
Radical Fortunes: Ideology and Armed Groups



Matthew Zelina
Nuffield College
University of Oxford

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Abstract

For the last several decades, discussions of civil wars, insurgencies, and rebellions have not been able to escape referencing ideology, even if it has been simply to dismiss its relevance. Throughout the apparent waves of ideologically flavoured conflict, from Marxists, nationalists, and more recently, Jihadists, the relevance of ideology is far less disputed; however, how exactly it influences armed group behaviour still isn't clear. I intend to help provide that clarity by asking the question: What is the fortune of radical armed groups? More precisely, does an investment in ideological institutions and the declared political goals of an armed group tell us who might win civil wars?

In this dissertation, I offer a clear conceptualisation of radicalism which i) helps clarify the often-blurry lines between when ideology does and doesn't matter and ii) offers us the ability to measure ideology meaningfully. I suggest that radicalism possesses three main components: a desire for drastic political change, ideologically consistent behaviour, and the adoption of non-routine means to achieve those desires. I categorise these components to understand radicalism in general and more specifically for non-state armed groups. I demonstrate that by grouping non-state actors based on how ideological they are, rather than which ideology they subscribe to, we can better explain why the groups win and lose civil war and how long those wars might be.

I argue that for radical armed groups, their fortunes are limited to attaining all or none of their goals. They either win or they lose. Neither do radical groups necessarily have an advantage in civil war. While their ideology could impart an advantage in battle, such as increasing military effectiveness, radicalism may not help them win the war. This is partly due to their radical ideology, which handicaps their ability to negotiate and compromise with their enemies. Compared to their less or non-radical counterparts, radical groups are least likely to negotiate with their enemies and just as likely, if not more, to lose. I suggest that there are several mechanisms that discourage radical armed groups from settling during war and others that may encourage it.

To test this theory, I have created a dataset of N=78 non-state armed groups with variables that measure ideological institutionalisation (such as recruit indoctrination, ideological training, civilian indoctrination, and the presence of a propaganda cadre) and ideological ambition (desired political change and desired political control). In doing so, I have created an index of non-state armed group radicalism. Equally, I classify the conflict outcome of these groups into four categories: hard victory (attains all goals), soft victory (achieves few goals), soft defeat (achieves no goals), hard defeat (the group is terminated).

My analysis supports the theory, revealing that radical armed groups are significantly more likely to experience extreme conflict outcomes (hard victory or defeat) rather than a moderate outcome (soft victory or defeat and that radicalism is significantly associated with wars lasting at least ten years. Overall, this study clarifies both the advantages and disadvantages of radical armed groups in civil war with empirical evidence.

Acknowledgements

‘How is it that you live, and what is it you do?’ This is the deep and generally unanswerable question William Wordsworth asks in his poem Resolution and Independence. Though the question I pose in this dissertation isn’t nearly as difficult to answer as Wordsworth’s, there are a few people I would have to mention in any meaningful attempt to form a response to it.

While my parents still only have a vague idea of what this is all about, they consistently offered me the freedom and encouragement to seek what interests me, never giving the impression that anything is out of my reach.

Academically, I’ve been lucky enough to find those that, for whatever reason, chose to spend their time and effort on me. My military career taught me about how to endure suffering and boredom, while these individuals instructed me on the discipline and hard work required to truly create, think, and know. They were very good at using their original and gruelling methods to remind me that I’m not as smart as I thought I was, while simultaneously making me a better student and person. These include Andrew Cresswell, Major Andy Belyea of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), and Steve Lukits (RMC). Steve has been particularly instrumental in the completion of this dissertation. Throughout our conversations over the last four years, he never allowed me to wallow in the inevitable DPhil despair.

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My supervisor Andrea Ruggeri pushed me to be a better academic. Not only did he go out of his way to provide me with opportunities I otherwise would not have had, he has also never treated any of my ideas (or the ideas of others for that matter) with contempt. Andrea fostered a community at Oxford that allowed his students grow and explore while maintaining the perspective of rigour and seriousness required of the subject and the pursuit of knowledge.

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Chapter 1: Introduction 8
Contributions **11**
Concepts **13**
Radicalism 13
Extreme Outcomes 13
Is Radicalism an Advantage? **14**
Why Radicalism? 16
Science, Psychology, and Belief 16
Ideology **21**
Ideology and Civil War 25
Research Design **30**
Limitations 30
Radicalism Index 31
Quantitative Analysis 32
Case Studies of Mechanisms 33
Chapter 2: Concepts 35
Radicalisation and Radicalism 35
Identifying Radicalism **39**
Why Radicalism? 42
Defining Radicalism for Armed Groups 45
Ideological Ambition **46**
Change and Control 46
What kind of Change? 46
What Kind of Control? 49
How Ideological Ambition Looks 50
Ideological Intensity **52**
Institutionalisation and Internalisation 52
Internalisation 53
Ideological Institutionalisation 55
Recruit Indoctrination 57
Political/Ideological/Religious Training 59
Civilian Indoctrination 60
Propaganda 61
Chapter 3: Theory 67
Radicalism : The Unintentional Self-Restriction of Strategic Options **77**
How Radicalism Affects Outcomes **78**
Hypotheses 1 and 2 79
How Radicalism Changes **80**
Hypothesis 3 80
Why Radical Groups Fight For Longer **81**
Hypothesis 4 82
Empirical Expectations **82**
Observability of Mechanisms 83
Theory Conditions: The State 84
Conditions Promoting Extreme Outcomes 85
External Audience Costs 85
Internal Audience Costs 88

Perceived Elevated Threat ... 89
Conditions Mitigating Extreme Outcomes ... 91
External Audience Costs ... 91
War Weariness ... 92
Societal Change ... 93
Conclusion ... 94
Chapter 4: Methodology and Empirical Analyses ... 95
Case Selection ... 96
Data Collection ... 99
Desk Research ... 99
Expert Survey ... 100
Randomization ... 101
Collected Variables ... 102
Ideological Ambition ... 103
Ideological Institutionalisation ... 105
Recruit Indoctrination ... 105
Ideological Training ... 106
Civilian Indoctrination ... 107
Propaganda ... 108
The Radicalism Variable ... 109
Data on Outcome and Duration ... 113
Available Duration Data ... 113
Available Outcome Data ... 117
Distinguishing Rebel Outcomes ... 120
Data Analysis ... 123
Outcome and Radicalism ... 124
OLS ... 126
Multinomial Model ... 131
Binary Model ... 139
Duration and Radicalism ... 145
Discussion ... 151
Omission: The State ... 155
Alternative Explanations ... 156
Institutionalisation ... 156
Mimic Groups ... 157
Radical Obsessives ... 158
Chapter 5: Mechanisms Encouraging Extreme Outcomes ... 160
Cases ... 160
Shining Path ... 161
Communist Part of Nepal – Maoist ... 166
Non-Radical Explanations? ... 168
Encouraging Mechanisms ... 170
Intrinsic Belief ... 170
Internal Audience Costs ... 173
Institutionalisation ... 178
Monitoring ... 180
Pluralistic Ignorance ... 182
Why Different Outcomes? ... 186

Institutional Capacity 187
State Forces 190
Nepal 190
Peru 191
Conclusion 194
Chapter 6: Mechanisms Discouraging Extreme Outcomes 196
Discouraging Mechanisms 197
Generational Change 197
Leadership Change 200
War Weariness 202
Loss of Institutional Capacity 203
Combat Defeats 205
Cases 207
MILF 207
Combat Defeat 209
Leadership Change 212
Generational Change 213
Abu Sayyaf Group 215
Leadership Change 217
Lack of Institutional Capacity 219
Combat Defeats 221
Why Different Outcomes? 222
Conclusion 223
Chapter 7: Conclusion 225
Research Question and Findings 225
Civil War, Ideology, and Radicalism 226
Ideological Ambition and Institutionalisation 227
Spectrum of Outcomes 229
Empirical Evidence and Analysis 230
Mechanisms Encouraging and Discouraging Extreme Outcomes 232
Limitations: Role of the State 235
Alternative Explanations 237
Institutionalisation 237
Mimic Groups 238
Radical Obsessives 238
Thesis' Implications 239
Future Research 240
References 243
Annex A – Codebook and Descriptive Statistics 254
Annex B – Statistical Checks 260

Chapter 1: Introduction

This is a study about beliefs and violence. Beliefs often share simultaneous contradictory characteristics. Depending on who one asks, the same beliefs appear to be both monolithic and ephemeral, modern and antiquated, true and false. These beliefs, at least to their owners, are not merely differences in opinion – they are categorical claims of truth, of which the most important kind are claims of moral truth. Extending the contradiction further, these beliefs of how one ought to live can convince the believer that they (often along with others) ought to die. In Camus' play *Les Justes*[1], the freedom fighter or terrorist in Tsarist Russia declares that 'To die for the idea is the only way to live up to the idea.'[2] One product of belief, particularly ideological belief, is personal and intense conviction. A second is a prescribed way of life that is derived from the core values of an ideological belief, whatever they may be. At the intersection of conviction and values, we often find the motivation, initiation, and sustainment of political violence.

For the last several decades, discussions of civil wars, insurgencies, and rebellions have not been able to escape without referencing ideology, even if it has been simply to dismiss its relevance. Throughout the apparent waves of ideologically flavoured conflict, from Marxists, nationalists, and more recently, Jihadists, the relevance of ideology is far less disputed; however, how exactly it influences armed groups still isn't clear. I intend to help provide that clarity by asking the question**: What is the fortune of radical armed groups?** More precisely, does an investment in ideological institutions, and the declared political goals of an armed group tell us who might win civil wars?

[1] Albert Camus, *Les Justes*, *Collection Folio Théatre*, 2008.
[2] 'Mourir pour l'idée, c'est la seule façon d'être à la hauteur de l'idée.'

This thesis asks several questions: 'What is radicalism?', 'Do radical armed groups have an advantage in civil war?' and 'Do radical groups prolong civil wars?' I argue that radicalism leads to extreme outcomes in civil wars and is not necessarily an advantage.[3] Radical armed groups, for many reasons, will be less likely to enter negotiations with their enemy or offer concessions, which limits their ability to achieve a favourable outcome. Partly because of this, radical groups will either lose badly or win well, seldom settling with their enemy—the state.

Radical groups have made headlines for decades. In the late 1980s, in an article captioned 'A Shining Path of Blood,' the Shining Path was described as 'a guerrilla organization determined to obliterate the Peruvian state.'[4] More recently, these headlines take the form of 'ISIS: An Islamist Group Too Extreme Even for Al-Qaida.'[5] There is a fascination with these groups, partly due to their horrific violence, but also because of their extreme and unrelatable views. These armed groups appear to be more dangerous and stranger than others, especially with grotesque mantras like 'You Love Life, We Love Death.'[6]

Perhaps other reasons why radical groups are felt to be more threatening than other armed movements are because they appear serious, intolerant, and may actually be able to execute their goals. As Hoffer notes, 'the fanatic cannot be weaned away from his cause by an appeal to his reason or moral sense.'[7] These groups are perceived to possess a non-negotiable

[3] Barbara Walter, "The Extremists's Advantage in Civil Wars," *International Security* 42, no. 2 (2017).
[4] VIctor Smith, "A Shining Path of Blood," *New Internationalist*, July 5, 1985.
[5] Krishnadev Calamur, "ISIS: An Islamist Group Too Extreme Even For Al-Qaida," *NPR*, July 13, 2014.
[6] Olivier Roy, *Ihr Liebt Das Leben, Wir Lieben Den Tod: Der Dschihad Und Die Wurzeln Des Terrors* (Siedler Verlag, 2017).
[7] Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1951). p 106.

resolve of the strongest kind. It seems intuitive that in combat, troops with resolve, especially when derived from whimsical metaphysical or sociological fantasies, would equally acquire some kind of advantage – the ability to suffer, the desire to kill, and the will to die. Surely this translates into radical groups winning. Is this true? I argue that radical armed groups i) rarely seriously consider compromise, meaning that conflict outcomes are limited to attaining all or none of their objectives; (ii) only consider compromise once their radicalism decays, which is normally after lengthy wars ; (iii) win as little or lose as much as their non-radical counterparts; (iv) and increase the duration of conflict.

This thesis unfolds in the following sequence. This chapter will indicate this thesis' contributions, demonstrate why radicalism deserves study, define ideology and highlight its importance for understanding ideology in the context of civil wars, and explain the research design. Chapter 2 focusses on the conceptualisation and operationalisation of radicalism; Chapter 3 presents my theory of how radicalism affects rebel outcomes and conflict duration; Chapter 4 covers the quantitative empirics and analyses; Chapter 5 is a study of the mechanisms that encourage extreme outcomes for radical groups while Chapter 6 examines the mechanisms that can discourage extreme outcomes; finally, Chapter 7 summarises and concludes the thesis.

Contributions

The major difficulty of studying radicalism is that it has proven easier to study ideology either with an emphasis on theory or empirics.[8] Seldom do the two meet in a satisfactory way to properly understand ideology, and consequently, radicalism.

The case has been made that extreme groups have an advantage in civil war, partly because civilians identify them as more competent, meaning the group can attract the best recruits, more foreign recruits, and better financing while allowing civilians under their control to have accurate expectations of their relationship with the group.[9] This heavily theoretical work draws well on intuition to reveal how an extreme ideology might work, though it is thin on evidence. Other works have relied more heavily on empirics, demonstrating how socialist armed groups normally fight irregular wars and lose.[10] This work helps us understand what a particular ideological flavour means in conflict outcomes; however, we don't learn a large amount about the phenomenon of ideology itself. Another important empirical study suggests that armed groups that employ terrorism, groups we might imagine to be radical, are less likely to win.[11] So which is it? Do only *some* ideologies lose, while others that are more

[8] ***Empirical*** : Kentaro Hirose, Kosuke Imai, and Jason Lyall, "Can Civilian Attitudes Predict Insurgent Violence? Ideology and Insurgent Tactical Choice in Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 1 (2017): 47–63.;Michael Weintraub and Juan E. Ugarriza, "The Effects of Ideology on Insurgent Targeting Decisions: Explaining Colombian Guerrillas' Tactical Choices," In *International Studies Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA*. 2015.; Monica Toft and Yuri Zhukov, "Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and Counterinsurgency in Russia's North Caucasus," *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 02 (2015): 222–38. ***Theoretical*****:** Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood, "Ideology in Civil War Instrumental Adoption and Beyond," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (2014): 213–226; Juan E. Ugarriza and Matthew J. Craig, *The Relevance of Ideology to Contemporary Armed Conflicts*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 57, 2013; Jonathan Leader Maynard, "Ideology and Armed Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 5 (2019); Livia Isabella Schubiger and Matthew Zelina, "Ideology in Armed Groups," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 50, no. 04 (2017).

[9] Barbara Walter, "The Extremists's Advantage in Civil Wars," *International Security* 42, no. 2 (2017): 7–39,.

[10] Laia Balcells and Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Revolutionary Rebels and the Marxist Paradox," 2015.

[11] Virginia Page Fortna, "Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes," *International Organization* 69, no. 3 (2015).

extreme reap benefits, so long as they don't use terrorism? I attempt to harmonise these discrepancies.

This thesis has several unique features. Its conceptualisation of radicalism helps clarify the often-blurry lines between when ideology does and doesn't matter. While it is especially helpful for understanding ideology within armed groups, radicalism's broad conceptualisation will also be of use to a wider audience in political science, international relations, and political theory. Radicalism, a systematic measurement of ideology, is entirely absent from the conflict literature. It is conceptually new since its focus is not on what kind of ideology is expressed but rather how strongly any ideology is expressed. This allows researchers to consider ideology as a phenomenon itself, rather than as a simple set of rules. It helps us understand the power of *idea* and *belief*, rather than the power of specific ideas and beliefs. Importantly, radicalism comprises two components, ideological intensity and ideological ambition. How these two elements work together, and sometimes against one another, helps to unlock how it is that ideology functions within an armed group. A significant part of this thesis is to develop the variable of radicalism, which has been achieved by creating a quantitative index of radicalism with an accompanying dataset.

In addition, this thesis also offers a framework to reconsider civil war conflict outcomes, which are often driven by the definitions of conflict databases. Rather than focusing on the mechanisms of conflict termination, this thesis' approach clarifies when rebels win and when they lose. This clarity allows us to question *why* some groups win and others lose, which my findings suggest is linked to just how radical an armed group is. By explaining conflict

outcomes in relation to armed group radicalism, this thesis helps to integrate diverging understandings of armed groups in civil war.

Concepts

The next chapter offers an in-depth explanation and justification of radicalism; however, two main concepts, radicalism and success, are briefly described here for context.

Radicalism

Radicalism is a dimension of ideology with two component parts: ideological ambition (what the group's professed ideological beliefs demand regarding political change) and ideological institutionalisation (how firmly ideology is embedded into the working of an armed group). Ideological ambition captures the variation of political goals that appear across all ideologies, identifying the magnitude of political change from the status quo armed groups desire. Ideological institutionalisation captures how important an ideology is to an armed group, or how much an armed group is willing to invest in the ideology—be that time, resources, or otherwise. This does not measure whether an armed group is using ideology instrumentally or not. It is simply a measure of how ideology permeates through group institutions, including creating uniquely ideological institutions. In short, radicalism doesn't tell us *what* ideology a group believes, but it does tell us to what extent the group is ideological.

Extreme Outcomes

Within this thesis, armed group outcomes are grouped into four categories: hard victory, soft victory, soft defeat, and hard defeat. Rather than simply asking what mechanism ended civil war, be that a cease fire, peace agreement, or low activity, this distinction helps us identify who wins and who loses. It also allows us to identify which groups win well or lose badly. Using this spectrum of outcomes, we can finally explore if there is a relationship between how

wars end and the ideological properties of an armed group. I suggest that radical armed groups are the most likely to experience extreme outcomes, that is experiencing either a hard victory or a hard defeat.

Is Radicalism an Advantage?

It seems natural that being radical is an advantage in civil war, specifically in helping to boost military effectiveness. At the individual level, being radical and internalising an ideology can be an asset. When a combatant internalises the ideology and goals of the group, they will be more willing to take risks for the group, and more willing to employ violence on behalf of the group. These are baseline requirements for any effective fighting force. Members who internalise the ideology will ask in combat 'How do I win?' rather than 'How do I survive?' Likewise, they will also be reliable monitors within the group. There are negative effects of internalisation, too. For example, the group's tactics and strategy may remain inflexible since the 'true believers' will not tolerate any deviation from the ideological prescriptions, which could result in fragmentation or battlefield losses.

At the group level, the more ideology is institutionalised, the more it may improve military effectiveness. Some kind of standard is better than none, and ideology provides this (though standards aren't exclusive to ideology). Ideological standards will be implemented and upheld throughout many or all armed group institutions in radical groups. Standardisation allows groups to fight competently together, creating reliable expectations and unconsciously making institutions more effective, despite some of the absurdities that ideology drags along with it. Secondly, when a group appears to possess conviction, as would be the case in a group that highly institutionalises their ideology, the group might appear to be more competent and

trustworthy to civilians simply because it believes in *something*, the group appears to take that belief seriously, and reliable behavioural expectations can be formed, even if they aren't pleasant. Military effectiveness may also be improved since, in environments where there is competition for recruits among several actors, having a highly institutionalised ideology might make the group appear more professional, more serious; it seems reasonable to assume that recruits will want to join groups that appear organised and competent. Like a self-fulfilling prophecy, if the group appears competent, they will attract the best recruits and thus become more effective. Finally, even if nobody in the armed group believes in an ideology, if it is heavily institutionalised, there are reasonable chances that members will at least behave as though they do—a mechanism known as pluralistic ignorance.

Radicalism, however, is not all positive. Unmoveable convictions may mean that armed groups fight better for a little while, but can never be brought to the bargaining table, even when it's in their favour. This limits the universe of possible outcomes for armed groups to a sweeping victory or crushing defeat. Since decisive victories are already unusual for non-state armed groups, it appears likely that radical groups will lose just as often as non-radical groups. Also, when a group's radicalism decays over time, the state they are fighting may still perceive them to be radical based on the group's prior actions, requiring the group to prove their commitment to negotiations by making larger concessions prior to any bargaining. Radicalism probably helps armed groups win the battle, but it does not necessarily make them less likely to lose the war.

Why Radicalism?

A simplified illustration of why radicalism can be important is the following. If, for instance, we can imagine three Catholics, one of them who goes to church every day, one once a month, and the other once a year. We may well consider all of these individuals to be Catholic, though we may think of them as being either *more* or *less* Catholic. Equally, if we imagine three Muslims, one who goes to Mosque every day, one who goes once a month, and one who goes once a year, it may be reasonable to expect that the Muslim and Catholic who worship every day have far more in common than they would with their 'once a year' counterparts. Thus, it may be fruitful to not only compare groups of different ideological orientations but also those with similar ideological dedication – radicalism helps us identify this dedication. While this thesis may not be able to measure how much combatants *actually* believe their ideology, it attempts to get as close to doing so as practically possible. Some of the variables collected for this thesis, including recruit indoctrination and ideological training, which help make up radicalism, are largely motivated as an attempt to measure ideological internalisation. Though they are our best hope yet of doing so, they still are not very good at it. However, it is important to endeavour to do so as there is sufficient evidence from the disciplines of psychology and neuroscience that demonstrate that the effect of internalised belief should be taken seriously.

Science, Psychology, and Belief

Beliefs, at their core, are held once an individual considers them to be true. Once we decide what is true, our beliefs manifest into biological activity. Why is this important? Because beliefs are real *things* – however, they come about, whether true, false, mystical or otherwise, their influence on us is not just only philosophical or theoretical, but materially substantive.

When we study the emergence and consequences of different beliefs within the social sciences, it is important to remember that these are not simply constructed phenomena unique to humans, but that they are processes in our minds, or more precisely, our brains. Neuroscience continues to locate what brain activity is associated with beliefs. Early research suggests that states of belief and disbelief 'activate distinct regions' of the brain and that our acceptance or rejection of a statement as true or false 'appears to rely on primitive' brain regions,[12] meaning we can identify where in our brains our beliefs 'live.' The physical properties of our brains also appear to have a relationship with what we believe. New evidence reveals a correlation between the size of brain regions and an individual's propensity for conservative beliefs.[13] Another study, concerned with mapping the neural mechanisms of how individuals with strong beliefs react when presented with contradictory evidence, shows how regions of the brain associated with political beliefs are closely associated with regions responsible for emotions and decision-making.[14] The study shows that deeply held political beliefs are remarkably resilient to change compared to non-political beliefs. It should not be surprising that beliefs and emotions are so intertwined biologically as they are behaviourally. Beliefs, especially strong beliefs, form a significant portion of individuals' identities. For some, when their beliefs are being challenged, so is their identity.

Recognising the relationship between belief and identity is important. The power of ideology lays not only in its normative prescriptions, but in its ability to envelop and define the identity

[12] Sam Harris, Sameer A. Sheth, and Mark S. Cohen, "Functional Neuroimaging of Belief, Disbelief, and Uncertainty," *Annals of Neurology* 63, no. 2 (2008): p 141.
[13] H. Hannah Nam et al., "Amygdala Structure and the Tendency to Regard the Social System as Legitimate and Desirable," *Nature Human Behaviour* 2, no. 2 (2018): 133–38.
[14] Jonas T. Kaplan, Sarah I. Gimbel, and Sam Harris, "Neural Correlates of Maintaining One's Political Beliefs in the Face of Counterevidence," *Scientific Reports* 6, no. December (2016): 1–11.

of the believer. Psychologists have demonstrated that when that identity is insecure—otherwise meaning based solely on a single source, like membership in an armed group, for example—there can be drastic effects on individual behaviour. This is the case for 'obsessive ideological passion' which is defined as the 'controlled internalization of a cherished activity into the person's identity, which occurs in contexts where perceptions of self-esteem, social acceptance, life satisfaction, or uncontrollable excitement become associated with the activity in question.'[15] What this means is that individuals become extraordinarily dedicated to maintaining one's beliefs and the behaviour necessary to express them: 'a person's very sense of worth may become contingent on continued success in the passionate domain such that he or she may persist in the passionate activity in an extreme and rigid fashion in spite of experiencing negative affect and health problems.'[16] The study demonstrates that individuals who express obsessive ideological passion are significantly more likely to 'engender hatred and aggressive extremism' when compared to those not ideologically obsessed. Other studies have reached similar conclusions, using the term 'identity fusion' to describe the intense relationship between beliefs and identity which affect an individual's willingness to fight[17] and self-sacrifice.[18]

Similar results have been found regarding dogmatic intolerance, extreme ideological beliefs, and the strength in which those beliefs are held. Individuals who self-identified as either very left wing or very right wing were found to be almost identically dogmatically intolerant of

[15] Blanka Rip, Robert J. Vallerand, and Marc André K. Lafrenière, "Passion for a Cause, Passion for a Creed: On Ideological Passion, Identity Threat, and Extremism," *Journal of Personality* 80, no. 3 (2012) p 574.
[16] Ibid. p 575.
[17] Ángel Gómez et al., "The Devoted Actor's Will to Fight and the Spiritual Dimension of Human Conflict," *Nature Human Behaviour* 1, no. 9 (2017).
[18] Harvey Whitehouse, "Dying for the Group: Towards a General Theory of Extreme Self-Sacrifice," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 2018, 1–64.

other ideological beliefs. In other words, 'extremist beliefs—at either the left or the right—predict a decreased willingness to accept opinions that differ from one's own.'[19] The strength of political belief 'predicts dogmatic intolerance, which is associated with increased willingness to protest, decreased willingness to grant free speech to people holding a different opinion, and increased support for antisocial behaviour.'[20] This is convincing evidence that the simple fact of being ideological and holding strong ideological beliefs elicits similar effects across the ideological spectrum, further justifying my conceptualisation of radicalism.

Other psychologists have measured how ideological commitment is a significant factor that diminishes an individual's chances of suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and coping with traumatic experiences. In this context, ideological commitment is operationalised as the glorification of war, patriotic involvement, and defiant attitudes toward the enemy.[21] A study of former Tamil child soldiers found that those who, several years after combat, still possessed a strong ideological commitment to the Tamil cause experienced significantly lower levels of post-traumatic symptoms compared to those with weak ideological commitment.[22] Another study of Israeli youth exposed to terror found that those with strong ideologies and commitment, regardless of political orientation, suffered significantly fewer symptoms of PTSD than those without a strong ideology.[23]

[19] Jan Willem van Prooijen and André p M. Krouwel, "Extreme Political Beliefs Predict Dogmatic Intolerance," *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 8, no. 3 (2017) p 297.
[20] Ibid. p 297.
[21] Punamäki, Raija-Leena. "Can ideological commitment protect children's psychosocial well-being in situations of political violence?" *Child development* 67, no. 1 (1996): 55-69.
[22] Kanagaratnam, Pushpa, Magne Raundalen, and Arve E. Asbjørnsen. "Ideological commitment and posttraumatic stress in former Tamil child soldiers." *Scandinavian journal of psychology* 46, no. 6 (2005): 511-520.
[23] Avital Laufer, Zahava Solomon, and Stephen Z. Levine, "Elaboration on Posttraumatic Growth in Youth Exposed to Terror: The Role of Religiosity and Political Ideology," *Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology* 45, no. 6 (2010).

The benefits of cultivating a strong ideology for armed groups become apparent when psychologists attempt to measure belief among ex-combatants. A study of Sunni Bosnian war veterans revealed that those who prayed five times a day 'were more sociable, affectionate, and obedient' while those who did not pray 'had lower capacity to control themselves in their anger, rage, disgust, fear, and terror.'[24] It is reasonable to suggest that those who pray likely have a more internalised belief of Islam than those who do not. Also, as the authors admit, the physical act of praying, along with all else associated with the ritual, could be responsible for the observed effects. In any case, the authors conclude that strength of belief, here named religiosity, 'may represent one very effective way to achieve larger resistances to different stress factors in everyday life, and especially in extreme, catastrophic situations like war.'[25] In some groups, even secular ideologies appear to operate with religious fervour, which makes it appropriate to apply such findings to the study of ideology.

What this literature tells us is that the intensity of ideological belief, independent of its content, has its own effects. Physically, the brain treats strongly held political beliefs differently from other beliefs; however, all political beliefs appear to operate in the brain the same way. Psychologically, when ideological belief is so intense that it essentially substitutes for one's identity, individuals appear to be capable of doing anything to maintain the 'ideological passion.' The more firmly political beliefs are held, regardless of content, the more likely individuals are to be dogmatic and endorse extreme behaviour. Finally, stronger ideological commitment, independent of content, is associated with a higher capacity to cope

[24] Izet Pajević, Osman Sinanović, and Mevludin Hasanović, "Association of Islamic Prayer with Psychological Stability in Bosnian War Veterans," *Journal of Religion and Health* 56, no. 6 (2017) p 2322.
[25] Ibid. p 2327.

with traumatic experiences such as terror and war. Clearly, the strength of ideological belief is a variable worth investigating.

Ideology

Every discussion of what ideology *is* always starts with the warning that it is one of the most used and misunderstood concepts in political science. Initially, scholars defined ideology based on its apparent relationship with truth or reality. They claim that ideologies mix truth with falsehoods, that they are maladaptive ideas for the current time,[26] that ideology is nothing more than an illusion,[27] that it is used by people who need to justify and convince themselves and others of their beliefs,[28] that it is used to promote the interests of those who subscribe to them,[29] or that they are 'cognitive viruses.'[30] Boudon suggests that 'ideologies are often based on a realistic interpretation of interpretations or explanations which are themselves removed from reality,'[31] while Elster concisely explains that the 'key feature' of ideology is that it 'embodies an understanding of the whole according to the logic of the part.'[32] He explains further that ideologies 'belong to a more general class of biased belief,' those biases being either 'illusion or distortion.'[33]

Gradually, ideology has become a less pejorative term. It has become solely about beliefs, rather than the logical rigour required to hold and justify those beliefs. Political psychologists

[26] Mannheim, Karl. *Ideology And Utopia : an Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York :Harcourt, 1936.
[27] Marx, Karl, Friedrich Engels, and C. J. Arthur. *The German ideology*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1974.
[28] Pareto, Vilfredo. *The Mind and Society*. Vol. 1. New York, 1935.
[29] Plamenatz, John. *Ideology*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1970.
[30] Balkin, Jack M. *Cultural software: A theory of ideology*. Yale University Press, 2002.
[31] Boudon, Raymond. *The analysis of ideology*. University of Chicago Press, 1989. P 9.
[32] Elster, Jon. *Sour Grapes: Essays in the Subversion of Rationality*. Cambridge University Press, 1983. p 145.
[33] Ibid, p 141.

suggest that at its core, ideology is about 'preferences for change versus stability,'[34] while others propose that ideologies are the shared general beliefs of a specific sub-group that are different from the common cultural order.[35] The civil war literature has reflected this trend, the two most common definitions of ideology being those of Sanin and Wood[36] and Ugarriza and Craig.[37] Both definitions highlight how ideology is a collection of beliefs that shape our relationships and understandings of the world. Sanin and Wood add that ideology identifies 'the objectives to pursue on behalf of [the] group and a (perhaps vague) program of action,'[38] while, similarly, Ugarriza and Craig state that ideology is 'as a set of political beliefs that promotes a particular way of understanding the world and shapes relations between members of a group and outsiders, and among members themselves.'[39] Thus, ideology isn't only a set of beliefs, but also a strategy inspired by beliefs that influences the relationship we have with others around us. More recently, ideology is defined simply as 'a set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved.'[40] Parsimony is often the mark of a clear definition—but not necessarily a precise one.

Such definitions ignore an important fact: not all beliefs are equal. Sartori[41] cleanly makes the distinction between ideological beliefs and pragmatic beliefs, both existing within the

[34] John T. Jost, Christopher M. Federico, and Jaime L. Napier, "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities," *Annual Review of Psychology* 60, no. 1 (2009): 307–37.
[35] Van Dijk, Teun A. *Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach*. Sage, 1998.
[36] Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood, "Ideology in Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (2014): 213–26.
[37] Juan E. Ugarriza and Matthew J. Craig, "The Relevance of Ideology to Contemporary Armed Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 57, 2013.
[38] Sanín and Wood, "Ideology in Civil War." p 214
[39] Ugarriza and Craig, "The Relevance of Ideology to Contemporary Armed Conflicts". p 450.
[40] Barbara Walter, "The Extremists's Advantage in Civil Wars," *International Security* 42, no. 2 (2017): 7–39. p 15.
[41] Giovanni Sartori, "Politics , Ideology , and Belief Systems," *The American Political Science Review* , Vol . 63 , No . 2 (1969): 398-411.

universe of political ideas. Ideological belief systems are based on 'fixed elements, characterized by strong affect and a close cognitive structure' and pragmatic belief system comprise 'flexible elements characterized by weak affect and an open cognitive structure.'[42] These precise differences are lost in the all-encompassing effort by Gerring, who analyses every available definition of ideology and attempts to devise a definition of universals: ideology is 'a set of idea-elements that are bound together, that belong to one another in a non-random fashion.'[43] Fagerhorn improves upon this definition, adding the caveat that ideologies are also 'biased thoughts related to the organization of power and status in a society.'[44]

To add to the chorus, my understanding of ideology is formed partly by its relationship with values and identity. It is no secret that values, ideology, and identity likely work together simultaneously; however, it is important to consider the function of each. While I don't claim to know from where and how morality and values originate, all cultures prioritise their own specific values, which results in different cultures prizing some of those values over others, such as individual liberty over the public good and vice versa, among other iterations.[45] Whatever the important values are, be them, for example, equality or freedom, individuals wish to promote and instil them in society, an inherently political practice. If we focus on equality as an important value, societies may devise rules, systems, and policies to ensure that equality is pervasive. Some of these policies are argued to be better or worse at

[42] Ibid, p 405.
[43] Gerring, John. "Ideology: A definitional analysis." *Political Research Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (1997): 957-994. p 980.
[44] Andreas Fagerholm, "Ideology: A Proposal for a Conceptual Typology," *Social Science Information* 55, no. 2 (2016): 137–60. p 144.
[45] Joshua Greene, *Moral Tribes* (Penguin Press, 2013).

promoting equality. The transition to ideology occurs when the *policies* promoting equality become more important than the *value* of equality itself. To illustrate this, if we consider a regime that prioritises equality over any other value, for example a communist regime, to its communist believers, maintaining a communist political system is more important than addressing the obvious inequalities that the system produces. Put another way, it is more important to be communist (which originates from valuing equality), than it is to be truly equal.

The difference between ideology and identity, in this case, is that for someone who is ideological, while they ignore or rationalise the contradictions and counterproductive features to protect their *policies* (communism), they still behave like a communist and internalise its tenets. Ideology transitions into identity when one still believes themselves to be a communist, and just as they have abandoned the value of equality for communism, they abandon abiding by communist rules, appearing no more than symbolically communist. What merits protecting for these 'communists by name' isn't equality, nor is it communism, but rather those that identify as communist—their 'in group.' The group becomes more important than the beliefs they betray, which brought them together in the first place. Bishop of Verdun, Dietrich von Nieheim reveals this in 1411: 'If the existence of the Church is in danger, she is, dispensed from the moral law. The end of unity sanctifies all means: craft, deception, violence, bribery, imprisonment, and death.'[46] When individuals 'dispense' themselves from their own moral law (ideology in other words), while claiming to fight for the

[46] Freiherr von Pastor, Ludwig, *The History of the Popes, From the Close of the Middle Ages.*, ed. Frederick Ignatius Antrobus (London, 1891). P 193.

very idea they are forsaking, perhaps identity explains their behaviour better than just ideology or values.

In short, ideology is a confused belief in a set of *policies* which is mistaken for the *values* which brought about its creation. Ideology is resistant to change, and hostile and intolerant to other beliefs, be them ideological or not, since it is thought to be as self-evidently true as the values it claims to uphold.

While a rich philosophical understanding of ideology is important when discussing the concept, it makes for difficult work when our goal is to observe and analyse it within the social sciences—simplicity is required. This simplicity is found in Sanin & Wood's definition that I employ for this thesis: 'a set of more or less systematic ideas that identify a constituency, the challenges the group confronts, the objectives to pursue on behalf of that group and a (perhaps vague) program of action.'[47]

Ideology and Civil War

Likely related to rise and prominence of today's Jihadist groups, ideology is now being taken more seriously in civil war research. While they are not the first to approach the subject, conceptually, Sanin and Wood helped lay the foundation for the study of ideology in civil war.[48] They make the important distinction that ideology can have both instrumental uses and normative constraints. Instrumentally, ideology provides a means of socialisation, providing a group identity, and a cognitive device to help with decision-making. Normatively,

[47] Sanín and Wood, "Ideology in Civil War." p 214.
[48] Ibid.

ideology often prescribes strategy and targets; however, this can make ideological groups strategically less flexible since a change a in strategy undermines the group's ideological base.

Though Sanin and Wood have erected a framework for how we ought to think about ideology, researchers are still trying to understand what ideology empirically explains in civil war. In some cases, it can help explain who joins which armed group and how individuals view the group to which they belong. Interviews with former Colombian combatants suggests that 'pre-enlistment experiences,' such as the ideological orientation of family members, the location one lived, as well as 'ideological training' administered by groups, can partially explain how combatants feel about the group and why they may have joined.[49] This is consistent with psychology and political psychology research that emphasises the influence of parents, peers, and elites on the political beliefs of children and adults alike,[50] and that ideological training, such as indoctrination, can be effective at changing beliefs, especially when it is intense.[51]

A major focus of research into ideology and political violence is concerned with explaining civilian victimisation during civil war.[52] The real puzzle for these scholars is figuring out why some groups target civilians and why others don't – put another way, it appears the

[49] Ugarriza and Craig, "The Relevance of Ideology to Contemporary Armed Conflicts."
[50] Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. *Generations and politics: a panel study of young Americans and their parents*. Princeton Univ Press, 1981.; Alwin, Duane Francis, Ronald Lee Cohen, and Theodore Mead Newcomb. *Political attitudes over the life span: The Bennington women after fifty years*. Univ of Wisconsin Press, 1991.; Jost, Federico, and Napier, "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities."
[51] Robert S. Baron, "Arousal, Capacity, and Intense Indoctrination," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 4, no. 3 (2000): 238–54.
[52] Kai M. Thaler, "Ideology and Violence in Civil Wars: Theory and Evidence from Mozambique and Angola," *Civil Wars* 14, no. 4 (2012): 546–67.;Ben Oppenheim and Michael Weintraub, "Doctrine and Violence: The Impact of Combatant Training on Civilian Killings," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29, no. 6 (2016): 1–23.; Amelia Hoover Green, "Repertoires of Violence Against Noncombatants: The Role of Armed Group Institutions and Ideologies." PhD Diss. Yale Univeristy. 2011.

ideological orientation of the group can help introduce violence restraint by non-state armed actors. There can be a number of reasons for this, but the simplest is that ideology prescribes who is and is not a target – if combatants subscribe to an ideology, it is presumed they will follow the rules. Wood highlights how the FMLN, a leftist armed group in El Salvador, used violence in a 'highly selective' manner against civilians 'compared to other armed groups.'[53] Likewise, even if members don't believe in the ideology, they may well act as though they do either out of fear of punishment, social pressure, among other reasons. These feelings can be enhanced and exploited by group institutions, such as indoctrination and political education, which target individual identity, critical features of an ideology if it is to be maintained in an armed group setting.[54]

Armed group ideology relies heavily on costly processes of socialisation and strong institutions.[55] An obvious question is why would an armed group bother investing the time and resources required to promote and maintain an ideology? Oppenheim et al suggests that recruits who join for ideological reasons are less likely to defect; however, if a group is perceived to stray from its ideological precepts, these same fighters will be more likely to side-switch or demobilise.[56] Thus, maintaining a group's ideology can be a means of maintaining a portion of its fighting force. When groups are able to execute an ideological program with the sophistication required for combatants to internalise group goals, it can be

[53] Elisabeth Jean Wood, "Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?," *Politics and Society* 37, no. 1 (2009): 131–62. p 152.
[54] Hoover Green, "Repertoires of Violence Against Noncombatants: The Role of Armed Group Institutions and Ideologies."; Devorah Manekin, "The Limits of Socialization and the Underproduction of Military Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 5 (2017): 606–19.
[55] Kristine Eck, "Coercion in Rebel Recruitment," *Security Studies* 23, no. 2 (2014): 364–98.
[56] Ben Oppenheim et al., "True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 5 (2015): 794–823.

the most effective and cost-effective way of retaining the allegiance of its fighters.[57] So, while ideology can put the group at risk of fragmentation, particularly when highly committed fighters view the group ideology as polluted,[58] it also serves as a reason for fighters to show up for combat in the first place.

The advantages do not end there, however. Walter explains how 'extreme' groups, particularly religious groups, enjoy the discipline and dedication of religiously motivated fighters since the group can defer 'compensation in the form of an "eternal afterlife" or "rewards in paradise."'[59] She also highlights how 'extreme' ideologies can help screen out less committed fighters and also can serve to advertise that the group is 'better organised, more likely to win, and less corruptible than rival groups.'[60] These benefits of ideology are not only reserved for extreme Jihadist groups. Not often considered an ideological group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) practiced a kind of cosmology and spirituality that reinforced the traditional hierarchy[61] and provided effective spiritual monitoring and punishment.[62]

[57] Scott Gates, "Membership Matters," *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 5 (2017): 674–86.
[58] Livia Schubiger. "One for All? State Violence and Insurgent Cohesion." Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: 49, 2015.; Oppenheim et al., "True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why."
[59] Walter, "The Extremists's Advantage in Civil Wars."p. 9.
[60] Ibid. p 12.
[61] Christopher R. Day, "Survival Mode: Rebel Resilience and the Lords Resistance Army," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 00, no. 00 (2017): 1–21.
[62] Gates, "Membership Matters."

Whilst ideology can also help explain choice of tactics and strategies,[63] type of conflict,[64] conflict outcome and duration[65], ability to mobilize[66] and even the proportion of female fighters in armed groups,[67] virtually all of the ideological research in political violence focuses on ideological type: Jihadism, Marxism, Maoism, Nationalism, or Anarchism, to name a few. Ideologies are being organised into broader categories, such as radical ideologies[68] or 'conflict ideologies'[69] which is progress. Indeed, there are some types of ideologies that appear to be more suitable for organised violence – it is difficult to imagine a Quaker armed group, for instance. But what we don't have a grasp of, however, is just *how* ideological an armed group is and what that means. This question allows us to exploit intra-ideological variation of armed group behaviour – not all Marxist or Jihadist groups behave the same way. Likewise, for groups that take ideology seriously—by investing in ideological institutions and possessing ideologically committed fighters—it becomes appropriate to compare groups of entirely different ideological orientations. Among many other dependent variables, this new dimension of radicalism can most promisingly be used to explain a rather neglected element of armed groups: their fortune.

[63] Kentaro Hirose, Kosuke Imai, and Jason Lyall, "Can Civilian Attitudes Predict Insurgent Violence? Ideology and Insurgent Tactical Choice in Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 1 (2017): 47–63.;Michael Weintraub and Juan E. Ugarriza, "The Effects of Ideology on Insurgent Targeting Decisions: Explaining Colombian Guerrillas' Tactical Choices," In *International Studies Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA*. 2015.; Monica Toft and Yuri Zhukov, "Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and Counterinsurgency in Russia's North Caucasus," *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 02 (2015): 222–38.

[64] Balcells, Laia, and Stathis N. Kalyvas. "Revolutionary rebels and the Marxist paradox." *Manuscript Duke University and Yale University* (2015).

[65] Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Laia Balcells. "Did Marxism Make a Difference? Marxist Rebellions and National Liberation Movements." (2010).

