The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority: a quantitative (re)appraisal of Britain’s Jewish population

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Thesis submitted for the degree of DPhil in Geography

St Catherine’s College
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Abstract

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This study, located in the disciplines of human geography and demography, explores the socio-spatial boundaries encapsulating Britain’s Jewish population, particularly at micro-scales. It highlights and challenges key narratives of both Jewish and general interest relating to residential segregation, assimilation, partnership formation, exogamy and household living arrangements.

It presents a critical exploration of the dual ethnic and religious components of Jewish identity, arguing that this ‘White’ group has become ethnically ‘invisible’ in British identity politics and, as a consequence, is largely overlooked. In addition, the key socio-demographic processes relating to Jewish partnership formation are addressed and a critical assessment of data pertaining to the decline of marriage, the rise of cohabitation and the vexed topic of Jewish exogamy, is presented. The analysis culminates by linking each of these issues to the micro-geographical scale of the household and develops a critical assessment of this key unit of Jewish (re)production. Jewish population change is contextualised within the framework of the second demographic transition.
This deliberately quantitative study is designed to exploit a recent glut of data relating to Jews in Britain. It interrogates specially commissioned tables from Britain’s 2001 Census as well as four separate communal survey data sources. It highlights and challenges recent geographical critiques of quantitative methodologies by presenting a rigorous defence of quantification in post-‘cultural turn’ human geography. It emphasises the importance and relevance of this fruitful shift in geographical thought to quantitative methods and describes the role quantification can now play in the discipline. Above all, it synthesises two disparate sets of literature: one relating to geographical work on identity and segregation, and the other to work on the identity, demography and cultural practices of Jews. As a result, this thesis inserts the largely neglected ethno-religious Jewish case into the broader geographical literature whilst developing a critical quantitative spatial agenda for the study of Jews.
Acknowledgements

This project could never have come to fruition without the contribution of many generous people.

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<td>BHPS</td>
<td>British Household Panel Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>British Social Attitudes Survey</td>
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<td>CRU</td>
<td>Community Research Unit (of the Board of Deputies of British Jews)</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>Dependent Child(ren)</td>
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<td>ESRC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Research Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRP</td>
<td>Family Reference Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOR</td>
<td>Government Office Region</td>
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<td>GROS</td>
<td>General Register Office for Scotland</td>
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<td>HRP</td>
<td>Household Reference Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Index of Dissimilarity</td>
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<td>JPR</td>
<td>Institute for Jewish Policy Research (London)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAD</td>
<td>Local Authority District</td>
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<tr>
<td>NJPS</td>
<td>(American) National Jewish Population Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>No Religion</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSSeC</td>
<td>National Statistics Socioeconomic Classification</td>
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<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Output Area</td>
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<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office for National Statistics (England and Wales)</td>
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<tr>
<td>pph</td>
<td>persons per household</td>
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<td>RNS</td>
<td>Religion Not Stated (Census Non-response)</td>
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<td>SDT</td>
<td>The Second Demographic Transition</td>
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<td>UA</td>
<td>Unitary Authority</td>
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Chapter 1

The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority: a quantitative (re)appraisal of Britain’s Jewish population

1 Situating the thesis

‘It is clear that geographers have something to contribute to contemporary and historical debates about religion, space, place and identity emerging across a range of disciplines.’ (Brace et al., 2006:38)

This is a study of the social and spatial boundaries encapsulating Britain’s Jewish population. It is primarily located within three areas of geography: population geography, urban geography and the geography of religion. Population geography addresses a considerable diversity of subject matter but has a long tradition of attending to difference and diversity between people and places (Graham, 2000:258-9,268; Graham and Boyle, 2001; Ogden, 1999). Urban geography has an even longer tradition, reaching back to the early days of the twentieth century with the work of the ‘urban ecologists’ Robert E Park and Ernest W Burgess, in which the topic of ‘residential segregation’ was prominent (Brimicombe, 2007; Carter, 1975; Dear and Flusty, 1998; Dunn, 1998; Harris and Ullman, 1945; Hoyte, 1939; Johnston, 1971; Park, 1926; Park et al., 1925; Park and Burgess, 1969; Peach, 1974, 1975; Peach et al., 1981). The third geographical sub-discipline pertinent to this study is the geography of religion, a rather narrower and more recent field which is part of the broader social and cultural geographical traditions (Kong, 1990, 2001; Proctor, 2006; Sopher, 1967). Whilst each of these three areas is often studied independently, there is nevertheless considerable overlap between them and this is demonstrated throughout my thesis.
1.1 Key issues and debates

The thesis addresses several issues that have recently attracted particular media and political interest, as well as academic interest. I also highlight some debates that are specific to the broader geographical literature and others that are specific to Jews.

The first issue I wish to highlight is the recent (re)appearance of religion in politics and the media. Religion has gained ‘considerable social significance’ in the last 15 years (Brimicombe, 2007:889; also Modood et al, 1997). Indeed, when asked what would succeed ‘high theory and the triumvirate of race, gender, and class as the center of intellectual energy in the academy’, Stanley Fish recently ‘answered like a shot: religion’ (Fish, 2005). The placing, for the first time, of a religion question in the British Census\(^1\) of 2001 was another indication of religion’s new prominence in the ‘politics of identity’ (Christopher, 2006:343-4; see Chapter 2). But why has religion become so salient now? For many commentators religion was supposed to be in decline, if not already ‘dead’ (Bruce, 2002). In the 1960s, proponents of the ‘secularisation thesis’, were confident that ‘secularisation’ would develop hand in hand with ‘modernisation’ (Weller, 2004:3-5). For example, Putnam (2000) has highlighted what he sees as religion’s retreat in the United States and Voas (2003) has commented on the rise of ‘secularisation’ in Britain, along with the marginalisation of religion (see Chapter 3). Yet both of these views are contrary to Huntington’s provocative thesis, first proposed in 1993, about a ‘clash of civilisations’ in the new, post-Communist world. Huntington (2002:97) argued that a ‘global religious resurgence’ would dominate political agendas for decades: ‘[T]he most

\(^1\) Throughout this study I use the word ‘Census’ with a capitalised C when referring to a specific census (such as April 29th 2001). On all other occasions I use the lower case c, i.e. ‘census’.
pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities’ (ibid:28).

Given these conflicting views, it has been asked to what extent religion really matters. Is its current prominence, at least in the media, ‘in some sense an epiphenomenon or sentimental throwback?’ (Proctor, 2006:166). The answer is clearly that it does matter: as Brimicombe (2007:889) argues prosaically, ‘religion is back at the political forefront. It manifests itself in government agendas that address concerns of economic inclusion and social cohesion in a plural society’. And Weller (2004:5) suggests that religious self-identification has developed as an aspect of a wider ‘identity politics’, stating that religion is ‘once again becoming a significant feature of public discourse and policy at local, national, and international levels.’ For many people, religion is ‘the primary—or at least a highly important—marker for self-definition’ (ibid:12; see also Modood et al., 1997).

A number of social issues closely associated with this religious ‘resurgence’ have recently arisen and have a particular geographical relevance, especially the core issues of urban social and residential segregation. For example, the former head of the Commission for Racial Equality recently argued that British society was ‘sleepwalking to segregation’ (Trevor Phillips, 2005). Similar concerns have been expressed in government reports, for example, a prominent paper entitled ‘Community Cohesion’ by Ted Cantle (2001:9) claimed there was clear evidence of deep physical ‘segregation’ and ‘separation’ in Britain, and suggested that ‘many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. [My
emphasis]’ Cantle argued that ‘there is an urgent need to promote community cohesion, based upon a greater knowledge of, contact between, and respect for, the various cultures that now make Great Britain such a rich and diverse nation.’ Further, in the United States, Robert Putnam (2007) has recently argued that increased diversity is associated, at least in the short term, with diminished ‘social solidarity’ between groups. He said people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to ‘hunker down’ and ‘withdraw from collective life’ (ibid:149-50). Thus, the topics of ‘cohesion’ and ‘diversity’ are prominent on both sides of the Atlantic. According to Aspinall (2008), this is exemplified by the new prominence of the language of ‘diversity’ which he suggests has largely replaced, and substantially outpaced that of ‘multiculturalism’ in government initiatives. Indeed he argues that ‘[d]iversity’ has emerged as a key value in its own right in policy-making in the last few years’ [emphasis in original].

In Britain, a key aspect of the ‘diversity’ agenda is the faith school system. It is within the educational environment that religion as a socially and spatially segregative factor appears to be most prominent (Johnston et al, 2008). The government has enthusiastically supported the growth of the faith school sector but concern has been expressed by groups such as Accord² that faith schools are discriminatory. Such institutions are a divisive issue even within the ‘faith communities’ themselves. For example, there is currently a dispute in the High Court between a child who has been refused a place, allegedly on the grounds of discrimination, at JFS, a state-funded Jewish faith school (Symons, 2008a; Rocker, 2008b). This case raises many issues about identity, authenticity and power, i.e. who has the right to decide who is, and who is not, ‘authentically’

² See http://www.accordcoalition.org.uk/
Jewish. The dispute dramatically highlights human geography’s relevance to the politics of identity: in this case the social boundaries of religious identity collide with the spatial boundaries of the institution.

This notwithstanding, many Jewish leaders and communal institutions have expressed grave concern about assimilation, in effect, inverting the ‘separate lives’ narrative. A Jewish ‘intermarriage’ debate is prominent in both the Jewish media and in the Jewish demographic literature. In recent years many have focused on high levels of exogamy suggesting this threatens long term ‘Jewish survival’ (Cohen, 1994, 2006; Cromer, 1974; Phillips B, 2005; Sacks, 1995a; Sklare, 1970). The importance of the issue was recently highlighted by the creation of birthright israel [sic] a programme set up to ‘combat’ ‘intermarriage’; this received an initial funding donation of US$210 million (Saxe et al., 2002).

The geographical literature has a long history of addressing both the issues of segregation and assimilation. This is particularly clear in urban geography and its emphasis on social clustering and pluralism (Dear and Flusty, 1998; Dunn, 1998; Ley et al., 1984; Park, 1926; Peach et al., 1981). Although the statistical methods used to assess ‘residential segregation’ have become increasingly sophisticated and complex, the field has struggled for a long time with what Peach (1975) has described as the difficulty of interpreting the process of separation from the pattern of dissimilarity. I.e., demonstrating the extent to which segregation exists is a very different, and in many ways far simpler, task than explaining how and why such segregation is produced and reproduced. Recent works have shown that ‘residential segregation’ may not be the result of ‘oppression’. On the contrary, these studies demonstrate that many people make deliberate choices to live in
close proximity to other in-group members (Dunn, 1998; Simpson, 2007; Valins, 2003a). Geographers need to explain what processes act on individuals to produce these patterns by asking how and why spatial differentiation occurs in cities. This is challenging, as Stanley Waterman and Barry Kosmin (1987b, 1988) found twenty years ago in the last holistic assessment of ‘residential segregation’ with respect to Jews in Britain. They argued that the processes operating on this population were congregative, rather than segregative. They also concluded that social processes associated with such congregation could only be properly understood when data were analysed at ‘minute scales’, such as the household. However, they lacked sufficiently detailed data, at scales of the street and ‘below’, to develop these findings and therefore struggled to explain the processes that produced the patterns they had empirically demonstrated.

More recently, geographers have begun to address micro-scales in other contexts. Of particular interest has been the increasing ‘fluidity’ of modern lifestyles in which partnerships are less permanent and living arrangements are more complex (Buzar et al., 2005; McRae, 1999; Ogden and Hall, 2004). Linked to this are broader media concerns about high divorce rates, low birth rates, increasing numbers of births outside marriage, and a generalised view of the ‘breakdown of the family’ (Ahmed, 2008; Daley, 2006). Meanwhile, in academia, the meaning of the term ‘household’ has been questioned, especially how we should now conceptualise and enumerate this fundamental unit of geographical analysis (Cook, 2004b; Gallent, 2007).

Finally, this thesis highlights a broader methodological point that has arisen as a result of the ‘cultural turn’ in geographical thought in the 1990s, which
developed out of debates in disciplines such as sociology and anthropology (McDowell, 2002; Valins, 1999). In particular, the value of quantitative analysis in cultural geography has been questioned. Quantification is perceived as being highly problematic and subsequently inferior to qualitative approaches (see Chapter 2). Its use of ‘received categories’ means that quantitative methods are accused of being empiricist and that methodologies based on them are seen as positivist (Poon, 2005). This is particularly problematic for population geographers interested in assessing demographic issues which are often highly quantitative (Graham, 2000; Graham and Boyle, 2001).

1.2 Key arguments
In this dissertation I also address several arguments relating to these issues which I consider are of significance to the study of identity, Jews and the discipline of human geography.

My main argument is that the social and cultural geographical literature tends to overlook Jews whilst the socio-demographic literature on Jews tends to ignore broader work, especially the geographic oeuvre. The insertion of a Jewish case study into the general geographic literature, in which Jews are conspicuously absent, will enrich the fields of cultural geography, population geography and urban geography. The incorporation of space and issues related to propinquity will broaden our understanding of the processes impacting on this group.

Linked to this is a second argument: that the differentiation of ‘religion’ and ‘ethnicity’ into two separate axes, is analytically problematic. This socially constructed division limits our ability to assess the ‘religious’ and ‘ethnic’ groups it purports to define. That this division is normative is demonstrated most clearly
by the British 2001 Census but also in popular discourse of the kind discussed above relating to faith schools. An important implication of the construction is that groups are placed into one or other category and are therefore entirely missed out in studies focusing on the alternative identifier. For example, ‘Jewish’ is invariably labelled a ‘religion’ not an ‘ethnicity’, and being predominantly ‘white’ in appearance, Jews are placed in, and concealed by, the so-called ‘White ethnic’ category. Consequently, Jews and others are rendered invisible, both physically indistinguishable from the majority and also literally overlooked in the geographical work on ethnic groups.

My third argument is that the spatial concentration of groups in urban areas is mainly an outcome of social processes that occur at micro-scales (such as the household and workplaces) rather than processes linked to macro-scales like the city. Propinquity matters in creating concentration but only in ‘intimate’ places. ‘Residential segregation’ therefore begins with the individual in the home or at work, rather than with the community in the neighbourhood. As a consequence, the processes which produce ‘segregation’ may not necessarily take place at a location consummate with the ‘segregated’ area, i.e. macro-level propinquity is an independent outcome of micro-level processes.

My final two arguments relate specifically to quantitative methods in geography. The first is that indices of segregation used in numerous studies since the 1950s, and which are often complex and intricate, nevertheless fail to explain the socio-spatial processes that produce residential patterning. Therefore, different approaches are required.
However, I also argue that quantitative data can still provide geographers with a powerful tool of analysis, despite the criticisms such methods have recently received. The difference between quantitative and qualitative methods are, I argue, overplayed since opinions are as central to the interpretation of datasets as they are to the interpretation of interview scripts. Further, the ‘cultural turn’ in social and cultural geography which emphasised the importance of critical approaches to assessments of the social world, is entirely consistent with quantitative methodologies. Indeed, a quantitative approach that incorporates the spirit of the ‘cultural turn’ considerably enhances the quality of such methods since it foregrounds any issues that may lead to the drawing of false conclusions from quantitative data. Thus, whilst being mindful of the pitfalls associated with quantitatively fixing and categorising people, places, time and space, we must still be clear in acknowledging that everyday life and the social world as we know it could not otherwise exist; the delineation of boundaries is a fundamental aspect of our social world.

1.3 Addressing these arguments

I will address these arguments by means of a case study of Britain’s Jewish population. This group provides an opportunity to explain ‘ethnic persistence’ in modern society by enabling me to examine the mechanisms that operate to produce and reproduce the boundaries necessary to maintain such persistence. These mechanisms include endogamy, residential congregation and the performance of religious and cultural practices in the home (Buckser, 2000:729; Newman, 1985, 1987; Valins, 2003a and b; Waterman and Kosmin, 1986a and b, 1987a, 1988).
I will therefore focus on some of the key social and spatial boundaries that encapsulate this group. These are generally interrelated and in this study I refer to them as socio-spatial boundaries.\(^3\) They are also permeable and blurred; there are grey areas between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’. Indeed, the ‘fuzzy’ nature of such boundaries is central to this analysis.

Further, I will contextualise these blurred socio-spatial boundaries in terms of the somewhat neglected framework of the second demographic transition (SDT) (Van de Kaa, 2002; Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986). This idea incorporates the multitude of socio-demographic processes operating on groups such as the Jews in contemporary Britain. The SDT provides scholars with an opportunity to contextualise observations about groups and helps to explain the underlying social processes and changes that are exhibited.

1.4 Justifying the choices made in this study
By studying Jews I can make a direct contribution to several theoretical discussions which are currently prominent in the field of geography. For example, this thesis addresses issues relating to scale (Marston and Smith, 2001; Marston et al., 2005), to boundaries (Alba, 2005; Newman and Paasi, 1998; Valins, 2003a), to the relevance and justification of quantitative methods in human geography (Crang, 2002, 2005; Poon, 2003, 2004, 2005) and to the related debate about the relative merits of ‘old’ social geography and ‘new’ cultural geography (Peach, 2002). As such it is relevant not only to the various public debates and related policy issues noted at the beginning of this introduction, but also to social science more generally.

\(^3\) I have chosen to hyphenate the term ‘socio-spatial’ rather than concatenate it into ‘sociospatial’ in order to emphasise the interrelation of two separate concepts rather than use a word that might be construed as describing a third concept altogether.
1.4.1 Why study human geography?

“[T]he ‘human’ in human geography calls into question the physical and natural sciences’ tendencies toward universal beliefs and truth claims, and the purpose of geographers is to question, criticize, validate and interrogate these discourses.” (Poon, 2005:771)

Poon’s comment highlights both human geography’s critical stance as well as its potential for empirical assessment in our ongoing struggle to further our understanding of the social world we inhabit. McDowell (2002:300) emphasises geographers’ ‘long-held interest in difference, diversity, and place related specificity’, i.e. in social differentiation across space, which she suggests is the raison d’être of the discipline (ibid:296). Geography stands out by acknowledging the centrality of space in social experience and as Smith (1999:136) has noted, no social interactions can happen without ‘taking place’: at base, ‘Geography matters’.

Geographers’ interest in boundaries highlights the interdisciplinary nature of the field and therefore its relevance to the broader social scientific agenda (see also Ley at al., 1984:4-7). Much of the geographical literature on boundaries also crosses disciplinary lines incorporating fields such as demography and sociology (Newman and Paasi, 1998:188). This is a result of the reconceptualisation of space within geography which distinguishes ‘space per se, space as a contextual given […]from] socially-based spatiality, the created space of social organisation and production.’ (Soja, 1994:79) In other words, there is an interrelationship between spatial and social aspects of life; social processes impact on spatial organisation but equally, space and propinquity impact on social phenomena.
This ‘new interest in boundaries’ (Newman and Paasi, 1998:187) has also
demonstrated that in many instances, spatial boundaries (neighbourhood,
household) and social boundaries (community, family) are two sides of the same
coin—they are ‘mutually constitutive’ (Barnett, 1997:529). But boundaries can
also be viewed as contingent, illusory and only superficially fixed. A social or
spatial boundary for one person may be incongruent with the ‘same’ boundary
for another person. Thus, the demarcation of a boundary prompts us to question
who is being separated from whom, who is being bounded together with whom,
and—more challengingly from a quantitative point of view—why, how and in
whose interests this is occurring.

Geographers have also exhibited a renewed and critical interest in scale. Marston
(2000:220) argues that ‘scale is central to the research agenda of the entire
discipline of geography’ and many of the issues dealt with in this thesis relate to
scale. The very ontological status of scale has been questioned by geographers
and it has been exposed as an abstract and socially constructed concept (Paasi,
2004:536). But scale is relevant to the construction of identities since their
production and performance involves negotiations across ‘scales’ such as the
body, the household, the community and the nation. These negotiations are often
concerned with boundaries and how to cross them and it has become increasingly
clear that micro-scales have taken on macro-significance in geography (ibid:541;
see also Fotheringham, 1997; Houston et al., 2005; McDowell, 2007). For
example, the household is an increasingly important locus of geographical
analysis since it has taken on unexpected complexity in the last two decades: “the
study of the household and the family has evolved from being ‘one of the dullest
of endeavours’ to one of ‘the most provocative and involving’” (Giddens,
1987:23 cited in Ogden and Hall, 2004:102; also Marston and Smith, 2001). And the household is central to this study because as Wright et al. (2003:461) explain, ‘[t]he expression ‘household’ expands on ‘partnership’ and provides increased latitude in understanding residential choice, identity formation and assimilation.’

Another aspect of cultural geography which has gained interest in recent years is religion. Peach (2002:255) has suggested that as the ‘established field of ethnic segregation continues to gather strength, religion seems destined to become the new area for social geographical research in the first decade of the twenty-first century.’ By studying religion and religious groups, geographers can contribute to the broader debates in society noted above. However the relationship between religion and geography has been called ‘ambiguous’ or worse, ‘incoherent’ (Proctor, 2006:165; also Brace et al., 2006:38). Kong (2001:211-12) cites multiple examples in which religion has been misunderstood and variously labelled ‘depleted’, ‘chaotic’ and ‘in disarray’ within geography. A key concern is that despite the recent rise in its social significance, religion is still largely missing from geographical analysis ‘in the midst of this massive phenomenon’ (Proctor, 2006:165). Brace et al. (2006:28) also argue that ‘geographers have been slow to fully acknowledge the place of religion alongside such axes of identity as race, class, nationality and gender in their analyses’. In Britain, Pacione (2005:235) comments that the geography of religion has received particularly little attention and notes that ‘British geographers have made a disappointingly small contribution to the field.’

However, Kong (2001:211) has acknowledged that in the 1990s religion did attract ‘significant attention’ within geography but she too expresses concern that
it must not become a ‘residual category’ to the primary axes of race, class and
gender (ibid:228). According to Brace et al. (2006:38) ‘religious geography’
continues to be ‘elusive’ but they argue geographers must ‘retain a focus on
religion as an analytical category and […] sketch out the ground over which the
discipline of geography can engage with religion, where a geographical
sensibility may help in our understanding, and the terrain over which geographers
can converse with historians, sociologists, anthropologists[, demographers] and
theologians in a mutually beneficial light.’ I argue that a significant reason why
geographers continue to struggle with the topic is, as noted above, because of the
way in which religion is constructed in society, i.e. as a distinct facet of identity,
separate from ethnicity.

1.4.2 Why study Jews?

‘Analysing modern Jews is the same as analysing any other
group—that is, to study a people who are enmeshed in the
social, economic, and political transformations of recent
centuries […] the changes that have occurred among Jewish
communities exemplify general processes.’ (Goldscheider and
Zuckerman, 1984:ix)

The historian Vivian Lipman (1968:93) paraphrased a famous saying which
Samuel Heilman (1984:7) has attributed to Elliott Cohen, when he commented
that, ‘[a]s so often, we find the Jew is like his neighbour, only more so.’ I
interpret this to mean that in very many ways, Jews in Britain are as British as
other Brits, whilst Jews in the United States are as American as other Americans
and Jews in France are as French as other French. Yet in each case they are
nevertheless all ‘Jewish’, at the same time mutually similar and distinctive.

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4 Since Kong’s 2001 paper at least two geographical journals have devoted special editions to the
topic of religion; Social & Cultural Geography in 2002 (Vol. 3 #1) and the Annals of the
Association of American Geographers in 2006 (Vol. 96 #1).
5 Heilman provides no further reference.
Clearly Goldscheider and Zuckerman felt that by studying Jews we will also learn something about society in general, but the reality is that when the broader geographic literature engages with work on identity and social theory, Jews are mostly absent.

With relatively few recent exceptions, Jews do not form the focus of British geographical studies related to religion or ethnicity. This is in contrast to work on more ‘visible’ groups such as Muslims (Anwar, 1993; Dunn, 1998, 1999; Dwyer, 1993, 1999, 2003; Peach, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2006a; Phillips, 2006; Shaw, 1988). Thus, Britain’s Jewish population is considered to be a ‘relatively unknown case study’ and indeed, we must go back to the 1980s to find examples in which all Jews were examined as a group in geography (Newman, 1985:361; also Waterman and Kosmin, 1986d, 1987b, 1988) rather than limiting the focus to fringe sections (Valins, 2003a, 2003b). Recently, little seems to have changed as Kalmijn et al. (2006:1347) note: in general, Jews are a ‘less visible’ group and ‘have received comparatively little attention’. Yet Jews are far from irrelevant; in the British 2001 Census they constituted the fourth largest ‘minority’ ‘religious’ population and British Jews constitute the sixth largest Jewish population in the world, outside Israel (Massil, 2004:195-96).

There are two arguments why I think Jews have been ‘invisible’ in the geographical literature. The first relates to their physical appearance; they lack ‘colour’. Indeed Peach (2001) has argued that because religion was not asked in the census until 2001, Jews ‘escaped notice’. Jews are ‘concealed’ within a vast, homogeneous ‘White-ethnic’ category (Aspinall, 2008). Consequently, one key advantage of studying Jews is that they present a rare opportunity to begin to
‘unpack’ this ‘White’ group (Peach, 2000:621). But another reason for their invisibility in the literature is that Jews are not obviously subjected to significant social exclusion, discrimination, marginalisation, or subjugation, topics that have attracted considerable interest among cultural geographers (Harvey, 1973; McDowell, 1996; McDowell and Massey, 1984; Sibley, 1995).

But Jews are highly relevant to current geographical debates. For example, it is primarily within the context of residential segregation/congregation that Jews have most often appeared in the geographical literature (Brimicombe, 2007; Newman, 1985; Valins, 1999, 2003a; Waterman and Kosmin, 1987a, 1988). In particular, three aspects of the study of Jewish ‘segregation’ are of primary importance. First, Jewish ‘residential segregation’ is more accurately described as ‘residential congregation’. Rather than exclusion and separation the primary process acting on Jews is one of integration and coming together (Waterman, 1989; Waterman and Kosmin, 1987b). Second, these patterns and processes are best understood when studies are carried out at the smallest scales, such as streets and households (Waterman and Kosmin, 1988). And third, Jews offer an opportunity for us to learn more about the socio-spatial processes occurring in other groups.

It should be noted that in the United States copious work has been carried out on Jews, especially in the fields of sociology and demography (see Chapter 3). However, even here, little attempt is made to engage with the broader geographic literature. And besides this, the extent to which analyses of American Jews can be used as true proxies for the British case is questionable. To paraphrase Elliott Cohen, is the Jew more like his non-Jewish neighbo(u)r than his foreign Jewish
cousin? Consequently, I argue that many opportunities have been missed to advance our understanding of a group which has received copious, if intellectually bland, attention. For example, ‘segregation’, ‘intermarriage’, ‘kinship’, ‘families’, and ‘households’ have been central themes in much of the ‘Jewish literature’ for decades (see Barron, 1951; Cohen SM, 1988; Cohen EH, 2003; Davey et al., 2001; DellaPergola, 1992, 2003; Mott and Patel, 2008; Waite, 2002). Yet none of these examples, and many similar ones, attempt to deal with the challenges laid out by critical thinkers in geography and sociology. Few scholars focusing on Jews have engaged with the various ‘turns’ in geography, which since the 1970s have produced a ‘flowing of spatial imaginations’ (Graham, 2006:814; also McDowell, 2002). There are of course exceptions, several of which are reviewed here (Buckser, 2000; Charmé, 2000; Fishman, 1988; Scholefield, 2004; Valins, 2003a and b), but in general it is rare that Jews are critically appraised.

The normative approach to contemporary studies of Jews has been mostly policy-oriented, mindful of the objectives of specific philanthropists and funders. Studies rarely engage broader theoretical work and Jews are invariably treated as a distinct population with clearly delineated and stable social and spatial boundaries. Studies tend to focus on small, unrepresentative sections of the group, or else homogenise the population and ignore significant internal differences. Moreover, they are often highly descriptive thus failing to explain underlying socio-spatial processes operating on this group. Few scholars approach Jews critically and most have ignored the significance of space. (See for example Becher et al., 2002; Cohen, 2006; Graham et al., 2007; Haberman and Schmool, 1995; Holman and Holman, 2002; JPR, 2003; Kosmin et al., 1979,
1991; Miller et al., 1996; Saxe et al., 2007; Schmool, 2004; UJC, 2003; Waterman, 2003.)

But much can be gained by studying Jews because they are relevant to current debates in society about religion and identity more generally. Jewish identity is an example of an ambiguous category which ‘stubbornly’ resists definition and does not easily fit into the rigidly separate disciplinary divisions of the social world; it challenges us to conceive of categorisations beyond the labels academia and society generates. As noted, it can be viewed as a ‘religious’ or an ‘ethnic’ appellation or indeed a mixture of both (Kosmin, 1999a; Lazar et al., 2002; Webber, 1997b:268-70). Another reason Jews ought to be studied is that in Britain they are mostly fourth-generation descendents of immigrants, and yet are still more or less identifiable as a single ‘minority’ group. After 350 years since Oliver Cromwell’s readmission of the Jews to Britain (Schmool, 2007; though see Gordon, 2006), most of them today cannot be described as ‘immigrants’. Yet the very existence of Jews as a sizable and distinct entity in Britain challenges assimilationist theories such as the ‘melting pot’ and offers a rare, non-American, case study.

Finally, and despite Hout et al.’s (2001:498) reminder that ‘[p]redicting the future is precarious at best’, one of the most intriguing reason Jews should be studied is the group’s potential for offering a window on the future of other groups who are, at most, second or third generation immigrants. According to Waterman and Kosmin (1988:80), as forerunners, Jews are an ‘intrinsically interesting […] middle-class ethnic group, three generations removed [in 1988] from immigrant status’. They argued that Jews ‘can be thought of as the longest-established of
those immigrant groups which maintain a separate identity in British society. As such this may serve as a model for other minority groups, which arrived later on the scene and became rapidly upwardly mobile and middle-class.’ (ibid:87) They have also suggested that Jews are ‘running two generations ahead of other ethnic groups in terms of patterns and processes of integration and assimilation.’ (ibid, 1986a) And they are not alone in such opinions. In the United States, Goldscheider (2003:18) argues that groups ‘facing assimilation […] such as Hispanics and Asian Americans’ might gain from the experience of American Jews. In Britain, Deborah Phillips (2006:27:note1) suggests that Jews were forerunners to ‘Asian’ settlement in London’s East End. In a study of Manchester, Clapson (2003:117) notes that in the 1970s ‘poorer Indian households remained within their inner-urban communities, in areas of the city once occupied by Jews.’ He noted that Jews located in specific suburbs in both the United States and in England, ‘and by the late twentieth century there was evidence that Asian groups were following suit’ (ibid:120).

In addition, Simpson (2007:407,420) has argued that ‘[h]istorical studies of Huguenot, Jewish and Irish immigration identify very different historical contexts yet show many demographic parallels with more recent immigration […] In those historical studies, early clustering has been seen as social solidarity in a strange and largely unwelcoming land, enabling integration and later dispersal as experience increases in the labour and housing markets…’. Citing Peach (1996a), Simpson argues that ‘[i]n the long run we should not expect a residential melting-pot but more a mosaic […]. Clusters will remain as with the Jewish population whose main migration to Britain was a century ago. The Jewish population none-the-less has the highest index of dissimilarity in England
The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority

and Wales among groups defined by religious affiliation recorded in the 2001 census [citing Dorling and Thomas, 2004].’

Jews might also be considered not only forerunners for ‘immigrant’ groups but also as demographic forerunners more generally, early adopters of demographic regimes that fundamentally change society. For example, Kosmin (1982:251-2) suggested that British Jews experienced ‘faster than average modernisation’, i.e., a demographic transition at the beginning of the 19th century, which he argued matched observations of other Jewish populations. For example, he cited Livi-Bacci’s (1977:44) work on the Italian Jewish population, whose ‘birth rate started declining perhaps one hundred years before the rest of the population.’ He also noted Knodel’s (1974:137-8) discovery of data for Prussia which suggested ‘Jews probably started to reduce their fertility at least several decades prior to German reunification and well ahead of the rest of the population.’ (See also DellaPergola, 1992:84)

2 Aim and objectives of the thesis

2.1 Aim

By means of a case study of Jews in Britain, I will draw on recent geographical critiques which have embraced the significance of socio-spatial boundaries, especially at micro-scales, in order to address and challenge narratives relating to segregation, partnership formation and the household.

2.2 Objectives

- In this thesis I will synthesise two disparate sets of literature. On the one hand is the social and cultural geographical work which addresses issues of identity
and segregation. On the other is the work which explores the demography, identity and cultural practices of Jews.

- I will show that quantitative methods, used appropriately and approached critically, continue to have an important role to play in human geography.

- I will quantitatively examine Jewish identity in light of critiques that expose identity generally to be a fuzzy, contextual and contested concept. I will assess evidence for the multidimensionality of Jewish identity and challenge the pigeonholing of this appellation into religio-normative categories. I will expose the complex heterogeneity of this group and demonstrate how its homogenisation conceals a fragmented array of sub-populations and will assess the various differential social and spatial outcomes that this produces.

- I will investigate partnership types among Jews in Britain. The normative Jewish partnership is marriage but alternative arrangements, especially cohabitation, are increasingly significant though very little is known about this trend. I will contextualise Jewish partnerships in terms of the second demographic transition, the conditions of which foster diversity and fluidity in partnership formation in western societies generally. It is necessary to quantify the extent of these changes and also to explain their broader implications for this population.

- I will comprehensively assess Jewish ‘intermarriage’ in Britain, and contextualise this by demonstrating that a ‘narrative of doom’ has developed around the topic in terms of its presumed assimilatory implications. It is my contention that the second demographic transition offers a fruitful context in
which to examine this issue. But Jewish exogamy is a complex, socio-spatial process operating on Jews in Britain for which such disaster narratives are inadequate oversimplifications. I will also examine the well-established correlation between propinquity and exogamy which, though still demonstrable, may be misleading and fails to explain why and how such outcomes are (re)produced among Britain’s Jews.

• I will critically examine ‘Jewish households’, and demonstrate the normative, ‘traditional’ view that they are ‘nuclear’ and internally homogeneous. I will examine evidence for the extent to which this continues to be the case, especially in the context of literature showing a broader decentring of the ‘nuclear family’ and a ‘pluralisation’ of household arrangements in the context of the second demographic transition. The very meaning of ‘household’ and ‘home’ has been challenged in the broader literature, and I will examine how this might contribute to a better understanding of the nature of the ‘Jewish household’.

• By highlighting the importance of micro-scale geography, I will extend the ecological work carried out over 20 years ago on Jewish residential ‘segregation’ in Britain, which due to data paucity, failed to explain the macro-scale spatial concentration of Jews in urban areas. Therefore my final objective is to interpret the process of coming together from the pattern of congregation.
3 Thesis outline

The remainder of this dissertation addresses the issues and arguments raised in this chapter. In the next chapter (Chapter 2) I explain and justify my choice of methodology for this thesis. I discuss the epistemological debates that have taken place in social science generally as well as within geography in particular, about how we come to know the social world and how best we can (re)present this knowledge. I then address and defend the forthright quantitative stance of my study in light of the considerable criticism of the appropriateness of quantification which have come from within the discipline. I explain why quantitative methodologies still matter and how critical geographical approaches can be incorporated using the example of the 2001 Census. By embracing the spirit of these critiques, I argue that the ‘cultural turn’ can enhance the validity of quantitative methods rather than make them obsolete. In the remainder of Chapter 2 I explain how my own positionality may have impacted on this work and describe the sources and materials I use in this dissertation.

Chapter 3 constitutes the backbone of my thesis and also highlights the lack of synthesis between the Jewish and general geographical literatures. I introduce the core topics of this analysis in four separate, but interrelated, sections. First I discuss the literature on ‘residential segregation’ and explain its significance as the spatial expression of assimilation. I present a critical review of work underpinning theories of assimilation and pluralism—the ‘received wisdom’—and argue that this has tended to privilege socio-spatial boundaries at macro-scales of neighbourhood and city at the expense of micro-scales of street and household. This is because recent geographical literature suggests micro-spatial
arenas are more likely to provide explanations of the processes and patterns we observe at the macro-level.

In order to do this I explore three micro-scales of analysis in the three remaining sections of Chapter 3. In the second section I focus on the individual, drawing on a variety of works which have critically assessed the ‘permanently provisional’ nature of identity and apply these to the Jewish case in an effort to better understand the meaning of the category ‘Jewish’. I critically explore Jewish social boundaries and draw on broader literature to address two recurring problematics. The first of these is the tendency to homogenise Jews, to treat them as an internally coherent and consistent social entity. This I argue seriously limits the validity of the conclusions that can be drawn about the group. Second, I explain why both religion and ethnicity are fundamental aspects of ‘Jewishness’ and that pigeonholing of the term ‘Jewish’ into one or other category is detrimental to the research agenda.

In the third section of Chapter 3 I broaden the scale and extend this critical assessment by exploring theoretical work on the topics of partnership formation and partnership markets. This provides a context for a critical summary of the somewhat fraught literature on ‘Jewish intermarriage’ which follows it. I argue this topic must be theoretically contextualised and assessed in the light broader social changes. These changes are described in the fourth and final section of Chapter 3 in which I explore the ‘intimate scale’ of the household. I describe the fundamental changes which have occurred to living arrangements since the 1970s, especially the rise of cohabitation and new partnership types such as living-apart-together. I contextualise these changes in terms of the second
demographic transition. I also critically explore the problematic nature of the term and concept ‘household’ and explain how this has become a highly complex yet prominent arena of study.

In the second half of the thesis I empirically investigate these topics using recently assembled, but largely unexplored, datasets including the 2001 Census. In Chapter 4, I quantitatively analyse Jewish identity using these data sources and demonstrate the difficulties both researchers and Jews have when describing Jewish identity. I also explore the relationship between Jewish identity and socio-spatial boundaries in terms of neighbours and friendships circles.

In Chapter 5 I extend this assessment of the Jewish individual by examining Jewish partnerships, initially by focusing on the decline of marriage and the rise of cohabitation and subsequently by looking at exogamy. I assess the social and spatial significance of partnership type by comparing Jews who cohabit with Jews who marry, as well as cohabitees in the general population. I develop my analysis of Jewish partnerships in Chapter 6, with an examination of data on Jewish exogamy in Britain. I assess this phenomenon in various contexts and explore the ways in which the fluid nature of identity and ‘new’ partnership types disrupt simplistic disaster narratives found in the literature. I reaffirm the relationship between propinquity and exogamy but question what this correlation tells us about urban segregation and concentration.

My examination of identity of the individual and changes in partnership formation, are drawn together in the final empirical chapter by focusing on the scale of the household (Chapter 7). I assess Jewish living arrangements and in particular, critically examine the ‘Jewish household’. This fundamental
geographical unit is also a core ‘Jewish unit’ of reproduction and identity transmission, but it is being disrupted by many of the processes associated with the second demographic transition. I focus on the dilemmas that mixed households present for Jews and, in so doing, insert the Jewish case into the broader literature on households in which ‘religious’ aspects of identity are conspicuous by their absence. I finally explore the spatiality of ‘Jewish households’ and directly address the problem of explaining Jewish residential congregation which was raised in the geographic literature twenty years ago.

In the concluding chapter I draw together the findings of this broad empirical analysis (Chapters 4 to 7) and relate them to the aims and objectives of this thesis, and assess the extent to which these have, and have not, been achieved. I suggest that the quantitative data can ‘tell a story’ about the process of ‘segregation’ and tentatively describe what this may look like. I also summarise the limitations of this analysis and point to the paths that future work might fruitfully explore.
Chapter 2

Quantitatively analysing the social world: knowledge, methods and sources

In the previous chapter I noted that quantitative geography has lost ground in favour of more qualitative methodologies. In this chapter I explain why the ‘cultural turn’ in geography has apparently undermined quantitative approaches. I show that as a result, such methods are now construed as ‘old’ and ‘outdated’, unsuitable for the pursuits of ‘new’ geographers. However, I argue that not only are there considerable merits to be gained by the use of quantitative data but also that this dichotomy is in fact a false construction. Used appropriately, quantitative data continue to offer geographers considerable analytical scope and benefits. I use the example of census data to explain what the key methodological issues are and how we might go about confronting them. I argue firstly that it is vital we take critical stance to any data, quantitative or qualitative, and secondly that census data in particular must be handled with care; they can only reach their full potential when used in combination other sources, a ‘mixed methods’ approach. Such an approach is entirely appropriate and allows the researcher to reap the benefits of quantitative methods whilst remaining firmly within the boundaries of ‘new’ geography.

I also describe the data sources and materials used in this study, how these materials were created and obtained as well as my own positionality and how this has influenced the choices I have made about the subject matter and methodology. But I start with a discussion that underlies much of the methodological debate in geography. This is the epistemological question of how we come to know the social
world at all and how we can assess the ‘legitimacy’ of different sources of knowledge and representation.

1 How do we know?

‘All philosophical positions and their attendant methodologies, explicitly or implicitly, hold a view about social reality. This view in turn will determine what can be regarded as legitimate knowledge. Thus the ontological shapes the epistemological.’ (Williams and May, 1997:69)

The question, how we come to know the world, our epistemology, is central to philosophy and underlies the intellectual effort of ‘science’, be it ‘natural’ or ‘social’. Karl Popper’s work made a clear distinction between science and non-science (‘pseudo-science’) arguing that the latter provides us with a basis for developing knowledge by enabling empirical predictions to be made which can be falsified through observation (Honderich, 1995:702). However, the apparent ‘purity’ of the ‘scientific’ approach is not without problems, especially in the context of the social world. As Elspeth Graham (2000:264) has noted, ‘[n]o academic research, however mundane, can avoid making philosophical assumptions. Since the broad purpose of academic research is to acquire knowledge of the world, it must assume some epistemological stance.’ The way we produce knowledge and the decisions we make in that process is known as ‘methodology’ which Philip (1998:262) has defined as ‘the way in which information is collected, and concerns both the ways in which research material is gathered and the techniques used in the subsequent analysis/interpretation of the information.’
But this seemingly mundane set of ‘scientific’ procedures is fraught with difficulties. For example, Friedrich Nietzsche argued that there are no facts or objective truths, only interpretations from particular perspectives, so ‘truths’ must be social constructs (cited in Dear, 2000:31; Williams and May, 1997:157). But the realisation that knowledge is non-neutral is highly problematic when we wish to make ‘objective’ ontological claims about the world and during the 1960s and 1970s there were debates among philosophers of science such as Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos about the way in which ‘scientific knowledge’ develops and how the ‘scientific process’ works or rather, does not work (Williams and May, 1997; also Berger and Luckman, 1967; Lesthaeghe, 1998:2). The issues they were concerned with, how we can know the (social) world and by what means, forced social scientists to critically address issues of objectivity, fact and general truths that ‘positivist’ stances had heretofore taken for granted.

These ideas have important implications for the practical world of ‘doing science’—methodology. Science starts with observations but observation is always selective; there are no neutral observations (Williams and May, 1997:16-19). And having selected from our observations we then order and categorise them, which is itself a non-neutral process. What we observe is what we choose to observe, laden as we are with prior assumptions about the world based on our own experiences of it. As Livingstone (1998:13) has pointed out ‘science is itself a social practice; not indeed that science is never anything but the articulation of social interests but that it is embedded in a social matrix and that its theories are conditioned by social factors.’ Our values enter the equation and there is a large body of literature relating to values
in social science, how these affect research and the distinctions between ‘facts’ and
‘values’ in the search for ‘truth’. The whole research process is then vulnerable to
contamination by the values and biases of various individuals, especially in social
science where most of the ‘things’ we wish to study are beyond our sensory
experience, such as liberty and identity. Indeed critical theorists argue that an
individual’s social position largely determines what a person may know (Williams

To take a simple but relevant example; a census contains a question asking ‘What is
your religion?’ and one of the seven labelled categories it presents is ‘Jewish’. There
is here an apparent objectivity, but this is an illusory. For example, who decided
‘Jewish’ should be included as a category and why? Why seven categories? Why
these categories in particular? Why this specific question wording and this question
structure? Someone at some point made choices and decisions (no doubt after
lengthy consultation (see Graham and Waterman, 2005)) when answering these
questions but their own values and opinions will have guided the answers they
produced. Indeed, asking the question in the first place raises multiple questions
about why, its purpose, and reason. Meanwhile, we must also be aware of the
respondent’s values when answering and whether they answer for themselves or on
behalf of others, perhaps their children (see Voas and Bruce, 2004). What one person
means in choosing a category may have little correspondence with what another
person means when they select it. Some have argued that without interviewing and
observing those individuals in person, this can never be ‘truly’ known. But even
doing this is fraught with difficulties (as will be discussed in section 2.1.2 on p54);
what are the values of those that review and interpret the results? The point is that what might appear to be objective may not necessarily be valid shaped as it is by the values and experiences of different individuals.

McDowell (2002:297,306) suggests that the realisation that knowledge is contextual, anchored to particular times, places, and circumstances, is rather ‘unsettling’. For geographers, the notion of ‘competing knowledge claims’ detracts from any confidence we may gain from the assumed ‘scientific’ credentials of our discipline. We are setting out to portray ‘reality’ but how can we do this if there is no single version of reality to portray? And we differ ‘radically’ in our approaches to knowledge, we are a ‘motley collection… with different views of the world’ (ibid:305). What then unites us? For McDowell, accepting this ‘truth’, the ‘reality’ of conditionality, of ‘diverse ways of seeing the world’ (such as feminism and poststructuralism) is one answer. We must, she argues ‘establish ways of criticising universalistic claims without completely surrendering to particularism.’ (ibid:306)

Inherent within the understanding of the non-neutrality of the ‘scientific’ process is the presupposition of a theoretical basis from which we approach our subject. As Williams and May (1997:17-18) have noted, ‘…science does not begin from neutral observation, but presupposes a theory to render its observations intelligible. Observations are thus said to be “theory laden”’. What then guides our ‘criteria for selection’? We use theory in order to ‘permit and to justify’ the choices we make in our construction of knowledge, what will we count as ‘evidence’, what will we count as ‘truth’ (McDowell, 2002:297). Geography is about difference and diversity and the theories we construct ‘are “texts” or narratives that tell a single and particular
The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority

story’ about that difference and diversity (ibid). Elspeth Graham (2000:258) emphasises that theory ‘is not an optional extra’, that some theory underlies any analysis, but Dear (2000:36) asks, ‘on what basis can a claim be made for a privileged status of one theoretical viewpoint over another?’ How should we judge theoretical authenticity?

Graham (2000:258) defines a theory as a ‘set of ideas, or conceptualisation, which goes beyond the particularities of individual cases and offers some more general framework, or account of the nature of certain circumstances, relationships or events. In addition, a theory must have explanatory force, which is to say that it must contribute to making these circumstances, relationships or events intelligible. [My emphasis]’ Whilst addressing the problem of a lack of theory in population geography, she suggests that the ‘controversial’ notion of demographic transition theory offers a useful example. Graham (2000:260) argues that transition theory, stemming from the formulation by Notestein in 1945, offers us the potential ‘for making demographic changes intelligible.’6 Noting its ‘modernist’ credentials—that it over-generalises, is Eurocentric, linear, deterministic and so on (ibid:262)—she nevertheless argues that by linking demographic changes such as birth and death rates to economic and social change, often summarised as ‘modernisation’, it derives ‘explanatory force’ (ibid:261).

Moreover, Graham (2000:261) notes that ‘[s]till others are finding further [demographic] transitions and constructing multicausal theories within the same general framework’. A key example is the ‘second demographic transition’

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6 See Wilson (1989:52-4) for a brief discussion of ‘demographic transition theory’.
introduced by Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa (1986). The SDT has been proposed as a distinct, secondary phase to the standard demographic transition model (Lesthaeghe and Neidert, 2006:669; Notestein, 1945; Wilson, 1989:52-4) and refers to the ‘broad set of population dynamics’ which have occurred, and continue to occur in most Western countries, in particular the near universal phenomenon of fertility rates permanently below replacement levels and death rates (Lesthaeghe, 2001, 1998). It relates depressed fertility to demography, economics, and ideational change (Lesthaeghe, 1998:6-8). Rees (1997:385) suggests five reasons for assuming that fertility will remain permanently low in western countries: ‘the trend towards individualism, increasing economic independence of women, increasing partnership instability, preferences for consumption versus children, and improving contraception.’ Depressed fertility is therefore seen as part of a larger process of social and demographic change related to widespread shifts in attitudes and behaviours regarding sexuality, living and partnership arrangements and childbearing (Kuijsten 1995; Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986; Lesthaeghe and Moors, 2000; Van de Kaa, 1987, 1999).

Some have argued that the concept of the SDT is too broad and that this limits its analytical value; in its current formulation it is more a loose framework than a theory (see Coleman, 2004). Others have noted that the conditions ascribed to it may merely be extensions of the first demographic transition (Cliquet, 1991). However, Lesthaeghe and Neidert (2006:670) argue that despite this contestation, the manifestation of what the SDT ‘predicts’ is clear: ‘every characteristic of the second demographic transition has spread to the majority of industrialized Western
populations’ as well as the Far East (Raymo and Iwasawa, 2006). It is therefore a device which can be employed to contextualize demographic and societal changes in the contemporary period.

2 **Quantitative methods in qualitative times**

Given these epistemological debates, Williams and May (1997:103) ask what then are the most appropriate strategies for coming to know social realities? This type of question has recently provoked fruitful debates in geography. Poon (2004:808) summarises the difficulty thus: ‘scientific knowledge is charged to establish singular methodologies and meanings, yet social texts and geographic facts are contested terrain’. And according to McDowell (2002:306) this tension ‘led to exciting debates in the “new” geography of the 1990s and the new millennium but also to a continuing expression of unease.’ In the following section I will describe the criticisms levelled at what appears by default to be labelled ‘old’ geography and describe the ‘new’ approaches and ‘geographical imaginations’ which it emphasises (Gregory, 1994). But I will also argue that the labelling of quantitative methods as ‘old’ geography is to misconstrue an important and valid aspect of modern geographical analysis.

2.1 **Geography: out with the ‘old’, in with the ‘new’?**

‘One of the consequences of the fashion for postmodernism in human geography is that cultural geography, with its emphases on hybridity, in-betweenness and flexibility, has claimed the epithet of ‘new’ while social geography, with its engagement in the ‘real’ world, with numbers and census categories, seems to have become, by default, ‘the old’. Social geography is criticized for its empiricism, its use of received categories and supposed political incorrectness. New cultural geography teaches that everything is nuanced, plastic and fluid, so that the analysis of census-given
ethnic or racialized categories may be represented as static and empiricist.’ (Peach, 2002:252)

2.1.1 The trouble with quantification

According to Poon (2005:766) ‘the past 10 years have not been kind to human geographers practising quantitative geography’. One set of problems that have been identified is that ‘old’ social geography is empiricist, that our experiences and perceptions are falsely considered neutral. Other common accusations are that it is positivist and modernist and Elspeth Graham (2000:258) argues that these basic criticisms are, in many cases, valid (also Graham and Boyle, 2001:390; White and Jackson, 1995). In particular it has been suggested that quantitative geography is “unduly concerned with the search for global generalities and ‘laws’.” (Fotheringham, 1997:88) Its tendency towards ‘universalizing claims’ (McDowell, 2002:305) and only telling ‘large stories and… metanarratives’ (Poon, 2004:811) with ‘mathematical or statistical language that obfuscates rather than clarifies’ (Poon, 2003:753).

Thus it is argued that the human world is too chaotic and dynamic to be usefully categorised and quantified and that ‘old’ geography oversimplifies and is ‘inherently insensitive, unimaginative, and with no legitimate role to play in researching a world of meaningful peopled places…’ (Philo, 1998:191-92,198-99). According to Crang (2005:232) it struggles to populate its work with ‘real subjects rather than research objects’. And McLennan (2002:493) has suggested that quantitative geographers are under pressure to ‘move closer to reality’ for example by emphasising ‘non-Cartesian space’ and become more ‘reflexive’.
The tendency to aggregate data is a particular problem for geographers who are interested in individuals. This means that relationships and causes must be inferred often leading to a false sense of objectivity owing to the removal of the observer from the observed (see Withers, 2002:562). Aggregation means that macrolevel data are used to infer microlevel relationships and individual information is then irrecoverably lost in the process (Schuessler, 1999; Singleton et al., 1993:71). This is especially true for users of census data given the disclosure control procedures used to protect confidentiality (see ONS, 2007b discussed below—see section 2.2).

Thus it should not be unsurprising, as per Peach’s comment noted at the start of this section, that qualitative approaches have gained ground over the last decade or so at the expense of quantitative approaches (Crang, 2002:647). They are perceived, it is argued, as being better suited for analysing ‘the realities of everyday lives as they are explained by the people who live them’ (Pile, 1991:458).

2.1.2 Critiquing ‘new’ geography
Advocates of ‘new’ cultural geography, which increasingly includes a majority of contemporary human geographers, argue that it represents a successful epistemological challenge to how we can know the world. ‘New’ cultural geography has exhibited ‘a narrowing of scale’, a move from physical space to abstract space and ‘progressive distancing from the analysis of place to the analysis of the representation and meaning of place.’ (Peach, 2002:256-7). It also emphasises representation and performance (see for example, Blunt, 2005; Kong, 2001; and Valins, 2003a).
Meanwhile qualitative geography attempts to address the limitations of quantitative geography discussed above. Often a postmodernist approach is adopted as a direct challenge to modernist thinking, with its implicit recognition that the ontological status of things is conditional and fluid; boundaries are not Cartesian absolutes and the nature of a subject’s existence and our subsequent conclusions drawn of it, is often contingent (see McDowell, 2002:306). Dear (2000:43) has argued that postmodernism is a ‘deliberately relativist, ontological stance’ and geographers have embraced this position as enthusiastically as sociologists. He argues that in geography, postmodernism is recognition ‘of the negotiated, contingent nature of knowing i.e. the conviction that getting to the truth is inseparable from the processes and the peoples involved in determining it.’ (ibid:5) Thus Massey, in response to Harvey (1989), suggests that there is ‘no condition of postmodernity, only conditions’ (1994e:164-5, emphasis in original).

Despite the enthusiasm for ‘new’ cultural geography and its attendant qualitative methodologies, there are however some serious problems with this type of approach. According to McDowell (2002:296) new critiques of science which have questioned ‘old’ certainties have unfortunately ‘left us marooned in a quagmire of relativism in which different ways of knowing have apparently equal claims to validity.’ There is, she argues, ‘unease’ in the field surrounding accusations of geography’s relativism and politicisation (McDowell, 2002:306). For example, Dear notes that attacks on postmodernism suggest that it presents a directionless, ‘amoral “anything-goes” wasteland’ full of ‘stultifying political correctness’ (2000:6,1; also see Harvey, 1989). Postmodernism itself ‘has suffered from its popularity, coming to mean
anything and everything, and therefore almost nothing.’ (Warf, 2006:816). And Weller (2004:16) warns that ‘the postmodern penchant for deconstruction can be taken too far when used to deny the utility of any form of self-identification that goes beyond the isolated self.’

In addition, the qualitative methodologies typically employed by cultural geographers have been criticised for what Crang (2005:231) calls a ‘crisis of representation’ whereby qualitative data, though rich, are also ‘ambiguous and messy’. Duncan and Smith (2002:473) also note that ‘intensive’ qualitative research ‘is often used to make unwarranted claims about generality and representativeness’, i.e. the mirror of an accusation about quantitative approaches. Philip (1998:267) suggests that qualitative methods can be seen as too subjective and ‘value laden’, too open to the ‘vagaries’ of the researcher. Other charges are that qualitative methods lack transparency and the possibility of audit, that they are ‘opaque’, unrepeatable, not open to scrutiny, can lack credibility, and that ‘capricious interpretations’ can go unchallenged (Crang, 2002:652).

Finally, there is the broader and thornier issue of what the discipline of ‘geography’ is becoming, or has become. Some, such as Peach (2002:257) are concerned that ‘new cultural geography, it seems, is more interested in culture than in geography.’ Graham and Boyle (2001:389-91) have argued that during the ‘reinvention’ of human geography along the lines of social theory, cultural studies and feminist thinking, entire subdisciplines have been entirely marginalised.
2.1.3 In defence of the quantitative method and the new ‘old’ geography

In pointing out the difficulties encountered by ‘new’ cultural geography but equally, acknowledging the important issues critiques of the ‘scientific method’ and ‘modernist’ thinking have produced, quantitative geographers have responded in a number of ways. Some simply argued that the challenges to social geography are unfair. Fotheringham (1997:88) stated that it is rather ‘naïve’ to suggest that quantitative approaches aim for global generalities and ‘laws’. Poon (2004:808) sees quantitative geographers now offering ‘a more critical attitude towards the scientific standard of completeness of theories and explanations… [developing] a more contextualized view where normative explanation is only one of potentially diverse explanatory outcomes’. There is then a gradual acceptance that it is no longer necessary, or even acceptable, for quantitative practitioners to discover universal laws (Hanson, 2003:469).

Others, such as Graham and Boyle (2001:390) have argued that ‘to challenge empiricism is not, in itself, an argument against the use of quantitative methods’. They cite the example of population geography arguing that it is ‘appropriately quantitative’. Like Poon (2004:812) they are clear that quantitative data can also ‘tell their own story’ while Poon also argues that the positivist charge is misconstrued, that quantitative methods are not ‘positively positive’ stating that, ‘Few quantitative human geographers today fully subscribe to the revered modernist principles of certainty and predictability that commonly characterize nomothetic research using the scientific method.’ (Poon, 2005:754; see also Philo (1998:199) who argues that the positivist charge is ‘wholly misguided’.) Indeed ‘quantitative geography finds
increased resonance in the increased fluidity and multiplicity of methodology’ (Poon, 2005:771).

‘Old’ social geographers have also responded by adapting their main focuses. For example, Poon (2004:807) notes a greater sensitivity by practitioners ‘to the constitutive parts, that is, individuals and their properties or attributes, than the social or geographic wholes themselves.’ Fotheringham (1997:94) speaks of a veritable ‘explosion’ of interest in the local which he argues ‘belyes the criticism that the quantitative approach is only concerned with the search for broad generalizations and not with identifying local exceptions.’ He notes an increased ‘concentration on local exceptions rather than the search for global regularities’ (Fotheringham, 1997:88). For Poon (2004:811) the increased use of microdata has been a key development in contemporary quantitative geography whereby analysis can take place at the level of the ‘individual’ or the ‘household’. In many ways this has been made possible by advances in computational power combined with a more critical stance towards the assumptions of classical statistical inference tests. As Fotheringham (1999:605) notes, quantitative geographers have ‘unshackled’ themselves from many constraints of the past in terms of spatial analysis. They no longer expect relationships derived from social data to be constant over space. Given these changes he states that ‘much of the criticism that has been levelled at quantitative geography appears ignorant’ (ibid).

Duncan and Smith (2002:473) accept that ‘process and explanation’ in particular are difficult to derive from exclusively ‘extensive’, quantitative research; they argue however that such a methodology is acceptable if the topic at hand remains generally
unexplored and where its nature and scope is uncertain. Also quantitative geographers are more concerned today ‘with relevant and correct practices than establishment of certainty and predictability’ (Poon, 2003:760; 2004; 2005). Poon argues that quantitative methods are more likely to incorporate probability than determinism; that they are characterised by ‘imperfect empiricism’ rather than modernism; they accept that unlike the ‘natural’ sciences, geographic data tend to be non-experimental and ‘noisy’; and that statistical evaluation of evidence relies on persuasion, not prescription. Quantitative practitioners continue to search for better ways of studying dynamic systems rather than merely analysing pattern and equilibrium states (Poon, 2004:810).

Peach (2002:257) emphasises how ‘old’ geography is more ‘accessible’, suggesting that ‘social geography works in an area where many more than the cognoscenti can understand what is written’. Lees (2003:107) argues that quantitative methods avoid the qualitative problems regarding their limited transparency since they allow for more explicit discussion of methods and data collection. Peach also pointedly notes that simply demonstrating ethnic identities are social constructions, or that religion is the opium of the people, ‘does not make the phenomena less potent.’ (op. cit.:253)

These types of argument enable quantitative geographers to move forward in ways that do not contradict the constructive ethos of ‘new’ geography but rather allow them to be incorporated within it. As Poon (2004:812) notes quantitative methodology also ‘tells a story’. For Fotheringham (1999:605) now is ‘an exciting time to be a quantitative geographer!’ And Peach (2002:257) is equally optimistic stating that ‘…as the [2001 Census] results of the new ethnic question and the new
question on religion come on stream, it is going to be a wonderful time to be a social geographer.’

A methodological compromise?
Yet Kwan (2004:756) describes a ‘deeply entrenched’ division in geography with ‘mutual indifference and absence of dialogue between these two groups of geographers’. Is there a response to such pessimism? What is the way forward in this old/new quantitative/qualitative debate? Many would argue that, on the contrary, there may be no debate at all. Philo (1998:192) for example, has suggested that we reconsider the ‘quantity and quality’ distinction arguing that the differences are not so clear cut (ibid:196). He argues that quantitative methods are generally far more complex and nuanced than many critics are prepared to admit (ibid:197). While Crang (2002:648) notes that the debate has moved beyond this simplistic binary and Philip (1998:261,273) has called for researchers to ‘think beyond the myopic quantitative-qualitative divide’. She argues that a method should be selected that ‘best satisfies the need of specific research projects’ whether quantitative, qualitative, or a ‘scrambled’ combination of both.

But of course that begs the question as to who decides what counts as ‘appropriate’ in each specific instance? It is also a somewhat idealistic, even quixotic, aim which ignores the realities of resource limitations in all scientific research—including the skills of the researcher him/herself. In this work, I aim to examine critically what is, by most standards, a vast amount of untapped quantitative data, given financial and time constraints; it is unrealistic to conduct a parallel qualitative research project, even though that may be desirable. In addition and as noted, Duncan and Smith
(2002:473) have argued that a quantitative approach is acceptable if the topic under consideration remains generally unexplored and where its nature and scope is uncertain. This indeed is presently the case.

Like Philo (1998) I would also argue that the distinction is perhaps overplayed. Moreover there are numerous ways in which the ‘spirit’ of ‘new’ approaches can, or should, be incorporated into any geographical analysis. The vehemently critical stance of many cultural geographers should be fully digested by the quantitative analyst. A sceptical, but constructive, attitude towards quantitative data blunts the harder edges of ‘old’ social geography. Indeed this may be what Philip had in mind in her broader conceptualisation of ‘mixed methods’ (1998:263). Philo (1998:193) suggests that quantitative geographers begin ‘opening up a (self-)critical scrutiny of quantitative geography akin to that which is now commonplace in relation to the qualitative methods’. Poon notes this is happening, that ‘the present direction in analytical formalization appears to be moving towards a more critical scrutiny of general linear reality with the effect that scientific ambitions have been downsized though not abandoned’ (2004:812).

Thus my own reliance on quantitative data, bold given the present academic climate in geography (Kwan, 2004), follows this type of approach—that a rapprochement is possible and desirable. Indeed, the very notion of an ‘old’ methodology juxtaposed with a ‘new’ approach is false. Whether we choose to privilege extensive work using quantitative methods or intensive work using qualitative methods, all geographers must be critical in their approach and heed Duncan and Smith’s (2002:473) warning to avoid making unwarranted claims about the scope and strength of research results.
2.2 A critique of the 2001 Census data

“The interest and significance of the census for the community lie in this,” wrote Leo Tolstoy of the Moscow census of 1882: “that it furnishes it with a mirror into which, willy nilly, the whole community, and each one of us, gaze.” The faces that look back can surprise us still.” (The Economist, 2007)

Kertzer and Arel (2002:35) note that, ‘Census categorization of populations by various markers of identity—race, ethnic groups, language, religion—has a two-hundred-year history.’ This thesis makes extensive use of census data from Britain in 2001, especially those relating to identity. However, there are several reasons to query the ability of censuses generally to satisfactorily elicit information relating to identity, and once obtained, establish what such data mean. In the following critique I highlight a number of criticisms that have been levelled at the census instrument and the veracity of the data it procures. I then explain why, in spite of these difficulties, censuses continue to be considered a most valuable source of data and why, if used correctly, I am confident that its inclusion here is valid and necessary.

Are census data positivist?

It can be argued that censuses are the ultimate tool of myth creation in the modern age. As Anderson (1991:164,169) noted, ‘The fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that everyone has one—and only one—extremely clear place. No fractions.’ We are the objects of its ‘feverish imaginings’ and must fit in somewhere however this is not necessarily desirable or even possible in the increasingly subjective question content of the modern census.

Particular concern is expressed about the positivist nature of censuses to demarcate and categorise. But in doing so, as Kertzer and Arel (2002:11,35) note, ‘the census
does much more than simply reflect social reality; rather, it plays a key role in the
construction of that reality.’ They also point out that censuses ‘pigeonhole’ people
into ‘official government categories’, as well as ‘legitimate’ such categories and ‘this
mode of thinking about people’. Thus the census merely reinforces and reifies rigid,
politically inspired categories and societal stereotypes (Anderson, 1991; Aspinall,
can be seen as ‘purification’ of groupings that are rarely homogeneous (Halfacree,
2001:367). Such criticisms tend to devalue the data in the eyes of many. (See also
the critiques by Sibley (1988, 1995) on this issue.)

The most ‘controversial’ of topics tackled by censuses relate to race or ethnic group,
with categories often inherited from colonial anthropological studies (Christopher,
2006:344). But, ‘Where issues of ethnicity and religion are concerned, attempts at
labelling quickly run into a minefield of political correctness and contested
meaning.’ (Brimicombe, 2007:891) Indeed census data users stand accused of being
‘positivist’ and ‘modernist’ (Graham and Boyle, 2001:390). In Britain, Simpson
(2004:662-63) points out that census data on ‘race’ and ‘ethnic groups’ are
problematic because although respondents can choose which category to mark ‘this
is not a declaration of self-identity because the categories have already been set.’
They are fixed despite identity being complex and dynamic, and worse, they are
constructed for ‘reasons of public policy’ (Weller, 2004:11). In effect the taxonomies
used in censuses construct, or at least reinforce and reify difference, presenting clear-
cut categories to people that may be alien to those being asked to ‘fit’ into them
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(Kertzer and Arel, 2002:2, 31-34; see also Aspinall, 2002, 2003; Goldscheider, 2002).

