', recognising the state's 'failings

---

[88] Indeed, Cameron thought the symbiotic relationship between the City and the 'interventionist' state, which supported 'spiraling welfare costs' and caused a 'debt-crazed economy', was 'a Faustian pact'. D. Cameron. 2012. 'Speech on Moral Capitalism', 19 January.

[89] Cameron, 'Speech to the LSE'.

[90] S. Buckler and D. Dolowitz. 2012. 'Ideology Matters: Party Competition, Ideological Positioning and the Case of the Conservative Party under David Cameron', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 14 (4): 586. D. Cameron. 2007. 'Empowering local communities can heal our broken society', Speech. 5 July.

[91] D. Cameron. 2008. 'Conference Speech', 1 October (emphasis added).

[92] D. Cameron. 2009. 'Hugo Young Lecture'.

and inadequacies'.[93] Throughout however, Cameronism identifies New Labour's 'further extensions' of the state as the central target for Conservative retrenchment.[94]

Cameronism's anti-statist convictions were presented with ever more elaborate and byzantine conceptual decoration. The first was the Cameronite emphasis on 'social responsibility'.[95] The use of social responsibility was a quintessential Cameronite ploy, according to Cameron's biographers, of putting forward 'traditional arguments for a smaller state in more electorally acceptable terms'.[96] Stephen Evans detected that, 'the link between social responsibility and limited government cannot be ignored, and it could fairly be described as the *ghost in the machine* of Cameron's policies'.[97] Social responsibility therefore, for Cameronism, seems to encapsulate Conservatism's long preoccupation with limited government and anti-statism in a way that 'suited...the demands of the 21st century'.[98] The enemy of social responsibility, much like the Big Society, was 'big government', and social responsibility could only flourish if the Conservatives 'cut big government back' and 'move society forward': creating 'a very profound shift....away from state control towards social responsibility'.[99] There was however, another dimension to social responsibility apart from its anti-

---

[93] D. Willetts. 2013. 'Beyond Bare-Earth Conservatism: The Future of the British Economy', In *Tory Modernisation 2.0: The Future of the Conservative Party*, edited by R. Shorthouse and G. Stagg. London: Bright Blue, 35.

[94] Norman, *The Big Society*, 26.

[95] This was purported to be the 'big idea' or a core concept of Cameronism in 2006 and 2007. See D. Cameron. 2007. *Social Responsibility: The Big Idea for Britain's Future*. London: Conservative Party.

[96] Elliott and Hanning, *Cameron: Practically a Conservative*, 313-314, 329-330, 335-336.

[97] Evans, ''Mother's Boy', 334 (emphasis added).

[98] Ibid.

[99] D. Cameron. 2009. 'Conference Speech', 8 October; Letwin quoted in W. Lyons and I. Martin. 2010. 'Defining the Tory message: From Architect of Party's Plan', *Wall Street Journal*. 29 March.

statist euphony. Social responsibility has important allusions to Cameronism's desire to 'moralise capitalism' and the broader recognition that there needed to be a *qualified* taming of the (neoliberal form of) capitalism, which Thatcherism had untamed.[100] It was also a component part of Cameronism's attempt to define a new communitarian politics of the Right in seeing civic renewal as an antidote to the problem of the untamed capitalism aforementioned.[101]

Cameronism's anti-statism is in evidence further still in other ideas such as Cameronism's pre-Coalition notion of the 'post-bureaucratic age'.[102] The post-bureaucratic age, introduced by Steve Hilton in 2008, Cameron's former Director of Strategy, referred to Cameronism's 'reimagining of capitalism', conviction in the power of individual social action and scepticism of the state.[103] By emphasising that Cameronism was *post*-bureaucratic, the era under New Labour was decontested as a 'bureaucratic age' of taxes, regulations and diktats. Supporting this unremarkable insight was Cameronism's interest in behavioural economics, which is dealt with later in the chapter.[104] In relation to anti-statism, the behavioural economics of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein interested Cameronites. Thaler and Sunstein's 'nudge' theory was associated with the idea of 'asymmetrical paternalism', in which policy makers 'nudge', not dictate, within a

---

[100] Cameron, 'Speech on Moral Capitalism'.

[101] J. Cruddas and J. Rutherford. 2008. 'Is the Future Conservative?' In *Is the Future Conservative?* edited by J. Cruddas and J. Rutherford. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2.

[102] G. Osborne. 2008. 'We have to mend Britain's broken society', Centre for Policy Studies Annual Lecture. 15 July; D. Cameron. 2009. 'A new politics: The post-bureaucratic age', *The Guardian*, 25 May.

[103] A. Finlayson. 2012. 'Cameron, Culture and the Creative Class: The Big Society and the Post-Bureaucratic Age', In *Retrieving the Big Society*, edited by J. Edwards. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 35-47.

[104] Cameronites, most notably Letwin, Osborne and Willetts, are also interested in the policy and ideological implications of social psychology, evolutionary psychology and game theory. D. Willetts. 2008. 'Renewing Civic Conservatism', The Oakeshott Lecture. 20 February.

'choice architecture' in order to help people make the 'right decisions'.[105] Nevertheless, even though behavioural economics and nudge theory has been used to limit the rationalism of neoliberal insights, its insights have been used by Cameronism and the Coalition Government in both 'deregulatory' and 'interventionist' ways to 'cut burdensome regulation and costs'.[106] Oliver Letwin lectured that the Coalition Government was 'learning the abilities of governments to influence outcomes for the better in non-regulatory ways, and indeed while simultaneously reducing the amount of regulatory interference'[107]

Anti-statism and state retrenchment was given greater resonance within the context of economic austerity in 2010, which was the selected remedy to the debt incurred after the public expenditure largesse of the Blair-Brown Governments (Tory view), the expenditure used to bailout the banking system after the GFC in 2007-08, and the Brown Government's fiscal stimulus to soften the consequences (Labour view) of the Great Recession (GR hereafter).[108] Philip Lynch concluded that 'a coherent theory of the state is lacking' in Cameronism.[109] On the contrary, Cameronism's anti-statism is remarkably coherent and consistent. Indeed, state retrenchment is the 'golden thread...through modern Conservative thinking'.[110] From Blair's age of prosperity to Cameron's own age of austerity, Cameronism and the Conservative Party under his stewardship has been wed to a deep-seated

---

[105] R. H. Thaler and C. R. Sunstein. 2008. *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness*. London: Penguin, 3.

[106] O. Letwin. 2014. 'Speech on the Role of the State', Institute for Government. 13 May; G. Osborne and R. Thaler. 2010. 'We can make you behave', *The Guardian*, 28 January. See C. R. Sunstein. 2014. *Why Nudge? The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

[107] Ibid.

[108] See pages 205-227 in chapter four.

[109] P. Lynch, 'Cameron, Modernisation and Conservative Britain', In *British Party Politics and Ideology after New Labour*, 124.

[110] Buckler and Dolowitz, 'Ideology Matters', 586.

hostility to what Letwin calls 'the provision-based state'; a state decontested 'as the proper provider of goods and services through ownership of the means of production...and of well-being through direction and control'.[111] Instead Cameronism endorses an *enabling state* or a 'framework theory of the state', in which 'direction and control' is used to design a framework, which nudges, fragments, incentivises and enables 'individual citizens and organisations to act in ways that fulfil not merely their own self-interested ambitions but also their wider social responsibilities'.[112] It is decontested as a simpler and more efficient state, in which the state is an enabler of civic and individual prosperity, but not its guarantor. The state is a pump-primer and fundraiser not a tax-raiser nor a service-provider. The Cameronite state differs very little from the Thatcherite state in regard to decontesting the state as an enabler and not a provider.[113] Qualified opposition to the state is a definitive component of Cameronism therefore. Cameronism believes 'that the state is bad and almost anything else - the free market, charities, volunteers - is better'.[114] What is distinctive however, is the combination of this consistent anti-statism with Cameronism's rhetorical and practical political economy, and its ubiquitous reference to civil society, civic renewal and, more broadly, its rediscovery of the social.[115]

3. Recognising Insufficiency: From 'Roll-Back' to 'Roll-Out' Neoliberalism

---

[111] O. Letwin. 2007. 'Cameron's Conservatism', Speech to Policy Exchange, 8 May.

[112] Ibid.

[113] F. Mount. 1993. *Clubbing Together: The Revival of the Voluntary Principle*. London: W. H. Smith Contemporary Papers, 15.

[114] B. Kisby. 2010. 'The Big Society: Power to the People?' *Political Quarterly* 81 (4): 485.

[115] F. Powell. 2007. *The Politics of Civil Society: Neoliberalism or Social Left?* Bristol: Policy Press, 168.

The neoliberal political economy ushered into Britain during the Thatcher-Major years, with various social democratic modifications under Blair and Brown, untamed post-war Keynesian capitalism by deregulating, liberalising and privatising large swathes of the economy. Thatcherism and neoliberalism coincided in their celebration of the 'virtues of capitalism, competition and the customer' and the desire to build a 'market-oriented society'.[116] The language, discourse and praxes of British politics had been influenced or infected, according to taste, by neoliberalism, which was transacted into the micro-level of public-policy positions. Even in the 1990s Major triumphantly declared that, 'The language of politics is now Conservative language', and that language had common ideological affinities with neoliberalism.[117] Cameronism broadly accepts this logic, and broadly consolidates the fundamentals of the neoliberal economy. Nevertheless, post-Thatcher Conservatism, reaching its apogee with Cameronism, recognises the limits of Thatcherism's dream of the market society, insofar as neoliberal economics, which delivers this dream, is *necessary* but not *sufficient* in delivering the Conservative aim of a more limited conception of politics. Stuart McAnulla argued that a formative component of Coalition ideology holds that 'neoliberal economics' is 'necessary' but 'insufficient' in the mission of regenerating civil society.[118] Kieron O'Hara argued that Cameronism orchestrated a 'leftward move to the post-Blair centre' in accepting that 'markets were *necessary* but not *sufficient*'.[119] This is all grist to the mill. However, the proposed notion of the simultaneous necessity and insufficiency of neoliberalism is not just

---

[116] Keith Joseph quoted in Lakin and Ostrowski, 'Ideology in the Age of the Coalition', 20.

[117] J. Major. 1994. 'Conference Speech', 14 October.

[118] McAnulla, 'Liberal Conservatism', 167.

[119] K. O'Hara. 2007. *After Blair: David Cameron and the Conservative Tradition*. London: Icon Books, 299, 315.

a feature of Coalition ideology and Cameronism, but a core decontestation of market-state-civil society relations in post-Thatcher Conservatisms.

This recognition has its origins during the Major years. Albeit not as explicit as in Cameronism, Conservatism in the Major era begins to recognise that Thatcherism's vision of the market society is an insufficient Conservative narrative. In one sense, Majorism, like its anti-statism, was broadly continuous with Thatcherism. Indeed Steve Ludlam and Martin Smith argued that, 'Major's direction has been one of implementing Thatcherism rather than challenging its key precepts'.[120] Major encouraged that the Conservatives 'must develop policies that sound a common chord across all programmes'.[121] This 'common chord' was unambiguously neoliberal: 'The Citizen's Charter, deregulation, privatisation, private finance, market-testing, openness'.[122] Indeed, reflecting on the ideological flavour of his premiership, Major attested that, 'In economic policy...I was no counter-revolutionary. In these policies, I led the Thatcherite march onwards with conviction - for I believed in it'.[123] Ian Lang, a Conservative Cabinet minister under Major, remarked that Major proved to be 'more Thatcherite than the lady herself...taking the Conservative agenda further than his predecessor did'.[124] Indeed, other Conservatives in this era celebrated the neoliberal aspiration of creating an 'economic democracy', which was a democracy where 'the accumulated preferences of millions of...citizens' exercise 'individual choice' in

---

[120] S. Ludlam and M. J. Smith, 'The Character of Contemporary Conservatism', In *Contemporary British Conservatism*, 278-279.

[121] J. Major. 1993. 'Conservatism in the 1990s - Our Common Purpose', Speech to the Carlton Club, 3 February.

[122] Ibid.

[123] Major, *The Autobiography*, 215.

[124] I. Lang. 1994. *Doing the Right Thing: The 1994 Swinton Lecture*. London: Conservative Political Centre, 7.

the market place.[125] Majorism was merely the extension of the Thatcherite decontestations of choice, opportunity and economic freedom in relation to every policy-area from home ownership and employment, to trade and private pensions. Major's biographer maintained that by using a new vocabulary, 'standards', 'aspirations' and 'value for money', Majorism equated to 'calibrating Thatcherism for the 1990s'.[126]

Nevertheless, bubbling under the surface, during the Major years, academic critics of Thatcherism and Conservative elites questioned the ideological viability of this dogged adherence to what had become neo-Thatcherite orthodoxy. This pertains to the aforementioned 'crisis of Conservatism'. Gray's crisis of Conservatism critique argued that Conservatism had been undone by Thatcherism's market society dogma.[127] Even though One Nation Tories like Gilmour and Waldegrave, traditional Tories like Alan Clark,[128] and critics on the Centre-Left, had long-warned of the self-defeating tendencies in Thatcherite Conservatism, it was only until the mid-1990s that the specific critique was deployed, which proposed that Thatcherism's market society had ideologically undermined other Conservative objectives, namely the health of civil society itself.[129] The Conservative emphasis on market choice, the sovereignty of contract, and the cult of individual mobility, consorted negatively,

---

[125] M. Howard. 1991. *Consistency and Change: The Conservative Challenge in the 1990s*. London: Conservative Political Centre, 8-9.

[126] A. Seldon. 1997. *Major: A Political Life*. London: Phoenix, 188.

[127] Also echoed in Gerry Cohen and Stefan Collini's similar critiques. G. A. Cohen. 2004. 'A Truth in Conservatism: Rescuing Conservatism from the Conservatives'. Unpublished paper, 35-6; S. Collini. 2008. *Common Reading: Critics, Historians, Publics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 207-208.

[128] A. Clark. 2002. *The Last Diaries: In and Out of the Wilderness*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 236.

[129] A. W. Turner. 2013. *A Classless Society: Britain in the 1990s*. London: Aurum Press, 289.

according to Gray, with the settled communities cherished by traditional Conservatives.

The problem was irresolvable for Gray. The 'endgame' for late-modern British Conservatism is a position of invidiousness because: (1) its policies had ostensibly pushed free market radicalism to the point that another dose would threaten further social instability (i.e. 'the fragmentation of family life which contemporary conservatives bemoan is, in very large part, a product of the culture and economy of unrestricted mobility, which they themselves celebrate'[130]), and (2) any retreat to a more communitarian Conservatism is rendered obsolete by the hyper-individualism wrought by free market radicalism. Scruton argued, similarly to Gray, that with the preeminence of the market society and neoliberal economics, 'the Conservative Party has virtually nothing to say' on questions of law and order, religion and morality, the family and community.[131] Scruton is referring to the tragedy of unintended consequences undermining intentions: 'in adopting the Hayekian defence of the market, the Conservative Party neglected the social philosophy which gives sense to it'.[132] Gray argued that, 'during the long interregnum of the Major years', neoliberalism suffered its 'political collapse...slowly and with a whimper'.[133] Neoliberalism didn't collapse, but it was compromised insofar as Conservatism gave increasing priority to the renewal of civil society. Gray, argued, critically, Conservatism was undone by the 'unintended' and 'uncomprehended' consequences of Conservative policies.[134]

---

[130] Ibid, 49.

[131] Scruton however, unlike Gray, blames 'the welfare state' as much as the preeminence of 'liberal contract' for the 'decline of communities' R. Scruton. 1996. *The Conservative Idea of Community*. London: The Conservative 2000 Foundation, 9, 29.

[132] Ibid, 8.

[133] Gray, *Endgames*, 14.

[134] Gray, 'Conclusion', 146

Whilst there was no intention on the part of the Conservative Party to bring forth a crisis of its own values, the notion that this went on unheeded is questionable. Furthermore, Gray argued that, 'the conditions under which conservatism as a coherent form of political thought and practice are possible no longer exist'.[135] This is also contestable.

Willetts did more to question the lack of comprehension on the part of Conservatives concerning the crisis of Conservatism wrought by markets than any other other senior Conservative. Whilst other Conservatives shunned or attacked Gray's obituary of Conservatism as a defence of the 'old bureaucracies',[136] Willetts engaged in a hearty defence of the Conservative tradition whilst attending to the central thrust of Gray's critique. Whilst Willetts disagrees with Gray, he nevertheless acknowledges that, in the 1990s, Conservatism had problems that were 'much deeper' than mere 'indiscipline' of the Conservative Parliamentary Party.[137] 'It was', Willetts qualifies, 'a dangerous uncertainty about the nature of modern conservatism'.[138] The debate between Gray and Willetts was, for Hayton, a debate between '*post*-Thatcherism' and '*neo*-Thatcherism' respectively.[139] Indeed, Willetts' neo-Thatcherite response to Gray constituted a fundamental starting point for Cameronism's later attempt to seriously think about the requirements of the renewal of civil society.[140] Whereas Gray wanted to bury Thatcherism, even though he thought you couldn't, Willetts wanted to incorporate a greater concern for non-state collective action around what Willetts called 'Civic

---

[135] Gray, 'The undoing of conservatism', In *Is Conservatism Dead?* 13-14.

[136] Waldegrave, 'Conservatism offers Practical Policies for the 1990's'.

[137] Willetts, 'Civic Conservatism', 69.

[138] Ibid (emphasis added).

[139] Hayton, *Reconstructing Conservatism?* 20.

[140] See chapter four.

Conservatism'. It was more a change of *degree* than *kind*. The writings of Willetts themselves illustrate the gradual move away from an uncritical acceptance of neoliberalism towards *qualifying* neoliberalism, by embracing the politics and languages of community and society. Willetts' 1992 book for example, *Modern Conservatism*, focused 'on the primacy of the free market'.[141] On other occasions, Willetts has even criticised Thatcherism from the neoliberal Right, stating in 1993 that the 'regulatory burden...has been steadily increasing since the mid-1980s', which 'constitute a serious obstacle to creating a flexible, dynamic' economy.[142] Whereas in his *Civic Conservatism*, written two years after *Modern Conservatism*, Willetts accepts a more qualified neoliberalism, even paying lip service to the language of social justice.[143] In order to understand Willetts' contribution to post-Thatcher Conservatism's legitimation of neoliberal political economy *via* a revived interest in civil society, an understanding of what Willetts meant by 'Civic Conservatism' is integral. Willetts expounds that, 'Civic conservatism...places the *free market* in the *context of institutions* and *values* which make up *civil society*'.[144] Civic Conservatism was an attempt therefore 'to define *the* authentic Conservative position which escapes the perils of the progressive liberals, of the over-demanding communitarian and of the aggressively individualistic neoliberals'.[145] There are two features of Civic Conservatism that are worth identifying: (1) its asymmetric proximity to neoliberalism and anti-statism in comparison to social democratic political visions, and (2) the importance of

---

[141] P. Dorey and M. Garnett. 2012. 'No such thing as the 'Big Society'? The Conservative Party's unnecessary search for 'narrative' in the 2010 general election', *British Politics* 7 (4): 394.

[142] Willetts, *Deregulation*, 5.

[143] Garnett and Hickson, *Conservative Thinkers*, 164.

[144] Willetts, 'Civic Conservatism', 94-95.

[145] D. Willetts, 'The Free Market and Civic Conservatism', In *Conservative Realism*, 89.

institutions as a distinguishing feature of its interest in civic renewal as a remedy for the Conservative obsession with free markets. First, the free market reforms of the 1980s were not to be rejected, but embedded into the institutions of civil society. Like Major, Willetts does 'not see the free market as a threat to communities'.[146] Indeed, Willetts maintains that critiques of markets, which suggest 'markets undermine values' and 'commerce destroys culture', need defying.[147] 'The free market is an integral part of our history', for Willetts, and key features of the Thatcherite neoliberal inheritance like deregulation play 'a crucial part of civic conservatism'.[148] Markets made people, to use William Blackstone's description of eighteenth century Englishman, a 'polite and commercial people'. Second, the civilising of free markets must take place within a society composed of strong and independent institutions. Institutions have long been an important emphasis in the ideologies of British Conservatism. Willetts argued that the Conservative 'commitment to maintaining the institutions which hold our nation together' is a central strand of contemporary Conservatism.[149] There was a serious and impressive blossoming Conservative interest in institutions in the 1990s, with contributions including those of Douglas Hurd,[150] Ferdinand Mount,[151] John Patten,[152] Waldegrave,[153] and Willetts. Hurd attests that

---

[146] Major, 'Conservatism in the 1990s'.

[147] Willetts, 'Civic Conservatism', 71.

[148] Ibid, 81, 128.

[149] D. Willetts. 1997. *Why Vote Conservative?* London: Penguin, 5.

[150] See D. Hurd. 1991. *Conservatism in the 1990s*. London: Conservative Political Centre.

[151] Mount, *Clubbing Together*.

[152] See J. Patten. 1991. *Political Culture, Conservatism and Rolling Constitutional Change*: *The 1991 Swinton Lecture*. London: Conservative Political Centre.

[153] See W. Waldegrave. 1996. *Two Lectures: A Competitive Nation? Why the Next Election Matters? Tory Democracy and One Nation: Their Relevance Today*. London: Conservative Political Centre.

the ‘neglect of our institutions’ had taken place under Thatcherism.[154] Institutions are the parts of civil society that are the real and actual places in which networks of mutual dependence form. Waldegrave, whose political thought-practices were sympathetic to Civic Conservatism, argued that, ‘...even in free commercial markets, collapse will soon follow if there are not firm foundations in morality, law and *independent institutions*’.[155] What is most noteworthy about this presentation of institutions is that institutions are decontested doubly as an essential precondition for the flourishing of civil society, and the mechanisms through which market behaviour and transactions can take place and be regulated.[156] It goes beyond, for Civic Conservatives, the ‘vague’ Labour commitment to community; it perceived community playing out, and being shaped by, ‘real [and] live institutions’ with ‘backbones’.[157] These ‘backbones’, or the units of civil society, in Civic Conservatism, are ‘the nation state and the family’, which ‘are the two most significant non-market institutions’.[158] Whereas Gray thought institutions were traduced during Thatcherism (and Majorism),[159] Willetts criticism is that, ‘Conservatives failed during the 1980s to show how we understood...[the]...essential underpinnings to the market’.[160] Indeed, for Willetts, it was not Thatcherism or ‘brash market forces’ that destroyed British institutions; ‘the real threat was coming from the intrusive state’, and ‘big government’ had

---

[154] Hurd, *Conservatism in the 1990s*, 6.

[155] W. Waldegrave. 1994. ‘Recruiting to the Little Platoons’, Speech to the Social Market Foundation, 9 March.

[156] Willetts, ‘Civic Conservatism’, 82.

[157] Willetts, ‘Renewing Civic Conservatism’.

[158] Willetts, ‘Civic Conservatism’, 70; ‘The Free Market and Civic Conservatism’, 83.

[159] Gray, ‘Conclusion’, 148.

[160] Willetts, ‘Civic Conservatism’, 81.

overwhelmingly contributed to the 'atrophy of a far richer and more satisfying network of non-State activities'.[161] Willetts effectively wanted to protect the Thatcherite promotion, and legacy, of the market society from those that thought its consequences tolled the death for Conservatism. Willetts nevertheless accepted that Conservatism needed a pro-social and society-oriented agenda to complement neoliberal economics in the quest to achieve both broader Conservative political objectives and stave off crisis. Willetts wrote that during the 1990s, the Conservatives 'were discovering that you could not deliver Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* without also having his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*'.[162]

Post-Thatcher Conservatives 'want to combine the dynamism of the free market with respect for...traditional institutions' therefore.[163] Willetts' critique of the late-Thatcherite slavish adherence to neoliberalism was the most eloquent and intellectually-accomplished contribution among a chorus of less thorough critiques. There were notable dissenting voices against the taming of neoliberalism, such as Alan Duncan and Dominic Hobson's tract, *Saturn's Children*, which was a passionate defence of neoliberalism, and went well beyond Thatcherite and post-Thatcher Conservatism's anti-statism in wanting to 'liquidate', not 'reinvent', government to allow for the untrammelled free reign of markets.[164] The dissension against the Conservative attempt to qualify neoliberalism however, was small. To illustrate the Conservative questioning of the limits of neoliberal economics, David Hunt argued that the language of the market economy needed 'refining' and 'redefining' against the taint of its

---

[161] Ibid, 78; Willetts, 'The Free Market and Civic Conservatism', 84.

[162] Willetts, 'Reviving Civic Conservatism', 28.

[163] Willetts, *Why Vote Conservative?* xi.

[164] A. Duncan and D. Hobson. 1995. *Saturn's Children: How the State Devours Liberty, Prosperity and Virtue*. London: Sinclair-Stevenson, xv.

shameful association with selfishness.[165] Mount warned that the 'retreat of the State' in the 1980s had 'left behind an ideologically confused scene', in which the 'principle of profit' and markets were exalted without 'pausing to think' about the 'unsuspected costs' incurred.[166] Waldegrave lamented the loss of 'the powerful rhetoric of Burke, and his celebration of the importance of the little platoons', and the lack of resonant language in the post-Thatcher Conservative vocabulary, which has been 'cloaked...in the truly dreadful jargon of management-speak'.[167] Even Michael Portillo, a one time darling of the Right, in a parishioner confession (an early 'moderniser') thought one of the causes of Conservative crisis was the disproportionate emphasis on the 'language of economics and high finance'.[168]

The crowning realisation that neoliberal economics had been wrongheadedly perceived as interchangeable with Conservative aims and objectives resulted in not the *rejection,* but *supplementation*, of neoliberalism in post-Thatcher Conservatism. Letwin and Willetts both assessed that the Conservative Party was seen narrowly as 'the economics party'.[169] Hague also agreed that, 'One of the reasons we lost in 1997 was that we appeared to have become the *economics party*, as we were shining an intense searchlight on a

---

[165] D. Hunt. 1994. *Right Ahead: Conservatism and the Social Market*. London: Conservative Political Centre, 7.

[166] In doing so, Mount argued for Conservatives to emphasise 'non-profit-making enterprise' instead of 'private commercial enterprise'. Mount, *Clubbing Together*, 14. Also see Mount's critique of the Conservatives' appropriation of New Public Management ideology, F. Mount. 2000. *Home Pages: A New Domestic Agenda for the Next Government*. London: Centre for Policy Studies, 9.

[167] Waldegrave, 'Recruiting to the Little Platoons' (emphasis added).

[168] M. Portillo. 1997. *The Ghost of Toryism Past: The Spirit of Conservatism Future*. London: Centre for Policy Studies, 3.

[169] Willetts, 'Reviving Civic Conservatism', 29; D. Willetts. 1998. 'Conservative Renewal', *Political Quarterly* 69 (2), 113; O. Letwin, 'From economic revolution to social revolution', In *Is the Future Conservative?* 73.

particular set of economic issues'.[170] Hence, a new, albeit slow, mood descended onto the thought-practices of British Conservatism in the 1990s and early 2000s: the neoliberal language of 'markets', 'enterprise' and 'choice' needed to be supplemented with the language of 'citizenship', 'responsibility' and 'stewardship'.[171]

This moderation and subduing of neoliberalism in this period has been recognised by theorists of political economy. Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell argued that, whereas Thatcherism was an example of *"roll-back" neoliberalism* (referring to the deregulatory, privatising and liberalising practices of Thatcherism's market society, which dismantled the social-collectivist, Keynesian-welfarist settlement), *"roll-out" neoliberalism* was the supplementary phase in which the deregulated economy was managed by a government professing its commitment to a highly selective and decontested notion of 'community'.[172] Others have characterised this phase as erecting the 'institutional hardware' for the market society.[173] The supplementation of the ('roll-out' stage of the) neoliberal political economy increasingly became a more important focus for Conservatives after the election defeat in 1997. Gray argued that another term of Tory rule' after 1997 'would mean the dismantlement of the last obstacles to the continued desolation of

---

[170] W. Hague. 1998. 'Freedom and the Family', Speech to the Social Market Foundation, 29 January (emphasis added).

[171] D. Marquand, 'The Language of Community', In *The Alternative*, 3.

[172] Peck and Tickell write pellucidly of this 'roll-out' phase in that the market society agenda selectively appropriated '"community" and non-market metrics, the establishment of social-capital discourses and techniques, the incorporation (and underwriting) of local-governance and partnership-based modes of policy development and program delivery in areas like urban regeneration and social welfare, the mobilization of the "little platoon" in the shape of (local) voluntary and faith-based associations in the service of neoliberal goals, and the evolution of invasive, neopaternalist modes of intervention...in areas like penal and workfare policy'. J. Peck and N. Tickell. 2002. 'Neoliberalising Space', *Antipode* 34 (3): 380-404, 390.

[173] P. Catney, S. MacGregor, A. Dobson, S. M. Hall, S. Royston, Z. Robinson, M. Ormerod and S. Ross. 2013. 'Big society, little justice? Community renewable energy and the politics of localism', *Local Environment*, published on 17 May 2013. Doi: 10.1080/13549839.2013.792044, 3.

communities by unchannelled market forces'.[174] Under Hague, even though opposition to New Labour's own supplementations to neoliberalism predominated, the Conservatives slowly accepted, following initial and staunch resistance, the introduction of the national minimum wage and symbolically accepted the Blair Government's 'pursuit of full employment as a policy objective'.[175] Indeed, Cameronism's revisions to neoliberalism, atoning, and overturning the *perceived* Tory hostility to public services, has its roots under Hague. Iain Duncan Smith, Hague's beleaguered successor, attempted to reconceptualise social justice in an attempt to deliver *compassionate* Conservatism.[176] Duncan Smith's successor, Michael Howard, even though contributing little to this development, contributed insofar as he 'tested to destruction' any return to Thatcherism, and his tenure ultimately prepared the way for Cameronism's more coherent and critical qualified neoliberalism.[177] The ideological tentativeness of Conservatism in these years was in stark contrast therefore to the assertiveness of Conservatism's qualified neoliberalism under Cameron.

The supplementation of the neoliberal approach to the economy reached its apogee under Cameron between 2006 and 2007. Willetts recognised that the Conservative Party was 'still good at 'me'', but 'not so good at 'us''.[178] Neoliberalism had produced, as discussed, an ethic of possessive individualism, which became associated with the outcomes of Thatcherism's attempt to build the

---

[174] Gray, *Endgames*, 103.

[175] HC Deb, No. 39, Col. 1189, 3 February 2000. P. Dorey. 2003. 'Conservative Policy under Hague', In *The Conservatives in Crisis*, 128.

[176] I. Duncan Smith. 2003. 'Conference Speech', 15 September; J. Norman and J. Ganesh. 2006. *Compassionate Conservatism: What It Is. Why We Need It*. London: Policy Exchange.

[177] Bale, *Conservative Party*, 253.

[178] Willetts, 'Renewing Civic Conservatism', 28.

market society. Cameron and other senior Conservatives, from late 2005 onwards, made more concerted efforts than his four post-Thatcher predecessors to qualify and supplement British Conservatism's commitment to neoliberal economics. Cameronism is not, as Mark Evans argues, 'essentially a neoliberal project'.[179] Even more so, it is not, as Polly Toynbee asserts, an intensification of Thatcherite neoliberalism.[180] There are four distinct and identifiable areas of Cameronite neoliberal supplementation: (1) Cameronism's pitch to ensconce a new and more 'moral capitalism'; (2) a rhetorical, albeit shallow, commitment to downward income redistribution, social justice and wealth inequality; (3) a more inclusive and positive attitude to public services; and (4) the evolution of a *light* industrial strategy with an adjacent emphasis on 'full employment'.

(1) The hyper, casino, turbo-capitalism in the late modern era of Anglo-American politics created a more dynamic market economy, but, as social democrats realised first and some Conservatives later, it had not delivered a cognate moral transformation. The Conservatives and Conservatism was hindered further however. New Labour had *ostensibly* imitated much of the Thatcherite neoliberal political economy.[181] Therefore, Cameronism did not reject neoliberalism, but it used a Conservative vocabulary of responsibility to qualify neoliberalism. Cameronism 'intended to cleanse the electorate's palate of late Thatcherism', and its association with an unqualified devotion to neoliberalism, because it sidelined other priorities.[182] Cameron argued that the problem of

---

[179] M. Evans, 'Cameron's Competition State', In *The Conservatives under David Cameron*, 131.

[180] Interview with Polly Toynbee, 13 September 2013. See P. Toynbee and D. Walker. 2012. *Dogma and Disarray: Cameron at Half-Time*. London: Granta; P. Toynbee and D. Walker. 2015. *Cameron's Coup: How the Tories Took Britain to the Brink*. London: Faber & Faber. 2015.

[181] Dorey, 'Sharing the Proceeds of Growth', 259.

[182] R. Reeves. 2008. 'This is David Cameron', *Public Policy Research* 15 (2): 64.

neoliberalism was that it dominated the Conservative ideological offering, and consequently, 'no one knew what [the Conservatives]...thought about the health service, or the environment or society'.[183] This was another example of what has been called the, '...and theory of Conservatism', in which traditional Conservative conceptual priorities (i.e. market economics) are wed to more unorthodox priorities (i.e. concern for the environment and the NHS).[184] Cameron thus endorsed what he called 'moral capitalism'.[185] Cameron's 'moral capitalism' recognised that 'markets can fail' and that 'uncontrolled globalisation can slide into monopolisation, sweeping aside the small, the personal and the local'.[186] Harnessing the extremities of neoliberalism, Cameron argued that, 'the idea of social responsibility' is critical of the 'atomistic' view of individualism, which underpins neoliberal theory, and reminds Conservatives 'that companies have obligations too'.[187] Norman argued that the 'hyper-libertarian' and 'crony' variety of capitalism produces 'economism' and '*rigor mortis economics*', which produces 'desiccated economic atomism'.[188] Moral capitalism thus questions and revises the self-interestedness of individuals and corporations. Cameron, harking back to Burke, Pitt the Younger, Peel and Disraeli, argued that 'corporate social responsibility' and 'environmental responsibility' were at the core of his (and Conservative) politics, and that Cameronism would '*stand up to big business* when it was in the national interest'.[189] Osborne argued that Cameronism's *raison*

---

[183] Cameron in Jones, *Cameron on Cameron,* 290.

[184] Bale, *Conservative Party*, 283-362.

[185] Cameron, 'Speech on Moral Capitalism'.

[186] Ibid.

[187] Ibid.

[188] Norman, *The Big Society*, 64.

[189] Cameron, 'Moral Capitalism' (emphasis added).

d'etre had been to argue that 'Conservatives have always understood the limitations of free markets on their own'.[190] In castigating 'markets without morality' and 'wealth without fairness' and 'capitalism without conscience', Cameronism's central conception of the way in which it sees markets is as follows: in overturning what Cameron called 'the free market orthodoxy', 'markets are a means to an end, not an end in themselves'.[191] For Cameron, Conservatives understand the free market and thus 'know its failings as well as its strengths', and this vision was thus not an attempt to 'weaken' or 'undermine' markets, but 'an opportunity to improve them'.[192] Examples of Cameronism's attempt to build a more moral capitalism included the greater regulation of investment banking; the commission of the Vickers Report on restructuring the banking system placing a firewall between the retail and investment arms of banks, and increases to the bank levy. It was a Cameronite attempt to supplement the ethos of free market economics with social responsibility supported by institutions. Osborne illustratively argues that Conservatives:

> '...understand that unless markets are embedded in strong institutions, laws and cultural norms they can become free-for-alls that are prone to instability, laws and cultural norms they become free-for-alls that are prone to instability and end up benefiting the powerful at the expense of the needy'.[193]

Cameronite moral capitalism was an attempt to re-imagine the capitalism inherited from Thatcherism and New Labour, maintaining a Tory hostility to the

---

[190] G. Osborne. 2009. 'Policy making after the crash', RSA Speech, 8 April.

[191] D. Cameron. 2009. 'We need popular capitalism', Speech in Davos, 30 January.

[192] Cameron, 'Moral Capitalism'.

[193] Osborne, 'Policy making after the crash'.

state, married to a belief in the power of individual and community social action. Cameron said of his Davos speech in 2009 that it represented 'a change from the 1980s, where we rightly had the spirit of enterprise, but on which we now need to build the sense of responsibility'.[194]

Adjacent to Cameronism's interest in moral capitalism was a deeper critique of the implied *motivations* and *socio-psychology* of the agents in neoliberal polities in the form of behavioural economics. Behavioural economics departed from neoliberalism, much like moral capitalism, in rejecting its reduction of human behaviour to rational self-interest. Behavioural economics asserts the importance of 'social norms' (i.e. constituted 'normal behaviour'). Social norms affects people's behaviour, independent of prices and incomes, because of how they affect people's spiritual well-being and level of happiness.[195] Neoliberal economic theory assumes that individuals operate within neutral designs, removed from both institutional particularities or cultural customs. Man is merely *homo economicus*.[196] The insights of behavioural economics, 'nudge' theory and the work of others, such as Nassim Nicholas Taleb,[197] Daniel Kahneman, Daniel Ariely, Richard Sennett, Tom Steinberg, Anil Gaba, Richard Nisbett and Claude Steele, influenced Cameronites such as Cameron, Osborne, Letwin, Willetts and Hilton. The interest in behavioural economics is significant for two reasons: (i)

---

[194] W. Hutton and D. Cameron. 2009. 'Recession Britain: The Great Debate', *The Guardian*, 1 February.

[195] Cameron in 2006 was interested in Richard Layard's research into the conditions for happiness, the 'post-material' agenda, and what Cameron called 'general well-being'. Cameron argued that 'Wealth is about so much more than pounds, or euros or dollars can ever measure. It's time we admitted that there's more to life than money, and it's time we focused not just on GDP, but on GWB - general well-being'. D. Cameron. 2006. 'Improving Society's Sense of Well Being is Challenge of Our Times', Google Zeitgeist Speech. 22 May.

[196] Thaler and Sunstein, *Nudge*, 7 (emphasis added); Osborne, 'Policy making after the crash'.

[197] Notably, Cameron had a filmed discussion with Nicholas Nassim Taleb in 2009. J. Ganesh. 2012. 'Is Nassim Nicholas Taleb Downing Street's favourite adviser?' *BBC News*, 12 March.

the broader Conservative interest in disparate disciplines' insights - social psychology, evolutionary psychology, game theory, evolutionary biology and neuroscience - reinforced the accorded Conservative importance to institutions, contracts between the generations and the limitations of the state,[198] and (ii), behavioural economics has had a direct influence on Treasury thinking. Headed by David Halpern and advised by Thaler, the Conservatives on forming the government in 2010, established a Behavioural Insights Team ('nudge unit'), which was responsible for enacting and putting into practice the insights of behavioural economics. It was crucial for the Conservatives because it 'offered an appealingly fresh way of looking at the state', in which 'nudges', and not 'mandates', would both revise a key neoliberal insight on human motivation (i.e. self-interested rational calculators related to each other transactionally), and intellectually correspond to Cameronite anti-statism'.[199]

(2) The attempt to moralise 'crony capitalism',[200] and revise the underlying motivations of neoliberalism by turning to the insights of behavioural economics, was a large feature of Cameronite rhetorical de-neoliberalisation or *qualified* neoliberalism. A lesser aspect, although *prima facie* an extraordinary aspect, was the pre-GFC emphasis on Cameronism's willingness to engage with the language of income redistribution, social justice and narrowing wealth inequalities.[201] This language was more familiar to the ideological families of the

---

[198] Interview with David Willetts, 9 December 2013; D. Willetts. 2012. 'Tory Modernisation 2.0: The Future of the Conservative Party', Speech to Bright Blue. 28 July; D. Willetts. 2012. 'What's the Good of Government?' Speech to University of East Anglia. 24 May; D. Willetts. 2011. *The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Took Their Children's Future - and Why They Should Give It Back*. London: Atlantic Books.

[199] d'Ancona. *In It Together*, 154; Thaler and Sunstein, *Nudge*, 6, 14;

[200] Cameron, 'Moral Capitalism'.

[201] See collected speeches in K. Carter ed. 2010. *From Thatcher to Cameron: The Journey to Compassionate Conservatism: The Collected Wilberforce Addresses 1997-2009*. London: Biteback.

(Centre-)Left. Equality has a marginal position in the ideologies of Conservatism. Blairism had cleverly ensconced a election-winning political fusion of social justice and economic efficiency, which Cameron called 'the new common ground in British politics'.[202] On the social justice side of the political equation, New Labour redistributed income downwards by stealth, used tax receipts to develop Sure Start, improved schools, built infrastructure projects, transformed public spaces, and significantly reduced poverty.[203] In the atmosphere of convergence aforementioned, Cameronites argued that the aims of Cameronism should be 'to narrow the gap between rich and poor', and unambiguously move beyond support ing 'safety nets' to supporting the 'redistribution principle'.[204] Letwin's interest in redistribution was mirrored by Cameronism's (rhetorical) interest in social justice. This was not without precedence however. Duncan Smith, along with Tim Montgomerie, founded the *Centre for Social Justice* in 2004, whose aim was to put 'social justice at the heart of British politics'.[205] Indeed under Cameron, Duncan Smith was appointed as Chairman of the Social Justice Policy Group, one of six of the policy groups established by Cameron in 2006. Other Cameronites, like Willetts, became interested in the 'social justice agenda', especially the work of Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, and Michael Marmot.[206] There was an impressive consideration of 'what "equality" might mean for a right-of-centre party in our pluralist, globalised, hyper-technological century'.[207] Self-conscious

---

[202] Cameron, 'Modern Conservatism'.

[203] Smith, 'From Big Government to Big Society', 819-820.

[204] R. Sylvester. 2005. 'Letwin: We will redistribute wealth', *The Daily Telegraph*, 23 December.

[205] *Centre for Social Justice* website. http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/about-us/social-breakdown-and-poverty (accessed 8 July 2014).

[206] Interview with Willetts.

[207] M. d'Ancona. 2014. 'Tories on top: What now for modernisers?' In *The Modernisers' Manifesto*, edited by R. Shorthouse, K. Maltby and J. Brenton. London: Bright Blue, 21.

progressive Conservative think-tanks such as *Renewal* and *Bright Blue* have argued that the Conservative embrace of social justice, through measures such as increases in the minimum wage, would be electorally-advantageous in reorienting the Conservative Party as the 'new workers party'.[208] Cameron thought historical attempts to promote social justice 'up until the 1960s' was 'well-intentioned', 'compassionate' and 'successful'.[209] Simultaneous to the Cameronite pillaging of social justice agendas, Cameronism was keen to exploit the growth in inequality under New Labour:

> Who made the poorest poorer? Who left youth unemployment higher? Who made inequality greater? No, not the wicked Tories. You, Labour: you're the ones that did this to our society. So don't you dare lecture us about poverty. You have failed and it falls to us, the modern Conservative party to fight for the poorest who you have let down'.[210]

Blind spots remained, in Cameronite thought-practices, about Thatcherism's contribution to this inequality, but the criticism of New Labour allowed Cameron's Conservatives to attempt to apportion blame, and make social justice their own. What is most interesting about these references to social justice and inequality is that it is highly selective. In Cameronism, it was a contribution to the insufficiency of neoliberalism, but it was *more* concerned with the other core feature of Cameronism, namely the rediscovery and celebration of the social. Whilst Letwin explicitly talked about the redistribution of income, the language of Cameronism on redistribution was focused less on income and more on the

---

[208] D. Skelton ed. 2013. *Access All Areas: Building a Majority*. London: Renewal; D. Cameron. 2014. 'Conference Speech', 1 October

[209] D. Cameron, 'Hugo Young Lecture'.

[210] Cameron, 'Conservative Conference of 2009'.

redistribution of 'power' and 'control' from the central state and its agencies to individuals and communities. Gary Streeter, a pro-social Conservative politician, argued representatively that, 'proper redistribution is delivered through society - not the state'.[211] Whilst Duncan Smith and Willetts tried to assert their interest in social justice, it was a social justice conceptualised in relation to the 'social action' of the 'voluntary sector and social enterprises', which would banish 'the broken society', and 'the linked problems that blight...communities' such as 'drug abuse, family breakdown, poor public choice, chaotic home environments, high crime'.[212] As the state got bigger, Cameron asserted that, 'reducing poverty, fighting inequality and increasing general well-being' became harder.[213] One of the many tropes of Cameronism, prior to May 2010, was that it was going to deliver *progressive ends*, such as social justice, through *Conservative means* such as state retrenchment.[214] Curiously, in the confused post-New Labour world, Cameronism could simultaneously claim the 'progressive mantle', 'qualify' neoliberalism and maintain other Conservative priorities. A resonant example was the Coalition Government's reduction of the top rate of income tax from 50% to 45%. Cameron could accurately claim that, whilst cutting the top rate of tax in the name of the neoliberal justifications of greater competitiveness and creating incentives for wealth-creation, 'the rich have paid more in tax - specifically more in income tax - than they did in any year under Labour'.[215] In the same vein,

---

[211] G. Streeter, 'Conservatives must change in order to help the vulnerable', In *There Is Such a Thing as Society: Twelve Principles of Compassionate Conservatism*, 7.

[212] Cameron, 'Leadership Victory Speech'; D. Cameron. 2008. 'Fixing our Broken Society', Speech. 7 July.

[213] Cameron, 'Hugo Young Lecture'.

[214] G. Clark and J. Hunt. 2008. *Who's Progressive Now, Why the Conservatives Offer the Best Hope for Progressive Politics*. London: Conservative Party; D. Cameron. 2009. 'Making progressive conservatism a reality', Speech to Demos.

[215] HC Deb, Col. 344 26 March 2014.

Osborne in his 2014 Budget hailed that under Cameron, 'income inequality is at its lowest level for 28 years, lower than at any single moment under Labour'.[216] Indeed, the Gini coefficient for disposable income in 2011-12 was 32.3 per cent, the lowest level since 1986. Nevertheless, despite the allusions to progressivism, Cameronism used *Conservative means* to deliver *Conservative ends*!

(3) Conservatism had made itself an enemy of the public services under Thatcher and beyond. Cameronism attempted to put rest to this. New Labour's record on public services requires proof and elucidation in order for Cameronite attitudes to public services to be clarified. New Labour ideologically preserved the Conservative fetish for 'choice' and internal markets in the public services, diversifying provision in schools (i.e. academies) and hospitals (i.e. foundation hospitals). The significant point of departure, from past Conservative governments, was the large increases in public expenditure on the public services:

> '...between 1997 and 2006, public spending on health increased from 5.4 per cent to around 7.3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). In 2007/08, spending on the NHS will...be £92 billion as compared with £33 billion in 1996/97. Between 1997 and 2006, government spending on education rose from 4.5% per cent of GDP to roughly 5.5 per cent of GDP'.[217]

This backdrop meant that Cameronism committed itself to matching the Blair Government's spending levels on public services. This signified, symbolically, that Cameronism 'rejected the New Right thinking of the Thatcher years' and

---

[216] HC Deb, Col. 784 19 March 2014.

[217] S. Griffiths, 'Cameron's Conservatives and the Public Services', In *The Conservatives under David Cameron*, 104.

'openly embraced the continuation of public welfare provision'.[218] Simon Lee also noted that these commitments to public spending formed part of the process of distancing Conservatism 'from the under-investment in public services of the 1979-97 period'.[219] Furthermore, in the Cameron era, an interim report found that the previous Conservative administrations had subjected public services to a avalanche of audits, inspections and reviews so as to merely mimic private, market practices.[220] Public services were not decontested as an essential 'safety net' for those 'who could not afford to take the private route' under Cameronism, but as essential to the fabric of British society, and as a key signifier that the ubiquity of markets, associated with neoliberalism, had limits.[221]

In Coalition, Cameron's Conservatives' commitment to public services persisted insofar as they promised to protect (or 'ring-fence') the NHS, schools and international development spending from the spending cuts demanded by the imprimaturs of austerity. Cameron's biographers argued that, 'Cameron...accepted Blair's public service investment in order to neutralise the negative perception of the Tories as enemies of the NHS and state education'.[222] Cameron went so far, echoing Blair's mantra on education, that he declared that he could state his priority 'in three letters: NHS'.[223] Nevertheless, it is a curious point that Cameronites consistently contended that the additional spending on public services under New Labour didn't work. Cameron argued that, 'the extra billions

---

[218] P. Alcock. 2008. *Social Policy in Britain*. 3rd edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 11.

[219] Griffiths, 'Cameron's Conservatives and the Public Services', 104.

[220] P. Dorey. 2007. 'A New Direction or Another False Dawn? David Cameron and the Crisis of British Conservatism', *British Politics* 2 (2): 143; Mount, *Home Pages*, 9.

[221] d'Ancona, *In It Together*, 101.

[222] F. Elliott and J. Hanning. 2007. *Cameron: The Rise of the New Conservative*. London: HarperCollins, 145.

[223] D. Cameron. 2006. 'Conference Speech', 4 October.

spent by Labour has not produced...more police on the beat, rigour in education, and shorter hospital waiting times'.[224] Whilst the 'priority' spending areas aforementioned were protected, other spending departments such as local government and higher education faced deep and sharp cuts. One common feature of the Cameronite approach to public services, both those that are protected and unprotected from spending retrenchments, was the extension of quasi-markets, the greater emphasis on user-choice, greater professional autonomy, greater involvement of private and voluntary providers, and a consistent and preponderant scepticism of the state as a dominant provider of these public services.[225] Public services were to be handed over with greater enthusiasm than New Labour to 'individuals and families' equipped with choice. The approach towards public services embodied Cameronism's attitude to neoliberalism more broadly: the equitable outcomes of public service provision and administration, which is preserved and underpinned by a traditional system of financing is wedded to mechanisms that imitate the efficiency-gains of the free market economy.

(4) The final feature of neoliberal revisionism is the Cameronite interest in a coordinated industrial policy as a root to boosting job creation to meet the Coalition ambition of 'full employment'.[226] The move towards a quasi-activist and coordinated industrial policy has been tentative. Indeed Steve Richards astutely noted that the industrial policy promoted in 2012 onwards was in 'marked contrast to the early years of the Coalition when it was ideologically allergic to

---

[224] D. Cameron. 2005. 'Speech on Public Service Reform', 9 September.

[225] R. Prabhakar, 'Reforming Public Services: The Views of the Main Parties', In *British Party Politics and Ideology after New Labour*, 195-207.

[226] S. Williams and P. Scott. 2011. 'The Nature of Conservative Party Modernisation Under David Cameron: The Trajectory of Employment Relations Policy', *Parliamentary Affairs* 64 (3): 513-529.

state intervention in any form'.[227] A symbolic example of this allergy was the Cameron Government's refusal to maintain capital expenditure budgets. Thatcherism thought that the words 'industrial policy' and 'industrial strategy' were an 'irrelevance and a delusion'.[228] The task of government was to create and sustain a free competitive market. The attempt to intervene, to be selective or to 'pick winners', was by definition counter-productive.[229] The departure from these laissez-faire assumptions was significant. Cameron argued that he 'never believed in just laissez faire' and, as such, 'government should play an active part in helping businesses and industry'.[230] Osborne argued that an industrial policy to stimulate an 'export-led recovery' was not a 'philosophical departure' as Conservatism believed in 'regulated markets' with rules for market conduct designed and monitored by government'.[231] Michael Heseltine, who had a long record and rare distinction in the Thatcher era for promoting industrial activism, advised Cameron's Coalition Government,[232] and argued for a 'National Growth Council'.[233] Osborne wanted Cameron's 'Britain carried aloft by the march of the makers' in a new age of industrial growth and productivity.[234] In his 2013 Budget, Osborne pledged to 'back sectors that are global successes', like aerospace and

---

[227] S. Richards. 2013. 'For the state to intervene in the free market would have been anathema to Osborne. How times change', *The Independent*, 25 November.

[228] Keith Joseph quoted in S. Wilks. 1993. 'Economic Policy', In *Developments in British Politics 4*, edited by P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, I. Holliday and G. Peele. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 240.

[229] Ibid, 240.

[230] Cameron, 'Conference Speech of 2008'.

[231] George Osborne quoted in P. Wintour. 2013. 'Payday loan costs cap unveiled by George Osborne', *The Guardian*, 25 November.

[232] M. Heseltine. 1987. *Where There's a Will*. London: Hutchinson, 5; M. Crick. 1997. *Michael Heseltine: A Biography*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 385.

[233] M. Heseltine, *No Stone Unturned: In Pursuit of Growth*, (London: Crown, 2012), 203.

[234] HC Deb, Col. 966 23 March 2011.

shale gas, which effectively amounted to the selection of winners.[235] Willetts argued that Cameronism's interest in industrial activism was defined by its mirror-images of *state dirigisme* and *market laissez-faire*. Willetts envisaged:

> '...Government playing a creative and constructive role working with researchers, universities and business to promote innovation and achieve the greatest possible economic value. Increasingly I think of this less as the passing of a baton in relay race and more as a partnership in which both Government and business and other players are all active at the same time'.[236]

Whilst Cameronism had not lost its taste for the ethics of neoliberalism, it was being supplemented by measures hitherto which, since the late 1970s, were seen as ideologically incompatible with broader Conservative aims.

An even more extraordinary feature of Cameronism, associated with the revival of an industrial strategy, was the rhetorical commitment to *full* employment. Conservatives had previously accepted New Labour's 'pursuit of full employment'.[237] Osborne's economic vision of a long-term, export-led economy recovery, with a neoliberal attitude towards regulation and intervention, was supplemented by a quasi-activist industrial policy, behavioural economics and an interest in moralising capitalism, and an acknowledgement that Osbornomics was about 'Working to build an economy that supports *full employment*'.[238] This, like the adoption of an industrial strategy, *seemed* to mark a further rejection of one of the central planks of Thatcherite economics. Thatcherism in its efforts to

---

[235] G. Osborne. 2013. 'Chancellor's Budget Speech', 20 March.

[236] Willetts, 'What's the Good of Government?'

[237] See page 157 in chapter three.

[238] G. Osborne. 2014. 'Speech on Tax and Benefits'. 31 March.

cut inflation ditched the post-war governments' commitment to full employment. It was not the business of government to guarantee full employment in Thatcherite thought-practices. Cameronism does not depart from this contention. It does however shift the rhetoric. Norman Lamont's reaction to the soaring unemployment of the early 1990s as 'a price...well worth paying' for getting 'inflation down',[239] was rejected for a commitment to full employment, albeit not the economists decontestation of unemployment as unemployment below 5%, but an arbitrary decontestation of unemployment as having 'more people working than any other country in the G7'.[240] Full employment however, was secondary to the preponderant and long-standing Conservative enthusiasm and commitment to tax cuts. Indeed, a central feature of Cameronite-cum-Osbornomic Conservatism's political economy was fiscal conservatism, which was manifested dually in: (i) the prevalent appeal to reducing the deficit, and (ii) *selective* tax cuts. Osborne pronounced that the Cameron Government had presided over a 'quiet revolution' in tax cuts with its cumulative tax cuts amounting to 'the biggest cuts of personal and business taxes for two decades'.[241] Notably, as discussed, Osborne cut the top rate of tax, describing the Brown Government's imposition of the 50% top rate of income tax as both 'distraction burglary' and a 'pathetic piece of class war posturing'.[242] Furthermore, at the opposite end of the income scale, the Tory reward for what they routinely referred to as the 'hard-working taxpayers' of Britain, were no longer (income) taxpayers as the threshold at which income tax

---

[239] HC Deb, Col 143. 16 May 1991; Lamont, *In Office*, 90.

[240] Osborne, 'Speech on Tax and Benefits'.

[241] D. Roland. 2013. 'Osborne: I've started a 'quiet revolution' on tax cuts', *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 December; Osborne, 'Speech on Tax and Benefits'.

[242] Cameron, 'The Age of Austerity'.

was paid was raised.[243] On tax therefore, Cameronism conforms to typical Conservative prejudices: the aim is to flatten and lower taxes in an effort to unleash enterprise.

The simultaneous acceptance and revision of neoliberalism is intellectually curious and ideologically interesting. Phillip Blond notes that, for example, 'Osborne...remains a convinced Thatcherite who nonetheless recognises the macro-economic errors of neoliberalism'.[244] Cameronites subscribe to the market society vision, insofar as Cameronism similarly eschews applying social purposes to the market, but attempts, for the purposes of ideological survival and electoral success, to modify this temporal *raison d'être* of Conservatism. Cameronism's interest in the assumptions of behavioural economics is contrasted with its reductivist austerity economics; its passion for 'moralising' capitalism is set against its resistance to impede London's financial sector;[245] its commitment to public services is counterbalanced by public expenditure cuts, and its interest in emphasising the importance of employment is juxtaposed to its alacrity for tax cuts and employment deregulation.[246] *Attitudes towards neoliberal economics has been the most misunderstood aspect of Cameronism*. This is understandable, in addition to the reasons aforementioned, insofar as the preponderance of austerity in the ideological practices of Cameronism has overcast the subtle points of the

---

[243] D. Skelton. 2013. 'Reviving the Tory tradition of social reform', In *Poverty in the UK: Can it be eradicated?* edited by J. Derbyshire. London: Prospect, 46-49.

[244] P. Blond. 2010. *Red Tory: How the Left and Right Have Broken Britain and How We Can Fix It*. London: Faber & Faber, 33.