[66] Stefano Costalli and Andrea Ruggeri, "Indignation, Ideologies, and Armed Mobilization: Civil War in Italy, 1943-45," *International Security* 40, no. 2 (2015).

[67] Reed M Wood and Jakana L Thomas, "Women on the Frontline," *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 1 (2017): 31–46.

[68] Costalli and Ruggeri, "Indignation, Ideologies, and Armed Mobilization: Civil War in Italy, 1943-45."

[69]Daphna Canetti, "Emotional Distress, Conflict Ideology, and Radicalization," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 50, no. 04 (2017): 940–43, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096517001032.

Research Design

This is a mixed-methods thesis which is separated into five phases: conceptualizing and creating an index of radicalism, determining conflict outcomes and duration, quantitative analysis, and case studies of mechanisms. The scope of this thesis is of armed groups from 1946 until 2010, which based on the temporal scope of the Non-State Actor dataset. Furthermore, I'm primarily concerned with the actions and dynamics of armed groups, not those of the state (though these are briefly considered). Neither is the goal of the thesis to prove causality, but to identify probabilistic and logical explanations based on patterned and converging evidence regarding the fortune of radical armed groups.

Limitations

The first limitation of the thesis is that the variable of radicalism is 'noisy.' Although I make a considerable contribution making radicalism less noisy conceptually and analytically, the variable measured empirically is complex. It is a conglomeration of many different characteristics of armed groups and to consider it an objective measurement would be a mistake, despite the efforts to do just that. The data of which this variable is based on is also sure to be biased as we are bound by the constraints of available data, which for some groups is minimal and probably subjective. Even when there is a substantial volume of data for specific armed groups, my dataset does not account for temporal variation throughout the lifespan of an armed group.

Another limitation is the sample size used for the dataset. While a sample of 78 is not small, it is also not large enough to add all of the variables one would wish in analysis. The goal for the dataset was N=100; however, due to do pragmatic considerations, the arduous and

painstaking process of data collection was limited. This sample size is the largest that could be achieved using the best sources available. Unfortunately, due to the pandemic, accessing the numerous libraries required to expand my data collection was simply not an option.

Radicalism Index

The radicalism index is a conglomerate score that is assigned to armed groups based on a data set that has been collected for this thesis.[70] The sample (N=78) is randomly selected from Non-State Actor Data[71] (geographic distribution of groups in Figure 1.1) in order to leverage the relevant variables coded in the dataset that can be used for controls and further analysis.[72] This sample represents roughly 20% of the NSA dataset when military factions and state forces are removed. The variables collected are theoretically relevant for measuring the ideological institutionalisation and ambition in armed groups, such as recruit indoctrination, civilian indoctrination, ideological training, the operation of a propaganda cadre, and the desired political change. These variables have then been weighted to assign a radicalism score to each group.

[70] Supported by the John Fell Fund, University of Oxford.
[71] Cunningham, David E.; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, & Idean Salehyan. "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, 4, (2009): 570-597.
[72] Such as group size, presence of a political wing…




Figure 1.1 - Geographic Distribution of Random Sample

Quantitative Analysis

The goal of the quantitative analysis is to explore the correlations and patterns between radicalism, outcome, and duration to evaluate the plausibility of my theory. The explanatory power the analyses is somewhat limited given the sample is medium-N, and as such cannot attribute causality. Even if *every* armed group could be classified, I would have reservations of attributing causality to quantitative analyses as radicalism itself is not a discrete, easily measured variable, hence the quantitative analyses should indeed be interpreted as correlational rather than causal. The analysis of the independent variable (radicalism) and the dependent variables (outcome and duration) are relatively simple. The estimators used are a combination of logistic models and Ordinary Least Square (OLS).

Case Studies of Mechanisms

Understanding how ideology and radicalism works is a complex undertaking. Throughout my quantitative research, I've found that there is indeed a variation of their functions and that specific mechanisms are more important in different circumstances. As this is a thesis focussing on ideology and radicalism itself, it is more appropriate to aim our attention at their mechanisms. My quantitative analysis strongly suggests that the more radical an armed group is, the more probable they are to experience an extreme outcome – that is an outcome where armed groups achieve all of their primary goals or none at all. To offer an explanation as to why this happens, focussing only one or two armed groups as a case study would not properly cover the variation found.

Considering this, two chapters explaining the mechanisms behind the theory are provided with two cases each. The first of the chapters describes the mechanisms that discourage a radical armed group from seeking settlement in civil war using the Shining Path (Peru) and the CPN-M (Nepal) as a case study. This chapter highlights both the inherent and potentially unintended barriers that radical armed groups impose upon themselves by virtue of being radical. The second of these chapters describes how radicalism can change over time – mechanisms that encourage radical groups to settle in civil war. The groups used for this case study are the MILF and ASG, both in the Philippines.

Overall, the findings of this thesis suggest that the more radical an armed group is, the more likely they are to lose everything or attain their goals. Put another way, radical groups are the least likely to end civil war gaining only some of their demands: compromise is not a feature

of radicalism. Regarding civil war duration, it appears possible that radicalism may prolong intrastate conflict.

'The Party can never be mistaken,' said Rubashov. 'You and I can make a mistake. Not the Party. The Party, comrade, is more than you and I and a thousand others like you and I. The Party is the embodiment of the revolutionary idea in history' - Arthur Koestler [73]

Chapter 2: Concepts

How does ideology work and what does it look like? How can we know an individual or a group is ideological? How do we know when they're behaviour can be explained by ideology? To answer these questions, we require a grounded framework routed in solid conceptualisation. To understand a phenomenon, it is helpful to use its most extreme expressions to determine its limits and functions. In the case of ideology, this is radicalism. The following is a detailed conceptualisation of radicalism. I suggest that radicalism possesses three main components: a desire for drastic political change, ideologically consistent behaviour, and the adoption of non-routine means to achieve those desires. I dissect and categorise these components to understand radicalism in a general sense, and more specifically for non-state armed groups. To simplify our ability to observe and identify radicalism, it is divided into two distinct attributes: ideological ambition and ideological intensity. The components of these attributes are then non-exhaustively determined and explained.

Radicalisation and Radicalism

Radicalism as a concept has enjoyed a renaissance of sorts since the 2000s, almost entirely due to the focus on 'radicalisation' that has proliferated with hundreds of papers from think tanks, government, and academia since the September 11 attacks. While the end state of radicalism is what is considered dangerous by many of these studies, they all concentrate almost exclusively on the process of either becoming radical (radicalisation) or not (de-

[73] Arthur Koestler, *Darkness at Noon* (Bantam Books, 1941). p 34.

radicalisation). In relative terms, very little attention is devoted to understanding radicalism as a phenomenon itself, while the studies of radicalisation have at best offered us *some* insight and at worst sustained an uninteresting and unhelpful cottage industry of research. To contextualise how many understand radicalism today and to reclaim it as a useful concept, we're required to disentangle the knotted field of radicalisation, where radicalism has accumulated its intellectual baggage.

There appears to be an emerging consensus that radicalisation may not serve much conceptual use at all, and this is largely due to the indiscriminate manner in which it has been employed. Radicalisation has been described as an 'unclear term,'[74] when others think it is an 'ambiguous and contested concept…to the point that some scholars even deny that radicalisation exists.'[75] It isn't shocking that this is the case. A European Commission expert group 'interpreted radicalisation as socialization to extremism, manifesting itself in acts of terrorism and observed that radicalisation happens at the "intersection of an enabling environment and a personal trajectory."'[76] Other scholars propose that radicalisation is 'the process through which an individual changes from passiveness or activism to become more revolutionary, militant or extremist, especially where there is intent towards or support for

[74] Tina Christensen, Matt Feear, and Hadija Suleiman, "Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism – STRIVE II:A Mentorship Manual for Countering Violent Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism – STRIVE II A Mentorship Manual for Countering Violent," p 27.
[7575] Matteo Vergani et al., "The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalization Into Violent Extremism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 2018, p 2.; Charlotte Heath-Kelly, "Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the 'radicalisation' Discourse and the UK Prevent Strategy," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 15, no. 3 (2013), p 19.
[76] Alex Schmid, "Research on Radicalisation: Topics and Themes," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10, no. 3 (2016) p 26.

violence.'[77] In short, radicalisation 'comprises a gradual process that, although it can occur very rapidly, has no specifically defined beginning or end state,'[78] with that change being one of belief and behaviour, that for many, is one they don't like.

This is illustrated in the way that states have tried to define radicalisation. The UK Home Office simply states that radicalisation is 'the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups.'[79] While the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) define radicalisation in opposition to democracy – radicals are those that 'support deeply fundamental changes in society, which could become a danger for the democratic rule of law.'[80] The problem with this thinking is that it unimaginatively considers radicalisation something that can only occur which is in conflict with *our* beliefs. This is one reason why most attention has been on why and how westerners become radicalised with Islamic beliefs.[81] We rarely describe those supporting democracy in Iran or Russia as 'radicalised.' Some consider the radicalisation term to be 'contested' because of its roots used to describe progressive movements – one of the 'many positive or non-harmful connotations' of the word.[82] This is, of course, the major failing of much of the literature of radicalism: ascribing normative weight not only to the meaning of the concept, but also the

[77] R Briggs and A Strugnell, "The Role of Civil Society in Counter-Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation," 2010 as cited in Riazat Butt, Henry Tuck, and Institute for Strategic Dialogue, "European Counter-Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands , Sweden , Denmark and Germany"..

[78] Tinka Veldhuis and Jorgen Staun, "Islamist Radicalisation : A Root Cause Model Islamist Radicalisation : A Root Cause Model," 2009 p 4.

[79] UK Home Office, "Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism," 2009.

[80] M Slootman and J Tillie, "Processen van Radicalisering: Waarom Sommige Amsterdamse Moslims Radicaal Worden," 2006, p 15.

[81] For example: Elizabeth Pearson and Emily Winterbotham, "Women, Gender and Daesh Radicalisation: A Milieu Approach," *RUSI Journal* 162, no. 3 (2017).

[82] Ines Von Behr et al., "Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism," 2013, p 2.

analysis of it. Radicalisation, and hence radicalism, is neither objectively good or bad – it can be both progressive and brutally regressive. That judgement depends on the individual.

This underlying normative assumption hasn't advanced the radicalisation field and points to things we already know. Several reports that summarise the findings about how and why radicalisation works, highlighting a combination of push and pull factors including socio-economic deprivation, social affiliations, political marginalisation and grievances, globalisation, and identity.[83] These are almost the same as drivers of migration,[84] with the exception of identity. They also appear to be the same factors that encourage mobilisation into armed conflict of almost any kind. The question then becomes the following: what have we learned from radicalisation research?

It easy to be discouraged when think tanks obscure the discourse with business speak, describing radicalisation as a 'complex and evolving process' that can be countered by viewing 'anti-radicalisation through a holistic systems context.'[85] Some meaningful advancement of the radicalisation literature has occurred. The first is that radicalisation is wrongly only used at the micro level to describe individuals and non-state armed actors.[86] How a state's ideology changes over the course of a conflict, be that inter or intrastate, and its consequence on the employment of violence has received little attention. The second implicitly accepts that what radical thoughts and ideas individuals have isn't as important as their behaviour—we should

[83] Mina Al-lami, "Studies of Radicalisation: State of the Field Report," *Politics and International Relations Working Paper*, 2009,; Moeed Yousaf, "Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan: Implications for U.S. Policy," *Brooking Analysis* 14, no. 1 (2008): 1–27.Magnus Ranstrop, "The Root Causes of Violent Extremism," *RAN Centre of Excellence*, 2016.
[84] European Aslyum Support Office, "The Push and Pull Factors of Asylum-Related Migration," 2016.
[85] Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network, "Anti-Radicalisation First Edition," 2019.
[86] Schmid, "Research on Radicalisation: Topics and Themes." P 28.

focus most of our efforts on understanding people that have radical ideas and actually use violence.[87]

While this thesis does not address state radicalism, a topic that surely warrants further study, it does, however, try to understand the radicalism at the group level and focuses on those perpetrating violence: non-state armed groups. Radicalism is indeed burdened with the largely confused and unenlightening work of the past few decades and this thesis aims to clearly define it and make it once again a useful concept.

Identifying Radicalism

Radicalism is a feature of ideology and can be understood in broadest sense as a strong desire for drastic changes and the audacity and conviction to pursue them at much and sometimes all costs. It has been thought of as 'an assertion of new meanings usually accompanied by demands for the acceptance of new forms of behaviour.'[88] This means that radicalism can be recognised through a demand for a change of ideas, which in the case of armed groups, is fundamentally political. These changes, however, are not just 'a difference of degree' from convention, but perceived 'as a juxtaposition of opposites.'[89] The radical does not endeavour only for these ideas to be tolerated but seeks political ideological dominance—radicalism '…may envisage the entire complex of a society or a culture . . . [or] tends to expand in scope until [its] field is coincident with the entire setup of a society.'[90]

[87] Manni Crone, "Radicalization Revisited: Violence, Politics and the Skills of the Body," *International Affairs* 92, no. 3 (2016).
[88] Ralph Turner, *Great Cultural Traditions Vol I* (New York, 1941), P 20.
[89] Egon Bittner, "Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements," *American Sociological Review*, 1963, P 929.
[90] Horace Kallen, "Radicalism," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol 13* (MacMillian Publishers, 1963). As cited in Bittner, "Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements."

There are two popular underlying assumptions regarding radicalism that appear to have corrupted our ability to properly investigate it. The first is that only certain ideologies can be radical. The second is that radicalism is normative. It's possible that these apparent assumptions reflect the contemporary focus on Jihadist extremists like Al Qaeda and ISIS. The western academic idea of radicalism is greatly shaped by what we perceive as a threat, both physically and normatively. However, I suggest that radicalism is neither the domain of any specific group of ideologies, nor is it inherently normative. Radicalism is a property of ideology; the same way mass is a physical property of a nuclear weapon or a lifeboat filled with refugees. All ideologies can be radical. Radicalism is not only about *what* the beliefs of an ideology are, but also *how* strongly those beliefs are held and practiced, and the *means* used to promote the ideology's goals. For any individual or group to be labelled radical, they must be radical in these three categories.

Regarding the *what*, an ideology which advocates for a drastic change to the current status quo is radical in nature. Just as an ideologue in Canada who calls for a mystic totalitarian state is radical, so is a democratic liberal in Iran. Radicalism is always relative to a point of reference (Figure 2.1). In this study, I suggest that point of reference be the regime since that is the enemy to most non-state armed groups.[91]

91 Though this may not always be an appropriate reference point employing this framework outside of this study.




Figure 2.1 -Radical Desires as a Relative Concept

Considering the *how*, simply possessing radical ideas is not sufficient for being radical – if the ideology is strongly held, the ideology must manifest itself in behaviour. It is possible to hold radical beliefs, but not hold them strongly enough to act upon them. If individuals who possess a radical ideology and do not behave according to the demands of the ideology (i.e. do they pray if religious, eschew capitalism if communist), are they radical? For someone who strongly holds radical beliefs, there are obvious reasons why one might not publicly advertise their beliefs through behaviour – threat of ostracism, ridicule, or punishment.[92] But for radicals, there will always be action of some kind, whether private or public. Knowing just how strongly held any beliefs are for individuals is difficult in the best of times. For radicals, however, the presence of behaviour, observable or not, that can best (or only) be explained by the ideology signals a commitment to the ideology, without revealing the reasons why (instrumental or intrinsic). In short, radical behaviour is *facta **et** verbis*—deeds *and* words.

92 Timur Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies : The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification,* (Harvard University Press, 1995).

The *means* by which an individual or a group chooses to employ to obtain their desired political change also helps identify radicalism. Whatever the desired change may be – replacing the constitution with holy scripture, dismantling the financial system, allowing women to vote, or abolishing slavery – individuals or groups choose to seek these changes either within or outside of the established political institutions and routine.[93] Once action to bring about their desired change strays from the confines of routine and existing institutions, the action becomes radical. There is, of course, a difference between a mass protest, riots, and an insurrection. This spectrum of radical means deserves (and obtains) further analysis elsewhere; however, in the case of armed groups, who actively employ violence against the state, they all use a radical means in the pursuit of their desired political change—violence. Figure 2.2 summarises the relationship between these three equal components of radicalism for any political group.




Figure 2.2 - Generalisable Radicalism

Why Radicalism?

When we attempt to identify radicalism, we are in effect identifying a dimension of ideology. Ideologies are constellations of beliefs, mostly political in our case, that normally revolve

[93] Colin J. Beck, *Radicals, Revolutionaries, and Terrorists* (Cambridge: Polity, 2015). p 18.

around one or several fundamental beliefs about how the society ought to be ordered. The first analytical step researchers often take in order to understand these beliefs is to interrogate the beliefs themselves and those who believe them. What are the beliefs? Where do they come from? Why do people believe them? In the context of political violence, these questions help us understand a specific ideology of a group at a particular time. There is an ever-expanding menu of ideologies, however. Thus, while understanding the ideology of one group helps us recognise how it works in its specific case, the research strategy is self-confined from studying ideology as a phenomenon itself.

One useful assumption of the study of ideology is that if we can explain why and what individuals believe, we will be able to partly explain why they behave the way they do. So, rather than try to explain why one ideological armed group behaves the way it does, we want to explain why many armed groups behave the way they do. For those who seek generalisation, the second analytical step is to understand ideology by studying like-minded groups and explaining their behaviour by their shared ideology. This approach is intuitive, though there are three implicit assumptions.

The first is the assumption that all groups that that subscribe to the same ideology will behave in a similar manner. Do all Islamic armed groups behave in the same way? The Islamic State sought a worldwide caliphate and killed those who did not believe, while the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines sought independence and murdering non-believers was not a strategic goal. The second is the assumption that all groups that subscribe to the same ideology believe it in the same way. Do all self-labelled communists believe the same thing? The Shining Path in Peru, for example, mixed Maoism with Inca mythologies, while the

ELN in Colombia mixes Marxism with a Theology of Liberation. The third is the assumption that all groups that subscribe to the same (or any) ideology are equally ideological. The PKK has been known to train recruits with hours of daily 'party education' and reach out to communities in person and through media to spread their message and educate the public,[94] while members of the Abu Sayyaf Group, a self-declared Islamic group in the Philippines, doesn't appear to follow even the most superficial obligations of Islam.[95] These assumptions certainly obscure ideological nuances, 'where the link between belief and action is taken for granted rather than made the object of study.'[96] The other unfortunate limitation of this strategy is that the focus is on how ideological types are different, rather than how they might be the same. There is a way to remedy this.

To take the next analytical step, allowing ideological comparisons, while sacrificing as little nuance as possible, it is appropriate to organise groups based on how they express and practice their ideology. The expression of an ideology is essentially what the group says it wants and why, whereas the practice of ideology relates to how we would recognise ideology through behaviour. To further specify, expression amounts to a group's ideological ambition, while practice measures a group's ideological intensity. I intend to categorise non-state armed groups not by their specific beliefs, but by two ideological dimensions and their components: Ideological ambition (desired political change and control) and ideological intensity (institutionalisation and internalisation).

[94] AK Özcan, *Turkey's Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan* (Routledge, 2012). p 225.
[95] Maria Ressa, "Rappler Talk: Baker Atyani's 18 Months with the Abu Sayyaf," Rappler, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/158503-rappler-talk-baker-atyani-18-months-with-the-abu-sayyaf.
[96] Beck, *Radicals, Revolutionaries, and Terrorists*. p 108.




Figure 2.3 - Components of Radicalism in Armed Groups

Defining Radicalism for Armed Groups

Defining radicalism is difficult, but as the above suggests, there are three general components: desire for political change, radical behaviour, and radical means. When considering how to apply this framework to non-state armed groups, some changes and operationalisation are required. For example, non-state armed groups are already employing a radical means, violence, which makes this component less relevant than the other two.[97] Also, what exactly does radical change and behaviour look like for armed groups? I further specify these components into four different categories: a desire for profound political change, a desire for political control, accompanying ideological behaviour, and intrinsic belief. In short, radicalism is the sum of desires for drastic political change, often political control (ideological ambition), and the resolve to pursue those desires and abide by their rules (ideological intensity). Radicalism is ideology amplified – it is intense and loud.

[97] Though it is arguable that in some environments, using violence is routine.

Ideological Ambition

Change and Control

Clustering ideologies together by the extent of desired political change and political control accomplishes several things. First, it allows us to overcome the analytical boundaries between different ideologies, while broadly retaining the weight of an ideology's ideas and goals: their desired change and control. If a Marxist group seeks a revolution in one state, and a nationalist group desires the same in another, their ambition for change is similar, if not the same. Second, by considering the *extent* of an ideology' professed desire for change and control, it contextualises ideologies within their environment and simplifies our ability to compare them. For example, the extent of desired change by an Islamic group that wishes to oust the government in an already Islamic state is less so than that of an Islamic group wishing to do the same thing in a secular state. Thirdly, analysing desired change and control grants us the opportunity to clarify the boundaries between when ideology matters and when it may not. The Shining Path in Peru and the La Familia drug cartel in Mexico both exhibit ideological institutionalisation; however, La Familia had no desire for any political change or control, while the Shining Path demanded revolution and control of the state. Inherently, groups of all kinds have a position on political change and control – this framework provides an imperfect, though logically grounded, starting point to discriminate and compare non-state armed groups of different ideological orientation.

What kind of Change?

When considering what kind of political change can be desired by a group, there are many. These changes can include domestic and international policy, treatment of minorities, individual rights, among others. These kinds of political changes are synonymous with normal

government business. Though some of these desired changes can be great, they often aren't enough to begin a civil war or support substantial political violence on their own, which is what we're most interested in when we think about non-state armed groups.

What are the types of desired changes that foster political violence? The UCDP categorises conflicts based on 'incompatibilities' which can either be over 'government or territory.'[98] Government meaning incompatibility over 'the type of political system, the replacement of the central government or the change of its composition,' and territory defined as an incompatibility over the 'status of a specified territory.'[99] We can use these two types of incompatibilities to help operationalise desired political change: either a desired change of government or territory. But how do we measure the magnitude, the *extent*, of these desired political changes?

A reasonable place to start is to weigh permanent changes higher than temporary changes. Replacement of the central government or its composition is a temporary change, even in autocracies. Secession of a territory and the creation of a new state, on the other hand, permanently alters the original state. We can also weigh changes based on their effect on the population. A change of political system (i.e. from capitalist to communist) would have a major effect on the daily lives of civilians within the country. A change from state-governed territory to an autonomously governed territory could have a significant effect only on the lives of those living there, thus a smaller change than the previous example. But there is also

[98] UCDP, "Definitions - Department of Peace and Conflict Research - Uppsala University, Sweden," accessed February 9, 2020, https://pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.
[99] UCDP.

an implicit need within the extent of desired political change of appreciating the means of change.

To do so we must make a clear boundary between desired political change that occurs within 'the common routine of politics'[100] and existing institutions, and those that do not. When a state government responds to desired change of opposition parties and the public through parliament, it is simply governing. When these calls for change cannot be dealt with through an established governing body like a parliament, it is a crisis. For example, changing governments through elections in a democratic society is routine. Similarly, seeking territorial autonomy or secession can be done within existing political institutions. What kind of change is outside political routine and existing institutions? Non-exhaustively, the forceful removal of a regime, a change of the political system, a self-declared breakaway state. These changes do not necessarily need to be violent, though they often are.

Thus, on the hierarchy of change, the least amount of change occurs by those who simply want to influence government, either its policy or composition (such as through elections) within the common political routine. Larger change is demanded by those that seek autonomy, and larger still those that seek secession since it permanently alters the state, which can occur both within and outside routine and existing institutions. The largest change comes from those who are revolutionary, who demand a change to the composition of the government, through extra-institutional means, likely also a change to the political system, and potentially a change to the world order. These changes can only occur outside routine and existing institutions.

[100] Beck, *Radicals, Revolutionaries, and Terrorists*. p 18.

What Kind of Control?

Desired political control is essentially a subset of desired political change – a change in political control is conditional on political change in some form. Desired political control is an important dimension of group ideology because it reveals what role the group believes it should occupy within society and the state alike. Does a group want to be in power, part of government, or neither? Groups can desire great change, but they don't necessarily desire to be in charge once the change has occurred. It can be imagined that a loose group would mobilise with the hopes of ousting a repressive dictator, without wanting to be part of the apparatus to replace them, such as what happened with Egyptian revolution of 2011. Likewise, a group may fight for reunification of territory without the desire to control it, such as the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. But this isn't always the case. Some groups wish to control their own territory, either through autonomy or secession. Others want to control the entire state, while others still want to control the entire world. For those that seek political control, it provides a further condition that must be satisfied in order to cease violence. In a conflict setting, not only is changing the government, or seceding a territory sufficient for victory, but being in control once the conflict is over.

One particular element of control that is often important for ideological groups is the ability to control and intrude on the social lives of individuals. Not only is it about the control of the territory or government that interests some groups, but also controlling the lives of civilians, which normally takes the form of introducing laws that try to limit the freedom of individuals, such as in their private lives. An empirical indication of such behaviour is the relationship armed groups have with civilians, from the way they govern to attempts to indoctrinate them.

The desire for political control is not required for a group to be radical; however, it makes an already radical group even more so.

How Ideological Ambition Looks

To demonstrate what ideological ambition looks like and how the relationship of desired political change and control is relevant to different kinds of ideologies, I present a non-exhaustive, though illustrative list of ideological types based on these factors (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 – Ideological Types and Desires for Political Change and Control

Lowest Change, Lowest Control	**Lower Change, Higher Control**	**Larger Change, Higher Control**	**Largest Change, Highest Control**
These groups do not seek to operate outside the common routine of politics and existing institutions.	These groups seek to operate outside of the common routine of politics, but their objective is power. They are the least ideological.	These groups can operate both within and outside common routine of politics and existing institutions.	These groups operate exclusively outside of the common routine of politics and existing institutions.
Traditionalism *Regressives*: Those who want some change to revert to previous social, traditional, or political practices. *Traditionalists*: Those who desire no change. They seek to preserve the status quo. **Reformers** *Modernisers*: Those who aim to change policies that are no longer efficient. Non-normative. *Progressives*: Those who aim to change social policies. Normative.	**Usurpers**: Those who seek to overthrow governments, through an irregular method, such as a coup d'état. The status quo remains relatively unchanged following the other throw.	**Self-determination** *Autonomists*: Those who seek larger roles in self-determination of a territory, while remaining part of the original state. *Secessionists*: Those who seek the full role of self-determination of a territory, breaking away from the state.	**Revolutionaries** *Popular Revolutionaries*: Those who want to change the regime and/or system of governance, but do not find themselves as the rightful rulers. *Vain Revolutionaries*: Those who want to change the regime and/or system and find themselves as the rightful rulers. *Cosmological Revolutionaries*: Those who want to change the world order and find themselves the rightful rulers.

Using these ideological archetypes, we can then visualise how they differ in terms of ideological ambition (Figure 2.5). This framework of ideological ambition is intended to function for groups of individuals in general, not only non-state armed groups. Those whose range (indicated by a confidence interval) remain under the dashed line of routine politics within established institutions are simply participating in governance and are likely non-violent. Those over the line, however, are much more likely to be violent non-state armed groups.




Figure 2.4 - Ideological Types and Ambition

Considering these dimensions further, political control can be parsed into two types: those seeking power and those that do not. Political change can also be separated into two categories: changes that can occur within the common routine and those that cannot (Table 2.2). Interestingly, autonomists and secessionists can populate each quadrant.

Ideological Ambition

Desired Political Control	*Desired Political Change* Within Common Routine	Outside Common Routine
Not overtly Seeking power	Lobby Groups	Popular Revolutionaries
Seeks Power	Political Parties	Vain Revolutionaries Cosmological Revolutionaries

Table 2.2 - Ideological Ambition and Political Groups

Now that two dimensions of ideology have been satisfactorily defined, desired political change and control, we can identify where ideological armed groups live within the universe of political ideologies. While this work offers us the ability to account for the different ideological programs by essentially grouping based on goals, in order to understand if groups *actually* take their ideologies seriously, we must look into how the ideology is practiced and if individuals truly believe in their ideologies.

Ideological Intensity

Institutionalisation and Internalisation

Despite a group's ideological ambition– its desired political changes and control– there is also a difference in how the ideology manifests within the group and individual. A group can label themselves as subscribing to whichever constellation of beliefs they choose; however, self-labelling is not always accurate. A group can express its ideology, while not practicing it. The expression of ideology is essentially what the group says its ideology is—it's desired control and change, while a group practices an ideology if its behaviour is coherent with what the

group professes their ideology to be. If a Marxist group profits from capitalism, of which they profess to be evil, then we might consider them to be Marxist in name only. The question here is if the group is ideologically intense – do combatants truly believe the ideology they profess to subscribe to (internalisation) and do they behave according to those beliefs (institutionalisation)?

In order to ensure that armed group members match the group's ideological talk with action, a group must institutionalise its ideology. Likewise, if the ideology is only institutionalised, and not truly believed by combatants, then the group environment is one of individuals only behaving as if they believe – an individual's public preferences match those of the group's, for survival or otherwise, while their private preferences contradict the group's ideology.[101] Thus, if the ideology is highly institutionalised and internalised by individuals, then we would label the group as particularly intense in its expression of ideology. Since ideological intensity is the combination of internalised beliefs and institutionalised behaviour, it is required to consider these two different dimensions of intensity more closely.

Internalisation

Does it matter *if* individuals believe? This is the central question when we are considering internalisation, the strongly held belief of something, in our case ideology. One might argue that ideological internalisation is the most attractive and powerful component of ideology for armed groups, providing individuals with the will to suffer awful conditions, to fight, and to die. As seen in the introduction, the short answer is yes, it does matter. There seem to be

[101] Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies : The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification,*. p 17.

similarities between those who hold beliefs strongly, whatever those beliefs are, such as intolerance and in some cases resilience. Internalisation is the one-dimensional characteristic that many of us use to identify fundamentalists, fanatics, extremists—radicals. If there is one defining feature of a radical, it would be an uncompromising, full acceptance and embodiment of an ideology. A radical is someone who *actually* believes, but how can we know if someone truly believes what they declare they do? It isn't overly problematic to imagine that some southern Baptists who dance with venomous snakes, leftists that burn their money, attendees of the Jonestown massacre, or Jihadis that blow themselves up are true believers. In other words, when someone performs acts that are difficult to explain in the absence of an ideology, we likely attribute the motivations of those acts to an internalisation of that ideology. This might not always be a mistake; however, there are many alternative explanations for why someone might execute radical actions.[102] Suicide bombers, for example, can be motivated by vengeance or cash for family members—not necessarily their beliefs.[103] So how can we get into the mind of a radical to know with certainty that they're true believers? I'm skeptical that this is empirically possible within the social sciences. Internalisation is theoretically and conceptually relevant to defining ideological intensity and radicalism since it helps explain intolerance, resolve, and the will to sacrifice. After all, radicals are believers. Without the expertise or methods to determine ideological internalisation (if they exist), I will avoid any attempts to superficially measure it within this thesis. The only observable and measurable component of ideological intensity is its institutionalisation.

[102] Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies : The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*.

[103] John Rosenberger, "Discerning the Behavior of the Suicide Bomber: The Role of Vengeance," *Journal of Religion and Health* 42 (2003); Mia Bloom, "Dying to Kill: Motivations for Suicide Terrorism," in *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism* (Routledge, 2006).

Ideological Institutionalisation

Economist Douglas North defines the role of institutions as a means to 'reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life,' which are also a 'guide to human interaction.' [104] For armed groups, institutions, formal or informal, are formed with the most basic goal 'to prevent combatants from turning on commanders.'[105] Institutions are the 'crucial base of insurgent organization,'[106] and essential for mitigating principal agent problems[107] and preference divergence[108] between the group's leadership and its members, and can even be valuable for elections post-conflict.[109] Fundamentally, institutions show combatants why they should comply and enforce the punishments for non-compliance to recruits and veterans alike. They are designed to steer individual preference in the direction of group preferences and to eventually mirror them. They are not inherently ideological. When considering what institutions look like in armed groups, it is useful to consider the institutions practiced by professional militaries to get an idea of what we're looking for and what they do.

Professional militaries have optimised their institutions so that they are not only forming and shaping recruits, but that they maintain the ethos, skills, and compliance of all soldiers, new and old. In western militaries, basic training often lasts roughly three months, where everything is taught from weapons handling, dress and deportment, and respect for the chain

[104]Douglas North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Public Performance* (Cambridge University Press, 1990). p 3.
[105] Green, "Repertoires of Violence Against Noncombatants: The Role of Armed Group Institutions and Ideologies." p 19.
[106]Paul Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse* (Cornell University Press, 2014). p 69.
[107] Jeremy Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
[108] Jacob Shapiro, *The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations* (Princeton University Press, 2013).
[109] Stefano Costalli and Andrea Ruggeri, "The Long-Term Electoral Legacies of Civil War in Young Democracies: Italy, 1946-1968," *Comparative Political Studies* 52, no. 6 (2019).

of command. After basic training, soldiers are continually required to gain more qualifications and participate in week to months long exercises annually. Discipline is continually enforced through inspections of a soldier's uniform or haircut, verbal and written warnings, extra duty, and summary trials and court-martials. This form of institutionalisation creates professional and competent soldiers. Unfortunately for armed groups, they often don't have the luxury of time or resources offered by a state to create these elaborate institutions. What they can do is imitate them. For groups that institutionalise their ideology, it permeates the daily life of combatants, including other institutions, and also erects uniquely ideological institutions. Formally, these institutions can be indoctrination or a propaganda cadre, while informally they can be the memorisation of sacred texts, prayer, songs, political discussions, and other rituals.

Ideological institutions serve two main purposes: to persuade and punish.[110] Their primary function is to convince an audience that the beliefs and ideas of the ideology are right and, secondarily, to identify and penalise dissenters and enemies. Another important distinction is that armed groups have both internal and external audiences, and that the persuasion or punishment of those audiences require different institutions. Thus, what institution is built to convince armed group members of the ideology will be different from the institution created with the aim of convincing civilians and others of the ideology. What could these institutions look like?

[110] Zelina, McCauley, Ruggeri 'Persuade and Punish.' Working Paper;

For the internal audience, the armed group members, persuasion can be intense (10-hour a day classes) or general (casual rituals); it can be routine (discussions every week) or episodic (re-education sessions); it can be a combination of all or some of these characteristics. What these types of institutions can be distilled down into are two categories which are recruit indoctrination and ideological training. Recruit indoctrination is normally intense and episodic, while ideological training is often general and routine.

For the external audience, persuasion can either occur through face-to-face contact (direct) or through a medium (indirect). Face-to-face contact can include community meetings, reform of local schools, mandatory participation in rituals, among other forms. Mediums of influence can include the distribution of newspapers or pamphlets, word of mouth, posters, radio, and television among many others. These two forms of persuasion fit neatly into two categories: civilian indoctrination (direct) and propaganda (indirect). There is no guarantee that an armed group, radical or not, necessarily cares about what outsiders think, but when they appear to, we have to ask why.

Recruit Indoctrination

Indoctrination is also known as re-education, thought reform, and brainwashing. It is characterised by a controlled and intense period of varying length immediately following the attainment of group membership that often includes 'physical and social separation, changes in diet, sleep deprivation, peer pressure, and emotional manipulations.'[111] The goal of indoctrination is to create a 'symbolic death' of the individual's former self and to present

111 Robert S. Baron, "Arousal, Capacity, and Intense Indoctrination," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 4, no. 3 (2000): 238–54. p 240.

them with a 'rebirth experience.' This experience changes the individual's 'loyalties and beliefs' and 'inner identity.'[112] Successful indoctrination has typically three features: 'a radical departure from previous values, attitudes, and behaviours,' the behaviours are 'emitted freely' and not the product of 'any current or physical or material threat,' and that these behaviours 'involve substantial costs for the indoctrinee.'[113]

The practice of political indoctrination is helpful for recognising radical armed groups for two reasons. The first is that the group's ideology is different enough that it requires systematic procedures to encourage individuals to adopt it. If radical ideas are easily adopted by large numbers of individuals, are they truly radical? The second reason is that, while there are substantial costs for those being indoctrinated, it is also costly for those carrying out the program.[114] By investing the time and effort required of indoctrination, it signals that the group leadership takes its ideology seriously and desires that its members develop an ideological expertise and behave accordingly.

The presence of indoctrination does not mean a group is radical – almost all professional militaries use indoctrination for practical reasons, such as conditioning soldiers to kill when they otherwise would not and forming new personal identities that values subservience and sacrifice. These qualities are required for militaries to work. What's absent from (most) professional military indoctrination is an emphasis on political indoctrination. Soldiers are

112 Robert Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of Brainwashing in China* (University of North Carolina Press, 1989). P 66.
113 Robert S. Baron, "Arousal, Capacity, and Intense Indoctrination," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 4, no. 3 (2000): 238–54. p 240.
114 Kristine Eck, "Coercion in Rebel Recruitment," *Security Studies* 23, no. 2 (2014): 364–98.

indoctrinated with military doctrine—essentially how they should behave and how their side fights wars; radical non-state armed group combatants are also indoctrinated with ideology.

Understanding this distinction is important, and while there are other nuances surrounding indoctrination and socialisation that are not being dealt with here, at a minimum we can arrive at the following syllogism: all radical groups use indoctrination, but not all groups that use indoctrination are radical. It is a necessary, though insufficient condition that radical groups use indoctrination. In order to identify radical armed groups based on observed behaviour, then, the priority is to establish if the indoctrination of recruits takes place. And of course, there is a varying quality of indoctrination across armed groups.

Political/Ideological/Religious Training

Political training is defined as 'formal instruction that explains specific social or political purposes of a particular conflict, and connects conflict purposes to specific behavioural norms,'[115] while ideological training is defined by the aim of 'preference transformation' which is meant to 'produce homogeneity of opinion and desires across combatants… that can be transformed into tactical and strategic advantages.[116] What makes this kind of training different from indoctrination is that it is sustained over time, meaning that not only are new recruits exposed to it, but all members.[117] Political/ideological/religious training indicates, like indoctrination, that ideological maintenance is a priority.

[115] Amelia Hoover Green, "The Commander's Dilemma," *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 5 (2016). p 624
[116]Weintraub and Ugarriza, "The Effects of Ideology on Insurgent Targeting Decisions: Explaining Colombian Guerrillas' Tactical Choices." p 4.
[117] Hoover Green, "The Commander's Dilemma." p 625.

Also, like indoctrination, we can't know for sure if the motivation behind this institution is instrumental, intrinsic, or a combination of both. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a radical group that does not employ such practices if their ideology was truly central to their cause. Considering this, the practice of ideological training is another necessary condition for radical non-state armed groups.

Civilian Indoctrination

Civilian indoctrination comprises a collection of methods employed by armed groups to educate, and sometimes indoctrinate, non-combatants. They can take the form as popular schools (Shining Path), pengwe (ZAPU), the schooling of children (Khmer Rouge, MILF), among other forms. These methods vary between systematic and ad hoc. The training normally requires civilians to listen to lectures or participate in discussions about the armed group's ideology – its goals and strategy. This is practice is not simply a public relations charade, but a concerted effort to 'educate' and change the minds of civilians. The goal of conducting civilian indoctrination is also difficult to attain; however, what is advertised once again is the importance of the ideology to the armed group. Not only is the group willing to dedicate resources and time to indoctrinate its own members, but civilians as well.

Civilian indoctrination is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for radicalism, but is rather a likely shared characteristic of radical armed groups. It's possible that some radical armed groups wish to conduct such training, but simply don't have the capacity to do so. Also possible, though more difficult to imagine, is an armed group that places little emphasis on ideology internally, though expends time and resources to do so externally. Finally, there may be a radical armed group that does not want to proselytize to civilians. When we observe

civilian indoctrination, however, it is reasonable to treat it as evidence in support of designating a group as radical, rather than not.

Propaganda

Propaganda is 'a systematic form of purposeful persuasion that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions of specified target audiences for ideological, political or commercial purposes through the controlled transmission of one-sided messages (which may or may not be factual) via mass and direct media channels.'[118] The major difference between propaganda and indoctrination is that propaganda does not require face to face interaction. Propaganda is an output: graffiti, pamphlets, posters, books, radio shows, television shows. It remains an effort to persuade an external audience to the armed group either about the legitimacy of the itself and ideology or the illegitimacy of its enemies and their ideology. There are varying degrees of sophistication to which propaganda is executed and it is difficult to grasp these variations without laboriously cataloguing propaganda efforts across time and armed groups. But if we were interested in which armed groups prioritise propaganda, we might notice that some of them operate dedicated propaganda cadres, while others don't. Of course, like civilian indoctrination, similar caveats apply: perhaps they don't want to or don't have the capacity to. However, if a group produces propaganda and has a dedicated cadre to do so, it suggests that the armed group places a high value on its ideology.

What does Ideological Intensity Look Like?

[118] Richard Alan Nelson, *A Chronology and Glossary of Propaganda in the United States* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996). P 232.

To demonstrate what ideological intensity might look like empirically, the following (Table 2.3) categorises several armed groups based on the level of their ideological institutionalisation and internalisation.

Institutionalization

Intense Ideology / **Internalization**	High	Low
High	Shining Path ELN LTTE	Mujahid Party
Low	FDN/Contras	RUF SNM

Weak/No Ideology

Table 2.3 - Ideological Intensity and Selected Armed Groups

This typology is illustrative. The measurement of internalisation, while informed, are not claims, but suggestions. Acknowledging that, for the Shining Path, ELN, and LTTE, there is evidence of internalisation. In the ELN, for example, a now known innocent mid-level officer dug his own grave and commanded his own firing squad when wrongly found guilty for attempting to oust the leader.[119] Attempting to pursue no other recourse, it is a remarkable act of dedication to the revolution that suggests he cared more about the group than himself. Some members of the Mujahid Party appeared to internalize a nationalist Muslim ideology, mostly due to Muslims being indiscriminately targeted by the government. The Mujahid Party even 'offered the inducement, by a fatwa, of holiness for those who fall in battle,'[120] which

[119] Juan Carlos Sanchez Sierra,"Worshiping Leadership: Morality, Revolutionary Values, and the Politics of Magnicidio in the Case of Camilo Torres and Fabio Vasquez with the ELN, Colombia 1963-1978." PhD diss. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. (2011). p 129

[120] Moshe Yegar, *The Muslims of Burma* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 1972). p 101.

would likely mostly motivate only those who internalised Islam and understood the conflict as a means of defending their faith.

Unlike the institutions of the Shining Path, ELN, or LTTE, who often had significant training and indoctrination which lasted for months, the Mujahid Party appears to have organised hasty training with little to no indoctrination—a sign of low institutionalisation. Cases like Nicaragua's FDN/Contras are probably relatively rare. Their ideology was highly institutionalised, though there doesn't appear to be any internalisation. Many members undertook several months of training in the US, in everything from combat operations to propaganda.[121] The group even apparently attempted to set up its own Red Cross to counter reports of their terrible abuses, which was somehow meant to 'educate the people.'[122] Despite this, the Contra leadership appeared to be fuelled by hate of the Sandinista government because it meant that former members of the military dictatorship were not in power. There didn't appear to be anything particularly anti-communist about the Contras and in contrary to American training, they were ideologically incoherent and inconsistent, suggesting that few members internalised any belief or even knew what they were supposed to believe.

The Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed by Somali expats in London and tried to export their group to the Somali region, operating out of Ethiopia. The SNM was meant to fight for democratisation of Somalia; however, combatants came and went almost as they

[121] Central Intelligence Agency, "Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare Tayacan," 1984, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86m00886r001300010029-9.
[122]Robert McCartney, "Contras Address 'Errors'; Rebel Units Set Up To Foster Rights," *The Washington Post*, 1985.

pleased, there was no institutionalisation of ideology or any real ideology to believe in (though they did try to make use of Issaqism[123] and published a propaganda newspaper). Many times, the SNM were at the whim of tribal elders who would make decisions that greatly affected the group.[124]

These examples illustrate how it might be useful to distinguish between ideological internalisation and institutionalisation. High institutionalisation does not necessarily mean high internalisation, and vice versa. Ideological intensity can be thought of a measure of how serious or hard-lined an armed group is regarding its ideological orientation. While I believe it possible (though difficult) to measure the group institutionalisation of its ideology, despite the table above, even with robust ethnographic evidence, it is hard, if not impossible to measure the average level of individual internalisation of ideology within an armed group. Thus, we are left with only half of the equation of ideological intensity: ideological institutionalisation. Consequentially, within this thesis, radicalism is measured through a combination of ideological institutionalisation and ambition (Figure 2.5).




Figure 2.5 - Observable Components of the Anatomy of Radicalism within Armed Groups

[123] Marleen Renders, *Consider Somaliland: State-Building with Traditional Leaders and Institutions* (Brill, 2012).P. 200.
[124] Renders.

Within this chapter, I presented my conceptualisation of radicalism generally, and specific to armed groups. Radicalism is a feature of ideology that does not belong to any specific ideolog type. There are three simultaneous necessary conditions one must fulfil to be considered radical: an ideological desire for a drastic political change from the status quo, behaviour that is consistent the subscribed ideology, and the embrace of a means outside of the routine and existing institutions to achieve the desired change. Since armed groups participating in civil war always seek change outside of the routine and existing institutions, to determine their radical credentials, we need look no further than what they say they want and how they behave. These two factors are broken down into two categories, ideological ambition and ideological intensity. Ideological ambition is a combination of the magnitude of desired political change and control. Ideological intensity is a composite of ideological internalisation at the individual level and ideological institutionalisation at the group level. Since empirically observing internalisation is problematic at best, for non-state armed groups, radicalism is a measure of their ideological ambition and ideological institutionalisation. This conceptualisation of radicalism may not be perfect; however, to my knowledge it is the first attempt to identify its components and suggest a systematic way to measure it. We now turn to how to practically apply it.

'Curiosity…is insubordination in its purest form' - Vladimir Nabokov [125]

Chapter 3: Theory

Broadly, this is a theory about the constraints placed upon a non-state armed group by radical ideology, internally and strategically. This is also a theory about how radicalism, and ideology more generally, changes. I suggest that a major constraint of radical groups is that by being radical, at conflict termination, rebels either are likely to achieve all or none of their objectives, at least in the short to medium term. This may be for several reasons. The first is that radicals rarely compromise, especially with their enemies (namely the state), removing hope of a negotiated settlement. This inability to compromise is caused by both intrinsic and instrumental reasons. Changing or subverting a radical ideology, which is often required in order for negotiations to take place, is difficult, dangerous, or not desired. The second is that radical demands are often grand and unrealistic, meaning that the possibility of achieving these goals is inherently low, since no sensible government would choose to, or could, meet them. In some cases, there is no conceivable universe where the armed group's goals could materialise. The third reason is that even if a radical group had more tangible demands, the nature of the armed group's radicalism may mean that the state refuses to enter any non-kinetic dialogue with them. There is always hesitation in negotiating with any armed groups since it risks further legitimising the armed group; however, radical groups are in a different league. Entertaining any portion of a radical group's often fringe ideas about transforming society threatens the government's credibility the same way a scientist's credibility is damaged by contemplating the flat earth conspiracy. It's also possible that a radical armed

[125] Vladimir Nabokov, *Bend Sinister* (Penguin Random House UK, 1960). p 33.

group is considered a more serious threat, encouraging states to then deploy more resources to defeat the group.

In the long-term, however, ideologies are more susceptible to change, including their radical nature. Some of this change occurs through mechanisms of ideological decay brought about by long wars, intolerable conditions, grim prospects, and generational changes. Over a long enough time, a group's radical goals may no longer be radical within its environment or society, which simultaneously partially accomplishes the group's goals while diminishing its very reason to fight. These factors can allow an armed group to settle conflict through other means than combat – sometimes this is negotiation, other times it's a gradual abandonment of the conflict. Whether or not a state would entertain mediation with radicals is another matter altogether.

It's intuitive to believe that radicalism is an advantage in war. The more combatants are dedicated to a cause, the more they are willing to suffer, kill, and die. There may be some truth to this. One might imagine that it will be easier to coordinate operations within a group of radicals who intensely share a common goal. Calls for suicide or suicidal missions might be eagerly answered by radicals. This apparent devotion might make ill-equipped radicals as effective as well-equipped enemies on the battlefield. Radicalism probably permits armed groups to perform better than they otherwise would if they were not radical; however, they possess no inherent advantage in winning a war. I suggest that radicalism likely increases a group's ability to fight and survive, which in turn increases the duration of conflict, but not the probability of an armed group victory.

In short, I argue that radical armed groups i) rarely seriously consider compromise, meaning that conflict outcomes are limited to attaining all or none of their objectives; (ii) only consider compromise once their radicalism decays, which is normally after lengthy wars ; (iii) win as little or lose as much as their non-radical counterparts; (iv) and increase the duration of conflict.

We already know some things about conflict outcomes, negotiation, and duration. Outcomes are closely linked to the ideas of success and failure– who wins and who loses? These concepts in civil war are complicated, not all successes and failures are equal. Does success mean that all of the declared goals of an armed group at the outset of war were achieved in full or in part? Perhaps to outside observers, a 5-year civil war that kills 100,000 people is not a worthwhile price to pay for autonomy within a state when regime change was the goal. To those fighting, maybe our perception of failure is wrong. Is it the same kind of failure when an armed group loses, and its members are granted amnesty or when they're executed or imprisoned? Success and failure are normally susceptible to framing – if they were not, compromise would never be a possibility (i.e. for radical armed groups). This doesn't mean that we can't objectively determine the winners and losers of civil wars, it just means that in *some* cases, it's more difficult. Considering this, it is useful to employ Fortna's spectrum of civil war outcomes (Figure 3.1). In her study of the use of terrorism in civil wars and their related outcomes, she distils the possible outcomes into four categories on a continuum of rebel success: victory for the government or rebels, negotiated agreement, and the conflict petering out.[126]

[126] Virginia Page Fortna, "Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes," *International Organization* 69, no. 3 (2015). P 523.




Figure 3.1 - Fortna's Continuum of Rebel Success[127]

Though this continuum lacks some nuance regarding how badly one loses or how well one wins, it is not dichotomous, and still retains enough variation to be useful theoretically. It is logical that a negotiated agreement is less successful than a rebel victory, since it suggests that the rebels have given something up. Likewise, a rebellion fizzling out is more successful than a government victory for because it implies that the armed group has not been exterminated and could potentially participate in conflict later.

To further expand on this spectrum, I suggest that it can be enhanced in a way that will allow us to further distinguish how well radical groups achieve their goals. Not all negotiated agreements are created equal. For example, an agreement which allows a group to disband in return for amnesty is not the same as a group signing an agreement for autonomy when the group's desire was secession. Equally, isn't a rebellion fizzling out a rebel defeat by another name? To focus on rebel outcomes, I further specify this continuum of success into four different categories: hard victory, soft victory, soft defeat, and hard defeat (Table 3.1).

[127] Fortna. p 524

Table 3.1 - Rebel Outcomes Relative to Degree Success

Hard Victory	Unambiguous victory for the rebels. They achieve all or most of their demands, either through decisive military action or agreement. Violence ceases.
Soft Victory	Ambiguous victory for the rebels. They achieve few of their demands, usually through an agreement. Violence ceases.
Ongoing	Not an outcome. The conflict is clearly ongoing. Violence continues, but not only from a fringe splinter group.
Soft Defeat	Ambiguous defeat for the rebels. Superficial demands, or no demands are met. The group may continue to carry out attacks, but they are merely symbolic. The group is no longer considered a serious threat and can operate only at menial levels. Can occur through an agreement.
Hard Defeat	Unambiguous defeat for rebels. Rebels either surrender, are decisively defeated on the battlefield, dismantled through arrests and executions, or forced to disarm, disband, and made illegal. There is no credible hope of a future for the rebel group and no goals are gained.

This concept of success allows us to evaluate if rebel groups ever do achieve their goals. Most studies on outcome are really focussing on the *mechanism* of how civil wars end; for example, decisive military action, negotiated settlement, low activity. While decisive military action can tell us who won and who lost, these are relatively rare occurrences in conflict datasets. My proposed concept of success doesn't focus on the conflict termination mechanism, but rather the success or failure of armed groups in achieving their goals. As will be expanded on in the chapter 4, another advantage of focussing on rebel outcomes relative to the attainment of their desired goals allows us to classify many of the 'low activity' cases that permeate most of the conflict databases.

With this concept of success and failure in mind, it is appropriate to consider what we already know about civil war outcome, duration, and negotiations. Doing so will allow us to narrow down what a radical group might look like based on my theory and currently available research. What outcome, negotiation, and, duration in civil war have in common is that the strength, strategy and tactics, and number of actors on behalf of the state or armed group matter. This is unsurprising. What is sometimes surprising is *how* they matter.

Many factors have been identified that appear to influence who wins in civil wars. It's been found that conflict outcome might be due to the strategies, tactics, and equipment employed by armed groups. It appears that irregular civil wars are mostly won by incumbents, while conventional civil wars are where armed groups are most successful.[128] Relatedly, those armed groups that employ terrorism don't appear to have any advantage in attaining victory or concessions.[129] Putting strategy aside, armed groups seem to be more successful when they work with others. Foreign intervention on the side of armed groups is associated with a higher likelihood of victory for armed groups,[130] while credible alliances with a unified command with other armed groups do the same.[131] Civil war outcomes, however, do not only depend on the actions and characteristics of the armed group, but also the state that they are fighting. For example, there is an association between regime types and outcomes,[132] level of

[128] Laia Balcells and Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 8 (2014): 1390–1418.
[129] Fortna, "Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes."
[130] Allison M. Shelton, Szymon M. Stojek, and Patricia L. Sullivan, "What Do We Know about Civil War Outcomes?," *International Studies Review* 15, no. 4 (2013): 515–38.
[131] Seden Akcinaroglu, "Rebel Interdependencies and Civil War Outcomes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 5 (2012): 879–903.
[132] Anup Phayal, T David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses, "Who Wins, Who Loses, Who Negotiates Peace in Civil Wars: Does Regime Type Matter?," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 4, no. 4 (2019): 482–98.

bureaucracy,[133] military strength,[134] and state capacity.[135] But what happens when civil war ends off of the battlefield?

There are several hurdles that must be cleared before negotiation can begin. One is that the armed group must be perceived as a credible threat to the state. This manifests itself both in terms of location of the conflict within the state and its intensity. When battles are either occurring close to major cities,[136] or when armed groups appear strong[137] and can conduct operations over a large territory,[138] negotiations are more likely. However, during low-intensity conflict, mediation is less likely, since armed groups are perceived as weaker by the state.[139] The global environment can also influence the likelihood of discussions. Whether or not negotiations can ever occur might depend on specific global norms, such as those introduced after 9/11 when many states refused to negotiate with terrorists.[140] It appears that governments and armed groups alike are most likely to start talking when things aren't going particularly well for either of them. When stalemates occur early on in the war, negotiations are much more likely; however, they are ultimately often unsuccessful.[141] Predictably, when negotiations do take place, they can often be complicated by the

[133] Karl R. DeRouen Jr and David Sobek, "The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 303–20.
[134] Shelton, Stojek, and Sullivan, "What Do We Know about Civil War Outcomes?"
[135] David Sobek and Cameron G. Thies, "Civil Wars and Contemporary State Building: Rebellion, Conflict Duration, and Lootable Resources," *Civil Wars* 17, no. 1 (2015): 51–69.
[136] J. Michael Greig, "Nipping Them in the Bud: The Onset of Mediation in Low-Intensity Civil Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 2 (2015): 336–61.
[137] Shelton, Stojek, and Sullivan, "What Do We Know about Civil War Outcomes?"
[138] J. Michael Greig, T. David Mason, and Jesse Hamner, "Win, Lose, or Draw in the Fog of Civil War," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35, no. 5 (2018): 523–43.
[139] Greig, "Nipping Them in the Bud: The Onset of Mediation in Low-Intensity Civil Conflicts."
[140] Lise Morje Howard and Alexandra Stark, "How Civil Wars End," *International Security* 2442, no. 13 (2018): 127–71.
[141] Michael G. Findley, "Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57, no. 5 (2013): 905–32.

'divergent ideologies' of the state and armed groups.[142] Like outcomes, the characteristics of the state and armed group matter when it comes to negotiation. When both the state and armed group is relatively evenly matched with low capabilities, compromise between the two parties is most likely, compared to higher capabilities or asymmetries.[143] Even if any agreements are signed, the level of state capacity of the signatory government greatly influences if peace ever occurs.[144]

Like civil war outcome and negotiations, conflict duration has a number of factors that appear to affect it. From an actor perspective, studies suggest that the more of them there are, the longer the war. For example, longer durations are associated with the presence of pro-regime militias in conflict,[145] equal third-party interventions on behalf of the state and armed group,[146] and a higher number of 'veto' players in peace negotiations.[147] Armed group goals also influence duration; the more 'intangible' a group's ideology is, the longer the conflict is expected to last, mostly due to commitment problems.[148] Chosen strategy and tactics by states and their challengers also seem to play a role. Naturally, states that choose a containment strategy against insurgency prolongs war,[149] as does employing guerrilla warfare[150] and terrorism[151] on behalf of the armed group. Strategies and tactics are likely

[142] Eric Keels and Krista Wiegand, "Mutually Assured Distrust: Ideology and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2020, 1–27.
[143] Laia Balcells and Stathis Kalyvas, "Did Marxism Make a Difference," 2010.
[144] Karl DeRouen et al., "Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation and State Capacity," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (2010).
[145] Huseyn Aliyev, "Pro-Regime Militias and Civil War Duration," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32, no. 3 (2020): 630–50.
[146] Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterline, "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820-1992," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (2000): 615–42.
[147] David E. Cunningham, "Veto Players and Civil War Duration," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 4 (2006): 875–92.
[148] Keels and Wiegand, "Mutually Assured Distrust: Ideology and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars."
[149] Shivaji Mukherjee, "Why Are the Longest Insurgencies Low Violence? Politician Motivations, Sons of the Soil, and Civil War Duration," *Civil Wars* 16, no. 2 (2014): 172–207.
[150] Balcells and Kalyvas, "Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars."
[151] Fortna, "Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes."

related to the relative and absolute strength of armed actors, which also affects the duration of conflict. Shorter conflicts are associated with strong rebels,[152] while weaker rebels who can control peripheric territory is correlated with longer conflicts.[153] Economists have highlighted country specific characteristics that correspond with longer civil wars, including a low per capita income, high inequality, and a 'moderate degree of ethnic division.'[154] Ethnicity has indeed been shown to be an important factor in civil war duration, specifically when some ethnicities are systematically excluded from state power, developing stronger solidarity between those excluded, allowing them to sustain conflict for longer.[155] Finally, there seems to be a relationship between how wars end and how long they last.[156]

As this brief survey of the literature has demonstrated, there are many factors that affect outcome, negotiations, and duration in civil war. In no way is the literature exhaustive, either. It's worth considering the factors that appear to affect all three: military strength, strategy and tactics, and number of actors involved. It is clear that state, armed group, social, temporal, and regional characteristics influence civil war outcomes, negotiations, and duration. My focus, however, is on armed groups and I summarise the above literature in relation to armed groups in the following table (3.2), according to the three most common factors.

[152]David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (2009): 570–97.;Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Päivi Lujala, "Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (2009): 544–69.

[153] Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome."

[154] Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, "On the Duration of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 253–73.

[155] Julian Wucherpfennig et al., "Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War," *World Politics* 64, no. 1 (2012): 79–115.

[156] Patrick T. Brandt et al., "When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars," *Defence and Peace Economics* 19, no. 6 (2008): 415–34.

Table 3.2 - Summary of Effects of Outcome, Negotiations, and Duration Literature for Armed Groups

		Rebel		
		Strength	Strategy, Tactics	Number of actors
Outcome	+ Victory	Armed groups capable of fielding conventional forces are more likely to win than those who can't.	Nil	Foreign intervention on the side of armed groups increases likelihood of victory. Credible alliances with a unified command increases likelihood of victory.
	- Defeat	Nil	Guerrilla warfare decreases likelihood of victory for rebels. The use of terrorism decreases likelihood of victory for rebels.	Nil
Negotiation	+ Negotiation	When armed groups project power, negotiations are more likely. When groups and the government are evenly matched in stalemate or low capabilities, negotiations more likely.	Nil	Nil
	- No negotiation	Low intensity conflict decreases likelihood of negotiations.	The use of terrorism decreases chances of negotiation.	Peace agreements are less likely for allied rebels.
Duration	+ Longer	Weaker rebels controlling some rural territory associated with increased duration.	Guerrilla warfare increases duration. Use of terrorism increases duration.	Any third-party intervention on behalf of state or armed group increases duration Higher number of 'veto' players increases duration.
	- Shorter	Strong armed groups are associated with shorter conflicts.	Nil	Nil

What does an armed group theoretically look like that has the best chances of winning, negotiating, and fighting for the shortest time? One that is militarily strong, using conventional forces and not terrorism, and does not have allies or others intervening in any way. This is, of course, a simplistic exercise, but one that I will extend to radical groups as a token first obstacle for my theory to navigate.

My suggestion is that radical armed groups will lose just as much as non-radical groups on the battlefield, refuse to negotiate, and increase the duration of conflict. According to the above table a radical group would be generally be weaker than the state, resulting in the use of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. The group would control some peripheric territory and might have some allies. Within the conflict the group is involved, there would be third-party intervention on behalf of the state or the group itself, and perhaps the conflict would eventually lower in intensity. At first glance, this profile appears to satisfy what we might archetypally consider to be radical or extreme groups. It also sounds like most armed groups. This superficial comparison certainly doesn't validate any characteristics of radical armed groups, but it neither points to absurdities. Perhaps a systematic theory with underlying mechanisms might be more convincing.

Radicalism : The Unintentional Self-Restriction of Strategic Options

For radical armed groups, their fortunes are limited to attaining all or none of their goals—in other words, extreme outcomes. They either win or they lose. Neither do radical groups necessarily have an advantage in civil war. While their ideology could impart an advantage in battle, such as increasing military effectiveness, radicalism does not help them *win* the war. This is partly due to their radical ideology, which handicaps their ability to negotiate and

compromise with their enemies. Compared to their less or non-radical counterparts, radical groups are least likely to negotiate with their enemies and just as likely to lose. The following explains how radicalism affects civil war outcomes and duration. I argue that radical armed groups i) rarely seriously consider negotiation, meaning that conflict outcomes are limited to attaining extreme outcomes; (ii) only consider negotiation once their radicalism decays, which is normally after lengthy wars ; (iii) win as little or lose as much as their non-radical counterparts; (iv) and increase the duration of conflict. What follows is an explanation of how radicalism affects outcomes, how radicalism changes, and why radical groups might fight for longer, along with their respective mechanisms and associated hypotheses. The mechanisms will be further explored in greater detail using cases' examples in Chapters 5 and 6.

How Radicalism Affects Outcomes




Figure 3.2 -Outcomes Available to Radical Armed Groups

As the above diagram illustrates, the major way that radicalism affects civil war outcomes is that it removes the 'soft victory' possibility. Soft victories are normally negotiated settlements, and by virtue of being radical, armed groups are discouraged from seeking any

kind of settlement. There are several discouraging mechanisms that can contribute to this. The first is intrinsic belief. When radical armed groups comprise of true believers, fighting to the death is more attractive than any kind of compromise with the enemy. The second is internal audience costs. Leader of radical armed groups have erected a number of ideological institutions that govern the daily lives of their combatants. The institutions can include excessive monitoring of combatants, too. Due to this collection of ideological institutions, what leaders of radical armed groups might notice is that they're in the same position as us: they don't who is and isn't a true believer. Leaders will overestimate the importance of ideology to group members and hence the risk of fragmentation and mutiny should leaders stray from the ideology in suggesting a compromise with the enemy.

Hypotheses 1 and 2

Radical armed groups have limited the universe of possible conflict outcomes by being radical. These groups are unable to compromise on declared goals, which can often be unrealistic, with states and other actors. The inability to compromise can both be intrinsic and instrumental. In the intrinsic case, leaders, combatants, or both perceive the goals of the group as their own. Some have made up their mind that they are willing to lose their lives to pursue the goals of the groups, adopting an absolutist outlook. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reason with such a group of individuals. They will only accept victory or death. Instrumentally, radical group leadership invests time and resources fostering radicalism amongst its membership. Whether or not the leadership or the combatants are intrinsically ideologically radical, without the radicalism on which the group finds its foundation, it will fall apart, splinter, or desert. This means that for leadership, to compromise even within an ideologically instrumental environment means either the end of, or significant harm to, the armed group. For both cases, intrinsic and instrumental, the ability to contemplate

compromise is either impossible or problematic. Conflict results in either attaining all or no objectives for radical armed groups (Figure 3.2), leading to the following two hypotheses.

H1: Radical armed groups are least likely to end conflict with a soft victory.

H2: Radical armed groups are most likely to end conflict with an extreme outcome.

How Radicalism Changes

While radicalism can push these groups to extreme outcomes, this doesn't always need to be the case. Over time a group's radicalism can change. This can occur through ideological decay, when a combination of poor morale and prospects for victory serve to make combatants and leaders think more pragmatically about their situation. After several years of being hungry and tired, it is natural for ideological conviction to wane (war weariness). This process can be expedited by demoralising frequent battlefield defeats, and being put under significant pressure by the enemy that ideological institutions are no longer prioritised (loss of institutional capacity). Additionally, a change in leadership (either planned or not) can be both a moderating or radicalising influence on the group. Finally, a group can be around for so long that it has seen several generations of combatants and the allure and importance of a radical ideology diminishes (generational change). It seems the most important factor of ideological change is time. The longer a radical group is at war, the less important ideology becomes, removing the barriers erected by radicalism that encourage these groups to seek an extreme outcome.

Hypothesis 3

The conditions required for a radical group to consider compromise to terminate conflict includes either a moderation of ideology or for their ideology to no longer appear radical.

Almost always, these changes of ideological decay or growth take time. Logically, the only groups in conflict long enough for these changes to take place are those engaged in a protracted conflict.

H3: If radical groups achieve a soft victory, it is after a long war.

Why Radical Groups Fight For Longer

Radical groups will fight for longer if they survive the immediate confrontation with the state, largely due to the mechanisms mentioned already. Radical groups tend to be morally opposed to compromise with the state. This means that if they aren't decisively defeated on the battlefield, they're likely to stick around for longer. Another reason they may fight longer is because they have increased military effectiveness. Remembering that part of being radical is to have ideological institutions, it takes organisational capacity to do so. Radical armed groups are probably more organised and being organised almost certainly makes groups more effective in combat. This then means that radical groups may be able to survive longer because they can fight better. Equally, radical groups practice other habits that act as mechanisms for retention, allowing groups to survive for longer. Often these groups promote a culture of suffering and sacrifice, which likely breeds resilience among its members, allowing them to fight for longer than they would if such a culture was absent. Likewise, the fact that institutions exist help create the illusion of competence where there is none, or at least, very little. This helps combatants defer their questions and doubts about the prospects of victory and simply buys leadership more time before these doubts become critical within cadres and they choose to desert.

Hypothesis 4

Radical groups will be involved in conflict for longer than their non-radical counterparts because they are more resilient. This resiliency is fostered by their intrinsic belief that what they are fighting for is right and that their self-devised moral superiority produces overconfidence in their ability succeed. Radical groups also obtain, perhaps unintentionally, an improvement in military effectiveness since radical ideological group institutions reinforce those required for combat performance.

H4: The more radical an armed group is, the longer the conflict is likely to be.

Empirical Expectations

For each hypothesis, Table 3.3 summarises what the theory predicts, the suggested mechanisms at work, and the empirical evidence required to support the hypothesis.

<table>
<tr><th>Theoretical Predictions</th><th>Mechanisms</th><th>Empirical Expectations</th></tr>
<tr><td>1) Radical groups will rarely achieve a soft victory</td><td rowspan="2">Intrinsic Belief
Internal Audience Cost
Institutionalisation
Monitoring
Pluralistic Ignorance</td><td>Radical groups will either achieve all or none of their goals.</td></tr>
<tr><td>2) Radical groups have no advantage regarding conflict outcome.</td><td>Radical groups will lose just as frequently or more than non-radical groups, partly due to 1.</td></tr>
<tr><td>3) Radicalism decays over time.</td><td>Generational Change
Leadership Change
War Weariness
Loss of Institutional Capacity
Combat Defeats</td><td>It will take longer for a group that begins radical to enter negotiations compared to non-radical groups.</td></tr>
</table>

4) Radical groups are more resilient.	Intrinsic Belief	Radical armed groups will be at war longer than non-radical groups.

Table 3.3 - Theory: Empirical Expectations

Observability of Mechanisms

Some of the mechanisms I propose appear problematic since it is difficult to imagine how they might be observed. Indeed, I concede that some of them are unobservable. However, this does not mean that they should be abandoned. To clarify the observability of these mechanisms, I categorise the potential evidence of their existence into two categories: direct and indirect. Direct evidence denotes explicit observation of the mechanism, while indirect evidence is an implicit observation of the mechanism. For each mechanism, I summarise the level, source, type, and empirical evidence required below in Table 3.4. Additionally, many of these mechanisms appear to predict the same observations. This is because they are related and contribute to an overall effect. The relationship between these mechanisms and their respective positions within processes will be clarified in in chapter 5 and 6; however, those that are related are grouped together below.

Mechanism	**Level of Observation**	**Source**	**Type of Observation**	**Empirical Expectations**
Internal Audience Cost	Individual	Leadership	Direct	Minutes of meetings/Records of discussion about the consequences of ideological moderation.
Institutionalisation	Group	Group	Direct	Ideology is institutionalised through indoctrination, training, and propaganda.
Monitoring	Group	Combatants and Leadership	Direct	Details of monitoring practices from former combatants and leaders in memoirs and research. Details and sentiments of constant surveillance.

Pluralistic Ignorance	Individual	Combatants	Direct	Interviews with/Records of former combatants who describe their behaviour as a consequence of the group's apparent ideological fervour.
Intrinsic Belief	Individual	Combatants and Leadership	Indirect	Acts difficult to explain in the absence of intrinsic belief, such as self-sacrifice or counter-productive behaviour and policies.

Table 3.4 - Mechanisms: Empirical Expectations

Theory Conditions: The State

Up until this point, the discussion of how civil wars end for radical groups has been largely one-sided. The main emphasis of this thesis is indeed on the radical non-state armed groups; however, to properly explain, or try to explain, how their radical dimension leads to extreme outcomes, it is necessary to examine the role of player two: the state. Since 'the enemy always gets a vote' in warfare, so too does the state. Do states interact with radical groups differently, and if so, how? At the risk of over-theorisation, I do not attempt to answer this question fully, which is a limitation of my theory. I do, however, offer a brief summary of the conditional and mitigating factors that likely encourage and discourage states from settling with a radical armed group.

A significant difficulty of assessing a state's actions towards radical armed groups is uncovering the true intents of the state. Negotiation is a tool to bring about peace between two warring parties; however, it is also a tool to win wars. States (and indeed rebels alike) may propose peace talks without any intent on securing that peace. Talks can be both strategic and tactical and states, in this case, may use negotiations to fragment radicals. This can happen when governments 'turn to negotiation when they see negotiation with one

extremist faction as a way for creating a split between that faction and other extremist groups.'[157] Thus, when we see that overtures are made to radical armed groups, it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to know if these attempts are genuine. Despite this difficulty, I outline several reasons why the state may both encourage and discourage extreme outcomes in civil war with radical armed groups.

Conditions Promoting Extreme Outcomes

There are many pragmatic reasons why a state may wish to attempt to end a civil war through settlement. War is costly, exhausting, and obstructs the state's ability to govern effectively. However, there are instances where continuing to fight is still more attractive. There are three main reasons that could discourage a state from reaching out to try and find a negotiated settlement with a radical armed group: external audience costs, internal audience costs, and a higher perceived threat. These encourage an extreme outcome because they support continued conflict.

External Audience Costs

While states face the (sometimes) existential threat of civil war domestically, it is important to remember that they continue to interact with other states at the international level. This means that though civil war is a major domestic concern, there can exist international strategic issues that supersede even war at home. These issues include things like international norms and strategic partnerships. The most recent and major example of how these international relationships affect civil war is the United State's 'War on Terror' following

[157] William Zartman, *A Pioneer in Conflict Management and Area Studies*, 2019, p 221.

the 9/11 attacks. The 'War on Terror' both helped states name their domestic enemies as terrorists[158] and inherently raised obstacles to civil war settlement through a widely held norm of not negotiating with terrorist.[159] The result of the these policies is clear. In 2013, 50% of civil wars being fought included at least one armed actor that appeared on a list of designated foreign terrorist organisation by either the US, UN, EU, or other Western government.[160]

The US's policy of not negotiating with terrorists has had a tremendous effect of influencing how other states deal with the broad definition of domestic terrorism and its actors (which often includes civil war). This is because negotiation with a terrorist 'is presumed to be impossible because terrorists are mad, share no common interests, are unrepresentative, and are illegitimate.'[161] More practically, for the armed groups themselves, being labelled a terrorist 'reduced the pool of people armed groups have engaged with' including NGOs that can be critical to initiating mediation processes.[162] Being proscribed as a terrorist organisation nearly makes peace negotiations impossible.[163]

[158] Sophie Haspeslagh, "'Listing Terrorists': The Impact of Proscription on Third-Party Efforts to Engage Armed Groups in Peace Processes-a Practitioner's Perspective," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 6, no. 1 (2013): 189–208.
[159] Harmonie Toros, "'We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts," *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 4 (2008).
[160] Sophie Haspeslagh, "'Listing Terrorists': The Impact of Proscription on Third-Party Efforts to Engage Armed Groups in Peace Processes-a Practitioner's Perspective," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 6, no. 1 (2013): 189–208,.
[161] Miller Carl, "Is It Possible and Preferable to Negotiate with Terrorists?," *Defence Studies* 11, no. 1 (2011), p 146.
[162] Haspeslagh, "'Listing Terrorists': The Impact of Proscription on Third-Party Efforts to Engage Armed Groups in Peace Processes-a Practitioner's Perspective." p 205.
[163] Flavia Eichmann and Development Studies, "Naming Terror : Impact of Proscription on Negotiations with Non-State Armed Naming Terror : Impact of Proscription on Negotiations with Non-State Armed Groups," (2019).

In the case of the 'War on Terror,' it has become a norm not to end civil wars with radical armed groups, but rather to win them. The result is that this newly established norm could well have prolonged conflict in some instances, as the state's decision to prioritise international favour over domestic stability pushed policy makers in the direction of continuing conflict, rather than ending it diplomatically.

And while the 'War on Terror' is the most recent example, the Cold War created similar incentives and confusion. Any group that called itself communist became a target of the west and any communist – no matter how devoted– was considered radical and an enemy. Of course, we know that identifying as leftist had its instrumental advantages, such as foreign support from either Russia, China, or others. Thus, we're able to observe how states choose to interact with radical groups in such periods (as all leftist groups were considered radical); however, not all of the groups were indeed radical. What we can observe, however, is when a state, or a strategic partner, perceives a group within its borders as radical, there is significant pressure to defeat them, rather than reason with them.

This kind of state external audience cost is not reserved for their approach to addressing radical groups. Militant movements, whatever their motives and practices, are disruptive and neighbouring countries are right to be concerned over the possibility of spill overs and cross border violence. What is unique about radical groups in this case, however, is that it is not uniquely neighbouring or regional states that are applying pressure or making requests to quell these armed groups – they are on the other side of the planet. Within the recent political climate, a separatist armed group in north eastern India is not of grave interest to the United States. A separatist and Islamic armed group in the same area certainly might be. In essence,

external audience costs encourage extreme outcomes in civil war whenever there is a transnational cultural agreement that a specific ideology is dangerous, be that communism, jihadism, or otherwise.

Internal Audience Costs

The state government can find itself in a precarious situation. While in conflict with a radical group, they may wish to end the conflict; however, the domestic population, for which the state depends upon for its power, is perceived to detest any outcome other than the destruction of the group. Logically, this internal audience cost would be more important in democracies. There are a few conditions that increase the audience costs of settling with a radical armed group. The first is that the radical armed group participates in or is perceived to exercise violence against civilians.[164] This violence is likely to be deliberate, brutal, and amount to atrocities. At the foundation, it is the domestic population's clear desire for punishment and revenge that makes a state government weary of negotiation with such radical groups. Much like 'ripeness theory' works for belligerents, which suggests that 'high casualties make it harder for the parties to recognise a ripe or opportune moment to being conflict management' because of 'negative attitudes, distrust, and a desire for revenge'[165] it can be similar for civilians. However, the desire for revenge and punishment is not necessarily linked to a high volume of casualties, whatever the threshold of that metric may be, but also the nature of the violence perpetrated by the armed group. Research has shown that peace processes for civilians can be 'driven by normative considerations' which can 'present

[164] This is not a unique characteristic of radical armed groups, nor is it a necessary condition for radicalism.
[165] Scott Sigmund Gartner and Jacob Bercovitch, "Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: The Contribution of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements," *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (2006): p 824; William Zartman, "Explaining Oslo," *International Negotiation* 2, no. 2 (1997).

substantial barriers to public support' as they prefer agreements that 'punish actors perceived as perpetrators in the conflict.'[166] Radical armed groups, by their very nature, are the most likely to be intolerant of whomever they consider the 'other' and it is not uncommon for them to commit atrocities. Thus, while the desire for revenge among civilians is available to any group that carries out brutal violence, a large number of them will be radical.

The second condition is that the population despises what the group stands for – its ideology. This occurs when the group espouses ideas and proposes a way of life that is perceived to be entirely at odds with the country's mainstream culture. For example, this can come in the form of advancing theocracy in a state where there is none, the widening or constraining of individual liberties, or a complete restructuring of civil governance. The group and its ideas are recognised as an infection that needs to be destroyed. So vehemently opposed to even the existence of the group, the majority of citizens wish to see it disappear, and any form of legitimising it through talks with the state will be seen as morally wrong.

Perceived Elevated Threat

When states are faced with a perceived radical adversary in civil war, it is not unusual for them to perceive the group as posing an elevated threat. When groups are labelled as radical or extremists, states may take the threat of the group more seriously. There are several reasons for this. The first has to do with the misconception that all members of radical armed groups are ideologues. From the state's perspective, they're fighting fearless combatants who are willing to kill indiscriminately at the cost of their own lives. These ideas are compounded

[166] Juan Fernando Tellez, "Peace Agreement Design and Public Support for Peace: Evidence from Colombia," *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 6 (2019) p 32.

when the groups engage in terrorism, especially suicide terrorism. While it isn't the only course of action, an historically popular belief is that the only way to stop such a difficult to fight group is through their destruction because it is thought that one can't reason with a radical.[167] The appropriate strategy to respond to a more dangerous threat is to then allocate more soldiers, tanks, and aircraft to fight them. This inevitably makes negotiation and settlement a less likely outcome to the war, and a decisive military victory by the state a more likely outcome.

The second reason states will perceive radical groups as an elevated threat has to do with the often transnational nature of ideology. Again, a state's perception of what is and isn't radical may be inaccurate – in many cases, just professing an ideology is enough to be labelled as such. As described above, there periodically exists international or regional climates of ideological hostility. During the Cold War, all communists were understood to be dangerous by the west, and during the 'War on Terror,' almost any Muslim armed group was believed to be extremist. What these two ideologies have in common, other than it being fashionable to oppose them, is that there is both a real and imagined transnational militant network based on shared ideas and causes. Because it isn't unusual for some of these groups to elicit foreign support, it is equally reasonable for states to assume that such radical groups will have foreign support, and often this is the case.[168] Since foreign support normally augments the operational capability of armed groups, what this means is that states will consider radical armed groups more dangerous. This doesn't necessarily reduce the odds of a negotiated

[167] Carl, "Is It Possible and Preferable to Negotiate with Terrorists?"
[168] Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham, "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups," *International Organization* 65, no. 4 (2011) p 727.

settlement, but it does encourage the state to, again, allocate more resources to the war, leading to other processes that make a settlement less likely.

Conditions Mitigating Extreme Outcomes

The factors that discourage states from seeking extreme outcomes share some similarity with the factors that encourage it: external audience costs. In addition to external audience costs, war weariness and societal change are also probable causes of states seeking to avoid extreme outcomes with radical armed groups.

External Audience Costs

The strategic domestic choices states make in civil war are shaped not only by what is going on within its borders, but also by its interstate relationships. States need to balance their own desires against how pursing them will be perceived by the international community. Especially when the state is not considered powerful internationally, as is often the case for states experiencing civil war, they must make strategic choices between doing what they wish domestically and appeasing strategic partners when these interests collide.

It is routinely the case that states will condemn government-led atrocities, human rights violations, and war crimes. However, advocating on behalf of the radical armed group is different. While not considered a civil war in the traditional sense, the political violence of South Africa's African National Congress (ANC), which appears in numerous datasets as an armed actor, helps illustrate the point. While the ANC was fighting for an end to apartheid, they enjoyed the widespread support of the international community with a number of countries imposing sanctions 'covering a range of strategic, diplomatic, economic, and

cultural exchanges.'[169] This was most notably done by the US which enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986.[170] Eventually the South African state, through a series of negotiations created the conditions to end apartheid with the ANC winning the subsequent election in 1994. To emphasise, at the time of these events, it is an enormous stretch to claim civil war was taking place in South Africa – by many definitions, it wasn't. This case does however demonstrate one iteration of how this external audience costs has worked. It is difficult to imagine that this is a common occurrence.

War Weariness

Just like radical non state armed groups, states can become confronted with the reality that victory is unlikely. The enormous volume of resources required to fight war, the casualties, and the distraction from focussing on other government priorities can create conditions when states, whoever their enemy is, believes that there is little to be gained from continued fighting.[171] The fact that the armed group is radical becomes less relevant, especially when the conflict has reached a stalemate. A major condition for this war weariness is that a significant amount of time must pass in order for it to occur. There is very little literature that addresses the war weariness of the state in a civil war. Previous findings have suggested the longer a civil war lasts, the less likely it is to recur, which is partly explained by a 'war weariness effect' .[172] I suggest that war weariness doesn't only matter *between* wars, but that it also occurs *within* wars. War weariness has been found to be 'sufficient to impel combatants to

[169] Audie Klotz, "Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The Anti-Apartheid and Abolitionist Experiences," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 1 (2002), p 65.
[170] William H. Gray, "H.R.4868 - Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986" (1986).
[171] Sema Hande Ogutcu-Fu, "Outside the Battlefield: In-Group Political Dynamics of Civil Conflict Negotiations and Settlements," *Political Research Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (2016), p 8.
[172] J. Michael Quinn, T. David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses, "Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence," *International Interactions* 33, no. 2 (2007), p 186.

start negotiations,' though it is unlikely to lead to a settlement unless the group is internally cohesive.[173] It is reasonable to believe that war weariness of states, too, affects their likelihood of entering negotiations. Not all states or administrations will reach the same conclusion that further conflict is fruitless; however, if we expect a state to be self-motivated to negotiate concessions with a radical armed group, it is because they think they will either lose, that they can't win, or the cost is too great. It does appear that the importance of war weariness is conditional on regime type, as autocracies seem less affected by it than democracies.[174]

Societal Change

The most interesting occurrence that helps remove barriers for states to negotiate and settle with a radical armed group is when the group no longer perceived to be radical by society at large. Essentially, the ideas and goals of the radical armed group were either 'ahead of their time' and become more mainstream as society begins to mirror them, appreciate them, or simply tolerate them after a period of many years. While this doesn't mean that the group is welcomed with open arms and that the violence it wields is excused, it does mean, however, that the obstacles to negotiation and settlement caused by radicalism disappear. Thus, previously radical groups find themselves on a level playing field with non-radical armed groups.

[173] Ogutcu-Fu, "Outside the Battlefield: In-Group Political Dynamics of Civil Conflict Negotiations and Settlements."p 24.
[174] Daniel Byman, "'Death Solves All Problems': The Authoritarian Model of Counterinsurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 39, no. 1 (2016) p 2.

Despite my theory not taking explicitly taking into account the role of the state, I have tried to here highlight the conditions that can both promote and militate against an extreme outcome in civil war.

Conclusion

Does it matter if an armed group is radical? The main objective of this chapter was to offer an answer to this question. I suggest that being radical discourages armed groups from being able to compromise and secure a soft victory, which would allow them to attain at least some of their objectives. I also argue that radicalism requires time to change to a level that would encourage negotiations between a state and an armed group to take place, implying that previously radical groups will consider this avenue of ending conflict only after a long period of time. Finally, I propose that being radical likely increases an armed groups probability of survival and military effectiveness. While radicalism may improve an armed group's ability at the tactical level, at the strategic level, radical groups are the most likely to experience an extreme outcome in civil war termination. I also highlighted the main limitation of my theory: the role of the state in civil war and how certain conditions are likely to affect the probability of an extreme outcome.

'To see what is in front of one's nose needs a constant struggle' – George Orwell[175]

Chapter 4: Methodology and Empirical Analyses

What is the fortune of radical armed groups? It's relatively easy to theorise about abstract concepts; however, it is difficult to discover and assemble empirical evidence in their favour. It likely isn't wise to invest heavily in the causal explanations of abstract concepts derived from quantitative analysis. There are too many contextual and complicated factors that are ignored by superficial proxy indicators. It also is not helpful to form conclusions based on cases that the researcher knows little or nothing about. When dealing with abstractions, in depth case studies are far more authoritative to reveal answers about *those* cases. It is,

[175] George Orwell, "In Front of Your Nose," *Tribune*, March 22, 1946.

however, impractical to compare more than several cases properly in this way, unless it is to be made one's life work. In an effort to find a balance, I intend to use both quantitative and qualitative methods to try and answer the above question. This chapter is about my quantitative efforts.

Within this section I first explain the case selection process, data collection methods, and research difficulties experienced throughout this exercise. Secondly, I describe how the collected variables are coded, using examples to clarify them. Thirdly, I illustrate how the radicalism variable is built and weighted. Fourth, I compare datasets of regarding the dependent variables of conflict outcome and duration. Fifth, I conduct statistical analysis of the effect of radicalism on conflict outcome and duration, present results, and discuss implications. Overall, it appears that there is a strong relationship between radicalism and extreme outcomes in civil war, while there is either no relationship or a negative relationship between radicalism and conflict duration.

Case Selection

The case selection strategy for this data collection project was a random sample of 78 cases[176] from the Non-State Actor (NSA) data set, representing 20% of the full sample when military factions and state forces are removed.[177] The dataset was chosen to sample from because it is far more rich than other substantial datasets on non-state armed groups like the UCDP or Correlates of War (COW) datasets. The NSA includes a more detailed variables that would be relevant for analysis, including if the armed group had a political wing, estimates on strength,

[176] This is not a representative sample with a confidence interval of 95% and margin of error of 5% of the NSA Dataset. This would require a random sample of 196 armed groups. My sample of 78 groups is representative with a confidence interval of 95% but with a 10% margin of error.

[177] Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome."

and territorial control, among many others. The scope of the dataset is from 1946-2010. Another advantage of the NSA data project is that it includes detailed case notes on almost all of the armed groups within the dataset, with in concert with UCDP notes, offers an accessible first step of understanding of the armed groups and the conflicts in which they appear.