As will be elaborated in Section 2 of Chapter 3, recent critiques of identity mean that users of census data must proceed with special caution when it comes to interpreting meaning. For example, in Britain’s 1991 Census, a question on ‘ethnic group’ was introduced for the first time. The question directed respondents to ‘tick the appropriate box’ and provided the following wordy note: “If the person is descended from more than one ethnic or racial group, please tick the groups to which the person considers he/she belongs, or tick the ‘Any other ethnic group’ box and describe the person’s ancestry in the space provided. [My emphasis]” (OPCS, 1991:Q11). The multiple meanings and notions inherent in the emphasised words are very confusing. Categories such as ‘White’, ‘Black-Caribbean’, and ‘Chinese’ do little to assuage the confusion as to what the question was actually about, Do I belong to a White race? Is my ethnic ancestry ‘White’? The trap here is to assume that such labels are those the respondents would choose for themselves. For example, in a discussion of identity questions in recent censuses, Christopher (2006:347) states that ‘it was sometimes difficult to ensure that people from such [ethnic] groups identified themselves correctly…’ But in what sense does he mean ‘correctly’? It is the assumption that subjective questions can elicit objective answers which ‘postmodern’ critiques emphasise.

Censuses not only fix labels, they also fix categorical meanings and space. The 2001 Census of England and Wales made it quite clear that ethnically ‘Irish’ also means ‘White’, whereas being ‘White was incongruent with being ‘Chinese’ (Aspinall,
2008). But I would argue it creates and imposes its imagined reality in an even more profound way. For example, the Census clearly differentiates ‘religion’ from ‘ethnicity’ (ONS, 2001b) despite the boundary between these two labels being blurred. It also homogenises and fixes space imposing (invariably political) boundaries and hierarchical scale. In the British example administrative areas are labelled ‘Local Authority Districts’ (LADs) and ‘Wards’ and become reified ‘communities’ whether or not these bounded areas have any relation to what is occurring within and between them.\(^7\)

Aspinall (2008) points out that there is a ‘trade-off’ between data validity and utility. He suggests that the challenge for censuses is to mediate the ‘tension’ between the desire for granularity (category sensitivity, representation and flexibility of answer capture) and the practical needs of manageable datasets with category stability. One option is for questions to facilitate multiple responses across categories.

But there is a more subtle problem for censuses that cannot be overcome as easily. This is a census’s inability to capture dynamism and change in anything but the broadest sense. Discussing the value of census data, Hall et al. (1997:162) argue that it clearly ‘cannot show the full diversity of ways in which groups of individuals organise their lives, or how people interpret their living arrangements.’ They note that given the increasingly transitory nature of many people’s lifecycles, the cross-sectional (snapshot) approach of a census is a rather inadequate method of capturing the dynamic nuances of contemporary living arrangements. They suggest that

\(^7\) For critiques of such approaches to scale see Marston (2000); and to space see (Amin) 2004; Blaut (1961); Gregory (1994) and Massey (1994).
longitudinal data following individual’s life courses are preferable because such data are more in tune with the dynamism and complexity of the ‘real’ world (see also Ogden and Hall, 2000:369). Indeed the Office for National Statistics (ONS) itself acknowledges such limitations: ‘The growth of migrant flows, transient working and variety in household formation both provide challenges to our existing methods and yet need to be measured with increased reliability.’ (ONS, 2003b:5)

Anderson (1991:163-64) argues that the census is an ‘institution of power’ shaping the way states imagine their dominion. As such, census data are also accused of being politically saturated. The decision even to conduct a census is ultimately a political one, implemented by nation states for various reasons of ‘national accounting’ (Kertzer and Arel, 2002:2; Wilson, 1989:26-8). The decision to add a new question to a census is also political (Aspinall, 2000a, 2008; Weller, 2004:11). Further, Anderson (1991:164) has argued that the politically powerful categories always lead the list. In Britain, the inclusion of a question on ethnicity was justified on the grounds that the categories were ‘chosen to support government legislation against inequality and for equal opportunity’ (Simpson, 2004:663). The religion question required a debate in the House of Commons and a change in legislation in order for it to be included (Graham and Waterman, 2005:92).

Finally there is the technical issue of data aggregation and disclosure. The need to maintain an individual’s privacy in a compulsory national census means that census offices must apply strict controls to the raw data to protect confidentiality (ONS, 2007b). Although this bypasses the ethical difficulties that qualitative practitioners encounter regarding informed consent, this does have unavoidable and unsatisfactory
implications (Burgess, 1997:185-208; Singleton et al., 1993:479-81; Valins, 1999a). What Brimicombe (2007:892) describes as the ‘smaller-number problem’ refers to the inevitable sacrifice of detail in micro-data output due to aggregation. For example Martin (2006:8) describes how the 2001 Census in Britain was ‘subject to unprecedented levels of disclosure control, involving pre-tabulation record swapping, random adjustments and rounding of small counts to 0 or 3. In the case of relatively rare characteristics these adjustments place serious limitations on the use of some counts for small areas.’ (see also ONS, 2004c:2.104; Schuessler, 1999). This means that in some cases it is not possible to access data at the smallest scales especially when multiple parameters are cross-tabulated. In addition there is also the issue of data ‘imputation’ which is a method used to account for ‘missing people’ (ONS, 2003a). In Britain in 2001 the method was known as ‘The One Number Census’ and this represented an attempt to ensure that ‘Hard to Count’ groups (such as the highly mobile and the socially disaffected) were included (Boyle and Dorling, 2004:105; Cook, 2004a:121; Martin, 2006:8).

Defending the census
Of course, each of these issues must be acknowledged and addressed if possible, but there are also many reasons to consider census data in a more positive light. Boyle and Dorling (2004:101-02,109) offer a vigorous defence of the census stating that it is a ‘vital resource’ whose ‘value cannot be underestimated’; it has a ‘unique’ status to which no other ‘administrative data’ are comparable and for Cook (2004a:114), the census is ‘an analytically rich statistical source’. Similarly Kertzer and Arel (2002:35) comment that ‘The census, although only one of many government
information-gathering devices, is arguably the most important and certainly the most
universal.’ Regarding the census question on religion, Brimicombe (2007:889) notes
that it ‘affords new and important opportunities to study a key dimension of self-
identity.’

Specifically, the census is the only way a global picture of a population can be
obtained. It can be used to form baselines for the purposes of creating sampling
frames for other surveys (Aspinall, 2008). It allows ‘rare’ groups to be sampled
where this might be impossible or impracticable to achieve by other means. It is also
not entirely without dynamism. For example, Britain’s 2001 Census contained
questions about migratory behaviour over the year prior to the census (ONS, 2001b)
and in Scotland data on religion indicated identity changes between upbringing and
the present (GROS, 2001). Separately, in response to anthropological criticisms that
identity is constructed out of the categories of the census Kertzer and Arel (2002:19-
20) note that it is also the case that ‘while identities have no reality independent of
people’s perceptions, the belief by social actors that their identities are real is itself a
social fact.’

Boyle and Dorling (2004:103) note that Britain’s 2001 Census was ‘amongst the
most advanced national censuses ever attempted’. They also note that ‘geographers
are probably the largest single group of social scientists in the UK who specialize in
census data handling, provision and analysis’ (ibid:102; also Martin, 2006:7). ‘On
balance’ they argue ‘the decennial census is a vital resource for a remarkable amount
of demographic, economic, health and social research, which would not be possible
using alternative sources of information.’ (ibid:109)
More generally, Halfacree (2001:396-97) has argued that ‘[t]axonomic practices… are central to geography’ and that the classification, categorisation and codification of the world around us is ‘integral to everyday life’. He suggests that ‘the world is organised, understood and mediated through these basic cognitive units’. And Peach (2002:253) pointedly argues that ‘[a]bolishing the categories … does not abolish the issues; the issues simply become more difficult to quantify.’ Modood (1998:381-97) has called for restraint in regard to challenges to what he terms ‘the myth of unity’. He suggests that ‘[u]nitities, continuities, resemblances, groupness are not a priori banished but remain the object of empirical enquiry.’ Therefore, generalisations and boundaries can, and indeed, must be drawn if any analytical progress is to be made at all.

However, virtually all commentators do agree that relying on census data alone is not acceptable for in-depth quantitative studies. For example in their assessment of religion data in the 2001 Census, Voas and Bruce (2004:28) accept that their conclusions remain provisional ‘until the census results are supported with data from other sources’. Even within their enthusiastic endorsement of census data, Boyle and Dorling (2004:109) also accept that other sources of information and other methods of data collection should be considered by researchers. In effect, this implies that triangulation is necessary; this is the use of multiple methods or measures in order to increase confidence in one’s findings (Singleton et al., 1993:391-94,526).

Appraising specific aspects of the British 2001 Census

I now highlight, by means of specific examples from the 2001 Census of Britain, a number of practical and technical issues which are encountered by analysts dealing
with these data. No quantitative or qualitative data are immune from the dilemmas of establishing ‘truths’, thus what matters is that we are made fully aware of which difficulties have been or are likely to be encountered so that we can make judgments about the value of findings.

The inclusion for the first time (outside Northern Ireland) of a question on religion in the 2001 Census only came after ‘a very great deal of consultation, discussion, and debate’ (Weller, 2004:3,5; see also Graham and Waterman, 2005). According to Weller (2004:18) ‘there are both promises and perils arising from the inclusion of questions on religion in the Census’. Peach (2002:255) has argued that its inclusion ‘was to improve our knowledge of ethnicity.’ The religion question immediately followed the ethnicity question on the form. The question wording (discussed below) makes no reference to socio-normative facets of religion such as belief, affiliation or practice. The question structure itself also did not allow for any sort of syncretic category, unlike the mixed options in the ethnicity question (see ONS, 2001b). But as Weller (2004:14) points out, there are ‘growing numbers of people in “mixed faith” families. For respondents in such families and indeed for those in religious/secular families, providing an answer to the religion question with regard to any children of the householders is not straightforward’.

One particular concern this thesis addresses is the quantitative evaluation of households (see Chapter 4 - Section 4 and Chapter 7). Cook (2004a:114) points out that the quality of a census ‘is founded on our capacity to associate the population with key statistical reference units’. But Martin (2006:12) notes that ‘[a]s personal mobility patterns and living arrangements become more complex, it does not follow
that a household equates to a single dwelling space (or vice versa). The constraints of a census questionnaire are increasingly inadequate for capturing this complexity, and reassessing the definition of households is a critical issue being addressed in [the] 2011 census consultation’. The census imposes its own limited definition of ‘household’ but since there are multiple types of living arrangement, it aggregates and simplifies the data into specific bounded categories. In effect, the census homogenises household types (Wathan et al., 2004:1102) and thus the long tail of rarer types are inaccurately recorded in an all-encompassing ‘Other’ or simply not recorded at all (see ONS, 2001b). Wathan et al. (op. cit.) also conclude that the standardised household classifications used in censuses ‘do little more than describe various elements of household structure [such as number of rooms], and as such do not provide much insight into the dynamics of households.’ They do not suggest we ignore household census data, rather, they argue that more sophisticated and flexible approaches to the data are incorporated into analyses.

The census does however provide an opportunity to quantitatively operationalize ‘household’ (and therein ‘family’) on a national scale and for that it is unique. It also does this consistently. In 2001 it included for the first time a household relationship grid, (limited to the first five individuals) allowing for a far more detailed examination of household structure to be carried out than had been possible in the past (ONS, 2001a; Wathan et al., 2004:1103). Many analyses of households inevitably rely on census data and for the Jewish population, the level of detail provided on household structure is unprecedented (Goldscheider and Bures, 2003:584; Hall et al., 1997).
Voas and Bruce (2004:24) have pointed out a related but subtle problem regarding households. They argue that census results on religion may be biased because ‘census forms are generally completed by one individual on behalf of the entire household.’ This is problematic because that person tends to be older and male. For example, men are more likely to report ‘No Religion’ than women and this may affect the identities recorded for any children in the household. Also, given that ‘religious affiliation is strongly correlated with age, one might thus expect the census figures to be biased upwards (ibid:24).’ However they do not accept that this unduly prejudices the 2001 data stating that, ‘On the face of it, the net effect of the age and sex bias among HRPs [Household Reference Persons] is negligible.’ (ibid:25)

A similar difficulty relates to the Family Reference Person (FRP) and partnership data. The FRP is the person in a couple (as opposed to a household) who is identified by ONS based on various criteria (economic activity, age, order in which the census form was completed—see ONS, 2004c:6.67 (Definitions)). This means that the FRP is more likely to be male than female. For example, the data report the religion of married couples based on the religion of the FRP, but this is problematic because the implication is that they are showing religious endogamy when this may not be the case; a Jewish male married to a non-Jewish female is more likely to be included than a Jewish female married to a non-Jewish male because of the way the FRP is allocated. Either way, it is not possible to distinguish endogamous from exogamous couples in the Standard Output. Census analysts must be alert to such subtleties and either locate appropriate alternative data or attempt to assess the extent and effect of any such bias.
Additionally, census data on partnerships are *ex post facto*; the partnerships have already crystallised. Their present location tells us nothing about where couples met or how they met, yet this may be fundamental to assessments of exogamy. This implies that examining cause and effect is problematic—a high density of Jewish endogamous couples living in a given area does not necessarily mean they *met* in that area. It would therefore be erroneous to automatically assume a direct relationship between propinquity (or high population density) and endogamy (even though this may have been the case). It is possible that having formed a union elsewhere—at university for example or through a *shadchan* (religious introducer)—the couple moved together to an area of high Jewish density. Thus where possible, triangulation of alternative sources should be used to avoid erroneous conclusions.

Finally a word about words. It is well known that the wording of questions in questionnaires can influence the answer that is most likely to be given.\(^8\) The voluntary religion question in the 2001 Census in England and Wales asked ‘What is your religion?’ (ONS, 2001b). Voas and Bruce (2004:26) comment that this wording has a ‘positive presumption’, perhaps suggesting that people are expected to have a religion. They contrast this with the wording used in the British Social Attitudes survey which asked: ‘Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?’ (ibid). This, they suggest, does less to encourage an affirmative response, and indeed they show that the two questions elicited pointedly different results. However, since the first category offered in the 2001 Census question is ‘None’, I would suggest this was not likely to have been overly problematic for the Census

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\(^8\) See Singleton et al. (1993:297-309) for a discussion of this and other issues relating to the construction of questionnaire forms and question arrangement.
data. A separate issue is that interpretation of the word ‘religion’ will vary, some reading it as a question about affiliation, others about practice or belief and according to Voas and Bruce, national identity. Brimicombe (2007:889) describes this as a question on ‘religious affiliation’ but I disagree with his interpretation—there was no indication that it was asking about official membership of a religious body.

It has also been argued that the ‘religion’ question was really an ethnicity question in disguise. Voas (2007:402) suggests that the ‘so-called religion question is in practice quasi-ethnic’ because it immediately followed the question on ethnic identity, and the responses offered seem to refer to cultural heritage rather than organisational membership, though as noted, it is not necessary to be affiliated to claim a religion. Weller (2004:11) has pointed out that it was concerned with determining identity ‘rather than with more personal matters of belief, practice, or religiosity.’ As my arguments in Chapter 3 (Section 2.1.2, p119) make clear, these debates stem from the instrument’s attempts to separate ‘religion’ from ‘ethnicity’ and define them as strictly independent categories.

It should also be noted that in the 2001 Census of Scotland the wording and structure of the religion question differed markedly to that in England and Wales. In Scotland the question asked, ‘What religion, religious denomination, or body do you belong to?’ followed by a separate question, ‘What religion, religious denomination, or body were you brought up in?’ (see ONS, 2004d:86). Thus in Scotland the notion of ‘belonging’ is inserted whereas in England and Wales the question is more ambiguous, simply asking ‘what’ the religion ‘is’. Also, the Scottish question
structure implies that religious identity can change over a person’s lifetime whereas no such inference is made in England and Wales. This means that the two instruments (measuring ‘current religion’ in Scotland and ‘religion’ in England and Wales) are not necessarily measuring the same thing—having identified a religio-cultural background, a person in Scotland may have felt freer to state ‘No Religion’ or nothing in the ‘current’ box whereas a person in England and Wales, if they were to register any ‘religious’ identity at all had no such choice. Clearly these fundamental differences have implications for the extent to which the two datasets (‘Scotland’ and ‘England and Wales’) can be amalgamated or even directly compared.

The wording of the *ethnicity* question presents another set of difficulties. In England and Wales respondents were asked, ‘What is your ethnic group?’ and directed respondents to ‘✓ the appropriate box to indicate your cultural background. [My emphasis]’ (see ONS, 2004d:55). In addition, the question lists a set of categories which mix together notions of ‘race’, skin colour (‘Black’, ‘White’ etc.) and nationality (‘Indian’, ‘Chinese’ etc.). So many different facets of identity are included in this question that its purpose is rather ambiguous and ‘confusing’ (Brimicombe, 2007:889; see also Graham and Waterman, 2007:410-411; Simpson, 2004:662-63). Kertzer and Arel (2002:13) explain this by noting that Britain’s anti-discrimination Race Relations Act (1976) ‘In one fell swoop… mixed together race, ethnicity/cultural nationality, and citizenship.’ This political history is crucial to understanding the wording problems of this supposedly ‘objective’, ‘ethnic’ question. (See further Sillitoe and White, 1992)
Question wording was also problematic regarding the tricky topic of households (see Chapter 3 - Section 4). The Census form’s guidance notes to respondents recording details of household members amounted to a substantial ten sentences (ONS, 2001a:2). Within the notes, respondents were directed to record all members of the household ‘who usually live at this address [my emphasis]’; as well as ‘anyone who is temporarily away from home on the night of 29 April 2001… [my emphasis]’; and include ‘people with more than one address if they live at this address for the majority of time. [emphasis in original]’. These instructions insert considerable subjectivity into the definition of household; Redfern (2004:211) describes the effect as ‘fuzzy’. He also argues that by asking respondents to include ‘anyone who is staying with you who has no other usual address’ (ONS, 2001a:2) is confusing ‘because it introduced circularity’ and might have led to double counting (Redfern, 2004:211). Clearly it is important that data analysts carefully examine the wording of the questions which elicited the data and attempt to assess their potential impact on the results obtained.

3 Sources, positionality and materials

‘There is much work for those who will mine the rich lodes of material on Jewish communities that may be found in various censuses and surveys.’ (Goldscheider and Zuckerman, 1984:x)

3.1 Data watershed: from drought to deluge

The demographic study of Jews in Britain has a long tradition (Rosenbaum, 1905; Kantorowitsch, 1936; Neustatter, 1955; Freedman and Parkes, 1955; Prais and Schmoool, 1967, 1968, 1970, 1973; Prais, 1972, 1974). Yet until relatively recently any efforts to study the group were hampered by a lack of data. This is because
considerable effort and expense was required in order to gather data on such a ‘rare’ population (Kosmin and Waterman, 1989; Waterman 1989). Indeed, locating studies which have not mentioned the problem of data paucity (quantitative or qualitative) is challenging. For example, Krausz (1968b:86) noted that data on Jewish demography were ‘scanty’ and the lack of census or other ‘official’ datasets asking about religion has been widely recognised (see also, Comenetz, 2003; Cromer, 1974:155; Kosmin, 1981, 1982:248, 1998; Waterman, 1997:144; Waterman and Kosmin, 1986b:491,498, 1987a:259, 1987b:107; Webber, 1997a:258-9).  

In addition, even when religion has been asked in national omnibus surveys, such as the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (carried out by the ESRC) and the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) (carried out by NatCen), these are unable to sample sufficiently large numbers of ethnic minority groups (such as Jews) to be useful to researchers (Voas and Bruce, 2004:24). For example, the 2003 BSA contained 15 Jewish respondents, an accurate reflection of the Jewish representation nationally but of minimal statistical value (NatCen, 2004).

One ‘official’ source that does contain data on Jews comes from the *FM2 Series ‘Marriage, Divorce and Adoption Statistics’* produced annually by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). This reports on twenty different types of marriage ceremony in England and Wales including ‘Jewish marriages’ carried out in ‘registered buildings’ (i.e. synagogues). However, as discussed in Chapter 5 (Section

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9 For similar comments outside Britain see DellaPergola (1992:84) and Waite (2002:35).
10 Similar difficulties are encountered with the British Cohort Study (BCS70), the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS), the National Child Development Survey (NCDS), the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE), and the British Crime Survey (BCS).
2.1 p236), this dataset is limited to those who married in such buildings under Jewish auspices and therefore excludes the many couples who marry in hotels, or are in exogamous unions, as well as those who marry outside Britain.

Therefore, analysts have had to rely on self-generated data. For example, Haberman and Schmool (1995:547) used ‘indirect methods’ when estimating the ‘Jewish population size’ by means of death records (also Haberman et al., 1983), and Kosmin and Waterman (1989) relied on the sampling of ‘ethnic surnames’ from electoral lists. Indeed, de Lange and Kosmin (1979) produced an entire report on how best surveys might be carried out on groups such as the Jews in light of data paucity.  

This ‘data drought’ continued until the mid-1990s at which point the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) instigated a large scale survey of Jewish identity (Miller et al., 1996). Since then the drought began to abate and in the new millennium there has been a veritable data deluge, the result of two parallel ‘data revolutions’. The first was the inclusion of a religion question in the 2001 Census of England and Wales, and Scotland; the second was the completion, in 2003, of a five year ‘Long-Term Planning’ project by JPR (JPR, 2003). The 2001 Census was the first time that such a (voluntary) question was included and was internationally significant given that the UK was home to one of the largest Jewish populations in the world. JPR’s ‘Long-Term Planning’ involved the completion of one of the most ambitious survey projects of British Jews ever undertaken and included two large

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surveys of the population—one in London and the South-east and one in Leeds—in order to create ‘a profile of the needs and characteristics of the Jewish public’ (JPR, 2003:3). Both the census and the JPR surveys were extremely expensive but, obviously, different constituencies were called upon to pay for the work (Cook, 2004a:112; Waterman, 1989, 2003).

Despite this data watershed and almost 60 years of dissatisfaction with data availability, it is still the case that relatively little work has been carried out in its wake, though there are exceptions (Becher et al., 2002; Graham, 2003; Graham et al., 2007; Miller, 2003; Waterman, 2003). Thus, there exists an unprecedented opportunity to make a substantial contribution to the study of Jews in Britain. And whilst these data are clearly biased towards quantitative analysis, they nevertheless present a true data revolution.

This abundance of new data, which to date are largely unexplored, necessitates this being a primarily quantitative study. In addition, the broad scope of this work combined with the dearth of previous work on which to build, means that it is also ‘appropriately quantitative’ (Graham and Boyle, 2001:390). Nevertheless, considerable attention is paid throughout this dissertation to the potential difficulties such a methodology elicits and which have been so clearly highlighted in the literature (Duncan and Smith, 2002; Poon, 2005). Further, I do not deny the value that qualitative or ethnographic input (of the type carried out by Valins (1999)). The limitations of the quantitative data encountered here are highlighted in the empirical sections of the study and at many points I draw attention to areas that would benefit from such approaches in future work. However, these data do allow broad overviews
of each topic to be presented where, as in the case of Jewish intermarriage and households in Britain, very little of substance had been written before (see Chapter 3).

Therefore, this study is based on the secondary analysis of quantitative datasets (Singleton et al., 1993:251-2,363-67). In the first instance it is an analysis of previously unexplored 2001 Census data on Jews in Britain. However, as noted above by Voas and Bruce (2004:28) and Boyle and Dorling (2004:109), census data cannot stand alone and must be supported by other sources. Therefore I utilise surveys of the Jewish population which are a far richer though narrower data source than the Census. This combination increases the confidence in my conclusions as well as the reliability and validity of the Census data themselves (Singleton et al., 1993:114-5,391-94). Such ‘triangulation’ attenuates the problems associated with the census data and any overreliance on received census taxonomies (see section 2.2 on page 62 above). Thus, this thesis is by default, a critique of the 2001 Census on identity.

3.2 My positionality
The inherent lack of impartiality on the part of the researcher requires a level of self-reflection to be inserted into the research process in an attempt to bring one’s own foundational assumptions to the surface (Poon, 2004:808). It is therefore necessary to briefly note how my own positionality has influenced the choices I have made in this study in relation to subject matter and methodology (see further, Williams and May, 1997:16-19).
I was brought up in a ‘Jewish household’ and would continue to describe my identity as culturally ‘Jewish’, although I am not at all religious. My interest in studying Jewish identity was piqued whilst previously working at the Institute for Jewish Policy Research in London with Barry Kosmin and Stanley Waterman. It was there that I became aware of the need to use the new data sources that had just become available and extend the academic work on Britain’s Jewish population that had been carried out in the 1980s. Through my professional training in geography and statistical methods to Masters Degree level, I have developed a general preference for working with quantitative data rather than qualitative material.

### 3.3 Materials: 2001 Census data

The census data used in this study were obtained from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) (for data on England and Wales) and the General Register Office for Scotland (GROS). (Census data for Northern Ireland have only been included in Table 6, on page 212 in Chapter 4.) Three different types of data output have been used: Standard Output, Commissioned Output, and Samples of Anonymised Records (SARs). All three types of output are subject to strict disclosure controls in order to protect confidentiality (see further, Martin, 2006:8; ONS, 2004d:12, 2007b). All census data are Crown Copyright.

#### 3.3.1 Standard Output

Standard cross-tabulations were made freely available (on request) by the various census agencies from September 2003 onwards on CD and DVD formats. In total, 25 separate cross-tabulations based on the religion variable(s) were released. Depending on the particular table, these data are available at scales ranging from the national
level to Output Area (see ONS, 2004d:8). Throughout the empirical sections of this thesis, reference is made to table codes pertaining to the datasets used in the analyses. In each instance, I refer to Appendix 1 (p401). This shows the identity code of the table and its title indicating the data contents of the particular cross-tabulation (e.g. table S149 *Sex and age by religion*).

### 3.3.2 Privately commissioned Census material

Although the Standard Output covered cross-tabulations of the most commonly requested variables, it was necessary to request several other cross-tabulations through ONS’s Commissioned Tables scheme. All such tables were paid for by a commissioning organisation at a charge of £50 to £150 per table. Tables for this work were commissioned through the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) and the Board of Deputies of British Jews. They were supplied between 2005 and 2007. The Appendix shows which tables were commissioned solely by me or in collaboration with bodies or independently by others. A total of 25 tables were commissioned by JPR and the Board, and 14 tables were commissioned by other parties and used in this analysis. (To promote ‘equality of access’, ONS practice is to make publically available all privately commissioned material once it has been paid for). As with the Standard Output, codes listed in the Appendix refer to individual privately commissioned tables.

### 3.3.3 Samples of Anonymised Records (SARs)

In addition to the cross-tabulations, this study also explores the Samples of Anonymised Records (SAR), produced by the Cathie Marsh Centre for Census and Survey Research (CCSR) at the University of Manchester. SARs are randomly
extracted responses from the 2001 Census which have been anonymised (through disclosure controls) and are delivered in the form of an SPSS file of the type created from sample surveys. Several anonymised datasets are produced by the CCRS with differing levels of confidentiality protection applied. The dataset used in this analysis is the 3% Individual (Licensed) SAR which is a sample of 1.84 million people in the UK of whom 8,076 (or 3%) were ‘Jewish’ responses. The dataset contains 88 variables, some of which are derived to represent summary household variables. The geography is limited to Government Office Region (GOR). These data became available in 2005 as a licensed, downloadable SPSS file.

3.4 Materials: ‘official’ and ‘communal’ datasets

3.4.1 ONS Series FM2

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) produces an annual report known as ‘Series FM2 - Marriage, divorce and adoption statistics’. It is a review of the Registrar General’s data collected over the course of a year on marriages, divorces, and adoptions in England and Wales (ONS, 2007a). Uniquely for ‘official’ records data are reported on marriages occurring in synagogues and hence are of use in this analysis. All of these data are freely available and are Crown Copyright.

3.4.2 JPR survey datasets

The Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) in London is a not-for-profit ‘think-tank’ that has carried out three large-scale questionnaire surveys on the Jewish population in Britain since 1995. These were a survey carried out in 1995 on the social and political attitudes of Jews in Britain (Miller et al., 1996) and two identity surveys in London and Leeds which formed part of JPR’s Long-term planning for
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*British Jewry* (JPR, 2003) to provide detailed information about Jewish identity and behaviour. Access to these datasets (in the form of SPSS files) was by virtue of a previous working relationship I had with JPR. The data from these three surveys are used here to operationalize Jewish identity, highlighting complexities, subtleties and contradictions in a way that the Census data cannot. For example, Jewish practices such as eating kosher food and attending synagogue services are examined. There are also data on Jewish experiences and identity background, such as levels of Jewish education and more abstract variables about how ‘Jewish’ a person feels.

**JPR 1995 UK dataset**

JPR’s 1995 dataset contains 2,180 household responses from a national survey carried out between July and October 1995. The sampling frame was divided into three separate strategies depending on the area sampled (Miller et al., 1996:19). Random household sampling occurred in areas of highest Jewish concentrations, identified using the popular ‘distinctive Jewish [sur]names’ (DJN) technique (see Himmelfarb et al., 1981; Kosmin and Waterman, 1986, 1989; Lazerwitz, 1985). For the remainder of the country, where Jewish concentrations were low the DJN list was used to target potentially ‘Jewish households’. A snowball sample was also used to identify households with intermarried Jewish women who may not have appeared on DJN lists. (See Miller (1994:228-29) for a full description.) The final dataset consists of a single, pre-coded SPSS file.

The screening questions used in the covering letters and questionnaire introductions for all three surveys differed from the ‘religion question’ asked in the 2001 Census, which implicitly equated the appellation ‘Jewish’ with the category ‘religion’. As
Waterman (2003:35) put it regarding the Leeds survey: ‘Because of a desire not to influence or prejudice the designation ‘Jewish’, potential respondents in those households that received questionnaires were left to consider their own Jewishness and their differing approaches to being Jewish.’ For example, the introduction to the 1995 questionnaire contained the following screening question: ‘Who should answer? We hope that you, as the person to whom the questionnaire is addressed, will be kind enough to fill it in. However if you are not Jewish and there is someone else in your household who is, we would be very grateful if you would pass the questionnaire on to that person’ [emphasis in original]. Note that interpretation of the meaning of ‘Jewish’ is left entirely to the respondent’s discretion; the words such as ‘religion’ or ‘ethnicity’ are not used.

JPR/NatCen 2002 London and South-east dataset
The second Jewish survey dataset utilised in this report comes from JPR’s London and South-east Jewish Community Study which was carried out jointly with the ‘National Centre for Social Research’ (NatCen) in February 2002. This dataset contains 2,965 households making this the largest survey of Jews ever undertaken in Britain—other than the 2001 Census. The first mail-out occurred on 7th February 2002 followed by a reminder letter on February 22nd and a second reminder on March 15th. A relatively high response rate of 31.3% was estimated (Becher et al., 2002:69).

Details of the sampling strategy employed for this survey are provided by Becher et al. (2002:66-9) and Thomson and Waterman (2003). Again the sampling area was split such that different strategies were employed in different areas. As in 1995, the
DJN methodology was employed to identify districts with high concentrations of Jews (Becher et al., 2002:66). In ‘South London’, where concentrations of Jews were known to be low, households from the DJN list were directly targeted. In ‘North-west’ and ‘North-east’ London the sample was created by using address lists supplied by a ‘large Jewish charity’ to identify locales with relatively large numbers of ‘Jewish households’. These areas were then randomly sampled. The final dataset consists of a single, pre-coded SPSS file. It should be noted that neither Stamford Hill, an area containing London’s largest strictly Orthodox (‘Haredi’) population, nor the wards of south Barnet including Golders Green and Hendon, again where large numbers of more Orthodox Jews live, were not sampled in this survey. Consequently, summary findings from these data, especially those referring to variables relating to religiosity, will have been skewed towards the less religious.

The questionnaire began with the following screening question (printed in bold type): ‘If there is more than one Jewish person aged 18 or over in your household, please ask the Jewish adult who most recently had a birthday to complete the questionnaire(s).’ (Note that the survey also included separate questionnaires about Jewish schools and care for the elderly.) As with the 1995 JPR survey, whether a respondent identifies him/herself as ‘Jewish’ and what that means, is left entirely to their discretion.

**JPR 2000/01 Leeds data**
A parallel survey was carried out by JPR in Leeds in July 2001, i.e., before the London survey. This produced a dataset of 1,496 household responses. Details of the sampling strategy are provided by Waterman (2003:36). The DJN methodology was
used here, too, to identify the parts of Leeds with the highest concentrations of Jews (ibid). In addition, three address lists were received from the Leeds Jewish Welfare Board as well as from ‘a major national Jewish charity’ to further identify target areas. Similar screening questions to those used in London were also used in Leeds.

3.4.3 Datasets from the Board of Deputies of British Jews

The Board of Deputies of British Jews carries out research into the Jewish population through its Community Research Unit (CRU) on an annual basis. This is responsible for regularly collecting and collating data on aspects of the Jewish population not available elsewhere. ‘The Board’ is the only ‘Jewish organisation’, other than large charities, that is approximately multi-denominational. Although it is made up of full-time professional staff it is based on the national governmental model with elected representatives from the various synagogue communities in Britain, but does not include the strictly Orthodox groups.

This places the Board in the unique position of being able to negotiate access to wide-ranging cross-denominational data, which it publishes either annually or quinquennially. In addition, it has done this for some time and is therefore (with the exception of the ONS FM2 Series, see above) a unique resource, being able to provide an indication of population change. This is especially important given that there are no other temporal indicators for Jews in Britain.

The Board of Deputies data used in this thesis relate to male circumcisions (collected since 1979 and used to indicate the size of Jewishly identifying birth cohorts (Kosmin and Levy, 1985)) and Jewish religious marriages (collected since 1901).
The data are sourced on an annual basis, from rabbis, synagogue administrators, *mohelim* (practitioners of circumcision), and *batei din* (Jewish religious courts), by members of the CRU. Access to these data was gained through a professional relationship with the Board.

The Board of Deputies’ data differ from both census and survey data as they only record information about the ‘affiliated’12 Jewish population. For example, a legal Jewish religious marriage in Britain must be carried out by a rabbi authorised to do so. That authority is gained by his or (in the case of Progressive Jews) her affiliation to one of the Jewish denominational bodies in Britain. It is also limited by the practical difficulties of maintaining regular contact with a swathe of different organisations and individuals charged with collecting this information (Schmool, op. cit). The diminishing validity of this method, due to ‘secularisation’, has been discussed elsewhere (Haberman and Schmool, 1995:560) but continues to be a limitation of these data.

### 4 Summary: in defence of quantitative methods

In this chapter I have argued that the ‘default’ labelling of quantitative methods in geography as ‘old’, or even positivist, is unwarranted. It is clear that there are equal numbers of problems with any approach, whether quantitative or qualitative. What the debates of the 1990s have taught us is that it is imperative to take a critical stance to data regardless of their nature and furthermore, acknowledge clearly their limitations ensuring our conclusions are always qualified. I would further argue that

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12 Here, ‘affiliation’ means either formal synagogue membership or some looser connection that requires the services of a rabbi or other Jewish clerical professional.
the very distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ geography is at least overly simplistic and possibly false. There is no reason that quantitative theorists cannot assimilate the legitimate critiques of the ‘scientific method’ and of ‘positivism’ into their work whilst continuing to accrue the benefits of quantitative methods. Indeed, this is exactly what they should be doing. It is entirely feasible and appropriate to carry out ‘scientifically’ grounded, empirically testable and repeatable quantitative studies of complex social processes which are simultaneously self-critical in nature, alive to their own limitations.

I have explained how census data contain both benefits and drawbacks for quantitative research. I would argue that census data do allow us to ‘narrow the scale’ and when combined with survey material let them ‘tell their own story’, albeit a different type of story to the one we might obtain qualitatively.

Finally, I have highlighted the data deluge relating to Jews in Britain which represents a revolutionary ‘turn’ in and of itself. The 2001 Census data are unparalleled in their ability to make visible this concealed population and yet, despite this, they have barely been explored. In addition, there is a unique opportunity to contextualise and triangulate these data with new sources of survey material. Combined with the spirit of geographical critique, this then is an ‘appropriately quantitative’ study, ‘new’ in every sense of that word.
Chapter 3

Residential ‘segregation’ and the assessment of socio-spatial boundaries: individuals, partnerships, households

“We stress […] that both households and bodies can be plural, mixing up commonplace notions of segregation, integration and diversity. Thus […] we […] call to researchers to re-evaluate and re-imagine linguistic, physical and theoretical conceptions of singularly ‘black’, ‘white’, or ‘Asian’ bodies, households and parts of town.” (Wright et al., 2003:458)

My aim in the following chapter is to review the literature on ‘residential segregation’ and address a number of the key arguments I presented in Chapter 1. I will show that Jews are largely missing from the segregation literature and the more recent critical geographical work on identity. I explain that Jews are, however, a highly relevant case study for assessing issues of segregation, assimilation and social change. In doing so this chapter demonstrates that the literature on Jews and the geographical literature more generally do not ‘speak’ to each other and are disparate. Therefore this chapter is also the start of my effort to integrate these two sets of literature.

The chapter is laid out in four distinct, but interrelated, sections which together address another key argument of this thesis: that we can only explain patterns of urban congregation by examining the social processes that occur on micro-geographical scales. The first section presents a critical review of the rich literature on assimilation and ‘residential segregation’. I place the work carried out by Waterman and Kosmin in the 1980s on Britain’s Jewish population, in the context of
this literature and describe the difficulties they encountered in attempting to explain the patterns of congregation they observed.

The remainder of the chapter is logically sequenced in order of scale starting with the individual. So in Section 2 I next examine the literature on identity and explain that it is now accepted identity is a socially constructed and contingent concept. I note some of the difficulties this realisation presents, such as issues of authenticity and how the boundaries of identity are, as a result, fundamentally ‘blurred’. I also highlight other aspects of identity such as the rise of secular outlooks and the awkward cleaving of ethnicity from religion.

In Section 3 I address partnerships and explain the various ways in which these have been theorised. I discuss ‘places of encounter’ and factors influencing the reasons why individuals choose one particular partner over another. Having presented this theoretical context, I follow this with an in-depth critical discussion of the somewhat controversial but topical debate on Jewish ‘interracial marriage’.

In the fourth and final section of the chapter I explore the literature highlighting the increasing complexity of lifestyles and how this manifests itself in living arrangements and household structures. I then use this review to present a critical assessment of the ‘Jewish household’. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the key findings before embarking on the empirical sections of this thesis.
1 Assimilation and residential ‘segregation’

1.1 The ‘received wisdom’

Early conceptions of ‘assimilation’ can be traced back to the notion of the ‘melting pot’, a term coined by Israel Zangwill in a 1914 play about American immigrant society. Assimilation theory was formalised in the 1920s by Robert E Park and colleagues of the ‘Chicago School’. In essence it stated that ethnic distinctiveness in society would, over time, disappear as social integration proceeded (see for example Wirth, 1956). An early critique by Kennedy (1944) suggested that assimilation may actually be occurring along three independent lines. She coined the term ‘triple melting pot’ to describe these ‘pots’ of assimilation: Protestant, Catholic and Jewish. However, this view of the mechanics of assimilation has received considerable criticism and as Buckser (2000:note2:731) notes ‘both theory and experience have subsequently discredited this idea’. Construed this way, Alba and Nee (1997:827) note that assimilation theory does indeed appear to be ‘worn-out’, yet they argue that as a concept, it is still the best way to generally describe social integration into the ‘mainstream’. Further, they suggest that what Park (1926) and Park and Burgess (1969) were arguing was not that groups would disappear *per se* but that they would be elevated into the ‘mainstream’ of society (ibid:828; see also Kivisto (2004) who argues that Park has indeed been misread).

Whether or not Park intended a melting pot interpretation to be aligned with his work, these ideas have been highly influential.\(^\text{13}\) They were first seriously developed

\(^{13}\) For example, in his book *Protestant—Catholic—Jew*, Will Herberg (1960:21-23) described the American situation as a ‘transmuting pot’ whereby identities tended towards an idealised ‘Anglo-Saxon’ type in which religion was maintained but ‘culture’, language and nationality transmuted.
by what Peach et al. (1981a:11) call the ‘pivotal’ work of Milton Gordon (1964:70-2). In his book *Assimilation in American Life*, Gordon attempted to unravel the process of assimilation. He presented a multidimensional formulation and identified seven ‘subprocesses’ or ‘types’ of assimilation. Of these, two were paramount: ‘acculturation’—the ‘inevitable’ adoption of the ‘host’ group’s cultural habits and values—and ‘structural assimilation’—the entry of the minority into the ‘cliques, clubs and institutions’ of the majority, ‘host’ or ‘core’ society. According to Gordon, it is structural assimilation that ‘inevitably’ (ibid:80) leads to ‘marital assimilation’ (‘intermarriage’) and the erosion of distinct identities, though he does recognise that structural assimilation is not itself inevitable. Alba and Nee (1997:829-30) argue that Gordon’s framework underlies much of what has followed in subsequent analyses and his approach continues to be the main assimilationist argument according to Bruce Phillips (2005:51).\(^{14}\)

However, Gordon’s approach crucially overlooked space and the role of proximity, despite the fact that culture varies greatly by location, i.e. whilst assimilation can be seen as a framework for assessing social boundaries in society, there is also a spatial expression of this framework which Gordon’s formulation did not address, namely segregation. The spatial manifestation of the assimilation process is residential segregation. And again it is the theoretical work of the Chicago School’s ‘ecological tradition’ to which we initially turn. Indeed it is this work that is the ‘fountainhead from which all else flows’ (Peach, 1975:1). The reason Park suggested geography matters was because it determines ‘so irreversibly and fatally the place, the group,  

\(^{14}\) For a comprehensive critical overview of the development of these see Hirschman (1983).
and the associates with whom each one of us is bound to live.’ (Park, 1926:30; see also Duncan and Duncan, 1955b:493; Hirschman, 1983). Park also cautiously suggested that it was possible to measure the interrelationship of the social and the spatial: it is ‘because social relations so frequently and so inevitably correlate with spatial relations; because physical distances, so frequently are, or seem to be, the indexes of social distances, that statistics have any significance whatsoever…’ (ibid:30-1; see Duncan and Duncan (1955b) on the development of such measures). Park’s linkage of ‘the process of assimilation’ with ‘the spatial pattern of dispersal’ forms what Peach (2001:1) labels the ‘received wisdom’ in the study of residential segregation.15 (See also Kantrowitz, 1981)

The underlying assumption here is of a relationship between spatial distribution and social integration. This idea was developed by Duncan and Lieberson who argued that the degree to which a group is residentially segregated, ‘is inversely related to appropriate indicators of its socioeconomic status and degree of assimilation…’ measured for example, by intermarriage (1959:364, my emphasis). And indeed such a relationship has been borne out by other studies including this one (Peach, 1974, 1980a, 1980b; see Chapter 6, Section 4, p314).16 Peach (1980a:372) argued the implication here was that ‘if the spatial distributions of two or more ethnic groups overlap considerably and are highly mixed, then the chances of contact are maximised. If the social contacts are substantial intermarriage is an inevitable consequence of such contacts. [My emphasis]’ Conversely, Peach suggested ‘The

15 Alba and Nee (1997) prefer to call this ‘The Canonical Account’.
16 Though see Clarke (1971) in which such a correlation was not found. However, in this example the analysis was based on a small town (San Fernando, Trinidad) and other forms of segregation were noted particularly at the level of household. (See Chapter 8)
implication of Duncan and Lieberson’s finding is that groups that were highly segregated would have little interaction or intermarriage with other groups.’ (ibid:373) Based on an analysis of data for New Haven, Connecticut, he concluded that ‘although distance itself is not examined as a variable, the findings fit in well with geographic theory on interaction, distance and segregation’ (ibid:381). Peach states that ‘residential propinquity may well be an independent variable’ (ibid). More recently he has argued that ‘residential segregation’ is the clearest predictor of group intermarriage; where residential mixing takes place ‘with outsiders’, ‘it is likely to promote social interaction’ (Peach, 2001:2-3).

Peach (1980b, 1981b) re-evaluated Kennedy’s notion of an American ‘triple melting pot’ and challenged her idea that religion was the primary engine of segregation in New Haven by pointing out that Irish Catholics were marrying British, German and Scandinavian Protestants. This whilst Italian Catholics and Polish Catholics largely married people of their own nationality, i.e. he saw no evidence of a separate Catholic melting pot but rather that the ‘degree of segregation of each group from each other group correlates with levels of intermarriage.’ (1980b:213; see also Boal, 1969). What also emerged from his analysis was the fact that ‘Blacks’ and ‘Jews’ maintained high levels of endogamy as well as high levels of segregation. Indeed, in more recent work the persistent ‘separateness’ of these two groups has frequently been mentioned though the processes acting upon them are somewhat different. For example, Massey and Denton (1993, 1998) have examined ‘Black’ ‘hypersegregation’ in the United States in which high proportions of the group live in ghettos.
Peach (2001:12-18) has argued that the best way to account for this divergence from the ‘brick-in-the-pond’ model of assimilation is to acknowledge that such groups follow a plural model. Thus, two models of assimilation are prominent in the geographical literature: the assimilative ‘melting pot’ and the pluralist ‘mosaic’ (or multicultural model) (Peach, 2005). In the case of the Black population this produces ‘ghettos’ whereas Jews form voluntary ‘enclaves’, ‘different in kind as well as degree’. One example of such a ‘stubborn’ pocket (Valins, 2003a) is the concentration of strictly Orthodox Jews in Broughton Park, Manchester. Another example is Belfast where Protestants and Catholics tend not to mix, despite their close residential proximity to each other (Boal, 1978, 1982).

Such findings have led to the notion of ‘good segregation’ and ‘bad segregation’ (Peach, 1981a, 1996b and c). Indeed, Louis Wirth in his classic sociological work *The Ghetto* argued that when segregation is voluntary it is construed as good whereas if it is forced or involuntary it is construed as bad (Wirth:1956:18-27,29-34; see also Brown, 1981; Valins, 2003a:160). There are examples of work that construe ‘segregation’ as a way of preserving identity, whereby individuals will actively seek to live with or near like groups, i.e. ‘self-segregation’ (Boal, 1978; Newman 1985:360-1). In this view, segregation then, is a mechanism for group ‘survival’ (Peach, 1996c; Kantrowitz, 1969). Gordon (1964:241) himself argued that most groups desire self-preservation. Aldrich et al. (1981) noted how ‘Asians’ in Britain used self-segregation as a means of survival in achieving better housing and employment opportunities, enabling them to bypass barriers in a ‘white’-dominated market. Kevin Dunn (1998) cites the example of the concentration of Indo-Chinese-
Australians in the Vietnamese ‘ethnic enclave’ of Cabramatta, Sydney. Dunn suggested that, rather than the result of oppression, or ‘societal malady’, ‘ethnic concentration’ is about choice and empowerment (ibid:509,511). He argued that many advantages accrue to groups who are ethnically concentrated, from dining out to the provision of religious facilities (ibid:518-19) (See also Rosenthal, 1960; Valins, 1999, 2003a and b)

Measurement

Running alongside ideas about residential segregation has been the development, over the last sixty years, of various statistical techniques using ‘summary indices’ of spatial distribution in urban areas (Brimicombe, 2007; Johnston et al., 2002:595; Rees and Butt, 2004:Note 2; Simpson, 2007). These areal-based approaches stem from the efforts of Duncan and Duncan’s (1955a and b; Beshers, et al., 1964) use of the Index of Dissimilarity (ID) which measures the spatial ‘dissimilarity’ between two groups and varies between ‘integration’, generally construed as ‘good’, to ‘segregation’ construed as ‘bad’ (Peach, 1996c).  

A more straightforward example is Kosmin and Grizzard’s (1975:19-21) use of the Location Quotient (LQ) to demonstrate particularly high levels of concentration for Jews compared with other ‘ethnic’ groups in the London Borough of Hackney. Measuring concentration (good or bad) requires not only the absolute level of location exclusivity, which itself is a function of the area chosen to make such a measurement, but also an appreciation of the proportion of the total population of that group that appears in the concentrated area. Indeed, Massey and Denton (1988) identify five ‘dimensions of residential

17 Further examples of the use of statistical indices to assess residential segregation are discussed in Massey and Denton (1988), White (1983), Lieberson and Carter (1982), and Taeuber and Taeuber (1976).
Chapter 3 - Review of literature

Several other approaches are discussed in the literature (see Duncan and Duncan, 1955a and b; Taeuber and Taeuber, 1964, 1976), so much so that Peach (1975, 1996a:218) has referred to the ongoing debates about the most ‘effective’ ways to measure segregation as ‘index wars’ (see Gorard and Taylor, 2002). For example, Cortese et al. (1976) take the Index of Dissimilarity to task—though see Taeuber and Taeuber (1976) for a defence.

Recent examples include Rees and Butt’s (2004:183) usage of the LQ and Dorling and Thomas (2004:56-7) on Indices of Dispersal applied to 2001 Census data. Johnston et al. (2008) utilise Duncan and Duncan’s Index of Change in their analysis of the ethnic composition in English Schools. Brimicombe (2007:894) proposes an eight-branched, multi-dimensional ‘decision-tree’ index. Each of these efforts offers advantages and disadvantages, but all of them inevitably over-simplify highly complex social processes. They also fail to measure social integration and none is able to explain why the various types of concentration have occurred. (See Wong (1998:14-16) for a more detailed discussion of these issues and Voas and Williamson (2000:466-73) on the Index of Dissimilarity in particular.)

Contemporary debate

This brief excursion into the literature on residential segregation, much of it focused on the United States, is nevertheless, highly relevant to the contemporary British

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18 These are evenness, exposure, concentration, centralisation and clustering. Massey and Denton propose separate measurements for each type (1988:282-297).
19 See Brimicombe (2007:888) for a critical assessment of the literature on several of these statistical approaches.
20 A rare example of approaching the topic qualitatively can be found in Valins’ work (1999, 2003a) which addresses ‘segregation’ relating to Britain’s small strictly Orthodox Jewish population.
21 Indeed, there is a considerable bias in the literature towards American studies over the history of the topic at the expense of other Western examples, including Britain. For example, see Alba and
situation. But in Britain, popular belief has tended to view any concentration by non-charter groups as ‘bad’. Simpson (2004:664) for example suggests, ‘Statistical investigations have viewed concentrations of non-White populations in a negative light’. Here the ‘assimilation’ debate (often masquerading as an ‘immigration’ debate) can be traced back to at least the late 1960s when Enoch Powell made his (in)famous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech (see Heffer, 1998). More recently it has been suggested by no less than the former head of the Commission for Racial Equality that Britain is ‘sleepwalking’ to segregation (Trevor Phillips, 2005). Simpson (2007:405) points to a number of studies which have fuelled this debate and arguably influenced Government decision-making (Cantle, 2001; Ouseley, 2001; Johnston et al., 2002). For example, Simpson suggests that the ‘urban tensions’ in a number of northern English towns in 2001 have been viewed as symptomatic of ‘the policy view’ that ‘communities’ are ‘self-segregating’ and ‘polarising’. He notes Cantle’s (2001:9) claim that ‘many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges’ [my emphasis]. Deborah Phillips (2006:25,28) has suggested that such views form what has become a ‘separate lives’ narrative which constructs especially ‘Muslims’ as a threat along with an ‘isolationist discourse’ which argues that ‘communities’ choose to (residentially) set themselves apart from the ‘majority’ population. She notes in particular how ‘segregation’ is sensationalised and politicised (Phillips, 2006:26).

Indeed, Dorling and Rees (2003:1309-1319) point to ‘extraordinary’ socioeconomic polarisation found in the 2001 Census (see also Rees and Butt, 2004:183), yet others have argued that there is no ‘evidence’ for ever widening segregation. For example, Johnston et al. (2008:88) examine segregation in Britain’s schools and conclude that there was no evidence of increasing ‘ethnic’ segregation (see also Burgess and Wilson, 2005:20). For Simpson (2007:420), there is little evidence of increased segregation in the sense of more uneven distribution of ethnic groups across localities. Nor can he identify evidence for self-segregation in the sense of minority groups moving towards their existing areas of highest concentration. He also suggests the idea of ‘White flight […] appears to be a misnomer; the movement away from the most non-white areas is less for white people than for others in absolute numbers and similar in proportion to their population in those areas.’ Simpson (2004:668) has previously suggested that the notion of increasing ‘residential segregation of South Asian communities [in Britain] is a myth.’ Regarding the Ouseley and Cantle reports (op. cit.), Simpson (2007:423) argues the ‘anxieties [about increasing segregation] are better seen as ghettos of the mind rather than ghettos of reality.’ (See also Peach, 1999 and 2001)

1.2 Not so wise? Critiquing the ‘received wisdom’

The influence of the Chicago School’s ‘human ecologists’ upon contemporary urban studies has been ‘profound’ (Dunn, 1998:506-7). And yet there are many difficulties with the ‘received wisdom’, at least as I have presented it here. This conclusion stems from broader critiques in geography and other disciplines that have been
developed since the early 1990s, especially those relating to socio-spatial boundaries, a fundamentally important aspect of residential segregation.

During the 1990s geographers became increasingly interested in the social and cultural meanings of boundaries, along with the study of ‘social constructionism’ (Newman and Paasi, 1998:194-95). The notion of boundary is explicitly connected with such categories as nation, ‘race’, ethnicity or state, and boundaries may be ‘visible or invisible, physical or symbolic, and even all of them at the same time.’ (ibid) Indeed, Valins (2003a:171) has argued that since the 1990s geographers have ‘challenged ideas of boundaries as somehow being fixed and immutable and recognized how these are often spatially and temporally contingent.’

Alba (2006:348-50) equates assimilation with boundary crossing but notes that the far more common reality is that of ‘boundary blurring’. By this he means, ‘Experiences and outlooks that were once distinctive to each side of the boundary are now shared to a significant extent. The zone of ambiguity is even greater because some individuals who at times appear to belong to one side of the boundary can successfully present themselves as members, or at least fellow travelers, of the other.’ Indeed he suggests that ‘the most significant feature of the contemporary situation of American Jews, […] is the very significant blurring of boundaries between Jews and other Americans, especially Christians and the non-religious.’

But why should boundaries blur? Buckser (2000:714) suggests one reason may be related to ‘Modern demographic patterns’, for example increasing geographic and occupational mobility. He argues that ‘Modern cultural trends, such as universal
education and secular public discourse, act both to mix members of different ethnic groups together and to devalue in-group knowledge. The rise of government and corporate bureaucracies, moreover, tends to de-emphasize ethnic and other particularistic identities in favour of universalistic classifications. While such trends clearly do not mean the end of ethnicity, they tend over time to disrupt the cohesion and organization of traditional ethnic communities.’

Such boundary thinking has occurred in tandem with what Elspeth Graham (2006:814) has recently referred to as a ‘flowering of spatial imaginations within geography’. These have provided fruitful critiques of socio-spatial bounding with respect to ‘residential segregation’. Drawing on philosophically conceptual work by critical thinkers such as Lefebvre (1991), the very idea of space as a fixed, geometrical construct has been questioned. Space, like identity, has been shown to be something that is socially produced and given meaning; social space is a social product (Soja, 1994:79; see also Dear, 2000:especially Chapter 3 for a detailed assessment of this literature). We therefore learn that the bounding of entities, the delineation of difference, profoundly affects the way the world is interpreted and understood. By drawing a boundary we as social and political actors reify a particular space, fix it and label it: ‘segregated’, ‘mixed’ and so on. There are ‘no neutral maps’ (Dorling, 1998:278) so great care must be taken when assessing the relationship between space and the people who live in it, especially in our efforts to label and measure. Such thinking therefore prompts us to ask, to what extent is a ‘ghetto’ or an ‘enclave’ pure, internally homogeneous and hermetic? (See further
Varaday, 2005:viii) What are the layers, overlaps, crossings, grey areas, and hidden
dynamics we should be trying to expose?

It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that a host of neologisms have recently appeared,
to try and describe the ‘reality’ of segregation. For example Zelinsky and Lee (1998)
coined the term *heterolocalism* to describe ‘communities without propinquity’ as an
alternative model to both the assimilation and pluralist approaches. A ‘heterolocal’
population shares common ethnicity and maintains ‘strong social cohesion by
various means’ but are residentially dispersed and lacking propinquity (ibid:293).
Dear and Flusty’s (1998) ‘postmodern’ approach highlights the acute fragmentation
and specialisation of the urban environment describing the ‘city as gaming board’
(Dear, 2000:159). Other descriptions include *glocalisation* (Swyngedouw, 1992), the
*ethnoburb* (Li, 1998), and *EthniCity* (Roseman et al., 1996), *parachuted plurality*
(Peach, 2000). This list, though exhausting, is not exhaustive.

One of the most important problems with the ‘received wisdom’ however, stems
from the meaning of ‘segregation’ itself. For Brimicombe (2007:886), ‘Residential
segregation is the geographical concentration of a minority group on the basis of its
ethnicity, religion, or some other unifying characteristic.’ Neill (1996) suggests it is
about ‘accommodating difference’ (see also Peach et al, 1981:21). Even in the mid-
1950s it was recognised that segregation was a highly complex and ‘fuzzy’ concept
that was awkward to operationalise (Duncan and Duncan, 1955a:217). In particular,
Peach (1975) noted the problem of interpreting the *process of separation* from the
*pattern of dissimilarity*, i.e. that segregation is both an ‘attribute’ of a group
(separation in space) but also a ‘process’ operating within or without a group
(Waterman and Kosmin, 1988:80; see also Duncan and Duncan, 1955a:216; Johnston et al., 2008). As a process, it presents many, perhaps insurmountable, measurement difficulties. Waterman and Kosmin (1988:87) for example note that indices tend to be ‘time-and-place-specific’ yet segregation is also a complex process that is far from static. Indeed, temporal change ‘…might be the most relevant detail for understanding the processes behind urban ethnic residential differentiation.’ (Blalock, 1969:121-8; see also Boal, 1982; Cortese et al., 1976; Jones and Eyles, 1977:177; Lee, 1978:367)

Waterman and Kosmin (1988) argue that this presents methodological dilemmas which make segregation ‘a difficult theoretical and methodological problem to research’ (ibid:79). There are social aspects of segregation (in addition to the spatial components) which they suggest require both quantitative and qualitative approaches. For example Massey (1994:163) has also argued that it is necessary to understand what segregation means to the individuals supposedly segregated (see also Houston et al., 2005:705; Lees, 2003). Waterman and Kosmin suggest that field studies might reveal the ‘more qualitative aspect of intra-group relations’, the motivations behind what appears to be segregative behaviour, the perceptions of neighbourhood, relations with neighbours and so on (1988:89,93). But even they resort to (yet another) “admittedly ‘crude’” quantitative index of ‘Ethnic Intensity’.

This complexity has led many to suggest the ‘received wisdom’ is excessive in its oversimplification of dynamic social processes. Small (1995:98) highlights the overly ‘positivist’ tendency of the Chicago School to rigidly bound and essentialise groups, and simplify what are in fact highly complex and dynamic systems. Dear
(2000:38,65) notes how recent critiques of the generalised ‘meta theories’ of the early pioneering work have exposed them to be oversimplified ‘fictions’, destined to imprecision and failure in a world devoid of neat universal norms and moralities. This basic recognition is not new; Jackson (1981:114) for example had already observed the ‘inadequacy’ of “conventional ‘assimilation’ theory” and the ‘simplistic assumptions’ on which it is based. It is not surprising that statistical measures embarked on a ‘war’; fixing the inherently dynamic and blurred can be done in a multitude of different ways. Thus Phillips (2006:32) warns that statistical measures of ethnic residential segregation ‘should be treated with caution’. On the other hand, as Simpson (2007) demonstrates, they can nevertheless be used to dispel myths.

In terms of ‘assimilation’ Alba (2006:351) points out that implicit within the notion of ‘boundary blurring’, movement is bidirectional, i.e. ‘cultural change is not limited to the minority group; it occurs to the majority group as well, and therefore the process of acculturation is to some extent a two-sided affair.’ This, it should be noted, contrasts with Gordon’s (1964:109-10) characterisation of acculturation as a one-way process. The hegemony of Indian restaurants across Britain is a simple example of such an occurrence.

Another problem with the received wisdom concerns the assumed relationship between spatial distance and social distance (see Ley et al., 1984:17-8). For example, Waterman and Kosmin (1988:81) argue that technologies, such as the car and telephone, blur Cartesian notions of distance. Even 80 years ago, Park (1926:28) argued that social relations are complicated by communications technology, converting the world into ‘one vast whispering-gallery’ which has ‘dissolved the
distances and broken through the isolations which once separated races and peoples.’
More recently Castells (2004:11) has described a network society in which a ‘space of flows’ interacts with the more traditional ‘space of places’. The virtual world is an abstract space which produces a dissonance between experience and place (Dear 2000:55).

The homogenisation of groups is a common aspect particularly of quantitative assessments of residential segregation. Supposedly homogeneous ‘minority’ and ‘host’ groups such as ‘Asians’, ‘African-Americans’, ‘Whites’, ‘Hispanics’, ‘Muslims’, ‘Jews’ and so on are directly compared with one another in most analyses of ‘segregation’ (For example see, Aldrich et al. (1981), Brimicombe (2007), Gordon (1964), Johnston et al. (2003, 2007).) As will be discussed below (section 2.1.3, p122), such groupings have been shown to be more ‘imagined’ than ‘real’ (Anderson, 1991; Said, 1978). But the homogenisation of, say, the ‘host’ group can conceal important variations that impact on the patterns and processes of segregation and assimilation. For example, some individuals will (be able to) ‘assimilate’ faster than others, perhaps depending on skin colour or educational achievement (see for example Qian and Lichter (2001:308) on ‘Latinos’ in the United States; Harris, 1995 on passing). Jackson (1981:120-22) for example, has noted that Puerto Ricans in New York were being spatially ‘pulled apart’ at differential rates depending on wealth, education and skin colour.

Deborah Phillips (2006:30) presents the example of Muslims in Britain: ‘The concept of self-segregation rests on an oversimplified construction of ethnic identity, which understates the permeability of the boundaries between sociocultural and
The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority

religious groups, the diversity of British Muslim people’s identifications, and their varied strategies for social interaction. Segregationist arguments assume that ethnic groups (white and non-white), defined in terms of their ethnic or religious affiliations, are fixed, internally homogeneous, and easily identifiable entities.’ (See also Peach, 2006a and b) Group homogenisation is a particular problem for studies which use census data (see for example Brimicombe, 2007; Rees and Butt, 2004; Simpson, 2004). Even the relatively small British Jewish example is a complex mix of differing religiosities, ethnicities, nationalities, ages and so on, and as will become the focus of later chapters, this hugely complicates the outcomes of ‘segregative’ processes operating on them.

That said, there is an argument that religion has been very much neglected at the expense of race and ethnicity in studies of residential segregation. As Brimicombe (2007:885-87) points out, the literature is ‘dominated by studies along the lines of race and ethnicity with very few studies along the lines of religion.’ With few exceptions, religion is the poor relation to ethnicity and especially race, in the literature on residential segregation and its sociological cousins, assimilation and multiculturalism (see for example, Aldrich et al., 1981; Duncan and Lieberson, 1959; Mitchell, 2004; Peach, 1999, 2000, 2005; Peach et al., 1981; Simpson, 2004, 2007; Small, 1995). Yet, he argues that ‘Religion, rather than ethnicity, may well be the key to understanding contemporary urban residential segregation and the impact this may have on people’s life chances. In this regard, London can be considered as paradigmatic for the study of multicultural cities.’ (Brimicombe, 2007:902)
A corollary of this sidelining is that Jews are also understudied. Even when religion does occasionally appear, it is itself invariably biased towards studies of Muslim populations (Cantle, 2001; Dunn, 1998; Peach, 1990, 1995; Phillips, 2006). With the exception of a few papers in the mid-1980s (Newman, 1985; Waterman and Kosmin, 1987a and b, 1988) and some ethnographic work by Valins (2003a) which only focused on the narrow, and arguably ‘extreme’, example of strictly Orthodox Jews, remarkably little work has been carried out on this group. Waterman and Kosmin’s (1987a:260) statement made over 20 years ago that ‘little is known about the mechanisms of residential change among Jewish populations in the west’, continues to be true.

The notion of good and bad segregation is also problematic (Peach, 1996c; Simpson, 2007:406). Indeed Kantrowitz has suggested that residential segregation should not necessarily be seen as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ but rather that it just is (1981:54). Deborah Phillips (2006:29) argues that the supposed self-segregation of the ‘host’ (‘White British’) society is labelled ‘White flight’ and construed as ‘normal’ or at least understandable, yet the parallel supposed self-segregation of the (‘Brown’ or ‘Black’) minority is labelled ‘segregation’ and construed as detrimental and troublesome. Ambiguity also hangs over the notion of choice and constraint. For example Kong (2001:222) argues that community (identity) can be simultaneously empowering (providing a sense of security and acceptance) but also constraining (such as ‘surveillance’ felt by some women in ‘Asian communities’). This, she notes, is the ‘contradiction of community’, simultaneously a source of security and strength as well as constraint and oppression (ibid; Dwyer, 1999; Phillips, 2006:34).
Linked to this is Simpson’s (2004:679) concern about the difficulty of divorcing the politics of race from the analysis of segregation: ‘geographical analyses have become unnecessarily racialised to the point that it is not the geography but the analysis which is racially patterned.’ How, he asks, can scholars avoid ‘reinforcing the racial thinking that reifies social categories of race and wrongly attributes social change to racial causation?’

Scale
Scale, a topic that has received considerable attention by geographers in recent years, is also problematic for the traditional assessment of residential segregation. For example, Waterman and Kosmin (1988:79,92) noted that ‘the scale of study and the size of the study area can greatly affect our descriptions of that we purport to observe.’ (See further Voas and Williamson, 2000.) What we infer at one scale may not necessarily be appropriate at another. Their concern stemmed from the description of Jewish residential patterns in Britain as ‘segregated’. They rejected this, suggesting that ‘the majority of London Jews wish to maintain a separate identity while being functionally integrated into society. In order to achieve this, the process used is one of congregation. [emphasis in original]’ (ibid:90) They argued that such a description has more positive connotations than ‘segregation’, emphasising the benefits to be gained from living in close mutual proximity rather than the more pejorative exclusionary connotations of ‘segregation’. Waterman and Kosmin (1988:80) stressed the ‘governing forces here would seem to be congregative, rather than the conscious setting apart of segregative forces [emphasis in original].’ Waterman (1989:23) argued that, ‘Far from living in residentially
homogeneous, segregated neighbourhoods, most Jews live in areas that are mixed and close by neighbours who are Gentiles.’ Using data for Jews in London, Waterman and Kosmin (1988:79) highlighted what appeared to be patterns of segregation at borough and ward levels yet showed that in no ward did Jews approach even a majority (i.e. more than half) of the population. They concluded that ‘the ward[,] like the borough, is too gross a unit to enable many meaningful statements to be made about [Jewish] residential patterns and processes.’ (ibid) (See Kosmin (1981:88-89) on the difficulties of spatially bounding Jewish communities.) Further, Waterman has suggested that the general Jewish settlement model is not especially unique and that in London at least, the overall pattern was one of ethnic congregation rather than segregation (1989:53).