[245] Indeed, the Cameronite state is more activist on financial regulation than the Thatcherite-Blairite state. However, proposed incursions to the excesses of high finance such as the financial transaction tax/Tobin tax and bank payroll taxes ('bank bonuses tax') have been resisted in favour of softer penalties such as the 'bank levy'. HM Government. 2010. *The Coalition: Our Programme for Government*. London: Cabinet Office, 9.

[246] See the Conservatives interest, for example, in the 'Beecroft' reforms on employment deregulation. G. Osborne. 2012. 'Conference Speech', 8 October.

insufficiency argument; that austerity seemed to not modify but promulgate neoliberalism further still. It is for this reason that Conservatives have been keen to shun the mistaken and facile equation of Conservatism with neoliberalism.[247] Whilst Cameronism consistently criticises the failures of statism, it also questions the Thatcher-era adherence to neoliberalism as the *sine qua non* of achieving Conservative ends.

4. Ideological 'Backpeddling': Civic Renewal and the Road to the Big Society

Cameronism's qualified neoliberalism was a byproduct of Conservatism's discovery that 'economics is not enough' and 'a vibrant market economy' is merely a 'precondition' for the third strand of Cameronism: the renewal and interest in civil society.[248] Green noted that the 'emphasis on 'civic' virtues'' was the 'missing ingredient' of Thatcherite Conservatism.[249] A. J. Davies recognised that the post-Thatcher Conservative embrace of the civil society, voluntarism and mutualism constituted a kind of *ideological 'backpeddling*' because of the dawning realisation that Thatcherism's market society required 'some institutional framework or foundation'.[250] Therefore, Cameronism's interest in civil society is both *essential* for understanding its ideological nature and motivation, and distinctiveness. The conceptual commitment to civil society, for Cameronism, is essential and distinctive because: (1) *civil society* and its *renewal* are decontested

---

[247] T. May. 2012. 'Conference Speech', 9 October; Cameron, 'Conference Speech of 2008'; Osborne, 'Policy making after the crash'.

[248] Letwin, 'From economic revolution to social revolution', 73.

[249] Green, *Reinventing Civil Society*, ix.

[250] A. J. Davies quoted in Ellis, 'Mutualism and the Reinvention of Civil Society', 144 (emphasis added).

as a better response to the *problem of the insufficiency* of neoliberalism than *state intervention*, and (2) civil society pervades Conservative semantics in the post-Thatcher period, and shares, reaching its zenith in Cameronism, the ideological stage as a free-standing concept, alongside the market, as a significant mirror-image to the state. Conservatism's market society social vision, in the post-Thatcher era, took 'shelter under the umbrella' of community and society. Civic associationalism was melded with markets as a vision of society that presented an alternative vision to the contemporary social democratic vision of collective trust and social solidarity.[251] Conservative discussion of civil society was not new; what was notable however, was the relative prominence accorded to the concept.[252]

Following the era of Thatcherism's market vision of social relations, Conservatism began to supplement this with the need to renew civil society, and its attendant values. It was a period of ideological self-reflection for the Right. Bruce Pilbeam observes that Conservative writings from the late 1980s onwards 'are...filled with exhortations constituted by 're-' prefixed terms, enjoining us to 'rebuild', 'reinvigorate', or 'revitalize' our social values and institutions'.[253] Conservatives started talking of the active citizen, of civil society, of community, of the intermediary structure, and of the 'little platoons'. Indeed, commentators noticed that the interest in civil society was not just Conservative but a hallmark of flowering pan-political, post-Thatcherite discourses in the 1990s, which

---

[251] Freeden, *Ideology*, 95.

[252] B. Pilbeam. 2003. *Conservatism in Crisis? Anglo-American Conservative Ideology after the Cold War*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 61.

[253] Pilbeam, *Conservatism in Crisis?* 67.

supplemented the language of market visions with social visions.[254] Stressing the saliency of civil society gave Conservatism the conceptual shelter to build a viable alternative to Thatcherism, which did not break with Thatcherism, but revised the Thatcherite vision of the market society.

In Majorism, the importance of civil society and its renewal played a bit part in its ideological content. It marked the beginning of understated *mea culpas* for the neglect of Britain's civic structures under Thatcherism.[255] Waldegrave talked euphoniously about the importance of the 'little platoons', with people's loyalties to their 'town, village, county, region, principality or kingdom', and worried that under Thatcherism, it was being 'cloaked' by the 'dreadful jargon of management-speak'.[256] Behind the managerialist Conservatism of Majorism was an attempt to reemphasise the importance of communities as the locale of social activity. The restructuring of hospitals, schools and universities, in the name of the 'Citizen's Charter', was conceptualised as returning a 'sense of community' to these institutions from the 'homogeneous bureaucracy into ever widening fields far from its origins'.[257] Hurd, in the late 1980s, argued that Conservatism wanted to 'shift power outwards...away from the corporatist battalions to the small platoons' where 'parents will gain a bigger say in education', 'Council tenants will get more control over the management of their estates', and 'local radio stations will multiply'.[258] Major argued that these institutions provided 'continuity

---

[254] P. Hirst. 1994. *Associative Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity, 13; F. Field. 2003. *Neighbours from Hell*. London: Politicos

[255] Hurd, *Conservatism in the 1990s*, 10.

[256] Waldegrave, 'Recruiting to the Little Platoons'.

[257] Ibid.

[258] Hurd, 'Citizenship in the Tory Democracy'.

and a framework' to 'national life'.[259] The relatively modern incarnations of British institutions were wedded to the staple Conservative institutions; the monarchy, Parliament, churches and voluntary organisations, which give life and Conservatism purportedly its meaning.[260] Beyond allusions to communities supported by institutions, Major opined at the need to restore 'family values', and the need to go 'back to basics', as a route to civic renewal. Family values were decontested as 'neighbourliness, decency [and] courtesy'.[261] Others however, decontested Majorism's emphasis on family values, and the need to get back to basics, as a moral paroxysm against the failings of multiculturalism and liberal neutralism, of which single mothers and the indigence of new age travellers were the two target groups for Conservative vilification in the early 1990s. Geoffrey Wheatcroft fairly decontested these Conservative tropes as raw authoritarianism that had, unfortunately for the Conservative ministers involved, been decontested by parts of the media as pertaining to 'private conduct or morality'![262] These attempts to remoralise British society, through allusions to a 'new moralism', taking inspiration from Tory ministers' wistful memories of the 1950s nuclear family,[263] with its allusions of monogamy and heterosexuality, looked both fundamentalist in trying to reprise a model of a family that was antique, and hopeless insofar as the route chosen to renew civil society was alienating and presented a bizarre interpretation of communal ties.

---

[259] Major, 'Conservatism in the 1990s'.

[260] Ibid.

[261] J. Major. 1993. 'Conference Speech'. 8 October.

[262] Wheatcroft, *The Strange Death of Tory England*, 204; I. Gilmour and M. Garnett. 1997. *Whatever Happened to the Tories: The Conservative Party since 1945*. London: Fourth Estate, 363.

[263] Harrison argues that the 1950s transfixes much of the ideologies of Majorism. B. Harrison. 2011. *Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom 1951-1970*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 204.

At the more subterranean level, Conservative sages in the 1990s were pointing towards a more socially-engaged, thoughtful, and civically-minded Conservatism. Indeed, Hirst argued that the interest in 'civil renewal' was the attempt by Conservative intellectuals and practitioners who had 'come to recognize that something has gone very wrong with the project of the New Right'.[264] Chris Patten wanted to underpin the market society with an appeal to social conscience. To that end, Chris Patten called upon Conservatism to integrate the European tradition of Christian Democracy into its ideological thought-practices.[265] Hunt wanted to purloin the idea of the social market economy, a concept drawn from Continental Europe, because the 'prefix 'social'' in the *social* market economy refers to Conservatism's 'communitarian philosophy', which 'underlines how economic relationships' between the state, individuals and companies is based on 'real individual responsibility' and not 'cut-throat or self-serving' individualism.[266] Hurd promoted a post-Thatcherite version of an old Conservative idea, Tory democracy, in emphasising the importance of the 'moral framework', which underpins modern Conservatism.[267] Mount advocated that Conservatism adopt the non-state and non-commercial third way of philanthropic voluntarism.[268] Willetts' Civic Conservatism was preoccupied with supplementing the market society with a 'recognition of the value of non-state collective

---

[264] P. Hirst. 1997. *From Statism to Pluralism*. London: UCL Press, 136.

[265] C. Patten. 1990. 'Big Battalions and Little Platoons', The Seventh Arnold Goodman Lecture. 7 June; Kavanagh, 'A Major Agenda?' 4.

[266] Hunt, *Right Ahead*, 10, 19.

[267] Tory Democracy's moralism, for Hurd, with its belief in self-responsibility, civic obligations and voluntary duties to others is dependent on, as mentioned, active citizenship. Hurd, *Conservatism in the 1990s*, 5; 'Citizenship in the Tory Democracy'.

[268] Mount, *Clubbing Together*, 6, 13.

action'.[269] Even Michael Howard, an avowed supporter of the market society, contended that it was sensible for Conservatives to eschew the '1980s caricature' of Conservatism as a 'dogmatic' and 'rigid' ideology interested solely in 'encouraging enterprise'.[270] Ben Kisby has argued that these early forays into reawakening the importance of pro-social, civic Conservatism is 'indistinguishable' from Cameronism's later promotion of civic renewal; both were attempts to negate the unintended outcomes of Thatcherism by shoring up the market society with a civic agenda.[271]

Thatcher's departure gave Conservative Party elites the opportunity to integrate free market economics into a wider social agenda. Willetts argued that Majorism failed to successfully supplement the market society with a social vision that gave priority to *civic renewal* over and above *state intervention*.[272] Kerr argues similarly that Majorism ensured that Thatcherism remained 'an uncontested policy paradigm'.[273] Dorey's indictment goes further in arguing that Majorism enfeebled the civic structure of Britain beyond the demolition meted out by Thatcherism.[274] There was indeed doubly a profound reticence to acknowledge the problem of the gap in Thatcherism, and a tendency to shift culpability to its more customary enemy, the state. Communities were destroyed, less by neoliberal economics, and more by everything from 'government power' and 'corporatist'

---

[269] D. Willetts, 'Response to Charlie Ellis', In *British Party Politics and Ideology after New Labour*, 150.

[270] Howard, *Consistency and Change*, 7, 8-9, 13. M. Howard. 1994. 'Conservatives and the Community', *The 1994 Disraeli Lecture*. London: Conservative Political Centre.

[271] Kisby, 'The Big Society', 490.

[272] Willetts, 'Reviving Civic Conservatism', 30.

[273] Kerr, *Postwar British Politics: From Conflict to Consensus*, 179.

[274] P. Dorey. 1999. 'Despair and Disillusion Abound: The Major Premiership in Perspective', In *The Major Premiership: Politics and Policies under John Major, 1990-97*, edited by P. Dorey. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 237.

practices to 'modernist architecture' and 'social theory'.[275] Whilst Majorism found it difficult to construct a Conservatism with the analogous vividness of Thatcherism, it developed a preliminary construction of, certainly at the subterranean level of Conservative intellectual discourse, an account of the renewal of civil society as a palliative to the excesses of Thatcherism's market society. Under Majorism, for example, even though there was no warmth towards the socio-economic role of the state, there was a reaction to the excesses of neoliberalism.

Whilst Conservatives tried to take ownership over the language of community and civil society, it remained contested ground.[276] With the advent of New Labour, the Conservative meanings and decontestations of these values competed with more successful rival decontestations. This debate from the mid-1990s onwards was associated with communitarianism, which is itself a highly contested concept.[277] The two competing conceptions of communitarianism were, using Derek Phillips' terminology, New Labour's *forward-looking communitarianism* and the Conservatives' *backward-looking communitarianism*.[278] New Labour's forward-looking communitarianism accepted the tropes of modernity with its 'multiracial, multireligious, and multicultural' aspects, but it is anxious that 'traditional sources of social unity' cannot cope with

---

[275] W. Waldegrave. 1995. 'A Competitive Nation? Why the Next Election Matters', Speech to the Conservative Political Centre. 10 October.

[276] R. Plant. 1978. 'Community: Concept, Conception and Ideology', *Politics and Society* 8 (1): 79-107.

[277] Communitarian political philosophy came to prominence in the early 1980s. See M. Sandel. 1982. *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; A. MacIntyre. 1981. *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. London: Duckworth; M. Walzer. 1983. *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality*. Oxford: Blackwell; C. Taylor. 1985. *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[278] See D. Phillips. 1993. *Looking Backward: A Critical Appraisal of Communitarian Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

this diversity'.[279] It therefore tries to construct 'stronger sources of communality' in order to 'build bonds of community that integrate and accommodate...diverse choices and lifestyles'.[280] New Labour's forward-looking communitarianism was particularly concerned with the 'social context' in which people conducted their lives.[281] New Labour talked of creating a 'progressive century' with a particular conception of civil society and community at its heart: the Blair Government was interested, variously, in social capital, the 'third sector', 'stakeholding', and the 'respect' agenda.[282] The Blair Government established an 'Office for the Third Sector', which marked the 'rise in the profile of voluntary action to rival, if not outstrip, any other in the century'.[283] With the aid of Conservative political propaganda and New Labour's own quasi-Fabian centralist instincts, New Labour's civic language was eclipsed by a technocratic managerialism. New Labour's lexicon was progressively polluted with with the ugly language of 'pathfinders', 'beacons', and the language of 'partnership and 'best value'.[284] New Labour's retreat from communitarianism gave Cameron's Conservatives a golden opportunity to exploit the ethical and emotional language of civil society.

Conservatives early on realised the importance of challenging New Labour's 'attempt to claim exclusive ownership of the word "community"'.[285] For

---

[279] W. Kymlicka. 2002. *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction*. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 272.

[280] Ibid.

[281] Ibid, 270-271.

[282] Blair, 'Preface', 5; R. Prabjakar. 2003. *Stakeholding and New Labour*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 119-154.

[283] P. Alcock. 2011. 'Voluntary Action, New Labour and the 'third sector'', In *The Ages of Voluntarism: How We Got to the Big Society*, edited by M. Hilton and J. McKay. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 158.

[284] C. Mullin. 2010. *A View from the Foothills: The Diaries of Chris Mullin*. London: Profile, 61. See D. Willetts. 1996. *Blair's Gurus: An Examination of Labour's Rhetoric*. London: Centre for Policy Studies.

[285] See B. Mawhinney. 1996. *Reclaiming the Community*. London: Conservative Political Centre.

the Conservatives, the Blair Governments 'may have talked the language of community' but there loyalties resided in their belief in the 'big state'.[286] Major predicted that the language of stakeholding meant encumbering business, and the language of community meant increasing the role of the state.[287] Letwin argued that underneath the language of community and society lurked, much like post-war Labour governments' attempts to regulate the economy, the ambition to 'regulate' and 'nationalise' society.[288] *Backward*-looking communitarianism contained a 'nostalgic lament' for the 'decline' of communities, with the tendency to blame 'feminism, gay rights, and multiculturalism' for its decline.[289] This was largely the vision of communities and society, wedded to an exultant enthusiasm for market economics, of Conservatism before Cameronism. It was the 'language of traditional conservatism, wrapped up in the new vocabulary of communitarianism, and...essentially at odds with liberal values'.[290] Cameronism effectively integrated both elements of backward and forward-looking communitarianism. It was an ideology that wedded a visionary rhetoric of building new bonds with a rhetoric of nostalgic decline that bemoaned the advent of 'broken Britain'.[291] It was the shift in the Conservatives 'thematic language',

---

[286] K. Hickson. 2013. 'The Localist Turn in British Politics and Its Critics', *Policy Studies* 34 (4): 418.

[287] Major, 'Foreword', 422.

[288] O. Letwin, 'For Labour there is no such thing a society, only the state', In *There Is Such a Thing as Society: Twelve Principles of Compassionate Conservatism*, 38-51.

[289] Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, 271. For exemplar see, Scruton, *The Conservative Idea of Community*

[290] Ibid.

[291] A notion fused with moral outrage, which was featured in Conservative discourses from 2005 onwards. Finlayson notices that Cameronism's backward-looking 'broken Britain' analysis of communities stands in contrast to New Labour's forward-looking 'social recession' discourse. A. Finlayson. 2010. 'The Broken Society versus the Social Recession', *Soundings* 44: 22-35.

that Letwin had advocated in his essay, *Civilised Conservatism*.[292] What remained consistent in Cameronite communitarianism from the backward-looking civic agendas, was an animus to state-driven social agendas. It remained wedded to the quasi-Oakeshottian 'felt', 'experienced', 'inherited', 'stable' and 'secure' society, as against the 'new' and 'modern' vision of New Labour's society.[293] More profoundly, Cameronism's interest in civil society continued, albeit in different language and different motifs, Thatcherism's hostility towards politics. Nikolas Rose argues that (Conservative) communitarianism is 'anti-political' politics, in part, because it tries to surpass the state and instead focus on families and communities.[294]

Another concept that reveals the distinctive and selective conceptualisation of civil society under Cameronism is to consider the role and character of localism. Localism is, like all political concepts, malleable. Hickson defines localism as a 'concern with the decentralisation of power and an increased focus on the local community'.[295] Mark Evans, David Marsh and Gerry Stoker argued that New Labour's 'new localism', or what David Miliband referred to as 'double devolution', was decontested as *managerial* localism, characterised by 'evidence-based policy making', 'top-down direction' and 'an over-arching managerialism'.[296] This conforms to what others have called '*positive localism*': a *progressive* response to both *state* and *market failure*, which argues that communities are best placed to secure social justice, level social classes and a

---

[292] O. Letwin. 1999. 'Civilised Conservatism', In *Conservative Debates*, by O. Letwin and J. Marenbon. London: Politeia, 11.

[293] Ibid, 11-12, 3.

[294] N. Rose. 1996. 'The death of the social? Re-figuring the territory of government', *Economy and Society* 25 (3): 352.

[295] Hickson, 'The Localist Turn in British Politics and Its Critics', 408.

[296] M. Evans, D. Marsh and G. Stoker. 2013. 'Understanding localism', *Policy Studies* 34 (4): 403.

fairer distribution of goods and resource.[297] Cameronism, whilst subscribing to localism, is decontested as a *negative* account of community localism. It emphasises the 'freeing' of *selective* aspects (i.e. resources for the provision of services) of communities by dispensing with the constraints imposed by government. Communities, under the negatively-defined localism of Cameronism, are decontested as 'imagined...islands', with emphasis on the virtues of competition between communities, and individual community self-sufficiency.[298] It is a 'neoliberal' justification for localism insofar as it accentuates disproportionately the failings of big and interventionist government. Cameronite localism 'emphasised the role that...communities could, and should, play in the delivery of services', and 'it was a localism in which responsibilities, rather than power or resources, were devolved'.[299] Cameronite communitarianism thus rhetorically valued family, charities, faith-groups, and voluntary associations as the bonds of these communities which constitute civil society. This conception of civil society enabled (Cameronite) Conservatism to 'forward a philosophy of social bonds free from the ideological entanglement of notions such as class'.[300] This distinctive conceptualisation of communities, localism and civil society was prominent with the Cameron Government's inauguration of austerity, in which community self-reliance and market competitiveness were hailed as the surest semi-collectivist route to surviving austerity.

Civic renewal, before the ascendency of Cameronism, was a relatively feeble aspect of Conservatism's ideological field. Prior to Cameronism's serious

---

[297] P. Catney, et al, 'Big society, little justice?' 2.

[298] Ibid, 3.

[299] Evans, et al, 'Understanding localism', 403.

[300] Pilbeam, *Conservatism in Crisis?* 63.

communitarian response to both the problem of Thatcherism and New Labour's approach to the idea, Conservatism after Majorism flirted with the renewal of civil society. Hague proposed to establish an Office for Civil Society tasked with the strengthening the role of voluntary organisations and faith communities in dealing with social problems.[301] Hague admitted that Thatcherite Conservatism's narrow focus on the 'quantity of money' had meant that Conservatives had to backpeddle and catch-up with renewing civil society in order to improve 'quality of life'.[302] Letwin promoted the notion of the 'neighbourly society', which rebooted the active citizenship agenda.[303] Duncan Smith's campaign for 'social justice' had a powerful and resonant Conservative message: 'There will be no sustainable reduction in the size of the state if civil society doesn't become stronger, nurturing more self-sufficient and vigorous citizens'.[304] Civil society's renewal would not only compensate for the collateral of neoliberalism, but it would also figure as a precondition for state retrenchment in Conservative ideology. The Conservative Party was still seen as the 'party of economics' and Conservatism was associated with the 'atomised society', 'selfishness' and 'greed'.[305] Bale judges that the Conservatism propounded between 1997-2005 merely amounted to an institutional, and not ideological, renewal, which sought to advance Thatcherism to the 'next level'.[306] Under Cameronism, Conservatism took a *substantive*

---

[301] See Conservative Party. 2001. *Renewing Civil Society: How Conservatives Will Empower Britain's Good Neighbours*. London: Conservative Party.

[302] The Thatcherite motifs of tax-cutting and regulation-busting were however, key features of Hague's forays into civic renewal. BBC News. 1999. 'Money isn't everything - Hague', 12 March.

[303] Letwin, *Neighbourly Society,* 53.

[304] I. Duncan Smith. 2009. 'Renewing Conservatism: Lessons from Britain', Speech to The Heritage Foundation, 9 April.

[305] O'Hara, *After Blair*, 11.

[306] Bale, *Conservative Party,* 372.

'localist' and 'communitarian' turn. The exemplification of civil society in Cameronism, whilst remaining true to Tory anti-statist doctrines, was executed so as to explicitly repudiate the notion that Conservatism was collapsable to the cult of the market. Maurice Glasman, the advocate of Blue Labour, argued that Cameronism was an ideological member of the Conservative family that was trying to rescue a Conservative conception of the social: the 'Conservative tradition does have a conception of the social....but it was lost under Thatcherism and has been robustly reclaimed by Cameron'.[307] It was powerful and revitalised Conservatism with its roots, however superficial, in Burke's Conservative utopia of the 'little platoons'.

The *locus classicus* of Cameronism is Cameron's repeated pronouncement that '*there is such a thing as society, it's just not the same thing as the state*'.[308] This was an ideological formulation invested with piquant allusions to Cameronism's central desire to revise the outcomes of Thatcherism, whilst conforming to its intentions. It was a response to Thatcher's famous, and so-called, denial of society in 1987. Like Thatcherism, Cameronism believed that society was separate and separable from the state, and their conflation accorded a collective will to society it did not possess. The difference, however, was that Cameronism's conception of society, community and localism, was that its renewal resided in qualifying the Thatcherite market decontestion of society by arguing that the health of society is not sufficiently guaranteed by rolling back the state and rolling forward the market. Cameron argued that he wanted 'to roll

---

[307] M. Glasman. 2011. 'Labour as a Radical Tradition', In *The Labour Tradition and the Politics of Paradox*, edited by M. Glasman, J. Rutherford, M. Stears and S. White. Oxford/London: Soundings, 27.

[308] First showcased in Cameron's leadership acceptance speech in December 2005. See pages 80-82 in chapter two.

forward the frontiers of society' and this was was the 'important difference' to Thatcherism's 'rolling back [of] the frontiers of the state'.[309] Another, but related, point of difference, was that civil renewal was not merely 'a matter of rolling back the state' - it was not a 'reheated version of ideological laissez-faire'.[310] 'For years', Cameron analysed, 'Conservatives talked about rolling back the state. But that is not an *end in itself*. Our fundamental aim is to roll forward the frontiers of society'.[311] Instead, the state would motivate, cajole, encourage, 'nudge' and persuade the creation of a 'Big Society'.[312] This was a profound, albeit nuanced, shift in Conservative thought-practices. Civil society had been damaged by the insensitive intrusions of the state and the anarchic vibrations of markets. The renewal of society however, would, and could only be, delivered by a smaller, but strong, state that could take 'strong and concerted action' in delivering that civic renewal.[313] In terms of ideological proximity, even though the state was still the larger enemy and threat to civil society, the acknowledged insufficiency of neoliberalism too gave Cameronism greater distinctiveness and remove from Thatcherism. Thatcherism was a comparably *negative* ideological vision. As Scruton stated, without the market society being 'supplemented by a positive vision of society, [it] invites the criticism that, without the state to support them, many people will be abandoned to their fate'.[314] It was the institutions of civil

---

[309] Indeed, the theme of *rolling forward* society was a consistent indication of intent for the Big Society. D. Cameron. 2006. 'Tackling Poverty is a Social Responsibility', The Scarman Lecture, 24 November; Cameron, Hugo Young Lecture. S. Driver, ''Fixing Our Broken Society': David Cameron's Post-Thatcherite Social Policy', In *The Conservatives under David Cameron*, 77.

[310] Ibid.

[311] Ibid (emphasis added).

[312] Ibid.

[313] Ibid.

[314] Scruton, *The Conservative Idea of Community*, 16.

society, for Cameronism, that maintained the 'social fabric' of life, and protected individuals and their families, and their communities from their fate. Eschewing the economic individualism associated with the ethics of neoliberalism, Cameron asserted that 'there is a "we" as well as a "me"' in Conservative conceptions of the social, but, conforming to its dogged anti-statism, declared that 'the "we" is society *not* the state'.[315] This Conservative vision of the social went under many guises in Cameronite thought-practices however.

Cameronism called the project of civic renewal and the attempt to build a Big Society, a 'social revolution'. Cameron talked in epic terms of their 'overriding mission' of delivering social renewal, on the scale that Thatcherism delivered economic renewal.[316] Letwin defined this as shifting 'the locus of debate from an econo-centric paradigm to a socio-centric paradigm'.[317] Thatcher had 'mended the broken economy in the 1980s', so Cameron's Conservatives were going 'to mend Britain's broken society in the early decades of the twenty-first century'.[318] The theme of a social revolution delivering the Big Society animated Cameronism from 2005 through to the onset of the GFC. A brief breakdown of Cameronism's social revolution illustrates some of the disparate elements of civic renewal.[319] Three elements of this social revolution were the *enabling state*; *empowerment* and *responsibility.* (1) The enabling state has been discussed and mentioned already. In relation to civil society, its renewal and the theme of social revolution, the enabling state conceptually complements the negative localism

---

[315] D. Cameron. 2006. 'The importance of family life', Speech. 21 June (emphasis added).

[316] D. Cameron. 2008. 'Living within our means', Speech. 19 May (emphasis added).

[317] Letwin, 'Cameron Conservatism'.

[318] Cameron in Jones, *Cameron on Cameron,* 288.

[319] Austerity as a means to the Big Society is covered in chapter 4. See pages 237-240.

endorsed by Cameronism.[320] The enabling state is 'an agency for enabling individuals, families, association and corporations to internalise externalities and hence to live up to social responsibilities without the further intervention of authority'.[321] This conception of the state passes responsibilities over to communities. These communities, *à la*, negative localism take over provision of services and are rhetorically-oriented around families and voluntary associations. This was what Francis Maude called the 'supply-side' of the Big Society. The 'demand-side' of the Big Society relates to the other elements of Cameronism's civil renewal, namely (2) the emphasis on empowerment, and (3) responsibility. Empowerment was not merely achieved by the scaling back of the bureaucratic state. Empowerment, understood as the forward-looking aspect of Cameronism's civil society, was the demand for new non-state entitlements. Cameronism has focused, variously for example, on gay equality via marriage; all-women shortlists and the pre-GFC emphasis on environmentalism and the green agenda, as sources of community and individual empowerment. Social responsibility, the more backward-looking aspect of Cameronism's civil society, emphasised individuals and communities' responsibilities. In condemning 'broken Britain', Conservatives from 2005 onwards,[322] have targeted welfare dependency, cultural poverty, educational underperformance, community breakdown, a fractured criminal justice system and a pervasive decline of morality, as key byproducts of this breakage. Cameronites have thus promoted the need for 'British values'. With (social and personal) responsibility at the fore, Cameronism's British values were particularistic, shunning social democratic allusions to social solidarity;

---

[320] Letwin, 'Cameron Conservatism'; Interview with Oliver Letwin, 17 June 2009

[321] Ibid.

[322] Liam Fox first used the expression in 2005. d'Ancona, *In It Together*, 87.

emphasising the Christian-character of Britain, and emphasising the importance of democracy and the rule of law, and outlining the limits of 'state multiculturalism'.[323]

5. Conclusion: 'Bring on the Scrutiny'

With the onset of the GFC, social revolution was *enjoined* with, and not *displaced* by, the need for the 'economic revolution' of austerity. The enabling state, empowerment and social responsibility, as buttresses to Cameronism's Big Society, indeed had to share the ideological stage with austerity. The Big Society remained important, not just as a Cameronite articulation of civic renewal, but also as a way of satisfying the requirement of the broader need for Conservative ideological renewal, before and during the age of austerity.[324] Nevertheless, the Big Society is merely a signifier of a long-term Conservative interest in civil society. Many of the Cameronite signifiers are markers of long-term Conservative thought-practices. This pertains to a central question of this chapter: is Cameronism a prisoner of an ideological past? Despite Cameron's protestations that he wouldn't be a prisoner, context matters insofar as idea-environments constrain political actors. This chapter has attempted to show that post-Thatcher Conservatism has responded to the crisis of Conservatism by formulating three formative features of its thinking: (1) the continued rhetorical desire to roll back the central state; (2) the problematisation of undiluted neoliberal economics, and (3) the effort to renew civil society. Cameronism, therefore, is a prisoner of an

---

[323] D. Cameron. 2011. Speech at Munich Security Conference. 5 February.

[324] G. Talshir, 'Civil Society and the Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: Ideologies between Theory and Politics', In *Liberalism as Ideology*, 206-208.

ideological past insofar as these developments predate Cameronism. Nevertheless, that is not the end of the story. Letwin, the chief thought-practitioner of Cameronism, invited students of Conservatism and the Conservative Party, to 'bring on the scrutiny' of the content of Conservative ideas under Cameron.[325] The temptation has been to equate Cameronism with Thatcherism. Indeed there is a shared preference for reducing social and welfarist government interference, and enhancing the role of markets. Cameron, on one level, saw little reason to ditch Thatcherism's core ideal of the market society. It has merely been revised. Despite the various and substantive points of ideological elision between them however, Cameronism is a distinctive and distinct form of British Conservatism. The distinctiveness resides in the particular ideological mix of Cameronism, with its ideological priorities formulated so as the state is decontested as an *enabling*, *post-bureaucratic* and *framework-based* state, which is provisionally reduced and responsible for protecting the Big Society. This runs alongside the decontestation of neoliberalism as a *necessary* and *essential* model of economics, which is distinctively promoted in a *qualified* form so as to respond to the crisis of Conservatism. Both state retrenchment and neoliberal economics are supplemented with an attempt, reaching its apogee in the Big Society, to renew civil society.

[325] O. Letwin. 2008. 'Bring on the scrutiny', *The Guardian*. 3 June.

Chapter Four

Austerity and the Big Society: Cameronism in Practice

'For more than four years...they had been trying to explain the purpose of a Cameron administration. The Big Society, they believed, was it'[1]

1. Introduction: Cameronism in Practice

The translation of (proto-) Cameronite ideas from opposition to government has given rise to a *supposed*, and potentially ideological undermining, tension: the Cameronite and Coalition commitment to civic renewal, in the form of the *Big Society*, was *ineluctably* undermined by its *contingent* and *essential* need to shrink the size, scope and range of the state in a programme of austerity, in response to the GFC. This chapter seeks to interrogate this tension. The chapter argues that the Big Society and the near-ubiquitous reference point of austerity are the *micro-core* concepts of *Cameronism in practice*. They, like Thatcherism's composite of political minimalism and the market society, bring to fruition a limited conception of politics. The notion however, that the Big Society and austerity are core concepts in practicable Cameronism, is contentious insofar as critics have seen the two concepts as *contradictory*. Others have seen them as *parallel*, with few, if no synchronic, ideological relations. This chapter will, in addition to understanding the meanings and arguments of the Big Society and austerity, consider these two arguments, concluding that the two concepts are not contradictory or parallel but *consanguineous*. The chapter concludes that fiscal austerity is decontested by

---

[1] D. Kavanagh and P. Cowley. 2010. *The British General Election of 2010*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 135.

Cameronism as an essential precondition and means to building the Big Society. Austerity provides the *means* to the Big Society's *ends* in Cameronism.

2. The Big Society: Applied Civic Renewal and Pro-Social Conservatism

Never has a political concept been understood by so few and ridiculed by so many.[2] This ridicule, mockery and derision stands in contrast to the earnestness with which Cameron and other senior Conservatives such as Greg Clark, Nick Hurd, Letwin, Francis Maude, Norman, and Willetts, after 2005 and particularly after 2009,[3] treated the concept of the Big Society. Cameron argued that the Big Society was at the epicentre of his Conservatism - it was his 'mission in politics' and pledged 'to fight for it every day'.[4] It was Cameronism's 'unifying' approach'; it was 'the thread' of the Coalition 'policy programme', which was said to variously include and contain: 'breaking state monopolies, allowing charities, social enterprises and companies to provide public services, devolving power down to neighbourhoods, making government more accountable...mend our broken society, and rebuild trust in politics'.[5] The Big Society was not without its problems. It became a contentious claim when the Conservatives *appeared* to be laying claim to, and thus politicising, 'a concept everyone believed in'.[6] The voices against some of the *leitmotifs* of the Big Society however - philanthropy,

---

[2] For a representative view see C. Bennett. 2011. 'The 'big society' is collapsing under its inherent absurdity', *The Observer*, 6 February.

[3] For Cameron's first use of the Big Society, see Cameron, 'Hugo Young Lecture'.

[4] D. Cameron. 2011. 'Big Society Speech', 15 February.

[5] D. Cameron. 2010. 'Speech launching the 2010 Conservative Manifesto', 31 March.

[6] Jesse Norman quoted in B. Wright and A. Fagg. 2012. 'Politics in 2012: Party revolts and Budget tops Cameron's difficult years', *BBC News*. 27 December.

voluntarism and community engagement - were few.[7] Nevertheless, the motives and drives behind the Cameronite assertion of the Big Society, were open to multiple interpretations. A brief analysis of the various claims of the Big Society - as (1) romanticist neo-Burkeanism; (2) a synthesis of liberalism and Conservatism; (3) a signifier for the further entrenchment of neoliberalism and the humanisation of Thatcherism; (4) a Conservative variant of New Labour's 'Third Way'; and (5) a mere meaninglessness - hopes to illustrate the problems of defining and understanding the Big Society.

(1) Despite its appearance in Cameronite political repertoire in 2009, the first conception of the Big Society interrogates its deeper roots.[8] Its contemporary lineage and conceptual anchorage is found in the post-Thatcher Conservative emphasis on civic renewal, with Conservative pro-social formulations found in the writings of Duncan Smith, Damien Green, David Hunt, Letwin, Waldegrave, and Willetts. The Big Society's roots go much deeper. Phillip Blond, the progenitor of British Red Toryism, argued that the Big Society marked Cameronism's simultaneous rejection of, and departure from, the Thatcherite celebration of rugged individualism and the Fabian uniformity of Labourite statism.[9] It functioned as a qualified criticism of the Thatcherite neoliberal political economy, but it nevertheless endorsed a (contingently) smaller state in *mirror-image* to New Labour's 'social investment state'. Blond invoked the Toryism of Burke, Ruskin, William Cobbett, Thomas Carlyle, the distributivism of Hillaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton, and he even nominated 'Medievalist'

---

[7] See Hilton and McKay eds. *The Ages of Voluntarism*.

[8] See P. Thane. 2012. 'The Ben Pimlott Memorial Lecture 2011: The 'Big Society' and the 'Big State': Creative Tension or Crowding Out?' *Twentieth Century British History* 23 (3): 408-429.

[9] See Blond, *Red Tory*; P. Blond. 2009. 'Rise of the red Tories', *Prospect*, 28 February.

political thinking, to provide historical legitimacy to Cameron's Big Society.[10] There are significant problems however, with this Red Toryist, neo-Burkean defence of the Big Society. First, there is a problematic acontextualism in the usage of Burke. Rodney Barker sees the contemporary Conservative attachment to the 'little platoons' as 'empty' and effectively meaningless as its emphasis on voluntary associations could 'cover a fox hunt or a hedge fund just as easily as it can cover a parents' group or an allotment association'.[11] Second, there is a deeper and more profound problem in the Red Tory contribution to the Big Society. Freeden has dismissed Red Toryism as an 'ideological gimmick',[12] in part because it has what Paul Kelly argues is a 'magpie-like approach'[13] to the history of ideas and political ideology, in which a highly 'eccentric' account of Conservatism, contemporary British politics and a demonisation of liberalism is presented. Finally, Red Toryism is informed by Radical Orthodoxy, which is an esoteric form of political theology, found in the writings of John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward, which rejects modernity in favour of communitarian cultural norms.[14] This social Centre-Right communitarianism, albeit in measured form, chimed with the Cameronite interest in civic renewal and the insufficiency of neoliberalism, but the Catholic-inspired social Conservatism jaded with Cameronism's claims to 'progressive', 'modern' and 'liberal' Conservatism. In

---

[10] P. Blond. 2008. 'Medieval thinking', *The Guardian*, 30 September. Cameron went further in claiming that 'Jesus invented the Big Society 2000 years ago'. A. Withnall. 2014. 'David Cameron: 'Jesus invented the Big Society - I'm just continuing God's work', *The Independent*, 10 April.

[11] R. Barker, 'Big Societies, Little Platoons and the Problems with Pluralism', In *Retrieving the Big Society*, 48.

[12] Freeden, 'Progress and Progressivism', 71.

[13] P. Kelly, 'Red or Orange: The Big Society in the New Conservatism', In *Retrieving the Big Society*, 22.

[14] See J. Milbank, G. Ward and P. Catherine. 1999. 'Introduction: Suspending the Material: The Turn of Radical Orthodoxy', In *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology*, edited by J. Milbank, G. Ward and P. Catherine. London: Routledge: 1-20.

short, Red Toryism's civic and communitarian Conservatism would require a rolling-back of modernity, secularism, and contemporary liberal pluralism, which Cameronism could not and would not countenance.[15]

Nevertheless, these difficulties with its conceptual coherence and historical accuracy can be accounted for by what Nathan Coombs described as the 'young ideology' status of Red Toryism.[16] It has an *ostensibly* contradictory collection of decontestations, which are more obvious than other ideologies, because of its ideological infancy. Nevertheless, this is true of all contemporary political ideologies, in which 'ideological experimentation' and 'the resurrection of past principles' are 'combined with new attitudes'.[17] Red Toryism is a parallel ideological contribution, albeit one with a distinctively unambiguous critique of Thatcherite economics, to the smorgasbord of post-Thatcher Conservatisms.

(2) The Big Society, in its second interpretation, is purported to represent the *synthesis of Conservatism and liberalism*, which is an emboldened view since the formation of the Coalition Government in 2010.[18] There has been a longstanding discussion about the degree of ideological overlap between Conservatism and liberalism. There are indeed identifiable and permeable family resemblances between the two ideological families. Quintin Hogg, keen to erect an anti-statist One Nation libertarian response to Labour in the 1940s and 1950s,[19] argued that 'liberalism was *very nearly true*'.[20] One of the hallmarks of

---

[15] J. Gray. 2010. 'Red Tory: Review', *The Independent*. 2 April.

[16] N. Coombs. 2011. 'The Political Theology of Red Toryism', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 16 (1): 93.

[17] Freeden, 'The Ideology of New Labour', 43.

[18] See chapter five.

[19] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, 260.

[20] Q. Hogg. 1959. *The Conservative Case*. London: Penguin, 57 (emphasis added).

Cameron's leadership of the Conservatives has been to promote his *alleged* and *eccentric* liberalism in supporting (negatively-defined) freedom and (anti-statist) fairness as conceptual buttresses to the Big Society.[21] Cameron even audaciously hinted at the straightforward synonymy between the Big Society and liberalism.[22] This view of the Big Society is found in Norman's work on the Big Society. Liberal ideas, for Norman, converge with Conservative ideas, in the context of the Big Society, in its support for 'free markets, localism and private property'.[23] Localism, individual empowerment and its intrinsic non-statism are notionally liberal aspects of the Big Society, and in addition to the Cameronite attachment to the idea, they made the formation of the Coalition Government smoother (allowing for neat ideological tessellation with the 'Orange Book' liberals).[24] It allowed Cameron to present it as an arrangement that goes beyond one of a 'marriage of convenience'.[25]

The merit of this view is that it successfully discounts the 'marriage of convenience' view of the Coalition, insofar as their accounts shed light on the heavy degree of ideological synthesis between the ideas of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. In short, they agree with Cameron's protest that the Coalition Government is not a 'lowest common dominator government'.[26] However, the degree of liberalism involved in the thought-practices underpinning

---

[21] 'David Cameron - I am a 'liberal Conservative'' *BBC News*, 16 May 2010. See chapter six.

[22] Cameron in the earliest days of his premiership commented, 'You can call it liberalism. You can call it empowerment. You can call it freedom. You can call it responsibility. I call it the Big Society'. D. Cameron. 2010. 'Big Society Speech', 19 July.

[23] Norman, *The Big Society*, 87.

[24] D. Laws. 2012. 'The Orange Book: Eight Years On', *Institute of Economic Affairs*, 32 (2): 31.

[25] Tony Blair's criticism of the Coalition was that it was '"more of a marriage of convenience than conviction' In 'Coalition still working well, David Cameron insists', *BBC News*, 17 April 2012.

[26] Cameron quoted in 'Dispatches: A Year Inside Number 10', *Channel 4*, London. 9 May 2011.

the Big Society is questionable, given Cameronism's attachment to qualified neoliberalism, civic renewal, which places customary Conservative emphasis on the *family* and a belief in the retrenchment of the central state in the name of austerity.

(3) The third interpretation exploits the particular vagueness of the term produced by (i) the Tory inability to translate the Big Society in such a way that resonates widely; and (ii), as a consequence of its lack of resonance, Cameronism's *perceived* gradual reduction in the ambitiousness of the Big Society, so that it morphed from being a shorthand for the 'transformation of the public and civic realms' to the diminutive role of encouraging 'litter pickers' and the celebrating of 'village fêtes'.[27] In exploiting this vagueness, the third conception's 'double-coding' and decontestation of the Big Society is *negative*. This interpretation holds that the Big Society is a 'cipher' for the further entrenchment of neoliberalism.[28] Kerr et al has argued that the Big Society, much like Blair's 'Third Way', is an empty signifier, which serves 'a more electorally friendly variant of the Thatcherite, neoliberal agenda' to the electorate, and is one that presents a 'more palatable form' of neoliberalism for 'the post-Thatcherite 2010s'.[29] The Big Society in Cameronism humanises Thatcherism because it acts as a cipher or cover for its desire to shrink the role and scope of the central state. The Big Society is simply, for Ruth Levitas, an 'umbrella' for the 'neoliberal shock doctrine' of Cameronite austerity.[30] Alan Ware argues that the Big Society

---

[27] Interview with Danny Kruger, 12 September 2013; A. Seldon. 2011. 'Time to take the big society seriously', *theguardian.com*, 15 February (accessed 3 July 2014).

[28] H. Ham. 2011. 'The Big Con: Reframing the State/Society Debate', *Public Policy Research* 18 (1): 30-40; Seymour, *The Meaning of David Cameron*, 1.

[29] Kerr, et al, 'Theorising Cameronism', 198; C. Byrne, E. Foster and P. Kerr, 'Understanding Conservative Modernisation', In *Cameron and the Conservatives*, 20; 25-26.

[30] R. Levitas. 2012. 'The Just's Umbrella: Austerity and the Big Society in Coalition Policy and Beyond', *Critical Social Policy* 32 (3): 320-342.

was an *anti-statist* supplement to New Right Conservatism.[31] It performs as a 'smokescreen' for the privatisation of public service provision, and legitimates profit-extraction for companies like Serco, G4S, Capita, Atos and A4e. The Big Society is thus a 'code for a retrenchment in public services', which continues the anti-statist preferences, albeit with progressive pretenses, of Thatcherism, and, according to Gray, exceeds 'anything dreamt of by Margaret Thatcher'.[32]

The central strength of this third interpretation of the Big Society is the observation that the connection between the Big Society and anti-statism is intrinsic and 'inextricably linked' to its understanding.[33] The ontology of the Big Society is predicated on the shriveling of the central state. Nevertheless, the proponents of this anti-statist interpretation attach their interpretations to negative assessments of the Big Society, insofar as it is seen as a 'dangerous' cover[34] for the onward march of neoliberalism, which has the rolling back of the state as its central conceptual commitment. It cannot, because of its ideological animus to Conservatism, accept the Cameronite intention of the Big Society to bring about, in addition to its anti-statism, its commitment to civic renewal, and the exigent ideological requirement to supplement neoliberalism.

(4) The fourth interpretation contends that the Big Society is a stylistic imitation to *triangulate* British politics in much the same way as New Labour's Third Way ideology was an attempt to transcend the seemingly indefeasible ideological polls of '*old-style social democracy*' and '*the neoliberal outlook*' in

---

[31] A. Ware, 'The Big Society and Conservative Politics: Back to the Future or Forward to the Past?' In *Retrieving the Big Society*, 82-97.

[32] J. Gray. 2010. 'Bad night for Cameron. Very good one for the party's bigoted tendency', *The Guardian*, 8 May.

[33] P. Dorey. 2014. *Policy Making in Britain*. 2nd edn. London: SAGE, 185.

[34] Kisby, 'The Big Society', 484-491; P. T. Gooby and G. Stoker. 2011. 'The Coalition Programme: A New Vision for Britain or Politics as Usual?' *Political Quarterly* 82 (1): 4-14.

the late 1990s.[35] The utilisation of ideological nemeses to provide definition to the *raison d'etre* of Conservatisms is long-standing and pre-dates Cameronism in what Freeden identified as the (reflective) mirror-image mechanism of Conservatism. Furthermore, relations between political concepts confer sense onto an ideology. Freeden argues that 'political concepts make no sense on their own. They can only be understood when examined within a particular idea-environment of surrounding concepts'.[36] 'Third Way Cameronism' is different in content and context to the Third Way of New Labour, but the underlying purpose is similar. Norman postulates that the Big Society 'differs from the Third Way' on the basis that there is a 'history' and a 'coherent set of ideas' underpinning it, whereas Blair's Third Way was 'a piece of pure triangulation', with 'political but not intellectual merit'.[37] The differences between Blair and Cameron's politics of triangulation do not relate to the latter's conceptual-historical continuity and the former's apparent absence of intellectual significance, but in regards to what the two ideologies present as the ideological polls, in which conceptual triangulation takes place. Blairite triangulation involved the triangulation of old-style social democracy and Thatcherite neoliberalism. It was an exercise in what Colin Hay and Richard Heffernan called the ideological 'politics of catch-up' with the *ostensible* ideological preeminence of Thatcherism.[38] The Big Society is

---

[35] See A. Giddens. 1998. *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1-26 (emphasis added); S. Hale. 2011. 'Discourse, Policy...and Ideas: An Obituary of the Third Way in Britain', *European Political Science* 10 (4): 488-500; P. Dorey. 2011. 'The Conservative "Third Way"? British Conservatives and the Development of Post-Thatcherite Conservatism', In *Reflections on Conservatism*, edited by D. Özsel. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 146-177; McAnulla, 'Heirs to Blair's Third Way? 286-314.

[36] Freeden, *Ideology*, 61.

[37] M. Glasman and J. Norman, 'The Big Society in Question', In *Retrieving the Big Society*, 9; Interview with Norman.

[38] Hay, *Political Economy of New Labour*, 42-75; Heffernan, *New Labour and Thatcherism*, 110-138.

presented, in Cameronism, as an 'alternative' to both New Labour's 'significant extension of the state', and the 'reheated...laissez-faire' of an unspecified, presumably Thatcherite, ideology.[39] Cameron argued that, 'In the past, the left focused on the state and the right focused on the market', and Cameronism was preoccupied with 'harnessing that space in between - society - the 'hidden wealth' of our nation'.[40] There are further Cameronite formulations of this triangulatory configuration. Norman presents this triangulation as between the Fabian tradition of centralist and expansionist *étatisme*, and the 'atomism' of neoliberalism, which produces '*rigor mortis*' economics.[41] In short, Norman's Big Society is a purported 'richer hinterland' with a dual 'critique of state expansionism and neoliberal economics'.[42] Kruger, a former speechwriter to Cameron and an advocate of pro-social Conservatism, proposed a 'right dialectic': 'Conservatism is the philosophy of *society*' with 'fraternity' at its core, which is situated between liberalism, the 'philosophy of the *individual*', and socialism, which is 'the philosophy of the *state*'.[43] Blond also defined Cameronism relationally as between the Scylla of Attleeite statism and the Charybdis of Thatcherite market fundamentalism.[44] Therefore, the Big Society, for Blond, Kruger and Norman, had the potential to be 'squeezed to death...between the self-seeking individualism' of Thatcherism, and the 'bloated, all-aggrandising, all-

---

[39] Cameron, 'Hugo Young Lecture'.

[40] D. Cameron. 2011. 'Speech on the Big Society', 23 May.

[41] Norman, *The Big Society*, 84, 59-77.

[42] Norman, *The Big Society*, 183. Interview with Norman. Norman's critique is far more explicit than Cameron's critique of neo-liberalism but less explicit than Blond's or Kruger's.

[43] Fraternity for Kruger was 'David Cameron's big idea'. D. Kruger. 2006. 'The right dialectic', *Prospect*, 24 September; D. Kruger. 2007. *On Fraternity: Politics beyond Liberty and Equality*. London: Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 13 (emphasis added).

[44] Interview with Phillip Blond, 4 November 2013.

powerful state' of state-centric social democracy.[45] Curiously however, there is an *asymmetrical* relationship between the Big Society and the mirror-images of 'state-first Fabianism' and the 'hyper-libertarian' outcomes of neoliberalism.[46] The state is the bigger and larger *bête noire* of the Big Society than is the economism of neoliberalism. The state, in Cameronism, 'still remains the impediment to freedom'.[47] Francis Maude, Cabinet minister and exponent of the Big Society, argued that, 'The Big society has been thwarted', not by the market, but, 'by a Big State that has gradually inserted itself into every aspect of our lives, controlling everything from the centre'.[48] Moreover, Red Toryism's 'reservations about the social impact of free markets', and its critique of neoliberalism, was never fully appreciated and applied in Cameronism's realisation of the Big Society.[49]

The ideologies of the Third Way are an exercise of 'ideological refashioning';[50] it was a strategic, positional and relational tool for Blairism and Cameronism. The problem is one of plurality: there is not *one* third way but *many* third ways. Therefore the resemblances between the third ways of Blairism and Cameronism have *substantive* limitations. Cameronism's positional and relational value resided in the Big Society's *explicit* criticism of Labour's statist tradition,

---

[45] Kruger, *On Fraternity*, 41; Blond, *Red Tory*, 3-4, 35.

[46] Norman, *The Big Society*, 59-77.

[47] J. Rutherford. 2008. 'Fraternity without Equality, and other Conservative Ideals', *Soundings* 39 (1): 99

[48] F. Maude. 2012. 'The Big Society and the City', Speech. 20 February.

[49] S. Corbett and A. Walker. 2012. 'The Big Society: Back to the Future', *Political Quarterly* 83 (3): 490. Cameron's disclaimer on the limits of Red Toryism's influence on Cameronism came at the launch of Blond's think-tank, *ResPublica*, stating that 'I wouldn't say I agree with everything he [Blond] has said'. D. Cameron. 2009. 'Launch Speech of ResPublica', 26 November.

[50] S. White. 1998. 'Interpreting the 'Third Way': not one road, but many', *Renewal: A Journal of Social Democracy* 6 (2): 17-30; S. Bastow, J. Martin and D. Pels. 2002. 'Introduction: third ways in political ideology', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 7 (3): 269-280. S. Bastow and J. Martin. 2003. *Third Way Discourse: European Ideologies in the Twentieth Century*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

ephemerally embodied in New Labour, and *implicit* criticism of neoliberalism, allowing Cameron to create a space, in which the Conservatives could reposition, and reassert, themselves as the custodians of community, personal freedom, and self-reliance. Christopher Byrne et al. observed that, 'The Big Society is really what distinguished Cameron's form of neoliberalism from the Blairite form which has been dominant since the late 1990s'.[51] Cameronite neoliberalism was more 'stable' and 'decentralised'.[52] Byrne et al's observation serves to illustrate just one limitation of comparing Blairite and Cameronite Third Way ideologies.

(5) As noted, the infamy of the Big Society, in part, arises out of its vagueness both in terms of the *communication* and *reception* of the idea. This final interpretation of the Big Society concludes that the Big Society is *meaningless*. Confusion emerged from the ways in which the Big Society was communicated by its political proponents. The choice of the noun *big* was unexplained and confusing: why not a *great*, *strong* or *good* society? Cameronism, in Opposition and periodically in the Coalition Government, portrayed the Big Society as a 'guiding philosophy' for the Conservatives, whereby 'society', not 'state control, was the 'leading force for progress'.[53] It envisaged 'a less centralist state' and 'a greater role for voluntary activity'.[54] As identified and remarked by Kruger, this ambitious definition of the Big Society was conceptually downsized. Cameronism's inability to provide clarity to its 'guiding philosophy' allowed the Big Society to be conceptually superseded by other themes in Conservative politics, namely the necessities of the 'Global Race',

---

[51] Byrne, et al, 'Understanding Conservative Modernisation', 25.

[52] Ibid, 25.

[53] Cameron, 'Speech launching the 2010 Conservative Manifesto'.

[54] Kisby, 'The Big Society', 484.

and the need to deliver economic growth through a 'decade-long'[55] (the 'long-term economic plan' to which Cameron's Conservatives constantly refer) programme of austerity.[56] The inability of Cameronism to fix and finalise the meaning of the Big Society, an essential process for the electoral success of any ideology, was impacted further by the reception of the idea. The near unanimous criticism of the Big Society, from friends and foes alike of the idea, was that it was ill-defined and, for some, simply *meaningless*.[57]

The Big Society however, is not meaningless. Cameron freely admitted that the Big Society was 'complicated' and 'difficult to explain'.[58] The difficulty does not reside in the meaning of the Big Society however. The difficulty arises in the unidentified and unacknowledged impediment in the Cameronite usage of the Big Society. Its meaning and essential character is (1) found in its original *mirror-image* of Big Government,[59] and (2) it is an amplification of the Conservative interest in civil society, and a belief that Conservatism must go beyond a commitment to neoliberal political economy. The inability for Cameronites to properly define the Big Society, and in so doing disappointing the more pro-social Tories like Blond, Kruger, and Ian Birrell, was as a result of the political climate in which the Big Society was born. First mentioned in November 2009 in the

---

[55] J. Landale. 2013. 'Economy a 'decade long project', *BBC News*, 15 November.

[56] Note however, the Big Society is still an *end* of Cameronism, but by 2012 it was joined by other ends. Kruger argued that '[s]ome time in 2012 the big society disappeared from view, submerged at last under a tide of scorn'. D. Kruger. 2014. 'The big society is not about picking litter: it is meant to be a challenge', *The Observer*, 4 January.

[57] M. Hanson. 2010. 'Big Society is a meaningless concept', *The Guardian*, 9 December; J. Daley. 2011. 'Big Society: Common Sense Idea Hampered by a Silly Name', *Telegraph Blogs*, 15 February (accessed 4 May 2014).

[58] Cameron quoted in G. Greig. 2010. 'David Cameron: You don't deserve to govern if you treat people like fools', *Evening Standard*, 29 April.

[59] See image in *Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 2010*. 2010. London: Conservative Party, 36. For contrary view see D. Bulley and B. S. Bulley. 2014. 'Big Society as Big Government: Cameron's Governmentality Agenda', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 16 (3): 452-470.

midst of the worst financial crisis since the 1920s, the Big Society had to share the Conservative ideological stage with the need to reduce public expenditure, and with it scale back the scope of the state, as a method of eliminating the structural deficit. Austerity and small statism became the overriding political imperatives of the Conservatives at the very moment of the Big Society's conception. The politics of the Big Society was designed in a pre-GFC context. This still does not account for Cameronism's inability to successfully articulate the meaning of the Big Society. Crucially, the link between austerity and the Big Society was a *retrenchment of the central state*. Cameronism could not *explicitly* draw this link between the Big Society and austerity, because of the risk it posed to the *balance* in the ideological presentation of post-Thatcher Conservatism. Cameronism constantly needed to ensure that Conservatism did not return to the *uncured* outcome of Thatcherism: namely, that Conservatism was *synonymous* with free market radicalism underpinned by a passionate defence of neoliberal economics as a route to a limited conception of politics. The post-Thatcher Conservative addition, in short, of a commitment to civic renewal would, if the link between austerity and the Big Society was detected, be seen as a smokescreen for state retrenchment and/or futile insofar as a genuine attempt to revive civil society would be sacrificed on the altar of austerity.