The discipline of conflict studies is naturally biased in favour of easily accessible data. That is to say, the cases with the most available data (Colombia, for example), are disproportionately used to form theories and explain civil war dynamics. The main reason for choosing a random selection of cases was to avoid limiting the data collection on armed groups due to a perceived scarcity or abundance of available information. In doing so, I also limit the volume of selection bias I could introduce if I were to select on specific variables. Random selection also provides a sample of cases that varies over characteristics important for this study, namely outcome and duration. Cases were not selected on ideology type, location, or time period, since these can be controlled for in later analyses. There is no question that selection bias exists within the NSA dataset – specifically those relating to inclusion criteria such as battle-death thresholds. However, it is also very likely that, despite all of the efforts of the researchers who contributed to the project, there are some armed groups that were not included simply because few scholars have ever heard of them. Some armed groups are probably so short-lived that they barely make their way into the public record. Intuitively, it seems plausible that many of these short-lived and unrecorded groups would meet my definition of radical. The fact is that we will likely never know if that's the case and dedicating the required time and research to properly answer that question, I suggest, isn't worth it. It is understandable that no dataset is exhaustive and unreasonable to expect as much. The important and practical

way forward is to recognise and acknowledge these unavoidable biases when analysing and interpreting the data.

Forty cases were randomly selected initially as a pilot project to test the feasibility of collecting such granular characteristics of armed groups. The following table (4.1) lists those selected. Insufficient data was collected on groups highlighted in grey, reducing the sample of 40 to 27. A similar proportion of armed groups were found to have insufficient data when the data set was expanded.

Table 4.1 – Case Selection

Group	*Country*	*Group*	*Country*
African National Congress (ANC)	*South Africa*	*Sendero Luminoso (SL)*	*Peru*
Baluchistan Republican Army (BRA)	*Pakistan*	*Somali National Movement (SNM)*	*Somalia*
Bundu dia Kongo (BDK)	*Zaire*	*The National Liberation Army (ELN)*	*Colombia*
Communist Party of Malaya (CPM)	*Malaysia*	*The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)*	*Ethiopia*
Coordination de la résistance armée (CRA)	*Niger*	*The United Wa State Army (UWSA)*	*Burma*
Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM)	*Eritrea*	*Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)*	*Zimbabwe*
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF/TPLF)	*Ethiopia*	*Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)*	*Zimbabwe*
Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	*Russia*	*All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)*	*India*
Janatha Vimukti Permamuna (JVP)	*Sri Lanka*	*Bandera Roja*	*Venezuela*
Khmer Rouge (KR)	*Cambodia*	*Biplobi Communist Party (BCP)*	*Bangladesh*
Kuki National Front (KNF)	*India*	*Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)*	*Papua New Guinea*
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	*Turkey*	*FLEC-Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC)*	*Angola*
Lao Issara	*Laos*	*Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY)*	*Yemen*
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	*Philippines*	*Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)*	*Angola*
Mujahid Party	*Burma*	*Islamic Charter Front*	*Sudan*
National Liberation Movement (MNL-T)	*Uruguay*	*Lebanese National Movement*	*Lebanon*
New Mon State Party (NMSP)	*Burma*	*Popular Front*	*Burkina Faso*
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN/Contras)	*Nicaragua*	*Shan State Revolutionary Army (SSRA)*	*Burma*
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC)	*Palestine*	*The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)*	*Sudan*

Revolutionary Movement Túpac Amaru (MRTA)	*Peru*	*United Tajik Opposition (UTO)*	*Tajikistan*

Given that twenty-seven cases offered very little explanatory power for analysis, a further round of data collection was undertaken, expanding the number of randomly selected cases to seventy-eight. The original goal was to expand to 100 cases; however, the pandemic, availability of resources, and time constraints limited these efforts.

Data Collection

Due to the specific nature of the variables that were collected, two data collection methods were undertaken: desk research and an expert survey.

Desk Research

Desk research was carried out for all 78 groups with the help of research assistants and a generous grant from Oxford's John Fell Fund in support of the Adaptation, Ideology, and Rebels (AIR) research project. Research was conducted using primary and secondary sources, notably academic books and articles, news media, social media, and government documents. For the first random sample of 40, each group was independently coded twice by different researchers for the initial round of data collection. I verified all coding and any disagreements were decided by me. Some cases were far more difficult to research than others and after a combined total of 30 research hours on a specific group, if the group continued to contain significant missing data, they were dropped, resulting in 27 groups. The second round of data collection, which produced the additional 51 randomly selected groups, was carried out uniquely by me without any research assistance. [178]

[178] If this step were to have introduced bias into the data set, it would be via the types of data sought and used, not in the coding as I personally checked every group coded.

Expert Survey

An expert survey was conducted for the first 40 groups. Due to the anticipated response rate, every attempt was made to identify five experts per armed group (N=200). Experts were initially identified with strict guidelines to demonstrate their expertise; an individual must have published a peer-reviewed article or a monograph on a respective armed group in the sample; and the publication must deal directly with the armed group or discuss in-depth the armed conflict where the group was active. Only publications from the fields of area studies, political science, international relations, anthropology, sociology, history, and law were originally consulted.[179] These publications were identified using Google Scholar and Web of Science. To avoid further bias, experts were not to be members of government, former members of the armed groups, or overtly biased in their publications. Within these constraints, less than a quarter of the experts required were identified after lengthy searches. Secondary searches were conducted of faculty in universities that were relatively local to where the armed group in question had operated. Part of the difficulty was likely attributed to language barriers, since identifying research of academic faculty of small universities within the regions where particular armed groups operated was difficult or impossible. Some university websites had little information about their staff, and when enquiries were made to specific departments, responses were uncommon. The scope of experts was widened to include journalists, NGO workers and others who appeared to have direct experience with these groups, through publications or otherwise. Despite the widened scope, it was not possible to identify experts of some groups, such as the Eritrean Jihad Islamic Movement (EIJM) and the Muhajid Party. Overall, we were able to identify 135 experts. The experts were

[179]Zelina, McCauley, Ruggeri 'Persuade and Punish.' Working Paper.

emailed a 10-question multiple choice survey through Qualtrics. One reminder email was sent roughly one month after the first invitation was sent. We received 31 responses, of which 20 were complete responses, which covered 11 armed groups. Overall, the expert survey was a failure; however, some of the responses were able to be used further enrichen the desk research.

Given the poor response rate of the expert survey and the significant efforts required to undertake it, an expert survey was not considered a pragmatic addition to the second round of data collection.

Randomization

While one of the intents of the random selection was to avoid a bias towards groups that had the most easily accessible data, this bias still exists within the case selection. A high number of cases that were selected could not be properly coded due to a scarcity of information. It's likely that there is a reason why some of the groups have more information than others – the more powerful, organised, influential, and brutal groups are going to capture the attention of the media and scholars alike. These armed groups probably have a higher capacity to fight and threaten states, which is why they're overrepresented in the sample – because people write about them. Every effort was made to collect data for the less frequently considered armed groups and, while it was successful in many cases, it was not in all. As this study is about conflict outcomes, armed groups that were involved in conflicts that were still clearly occurring were not included in the analysis. This could have also introduced bias into the sample as some of the longest conflicts are still underway and could not have been included. The below table (4.2) displays the chi square test comparing the proportion of the random

sample to the proportion in the NSA data set as a whole. If my sample was truly random, there would be no statistically significant difference between the proportion of values of the variables in my sample and the entire NSA dataset, meaning that all p-values should at least be larger that 0.05. As we can see, randomisation has not occurred over all variables, but it still exists to a certain extent. If we keep in mind that groups in this sample likely have higher strength and support than

average, we can still use the following analysis for the purposes of correlation.

Table 4.2 – Chi-Squared Test of Proportions between Random Sample and Full Sample

Variable	Chi-Squared Test
Rebel Political Wing	p-value= 0.46
Rebel Strength	p-value= < 0.01
Fighting Capability	p-value= 0.47
Government Support	p-value= 0.18
Rebel Support	p-value= < 0.001

Collected Variables

The main variables collected were done so with the aim of being able to allocate a radicalism score to each armed group. As the theory demands, these observable variables were of ideological institutionalisation and ambition. A significant difficulty of this data collection is that some of these groups had existed for decades. This means that the attributes of radicalism would almost certainly have changed over time. This data does not account for temporal variation. To do so in a non-superficial and honest way would be virtually impossible without ethnographies for each group or in-depth interviews with their former combatants. Since the theory is about the trajectory of radical armed groups, when the luxury of several sources of information on

specific variables was available, the data that refers to the earliest period of the armed group's existence was favoured.

Ideological Ambition

Ideological ambition is a combination of a group's desired political change and control. Desired political change is coded in five different levels. The first two levels are if a group was seeking autonomy (1) or if the group was secessionist or defending against an invader(2). If a group was revolutionary, seeking change of the regime and/or a change of political system only within the state they were active, they are coded as 3. If a group was revolutionary, seeking transnational change of regimes and/or a change of political systems, they are coded 4. A group is coded 0 if there were no overt political demands made; however, no such group was identified within the sample. This can be explained by the fact that the NSA dataset, which is based on the UCDP dataset, excludes groups without an incompatibility of either territory or government . The main source of this data was found in armed group manifestos, transcribed interviews with leaders, or publications produced by armed groups which detailed their demands. Of course, there is no guarantee that these demands are *really* what the group wanted or if they were a form of strategic dialogue. This distinction isn't made in the coding.

Political control is an estimate and coded in three levels: no desire for control (0), desire of partial control (1), desire of full control (2). This is likely the least credible variable collected in this study. It's very difficult to ascertain the strategic goals of armed groups. Within official documents, many groups, especially communist/socialist groups, expressed a desire for democracy of some kind. It is impossible to know with certainty what these groups meant by

'democracy' and if these desires were serious. To remain conservative, if this occurred, groups were coded as 0. If a group was seeking autonomy or secession and they were the only group fighting for these goals, it is intuitive that they sought to take control from the state and would form the regime or authority should they be successful, and were thus coded as a desire for full control. In the same situation, if an armed group was cooperating with other armed groups for the same goal, this is coded as partial control since cooperation with other parties has already been demonstrated, despite the fact that this may not be the case in reality.

The Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), for example, is coded as 3 for desired political change and 0 for desired political control. Within documents produced by the group, the top three main goals were 'Expulsion of the British Imperialist out of Malaya,' the 'establishment of an All Malayan Congress and the State Councils, candidates to which are to be elected through a universal franchise in which all the anti-imperialist parties and organisations and the peoples of Malaya will have the right to participate,' and the 'realization of democracy.'[180] This suggests that the group desired to change not only who was in government, but the system of governance as well, from colonial rule to democracy. The detailed goal of democracy and what that appears to mean to the CPM suggests, at least in writing, that the group did not intend to seize unilateral control of the state. No evidence was found if this interpretation of democracy by the CPM was meant to be executed in a one-party state.

[180] Fujio Haja, "The Malayan Communist Party as Recorded in the Comintern Files," 2016. p 119.

Alternatively, the United Wa State Army in Burma, only ever sought autonomy, of which it attained and continued to be the de facto authority in the area. The desired political change of the UWSA is coded as desiring autonomy (1) and desire for control as full (2).

Ideological Institutionalisation

Four variables related to ideological institutionalisation are collected: recruit indoctrination, ideological training, civilian indoctrination, and propaganda.

Recruit Indoctrination

Recruit indoctrination is a binary variable. If there is credible evidence of some kind of emphasis on ideology during the initial training for new recruits, the group is coded as practicing recruit indoctrination. This evidence would appear in documents or research that highlights the basic training routine for new recruits, with portions of the schedule devoted to 'political classes' or 'ideological classes.'

Recruits of the Balochistan Republican Army (BRA) in south-western Pakistan were taught 'ideological orientation,' including classes on 'Baloch's right of independence,' 'the concept of Greater Balochistan,' and 'the tyranny of Punjab and plight of oppressed nations.'[181] The BRA is coded as having conducted recruit indoctrination. Likewise, recruits of the Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) received 'mystic training,'[182] that is also coded as recruit indoctrination. In contrast, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia appeared to 'lack organizational and

[181] Maloy Dhar, "Balochistan: Cruces of History- Part II," 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20090813115652/http://maloykrishnadhar.com/balochistan-cruces-of-history-part-ii.
[182] Veronique Mouflet, "Le Bas-Congo, Aux Marges de l'agenda International," *Afrique Contemporaine* 4 (2009). P 64.

ideological coherence as well as military discipline,'[183] along with an absence of any other evidence of recruit indoctrination is coded as not practicing it.

Ideological Training

Ideological training is coded in three levels: none/no evidence for ideological training (0), possible ideological training (1), explicit ideological training (2). Since ideological training is something that occurs over time, rather than only during recruitment like indoctrination, it's difficult to be sure how consistent the practice was. When there were vague or inconsistent reports of ideological training, the group is coded as likely having practiced it (1).

The Kuki National Front (KNF) in north-east India gave it's recruits one month of political training; however, there is little evidence of continued training. There is mention of the organisation releasing a book about the Kuki people during a celebration[184] and attempts to replace Indian national holidays with Kuki events, like the parades for 'raising day' to celebrate the organisation's founding.[185] It is difficult to imagine in these circumstances that ideological training of some kind was not practiced, given these details. Thus, the KNF is coded as possibly practicing ideological training.

Conversely, the Janatha Vimukhthi Peramuna (JVP) in Sri Lanka, held routine ideological discussions known as the 'five classes' and claims to have undertaken 'an educational programme to give political education to its members and arm them with the correct

[183] Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (Yale University Press, 2007). p 240.
[184] "Kukis Observes 'Martyr Day,'" *Imphal Free Press (India)*, October 12, 2018.
[185] Arora, Vibha and Narayana Jayaram, *Democratisation in the Himalayas: Interests, Conflicts, and Negotiations* (Taylor & Francis, 2017).

ideology,' later setting up 'educational camps' for 'further education.'[186] The JVP is coded as explicitly conducting ideological training.

Civilian Indoctrination

Civilian indoctrination is a binary variable. Not all groups wish to proselytize; however, many do wish to influence civilians. While this influence can occur in many ways, civilian indoctrination is only coded for if there is a record of face to face interactions between armed group members and civilians with the goal of discussing ideological, political, or religious matters. Often, these encounters are mandatory for civilians.

The New Mon State Party (NMSP) of Burma, for example, operated their own school system which 'played an important role in the NMSP's projection of a distinctly Mon national culture, underpinning the party's secessionist – later federalist – policies.'[187] While there is a distinction between preserving one's heritage and indoctrination, in this case, there is a clear effort to promote the goals of the NMSP, despite also offering education to civilians. Another clear case of civilian indoctrination is supplied the Shining Path in Peru, which created 'escualas populares' for civilians meant to teach students about 'Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, guerrilla warfare, and the teachings of Guzman.'[188]

[186] JVP, "History of the JVP (1965-1994)," People's Liberation Front, n.d., http://www.jvpsrilanka.com/english/about-us/history-of-1965-1994/.
[187] Ashley South, "Ceasefires and Civil Society: The Case of the Mon," in *Exploring Ethnic Diversity in Burma* (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2007). p 18.
[188] Jason Heeg, "The Shining Path ' s Employment of Psychological Warfare during Its Terrorism Campaign in Peru , 1970-1992," *Special Operations Journal* 3, no. 2 (2017). p 114.

Contrarily, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) of the Contras heavily emphasised propaganda in their efforts to oust the Sandinistas. There is no record, however, of face to face meetings with civilians with the purpose of changing their ideological beliefs, and thus they are not considered to have practiced civilian indoctrination.

Propaganda

Propaganda is coded in three levels: did not appear to produce propaganda (0), produced propaganda (1), formalised propaganda with a dedicated propaganda cadre (2). It is difficult to prove a negative in this case, considering that the definition of propaganda can be rather wide, including professionally produced literature and television, to graffiti on a wall. The distinction made here, between an evident propaganda cadre and simply producing propaganda, is meant to highlight how important the production of it was to the armed group. For example, the NMSP above did not appear to produce propaganda at all; however, this is likely because they had control of a school system to promote their message to their target audience. The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement appeared to produce propaganda from time to time, notably in the form of online videos or sometimes featuring on radio.[189] Their propaganda production, however, appears sporadic and there is little to suggest that there was any permanent cell or position within the organisation responsible for propaganda.

The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa did have a permanent propaganda cadre. From their own documents, they report in detail that they 'established a production and propaganda unit in our area. It produces a sheet as regular as resources allow. The

[189] "Opposition Voices," *Africa Intelligence*, November 22, 1997, https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-and-southern-africa/1997/11/22/opposition-voices,46432-art.

propaganda is then fed into [their] internal machinery for distribution. [They] decided that the contents should be in our [their] languages to ensure that our messages are understood by the working people and peasants.'[190]

The Radicalism Variable

Building any variable or index regularly involves some arbitrary decisions, be them in the form of thresholds or weighing of factors. While it's likely that some level of frivolity has trickled into this index, it is intended that the formulation of the radicalism variable is driven by theory. The conceptualisation of radicalism for armed groups is based on two main factors, ideological ambition and ideological institutionalisation. Put another way, radicalism is decided not only by what people say, but what they do. Both are important for understanding radicalism; however, are they both equally important? It's difficult to argue that if we knew one's true desires that we would be able to predict with some accuracy their behaviour. In our case, unfortunately, we don't know these true desires. Instead we only possess what groups *say* they desire. It is far easier to say something than it is to do something. But a group's institutionalisation is also influenced by what the group believes and its ambitions. It is difficult to argue which component, ambition or institutionalisation, should be weighted more and for this reason, they are weighted equally (Table 4.3). There may be cause to revisit this weighting in the future (see Table 4.12).[191]

Variable	Weight	Variable	Weight
Institutionalisation	**0.5**	**Ambition**	**0.5**

[190] "Report of the Politico-Military Strategy Commission to the ANC National Executive Committee, August 1979," in *The Green Book*, 1979.

[191] An example of how the change of the current weighting can influence the magnitude and significance of radicalism is provided in this chapter, Table 4.12.

Recruit Indoctrination	0 = 0 1 = 2	Political Change	0 = 0 1 = 0.5 2 = 1 3 = 2 4 = 3
Ideological Training	0 = 0 1 = 1 2 = 2		
Civilian Indoctrination	0 = 0 1 = 1	Political Control	0 = 0 1 = 0.5 2 = 1
Propaganda	0 = 0 1 = 0.5 2 = 1		

Table 4.3 - Variable Weights and Radicalism

Since ideological institutionalisation and ambition are also novel variables, internal weighing is required to determine their values.[192] For institutionalisation, the two most theoretically important institutions are ideological training and recruit indoctrination. These two institutions focus exclusively on disseminating ideology internally to group members. As such, they each make up a third of institutionalisation's contribution to radicalism. Civilian indoctrination and propaganda are ideological institutions that target those outside of the group, thus they possess a lower weight. Together, they comprise a third of institutionalisation. These theoretically informed weights are then distributed to each variable based on the number of categories they have in the dataset.[193] The distribution of these weights on a select sample of the data can be observed below (Figure 4.1).

[192] These values may appear to be arbitrary; however, they are informed by theory. Whatever the values are presented in Table 4.3, slight changes in values would not affect the overall relationship between radicalism and outcomes as the theoretical relevance of these variables would keep results relatively consistent. If there was good reason for the theoretical assumptions and understandings of these variables were to change, then we would likely see a meaningful change in how radicalism relates to outcomes.

[193] As recruit indoctrination is binary and allotted 2 points out 6 for institutionalisation, the presence of it equals 2, while its absence is 0. Equally, as propaganda is only allotted 1 point out of 6 for institutionalisation,




Figure 4.1 - Radicalism due to Ideological Institutionalisation

For ideological ambition, desire for political change is far more significant than desire for political control. Consequently, political change accounts for ¾ of ideological ambition, while only ¼ for political control.[194] Overall, out of ideological ambition's contribution to radicalism, desire for political change is responsible for 37.5% and desire for political control 12.5%. The distribution of these weights is demonstrated below (Figure 4.2).

it's three categories (no propaganda produced, propaganda produced, propaganda cadre) are thus scored, resulting in 0.5 for 'propaganda produced.'

[194] It was a theoretical and pragmatic choice to weigh autonomy (political change=1) as 0.5. Theoretical because calls for autonomy are at least half a severe as calls for secession (political change=2) and pragmatic because only 3 points out of 4 are allotted to political change, which has five categories.




Figure 4.2 - Radicalism due to Ideological Ambition

Finally, the combination of these variables provides us with a radicalism score, as represented by the scatter plot of select groups below (Figure 4.3). Those groups in the top right quadrant are the most radical while those in the lower left quadrant are the least radical.




Figure 4.3 - Scatterplot of Radicalism: Ideological Institutionalisation vs. Ideological Ambition

The observed radicalism scores range from 1.3 to 9.4 with a mean score of 5.4. At first glance, the index appears relatively valid based on what we might stereotypically consider radical. Notorious groups like the Shining Path, Khmer Rouge, and ELN find themselves near the top right. It may be slightly surprising to see ZANU and the ANC scoring so high and the MILF scoring so low.

Data on Outcome and Duration

Since the dependent variables of this study are conflict outcome and duration, it is important to ensure that the correct values of both outcome and duration can be verified in order to carry out any sort of analysis. To carry out this verification, I started by comparing the outcomes and durations of the three most comprehensive and popular datasets on conflict and armed groups: the NSA, UCDP, and COW dataset.

Available Duration Data

The data on conflict duration is complicated. Two pieces of data are required to determine a conflict's duration and that's when the conflict begins and when it ends. While this appears simple in practice, less consensus than desired exists. These inconsistencies arise from different interpretations of when conflict begins, and often more difficult, when it ends. The UCDP for example codes start dates for when the first battle death occurred and also when the 25 battle deaths a year threshold is met.[195] The NSA adopts the UCDP start date of the 25 battle deaths a year threshold; however, they ignore 'intermittent periods without sufficient violence of less than two years between included spells of fighting.'[196] The COW codes start

[195]Lotta Harbom, Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen, "Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-2007," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 5 (2008).
[196] Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome."

dates based on the first year the conflict involved 'sustained combat,' otherwise meaning reaching a threshold of 1000 battle deaths a year from all participating combatants.[197] These different thresholds clearly have an impact on conflict start dates. These same thresholds also affect when conflict is considered to have ended. These impacts can be observed in the following comparisons (Figure 4.4):[198]




Figure 4.4 - Comparison of Civil War Duration between UCDP, NSA, and COW Datasets

As expected, when the COW does code for a non-state conflict, it's far more constrained threshold suggests that conflicts are much shorter than in the UCDP and NSA. Interestingly, though the NSA adopts much of the UCDP data on end and start dates, there is still significant disagreements between the two. The NSA is systematically biased to be slightly longer than the UCDP since it often doesn't code precisely for end dates, meaning that if a conflict is coded as having ended on 1 Jan 1987 in the UCDP, the NSA codes it as having ended on 31 Dec 1987.

[197] Zeev Moaz et al., "The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0: Logic, Characteristics, and Comparisons to Alternative Datasets," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2019.

[198] For this visualisation, any conflict that was coded as ongoing, (ELN, Caucasus Emirates), their dates are extended to August 2020, the time of writing.

Within this data, however, the UCDP appears to code conflicts longer than the other two datasets, likely because the start date used in this chart is for the first battle related death. These disagreements do not inspire confidence when modelling conflict duration, so I've examined each case individually to more appropriately determine when conflict starts and ends. Rather than employ a threshold of deaths, I instead code the conflict as starting when the first recorded instance of violence is used by a group, or the formation of an armed group with the sole purpose to use violence,[199] and when that cannot be accurately determined, I adopt UCDP's start date of first battle death. For conflict termination, I examine the events surrounding the proposed dates for termination and determine if they are valid. For example, conflict termination is often coded as 'low activity' despite the conflict being clearly over, or as a ceasefire, despite the conflict continuing. This new coding compared to the UCDP appears as the following (Figure 4.5).




*Figure 4.5 - Comparison of UCDP and Own Coding of Civil War Duration. *Indicates conflict ongoing as of August 2020*

[199] uMkhonto weSizwe of the ANC, for example.

This figure demonstrates that though there is a consensus of duration for many of the observations in the sample, there are still major disagreements. For example, rather than outcomes being coded as 'low activity' four cases have been coded as ongoing at the time of writing (Balochistan Republican Army, ELN, Kuki National Front, and the PKK). There are some strange discrepancies where the UCDP overestimates the length of conflicts, such as the MILF, of which the UCDP codes its dyad start in 1970, despite the group not forming until 1977. The MRTA dyad is coded to start in 1963, despite first armed action taking place in 1984. There are other instances where the UCDP underestimates the duration of conflict, such as with the ANC, which first appears in 1978; however, the first guerrilla attacks orchestrated by the ANC were in 1961. What this tells us is that using battle death thresholds is a pragmatic way to collect *some* information about many conflicts. *Some* information, however, isn't always enough.

One other disadvantage about using battle death thresholds is that as soon as they are not met, the researcher is forced to code an outcome for the conflict, which often is easily placed into the 'low activity' category. This practice is common and understandable; though, it obscures not only how the conflict ended, but also who wins.

Another source of relevant duration data is used which estimates duration for the entire lifecycle of the armed group, rather than just the civil war.[200] This data codes for when a group forms and ceases to be an armed opposition group. A group is considered to have formed as an armed opposition group when either i) the group forms a militant wing, ii) the group

[200] Cheng Xu, "It Takes a Village to Raise a Rebel: A Social Theory of Insurgent Mobilization" (University of Toronto, n.d.).

announces itself as a revolutionary movement, iii) or when there is evidence of the start of violent mobilisation. A group is considered to have ceased being an armed opposition group when they have i) been defeated by the government (either decisive military defeat or surrender), ii) participated in a Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) plan, iii) renounced violence, or iv) disbands their military wing. While this data ends in 2011, I have extended it to 2021 for the relevant groups.

Available Outcome Data

When considering how conflict ends, there unexpectedly isn't always a consensus for every conflict, nor is there a consensus of the universe of possible outcomes. Comparing the NSA, UCDP, and COW datasets based on the categories of outcome possibilities demonstrates this variation (Figure 4.6).




Figure 4.6 - Civil War Outcomes used by UCDP, NSA, and COW Datasets

The two outcomes included in all datasets are 'victory' for either the rebels or government, and the mysterious 'low activity' outcome. Both the UCDP and NSA employ 'ceasefire agreement' and 'peace agreement' as a possible outcome, while the COW uses the less

granular 'compromise.' While those who find this discussion pedantic can be forgiven, it's important that when we're conducting analyses on conflict outcome, we are talking about the same thing. Would some of the 'low activity' outcomes that appear in the NSA and UCDP be considered 'stalemates' in the COW? Is the 'end of anti-colonial conflict' all that different from victory or defeat more generally? For the UCDP, outcomes are 'based on the final year of activity and first year of non-activity,'[201] otherwise meaning when the conflict dips below the recorded 25 battle-related deaths a year, while the NSA does the same.[202] Usually, if this occurs and no agreement nor victory is achieved in the conflict, its outcome is labelled as 'low activity.' The COW also subscribes to the 25 battle-related deaths a year constraint, but will also record armed group as active in a conflict if it can 'commit 100 armed personnel to the war.'[203] When neither of those conditions can be satisfied, the armed group likely falls into the obscurity of 'low activity.' I intend to clarify this category later. Two other authoritative data sources were included in this analysis, Stanford's Mapping Militant Organisations (MMO) project and the IISS Armed Conflict Survey (ACS). Only a handful of observations are included in either of the data sources, but it's important to include them to discover if there is a consensus, or at least general agreement, on civil war outcomes. To compare the outcomes, I collapsed any kind of agreement or compromise into the 'agreement' outcome (Figure 4.7).

[201] Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen, "Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-2007."
[202] Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome."
[203] Moaz et al., "The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0: Logic, Characteristics, and Comparisons to Alternative Datasets."




Figure 4.7 - Comparison of Civil War Outcomes from UCDP, NSA, COW, Stanford, and IISS data sources

As seen above, there is only an agreement on 12 outcomes out of 27 (44%). Some of the possible reasons for this include the dates the data were collected for each project. For example, the last iteration of the NSA data was published in 2013 and the UCDP data set was published in 2015. There have been some developments with groups in this sample, namely the MILF and OLF signing agreements of some kind since 2014. However, the most interesting differences are between victories and low activity. The Khmer Rouge was clearly victorious and became the regime in Cambodia, and the SNM also successfully established Somaliland, but they are classified as 'low activity' and rebel victory. The Shining Path and CPM were also decisively defeated; however, they are also coded as 'low activity' outcome and government victory. Of the 15 cases that disagree, 13 of them (86%) include the 'low activity' outcome. This is partly because the battle death threshold liberates these data projects from having to make difficult decisions about conflict outcome. Such pragmatic conditions, however, are required for such massive projects. Another reason why low activity is pervasive throughout these datasets is because it's *hard* to count causalities in unfamiliar regions, reporting in

foreign languages, and to discriminate between battle deaths and civilian casualties. In some cases, it's likely that many deaths, battle or otherwise, are either not reported or they are inaccurately reported. When the situation is uncertain, 'low activity' is the safe and conservative coding decision. However, when we're asking questions about how conflict ends, 'low activity' is not helpful, as it is not an outcome.

Distinguishing Rebel Outcomes

One striking feature of this chart is how few instances of victory occur. War is complicated, but it is also a contest that involves winners and losers. There is no question who lost the first and second world wars, but there were also formal surrender agreements – one doesn't need to be an expert to make that distinction. Civil war is more obscure and because information on these conflicts is either scarce or first-hand knowledge of them is lacking, there is a hesitation of declaring a winner and loser. It's possible that within these datasets, there really are few clear winners and losers. Perhaps there is a normative aversion to making such calls. But it's also possible that there isn't a pragmatic framework to distinguish outcomes and to make informed judgements. For example, within these datasets there is no possibility of coding both for an agreement and a victory. This means that negotiated peace terms that dissolve an armed group, make membership illegal in return for amnesty or not being executed is not considered a rebel defeat. The same can be said for a peace deal which grants an armed group most of their demands, which is not coded as a rebel victory.

The framework I propose to do so is inspired by Fortna's spectrum of success.[204] However, rather than there being only rebel defeat and victory, low activity, and negotiated settlement, I suggest enriching this spectrum with the concept of hard and soft victories and defeats. Doing so allows us to claw back much of the data locked away in 'low intensity' outcomes. It also allows us to unmask the observations that end in 'agreement.' While an agreement may signal the end of hostilities between two parties, the fact that it occurred tells us little about if anything was ultimately gained for either of them. This spectrum of success is found in the following table (4.4).

Hard Victory	Unambiguous victory for the rebels. They achieve all or most of their demands, either through decisive military action or agreement. Violence ceases.
Soft Victory	Ambiguous victory for the rebels. They achieve few of their demands, usually through an agreement. Violence ceases.
Ongoing	The conflict is clearly ongoing. Violence continues, but not only from a fringe splinter group.
Soft Defeat	Ambiguous defeat for the rebels. Superficial demands, or no demands are met. The group may continue to carry out attacks, but they are merely symbolic. The group is no longer considered a serious threat and its capacity is severely limited compared to the group's known operational capacity. Can occur through an agreement.
Hard Defeat	Unambiguous defeat for rebels. Rebels either surrender, are decisively defeated on the battlefield, dismantled through arrests and executions, or forced to disarm, disband, and made illegal. There is no credible hope of a future for the rebel group and no goals are gained.

Table 4.4 – Conflict Outcomes

[204] Virginia Page Fortna, "Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes," *International Organization* 69, no. 3 (2015).

How difference does this distinction make to our cases? If we look at ZANU and ZAPU, both of these groups were fighting for equality, majority representation, and to end white colonial rule in Rhodesia. Both groups combined to create ZANU-PF in 1976 and in 1979 an agreement was made with the Rhodesian government which then stipulated that democratic elections would take place. While the outcome of this conflict is coded as having ended by agreement, which it had, this is a clear hard victory for ZANU and ZAPU. They were virtually able to secure all of their demands.

Peru's MRTA is coded as 'low activity' in the datasets; however, the MRTA were effectively destroyed following the hostage crisis at the Japanese embassy in Lima in 1997. Since the group essentially no longer exists and achieved none of their aims, the MRTA can be considered having suffered a hard defeat.

The BDK conflict is coded as having ended in a government victory and agreement. This is likely because the leader, Ne Muanda Nsemi, was once arrested and a ceasefire was signed. However, the remnants of the group continue to carry out small scale attacks and face mass arrests. Since the group hasn't been effectively destroyed and still presents security nuisance for the government, the BDK is coded as suffering a soft defeat.

Both the MILF and Contras achieved a soft victory. While the MILF is coded as 'low activity,' this is largely due to the fact the peace agreement they signed in 2014 is temporally outside the scope of the datasets. The MILF initially desired an independent and Islamic Bangasamoro state; however, MILF settled for autonomy and power sharing in the region, in return for decommissioning weapons. While it isn't exactly what the MILF originally desired, the

concessions they extracted from the government of the Philippines cannot be considered a defeat. The Contra conflict is coded as having ended in an agreement. Despite the fortune of the Contras being widely decided by the Esquipulas Peace Agreement, signed by presidents of regional states, more than anything the Contras were anti-Sanadista. The peace agreement set the conditions for that Nicaraguan Sanadista government calling for democratic elections, where the Contras witnessed the defeat of the regime. The Contras did not overthrow the regime, as they initially desired; however, their desires were partially fulfilled with the defeat of the Sanadista regime.

Like all metrics proposed to measure success of armed groups, this one too is imperfect. It focuses on the extent that armed groups attained their core goals – depending on what those goals were, it's possible they had little or nothing to do with securing them. It does, however, offer us a nuanced spectrum of both success and defeat.

The following is a table of descriptive statistics of radicalism, which is scored from 0-10 (4.5) and outcome (4.6).

Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
1.25	9.38	5.37	2.23

Table 4.5 – Distribution of Radicalism (N=78)

Hard Defeat	Soft Defeat	Soft Victory	Hard Victory
30	9	16	23

Table 4.6 – Distribution of Outcomes (N=78)

Data Analysis

It's first important to note that the database for this thesis is limited and that the purpose of conducting statistical analysis is not to make causal claims, but to instead explore the correlational relationship between radicalism and its theoretically relevant dependent

variables. This exploratory exercise is intended produce neither sufficient nor necessary evidence for my theory, but rather evidence to warrant further investigation.

Outcome and Radicalism

In order to conduct analysis on civil war outcome, the conflict must have ended. Since my own investigation into conflict duration revealed that 4 of the cases were indeed still ongoing at the time of writing, they were dropped, resulting in a sample of N=78. This small but reasonably sized sample does introduce some limits regarding the explanatory power of any model as well as the number of covariates that can be included. The covariates used are those that appear most relevant to explain civil war outcome and evaluate the theory. These include external material support (weapons, troops, or funds at any time during the conflict),[205] the relative fighting capability compared to the state,[206] the relative strength of the armed group compared to the state,[207] the group's ideology type, and the duration of the conflict.

The relative fighting capability is a measurement of an armed groups ability to 'effectively engage the army militarily and win major battles.'[208] While the exact criteria of this what equates to effective engagement for this variable isn't entirely clear, it hinges on the assumption that armed groups that can confront the state military in conventional means are stronger than armed groups that use 'hit and run attacks typical of guerrilla warfare.'[209] Though this may not always be the case, I assess that it is a fair assumption for the purposes of this study. The relative strength of the armed group compared to the state is a variable

[205] From Belgin San-Akca, *States in Disguise: Causes of External State Support for Rebel Groups* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
[206] From Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome."
[207] From Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan.
[208] Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan p 580.
[209] Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan p 581.

that takes into consideration a number of different factors that can contribute to a group's ability to fight effectively. The first of these factors is to what extent the group has a strong central command, with the assumption that such leadership contributes to a group's strength, rather than weaken it. The second is the ability of armed groups to mobilise—those that can mobilise more people are considered stronger. The third is a measure of the extent to which armed groups are able to procure weapons. Finally, the fourth is the group's relative fighting capacity compared to the state. While this conglomeration of variable probably lacks precision, and that its also unclear what the calculus was to weigh each of these components, nevertheless, this variable is still useful and should be considered a control with broad brush.

Another limitation of using these control variables is that they do not account for temporal variation. This means that how these variables affect conflict outcome for armed groups in the following models is likely further obscured. Despite this being the case, these variables are still the best and most accurate available for use in a quantitative model. To improve upon this would require the completion of an enormous data project, collecting these variables on a yearly and sometimes monthly basis. Not only is such a massive effort seemingly impossible to carry out due to a scarcity of available data, but in all likelihood it would reveal generally what we already know as is captured by these control variables. Indeed, to improve upon these static controls one must abandon quantitative models entirely.

Three different estimators are used to observe if any relationship between radicalism and outcome are consistent across them. The three estimators used are the following: ordinal

logistic regression, multinomial logistic regression, and binary logistic regression.[210] All models suggest that the more radical an armed group is, the more likely the group will achieve an extreme outcome. There is some evidence that radical armed groups may have an overall advantage in civil war.

OLS

To first explore if there is any relationship between radicalism and outcomes, a series of simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models are used. The outcome variable I propose is categorical, however, it can also be thought of as ordinal variable, hard defeat being the lowest level, and hard victory being the highest. OLS models are not exactly appropriate for evaluating categorical or ordinal variables, though this exercise is exploratory. The following models (Table 4.7 and 4.8) employ outcome as an ordinal and binary (win/loss) variable. One of my arguments is that radicalism can help explain conflict outcomes better than ideological types. For this reason, ideological types are also tested for correlation in these models.[211] All groups are classified into one of four ideological types: Nationalist, Leftist, Religious, or Other. Considering that radicalism is a new variable comprising of two different components (ideological institutionalisation and ambition) both of the components are tested separately throughout. These correlations are first presented without and then with controls.

[210] J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese, *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata*, 2nd editio (Stata Press, 2005); J. Scott Long, *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables: 7 (Advanced Quantitative Techniques in the Social Sciences)* (SAGE Publications, 1997).

[211] These ideological types come from the Dangerous Companions Dataset: San-Akca, *States in Disguise: Causes of External State Support for Rebel Groups*.

OLS - Correlations of Radicalism and Ideology Types - Ordinal

	Dependent variable:			
	Outcome - Ordinal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Institutionalisation	0.142*			
	(0.076)			
Ambition		−0.176		
		(0.157)		
Radicalism			0.069	
			(0.065)	
Nationalist (Compared to Leftist)				0.199
				(0.362)
Other (Compared to Leftist)				0.131
				(0.469)
Religious (Compared to Leftist)				0.131
				(0.469)
Constant	2.011***	2.860***	2.039***	2.286***
	(0.258)	(0.426)	(0.377)	(0.283)
Observations	78	78	78	78
R^2	0.043	0.016	0.015	0.004
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.7 - Correlations of Radicalism and Ideology Types with Outcomes as an Ordinal Variable, Without Controls

OLS - Correlations of Radicalism and Ideology Types - Binary

	Dependent variable:			
	Victory			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Institutionalisation	0.031			
	(0.031)			
Ambition		−0.076		
		(0.062)		
Radicalism			0.009	
			(0.026)	
Nationalist (Compared to Leftist)				0.117
				(0.143)
Other (Compared to Leftist)				0.071
				(0.185)
Religious (Compared to Leftist)				0.071
				(0.185)
Constant	1.413***	1.695***	1.453***	1.429***
	(0.104)	(0.168)	(0.150)	(0.112)
Observations	78	78	78	78
R^2	0.013	0.020	0.001	0.009
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.8 - Correlations of Radicalism and Ideology Types with Binary Outcome, Without Controls

What we first notice from these two models is that there appears to be no correlation between ideological type and outcome, either as an ordinal or binary variable. Interestingly, despite not being significant, the direction of the relationship of all ideologies compared to Leftists is positive, which begins to suggest that Leftists may be more prone to losing than others. Only ideological institutionalisation in the ordinal model, however, begins to approach any significance. Ambition's relationship with victory appears to be a negative one (though insignificant) which makes sense: the more ambitious your goals, the less likely you are to achieve them. Overall, however, in this simple OLS model, radicalism and ideological types do not appear to have a significant relationship with victory. It is worth investigating if this changes when controls are added.

When controls are added (Table 4.9 and 4.10), we see very much the same thing: ideological types do not appear significantly correlated to conflict outcomes and ideological institutionalisation now becomes significant at the p 0.05 level, again, only in the ordinal model. Radicalism and ambition remain virtually unchanged.

OLS - Correlations of Radicalism and Ideology Types - Ordinal

	Dependent variable:			
	Outcome - Ordinal			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Institutionalisation	0.237**			
	(0.092)			
Ambition		−0.305		
		(0.194)		
Radicalism			0.132	
			(0.085)	
External Government Support	−0.200	−0.247	−0.216	−0.242
	(0.284)	(0.292)	(0.293)	(0.295)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	0.256	0.268	0.219	0.220
	(0.321)	(0.332)	(0.331)	(0.334)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	0.350	0.038	0.427	0.283
	(0.677)	(0.714)	(0.704)	(0.705)
Moderate Fighting Capability (Compared to Low)	0.004	0.187	0.029	0.123
	(0.323)	(0.332)	(0.335)	(0.333)
Asia (Compared to Africa)	−0.959***	−0.755**	−0.800**	−0.677**
	(0.333)	(0.328)	(0.334)	(0.328)
Europe (Compared to Africa)	−2.565*	−1.921	−2.460*	−2.127
	(1.380)	(1.418)	(1.429)	(1.428)
Middle East (Compared to Africa)	−0.185	0.067	−0.075	0.066
	(0.597)	(0.607)	(0.614)	(0.614)
South America (Compared to Africa)	−0.981*	−0.723	−1.020*	−0.898
	(0.549)	(0.576)	(0.571)	(0.572)
Nationalist (Compared to Leftist)	0.413	−0.218	0.321	−0.003
	(0.400)	(0.401)	(0.432)	(0.382)
Other (Compared to Leftist)	0.581	0.055	0.397	0.111
	(0.492)	(0.473)	(0.507)	(0.477)
Religious (Compared to Leftist)	−0.226	−0.147	−0.351	−0.330
	(0.501)	(0.527)	(0.515)	(0.520)
Over Five Years	0.793**	0.967***	0.861***	0.957***
	(0.309)	(0.312)	(0.318)	(0.315)
Constant	1.418**	2.954***	1.378*	2.132***
	(0.604)	(0.760)	(0.737)	(0.560)
Observations	78	78	78	78
R^2	0.300	0.256	0.255	0.227
Adjusted R^2	0.157	0.105	0.104	0.084
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.9 -Correlations of Radicalism and Ideology Types with Outcomes as an Ordinal Variable, With Controls

OLS - Correlations of Radicalism and Ideology Types - Binary

	Dependent variable:			
	Outcome - Victory			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Institutionalisation	0.047			
	(0.038)			
Ambition		−0.104		
		(0.077)		
Radicalism			0.018	
			(0.034)	
External Government Support	−0.077	−0.087	−0.082	−0.085
	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.117)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	0.079	0.088	0.071	0.072
	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.133)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	0.313	0.215	0.318	0.299
	(0.279)	(0.284)	(0.283)	(0.279)
Moderate Fighting Capability (Compared to Low)	0.109	0.154	0.120	0.132
	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.135)	(0.132)
Asia (Compared to Africa)	−0.271*	−0.242*	−0.231*	−0.215
	(0.137)	(0.131)	(0.135)	(0.130)
Europe (Compared to Africa)	−1.054*	−0.897	−1.012*	−0.967*
	(0.568)	(0.565)	(0.576)	(0.566)
Middle East (Compared to Africa)	−0.039	0.010	−0.009	0.010
	(0.246)	(0.242)	(0.248)	(0.243)
South America (Compared to Africa)	−0.327	−0.251	−0.327	−0.310
	(0.226)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.227)
Nationalist	0.147	−0.008	0.108	0.065
	(0.165)	(0.160)	(0.174)	(0.151)
Other	0.172	0.060	0.117	0.079
	(0.203)	(0.188)	(0.204)	(0.189)
Religious (Compared to Leftist)	−0.090	−0.048	−0.113	−0.111
	(0.206)	(0.210)	(0.207)	(0.206)
Over Five Years	0.372***	0.407***	0.391***	0.404***
	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.128)	(0.125)
Constant	1.143***	1.565***	1.184***	1.284***
	(0.249)	(0.303)	(0.297)	(0.222)
Observations	78	78	78	78
R^2	0.240	0.244	0.225	0.222
Adjusted R^2	0.086	0.090	0.068	0.078
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.10 - Correlations of Radicalism and Ideology Types with Binary Outcome, With Controls

Understanding that we're using a less than ideal estimator, the lack of apparent associations within these models is troubling. The robust relationship that I suggests exists, one would expect, would at least reveal itself in some form even in these imprecise models. It is important to remember, however, that the theory predicts that radical armed groups are

more prone to *extreme outcomes* in civil war. These models are essentially estimating if there is an advantage of radicalism in civil war, which meagrely suggests there isn't. Taking one more step with the OLS exercise, I will now run the same binary model with controls; however, the dependent variable will be extreme outcomes (hard defeat, hard victory vs. soft victory, soft defeat).