Fundamental to their argument was scale. As Marston (2000:220) has argued, ‘scale is central to the research agenda of the entire discipline of geography’ and many of the difficulties and complexities associated with the analysis of urban segregation highlighted here are indeed related to scale. According to Waterman (1989:19), when ‘populations are mapped at minute scales such as that of the street, interpretations of the patterns observed can throw up a host of questions that relate to social geographic processes. It is only at a scale such as this that we are in a position to ask relevant questions about trends in residential processes - whether segregation exists, whether it is increasing, or whether some other process of residential change is currently dominant.’ (See also Kosmin, 1981; Valins, 1999) Their work showed that ‘the ward, like the borough, is too gross a unit to enable many meaningful statements to be made about residential patterns and processes.’ (Waterman and
Kosmin, 1988:83) So they urged scholars to investigate data at smaller and smaller scales since data mapped at an increasingly fine mesh, ‘seem to point to a complex situation.’ (Waterman and Kosmin, 1987b:111). Thus, processes which affect Jewish concentration, segregation or integration ‘…relate to events which occur at the scales of the suburb, the neighbourhood, the street, the individual household. These are social processes which cannot be explained through the use of aggregated data. [My emphasis]’ (Waterman and Kosmin, 1987b:110)

An example is found in Clarke’s (1971) study of residential segregation and intermarriage in San Fernando, Trinidad. This highlighted the importance of assessing the household as opposed to the neighbourhood (in his data, enumeration districts). Clarke found little evidence of residential segregation in the town’s patchwork of ‘racial’ and religious groups; however, this did not extend to extensive intermarriage. Rather, it was the household units themselves that constituted ‘separate social and cultural cells in the structure of San Fernando’s society.’ (p217)

More recently, the geographical literature has been grappling with the problem of scale and the push has been generally towards such ‘microscales’. Paasi (1991, 2004:540-41) has argued that regional geographers should pay more attention to such scales of human life as the spatial constitution/manifestation of social groupings based on gender, generation, race, private social relations within the family, home and voluntary associations. As Clarke (op. cit.) himself noted, there are different degrees of association at the spatial level in the public domain and at the domestic level in the private domain. Deborah Phillips (2006:32) has also found ‘intense physical segregation in localised areas’ especially at the street level and suggests that
there is much more ethnic diversity in neighbourhoods than is generally recognised. But ‘diversity’ may not necessarily translate as ‘social mixing’. Houston et al. (2005:705) argue that a ‘racially mixed area … should not be taken as “integration”[…] …Whites and blacks may occupy the same block and the ratio between blacks and whites may appear to be even, but the exact location of the residences within the block usually displayed a tendency toward microscale spatial separation’. (See also Wong, 1998)

So which scale should be chosen and why? The answer is inevitably a social and political decision on the part of the analyst. Indeed, a complex debate about scale in geography has recently emerged (Brenner, 2001; Cidell, 2006; Marston, 2000). Cidell (2006:197) notes that ‘what has been termed […] the production of scale, the politics of scale or the social construction of scale’ is an argument for caution when using labels such as ‘local, regional or even global’, and we should consider even these as social constructions (see further Paasi, 2004). Some, such as Wright et al. (2003:462), argue that we avoid privileging any particular scale, that all scales may be of relevance to a study: “…we anticipate that we will be able to ‘scale up’ the insights of research on the body through the household while at the same time ‘scaling down’ the gaze of spatial demography and population geography to view neighborhood and household racial geographies in new ways. This, we hope, will provide a fertile ground for fruitful engagement with geographies of mixed race.” (see also Marston, 2000; Marston and Smith, 2001)

Perhaps what matters most in this debate is the recognition of the non-neutrality of scale, that there is no ‘natural’ scale, all are ‘produced’ and that ‘The production of
scale thus is closely related to the location of political power.’ (Cidell, 2006:198). Paasi (2004:538) has referred to this as the politics of scale: any geographical unit is produced. In its most extreme incarnation, this view can go so far as to recommend that scale should be expurgated from the geographic vocabulary altogether; that the concept be eliminated from human geography (Marston et al., 2005:422).

Uncovering process
Disaggregated data and scale are hugely important for assessing and explaining residential segregation. This issue is highlighted by Peach’s (2001:14) suggestion that Jews in Canadian cities were nearly as segregated as Blacks in American cities. Though he distinguished between the Black ‘ghetto’ and the Jewish ‘enclave’, this approach overly generalises and fails truly to explain fundamentally different social phenomena. For example, Waterman and Kosmin (1988:84) noted that ‘[i]t is only at the street—or at most the Enumeration District—level that high concentrations (over 70 per cent) of Jewish populations occur…’ (and this pattern continued to be the scenario found in the 2001 Census). They therefore rejected as a misconstruction the conclusion that Jews are highly ‘segregated’ or more generously, highly ‘concentrated’. Thus an appreciation of scale is vital if we are to understand the nature of spatial patterns and data paucity aside, there is no reason why our analyses should not go beyond the street and into blocks of flats and individual houses when exploring ‘segregation’. In doing so, we are more likely to overcome a key problem with the ‘received wisdom’, one which has received little attention, especially given its significance. That is the issue of causality in the process of residential segregation, and more specifically, the direction of that causality. Describing
patterns of separation takes us only so far; explaining them is another matter entirely. Waterman and Kosmin (1987b:111) have argued that ‘aggregate data’ homogenise space into ‘neighbourhoods’, ‘wards’ and ‘suburbs’ and so cannot be used to explain the social processes occurring in these populations. There remains then the problem of interpreting the process of coming together from the pattern of congregation.

There is considerable ambiguity in the literature regarding the direction of causality (see for example, Peach, 1980a:381, 1980b:214). Alba and Nee (1997:837) point out that this stems from Gordon’s own avoidance of addressing not only the direction of causality, but also explaining the mechanisms that give rise to assimilation and by implication, spatiality. What is the role of propinquity in the outcome of segregation? Peach (1980a:372) has argued that based on ‘sociological theory … residential propinquity may well be an independent variable’. Elsewhere he has suggested that ‘[r]esidential intermixture may well be the most significant factor in ethnic interaction in western societies’ (Peach, 1981b:214; also Peach, 1975:1 in which he suggests high ‘separation’ correlates with lower ‘interaction’). However, as Wong (1998:14) points out, different ethnic groups residing in the same area does not necessarily mean that interaction and integration is taking place: ‘In short, areal-based segregation measures may reflect spatial separation but they cannot effectively capture social interaction.’

As will be explained in later empirical chapters, I suggest that propinquity at the neighbourhood scale is an outcome of social processes that are independent of neighbourhood propinquity itself. Correlations of intermarriage and spatial distribution tell us very little about how this arises in the first place; propinquity is
not a cause but a result of other processes. For example, Ellis et al. (2004) consider the role of diurnal migration. They note that more intergroup interaction takes place during working hours than in the neighbourhood. Yet they state that ‘[t]he bulk of academic research on racial and ethnic segregation, however, continues to ignore daily variation in the spatial separation of groups, focusing instead on segregation by neighborhood of residence.’ (ibid:620) Thus we must ask, how and where do people meet? Why do they choose certain partners? And where do they subsequently choose to live and why? As Peach (1996:233-234) himself has noted, the ‘positive desire for clustering… [is]… worthy of further investigation’. Jews offer a pertinent case in point.
2 Identity, geography and Jews

Identity is central to questions of spatial segregation/congregation. Understanding how critical approaches to identity have exposed it to be socially constructed and contingent is crucial if we are to consider the true limits of the ‘received wisdom’. In this second section I explore the ways in which identity as a means of marking social difference has been conceptualised in the geographical and sociological literature. I explain that normative conceptions of ‘Jewish’ identity do, but often do not, fit into these conceptualisations.

2.1 Key arguments

2.1.1 The homogeneity problematic

The terms we use to label social groups are convenient devices for everyday life but have for some time been recognised as problematic generalisations. Indeed, in the 1920s Robert Park noted the difficulties that the inherent heterogeneity found in most social entities presented the quantitative analyst. In his work on the socio-spatial structure of the Chicago urban area he noted that grouped individuals, ‘are so far from representing homogeneous units that any thorough going mathematical treatment of them seems impossible.’ (Park, 1926:27-8) Yet the temptation to bound and homogenise groups is strong, not least to Park himself. Nevertheless, there is ‘an inherent heterogeneity within groups’ (Dunn, 1998:511) and what we might call a homogeneity problematic has concerned many scholars over the years. For example Alba and Chamlin (1983:247) argued that ‘All too frequently in ethnic research, individuals of mixed-background are lumped into ethnic categories by some handy criterion, with little regard for the internal heterogeneity of the resulting ethnic
“groups”. More recently in Britain, Brace et al. (2006:34) have contested ‘the common perception that there was a monolithic and homogeneous experience of ‘Methodism’ among an equally monolithic and homogeneous ‘Cornish Community’.

This problematic extends to conceptions of groups across space and there are multiple examples in which presumed socio-spatial homogeneity is somewhat mythic. For example, Lie (2001) has emphasised how the mythically homogeneous Japanese population consists of Koreans, Chinese, Ainu, Okinawans, Burakumin, mixed-groups and so on. Heterogeneity is also the rule at the urban scale. In London, Johnston et al. (2002:608) noted how ‘Indians’ living in the Boroughs of Ealing and Brent consist of Punjabi, Sikh, East-Africans of Gujarati origin (see also Raj, 2000:541).

But the greatest homogeniser of all is surely the census and consequently users of census data must be extremely wary of the social categories these claim to represent (see Chapter 2, section 2.2 p62 above for a thorough critique). Yet there are multiple examples of quantitative scholars failing to acknowledge sufficiently the often gross homogenisation of ‘groups’ that are in many instances little more than the anti-version, ‘the Other’, of a paralleled group. Terms such as ‘White’, ‘Other’ and ‘No Religion’ tend towards meaninglessness when examined out of context. (See for example Johnston et al.’s (2002:608) use of ‘White’; Iannaccone and Everton’s (2004) and Brimicombe (2007) use of ‘No Religion’ and the ‘religious’ categories; Dorling and Rees’s (2003:1299-300) comparison of ‘Bangladeshi’ with ‘White’, and so on.) In the case of the 2001 Census of England and Wales, the insertion of a question on religion was at least partially motivated by the desire to ‘unpack’ (Peach,
2000:621) categories such as ‘Indian’ and ‘White’ (see also Aspinall, 2000b:586). But the ironic outcome has been to create a vast homogenised and analytically unhelpful ‘Christian’ category (Voas and Bruce, 2004:27).

2.1.2 Cleaving religion from ethnicity

In addition to acknowledging the problem of homogenised categories should be a recognition that ‘groups’, such that there are, do not necessarily ‘fit’ into the meta-categories to which they are presumed to belong. An obvious example was the 2001 Census’ placement of ‘Black’ commonly a racial term, and ‘Pakistani’, a nationalistic term, into an ‘ethnicity’ question (ONS, 2001b). But as Raj (2000) has noted, the issue is more complex than the triviality of what may be referred to as ‘incorrect’ categorisation. In Britain she discusses the tendency for groups to be placed into one category or another and simply left there as if such categorisation fully encompassed all the qualities of that group’s identity. In particular she points out that distinguishing a group’s ethnic-ness from its religious-ness may be highly problematic especially in cases where the distinction is constructed and imposed from above rather than from below. For example, Ballard (1996:9) has argued that the notion of ethnicity as solely a characteristic of ‘exotic Others[,] is seriously mistaken.’ Rather, he suggests ethnic affiliation ‘is a matter of involvement in and commitment to a self-conscious community of some kind. [Original emphasis]’ (ibid:22). Indeed he points out the term ‘ethnic’ is derived from the Greek word *ethnos* meaning people or nation. This broader conception of ethnicity draws attention to ethnic ties beyond kin connections, such as shared religion, language or dialect and common social practices (Jacobson, 1997:238).
Despite acknowledgements of broader, richer interpretations of ‘ethnicity’, there is in Britain what Raj (2000:550) has called an ‘unsuspected by-product’ of multiculturalism. With respect to religion, she notes an ‘increasing fixity and reification of religious identities’, a ‘strategic essentialism’ that locks in meaning for a group whether or not that meaning is relevant to all. She argues that the need to simplify, fix and stabilise identity forces one aspect of identity to be stressed at the expense of another (2000:545). But often such distinct boundaries are untenable, bearing little relation to everyday articulations of identity. For instance, a group may be ‘ethnic’ in some ways and ‘religious’ in others but it would make little sense to distinguish between which traits are ‘valid’ and which are not, forcing that group into a ‘religious’ or ‘ethnic’ category. The result is to mislead, causing confusion and conflict. It also leads to entire groups vanishing from surveys simply because they do not ‘fit’ within narrow interpretations of a particular privileged label’s boundaries.

The identity overlap is particularly relevant to those groups that are defined by others as religious but often exhibit behavioural ethnicity. Raj’s qualitative study of young British Hindus noted that there prevails an “uneasy separation between ‘being ethnic’ and/or ‘being religious’”, sometimes they are separate other times overlapping but often equated (Raj, 2000:537). This has also been recognised by Jacobson in relation to British Muslims, in which she points out how religion and ethnicity are ‘two sources of identity which, in practice, are extremely tightly bound up with one another, but which, at the same time, are increasingly commonly regarded as the bases of separate or even alternative self-definitions.’ (Jacobson, 1997:254) Raj also highlights the fact that such overlap often results in particular
identity traits appearing to be somewhat ‘paradoxical’. She challenges any easy understanding of religion and ethnicity in reference to Hindus in Britain (op. cit.:538). She also notes a deliberate effort on the part of her respondents to separate the category ‘Hindu’ from the categories ‘Asian’, ‘Indian’ and ‘Muslim’. The delineation of such a boundary reflects a need on the part of these individuals for separation, and such distinction inherently establishes criteria for exclusion (Raj, 2000:541-47).

In her study of Muslim identity, Phillips (2006:33) similarly points out that the term ‘Asian’ was frequently used by ‘British Muslim’ respondents in a way which “conflated ‘race’ and religious/cultural difference.” And Dwyer (1999:60) has suggested that being ‘Muslim’ is part of an ‘ethnic’ inheritance. In her work on young British Pakistanis, Jacobson (1997) argues that ‘whereas Asian or Pakistani ethnicity is an aspect of life which relates to a particular people and a particular place, Islam has universal relevance and applicability’ (ibid:240, 253; Dwyer, 1999:55). The notion of a global, ‘religious’ Muslim umma was elevated by Dwyer’s younger research subjects above an ethnic Pakistani identity (a national identity), this being equated with ‘traditional’ cultural behaviours of their parents (ibid:241; Dwyer, 1999:56). Consequently Islam was described “not simply as a religion but as ‘a way of life’” (op. cit.:249) and this clearly has parallels with the Hindu idea of Dharma (see Raj, 2000:548-9, 551).22

22 The notion of an ethnic dimension to a ‘religious’ group also extends to Sikh identity as was recorded in a House of Lords [1983] 2 AC 548 decision in the case of “Mandla and another v Dowell Lee and another”. This case, regarding discrimination, held that Sikhs are to be considered an ethnic and racial group for the purposes of the Race Relations Act 1976. It is interesting to note that the
2.1.3 Imagined communities and the authenticity of identity

Critical approaches to identity narratives have highlighted the many difficulties with positivist and essentialist conceptualisations. For example, regarding ‘Black’ identity, Stuart Hall (1996:91) has stated that ‘What is at issue here is the recognition of the extraordinary diversity of subjective positions, social experiences and cultural identities which compose the category “black”; that is, the recognition that “black” is essentially a politically and culturally constructed category, which cannot be grounded in a set of fixed trans-cultural or transcendental racial categories and which therefore has no guarantees in nature [emphasis in original].’ Since the 1990s most scholars have accepted that race and ethnicity are social constructs (Peach, 2000:621). They are equally political constructs whether in reference to the self or ‘the Other’.

One of the main problems with especially quantitative approaches to the study of identity is the positivist tendency to reduce complexity by constructing boundaries that may not necessarily correlate with those we construct for ourselves. As Newman and Paasi (1998:194) note, boundaries both create identities and are created through identity; ‘Identity and boundaries thus seem to be different sides of the same coin.’ In constructing boundaries, we are delineating difference. Alba (2006:347) defines the concept of a social boundary as ‘a social distinction that individuals make in their everyday lives and that shapes their actions and mental orientations towards others; it is typically embedded in a variety of social and cultural differences between groups that give a boundary concrete significance (so that those on one side think of

currently ongoing case about Jewish faith school admission criteria is also about discrimination (Symons, 2008a and b).
those on the other, “they are not like us because…”

He also distinguishes two types of boundary: ‘bright’ boundaries are those in which the social distinction is unambiguous, so that individuals know at all times which side of the boundary they are on, whereas ‘blurred’ boundaries are more ambiguous, the social profile of the boundary is ‘less distinct: the clarity of the social distinction involved has become clouded, and individuals’ location with respect to the boundary may appear indeterminate.’ (Alba, 2005:22-3)

The way in which boundaries are constructed has also changed. In the past, difference was thought to be ascribed as a result of birth but it is increasingly accepted as an achieved facet of identity through the choices a person makes in life (Kalmijn et al., 2006:1347). Cadge and Davidman (2006) argue that both ascription and choice are involved in the construction of difference, when clarifying ‘who we are’ as well as ‘who we are not’. (See for example Jacobson, 1997:249 regarding Muslim identity.) This contextual nature of identity has also been emphasised; who is asking and who is telling matters, as does where the telling and asking occurs. Ballard emphasises the ‘strongly contextual nature of ethnic expression’ (ibid:7) and highlights a distinction between public and private domains when considering ethnicity. He cites the example of Irish and Jewish settlers who were able to ‘pass’ (as white people) in public whilst their private behaviour was far more distinctive. (See also Harris (1995:75-76) who discusses passing in the context of ‘blacks’ in 1930s Chicago.) Peach (1996:5) summarises the importance of spatial context and identity thus: ‘I may be Welsh in England, British in Germany, European in Thailand, White in Africa.’
The heterogeneity, contextuality and non-essential nature of identity leads many to conclude that there is “no all-encompassing social entity such as a ‘community’ that can be considered an unproblematic whole as a stable and closed system” (Silk, 1999:12). At best communities are imagined, as Anderson (1991) has powerfully argued. Using the example of ‘nations’, he explains that these communities are ‘imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind. …it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.’ [emphasis in original] (ibid:6-7) For Dwyer (1999), what appear to be ‘natural’ and ‘authentic’ communal essences are actually social constructions which people and groups proclaim about themselves, and have proclaimed upon them by others producing a mental homogeneity. There are, she argues, ‘no natural or self-evident communities’; they are ‘produced within particular discursive and historical moments’ and must be recognised as just that: contextual, contingent, and political (ibid:64-5). And this understanding is equally valid when it comes to the boundaries within communities.

It is also argued that identity is inherently dynamic: it is always becoming. Jean-Paul Sartre (1956) considered identity to be a ‘dynamic process’ that included both continuity and discontinuity with the past (cited in Charmé, 2000:149). For Sartre, any statement about identity can only be tentative and already outdated, since we are always moving beyond that statement about what we are, transcending who we were
a moment earlier: ‘we are always in a process of becoming’ (ibid). The view of identity as an unending creative process is well accepted in the literature. For example, Hall (1990:225, cited in Charmé, 2000:144) has argued that “cultural identity is a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as ‘being’: human existence precedes any alleged essence”, and Pile and Thrift (1995:49) suggest that ‘identity is a fiction which must be continually established as a truth.’ And as Charmé (2000:143) points out, it is established as ‘truth’ through narrative: ‘The process of positioning ourselves within particular personal, family, cultural, historical narratives inevitably selects, condenses, and possibly even distorts the meaning of the situation we are born into. It is always a creative process … identity is expressed in narratives that position us in relation to the past, but these narratives are open to change. This is true on both collective and individual levels.’

Thus identities undergo constant transformation, continually being (re)constructed, (re)invented, (re)created and (re)presented (see also Jacobson, 1997:248; Smith 1999:129). In terms of religion, this continual (re)formation of identity is achieved through (repeated) performance of rituals (Scholefield, 2004:246). Kong (2001:213) discusses this with respect to the notion of sacredness. She argues that what are considered to be sacred objects, categories and places have no essential sacred qualities as such but take on meaning through continual social (re)construction and performance involving practices, activities, negotiations, claims and counterclaims (ibid; also Scholefield, 2004:246). This, Elspeth Graham (2000:263) points out, is how meanings are socially constructed—through contestation between and within groups.
This contestation, this unending process of claim and counterclaim is, according to Silk (1999:12), the reality of ‘community’, riven by tensions and conflict. A ‘politics of difference’ emerges out of these power relations, a ‘political content of the process of social differentiation’ which, according to Smith (1999:129), has only become clear through critiques of modernism. With each clash there is also the potential for contradiction (Dear, 2000:8; Dwyer, 1999; Lazar et al., 2002:518; Phillips, 2006:34). A singular identity is rapidly exposed to be decentred and multi-layered; there is no longer ‘Islam’; there are ‘Islams’ (Dunn, 1999) and ‘Judaisms’ and so on.

Such critical approaches to identity are highly problematic; if identity is relative and never fixed, how can we hope to describe it, let alone analyse it? Our conclusions will always be ‘wrong’. But intuitively identity does exist, at least in people’s minds and it is this that the analyst must struggle to represent. Through representation we attempt to produce a literary or quantitative approximation or depiction of reality, but as Livingstone (1998:18) points out, ‘some representations, like some maps, are more or less adequate, more or less authentic, than others’; we must acknowledge that there are no ‘perfect’ representations. Thus a key question is, which representations are authentic and which are inauthentic? How do we choose between competing claims to authenticity? (Charmé, 2000) Any appraisal of a representation of a particular identity is inherently subjective, made against a background of values by which we discriminate those traditions, feelings, and actions to be of significance to the particular depiction, and those which we decide are not (Taylor, 1992 cited in
Livingstone, 1998:15). In this way, boundaries are constructed and difference is established.

Charmé (2000:147-8) points out that we now arrive at a paradox: from where is the authority derived to claim one tradition is authentic whilst another is not? Who are those ‘authentic inquisitors’ who label others phony? Perhaps they themselves are inauthentic? Who authenticates their authenticity? An endless deferral of identity is set in motion preventing us from assessing the authenticity of representations. For Charmé the answer lies in accepting the ‘dynamic instability of identity’ and he argues that ‘…authenticity is not about finding one’s “true self” or the “real tradition” but about maintaining an honest view of the process by which we construct the identities and traditions we need to survive. It requires lucidity about the lack of essence or permanent foundation of all identities, and vigilance against the idea that it can be realized. [My emphasis]’ (Charmé, 2000:150).

As a quantitative analyst of the social world, always pinning down that which resists stabilising, I interpret this to mean that any representation, quantitative or qualitative, must acknowledge theirs is but one version of ‘reality’. Authenticity is derived from an honest acceptance of the dynamic and contingent nature of identity. So any social representation is authentic when it does not claim to be the only authoritative version of the social world.

2.2 The rise of secularisation and religion

Any discussion of religion in contemporary society must also address what appears to be religion’s antithesis—secularism. Davie (2007) emphasises that secularisation
is a multidimensional concept that is both a social process as well as a social theory. As Weller (2004:3-5) explains, during the 1960s, proponents of the secularisation thesis, such as Wilson (1998), were confident that, through the combined impact of technological advances, philosophical rationalism and the development of the consumer society, religion would almost completely retreat from the public into the private sphere. Weller suggests that in Europe at least, aspects of this thesis have been borne out (see also Proctor, 2006:166-67). But with the end of the Cold War and the rise of the ‘politics of identity’, the debate seems far from over (Bruce, 2002; Huntington, 2002; Phillips, 2007). Here my focus is on the process of secularisation and more specifically, how that process manifests itself in different ways and in different places.\textsuperscript{23} The points I wish to touch on relate specifically to definition and measurement.

The increasing prevalence, at least of what looks like secularism, has been observed in many studies in many places. For example, Putnam (2000:66,70-74) notes how religious attachment has declined in the United States; Knippenberg (1998) describes the decline of religious authority in the Netherlands; Tilley (2003:276) observes that ‘secularization has been occurring in Britain for the last 35 years’ in terms of fewer displays of religious behaviour and diminished church attendance, especially among the young.

Voas and Day (2007:96) distinguish between belonging (affiliation), belief, and behaviour when examining secularisation. This highlights the multidimensional nature of term. Traditionally, church attendance has been a key method of assessing

\textsuperscript{23} For a concise summary of the key theoretical approaches to secularisation, see Davie (2007:52-61).
the dominance or decline of religion in society (see Bruce, 2002), but more recently a key area of interest, and one which has been used to demonstrate the rise of secularisation is to measure the increase in the reporting of no religious preference, especially in the United States (Glenn, 1987; Hout and Fischer, 2002; Kosmin and Keysar, 2006). However, we must be careful using the terms ‘No Religion’ and ‘Secular’ interchangeably. For example, Hout and Fischer (2002:175) note that the fact of reporting ‘No Religion’, whilst correlating with a lack of participation in ‘organized religion’, did not necessarily equate with no religious belief. They found a sizable population of ‘unchurched believers’ who hold conventional religious beliefs: ‘Relatively few are secular, agnostic, or atheist; most actually pray. Their most distinguishing feature is their avoidance of churches’ (ibid). However it is not clear whether this is also the case in Britain (see Crockett and Voas, 2006:582).

But however secularisation is regarded, Proctor (2006) argues that it has ‘significant’ implications for geographers. ‘It is likely that secularization and sacralization are highly place-dependent, given country-specific and regional differences concerning institutional religion and other salient factors’ (ibid:167). For example, Voas (2006:113-15) notes, ‘A striking feature of religion in Scotland is the east-west divide. The levels of no religion are above average in the east (including Edinburgh, Dundee, and Aberdeen) and below average in the west (including most of Glasgow and North and South Lanarkshire).’ He also notes that the Scottish swing toward no religion has been ‘relatively uniform’ across the country and therefore these geographical differences have persisted. For geographers, the question is why? Voas speculates that these differences are possibly a ‘coincidental by product’ of separate
concentrations of Catholics (centred on Glasgow) and Presbyterians (in the Western Isles). He also suggests that ‘nonreligious outsiders’ have moved to eastern areas, particularly the major cities of Edinburgh and Aberdeen (ibid:114; see also Pacione, 2005).

Secularisation is also key aspect of the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986). It is argued that new living arrangements and cohabitation were at least in part a result of increases in secular sentiments. In addition, compared with ‘religious’ couples, secular couples are less fertile (Kaufman, 2006; Lesthaeghe and Neidert, 2006:671). In tandem with such sentiments is increased ‘individualisation’ (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1988). For example, Kalmijn (1991:798) argues that marriage choice has become ‘individualized’, that the opinions of third parties (such as parents and religious leaders) that mattered in the past are increasingly less important in partnership decision making.’

Finally it should also be noted that some argue secularisation is somewhat overplayed. Brimicombe (2007:889) for example, argues that ‘far from the secularisation thesis of the 1960s, in which religion would retreat under the impact of technology, rationalism, and consumerism, religion is back at the political forefront and manifests itself in government agendas that address concerns of economic inclusion and social cohesion in a plural society’. Kaufman (2006) argues that the fertility differential between the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ means that in the long run, religion will ‘win out’ by both natural increase and the immigration from (poor) religious countries to (prosperous) secular ones.
2.3 Religion and space

It was noted above that geographers should turn their attention to secularisation and religion. In the following section I want to explore this issue further. Parallels have been drawn between the negotiated and constructed nature of identity boundaries and those found in the physical environment. I will highlight the example of religion and geography which has recently begun to receive some attention in the field. Critical approaches to identity and religion in particular have been embraced by geographers in what Kong (2001:212) has referred to as ‘the intersection of sacred and secular forces in the making of place.’ Just as identity is a social construction, geographers have shown that (religious) meanings and labels given to places is similarly the outcome of social processes. It is by establishing sociocultural boundaries, by creating spatial difference, that we give place identity; the ‘construction of difference is a fundamentally spatial process’ (Smith, 1999:136; also Newman and Paasi, 1998). Thus, some spaces are distinguished as ‘religious’ in direct relation to ‘others’ that are labelled ‘secular’ or ‘profane’. It is the distribution of particular kinds of religious significance across space, argues Ivakhiv (2006:169), that should be the focus for geographers.

Two aspects of this ‘intersection’ are of especial interest to geographers; boundaries and politics. For example, the complexities found in the establishment of social boundaries, the establishment of differentiation between groups, are paralleled in the geographic context. Just as the boundaries separating and dividing religious groups are not clear-cut, neither are the boundaries separating religious and secular spaces; they are blurred and fuzzy. According to Ivakhiv (2006:172) this destabilisation
‘raises questions that geographers may be especially well poised to study.’ And just as claims to social difference are inherently political, so too are claims to spatial difference. As Smith (1999:136) notes, the appropriation and use of space, the establishment of control over and access to material, symbolic and territorial resources, are political acts. Kong (2001:213-18) suggests that churches, faith schools, cemeteries and so on constitute ‘officially sacred’ sites over which political claims about location and access take place—‘Sacred space is contested space’. Ivakhiv (2006:172) therefore also suggests that geographers should look at the contestations and negotiations involved in the articulation of specific meanings and significance attached to religious space.

However, although there has been some progress since Kong argued for religion ‘to be acknowledged fully and in like manner alongside race, class and gender in geographical analysis’ (2001:212), (for example, Buttimer, 2006; Ivakhiv, 2006; Valins, 2003a and b), according to Brace et al. (2006:30), there are still ‘significant gaps’ in the developing literature on the geography of religion. And Pacione (2005:235) points out that the British contribution in particular has been ‘disappointingly small’. As an example of how the work may be extended, Kong (2001:228) suggests one avenue for exploration could be to examine ‘how different religions may inform the constructions of different moral geographies’, i.e. how are competing constructions of good/bad, just/unjust played out in space, between different religious conceptions and between religious and secular conceptions. In what she label ““new” geographies of religion’, Kong emphasises that analytic categories should not be treated as substantive categories and that there is a need to
analyse religion at various scales from the global and regional to the local and, indeed, that of the body (ibid:226).

Therefore Kong (2001:213) asks, ‘If sacredness is not inherent, attention must be paid to how place is sacralized’. Ivakhiv (2006:172) argues that spaces, in which the religious domain is clearly articulated as distinct from the secular, are products of a very particular activity, ‘a purification involving practices of sacralization and desacralization, with various supporting mechanisms and ongoing maintenance to keep this separation in place.’ It is through performance or the ‘cultural labour of ritual’ that this occurs (Smith, 1978 cited in Kong, op. cit.). It extends to the identification of acceptable and unacceptable types and forms of space, the control over who may enter and who may not, as well as what may enter and what may not. To advance an earlier point, it is a quest to establish what counts as (in)authentic space. It also refers to objects, those which are included and those that are forbidden. Objects also determine the meaning of the space and the space in turn determines the meaning of the objects (see Grimes, 1992 cited in Kong, 2001:218).

An example of this can be found in Scholefield’s (2004:240-1) examination of the ‘material boundaries’ of a Jewish faith school in Britain. She points to the ‘tight physical boundaries’ of the school site which ‘mark off the Jewish school very clearly from the surrounding, non-Jewish, environment.’ These boundaries act to separate the community inside from the surrounding community outside. One way in which the inside has been designated Jewish space, and specifically Orthodox Jewish space, is the establishment of controls over who is admitted, ‘only Jewish students’, and what is admitted, ‘only kosher food’ (see also Valins, 2003b).
The Jewish school is an example of what Buckser (2000) has referred to as ‘symbolic space’. In his analysis of Jewish identity in Denmark, he noted that the community provides spaces such as the synagogue and community offices which function as places for individual members to construct their own understandings of Jewish self and group. The intention, says Buckser, is to accommodate Jewish diversity: ‘An ethnic group can become, like the Jewish Community in Denmark, not an urban village, but a symbolic space, in which to be Jewish is not to hold any particular set of beliefs or practices, but rather to regard the Jewish world as the conceptual domain upon which one will draw for the construction of the primordial elements of one’s own identity.’ (ibid:730).

A final example of constructing religious space, Mazumdar and Mazumdar (1993) discuss the sacralisation of the house in ‘mainstream Hinduism’, and emphasised the role of ritual in sacralisation, for example by consecrating the land and planting ritually significant plants. Similarly many Jews attach a mezuzah to the doorframes in their houses to signify that room or house is ‘Jewish’ space (see Katz, 1981:149-53 regarding the significance, rules and meaning attached to the mezuzah). Similarly, in the public domain, the eruv sacralises space at the neighbourhood scale—it makes public space, private.\footnote{Vincent and Wharf (2002:41) note that eruvim should be seen as consequences and not causes of voluntary self-segregation by Orthodox Jews. Therefore in terms of Jewish ‘residential segregation’, ‘eruvim have little role to play’. I would add that for similar reasons, neither do synagogues or ethno-religious stores.} For Orthodox Jews, ‘Eruvim are moments of representation and lived experience, filled with personal meaning and social connotation’ (Vincent and Warf, 2002:49). The eruv represents ‘the willingness of authorities and residents to sanction the city as a site of multiple readings’ (ibid). Vincent and Warf (2002:38-
45) and Watson (2005) also highlight the contestations that occur when eruvim are proposed in multicultural societies. These politically charged debates occur not only between the community and the wider, local population but also within the community itself, especially between different Jewish denominations.

2.4 Jewish identity: an overview

‘Who are the Jews? […] There is probably no people that has furnished the basis for more contradictory conclusions than the Jews. The traits with which they have been credited by their friends, their enemies and themselves fairly exhaust the vocabulary. Still, the elementary question as to whether the Jews are a race, a nationality, or a religious or cultural group remains unsettled.’ (Wirth, 1956:63)

2.4.1 Jewish heterogeneity

When Jews are discussed in the geographical and socio-demographic literature there is a tendency for the group to be homogenised. This is especially true when they are tangential to the main groups of interest (see for example, Peach, 1980a; Weller, 2004:16; Brimicombe, 2007; Dorling and Thomas, 2004; Pacione, 2005) but can also occur when they are the main focus of a study (Sacks, 1995a; Davey et al., 2001). But the reality is that all Jewish populations are heterogeneous, or in Gould’s (1984:4) words, the ‘condition of Jewishness’ in open Western societies is highly variable. This was recognised by Gordon (1964:176) who noted that ‘American Jewish communal life is not monolithic’ and Waterman and Kosmin (1988:87) who have pointed out that “Jews are no more homogeneous than other ‘ethnic’ groups such as Caribbean-born or Indians”. (Kosmin (1981:83) suggested the term ‘communities’.) The heterogeneity of the British Jewish population, despite its small size and apparent internal coherence, has been recognised by Valins (2003a:158-
9,171) who suggested it is ‘highly pluralistic’ and ‘fractured’ and Newman (1985:363) who used the term ‘factions’. Both Valins and Newman commented on its differentiation based on religiosity, denomination and synagogue affiliation. (See also, Kosmin, 1981; Kosmin and Levy, 1981; Waterman, 1981; Waterman and Kosmin, 1986a:499)

Jewish heterogeneity matters because there are key religious, economic and demographic differences within the population which produce different structural and behavioural outcomes. Some sections of the population exhibit social and residential characteristics that are all but indistinguishable from the ‘white British middle classes’ and other sections, such as the ‘strictly Orthodox’, are more visible through their distinctive dress and very large family sizes (Gonen, 2005; Holman and Holman, 2002; Valins, 2003a). But even this sub-group is far from monolithic. For example, Coleman (2006:9) notes that ‘Charedim [strictly Orthodox] include Ashkenazim, originating in Europe, Sephardim, who trace their origins to Spain and Portugal, and Oriental Jews, who originate from North African and Arab countries. These groups have developed separate liturgies and customs and resulting cultural identities. Charedim are religiously and ideologically divided into Chassidim and Misnagdim.’ In Stamford Hill alone (which is in the north of the London Borough of Hackney) the ‘strictly Orthodox’ consist of at least seven different Jewish sects: Satmar, Belz, Bobov, Vizhnitz, Skver, Lubavitch, and ‘Non-Hasidic’ (Vulkan and Graham, 2008:17; Gonen, 2006). Nor are these differences superficial; in New York recently ‘internecine struggles for power and prestige’ have occurred between and within the ‘rival camps’ (Shamir, 2007).
In addition to this socio-religious heterogeneity, it is equally important to recognise that there is geographical heterogeneity, which itself is related to social differentiation. Describing the Jewish population(s) in London, Waterman (1989:50) noted that the ‘variations observed here indicate that it is untenable and undesirable to refer to the Jewish population as a uniform body, even where there is a tendency to perceive [it] as such… [given] substantial variations within a relatively restricted geographical area. What we seem to be looking at is a series of sub-populations or sub-communities.’ Clapson (2003:109) also comments on Jewish suburban heterogeneity, stating that ‘the idea of a uniform Jewish suburb is as erroneous as that of a homogeneous suburbia per se.’ Waterman (1989:14,20) criticises work by Krausz (1968a and b; 1969) in Edgware, by Kosmin and Grizzard (1975) in Hackney and Kosmin et al. (1979) in Redbridge, for not being ‘representative’ of ‘Anglo-Jewry’.

2.4.2 What is ‘Jewish’?

It was noted above (section 2.1.2) that the term ‘religious’ was insufficiently rich to describe the complex identities of several so-called ‘religious’ groups in Britain. Rather, there was evidence that ‘ethnic’ or a combination of the two labels was more accurate. What kind of label then is the term ‘Jewish’? As far as the 2001 Census was concerned, and as was discussed in Chapter 2, ‘Jewish’ was placed firmly and solely within the confines of the question on religion (ONS, 2001b). But there was a wealth of evidence and literature determining a very strong ethnic component of Jewish identity. For example, in the American context Gordon (1964:174) noted that Jews can be considered an ‘ethnic group’ or a ‘religio-ethnic group’. In their study of
Jews in London, Waterman and Kosmin (1988:80-1) emphasised that they were ‘dealing with a single ethnic group, the Jews’. Schmool and Miller (1997:352) found that, if anything, it was ethnicity more than religiosity which united the majority of Jews in this British study. Webber (1997b:270) found that ‘there are, indeed, plenty of examples of contemporary religious Jewish life that expresses itself nowadays in various post-modern forms of ethnic assertiveness.’ But he emphasised that ‘ethnic’ did not necessarily mean ‘secular’, but rather that there does not appear to be any *a priori* requirement for a religious component of Jewish identity (ibid:267). (See also Alderman, 1994; DellaPergola, 2005; Phillips B, 2005:53; Saxe et al., 2002:6; Scholefield, 2004:240-41; though see Kosmin, 2002) Despite all this, it is still likely that the 2011 Census will follow its precedent of 2001 and place ‘Jewish’ in the religion question only (ONS, 2007c:39-42).

Yet Ballard (1996:32) has argued that ‘if Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus so identify themselves, not so much in terms of religious belief, but as members of communities with their own distinctive interests and concerns, …[we]… should surely seek to acknowledge those commitments.’ Similarly regarding the label ‘Black’, Hall (1996:93) notes that ‘We still have a great deal of work to do to *decouple* ethnicity, as it functions in the dominant discourse, from its equivalence with nationalism, imperialism, racism and the state, which are the points of attachment around which a distinctive British or, more accurately, English ethnicity have been constructed. [emphasis in original]’ Multiculturalism, he and others argue, whilst providing a space of separate identities, has ironically pigeonholed people into...
categories they would not necessarily choose for themselves or feel comfortable with.  

The problem with pigeonholing Jews into a ‘religious’ group matters not just because Jewish identity is a broader concept than that narrow term, but also because it has practical research implications. Many British studies of ‘ethnicity’ tend to disregard Jews even though the group provides a valuable opportunity for comparative work (Webber, 1997b:259). For example, in his discussion of the geographical distribution of ethnic minorities in Britain and especially London, Hamnett (2003:108-126) mentions Jews only once, in a single note regarding their historical settlement in the East End and subsequent ‘replacement’ by Bangladeshis. And in Johnston et al.’s (2002) work on ‘ethnic enclaves/ghettos in English cities’, Jews make no appearance at all. (Other similar examples occur in, Alba and Chamlin, 1983; Massey, 1994; Modood, 1998; and Rees and Butt, 2004.) The censuses of 1991 and 2001 have undoubtedly played a part in the sidelining of this group. Jews, along with the Polish, Turkish, Kurdish, Greeks and so on, are subsumed into an all-encompassing ‘White’ category. But not only can it be argued that ‘White’ is just a euphemism for ‘not coloured’ but, as Raj (2000:551) notes, the term is generally equated with ‘Anglo-Saxon’ in Britain, and Jews, like Hindus, are not on the whole (ancestrally) Anglo-Saxon. (On the social construction of ‘Whiteness’, see further, Bonnett, 1997; Jackson, 1998; McDowell, 2007)

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25 Aspinall (2008) points out that the language of ‘multiculturalism’ has now been largely replaced and substantially outpaced by an alternative discourse, the language of ‘diversity’.
However, even both terms ‘religious’ and ‘ethnic’ fail to fully encompass what Webber (1997b:269) prefers to call ‘Jewishness’. As far back as the 1920s Wirth (1956:64 citing Belloc, 1923) noted that Jews adjusted notions of themselves ‘to suit the various circumstances with which they were confronted. They were a race when it suited them, a nationality when necessity demanded it, a religious group, and, finally, a cultural unit when their situation made such a status desirable.’ And the list goes on; Gordon (1964:24) used the term ‘peoplehood’, and Anderson (1991:149, Note 16) uses ‘nation’ with respect to Zionism. Fanon (1967:64) racialised ‘Jewish’ by contrasting the racist’s valorisation of ‘blackness’ with the antisemite’s of ‘Jewishness’, the ‘Jew’ with ‘Negro’; indeed British case law acknowledges this ‘other’ aspect of Jewish identity. This was the 1980 case of Seide v Gillette Industries Ltd, 26 an Industrial Tribunal in which it was decided that under the provisions of the Race Relations Act 1976, ““Jewish” can mean a member of a race or a particular ethnic origin as well as being a member of a particular religious faith.’

Thus Buckser (2000:730) argues that Jews are ‘difficult to classify as a religion or an ethnic group’; Jewish identity, like many (all?) others, simply does not fit neatly into one single category. For Buckser the ‘social fragmentation’ found in the population itself is paralleled in a similarly ‘fragmented understanding of the nature and meaning of Jewish identity’ (ibid:718). And this reality is not unique, ‘In practice, many minority groups, Jews included, hold more than one model in their heads at any one time; some models out of date, some deriving from the inside, and some presented to them from the outside’ (Webber, 1997b:268). Like all identities

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‘Jewish’ is complex, contextual and fluid. We simply lack the nomenclature and imagination to verbally classify ‘Jewish’ succinctly. Yet an acceptance of the melded religious/ethnic duality within Jewish identity would very much help to progress understanding of the group.

So how has this ambiguous ‘Jewish’ identity been described in the literature? Anthony Smith (1991:33) suggests that Jewish historical myths such as Abrahamic ancestry, Exodus from Egypt, and the ‘golden age’ of the Davidic and Solomonic kingdom, today retain a potency that is not just religious, but remain even for secular Jews: “charters of their ethnic identity. …as with the Greeks and Armenians, the Irish and Ethiopians, there is a felt filiation, as well as a cultural affinity, with a remote past in which a community was formed, a community that despite all the changes it has undergone, is still in some sense recognised as the ‘same’ community.”

The sociologist Herbert Gans (1994:584) argued that the traditional notion of Jewish as religion has become an incoherent ‘symbolic religiosity’, a ‘civil religion’ and as such he suggests that Jews, as such, are ‘a religious group with ethnic secular characteristics’ preferring the label ‘religio-ethnic’ group (see also, Gans, 1979). In Britain, Miller (1998:236) has suggested there are three dimensions to Jewish identity: ‘behavioural ethnicity’ (incorporating ‘light rituals’ and organisational/social Jewish behaviour), ‘religiosity’ (strong religious beliefs and observance of stricter rituals), and ‘mental ethnicity’ (ethnic belonging and cognitive feelings of bonds). Qualitative work, such as Buckser’s (2000:718) study of Danish Jews, found that in addition to people whose identity was primarily religious, there
were those for whom ‘Judaism’ was seen as ‘a culture, a tradition of rituals, foodways and patterns of thought and behaviour that had been handed down’. Others he noted described a ‘Jewishness… primarily in social terms, as a set of family, personal, and business relationships within which they happened to live.’ In her study of Jewish ‘Connections and Journeys’ Horowitz (2003:2) says ‘…being Jewish has become a state of mind and is not simply a matter of inherited membership in a religious or ethnic group [emphasis in original]’. But for Schmool and Miller (1997:350) being Jewish is a matter of ‘lifestyle’. And finally, Scholefield’s (2004:246) study of Jewish school children concluded that ‘…there are, inevitably, different ways of understanding who and what is Jewish. For many […] school students] being Jewish does not necessarily mean being religious; it does involve bagels and schnitzel but it also includes eating McDonald’s, even in [Jewish] school uniform. Israel is important but so is Britain.’ (See further Lazar et al.’s (2002) study of the ‘multidimensionality of Jewish identity’; and Kosmin, 2002)

Such conceptualisations of Jewishness help explain many contradictions that are often observed by scholars. For example, Schmool and Miller’s (1997:350) study of members of the United Synagogue (a ‘microcosm’ of British Jewry (p357)), found that almost a quarter were ‘weak observers’ who had joined the organisation primarily because of a sense of ‘peoplehood’ rather than religious belief. Buckser (2000) noted how a number of ‘cultural Jews’ in his Dutch study observed or defended kashrut (Jewish dietary laws), and attended ‘religious’ services. For these people the service was less about Judaism’s connection with the divine as its ‘distinction from the Christian world’, highlighting symbols and traditions that made
Jews distinct as a people and a culture. In addition, it offered an opportunity to socialise in ‘a common symbolic space’ (ibid:720-22). Also in Israel, Lazar et al. (2002:518) note self-reporting ‘secular’ Jews performing religious rituals. They explain that people with different Jewish identities have different motives for the performance of such rituals; people perform the same rituals but do so for different reasons. And in Britain, Miller (1994) explained that the synagogue is becoming less a religious institution and more of a focus for the expression of ethnic identification; its meaning is being redefined.

Nevertheless, though it may be perpetually elusive, the age-old question ‘Who is a Jew?’, refuses to go away. For Waterman and Kosmin (1987b:108) it is ‘perplexing’ and one which has occupied the minds of scholars for decades. Gould (1984:4) for example has asked, “what, after all, is ‘Jewishness’? What are the attributes that Jews share with each other but not with those who are not Jews—those who, in Jewish circles, are referred to, somewhat opaquely and residually, as non-Jews?”

Some such as DellaPergola (2005) find this elusivity problematic. For him “The paradigmatic ‘Who is a Jew?’ question constitutes an ever-elusive issue in the field of Jewish population studies…” one which has produced a ‘lack of coherence and uniformity in the definitional criteria followed’ (2005:88).

This is because defining a population matters if you want to discuss it, measure it, plan for it or simply make statements about it. For DellaPergola (2005:86) the importance of Jewish population quantification ‘cannot be underestimated… [because statistics] may unveil the basic dynamics of growth, resilience, or decline among the group investigated in historical perspective, and the nature of mutual
relationships between the Jewish group and society’s majority or other minorities in comparative perspective.’ Identity and biology commingle in the demography of populations defined by (religious) identity, and the size of a Jewish population is ‘intensely affected by both biological-demographic and cultural-identificational variables’ (ibid:87; 1991:69). (See similar arguments by Voas, 2003:94.)

DellaPergola (2005:88) explains that the two common solutions to definition are the normative approach and the operational approach. The normative path is based principally on Jewish law—halacha (see Newman, 1987:113; Waterman and Kosmin, 1987a:255-258; Waterman, 1997). This means that a person is Jewish if his or her mother is Jewish or has converted in (but there are inevitably different views about what counts as an authentic conversion (see Scholefield, 2004:239)). In addition, patrilineal descent is increasingly part of the normative cannon in ‘non-Orthodox’ thinking. Whether Orthodox or non-Orthodox, central to the normative position is that ‘Jewish’ is viewed primarily as a ‘religious’ marker (Newman, 1987:113) and one which is always incompatible with other religious identities (DellaPergola, 2005:88).

However for the practical purposes the normative position is problematic. Political stances must be taken on patrilineality and conversion biasing surveys and thereby ‘missing’ many who might also claim to be Jewish. Thus it is argued that a ‘functional’ definition is required for empirical research—some kind of boundary or ‘working definition’ which allows us to generate analytic conclusions (DellaPergola, 2005:88; Waterman and Kosmin, 1987a). For example, the American National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) of 2001 defined a Jew as a person ‘Whose religion
is Jewish, [or] Whose religion is Jewish and something else, [or] Who has no
religion and has at least one Jewish parent or a Jewish upbringing, [or] Who has a
non-monotheistic religion, and has at least one Jewish parent or a Jewish upbringing’
(UJC, 2003:2). Alternatively, DellaPergola suggests a definitional distinction is
made between ‘core’ and ‘enlarged’ Jewish populations. The core ‘includes all those
who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews or, if the respondent is a different
person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews, and those of Jewish
parentage who are identificationally indifferent or agnostic but do not formally
identify with another religious group.’ (DellaPergola, 2005:89). He defines the
enlarged Jewish population as the core population plus ‘all other persons of Jewish
parentage who are not Jews currently (or at the time of investigation) and all the
additional non-Jewish members (spouses, children, etc.) in mixed religious
households.’ (ibid; see also DellaPergola, 1991:71-2)

The alternative to laying down specific parameters for a functional approach is to
rely on self-definition as was done by JPR (Becher et al., 2002) and the 2001 Census
(ONS, 2001b). But as Phillips and Chertok (2004:4) note, even asking a question
such as ‘Is your religion Jewish?’, is by itself ‘insufficient’ since the boundaries of
Jewishness become so fluid, so broad as to be virtually non-existent (one example
they cite is ‘the famous kabbalist Madonna-slash-Esther’). In addition this still fails
to define ‘Jewish’. Yet if we abandon self-definition, then we are drawn back to
some kind of fixed or normative definition, as is implicit in the NJPS and
core/enlarged approaches. But as will now be discussed these are highly problematic
since they attempt to fix and stabilise that which is inherently fluid and dynamic.
Any such definition implicitly assumes that it is indeed possible to produce a coherent answer to the question, ‘Who is a Jew?’, but is this really the case?

**2.4.3 ‘Who is a Jew?’ A critique**

Attempts to fix identity run rapidly into the problems of essentialism and circularity. Charmé (2000:136-7) argues that an essentialistic approach to Jewishness is common because ‘It is easier to see oneself as an expression of a group identity that pre-exists one’s birth and continues after one’s death.’ In this way Jewish existence precedes Jewish essence, belonging to the future as much as to the past, a ‘fragile thread’ that already exists, transcending place, time, history, and culture. It is circular because in deriving definitions of Jewishness based on ‘parentage’, it is implicit that the parent(s) derived their Jewishness from their parentage, and their parents from theirs and so on. This endless deferral breaks down when we ask, ‘from where did the first Jewish parent obtain their Jewishness?’

Even setting aside the dilemma of essentialism and circularity, a further difficulty lies in choosing which definition(s) to use and why. This is the question of authenticity: what, for example, counts as a valid ‘Jewish upbringing’ or ‘a valid conversion’? There is according to Scholefield (2004:239) ‘serious disagreement’ about these issues and the implications can be profound. One vivid example involves a (currently) ongoing High Court dispute between JFS—‘the largest Jewish faith school in Europe’—and the father of a child denied a place at this London-based institution (Symons, 2008a; also Rocker, 2008a). The admissions policy of JFS is guided by ‘Orthodox’ criteria; specifically that a child’s eligibility is determined by the Jewishness of his/her *mother* and specifically, that the mother must be Jewish
within ‘Orthodox criteria’. The mother of the child in question was ‘originally
Roman Catholic who had undergone a conversion by a Progressive minister’
(Symons, 2008b) A conversion carried out by a ‘non-Orthodox’ rabbi is considered
by the school to be invalid—inauthentic. This legal dispute about racial
discrimination is fundamentally one of authenticity: who is authentically Jewish and
who is privileged to decide.

Jewishness, argues Charmé (2000:143), emerges out of, and is expressed in,
narrative. For some, it will be a central and salient part of their identity; for others it
may simply be an aspect of background and ethnic or religious heritage (Horowitz,
2003:3). For many it may even be less than that: for example, in Sartre’s 1965 essay
Anti-Semite and Jew, he highlighted the ‘inescapable fact’ of being Jewish, a fact
that was being determined by antisemites from without whether or not he defined
himself as such (cited in Charmé, 2000:140). In recent times ‘the other’ continues to
define who we are albeit devoid of hatred; Barak Obama will be America’s first
‘Black’ President despite having a ‘White’ mother, and the Jewish faith school JFS
rejected an 11-year child’s application despite his having a ‘Jewish’ father.

The solution, argues Charmé is to accept that there is no single, authentic, fixed
answer to the question ‘Who is a Jew?’ There are only multiple, contested, authentic
definitions. Jewishness is ‘the crucial degree of difference that separates him from
the non-Jews around him’ (Charmé, 2000:145). But that ‘degree of difference’ is
blurred. Robin Cohen (1995) suggested the term ‘fuzzy’ to describe ‘frontiers of
identity’, and Scholefield (2004) argues this terminology can be used to describe the
boundary between ‘Jewish’ and ‘not-Jewish’; that it is not always clear who (and
what) is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ (see also Alba, 2006). Scholefield’s (2004:246) account of the ‘contested boundaries’ at a Jewish faith school in Britain concludes by noting that, ‘At first sight the boundaries around the school appear to be very tight but a more detailed analysis shows some of the ‘fuzzy frontiers’ which have to be negotiated by young people learning what it means to be Jewish in Britain today.’ We construct that ‘degree of difference’; Charmé (2000:144) argues that people are ‘not passive products of their cultures but active agents who express their culture in ways that contribute to the further development of their cultures and identities.’ (See also, Finkielkraut, 1997)

Charmé highlights what he terms ‘the critical new ingredient in the identity of the post-emancipation, post-Enlightenment, post-halakhic Jew: the enormous freedom to decide the content and meaning of being Jewish.’ (2000:141) Jewishness has become commodified, a form of consumption; Jews ‘prefer to look at bits and pieces they can try on for a while, taste, enjoy, and then throw away’ (Finkielkraut, 1995:112, cited in Charmé, 2000:149). Pick ‘n’ mix Judaism is symptomatic of postindustrial society where identities, like other commodities, are mass-produced (ibid:146; see also Kosmin and Keysar, 2006). And in America, Horowitz (2003:2) argues that Jews today ‘must come to think of themselves as “Jews by choice,” because in the face of wide-open opportunities about lifestyle and mobility in contemporary America, being actively Jewish for most people requires an active assertion of some sort, over and above simply being born Jewish.’

It is therefore ‘impossible to “be Jewish” in a simple way’ (Charmé, 2000:148). There are multiple authentic Judaisms that have constructed multiple understandings
of the Jewish situation. It would be ‘misleading to speak of a singular, uncomplicated thing called Jewish history or culture rather than the many ways of living one’s Jewishness in a variety of different situations.’ (ibid:144) Being Jewish in a postmodern world ‘is authentic—truthful about its own nature—only when it assumes the instability of all identities.’ (ibid:149)

Thus, for the quantitative investigator no definition is ‘correct’ but each must be justified in its own terms whilst accepting, however reluctantly, that it is one out of multiple others. DellaPergola (2005:86) acknowledges that quantitative measures do not provide more than a ‘broad descriptive container’ whose contents need to be enriched, for example by additional qualitative evidence. Any derived figure for a Jewish population size is a ‘synthetic indicator of an array of different demographic and sociocultural determinants and trends’ (ibid). It is also only one such indicator. So one challenge, argues DellaPergola, is to find a way to ‘disentangle the cluster of Jews and non-Jews who share their daily lives in the same households, and to trace virtual boundary lines where in reality such group boundaries have become increasingly flexible, porous and interchangeable.’ (ibid:89) I would argue the census is one, but only one, such way of achieving this and surveys can help ‘enrich’ the findings, for example by measuring the extent of ‘Jewish engagement’ (Horowitz, 2003:xiii).

2.5 Discussion: permanently provisional nature of identity

This review of the nature of identity, and of Jewish identity in particular, has produced unsettling conclusions. If identity is a contingent construction and communities are simply imagined, is it any longer possible to empirically examine
The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority

the group in a quantitative manner? Indeed, do our numbers bear any relevance at all to the populations we purport to represent? The confidence we can have in our findings must surely be diminished by such conclusions.

However, whilst this enhanced understanding is to be broadly welcomed, some argue that such ideas can take us only so far and that we should step back from the brink of rendering identity utterly meaningless. For example, in her reflections on religion and geography, Buttmer (2006:198) accepts that it is credible and analytically defensible to claim that religion and belief systems have been socially constructed, but she argues ‘it is quite another matter to claim that there is “nothing but” socially constructed discourses to religion.’ And Valins (2003a:172) adds that ‘Just because academics have exposed identities to be multiple, contested and hybrid does not make them any less important for people’s everyday lives’. Modood (1998:382) has argued that ‘we do not have to be browbeaten by a dogmatic anti-essentialism into believing that historical continuities, cultural groups, coherent selves do or do not exist.’ He says nothing is closed a priori; whether there is sameness or newness in the world, whether across time, across space or across populations, these are empirical questions. ‘Habitual homogenisation’ is real and even necessary and this is not about to change just because of its ‘exposure’. The tendency for people to group, cluster and label themselves and others is strong, and boundaries—even if they are socially constructed—do exist and are necessary. In the words of Stuart Hall (1987), they make politics and identity possible.

‘Jewishness’ then is an example and a reminder of the problematic nature of all identities and identity boundaries. ‘Who are the Jews?’ Who indeed? The answer to
Wirth’s (1956:63) ‘elementary question’ has become abundantly clear: there is no answer, at least no universally acceptable one. For some, such as Schnapper (1987), quantification in Jewish demography has been rendered ‘unfeasible’. Just how relevant and useful is demography when it comes to the appraisal of Jewish populations, especially when our definitional parameters are only meaningful at a certain moment and in a certain context? DellaPergola (2005:90) worries that ‘Jewish population continuity and discontinuity may become decreasingly connected with demographically traceable patterns, and increasingly a function of cultural, political or budget-related tides, fashions or propensities.’ For the quantitative researcher the consequences are complex and challenging. Jewish population data must be seen as contextual estimates which ‘highlight the increasing complexity of the sociodemographic and identificational processes underlying the definition[s] of Jewish populations… the analyst has to come to terms with the paradox of the permanently provisional character of Jewish population estimates [emphasis in original]’ (DellaPergola, 2002, 2005:90).
3 Partnership formation and ‘intermarriage’

The formation of partnerships is a key mechanism in the processes (re)producing residential segregation and assimilation. In this third section, I will examine the theoretical literature relating to partnership formation and then focus on one particular aspect of the topic that has become the most hotly debated topic in Jewish socio-demographic scholarship—‘intermarriage’. It is only by looking at how and why partnerships form that we can begin to understand the spatial patterns we observe in our data.

3.1 Theorising partnership formation

‘Unmarried people do not just wander around a region looking for a spouse; they spend most of their life in small and functional places, such as neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, bars and clubs.’ (Kalmijn, 1998:403)

Partnerships, their formation and their outcomes, have long attracted the attention of scholars from both the social and spatial traditions. This is because ‘partner selection will never be completely random’ (Voas, 2003:103; also Bozon and Heran, 1989; Davis, 1984). It is this understanding, this non-randomness, that has attracted the attention of scholars who have attempted to theorise and explain partnership formation over the last century or so (Kalmijn, 1998:396).

3.1.1 Social and spatial distance

An important idea that is commonly asserted, especially in the sociological literature, is that of social distance (the following ideas stem from the work of Park (1926) and the Chicago School). It is argued that factors such as class, education, ethnicity, religion, language and so on create a certain distance (or closeness) between groups
and individuals, which in turn impacts on the likelihood that such groups (or individuals) will form unions. Such factors have been employed to measure variously the preference, willingness and propensity for people to marry each other (Kalmijn, 1998; Voas, 2003). For example, Qian and Lichter (2001:309) have argued that newly arrived immigrant groups are more likely to partner each other than members of the ‘host’ group for reasons such as language differences.

It is also argued that over time, this social distance will diminish and the ‘force of attraction’ between groups will rise as the ‘minority’ structurally and culturally assimilates (Gordon, 1964; Okun, 2001; Qian and Preston, 1993). For example, Alba and Chamlin (1983:246-7) found that the greater the generational separation of individuals from their original immigrant status, the more likely they were to have a ‘mixed ancestry’ (see also Duncan and Lieberson, 1959; Kalmijn, 1998:411-12). It has been noted that some social distance factors have a greater persistence than others, especially ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ differences (Qian and Lichter, 2001:308). Kalmijn (1998:369) has argued that (marital religious) exogamy indicates people regard each other as social equals, whereas endogamy suggests that ‘a form of group closure’ exists in the population. Thus many conclude that by measuring (religious/ethnic/racial) ‘intermarriage’ a quantitative evaluation of social distance between groups can be achieved (Qian and Lichter, 2001:290-91; also Gordon, 1964; Gray, 1987:370; Duncan and Lieberson, 1959:372-73; Qian and Preston 1993:483).

A second idea that has an equally strong hold on the imagination of partnership theorists is the importance of spatial distance and how this relates to partnership formation. This is especially so in geographical analyses of partnership formations.
which have commonly related propinquity to partnership outcomes. This idea refers to the notion that residential propinquity between two groups enhances the likelihood that individuals of each group will meet and form marital unions (Peach, 1980a, 1996b:142). An important aspect of this argument is the assumption that propinquity is related to intermarriage (Qian and Preston 1993:483; Peach, 1980a). For example, Lieberson and Waters (1988: 188,232-35) have argued that ‘the level of a group’s residential segregation influenced the apparent frequency of intermarriage experienced by the group’. This relationship is referred to repeatedly in the literature, for example, Kalmijn (1998:403) regarding Catholics and Protestants in Holland; Voas (2003:103) regarding Catholics in Quebec; (as well as Kalmijn and Flap, 2001; Kennedy, 1943; Lieberson, 1961, 1963; Peach, 1980a:372, 1981b, 1975).

Highlighting the role of propinquity as an explanation for intermarriage, especially in terms of population concentration, is common in discussions of Jewish intermarriage. Cohen for example (2006:17) suggests that ‘Zip code may in fact be more predictive of in-marriage than Jewish education in that people still date and marry those they live near.’ (See also, DellaPergola, 1992:76; Kalmijn et al., 2006; Lieberson and Waters, 1988:206; Neustatter, 1955:95; Rosenthal, 1960:276; Waite, 2002:46.)

3.1.2 Opportunities and preferences

Building on the early work of Hollingshead (1950), a subtly different approach to understanding partnership formation outcomes, but which is nonetheless anchored in the notions of social and spatial distance, is the opportunity and preference model (see Gray, 1987:379; Kalmijn, 1991, 1998; Lieberson and Waters, 1988:235-6). This
is the idea that some factors involved in partnership formation affect the *opportunity* for individuals to meet potentially eligible partners, whilst others affect the *preferences* those individuals have about what constitutes eligibility. Factors relating to opportunity are generally spatial or structural (such as the number of eligible people in an area and of the right age), and factors relating to preferences are generally social or economic (such as preferences for a partner with the same ethnic background or a certain economic status). Preferences may also come from ‘third parties’, most commonly parents (Kalmijn, 1991; Kalmijn, 1998:400-402) but also institutions and institutional figures such as clergy who may condone or condemn particular partnership combinations.

It has also been noted that some relationships may be a ‘by-product’ of a more significant correlation. For example, it has been argued that a choice based on a preference for one particular factor (such as religion) will produce a bias towards or away from another factor (such as ethnicity). Thus, what may appear to be a choice based on ethnic similarity (e.g. ‘whiteness’) may actually be a by-product of a preference based on religion (see Kalmijn, 1998:415).

The sociological concept of opportunity is useful in explaining the geographical significance of propinquity. Opportunity refers to the potential of an *encounter* with a particular type of person. In this sense, opportunity is the same as *exposure*. It is suggested that opportunities are enhanced if group size is large, but Blau and Schwartz have noted that, ‘The chance to encounter a member of one’s own group does not depend on group size alone but also on the way a group is dispersed geographically’ (1984, cited in Kalmijn, 1998:402-3; see also Duncan and
Lieberson, 1959; Lieberson and Waters, 1988:205-09; Peach, 1974:641). Levels of end/exogamy are often used in the literature to measure opportunity. For example, Kalmijn refers to people with farming backgrounds who ‘have an exceptionally high rate of endogamy, a finding that can probably be explained in terms of the social and geographic isolation of the rural population’ (1998:409). Indeed, many studies imply that propinquity is an important mechanism for partnership formation. Waite (2002:46) for example, has argued that studies in the United States have found ‘that the likelihood of interfaith marriage declines with increases in the availability of same-religion partners in the local area.’ Wong (1989:97-8) found that Chinese-Americans married out less often in California, where they were relatively concentrated, than the rest of the United States. (See similarly, Davidson and Widman, 2002:402 regarding Catholics; and Lowenstein, 2005:32-3 regarding Jews). Kalmijn (1998:414) argues that ‘Such patterns undoubtedly point to the role of opportunity…’.

