

“THE STUFFE NOT OURS”

The work of derivation in early modern Englishwomen’s writing

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Abstract

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Twentieth-century critics sought writing by women that captured authentic female voices of the past, but primarily found derivative texts: translations and paraphrases. These texts were deemed emblematic of a patriarchal dynamic, with women silenced by the male-authored source text. The disappointment palpable in this scholarship, where women’s texts are seen as insufficiently subversive, has long affected the critical fortunes of early modern women’s writing in English. This thesis argues instead that the authentic female voice is a misnomer for the real interest of derivative texts, namely evidence of women’s authorship: the will and capacity to make. Far from mechanical exercises, women’s translations and paraphrases abound in all that we associate with canonical genius: creativity, intellectual vigour, political comment, and formal experimentation. My chapters address writers as various as Anne Lock, Mary Sidney, Margaret Tyler, Anne Dowriche, and Lucy Hutchinson. Moving between a range of literary genres in which they wrote, as well as a range of derivative modes, I demonstrate the diverse interests of these writings, including many areas of thought and action typically assumed to exclude women. Far from constituting a distinctly female tradition, their derivative texts demonstrate the continuity of women’s engagements with the intellectual mainstream. As such, they reveal that the mainstream was never entirely male to begin with.

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Note on the texts

When quoting from early modern works, I maintain original punctuation and orthography but modernise u/v and i/j, and silently expand superscript contractions. The titles of early modern printed texts have not been modernised but are sometimes shortened, as indicated with ellipses in square brackets.

INTRODUCTION

me parece que el traducir de una lengua en otra [. . .] es como quien mira los tapices flamencos por el revés, que aunque se ven las figuras, son llenas de hilos que las escurecen, y no se ven con la lisura y tez de la haz.¹

it seems to me that translating from one language to another [. . .] is like someone looking at a Flemish tapestry from behind so that, even though the illustrations are visible, they are full of threads that darken them, and cannot be seen with the smoothness or colour of the front.²

In a moment of clarity, Cervantes has Don Quixote observe that the translator attends to the intricate workings of literary text: to the warp and weft visible at the back of the tapestry. The emphasis placed on looking (*mira* is the only verb ascribed to the translator) suggests an unusual intensity of attention. Most people—most readers—are content with the smooth “tez de la haz”. To be a translator, however, one must possess a particular sensibility. They also require a particular set of skills. The emphasis on the materiality of the finished artwork, on the ghostly effect of the tapestry’s underside and its dark threads, draws attention to translation as craft. To unpick the original tapestry or to create another in the pattern of the original, the weaver must be a master of their craft; similarly, to translate a text from one language to another one must master the craft of literary writing. The translator is both someone curious about the way things are made and someone with their own desire to make.

This thesis makes two main claims. One is to contend that translation, and its close relative paraphrase, are not passive replications but creative and crafted acts of literary making—of *poiesis*—that are tantamount to authorship. The second is to suggest, contrary to the priorities of literary history and the prejudices of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, that

¹ Miguel de Cervantes, *Don Quijote de la Mancha* (Real Academia Española / Penguin Random House, 2015), 1032.

² Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.

Cervantes's attentive "someone" (*quien*) might be *she* as well as *he*. This introduction contextualises these interventions by considering the position of early modern women in English literary criticism and the status of acts of rewriting in contemporary humanist thought.

Revising early modern women

The study of early modern women's writing in English began as a response to their absence in received literary history. Pioneering scholars of the 1980s produced anthologies of women's writing that sought to make literary curricula more representative,³ leading them to foreground texts "expressive of the author's *experience* as a representative member of some social group".⁴ In practice, this meant texts by early modern women that could be made legible in a "narrative rubric of a quest for greater 'autonomy' for women".⁵ As in the canon they challenged, priority was given to texts that were understood as original. One of the legacies of these dual priorities has been the continued elision of those parts of early modern women's literary production that are "radically discontinuous with our present" in terms of literary and cultural valuation.⁶

Derivative writing—that is, writing modelled closely on other texts—is one such type of production. As the deeply negative connotations of the term "derivative" suggests, this writing falls foul of our post-Romantic preference for originality. For texts written by women, that

³ See, for example, Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, eds., *The Norton Anthology of Literature by Women: The Tradition in English* (W. W. Norton & Company, 1985); Margaret P. Hannay, ed., *Silent But for the Word* (The Kent State University Press, 1985); Germaine Greer et al., eds., *Kissing the Rod: An Anthology of 17th Century Women's Verse* (Virago Press, 1988); and Elaine Hobby, *Virtue of Necessity: English Women's Writing 1649–88* (Virago Press, 1988).

⁴ John Guillory, *Cultural Capital: The problem of literary canon formation* (The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 10. This rubric is often oppositional, as Margaret Ezell observes: "anthologies and literary histories strongly stress the repressive nature of being defined as 'different,' and of society's power to silence women through culturally maintained inhibitions, trapping the creative woman in a web of repressive definitions of 'femininity'"; she also observes that alternate canons that include women's literature often end up reproducing received systems of literary valuation, *Writing Women's Literary History* (John Hopkins University, 1993), 25 and 63.

⁵ Margaret W. Ferguson, "Moderation and Its Discontents: Recent Work on Renaissance Women", *Feminist Studies* 20/2 (1994): 349–66: 355.

⁶ Danielle Clarke, "Translation, interpretation and gender: women's writing c.1595–1644" (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 1994), ii. Though she locates it in criticism of the 1970s, Clarke also identifies the problematic attempt "to recover women/texts in order to identify a continuous tradition of female experience", *ibid.*

apparent lack of originality in turn complicates already problematic attempts to seek a gendered “voice” in the text.

Early critics rightly interpret the dearth of early modern women’s writing as the result of patriarchal subjugation, but also take subjugation to explain why a large portion of women’s *extant* writing is in derivative modes.⁷ Less original and not recognisably “feminine”, derivative writing was found “wanting in some desired quantity of opposition”.⁸ This rhetoric of disappointment becomes a kind of critical zeitgeist. In a 1985 essay about women translators, Mary Ellen Lamb states

[i]t is sad to speculate about what poems, plays, commentaries, or treatises we have lost because women had to invest so much energy into showing humility and obedience to men. But the tragedy extends farther. What effect did this repression have on the women themselves? Did they merely shrug off this propaganda and live their lives as best they could, accomplishing whatever tasks were allowed to them?⁹

Lamb implies that early modern women, so worn out from their humility, abandoned their “original” writing and had energy enough only for translation or paraphrase. These secondary, derivative forms of writing are rendered mechanical “tasks”.¹⁰ Lamb is not alone in this dismissal. Tina Krontiris explains the existence of female translators by saying that “[t]hrough in the Renaissance translation was much more highly ranked than it has been since, it was still a less active and hence less masculine literary activity than original composition”.¹¹ Condemned in

⁷ Danielle Clarke notes that translation is “disproportionately present in the remaining record of women’s literary production”, “Translation”, in *The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Women’s Writing*, edited by Laura Lunger Knoppers (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 167–180: 168.

⁸ Ferguson, “Moderation and Its Discontents”, 358. See also Erica Longfellow’s helpful overview “Early Modern Women’s Writing in 2005”, *Literature Compass* 3/4 (2006): 792–803.

⁹ Mary Ellen Lamb, “The Cooke Sisters: Attitudes toward Learned Women in the Renaissance”, in *Silent But for the Word*, edited by Margaret P. Hannay (The Kent State University Press, 1985), 107–25: 125.

¹⁰ Translation is regularly deemed “mechanical” until the emergence of translation studies, Susan Bassnett, *Translation Studies*, 4th ed. (Routledge, 2014), 15. Jonathan Goldberg also critiques Lamb’s account of Anne Cooke, asking “Why call this demeaning and forced work? What is being assumed about what Cooke would have chosen to write?”, *Desiring Women Writing* (Stanford University Press, 1997), 83.

¹¹ Tina Krontiris, *Oppositional Voices: Women as Writers and Translators of Literature in the English Renaissance* (Routledge, 1992), 20.

advance with a masculine yardstick, Krontiris suggests that even those women who do write enact “a relatively passive role”.¹²

These arguments are not yet consigned to the past. Neil Rhodes reiterates them in his 2018 book *Common*, where he contends that translation provided the “seedbed of Elizabeth literature” and that women

[a]s reproducers, both privately within marriage and, for the learned, publicly within the field of translation, [. . .] participate in the communal labour of nation-building, and they are apt for this work precisely *because* it is reproductive. In this respect the learned woman becomes a model of Reformation ideology, setting aside the enticements of the imagination in order to produce resources for the commonwealth.¹³

For Rhodes, as with Krontiris, the centrality of translation to early modern culture—that it is its “seedbed”—does not make participation in it seem any less of a sacrifice because they locate the real pleasures and value of writing in the imagination. Similarly, Rhodes argues that (biblical) paraphrase affords “the protective framework of scriptural authority [. . .] and just enough space for the individual voice to be heard” within what Erasmus calls its “extremely strait gate”. Nonetheless, he narrows paraphrase to religious purposes alone and sets it in opposition to “free space and independent life of writing”.¹⁴ Even if one considers translation and paraphrase unimaginative—and this is a claim I insistently challenge in this thesis—we must discard the idea that there are no enticements (and no interests) outside of imaginative writing. Rhodes reiterates an unhelpful, and indeed anachronistic, dichotomy of derivative and original writing, and it is

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Neil Rhodes, *Common: The Development of Literary Culture in Sixteenth-Century England* (Oxford University Press, 2018), 120 and 122. Similar sentiments, discussed in my final chapter, are found in Massimiliano Morini, *Tudor Translation in Theory and Practice* (Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 24.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, 122–23. This account of scriptural paraphrase was challenged back in 1987; Rivkah Zim argues in her seminal book that “[t]he argument that metrical psalm version cannot be considered new or original works because ‘the act of translation is a species of submission’ is based on a misunderstanding of the significance of imitation for a humanist poet, and of the literary processes of imitation themselves”, *English Metrical Psalms: Poetry as Praise and Prayer, 1535–1601* (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 7.

clear that he is more concerned with the literature yielded by the “seedbed” than the craft, use, and rewards of derivative works themselves.

If Rhodes sells short the literary craft of translation and paraphrase, his criticism is thoroughly inimical to the interest of women’s participation in those modes, a participation which he equates with biological reproduction. Women are “reproducers”, so are naturally drawn to translation, “precisely because it is reproductive”.¹⁵ Not only does this reduce women to a biological function, but it reinscribes a dated binary that opposes reproductive and productive labour. By describing derivative texts as resources, he deprives them of literary interest, and, by describing women as those who “[re]produce resources”, he deprives them of literary agency. This is, of course, pernicious rhetoric for early modern women and their writing. The anomaly and interest of women’s participation in “highly ranked” literary practices like translation is effaced, either by a literary teleology that renders all derivation vestigial and all its practitioners forbears; by the myth of an essentialised female; or, as in Rhodes’s account, by both together.

The dyad identified here between reproductive women and reproductive writing is one I seek to disentangle, contextualise, and ultimately contradict. To do so we need to not only set aside the negative connotations of the “derivative”, but also to suspend our assumptions about gender now and gender in the past. Just as we do not expect studies of men’s writing to limit their interests to masculinity (or rather we view male interests so capaciously that we do not articulate them as such), so too do I see no need for studies of women’s writing to limit themselves to femininity or to the experience of gender.¹⁶ That is not to say that gender is

¹⁵ Rhodes’s (ibid., 122) argument involves accepting at face-value John Florio’s depiction of translations, in his preface to Montaigne, as “reputed femalls, delivered at second hand”, Michel de Montaigne, *The essayes or morall, politike and millitarie discourses* [. . .], trans. John Florio (London: Valentine Sims, 1603), sig. A2r.

¹⁶ The risk in prioritising a gender-centric approach is that our present assumptions may determine our findings in advance. I am far from the first in the field to articulate this concern. Sarah C. E. Ross warns that, in the absence of evidence that women wrote in response to one another at this time, depicting a “specifically female lineage” of authorship may end up “disentangl[ing] women from their socio-political contexts” in unhelpful ways, *Women, Poetry, and Politics in Seventeenth-Century Britain* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 6. Elizabeth Scott-Baumann, in her advocacy of feminist formalism, is careful to remind us that “[i]n order to understand women’s place in literary history, we need to excavate and analyse their dialogue with existing [male] traditions”. In other words, even while we use gender as a criterion of text selection, we need to set aside the assumption that gender will determine their literary

irrelevant. Womanhood is a social construct which, in its imposition on female bodies in early modern England, structured many of their social, cultural, and political engagements. Particularly pertinent are the policing of women's access to literacy, humanist education, as well as the propriety of kinds of speech (including publication), but these are neither monolithic nor wholly constraining. As Jonathan Goldberg succinctly puts it: “[i]njuncts about use do not determine what will be done”.¹⁷ That said, I do not wish to simply label derivation as a back-door for transgressive articulation (though it *can* function in this way), for such a revisionist argument, where women “accomplish[ing] whatever tasks were allowed to them”¹⁸ is read as intrinsically transgressive is in effect just another version of the reductive argument that sees derivative writing as intrinsically oppressive. Framing women's texts as inevitably oppositional gives “[patriarchal] discourses too much credit” and women's writing too narrow a range of interests.¹⁹ Conversely, by attending closely to derivative works, we will find that the intellectual and cultural commitments of the women who wrote them are much more varied than has been assumed.

My thesis continues the work of critics who have illuminated the range of women's literary roles, as translators, transcribers, compilers, and patrons, through the framework of collaboration and expanded concepts of authorship.²⁰ My own interest in the agency of derivative writers is a corollary of these critiques of single authorship—a concept which dovetails

and cultural engagements, *Forms of Engagement: Women, Poetry, and Culture 1640–1680* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 9.

¹⁷ Goldberg, *Desiring Women Writing*, 83.

¹⁸ Lamb, “The Cooke Sisters”, 125.

¹⁹ Julie Crawford, *Mediatix: Women, Politics, and Literary Production in Early Modern England* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 2.

²⁰ See *ibid*; Patricia Pender, ed., *Gender, Authorship, and Early Modern Women's Collaboration* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Adam Smyth, “Commonplace Book Culture: A List of Sixteen Traits”, in *Women and Writing, c. 1340–c.1650: The Domestication of Print Culture*, edited by Anne Lawrence-Mathers and Phillipa Hardman (Boydell & Brewer, 2010); Helen Smith, ‘Grossly Material Things’: *Women and Book Production in Early Modern England* (Oxford University Press, 2012). See also the work on nuns (Marie-Louise Coolahan), mother's legacies (Paula McQuade) and funerary monuments (Peter Sherlock) in Patricia Phillippy, ed., *A History of Early Modern Women's Writing* (Cambridge University Press, 2018). In terms of translation, work from Jamie Goodrich's study of religious translations by women deserves particular attention, *Faithful Translators: Authorship, Gender, and Religion in Early Modern England* (Northwestern University Press, 2013). As this thesis was in its final stages, Hilary Brown's *Women and Early Modern Cultures of Translation* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2022) promised to offer a similar critique to my own, challenging the centrality placed on gender in studies of translation; she also helpfully pivots to lesser-known case studies of women's writing in Germany.

with the “original” work. Many of the writers I discuss produce both “original” and derivative writing, as of course do many canonical writers in the period, and viewing authorship as a spectrum rather than a binary is necessary to properly understand early modern literary culture and writers male and female. I do not apply the spectrum model to the distinction I make between “derivative” and “original” works because that binary is one my thesis as a whole sets out to complicate, and here serves merely as a received taxonomy. There is, of course, already an abundance of early modern scholarship that demonstrates without demonising the way old texts influence new texts (first in the language of “originals”, then “sources”, and “intertextuality”, as Kerrigan observes).²¹ This scholarship demonstrates that no literary work takes place in isolation and that early modern writers, schooled in *imitatio*, were particularly liberal borrowers. However, because studies about influence tend to focus on canonical figures and texts whose position in the discipline is in large part premised on their being innovative, they do not necessarily disrupt the original-derivative binary.²² Not only are the translations and paraphrases I treat more derivative (that is, they have much closer relationships with other texts), but they are by writers on the disciplinary margins. My thesis seeks to reveal the interest and value of derivative works, rather than the derivative aspects of works we already acknowledge to be interesting and valuable. In doing so, I hope to challenge more radically the original-derivative binary and to reveal its role in determining which texts get relegated to the disciplinary margins in the first place.

My thesis shares with the translation studies discipline the premise that linguistic transformations necessarily involve mediations literary, cultural, and interpretive.²³ Itamar Even-Zohar’s polysystems theory is an influential example of this thinking, which I also extend to paraphrase. He argues that when a literature is “young” or “peripheral” relative to its neighbours,

²¹ John Kerrigan, *Shakespeare’s Originality* (Oxford University Press, 2018), 10–2.

²² “[D]ependence on sources” becomes evidence for Shakespeare’s innovativeness in Kerrigan’s study: “[i]t is the originality with which he uses those originals that this book aims to explore”, *ibid.*, 18.

²³ See Bassnett, *Translation Studies*.

as in early modern Britain, derivative writing (including what he calls “semi- and quasi-translations”), “become[s] one of the means of elaborating the new repertoire”.²⁴ English translators might then be said to craft their text vis-à-vis a perceived gap, shaping the resources of the originating literature to the needs of the receptor literature and so providing a literary, cultural, and often linguistic infusion.²⁵ Recent scholarship has extended interest in mediation and transfusion to the “complex discursive engagements” of early modern paratexts,²⁶ as well as the acculturations implicit in print technologies, bibliographical conventions, and the European book trade.²⁷ Illuminating though these approaches often are, in less careful hands than these they can displace the comparative textual analysis crucial to the study of derivative writing, and re-inscribe the invisibility of the translator or paraphrast in the resulting text.²⁸ This is true in some existing studies of women’s derivative works. For example, Deborah Uman, in the 2012 *Women as Translators in Early Modern England*, argues that translation “gave women entry into the rich literary culture of the Renaissance” but never compares source (original) and target (translated) texts, relying on their English prefaces.²⁹ I contend that without close attention at the level of syntax, diction, and arrangement, much of the literary agency afforded by derivative writing becomes illegible. My methodology is comparative and granular; it bases itself in the

²⁴ Itamar Even-Zohar, “The Position of Translated Literature within the Literary Polysystem”, *Poetics Today* 11/1 (1990): 45–51: 50 and 47. F. O. Matthiessen famously stated that “[a] study of Elizabethan translations is a study of the means by which the Renaissance came to England”; it is in Britain’s belated uptake of Renaissance ideas that literary culture in English can be understood as “young”, *Translation: An Elizabethan Art* (Octagon Books, 1965), 3.

²⁵ As Bassnett and Lefevere observe, “[t]he more the image of one culture is constructed for another by translations, the more important it becomes to know how the process of rewriting develops, and what kinds of rewritings/translations are produced”, Susan Bassnett and André Lefevere, *Constructing Cultures: Essays on Literary Translation* (Multilingual Matters, 1998), 10. For translation as a response to Britain’s literary marginality, see Rhodes, *Common*; Robert Cummings, “Translation and Literary Innovation”, in *The Oxford History of Literary Translation in English: Volume 2 1550–1660*, edited by Gordon Braden et al. (Oxford University Press, 2010), 32–44; and A. E. B. Coldiron, *Printers without Borders: Translation and Textuality in the Renaissance* (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

²⁶ Marie-Alice Belle and Brenda M. Hosington, eds., *Thresholds of Translation: Paratexts, Print, and Cultural Exchange in Early Modern Britain (1473–1660)* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 5.

²⁷ Coldiron, *Printers without Borders: Translation and Textuality in the Renaissance*.

²⁸ On invisibility, see Lawrence Venuti’s provocative *The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of Translation* (Routledge, 1995).

²⁹ In effect, the book is not interested in translation as a practice so much as the way women name themselves as translators. *Women as Translators in Early Modern England* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 3.

defining feature of translations and paraphrases, namely that they are modelled on (an)other text(s).

It is also in this methodology that I differ in emphasis from Danielle Clarke, who first sought to recover early modern women's work in English translation. Clarke's premise that translation might entail a "slipperiness of ownership [which] can be exploited as a form of agency to figures who otherwise lack it" undergirds my study, and I apply it also to paraphrase.³⁰ However, her assertion that "it does not always follow that the [translated] text itself is actually read in relation to the original" and that women's translations are less wedded to their sources and to the "functional learning habits of the grammar school" leads her to limit her comparisons with source texts, consequently making that agency more diffuse and more difficult to prove.³¹ Using the evidence gleaned from comparative textual analysis, I argue that in fact women's derivative practices respond to humanist precepts just as men's production does, and with purposes just as various. This interest in the variety of women's derivative writing informs my choice not to limit my scope to one narrowly circumscribed period, genre, or oeuvre. But the dual demands of breadth and depth come with the necessary concession that I make no claims to be comprehensive. My thesis seeks not to exhaust any single text, author, or mode; rather, my chapters offer a provocation: that there are abundant rewards to be had in taking seriously derivative texts by women. These rewards are not a uniform "female" voice or set of concerns, but something much more interesting: the will and capacity to make.

Humanist prescriptions

To understand women's work in translation and paraphrase, we must first historicise those terms in the humanist thinking that brought them to prominence. Both are procedures of *imitatio*, a

³⁰ Clarke, "Translation", 170.

³¹ Clarke, "Translation, interpretation and gender: women's writing c.1595–1644", 20 and Clarke, "Translation", 170, respectively.

central tenet of humanist thought and learning which involved the re-use of classical learning and texts for linguistic, rhetorical, philosophical, or moral edification. The purpose of *imitatio* and the best method by which to do it occasioned a “bewildering variety of positions”.³² Colin Burrow’s *Imitating Authors* treats many of these positions in depth, tracing in Ancient Greek, Roman, and early modern sources the way that rhetoricians conceptualised how one should make use of the rhetoric and literature of antiquity. However, Burrow often uses *imitatio* and imitation as synonyms, so that the former (the ideology and pedagogical directive) is elided with specific kinds of intertextual relationships denoted by the latter—such as adaptive imitation (assimilating a text to the present age) and formal imitation (assimilating the formal structuration of other text[s]).³³ In reference to early modern sources, I recognise paraphrase and translation as part and parcel of the culture’s investment in *imitatio*, but distinguish them from the weaker intertextual relationships that comprise imitation.³⁴ For Burrow, and for the rhetoricians most influential in early modern English humanism (notably Quintilian), *imitatio* succeeds when a person’s writing “absorb[s] the excellences of others” and “consequently strengthens and enriches its own *vis* and *ingenium*”.³⁵ A failed act of *imitatio*, meanwhile, is a “simulacrum”, a “shadow” that “fails to capture the intrinsic properties of that which it imitates”.³⁶ While some have viewed paraphrase and translation as always pale reflections of original writing, this thesis argues that derivative texts can exhibit all the *vis* and *ingenium* that rhetoricians associated with successful *imitatio* and that we associate with authorship.

When Ben Jonson gives advice on *imitatio* in his *Discoveries*, he uses a language of derivation, writing that one must

³² G. W. Pigman, “Versions of Imitation in the Renaissance”, *Renaissance Quarterly* 33/1 (1980): 1–32: 2.

³³ Colin Burrow, *Imitating Authors: Plato to Futurity* (Oxford University Press, 2019), 9 ff.

³⁴ See Chapter 3: Versioned History.

³⁵ Burrow, *Imitating Authors*, 100.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

make choise of one excellent man above the rest, and so to follow him till he grow very Hee: or, so like him, as the Copie may be mistaken for the Principall. Not, as a Creature, that swallowes, what it takes in, crude, raw, or indigested; but that, feedes with an Appetite, and hath a Stomacke to concoct, devide, and turne all into nourishment.³⁷

Close likeness, close following, and even copying are not failings so long as they are the result of an attentive and voracious mind. Derivation is in other words essential to both the practice and conceptualisation of *imitatio* and to the rhetorical mastery it promised. Because it was thought that the literary manipulation of classical wisdom facilitated its absorption, translation and paraphrase came to form the heart of the humanist grammar school curriculum in Britain. Translation was especially prominent in this curriculum. As Ascham notes in his 1570 *The Scholemaster*, translation between languages (*translatio linguarum*) is the “most common, and most commendable of all other exercises for youth: most common, for all your constructions in Grammer scholes, be nothing els but translations”.³⁸ Warren Boutcher argues that “[o]ne learned to write good English, to think sharp English thoughts, even to act effectively in English circumstances, by lively translation from Latin or Italian books”,³⁹ and Rhodes sees the grammar school curriculum as “creating the conditions for a literary renaissance”, which he argues was effected through translation.⁴⁰

These critical accounts suggest that translation is seen as both the salient exercise of the humanist classroom and transformative of British society and letters. But we risk another

³⁷ Ben Jonson, *The workes of Benjamin Jonson* [. . .] (London: John Beale, James Dawson, Bernard Alsop and Thomas Fawcet, 1641), 127.

³⁸ Roger Ascham, *The scholemaster* [. . .] (London: John Day, 1570), fol. 33v.

³⁹ Warren Boutcher, “The Renaissance”, in *The Oxford Guide to Literature in English Translation*, edited by Peter France (Oxford University Press, 2006), 45–54: 46–7. For the literary and social afterlives of the humanist classroom in canonical works, see Lynn Enterline, *Shakespeare’s Schoolroom: Rhetoric, Discipline, Emotion* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).

⁴⁰ *Common*, 21; Rhodes argues throughout that translation is what the Renaissance and Reformation have in common (ibid., 8 and *passim*). Gordon Braden notes that, in 1550–1660, almost three thousand translations were printed and “[i]n some years a quarter or more of books printed in English were translations”, “An Overview”, in *The Oxford History of Literary Translation in English: Volume 2 1550–1660*, edited by Gordon Braden et al. (Oxford University Press, 2010), 3–11: 3. Between 1473–1640, there were over six thousand translations printed, see “Introduction” in Brenda Hosington et al., ed., *Renaissance Cultural Crossroads*, www.dhi.ac.uk/rcc/index.php?page=introduction accessed 7 March 2022.

definitional mismatch here. The fact that published translations were popular and that grammar school students were tasked with something called “translation” encourages us to elide those phenomena, to imagine a factory of trainee translators preparing to reinvigorate the culture. The reality is more complex (as indeed women translating suggests). First, and as we shall see, “translation” as a grammar school exercise is not synonymous with our modern sense of that word, weakening the relationship inferred between formal education and literary translation. Secondly, translation, whether literary translation or grammar school exercise, is not the only procedure that enacts *imitatio*. Many derivative writing practices were specifically paraphrastic, and paraphrase, too, was a popular mode that shaped early modern Britain’s literary culture.

Let us first look to how the terms translation and paraphrase are used in the twenty-first century. Translation tends to mean turning a text from one language into another and it is a process we understand as having literary applications with literary craft. Paraphrase now tends to mean producing a different version of a text *without* changing the language; it is not seen as literary and is perhaps most commonly associated with students summarising a long citation.⁴¹ Conversely, in early modern Britain, the terminological distinction between intra- and inter-lingual manipulations is not robust, and it is often paraphrase that is theorised as a literary procedure, and translation that carries educational connotations.

In England, theorisation of literary translation is thin on the ground until Dryden’s slight but famous intervention in 1680.⁴² The major exception is Laurence Humphrey’s expansive Latin-language *Interpretatio linguarum*.⁴³ Published in Basel in 1559 during his Marian exile, Humphrey’s discussion of the role of the translator (*interpre*s) includes with translation what we today recognise as paraphrase:

⁴¹ Matthew Reynolds, *The Poetry of Translation* (Oxford University Press, 2011), 17.