OLS - Correlations of Radicalism and Ideology Types with Controls - Binary

	Dependent variable:			
	Outcome - Extreme Outcome			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Institutionalisation	0.060*			
	(0.033)			
Ambition		0.047		
		(0.070)		
Radicalism			0.057*	
			(0.030)	
External Government Support	0.068	0.058	0.069	0.058
	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.105)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	−0.062	−0.078	−0.071	−0.071
	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.116)	(0.118)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	−0.417*	−0.396	−0.372	−0.434*
	(0.246)	(0.257)	(0.247)	(0.250)
Moderate Fighting Capability	0.087	0.107	0.076	0.116
	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.118)
(Compared to Low)				
Asia (Compared to Africa)	0.107	0.190	0.125	0.178
	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.116)
Europe (Compared to Africa)	0.832	0.911*	0.798	0.943*
	(0.501)	(0.510)	(0.501)	(0.506)
Middle East (Compared to Africa)	0.188	0.251	0.191	0.251
	(0.217)	(0.218)	(0.215)	(0.217)
South America (Compared to Africa)	−0.273	−0.279	−0.305	−0.252
	(0.199)	(0.207)	(0.200)	(0.202)
Nationalist (Compared to Leftists)	−0.177	−0.249*	−0.141	−0.281**
	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.151)	(0.135)
Other (Compared to Leftists)	−0.435**	−0.545***	−0.430**	−0.553***
	(0.179)	(0.170)	(0.178)	(0.169)
Religious (Compared to Leftists)	0.088	0.034	0.053	0.062
	(0.182)	(0.190)	(0.181)	(0.184)
Over Five Years	−0.293**	−0.253**	−0.293**	−0.252**
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.112)
Constant	1.787***	1.841***	1.641***	1.967***
	(0.219)	(0.273)	(0.258)	(0.198)
Observations	78	78	78	78
R^2	0.321	0.293	0.326	0.288
Adjusted R^2	0.184	0.149	0.189	0.156
Residual Std. Error	0.424 (df = 64)	0.433 (df = 64)	0.423 (df = 64)	0.431 (df = 65)
F Statistic	2.332** (df = 13; 64)	2.036** (df = 13; 64)	2.382** (df = 13; 64)	2.187** (df = 12; 65)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.11 - Correlations of Radicalism and Ideology Types with Binary Extreme Outcome, With Controls

What table 4.11 reveals is different. We see that ideological institutionalisation is both positive and bordering on significance, as is radicalism. These are relatively small estimated effects, but it does begin to suggest that radicalism is associated with extreme outcomes. Also

worth noting is that the direction of ideological ambition has switched from negative to positive. While insignificant, it hints that a high ideological ambition might contribute to the possibility of an extreme outcome in civil war, not only victory. The 'other' ideological category is also significant at the 0.01 level and strongly negative. This table suggests that, compared to leftist groups, the 'other' ideology groups is significantly less likely to achieve an extreme outcome. To preserve degrees of freedom, ideologies for which there were few others were collapsed into this category. Looking deeper into this category, of the 12 groups that make this up, 7 of them are labelled 'Democratic.' It seems reasonable to assume that group that subscribe to a democratic ideology would be less likely to experience an extreme outcome to civil war, perhaps because democracy, by its very nature, is an ideology of compromise. We also notice that nationalists appear to be less likely to experience an extreme outcome, which is could be due to the fact that nationalists often have less ambitious goals and settling for autonomy rather than secession isn't unusual. Overall, this analysis begins to point in the direction that not only is radicalism an important factor in extreme civil war outcomes, but ideology type also plays a role.

Since in these cases, it appears that ideological institution might be doing much of the work, it is appropriate to investigate how the manipulation of weighing the two components of radicalism (institutionalisation and ambition) can affect its correlation with extreme outcome. To do so, the following table displays several different weights.

Different Weighting of Radicalism and Correlations with Outcome

	Dependent variable:				
	Extreme Outcome				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
20% Inst 80% Amb	0.073**				
	(0.029)				
40% Inst 60% Amb		0.078***			
		(0.025)			
50% Inst 50% Amb			0.072***		
			(0.023)		
60% Inst 40% Amb				0.065***	
				(0.020)	
80% Inst 20% Amb					0.052***
					(0.016)
Constant	1.297***	1.266***	1.292***	1.326***	1.394***
	(0.160)	(0.143)	(0.132)	(0.121)	(0.104)
Observations	78	78	78	78	78
R^2	0.077	0.112	0.118	0.119	0.115
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.12 - Correlations of Radicalism and Ideology Types with Binary Outcome, With Controls

This table (4.12) demonstrates that virtually all weights of radicalism are significant in an OLS model. However, all weights are positive, with a higher magnitude the more weight given to ambition. It appears that retaining a 50/50 weight of both components of radicalism is appropriate as they theoretically play an equal role in radicalism and that the different weighting might not produce drastically different results in the further models.

Multinomial Model

To properly valuate the relationship between radicalism and conflict outcomes, a multinomial model is required. An ordinal logistic model is not appropriate in this case since

the proportional odds assumption does not hold. Doing so will allow us to uncover the different relationships that exist between radicalism and different civil war outcomes, as the relationship is not linear.

The first analysis is the most simple, including only radicalism without any controls.

Multinomial - Radicalism and Probabilities of all Outcomes

	Dependent variable (Compared to Hard Defeat):		
	Soft Defeat	Soft Victory	Hard Victory
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Radicalism	−0.153	−0.333**	0.249*
	(0.180)	(0.158)	(0.143)
Constant	−0.423	0.936	−1.755*
	(0.962)	(0.775)	(0.912)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	201.499	201.499	201.499
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.13 - Multinomial - Radicalism and Probabilities of Outcomes including Soft Defeat

Table 4.13 reveals that, without controls, radicalism has a statistically significant negative relationship with soft victory at the 0.05 level and a positive relationship with hard victory at the 0.1 level, compared to hard defeat. To interpret this, an increase in radicalism is associated with a 29% decrease in probability that an armed group will secure a soft victory compared to a hard defeat. Regarding a hard victory, this simple model suggests an increase of radicalism is associated with a 28% increase in probability of securing a hard victory, compared to a hard defeat. This begins to suggest that radicalism might be an advantage in civil war. It also suggests that either a hard victory or hard defeat are the most likely outcomes for radical groups. To further explore these relationships, controls are required and the results are the following.

Multinomial - Radicalism and Probabilities of all Outcomes with controls

	Dependent variable:								
	S. Vic	S.Def	H. Def	S. Vic	S.Def	H. Def	S. Vic	S.Def	H. Def
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Institutionalisation	−1.270***	−0.425	−1.073***						
	(0.398)	(0.319)	(0.354)						
Ambition				0.142	0.238	0.936*			
				(0.606)	(0.704)	(0.531)			
Radicalism							−0.769***	−0.291	−0.513**
							(0.278)	(0.289)	(0.250)
External Government Support	0.250	0.711	0.626	0.228	0.807	0.873	0.153	0.654	0.498
	(0.976)	(1.111)	(0.783)	(0.853)	(1.093)	(0.747)	(0.917)	(1.096)	(0.718)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov	0.131	1.175	−0.893	0.132	0.833	−0.720	0.458	1.252	−0.544
(Compared to much Weaker)	(1.053)	(1.323)	(0.878)	(0.882)	(1.246)	(0.789)	(0.975)	(1.292)	(0.790)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov	28.135***	−1.607***	22.195***	36.749***	−2.338***	31.880***	31.775***	−1.758***	26.342***
(Compared to much Weaker)	(1.426)	(0.000)	(1.426)	(1.339)	(0.000)	(1.339)	(1.389)	(0.000)	(1.389)
Moderate Fighting Capability	1.379	−25.476***	0.667	0.125	−25.523***	−0.296	0.967	−27.663***	0.290
(Compared to Low)	(1.255)	(0.000)	(0.955)	(0.950)	(0.000)	(0.812)	(1.114)	(0.000)	(0.837)
Asia	1.620	−0.827	3.395***	−0.328	−1.368	2.000**	0.639	−1.131	2.290**
(Compared to Africa)	(1.352)	(1.496)	(1.160)	(0.941)	(1.459)	(0.849)	(1.141)	(1.514)	(0.945)
Europe	−19.203***	−1.557	30.847***	−19.259***	−1.380***	27.126***	−19.707***	−2.014	31.197***
(Compared to Africa)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)
Middle East	−3.115	−7.101***	0.937	−4.846	−8.892***	−0.371	−3.663	−9.269***	0.125
(Compared to Africa)	(4.282)	(0.00000)	(1.609)	(3.651)	(0.000)	(1.464)	(3.893)	(0.000)	(1.442)
South America	30.550***	30.793***	29.485***	29.611***	30.640***	28.353***	33.302***	34.037***	31.934***
(Compared to Africa)	(1.042)	(1.295)	(1.072)	(1.075)	(1.217)	(1.071)	(1.039)	(1.262)	(1.081)
Nationalist	1.162	1.840	−1.370	2.753**	2.103	0.695	1.217	1.862	−0.926
(Compared to Leftist)	(1.438)	(1.621)	(1.096)	(1.396)	(1.621)	(0.972)	(1.385)	(1.730)	(1.019)
Other	2.612	4.932**	−1.351	4.559***	4.765**	0.453	3.263*	4.747**	−0.464
(Compared to Leftist)	(1.897)	(2.183)	(1.532)	(1.755)	(1.962)	(1.369)	(1.779)	(2.166)	(1.369)
Religious	−0.878	−11.032***	1.083	−0.550	−11.343***	0.975	−0.181	−10.903***	1.641
(Compared to Leftist)	(2.616)	(0.00001)	(1.358)	(2.607)	(0.00001)	(1.342)	(2.586)	(0.00001)	(1.296)
Over Five Years	2.796**	0.161	−1.198	1.455	−0.582	−2.072**	2.219*	−0.070	−1.507*
	(1.410)	(1.227)	(0.926)	(1.165)	(1.101)	(0.812)	(1.281)	(1.190)	(0.884)
Constant	−1.725	−2.416	3.072*	−4.498*	−3.559	−2.330	−0.605	−2.043	3.081*
	(2.143)	(2.435)	(1.607)	(2.522)	(3.009)	(2.095)	(2.262)	(2.798)	(1.819)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	201.501	201.501	201.501	219.375	219.375	219.375	211.585	211.585	211.585

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.14 - Multinomial - Radicalism and Outcomes, Compared to Hard Victory

In Table 4.14, for model 1 and 3, soft victory and hard defeat is negative and statistically significant either at the 0.05 or 0.01 level for institutionalisation and radicalism. This tells us that, compared to a hard victory, radicalism and its components decrease the odds of a soft victory. With controls, this can be interpreted as a decreased likelihood of a soft victory of

72% compared to a hard victory with an increase of institutionalisation and 54% for an increase of radicalism. It is similar regarding the difference of probability between hard victory and hard defeat. An increase in institutionalisation is associated with a 56% decrease of probability of hard defeat compared to hard victory, while radicalism decreases the probability of hard defeat by 41% compared to hard defeat. These effects are quite large. In model 6, ambition is significant at the 0.1 level and it appears that the direction and magnitude of ambition suggests that it could increase the probability of a hard defeat compared to a hard victory by 150%. Again, this is not a surprise as large ambitions are difficult to achieve. Overall, this is relatively strong evidence to suggest that radical armed groups are both unlikely to settle in civil war (soft defeat) and more probable to win than lose as their radicalism increases. This analysis appears to support H1: Radical armed groups are least likely to end conflict with a soft victory.

If we look at the ideological type variables in the model, we notice that these do indeed appear to play a role in how civil wars end. Compared to leftist and hard victory, religious armed groups are by far the least probable to reach a soft defeat, while the 'other' ideologies, which comprise a large number of democratic groups, are the most probable ideological group of suffering a soft defeat and achieving a soft victory. Investigating the location of conflict, there also appears to be geographic effects. Compared to groups in Africa, Asian armed groups are far more probable of suffering a hard defeat than a hard victory, while armed groups in South Africa are even more likely to suffer the same consequences. It is important to note that the size of these effects is likely not accurate as there are only 8 South American observation and 7 Middle Eastern observations. Equally, there is only one European observation, the PIRA/IRA. It appears that conflicts that last for more than five years are 79%

less probable of ending in a hard defeat compared to hard victory and 780% more likely to end in a soft victory compared to a hard victory, while controlling for radicalism.

While this model cannot be considered conclusive, it does suggest rather strongly that how civil wars end is likely related to where these wars are taking place, what ideology the group subscribes to, how long the war has been fought, and most importantly for this thesis, radicalism.

One would expect that if ambition were as theoretically relevant as I argue, that we might see some more of a significant effect in model 3 through 5 of table 4.12. We don't. To better understand the relationship between institutionalisation and ambition, it is useful to include them both in a single model, controlling for one another.

Table 4.15 shows that, when controlling for ambition, institutionalisation doesn't change all that much from 4.14. Ambition, however, is positive for each outcome scenario, grows in magnitude, and is significant for hard defeat. The ambition coefficient in column 3 can be interpreted as that higher ambitions are associated with a 260% increase in probability of hard defeat compared to hard victory. This begins to tell us that the effect of institutionalisation is relatively consistent despite a group's goals, however, this is not the same for ambition. While institutionalisation increases the probability of hard victory compared to hard defeat for armed groups, considering this factor alone without taking into account their bold goals, which can hamper their prospects for victory, reinforces the necessity of considering these two variables together as radicalism. To visualise these relationships, the predicted conditional and marginal probabilities of the model follows in figure 4.8 and 4.9.

Multinomial - Institutionalisation and Ambition and Probabilities of all Outcomes with controls

	Dependent variable:		
	S. Vic	S.Def	H. Def
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Institutionalisation	−1.412***	−0.475	−1.166***
	(0.422)	(0.321)	(0.390)
Ambition	1.159	0.734	1.301**
	(0.786)	(0.829)	(0.660)
External Government Support	0.449	0.826	0.827
	(0.996)	(1.143)	(0.840)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov	−0.196	0.920	−1.259
(Compared to much Weaker)	(1.093)	(1.338)	(0.956)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov	22.527***	0.514***	16.562***
(Compared to much Weaker)	(1.526)	(0.000)	(1.526)
Moderate Fighting Capability	1.085	−18.671***	0.332
(Compared to Low)	(1.324)	(0.00000)	(1.060)
Asia	2.100	−0.544	3.999***
(Compared to Africa)	(1.399)	(1.491)	(1.293)
Europe	−11.851***	−1.807	21.248***
(Compared to Africa)	(0.000)		(0.000)
Middle East	−3.274	−6.961***	0.660
(Compared to Africa)	(4.811)	(0.00000)	(1.749)
South America	21.127***	21.071***	19.924***
(Compared to Africa)	(1.093)	(1.307)	(1.122)
Nationalist	1.833	2.046	−0.502
(Compared to Leftist)	(1.541)	(1.786)	(1.220)
Other	2.929	5.313**	−1.042
(Compared to Leftist)	(2.009)	(2.291)	(1.673)
Religious	−1.283	−11.738***	0.753
(Compared to Leftist)	(2.740)	(0.00001)	(1.488)
Over Five Years	2.683*	−0.155	−1.478
	(1.520)	(1.237)	(0.955)
Constant	−4.390	−3.692	−0.075
	(2.933)	(3.538)	(2.351)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	202.443	202.443	202.443
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.15 - Multinomial – Institutionalisation, Ambition, and Outcomes, Compared to Hard Victory

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


Figure 4.8 - Multinomial – Predicted Probabilities of Outcomes Due to Radicalism – Conditional Probabilities




Figure 4.9 - Multinomial – Predicted Probabilities of Outcomes Due to Radicalism – Marginal Probabilities

This predicted probability visualisations (Figure 4.8 and 4.9) shows that hard victory and hard defeat are the most likely outcomes as groups become more radical. Soft victory has a

dramatic inverse relationship with radicalism, and soft defeat has a low probability across radicalism. These predicted probabilities should be considered imperfect, as the control variables, many of which are categorical, are given mean values. Despite this, it is further evidence that radical armed groups are more probable of experiencing an extreme outcome, even if the magnitude of the probability from this model is likely imprecise.

To evaluate if my categories of civil war outcome are useful, the following table (4.15) displays a similar model using the classical outcomes found in the UCDP and NSA dataset. They include 'Peace Agreement,' 'Ceasefire,' 'Low Activity,' 'Rebel Victory,' 'Government Victory,' and 'Other.' Due to missing values from these datasets, and hence fewer observations, the number of control variables is reduced. Radicalism is not significant with any of the outcomes. Compared to 'Peace Agreement' though, all outcomes appear more likely with an increase of radicalism, except for a rebel victory in the NSA dataset. This demonstrates that a reconceptualization of conflict outcome was required to uncover the fortune of radical armed groups.

Multinomial - Radicalism and Probability of Outcome NSA (1) and UCDP (2)

	Dependent variable (Compared to Peace Agreement):									
	Gov Victory	Low Activity	Other	Peace Agreement	Reb Victory	Gov Victory	Low Activity	Other	Peace Agreement	Reb Victory
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Radicalism	−0.408	−0.395	−0.121	−0.090	0.101	0.047	0.098	0.369	0.379	0.525
	(0.502)	(0.430)	(0.430)	(0.429)	(0.489)	(0.296)	(0.265)	(0.291)	(0.285)	(0.447)
External Gov Support	1.115	−0.223	−0.724	0.531	−0.338	2.355*	1.025	0.875	2.051*	1.614
	(2.628)	(2.380)	(2.414)	(2.390)	(2.562)	(1.225)	(1.021)	(1.149)	(1.131)	(1.776)
Weaker Relative Strength (Compared to much Weaker)	−2.520	−0.859	0.974	−0.445	−0.727	1.053	1.676	1.993	1.544	−0.106
	(2.768)	(2.397)	(2.501)	(2.412)	(2.613)	(1.262)	(1.093)	(1.352)	(1.214)	(1.934)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	8.833***	8.338***	12.050***	−19.482***	−3.295***	32.286***	−18.092***	32.802***	32.637***	−1.177***
	(1.187)	(1.058)	(1.071)	(0.000)	(0.00000)	(0.989)	(0.000)	(1.036)	(0.974)	(0.000)
Moderate Fighting Capability (Compared to Low)	−24.254***	−24.559***	−25.369***	−24.565***	−24.127***	0.181	−0.629	−0.493	0.211	0.967
	(1.744)	(1.454)	(1.557)	(1.509)	(1.725)	(1.218)	(1.075)	(1.176)	(1.132)	(1.714)
Asia (Compared to Africa)	29.396***	−0.478	−2.996*	−1.246	−31.050***	−1.471	−2.644*	−1.998	−2.757*	−23.889***
	(1.365)	(1.665)	(1.818)	(1.656)	(0.000)	(1.553)	(1.473)	(1.584)	(1.529)	(0.00000)
Europe (Compared to Africa)	−2.487***	35.644***	−27.523***	−3.557***	−1.171***	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)			(0.000)	(0.000)
Middle East (Compared to Africa)	1.879	14.461***	11.282***	−18.329***	12.601***	−35.128***	−2.922	−16.814***	−33.502***	−27.807***
		(0.830)	(1.037)	(0.000)	(1.134)	(0.00000)	(1.982)	(0.00004)	(0.00000)	(0.000)
South America (Compared to Africa)	44.165***	14.832***	15.164***	14.440***	−22.806***	−1.994	−2.865	−1.098	−3.491*	−24.073***
	(1.034)	(0.827)	(0.944)	(0.876)	(0.000)	(2.019)	(1.847)	(1.917)	(2.017)	(0.00000)
Constant	−2.598	28.140***	26.376***	26.103***	24.485***	−0.396	1.411	−1.363	−1.053	−2.327
	(1.603)	(1.636)	(1.758)	(1.723)	(2.227)	(1.792)	(1.468)	(1.859)	(1.729)	(2.486)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	268.209	268.209	268.209	268.209	268.209	278.284	278.284	278.284	278.284	278.284

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.15 - Multinomial - Radicalism and Outcome Probabilities from the NSA (1-5) and UCDP dataset (6-10)

Though these models cannot be considered causal proof of the effect of radicalism on outcomes, it certainly suggests that there is a relationship which warrants further investigation. To do so, collapsing the outcome variable further into a binary variable helps us accomplish this.

Binary Model

In an effort to liberate some degrees of freedom and to evaluate the theory, it is appropriate to collapse outcomes into a binary win/loss, combining hard victory and soft victory as well as hard defeat and soft defeat. This binary model analyses the probability of victory of any kind due to radicalism and yields the following results.

Binary Logistic - Probability of Victory Based on Radicalism

	Dependent variable:		
	Outcome - Victory		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Institutionalisation	0.247		
	(0.188)		
Ambition		−0.521	
		(0.382)	
Radicalism			0.097
			(0.166)
External Government Support	−0.472	−0.548	−0.493
	(0.560)	(0.574)	(0.554)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov	0.416	0.443	0.383
(Compared to much Weaker)	(0.617)	(0.633)	(0.611)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov	1.906	1.334	1.988
(Compared to much Weaker)	(1.602)	(1.720)	(1.615)
Moderate Fighting Capability	0.545	0.785	0.604
(Compared to Low)	(0.648)	(0.661)	(0.644)
Asia	−1.446**	−1.228*	−1.224*
(Compared to Africa)	(0.704)	(0.644)	(0.673)
Europe	−18.684	−17.756	−18.487
(Compared to Africa)	(1,455.399)	(1,455.399)	(1,455.399)
Middle East	−0.109	0.228	0.080
(Compared to Africa)	(1.342)	(1.321)	(1.319)
South America	−1.821	−1.514	−1.785
(Compared to Africa)	(1.159)	(1.209)	(1.155)
Nationalist	0.753	−0.078	0.560
(Compared to Leftist)	(0.788)	(0.777)	(0.816)
Other	0.912	0.259	0.632
(Compared to Leftist)	(0.937)	(0.872)	(0.924)
Religious	−0.630	−0.507	−0.763
(Compared to Leftist)	(1.108)	(1.129)	(1.100)
Over Five Years	1.891***	2.016***	1.957***
	(0.658)	(0.641)	(0.655)
Constant	−1.781	0.442	−1.597
	(1.175)	(1.516)	(1.400)
Observations	78	78	78
Log Likelihood	−43.268	−43.187	−43.990
Akaike Inf. Crit.	114.536	114.374	115.980
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 4.16- Binary Probability of Victory Based on Radicalism

Table 4.16 reveals that in all models radicalism and its components have no statistically significant relationship with victory. While the multinomial models show that radicalism both increases the odds of a hard victory, while simultaneously decreasing the odds of a soft victory, in collapsing the outcome variables, however, we observe that radical armed groups do not necessarily have an advantage in victory of any kind. The increased odds of a hard victory and the decreased odds of a soft victory essentially cancel each other out. This is further evidence that radical armed groups are constrained to extreme outcomes. To test this more explicitly, we will run the same model, except the dependent variable will be extreme outcomes (hard victory and hard defeat combined).

Binary Logistic - Probability of Extreme Outcome Based on Radicalism

	Dependent variable:		
	Extreme Outcome		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Institutionalisation	0.400*		
	(0.208)		
Ambition		0.370	
		(0.461)	
Radicalism			0.373**
			(0.185)
External Government Support	0.224	0.264	0.251
	(0.643)	(0.628)	(0.644)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov	−0.661	−0.568	−0.715
(Compared to much Weaker)	(0.743)	(0.707)	(0.747)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov	−4.079*	−3.627*	−3.814*
(Compared to much Weaker)	(2.136)	(2.004)	(2.177)
Moderate Fighting Capability	0.586	0.694	0.520
(Compared to Low)	(0.779)	(0.759)	(0.788)
Asia	0.781	1.329*	0.917
(Compared to Africa)	(0.789)	(0.746)	(0.771)
Europe	19.293	19.508	19.098
(Compared to Africa)	(1,455.399)	(1,455.399)	(1,455.399)
Middle East	2.620	2.960	2.673
(Compared to Africa)	(2.423)	(2.202)	(2.429)
South America	−2.510*	−2.305*	−2.834**
(Compared to Africa)	(1.358)	(1.371)	(1.400)
Nationalist	−1.604	−1.894*	−1.453
(Compared to Leftist)	(0.999)	(0.986)	(1.027)
Other	−3.583***	−3.922***	−3.593***
(Compared to Leftist)	(1.339)	(1.271)	(1.329)
Religious	2.008	1.578	1.829
(Compared to Leftist)	(2.174)	(2.078)	(2.230)
Over Five Years	−2.313***	−1.766**	−2.223***
	(0.870)	(0.751)	(0.835)
Constant	2.711*	2.388	1.763
	(1.423)	(1.748)	(1.546)
Observations	78	78	78
Log Likelihood	−32.621	−34.329	−32.434
Akaike Inf. Crit.	93.242	96.659	92.868
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 4.17 - Binary Probability of Extreme Outcome Based on Radicalism

In table 4.17, it's clear that there is a significant relationship between radicalism, and the probability of an extreme outcome. The coefficient suggest that an increase in radicalism increases the probability of an extreme outcome by 45%. It is also clear that institutionalisation is doing most of the work in radicalism, however, due to

institutionalisation only being significant at the 0.1 level, while radicalism is significant at the 0.05 level suggests that combining these two factors is appropriate. This is the strongest evidence that radical armed groups are limited to extreme outcomes in civil war and supports H2: Radical armed groups are most likely to end conflict with an extreme outcome.

What more this table can tell us is that geographic, ideological, and temporal are also important for explaining civil war outcome. Armed groups that are based in South America, subscribe to an 'other' ideology, or have fought for more than five years are the least probable to experience an extreme outcome, compared to their baselines.

To better visualise the relationship between radicalism and extreme outcomes, the below plot illustrates the predicted probability of the model (Figure 4.10).




Figure 4.10 - Binary Predicted Probability of Extreme Outcome Based on Radicalism

It's possible that the above is simply because radical armed groups often secure hard victories, as the multinomial models suggest that it is the most probable outcome for radical armed groups. To rule this out, I will analyse a subset of the data with only groups that are either recorded as having a hard victory or a hard defeat. It would be expected that, between these two outcomes, a significant statistical association should arise if radical armed groups achieve hard victories more often than hard defeats.

Binary Logistic - Probability of Hard Victory Based on Radicalism

	Dependent variable:
	Hard Victory
Radicalism	0.427*
	(0.255)
External Government Support	−0.582
	(0.758)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	0.743
	(0.818)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	−14.658
	(3,778.077)
Moderate Fighting Capability (Compared to Low)	−0.295
	(0.880)
Asia (Compared to Africa)	−2.069**
	(0.943)
Europe (Compared to Africa)	−5.075
	(7,537.817)
Middle East (Compared to Africa)	−0.025
	(1.441)
South America (Compared to Africa)	−19.458
	(2,671.616)
Nationalist (Compared to Leftist)	0.717
	(1.003)
Other (Compared to Leftist)	0.760
	(1.522)
Religious (Compared to Leftist)	−1.615
	(1.316)
Over Five Years	1.554*
	(0.934)
Constant	−2.745
	(1.850)
Observations	53
Log Likelihood	−24.770
Akaike Inf. Crit.	77.541
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.18 - Binary - Probability of Hard Victory compared to Hard Defeat Based on Radicalism

With much fewer observations (N=53), table 4.18 shows that the probability of a hard victory is higher compared to a hard defeat, and it borders on significance at the 0.05 level. This model is not conclusive, but it does suggest that there may indeed be an advantage to radicalism in civil war. What needs to be taken into account, however, is the bias of the sample in which hard victories are almost certainly overrepresented.

Duration and Radicalism

The theory predicts that radicalism will increase the duration of conflict and in order to test if this is at all plausible, a simple OLS model was employed using conflict duration in months (Table 4.18). A binary logistic estimator was also used to evaluate duration thresholds. Finally, a Cox Proportional Hazards (CPH) model was also employed, though it is unlikely that the proportional hazards assumption is valid in this case. The CPH is still appropriate, however, to illustrate if the effects are in the same direction as the binary logistic. Three different codings were used for the duration variable: my own, the NSA dataset's and Xu's. Xu's coding takes account of the armed group's full violent life-cycle, from the inception of violence to the group's cessation of violence, be that voluntary or not. This means it isn't necessarily capturing conflict duration, but more so how long armed groups survive as an armed group. Despite these different measures of duration no significant relationship between radicalism and conflict duration was observed. In fact, some models predict the exact opposite. Like conflict outcome and radicalism, this analysis is aimed not to make causal claims but to offer an initial evaluation of the theory to determine the plausibility of the theory.

OLS - Correlations Between Conflict Duration (Months) and Radicalism Across Datasets

	Dependent variable: Conflict Duration in Months								
	Own Coding			NSA Coding			Xu (Forthcoming)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Institutionalisation	3.329			3.294			−2.097		
	(9.514)			(4.477)			(10.936)		
Ambition		−8.739			−10.615			−45.906	
		(29.676)			(13.957)			(33.635)	
Radicalism			1.944			1.626			−9.007
			(10.331)			(4.875)			(11.819)
External Gov Support	−14.214	−15.325	−14.717	−6.020	−7.139	−6.599	−63.458	−63.257	−65.235
	(36.025)	(35.916)	(36.037)	(16.953)	(16.892)	(17.003)	(41.412)	(40.708)	(41.225)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	−17.426	−17.065	−18.080	18.356	18.952	17.702	15.641	21.655	15.871
	(40.689)	(40.811)	(40.668)	(19.148)	(19.194)	(19.188)	(46.773)	(46.255)	(46.523)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	−56.645	−64.597	−56.115	0.586	−8.595	0.704	86.229	56.955	75.269
	(84.840)	(86.928)	(85.846)	(39.924)	(40.884)	(40.504)	(97.525)	(98.525)	(98.206)
Moderate Fighting Capability (Compared to Low)	−3.429	−0.342	−3.008	1.809	5.195	2.409	25.540	32.246	30.062
	(40.618)	(40.673)	(40.878)	(19.114)	(19.129)	(19.287)	(46.691)	(46.099)	(46.764)
Asia (Compared to Africa)	44.311	48.246	47.415	26.346	29.932	29.755	95.640*	85.100*	102.495**
	(42.336)	(39.811)	(41.247)	(19.923)	(18.724)	(19.461)	(48.666)	(45.122)	(47.186)
Europe (Compared to Africa)	167.570	182.129	170.950	193.613**	209.183**	197.878**	200.547	221.801	222.463
	(173.481)	(172.339)	(174.454)	(81.638)	(81.055)	(82.311)	(199.421)	(195.330)	(199.572)
Middle East (Compared to Africa)	35.295	41.227	38.079	0.607	6.550	3.794	146.085*	144.287*	155.611*
	(73.846)	(72.118)	(73.676)	(34.751)	(33.919)	(34.762)	(84.888)	(81.739)	(84.284)
South America (Compared to Africa)	−3.981	1.812	−4.333	39.182	45.860	39.131	−10.728	10.342	−2.729
	(69.860)	(71.176)	(70.519)	(32.875)	(33.476)	(33.272)	(80.306)	(80.672)	(80.672)
Nationalist (Compared to Leftist)	10.733	−1.167	8.525	6.983	−5.901	4.068	−38.240	−59.738	−55.915
	(50.637)	(49.483)	(53.017)	(23.829)	(23.273)	(25.015)	(58.209)	(56.085)	(60.650)
Other (Compared to Leftist)	−24.232	−34.208	−28.333	−10.083	−20.244	−14.843	−112.540	−113.838*	−128.314*
	(62.250)	(57.269)	(62.105)	(29.294)	(26.935)	(29.302)	(71.558)	(64.909)	(71.047)
Religious (Compared to Leftist)	69.997	72.265	67.839	−6.845	−3.655	−8.945	24.664	47.929	26.937
	(63.574)	(64.936)	(63.388)	(29.917)	(30.541)	(29.908)	(73.080)	(73.598)	(72.515)
Constant	123.240	156.069*	125.230	39.696	76.408*	43.514	281.310***	371.098***	328.332***
	(74.270)	(89.286)	(89.532)	(34.950)	(41.993)	(42.243)	(85.375)	(101.197)	(102.423)
Observations	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
R^2	0.084	0.084	0.083	0.165	0.165	0.159	0.237	0.258	0.244
Adjusted R^2	−0.085	−0.086	−0.086	0.010	0.011	0.004	0.096	0.121	0.104
Residual Std. Error (df = 65)	148.460	148.501	148.559	69.863	69.843	70.093	170.658	168.312	169.949
F Statistic (df = 12; 65)	0.498	0.494	0.490	1.067	1.070	1.024	1.685*	1.884*	1.744*
Note:									*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.19 – OLS Correlations Between Conflict Duration and Radicalism

As no significant relationship was found in the OLS model, it appears that radicalism does not increase conflict duration in a linear manner. My theory suggests, however, that one of the reasons why conflict duration would increase with radical groups is because it would take a significantly long time to enable both the radical group and government to consider a settlement. This means that there might be temporal thresholds that are more likely to be

reached by radical armed groups than non-radical armed groups. To explore this, a binary logistic model was analysed with the dependent variable of conflict lasting over five years and ten years (table 4.20).

Binary Logistic - Probability of Conflict Duration Based on Radicalism

	Dependent variable:					
	Ten Years	Five Years	Ten Years	Five Years	Ten Years	Five Years
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Institutionalisation	0.363**	0.299*				
	(0.172)	(0.176)				
Ambition			−0.042	0.080		
			(0.350)	(0.356)		
Radicalism					0.283*	0.261
					(0.153)	(0.160)
External Government Support	−0.011	−0.263	−0.102	−0.305	−0.032	−0.272
	(0.542)	(0.586)	(0.515)	(0.578)	(0.536)	(0.584)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov	−0.307	−0.454	−0.385	−0.465	−0.375	−0.513
(Compared to much Weaker)	(0.619)	(0.649)	(0.588)	(0.642)	(0.613)	(0.648)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov	−0.024	−2.375	−0.267	−2.335	0.158	−2.201
(Compared to much Weaker)	(1.175)	(1.591)	(1.190)	(1.579)	(1.191)	(1.588)
Moderate Fighting Capability	0.182	−0.784	0.308	−0.649	0.136	−0.839
(Compared to Low)	(0.607)	(0.643)	(0.588)	(0.628)	(0.604)	(0.651)
Asia	0.702	0.668	1.100*	1.042*	0.867	0.792
(Compared to Africa)	(0.605)	(0.642)	(0.571)	(0.608)	(0.588)	(0.623)
Europe	15.705	18.803	16.532	19.384	15.683	18.730
(Compared to Africa)	(1,455.398)	(3,956.181)	(1,455.398)	(3,956.181)	(1,455.398)	(3,956.181)
Middle East	0.235	17.390	0.689	17.794	0.329	17.435
(Compared to Africa)	(1.053)	(1,353.798)	(1.010)	(1,360.096)	(1.045)	(1,349.930)
South America	1.457	0.115	1.520	0.169	1.307	−0.033
(Compared to Africa)	(1.030)	(1.061)	(1.012)	(1.054)	(1.028)	(1.064)
Nationalist	1.034	0.299	0.342	−0.203	1.098	0.398
(Compared to Leftist)	(0.776)	(0.782)	(0.728)	(0.734)	(0.812)	(0.813)
Other	0.610	−0.753	−0.200	−1.388	0.511	−0.813
(Compared to Leftist)	(0.939)	(0.939)	(0.838)	(0.864)	(0.939)	(0.930)
Religious	0.352	0.366	0.203	0.184	0.156	0.236
(Compared to Leftist)	(0.923)	(1.072)	(0.928)	(1.075)	(0.921)	(1.078)
Constant	−2.349*	0.105	−0.860	0.875	−2.812**	−0.449
	(1.205)	(1.127)	(1.315)	(1.367)	(1.424)	(1.333)
Observations	78	78	78	78	78	78
Log Likelihood	−45.940	−41.152	−48.268	−42.648	−46.509	−41.263
Akaike Inf. Crit.	117.879	108.304	122.536	111.296	119.018	108.525
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.20 – Binary - Probability of Conflict Duration and Radicalism, with conflicts lasting more than 5 years and 10 years.

Without controlling for how conflicts end, the model suggests that an increase in institutionalisation is increases the probability of a conflict lasting at least ten years by 40%.

Binary Logistic - Probability of Conflict Duration Based on Radicalism Controlling for Outcome

	Dependent variable:					
	Ten Years	Five Years	Ten Years	Five Years	Ten Years	Five Years
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Institutionalisation	0.698***	0.243				
	(0.242)	(0.228)				
Ambition			−0.032	0.432		
			(0.360)	(0.452)		
Radicalism					0.483**	0.256
					(0.195)	(0.193)
External Government Support	0.061	−0.244	−0.067	−0.324	0.017	−0.223
	(0.596)	(0.688)	(0.531)	(0.679)	(0.575)	(0.686)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	−0.073	−0.677	−0.395	−0.820	−0.299	−0.689
	(0.679)	(0.737)	(0.599)	(0.723)	(0.643)	(0.726)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)	−0.872	−4.003	−0.721	−3.634	−0.427	−3.763
	(1.272)	(2.498)	(1.250)	(2.348)	(1.237)	(2.402)
Moderate Fighting Capability (Compared to Low)	−0.014	−0.832	0.313	−0.782	−0.006	−0.915
	(0.663)	(0.772)	(0.618)	(0.763)	(0.654)	(0.781)
Asia (Compared to Africa)	0.301	1.561*	1.170*	2.125**	0.720	1.622*
	(0.681)	(0.887)	(0.606)	(0.861)	(0.638)	(0.852)
Europe (Compared to Africa)	16.014	23.355	17.233	23.749	16.096	23.152
	(1,455.398)	(6,522.639)	(1,455.398)	(6,522.639)	(1,455.398)	(6,522.639)
Middle East (Compared to Africa)	0.232	19.515	0.809	20.391	0.365	19.551
	(1.096)	(1,894.608)	(1.035)	(1,840.346)	(1.073)	(1,888.272)
South America (Compared to Africa)	1.078	0.556	1.332	0.550	0.879	0.457
	(1.158)	(1.333)	(1.051)	(1.280)	(1.104)	(1.315)
Nationalist (Compared to Leftist)	1.137	−0.428	0.082	−0.525	1.201	−0.250
	(0.840)	(0.911)	(0.759)	(0.887)	(0.870)	(0.931)
Other (Compared to Leftist)	0.576	−2.231*	−0.603	−2.731**	0.410	−2.169*
	(1.080)	(1.278)	(0.918)	(1.199)	(1.053)	(1.258)
Religious (Compared to Leftist)	0.459	1.159	0.235	0.980	0.168	0.996
	(0.944)	(1.333)	(0.933)	(1.380)	(0.942)	(1.347)
Soft Victory (Compared to Hard Victory)	2.776***	1.284	1.176	0.694	2.244**	1.286
	(1.065)	(1.154)	(0.793)	(1.038)	(0.968)	(1.119)
Soft Defeat (Compared to Hard Victory)	0.835	−0.203	0.425	−0.568	0.817	−0.228
	(1.143)	(1.096)	(1.007)	(1.063)	(1.088)	(1.089)
Hard Defeat (Compared to Hard Victory)	1.380*	−2.109**	0.216	−2.763***	0.936	−2.162**
	(0.815)	(1.050)	(0.667)	(0.981)	(0.761)	(0.990)
Constant	−4.482***	1.186	−1.117	1.254	−4.770**	0.479
	(1.682)	(1.657)	(1.373)	(1.710)	(1.880)	(1.820)
Observations	78	78	78	78	78	78
Log Likelihood	−41.869	−33.606	−46.995	−33.702	−43.452	−33.286
Akaike Inf. Crit.	115.738	99.211	125.990	99.403	118.903	98.572

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.21 – Binary - Probability of Conflict Duration and Radicalism, with conflicts lasting more than 5 years and 10 years.

There is also the possible association between radicalism at the ten year thresehold and institutionalisation at the five year threshold, both with a positive relationship. We we control for how conflicts end, however, we see that these results become more important.

With conflict outcomes controlled, institutionalisation and radicalism increase both in maginitude and significance. Table 4.21 suggests that institutionalisation and radicalism increase the probability of a conflict lasting over ten years by 83% and 62%, respectively. These models serve as evidence that there is an association between conflict duration and radicalism. It is not conclusive or necessarily precise evidence, but there appears to be a clear relationship (see figure 4.12 for visualisation of radicalism). Focussing on column 5 and 6, it also appears that, compared to a hard victory, soft victories are magnitudes more likely to last ten years or more, while hard defeats are 89% less likely to last at least five years. This shouldn't be surprising. The longer conflicts last, the less likely they are to be won decisively by either side. It does seem, though, that hard defeats are most likely to occur below the five year threshold. Armed groups are almost always at a disadvantage. There is a lot of 'learning on the job' that has to occur in the early stages of conflict, and these findings could perhaps be explained by a group's inability to gain enough momentum in the war to push them across the five year threshold. Equally plausible is that the government's advantage early on extends to fighting with overwhelming power with troops that are not yet demoralised, allowing them to deal a decisve defeat. If radical armed groups can hang on for, in the case, five years, their prospects of being better off after war than they were before the war improve. This analysis

offers only some evidence in support of H3: If radical groups achieve a soft victory, it is after a long war and H4: The more radical an armed group is, the longer the conflict.




Figure 4.11 - Binary Predicted Probability of Extreme Outcome Based on Radicalism

Another way of evaluating this data is to use a survival estimator. I employed the Cox Proportional Hazards model as it allows me to use controls, unlike the Kaplan Meier model. As duration models require and 'event', I have chosen the five year and ten year milestones of conflict duration. The controls I used are the same as the binary models above. Overall, the duration models appear to agree; it is suggested that radicalism increases the probability that a war will last ten years, but not five (Table 4.22).