But clearly, variables other than (relative) group size may impact on the likelihood and frequency of exposure. Kalmijn (1991, 1998) for example notes that education, class, ethnicity and religiosity should all be considered when assessing the relevance of exposure in addition to space.

Finally, partnerships have been analysed in terms of the market approach. This marks a development of, but is still grounded in, the above ideas, and is based on the premise that certain factors affect the supply of potentially eligible partners (supply-side) and certain factors affect the demand for such partners (demand-side). Supply-side variables tend to reflect opportunity factors such as population size, whereas
demand-side variables tend to reflect preference factors such as the availability of
individuals of a certain age or ethnicity (see further Gray, 1987; Houston et al., 2005:
702; Kalmijn and Flap, 2001).

A derivative of this idea is the ‘Exchange Hypothesis’ (Davis, 1941; Merton, 1941;
see also, Chiswick and Lehrer, 1991:22; Keysar et al. 1991:48 on ‘Status Exchange’;
within the market involve ‘resources’ such as class, ethnicity, physical attractiveness,
and so on. The idea of exchange has been used to explain religious exogamy
whereby individuals with lower (socio-economic) status would accept a partner of a
different religion if they had a higher social status. Goldscheider (1986) suggests that
in the mid-20th century a financially successful Jewish male often sought ‘higher-
status’ non-Jewish female (see also, Cohen, 1977; Gullickson, 2006:674-5; Phillips
B, 2005:52).

3.1.3 Theorising partnership formation: a critique
It is questionable how relevant the positivist logic of the ‘dismal science’ is to the
intricate complexities of partnership formation. Indeed even Gray (1987:365) points
out that the notion of a ‘market’ for partnership formation is an ‘extraordinarily
slippery concept’. Rosenfeld (2005) presents a particularly rigorous test of the idea
of status exchange and concludes that there is little evidence actually to support such
a notion in data relating to ‘racially intermarried individuals’ (ibid:1318). Qualities
such as aesthetic attractiveness, emotional affection and other aspects of social
psychology are even more difficult to measure quantitatively in a reliable way (see
for example Forgas, 1991).
Geographers have pointed to broader difficulties with the theoretical approaches to partnership formation presented above. In particular the relationship between distance and partnership formation has been questioned as being overly simplistic, whilst others highlight the importance of attending to the quality of interaction when it does occur. As Houston et al. (2005:702) state, ‘We do not doubt that residential segregation matters, but we believe that to understand partnership formation we must go beyond relying upon a tired correlation between certain social processes and spatial patterns.’ As noted in the previous section, highlighting correlations, whilst certainly indicative of social process, does not in itself explain why and how this occurs in the first place.

Clearly, note Houston et al. (2005: 712) ‘love happens in place’, but they argue that the neighbourhood has been passively accepted as the preeminent arena in which partnership formation occurs (ibid:705). In their discussion of mixed-race partnering they note a ‘troubling’ tendency in the literature of ‘relying upon causal and broad scale – distanced – interpretations of racial mixing’. The neighbourhood ‘in all its forms’ as a place of meeting is ‘declining in relevance’, and it is too broad a scale to understand the fomentation of friendships. They offer this as a critique of residential segregation arguing that ‘The cloaking of contact and separation within aggregate appraisals shows how statistical representations of residential segregation blur details of daily interaction.’ (ibid:705) They argue that there is a ‘significant need to acknowledge, theorize, and study the variety of spaces’ where mixing occurs. (ibid:706). ‘By scaling down to the microgeographies of the everyday and by acknowledging a variety of local places of encounter, the possibilities of cross-race
sociability and interaction, and thus the possible origins of mixed-race partnership formation, come to the fore.’ The ‘places of encounter’ they suggest focusing on are workplaces, educational places, and cyberspace. (See also Kalmijn and Flap, 2001)

Within these ‘places of encounter’ there is also a need to assess the frequency with which this occurs and the quality of the encounter itself. As Loretta Lees (2006, pers. com.) has noted, ‘social mixing’ does not necessarily follow simply because groups are residentially located in close proximity to each other. Houston et al. (2005:714, 702) emphasise the importance of ‘daily encounters’ and ‘everyday contexts’ as a potential focus for future work to illustrate different spatialities and ‘help reimagine social processes.’

### 3.2 The ‘intermarriage’ debate

Whether ‘intermarriage’ is viewed as a threat or a blessing often depends on the context in which it is deemed to occur and what it is supposedly indicating. In 1944, Kennedy asserted that, ‘Most authorities on population problems agree that intermarriage is the surest means of assimilation and the most infallible index of its occurrence.’ (p331; Gordon, 1964:70-2) This assimilationist stance has often been viewed positively, as a sign of ‘cultural and socioeconomic integration’ (Okun, 2001:50). For example, as early as 1928, Engelman suggested that Jewish intermarriage could be used as ‘an index of the state of racial cohesiveness of the Jew’ (p517). And Gray (1987:378) has urged the Australian government to use intermarriage data ‘to measure the extent to which migrant groups have blended with the rest of the Australian population, and should be of interest to the formulation of immigration policy.’ Intermarriage is thought to dilute ethnic exclusiveness and mix
various ethnic populations more effectively than any other process (Gray, 1987:371). It can also be seen as indicative of good race relations, reducing racism and intergroup antagonisms (Cohen, 1977:999; Kalmijn, 1998:417,398; Price and Zubrzycki, 1962; Qian and Lichter 2001:292).

On the other hand, intermarriage can be viewed negatively because it ‘has consequences both for the individuals involved and for the future viability and nature of the ethnic groups themselves. [My emphasis]’ (Lieberson and Waters, 1988:162). This pessimistic view tends to be based on an anti-assimilationist position. In many ways, it accepts the ‘received wisdom’ of the segregation debate (discussed above) at face value. Gordon’s (1964:80-1) assessment that ‘marital assimilation, [is] an inevitable by-product of structural assimilation’ and that at its fullest extent the minority group will lose its ethnic identity in the larger ‘host or core society’ leading to ‘identificational assimilation’, is treated as highly threatening to the very existence of groups such as Jews. For Gordon, the ‘acceptance’ into a society through intermarriage comes at a ‘price’ that being ‘the disappearance of the ethnic group as a separate entity and the evaporation of its distinctive values’ (ibid; see further Monahan, 1973:195).

Various versions of this underlying logic can be seen in the popular idea of erosion, especially of ‘ethnic distinctiveness’ (Qian and Lichter, 2001:290) due to intermarriage (Kalmijn, 1998:369; Keysar et al., 1991:49). Others have argued that intermarriage is demographically threatening, and equate the phenomenon with life events such as migration and mortality (DellaPergola, 1992:75, 1991:69; 2003). Voas (2003:94-96) for example proposes a ‘theory of disaffiliation’ in which he
equates declining religious affiliation with demographic trends. Another erosional mechanism is religious switching. This is based on the ‘free market’ ideas of Adam Smith (1904:Bk5, Ch1, Pt3, Art3), whereby religion is conceived as a ‘product’ which can be switched on or off (Kosmin and Keysar, 2006:56-64; see also Sands et al., 2006).

Although there have always been Jews who married non-Jews (Zenner, 1991; Barron, 1946, 1951:249; Slater, 1947; Wirth, 1956:67; Lowenstein, 2005:50), studies of Jewish ‘intermarriage’ both in Europe and the United States have historically shown a ‘significant marriage boundary between Jews and Gentiles’ (Kalmijn et al., 2006:1349; Gordon, 1964:178-9; Kennedy, 1944:339). Thus when this boundary becomes porous, blurs and is crossed to any significant degree, the phenomenon becomes a topic of considerable interest, or as some would have it, an ‘obsession’ (Goldscheider, 2003:18). The breaching of this boundary has over the last forty years or so, led to the development of two discourses; in one, the pessimistic view is taken of the intermarriage of Jews to non-Jews (see Cohen, 2006; Dershowitz, 1997; Sacks, 1995a; Wasserstein, 1996) and in the other, a more sanguine interpretation is presented (see Goldscheider, 2003; Saxe et al., 2007).

3.2.1 The Jewish ‘narrative of doom’

It is not surprising therefore that for Jews, the matter of marriages between Jews and non-Jews is ‘suffused with complexity and controversy’ (UJC, 2003:16). This was the case in the 1960s (Sklare, 1970) and continues to be so (Rosner, 2008). Indeed, according to DellaPergola (2007) it is back on the ‘center stage of Jewish academic and public debate’. Although I describe the ‘anti-assimilationist’ view on Jewish
intermarriage as a ‘narrative of doom’ there are degrees of doom in this debate ranging from gradual erosion to outright (cultural) annihilation of the Jewish population.

The current interest in the topic can be traced back to the National Jewish Population Study (NJPS) of 1990 carried out in the United States (see Kosmin et al., 1991). This survey ‘discovered’ an ‘intermarriage rate of 52% for the five years previous to the study…[and] whipped communal organisations into a decade-long frenzy of debate over how to stop a supposedly hemorrhaging community.’ (Cattan, 2003). Indeed, ‘52%’ became something of an icon, a ‘clarion call’ (Sheskin, 2003), which ‘rock[ed] the foundations of Jewish communal life’ (Forward, 2003). Though some have disputed the ‘accuracy’ of the 52% figure, arguing it is ‘actually’ 43% (Cohen, 2006:3,6; DellaPergola, 2005), such discussions tend to be definitional and methodological arguments. (See also Chapter 6, section 1, p270)

In the late 1970s it was argued that the (American) Jewish population was ‘eroding’ (Bergman, 1977) and Horowitz and Solomon (1992:319) have suggested that there is ‘a pattern of slow but sure erosion of the Jewish community in America—the longer we are here, the fewer of us will remain.’ (See also Goldscheider, 2003:19) This view is often linked to the idea that intermarriage ‘erodes’ Jewish identity (DellaPergola, 1991:91) leading to the children of intermarried couples being bought up with a weak or nonexistent Jewish identity (see Cohen, 2006:12; Waite 2002:45). Bruce Phillips (2007:30) has argued that ‘Jews who claim “no religion” tend to be the offspring of Jewish-Christian intermarriages. Many of them were raised as Christians and “no religion” represents a safe middle ground that avoided choosing
between parents.’ Voas (2003:96) has argued that for members of the Church of England exogamous unions are ‘usually religiously sterile’: intermarriage ‘acts as a sign that religion has lost, at least for the [intermarrying] individuals concerned, a major part of its function […] as a means of cultural transmission’ (ibid). (For similar arguments about Jews in Britain see Cromer (1974:155,165), Lipman and Lipman (1981) and (Prais and Schmool (1967; 1968).)

Often ‘intermarriage’ is discussed in purely epidemiological terms, as if it were a disease spreading through the population. The most extreme interpretations of Jewish intermarriage are that it is in effect deadly. The fact that it is ‘only’ culture that is ‘dying’ is often overlooked in increasingly pessimistic commentary. For example, Cohen (2006:11) has recently argued that ‘Interrmarriage does indeed constitute the greatest single threat to Jewish continuity today, both on an individual level (for specific Jewish families and their descendants) and on a group level (for the size and distinctiveness of the American Jewish population).’ He suggests that in the United States there are ‘two Jewries’, one consisting of ‘inmarried families’ which reproduce the Jewish population and one that consists of ‘interrmarried families’ which ‘do not’. Wasserstein (1996) has argued that the ‘Jewish Diaspora’ is ‘vanishing’, and Dershowitz (1997) in his book The Vanishing American Jew, argued that the ‘chosen people’ have become the ‘choosing people’. Cantor (1994 cited in Goldscheider, 2003:19) has even warned that Jews are ‘headed for catastrophic decline’ and are ‘approaching [the] end of Jewish history’. And Cohen and Fein (1985:86) have argued that additional factors such as fewer Jewish marriages and reduced Jewish fertility combined to present ‘an immediate threat to
the actual physical survival of the Jews.’ (See also Vincent and Warf, 2002:31-2). Goldscheider and Zuckerman (1984:80) have likened such comments to rhetorical ‘windstorm’ raging through Jewish communities.

Another aspect of this narrative is the belief in a feedback or ‘chain effect’. According to Sklare (1970:53) as intermarriage becomes prevalent in a population ‘it creates a measure of approval for itself’, i.e. it becomes more socially acceptable. DellaPergola (1992:79,84) argues that there is ‘a greater legitimation and acceptance of mixed-married couples within the fold of the community than in the past. This reduces the pressure on non-Jewish spouses to convert.’ Children of intermarried parentage are less likely to be ‘raised as Jews’ and will out-marry ‘at a far greater rate than children of in-marriages’ (also Cohen, 2006; Kalmijn et al., 2006; Neustatter, 1955:92).

In Britain the ‘narrative of doom’ has been no less vocal despite a lack of relevant data (Schmool and Miller, 1994:70). For example, Shindler (1993:22) asserted that ‘…one fact seems fairly indisputable: the bulk of Anglo-Jewry, as we know it today [1993], is in real danger of disappearing within a generation or two, due to indifference, assimilation, outmarriage, low fertility and divorce.’ In his book, Will we have Jewish grandchildren? (Sacks, 1995a) Britain’s Chief Rabbi, Jonathan Sacks describes ‘The end of optimism’ (ibid:24), ‘An unfolding tragedy’ (ibid:25) and ‘Crisis’ (ibid:17). He argued that Jewish marriages ‘have now reached the critical position where they represent less than one half of Jews of marriageable age, suggesting that more than half of young Jews are not marrying, are marrying out [sic], or are leaving the community in some other way. [emphasis in original]’
(Sacks, 1995a:22). Citing Kosmin (no reference given), Sacks argued that ‘the change in the demography of the Jewish people in the twentieth century is not only unparalleled but catastrophic. …’ (ibid:23). More recently a BBC report has suggested that there was a fear that ‘Jewry may die out’ (Dixon, 2005; see also Wynne-Jones, 2006).

I would argue that the ‘narrative of doom’ has had a direct and substantial impact on ‘communal’ policy. One major American philanthropist, who has argued that Jews are experiencing ‘rampant intermarriage’ (Frazer and Rocker, 2004), chose to invest US$210 million in an ‘experimental’ programme called *birthright israel* [sic], in part to ‘counter the threat to Jewish continuity posed by assimilation and intermarriage.’ (Saxe et al., 2002:ix,4). The programme also extends to Jews in Britain, but here, a more significant impact has been on Jewish education. Valins et al. (2001:3) note that despite a population contraction during the second half of the 20th century, ‘the number of Jewish children in full-time Jewish education […] increased by around 500 per cent.’ And ‘Communal expenditure on Jewish education now amounts to tens of millions of pounds.’ (ibid:1) Valins has argued that ‘the discourse surrounding the need to prevent inter-marriage through educational initiatives is extremely powerful, and pervades the viewpoints of all of the movements providing Jewish faith-based schooling’ (Valins, 2003b:246; see also Sacks, 1995a).

Jewish education and in particular the impact of Jewish schooling on ‘intermarriage’, has attracted considerable attention in the debate. For example, Cromer (1974:167) noted that ‘…the limited evidence available on the effect of Jewish education in England suggests that it has no influence on attitudes towards intermarriage and may
even have a negative one on attitudes towards religious observance.’ Miller et al., (1996:12) argued that Jewish education has a rather ‘insignificant role’ and that parental religiosity and ‘home background’ have a far greater influence on marriage outcomes. More recently however Cohen (2006:12) has stated that ‘As years of research on the intermarried have demonstrated, those who marry out derive from weaker Jewish backgrounds in terms of parental observance and Jewish education’. For Cohen ‘Jewish education works’ (ibid:13) i.e. it is a kind of antidote to the dangers of intermarriage. (See also Hielman, 1983) Indeed the stated aim of the financially massive birthright israel [sic] programme is to provide Jewish education ‘to counter the threat to Jewish continuity posed by assimilation and intermarriage.’ (Saxe et al., 2002:ix)

Jewish intermarriage: the transformation narrative
In the 1970s a number of scholars cautioned against the deterministic assumptions of the above discourse relating intermarriage directly to assimilation. These cautionary views have been referred to as ‘revisionism’ (Sklare, (no reference given) cited in DellaPergola, 1991:68). I will use the umbrella term ‘transformation narrative’ to describe the loose collection of responses to this narrative (of doom). These arguments tend to be united by their more optimistic stance suggesting that survival and adaptation rather than erosion and decline are plausible outcomes, in spite of high levels of intermarriage. Such responses have arisen not least because the assumed demise has as yet, failed to materialise. In 1970 Sklare, paraphrasing Mark Twain, pointed out that the American Jewish community is treated like ‘a kind of fabulous invalid whose death had long ago been predicted by the doctors in
attendance but whose ongoing salubrity confounds their predications.’ (p51). Goldscheider and Zuckerman (1984:9-10) wrote that ‘Clearly, the prediction of assimilation is confounded by Jewish continuity in the contemporary world.’ More recently Goldscheider (2003:24) notes ‘The astounding fact is that most American Jews living in a voluntary and open society choose to be Jewish rather than something else.’

There are two main arguments within the transformation narrative; that Jews and Jewishness will survive by adapting and ‘transforming’, and/or that survival will occur because of growth from in-conversions, natural growth and the raising of children in ‘mixed marriages’ as Jews. These approaches also tend to reject the straight-line interpretations of assimilation. In their book *The Transformation of the Jews* Goldscheider and Zuckerman (1984:237) argued that, ‘The relationship between modernization and intermarriage is … much more complex than simple extrapolations from intermarriage to assimilation.’ (See also Barron, 1946:13; Cohen and Fein, 1985). For Goldscheider and Zuckerman (1984:225, 181) intermarriage ‘is not equivalent to assimilation nor does it automatically lead to communal dissolution.’ They argued that many of the negative concerns expressed about intermarriage and its implications for future Jewish demographic vitality were ‘misplaced’ (ibid:187). In essence their argument was that the existing ‘structures’ of ‘modern’ society, such as religion, relationships, and occupations are ‘modified’ rather than replaced (ibid:8). Thus, Jewish identity is seen to thrive albeit in a changed, new form which cannot easily be compared with previous forms. ‘Modernization’ has led to a ‘reformation’ of the (American) Jewish community, and
produced ‘new forms of cohesion’ (ibid:92); ‘In the modernization of the Jews, their religion is transformed’ (ibid:6).

More recently Goldscheider (2003:23) has argued that ‘[i]nterrmarriage is no longer the ultimate step toward total assimilation. In most intermarriages, the Jewish partner remains attached to the Jewish community.’ (See also Fishman, 2004) In what he calls the ‘pre-modern’ period, ‘rigid structures’ may have prevented this from happening. Saxe et al. (2007:8) succinctly summarise the current transformationist stance: ‘…deterministic views of the impact of birthrates and intermarriage may need to be adjusted. Just as Jewish identity is regarded as fluid, and may change in intensity over a lifetime, the character of the population may also shift as norms about marriage, child-rearing and religious practice evolve.’ Indeed, Goldscheider (2003:20) has argued that ‘…the issue is not intermarriage but Jewishness in the family. How do people raise their children and connect to their extended families and the broader community that is Jewish? Questions about intermarriage and Jewish continuity need to be redirected toward these family networks.’

Another approach, and one which lies just beneath the surface of the transformationist position, argues that demographic growth can occur because of intermarriage. Goldscheider and Zuckerman (1984:180) argued that ‘substantial evidence shows that the Jewish community gains rather than loses members, through intermarriage, conversion, and the Jewish socialization of the children of intermarriage couples.’ Similar arguments were made by Massarik (1978) and Fein (1979) and Goldscheider (2003:20). Saxe et al. (2007:11-12) found that in their study of Jews in Boston ‘a majority of children in intermarried households are being
raised as Jews by religion’. They do note however that ‘The Boston Jewish community appears to be exceptional in this regard.’ (ibid:11; see further Voas, 2003:94). For Fishman (2004:5-6), intermarriage can be viewed as a ‘doubling’ of the family’s ‘cultural capital’ where conversion of the non-Jewish partner does not occur but nonetheless at least some ties to ethnoreligious Jewish heritage are maintained.

Finally, Lazerwitz et al. (1998) have proposed the ‘tradition-socialization model’. According to Phillips (2005:51) this approach highlights the religious heterogeneity of the Jewish population which in turn affects the propensity that Jews will intermarry. This model argues that ‘intermarriage’ is inversely correlated with ‘exposure to traditional Jewish values’ (Lazerwitz et al., 1998:104), e.g. Orthodox Jews were less likely to intermarry than the Reform Jews. This is because the children of ‘mixed’ couples have lowered ‘socialisation exposure’ (i.e. they are less likely to attend Jewish institutions such as schools and camps) as well as lowered ‘transmission exposure’ (i.e. fewer Jewish experiences within the family). (See also Cohen, 2006; Waite, 2002:46)

3.2.2 The intermarriage debate: a critique

The ‘intermarriage debate’ has continued for nearly 40 years and shows little sign of abating. Yet it should already be clear that there are significant problems with the premises, as outlined. Recent critiques of assimilation theory (see Chapter 3, section 1.2 p101), as well as theories of partnership formation, hitherto uncritically presented or simply ignored, must be acknowledged in this debate. Further, there are at least three specific issues I wish to raise that are problematic regardless of which
side of the debate one agrees with. In the first instance, the very term ‘intermarriage’ is highly complex and lacks a clear or consistent definition. Like ‘segregation’, it is sometimes interpreted as a state of social being; at other times a social process—a kind or force such as the ‘invisible hand’ of the market approach to partnerships.

More specifically the various ‘intermarriage’ narratives highlight two problems that rarely get acknowledged; what ‘intermarriage’ actually means and the privileging of marriage as the only game in town. What counts as intermarriage is far less clear-cut than much of the literature suggests. According to Lieberson and Waters (1988:168-71), there is no universal answer to this question. Indeed individual societies may adjust what counts as intermarriage over time. Much depends on how societies choose to classify groups and how to handle ‘mixed categories’. One British example relates to the fact that increasingly large numbers of people are reporting ‘No Religion’ (Kosmin, 2002), so it becomes necessary to ask if a Jew marries such a person are they ‘intermarried’?

The term ‘intermarriage’ itself lacks an acceptable polar opposite, ‘intramarrriage’ being rarely used. Other terms include ‘interfaith marriage’ (Schmool and Miller, 1994:84) and ‘interreligious marriage’ (Monahan, 1973). Whilst suitably focused, these are too narrow to encompass ethnic, secular or irreligious Jews. Even so both are superior to the somewhat vague ‘mixed marriage’ (Fishman, 2004) and the virtually meaningless ‘out (-) marriage’ (Shindler, 1993:20; DellaPergola, 1991:89). In many cases, several different terms are used interchangeably in the same work (see for example Chinitz and Brown, 2001).
Another difficulty with the term ‘intermarriage’ lies in its privileging of couples who marry. As will be discuss below regarding the growth of alternative partnership types this is increasingly problematic. To start with, it (currently) excludes same-sex couples by default, but it also demotes alternative arrangements such as cohabitation; perhaps we could derive ‘intercohabitation’? Thus the term ‘partnership’ has been suggested as a preferable alternative (Houston et al., 2005:703; Wright et al., 2003:461).

A further problem with the term, especially as it is used in the ‘doom’ and ‘transformation’ narratives and alluded to above, is its privileging of religion or ethnicity as independent variables (see also Gray, 1987; Kalmijn, 1998; Peach 1980a). This is despite a wealth of literature as well as plentiful demographic terms to describe ‘a/symmetrical’ partnerships. For example Williams and Lawler (2001) distinguish between ‘heterogamy’ to describe marriages within the same religion but between different denominations (Catholic/Protestant) and ‘homogamy’ to describe marriages of the same denominations and religion (Catholic/Catholic). Voas (2003:107, Note7) recommends Pullum and Peri’s (1999) practice of using ‘homogamy’ to describe marriage between individuals sharing a specified characteristic (such as wealth), and ‘endogamy’ to mean that they are ‘required or expected to marry in this way’ (such as skin colour). Chiswick and Lehrer (1991:31 Note1) distinguish between the variants exogenous, endogenous and heterogamous (ibid:27; see also Kalmijn, 1998:369). The Roland Pressat Dictionary of Demography defines endogamy as, ‘Marriage predominantly, or exclusively, between members of the same social geographical or ethnic group. … Various
qualifiers such as occupational or religious endogamy are sometimes found. The opposite term is exogamy. Homogamy and its synonyms—assortative marriage or assortative mating—indicate marriage between persons with certain common characteristics, either social, physical or mental. The opposite is heterogamy.’ (Wilson, 1989:69-70) In this thesis I will use the terms ‘exogamy’ and ‘endogamy’ to refer to ethnic and religious traits, and ‘homogamy’ and ‘heterogamy’ to refer to all other traits.

A final problem with the term ‘intermarriage’ is that like ‘segregation’ which has been sensationalised in the segregation debate (Phillips, 2006:26), it is endlessly constructed as negative, a ‘dangerous’ assimilative ‘force’ to be feared, rather than a social process or occurrence to be analysed.

Beyond nomenclature, a second problem both sides of the ‘intermarriage debate’ need to contend with is its premise on theoretical ideas about assimilation. I would suggest that the most important is the implicit notion of group homogeneity and essentialism in both the ‘doom’ and ‘transformation’ narratives; both speak of a minority ‘other’ and a majority ‘host’. But as DellaPergola (1992:75) points out, the Jewish population is heterogeneous; Orthodox Jews are less ‘at risk’ of intermarriage than ‘sections of the Jewish population with the weakest ethnic identification’.

The notion of different sections of a population being more at risk of ‘intermarriage’ than others is also socio-demographically relevant. For example, people aged under 16 cannot become intermarried and in older Jewish cohorts women are more at risk than men due to imbalances in the population sex ratio (see for example Schmool
and Miller (1994:77,80-1) who argue that single Jewish females find themselves between Scylla and Charibdys; they can either ‘stay unpartnered/unmarried or look for a non-Jewish partner.’ It should also be noted that how ‘at risk’ a person will be varies during the course of their lives.

A third dilemma for the ‘intermarriage debate’ to contend with is the lack of reference to broader understandings of socio-demographic change in contemporary western societies. Kalmijn (1998:397) has specifically argued that since the 1980s intermarriage trends alone appear increasingly limited in their utility for explaining ‘differentiation in society’. He points to other demographic trends that have become salient, such as changes in marriage timing and increases in divorce (Bongaarts, 2002). Indeed DellaPergola (2007:online) recently commented that ‘The more troubling omission in the current socio-demographic debate [about Jewish intermarriage] concerns the absence of any reference to general societal patterns in the United States, as the overarching system within which the existence of American Jews unfolds.’

There are, however, many examples where discussions of ‘intermarriage’ contain allusions to broader social processes though these are rarely, if ever, developed. For example, Sacks (1995a:23) somewhat morosely observes that ‘Jews are not marrying other Jews, and if they do, they are likely to marry late and have few children. Even then on current trends, one in three marriages will collapse.’ (See also Waite, 2002:38) Goldscheider and Zuckerman (1984:ix) argued that ‘most—but not all—of the transformations that have occurred among Jews during the processes of modernization relate to general forces of social change.’ DellaPergola (1992:73) has
pointed out that ‘Over the last several years, substantial increases in the proportion of marriages ending in divorce have occurred in virtually every country, among both total and Jewish populations.’ More recently DellaPergola (2003:6) highlights the prevalence of ‘Low Jewish birth rates and population ageing’. Waite (2002:36,40,43,48) makes several allusions to broader socio-demographic processes, such as more people living alone, delayed marriage, the rise of ‘alternative families’ such as cohabitation, changes to female employment patterns, low fertility, common use of birth control, and rising secularisation. She concludes that ‘Some of these social transformations that have reshaped American families have hit the Jewish community head on, and some seem to have missed entirely’ (Waite, 2002:37). And yet she makes no attempt to theorise the ‘social transformations’ (though see Goldscheider and Zuckerman’s (1984) early attempt). Clearly, these ‘social transformations’ are what demographers now refer to as the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986).
4 Households

4.1 Changing living arrangements

In this final section my focus shifts to households, the bridge the between aspatial partnerships and residential segregation. Living arrangements have changed dramatically in western societies over the last 40 years and it is increasingly difficult to define what a ‘household’ actually is. In addition, the identities of people living in ‘households’ are increasingly mixed making it as difficult to categorise households as it is to categorise individuals. Clearly, such ‘blurring’ of household boundaries further complicates notions of residential segregation. Channelled through the ‘vessel’ of the micro-scale household, these changes have also impacted the macro-scale urban environment.

4.1.1 The changing nature of living arrangements

It had been noted since the 1980s and, on some measures the 1950s, that unprecedented social and demographic changes were occurring in western societies (Hajnal, 1953; Frey and Kobrin, 1982). Of particular interest was how attitudes towards lifestyle affected living arrangements, and in recent years it has been argued that ‘a profound change in the way in which people live and relate to one another’ has occurred (Ogden and Hall, 2004:102; also Kiernan, 1989).

For example, relationships have become more diverse and complex, in terms of the types of partnership people engage in, and the variety they experience in their lifetimes; this is true for romantic relationships, social relationships and familial relationships. For example Cliquet (2002:2) has suggested there has been ‘an increasing shift from life-long monogamy to serial monogamy’.) Relationships and
living arrangements are more ‘diverse, fluid and unresolved’ as well as ‘insecure and
transitory’. (Hardill, 2004:377; see also Buzar et al., 2005:416; Ogden and Hall,
2000, 2004; Putnam, 2000:275,177). Paralleled to the trends have been important
changes to lifecycles. For example, children are increasingly leaving their parental
homes later and (first) marriage is delayed whilst divorce, separation and remarriage
have risen (Cliquet, 2002; Flatau et al., 2007; Goldscheider and Goldscheider, 1987;
Höhn, 2005; Lesthaeghe, 1983; Ogden and Hall, 2004; Van de Kaa, 2002; Zheng,
2000). Inevitably, birth rates have declined to what appear to be permanently low
levels in most western societies and some argue this is part of a second demographic
transition (Lesthaeghe and Moors, 2000).

This theme of lifecycle change and fluidity has had a dramatic impact on living
arrangements, and as a unit of residential living, the household has changed in
significant ways over the last generation (Buzar, et al., 2005; Hall et al., 1997;
Lesthaeghe and Moors, 2000). Some suggest that the ‘traditional’ household has
become ‘decentred’—it is no longer the norm. For example, it was noted in the early
1980s that people spent smaller parts of their lives in ‘families’ (Frey and Kobrin,
1982). Instead they experienced many and varied living arrangements throughout
their lives (Cliquet, 2002:2; Haskey, 2005) or what Kuijsten (1996:138) has
described as a ‘pluralization of living arrangements’. In addition, each lifecycle stage
was becoming more ‘transitory’ (Bonvalet and Lelièvre, 1997:193; also Duncan and
Phillips, 2008; Hardill, 2004; ONS, 2003b:9-10; Ogden and Hall, 2000) and ‘fluid’
(Blunt, 2005). As Wathan et al. (2004:1102) have commented there has been
‘considerable interest, from academic researchers and policymakers, in documenting
the dynamics of contemporary household structures and family practices; particularly in furthering understanding of the ways in which household and family formation, structure, and dissolution are being modified in late modernity…and how the boundaries of the household and/or family unit are becoming more fluid and, consequently, harder to define.’

‘The “unpacking” of kinship and residential relations has distended and blurred household boundaries, creating complex layers of hybrid structures that are in a constant state of flux.’ (Buzar, et al., 2005:420). By ‘deinstitutionalizing’ the ‘nuclear family’ and ‘destabilizing’ notions of family, kinship and residence over the last few decades we have witnessed a dramatic shift in the social function and structure of households (ibid, 415, 429).

Among the new ‘styles’ of living that have developed out of these trends are increases in the numbers of people living alone, especially among the young (Ogden and Hall, 2004:95,97; see also Duncan and Phillips, 2008:16; Hall et al., 1997; Putnam, 2000; Self and Zealey, 2007). Further, ‘non-dependent children’ are continuing to live with their parents long after their compulsory education is completed, especially ‘young men’ (Dorling and Rees, 2003:1297; Self and Zealey, 2007:13,17; de Valk and Billari, 2007). Some remain at home into their mid-20s because they are still in full-time education, others out of economic necessity, whilst others experience difficulties entering the housing market.

Another trend in living arrangements has been the rise of cohabitation, one of the most important new forms of ‘family’ (Buzar, et al., 2005; Cliquet, 2003:5; Haskey,
2005; Ogden and Hall, 2004:89; Self and Zealey, 2007). As a proportion of ‘family households’, cohabitation is rising rapidly; for example in 2005, 24% of non-married people aged under 60 were cohabiting in Britain, around twice the proportion recorded in 1986 (Self and Zealey, 2007:13; also Haskey, 2005:38; McRae, 1993:1-11). Barlow et al. (2008:31) note that compared with couples who marry, ‘cohabitants were much more likely to be young, to have no religious faith, and to have earnings as their main source of income (as opposed to benefits or a pension).’

It has also been noted in recent decades that, ‘[t]he traditional family household of a married couple with a child or children is less common, while there has been an increase in lone-parent households.’ (Self and Zealey, 2007:14; also Buzar et al., 2005; Cliquet 2003:25). This increase has been ‘rapid’ and like cohabitation, is closely related to rises in the proportion of ‘births outside marriage’ (Cliquet, 2002, 2003:9; McLanahan, 2004; McRae, 1993). For example, in England and Wales in the mid-1970s, under 10% of children were ‘non-marital’; by 2003 this had risen to over 40% (about 26% overall were to cohabiting couples) (Smallwood, 2004:26). Similarly the proportion of children living in lone-parent households in Britain more than tripled between 1972 and 2006 to 24% (Self and Zealey, 2007:13). But as Cliquet (2003:6) notes, being a single (invariably) mother is an increasingly transitory state, and some are single by choice—especially older, better-educated women. It should also be noted that ‘living together remains a conjugal norm, and the most common household form remains a heterosexual household’ (Hardill, 2004:378), and Cliquet (2003:7) also points out that ‘most fathering still continues to take place in intact two-parent families.’
One living arrangement gaining increasing prominence is ‘living-apart-together’ (LAT) (Bonvalet and Lelièvre, 1997:193; Cook, 2004a; Haskey, 2005). Not all people living alone, nor indeed sharing with others, are romantically single. For a number of years it has been recognised that many people are in fact in long-term relationships but do not live together on a permanent basis. Couples who ‘live-apart-together’ can be described as being in a ‘more than a temporary’ monogamous sexual relationship, usually live at different addresses from each other (with or without other people) but who regard themselves as a couple and are recognised by others as such (Haskey, 2005:36). This is true for older as well as younger people though more common among the young, and such relationships allow for greater independence or the maintenance of different caring relationship structures, careers and so on. Haskey argues that LAT is often a transitional state, a prelude to cohabitation or marriage; indeed it is not necessarily distinct from cohabitation so, rather than a ‘new form of relationship, it may merely reflect a new form of relationship living in practice [emphasis in original]’ (2005:37). However, Duncan and Phillips (2008:15) note that ‘By far the main single reason for living apart … is that they are not ready to live together, or that it is too early in their relationship.’ Thus they conclude that only a minority of so-called LATs are choosing to live apart (ibid:16).

The more geographically complex ‘transnational household’ and ‘dual-career’ households (Hardill, 2004:386) have also been recognised. In these arrangements household members choose to prioritise work life over family life. With increased mobility due to lower costs of travel, ‘space-time compression’, people are more
willing to be mobile and use technology to maintain ties (ibid:376). Many
transnational households are in fact LATs. (It should be noted that this has long been
a common form of arrangement in less developed countries where women leave
‘home’ to be domestic helpers in the homes of people in more developed countries.)

Similarly increased complexity of living arrangements can be found in the rise of
second homes (rarely if ever referred to as second ‘households’ because in this
instance ‘household’ has connotations of a family unit rather than the clichéd cottage
in the country). Indeed, most studies approach second (‘higher order’) homes in this
way, i.e. as those ‘owned’, typically by a (wealthy) ‘family’ in addition to a ‘first
home’ or ‘usual residence’ in a distant place (see for example, Gallent, 2007;

Two other trends have developed in parallel with the ‘pluralization of household
arrangements’ (Buzar, et al., 2005:414). The first is a reduction in average household
size (Cliquet, 2003:23; Hall et al., 1997; Keilman, 2003:51; Ogden and Hall, 2000,
2004). In 1971 in England and Wales ‘average household size’ was measured to be
2.9 people per household (pph); by 2001 this had fallen to 2.4pph (note, it was also
estimated to be 2.4 in 2006—Self and Zealey, 2007:14). And the second has been a
‘remarkable growth’ in the number of households which has exhibited a distinctive
spatiality in cities (Buzar et al., 2005; GROS, 2007:48; Ogden and Hall, 2004:100).
In 1982, Frey and Kobrin suggested that trends in living arrangements such as the
rise of ‘nontraditional’ households may provide the key to inner-city urban
(demographic) regeneration (see also Ogden and Hall, 2000). More recently,
Bromley et al. (2007:152) have noted that during the 1990s, British city centres
acquired a certain cachet in terms of raised social status. This, they argued, attracted a new population of young adults, often male, who valued the immediate access to leisure facilities and high-status jobs. In addition, the nature of accommodation in the city centres often dominated by (rentable) flats lends itself to more ‘transient’ lifestyles (ibid:151). (See also Duncan and Smith, 2002 regarding geographical variation in ‘non-marital births’.) Ogden and Hall (2004:102) comment that ‘an understanding of the changing demography of the city is an important element—sometimes neglected—in the interpretation of the geography of social change.’

4.1.2 Explaining household change

There have been a number of attempts to explain the lifestyle and lifecycle changes outlined above. One common theme in the literature relates to attitudinal changes in terms of social values, especially the increasing significance of ‘individualism’ and ‘self-fulfilment’ (Duncan and Smith, 2002:481; Lesthaeghe, 1983; Ogden and Hall, 2004). Though Friedman et al. (1994:393) note that the ‘unobservability’ of values is a challenge for social scientists, Lesthaeghe and Moors (1995:4) argue that western society has experienced the ‘accentuation of freedom of choice, the replacement of conformism by responsibility, and the greater tolerance for the choices and lifestyles of others’. Such attitudes tend to lead to new lifecycles and patterns of living, weakening kinship ties and the redefinition of ‘family, ‘friendship’ and ‘commitment’ (Buzar et al., 2005:416,420; Lesthaeghe, 1983:430). Thus, living alone becomes a popular ‘lifestyle choice’, and the decision to have children is measured in terms of ‘rational’ opportunity cost (Friedman et al., 1994; Ogden and Hall, 2000, 2004). However, Duncan and Phillips (2008:26) argue that the
individualisation thesis appears to be only ‘partial and exaggerated’ they see little evidence of fundamental shifts away from family life but rather its continuation in different forms: a ‘recentring’ rather than a ‘decentring’.

It was noted in Section 2 above that there has been a distinct rise in ‘secularisation’, this too has been linked to the rise of new living arrangements (Lesthaeghe and Neidert, 2006:671; Lesthaeghe and Moors, 2000:155). In addition, Popenoe (1988 cited by Kuijsten, 1996:140) has suggested that ‘familism as a cultural value is weakening in favour of such values as self-fulfilment and egalitarianism’.

Consequently household members are less likely to be related to each other. Watters (2003a and b) has argued that for young adults in particular, ‘friends are the new family’, offering each other the same kind of support as an extended family within an ‘urban tribe’. However Duncan and Phillips (2008:23-26) agree with this only up to a point, noting that a sense of obligation to the ‘family’ has by no means vanished. Nevertheless such new constructs regarding the meaning and definition of ‘family’ are, according to Ogden and Hall (2004), increasingly important in terms of explaining the socio-spatial processes operating in cites and communities.

This new multitude of living arrangements has become possible only because of economic growth in most western countries, especially that experienced from the end of the nineteenth century (Lesthaeghe, 1983:430). This produced rapid increases in real incomes which resulted in ‘changes in demographic parameters of family formation, dissolution, and reproduction’ (ibid). Wealth allowed individuals to become more self-reliant and more independent, pursue a ‘philosophy of self-fulfilment’ and fed ‘consumerism’ (Bongaarts, 2002:43). This has had a particularly
important impact on women who have ‘feminised’ higher education and the labour force, though not necessarily on a par with men or indeed evenly for all women (Ogden and Hall, 2004:100; see further McDowell and Massey, 1984).

These factors, plus the increased availability and acceptability of contraception (Lesthaeghe, 2001), have contributed towards a substantial postponement of marriage and parenthood as well as other trends such as increases in the share of births to unmarried couples (Berrington, 2004; Lesthaeghe, 1998:5; Lesthaeghe and Neidert, 2006; McRae, 1993). For example, in 2005 in England and Wales the average age for mothers at first childbirth was 27.3 years, more than three years older than in 1971 (Self and Zealey, 2007:13). Many have argued all these changes have brought about sustained subreplacement fertility, which is seen as being a structural, long-term shift (Bongaarts, 2002:420,436; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 2004:1). Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa (1986) have argued that this fertility shift is symptomatic of a second demographic transition and I argue that it is within this framework, that we can explain these changes to ‘family’ and ‘household’ arrangements. (See also Buzar, et al., 2005; Lesthaeghe and Moors, 2000.)

4.2 Problematising ‘the household’

For many geographers interested in the social processes of society, the household is considered to be ‘a key geographical scale that links bodies to broader geographic contexts, especially neighborhoods’ (Wright et al., 2003:458). Paasi (2004:537) has argued that along with ‘street’, ‘neighbourhood’, and ‘community’, ‘household’ is also one of the key ‘scales of daily life’ (see also Ogden, 1999:619). Yet the household is a ‘missing scale’ and its importance is all too rarely acknowledged in
socio-spatial analyses (Paasi, 2004:541). For example, studies of residential segregation tend to focus on the neighbourhood, not the household, despite this being where considerable social ‘mixing’ occurs (Wright et al., 2003).

Additionally, household change has led to a rise in social ‘anxiety’ and geographers have been prompted to revisit the household in a critically rigorous way; over the past two decades studies of residential space have ‘proliferated’ (Mallett, 2004:64; McDowell, 2007). Many of these critiques have approached the topic from feminist perspectives and used qualitative methodologies focusing on the lived experience of ‘home’, an ‘arena of domesticity’ (Marston and Smith, 2001:618) as well as ‘emotional geographies of home’ (Blunt, 2005:506). McDowell (2007:138) describes the home as a localised, intimate and private place of ‘daily geographies’ and Blunt (2005:506) argues it is a ‘material and an affective space, shaped by everyday practices, lived experiences, social relations, memories and emotions’. (See also McDowell and Massey, 1984; Mallett, 2004) It should also be noted that the ‘household’ tends to be missing in such assessments of ‘home’.

These critiques have highlighted the political and contested nature of ‘home’ (Blunt, 2005:510), and this is clearly evident in the literature, suffused as it is with implicit notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ household and family types. Sacks’ (1995a:23) statement that ‘Jewish families’ can ‘fail’ suggests they can go wrong apparently in comparison to those that go right (presumably ‘nuclear’ or ‘traditional’ families or DellaPergola’s (1991:94, 1992) no less subjective ‘(un)conventional’ families). Others suggest the family can be broken; that it is ‘fragile’ (Bonvalet and Lelièvre, 1997:184; Goldscheider and Waite, 1991), and can ‘break down’ (Putnam,
having previously been ‘intact’ (Cliquet, 2003:7) and becoming ‘fragmented’ (Bromley et al., 2007:139) and then ‘reconstituted’ (Cliquet, 2002; Heilman, 1984:8).

But although these ‘new’ domesticised ways of approaching the household—‘opening the door’, as it were, to different imaginations of the household—are welcome, there remains the matter of the increasing difficulty with quantitative approaches to the household. And one of the first difficulties encountered by those wishing to investigate the household quantitatively is to define what we mean by the terms ‘household’ or ‘family’. At the simplest level Saxe et al. (2007:2) state that the term *household* means ‘all people living in the same dwelling, whether related or not.’ The United Nations have taken a more nuanced approach suggesting that ‘A private household consists of a group of persons who live in the same dwelling. In addition to such multi-person households there are one-person households, i.e. persons who live alone.’ (Keilman, 2003:12). Note that this definition introduces the notion of privacy as well as emphasising a distinction between households with multiple residents and those with only one. ONS (2004c:17 and 34) takes it one step further, introducing the notion of sharing, defining a ‘household’ as ‘one person living alone, or a group of people (not necessarily related) living at the same address with common housekeeping - that is, sharing either a living room or sitting room or at least one meal a day.’ (This definition explicitly excludes ‘Communal Establishments’; see also Smith and Jeffries (2003:23) who distinguish *shared activities* (for example, paying bills, eating together) from *shared facilities* (for example, living room, bathroom).)
Keilman (2003:12) has pointed out that some languages do not even have a separate word for household: Italian (famiglia), Spanish (familia, hogar=home), and Portuguese (família). But defining the term ‘family’ is no less problematic. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe defines ‘family’ ‘in the narrow sense of a family nucleus, that is, as two or more persons within a private household who are related as husband and wife, as cohabiting partners, or as parent and child’ (Keilman, 2003:11,12). Here the notion of situated, private relationships is used but restricted to certain sanctioned arrangements. For example, there is no room in this definition for multi-generational households and the broader understanding of ‘family’ (cousins, aunts and so on) is implicitly excluded. ONS (2004c:33) defines ‘family’ as ‘a group of people consisting of a married or cohabiting couple with or without child(ren), or a lone parent with child(ren). It also includes a married or cohabiting couple with their grandchild(ren) or a lone grandparent with his or her grandchild(ren) where there are no children in the intervening generation in the household. Cohabiting couples include same sex couples. Children in couple families need not belong to both members of the couple.’ However even with this almost rambling definition, ONS allows some but implicitly rejects other arrangements.

For ‘household’ and ‘family’ alike there is then a list-trap. And any list, however long, must acknowledge its own role in producing the meaning of the terms; what is included and excluded. (See for example Goldscheider and Bures’ (2003:573) distinction between ‘complex households’ and ‘simple households’; and Haskey (2001a:15) who distinguishes ‘family households’ from ‘non-family households’.) In
addition, the insertion of concepts such as sharing and privacy into the definitions creates a secondary level of subjectivity. These issues highlight an aspect of what Blunt (2005:510) refers to as the ‘intensely political’ nature of the ‘home’. Yet Hardill (2004:379) can still see a clear distinction between households, ‘the residential units of everyday life’, and families ‘the more ambiguous, symbolic terrain in which kinship is represented’. She therefore distinguishes the more qualitative, and (literally) less concrete, concept family consisting of ‘meanings and relationships’ from the more quantitative, anchored, fixed, concept household ‘a locus of residence’ (Hardill, opt cit). Yet even she accepts this is still unsatisfactory, failing for example to accommodate those who reside in more than one household, perhaps in more than one country (ibid:386). ‘Households’ in terms of living arrangements in situ, are also increasingly fluid (Blunt, 2005:510; Hardill, 2004; Wathan et al., 2004) frustrating the task of those that wish to measure household dynamism. For example, Cook (2004a:114) notes that ‘Our population measures are founded on assigning to all a unique place of residence, yet for many applications of population measures this may incorrectly count serviced populations.’

Thus it is clear that no pure, essentialised form or notion of household or family can exist, since such terms are constructed identities we give to intimate social units. There are no ‘statistical norms for family life’ (Duncan and Smith, 2002:473), no standard Jewish or British or Black household in any sociological or geographical sense (Fishman, 1988:3). The meanings attached to the occupation of residential space vary from group to group, place to place, and moment to moment (Duncan and Smith, 2002:471). What matters then are the differences in meaning and emphasis
between groups. As Blunt (2005:512 citing the editors of the journal *Home Cultures*) comments, ‘Whether as a concept or a physical place, “home” … reflects and reifies identities and values…[and is where] …cultural ideologies and practices are shaped and reproduced’ (ibid:510; see Buchli et al., 2004; Buzar et al., 2005). Different groups value different ‘styles of living’ (Blunt 2005:505); some for example embrace cohabitation or tolerate a high incidence of non-marital childbirth whereas others do not (Duncan and Edwards, 1999; Duncan and Smith, op. cit; Dwyer, 2003; Waite, 2002—that said Waite (2002:47) has pointed out that ‘we know virtually nothing about how common unmarried childbearing is for Jews.’). Just as identities vary from culture to culture and from place to place, so too do the meanings of the terms ‘household’, ‘family’, and ‘home’. But equally, within groups there will be differences regarding what amounts to an ‘authentic’ (Jewish/British/Black) household (to paraphrase Charmé, 2000). Waite (2002:48) accepts this when she comments that it is ‘difficult to characterise “the Jewish family” and …[that] any picture of the family [will be] a little fuzzy round the edges.’ Even a one-person householder may be ‘Jewish, never-married’ in one context and ‘No Religion, LAT’ in another, blurring the meaning of even the simplest household unit.

Beyond definition, another way in which the household has been problematised relates to mixing. Multi-person households increasingly include people of different ethnic or racial identities and such structures have only recently been considered in quantitative analyses of segregation. But Wright et al. (2003:469) have argued that ‘including a consideration of the mixed-race household in segregation measures leads to new perspectives on neighborhood social process.’ They ask how indices of
segregation can be calculated if the majority of people in a neighbourhood live in mixed households.

The issue of presence has also received some critical attention in the literature. For example, the 2001 Census asked respondents to list all household members ‘who usually live at this address’ (ONS, 2001a:2). Redfern (2004:209) has expressed concern about the ambiguity of meaning in the instructions about who should be included as a usual member. Terms and phrases such as ‘temporarily’, ‘the majority of time’ and ‘anyone who is staying with you who has no other usual address’ inserts, he argues, an unacceptable level of ‘fuzziness’. But Redfern is merely embroiling himself in the list-trap. There is a broader issue here that has been picked up by Gallent (2007). He has argued that the concept of ‘home’ is normatively approached as a location for dwelling where, dwelling is social process. Dwelling he argues is ‘largely concerned with domesticating space’ (ibid:102-03). Gallent problematises the notion of ‘second homes’, arguing that these have a “limiting effect on full-time dwelling, and therefore on the ‘process’ of building community or raising social capital.” In particular Gallent (2007:97) raises the issue of ‘legitimacy’ of second homes and is primarily concerned with how these properties are used (ibid:102). But his notion of second home is rather simplistic. Hardill (2004) for example notes that people in ‘transnational’ households ‘dwell’ in more than one country. Other difficulties of presence and legitimacy of membership relate to children whose parents live at separate addresses, as well as people in LAT relationships. To what extent do they ‘dwell’ in more than one place, to what extent do they occupy ‘second homes’?
Finally, Marston and Smith (2001) argue that contestations regarding the meaning and nature of ‘household’ are ultimately a matter of scale. They suggest that if we are to understand the household (and the state, and the neighbourhood and so on) it is necessary to break ‘the limits of scale thinking’ (ibid:618) since ‘scale is a produced societal metric that differentiates space; it is not space *per se.*’ (ibid:615). Therefore, they argue that the household does not exist in any ‘singular’ atomic sense; rather it is ‘integral’ to the process of the production of space (ibid:616). The ‘household’ will ‘fit’ into a plurality of scales depending on which scale is being privileged in any particular context. For Cidell (2006:197) ‘The production of scale … is closely related to the location of political power’ and therefore researchers, governments, and a multitude of other actors will inevitably frame the ‘household’ with their own particular perspectives.

Yet these debates about the relationship between households, scale and the social production of space (see Brenner, 2001; Marston, 2000; Marston and Smith, 2001) have, according to Buzar et al., (2005:414) ‘paid little attention to the parallel body of knowledge about the social, economic, cultural and demographic character of the household *per se.*’ (see also Ogden, 1999:619; Wong et al., 2004). In addition, despite their mutual efforts to grapple with the entanglements of culture and the household, cultural intersections with the household have tended to privilege ‘race’ (Ellis et al., 2004), though even this remains ‘underexamined’ (Wright et al. 2003:458). The household’s intersection with religion has attracted scant attention from geographers, being conspicuously absent in many works (for example Blunt, 2005; Ellis et al., 2004; Wathan et al., 2004; Wright et al., 2003). Yet religion
matters regarding the household, affecting as it does decisions about family formation: whether to marry, when to marry, biological reproduction, social reproduction, and spatial location (Waite, 2002:41-45).

4.3 ‘The Jewish household’: a narrative

Having contextualised household change and critiqued ‘the household’, what can be said about ‘Jewish households’? Of primary importance is a narrative which has tended to emphasise the ‘centrality’ of ‘the Jewish family’. For example, DellaPergola (1992:65) speaks of the ‘normative centrality of the family in traditional Jewish culture’ with ‘Jewish familism’ being one of the ‘cardinal pillars of Jewish community life.’ Within this narrative is the normative idea of ‘Jewish family’, one that is different from ‘other families’ in terms of the closeness and strength of its ties and attachments (see Heilman, 1984:4; Krausz, 1968a:82; Sacks, 1995a and b). Schmool and Miller (1994:48,61) have suggested that Jews exhibit ‘traditional’ attitudes towards family formation ‘upholding an ingrained value that equates children with marriage, not just with partners.’ In essence, this narrative is one of philo-familialism—a pro-marital and pronatal (in that sequence) culture (Fishman, 1988:1-2; Heilman, 1984; Newman, 1985:366; Sacks, 1995b; Waite, 2002:38). Schmool and Miller (1994:48) have commented that ‘the British Jewish community has placed a high value on marriage, and concomitantly reproduction’.

The relatively rare occurrence of births outside marriage and single motherhood among Jewish women, has often been noted (Davey et al., 2001:324; Krausz, 1964:81; Waite, 2002).
A second aspect of this narrative is the function of the family as a unit of cultural transmission. Cromer (1974:155) has emphasised ‘the centrality of the home in Jewish tradition, and the role it has played in ensuring Jewish survival.’ And Davey et al. (2001:325) point to the Jewish family environment as being ‘essential in transmitting the Jewish culture to the next generation.’ And DellaPergola (1992:65-6) has argued that ‘The [Jewish] family was not only the product of a particular type of traditional culture; it also was the main agency of Jewish cultural continuity.’

However, in the 1970s concern was beginning to be expressed about ‘the future of the [Jewish] family as an agent of cultural transmission’ (Cromer 1974:167). The ‘traditional’, ‘nuclear’ Jewish family whose ‘structures were relatively simple’ (DellaPergola, 1992:65) was ‘disappearing’ (Wasserstein, 1996:282). For example, in early 1980s, Immanuel Jakobovits, then the British Chief Rabbi, argued that rising levels of divorce represented a ‘grave threat to the stability of the Jewish home—once the strongest bastion of Jewish life, the pride of Jews and the envy of non-Jews—may eventually pose no less a challenge to Jewish continuity, or at least the preservation of Jewish values, than the decline in religious observance and identification.’ (Jakobovitz, 1981:37). This doom-laden view of the state of household demography was echoed elsewhere: ‘…indicators [of intermarriage and divorce] suggest that the Jewish family, whose inner strength has been so much admired and perhaps exaggerated, is facing strains that confront and often disrupt today’s non-Jewish families’ (Gould, 1981:181). By the 1990s the new Chief Rabbi was blunt: ‘…the Jewish family, for millennia the crucible of continuity, is fissuring and beginning to fail’ (Sacks, 1995a:23, and b:Chapter 4).
Many demographic changes were cited as the cause of this alarm. For example, Goldstein (1988) suggested that the number of Jews ‘never marrying’ had been increasing in the United States in the 1960s and ‘70s, to a point where they married less than the general population. This ‘eschewing of marriage’ went beyond the mere delaying of marriage despite the fact that ‘most Jews aim to marry’ (DellaPergola, 1992:72,84). Other trends included ‘the weakening and decline of conventional Jewish marriage patterns’ (ibid:85) i.e. later marriages, greater marital instability, lower fertility, increased intermarriage and ‘the loss of the non-Jewish side of a majority of the children of such marriages’ which amounted to ‘a progressive erosion in the demography of the Jewish family’ (DellaPergola, 1991:68-69).

DellaPergola accepted that what was happening to the Jews was symptomatic of broader processes. For example, he noted that ‘major societal forces … have had very pervasive effects with respect to a variety of family processes’ (Westoff, 1978 cited in DellaPergola 1992:85; Espenshade, 1985) and that ‘More general changes in family norms are reflected in a greater diversity of living arrangements compared to the past, including more tolerant attitudes on cohabitation of young adults and greater freedom of sex mores’ (DellaPergola, 1992:83; see also Fishman, 1988:27). (It should also be noted that Cromer (1974:164) had previously made reference to the impact of ‘modernity’ on British Jews in terms of ‘shifting parent-child relationships’ and ‘changing structure of the family’.) But it was the assumption that these ‘general changes’ posed a particular threat to Jews, especially on the role of identity transmission in households, that caused the greatest concern. As
DellaPergola (1991:94) argued, ‘unconventional households’ have the effect of weakening Jewish identity: ‘weaker sections of the community, which today include many young Jewish adults who live in arrangements different from the conventional Jewish nuclear family composed by two Jewish parents and their children [my emphasis]’ (see also DellaPergola, 1992:79). For Heilman (1984:7) the general changes in the family ‘may be riskier for the Jews’ than for ‘others’ since ‘for the Jews and Jewish survival the matter is of greatest urgency and no small concern.’
5 Discussion: the micro-scales of ‘segregation’

The four sections of this chapter are closely interrelated. The final three—on identity, partnerships and households—together contribute to an improved understanding of the first, residential segregation. They do this by highlighting the fact that the ‘received wisdom’ of residential segregation has largely ignored micro-scale processes and that it is only by examining such processes that we can begin to truly appreciate the considerable complexity of ‘segregation’ and indeed, query the very meaning of that word.

As noted in Chapter 1, a key argument of this thesis is to interpret the process of coming together, from the pattern of congregation. This chapter has clearly begun to grapple with this issue and in doing so, has also begun to address the problem, raised in Chapter 1, of Waterman and Kosmin’s failure to explain the processes that are producing patterns of Jewish residential concentration. But they correctly surmised, it is only at micro-scales of analysis that we can begin to understand the ‘congregative forces’ acting on Jews and other groups.

There are other close links between each of the four sections in this chapter. For example, identity is clearly central to residential segregation as well as several aspects of partnership formation. It even impacts on household structure and formation patterns. In addition, intermarriage, perennially used to ‘measure’ assimilation and segregation, affects the makeup of households and the identity of individuals in partnerships. But perhaps more than anything else, these four sections are linked by their emphasis on the blurring of socio-spatial boundaries. It is clear that permeability and fluidity is evident at all levels from the individual through to
The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority partnerships and households. This blurring leads to confusion about where boundaries actually lie and makes it difficult to categorise who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’. Is a Jew married to a person of ‘No Religion’ intermarried? Would their household be considered a ‘Jewish household’? What if they were cohabiting? This chapter shows above all, that the delineation of boundaries is highly problematic.

I also argued that the fluidity of identity and ‘modern’ lifestyles underlying this blurring, is best understood in the context of the second demographic transition. Whether it is the rise of secularisation or the increasing incidence of cohabitation, the SDT offers a very useful framework within which we can theorise these changes and explain why they are occurring.

The implications of social blurring and the increased emphasis on the micro-scales of ‘residential segregation’ are twofold. First, to label an area as ‘segregated’ ignores a multitude of underlying complexities that exist at lower levels and therefore, grossly homogenises space to the extent that its labelling as ‘segregated’ or ‘integrated’ is rendered virtually meaningless. Even households fail to conform to homogeneous identity structures so it is clear that any area, however localised, will contain diverse mixtures of people, exhibiting intricate variations of identity over space.

Finally, this chapter has also begun to synthesise the two disparate literatures relating to Jews and the broader critical geographical work. In doing so it has demonstrated how they can be mutually beneficial. For example, the Jewish literature is enriched by more comprehensive understandings of how all identities are socially constructed.
and as a consequence, the question, ‘who is a Jew?’ is ultimately found to be unanswerable. Further, Jewish intermarriage and household structures can be contextualised and understood as being part of broader societal processes. The geographical literature gains because it has largely ignored religious groups as a focus of study at a time when this axis of identity is prominent in the media and government policy making. But it also gains because the Jews highlight the false dichotomous construction of ‘ethnicity’ as distinct from ‘religion’. By studying Jews it is possible to demonstrate that the two categories are not nearly as separate as the literature implies.

In the following chapters, I will test some of these ideas empirically. I will especially examine the notion that ‘segregation’ should be explained as an outcome of micro-scaled, socio-spatial processes.
Chapter 4

The boundaries of Jewish identity: an empirical assessment

In this first empirical chapter, I carry out a quantitative examination of Jewish identity. In doing so, I address several of the arguments presented in Chapter 1. I assess the boundaries of Jewish identity and demonstrate that they are indeed blurred and fluid. 2001 Census data are used to expose the fuzzy nature of identity, but I also draw on survey material to reveal its true complexity. I highlight the difficulties presented by the separation of the two social identifiers, religion and ethnicity, and show clear evidence that this cleavage makes little sense in terms of the everyday meaning of the term ‘Jewish’.

This chapter also begins to address the argument that social processes at the micro-level produce residential concentration at the macro-level of the neighbourhood. Data on Jewish friendship networks and neighbours reveal that there are intricate relationships between social networks and the people Jews choose to live near at the micro-geographical levels of the street and residential block.

1 International data on Jewish identity

As already discussed in Section 2 of the previous chapter, identity is a permanently provisional, socially constructed and contingent phenomenon. Consequently, labelling social groups is a ‘contentious’ project, especially in the context of national censuses (Dorling and Rees, 2003:1296; Wathan et al., 2004:1111). Indeed, censuses and surveys tend to fix identities forcing people into one ‘container’ or another; in
doing so they create a ‘particular vision of social reality’ (Kertzer and Arel, 2002:5). Respondents are obliged to fit themselves into particular ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’ and ‘national’ categories which may not portray identity as it is experienced by those individuals. For example, the ‘White’ residual component of ethnicity procured by the ‘ethnic’ question in the national census, reveals little about the composition of this so-called ‘group’; what this label means to the many people captured by it, largely remains a mystery.

Before exploring these data in depth, what do international data reveal about Jewish identity? Like Britain, the Canadian census also contains a question on ethnicity as well as one on religion. However in Canada, ethnicity is constructed in the broadest sense; the question’s wording incorporates notions of race, language, ancestry, religion and national origins (Goldscheider, 2002:79-83). For example, in the Canadian census of 2001 the wording of the ethnicity question was: ‘To which ethnic or cultural group(s) did this person’s ancestors belong?’ (Statistics Canada, 2001, emphasis in original) The question additionally provided a (non-exhaustive) list of 25 possible examples (most of which were nationality-based backgrounds) but included variations such as ‘Eskimo’, ‘Micmac’ and ‘Jewish’. Further, each respondent had the option of writing in up to four separate ‘origin’-types.

So in Canada, a country with a Jewish population size roughly comparable to the UK’s, a fascinating dataset of Jews by ethnicity and Jews by religion was procured. Kosmin (1999:232) examined these 1991 Census data and showed that 318,070 people were recorded as ‘Jewish’ in the religion question—‘Jews by religion’—but 356,315 people were recorded as ‘Jewish’ in the ethnicity question—‘Jews by
ethnicity’ (ibid:219). Though having a Jewish ancestor(s) does not necessarily mean a person considers themselves to be ‘ethnically Jewish’, the data arguably suggest that in the Canadian example at least, people are more likely to report an ethnic rather than a religious Jewish identity, and also affords opportunities to compare the two datasets. For example, Kosmin found that within the Jewish ethnic data there were 87,885 people recorded as Jewish by ethnicity but not Jewish by religion. This is equivalent to 27.6% of the Jewish by religion population.

The potential for further analysis of the Canadian dataset is substantial and would be a useful focus for further research into the differences between the various sub-groups. For example, in 2001 a total of 329,995 people were recorded as ‘Jewish by religion’ and 348,605 people as ‘Jewish by ethnicity’ (Statistics Canada, 2003a and b). In the ethnic dataset, 53.5% of the respondents reported a single ethnic response—‘Jewish’—whereas 46.5% reported multiple responses, i.e. ‘Jewish’ and up to three ‘something-elses’—fuzzy boundaries indeed.27

In the United States, religion is not asked in the census. However survey data procured similar results to those found in Canada and studies show a distinctly ethnic flavour to American Jewish ‘religious’ identity (Mayer et al., 2003:17-23). Such findings point to an identity ‘based on ethnicity and social affiliation, maintained by group ceremonies’ (1998:19, original emphasis). Indeed, Kosmin et al. (1991:3-6) have argued that a principal feature of Jewishness is its ‘amalgam’ of ethnicity and religion. They presented a number of definitions of the ‘Jewishly identifying

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27 Similar potential exists in data from the Australian census. See for example, Khoo (2006:76) who points to evidence of Jewish ethnic identity waning between 1986 and 2001.
population’ based on data from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) and found substantial numbers of people reporting a Jewish background but not a (current) Jewish religion. They also noted that ‘secular’ Jews exhibited a younger age profile than ‘religious’ Jews as well as geographical variation in residential location (ibid:8).

These studies prompt us to consider what the British census may reveal about Jewish identity beyond the strict constraints of the ‘religion’ boundary. In the following section I examine two very different datasets that emerged from the 2001 Census; one from Scotland and one from England and Wales.

2 Jewish identity in Britain’s 2001 Census

2.1 Jews in the 2001 Census of Scotland

I explained in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2, p62), the religion question posed in the 2001 Census of Scotland was considerably different to that asked in England and Wales. Not only did it differ in structure, including an additional question on religion of upbringing, but it also differed in meaning: to the question ‘What is your religion?’ were added the terms ‘denomination’ and ‘belong’, leaving the respondent in little doubt that the question was about religious practice compared with the far more open (and vaguer) stance taken in the Census of England and Wales (GROS, 2001:Q13 and Q14; ONS, 2001b; Voas and Bruce, 2004).

The size of the Jewish population in Scotland is 40 times smaller than in England and Wales. Yet the data gathered there offer considerably greater analytical potential. The different question structure and wording produced a radically different
picture of the Jewish population. For example, in Figure 1 I have summarised the 2001 Census data for Jews in Scotland in the form of a Venn diagram showing the ‘Current-Jewish’ population (N=6,448) and the ‘Jewish-Upbringing’ population (N=7,446). Given that 5,661 people reported both being brought up and currently Jewish (intersection area ‘A’ in the figure), it is immediately apparent that these data offer scope for assessing gains and losses (indicated here by segments ‘B’ and ‘C’ in the figure). Indeed the ‘loss’ (N=1,785), in effect secession, amounts to 28% of the ‘Current’ Jewish population.