⁴² See Braden, “Translating Procedures in Theory and Practice”, 89 and Morini, *Tudor Translation*, 8.

⁴³ Sheldon Brammall calls it the “most comprehensive piece of translation theory that was produced during the European Renaissance” and a copy was thoroughly annotated by Gabriel Harvey, see “Laurence Humphrey, Gabriel Harvey, and the Place of Personality in Renaissance Translation Theory”, *The Review of English Studies* 69/288 (2017): 56–75: 56. Humphrey’s influence in England is only now starting to be recognised. Most recently, see Katie Mennis, “Glossing *The Shepheardes Calender* in Latin Translation”, *Translation and Literature* 31/1 (2022): 1–34.

[. . .] estque hoc nomine Interpretis ambiguum, et in varios sensus trahi potest: nos hoc quidem loco & tempore eum vocauimus, qui Dialectum seu idioma minus multis notum, linguae notioris & familiaris interpretatione illustrat, & aliquid ex peregrina lingua convertit in aliam celebratam magis & pervagatam.⁴⁴

‘Translator’ is an ambiguous word and can be understood in various ways. For present purposes I take it to mean someone who brings clarity to some particular form of language or idiom generally less well known, translating [*interpretatione*] it into words that are better known and more familiar; or who turns something [*convertit*] from a foreign language into one that is more commonly and widely used.⁴⁵

Humphrey’s *interpretis* is both translator and paraphrast. They may transform foreign languages into familiar ones, but they also make words accessible *within* a language, perhaps by explicating esoteric or technical registers.⁴⁶ The English translation above chooses “translating” for *interpretatio*, but “paraphrasing” would be more apt for today’s definitions, given that Humphrey contrasts it with translation from foreign languages. Paraphrase does not seem to be a secondary function, as Humphrey’s word for it has the same root as his word for the overall role, *interpretis*. Humphrey’s formulation suggests that while translation between languages is one distinct function among others that an *interpretis* performs, it is nevertheless closely proximate with

⁴⁴ Laurence Humphrey, *Interpretatio Linguarum* (Basel: Jerome Frobenius, 1559), 3.

⁴⁵ The italics and square brackets are original. Neil Rhodes et al., eds., *English Renaissance Translation Theory* (Modern Humanities Research Association, 2013), 265.

⁴⁶ The primary distinction Humphrey makes is not between paraphrase and translation, but between those derivative procedures and what he calls *amulatio* (emulation), a looser intertextual practice that we might call imitation. He counsels that “Est autem interpretis officium, mea quidem sententia et ratione, autorem aequare, non superare, assequi non praecurrere, et ut similis esse studeat non superior” (“It is the duty of a translator, according to my thought and reason, to equal an author, not to surpass, to follow, not to run ahead, and to study to be alike, not greater than”), *Interpretatio Linguarum*, 251 and for this English translation, Brammall, “Laurence Humphrey, Gabriel Harvey, and the Place of Personality in Renaissance Translation Theory”, 71.

paraphrase, able to be performed by the same person, apt to be discussed in the same book, and to be encapsulated in the same term.

The close proximity of these terms is corroborated by their often interchangeable usage in early modern publications. In George Wither's 1632 book of metrical psalms, his preface is at pains to indicate his use of the Hebrew.⁴⁷ As we would expect, he first calls his work "[t]his translation", saying that, far from "such elegant-seeming *Paraphrases*, as are composed by those, who selecting easy and Passionate *Psalmes*, have trimmed them up with Rhetoricall Illustrations", he has instead "purposely avoyded those Descants, & confined my self to the grave, & simple *Language* of the *Text*".⁴⁸ However, Wither then implores readers that they "let what I have done, be duely weighed, (not rashlie condemned) by those who shall by some prose *Translations*, examine my *Paraphrase*".⁴⁹ Fidelity is here associated with translation and paraphrase with ornamentation, but the language of the source text has little to do with which term Wither uses, and the way he alternates between them cautions us about taking early modern uses of these terms at face-value.

Most vernacular discussion of derivation in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century is limited to prefaces like Wither's, and consequently tends to justify the translator or paraphrast's local approach to that text rather than doing broader conceptual or taxonomic work. Paraphrase is equated by some with versification or rhetorical ornamentation, but by others with prose exposition (and enlargement) following Erasmus's use of that term in his New Testament paraphrases.⁵⁰ At times paraphrase is something translators do, in others it is what they should

⁴⁷ George Wither, *The Psalmes of David translated into lyrick-verse* [. . .] ([Amsterdam?]: Cornelis Gerritis van Breughel, 1632), sigs. A7r–8r.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, sigs. A6r–v.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, sig. A8r.

⁵⁰ Erasmus describes paraphrase as "a plain setting forth of a text or sentence more at large, with such circumstance of mo[r]e and other wordes, as may make the sentence open, cleare, plaine, & familiar [. . .] to be understood of any that were unlearned", *The first tome or volume of the Paraphrase of Erasmus upon the newe testamente*, trans. Nicholas Udall (London: Edwarde Whitchurche, 1548), sig. xiiiiir [fol. 14r].

not do, as in: “a good translator is neither a paraphrast, nor a periphraſt”.⁵¹ Tertiary terms like periphraſis also muddy the water. The diſtinction between the Greek prefixes para- and peri-, expressing modification and circumlocution reſpectively, implies a taxonomy that never quite catches on. Dryden’s 1680 intervention, also in a preface, does little to clear up the iſſues; he offers a tripartite ſcheme, of metaphraſe (“word by word, and Line by Line”), paraphraſe (“with Latitude”) and imitation (“taking only ſome general hints from the Original”), but all three he ſees as transformations between languages, entirely diſcarding what we today would call paraphraſe.⁵²

More illuminating of the actual work involved in derivative procedures is Roger Aſcham’s influential *The Scholemaſter*. There Aſcham does diſtinguiſh translation and paraphraſe according to the language of the ſource and target text, but it is paraphraſe (within a language), not translation (between languages), which he ſees as a literary procedure.⁵³ Of the ſix methods Aſcham outlines “for the learning of tonges, and encrease of eloquence”, *translatio linguarum* is preſented as the “moſt common, and moſt commendable”.⁵⁴ However, the exerciſe he favours for *translatio linguarum*, double translation, is a tool for learning Latin and not in any recogniſable ſenſe a literary procedure. Double translation involves the ſtudent conſtruing a Latin text into Engliſh, and then at a later time translating the reſulting Engliſh text back into Latin.⁵⁵ At this point, the ſchoolmaſter takes the original and the double-translated text, “laie[s] them both together”, and offers corrections:

⁵¹ Robert Rollock, *A treatiſe of Gods effectual calling* [. . .], trans. Henry Holland (London: Felix Kyngſton, 1603), ſig. ¶3r.

⁵² John Dryden, *Ovid’s epiſtles* [. . .] (London: Jacob Tonſon, 1680), ſig. A8v (ſignatures corrupted, eleventh ſide counting from Preface title).

⁵³ Even Aſcham’s uſage is ſometimes flexible. “[T]ranslate” includes paraphraſtic transformations in ſome ſentences, like “to translate the beſt latin authors, into other latin wordes, as many or thereabouts”, *The ſcholemaſter*, fol. 35v.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 33r.

⁵⁵ This ſame exerciſe is deſcribed by another education treatiſe, Brinſley’s *Ludus Literarius*, in which he preſcribes double translation with Engliſh to learn Latin, with Engliſh or Latin to learn Greek, and with Latin to learn Hebrew, *Ludus literarius* [. . .] (London: Humphrey Lowneſ, 1612), 249–61 *passim*.

Tullie would have placed this worde here, not there: would have used this case, this number, this person, this degree, this gender: he would have used this moode, this tens, this simple, rather than this compound.⁵⁶

The schoolmaster is not only saying that Tullie “would have used this moode, this tens”, but that Tullie *did* use this mood, *did* use this tense—the quality of the student’s text is judged in direct reference to the original text, and both are in Latin. The exercise is all grammar, no rhetoric.

Ascham’s *translatio linguarum* is therefore more “for the learning of tonges” than for the “encrease of eloquence”, and has little to do with translation in our modern sense because the target (output) language and the source language are the same.

While translation drills still exist in twenty-first century classrooms, it is notable that discussions of craft, style, and the transmission of meaning, which are so crucial to how we now think about literary translation, are instead entirely displaced onto Ascham’s description of *paraphrasis* (paraphrase) and *metaphrasis* (metaphrase)—transformations within a language.⁵⁷ This conception of literary paraphrase simply does not exist in the twenty-first century. For Ascham, paraphrase involves a sophisticated manipulation of classical examples. His definition is capacious. Paraphrase means “to express at large with moe wordes”, but also “to translate the best latin authors, into other latin wordes, as many or thereaboutes”.⁵⁸ Its aims are sometimes explanatory (“expound[ing] openlie a good author withall”) and sometimes aesthetic (an technique whereby “some notable place of an excellent author, may be uttered with other fitte wordes”).⁵⁹ In the latter Ascham follows (and cites) Quintilian, who also discusses paraphrase as a re-working of words, whether others’ or one’s own, that sets out to “rival and vie with the

⁵⁶ Ascham, *The scholemaster*, fols. 1r–v.

⁵⁷ *Metaphrasis* is for Ascham “all one with *Paraphrasis*” but specifically involves a change from verse to prose or vice versa; *ibid.*, fol. 39v.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, fol. 35v.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

original in the expression of the same thoughts”.⁶⁰ Ascham qualifies these approaches with eighteen prescriptions, many of which are much more interventionist than modern “rewording” would permit. For example, he enjoins would-be paraphrasts to intervene in the text, “*Mutare quod ineptum est*” and “*Replere quod deest*”; and to differentiate between “*Sublime, et Tumidum*” and “*Grande, et immodicum*”.⁶¹ These instructions resemble Aphthonius’s *Progymnasmata* exercises that older grammar school students performed in Latin using Agricola’s translation, and which also involved paraphrastic operations, like amplifying proverbs or commonplaces and retelling stories or anecdotes within prescribed rhetorical structures.⁶² Ascham, however, considers the literary craft and decorum of paraphrase so delicate that he deems it inappropriate for schoolboys, who risk “turn[ing] pure gold and silver, into foule brasse and copper”.⁶³ Thus, though Ascham’s definitions seem modern, it soon becomes apparent that his usage wholly contradicts our sense that it is translation which can be literary, and paraphrase which is merely a schoolroom exercise.

Given these discontinuities and absent separate theorisations of movements between and within languages, this thesis considers both together, using what contemporary literary criteria do exist to inform its discussions of both translation and paraphrase. Like Ascham’s paraphrase, literary translation also involves choosing an author and “utter[ing] with other fitte words” their meaning, and the fact that the “fitte words” are in a different language would not seem to betray the spirit of his formulation. Both are literary manipulations that enact *imitatio*. However, even as I borrow from early modern discussions of both modes of derivation, I maintain for clarity’s sake the modern terminological distinction between paraphrase as a movement *within* languages

⁶⁰ Quintilian, *The Orator’s Education*, trans. D. A. Russell (Harvard University Press, 2001), 10.5.2–11 and 10.5.5. Ascham notes that this prescription was controversial, advanced by Crabo and Quintilian, but rejected by Cicero, Pliny the Younger and Crassus; Ascham comments “[i]t is a bold comparison in deede, to thinke to say better, than that is best”, *The scholemaster*, fol. 35v.

⁶¹ The Latin injunctions are “substitute what is senseless”, “complete what is lacking”, and the distinctions between “the high and the haughty” and “the grand and the excessive”. The italicisation is original. Ascham, *The scholemaster*, fols. 37r–v.

⁶² Mary Thomas Crane, *Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England* (Princeton University Press, 1993), 88–90. They also resemble Erasmus’s paraphrastic exercises in *De copia*, such as rewording “Your letter pleased me greatly”, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 24, ed. Craig R. Thompson (University of Toronto Press, 1978), 348–65. These copious exercises are discussed in Chapter 1: The Word Done in Verse.

⁶³ *The scholemaster*, fol. 35v.

and translation *between* languages. In this way, I hope to draw attention to a wider range of derivative writing without eliding the specific demands and literary choices intrinsic to each procedure.

Vis feminarum

If derivative practices are essential components of rhetorical and literary expertise in the period, we must ask why the translations and paraphrases of early modern women in particular have never been viewed as masterful. One answer to this lies in the way that classical and humanist thinkers depict *imitatio* as a specifically male rite of passage. When Ascham opines that the paraphrase of great authors is “not fitte for a scholer, but [only] for a perfite master, who in plentie hath good choise, in copie hath right judgement, and grounded skill”, the master here is both a schoolmaster, a master of rhetoric and, crucially, an adult man.⁶⁴ Cicero often describes rhetorical power as *vis*, meaning strength or power, a muscularity of speech that could not be taught.⁶⁵ Quintilian, influential in the teaching of rhetoric in early modern Europe, doubles down on this association.⁶⁶ As Burrow observes, for Quintilian *imitatio* is “an ideal of Roman manliness, which leads him to describe both rhetoric and imitation in quasi-military terms, or as a form of physical contest”; the *stilus* of the scribe becomes analogous with the athlete’s javelin as symbols of virility.⁶⁷ This blurring of physical and rhetorical mastery would be formative in early modern conceptions of masculinity that evolved around the soldier-poet, most notably in the figure of Philip Sidney.

The masculine terms in which *imitatio* is esteemed in classical and early modern sources cannot be straightforwardly applied to women and their writing and this may in part explain their

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Burrow, *Imitating Authors*, 78 and 83.

⁶⁶ Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria* (*The Orator’s Education*) was perhaps the most influential classical treatise of rhetoric for early moderns because, while he shared Cicero’s doubt that *vis* could be taught, he nevertheless codified the rules and tools of good rhetoric in ways more amenable to early modern application in the classroom.

⁶⁷ Burrow, *Imitating Authors*, 90–1; see also his discussion at 294 ff.

critical neglect. And yet this inhospitable language, not to mention girls' exclusion from the humanist classroom, makes early modern women's participation in the work of *imitatio* more anomalous and more worthy of inquiry. This thesis pursues that line of inquiry and seeks not to establish a separate female literary tradition or approach to derivation, but to recognise the participation of women in the interests and enterprises of the literary mainstream. Just as in Jonson's formulation boys came to (rhetorical) majority by becoming "very he" in their derivation from great authors, so too did women, outside the classroom but eager participants in the literary milieu, become "very he" in their derivative writing and, in the process, very much authors in their own right—very she. In effect, this thesis works to separate the accession to authorship afforded by *imitatio* from the accession to manhood with which it was analogised. Women, too, exhibit the *vis* we associate with authorship in acts of successful derivation.

Across its four chapters, this thesis recognises five women translators and paraphrasts as authors. My first chapter, "The Word Done in Verse" considers the most prolific tradition of women's derivative writing, biblical verse paraphrase, and specifically psalm versification. I turn first to Mary Sidney to exemplify the way that paraphrase and translation can blur in early modern literary practice. Her psalm versions triangulate from many sources (and languages) to create a poetic immediacy that results in some of the most evocative psalm versions in the period. I then turn to Anne Lock and her sonnet sequence versifying Psalm 51. I suggest that Lock's sequence represents not a "poetics of female-gendered textual reproduction", but a perceptive reading of biblical poetics and a major intervention in the English-language reception of the Petrarchan sonnet.⁶⁸

My second chapter, "England's Mirror", challenges the argument that Margaret Tyler's *The Mirrour of Knighthood*, a 1578 translation of a Spanish romance, is a throwback to the outmoded chivalric tradition. I argue that Tyler's translation choices evince a modernising

⁶⁸ Roland Greene, "Anne Lock's *Meditation*: Invention Versus Dilation and the Founding of Puritan Poetics", in *Form and Reform in Renaissance England: Essays in honor of Barbara Kiefer Lewalski*, edited by Amy Boesky and Mary Thomas Crane (Associated University Presses, 2000), 153–170: 157 and 155.

impulse that responds to its possible detractors and to innovations in English literary taste and culture. Her translation strategy has many parts, including an emphasis on communicative rather than martial action and an application of forensic rhetoric that encourages readers to infer probable arguments that mitigate the romance's narratological and psychological gaps. Moreover, Tyler continually introduces a lexicon of legal case and contract which reflects contemporary developments in English common law. These additions leave an unmistakably English mark on this Spanish text, threatening to unravel the chivalric world of the romance, and transforming our perception of Tyler and the literary and cultural interests of her romance.

“Versioned History”, my third chapter, complicates the category of derivative texts by proposing texts can be both derivative *and* imitative—that they can have close and distant relationships with other texts simultaneously. This may seem obvious, but in a post-Romantic hierarchy of literary value that sees imitation as creative (and masculine), and derivation as secondary, critics have had little stake in tracing their interaction. Anne Dowriche's *The French Historie* gives us just such an opportunity. I trace the way Dowriche selectively paraphrases Thomas Tymme's *Commentaries of the Ciuill Warres in Fraunce* (itself a translation from Jean de Serres) and then rearranges that material in an imitation of the providential narrative structure and style of Foxean martyrology. These versified episodes and the analogic habit of mind Dowriche encourages in her readers are intended to foster coreligionist sympathy and solidarity with the plight of the Huguenots. She thus fashions a text with its own identity and purposes even as it bears indelible signs of its textual lineage, part derivative and part imitative.

My final chapter, “The Dangers of Derivation”, jumps forward in time to one of the period's most accomplished and enigmatic figures: Lucy Hutchinson. The status of the derivative works in her oeuvre remain equivocal; their variety is often difficult to reconcile with what she records about her life and commitments. I direct my attention to this sense of contradiction. Her translation of Lucretius's atomist epic, *De rerum natura*, reveals the limits of the assumption that women's derivative writing is authorised by their male-authored originals. In that translation,

Hutchinson acts as her own scathing detractor, but she condemns her “wanton dalliance with impious bookes” at the very moment that she seeks to disseminate her translation. In this chapter I argue that Hutchinson’s translation is not passive or private, but is instrumental to how she sees herself as an author. She casts herself in the Lucretian model of a philosopher writing from retreat.

These four chapters only begin the work of this thesis. “*The stuffe not ours*” hopes to animate future study by exemplifying the rewards of applying its premises—that hierarchies of literary value ought to be challenged and that assumptions about gender and gender in the past hinder more than they help—and the results of its hypotheses: that women’s writing is conversant with mainstream cultural forces and that derivative works can partake in all the means and rewards of authorship. A derivative work implies a work well-trodden, but this thesis argues that it is in fact unknown territory, rich in the stuff that literary agency is made of: adaptation, imitation, and invention.

CHAPTER 1: THE WORD DONE IN VERSE

Barbara Lewalski argues that the “new factor” of Protestant poetics is the way “the Christian poet is led to relate his work not to ineffable and intuited divine revelation, but rather to its written formulation in scripture”.¹ This was a corollary of the signal importance Protestants placed on daily habits of private biblical reading or household recitation,² and the widespread participation in many kinds of pious writing.³ In effect, Protestant devotion became one of the richest traditions of *imitatio* and the Bible one of its richest literary models.

Lewalski’s primary interest is how the poets she treats (Donne, Herbert, Vaughan, and Traherne) appropriate the operations and forms of scripture for a new tradition of religious lyric in English. She describes poets in an efferent relationship with the Bible. Her interest is what those poets take from scripture, in how those writers—using the philological, rhetorical, and analytical skills afforded by their humanist training—identify and appropriate the generic models, language, and symbolic mode of the Bible for use in their own inventive poetic projects. My concern in this chapter is not this lyric tradition, but the genre of biblical versification whose derivative identity often leads it to be overlooked. Biblical verse paraphrase refers to the sub-tradition that rewrites not just biblical stories but the actual words of scripture. As such, more than the inventive lyric, these rewritings are true to Lewalski’s observation that the Protestant poet relates their work to scripture’s “written formulation”. However, this is a tradition that Lewalski seems to relegate to a secondary status when she argues that “this new attention to the metaphorical power of biblical language degenerated into tasteless jargon when biblical language ceased to mediate in some vital way between general spiritual concepts and personal experience”.⁴ Her priority is on the fusion of scripture and subjectivity; she talks of biblical

¹ Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, *Protestant Poetics and Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric* (Princeton University Press, 1979), 6.

² Alec Ryrie, *Being Protestant in Reformation Britain* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 270–81.

³ *Ibid.*, chapter 12.

⁴ Lewalski, *Protestant Poetics*, 73.

imagery and tropes that “fire the imagination” with the Bible lending fuel to a recognisably “original” poetic enterprise.⁵ This chapter seeks to reclaim fire and imagination for the more derivative tradition of biblical rewriting, and specifically for psalm versification. After all, the Book of Psalms was “a master text through which the writers of the age tested their capacities [. . .] not only as worshippers and theologians but as poets and critics”.¹ When we recognise that psalms were recognised as divine truth expressed in divine poetry, we can recognise the ambition and artistry of those who rewrote them.

Giving serious consideration to biblical rewritings means reappraising what we know—or what we assume we know—about the intellectual engagements and literary output of early modern women. A popular, vernacular offshoot of *imitatio* that spread well beyond the walls of the grammar school, biblical rewriting remains an “under-examined” genre that allowed writers to “speak on wide-ranging moral, social, and political issues”.⁶ It was also a genre regularly taken up by women.⁷ This fact alone suggests that women’s exclusion from formal education did not preclude their engagement with the methods and media by which humanism had transformed religious devotion. This chapter pursues that provocative suggestion in women’s texts, contending that when the source texts in question are scriptural, the intellectual and imaginative possibilities of derivative procedures are magnified. Biblical rewritings take scripture as both aetiology and teleology—as source and target text—and in doing so offer opportunities for exegetical, literary, and political interventions.

In this discussion I consider in detail works by Mary Sidney and Anne Lock. Though she is writing later, I discuss Sidney first because her psalms speak to the difficulties of taxonomising

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ross, *Women, Poetry, and Politics*, 67. As Zim argues, “the vogue for biblical literature [. . .] was a direct consequence of these humanist trends”, *English Metrical Psalms*, 4.

⁷ In English, these include: Anne Askew (Psalm 54), Anne Lock (Psalm 51), Mary Sidney (Psalms), Elizabeth Melville (Psalm 42 and the Song of Songs), Elizabeth Grymston (Penitential Psalms), Anne Southwell (the Decalogue), Frances Cook (Psalms), An Collins (Ecclesiastes), Mary Roper (Genesis), Lucy Hutchinson (Genesis), Barbara Mackay (Lamentations and the Song of Songs), Anne Wharton (Psalms and the Song of Songs), Queen Elizabeth (Psalm 13), Lady Fane Elizabeth (Psalms), and a manuscript discovery of mine in Bodleian MS. Rawl. Poet 64, Joan Whitchurch (the Song of Songs).

derivative procedures that were outlined in my introduction and which inform the approach of this work as a whole. Mary Sidney's psalms turn on their head assumptions about the passivity of derivation. These erudite and literary psalm rewritings speak to the drama of selection and synthesis, with Sidney drawing from biblical and para-biblical sources through both translation and paraphrase in her hybrid and dynamic practice. The second part of my chapter discusses Anne Lock's paraphrastic sonnet sequence and in particular its apparent refusal to innovate on the Bible's lexical resources. I reveal that this phenomenon is an informed literary and exegetical choice that favours proximity to biblical style, even while innovatively connecting the psalm and its speaker with the technology of the sonnet. For both Sidney and Lock deriving from the Bible becomes a form of authorship.

Part 1: Mary Sidney

The Sidney Psalter

In the poem "Even now that care", Mary Sidney presents her and her late brother's psalter to Queen Elizabeth and describes their collaborative writing process:

but hee did warpe, I weav'd this webb to end;
the stuffe not ours, our worke no curious thing,
Wherein yet well wee thought the Psalmist King
Now English denizend, though Hebrue borne,
woold to thy musicke undispleas'd sing,
Oft having worse, without repining worne.⁸

As in Cervantes's tapestry, Mary Sidney compares the work of translation to weaving. It is a work of craft where existing materials, the Biblical psalter's "stuffe not ours", are turned from

⁸ Margaret P. Hannay et al., eds., *The Collected Works of Mary Sidney Herbert, Countess of Pembroke*, vol. 1 (Clarendon Press, 1998), 102–3, ll. 27–32. The poem is part of the Tixall manuscript is thought to have been intended for presentation to Queen Elizabeth on her (ultimately cancelled) visit to Wilton House in 1599. The manuscript is a direct copy of the Penshurst manuscript, but also contains this poem and "To the Angell spirit of the most excellent Sir Philip Sidney". See *ibid.*, xxxii–xxxiii.

Hebrew to English. However, as I argue here, the Sidney psalter is in fact primarily a work of paraphrase. What translation signifies here is more the act of aesthetic renewal than actual linguistic transfer. After frequent poor versions (“often having worse”), Sidney presents her and her brother as having finally found an English worthy of the psalter and the Queen herself. This apparent paradox—a reverence for the originals and a desire to remake them—is the motive force of psalm rewriting, and in the hands of the Sidneys it yields particularly spectacular results.

An ambitious attempt to marry “two distinct poetic traditions, that of the courtly lyric and of Reformation psalmody”, the Sidney psalter was begun by Philip Sidney and completed after his death by his sister, Mary Sidney, Countess of Pembroke.⁹ The kind of derivation the psalter involves remains ill-defined in modern criticism, partly due to the taxonomical confusion I have already located in early modern descriptions of derivative practices. William A. Ringler calls the texts “metaphrases” in the sense of versification that Ascham uses that term;¹⁰ he states that “[Philip] Sidney’s main object was to alter the dress of the Psalms from prose to verse; but though he changed the cut, he used the same material”.¹¹ However, the label has not caught on and the Sidney psalms are still frequently called translations, for although they are not direct translations of the Hebrew, they do include material taken from other language sources.¹²

Though critics disagree about the terminology appropriate for the psalter, it is clearly not an “original work” and that has affected its reception. In his edition of Philip’s poetry, Ringler tells us that

⁹ G. F. Waller, *Mary Sidney, Countess of Pembroke: A critical study of her writings and literary milieu* (Universität Salzburg, 1979), 182.

¹⁰ Ascham, *The scholemaster*, fol. 39v.

¹¹ William A. Ringler, ed., *The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney* (Clarendon Press, 1962), 500 and 506.

¹² Theodore L. Steinberg suggests the Sidneys do use the original Hebrew, as (implicitly) does June Leavitt, but Melody D. Knowles shows that their English, French, or Latin sources provide likelier precedents. See Theodore L. Steinberg, “The Sidneys and the Psalms”, *Studies in Philology* 92/1 (1995): 1–17; June Leavitt, “The Influence of Medieval Rabbinical Commentaries on the Countess of Pembroke’s Psalm 58”, *Notes and Queries* 50/4 (2003): 401–3; and Melody D. Knowles, “‘Now English denizend, though Hebrue borne’: Did Mary Sidney Herbert, Countess of Pembroke, Read Hebrew?”, *Studies in Philology* 109/3 (2012): 279–89.

[t]he tracing of sources is more difficult in [Philip] Sidney than in almost any other Elizabethan poet, because he did not write, as did so many of his contemporaries, with source books open before him, but from a mind well stored with reading that he had thoroughly assimilated and made his own. He prided himself on being ‘no pick-purse of another’s wit’.¹³

This statement is at odds with Ringler’s exhaustive inventory of sources for the Sidney psalter in the same volume, suggesting that he sees the psalter as a negligible part of Philip Sidney’s oeuvre exactly because it is in this text that he picks purses. Deriving from “another’s wit”, the Sidneys’ psalm versions have at times been assumed to have little interest of their own.