The Big Society's meaning has multiplied beyond necessity. Five different meanings of the Big Society have been adduced. This chapter wants to establish that the Big Society is the *end* of Cameronism. Quoting Cameron, the Big Society is 'not a cover for anything', but a concept of Conservatism in its own right.[60] The Big Society is not unproblematic however. It maintained its unchallenged core

[60] D. Cameron. 2011. 'Speech on the Big Society', 15 February.

status up until 2012. After 2012, the Big Society was challenged by other themes. The Big Society, when viewed with a macroscopic lens, has not disappeared however. Despite the Big Society slipping from Cameron's repertoire in 2012, which coincidentally coincided with the nadir of the Coalition's electoral fortunes, Cameron made consistent and frequent references to the Big Society starting in 2009, with references in 2010[61] and 2011,[62] and after its disappearance in 2012, references resumed in 2013[63] and 2014.[64] 'The Big Society', the think-tank *Civil Exchange* correctly observes, 'has a lower political profile than when first launched but Ministers...still confirm their commitment to it in speeches' and it has 'spawned...new initiatives' such as 'free schools...Big Society Capital...[and] the National Citizen Service'.[65] Letwin, a co-intellectual architect of the Big Society, admitted in 2014, that the Big Society has diminished in the frequency of its *public* usage 'in deference to...Liberal colleagues' in the Coalition, but it nevertheless was 'an excellent description of...what [Conservatives]...care about'.[66]

3. Austerity: TINA updated?

---

[61] Cameron, 'Speech launching the 2010 Conservative Manifesto'; D. Cameron. 2010. 'Big Society versus Big Government' Speech. 19 April; Cameron, 'Big Society Speech', 19 July; D. Cameron. 2010. 'Conference Speech'. 6 October. Indeed, the Big Society became Oxford Dictionaries word of the year in 2010. Language expert Susie Dent, a spokeswoman for Oxford Dictionaries, said: '"'Big Society' was for us a clear winner because it embraces so much of the year's political and economic mood"'. M. Wainwright. 2010. ''Big society' chosen as Oxford University's Word of 2010', *The Guardian*, 24 November.

[62] Cameron, 'Speech on Big Society', 15 February; 'Speech on Big Society', 23 May.

[63] Cameron, 'Lord Banquet's Speech'.

[64] Withnall, 'David Cameron: Jesus invented the Big Society - I'm just continuing God's work'. Cameron quoted in M. Giannangeli. 2014. 'David Cameron's love of charity and Red Arrows', *Sunday Express*. 4 May.

[65] *The Big Society Audit 2013*. 2013. London: Civil Exchange, 11.

[66] Letwin, 'Speech on the Role of the State'.

The Big Society constitutes the end of Cameronism. Austerity serves as the means to that end. Nevertheless, austerity has emerged as a concept *seemingly* eclipsing the Big Society in Conservative and Coalition thought-practices since Cameron and George Osborne's proclamations in 2009 that the Conservatives, if they won the 2010 General Election, would usher in an 'age of austerity'.[67] Osborne argued that austerity was the 'only sustainable route...to prosperity', and any alternatives to austerity were simply 'fantasy'.[68] Cameron argued grandly that 'the world has completely changed'.[69] The age of prosperity, a decade and half of uninterrupted economic growth since from 1992 to 2007,[70] was giving way to a Conservative age of austerity. There was considerable risk for the Conservatives, both electorally and ideologically. Ideologically, Cameronism's pre-GFC ideological pick-a-mix - of small statism, qualified neo-liberalism, and the reinvigoration of the civic middle - risked being sacrificed and forgotten to the preponderant theme of austerity.

Austerity is conceptually and definitionally clearer than the Big Society, but the Conservative *purpose* of austerity is contested and contestable. Austerity has been presented as a central organising commitment of the Coalition constituting a core of political coherence. Cameron claimed that austerity would change Britain's 'whole way of life', and the 'decisions' made in the name of austerity would 'affect every single person in our country. And the effects of those

---

67 Cameron, 'The Age of Austerity'; G. Osborne. 2009. 'Speech', 15 September; G. Osborne. 2009. 'Conference Speech', 6 October.

68 Osborne, 'Conference Speech of 2009'.

69 Cameron, 'The Age of Austerity'.

70 Colin Crouch called this period of economic growth 'privatised Keynesianism'. See C. Crouch. 2009. 'Privatised Keynesianism: An Unacknowledged Policy Regime', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 11 (3): 382-399.

decisions will stay with us for years, perhaps decades to come'.[71] The ambitious nature of austerity is contested however. Terrence Casey and Peter Kerr et al have argued that Cameronite austerity is merely a reactive measure that 'sought to address the *specific* excesses of the recent past'.[72] From this perspective it does not seek to change, either in deviating from or intensifying, the prevailing neoliberal economics of Thatcherite orthodoxy. A counterpoint to this argument is the argument that austerity marks a seminal moment not only in the morphology of contemporary Conservatism, but also in the development of British politics. The explicit overarching narrative was that austerity measures had to be introduced immediately to restore economic health, given the large and increasing public sector deficit. The political end was that the structural deficit would be eliminated by 2015,[73] and the subsequent General Election of 2015 would be fought on a platform of economic competence and emerging economic prosperity. Simon Lee has argued that, theoretically, the Coalition's 'fiscal retrenchment' is 'far more ambitious than anything attempted by any British Government since 1945', even going beyond Thatcherism's attempt to create the market society.[74] Matt Beech, commenting on the Comprehensive Spending Review of October 2010, which set in motion the Coalition's austerity agenda, portentously asserted that it constituted one of the 'major policy events of the Coalition's tenure'.[75] The Conservative-led Coalition's austerity programme was striking for a number of

---

[71] D. Cameron. 2010. 'We must tackle Britain's massive deficit and growing debt', Speech. 7 June.

[72] T. Casey. 2011. 'Capitalism, Crisis, and a Zombie Named TINA', In *The Legacy of the Crash: How the Financial Crisis Change America and Britain*, edited by T. Casey. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 54. Kerr, et al, 'Theorising Cameronism', 203.

[73] Tge deficit-elimination goal was postponed to 2017-18 in the Autumn Statement of 2012. G. Osborne. 2012. 'Autumn Statement'. 5 December.

[74] S. Lee, 'We Are All in This Together': The Coalition Agenda for British Modernization', In *The Cameron-Clegg Government*, 21.

[75] Beech, 'A Tale of Two Liberalisms', 267.

different reasons. (1) The austerity envisaged the tightest squeeze on overall public expenditure since 1945; the tightest settlement for public expenditure on overall public services since 1975-80; and the tightest settlement on NHS spending since 1951-56.[76] (2) Peter Taylor Gooby and Gerry Stoker argued that the austerity programme's 'striking element' was contained in the 'cumulative, abrupt and substantial programme of public spending cuts and tax increases from 2010 to 2015'.[77] What was particularly striking however, as will be discussed later in the chapter, was (3) the *primacy of spending cuts* over *tax increases* in the Conservatives stated aim of reducing the structural deficit. Others observed that the Conservative ambition to both eliminate the deficit and deliver a budget surplus by 2018/19 'depended on the government slashing public spending as a proportion of GDP to levels last seen in 1948'.[78] The ideological emphasis on public expenditure reductions, austerity *for* the state and not tax increases *for* 'hardworking taxpayers',[79] placed Britain on a completely 'different spending trajectory'.[80] Austerity is therefore an ambitious project that serves one overriding ideological Conservative purpose: 'to curtail the size and responsibilities of the central state'.[81] These were just some of the reasons why *The Economist*, in 2010,

---

[76] Rowena Crawford quoted in Lee, 'We Are All in This Together', 15.

[77] Gooby and Stoker, 'The Coalition Programme', 4.

[78] W. Hutton. 2013. 'Osborne wants to take us back to 1948. Time to look forward instead', *The Observer*, 8 December.

[79] The prefix of 'hardworking' for 'people' or 'taxpayer' in Conservative semantics under Cameron is distinctive. In trying to reorient themselves as the 'new workers' party', their notion of 'hardworking' is an exclusive category presumably excluding ''children, older people, retired folk, and people with disabilities'. Margot James, a Cameronite Conservative and Member of Parliament for Stourbridge, quoted in N. Simons. 2013. 'Tory MP Admits Conference Slogan 'Excludes People'', *Huffington Post*. 30 September (accessed 2 October 2013).

[80] Gooby and Stoker, 'The Coalition Programme', 4.

[81] Beech, 'A Tale of Two Liberalisms', 267.

with some justification, called the Cameron Government the 'West's most daring government'.[82]

Cameron's Conservatives projected themselves as the guardians of Britain's return to austerity after New Labour's 'decade of excess'.[83] The era of 'conspicuous consumption' and public expenditure *largesse* was to be replaced by a decade of public and, to a lesser extent, private austerity. Austerity however, has a larger meaning for contemporary Conservatism than simply trying to reduce what is an arbitrary figure of public debt. Mark Blyth and Florian Schui, both critics of austerity,[84] have delved deeper into the ideological implications of austerity beyond the quotidian Cameronite references to 'tackling the fiscal deficit' or 'fixing our broken economy'. Whilst austerity denotes public spending cuts in general, Schui contends that this basic equation misses the deeper 'rationale' for austerity. Schui, surveying the components of austerity, argues that: (1) austerity is a proposed route for an expedient return to economic dynamism and competitiveness; (2) the objective of economic competitiveness and capitalist growth is achieved by (a) 'cutting back on government expenditure that funds...collective forms of consumption' and (b) 'lowering the cost of labour'.[85] Resultantly, austerity is purported to renew economic growth as a consequence of public expenditure cuts, which will deliver 'a smaller state' leaving more space, *à la* crowding-out theory, for 'private initiative and inspire confidence among

---

[82] 'The unlikely revolutionary', *The Economist*, 12 August 2010.

[83] C. Hay. 2010. ''Things can only get worse...': The political and economic significance of 2010', *British Politics* 5 (4): 395.

[84] Also see M. O' Hara. 2014. *Austerity Bites: A Journey to the Sharp End of Cuts in the UK*. Cambridge: Policy Press; R. Seymour. 2014. *Against Austerity: How We Can Fix the Crisis They Made*. London: Pluto Press.

[85] F. Schui. 2014. *Austerity: The Great Failure*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2.

private investors and consumers'.[86] Blyth argued that the kind of austerity employed in Cameronite Conservatism was intimately attached to a discourse that politically deploys spending cuts as a *political* attempt to undermine the welfare state and, by extension, the benign and larger state that underwrites it.[87] Both Blyth and Schui notice the intrinsic links between austerity and (1) state retrenchment; (2) labour market reforms; (3) a proposed route to an expedient return to growth; and (4) the abstention of consumption.[88] The Cameronite decontestation of austerity heavily emphasises the need for abstention from consumption in the *collective* and not individual realm. It is an austerity that proportionately favours austerity for collectivist institutions such as public services and local government than it does tax increases, especially tax increases for the wealthiest or interferences in corporate practices. Austerity, as Blyth and Schui emphasise, is more than just a contestable economic analysis; it is a position based on unavoidable *political* considerations. Blyth also contends that it is moral. The Conservatives 'turned the politics of debt into a morality play, one that has shifted the blame from the banks to the state. Austerity is the penance - the virtuous pain after the immoral party'.[89]

Cameronism has two *seemingly* polar opposite decontestations and semantics of austerity. Austerity has been decontested as (1) *contingent*, *unavoidable*, *responsible* and *urgent truth* and (2) as an explicitly-stated means to

---

[86] Ibid, 2.

[87] See M. Blyth. 2013. *Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[88] Schui, *Austerity*, 8.

[89] Blyth, *Austerity*, 13.

building a 'permanently smaller' state in order to vacate the space for the Big Society.[90]

The first decontestation of austerity is a quintessentially Conservative ploy. In emphasising the unavoidability of austerity, Conservative ministers were obviating other alternatives. Much like Thatcherism's determination to reshape British society in the 1980s, Cameronism has presented austerity as necessitous: 'there is...no alternative' (TINA).[91] Cameronism, in the attempt to sanitise austerity's tainted association with ideology, aligns its prescriptions with a universal, 'clear for all to see', intuitive common sense.[92] '[F]or me' austerity, Cameron argued, 'is *the only option*. We must pay down this deficit. The longer we leave it, the worse it will be for all of us'.[93] This first mode of argumentation stressed the contingent nature of austerity. Cameron claimed that he, and Nick Clegg, 'didn't come into politics to make cuts'.[94] Cameronism, prior to the GFC, defined itself primarily in relation to civic renewal. The change of emphasis from social renewal, prior to the GFC, to economic renewal after the crash, Cameron argued, represented the contingent nature of austerity. The change of emphasis for Cameronism indicated that austerity was pragmatic. '[T]he end of politics', Cameron argued, 'is about the *national interest*, not personal political agendas'.[95] Andrew Crines observed that Cameronism justified the contingency of austerity by decontesting 'fiscal austerity in the national interest', and not in the *narrow*,

---

[90] G. Osborne. 2014. 'New Year Economy Speech', 6 January (emphasis added).

[91] M. Thatcher. 1980. 'Press Conference for American Correspondents in London', 25 June.

[92] Cameron, 'We must tackle Britain's massive deficit and growing debt'.

[93] Cameron, 'Conference Speech of 2009'.

[94] D. Cameron. 2010. 'New Year Message', 31 December.

[95] Ibid (emphasis added).

political or *ideological* interest.[96] Similarly, one of the most frequent, and derided, slogans of the Conservatives has been to argue that during the age of austerity, '*we are all in this together*'.[97] Accordingly, Cameron was insistent that the Coalition had a '*practical* desire to sort out' the economy, and that his government was not cutting the deficit 'because we want to, driven by *theory* or *ideology*. We are doing this because we have to, driven by the *urgent truth* that unless we do, people will suffer and our national interest will suffer'.[98] Cameronite semantics 'worked hard to secure this meaning of austerity as a necessary [and] responsible mode of managing the consequences of shameful, reckless excess'.[99]

This contingent argumentation for austerity is further supported by the argument that Cameronite political economy has evolved and changed to the circumstances and vicissitudes of events. Peter Dorey and Simon Lee have identified the *purported* ideological permutations of Cameronite political economy. The first incarnation of Cameronite political economy[100] refers to 'sharing the proceeds of growth' between tax cuts and public spending commitments, which was the strategy in existence between 2005 and 2007. The second incarnation refers to Cameron's Conservatives attack on the Brown Government after the collapse of Northern Rock in September 2007 and its nationalisation in February 2008. The third phase in Lee's account, but the second phase in Dorey's account as Dorey omits Lee's second phase, is Cameronism's

---

[96] A. S. Crines. 2013. 'The Rhetoric of the Coalition: Governing in the National Interest?' *Representation* 49 (2): 213.

[97] First used by Cameron in June 2005. D. Cameron. 2005. 'We're All in it Together', Speech to Policy Exchange, 29 June.

[98] Cameron, 'New Year Message' (emphasis added); D. Cameron, 'We must tackle Britain's massive deficit and growing debt' (emphasis added).

[99] R. Bramall. 2013. *The Cultural Politics of Austerity: Past and Present in Austere Times*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 20.

[100] See pages 140-142 in chapter three.

reassertion of fiscal conservatism from autumn 2008: opposing the Brown Government's quasi-Keynesian fiscal stimulus and the part-nationalisations of some of the British banking system (including Barclays; Royal Bank of Scotland; HBOS and Lloyds TSB); and the abandonment of the commitment to match the Blair-Brown Governments spending commitments for lower public expenditure.[101] The last incarnation, which is Lee's fourth phase, refers to the 'new economic model' propounded by Cameron and Osborne, developed in Osborne's 2010 Mais Lecture, which refers to the deficit reduction plan, the age of austerity and the mechanisms (i.e. the creation of the Office for Budget Responsibility) and policies (the emphasis on "a supply side revolution" to release "enterprise and wealth creation")[102] to cut spending and eliminate public debt. These changes from the acceptance of the Blairite, New Labour political economy to a critique of the Brown Government's handling of the banking crisis to an ideological divergence on the size and role of the state, and the regulation of banking and markets, constitutes an *ostensibly changeable*, *adaptable* and *pragmatic* collection of responses to events as they happened. Willetts, justifying and defending Cameronite adaptivity, argued that 'political priorities adjust as national priorities adjust'.[103] Richard Wade argued that the Cameronite response to the GFC of 2007-08 constituted a 'divergence' from the Blairite political economy: it 'constituted a definitive drawing of the battle lines over public finances'.[104]

---

[101] S. Lee, 'Convergence, Critique and Divergence: The Development of Economic Policy under David Cameron', In *The Conservatives under David Cameron*, 50-79.

[102] Osborne quoted in See S. Lee, 'No Plan B: The Coalition Agenda for Cutting the Deficit and Rebalancing the Economy', In *The Cameron-Clegg Government*, 62.

[103] Interview with Willetts.

[104] Wade, *Conservative Party Economic Policy*, 170.

The Cameronite divergence from its anterior ideological commitments, at various stages since 2007, on the role of the state in relation to the regulation of markets, is exaggerated at best and chimerical at worst. Even though Lee identified four demarcation points in the development of Cameronite political economy, Lee argues correctly that the commitment to a smaller state underpinned Cameronism's 'core assumptions about the respective role of the state and the market' all the way through.[105] Even during the period of so-called 'convergence' between 2006 and 2007, Cameron's Conservatives attacked the Blair Government's 'micro-management', over-taxation and regulation-heavy approach to the economy.[106] The Cameronite critique of Labour increased during and following the GFC: the Brown Government's stimuluses, recapitalisations, nationalisations, subsidies, and interventions were denounced as a 'reversion to 'old' Labour policies'.[107] Therefore, the Cameronite commitment to a smaller state is protected, supported and concealed by a set of mirror-images: Cameronite efficiency checks Blairite managerialism; Cameronite austerity checks Brownite profligacy. The arguments for the Cameronite commitment to the smaller and shrunken state have merely been reframed and reconceptualised with the passing of events. Austerity has thus been decontested as necessitous, unavoidable (there is no alternative and other alternatives are rendered dangerous and/or

[105] Lee, 'Convergence, Critique and Divergence', 78.

[106] Dorey, 'Sharing the Proceeds of Growth', 260; Cameron, 'Modern Conservatism'.

[107] Ibid, 264.

deceptive),[108] and pragmatic (a thoughtless, intuitive and instinctive response to events), and realistic.[109]

The second argument notes that austerity's instrumental value resides in the *rolling back of the state* in order for Cameronism to *roll forward the Big Society*: austerity rolls back the state and the Big Society is rolled forward superintended, *déjà vu* Thatcherism, by a smaller but strong state.[110] This decontestation of austerity is denuded of the self-delusive pragmatism of the former justification for austerity. Critics of Cameronism and the austerity programme of the Coalition Government have exposed the central motivation behind austerity. 'Shrinkage was and remains', Toynbee and David Walker write, the Cameron Government's 'guiding light'.[111] Cameronites themselves have been no less forthcoming in declaring their motivations for austerity however. 'The Spending Review', which is the guidebook for the austerity programme, '*makes choices*. Particular focus has been given to reducing welfare costs and welfare spending' with the aim 'to eliminate the structural current deficit over a five year horizon'.[112] The spending reductions were a choice. A principle of 'Osbornomics' was that spending cuts predominate in the means to deficit elimination.[113] As Osborne clarified, Britain 'has overspent; it has not been under-taxed'.[114] This

---

[108] Cameron argued, illustratively, that 'Those who argue that dealing with our deficit and promoting growth are somehow alternatives are wrong. You cannot put off the first in order to promote the second'. D. Cameron. 2011. 'Speech to World Economic Forum Annual Meeting', 28 January.

[109] Austerians, Schui writes, are 'cast as hard-nosed economic experts who advocate unpleasant but necessary measures' in mirror-image to anti-austerians as 'well meaning but ultimately naive'. Schui, *Austerity*, 4.

[110] Bulley and Bulley, 'Big Society as Big Government', 464-466.

[111] Toynbee and Walker, *Dogma and Disarray*, 77.

[112] HM Treasury. 2010. *Spending Review*. London: HM Treasury, 5 (emphasis added).

[113] HM Treasury. 2010. *Budget 2010*. HC 61. London: The Stationery Office, 2.

[114] G. Osborne. 2010. 'Budget Statement', 22 June.

envisages an entirely different shape and role for the state. The Institute for Fiscal Studies have marshaled a series of figures to provide evidence of this ambitious project of state shrinkage: departmental spending by 2018 will have fallen by £85 billion (21%) and 400,000 fewer people will exist on the state's payroll.[115] The smaller state is seen as a decade-long political project. Cameron predicted that he did not 'see a time' when the austerity programme would end.[116] Austerity was therefore not a short-term pragmatic response to the problem of debt and deficits. Both Cameron and Osborne have talked about (1) the integrality of austerity, and (2) the resultant *permanence* of a smaller state. Cameron, in exact contradistinction to remarks such as his claim that he 'didn't come into politics to make cuts' and that the austerity programme was not 'driven by theory or ideology' or 'some ideological zeal' but by a 'practical desire to sort out' the deficit; in his 2013 Lord Banquet speech, Cameron argued that austerity was 'something more profound' than 'making difficult decisions on public spending'.[117] It was more 'profound' because Cameron was now dispensing with the argument from contingency and unavoidability, and now explicitly articulating the ideological intention underpinning austerity. The profundity of austerity was that it '*means building a leaner, more efficient state.* We need to do more with less. Not just now, but *permanently*'.[118] The implications of the permanence of a leaner, more efficient and smaller state close off the option of restoring the 'social investment state' of the New Labour years. Indeed Osborne censured that 'Britain

---

[115] 'Leviathan, tamed', *The Economist*, 15 June 2013.

[116] R. Winnett. 2012. 'David Cameron: I'll never campaign to take us out of Europe', *The Daily Telegraph*, 18 July.

[117] Cameron, 'Banquet Speech'.

[118] Ibid (emphasis added).

should never return to the levels of spending of the last government'.[119] Interestingly, the emphasis on state reduction as means to fulfilling the promise of austerity's deficit reduction was projected to increase beyond 2015. Further cuts, in the sum of £25 billion, beyond 2015-16 were premised however, on 'a spending consolidation' (spending reductions) alone. In sum, Osborne declared that 'Government is going to have to be *permanently smaller*'.[120] Letwin, with celebratory fervour, called this Cameronite state the 'weightless state'.[121]

The smaller state has been a *consistent* ideological priority of British Conservatism since the age of Thatcherism. The post-Thatcher Conservative arguments for a smaller state are protean and varied, as discussed in chapter three. Arguably, Conservatism under Cameron was just resuming, and putting into practice in government, this project of state diminution after a 'wasted decade' of New Labour excess. Austerity was therefore a political convenience for Cameronite arguments for state shrinkage. Toynbee argued that 'without the God-given opportunity' of the need to reduce the deficit in their central role of 'shrinking the size of the state', Cameron's Conservatives would have 'gone for tax cuts' as a need to shrink the state.[122] Toynbee and Walker further argue that, 'claiming cuts cause recovery served a prime purpose: to get rid of as much public spending as these opportune circumstances would allow'.[123] The Conservatives in the mid-2000s, most notably proto-Cameronites like Letwin, talked about

---

[119] Osborne, 'New Year Economy Speech'.

[120] Ibid.

[121] Interview with Letwin; Toynbee and Walker, *Dogma and Disarray*, 53; P. Toynbee. 2014. 'Nothing will stop David Cameron's race to the 'weightless state'', *The Guardian*, 20 May.

[122] Interview with Toynbee.

[123] *Dogma and Disarray*, 17.

whittling the size of the state as a proportion of GDP to '35% or 30%'.[124] The financial crisis and the escalating public deficit meant that Conservatism in the 2010s would, in part, inevitably be associated with amputating the role and scope of the state. Austerity was more than just an immediate response to a large current public deficit therefore. Gooby and Stoker wrote that the Cameronite austerity agenda:

> '...involves a restructuring of welfare benefits and public services that takes the country in a new direction, rolling back the state to a level of intervention below that in the United States - something which unprecedented. Britain will abandon the goal [a goal resuscitated by the Blair governments[125]] of attaining a European level of public provision'.[126]

Beech similarly writes that the notion that all the debt needs to be repaid as quickly as possible, incurred from a mixture of public spending, banking bailouts, and the stimulus package, is 'not an economically watertight assertion'.[127] Austerity is first a *political*, and not an economic, enterprise.[128] Second, austerity is undoubtedly, both in its contingent and ideological guises, 'a politically expedient goal for the Conservatives...to embark on the most drastic round of cuts to public expenditure in the modern era'.[129] The nature of austerity becomes clear when one (1) considers the primary moral nature of austerity; (2) dispenses with

---

[124] 'Tories' spending plans under fire', *BBC News*, 23 May 2004.

[125] Indeed, Maurice Mullard and Raymond Swaray argued that 'public expenditure during the Blair years had increased significantly above the levels reached by the previous Labour governments'. M. Mullard and R. Swaray, 'New Labour and Public Expenditure', In *Ten Years of New Labour*, 35, 35-49.

[126] Gooby and Stoker, 'The Coalition Programme', 14.

[127] Beech, 'A Tale of Two Liberalisms', 275.

[128] A. Gamble. 2014. 'Austerity as Statecraft', *Parliamentary Affairs*. Doi: 10.1093/pa/gsu016.

[129] Beech, 'A Tale of Two Liberalisms', 275.

the unavoidability and contingency accounts of austerity, and (3) realises that the motivation for austerity, the rolling back of New Labour's social investment state, has precedence in past Conservative thought-practices.

4. Austerity and Its Counter-Response

The political and ideological nature of austerity when austerity is considered as one option among a plethora of possible responses to the GFC and the GR. It is a *highly selective* and *ideological* 'framing' of the most challenging crisis of Western capitalism since the Wall Street Crash in 1929. Even though a comprehensive treatment of the causes, consequences and precedence of the GFC of 2007-08 is firmly outside of the remit of this thesis, a basic understanding of the nature of the financial crisis is important in understanding some of the ideological responses of British political elite. It is important to note therefore that the GFC, note that it was not just a financial crisis but also a 'Great' financial crisis, was distinct from the crises in capitalist economies before it. The GFC 'differed' from previous crises, for Andrew Crines, 'because the fundamentals of economic liberalisation', which were firmly installed under Thatcher and maintained with mixed revisions by the subsequent administrations, 'were now being undermined'.[130] Therefore the sheer scale and magnitude of the crisis, insofar as it was an existential challenge to (the neoliberal form of) capitalism, made this quite different to previous crises. Cameron shared the analysis that the

[130] A. S. Crines. 2014. 'The Rhetoric of Neoliberalism in the Politics of Crisis', *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought*, published online on 22 May 2014. Doi: 10.1080/23269995.2014.922360, 2-3. A. Gamble. 2014. *Crisis Without End? The Unravelling of Western Prosperity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 11-27.

crisis, and the subsequent recession, was not 'normal'.[131] Nevertheless, Cameronism had a particular decontestation of the roots/causes of the crisis which had profound implications for the prognosis and palliative for the crisis: 'we're in a debt crisis. It was caused by *too much borrowing*, by individuals, businesses, banks, and *most of all, governments*'.[132] As argued, the Cameronite decision to touch upon austerity was not only a means to bringing about long-held Conservative ideological ends, it further signified a commitment to a *particular* and *selective* approach to the most critical crisis of capitalism since the 1920s. An analysis of austerity as a *choice* is highlighted when 'Tory austerity' is analysed in juxtaposition and mirror-image to Labour's neo-Keynesian discourse of 'prosperity not austerity' (or 'austerity-lite'), as a response to the crisis.[133]

The debate between Tory austerity and Labour investment, was what Lee called a 'back to the future' moment in which the politico-economic battles of the 1980s had been revived.[134] Suddenly, after a period of *ostensible* convergence, the political economies of the Conservatives and Labour diverged.[135] Despite Cameronism's tentativeness on the development of a political economy because of the unpopularity of the Thatcherite-Majorite political economy in the 1990s and the politico-economic successes of New Labour, the financial crisis was an opportunity for Cameronism to arrest the narrative on political economy back off New Labour. The interrogation of these rival narratives has been negligible, largely because the chasm between the two parties on the solution to the crisis is,

---

[131] D. Cameron. 2011. 'Conference Speech', 5 October.

[132] Ibid (emphasis added).

[133] Bramall, *The Cultural Politics of Austerity*, 20.

[134] See Lee, 'No Plan B: The Coalition Agenda for Cutting the Deficit and Rebalancing the Economy', 59-74.

[135] See Lee, 'Convergence, Critique and Divergence', 60-79.

prima facie, negligible. Both Cameron's Conservatives and Gordon Brown's/Ed Miliband's Labour Party proposed cuts to the deficit through public expenditure and tax increases as a remedy for fixing the economy.[136] Nevertheless, the two approaches were *significantly* different: Labour's answer to the crisis was increasingly a traditional Keynesian and social democratic response, whilst the Conservatives doubled-down on the rhetoric of austerity in order to slim the state. In short, 'behind these shared goals was a very different vision'.[137] Gamble argued that, 'There is always a contest to define the crisis, what caused it, who is to blame for it, whether it was a crisis at all and what the response should be'.[138] Explanations for the GFC have largely broken down along ideological lines therefore: 'analyses have tended to focus on *either* the market *or* the statist aspects of the origins of the financial crisis, producing two groups of explanations with strong internal 'family resemblances''.[139] Labour see this largely as a failure of markets or, more precisely, the decades of deregulation that allowed the financial system to develop unchecked and devolve into an inherently unstable sort of 'casino capitalism'. Brown argued that whilst Cameronism equated to 'markets left to themselves can sort out the crisis', Labour's response would be defined by government activism, in evidence in Brown's ostensible late conversion to government intervention and a quasi-Keynesian stimulus.[140] Conversely, Conservatives see the crisis emanating from government policies and over-regulation, which encouraged misguided economic decisions.

---

[136] For example, see Ed Balls', the Shadow Chancellor under Miliband, pro-austerity 'iron discipline' speech. E. Balls. 2014. 'Speech to the Fabian Society', 25 January.

[137] Smith, 'From Big Government to Big Society', 827.

[138] Gamble, *Crisis Without End?* 12.

[139] Lakin and Ostrowski, 'Ideology in the Age of the Coalition', 26 (emphasis in the original).

[140] G. Brown. 2009. 'Conference Speech', 29 September; *A Future Fair For All: The Labour Party Manifesto 2010*. 2010. London: Labour Party, 3.

Labour therefore, and the Liberal Democrats before the formation of the Coalition Government, largely had a market failure account of the financial crisis. The chief candidates for blame therefore were financial institutions and bankers. The Brown Government's response to the 'credit crunch' and GR was to increase the use of government intervention in the form of a fiscal stimulus and an increase in public expenditure, which for Martin Smith, demonstrated 'a traditional Keynesian maintenance of demand in times of recession'.[141] Among other policy responses in its arsenal included the recapitalisation and renationalisation of large parts of the banking system, inflation-targeting, and a targeted investment in technological industries, which amounted to the most activist industrial policy since the 1970s.[142] Contrary to this view, Hay argues that the Brown Government 'engaged in a bout of *inter-paradigm borrowing* - in using a repertoire of at least quasi-Keynesian techniques to shore up the existing [neoliberal] growth model'.[143] Smith acknowledges that Brownism was inter-paradigmatic because Labour, post-crash, still 'supported the continuation of the sound money market-led conservatism that had predominated since the 1980s'.[144] In order for the Brown Government to respond to the crisis, borrowing increased considerably. Whilst the Conservatives demanded instant cuts to reduce the borrowing, the Labour approach to the economy after 2010 had three features: (1) the size and quantity of Osborne's spending reductions are unnecessary and thus a political choice rather than an economic imperative; (2) if Labour had formed the government after May 2010, they would be exercising Labour's 'fiscalist thesis'

---

[141] Smith, 'From Big Government to Big Society', 824.

[142] See HM Government. 2009. *Building Britain's Future*. London: HM Government.

[143] Hay, *Failure of Anglo-liberal Capitalism*, 39 (emphasis added). This view is amplified in Crines, 'The Rhetoric of Neoliberalism in the Politics of Crisis', 3.

[144] Smith, 'From Big Government to Big Society', 823.

or ‘Plan B’ for the economy, in opposition to Osborne’s ‘Plan A’, which argues for less spending cuts and more tax increases than the Coalition, 70% and 30% respectively;[145] (3) the speed and timeframe of the cuts, to eliminate the deficit in the space of a five-year parliament, are not only unnecessary but damaging.[146] For Labour the crisis was triggered principally by the lax global regulation of financial institutions and the increasingly esoteric financial instruments used by investment banks, not by the public expenditure increases in the Blair years. What was needed, according to the 2010 Labour manifesto, was an ‘active reforming government, not [the] absent government’ offered by Cameronism, in order to tackle market-failure.[147]

Cameronism’s austerity narrative twinned the crisis with the politics and policy failures of the Blair-Brown Governments. Cameronism subscribed to a ‘state-failure’ explanation of the crisis. ‘Why is our economy broken?’ Cameron asked rhetorically, ‘because government got too big, spent too much and doubled the national debt’.[148] The Cameronite discourse of a *crisis of (Labour’s public) debt* and state failure discourse are the discourses that have ‘consolidated in Britain’ over the market failure and cuts discourse ‘to which...austerity and deficit reduction is the solution’.[149] Hay’s analysis reveals that the success of the Cameronite ‘Labour debt discourse’, and the argument that the crisis was caused by state failure and not market failure, is attributable to the Conservatives resolute

---

[145] Under Miliband, this was later revised in a more social democratic direction designed to ‘do more on tax’ by having a 50:50 plan.

[146] Hay, *Failure of Anglo-liberal Capitalism*, 45; Gooby and Stoker, ‘The Coalition Programme’, 5.

[147] *A Future Fair For All*, 3.

[148] Cameron, ‘Conference Speech of 2009’.

[149] Hay, *Failure of Anglo-Liberal Capitalism*, 41. See chapter six.

hostility to the state: it was a crisis *of* the state not a crisis *for* the state.[150] The crisis emerged from the failures of the state as opposed to anything extrinsic to the state. The difference is that if one situates the crisis *for* the state 'it is to suggest that the fiscal deficit which now threatens public expenditure cannot be attributed to any dynamic internal to the state itself since its origins lie elsewhere', whereas the crisis *of* the state 'would implicate the state directly in the generation of the fiscal shortfall that now threatens the public programmes with which we associate it'.[151] Indeed Cameronism's anti-statism featured in the diagnosis and prognosis of the crisis. Cameron's Conservatives, *contra* the Brown Government's raft of interventions, consistently opposed the bank nationalisations and the increases in public expenditure during the GR.[152]

Cameronism diagnosed state failure which was purportedly the result of a Labour debt crisis. Austerity would roll back the state, in order that state failure was reduced if not eliminated, and reduce 'Labour's' debt. Cameron's Conservatives, with the supplementary aid of Clegg's Liberal Democrats, 'politicised' Labour's fiscal policy record. The solution to the crisis was to restore balance to the public finances in the form of *light* tax increases and *heavy* public spending reductions. The Conservative-led Coalition thus embarked upon a 'range of measures to substantially reduce the costs of the welfare state and public services'.[153] Beech observes that the Cameronite expectation was that a period of prolonged austerity would 'enable entrepreneurs and private firms to engender

---

[150] Ibid, 18.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Kavanagh and Cowley, *The British General Election of 2010*, 91. Cameron claimed that the Tories 'opposed the £12 billion Labour wasted on the VAT cut. We were against the fiscal stimulus'. Cameron, 'The Age of Austerity'.

[153] Beech. 2011. 'Tale of Two Liberalism,' 272.

growth and for the voluntary sector and businesses to begin to provide more goods and services to the British people where previously the state had dominated'.[154] To a large extent the Conservative austerity discourse with its diagnosis (state failure) and the prognosis (cutting the state in an effort to repay 'Labour's debt') has ideologically prevailed. There are innumerable reasons for this of which some include the ostensible implausibility of the quasi-Keynesian remedies proffered by Labour. Cameron's Conservatives have characterised Labour's position as an attempt to borrow more to cut borrowing. Cameron has thus portrayed Miliband's 'One Nation' Labour Party as the 'anti-business, anti-growth and anti-jobs' Party of 'one notion: more borrowing'.[155] Osborne presented Labour's Plan B as a 'a return to higher borrowing, more debt, more instability, lost jobs, rising interest rates and higher taxes'.[156]

The Cameronite justifications for austerity, whilst diachronically different and contextually new, have precedence in the politico-economic semantics of the ideologies of British Conservatism in the twentieth century. Ben Jackson and Gregg McClymont's research sought historical precedence for Cameronite Conservatism's attachment to the politics of austerity. Jackson and McClymont thought Stanley Baldwin's National Government in the 1930s and the Thatcher Conservative Governments in the 1980s were apposite examples.[157] In relation to Cameronism, Jackson and McClymont write that, 'If the key political challenge facing the country over the long term becomes defined as cutting public spending,

---

[154] Ibid.

[155] HC Deb, Col. 281. 28 January 2014.

[156] G. Osborne. 2013. 'Speech on the Economy', 9 September.

[157] B. Jackson and G. McClymont. 2011. *Cameron's Trap: Lessons for Labour from the 1930s and 1980s.* London: Policy Network, 6.

then the Conservatives are more likely to prosper'.[158] It depended also, as had happened in the 1930s and 1980s, on the demonisation of Labour's economic record and policies as ''profligate and 'incompetent''.[159] Furthermore, Jackson and McClymont predicted correctly that when growth, the other 'half of the Conservative recipe', returns, as it did in 2013, the Conservatives would use the growth to 'pledge tax cuts rather than a return to pre-crisis levels of spending' in order to help those who traditionally benefit from periods of Conservative office.[160] The success of this formulation, a divisive political economy in the form of austerity, which delivers prosperity and growth for some, was a 'recurring theme in twentieth century British political history', insofar as 'partisan policies' were decontested as 'national imperatives'.[161] Austerity was a means of fulfilling the Tory 'conviction that a smaller state is morally and economically desirable, creating both greater prosperity and a more virtuous citizenry' and this was 'allied to a resentment of egalitarianism, and a demand for lower and more regressive taxes'.[162] The historical, ideological and electoral potential of austerity for the Conservatives, reveals the importance of austerity for Cameronism. Indeed a rhetorical device of Cameronism was to 'develop a narrative of Labour failure' and, in so doing, 'connected the 2008 financial crisis with earlier financial crises when Labour had been in office' with the 1931 collapse of the MacDonald

---

[158] Ibid, 10.

[159] Ibid, 4.

[160] Jackson and McClymont, *Cameron's Trap*, 10, 12. This form of growth has been decontested as 'exclusive growth' by Ed Balls and the Labour Party. E. Balls. 2013. 'Now Britain needs a recovery that will last', *The Times*, 10 September; E. Miliband. 2013. 'Speech on the Cost of Living Crisis', 5 November; Interview with Wood.

[161] Crines, 'The Rhetoric of the Coalition', 207-218; Jackson and McClymont, *Cameron's Trap*, 23.

[162] Jackson and McClymont, *Cameron's Trap*, 10.

Government, and the Callaghan Government's IMF crisis in 1976.[163] Austerity was decontested as unavoidable; decontested as in the national interest; and decontested as arresting (Tory) order and efficiency in mirror-image to (Labour) collapse, chaos and excess. One perspicacious Conservative commentator noted that 'the age of austerity' has the potential to be a 'deeply conservative period' and that the Cameron era witnessed 'a bigger appetite for conservatism than there has been for many years'.[164] This was therefore not just a pettifogging debate about the minutia of political economy, but an attempt to ensconce a conception of the 'moral economy', albeit one decontested as 'laissez-faire', that would benefit the wider ideological interests of Conservatism.[165]

5. Austerity and the Big Society: Contradictory, Parallel or Consanguineous Relations?

Austerity envisages a 'permanently' smaller state. The argument thus far has been that this objective of a smaller and emaciated state was a means to an end. The end was the Big Society. Now a settled meaning and detailed conceptual and historical contextualisation of these two concepts has been established, the chapter considers three arguments about the relations between these two concepts: (1) the contradictory view; (2) the parallel view, and (3) the consanguineous view.

a. Austerity and the Big Society as Contradictory Concepts

---

[163] Gamble, *Spectre at the Feast*, 108.

[164] T. Montgomerie. 2011. 'An appetite for conservatism that the PM doesn't always satisfy', *The Independent*. 28 December.

[165] Marquand sees the financial crisis as constituting a 'crisis of the *moral* economy', and the subsequent debate about the causes and the solutions to the crisis as a debate about competing moral economies. Marquand, *Mammon's Kingdom*, 2-3.

The contradictory view holds that austerity is a concept that is an unsuitable basis at best and an undermining basis at worst for the Big Society. Stuart Hall has characterised the Cameronite nexus of austerity and the Big Society as a 'gulf' between the 'hard edge of cuts, work-fare and the gospel of self-reliance' of the former, and the ''soft' face of compassionate conservatism of the latter.[166] Others argue that the Big Society is not the end of austerity because it is *subordinate* to it. Steve Corbett and Alan Walker argue illustratively that the Big Society is 'subordinate to a neoliberal agenda' of austerity, 'which prioritises cuts in public expenditure and, therefore, fails to deliver the minimum of resources necessary to transform rhetoric into reality'.[167] Kerr et al's critique is that the Big Society is 'anaemic' next to austerity and its attendant drive to reduce the deficit.[168] These perspectives pertain to the first and central critique of the contradictory view of the relationship. The Big Society and austerity is a purportedly contradictory relationship because Cameronism's conception of the Big Society rests on a hostile view of the state. Marquand has long argued that voluntarism and a healthy civil society, *contra* Cameronism, requires generous state support as a condition of its health and success.[169] Practical concerns arise about the possibility of building a bigger society in an age of austerity. How can community groups, for example, practically fund, organise, run, and maintain services after its public funding has been reduced or completely removed? Critics of the austerity-Big Society nexus connection argue that Cameronism does not 'acknowledge the

---

[166] Hall, 'The Neo-Liberal Revolution', 710.

[167] Corbett and Walker, 'The Big Society: Back to the Future', 490.

[168] Kerr, et al, 'Theorising Cameronism', 196.

[169] D. Marquand. 2004. *Decline of the Public: The Hollowing Out of Citizenship*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 41.

impossibility of attempting to renew local community institutions and services while simultaneously withdrawing state funding for them'.[170] Liverpool, one of Cameron's Big Society 'vanguard areas', for example, had to withdraw from the Coalition's programme because it had to save £141 million from its budget because of austerity's requirement for spending reductions. The 'post-bureaucratic society', for Cameronism however, is dependent on the shriveling of the state.

The second critique from the contradictory school problematises austerity in relation to the broader ideological horizons of Cameronism. The return to austerity sacrifices the Cameronite equilibrium between *qualified neoliberalism* and *civic renewal*. Cameronite austerity, according to the contradictory school, has too sanguine a view of neoliberal logic. This is witnessed in the revival of the language around markets, economic freedom, and state retrenchment. Maurice Glasman, an intellectual godfather of Milibandism, welcomed the introduction of the Big Society into the ideological conversation of British politics for both critiquing 'the statism of New Labour' and celebrating 'goods of practice and institutions of goodness, of knowledge, of skill, of excellence, of good practice'.[171] Whereas the first critique of the relationship between austerity and the Big Society pertains to the *absence* of a positive conception of the state (i.e. the state's role is conceived of as negative as its primary role is to police the neoliberal regime), this second critique of the relationship critiques the *presence* of a positive conception of the market. Whilst the Big Society has a multi-dimensional and detailed critique of the activity and role of the central state, Glasman and contradictory theorists claim that Cameronism possesses an overly-

---

[170] Corbett and Walker, 'The Big Society: Back to the Future', 490; C. Pattie and R. Johnson. 2011. 'How Big is the Big Society?' *Parliamentary Affairs* 64 (3), 419.

[171] M. Glasman and J. Norman, 'The Big Society in Question', In *Retrieving the Big Society*, 12.

Pollyanna view of the market. Glasman argues that, 'what you have is a very great timidity upon the Conservative side of the Big Society agenda in extending the critique of the state to a critique of the market'.[172] The blind-spot for Cameronism was that the renewal of society was, in part, supported by a more sceptical and critical view of markets. The Cameron Coalition's political economy 'encourages mobility, flexibility and competitiveness', which undermines the 'mutuality, solidarity and sense of place required to make stable association a meaningful possibility in people's life', featured in the Cameronite determination to build the Big Society.[173] Glasman interestingly argues that this seemingly insurmountable tension, between the reductionist political economy and a sentimentalist attachment to hearth and home, 'goes back to Burke' and the origins of modern Conservative ideology.[174] Ben Kisby further argues that the Big Society is further hamstrung because it is not 'underpinned by a commitment to social justice'.[175]

This third critique, which is co-existent with the second critique, argues that for ideological reasons, especially diachronically, the Conservatives' hostility to both equality and demands for *social* justice meant that any conception of society would be denuded of a generous or thick conception of justice.[176] Cameronism's commitment to civil renewal, for the contradictory view, was a weak supplement to a much stronger strand within Conservative political thought-practices, namely the residual Thatcherite commitment to the neoliberal political

---

[172] Ibid.

[173] M. Glasman. 2010. 'Society not State: The challenge of the Big Society', *Public Policy Research* 17 (2): 62.

[174] Ibid.

[175] Kisby, 'The Big Society', 488.

[176] See pages 257-258 in chapter five.

economy.[177] Neoliberalism's existential challenge during the GFC resulted in Cameronism's defence of an economic system that it had always thought *necessary* and even *desirable* in the delivery of prosperity and Conservative ideological ends. This need to shore up neoliberalism resulted in the hollowing-out of the Big Society

This contradictory critique of the austerity-Big Society nexus is the critique honed in upon by the Labour Party under Miliband, especially by Labour's Policy Coordinator Jon Cruddas.[178] What is more surprising than Labour's belief that austerity and the Big Society are contradictory conceptual commitments, is that this argument is also perpetuated by a group of disaffected 'compassionate', 'centrist' and/or 'Red' Conservatives. They desire to keep Cameronism wedded to its pre-austerity compassionate core, which was best articulated in the Big Society. They are a significant grouping because they all, with different degrees of success, made contributions to the ideologies of Cameronism before the formation of the Coalition Government, with Kruger's in the form of emphasising the importance of fraternalism and acting as a speechwriter for Cameron; Blond's in the form of constructing Red Toryism;[179] and Birrell's in the form of propounding the virtues of compassionate Conservatism and acting too as a speechwriter for Cameron during the 2010 General Election. They are, as mentioned, advocates of pro-social Conservatism. Blond observed, and hoped, that the GFC of 2008 had delivered a 'crisis of neoliberalism', which would precipitate 'a philosophical change in the

---

[177] See Ware, 'The Big Society and Conservative Politics', 82-97.

[178] J. Cruddas. 2012. 'The Role of the State in the Good Society', Speech, 13 December.

[179] The ideological contours of Red Toryism have been attended to elsewhere in this chapter, see pages 193-195.

Conservative party', breaking with the Thatcherite valorisation of markets towards to the 'civic communitarian Conservative' insights of Cobbett, Ruskin, Chesterton and Belloc.[180] Blond, when publishing his *Red Tory* in 2010, thought that Cameron was 'politically astute enough to recognise that the political and...the economic era of Thatcherism is over'.[181] On forming the Coalition however, Blond saw the elevation and preponderance of austerity, and the marginality of the Big Society, as constituting a victory of Osbornomics over Cameronism. For Birrell, austerity 'knocked off course' the 'half-completed' politics of 'Tory modernisation', of which the Big Society was the central concept.[182] Blond wrote that the Big Society's 'positive vision of the future' became withered and entirely subordinated to 'a purely negative agenda of deficit reduction'.[183] Blond argues further:

> 'Cameron subscribes to the rhetoric of a new settlement [presumably a Red Tory one] but he doesn't think through the political economy that that requires. You can't subscribe to Thatcherite ideas and then not expect a Thatcherite outcome. If you pursue the same policies as the 1980s, you should expect 1980s outcomes'.[184]

Damningly, the outcome of Cameronism's reheated Thatcherism, argues Blond, has produced a record of 'narrowing opportunity, concentrating wealth and protecting [market] monopoly interests'.[185] Blond's flirtation with Cameronite

---

[180] P. Blond. 2008. 'A deeper shade of blue', *The Guardian*, 21 August.

[181] Blond, *Red Tory*, 33.

[182] I. Birrell. 2013. 'Why the Conservatives should reclaim their compassionate core', *The Guardian*, 25 September.

[183] P. Blond. 2012. 'Cameron has lost any hope of redefining the Tories', *The Guardian*, 4 October.

[184] Ibid.

[185] P. Blond. 2012. 'Modern conservatives make plebs of us all', *The Financial Times*, 25 September.

Conservatism, whilst not over, has been considerably ruptured by what Blond regards as the contradictory quality of austerity's 'negative agenda' and the Big Society's 'positive vision'.

Kruger, whose Conservatism and critique of Cameronism is 'very much on the same page' as Blond's,[186] argued similarly that Cameronism's 'transformative agenda' around 'renewing and reviving local social relationships and making communities function' has been taken hostage by 'other agendas'.[187] These agendas are three in number. First, Kruger argues that the Big Society was killed by 'a thousand cuts' of austerity.[188] Like social democratic critics of austerity's impact on the Big Society, Kruger argues that the health of the Big Society, in part, depends on public expenditure and funding. Second, Kruger argued that the Conservatives suffered from a 'defining contradiction' in its conception of the Big Society. The contradiction derives from the Cameronite decontestation of the Big Society as:

> 'a central government initiative that casts central government as the enemy; a grassroots movement born in Whitehall. Recognising this, the coalition has embraced a *neoliberal interpretation*, in which the Big Society simply means free men and women taking power into their own hands, where the only job of the state is to get out of the way'.[189]

The Cameronite commitment to a *negative* conception of the state, for Kruger and the pro-social Conservatives, inhibits the prospect of Big Society success because it assumes the Big Society, even though initiated from the top, will spontaneously

---

[186] Interview with Kruger.

[187] Kruger, 'The big society is not about picking litter'; M. Townsend, 'David Cameron's vision has been lost, says author of 'hug a hoodie' speech', *The Observer*, 10 August 2013.

[188] D. Kruger. 2011. 'Death by a thousand cuts for Big Society', *The Financial Times*, 6 February.

[189] Ibid.

produce itself from a 'thousand points of light'.[190] Kruger commented that the 'reverse alchemy' of converting 'state institutions into social ones' required a major role for the state, not the state that presides merely over implementing austerity.[191] Third, the Big Society has been contradicted and undermined by 'crude populism', consisting of 'bashing burglars', 'sending immigrants home', 'posturing on Europe', 'cutting taxes', and generally being 'tough'.[192] Birrell argued identically that Conservatism has been 'stripped back to basics' and the Big Society has been ditched.[193]

Contradictory accounts of the conceptual relationship between austerity and the Big Society therefore argue that Osbornomic austerity has fatally undermined the prospect and realisation of the Big Society because the account contends that (the renewal of) civil society requires a *positive* conception of the state; a more *sceptical* view of the operation of markets, and a consideration of the importance of *inequality* and the need for *social justice*. Austerity for these theorists reveals the true character of Cameronism; 'radicalised Thatcherism'.[194] Austerity is the resumption of 'business as usual' in Cameronism's acceptance of neoliberal economics, which essentially undermines civic institutions and civic life.[195] In short, contradictory accounts argue that 'Fiscal retrenchment may yet prove the Big Society's *Achilles' heel*'.[196]

---

[190] Interview with Kruger.

[191] Kruger quoted in McAnulla, 'Liberal Conservatism', 178.

[192] Interview with Kruger.

[193] Birrell, 'Why the Conservatives should reclaim their compassionate core'.

[194] S. Farrall and C. Hay, 'Locating 'Thatcherism' in the 'here and now'', In *The Legacy of Thatcherism*, 328.

[195] W. Grant, 'Was there Ever an Anglo-American Model of Capitalism? In *The Legacy of the Crash*, 33-34; W. Grant. 1989. 'The Erosion of Intermediary Institutions', *Political Quarterly* 60 (1): 10-21; Dorey, *Policy Making in Britain*, 34.

[196] Pattie and Johnson, 'How Big is the Big Society? 420 (emphasis added).

b. Austerity and the Big Society as Parallel Concepts

Austerity and the Big Society can be seen as parallel concepts. This views holds that they are free-standing concepts that have no interaction or at least do not depend on each other at a deeper level. Cameron has argued that the Big Society would feature in Cameronism 'whether you're having to make difficult decisions or more generous ones because you're living in times of plenty'.[197] This is supported when one considers that the Big Society was a core concept in Cameronism before the onset of austerity. Willetts argued similarly that the 'Big Society would have remained at the core of Cameron's agenda' in both an imagined 'age of prosperity' and the actual 'age of austerity'.[198] 'A Cameron Government', Willetts argues, 'would still be wanting to have...voluntary groups and charities [for example] involved in delivering welfare-to-work'.[199] Kisby, argued that ostensibly, 'even in the context of a very different financial situation it seems highly likely that Cameron would have favoured the Big Society he has set out; for him, creating 'communities with oomph' is his 'great passion' as prime minister'.[200] Therefore, Cameronites have presented austerity and the Big Society as separate and parallel concepts insofar as the Big Society was a consistent and deep-seated commitment, whereas austerity was an unforeseen and unfortunate

---

[197] Cameron quoted in Giannangeli, 'David Cameron's love of charity and Red Arrows'.

[198] Willetts has an ostensibly hyper-adaptive view of the Big Society. Willetts intriguingly argues that 'the area of future discussion' in regards to the Big Society is 'to what extent the state and government can itself support the Big Society or is government a threat to the Big Society or can the government by acting as an ultimate insurer itself lower risk of cost and support the Big Society?' Nevertheless, the Cameronite view is a fixed view that big government and the state are threats to the Big Society. Interview with Willetts.

[199] Interview with Willetts.

[200] Kisby, 'The Big Society', 485.

necessity. Cameron argued that the Big Society was 'his mission in politics' and thus pledged 'to fight for it everyday', whereas austerity was his - and his government's - 'duty'.[201]

This view has been difficult to sustain as concepts, regardless of the diachrony or context, interact either positively or negatively. It is true for example that the Big Society was conceived prior to the GFC informed, according to Jason Edwards, 'by anxieties regarding neoliberal government that had amounted over the decades: the lack of democratic control over managerialist bureaucracies in both the public and private sectors, and the socially dissociative effects of the pursuit of free-market economics and consumer capitalism'.[202] Nevertheless, the categorisation of the Big Society's free-standing, independent and parallel from the concept of austerity, ignores the notion that political concepts are realised and practiced in specific 'idea-environments'. Dorey and Garnett derive the *problem* for the Big Society, not in its 'content', but in its 'context'.[203] The context in which the Big Society was outed, in Cameron's Hugo Young Lecture in November 2009, in the midst of the GR, and then again during the General Election campaign in May 2010, was a context of austerity. Dorey and Garnett argue the 'context' of the Big Society made it easy for critics, *à la* contradictory theorists, to portray the Big Society as (1) the rationale and/or façade for austerity or (2) contradictory or paradoxical to the aims of austerity. 'Persevering with the concept of the 'Big Society'', Dorey and Garnett argue, 'after economic circumstances had changed in a way that *increased* the potential for

---

[201] Cameron, 'Speech on Big Society', 15 February.

[202] J. Edwards, 'Introduction: Retrieving the Big Society', In *Retrieving the Big Society*, 1.

[203] Dorey and Garnett, 'No such thing as the 'Big Society?' 389-417.

misunderstanding was courageous but ultimately self-defeating'.[204] Importantly, an *explicit* endorsement of austerity was never envisioned when Cameronism was trying to develop its post-Thatcherism narrative. Had there not been the GFC, the credit crunch, and the GR, it would have been difficult to associate the Big Society with austerity and state diminution. Thus, Cameron is consistently at pains to disassociate the Big Society and austerity by arguing that the 'idea that the big society is some excuse for cutting public services is nonsense'.[205] Nevertheless, the treatment of austerity and the Big Society, whether in a contradictory or consanguineous relationship, was difficult if not impossible to accept. The Big Society inevitably became 'mired in the financial crisis...[and] the cuts agenda'.[206]

c. Austerity and the Big Society as Consanguineous Concepts

The conceptual relationship between austerity and the Big Society is most accurately understood as a *consanguineous* relationship. Indeed, Timothy Heppell has argued that if austerity fails, then the Big Society fails with it.[207] Austerity is the means to Big Society ends. According to the Minister for Civil Society, Nick Hurd, as a minister in the Office for Civil Society, which is specifically devoted to the promotion of the Big Society, 'the aims of building a bigger society and reducing the deficit...interact at various levels'.[208] In sum, it envisages a 'horizon

---

[204] Ibid, 414 (emphasis added).

[205] Cameron quoted in Giannangeli, 'David Cameron's love of charity and Red Arrows'.

[206] Glasman and Norman, 'The Big Society in Question', 11.

[207] Heppell, *The Tories*, 158.

[208] Interview with Hurd.

shift' in the expectations, duties, role and composition of the state with austerity as the means, or 'duty', and the Big Society as the ends, or passion, of Cameronism. Cameron grandly claimed that if the Big Society were allowed to come to fruition it could 'change our world'![209] The Big Society is not just 'merely a call to great volunteerism'; instead, as Beech argues, it 'ought to be viewed as the ideological agenda for a set of reforms driven by the financial measures outlined in the CSR' (Comprehensive Spending Review).[210] In short, the CSR, Duncan Smith's comprehensive welfare reform, Michael Gove's restructuring of state education and Andrew Lansley/Jeremy Hunt's part-privatisation of the NHS, are 'means to secure the wider ideological ends - the 'big society''.[211] The Big Society therefore signals the government's ambition to transform public services. It is the rubric that is being used to shrink the state. This signals the government's ambition to transform public services and it is the rubric that is being used to shrink the state and undermine long−standing systems of public service employment relations. The Big Society is integrally connected to deficit reduction with the voluntary sector and an increased emphasis on volunteering decontested as a user-centred and cost-effective way of delivering public services in an age of austerity.