Figure 1 Jewish identification in Scotland’s 2001 Census, ‘Upbringing’ versus ‘Current’¹

Source: Author’s calculation based on GROS, 2001 Table 9 - see Appendix
¹ Not to scale

It is impossible to know from these data exactly why a person reported Jewish for their upbringing but not for their current identity. However, a limited insight may be gained by looking at the composition of segment ‘C’, based on the responses given
for ‘current’ religion. This includes 620 Jews-by-upbringing who currently (in 2001) identified with a religion other than Jewish, i.e. were currently non-Jews or ‘people of Jewish background/ancestry only’. In addition, 774 Jews-by-upbringing reported currently having ‘No Religion’ and for this group it is legitimate to ask whether these people might consider themselves to be secular, ethnic or ancestral Jews, but it is not possible to tell with these data alone.

By contrast, segment ‘B’ shows that 787 people reported their current religion as Jewish but not their religion of upbringing; these are accessions. Within this group, 317 were bought up in a religion other than Jewish and have, presumably, converted to Judaism. In addition, 129 people were bought up with ‘No Religion’ but now claim to be ‘Jewish’. Given a general shift in western societies away from religious identification towards secular affinities (Bruce, 2002; Putnam, 2000; Voas, 2003; see Chapter 3, Section 2.2, p127), these people are exhibiting unusual behaviour. It is possible that many of them are also converts to the religion, but again, this cannot be ascertained from the data. Finally, 341 individuals currently identifying as Jews provided no response for their religion of upbringing. And again we can only guess at the reasons for this, which may have been as simple as not being bothered to report it or as complex as wishing to conceal an alternative religious background.

Using only these data, it is clear that people claim to be ‘Jewish’ at different times in their lives and that the boundaries of Jewish identity, even within the strict confines of the Scottish census data, are blurred. At the very least, several different types of

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28 There is considerable evidence in the United States that conversion to Judaism is closely associated with marriage (see Fishman, 2006b)
Jewish population have been identified in Scotland and future work might explore how these various ‘Jewish’ sub-groups compare socio-economically, geographically and demographically. Indeed, such an analysis should be extended to all the religion data in the Scottish Census.

2.2 Jews in the 2001 Census of England and Wales

In the past there have been calls for the census to broaden the scope of the ethnicity question so that it includes Jews (Kosmin, 1998; Schmool, 1998), but is there evidence for Jewish ethnicity in the most recent census of England and Wales? The ethnicity question adopted in the 2001 Census was somewhat confused. Though it was ostensibly a question about ‘ethnicity’ and ‘cultural background’ it was also a question about ‘race’ and national origins. It revealed a large and apparently homogeneous ‘White’ group differentiated only by national outlooks—British and Irish—and accounted for 91.3% of respondents in England and Wales. The analytical value of such data is rather limited with multiple sub-groups such as Turkish, Greek and various East European groups hidden (see Aspinall, 2002:809). However, the ‘invisible’ group of particular interest here however is ‘Jewish’.29

The Census noted that 251,635 Jews (by religion) reported their ‘ethnicity’ as ‘White’. But within this group of ‘White’ Jews 32,164 respondents reported their ‘ethnicity’ as ‘White Other’. In other words, 12.8% of ‘White’ Jews in England and Wales were not satisfied to describe their ethnicity as simply ‘White-British/Irish’. This was a far greater proportion than was recorded in the general population (2.8%)

The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority

(see Table 1). I.e. ‘White’ Jews were 4½ times as likely to report ‘Other White’ as
‘White’ others. Jews were also twice as likely as the general population to report ‘Other-other-ethnicity’ in the last option of the question’s five categories (clumsily located in the ‘Chinese’ category, which itself was oddly located outside the ‘Asian’ category).

Table 1 Responses to the 2001 Census question on ethnicity, %, England and Wales¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Ethnic’ group</th>
<th>All people</th>
<th>Religion = ‘Jewish’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>52,041,916</td>
<td>259,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>96.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other White</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or Black British</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese or Other Ethnic Group</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS Table S104 - see Appendix

¹ Columns may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.

What else can be said of the 32,164 ‘White Other-White’ Jews and the 2,297 ‘Chinese or Other Ethnic Group, Other Ethnic Group’ Jews? One option is to explore the geography of these individuals as it reveals a distinctive pattern. For example, the proportion of ‘White Other-White’ Jews in Inner London was 23.6% (N=49,199) compared with only 9.8% (N=11,609) in Outer London (9,895).³¹ Indeed in the contiguous London Jewish hinterland of Hertsmere the proportion was even lower (4.5%, N=485). At the more localised level of the LAD, the

³⁰ It should be noted that ‘White-other’ could be a response given by a person because they were not British or Irish born. Indeed the data showed that 71.8% of ‘White-other’ Jews were not born in the UK, a slightly lower proportion than for the population as a whole (79.8%). (Based on ONS Table C0328 - see Appendix)

³¹ Calculations in this paragraph are based on ONS Table S104 - see Appendix
predominantly strictly Orthodox areas of Gateshead, Hackney, Haringey, and Salford averaged 25.5% ‘White Other-White’ Jews, whilst the (equally urban) but more ‘secular’ areas of Kensington & Chelsea, Islington, Hammersmith & Fulham, and Westminster averaged 29.2%. By contrast in Barnet, which lies on the border of urban and suburban London and has a more diverse Jewish population, the ‘White Other-White’ proportion was 12.9%.

In conclusion, despite the meaninglessness of ‘White’ as an ethnic label for Jews, and indeed most other ‘white’ people, there is clear evidence that many had some specific concept in mind when answering the question. As a result, a distinctive spatial pattern was revealed. But little more can be interpreted from these data and it remains impossible to ascertain exactly what respondents meant when they ticked ‘White Other’. In some cases this may have been a purely practical indication that the person’s nationality was not British and indeed that could well explain the distinctive spatial patterns described above. But there is some evidence to suggest that for many of these ‘White-other’ Jews, the label ‘White’ alone was simply insufficient as an ethnic descriptor. Indeed prior to the 2001 Census, Kosmin (1999a; 1991:3) called for a separate ‘Jewish’ category in the ethnicity question in addition to a religion question as occurs in Canada.

2.3 Exploring ethnic ‘Jewish’ write-in data
Evidence for Jewish ethnicity can be found in commissioned data which reveal the results obtained from the five write-in options embedded within the ethnicity question. They show that a total of 14,087 people wrote ‘Jewish’ into the ethnicity
question despite its confused structure and content (see Table 2). This group of ‘ethnic Jews’ can also be subdivided into various identity types based on their response to the religion question. A majority (77.7%) also recorded their religion as Jewish but almost a quarter (or 3,141 people) did not. Some of these people reported ‘No Religion’, others reported a religion other than Jewish, yet others chose to give no response to the religion question at all.

Table 2 Total counts by religion response for ‘ethnic’ group write-in = ‘Jewish’, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion response</th>
<th>Number of people</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>10,950</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>1,749</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion Not Stated</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion other than Jewish</td>
<td>547*</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,087</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS Table C0476 - see Appendix
* Personal Communication, Caroline Packer at ONS on the 6th May 2007

It should be borne in mind that this is a non-representative sample. Given its non-ethnic bent, it may not have occurred to most Jews by religion to write ‘Jewish’ into this ethnicity question even if they might ordinarily be inclined to do so. Nevertheless these data do grant us an opportunity to carry out further analyses. For example, it is possible to contrast the resulting Jewish sub-groups: ‘Jews by religion only’ (N=248,997), ‘Jews by religion and ethnicity’ (N=10,950), ‘Jews by ethnicity and No Religion’ (N=1,739), and ‘Jews by ethnicity and Religion not Stated’ (N=855).

32 It should be noted that the 2006 Census Test for Scotland contained an ethnicity question with the term ‘Jewish’ included in the ‘Other ethnic group’ section (GROS, 2005:7). But it remains to be seen if this is the format to be used in the 2011 Census.
Table 3 presents age structure comparatives for these four independent Jewish subgroups and the general population. The oldest group is ‘Jews by religion only’ with a median age of 43.7 years compared with ‘Jews by religion and by ethnicity (write-in)’ with a median age of 34.5 years—almost a 10 year difference. This is also emphasised by the high proportion of people aged 75 years and above (12.8%) in the religion-only group. Also of interest is the group ‘Jews by ethnicity with No Religion’. They had a high median age (42.8 years) but a very small proportion aged under 16 years (7.9%). Clearly, ‘ethnic Jews’ of ‘No Religion’ tend to be middle-aged adults.

Table 3 Age comparative for various Jewish sub-groups, England and Wales¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jewish by religion only</th>
<th>Jewish by religion and by ethnicity (write-in)</th>
<th>Jewish by ethnicity (write-in) and NR</th>
<th>Jewish by ethnicity (write-in) and RNS²</th>
<th>General population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>248,979</td>
<td>10,957</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>52,041,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% aged 0 - 15</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% aged 75 and over</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age (years)</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS Tables C0476a-c and T53 - see Appendix
¹ Note that the 547 ethnic write-in Jews who reported a religion other than Jewish have not been included here.
² RNS = Religion Not Stated

Further analysis of the three largest sub-groups reveals that ‘Jews by religion-only’ are more likely to be female whereas ‘Jews by ethnicity with No Religion’ are more likely to be male (see Table 4). In addition, religion-only Jews are the least well qualified of the three groups and the least likely to be categorised in the highest socio-economic class. Indeed, two-thirds (66.3%) of ethnic Jews of ‘No Religion’ had higher level qualifications compared with only one quarter (24.9%) of religion-
only Jews. Both the sex ratio and qualification gap can partly be explained by the age gap between the groups, however it is unlikely this explains all the variation given how substantial the differences are. Future investigations might reveal possible associations between religious identification and educational attainment among Jews.

Table 4 Various socio-economic comparatives between three Jewish sub-groups, England and Wales, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jewish by religion only (N=248,977)</th>
<th>Jewish by religion and by ethnicity (write-in) (N=10,950*)</th>
<th>Jewish by ethnicity (write-in) NR (N=1,749)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Male</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher level qualifications¹</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS-SeC1²</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically inactive</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS Tables C0476a-c - see Appendix
¹ Higher level = ‘first degrees; higher degrees; NVQ levels 4 and 5; HND; HNC; and certain professional qualifications’.
² NS-SeC1 = ‘Higher managerial and professional occupations’

Differences in location can also be assessed with these data. However, ONS disclosure controls limit the geographical breakdown that can be obtained. This showed parallels with the findings already noted regarding ‘White Other’ ethnicity. For example, Table 5 shows that Jews by ethnicity with ‘No Religion’ tended to live in Inner London (outside predominantly strictly Orthodox centres in Hackney and Haringey) (27.3%); significantly, 39.3% lived away from the main Jewish population clusters in England and Wales. Of similar interest are the 39.1% of ‘Jews by Religion only’ living in Outer London (including Barnet, the largest Jewish LAD, but excluding Hackney & Haringey), whereas 41.9% of ‘Jews by ethnicity and religion’ lived in Outer London (including Hackney & Haringey, but not Barnet).
Clearly the potential scope for this sort of analysis is considerable and so perhaps the key point here is to note that important social and spatial difference between groups within this small ethnic Jewish sub-group exist, despite the difficulties with the Census question’s wording. But equally, these differences must be treated with care and not over-emphasised. The boundaries are fuzzy—not all ethnic-only Jews are highly qualified and not all religion-only Jews are old. They are indicative of difference but further examination of what this means is necessary (see the next section).

Table 5 Proportion of Jews (by religion) who wrote ‘Jewish’ into the ethnicity question by location, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locale</th>
<th>Jewish by religion only</th>
<th>Jewish by religion and by ethnicity (write-in)</th>
<th>Jewish by ethnicity (write-in) NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hackney &amp; Haringey</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Inner London</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnet</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Outer London</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West Hertfordshire²</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Manchester (Met County)</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ONS Table C0476 b and c; Table KS07 - see Appendix

¹ Columns may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.
² LADs of Broxbourne, Hertsmere, Three Rivers, and Watford

Finally, multiple Jewish population types have been identified by this brief analysis and are summarised in Table 6, which shows all the sub-groups noted here as well as the data for Northern Ireland. There are numerous ways in which these totals might be combined to produce the ‘total Jewish population’ for the UK. For example, the population ‘Current religion Jewish’ is A+B+F+G+K = 266,740 people, whereas the
The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority

population ‘Current religion Jewish, and/or brought up Jewish, and/or ethnically Jewish’ is A through K = 271,666 or 4,926 more than the previous figure. Needless to say, neither figure is more ‘correct’ or ‘accurate’ than any other. What matters is context. For instance, if the focus is on assessing synagogue membership it would seem that A+F+G+K would be the most useful combination (i.e. all current Jews by religion). This quantitative analysis highlights the problematic and controversial nature of Jewish population assessments so beloved in Jewish demography (DellaPergola, 2005; Neustatter, 1955).

Table 6 Population totals for various Jewish sub-groups by country, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description of Jewish identification</th>
<th>Sub-totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>Jewish by Religion only</td>
<td>248,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jewish by Ethnicity (write-in), Religion Jewish</td>
<td>10,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jewish by Ethnicity (write-in), No Religion</td>
<td>1,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jewish by Ethnicity (write-in), Religion Not Stated</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jewish by Ethnicity (write-in), Non-Jewish Religion</td>
<td>547*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Upbringing Religion Jewish and Current Religion: Jewish</td>
<td>5,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upbringing Religion Not Jewish/Not Known and Current Religion: Jewish</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upbringing Religion Jewish and Current Religion: No Religion</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upbringing Religion Jewish and Current Religion: Not Stated</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upbringing Religion Jewish and Current Religion: Non-Jewish</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Ireland</td>
<td>Current Religion Jewish</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 2001 Census, ONS table C0476 (England and Wales); GROS table 9, 2001 (Scotland); NISRA table KS07 (N. Ireland) - see Appendix
* see note to Table 2

3 Jewish identity in British communal surveys

The preceding analysis demonstrated clear evidence, even in census data, that the boundaries of Jewish identity are blurred. But these data only hint at its true
complexity. As Horowitz (2003:182) notes, ‘studying Jewish identity requires a set of questions that taps self-perception directly’. Obviously, this is a task beyond the limits of any census or national survey. Therefore, I now turn to detailed communal survey evidence relating to Jewish identity and demonstrate that the term ‘Jewish’ is far broader than its normative ‘religious’ interpretation suggests.

The label ‘Jewish’, it is suggested, implies ‘a sense of belonging to the Jewish people, incorporating feelings of closeness to other Jews, a consciousness of one’s own Jewishness and a desire for group continuity’ (Schmool and Cohen, 1998:21). The ethnic component of ‘Jewishness’ has been examined by Miller et al. (1996:3) who found that ‘levels of ritual observance are far more closely related to ethnic identity than to strength of [religious] belief.’ And Schmool and Cohen (1998:20) found that ‘ethnicity is actually a better predictor of Jewish practice than is belief… In other words the desire to belong and identify seems to have more to do with religious observance than fundamental aspects of faith and belief.’ (ibid:24-5)

Table 7 ‘When it comes to your outlook, how do you regard yourself?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outlook</th>
<th>% response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat-secular</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat-religious</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on JPR’s 2001 London dataset, Q51

JPR’s 2001 London survey contained several questions asking respondents about their Jewish identity.33 The following three tables present data which approach

33 See also Becher et al. (2002:15-17) for a summary assessment of these identity data.
Jewish identity in different ways; ‘outlook’, ‘consciousness’ and ‘practice’. Table 7 shows that the respondents were more likely to consider themselves ‘Secular’ or ‘Somewhat-secular’ than ‘Religious’ or ‘Somewhat-religious’; in fact less than 10% of the London sample described themselves as ‘Religious’ (see further Graham, 2003).34

Table 8 shows data relating to feelings of Jewishness, akin to questions about feeling British. This question explicitly noted that it was not asking about Jewish (‘religious’) observance. Despite the predominantly secular alignment of the sample, the extent to which the respondents were conscious of being Jewish is striking, with 87.2% reporting that they felt ‘quite strongly’ conscious or ‘extremely’ conscious of their Jewishness. This suggests there is an important mental element to their Jewish identity which does not incorporate practising the ‘religion’. (See further Gans (1979) on ‘symbolic ethnicity’ and Miller (1994) on mental ethnicity.)

Table 8 ‘Some people are far more conscious of being Jewish than others. Which statement best describes your feelings? (This question is not concerned with your level of observance)’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Jewish consciousness</th>
<th>% response</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am aware of my Jewishness but I do not think about it very often</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel quite strongly Jewish but I am equally conscious of other aspects of my life</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel extremely conscious of being Jewish and it is very important to me at all times</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on JPR’s 2001 London dataset, Q47

34 Although it should be remembered strictly Orthodox Jews in Hackney were not included in this survey.
London respondents were also asked about their ‘Jewish upbringing’ and ‘current practice’. The categories in this question are closely aligned with the main religious denominations and synagogal bodies that exist in Britain. Though it is arguable that categories such as ‘Just Jewish’ are confusing, it is nevertheless clear that for both ‘upbringing’ and ‘current’ practice the ‘Orthodox’ category accounts for a very small proportion of the sample. In addition, as with the 2001 Scottish census data discussed above, there is clear indication of apostasy over the life courses of individuals, suggesting that future studies will increasingly find secular or cultural Jewishness the most common Jewish identity type.

Table 9 ‘How would you describe the kind of Jewish upbringing you had as a child?’ and ‘In terms of your religious practice, which of the following best describes your current position?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Jewish upbringing</th>
<th>Current practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,916</td>
<td>2,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-practising (i.e. secular/cultural)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Jewish</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform/Progressive</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional (not strictly Orthodox)*</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox (e.g. would not turn on a light on Sabbath)/Haredi*</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on JPR’s 2001 London dataset, Q43 and Q44

‘Contradictions’ of Jewish identity

It was noted in Chapter 3 (section 2.4.2 p137) that Jewish identity often appears to be contradictory and that so-called ‘secular’ Jews were found to carry out so-called ‘religious’ activities. For example, Buckser (2000:721) has found that in Denmark, secular Jews attended synagogue services but they did so, not so much to pray, but to

35 Though see footnote 34.
engage socially with other Jews. When the identity indicators discussed above are
cross-tabulated with indicators of Jewish ‘religious’ practice the contradictions are
again revealed—‘secular’ Jews are apparently behaving in rather ‘religious’ ways.
Table 10, for example, shows that 60.4% of ‘Secular’ respondents reported being
members of a synagogue, which is a public expression of religiosity. Indeed an even
higher proportion (60.7%) of people who described themselves as ‘Non-practising’
were synagogue members. However Table 10 is revealing in that it also shows that
attendance at a synagogue service is a different matter altogether. As might be
expected with ‘non-practising’ Jews, only 6.6% actually turn up. But this is what is
expected if membership is held for cultural/social reasons, like the marking of life
events and participating in communal activities (Jewish football leagues, Scouts and
so on). In addition, synagogue membership often relates to a household rather than
an individual, which means that it is possible the person in whose name the
membership is held is not necessarily the same person who attends the services
(Schmoool and Cohen, 2002).

That said, ‘Secular’ Jews are not immune from ‘religious’ behaviour. Table 10 also
shows that over a third (34.2%) of ‘Secular’ Jews fast on *Yom Kippur* (Day of
Atonement) ‘every year’, perhaps a surprising result for such a peculiarly personal
behaviour. Though the remaining items in the table also indicate evidence of
‘religious practice’ among ‘Secular’ or ‘Non-practising’ Jews, these are all related to
the private domain of the home so could conceivably involve other people. Thus,
lighting candles and purchasing kosher meat may well occur in homes of mixed
Jewish denominations: individuals with ‘secular’ Jewish stances may live in
housesholds with people of more ‘religious’ outlooks or may be cultural examples to children, as a form of identity transmission (see Chapter 7, section 1.1 p330). Attending a seder (family meal) at Passover is habitual for almost half the ‘Secular’ sample. This is very much as a family affair, perhaps involving an invitation to the home of relatives with parallels to the cultural significance of a Christmas Dinner; attendance is not generally premised on religious adherence, even though the occasion itself might be ostensibly doctrinal.

Table 10 ‘Religious’ practice among ‘Secular’ and ‘Non-practising’ Jews, %, (N) = number of responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator of religious practice</th>
<th>‘Outlook’ = ‘Secular’ N=714 (Q51i)</th>
<th>‘Just Jewish’ or ‘Non-practising (i.e. secular/cultural)’ N=443 (Q44i,ii)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member of a synagogue = Yes (Q49ii-vii)</td>
<td>60.4 (426)</td>
<td>60.7 (580)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended a synagogue service ‘about once a month’ or ‘more often’ in the past 12 months (Q48v)</td>
<td>8.4 (59)</td>
<td>6.6 (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast ‘Every year’ on Yom Kippur (Q39iv)</td>
<td>34.2 (209)</td>
<td>31.8 (259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candles lit ‘Every Friday’ (Q37iii)</td>
<td>27.1 (191)</td>
<td>25.8 (251)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend Passover Seder [meal] ‘Every year’ (Q38iv)</td>
<td>47.1 (333)</td>
<td>45.8 (447)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Only kosher’ meat bought for the home (Q42ii)</td>
<td>22.9 (152)</td>
<td>23.8 (213)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on JPR’s 2001 London dataset

4 Jewish identity and social boundaries

In this final section, I explore how the blurred boundaries of Jewish identity impact on the social boundaries of everyday life for Jews. This can be achieved by examining data related to Jewish friendship networks and Jewish neighbours. As the sociologist, Steven M. Cohen (2006:17) has recently argued, these topics are
relatively understudied, even in the Jewish sociological literature. He argues that studies of Jewish intermarriage for example, have failed to recognise the ‘powerful’ influence of factors such as ‘proximity to other Jews, Jewish residential density, and association (informal ties among Jews—friends, neighbors, co-workers, and the like)’; such factors deserve to receive considerably more attention.

4.1 Jewish friends

Jewish identity does not only affect ‘religious’ behaviour but also impacts on who Jews choose to socialise with. For example, Horowitz (2003) uses a typology of ‘Jewish engagement’ to help understand Jewish identity. She suggests that the nature of a person’s ‘Jewish engagement’ can be seen as both a cause and a consequence of their social networks and identity. In other words, by mixing in Jewish social circles, the likelihood of meeting other Jewish people increases; this in turn is likely to lead to further Jewish engagement and enhance identity. She suggests that this is illustrated by looking at friendship patterns and neighbourhood composition: ‘Having highly Jewish networks—among friends and neighbors (and also professional colleagues)—has been treated as evidence of strong ethnic association.’ Horowitz lists seven ‘patterns of Jewish engagement’ (p v-vi) and shows that the more ‘intensively engaged’ a respondent was, the more likely they were to socialise predominantly with Jews.36 (See also, Geffen, 2002; Goldscheider, 1986)

Figure 2 uses outlook to assess Jewish identity and shows that a similar relationship exists in JPR’s London dataset. Respondents reporting a ‘Religious’ outlook were

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36 Within Horowitz’s (2003:77-91) study is a qualitative account of the significance of having Jewish friends. Her assessment is based on interviews with Jews that she has categorised by their levels of ‘Jewish engagement’.
also more likely to report having mostly Jewish friends. However, as noted above with respect to ‘Jewish religious practice’, Jews who regarded themselves as ‘Secular’ also reported having mostly Jewish friends, albeit to a lesser extent. Nearly two-thirds (63.9%) of ‘Secular’ Jews said that over half their close friends were Jewish. Further analysis suggests that current ‘Jewish religious practice’ is more discriminatory than outlook; ‘Orthodox’ Jews are considerably more likely to report that ‘All or nearly all’ their friends were Jewish than ‘Non-practising (i.e. secular/cultural)’ Jews.37

Figure 2 ‘Thinking about your close friends, what proportion would you say are Jewish?’ by Outlook

Source: Author’s calculations based on JPR’s 2001 London dataset, Q50 and Q51

The data also show that ‘Married’ respondents were nearly twice as likely as ‘Single, never married’ respondents and those ‘Living with a partner’, to report ‘All or nearly

37 The data showed that 89.4% (out of 211) of ‘Orthodox’ respondents reported ‘All or nearly all’ their friends were Jewish, compared with only 24.8% (out of 330) of ‘Non-practising’ Jews. (JPR, 2001 London dataset Q50 and Q44)
all’ their friends were Jewish.\textsuperscript{38} Needless to say, Jews who were married to non-Jews were far less likely to report all Jewish friends but the JPR data are only indicative of this.\textsuperscript{39}

Figure 3 \textit{‘Thinking about your close friends, what proportion would you say are Jewish?’}, by location (London)

![Figure 3](image_url)

Source: Author’s calculations based on JPR’s 2001 London dataset, Q50

Residential location is also clearly related to Jewish friendship networks and identity. Figure 3 shows that respondents in Inner London, and especially South London, were considerably less likely than Jews living elsewhere in the capital to report having many Jewish friends. However, these data do not allow us to examine how closely this relates to Jewish population density in each locale sampled. Neither

\textsuperscript{38} The data showed that 66.4\% (out of 2,150) of ‘Married’ respondents reported ‘All or nearly all’ their friends were Jewish, compared with only 34.3\% (out of 204) of ‘Single, never married’ Jews and 36.1\% (out of 72) of those who were ‘Living with a partner’. (JPR 2001 London dataset Q50 and Q8)

\textsuperscript{39} The data showed that 72.1\% (out of 2,141) of respondents reporting a ‘Jewish religious marriage only’ said ‘All or nearly all’ their friends were Jewish, compared with only 21.7\%\% (out of 212) of those who experienced a ‘Registry Office marriage only’. (JPR 2001 London dataset Q50 and Q9)
could the direction of causality be established, i.e., do Jews in South London have fewer Jewish friends because they reside in a locality where relatively few Jews live or is their presence in such a locale due to them not having many Jewish friends in the first place, which would in turn diminish their desire to live in ‘Jewish areas’? Such questions cannot be answered with these data and require further study.

4.2 Jewish neighbours

As I explained in Chapter 3 (section 1.2 p101), scholarly attention has been paid to the distinctive patterns of Jewish residential location, but relatively little has been said about how and why this occurs. Waterman and Kosmin (1988:90) argued that the principal socio-spatial process at work on Jews in London was one of congregation, a word they considered to have positive behavioural connotations (contra segregation). Their data ‘hint[ed] at … a conscious effort on the part of the Jewish population to maintain a high level of mutual proximity’ (ibid:84) and suggested that for Jews, there were ‘benefits to be gained from living in close mutual proximity’. If this is the case, then it can be assumed that a conscious effort is being made on the part of ‘Jewish households’ to locate near other ‘Jewish households’. The 2001 Census data hinted at such as a possibility (see Table 5) but the survey data offer more convincing evidence that this may well be occurring.

First, it is necessary to describe briefly the extent of spatial concentration of Jews in Britain. The Census revealed a patchy distribution of Jewish congregation across England and Wales with very few majorities at even at the smallest administrative
scales. Although Jews were recorded in all 376 LADs\textsuperscript{40}, the population distribution was highly skewed with almost a quarter (23.1\%) located in just two LADs, the London Boroughs of Barnet and Redbridge; just ten LADs accounted for over half (52\%) the population.\textsuperscript{41} A similar skewness was found at ward level: just 80 of the more than 8,800 wards in England and Wales accounted for half (50.1\%) the Jewish population, of which 57 were in London alone. And yet, Waterman and Kosmin (1988) concluded, the pattern is one of congregation not segregation—Jews did not come close to forming a majority in a single ward (the highest proportion being Garden Suburb ward at 37\%). Only at the scale of Output Area (OA) are majorities formed but again the skewed pattern is repeated, fractal-like. Of the UK’s 218,040 OAs, Jews were recorded in only 14.8\% of them. In only two (OA #41 in Nightingale ward in Wandsworth and OA #36 in Golders Green ward in Barnet) was more than three-quarters of the population Jewish, and in only 108 did Jews comprise a majority. Even in London, Jews were recorded in less than half of the OAs. (Dorling and Thomas (2004:55-57) use Indices of Dispersal to describe these data; see also, Brimicombe, 2007; Graham et al., 2007:24-34.)

Survey evidence exploring the reasons why people choose to live where they live is rare. An earlier study by the author in the small town of Radlett, Hertfordshire did find evidence of Jews deliberately choosing to live in close proximity to other Jews (Graham, 1996). However, it is only with large-scale survey data that broader conclusions can be drawn with confidence. JPR’s 2001 London dataset showed that 90.8\% of respondents reported that they were aware of having Jewish neighbours on

\textsuperscript{40} The one exception was the Isles of Scilly with as tiny population.  
\textsuperscript{41} All Census figures in this paragraph are based on calculations derived from ONS Table KS07.
the same street, and 55.9% reported having Jewish next-door neighbours (see Table 11). Similar results were also observed in the 2001 Leeds data.

What the exact meaning of these findings is cannot be easily assessed and it should be stressed that awareness of other Jews living nearby is not in itself indicative of any sort of social relationship. However, it is clear that respondents were fully aware of the social makeup of their immediate residential environment. Moreover, this awareness was sensitive to Jewish identity. For example, data in Table 11 also show that ‘Secular’ Jews are less likely to report having Jewish neighbours than ‘Religious’ Jews, although a substantial majority (83.1%) of even ‘Secular’ Jews still reported having Jewish neighbours on the same street.

Table 11 Awareness of having Jewish neighbours, % responding ‘Yes’¹ ²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish people in street</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish people within three doors</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish people next door</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on JPR’s 2001 London dataset and Leeds dataset

¹ The series of questions asked were as follows: ‘How long have you lived at your current address?’; ‘Are there Jewish people living in this street?’; ‘Are there Jewish people living within 3 doors or on the floor above or below you?’; and ‘Are there Jewish people living next-door or on the same floor?’

² Minimum sample size N=160

It is also clear from these data that the greater the proportion of Jewish friends a person reported having, the more likely they were to be aware of Jews living very nearby. For example, 97.1% of people who reported that ‘All or nearly all’ their friends were Jewish also reported Jews living on the same street; 68.8% of these reported have Jewish next-door neighbours. For Jews reporting that ‘less than half’
their friends were Jewish, this was the case for 58.9% and 25.8% respectively. These results are redolent of Horowitz’s (2003) comment, noted above, about the self-reinforcing effects of Jewish friends and neighbours.

And where Jews live dictates the very likelihood of them living near other Jews. The data showed that in South London, of the 208 households sampled by JPR, only 22.1% reported having Jewish neighbours even on the same street whereas in ‘Outer North-west London’ (encompassing Harrow and Brent), 76.0% reported having Jewish neighbours living next-door (see also Clapson, 2003:112-113). Unsurprisingly, Jews living in ‘South London’ were considerably more likely to report being ‘Secular’ or ‘Somewhat-secular’ than Jews in the rest of the city. Although 24.9% of the entire sample reported a ‘Secular’ outlook (see Table 7 above), the proportion in South London was twice as high (51.0%). Jews in South London also reported having fewer Jewish friends (25.1% said that more than half their friends were Jewish compared with an average of 64.8% for the remainder of the sample), and were more likely to be ‘Non-practising (i.e. secular/cultural)’ or ‘Just Jewish’ (63.9%), compared with 32.4% for the rest of the sample (N=848). (Measures of Jewish consciousness showed similar results).

5 Discussion: quantitative identity data also ‘tell a story’

This quantitative analysis has demonstrated that, notwithstanding ‘new’ geographical critiques, quantitative data can reveal much about the complexity, fluidity and contradictions of identity. By focusing on the Jewish example, I have shown that the boundaries of Jewish identity stretch well beyond the normative ‘religious’ categorisation demonstrated by the 2001 Census. This instrument’s approach to
Jewishness constructs ‘Jewish’ as ‘religious’, but I have presented evidence that show, even in the Census, Jews identifying in multiple ways, many with no ‘religious’ component at all. The overly-homogenised ‘White ethnic’ group, a category of dubious meaning and questionable utility, was shown to contain within it people specifically identifying themselves as ethnically Jewish, despite the question’s confused wording.

However, census data are ultimately insufficient for revealing the true extent of the blurred boundaries and contradictory meaning of the category ‘Jewish’. Other quantitative data showed the ‘fuzzy’ and complex nature of the term and how this impacts on everyday lives. Survey data revealed clear evidence of the multidimensional nature of Jewish identity. ‘Secular’ Jews who never practised their ‘religion’, nevertheless exhibited clear Jewish connections and engagement (see also Horowitz, 2003). Furthermore, and quite paradoxically, many ‘Secular’ and ‘Non-practising’ Jews were indeed practising. This contradictory behaviour expresses itself in decidedly ‘religious’ activities in various bounded arenas: on a personal level (fasting), in the private domain (seder meal) and in the public domain (attending a synagogue service). It is only when the term ‘Jewish’ is constructed from a neutral stance that such contradictions begin to make sense. However, quantitative data go only so far and fail to reveal clearly the motivations behind such behaviours. For example, if a non-religious person fasts for 25 hours, what are they achieving by this behaviour? Perhaps it is a purely ethnic expression marking a boundary between the ‘Jewish self’ and the ‘other’. Qualitative data are clearly required to investigate these issues further.
This chapter also ‘tells a story’, or at least strongly hints at one, regarding the social processes underlying Jewish residential congregation. The data suggest that Jews make deliberate choices to live very near, and in many cases next-door, to other Jews. It is also clear that the stronger the sense of Jewish identity and social engagement, the more likely this is to occur. Further, these factors interplay and feed back onto one another; Jews who have mostly Jewish friends live closer to other Jews and vice versa. For example, in south London, Jews were living away from the main Jewish concentrations in north London and were therefore, less likely to have Jewish neighbours; they were also less likely to have close Jewish friends or describe themselves as ‘religious’.

But again, the story these data tell only goes so. For example, what were the motivations for Jews moving to south London? Indeed, did they move there or have they always lived there? Why does it matter for many Jews to live near other Jews? Waterman and Kosmin (1988) noted that there were certain ‘benefits to be gained’ from close proximity but did not elaborate on what these might be. The survey data suggest it may be that living near Jews is incidental to other motivations, especially the desire to live near friends who happen to be Jewish or at least in a neighbourhood of the type such friends might also choose to live in. If a Jewish person has mostly Jewish friends that he or she wants to live near, the sum effect of multiple similar desires will clearly produce spatial concentration, i.e., concentration would be a result of desires for social proximity. But the data are silent on such desires as well as the significance of neighbourhood status, proximity to family, access to facilities such as schools and shops and places of work. They are also silent on whether or not
social interaction takes place between neighbours and whether Jews are more likely to interact with their Jewish neighbours than with their non-Jewish neighbours. Only further field studies can establish this level of detail regarding the processes leading to spatial concentration.
Chapter 5

Assessing ‘new’ Jewish partnership types: marriage and cohabitation

In Chapter 1, I noted that a key issue in contemporary debates about society is the increasing fluidity of ‘modern’ lifestyles. The casualness of cohabiting partnerships is cited by some as evidence of the demise of ‘traditional’ partnerships, ‘family values’ and the ‘breakdown of the family’. But partnership type is a complex topic and the partnerships a person enters into is dependent on multiple factors which will be explored in this analysis. Further, partnership type itself produces spatial outcomes that are of relevance if we are to expose the underlying social processes involved in producing residential concentration.

To examine these issues I explore for the first time an analysis of data relating to Jewish cohabitation in Britain. I contrast this ‘new’ form of partnership with the normative, ‘traditional’ form—marriage. It is important to understand not only the prevalence of cohabitation in this group but also who cohabits and why. This analysis contributes not only to the socio-demographic literature on Jews, but also represents a rare contribution to the developing literature on new living arrangements, which has hitherto neglected ethnic and religious subgroups.

1 Marriage and cohabitation: theoretical and quantitative issues

Theories of ‘individualisation’ suggest that people in society have become more concerned with themselves than about others to the extent that partnerships are relegated in terms of their importance in people’s lives (Duncan and Smith, 2006;
The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority

Lewis, 2001; Putnam, 2000). Such changes have led to a ‘decentring’ of the ‘traditional’ family unit and the rise of new forms of partnership (Duncan and Phillips, 2008). The individualisation thesis also predicts that more ‘traditional’ views about partnership formation will be the result of factors such as age (older people are assumed to be more traditional than younger people), gender (men are assumed to be more traditional than ‘change leading’ women), and “religion as prescribing a traditionally determined and ‘externally imposed’ moral code for social behaviour, particularly in relation to sexual relations, marriage and parenting.” (ibid:3,6)

The second demographic transition is also strongly associated with shifts away from marriage and towards cohabitation (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986). According to Lesthaeghe and Moors (2000:153), ‘The most salient characteristics of the second demographic transition are all associated with the destandardization of patterns of home leaving and household formation.’ This is predicated on both structural and cultural factors such as the expansion of the welfare state which fostered earlier economic independence of younger people, the prolongation of education, the emergence of a more libertarian culture with greater tolerance for alternative lifestyles and the ‘intergenerational transmission of family instability’ (ibid:154). Lesthaeghe and Neidert (2006:669) argue that ‘the expression of secular and anti-authoritarian sentiments of better-educated men and women’ as well as ‘self-actualization, individualistic and expressive orientations’ influence attitudes towards such living arrangements. In addition, the second demographic transition is also characterised by the postponement of both marriage and parenthood and by an
increase in the share of births to unmarried couples, again associated with increased cohabitation (ibid).

A third idea is that the (assumed) less permanent nature of cohabitation as compared with marriage means that when choices are made about with whom to cohabit, rather than marry, less weight is given to ascribed characteristics (Schoen and Weinick, 1993). Thus, factors such as age, race, and religion would be given greater consideration if long-term partnerships (i.e. marriage) are being considered than shorter-term partnerships (i.e. cohabitation). Schoen and Weinick found that ‘cohabiting couples are more homogamous with respect to education, are less homogamous with respect to age and religion, and show less educational hypergamy.’ (ibid:412)

Finally, attitudes towards partnership formation are assumed to be central to partnership outcomes. According to Barlow et al. (2008:30), attitudes strongly affect the scale of cohabitation in society and in turn, what they label ‘traditional’ partnership types (i.e. marriage). Thus it is suggested that rises in cohabitation are also a result of falls in the stigma traditionally associated with cohabitation as a ‘legitimate’ form of partnership. Hence the idea that it is sensible for a couple to live together before deciding to marry has gained increasing support (Haskey, 2001a:7). However Barlow et al. also point out that attitudes towards cohabitation may be a result of changes in attitudes towards marriage rather than any particular embrace of cohabitation in and of itself (ibid). But assessing such attitudes is tricky since they also note that attitudes towards partnership type differ depending on a person’s current partnership status, e.g. cohabitation tends to be favoured more by those
currently in cohabitations than those currently married and vice versa (Barlow et al., 2008:36).

Definitions and data
Cohabitation does not take place in a vacuum; it is closely related to marriage patterns and according to Haskey (2001a:5) the two are ‘inextricably linked’. Cohabitation has increased as marriage rates have declined (Bumpass et al., 1991). In addition, cohabitation is also partly responsible for the trend towards the older age at first marriage discussed below. And yet, the two partnership types are not necessarily opposite sides of the same coin; in some cases they may not even be mutually exclusive. So, to some extent contrasting ‘marriage’ with ‘cohabitation’ is misleading; cohabitation differs from marriage in form as well as type. Although a majority of cohabiting couples expect to marry each other (nearly three-quarters in one study (Ermisch, 2000)), not all do. And though it is possible for a married couple to live apart and not consider their status ‘separated’, there is still only one state of ‘marriage’, the alternative being ‘not married’. But cohabitation is different; some are considered to be pre-marital trials, whereas others are preludes to marriage (in the case of engaged cohabitees), part of a two-stage partnership process leading to an eventual marriage (Haskey, 2001a). Yet others are parallel with marriage, being ends in themselves, substitutes for marriage; a two-lane situation (ibid). Note that Barlow et al. (2008:33) suggest there is increasing evidence to consider cohabitation more of a long-term partnership solution than a prelude to marriage.

Thus, even though pre-marital cohabitation has, for many people, become a distinct stage in their life course, cohabitation is a far more dynamic concept than marriage.
Haskey (2001b:27) divides cohabitation into four types: youthful first-time cohabitation; pre-marital cohabitation; post-marital cohabitation and subsequent cohabitation(s). The categories can overlap, particularly the first two, and each individual in a couple may be situated in different categories or stages of the process. Unfortunately, data classifying cohabitation at this level of detail are rare.

Marriage and cohabitation may be linked in another way, too. There is the opinion that pre-marital cohabitation is more likely to result in a divorce than marriage as the first co-residential arrangement (Waite, 2002:39). However, it is not clear what data show this and why it might be the case.

Duncan and Phillips (2008:5) argue that for many, marriage and unmarried cohabitation are socially, rather similar. They show that cohabiters are just as likely as married couples to ‘condemn’ sex outside the partnership, reflecting what they call ‘traditional’ attitudes applied to so-called ‘modern’ partnerships. However, they do note that marriage is seen by many as an ‘ideal’ form, and in this sense, cohabitation is viewed as an ‘informal’ version of that ideal (ibid:7-8).

In addition to definitional dilemmas, quantitative analysts must also face a number of problems regarding data. The most important problem is that of data paucity. As Haskey (2001b:26) points out, unlike some European countries, most notably in Scandinavia, British data on cohabitation are not automatically available or routinely collected for the whole population. Only recently has the collection and analysis of data on cohabitation begun to occur on a par with marriage.
The notion of ‘partnerships’, as opposed to ‘marriages’, barely registers on the radar regarding demographic studies of Jews, particularly in relation to ‘intermarriage’. Miller et al. (1996:12) note that, ‘Despite the concern over intermarriage in Britain the factors underlying this critical statistic are hardly understood’. In particular, these authors point to the impact of other factors in partnership formation such as delay in first marriage, cohabitation, and civil marriage ceremonies, that themselves need to be explored comprehensively. Others, such as Saxe et al. (2007:8), comment that assessing the way that the character of the Jewish population shifts as norms about marriage, child-rearing and religious practice evolve ‘is an exciting research challenge and an important moment in the history of the Jewish community.’ Yet Waite (2002:38-9) has pointed out that despite a sizable literature on the role religion plays in the choice of marital partner, ‘very little attention had been paid to the role of religion in the timing of marriage or on experience with cohabitation.’ She continues by noting that ‘[w]e know little about the choice of Jews to cohabit and not very much about how common this alternative family type is among Jews.’ (ibid:49) Data are unsurprisingly scarce. Although some data on cohabitation among Jews outside Britain have become available, it remains extremely rare (see Brasz, 2001; van Solinge and de Vries, 2001). And needless to say, Jews are virtually never mentioned in general discussions of cohabitation.\footnote{For example, Barlow et al. (2008:32) discuss religion with respect to cohabitation as do Schoen and Weinick (1993:412) but neither assessment mentions Jews.}

Therefore, the 2001 Census was undoubtedly the watershed for data on this topic and it has considerably expanded the amount of information available on cohabitation among Jews and other sub-groups. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the term
‘cohabitation’ was not used in the 2001 Census form. The categories used in the marital status question on the individual form (I1) were: *Single (never married), Married (first marriage), Re-married, Separated (but still legally married), Divorced,* and *Widowed.* However, on the household form (H1) a relationship matrix was used and included the categories *Partner* in addition to *Husband or wife* and *Unrelated.* This makes a clear distinction between three co-habitational types: couples in (sexual) cohabitational union, married couples, and two people sharing the same accommodation.

In this context, there is some evidence of under-reporting of cohabitation by Jews, or rather the under-reporting of ‘Jewish’ by cohabitees, in the 2001 Census data. For example, JPR’s survey data suggest that Jewish cohabitees were less likely to respond ‘Jewish’ to the 2001 Census than Jews who were married. Table 12 shows the marital status of people who had all responded ‘Yes’ to the survey question ‘Are you Jewish?’ and were also asked about how they responded to the Census. Although only 102 cohabiting couples were sampled, it shows that Jews who cohabit were less likely than Jews who were married to have answered ‘Jewish’ to the Census ‘voluntary question on religion’: 8.1% of married respondents said ‘No’ compared with 19.6% of respondents who were ‘Living with a partner’. Responses were also sensitive to age with younger people less likely to have reported Jewish (see further Graham and Waterman, 2005:95).

In the remainder of this chapter I present an empirical examination of ‘Jewish partnerships’, paying particular attention to cohabitation among Jews and placing

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43 Pearson Chi-Square significant at 99% level
this in context with marriage among Jews. I also draw on evidence from the wider literature on these topics to facilitate a broader contextualisation. But first I summarise the data relating to marriage.

Table 12 Responses to the question ‘In the national Census of April 29 2001, there was a voluntary question on religion. Did you answer ‘Jewish’ for this question?’ by marital status, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>‘Living with a partner’</th>
<th>Divorced/separated</th>
<th>Single-never-married</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>3,052</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot remember</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on JPR 2001 dataset for London and Leeds combined, by household

Columns may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.

2 Marriage and cohabitation: a quantitative assessment

2.1 Marriage: prevalence and trends

As noted above, there is inevitably far more information available on marriage prevalence and trends than on cohabitation. And the overwhelming conclusion is that marriage rates in Britain have been declining. For example, in 2005 marriage rates\(^4\) in England and Wales fell to their lowest levels since they were first calculated in 1862 (ONS, 2007d:61). Wilson and Smallwood (2007:24) report that the number of marriages in the UK has fallen by more than 30 per cent over the last twenty-five years and that marriage rates have therefore fallen considerably. They further note, ‘It is widely accepted that important drivers of this trend are that men and women are deciding to delay getting married, or deciding not to marry at all.’ (See further, ONS,

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\(^4\) The marriage rate refers to the proportion of people marrying in the year compared with the proportion ‘at risk’ of marriage (ONS, 2007d:61).
2008; Dorling and Rees, 2003:1297). Cliquet (2003:3,24) noted that this trend has also occurred across Europe but despite these ‘spectacular declines […] Eventually the large majority of the couples marry.’ Indeed marriage still clearly matters. In Britain Barlow et al. report very few people believing there is ‘no point’ to marriage but they do not necessarily agree that it is the ‘best kind of relationship’ (2008:34).

Since the early twentieth century there has been a strong tradition of analysing Jewish marriage patterns in Britain albeit with a noticeable lack of any particular theoretical framework (Kantorowitsch, 1936; Kosmin 1982, 1983; Kosmin and Waterman, 1986; Prais and Schmool, 1967; Schmool, 1991, 2007; Schmool and Cohen, 1998; Shindler, 1993). In the following data a ‘Jewish marriage’ is defined as any marriage that takes place under the auspices of a rabbi, i.e., where a Jewish religious ceremony occurred. This is because data are not systematically recorded for any other type of ‘Jewish marriage’. In England and Wales this means that the officiant must consider both partners to be Jewish. This definition inevitably excludes any two Jews who marry each other civilly as well as exogamous marriages and same-sex ‘marriages’. There are two data sources for Jewish marriages: ONS\textsuperscript{45} and the Board of Deputies\textsuperscript{46}. The ONS data also exclude Scottish marriages (few in

\textsuperscript{45} ONS publishes annually \textit{Series FM2 Marriage, divorce and adoption statistics} which includes some data on Jewish marriages. These are recorded as those ‘registered by the secretary (for marriages) of the man’s synagogue … [These] should be registered as soon as possible after the solemnisation.’ (ONS, 2007a:xxv). They can take place in ‘buildings registered for marriage which are certified as a place of worship’ (ibid: xxxvii).

\textsuperscript{46} Collected by the Community Research Unit (CRU). Data on marriages captured by the CRU are collected directly from rabbinical authorities.
practice) and fail to record Jewish marriages which took place outside the UK.\textsuperscript{47} In addition, only mixed-sex marriage is currently (2008) legal in Britain.\textsuperscript{48}

In England and Wales all official statistics relating to marriage are separated into ‘religious marriages’ (the majority of which are within the Church of England) and ‘civil marriages’. In practice, Jewish marriages are only recorded by ONS if the secretary for marriages registers both the civil and the religious ceremony, and this is most likely to happen if the two coincide. But if the civil ceremony occurs at some time before the Jewish ceremony then it is likely the Jewish marriage will not appear in the ONS data. In 2002, 763 Jewish marriages were recorded by ONS\textsuperscript{49} whereas the CRU recorded 921 marriages, a difference of 158. On average between 1990 and 2002, the ONS data recorded 10.4% fewer Jewish marriages per year than the CRU data.

Figure 4 summarises Jewish marriage data from 1970 to 2002 for Jews (using both ONS and CRU records), all civil marriages, and all religious marriages. It is clear how well the trends for the two sets of Jewish records parallel each other over the period, reinforcing confidence in their validity. It is also clear that there has been a steady decline in marriage for all groups during the 32-year period (heavy line in Figure 4). The impact of implementation of the Divorce Reform Act 1969, which according to Fine and Fine (1994) was ‘dramatic’, can also be inferred from these

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{47}] British Jews may marry ‘foreign’ Jews abroad and occasionally both British partners may opt to marry in a foreign destination (Kosmin and Waterman, 1986).
\item[\textsuperscript{48}] The Civil Partnership Act 2004 enables same-sex couples to register as civil partners of each other, but not to marry.
\item[\textsuperscript{49}] Series FM2 volume 30 p8
\end{itemize}
data. The data show a clear shift away from religious marriages towards civil ceremonies.

Figure 4 Marriage trends for various groups, 1970-2002, % change on the previous year’s total, 1970=100, England and Wales

Sources: Author’s calculations based on ONS dataset PMH38a (see Appendix) and CRU marriage records for Great Britain

For the general population, the decline in ‘All marriages’ has been steady year on year and the differential rates of change between religious marriages (which have declined considerably) and civil ceremonies (which have declined only marginally), are evidence of society’s shift away from religious forms of identity towards more secular outlooks, at least, but possibly also reflect shifts away from marriage altogether. The majority of religious ceremonies over the period were Christian (of which 67% of these were Church of England) and exhibited a dramatic decline in the early to mid-1970s followed by a flattening-out during the 1980s and a second
decline throughout the 1990s to at least 2002. But for Jews the trend is different. They experienced a continued and dramatic decline earlier during the 1970s until the early 1980s when Jewish marriages declined on average by 2.8% per year compared with 2.3% for all religious marriages.\textsuperscript{50} But since this time the decline, though continuing, has been more sedate at 0.9% per year. This is much less than the 1.9% per year decline recorded for all religious marriages in the 1983-2002 period.

This declining trend in Jewish marriages is the result of several concomitant factors. For example, Schmool (2007:xvii) suggests that the ‘sharp drop’ might be due to increased cohabitation as a substitute for marriage or the shunning of marriage altogether—increased ‘solo living’ (Duncan and Phillips, 2008:16-19). Further, some couples are opting for civil marriages instead of religious ceremonies (and are thus unrecorded), a trend which might have started in mid-1960s (Haberman and Schmool, 1995:560; Schmool, op. cit.); rising ‘intermarriage’ will have the same effect (see Chapter 6). There may also be an element of emigration in the search for suitable endogamous partners, but this is necessarily speculative due to a lack of data. Marriage timing may also be a factor; increases in age at first marriage would explain declines, at least in the short term (Schmool and Miller, 1994). Yet another possible reason for underreporting relates to a ‘deficit’ of Jewish marriages compared with Jewish births (see Waterman and Kosmin, 1986:12).

Finally data in Figure 4 are not rates and therefore take no account of the ‘at risk’ population. So the Jewish marriage trends may be declining due to shrinkage in the

\textsuperscript{50} Author’s calculations based on ONS dataset PMH38a - see Appendix
Jewish population size whilst the rate remains unchanged.\footnote{No account has been taken of remarriage as there are insufficient data available.} Indeed, in recent years, a noticeable flattening out of the Jewish trend line has occurred (Graham and Vulkan, 2007:10). This is most likely related to the denominational heterogeneity of Britain’s Jewish population and in particular the high birth and marriage rates among the strictly Orthodox population discussed in detail below (see also, Holman and Holman 2002; Vulkan and Graham, 2008). 

Although the numbers may have decreased, Jews exhibited a slightly higher propensity towards marriage compared with the general population. The 2001 Census showed that 72.6\% (N=6,709) of Jews (in England and Wales) were ‘ever married’ compared with 69.9\% for the general population.\footnote{Author’s calculations based on ONS 2001 SARs dataset} Only Christians (74.2\%) and Sikhs (72.9\%) had higher proportions whereas people reporting ‘No Religion’ (51.3\%) and ‘Other Religion’ (40.5\%) had the lowest proportions.

### 2.2 Cohabitation: prevalence and trends

According to Haskey (2001a:11), in the 1970s the prevalence of cohabitation in Britain and America in general was relatively low but in the three decades since there has been a ‘sustained and dramatic increase’ (see also, Qian and Preston, 1993:492; Waite, 2002:36-7). Cohabitation is now more or less normative social practice, especially in terms of cohabitation prior to marriage (Duncan and Phillips, 2008; Duncan and Smith, 2002:475). The proportion of families consisting of a cohabiting couple in England and Wales (and in which the ‘head’ was aged under 60) was 5\% in 1986, but by 1998 it was 14\% (Haskey, 2001a:13). Further, the
The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority

proportion of non-married women who were cohabiting more than trebled between 1976 and 1998 from 9% to 29% (Haskey, 2001a:7). In 1996, 77% of women in England and Wales reported that they had lived together with their first husband before marrying (2001a:11-12). Interestingly Kosmin and Keysar (2006:78) note lower proportions among American adults: 6% of males and 5% of females were ‘unmarried living with a partner in 2001.’

More recently Barlow et al. (2008:30) reported that 36% ‘of the public’ in Britain have been in a cohabiting relationship at some point in their lives, and 11% are currently (2006) in one. These are both increases on data from the year 2000. They also argue that these increases have taken place ‘at the expense of marriage’ and that they are more likely the result of a “‘period’ effect (where behaviour changes across all age groups at the one time) rather than a ‘generational’ effect” (ibid:31).

Generally cohabitations are of a shorter duration than marriages but this gap is decreasing. Over the last 40 years, the median duration of premarital cohabitation (for first marriages) has quintupled, from under 6 months to 27 months. (There appears to be no data that report the number of cohabiting couples who are engaged to be married.) According to Kosmin and Keysar (2006:77) ‘the average American young couple now lives together for about three years before they get formally married.’

The 2001 Census provided prevalence data on Jews who cohabit on Britain. It showed that there were 11,236 Jewish *individuals* in cohabiting partnerships
compared with 111,697 Jewish individuals in marital partnerships. This implies that 10.0% of all Jewish individuals in couples were cohabiting compared with 18.6% for the rest of the population in partnerships. Thus, Jews were considerably less likely to cohabit than the population in general, though the proportion was still substantial. However, when the data are calculated in terms of couples (in which at least one-person is Jewish) the ratio is 14.1%, i.e., approaching its prevalence in the general population. Unfortunately there are currently no trend data on Jewish cohabitation.

2.3 Demography and partnership type

2.3.1 Marital status and cohabitation

Partnership type is a complex topic. For example, Barlow et al. (2008:30) note that ‘Cohabitation and marriage may be engaged in by the same individuals at different life-stages, on more than one occasion and in different sequences’. They noted that in 2006 in Britain, 30% of cohabitants had been married previously and 27% of those who were currently married, had previously cohabited (ibid:30-1). In other words, not all cohabitees are single-never-married; many are divorcees or widows (Haskey, 2001b:18). Marital status is likely to affect the reasons for engaging in cohabitation and thereby the type of cohabitation being undertaken by the couple. Younger, never-married people may consider living together to be a ‘trial marriage’ whereas divorced people may consider it a form of companionship which avoids the potential emotional and financial costs of marriage failure (Haskey, 2001a:7). Some cohabiting individuals may still be legally married to a person other than the partner.

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53 Author’s calculations based on tables C0629 and C0400 respectively - see Appendix
with whom they cohabit, i.e., they are separated. And though rarely recorded, there is also the possibility that for many people their present cohabitation is not their first. Still, according to Haskey about two-thirds of cohabitees are single-never-married (2001b:29).

Though Waite (2002:38) has commented that in the United States reports of Jewish cohabitation are fairly low, her analysis prompted her to state, ‘I suspect that while a relatively high proportion of Jewish women cohabit, they move rather quickly into marriage, so that cohabitation is more often a brief stage than a permanent state.’ She went onto suggest that in the United States generally, ‘Cohabitation is even more prevalent among people who are divorced or separated; sixty percent of persons who remarried between 1980 and 1987 lived with someone before marriage—usually but not always the person they married.’ (2002:37)

The 2001 Census data allows us for the first time to examine the ‘marital status’ of cohabiting Jews. They show that 63.1% of Jewish cohabitees were single-never-married (a similar proportion to Haskey’s findings in the general population) with the remainder being divorced (24.1%), separated (5.4%), widowed (4.7%), or married (2.7%).

2.3.2 Age and partnership type

Age at marriage

Marriage is a life-cycle event closely related to age, a fact clearly demonstrated by the Census data. Figure 5 shows that the majority (81.9%) of young Jewish people aged 16 to 30 reported being ‘Single (never married)’ whereas for people in their 60s

54 Author’s calculations using ONS SARs dataset, N=407
this was true for only 7% of respondents. By their middle ages (45 to 59 years old) 89.8% of Jews were or had been married and the majority of this group were currently ‘Married (first marriage)’ (59.3%), but over a quarter were ‘Divorced’ and half of these had ‘Remarried’. Over a third of people in their 70s and early 80s were ‘Widowed’.

Figure 5 Partnership status for Jews by age¹ in 2001, England and Wales

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2001 SARs dataset
¹ Uneven age cohorts

Barlow et al. (2008:33) note that the average age at marriage has generally been increasing: in 2004 it was 36 for men and 33 for women compared with 27 and 25 in 1990. Data from ONS show that Jews, by comparison with the general population, marry at younger ages; for example, the median age for Jewish men was 31.4 years compared with 35.3 in general (see Table 13). However, this is not the case when the data are examined in terms of denomination or previous marital status. Most other
findings suggest that Jews actually marry later than most groups. For instance, Kosmin has suggested that for marriages in which both partners were marrying for the first time, Jews tended to be older on average than the general population (1983:206). Late age of Jews at first marriage was noted in the 1980s in the United States by Fishman (1988:1-2) and again in the NJPS 2000-01 survey which noted that Jews, both men and women, marry later than Americans generally (UJC, 2003:3). This is likely to be related to Jews spending long periods of time in higher education, as Lehrer (2000) has argued: ‘the distinctive Jewish pattern of delayed marriage and the frequency of cohabitation [is due] to the high educational attainment of Jewish men and women which tends to delay marriage.’ (See also Waite, 2002:40)

Table 13 Mean age at marriage for various types, 2002, %, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Marriage</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All first marriages (both partners) a</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All marriages b</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All religious marriages c</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Jewish* marriages c</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Author’s calculation based on the following ONS tables (see Appendix): a: PMH35A (males) and PMH35B (females); b: PMH35A (males) and PMH35B (females); c: ONS (2007a) FM2 30 Table 3.32 (calculated mean).
* Endogamous marriages only.

Table 13 also shows data for the mean age at first marriage, which for the general population in 2002 was 30.1 for males and 27.9 for females. It does not show data for Jews at first marriage. For this we turn to CRU data which show that for single males, the age at first marriage was 31.3 years and for single females was 29.2 years. Ages for the strictly Orthodox marriages are likely to be considerably younger.

Unfortunately the CRU data do not report age for Jews prior to 2006. At the time of writing only data for ‘mainstream Orthodox’ (United Synagogue) marriages were available.
(Holman and Holman, 2002). In other words, this is consistent with other findings that Jews are older at first marriage than the general population.

If Jews are older at first marriage, why are they younger in the overall data? One reason may be related to findings by Schmool (2002:7) who noted that Jews in Britain are more likely than the general population to be marrying for the first time. Indeed CRU data for ‘mainstream’ (i.e., excluding strictly Orthodox) marriages in 2006 showed that 83.7% (N=447) were first marriages for both partners. ONS data also show that in 2002, 80.7% (N=736) of Jewish marriages were first marriages for both partners, similar to the 79.2% for all other ‘religious’ marriages but, crucially, far higher than the 59.1% for ‘all marriages’ (and especially high compared with civil marriages at 48.8%) in England and Wales.56

However, although it appears that Jews exhibit rather similar marriage patterns to ‘religious’ couples in the general population, there are reasons to believe that this conclusion may be incorrect. Figure 6 presents data comparing the age structure of marrying individuals by the type of marriage ceremony ‘civil’, ‘religious’ (mostly Christian) and ‘Jewish’ marriages. It shows that men marrying with a civil ceremony were more likely to be older than those marrying with religious ceremonies. (Any tendency for individuals to remarry in a civil ceremony will exaggerate this difference.) When the data for (endogamous) Jewish grooms are compared it is clear from Figure 6 that there is a substantial bias towards the younger cohorts. For example, Jewish grooms are more than twice as likely as ‘Religious grooms’ generally to be aged under 25 when they marry. Interestingly they are also more

56 Author’s calculations based on data from ONS FM2 Series, 30 2002:Table 3.31
likely to be in the 50 years and above cohort suggesting a relatively high tendency towards Jewish religious marriage later in life, presumably the majority of these being remarriages. But it should also be noted that 56.4% of Jewish (endogamous) grooms are marrying between the ages of 25 and 39 so there is still a plurality in the late 20s and 30s. What these data seem to be showing is high age variance for Jewish (endogamous) marriage.

Figure 6 Age at marriage of grooms* by ceremony type, %, England and Wales, 2002

* Very similar patterns are observed in the equivalent data for brides.
Source: Author’s calculations based on FM2 Series dataset 30, table 3.32 (ONS, 2007a)

Age, cohabitation and marriage

According to Haskey (2001a:6), attitudes towards most issues concerning relationships vary considerably with age. Barlow et al. (2008:31) note that younger people are more likely to cohabit than older people, but because younger people are
also less likely to be married they are at greater ‘risk’ of cohabitation (see also Buck et al., 1994). The 2001 Census showed that 41.3% of cohabiting women in England and Wales were aged under 30 compared with 6.9% of married women. In addition higher proportions of these younger cohorts are likely to be cohabiting. Almost a quarter (23%) of women aged 20 to 24 were cohabiting in 1998 (Haskey, 2001a:10).

Figure 7 Age structure for married and cohabiting Jewish individuals, England and Wales

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS 2001 SARs dataset

What do the data tell us about the relationship between partnership type and age among Jews? Figure 7 shows a comparison of the age structures of Jews in married and cohabiting couples. From this, it is immediately clear in the figure that age structures for married Jews and cohabiting Jews are very different: the median age

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57 Author’s calculations based in ONS table S004 - see Appendix
for married Jews is considerably older than that of cohabiting Jews. The median age for the married Jews is 49.1 years and for cohabiting Jews is 39.2 years (N=3,960 and 407 respectively). However, despite this age difference almost a third (32.9%) of cohabiting Jews were nevertheless aged over 44 (compared with only 15.5% in the general population). Thus, cohabitation is clearly not the exclusive preserve of young Jews.

Although the SARs sample is small (N=407 cohabiting Jews) it provides an opportunity to look at the relationship between age and marital status. Table 14 shows that over half (52.1%) of single-never-married Jews were aged under 30 whereas nearly three-quarters of divorced cohabitees were aged over 44.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Single (never married)</th>
<th>Married (first marriage)</th>
<th>Separated (but still legally married)</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
<th>Widowed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 30</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS 2001 SARs dataset

2.3.3 Gender and partnership type

It was demonstrated above that women marry at an earlier age than men and that following a divorce, men are more likely to remarry than women of the same age (Haskey, 2001a:8). The data show that gender and partnership formation are related. For example, Figure 8 shows that Jewish women are more likely to be Divorced (57%) than Jewish men (43%), and that following the dissolution of a marriage (by whichever means), Jewish women are far more likely to be Widowed (81.2%)
compared with 18.8% for men though this is a direct consequence of longer female expectancy.

Figure 8 Marital status by gender, for currently or previously married Jews, %, England and Wales

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS 2001 SARs dataset

2.4 Identity and partnership type

2.4.1 Religiosity and the likelihood of cohabitation

Duncan and Phillips (2008:6) find that religion is a key predictor of ‘traditional’ views about attitudes towards partnership formation. As already noted, people marrying under religious auspices tend to be younger than those marrying civilly and it has been suggested that this is because religious authorities tend to discourage cohabitation (which delays marriage) and encourage pronatalism (and thus early marriage) (Lehrer, 2004:717). Indeed, according to Williams and Lawler (2001:476) ‘…there is abundant research to support that cohabitation is negatively related to religiosity.’ For example, Barlow et al. (2008:31) note, ‘[a]lmost a fifth of those with
no religion are currently cohabiting, compared with less than one per cent of those who belong to a non-Christian religion.’ (See also Lesthaeghe and Moors, 2000:155). Barlow et al. do however suggest that since older people ‘are much more likely to belong to a religion’ this may impact on cohabitation propensities ‘independently’ (ibid).

In England and Wales, Haskey (2001a:11) notes that the steady rise in cohabitation has been accompanied by a societal rise in civil marriage ceremonies, which are themselves more likely to have been preceded by pre-marital cohabitation than religious marriages. In the United States, just over half of marriages preceded by cohabitation had ceremonies under the auspices of a religious group (Kosmin and Keysar, 2006:77). But Waite (2002:38) notes that Jewish (American) cohabitation is low compared with the general population. When Jews do cohabit she says this is a prelude to marriage, ‘more often a brief stage than a permanent state’.

ONS data reveal whether or not marrying couples had the same address prior to their wedding (i.e., were presumably cohabiting). Couples marrying with a religious ceremony were less likely (58.9%) to have been cohabiting than couples marrying with a civil ceremony (86.6%). The same data are also available for Jewish (endogamous) couples. For this group, pre-marital cohabitation was far less common. In 2002 it was recorded in only 37.1% (N=763) of cases. The suggestion here then is that Jews who marry endogamously tend not to cohabit with each other beforehand. However it cannot be concluded from these figures that they have never cohabited at all.