The psalter’s reception has been further complicated by the fact that it is collaborative, and so exists at one further remove from single-author original composition. Mary herself describes the psalter as a “coupled worke”.¹⁴ Much modern criticism has devoted itself to disentangling this coupling through the psalter’s complex stemma of eighteen extant manuscripts circulated at different stages of composition and revision.¹⁵ We now know that Philip Sidney wrote versions of the first 43 psalms and, after his death, Mary Sidney wrote (sometimes multiple) versions of Psalms 44–150 over a period of more than a decade, as well as significantly editing seven of Philip’s (1, 16, 22, 23, 26, 29, and 31).¹⁶ More recently, the psalter’s collaborative nature has posed obstacles for critics seeking to recover traces of Mary Sidney’s “authentic”

¹³ Ringler, *Poems*, xxxv.

¹⁴ From “To The Angell spirit of the most excellent Sir Philip Sidney”, in Hannay et al., *Collected*, 1, 110, l. 2.

¹⁵ Noel J. Kinnamon, “The Circulation of the Sidney Psalter”, in *The Ashgate Research Companion to The Sidneys, 1500–1700: Volume 2: Literature*, edited by Margaret P. Hannay et al. (Ashgate, 2015), 23–40.

¹⁶ For an analysis of her changes to Philip’s psalms, see Suzanne Trill, “‘We thy Sydnean Psalmes shall celebrate’: collaborative authorship, Sidney’s sister and the English devotional lyric”, in *Early Modern Women and the Poem*, edited by Susan Wiseman (Manchester University Press, 2013), 97–116. For the process of identifying Mary’s changes (and Philip’s “originals”), see Ringler, *The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney*, 500–52.

voice,¹⁷ as has the way she depicts her role as subordinate and surrogate to her brother's legacy.¹⁸ Conversely in the 1960s, Ringler sought to wrest Philip's part of the psalter from Mary's changes, calling her "an inveterate tinkerer who found it difficult to make up her mind".¹⁹ Collaborative and derivative, the psalter has occupied vexed ground in traditional and feminist literary criticism alike.

Rather than interpreting her derivative method as a disguise that, once thrown off, will reveal the "real" Mary Sidney, I argue that it is precisely by examining her method that the power of her psalm versions becomes apparent. Neither passive nor desultory, as "tinker[ing]" suggests, that method is laborious, scholarly, and its results decidedly literary. I argue that she combines paraphrase and translation to synthesise a wide range of sources and create provocative texts whose innovations—literary and exegetical—are only fully appreciable when viewed through the particular choices of that writing process. Examining that hybrid process helps us to recover a sense of the creative vitality that *imitatio* and its procedures afforded before they were exhausted and taxonomised by legal frameworks of intellectual property. Recovering that vitality is key to recognising the work of derivation as the work of authorship.

Selection and synthesis

As with all derivative writing, the Sidneys' is based on reading, though theirs was particularly extensive. Mary Sidney works primarily from the Geneva Bible and its glosses, the psalter in the

¹⁷ Anne Lake Prescott, for example, asks: "Does the voice of Philip Sidney's versions have the same gender as that of his sister when writing hers?", "Sibling Harps: The Sidneys and the Chérons Translate the Psalms", in *Psalms in the Early Modern World*, edited by Linda Phyllis Austern and Kari Boyd McBride (Routledge, 2011), 235–55: 235. Elsewhere Beth Wynne Fisker argues that "[o]nly in the psalm, through the words of another, is Mary Sidney able to begin to speak as herself", "'The Art of Sacred Parody' in Mary Sidney's *Psalms*", *Tulsa Studies in Women's Literature* 8/2 (1989): 223–39: 236.

¹⁸ Danielle Clarke argues that "by invoking her unique proximity to Philip Sidney, Mary gathers his author-function to herself", "The Psalms of Mary Sidney Herbert, Countess of Pembroke", in *The Ashgate Research Companion to The Sidneys, 1500–1700: Volume 2: Literature*, edited by Margaret P. Hannay et al. (Ashgate, 2015), 295–310: 296.

¹⁹ Ringler, *Poems*, 502. This "tinker[ing]" is less anomalous when we recognise that revising long poetic sequences like sonnet sequences was *de rigueur*; see for example, Katherine Duncan-Jones, ed., *Shakespeare's Sonnets: Revised* (The Arden Shakespeare, 2010), 13.

Book of Common Prayer and Coverdale's Great Bible, and the Clement Marot and Théodore de Bèze *Psaumes de David, mis en rime Française*. She makes regular use of Calvin's Commentaries (in Golding's translation), and the commentaries of Bèze (in Latin and in Anthony Gilby's English); they also sometimes draw from other bible translations (the Matthew and Bishops' Bible), and less frequently from other commentaries and other metrical psalters, including the Sternhold and Hopkins version.²⁰ Mary Sidney alters and expands her sources through both translation and paraphrase, availing herself of their lexical, syntactical, and interpretative resources, as well as supplying her own. In this discussion, I turn to her Psalm 58, as a representative of the way her hybrid method of derivation informs striking literary and exegetical interventions. The comparative study of the psalm and her sources that I undertake here is not a fashionable approach; Kerrigan notes source study's reputation for "ignoring the integrity of literary works in its desire to isolate pieces in the jigsaw."²¹ But it is only through source study that the authorial agency and expressive potential of *derivative* writing becomes visible. In order to get a broad sense of how her version relates to the biblical text, I first provide stanzas of Mary Sidney's Psalm 58 alongside equivalent verses from the Geneva Bible, her single most important source, before situating her changes among the full range of her reading.²²

In Psalm 58, David "describeth the malice of his enemies, the flatters of Saul", before appealing to God and rejoicing at God's vengeance on the ungodly.²³ Sidney's and Geneva's versions begin:

²⁰ On Mary Sidney's sources, see Hannibal Hamlin et al., eds., *The Sidney Psalter: The Psalms of Sir Philip and Mary Sidney* (Oxford University Press, 2009), xviii. Philip Sidney's sources are fewer. Ringler suggests that "[h]e probably had the English prose Psalter, the Geneva version, the Marot-Bèze French metrical Psalter, and Bèze's *Paraphrasis* open before him, and read each Psalm through carefully in all four texts before making his own metaphrase", but that "[i]n everything affecting the meaning and interpretation of his own version, he gave precedence to the Geneva version", *Poems*, 505–6.

²¹ Kerrigan, *Shakespeare's Originality*, 9.

²² The full text of Sidney's Psalm 58 can be found in the Appendix.

²³ *The Bible and Holy Scriptures conteyned in the Olde and Newe Testament* [. . .], (Geneva: Rowland Hall, 1560), sigs. Qq2v–3r.

Psalm 58, Mary Sidney

And call ye this to utter what is just,
 you that of justice hold the sov'raign throne?
and call yee this to yield, O sonnes of dust,
 to wronged brethren ev'ry man his own?
 O no: it is your long malicious will
now to the world to make by practize known
 with whose oppression you the ballance fill,
Just to your selves, indiffr'ent els to none.²⁴

Psalm 58, Geneva 1560

1. Is it true? O Congregation,
 speake ye justly? O sonnes of
men, judge ye uprightly?
2. Yea, rather ye imagine
 mischief in *your* heart: your
hands execute crueltie upon the
earth.²⁵

It is immediately clear that Sidney envisages her version as more than a simple “metaphrase”, a shift from prose to verse, for while she includes every part of Geneva, her version is three times as long.²⁶ This extra word count is used to add new images and a more robust syntax which cast David as a lawyer representing the people against Saul’s immoral judiciary. Her expository second line and the later metonymic “ballance” replaces Geneva’s ambiguous “Congregation” with a panel of judges, and Sidney’s David identifies as corruption what Geneva calls their “crueltie”. David deems the judges mere “sons of dust” who usurp the “sov’raign throne” of divine justice. The “wronged brethren” receive no restitution from the judges, who not only fail to effect distributive justice, but tip the scales firmly in their own favour in Sidney’s punning “just to your selves”. Sidney’s syntactical changes further evoke the courtroom, beginning with the *in media res* of the doubled opening “And call ye”. The reader of her psalm finds David driving home two parallel accusations across the first quatrain, as though in the flow of his closing arguments. These questions are rhetorical; they disparage the judges and suggest that

²⁴ Margaret P. Hannay et al., eds., *The Collected Works of Mary Sidney Herbert, Countess of Pembroke*, vol. 2 (Clarendon Press, 1998), 61–2, ll. 1–8.

²⁵ *The Bible*, sigs. Qq2v–3r.

²⁶ Like Ascham’s paraphrase, Sidney’s version “express[es] at large with moe wordes”, *The scholemaster*, fol. 35v.

their palpable corruption is answer enough. This is most dramatic in the second question, where the indirect and direct objects are pushed to the next line to make way for the derisive epithet (“O sonnes of dust”). Each quatrain accounts for a single biblical verse, but the second is a single enjambed sentence, the flow of David’s accusation only broken by the oratorical flourishes of the caesura after “O no” and to mark his final accusation of partiality in the last line.

Striking though these changes are, Sidney’s text is not a straight verse paraphrase from Geneva, and we cannot ascribe to her the poem’s every deviation from that source. She draws on a variety of texts in English (through paraphrase) and in other languages (through translation) to inform those modifications. Her interpretation of the “Congregation” as judges could be from Calvin’s commentaries in Golding’s translation, where they are called “rather a rowt of murtherers, than a Session of Judges”.²⁷ It may also come from Bèze’s *Psalmorum Davidis*, from which she draws other material.²⁸ *Psalmorum Davidis* provides four Latin-language versions for each psalm: two translations from the Hebrew (the looser *paraphrasis* and stricter *interpretatio*)²⁹ along with an *argumentum* (a prose explanation) and a *carmen* (a versification). The print layout of these versions encourage side-by-side readings (see fig. 1 and 2).

²⁷ John Calvin, *The Psalmes of Dauid and others* [. . .], trans. Arthur Golding (London: Thomas East and Henry Middleton, 1571), sig. 223r. The Geneva Bible identifies them as Saul’s counsellors, *The Bible*, sigs. Qq2v–3r.

²⁸ The Latin *argumentum* has “corruptissimos illos iudices”, Théodore de Bèze, *Psalmorum Davidis et aliorum prophetarum* [. . .] (Geneva: n.p., 1579), 254. This text was also printed in London in 1580.

²⁹ “[. . .] addita duplici latina versione ex Hebræis, una paraphrastica, altera adstrictiore”, *ibid.*, 1 (i.e. sig. A1r).




Fig. 1 and 2. Bèze’s four versions of each psalm, with the prose *argumentum* (fig. 1), the side by side prose *paraphrasis* and *interpretatio* (fig. 1 and continued in fig. 2), and the verse *carmen* (fig. 2).³⁰

Gilby’s 1581 English edition of this text translates only the *argumentum* and *paraphrasis*, but Mary Sidney draws on all four, so we know she used the Latin text. Noel J. Kinnamon suggests Bèze’s *carmen* (only in the Latin) influences the beginning of Psalm 58 in a “matter of phrasing”, though he does not further specify the influence.³¹ The texts read:

³⁰ Ibid., 254 and 256.

³¹ Noel J. Kinnamon, “God’s ‘Scholer’: The Countess of Pembroke’s *Psalmes* and Beza’s *Psalmorum Davidis*...*Libri Quinquæ*”, *Notes and Queries* 44/1 (1997): 85–8: 87.

Psalm 58, Mary Sidney

And call ye this to utter what is just,
you that of justice hold the sov'raign throne?
and call yee this to yeld, O sonnes of dust,
to wronged brethren ev'ry man his own?³²

Bèze's *carmen*, Psalm 58

dicite mortales, reliquis mortalibus alto
Quis jus dicitis ex throno
Siccine cuiq[ue] suum vos redditis?³³

Most obviously taken by Sidney is the “lofty throne” (“alto / [. . .] throno”). However, she may also have been influenced by Bèze’s repeated nominalisations *mortales / mortalibus*, which bitingly challenge the judges’ authority to pass verdict on other (“reliquis”) mortals when they are mortals themselves. Sidney’s version is similarly scathing, but her choice of the religiously charged “sons of dust” and “brethren”, and the addition of “sov’raign”, underscores the implicit comparison between human judgement and divine authority, pointing to a true sovereign above. Syntactical influences are difficult to trace to Bèze’s version due to Latin’s pliant inflectional morphology; however, a potential borrowing is the dative construction “to wronged brethren”, which is absent in Geneva and in other bible translations Sidney uses.

Bèze is by no means her only source in another language. The French Marot-Bèze *Psaumes* calls the judges “Enfans d’Adam”,³⁴ providing the Genesis link that informs Sidney’s own “sonnes of dust”—a reference to Genesis 3:19 that reiterates David’s argument that the judges are fallen and mortal. Likewise, “ballance” in the literal sense of scales in which Sidney uses it comes most clearly from the French “Et ne pesez qu’iniquité / En vos balances inégales”.³⁵ There are also English sources at work here. Geneva’s marginal gloss describes the “malice” of David’s enemies (the judges or counsellors), which may have led to the phrasing “long malicious

³² Hannay et al., *Collected*, 2, 61, ll. 1–4.

³³ In my translation: “Say ye, mortals, passing judgement on the rest of us mortals from your lofty throne, that ye thus render to each his own?”. Bèze, *Psalmorum Davidis*, 256, ll. 1–3.

³⁴ Théodore de Bèze and Clément Marot, *Psaumes mis en vers français (1551–1562)* ed. Pierre Pidoux (Librairie Droz, 1984), 84, l. 5.

³⁵ “And you weigh only iniquity / In your unequal balances”, *ibid.*, 84, ll. 8–9.

will”, and the Sternhold and Hopkins psalter has clear images of corruption, for example “[a]nd when you should true justice use, / your handes to bribes are bent”, which may also have informed Sidney’s interpretation.³⁶

Therefore, while it is clear that Sidney’s method combines translation and paraphrase, and so occupies a lacuna in our modern taxonomies, those procedures do not themselves entail a particular kind of influence. Lexical changes can carry across languages such as that between Latin, French, and English in “[T]hrone” and “balances”. Other influences are less transparent. For example, the “mortales” repetition in Bèze (if she was indeed influenced by it) does not determine her diction; rather she replicates the derisive tone that it produces through her own lexical and syntactical choices. More broadly, the portrayal of the congregation as unjust judges, while corroborated piecemeal by many English and non-English sources, is an interpretation she adopts, not in any single choice, but as part of a wider poetic exploration.

Amplificatio

As Psalm 58 progresses, and as her sources become increasingly discordant,³⁷ Sidney intervenes more forcefully, marrying interpretative oversight with poetic intuition:

Psalm 58, Mary Sidney

But what could they, who ev’n in birth declin’d,
from truth and right to lies and injuries?
to shew the venom of their cancer’d mynd
the Adders image scarcely can suffice.
nay scarce the Aspick may with them contend,

Psalm 58, Geneva

3. The wicked are strangers from
the wombe: *euen* from the belly
haue they erred, and speake lies.

³⁶ Thomas Sternhold and John Hopkins, *The whole booke of Psalmes [. . .]* (London: John Day, 1584), 53, ll. 9–10.

³⁷ This discordance is due to the original Hebrew being “badly mangled”, Robert Alter, *The Book of Psalms: A Translation with Commentary* (W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 202.

on whom the charmer all in vaine applies
his skilful'st spells: ay missing of his end,
while shee self-deaff, and unaffected lies.³⁸

4. Their poison is euen like the
poison of a serpent: like the deafe
adder *that* stoppeth his eare.

5. Which heareth not the voyce of
the inchanter, though he be moste
expert in charming.³⁹

While in its opening question Sidney's version extends her psalm's sense of a rhetorical performance, David's address then becomes deliberative rather than interrogatory as sinful deeds are traced to sinful natures. Calvin's reading of the passage finds in Geneva's "even from the belly have they erred" a reference to original sin, which is by definition universal. However, Calvin seeks to reconcile that article of faith against the way the Bible singles out the judges for particular wickedness, noting that:

[a]lthough then that the corruption of originall sinne reigne in all mankynde: yit dooth experience shewe, that there be some of a shimefaste & honest behaiour: some stayned but with meane corruption: and othersome of so froward nature, that they bee utterly intolerable. This unbrydled naughtinesse therefore which is detestable in the common corruptnesse of mankynd, t[i]s it that David avoucheth too reigne in his enemies.⁴⁰

Sidney integrates Calvin's qualification into her account, evoking the judges' "unbrydled" depravity—not by importing that term, but in the phrases "scarcly can suffice" and "nay scarce". These additions imply that David's "image[s]", the analogies by which he "contend[s]"⁴¹ to represent and condemn the judges, are inadequate. Hence, her word "Aspick", which comes from *Psaumes*, provides a more venomous cousin to the adder, but is still found wanting. Not

³⁸ Hannay et al., *Collected*, 2, 61–2, ll. 9–16.

³⁹ *The Bible*, sigs. Qq2v–3r.

⁴⁰ Calvin, *The Psalmes*, fol. 223v.

⁴¹ The legal connotation of "contend" is apposite to Sidney's courtroom opening.

merely fallen men, they are so “detestable” they cannot be described. While the need to distinguish degrees of depravity is suggested by Calvin, the metapoetic approach Sidney adopts to convey that interpretation is her own.

This approach also serves to gloss the series of striking and unusual images which David proceeds to level against the ungodly more broadly. Calvin’s commentary interprets the Psalm’s varied images (“similitudes”) as “the hastening of God’s vengeance”, with David seen as desiring “that they [the ungodly] should be dispatched out of the way as slightful things”.⁴² Bèze, meanwhile, says the images depict the ungodly “cut [. . .] off in the mid course of their covetous desires”.⁴³ But in Sidney’s version these images are instead a catalogue of David’s attempts to articulate a punishment meet for the especial depravity of his opponents, enabling her to turn the scattershot of biblical images into an exercise in rhetorical *amplificatio* and to wrest from them a more coherent thematic development. I quote the final two stanzas with Sidney’s major changes vis-à-vis Geneva indicated in bold:

Psalm 58, Mary Sidney

Lord crack their teeth, lord crush these lions jawes,

soe lett them sinck as water **in the sand:**

when **deadly bow their aiming fury drawes,**

shiver the shaft er past the shooters hand.

so make them melt as the **dishowsed** snaile

or as the **Embrio, whose vitall band**

breakes er it holdes, and formlesse eyes doe faile

to see the sunn, **though brought to lightfull land.**

Psalm 58, Geneva

6. Breake their teeth, O God, in their
mouthes: breake the jawes of the yong
lions, O Lord.

7. Let them melt like the waters, let
them passe away: when hee shooteth his
arrowes, *let them be* as broken.

8. Let them consume like a snaile that
melteth, & *like* the untimelie frute of a
woman, *that* hathe not sene the sunne.

⁴² Calvin, *The Psalmes*, fol. 224r.

⁴³ Théodore de Bèze, *The Psalmes of David truly opened and explained by paraphrasis [. . .]*, trans. Anthony Gilby (London: Henry Denham, 1581), 127. The Latin is “in medio cupiditatum cursu abripit”, Bèze, *Psalmorum Davidis*, 254.

O lett their brood, a brood of springing thornes,
 be by **untymely rooting** overthrowne
er bushes waxt, they push with pricking hornes,
 as fruites yet greene are oft by tempest blowne
 the good with gladnes this reveng shall see,
 and bath his feet in bloud of wicked one.
 While all shall say: the just rewarded be
 there is a god that **carves to each his own.**⁴⁴

9. As rawe flesh before your pottes fele
 the *fyre* of thornes: *so* let him cary them
 away as with a whirle winde in *his* wrath.
 10. The righteous shal rejoyce when he
 seeeth the vengeance: he shal wash his
 fete in the blood of the wicked.
 11. And men shal say, Verely there is
 frute for the righteous: doutles there is a
 God that judgeth in the earth.⁴⁵

Sidney’s version has an incantatory force that is all the more powerful for being comprehensible. She clarifies and reconciles the obscure biblical images. For example, that Sidney’s snail is “dishowsed” more evocatively links it with the miscarried foetus than their somewhat cryptic melting. Likewise, the foetus’s “vitall band” picks up on the string of the “deadly bow”: both break and take their charges—the arrow and the embryo—with them. Her images also cooperate metrically. The left-side stress of the verbs “crack”, “shiver”⁴⁶ and “breakes” distinguishes shifts in image but does so with a visceral impression of cumulative violence. Likewise, aural disruption marks the shift from the sibilant first section to the string of plosives in lines 22 to 24 (“Embrio”, “band”, “breakes”, “brought”).

In Sidney’s version, the disparate images represent David’s attempts to find an appropriately dire fate for the ungodly, and so do not necessarily need to cooperate with one another. But she nonetheless chooses to shepherd them into conversation through the theme of untimeliness. Her elaboration on the miscarriage is perhaps the most poignant example of this and it coincides with an emotive breakdown between the poetic line and sentence syntax. Like

⁴⁴ Hannay et al., *Collected*, 2, 62, ll. 17–32.

⁴⁵ *The Bible*, sigs. Qq2v–3r.

⁴⁶ Here “shiver” means break into small fragments (“shiver” v. 1, *OED*).

the arrow and band, the foetus’s “formlesse eyes” fail in advance (the repeated “er[e]”), recalling the melting snail and subsiding waters. A formal “formlessness” is evoked in the way “breakes er it holdes, and formlesse eyes doe faile” unexpectedly runs on, in the next line, with the sombre “to see the sunn”.⁴⁷ After the welcome pause afforded by the funereal alliteration “lightfull land”, we continue to find Sidney prioritising clarity. She ignores the obscure “rawe flesh” image in Geneva’s verse 9 (it also appears in Calvin and the Great Bible)⁴⁸ and instead chooses to use Bèze, who drops the “flesh” and compares the thorns to “children” that are subject to “sudden death” “before they growe to sharpe pricks”.⁴⁹ Sidney does not miss the poetic opportunity this provides, her description of the “untymely rooting” of the thorns’ “springing”⁵⁰ “brood”, recalling the preceding miscarriage before being revised again in the image of “fruites yet greene [. . .] by tempest blowne”.⁵¹ Each image responds and builds on its predecessor in a kind of semantic parallelism or *exergasia* (*expolitio*) which suggests Sidney’s keen ear for biblical poetics, as, too, does the way she places the fruit and thorns and snail and embryos in complementary quatrains.⁵² In the final lines, Sidney tacks close to Geneva until “there is a god that carves to each his own”. Here Sidney returns to the courtroom and recalls in its rhyme the “sov’raign throne”. Unlike Saul’s corrupt authorities, here we have a fairly apportioning God who restores “to each his own”, enacting Bèze’s “cuiq[ue] suum vos redditis”.⁵³

⁴⁷ Bèze, *The Psalmes of David*, 127. Hamlin also notes this run-on, and suggests a possible reference to Mark 8:18: “Have ye eyes, and see not?”, Hannibal Hamlin, ““The highest matter in the noblest forme”: The Influence of the Sidney Psalms”, *Sidney Journal* 23/1–2 (2005): 133–157: 148.

⁴⁸ Calvin acknowledges both translations (pot and raw flesh / young thorns) but opts for the former: “the wrath of GOD should with [boisterous] violence sweepe away the wicked like unsodden flesh, and such as hathe scarcely felt the first warmth of the fire”, Calvin, *The Psalmes*, fol. 224v.

⁴⁹ See also the Matthew Bible’s “or ever youre thornes be sharpe, the wrath shal take them away quicke, lyke a stormy winde”, Thomas Matthew [i.e. John Rogers], *The Byble, that is to saye, all the Holye Scripture [. . .]* (London: John Wighte, 1551), sig. Cc3r.

⁵⁰ Here it means “sprouting” or “growing” (“springing, adj.” 1.a, *OED*).

⁵¹ The fruit image is biblical but appears belatedly in Sidney’s version, suggesting an urge to be faithful to her source texts even as she varies them poetically.

⁵² Parallelism is ubiquitous in the Bible and, as here, often contributes to thematic development. This is discussed in depth in the following section on Anne Lock.

⁵³ Bèze, *Psalmorum Davidis*, 256. “Carve” here means “[t]o apportion at discretion, to assign as one’s portion or lot” (“carve, v.” III.9.b, *OED*). See also its legal connotations in Gascoigne’s *Supposes*: “in such cases it is not lawful for a man to be his owne carver”, *The poesies of George Gascoigne Esquire* (London: H. Bynneman, 1575), 29.

Psalm 58 is typical of the way Mary Sidney’s psalm versions exploit the expressive potential of deriving from, and synthesising, multiple sources.⁵⁴ Her version is an extended oratorical as well as poetic display, syntactically dense and almost imagistic in its intensity. But it also pays careful attention to her exegetical sources and their ramifications. Like a commonplace book or verse miscellany, the Sidney psalter is unique in the combination of sources it selects, but these sources are also meditated, reframed, and augmented or compressed. From these myriad changes emerges a new work and distinct textuality, and a strong sense of Sidney herself as the text’s ultimate organising principle—that is, as its author. In writing her psalm versions, Sidney continually reconciles her religious, political, and literary interests against those of many authoritative sources. Far from superficial “tinker[ing]”, her method of derivation resembles Ascham’s stipulations for good paraphrase in its willingness to intervene. She regularly “expounds” the biblical text, substituting what she sees as senseless (“*Mutare quod ineptum est*”), like the raw flesh of 58:9, in order to complete what is lacking (“*Replere quod deest*”)—clarity and thematic development.⁵⁵ She finds “other fitte wordes”,⁵⁶ and, as Quintilian advocates, she “rival[s] and vie[s] with the original in the expression of the same thoughts”,⁵⁷ using the cumulative wisdom of her sources and her own literary discernment to evoke Hebrew originals which were inaccessible to her personally and whose poetic power had so far eluded English psalters and contemporary theologians alike.⁵⁸ Sidney’s psalms show the fallacy of Rhodes’s dichotomy between derivative work and “the enticements of the imagination”.⁵⁹ What, after all, could be more enticing—or more ambitious—than rewriting some of the best-loved poetry in

⁵⁴ While here space constraints have limited my analysis to one of Mary Sidney’s psalms, I have written about how she applies the same method to others in “Biblical verse paraphrase”, in *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Early Modern Women’s Writing in English*, edited by Sarah C. E. Ross and Jake Arthur (Palgrave, 2022).

⁵⁵ Ascham, *The scholemaster*, fol. 37r.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, fol. 35v.

⁵⁷ Quintilian, *The Orator’s Education*, 10.5.5.

⁵⁸ As Philip Sidney notes in his *Defence*, the rules of Hebrew poetics “be not yet fully found”, Philip Sidney, *The Defence of Poesie* (London: Thomas Creede, 1595), sig. B4r. Little progress would be made until the eighteenth century; for an overview, see Robert Alter, *The Art of Biblical Poetry*, 2nd ed. (Basic Books, 2011).

⁵⁹ Rhodes, *Common*, 122.

Christendom? Neither mechanically reproductive nor an *ex nihilo* invention, Sidney's psalter shows the rewards, and the excitement, that can inhere in reworking "the stuffe not ours".