The consanguineous conception of the austerity-Big Society nexus has a *negatively*-defined element and a *positively*-defined element. The negative element of the relationship refers to austerity as the means to bringing about a smaller state, which is principally decontested as a smaller state in terms of

---

[209] D. Cameron. 2010. 'This is a radical revolt against the statist approach of Big Government', *The Observer*, 18 April.

[210] Beech. 'A Tale of Two Liberalisms', 276.

[211] Ibid, 275-276.

economic intervention (regulation) and reduced public spending (taxation). It is the means with which the state is reduced to vacate space to be occupied by the Big Society. The need for austerity and spending reduction has merely, in Cameronite ideology, 'exposed the limits of 'big government' as a means of doing business'.[212] Cameron has emphasised the importance of a limited state, not *ipso facto*, but so as to 'roll forward the frontiers of society'.[213] Cameronism makes a semantic shift from Thatcherism in support of a limited state, which is done so as to make sure that the Big Society is protected from ideological threats once, and if, it comes into being. In the most ideologically coherent speech Cameron ever made, Cameron points to the distinction between 'a larger society' and 'a smaller state'.[214] Indeed, the state would be smaller, theoretically, at the end of the Cameron years than before them. However, the semantic shift does two things: (1) Cameronism sustains its commitment to go beyond the Thatcherite preoccupation with anti-statism and the market society by believing 'a larger society'; and (2) crucially, there is an important role for the state, after the Big Society's creation, insofar as the state will protect the Big Society. Furthermore, given that the Big Society is impossible to measure (i.e. how do, and would, we know when we have *enough* strong communities and strong relationships to constitute a *Big* Society?), there would be a permanent protective role for the state.[215]

The positive element of the relationship refers to austerity's accomplishments. If austerity delivers a smaller state, and if the Cameronites

---

[212] Interview with Hurd.

[213] Cameron, 'Hugo Young Lecture'.

[214] Ibid.

[215] Francis Maude argued that the Big Society was not for government to specify what it is; citizens should effect what the Big Society is. M. Chorley and M. Merrick. 2011. 'Francis Maude: Big Society? It's nothing to do with us', *The Independent*, 2 October.

theory is realised in practice, the space vacated by the state will give life to the Big Society, which meets higher Conservative ideological objectives. It realises Conservatism's limited conception of politics. This is the Cameronite role of the Big Society. I will provide examples to illustrate this point. First, even though the state is not abolished, its role is diminished to a protective and qualitative role. Areas that are politicised, in the sense that they are controlled by the state, are privatised (i.e. the Royal Mail), mutualised (i.e. parts of the Civil Service), or deregulated (i.e. building planning rules). Thus, as Christopher Byrne et al outline, the reforms strengthens the state's role as protector of the Big Society because the 'depoliticisation' of the state has insulated the state 'from certain difficult-to-deal-with political pressure'.[216] Second, the Big Society enables a restructuring of society, which gives 'renewed prominence' to Conservatism.[217] It reduces government interference in the economy and enhances market practices. Third, the Big Society makes a virtue of civil society; celebrating the uncoordinated, organic, spontaneous and voluntary exchanges between individuals, families and communities, which are removed from the diktats of the state.

6. Conclusion: The Ends and Means of Cameronism

Austerity and the Big Society have served to animate the thought-practices of Cameronism and the Coalition Government. They serve to bring to fruition the three lineaments of post-Thatcher Conservatism discussed in chapter three. Both the Big Society and austerity are continuous with past Conservative thought-

---

[216] Byrne, et al, 'Understanding Conservative Modernisation', 26.

[217] Talshir, 'Civil Society and the Reconstruction of the Public Sphere', 207.

practices. It rejects the notion that the Cameronite celebration of the Big Society 'marks an important break in conservative ideology'.[218] Its anti-statist element is continuous with the Thatcherite decontestation of society as the *market society*; the element of civil renewal is found in the Conservative interest in the voluntary associations from the late 1980s onwards; and is continuous with the notion that civic renewal is a better response to the problem of neoliberalism than state intervention.

However, even though austerity provides the means to the Big Society's ends, austerity has strained the three features of Cameronism. Of the three features, the commitment to civic renewal has been stretched almost to breaking point. Ideologically the commitment to austerity risked Cameronism's pre-GFC equilibrium between a commitment to a smaller state and the insufficiency of neoliberalism risked being sacrificed and forgotten with the chosen Conservative diagnosis and prognosis of and for the GFC of 2007-08. Matthew d'Ancona talked about the dangers of 'ideological creep' with the onset of austerity in that Cameron's 'practical' Conservatism would be distorted by 'a doctrinal veneer', which looks 'like the work of Tory Jacobites, ideological restorationists determined to continue the 'unfinished revolution' of the 1980s'.[219] Cameronite Conservatives, in order to avoid ideological creep, were thus at pains to point out that the course of action involving spending reductions was beyond choice and ultimately unavoidable. Nevertheless, the mask slipped and austerity became an ambition to build the smaller state in order to vacate the space in which the Big Society would eventually occupy. The central problem arising out of this

---

[218] J. Edwards, 'Freedom, Free Institutions and the Big Society', In *Retrieving the Big Society*, 98.

[219] M. d'Ancona, 'Last chance saloon: The History and Future of Tory Modernisation', In *Tory Modernisation 2.0*, 21.

consanguineous relationship is the degree to which state retrenchment will achieve the desired renewal of civil society. Cameronites continuously dispute the 'displacement' of its 'commitment to socio-centric' themes in the light of austerity.[220] It remains to be seen whether Cameronism achieves equilibrium between its three ideological, and at times competing, objectives.[221]

[220] Interview with Letwin.

[221] See chapter six.

Chapter Five

The Ideologies of the Coalition: More 'Muscular' than 'Liberal'?

'There's been a sense that we don't want to be a lowest common denominator government just trying to legislate where we agree'[1]

1. Introduction: Cameron's Coalition?

George Dangerfield first published his *The Strange Death of Liberal England* in 1935; it charted the slow decline of the Liberal Party in the years 1910 to 1914. An analogous declinist thesis has been similarly applied to the Conservative Party in 2005 with the publication of Geoffrey Wheatcroft's *The Strange Death of Tory England*. This poses difficult questions for the future of the Conservative Party and possibly Conservatism. This, and other, declinist theses have an added academic relevancy insofar as the Conservatives under David Cameron failed to secure a majority government in May 2010. The first question therefore, that the chapter will address, is whether the formation of the Coalition Government in 2010, between Cameron's Conservative Party and Nick Clegg's Liberal Democrat Party, represents a revival and rebirth of these two political parties and their attendant political traditions or not? Second, and more importantly, is this a government animated centrally by the ideologies of Conservatism or liberalism? In short, the chapter hopes to answer whether the Coalition Government is a 'tale of two liberalisms', or a 'liberal' accommodation to Conservatism?

---

[1] David Cameron hints that the Coalition Government has developed a convergent ideology distinct from the ideologies of the two individual coalition parties. Cameron quoted in 'Dispatches: A Year Inside Number 10'.

On 12 May 2010, Cameron, the newly elected Conservative Prime Minister, stood alongside Clegg, leader of the Liberal Democrats and newly-appointed Deputy Prime Minister, at a joint news conference in the gardens of 10 Downing Street. They both declared that the Coalition would 'take Britain in a new historic direction' and the Coalition, they claimed, 'has the potential for era-changing, convention-challenging, radical reform'.[2] With a majority of 77, the Coalition had the largest majority (discounting the Speaker) since Blair's 2001 majority of 167; the two parties combined garnered 59.1% of the votes cast,[3] the first time since the Second World War in which a government could command over 50% of the popular vote. It was a decisive departure with Britain's post-war experience of single-party government too. What was more decisive was that a coalition had been formed, seemingly and relatively effortlessly, between the Party of the Centre-Right with a Party that had, during the Blair years, been the most Centre-Left of the mainstream political parties.

The formation of the Coalition was of course the byproduct of strategic maneuvers, leadership changes, economic circumstances, events, and ideological permutations.[4] Broadly, two views about the *political nature* of the Coalition Government have arisen: (1) Blair characterised the Coalition as being 'a coalition of people and party organisations born of necessity, not a coalescence of ideas' and it was 'more a marriage of convenience than conviction'.[5] This view sees the Coalition as a matter of pragmatic electoral arithmetic; and (2) Cameron, prior to

---

[2] *Our Programme for Government*, 7.

[3] Lee, 'We Are All in This Together', 13.

[4] For accounts of the formation of the Coalition, see D. Laws. 2010. *22 Days in May: The Birth of the Lib Dem-Conservative Coalition*. London: Biteback; R. Wilson. 2010. *5 Days to Power: The Journey to Coalition Britain*. London: Biteback, 2010; A. Adonis. 2013. *5 Days in May: The Coalition and Beyond*. London: Biteback.

[5] T. Blair. 2010. *A Journey*. London: Arrow Books, xxvi; 'Coalition still working well, David Cameron insists'.

the formation of the Coalition, had argued that the ideologies of Conservatism and liberalism depended on each other 'at a deeper level'.[6] This view sees the Coalition as an *'ideological Coalition*'.[7] It is the latter view with which the chapter has sympathy with. Indeed, 'liberal Conservatism' was one of the labels chosen by Cameronites to signify their distinctive form of Conservatism.[8] This was chiefly to distance Conservatism from: (1) the perception that the Conservative Party was merely the 'economics party', and in so doing was able to address non-economic issues, and (2) it denoted a move away from the populist traditionalism of Thatcherism and the populist authoritarianism of New Labour, which was broadly complementary to Liberal Democrat thought-practices. The chapter will consider the ideology of the Coalition by analysing its language and the translation of that language into public policy positions; namely its purported core concept and centrepiece commitment of and to the Big Society and its three stated aims of enhancing 'freedom', 'fairness' and 'responsibility', by applying Freeden's concept of decontestation to these terms to discern as to whether the prevailing decontestations are Conservative or liberal.[9] Decontestation is a process of closing down meanings and options, and removing the indeterminacy from the meaning of political concepts. 'What *is* meaningful', according to Freeden, 'is why one specific decontestation, one ordering of the political world, prevails over another'.[10] Decontestation therefore removes the indeterminacy of meaning over a particular concept. This is especially important and useful when looking at the

---

[6] D. Cameron. 2007. 'A Liberal Conservative Consensus to Restore Trust in Politics', Speech, 22 March.

[7] Lee, 'We Are All in This Together', 7 (emphasis added).

[8] Cameron, 'A Liberal Conservative Consensus to Restore Trust in Politics'.

[9] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 76-77.

[10] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 77 (emphasis in the original).

decontested concepts that form the ideology of the Coalition Government. An important reference point for this will be *The Coalition: Our Programme for Government* document.

Both Cameron and Clegg have advocated 'muscular liberalism'.[11] Muscular liberalism, for Cameron, is an active rejection of the 'passive tolerance' of extremism and assaults on 'British values', namely 'Freedom of speech. Freedom of worship. Democracy. The rule of law. Equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality'.[12] Muscular liberalism, for Clegg, is a liberalism which holds true to the liberal insistence on liberties, but one which is not relativist or agnostic on moral issues. Clegg made the distinction between old progressives who argued for a powerful state, which was the kind of liberal progressivism the social democratic wing of the Liberal Democrats argue for,[13] and the 'new progressives', of which Clegg included himself, who argue for powerful citizens.[14] Two attendant and supplementary questions arise, with the talk of 'muscular liberalism': (1) what happened to Conservatism and if it has disappeared (2) is the Coalition Government a union of two liberalisms?

2. Cameronite Conservatism

---

[11] Cameron, 'Munich Speech'; N. Clegg. 2011. 'Speech on an Open, Confident Society: The Application of Muscular Liberalism in a Multicultural Society', 3 March.

[12] Cameron, 'Munich Speech'. See page 190 in chapter three.

[13] For example, see D. Brack, R. Grayson and D. Howarth eds. 2007. *Reinventing the State: Social Liberalism for the 21st Century*. London: Politico's. *Reinventing the State* was a counter-response to *The Orange Book* that gave primacy to "non-market outcomes". T. Papworth. 2012. 'Editorial: Eight Years Since The Orange Book: Have the Liberal Democrats 'Reclaimed' Liberalism?' *Institute of Economic Affairs* 32 (2): 2-5.

[14] Clegg, 'Open, Confident Society'.

The Coalition Government's central priority, instrumentally, is outlined at the back of the Coalition agreement :

> 'The deficit reduction programme takes precedence over any of the other measures in this agreement, and the speed of implementation of any measures that have a cost to the public finances will depend on decisions to be made in the Comprehensive Spending Review' [15]

The means to bringing about freedom, fairness and responsibility can only be understood through the Conservative, and now Coalition, aspiration of building the Big Society. However, the means to that end is the deficit reduction programme.[16] The accelerated deficit reduction programme, which if successful, will wipe out the bulk of the structural deficit by 2017-18, envisages a smaller state and thus shrinking the liabilities of the state. This attempt to reduce the size, scope and scale of the state, as discussed, has been a central feature of post-Thatcher Conservatism.[17] This is the plan envisaged in the Conservative manifesto and strongly rejected in the Liberal Democrat manifesto. Therefore, on the core economic plan for the government, the Conservatives hold sway and have persuaded, or dragooned, the Liberal Democrats into changing their position. In the background however, a powerful crisis of Conservatism narrative rumbled on that argued that, whatever the Conservative Party's fortunes, Conservatism was dead and other ideologies, namely a nominated assortment of liberalisms, took its place. This crisis narrative attributed the outcomes of Thatcherism with its unleashing of market forces with the undoing of Conservatism. Market

---

[15] See *Our Programme for Government*. The deficit reduction programme was announced in the June 2010 Budget and in the Comprehensive Spending Review in October 2010.

[16] See chapter four.

[17] See chapter three.

destructiveness had destroyed the cultural norms, which Conservatism was intellectually and electorally dependent on. We are reminded of Conservatism's obituary, so the narrative goes, with the formation of the Coalition, which, because of Conservatism's disappearance, marks a matrimony of liberalisms, in which the Liberal Democrats contribute social and, the Conservatives, market liberalism. There is therefore a problematic position for Conservatism in contemporary British politics if the literature on the condition of political ideologies in Britain is anything to go by. Liberalism is said to be the 'meta-ideology' of contemporary post-Thatcher British politics. Simon Lee contended that the ideological competition of politics leading up to the 2010 General Election would be fought in order 'to convince the electorate that they [the leaders of the three big parties] are the most authentic speakers of liberalism'.[18] Cameron had professed in 2007, as mentioned, that liberalism and Conservatism depended on each other 'at a deeper level'; Conservatism depended on liberalism but was it true in reverse? In contrast Scruton, doyen of the high Tory intellectuals, identified liberalism as 'the principal enemy of conservatism'.[19] So, if Conservatism still exists, which one of the central arguments of the thesis is to assert that it does, what is the nature of Cameronite Conservatism and, crucially, what is its relationship to liberalism?

Cameronism casts itself as strictly 'non-ideological' and 'technocratic'. It is outcome and results-focused, echoing Blair's ostensible pragmatism; 'what matter is what works'. It is putatively disinterested and unconcerned as to which organisation, public, private or voluntary, provides a service. There is an apparent

---

[18] S. Lee, 'Conclusion', In *Ten Years of New Labour*, 192.

[19] Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, 12.

adaptability and indefinability to Cameronite Conservatism. Beech thought it a rich mixture of Centre-Right ideas deriving influence from Thatcherite, liberal and One Nation Conservatism.[20] There is an already sizable literature that sees 'Cameronism' as an extension of the Thatcherite project of further extending free-markets. Cameronism is the heir to Thatcherism and neoliberal Toryism for these group of thinkers.[21] Kerr et al argued that Cameronism, like Thatcherism and Blairism (New Labour) before it, constitutes a 'distinct hegemonic project', but a hegemonic project 'that nevertheless serve to uphold and advance the same abiding state project: namely, neoliberalism'.[22] The Coalition Government, by extension, for the Marxian thinkers, uses 'new ideological tropes' like the Big Society, the 'post-bureaucratic age', 'freedom, fairness and responsibility' and 'muscular liberalism', to 'shore up the foundations of the neoliberal governmental project'.[23] It is, to quote Hall, a continuation of the 'neoliberal revolution'.[24] The Thatcherite signifiers of 'rolling back the frontiers of the state', 'popular capitalism' and restoring 'Victorian values', has from this angle, been replaced by Cameron's core signifier, the Big Society. For Byrne et al Cameronism is 'an attempt, at an ideological level, to present a more electorally friendly variant of the Thatcherite, neoliberal agenda'.[25] The Coalition Government therefore is a government of Thatcherite consolidation, if not intensification. Alternatively, there are those like McAnulla who focus on the 'heir to Blair' qualities of

---

[20] Beech, 'Cameron and Conservative Ideology', 18-30.

[21] Seymour, *The Meaning of David Cameron*; Kerr, et al, 'Theorising Cameronism', 193-207; Evans, 'Consigning its Past to History?' 291-314; ''Mother's Boy', 325-343.

[22] Kerr, et al, 'Theorising Cameronism', 198.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Hall, 'The Neo-Liberal Revolution', 705-728.

[25] Byrne, et al, 'Understanding Conservative Modernisation', 20.

Cameronism.[26] Like Blair, Cameron plays 'triangulatory' politics, melding different political traditions together in novel and contradictory ways. The problem here is that Cameron, like Blair, rhetorically commits himself to marrying and advancing the twin goals of 'social justice' and 'economic efficiency'.[27] This has always been the longstanding objective of the contemporary Conservative Party for Cameronites. According to Cameron, Blair's 'aims were not markedly different to Mrs Thatcher's aims, or John Major's aims'.[28] The social ills New Labour tried to cure, Cameron argued, were the same ills the Thatcher and Major Governments tried to cure. It is misguided and ill-judged to suggest however, that the Coalition Government is a straightforward continuation of Thatcherism or New Labour. Thatcherism, for example, is a historically specific, and conceptually innovative ideology of late twentieth century Conservative ideologies. To equate Cameronite Conservatism or the 'action-orientation' ideology of the Coalition Government with Thatcherism is another feature of our misreading of Thatcherism and the political thought-practices of the Thatcher Governments. This is further problematised if we accept the false analysis that New Labour, especially the Blair Governments, is a continuation of Thatcherism with a human face. It ignores the historical contingencies, the ideational commitments, the ideological traditions and the individuals associated with the different periods of government. Kerr makes this argument in arguing that by looking for consensuses we hamper rather than help our understanding of the contemporary political scene in Britain.[29] There are those

---

[26] See McAnulla, 'Heirs to Blair's Third Way?' 286-314.

[27] Cameron, 'Modern Conservatism'.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Kerr, 'Cameron Chameleon', 46-65.

like Anthony Barnett who see the formation of the Coalition as an end of Thatcherism. Indeed Barnett postulated that the Coalition Government would be to the Left of its New Labour predecessors. Barnett points to a tougher rhetoric on bankers; more focused and targeted support for the very poor; more democratic; ending New Labour's overweening assault on liberty; Europeanising Westminster politics; implementing greener policies; and the reintroduction of Cabinet government. Nevertheless, Barnett concedes that the Coalition Government 'remains a Tory government'.[30] With that reappraisal of Conservatism under Cameron, where is Cleggite Liberalism situated?

3. Cleggite Liberalism

The formation of the Coalition gave Cameron a profound opportunity to reshape British politics to the Conservatives advantage. Lee argues that, 'there has long been a battle between social democratic and conservative narratives over which party has been best placed to form a progressive ideological Coalition with liberalism'.[31] Under Cameron, the Conservatives' wooing of Liberal Democrats into government, signified a partial winning of this ideological battle. The contemporary Liberal Democrat Party is largely a coalition of social democratic liberals and classical neoliberals. It is the neoliberal group that has been in ascendency since the leadership election victory of Clegg in 2007. A group of Liberal Democrats close to Clegg, including David Laws, Ed Davey and Vince Cable, all contributed chapters to *The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism*. In

[30] A. Barnett. 2010. 'The End of Thatcherism', *OurKingdom,* 13 May.

[31] Lee, 'We Are All in This Together', 4.

short, this group of Liberal Democrats, who dominate the Liberal positions in the Coalition Cabinet today, wanted to move the Party away from their 'tax and spend' posture under Charles Kennedy and Menzies Campbell,[32] and in its place 'reclaim' economic liberalism. Laws called 'for the Party to draw on its economic liberal heritage to address public service delivery, introducing more choice, competition and consumer power'.[33] Kennedy, firmly in the 'progressive' tradition of liberalism, described the neo-classical liberalism of *The Orange Book* as 'hard-headed'.[34] Many of the proposals found in *The Orange Book* are included in the Coalition programme, the central of which are: a determination to implement a lower and flatter taxation system; liberalise the economy and dismantle trade barriers; radically reform the health service to introduce greater choice; and implement a new funded pensions settlement.[35] Indeed, Clegg indicated in the months leading up to the General Election of 2010, that he was inspired by Thatcher's legacy of tax cuts and smaller government instincts, claiming that he'd cut the structural deficit 'purely' through 'spending cuts'.[36] Indeed, Richard Reeves argued that Cleggism was the only path to 'true liberalism' insofar as it could be 'open, internationalist, economically radical, green, [and] obsessed with opportunity', but it avoided 'any return to social democracy liberalism'.[37]

---

[32] Leader of the Liberal Democrats from 2006-07.

[33] D. Brack, 'The Liberal Democrats and the Role of the State', In *British Party Politics and Ideology After New Labour*, 181.

[34] C. Kennedy. 2004. 'Foreword', In *The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism*, edited by P. Marshall and D. Laws. London: Profile Books, xiii.

[35] *Our Programme for Government*, 9, 24, 26, 30. See Laws, 'The Orange Book: Eight Years On', 31-35. Paul Marshall, the books co-editor, later regretted *The Orange Book's* oversight of market failure. T. Jones. 2011. *The Revival of British Liberalism: From Grimond to Clegg*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 220.

[36] F. Nelson. 2010. 'Clegg: Heir to Thatcher', *The Spectator*, 10 March. Clegg identified New Labour with 'Fabian centralism'. See N. Clegg. 2009. *The Liberal Moment*. London: Demos.

[37] See R. Reeves. 2012. *A Liberal Inside*. London: Demos

Did Orange Book Liberalism have a crucial ideological role to play in making the Coalition possible? Numerous commentators, such as Richard Reeves, Paul Kelly and Beech, have suggested that the Coalition marks a matrimony of liberalisms.[38] From this view, it is Cameron's Conservative accommodation to liberalism that made the Coalition possible because of the degree of liberal ideology inbuilt into the Conservative Party.[39] Any allusion to contemporary Conservative ideas such as Red Toryism, according to Kelly, were merely synthetic and presentational in much the same way, erroneously, that New Labour's flirtation with communitarianism was presented as being merely presentational.[40] The Coalition is summed up, for Reeves, Kelly and Beech, in the epithet, *Orange Book Conservatism*, 'in which differences between liberals and conservatives are differences of degree rather than kind - as an attempt to accommodate conservatism to a more socially liberal society'.[41] Beech boldly claimed that liberalism is back '*en vogue* and restored to a leading position in the ideological discussions of British politics'.[42] Further, Beech contends that 'Cameron's neoliberal credentials have certainly come to the fore and in his partnership with Clegg and other liberals from the Manchester tradition, a robust liberal perspective has once again surfaced in the policies of the British centre-

---

[38] Ibid, P. Kelly. 2010. *Orange Book Conservatism - on the relationship between Conservatism and Liberalism*. Unpublished paper; Kelly, 'Red or Orange', 22-34; Beech, 'A Tale of Two Liberalisms', 267-279.

[39] There are a host of British politics and ideology specialists who think Conservatism has been ideologically displaced by liberalism. Lee argued that twentieth century British politics was an ideological fight between Left and Right for who could express the most authentic form of liberalism. Others, like Garnett, argue that Conservatism was hollowed out by economic liberalism. Lee, 'We Are All in This Together', 3-23; M. Garnett. 2003. 'A question of definition? Ideology and the Conservative Party', In *The Conservatives in Crisis*, 125-145.

[40] For a passionate defence against this perspective, see S. Hale. 2006. *Blair's Community: Communitarian Thought and New Labour*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

[41] Kelly, *Orange Book Conservatism*; For the opposite view see R. Muir. 2010. 'Coalition: A New Era in British Politics', *Public Policy Research* 17 (1): 17-22.

[42] Beech, 'A Tale of Two Liberalisms', 278.

right'.[43] Thus, Conservatism is as much an ideological outsider as social democracy. Indeed, Conservatism's ideological adjustments throughout the 1990s and especially the changes wrought by Cameron, namely (1) the belief in the need to *renew* civil society; (2) the insufficiency of neoliberalism and (3) the decontestation of state retrenchment as *contingent* and/or *desirable* in economic affairs and *liberal* in *some* social affairs was an essential precondition for the formation of the Coalition. Lee argues that, 'there was little that Cameron [and]...Osborne or the ranks of the quintessentially Thatcherite MPs populating the contemporary Conservative Party might have taken issue with' in *The Orange Book*.[44] Clegg's liberalism developed an increasingly anti-statist stance, shifting the Party to the Right so as to ideologically tesselate with the Conservatives. Simultaneously, Clegg distanced his Party from its twenty-five year embrace of social democracy and past connections with the Labour Party. As a consequence, this, *inter alia*, made a political partnership possible with the Conservatives. Nevertheless, unlike contemporary Conservatism, it remains difficult to articulate a distinctive Liberal Democrat ideology, especially now in Coalition where Conservative ideas dominate. The diversity of views within the Liberal Democrats is especially wide between the free-market Orange Book Liberals and social democratic liberals. This ideological pluralism demonstrates, for some commentators, tolerance and inclusiveness but hardly ideological coherence.[45] One Liberal Democrat minister in the Coalition Government lamented, 'Ideas

---

[43] Ibid.

[44] Lee, 'We Are All in This Together', 8.

[45] Jackie Ballard quoted in Leach, *Political Ideology in Britain*, 51.

have become a real problem for us...[w]e need to be thinking of new things, but there is a real dearth'.[46]

4. Freedom, Fairness and Responsibility: The Conceptual Commitments of the Coalition

The formation of the Coalition with the Conservatives, for the Liberal Democrats, in part, is attributable to the mutual ideological priorities of the Cameronites and the Orange Book Liberals. The Coalition created a safe Commons majority for Cameron; it also neutralised the Right-wing of the Conservative Party, and averted criticism of the desultory 2010 election campaign.[47] It would also reassure financial markets. As the cuts came and reduction of the deficit gathered momentum, the Tories would embroil the Liberal Democrats into any electoral backlash. Common ground on education reform, creating a low-carbon economy, reform of the political system, decentralising power, protecting civil liberties, abolishing plans for ID cards and so forth made coalition formation possible. There was however, important 'red line issues'. Cameron conceded on bringing a referendum bill forward for a national vote on the AV system. On tax, the Tories agreed to move towards the Liberal Democrats' objective of lifting earnings up to £10,000 out of income tax. The Conservatives' plans to increase the inheritance tax threshold were shelved and the Liberal Democrat proposals for a 'mansion tax' was scrapped. *Nevertheless, a significant proportion of the policy objectives*

---

[46] M. Savage. 2012. ''Danny has gone native': Lib Dems fear their No 2 is Treasury turncoat', *The Times*, 10 March.

[47] M. Ashcroft. 2010. *Minority Verdict: The Conservative Party, the voters and the 2010 election*. London: Biteback; D. Seawright. 2012. 'The Conservative Election Campaign', In *Cameron and the Conservatives*, 32-43.

and proposals are Conservative and the underlying motivations are derived from the Conservative Party more so than the Liberal Democrats.[48]

The Coalition has an abiding commitment to three overriding concepts - freedom, fairness and responsibility. 'Freedom, fairness, responsibility', Cameron argues, 'are the values that drive' the Coalition.[49] Nevertheless, without the methodological work of decontestation, these concepts are too generic to have any exact meaning as they, along with other concepts, are the *lingua franca* of politics. Employing Freeden's methods of ideological investigation, the chapter seeks to unearth the decontestation and particular conception of each of these concepts: namely, is the Coalition following liberal or Conservative decontestations of these concepts? The dynamic through which these concepts can be better understood is through the Coalition Government's rhetoric and action on the relationships, and apportioned values, between the state, the market and civil society. Policy, in both rhetoric and action, gives expression to ideology, or at least policy is periphery giving expression to core and adjacent concepts in an ideology.

a. Fairness

Fairness is decontested as social mobility with the focus weighted on outcomes and results. Social democratic liberals have drawn on John Rawls's idea of the 'difference principle', which is one of the two principles of 'justice as fairness': 'Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that...they are to be of the

---

[48] See T. Bale. 2011. 'I *don't* Agree with Nick: Retrodicting the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition', *Political Quarterly* 82 (2): 244-250; Hazell and Yong, *The Politics of Coalition*', 213-224. For a contrary view, see T. Quinn, J. Bara and J. Bartle. 2011. 'The UK Coalition Agreement of 2010: Who Won?' *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 21 (2): 295-312.

[49] Cameron, 'We must tackle Britain's massive deficit and growing debt'.

greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society'.[50] Conservatives, and more market-oriented Liberals are suspicious of the Rawlsian, social democratic conception of fairness, because it involves a level of redistribution, and a provision-based role for the state. Fairness, in Coalition discourses, is connected to desert.[51] Cameron argued that, 'Fairness means giving people what they deserve - and what people deserve depends on how they behave'.[52] Nevertheless, the Coalition pays lip service to the Rawlsian notion that a 'strong and just society is how it looks after the least advantaged'.[53] The Coalition is against the idea that only the state can guarantee fairness; there is a role for business, social enterprises, voluntary organisations, individuals and families in building a fairer society. The Coalition, especially Conservative elements of the Coalition, accuse the Labour Party of conceptualising the state as the only guarantor of fairness. The Coalition Government's anti-statism is evinced in its goal for greater fairness achieved through civil society, which, for the Coalition, provides better solutions than the 'top-down', 'bureaucratic' state.[54] There is however, a rejection of J. K. Galbraith's criticism of the 'private opulence and public squalor' mentality towards the private and public sectors respectively.[55]

The Coalition has effectively abandoned equality of opportunity and endorsed 'social mobility' as a replacement. Alex Nunn has suggested that both

---

[50] J. Rawls. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 83.

[51] See S. Scheffler. 2000. 'Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory', *California Law Review* 88 (3): 965-990.

[52] Cameron, 'Conference Speech of 2010'.

[53] *Built to Last: The Aims and Values of the Conservative Party*. 2006. London: Conservative Party, 5. S. Žižek. 2009. *Violence*. London: Profile Books, 75.

[54] D. Cameron. 2012. 'Brick by brick, we're tearing down the big state', *The Daily Telegraph*, 28 March.

[55] J. K. Galbraith. 1962. *The Affluent Society*. London: Penguin, 191.

New Labour and the Coalition use social mobility as a way of referring to social justice without questioning central and key aspects of the neoliberal political economy. However, for Nunn, the Coalition's conception of social mobility is narrower.[56] There is a rejection not of equality *per se* but a rejection of the dominant mode of thinking about equality in the New Labour era. It is a reversion to a more Thatcherite understanding of equality; that of formal equality. Political and civic rights are guaranteed but social rights or 'entitlements' are provisional and therefore eradicable: 'We believe that everyone has the right to be unequal'.[57] Nevertheless, the language of the Coalition by talking about 'social mobility' is much more soothing than the Thatcherite rhetoric of the entrepreneurial, market society. In content however, it differs very little. Nevertheless, the Coalition, especially the Conservative side of the Coalition, recognised the social divisiveness of the Thatcher Governments' attitudes towards the growth of child poverty and widening inequalities. Cameron came to argue that the Conservatives would be wrong to reject the concept of 'relative poverty'.[58] Nevertheless, like the Thatcher Governments, it has restored the Victorian attitude towards poverty and behaviour between the 'deserving' and the 'undeserving' in the area of welfare.

In Opposition, Cameron talked about using 'conservative means to achieve progressive ends'.[59] The ends of fairness for the Coalition are abolishing poverty and creating more opportunity by abolishing obstacles and barriers to social mobility. The means include decentralising power to individuals, communities and civic institutions; creating frameworks rather than rules; influencing

---

[56] A. Nunn. 2012. 'The political economy of competitiveness and social mobility', *British Politics* 7 (2): 86-110.

[57] M. Thatcher. 1975. 'Conference Speech', 10 October.

[58] Cameron, 'Tackling Poverty is a Social Responsibility'.

[59] Cameron, 'Making progressive conservatism a reality'.

behaviour rather than issuing diktats; designing smart incentives rather than imposing regulations. This all amounts to what Cameronites called the 'post-bureaucratic age'.[60] Families and civil society are strengthened when the state is withdrawn.[61] Another feature is 'fiscal responsibility'. Fairness is not about downward economic redistribution but about 'getting out what they put in'. Fairness is understood as just desert. The prevailing conception of fairness, for the Coalition, is about the link and network between merit and reward. In Cameronism, for example, the benefit cap of £26,000 for families on welfare is a 'basic issue of fairness', as much as raising the personal allowance on the first £10,000 of earnings is about fairness. Fairness allows the Coalition balance in its discourse with talk of austerity. Indeed, this decontestation of fairness is wedded to a decontestation of responsibility as economic discipline.

b. Responsibility

In Cameron's founding document, indicating Conservative Party 'renewal', he promised a 'responsibility revolution'.[62] On entering government, responsibility was one of the core concepts of the Coalition Government. Responsibility is decontested principally as discipline applied through market mechanisms. 'Social responsibility' was the leitmotif and even a contender for core concept in early Cameronism.[63] It was certainly a *leitmotif* of the Conservative's statement of aims under Cameron, *Built to Last*, stressing personal, professional, corporate and civic

---

[60] Cameron, 'A new politics: The post-bureaucratic age'.

[61] D. Cameron. Speech on Families, 18 August 2014.

[62] D. Cameron, 'Foreword', In *Built to Last*, 2.

[63] Cameron, *Social Responsibility: The Big Idea for Britain's Future*.

responsibility.[64] However, the Coalition's conception of responsibility has taken on a particular conception and decontestation. Coalition reforms attack monopoly provision of services and advocate a trimming of the social democratic excesses of the New Labour 'social investment state'.[65] The attack on standarisation and universal provision of public services, accompanied by the Coalition's overarching anti-statism, are illustrations of the Coalition decontestation of responsibility.

Cameron suggested that the two routes, in addition to austerity, to the *Big Society in practice* are public service modernisation and social responsibility.[66] The two are mutually reinforcing. The most lucid and articulate outline of this conception of responsibility, as applied to public service reform, is the *Open Public Services White Paper 2011* and its annual updates.[67] Indeed, Mark Easton, thought the 2011 *Open Public Services White Paper* amounted to an 'unveiling of a convincing definition of Cameronism'.[68] Much of this comes out of Blond's *ResPublica* report on public services, in which he advocates 'community right-to-buy' and shared, worker-ownership stakeholding.[69] The White Paper describes a division of public services into three groups, with delegated levels of 'responsibility': (1) individual services such as school places and hospital beds, with the emphasis on responsibility as individual choice; (2), community services such as libraries, museums and community centres, with the emphasis on

---

[64] See *Built to Last*.

[65] Giddens, *The Third Way,* 99-128.

[66] Cameron, 'Building a bigger, strong society'.

[67] *Open Public Services: White Paper*. 2011. London: Cabinet Office; *Open Public Services 2012*. 2012. London: Cabinet Office; *Open Public Services 2013*. 2013. London: Cabinet Office.

[68] M. Easton. 2011. 'Introducing Cameronism', *BBC News*. 11 July.

[69] See P. Blond. 2009. *The Ownership State: Restoring excellence, innovation and ethos in the public services*. London: ResPublica, NESTA; Interview with Blond.

responsibility as promoting community engagement and promoting neighbourliness; and (3) state functions such as drug services, prisoner rehabilitation, work programme and the benefits system, with the emphasis on responsibility as withdrawing state provision and 'commissioned-services' through competitive tendering, contracting-out and privatisation.[70] This tripartite approach to public services offers a distinctive Cameronite perspective on the role of the state, the individual and markets. It marks a general shift away from the state, following on from Thatcherism and New Labour, to markets and non-statist institutions.

To understand this decontestation of responsibility, the employment of 'double coding', words which say one thing, mean another is and conceal a third, is worthwhile. One of the overarching aims of the Coalition is to build a 'stronger society' by creating a 'smaller state'. While for some, a smaller state is equated with greater freedom and personal responsibility, Marxist insights have evinced that 'rolling back the frontiers' of the state and replacing it with a spectrum of non-statist, market institutions introduces a discipline that is more economic-centric. Therefore, neoliberal market economics is not laissez-faire, but an instrument of discipline applying market methods to wider areas of society.

This decontestation of responsibility is demonstrable further in the case of welfare reform and the continued attack on welfare dependency. *Our Programme for Government* pledged that the Government would 'encourage responsibility and fairness in the welfare system...providing help for those who cannot work, training an targeted support for those looking for work, but *sanctions* for those

[70] Letwin, 'Speech on the Role of the State'.

who turn down reasonable offers of work or training'.[71] Examples of responsibility decontested as discipline through bringing individuals closer to the realities of the market place in welfare reform include the scrapping of the New Deal; cutting the period between claims for JSA and referrals to welfare-to-work programmes; payment-by-results contracts for welfare-to-work providers like A4e; greater conditionality on those on welfare to take work and employment; the reassessment of incapacity benefit claimants, etc. The emphasis on the importance of work is most evident in the Coalition's desire to implement Duncan Smith's 'universal credit', which is a merger of out-of-work benefits and tax credits, and would operate under a single set of entitlements. The universal credit would take away income support at a more gradual rate as an individual found work and started to earn more. Under the Coalition, the conception and decontestation of responsibility has been tied to the discipline of the marketplace. Markets are better at allocating resources, providing incentives, and generating jobs. The market forces individuals to be free and enterprising because responsibility is individual and located in communities. In welfare, as discussed, Duncan Smith and the Coalition have proposed significantly tougher rules for claiming social security. The conditionality of the benefits system would increase, with sanctions for those refusing work three times losing their benefit for three months, and benefits were delinked from RPI to the lower CPI, 'resulting in cuts to living standards for those on social security'.[72]

Responsibility is understood primarily as economic discipline, which encourages, in turn, social responsibility. By rolling back the frontiers of the state

---

[71] *Our Programme for Government*, 23 (emphasis added).

[72] S. Driver, 'Welfare Reform and Coalition Politics in the Age of Austerity', In *The Cameron-Clegg Government*, 110.

and attacking 'Big Government', responsibility will miraculously emerge. The Coalition's intention, for Cameron, is to wed Conservatism to liberalism by identifying 'a strong liberal, civic tradition within Conservative thinking, stretching back from Burke through to Oakeshott, that celebrates the small and local over the big and central'.[73] Big Government had failed and caused irresponsibility and a smaller state will achieve greater responsibility. This is made possible by the austerity programme as a means to achieving a Big Society, of which responsibility is an adjacent concept. The Coalition's anti-statism is explicit across its policy commitments in government.

c. Freedom

Freedom is decontested as a lack of social, political constraint (negative) and the enablement of economic choice (crucially not understood in terms of money or economics). It is a belief in personal freedom and the right of every individual to live their life the way they choose, subject only to constraints on their freedom to act in a way that harms others. It is effectively a Millian conception of freedom.[74] Ideologically, Cameron's Conservatives and Clegg's Orange Book Liberals Democrats share one big idea in relation to freedom; they are both doctrinally suspicious of central government and its capacity to solve Britain's ills.[75] They both favour localism, decentralisation, individual freedom, and accountability. They want to tear down the 'Big State' and all of its paraphernalia: bureaucracy, secrecy and central control. On 19th May 2010, Clegg announced a Great Repeal

[73] Cameron, 'A Liberal Conservative Consensus to Restore Trust in Politics'.

[74] Boles, *Which Way's Up?* xvii.

[75] D. Willetts. 2011. 'There are many ties that bind the Coalition', *The Daily Telegraph*, 9 May.

Bill intended to roll back the 'obsessive lawmaking' of the New Labour years. Clegg spoke of the thousands of new criminal offences created since 1997.[76] The Bill repealed the proposed ID card scheme, the National Identity register, and halted the next generation of biometric passports with the passing of the Identity Documents Act 2010. Freedom therefore is understood and focuses on the social and political encroachments engineered in the New Labour years. It is about the absence of control not the enablement of freedom. Both Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives in opposition held common hostilities to what was perceived to be New Labour's illiberal policies, which had changed the relationship between individuals and the state. In the Coalition programme, this was described as 'the relentless incursion of the state into the lives of individuals'.[77] Curbing the excrescences of the state, the Coalition could allow the Big Society to flourish, 'matched by big citizens'.[78] Cleggism was defined in opposition to 'the discredited politics of big government'.[79] Freedom here is conceived of in terms of individuals rights being threatened and harmed by the growth in the power of the state to intrude on political and civil life. Freeing individuals from these constraints and these incursions is a way of bringing about freedom. Even though no mention of this in the Coalition agreement, a key example of their joint resistance to the over-reach of government is the determination to overturn the excesses of the Blair Government's counter-terrorism legislation (perhaps apart from a pledge to 'urgently review Control Orders', which were replaced with a water-down version calls TPIMs). The Terrorism Act 2006 increased pre-charge

---

[76] N. Clegg. 2010. 'Speech on New Politics', 19 May.

[77] D. Cameron and N. Clegg, 'Foreword', In *Our Programme for Government*, 8

[78] Ibid.

[79] N. Clegg. 2007. 'Leadership Victory Speech', 18 December.

detention for terrorist offences from 14 to 28 days. The Coalition Government has proposed to restore pre-charge detention to 14 days. There are also proposals in the Protection of Freedoms Bill to repeal the powers of police to stop-and-search individuals in specific areas without having show reasonable suspicion. The Bill also, as outlined in the Coalition agreement, curtails and regulates the use of CCTV, regulating biometric data and extending the powers and transparency of Freedom of Information.Protection of Freedoms Bill for example - broadly illustrates a libertarian attitude towards 'liberty' and of course 'freedom', but it is more a document of what the Coalition is against than a vision of the government's priorities on fundamental rights. The Coalition is split on human rights, with Cameron's Conservatives wanting to scrap the Human Rights Act to be replaced with a British Bill of Rights, and Clegg's Liberals remaining resistant to any change.[80] Running alongside this, as illustrated in the 'Great Repeal Bill', is a deregulatory and pro-business aspect. Freedom for the Coalition is classically Thatcherite on economic affairs. The Bill intended to abolish restrictive laws and regulations hampering not only individual freedoms but businesses and their ability to grow. The melding of these two freedoms, social and economic freedom, can be found in Douglas Carswell and Daniel Hannan's economically libertarian and politically-Coalitionist book, *The Plan: Twelve Months to Renew Britain*, which melds open politics and direct democracy with a focus on deregulation and entrepreneurialism.[81]

5. The Language of the Coalition

---

[80] J. Slack. 2011. "I want to scrap the Human Rights Act but Clegg won't let me, says the PM", *Daily Mail*, 3 October.

[81] See D. Carswell and D. Hannan. 2008. *The Plan: Twelve Months to Renew Britain*. London: DirectDemocracy.

Freedom, fairness and responsibility are Conservative decontestations alloyed to liberal language. Cameronite language is institutional, liberal, and instrumental with its emphasis on 'schemes', 'initiatives', and 'incentives'.[82] This can be found in its loadstars: localism, the Big Society, mutuals, payment-by-results, commissioning, and social enterprises. The Coalition Government encourages a 'messy set of arrangements', or 'administrative untidiness',[83] reflecting the diverging wishes of individuals. It envisages a fragmentation of services, with provision from a wide variety of providers and a prominent role from the private sector. This has been decontested as 'chaos' by Boles, and more pejoratively, 'Maoist' by Cable.[84] There is an element of what Freeden identifies as the 'extra-human origins of social order' at work here. The emphasis on a web of semi-independent providers filling the vacuum vacated by the state accords to a 'Tory romanticism of a more organic social order in which individuals contribute to the common good through their own direct efforts'.[85] It is, in short, the little platoons for the twenty-first century. So the language has changed, not the inferences and meanings of the language. The emphasis on the 'enabling' state, and not the provision-based state, has parallels in Thatcherite Conservative rhetoric,[86] and New Labour's Third Way thought-practices. The language is tempered and more liberal however. Thatcherite Conservatism talked in terms of 'contracting-out',

---

[82] 'Cameronism and Its Discontents', *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 March 2014.

[83] Francis Maude quoted in Toynbee and Walker, *Dogma and Disarray*, 6.

[84] See B. Wheeler. 2010. 'Is the coalition really 'Maoist'?' *BBC News*, 21 December; A. Asthana, T. Helm and L. Hall. 2010. 'Welcome to the 'chaos theory' of government', *The Guardian*, 18 December.

[85] Gooby and Stoker, 'The Coalition Programme', 11.

[86] See N. Ridley. 1988. *The Local Right: Enabling not Providing*. London: Centre for Policy Studies.

privatisation, deregulation, and liberalisation. Cameronism envisages a smorgasbord, a rainbow of providers in public services provision and reconstruction of the state minimising the public and superintending over the private, voluntary, mutual and social enterprise providers. Burke's 'little platoons', manifest in the emphasis on localism, meets the liberal instinct for autonomy, liberty and the local. This is analogous to what has been called 'Municipal Toryism' or, more recently, 'Red Toryism'.[87]

Even though the speeches, communications, and policy positions of the Coalition Government available to the student of British politics provides a welter of data and information in which to build a picture up of its ideological character, the pronouncements on the ideology of the Coalition are still somewhat speculative. However, there are some things that are certain. There is no one or singular ideology, not even in a single-majority government, but always multiple ideologies. However, these ideologies fight on the same discursive territory and one decontestation must prevail over the others in order to break the indeterminacy of meaning, which provides a government ideological definition, purpose, goals, objectives and end-oriented milestones. The political ideology of Cameron's *Conservative-led* Coalition Government is a contemporary expression of the Conservative values and principles that the Party has always invested intellectual energy in. Conservative politics at any one time and like any other sort of politics is a product of answers, firm and tentative and contradictory, that flow from questions about perceived trends in British society. In turn, these questions and answers reflect the current values and priorities of Conservatism, and draw upon the common tradition of party vocabulary. Nevertheless, this is less

[87] H. Butcher, et al, *Local Government and Thatcherism*, 47; Blond, *Red Tory*

consistent and more nuanced than Thatcherite Conservatism insofar as Cameron is accommodating to a Party with a rich and mixed ideological heritage of its own, with social democratic elements especially having a historical antagonism to Conservative ideology.[88] Nevertheless, according to Bale and Robin Kolodny, 'From May 2010, then, Britain has had a Coalition government but one that, to all intents and purposes, looks, sounds and behaves like a Conservative administration, and this is unlikely to change'.[89] This Conservative orthodox behaviour was first adverted by the Conservatives' promotion of austerity in late 2008. In effect, the state will do less more quickly, which will disproportionately affect the poorest. Bale and Paul Webb argue that, 'The program as a whole then looks very much like an attempt to take up where Thatcher and Major left off rather than the more 'touchy-feely' and centrist 'one nation' Conservatism that Cameron first stressed when he took over in 2005'.[90] In the direct aftermath of Cameron's leadership victory, Cameron did everything he could to personally embody change, modernisation, and move the Conservatives to the 'centre ground' of British politics. In doing so, he evoked his Party's Disraelian commitment to 'One Nation' politics and shunned the Thatcherite policies of the 1980s that were perceived to divide the country, which distinctively included Cameron's apology for the Thatcher Government's approach to the African National Congress during the apartheid era in South Africa,[91] and issuing a formal apology for his Party's introduction of section 28 of the Local Government Act

---

[88] See K. Hickson ed. 2009. *The Political Thought of the Liberals and Liberal Democrats since 1945*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

[89] T. Bale and R. Kolodny, 'Divided in Victory? The Conservatives and the Republicans', In *The Legacy of the Crash*, 115.

[90] T. Bale and P. Webb. 2011. 'The Conservative Party', In *Britain at the Polls 2010*, edited by N. Allen and J. Bartle. London: SAGE, 52.

[91] N. Temko. 2006. 'Cameron: we got it wrong on apartheid', *The Observer*, 27 August.

1988, which made it illegal for local authorities to 'promote' homosexuality.[92] Nevertheless, Cameron claimed early on in his leadership of the Party that the Tories had 'won the battle of ideas' in the 1980s, New Labour had accepted this, and it was for Cameronite Conservatives to take comfort in that victory whilst adjusting to a changed social and political culture. The real crisis for Conservatism and the Conservative Party therefore was that, 'We [the Conservative Party] did not know how to deal with our own victory in the battle of ideas'.[93] New Labour, from this perspective, had merely adjusted the language of the Conservative programme of government in the 1980s and 1990s. With hindsight, the Cameronites found much to complain about in the macroeconomic management of the economy under Blair and Brown, but at the time, before the run on Northern Rock in 2007 and the collapse of Lehmann Brothers in 2008, they pledged to 'share the proceeds' of growth' between tax cuts and public spending, admittedly with greater stress on the former. Therefore, the 'Blair agenda' had a not dissimilar objective to the Thatcher and Major Governments, even though there was a tangible move Leftwards on the Centre ground under New Labour. Cameron *ostensibly* wants to revive parts of that agenda after the *perceived* aberration of the social democracy and neo-Keynesianism of the Brown Government. The Cameronite project before the financial crisis was focused on social issues and the ''socio-centric' paradigm' with a focus on general well being,[94] whereas as post-Lehmann Cameronism, necessarily, had to enjoin this focus with a concern economic renewal too. Cameronism, in government, is having to purportedly 'fix' both the social and economic realms.

---

[92] N. Watt. 2009. 'David Cameron apologises to gay people for section 28', *The Guardian*, 2 July.

[93] Cameron, 'Modern Conservatism'.

[94] Letwin, 'Cameron Conservatism'.

6. The Big Society: The Coalition's Core Concept

The concepts of freedom, fairness and responsibility can all be understood better in relation to the Cameronite/Coalition core concept, the Big Society. Even though the Big Society is treated to an detailed analysis in chapter four, this chapter aims to consider the Big Society in relation to the language of the Coalition Government and not just in relation to austerity.[95] The concept of the Big Society, as its leading theorist and exponent argued, is 'at the heart of their programme for government'.[96] Cameron has placed the Big Society at the centre of his political agenda and it occupies a central place in the Coalition Government. Cameron's inclusion of the Big Society at the epicentre of the Coalition's policy programme and ideology was not inevitable. There remains significant anxieties about the Big Society, partly because of the health of the civil society in the environment of public spending cuts, even though the latter is Cameronism's purported route to the creation of the Big Society, and the extent to which the public will be willing to participate in Big Society initiatives.[97] The Conservatives nevertheless made the Big Society a key part of their 2010 General Election manifesto. The manifesto declared that the, 'Big Society runs consistently through our policy programme. Our plans to reform public services, mend our broken society, and rebuild trust in politics are all part of our Big Society agenda'.[98] The Big Society is a bottom-up Conservative mirror-image of New Labour's top-down approach to

---

[95] See chapter four for account of, and relationship between, the Big Society and austerity.

[96] Norman, *The Big Society*, 3.

[97] Ibid, 403-424.

[98] *Invitation to Join the Government of Britain*, 37.

government. The essence of this distinctive ideological position of Cameronism and the Coalition Government is a scepticism of the central state. Both Coalition parties accuse New Labour of dangerously conflating civil society and the central state. The Big Society gives the Coalition, and especially the Conservatives given their historical association with austerity and public expenditure reductions, something additional to the character of the government other than cuts. Cameron posed and then answered, 'So is this government about more than cuts? Yes. Is the Big Society some optional extra? No'.[99] According to Martin Smith, 'The 'big society' concept was part of the Conservatives' overall economic strategy. It was a way of trying to ensure the public good whilst reducing the size of the state'.[100] Cameron, in his Hugo Young lecture of November 2009, where he first adverted the 'Big Society', gave his critique of government:

> 'The size, scope and role of government in Britain has reached a point where it is now inhibiting, not advancing, the progressive aims of reducing poverty, fighting inequality and increasing general well-being. Indeed there is a worrying paradox that because of its effect on personal and social responsibility, the recent growth of the state has promoted not social solidarity but selfishness and individualism'.[101]

Small government *ipso facto* is a necessary but not sufficient precursor to bring about a healthier, fuller and bigger society for Cameronite Conservatives. In Cameron's words, 'We need to use the state to remake society'.[102] Therefore, the state is needed in order to carefully withdraw itself from society. There are three

---

[99] Cameron, 'Building a bigger, stronger society'.

[100] Smith, 'From Big Government to Big Society', 829.

[101] Cameron, 'Hugo Young Lecture'.

[102] Ibid.

discernible Cameronite uses of the Big Society: the first is that social enterprises, community groups and bands of private individuals will step up to influence, cajole and provide services in their locality; the second is a public sector that is 'revived' and diversified through the infusion of new providers. The provision of health, social care and education will be opened up to non-state actors;[103] and the third is less tangible. It is the attempt by government to create new social norms, buttressed by the insights of behavioural economics, by moral suasion. The Big Society will only work, as it was surely meant to, in opposition to the idea of the Big State. The purpose of 'empowering' individuals and communities is to reduce the size and scope of the state and government. A reduction in bureaucracy, spending and tax naturally and logically follows. Despite this, the Big Society has received swathes of hostility in the Conservative Party from Cabinet ministers right down to Conservative Party members. Ministers have found the Letwinian, Hiltonian approach difficult to elucidate or connect to public policy initiatives, objectives and achievements. One Conservative MP spoke for many of the backbenchers, 'The 'Big Society' is bollocks. It is boiled vegetables that have been cooked for three minutes too long. It tastes of nothing. What is it?'[104] Conservative ideologues like Scruton are just as dismissive and critical: 'It's words, isn't it....it is scarcely a mark of intellectual profundity to have noticed that our society is big'.[105] Miliband argued that Labour had 'to take back that term 'big society' back off David Cameron'.[106] Nevertheless, when Miliband was Energy

---

[103] The opening up of the NHS to 'any willing provider' in the original draft of the Health and Social Care Bill 2011 amounted to 'liberal anarchism', according to Tony Travers. T. Travers. 2010. 'Cameron's shoving back of the state', *The Financial Times*, 17 August.

[104] N. Watt. 2010. 'There's no such thing as 'big society', senior Tories tell Cameron', *The Guardian*, 21 April 2010.

[105] A. Edemariam. 2010. 'Roger Scruton: A pessimist's guide to life', *The Guardian*, 5 June.

[106] E. Miliband. 2010. 'Speech to Labour's to National Policy Forum', 27 November.

Secretary in the Brown Government he thought Cameron's use of the Big Society and its attendant meanings was a 'con'; for Miliband, 'it's the same old idea of laissez-faire, self-help that we saw in the 1980s, in new clothes'.[107] The Big Society, for many on the Left, is a masked desire for a small state and a safety-net welfare regime. It is Thatcherism with a smile on its face.[108] In reality, the Big Society is more an articulation of a core Conservative idea and commitment; all that is different is the language. It follows Oakeshott's 'civic association'; Churchill's 'Ownership Society', Heath's 'Opportunity Society', Thatcher's 'Enterprise Society', and Major's 'active citizenship' agenda. Norman has done much to give the Big Society conceptual and historical anchorage. The Big Society, for Norman, highlights the importance of virtue and the 'connected society', which is contrasted with New Labour's technocratic utilitarian modernism. The Conservatives use of the Big Society is an appeal to continuity and cultural familiarity, which, for Norman, is in accordance with the pro-social, anti-statist, Conservative tradition.[109] The Big Society allows the Coalition to criticise, through the mirror-image mechanism of Conservative ideology, Labour's statist, centralising tendencies and recast notions of community, personal freedom and self-reliance as *exclusive* to Conservatism.

This pro-social, anti-statism Toryism is played out through a discourse of depoliticisation or 'anti-politics',[110] which is key component of the Big Society and gives a critical perspective on Coalition ideology, and its programme for

---

[107] E. Miliband. 2010. 'Only New Labour offers you a genuine big society', *The Observer*, 22 April.

[108] T. Bale. 2010. 'Thatcher's Ideology is behind this Spending Review', *The Guardian*, 22 October.

[109] See Norman, *The Big Society*.