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58 Author’s calculations based on ONS FM2 Series, 2002, 30, table 3.40
The 2001 Census showed that among religious groups, rates of cohabitation varied. Table 15 presents data for all people recorded as being in a ‘couple family’ in the Census (based on the Family Reference Person). People reporting ‘No Religion’ were almost twice as likely to be in a cohabitational relationship than the national average (22.1% compared with 12%). In the United States, Kosmin and Keysar (2006:78) found similarly high levels of cohabitation among people reporting ‘No Religion’: 29% of cohabiting men and 24% of cohabiting women reported ‘No Religion’ despite ‘No Religion’ accounting of 14.1% of the national US population (ibid:36).

Table 15 Proportion of all Family Reference Persons (FRPs) in cohabitational unions, by religion, 2001, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Total number of FRPs</th>
<th>% of FRPs cohabiting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>10,909,417</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>37,562</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>150,296</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>357,897</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>87,103</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>70,320</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>44,144</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated</td>
<td>940,090</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘No Religion’</td>
<td>2,085,018</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS table M290 - see Appendix
* FRPs are more likely to be male and therefore these data are slightly skewed.59

59 A potential data bias should be noted for figures relating to the Family Reference Person (FRP). The FRP is automatically selected by ONS on the basis of using age and employment status. Because males in partnerships tend to be older than females and also tend (on average) to have more senior employment statuses, FRPs are more likely to be male. Since men are more likely to report ‘No Religion’ this will skew the data. They are also more likely to be older and this will also potentially bias the data.
In the United States, Lehrer (2004:718) noted that religious denomination predicts the likelihood of cohabitation. She found that the highest levels of cohabitation were found among the ‘unaffiliated’ members of her sample. In England and Wales, Table 15 also shows that cohabitation is far less prevalent among certain groups. Under 5% of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in couples were cohabiting. As a group, Jews also apparently exhibit relatively low propensities towards cohabitation. Other Census data show that cohabiting couples accounted for 13.1% of all households in England and Wales compared with 8.2% of ‘Jewish households’ and 4.2% of ‘Muslim households’. Where the HRP reported ‘No Religion’ the proportion was far higher (25.8%).

2.4.2 Jewish denomination

That Jews are more favourable towards cohabitation than other ‘religious’ groups has been noted by Waite (2002:42) in the United States. This, she argues, may be linked to the high levels of educational achievement among much of this population. Lehrer (2004:718) suggests that this is attitudinal: ‘The liberal attitudes of Jews toward premarital sex and their low fertility and high levels of female education and employment combine to produce a high prevalence of informal unions.’ However, she notes the ‘evidence is contradictory’. I contend that there are two reasons for this ‘contradiction’. The first is that Jews, like other groups, cannot be homogenised as different denominations are likely to exhibit different propensities toward cohabitation. In addition, the ethnic facets of the ‘Jewish’ appellation may also provide some explanation—ethnic groups are less likely to be subject to the same...

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60 For households with ‘One family and no other’, using the HRP are the reference for religion. Author’s calculations based on ONS table S151 - see Appendix
‘traditional’ views on partnerships formation as religious groups. To better understand the importance of ‘religion’ we need to observe levels of religiosity and denomination within the same group closely.

Some evidence can be derived from findings of various attitudinal surveys of Jews in Britain. For example, Schmool and Miller (1994:80) found that among (predominantly married) Jewish women there was ‘firm support’ for marriage as opposed to cohabitation, which they argued ‘is consistent with both historical marriage levels and Jewish belief in marriage as an institution.’ Only 2% (N=1,117) of their respondents who were affiliated to a synagogue, were currently ‘Living with a partner’. However for respondents who were unaffiliated, cohabitation was found to be notably more common—15% (N=220) (ibid, Appendix B:11,35 (Q30)).

Other survey data offer contradictory results. 81% of Jewish respondents disagreed with the statement ‘Marriage is an outdated institution’ (N=2,180, based on JPR’s 1995 dataset). On the other hand, 57.9% thought ‘Sexual relations between a man and a woman before marriage’ was ‘rarely wrong’ or ‘not wrong at all’ (N=2,168). Schmool and Miller’s (1994:80) survey found evidence for distinctly pro-nuptial attitudes: ‘Three-quarters of both affiliated [i.e. synagogue members] and unaffiliated samples disagreed with the statement “If a Jew falls in love with a non-Jew, they should live together rather than get married”.’ In other words, their (female) respondents said that marriage to a non-Jew was preferable to cohabitation.

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From this, Schmool and Miller (1994:81) concluded that ‘marriage, rather than no marriage, appears to be the aim of most of the [Jewish] women sampled’ (ibid).

However, it is important to recognise that Jewish marriages are denominational (Liberal, Reform, Orthodox and so on). These nuances are captured by the CRU data and these can be disaggregated by denomination. Schmool (2002:7-8) has suggested that two parallel but independent trends have developed in the Jewish marriage market since the early 1960s in Britain. On the one hand there are ‘traditional’ marriages, characterised by very young age at first marriage for both partners and in which the vast majority of individuals are marrying for the first time—these are generally strictly Orthodox Jews (see also Holman and Holman, 2002:28). On the other hand there are ‘modernist’ marriages (including affiliates to the ‘mainstream’ United Synagogue, Reform and Liberal Jewish marriages), characterised by older ages at marriage with lower proportions of first marriage for either partner (Schmool, 2002:8).

The data reveal that as ‘traditional’ marriages have increased, ‘modernist’ marriages have decreased (see Figure 9). CRU data suggest that in 1980 ‘traditional’ (i.e., strictly Orthodox) marriages accounted for 7.8% of all rabbinically ordained marriages; by 2004 they were 26.8% (see also Schmool and Cohen, 1998:8). During the period, ‘traditional’ marriages increased on average by 4.2% per year whereas ‘modernist’ marriages decreased by 1.9% each year. Because of the very different demographic profiles of these two sub-populations (early marriage and high birth rates in the ‘traditional’ group compared with late marriage and low birth rates in the ‘modernist’ group), this gap is likely to continue widening. Although religious
switching—whereby individuals change denominations and, in this case, become more religious—might be one explanation for these trends (Kosmin and Keysar, 2006:56), there is no empirical evidence to suggest this is a common occurrence. Therefore Figure 9 highlights what, in effect, is a **two-tiered marriage market**, one that is growing and one that is declining.

Figure 9 Trends in Jewish marriages, 1980 to 2004, with the ‘traditional’ and ‘modernist’ components separated out, UK

Source: Author’s calculations based on CRU marriage records
* ‘Traditional’ marriages, most of which are ‘strictly Orthodox’, are defined as those taking place in synagogues affiliated to the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations. The diamond line shows the proportion of all marriages, year on year, which are strictly Orthodox. ‘Modernist’ marriages refer to all Jewish marriages minus the strictly Orthodox (‘Traditional’) component.

In Figure 6 on page 248 above, evidence was presented of a high age variance among endogamously marrying Jews. This is explained by a two-tiered marriage market. The relatively high proportions of Jewish marriages in younger age cohorts can mostly be attributed to the ‘traditionalist’ component of the population which
skews the marriage data. The relatively high proportions in the oldest cohort (age 50 and above) may also reflect this biasing factor—religious Jews are strongly encouraged to remarry following divorce or widowhood (Holman and Holman, 2002:28-29). Even so, people in their late 20s and 30s still account for the majority of Jewish marriages, matching the pattern if not the volume, found among other religious groups.

Finally, data from JPR add further credence to the relationship between religion and propensity to cohabit. Jews who were ‘living with a partner’ were far more likely to report being ‘secular’ or ‘somewhat secular’ (78.6%) than Jews who were ‘married’ (55.4%) (see Figure 10). Similar results are obtained when the data are restricted to all respondents under the age of 50. Unfortunately, data do not exist to tell us whether or not religiosity predicts the likelihood of married couples having previously cohabited (either together or with other parties). It is also possible that
getting married in itself affects attitudes towards cohabitation. Clearly there is great scope for future investigations.

2.5 Socio-economic status and partnership type

2.5.1 Education and economic activity

The 2001 Census data showed evidence of clear differences in terms of educational achievement for married Jews compared with Jews in cohabiting partnerships. In terms of Jewish individuals in married couples, 36.2% had achieved ‘Higher level qualifications’, whereas Jews in cohabiting couples this was the case for 47.4% of individuals. Age is undoubtedly a factor in this difference but unfortunately it has not been possible to get sufficiently detailed data in order to control for this variable. Similarly, age is also related to the level of seniority a person is likely to have achieved in the workplace as well as the type of economic activity they are likely to exhibit. Older people tend to occupy more senior positions and are more likely to be ‘retired’. Gender is also an important variable since women are more likely to be ‘Economically inactive - Looking after home/family’ than men. For example, Jewish females aged 25 and above were less likely to be economically active (59.7%) than Jewish males (79.9%). The Census data show that in terms of partnership type married Jews were less economically active (79.2%) than cohabiting Jews (85.3%) (see footnote 62). Again, this is most likely to be due to the age differential: Jews who were married and economically inactive were more than twice as likely to be retired (66.2%) as cohabiting Jews (29.5%).

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62 For all Jews a couple family in England and Wales. Calculations based on ONS tables C0480a and b - see Appendix
63 Calculations based on ONS table S153
2.5.2 Accommodation, tenure and children

A person’s economic and employment position impacts on the type of housing they can afford as well as the type of their tenure. In addition, the age of a couple and their life stage impacts their housing needs. In terms of home ownership, it has been found that cohabiting couples are to be more likely than their married counterparts to rent their accommodation than own it (Haskey, 2001b). There were clear differences in tenure depending on partnership type (see Figure 11). About half of all Jews in couples owned their home with a mortgage regardless of partnership type. However, married Jews were twice as likely as cohabiting Jews to own their home ‘outright’. Conversely, cohabiting Jews were nearly three times as likely to privately rent their homes as married Jews.

Figure 11 Type of tenure for married and cohabiting couples⁴ in which at least one partner is Jewish, %, England and Wales

![Figure 11](image)

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS table C0480a and b - see Appendix
* ‘Other’ = Shared ownership; Living rent free; Living in a Communal Establishment.
⁴ Data refer to the Jewish member of exogamous couples and the FRP of endogamous couples.
It is interesting to speculate about the reason for these differences, beyond the important factor of age differentials. Cohabiting couples, being younger, will have less wealth than married couples, so buying a home is likely to be a more challenging proposition than renting one. Also, in terms of shared finances, there are different legal issues between the two partnership types (see Barlow et al., 2008; Haskey, 2001b). But there is also a difference in lifestyle; the more fluid nature of cohabiting partnerships implies that the long-term burden of a mortgage is likely to be less attractive than the more temporary nature of a rental agreement. Yet another factor relates to homes acquired during a previous marriage that older cohabitees may bring to the new partnership. However some married Jews do rent their accommodation, e.g. strictly Orthodox married couples commonly live in privately rented accommodation (Holman and Holman, 2002) and this was also recorded in the Census data (Graham et al., 2007:69).

The relationship between children and cohabitation should also be considered. The arrival of children may encourage the cohabitees to marry (Steele et al., 2005). Alternatively, children may be present because they were the outcome of a previous partnership(s) of one or both of the partners. And children, when present, affect requirements for living space and type of accommodation sought (e.g., house versus flat). However, age for age, cohabiting couple families have fewer dependent children than married couple families (Haskey, 2001a:13). This may be related to the more transient nature of cohabiting unions compared with marriages. As Haskey (2001a:5) notes, children born to cohabiting couples are more likely to experience union breakup compared to children of married couples.
The 2001 Census data show that Jews who cohabit are half as likely to have children as Jews who are married: 52.9% of married couple families with a Jewish HRP had one or more dependent child(ren) compared with only 24.7% of cohabiting couples.\(^{64}\) And cohabiting Jews are less likely than other cohabiting couples to have dependent children (39.1%). Nevertheless, that a quarter of Jews who do cohabit have dependent children may be surprising to many among a population that considers the married-couple family to be the normative arrangement for reproduction (see Chapter 3, section 4.3, p191).

### 3 Location and partnership type

The relationship between cohabitation and space should be of considerable interest to geographers. For instance Lesthaeghe and Moors (2000:157-67) have noted that rates and types of cohabitation vary from country to country. In this context, Lesthaeghe and Neidert point to evidence that ‘Marriage and fertility postponement, premarital cohabitation, and even fertility within cohabitation in the United States follow trends similar to those in western Europe, but spatial variation also remains very important in the United States.’ (2006:672) Others have described what they call a ‘spatial sorting of household types’ inside urban areas whereby migration leads to a concentration of cohabiting (and single) young professionals in urban cores of postindustrial cities (Buzar et al., 2005:426; see also, Duncan and Edwards, 1999; Duncan and Smith, 2002). In addition, Blunt (2005:511-2) has considered the geography of cohabitation at the micro level of the home itself.

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\(^{64}\) Calculations based on ONS table S151 - see Appendix
Table 16 Proportion of couples who are married or cohabiting and in which at least one partner is Jewish, by GOR, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of couples</th>
<th>% married</th>
<th>% cohabiting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inner London</td>
<td>12,670</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>1,678</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-west</td>
<td>2,688</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-east</td>
<td>7,631</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire &amp; the Humber</td>
<td>3,603</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>10,741</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-east</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-west</td>
<td>7,719</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer London</td>
<td>28,806</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>England and Wales</strong></td>
<td><strong>78,706</strong></td>
<td><strong>87.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS table C0695 - see Appendix

However, very little work has been carried out in terms of the way identity impacts on cohabitation across space. For example, the topic of Jewish residential concentration in urban areas is fairly well documented in the literature (Brimicombe, 2007; Waterman and Kosmin, 1987b, 1988). But none of this work considers how partnership type may be related to residential location. Data from the 2001 Census enables us to compare the spatiality of cohabiting and married couples both regionally and in the urban environment. Table 16 presents data at the regional level. Over a fifth (20.1%) of couples in Inner London in which at least one partner was Jewish, were cohabiting. This is in stark contrast to Outer London where only 8.7% of couples were cohabiting. This sharp delineation is also evident in London’s general population with cohabitees forming 27.2% of partnerships in Inner London and only 15.7% in Outer London.\(^{65}\) It is likely that the factors relating to tenure

\(^{65}\) Calculations based on ONS table S151 - see Appendix
The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority

(discussed in section 2.5.2) account for much of this variation (see also Buzar et al., 2005; Ogden and Hall, 2000).

Observing data at scales within the urban area adds credence to this point since a clearer pattern of spatial differentiation between married and cohabiting couples emerges amongst London’s 33 boroughs. Table 17 shows that for couples in which at least one partner was Jewish there was high variation by location. For example, over a third (33.8%) of couples in the Inner London Borough of Islington were cohabiting, whereas in suburban Harrow only 4.5% of couples were.

Table 17 Proportion of cohabiting couples in which at least one partner is Jewish, by LAD, London¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borough (LAD)</th>
<th>Number of couples</th>
<th>% cohabiting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islington</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambeth</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wandsworth</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hammersmith &amp; Fulham</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenwich</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewisham</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camden</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kensington &amp; Chelsea</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newham</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barking &amp; Dagenham</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ealing</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hounslow</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bexley</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haringey</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borough (LAD)</th>
<th>Number of couples</th>
<th>% cohabiting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croydon</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merton</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster</td>
<td>1,985</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bromley</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston upon Thames</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brent</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond upon Thames</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of London</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havering</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enfield</td>
<td>1,668</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hackney</td>
<td>2,041</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redbridge</td>
<td>4,291</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillingdon</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnet</td>
<td>11,971</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrow</td>
<td>3,852</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS table C0695 - see Appendix
¹ Proportions based on all couples (with at least one Jewish partner) in partnerships
Figure 12 Cohabitation as a proportion of all couples in which the HRP was Jewish¹, by LAD, London region²

![Map of London regions with cohabitation percentages](image)

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS table S151 using MapInfo v7.8

¹ Since these data are based on HRP, they may be over-reporting for males and under-reporting for females.

² Note that these data are relative, not absolute values. Jewish cohabitation is at its absolute highest in areas where Jewish population concentration is highest (see Table 17).

The spatial patterns this creates are clear; Jewish cohabitation is most likely to occur in Inner London and to some extent, in south London (see Figure 12). The only exception is the London Borough of Hackney but this anomaly proves the rule since the majority of Jews here are strictly Orthodox and cohabitation in this group is virtually nil (Holman and Holman, 2002). Factors such as the greater availability of rental accommodation in inner city areas, and the different space requirements of...
cohabiting compared with married couples, may account for these differences. However, this can only be inferred from these data and further investigation is required in order to assess the reasons couples choose to live where they do.

Finally, it is interesting to speculate whether there is a process of intra-urban migration occurring in which there is spatial sorting of married and cohabiting couples. Since there is more rental property available in inner-urban than outer-urban areas, it is plausible that cohabiting Jews are experiencing centripetal movement towards the centre and away from the main suburban Jewish residential concentrations (see Bromley, et al. 2007 regarding this process in general). Again, other data especially qualitative data, would aid a better understand of the processes behind these patterns.

4 Discussion: Jewish partnership fluidity

The fluidity of partnership arrangements discussed in the broader literature is clearly evident among Britain’s Jewish population. There has been a marked decline in the prevalence of marriage among Jews in Britain since at least the 1970s as well as a rise in the prevalence of cohabitation. For some, such changes are unsettling (see for example, Sacks, 1995a), but these trends are symptomatic of broader processes associated with the second demographic transition.

Through the application of theories relating to ‘partnership markets’, this quantitative analysis has exposed the complex nature of Jewish partnership formation. It has highlighted the fact that the Jewish marriage market is fragmented, consisting of ‘Traditional’ and ‘Modernist’ tiers. The ‘Traditional’ tier mostly
comprises strictly Orthodox Jews among whom marriage is universal and early, and to some extent, growth in this market is dampening the overall declining trend. By contrast, the majority Jewish ‘Modernist’ population exhibits partnership formation habits that more closely resemble those of the general population. Most Jews are therefore experiencing the same social forces and demographic trends as the general population. This is contrary to the normative pro-nuptial narrative of ‘Jewish family values’ (Fishman, 1988:1-2; Schmool and Miller, 1994; Waite, 2002:38). The notion of a Jewish partnership in which marriage is not the ultimate aim is anathema to this narrative. Yet Jews do cohabit at various lifestages, adding considerable complexity to their partnership lifecycles. However, the heterogeneity of the group is again significant since it is clear that cohabitation is more prevalent among ‘Secular’ Jews than among ‘Religious’ Jews. Furthermore, cohabitation is likely to have important effects on the future size of the (‘Modernist’) Jewish population since cohabitation delays marriage, which in turn, reduces fertility.

Cohabitation also impacts on where Jews choose to live. Compared with married couples, cohabiting couples are more likely to live in rented accommodation and flats, for which there is greater availability in inner urban areas; i.e., away from main Jewish suburban centres. Thus, increasing cohabitation is likely to disrupt the residential concentration of Jews, which does not coincide with the inner city. Cohabitation may therefore be a factor in Jewish residential dispersal, though further study is required to confirm the direction of causality.

This analysis then represents a first step towards a better understanding of the complex processes of partnership formation among Jews, but evidently many
questions remain unanswered. For example, what are people’s partnership-life histories? And what do cohabiting couples plan to do in the future with regards issues such as residential location, marriage, and children?

But perhaps the most important topic relating to Jewish partnership formation and which has not been addressed in this analysis so far is exogamy. It is this topic to which my focus and critique now turns.
Chapter 6

A quantitative analysis of Jewish exogamy in Britain

In Chapter 1, I noted that concerns have recently been expressed regarding ‘segregation’ in Britain and highlighted in particular, two influential reports suggesting that the population is ‘sleepwalking to segregation’ and living ‘parallel lives’ (Cantle, 2001; Ouseley, 2001; Phillips T, 2005). On the other hand, a key issue for many in the Jewish population is that assimilation is rather too successful and that on the contrary, a ‘narrative of doom’ has arisen in which exogamy is considered a threat to ‘Jewish continuity’ (Sacks, 1995a:101-11) and Jewish ‘intermarriage’ is framed largely in epidemiological terms: that its effects are those of a ‘rampant’, pervasive disease (The JC, 2006). Such opinions have attracted considerable attention from wealthy philanthropists eager to avert what some regard as imminent danger to the population’s very survival (Saxe, et al., 2002).

In the following chapter, I explore these contradictory perspectives with newly available data on exogamy which, as noted in Chapter 3, has historically been used to measure social integration. ‘Intermarriage’ is the *sine qua non* of what Gordon (1964) called ‘structural assimilation’. By measuring ‘intermarriage’ we can assess the extent to which ‘social mixing’ and ‘integration’ have occurred in society (Gray, 1987:371-72; Lieberson and Waters, 1988:162-3). But geographers are also interested in ‘intermarriage’ because of Duncan and Lieberson’s (1959) contention that exogamy is inversely related to propinquity. In other words, by measuring ‘intermarriage’ we can better understand residential location (Gray, 1987; Kalmijn,
Indeed, the entire ‘residential segregation’ literature can be considered as the spatial expression of the assimilation literature.

But in this dissertation I challenge the relevance of the exogamy/propinquity correlation and more specifically, its implicit elevation of propinquity as a major factor in producing endogamy. Little mention is made in most geographical works about other factors that might be relevant to exogamous partnership outcomes. Some very sophisticated and complex statistical indices have been developed over the years in attempts to describe ‘residential segregation’ and relative rates of intermarriage at the expense of addressing the main social process and mechanisms which produce these concentrated patterns in the first place. Jews represent one of Britain’s most residentially concentrated groups and therefore data relating to this population might reveal something about the processes operating to produce these patterns. However, another key argument I make is that quantitative methods are still relevant to geographers. So this chapter is also an effort to highlight how quantitative data can be used to develop explanations for ‘residential segregation’ and concentration.

1 Measuring exogamy: technical issues
Despite the concern ‘Jewish intermarriage’ elicits, this topic has received little rigorous, analytical attention in Britain. This is because there have traditionally been few data sources rich enough to investigate the phenomenon. Although this is slowly changing (see for example, Fishman, 2004; Gan et al., 2008; Kalmijn et al., 2006), such studies do not relate to Britain. Yet there are many aspects of the topic that are
not well understood. For example, Goldscheider (2003:24) suggests ‘…we should try to understand what sustains [Jewish] ethnic and religious continuity in the absence of overt discrimination and economic disadvantage and in the face of pressures that erase distinctiveness.’ And Miller et al., (1996:12) have argued that, ‘Despite concern over intermarriage in Britain the factors underlying this critical statistic are hardly understood…’ In the words of Waite (2002:48), ‘we need to know more about who intermarries and why’; as geographers we might add, and where.

But measuring exogamy is challenging, and the political desire to compare ‘intermarriage rates’ between one group and another or within the same group over time is rarely matched by the availability of sufficiently detailed data. Besides which, although such figures help to give meaning to rather abstract figures, they become meaningless without careful construction and an accompanying description of context. Much confusion surrounds the measurement of exogamy. This is because there are at least three statistical complications encountered when analysing such data. These are relative group size, the ‘two-sex problem’, and the confusion between ‘rates and ratios/proportions’.

The issue of group size arises when comparisons are being made of intermarriage among (as opposed to between) different groups with different population sizes. As is discussed below, relative group size is an important factor influencing the amount of exogamy a population is likely to experience. A high rate of endogamy may be solely the result of a relatively large group size (such that people tend only to meet fellow group members) rather than any particular conscious effort to do so. Several
techniques have been proposed to overcome this problem, including the use of odds ratios discussed by Kalmijn (1998:405) and the harmonic mean function (Qian and Preston, 1993:483; Schoen, 1988) which focuses on controlling for differing age distributions in a population. (See also Lowenstein, 2005:54 note 4; Okun, 2001)

Table 18 The ‘two-sex problem’: partnership combination data based on individuals and couples for married Jews, %, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership combination</th>
<th>Married Jewish individuals</th>
<th>Married couples with at least one partner Jewish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>111,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish to Jewish</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish to No Religion</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish to RNS¹</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish to not Jewish</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0400 - see Appendix

¹ RNS = Religion Not Stated

A second complication, called the ‘two-sex problem’ (Okun, 2001), is of greatest relevance to this analysis. Demographic data generally refer to individuals only, especially birth and death rates. However, when the referent is couples the ‘two-sex problem’ arises. Calculations in which the base unit is individuals in couples produce quite different results to those in which the primary unit is the couple itself. This is especially important when dealing with intermarriage data. For example, Table 18 presents 2001 Census data on exogamy for married Jews. Of the 111,697 Jewish individuals who were married, 76.4% were endogamous, i.e. married to another Jew. However, there were 69,010 married couples in which at least one partner was Jewish, and of these 61.9% were endogamous. Thus endogamy appears to be more prevalent when figures are based on individuals because these are double the size of their couple equivalents (44,197 couples compared with 88,394 individuals). Thus,
exogamy will appear to be more prevalent (and endogamy less prevalent) if data are calculated using a couples-based unit rather than an individuals base unit. Of course neither measure is more or less ‘correct’; the key point is for the base (context) to be noted.

The third measurement complication is ‘rates versus ratios’ (or proportions), and occurs when the analysis is focused on making temporal comparatives. This is as much a problem of nomenclature as it is of statistics. A rate is ‘the number of events in a given period of time divided by the average population (or appropriate sub-population) during the period. … While rates are a measure of change over time, ratios are appropriate to the description of a population at a particular moment.’ (Wilson, 1989:193-4) So for example, it is important to distinguish between ‘the stock of marriages at a given point in time (prevalence measures)… [and] the people who marry in a given period of time (incidence measures).’ (Kalmijn, 1998:404: see also, Lieberson and Water, 1988:171; Wilson, 1989:102-3,183-4) Thus, the (in)famous/iconic Jewish intermarriage figure of 52% (Kosmin et al., 1991; see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1, p161) is a rate because it refers to the period between 1985 and 1990, whereas the figure 76.4% (Table 18) is a ratio. Regardless of whether the figure is a rate or a ratio, it is also crucial to be clear about which population it is referring to. In the case of 76.4% this is all married Jewish individuals in England and Wales in April 2001 but a figure could just as easily be calculated based on all partnered individuals or all individuals of legal marriageable age, or all males, and so on. As with all statistics, the important point is that the premises of calculations are transparent.
In addition, Kosmin (1992:297) warns that findings can easily be affected by the definitions used for the units of analysis, such as who is and is not considered Jewish and therefore who is included in the calculations. Yet another problem relates to the authenticity of Jewish marriage contracts (*ketubot*)—Orthodox groups may not consider marriages carried out by less Orthodox groups to be ‘valid’. The political delicacy of these issues is demonstrated by the experiences of the authors of one of the biggest Jewish intermarriage studies ever carried out—the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) (Kosmin et al., 1991). As noted, the figure 52% ‘became the best known and most quoted Jewish statistic in the world.’ (Forward, 2003). However in the decennial follow-up study of 2000-01 NJPS reported a ‘revised’ rate of 43% for the same 1985 to 1990 period, this time using data from the more recent survey (UJC, 2003:16). Since millions of dollars of ‘continuity programming’ had already been diverted in response to the 52% figure (Saxe et al., 2002), the revised figure (based on a different methodology) led to accusations that the original figure had been ‘sexed up… to make it sound more dramatic’ (Forward, 2003) and the 1991 report’s authors were accused of perpetrating a politically motivated ‘fraud’ (Goldberg, 2003; see also, Cattan, 2003; Forward, 2003; Horowitz and Solomon, 1992:315; Phillips, 1997:1; Sheskin, 2003). The problems stemmed in part from a lack of clarity about the base population, but also from the use of a narrower definition of ‘Jewish’ in the 2000-01 study (born-Jews with a current non-Jewish religion were excluded).

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66 The ‘intermarriage rate’ for the period 1996 to 2001 was calculated to be 47% and 54% when the 1991 methodology was applied to the 2000-01 data (UJC, 2003:16-17).
Using figures such as these, millions continue to be spent on initiatives aimed at ‘reversing’ the ‘rise of intermarriage’ (The JC, 2006). Statistical clarity is therefore crucial but no more so than a clear understanding of the process of intermarriage itself, one that is not only politically charged but also socially and—somewhat less obviously—spatially infused.

2 Historical overview and contemporary prevalence of ‘intermarriage’

In Britain, the phenomenon of ‘Jewish intermarriage’ has been noted by several scholars over the past century. In the early twentieth century, Barron (1946:9-10) noted that with the exception of the Orthodox, ‘English Jews of Spanish and Portuguese origin have almost disappeared through intermarriage with Christians…’.

By the middle of the century Slater (1947) suggested that intermarriage affected ‘one in eight’ young adults of the Second World War period. By 1955, Neustatter argued that ‘mixed marriages’ were an important factor in shaping the future of ‘the Anglo-Jewish community’ (p97). In 1981, Lipman and Lipman noted that ‘the incidence of intermarriage, variously assessed at between 15% and 30%, is now patently a major factor in the shrinkage of the community…’, this they described as a ‘disturbing phenomenon’ (p37). By the 1990s, Miller et al. (1996:12) suggested that ‘the overall rate of intermarriage across the entire age range [of British Jews] is about 30 per cent.’ None of these figures can be directly compared with each other, but they do provide clear evidence of the historical prominence of the topic.

There have been no studies dedicated to quantifying Jewish ‘intermarriage’ in Britain and until 1996 estimates of the extent of mixed faith marriage among Jews
was essentially anecdotal (Schmool, 2002:4-5; Schmool and Miller, 1994:71). In one of the earliest national attempts to examine Jewish exogamy, Miller et al. (1996:12) reported that 38% of partnered men had a non-Jewish partner but data for women could not be confidently reported. However a review of JPR’s original data reveals a figure of 34.8% for all married men with non-Jewish spouses (and 34.4% for all partnered men).67

In the most recent period, the 2001 Census enables a far more detailed assessment of ‘intermarriage’ to be made. As noted, it provides an overall prevalence measure of 26.2% (see Table 18 above). These data also account for couples in which a partner reported ‘No Religion’ or provided no response (‘RNS’). Whether such couples were considered ‘intermarried’ in most of the studies mentioned above is generally unclear. In the United States, data from the NJPS 2000-01 study suggest that the prevalence of Jewish intermarriage is 31% of all currently married (in 2000) US Jews (UJC, 2003:17). However, directly comparing these two figures is arguably misleading for several reasons, including the relative differences in Jewish population sizes, the different definitions of ‘Jewish’ being used, and the blurring effects of the ‘No Religion’ and RNS categories.

However, in none of the literature on ‘intermarriage’ is mention made of ‘mixed-faith’ cohabitations. Given the significance of cohabitation among Jews in Britain this is a significant lacuna. Schoen and Weinick (1993:412) have argued that ‘marriages are much more religiously homogamous than cohabitations[…] That is consistent with our view that ascriptive characteristics are less important in

67 Calculations based on JPR’s 1995 dataset.
cohabitations than in marriages.’ Their data showed that cohabitees were more likely to choose a partner with the same educational background and were less likely to be as concerned about age or religion, compared with married couples. Cohabitational partnerships they noted have a ‘looser bond’ than marital partnerships. Some studies of Jews have noted that those who cohabit are more likely to have a non-Jewish partner than Jews who are married. For example, Kalmijn et al. (2006:1356) found that Jews in Holland who cohabit are more likely to be in exogamous partnerships than married couples, though the difference was small, with 54% of all first marriages and 58% of all first cohabitational unions being exogamous (ibid:1353).

Table 19 Partnership type by ‘religious’ combination for all couples in which at least one partner reported Jewish, %, England and Wales¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership combination</th>
<th>Married (a)</th>
<th>Cohabiting (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=</td>
<td>69,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish to Jewish</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish to ’No Religion’</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish to RNS²</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish to not Jewish</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS tables (a) C0400 and (b) C0629 - see Appendix

¹ Columns may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.
² RNS = Religion Not Stated

Although it is not possible to compare these results directly with British data (since marriage-order is unavailable) far greater differences are observed between the two partnership types among the Jews in Britain. Table 19 shows that cohabiting couples in Britain in which at least one person was Jewish were four times less likely to be endogamous partnerships (15.5%) than married couples (61.9%). Conversely, cohabiting couples were twice as likely to be exogamous unions (52.6%) as married
The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority

couples (26.2%). Jews in cohabiting couples were also three times as likely to have a partner of ‘No Religion’ as Jews in married couples. This relates to the finding discussed above regarding the high tendency among people who cohabit to report ‘No Religion’. It appears therefore, that an inverse relationship exists between the propensity to cohabit and the propensity towards endogamy.

Whether or not these very high levels of exogamy among cohabiting Jews get translated into marital unions is unknown. Are these people choosing to experience other forms of homogamous compatibility before choosing to marry for reasons of religious endogamy? Or are these actually pre-marital ‘trials’, which most Jewish cohabitation is assumed to be (Waite, 2002:38)? This is a fruitful area for further study.

3 Sociological and demographic determinates of exogamy

3.1 Jewish exogamy and demographic factors

3.1.1 Exogamy and marital status

Regarding married couples, some studies have suggested that marriage-order may influence the likelihood of exogamy. Figure 13 shows a summary representation of the possible paths a person might take during their ‘marriage career’. Keysar et al. (1991:60-61,63) distinguish between first marriages which are (currently) the only marriage an individual has been party to (first-only) and first marriages that have been superseded by higher order marriages (first-previous). They found that the best predictors for exogamy in first-only marriages were year of marriage (i.e. more recent marriages were more exogamous), followed by generations removed from (US) immigrant status (more removed were more exogamous). The authors argued
that this supports Gordon’s (1964) theory of assimilation (Keysar et al., 1991:63). The study used multiple regression analysis to examine what they considered to be the key factors leading to exogamy in higher order events. Note the relationship between the various factors (age, education, etc.) becomes complex because the outcome of the previous marriage must be taken into account. According to Keysar et al. (1991:57-58 and 61-63) the best predictor of exogamy in second marriages is exogamy in first marriages (see also Kosmin et al., 1989; Monahan, 1973:198-99). However, though they clearly found a correlation it is less certain that this could be labelled a cause. Interestingly they concluded that ‘the pattern of exogamy among those who remarry appears to be substantially different from those who are in a first-and-only [exogamous] marriage.’ (Keysar et al., 1991:52,55)

Figure 13 Marriage outcomes for first-only and higher order unions, for individuals¹. (En=endogamous, Ex=exogamous)

¹ This figure assumes endogamy/exogamy is clear-cut—i.e. the ambiguous ‘No Religion’ category is ignored, as is cohabitation.
Among the factors dismissed as statistically insignificant by Keysar et al. (1991:57) in producing exogamy in second rather than first marriages were gender, education, religious denomination, generations removed from (US) immigrant status, Jewish educational background, and current household income. They also suggested that the presence of children from a previous marriage is not statistically related and this has also been found in British data (see Schmool and Miller, 1994:81-2). Though Keysar et al. examined multiple factors, conspicuous by its absence in their study is geography, propinquity and ‘places of encounter’ (see Houston et al., 2005).

There has been some debate as to whether exogamy is more likely to end in divorce. Kosmin has previously argued that there is little agreement on the relationship between intermarriage, divorce and higher order marriages but noted that the relationship between Jewish divorce and exogamy was ‘much overlooked’ (1983:211). More recent (American) studies have suggested that exogamy leads to ‘marital instability’, ‘discontent’ and diminished happiness (Bumpass and Sweet, 1972; Chiswick, 1997; Chiswick and Lehrer, 1991:22-23; Fishman, 2004:44-46; Lehrer, 2004:708; Waite, 2002:47). Indeed, Chiswick and Lehrer (1991:21) argue that a major reason why it is worth studying intermarriage at all is because of its associated lack of ‘marital harmony and stability’. That said, others argue that the relationship between divorce and intermarriage is complex and inconclusive (Chinitz and Brown, 2001:725; Kalmijn, 1998:397; Monahan, 1973:199).

Unfortunately neither the 2001 Census data nor the JPR survey data shed much light on this. The Census showed that 12.9% of Jewish married individuals were in second marriages but data relating to details of endogamy in previous marriages cannot be
determined.\textsuperscript{68} It has also not been possible to compare current levels of endogamy by marital status (i.e. between married and remarried Jewish individuals), nor partnership type following marriage.\textsuperscript{69}

\subsection*{3.1.2 Exogamy and age}

A number of studies have shown that younger Jews are more likely to be married to non-Jews than older Jews. For example, the NJPS 2000-01 data in the United States found that 20\% of married Jewish adults aged 55 and over had non-Jewish spouses compared with 37\% among those aged 35 to 54 and 41\% among those aged 35 and below (UJC, 2003:17). This is consistent with a temporal finding of the NJPS study that the rate of intermarriage has been increasing over time and has ‘climbed dramatically over the course of the second half of the twentieth century’ (ibid:16; Kosmin et al., 1991:14). The NJPS data also noted that gender was of importance. Not only did it find the familiar gap between men and women—33\% of Jewish men had a non-Jewish spouse compared with 29\% of Jewish women—but it also observed that this was not consistent by age. For example men above the age of 55 were more likely to be intermarried than women of that age group but little difference was observed between the sexes among the 35-54 year cohort (UJC, 2003:17). Although there are no truly temporal data on Jewish exogamy in Britain, here too data have shown that younger Jews are more likely to be in exogamous partnerships than older people at least among males (Miller et al., 1996:12).

\textsuperscript{68} Author’s calculations using the SARs dataset.
\textsuperscript{69} The Household (as opposed to the Individual) SAR dataset might be a helpful source to investigate these questions further. It might be equally fruitful to look at the linked data from the 2001 Census to the Longitudinal Study (LS) (Blackwell et al., 2005). These data might be able cast light on this issue, but to date this dataset has not been analysed in specific reference to Jews.
The 2001 Census data broadly concur with these findings. Figure 14 suggests that there is a relationship between an individual’s age and the likelihood of endogamy, but it is not straightforward. Whilst older married Jews are indeed more likely to be in endogamous partnerships than those in younger age cohorts, this is not the case for the youngest group. Figure 14 shows that for those aged 16 to 29, there is actually a higher likelihood of endogamy (80.7%) than for those aged 50 to 59 (76.1%). This is most likely due to the religious heterogeneity of Britain’s Jewish population. Orthodox and strictly Orthodox Jews are strongly encouraged to marry early and endogamously (Holman and Holman, 2002).\footnote{These data (Figure 14) are arguably showing evidence for two distinct marriage markets, discussed in Chapter 5.}

Figure 14 Religion and age of spouse for all married Jewish individuals in England and Wales\textsuperscript{1}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure14}
\caption{Figure 14 Religion and age of spouse for all married Jewish individuals in England and Wales\textsuperscript{1}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{1}Note age cohorts are uneven

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Age Group & 16 to 29 & 30 to 39 & 40 to 49 & 50 to 59 & 60 to 69 & 70 and over \\
\hline
6,136 & 19,344 & 22,822 & 25,980 & 17,888 & 19,519 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0698 - see Appendix
What is also noticeable in Figure 14 is that ‘No Religion’ parallels the exogamous pattern; the younger the cohort the more likely the spouse will have ‘No Religion’. This is because reporting ‘No Religion’ is more common among younger than older people, the highest proportions being for people in their 20s.\footnote{Based on data from table S149 - see Appendix}

Figure 15 Married couples where at least one partner was Jewish¹, by age and partnership combination, England and Wales

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0480a - see Appendix

¹ Age refers to the Jewish member of the couple. In the case of endogamous couples age refers to the Family Reference Person (FRP)

Alternative Census data allow a direct comparison of exogamy between married and cohabitating couples based on age.\footnote{This comparison was not possible with data from table C0698.} Figure 15 shows data for married couples in which at least one partner was Jewish and Figure 16 shows data for cohabiting couples—it is clear that different pictures emerge. Whilst endogamy is higher in older cohorts for both married and cohabiting couples, this was not the case for
exogamy which among cohabiting couples was similar for each cohort, between 50% and 55%. Therefore, unlike for married Jews, the relationship between endogamy, exogamy and age for cohabating Jews is asymmetric.

Figure 16 Cohabiting couples (opposite-sex) where at least one partner is Jewish\(^1\), by age and partnership combination, England and Wales

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0480b - see Appendix
\(^1\)Age refers to the Jewish member of the couple. In the case of endogamous couples age refers to the FRP

### 3.1.3 Exogamy and gender

It has been found that gender may also be an important factor in ethno-religious exogamy (Kalmijn, 1993). In the United States, Qian and Lichter (2001:295,307) have noted that ‘Black’ men were 85% more likely to marry ‘White’ women than ‘Black’ women were to marry ‘White’ men, and that ‘Asian’ women were 15% more likely to marry ‘White’ men than ‘Asian’ men were to marry ‘White’ women. They also pointed to similar types of gendered patterns among ‘Hispanics’ (see also Okun,
2001:62 regarding Israelis). Explanations for these types of findings have been grounded in the theory of status exchange (ibid; see Chapter 3, section 3.1.2, p154).

Among Jews, the role of gender in patterns of Jewish exogamy has long been noted. For example DellaPergola (1972:199) found that ‘many more [Jewish] men than women marry out of the faith’. In Britain, Kosmin (1982:257) noted that Jewish males in particular were ‘marrying out’ at a significant scale by 1900. Similarly Miller et al. (1996:12-13) noted Jewish men exhibit a ‘significantly higher rate of intermarriage’ compared with Jewish women, and that 64% of Jewish women felt it was ‘important’ or ‘very important’ to find a Jewish partner compared with 50% of Jewish men. (See also Graham et al., 2007:60-1) In the long run such asymmetry can only be maintained if large numbers of Jewish women either remain unmarried or are more insistent on the in-conversion of their prospective non-Jewish spouses than Jewish men. This latter point remains theoretical.

Data from the 2001 Census showed that among married Jewish individuals, women were more likely to be in endogamous partnerships than men, but only slightly: 77.5% compared with 75.4% (see Table 20). However this disguises a more pronounced difference between the sexes in terms of exogamy. Jewish men were considerably more likely to be in exogamous partnerships (18.4%) than Jewish women (13.9%). On the other hand, Jewish women were almost twice as likely as Jewish men to have a spouse with ‘No Religion’. However, whereas the exogamy data reflect male choices in female partners, the ‘No Religion’ data probably reflect male choices in religion response rather than any predilection of Jewish women towards male partners with ‘No Religion’. This is because men have been found to
exhibit weaker affinities to religious identification than women (Kosmin and Keysar, 2006:67-8; Stark, 2002). Indeed the 2001 Census showed that 16.9% of men reported ‘No Religion’ compared with 11.4% of women.\textsuperscript{73}

Table 20 Spouse’s religion response for married Jewish individuals by gender, %, England and Wales\textsuperscript{1}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion response</th>
<th>Jewish females: response of husband</th>
<th>Jewish males: response of wife</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>55,050</td>
<td>56,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNS</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another Religion</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0400 - see Appendix

\textsuperscript{1} Columns may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.

Table 21 Religion of partner for cohabiting Jewish individuals by gender, %, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion response</th>
<th>Jewish females: response of male partner</th>
<th>Jewish males: response of female partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>5,618</td>
<td>5,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘No Religion’</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNS</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another Religion</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0629 - see Appendix

Census data for cohabiting couples reveal similar, though considerably more exaggerated, patterns (see Table 21). They show that 41.7% of cohabiting Jewish women and 49.4% of cohabiting Jewish men had a partner with a non-Jewish religion, i.e. almost half the group. It is interesting to note that the differences between the sexes are less marked depending on the partnership type: the likelihood

\textsuperscript{73} For people aged 18 and above. Calculations based on table S149 - see Appendix.
of Jewish women cohabiting exogamously is almost the same as for their male counterparts, whereas this is not the case for married Jewish women. As with marriage, Jewish women who cohabit are more likely to be partnered by men reporting ‘No Religion’ than vice versa, but again this is because of male, rather than female, tendencies.

### 3.2 Jewish exogamy and identity

#### 3.2.1 Exogamy where partner has ‘No Religion’

In their analysis of data on Jewish exogamous marriages, Chiswick and Lehrer (1991:21) argue that exogamy ‘is a dichotomous variable: a union is either inter-faith or intra-faith for a given definition of religious groups.’ For this purpose they regard ‘No Religion’ as a ‘religious’, non-Jewish category (ibid:27). But the ‘No Religion’ category is analytically complex and should not be simply bundled in with ‘non-Jews’. Unlike other ‘religious’ categories, ‘No Religion’ tends to be a status that is achieved rather than ascribed (Kalmijn et al., 2006:1347); it is a choice made by, rather than for, an individual (though of course religion can also be achieved). But more than this, ‘No Religion’ represents the reification of a category that describes only the absence of religion; it is not a religion per se. (See Chapter 3, section 2.2, p127 regarding secularisation.)

Kosmin and Keysar (2006) note there are no organised groups associated with ‘No Religion’, there are no representative bodies for people who report such a response.\(^74\) But people reporting ‘No Religion’ are highly diverse. Some are hard-line atheists,

\(^{74}\) There are however secularist and humanist groups such as the National Secular Society and the British Humanist Association.
others are lapsed theists who were reared in a religion they no longer identify with, yet others simply reject the notion of being labelled ‘religious’. Though the term is ambiguous, what it signifies (i.e. secularism) is increasingly prominent: in the United States, Kosmin and Keysar (2006:24) found that between 1990 and 2001, the number of people reporting ‘No Religion’ more than doubled to 29.4 million adults: the category represented the largest absolute change of any religious group in the period. Such data have been used as evidence for the rise in secularism (Bruce, 2002; Glenn, 1987) and linked to the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe, 1998).

But there are some cases where ‘No Religion’ is more complex than even this because a person bought up in a particular religion may continue to feel part of that group, or at least be considered by others to be part of that group, even as they consider themselves to be non-‘religious’. This gives rise to the apparently oxymoronic term ‘Jews of No Religion’ (JNR) (Kosmin et al., 1991:15-16) which refers to people who would be considered Jewish by most Jewish institutions. Indeed JNRs may consider themselves to be ethnically or culturally Jewish but not religiously Jewish.

The Scottish 2001 Census data showed that 10.4% of people brought up Jewish (N=7,446) reported ‘No Religion’ as their current ‘religion’.75 Normative approaches categorise such individuals as secular Jews (Kosmin et al., 1991). No doubt many of these individuals were partnered to people who reported Jewish as their current religion in 2001 however such data were unavailable. Unfortunately religion of upbringing was not recorded in England or Wales so it is not possible to assess the

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75 Author’s calculations based on GROS table 9 - see Appendix.
proportion of people of ‘No Religion’ who were ‘Jews of No Religion’. How then should the category ‘No Religion’ be dealt with analytically? Clearly this is an ambiguous group since Jews partnered to people of ‘No Religion’ are strictly neither endogamous nor exogamous. Again we are faced with the dilemma of meaning; what cases count as ‘valid’ endogamy and ‘valid’ exogamy? Surveys assessing the propensity of self-identifying Jews to profess ‘No Religion’ would be advantageous in this situation.

This ambiguity is also found in the case of Jews married to people who did not respond (RNS) to the Census’ voluntary question on religion, albeit for different reasons. A non-response in this context provides no information at all about the intentions or identity of the individuals concerned. There are many reasons why a person who would claim a religious identity in one situation but might not do so in another such as a census. They may be choosing to exercise their right to privacy or they might be registering a protest at the question’s intrusiveness (see Zellick, 1998). For Jews it is also argued that some consider their identity in ethnic and not religious terms and so may have not responded (see further Graham and Waterman, 2005 regarding Jewish non-response).

Therefore Jews partnered by people reporting ‘No Religion’ form a third group, one that is neither endogamous nor exogamous. This is not to deny that some of the 11,356 individuals in the 2001 Census who reported ‘No Religion’ or RNS whose partner (by marriage or cohabitation) reported Jewish would consider themselves
Jewish or be considered by others as Jewish in other contexts, but here it is not possible to tell either way.\textsuperscript{76}

\subsection*{3.2.2 Religion of non-Jewish partner}

In Britain, the overwhelming majority of the population reporting a religion reports ‘Christian’ (though there is debate as to what the motivation is for doing so—see Voas and Bruce, 2004). Therefore, if only for the differences in group size the majority of Jews partnered by ‘non-Jews’ will have a ‘Christian’ partner. This group accounted for 93.2\% of all people who reported a religion other than Jewish and excluding ‘No Religion’ and RNS.\textsuperscript{77} Even in Inner London, the locale with the highest proportion of non-Christians, the proportion was 77.9\% ‘Christian’. But beyond group size, theory suggests that intermarriage will be highest when social distance is shortest (Duncan and Lieberson, 1959; Park, 1926). Indeed Kosmin and Keysar (2006:99) found that ‘Mixing is more common among groups with similar religious traditions…’ Unfortunately, the Census failed to ‘unpack’ the category ‘Christian’ so it is not clear which Christian sub-denominations Jews were more likely to form unions with, but some sources have noted that Jews have been more likely to be partnered to Protestants than to Catholics (Engelman, 1928:519; Lowenstein, 2005:45).

The 2001 Census data show that 95.3\% of all non-Jewish partners of Jews were ‘Christian’, i.e. a slightly greater proportion than was found in the population at large (see Table 22). This overrepresentation was also seen among Jews partnered to

\textsuperscript{76} Calculations based on tables C0400 and C0629 - see Appendix.

\textsuperscript{77} Calculations based on table KS07 - see Appendix.
Buddhists and ‘Other religion’, suggesting that social distance is shorter for these groups. Very little variation can be seen in terms of partnership type. In Inner London, where there are relatively fewer Christians, the proportion of Jews with non-Jewish partners who are married to Christians is smallest, but it is still 92.9%; the proportion partnered to Muslims is 3.4%. This suggests that propinquity may be a relevant factor though the counts are rather too small to draw firm conclusions.

Table 22 Religion of not-Jewish [sic] partner for exogamous Jews by partnership type, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner’s religion²</th>
<th>Married couples</th>
<th>%¹³</th>
<th>Cohabiting couples</th>
<th>%¹³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian (93.2)</td>
<td>17,181</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>4,889</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist (0.4)</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu (1.4)</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim (3.9)</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh (0.8)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religion (0.4)</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>18,035</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5,119</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0695 - see Appendix
¹ Columns may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.
² Numbers in parentheses refer to the proportion of the population in England and Wales who reported a religion other than Jewish, ‘No Religion’ and RNS.
³ Columns may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.

3.2.3 Exogamy and Jewish denomination

It is well established that the likelihood of exogamy is closely related to the strength of religious commitment (religiosity). For example, Waite and Friedman (1997) showed that (American) Jews raised in a household with a reform ethos were more likely to intermarry than those raised in a more orthodox household. (See also DellaPergola, 1991:89; Mott and Patel, 2008:38; Waite, 2002) In Britain, Schmool and Miller (1994:73-74) found that respondents with a more liberal synagogue affiliation held more liberal attitudes towards exogamy. For example, Progressive
female synagogue members were more likely than Orthodox respondents to believe in the ‘inevitability of intermarriage’, that ‘nothing can be done to reduce intermarriage’, and that their current endogamous marriages were due more to chance than to ‘design’. The Orthodox were also more likely to say they would ‘try to prevent intermarriage within their personal nuclear family’ (ibid:75), whereas Progressive Jews were more likely to think that rabbis should be more welcoming towards ‘non-Jewish partners’ (ibid:79).

Table 23 Attitudes towards ‘intermarriage’ by type of ‘Jewish religious practice’ for all those that reported ‘Agree’ or ‘Strongly agree’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Jewish religious practice</th>
<th>‘A Jew should marry someone who is also Jewish’</th>
<th>‘If my son or daughter wished to marry a non-Jew I would do everything possible to prevent it’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-practising (i.e. secular)</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Jewish</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Jew (e.g. Liberal, Reform)</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Traditional” (not strictly Orthodox)</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strictly orthodox (e.g. would not turn on a light on Sabbath)</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>93.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations using JPR’s 1995 UK dataset (Q63, Q85, Q74)

JPR’s 1995 UK dataset sheds more light on the relationship between denomination and Jewish attitudes towards ‘intermarriage’. Table 23 shows that the more religious a person’s denomination, the more likely it is they believe Jews should marry other Jews. Indeed almost all ‘Traditional’ Jews (87.3%) agreed with this idea. But when asked if they would be prepared to directly intervene if their child planned to marry a non-Jew the ‘Traditional’ group were less sure. Only 59.3% said they would do ‘everything possible’ to prevent a child intermarrying compared with 93.8% for the Orthodox group. The 1995 dataset also shows that these opinions convert directly
into actions. Those who reported having a non-Jewish partner were six times as likely to also report being a ‘Non-practising (i.e. secular) Jew’ (see Figure 17).

Figure 17 Self-described ‘Jewish religious practice’ by religion of partner¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion of Partner</th>
<th>Partner Jewish (endogamy)</th>
<th>Partner not Jewish (exogamy)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strictly orthodox (e.g. would not turn on a light on Sabbath)</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Traditional&quot; (not strictly Orthodox)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Jew (e.g. Liberal, Reform)</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Jewish</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-practising (i.e. secular) Jew</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations using JPR’s 1995 UK dataset (Q63)
¹ No distinction was made in these data between married and cohabiting couples.

Other evidence for the relationship between denomination and intermarriage can be found in the 2001 Census data. In London there were 36,421 married couples in which at least one person was Jewish, of which 17.6% were exogamous. However, this disguises internal variation which cannot be explained by population size or propinquity alone. For example, in Hackney with 1,841 married couples in which at least one person was Jewish, only 6.8% were exogamous, whereas in Westminster with a similar number of couples to Hackney (N=1,677), the exogamy ratio was three times greater at 21.8%. ⁷⁸ ⁷⁹ Clearly there is more to such results than population

⁷⁸ All calculations based on table C0695 - see Appendix.
⁷⁹ In the JPR dataset ‘Westminster’ was surveyed as part of ‘Inner London’. See Becher et al., 2002:67.
size, and by extension propinquity. The main difference between these two groups is their average levels of religiosity. In Hackney there is a large, strictly Orthodox population (Gonen, 2006; Holman and Holman, 2002) but in Westminster, JPR’s 2001 survey data show that these Jews had a much more secular outlook than the average for London (64.4% reporting a secular or somewhat secular outlook (N=261, significant at the 99% level) compared with 57.5% for the entire London sample (N=2,867)).

These results indicate that denomination and/or religiosity impact on attitudes towards, and the likelihood of, Jewish exogamy. At the very least this diminishes the importance of propinquity and possibly overrides it, though this remains to be proven. But there is another, broader conclusion to be drawn here. One of the key aspects of the second demographic transition is a shift towards more secular outlooks (Lesthaeghe, 1998:6). Thus, levels of intermarriage will inevitably rise under the conditions of the second demographic transition.

### 3.2.4 Exogamy and ethnicity

So far in this analysis exogamy has been considered in the context of ‘religious’ intermarriage but it is important to recognise that exogamy is just as relevant to inter-ethnic partnership formation as it is to inter-religious unions. For example, Qian and Lichter (2001:305) have noted in the United States that when people of ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Asian’ (especially East Asian) origin marry a person of a different ‘ethnic’ group, most marry ‘Whites’ rather than people from the other dominant ethno-racial groups in that country. They have also described how ‘second- or third-generation Japanese Americans are more successful economically than their first-
generation counterparts’ and are also more likely to be in ethnically exogamous relationships (ibid:292; also see Lieberson and Waters (1988:Chapter 7) for a thorough analysis of this with respect to American census data).

It has been emphasised that Jews should be considered as much an ‘ethnic’ group as a ‘religious’ group (Kosmin, 1999a; Kosmin and Waterman, 1989; see Chapter 3, section 2.4.2, p137 above). For Jews, ethnicity is an ascribed characteristic especially for those who choose to identify Jewishly but not religiously. In Israel, where the majority of the population describes its religious identity as ‘Jewish’, ethnicity plays an important role in multicultural politics. Okun (2004:174) has compared ethnic differentiation in Israel to that found in the United States: ‘The gap in socioeconomic status between Jewish ancestry groups in Israel, however, is similar to that of some immigrant Hispanic and Asian groups in the United States today.’ In Israel the notion of Jewish intermarriage therefore focuses on inter-ethnic marriage. For example, Okun has noted ‘very significant’ ‘endogamy’ within certain sub-groups: Jews of Asian origin, African (Maghrebian) origin and European origin (2001:54-56)—a triple melting pot, she wonders? More recently she suggests that ‘there have been very large and significant increases in ethnic intermarriage between Mizrachim [Eastern] and Europeans, producing a large ‘mixed-ethnic’, but predominantly Jewish, group (ibid:63; Okun, 2004).

As was shown in Chapter 4, Jews in Britain are an invisible sub-group within a vast ‘White-ethnic’ category. Unfortunately, data were not obtained relating to partnership outcomes for the 14,000 people who wrote ‘Jewish’ into the ethnicity question and these data represent an interesting possibility for future research.
However, it is possible to briefly examine the ‘official’ ethnicity data pertaining to Jews. Table 24 shows that the majority of ‘White’ Jews have ‘White’ partners. The data (limited here to married couples) show that only 1,335 Jewish men and 1,272 Jewish women had a ‘non-White’ spouse, and this person was most likely to be labelled ‘Other Ethnic’ and least likely to be ‘Black’. This also has implications for the role of propinquity: given that Jews are concentrated in London, and that London has the highest concentration of ‘non-White’ groups in the country, it should be surprising from a theoretical standpoint that so few Jews are married to ‘non-Whites’. Though the data do show that there is a slight increase due to geography as noted above, only 2.7% of married Jews in London have a ‘non-White’ spouse (Table 24). The propinquity argument surely predicts otherwise?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Ethnicity’ of spouse</th>
<th>London</th>
<th>Rest of England and Wales¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>87.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other White</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not White</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0701 - see Appendix
¹ Note this may include areas directly adjacent to London such as Southern Hertfordshire whose inhabitants may consider themselves to be ‘Londoners’.

### 3.3 Jewish exogamy, migration and achieved status

#### 3.3.1 Exogamy, migration and immigration

Assimilationist theory argues that over time, the social distance between different groups in a specified place declines as social barriers are overcome, citizenship is gained, local languages are learnt, and immigrants are socialised in the schools and

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80 Calculations based on table C0701 - see Appendix.
workplaces of the ‘natives’ (Qian and Lichter, 2001; Cohen, 1977; Gordon, 1964). With subsequent generations structural assimilation develops with intermarriage occurring between the ‘immigrants’ and the ‘hosts’ (Okun, 2004:173). However, some immigrants, especially those from small groups, may move precisely because they are searching for an endogamous partner. Indeed this is what Monahan (1973:198) discovered for Jews in Indiana. He noted relatively high rates of ‘non-residence’ (i.e. in-migration) for either one or both partners in endogamous couples, which he argued was an indication of a wider search for a Jewish partner. He did not find evidence to suggest similar levels of migration for Jewish exogamous couples however he did note that it was more likely both individuals were ‘non-residents’, i.e. Jews had moved away with their non-Jewish spouse, following an exogamous union.

In Britain, Holman and Holman’s (2002:29) study of strictly Orthodox Jews in Stamford Hill revealed extremely high levels of ‘non-residence’. Less than 30% of spouses of adult children of their interviewees had been born in London and only 45% had been born in the UK. Other more recently available data, based on the addresses posted next to Orthodox engagement announcements, point to similar conclusions regarding the strictly Orthodox more generally (Vulkan and Graham, 2008). This group is dispersed geographically and concentrated locally in relatively small pockets. These data suggest individuals are highly mobile and prepared to engage in a very broad search for a suitable partner. Thus, though residential propinquity is most extreme for this group, as evidenced by the Census data
(Graham et al., 2007), it is clear that other processes are operating to maintain (endogamous) Jewish distinctiveness.

Of the non-strictly Orthodox Jewish population in Britain, i.e. the vast majority, migration plays a rather different role in people’s lives. Data from the 2001 Census revealed that the majority of this group (83.2%) was born in the UK. The most recent significant waves of Jewish immigration to Britain were in the 19th century (Lipman and Lipman, 1981) with some sporadic but fairly small waves from Continental Europe prior to the outbreak of World War II, and since then from the Middle East and South Africa. Most recently, Jewish immigration has originated from Israel, West European and American destinations largely as a result of Britain’s, and especially London’s, position as a financial centre. This city has traditionally acted as a locus for immigrants and a smaller proportion of the general population is ‘native’ (Hamnett, 2003:103-127).

The Census data enable us to examine the partnership patterns of foreign born Jews. The three largest foreign born, married Jewish sub-groups by country of birth (excluding Scotland) were from South Africa, Israel and the USA. Of these three groups, South African born Jews were most likely to have a spouse of homogamous origin (39.9%) (see Table 25). Only 25.4% of American born Jews and 19.9% of Israeli born Jews had spouses from their ‘home’ countries. It is likely that this is a result of UK born Jews visiting the United States or Israel, forming partnerships in

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81 Also includes strictly Orthodox figures. Author’s calculation based on table S150 for England and Wales - see Appendix.
82 The choice of these three groups limits this analysis to mostly post-War ‘modern’ migration; pre-War migration was predominately European in origin.
those countries and returning to Britain with their partner. A more speculative explanation relates to the older median age of South African born Jews (42.7 years), which is similar to that of the national Jewish population (43.4 years), compared with the younger American born group (36.4 years) and Israeli born group (33.8 years).\textsuperscript{83} Though there are no data relating to year of migration, it is tempting to surmise that many South African Jews migrated during the latter apartheid years of the 1970s and 1980s after forming families in South Africa, whereas American and especially Israeli immigrants are more likely to have arrived in Britain unmarried. Nevertheless, it is \textit{where people meet} that is of primary interest here and unfortunately neither the Census nor the surveys can provide any data to elucidate this issue.

Table 25 Place of birth of spouse for Jews\textsuperscript{1} born in South Africa or Israel or the USA, \%, England and Wales\textsuperscript{2}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of birth of spouse</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,472</td>
<td>2,995</td>
<td>2,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (excluding UK)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia\textsuperscript{c}</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other\textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0483 - see Appendix
\textsuperscript{1} Jewish also includes all responses to ethnicity write-in = ‘Jewish’
\textsuperscript{2} Columns may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.
\textsuperscript{a} The majority of the ‘UK’ group are English born; \textsuperscript{b} The majority of the ‘Africa’ group are South African born (some are from Zimbabwe); \textsuperscript{c} The majority of the ‘Asia’ group are Israeli born (some others are from the wider Middle East); \textsuperscript{d} The majority of the ‘Other’ group are American born.

\textsuperscript{83} Author’s calculations based on tables C0484 and S149 - see Appendix
Table 26 reveals that there is an idiosyncratic spatiality to ‘foreign born’ married Jews. They are considerably overrepresented in London, even by Jewish clustering standards, but underrepresented elsewhere in the country. Married American born Jews show distinct spatial bias towards Inner London; almost half (46.5%) of this group lives there compared with 14.5% of married Jews generally. South African and Israeli born Jews show very similar spatial patterns despite substantially different age structures between the two groups (see above).

Table 26 Location of married Jewish individuals by country of birth, %, England and Wales¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>All married Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>3,294</td>
<td>3,592</td>
<td>3,258</td>
<td>111,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner London</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer London</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of E&amp;W</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0484 and C0695 - see Appendix ¹ Columns may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.

Table 27 Religion of spouse for Jewish¹ individuals born in South Africa, Israel or the USA, %, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion of Spouse</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>All Jews in England and Wales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>2,472</td>
<td>2,995</td>
<td>2,806</td>
<td>111,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion + RNS + Other²</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0483 and C0400 - see Appendix ¹ Jewish also includes all responses to the ethnicity write-in option ‘Jewish’ ² ‘Other’ refers to non-Jews but the data could not be separated out for the three subgroups. Counts are likely to be very small.

Data relating to foreign born Jewish exogamy are shown in Table 27. American born Jews again differ from their Israeli born and South African born counterparts. They
were more than twice as likely to have a non-Jewish, in this case Christian, spouse as either of the other two groups. They were also much more likely to have a spouse of ‘No Religion’ or RNS. It is therefore likely that American Jews bring with them more liberal attitudes towards interfaith marriage, attitudes which are reflected in the literature relating to this group (see for example Fishman, 2004; Gan et al., 2008).

The lack of data relating to the religious end/exogamy of European born Jews gives these data a frustrating feel of incompleteness. Nevertheless, the data in Table 27 suggest that the notion of immigrants intermarrying more with succeeding generations (Gordon, 1964; Qian and Lichter, 2001) is not necessarily true, or at least not as simple as this idea suggests. The ‘immigrants’ are more intermarried than the UK born population who are mostly the descendents of immigrants three to five generations ago. They are also more likely to have spouses who reported ‘No Religion’.

3.3.2 Exogamy and educational homogamy
Kalmijn et al. (2006:1347) argue that ‘the degree to which members of ethnic and religious groups marry within rather than outside their group is often viewed as an indicator of the strength of ascription in society.’ *Ascribed* status refers to the labels that we inherit such as religious, cultural, ethnic and racial identifiers. As ascription declines, intermarriage, so the theory goes, rises (ibid). Conversely *achieved* status refers to the labels that derive from our own achievements, those that individuals acquire for themselves through their own actions and behaviour including educational achievements and occupations. As ascription declines, achieved status takes on greater significance. (Clearly, some statuses, such as religion, class and race
can be both achieved and ascribed; indeed migrant and immigrant statuses can also be achieved and ascribed.)

In the following analysis the by-product thesis must be borne in mind, which is that if a population is culturally and socio-economically homogeneous, status homogamy will occur by default (a by-product) of any effort to achieve cultural endogamy (Kalmijn, 1998:409). So, if educational and occupational homogamy are found to be common among married Jewish couples this may not necessarily mean that partnership decisions have been made based on socio-economic statuses as some have suggested (DellaPergola, 1972:202). Any observed status homogamy may simply be the result of an overriding preference for endogamy.

According to structural theories of assimilation ‘education and the educational system play key roles in the structural assimilation of groups because they promote universalistic and democratic norms, which tend to break down group barriers’ (Gordon, 1964; Gullickson, 2006:675). For example, Kalmijn (1991:797) cites American data on Catholic/Protestant intermarriage which increased ‘dramatically’ between the 1920s and 1980s, in line with increases in educational homogamy, especially at the higher educational levels (ibid:797; see also Williams and Lawler, 2001). However sociological theories, such as status exchange, suggest that education introduces its own stratifying effects to society (ibid:674). This is because education (achieved status) offers a good indicator of potential economic success and future earnings so is used by individuals when making partnership decisions (Kalmijn, 1991:789). Education also moulds people’s value systems affecting their attitudes towards life in general (ibid). Thus education influences preferences in a
partnership market and it is suggested that through educational assortative marriage (homogamy), couples will tend to have similar educational backgrounds (Lieberson and Waters, 1988:211-3; Mare, 1991; Okun, 2004; Schwartz and Mare, 2005).