Danielle Clarke has rightly noted the laboriousness of Mary Sidney's writing and revision, but she interprets it as part of "the activity of minute comparison and the consultation of key authorities [which] appears to have been a key component of women's spiritual activity".⁶⁰ It is important that we do not limit her writing to a single, gendered dimension. Philip Sidney began the project with much the same method and influences, and we would not consider that "women's spiritual activity". As we will see throughout this thesis, even when removed from formal humanist learning, women's writings reflect engagement with humanist ideas, accessed through literate (including religious) culture as well as through family or community relations. Mary Sidney's psalm project is one ambitious, accomplished extreme of a spectrum of humanist-inflected textual devotions practiced by both men and women. Part of what is interesting about women's "comparison and the consultation of key authorities" and their application of "the entwined heritage of both poetic variation (*copia*) and divine meditation" is not that those practices are specifically feminine but that they may have little to do with gender, after all.⁶¹ As Sidney's works show, and Lock's works will corroborate, humanist ideals like *imitatio* and their characteristic modes and procedures were not a preserve of the male elite, but a common vehicle for religious inquiry and literary experimentation.

Part 2: Anne Lock

The poetic Bible

The lyric virtuosity Sidney supplies in her psalm versions might suggest that scripture lacked for poetry, but the truth is more complex. We cannot cut off biblical verse paraphrase from the lyric

⁶⁰ Danielle Clarke, "The Countess of Pembroke and the Practice of Piety", *Literature Compass* 9/3 (2012): 252–61: 257–58.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

tout court, primarily because we cannot cut scripture off from the lyric. Both traditions draw legitimacy from the recognition that the Bible was *ars rhetorica* and *ars poetica*. The literary craft of scripture had long been subject to scholarly attention by the time “the Reformation brought in its wake both a greater emphasis upon, and a more systematic analysis of, the tropes and schemes that made biblical language radically poetic”.⁶² The wide availability of scripture in the vernacular was accompanied by a raft of new scriptural aids like commentaries, grammars, and devotional handbooks with the effect that what might be called exegetical scrutiny came not only from above (that is, from a pan-European university-educated elite) but also from below, in a “quiet revolution” among lay persons.⁶³ While the four-fold analytical method, the Quadriga, was out, Protestants were nevertheless eager to properly construe an expanded “literal” sense.⁶⁴ As William Whitaker states, “[t]he literal sense, then, is not that which the words immediately suggest [. . .] but rather that which arises from the words themselves, whether they be taken strictly or figuratively”.⁶⁵ The way meaning “arose” from the divine word was the subject of vigorous inquiry.

While newly democratized, the interest in how scripture produced meaning is much older. In the sixth century, Cassiodorus identified a scriptural origin for the secular art of rhetoric; for him, “the Psalms become the consummate statement of rhetorical doctrine”.⁶⁶ Bede follows his lead at the beginning of the eighth century in his *De schematibus et tropis*, where he contends that “teachers of secular eloquence in any age have not been able to furnish us with any

⁶² Lewalski, *Protestant Poetics*, 72.

⁶³ For a striking example of this, see Kirsten Macfarlane, “Hugh Broughton (1549–1612): scholarship, controversy and the English Bible” (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2017). The phrase “quiet revolution” is from Kate Narveson, *Bible Readers and Lay Writers in Early Modern England* (Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 215.

⁶⁴ “The reformers’ commitment to a single, literal sense of scripture was bound up with the accusation that medieval and later Roman Catholic writers had, at best, marginalized this manner of reading the scriptures”, Victoria Brownlee, *Biblical Readings and Literary Writings in Early Modern England, 1558–1625* (Oxford University Press, 2018), 40–1.

⁶⁵ Cited in George L. Scheper, “Reformation Attitudes toward Allegory and the Song of Songs”, *PMLA* 89/3 (1974): 551–62: 555.

⁶⁶ Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter, eds., *Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric: Language Arts and Literary Theory* (Oxford University Press, 2012), 211. Cassiodorus argues that “de Scripturis divinis emanasse quod doctores saecularium litterarum ad sua studia postea transtulerunt” (“from the divine scripture arose what doctors of secular letters later transferred to their own studies”), *Institutiones* ed. R. A. B. Mynors (Clarendon Press, 1937), 21.

of these figures and tropes which did not first appear in Holy Writ”.⁶⁷ A divine origin for rhetoric, as Bede and Cassiodorus posit, legitimises engagement with classical treatises of rhetoric like those of Cicero and Quintilian because they can illuminate scripture.⁶⁸ And because early moderns saw rhetoric as apposite to the analysis and composition of poetry, much of this scrutiny would be directed towards what came to be called the poetic books of the Bible, primarily the Psalms, Job, Ecclesiastes, Proverbs, and the Song of Songs.⁶⁹ By the sixteenth century writers like Philip Sidney can take for granted the “poeticity” of the Bible and recruit it for a broad defence of “poesy”. Poetry is legitimate, he claims, because it shares the vehicle and craft of the divine word. In Sidney’s *Defence*, he deems that the highest in his hierarchy of poets were “they that did imitate the unconceivable excellencies of God. Such were *David* in his Psalmes; *Salomon* in his song of songs, in his *Ecclesiastes* and *Proverbes*[,] *Moses* and *Debora*, in their Hymns, and the wryter of *Jobe*”.⁷⁰ Into this category, however, he also includes classical figures “in a full wrong divinitie [. . .] Orpheus, Amphion, Homer in his himnes, and manie other.”⁷¹ If Sidney appears to suggest that poetry is best when it has a divine subject matter (perhaps evoking his own psalm versions), he does not limit this to Christianity. Indeed, there is an argumentative slippage here and throughout the *Defence* by which poetry itself partakes of the divine, able to imitate “unconceivable excellencies” and to render its practitioner a “*Vates*”, a seer or prophet.⁷²

⁶⁷ Gussie Hecht Tanenhaus, “Bede’s ‘De Schematibus et Tropis’—A Translation”, *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 48/3 (1962): 237–53: 240.

⁶⁸ For Cassiodorus in particular, and his effort to link secular and divine learning, see Ann W. Astell, “Cassiodorus’s *Commentary on the Psalms* as an *Ars rhetorica*”, *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 17/1 (1999): 37–75.

⁶⁹ Gavin Alexander notes that Renaissance theorists are “not sure if they are writing treatises on oratory with literary examples or treatises about how to read and write literature”, “Prosopopoeia: the speaking figure”, in *Renaissance Figures of Speech*, edited by Sylvia Adamson et al. (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 97–114: 103. This is traceable to a much earlier tendency to apply Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* to poetry, neglecting his *Poetics*; see Kathy Eden, *Poetic and Legal Fiction in the Aristotelian Tradition* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 8–9.

⁷⁰ Sidney, *Defence*, sig. C1v.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, sig. C2r.

⁷² *Ibid.*, sigs. C1v and C2v.

The Bible, home to the “most excellent Lyricke *Poesy* that ever was invented”, thus came to be enlisted in the defence of poetry religious and secular.⁷³

But if the poetical Bible was seen to license and inspire lyric poetry which moved beyond its immediate concerns, it also prompted a popular tradition that sought to stay close—or get closer—to the divine truth, namely, biblical verse paraphrase. As we have seen, this too was a literary tradition. Some verse paraphrases were intended to allow scripture to take on a ritual function, as in Protestant psalm singing in the Sternhold and Hopkins psalter; other paraphrastic projects, like the Sidney psalter, had more recognisably literary ambitions and sought not only to supply a metre but to restore the poetic gravitas thought to have been diminished through the vagaries of biblical translation and textual transmission. But I now want to turn to an example of derivative poetic practice that stays close to Lewalski’s “written formulation in scripture”, not only in content but in form or style. For this, I turn to the work of Anne Lock.

Meditating on style

“A Meditation of a Penitent Sinner: Written in Maner of a Paraphrase upon the 51. Psalme of David” is a sonnet sequence appended to the translation *Sermons of John Calvin, upon the songe that Ezechias made after he had bene sicke* which was first published in 1560 and is attributed to “A. L.,” identified as Anne Lock.⁷⁴ Lock (ca. 1530–after 1590) was daughter to the merchant, courtier, and royal agent Stephen Vaughan.⁷⁵ In 1557, she fled to Geneva with her two young children at the encouragement of Scottish reformer John Knox, with whom she regularly exchanged letters

⁷³ This quotation is from poet and translator George Wither, who argues of the psalter that “no volume of the same bignesse, hath so many [ornaments] as this”; *A preparation to the Psalter* (London: Nicholas Okes, 1619), 71.

⁷⁴ The attribution to Lock was made primarily from her husband’s handwritten inscription in a surviving copy of the book, which reads: “Liber Henrici Lock ex dono Annae uxoris suae. 1559”. Another edition of Lock’s Calvin translation was published in 1574 but is lost; there is also a possible 1569 edition, see Susan M. Felch, ed., *The Collected Works of Anne Vaughan Lock* (Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 1999), lxx.

⁷⁵ Patrick Collinson, “Locke [née Vaughan; other married names Dering, Prowse], Anne (c. 1530-1590x1607), translator and religious activist,” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, 2004, accessed 30 June 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/69054>.

on religious matters.⁷⁶ It was there that she likely translated Calvin's sermons. Back in England, she acted as Knox's intermediary and raised money to support his cause; the letters from Knox to Lock show her questioning the 1559 liturgy, thus making her "the very first documented protestant separatist from the Elizabethan church".⁷⁷ These religious commitments characterized the rest of Lock's life. As "Mistresse Dering", she was commended to Queen Elizabeth in James Sanford's preface to *Hours of recreation* (1576) as part of a group of "Gentlewomen famous for their learning" and, implicitly, for their commitment to religious reform.⁷⁸ Moving to Exeter in about 1579, she became part of a local Puritan community and literary network that prominently featured women writers, including Anne Dowriche.⁷⁹ In late middle age, Lock returned to public view in her translation of Jean Taffin's *Of the Markes of the Children of God* (1590). Her preface to that text states that while she was precluded from "great things by reason of my sex," "I have according to my duetie brought my poore basket of stones to the strengthening of the walles of that Jerusalem."⁸⁰

In spite of a disclaimer on the 1560 translation that she is not the author of the appended "Meditation" sequence, most existing scholarship (including my own), has nonetheless attributed

⁷⁶ Thirteen letters from Knox to Lock survive. See David Laing, ed., *The Works of John Knox*, vol. 6 (1895).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, letter XXXVII, 83; Collinson, "Locke."

⁷⁸ Ludovico Guicciardini, *Hours of recreation, or afterdinner which may aptly be called The garden of pleasure* (London: Henry Bynneman, 1576), sig. A4r. This point was first made by Susan M. Felch, "Noble gentlewomen famous for their learning: The London circle of Anne Vaughan Lock", *ANQ* 16/2 (2003): 14–9.

⁷⁹ Micheline White, "Women Writers and Literary-Religious Circles in the Elizabethan West Country: Anne Dowriche, Anne Lock Prowse, Anne Lock Moyle, Ursula Fulford, and Elizabeth Rous", *Modern Philology* 103/2 (2005): 187–214.

⁸⁰ Jean Taffin, *Of the Markes of the children of God* (London: Thomas Orwin, 1590), sig. A4r. This translation was printed eight times between 1590 and 1634. For a discussion of Lock's aims in this translation, see Micheline White, "Renaissance Englishwomen and Religious Translations: The Case of Anne Lock's *Of the Markes of the Children of God* (1590)", *English Literary Renaissance* 29/2 (1999): 375–400.

it to Anne Lock, in part because of these biographical particulars.⁸¹ The “Meditation” is the first sonnet sequence in English and one of the first known English applications of the sonnet to religious devotion.⁸² It consists of twenty-six sonnets: five prefatory and twenty-one which paraphrase a prose version of Psalm 51 included in the margin alongside the verses. This marginal text may be Lock’s own translation of the Vulgate or a composite of existing English versions.⁸³ Much longer than its source, Lock’s sonnet sequence is a powerful psychological profile of the titular sinner who moves between remorse, bargaining, petition, and praise. While enthusiastically added to the emerging corpus of women’s writing in the 1990s, its poetic quality has sometimes been criticised. Just as early modern women’s translations have been derided as slavishly reproductive, so has the “Meditation” sequence, itself attached to a translation, been seen as a work excessively beholden to its original. Greene acknowledges that her sequence creates “an entire breviary or psalmody” from “the nucleus of Psalm 51”, but nevertheless suggests this represents the “poetics of female-gendered textual reproduction more than male-gendered creation, of enlargement more than originality, and provides an alternative to the dominant tradition of poetic writing in English”, which he associates with invention.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Lock’s reputation for learning, her literary activities and connections, and her religious convictions all suggest it is perfectly possible that she authored the “Meditation” sequence attached to her first publication. The most important textual evidence is the verbal echoes between the “Meditation” and the rest of the volume as identified in Felch, *Works*, liii–liv and Margaret P. Hannay, ““Unlock my lipps”: The *Miserere mei Deus* of Anne Vaughan Lok and Mary Sidney Herbert, Countess of Pembroke”, in *Privileging Gender in Early Modern England*, edited by Jean R. Brink (Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1993), 19–36: 3–23. Rosalind Smith identifies thematic overlap between the texts and while she is circumspect about attribution, notes that Lock is “perfectly positioned” historically and culturally to have written the sequence in *Sonnets and the English Woman Writer, 1560–1621: The Politics of Absence* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 23–4. Steven W. May has suggested Thomas Norton is the real author, in “Anne Lock and Thomas Norton’s Meditation of a Penitent Sinner”, *Modern Philology* 114/4 (2017): 793–819. I respond to May’s article and arguments for Lock’s authorship in my article, “Anne Lock or Thomas Norton? A response to the re-attribution of the first sonnet sequence in English”, *Early Modern Women: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 16.2 (2022).

⁸² It is predated by the translation of Maffeo Vegio’s Latin “Carmina de utilitate psalmodum” written by Henry Parker, Baron Morley, “[i]n an Itali[a]n Ryme called. Soneto” and written c. 1540. See Ewald Flügel, “Verschollene Sonette”, *Anglia* 13 (1891): 72–6.

⁸³ Susan Felch compares many psalm versions in English and finds that none is as similar to Lock’s marginal text as the Vulgate. However, there is no phrasing in Lock’s text that does not have an English precedent and many of her phrasings come from Coverdale. I think it just as likely that she used a composite of extant English translations, which, as Felch herself notes, was common practice. See Susan M. Felch, “The Vulgate as Reformation Bible: The Sonnet Sequence of Anne Lock”, in *The Bible as Book*, edited by Orlaith O’Sullivan and Ellen N. Herron (The British Library & Oak Knoll Press, 2000), 65–88.

⁸⁴ Greene, “Anne Lock’s *Meditation*”, 157 and 155.

Other critics have suggested Lock goes beyond “textual reproduction”. Margaret Hannay notes Lock’s Calvinistic emphasis on original sin (sonnet 7), Christological types (sonnet 9), and the doctrine of atonement (sonnet 21).⁸⁵ Lock also decries outward shows of faith, likely an attack on Catholic ritual or perceived shortcomings in the Book of Common Prayer. In sonnet 8, for example, which carries the marginal verse “But lo, thou haste loved trueth, the hidden and secrete thinges of thy wisdome thou haste opened unto me”, Lock specifies that: “[t]hou lovest simple sooth, not hidden face / With trutheles visour of deceiving showe”.⁸⁶ Repeating “simplie” four times, Lock appears to step out from the shroud of the psalm speaker to assert her conviction that the “trueth” God loves is the “simple sooth” of a personal and unmediated relationship, rather than the “deceiving” rituals of the Roman church or the new liturgy. These additions are themselves suggestive of how small changes in derivative texts can alter the import of a text, particularly with a scriptural source where individual words are subject to so much scrutiny.

Nonetheless, it must be said that these are conventional Protestant readings of Psalm 51, and that they are integrated here through subtle changes in diction rather than in a more recognisably inventive refashioning. I say this not to justify the premises of Greene’s argument, to which my whole thesis in essence responds, but to acknowledge that on a surface level he hits upon a fact about Lock’s poetic approach that needs to be accounted for. Lock *does* appear to limit herself closely to the language of the marginal biblical text. The form of the sonnet sequence, so inextricably tied in our minds with the inventive and “original” male writer, is here put into the service of different content and different effects.

But fidelity to scripture itself constitutes a kind of response, just as repetition constitutes a rhetorical strategy. I want to suggest that the style of this sequence is not a marker of “female-

⁸⁵ Hannay, “Unlock my lipps”: The *Miserere mei Deus* of Anne Vaughan Lok and Mary Sidney Herbert, Countess of Pembroke”, 32.

⁸⁶ Felch, *Works*, 66, ll. 185–86.

gendered textual reproduction”, but a result of Lock’s astute analysis of biblical style. Unlike the Sidneys’ effort to supply the psalter with the full range of the courtly lyric, Lock’s sequence makes exclusive and extensive (re)use of the rhetorical schemes that she observes in (vernacular) scripture. Her paraphrase could thus be said to reflect the way that exegetical attention to “scripture tropes and figures was not primarily directed to them as ornament, but was in the interest of the most precise apprehension of divine truth”.⁸⁷ These devices were not seen as ancillary to sacred meaning but productive of it. As such, preserving not just the tropes but also the schemes of the biblical text in one’s versification might be said to restore a properly poetic vehicle while also preserving its more robustly understood methods of signification. Primary among these is scriptural poetry’s use of repetition, reiterating and refiguring what came before as though it were paraphrasing itself. Lock’s sequence preserves and extends those tendencies of *collocatio*, amplifying the psalm’s style as well as its length.⁸⁸ As such, Lock’s poem meditates affectively on the conflicted passions of its titular sinner but also intellectually, on the rhetorical craft of the psalmist.

Schemes

In *De schematibus et tropis*, Bede describes how the “Holy Writ surpasses all other writings not merely in authority because it is divine, or in usefulness because it leads to eternal life, but also for its age and artistic composition”.⁸⁹ Of the schemes he identifies in the Bible (he also calls them “*figurae*”), the most important are:

⁸⁷ Lewalski, *Protestant Poetics*, 83.

⁸⁸ Melancthon identifies this as *imitatio specialis*, the imitation of “how that author put things together”, *Imitating Authors*, 212.

⁸⁹ Tanenhaus, “Bede’s ‘De Schematibus et Tropis’”, 240.

Prolepsis, Zeugma, Hypozeuxis, Syllepsis, **Anadiplosis, Anaphora, Epanalepsis, Epizeuxis, Paronomasia, Schesis Onomatōn, Paromoeon, Homoeoteleuton, Homoeoptoton, Polypoton,** Hirmos, **Polysyndeton,** and Diallyton.⁹⁰

The significant emphasis Bede places on figures of repetition (indicated in bold above) recognises a fact about biblical style that more recent scholarship has confirmed. The primary stylistic basis of biblical poetry is what Robert Alter has influentially described as “semantic parallelism”, in which each verse or “verset” rephrases its predecessor.⁹¹ Others have styled this habit as “thought-rhymes” but Alter emphasises that parallelism is not (usually) static, but that it specifies, intensifies, or implies consequence, and so can serve to advance a narrative even as it relies heavily on repetition.⁹² The tendency to repeat paradoxically demands that readers attend to differences. In the original Hebrew this technique also occurs at the level of the individual word because the same “root” or *shorash* (consisting of two to four consonants) is often modified with prefixes, suffixes or infixes to create meanings that in English would be rendered with a different verb. This means that the Hebrew word for *engrave* resembles, visually and aurally, the Hebrew word for *write*, even as it specifies and heightens that basic meaning.⁹³ In languages like Latin and English, writers can instead represent that echoing through schemes—like Bede’s own *schematibus*—that repeat the same word paradigm (*write, wrote, written*) or strategically recall what has come before by syntactical and formal patterning. Though the grammatical resources available to each language differ, Ruth apRoberts considers the parallelism in biblical Hebrew to be “eminently—even uniquely—translatable” because all human languages proliferate ways of saying much the same thing; as she puts it, “[t]o be human is to be able to paraphrase”.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Alter, *The Art of Biblical Poetry*, 7 ff.

⁹² Ibid., 9–10.

⁹³ *Engrave* would be the intensive active or *piel* stem.

⁹⁴ Ruth apRoberts, “Old Testament Poetry: The Translatable Structure”, *PMLA* 92/5 (1977): 987–1004: 989 and 997.

We can see semantic parallelism at work in Psalm 51. Verses two to five in the Geneva version read:

Wash me thoroughly from mine iniquitie, and clense me from my sinne.

For I know mine iniquities, and my sinne is ever before me.

Against thee, against thee onely have I sinned, and done evill in thy sight, that thou mayest be just when thou speakest, and pure when thou judgest.

Beholde, I was borne in iniquitie, and in sinne hath my mother conceived me.⁹⁵

All these verses exhibit semantic parallelism across their clauses or cola (Alter's "versets"). Alter observes that "literary expression abhors complete parallelism" and that "as the restatement is made, an emphasis of meaning is introduced in the increment that was no more than implicit in the original statement".⁹⁶ So the generic "wash" becomes "clense" and "iniquitie" becomes "sinne", a much more freighted term in a Christian context. Often a new element is added or there is a change in aspect, as in the third verse where sin is first "know[n]" and then physically seen "ever before me"—not only thought about, but felt, and not past, but insistently present in the form of guilt.⁹⁷ The fourth verse is more complicated only because it uses the same structure twice, with two sets of cola (AA and BB). The AA cola are on the one hand circumstantial in an evidentiary sense (the speaker has sinned against God and God has seen him do it), but they also reprise the third verse in a turn from the fact of sin to the (now shared) perception of it. The BB cola of this same verse, "thou speakest" and "thou judgest", exhibit what Alter elsewhere calls "a specific instance of the category coming after the general term and [which] by so doing effects an intensification or focusing of meaning": God speaks, God pronounces his verdict.⁹⁸ A final

⁹⁵ *The Bible*, sig. Qq1v. Lock's time in Geneva may have given her early access to the work of the Geneva translators and the involvement of her friend John Knox would have made the version, when published, her preferred translation.

⁹⁶ Alter, *The Art of Biblical Poetry*, 25.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 26–7.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 26.

intensification occurs in the fifth verse, as the speaker backdates their sin from their birth to their conception; in other words, their sin was “ever before me” before the sinner was even a “me”.

Semantic parallelism (what Bede might call *schesis onomatōn*, “groups of words that differ in sound but are alike in meaning”) is therefore central to biblical poetics, its delineation of line and sub-line structures enriching its signifying possibilities.⁹⁹ But there is far more at work here. The verses are in fact complexly structured with different schemes, or figures of repetition. Psalm 51 exhibits many of those identified by Bede—isocolon, anaphora, epanalepsis, epizeuxis, polyptoton, homoioteleuton, and polysyndeton—all of which, except homoioteleuton (the repetition of inflectional endings), carry across from Bede’s Latin sources to English translations.¹⁰⁰ Isocolon appears most clearly in verses two and three; in four we have anaphora and epizeuxis (consecutive repetition); epanalepsis (repetition of a word after an interval) is apparent in both “iniquitie” and “sin”; polyptoton (using a different form of the same root word) we see in “just” and “judgest” in four; polysyndeton (using many conjunctions to slow the pace) occurs throughout. These devices, combined with the structuring principle of semantic parallelism, create the incantatory effect that lends psalms to private prayer as well as ritual application in song. Words and phrases are repeated as in a chorus and any innovations in *res* (subject matter or trope) are introduced gradually, often by recalling related thoughts that have come before. The repeated conjunctions not only slow the pace, as Bede suggests, but create a rhythm of pivots between two aspects of a thought. Figures of repetition are, then, central to how the biblical text produces meaning—across multiple languages.

To acknowledge the centrality of repetition to Psalm 51 is to re-evaluate scholarly claims that Anne Lock’s paraphrase “refuses invention to a degree almost unprecedented at the time”.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Bede’s example of this device is biblical “Ah sinful nation, a people laden with iniquity, a seed of evil-doers, children that deal corruptly” (Isaiah 1:4). Tanenhaus, “Bede’s ‘De Schematibus et Tropis’”, 243.

¹⁰⁰ Thus in the Latin we have “Amplius lava me [. . .] munda me” in the fourth verse. Swift Edgar and Angela M. Kinney, *The Vulgate Bible*, vol. 3 (Harvard University Press, 2010), 284.

¹⁰¹ Greene, “Anne Lock’s *Meditation*”, 158

Her precedent is, unsurprisingly, the biblical text itself. We can see this if we take the third stanza of Lock's "Meditation" and the marginal verse it paraphrases:

So foule is sinne and lothesome in thy sighte,	<i>Wash me yet more from my</i>
So foule with sinne I see my selfe to be,	<i>wickednes, and cense me</i>
That till from sinne I may be washed white,	<i>from my sinne</i>
So foule I dare not, Lord, approche to thee.	
Ofte hath thy mercie washed me before,	
Thou madest me cleane: but I am foule againe.	
Yet washe me Lord againe, and washe me more.	
Washe me, O Lord, and do away the staine	
Of ugly sinnes that in my soule appere.	
Let flow thy ple[n]tuous streames of censing grace.	
Washe me againe, yea washe me every where,	
Bothe leprous bodie and defiled face.	
Yea washe me all, for I am all uncleane,	
And from my sin, Lord, cleanse me ones againe. ¹⁰²	

Lock's version is sometimes more discursive than the original psalm, its logical moves more clearly signalled by conjunctions like "that", "yet" and "for", but she continually returns to biblical style.¹⁰³ Like the psalm itself, Lock makes use of semantic parallelism within cola and sometimes across lines. Thus the two clauses of "So foule is sinne and lothesome in thy sighte" parallel each other, but change aspect from a statement of fact to its perception by God, before the whole line is reprised by the next: "So foule with sinne I see my selfe to be". Though at the level of *res* there seems to be little development, in fact we have the shift from the general to the specific that is typical of biblical poetry: sin is foul, sin is foul to God, and finally, I see myself as

¹⁰² Felch, *Works*, 65, ll. 115–128.

¹⁰³ See for example her clearly marked protasis "that till from sinne [. . .]" and apodosis "I dare not".

foul with sin (now implicitly *because* it is foul to God). In effect these shifts deepen the emotional power of the poem without betraying the stasis it thematises. Lock elongates the psalm without moving it towards a resolution because that resolution is depicted as contingent on God rather than the speaker.

Similarly, the word “washe” is repeated and reordered using many of Bede’s schemes and it appears in successive cola, some which are almost direct synonyms (“washe me Lord againe” and “washe me more”), some which specify (“do away the staine”) and some which intensify (“Let flow thy plentuous streams of clensing grace”).¹⁰⁴ The terminal couplet has four cola in an ABBA relation: the middle cola specify (“I am all uncleane / [. . .] my sin”) while the bookending cola intensify (“washe me all” becomes “cleanse me ones againe”). The final couplet also summarises the sonnet and returns closely to the phrasing of the marginal biblical verse. We cannot call this sonnet innovative in scheme or trope, but nevertheless the way it preserves and extends the stylistic principles of its source is a feat of readerly attention and writerly control; moreover, in prolonging the speaker’s plight, it heightens its thematic expulsion from God’s ministering care.

Nor is this prolongation neutral in its affect. Like all complaint poems, the speaker in Psalm 51 highlights their grievances in the hope of soliciting redress.¹⁰⁵ By amplifying its length and its devices, Lock’s paraphrase of Psalm 51 cries out louder and longer. We can make sense of a text like Lock’s that intensifies effects already present in the Bible if we take seriously its self-identification as a “meditation”; namely, as a devotional text by which the believer seeks to “‘feel’ a religious thought, to respond to it emotionally”.¹⁰⁶ Lock’s work with schemes and the new particulars of emotional turmoil she supplies—from figurative “slyne delightes” to visceral

¹⁰⁴ In terms of Bede’s *schematibus*, the stanza/sonnet makes frequent use of anaphora, epanalepsis, and polysyndeton, in addition to aural repetitions: rhyme and alliteration.