[110] Müller, *Contesting Democracy*, 202-242.

government. In accordance with Oakeshott's conception of the 'civic association', the Coalition Government sees the state as setting procedural not substantive rules; they will set frameworks within which people can live, not targets for them to achieve. It is an exquisite case of what Vaclav Havel called 'antipolitical politics', which refers to the attempt to renew politics by creating a culture in we ask not what we can get from the system, government or the state but what we ought to do for ourselves and others by creating a network of meaning. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have called this the 'enclosure of the commons'.[111] For example, Cameron's 'broken Britain' observation and moral crusade: vulnerable individuals should look to themselves first. Social problems are not structural or intrinsic to a system of distribution, production and exchange, but the byproduct of choices.[112] The state should swap moral neutrality for exhortation and moral suasion but economic and social inequalities were not the concern of the state. Cameronites argue that New Labour shirked their responsibilities in failing to talk about public morality and the condemnation of certain patterns of behaviour. The way, therefore, to fix 'broken Britain' is to distribute and give power way to citizens. It is Cameron's DIY revolution in which public services are handed over to private citizens. There is a depoliticisation of the provision of goods and services, which is seen as an improvement by the Coalition as market actors cater better to their consumers than politicians, bureaucrats or lobbyists. This is being implemented across all areas of public policy under the Coalition Government: Gove's reforms of England's state schools; the outsourcing of police functions; the opening of planning on behalf of developers; the abolition of Regional Spatial

---

[111] See M. Hardt and A. Negri. 2009. *Commonwealth*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

[112] Example in F. Elliott and P. Riddell. 2008. 'Help yourselves, Cameron tells the fat and the poor', *The Times*, 8 July.

Strategies; the restriction of state welfare benefits; the abandonment by the state of families renting from private landlords; the Health and Social Care bill permitting private companies to have a greater involvement in services, managerial processes and infrastructure; the removal of environmental controls on behalf of industry; the privatisations of Search and Rescue (SAR); the uranium-enrichment group Urenco; Remploy; the Law Courts; the East Coast railway; tranches of the banking system; part-privatisations of probation services and the Royal Mail; the proposed privatisations of Eurostar, the Student Loans Company and the Land Registry, and so forth. How does depoliticisation link itself to the Big Society? Ewen Green argued that the core concept of British Conservatism is not, as many assume, found in its attitudes to the role and size of the state but 'the primary focus should instead be on Conservative views of the effectiveness of agencies of the civil society'.[113] Civil society and its strengthening implies a withdrawal of the state from areas of life Conservatives feel the state has no place to be. The fundamental problem, therefore, for contemporary Conservatives is that increased state intervention politicises areas of social life which should have remained simply 'social', not political. 'Withdrawing the State', for Green, 'meant in effect, withdrawing 'politics' from aspects and walks of life it should never have entered'.[114] This, in turn, was to create space for agencies of civil society to flourish. The Big Society therefore gives realisation to the meso-core concept of Conservatism: a belief in the limited role of politics.

7. Conclusion: The Two Dimensions of Cameronism

---

[113] Green, *Ideologies of Conservatism*, 241.

[114] Ibid, 278.

Cameron and Clegg are masters of political and ideological ambiguity. This is a byproduct of the supposed post-ideological nature of contemporary Western politics. As far back as Daniel Bell and Giovanni Sartori in the 1960s, we allegedly have witnessed the 'end of ideology' (an observation itself tinged with ideology) and for Francis Fukuyama, with the advent of the death of the Soviet Union, the 'end of history' was constituted by the triumph of Western liberal democracy. Indeed, measured against this association between ideologies and 'grand narratives', perhaps ideologies are indeed dead. However, we must not abandon ideology and the category of the concept in analysis of politics, but instead look for ideology in more subtle and more fragmented manifestations. 'The age in which we live', Freeden argues, 'far from being post-ideological, is one of ideological experimentation, of the resurrection of past principles combined with new attitudes'.[115] Nevertheless, self-effacement and denial of ideological properties is the ideology of today. This denial is the hallmark of ideology at work for thinkers like Slavoj Žižek. Žižek argues that, 'The contemporary era constantly proclaims itself as post-ideological, but this denial of ideology only provides the ultimate proof that we are more than ever embedded in ideology'.[116] Cameron's mantra is quintessentially ideologically 'post-ideological' with his emphasis on pragmatic change. Bale and Webb write, 'Ideology was out and pragmatism very much in. Thatcherism was not so much apologised for as simply turned into history'.[117] This is nothing remarkable for

---

[115] Freeden, 'The Ideology of New Labour', 43. Also see Freeden, 'Confronting the chimera of a 'post-ideological' age', 247-262.

[116] S. Žižek. 2009. *First As Tragedy, Then As Farce*. London: Verso, 37.

[117] Bale and Webb, 'The Conservative Party', 46.

British Conservatives who have a whole tradition of rejecting ideology and claiming their politics is pragmatic, doctrine, disposition, habit, or practice. The exception to this ideological blindness in British politics was the period of Conservatism spearheaded by Thatcher. The exceptionalism of Thatcherism, if there was anything indeed exceptional about Thatcherism, was the degree of ideological self-consciousness of her Conservatism. Cameron, like the Coalition Government, precariously straddles the crusading aspects of Thatcherite Toryism, tempered by the Liberal Democrats' residual social democratic leanings, and a pre-Thatcherite Conservative rhetoric that invokes One-Nation principles.

Essentially, the Coalition Government represents not two parties, but the two dimensions of Cameronism. The first dimension, which refers to the 'decontamination' of Conservatism, and the return to so-called 'One Nation' values, lives alongside the increasingly dominant second dimension, which refers to the reintroduction, although in a more measured language, of the neoliberal themes and policies of the Thatcher era, especially on public service reform, 'inhumane' welfare reform such as the 'bedroom tax', tax cuts for the wealthy, deficit reduction, and the emphasis on the importance of non-state institutions. Sealing and combining together concepts, values and ideas that were hitherto seen as contradictory and in conflict with one another. Nevertheless, the core concept of the Coalition Government, the Big Society, and its purported concepts, freedom, fairness and responsibility, are *decontested Conservative concepts finessed in a liberal language of inclusion and tolerance.* By 2015, the Coalition Government will have created a Britain that looks more like the United States. According to Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 'On current projections public expenditure in the United Kingdom appears likely to fall below that in the United

States by 2014 or 2015. This is simply unprecedented and, if fully implemented, indicates a radical new departure in British policy directions'.[118] There will, as a corollary, be a smaller state; a welfare system that is little more than what Richard Titmuss called 'residual welfare',[119] with individuals relying far more heavily on the private market and their families; a more deregulated and flexible labour market and a taxation system that will inevitably lead to an increase in inequality between the highest and the lowest income groups. Liberal Democrats join the Conservatives to further the project started under Thatcher: to move Britain towards the market society, individualism and private enterprise. They are on a joint mission to roll back the state and free the individual in the private market and civil society. In short, the Coalition is more 'muscular', or Conservative, than liberal. Or, more specifically, it is liberal Conservatism not Conservative liberalism.[120] Cameron's Conservatives, with the aid of the Liberal Democrats in coalition, are attempting to create a broad-church Centre-Right hegemony in Britain. The success of which depends on a whole range of factors, not least the nature and development of Conservatism as the Coalition progresses. Cameronism is not the only Conservative ideology in town!

---

[118] Gooby and Stoker, 'The Coalition Programme', 6.

[119] R. M. Titmuss. 1974. *Social Policy: An Introduction*. (London: Allen & Unwin, 30-31.

[120] Similar sentiment shared by McAnulla, 'Liberal Conservatism', 181-193.

Part Three: Challenges to Cameronism

Chapter Six

After Cameronism: The New New Right and the Unchaining of Britannia

'Not since the 1970s has there been a group of Tories thinking so hard, with such freedom, about the future of the country'[1]

1. Introduction: A Conservative Coalition

David Cameron in May 2010 tried to disprove Benjamin Disraeli's oft-used quip 'that England does not love coalitions'.[2] In forming the Coalition Government with the Liberal Democrats Cameron had failed to win a majority in such an ostensibly auspicious political climate: an unpopular Labour Government seemingly bereft of ideas[3] managed by a beleaguered and mistrusted leadership; a financial crisis echoing the Wall Street Crash in its severity; the GR of 2008-09, which severely dented the living standards of millions and brought an end to a period of uninterrupted economic growth stretching back to 1993; and a Conservative Party, organisationally, strategically and politically, revived after thirteen years in Opposition. Despite Cameron's failure to secure a majority Conservative government, the Conservative Party emerged as the largest Party in a hung parliament and eventually formed a coalition with the Liberal Democrats.

---

[1] J. Forsyth. 2012. 'Next Right', The Spectator, 23 June.

[2] HC Deb. Vol. 123, Col. 1666, 16 December 1852; I. McLean. 2012. ''England Does Not Love Coalitions': The Most Misused Political Quotation in the Book', *Government and Opposition* 47 (1): 3-20.

[3] See M. Beech. 2010. 'A puzzle of ideas and policy: Gordon Brown as prime minister', In *The Brown Government: A Policy Evaluation*, edited by M. Beech and S. Lee. Oxford: Routledge, 4-15.

The Coalition Government has had its, debatable, political accomplishments: welfare reform, education reform, health reform, deficit reduction, and the start of an economic recovery (HM Government, 2013). Its very survival is a mark of its success too. The greatest ideological triumph of the 'Conservative-led' Coalition Government has been the alignment of Tory prescriptions/discourses of the causes, and diagnoses of, the financial crisis with the 'climate of opinion': the successful and politically-resonant 'crisis discourse that has consolidated in Britain in recent years is one of a *crisis of (public) debt* - to which...austerity and deficit reduction is the solution'.[4] The Cameronite Tories and the Orange Book Liberals are united in an attempt to 'modernise' post-Blair, post-'Great Crash' Britain, with an agenda wedding social and moral liberalism to fiscal conservatism. The dual mission of the Coalition has been: (1) a programme of austerity, which is utilised as the means to (2) the ends of the Coalition, a programme of civic revival.

'Coalition' refers to something more than the political bind between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Indeed, the Coalition may have borne political fruit for these two factions of the two coalition parties, but they have disrupted the ideological equilibria and coalitions of the parties themselves. The clearest manifestation of this has been the series of revolts on House of Lords reform, Europe and immigration. Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart have calculated the share of parliamentary votes in which a government MP rebelled: on this measure, every year of the Coalition has seen more revolts than any year of the Major Government in the 1992-1997 period.[5] More detrimentally, Cameronism,

---

[4] Hay, *Failure of Anglo-Liberal Capitalism*, 41.

[5] P. Cowley and M. Stuart. 2012. 'The Coalition's 'wobbly wings': Backbench dissent in the Commons since May 2010', In *The Coalition: Voters, Parties and Institutions*, edited by H. Kassim, C. Clarke and C. Haddon. London: UEA/Institute for Government, 46.

with its qualified neoliberalism and attempt to renew the civic structures and institutions of Britain, was meant to amount to a what Will Hutton described as a 'compact with liberal Enlightenment Britain'.[6] This has been severely challenged and tested as the Coalition has progressed.

The Conservative Party, in line with Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances, is a coalition of different Conservatisms. Conservatism, like all ideologies, is to be understood plurally: there is not *a* Conservatism but Conservatisms. In part, this is the recognition of the pluralisation of ideological distinctiveness; the context-bound responsiveness of Conservatism, and the range of effective decontestations available to it. This chapter analyses, and places into context, the emergence of a new grouping of Conservatism within the Conservative Party coalition. It addresses directly the political thought and ideology of the newest ideological grouping within the Conservative Party: the *New New Right* (NNR hereafter). It is a centrifugal response to the socio-politico-economic events since the financial crisis of 2007-08, which is recognisably Conservative. It is a Conservatism that intends to restore a much fiercer *market fundamentalist* Conservatism, resisting the deemphasis of neoliberalism from all mainstream political parties. Employing Freeden's morphological approach to ideology, in addition to utilising interviews with key members of this group, I interrogate the explicitly post-Cameronite thinking of the NNR drawing on three central features of its thinking: (1) the rejection of the *rhetorical* 'de-neoliberalisation' of British society after the financial crisis of 2007-08; (2) a resistance to 'anti-market socialisation' and a promotion of its obverse - *anti-social marketisation*, (3) and the promotion of a 'thin' conception of social rights,

---

[6] W. Hutton. 2013. 'Does the narrow and regressive Tory party have a death wish?' *The Observer* 24 November (12 June 2014).

which rejects the 'thick' conception of social rights pertaining to 'identity politics'. It concludes with a review of the interaction and conflict between Cameronite Conservatism, and the NNR. The examination of this nascent Conservative grouping is important, not necessarily for its causal effect on the Rightward move of the Conservative Party since 2010, but in its resonant contribution to the chorus of wider Conservative opinion that constitutes: (1) a move away from the pro-social, Big Society Conservative centrism that Cameron adverted between 2006-2010; (2) a growing hostility to what it sees as the de-neoliberalisation of the British political economy combined with (3) an *ostensibly* forward-looking ideological outlook distinct from the 'first generation' of Thatcherites. The ultimate significance of the NNR is impossible to gauge at this early stage. However, when politicians put their names to publications which indicate a distinctive ideological position at variance with the stance of the current leadership, their views are worthy of academic analysis whether or not they come to hold influential positions within the Conservative Party.

2. Mapping Coalition Conservatisms: Old New Right, Cameronism, and the New New Right

There are existing works that deal with the ideological taxonomies or typologies of contemporary Conservatism within the confines of the Conservative Party.[7]

[7] See P. Norton. 1994. 'Factions and Tendencies in the Conservative Party', In *Turning Japanese? Britain with a Permanent Party of Government*, edited by H. Margetts and G. Smyth. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 93-104; D. Baker, A. Gamble and S. Ludlam. 1994. 'Mapping Conservative Fault Lines: Problems of Typology', In *Contemporary Political Studies 1994*, edited by P. Dunleavy and G. Stayner. Exeter: Exeter University Press, 278-298; T. Heppell and M. Hill. 2005. 'Ideological Typologies of Contemporary British Conservatism', *Political Studies Review* 3 (3): 335-355; P. Webb and S. Childs. 2011. 'Wets and Dries Resurgent? Intra-Party Alignments Among Contemporary Conservative Conservative Party Members', *Parliamentary Affairs* 64 (3): 383-402.

Indeed, post-Thatcher, there has been an explosion of different maps of Conservatism: Thatcherites (Dries) vs. One Nation Tories (Wets/Damps); Eurosceptics vs. Pro-Europeans; and the Hague-era 'Mods' vs. 'Rockers'.[8] These extant ideological groupings, albeit important, need updating for the Coalition era. Since the formation of the Coalition, there are have been a variety of identifiable ideological groupings. Paul Webb and Sarah Childs see the potential for the 'revival of the old conflicts between the 'wets' and the 'dries' of the 1980s'.[9] Richard Kelly have separated the Conservative Party into 'pre-Thatcherites', Conservatives whom 'harked back to the 'one nation' Toryism of Macmillan, Baldwin and Disraeli'; 'Thatcherites', 'economic liberalism plus social and constitutional conservatism', and 'post-Thatcherites', a 'new form of conservatism', which 'reflected the peculiar circumstances of the post-Blair era'.[10] The NNR don't fit neatly into either of these ideological encampments. They share with Thatcherites and post-Thatcherites a scepticism of the central state, but their anti-statism is conceptually more consistent. They share with pre-Thatcherites and some Thatcherites a respect for traditional values but, again, their argumentation is different.[11] Finally, their hostility to anti-market socialisation is discordant with pre-Thatcherites and post-Thatcherites. Discontent is not merely confined however, to the traditional Thatcherite Right of the Party therefore. What this reveals is the limited success of the Cameronite variation of Conservatism to persuade the opinions of a significant majority of the Conservative Party.

---

[8] Bale, *Conservative Party*, 119-120.

[9] Webb and Childs, 'Wets and Dries Resurgent? 384.

[10] R. Kelly. 2013. 'Political Parties', In *Politics UK*, edited by B. Jones and P. Norton. London: Routledge, 210-211.

[11] Hayton, *Reconstructing Conservatism?*

Even though there are other ideological groupings within the Conservative Party, since the formation of the Coalition, there are three identifiable, broadly-defined, and at times crossover, ideological collectivities within Cameron's Conservative Party, propounding different, competing conceptions of Conservatism: (1) the *Old New Right* (ONR hereafter) ; (2) *Cameronism*; and (3) the *New New Right*. A brief discussion of the ideological disappearance of *One Nation Conservatism* will also be considered.

The *ONR* is the remnant of an ensemble of ideas, policies and institutions associated with the New Right of the 1970s, '80s and '90s. It is the 'first generation' of Thatcherism. The ONR correlate with the bricolage of ideas associated with Thatcher's 1980s and 1990s generation of New Right Conservatives: a Conservative ideological nexus of economic neoliberals and/or moral neoconservatives. It is a *retro-ideology*: freezing and framing the issues and politics of British politics in the debates of the 1980s. Retro-ideologies synchrony (conceptual field) are kept in aspic: they are not as sensitive to diachrony (historical developments) as Cameronism and the NNR: the former updates Conservatism by using a more 'liberal' discourse on social affairs, and the latter explicitly frames its proposal for *counter-reformist change* in reference to learning 'from the rest of the world'.[12] The core beliefs of the ONR are: the *qualified* neoliberal political economy (i.e. neoliberalism is tempered by patriotic traditionalism in respect of the Constitution and traditional Tory institutions: the British Armed Forces, the Royal Family, and the House of Lords); a belief in the market society (i.e. the spreading of the salience of consumerism and the values of choice and competition into areas of society where the economic presence of the

[12] K. Kwarteng, P. Patel, D. Raab, C. Skidmore, and E. Truss. 2012. *Britannia Unchained: Global Lessons for Growth and Prosperity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1.

state has been furled); *rhetorical* moral authoritarianism; the centralisation of the autonomous decision-making of the central executive; and a reflex hostility to multi-level governance from below (i.e. local government) and above (i.e. European Parliament) the Westminster Parliament.[13] Conservatives associated with the ONR are members of groups that are professed 'keepers of the Thatcherite flame': groups like the *Bruges Group*, *No Turning Back*, *the Cornerstone Group* and the *92 Group*. Conservative MPs affiliated to these groups are Thatcherite stalwarts, some of which are the most rebellious MPs since the formation of Cameron's Coalition in May 2010,[14] like the notable examples of Peter Bone, Bill Cash, Christopher Chope, Philip Hollobone, Gerald Howarth, Edward Leigh, Peter Lilley, David Nuttall and John Redwood.[15] With the exception of John Redwood, all voted against the 2013 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill, and all are sceptical of 'man-made' explanations of climate change; all voted consistently against European integration, against the removal of the hereditary peerage in the House of Lords, and for greater deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation of the British economy. This group is also supported by an 'archipelago' of Thatcherite think-tanks like the Centre for Policy Studies, the Adam Smith Institute, and the Institute for Economic Affairs.[16] These groups, individuals and think-tanks that constitute the ONR, are unreconstructed

---

[13] See chapter two.

[14] Cowley and Stuart, 'The Coalition's 'wobbly wings'', 46.

[15] In a defiant act of rebellion against the Government, Peter Bone, Christopher Chope, Philip Hollobone and David Nutall proposed an 'Alternative Queen's Speech' in June 2013, which proposed forty Bills, including the restoration of national service and capital punishment; the abolition of the Equality Act 2010 and the compulsory payment of the BBC license fee; the deregulation of employment, and to rename the annual bank holiday in late August 'Margaret Thatcher Day'.

[16] See R. Cockett. 1995. *Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931-1983*, London: Fontana; A. Denham. 1996. *Think-Tanks of the New Right*. Aldershot: Dartmouth; A. Denham and M. Garnett. 1998. *British Think-Tanks and the Climate of Opinion.* London: UCL Press; B. Jackson, 'The Think-Tank Archipelago: Thatcherism and Neo-Liberalism', In *Making Thatcher's Britain*, 43-61.

Thatcherites, and in combination they embody the quintessence of Thatcherite Conservatism: the confluence of the free market economy and a strong, authoritarian state.[17] In addition, this group, unlike Cameronism and the NNR, unambiguously support Centre-Right/Right movements that promote and support (quasi)-Thatcherite ideas and policies. The most prominent, relatively-new political grouping in British politics, which in some respects is an ideological addendum of the ONR, is the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).[18] The ONR is ideologically homologous to UKIP. Nigel Farage, UKIP's populist and charismatic leader, insisted that UKIP were 'the true heirs to Thatcher'.[19] Norman Tebbit echoed Farage's sentiments: '[h]ad Thatcher stayed, the need for UKIP would not have arisen'.[20] Not only would Thatcher have voted for 'getting out, out, out' of Europe, according to Farage, a claim supported by her official biographer,[21] but she would of supported a whole raft of UKIP's policies, which are socially, constitutionally, and economically to the Right of Cameron's 'social democratic' Toryism.[22] UKIP has quasi-Thatcherite credentials other than its resistance to pooling sovereignty to the European Union. The 2010 UKIP manifesto, *Empowering the people,* argued for the introduction of a flat tax at

---

[17] See Gamble, *Free Economy and the Strong State*; B. Jackson. 2010 'At the Origins of Neo-Liberalism: The Free Economy and the Strong State, 1930-1947', *The Historical Journal*, 53 (1): 129-151.

[18] For an excellent study of UKIP, see R. Ford and M. Goodwin. 2014. *Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain*. London: Routledge.

[19] N. Farage. 2013. 'Maggie would vote for getting out, out, out', *The Times*, 15 April; This was reinforced by Miliband's quip that Farage was 'more Thatcherite than Thatcher'. E. Miliband. 2014. 'A vote for UKIP would be a vote for the very worst of Thatcherism', *The Mirror*, 30 April. However, Farage, in the hope of catching non-Tory voters, has argued that much like Cameronites, that 'Thatcherism was of its time, 40 years ago, to deal with a specific set of problems'. 'Nigel Farage: 'Thatcherism was of its time'', *BBC News*, 1 June 2014.

[20] T. Helm. 2013. "UKIP would not exist if Thatcher were still Tory leader', says Norman Tebbit', *The Observer*, 28 September.

[21] See Moore, *Margaret Thatcher*.

[22] I. Hardman. 2013. 'No-one does anti-politics stand-up like Nigel Farage. But what about that tax policy?' *The Spectator, Coffee House Blog*, 23 April.

31% and the abolition of Inheritance Tax; the denationalisation of universities and Further Education; the end of 'mass, uncontrolled immigration' with a 'five-year freeze' of any future immigration for permanent settlement; the repeal of the Human Rights Act; 'encourage the creation of new grammar schools'; and sceptical of 'man-made global warming claims'.[23] The ONR, ideologically and organisationally bifurcated between the remnant of unreconstructed Thatcherites in the Conservative Party, and the defectors/disenchanted Tories at the elite-level of UKIP, are critical of Cameronite Conservatism, but largely ineffectual insofar as their retro-ideologies, or 'karaoke Thatcherism',[24] are held back by attitudes discrepant with the liberalisation of British social attitudes regarding sexual orientation, cultural pluralism, multiculturalism, and social liberalism. Furthermore, and more critically, the ONR are 'old' insomuch as they have become ineluctably detached from the political context in which Thatcher's Thatcherism originally made sense. They are nostalgic ideologies of the contemporary Conservative populist Right.[25]

Cameronism is the leading ideological school of Conservatism within the thought-practices of the Coalition Government, which animates the political behaviour of its leading luminaries: Cameron, Osborne, Boles, Hunt, Gove, Willetts, and Letwin. Although the thought-practices of Cameronism are discussed in detail elsewhere,[26] a summary of some of its features help draw essential similarities and differences with the NNR. Cameronism in practice is animated by

---

[23] *UKIP Manifesto: Empowering the People*, Coombes/Imax Design and Print. 2010: 3-6; 8; 10.

[24] d'Ancona, *In It* Together*,* 348.

[25] For an ideological outline, see H. G. Bertz and C. Johnson. 2004. 'Against the current-stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9 (3): 311-327.

[26] See chapters three, four and five.

the *Big Society* and *fiscal austerity*. In the same way as neoliberal economics served as the *means* to the Thatcherite *ends* of narrowing the scope of the political and restoring the 'vigorous virtues'[27] that underpinned the Tory society, the Coalition's fiscal austerity is utilised as the *means* to the Cameronite/Coalition *ends* of building the Big Society. The Big Society is juxtaposed to Big Government in Cameronite discourses: it is presented as a juxtaposition, *zero-sum* game, where society can 'roll forward' if the state is 'rolled back'. The means to rolling back the state is fiscal austerity. Cameronism is quintessentially Conservative insofar as its central guiding thrust is to shrink the size of the state, not in terms of state spending as a proportion of GDP as some Thatcherites have proposed,[28] but in order for the spontaneous order of society and the marketplace to perform freely. With this, Cameronism is able to establish its 'enabling state' or 'framework-based state', which acts as an enabler of individual prosperity in contradistinction to its mirror-image: the 'provision-based' state, which enlarges the state in order to guarantee certain welfare or social citizenship provisions and rights.

Cameronism therefore is a pixilated and more nuanced sub- or micro-ideology of the Conservative family. It is a melange of different political themes, concepts, and narratives communicated in a rich and tradition-bound vocabulary. It is accommodative to Conservative traditions, and is tempered by the inclusion of a liberal social inclusiveness, an extension of both its need to 'decontaminate' and 'detoxify' its 'nasty party' image, and assistance with the ideological cooperation with the Liberal Democrats, on the issues of rights and civil liberties

---

[27] Letwin, *The Anatomy of Thatcherism*, 32-36.

[28] T. Congdon. 2012. 'The case for halving the size of the state', In *The Next Ten Years*, edited by N. Seddon. London: Reform, 116-120.

for minorities, women, gays and the protection of foreign aid for developing countries. Nevertheless, the broader political programme is Conservative: 'muscular liberalism' replaces failed 'state multiculturalism';[29] soft Euroscepticism and a promised referendum on EU membership in 2017; an immigration cap on non-EU immigrants, and a programme of decade-long economic austerity.[30]

Bale contends that Cameron was never looking for a Blair 'Clause IV moment', a symbolic departure from a political party's past ideological commitments.[31] Cameron 'believed that, fundamentally, Tory values were not - as Labour's had been when it stood for socialism via public ownership - out of line with those held by most voters'.[32] In 2006, Cameron claimed that the problem of the 'crisis years'[33] of both Conservatism and the Conservative Party was attributable to not knowing 'how to deal with our victory in that battle of ideas'[34] when New Labour conceded ground on the Thatcherite political economy. Cameron's preoccupation was to help the Party 'come to terms with...[their] own victory in the battle of ideas'.[35] 'Where New Labour was a 'reengineered party' argued Heppell, 'Cameron has merely 'restyled' the Conservatives'.[36] With almost

---

[29] Cameron, 'Munich Speech'.

[30] Indeed, Harris and McCrae argued that 'it would not be surprising if not just 2015 but also 2020 was an 'austerity' election'. J. Harris, and J. McCrae. 2013. *The 2015-16 Spending Round*. London: Institute for Government, 2.

[31] Ibid, 333. T. Bale. 2013. 'David Cameron, 2005-10', In *Leaders of the Opposition: From Churchill to Cameron*, edited by T. Heppell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 231.

[32] Bale, 'David Cameron, 2005-10', 231.

[33] See Garnett and Lynch eds. *The Conservatives in Crisis*.

[34] Cameron, 'Modern Conservatism'.

[35] Ibid.

[36] T. Heppell. 2013. 'The Fall of the Brown Government, 2010', In *How Labour Governments Fall: From Ramsay MacDonald to Gordon Brown*, edited by T. Heppell and K. Theakston. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 163.

four years into the life of the Government, the Cameronites within the Conservative Party have certainly come to terms with its supposed 'victory in the battle of ideas'.

The *NNR* think no such 'victory in the battle of ideas' has taken place however,[37] and are contemptuous of the 'intellectual flabbiness' of the Cameronites for thinking so.[38] Its a view shared elsewhere that Cameronism 'lacks the widespread intellectual and cultural support enjoyed' by Thatcherism and Blairism 'which preceded it'.[39] I provide a cursory overview of the NNR, as a fuller and more comprehensive compartmentalisation and analysis of the ideology of the NNR is the primacy focus of the rest of the chapter. The NNR, even though 'fully supportive of the coalition government', is readably disappointed and discontented with the Cameron generation of Conservatism.[40] The disappointment is first electoral. The Conservative Party, a point belaboured in *After the Coalition*, has not won a General Election since April 1992. The Conservative Party, despite the electorally-fortunate context in which the 2010 General Election was fought, failed to win an overall majority. It is secondly ideological, and it is for ideological reasons that they are disappointed with Cameron's electoral underachievement, in that the Conservatives failed to properly promote 'Tory values'. Election posters with ''I've never voted Tory before...'' in the 2010 election campaign implied that there was something rare and unusual about voting Conservative, as if they were a minority Party unaccustomed to getting a widespread vote. Furthermore, the NNR imply that Cameron, harnessed and

---

[37] Interview with Elizabeth Truss MP, 4 November 2013.

[38] Forsyth, 'Next Right'.

[39] Byrne, et al, 'Understanding Conservative Modernisation', 29-30.

[40] K. Kwarteng, P. Patel, D. Raab, C. Skidmore. and E. Truss. 2011. *After the Coalition: A Conservative Agenda for Britain*. London: Biteback, 14.

straitjacketed by the Liberal Democrats in government, is not fundamentally changing the climate of opinion in British society, and thus its efforts to eliminate the structural deficit, reduce immigration, deregulate the economy, and cap welfare expenditure, are being undermined because of the domination of 'left-wing thinking'. The NNR argues that, 'the last thirty years of public debate in Britain has been dominated by left-wing thinking...[a]lthough there is a Conservative-led government, there still remains a left-wing consensus'.[41] It is for this reason that, *contra* the 'purple plotters' like ultra-Cameronite Minister for Planning Nick Boles, and Major who argue for a two-term, ten year on-running coalition arrangement between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats,[42] the NNR see the Coalition as a temporary aberration for one term in the long succession of single-party majority governments. The NNR see the Coalition compact as 'one which meets a temporary, but nevertheless important need, to pay off the fiscal deficit'.[43] Aside from attempting to clear the deficit, the Coalition Government is going to achieve little else with the Liberal Democrats, a Party hostile to Tory ideals. Whilst Cameron remains in coalition, the NNR argue, much like the Thatcherite criticism of Tory post-war governments, Cameron conspires in a national consensus: accommodating to the Blairite, micro-social democratic revisions and modifications to the Thatcherite consensus. Deepak Lal, an economist with thought-practices not indistinct from the NNR, argues:

> 'All the political parties have embraced the status quo of a large, unreformed welfare state with high levels of tax and spending. The

---

[41] Ibid, 3.

[42] Boles, *Which Way's Up?* 131, 193; J. Kirkup. 2010. 'John Major: let's keep the Coalition after the next election', *The Daily Telegraph*, 26 November.

[43] Kwarteng, et al, *After The Coalition*, 14.

> position is like Butskellism. The post-war economic ideology dominated until Keith Joseph in the 1970s and repudiated by the Thatcher governments in the 1980s. Since then the parties have been changing their clothes: Tony Blair stole the Conservatives' clothes and David Cameron is stealing New Labour's'.[44]

In order to reverse what Joseph, the co-intellectual architect of Thatcherism, called the 'left-wing ratchet'[45] towards more interventionist social democratic outcomes, the NNR argue the Conservatives should argue from 'first principles': the case for the market and the smaller state.[46] Kwasi Kwarteng, the Josephite figure and 'main driver'[47] of the NNR, and leader of the Free Enterprise Group (FEG), invoked 'Stockholm syndrome' to characterise the Conservative Party's ideological dilemma, arguing that the Conservatives are limited in their 'ability to win big majorities' because the Party has been 'captured by the Left' and consequently the Conservatives have been '"apologetic about some of the positions we hold, on...the economy...welfare, or immigration"'.[48] The NNR see Cameronism's 'detoxification' and self-conscious adoption of New Labour's modernisation as a deemphasis of Tory values as it is a dilution, and political move away from, Tory values. The NNR, much like the Thatcherite insurrectionary counter-revolutionaries in the 1970s, expressly want to change the political ethos in Britain by turning Right. They have the potential to be as ideologically successful as the *One Nation Group* around R. A. Butler and Angus

---

[44] D. Lal. 2012. *Lost Causes: The Retreat from Classical Liberalism*. London: Biteback, 1.

[45] Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground?* 19.

[46] Forsyth, 'Next Right'.

[47] Interview with Kwasi Kwarteng, 14 October 2014.

[48] A. Chakelian. 2013. 'Kwasi Kwarteng: 'Let's be the same as New Labour'', *Total Politics*, 27 September.

Maude in the 1950s, or the Thatcherites around the Centre for Policy Studies in the 1970s in attaching their prescriptions for the country with a prevailing 'common sense'. Indeed, the inspiration for *After the Coalition* and *Britannia Unchained* derives from the *One Nation Group* and its book, *One Nation: A Tory Approach to Social Problems*.[49]

The NNR, a smaller, younger and newer generation of Conservatives, and a conceptually refurnished version of the (Old) New Right, are composed entirely of the 2010 generation of Conservative MPs. Although not to the exclusion of other contributors, the chapter focuses on the thought and practice of five MPs - Kwasi Kwarteng, Priti Patel, Dominic Raab, Chris Skidmore, and Elizabeth Truss - all of which are members of the academic seminar group, and prolific publisher of policy recommendations, of the NNR, the FEG.[50] All five were contributors to two books: the first, *After the Coalition: A Conservative Agenda for Britain* (2011), and the second, *Britannia Unchained: Global Lessons for Growth and Prosperity* (2012). These two books constitute the manifestos, and the analysis, of the NNR.

Although there is no academic literature on the thought-practices of the NNR, largely because it is a relatively-nascent Conservative grouping, there has been a substantial degree of journalistic interest. The most critical assessment of

---

[49] Interview with Kwarteng; I. Macleod. and A. Maude eds. *One Nation: A Tory Approach to Social Problems*, (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1950).

[50] The following Conservative MPs are members of the *Free Enterprise Group*: Harriet Baldwin; Nick de Bois; Karen Bradley; Robert Buckland; Aidan Burley; Alun Cairns; Therese Coffey; Charlie Elphicke; George Eustice; George Freeman; Mark Garnier; John Glen; Ben Gummer; Sam Gyimah; Matthew Hancock; Richard Harrington; Chris Heaton-Harris; Margot James; Sajid Javid; Chris Kelly; Kwasi Kwarteng; Andrea Leadsom; Phillip Lee; Brandon Lewis; Anne-Marie Morris; Brooks Newmark; Jesse Norman; Guy Opperman; Priti Patel; Christopher Pincher; Mark Pritchard; Dominic Raab; Jacob-Rees Mogg; David Ruffley; David Rutley; Laura Sandys; Chris Skidmore; Julian Smith; Rory Stewart; Elizabeth Truss (chairman of group); Andrew Tyrie; Mike Weatherly, and Nadhim Zahawi. Only 4 of the 43 MPs of this group were elected prior to the May 2010 General Election: Brooks Newmark (2005); Mark Pritchard (2005); David Ruffley (1997), and Andrew Tyrie (1997). With 43 members it constitutes just under a sixth of the membership of the Conservative Parliamentary Party.

their thought-practices is Jon Cruddas. Cruddas argues that the NNR constitute a programme of 'intensified commodification' and 'destructive economic liberalism that threatens the foundations of modern conservatism'.[51] James Forsyth characterises them as 'New Radicals', 'a group of ideologically driven Tory radicals' that intend to 'change the Tory party and Britain too'.[52] Andy Beckett treats this ideological grouping 'seriously' too, asserting that they 'are trying to seize the political agenda with some of the most rightwing ideas the party has seen for decades'.[53] In the same register, John McDermott warns that the group want to implement 'shock therapy' to the UK.[54] Scruton, the doyen of high Toryism, argued that they constitute an attempt to call on the 'Conservatives to save the country'.[55] Conversely, Dominic Lawson thinks their contribution to British politics is not 'notable'.[56] All accounts hitherto are unsatisfactory. Unsatisfactory, largely, because of a lack of depth and analysis. Cruddas asserts that the NNR 'threatens' existing Conservatisms.[57] The contrary is true, as opposed to promoting a 'destructive economic liberalism' that vitiates Conservatism, its economic neoliberalism reinforces Tory ideals: 'order, discipline, anti-collectivism, the containment of change, and responsibility'.[58] Forysth is

---

[51] J. Cruddas. 2012. 'Britannia Unchained: Global Lessons for Growth and Prosperity - Review', *The Guardian*, 27 September.

[52] Forsyth, 'Next Right'.

[53] A. Beckett. 2012. 'Britannia Unchained: the rise of the new Tory right', *The Guardian*, 22 August

[54] J. McDermott, 2012. 'Britannia Unchained: Review', *The Financial Times*, 10 September.

[55] R. Scruton. 2013. 'Postmodern Tories', *Prospect*, 21 February

[56] D. Lawson. 2012. 'Review: Britannia Unchained by Kwasi Kwarteng, Priti Patel, Dominic Raab, Chris Skidmore and Elizabeth Truss', *The Sunday Times*, 23 September.

[57] Cruddas. 2012. 'Britannia Unchained', 27 September.

[58] Lakin and Ostrowski, 'Ideology in the Age of the Coalition', 20

persuasive, calling the NNR 'New Radicals'.[59] Nevertheless, their radicalism is 'illusory'. It is tantamount, for Freeden, to a form of 'reactionary counter-reformism': using the power of the state, not to create a new set of institutions or new forms of social behaviour, but to retrench the state, reversing the socio-politico-culturo-economic consensus of the - 'state interventionist, socialising, socialist, neo-socialist, social democratic' - Left.[60] Like the Thatcherites, the NNR want to move British society *forward to the past*.

The omission of *One-Nation Conservatism* is worth noting partly because it alludes to their lack of 'force in the parliamentary Conservative Party'.[61] The Conservative Party's association with a Disraelian, pre-Thatcherite or non-Thatcherite Conservatism, preferring consensus over conflict remains *rhetorically* powerful. However, commentators have observed that Miliband's purloining of this once common Tory slogan was made possible by the gap created by the lack of a Tory Left.[62] Nevertheless, One Nation Conservatism remains an elusive typology, an empty signifier, and more of a label than a location on a political spectrum. David Seawright saw One Nation more of an 'ethos' than a particular doctrinal or ideological sub-category of a Conservatism on the Left.[63] Far from One Nation Conservatism being aligned with the Left, for example, members of

---

[59] Forsyth, 'Next Right'.

[60] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 411; Interview with Kwarteng.

[61] Beech, 'Cameron and Conservative Ideology', 21.

[62] T. Bale. 2012. 'Whither the Tory Left? The Demise of Progressive Conservatism', *Juncture* 49 (2): 84-91; P. Dorey and M. Garnett. 2014. "The weaker-willed, the craven-hearted': the decline of One Nation Conservatism', *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought*, published online on 30 May 2014. Doi: 10.1080/23269995.2014.914823.

[63] D. Seawright. 2009. *The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics*. London: Continuum, 3. For the contrary view see Garnett, 'Built on Sand?'107-118.

the One Nation Group[64] included Thatcherites like Geoffrey Howe; and Thatcher famously claimed, contradicting the claim that Thatcherism mounted a fundamental and existential challenge to One Nation Conservatism, to be 'right in their tradition'.[65] One Nation Conservatism was decontested, for Thatcherites, as the promotion of the national ideal whilst maintaining a free-market economic structure.[66]

3. The New New Right

Timothy Heppell has argued that the 2010 generation of Conservative MPs are ideologically economic, and social, liberals, and overwhelmingly Eurosceptic Conservatives.[67] The chapter does not strongly depart from these categorisations, but proposes to bring into focus and magnify one influential sub-section of the Conservative Party. The NNR thus have three distinctive features that compose their ideological makeup: (1) they reject the *rhetorical de-neoliberalisation* of British society; (2) they promote *free-market anti-socialisation*; and (3) they promote a 'thin' conception of social rights that rejects 'thick' conceptions of social rights and identity politics. The NNR is thus economically neoliberal, constitutionally conservative and largely anti-statist on social issues. The chapter, in turn, will address the three constitutive features of the NNR's Conservatism.

---

[64] R. Walsha. 2003. 'The One Nation Group and One Nation Conservatism, 1950-2002', *Contemporary British History* 17 (2): 69-120.

[65] Thatcher, 'TV Interview for BBC1 *Panorama*'. See S. Evans. 2009. 'The Not So Odd Couple: Margaret Thatcher and One Nation Conservatism', *Contemporary British History* 23 (1): 101-121.

[66] See T. E. Utley. 1981. *One Nation: 100 Years On*. London: Conservative Political Centre; M. Fforde. 1990. *Conservatism and Collectivism, 1886-1914*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 116.

[67] T. Heppell. 2013. 'Cameron and Liberal Conservatism: Attitudes within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and Conservative Ministers', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 15 (3): 340-361.

What the NNR's ideology constitutes, potentially, is a challenge to the Tory orthodoxies of both Thatcherism and Cameronism. Even though it constitutes a 'third generation' of Thatcherism, their ideological world views, unlike the first generation Thatcherism of the ONR, are cast in contemporary and present political debates. Unlike the Cameronites, they 'have a traditional view of politics' shunning the focus group politics of Blair and Cameron in favour of politicians campaigning 'on clear platforms' in an 'attempt to persuade the electorate to adopt their policies'.[68]

a. The Rejection of the Rhetorical De-neoliberalisation of British Society

The NNR challenges Cameronism's attempt to formulate a measured, and at least rhetorical, de-neoliberalisation of Conservatism. Rhetorical de-neoliberalisation refers to Cameron, and the Coalition's, efforts to alter the language, if not the action, behaviour and practice, around the political economy: the neoliberal political economy, which was intellectually challenged for the first time since its inception in the late 1970s in the 'neoliberal orthodox' British and American polities by the financial crisis of 2007-08. Lal argues that the 'crisis has brought all kinds of dirigiste panaceas to the fore, and there seems to have been a revival of crude Keynesianism amongst the commentariat and policy makers'.[69] 'In the home lands of neoliberalism', Terence Casey argues, 'the financial crisis...produced the unthinkable: nationalization, market intervention, and a revival of Keynesianism'.[70]

---

[68] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 230.

[69] Lal, *Lost Causes*, 223.

[70] Casey. 2011. 'Capitalism, Crisis, and a Zombie Named TINA', 54.

The very politico-economics the anti-capitalist, social democratic, and regulatory liberal discourses attribute as the central cause of the crisis, neoliberalism, are for Cameronites, and more so for the *market fundamentalism* of the NNR, not the problem but the solution to the crisis, because the crisis is not one of 'market failure' but one of 'state failure': a crisis *of* the state not a crisis *for* the state. Cameronism and the NNR occupy a similar semantic field in attributing the primary cause of the GFC to 'state failure' therefore. The NNR more vigorously defends the merits of the market against the Keynesian, 'regulatory liberal', Labour discourses of 'market failure', and the occasional attendant explicit critique of the failure of neoliberalism. Cameronism's reticence to defend the market, whilst simultaneously aggressively asserting state failure and Labour's public spending profligacy, is attributable to both Cameronite's pre-financial crisis commitment to 'progressive conservatism', in which he implemented the so-called 'politics of and...',[71] whereby issues of (Tory) *economic efficiency* were wedded to issues of *social justice*, and coalition with the Liberal Democrats.[72] The NNR have no such ideological affinity with progressivism nor are they shackled by the necessity of ideological trading with the more progressive elements of Liberal Democrat ideology, who believe in shielding New Labour's 'social investment state'[73] against neoliberal retrenchments. Cameronism, as one of its distinctive features, contends and realises that there is an *insufficiency of neoliberalism*. In managing the fall-out of the financial crisis, Cameron's Coalition have participated in a rhetorical rejection of the practices and thought of

---

[71] Bale, *Conservative Party*, 283-362.

[72] Prior to the formation of the Coalition, the Liberal Democrats adopted a more Labourite, market failure discourse of the crisis than the Tories state failure discourse. *Change That Works For You: Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010*. 2010. London: Liberal Democrat, 14-15.

[73] Giddens, *The Third Way,* 99-128.

neoliberalism, including regulation of the banking sector, maintaining a 45% higher rate of tax, Cameron's attack on 'crony capitalism',[74] protecting NHS, schools and overseas aid spending, and a corporatist-style industrial strategy.[75] Crines posits that neoliberalism has not so much been rejected by Cameron but metamorphosed into 'progressive neoliberalism',[76] manifested in Cameron, and the Coalition's, ready endorsement of self-regulation and shareholder control along the lines of the 'John Lewis' model. There is no such postulated insufficiency of neoliberalism, nor any need to add progressivism to neoliberalism, in NNR discourse.

As mentioned above, the NNR has its own publication and propaganda outlet, the FEG. It is one of many groups that has sprung up inside the Conservative Party since 2010, alongside *The Forty*, the *301* and the *2020*, but the FEG is by far the most forceful of the groups in terms of the development of ideas and policy proposals. The stated aims of the FEG, given 'administrative support by the Institute for Economic Affairs',[77] are quintessentially neoliberal: 'Encourage a competitive and free economic environment; Raise the global standing of the United Kingdom; Challenge monopolies and oligopolies; Free individuals to create, innovate and take risks'.[78] The NNR supports the 'austerity programme' of the Osborne Treasury not only in order to maintain market confidence, cut public expenditure, bring down the deficit and ensure Britain

---

[74] Cameron, 'Speech on Moral Capitalism'.

[75] V. Cable. 2012. 'Speech on Industrial Strategy', 11 September; Osborne, 'Budget Speech'; Heseltine, *No Stone Unturned*.

[76] Crines, 'The Rhetoric of the Coalition', 213-216.

[77] Interestingly, the IEA was the FEG of its day. The IEA was founded in 1955 by Anthony Fisher with the express intention of combating the Keynesian orthodoxy and spreading the gospel of Friedrich von Hayek.

[78] Homepage of *Free Enterprise Group*, http://www.freeenterprise.org.uk/.

'lives within its means', but to restore an environment and the conditions where neoliberal ideas can better thrive. Nevertheless, the NNR, typical of fiscal conservatives, argues that there has been too little austerity.[79] Austerity is decontested as a 'virtuous necessity'.[80] Historically, the politics of austerity has borne fruit for Conservative electoral success, and the wider proliferation of Conservative values.[81]

The Tory discourse, for Colin Hay, that 'state indebtedness was the cause of the crisis and spending retrenchments is the solution' has become neoliberal 'paradigm-reinforcing rather than paradigm-threatening' in Britain.[82] The Conservatives subscribed to what Hay called a 'Labour debt crisis' discourse: the crisis has its origins in 'state failure' and thus the solution to the crisis is to restore balance to the public finances through a combination of *light* tax raising and *heavy* public spending reductions. Hay observes, however, the crisis is *for* the state as opposed to the Conservatives contention that the crisis, and the resultant resolution as manifest in austerity, is a crisis *of* the state.[83] The difference is that if one situates the crisis *for* the state 'it is to suggest that the fiscal deficit which now threatens public expenditure cannot be attributed to any dynamic internal to the state itself since its origins lie elsewhere', whereas the crisis *of* the state 'would implicate the state directly in the generation of the fiscal shortfall that now threatens the public programmes with which we associate it'.[84] Whilst the

---

[79] Gamble, *Crisis Without End?* 23.

[80] See J. Clarke and J. Newman. 2013. 'The alchemy of austerity', *Critical Social Policy* 32 (3): 299-319.

[81] See Jackson and McClymont, *Cameron's Trap*.

[82] Hay, *Failure of Anglo-Liberal Capitalism*, 41.

[83] Ibid, 16-21

[84] Ibid, 18.

Cameronites have had to temper their rhetorical crisis *of* the state, the NNR have argued emphatically for a restoration of a language that is consonant with a practice of retrenchment that the austerity programme *promises* to deliver. Cameronites's neoliberalism, whilst they are committed to a form of 'progressive neoliberalism', eschews the liberal individualism of both the Thatcherite New Right and the post-Cameronite NNR. Both are united in a joint scepticism of, the role and scope, of the state, and the efficiency of the public sector, but the language and thought-practices of the NNR see the Cameronite 'progressive neoliberalism' as being tantamount to an abnegation of neoliberalism.

The NNR's concerted effort to resist the de-neoliberalisation of British society, and their conceptually attendant joint endeavour with Cameronism to assert 'state failure', not 'market failure', as the cause of the financial crisis, constitutes what Gamble calls 'market fundamentalism'.[85] The NNR, in line with market fundamentalism, has thus developed 'the argument that the problem was caused not by too little but too much regulation. If deregulation had been allowed to go further then the market itself would have sorted out the problems'.[86] The NNR's attempt to (rhetorically) *re-neoliberalise* Britain is not just a diagnosis of 'state failure' however, but a prognosis for the future transacted into public-policy positions: direct tax cuts; reduction of every government departments' expenditures; anti-inflationary bias; creation of economic zones; privatisation of public sector services; and New Public Management reforms of public services in receipt of taxpayer funds. The NNR complain about the 'large, bloated public sector' with its 'increasingly large liabilities' subsuming 'too much spending' and

---

[85] Gamble, *Spectre at the Feast*, 141-167.

[86] Ibid, 146.

generating ‘too little growth’ and overall ‘poor productivity’.[87] They want, much like the Coalition’s shift from targets to outcomes, an abolition of New Labour-era controls, such as, child poverty targets, waiting lists, school results and climate change targets. They postulate that ‘privatisation has been an an almost unqualified success’.[88] The Coalition’s record on marketisation, commodification, (internal and external) privatisation, deregulation, and liberalisation has been considerable - in many areas going beyond Thatcher’s extension privatisation programmes in the 1980s.

The NNR, however, want to go further in their project of narrowing the scope of the political and spreading market-based, free enterprise principles: a market-based immigration visa system;[89] freezing the minimum wage; exempting ‘micro-businesses’ from paying the minimum wage to under-21s along with abolishing Agency Workers Regulations and the Working Time Regulations;[90] abolishing the Low Pay Commission;[91] nearly halving the number of Whitehall departments;[92] liberalising transport markets;[93] relaxing childcare ratios;[94] market-solutions to climate change;[95] restoring the awry Beveridgean contributory

---

[87] Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 3.

[88] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 53.

[89] G. Freeman and K. Kwarteng. 2013. *The Innovation Economy: Industrial Policy for the 21st Century*. London: Free Enterprise Group/IEA.

[90] D. Raab. 2011. *Escaping the Strait Jacket: Ten Regulatory Reforms to Create Jobs*. London: CPS.

[91] Forsyth, ‘Next Right’.

[92] D. Raab. 2013. *Weight Watchers for Whitehall.* London: Free Enterprise Group/IEA. D. Raab. 2013. ‘This week’s fire brigade union action shows why we need strike law reform’, *ConservativeHome*, 22 September.

[93] See K. Kwarteng and J. DuPont. 2011. *Gridlock Nation*. London: Biteback; K. Kwarteng. 2012. *The Case of Aviation*. London: Free Enterprise Group/IEA.

[94] E. Truss, ‘A class act’, In *The Next Ten Years*, 322-325.

[95] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 75-80.

principle in the benefits system,[96] and, consistent with long-standing Tory hostility to organised labour, a call for a 'strike law reform', which would require a 'voting threshold of support from 50 per cent of balloted members for strike action to proceed' thus placing a further restraint on trade union power.[97] In total, these reforms are purported as necessary because of the need to contain costs, and eliminate debt and deficits. Therefore, in addition to these market-based reforms of everything from regulation of working hours to immigration visas, the NNR propose a 'Golden Rule', in which 'budgets should be balanced across a cycle'.[98] This includes three distinct ideas. The first is a 'debt cap', which is 'the idea that Parliament should legislate a hard limit to the amount of debt the country could take on', prohibiting large spending programmes without commensurate tax revenues.[99] This is compounded by the second idea, a 'balanced budget enforcement', imported from Reaganite and post-Reaganite US Republicans, which requires that the state cannot spend more than its income. It requires a balance between the projected receipts and expenditures of the government. Therefore, 'in the medium term, the government's books should balance'.[100] Third, the NNR have proposed a 'debt brake', balancing the structural deficit in such a way that, shortfalls, in any one year are, compensated for with greater austerity in the next.[101] Together, these measures, seek to entrench an anti-public

---

[96] See C. Skidmore. 2012. *A New Beveridge: 70 years on*. London: Free Enterprise Group/IEA.

[97] D. Raab. 2011. 'Trade Union Reform', In *The Future of Conservatism: Values Revisited*, edited by D. David, B Binley, and J. Baron, 73-83. London: Biteback.

[98] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 4.

[99] Ibid, 35.

[100] Ibid, 36. Also see D. Lal. 1990. *Fighting Fiscal Privilege: Towards a Fiscal Constitution*. London: Social Market Foundation.

[101] See J. Forsyth, K. Kwarteng, M. Littlewood, D. Raab, and C. Skidmore. 2012. *A Manifesto Fit for 2015: 15 Ideas to Transform Britain*. London: Free Enterprise Group/IEA.

spending/pro-low taxes bias in the constitutional and parliamentary arrangements of British politics, benefiting the broader ideological objectives of modern Conservatism to limit the scope of politics.

The NNR go beyond the typical bugbears of neoliberalism in condemning '[b]ankers, lawyers and managers in major corporations' who 'have hidden behind "innovative financial products" and opaque practices to cover up their subsidy from the rest of the economy. Risks that should have been borne by those who took them have been socialised by the government'.[102] Their insulation from the neoliberal requirements, for the NNR, to 'create wealth through innovation and hard work', whilst claiming 'the rewards that were reserved for entrepreneurs' is as much of an obstacle to their 'support for business, the profit motive and the individual drive of the wealth creator' as the public sector worker or Whitehall mandarin.[103] NNR neoliberalism is therefore discrepant from the Thatcherite variant of neoliberalism in its *poujadist* disdain for elites of all kind; this disdain for elites, in addition to tax-cutting measures, is designed to 'motivate the middle'.[104] As mentioned, the NNR contend that British politics over 'the last thirty years...has been dominated by left-wing thinking'.[105] Beckett rightly points out that this comment is stated as if 'the transformative 18 years of the Thatcher and Major Governments had never happened', an admission that Thatcher's 'rightwing project' had 'failed'.[106] Kwarteng, acknowledging this implied criticism of Thatcher, revised this by dating the inception of the left wing

---

[102] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 18.

[103] Ibid, 47; Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 4; See G. Eustice. 2012. *Defending the rights of those who take risks*. London: Free Enterprise Group/IEA.

[104] See K. Kwarteng and P. Patel. 2012. *Motivating the Middle*. London: Free Enterprise Group/ IEA.

[105] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 3.

[106] Beckett, 'Britannia Unchained: the rise of the new Tory right'.

consensus at the downfall of Thatcher in 1990.[107] This revised comment chimes with the NNR's claim that 'The 1980s, contrary to the beliefs of many on the left, were a successful decade for Britain'.[108] Truss hails Thatcher as a source of 'inspiration...for the politics of the Right'.[109] Indeed, d'Ancona contended that the NNR are "Thatcher's grandchildren".[110] Nevertheless, there is a perceptible simultaneous subduing and celebrating of Thatcherism. There are three proposed reasons for this. First, Thatcher's Thatcherism endorsed neoliberalism with considerable qualification. Thatcherism alloyed neoliberal economics with a high Tory traditional, patriotic sentiment of her Party and the country: 'although Thatcherites engaged with neoliberalism they did not fully embrace, and on occasion explicitly rejected, neoliberal economics in their purest form'.[111] For this reason, the NNR believe Thatcher's 'work remains incomplete'.[112] Second, Kwarteng contends that Thatcher's radicalism must be contextualised and historicised.[113] Thatcherism, it is contended, was radical *in its time*. The NNR agree with other Tory historians that all Thatcher did was use a 'radical rhetoric to give intellectual respectability to what the Conservative Party has always wanted',[114] and the critics of Thatcher, Thatcherism and the politics of the 1980s exceptionalise Thatcherism, from the (Conservative) British Political Tradition, in order to demonise and traduce it. Downplaying the *novelty* of Thatcherism is a

---

[107] Interview with Kwarteng.

[108] Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 2.

[109] E. Truss. 2013. 'My generation of Tories takes its lead from the radical Margaret Thatcher', *The Daily Telegraph*, 9 April.

[110] d'Ancona, *In It Together*, 349.

[111] Green, *Thatcher*, 49.

[112] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 12.

[113] Interview with Kwarteng.

[114] Cowling, *Mill and Liberalism*, xxviii.

way in which the NNR can make useful political/strategic comparisons with Thatcherism and also *macro-decontest* the ideological counter-transformations of the 1980s as natural and essential. Third, despite the achievements of the Tory administrations of the 1980s and 1990s, the impact of New Labour's ideology on the socio-cultural fabric on Britain, only served *inter alia* to eclipse Thatcherism.[115] Therefore, by arguing that New Labour eclipsed Thatcherism, they are not criticising Thatcherism, but arguing for its continuation with a revision that there needs to be a more coherent, holistic and explicit implementation of neoliberalism in order to overcome the legacy of New Labour's 'high taxes and...poorly designed welfare system'.[116] The NNR argue that, 'the greatest achievement of Thatcher's administration was less taking on the unions and liberalising the economy, but making Britain believe in itself again....Britain is once again facing the same loss of confidence last seen in the 1970s'.[117] The NNR go, ante-Thatcherism, to the 'Victorian liberal principles' of 'sound money, free trade and free competition' for the political climate they desire to restore.[118] Conservative modernisers like Francis Maude, although not trenchantly critical of NNR thought-practices, warns the Conservative Party of looking like a Party that 'want to turn the clock back to an imagined golden era'.[119] It is not 'imagined', but real, for the NNR.