Cox PH Models of Conflict Duration with Events as Five and Ten years

	Dependent variable:			
	Months (5yr)	Months (10yr)	Months (5yr)	Months (10yr)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Radicalism	0.039	0.360**	−0.030	0.373**
	(0.091)	(0.140)	(0.115)	(0.162)
External Government Support	0.006	1.299**	0.043	1.317**
	(0.381)	(0.542)	(0.370)	(0.568)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov	0.098	1.051	0.006	1.067
(Compared to much Weaker)	(0.406)	(0.671)	(0.422)	(0.676)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov	−0.229	2.600**	−0.581	2.586*
(Compared to much Weaker)	(0.855)	(1.271)	(0.917)	(1.403)
Moderate Fighting Capability	−0.082	1.149**	−0.110	1.160**
(Compared to Low)	(0.392)	(0.547)	(0.408)	(0.569)
Asia	0.043	0.736	0.570	0.709
(Compared to Africa)	(0.358)	(0.507)	(0.407)	(0.567)
Europe	0.010	−1.774	1.441	−1.794
(Compared to Africa)	(1.336)	(1.567)	(1.500)	(1.996)
Middle East	0.513	−0.079	0.987	−0.113
(Compared to Africa)	(0.556)	(0.840)	(0.619)	(0.969)
South America	0.221	3.863***	0.700	3.847***
(Compared to Africa)	(0.792)	(1.261)	(0.842)	(1.282)
Nationalist	0.026	1.954**	−0.195	1.973**
(Compared to Leftist)	(0.526)	(0.823)	(0.519)	(0.879)
Other	−0.350	1.169	−0.532	1.175
(Compared to Leftist)	(0.628)	(0.884)	(0.660)	(0.914)
Religious	−0.869	−1.608*	−0.529	−1.631*
(Compared to Leftist)	(0.577)	(0.971)	(0.624)	(0.984)
Soft Defeat			0.948	−0.062
(Compared to Hard Defeat)			(0.659)	(0.802)
Soft Victory			0.594	0.051
(Compared to Hard Defeat)			(0.572)	(0.739)
Hard Victory			1.414***	−0.072
(Compared to Hard Defeat)			(0.487)	(0.708)
Observations	78	78	78	78
R^2	0.055	0.260	0.160	0.260
LR Test	4.449 (df = 12)	23.488** (df = 12)	13.612 (df = 15)	23.520* (df = 15)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 4.22 – Cox PH – Probability of Conflict Duration reach Five and Ten Years due to Radicalism.

Discussion

Overall, within this chapter I have demonstrated that the currently available conflict datasets disagree not only on how conflicts have ended, but also on their duration. I have attempted to unify the variable of conflict outcome by employing a definitive spectrum of success ranging from hard victory to hard defeat. Using this new variable, I use a collection of models

to investigate its relationship with radicalism. Initially, we find in a simple OLS model that institutionalisation is positive and borders on significant when outcome is an ordinal variable and controlling for ideology type, while there is no hint of significance with a binary outcome variable for victory. Expanding the number of controls used in these same models, the same is found; however, institutionalisation is shown to be statistically significant. From there, a further OLS model is used, though this time the dependent variable is binary and represents extreme outcome, where institutionalisation and radicalism are both found to be statistically significant.

Following the use of the OLS estimator, the more appropriate multinomial model is employed with the same controls. This shows that when compared to a hard victory, the probability of a soft victory and hard defeat decrease substantially with institutionalisation, while the same results are seen regarding radicalism but with a much smaller magnitude. Ambition is observed to increase the probability of hard defeat compared to hard victory and borders on significant.

To find out if ambition is doing any real work, the same multinomial model is run but with ambition and institutionalisation controlling for one another. While this doesn't drastically change the results of institutionalisation, it does show that ambition substantially increases the probability of a hard defeat compared to a hard victory and is statistically significant. I then compare my findings to the classic outcomes available in both the NSA and UCDP dataset using the multinomial estimator and find no statistically significant relationship between these outcomes and radicalism.

To properly assess my theory in respect to extreme outcomes, the binary logistic estimator is used, adopting victory and extreme outcomes as dependent variables. No aspect of radicalism is found to be significant in the victory model; however, in the extreme outcomes model, radicalism is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that it does increase the probability of an extreme outcome.

Regarding duration, no measure of radicalism is found to be significant using any measure of conflict duration in an OLS model. I then use the binary logistic estimator to investigate if specific thresholds of conflict duration are related to radicalism, specifically conflicts over five and ten years. Without controlling for outcome, it appears that there could be a positive correlation between radicalism and conflicts lasting over ten year. When controlling for outcome, radicalism seems to statistically increase the probability that a conflict will last over ten years. The Cox Proportional Hazards model is then used and suggests that radicalism increases the probability of a conflict lasting longer than ten years with and without controlling for outcome.

While these results cannot attribute causality to the effects radicalism, they do offer insight into the plausibility of the theory. Regarding outcome, considering the relatively small sample size, there appears to be a and significant relationship between radicalism and extreme outcomes in civil war. Is it radicalism that is causing this? These models cannot give us this answer, but they don't need to. The aphorism 'all models are wrong, but some are useful'[212] applies here. The models in this chapter *are* wrong, but they also *are* useful.

[212] Attributed to George Box

This evidence paired with logic suggests that radical armed groups limit their universe of outcomes. These models show us that empirically this seems to be the case. What is unexpected is that it's possible that radical armed groups may have a higher probability of winning a hard victory than hard defeat. One possible explanation for this is that half of my definition of radicalism is based on the level of ideological institutionalisation. It is uncontroversial to suggest that the more organised an armed group is, the better they will fare in battle. While institutionalisation is a critical factor for radicalism, it is also a proxy of the group's organisational capacity. This is one of unanticipated consequences of not only adopting and ideology, but practicing it. Whether or not the ideology is used instrumentally or intrinsically adopted, it creates conditions that make the group more organised as a result, which probably translates into military effectiveness.

Radicalism appears to impose a non-linear effect on duration. There appears to be a duration threshold as to when radicalism starts to matter. Radical groups are more likely to be involved in wars lasting more than ten years, but not five years. This remains consistent with my theory that suggests the same – radical groups will be at war for longer.

Should we consider the probabilities to be precise? I would suggest not – more observations would make the specific probabilities themselves more convincing. The real question is, however, would we expect the nature of the relationship between radicalism, outcome, and duration with the addition of more observations? The magnitude of the effects would likley change, but it's difficult to think that the direction of the relationship would. The NSA dataset has 397 recorded armed groups, when military factions and state forces are removed and this analysis is based on roughly 20% of those groups.

Omission: The State

It's clear that in these models, the role of the state is absent. The controls used, such as an armed group's relative fighting capability and strength to the government do not, by any objective measure, tell us about the state aside from how it loosely compares with the armed group. While the control variables I employ for the state from the NSA dataset are, I argue, the best that currently exist, there are number of state-centric factors that are important to consider when we're discussing civil war outcomes, some of which I've touched upon in the previous chapter. The first of these factors are the norms and frequency regarding the deployment of violence within each state. If violence is often used by the state (be that domestically or otherwise), we can imagine that their security forces are not only have the adequate resources to operate, but also the experience. Secondly, the equipment the state has in its possession can drastically alter the outcome of a conflict. Perhaps the most telling indicator of this is if a state maintains an air force with modern aircraft capable of undertaking close air support (CAS) missions. When a state has air superiority with the ability to conduct CAS, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where a non-state armed group wouldn't be forced to operate in a more covert and less efficient manner. Equipment doesn't matter all that much unless there are soldiers to competently operate it, meaning that the third important factor is the number and quality of troops at the state's disposal. Finally, another factor that would significantly affect a state's ability to fight a civil war is if there are a number of different fronts or groups to fight simultaneously. One of the principles of competent warfare is the concentration of force and if a state is forced to split their formations, then this would hinder the military's ability to fight. This list of factors is not exhaustive, but it does illustrate to what extent state-centric factors matter for explaining why an armed group wins or loses. This study does not take these factors into account. My theory is about why radical armed groups

are more likely to experience extreme outcomes in civil war and these state-centric factors could help explain why; however, what they are most useful for is explaining why a radical armed group's extreme outcome is either outright victory or defeat, which is outside the scope of this study.

Alternative Explanations

What else might explain why we see radical armed groups achieving extreme outcomes? Is there something else that could strategically and internally constrain these armed groups from seeking a compromise? I suggest that the main alternative explanation to my theory is that of institutionalisation – a group that is more organised is likely to fight better and win. Two further alternative explanations are offered, one which acknowledges the role of mimicking radicalism and another in which radicalism can be taken too seriously.

Institutionalisation

I suggest the main alternative explanation for why armed groups might achieve extreme outcomes, outside of ideological explanations, probably comes from the group possessing a well-trained cadre of fighters, which can be connected to institutionalisation. Even with meagre resources, combatants with the appropriate training, coupled with a competent strategy, can be devastating against superior forces. Why is this relevant for radical armed groups? In short, I argue that the institutionalisation of ideology makes up roughly one half of the definition of radicalism. If a group is highly institutionalised, it's reasonable to assume that they are highly organised. While group organisation is critical to military effectiveness, the fact that the leadership of radical groups takes seriously the task of ideologically training their combatants, they could also be serious about combat training.

Is this true? Though data on combatant training, either length, type, or quality is sparse, we would have to assume that having a well-trained cadre discourages armed groups from compromise. It makes sense that an armed group with the ability to fight competently may choose to continue fighting until they've achieved their primary goal. It makes less sense that well-trained armed would be systematically biased towards either winning outright or being killed. It is unclear how a group with a well-trained and competent fighting force would discourage the leaders of such groups to consistently refuse settlement in civil war. It's also probable that fighting better organised and trained groups encourages states to devote more resources to fighting them than they otherwise would. But even this doesn't explain why highly organised groups would be less likely to compromise in civil war, in fact we would expect the opposite.

Mimic Groups

Another way that extreme outcomes can be explained is by accepting the explanation above: that institutionalisation likely makes radical groups fight better than they otherwise would. In doing so, and assuming that leaders other armed groups (or those hoping to establish one) have observed this relationship, we can expect at least some to mimic and imitate the radicalism of an armed group with the aim that its success will also be copied. As is often the case, copies seldom possess the quality of their original. This is a case of a truly instrumentalised ideology. While I suggest the motivations for the ideology (instrumental vs intrinsic) doesn't necessarily change the effect of having a radical ideology, for the instrumentalists the challenge is that the ideology has to appear to be adopted whole-heartedly. For those who try to imitate, it's possible that those creating, adopting, or modifying an ideology for their purposes consider it an organisational shortcut and underestimate the time and resources required to do so successfully. This would leave us with

two distinct groups: those truly radical armed groups that mostly win, and those that only appear radical and mostly lose. This explanation would be more attractive if it wasn't for groups such as the Shining Path and LTTE, considered to be some of the highest ideologically committed groups in recent history, to have suffered hard defeats.

Radical Obsessives

A further alternative explanation that appears to lead radical armed groups to extreme outcomes is that radicalism can be both an advantage and severe disadvantage depending on how seriously a group adopts it. The appearance of being radical could be unifying two different kinds of armed groups that do not belong together. For example, there can be armed groups that are ideologically obsessive. Such a group places a high priority on their ideology that combat training and other practical matters critical to war fighting are either forgotten or given superficial attention. This results in a group that is radical but without many of the perceived advantages of it. In short, a group that is likely to lose badly. Conversely, we can also imagine a group that reaps the apparent benefits of being radical, leading to a well-organised, trained, and dedicated cadre. This then leads to a higher probability of a hard victory. Again, in this scenario, we would expect to see outcomes split between hard defeat and hard victory. Throughout this research, however, only one instance of a misplaced emphasis on ideological training at the cost of combat training was identified, the JVP in Sri Lanka.

'*We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we pretend to be'*
- Kurt Vonnegut [213]

Chapter 5: Mechanisms Encouraging Extreme Outcomes

Why is it that radical armed groups find themselves disproportionately experiencing extreme outcomes in civil war? My theory's main argument is that radical groups erect structural and psychological barriers that diminish the likelihood of negotiations or settling as a possible outcome in civil war. These barriers are both calculated and unintentional, focus on leaders and combatants to varying degrees, and originate from internal dynamics and external perceptions. Understanding these barriers confronts us with complex and entangled pathways of plausible causality. It is my intention to bring some clarity to how these barriers work. In other words, I aim to identify some of the most important mechanisms that constrain radical groups from seeking settlement in civil war. Those focussed on in this chapter are the mechanisms of intrinsic belief, internal audience costs, ideological institutionalisation, monitoring, and pluralistic ignorance. Though this case study is not exhaustive, the intention of it is to identify, demonstrate, and recognise how these mechanisms might work in reality.

Cases

While these mechanisms are generalised explanations for how radical armed groups function, it is necessary and helpful to see how these work within specific armed groups. To do this, I've chosen two cases which vary on outcome, yet share similar ideological characteristics. As these mechanisms serve to encourage extreme outcomes in civil war, it is natural that these

[213] Kurt Vonnegut, *Mother Night* (Delta Fiction, 1961). P v.

two cases represent both: hard defeat and hard victory. This helps demonstrate that radical armed groups with similar radical attributes don't necessarily achieve the same outcomes, but do occupy the far ends of the outcome spectrum (extreme outcomes). Equally, as I suggest that radicalism encourages these extreme outcomes, rather than only the content of the ideology, selecting two cases with similar ideologies helps control for differences that may be more or less associated with a specific ideology (for example, we may assume that Jihadist groups likely have more supernatural beliefs than Marxists).

Considering this, the two cases I've selected are both Maoist, have the same high score of radicalism (8.75), and vary on the type of extreme outcome achieved. These two groups are the Shining Path (hard defeat) and the CPN-M (hard victory). This selection of cases can be considered 'typical' as the goal of the research is to ' better explore the causal mechanisms at work in general.' [214]I will first offer a short profile of each group along with the a broad summary of the conflict and their participation in it. Following that I will highlight the mechanisms related to radicalism that appear to discourage conflict settlement that both groups share. By comparing both groups, I also seek to understand what of these mechanisms are most important regarding outcomes and why the CPN-M won, while the Shining Path lost.

Shining Path

The Shining Path began to form in 1970 when Abimael Guzmán, otherwise known as President Gonzalo, the group's leader, broke away from the Bandera Roja in Peru. Its ideology has been described by one former combatant as 'Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo thought.'[215] The

[214] Jason Seawright and John Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options," *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (2008) p 299.
[215] Lurgio Gavilan Sánchez, *When Rains Became Floods* (Duke University Press Books, 2015). p xiv.

group was robustly communist, and heavily influenced by Maoism, believing that a peasant revolution is the only means of overthrowing the capitalists and building 'the New Democratic State.'[216]

The Shining Path had an advantage compared to many armed groups as they indoctrinated and built the group many years prior to adopting violence. As early as the 60's, in university, Guzman was 'teaching and indoctrinating students to go back home and spread the message.'[217] Indoctrination specifically for Shining Path began in earnest in 1970, when the group 'used the public school and university system to develop junior leaders and conduct political indoctrination of the masses.'[218] Shining Path was concerned not only about indoctrinating its own members, but also civilians. The Shining Path would begin to establish *escuelas populares* (popular schools) in 1976, mostly in rural regions, but also in poor areas around Lima. Popular schools would teach students about 'Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, guerrilla warfare, and the teachings of Guzman.'[219] The scale of the operation was immense. By 1977, the Peruvian intelligence services 'assessed that there were as many as 500 popular schools in the capital'[220] alone.

Early on, specifically from 1980-82, the group would achieve tactical success with the assassination of state officials which led to 'large scale resignations by pro-government

[216] James. Anderson, *Sendero Luminoso: A New Revolutionary Model?* (Institute for the Study of Terrorism, 1987). p 64.
[217] Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, "The Organization of Shining Path," in *The Shining Path of Peru* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1994). p 179.
[218] Heeg, "The Shining Path ' s Employment of Psychological Warfare during Its Terrorism Campaign in Peru , 1970-1992." p 111.
[219] Heeg. p 114.
[220] Heeg. p 114.

officials over the whole provinces of Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica.'[221] Once larger scale attacks began, Guzman made it very clear that he was willing to accept high casualties 'so long as they were lower than new recruits' and that those killed were not leadership since 'leadership needs to be protected at all costs.'[222] Equally, the lives of civilians were not valued – in 1982, leadership agreed that the 'countryside would be churned up in order to force the rural elite and state functionaries to flee the town.'[223] On replying to the deaths of 83 peasants during an attack, Guzman remorsefully said 'the principle thing was to make them understand that we were a hard bone to chew, and that we were ready to do anything, anything.'[224]

At the tactical level, the Shining Path had no sense of proportionality. When a member was killed by a 'local defence group' the Shining Path assaulted the offending town with 70 members and 'murdered 79 locals including women, children, and the elderly.'[225] The size of these attacks was not uncommon. While the Shining Path was purportedly organised into small cells with little or no contact of one another, attacks were often carried out by 50-60 members, 'but actions involving 100 guerrillas or more are not infrequent.'[226] One attack, which was 'against the Yawarmayu village militia,' was apparently performed by '300 guerrillas.'[227] And although the Shining Path juggled with centralised and decentralised

[221] Lewis Taylor, *Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru* (Liverpool: Centre for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, 1983). P. 31.
[222] Gustavo Gorriti, *The Shining Path: History of the Millenarian War in Peru* (University of North Carolina Press, 1999). P. 68.
[223]Lewis Taylor, *Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980-1997* (Liverpool University Press, 2006). P. 90.
[224] Carlos Iván Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God: Shining Path's Politics of War in Peru, 1980–1999* (University of Wisconsin Press, 2012). P. 143.
[225] Heeg, "The Shining Path ' s Employment of Psychological Warfare during Its Terrorism Campaign in Peru , 1970-1992." P, 118.
[226] Anderson, *Sendero Luminoso: A New Revolutionary Model?* P. 43.
[227] Sánchez, *When Rains Became Floods*. P. 17.

command, the group was still able carry out synchronised attacks and multiple targets 'many miles apart.'[228]

While Peruvian armed forces operations seriously began in 1981, they continued to escalate which proved difficult for the Shining Path. Over the course of the 1980s, the Shining Path would suffer significant defeats and casualties. In 1983, they started to recruit farmers and other individuals critical to the economy since they believed that 'it was no longer time to be producing for the market and making money' and that 'the armed struggled demanded sacrifice and total dedication form each and every person.'[229] As early as 1982, Shining Path 'would recruit additional youth, more by coercive than voluntary means' who participated 'under pressure and out of fear of retaliation' which differed drastically from Shining Path's 'first generation, who had assumed the political line of total subordination.'[230]

In the mid-1980s, leadership was losing control of the group. Though, at this time, between 1985-90, it seemed that Shining Path had an 'image of efficiency, meticulous planning, and coherent decision making,' internally the group's 'working arrangements and control mechanisms proved seriously flawed.'[231] Problems were recognised in 1986, such as 'entryism' into the group and some members who had 'informal contact' with the MRTA (another leftist armed group in Peru) who leadership declared 'follows the line of Cuba' and

[228] Taylor, *Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru*. P. 34.
[229] Ponciano Del Pino, "Family, Culture, and 'Revolution': Everyday Life with Sendero Luminoso," in *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995* (Duke University Press, 1998). p 171.
[230] Del Pino. p 164.
[231] Taylor, *Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980-1997*. p 183.

that the group 'must vaccinate ourselves against it.'[232] In 1987, Shining Path's 'tight structure somewhat loosened in some rural areas.'[233]

As the war carried on, Shining Path cadres were living in terrible conditions that became progressively worse. In 1983, combatants reportedly ate three meals a day, but that soon fell to two meals a day and by 1985, they ate whatever they could find.[234] By 1988, 'families were living in plastic tents, exposed to the weather, and without sufficient clothing,' and 'they virtually stopped consuming salt, sugar, vegetables, and stews.'[235] In one Shining Path village, over the course of ten years, 'around 100 children and adults died for lack of food' while 'children who did not have anything to eat often ingested herbs and dirt that caused their deaths.'[236] In 1993, 100% of the village 'suffered from amenia, many with tuberculosis, acute bronchitis, and malaria.'[237]

In the early 1990s, most of the Shining Path leadership was captured, including Guzman. The group was already drastically weakened at this time and essentially served as the moment when the Shining Path was decisively defeated by the Peruvian state.

[232] Anderson, *Sendero Luminoso: A New Revolutionary Model?* p 35
[233] Anderson. p 32.
[234] Sánchez, *When Rains Became Floods*. p 17
[235] Del Pino, "Family, Culture, and 'Revolution': Everyday Life with Sendero Luminoso." p 177
[236] Del Pino. p 177
[237] Del Pino. p 177

Communist Part of Nepal – Maoist

The CPN-M began in 1994 after splintering from another communist party named Unity Centre.[238] Several years prior, in 1990, Nepal had become a multiparty constitutional monarchy after decades of royal rule which came to an end after large public demonstrations.[239] Despite the arrival of democracy, there were doubts about whether anything had meaningfully changed, and for some, including Parchanda, the CPN-M's leader, it appeared to be an continuation of monarchy rule in another form.[240]

While CPN-M is certainly revolutionary in their aims, their main goals, which they presented to the Nepalese government in the form of 40 demands, 'dealt largely with rectifying economic and social injustices, abolishing monarchy and establishing a constituent assembly.'[241] Other demands included 'Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped,' 'Nepal should be declared a secular nation,' and others such as 'Fertiliser and seeds should be easily available and at a cheap rate.'[242] Though the CPN-M welcomed a Maoist revolution, the priority for the CPN-M appeared to be that the Nepalese people should have 'the right to determine their own fate'[243] by abolishing the monarchy and 'destroying feudalism and imperialism.'[244]

[238] Alpa Shah and Judith Pettigrew, "Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in South Asia," *Dialect Anthropology* 3, no. 33 (2009) p 232.
[239] Anup Phayal, "Cost of Violence and the Peaceful Way out: A Comparison of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists)," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 2011, p 12.
[240] Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist, "Appeal of the C.P.N. (Maoist) to the People," 1996, https://www.bannedthought.net/Nepal/UCPNM-Docs/1996/AppealOfCPNM-9602.pdf.
[241] Shah and Pettigrew, "Windows into a Revolution: Ethnographies of Maoism in South Asia," p 232.
[242] Deepak Thapa, *Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal* (Kathmandu : Centre for Social Research and Development, 2003) p 391.
[243] Prachanda, "Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) Central Committee: Press Statement," 2004, https://www.bannedthought.net/Nepal/UCPNM-Docs/2004/OnKofiAnnanAppeal-040325.pdf.
[244] Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist, "Theoretical Premises for the Historic Initiation of the People's War," 1995, https://www.bannedthought.net/Nepal/UCPNM-Docs/1995/TheoreticalPremisesForPW-9509.pdf.

The CPN-M cleverly prepared for future conflict by provoking the police forces in 1995 to carry out the infamous Operation Romeo which was meant to quell CPN-M non-violent agitations but resulted in 'violations of human rights and indiscriminate targeting without any but counterproductive results.'[245] As the Nepalese government ignored the 40 demands of the CPN-M, the group launched a 'People's War' in 1996 by initially attacking police forces. These attacks were well-coordinated and the poor performance of the police 'became one of the key mobilization narratives for the Maoist leaders.'[246] The CPN-M was able to spread its influence and after five years it had 'reached a strategic offensive position.'[247] However, after violating a ceasefire in 2001 the group launched a coordinated attack against Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) in three district headquarters, which resulted in a state of emergency being declared and the deployment of the RNA to fight the CPN-M. Between 1996 and 2001, it is estimated that 1698 combatants were killed; however, from 2001 to 2005 at least 11400 were killed marking a clear rise in conflict intensity.[248]

Despite the RNA exerting serious pressure on the CPN-M, some assess that the CPN-M was unable to launch a full scale war due to a lack of equipment and external support, while the RNA was 'inadequate' in supressing the CPN-M due to their inexperience, lack of cooperation

[245] Mika Kertteunen, "A Transformed Insurgency: The Strategy of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in the Light of Communist Insurgency Theories and a Modified Beaufrean Exterior/Interior Framework," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 22, no. 1 (2011) p 93.
[246] Phayal, "Cost of Violence and the Peaceful Way out: A Comparison of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists)" p 12.
[247] Khagendra Acharya and Orla Muldoon, "Why 'I' Became a Combatant: A Study of Memoirs Written by Nepali Maoist Combatants," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29, no. 6 (2017) p 1009.
[248] Acharya and Muldoon p 1009.

with police, and 'reluctance of the people to support the RNA.'[249] This lack of support for the RNA was compounded in 2005 Nepalese king restored autocratic rule and command of the security forces, which was deeply unpopular.

The CPN-M were able to capitalise on public discontent in 2005 and reached a 12-point understanding between the group and the seven party alliance[250] in which the CPN-M chose to end the war in return for the abolition of the monarchy, the establishment of true democracy, and their ability to participate in elections.[251] In essence, the CPN-M compromised very little, if at all, to achieve their primary goals and in 2008 the group became the dominant political party, forcing the king to abdicate, and their leader Prachanda becoming prime minister.[252]

Non-Radical Explanations?

These short profiles seem to point to quite simple explanations as to why each group met the fate it had. For the Shining Path, it seems that they were quite competent initially; however, they were unable to properly control the flow of new recruits into the organisation and properly indoctrinate and train them later on in the conflict. It also seems that the pressure the state was exerting on the group, which was considerably subdued at the conflict outset,

[249] Kertteunen, "A Transformed Insurgency: The Strategy of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in the Light of Communist Insurgency Theories and a Modified Beaufrean Exterior/Interior Framework" p 106.
[250] "12-Point Understanding Reached between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal Communist Party (Maoists)" (Government of Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, 2005), https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/NP_051122_12 Point Understanding.pdf.
[251] Phayal, "Cost of Violence and the Peaceful Way out: A Comparison of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists)" p 16.
[252] Kertteunen, "A Transformed Insurgency: The Strategy of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in the Light of Communist Insurgency Theories and a Modified Beaufrean Exterior/Interior Framework" p 81.

helped foment the lack of control that ultimately led to its downfall. In short, the Shining Path started with high competence and ended with low competence, while the Peruvian armed forces appeared to stagnate.

For the CPN-M, it seems that the group was able to capitalise on the popular discontent with the government of the time and made good strategic decisions to minimise the number of enemy combatants by focussing attacks on the police and only involving the army when the CPN-M desired to. The CPN-M combatants appear to have been more consistently competent fighters, but equally, it doesn't seems that the RNA improved much over the course of the conflict. The easy deduction here is that the CPN-M maintained their military effectiveness, while the state armed forces maintained their mediocrity.

These are oversimplifications, of course, but where does ideology and radicalism fit into this? Do these accounts explain why those in Shining Path camps chose to eat dirt, rather than surrender? Or why the CPN-M were able were such formidable opponents to the government? Do they explain why the Shining Path or the CPN-M believed they were in a position to capture the state in the first place or why they chose to continue fighting a long and difficult war? They don't, but considering the role of radicalism can help answer those questions. In the following, I identify the mechanisms related to radicalism that discourage these two groups from seeking compromise in their respective civil wars.

Encouraging Mechanisms

Intrinsic Belief

The first of these mechanisms is intrinsic belief. Intrinsic belief is probably unmeasurable; however, its role in encouraging extreme outcomes must be considered. To identify and deduce all the ways ideology can affect an armed group's outcome, we must allow the possibility that some combatants are primarily motivated by their beliefs, however strange or horrible they may be. We must assume that at least some combatants in some armed groups *actually* believe. By accepting this, it is reasonable to imagine that some radical armed group members limit their possible outcomes to extremes in conflict not as a rational mistake, but because they truly want to win or die trying.

If we were to observe intrinsic belief, what might it look like? In order for us to make any assessment of behaviour linked to intrinsic belief, we must witness behaviour that would be difficult to explain in the absence of it. It is hard to know with any certainty if combatants truly believe what they say they do. The Shining Path and the CPN-M; however, do give us some evidence to consider. Is intrinsic belief the gleeful singing of a Shining Path song :'Today the quota must be filled, if we have to give our blood for revolution, how good it will be?'[253]

In the case of the Shining Path, the picture becomes slightly clearer with more evidence. One former Shining Path militant wrote that combatants 'whose wounds were rotting'[254] continued to read Marxist and Gonzalo literature. Other observers have suggested of the Shining Path that 'there was no more motivated, convinced, or determined group in the

[253] Gorriti, *The Shining Path: History of the Millenarian War in Peru*. p 106.
[254] Sánchez, *When Rains Became Floods*. p 28

country and perhaps the hemisphere,'[255] which could be demonstrated by Shining Path militants shouting 'Viva Gonzalo, Viva Mao!' before being executed from crimes such as 'overstaying their vacation time.'[256] Does this mean that Shining Path members were true believers? No, but it does *seem* like it.

Within the CPN-M, songs too were sung after the murder of three policeman: 'Our guerrillas have answered bullets with bullets.'[257] This song doesn't exactly match the zeal of the Shining Path's quota. But the words of a former combatant echo their disquieting commitment, writing 'Experiencing even suffering as happiness, we continued to carry out the Party's directions. We knew this: that to live in a disciplined manner in the camp is revolution! […] When [the Party] tells us to come out we will come out.' The CPN-M have been described as 'a tightly knit community of ardent revolutionaries whose loyalties were geared almost undividedly towards the cause of revolution.'[258] And like the examples given for the Shining Path, this evidence does not prove that members of the CPN-M intrinsically believed their ideology. It does, however, suggest that at least *some* of their members probably did and we have to consider this likelihood seriously.

Both the Shining Path and CPN-M's belief had created some absurd actions that are difficult to explain in the absence of intrinsic belief or a massive misunderstanding of orders. The Shining Path bombed a renovated Inca temple 'because the money for the renovation had

[255] Del Pino, "Family, Culture, and 'Revolution': Everyday Life with Sendero Luminoso." p 36.
[256] Sánchez, *When Rains Became Floods*. p 19
[257] Michael Hutt, "Reading Nepali Maoist Memoirs," *Studies in Nepali History and Society* 17, no. 1 (2012) p 117.
[258] Zharkevich p 112.

come from abroad'[259] and destroyed a University of Huamanga experiment that was meant to improve farming practices, including killing livestock, because it appeared 'imperialist.'[260] The CPN-M carried comparable actions, though more systematically. The group sought to 'destroy anything that had been constructed by the government, from suspension bridges to hydroelectric facilities[…] and was accompanied by a parallel substitution of Maoist copies of the same.'[261]

These are strange and counterproductive policies by both groups which are clearly motivated by ideology. These examples aren't proof of intrinsic belief in operation, but they do supply us with converging evidence – this is what intrinsic belief *looks* like. It appears unlikely to me that the large majority of any armed group membership wholly internalises a group's ideology. What can't be ignored, however, is that some individuals do internalise such an ideology and accept the consequences of their beliefs, even if it leads to death. We have to accept that intrinsic belief probably exists within each of these groups to some degree.

If a combatant truly believes that they are either on a divine mission from their alleged creator, or that a revolution, which includes the eradication of the educated and wealthy classes is the only method to ensure safe and tolerable living conditions, they are also likely to believe that they must carry out this mission. But it isn't as simple as 'giving it a go,' they must carry out their missions at all costs. There is no middle ground. The only acceptable

[259] Anderson, *Sendero Luminoso: A New Revolutionary Model?* p 43.
[260] Taylor, *Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru* p 21.
[261] Thomas Marks, "Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 28, no. 1 (2017) p 90.

outcomes to such individuals are that they either attain their objectives or they sacrifice themselves in the process. It is difficult to accept negotiation terms from those you find evil.




Figure 5.1 – Process of Intrinsic Belief

If true believers were widespread in the Shining Path and CPN-M, it then becomes easy to explain why these radical groups experience extreme outcomes in conflict: compromise is not considered an option due to the intrinsic beliefs of the group members. In reality, it isn't so simple. But just as we don't know to what extent combatants and leaders intrinsically believed, neither do the combatants or leaders themselves—this is important.

Intrinsic belief works in itself as a mechanism for encouraging extreme outcomes; however, it also helps reify the role of two others: internal audience costs and institutionalisation.

Internal Audience Costs

Leaders of armed groups who wish to negotiate find themselves in a precarious situation. Negotiation is, by definition, a compromise. For whatever reason armed group leaders have chosen to mobilise in the first place, there is almost always some kind compromise of their values and goals when they enter negotiations with the state. Some of these compromises are easier to accept than others, as what they aim to gain from a deal – such as not being killed, not living in intolerable conditions, or obtaining status – is more valuable than what they stand to lose (weapons, disbandment, hope). I suggest that the cost of compromise is

both objectively higher and perceived to be much higher for leaders in radical armed groups since there is a heavier emphasis on the importance of group goals and the effort to instil unalterable beliefs about those goals among combatants. This means that the internal audience cost a leader may suffer from compromise is both objectively higher and overestimated by leaders. The primary reason for this is due to the extensive ideological institutionalisation that combatants experience and its side effects.

Before blaming institutionalisation, however, another intuitive reason why internal audience costs are higher in radical armed groups is partly due to the intrinsic belief mechanism. While intrinsic belief itself fosters an unwillingness to compromise, it is also a mechanism that elevates internal audience costs. Simply put, any reasonable leader would recognise that the 'true believers' of the group would be the least likely to accept compromise and most likely to fragment due to a lack of ideological purity. The fragmentation would lead to the leader with retaining fewer loyal combatants, and thus, a loss of credibility of the leader as a bargaining actor in the eyes of the state. But intrinsic belief can only play a part in increasing the internal audience costs if leaders have a justification to believe that its members *are* or *could* be true believers. This justification comes from the breadth and severity of the group's ideological institutions. Both the Shining Path and CPN-M enormously invested in ideological institutionalisation which meant that to leaders, it always *appeared* that everyone was a true believer because combatants were taught to behave as though they were and acutely punished when they did not.

In order for radical armed groups to sincerely compromise, they need to moderate or change their ideology. This change is both direct and indirect. Directly, negotiation generally means compromise, which implies that the group is open to modify its goals in some manner. Indirectly, whatever this modification is would need to be reflected within the institutions of the armed group. Changing the composition of a group's ideological foundations is difficult, and regarding armed group cohesion, it is dangerous. Not only due to the risks of fragmentation, splinters, and desertions, but also because the authority of the group's leadership is largely provided by their role as ideological guardians and sometimes go as far to claim divine connections or foster a cult of personality as, Gonazlo did for the Shining Path and Prachanda for the CPN-M. To change the ideology means to depreciate the clarity of its original message and the authority it provided to leaders.

Radical groups maintain robust and rigid ideological institutions, making ideological deviation hard, even for leaders. This is because, since their recruitment, combatants have been indoctrinated and exposed to the ideology regularly as it is ingrained institutionally into everyday life. We don't need to assume that group membership is comprised of ideologues (though some may exist), but we need to accept that ideology is central to the routines of combatants and that group members are conditioned or encouraged to behave as though they do believe.

For combatants of the CPN-M in Nepal, 'the whole of life—work and sleep, travel and learning, friendships and often love—was done within the boundaries of the underground Maoist universe' which 'unmade the separation between the personal and the political,

between the public and the private, between personal learning and ideological training.'[262] The CPN-M invested heavily in indoctrination, especially for those who were coercively recruited, with the goal of 'instilling communist world views…and radicalising individuals to the extent that they would be willing to attain martyrdom.'[263]

For Shining Path recruits prior to 1982-3, individuals would have undergone some indoctrination even prior to joining. Once they've joined, they would be at the rank of 'pre-militant' where they would 'usually spend their first year of their connection with Shining Path on simple propaganda tasks…They undertake no military action and do not come into contact with the Party's military apparatus, spending much of their time being indoctrinated with Shining Path's political line, and receiving basic instruction in Marxist texts and theory of guerrilla warfare.'[264] Twelve months of indoctrination even prior to military training is a considerable investment, of which the return had to be, at least in some cases, highly dedicated and loyal members.

It becomes easy to recognize that the leader of the CPN-M or Shining Path would need to be very clever in their framing of any abandonment or diversion from the group's revolutionary goals to prevent widespread dissatisfaction within the group. Members were reminded everyday of what those goals were, what they were killing and dying for. To change those goals, from a combatant's perspective, calls into question if everything they have suffered up

[262] Zharkevich, *Maoist People's War and the Revolution of Everyday Life in Nepal*. p 112
[263] D. B. Subedi, *Combatants to Civilians: Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Maoist Fighters in Nepal's Peace Process* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). p 64.
[264] Taylor, *Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru*. p 15.

until that point was meaningless. By erecting these ideological institutions of which so much of daily life is based on, they become obstacles and are less flexible to respond to changing strategic situations.

From their positions, whether or not combatants buy-in to the ideological rhetoric, if leaders deviate from what combatants have been taught and obligated to learn since being recruited, it is cause enough to question the command's competency. If the leadership was wrong in the beginning, how do we know they're not wrong now? This is not only be an obstacle for radical leaders who wish to negotiate, but also for those who want to narrow their aims for practical reasons. Perhaps the initial revolution was supposed to transform the country; however, the group is unable to expand its areas of operation due to pressure from government forces, so command thinks it's best to focus operations on a sliver of the countryside. The group also may not have the funds to carry out many operations or they have agreed to a geographic deconfliction with another armed group in the area that is also fighting. Thus, while combatants were indoctrinated with an urgency to spread revolution, strategic changes from the leadership can also lead to confusion among combatants. 'Command has told us for so long that *x* is important, but now we're doing *y*?' It is reasonable to assume that this confusion and doubt helps create the psychological cracks necessary for thoughts of desertion and fragmentation to begin to leak into and linger within the minds of combatants.

Put simply, the more ideology is institutionalised within an armed group, the more likely that *some* of the combatants will internalise the ideology and that, from the leader's perspective,

the more it will *appear* that the group is comprised of ideologues. Should a leader desire to seek a compromise of the group's goals, there will be a higher risk of fragmentation than if ideological institutionalisation did not occur, but that risk will not be as high as it is perceived by the armed group leader. This means that, in order to avoid fragmentation in radical armed groups, the leaders of these groups will be discouraged from seeking a civil war outcome that results from compromise.




Figure 5.2 – Process of Internal Audience Costs

Looking at how deeply institutionalised ideology was in the CPN-M and Shining Path helps demonstrate why internal audience costs could play a major role in encouraging radical armed groups to obtain extreme outcomes in conflict.

Institutionalisation

Recruits in the Shining Path encountered ideology and intense screening as soon as they joined the group—even before violence began. For those who wanted to join, they needed to be 'guaranteed by two already proven members.'[265] Of those that could join, one former member recalls that his basic training only graduated 20 out of 50 recruits.[266] Until shortly after the group's offensive actions began, the Shining Path was highly selective of its recruits and its message attracted large numbers of applicants in the Peruvian rural areas. The Shining path institutionalised its training with its own military school, which started in April of 1980

[265] Anderson, *Sendero Luminoso: A New Revolutionary Model?* P. 14.
[266] Sánchez, *When Rains Became Floods*. P. 16.

and was 'intensely ideological.'[267] The first course was seventeen days and 'ideology was paramount and was drilled into cadres with the ritual quotations invoked from the first day forward.'[268] Ideological maintenance became a routine feature in the lives of combatants. Even for seasoned members, 'at each stage of promotion, [they] must undergo 'extensive indoctrination.''[269]

Like the Shining Path, the CPN-M also began recruiting and indoctrinating before beginning their attacks. While the Shining Path had 'popular schools', the CPN-M employed 'political-cultural teams' that were sent into rural areas to 'educate the masses not only about the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology, but also the necessity of using violence to change the political system.'[270] New recruits received at least one week of political training and as much as one month, also conducting tasks related to ideological training and propaganda, waiting sometimes years before being able to participate in the conflict.[271] Within the CPN-M 'political training always preceded military training' and 'continuous political indoctrination' was seen as a strategic priority.[272]

There are many similarities between the CPN-M and the Shining Path regarding their ideological institutionalisation: they both started prior to the conflict, they made significant efforts to educate civilians, and it was a top priority that combatants be extensively

[267] Gorriti, *The Shining Path: History of the Millenarian War in Peru*. P. 30.
[268] Gorriti. P. 29.
[269] Tarazona-Sevillano, "The Organization of Shining Path." P. 184.
[270] Kristine Eck, "Recruiting Rebels: Indoctrination and Politicial Education in Nepal," *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century*, 2010. p 15.
[271] Eck. p 24.
[272] Eck. p 25.

indoctrinated. The effect of this institutionalisation is similar, too – not only how it increases audience costs for the armed group leaders, but also how the entrenched ideology, norms, and rituals created an environment where combatants could not know what their comrades were thinking. Ideological institutionalisation creates an environment of higher internal monitoring and ultimately leads to pluralistic ignorance.

Monitoring

High ideological institutionalisation is accompanied with a high capacity to monitor combatants. This is a feature of ideological institutionalisation. Everyone is aware of what they should believe, how they should be behaving, and what they should be saying. This means that every member of the armed group knows when others are making transgressions against the ideology. One way that ideological institutionalisation increases monitoring capacity is that it minimises opportunity for private interaction – it is public and time consuming. What is meant by this is that the lives of the combatants are so firmly controlled with duties and ideological training that combatants virtually have no time or opportunity to transgress.

For recruits in the CPN-M, members described that, especially as recruits, 'their routine was so tightly structured that there was almost no free time.'[273] Much of the routine comprised of physical training and 'talks of senior leaders, classes, and discussion groups.'[274] There are some practices such as criticism and self-criticism, which often appear in leftist groups, including the Shining Path, that serve not only to reinforce the group hierarchy, but also to

[273] Zharkevich, *Maoist People's War and the Revolution of Everyday Life in Nepal*. p 115.
[274] Zharkevich. p 115

create an atmosphere of constant monitoring. Individuals are required to admit to their mistakes, even if they don't think they've made any. Self-criticism was a chance to publicly confess one's guilt for something as small as being lazy or not abiding wholly to the group's principles. Because of self-criticism, any member of the group could accuse another, no matter the rank, of transgressions and the target of the accusations would thank the accuser for having pointed out the his or her mistakes. Punishments for admitted or accused mistakes can be severe, including death.

Psychological coercion of this kind can lead to combatants believing that they are always being watched. The Shining Path practiced such rituals with one leading scholar commenting on them that 'these tortured displays of personal self-destruction were only possible thanks to the constant and systematic use of the rituals of surveillance, accusation, defence, recognition of guilt, humiliation, and penitence' of criticism and self-criticism.[275] Within the group, these sessions occurred 'without fail every fifteen days' and it was a common feeling among combatants that 'the party had a thousand eyes and ears' and that 'everyone knew everything.'[276]

Though little evidence has been found regarding how the CPN-M disciplined it own members, within the Shining Path, punishments were brutal and sometimes absurd. For example, it was 'absolutely prohibited that its members cry' because it was 'symptomatic of wanting to abandon the party and the revolution.'[277] Some of those that did cry were subsequently killed.

[275] Gorriti, *The Shining Path: History of the Millenarian War in Peru*. p 30.
[276] Sánchez, *When Rains Became Floods*. p 31.
[277] Del Pino, "Family, Culture, and 'Revolution': Everyday Life with Sendero Luminoso."

Those who could not keep up on forced marches were killed,[278] while a teenager was 'strangled to death, Lord of the Flies style, for stealing some crackers and tuna.'[279]

When extreme punishments are combined with the appearance of constant monitoring, combatants have every incentive to hide and supress their true ideological preferences. Whether or not individuals believe in the ideology, they police themselves and others to make sure they always appear as though they do. This leads to the mechanism of pluralistic ignorance where combatants and leaders wrongly assess the preferences of group members.