Mare (1991:16) has argued that the more time a group of people spend in the same educational institution, the more homogeneous their educational status becomes. It therefore follows that if an institution is also culturally homogeneous, or at least culturally skewed, then there should also be an increased level of cultural homogamy ensuing. The opportunity/preference approach (discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.1.2 p154) offers a useful way for understanding the complex relationships involved in producing such homogamy. Higher education not only provides greater opportunity to meet similarly educated people, but it may also increase preference for better educated partners (Kalmijn, 1991:797; 1998:418).

Crucially education does not take place ‘on the head of a pin’, to paraphrase Soja (1994:31-32); for most people education takes place in enclosed, isolated and separated environments (Scholefield, 2004). Such bounding in space affects the partnership forming opportunities people are presented with especially at higher educational institutions. Further, educational institutions are inherently segregative and often socially homogeneous environments into which people are sorted, and sort themselves. These factors also make this topic highly geographically relevant (see Valins, 2003b). In some instances educational institutions may be culturally or religiously homogeneous, such as Britain’s faith-based schools, which add another segregative factor affecting potential partnership outcomes. A faith school exploits
the social homogenising and physical isolating effects of educational institutions (see Johnston et al., 2008).

Although Kalmijn (1998:409) has argued that ‘preferences for cultural similarity are stronger than preferences for economically attractive spouses’ there has nevertheless been considerable interest in this topic and its relationship with exogamy (Massey and Denton, 1993; Kalmijn, 1991; Mare, 1991; Okun, 2001; Qian and Preston, 1993; Schwartz and Mare, 2005). But as the above summary suggests, this is a complex topic and several possible relationships can be identified between the effects of education and assortative partnership outcomes. These will be discussed in the analysis below.

Figure 18 Responses of parents of school-aged children to the statement, ‘The more time spent in Jewish education, the less likelihood of intermarriage’, %¹

![Figure 18](image)

Source: Author’s calculations based on JPR 2001 London dataset
¹ N=834

Kalmijn et al. (2006:1355-6) have noted that Jewish children who have attended Jewish day-schools have a ‘significantly higher’ chance of forming endogamous partnerships (see also Cohen, 2006; Cohen and Kotler-Berkowitz, 2004). Such
findings have promoted the expansion of Jewish day schooling in Britain (Sacks, 1995a; Valins et al., 2001). It is clear that the parents of Jewish children tend to think it does—Figure 18 shows that there is a general feeling that ‘Jewish education’, which is not necessarily the same as a Jewish school, reduces intermarriage.

However the link may not be quite this clear-cut and it is important to recognise that distinctions must be made between Jewish religious education inside or outside a (Jewish) day-school environment, and secular education inside or outside a (Jewish) day-school environment. We must also distinguish between school education and higher level education (e.g. university). What is taught in (Jewish) school/college is less important than the fact that the school acts as a bounded place of social and spatial isolation (Scholefield, 2004). Indeed there is evidence to suggest that in ‘mainstream’ Jewish day schools children avoid ‘Jewish subjects’ (Valins et al., 2001:80). Further, Miller et al. (1996:12-13) found that Jewish (religious) education plays ‘an insignificant role in predicting outmarriage’ and that the likely key variables were ‘personality characteristics, career factors and opportunistic variables.’ (See also Dashefsky and Lebson, 2002) Assessing what impact the school environment has on endogamy, given that partnerships and especially marriages are not formed until long after leaving it, is clearly difficult. Any assessment must be sure to isolate the effects of the home environment and upbringing from the impact of a particular institution’s curriculum, and the isolatory effects of the bounded environment.
Higher education

It has been noted that higher (secular) education is normative among Jews (UJC, 2003:17-18). In Britain this was demonstrated by Census data on educational achievement. Overall, 20.5% of Jews aged 16 to 24 in England and Wales had achieved Level 4/5 qualifications\textsuperscript{84} compared with 11.5% generally.\textsuperscript{85} In the 25 to 34 year cohort well over half of all Jews (55.7%) had achieved Level 4/5 (compared with 28.9% generally). However, the reality of Jewish heterogeneity means that this statistic cannot stand alone. An important exception is the strictly Orthodox Jewish population.\textsuperscript{86}

Among the rest of the Jewish population there is evidence to suggest that self-selection is occurring at higher educational levels (ages 18 to 24). Younger Jews may be choosing to attend certain institutions to the exclusion of others. By biasing themselves to particular institutions these Jews effectively enhance their opportunity to meet other Jews, an effect not dissimilar to residential concentration. Given that higher education is normative in this population, the biasing to certain institutions will have an exaggerated assortative outcome; crucially any observed educational homogamy is therefore more likely to be a by-product of ethno-religious endogamy.

\textsuperscript{84} Level 4/5 refers to a first degree, higher degree, NVQ levels 4-5, HNC, HND, qualified teacher, medical doctor, dentist, nurse, midwife, or equivalents.
\textsuperscript{85} All calculations in this paragraph are derived from table S158 - see Appendix
\textsuperscript{86} It is ironic that this group has been described as a 'society of learners' (Gonen, 2005) since they significantly underachieve in secular education; in Hackney just 11% of Jews aged 16 to 24 and 23.2% aged 25 to 34 achieved Level 4/5. The educational institutions attended by this group are exclusively Jewish, bounded environments where the emphasis is on religious education (see Gonen, 2006). There is also evidence to suggest that strictly Orthodox boys leave formal education at age 13 to attend yeshivot (Vulkan and Graham, 2008:9). This emphasises the strictly Orthodox view that religious education always takes priority over secular education (ibid; Valins, 2000, 2003b). Further, since all educational institutions in this society are single sex, there is no mechanism for the educational system per se to act as a channel for homogamy, though it does tighten and strengthen the socio-spatial boundaries around the younger members of the group.
A side effect of this is that Jews lacking higher education will encounter a marriage market with fewer potential partners so we might expect to see higher exogamy among less well educated Jews. Indeed, DellaPergola (1991:89) has noted that ‘out-marriage is more frequent among lower than among higher-status [educated] Jews.’ However, this contradicts the idea that long term higher education increases exogamy (due to the opportunity to meet people from different cultural backgrounds and its moulding effects on preferences for such (better educated) people). In addition, there is a belief that higher education is associated with weakening religious commitments and ethnic ties (UJC, 2003; Voas and Day, 2007:106), which suggests exogamy should be more prevalent among better educated than lesser educated Jews (Mare, 1991:413).

Data from the 2001 Census can be used to assess whether or not Jewish students are being selective in terms of their locational decisions for higher education. In England and Wales there were 6,928 full-time students aged 18 to 24, accounting for 2.7% of all Jews enumerated in England and Wales (12,482 economically inactive, fulltime Jewish students aged 16 to 24 of which 5,554 were aged 16 or 17 and unlikely to be at university/college). However in certain LADs/UAs known to have large universities or colleges, Jews aged 18 to 24 were substantially overrepresented. For example, 11.5% of all Jewish students in England and Wales aged 16 to 24 were in Leeds compared with 2.6% in the general population. I.e. Jewish students are overrepresented in Leeds by a factor of 4.4. Similar overrepresentation was seen in

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87 All calculations in this paragraph are derived from tables S149 and S153 - see Appendix  
88 This is based on 6,948 Jewish students nationally; data for London have been excluded in order to control for the bias of Jewish schoolchildren in the Capital.
Manchester LAD (3.5), Cambridge (3.2), Oxford (2.9), Birmingham (2.2), Bristol (1.9), Nottingham (1.6) and Liverpool (1.5). This suggests that Jews are deliberately congregating at certain universities although establishing the exact motivations requires further investigation.

**Educational homogamy**
The data also allow us to observe the outcomes of partnership formation and its relationship to religious exogamy and educational heterogamy. The ideas and relationships described in the literature (see the above discussion) can be explored using the Census data. Theory implies that better educated couples will exhibit more exogamy than their lesser educated counterparts, because of the assumed eroding impact of education on religious beliefs and because university students have spent longer in bounded secular environments and so have had greater opportunities to meet non-Jewish partners.

Census data presented in Table 28 do seem to confirm this, albeit with some important caveats. Married Jewish men and women with higher level qualifications were less likely to be in endogamous partnerships than Jewish men and women with no qualifications. In part this may be explained by the strictly Orthodox who marry endogamously but are more likely to have no qualifications. In terms of exogamy the differences were marginal though still as theoretically expected—better educated Jews were more exogamous. In addition, a relationship between education and ‘No Religion’ is evident—Jews with higher levels of educational achievement were considerably more likely to have a spouse reporting ‘No Religion’ than those with no qualifications.
Table 28 Partnership combination for married Jewish individuals by educational achievement and gender, for all people aged 16 to 75, %, England and Wales²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion of spouse</th>
<th>Married Jewish males</th>
<th>Married Jewish females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No qualifications</td>
<td>Level 4/5 ¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish (endogamy)</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Jewish (exogamy)</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0699 - see Appendix

¹ Level 4/5 [not disaggregated by ONS] = First degree, Higher Degree, NVQ levels 4-5, HNC, HND, Qualified Teacher, Medical Doctor, Dentist, Nurse, Midwife, or equivalents.

² Columns may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.

Table 29 Proportion of partnerships that are educationally homogamous (at Level 4/5*) by partnership combination, by gender, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion of spouse</th>
<th>Married Jewish Men</th>
<th>Married Jewish Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish (endogamy)</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>14,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Jewish (exogamy)</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>3,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>1,114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0699 - see Appendix

* See note ¹ Table 28.

The ‘status exchange’ hypothesis states that endogamy is sacrificed if a partner of high(er) (educational) status can be obtained; i.e. *that exogamous couples will be more educationally homogamous than endogamous couples*. Table 29 shows Census data for married Jewish individuals who have achieved Level 4/5 qualifications. It can be seen that exogamous Jewish men are indeed more likely to have educationally homogamous spouses (64.0%) than endogamous Jewish men (58.6%), suggesting the theory is correct. However, this is not the case for Jewish women. Whereas 64.5% of exogamous Jewish women had educationally homogamous spouses, for endogamous women the proportion was 70.4%, i.e., Jewish women who marry
exogamously not only sacrifice endogamy but also sacrifice educational homogamy, contra theory. But the biggest effect occurred when partners reported ‘No Religion’. Over three-quarters of Jewish men and women had educationally homogamous spouses of ‘No Religion’.

Explaining these results is very challenging without other complementary data. It may be that Jewish women seeking high educational attributes in a spouse are most likely to find these among Jewish men, hence their high endogamy, i.e. for well educated Jewish women educational homogamy is a by-product of endogamy. Whereas for highly educated Jewish men, it is possible (though unproven) that such homogamy is more likely to be achieved at the cost of sacrificing endogamy. But one aspect of these data is less ambiguous; educational homogamy is most likely to occur when spouses report ‘No Religion’. Since high education correlates with reporting ‘No Religion’ (Voas and Day, 2007), then a Jew seeking an educationally homogamous spouse is more likely to find that that person reports ‘No Religion’ almost by default—a by-product.

3.3.3 Exogamy, homogamy and socio-economic status
Age at first marriage among Jews in Britain is 29 for women and 31 for men (Graham and Vulcan, 2007) so longer term partnerships are not being formed at ages when people are still in formal education. Thus the role of the workplace on status homogamy and exogamy among Jews should be examined. According to Houston et al. (2005), workplaces are important ‘places of encounter’ which provide opportunities to mix with those of similar socio-economic backgrounds but with
different cultural backgrounds. And unlike those at universities, people at work are more likely to be at partnership forming ages.

The literature suggests that the higher a (Jewish) person’s status the more likely it is that they will form exogamous partnerships compared with those of lower status (Lowenstein, 2005:37). This derives in part from Gordon’s (1964) structural thesis which predicts a population assimilates as it becomes more socially and economically similar to the ‘host’ society, which makes those individuals more attractive marriage propositions for the ‘native’ population (Keysar et al., 1991:49). Further, Barron (1946:9) and Lowenstein (2005:26) have argued that throughout Jewish history Jews have ‘intermarried’ more in prosperous times than in times of economic depression and social oppression. Lowenstein (ibid) cites the popular example of pre-War German Jews whose prosperity allowed a certain ‘acceptance’ into mainstream society which went hand in hand with intermarriage (see also Cohen, 1977).

However, this logic is in direct contradiction to the theory of status exchange (Davis, 1941; Merton, 1941). This predicts that lower status Jews are more prone to exogamy than higher status Jews; endogamy is more likely to be sacrificed if a non-Jewish partner with a higher social status can be obtained (known as ‘status hypergamy’ (Kalmijn, 1993:121)). Similarly, if the person’s status is below the average for the group then they may not be able to find a partner of similar status. In such cases the alternative to exogamy may be no partnership formation at all. Examining the data from pre-World War II Germany and Austria, Lowenstein
(2005:37) noted Jews who intermarried tended to be poorer, not richer. (See also, Monahan, 1973:202; van Rahden, 2000)

Employment type

There is evidence to suggest that the type of self-selection occurring among Jewish students in terms of particular universities is also occurring in terms of work. Jews have been shown to exhibit similar proclivities towards particular work types and places. For example, Jews are far more likely to engage in self-employment than average. This has been found in multiple British studies (Kosmin and Grizzard, 1975:27; Kosmin et al., 1976; 1975:20; Kosmin and Levy, 1981:19; Schmool and Cohen, 1998:25; Waterman and Kosmin, 1986a:44; see also Aldrich et al., 1981 regarding ‘Asians’). The 2001 Census confirmed these findings, showing that 14.2% of all economically active people in England and Wales were self-employed either part- or full-time, which compared with 30.5% of Jews.89 Self-employment allows a person to increase the control over when they work (for example avoiding the Sabbath), who they work with and for and where they work.

Studies have also noted Jewish preferences towards particular professions and occupation types (see further Waterman, 1989; Waterman and Kosmin, 1986a). Again such a bias was noted in the Census. In terms of industry, out of 61 different industrial categories, Jews were nearly three times as likely to be in ‘Real estate activities’ (N=5,689), and twice as likely to be in ‘Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation’ (N=2,513) and ‘Other business activities’ (N=25,480) (see Table 30). By choosing certain types of work Jews are consciously, or otherwise,

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89 For all people aged 25 and above. Author’s calculations based on table S153 - see Appendix
increasing their chances of working with other Jews which in turn increases endogamous partnership opportunities.

Table 30 Industrial sectors* in which people aged 16 to 74 were in employment in the week before the 2001 Census, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>General population, % (N=31,295,702)</th>
<th>Jewish % (N=150,648)</th>
<th>Ratio of Jewish over-representation in sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real estate activities</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Other’ business activities</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities of membership organisations</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreational, cultural and sporting activities</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer and related activities</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail and wholesale</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture of wearing apparel</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-territorial organisations and bodies</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table M306 - see Appendix
* This is part of a list of 61 different categories and is limited to sectors in which Jews were at least 1.5 times as likely to be present as the general population.

In addition, the Census data also showed that Jews are highly geographically concentrated in terms of workplace location. For example, the first quartile (N=29,133) of Jews in London and the South-east aged 16 to 74 and in employment the week before the Census, worked in just 23 out of 2,126 wards. The three wards of ‘Farringdon Without’, ‘West End’ and ‘St James’s’ accounted for 9.53% of all working Jews. Similarly high levels of concentration were noted nationally; over half (51.9%) of all Jews aged 16 to 74 in employment the week before the Census in England and Wales worked in 12 out of 376 LADs. Such workplace propinquity is

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90 Author’s calculations based on table C0646c - see Appendix
91 Author’s calculations based on table C0647c - see Appendix
a little recognised and rarely studied aspect of Jewish partnership formation. These data suggest that Jews in Britain are being selective when choosing workplaces.

4 Jewish exogamy and propinquity

In Chapter 3 I discussed the theoretical and empirical work that has been carried out on ‘residential segregation’. Theory states that if a population is large in a certain place then the *opportunity* for (single) in-group people meeting each other is enhanced (Kalmijn et al., 2006:1356; Lieberson and Waters, 1988:205-09). However, a population need not be absolutely large in order to achieve this outcome; by clustering together it is argued, small populations can artificially increase their apparent group size and in effect mimic the milieu of a large group (Peach, 1974:641). Either way, it is therefore assumed that endogamy will be greater in areas where the group is (absolutely or relatively) large; that an inverse relationship exists between exogamy and propinquity (Duncan and Lieberson, 1959). This relationship has been confirmed in subsequent studies (Davidson and Widman, 2002:402; Kalmijn et al., 2006; Peach, 1974, 1980; Waite, 2002:46).

Empirical evidence based on Jews in the United States also supports these findings (UJC, 2003). It was noted that exogamy was not geographically uniform across the country. In particular, where Jewish population densities were high (such as the North-eastern seaboard), rates were relatively low (25% of all currently married Jews) but where Jewish population densities were low, such as the West of the United States, it found that 42% of currently married Jews had a spouse who was not

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92 Note that Ellis et al. (2004) have carried out a study of the role of the workplace on racial mixing in the United States.
Jewish (ibid:17). Rates in the South and the Mid-west were located between these two extremes.

For the first time, the 2001 Census data provide an opportunity to empirically examine this relationship, to see the extent to which Jewish exogamy correlates with residential segregation. However, from the outset the relationship is confused due to the blurred boundaries of exogamy; i.e. account needs to be taken of couples consisting of Jews partnered to people reporting ‘No Religion’ or to non-respondents (RNS). In addition, it is necessary to distinguish between married and cohabiting couples, something that has rarely been done in past studies.

As noted, it is important to account for the relative size of a group in an area and therefore scale matters. When the data are analysed at the level of Government Office Region (GORs)—in which Jews are outnumbered, on average, by 200 to 1—it is difficult to see a clear relationship between population size and exogamy emerging. Figure 19 presents these data but no clear relationship is discernable. It can be seen that Outer London, the GOR with the largest number of married couples in which at least one partner reported ‘Jewish’, does have the highest level of endogamy. However, the North East has the smallest Jewish population and the fifth highest level of endogamy, a fact explained by the location of a religious seminary in Gateshead. Conversely, the South East contains a relatively large Jewish population that exhibits fairly high levels of exogamy.
Figure 19 Partnership combination for all married couples in which at least one partner reported ‘Jewish’, by GOR, England and Wales¹

Source: Author’s calculations using table C0695 - see Appendix

¹ It should be noted that these data fail to include couples where no ‘Jewish’ response was recorded for ‘born Jews of No Religion/RNS’ in exogamous partnerships. Couples in which both (‘Jewish’) members chose not to volunteer their religion are also missing.

Is a relationship discernable at smaller scales? Figure 20 presents data for 32 of the 33 boroughs (LADs) constituting the political administrative boundary of London. These are far smaller units than the GORs discussed above, in which Jews are ‘only’ outnumbered, on average, by 48 to 1. Together these 32 districts constitute over 56% of the Britain’s Jewish population.³ At this scale it is immediately clear that a relationship appears to exist between propinquity, endogamy and exogamy among married couples. There also appears to be a relationship between propinquity and

³ This is out of 376 LADs in England and Wales. Calculations based on data from ONS table KS07 - see Appendix
partners of Jews reporting ‘No Religion’—fewer couples present (less propinquity), the more likely ‘No Religion’ was reported.

Figure 20 Religion response of spouse for all married couples in which at least one partner reported ‘Jewish’, ordered by number of couples per LAD¹, London

Source: Author’s calculations using table C0695 - see Appendix
¹ Excluding City of London (N=44)

But as with the GOR data, there are also exceptions at this LAD scale. Sutton, Kingston, Hackney, and Hillingdon exhibit relatively high levels of endogamy given the small number of couples recorded, whereas Hammersmith, Kensington, and Richmond exhibit relatively high levels of exogamy. Nevertheless, a cursory analysis clearly suggests that a relationship in accord with Duncan and Lieberson’s (1959) theory: larger Jewish population concentrations are associated with lower exogamy.
Figure 21 Exogamous married Jews (individuals) as a ratio of all Jews aged 16 and above in each LAD. Numbers in cells refer to Location Quotient values¹

Source: Author’s calculations using table C0695 - see Appendix. Map created with MapInfo v7.8 using data from ONS table KS07.

¹ Formula used for LQ calculations: \(((\text{General population} = 7,172,091) / (\text{Jewish population} = 149,789)) * (\text{Jewish LAD} / \text{General population LAD})\)

In Figure 21 I have repeated this exercise but this time I use data for married Jewish *individuals* and compare them with a base population of Jews aged over 15—the ‘at risk’ group. This is a more accurate reflection of the ‘marriage market’ than using data based on couples alone. I have also incorporated a map to display location quotient (LQ) calculations for each LAD which provides a visual and quantitative means of assessing the degree of Jewish concentration for each LAD (see also Kosmin and Grizzard’s (1975:19-20) analysis). Figure 21 also shows clear evidence of high Jewish marital endogamy (light shading) in the northern and western districts
of London, areas in which Jews are relatively highly concentrated. For example, in Barnet the LQ is 7.11 with less than 5% of the population of marriageable age in exogamous partnerships. By contrast in Bexley (LQ=0.06) in the east, over a quarter of the Jewish population (aged over 15) is in an exogamous marriage. In the seven boroughs with less than 5% exogamy (i.e. the lightest shaded areas) Jews are outnumbered on average by 14 to 1, compared with 123 to 1 in the remaining 26 boroughs.

The final step in this analysis of married couples is to calculate correlation coefficients. Since the variables being tested are dichotomous they are best categorised as ordinal data and therefore Spearman’s rho (\( \rho \)) is the most appropriate statistic (Bryman and Cramer, 1998:57,184). Using the data from all 33 London LADs for married couples in which at least one partner was Jewish it is clear that endogamy is strongly and positively correlated with population size (\( \rho = +0.662, \alpha > 0.01 \)); marital exogamy is strongly and negatively correlated with population size (\( \rho = -0.635, \alpha > 0.01 \)). And as noted above, there is also a fairly strong and negative relationship between population size and Jews being married to people of ‘No Religion’ (\( \rho = -0.526, \alpha > 0.01 \)). The relationship with non-responding partners (RNS) was however ambiguous (\( \rho = -0.249 \) and not significant) which is unsurprising and bolsters support for the validity of these results in general. Thus for married couples the inverse relationship suggested by Duncan and Lieberson in 1959 appears to hold for Jews in London. (Calculations based on Jewish married individuals were as follows: endogamy \( \rho = +0.820 (\alpha > 0.01) \); exogamy \( \rho = -0.785 (\alpha > 0.01) \) i.e. even stronger relationships.)
Having established that an inverse relationship between exogamy and propinquity is apparent in the Census data for married couples, I will now examine the data for cohabitating couples. Figure 22 shows at the LAD level, and as was the case for married Jews, cohabital endogamy does more or less correlate with population size at the LAD scale. Again there is the odd exception—Kensington, Lambeth, Barking, and Hillingdon—but perhaps of greater interest here is the lack of any symmetrical relationship between cohabital exogamy (Jews to non-Jews) and propinquity, i.e. the data suggest that the size of the Jewish population in an LAD appears to be unrelated to the extent of exogamy among cohabiting Jews.
Figure 23 Exogamous cohabiting Jews (individuals) as a proportion of all Jews aged 16 and above in each LAD (regardless of partnership status). Numbers in cells refer to Location Quotient (LQ) values.

Source: Author’s calculations based on ONS tables C0695 and KS07 using MapInfo v7.8.

1 Formula for LQ calculations: \[ \frac{((\text{General population} = 7,172,091) / (\text{Jewish population} = 149,789) \times (\text{Jewish LAD} / \text{General population LAD}))}{1} \]

Why has this asymmetrical relationship—whereby cohabital endogamy appears to be related to population size but cohabital exogamy does not—arisen? Though it may be a product of the very small data counts in several boroughs, there are probably other factors and social processes operating. The map in Figure 23 presents data for cohabiting Jewish individuals and plots the LQ for each borough. The neat pattern seen in the data for Jewish married couples (Figure 21 above) is far less apparent. Whilst cohabital endogamy is relatively high in the LADs with the largest LQs,
cohabital exogamy is not. It is possible the centripetal tendency for cohabiting couples to locate close to inner city areas is affecting the locational decisions but this cannot be determined with these data.

When the proportion of cohabiting couples is correlated with the total number of couples per LAD it is found that a strong positive relationship exists between Jewish endogamous cohabitation and couple population size ($\rho = +0.752$, $\alpha > 0.01$). Indeed this correlation is even stronger than the one for married couples noted above ($\rho = +0.662$). However for Jews cohabiting exogamously the correlation, whilst remaining negative, is weaker ($\rho = -0.440$, $\alpha > 0.01$) than that for exogamous married couples ($\rho = -0.635$).

What has this analysis shown? It has confirmed Duncan and Lieberson’s (1959) conjecture that (marital) exogamy is inversely related to propinquity (here measured by population size). But it has also shown that this relationship does *not* hold for cohabiting couples. It is interesting to consider what factors and processes are involved here but the Census data reveal little more. It is possible that Jewish endogamous cohabittees look upon their partnership statuses differently to their exogamous counterparts? For example, it is possible, though unproven, that endogamous couples are more likely to consider themselves in pre-marital cohabitations (perhaps many of them are engaged to be married?), whereas the exogamous couples may be more likely to consider their partnership status as permanent or that eventual marriage is less of a concern than other factors such as

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94 Calculations based on Jewish cohabiting *individuals* were similar: endogamy $\rho = +0.795$ ($\alpha > 0.01$); exogamy $\rho = -0.524$ ($\alpha > 0.01$). As with married individuals these are statistically stronger relationships.
‘happiness’ (as per Schoen and Weinick, 1993). Once again, qualitative data, or at least focused quantitative data, would be most instructive.

5 Discussion: what is the role of propinquity in Jewish exogamy?

This analysis has shown that multiple factors—social, spatial and demographic—must be taken into account in any assessment of endogamy and exogamy in society. Single statistics, be they holistic intermarriage rates or segregation indices, will not suffice if the aim is to understand the processes that produce either ‘intermarriage’ or ‘segregation’. Neither fears of splitting apart (the separate/parallel lives narrative) nor fears of coming together (the narrative of doom) are accurate in this case. Rather they are clouded by the oversimplification of highly complex social processes which affect different sections of the same group in different ways and in different places. Geographers must take account not only of space but also of demographic and social factors involved in producing partnership outcomes. The heterogeneity of a group must be carefully considered since age, gender, religiosity, as well as education and socio-economic status, impact on the extent to which a person is ‘at risk’ of exogamy.

What has this analysis revealed about the role of propinquity in producing exogamy? According to Duncan and Lieberson (1959), as well as subsequent studies by Peach (1974, 1980a), there is an inverse relationship between exogamy and propinquity. And to a certain extent this relationship was also evident in the Census data. However, this was only true for marital exogamy, not cohabital exogamy. Further, demonstrating such a correlation exists, at least in the case of married couples, does
not explain how or why it occurs. As has been noted, a great many factors beyond propinquity are involved in the formation of partnerships and therefore the correlation between exogamy and propinquity is unhelpful and possibly misleading. It implies that proximity alone may be a factor in producing endogamy, but this is questionable. A key predictor of Jewish endogamy is religiosity but religiosity also correlates with congregation. Further, Jewish population density, even in the ‘most Jewish’ wards of London, is simply not great enough to account for the high levels of endogamy observed there by proximity alone.

The key issue here is scale and it matters for two different reasons. First, without sufficiently ‘fine grained’ data, no correlation between exogamy and propinquity is evident in these data on Jews. I.e., the choice of scale directly impacts on the results obtained. But second, this analysis suggests that propinquity matters but not at the neighbourhood level. Its importance most likely lies literally elsewhere, in the micro-localities of universities, workplaces and other bounded institutions of social meeting and mixing. Such places facilitate more intense opportunities to meet ‘suitable’ partners. It is in such ‘intimate places of encounter’ that the ‘everyday geographies of mixing’ take place (Houston et al., 2005:713). Rather than ‘rare’ groups such as Jews artificially increasing their apparent group size at the neighbourhood level replete with already-partnered couples, it is the micro-scale places where the impact of artificial population inflation takes effect. Macro-level propinquity is therefore likely to be a result of propinquinous processes at the micro-level. Scale matters, but in complicated ways.
Throughout this dissertation I have noted that many of the socio-demographic processes affecting Jews can be better understood within the framework of the second demographic transition (SDT), an idea that has garnered only limited interest in the geographic literature. Two aspects of the SDT are of relevance here. First is the associated rise of cohabitation, and second is the rise of secularisation as measured by the reporting of ‘No Religion’. As per Schoen and Weinick’s (1993) findings, this analysis also found that cohabitation is associated with greater levels of exogamy (religious heterogamy) than marriage. Therefore, if cohabitation continues to rise as a proportion of all ‘Jewish partnerships’, it is likely that exogamy will also become more prevalent. Further, this analysis also demonstrated that Jewish exogamy closely correlates with strength of ‘religious’ sentiment and therefore, as secularisation rises, Jewish exogamy also rises. Thus, for at least two different reasons the conditions of the SDT will increase Jewish exogamous behaviour, which in turn will contribute to a decline in ‘religious fertility’ (Voas, 2003:94). Children of exogamous couples may not be raised as Jews, but also exogamy reduces actual fertility since exogamous unions are less ‘religious’ than endogamous unions and religiosity is a key proximate determinate of fertility (see Chapter 7, Section 02.4.2, p371 below). But there may also be a third, spatial impact of the SDT: marital exogamy is associated with residential dispersal, demonstrated by the data for Jews in south London. Thus, the SDT may stimulate social processes that lead to spatial dispersal, thereby reversing the Jewish tendency towards residential congregation.

Finally, whilst this analysis has demonstrated the breadth of what can be assessed using quantitative data it has also shown the limits of such data. It has not been
possible to examine whether educational homogamy, for example, is an intentional outcome or the by-product of a meeting in an educational institution or workplace. Educational homogamy may simply be a by-product of a Jewishly endogamous partnership. Further, these data are *ex post facto*; they relate only to partnerships that have already crystallised. No information is available here about people’s motivations when searching for a partner, nor how they met or where they met, and having done so, where they subsequently moved to, if anywhere else. What lengths did people go to to ensure an endogamous partnership outcome? Indeed, what counts as endogamous/exogamous to them? Finally, what social and spatial compromises, choices and sacrifices were made in terms of compatibilities? Such questions are central to understanding the social and spatial (re)production of groups like the Jews, questions that narratives of doom distract us from answering.
Chapter 7

‘Jewish households’: a critique

I noted in Chapter 3 that scholars have become increasingly interested in the complexity of contemporary living arrangements and the ‘fluidity’ of lifestyles. In particular, focus has turned to the micro-scale of the household and household demography. The social and spatial boundaries of the household have become increasingly blurred. As concerns are being raised in the media about ‘family breakdown’ (Ahmed, 2008; Daley, 2006) it is noticeable that a number of critiques of the household have also recently appeared in the geographic literature (Blunt, 2005; Bromley et al., 2007; Gallent, 2007; Marston and Smith, 2001; McDowell, 2007; Wright et al., 2003). However, few of these consider the topic of religion and Jews are overlooked entirely. This is unfortunate given that the ‘Jewish household’ has garnered considerable interest over the years but most studies have tended to be rather descriptive and lacked a critical edge. (See for example, Cromer, 1980; Fishman, 1988, 2004; Heilman, 1984; Holman and Holman, 2002; Newman, 1985; Sacks, 1995a, 1995b; Waite, 2002.) The ‘fluidity of modern lifestyles’ has considerably increased the complexity of households in general and issues of social mixing and ‘intermarriage’, of great concern to many Jewish commentators, can be fruitfully explored by critically examining the ‘Jewish household’.

In addition, the household is central to a key argument I also raised in Chapter 1 regarding ‘residential segregation’. Twenty years ago, Waterman (1989) and Waterman and Kosmin (1987b, 1988) concluded that social processes associated
with ‘residential segregation’ could only be properly understood when data were analysed at ‘minute scales’, such as the household. However, in the years since these conclusions were reached, no studies have attempted to follow up on the issues they raised. With the availability of new, fine-grained data I will explore Jewish residential segregation at the micro-scale of the household for the first time. In particular, I will investigate its significance in terms of the social processes that occur within the household and how these might translate into spatial congregation. I will also explore the complex makeup of the household and suggest that this poses serious problems for the statistical measurement of segregation.

1 The geography and demography of households: an incomplete picture

Since the early 1970s it has been recognised that key changes have occurred to household living arrangements (Bonvalet and Lelièvre, 1997; Buzar et al., 2005; Kuijsten, 1995). The ‘nuclear family’ has been decentred and deinstitutionalised (Buzar et al., 2005:415; Lesthaeghe, 1991; Van da Kaa, 2001). Household living arrangements have become more diverse, dynamic, fluid and complex (Cliquet, 2003; Cook, 2004a; Hardill, 2004:377; ONS, 2003b:9-10; Smith and Jefferies, 2006:18; Wathan et al., 2004). Entirely new arrangements have arisen such as living-apart-together (LAT) and transnational living (Hardill, 2004; Haskey, 2005). These changes have ‘blurred the boundaries’ (Buzar, et al., 2005:414) of traditional readings of the very concept ‘household’. In addition, they have produced a number of distinctive spatial outcomes especially within the urban environment (Hall et al., 1997; Ogden and Hall, 2004, 2000).
However, despite this increased attention there are at least two lacunae in the geographic literature on households. These are the related topics of identity (especially ethnicity and religion) and ‘residential segregation’. Whilst identity within the household has been addressed (Wright et al., 2003; Ellis et al., 2004) most of this work has tended to privilege ‘race’ over ethnicity and especially over religion (see for example, Blunt, 2005; Wathan et al., 2004). De Valk and Billari (2007:201) argue that ‘few insights have been gained into the mechanisms that give rise to ethnic differences in living arrangements.’ To this should be added religion and how such identities factor in structural and spatial outcomes for households.

The complexity of household arrangements (such as people of differing identities living in the same household) has potentially important implications for the geographically familiar territory of residential segregation, something that has seldom been acknowledged. Traditionally focused on the number of individuals in a particular neighbourhood (Brimicombe, 2007; Duncan and Duncan, 1955a; Gorard and Taylor, 2002; Massey and Denton, 1993, 1988, 1989; Peach, 1980a, 1999; Waterman and Kosmin, 1988), the study of residential segregation has rarely addressed underlying complexities within households. The prevailing assumption is that households are internally homogeneous, especially in terms of identity. For example, most studies of residential segregation assume the identities of household members are the same, be they ‘black households/families’ (Goldscheider and Bures, 2003; Massey and Denton, 1989), ‘Catholic households’ (Boal, 1982) or ‘Jewish households/families’ (Newman, 1985; Valins, 2003a; Waite, 2002) etc. Although ‘mixed’ categories are occasionally recognised (see Wright et al., 2003), these are
not only rare but they tend to refer to *individuals* who report a ‘mixed’ (invariably ‘racial’) background (Brimicombe, 2007) rather than households containing a mixture within. An appreciation of the complex makeup of households and the patterns and processes associated with them affords a critical understanding of ‘segregation’, one that is largely overlooked in these studies. Therefore an examination of households containing members with varied identities is required and its relevance to the study of residential segregation and indeed, the very meaning of ‘residential segregation’, needs to be acknowledged.

### 1.1 Theoretical approaches to the household

The household is at once a social and a spatial entity (Marston and Smith, 2001) and therefore its theorisation is necessarily inter-disciplinary. I will draw upon a spatial approach presented by Duncan and Smith (2002) and a sociological approach used by Alba (1991) and Kalmijn et al. (2006).

In Chapter 3 I discussed how opportunity and preference variables contribute to understating partnership markets (Gray, 1987). I argue here that the assessment of household living arrangements, especially their structural and locational outcomes, benefits from this approach. Opportunity factors (such as the ability to afford to live alone) and preference factors (such as decisions about having children) underlie living arrangement outcomes (De Valk and Billari, 2007). Similarly, Hall et al. (1997:163-4) have suggested that changes to household living arrangements are the result of three types of factors: *compositional* (structural variables such as ageing), *propensity* (attitudinal and behavioural variables such as the acceptability of pre-marital cohabitation) and *ability* (enabling variables such as women’s increased
presence in the paid labour market) (see also Ogden and Hall, 2000:368, 2004:93). Hall et al. (op. cit.) make no direct mention of religion or ethnicity but clearly these have the potential to impact on all three factor types.

Duncan and Smith (2002) have developed a spatial typology of households which argues that in the same way there has never been a standard family type over time, neither has there been one over space (ibid:471). Family type is the result of local socio-economic histories which produce geographies of family formations (ibid:478). They present four indices to measure the propensity towards certain types of family formations in a particular area: the extent to which partnered females withdraw from the labour market on becoming mothers; the importance placed on marriage (as opposed to cohabitation) for the purposes of parenting; the relative prevalence of alternatives to the normative ideal ‘heterosexual couple family’; and the level of local divorce to establish the degree to which ‘marriage no longer corresponds to lifelong partnership’.

Duncan and Smith (2002) take a fine grained approach to the geographies of family formations. For example, they contrast ‘typical’ family formation by women in Finland, culturally defined as ‘full-time workers’, with those of women in (former West) Germany, ‘culturally defined as homemakers and carers’ (ibid:472). This approach they argue loses sight of local variations within these populations. They consequently suggest that such variations remain under-researched, noting that ‘mothers in west inner London—a high status and economically buoyant area—may usually have full-time jobs, but they tend to stay within marriage as far as having children is concerned.’ (ibid:481). But Duncan and Smith do not directly address the
role identity might play in these geographies although it is reasonable to assume that spatial variations in religiosity for example, will produce spatial variation (Waterman and Kosmin, 1987a). ‘West inner London’ is also an area where many Jewish mothers are present, indeed one study independently categorised them as carers and workers (Schmool and Miller, 1994).

A sociological approach to household living arrangements has been used by Alba (1991) and Kalmijn et al. (2006) and is based on the notion of transmission. This approach argues that households act as vessels for transmitting identity and culture across generations. ‘[A] socialization that puts an emphasis on the importance of one’s ethno-religious identity leaves a strong mark on its recipients.’ (Kalmijn et al., 2006:1356-57). Miller (1998:237) goes further by arguing that ‘parental religiosity is the most potent determinant of Jewish identity’. Ultimately ‘…great burdens fall on the family and some other “private” institutions (such as social clubs and friendship networks) as the preservers of ethnicity.’ (Alba, 1991:15; also Krausz, 1964:84) Therefore the household is central to the (re)production of identity.

But transmission also has a crucial demographic component which is underplayed in these works. In addition to identity, attitudes towards family formation and other propensity traits affecting behaviour are also developed and transmitted through the household (De Valk and Billari, 2007:203). Thus ‘culturally defined expectations’ of what family should look like (preference and propensity variables) is also determined by ‘ethnic origin’ and, I argue, religion. But the mechanism of such a transmission through the household is highly complex and difficult to demonstrate quantitatively. In part the ‘success’ of transmission is a function of the strength of
parental identity (Alba, 1991; Bibby, 2000:236) which will influence the preferences parents make for their children, such as sending them to certain schools (Gray, 1987; Kalmijn, 1991; Kalmijn et al., 2006). However, it is also a function of other factors such as the strength of ‘family ties’ (De Valk and Billari, 2007) and gender (Stark, 2002). For example the mother’s identity appears to have a greater impact on the identity outcome of children than that of the father (see Williams and Lawler, 2001:477 for a list of such works; Stark, 2002) and greater levels of religiosity have been shown to be associated with stronger family ties (Cohen, 2006:4; Chiswick and Lehrer, 1991:26; Keilman, 2003:16; Lowenstein, 2005:38). But this can be highly complex, since it has been argued by Davey et al. (2001:338) that merely the ‘appearance’ of children in a family is sufficient to ‘trigger’ a sense of obligation and responsibility on the part of parents to develop an ‘ethnic/religious identity’ in their children (see also Schmool et al., 2005:55). If the appearance of a child in the household induces heightened ethno-religious awareness then it follows that the absence of children should be associated with diminished religious adherence.

2 Assessing the ‘Jewish household’

2.1 ‘Jewish households’: the need for a critical approach

Although the broader geographical work has all but ignored ‘Jewish households’ this topic remains prominent in many socio-demographic studies and commentaries focused on Jews. Indeed the centrality of the ‘Jewish household’ or ‘Jewish family’ (often used interchangeably) has been a theme in many works (for example, Cromer; 1974; DellaPergola, 1992; Krausz, 1964; Newman, 1985; Sacks, 1995a and b) especially in terms of its role in the transition of ‘Jewishness’ from parents to
children (Davey et al., 2001; DellaPergola, 1992; Heilman, 1983). However much of
the focus has been on the demise of the normative ‘traditional’ or ‘nuclear’ structure
with little acknowledgement of broader social processes (DellaPergola, 1992;

With the exception of Fishman (1988), studies of the ‘Jewish household’ are rarely
critical, incorporating neither broader contextualisations nor theoretical foundation.
Most of the writing has been subjective, infused with terms such as ‘intact families’,
‘reconstituted families’, ‘un/conventional households’, ‘nuclear’, ‘traditional’ and so
on (DellaPergola, 1991:94, 1992:83; Heilman, 1984:8). Such approaches tend to be
inherently loaded with particular perspectives which assume some kind of pure,
essentialised notion of the ‘Jewish household’ or ‘Jewish family’. Household
complexity is generally dismissed as part of a narrative of doom (Sacks, 1995a)
associated with ‘assimilation’ (Wasserstein, 1996) or ‘modernity’ (Goldscheider and
Zuckerman, 1984).

A critical reading of the ‘Jewish household’ highlights the importance of gender. In
the general literature gender has been shown to be an important factor affecting the
structure of households. For example, the majority of older one-person householders
are female (Ogden and Hall, 2000). But gender is also relevant in terms of the
identity makeup of households. In Chapter 6 it was demonstrated that Jewish women
are less likely to ‘intermarry’ than Jewish men (Section 3.1.3 on page 284). But it
has also been found that mothers have a greater impact on the identity of their
children than fathers (Kalmijn et al., 2006). The complex interrelationship of
religion, gender and household structure requires further examination.
A critical reading also raises important conceptual issues. For example, at what point does a ‘household in which people identified as Jews dwell’ become a ‘Jewish household’? What proportion of people in a household identifying themselves as ‘Jewish’ need to dwell in that household for it to be a ‘Jewish household’? How ‘Jewish’, religiously or ethnically, do the inhabitants of a household have to be? And how permanent must their presence be? Even when such questions are posed they tend to be little more than afterthoughts rather than serious efforts to unravel the complexities of the ‘Jewish household’. For example Waite (2002:48) accepts that the ‘fuzzy’ boundaries of “the Jewish family” ‘make it difficult to characterize’. She presents theoretical examples of ‘Jewish household’ structures (such as father Jewish, mother not, children ‘No Religion’) but bases these on an essentialism privileging the halachic (religious legal) ‘definition’ of Jewish and the nuclear structure.

In sum, the Jewish and general literatures pertaining to households have developed independently. By drawing on the broader literature and taking a more theoretically grounded and critical approach to the ‘Jewish household’, this chapter aims to develop a better understanding of the topic. In so doing, it will insert religion into the geographic literature on households.

2.2 Assessing ‘Jewish household’ structure

In Chapter 3 I noted a distinct philo-familial narrative in the cultural imagination of Jews and this is somewhat reflected in the survey data. When asked whether or not an ‘Emphasis on the family’ was more common among ‘the Jewish community’ than
‘the rest of society’, 84.9% of respondents said it was more common among Jews. In the literature, there are multiple references to the ‘typical’ structure of ‘Jewish households’ being ‘nuclear’ or ‘traditional’ with homogeneous compositions (i.e. all household members are Jewish) with little or no attempt to view the household critically (see Kosmin and Grizzard, 1975; Krausz, 1964; Waite, 2002; Waterman and Kosmin, 1986). For example, DellaPergola (1992:65) has argued that ‘Structurally, Jewish populations were mostly composed of nuclear Jewish households…[and] Jewish familism was one of the cardinal pillars of Jewish community life.’ (ibid). However, there has been some limited acknowledgement that Jewish living arrangements are not quite this straightforward. In the United States Fishman (1988:2) observed that ‘…increasing numbers of Jewish “families” are composed of childless couples and unmarried individuals. For Jews, as for all Americans, the family has become increasingly unconventional.’

The structure of ‘Jewish households’ can be examined using the 2001 Census data which also allow direct comparisons to be made between Jews and other groups. These data can and will be critiqued, but they offer an interesting and unique, if limited, insight. Table 31 shows that the Census recorded 116,330 ‘Jewish households’ in England and Wales of which 36.1% were one-person, compared with 30.0% generally, and 56.9% were ‘one-family’ households, compared with 63.3% generally. It therefore appears that contemporary ‘Jewish household’ structures are not only different from the past but also different from the population as a whole; Jews in England and Wales are less likely to live in what the Census labels as

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95 Author’s calculations using JPR’s 1995 dataset (N=2,075)
‘families’. When Jews do live in such ‘family households’ it is less likely that children will be present (32.5% had dependent or non-dependent children compared with 38.9% generally) despite a philo-familial narrative in Jewish cultural discourse (Fishman, 1988:1-2; Schmool and Miller, 1994:48; Waite, 2002:38).

Table 31 Household structure based on ONS’s household categorisations and the HRP method², Jewish and general population³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household structure¹</th>
<th>England and Wales</th>
<th>Hampstead Garden Suburb (ward)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>21,660,475</td>
<td>116,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pensioner</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘One family’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All pensioner</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married couple</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no children</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one or more DC</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all children non-DC</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabiting couple</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no children</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one or more DC</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all children non-DC</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lone parent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all children non-DC</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Other’ households</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all student</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all pensioners</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table S151 - see Appendix
¹ DC = Dependent Child(ren)
² See Table 33 below for an explanation of the method.
³ Columns may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.

A trend of the second demographic transition has been a rise in births occurring outside marriage—‘non-marital births’ (Cliquet, 2003:9). In 2005, more than a quarter of children in Britain were born to cohabiting couples (Barlow et al., 2008:33). And children who are brought up predominantly by one parent (usually the mother) are known to experience economic disadvantage (McLanahan, 2004). But
what is the relationship between cultural background and non-marital births? Among Jews, non-marital births are comparatively rare, not least because of a liberal attitude towards contraception (Waite, 2002:40,47; Lasker and Murray, 2001). Table 31 shows that there were relatively few Jewish lone-parent householders (5.6% compared with 9.6% generally and 22.4% for ‘Black households’), and far fewer children in non-marital households (1.3% were cohabiting couples with children compared with 3.5% generally). I argue that understanding cultural components in the production of such outcomes is as important as understanding the economic factors highlighted by McLanahan (op. cit.).

However, a meaningful comparison of ‘Jewish households’ with households more generally requires that geography be taken into account. This is because the Jewish population in England is spatially concentrated (Dorling and Thomas, 2004; Graham et al., 2007; Waterman and Kosmin, 1986c). The local nature of geographies of family formations (Duncan and Smith, 2002) mean it is inappropriate to draw conclusions from national comparatives. Local scales also help mitigate other biases influencing household structures such as socio-economic and educational background and age structures (Martin M, 2006; McLanahan, 2004; Musick and Mare, 2004); the average Jewish position differs somewhat from the general population on these factors.

It can be seen that comparisons at a smaller scale do indeed reveal a rather different picture (see the final two columns of Table 31). The ward of Hampstead Garden

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96 Author’s calculations based on table S106 - see Appendix
97 Author’s calculations based on tables S149, S157 and M298 - see Appendix
Suburb (HGS) in the London Borough of Barnet has the largest Jewish population of any ward in Britain. At this scale the comparison shows that ‘Jewish households’ are actually larger than average and do conform to the pro-family structure. There are relatively few Jewish one-person households (28.8% compared with 36.8% generally) and relatively more Jewish married-couple households (43.9% compared with 31.5%). However other idiosyncrasies remain: there are fewer Jewish cohabiting couple households and fewer Jewish lone-parent households. There are also more Jewish ‘All pensioner’ households.

ONS’s categorisations in Table 31 present further difficulties. Setting aside the non-measurement of more complex structures, such as living-apart-together (LAT) and higher-order homes (second, third homes etc.) this taxonomy oversimplifies structures and confuses categories. ‘All-pensioner households’ fails to distinguish between married and cohabiting couples even though this has been done for the ‘non-pensioner’ couple category. Pensioners themselves are defined differently depending on gender (ONS, 2004c:39) adding further confusion. There is also no space for couples consisting of one pensioner and one non-pensioner, or pensioner couples with non-dependent children, an important omission given the tendency for young adults to delay ‘flying the nest’ (Self and Zealey, 2007; de Valk and Billari, 2007). Households with a mixture of dependent and non-dependent children are also missing. In addition, ONS imposes its own definition of ‘family’, one that simplifies its meaning to the exclusion of complex structures; one-person households are not families despite the possibility of LAT relationships or children from previous partnerships staying at weekends and so on.
2.2.1 Exploring one-person households

Such oversimplifications will be emphasised and where possible, demonstrated. Little else highlights the rise of individualistic values in modern society more than the increasing tendency for people to live alone (Hall et al., 1997; Putnam, 2000). This, along with a decline in fertility, is also one of the main drivers behind the shrinkage of average household size and the concomitant rise in the number of households across Europe (Cliquet 2003; Cook, 2004a and b; Lesthaeghe and Moors, 2000). ‘One of the most notable changes in household composition since 1971 has been the increase in one-person households. In 2005 there were 7 million people living alone in Great Britain compared with 3 million in 1971.’ (Self and Zealey, 2007:16; see also Buzar et al., 2005; Cook, 2004a:116; Ogden and Hall, 2000, 2004:93). Although the increase was most marked in the 1970s and 1980s and has ‘levelled off since 1991’ (Self and Zealey, 2007:16), it is still one of the key changes to household structure in recent decades (Hall et al., 1997). Fishman (1988:1-2) has suggested that the rise of one-person households in the United States from the early 1970s was the result of ‘dramatic changes’ in the ‘social climate…including a lively and much publicised “singles culture,” later marriages, smaller families, increasing divorce rates, high geographical mobility, and chronological segmentation of populations’. In Britain ‘people are spending time living on their own before forming a relationship, after a relationship has broken down, or following the death of a spouse or partner.’ (Self and Zealey, 2007:14). Such ‘transitory periods’ (Bonvalet and Lelièvre, 1997:193) have become more widespread and therefore more important (see also Hall et al., 1997:162).
The definition of living alone however is ‘not unproblematic’ (Ogden and Hall, 2000:368). Even the term ‘single-person household’ can be misleading since a person living alone may not necessarily be ‘single’ in the romantic sense. Similarly the term ‘lone-person household’ suggests isolation, which may be equally misleading (Hall et al., 1997:162; Scott, 1997). What then is a ‘one-person household’? There are many definitions. It may consist of a young or an older person who may be never-married or divorced, separated or widowed, or in a relationship but living-apart-together (Haskey, 2005) (and in theory LATs might also be married). In addition, any of these instances of living by oneself will be either voluntary or involuntary (see also Fishman, 1988:4; Hall, et al., 1997:162); i.e. a lifestyle choice or a lifecycle outcome.

Thus, people living by themselves are an ‘extremely heterogeneous’ group (Bonvalet and Lelièvre 1997:194) in which age and gender are key factors. The largest increase over the past 20 years has been for younger people, aged 25 to 44 years, to live alone. In Britain the proportion of men in this age group who lived alone more than doubled from 7% in 1986 to 15% in 2005; for women the rise was proportionally greater, from 4% to 9% (Self and Zealey, 2007:16-17). Haskey (2001a:8) notes that the proportion of women aged under 50 years who were ‘single’ but not necessarily living alone, grew from 17% in 1976 to 30% in 1998, again a near doubling. And the number of older people living alone has also been rising. But this is not a homogeneous group and a distinction is generally made between the ‘young old’ (aged 65 to 84) and the ‘oldest old’ (those aged 85 and over). The latter group are more likely to live alone and more likely to be in social rented accommodation
(Tomassini, 2006:32). Between the early 1980s and the early 2000s the proportion of oldest-old living alone increased by over a third for men and a quarter for women (ibid:38).

Fishman (1988:2) argues that Jews have ‘epitomised’ the changes which have led to the growth of one-person households, yet there have been few attempts in the literature to explore this increasingly prominent arrangement. Historical analyses of Britain’s Jewish population show that until the 1970s such structures were uncommon. For example, Kosmin and Grizzard (1975:23) noted in Hackney that the main difference between the Jewish and general populations ‘was the smaller proportion of Jewish one-person households’ and this was also the case in Edgware, London (Krausz, 1968b:84-86). The Jewish one-person households that were recorded consisted mostly of elderly females (Kosmin and Grizzard, op. cit; Kosmin et al., 1979:33).

The rising significance of Jewish one-person households can be seen by comparing early survey data with 2001 Census data. For example, in just 23 years the London Borough of Redbridge has experienced dramatic changes to Jewish household structure: the proportion of Jewish married-couple households fell from 62% in 1978 (N=6,493) (Kosmin et al., 1979:33) to 36.8% in 2001 (N=6,486), whilst the proportion of one-person households rose from 11% in 1978 to 32% in 2001.98 Similar changes can be observed for the London Borough of Hackney where the number of one-person Jewish households increased from 20.5% in 1971 (Kosmin

98 Author’s calculations based on table S151 - see Appendix
and Grizzard, 1975:22) to 39.2% in 2001,\textsuperscript{99} and the London Borough of Barnet: one-person Jewish households formed 20.5% in 1981 (Waterman, 1989) and 32.6% in 2001.\textsuperscript{100}

Table 32 One-person households by religion, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Total number of households</th>
<th>% of households = one-person</th>
<th>% of one-person households = 'pensioner'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other religion</td>
<td>76,190</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNS*</td>
<td>1,590,604</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>116,330</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>64,360</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>15,995,596</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>3,140,413</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>411,415</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>172,379</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>93,188</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All households</td>
<td>21,660,475</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table S151 - see Appendix
* RNS = Religion Not Stated

Contemporary Jews are also more likely to live alone compared with other ‘religious groups’, with the exception of ‘Other’ and RNS (see Table 32). Only ‘White Irish’ and ‘Black Caribbean’ are more likely to form one-person households than Jews.\textsuperscript{101}

A similar picture of high proportions of Jews living alone has been noted in the United States (Kosmin et al., 1991:17). Indeed in discussing this tendency Fishman (1988:1-2) suggested that in the United States, ‘the Jewish population has epitomised many of the social changes occurring at large’ such as later marriages and higher levels of divorce.

\textsuperscript{99} Author’s calculations op. cit.
\textsuperscript{100} Author’s calculations op. cit.
\textsuperscript{101} Author’s calculations based on table S106 - see Appendix
But as noted, one-person householders are not a simple, homogeneous group. Table 32 also shows that a high proportion of Jewish one-person households consisted of pensioners (53.0%) and Jews join only ‘Christians’ in consisting of a majority of one-person pensioner households nationally. The age structure of Jews living in one-person households is shown in Figure 24. It is clear that the very high proportion of Jewish one-person householders aged 75 and above (83.5% of which consist of female widows)\textsuperscript{102} produce a skewed distribution. This also produces a gender imbalance among one-person householders: 59.1% were Jewish females, slightly higher than the general imbalance (57.1%). And yet over a quarter (25.5%) of one-person Jewish householders were under 45 years old and in this age group it was Jewish men who predominate (61.7% compared with 30.8% for Jewish women).

Figure 24 Age structure for people in one-person households, Jewish and general population, %, England and Wales

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2001 household SARs dataset

\textsuperscript{102} Author’s calculations using 2001 SARs data.
Figure 25 Sex and marital status of Jewish one-person householders, %, England and Wales

![Bar chart showing the distribution of marital status among Jewish one-person householders by gender.](chart.png)

Source: Author’s calculations based on the 2001 household SARs dataset
* Other = ‘Married (first marriage)’; ‘Remarried’; and ‘Separated (but still legally married)’

Clearly different processes are in operation depending on gender and age. The stark age and gender contrast in Jewish one-person households is partly explained by marriage patterns. For example Figure 25 shows that Jewish men living alone are most likely to be ‘Single (never married)’ whereas women are most likely to be widows. The lower proportion of divorced women is explained by the higher proportion of female single-parents. However it is clear that considerably more could be learnt if individual life stories were examined which requires an additional investigation using longitudinal data. Further, the analysis has not explored LAT households, but even in the general population data on these living arrangements are tentative (Haskey, 2005:35). Nevertheless, the complexity of one-person ‘Jewish households’ has been demonstrated and it suggests that different processes operate on different groups within the same (Jewish) population. I now turn to ‘Jewish
households’ containing more than one-person—multi-person households—which is an altogether more complex case.

### 2.2.2 The structure of multi-person households

In households with more than one person (multi-person households) two structural facets must be addressed. First, *demographic structure* or living arrangements (for example couples with or without children) and second, what I am labelling here as *identity structure*, which refers to the identity mix within a household. A homogeneous identity structure is one in which all household members claim the same identity and a heterogeneous identity structure is one in which they claim different identities. What then is the typical demographic and identity structure of a ‘Jewish household’? And are these two structure types related?

Such questions matter not only because a critical analysis of the ‘Jewish household’ must acknowledge such complexity but also, because analysts of residential segregation tend to overlook such matters (see for example Brimicombe, 2007; Cortese et al., 1976; Massey and Denton, 1993). This is despite the recognition that forming multiethnic households is one of the most important types of assimilation (Peach, 1980a). As Wong (1998:14) has noted, the measurement of segregation at the household level, i.e., the extent to which ethnic mixing occurs, reflects the extent of both social and spatial integration. In addition, Wright et al. (2003:470) have pointed out why this matters to geographers in particular: “When we better understand the intersection of mixed-race household identities with other social dynamics, we will learn more about the nature of identity development. In addition, we will recognize how neighborhood spaces are racialized [or ethnicised?],...
potentially altering how we ‘see’ and understand broader patterns of segregation, integration and diversity.” The key point is that assumptions of household homogeneity are misplaced.

The homo/heterogeneous nature of a household’s identity makeup has important implications for the meaning of the term ‘Jewish household’—it becomes contested territory. To take one example, Saxe et al. (2007:2) define a ‘Jewish household’ as one that ‘contain[s] one or more adult Jews’, but this immediately presents difficulties. It ignores richer conceptions of ‘Jewish household’ such as the extent to which Jewish rituals/activities are actually carried out within its space. It implies that the presence of a Jewish child or teenager alone would not constitute a ‘Jewish household’, and the onus of definition is on the observer rather than the observed. Other definitions are similarly problematic (see for example Kosmin et al., 1991:17).

It is difficult to avoid the significance of the heterogeneity of ‘Jewish households’. For example, DellaPergola (1991:87-89) has pointed out that ‘The majority of all new Jewish households formed in America in recent years [to 1991] involved a non-converted non-Jewish spouse.’ More recently the NJPS 2000-01 survey found that of all people in ‘Jewish households’, 76% were Jews and 24% were ‘not Jews’ (UJC, 2003:2; Cattan, 2003). In Boston, Saxe et al. (2007:3) found that ‘The most dramatic increase in the Jewish population [between 1995 and 2005] is among the total number of individuals, Jewish and non-Jewish, living in Jewish households.’ Paradoxically for some, Saxe et al. argue that this effectively enlarges the size of the ‘Jewish community’ (ibid:5).
In Britain very little (if any) comment exists in the literature on this topic but the 2001 Census data means that, for the first time, a picture can be drawn of the identity structure of ‘Jewish households’. Table 33 shows that 76.8% of the 116,330 ‘Jewish households’ (based on HRP) contained solely people identifying as Jewish. However, given that one-person households are homogeneous by default, and that this category is relatively large in the Jewish population, the relevant proportion is actually somewhat smaller: only 63.7% of multi-person households were homogeneous. No doubt some of the 11.7% of ‘Jewish households’ containing members reporting ‘No Religion’ or Religion Not Stated (RNS), refer to self-identifying Jews in other contexts, such as people who chose not to report their religion, or ‘born Jews of no religion’. There is no direct way of telling how many, if any, of these people consider themselves to be ‘Jewish’ (however see further Graham and Waterman, 2005).

Table 33 Demographic and identity structure of ‘households in which Jews dwell’ by ‘HRP’¹ and individual’s identity, %, England and Wales²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic and Identity Structure of Household</th>
<th>Method 1: HRPᵃ (Where HRP* = Jewish)</th>
<th>Method 2: Individual identityᵇ (At least one-person Jewish)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Multi-person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households</td>
<td>116,330</td>
<td>74,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-person (Jewish)</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Jewish</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish + No Religion</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish + RNS*</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Jewish</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on tables ᵃC0403 and ᵇC0478 - see Appendix ¹HRP = Household Reference Person; RNS = Religion Not Stated ²Columns may not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.
Another important problem relates to the methodology used by ONS to enumerate households. Household identity, in this case ‘Jewish’, is anchored to the identity of the ‘Household/Family Reference Person’ (HRP or FRP) (ONS, 2004c:33, Definition 5.44). But the assumption that the HRP can be a proxy for the identity of other household members is just that, only an assumption. As a methodology it is inherently flawed not least because the criteria used to identify the FRP/HRP (i.e. economic activity and age) means that a disproportionate number of HRPs are male.\footnote{Author’s calculations based on table S103 - see Appendix} Since the religious identity patterns of men often differ to those of women, this further exacerbates the problem (Kosmin and Keysar, 2006; Loewenthal et al., 2002; Stark 2002).

Acknowledging this, the final two columns of Table 33 take a different methodological approach to the Census data. They refer to the identities of all individuals in the household. Thus there were 143,071 households in which at least one person reported being Jewish—almost a quarter (23.0%) as many ‘Jewish households’ as was recorded by the HRP method. In addition, this method produces a smaller proportion of one-person households (because it picks-up more complex multi-person households) and a smaller proportion of homogeneous households, in which all members were Jewish. Using this more accurate method of enumeration, less than half (46.8%) of multi-person ‘Jewish households’ (more accurately, households with at least one Jewish member) were homogeneous. Thus the data show that in England and Wales 88,644 individuals were living in ‘Jewish households’ but did not report ‘Jewish’, i.e. a third (34.1%) of the total number of all
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Jews enumerated in the 2001 Census. Based on the proportions shown in column 1 of Table 33, an extrapolation suggests that about 68% of these individuals may have been non-Jews.

Table 34 Demographic and identity structure for all multi-person households with ‘One family and no others’ in which at least one person reported ‘Jewish’, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household structure</th>
<th>Homogeneous (All members reported Jewish)</th>
<th>Heterogeneous (At least one but not all members reported Jewish)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households</td>
<td>47,327</td>
<td>53,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All pensioners</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couple Households</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No children</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with dependent children</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All children non-dependent</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lone Parent Households</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other households</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0478 - see Appendix
* Including household members reporting a religion other than Jewish but also ‘No Religion’ and Religion Not Stated.

Taking this analysis a step further, it is possible to assess whether there are any structural differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous ‘Jewish households’, i.e. how these two structural dimensions interrelate. The average household size of homogeneous households is smaller (2.0 person’s per household (pph)) than for heterogeneous households (2.2pph).104 (Such a differential was noted in the United States by Kosmin et al. (1991:17)) This is also despite evidence for a small number of very large Orthodox households, especially in Hackney (Holman and Holman, 2002).105 The data in Table 34 show that there were 13.5% more mixed-identity households than homogeneously Jewish (multi-person) households.

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104 Author’s calculations based on table C0478 - see Appendix.
105 Author’s calculations based on table C0645 - see Appendix.
In addition two key structural differences can be discerned. People in homogeneous households are older than those in mixed households; they are over three times as likely to consist of only pensioners (24.1%) than mixed households (7.3%). They are also four times less likely to be classified as ‘Other households’, i.e. households with predominantly unrelated people sharing.

Given that mixed households are younger than homogeneous households it would be expected that they would have more children living in them. Indeed the data showed that 39.2% of endogamously Jewish married-couple households had at least one child compared with 43.4% of Jewish women married to non-Jewish men (see Table 35—for exogamous Jewish men the proportion was 44.9%). But the most fecund arrangement occurred among Jewish women married to men of ‘No Religion’; half (49.3%) had at least one child, a result that cannot be explained using these data.

Table 35 Presence of dependent children for married Jewish females, by religion of husband, England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion of husband</th>
<th>No Dependent Child(ren)</th>
<th>1 or more Dependent Child(ren)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No religion (N=3,486)</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Jewish (N=7,654)</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish (N=42,686)</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion not stated (N=1,222)</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0697 - see Appendix

Such results pose an interesting question: what is the religious identity of these ‘religiously hybrid’ children? Some studies suggest that children more closely follow their mother’s religious identity than their father’s (Kalmijn et al., 2006) but among Jews it has been shown that where intermarriage has occurred, children are far less likely to be ‘raised as Jews’, than children of in-married couples (Bibby, 2000:236,
In 1990 the American NJPS survey found that ‘only 28% of the children of current mixed marriages were raised Jewish. Some 41% were raised in a non-Jewish religion and 31% were raised with no religion.’ (DellaPergola, 1991:91). A more recent survey showed that ‘[n]early all children (96%) in households with two Jewish spouses are being raised Jewish, compared to a third (33%) of the children in households with one non-Jewish spouse.’ (UJC, 2004:18). However Saxe et al. (2007:12) found that ‘a majority of children in intermarried households are being raised as Jews by religion…’ (See further Fishman, 2004)

Figure 26 Religion of child(ren) in households with at least one Jewish person present and where a parent-child relationship was extant¹, by gender of parent, England and Wales

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0477 - see Appendix
¹ For households of up to four people only. Table C0477 provides data on the relationship between Person 1 and Person 2, Person 3, and Person 4. The number of mother-child relationships is substantially smaller than the number of father-child relationships because the data do not include information on the relationship of Person 2 to Person 3 or Person 4 and Person 1 is more likely to be male. Step-parent relationships are included.