The NNR don't just blame the institutions that are typically allied to Conservative interests for Britain's decline and departure from Victorian liberal

---

[115] A. Gamble. 2005. 'Eclipsing Thatcherism', *The Guardian*, 14 October.

[116] Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 68.

[117] Ibid, 11, 4.

[118] Ibid, 8.

[119] F. Maude, 'Foreword', In *Tory Modernisation 2.0*, 4.

principles. They enlist Britons too to their list of guilty parties. Michel Foucault talked of 'governmentality', the ways in which governments try to produce, through power structures, the best citizen suited to fulfill particular political ends. Foucault further talked about 'neoliberal governmentality' as 'the responsibility of political government to actively create the conditions in which entrepreneurial and competitive conduct was possible'.[120] The NNR outline the kind of citizens required to bring to fruition and maintain this market fundamentalist and re-neoliberalised governmentality. The NNR argue that, 'As the world becomes more competitive, Britain will have to work harder to keep up'.[121] Cruddas critically thinks there is an impediment for the NNR which resides in its stark characterisation of their 'ideal worker' as one 'prepared to work long hours, commute long distances and expect no employment protection and low pay'.[122] The impediment is conceptualised differently for the NNR: it is not the, presumable electoral, starkness of their 'ideal worker' that is the impediment, but the lack of neoliberal citizens and workers. Echoing Niall Ferguson's retort that 'Europeans are the idlers of the world',[123] the NNR argue that, 'the British are among the worst idlers in the world...Once they enter the workplace, the British have long been less productive than workers in other Western countries'.[124] 'The state', the NNR claim, 'has made Britons idle. Our culture of instant gratification ignores the years of persistence that lie behind real success. Too many people in

---

[120] A. Barry, T. Osborne. and N. Rose. 1996. 'Introduction', In *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government*, edited by A. Barry, T. Osborne, and N. Rose. London: UCL Press, 1-18.

[121] Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 1.

[122] Cruddas. 2012. 'Britannia Unchained', 27 September.

[123] Ferguson quoted in Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 66.

[124] Ibid, 61, 66.

Britain...prefer a lie-in to hard work'.[125] Simply, '[f]ewer Britons work. Those who work put in fewer hours. For the overwhelming majority, the financial rewards from hard work declined because of higher taxes or perverse disincentives in the welfare system'.[126] This is a call for more individual responsibility, enabling individuals to financially provide for themselves, 'rather than a central state to do it all for them'.[127] Whilst supporting a state-funded education, healthcare and welfare system, the state 'can never fully solve any individual's problems'.[128] Truss argues that, ''decline is not inevitable."[129] In seeking to reverse this, they state that national decline is reversible if Britain recognises 'support for business, the profit motive and the individual drive of the wealth creator', and the British worker 'abandon[s] the quick fix and instead put[s] in the fundamental graft, risk and effort that bring long-term rewards'.[130] The NNR see the expansion of the state, with income tax featuring as the 'principle means of financing this expansion', as the biggest impediment to restoring and spreading the value and benefits of work.[131] The NNR, believe strongly, that the socio-political climate needs to change. Profit, too, for example, 'remains a dirty word'.[132] The NNR propound a 'shift' in 'our moral perspective':

---

[125] Ibid, 5.

[126] Ibid, 77.

[127] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 13.

[128] Ibid.

[129] Forsyth, 'Next Right'.

[130] Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 4, 116.

[131] Kwarteng and Patel, 'Motivating the Middle', 6.

[132] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 12.

'Making an honest profit should be seen as a good thing, while rent seeking from the State should be regarded as a bad thing'.[133]

Neoliberalism is a term that students of the Conservative Party or Conservatism should sensibly be cautious of using. Cautious for three reasons. First, the expanded usage of the word means that it has no macro-definition apart from some vague endorsement of markets and competition;[134] second, it is often used as a term of abuse,[135] and third, those who scholars and students alike label as 'neoliberals' do not self-identify with the term. Whilst the second use of neoliberalism should be eschewed because the object is *Verstehen,* not to normatively upgrade or downgrade, the last explanation for endorsed cautiousness when using neoliberalism should not be an impediment to its usage in itself, particularly in the light of postmodernist 'double-coding', 'words which say one thing, while meaning another and camouflaging, or concealing, a third'',[136] and the 'surplus of meaning',[137] which offer scope for interpretations of political ideologies. However, the primary case for the usage of neoliberalism here is that the NNR expressly employs the term when talking about ''neoliberal' reforms', which they endorse, such as cuts in cuts, the taming of and the privatisation of government monopolies.[138] Whilst precision and interpretive caution is always important in the study of ideologies, especially Conservative ideologies, the use of

---

[133] Ibid, 48.

[134] T. Boas, and J. G. Morse. 2009. J. 'Neo-Liberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44 (1): 137-161. Boas and Morse thought neo-liberalism was so multi-definitional that it had become 'a conceptual trash heap'. Ibid, 156.

[135] A. Gamble. 2008. 'The Western Ideology', *Government and Opposition* 44 (1), 3.

[136] Eccleshall, 'The doing of conservatism', 278.

[137] See Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*.

[138] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 44-45.

the term neoliberal is not only useful in terms of decoding their thought-practices, but essential insofar as the NNR themselves express affinity with neoliberal reforms, despite Kwarteng's preference for the term 'neo-classical liberal'.[139] The NNR are unprecedentedly, in British politics, avowed neoliberals. They are unabashed and consistently lay blame for the financial crisis primarily on *past dirigisme:* bureaucrats, regulators, governments, and the unsustainable entitlement economy. They further resist arguments that the financial crisis has intellectually discredited, and made political impracticable, neoliberalism. The crises of capitalism, not dissimilar to Marxist and Schumpeterian analyses, are simply decontested as natural moments of 'creative destruction', and beyond the volition or control of human agents. The NNR thus advocate the trinity of neoliberalism: deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation, in order to restore 'the fundamental graft, risk and effort that bring long-term rewards'[140]in the overarching effort to reconstruct the 'basis for renewed capitalist prosperity'.[141]

b. Free Market Anti-Socialisation

The retreat of Tory values is not solely confined to the realm of political economy for the NNR. Progressive, or Centre-Left, values have, the NNR argue, dominated the ideas in civil society and the social and cultural interactions it has with markets and the state over the 'last thirty years'.[142] Rhetorical re-neoliberalisation, generally, offers a guide to the NNR's politico-economic preference for

---

[139] Interview with Kwarteng.

[140] Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 116.

[141] Gamble, *Spectre at the Feast,* 148.

[142] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 3.

maintaining financial responsibility and safeguarding the market order at the cost of other political priorities such as social justice or social integration for example. Part of the NNR's ideological matrix is not just a support of neoliberalism, it is a charge against the 'social justice, equality, and compassion' vogues of contemporary post-Great Crash British politics, which threaten, and promise to upend, pillars of neoliberalism.[143] Truss called this threat 'anti-market socialization', asserting that 'Conservatives need to recast the argument about free enterprise for a new age, or risk losing the debate to a tide of *anti-market socialization*'.[144] Anti-market socialisation refers to the various political projects that want to roll back, or delimit in favour of non-market actors/forces, the free market economy. The NNR, therefore, supports the opposite: free market anti-socialisation.

The promoters of anti-market socialisation, or non-market alternatives, are to be found in all three major Westminster political parties. Indeed Kelly has correctly argued that the 'emergence of a fresh consensus', after the financial crisis, albeit one 'not easy to categorise', is one centred around non-state and non-market alternatives for social cohesion and economic inclusion.[145] Kelly points to the pan-political interest in society, with its various decontestations of Cameron's 'Big Society'; Clegg's 'Open Society', and Miliband's 'Good Society'. These decontestations of society modify, and in some senses reject, Thatcherism's market society vision.

The Cameronites are the Tory tribe that has done most to promote a diluted and moderate version of a Conservatism that limits the scope, emphasis, and

---

[143] Scruton, 'Postmodern Tories'.

[144] Homepage of Free Enterprise Group http://www.freeenterprise.org.uk/ (emphasis added).

[145] Kelly, 'Political Parties', 214.

importance of the market, and celebrates the 'socio-centric paradigm'.[146] Cameron presented such a Conservative formulation in the idioms of *social responsibility*, *the enabling state*, *the post-bureaucratic age*, *localism*, and the *Big Society*. Cameron emphasized a 'limited state' but one where the Conservatives would 'roll forward the frontiers of society': different from the Thatcherite imprimatur to 'roll back the frontiers of the state', because Cameronism is putting the emphasis on a larger society, rather than a smaller state,[147] positive civic renewal, and community engagement replaced a negatively-defined economic programme of retrenchment. Cameron described the task of Cameronism in government: deficit reduction is his 'duty' and the Big Society is his 'passion'. Cameronism therefore, in theory, is constituted by a pairing of 'social recovery' with 'economic recovery'.[148] Blond's anti-neoliberal 'civic communitarian conservative' Red Toryism,[149] Kruger's emphasis on fraternalism,[150] and Norman's pro-social, anti-statism[151] underpinned Cameron's attempt to reconnect, what had been severed under Thatcherism, civic values with the Conservative Party, whilst avoiding a full-blown critique of Thatcherite neoliberalism. Cameronism's dual-critique of 'state expansionism' and 'neoliberal economics', albeit imbalanced with the heaviest criticism for the former rather than the latter, has diminished into a greater acceptance of neoliberalism during the life of the Coalition Government. Three 'Big Society Tories', Blond, Kruger and Ian Birrell, lament the

---

[146] Letwin, 'Cameron Conservatism'.

[147] Cameron, 'The Hugo Young Lecture'.

[148] Cameron, 'Speech on the Big Society', 15 February.

[149] Blond, 'Rise of the red Tories'; P. Blond. 2009. 'The Future of Conservatism', Speech to ResPublica, 26 November; Blond, *Red Tory*.

[150] Kruger, *On Fraternity*.

[151] Norman, *The Big Society*.

abandonment of its element of anti-market socialisation/pre-austerity compassionate Conservatism.[152] Cameron, having 'lost sight of his reforming programme', has allowed 'other agendas' to take hold.[153] This 'other agenda', the perceptible rhetorical and political shifts of Conservative languages to the Right, is in part attributable to the intellectual force of the NNR on Cameron's Coalition. Cameronism is still a delicate balancing act between the neoliberal priority of *economic realism* and the civic Conservative priority of *social integration*. Cameronism's early civic idealism, with the Big Society as its most resonant and pithy label, has been conceptually superseded by the more Spencerian-sounding 'Global Race',[154] a theme almost handpicked from the ideological manual of the NNR.[155] Whilst the NNR decry the Big Society as an irrelevance of no interest and bereft of a 'definitive blueprint',[156] the NNR ally themselves with Cameronism in their support for localism, decontested as departing from the centralist features of standardisation, regularity, and evenness of state provision and replacing it, not with the messy Cameronite cornucopia of voluntary, private, civic and market institutions, but in favour of neoliberal, for-profit, business and neoliberal institutions.

Cameron's flight from a centrist Conservatism has presented Labour with the opportunity to promote a different, but not linguistically dissimilar, discourse of anti-market socialisation. In Miliband's attempt to arrest the "Big Society' back

---

[152] Birrell, 'Why the Conservatives should reclaim their compassionate core'.

[153] Townsend, 'David Cameron's vision has been lost'.

[154] D. Cameron. 2012. 'Conference Speech', 10 October; D. Cameron. 2013. 'Speech on the Economy', 7 March.

[155] Chekelian, 'Kwasi Kwarteng'; Interview with Kwarteng.

[156] Interview with Kwarteng; E. Truss. 2011. 'Foreword', In *The Big Society Challenge*, edited by M. Scott, Cardiff: Keystone Development Trust, ix

off David Cameron',[157] Labour Party elites, intellectuals, politicians and public policy wonks, have proposed several different counter-responses, including Purple Labour's liberal, modern and revised Blairite Labour discourses,[158] Blue Labour's localist, communitarian and traditional discourses,[159] and One Nation Labour's centralist, conservative and radical discourses.[160] In combination, the panoply of Labour discourses present an ideological map, which threatens the NNR's anti-social marketisation and attempt to re-neoliberalise British politics. Central to Milibandism is a critique of the market society believing that, from the age of Thatcher 'we drifted from *having* a *market economy* to *being* a *market society*', in which, 'social relations are made over in the image of the market'.[161] For Andrew Vincent, Miliband's One Nation variant of social democracy would reverse, contrary to the NNR's notion that there is both a de-neoliberalisation and anti-market socialising bias, the 'institutional vernaculars' of neoliberalism:

> 'The prospect of social democracy in government would signal a return to political realism and sanity. Private market-based police, armies, roads, transport, networks, education, welfare, prisons, water, or even judicial systems, may look attractive for a minority, but in practice any ordinary citizen would know that this latter strategy is verging on ideological psychosis'.[162]

---

[157] E. Miliband. 2010. 'Speech', 28 November.

[158] See R. Philpot ed. 2011. *The Purple Book: A Progressive Future for Labour*. London: Biteback

[159] See M. Glasman, et al, *The Labour Tradition and the Politics of Paradox*.

[160] See O. Smith and R. Reeves eds. 2013. *One Nation: Power, Hope, Community*. London: One Nation Register.

[161] Sandel, *What Money Can't Buy*, 10-11.

[162] A. Vincent. 2013. 'Social Democracy and the Progressive Tradition', In *The Socialist Way: Social Democracy in Contemporary Britain*, edited R. Hattersley, and K. Hickson. London: I. B. Tauris & Co, 136, 141.

Neoliberalism is therefore not an extinct macro-economistic ideology:[163] Cameron's Coalition Government is portrayed as the embodiment of the last defender of this *ancien regime* that started with Thatcher and, presumably, would end with Miliband's 'counter-hegemonic' programme of post-New Labour social democracy in 2015.[164] In order to reverse the market society and private market-based practices, and the concomitant absence of the 'role of politics' in NNR's thought in particular,[165] Miliband has proposed the rejuvenation of Labour's commitment to the activist, although not a 'centralised', state in contradistinction to the 'Serco/G4S state'.[166] In this vein the self-styled 'One Nation' Labour Party will impose price controls on the 'Big Six' energy companies, use the state to requisition private land,[167] and rent controls on private landlords;[168] part-renationalise the railways;[169] move from Croslandite redistribution to Milibandite 'predistribution'[170] in order to help the 'squeezed middle' in an age of 'responsible capitalism';[171] increase taxes on the highest earners, and commit to check and change the pace, and composition of, the Conservative's austerity programme.

The Cameronite civic communitarian Toryism, albeit in retreat and substituted by Osbornomic economic reductionism, along with Miliband's

---

[163] See C. Crouch. 2011. *The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

[164] J. Cowley. 2012. 'He's not for turning', *NewStatesman*, 7-13 September 2012. Indeed, Ed Balls argued that Milibandism perceived New Labour's Third Way ideology as a 'failure'. E. Balls. 2014. 'Beyond the Third Way', Speech, 30 June.

[165] Cruddas. 2012. 'Britannia Unchained', 27 September; Interview with Jon Cruddas MP, 3 December 2013.

[166] E. Miliband. 2014. 'The Hugo Young Lecture', 10 February.

[167] E. Miliband. 2013. 'Conference Speech', 24 September.

[168] E. Miliband. 2014. 'Speech on 'Generation Rent'', 1 May.

[169] E. Miliband. 2014. 'A new settlement for a new era', Speech, 19 July.

[170] J. Hacker. 2013. 'How to reinvigorate the centre-left? Predistribution', *The Guardian*, 12 June.

[171] T. Hunt, 'One Nation Labour', In *One Nation*, 146.

spectrum of Labour critiques that revolve around the reversal of the neoliberal market society, plus the Liberal Democrats peripheral contribution to the anti-market socialisation in the forms of social localism, pro-Europeanism, economic centrism and constitutional radicalism, feature as the various *reflex*, *mirror-images* of the NNR's anti-social marketisation, namely, anti-market socialisation. The NNR use the threat of anti-market socialisation to shore up the project of re-neoliberalisation by resisting what it sees as internal and external threats to its essential ideological commitment to the entrenchment and expansion of the neoliberal and market fundamentalist vision of the market society. Labour argue that, 'community, society...or country' is 'always trumped by textbook economic liberalism' in NNR political thought.[172] Scruton, sympathetic to the economism and enmity to equality and social justice, interprets the thought-practices of the NNR as Conservative insofar as they 'are seeking to conserve a country and its institutions'.[173] In trying to conserve Britain and *some* of its institutions, the NNR defends free enterprise and the neoliberal market order from sources of anti-market socialisation beyond the constellation of communitarian critiques of the market society. They are additionally against the relativism and the 'culture of equivalence' in education berating the notion of 'prizes for all' and the notion of equal validity among all academic subjects.[174] New Labour-era additions to the National Curriculum, such as Citizenship, are derided by Truss as 'peripheral'.[175] In deviating to the mean, values like 'beauty', 'merit' and 'personal distinction' have been denuded and replaced by bureaucratic and technocratic values of

---

[172] Cruddas. 2012. 'Britannia Unchained', 27 September.

[173] Scruton, 'Postmodern Tories'.

[174] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 135-153; Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 38-60; Raab, *Meritocrat's Manifesto*, 15.

[175] E. Truss. 2012. *Affordable Quality: New Approaches to Childcare*. London: CentreForum, 295.

'systems', 'processes' and 'common good' respectively.[176] Anti-market socialisation in education, in which there is a purported 'anti-success culture', has impacted on wage differentials, welfarism, productivity and importantly work ethic.[177] Instead of 'academic rigour' in state schools, which the NNR claim the 'egalitarian consensus has demonised', the progressive consensus has focused on non-market alternatives in search of solutions: 'counterproductive' policies such as 'abolishing grammar schools or redistributing wealth'.[178] Contrary to the social democratic notion that the emergence of market dominance in the 1980s onward fueled socio-economic inequalities, inequalities are attributed to the 'debt-delusion Keynesianism' of the 'flawed egalitarian consensus of the 1960s', in which 'the Statist way of thinking' took hold, focused 'wholly on the *social causes* of an individual's poverty', at the expense of individual 'choice', 'autonomy' and 'responsibility'.[179] Statists, who are analogous to the 'Left' in NNR discourse, have not just 'annexed' education, but also family policy whereby 'progress is state involvement and institutionalised subsidy support'.[180] In a Thatcherite, quasi-libertarian self-help register, individuals and families, in mirror-image to the state and its impersonal institutions, are the loci or foundational units of society for the NNR, such that, 'By strengthening the role and responsibility of the individual, we are helping them provide for others, their family, and the community'.[181] The diminution of individual responsibility and the

---

[176] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 16; D. Raab. 2014. *The Meritocrat's Manifesto*. London: Social Market Foundation.

[177] Ibid, 6.

[178] Ibid, 3; See Forsyth, et al, *A Manifesto Fit for 2015.*

[179] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 137; Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 23.

[180] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 3.

[181] Ibid, 19.

attendant need to blame individual failures on society or social causes, for the NNR, was a contributory factor of New Labour's 'era of indulgence and hedonism: the 'boom of celebrity culture, reality TV, and binge drinking'.[182]

c. Postmodern Libertarianism? Reversing the Social State and Promoting Thin Rights

Scruton has surprisingly described the NNR as 'postmodern Tories'.[183] *Prima facie*, the notion that 'Tories' are 'postmodern' is oxymoronic. Bruce Pilbeam argues that there are 'suggestive parallels' between Conservatism and postmodernism insofar as they both strenuously reject 'rationalist' ideological prescriptions.[184] O'Sullivan has argued that postmodernism creates a 'more viable framework of limited politics', which would satisfy the ideologies of Conservatism.[185] However, Scruton described postmodernism as '*vulgar* relativism', which 'has no hope of surviving outside the minds of ignorant rascals'.[186] Surprising therefore that he would describe a Tory grouping he has a fondness for as 'postmodern Tories'. There are no serious ideological 'consanguineous relations' between Conservatism and postmodernism but they express, albeit in 'different voices', the politics of identity politics: postmodernism promotes it and the NNR denigrate it. In a similar way to

---

[182] Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 115.

[183] Scruton, 'Postmodern Tories'.

[184] B. Pilbeam. 2001. "Conservatism and postmodernism: consanguineous relations or 'different' voices?" *Journal of Political Ideologies* 6 (1): 33-54.

[185] See N. O'Sullivan. 1993. 'Political Integration, the Limited State, and the Philosophy of Postmodernism', *Political Studies* 41 (s1): 21-42.

[186] R. Scruton. 1994. *Modern Philosophy: An Introduction and Survey*. London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 3.

neoliberalism providing the economic antidote to social democratic *étatisme*, the NNR's rejection of identity politics and thick conceptions of social rights amounts to a rejection of collectivist social visions. Social visions, for Kwarteng, are neither expected nor wanted from Conservative governments.[187] The NNR's opposition to identity politics, its thinly-defined conception of rights and animus to social visions of politics is thus constitutes an *any extension of the social state.*

Our programme for government, the Coalition's manifesto, states that the Coalition is a 'partnership government driven by...values'. Among its values is a desire to build 'a smaller state' with more 'power and responsibility in the hands of every citizen'.[188] The Coalition's commitment to the smaller state has not, for the NNR, delivered the scaling-back of the state they are committed to. The NRR are committed to a comprehensive scaling back of the role of government and the interventions of the state. Ideologically against the sharp rise in government spending between 2001-2007 in which government spending as a proportion of GDP rose from 36% in 2000 to 46% in 2008-09. This increase in government spending, the NNR contend, which contributed to budget deficits and higher public sector debt, merely emphasises the necessity of fiscal austerity. Unlike the ONR, or the Tory Right, who, for reasons of nationalism, struggle to look beyond the shores of Britain (and possibly America) for inspiration, the NRR is outward-looking: *Britannia Unchained* is a book not for the 'little Englanders', they are internationalist, wanting to learn economic lessons of efficient practices in Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, and India in order to find free-market innovations that they advocate should be imported into Britain. The NNR's smaller, quasi-

---

[187] Interview with Kwarteng.

[188] *Our Programme for Government*, 8.

nightwatchman, state in part applies to non-economic issues such as social policy or constitutional reform. Unlike the hortatory expostulations of the ONR to liberal moral values, the NNR ostensibly exhibit, on occasion, liberal social positions defending their moral and social positions in Tory decontestations of the concept of 'civilised', negatively defined, as freedom, liberty, and the preeminence of economic choice. There are multiple examples. Patel wants to restore the death penalty because it is 'civilised'.[189] Raab is critical of Labour's Equality Act 2010 because, in its attempt to legislate away inequalities, it has become a 'vehicle for social engineering' thus violating liberty.[190] Raab is also critical of 'feminist bigotry', with the pay gap in the workplace, for example, the outcome of 'genuine choice' and not the 'result of discrimination' against women.[191] Raab's opposition to social engineering is repeated in the NNR's opposition to 'identity politics', which focuses on 'an individual's ethnicity or gender...without any regard to the person'.[192] Once more, the culprits are the 'Left':

> 'The new Left emerged in the 1960s and 1970s with a form of identity politics that grouped people together to form a rainbow coalition: women's groups, gay rights and black and minority ethnicity citizens. In contrast, the Right cherished the uniqueness of the individual and shared values over this static approach'.[193]

The NNR celebrate individuation thus weakening their ties to (social) collectivism. Other, older forms of identity politics such as 'character' and 'class'

---

[189] T. G. Kozlowski. 2012. 'Priti Patel: Saviour of the Tory Right', *Total Politics*, 5 October.

[190] Raab, 'This week's fire brigade union action shows why we need strike law reform'.

[191] D. Raab. 2011 'We must end feminist bigotry', *PoliticsHome*, 24 January.

[192] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 3.

[193] Ibid.

are attacked on account of their constrictive effect on British economic progress too.[194] Cameronites like Willetts believed that the road to Tory renewal in the late 1990s was 'offering' a Tory 'version of identity politics', in response to Labour's, in order to 'modernise' the Conservatives.[195] Cameron's 'A-list candidates' was an example of positive discrimination with the aim of changing the 'image' of the Conservative Party as a party with women, gay, and ethnic minority candidates.[196] Whereas the Cameronites concern is to keep the Party apace with the frenetic changes in the social and cultural world, the NNR 'turn to economics whenever they need a conclusive reason for their policies'.[197] However, as Scruton continues, non-economic affairs are important for the NNR because they 'are acutely aware that our civil inheritance can no longer be taken for granted'.[198] Britain's civil inheritance is thus threatened both by anti-market socialisation and the proliferation of 'identity politics' into the cultural fabric of the country.

A key piece of 'identity politics' which divides the NNR is gay rights. One of the hallmarks of both Cameronism's social inclusiveness and 'modernisation' agenda was shifting the Conservative Party's attitudes towards same-sex couples, illustrated by Cameron's distancing of the Party's association with the Thatcher Government's 'Section 28' legislation. The NNR were divided on the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill. Skidmore and Truss supported the Bill on the basis that extending marriage to same sex couples was consistent with both the NNR's anti-statism (i.e. the state is not an arbiter of moral beliefs) and Cameronism's

---

[194] See Kwarteng, *Ghosts of Empire*; Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 3.

[195] Willetts, 'Conservative Renewal', 117.

[196] R. McIlveen. 2009. 'Ladies of the Right: An Interim Analysis of the A-list', *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 19 (2): 147-157.

[197] Scruton, 'Postmodern Tories'.

[198] Ibid.

inclusiveness and broadening of conservative institutions (decontesting gay marriage as one not of 'equality' but of 'commitment').[199] Kwarteng, Patel, and Raab who voted against the Bill, did so on the same anti-statist justifications as Skidmore and Truss. Raab invoked negative liberty in claiming that, 'in the...spirit of tolerance, I want to protect churches and other religious institutions from being forced to conduct ceremonies that run counter to their faith'.[200] It is also, as befitting Conservative ideologies, a decontestation of rights as an unequal and hierarchical arrangement: the protection of *prior* and *organic* rights over *later* and *artificial* rights (i.e. the religious right prior to minority relationship-recognition right; the market right prior to the welfare right). The NNR's decontestation of rights is applied its belief in the superiority of ancient liberties (against the Human Rights Act), the protection of the unwritten constitution (from EU law), and the wisdom of the common law tradition. The NNR claim that, 'The expansion of the British state since 1997 has eroded freedom, democratic accountability and meritocracy in this country'.[201] They lament the Blair Government's erosion of civil liberties, and the undermining of the rule of law changing 'clear principles and predictable rules to be applied by the courts in concrete cases, into a series of complex regulations which are themselves liable to obfuscation by further judicial legislation'.[202] NNR Tories are joined by other Tories like Eleanor Laing, Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons and member of the FEG, who resent Cameronism's imposition of 'social change through "diktat"'. Laing argues that, '"social change should come about by evolution, not by diktat from the top of

---

[199] Cameron, 'Conference Speech of 2011'.

[200] D. Raab. 2012. 'The Government wants its same-sex marriage safeguards to work. So it mustn't appease the Strasbourg Court', *ConservativeHome*, 12 December.

[201] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 182.

[202] Ibid, 17

government."'[203] The problem of (social) change for the NNR is addressed as support for change that is 'evolutionary' or organic, thus producing thin rights, and against the unsafe change imposed on society by government fiat or diktat, which is the motor for thick rights.

4. Responsibility: 'Master-Super-Concept'

As discussed, the central feature of contemporary Conservative ideologies is a defence of a limited, narrow and minimalistic conception of politics. This finds expression in the three core features of the ideology of the NNR: a re-neoliberalisation of British society; anti-social marketisation, and a commitment to small government. One of the more fascinating aspects of the NNR's conceptual field is that Conservatism's limited politics is articulated in its elevated status of the concept of responsibility. Responsibility is decontested as to coalesce with a core concept of neoliberal ideology: the self-regulating market, which for Conservative decontestations rewards thrift, self-reliance, entrepreneurship and (fiscal/financial) responsibility.[204] A nominally adjacent concept in the ideologies of Conservatism, responsibility features as the NNR's version of Cameronism's Big Society: a micro-core realisation of O'Sullivan's observation that a defence of limited politics constitutes the meso-core feature of contemporary Conservative ideologies. Responsibility is both what Freeden calls a 'master-concept' and 'super-concept', the latter not dissimilar to William Connolly's notion of a 'cluster

---

[203] N. Watt. 2013. 'Cameron's 'social change by diktat' hurting Conservatives, Tory warns', *The Guardian*, 1 March.

[204] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 5.

concept', in NNR's political thinking.[205] By 'master-concept', Freeden refers to a core concept that has elevated import, in weight and salience, within a corpus of work around which the theory is organised. It is different however, to Freeden's concept of core concepts: [206] one of the core concepts, the master-concept, is considerably inflated in relation to the others. In that regard, concepts such as liberty, markets, meritocracy, choice, competition and so forth, are putative core concepts of the NNR, but responsibility is inflated above and beyond these in terms of weighting and salience. It is furthermore a 'super-concept' 'that embraces a number of otherwise separately identifiable constitutive concepts, each of which has an important historical and contemporary existence on its own, but each of which can be decontested in multiple ways'.[207] Responsibility, decontested specifically as 'financial responsibility',[208] for the NNR, embraces the three features discussed: the concept of the market decontested as a *realistic* illimitable self-regulating panacea; the concept of the social decontested negatively as an impediment to economic efficiency; and the concept of government decontested as small, limited, and problematic. Hence, responsibility is a recurring and consistent feature of Conservative discourse and praxis, featuring prominently in Thatcherite and Cameronite discourses. The decontestation of responsibility, for the NNR, is one that purports to believe and celebrate individual, fiscal, welfare and economic responsibility as the foundational unit for responsibility within their families, communities, and their country. Obstacles to responsibility include social

---

[205] Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 18, 70; See Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse*.

[206] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 77-78.

[207] Freeden, *Political Theory of Political Thinking*, 70.

[208] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 3.

explanations of causal failure, multiculturalism,[209] attempts to promote social justice, economic redistribution, and the comprehensivisation of secondary education. The NNR's ideology is easily decodable, with responsibility its master and super concept articulated in their emphasis on the importance of a return to neoliberal certainties in the realm of the political economy; their resistance to social incursions that amount to a socialised curtailment of the market society, and they are largely ambiguous regarding Cameronite social progressivism. This ideology benefits from being buttressed by a proselytising and converting mentality, expressed in Truss' claim that 'when a case is made, public opinion can and will shift',[210] that consistently translates its complex ideology into simple precepts: tax cuts, accelerated spending cuts, and the removal of bureaucratic barriers to growth.

5. Conclusion: Conservative Languages

The second decade of the twenty-first century in Britain is a decade potentially ripe for the flourishing of Conservative, both big and small 'c', values. Crewe concluded that, although the Thatcher Governments were electorally successful and politically dominant, there was no evidence which indicated a corresponding inculcation of Thatcherite values among the electorate. Things have changed however.[211] *British Attitude Surveys*, during and after the financial crisis, have revealed attitudes, especially towards the economy, the role of the state, and

---

[209] Ibid, 20.

[210] Truss, 'My generation of Tories takes its lead from the radical Margaret Thatcher'; Interview with Truss, 4 November 2013.

[211] Crewe, '"Has the Electorate become Thatcherite?"' 25-49.

immigration, attuned to NNR ideology forcing one *Guardian* columnist to write that 'Britain', in 2010, was 'more Thatcherite...than in the 80s'.[212] The notion that attitudes are becoming more anti-statist and anti-collectivist, in both the social and economic realm, are supported in the British Social Attitude Surveys (BSA). The 2013 BSA, announced that 'Britain's moral outlook', as well as its attitudes to 'the welfare state,' are 'affected by individualisation'.[213] This is especially true of 'generation Y', 'Thatcher's Children', attributable in part because 'postwar collectivism is increasingly but a distant memory, and the free-market worldview handed on from Thatcher...is seemingly as ordinary and immovable as the weather'.[214] Furthermore, echoing the NNR, 'Britain is more inclined than it was in the 1980s to feel that people should stand on their own two feet economically, and is less likely to favour increased spending on welfare benefits'.[215] The NNR are potentially, supported by the findings of the BSA survey, the by-product and expression of a decade-long 'shift to the Right'. As the BSA puts it, 'the electorate were nearly as 'right-wing' in 2009 as 1979, the year that Mrs Thatcher came to office...It suggests that the public are now less supportive of 'big government' than at any time since the late 1970s'.[216] The NNR therefore think the climate of opinion chimes with their anti-statist and anti-collectivist tune. They celebrate that, 'Since the pre-credit crunch noughties, there has been less concern about just

---

[212] Curtis, 'Britain 'More Thatcherite Now than in the 80s' says Survey'; Kwarteng, et al, *Britannia Unchained*, 109.

[213] A. Park, C. Bryson, E. Clery, J. Curtice, and M. Phillips. 2013. 'Key Findings', In *British Social Attitudes: The 30th Report*, edited by A. Park, C. Bryson, E. Clery, J. Curtice, and M. Phillips. London: NatCen Social Research, ix, x.

[214] J. Harris. 2013. 'Generation Y: why young voters are backing the Conservatives', *The Guardian*, 26 June; J. Ball and Clark, T. 2013. 'Generation Self: What Do Young People Really Care About?' *The Guardian*, 11 March.

[215] Park, et al, "Key findings", xviii.

[216] J. S. Bartle, D. Avellaneda. and J. A. Stimson. 2010. 'Post-War British Public Opinion: Is There a Political Centre?' In *British Social Attitudes: The 27th Report: Exploring Labour's Legacy*, edited by A. Park, J. Curtice, E. Clery, C. Bryson. London: SAGE, 216.

and fair outcomes'.[217] This qualified nonchalance towards the disparity of socio-economic outcomes was not altered by the government's rescuing of the banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis contrary to the Left's belief that it would spark, because of their discourse of 'market failure', a 'renewal of enthusiasm for more active government'.[218] On other issues of British politics, the NNR reflects a mainstream: a hardening of attitudes towards social welfare and economic redistributionism supporting a clear 'hierarchy of desert';[219] a hardening of attitudes towards immigration with 48% of public opinion believing immigration 'undermined' Britain's cultural life;[220] and 'Euroscepticism is firmly in the ascendancy' with 67% of public opinion wanting Britain to either to leave - or renegotiate its relationship with - the EU.[221] A more unambiguous long-term social development for the NNR is the 'continued increase in liberal attitudes towards a range of issues such as abortion, homosexuality, same-sex marriage and euthanasia' (Lee, 2012: 182),[222] partly because individually, they arrive at different judgements on these issues, from the same starting point, of an anti-statism increasingly popular in Britain.

As social attitudes have shifted, Conservative languages have shifted too. As argued above, Cameronism and the NNR occupy the same semantic field,

---

[217] Kwarteng, et al, *After the Coalition*, 19.

[218] J. Curtice and A. Park, 'A Tale of Two Crises: Banks, MPs' Expenses and Public Opinion', In *The 27th Report*, 150.

[219] N. Pearce and E. Taylor, 'Government Spending and Welfare', In *The 30th Report*, 79; A. Park, E. Clery, J. Curtice, M. Phillips, and D. Utting. 2012. 'Key Findings', In *British Social Attitudes 29*: *The 29th Report*, edited by A. Park, E. Clery, J. Curtice, M. Phillips, and D. Utting. London: NatCen Social Research, ii, ix.

[220] R. Ford, G. Morrell and A. Heath, 'Immigration: 'Fewer but better'? Public views about immigration', In *The 29th Report*, 26-44.

[221] Park, et al, 'Key findings', xv.

[222] L. Lee. 2012. 'Religion: Losing faith?' In *British Social Attitudes 28: The 28th Report*, edited by A. Park, E. Clery, J. Curtice, M. Phillips, and D. Utting. London: SAGE, 182.

emerging, from within the family of Conservative ideologies. As the Coalition Government has evolved, the original and earlier emphasis, despite the preponderance of deficit reduction, on the Big Society, localism, and communities, has been marginalised with a language not discordant with the leitmotifs of the NNR, concerned with freedom, enterprise, deregulation, liberation and an increasingly decontested narrow, fiscal account of responsibility.[223] Indeed the percipient observer of Conservative theatre, Tim Montgomerie, noted that, 'The next election represents a different challenge for Tory strategists [to the election of 2010]. By 2015, voters are likely to see the Tories as a party of deficit reduction, welfare control and Euroscepticism'.[224] Cameron has stressed, in 2012-2014, the 'global race' associated with: '"jobs", "wealth", "growth", "trade", "talent", "technology", "skills", "capital", "competitiveness"..."influence", "innovation", "investment", "investment opportunities", "recovery"'.[225] Osborne celebrates the 'march of the makers', 'the workers' and 'the strivers' against 'the shirkers' and 'the skivers', forcing Britain to become more economically-competitive, resulting in support for zero-hour contracts, punitive welfare attitudes to claimants, and a creeping unprecedented mainstream hostility towards government. Cameron, at the beginning of his leadership of the Conservative Party, postured as the 'heir to Disraeli'. In Coalition, Cameron turns Right on his erstwhile mentor's One Nation vision towards an intellectually-febrile, aggressively neoliberal Conservatism that seeks to ensconce and embellish the market society by re-neoliberalising the economy,

---

[223] 'Leader: The Cameroon dream fades as the new right continues to rise', *NewStatesman*, 17 July 2014.

[224] T. Montgomerie. 2013. 'Five ways to widen the Tory appeal and win', *The Times*, 29 July.

[225] A. Beckett. 2013. 'What is the 'global race'?' *The Observer*, 22 September.

delimiting the socialisation of markets, and restraining the 'new Left' legacy of 'identity politics' that smothers both individualism, and extends the frontier of the political.

'The centre-right in British politics', Raab claims, 'needs to build a compelling, substantive and coherent narrative...at a time of austerity'.[226] The narrative of the NNR, Raab believes, is the most ideologically appealing and convincing narrative in which 'greater socio-economic equality, through social engineering, re-distribution of wealth and positive discrimination' is matched by the NNR's 'alternative vision', namely one that 'champions the underdog, breaks through glass ceilings, and re-defines the mandate of an 'enabling state' to maximise social mobility'.[227] In turn, the NNR hope to replace 'the left's dependency culture with a 'leg up' culture that rewards self-help and prizes personal responsibility'.[228] The NNR potentially provides the ideological template for the next generation of Conservatism therefore. It is the latest expression of a limited conception of the political that is at the very core of Conservative ideologies. In 2014, the NNR is a subsidiary contribution to the myriad of post-financial crisis/post-GR Western Conservative responses that conforms to the promotion of limited politics: the Randian 'disorganised, devolved, amorphous' Tea Party caucus of the US Republican Party;[229] the Lutheran Christian Democracy of Angela Merkel's austerian economics; and the austerity-Big Society nexus of Cameron's Conservative-led Coalition. Despite the Conservative electoral dominance in Europe, problems for the theory and practice of

---

[226] Raab, *Meritocrat's Manifesto*, 18.

[227] Ibid.

[228] Ibid.

[229] O'Sullivan, 'Conservatism', 307.

Conservatism still abound. One of the central problems for ideologies of Conservatism revolves around the problem of change and conservation. This problem is just as acute for the NNR. Scruton notices that the thought-practices of the NNR seek to 'conserve a country and its institutions',[230] but the NNR do 'not answer' the question: 'just what is the country, this Britain, that they wish to conserve?' The NNR postures as 'New Radicals', or as Kwarteng calls this group 'Tory Radicals',[231] rhetorically more incendiary and more consistently neoliberal than the Thatcherites of the 1980s, wanting to upend the purported progressive consensus in British society, which has developed over time since the fall of Thatcher.[232] The battle for the future of Conservatism, between the ONR, the Cameronites, UKIP and the NNR, is a debate as much about the past as it is about the future therefore. With Truss in Cameron's Cabinet serving as Environment Secretary and Patel as Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury, the NNR have an opportunity to promote their vision of Britain further: a future that lies in its neoliberal past and free market values, shorn of its Cameronite pro-social modifications, and underpinned by greater individual fiscal responsibility.

---

[230] Scruton, 'Postmodern Tories'.

[231] An allusion to Nigel Lawson's use of the term 'Tory radical' in Lawson, *The View from No. 11*; Interview with Kwarteng.

[232] Interview with Kwarteng.

Conclusion: W(h)ither Cameronism?

The thesis has examined the immediate Thatcher and post-Thatcher antecedents to; the various formulations of, and the emerging challenges to, Cameronism. The overriding theme of the thesis has been to interrogate the ideological thought-practices of Cameronism in relation to the problem of ideology *per se*, and specifically to the problematic legacy of Thatcherism.

I have focused on four themes and developments. The *first theme* relates to the *problematic ideological legacy of Thatcherism*. The problem, for successor ideological thought-patterns of Conservatism and the Conservative Party, is one of a gap, sometimes perceived, begrudgingly acknowledged, or totally ignored, between Thatcherism's moralistic *intentions* and its hyper-libertarian, free market *outcomes*. This tension between intentions and outcomes in Thatcherism has been the chief contributory ideological cause of Conservative crisis. Successful Conservative renewal had, at the very least, to attend to these negative outcomes.

The *second theme* of the thesis focused on the particular Conservative conceptualisations and responses to the post-Thatcher crisis of Conservatism. For the last two decades of the twentieth and the first decade and a half of the twenty first century, Conservatism has been animated and transfixed by the core of Thatcherism; namely that the redesigning of politics, and the objective of realising a limited conception of politics, best conforms to, or is best delivered by, the re-creation and celebration of the market society. This vision however, needed ideological supplementation if Conservatism was going to overcome the negative outcomes of Thatcherism, and remain ideologically influential and electorally attractive, via the Conservative Party, as a political ideology. Commentators have

correctly observed that Cameronism, unlike New Labour, was absent of a moment that you could describe as a ''Clause IV' moment'. Although the embrace of the Big Society came close, Cameronism was a supplementation, and not a rejection, of previous Conservative ideological thought-patterns. Buckler and Dolowitz argue that Cameronism's 'Clause IV moment' would derive from, and be signalled by, 'the repudiation of Thatcherism'.[1] Cameron himself claimed however, that there would be 'no Clause 4' under his leadership and this was because Cameron 'thought that in all the big arguments Thatcher and Major were on the right side, and Labour was on the wrong side. And Thatcher won the argument'.[2] In this context, post-Thatcher (and particularly Cameronite) Conservatism, in temporally reworking some of its conceptual commitments, sought to go beyond Thatcherism's commitment to *further* retrenchments of the central state; the state was decontested as bureaucratic, bloated, irresponsible, distant, and, with later Cameronite formulations of anti-statism, it was decontested as being anti-progressive, and the enemy of social progress.[3] Even if the language and articulation of anti-statism changed, the hostility and rhetorical vilification of the central state remained. It was in the two other areas of Conservative ideological renewal where quasi-ideological departures from Thatcherism was taking place. Neoliberal economics was not dumped but qualified with lots of complex caveats and conceptual add-ons. Conservatives worried that Conservatism, and the Conservative Party by extension, was becoming too economistic. The languages of markets, profit and enterprise was increasingly being supplemented by the

---

[1] Buckler and Dolowitz, 'Ideology Matters', 586.

[2] D. Cameron. 2005. 'Leadership launch speech', 29 September.; Cameron in Jones, *Cameron on Cameron: Conversations with Dylan Jones*, 34; Reyes, 'A New Political Landscape', 83.

[3] Griffiths, 'What was Progressive in 'Progressive Conservatism'?' 29-40.

languages of citizenship, institutions and responsibility. Willetts' Civic Conservatism attempted to situate the market economy in 'the context of institutions and values which make up civil society' in the 1990s and 2000s.[4] In Cameronism, the dual necessity and insufficiency of neoliberalism was articulated in a range of ideas from the belief in 'moral capitalism', to the brief flirtation with social justice, to the emphasis on the protection of existing public expenditure patterns for some public services. These qualifications were important insofar as Conservatism gradually acknowledged the insufficiency of neoliberal economics in delivering broader Conservative ends. Thatcherism's supposed unqualified support for neoliberalism was perceived to have enervated the 'civic virtues' of British society as a consequence of its determination to promote the 'vigorous virtues' of the market society. As a response, Conservatism's third formative feature was to reinvigorate its interest in the social, civil society, and the renewal of the intermediary institutions and sentiments that, according to its decontestation of society, are situated between the conformist state and the possessive individual. Along with the civic-inspired, 'neighbourly' Conservatism promulgated by Willetts and Letwin, other formulations of the same theme included Chris Patten's Christian Democracy; David Hunt's social market economy; and Douglas Hurd's 'active citizenship' and 'Tory democracy' shibboleths. Cameronite formulations were both more numerous and thoughtful: (negatively-defined) localism; Conservative communitarianism; social responsibility; socio-centrism, and the Big Society. The renewal of civil society was important because (1) it was presented as an alternative to state intervention as the better response to both unqualified neoliberalism and Thatcherism's free market radical outcomes; and

[4] Willetts, 'Civic Conservatism', 94-95.

(2) civil society was decontested as a softer and more ideologically-accepted mirror-image to the state than the market *ipso facto*.

These three feature are formative in the renewal of Conservatism after Thatcher, and are especially vivid, consistently-articulated, and explicit in the political thought-practices of Cameronism. The *third theme* has been explored by looking at the ways in which these ideological adjustments have been transacted into practice. Chapters four and five deal specifically with two different aspects of what one might call 'Cameronism in practice'. Chapter four demonstrated (1) that the Big Society was seen as being consanguineous with, and deliverable through, a smaller and reduced state, in terms of size and scope, in the form of austerity; and (2) these two-micro core realisations of Cameronite Conservatism, austerity and the Big Society, are concrete applications of the three formative strands of Conservatism detailed in chapter three. Cameronism's ideological adaptations to the Liberal Democrats in the context of the Coalition Government offer a further glimpse of Cameronism in practice. Successfully and resoundingly, the Coalition Government is a coalition only in name. Apart from occasional ideological concessions, the thesis documents that the overriding ideological claims, objectives and themes are Conservative. Despite the preponderance of liberal rhetoric, the substantive aims of the Coalition are overwhelmingly derivable from Conservative ideology.

Despite the ideological coherence of Cameronism, and the more debatable success of Cameronism in the Coalition, the *fourth theme* is the emergence of a particular and highly-confident post-Cameronite Conservatism in the form of the New New Right. This is not the only challenge to Cameronism. Both the 'first generation' of Thatcherites, who still contest Cameronism's pro-social

commitments and its understated support for neoliberalism, and UKIP's retro-Conservatism, pose significant ideological challenges to Cameronism's predominance over Conservative visions. Nevertheless, the NNR present a more ideologically-thoughtful, passionate and innovative challenge to Cameronism. It exposes the precariousness of Cameronism's distinctive ideological cocktail of anti-statism, qualified neoliberalism, and enthusiasm for civil society. Another source of danger for Cameronism was the GFC, in which its own narrative of austerity threatened to undo the rebalancing of Conservatism. Whilst Cameronism consistently conceptualised austerity as the route to the Big Society, the NNR began to 'eclipse' Cameronism with its own ideological map that argued for: (1) a re-neoliberalisation of British society; (2) a rearguard action against 'anti-market socialisation', and (3) a complete rejection of thick conception of social rights.

With less than five years into his premiership, it may only be a matter of months until we have the total number of days of the Cameron premiership. Nevertheless, a pause is necessary to consider one final question: is Cameronism undone? In answering this, I would like to use British Conservatism's recent past to give insight into its not so distant future. A set of contradictions will illustrate the complexities involved in trying to track Conservatism's possible course of action. First, Cameronite Conservatism has given unrivalled predominance to the importance of civil society, which distinguishes it from previous Conservatisms. However, with the onset of austerity and the alacrity with which the Cameron Government has slashed the state, it gives the impression that Conservatism has not 'truly and conclusively' moved beyond the languages and praxes of Thatcherism.[5] The pursuit of 'rolling back the state' has been *the* Conservative

[5] d'Ancona, 'Last chance saloon', 22; Marquand, *Mammon's Kingdom*, 51.

leitmotif for over four decades and Cameronism has merely succumbed to this ideological path-dependency. Second, the subduing of market triumphalism was a formative tenet of Cameronism. Yet, other ideologies in the Conservative movement, such as the NNR, promote the idea of unrestricted markets and the ethics of neoliberalism beyond that ever countenanced by Thatcherism. Third, the Cameronite vision of state retrenchment and the civilising of market ethics as dual routes to the Big Society remains the most ideologically-vivid and potent vision in British politics. Indeed, as Gamble has argued, there has been minimal 'dissent, radicalism or resistance' to the Conservative orthodox discourse of 'debt, retrenchment and austerity'.[6] However, the Conservatives operate in a so-called 'Labour age', in which the Conservative Party has both failed to win an outright majority since April 1992, and has been implementing a nominally Labour, Centre-Left, and social democratic agenda. The intellectual coordinator of the NNR predicted that historians, looking back on the Cameron era, 'will say that Britain lived through a Labour-dominated era of British politics'.[7] At the time of writing this, a Conservative outright majority, whilst not impossible, is a highly improbable outcome of the General Election of 2015. Even though the Cameron Government has presided over an economic recovery (triumphantly hailed as the 'Great Revival'), in which it hopes a rising economic tide will lift all boats, it may prove to be a 'voteless recovery', very much akin to 1997.[8]

These paradoxes may mark the death of Cameronism, or it may mark the beginning of 'Cameronism 2.0'. Beech correctly noted that Cameronism is not a

---

[6] Gamble, *Crisis Without End?* 7.

[7] Interview with Kwarteng.

[8] d'Ancona, *In It Together*, 52.

'watertight ideology'.[9] No ideology is. Ideologies mutate, permute and change. Cameronism is, like any ideology, adaptable. Cameronism is conditioned by the ideological inheritances and environments in which it operates. Indeed, as discussed in chapter three, Cameronism is to some degree a prisoner of a Thatcherite ideological past. Nevertheless, *contra* Hayton,[10] Thatcherism hasn't so much restricted the parameters within which British Conservatism can renew and adapt itself, but Thatcherism's vision of the market society remains, to the 2010 generation of Conservative politicians, a much more ideologically clear, resonant and attractive formulation of Conservatism than Cameronism. The neo-Thatcherite political thought-practices of the NNR uncovered in chapter six are evidence of this. The degree to which the Cameronite nexus of anti-statism-qualified market economics-Big Society is disbanded is questionable. The NNR double-down on anti-statism; they discard the qualifications attached to the consequences of neoliberalism, and they discard Cameronism's interest in civil society and pro-social visions of Conservatism. If one looks to the future in terms of Conservative intentions for the future, it would seem that Cameronism (mark 1?) has been *eclipsed* by other Conservatisms. It may mark the beginnings of Cameronism 2.0 insofar as semblances of its earlier manifestations remain whilst others are discarded. Facing an intellectually impressive and ideologically-ambitious Labour Party under Ed Miliband, the Conservative Party under Cameron is heading further to the Right. The evidence for this is wide-ranging. Cowling once wrote that a 'Conservative government should wish to dismantle some part of existing governmental machinery'. [11] Dismantlement is an apt

---

[9] Beech, 'A Tale of Two Liberalisms', 269.

[10] See Hayton, *Reconstructing Conservatism?*

[11] M. Cowling. 1968. 'Intellectuals and the Tory Party', *The Spectator*, 8 March.

characterisation of Conservative intentions going into 2015. Beyond 2015, the attempt to shrink the (social) state is predictably going to gather apace with senior Conservatives, like Cameron and Osborne, desiring a 'permanently smaller state' (a long-desired Tory aspiration of 35% of GDP), and an unprecedented squeeze on public expenditure, which, as Gooby and Stoker remind us, envisages a smaller role for the state than in the United States.[12] This is part of a broader intellectual movement on the Right that endeavours to 'set the people free', and envisages the completion of Thatcherism's market society vision as part of the 'fourth revolution' to replace remaining social rights with market 'individual rights', which will finally kill off statist instincts, and any remnant ambitions to recreate Leviathan.[13] Further reductions to welfare are to pay for the continued flattening and lowering of income and corporation taxes. Measures to re-neoliberalise Britain include the imposition of further obstacles to trade union strike rules;[14] and further liberalisations, fragmentations, and quasi-markets systems in the 'inescapable core' of the state such as further proposed privatisations, and further fragmentations of England's public services. Contrary to Cameronism's attempt to reengineer Conservative interest in society and the social, the Conservative Party have promised a referendum on membership of the EU on the basis that Britons did not properly assent to a 'social Europe', which ostensibly forces through social protections and regulations, for Britain, to soften the consequences of the market society. Even if Britain remains in the EU after 2017, the Conservatives plan to gut wide areas of existing regulation, which

---

[12] Gooby and Stoker, 'The Coalition Programme', 14.

[13] J. Micklethwait and A. Wooldridge. 2014. *The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State*. London: Allen Lane, 267-268.

[14] HC Deb, Col. 292 9 July 2014.

jeopardise the entire progressive legislative achievements of the twentieth and twenty first century.[15] Serious flirtations with communitarian models of societal relations, or latent scepticism of economic rationalism, have been forgotten, and largely ideologically-snatched by Labour.[16]

The 2015 General Election is likely to see the most divergent ideological offerings, with vivid competing 'national stories', between the Conservatives and Labour since 1983. Whilst the Conservatives look Right to the deregulation of labour practices and permanent austerity with a permanently smaller state comparable to the size of the state in the 1930s; for-profit state schools; the further fragmentation of the NHS; withdrawal from the European Court of Human Rights, and a creeping European isolationism, Labour looks Left to an activist state with its promise of energy-price freezes, higher minimum wages, abolition of zero-hour contracts, rent controls and guarantees; a concerted effort to narrow socio-economic inequalities by predistributing and reworking market models, which all amounts to the most significant and coherent ideological challenge to Thatcherism yet seen.[17] The Conservatives contrast their political recipe with the Milibandite political recipe as a choice between Labour 'chaos' vs. Tory 'competence'.[18] The Cameron Conservative-led Coalition Government has delivered a smaller state; an acceptance - ambiguous at best, and enthusiastic at worst - of the neoliberal economic settlement, and has failed to fully realise its

---

[15] K. Rawlinson. 2014. 'David Blunkett quits as MP amid election warning for Labour', *The Guardian*, 21 June.

[16] D. Goodhart. 2014. 'A Postliberal Future?' *Demos Quarterly* 1: 1-54.

[17] M. Hasan and J. Macintyre. 2012. *Ed: The Milibands and the Making of a Labour Leader*. London: Biteback, 288; A. Beckett. 2013. 'Could Ed Miliband be Labour's Margaret Thatcher?' *The Guardian*, 16 January; Interview with Wood.

[18] For representative example see D. Cameron. 2015. 'The choice is between Tory competence and Labour chaos', *The Daily Telegraph*, 7 February 2015.

earlier ambitions of renewing the civic realm of Britain.[19] Cameronism may be on the brink of being eclipsed. Nevertheless, *Cameronism is a coherent ideology of Conservatism*, with identifiable combinatory features, which have with varying degrees of success been applied into practice and will, undoubtedly, bequeath to the Conservative Party, Conservatism and Britain, a complex and seemingly confused legacy.

[19] H. Reed. 2010. 'Osbornomics', *Renewal: A Journal of Social Democracy* 18 (1/2): 79.

Bibliography

The bibliography contains works either cited in the text or works that have significantly shaped the interpretation offered in the thesis. Identified works are listed alphabetically by author. Within each author's list, items are arranged first by year and then, within each year, alphabetically by title.

1. Interviews

Phillip Blond (18th January 2012; 4th November 2013)

Samuel Brittan (15th August 2008)

Jon Cruddas MP (3rd December 2013)

Nick Hurd MP (24th September 2013)

Danny Kruger (12th September 2013)

Kwasi Kwarteng MP (14th October 2013; 4th November 2013)

Oliver Letwin MP (17th June 2009)

Jesse Norman MP (22nd September 2009)

Polly Toynbee (3rd September 2013)

Elizabeth Truss MP (4th November 2013)

David Willetts MP (22nd October 2008; 9th December 2013)

Stewart Wood (4th November 2013)

2. Private Papers

Conservative Party Archive, Bodleian Library, Oxford

The Thatcher Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge

The Thatcher Archive, Margaret Thatcher Foundation

3. Unpublished Works

Byrne, C., 'Neo-liberalisms in British Politics', Ph.D thesis, University of Birmingham, 2014.

Cohen, G. A., 'A Truth in Conservatism: Rescuing Conservatism from the Conservatives', unpublished paper, 2004.

Freeden, M., 'Is liberalism on the road to perdition?', *John Milton Fellowship Annual Lecture*, February 2014.

Kelly, P., 'Orange book Conservatism - On the Relationship between Conservatism and Liberalism'. Paper presented at *The New Conservatism Conference* at the London School of Economics, 26 November 2010.

Reyes, O., 'Skinhead Conservatism: The Failure of Contemporary British Populism', unpublished essay, Exeter University, 2002.

4. Speeches

Balls, E., 'Speech to the Fabian Society', 25 January 2014.

Balls, E., 'Beyond the Third Way', Speech, 30 June 2014.

Blond, P., 'The Future of Conservatism', Speech to ResPublica, 26 November 2009.

Brown, G., 'Conference Speech', 29 September 2009.

Cable, V., 'Speech on Industrial Strategy', 11 September 2012.

Cameron, D., ‘Practical Conservatism’, Sir Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture, Centre for Policy Studies, 10 March 2005.

Cameron, D., ‘We’re All in it Together’, Speech to Policy Exchange, 29 June 2005.

Cameron, D., ‘Speech on Public Service Reform’, 9 September 2005.