¹⁰⁵ Complaint can be defined “a dramatic, highly emotional lament that reveals the complainant’s specific grievances against a public or private injustice”, “Complaint”, in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, edited by Stephen Cushman and Clare Cavanagh (Princeton University Press, 2012), 287.

¹⁰⁶ David Marno, *Death Be Not Proud: The Art of Holy Attention* (The University of Chicago Press, 2016), 3.

commands to “splat my ripped hert”—assist the reader in “feeling” the plight of the sinner. But it is worth thinking not only about the devotional experience of *reading* the poem, imaginatively open to its shifting passions, but about the experience of writing it. We are, I think, apt to imagine devotional texts as less deliberative than other kinds of writing, as somehow authored by the soul rather than the mind. But this is surely a mistake. In texts that are both devotional *and* derivative, the error is two-fold, for these not only involve writing (which is necessarily active) but a peculiarly intensive kind of reading: one in which the reader does not surrender to the text but unpicks it, mastering the source in order to remake it. If the poet offered visions of truth in their role as a “*Vates*”, they were also thought to partake in the Maker’s knowledge—and to inculcate that knowledge in their readers.¹⁰⁷ To write a biblical verse paraphrase like Lock’s “Meditation” is not only to meditate affectively on the divine meaning but to meditate intellectually on—and then to re-enact—how the Bible, as crafted and stylised text, contrives to represent that meaning. In this case, that intellectual work resulted in a biblical verse paraphrase instead of, say, a work of exegetical commentary, but both involve the parsing of biblical language and meaning. This should prompt us to re-evaluate Greene’s suggestion that Lock “struggl[es] to say almost nothing new”.¹⁰⁸ It may not be a struggle, but a choice. She maintains the integrity of her source while amplifying its workings and devotional affect and it is a successful literary text on those terms.

Copia

However, the Bible is not the only precedent for Lock’s derivative method. The sequence paraphrases the psalm as a whole, but at the level of the individual sonnet Lock writes many

¹⁰⁷ Victoria Kahn notes that in the Renaissance the poet was seen increasingly seen as an *artifex*, a “quasi-divine creator”. In a humanist regime of *imitatio* that collapsed reading and writing, poets not only made new texts but made new poets—people inspired (and taught) by attentive reading to take up the pen themselves, *The Trouble with Literature* (Oxford University Press, 2020), 24–7. “*Vates*” is from Sidney, *Defence*, sig. C2v.

¹⁰⁸ Greene, “Anne Lock’s *Meditation*”, 158.

versions of the same single biblical verse in a way that resembles Erasmian *copia*. Erasmus discusses the advantages of paraphrase (and more specifically, metaphrase):

It will be of enormous value to take apart the fabric of poetry and reweave it in prose, and, vice versa, to bind the freer language of prose under the rules of metre, and also to pour the same subject-matter from one form of poetic container into another.¹⁰⁹

This is what Lock does here, turning prose to poetry and biblical verses into whole sonnets. Erasmus is also, of course, a proponent of abundance, as in his famous multiplication of many different ways to say “Your letter pleased me greatly” and “Always, as long as I live, I shall remember you”.¹¹⁰ He advises that “we should frequently take a group of sentences and deliberately set out to express each of them in as many versions as possible, as Quintilian advises, using the analogy of a piece of wax which can be moulded into one shape after another”.¹¹¹ These examples take up a significant portion of *De copia* and serve to exemplify the series of rhetorical devices Erasmus covers immediately beforehand in his discussion of *verba*. The division in the two books of *De copia* between *verba* (abundance of expression) and *res* (abundance of subject-matter) is one Erasmus sets out to break down—for both alter the sense. So, he draws the reader’s attention to small differences between apparently similar formulations, as in these versions of “Always, as long as I live, I shall remember you”, in an English translation:

My life being safe, your memory will not flee from me.

This life being preserved, my memory of you will not die.

As long as this life bears me company, so shall the remembrance of you.

This life will depart from one still mindful of you.¹¹²

These variations—of grammatical subject, agent, mood, and clausal relationships as well as diction—are subtle but have transformative effects on meaning. These are not a demonstration

¹⁰⁹ Erasmus, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, 24, 303.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 348–65.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 303.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 362.

of perfect equivalence, but of rhetorical *varietas*. The same occurs in the proliferating variations of Lock's paraphrased sonnets. See, for example, some of her rephrasings of "my tong shall joyfullye talke of thy justice":

So, Lord, my joying tong shall talke thy praise,
Thy name my mouth shall vtter in delight,
My voice shall sounde thy justice, and thy waies,
Thy waies to justifie thy sinfull wight.¹¹³

Lock's proliferation of "restatements" is a properly abundant style, not here a rhetorical exercise, but one that evidently emerges from that intellectual milieu.

Indeed we can be confident that Lock's copious style is not only a reflection of the copiousness of her scriptural source because we have ample evidence of her humanist engagements. She was educated (or self-educated) enough to discuss liturgy with John Knox, to write in Latin, and to translate Calvin and, later, Jean Taffin's French.¹¹⁴ Moreover, her description of the sonnet sequence as a "paraphrase", a recent calque into English, is almost certainly inspired by Erasmus's *Paraphrases on the New Testament*. Catherine Carsley suggests the use of that term is a "clue to Lock's scholarly ambitions".¹¹⁵ And indeed her copious sonnets constitute an exegetical engagement by interrogating the wider semantic field that can be derived from the biblical text as written. Like Luther "beating away desperately at this phrase of Paul" before his conversion ("pulsabam tamen importunus eo loco Paulum"), Lock's proliferating paraphrase is an intensive engagement with scripture as text and proof that retaining material from a source text can be as revealing as altering it.¹¹⁶ Her sequence both interprets the biblical

¹¹³ Felch, *Works*, 69–70, ll. 305–8.

¹¹⁴ There are Latin dedicatory verses attributed to Anne Lock in a presentation manuscript of Bartholo Sylva, *Giardino cosmografico coltivato* (Cambridge University Library, MS II.5.37); see Jane Stevenson, "Women, Writing and Scribal Publication in the Sixteenth Century", *English Manuscript Studies, 1100–1700* 9 (2000): 1–32.

¹¹⁵ Catherine A. Carsley, "Biblical Versification and French Religious Paraphrase in Anne Lock's "A Meditation of a Penitent Sinner"", *ANQ: A Quarterly Journal of Short Articles, Notes and Reviews* 24/1–2 (2011): 42–50: 46.

¹¹⁶ Quoted in Brian Cummings, *The Literary Culture of the Reformation: Grammar and Grace* (Oxford University Press, 2002), 62.

text and carefully identifies and redeploys its schemes in an act of writing that is both devotional and humanistic, both felt and thought. In doing so, Lock demonstrates that women were not always exempt from humanist and reformed interest in how texts and their meanings were constructed—and in how they could be reconstructed.

Is this thy voice?¹¹⁷

The popularity of the Psalms stemmed from the perception that they expressed universal predicaments. Calvin famously described the Book of Psalms as an “Anatomy of all the partes of the Soule, inasmuch as a man shal not find any affection in himselfe, whereof the Image appeareth not in this glasse”.¹¹⁸ Matthew Parker remarked in his preface to the Coverdale psalter that the psalm reader “reputeth and thinketh all the wordes he readeth [. . .] to be as his very owne wordes spoken in his owne person”.¹¹⁹ And yet in spite of this sense that psalms were radically applicable to the lives of believers, many were thought to be the words of an ancient Hebrew King, King David. Biblical commentaries, including Calvin’s, wrote at length about the specific historical circumstances attending each psalm. These commentaries did not seek to displace their universality; rather, the historical level of the text was thought to clarify the spiritual or symbolic sense that readers were intended to take from it. So Cassiodorus comments that David’s lament in Psalm 51 “afforded all men a chance to absolve themselves. He ensured that his tears, running down the faces of people who came after him, are dried with no lapse of time”.¹²⁰ Likewise Calvin observes, when at the end of the psalm David calls for God to “be favourable unto Zion”, that “as soon as we are reconciled to God, not only every man has free liberty to pray for his own welfare, but also we are admitted to be suitors for others”.¹²¹ David

¹¹⁷ Saul says this to David in 1 Samuel 26:17.

¹¹⁸ Calvin, *The Psalmes*, sig. *6v.

¹¹⁹ *The whole Psalter* [. . .] (London: John Day, 1567), sig. C1v.

¹²⁰ Patrick Gerard Walsh, ed., *Cassiodorus: Explanation of the Psalmes*, vol. 1 (Paulist Press, 1990), 493.

¹²¹ John Calvin, *A Commentary on the Psalmes of David*, vol. 2 (D. A. Talyboys, 1840), 75. It is Psalm 50 in this edition.

was recognised as a historical person and forerunner of Christ, but his psalms were nonetheless templates for all believers to appeal to God. His psalms were “suits” that could be appropriated “for others”; his tears could stand in for the tears of all believers. Psalms therefore occupy a liminal space, both already identified and open for identification. For biblical verse paraphrasts, this liminality offered choices.

Patristic and contemporary commentaries alike, as well as all early modern bible translations, consider Psalm 51 to be in David’s voice, pertaining to his adultery with Bathsheba and his subsequent (indirect) killing of her husband Uriah.¹²² But I want to suggest that these particulars, what George Scheper calls the “the grammatical-historical sense” of the biblical text, are more marked in Lock’s sequence than in other versified psalms, in part because hers is so much longer.¹²³ Most versified psalters are short because of their ritual function; they tend to keep close to the length of the original psalm. Fewer words enable less specification and because the psalm does not explicitly refer to David outside of the (apocryphal) headnote, he does not tend to get a look in. Though, as we have seen, Lock does not indiscriminately introduce new material to the biblical text, her much longer text nonetheless involves specification. Given contemporary perceptions about the origin of the Psalm 51, it is no surprise that much of this added content is Davidic.

The story of David, Bathsheba and her husband Uriah, is told in 2 Samuel 11-12. David sees Bathsheba bathing on the rooftop, finds that “the woman was very beautiful to look upon” and subsequently sleeps with her.¹²⁴ Following David’s adultery with Bathsheba, he sends her husband Uriah into battle against the Ammonites in the hope that he will be killed. This is exactly what happens, and soon after Uriah’s death David himself marries Bathsheba. However,

¹²² This attribution is now thought to be retrospective and apocryphal. Robert Alter, *The Hebrew Bible*, vol. 3 (W. W. Norton & Company, 2019), 132.

¹²³ “Reformation Attitudes”, 555.

¹²⁴ 2 Samuel 11:2, *The Bible*, sig. M4r.

“the thing that David had done, displeased the Lord”.¹²⁵ The Prophet Nathan comes to David and tells him the Lord is angered at his sins and that the son he has had with Bathsheba will die. The conventional association of this story with Psalm 51 likely came from the second half of this account (2 Samuel 12:16 following), where David begs God to have mercy on his son, by lamenting, fasting and lying “all night upon the earth” for seven days.¹²⁶ The child dies in spite of his efforts and David abruptly ceases to grieve, explaining to his servants that “While the childe was yet alive, I fasted, and wept; for I said, Who can tel whether God wil have mercie on me, that the childe may live?”.¹²⁷ David’s lamentations, recounted briefly in 2 Samuel, are vividly articulated in the first-person pleas of Psalm 51.

Though Lock’s titular “sinner” has been seen as “remarkably genderless” or even autobiographical, her psalm version in fact ties itself particularly closely with 2 Samuel and therefore with David.¹²⁸ Both her paraphrase and the biblical account dwell on issues of sight and witness. 2 Samuel begins with David’s chance sighting of Bathsheba and involves repeated concealments in his adultery and dispatching of Uriah. However, David’s covert machinations are as visible to God as Bathsheba is to David on the rooftop. Nathan sweeps aside David’s concealments: “Wherefore hast thou despised the commandment of the Lord, to do evil in his sight?”.¹²⁹ God’s punishment makes a mockery of David’s attempts at secrecy, declaring that He “wil take thy wives before thine eyes, & give them unto thy neighbour, and he shal lye with thy wives in the sight of this sunne. For thou didest it secretly: but I wil do this thing before all

¹²⁵ 2 Samuel 11:27, *ibid.*, sig. M4v.

¹²⁶ 2 Samuel 12:16 ff., *ibid.*

¹²⁷ 2 Samuel 12:22; *ibid.* This implication of contrived performance here is one that Lock expands, as we will see.

¹²⁸ Deborah Uman calls the speaker “remarkably genderless” open to identification with the female author by “select readers” in the know, *Women as Translators*, 50. Kel Morin-Parsons calls the voice “resolutely genderless” in spite of the “mantle of the (usually male) psalmic voice”, “‘Loose my speche’: Anne Locke’s sonnets and the matrilineal Protestant poetic” (University of Ottawa, 2001), 109. Rosalind Smith also describes the sequence as concerning the “genderless penitent sinner’s subjective experience of sin” in *Sonnets*, 33.

¹²⁹ 2 Samuel 12:9; *The Bible*, sig. M4v.

Israel, and before the sunne".¹³⁰ David's futile secrecy, the concealment of his bad intentions, is a hubris that God specifically seeks to punish.

While Psalm 51 seems to evoke 2 Samuel in its verse "I have sinned, and done evil in thy sight", Lock's "Meditation" goes well beyond this fleeting reference. Her sequence makes seeing and being seen a key theme and motif and in doing so aligns the speaker specifically with David in 2 Samuel. There are two aspects to this treatment. First, and as in 2 Samuel, David's sins are visible to God. We see this expanded in Lock's third sonnet and throughout the eleventh sonnet, which reads:

Loke on me, Lord: though trembling I beknowe,
That sight of sinne so sore offendeth thee,
That seing sinne, how it doth overflowe
My whelmed soule, thou canst not loke on me
But with disdain, with horror and despite.
[. . .] Looke not how I
Am foule by sinne: but make me by thy grace
Pure in thy mercies sight [. . .]¹³¹

The mention of grace in the last lines of this extract refers to the other aspect of Lock's treatment, where David's sin obstructs his view of, and access to, God's mercy, as in the fourth sonnet:

[I] presume to mercy to direct my sight,
My Chaos and my heape of sinne doth lie
Betwene me and thy mercies shining light.
What ever way I gaze about for grace,

¹³⁰ 2 Samuel 12:11–12; *ibid.*

¹³¹ Felch, *Works*, 68, ll. 232–39.

My filth and fault are ever in my face.¹³²

These lines are a dramatic fulfilment of God's promise in 2 Samuel to expose David's sin "before all Israel, and before the sunne".¹³³ Not only has God made David recognise his sin, but his ensuing guilt has blotted out his ability to see God's grace. The predicament resonates with Calvinist "total depravity": the sinner has no agency to move towards God except that which He admits.¹³⁴

Lock also develops the image of the sword that appears in 2 Samuel. At 2 Samuel 11:25, David dismisses misgivings about Uriah's death, saying that "the sword devoureth one aswel as another".¹³⁵ In this impersonal construction, death in battle is nobody's fault. Nathan, speaking for God, rejects this, stating that: "thou hast killed Uriah the Hittite with the sworde, and hast taken his wife to be thy wife, and hast slaine him with the sworde of the children of Ammon"; "[n]ow therefore the sworde shal never departe from thine house, because thou hast despised me".¹³⁶ This final prophecy is fulfilled by the unceasing conflicts among David's descendants ("thine house"), but in her paraphrase Lock develops the sword as a symbol of personal guilt that, as in 2 Samuel, "shall never depart". So, in the prefatory sonnets, the Lord's wrath is described as making wounds deeper "than dobledged sworde" and in the sixteenth of the "Meditation" sonnets as "thy revengyng sworde".¹³⁷ In the fifth sonnet, as we have already seen:

My cruell conscience with sharpned knife

Doth splat my ripped hert, and layes abroad

¹³² Ibid., 65, ll. 138–42.

¹³³ Similar sentiments appear in sonnet 14 and 16 before being resolved in God's forgiving "gentle eyes" in sonnet 21. We also see this in the first of the prefatory sonnets, where she writes "dimmed and foredulled eyes [. . .] can not enjoy the comfort of the light", *ibid.*, 62, ll. 23–6.

¹³⁴ Total depravity is based on passages like John 6:44: "No man can come to me, except [that] the Father, which hath sent me, draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day".

¹³⁵ *The Bible*, sigs. M4r–v.

¹³⁶ 2 Samuel 12:9–10, *ibid.*, sig. M4v.

¹³⁷ Felch, *Works*, 62 and 69, ll. 21 and 304. These images also evoke Psalm 149:6–7: "Let the high Acts of God be in their mouth, and a two edged sword in their hands / To execute vengeance upon the heathen, *and* corrections among the people".

The lothesome secretes of my filthy life,
And sprede them forth before the face of God.¹³⁸

While in 2 Samuel David in effect enlists the sword of the Ammonites to dispose of Uriah by sending him into battle, here that sword turns against David himself, not only wounding him, but eviscerating his concealed motives for all to see. Whereas before the blade, as metonym of warfare, exculpated David's direct responsibility, here that facade falls away "before the face of God" and before David himself as the murder weapon smarts his conscience. The "Meditation" thus extends Lock's version of Psalm 51 by developing the themes and images of 2 Samuel in a ventriloquism of David.

Lover, sonneteer

The most intriguing evidence that the speaker is David, rather than an unspecified stand-in available for the reader, is Lock's use of the sonnet sequence form. The "Meditation" is the first sonnet sequence and the earliest use of the sonnet for religious devotion in English, but she was likely inspired to use the form by Tottel's *Miscellany*, first published in 1557.¹³⁹ Many of Surrey and Wyatt's sonnets in that publication are amorous complaints that imitate Petrarch's *Canzoniere*.¹⁴⁰ As Leah Whittington argues in *Renaissance Suppliants*, Petrarch restores *eros* to the tradition of love poetry inherited from Dante: "[f]or Dante, the poetry of praise [of Beatrice] has no rhetorical aim, no strategy of persuasion, no expectation of response, no need for the dialectic of plea and reply".¹⁴¹ Petrarch instead turns to the sonnet sequence to reinvigorate a tradition of love lyric marked by "the lexicon of feudal vassalage and religious prayer" in which "the poet-

¹³⁸ Ibid., 65–6, ll. 151–54.

¹³⁹ *Songes and sonettes*, comp. Richard Tottel (London: Richard Tottel, 1557). Arguably there are two sonnet sequences in question in Lock's publication, the prefatory series of five sonnets and the twenty-one sonnets of the "Meditation".

¹⁴⁰ As Amanda Holton and Tom MacFaul note, "even where textual relationships are less close, the love-poems in Tottel are characterized by behavioural and linguistic conventions which can be identified with Petrarchism", *Tottel's Miscellany* (Penguin, 2011), xiii.

¹⁴¹ *Renaissance Suppliants: Poetry, Antiquity, Reconciliation* (Oxford University Press, 2016), 92.

lover portrayed himself as a helpless pleader who came to the lady in a state of utter powerlessness, approaching her elevated being only through the form of the humble request”.¹⁴²

From this potted history, Lock’s sequence could be said to simply return a divine object to the suppliant posture that Petrarch and his imitators in Tottel’s had directed to amorous love. The broad compatibility between religious petition and amorous suit—between psalm and the love lyric—reflects the way that both forged literary interiority, tracing (or appearing to trace) the shifting eddies of a first-person speaker’s attention and emotion.¹⁴³ Deirdre Serjeantson suggests that Lock may have seen the combination of psalm and sonnet “as a useful and unproblematic match”.¹⁴⁴ She suggests that Lock was not picking up on the amorous sonnet *per se*, but on a supposed wider application of the form to religion, as in Surrey’s sonnet (also in Tottel’s) entitled “Praise of certaine psalmes of David, translated by sir T. w. the elder”.¹⁴⁵ However, it is difficult to see a viable path of influence for Lock’s sonnets (and even more so for her sonnet cycle) without Petrarch. For, while the Surrey sonnet about the psalms appears promising, Lock’s sequence has very little in common with that encomiastic poem and she still would have encountered it through Tottel’s, where overwhelmingly the sonnet is used in imitations of amorous (and plaintive) Petrarchan models.¹⁴⁶ Indeed there would be no further English application of the sonnet to devotion until until *Sundry Christian passions* in 1593, written by Anne Lock’s son Henry.

¹⁴² Ibid., 88.

¹⁴³ Leonard Forster sees Petrarch as creating “a poetic idiom of great flexibility [. . .] which could be used to parade fictitious emotions or to conceal real ones” and notes, following H. A. Mason, how writers like Wyatt would turn to their Petrarchan training (in this case through translation) “to express his own deeply felt emotions in identifiable circumstances”, *The Icy Fire: Five Studies in European Petrarchism* (Cambridge University Press, 1969), 8 and 76. Debora Shuger also finds an origin story in this generic overlap, arguing that “[t]he language of introspection, desire, and inner struggle migrates from devotional *praxis* [. . .] to literature”, *The Renaissance Bible: Scholarship, Sacrifice, and Subjectivity* (University of California Press, 1998), 165.

¹⁴⁴ Deirdre Serjeantson, “The Book of Psalms and the early modern sonnet”, *Renaissance Studies* 29/4 (2015): 632–49: 639.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., the poem’s first line is “The great Macedon, that out of Persle chased”.

¹⁴⁶ Indeed in a section dense with love complaints, this influence is made in explicit in two sonnets addressed to Petrarch: “A praise of Petrarke and of Laura his ladie” and “That petrark cannot be passed but notwithstanding that Lawra is far surpassed”, *Songes and sonettes*, sigs. T2r–v.

It is very likely, then, that Lock was aware of the form's specifically amorous associations. By 1560, sonnets probably already had this reputation among those who knew them from the continent. This is suggested in a preface by Archbishop Parker published in 1561 that inveighs against:

Ye songes so nice: ye sonnets all,
of lothy lovers layes:
Ye worke mens myndes: but bitter gall.
By phansies pevishe playes.¹⁴⁷

In 1572 Edward Dering, Lock's future husband, described the sonnet as "full of all synne and abomination".¹⁴⁸ However it does not follow from this reputation that Lock is naïve in her application of sonnet to scripture; in fact those very emphases—"synne and abomination"—are perfectly apt to a paraphrase of Psalm 51 that voices a penitent David. Lock chose the form because it suited her prosopopoeia. After all, David's sin was always thought to be, first and foremost, sexual. The biblical header reads, "A psalme of David, when the Prophet Nathan came unto him, after he had gone in to Bath-sheba", glossing the psalm as his repentance for the carnal sin rather than for his killing of Uriah.¹⁴⁹ This framing, added some time after the psalm's composition, likely responds to the emphasis in the psalm on images of purity, cleanliness and purging.¹⁵⁰ This diction is abundant in Lock's paraphrase; her David requests that God "wash me well within" and dwells on his carnal sin, the "secret remorse and gnawing of my hart" repeating "filth" three times, "shame" six, and "foul" eight.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Parker, *The Whole Psalter*, sig. B2r.

¹⁴⁸ Edward Dering, *A briefe & necessary instruction* [. . .] (London: J. Awdely, 1572), sig. A3r.

¹⁴⁹ *The Bible*, sig. Qq1v.

¹⁵⁰ Alter, *The Hebrew Bible*, 3, 132–33.

¹⁵¹ Felch, *Works*, 67 and 65, ll. 210 and 134, the individual words passim.

These emotions are not at all alien to the Petrarchan sonnet. Shame, guilt, and secrecy all appear in the sonnets in Tottel's. For example, part of Surrey's "Complaint of a lover rebuked" reads:

She that me taught to love, and suffer payne,
My doutfull hope, and eke my hot desire,
with shamefast cloke to shadow and restraine,
And coward love then to the hart apace
Taket hys flight, whereas he lurkes and plaines
His purpose lost, and dare not shew his face.
For my lordes gilt thus faultlesse bide I paines,
Yet from my lorde shall not my foote remove
Sweete is his death, that takes his end by love.¹⁵²

This poem imitates Petrarch's sonnet 140 ("Amor, che nel penser mio vive et regna"), as Wyatt also does later in the collection.¹⁵³ Here the beloved woman inspires feelings of pain and shame, personified in Love who drives the speaker into secrecy. The lover's subjection to Love (to "my lorde" and to "my lordes guilt") evokes Petrarch's adoption of the language of "feudal vassalage".¹⁵⁴ But that language itself stems from divine lordship, with social and political hierarchies typically clothed in Christian language, as in the divine right of kings. It is no surprise, then, that Lock makes use of that feudal language in her paraphrase, for example as David describes his "thrall'd brest" and his "captive soule in such restraint".¹⁵⁵ We even have in Surrey's sonnet the line "dare not shew his face", a reversal of Psalm 51:9's request that God "[h]ide thy face from my sinnes".¹⁵⁶ The sonnets in Tottel's solicit an amorous relenting from the

¹⁵² *Songes and sonettes*, sig. A4v, ll. 5–14.

¹⁵³ His poem is titled "The lover for shamefastnesse hideth his desire within his faithfull hart", *ibid.*, sig. E3r.

¹⁵⁴ Whittington, *Renaissance Suppliants*, 88.

¹⁵⁵ Felch, *Works*, 65 and 68, ll. 133 and 242.

¹⁵⁶ *The Bible*, sig. Qq1v.

beloved while Lock's sequence laments an amorous consummation that has already taken place. In practice, though, they substantially overlap, both in the suppliant posture of their first-person speakers and in the topoi through which they lodge their pleas.

The innovation Lock is most famous for, the first sonnet *sequence* in English, might suggest she accessed or at least knew of Petrarch's *Canzoniere*.¹⁵⁷ This is possible, but Tottel's may have inspired even this, for though that miscellany does not contain a sonnet sequence, it is nonetheless a compendium which uses the sonnet to explore similar predicaments time and time again. So sonnets like "Complaint of a lover rebuked", "Complaint of the lover disdained", and "A complaint by night of the lover not beloved" evidently reprise one another in theme. Viewed as a collection, the sonnets in Tottel's withhold resolution through length, repetition, and structural circularity in a way that resembles both Lock's sequence and Petrarch's *Canzoniere*. The Book of Psalms is a similar compendium which, through the person of David, took on a unity of focalisation and even narrative that "foreground[ed] David in his role of lover".¹⁵⁸ Versions of the Psalms perpetuated this impression. Wyatt's 1549 *Certayne psalmes* (i.e. his Penitential Psalms), for example, "form a series of complaints, not so much for sin in general as for the traps and trammels of the flesh from a courtly point of view. David is made the author of a kind of *de remedia amoris*".¹⁵⁹ Philip Sidney, too, sees David as a lover, describing his "heavenly poesie, wherein almost he sheweth himselfe a passionate lover".¹⁶⁰ Lock's application of the sonnet sequence to Psalm 51 and her emphasis on that text's erotic significance is therefore an early (but not the first) recognition that David's predicament overlaps with the plaintive secular lover. Her use of the sonnet and sonnet sequence contributes to the specification of David that she enacts

¹⁵⁷ Serjeantson notes the wide availability and reception of Petrarch's writing in sixteenth-century England, "Psalms", 640–42.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 642.

¹⁵⁹ Hallett Smith, "English Metrical Psalms in the Sixteenth Century and their Literary Significance", *Huntington Library Quarterly* 9/1 (1945): 249–71: 262.

¹⁶⁰ Sidney, *Defence*, sig. B4r. Serjeantson also notes Gascoigne's sonnets between characters called David and Bathsheba and George Peele's *The loue of King Dauid and fair Bethsabe* (1599), concluding that "David was, in the most literal of terms, adopted as a Petrarchan lover", "Psalms", 642–43.

through verbal echoes of 2 Samuel. Psalm and sonnet together cast David's sin as amorous; he becomes a repentant lover who redirects his poetic entreaty from seduction to penance.