¹⁰⁶ Recent findings by Gan et al. (2008:9) however suggest this may not always be the case.
The rigid boundaries of the 2001 Census do not record mixed ‘religious’ outcomes even though mixed ethnicity is acknowledged (ONS, 2001a). Indeed this notion is rarely mentioned in the literature either. But some Census data do allow an insight into transmission outcomes. As noted in the United States they show that there is a considerably greater likelihood of Jewish children being present in households when the mother reports Jewish (40.9%) than when the father reports Jewish (26.6%) (Figure 26). In addition, households containing a Jewish father and non-Jewish child(ren) are much more likely (31.7%) than households containing a Jewish mother and non-Jewish child(ren) (16.5%).

Figure 27 Religion of parents in households with at least one Jewish child present and where a parent-child relationship was extant¹, by gender of parent, England and Wales

![Figure 27](image)

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0477 - see Appendix

¹ See Figure 26 for notes.

Identity structural outcomes can also be assessed from the perspective of Jewish children in households (as opposed to Jewish parents) (see Figure 27). When a Jewish child is present in a household a Jewish mother is also present in 62.7% of cases and in 20.5% of cases the mother of a Jewish child is not herself Jewish. But
for fathers of Jewish children in households the situation is different. Only 42.1% of fathers reported being Jewish which is partly explained by a higher proportion of fathers than mothers reporting ‘No Religion’ (15.7% compared with 8.5%) but it is also a result of over a third of fathers of Jewish children being non-Jews.

The above analysis has shown that multi-person ‘Jewish households’ are structured in two dimensions, demographically and identificationally. Further, these two dimensions are not independent. In the next section I focus on spatial outcomes for ‘Jewish households’ in light of the above findings.

2.3 Spatial outcomes for ‘Jewish households’

The residential concentration of Jews in Britain has been well documented (Brimicombe, 2007; Dorling and Thomas, 2004:56-7; Newman, 1985; Schmool and Cohen, 1998; Waterman and Kosmin, 1988, 1987a, 1986a). Indeed, it is invariably within this context that Jews are discussed, if at all, in the geographic literature (Peach, 2000; Peach et al., 1981). However, these distinctive residential patterns are rarely critically assessed with the Jewish population generally being homogenised (Brimicombe, 2007; Dorling and Thomas, 2004). This second section examines spatial outcomes for the ‘Jewish household’ whilst bearing in mind both its demographic and identificational structural dimensions.

2.3.1 Location and the demographic structure of one-person households

In the early 1980s Frey and Kobrin (1982:261) noted a distinct growth in the number of one-person households which they referred to as ‘nontraditional’, especially in urban cores. Since then several commentators have documented this trend (Bromley
et al., 2007:149-50; Ogden and Hall, 2004, 2000) and linked it to the second demographic transition (Buzar et al., 2005; Ogden and Hall, 2000). It has also been noted that there is structure within this growth which Schmool and Miller (1994:62) have argued is the result of different processes acting on different groups living in one-person households (see Section 2.2.1 on page 340). For example, Hall et al. (1997:166-8) examined data showing that ‘each age category of one-person households has a distinct geography’. (See also Duncan and Smith, 2002.) Retirees often live in peripheral areas whereas younger people are more likely to live in central areas (Hall et al., op. cit.). For example, Hardill (2004:378) has suggested that London attracts many upwardly mobile young adults because it offers a wide range of job opportunities with ‘career potential’.

Though rarely noted, such geographies also apply in the Jewish case. For example Fishman (1988:13,20) has argued that contemporary (American) Jewish communities ‘exhibit patterns of “specialization”: single people and childless dual-career couples occupy revitalized urban areas, families seek out suburban or exurban areas, [etc.]’. She cited Manhattan as having a disproportionately high number of one-person households and childless-couple households. She argued that unmarried Americans have ‘gravitated towards cities reputed to offer a sophisticated and vibrant singles culture’ and lifestyle (ibid:4).

The 2001 Census reveals a similar spatial pattern among Jews to that noted by Hall et al. (1997). There are clear differences in the spatial patterns of the younger and older one-person ‘Jewish households’. For example, Figure 28 shows the distribution of younger ‘non-pensioner’ one-person householders. These Jewish householders
The socio-spatial boundaries of an ‘invisible’ minority
tend to predominate in the more central locations of London, they are also relatively scarce among the main concentration of Jews in North-west London.

**Figure 28** One-person non-pensioner Jewish households as a proportion of all Jewish households per LAD*, in London and the South-east, by HRP

Source: Created by the author using data from table S151 (see Appendix) and MapInfo v7.8, range sorted by ‘Equal Count’
* The scale shows one-person non-pensioner ‘Jewish households’ (by HRP) as a proportion of all Jewish households per LAD

However, when Figure 28 is contrasted with Figure 29 which shows pensioner one-person households, clear differences are noticeable. For this older population no clear pattern emerges in London but there is evidence of a ‘residual’ population of older one-person Jewish householders to the east of the City of London—those who remained following Jewish out-migration from the East End (Lipman, 1968). There is also a comparative dominance of these households in coastal areas. This picture,
though not as extreme, does bear a resemblance to that described by Hall et al. (1997) for the general population: younger one-person households in central urban locations whilst older one-person households (dominated by females) generally more dispersed but concentrated in coastal areas.

Figure 29 One-person pensioner Jewish households as a proportion of all Jewish households per LAD*, in London and the South-east, by HRP

Source: as per Figure 28
* The scale shows one-person pensioner ‘Jewish households’ (by HRP) as a proportion of all Jewish households per LAD

2.3.2 Location and identity-structure of multi-person households

For households containing more than one person the data are more complicated. Locational differences may exist between homogeneous households (those that contain only Jews) and heterogeneous households that contain Jews and people of other identities. Such differentiation in terms of identity structure within households
is rarely acknowledged in the literature on residential segregation (see for example, Boal, 1978; Brimicombe, 2007, Massey and Denton, 1993; Peach et al., 1981; Waterman and Kosmin, 1987a, 1988). However this is an important omission as Wright et al. (2003:468 citing Delaney, 2002) have argued, ‘mixed-race household residential decision-making takes on new importance as the scale of the household makes explicit the implicit spatiality of the metaphor of crossing boundaries’ (see also Wong, 1998). Whilst it is true that some studies have included all encompassing ‘mixed’ or ‘other’ categories such as ONS’s mixed-ethnic categorisations (Brimicombe, 2007), these tend to refer to individuals, not households, so are in effect simply additional categories to the more commonly used taxonomies. Ethnically and religiously heterogeneous households tend to be absent in the literature.

David Wong (1999:35) has suggested that in the same way households stratified by ethnicity have revealed certain urban patterns, ‘multiethnic households should also exhibit particular spatial patterns.’ But what patterns are observed for mixed religious households? A direct comparison between homogeneous and heterogeneous households for a single group, such as the Jews, might reveal whether or not spatial differentiation exists, i.e. whether or not the geographies of family formations (Duncan and Smith, 2002) are influenced by religious heterogeneity at the household level.

That household homogeneity is geographically uneven for Jews has been shown to occur in the United States (Kosmin et al., 1991:20). Areas with high Jewish population densities had concomitantly high proportions of household homogeneity.
Is this also the case in Britain? The 2001 Census data showed that there does appear to be a relationship between household homogeneity and population size, at least at the very broad GOR scale (see Figure 30). Whilst bearing in mind the caveats relating to identifying households using the HRP methodology (see p348), regions with larger Jewish populations such as London and the East of England (which itself includes London’s contiguous Jewish population in Hertfordshire) also exhibit higher levels of household homogeneity. By contrast, regions with smaller Jewish populations, such as Wales and the East Midlands, exhibit lower levels of household homogeneity.

**Figure 30 Household homogeneity for multi-person ‘Jewish households’*, by GOR**

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0403 - see Appendix  
* Households identified by religion of the HRP
However, it is also clear from Figure 30 that this relationship between population size and household homogeneity is not clear-cut. For example, the South-east has a relatively large number of households (5,858) but relatively low homogeneity (40.3%). Conversely, Yorkshire & Humberside as well as the North-east have relatively few ‘Jewish households’ but high homogeneity. Does this mean no relationship exists? Duncan and Smith’s (2002) notion of geographies of family formations highlights the importance of factors at the localised level to explain structural outcomes for households (see also Wong, 1999:47). Taking account of local factors, plausible explanations for the above anomalies can be found. In Yorkshire & Humberside, 71.6% of the Jewish population lives in just a few wards in Leeds\textsuperscript{107} (see also Waterman, 2003). Similarly in the North-east, 49.6% of the region’s Jewish population lives in Gateshead LAD (most of whom live in the ward of Bensham) where a yeshiva (seminary) for strictly Orthodox Jews is located.

Thus a tentative conclusion is that household homogeneity is related to population size. However data at smaller scales than GOR and which reveal the identities of individuals in households rather just the HRPs, would clarify the situation. Unfortunately, such data were unavailable (due to ONS disclosure controls) but one dataset based on individuals in households provides a limited hint of what more comprehensive data might reveal. Figure 31 shows that the greatest level of household homogeneity (69.4%) is found in the suburban Jewish cluster of South-west Hertfordshire, with strikingly similar levels in the two other Jewish suburban areas of Outer London (63.5%) and Greater Manchester (64.1%). These can be

\textsuperscript{107} Author’s calculations based on table KS07 - see Appendix
contrasted with ‘Jewish households’ in the Rest of England and Wales, which in relative terms, is rural and dispersed and where homogeneity is evidently low (30.5%). But this dichotomous suburban (clustered) / rural (dispersed) picture fails to predict the pattern in the Jewish cluster in Inner London. Here homogeneity is low (34.4%) not high as the relationship with population size would imply.

Figure 31 Extent of household homogeneity for multi-person households with at least one Jew, by location

Source: Author’s calculations based on table C0478 - see Appendix

One alternative source of data which can be used to further investigate the relationship between household homogeneity and location is JPR’s 2001 survey of Jews in London and the South-east. These data show that some degree of distinctive spatiality is present when the population is stratified according to marriage type (see note to Figure 32). The JPR sample reveals that south London in particular is an area with a high proportion of Jews who did not marry under only Jewish auspices (73.1%) suggesting that these households are likely to be heterogeneous. Inner
London also shows a relatively high proportion of heterogeneous households (26.7%) (see Figure 32).

Further work is required to assess the relationship between Jewish population clustering and ‘Jewish household’ homogeneity but it has been demonstrated that a relationship exists in the British case. The next section extends this analysis by incorporating household religiosity into this spatial analysis.

Figure 32 Household homogeneity based on marriage type* by location, for households with at least three members, London and South-east England

Source: Author’s calculations using JPR’s 2001 London and South-east dataset, Q9
* Homogeneity is assessed here by proxy based on the type of marriage reported. ‘Homogeneous’ refers to households reporting ‘Jewish religious marriage only’ since such households are most likely to only contain Jews. ‘Mixed’ refers to households reporting ‘other’ types of marriage; respondents who reported having had either an ‘other’ type of religious marriage or a marriage in a Registry Office or a mixture of types are most likely to be living in heterogeneous households.

2.3.3 Household ‘religiosity’ and location

The spatial differentiations associated with the demographic and identity structure of ‘Jewish households’ are also affected by household religiosity. That strictly Orthodox Jews live in highly clustered groups is well documented (Gonen, 2005a
and b; Holman and Holman, 2002, 2003; Valins, 2003a and b). For example in Stamford Hill in London, Broughton Park in Manchester and Gateshead in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. But is this one extreme of a more generalised phenomenon in which clustering is proportional to ‘household religiosity’? Whilst this can be measured in a number of ways, in general are more religious households more clustered than less religious households?

Data from JPR’s 2001 survey can be used to assess whether or not a relationship between household religiosity and location exists. It is common in studies of Jewish ‘religiousness’ that religiosity be measured by indicators of (ostensibly) ‘religious’ practice such as lighting candles on Friday night, eating kosher food, fasting on Yom Kippur and attending a Passover seder (amongst others) rather than belief or spirituality, as these are considered to be more reliable indicators of ‘Jewishness’ or ‘Jewish connections’ (Phillips and Chertok, 2004:4; UJC, 2004:7; see also Cohen, 2006; Gould, 1984; Horowitz, 2003; Miller, 1998; Saxe, et al., 2007). The data were selected to indicate the extent to which certain home-based Jewish activities are spatialised. The activities assessed are the consumption of non-kosher meat at home and candle lighting (the Sabbath traditionally commences with the lighting of candles in the home on Friday night, often followed by a family meal). These two indicators of ‘Jewish engagement’ have been shown to discriminate between ‘engaged’ and ‘unengaged’ Jews (Horowitz, 2003:34,104). Figure 33 summarises the data and shows that south London and Inner London stand out as locales where kosher meat is least likely to be consumed, however only south London is prominent as a place where candle lighting tends not to occur. These data approximate the
findings in Figure 32. On closer examination, four areas stand out here: those in the North-western swathe (Southern Hertfordshire, Outer North-west London, Outer North London, and Hampstead & Highgate), in North-east (Redbridge and Essex), in Inner London, and south London.

Figure 33 Jewish religious indicators by location, for households with three or more members, London and South-east England

Source: as per Figure 32 on page 362, Q37 and Q42 (minimum N=67 households)

This differentiation is in itself interesting, highlighting contradictions and posing a number of questions. For example, why do ‘Jewish households’ in Inner London actively consume non-kosher meat yet relatively few report ‘Never’ lighting candles (at least compared with South London)? This may have something to do with accessibility to shops selling kosher meat. However, the contradiction of ‘Jewish households’ in Redbridge and Essex keeping kosher but being three times more

108 Anecdotally, adverts placed in the Jewish Chronicle during April 2008 show that there are few outlets in Inner London and hardly any in south London.
likely to ‘never’ light candles as householders in North-west London, requires a more robust explanation than can be achieved with these data.

2.4 The (re)production of ‘Jewish households’

In this third and final section I present evidence of transmission in households. It was noted above that households are arenas of religious and cultural ‘situated practices’ (Wright et al. 2003:466). They are fundamental to the production and reproduction of identity and so have been labelled ‘preservers of ethnicity’ (Alba, 1991:15).109

From an ethno-religious point of view, space is not continuous. There are certain places that are deemed ‘holy’ or ‘Jewish’ (though the boundary between religious practice and cultural practice remains blurred, for example the purchasing of kosher food) and others that are deemed profane. Kong (2001:213) has pointed out that given ‘sacredness is not inherent, attention must be paid to how place is sacralised [or ‘ethnicised’].’ As noted, the presence of Jews in a household is one way of making that space ‘Jewish’. To borrow Kong’s terminology, what are the ‘poetics’, the ‘substantial’, the ‘essential character’ of the ‘Jewish household’?110 What Jewish practices or behaviours make a household Jewish?

Understanding how this operates is challenging, especially when relying on quantitative data but in the following analysis I present some initial evidence that transmission not only occurs but does so in two ways. First I examine the ‘Jewish household’ as a vessel for ethno-religious practise, particularly when children are

109 In his study of San Fernando, Trinidad, Clarke (1971:215-16) established that identity of dependents was itself dependent on the trait being examined. He found that ‘race’ was far more likely to be inherited than religion, and this was often due to conversion (to Christianity).

110 The notion of a boundary between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ space can be traced to the work of Eliade (1959).
present. Second I suggest that transmission involves more than the passing and nurturing of identity traits but also included in its cannon are attitudinal and behavioural traits that influence propensity factors such as the decision to marry and have a large number of children (Hall et al., 1997; Kalmijn et al., 2006). Transmission therefore has distinctive structural outcomes as well as identificational outcomes.

2.4.1 Identity transmission in ‘Jewish households’

Far from being passive vessels, households are active places which transform profane space to scared or ethnic space through religious acts and cultural symbolism. A Jewish example is the attachment of a mezuza (religious ornament) to the doorframes of the home (Katz, 1981:149-53) or the display of items such as candelabras. But behaviour is also central to this transformation. It is through such acts, as well as displays, that the household itself becomes Jewish. Cromer (1980:229) has argued that by exposing children to rituals in the home, for example by observing kashrut (dietary laws) or lighting candles on Friday nights, Jewish identity was transmitted across generations, in a Jewish place. He suggested that the common, yet contradictory, behaviour involving ‘Jewish families’ consuming kosher meat inside the home but non-kosher meat outside the home ‘was often explained in terms of the need to set an example to one’s children’ (ibid; see also Heilman, 1984:6; Lazar et al., 2002:518). This behaviour was even noted among those who were ‘not at all observant…’ (Cromer, 1980:229-30). Miller (2003:58) has found that ‘behavioural ethnicity’ (measured in terms of ‘religious’ activities and Jewish friends), is a significant predictor of marriage choice: ‘parents with high levels of
behavioural ethnicity are less likely to have their children marry out.’ Indeed the home environment has been found to be more important for Jewish identity formation than formal Jewish education (Miller, 1998:237-39). (Note however, Cohen and Kotler-Berkowitz (2004) draw ambiguous conclusions about the relationship between Jewish education and identity.)

Children brought up by parents with different identities are likely to have quite different cultural experiences to those in endogamous households (Fishman, 2004). According to Williams and Lawler (2001), if the religious denominations of partners in a married couple differ (are heterogamous), then this tends to be associated with reduced religiosity, even if the spouses have ostensibly the same religion. A recent study of Jewish mixed-faith households in Boston (Gan et al., 2008:9-10) highlighted the complexity of this issue. In the study, some ‘intermarried’ couples chose to raise their children as Jews whereas others did so with ‘no religion’, or as ‘non-Jews’ or with a syncretic identity.

The type of ethno-religious upbringing children receive, determined by the practices they are exposed to in the home (and outside), will in turn impact on their ethno-religious outlook and attitudes later in life. Kalmijn et al. (2006:1348) have argued ‘that the more strongly parents are oriented toward their ethno-religious identity, the greater the chances that their children will marry endogamously. The underlying reasoning is that children from families that stress their ethno-religious roots will attach more importance to their own ethno-religious identity and that this translates into a strong preference for a spouse in one’s own group.’ I.e. there is a feedback process taking place. In Holland they found that children of ‘mixed marriages’ in
which only one parent was Jewish, were much less likely to marry within the group than children with two Jewish parents—especially so if the father rather than the mother was Jewish. They concluded that the religious homogeneity of the ‘family of origin’ plays a ‘crucial’ role in fostering ethnic endogamy (ibid:1355-57). (See also Cohen, 2006; Cromer, 1980:231; Chiswick and Lehrer, 1991:26; Kalmijn, 1998; Lieberson and Waters, 1988; Phillips and Chertok, 2004:8; Schmool and Miller, 1994:84.)

Therefore, there are a number of possible ways in which the transmission of (Jewish) identity can be measured. For example, some Jewish parents would argue that the in-marriage of their children to another Jew would be evidence of ‘success’. In the past, religious Jews took drastic measures such as terminating a relationship with a child to try and achieve this outcome (Schmool and Miller, 1994:83). In an interview carried out by Schmool et al. (2005:58), a Jewish mother of two young adult boys commented that, “I desperately want them to marry Jewish girls …because obviously the grandchildren and their children wouldn’t be Jewish …I mean I’d be really upset.” But today it is rare for parents to ostracise their children and most feel comparatively powerless, accepting that who their children marry is up to the children themselves (Cromer, 1980:232). (See also Kalmijn (1998:400) on the diminishing influence of ‘third parties’.)

Alternatively, Kalmijn et al. (2006:1355) note that certain behaviours and practices tend to ‘dilute’ transmission. It is common in studies of Jewish identity to use an array of indicators to measure cultural, religious and ethnic ties or engagement (Cohen, 2006; Saxe, et al., 2007; Miller, 1998; UJC, 2004:7). Horowitz (2003:34-5)
suggests that candle lighting, the observance of *kashrut* (dietary laws) and the purchasing of ‘Jewish objects’ such as books, ritual objects and works of art are useful indicators of the strength of Jewish identity.

The JPR data show that regardless of which indicator is chosen, households in which Jewish practice occurred were less likely to report having ‘children who are married to a non-Jew’. For households reporting candle lighting ‘Every Friday’, 11% (N=1,665) reported having intermarried children; where candles were ‘Never’ lit the proportion was 27.3% (N=501).\(^{111}\) Similarly for households in which ‘Only meat from a kosher butcher’ was bought for the home, 9.5% reported intermarried children; when meat was purchased ‘From an ordinary (non-kosher) butcher, but not pork products’, 22.9% of children were intermarried.\(^{112}\)

It has been noted that the arrival of children ‘triggers’ a need on the part of parents to transmit their Jewishness (Davey et al., 2001; Sands et al., 2006:445; Schmool et al. 2005:55). Therefore, if identity transmission is occurring in ‘Jewish households’ then couples with children present should exhibit greater levels of religious/cultural Jewish activity in the home than comparative households in which no children are present. In addition, if transmission has been ‘diluted’ by exogamy then exogamous ‘Jewish households’ with children should exhibit lower levels of Jewish activity in the home compared with endogamous families.

JPR’s survey data show that on six indicators of household-centric Jewish identificational behaviour, the presence of children is associated with higher levels

\(^{111}\) Author’s calculation based on JPR 2001 London dataset Q52, Q37

\(^{112}\) Op. cit., Q42
of activity (see Table 36). Items relating to religious activity, such as lighting candles or purchasing a Jewish object were proportionately more likely to occur in households with children present than in households with no children present. The data also suggest that the same items are less likely to occur in exogamous households compared with endogamous households (see Table 37).

Table 36 Indicators of Jewish activity in the home by presence of children, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>No children in household¹ (min N=553)²</th>
<th>One or more child(ren) in household under 19 (min N=1,288)²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candles lit at home 'Every Friday' night</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Only meat from a kosher butcher' at home</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seder 'Every year'</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased a Jewish book</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased some Jewish artwork</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased a Jewish (ritualistic) object</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: as per Figure 32 on page 362, Q37, Q42, Q38, and Q53iv,v,vi
¹ Excluding one-person households and pensioner couple households
² Min N = minimum response total for any item

These findings are generally in accordance with the idea that transmission is occurring in households. But they are not conclusive and further analysis would be beneficial. For example, there is a relatively small proportionate difference between households with/without children based on the kosher meat item but the difference for the same item for end/exogamous households is considerably larger (more than twice as likely in endogamous households). There is also a query over the direction of causality. And as will be discussed next, household structure is also an outcome of transmission and there is evidence that more ‘religious’ households are larger.
Table 37 Indicators of Jewish activity in the home by endogamy (as measured by type of religious marriage\(^1\)) for households with three or more people

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Endogamous households (min N=1,008)</th>
<th>Exogamous households (min N=189)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candles lit at home ‘Every Friday’ night</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Only meat from a kosher butcher’ at home</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seder ‘Every year’</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased a Jewish book</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased some Jewish artwork</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased a Jewish object</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: as per Figure 32 on page 362, Q37, Q42, Q38, and Q53iv,v,vi

\(^1\) See note to Figure 32 on page 362.

2.4.2 Structural transmission in ‘Jewish households’

It is not simply Jewish identity that is transmitted (at least in theory) through the household. De Valk and Billari (2007:213) found that ‘The choice of leaving the parental home appears to depend on the norms and expectations of parents and the degree to which the individual is embedded in the parental family.’ This hints at the possibility that household demographic structure might also be transmitted. Waite (2002:38) has argued that ‘Jews are more family oriented than non-Jews’ but she also acknowledges this is an oversimplification and that differences exist within the population (ibid:44). There is evidence to suggest a relationship between religiosity and household size. For example Schmool and Miller (1994:36) found that the average household size was 3.2 for ‘affiliated’ women and 2.5 for ‘unaffiliated’ women. But whether this also extends to household structure more generally is less certain. And less certain still is how this might work in terms of the transmission of propensity factors (such as attitudinal and behavioural traits) affecting structural
outcomes. Are the low levels of non-marital births among Jews and the relative lack of children among cohabiting ‘Jewish couples’ (Table 31, p337) a result of the transmission of propensity factors? This final section begins to address this question.

There is evidence for a relationship between religiosity and household structure. For example, Holman and Holman (2002:23, 2003) found that in Stamford Hill, in the London Borough of Hackney, and Broughton Park in Manchester, both areas with strictly Orthodox Jewish clusters, household sizes were particularly large. In Stamford Hill average household size was 5.9pph and over a quarter of ‘Jewish households’ had eight or more members. Data from the 2001 Census showed that in the London Borough of Barnet (the largest Jewish LAD in the country) the average size of ‘Jewish households’ (measured by HRP) was 2.46pph. But in the five wards which comprise Stamford Hill (Springfield, Cazenove, Lordship, New River and in Hackney, and Seven Sisters ward in Haringey) average Jewish household size was 3.4. 113 This is still considerably smaller than Holman and Holman’s (2002) assessment but the difference may be a result of Census enumeration difficulties in that community (Graham and Waterman, 2005).

JPR’s dataset can also be used to assess the relationship between religiosity and household size. Jewish religiosity is often measured using indicators such as synagogue membership, levels of Jewish engagement, outlook and types of practice (see for example Becher et al., 2002; Horowitz, 2003; Kosmin et al., 1979; Kosmin and Grizzard, 1975; Miller, 1994, 1998). Two variables recorded in JPR’s 2001 London dataset are used here to operationalize Jewish ‘religiosity’: ‘Synagogue

113 Author’s calculation based on table C0645 - see Appendix
membership’ which is a measure of Jewish religious affiliation and ‘outlook’ in terms of a secular-religious scale (a third variable ‘Current Jewish practice’ produced similar results). Table 38 shows the relationship between the household’s affiliation based on synagogue membership type and household size. Respondents belonging to the most orthodox synagogues lived in the largest households. Further and unsurprisingly, such households had the largest number of children. Conversely, households with no synagogue affiliation were smallest with the fewest children. Table 39 also shows such a relationship, here measured by outlook. The more ‘religious’ the outlook, the larger the household size and the more children present.

Table 38 Household size and number of children under 18 by synagogue membership type for all reproductive households¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Synagogue denomination</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Average household size (pph)</th>
<th>Children per household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Orthodox⁺</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream Orthodox⁺</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal / Reform</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: as per Figure 32 on page 362, derived variables
¹ Excluding one-person households and couple-households where the respondent was aged 65 and above.
⁺ Including Adass and Federation denominations; ² Including United Synagogue and Masorti denominations

Table 39 Household size and number of children under 18, by ‘outlook’¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outlook</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Average household size (pph)</th>
<th>Children per household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat religious</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat secular</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: as per Figure 32 on page 362, Q51 and derived variables
¹ Excluding one-person households and couple-households where the respondent was aged 65 and above.
Figure 34 Household structure by ‘current position’ of ‘religious Jewish practice’

Source: as per Figure 32 on page 362, Q44 and derived variable
* Orthodox: ‘e.g. would not turn on a light on the Sabbath’ as well as ‘Haredi’

Is there a relationship between religiosity and household structure more broadly? Schmool and Miller (1994:36) have suggested there is a relationship between living alone and religiosity stating that ‘unaffiliated women’ in their sample were more than three times as likely (27%) to live alone as women who were affiliated to a synagogue (8%). The JPR data for London indicate that the relationship is not so simple (which Schmool and Miller do acknowledge, ibid:62-3). In Figure 34 household structure is compared with an ordinal scale of ‘religious Jewish practice’ (see Becher et al., 2002:15-16 regarding the rationale for this taxonomy of identity; also Miller et al., 1996; Waterman, 2003). It suggests that a relationship exists between household structure and type of Jewish practice. Low levels of practice are reported by people in one-person households and single-parent households (suggesting that the practice of Judaism is more likely to occur within the context of
a ‘family household’). Conversely, only a fifth of households with children (not including single-parent households) reported ‘Non-practising’ or ‘Just Jewish’.

Using ‘outlook’ as the religious identity indicator, Figure 35 shows a similar, though not identical, relationship. The most ‘secular’ households are single-parent households and younger one-person households. But unlike the above results, older one-person households are more ‘religious’ than their younger counterparts. However, households with children present are again the most ‘religious’.

Figure 35 Household structure by ‘outlook’

Source: as per Figure 32 on page 362, Q51 and derived variable

Theoretically, household structure should also be an outcome of the transmission of ethnic-specific preferences and behaviour (de Valk and Billari, 2007:204). JPR respondents were asked about their ‘religious Jewish upbringing’ based on the categorisation presented in Figure 34 above. It has been shown that religious Jews have larger households than secular Jews, so, does religious upbringing influence the
size and structure of a person’s household? In terms of household size the data initially suggest not: those with ‘Reform/Progressive’ upbringings had the largest households (3.01pph), larger even than those bought up ‘Orthodox’ (2.72pph). However, these data need to be controlled for age since the ‘Reform/Progressive’ label was relatively rare until the 1970s (Schmool et al., 2005) and the average age of respondents in this group is considerably younger (49 years) than respondents in the other categories combined (58 years). When age is controlled for a relationship is clearly seen. For all respondents aged under 50, those with an ‘Orthodox’ upbringing lived in the largest households (4.00pph), followed by ‘Traditional’ (3.81pph), ‘Reform’ (3.52pph), ‘Just Jewish’ (3.51pph) and ‘Non-practising (i.e. secular/cultural)’ (3.39pph).

Figure 36 Household structure by ‘religious Jewish upbringing’

![Figure 36](image)

Source: as per Figure 32 on page 362, Q43 and derived variable

¹ Households controlled for respondents aged under 50

* Orthodox prompt = ‘e.g. would not turn on a light on the Sabbath’
Finally, Figure 36 shows the structure of households based on upbringing and controlled for age. People living alone or in childless couple households, are more likely to be ‘Just Jewish’ or ‘Non-practising (i.e. secular/cultural)’ households. With the exception of single parent households, the presence of children is associated with a ‘Traditional (not strictly Orthodox)’ upbringing. Therefore a relationship appears to exist between upbringing and at least some structural outcomes for ‘Jewish households’. These findings would undoubtedly benefit from a qualitative investigation about what particular preferences were passed on prior to ‘flying the nest’ which may have influenced household formation decisions taken later in life.

3 Discussion: crossing the threshold of ‘Jewish households’

This quantitative examination of the ‘Jewish household’ has brought together two disparate sets of literature. On the one hand, I have inserted the Jewish case into the general literature on households (as well as ‘home’ and ‘family’) which has more or less ignored not only Jews, but also religion and to a large extent, ethnicity. However, I have shown that ethno-religious identity affects various aspects of household formation such as which living arrangements are considered to be acceptable. It also influences the likely structure, makeup and location of households. On the other hand, I have developed the literature relating to ‘Jewish households’ by taking a critical look at the common narrative of the ‘failing’, ‘nuclear’ household (Cohen, 2006; Sacks, 1995a:23; Wasserstein, 1996). I have shown that the very meaning of the term ‘Jewish household’ is contested, that it defies simple definition and that its social and spatial boundaries are blurred. And
yet, through the process of ‘transmission’ it is a vital aspect of the production and reproduction of the ‘Jewish’ population.

The ‘Jewish household’ in Britain has no typical form and the normative ‘nuclear’ structure, itself a fuzzy term, is far from dominant. Considerable numbers of ‘Jewish households’ contain only one person whilst many others contain members who are not Jewish or profess ‘No Religion’. Further, the ‘Jewish household’ is subject to, and affected by, social changes related to the second demographic transition (SDT), and concerns about its ‘failure’ are paralleled by concerns in the wider population about the ‘breakdown’ of the family. However, ‘Jewish households’ are distinguishable from other households in terms of the practices that are performed within their boundaries, for example, different foodways and celebrations. Further, not all ‘Jewish households’ are alike and just as no two Jews are alike, that opinions differ as to who is and is not authentically Jewish, so too with authentically ‘Jewish households’. And social and spatial constructions of the ‘Jewish household’ also expose the fuzzy boundary between the axes of religion and ethnicity.

This analysis also has implications for the statistical study of residential segregation. These have tended to focus on individuals in a particular neighbourhood and use indices to label these areas as ‘segregated’ or variations of that term (see Duncan and Duncan, 1955a; Gorard and Taylor, 2002; Massey and Denton, 1993, 1988; Peach, 1999). But people live in households and as has been quantitatively demonstrated here, households do not necessarily fit into neat black/white or Jewish/non-Jewish categories. Households of whatever identity are complex socio-spatial constructions and in a single street there is likely to be a complex patchwork of residences
exhibiting highly varied identity structures. For example, the members of a household may be homogeneously Jewish, or a mixture of Jews and non-Jews, or Jews and people of ‘No Religion’. Without having even considered issues of fluidity and dwelling, it is evident that the street, let alone a neighbourhood, cannot easily be labelled ‘segregated’, ‘concentrated’, ‘polarised’, ‘enclave’ and so on (Brimicombe, 2007; Peach, 2001) without due regard to highly disaggregated data.

One of the aims of this assessment has been to extend Waterman and Kosmin’s (1987b) work relating to Jewish congregation and specifically, to assess the social processes which occur at the micro-scale of the household. By using fine-grained disaggregated data, I have shown that Jewish identity impacts on the household’s demographic and identity structure (i.e. its homogeneity), the number of children that will be present, if any, the practices and behaviours that are carried out and above all, its location. But this work is incomplete since the ‘Jewish household’ is a fluid and dynamic arena, in a constant state of flux. It has not been possible to assess what Gallent (2007:99) terms the ‘process of dwelling’, the extent to which household members associate themselves with a particular household, nor the extent of LAT arrangements and how these play out spatially. I have been unable to explore the negotiations that occur inside this ‘intimate space’ (McDowell, 2007) for example, in interfaith households (Cromer, 2005; Fishman, 2004) or indeed in homogeneous households where members exhibit different levels and denominations of Jewishness.
Chapter 8

Concluding summary and discussion: a cycle of residential congregation?

1 Context: reviewing key issues and arguments

In this thesis I have carried out a quantitative assessment of the socio-spatial boundaries of Britain’s Jewish population. It is relevant to several issues that have become topical both in scholarly work and in the media, the main one being the apparent rise in prominence of religion as a key axis of identity, despite evidence of rising secularisation. This rise is reflected in a number of narratives concerned with the state of British (and American) society and sub-groups within it. For example, it has been argued that ‘communities’ are living ‘parallel lives’ and ‘hunkering down’ socially and spatially in this era of increasing ‘diversity’. Thus government policies have been directed towards ‘community cohesion’ in order to prevent us ‘sleepwalking to segregation’. But I have noted that for the ‘Jewish community’, a group that is largely third or fourth generation British born, a key narrative inverts these issues. It reflects anxieties about assimilation, especially through ‘intermarriage’, and that this will eventually lead to Jews in Britain vanishing as a distinct group. Consequently, the boundaries of this group are fiercely defended as demonstrated by recent legal battles over who can and cannot be admitted to Jewish faith schools.

In addition to the broader ‘separate lives’ debates are other concerns relating to the state of the family, reflected in a narrative of ‘family breakdown’. This has emerged in Britain in response to modern lifestyles that are increasingly fluid and complex
and have produced new types of living arrangement and shortened partnership life-spans. And again Jewish narratives have arisen highlighting the apparent demise of the ‘Jewish household’.

Academically, this thesis has been carried out in the context of potent criticism of the validity of the use of quantitative methods in geography, especially for the study of complex social phenomena. The ‘cultural turn’ of the 1990s created a ‘new’ geography that raised particular concerns about the empiricist nature of ‘traditional’ methods of analysis, producing a climate in which an ever-decreasing number of geographers use quantitative approaches in their work.

Within this overall context, several arguments have been addressed in this thesis. The most important point raised is that two key sets of literature have failed to engage with one another despite considerable overlap. The first set is the literature on social and cultural geography and the second is the large body of socio-demographic work on Jews in Britain, but in particular, in the United States. I have also argued that there continues to be a role for quantitative methods in social and cultural geographical analysis but in using them, we need to be fully aware of their limitations and utilise as many alternative data sources as possible.

In addition I have examined ‘residential segregation’, a topic that has long interested geographers and I have used the Jewish case to argue that particular emphasis must be placed on the study of segregation at micro-scales. This is because recent critiques of the concept of scale have exposed its socially constructed nature and emphasised the significance of the smallest scales of everyday life when examining
the social world. These ‘intimate’ and ‘daily’ geographies (such as at the scale of the household) have rarely been addressed in the segregation literature and as a consequence, scholars have struggled to explain the social processes that produce and reproduce residential segregation.

This dissertation approached these theoretical and methodological issues by way of a case study of Britain’s Jews. It used boundary analysis in order to focus attention on the ‘blurred’ nature of the socio-spatial boundaries encapsulating this population. Such boundaries are not only common but expose the multidimensional nature of the social constructions associated with this group. It contextualised this analysis in terms of the second demographic transition (SDT)—a broad framework which has informed many of the central issues of this analysis.

2 Summary of principal findings

I have synthesised the literature relating to the social and cultural geographical work addressing issues of identity and segregation, with work exploring the demography, identity and cultural practices of Jews. This integration brings three specific benefits. First, inserting the largely ‘invisible’ Jewish example into the broader geographical literature has furthered the geographical work on identity, living arrangements and the household. This literature has previously neglected ‘religious’ groups preferring instead to focus on race, gender and ethnicity. Second, applying geographical critiques and methods to the Jewish case, I have been able to challenge extant narratives and develop more sophisticated socio-spatial understandings of the boundaries encapsulating this group. Third, I have added a rare British example to Jewish literature overly dominated by American studies.
2.1 Critiquing the boundaries of ‘Jewish’ identity

I began my assessment at the scale of the individual by critiquing Jewish identity. I highlighted social critiques of identity and applied these to the Jewish case emphasising that religious Jewish identities in particular tend to be based on essentialist narratives. To be Jewish, like having any identity, is to socially construct boundaries to ascertain who and what counts, and does not count, as being ‘Jewish’. This led to a discussion about authenticity which I explained underlies the current debates relating to Jewish faith schools. Like others, I concluded that ‘Jewishness’ has a ‘permanently provisional’ nature and therefore the boundaries of Jewish identity are always ‘blurred’. This makes the quantitative study of Jews challenging since quantification is often portrayed in geography as an inherently black-and-white approach.

Moreover, the appellation ‘Jewish’ does not fit neatly into the normative category ‘religion’ and I demonstrated empirically that even self-identifying ‘secular’ and ‘ethnic’ Jews can behave and identify ‘religiously’. I noted that this dual ethno-religious nature of ‘Jewishness’ is also relevant to ‘religious’ Jews, demonstrated by the essentialist myth of matrilineal descent within the group. Thus, the separation of ‘Religion’ from ‘Ethnicity’ in public discourse and surveys such as the 2001 Census, forces the Jewish category into an either/or situation, and normatively ‘Jewish’ is placed in the ‘Religion’ axis. This construction is problematic and limits our ability to assess this and similar groups. Most obviously, it has meant that Jews are rendered ethnically invisible since the majority are ‘White’, and I argued that this explains why Jews are mostly absent in the geographic literature; studies of ethnic groups in
Britain ignore Jews. Finally, when they do appear Jews are often portrayed as homogeneous, despite their being a highly fragmented group, and this places further limitations on our ability to analyse them successfully.

I also explained that ‘Jewishness’ is closely related to friendship networks and neighbours: the stronger a person’s sense of Jewish identity (measured in terms of ‘religiosity’ and/or ‘connectivity’), the more Jewish friends and close neighbours they had. This linkage is central to understanding how the micro-scale of the individual relates to the macro-scale of community and neighbourhood, i.e. to understanding how identity plays out spatially. However, there were limitations to the data in this assessment: it was not possible to explain why individuals were motivated to live where they did; whether their close friends lived predominantly nearby; and the extent to which they socially interacted with their neighbours. Further, with the exception of data on upbringing, and given the ‘fluid’ nature of identity, it was frustrating to be unable to examine how Jewish identity had changed over individuals’ lifetimes—the ‘Jewish journeys’ they had taken to arrive at their current positions.

Notwithstanding these constraints, this thesis has however, ‘unpacked’ the category ‘White’ and placed the Jewish case into the broader literature. In doing so it has exposed a key issue relating to the construction of ‘religion’ and ‘ethnicity’ in Britain.
2.2 Examining partnerships

Beyond the individual, I set out to explore partnerships, and in particular the fundamental societal changes that are taking place in terms of living arrangements. I explained that theoretical work has addressed the mechanics of partnership formation and described the idea of ‘partnership markets’ in which spatial ‘opportunities’ and social ‘preferences’ deliver particular partnership outcomes. I also observed the important concepts of social distance and spatial distance and how these two are interrelated. Further, I discussed the changing nature of living arrangements, especially how these are becoming increasingly ‘fluid’ whilst partnerships are becoming less permanent. I contextualised this in terms of the second demographic transition noting particularly how rises in cohabitation have been linked to demographic decline and I explained how cohabitation was a far more complex partnership type than the more ‘traditional’ marital arrangement.

Marriage as been declining among Jews in Britain for several decades but, being a heterogeneous population, I noted how this trend disguised at least two tiers to the ‘Jewish marriage market’: ‘traditional’ Jews and ‘modernist’ Jews. The institution of marriage is very strong among the religious ‘traditional’ group; it occurs early and is universal. But in the ‘modernist’ population this is not the case; marriage occurs later and in some cases not at all. A key aspect of these differences is Jewish cohabitation, a topic that has received virtually no attention, even in the Jewish demographic literature, despite its prominence. I showed that the likelihood and type of cohabitation is related to religiosity and life-stage and that it had a distinctive spatial expression compared with marriage. This assessment is a contribution to the general
literature on ‘new’ types of partnership formation which has heretofore rather neglected ‘religious’ groups.

Yet there were important limits to my analysis of cohabitation. For instance, I was unable to explain why people had chosen certain types of partnership at specific times in their lives. I could neither assess what proportion of cohabitating individuals planned to marry nor the proportion of married individuals which had previously cohabited. Moreover, the data said nothing about how people met; religious Jews often meet through formal introductions but even secular Jews do not ‘just wander around’ looking for a partner. They too inject a level of ‘non-randomness’ into their search based on ethnic identity, educational background and so on. This is a key area in which future research should be focused. And where people meet is also of great interest. ‘Places of encounter’ may be social, educational, work related or virtual. But again it was not possible to explore this topic with these data. Nor was I able to shed much light on partnership histories, which is important because these highlight rarer complex living arrangements such as living-apart-together in which apparently ‘single’ people do in fact have partners. Thus, despite the quantitative nature of this thesis there remains room for qualitative exploration.

2.3 Exogamy

Despite these difficulties, I was however able to extend my analysis of partnerships in one significant direction. For the first time these data permitted a detailed assessment of exogamy among Jews in Britain. Assimilation theory has long been interested in ‘intermarriage’ since it appears to provide an opportunity to measure the phenomenon directly and assess where social boundaries lie. When intermarriage
occurs the boundaries between groups are considered to be permeable. But spatial boundaries are also central to this topic especially since the establishment of the geographic axiom that exogamy is inversely related to propinquity. This topic is also one in which spatial and social factors are intimately related.

Contrary to the ‘separate lives’ narrative discussed in the media, there is an ‘interrmarriage’ discourse among Jews. I explained that two narratives have developed within this discourse: on the one hand, the ‘transformation narrative’ describes the way Jewish identity and Jewish people adapt to new situations and environments, how the ‘religion’ is continually transformed through processes such as exogamy. On the other hand, there is a ‘narrative of doom’ in which ‘interrmarriage’ is regarded in epidemiological terms, a threat to Jewish ‘survival’. This is a powerful narrative which has influenced policy making in significant ways. In Britain, parents send their children to Jewish faith schools in part because they consider them to ‘protect’ their children from ‘interrmarriage’. Additionally, enormous amounts of money are spent on programmes aimed at teenagers and young adults to ‘combat’ ‘interrmarriage’ such as birthright israel.

This analysis has made clear that Jewish exogamy is an extremely complex social phenomenon which should be viewed in the context of the SDT. Within this framework, the rise of individualism diminishes the importance of religion as a factor in deciding lifecycle decisions such as who to marry. But it is also clear that the substantial social and spatial heterogeneity of the Jewish population greatly affects who is ‘at risk’ of exogamy, and indeed, who marries at all. The analysis of Census data showed that demographic and socio-economic factors (such as age,
gender, and even marital status) impact on partnership outcomes. It was also evident that identity is very important in assessing the likelihood of exogamy. Hardly discussed in the literature relating to Jews, cohabitation and exogamy or rather, ‘mixed-faith cohabitation’, has become significant. Compared with Jews who marry, Jews who cohabit were considerably more likely to form partnerships with non-Jews and were also more likely to partner people of ‘No Religion’. This highlights the attitudinal aspects of cohabitation. Cohabitation and partners of ‘No Religion’ blur the boundaries of the Jewish intermarriage debate prompting the question, ‘What counts as intermarriage?’

On the other hand, it was also evident that levels of (marital) endogamy were relatively high, reflecting the importance of social processes which operate to maintain group boundaries. This aspect of boundary maintenance, alongside boundary permeability, is a central concern of contemporary geographical and media debates. Though the hypothesis that exogamy and propinquity are inversely related has been demonstrated in this analysis, three important caveats were highlighted. First, data on ‘mixed-faith cohabitation’ did not follow the inverse relationship between exogamy and propinquity. Second, the scale used to examine the relationship between propinquity and exogamy was not independent of that relationship—macro-scales showed no relationship at all. And whilst micro-scales did demonstrate the inverse relationship, the data were only available down to borough level; ward and street level data were unavailable.

The third caveat is more subtle. Demonstrating the inverse relationship between exogamy and propinquity actually tells us rather little. Indeed it is arguably
misleading since it implies a relationship without actually proving one exists. What is the direction of causality? What processes produce this relationship? How is it maintained? Such questions are rarely addressed in the quantitative literature on residential segregation. In an attempt to explore this issue further, data relating to higher education and type and place of work were analysed. These revealed quite distinct patterns among Jewish students regarding preferred university towns, and among Jewish workers to certain types of industry (such as real estate and finance) and places of work (the City and West End). Thus the data hint that Jewish congregation is not only spatial in the urban context but is also evident in higher education and the everyday context of employment. Crucially, these are arenas and environments that are not propinquitous with places of residence.

Thus, these data were limited in terms of what they could truly explain about exogamy and its spatial expression. In particular, the *ex post facto* nature of the data obscured the detail of the stories behind the numbers. For example, why have these outcomes occurred? What motivated people to engage in a partnership with a Jew/non-Jew and what role did propinquity play in this? Exogamous coupes were shown to live away from the main congregations of Jews but whether this outcome was by choice or by default was not discernable. Having met, what is the relationship between identity and where couples choose to live? Places of meeting and places of residing may well be different if neighbourhood propinquity is largely independent of partnership formation outcomes.
2.4 ‘Jewish households’

The preceding discussions funnelled into my examination of the ‘Jewish household’ and I began to extend the critical work of geographers on this key unit of analysis by inserting an ethno-religious example into the literature. This work has shown that the boundaries of the household have blurred as living arrangements become more fluid and more complex. Average household sizes have diminished while the number of households has grown. In particular, the notion of ‘dwelling’ has received attention with respect to the ‘validity’ of household membership and residence. And again, these changes have been linked to the processes of the second demographic transition. In public discourse they have led some, including Jewish commentators, to conclude that the family is ‘breaking down’ to the detriment of society and the ‘Jewish community’.

I also showed that a Jewish narrative constructs the ‘Jewish household’ to be a single, ‘nuclear’ unit, invariably comprising a married couple with children—present, formerly present or on the way—in which all members are Jewish. However, this is patently not the case and the reasons have little to do with ‘family breakdown’. A high proportion of ‘Jewish households’ had only one member and relatively few of the remainder conformed to the ‘nuclear’ ideal in which children were present and all members were Jewish. Many multi-person households contained non-Jews or persons of ‘No Religion’: are these ‘Jewish households’ or not? It was also clear that the Jewish homogeneity of multi-person households impacted on location. Households with Jewish and non-Jewish members were less likely to be located in the ‘core’ areas of Jewish urban congregation. In addition,
households with differing demographic structures also produce distinct spatial outcomes with younger, one-person households more likely to gravitate towards inner urban areas.

I also noted sociological work which has theorised the household to be an arena of identity transmission from parents to children. I used survey data to demonstrate how this may be occurring and explained that the ‘Jewish household’ was a place in which Jewishness is ‘transmitted’ to children. Further, I showed that data relating to Jewish neighbours revealed that many Jews lived next-door to other Jews and that they were aware of other Jews living on their street or in their block. However, this was related to identity: more religious/engaged Jews are more likely to live near other Jews than less religious/engaged Jews. And that very identity is (re)produced in the household.

However, this analysis has once more been constrained by the limitations of the data. I was unable to assess precisely the extent to which mixed households are choosing to transmit Jewishness to children. What negotiations are occurring in these spaces? And there are no data on complex Jewish living arrangements such living-apart-together and other more temporary states. Nevertheless, these findings do provide embryonic indications of the socio-spatial processes operating which can explain residential congregation. And they underline the importance of the micro-scale household in such analyses. I will now discuss how this might be more generally applicable.
3 Discussion: the process of segregation in the second demographic transition

A key objective of this thesis has been to extend the ecological work of Waterman and Kosmin (1988; 1987b) in an effort to further our understanding of the social processes that produce Jewish residential congregation. Their work was hindered by a lack of suitably disaggregated data at scales of the street and below, which they suggested future studies should focus on. Explaining these processes will also contribute to a geographical literature which is ambiguous about the role of propinquity in producing patterns of urban congregation. Therefore, I have argued here that we need to interpret the process of coming together from the pattern of congregation. I have focused on data relating to the micro-scales of everyday life, particularly the household, and by drawing on sociological work, I believe that these data do allow me to ‘tell a story’, contrary to criticism of the quantitative method.

This ‘story’ attempts to unravel the process behind (Jewish) residential congregation and shows that it is less about setting apart and more about coming together. It is based on the premise that residential propinquity alone is insufficient to produce the type of social interaction that leads to endogamous partnership formation. But how does endogamy come about and how is this related to the production of urban congregation? The data are not rich enough to answer this conclusively but they do provide hints at an underlying, circular process. The ‘story’ then is as follows: (Jewish) identity is transmitted to children in the household though the performance of certain religio-cultural acts. On leaving home the children ‘self-select’ socially and spatially in micro-environments that enhance their chances of socialising with
other in-group individuals. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of them forming an endogamous partnership. And endogamous couples are more likely to choose to live near similar endogamous couples which produces residential congregation by default. Thus a cycle is set in motion which, based on my analysis, may work as follows:

Transmission in the household
This was demonstrated by the data showing that Jewish cultural rituals were carried out in the home, especially where children were present. It was also revealed in data showing that type of Jewish upbringing predicts current Jewish practice.

Self-congregation in micro-environments
The data showed evidence of Jews ‘self-selecting’ certain environments. For example, they chose to study in specific university towns, to work in certain industries and in particular locations. Social interaction with other group members is more likely to take place in these tightly bounded, micro-locations of everyday life.

(Marital) endogamy
The data showed that the stronger people’s Jewish identity and the more Jewish friends they had, the more likely they were to be in endogamous partnerships. And endogamous Jews were more likely to be living in areas of higher Jewish concentration.

Residential location near like group members
The data showed that the stronger a person’s Jewish identity was the more Jewish friends they had and the more likely it was they would have Jewish neighbours living on the same street or in the same block. They were also more likely to carry
out more Jewish practices in the home, have more children and therefore were more likely to transmit their Jewish culture.

The key point here is that propinquity is an outcome, rather than a cause, of endogamy. It is the result of complex socio-spatial processes (more or less along the lines of this four-staged description) that take place at the micro-scales of everyday life. But this ‘story’ is also taking place in the context of the second demographic transition which impacts on every aspect of the cycle but in an opposite way and effectively fuelling exogamy and spatial dispersal. For example, increased secularisation lessens the likelihood of ‘religion’ being transmitted to children; increased individualism delays or even negates marriage and increases the number of people living alone; and increased cohabitation feeds exogamy and diminishes the number of children being born. Together these social changes produce residential dispersal since the desire and need to live near other in-group people is diminished and congregation declines.

For Jews, this ‘unparalleled and catastrophic’ change in demography spells out a narrative of doom, in which assimilation and ‘family breakdown’ are the dominating forces. This straight-line assimilationist view has proven to be attractive and reaches its apotheosis in Jonathan Sacks’ (1995a) book Will We Have Jewish Grandchildren? Yet Jews do continue to exhibit high endogamy and high residential congregation. Is there a middle ground? The alternative narrative suggests that, at root, ‘transformation’ predominates and new boundaries are continually being created. These are ‘fuzzier’ and less permanent but are boundaries nonetheless. In their book The Transformation of the Jews, Goldscheider and Zuckerman (1984:181)
discussed the transformative ‘forces of modernity’. They emphasised that it is the ‘demographic context rather than intermarriage per se’ that will mould the future of a Jewish population. Though they accepted that ‘intermarriage’ mattered they emphasised it was but one part of a complex set of factors and processes that included low marital fertility, geographic dispersion, minimum potential sources of population renewal through immigration, changes in family cohesion, and relatively high intermarriage rates. DellaPergola (1992:81) has also recognised and emphasised the multidimensional nature of transformation factors affecting the ‘general recent decline in conventional Jewish familism.’ Yet to this author’s knowledge the literature on Jews, whether doom-laden or transformationist, has failed to mention, even critically, that these changes are what would be expected given the second demographic transition (SDT), proposed in 1986 by Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa. Thus the demographic ‘windstorm’ sweeping through ‘Jewish communities’—described by Goldscheider and Zuckerman two years prior to the formulation of the SDT—is clearly an early description of the SDT happening to Jews. Thus Jews are again shown to be demographic ‘forerunners’.

Jews in Britain have now been exposed to the cocktail of socio-demographic processes associated with the SDT for several decades. This thesis then is also a description of how this group has fared in under these circumstances. The increasing fluidity and complexity of modern lifestyles blurs the ‘bright’ boundaries demarcating difference; familiar constructs such as ‘Jewish household’ and ‘Jewish family’ and indeed ‘Jewishness’ have become blurred as the social processes outlined above produce hybrid and interstitial categories in which a person, a
household, a neighbourhood are neither one thing nor another. This is unsettling and goes some way to explaining the forthright nature of the doom narrative.

Jews therefore are not immune from the social forces in the world around them, but demonstrating this is the case has required the analysis of substantial amounts of data not previously available. The rise of secularisation goes against the natural grain of a group that is normatively defined in terms of ‘religion’. As religion declines in prominence, the power and influence parents have over their children to transmit culture is diminished. As identities are ‘transformed’ some Jews who married other Jews gradually discover their spouses define themselves as having ‘No Religion’ making them difficult to distinguish from Jews who married ‘non-Jews of No Religion’. But increasingly, they do not marry, at least not initially, since a key factor of the SDT is increased fluidity in partnership formation, evidenced by the rise of cohabitation. These less permanent living arrangements delay or eliminate marriage altogether, reducing fertility (and few Jews have non-marital births), and enhance the likelihood of non-Jewish partnering. All of this goes against the narrative of the ‘Jewish family’ and represents a direct assault on the cycle of congregation described above.

This is compounded by the rise of individualism, also associated with the SDT, and is reflected in two parallel but opposite trends: the decline of Jewish marriage and the rise of living alone, the latter not just among the old but among the young as well (‘Jewish households’ are small, even by diminutive national standards).
For those Jews who do marry, the much misunderstood phenomenon of exogamy is an important factor impacting the population, but still one of many. This examination of ‘intermarriage’ has shown it to be anything but a simple, straight-line assimilatory process. The finality of intermarriage is overemphasised and it is not always clear even what counts as ‘intermarriage’. This mixing has produced thousands of ‘Jewish households’ containing non-Jewish members; this alone is clear evidence that the ‘separate lives’ narrative is false. It remains to be seen what hybrid ‘Jewish’ identities such households display but ‘assimilation’ is no one-way process: non-Jews in ‘Jewish households’ are ‘intimately’ and inevitably connected to the ‘Jewish community’ as are their children and their friends.

But this is not the only ‘story’. The Jewish population of Britain is heterogeneous and one section of the group has remained immune from the SDT, at least for the time being. By building very bright socio-spatial boundaries, strictly Orthodox Jews counter all of these trends and intensify the cycle of reproduction. They live in very close proximity, utilising separate schooling systems and operating separate working environments, as well as imposing strict social control over marriages, births and living arrangements. Their extreme response to the ambient social forces of the SDT limits the ‘transformations’ they experience. But this group is still the minority though of rapidly increasing significance.

4 The limits of quantification and lessons for the future

This study has been ‘appropriately quantitative’. I took advantage of new datasets containing material of unprecedented breath and depth. Using data from the 2001 Census permitted me to compare Jews to the general population and additional
survey data allowed me to explore more detailed and nuanced aspects of the group’s identity and cultural practices. These sets of ‘fixed’ data revealed blurred boundaries, in terms of identity, partnership formation and household structure that are surely relevant, or at least will soon be relevant, to other groups in British society. The data also enabled me to ‘tell a story’, something that ‘new’ geography presupposes quantitative approaches fail to achieve.

Therefore this analysis demonstrates that much can be learnt about culture and identity using quantitative methods. I have demonstrated that used appropriately, the 2001 Census is a goldmine of information and insights into the Jewish population of Britain and therefore the other ‘religious’ groups it enumerated. Even though there are legitimate concerns over its politically constructed and rigid categories, this thesis makes clear that its benefits far outweigh its drawbacks. This is especially so when data from the Census are combined with alternative sources such as communal surveys.

However, this analysis was constrained by a number of limitations. With the exception of figures from the Board of Deputies, there are no other examples of temporal data. Though data on upbringing do provide some indication of changes over time, these are ultimately unsatisfactory. Although the religion question is likely to be repeated in the 2011 Census, it will still be several years before this second ‘data revolution’ arrives. Ideally a Jewish longitudinal study tracking individuals over time could be launched however its costs would be prohibitive and realistically it is unlikely to happen. One alternative might be to examine data which have already been linked from the 2001 Census to the Longitudinal Study which can
potentially track lifecycle events for a sample of people who were recorded Jewish in the 2001 Census.

There also remains the Household SAR dataset from the 2001 Census which is unexplored with respect to Jews and may answer some of the questions that have arisen in this dissertation. But ideally a new survey of Jews in Britain should be carried out focusing on the key issues raised here whilst bearing in mind the limitations of quantification. Quantitative data have provided a broad picture of the social world even down to the micro-scale of the household, but they still oversimplify complex social phenomena and processes. Thus in terms of partnership formation and the Jewish household, I have only been able to scratch the surface of these key topics because of the most limiting aspect of these data: that they represent already crystallised circumstances—they are ex post facto. The social processes I have endeavoured to explore require more detailed investigations of personal histories and decision-making processes. Questions about the circumstances of ‘encounter’, how and where couples meet, their partnership and living arrangement histories, the upbringing each experienced, the desires that motivate(d) them, the negotiations that have occurred and so on. Such data can be gathered through detailed surveys but equally, interviews and qualitative investigations could be used to provide a new dimension to this continuing enquiry.
Appendix - Table codes and descriptions for 2001 Census output

ONS Standard Output Material

Throughout this these references are made to Census table codes. These are allocated by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and in the following appendix full table descriptions are provided for each code. The majority of these tables were published between 2003 and 2004.

Table 40 Reference codes for Standard Output datasets from the 2001 Census for England and Wales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Code*</th>
<th>Title of dataset</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KS07</td>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S004</td>
<td>Age by sex and living arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S103</td>
<td>Sex and age by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S104</td>
<td>Ethnic group by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S149</td>
<td>Sex and age by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S150</td>
<td>Sex and country of birth by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S151</td>
<td>Household composition by religion of Household Reference Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S152</td>
<td>Sex and age and limiting long-term illness and general health by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S153</td>
<td>Sex and age and economic activity by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S154</td>
<td>Sex and occupation by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S155</td>
<td>Sex and industry by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S156</td>
<td>Tenure and number of cars or vans by religion of Household Reference Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S157</td>
<td>Sex and NS-SeC by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S158</td>
<td>Age and highest level of qualification by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S159</td>
<td>Shared/unshared dwelling and central heating and occupancy rating by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S160</td>
<td>Shared/unshared dwelling and central heating and occupancy rating by religion of Household Reference Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S161</td>
<td>Sex and type of communal establishment by resident type and religion</td>
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<tr>
<td>T52</td>
<td>Theme table on religion of all dependent children in households</td>
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<tr>
<td>T53</td>
<td>Theme table on religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UV15</td>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS103</td>
<td>Sex and age by religion</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAST10</td>
<td>Theme table on religion - people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAST11</td>
<td>Theme table on religion (of Household Reference Person) – households</td>
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</table>

Source: ONS, 2004a (LADs); ONS, 2004b (Wards)

* KS=Key Statistics; S=Standard; T=Themed Statistics; UV=Univariate Statistics; CAST=Census Area Statistics Themed
Table 41 Reference codes for Standard Output datasets from the 2001 Census for Scotland and Northern Ireland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Code*</th>
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<tr>
<td>KS07 (Scotland)</td>
<td>Current religion</td>
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<td>S203</td>
<td>Current religion by sex</td>
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<td>T25 (Scotland)</td>
<td>Theme table on current religion</td>
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<td>T26 (Scotland)</td>
<td>Theme table on religion of upbringing</td>
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<td>Table 20</td>
<td>Religion of upbringing and economic activity</td>
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<td>Table 9</td>
<td>Persons by current religion and religion of upbringing</td>
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<td>UV16 (Scotland)</td>
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<td>UV17 (Scotland)</td>
<td>Religion of upbringing</td>
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<td>S308 (NI)*</td>
<td>Religion by sex</td>
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</table>

Source: GROS, SCROL CD6 v2; SCROL CD5 Volume 1; SCROL CD1 v2
* KS=Key Statistics; S=Standard; T=Themed Statistics; UV=Univariate Statistics

Commissioned Census Material

The following tables list the details of independently commissioned crosstabulations used in this thesis. These tables were received by the author at various dates between 2005 and 2007 in the form of CDs and DVDs. (All commissioned material is made publically available following payment.)

Table 42 2001 Census data privately commissioned from ONS by the author

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table Code*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C0629</td>
<td>Religion of cohabiting couples</td>
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<tr>
<td>C0695</td>
<td>Couples (married and cohabiting) by religion and location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C0696</td>
<td>Couples (married) by religion and tenure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C0697</td>
<td>Couples (married) by religion and dependent children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C0698</td>
<td>Couples (married) by religion and age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C0699</td>
<td>Couples (married) by religion and highest qualification</td>
</tr>
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<td>C0700</td>
<td>Couples (married) by religion and ns-sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C0701</td>
<td>Couples (married) by religion and ethnic group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* C=Commissioned Table
Table 43 2001 Census data privately commissioned from ONS by the author in collaboration with other parties

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C0472 (a-c)</td>
<td>Occupation (SOC 2 digit) by sex</td>
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<tr>
<td>C0474 (c)</td>
<td>Age (5 yr age groups 0 - 80+) by sex and religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C0475 (a-c)</td>
<td>Sex and age (5 yr groups) and qualifications by economic activity (based on S032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C0476 (a-c)</td>
<td>Theme table on religion (based on T53)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C0477 (i-iii), b(i-ii)</td>
<td>Household Structure (Sex of P1 and HH composition and relationship to P2 by sex of P2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C0478 (a-c)</td>
<td>Theme table on households (based on T08)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C0479</td>
<td>Sex and age (5 year groups) by religion of partner (6 categories)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C0480 (a-b)</td>
<td>Theme table couples (married and cohabiting) by religion (based on T53)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C0481 (a-c)</td>
<td>Age of HRP by sex, marital status (Based on S003)</td>
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<td>C0482</td>
<td>Area by age and sex by country of birth (S. Africa; Israel; USA)</td>
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<td>C0483</td>
<td>CoB (S Africa; Israel; USA) and religion of partner</td>
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<td>C0484</td>
<td>Sex, marital status and age by country of birth (S. Africa; Israel; USA)</td>
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<td>C0485</td>
<td>Sex, marital status and age by country of birth (S. Africa; Israel; USA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C0486</td>
<td>Theme table on religion by country of birth (S. Africa; Israel; USA) (based on table T53)</td>
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<td>C0487 a-c</td>
<td>country of birth (S. Africa; Israel; USA) by age and sex</td>
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<td>C0593*</td>
<td>Migrants from outside the UK (based on T53)</td>
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<td>C0620†</td>
<td>Migrants</td>
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† Material in this table was commissioned by the author and Marlena Schmool on behalf of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research and the Board of Deputies of British Jews
‡ Independently commissioned by Rona Hart at the Board of Deputies
* C=Commissioned Table
Table 44 2001 Census data privately commissioned from ONS by unknown parties¹

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<td>C0328</td>
<td>Country of birth by religion by ethnic group (country of birth: All, UK, Eastern Europe, North Africa, Central and West Africa, South and Eastern Africa, Middle East, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan)</td>
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<td>C0397</td>
<td>Sex by ethnic group, country of birth, religion, language needs indicator and migration by size of company, employment status and approximated social grade</td>
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<td>C0400</td>
<td>Religion of married couples</td>
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<td>C0403</td>
<td>Multiple religious identifier by religion of HRP</td>
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<td>C0644</td>
<td>Detailed country of birth by religion</td>
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<td>C0645ª</td>
<td>Household size by religion of HRP</td>
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<td>C0646ª</td>
<td>Workplace by occupation by religion</td>
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<td>C0647ª</td>
<td>Workplace by industry by religion</td>
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<td>C0648ª</td>
<td>Address 1 year ago by religion</td>
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<td>C0649ª</td>
<td>Origin and destination by religion</td>
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<td>M210</td>
<td>Sex, age and limiting long-term illness by religion</td>
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<td>M277</td>
<td>Detailed age group by religion</td>
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<td>M296</td>
<td>Sex, age and communal establishment type by religion (residents)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M298</td>
<td>Sex, age and highest level of qualification by religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M306</td>
<td>Sex and industry by religion</td>
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¹ Commissioned by the Greater London Authority (GLA)
* C=Commissioned Table, M=MSTR (Multi Source Topic Reports) Tables

Table 45 ONS datasets (based on FM2 Series data)

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<td>Marriages, 1837-2003: Type of ceremony and denomination, a. numbers</td>
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<td>PMH34</td>
<td>Marriages, 1846-2002: median age at marriage by sex and previous marital status</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMH35a</td>
<td>Marriages, 1846-2003: mean age at marriage by previous marital status in combination, a. males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMH35b</td>
<td>Marriages, 1846-2003: mean age at marriage by previous marital status in combination, b. females</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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