Cameron, D., ‘Leadership launch speech’, 29 September 2005.

Cameron, D., ‘Leadership Victory Speech’, 6 December 2005.

Cameron, D., ‘Speech on Modern Conservatism’, Speech to Demos, 30 January 2006.

Cameron, D., ‘Improving Society’s Sense of Well Being is Challenge of our Times’, Google Zeitgeist Speech, 22 May 2006.

Cameron, D., ‘The importance of family life’, Speech, 21 June 2006.

Cameron, D., ‘Conference Speech’, 4 October 2006.

Cameron, D., ‘Tackling Poverty is a Social Responsibility’, The Scarman Lecture, 24 November 2006.

Cameron, D., ‘A Liberal Conservative Consensus to Restore Trust in Politics’, Speech, 22 March 2007.

Cameron, D., ‘Empowering local communities can heal our broken society’, speech, 5 July 2007.

Cameron, D., ‘Speech to the LSE’, 10 September 2007.

Cameron, D., ‘Living within our means’, Speech, 19 May 2008.

Cameron, D., ‘Conference Speech’, 1 October 2008.

Cameron, D., ‘Fixing our Broken Society’, Speech, 7 July 2008.

Cameron, D., ‘Making progressive conservatism a reality’, Speech to Demos, 22 January 2009.

Cameron, D., ‘We need popular capitalism’, Speech to Davos, 30 January 2009.

Cameron, D., ‘The Age of Austerity’, Speech, 26 April 2009.

Cameron, D., Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 8 October 2009.

Cameron, D., ‘The Big Society’, The Hugo Young Lecture, 10 November 2009.

Cameron, D., ‘Launch Speech of ResPublica’, 26 November 2009.

Cameron, D., ‘Speech launching the 2010 Conservative Manifesto’, 31 March 2010.

Cameron, D., ‘Speech’, 7 May 2010.

Cameron, D., ‘We must tackle Britain’s massive deficit and growing debt’, Speech, 7 June 2010.

Cameron, D., ‘Big Society Speech’, 19 July 2010.

Cameron, D., ‘Conference Speech, 6 October 2010.

Cameron, D., ‘New Year Message’, 31 December 2010.

Cameron, D., ‘Speech to World Economic Forum Annual Meeting’, 28 January 2011.

Cameron, D., ‘Speech at Munich Security Conference’, 5 February 2011.

Cameron, D., ‘Big Society Speech’, 15 February 2011.

Cameron, D., ‘Speech on the Big Society’, 23 May 2011.

Cameron, D., ‘Conference Speech’, 5 October 2011.

Cameron, D., ‘Speech on Moral Capitalism’, 19 January 2012.

Cameron, D., ‘Conference Speech’, 10 October 2012.

Cameron, D., ‘Speech on the Economy’, 7 March 2013.

Cameron, D., ‘Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech’, 11 November 2013.

Cameron, D., ‘Speech on Families’, 18 August 2014.

Cameron, D., ‘Conference Speech’, 1 October 2014.

Clegg, N., ‘Leadership Victory Speech’, 18 December 2007.

Clegg, N., Speech on New Politics, 19 May 2010.

Clegg, N., ‘Speech on an Open, Confident Society: The Application of Muscular Liberalism in a Multicultural Society’, 3 March 2011.

Clegg, N., ‘Spring Conference Speech’, 14 March 2014.

Clegg, N., ‘Opportunity for Everyone’, Speech, 9 June 2014.

Cruddas, J., ‘The Role of the State in the Good Society’, Speech, 13 December 2012.

Dorrell, S., ‘Redefining the Mixed Economy’, Speech to the Centre for Policy Studies, 23 November 1992.

Duncan Smith, I., ‘Conference Speech’, 15 September 2003.

Duncan Smith, I., ‘Renewing Conservatism: Lessons from Britain’, Speech to The Heritage Foundation, 9 April 2009.

Hague, W., ‘Freedom and the Family’, Speech to the Social Market Foundation, 29 January 1998.

Lamont, N., ‘Resignation Speech’, 9 June 1993.

Lawson, N., ‘The New Conservatism’, Speech to the Bow Group, 4 August 1980.

Letwin, O., ‘Cameron’s Conservatism’, Speech to Policy Exchange, 8 May 2007.

Letwin, O., ‘Speech on the Role of the State’, Institute for Government, 13 May 2014.

Lilley, P., ‘Butler Memorial Lecture’, 20 April 1999.

Major, J., ‘Conference Speech’, 11 October 1991.

Major, J., ‘The Next Phase of Conservatism: The Privatisation of Choice’, The Adam Smith Institute, 16 June 1992.

Major, J., ‘Conservatism in the 1990s - Our Common Purpose’, Speech to the Carlton Club, 3 February 1993.

Major, J., ‘Conference Speech’, 8 October 1993.

Major, J., ‘Conference Speech’, 14 October 1994.

Major, J., ‘Conference Speech’, 13 October 1995.

Maude, F., ‘The Big Society and the City’, Speech, 20 February 2012.

May, T., ‘Conference Speech’, 9 October 2012.

Miliband, E., ‘Speech to the TUC Rally’, 26 March 2010.

Miliband, E., Speech to Labour’s National Policy Forum, 27 November 2010.

Miliband, E., ‘Speech’, 28 November 2010.

Miliband, E., ‘Rebuilding Britain with a One Nation Economy’, 14 February 2013.

Miliband, E., ‘Conference Speech’, 24 September 2013.

Miliband, E., ‘Speech on the Cost of Living Crisis’, 5 November 2013.

Miliband, E., ‘The Hugo Young Lecture’, 10 February 2014.

Miliband, E., ‘Speech on ‘Generation Rent’’, 1 May 2014.

Miliband, E., ‘A new settlement for a new era’, Speech, 19 July 2014.

Osborne, G., ‘A tax policy that puts stability first’, Speech, 1 June 2006.

Osborne, G., ‘We have to men Britain’s broken society’, Centre for Policy Studies Lecture, 15 July 2008.

Osborne, G., ‘Policy making after the crash’, RSA Speech, 9 April 2009.

Osborne, G., ‘Speech’, 15 September 2009.

Osborne, G., ‘Budget Statement’, 22 June 2010.

Osborne, G., ‘Conference Speech’, 6 October 2012.

Osborne, G., ‘Autumn Statement’, 5 December 2012.

Osborne, G., ‘Chancellor’s Budget Speech’, 20 March 2013.

Osborne, G., ‘Speech on the Economy’, 9 September 2013.

Osborne, G., ‘New Year Economy Speech’, 6 January 2014.

Osborne, G., ‘Speech on Tax and Benefits, 31 March 2014.

Patten, C., ‘Big Battalions and Little Platoons’, The Seventh Arnold Goodman Lecture, 7 June 1990.

Patten, C., ‘Conference Speech’, 8 October 1991.

Portillo, M., ‘Think Twice about Labour’s Doublethink’, The Alan Palmer Lecture, 13 March 1997.

Thatcher, M., ‘Speech to the Institute of SocioEconomic Studies “Let Our Children Grow Tall”, 15 September 1975.

Thatcher, M., ‘Conference Speech’, 10 October 1975.

Thatcher, M., ‘Speech to Zurich Economic Society’, 14 March 1977.

Thatcher, M., ‘Interview for Granada World in Action’, 27 January 1978.

Thatcher, M., ‘Wales Conservative Conference Speech’, 10 June 1978.

Thatcher, M., ‘Speech at a General Election Press Campaign’, 25 April 1979.

Thatcher, M., ‘Radio Interview for London Broadcasting’, 28 April 1979.

Thatcher, M., ‘Remarks on becoming Prime Minister, St Francis’s Prayer’, 4 May 1979.

Thatcher, M., ‘Press Conference for American Correspondents in London’, 25 June 1980.

Thatcher, M., ‘Conference Speech’, 10 October 1980.

Thatcher, M., ‘Remarks on Orgreave picketing’, 30 May 1984.

Thatcher, M., ‘Speech to Joint Houses of Congress’, 20 January 1985.

Thatcher, M., ‘TV Interview for Yorkshire Television Woman to Woman’, 2 October 1985.

Thatcher, M., ‘Conference Speech’, 11 October 1985.

Thatcher, M., ‘Interview for BBC Panorama’, 8 June 1987.

Thatcher, M., ‘Interview for Woman’s Own’, 23 September 1987.

Thatcher, M., ‘Radio Interview for BBC Radio 2 Jimmy Young Programme’, 27 July 1988.

Thatcher, M., ‘Interview for The Age’, 4 August 1988.

Thatcher, M., ‘Speech to General Assembly of the Church of Scotland’, 21 May 1988.

Thatcher, M., ‘Speech to the College of Europe, ‘The Bruges Speech’’, 20 September 1988.

Thatcher, M., ‘Conference Speech’, 14 October 1988.

Thatcher, M., ‘Interview for The Times’, 25 October 1988.

Thatcher, M., ‘Speech to Nottingham European Rally’, 12 June 1989.

Thatcher, M., ‘Scottish Conservative Party Conference Speech’, 12 May 1990.

Thatcher, M., ‘Joint Conference with Hungarian Prime Minister’, 19 September 1990.

Thatcher, M., ‘Statement to the House of Commons’, 30 October 1990.

Thatcher, M., ‘Liberty and Limited Government’, Sir Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture, Centre for Policy Studies, 11 January 1996.

Waldegrave, W., ‘Conference Speech’, 6 October 1992.

Waldegrave, W., ‘Recruiting to the Little Platoons’, Speech to the Social Market Foundation, 9 March 1994.

Waldegrave, W., ‘Conservatism offers Practical Policies for the 1990s’, Speech to the Conservative Political Centre Summer School, 1 July 1994.

Waldegrave, W., ‘John Major has shown how to cut the State down to size’, Speech, Bristol West Conservative Association, 29 July 1994.

Waldegrave, W., ‘A Competitive Nation? Why the Next Election Matters’, Speech to the Conservative Political Centre, 10 October 1995.

Waldegrave, W., ‘The Politics of Public Spending’, Speech to the Conservative Political Centre, 10 October 1996.

Willetts, D., ‘A New Conservatism for a New Century’, Speech to the Social Market Foundation, 2 June 2005.

Willetts, D., ‘Renewing Civic Conservatism’, The Oakeshott Lecture, 20 February 2008.

Willetts, D., ‘What’s the Good of Government?’ Speech to University of East Anglia, 24 May 2012.

Willetts, D., ‘Tory Modernisation 2.0: The Future of the Conservative Party’, Speech to Bright Blue, 28 July 2012.

4. Political Party and Government Publications:

A Future Fair For All: The Labour Party Manifesto 2010 (London: Labour Party, 2010).

Blair, T., ‘Preface’, in *Britain Forward not Back: The Labour Manifesto 2005* (London: Labour Party, 2005), pp. 4-9.

Budget 2010 (London: The Stationary Office, 2010).

Building Britain’s Future (London: HM Government, 2009).

Built to Last (London: Conservative Party, 2006).

Built to Last: The Aims and Values of the Conservative Party (London: Conservative Party, 2006).

Cameron, D., 'Foreword', in *Built to Last: The Aims and Values of the Conservative Party* (London: Conservative Party, 2006), pp. 2-3.

Cameron, D. and N. Clegg, 'Foreword', in *The Coalition: Our Programme for Government* (HM Government: Cabinet Office, 2010), pp. 7-8.

Change That Works For You: Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010 (London: Liberal Democrat, 2010).

Citizen's Britain: Liberal Democratic Policies for a People's Charter (London: Liberal Democrat Party, 1991).

Clark, G. and J. Hunt, *Who's Progressive Now, Why the Conservatives Offer the Best Hope for Progressive Politics* (London: Conservative Party, 2008).

Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 2010 (London: Conservative Party, 2010).

New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better (London: Labour Party, 1997).

Open Public Services: White Paper (London: Cabinet Office, 2011).

Open Public Services 2012 (London: Cabinet Office, 2012).

Open Public Services 2013 (London: Cabinet Office, 2013).

Renewing Civil Society: How Conservatives Will Empower Britain's Good Neighbours (London: Conservative Party, 2001).

Spending Review (London: HM Treasury, 2010).

The Citizen's Charter: Raising the Standard, Cm 1599 (London: Cabinet Office, 1991).

The Coalition: Our Programme for Government (HM Government: Cabinet Office, 2010).

The Coalition: Together in the National Interest: Mid-Term Review (HM Government: Cabinet Office, 2013).

Times for Common Sense: The Conservative Manifesto, 2001 (London: Conservative Party, 2001).

UKIP Manifesto: Empowering the People (Coombes: Imax Design and Print, 2010).

5. Parliamentary Debates

HC Deb. Vol. 123, Col. 1666, 16 December 1852.

HC Deb, Col 143, 16 May 1991.

HC Deb, No. 29, Col. 1189, 3 February 2000.

HC Deb, Col 966, 23 March 2011.

HC Deb, Col. 282, 28 January 2014.

HC Deb, Col. 784, 19 March 2014.

HC Deb, Col. 344, 26 March 2014.

HC Deb, Col. 10, 4 June 2014.

HC Deb, Col. 292, 9 July 2014.

6. Secondary Sources

Adonis, A., 'Transformation of the Conservative Party in the 1980s', in A. Adonis and T. Hames (eds), *A Conservative Revolution: The Thatcher-Reagan Decade in Perspective* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), pp. 145-167.

Adonis, A., *5 Days in May: The Coalition and Beyond* (London: Biteback, 2013).

Ahrendt, D. and K. Young, 'Authoritarianism Updated?' in R. Jowell, J. Curtice, L. Brook, D. Ahrendt with A. Park (eds), *British Social Attitudes: The 11th Report* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 75-93.

Aitken, J., *Margaret Thatcher: Power and Personality* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

Alcock, P., *Social Policy in Britain*, 3rd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

Alcock, P., 'Voluntary Action, New Labour and the 'third sector'', in M. Hilton and J. McKay (eds), *The Ages of Voluntarism: How We Got to the Big Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 158-179.

Ashcroft, M., *Smell the Coffee: A Wake-up Call for the Conservative Party* London: Michael Ashcroft, 2005).

Ashcroft, M., *Minority Verdict: The Conservative Party, the voters and the 2010 election* (London: Biteback, 2010).

Allison, L., *Right Principles: A Conservative Philosophy of Politics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

Asthana, A,. T. Helm, and L. Hall, 'Welcome to the 'chaos theory' of government', *The Guardian*, 18 December 2010.

Atkins, J., *Justifying New Labour Policy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

Attlee, C., *Purpose and Policy: Selected Speeches* (London: Hutchinson, 1946).

Attalah, N., *Singular Encounters* (London: Quartet Books, 1990).

Auer, C., ‘Margaret Thatcher’s “Victorian Values”: A Reappraisal’, in C. Marshall and S. Guy (eds), *The Victorian Legacy in Political Thought* (Bern: Peter Lang), pp. 233-246.

Aughey, A., G. Jones, and W. T. M. Jones, *The Conservative Political Tradition in Britain and the United States* (London: Pinter, 1992).

Austin, J., *How to Do Things With Words* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).

‘Autumn Statement: George Osborne says austerity plan is working’, *BBC News*, 5 December 2013.

Baker, D., A. Gamble, and S. Ludlam, ‘Mapping Conservative Fault Lines: Problems of Typology’, in P. Dunleavy and G. Stayner (eds), *Contemporary Political Studies 1994* (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1994), pp. 278-298.

Baldini, G. and J. Hopkin (eds), *Coalition Britain: The UK election of 2010* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).

Bale, T., ‘A Bit Less Bunny-Hugging and a Bit More Bunny-Boiling? Qualifying Conservative Party Change under Cameron’, *British Politics*, vol. 3, no. 3, (2008), 270-299.

Bale, T., *The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron* (Cambridge: Policy Press, 2010).

Bale, T., ‘Thatcher’s ideology is behind this spending review’, *The Guardian*, 22 October 2010.

Bale, T., ‘I *don’t* Agree with Nick: Retrodicting the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition’, *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 82, no. 2, (2011), 244-250.

Bale, T., *The Conservatives since 1945: The Drivers of Party Change* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

Bale, T., ‘Whither the Tory Left? The Demise of Progressive Conservatism’, *Juncture*, vol. 49, no. 2, (2012), 84-91.

Bale, T., ‘David Cameron, 2005-10’, in T. Heppell (ed), *Leaders of the Opposition: From Churchill to Cameron* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 222-236.

Bale, T. and R. Kolodny, ‘Divided in Victory? The Conservatives and the Republicans’, in T. Casey (ed), *The Legacy of the Crash: How the Financial Crisis Changed America and Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 101-121.

Bale, T. and P. Webb, ‘The Conservative Party’, in N. Allen and J. Bartle (eds), *Britain at the Polls 2010* (London: SAGE, 2011), pp. 37-62.

Ball, J. and T. Clark, ‘Generation Self: What Do Young People Really Care About?’ *The Guardian*, 11 March 2013.

Balls, E., ‘Now Britain needs a recovery that will last’, *The Times*, 10 September 2013.

Barker, R., ‘Big Societies, Little Platoons and the Problems with Pluralism’, in J. Edwards (ed), *Retrieving the Big Society* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 48-54.

Barnett, A., ‘The End of Thatcherism’, *OurKingdom*, 13 May 2010.

Barnett, S. and S. S. Harrold, ‘Interim Report: Charitable Giving’, in R. Jowell, L. Brook, G. Prior, and B. Taylor (eds), *British Social Attitudes: The 9th Report* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992), pp. 195-208.

Barry, A. T. Osborne. and N. Rose, ‘Introduction’, in A. Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose (eds), *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government* (London: UCL Press, 1996), pp. 1-18.

Barry, N. P., *The New Right* (Kent: Croom Helm, 1987).

Barthes, R., 'From Work to Text', in J. V. Harari (ed), *Textual Strategies* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 73-81.

Bartle, J., S. D. Avellaneda, and J. A. Stimson, 'Post-War British Public Opinion: Is There a Political Centre?', in A. Park, J. Curtice, E. Clery, and C. Bryson (eds), *British Social Attitudes: The 27th Report: Exploring Labour's Legacy* (London: SAGE, 2010), pp. 203-224.

Bastow, S. and J. Martin, *Third Way Discourse: European Ideologies in the Twentieth Century* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003).

Bastow, S., J. Martin, and D. Pels, 'Introduction: Third Ways in Political Ideology', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 7, no. 3, (2002), 269-280.

'BBC Breakfast with Frost Interview', 17 June 2001.

Beech, M., 'New Labour and the Politics of Dominance', in M. Beech and S. Lee (eds), *Ten Years of New Labour* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 1-16.

Beech, M., 'A puzzle of ideas and policy: Gordon Brown as prime minister', in M. Beech and S. Lee (eds), *The Brown Government: A Policy Evaluation* (Oxford: Routledge, 2009), pp. 4-15.

Beech, M., 'Cameron and Conservative Ideology', in S. Lee and M. Beech (eds), *The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 18-30.

Beech, M., 'Conclusion: A Cameronite United Kingdom?' in S. Lee and M. Beech (eds), *The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 208-214.

Beech, M., 'A Tale of Two Liberalisms', in S. Lee and M. Beech (eds), *The Cameron-Clegg Government: Coalition Politics in an Age of Austerity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 267-279.

Beech, M., 'British Conservatism and Foreign Policy: Traditions and Ideas Shaping Cameron's Global View', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 13, no. 3, (2011), 348-363.

Beckett, A., 'Britannia Unchained: the rise of the new Tory right', *The Guardian*, 22 August 2012.

Beckett, A., 'Could Ed Miliband be Labour's Margaret Thatcher?' *The Guardian*, 16 January 2013.

Beckett, A., 'What is the 'global race'?' *The Observer*, 22 September 2013.

Bell, D., *The End of Ideology* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).

Bennett, C., 'The 'big society' is collapsing under its inherent absurdity', *The Observer*, 6 February 2011.

Bentham, J., *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2007).

Belsey, A., 'The New Right, Social Order and Civil Liberties', in R. Levitas (ed), *The Ideology of the New Right* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), pp. 167-197.

Berrington, H., 'Britain in the Nineties: The Politics of Paradox', in H. Berrington (eds), *Britain in the Nineties: The Politics of Paradox* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 1-27.

Berry, C, and M. Kenny., 'Ideology and the Intellectuals', in M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent, and M. Stears (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 251-270.

Bertz, H. G. and C. Johnson, 'Against the current-stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 9, no. 3, (2004), 311-327.

Bevir, M., 'New Labour: a study in ideology', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 2, no. 3, (2000), 277-301.

Bevir, M. and R. A. W. Rhodes, 'Narratives of 'Thatcherism'', *West European Politics*, vol. 21, no. 1, (1998), 97-119.

Birrell, I., 'Why the Conservatives should reclaim their compassionate core', *The Guardian*, 25 September 2013.

Blair, T., *The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century* (London: Fabian Society, 1998).

Blair, T., *A Journey* (London: Arrow Books, 2010).

Blair, T. and G. Schröder, 'Europe: the Third Way/die Neue Mitte', in B. Homback (ed), *The Politics of the New Centre* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 157-177.

Blake, R., *The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher* (London: Fontana, 1985).

Blanchflower, D. G. and A. J. Oswald, 'Self-Employment and the Enterprise Culture', in R. Jowell, S. Witherspoon, L. Brook with B. Taylor (eds), *British Social Attitudes: The 7th Report* (Aldershot: Gower, 1990), pp. 127-143.

Blond, P., 'A deeper shade of blue', *The Guardian*, 21 August 2008.

Blond, P., 'Medieval thinking', *The Guardian*, 30 September 2008.

Blond, P., 'Rise of the red Tories', *Prospect*, 28 February 2009.

Blond, P. *The Ownership State: Restoring excellence, innovation and ethos in the public services* (London: ResPublica, NESTA, 2009).

Blond, P., *Red Tory: How Left and Right Have Broken Britain and How We Can Fix It* (London: Faber & Faber, 2010)

Blond, P., 'Modern conservatives make plebs of us all', *The Financial Times*, 25 September 2012.

Blond, P., 'Cameron has lost any hope of redefining the Tories', *The Guardian*, 4 October 2012.

Blythe, M., *Austerity: The History of a Bad Idea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Boas, T. and J. G. Morse, 'Neo-Liberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, vol. 44, no. 1, (2009), 137-161.

Boles, N., *Which Way's Up? The Future for Coalition Britain and How to Get There* (London: Biteback, 2010).

Boulton, A. and J. Jones, *Hung Together: The 2010 Election and the Coalition Government* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

Brack, D., 'The Liberal Democrats and the Role of the State', in S. Griffiths and K. Hickson (eds), *British Party Politics and Ideology After New Labour* (Bastingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 173-188.

Brack, D., R. Grayson, and D. Howarth (eds), *Reinventing the State: Social Liberalism for the 21st Century* (London: Politco's, 2007).

Braithwaite, F.S., 'Neo-liberalism and Morality in the Making of Thatcherite Social Policy', *The Historical Journal*, vol. 55, no. 2, (2012), 497-520.

Bramall, R., *The Cultural Politics of Austerity: Past and Present in Austere Times* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Brennan, G. and A. Hamlin, 'Analytic Conservatism', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 34, no. 4 (2004), 675-691.

Brunner, O., W. Conze and R. Koselleck (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* 8 vols (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972-1996).

Buckler, S. and Dolowitz, D., 'Ideology Matters: Party Competition, Ideological Positioning and the Case of the Conservative Party under David Cameron', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 14, no. 4 (2012), 576-594.

Bulpitt, J., 'The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher's Domestic Statecraft', *Political Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1, (1986), 19-39.

Bulley, D. and B. S. Bulley, 'Big Society as Big Government: Cameron's Governmentality Agenda' *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 16, no. 3, (2014), 452-470.

Burke, E., *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (London: Penguin, 2009).

Burnham, P., 'The Politicisation of Monetary Policy-Making in Postwar Britain', *British Politics*, vol. 2, no. 3, (2007), 395-419.

Burns, T., 'John Gray and the Death of Conservatism', *Contemporary Politics*, vol. 5, no. 1, (1999), 7-24.

Butcher, B.S., J. Paton, and D. Cahill, *Market Society: History, Theory, Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Butcher, H., I. G. Law, R. Leach, and M. Mullard, *Local Government and Thatcherism* (London: Routledge, 1990).

Butler, D. and D. Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1992* (London: Macmillan, 1992).

Butt, R., 'Interview with Margaret Thatcher', *The Sunday Times*, 1 May 1981.

Butt, R., *The Unfinished Task: The Conservative Record in Perspective* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1986).

Bynoe, I., *Beyond the Citizen's Charter: New Directions for Social Rights* (London: IPPR, 1996).

Byrne, C., E. Foster, and P. Kerr, 'Understanding Conservative Modernisation', in T. Heppell, D. Seawright (eds), *Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition Government* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 16-31.

Cairncross, F., 'The Influence of the Recession', in R. Jowell, L. Brook, G. Prior, and B. Taylor (eds), *British Social Attitudes: The 9th Report* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992), pp. 27-49.

'Cameron: Tories need new identity', *BBC News*, 17 November 2005.

Cameron, D., *Social Responsibility: The Big Idea for Britain's Future* (London: Conservative Party, 2007).

Cameron, D., 'A new politics: The post-bureaucratic age', *The Guardian*, 25 May 2009.

Cameron, D., 'This is a radical revolt against the statist approach of Big Government', *The Observer*, 18 April 2010.

Cameron, D., 'The choice is between Tory competence and Labour chaos', *The Daily Telegraph*, 7 February 2015.

'Cameronism and Its Discontents', *The Wall Street Journal*, 19 March 2014.

Campbell, J., *Margaret Thatcher: Volume One: The Grocer's Daughter* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000).

Campbell, J., *Margaret Thatcher: Volume Two: The Iron Lady* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2003).

Carswell, D. and D. Hannan, *The Plan: Twelve Months to Renew Britain* (London: DirectDemocracy, 2008).

Carter, K (ed), *From Thatcher to Cameron: The Journey to Compassionate Conservatism: The Collected Wilberforce Addresses 1997-2009* (London: Biteback, 2010).

Caryl, C., *Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2013).

Casey, T., 'Capitalism, Crisis, and a Zombie Named TINA', in T. Casey (ed), *The Legacy of the Crash: How the Financial Crisis Changed America and Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 38-59.

Casey, T., 'Introduction', in T. Casey (ed), *The Legacy of the Crash: How the Financial Crisis Changed America and Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 1-18.

Casey, T (ed), *The Legacy of the Crash: How the Financial Crisis Changed America and Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

Catney, P., S. MacGregor, A. Dobson, S. M. Hall, S. Royston, Z. Robinson, M. Ormerod, and S. Ross, 'Big society, little justice? Community renewable energy and the politics of localism', *Local Environment*, published online on 17 May 2013, Doi: 10.1080/13549839.2013.792044.3.

Chakelian, A., 'Kwasi Kwarteng: 'Let's be the same as New Labour'', *Total Politics*, 27 September 2013.

Chambers, S. A., 'Jacques Rancière and the problem of pure politics', *European Journal of Political Theory*, vol. 10, no. 3, (2011), 303-326.

Chorley, M. and M. Merrick, 'Francis Maude: Big Society? It's nothing to do with us', *The Independent*, 2 October 2011.

Clark, A., *The Last Diaries: In and Out of the Wilderness* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2002).

Clarke, J. and J. Newman, 'The alchemy of austerity', *Critical Social Policy*, vol. 32, no. 3, (2013), 299-319.

Clarke, P., 'Obituary: EHH Green', *The Guardian*, 29 September 2006.

Clegg, N., *The Liberal Moment* (London: Demos, 2009).

'Coalition still working well, David Cameron insists', *BBC News*, 17 April 2012.

Cockett, R., *Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931-1983* (London: Fontana Press, 1994).

Collier, D., F. D. Hidalgo, and A. O. Macluceanu, 'Essentially contested concepts: Debates and application', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 11, no. 3 (2006), 211-246.

Collini, S., *Common Reading: Critics, Historians, Publics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Condren, C., 'The death of political theory: The importance of historiographical myth', *Politics*, vol. 9, no. 2 (1974), 46-49.

Congdon, T., 'The case for halving the size of the state', in N. Seddon (ed), *The Next Ten Years* (London: Reform, 2012), pp. 116-120.

Connolly, W. E., *The Terms of Political Discourse*, 3rd edn (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

Cook, C., *A Short History of the Liberal Party: The Road Back to Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

Cook, C. and J. Stevenson, *The Longman Companion to Britain since 1945*, 2nd edn (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000).

Coombs, N., ‘The political theology of red Toryism’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 16, no. 1, (2011), 76-96.

Corbett, S. and A. Walker, ‘The Big Society: Back to the Future’, *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 83, no. 3, (2012), 487-493.

Covell, C., *The Redefinition of Conservatism: Politics and Doctrine* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1986).

Cowley, J., ‘He’s not for turning’, *NewStatesman*, 7-13 September 2012.

Cowley, P. and M. Stuart, ‘The Coalition’s ‘wobbly wings’: Backbench dissent in the Commons since May 2010’, in K. Hassim, C. Clarke, and C. Haddon (eds), *The Coalition: Voters, Parties and Institutions* (London: UEA/Institute for Government, 2012), pp. 44-48.

Cowling, M., ‘Intellectuals and the Tory Party’, *The Spectator*, 8 March 1968.

Cowling, M., *Mill and Liberalism*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Cowling, M., *The Nature and Limits of Political Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Cowling, M., *A Conservative Future* (London: Politeia, 1997).

Crewe, I., “‘Has the Electorate become Thatcherite?”’, in R. Skidelsky (ed), *Thatcherism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), pp. 25-49.

Crewe, I., ‘Values: The Crusade That Failed’, in D. Kavanagh and A. Seldon (eds), *The Thatcher Effect* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 239-250.

Crewe, I., ‘1979-96’, in A. Seldon (ed), *How Tory Governments Fall: The Tory Party in Power Since 1783* (London: Fontana Press, 1996), pp. 393-451.

Crick, M., *Michael Heseltine: A Biography* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1997).

Crines, A. S., 'The Rhetoric of the Coalition: Governing in the National Interest?' *Representation*, vol. 49, no. 2, (2013), 207-218.

Crines, A. S., 'The Rhetoric of Neoliberalism in the Politics of Crisis', *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought*, published online on 22 May 2014, Doi: 10.1080/23269995.2014.922360.

Cristi, R (ed), *Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998).

Crouch, C., 'Privatised Keynesianism: An Unacknowledged Policy Regime', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 11, no. 3, (2009), 382-399.

Crouch, C., *The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).

Cruddas, J., 'Britannia Unchained: Global Lessons for Growth and Prosperity - Review', *The Guardian*, 27 September 2012.

Cruddas, J. and L. Nandy, 'Only Labour can build the Big Society', *NewStatesman*, 9 May 2014.

Cruddas, J. and J. Rutherford, 'Is the Future Conservative?' in J. Cruddas and J. Rutherford (eds), *Is the Future Conservative?* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2008), pp. 9-22.

Cruddas, J. and J. Rutherford, 'The Big Society: the Anatomy of the New Politics Review', *NewStatesman*, 15 December 2010.

Curtice, J. and A. Park, 'A Tale of Two Crises: Banks, MPs' Expenses and Public Opinion', in A. Park, J. Curtice, E. Clery, and C. Bryson (eds), *British Social*

Attitudes: The 27th Report: Exploring Labour's Legacy (London: SAGE, 2010), pp. 131-154.

Curtis, P., 'Britain 'more' Thatcherite now than in the 80s' says survey', *The Guardian*, 13 December 2010.

d'Ancona, M., 'David Cameron must now pass the Christopher Hitchens test', *The Daily Telegraph*, 17 December 2011.

d'Ancona, M., *In It Together: The Inside Story of the Coalition Government* (London: Viking, 2013).

d'Ancona, M., *In It Together: The Inside Story of the Coalition Government* (London, Penguin, 2014).

d'Ancona, M., 'Last chance saloon: The History and Future of Tory Modernisation' , in R. Shorthouse and G. Stagg (eds), *Tory Modernisation 2.0: The Future of the Conservative Party* (London: Bright Blue, 2013), pp. 12-24.

d'Ancona, M., 'Tories on top: What now for modernisers?' in R. Shorthouse, K. Maltby, and J. Brenton (eds), *The Modernisers' Manifesto* (London: Bright Blue, 2014), pp. 20-28.

Dale, I (ed), *Memories of Margaret Thatcher: A Portrait by Those Who Knew Her Best* (London: Biteback, 2013).

Daley, J., 'Big Society: Common Sense Idea Hampered by a Silly Name', *Telegraph Blogs*, 15 February 2011.

Dalyell, T., *Thatcher: Pattern of Deceit* (London: Cecil Woolf, 1987).

'David Cameron - I am a 'liberal Conservative'', *BBC News*, 16 May 2010.

David, M., 'Moral and Maternal: The Family in the Right', in R. Levitas (ed), *The Ideology of the New Right* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), pp. 136-168.

Davies, A. J., *We, The Nation: The Conservative Party and the Pursuit of Power* (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1995).

Denham, A., *Think-Tanks of the New Right* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996).

Denham, A. and M. Garnett, *British Think-Tanks and the Climate of Opinion* (London: UCL Press, 1998).

Denham, A. and M. Garnett, *Keith Joseph* (London: Acumen, 2001).

Denham, A. and M. Garnett, 'Sir Keith Joseph and the undoing of British conservatism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 7, no. 1, (2002), 57-75.

Derrida, J., *Of Grammatology*, trans. G. C. Spivak (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1997).

Diamond, P., 'The new "progressive" conservatism in Europe', *Policy Network*, 13 April 2011.

Dispatches: A Year Inside Number 10, Channel 4, 9 May 2011.

Dorey, P., 'Despair and Disillusion Abound: The Major Premiership in Perspective', in P. Dorey (ed), *The Major Premiership: Politics and Policies under John Major, 1990-97* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), pp. 218-249.

Dorey. P., 'Conservative Policy under Hague', in M. Garnett and P, Lynch (eds), *The Conservatives in Crisis* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 125-145.

Dorey, P., 'A New Direction or Another False Dawn? David Cameron and the Crisis of British Conservatism', *British Politics*, vol. 2, no. 2, (2007), 137-166.

Dorey, P., "Sharing the Proceeds of Growth': Conservative Economic Policy under David Cameron', *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 80, no. 2, (2009), 259-269.

Dorey, P., *British Conservatism: The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2011).

Dorey, P., 'The Conservative "Third Way"? British Conservatives and the Development of Post-Thatcherite Conservatism' in D. Özsel (ed), *Reflections on Conservatism* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 2011), pp. 146-177.

Dorey, P., *Policy Making in Britain*, 2nd edn (London: SAGE, 2014).

Dorey, P. and M. Garnett, 'No such thing as the 'Big Society'? The Conservative Party's unnecessary search for 'narrative' in the 2010 general election', *British Politics*, vol. 7, no. 4, (2012), 389-417.

Dorey, P. and M. Garnett, ''The weaker-willed, the craved-hearted': The Decline of One Nation Conservatism', *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought*, published online 30 May 2014, Doi: 10.1080/23269995.2014.914823.

Dorey, P., M. Garnett, and A. Denham, *From Crisis to Coalition: The Conservative Party 1997-2010* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

Dorling, D., 'Mapping the Thatcher Legacy: The Human Geography of Social Inequality in Britain Since the 1970s', in S. Farrall and C. Hay (eds), *The Legacy of Thatcherism: Assessing and Exploring Social and Economic Policies* (Oxford: The British Academy, 2014), pp. 240-272.

Driver, S., ''Fixing Our Broken Society': David Cameron's Post-Thatcherite Social Policy' in S. Lee and M. Beech (eds), *The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 80-96.

Driver, S., 'Welfare Reform and Coalition Politics in the Age of Austerity', in S. Lee and M. Beech (eds), *The Cameron-Clegg Government: Coalition Politics in an Age of Austerity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 105-117.

Duncan, A. and D. Hobson, *Saturn's Children: How the State Devours Liberty, Prosperity and Virtue* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1995).

Dunleavy, P., 'Introduction: New Times', in P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, I. Holliday and G. Peele (eds), *Developments in British Politics 5* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 1-19.

Dunn, C. W. and J. D. Woodward, *The Conservative Tradition in America* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996).

Durham, M., *Moral Crusades: Family and Morality in the Thatcher Years* (New York: New York University, 1991).

Easton, M., 'Introducing Cameronism', *BBC News*, 11 July 2011.

Eccleshall, R., 'English Conservatism as Ideology', *Political Studies*, Vol. 25, no. 1 (1977), 62-83.

Eccleshall, R., *English Conservatism since the Reformation: An Introduction & Anthology* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1990).

Eccleshall, R., 'The doing of conservatism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 5, no. 3 (2000), 325-343.

Eccleshall, R., 'Conservatism', in R. Eccleshall, A. Finlayson, V. Geoghegan, M. Kenny, M. Lloyd, I. MacKenzie, and R. Wilford (eds), *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* 3rd edn (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 47-72.

Edemariam, A., 'Roger Scruton: A pessimist's guide to life', *The Guardian*, 5 June 2010.

Edgar, D., 'The Free or the Good', in R. Levitas (ed), *The Ideology of the New Right* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), pp. 55-79.

Edwards, J., 'Freedom, Free Institutions and the Big Society', in J. Edwards (ed), *Retrieving the Big Society* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 98-108.

Edwards, J., ‘Introduction: Retrieving the Big Society’, in J. Edward (ed), *Retrieving the Big Society* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 1-8.

Elliott, F. and J. Hanning, *Cameron: The Rise of the New Conservative* (London: HarperPress, 2009).

Elliott, F. and Hanning, J, *Cameron: Practically a Conservative* (London: HarperPress, 2012).

Elliott, F. and P. Riddell, ‘Help yourselves, Cameron tells the fat and the poor’, *The Times*, (8 July 2008).

Ellis, C., ‘Mutualism and the Reinvention of Civil Society: A Conservative Agenda’, in S. Griffiths and K. Hickson (eds), *British Party Politics and Ideology After New Labour* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 138-149.

Elst, P. V., ‘Radical Toryism - The Libertarian Alternative’, *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 1, (1975), 65-72.

Evans, B, and A. Taylor, *From Salisbury to Major: Continuity and Change in Conservative Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).

Evans, E., *Thatcher and Thatcherism,* 2nd edn (Routledge: London, 2005).

Evans, E., *Thatcher and Thatcherism*, 3rd edn (Routledge: London, 2013).

Evans, M., ‘Cameron’s Competition State’, in S. Lee and M. Beech (eds), *The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 109-133.

Evans, M., D. Marsh, and G. Stoker, ‘Understanding Localism’, *Policy Studies*, vol. 34, no. 4, (2013), 401-407.

Evans, S., ‘Consigning its Past to History? David Cameron and the Conservative Party’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 61, no. 2, (2008), pp. 291-314.

Evans, S., ‘The Not So Odd Couple: Margaret Thatcher and One Nation Conservatism’, *Contemporary British History*, vol. 23, no. 1, (2009), 101-121.

Evans, S., ‘‘Mother’s Boy’: David Cameron and Margaret Thatcher’, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 12, no. 3, (2010), 325-343.

Evans, S., ‘Reluctant Coalitionists: The Conservative Party and the Establishment of the Coalition Government in May 2010’, *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 83, no. 3 (2012), 478-486.

Eustice, G., *Defending the rights of those who take risks* (London: Free Enterprise Group/IEA, 2012).

Fairclough, N., *New Labour, New Language?* (London: Routledge, 2000).

Farage, N., ‘Maggie would vote for getting out, out, out’, *The Times*, 15 April 2013.

Farall, S. and C. Hay (eds), *The Legacy of Thatcherism: Assessing and Exploring Social and Economic Policies* (Oxford: The British Academy, 2014).

Farall, S. and C. Hay, ‘Locating ‘Thatcherism’ in the ‘her and now’’, in S. Farall and C. Hay (eds), *The Legacy of Thatcherism: Assessing and Exploring Social and Economic Policies* (Oxford: The British Academy, 2014), pp. 315-339.

Ferguson, N., *The Great Degeneration: How Institutions Decay and Economies Die* (London: Penguin, 2014).

Fforde, M., *Conservatism and Collectivism, 1886-1914* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990).

Field, F., *Neighbours from Hell* (London: Politicos, 2003).

Field, F., ‘Mrs T would have reined in the wealthy’, *The Times*, 18 April 2013.

Fielding, S., *The Labour Party: Continuity and Change in the Making of ‘New’ Labour* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

Finer, S. E., ‘Thatcherism and British Political History’, in K. Minogue and M. Biddiss (eds), *Thatcherism: Personality and Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 127-140.

Finlayson, A., ‘Making Sense of David Cameron’, *Public Policy Research*, vol. 14, no. 1, (2007), 3-10.

Finlayson, A., ‘The Broken Society versus the Social Recession’, *Soundings*, vol. 44 , (2010), 22-35.

Finlayson, A., ‘Cameron, Culture and the Creative Class: The Big Society and the Post-Bureaucratic Age’, in J. Edwards (ed), *Retrieving the Big Society* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 35-47.

Flinders, M. and J. Buller, ‘Depoliticisation: Principles, Tactics and Tools’, *British Politics*, vol. 1, no. 3, (2006), 293-318.

Floyd, J, and M. Stears (eds), *Political Philosophy versus History? Contextualism and Real Politics in Contemporary Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Ford, R. and M. Goodwin, *Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain* (London: Routledge, 2014).

Ford, R., G. Morrell, and A. Heath, ‘Immigration: ‘“Fewer but better”? Public views about immigration’, in A. Park, E. Clery, J. Curtice, M. Phillips, and D. Utting (eds), *British Social Attitudes 29: The 29th Report*, (London: NatCen Social Research, 2012), pp. 26-44.

Forsyth, J., ‘Next Right’, *The Spectator*, 23 June 2012.

Forsyth, J., K. Kwarteng, K, M. Littlewood, D. Raab, and C. Skidmore, *A Manifesto Fit for 2015: 15 Ideas to Transform Britain* (London: IEA/Free Enterprise Group, 2012).

Foster, J. B. and F. Maddoff, *The Great Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009).

Foucault, M., 'What is an Author?' in J. V. Harari (ed), *Textual Strategies* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 141-160.

Foucault, M., 'The order of discourse', in M. Shapiro (ed), *Language and Politics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 108-138.

Fowler, N., *A Political Suicide: The Conservatives' Voyage into the Wilderness* (London: Politico's, 2008).

Franco, P., *Michael Oakeshott: An Introduction* (New York/London: Yale University Press, 2004).

Francis, M., '"Set the People Free"? The Conservative Party and the State, 1920-60', in M. Francis and I. Z. Bargielowska (eds), *The Conservatives and British Society, 1880-1990* (Cardiff: Cardiff University Press, 1996), pp. 58-77.

Free Enterprise Group, http://www.freeenterprise.org.uk/

Freeden, M., *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

Freeden, M., 'Editorial: Ideologies and Conceptual History', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1997), 3-11.

Freeden, M., 'The Ideology of New Labour', *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 70, no. 1, (1999), 42-51.

Freeden, M., *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Freeden, M., 'Editorial: Essential Contestability and Effective Contestability', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 9, no. 1 (2004), 3-11.

Freeden, M., ‘Ideology and Political Theory’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 11, no. 1 (2004), 3-22.

Freeden, M., ‘Confronting the chimera of a ‘post-ideological’ age’, *Critical Review of International and Social Philosophy*, vol. 8, no. 2, (2005), 247-262.

Freeden, M., *Liberal Languages: Ideological Imaginations and Twentieth-Century Progressive Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

Freeden, M., ‘What Should the ‘Political’ in Political Theory Explore?’ *Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol. 32, no. 2 (2005), 113-134.

Freeden, M., ‘Ideology and Political Theory’, in M. Freeden (ed), *The Meaning of Ideology: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 1-20.

Freeden, M., ‘Thinking Politically and Thinking about Politics: Language, Interpretation and Ideology’, in D. Leopold and M. Stears (eds), *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 196-215.

Freeden, M., ‘Editorial: Interpretive realism and prescriptive realism’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 17, no. 1 (2012), 1-11.

Freeden, M., ‘The Morphological Analysis of Ideology’, in M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent, and M. Stears (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 115-137.

Freeden, M., *The Political Theory of Political Thinking: The Anatomy of a Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Freeden, M., ‘Editorial: The ‘political turn’ in political theory’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 19, no. 1 (2014), 1-14.

Freeden, M., ‘Progress and Progressivism: Thoughts on an Elusive Term’, *Political Studies Review*, vol. 12, no. 1 (2014), pp. 68-74.

Freeden, M. and M. Stears, 'Liberalism', in M. Freeden, L.T. Sargent, and M. Stears (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 329-347.

Freeden, M. and A. Vincent, 'Introduction: the study of comparative political thought', in M. Freeden and A. Vincent (eds), *Comparative Political Thought: Theorizing Practices* (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 1-23.

Freeman, G. and K. Kwarteng, *The Innovation Economy: Industrial Policy for the 21st Century* (London: Free Enterprise Group/IEA, 2013).

Fukuyama, F., *The End of History and the Last Man* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992).

Fukuyama, F., *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy* (London: Yale University Press, 2006).

Fuller, T., 'The Poetics of the Civil Life', in J. Norman (ed), *The Achievement of Michael Oakeshott* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co, 1993), pp. 67-81.

Gaebler, D. and T. Osborne, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector* (New York: Plume. 1993).

Galbraith, J. K., *The Affluent Society* (London: Penguin, 1962).

Gallie, W. B., 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 56, (1956), 167-198.

Gamble, A., 'Privatization, Thatcherism, and the British State', in A. Gamble and C. Wells (eds), *Thatcher's Law* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 1-20.

Gamble, A., 'After the Right', in B. Pimlott, A. Wright, and T. Flower (eds), *The Alternative: Politics for a Change* (London: W. H. Allen, 1990), pp. 47-57.

Gamble, A., *The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism*, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994).

Gamble, A., 'The crisis of conservatism', *New Left Review*, vol. 214, no. 1, (1995), 3-25.

Gamble, A., 'An Ideological Party', in S. Ludlam and M. J. Smith (eds), *Contemporary British Conservatism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 19-36.

Gamble, A., 'Eclipsing Thatcherism', *The Guardian*, 14 October 2005.

Gamble, A., *The Spectre of the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of Recession* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

Gamble. A., 'The Western Ideology', *Government and Opposition*, vol. 44, no. 1, (2009), 1-19.

Gamble, A., 'New Labour and Political Change', *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 63, no. 4, (2010), 639-52.

Gamble, A., 'Project Cameron', *Public Policy Research*, vol. 18, no. 3, (2011), 173-178.

Gamble, A., 'Oakeshott's ideological politics: conservative or liberal?' in E. Podoksik (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Oakeshott* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 153-176.

Gamble, A., 'Economic Libertarianism', in M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent, and M. Stears (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 405-421.

Gamble, A., 'Austerity as Statecraft', *Parliamentary Affairs*, published online 11 July 2014, Doi: 10.1093/pa/gsu016.

Gamble, A., *Crisis Without End? The Unravelling of Western Prosperity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

Ganesh, J., *George Osborne: The Austerity Chancellor* (London: Biteback, 2012).

Ganesh, J., ‘Is Nassim Nicholas Taleb Downing Street’s favourite adviser’, *BBC News*, 12 March 2012.

Garnett, M., ‘A question of definition? Ideology and the Conservative Party, 1997-2001’, in M. Garnett and P. Lynch (eds), *The Conservatives in crisis: The Tories after 1997* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 125-145.

Garnett, M., ‘The Free Economy and the Schizophrenic State: Ideology and the Conservatives’, *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 75, no. 4, (2004), 367-372.

Garnett, M., ‘Built on Sand? Ideology and Conservative Modernization under David Cameron’, in S. Griffiths and K. Hickson (eds), *British Party Politics and Ideology after New Labour* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 107-118.

Garnett, M., ‘The Conservative Party, David Cameron and Lady Thatcher’s Legacy’, *Contemporary British History*, vol. 27, no. 4, (2013), 514-524.

Garnett, M. and K. Hickson, *Conservative thinkers: The key contributors to the political thought of the modern Conservative Party* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).

Garnett, M. and P. Lynch (eds), *The Conservatives in Crisis: The Tories after 1997* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).

Geoghegan, V. and R. Wilford (eds), *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2014).

Geuss, R., *Philosophy and Real Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Giannangeli, M., ‘David Cameron’s love of charity and Red Arrows’, *Sunday Express*, 4 May 2014.

Giavazzi, F. and M. Pagano, 'Can Severe Fiscal Contractions by Expansionary? Tales of Two Small European Countries', *NBER Macroeconomics Annual*, vol. 5, (1990), 75-111.

Giddens, A., *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

Giddens, A., *Over To You, Mr Brown: How Labour Can Win Again* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).

Gilmour, I., *Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism* (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1977).

Gilmour, I., *Dancing with Dogma: Britain under Thatcherism* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1992).

Gilmour, I. and M. Garnett, 'Thatcherism and the Conservative Tradition', in M. Francis and I. Z. Bargielowska (eds), *The Conservatives and British Society 1880-1990* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996), pp. 78-95.

Gilmour, I. and M. Garnett, *Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945* (London: Fourth Estate, 1997).

Glasman, M., 'Society not State: The challenge of the Big Society', *Public Policy Research*, vol. 17, no. 2, (2010), 59-63.

Glasman, M., 'Labour as a Radical Tradition', in M. Glasman, J. Rutherford, M. Stears, and S. White (eds), *The Labour Tradition and the Politics of Paradox* (Oxford/London: Soundings, 2011), pp. 14-34.

Glasman, M., J. Rutherford, M. Stears, and S. White (eds), *The Labour Tradition and the Politics of Paradox* (Oxford, London: Soundings, 2011).

Glasman, M. and Norman, J., 'The Big Society in Question', in J. Edwards (ed), *Retrieving the Big Society* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 9-21.

Gooby, P. T., ‘Attachment to the Welfare State’, in R. Jowell, L. Brook, B. Taylor with G. Prior (eds), *British Social Attitudes: The 8th Report* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991), pp. 23-42.

Gooby, P. T. and G. Stoker, ‘The Coalition Programme: A New Vision for Britain or Politics as Usual?’ *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 81, no. 1, (2011), 4-14.

Goodhart, D., ‘A Postliberal Future?’ *Demos Quarterly*, vol. 1, (2014), 1-52.

Gould, J. and D. Anderson, ‘Thatcherism and British Society’, in K. Minogue and M. Biddiss (eds), *Thatcherism: Personality and Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 38-54.

Graham, D. and P. Clarke, *The New Enlightenment: The Rebirth of Liberalism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986).

Grant, W., ‘The Erosion of Intermediary Institutions’, *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 60, no. 1, (1989), 10-21.

Grant, W., ‘Was there Ever an Anglo-American Model of Capitalism? In *The Legacy of the Crash: How the Financial Crisis Change America and Britain*, edited by T. Casey (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 19-37.

Gray, J., ‘Conservatism, Individualism and the Political Thought of the New Right’, in J. C. D. Clark (ed), *Ideas and Politics in Modern Britain* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 87-99.

Gray, J., ‘Hayek on the Market Economy and the Limits of State Action’, in D. Helm (ed), *The Economic Borders of the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 127-143.

Gray, J., *Beyond the New Right: Markets, Government and the Common Environment* (London: Rouledge, 1993).

Gray, J., *Post-liberalism: Studies in Political Thought* (London: Routledge, 1993).

Gray, J., *Endgames: Questions in Late Modern Political Thought* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997).

Gray, J., 'Conclusion', in J. Gray and D. Willetts, *Is Conservatism Dead?* (London: Profile Books, 1997), pp. 143-163.

Gray, J., *Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and culture at the close of the modern age* (London: Routledge, 2007).

Gray, J., *Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia* (London: Penguin, 2008).

Gray, J., *Gray's Anatomy* (London: Penguin, 2010).

Gray, J., 'Red Tory: Review', *The Independent*, 2 April 2010.

Gray, J., 'Bad night for Cameron. Very good one for the party's bigoted tendency', *The Guardian*, 8 May 2010.

Gray, J., 'Margaret Thatcher's austerity programme was far less a gamble than George Osborne's cuts', *The Guardian*, 22 October 2010.

Green, D. G., *Reinventing Civil Society: Rediscovery of Welfare Without Politics*. (London: IEA, 1993).

Green, E. H. H., *The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the British Conservative Party, 1880-1914* (London: Routledge, 1996).

Green, E. H. H., *Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Green, E. H. H., *Thatcher* (Oxford: Hodder, 2006).

Greenleaf, W. H., *The British Political Tradition: Volume 2: The Ideological Heritage* (London: Routledge, 1983).

Grieg, G., ‘David Cameron: You don’t deserve to govern if you treat people like fools’, *Evening Standard*, 29 April 2010.

Griffiths, B., *The Moral Basis of the Market Economy* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1983).

Griffiths, B., *The Creation of Wealth* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1984).

Griffiths, B., *Monetarism and Morality: A Response to the Bishops* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1985).

Griffiths, B., *Morality and the Market Place: Christian Alternatives to Capitalism and Socialism* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989).

Griffiths, R., ‘The Perils of Principle’, in K. Minogue (ed), *Conservative Realism: New Essays on Conservatism* (London: HarperCollins, 1996), pp. 68-79.

Griffiths, S., ‘Cameron’s Conservatives and the Public Services’, in S. Lee and M. Beech (eds), *The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 97-108.

Griffiths, S. and K. Hickson (eds), *British Party Politics and Ideology after New Labour* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

Grimley, M., ‘Thatcherism, morality and religion’, in B. Jackson and R. Saunders (eds), *Making Thatcher’s Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 78-94.

Hacker, J., ‘How to reinvigorate the centre-left? Predistribution’, *The Guardian*, 12 June 2013.

Hadley, L., *Responding to Margaret Thatcher’s Death* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

Hadley, L. and E. Ho, ‘Introduction: “The Lady’s Not For Turning”: New Cultural Perspectives on Thatcher and Thatcherism’, in L. Hadley and E. Ho (eds),

Thatcher and After: Margaret Thatcher and Her Afterlife in Contemporary Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 1-28.

Hale, S., *Blair's Community: Communitarian Thought and New Labour* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).

Hale, S. 2011., 'Discourse, Policy...and Ideas: An Obituary of the Third Way in Britain', *European Political Science*, vol. 10, no. 4, (2011), 488-500.

Hall, S., 'The Great Moving Right Show', in S. Hall and M. Jacques (eds), *The Politics of Thatcherism* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983), pp. 19-39.

Hall, S., 'The march of the neoliberals', *The Guardian*, 12 September 2011.

Hall, S., 'The Neo-Liberal Revolution', *Cultural Studies*, vol. 25, no. 6 (2011), 705-728.

Hall, S. and M. Jacques, 'Introduction', in S. Hall and M. Jacques (eds), *The Politics of Thatcherism* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983), pp. 9-16.

Hall, S. and M. Jacques (eds), *The Politics of Thatcherism* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983).

Ham, H., 'The Big Con: Reframing the state/society debate', *Public Policy Research*, vol. 18, no. 1, (2011), 30-40.

Hanson, M., 'Big Society is a meaningless concept', *The Guardian*, 9 December 2010.

Hardman, I., 'No-one does anti-politics stand-up like Nigel Farage. But what about that tax policy? *The Spectator, Coffee House Blog*, 23 April 2013.

Hardt, M. and A. Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

Harris, J., ‘Servile State or Discredited State: Some Historical Antecedents of Current ‘Big Society’ Debates’, in J. Edwards (ed), *Retrieving the Big Society* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 55-67.

Harris, J., ‘Generation Y: why young voters are backing the Conservatives’, *The Guardian*, 26 June 2013.

Harris, J., ‘Osborne economics is not an invincible force of nature’, *The Guardian*, 17 August 2013.

Harris, J. and J. McCrae, *The 2015-16 Spending Round* (London: Institute for Government, 2013).

Harris, M., ‘The New Right’, in A. Lent (ed), *New Political Thought: An Introduction* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1998), pp. 53-71.

Harris, R., *Morality and Markets* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1986).

Harris, R., *The Conservative Community: The Roots of Thatcherism - and Its Future* (London: CPS, 1989).

Harris, R., *Not For Turning: The Life of Margaret Thatcher* (London: Bantam, 2013).

Harrison, B., ‘Mrs Thatcher and the Intellectuals’, *Twentieth Century British History*, vol. 5, no. 2, (1994), 206-234.

Harrison, B., *Finding a Role? The United Kingdom, 1970-1990* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010).

Harrison, B., *Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom, 1951-1970* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011).

Hart, P., ‘The Civilised Imperative’, in J. Norman (ed), *The Achievement of Michael Oakeshott* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co, 1993), pp. 82-86.

Hasan, M. and J. Macintyre, *Ed: The Milibands and the Making of a Labour Leader* (London; Biteback, 2012).

Hay, C., *The Political Economy of New Labour: Labouring under False Pretences?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).

Hay, C., ‘‘Things can only get worse...’: The political and economic significance of 2010’, *British Politics*, vol. 5, no. 4, (2010), 391-401.

Hay, C., *The Failure of Anglo-Liberal Capitalism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Hay, C. and S. Farrall, ‘Establishing the Ontological Status of Thatcherism by Gauging Its ‘Periodisability’: Towards a ‘Cascade Theory’ of Public Policy Radicalism’, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 13, no. 4, (2011), 439-458.