Lock's decision to develop in her paraphrase the themes and images of the David story in 2 Samuel 12 again demonstrates that the "Meditation" is a closely crafted literary work, rather than the ingénue voice of the devotional writer or a text interested in a passive reproduction of its source. Moreover, in the formal and theological attention it pays its sources, Lock's sequence innovates on her source and is involved in the work of philological and historical interpretation typically associated with male-authored commentary. Her text is not depersonalised or genderless as has sometimes been assumed, but a *prosopopoeia*; it is to David's speech I now turn.

Bad character

"Moral character [. . .] constitutes the most effective source of persuasion".¹⁶¹ This is what Aristotle calls *ēthos* which, alongside *pathos* and *logos*, he identifies as the three kinds of persuasive appeal (*ḗstis*). He asserts that "[t]he orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence".¹⁶² There is a tension here, for while we might think of "personal character" as immutable—either you're a good person or you're not—*ēthos* refers to how character is represented for an audience and there can be no representation that does not involve a degree of contrivance. As Gavin Alexander notes, "even when we speak for ourselves we are wearing a mask, though of our own making".¹⁶³ Roman writers replicate this paradox: "Cicero and Quintilian struggle to argue that the orator must be good and must believe what he says, and they are repeatedly betrayed in their efforts by the very dramatic metaphors that the word *ēthos* brought with it".¹⁶⁴ *Ēthos* is an artificial (entechnic) proof

¹⁶¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, trans. John Henry Freese (Harvard University Press, 1926), 1356a.

¹⁶² This kind of persuasion, Aristotle says, "must be due to the speech itself, not to any preconceived idea of the speaker's character", *ibid.*

¹⁶³ Alexander, "Prosopopoeia", 97.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 100.

that constructs for an audience an impression of the speaker's moral virtue and has no necessary relation to one's true moral character; it can be put on, like a mask in a play, in order to deceive. For this reason, *prosopopoeia* (making a mask) is a near synonym of *ethopoeia* (disposition-making).¹⁶⁵ Whether real or contrived, creating the appearance of upstanding character is crucial for persuasion because as Aristotle states: "we believe good men more fully and readily than others".¹⁶⁶

However, in the genre of complaint—and particularly religious complaint—good character does not have a monopoly on suasive force. Lock's identification of the first-person persona with David reverses the usual working of *ethos* to give the reader a fuller understanding of the speaker's *bad* character—the sins that have brought about his "passioned minde".¹⁶⁷ Quintilian suggests that "[t]he great virtue in expressing it [one's *ethos*] lies in making it seem that everything flows from the nature of the facts and the persons, so that the speaker's character shines through his speech and is somehow recognised".¹⁶⁸ Quintilian's advice has a legal application; he suggests orators will be most credible when they arrange well the "facts" (the rhetorical circumstances) of the case. A lawyer defending their client must represent what happened, when, how, and why in a way that exonerates the suspect's motives and their character. Conversely, in Lock's sequence, David is already guilty and all the particulars of the biblical framing, the echoes of 2 Samuel, and David's rhetoric further characterise that guilt. Shining out from his speech is not David's virtue, but his sin. This bad *ethos*, I will suggest, is its own kind of persuasive strategy which, in the context of religious complaint, can help us to account for many of the innovations in Lock's paraphrase.

¹⁶⁵ The distinction Alexander draws between them—the former as "outer person" and the latter as "inner person"—is tentative as both are postures assumed through what one says and how, *ibid.*, 99.

¹⁶⁶ This is my paraphrase; Freese's Loeb edition has the clunky "we feel confidence in a greater degree and more readily in persons of worth", Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1356a.

¹⁶⁷ This formulation is from the title of the sonnet sequence that prefaces the "Meditation", called "The preface, expressing the passionate minde of the penitent sinner".

¹⁶⁸ Quintilian, *The Orator's Education*, 6.2.13.

Leah Whittington does not discuss divine supplication specifically, but her analysis still helps to illuminate the dynamic I identify in religious complaint. She states:

All relationships of asking and answering have a greater or lesser degree of imbalance.

When we ask for something, the implication is that we lack it, and to posit someone as a respondent is to suggest that he or she may have the power to fill that lack. In supplication, in contrast with other modes of asking, this imbalance is accentuated to the point of maximum polarity.¹⁶⁹

But if there is a “maximum polarity” on Earth, pleading for your life with a sword at your neck, a plea to the divine entails a new “maximum”: an infinite distance between interlocutors.

“Crouching, kneeling, bending, prostrating”: these are the postures of the powerless.¹⁷⁰ But what rhetorical posture can bridge the gap between the believer and the Christian God? In an appeal to another person, an appellant might stress their virtue: why they beyond others deserve to be spared suffering. They might stress their usefulness, like a prisoner of war offering information. They might even not be wholly powerless, able to resort to some other authority that could bring vengeance down on the heads of their oppressor.¹⁷¹ None of these are available when one supplicates God for redemption from sin, particularly from a Calvinist perspective like Lock’s where that sin is in-born and election predestined. In this case and because the Christian God, being omniscient, cannot be fooled, the only remaining option is to abandon a rhetoric that presents your character as redeemable and instead present it as *bad*, irredeemable to any except God.

This is the ethical appeal Lock’s David makes in the “Meditation” sequence. We have seen how the sequence dwells on the carnality of David’s sin, on visceral images of suffering, constantly repeating in an imitation of biblical style how far he has fallen from God. These align

¹⁶⁹ Whittington, *Renaissance Suppliants*, 16.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ This could also be workable in a polytheistic pantheon, where gods could be played off against one another.

with the approach of the complaint genre that seeks first to amplify the speaker's distress, as when David's own "cruel conscience" repeatedly takes the "sharpend knife" to himself, and second, to use that amplified distress to solicit redress.¹⁷² Here David stresses his bad character, presenting himself as the ideal opportunity for God to demonstrate his limitless redemptive power. In other words, because David is so sinful and because, as he states, "damning me to depth of during woe / just in thy judgement shouldest thou be found", God's choice to spare him affliction is especially praiseworthy.¹⁷³ The following lines extend the argument: "And from deserved flames relevyng me / Just in thy mercy mayst thou also be".¹⁷⁴ David recognises God's irreproachable judgement, but argues that by sparing him punishment, God may also exhibit his irreproachable mercy. So David appeals:

But mercy Lord, O Lord some pitie take,
Withdraw my soule from the deserved hell,
O Lord of glory, for thy glories sake:
That I may saved of thy mercy tell,
[. . .]
Performest mercy: so as in the sight
Of them that judge the justice of thy cause
Thou onely just be demed, and no moe,
The worldes unjustice wholly to confound.¹⁷⁵

Deploying all the artificial means of biblical style, David represents his *ethos*—his moral character—as so dire that it damns him to a "deserved hell". However, this counterintuitively works as a persuasive appeal. David argues that because he is so very bad, his redemption would

¹⁷² Felch, *Works*, 65, l. 151.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 66, ll. 167–68.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, ll. 169–70.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, ll. 157–70.

be an ideal demonstration of God's magnanimity. Moreover, he promises that if he is saved, he will spread the word of God's justice to others: "That I may saved of thy mercy tell".

Another iteration of this strategy appears in the following sonnet (7) about the origin of sin, which I quote in full below:

For lo, in sinne, Lord, I begotten was,
With sede and shape my sinne I toke also,
Sinne is my nature and my kinde alas,
In sinne my mother me conceived: Lo
I am but sinne, and sinfull ought to dye,
Dye in his wrath that hath forbydden sinne.
Such bloome and frute loe sinne doth multiplie,
Such was my roote, such is my juyse within.
I plead not this as to excuse my blame,
On kynde or parentes myne owne gilt to lay:
But by disclosing of my sinne, my shame,
And nede of helpe, the plainer to displaye
Thy mightie mercy, if with plenteous grace
My plenteous sinnes it please thee to deface.¹⁷⁶

The first four lines exhibit semantic parallelism, weaving between birth and conception to describe his sin as inborn and irrevocable, imagery that is revised with the root and fruit of the later lines. But this, David claims, is not an excuse. He is not trying to blame his parents. Instead David admits that these images are part of his rhetorical strategy of bad *ethos*: by "disclosing" his sins in this way, it becomes "the plainer to displaye" the mercy of God when He (David hopes) does ultimately respond to his "nede of helpe". David therefore offers God an opportunity to

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., ll. 171–84.

show His boundless mercy by forgiving David's iniquities. Indeed, to the task of defacing David's "plenteous sinnes" only God's "plenteous grace" is equal. Like the sinner he is, David bargains to the end, the power differential inherent in religious complaint leading him to try to persuade God to make him an example of divine mercy. For a Calvinist like Lock who believed in total depravity and double predestination, this abject rhetorical position may have been the only thinkable way to appeal to God. It makes sense, then, that all Lock's innovations would turn to buttressing that appeal. Her longer, more plaintive paraphrase, her use of biblical style, her echoes of 2 Samuel, and the way she operationalises the generic associations of the sonnet sequence all tend to the specification and characterisation of David, his sin, and thus, via a strategy of bad *ethos*, ultimately to the suasive power of his plea for mercy.

Authoring voice

If Petrarch's *Canzoniere*, according to John Freccero, is a kind of idolatry, a closed-circuit where Laura displaces God as the highest object of worship, then Lock brings to the sonnet a divine order of reference.¹⁷⁷ Her sequence is still in conversation with the amorous sonnet tradition, taking its form, its erotic baggage and emphasis on subjectivity, but here those serve devotional ends. What are those ends? Lock's sequence is unlike almost all other English metrical psalters in the early post-Reformation period which made clear their ritual function. Indeed, that her main innovations specify David as the speaker, rather than leaving that position "open", might seem to preclude her sequence being used as a devotional aid: as a tool for meditation. I do not think this is true. Readers and listeners are perfectly capable of imagining a character that, as Quintilian puts it, "shines through his speech". David Lawton argues that the psalms exhibit a "public interiority" of many voices:

¹⁷⁷ John Freccero, "The Fig Tree and the Laurel: Petrarch's Poetics", in *Literary theory/Renaissance texts*, edited by Patricia A. Parker and David Quint (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 20–32: 27.

They [the Psalms] already exist as text before they are inhabited, often in a shared first-person, by a speaker or group. Those who inhabit them do not own them, and do not control their future. [. . .] Those who engage with such interiorities find a voice in or through them.¹⁷⁸

To “find a voice” does not refer to a twenty-first century self-actualisation, but to the way that the psalter acted as a repository, an *ars dicendi*, of kinds of communications with God. Psalm 51 provided a model of guilt and abjection and Lock’s version is no exception. However, instead of retaining the Psalm’s ambiguous speaker that a user can “fill in”, the voice the reader of Lock’s sequence inhabits is David’s. While it is true that readers and reciters of the biblical Psalms “do not own them, and do not control their future”, biblical rewriters like Lock do claim some degree of ownership and control—do claim authorship—by creating and disseminating a new version of the text. Her sequence is loyal to scripture, but it is also a template of a distinctly Calvinist devotion. By voicing David and the abject workings of his mind, Lock urges her readers to reckon with their immutable condition of sin and the limited scope that leaves for human appeal.

Lock’s sequence is also a specifically literary experiment. English schoolboys were tasked with exercises in prosopopoeia, writing persuasive texts in the voice of classical figures. They took as their model the epistolary pleas of the heroines of the *Heroides*. These were ideal models not because they were “empty” or underspecified but because they were rich in circumstance and character, motive and accident. As such, they functioned as one script in an *ars dicendi* whose close observation and reuse helped the student to develop their own rich rhetorical style, imitating their models and innovating upon them. Lock’s paraphrase is similarly attentive to the style and “voice” of the original text. She is not averse to innovation but directs it towards, not away from, the explication and imagination of the source text. A written response to the “written

¹⁷⁸ David Lawton, “Psalms as Public Interiorities: Eleanor Hull’s Voices”, in *The Psalms and Medieval English Literature: from the conversion to the Reformation*, edited by Tamara Atkin and Francis Leneghan (D.S. Brewer, 2017), 298–317: 302.

formulation of scripture”,¹⁷⁹ the “Meditation” is an attempt to marry the form of humanistic commentary (the paraphrase) and the secular lyric (the sonnet) through the words and style of scripture (the psalm). Her David is a disgraced King, a remorseful lover, and a Calvinist dwelling on sin and mercy—and Lock’s sequence finds these positions, and the forms that afford them, surprisingly compatible.

Conclusion

Miles Coverdale argued that:

there commeth more knowlege and understandinge of the scripture by theyr sondrie translacyons, then by all the gloses of oure sophisticall doctours. For that one interpreteth somthyng obscurely in one place, the same translatheth another (or els he him selfe) more manifestly by a more playne vocable of the same meanyng in another place.¹⁸⁰

Lock’s paraphrase is not a translation, but it is clearly engaged in the same enterprise, producing not only one new version of the psalm but a series for each individual verse. Similarly, in Mary Sidney’s psalms, a range of historical versions are used as grist to the mill of her own synthetic psalm versifications, which she continues to revise through multiple versions. For both women, the words of the Bible enable rather than obstruct authorship. Their paraphrases show that rhetorical and exegetical inquiry into scripture could cooperate with secular verse to better approximate divine poetry. Not least, they show that such a conjunction was not the reserve of male poets alone.

¹⁷⁹ Lewalski, *Protestant Poetics*, 6.

¹⁸⁰ Miles Coverdale, *Biblia the Byble* [. . .] (London: J. Nicolson, 1535), fol. *6v.

CHAPTER 2: ENGLAND'S MIRROR

Accuracy

Translations, Matthew Reynolds suggests, are generally held to a high standard of identification with their source text. Though different texts, that “recognition of difference is overlaid by the flickering possibility of identity”.¹ The belief that translations might be able to stand in for the texts they in fact rewrite informs the way translations are talked about and evaluated. We see this in the way popular reviews of translated works fixate on accuracy; as Edwin Honig observes that “[a] lot of the criticism of translation by people who look at it as a linguistic exercise [. . .] based on a linguistic transferral, is that the writer always ‘takes too many liberties’ with the text”.² But implicit in “taking liberties” is the spurious notion that the meaning of a source text can be measured and then used as a yardstick with which to evaluate the resulting text. Meaning and language elude this kind of quantification. If there is no such thing as a perfect synonym inside a language (if, for instance, you can have a “stony silence” but never a “rocky silence”), then the expectation that there could be perfect synonymy *between* languages—and not only between single words but whole texts—seems perverse.³ But this is exactly what accuracy, and similar terms like faithfulness and literalness, imply.

Translation is often discussed in terms of semantic loss, especially when poetic texts are involved.⁴ Because context informs meaning, “the richer the context of a message, the smaller

A version of part of this chapter is forthcoming as Jake Arthur, “‘The surplusage’: Margaret Tyler and the Englishing of Spanish Chivalric Romance”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Women’s Writing*, edited by Danielle Clarke et al. (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2022).

¹ Reynolds, *The Poetry of Translation*, 24.

² *The Poet’s Other Voice: Conversations on Literary Translation* (The University of Massachusetts Press, 1985), 177.

³ Quintilian observes that “total similarity is so difficult to achieve that even Nature herself has failed to prevent things which seem to match and resemble each other most closely from being always distinguishable in some respect”, Quintilian, *The Orator’s Education*, 10.2.10.

⁴ Roman Jakobson, “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation”, *On Translation 23* (1959): 232–39: 238.

the loss of information”,⁵ but, asymptotically, some meaning will always escape no matter how much context is provided. Words are meaningful units, but the grammar which structures and sequences those words, as well as their very appearance and sound, have a role in producing meaning. Even if we imagine the text alone as the locus of signification, a hypothetical list of any text’s semantic attributes would for practical purposes be infinite. Conversely, translations are just as likely to fail in terms of “accuracy” because they add something new to the text as they are to fail because they leave something out. The associative and connotative networks of the English *woman* are very different to those from the German *Frau*, most obviously because *Frau* also means “wife” but also because, for example, it rhymes with the German for traffic jam (*Stau*).

Accuracy can also be understood in a variety of ways. In languages with shared vocabulary, it is possible to contend the most “accurate” translation of the French *parler* is the English *parley*, of which it is a direct descendent. Matthew Reynolds mentions another radical interpretation of accuracy, this time based around sound:

Louis and Celia Zukofsky, in their translations from Catullus, took the word ‘literal’ almost literally: they focused on the letters of the text, reproducing as much as they could of the source’s sound. ‘Amabo, mea dulcis Ipsitilla’ becomes ‘I’m a bow, my dual kiss, Ipsithilla’.⁶

This approach, Reynolds argues, is “equally ‘faithful’, though they understand fidelity in different ways”.⁷ What Reynolds draws attention to here is that translating a text first necessitates a literary critical judgement about what aspects of signification in the original are worth preserving; the work of translation proper is then how best to preserve those aspects. Few English translators of *The Odyssey*, for example, choose to preserve Homer’s dactylic hexameters because that meter is

⁵ Ibid., 236.

⁶ Reynolds, *The Poetry of Translation*, 34.

⁷ Ibid., 38.

so ill-suited to English that it forces difficult concessions in syntax, diction, and length.⁸

Translation choices are, in other words, literary choices; solving the problems that arise in transferring meaning from one language to another require the same kind of skill and inventiveness that we associate with “original” authorship.

When it goes underspecified, accuracy is a fuzzy term that produces fuzzy criticism. This has particular repercussions for early modern women’s place in literary history because translations make up a significant proportion of the extant works of early modern women. Even when critical accounts praise women translators for their “accuracy”, the very fact of prioritising that criterion obscures richer accounts we could be making of these works. Jason Lawrence describes Mary Sidney’s translation of Petrarch’s *Trionfo della Morte* as “skilful and highly accurate”.⁹ Uman and Bistué call Margaret Tyler’s translation a “relatively faithful reproduction” that, though “not strictly word for word”, “does not offer us a glimpse of the author’s imaginative flair or poetic skill”;¹⁰ Boro calls the same work “fairly direct”, “cautious and meticulous” and “accurate and impressive”.¹¹ Lamb and Clarke each call different women’s translations “exceedingly literal”.¹² I will go on to suggest that these claims about Tyler do not bear scrutiny but, as we have seen, the more interesting question to ask of translation is not “how accurate is this?” but “what does this translation attempt—or not attempt—to preserve?” and then “why” and “how?”. This mode of evaluating translations is advocated by Vermeer’s *Skopostheorie*. Just as John Updike argues that book reviewers should “try to understand what the

⁸ The preface to Emily Wilson’s recent translation provides a clear-eyed literary discussion of her translation choices, including her use of iambic pentameter; Homer, *The Odyssey*, trans. Emily Wilson (W. W. Norton & Company, 2018), 81–91. Other translators insist on preserving the original metre, for example *The Odyssey*, trans. Rodney Merrill (University of Michigan Press, 2002).

⁹ *Who the Devil Taught Thee So Much Italian?: Italian Language Learning and Literary Imitation in Early Modern England* (Manchester University Press, 2006), 14.

¹⁰ Deborah Uman and Belén Bistué, “Translation as Collaborative Authorship: Margaret Tyler’s *The Mirror of Princely Deeds and Knighthood*”, *Comparative Literature Studies* 44/3 (2007): 298–323: 299 and 298.

¹¹ Margaret Tyler, *Mirror of Princely Deeds and Knighthood*, ed. Joyce Boro (Modern Humanities Research Association, 2014), 1 and 18. Boro also repeats without critique Lamb’s depiction of women’s translations in *Silent but for the Word*, *ibid.*, 1.

¹² Lamb, “The Cooke Sisters”, 124 and Clarke, “Translation, interpretation and gender: women’s writing c.1595–1644”, 226.

author wished to do, and [. . .] not blame him for not achieving what he did not attempt”,¹³ so *Skopostheorie* suggests that translations should be evaluated according to their stated or perceived intentions. In this model, as Vermeer and Reiß argue, “the end justifies the means”, leaving the literary critic to evaluate how successfully those “means” effect the translator’s stated “ends” (their *skopos*).¹⁴

More damaging still for the status of early modern women’s translations is the way Lamb’s foundational account in particular weaponises accuracy against women’s translations. Her phrase “exceedingly literal” suggests *too* literal: a translation that is slavish. She states that “[t]he translations by Renaissance women are different from the translations of Renaissance men in being exceedingly literal”, the difference being that women’s translation “deprived them of any original voice”.¹⁵ For Lamb, being “literal” means to align one’s purposes so seamlessly with those of the source text that they become indivisible. But, if Lamb seems to be suggesting that early modern women have mastered the chimerical perfect translation, this is no cause for celebration. In her view, an “accurate” translation prevents female articulation—the irruption of female subjectivity into the masculine text. This description is under-theorised (in what way “literal”? which “female subjectivity”?) and it denies these women the possibility of their own *skopos*, for example one that seeks, through various textual strategies, to replicate as many parts of their source as possible. That *skopos* would not be surprising given the praise that “literal” translation merited in contemporary discussions. Laurence Humphrey, in 1559, argues (somewhat optimistically) that a translation should be *plena, propria, pura, and apta*:

¹³ John Updike, *Picked-up Pieces* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), xvi.

¹⁴ Katharina Reiß and Hans J. Vermeer, *Towards a General Theory of Translational Action: Skopos Theory Explained*, trans. Christiane Nord (St. Jerome Publishing, 2013), 90.

¹⁵ Lamb, “The Cooke Sisters”, 124–25.

I call a translation ‘comprehensive’ when it gives the sense in full, so that every part of the meaning has its parallel, and it corresponds fully throughout to what the author has in mind, with nothing left out and nothing added.¹⁶

But, in Lamb’s rhetoric of disappointment, the same criteria that might be used to praise a male translator (faithfulness, skilled transmission of an original text) signal women’s self-effacement. In seeking authentic female articulation above all, early feminist criticism imposes a double standard that overlooks the literariness—and the interest—of women’s work in translation.

This chapter turns to Margaret Tyler and her “relatively faithful reproduction” of a Spanish chivalric romance. I try to exemplify a kind of criticism that does not begin and end with the “arid debates about faithfulness” which the field of translation studies has long abandoned.¹⁷ Instead I hope to signal without delimiting the kinds of rewards that close comparative study can enable if we open out our terms of inquiry and recognise translation as a process of cultural and literary mediation—if we recognise it, in other words, as a kind of authorship.

Margaret Tyler and Spanish chivalric romance

The turbulent relationship between early modern Spain and England was characterised by religious difference, military conflict, and oppositional national mythmaking. But as Barbara Fuchs has argued, “early modern taste does not rigidly follow religious or political conviction” and English readers and writers were often “seduced by Spanish imaginary, language or plots”.¹⁸ According to the *Renaissance Cultural Crossroads* database, Spanish is well-represented as a vernacular language of origin for English publications, with 340 printed texts translated from Spanish into English between 1520 and 1641 (its period of data collection), more than it lists

¹⁶ Rhodes et al., *English Renaissance Translation Theory*, 268.

¹⁷ Bassnett, *Translation Studies*, 7. Even-Zohar’s polysystems theory and Toury’s Descriptive Translation Studies are examples of more recent approaches.

¹⁸ Barbara Fuchs, *The Poetics of Piracy: Emulating Spain in English Literature* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 6.

from Italian (322), German (229), or Dutch (217).¹⁹ These texts are largely Catholic or crypto-Catholic material, treatises on the Americas or on maritime and military subjects, or romances. These categories are not as disparate as they seem. Spain's widely coveted military and naval expertise facilitated its ongoing expansion into the Americas, which in turn captured the European imagination with tales of exotic "discoveries". In the New World, reality seemed to collide with romance. Conquistadors like Álvaro Núñez Cabeza de Vaca wrote chronicles styling themselves as Christian heroes surrounded by alien marvels; others took romances with them and were inspired to seek out cities of gold and tribes of Amazonian women.²⁰ Given Spain's association with adventure and the exotic, it is perhaps no surprise that when Spanish chivalric romances were first translated into English in 1578 they were a sensation, representing a quarter of all Spanish-language texts translated into English in the following three decades.

This vogue for Spanish chivalric romance was initiated by an Englishwoman, Margaret Tyler, and her *The Mirrour of Princely Deedes and Knighthood* (1578), a translation of the first part of Diego Ortúñez de Calahorra's *Espejo de príncipes y cavalleros* (1555). Tyler's translation, also known as *The Mirrour of Knighthood*, is the first secular publication translated into English by a woman and the only publication known to be translated into English from Spanish by a woman in the period.²¹ Much of what we know about Tyler we have gleaned from *Mirrour's* dedication and translator's preface. In the dedication, she refers to herself as a former "servant" in the household of Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, and Duchess Margaret Audley Howard, where she likely took to "spot translating" romances for entertainment. Because of her employers and because she spoke Spanish, it has been conjectured that she was Catholic, but there is no evidence of this (for example in the Recusant Rolls) and Louise Schleiner reminds us that

¹⁹ Hosington et al., *Renaissance Cultural Crossroads*, The University of Warwick, www.dhi.ac.uk/rcc, accessed 20 December 2020.

²⁰ See Irving A. Leonard, *Books of the Brave* (Harvard University Press, 1949).

²¹ That is, up to 1640/1, the limit of both the *Renaissance Cultural Crossroads* database and *A Bibliography of Spanish-English Translations 1500-1640* (King's College London, 2006), www.ems.kcl.ac.uk/apps/ accessed 20 December 2020.

Spanish was a useful language for travel or commerce, suggesting Tyler may have grown up in a merchant family or served in a diplomat's household.²² We can be certain, however, that she read widely in Spanish-language chivalric romances, for she references the twelfth book of the *Amadís de Gaula* (not available in English at this time) and events in subsequent volumes of the *Mirroure* series.²³ Returning to what she calls her "old reading" at a later age, publication offered Tyler income and her printer Thomas East an opportunity to open a new market in romances.²⁴ Indeed, her translation proved a commercial success. Reprinted in 1580 and 1599, her first part of *Mirroure* spawned the publication of eight subsequent volumes (with different translators), as well as inspiring rival offerings, including Anthony Munday's translations of the *Amadís de Gaula* (first in 1590) and the various *Palmerin* series.

Much has quite rightly been said about Tyler's translator's preface, where she makes a spirited defence of her right to write "a story profane and a matter more manlike than becommeth my sex".²⁵ The preface is complexly constructed. She performs a rhetorical sleight of hand in which she equates religious writing—the only writing that even the "straight" (strict) allow to women—with "matter[s] of controversy", flipping received logic to depict her translation of a chivalric romance as safer discursive territory.²⁶ This inversion of ideas of exposure and modesty, of daring and decorum, characterises the whole preface. For example, she evokes the modesty topos (used by both men and women) that her friends were responsible for pressing her to write the translation only to then concede "and yet, because the refusal was in my power, I must stand to answer for my easy yielding and may not be unprovided of excuse".²⁷

²² "Margaret Tyler, Translator and Waiting Woman", *ELN* 29 (1992): 1–8: 4.

²³ The *Amadís* reference is to the character Rogel de Grecia; she shows knowledge of future events in the *Mirroure* series when, for example, she suggests Olivia will not see Rosicleer for a long time and when she summarises the twists and turns in Florinaldes and the Knight of the Sun's friendship in the coming volumes. See Tyler, *Mirroure*, 97, 166, and 233 respectively. There were nine subsequent volumes of *Mirroure* published in English.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 48. See also Schleiner, "Margaret Tyler".

²⁵ *Mirroure*, 49.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 50.

²⁷ Similarly, she acknowledges that many write similarly "idle conceits" but rejects that defence "because there is little merit of pardon if the fault be excused as common", *ibid.*, 50.