Pluralistic Ignorance

Pluralistic ignorance is a phenomenon in which individuals in groups wrongly assess that their own beliefs are more or less extreme than those within the group. What this results in is individuals who continue to behave in a way they find absurd or untrue primarily because they think that's how they're supposed to behave and that there are consequences if they don't. Psychological studies show that the need to conform is so great, that in certain environments, individuals will behave and purport to believe things that they consider untrue.[280] Because of this, it's possible (though unlikely) to have a group that appears to be hard-line Jihadist, without a single practicing Muslim. Like a snake eating its own tail, ideological institutionalisation can make a group appear to internalise the ideology in every conceivable way without any of the individuals believing it. There is no discerning between an intrinsic believer and a social performer. Pluralistic ignorance does not need intense

[278] Del Pino. p 186
[279] Sánchez, *When Rains Became Floods*. p xvii.
[280] Solomon Asch, "Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of One against a Unanimous Majority," *Psychological Monographs: General and Applied* 9, no. 70 (1956).

institutionalisation to take place – it can occur in all facets of life. Radical groups, however, greatly increase its occurrence, primarily through institutions and monitoring. It is difficult to find concrete evidence of this within armed groups, since it requires a current or former combatant to admit that the entire enterprise they pursued was a lie and that they were susceptible to being fooled. It's worth considering what this might look like in practice, though.

As previously highlighted, some Shining Path members were continuing to study Marxism while their wounds were rotting in the field, while others who were to be imminently executed cheered for their leader, who also just ordered their death. Do these people *really* care about their ideology that much? Perhaps they're hoping that appearing to do so will make punishment less likely? An important concept in the group was that of the 'quota.' The quota was an agreement that members 'no longer owned their own life'[281] and it was as much an acceptance of death as it was the need to kill. For Shining Path members 'preparing for death became a central preoccupation,' and the quota was 'mythified and adorned with symbols and metaphors.'[282] I find it hard to believe that a majority of Shining Path members who sang songs about whishing for their own death did so sincerely. It is this exact kind of environment where pluralistic ignorance flourishes.

Back in Nepal, while setting up residence in a village, a CPN-M member with some down time was seen to be drawing a picture of 'a large, stern-looking, moustached man wearing a peaked

[281] Gorriti, *The Shining Path: History of the Millenarian War in Peru*. P. 105.
[282] Gorriti. P. 99.

Maoist-style cap.'[283] This is isn't an extraordinary event, but it suggests one of three things: by drawing this Maoist figure in full view of their comrades, the combatant either reveres this symbol and wishes to reproduce it; for an individual who doesn't necessarily internalise the Maoist ideology, but is aware of the costs of not doing so, it signals that there is nothing to worry about; or that it is a common practice and the combatant does it because everyone else does. Of course, the combatant might simply enjoy drawing. This kind of anecdotal evidence of these ordinary actions is very difficult to come by. There is some evidence of pluralistic ignorance within the populations the groups either controlled or operated within close proximity, however. Those who were victim to CPN-M rule had to feign support for their own safety. Many teachers 'became workers and supporters of the war' as 'their survival strategy for avoiding physical threats emanating from not supporting the Maoist ideology.'[284]

This is not an unheard-of coping strategy for survival within these environments. What I argue, however, is that the need to continuously perform like a believer is much more important in radical groups like the CPN-M and Shining Path. Not only is the combatant taxed with carrying out military duties as instructed, every aspect of their public and private lives must attain a satisfactory ideological standard. Why is this important to explain extreme outcomes for radical armed groups? Because, from the perspective of radical leaders, it would appear to them that they are in command of a group of true believers. They overestimate just how ideological their group is.

[283] Judith Pettigrew, *Maoists at the Hearth: Everyday Life in Nepal's Civil War* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). p 100
[284] Subedi, *Combatants to Civilians: Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Maoist Fighters in Nepal's Peace Process*. p 59.

So, when a radical leader wants to modify their aims and consider compromise with the state, the ideological institutionalisation they've initiated, which helps give them more control of the group, means that they believe their combatants are more ideological than they really are, leading to a fear of fragmentation and loss of leadership credibility should leaders deviate from the ideology. This results in the leader overestimating the risk of compromise and deciding against it.

Under such conditions, there is little possibility for less radical members of the group to create a moderate critical mass. One which signals to superiors that there is an acceptance of less-than-ideal outcomes for some gain. It's a positive feedback loop of constant ideological one-upmanship leading to unintended constraints and undesired extreme outcomes.




Figure 5.3 Process of Ideological Institutionalisation

Referring to the above figure, ideological institutionalisation appears to be a driving force for encouraging extreme outcomes. High institutionalisation is accompanied with increased monitoring, which makes combatants behave according to the ideology out of a fear of consequences if one deviates. Institutionalisation also increases the chances of pluralistic ignorance occurring, making combatants further behave like those around them in order to conform to the group. Sometimes institutionalisation can even lead to combatants

intrinsically believing the ideology. The leadership who observe the behaviour of their combatants are then perceive that their subordinates are true believers because they're acting like it. This ultimately leads to the leader overestimating the internal audience costs of modifying the goals and ideology of the group, discouraging the probability of seeking a settlement during civil war.

Why Different Outcomes?

The Shining Path and CPN-M are both radical and both avoided a moderate outcome (soft victory and soft defeat) in civil war. Their levels of radicalism might help explain this; however, they don't seem to explain why one group achieved an outright victory while the other was destroyed. Looking deeper into the differences between how each Maoist group fought their respective wars can help us identify what radical mechanisms matter the most and others factors that are entirely independent from radicalism.

It is helpful to be reminded that initially, both the CPN-M and Shining Path placed a heavy influence on the indoctrination of their cadres and that this occurred prior to war. Once each conflict properly began, both groups had to navigate the problem of increasing recruitment, maintaining ideological standards, and fighting a war, rather than just thinking about it. This meant that resources and time had to prioritised differently during the conflicts, which inevitably results in less ideological indoctrination for each group.

Institutional Capacity

Indeed, both groups did experience falling ideological requirements as the conflicts waged on. The difference, however, is that it appears the CPN-M were far better able to manage fighting a war and maintaining group ideology than the Shining Path. Unlike the Shining Path, there is no evidence of a loss of ideological narrative or control. Some suggest that the length of indoctrination for recruits might have changed from one month to one week as the conflict carried on, but there always appears to be an emphasis on ideological standards. For example, even those that the CPN-M captured or kidnapped, such as police officers, 'were subject to political indoctrination in an attempt to re-educate them and convince them to join the Maoists.'[285] Though its unclear what scale such re-education efforts occurred, we might be able to assume that if the CPN-M is dedicating these resources to indoctrinate those who aren't even in the group, then they are probably still carrying out some kind of ideological training for those within the group, considering the strategic importance placed upon such activities within the CPN-M. The CPN-M appears to have consistently possessed the institutional capacity to maintain their ideology and prioritise it.

The Shining Path seems to have lost some of its institutional capacity several years into the war. In 1983, it began mass and coercive recruitment without the intense political indoctrination the group previously administered.[286] As early as 1982, the group 'would recruit additional youth, more by coercive than voluntary means' who participated 'under pressure and out of fear of retaliation' which differed drastically from the Shining Path's 'first

[285] Eck, "Recruiting Rebels: Indoctrination and Politicial Education in Nepal." p 23.
[286] Del Pino, "Family, Culture, and 'Revolution': Everyday Life with Sendero Luminoso." p 171.

generation, who had assumed the political line of total subordination.'[287] Either due to the dire living standards within Shining Path or the extreme violence the group expressed, potential recruits no longer found their message attractive enough to join. By 1984 'many young people who in the beginning had been attracted to SL's message no longer wanted to participate'—fewer and fewer members were 'seeking immortality and heroism, even less so among those trapped in the ranks by terror.'[288]

Terror is the appropriate word. Initially, the Shining Path screened, recruited, and indoctrinated ideologically motivated recruits. In the mid 1980's recruitment was not only coercive, but brutal. When villagers did not want to join the group, the group 'responded by sealing off territories and conscripting entire families'[289] or, combatants would kill family members and conscript those who are left.[290] In 1987, a US report 'assessed that the primary reason for joining the Shining Path was 'out of fear from threat of death and disfigurement.''[291] By 1988, 'desertion had begun to emerge' among both 'combatants and members of the 'masa''[292] (conscripted villagers). No longer were the majority of Shining Path members motivated by revolution, destroying capitalism, and creating the New Democratic State, but rather they were motivated and controlled by fear. The largely coercively recruited Shining Path at this time no longer possessed the intense loyalty and devotion as those who

[287] Del Pino. P. 164.
[288] Del Pino. P. 171.
[289] Del Pino. P. 171.
[290] Del Pino. P. 172.
[291] Heeg, "The Shining Path ' s Employment of Psychological Warfare during Its Terrorism Campaign in Peru , 1970-1992." P. 123.
[292] Del Pino, "Family, Culture, and 'Revolution': Everyday Life with Sendero Luminoso." P. 184.

started the war, and the group's 'reliance on coercion as a method of recruitment and control contributed to the downfall of the Shining Path.'[293]

It was around this same time that ideological training was no longer prioritised that the Shining Path leadership began losing control of the group. The group began to entrust 'very young kids' with the command over communities and these children 'lacked experience, maturity, and ideological resolve, did not act according to Guzman's guidance.'[294] These children 'abused their power' this resulted in the group losing 'credibility among the population which undermined its early successful psychological indoctrination.' [295] Thus the ability to internally control and shape the ideology of combatants for the Shining Path also helped lead towards the rejection of the group's beliefs.

Losing focus of ideological standards likely has a negative effect on the ability of a radical armed group to competently fight wars. This is true not only because it probably influences military effectiveness and discipline, but also because it could be symptomatic of groups losing control overall. So while investing in fewer ideological institutions might make war more difficult to win, groups might not be choosing to abandon ideological training but that they are forced to because they struggling on the battlefield.

[293] Heeg, "The Shining Path ' s Employment of Psychological Warfare during Its Terrorism Campaign in Peru , 1970-1992." P. 123.
[294] Heeg. p 119.
[295] Heeg. p 119

State Forces

One of the many factors independent of radicalism that can explain why some groups win or lose is the military capacity of the state. In other words, how powerful is the state? It doesn't matter how radical an armed group is or isn't, if they're facing off against state-of-the-art military equipment, robust intelligence, superior numbers, and competent leaders prospects for victory are sparse. Also, if the state forces are incompetent or non-existent, the pathway to victory is clearly a more favourable one. In these two cases, the state forces appeared to be equally flawed, though a far more in depth study of the security and military forces of each country would be required to accurately assess this claim.

Nepal

The CPN-M began their war successfully and slowly, by specifically targeting police. For the first few years of the war, the police 'were not trained for counter insurgency' and their 'operations were conducted through an ad hoc concentration of police units' which resulted in 'heave handed search and arrest operations' and the alienation of 'the large part of public.'[296] The police were very ineffective at halting the CPN-M advances and the reluctance to deploy the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), which was due mostly to political considerations, allowed the group to expand and develop its insurgency. The abuses committed by the police continued to push rural civilians in the direction of the CPN-M, strengthening their position. It wasn't until 2001, after attacking the RNA during a ceasefire, that the army properly mobilised and a state of emergency had been ordered.[297] Despite not having the necessary

[296] Pruna Khatri, "An Analysis Of Nepalese Government's Counter Insurgency Operations (1996-2006)" (USMC Marine Corps University, 2008). p 18.
[297] Phayal, "Cost of Violence and the Peaceful Way out: A Comparison of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists)." p 12.

resources or preparedness required, the RNA was able to more effectively oppose the CPN-M than the police; however, their efforts suffered from internal political infighting and having no clear direction or leadership making waging counterinsurgency operations very difficult.[298] Also at this time, the police were entirely exhausted and demoralised from their confrontations with the CPN-M over the past five years.[299] The King began to rule by royal decree without the support of any political parties, which he did for three years, eroding any public trust of the government and its forces, allowing the CPN-M to capitalise on public discontent. The lack of coordination, strategy, preparedness, and competence on behalf of the government was significant reason the CPN-M attained victory.

Peru

For the Shining Path, the initial offensives of the conflict were largely successful. During this time the Peruvian government declared emergency zones which were under direct control of the army, suspending civilian liberties and relying 'almost exclusively on fielding a military response'[300] The Peruvian military were essentially tasked to rid the country side of the Shining Path problem without supervision and using any means necessary, which unsurprisingly 'created the context for a wave of human rights abuses that surpassed anything Peru had experienced under its previous authoritarian regime.'[301] According to one scholar, the main problems with the Peruvian military were its 'attitude, training, and resources.'[302] The Peruvian military attitude can be summed up at the time as a reluctance to take the Shining Path seriously, considering it to be a fringe group that will fade away on its own. It's

[298] Khatri, "An Analysis Of Nepalese Government's Counter Insurgency Operations (1996-2006)."
[299] Khatri.
[300] Gordon H. McCormick, "The Shining Path and Future of Peru," 1990. p 32.
[301] Angela Cornell and Kenneth ROberts, "Democracy, Counterinsurgency, and Human Rights: The Case of Peru," *Cornell Law Faculty Publications*, no. Paper 980 (1990). p 532.
[302] McCormick, "The Shining Path and Future of Peru." p 33.

other faults included 'an overly centralised decision making process, no corpus of unconventional small unit tactics, little ability to react quickly to guerrilla actions, and a chronic problems with sustaining large numbers of forces in the field.'[303]

Fortunes began to turn in favour for the Peruvian government when, in 1991, it began distributing large numbers of weapons to rural villagers and in 1992 legalised owning weapons for Andean peasants.[304] These peasants formed armed organisations called 'rondas campesinas' to protect themselves from the brutal actions of the Shining Path, from whom they sought protection from the government a decade earlier. No longer were the Shining Path looked up as saviours of the rural peasants, but instead as the repressors. Arming the peasants made operations more difficult for the Shining Path, and while it doesn't appear as though the Peruvian military improved drastically over the course of the conflict, the more repressive and brutal legislation brought in by the recently elected President Fujimori seems to have improved intelligence operations, which led to the capture of the virtually all of the Shining Path leadership in 1992.

It may be too much to say that that Peruvian military won the war, so much as they stumbled into victory. It doesn't appear as though much institutional learning occurred within the organisation over the course of the war, either through changing strategy or tactics. Overall, it can be said that the Shining Path lost the war by antagonising its support base with extreme violence. While some of this violence was intended by Shining Path leadership, it seems that

[303] McCormick. p 35.
[304] Orin Starn, "Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes," in *Contemporary Indigenous Movements in Latin America*, ed. Erick Langer and Elana Munoz (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). p 232.

the lack of capacity to maintain control and the ideology of the group caused the violence. Combatants with little to no ideological training ruthlessly abused the communities they were in charge of in ways that the Shining Path's ideology would normally forbid.

Both the Shining Path and CPN-M faced enemies that underestimated the group's ability to wage war. In the case of the CPN-M, the fractured government only deployed police, while for the Shining Path they simply were not taken seriously. Both state forces committed human rights abuses that strengthened civilian support for the armed groups and both groups appeared to be competent on the battlefield, at least initially. In each case, the state security forces did not have the necessary equipment, soldiers, or training required to properly carry out counter-insurgent operations, and in Peru the military did not appear to learn strategic lessons over the course of the conflict, continuing to use brutal and repressive tactics. It seems that the Shining Path and CPN-M both fought equally flawed opponents.

I suggest that the major reason why we observe different outcomes between the CPN-M and the Shining Path is due to the CPN-M's greater dedication to its ideological institutions. In doing so, not only did it likely contribute to the CPN-M's ability to retain control and effectively wage war, it also helped moderate the violence the group used against civilians and offered civilians a predictable relationship with the group, even if it wasn't pleasant. The Shining Path was not as careful when it began expanding its ranks—compared to early joiners, ideological indoctrination was meagre. This created conditions for a lack of restraint among junior cadres who were unmonitored and terrorised civilians in the country side to an extent that these civilians sought weapons to fight the Shining Path. Though the Shining Path appears to have eventually failed its duty to uphold its ideology through its institutions, a probable

reason that the group did not attempt to negotiate or surrender is due to the intrinsic belief and resolve of the leadership.

Conclusion

What these two cases have demonstrated is that some of the mechanisms that discourage radical armed groups from seeking a settlement in civil war are the following: intrinsic belief, internal audience costs, and institutionalisation. Though we'll likely never know which combatants properly believe their ideology, it is uncontroversial to assume that some probably do. Is this the case in the Shining Path and CPN-M? Probably. Regarding internal audience costs, it's difficult to know to what extent this mechanism played in the outcomes of each conflict, though the ingredients for it to matter were certainly present. When it comes to the which radical groups win or lose, these two cases suggest that the mechanism of institutionalisation is most important in explaining that difference. This is because institutionalisation helps form behaviours, expectations, and seems to increase control through extra monitoring and pluralistic ignorance. When a group like the Shining Path begins to lose its institutional capacity, the leadership's coherent strategy and messages are lost, which helped mobilise their alleged base of support against themselves—and the leadership's intense commitment to their beliefs obscure their ability to recognise exit routes that do not involve their complete destruction.

Never watching where they are going, the people move through something prearranged, armed with lies. They're always looking forward to going places they've just come back from, or regretting doing things they haven't yet done. They say hello when they mean goodbye.
-Martin Amis[305]

Chapter 6: Mechanisms Discouraging Extreme Outcomes

We've seen that the major reasons why radical armed groups choose not to settle mainly originate from three sources: the institutionalisation of ideology, intrinsic belief, and internal audience costs. Does this mean that radical groups forever refuse settlement compared to outright defeat or victory? Certainly not; however, one of three conditions is required for a radical armed group to settle. The first is that the ideology changes – specifically the goals. The second is that the ideology decays and is no longer meaningful to its members the same way it was when the group adopted violence. The third is that the group's ideology is no longer perceived to be radical by society or the government. In the first two instances, the group's belief changes and in the third, society changes. I will focus on the two former.

This chapter will identify and specify the mechanisms that increase the probability that radical armed groups will settle in civil war. In an effort to demonstrate these mechanisms in practice and to highlight their limitations, after their description and explanation, two illustrative case studies follow of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The case studies demonstrate when these mechanisms work, when they don't, and highlights the importance of *when* these mechanisms occur in the lifespan of a radical armed group.

[305] Martin Amis, *Time's Arrow* (Random House, 1991) p 51.

The mechanisms of interest in this chapter are the following: generational change, leadership change, war weariness, and combat defeats. For a group that is more radical than not, these mechanisms do not guarantee that an armed group will settle in civil war. Instead, these are meant to explain how it might occur with evidence from two different cases. This process is not uniform and at best we can identify when the barriers presented by ideology are removed from, or made less relevant to, the negotiation and settling process in civil war.

Discouraging Mechanisms

Generational Change

It is no surprise that beliefs and ideas can be drastically different between generations within society. While some of the differences are indeed major, a significant volume of change occurs gradually over time, and even generations. Within armed groups, ideas and beliefs can endure similar processes. The most important change of belief with in a radical armed group is the change between those that do believe and those that don't. Initially, as with many movements, those who are closest to the inception of the ideology or religion appear to be the most dedicated and devout. After all, they were there to witness either the miracle, heroic feat, or charismatic leader that lead to the ideology's inception. Whatever myth or fact that best describes how these ideologies and groups come about, there is no question that those present will feel more connected to and will be more likely to believe them. But what happens after its founders are long gone? What happens, after many years, when the members of a movement can never meet the founders or have not experienced the hardships or other things that necessitated the creation of a movement in the first place? What happens when members don't have any temporal or physical connection to people and conditions of inception, even indirectly through their acquaintances?

The more that members of a group are separated by time from the moments of group creation, the less connected those members will feel to those very ideas. Within new religious movements (NRM), it is found that with each generation followers tend to be less certain of their beliefs and question them.[306] For NRMs, the demographic change over time is significant, specifically over age as 'merely the fact that time has passed means that founders have died, that young, idealist converts with few dependents or other responsibilities have grown into middle-aged parents' and that a 'new "born-into" generation, demanding the allocation of such resources as time and money, will have to be socialised and accommodated.'[307] While non-state armed groups may not be as susceptible to such demographic shifts (young people are required to fight wars) generational change can still have an effect. Literal interpretations of leaders being connected to the divine or impervious to bullets may be dampened and be considered myths by subsequent generations (especially if proven wrong in battle). This form of scepticism of subsequent generations can lead to a gentle abandonment of hard-line beliefs and a gradual steering towards moderation.

Rather than considering the ideology and associated rituals as dogma, the later members will be more likely to consider them symbolic. This creates the conditions where ideology becomes malleable and, in fact, to an extent decays. Over time, the reasons and motivations for joining an armed group might change. On the one hand, joining could be due to a strong inner conviction that aligns with the group's goals. On the other, after a long enough time, combatants might join just because it's tradition for them, or that it's safer than not doing so. There comes a time when the original purpose of the group decays and disappears. This is


[306] Eileen Barker, "Plus ca Change...," *Social Compass* 42, no. 2 (1995): 165–80.
[307] Eileen Barker, "New Religious Movements: Their Incidence and Significance," in *New Religious Movements: Challenge and Response*, ed. Bryan Wilson and Jamie Cresswell (Routledge, 1999).

aided by generational change, and particularly relevant in protracted conflicts, as there can be little generational change without a significant passage of time.

What this means for the armed group is that they are no longer radical. Like an ideological isotope, the radicalism decays and what was once thought to be fundamental to a group's identity and mandate is considered to be more or less cosmetic. Maybe it's not about overthrowing the government and dismantling the capitalist system, and instead it's more about autonomy or aid. Perhaps it's no longer about establishing a caliphate but more so about maintaining a steady revenue stream when no others exist (Abu Sayyaf Group). Rather than hoping for reunification, the struggle is more about maintaining some semblance of power in the community, or it facilitates profits from organised crime (PIRA).

The generational changes help negate the effects of the constraining mechanisms present in radical groups that lower the probability of settling in civil war. Since ideological institutionalisation normally becomes less of a feature over time, and the goals and ideas also change, there are likely to be fewer true believers within the group. The leader does not suffer from the same lack of information which encourages them to overestimate the internal audience costs of negotiating as there are fewer people who appear to be true believers. How much time and how many generations are required for this mechanism to take place is likely different for different ideologies and different scenarios.

Process of Generational Change



Leadership Change

Leaders are more significant in radical groups than non-radical groups.[308] This is because not only do they need to manage the operations of the group, but also the ideology. There is often an emphasis of importance placed on radical ideological leaders that doesn't appear elsewhere. For example, the leader of PKK in Kurdistan, Abdullah Ocalan, was glorified in cadre indoctrination, requiring them to pledge allegiance to Ocalan, rather than to 'a religious or ideological doctrine.'[309] Some have noted that leadership decapitation in older religious ideological groups with a bureaucratic capacity can resist destabilisation better than younger, smaller, and non-religious ideological groups.[310] While others have found that 'religious and ideological' groups are more likely to suffer 'organizational degradation and collapse' from leadership decapitation than groups 'motivated by nationalism or separatism.'[311] Though these studies appear to show that leadership removal might have various consequences for groups of different ideological types, it appears that groups that suffer from leadership decapitation are also likely to then engage in more indiscriminate violence as junior members are empowered.[312]

[308]Bryan C. Price, *Targeting Top Terrorists* (Columbia University Press, 2019) p 50.
[309] Price.
[310] Jenna Jordan, "Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark," *International Security* 38, no. 4 (2014), p 38.
[311] Ted Clemens, "Headhunting: Evaluating the Disruptive Capacity of Leadership Decapitation on Terrorist Organizations," *CUNY Academic Works Graduate Center* (City University of New York, 2016) p 3.
[312] Max Abrahms and Jochen Mierau, "Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group Tactics," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29, no. 5 (2015): 830–51.


For radical armed groups, leadership change is sometimes accompanied with a change in radicalism. This can be a change of increasing or decreasing radicalism. Leadership change is a chance for fixed ideological elements to unfreeze and for group members to share their private preferences. It surely depends on how this change occurs, whether it is through necessity (death or capture of a leader), internal coup, or retirement. I suggest that groups that experience leadership changes are most likely to lead to ideological decay. Radicalism requires vision and stability; leadership change threatens that.

One reason for this is that many radical armed groups are lead by ideological guardians. These individuals purport to represent the ideology and to their followers, there is nobody more ideologically pure than them. These cult of personality figures are often so radical that any leadership change would result in a less radical group.

When a radical leader is removed forcefully, either through death or capture, it causes several things to occur. The first is that the removal of a leader demonstrates to combatants that nobody is truly safe and calls into question the viability of the group. The second is that it creates the condition where several leaders, all with slightly different goals and strategies, will either try to become the leader or seek to influence the direction of the group.[313] It is an opportunity for more pragmatic leaders to assume control of the group and these individuals may be actively seeking a compromise with the state, especially when leadership change occurs from within the group, rather than through a targeted killing, as assassinations could strengthen the resolve of group members.[314]

[313] Price, *Target. Top Terror* p 52.
[314] Jenna Jordan, *Leadership Decapitation : Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organizations* (Stanford University Press, 2019) p 152.

Process of Leadership Change




War Weariness

War weariness is a mechanism that enables groups that were once radical and unwilling to compromise to finally seek settlement. For this mechanism to work, ideology in some way must be made irrelevant. It results in a realisation that there is likely no hope of victory or for the armed groups and many or all of the illusions being radical offered to the group has eroded. War weariness emerges from the exhaustion of civil war. Especially for protracted wars, combatants are living in awful, covert conditions. They are continuously on the move and they are tired and hungry. The longer they've been involved in the war, the more likely they are to have witnessed their friends and colleagues killed or experienced injuries themselves. While emotions like revenge and hate can help these individuals continue fighting, as well as the ideological framing of the conflict, most individuals can only go on for so long with little or no signs of progress. There comes a time when the excitement of war dies, as do the reasons for fighting it. Living in consistently awful conditions for so long will encourage combatants to question re-evaluate what it is they're doing and why. There is only so long that the ideas of Mao or scripture can be substitutes for food and sleep. The pragmatism that evolves from these situations is one where it allows combatants and leaders alike to consider alternative methods to end the war, or in other words, settle.

It's unclear what threshold of suffering is required to switch radical armed group members into pragmatists. A logical deduction is that the longer and more intense the suffering is, along with little progress, the more likely individuals are to experience war weariness. By extension we would expect to see this in prolonged wars.

Process of War Weariness



Loss of Institutional Capacity

One mechanism that creates the condition for pragmatism to emerge is a lack of institutional capacity. One of the major differences between radical and non-radical armed groups is the attention dedicated by radical groups to the institutionalisation of ideology. Many of the mechanisms that prohibit settlement in civil war hinge on institutionalisation. The question that needs to be asked what happens when radical armed groups stop investing in ideological institutionalisation? For one, new recruits will not be formally indoctrinated and ideological maintenance in the form of rituals or classes would cease. The monitoring offered from ideological institutionalisation would also end. Essentially, when these activities end, it is clear that ideology is no longer a priority. Strategically, two things happen. The first is that there would appear to be some flexibility on behalf of the leader, which can include the changing on goals, mostly due to less expensive internal audience costs – How can a leader be criticised for their lack of ideological purity when the combatants aren't even introduced to it? The second is that it is very difficult to re-establish these institutions once they've been neglected.


Imposing ideological order on an armed group of which a significant number of have never been indoctrinated would appear to be difficult. In fact, the leader may suffer from internal audience costs not of settling or negotiation, but for re-imposing ideological rigour.

But what this suggests, however, is that a disruption in the capacity of armed groups to institutionalise their ideology can subvert the radical nature of an armed group. How such a change can be consequential for control of the group is an altogether different matter.

If institutionalisation was so important for armed groups, then why would they abandon them? It is important to remember that these institutions are resource intensive. They require time, planning, and training for subjects that are not directly related to war. And all of this must occur within the background of civil war with the state. In some cases, the abandonment of institutions is not a decision at all – if you're retreating under contact for days or weeks at a time, ideological classes are hardly going to be a priority. Likewise, under periods of intense pressure, some groups might decide to temporarily suspend ideological training, or recognise that they need recruits quicker than they can train them. Once this capacity to institutionalise ideology is lost, it become increasingly difficult to re-impose.

The inability to maintain ideological institutions directly influences the strength of mechanisms that constrain radical groups from seeking negotiation in civil war. If there is no institutionalisation, there is less monitoring and a weaker case of pluralistic ignorance, making internal audience costs easier to accurately assess.

Process of Lost Institutional Capacity



Combat Defeats

When armed groups cease to maintain the initiative, they are consistently occupied with defensive operations. This is because state forces are conducting missions to close with and destroy the armed group. The internal operations of a group will be greatly affected when they are consistently receiving pressure from their adversaries. This is because there is no time that is not being spent finding security and cover. Armed group members are preoccupied with surviving, rather than fighting, and especially rather than instilling ideological values. The main requirement for conducting ideological training and indoctrination is that there is time to do it. When armed groups are frequently engaged by their enemy, it becomes difficult to maintain ideological institutions because they are not necessary for immediate survival.


Thus, the lack of capacity for institutions occurs in any conflict that has frequent engagements with the enemy. The group simply doesn't have the time or security. But what happens when these engagements are regular and the group is decisively pushed back or defeated? While ideology can go a long way in offering combatants the internal fortitude to continue fighting in desperate situations, surely this strength is finite. If, as member of a radical group, you are not only constantly on the run or never in a position to properly rest due to counterinsurgent actions, life is hard. However, if this is occurring and the group is not at all making any

progress – perhaps not even inflicting casualties on the enemy while many members of the group die – this is demoralising.

Thus, we must consider the actual operational tempo of ideological armed groups. It becomes very easy to maintain a radical ideology when the group is not being properly challenged, for whatever reason that may be. However, if the group is consistently being attacked, not only is it difficult to maintain an ideology, but it also becomes difficult to remain optimistic about outcomes. As such, the intensity in which a radical armed group is the recipient of violence from their enemy is a crucial variable that inhibits an armed group from both maintaining their ideology and being overconfident.

Similar effects may also be witnessed in large scale decisive battlefield operations from the enemy. If a successful counterinsurgent operation is able to destroy major bases, infrastructure, and weapons caches, this can be a reality shock to armed groups. It has the potential of destroying hope and crushing faith in the group's ability to bring about victory. While the common saying goes 'there are no atheists in foxholes,' it is perhaps also appropriate to consider that for many, foxholes are the cure for radicalism.

Process of Combat Defeats



Cases

To illustrate how these mechanisms might work and their limitations, it is helpful to look more in depth to two different groups of varying radicalism and outcome. These two groups are the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines. This case selection method can be described as 'deviant' which 'demonstrates a surprising value' and can be 'closely linked to the investigation of theoretical anomalies.'[315] These cases are deviant because each group begins with radical intentions but do not experience extreme outcomes. The MILF and ASG have respective radicalism scores of 5.4 and 3.9. These two groups help explain why and how radicalism can change as their varying trajectory help clarify the variation in outcomes. Equally, just as both of these groups are Islamic and in the Philippines, they also operated at the same time. Where these two groups vary is in their outcome: the MILF achieved a soft victory, while the ASG a soft defeat. As ideology, location, time, and state military strength are equal, this comparison helps us understand how radicalism can change and what that might look like and why.

MILF

The MILF experienced virtually all of the mechanisms and subsequently accepted a peace deal from the Philippine government. This example also allows us to see how these mechanisms work together. The MILF was clearly becoming more moderate over time (generational change), the group had a significant leadership change, it modified its goals pragmatically over time, which coincided with a considerable battlefield losses. The MILF is an example of a group that began radical and then its ideology slowly decayed.

[315] Jason Seawright and John Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options," *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (2008) p 302.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) found its beginnings from within the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MILF was originally a splinter group from the MNLF which broke away in 1977 following the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and MNLF peace negotiations, due to 'differences in ideological orientation, political strategy, and ethnic allegiances.'[316] The splinter group, then named the New MNLF, was led by Salamat Hashim, former Chairman of Foreign Affairs of the MNLF,[317] who was educated in Cairo and influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistani Jamaat.[318] The period between 1977 and 1984 for the MILF consisted of 'quiet organizational and military build-up'[319] and a clear declaration that it was no longer associated with the MNLF, specifically by officially adopting its current name. The name change was important for the group not only because it distinguished the group from the MNLF, but also because it introduced the word 'Islamic', signalling a separate ideological direction from the MNLF. Iqbal, a MILF 'propaganda chief' said the name change was made 'in order to set in perfect place and direction the very raison d'être for launching the struggle.'[320]

The MILF tried to emphasise inclusiveness, specifically of non-Muslims and Christians,[321] as the MILF Central Committee had 'tended to include members of the traditional, secular, and religious elites.'[322] It appears that the MILF tried to blend ideology and pragmatism early on,

[316] Soliman Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines," 2010. P 150.
[317] Santos Jr et al.
[318] Lawrence Cline, "The Islamic Insurgency in the Philippines," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 11, no. 3 (2000): 115–38. p 125.
[319] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 150
[320] Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, "Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf : Who ' s Afraid of an Islamic State ?," *Public Policy* 3, no. 4 (1999). p 44.
[321] It should be noted that the MILF have been equally 'inclusive' with their attacks, which have included Christian civilians and targets.
[322] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 346.

as some scholars note that the MILF 'made ideology, and identity issues flexible; tailoring both territorial and group objectives to meet exigency.'[323]

Despite this variety of tolerance, the MILF is still very much Islamic. Just *how* Islamic and what *kind* of Islam the MILF practices, or did, appears to be expressed differently over the years. A senior member of the organisation stated in the early '90s that 'jihad is a collective responsibility of all Muslims' and that the MILF is 'an Islamic, mass-based organisation where jihad is obligatory for all the Bangsamoro.'[324] While the definition of jihad in this context is unclear, this is the recognisable language of radical Islam. Additionally, Salamat, the group's leader, shared the group's six objectives, which were almost all Islamic in nature in 1998. [325]

Combat Defeat

There appears to be a shift in ideological expression and goals in the 2000s, however. In 2000, the GRP conducted an 'all out war' against the MILF, championed by President Estrada. The offensive operations dealt dramatic losses to the MILF, including their main base, Camp Abu Bakar.[326] This forced the MILF to change their structure and strategy.

Early on in the 'mid-1980s' the MILF 'had a firm network of at least seven major camps,' which were used training that was 'oriented to semi-conventional warfare, including positional

[323] Alpaslan Ozerdem, Sukanya Podder, and Eddie Quitoriano, "Identity , Ideology and Child Soldiering : Community and Youth Participation in Civil Conflict – A Study on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao , Philippines," *Civil Wars* 12, no. 3 (2010): 304–25. p 309.

[324] Shamsuddin L Taya, "The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Self-Determination in the Philippines," *Intellectual Discourse* 15, no. 1 (2007): 59–84. p 64.

[325] Zahir, Abu. "Interview with Sheikh Salamat Hashim, Amir of the Moro Mujahideen." Nida'ul Islam. http://islam.org.au/articles/23/ph1.htm (accessed February 16, 2019).

[326] Zachary Abuza, "The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20 : State of the Revolution," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, no. 6 (2005): 453–79. p 462.

warfare.'[327] The MILF's first major operation was in 1986, known as the 'MILF 5-Day War,' which was a 'five-day tactical offensive' in response to MNLF's 'Jeddah Accord' with President Aquino, helped secure 'its own truce meetings with Aquino.'[328] Thus, by this time, the MILF was militarily formidable enough to create the conditions for negotiations with the government. From the beginning, the MILF's 'target was to destroy the enemy's will to fight and to win the hearts and minds of the population.'[329]

In 1999 and 2000, as the MILF had 'become more confrontational and daring,'[330] and the GRP responded with an 'all out war,' which resulted in the MILF losing all of its 'fixed camps.'[331] After this disastrous defeat, the MILF could no longer attempt to wage conventional and mobile tactics and was forced to resort to employing 'small units…using ambushes and hit-and-run-tactics against military targets,'[332] otherwise known a guerrilla tactics. As the camps were lost, one could perhaps argue that the MILF also lost some of its connection to civilians, which were partially integrated in these camps . This is reflected in what appears to be an increase in civilian victimisation post-2000. For example, after 2000, the MILF would carry out 'isolated' attack against 'civilians to extort money' which were 'exclusively oriented against Christian business.'[333] Likewise, the MILFs 2003 counter-offensive 'resulted in the deaths of many civilians, some of whom were used as human shields by the MILF.'[334] Even into the year 2008, MILF units perpetrated 'several human rights abuses' against 'Christian communities,'

[327] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 352.
[328] "Philippine Human Development Report 2005: Peace, Human Security and Human Development in the Philippines," 2005.p. 73.
[329] Quimpo, "Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf : Who ' s Afraid of an Islamic State ?" p 45.
[330] Diaz, Understanding Mindanao Conflict. p 82.
[331] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 352.
[332] Jean-louis Arcand et al., "Conflict , Ideology and Foreign Aid Conflict , Ideology and Foreign Aid," 2011. p 12
[333] Arcand et al. p 12.
[334] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 357.

which included killing villagers with machetes, torturing civilians, 'burning houses, schools, and business; and looting.'[335] Regarding such instances, the MILF Central Committee either says these atrocities are to be blamed on the GRP who are responsible for the conflict, or on rogue MILF commanders.

After the GRP's 'all out war,' the BIAF, the armed wing of the MILF, 'went through major restructuring,'[336] largely due to the loss of their camps. From their previous six divisions, the BIAF reorganised into 'nine base commands' that range from '1,200 to over 3,000 fighters' that are divided into smaller 'unit-brigades.'[337] There is a large variation in the size and function of the base commands, as some are very small and engage 'mostly in guerrilla tactics,' while others 'are quite large, fixed camps…and control vast territories.'[338]

The 2000 government offensive also brought about other changes to the group. For one, command and control appears to have been affected. Based on the adoption of almost purely guerrilla tactics, MILF's 'top leadership has loosened its firm grip over those rebels in the field' to allow for 'autonomy in coping with situations on the ground' which has resulted in 'less MILF control of its field units now than before the AFP offensive.'[339] While it's unclear to what extent the GRP offensive had a permanent effect on the group's institutional capacity, it is clear that such an enormous operation would have at least temporarily and severely disrupted the group's ability to carry on with ideological training. Though it would be naïve in

[335] Santos Jr et al. p 357.
[336] Abuza, "The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20 : State of the Revolution." p 462.
[337] Abuza. p 462.
[338] Abuza. p 462.
[339] Ariel Cacultian, "Negotiating Peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Southern Philippines" (Naval Postgraduate School, 2005). p 31.

this context to suggest that the MILF's movement towards autonomy demands, rather than secession, is due to their lack of institutional capacity during the government offensive, its disruption certainly did not present an obstacle to pragmatism.

It is evident that the Philippine offensive targeting the MILF was a major shock to the group. Prior to the attack, the group was firm on secession from the Philippines and was even waging semi-conventional war. After the attack, the group had to entirely reorganise, could only use guerrilla tactics and soon stated they would accept autonomy in Mindanao. While it was the MILF's firm ideological goals of state-hood and Islam that initially forced its splinter from the MNLF, whatever resilience and optimism the MILF's initial radicalism may have offered them was certainly muted after their almost decisive defeat.

Leadership Change

In 2003, Salamat Hashim, the MILF's leader, died of natural causes. Salamat is known for stating that the MILF's 'methodology' is the 'complete submission to the Will of Allah.'[340] Salamat ensured that the MILF 'was gradually transformed ideologically from being 'nationalistic' to 'Islamic'.'[341] Under Salamat the group's ideology has been described as 'radical Islamic revivalism or radical political Islamism,'[342] though the MILF 'is in no way comparable in attitudes or practices to Islamic fundamentalist organizations elsewhere in East Asia.'[343] Salamat's death allowed Murad 'a moderate, nationalistic-type leader' to take over the leadership of the MILF and who 'reiterated MILF's territorial and nationalistic

[340] Zahir.
[341] Quimpo, "Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf : Who ' s Afraid of an Islamic State ?" p 44.
[342] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 345.
[343] Salvatore Schiavo-campo and Mary Judd, "The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines : Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend," 2005. p 2.

objectives.'[344] This change is indicative of the trend that 'the glue of identity, ideology, and an Islamic way of life that the MILF touted as its Bangsamoro ideal has weakened over time'.[345] Salamat's death was an opportunity for the group to reorient its objectives that were more amicable for negotiation.

Generational Change

This weakening over time can partly be attributed to generational change. Once the MILF was a group that helped train Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) fighters, a group closely connected to Al-Qaeda,[346] while later they 'offered to fight hand in hand with the Philippine military to end the Abu Sayyaf problem.'[347] Part of the reason to target the more extremist and local Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was because their tactics, such as kidnapping 'are against Islam. [The MILF] do not sanction most of their activities.'[348] But also likely because it was a means of remaining off of the US's Foreign Terrorist Organisation list in the shadow of 9/11. Without dismissing the effect of the 'War on Terror' and the strategic decisions of the MILF, there was an increasingly more moderate critical mass that was emerging in the group.

This was evidenced through statements from MILF officials. For example, the MILF chief negotiator in 2005 said in an interview that 'the best way to solve the conflict in the region was through a negotiated political settlement,'[349] while another senior MILF member in the

[344] Andrew T H Tan, "Terrorism , Insurgency and Religious Fundamentalism in Southeast Asia Terrorism , Insurgency and Religious Fundamentalism in Southeast Asia," *Defence Studies* 8, no. 3 (2008): 311–25. p 319.
[345] Sukanya Podder, "Legitimacy , Loyalty and Civilian Support for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front : Changing Dynamics in Mindanao , Philippines," *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 13, no. 4 (2012): 495–512. p 511.
[346] Brian Jackson et al., "Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups," 2005. p 78.
[347] Tan, "Terrorism , Insurgency and Religious Fundamentalism in Southeast Asia Terrorism , Insurgency and Religious Fundamentalism in Southeast Asia." p 318.
[348] Abuza, "The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20 : State of the Revolution." p 470.
[349] Taya, "The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Self-Determination in the Philippines." p 78.

same year framed the group's struggle without any reference to ideology, stating that the group's grievances are 'over the loss of their freedom, occupation of the Bangsamoro homeland and genocidal attacks.'[350] As early as 2002, the group tried to brand itself as non-fanatical, stating that the group 'counts on committed popular memberships who are not fanatical about their religion' and does not support 'terrorism or any extremist groups using religious faith as a tool for terroristic activities.'[351]

Within the group, the moderation was institutionalised. There were concerns of group fragmentation based on ideological differences since there was a collection of 'younger commanders sympathetic to Osama's brand of radical pan-Islamic ideology.'[352] Radicalism was becoming such a concern for the MILF that, as early as 2004, MILF leadership was 'monitoring those who return from the Middle East' and if they are found to be more radical than Salamat, 'then they have to be re-educated.'[353]

It is likely that this re-education is carried out by the department of Islamic Call and Guidance, a department part of the general staff that is responsible for 'strengthening Islamic consciousness, awareness, and education' coordination of the 'strict implementation of Islamization of all officers and elements of the BIAF.' [354] This is the internal institution that regulates and promulgates the Islamic ideology of the MILF and suggests that the organisation desires tight control of its message and ideas.

[350] Taya. p 63

[351] Tan, "Terrorism , Insurgency and Religious Fundamentalism in Southeast Asia Terrorism , Insurgency and Religious Fundamentalism in Southeast Asia." p 318.

[352] Tan. p 319.

[353] Abuza, "The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20 : State of the Revolution." p 461.

[354] BIAF, "General Order No. 1," 2005. p 6.

Thus, there was a clear concern for what kind of ideas, what brand of Islam, was infiltrating the group. The MILF leadership had a clear of idea of what it was willing to tolerate and institutionalised, what may be the first for any armed group, a moderating re-indoctrination program.

Though the MILF were not an archetypal radical group, their trajectory helps demonstrate how these mechanisms assist in creating the conditions for a negotiated settlement to civil war. The major factors that allowed the MILF to change their ideological goals and moderate their beliefs were undoubtedly the devastating 2000 government offensive and the leadership change that occurred in 2003. The two main causes were probably helped both by a diminished institutional capacity produced by the government offensive and the gradual moderation of beliefs brought about by generational change (and pragmatic considerations for the war on terror).