Hay, C. and S. Farrall, ‘Interrogating and conceptualizing the legacy of Thatcherism’, in S. Farrall and C. Hay (eds), *The Legacy of Thatcherism: Assessing and Exploring Thatcherite Social and Economic Policies* (Oxford: The British Academy, 2014), pp. 3-30.

Hayek, F. A., *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism* (London: Routledge, 1988).

Hayek, F. A., ‘The weasel word ‘social’’, in R. Scruton (ed), *Conservative Thoughts: Essays from The Salisbury Review* (London: Claridge, 1991), pp. 49-54.

Hayek, F. A., *The Constitution of Liberty* (London: Routledge, 2006).

Hayek, F. A., *Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy* (Routledge: London, 2013).

Hayes, M., *The New Right in Britain: An Introduction to Theory and Practice* (London: Pluto Press, 1994).

Hayton, R., *Reconstructing Conservatism? The Conservative Party in Opposition, 1997-2010* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).

Hayton, R., 'Reply: The strange revival of Tory conservatism', *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs*, published online 30 June 2014, Doi: 10.1080/2326995.2014.914827.

Hazareesingh, S, and K. Nabulsi, 'Using archival sources to theorize about politics', in D. Leopold and M. Stears (eds), *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 150-170.

Hazell, R. and B. Young, *The Politics of Coalition: How the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Government Works* (Oxford: Hart, 2012).

Hearnshaw, F. J., *Conservatism in England: An Analytical, Historical and Political Survey* (London: Macmillan, 1933).

Heffernan, R., *New Labour and Thatcherism: Political Change in Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

Heffernan, R., 'The Continuing Shadow of the Thatcher Governments', *British Politics Review*, vol. 4, no. 1, (2009), 8-9.

Hegel, G. W. F., *The Philosophy of Right*, trans T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967).

Held, D., 'Liberalism, Marxism and the Future Direction of Public Policy', in P. Nolan and S. Paine (eds), *Rethinking Socialist Economics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), pp. 13-34.

Helm, D (ed), *The Economic Borders of the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

Helm, T., ‘‘UKIP would not exist if Thatcher were still Tory leader’, says Norman Tebbit’, *The Observer*, 28 September 2013.

Hennessy, P., *The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders Since 1945* (London: Penguin, 2000).

Heppell, T., *The Conservative Party Leadership of John Major 1992 to 1997* (Lampeter, Wales: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006).

Heppell, T., ‘Cameron and Liberal Conservatism: Attitudes within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and Conservative Ministers’, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 15, no. 3, (2013), 340-361.

Heppell, T., ‘The Fall of the Brown Government, 2010’, in T. Heppell and K. Theakston (eds), *How Labour Governments Fall: From Ramsay MacDonald to Gordon Brown* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 141-170.

Heppell, T., *The Tories: From Winston Churchill to David Cameron* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

Heppell, T. and M. Hill, ‘Ideological Typologies of Contemporary British Conservatism’, *Political Studies Review*, vol. 3, no. 3, (2005), 335-355.

Heppell, T. and M. Hill, ‘Transcending Thatcherism? Ideology and the Conservative Party Leadership Mandate of David Cameron’, *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 80, no. 3, (2009), 388-399.

Heppell, T. and Seawright, D. (eds.) *Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition Government*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

Herzog, L., *Inventing the Market: Smith, Hegel & Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Heseltine, M., *Where There’s a Will* (London: Hutchinson, 1987).

Heseltine, M., *No Stone Unturned: In Pursuit of Growth* (London: Crown, 2012).

Heywood, A., *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, 5th edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

Hickson, K., 'Inequality', in K. Hickson (ed), *The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 158-177.

Hickson, K (ed), *The Political Thought of the Liberals and Liberal Democrats since 1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).

Hickson, K., 'Conservatism and the Poor: Conservative Party Attitudes to Poverty and Inequality since the 1970s', *British Politics*, vol. 4, no. 3, (2009), 341-362.

Hickson, K., 'Review', *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 64, no. 3 (2011), 578-584.

Hickson, K., 'The localist turn in British politics and its critics', *Policy Studies*, vol. 34, no. 4, (2013), 408-421.

Hills, J., M. Brewer, S. Jenkins, R. Lister, R. Lupton, S. Machin, C. Mills, T. Modood, T. Rees, and S. Riddell (eds), *An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK: Report of the National Equality Panel* (London: Government Equalities Office, 2010).

Hilton, M. and J. McKay (eds), *The Ages of Voluntarism: How we got the Big Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Hirst, P., *Associative Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).

Hirst, P., *From Statism to Pluralism* (London: UCL Press, 1997).

Hitchens, C., 'A Kinder, Gentler Tory Party: Whatever happened to Britain's Conservatives?' *Slate*, 27 February 2007.

Hitchens, P., *The Cameron Delusion* (London: Continuum, 2010).

Hobsbawm, E., *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991* (London: Abacus, 1995).

Holehouse, M., ‘Spend too much? In some areas Labour didn’t spend enough, says Ed Balls’, *The Sunday Telegraph*, 26 January 2014.

Holland, P. and G. Eglezou, ‘“There is no such thing!”: On Public Service, Broadcasting, the National Health Service and “people” in the 1980s’, in L. Hadley and E. Ho (eds), *Thatcher and After: Margaret Thatcher and Her Afterlife in Contemporary Culture* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 29-52.

Holmes, M., *Thatcherism: Scope and Limits, 1983-87* (Macmillan: Basingstoke, 1989).

Hogg, Q., *The Case for Conservatism* (London: Penguin, 1947).

Hogg, Q., *The Conservative Case* (London: Penguin, 1959).

Hogg, S. and J. Hill, *Too Close to Call: Power and Politics - John Major in No. 10* (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1995).

Honderich, T., *Conservatism: Burke, Nozick, Bush, Blair?* (London: Pluto Press, 2005).

Honig, B., *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

Howard, M., *Consistency and Change: The Conservative Challenge in the 1990s* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1991).

Howard, M., ‘Conservatives and the Community’, *The 1994 Disraeli Lecture* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1994).

Humphrey, M, ‘Getting ‘Real’ About Political Ideas: Conceptual Morphology and the Realist Critique of Anglo-American Political Philosophy’, in B. Jackson and M. Stears (eds), *Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeden* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 241-258.

Hunt, D., *Right Ahead: Conservatism and the Social Market* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1994).

Hunt, T., 'One Nation Labour', in O. Smith and R. Reeves (eds), *One Nation: Power, Hope, Community* (London: One Nation Register, 2013), pp. 145-159.

Huntington, S., 'Conservatism as an Ideology', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 51, no. 2, (1957), 454-73.

Hurd, D., 'Citizenship in the Tory Democracy', *NewStatesman*, 29 April 1988.

Hurd, D., 'Freedom will flourish where citizens accept responsibilities', *The Independent*, 7 September 1989.

Hurd, D., *Conservatism in the 1990s* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1991).

Hutton, W., *The State We're In* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995).

Hutton, W., 'Does the narrow and regressive Tory party have a death wish?' *The Observer*, 24 November 2013.

Hutton, W. and D. Cameron, 'Recession Britain: The Great Debate', *The Guardian*, 1 February 2009.

Ignatieff, M., 'Citizenship and Moral Narcissism', *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 60, no. 1, (1989), 63-74.

Isaac, J. U., 'The New Right and the Moral Society', *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 43, no. 2, (1990), 209-226.

Jackson, B., 'At the Origins of Neo-Liberalism: The Free Economy and the Strong State, 1930-1947', *The Historical Journal*, vol. 53, no. 1, (2010), 129-151.

Jackson, B., 'The Think-Tank Archipelago: Thatcherism and Neo-Liberalism', in B. Jackson and R. Saunders (eds), *Making Thatcher's Britain*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 43-61.

Jackson, B. and G. McClymont, *Cameron's Trap: Lessons for Labour from the 1930s and 1980s* (London: Policy Network, 2011).

Jackson, B. and R. Saunders (eds), *Making Thatcher's Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Jarvis, M., *Conservative Governments, Morality and Social Change in Affluent Britain, 1957-64* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).

Jeffries, L. and M. Evans, 'The rise of choice as an absolute 'good': a study of British manifestos 1900-2010', *SRC Working Papers*, vol. 5, (2013), 1-24.

Jenkins, P., *Mrs Thatcher's Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era* (London: Pan Books, 1989).

Jenkins, S., *Accountable to None: The Tory Nationalization of Britain* (London: Penguin, 1996).

Jenkins, S., *Thatcher & Sons: A Revolution in Three Acts* (London: Penguin, 2007).

'Jeremy Heywood: Cuts may last until 2020', *BBC News*, 21 June 2012.

Jessop, B., K. Bonnett, S. Bromley, and T. Ling, *Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988)

Johnson, R. W., *The Politics of Recession* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985).

Johnston, M., 'What price profits?' in R. Jowell, L. Brook, G. Prior, and B. Taylor (eds), *British Social Attitudes: The 9th Report* (Aldershot: Dartmouth), pp. 131-154.

Jones, D., *Cameron on Cameron: Conversations with Dylan Jones* (London: HarperCollins, 2010).

Jones, D. S., *Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

Jones, T., *The Revival of British Liberalism: From Grimond to Clegg* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

Joseph, K., *Reversing the Trend: A Critical Re-appraisal of Conservative Economic and Social Policies: Seven Speeches* (London: Barry Rose, 1975).

Joseph, K., *Stranded on the Middle Ground? Reflections on Circumstances and Policies* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1976).

Joseph, K. and J. Sumption, *Equality* (London: John Murray, 1979).

Joyce, P., *The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Judt, T., *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (London: Pimlico, 2007).

Katwala, S., 'In Maggie's Shadow', *Public Policy Research*, vol. 16, no. 1, (2009), pp. 3-13.

Kavanagh, D., 'A Major Agenda?' in D. Kavanagh and A. Seldon (eds), *The Major Effect* (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 3-17.

Kavanagh, D., *The Reordering of British Politics: Politics After Thatcher* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Kavanagh, D. and P. Cowley, *The British General Election of 2010* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

Keat, R., 'Introduction: Starship Britain or Universal Enterprise?' in R. Keat and N. Abercrombie (eds), *Enterprise Culture* (London: Routledge, 1991), pp.1-17.

Keegan, W., *Mrs Thatcher's Economic Experiment* (London: Penguin, 1984).

Kelly, P., 'Red or Orange: The Big Society in the New Conservatism', in J. Edwards (ed), *Retrieving the Big Society* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 22-34.

Kelly, R., ‘Political Parties’, in B. Jones and P. Norton (eds), *Politics UK* (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 202-219.

Kennedy, C., ‘Foreword’, in P. Marshall and D. Laws (eds), *The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism* (London: Profile Books), p. xii

Kerr, P., *Postwar British Politics: From Conflict to Consensus* (London: Routledge, 2001).

Kerr, P., ‘Cameron Chameleon and the Current State of Britain’s ‘Consensus’’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 60, no. 1, (2007), 46-65.

Kerr, P. and D. Marsh, ‘Explaining Thatcherism: Towards a Multidimensional Approach’, in D. Marsh, J. Buller, C. Hay, J. Johnston, P. Kerr, S. McAnulla, and M. Watson (eds), *Postwar British Politics in Perspective* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 168-188.

Kerr, P., C. Byrne, C. and Foster, E, ‘Theorising Cameronism’, *Political Studies Review*, vol. 9, no. 2 (2011), 193-207.

Ketler, D., V. Meja, and N. Stehr., ‘Rationalizing the irrational: Karl Mannheim and the besetting sin of German intellectuals’, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 95, no. 6 (1990), 1441-1473.

King, D. S., *The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987).

King, R. and N. Nugent (eds), *Respectable Rebels: Middle Class Campaigns in Britain in the 1970s* (Kent: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979).

Kirby, J., ‘From Broken Families to the Broken Society’, *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 80, no. 2, (2009), 243-247.

Kirk, R., *The Conservative Mind* (Chicago: H. Regnert Co, 1953).

Kirkup, J., ‘John Major: let’s keep the Coalition after the next election’, *The Daily Telegraph,* 26 November 2010.

Kisby, B., ‘The Big Society: Power to the People?’ *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 81, no. 4, (2010), 484-491.

Koselleck, R., *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. and introduction by K. Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

Koselleck, R., *The Practice of Conceptual History*, trans. by T. Presner, K. Behnke and J. Welge (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).

Kozlowski, T. G., ‘Priti Patel: Saviour of the Tory Right’, *Total Politics*, 5 October 2012.

Kresge, S. and L. Wenar, *Hayek on Hayek: An Autobiographical Dialogue* (London: Routledge, 1994).

Kruger, D., ‘The right dialectic’, *Prospect*, 24 September 2006.

Kruger, D., *On Fraternity: Politics Beyond Liberty and Equality* (London: Civitas: The Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 2007).

Kruger, D., ‘Death by a thousand cuts for Big Society’, *The Financial Times*, 6 February 2011.

Kruger, D., ‘The big society is not about picking litter: it is meant to be a challenge’, *The Observer*, 4 January 2014.

Krugman, P., *The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008* (London: Penguin, 2008).

Kutwala, S., ‘In Maggie’ Shadow’, *Public Policy Research*, vol. 16, no. 1, (2009), 3-13.

Kwarteng, K, *Ghosts of Empire: Britain’s Legacies in the Modern World* (London: Bloomsbury, 2011).

Kwarteng, K., and J. DuPont, *Gridlock Nation* (London: Biteback, 2011).

Kwarteng, K., *The Case of Aviation* (London: Free Enterprise Group/IEA, 2012).

Kwarteng, K, *War and Gold: A History of Money, Wars and Debt* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

Kwarteng, K., and P. Patel, *Motivating the Middle* (London: Free Enterprise Group/IEA, 2012).

Kwarteng, K., P. Patel, D. Raab, C. Skidmore, and E. Truss, *After the Coalition: A Conservative Agenda for Britain* (London: Biteback, 2011).

Kwarteng, K., P. Patel, D. Raab, C. Skidmore, and E. Truss, *Britannia Unchained: Global Lessons for Growth and Prosperity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

Kymlicka, W., *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C., *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, 2nd edn (London: Verso, 2011).

Lakin, M., 'The Ideology of the Coalition: More 'Muscular' than 'Liberal'?' *British Politics*, vol. 8, no. 4 (2013), 476-490.

Lakin, M., 'After Cameron: The New New Right and the Unchaining of Britannia', *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought*, vol. 4, no. 1 (2014), 71-89.

Lakin, M. and M. S. Ostrowski, 'Ideology in the Age of the Coalition: The Strange Rebirth of British Centrism', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 19, no. 1 (2014), 15-40.

Lal, D., *Nationalised Universities: Paradox of the Privatisation Age* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1989).

Lal, D., *Fighting Fiscal Privilege: Towards a Fiscal Constitution* (London: Social Market Foundation, 1990).

Lal, D., *Lost Causes: The Retreat from Classical Liberalism* (London: Biteback, 2012).

Lamont, N., *In Office* (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1999).

Landale, J., 'Economy a 'decade long project'', *BBC News*, 15 November 2013.

Lang, I., *Doing the Right Thing: The 1994 Swinton Lecture* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1994).

Lawrence, J. and F. S. Braithwaite, 'Margaret Thatcher and the decline of class politics', in B. Jackson and R. Saunders (eds), *Making Thatcher's Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 132-147.

Laws, D., *22 Days in May: The Birth of the Lib Dem-Conservative Coalition* (London: Biteback, 2010).

Laws, D., 'The Orange Book: Eight Years On', *Institute of Economic Affairs*, vol. 32, no. 2, (2012), 31-35.

Lawson, D., 'Review: Britannia Unchained by Kwasi Kwarteng, Priti Patel, Dominic Raab, Chris Skidmore and Elizabeth Truss', *The Sunday Times*, 23 September 2012.

Lawson, N., *The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical* (London: Bantam, 1992).

Layard, R., *Happiness: Lessons from a New Science* (London: Allen Lane, 2005).

Leach, R., *Political Ideology in Britain*, 2nd edn (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

'Leader: The Cameroon dream fades as the new right continues to rise', *NewStatesman*, 17 July 2014.

Lee, L., ‘Religion: Losing faith?’ in A. Park, E. Clery, J. Curtice, M. Phillips, and D. Utting (eds), *British Social Attitudes 28: The 28th Report* (London: SAGE, 2012), pp. 173-184.

Lee, S., *Boom and Bust: The Politics and Legacy of Gordon Brown* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009).

Lee, S., ‘Conclusion’, in M. Beech and S. Lee (eds), *Ten Years of New Labour* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 187-195.

Lee, S., ‘Convergence, Critique and Divergence: The Development of Economic Policy under David Cameron’, in S. Lee and M. Beech (eds), *The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 60-79.

Lee, S., ‘No Plan B: The Coalition Agenda for Cutting the Deficit and Rebalancing the Economy’, in S. Lee and M. Beech (eds), *The Cameron-Clegg Government: Coalition Politics in an Age of Austerity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 59-74.

Lee, S., ‘“We Are All in This Together’: The Coalition Agenda for British Modernization’, in S. Lee and M. Beech (eds), *The Cameron-Clegg Government: Coalition Politics in an Age of Austerity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 3-23.

Letwin, O., ‘Civilised Conservatism’, in O. Letwin and J. Marenbon, *Conservative Debates* (London: Politeia, 1999), pp. 1-14.

Letwin, O., ‘For Labour there is no such thing as society, only the state’, in G. Streeter (ed), *There Is Such a Thing as Society: Twelve Principles of Compassionate Conservatism* (London: Politico’s, 2003), pp. 38-51.

Letwin, O., *The Neighbourly Society: Collected Speeches 2001-2003* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 2003).

Letwin, O., 'Tories should aim to cut inequality', *The Guardian*, 24 December 2005.

Letwin, O., 'Bring on the scrutiny', *The Guardian*, 3 June 2008.

Letwin, O., 'From economic revolution to social revolution' in J. Cruddas and J. Rutherford (eds), *Is the Future Conservative?* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2008), pp. 71-78.

Letwin, S. R., 'Conservative Individualism', in M. Cowling (ed), *Conservative Essays* (London: Cassell, 1978), pp. 52-68.

Letwin, S. R., *The Anatomy of Thatcherism* (London: Fontana, 1992).

'Leviathan, tamed', *The Economist*, 15 June 2013.

Levitas, R., 'The Just's Umbrella: Austerity and the Big Society in Coalition Policy and Beyond', *Critical Social Policy*, vol. 32, no. 2, (2012), 320-342.

Lewis, J., "It All Really Starts in the Family...': Community Care in the 1980s', in A. Gamble and C. Wells (eds), *Thatcher's Law* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 83-96.

Lewis, S. W., 'Aggregate fiscal policy under the Labour government, 1997-2010', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, vol. 29, no. 1, (2013), 25-46.

Lilley, P., *Thatcherism: The Next Generation* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1989).

Lipsey, D., 'Do we really want more public spending?' in R. Jowell, J. Curtice, L. Brook, D. Ahrendt with A. Park (eds), *British Social Attitudes: The 11th Report* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 1-12.

Louis, W. R., *More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 1998).

Ludlam, S. and M. J. Smith, 'The Character of Contemporary Conservatism', in S. Ludlam and M. J. Smith (eds), *Contemporary British Conservatism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 264-281.

Lynch, P., 'Cameron, Modernisation and Conservative Britain', in S. Griffiths and K. Hickson (eds.) *British Politics and Ideology after New Labour*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 119-134.

Lyons, W. and I. Martin, 'Defining the Tory message: From Architect of Party's Plan', *Wall Street Journal*, 29 March 2009.

Macfarlane, A., *Origins of English Individualism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).

MacIntyre, A., *Against the Self-Images of the Age* (London: Duckworth, 1971).

MacIntyre, A., *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (London: Duckworth, 1981).

Macleod, I. and A. Maude (eds), *One Nation: A Tory Approach to Social Problems* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1950).

Macmillan, H., *The Middle Way: A Study of the Problem of Economic and Social Progress in a Free and Democratic Society* (London: Macmillan, 1938).

Major., *The Role and Limits of the State* (London: European Policy Forum, 1994).

Major, J., *The Autobiography* (London: HarperCollins, 1999).

Major, J., 'Foreword' in 'You can only be sure with the Conservatives: The Conservative Manifesto 1997', in I. Dale (ed), *Conservative Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997* (Oxford: Routledge, 2000), pp. 419-462.

Mandelson, P., ‘There’s plenty life in the ‘new’ Third Way yet’, *The Times*, 10 June 2002.

Manning, D. and Y. Carlisle, ‘The Ideologies of Modern Politics’, *Political Studies*, vol. 43, no. 3 (1995), 482-496.

Marquand, D., ‘The Paradoxes of Thatcherism’, in R. Skidelsky (ed), *Thatcherism* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1988), pp. 159-172.

Marquand, D., ‘The Language of Community’, in B. Pimlott, A. Wright, and T. Flower (eds), *The Alternative: Politics for a Change* (London: W. H. Allen, 1990), pp. 3-13.

Marquand, D., ‘Moralists and Hedonists’, in D. Marquand and A. Seldon (eds), *Ideas That Shaped Post-War Britain* (London: Fontana, 1996), pp. 5-28.

Marquand, D., *Decline of the Public: The Hollowing Out of Citizenship* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).

Marquand, D., ‘Labour has got Cameron wrong: this is no crypto-Thatcherite but a whig’, *The Guardian*, 29 August 2008.

Marquand, D., *Britain since 1918: The Strange Career of British Democracy* (London: Phoenix, 2009).

Marquand, D., ‘Patron saint of the Big Society’, *Prospect*, 5 October 2010.

Marquand, D., *Mammon’s Kingdom: An Essay on Britain, Now* (London: Allen Lane, 2014).

Marsh, D., *The New Politics of British Trade Unionism: Union Power and the Thatcher Legacy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992).

Marsh, D. and M. Hall, ‘The British Political Tradition: Explaining the Fate of New Labour’s Constitutional Reform Agenda’, *British Politics*, vol. 2, no. 2, (2007), 215-234.

Marsh, D. and R. A. W. Rhodes, 'The Implementation Gap: Explaining Policy Change and Continuity', in D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes (eds), *Implementing Thatcherite Policies: Audit of an Era* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992), pp. 170-187.

Marshall, P. and Laws, D (eds.) *The Orange Book: Reclaiming Liberalism*, (London: Profile, 2004)

Marx, K. and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*, trans. by S. Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress, 1964).

Maude, F., 'Foreword', in R. Shorthouse and G. Stagg (eds), *Tory Modernisation 2.0: The Future of the Conservative Party* (London: Bright Blue, 2013), pp. 2-4.

Maynard, J. L., 'A map of the field of ideological analysis', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 18, no. 3 (2013), 299-327.

Mawhinney, B., *Reclaiming the Community* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1996).

McAnulla, S., 'Heirs to Blair's third way? David Cameron's triangulating conservatism', *British Politics*, vol. 5, no. 3, (2010), 286-314.

McAnulla, S., 'Liberal Conservatism: Ideological Coherence?' in T. Heppell and D. Seawright (eds), *Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition Government* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 166-180.

McCloskey, D. N., *The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2006).

McCullough, H. B., *Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

McDermott, J., 'Britannia Unchained: Review', *The Financial Times*, 10 September 2012.

McIlveen, R., ‘Ladies of the Right: An Interim Analysis of the A-list’, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, vol. 18, no. 2, (2009), 147-157.

McKibbin, R., ‘What can Cameron do?’ *London Review of Books*, vol. 30, no. 20, (2008), 7-8.

McLean, I., “England Does Not Love Coalitions’: The Most Miused Political Quotation in the Book’, *Government and Opposition*, vol. 47, no. 1, (2012), 3-20.

McLellan, D, *Ideology*, 2nd edn (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995).

McNay, L, ‘Contemporary Critical Theory’, in M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent, and M. Stears (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 138-154.

McSmith, A., *No Such Thing As Society: A History of Britain in the 1980s* (London: Constable, 2011).

Meredith, S., ‘Mr Crosland’s Nightmare? New Labour and Equality in Historical Perspective’, *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, vol. 8, no. 2, (2006), 238-255.

Mészáros, I., *Philosophy, Ideology and Social Science: Essays in Negative and Affirmation* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986).

Micklethwait, J. and A. Wooldridge, *The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State* (London: Allen Lane, 2014).

Middleton, P., ‘For “Victorian” Read “Georgian”’ *Encounter*, vol. 67, no. 2, (1986), 5-9.

Milbank, J., G. Ward, and P. Catherine, ‘Introduction: Suspending the Material: The Turn of Radical Orthodoxy’, in J. Milbank, G. Ward, and P. Catherine (eds), *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1-20.

Miliband, E., ‘Only New Labour offers you a genuine big society’, *The Observer*, 22 April 2010.

Miliband, E., ‘A vote for UKIP would be a vote for the very worst of Thatcherism’, *The Mirror*, 30 April 2014.

Miller, D, *Justice For Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Mills, E., “I have problems with the Thatcher legacy”, *The Sunday Times*, 28 April 2013.

Minford, P., ‘Ideology and Pragmatism in Economic Thatcherism’, in J. C. D. Clark (ed), *Ideas and Politics in Modern Britain* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 191-202.

Minogue, K., ‘Introduction: The Context of Thatcherism’, in K. Minogue and M. Biddiss (eds), *Thatcherism: Personality and Politics* (Basingstoke, London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. x-xvii.

Minogue, K., ‘The Emergence of the New Right’, in R. Skidelsky (ed), *Thatcherism* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1988), pp. 125-142.

Mirowski, P. and D. Plehwe (eds), *The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective* (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

‘Money isn’t everything - Hague’, *BBC News*, 12 March 1999.

Montgomerie, T., ‘An appetite for conservatism that the PM doesn’t always satisfy’, *The Independent*, 28 December 2011.

Montgomerie, T., ‘Five ways to widen the Tory appeal and win’, *The Times*, 29 July 2013.

Moore, C., ‘I’m starting to think that the Left might actually be right’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 22 July 2011.

Moore, C., *Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography: Volume One: Not For Turning* (London: Allen Lane, 2013).

Moran, M., 'The Rise of the Regulatory State', in D. Coen, W. Grant and G. Wilson (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 383-403.

Morris, N., 'I'm no prisoner of Thatcherism', *The Independent*, 2 January 2006.

Morris, R., *Tories: From Village Hall to Westminster: A Political Sketch* (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1991).

Mouffe, C., *The Return of the Political* (London: Verso, 2005).

Mount, F., *Clubbing Together: The Revival of the Voluntary Principle* (London: W. H. Smith Contemporary Papers, 1993).

Mount, F., *Home Pages: A New Domestic Agenda for the Next Government* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 2000).

Muir, R., 'Coalition: A new Era in British Politics', *Public Policy Research*, vol. 17, no. 1, (2010), 17-22.

Mulholland, M., *Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear: From Absolutism to Neo-Conservatism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

Mullard, M. and R. Swaray, 'New Labour and Public Expenditure', in M. Beech and S. Lee (eds), *Ten Years of New Labour* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 35-49.

Müller, J. W., *Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2011).

Müller, J. W., *A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003).

Mullin, C., *A View from the Foothills: The Diaries of Chris Mullin* (London: Profile, 2010).

Murray, C., *The Emerging British Underclass* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1990).

Needham, D. and A. Hotson (eds), *Expansionary Fiscal Contraction: The Thatcher Government's 1981 Budget in Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

Nelson, F., 'Clegg: Heir to Thatcher', *The Spectator*, 10 March 2010.

Newey, G., 'Gray's Blues: Pessimism as a Political Project', in J. Norton and G. Newey (eds), *The Political Theory of John Gray* (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), pp. 151-172.

'Nigel Farage: 'Thatcherism was of its time'', *BBC News*, 1 June 2014.

Nisbet, R., *Conservatism: Dream and Reality* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1986).

Norman, J., *The Big Society: The Anatomy of the New Politics* (Buckingham: University of Buckingham Press, 2010).

Norman, J., *Edmund Burke: Philosopher, Politician, Prophet* (London: HarperCollins, 2013).

Norman, J. and J. Ganesh, *Compassionate Conservatism: What It Is. Why We Need It* (London: Policy Exchange, 2006).

Norton, P., 'Factions and Tendencies in the Conservative Party', in H. Margetts and G. Smyth (eds), *Turning Japanese? Britain with a Permanent Party of Government* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1994), pp. 93-104.

Norval, A. J, 'The Things We Do with Words: Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology', *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 30, no. 2 (2000), 313-346.

Nunn, A., 'The political economy of competitiveness and social mobility', *British Politics*, vol. 7, no. 2, (2012), 86-110.

O'Hara, K., *After Blair: David Cameron and the Conservative Tradition* (Cambridge: Icon Books, 2007).

O'Hara, K., *Conservatism* (London: Reaktion Books, 2011).

O'Hara, M., *Austerity Bites: A Journey to the Sharp End of Cuts in the UK* (Cambridge: Policy Press, 2014).

O'Sullivan, N., *Conservatism* (London: Dent, 1976).

O'Sullivan, N., 'The Politics of Ideology', in N. O'Sullivan (ed), *The Structure of Modern Ideology: Critical Perspectives on Social and Political Theory* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989), pp.188-212.

O'Sullivan, N., 'Political Integration, the Limited State, and the Philosophy of Postmodernism', *Political Studies*, vol. 41, no. s1, (1993), 21-42.

O'Sullivan, N., 'Conservatism' in M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent, and M. Stears (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 293-311.

Oakeshott, M., 'Contemporary British Politics', *The Cambridge Journal*, vol. 1, no. 8 (1948), 474-490.

Oakeshott, M., *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (London: Methuen, 1962).

Oakeshott, M., *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

Osborne, G., ‘How Thatcher restored Britain’s optimism’, *The Times*, 12 April 2013.

Osborne, G. and R. Thaler, ‘We can make you behave’, *The Guardian*, 28 January 2010.

Özsel, D., ‘The Conservative Minimum: Historical and Transcendent Subject’, *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought*, published online 27 January 2014, Doi: 10.1080/23269995.2014.933054.

Papadakis, E. and P. T. Gooby, *The Private Provision of Public Welfare: State, Market and Community* (Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1987).

Papworth, T., ‘Editorial: Eight Years Since The Orange Book: Have the Liberal Democrats ‘Reclaimed’ Liberalism?’ *Institute of Economic Affairs*, vol. 32, no. 2, (2012), 2-5.

Park, A., E. Clery, J. Curtice, M. Phillips, and D. Utting, ‘Key findings’, in A. Park E. Clery, J. Curtice, M. Phillips, and D. Utting (eds), *British Social Attitudes 29*: *The 29th Report* (London: NatCen Social Research, 2012), pp. ii-xiv.

Park, A., C. Bryson, E. Clery, E, J. Curtice, and M. Phillips, ‘Key findings’, in A. Park, C. Bryson, E. Clery, J. Curtice and, M. Phillips (eds), *British Social Attitudes: The 30th Report* (London: NatCen Social Research, 2013), pp. ii-xxii.

Patten, J., ‘Launching the active citizen’, *The Guardian*, 28 September 1988.

Patten, J., *Political Culture, Conservatism and Rolling Constitutional Change: The 1991 Swinton Lecture* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1991).

Patten, J., *Things to Come: The Tories in the 21st Century* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1995).

Pattie, C. and R. Johnston, 'How Big is the Big Society?' *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 64, no. 3, (2011), 403-424.

Pautz, H., 'The Think Tanks behind 'Cameronism'', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol. 15, no. 3, (2013), 362-377.

Pearce, N. and E. Taylor, 'Government spending and welfare', in A. Park, C. Bryson, E. Clery, J. Curtice, and M. Phillips (eds), *British Social Attitudes: The 30th Report* (London: NatCen Social Research, 2013), pp. 33-61.

Pécheux, M., 'The Mechanism of Ideological (Mis)recognition', in S. Žižek (ed), *Mapping Ideology* (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 141-151.

Peck, J., *Constructions of Neoliberal Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Peck, J. and N. Tickell., 'Neoliberalising Space', *Antipode*, vol. 34, no. 3, (2002), 380-404.

Pedersen, S., 'Review: Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century', *Twentieth Century British History*, vol. 15, no. 4, (2004), 438-440.

Peele, G., 'British Conservatism: Ideological Change and Electoral Uncertainty', in B. Girvin (ed), *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism* (London: SAGE, 1988), pp. 13-34.

Peele, G., 'Culture, Religion and Public Morality', in A. Adonis and T. Hames (eds), *A Conservative Revolution: The Thatcher-Reagan in Perspective* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), pp. 67-88.

Phillips, D., *Looking Backward: A Critical Appraisal of Communitarian Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

Philpot, R (ed), *The Purple Book: A Progressive Future for Labour* (London: Biteback, 2011).

Pierson, P., *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Pilbeam, B., 'Conservatism and postmodernism: consanguineous or 'different' voices?' *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 6, no. 1, (2001), 33-54.

Pilbeam, B., *Conservatism in Crisis? Anglo-American Conservative Ideology after the Cold War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

Plant, R., 'Community: Concept, Conception and Ideology', *Politics and Society*, vol. 8, no. 2, (1978), 79-107.

Plant, R., 'Citizenship, Empowerment and Welfare', in B. Pimlott, A. Wright, and T. Flower (eds), *The Alternative: Politics for a Change* (London: W. H. Allen, 1990), pp. 33-42.

Plant, R., *Modern Political Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

Plant, R., *The Neo-Liberal State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Plant, R. and K. Hoover, *Conservative Capitalism in Britain and the United States: A Critical Appraisal* (London: Routledge, 1989).

Pocock, J. G. A., *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays in Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Pocock, J. G. A., *Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Polanyi, K., *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1957).

Portillo, M., *A Vision for the 1990s* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1992).

Portillo, M., *The Blue Horizon* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1993).

Portillo, M., *The Ghost of Toryism Past: The Spirit of Conservatism Future* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1997).

Powell, F., *The Politics of Civil Society: Neoliberalism or Social Left* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2007).

Powell, F., *The Politics of Civil Society: Big Society and Small Government*, 2nd edn (Bristol: Policy Press, 2013).

Prabhakar, R., *Stakeholding and New Labour* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

Prabhakar, R., 'Reforming Public Services: The Views of the Main Parties', in S. Griffiths and K. Hickson (eds), *British Politics and Ideology after New Labour* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 195-207.

Proctor, J., *Stuart Hall* (London: Routledge, 2004).

Putnam, R., *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

Quinn, T., 'The Conservative Party and the "Centre Ground" of British Politics', *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, vol. 18, no. 2, (2008), 179-199.

Quinn, T., J. Bara, and J. Bartle, 'The UK Coalition Agreement of 2010: Who Won?' *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, vol. 21, no. 2, (2011), 295-312.

Quinton, A., *The Politics of Imperfection: the Religious and Secular Traditions of Conservative Thought in England from Hooker to Oakeshott* (London: Faber & Faber, 1978).

Raab, D., *Escaping the Strait Jacket: Ten Regulatory Reforms to Create Jobs* (London: CPS, 2011).

Raab, D., 'Trade Union Reform', in D. David, B Binley and J. Baron (eds), *The Future of Conservatism: Values Revisited* (London: Biteback, 2011), pp. 73-83.

Raab, D., 'We must end feminist bigotry', *PoliticsHome*, 24 January 2011.

Raab, D., 'The Government wants its same-sex marriage safeguards to work. So it mustn't appease the Strasbourg Court', *ConservativeHome*, 12 December 2012.

Raab, D., *Weight Watchers for Whitehall* (London: Free Enterprise Group/IEA, 2013).

Raab, D., 'This week's fire brigade union action shows why we need strike law reform', *ConservativeHome*, 22 September 2013.

Raab, D., *The Meritocrat's Manifesto* (London: Social Market Foundation, 2014).

Raban, J., *God, Man and Mrs Thatcher* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1989).

Ramsden, J., *A History of the Conservative Politics, 1990-1996* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).

Ranelagh, J., *Thatcher's People: An Insider's Account of the Politics, the Power and the Personalities* (London: Fontana, 1992).

Rawlinson, K., 'David Blunkett quits as MP amid election warning for Labour', *The Guardian*, 21 June 2014.

Rawls, J., *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).

Rawls, J. and E. Kelly (eds), *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003).

Rawnsley, A., ''I'm not a deeply ideological person. I'm a practical one'', *The Observer*, 18 December 2005.

Redwood, J., A. Perkins, A. Lent, A. De Waal, J. Kampfner, and I. Jack, 'What is Cameronism? Part Two', *The Guardian*, 18 August 2010.

Reed, H., 'Osbornomics', *Renewal: A Journal of Social Democracy*, vol. 18, no. 1/2, (2010), 74-80.

Reeves, R., 'This is David Cameron', *Public Policy Research*, vol. 15, no. 2, (2008), 63-7.

Reeves, R., *A Liberal Inside* (London: Demos, 2012).

Rentoul, J., 'Individualism', in R. Jowell, S. Witherspoon, L. Brook with B. Taylor (eds), *British Social Attitudes: The 7th Report* (Aldershot: Gower, 1990), pp. 167-182.

Reyes, O., 'A new political landscape: Engaging with Cameronism', *Renewal*, vol. 15, no. 2/3, (2007), 83-88.

Rhodes, R. A. W., 'The Hollowing Out of the State: the Changing Nature of the Public Service in Britain', *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 65, no. 2, (1994), 138-151.

Richards, S., 'For the state to intervene in the free market would have been anathema to Osborne. How times changes', *The Independent*, 25 November 2013.

Ricoeur. P., *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth, TX: The Texas Christianity University Press, 1976).

Ricoeur, P., 'Ideology and Ideology Critique', in B. Waldenfels, J. M. Broekman, and A. Pažanin (eds), trans. by J.C. Evans (Boston, MA: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 134-164.

Ridley, N., *The Local Right: Enabling not Providing* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1988).

Riddell, P., ‘Ideology in Practice’, in A. Adonis and T. Hames (eds), *A Conservative Revolution: The Thatcher-Reagan in Perspective* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), pp. 19-41.

Robin, C., *The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Robinson, E., *History, heritage and tradition in contemporary British politics: Past politics and present histories* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012).

Roland, D., ‘Osborne: I’ve started a ‘quiet revolution’ on tax cuts’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 December 2013.

Rollings, N., ‘Cracks in the Post-War Keynesian Settlement? The Role of Organised Business in Britain in the Rise of Neoliberalism Before Margaret Thatcher’, *Twentieth Century British History*, vol. 24, no. 4, (2013), 637-659.

Rose, N., ‘The death of the social? Re-figuring the territory of government’, *Economy and Society*, vol. 25, no. 3, (1996), 327-356.

Rossiter, C., *Conservatism in America* (New York: Vintage, 1962).

Rutherford, J., ‘Fraternity without Equality, and other Conservative Ideals’, *Soundings*, vol. 39, no. 1, (2008), 98-107.

Saatchi, M., ‘A radical policy to set small businesses free’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 16 June 2014.

Samuel, R., ‘Mrs Thatcher’s Return to Victorian Values’, in T. C. Smout (ed), *Victorian Values: Joint Symposium of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and the British Academy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 9-23.

Sandel, M., *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

Sandel, M., *What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets* (London: Penguin, 2013).

Sandry, A., *Plaid Cymru: An Ideological Analysis* (Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press, 2011).

Savage, M., ''Danny has gone native': Lib Dems fear their No 2 is Treasury turncoat', *The Times*, 10 March 2012.

Scheffler, S., 'Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory', *California Law Review*, vol. 83, no. 3, (2000), 965-990.

Scheuerman, W. E., 'The unholy alliance of Carl Schmitt and Friedrich A. Hayek', *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory*, vol. 4, no. 2, (1997), 172-188.

Schmitt, C., 'Strong State and Sound Economy: An Address to Business Leaders', in R. Cristi (ed), *Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998), pp. 212-232.

Schmitt, C., *The Concept of the Political*, trans by J. Seitzer (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

Schmitt, C., *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

Schui, F., *Austerity: The Great Failure* (New York/London: Yale University Press, 2014).

Schumaker, P., *From Ideologies to Public Philosophies: An Introduction to Political Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

Scruton, R., *Modern Philosophy: An Introduction and Survey* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994).

Scruton, R., *The Conservative Idea of Community* (London: The Conservative 2000 Foundation, 1996).

Scruton, R., *The Meaning of Conservatism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001).

Scruton, R., *England: An Elegy* (London: Continuum, 2006).

Scruton, R., 'Hayek and conservatism', in E. Feser (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Hayek* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 208-231.

Scruton, R., 'Postmodern Tories', *Prospect*, 21 February 2013.

Seawright, D., 'One Nation', in K. Hickson (ed), *The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 69-92.

Seawright, D., *The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics* (London: Continuum, 2009).

Seawright, D., 'The Conservative Election Campaign', in T. Heppell and D. Seawright (eds), *Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition Government* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 32-43.

Sebastián, J. F (eds), *Political Concepts and Time: New Approaches to Conceptual History* (Santander: Cantabria University Press, 2011).

Seldon, A., 'Ideas Are Not Enough', in D. Marquand and A. Seldon (eds), *Ideas That Shaped Post-War Britain* (London: Fontana, 1996), pp. 257-289.

Seldon, A., *Major: A Political Life* (London: Phoenix, 1997).

Seldon, A., 'Time to take the big society seriously', *theguardian.com*, 15 February 2011.

Seldon, A. with P. Snowden, *Cameron at 10* (London: HarperCollins, 2015) (forthcoming).

Self, W., ‘John Gray: Forget everything you know’, *The Independent*, 3 September 2002.

Seliger, M., *Ideology and Politics* (London: Free Press, 1976).

Seymour, R., *The Meaning of David Cameron* (Winchester: 0-Books, 2010).

Seymour, R., *Against Austerity: How We Can Fix the Crisis They Made* (London: Pluto Press, 2014).

Shaw, E., *Losing Labour’s Soul? New Labour and the Blair Government 1997-2007* (London: Routledge, 2007).

Simons, N., ‘Tory MP Admits Conference Slogan ‘Excludes People’’, *The Huffington Post*, 30 September 2013.

Skelton, D (ed), *Access All Areas: Building a Majority* (Renewal: London, 2013).

Skelton, D., ‘Reviving the Tory tradition of social reform’, in J. Derbyshire (ed), *Poverty in the UK: Can it be eradicted?* (London: Prospect, 2013), pp. 46-49.

Skidmore, C., *A New Beveridge: 70 years on* (London: IEA, 2012).

Skinner, Q., ‘Method and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, *History and Theory*, vol. 8, no. 1, (1969), 3-53.

Skinner, Q., ‘On performing and explaining linguistic actions’, *Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 82, (1971), 1-21.

Skinner, Q., ‘‘Social Meaning’ and the Explanation of Social Action’, in J. Tully (eds), *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 79-96.

Skinner, Q., *Visions of Politics: Volume 1: Regarding Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Slack, J., ‘‘I want to scrap the Human Rights act but Clegg won’t let me, says the PM’’, *Daily Mail*, 3 October 2011.

Smith, A. M., *New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality: Britain, 1968-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Smith, M. J., 'From Big Government to Big Society: Changing the State-Society Balance', *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 63, no. 4, (2010), 818-833.

Smith, O. and R. Reeves (eds), *One Nation: Power, Hope, Community* (London: One Nation Register, 2013).

Snowdon, P., *Back from the Brink: The Inside Story of the Tory Resurrection* (London: HarperPress, 2010).

Snowdon, P., *Back from the Brink: The Extraordinary Fall and Rise of the Conservative Party* (London: HarperCollins, 2010).

Soffer, R. N., *History, Historians, and Conservatism in Britain and America: The Great War to Thatcher and Reagan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Stapleton, J., 'T. E. Utley and Renewal of Conservatism in Post-War Britain', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 19, no. 2 (2014), 207-226.

Steger, M. B., 'Ideologies of Globalization', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, vol. 10, no. 1, (2005), 11-30.

Steger, M. B., 'Political Ideologies in the Age of Globalization', in M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent, and M. Stears (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 214-231.

Steger, M. B. and R. K. Roy, *Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Stevens, C., 'Thatcherism, Majorism and the Collapse of Tory Statecraft', *Contemporary British History*, vol. 16, no. 1, (2002), 119-150.

Stoker, G., *The Politics of Local Government* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988).

Stoker, G., ‘Social Welfare: The Unkindest Cuts’, in R. Jowell, S. Witherspoon, L. Brook with B. Taylor (eds), *British Social Attitudes: The 7th Report* (Aldershot: Gower, 1990), pp. 1-26.

Stoker, G., ‘New Localism, Progressive Politics and Democracy’, in A. Gamble and T. Wright (eds), *Restating the State?* (Oxford: Blackwell/The Political Quarterly, 2004), pp. 117-129.

Streeter, G., ‘Conservatives must change in order to help the vulnerable’, in G. Streeter (ed), *There Is Such a Thing as Society: Twelve Principles of Compassionate Conservatism* (London: Politico’s, 2003), pp. 1-10.

Sunstein, C. R., *Why Nudge? The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2014).

Sylvester, R., ‘Letwin: We will redistribute wealth’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 23 December 2005.

Talshir, G., ‘Civil Society and the Reconstruction of the Public Sphere: Ideologies between Theory and Politics’, in B. Jackson and M. Stears (eds), *Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeden* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 199-220.

Taylor, A., ‘British Conservatives, David Cameron and the Politics of Adaptation’, *Representation*, Vol. 46, no. 4, (2010), 489-496.

Taylor, C., *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Taylor, D., ‘A Big Idea for the nineties? The rise of the citizens’ charters’, *Critical Social Policy*, vol. 11, no. 33, (1991), 87-94.

Taylor, I., *Releasing the Community Spirit - A Framework for the Active Citizen* (London: Tory Reform Group, 1990).

Tebbit, N., *The Values of Freedom* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1986).

Temko, N., 'Cameron: we got it wrong on apartheid', *The Observer*, 27 August 2006.

Thaler, R. H. and R. C. Sunstein, *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness* (London: Penguin, 2008).

Thane, P., 'The Ben Pimlott Memorial Lecture 2011: The 'Big Society' and the 'Big State': Creative Tension or Crowding Out?' *Twentieth Century British History*, vol. 23, no. 3, (2012), 408-429.

Thatcher, M., *Let Our Children Grow Tall: Selected Speeches, 1975-77* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1977).

Thatcher, M., 'Letter to Friedrich Hayek', 18 May 1979.

Thatcher, M., 'Don't Undo My Work', *Newsweek*, 27 April 1992.

Thatcher, M., *The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993).

Thatcher, M., 'Foreword', in K. Minogue (ed), *Conservative Realism: New Essays on Conservatism* (London: HarperCollins, 1996), pp. xiii-xv.

Thatcher, M., *Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World* (London: HarperCollins, 2002).

Thatcher, M., 'Reflections on Liberty', in S. Pugliese (ed), *The Political Legacy of Margaret Thatcher* (London: Politico's, 2003), pp. 1-8.

'The Conservative Manifesto 1979' in I. Dale (ed), *Conservative Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997* (Oxford: Routledge, 2000), pp. 263-282.

'The Next Moves Forward: The Conservative Manifesto 1987', in I. Dale (ed), *Conservative Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997* (Oxford: Routledge, 2000), pp. 311-352.

The Big Society Audit (London: Civil Exchange, 2013).

‘The strange rebirth of liberal England’, *The Economist*, 1st-7th June 2013.

‘The unlikely revolutionary’, *The Economist*, 12 August 2010.

Thornton, A., *Urban Planning under Thatcherism: The Challenge of the Market*, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 1991).

Titmuss, R. M., *Social Policy: An Introduction* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974).

Toynbee, P., ‘Labour’s spending worked. Why don’t they defend it?’ *The Guardian*, 2 July 2013.

Toynbee, P., ‘Nothing will stop David Cameron’s race to the ‘weightless state’’, *The Guardian*, 20 May 2014.

Toynbee, P. and D. Walker, *Dogma and Disarray: Cameron at Half-Time* (London: Granta, 2012).

Toynbee, P. and D. Walker, *Cameron’s Coup: How the Tories Took Britain to the Brink* (London: Faber & Faber, 2015).

Townsend, M., ‘David Cameron’s vision has been lost, says author of ‘hug a hoodie’ speech’, *The Observer*, 10 August 2013.

Travers, T., ‘Cameron’s shoving back of the state’, *The Financial Times*, 17 August 2010.

‘Treasury’s chief note to successor: There’s no money’, *BBC News*, 17 May 2010.

Truss, E., ‘Foreword’, in M. Scott (ed), *The Big Society Challenge* (Cardiff: Keystone Development Trust, 2011), pp. ix-x.

Truss, E., *Affordable Quality: New Approaches to Childcare* (London: CentreForum, 2012).

Truss, E., ‘A class act’, in N. Seddon (ed), *The Next Ten Years*, (London: Reform, 2012), pp. 322-325.

Truss, E., ‘My generation of Tories takes its lead from the radical Margaret Thatcher’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 9 April 2013.

Tully, J (eds), *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

Tully, J., *Public Philosophy in a New Key. Vol I: Democracy and Civic Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Tully, J. H., ‘The pen is a mighty sword: Quentin Skinner’s analysis of politics’, *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 13, no. 4 (1983), 489-509.

Turner, A. W., *A Classless Society: Britain in the 1990s* (London: Aurum Press, 2013).

Turner, R., *Neo-Liberal Ideology: History, Concepts and Policies* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).

Utley, T. E., *One Nation: 100 Years On* (London: CPC, 1981).

Utley, T. E., ‘Monstrous Invention’, *The Spectator*, 9 August 1986.

Viereck, P., *Conservatism Revisited: The Revolt against Revolt 1815-1949* (London: John Lehmann, 1950).

Vincent, A., ‘British Conservatism and the Problem of Ideology’, *Political Studies*, vol. 42, no. 2, (1994), 204-227.

Vincent, A., *The Nature of Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Vincent, A., *Modern Political Ideologies*, 3rd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010).

Vincent, A., ‘Political Ideology and Political Theory: Reflections on an Awkward Partnership’, in B. Jackson and M. Stears (eds), *Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeden* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 159-177.

Vincent, A., ‘Social Democracy and the Progressive Tradition’, in R. Hattersley and K. Hickson (eds), *The Socialist Way: Social Democracy in Contemporary Britain* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co, 2013), pp. 132-141.

Vincent, J., ‘Margaret Thatcher: her place in history’, *Contemporary Record*, vol. 1, no. 3, (1987), 23-24.

Vincent, J., ‘The Thatcher Governments, 1979-1987’, in P. Hennessy and A. Seldon (eds), *Ruling Performance: British Governments from Attlee to Thatcher* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 274-300.

Vinen, R., *Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the Thatcher Era* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009).

Wade, R., *Conservative Party Economic Policy: From Heath in Opposition to Cameron in Coalition* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Waldegrave, W., *Two Lectures: A Competitive Nation? Why the Next Election Matters? Tory Democracy and One Nation: Their Relevance Today* (London: Conservative Political Centre, 1996).

Walsha, R., ‘The One Nation Group and One Nation Conservatism, 1950-2002, *Contemporary British History*, vol. 17, no. 2, (2003), 69-120.

Walters, S., *Tory Wars: Conservatives in Crisis* (London: Politico’s, 2001).

Walzer, M., *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

Ware, A., ‘The Big Society and Conservative Politics: Back to the Future or Forward to the Past?’ in J. Edwards (ed), *Retrieving the Big Society* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 82-97.

Warnock, M., *A Memoir: People & Places* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co, 2000).

Watson, R., ‘Cameron salutes a great moderniser and says ‘we’re all Thatcherites now’’, *The Times*, 18 April 2013.

Watt, N., ‘David Cameron apologises to gay people for section 28’, *The Guardian*, 2 July 2009.

Watt, N., ‘‘There’s no such thing as ‘big society’’, senior Tories tell Cameron’, *The Guardian*, 21 March 2010.

Watt, N., ‘Cameron’s ‘social change by diktat’ hurting Conservatives, Tory warns’, *The Guardian*, 1 March 2013.

Webb, P. and S. Childs, ‘Wets and Dries Resurgent? Intra-Party Alignments Among Contemporary Conservative Party Members’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 64, no, 3, (2011), 383-402.

Wheatcroft, G., *The Strange Death of Tory England* (London: Allen Lane, 2005).

Wheeler, B., ‘Is the coalition really ‘Maoist’?’, *BBC News*, 21 December 2010.

White, S., ‘Interpreting the ‘Third Way’: Not one word, but many’, *Renewal: A Journal of Social Democracy*, vol. 6, no. 2, (1998), 17-30.

White, S., ‘An ideological map’, *NewStatesman*, 3 September 2009.

Wilks, S., ‘Economic Policy’, in P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, I. Holliday, and G. Peele (eds), *Developments in British Politics 4* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 221-245.

Willetts, D., *Modern Conservatism* (London: Penguin, 1992).

Willetts, D., *Deregulation* (London: Social Market Foundation, 1993).

Willetts, D., *Civic Conservatism* (London: Social Market Foundation, 1994).

Willetts, D., *Blair’s Gurus: An Examination of Labour’s Rhetoric* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1996).

Willetts, D., 'The Free Market and Civic Conservatism' in K. Minogue (ed), *Conservative Realism: New Essays in Conservatism* (London: HarperCollins, 1996), pp. 80-97.

Willetts, D., 'Civic Conservatism', in J. Gray and D. Willetts (eds), *Is Conservatism Dead?* (London: Profile Books, 1997), pp. 67-141.

Willetts, D., *Why Vote Conservative?* (London: Penguin, 1997).

Willetts, D., 'Conservative Renewal', *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 69, no. 2, (1998), 110-117.

Willetts, D., *Who Do We Think We Are?* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1998).

Willetts, D., 'Reviving Civic Conservatism', in A. Kilmarnock (ed), *The Social Market and the State* (London: Social Market Foundation, 1999), pp. 25-38.

Willetts, D., 'The New Contours of British Politics', in G. Streeter (ed), *There Is Such a Thing as Society: Twelve Principles of Compassionate Conservatism* (London: Politico's, 2003), pp. 52-59.

Willetts, D., 'Renewing Civic Conservatism', in J. Tate (ed), *What's Right Now: Conservative Essays on the Role of Civil Society, Markets and the State* (London: Social Market Foundation, 2005), pp. 27-34.

Willetts, D., 'Response to Charlie Ellis', in S. Griffiths and K. Hickson (eds), *British Politics and Ideology after New Labour* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 150-152.

Willetts, D., *The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Took Their Children's Future – and Why They Should Give It Back* (London: Atlantic Books, 2011).

Willetts, D., 'There are many ties that bind the Coalition', *The Daily Telegraph*, 9 May 2011.

Willetts, D., ‘Beyond Bare-Earth Conservatism: The Future of the British Economy’, in R. Shorthouse and G. Stagg (eds), *Tory Modernisation 2.0: The Future of the Conservative Party* (London: Bright Blue, 2012), pp. 25-35.

Williams, B., *In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

Williams, H., ‘Preface’, in R. Scruton, *The Conservative Idea of Community* (London: The Conservative 2000 Foundation, 1996), p. 5.

Williams, S. and P. Scott, ‘The Nature of Conservative Party Modernisation Under David Cameron: The Trajectory of Employment Relations Policy’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol. 64, no. 3, (2011), 513-529.

Wilson, R., *5 Days to Power: The Journey to Coalition Britain* (London: Biteback, 2010).

Windsor, D., ‘Reprivatising Britain: Thatcherism and Its Results’, in S. Pugliese (ed), *The Political Legacy of Margaret Thatcher* (London: Politico’s, 2003), pp. 124-137.

Winnett, R., ‘WikiLeaks: Barack Obama regarded David Cameron as ‘lightweight’’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 30 November 2010.

Winnett, R., ‘David Cameron: I’ll never campaign to take us out of Europe’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 18 July 2012.

Wintour, P., ‘Thatcher funeral address prompts Tory praise for bishop of London’, *The Guardian*, 17 April 2013.

Wintour, P., ‘Payday loans costs cap unveiled by George Osborne’, *The Guardian*, 25 September 2013.

Withnall, A., ‘David Cameron: ‘Jesus invented the Big Society - I’m just continuing God’s work’, *The Independent*, 10 April 2014.

Wolf, M., ‘‘Cameronism’ is empty at the centre’, *The Financial Times*, 20 January 2006.

Worsthorne, P., ‘Too Much Freedom’, in M. Cowling (ed), *Conservative Essays* (London: Cassell, 1978), pp. 141-154.

Worsthorne, P., ‘Preface’, in S. Roy and J. Clarke (eds), *Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution: How it Happened and What it Meant* (London: Continuum, 2005), pp. vii-xvi.

Wright, A. and A. Fagg, ‘Politics in 2012: Party revolts and Budget tops Cameron’s difficult year’, *BBC News*, 27 December 2012.

Wright, T., *Citizens and Subjects: An Essay on British Politics* (London: Routledge, 1994).

‘You can only be sure with the Conservatives: The Conservative Manifesto 1997’, in I. Dale (ed), *Conservative Party General Election Manifestos 1900-1997* (Oxford: Routledge, 2000), pp. 419-462.

Žižek, S., ‘The spectre of ideology’, in S. Žižek (ed), *Mapping Ideology* (London: Verso, [1994), 2012), pp. 1-33.

Žižek, S., *First As Tragedy, Then As Farce* (London: Verso, 2009).

Žižek, S., *Violence* (London: Profile Books, 2009).