Likewise, she mentions “ill-willers” who will ostracize her for her writing, but is not dissuaded from naming herself as the text’s translator, though presumably this disclosure, too, was in her power to refuse.²⁸ In a period in which very few women entered openly into print, it feels radical that Tyler’s preface not only justifies her own translation but advocates for all would-be women writers. She argues that it is “all one for a woman to pen a story as for a man to address his story to a woman”; for if men dedicate their works to women, then women have the right to read them and, “if we may read them, why not farther wade in them to the search of a truth?”²⁹

The intriguing suggestion that translation might be a “search of a truth”—an involved textual “wading”—has, however, tempted few critics to turn their attention from her two-page preface to the 358-page romance and fewer still to consider it seriously as a version of, and response to, another text. But the preface and romance inform one another, most conspicuously in the continuity of the first-person persona of Tyler’s preface in the first-person narrator of the romance. Tyler’s preface and the dedication replace the multiple prefatory texts in the original Spanish, leaving no mention of the original author, Diego Ortúñez de Calahorra. Instead, the reader gets an impression of Tyler, or rather her persona, as assertive, reflective, and conversational; as Joyce Boro notes in her edition, she forges a “relationship of complicity with them [the readers] by routinely addressing them directly and by aligning herself with their values and perspective”.³⁰ That persona persists in the first-person narratorial interventions that Tyler adds throughout the translation and which are absent in the Spanish or are instead framed there in the third-person or, occasionally, the first-person plural.³¹ Where, in one episode in *Espejo*,

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., 35.

³¹ Uman and Bistué also make this argument, though their contention that “because of the initial rhetorical negotiations, the fictional “I” in the English version [of the preface] can be seen as the voice of a fictional female translator” is, if anything, too cautious. *Mirror* begins “I will report here [these deeds], according as Artimodoro the Grecian hath left them [. . .] The story sayeth thus” but throughout Tyler maintains this quote’s double voice. Alongside “the story” (the chronicle) there is always the “I” narrator. The persistence of Tyler’s voice, or of her persona, in the text is obvious when referring to the Spanish, where the first-person is absent. See Uman and Bistué, “Translation as Collaborative Authorship”, 307. The romance quote is Tyler, *Mirror*, 52.

Emperor Trebatio plans to have a story painted on the façade of his palace in Constantinople,³² Tyler’s version instead comments chattily “So, by the way, this piece of the story, as I have heard, was afterward penned and portrayed in the court hall of the emperor’s palace at Constantinople”.³³ I discuss these narratorial interventions in more detail shortly, but it is worth underscoring how this device keeps the translator, as a mediating force and a forceful personality, present in the text and for the reader. While anyone reading the English senses the continuity of Tyler’s “I”, only by looking at the Spanish can we understand the degree they differ from her source and hence gauge the truth of her claims in her preface that “[t]he invention, disposition, trimming and what else in this story is wholly another man’s”.³⁴

Joyce Boro’s recent edition of Tyler’s translation begins this work. Boro continues the discussion of whether Tyler was Catholic (though she, like Schleiner, reaches no definitive verdict) and this informs much of her editorial emphases, such as how Tyler deals with explicit Catholic content; Spain-specific content at a time of Hispano-Anglo tension; and the romance genre’s Catholic-tainted marvels.³⁵ All are sparse to begin with in the original *Espejo*, and Tyler’s treatment of them is inconclusive.³⁶ Boro argues convincingly that one of the most Hispanic aspects of *Espejo* and consequently *Mirror* is the way it treats “pagan” characters with a sympathy and tolerance that is foreign to the English literary tradition.³⁷ Less convincing, however, is Boro’s argument that Tyler plays down the romance’s marvels and its violence for a sensitive English audience, a claim for which the text itself provides conflicting evidence. While, unlike

³² Trebatio “tomándolo todo en su memoria, propuso en sí de hazer pintar toda aquella historia en la delantera de su gran palacio de Constantinopla” (“taking it all into his memory, decided to have that story painted on the front of his great palace at Constantinople”). This and all subsequent references to the Spanish are taken from Daniel Eisenberg’s edition of the 1555 text which Tyler also used; here see Diego Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo de príncipes y caballeros*, vol. 2, ed. Daniel Eisenberg (Espasa-Calpe, 1975), 214.

³³ Tyler, *Mirror*, 205.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 49.

³⁵ Boro also discusses the gender politics of her translation, focusing on female characters, though I think this discussion yields little. For a recent revision of arguments that minimised Spain’s influence on English literature, see Fuchs, *Poetics of Piracy*. On the association of the romance with Catholicism, see Tiffany Jo Werth, *The Fabulous Dark Cloister: Romance in England after the Reformation* (The John Hopkins University Press, 2011).

³⁶ Boro notes how Tyler removes some Catholic references, but adds others, Tyler, *Mirror*, 9–12.

³⁷ Another key observation that Boro makes about Tyler’s method is her effective use of direct speech. See *ibid.*, 20–1.

Ortúñez, Tyler does not describe Emperor Trebatio (one of our three heroes) as eight feet tall, giants still roam *Mirroure*, sometimes frothing at the mouth, and the few enchantments there are in the original remain in her version. Moreover, Tyler's descriptions at times seem to add, rather than remove, violence. The Knight of the Sun (another of the heroes) turns a foe's head into pieces in the Spanish ("cabeça hecha pedaços") but in Tyler's English, he is rather said to have "quartered the helmet and made the brains sprinkle on the ground".³⁸ Overall Boro's arguments suggest that Tyler's adjustments seek to make her romance more palatable at a time when the genre was coming under increasing suspicion. However, within the limited scope of the introduction to her edition, she almost exclusively considers the translation as a reception of Spanish culture, and on this level the evidence is limited.³⁹

Tyler's translation, I want to suggest, is primarily engaged in modernising its source. Her changes betray doubts about the chivalric romance's literary and ideological value, both of which were being debated in the sixteenth-century England. Unlike Ortúñez's original, Tyler's translation is anxious about its relevance. Lorna Hutson, in *The Usurer's Daughter*, argues that instead of providing a precedent for the female addressees and characters in "humanistic" romances like those of Pettie, Lyly, and Philip Sidney, Tyler's romance and preface are "consonant with feudal conceptions of male and female contributions to lineal virtue".⁴⁰ The romance is, Hutson suggests, more atavistic than inaugurating, providing "even in the moment of the humanists' deprecation of chivalric romance, and in the very midst of the diffusion of the *novelle* of Bandello in France and England, [. . .] a reinfusion of 'romance' elements into the

³⁸ Ibid., 116. Diego Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo de príncipes y caballeros*, vol. 1, ed. Daniel Eisenberg (Espasa-Calpe, 1975), 208.

³⁹ *Espejo* is not particularly Spanish, Catholic, nor marvellous. Chivalric romances privilege generalised exotic settings over detailed descriptions; none of the main cast of *Espejo* are Spanish, nor do its events take place in Spain. It is arguable whether romance marvels typically have much role in the events of romances anyway; see the aptly named "Magic that doesn't work" chapter in Helen Cooper, *The English Romance in Time* (Oxford University Press, 2004), 137–72 and John Finlayson, "The Marvellous in Middle English Romance", *The Chaucer Review* 33/4 (1999): 363–408.

⁴⁰ *The Usurer's Daughter: Male Friendship and Fictions of Women in Sixteenth-Century England* (Routledge, 1994), 93.

newer, more densely rhetorical and humanistic plot structures”.⁴¹ This chapter challenges that verdict, arguing with close reference to the original Spanish that Tyler in fact perceives and attempts to address the outmodedness of her text, creating a chivalric romance strangely at odds with itself. Tyler makes three broad mitigations which I discuss in the three parts of this chapter. These are that she seeks: to adapt the text to contemporary generic expectations of refined speech; to defend it against the humanist deprecation of the chivalric romance; and to inflect it with contemporary English cultural preoccupations. The cumulative result of these changes is a translation that stages a clash of sensibilities and values that strains against her source text and her stated *skopos*: the faithful transmission of “another man’s” text.

Part 1: Seldom is the tale carried clean from another’s mouth

Knightly speech

Like many of the Spanish romances that would be translated into English in this period, Tyler’s *Mirror* is a dynastic chivalric romance. Emperor Trebatio of Hungary is trapped in an enchanted castle for much of the book while his two young sons, the Knight of the Sun and Rosicleer, are scattered across the globe. The reader, enjoying a bird’s-eye view of events, awaits realisations and reconciliations that are either tantalisingly delayed or effected only to be undone. These delays and reversals allow for the titular “princely deedes”: opportunities for these fair unknowns to distinguish themselves at jousts, defeat giants, and rescue gentlewomen—that is, opportunities to earn the knightly credentials that their undiscovered noble parentage in fact makes theirs by right. Tyler’s translation, however, places as much emphasis on their acts of speech as their deeds of arms, registering anxieties about the literary value of the romance genre and the rhetorical skills of its heroes.

⁴¹ Ibid., 97.

The first change I want to investigate, and one which Boro overlooks, is Tyler's consistent adoption of a higher and often self-consciously poetic register marked by a high degree of Latinisms or Romanticisms. The equivalent higher register is often absent from the original Spanish. In her translation, shields ("escudos")⁴² become "pavises".⁴³ When the Spanish says "[n]o me digas esso, Clandestria",⁴⁴ which is more naturally rendered as "don't say that to me, Clandestria", Tyler writes "[p]ersuade me not to this, good Clandestria",⁴⁵ adding an epithet and a more formal verb. When a damsel cries for help in Tyler's translation, we again get a new epithet and an increase in register; "Succour me, good knights, for this traitorous knight will ravish me!",⁴⁶ instead of the Spanish's more restrained "Aid me, knights! This bad knight wants to take me by force".⁴⁷

This elevated language became synonymous with the chivalric romance, as we can see in seventeenth-century parodies of the genre. In Beaumont's 1607 *The Knight of the Burning Pestle*, Rafe trains his Squire in the appropriate style of knightly discourse:

Rafe. My beloved squire *Tim*, stand out, admit this were a Desert, and over it a Knight errant pricking, and I should bid you inquire of his intents, what would you say?

Squire. Sir, my Maister sent me, to know whether you are riding?

Rafe. No, thus; faire sir, the *Right Courteous and Valiant Knight of the burning Pestle*, commanded me to enquire, upon what adventure you are bound, whether to relieve some distressed Damsels, or otherwise.⁴⁸

⁴² Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 1, 169.

⁴³ Tyler, *Mirror*, 103.

⁴⁴ Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 1, 87.

⁴⁵ Tyler, *Mirror*, 73.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 220.

⁴⁷ This and all subsequent translations to extracts of *Espejo* are my own. The Spanish is "¡Accoredme, cavalleros! Que este mal cavallero me quiere llevar por fuerça" Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 2, 268.

⁴⁸ Francis Beaumont, *The Knight of the Burning Pestle*, ed. Andrew Gurr (Oliver and Boyd Ltd, 1968), 31, 1.3.69–76.

In this passage what Dryden would later call “old Teuton monosyllables”⁴⁹ are replaced by Latin alternatives wherever possible: “sent me” becomes “commanded me”, “know” becomes “inquire”. The speech becomes unnecessarily long and refers in its digressive latter section to the essential vocation of any “good knight”—rescuing helpless women. Rafe’s combination of upstanding vocation with upstanding locution is emblematic of the chivalric tradition that Beaumont knows his audience will instantly recognise even many decades after the peak of Renaissance chivalric romance.

In Miguel de Cervantes’s *Don Quixote* (published in 1605 and part two in 1615) the parody of knightly undertaking also extends to decorous speech. Early in that book, Don Quixote talks to himself as he journeys:

— ¿Quién duda sino que en los venideros tiempos, cuando salga a luz la verdadera historia de mis famosos hechos, que el sabio que los escribiere no ponga, cuando llegue a contar esta mi primera salida tan de mañana, de esta manera?: «Apenas había el rubicundo Apolo tendido por la faz de la ancha y espaciosa tierra las doradas hebras de sus hermosos cabellos, y apenas los pequeños y pintados pajarillos con sus harpadas lenguas habían saludado con dulce y meliflua armonía la venida de la rosada aurora [. . .] cuando el famoso caballero don Quijote de la Mancha, dejando las ociosas plumas, subió sobre su famoso caballo Rocinante y comenzó a caminar por el antiguo y conocido campo de Montiel».⁵⁰

Who can doubt that in times to come, when the true history of my famous deeds comes to light, the wise man who compiles them, when he begins to recount my first sally so early in the day, will write in this manner: ‘No sooner had the rubicund Apollo spread

⁴⁹ Like Tyler, Dryden has no qualms about turning (etymologically) abroad, stating “when I want at home, I must seek abroad”. *The works of Virgil* [. . .] (London: Jacob Tonson, 1697), sig. F2v.

⁵⁰ Cervantes, *Don Quijote*, 35.

over the face of the wide and spacious earth the golden strands of his beauteous hair, no sooner had diminutive and bright-hued birds with dulcet tongues greeted in sweet, mellifluous harmony the advent of rosy dawn [. . .] than the famous knight Don Quixote of La Mancha, abandoning the downy bed of idleness, mounted his famous steed, Rocinante, and commenced to ride through the ancient and illustrious countryside of Montiel.⁵¹

These orotund heights are ones that the first book of Ortúñez's *Espejo de príncipes* does not reach, and rarely attempts. Ortúñez's approach to style is functional;⁵² he rarely engages in lengthy descriptions like the above; and his vocabulary is, aside from a very few romantic speeches, plain and repetitive rather than decorative.⁵³ The disparity extends even to grammar. Cervantes makes frequent use of the future subjunctive ("escribiere" in the quote above), a form which in the seventeenth century was in steep decline, but Ortúñez, though writing earlier, rarely does.⁵⁴ In fact, *Espejo de príncipes* is notably less ornate than other popular chivalric romances written in Spanish at the time, like the *Palmerín* series, Montemayor's pastoral *Diana*, and most notably the popular *Amadís de Gaula*, which influenced Philip Sidney's *Armadia* in both plot and aspects of style.⁵⁵

Perceiving its shortcomings, Tyler continually adds ornamentation absent in the Spanish to her English edition. High-register Spanish is marked by particular grammatical forms, inverted or involuted syntax, and low frequency vocabulary, but as I have already suggested elevated

⁵¹ Miguel de Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, trans. Edith Grossman (Random House, 2005), 25.

⁵² This is visible in, for example, chapter 15, where which some ten sentences begin with "and" ("y"), almost consecutively; see Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 1, 107–9.

⁵³ Ortúñez regularly repeats some descriptions, such as sparks flying from clashing swords. Conversely, Tyler is averse to repetition and tends to remove it.

⁵⁴ Alexandre Veiga, "La sustitución del futuro del subjuntivo en la diacronía del verbo español", *Verba: Anuario Galego de Filoloxía* 16 (1989): 257–338: 266.

⁵⁵ Philip Sidney says in his *Defence* that "I have known men that even with reading *Amadis de gaule*, which God knoweth wanteth much of a perfect *Poesie*, have found their hearts moved to the exercise of courtesy, liberality, and especially courage" (sig. E2v); and yet for all its poetic imperfections, Sidney's own romance seems to have been influenced not just by the individual incidents of the *Amadís* but the eponymous character's melancholy love speeches and sexual ethic, as Helen Moore explores in *Amadís in English: A Study in the Reading of Romance* (Oxford University Press, 2020), 79–87.

English is most clearly signalled by a shift from “Teuton” vocabulary to multisyllabic Latinate and Romance (or sometimes Greek) words.⁵⁶ These Latinate and Romance imports are the “choisest words” Henry Cockeram later refers to in his 1623 dictionary with which, he says, “our language is enriched and become so copious”.⁵⁷ For Cockeram, there is nothing satirical about a high register wielded well. He provides a list of “vulgar words” that if “any desirous of a more curious explanation by a more refined and elegant speech shall look into, he shall there receive the exact and ample word to express the same”—in other words, the equivalent Latinate term.⁵⁸ For “call upon” he suggests “invoke”, and for “muse” “contemplate”.⁵⁹ In a similar procedure, when the Spanish chooses a common, low-register word, Tyler tends to select higher-register alternatives:

Mirror

Ah, silly woman! The longer I rub out this life, the more my grief increaseth. When I seek to mollify my grief, then my care redoubleth, and one sorrow surceasing, there succeedeth another, as one billow followeth on the other’s neck in the main sea.⁶⁰

Espejo

¡Ay de mí! Que quanto más vivo más se doblan mis males y crescen mis desventuras; quando más me quiero consolar, más me sobreviene el desconsuelo; quando quiero acabar de penar, la pena comienza de nuevo.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Manfred Görlach argues that “[o]ne consequence of the flood of new Latin words was that a language barrier was erected *within* English in the sixteenth century. The proper use of the Latinate portion of English came to replace knowledge of the classical languages alone as the marker of social class and education”, *Introduction to Early Modern English* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 162.

⁵⁷ Henry Cockeram, *The English dictionarie* (London: Edmund Weaver, 1623), sig. [1]A4v.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, sigs. [2]A7v and [2]D7v.

⁶⁰ Tyler, *Mirror*, 81–2.

⁶¹ Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 1, 112. “Woe is me! The more I live the more my ills double and my misfortunes grow; when I most want to comfort myself I am overcome with dismay; when I want to end my sorrow, sorrow begins again”.

The choice of Latinate terms like “mollify” and “surceasing” (which both make Cockeram’s list) themselves produce a more “refined” discourse, but her version is also more densely rhetorical, with the added analogy of the “billow[ing]” sea and the assonance between it and “follow” and between “surcease” and “succeed”.

It is clear that Tyler saw this register and style of English as a fitting, or even a requisite, accomplishment for the knights in her romance. But not all chivalric romances use ornate diction, the most obvious example being Malory, whose language was so unassuming that his printer William Caxton saw fit to add his own Latinisms.⁶² Moreover, the seventeenth-century parodies must be seen in part as a response to the influx of Spanish romances that Tyler herself inaugurated and whose style she helped to define, so that we cannot read back from them to explain her text. What, then, is informing her choice of register in 1578? While we cannot discard French-language romances which circulated widely in England and brought many loanwords along with them, we do not know that Tyler spoke French.⁶³ However, there are also Spanish precedents at work here. We know that Tyler read the *Amadís de Gaula*, a neo-Arthurian Iberian romance that had been circulating since the fourteenth century, and which, far more than *Espejo*, privileges fine feelings and fine speech.⁶⁴ Late-medieval Spanish sentimental romances are another possible influence.⁶⁵ These were popular in England, and while of course Tyler could read the Spanish, they were also translated into English (often via French). *Aurelio y Isabela* (a version of *Grisel y Mirabella* by Juan de Flores) was published in a quadrilingual edition in 1556 and translations of *Arnalte y Lucenda* by Diego de San Pedro were published in 1543 (translated

⁶² Richard M. Hogg et al., *The Cambridge History of the English Language*, vol. 3 (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 572.

⁶³ French loanwords were often popularised by imported romances, Görlach, *Introduction to Early Modern English*, 168.

⁶⁴ See footnote 23. The first book of *Amadís* was published in English in 1590 and subsequent volumes continued to be translated well into the seventeenth century. By comparison, it was first published in French in 1540. However, without other evidence of her linguistic abilities, we must presume Tyler read it in the source Spanish.

⁶⁵ The term “sentimental romance” was coined by Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, who described it as a *novela sentimental* “en que se da mucha más importancia al amor que al esfuerzo [. . .] Es, pues, una tentativa de novela íntima y no meramente exterior como casi todas las que hasta entonces se habían compuesto”, (“in which more importance is given to love than to force [. . .] It is, then, an attempt at an intimate novel rather than a merely exterior one, as all had been up until that time”), Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, *Orígenes de la novela* (Bailly-Bailliere, 1905), 16–7.

by John Clerke through French) and then as an English and Italian side-by-side translation in 1575 (reprinted in 1597 and 1608).⁶⁶ Sentimental romances tended to the verbose (Clerke's translation is "choked with neologisms")⁶⁷ and were marked by a "focus on emotion rather [than] action [. . .] in rhetoric, epistolarity, and narrative experimentation".⁶⁸ As we will see throughout this chapter, these are also emphases in Tyler's, as opposed to Ortúñez's, text.

Indeed, many of Tyler's most substantial additions to the text are concentrated around recognisably "sentimental" episodes, such as when Rosicleer falls in love with Princess Olivia at her father's court in England. Princess Olivia surveys the jousting field and alights on Rosicleer. Tyler, in a description entirely absent in the Spanish, reports that:

which liked the princess best was a conceit devised in the pencil of his spear, being a burning torch, the wax dropping from it, signifying thereby the misery of lovers, with this posy underneath in Roman letters: '*Extinguo* and '*Extinguor*'.⁶⁹

Tyler here delays the extended battle between Rosicleer and the giant Candramarte to describe an emblem and the Princess's reaction to it, in effect deprioritising action to focus on the hermeneutic movement. Geoffrey Whitney's *A Choice of emblems* includes a spear-like torch with just such a "pencil" (pennant) entitled "Qui me alit me extinguit" with the description beginning "Even as the waxe dothe feede, and quenche the flame / So, love gives life; and love, dispaire doth give".⁷⁰ Samuel Daniel gives a description very similar to Tyler's for the same *inscriptio* in his 1585 translation of a work by Paulus Jovius, stating: "An amorous gentleman of *Milan* bare in his Standard a Torch figured burning, and turning downeward, whereby the melting wax falling in great abundance, quencheth the flame [. . .] Alluding to a Lady, whose beautie did foster his

⁶⁶ Boro indicates the existence of an earlier translation of *Grisei*, between 1527–1535, Tyler, *Mirror*, 5.

⁶⁷ D. D. Carnicelli, "Review of 'Tractado de Amores de Arnalte e Lucenda' nella traduzione inglese di John Clerk", *Renaissance Quarterly* 29/1 (1976): 123–26: 124.

⁶⁸ Tyler, *Mirror*, 5.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁷⁰ Geoffrey Whitney, *A choice of emblems* [. . .] (Leyden: Christopher Plantyn, 1586), 183.

love, and whose disdayne did endamage his life".⁷¹ This is just one of many additions in which Tyler gravitates towards the tropes and interests of sentimental and hybrid chivalric-sentimental romances like *Amadís de Gaula* that emphasise the "misery of lovers".⁷² Rosicleer is indeed about to be tossed in love in *Espejo*, but Tyler alone casts him as a sentimental hero defined by unattainable love and its attendant griefs, rather than chivalric feats. In doing so she shifts the emphases, as well as the register, of Ortúñez's text.

While it is clear from *Pestle* and the success of *Quixote* that elevated speech had become a hallmark of chivalric romance as it was perceived in English culture, these were in part informed by the choices Tyler makes in translating *Mirroure* because her text prompted a new generation of romance translations. So successful is Tyler's (and subsequent translators') adoption of sentimental components that *Pestle* references Rosicleer from the *Mirroure of Knighthood* as an embodiment of both good speech *and* amorousness:

Rafe. There are no such courteous and faire well spoken Knights in this age, they will call one the sonne of a whore, that *Palmerin* of England, would have called faire sir; and one that *Rosicler* would have cal'd right beauteous Damsell, they will call dam'd bitch.⁷³

While Tyler only translated the first part of the *Mirroure of Knighthood*, her choices likely set a precedent for her successors with which the series as a whole came to be synonymous—so synonymous, in fact, that it became an object of parody.

Rhetorical treasury, rhetorical failure

The fact that by the seventeenth century chivalric romance was subject to ribbing in popular drama and prose rather than the blasts and counterblasts of humanist invectives suggests the attack was no longer seen as urgent. Errant knights were safely out of the zeitgeist. This was

⁷¹ Samuel Daniel, *The worthy tract of Paulus Jovius* [...] (London: G. Robertson, 1585), sigs. H7v–8r.

⁷² For discussion of these romances, see E. Michael Gerli, "Toward a Poetics of the Spanish Sentimental Romance", *Hispania* 72/3 (1989): 474–82.

⁷³ Beaumont, *The Knight of the Burning Pestle*, 30, 1.3.30–4.

decidedly not the case during the sixteenth century, when numerous humanist commentators including Juan Luis Vives and Roger Ascham inveighed against the genre. Ascham, writing in the 1560s, saves his most vociferous criticism for the “sutle, cunnyng, new” Italian romances, but also attacks “bookes of Chevalrie” for their parlous standards of moral behaviour.⁷⁴ Though *The Scholemaster* was published (posthumously) some eight years before the first part of *The Mirroure of Knighthood*, we can safely assume that Ascham would have derided the new fad for chivalric romance it inaugurated as more of what he calls “ill doinges” that “breed ill thinkinges”.⁷⁵ Earlier, Juan Luis Vives had attacked a slew of chivalric romances in his *Instruction of a Christen woman* (first in English in c.1529), including the yet-to-be-translated Spanish tradition, declaring that “[a]s for lernynge none is to be loked for in those men [the writers of chivalric romance] whiche sawe never so moche as a shadowe of lernyng them selfe”.⁷⁶

The force of these attacks and the authority of those making them suggest that humanistic paradigms of learning, reading, and writing could have nothing to do with chivalric romance. As Alex Davis puts it, “romances fill a space logically implied by and created by humanistic literary theory: the structurally necessary Other of Erasmian reading practices”; that is, the spectre of a text that takes mastery over its reader, rather than the other way around.⁷⁷ But in truth the line between them was blurred and humanist practices were sometimes applied to romances.⁷⁸ One striking example of this is found in Thomas Paynell’s *The tresurie of Amadis of*

⁷⁴ Ascham, *The scholemaster*, sigs. I2r–v.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, sig. I2r.

⁷⁶ Juan Luis Vives, *The Instructio[n] of a Christen woma[n] [. . .]*, trans. Richard Hyrde (London: Thomas Berthelet, 1529), sig. E4v.

⁷⁷ Alex Davis, *Chivalry and Romance in the English Renaissance* (D. S. Brewer, 2003), 15.

⁷⁸ Helen Moore observes that romances can have an “encyclopaedic dimension”, a copiousness, that aligns with the humanist commonplace book; elsewhere, she uses the example of the *Amadis de Gaula* to show how romance influenced ideas of eloquent speech and penetrated courtly and educated circles across Europe “Romance”, in *A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture*, edited by Michael Hattaway (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 238–48: 240, and Moore, *Amadis in English*, Chapter 3, *passim*. Many manuscript commonplace books extract prose romances of varying degrees of “literariness”, as discussed in Heidi Brayman Hackel, *Reading Material in Early Modern England: print, gender, and literacy* (Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Fred Schurink, “Manuscript Commonplace Books, Literature, and Reading in Early Modern England”, *Huntington Library Quarterly* 73/3 (2010): 453–69. For example, in the early seventeenth century, Rachael Fane, granddaughter of Lady Grace Mildmay, was taught French through translations of *Amadis* alongside Seneca and Isocrates; see Julie A. Eckerle, *Romancing the Self in Early Modern Englishwomen’s Life Writing* (Ashgate, 2013), 31.