Abu Sayyaf Group

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) example highlights the importance of timing in regards to these mechanisms. In the case of the ASG, it's the mechanism of leadership change that greatly influences the trajectory of the group as their founding leader was killed relatively early in the group's history. The group's first leader, Janjalani, can be considered the ideologue and visionary of the group. It is possible that had he not been killed, the group *could* have remained radical and maintained its political goals, rather than slipping into the realm of crime and terrorism for profit.

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was founded by Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani in 1991. Initially, the group was named the Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters, which was believed to be 'a breakaway faction' from either the MILF or MNLF in the mid-80s.[355] The group allegedly began in earnest in 1991 when Janjalani fought the Soviets in Afghanistan and met with Osama Bin Laden's brother.[356] Unlike other Islamic groups, the ASG does not wish to establish a transnational caliphate. Also, unlike the MNLF or the MILF, the ASG 'has never vacillated in its demands for independence rather than autonomy.'[357] Thus, ASG's goals have been independence, an Islamic state, and they have not been willing to compromise in order to achieve them.

ASG's ideology is particularly intolerant to those who do not share it. For ASG, the enemy is 'not only the Philippine soldiers, but also non-combatants, both Christian and Muslim, who disagree with their version of Jihad,' while Janjalani notes that the enemy includes 'Jews and Christians who will never accept the Qur'an, Muslims who do not read the Qur'an, and the sick ulama (Islamic scholars) who quarrel with the Qur'an.'[358] It seems that the appearance of ideological Islamic purity was especially important for the ASG for foreign support. It's been noted that once an Al-Qaeda affiliated group began to cooperate with ASG, the group had 'a more ideological bent to its character'[359] while the group's radicalism 'and willingness to purge the impure, have all served as signals of their credibility as partners in jihad.'[360] Indeed,

[355] Alfredo L Filler, "The Abu Sayyaf Group : A Growing Menace to Civil Society The Abu Sayyaf Group : A Growing Menace to Civil Society," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 4 (2010): 131–62, https://doi.org/10.1080/714005638. p 131.
[356] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 116.
[357] Santos Jr et al. p 118.
[358] Santos Jr et al. p 120. ; Jennifer Keister, "States within States : How Rebels Rule" (University of California, San Diego, 2011). p 395.
[359] Keister, "States within States : How Rebels Rule." p 182.
[360] Keister. p 179.

members were ordered to 'kill, if necessary, all enemies who stood in their way of achieving their Islamic goal of the rule of the Koran.'[361]

However, while this perceived ideological radicalism was effective at attracting foreign support, it was not widely accepted locally. Of Janjalani, 'civilians respected his Islamic credentials and personal passion, but found his Islamic vision relatively far removed from their own practice.'[362] This wasn't entirely problematic for the group since it considered itself an Islamic vanguard movement in which 'popular mass support is less important to the ASG than what it believes is the correct 'straight path'.'[363]

Leadership Change

After the death of Janjalani in 1998, his brother Khaddafy took over and the group's ideology appeared to change. Some say it became 'even more radical.'[364] However, it also introduced other leadership characters that did not appear to put any emphasis on the ASG's Islamic ideology. ASG continued and increased their kidnappings which were, and still are, lucrative for the group. One of ASG's hostages comments that he thought 'they were really fundamentalists' but after some time, 'he realised they were out only to make money. They only used Islam as a front.'[365] One anthropologist described the ASG 'like outlaws, but outlaws with an agenda and an ideology.'[366] The extent of ASG's ideology is confusing; scholars note

[361] Filler, "The Abu Sayyaf Group : A Growing Menace to Civil Society The Abu Sayyaf Group : A Growing Menace to Civil Society." p 132.
[362] Keister, "States within States : How Rebels Rule." p 175.
[363] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 121.
[364] Keister, "States within States : How Rebels Rule." p 389.
[365] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 127.
[366] Charles Frake, "Abu Sayyaf : Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities among Philippine Muslims," *American Anthropologist*, 1998.p. 48.

that the group's 'ideological position has become muddled'[367] and that 'it does not possess a well-defined ideological or religious motivation,'[368] the motivation instead being 'the allure of money and power that comes from the barrel of a gun.'[369] Baker Atyani, a Jordanian journalist and a hostage of ASG for 18 months, reiterates that ASG has little knowledge of ideology and is better considered like a loosely connected mafia.[370]

The ASG primarily conducts terrorist attacks and kidnappings. There are some intervals where one seems to be prioritised over the other, specifically kidnapping after the death of Janjalani. The rise in kidnappings is often credited to new leaders, named Robot and Nadni Uddih, who helped create ASG's 'bandit nature.'[371] Once these individuals were killed in 2003 and 2005, 'almost all kidnapping incidents by the ASG have ceased', and the ASG was 'getting back into the terrorism business.'[372]

Overall, it appears as though ASG began as an ideological group; however, Janjalani was never able to make it quite the ideological group he was hoping for. Once he was killed, ASG's ideology seems to have shifted to the background, while crime and kidnapping approached the foreground.

[367] Keister, "States within States : How Rebels Rule." p 429.
[368] Filler, "The Abu Sayyaf Group : A Growing Menace to Civil Society The Abu Sayyaf Group : A Growing Menace to Civil Society." p 140.
[369] Rommel C Banlaoi, "The Sources of the Abu Sayyaf's Resilience in the Southern Philippines," *CTC Sentinel* 3, no. 5 (2010): 17–19. p 19.
[370] Rappler.com, https://www.facebook.com/rapplerdotcom/videos/14726franc13206092791/?v=1472613206092791
[371] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 127.
[372] Santos Jr et al. p 127.

Lack of Institutional Capacity

ASG appears to be a case where institutional capacity wasn't lost, but it never existed in the first place. Little information exists on ASG's indoctrination practices. One scholar suggests that at least some of the children who are recruited into the group receive some form of 'Islamic education as well as military training.'[373] One reason for this is perhaps due to individuals being recruited from ASG families, where indoctrination and screening is not required. Another reason is that it just might not happen in any significant form, since 'the level of ideological indoctrination necessary to produce a suicide bomber are not yet found in or around the ASG.'[374]

With funds secured through large ransom payments, ASG targets youth 'not interested in ideology, but in guns and money,' while some families will volunteer their sons 'in exchange for a monthly supply of rice and financial support…of around $200.'[375] The number of recruits who join to 'exact revenge' on the state for killing friends and family are 'few.'[376] It seems that ASG's recruitment strategies are partly to blame why it is not the group it once was due to 'its current schizophrenic personality' of members who follow ASG, the MNLF, or MILF 'depending on the expedient situation.'[377]

ASG governance is inconsistent, but mostly relies on coercion and buying support. Janjalani was apparently the only one who had any vision for establishing an Islamic society; however,

[373] Quimpo, "Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf : Who ' s Afraid of an Islamic State ?" p 51.
[374] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 121.
[375] Banlaoi, "The Sources of the Abu Sayyaf's Resilience in the Southern Philippines." p 18
[376] Banlaoi. p 18.
[377] Rommel C Banlaoi, "Current Terrorist Groups and Emerging Extremist Armed Movements in the Southern Philippines:," no. September (2012). p 166.

he lacked expertise in political organization.[378]The ASG is small group that has a non-hierarchical structure[379], which allows it to operate 'in loosely coupled groups'[380] and is described as 'not a well-structured terror group.'[381] Overall, there is no centralised chain of command and no 'fully functioning collective leadership' allowing local leaders to make their own decisions.[382] The group is made up of many different factions. For example, in the region of Basilan in 2002, 10 different factions under the name of ASG operated 'acting independently of each other' while in Sulu, there were 16.[383] One explanation for this comes from a previous hostage of ASG who says that the group franchises its name and brand.

Atyani suggests that ASG is just a collection of criminal communities who desire more money.[384] Some of this is substantiated by other findings which show that 'when different portions of ASG's loose membership interact with one another, they are as likely to compete as to cooperate' and that ASG is a brand 'not an accurate descriptor of a well-formed organization.'[385] Others describe the group as 'a very heterogenous organization of faction and individuals with varying interests from radical Islamism to mere banditry.'[386] ASG factions are 'composed mostly of their own family members' using marriage to 'solidify connections'

[378] Keister, "States within States : How Rebels Rule." p 394.
[379] Keister. p 182.
[380] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 369
[381] Luke M Gerdes, Kristine Ringler, and Barbara Autin, "Assessing the Abu Sayyaf Group's Strategic and Learning Capacities," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37, no. 3 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.872021. p 287.
[382] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 368.
[383] Rommel C Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism ?," *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2006. p 28.
[384] Rappler.com, https://www.facebook.com/rapplerdotcom/videos/1472613206092791/?v=1472613206092791
[385] Gerdes, Ringler, and Autin, "Assessing the Abu Sayyaf Group's Strategic and Learning Capacities." p 270.
[386] Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism ?" p 29.

and even exchanging widows between factions to keep ties strong.[387] These familial ties allow 'internal coordination [to be] facilitated by trust.'[388]

Combat Defeats

ASG was confronted with significant losses in 2002. Following the 9/11 attacks in the US, air fields in the Philippines were lent to the American forces to support their Operation Enduring Freedom.[389] With special forces advisors, the US began training the Filipino army which was found to be 'in disarray and lacking in basic infantry skills and initiative.'[390] US forces operated alongside the Filipino army in Basilan and in six months decreased ASG's fighters to 'a few hundred' from their at-peak figure of a thousand.[391] This defeat helped create conditions for ASG members to confine themselves generally to the Sulu islands, where they continue to exist today. The Filipino military remains competent against the ASG as it has eliminated 'dozens of its leaders and hundreds of its combatants over the years' [392] with assessments that the ASG is currently 'in disarray, with only a handful of subleaders still alive.'[393] The

ASG is a group that began as radical; however, it wasn't long until the efforts to secure goal of an autonomous Islamic state in the Philippines dissipated in favour of using their perceived Islamic extremism to bolster ransom prices for their routine kidnappings. The group doesn't seem to have had the capacity to establish institutions to proliferate its ideology, especially

[387] Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/abu-sayyaf-blood-drugs-conspiracies-160724090604857.html
[388] Santos Jr et al., "Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines." p 369.
[389] https://irp.fas.org/world/para/manalo.pdf
[390] Gregory Wilson, "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach," *Military Review*, no. November-December (2006) p 43.
[391] Eusaquito Manalo, "The Philippine Response To Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group" (Naval Postgraduate School, 2004) p 59.
[392] Internationa Crisis Group, "Addressing Islamist Militancy in the Southern Philippines : Asia Report N°323," 2022 p 10.
[393] Internationa Crisis Group p 10.

after the founding leader was killed—this was likely the main mechanism that altered the group's radicalism which has resulted in a soft defeat.

Why Different Outcomes?

When considering why the MILF achieved a soft victory and why the ASG suffered a soft defeat, there are several distinctions to be made between these two groups. Though both groups found their beginning in the MNLF to an extent, the MILF has consistently been more organised and more serious about achieving their political goals. Ideology *always* meant more to the MILF than it did to ASG. The major distinction is that the MILF possessed political goals, while ASG used the perception of political goals for profit through ransoms. The MILF also was far better trained than ASG, which is predictable as the MILF brought the fight to the state, while ASG had little intent to, essentially nullifying training as a priority. Part of the reason the MILF were able to negotiate compromises with the Philippine government is the fact that they did pose a threat to the state, but also that they were able moderate their ideology in response to both offensive action from the Filippino military, but also the potential of being designated a terrorist group by the US. This moderation took time to germinate.

For the ASG, the reason they've achieved a soft defeat rather than a victory of any kind is due to the fact that they don't have discernible political goals that could be achieved to be considered a victory, somewhat like an organised crime group. The reason they've not suffered a hard defeat is likely due to the fact that the Philippine government continues to fight a communist rebellion in the north, is attempting to maintain peace regarding the agreements with the MNLF and MILF, and that ASG is mostly located on the small, somewhat

remote islands in Sulu. Radicalism is quite limited in explaining why the ASG suffered a soft defeat, but how radicalism can change within a group is well demonstrated by the MILF.

Conclusion

In order for radical armed groups to accept the idea of settlement in civil war, either a change in ideology is required or the importance of ideology itself needs to corrode. I've proposed several mechanisms that help accomplish these changes: generational change, leadership change, lack of institutional capacity, war weariness, and combat defeats. While the presence of these mechanisms does not guarantee that an armed group will settle in civil war, I suggest that in probabilistic terms, it increases the likelihood that it does. The collection of these permissive mechanisms do not need to be operating simultaneously to avoid an extreme outcome, though as seen in the case with the MILF, there is likely a cumulative effect. Also, simply because some or all of these mechanisms are present does not meet that an extreme outcome will be avoided. Finally, in the case of the ASG, we see that a group's radicalism can be greatly influenced by when these mechanisms take place, such as leadership change when an armed group is blossoming, with goals seemingly changing from political to criminal.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Research Question and Findings

What is the fortune of radical armed groups? This thesis and its analysis strongly points to the conclusion that radical armed groups either win or lose big. It points less strongly to the possibility that radicalism is an advantage in civil war. Why is this? Primarily, it's because radical armed groups are far more discouraged from considering negotiation and settlement as an option because their radicalism constrains them from doing so in direct and indirect ways. These constraints create barriers that make settling and negotiation difficult, limiting the possible universe of outcomes for radical armed groups to either a hard victory or hard defeat. While this is normally the case, a radical group need not remain radical indefinitely. Over time, radicalism has ways of decaying, through a combination of a loss of hope, combat defeats, new generations, and a deteriorated quality of life. Overall, this thesis finds that understanding the importance of ideology to an armed group, not just rhetorically, but also material, resources, and time, is necessary to identify when these types of groups might be willing to settle in civil war.

Engaging with literature from the fields of philosophy, sociology, political science, and international relations, I have interrogated the number of ways that ideology has been employed and studied. To properly understand ideology, it must be examined in association with both morality and identity. I suggest that ideology is a confused belief in the supremacy of a policy which is mistaken for the values that brought about its creation. Whatever values are prioritised in a community will inform what kind of policy we can expect to be

championed, while an individual's political identity is tied to the policy, rather than the values that the policy aims to uphold.

Civil War, Ideology, and Radicalism

The study of ideology in the civil war literature has been growing but it hasn't yet been able to consider the relationships that might exist *between* ideologies. In conventional war, the types of weapons matter. Whether your enemy has T-34 or T-70 tanks is an important distinction. While tactics will change based on which of these are employed, strategically, the plan remains the same: manoeuvre warfare. So far, in relation to ideology, the civil war literature has been concerned with the model of weapon non-state armed groups have, rather than the category of weapons systems they employ. Rather than compare the ideologies of armed groups based on their beliefs, we can learn more by trying to measure just *how* ideological these groups are. To bridge this gap, I have suggested to consider a dimension of ideology that treats the religious, nationalists, and leftists equally: radicalism.

Radicalism is a term that has been widely misunderstood and misused in recent decades as the result of government, think tanks, and academia trying to get to grips with Jihadism. The term has suffered from enormous concept stretching and I have tried to reclaim radicalism as a useful concept by defining it narrowly. I suggest that radicalism is a dimension of ideology and is a combination of three factors. The first is the desire for drastic change to the status quo. The second is that individuals appear to behave according to their ideological tenants. The third is that the means of obtaining the ideological goals is outside of the political routine and established institutions. An important distinction I make is that radicalism is relative to

its environment and that it is not normative. This allows us to consider radicalism in all states and not just define the term in opposition to what *we* believe.

Ideological Ambition and Institutionalisation

For non-state armed groups, I break radicalism down further into two categories that will help with its measurement: ideological ambition and ideological intensity. Ideological ambition has to do what it appears the leaders of non-state armed groups want, or in other words, their desire for political change and control. A group's desired political change can vary from aspiring to have more autonomy in their region, to demanding a change of regime, to wishing for a world-wide revolution. As these goals exist on a spectrum, we consider the extent of political change based on two criteria: if it fundamentally alters the state and the proportion of the population that would be affected by those changes. This gives us a means to contextualise just how large of a change a group desires from the status-quo. A group's desired political control is important because it creates a further condition that must be satisfied in order for the armed group to consider ending a war. Not all armed groups wish to be in control once their desired political changes have occurred—some wish for reunification with another state, while others appear satisfied with democratic reforms. Nonetheless, many groups do seek state control and radical groups also often want to control the way civilians live, intruding into their private lives and policing what kind of food and drink can be consumed, what music is allowed, and what individuals can say.

Ideological intensity is the other half of radicalism that is comprised of the beliefs of individuals within the group and the group-level practices that maintain those beliefs. When we think of radicals, we imagine that they are individuals with deeply held political beliefs,

that they internalise their ideology. It is someone we might consider to be a 'true believer.' Internalisation is an important aspect of radicalism. Whether they be combatants or leaders, if the individual *actually* holds their ideological beliefs to be true, their commitment to these ideas will be strong and have consequences when we ask why they may not want to settle a civil war.

Ideological institutionalisation is concerned with how the ideology is practiced within an armed group and also the amount of resources a group is willing to invest in an ideology. The logic here is that if the armed group leadership is serious about their ideology, as we would expect from radicals, then it matters if the beliefs of the combatants are align with the ideology the group subscribes to. This is done through a number of different ways, though the ideological institutionalisation that is focussed on in this thesis is recruit indoctrination, ideological training, civilian indoctrination, and the presence of a propaganda cadre. These institutions, should a group use and maintain them, advertise that the group is indeed serious about the ideology because these institutions absorb significant resources, whether or not the leaders that impose are doing so for instrumental reasons.

It is, of course, naïve to assume that it is possible to empirically observe or measure the average ideological internalisation of any group, let alone several dozens of them. It is for this reason that ideological institutionalisation substitutes for ideological intensity in this thesis.

Spectrum of Outcomes

When considering the relationship between radicalism and outcomes, it is necessary to define what we mean by outcomes. I created four different outcome categories that are not based on the mechanism of the outcome, but rather success the armed group had or had not achieved. Recognising that there is a spectrum of success crucial because not all victories or defeats are the same in civil war. Some win or lose everything, while others gain some concessions, and others still gain nothing. These categories of outcome are the following: hard victory, soft victory, soft defeat, and hard defeat. Doing so allows us to discriminate between the degrees of success a particular kind of armed group is most likely to experience – in our case, a radical group.

Most relevant for this thesis are the extremes of each spectrum (when a group achieves its primary goals or achieves none of them) as these are the extreme outcomes that my theory predicts are most likely to be experienced by radical armed groups.

The theory that I proposed is that radical armed groups are most likely to experience extreme outcomes due to the constraints that are consciously and unconsciously placed upon these groups by their ideology. These constraints discourage radical armed groups from seeking settlement in civil war, leaving them with the two most likely outcome: hard victory and hard defeat. I also offered that if radical armed groups do end up settling, this would most probably occur after long wars, since the mechanisms associated with decaying ideology, which removes the imposed barriers erected by radicalism, all take significant time to take place. I further theorised that the duration of civil wars for radical armed groups would be longer,

due in part to the time it takes a radical armed group to settle and that radicalism helps prolong war because it likely gives combatants more resilience to the many challenges individuals are faced with in war, as well as possibly improving the military effectiveness of the group as a whole, due to the organisation and standardisation that ideological institutionalisation demands.

Empirical Evidence and Analysis

To evaluate the plausibility of the theory, I created a dataset of 78 non-state armed groups that allowed me to assign radicalism scores to each group. I collected data on ideologically relevant variables like recruit indoctrination, ideological training, civilian indoctrination, propaganda cadre, group goals, and desired political control. The case selection was a random sample taken from the NSA database in order to avoid biases; however, not all biases could be avoided. Many groups were either dropped because they were still clearly fighting and others due to a dearth of data. This has resulted in a sample that favours armed groups with accessible data.

Data collection for the thesis was carried out via desk research and an expert survey, which ultimately was unsuccessful. The sources consulted included a wide range such as declassified intelligence reports, primary sources from the groups themselves, academic books and articles, as well as memoirs, news articles, and NGO reports. I weighed the different elements of radicalism in a manner that is congruent with the theory and the radicalism score was ultimately calculated with equal importance to ideological ambition and ideological institutionalisation.

In addition, I also offered a critique of the available data on conflict outcome and duration that is found in the most widely used conflict datasets. I found that there is often little agreement across datasets, which both calls into question how much we can rely on this data in the discipline, and justifies my own efforts to collect that data myself, according to my own needs. Considering this, I also collected outcome data based on my spectrum of success (hard victory, soft victory, soft defeat, hard defeat) and conflict duration.

My analysis of the data was not over complicated, relying on a combination of ordinary least squares (OLS), multinomial logistic, and binary logistic models. The goal of the analysis was not to provide causal proof of my theory, but rather to reveal the plausibility of the theory. I included a number of controls in my models that would most closely be associated with conflict outcome, such as armed group relative strength to the government, external support, and fighting capacity. In addition, I also used geographic and ideological controls.

The results of the analysis suggest that the theory is indeed plausible. Statistically significant associations between radicalism and extreme outcomes were clear. The more radical an armed group was, the more likely it was to have either experienced a hard victory or hard defeat, and the least likely to attain a soft victory. Moreover, in statistical terms, radicalism was able to explain substantial volume of the variation in outcomes. It was noted, however, that other factors are also important for understanding civil war outcome, including geography and ideology type.

A striking feature of the analysis is that it appeared to reveal that it's quite possible that radical armed groups have an advantage in civil war, a finding that was not expected. It is possible

that by virtue of being radical ,in my sense of the term, the ideological institutionalisation creates added layers of control and discipline which could translate into military effectiveness. Whether or not ideology makes armed groups more organised, or groups with a higher organisational capacity are the most likely to be radical is a question that is not answered in this thesis.

With respect to conflict duration, there appeared to be no linear relationship with radicalism. Using thresholds of five and ten years, there does seem to be a significant relationship between duration and radicalism, most notably radical groups are most likely to be in conflict over ten years.

Mechanisms Encouraging and Discouraging Extreme Outcomes

To explain why these results might be, I conducted case studies to highlight the mechanisms that I believe are responsible for the effects seen in the data analysis using converging evidence. I first described the mechanisms at play that discourage radical armed groups from seeking settlement in civil war, then I moved on to the mechanisms that can encourage radical armed groups to do the opposite.

Through a case study of the Shining Path and CPN-M, I demonstrate how discouraging mechanisms might work. I highlighted five main mechanisms the following: intrinsic belief, internal audience costs, institutionalisation, monitoring, and pluralistic ignorance. Intrinsic belief is the simplest answer as to why radicals choose not to settle. If radicals truly believe

their ideology, which often characterises the state as evil, it is not a curiosity that these groups do not engage with ideas of compromise with an enemy they morally detest.

The fear of internal audience costs is a bit more complicated. I suggest that leaders of radical armed groups will be discouraged from seeking a compromise with the state because they fear that doing so will affect the cohesion of the group, perhaps leading to fragmentation or their own removal from power. This is because radical groups heavily invest in ideological institutions, and whether or not the leader believes in the ideology, from their perspective, they will overestimate the importance placed on ideology by the combatants. Most combatants probably don't internalise the ideology of the group; however, as a result of increased monitoring and pluralistic ignorance they have to behave as though they do because they will be punished if they don't. Without knowing the true private preferences of their combatants, leaders are only left with their perception of what combatants believe, which is heavily conditioned by the leaders' direction to indoctrinate combatants and train them ideologically.

Regarding the mechanisms that discourage extreme outcomes for radical armed groups, I examine two cases in the Philippines, the MILF and ASG. I highlighted five mechanisms that are particularly relevant for radical armed groups, which are the following: generational change, leadership change, loss of institutional capacity, war weariness, and combat defeats.

A group's radicalism can change over time and one of the reasons for this is that the inner make up of members has changed. Over long enough periods, we can consider this generational change. What occurs in this instance is that the founding members and

combatants (the group's first generation) will get older, wounded, or even killed, meaning that replacements will occur. These replacements will not be as connected to the ideology the group maintains, and if they are, the nature of that relationship will be slightly different. The second, third, and fourth generations of combatants are likely not to take the group's ideology as seriously as the first generation. In a way, this is the decay of ideology. As these later generations are promoted into leadership roles, they bring along with them their perceptions and beliefs, which will be reflected in the day-to-day business of the group. It is uncontroversial to suggest that there will be a time when the ideology becomes more symbolic than meaningful, removing the barriers presented by internal audience costs and intrinsic belief to a settlement.

Another way these barriers can be removed is when leadership change occurs within the group. Some leaders get killed, others are captured or ousted. It's possible that when such a change occurs within a radical groups that the leader could well be *more* radical than the previous leader. The opposite is also true. Moderating leaders can create opportunities for the leader to seek negotiations with the state, so long as they're able to retain control if it.
Over time radical armed groups, for many different reasons, may lower or stop the level of ideological institutionalisation they employ. In some cases, this is due to requiring many new recruits and not having the facilities or resources to properly train them. In other cases, it's because the group invested heavily in ideology before or in the early stages of the war, being unable to sustain the same level of indoctrination and training once they are properly fighting the war. When the ideological institutions collapse, so does the ideology, and hence, the level of radicalism. It lower the perceived internal audience costs of leadership, removing it as an obstacle from seeking settlement.

Ideological decay can also occur over long conflicts due to war weariness. Combatants being forced to suffer terrible living conditions, being hungry, dirty, and seeing little progress is massively demoralising. While radicalism might protect combatants from demoralisation for some time, it will eventually dissipate.

Combat defeats can also work to minimise the radicalism of armed groups. This is in part due to its effect on the ability to maintain ideological institutions when the more pressing priority is war fighting as well as the shock decisive combat defeats can instil within the armed group. Major defeats can incapacitate armed groups and force leaders and combatants alike to re-evaluate if their position is tenable.

Limitations: Role of the State

While the primary focus of this thesis is on armed groups, it is necessary to consider the role of the state with respects to the possible civil war outcomes of radical armed groups. It is clear that states are able to leverage the use of terms like radicalism and extremism to suit their own interests and it's unclear if states are able to correctly identify radical armed groups. I detail state-centric conditions that will help explain both how states can create conditions for and militate against extreme outcomes.

For conditions promoting extreme outcomes, the first is external audience costs. Put simply, states may value interstate relationships more than the domestic stability of a potential diplomatic end to civil war. States may feel pressured to decisively defeat what they perceive

to be radical armed groups based on transnational norms to win friends and support abroad or for other covert strategic reasons.

The internal audience cost is also an important condition, as even if state leaders wished to concede territory, power, or recognition to a radical armed group to end the war, the price these leaders could pay domestically from a populace that is vehemently opposed to the armed group could be more fatal for the government than a continued war.

Of course, the state administration could also despise the radical armed group on its own ideological grounds, intrinsically believing that their enemy is evil and any thought of negotiations with the group is intolerable.

Finally, the state may perceive the radical armed group to be a higher threat than non-radical groups, believing them to have more resolve, to be more serious, and to have foreign support. A pragmatic response to this elevated threat is to dedicate enormous resources to fight it and extinguish the rebel fire before it is properly alite. Perceiving these groups to be an elevated threat creates a sense of urgency which is counterproductive to possible negotiations with the armed group.

States may also be in the position to discourage extreme outcomes with radical armed groups. For one, the survival of the radical armed group may be ideologically or strategically important to other more powerful states. These more powerful states may be in a position to influence administration to alter its course of action against the radical armed group. The state

administration in question may fear the consequences of a continued war with the group, perhaps in the form of sanctions or intervention.

States too become war weary. The enormous volume of resources required to fight a war, as well as loss of life, can become very difficult to endure. The domestic population will eventually tire of war and the state will want to focus its efforts on other priorities other than national defence. In such cases, it's conceivable the state will seek to negotiate with the radical armed group.

Finally, it's possible that the ideology and radicalism of an armed group may lose it's radical characteristic as society changes over the years and actually comes to accept the armed groups goals and ideas as mainstream.

Alternative Explanations

What else might explain why we see radical armed groups achieving extreme outcomes? I have identified three alternative explanations, though they appear to be less robust than my theory: institutionalisation, mimic groups, and radical obsessives.

Institutionalisation

If we ignore the ideological explanations, it is possible that highly institutionalised armed groups are also well-organised and probably competent war-fighting organisations. This would explain why institutionalisation is so closely correlated with achieving a hard victory.

What this doesn't explain, however, is why the leaders of well-organised and trained combatants would be systematically biased against settlement in civil war.

Mimic Groups

If we accept that institutionalisation likely makes radical groups fight better than they otherwise would, this opens the possibility of mimic and copy cat groups being created in the hopes that the success of radical groups will be copied, too. If we further allow that groups which copy radical armed groups won't do so especially well, we would then be left with two categories of radical armed groups: the truly radical who win and the copy-cat radicals that lose. Again, this explanation would be more attractive if it wasn't for groups such as the Shining Path and LTTE, considered to be some of the highest ideologically committed groups in recent history, to have suffered hard defeats.

Radical Obsessives

Similar to the above, two categories of radical groups might exist—those who are radical by my definition and those that are radically obsessive. Radically obsessive armed groups are those that prioritise ideological training and activities above all else, including combat training. This would mean that we would have a collection of radical armed groups which reap the benefit of radicalism and win and those that don't (radical obsessives). This would lead to the same observation of radical armed groups disproportionately experiencing extreme outcomes. This explanation does not appear likely as only one instance of a misplaced emphasis on ideological training at the cost of combat training was identified, the JVP in Sri Lanka.

Thesis' Implications

The major implication of this thesis is that radicalism in civil war is not an outright advantage, but a serious gamble. For radical armed groups, it appears as though they must be prepared to lose it all to win it all because there is seldom a middle ground of success for them to achieve. If armed group leaders declare their intention to secure lofty goals and think that using ideology instrumentally to create a more resilient, dedicated, and organised radical armed group with the true hopes of achieving moderate goals, it may come as an unwelcome surprise that such an outcome is unusual. Put simply, this thesis suggests that radicalism is not an effective bargaining tool.

Secondly, this thesis implies that generalised ideological labels are not the only useful means to categorise and understand armed groups. It is necessary not only to pay attention to what armed groups say, but also what they do. The concept and measurement of radicalism I have devised in this thesis helps make that distinction. What is likely the most effective avenue for understanding armed groups from an ideological perspective is to both consider what kind of ideology they hold and their radicalism. Doing so, however, is hard work.

Related to this point, this thesis also suggests that a deep qualitative understanding of armed groups is necessary make further progress in regards to such challenging dimensions like ideology within the civil war literature. Quantitative metrics in the social sciences can obscure reality, and while the dataset I've compiled may be the most comprehensively researched of its kind, it too is lacking the profound expert knowledge to trace the evolution of ideology

over time within these groups. What makes this problematic is that I'm convinced that for some of the armed groups that appear in popular datasets, no experts likely do exist.

For policy makers and NGOs that desire to bring about peace, this thesis suggests that knowing detailed information about the inner workings of the armed group is crucial to be able to appreciate the what ideological barriers may or may not exist. Equally, there may be better or worse times to approach radical armed groups for potential mediation which are all, unfortunately, strongly linked to longer wars.

Future Research

This thesis has touched upon the role of radicalism and its potential influence on military effectiveness. Military effectiveness, in and of itself, is a neglected topic in civil war literature and exploring the topic through the perspective of radicalism would further demonstrate the usefulness of the concept. Particularly, institutional capacity may be a useful proxy for military effectiveness as the ability for an armed group to organise will certainly improve their ability to fight.

There are several factors that comprise military effectiveness: knowledge of tactics and strategy, a clear chain of command, open lines of communication, discipline, material, and the will to kill and die. Within some armed groups, being able to note their ideological institutions accounts for half of these factors.

Additionally, radicalism might help explain the difficulties former combatants could experience when re-integrating into society once the conflict has ended. We might assume

that radical groups that lose will have more difficulty with truth and reconciliation efforts. Uncovering the relationship between radicalism after peace could help anticipate challenges and shape policy for how to lead to an enduring peace. It may be slightly counter-intuitive as well, as while radicalism may exasperate divisions between combatants and civilians, the increased group control that appears to accompany radicalism could potentially be leveraged in creative ways to alleviate these cleavages.

Other potential avenues of research can be found in the relationship between radicalism and the armed group's interaction with civilians. Some factors, such as the false consensus bias, may help use explain how any why some armed groups choose to pursue civilian victimisation. There may also be a relationship between radicalism and one-sided violence which can potentially be used to identify conditions lead to their occurrences and perhaps techniques that can prevent them.

While the focus of this thesis has been on the radicalism of armed groups, it is perhaps appropriate to extend the same designation to states. This could potentially help identify ideological motives and specific state behaviour for administrations. Radical states likely share critical features that would help us not only explain but anticipate their actions.

Finally, this thesis has stressed the likely outcomes of radical armed groups in civil war. It is important to consider, however, what non-radical groups may have in common. Now that we have a means of separating armed groups based on the importance of their ideology, it allows us to think about what occurs in civil wars when ideology is not a prime motivator or means of sustaining political violence.

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
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
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Ideological Ambition

Desired Political Change
0-No desired changes expressed
1-Autonomy Seeking
2-Seccession Seeking
3-Seeking regime change and/or change of political system within one country (Revolutionary)
4-Seeking regime change and/or change of political system transnationally (Revolutionary)




Desired Political Control
What is the estimated group desire for control?
0-No control
1-Partial control
2-Full control




Ideological Institutionalisation

Recruit Indoctrination
Does it appear that new recruits of the armed group were required to undergo ideological/political/religious indoctrination?
0-No evidence of recruit indoctrination
1-Yes



Ideological Training
Does it appear that group members as a whole, after the recruit period were required to undergo ideological/political/religious training?
0-No evidence of ideological training
1-Possible ideological training
2-Explicit ideological training




Civilian Indoctrination

Did armed groups appear to persuade and influence civilian population in a more or less systematic fashion?

0-No evidence of civilian indoctrination

1-Yes




Propaganda

What best describes the group's propaganda operations?

0-Did not appear to produce propaganda


1-Produced propaganda

2-Formalised propaganda with a dedicated cadre



Radicalism

Radicalism is weighted score of both ideological institutionalisation and ambition. The score ranges from 0 to 10.



Outcome


To what extent did armed groups win or lose?

HV-Hard Victory

SV-Soft Victory

SD-Soft Defeat

HD-Hard Defeat




By Ideology

Ideology	Avg Radicalism	Outcome	Outcome Proportion
Leftist	6.8	Hard Victory = 7	33%
		Soft Victory = 2	10%
		Soft Defeat = 2	10%
		Hard Defeat = 10	47%
Nationalist	4.2	Hard Victory = 9	29%
		Soft Victory = 8	26%
		Soft Defeat = 4	13%
		Hard Defeat = 10	32%
Other	4.5	Hard Victory = 2	17%
		Soft Victory = 4	33%
		Soft Defeat = 3	25%
		Hard Defeat = 3	25%
Religious	7.1	Hard Victory = 5	42%
		Soft Victory = 1	8%
		Soft Defeat = 0	0%
		Hard Defeat = 6	50%

Annex B – Statistical Checks

Pearson Correlation Matrix

Below is the Pearson correlation matrix for all of the control variables that appear within my quantitative models. Due to the limited number of observations in my data set and the high number of control variables I use, it is important to understand the relationship between these variables. There are only two relationships in the matrix that begin to suggest a lack of independence. The first is between 'Africa' and 'Asia', which are different categories of the same variable and have a correlation of -0.65. This suggests there may be systematic differences between these two regions regarding civil war, which isn't surprising, nor is it troubling for this study. The correlation, in this case, would be classified as 'medium.'[394] The second is a correlation of 0.49 between 'Middle East' and 'Religious' which also isn't surprising and considered borderline 'medium' correlation. While the interpretation of these coefficients is conditional based upon the use and purpose of these variables, this matrix suggests that the relationships between variables are sufficiently weak to consider the vast majority of variables to be adequately independent of one another.



[394] Jacob Cohen, *Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences*, Second (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoicates, 1988) p 82.

Generalized Variance Inflation Factor (GVIF) Test

The GVIF test is used to assess multicollinearity within a model. As there are no agreed upon cut off values for GVIF, a general rule of thumb is that values close to 1 are not collinear, values above 5 are moderately collinear, and values over 10 are highly collinear. The GVIF stat suggests that ideology is the most likely to be collinear, but still under 5. The GVIF^(1/(2*df) is the same stat, but adjusted to standardise for variables with multiple categories. Regarding this stat, all variables are very close to 1, suggesting no collinearity. Overall, this test suggests multicollinearity is not a concern.

Variables	GVIF	df	GVIF^(1/(2*df)
Radicalism	1.7625	1	1.3276
External Governmet Support	1.0588	1	1.029
Relative Strength	1.7494	1	1.3226
Relative Fighting Capability	1.2679	1	1.126
Over Five Years	1.7395	1	1.3189
Location	2.6993	4	1.1322
Ideology	4.1984	3	1.2701

Multinomial Model

Equally, as the models may be saturated, it is important to demonstrate what occurs to the models as control variables are added. Below is the multinomial model.

	Dependent variable: Outcome (Compared to Hard Victory)																		
	S.Def (1)	S.Vic (2)	H.Def (3)	S.Def (4)	S.Vic (5)	H.Def (6)	S.Def (7)	S.Vic (8)	H.Def (9)	S.Def (10)	S.Vic (11)	H.Def (12)	S.Def (13)	S.Vic (14)	H.Def (15)	S.Def (16)	S.Vic (17)	H.Def (18)
Radicalism	−0.396** (0.196)	−0.574*** (0.179)	−0.235 (0.144)	−0.392** (0.194)	−0.596*** (0.185)	−0.241* (0.145)	−0.336* (0.199)	−0.608*** (0.189)	−0.249* (0.147)	−0.261 (0.214)	−0.637*** (0.201)	−0.146 (0.164)	−0.409* (0.248)	−0.803*** (0.243)	−0.302 (0.196)	−0.291 (0.289)	−0.769*** (0.278)	−0.513** (0.250)
External Government Support	−0.031 (0.818)	−0.267 (0.714)	0.483 (0.585)	−0.156 (0.828)	−0.502 (0.746)	0.264 (0.605)	−0.330 (0.859)	−0.437 (0.760)	0.297 (0.619)	−0.264 (0.866)	−0.381 (0.782)	0.302 (0.632)	−0.073 (0.961)	0.046 (0.849)	0.572 (0.687)	0.654 (1.096)	0.153 (0.917)	0.498 (0.718)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)				−0.543 (0.834)	−0.780 (0.767)	−0.620 (0.606)	−0.735 (0.868)	−0.763 (0.781)	−0.563 (0.625)	−0.825 (0.878)	−0.592 (0.795)	−0.593 (0.640)	0.523 (1.117)	0.154 (0.885)	−0.058 (0.730)	1.252 (1.292)	0.458 (0.975)	−0.544 (0.790)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)				−4.603*** (0.000)	14.323*** (0.555)	13.768*** (0.555)	−4.961*** (0.000)	15.457*** (0.576)	14.892*** (0.576)	−5.011*** (0.000)	15.029*** (0.666)	14.300*** (0.666)	−6.249*** (0.000)	16.832*** (0.797)	14.558*** (0.797)	−1.758	31.775*** (1.389)	26.342*** (1.389)
Moderate Fighting Capability (Compared to Low)							−16.572*** (0.00000)	0.350 (0.840)	0.248 (0.655)	−17.287*** (0.00000)	0.702 (0.902)	−0.015 (0.689)	−19.910*** (0.000)	1.099 (0.995)	0.261 (0.775)	−27.663*** (0.000)	0.967 (1.114)	0.290 (0.837)
Over 5 Years										−0.908 (0.959)	1.072 (0.949)	−1.135 (0.713)	−0.779 (1.033)	1.133 (1.039)	−1.668* (0.863)	−0.070 (1.190)	2.219* (1.281)	−1.507* (0.884)
Asia (Compared to Africa)													−0.416 (1.323)	1.100 (1.002)	2.023** (0.857)	−1.131 (1.514)	0.639 (1.141)	2.290** (0.945)
Europe (Compared to Africa)													−1.251*** (0.000)	−12.943*** (0.000)	21.205*** (0.000)	−2.014*** (0.000)	−19.707*** (0.000)	31.197*** (0.000)
Middle East (Compared to Africa)													−14.295*** (0.00000)	−0.751 (2.232)	1.227 (1.204)	−9.269*** (0.000)	−3.663 (3.893)	0.125 (1.442)
South America (Compared to Africa)													26.235*** (1.008)	26.176*** (0.911)	25.915*** (0.856)	34.037*** (1.262)	33.302*** (1.039)	31.934*** (1.081)
Nationalist (Compared to Leftist)																1.862 (1.730)	1.217 (1.385)	−0.926 (1.019)
Other (Compared to Leftist)																4.747** (2.166)	3.263* (1.779)	−0.464 (1.369)
Religious (Compared to Leftist)																−10.903*** (0.00001)	−0.181 (2.586)	1.641 (1.296)
Constant	1.315 (1.246)	2.789*** (1.082)	1.384 (1.016)	1.689 (1.406)	3.312*** (1.251)	1.810 (1.153)	2.002 (1.426)	3.201** (1.282)	1.714 (1.185)	2.229 (1.460)	2.321* (1.377)	1.936 (1.211)	1.729 (1.461)	1.742 (1.399)	1.529 (1.234)	−2.043 (2.798)	−0.605 (2.262)	3.081* (1.819)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	205.917	205.917	205.917	211.089	211.089	211.089	209.667	209.667	209.667	206.233	206.233	206.233	209.166	209.166	209.166	211.585	211.585	211.585

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Binary Model

Below is the binary model for extreme outcomes with control variables added.

	Dependent variable:					
	Extreme Outcome					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Radicalism	0.363***	0.369***	0.353***	0.417***	0.463***	0.373**
	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.136)	(0.157)	(0.185)
External Government Support	0.469	0.516	0.607	0.590	0.533	0.251
	(0.526)	(0.536)	(0.547)	(0.560)	(0.596)	(0.644)
Weaker Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)		0.314	0.406	0.342	−0.055	−0.715
		(0.548)	(0.560)	(0.572)	(0.656)	(0.747)
Parity Relative Strength to Gov (Compared to much Weaker)		−0.379	−0.164	−0.240	−1.296	−3.814*
		(1.043)	(1.067)	(1.135)	(1.280)	(2.177)
Moderate Fighting Capability (Compared to Low)			0.645	0.450	0.378	0.520
			(0.647)	(0.669)	(0.703)	(0.788)
Over 5 Years				−0.996	−1.390**	−2.223***
				(0.609)	(0.650)	(0.835)
Asia (Compared to Africa)					0.620	0.917
					(0.679)	(0.771)
Europe (Compared to Africa)					16.481	19.098
					(1,455.398)	(1,455.399)
Middle East (Compared to Africa)					1.630	2.673
					(1.571)	(2.429)
South America (Compared to Africa)					−1.363	−2.834**
					(1.103)	(1.400)
Nationalist (Compared to Leftist)						−1.453
						(1.027)
Other (Compared to Leftist)						−3.593***
						(1.329)
Religious (Compared to Leftist)						1.829
						(2.230)
Constant	−1.359*	−1.550*	−1.755**	−1.346	−1.175	1.763
	(0.734)	(0.819)	(0.857)	(0.907)	(0.953)	(1.546)
Observations	78	78	78	78	78	78
Log Likelihood	−43.764	−43.451	−42.935	−41.503	−38.207	−32.434
Akaike Inf. Crit.	93.527	96.902	97.870	97.006	98.414	92.868
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01