Fraunce, a printed commonplace book of exemplary oratory, made up of quotes translated from the French version of the *Amadis de Gaula* series and divided for re-use according to “the minde and argument of him that writeth”.⁷⁹ It is notable that Paynell’s book marks the first appearance of *Amadis*, and indeed the Iberian chivalric tradition, in English for it sets an interesting precedent of taking those romances seriously—that is, as a rhetorical storehouse rather than refuse. Paynell himself was chaplain to Henry VIII and orator to Mary and Elizabeth. A former priest, he survived the Reformation and translated a range of humanist texts (often with royal dedicatees), including Erasmus’s *De contemptu mundi* and *De civilitate* and texts in the *speculum principis* genre.⁸⁰ His translator’s preface for *Treasure* styles *Amadis* as of a piece with the interests of those more scholastic efforts, praising the romance’s “rhetorical & eloquent orations”, “the diversities and arguments therein”, and its “prudent admonitions and good counsels”.⁸¹ From *Amadis*, he suggests, “men may learne to be noble oratours, wise and prude counsellours, excellent Rhetoricians, expert captains” but also “amorous companions” and “elegant enditers of lovely Epistles”.⁸² In a similar vein, the second prefatory poem (by an “A. R.”) uses the typical *copia* analogies to advocate the benefit to be had in “hoord[ing]” and “reap[ing]” “Eloquence and Rhetorike”,⁸³ whereas the first (by “T.H.”) places *Amadis* in an oratorical lineage from Demosthenes to Isocrates.⁸⁴ In short, not everyone agreed that chivalric romance promoted “ill thinkinges”.⁸⁵

⁷⁹ Thomas Paynell, *The treasure of Amadis of Fraunce* [...] (London: Henry Bynneman, 1572), sig. ¶¶2r. See Helen Moore for more on this text, which is a translation of the French *Tbresor des livres d’Amadis de Gaule* which ran through seventeen editions; the French version, she notes, “was well established in elite and educated circles”, *Amadis in English*, 57–68.

⁸⁰ Geoffrey Eatough, “Paynell, Thomas (d. 1564?), translator”, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, 2004, accessed 30 June 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/21661>.

⁸¹ Paynell, *The treasure of Amadis*, sig. ¶3v.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*, sigs. ¶3v-4v.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, sig. ¶4r.

⁸⁵ Extracts from *Treasure* would later find their way into epistolary manuals, like the third (1578) and subsequent editions of William Fulwood’s *Enimie of Idleness*; see Moore, *Amadis in English*, 61.

Margaret Tyler's translation, too, suggests a blurred line between humanist thought and chivalric romance. If we trace carefully the divergences of her English from the Spanish, we can observe the pressure of key humanist lines of attack and the strategies she uses to attenuate them. By 1578, when *The Mirroure of Princely Deedes* was first published, humanist attacks were well-established and, perhaps consequently, no new chivalric romances had been published for decades. This places Tyler, and her text, in a vulnerable position, as she is not only a woman translating but a woman translating a genre of dubious status.

We see this reflected in her preface. Her emphasis on her "aged years" and the mention that in translating *Espejo* she is "acquaint[ing] my selfe with mine old reading" can be read as a pre-emptive defence of the outmodedness of her chosen text.⁸⁶ I have already noted Hutson's argument that her preface stresses patrilineal and essentially feudal conceptions of virtue, but Tyler also emphasises something less expected: the text's rhetorical *utilitas*:

The whole discourse [of the book], in respect of the end, [is] not unnecessary for the variety and continual shift of fresh matter[, and is] very delightful in the speeches short and sweet, wise in sentence, and wary in the provision of contrary accidents. For I take the grace thereof to be rather in the reporter's device than in the truth of his report [. . .].⁸⁷

Here we find a two-pronged strategy: an endorsement of the text followed by a critique of its faults. Both respond to humanist values. Tyler argues that the text exemplifies the Horatian blend of instruction and delight ("sweet", "delightful" but also "wise in sentence") and that the romance's episodic structure—its proliferation of "contrary accidents"—trains the reader to be

⁸⁶ Tyler, *Mirror*, 48. Helen Hackett observes that "as the century turned the Iberian romances were increasingly regarded less as dangerous than as old-fashioned, ridiculous and *déclassé*", *Women and Romance Fiction in the English Renaissance* (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 65.

⁸⁷ If this provides a personal kind of *utilitas*, Tyler also underscores the romance's potential *utilitas publica* by distinguishing "[t]he author's purpose [. . .] to animate thereby and to set on fire the lusty courages of young gentlemen to the advancement of their line" from her own hopes for the text: "gentle reader, if my travail in Englishing this author may bring thee to a liking of the virtues herein commended, and by good example thereof in thy prince's and country's quarrel to hazard thy person and purchase good name [I will be vindicated]". See Tyler, *Mirror*, 49.

“wary”, that is, to exercise prudential caution.⁸⁸ These closely resemble the benefits of exemplary reading programmes advanced by humanists, and the advertisements of copious storehouses like *The treasure of Amadis*. But then, Tyler pre-empts a major humanist objection to romance—that it is fantastical—by herself questioning the “truth of his [Ortúñez’s] report”. She personalises this critique (“I take”), chattily pre-empting the preface’s fictive “ill-willers” while again creating an intimacy with the reader.⁸⁹ We will see this combination of textual accommodation and textual critique repeated in the way Tyler responds to humanist criticisms of romance’s plausibility, but before turning to that discussion, I first want to comment on one of her most extended original additions which speaks to the issues of rhetorical exemplarity raised by *The treasure of Amadis*.

Midway through *Mirror*, Rosicleer has grown into an accomplished knight and has fallen in love with the Princess Olivia of England. In spite of mistakenly believing they are closely related, Rosicleer decides to reveal his love in a letter. While in *Espejo*, Ortúñez devotes a single phrase to Rosicleer’s worry that the letter is not well or neatly written (“no paresciéndole que iva bien notada ni escripta”),⁹⁰ Tyler presents an original passage in which Rosicleer imagines Olivia receiving and reading his letter:

But when his fancy brought him to the finding of the letter, Lord what a f[r]ight he sustained! For the better understanding whereof, you must imagine a young scholar but lately entered into school points overseeing of his theme before he bring it to the review of his schoolmaster. And believe me, in far greater doubt hung Rosicleer of his lady’s liking than the boy doth of his master’s. For in his reading of the blotted copy, as

⁸⁸ Ibid. The stress Tyler places on prudence provides an interesting complication of the distinction Hutson draws between “the knight errant, who simply fights and follows the chivalric code, [and] the captain responsible for soldiers on a military campaign [who] embodies the very imperative that makes prudential activity—that is, the constant and unceasing emplotment of present circumstances to prevent future disaster and ensure good fortune—a habit of the mind”, *The Usurer’s Daughter*, 108. Given that Tyler in her preface also encourages her reader to “hazard thy person” in “thy prince’s and country’s quarrel”, she seems to want to have it both ways: to appeal to “errant knight” (the soldier in the ranks) and “prudent captain” alike. That the “contrary accidents” in *Mirror* are so often incredible might suggest her gesture to the text’s *utilitas* is at least partly tongue-in-cheek.

⁸⁹ Tyler, *Mirror*, 50.

⁹⁰ Rosicleer also wonders if it is appropriate for a stranger like himself to send a letter to “tan alta infanta” (“to such a noble princess”). Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 2, 72.

distinctly as if he were to guess Olivia's conjecture upon every syllable — good God unto what a hard censure was the poor paper subject, as if every sentence had been then arraigned before him! For almost at every line's end, he would say: either this was too much, either this was too little, or this is maimed, or this too rude and unlearned, or this was not well and finely penned, or that was not plain enough, or this is faulty, or this should be amended. And to draw all into a sum, in every piece he would blame either the little wit in invention or the lack of eloquence in the delivery of the matter, but chiefly his own overboldness in presuming upon so high a princess with so rude a discourse.⁹¹

One of Tyler's several humorous additions to the merely earnest *Espejo*, this passage is striking in the way it reflects changing models of ideal comportment—and on Rosicleer's failure to keep up. While letter writing and letter reading are typical in late-medieval Spanish sentimental romances, Tyler's dramatisation of rhetorical failure feels distinctly (early) modern. Rosicleer's bathetic fall from paragon of virtue to struggling pupil has him confront the trials of the humanist classroom, with Olivia intriguingly standing in as the reproving schoolmaster. He has been tasked with a theme (that is, a writing exercise) which, being “lately entered into school points”, he is woefully ill-equipped to write. He doubts his “blotted copy” and fails on both *inventio* (subject) and *elocutio* (style), Tyler's comments covering such diverse techniques as *amplificatio* (“too much [. . .] too little”), *decorum* (“rude and unlearned”), *perspicuitas* (“no[t] plain enough”) and *consuetudo/usus* (“this is faulty, or this should be amended”). This extended digression introduces into the diegetic world an alternate system of virtue that poses world-breaking questions like: do knights in chivalric romances receive a humanist education?

Of even greater interest is the way Rosicleer imagines Princess Olivia reading his letter. As Kathy Eden notes, drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer, an awareness that “rhetoric and hermeneutics—literary composition and literary interpretation” are inseparable is key to how

⁹¹ Tyler, *Mirror*, 161.

classical and humanist thinkers created textual *familiaritas*, or what she calls intimacy.⁹²

Understanding a text requires “a prior relation between the reader and the writer” but it also requires the reader “to approach the matter, as the letter writer would, from the writer’s point of view, as if with *his* eyes”.⁹³ What is galling for Rosicleer is exactly this, imagining Olivia imagining *him* writing the letter. Eden shows how early modern humanists sought to read and write in ways that produced this intimacy and how the development of this intimate style was formative in the literary production of what we now think of as individuality.⁹⁴ Tyler’s addition demonstrates this (and characterises Rosicleer’s “individuality” much more powerfully) by turning that intimacy into a source of embarrassment. Erasmus observes that “[t]he very thing which the reader enjoys is getting to know the writer’s feelings, character, disposition, and type of mind from the way he writes, just as he would by living on familiar terms with him for several years”.⁹⁵ But it is exactly that “getting to know” through literary style that Rosicleer fears—that Olivia may recognise all too well the faults of his character and the limitations of his mind. This comic reflection on epistolary intimacy is at once a flash of insight into a typically wooden character and an irruption of humanist debates about rhetorical value and craft into the world of chivalric romance.

This episode is a vivid example of what Hutson argues is a cultural shift discernible in the transition from the chivalric romance to later prose fictions, namely “an increasing devotion to the representation of *masculine* social agency as ‘civil’ rather than martial, and as celebrating victories of mental readiness rather than physical courage”.⁹⁶ When tasked with writing a persuasive letter, Rosicleer is out of genre and out of time. Multiple depictions of epistolary intimacy reinforce this. The reader later receives the letter through the eyes of Princess Olivia

⁹² Kathy Eden, *The Renaissance Rediscovery of Intimacy* (The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 4.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 123.

⁹⁵ From his *Ciceronianus*, Desiderius Erasmus, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 28, ed. A. H. T. Levi (University of Toronto Press, 2016), 440.

⁹⁶ Hutson, *The Usurer’s Daughter*, 97.

(who is torn between her love and Rosicleer's apparent lack of noble ancestry) but also through the eyes of the narrator, who states:

Rosicleer penned this letter either not well in his wits or else greatly perplexed in his thought, so hard it is to find an issue. But I believe, rather, that it came from heart to hand and was so set down without farther advice.⁹⁷

As I have already suggested, the "I" here is read as Tyler herself or her persona, and she deploys the same humanist criteria against Rosicleer as in the initial episode cited above. His struggle to "find an issue" refers to his failure to reach, by way of logical argumentation, any kind of conclusion, and indeed the letter itself is digressive and ends in a whimper.⁹⁸ In this rhetorical failure, Tyler emphasises the importance of humanist "mental readiness", acknowledging that, if chivalric romance was once a nostalgic genre, its vision of the past and the values implied therein are no longer adequate to the demands of the present. However, by adding this revealing episode, Tyler in effect makes *Mirror* a more modern and more reflective text than its original, and thus a less obvious target for the kind of censure to which the episode implicitly responds. This somewhat convoluted position is one that, in the rest of this chapter, we will see repeated. Tyler does not, as *Treasure* does, consistently cast her text as a storehouse of exemplary rhetoric, but she does concede the salience of humanist "civil" virtue, admitting into her chivalric world a dual and incommensurate set of values.

Part 2: Why may not we believe?

Unlikely events

A key line of humanist attack against chivalric romances was that they lacked verisimilitude. Cicero and Quintilian distinguish between *historia*, *argumentum*, and *fabula*. While "[h]istoria est

⁹⁷ Tyler, *Mirror*, 169.

⁹⁸ "issue, *n.*", 10.a., *OED*. Boro notes that Tyler also makes the letter conform to classical dictaminal structure by adding a *salutatio* and conclusion. See Tyler, *Mirror*, 17–18 and 168–69.

gesta res” (a thing that happened) and “[a]rgumentum est ficta res, quae tamen fieri potuit” (a fictional thing that could happen), *fabula* is “nec verae nec verisimiles”: neither true nor appearing to be true.⁹⁹ That the latter class would come to be associated with the chivalric romance is not surprising given that Cicero’s example of *fabula*, a huge winged dragon (“[a]ngues ingentes alites”), seems in retrospect to be taken directly from that genre. Quintilian stratifies this taxonomy, stating: “the rhetor should begin with historical ones [narratives], which are more grown-up because they are more real”.¹⁰⁰ Aristotle is more explicit, arguing that in diegetic and mimetic representation “[t]here should be nothing irrational in the events”; that is, nothing that lacks verisimilitude.¹⁰¹

For Renaissance humanists, mimetic failure was a moral liability. When Juan Luis Vives takes up the categories, the *fabula* becomes *fabulae licentiosae* (licentious stories), a category that refers primarily to chivalric romance. He asks in *Instruction of a Christen Woman*:

what delyte can be in those thynges that be so playne & folisshe lyes? One kylleth twenty hym selfe alone an other thirty an other wounded with a hundred woundes and lefte deed ryseth up agayne and on the next day made hole & stronge over cometh two gyants: and than goth away loden with golde and sylver and precious stones mo than a galy wolde cary away.¹⁰²

Davis argues these attacks take place on two, not mutually exclusive, levels. First, there are the genre’s “palpable absurdities” (such as the impossible martial deeds Vives primarily attacks here)

⁹⁹ Cicero, *De inventione*, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Harvard University Press, 1949), 1.19.

¹⁰⁰ “[A]pud rhetorem initium sit historica, tanto robustior quanto verior”, Quintilian, *The Orator’s Education*, 280, 2.4.4.

¹⁰¹ Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. Stephen Halliwell (Harvard University Press, 1995), 1454b. See also S. Halliwell, “Aristotelian Mimesis Reevaluated”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 28/4 (1990): 487–510.

¹⁰² Vives, *Instructio[n] of a Christen Woma[n]*, sig. E4v. Erasmus also inveighs against the implausibility of the marvellous, stating “some people have been excessively fond of this sort of thing and, relying on the gullibility of the crowd, have imported into Christian literature the most stupid miraculous events as if they were absolutely true”, Erasmus, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, 24, 634. See also Daniel Javitch, “The disparagement of chivalric romance for its lack of historicity in sixteenth-century Italian poetics”, in *Romance and History: Imagining Time from the Medieval to the Early Modern Period*, edited by Jon Whitman (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 187–99.

which may incite undiscerning readers to foolish or corrupt action.¹⁰³ Secondly there is “a specific assault on the discursive inadequacies of romantic narration, one focused on its improbabilities [. . .] the inability of such texts to produce their extraordinary circumstances within a rhetorical structure that might promote strategic thought about literary form”.¹⁰⁴ As Aristotle notes, the impossible can be more probable (that is, more verisimilar) than what is merely possible,¹⁰⁵ or, as Vives has it “sometimes certain falsehoods seem more probable than some truths, not because of the things themselves but because of our depraved judgements, and so it is not enough for a narration to *be* true [. . .] it must seem to be true for our sake”.¹⁰⁶ Texts that manage to give impossible or unlikely events the appearance of truth may then offer the attentive humanist reader edifying examples towards the construction of their own probable rhetoric.¹⁰⁷ But chivalric romances not only risk goading gullible readers into martial or moral missteps, but also, in falling foul of humanist criteria of verisimilitude, offer readers none of the edification that alternative reading material could provide.¹⁰⁸ The chivalric romance’s impossible feats are therefore serviceable towards neither “physical courage” nor “mental readiness”.

Tyler’s text registers and responds to these attacks on the genre in several ways. Boro notes how she adds to the text’s pseudo-historical framing devices by correcting and adding historical and classical allusions.¹⁰⁹ One striking example of this habit and of her engagement

¹⁰³ *The Mirror of Knighthood* incites a chambermaid to become a lady errant in Thomas Overbury, *Sir Thomas Overburie His WIFE* [. . .] (London: Edward Griffin, 1616), sigs. G7v–8v. François de la Noue fears his soldiers might believe themselves capable of romance’s impossible chivalric feats in his military tract *The Politicke and Militarie Discourses of the Lord de La Nouue* [. . .] (London: Thomas Orwin, 1588), sig. G7v.

¹⁰⁴ Davis, *Chivalry and Romance*, 14.

¹⁰⁵ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1454a.

¹⁰⁶ Juan Luis Vives, *De Ratione Dicendi*, vol. XI, ed. David Walker (Brill, 2018), 364–65.

¹⁰⁷ By “probable” I here refer to “the likelihood, verisimilitude, and persuasiveness of the general account of the case presented to the decision-maker”. I expand on the legal aspect of this definition in subsequent discussions. See Barbara J. Shapiro, “Classical Rhetoric and the English Law of Evidence”, in *Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Victoria Kahn and Lorna Hutson (Yale University Press, 2001), 54–72: 55.

¹⁰⁸ Javitch argues that “[i]t was because chivalric romance was seen to generate *incredible* falsehoods that its status became so impaired”, see “The disparagement of chivalric romance”, 194.

¹⁰⁹ Tyler, *Mirror*, 31.

with issues of verisimilitude comes when, as an infant, the Knight of the Sun is lost at sea but miraculously survives. Having described his survival, she addresses the reader:

And you, which read this history, may be brought by good reason to give credit to this my report, since you yourselves are witnesses of the evident presence of the Almighty in so certain a danger. And as the learned well know, Achilles hath his Pallas in Homer, and Aeneas his Venus in Virgil, goddesses assistant unto men in their dangerous conflicts—Homer and Virgil meaning no other thing than the care of God towards His [own]. Why may not we believe (that if it so pleased God) that this infant had the secret direction of God's mighty hand in all his enterprises?¹¹⁰

Tyler's argument has two parts. First she defends the power of a Christian god to determine events, using the *a posteriori* fact of the baby's survival as proof of God's intervention, described as evidence presented before the "witnessing" audience. She then adds classical literary precedents for divine protection, reiterating the text's pseudo-historicity as a thousand-year-old Greek chronicle, and implying that not "credit[ing]" the Knight of the Sun's survival would entail valuing Homer and Virgil's pagan goddesses over the Christian Almighty.¹¹¹ Her stress on this incident suggests that it is particularly *unbelievable*, probably because the trope is ubiquitous in romance.¹¹² As such Tyler's apologetics appear as a defence of the genre more broadly and an attempt to wrest from sceptical, seasoned readers of romance a renewed willingness to suspend disbelief.

When, in a similar episode in *Espejo*, a boat jumps away "misteriosamente" ("mysteriously"), Tyler also frames the episode as a reflection on plausibility:

¹¹⁰ There is no Spanish equivalent to Tyler's classical references. Ortúñez suggests that the Knight of the Sun's survival demonstrates his superlative virtues and God's blessing. *Ibid.*, 79–80; Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 1, 106–7.

¹¹¹ Or indeed failing to recognise divine dispensations in antiquity as misattributions of the Christian God's intervention.

¹¹² See Helen Cooper's discussion of this "meme" in her chapter on "Providence and the Sea" "[s]urvival for an infant marks him [. . .] as special, favoured by God or the gods", *The English Romance in Time*, 106–36 (110).

Thus much is ordinary in the course of worldly things, but that which is to come is beyond the credit of a story, as it were an extraordinary miracle. For when the Knight of the Sun leapt into the boat, the cable rent in pieces. And with the force of the jump and the rage of the winds together, the boat launched into the depth [. . .]

Mas fue una gran ventura, que según lo que después sucedió pareció aver sucedido misteriosamente. Que como el Cavallero del Febo saltó en el barco, con la fuerça del salto, o por la gran furia de los vientos, el barco se apartó tan presto de la nao [. . .]

Here again we find Tyler mixing concession and defence. Her first phrase, that everything so far has been perfectly plausible, delimits the opportunity for critique to this single, anomalous event, though what has immediately preceded it is at least as incredible.¹¹⁵ Then, in conceding that that this incident breaks the “credit of a story”, the narrator presents themselves as a reasonable observer: one who calls a spade a spade. But in spite of this apparent acknowledgement that some (strictly limited) parts of the text are indeed incredible, she nonetheless underscores the circumstances that might, after all, lend them credibility. First, she adds her own: that it was an “extraordinary miracle”. As with the Knight of the Sun’s survival at sea, Tyler reminds the audience that the impossible is in fact an accepted category of happenstance.¹¹⁶ However, if the reader is not fond of miracles, then Tyler is ready with other explanations. She underscores the

¹¹³ Tyler, *Mirror*, 122.

¹¹⁴ “Though it was very lucky, what happened after seemed to happen mysteriously. For when the Knight of the Sun jumped in the boat, with the force of the jump or the great fury of the winds, the boat went fast from the ship”; The Spanish is from Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 1, 224.

¹¹⁵ Much like Vives’s parody of the genre in *Instruction*, a strange knight has just killed “five or six” others, and Clavergudo ten more, all in pitch darkness but for the sparks of their clashing swords.

¹¹⁶ This is a common defence for particularly unlikely incidents. In another example, Tyler acknowledges the poor odds facing Rosicleer: “This was no even match: thirty knights and a giant to set upon one silly knight, before almost tired with two hours’ battle against the giant. But what thing may resist God’s ordinance?”, *Mirror*, 159. For the use of miraculous explanations, see Hutson’s discussion of Lodovico Castelvetro’s three-fold taxonomy of episodes, including *per miracolo* in *Circumstantial Shakespeare* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 20–1.

mitigating circumstances in the original text. The force of the Knight of the Sun's jump combines in her text with the "rage of the winds" and the boat is, in her version, already straining on a cable. The cable breaks under the force and the boat leaps forwards.

Other changes are less conspicuous, but tend to the same purpose. Key information about characters' relationships is regularly reiterated. For example Tyler reminds the reader that Rosicleer is not a bastard (this is somewhat ambiguous in *Espejo*) by having Briana, his mother, stress that her husband is "lawful", her son "begotten in wedlock".¹¹⁷ Tyler also regularly corrects the text's own continuity errors or adds small phrases to justify particular actions or shift pieces into necessary locations for the text's narrative to make sense. In one episode, the sage Artimodoro makes a bargain with King Oliverio to knight Rosicleer by outlining a prophecy of his future heroism. The action hinges on many parties responding to this speech, so Tyler adds:

[n]ow for that which followeth, you must intend that the wise man uttered his speeches to the king in the audience of the whole multitude, many knights and others compassing him about to hear his errand so that few or none but were partakers of it.¹¹⁸

In another example, Tyler justifies Briana's newly born children walking only a few paragraphs after they are described as newborns by adding the phrase "by this time [they] were of some growth, being two years old" and glosses Briana's otherwise confusing joy with the phrase: "not having seen her children since her first blessing of them".¹¹⁹

These changes are frequent and while individually trifling, they show us that Tyler was conversant with humanist thinking about how texts could become more verisimilar and imaginable by inventing and arranging "arguments" in particular ways. Tyler knows, as did the author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* that "if the things you are saying are fabricated, then it becomes all the more important to follow the [rhetorical] rules"¹²⁰ that assist in constructing a credible

¹¹⁷ Tyler, *Mirror*, 124–25.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 143–44.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 78.

¹²⁰ The quote is Quentin Skinner's translation of 1.9.16, in *Forensic Shakespeare* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 15.

narrative, for only then can they be readily and vividly imagined.¹²¹ These rules are outlined in classical treatises within the context of forensic legal rhetoric, which informed English legal practice but also came to influence all kinds of composition by way of the humanist classroom and texts like Agricola’s translation of the *Progymnasmata* and Erasmus’s *De copia*.¹²² These and the rhetorical treatises of Cicero, Quintilian and the unattributed *Ad Herennium*, as well as their revisions in the vernacular,¹²³ emphasised the use of “circumstances” as “places” (*loci*) or “topics” (*topoi*) from which probable arguments could be made. Circumstances, of “things” (place, time, context, antecedent and consequent events etc.) and of “persons” (their background, sex, age, temperament etc.), were the “indirect proofs” or “artificial proofs”¹²⁴ used by lawyers to create persuasive accounts of criminal culpability and by writers to create similarly persuasive, verisimilar fictions.¹²⁵ Vives gives a clear example of this in *De ratione dicendi*:

The narration of probabilities is brought about by an admixture of words which suggest briefly the reasons for the action and in which our proofs are scattered like seeds. [For example] ‘Since they were cheerful, and maidens were present, they drank more copiously, then they danced, their passions became heated through the levity of the occasion, and then they fell to quarrelling’.¹²⁶

¹²¹ This vivid imaginability is referred to as *enargeia*, where what is described should seem to be happening before the listeners eyes—“quasi geruntur sub aspectum”, in Cicero, *De optimo genere oratorum*, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Harvard University Press, 1949), 3.202, and in Quintilian, *The Orator’s Education*, 9.1.27.

¹²² See Kathy Eden, “Forensic Rhetoric and Humanist Education”, in *The Oxford Handbook of English Law and Literature, 1500–1700*, edited by Lorna Hutson (Oxford University Press, 2017), 23–40; and Hutson, *Circumstantial Shakespeare*, 17–8. We know Tyler knew of some classical texts and some Latin, so she may have read humanist thinkers directly or in their many vernacular imitators, or to have intuited key precepts through her own reading of changing literary fashions.

¹²³ Skinner notes in particular Richard Sherry, Dudley Fenner, and George Puttenham, *Forensic Shakespeare*, 201.

¹²⁴ Indirect proof is artificial in the sense that it relies on the “art” of the speaker’s rhetoric; conversely, direct proof is inartificial in that it does not rely on that “art” but on positive evidence, including witness testimony, oaths, or confessions. See Shapiro, “Classical Rhetoric”, 68–9 and Eden, “Forensic Rhetoric”, 27–8.

¹²⁵ The persuasiveness of a legal account or the verisimilitude of a narrative was in part attributed to its liveliness (*enargeia*) which was produced by its circumstances. As Erasmus states in *De copia*, to paint a scene rather than narrate it, “we [must] first conceive a mental picture of the subject with all its attendant circumstances”, Desiderius Erasmus, *On Copia of Words and Ideas*, ed. Donald B. King and H. David Rix (Marquette University Press, 1963), 47.

¹²⁶ Vives, *De Ratione Dicendi*, XI, 367.

Just as Vives's scatters "proofs"—artificial proofs or circumstances that make arguments feel probable—to explain the men's copious drinking (they were cheerful; maidens were present), so too does Tyler supply circumstances that make *Mirroure's* narrative more truth-like. How does the boat jump away? The cable breaks with the combined force of jump and winds or the working of a miracle. Why does Brandagedeon later challenge Rosicleer to a fight? Because he has heard Artimodo's speech and wants to win the bargain for himself. Why is Briana happy? Because she is reunited with her children after a long absence. And both Vives and Tyler arrange those circumstantial proofs in clauses that lend them causality and persuasive inevitability ("since", "then"). Tyler thus sets out to mitigate the "palpable absurdities" and "improbabilities" of her source, making it seem more truthful and thickening its fictional texture so that its events are more readily imaginable.

Likely feelings

In a classical juridical context, lawyers (and, in early modern England, Justices of the Peace) constructed probable narratives about crimes from the topics of argument furnished by circumstances of "place" and "thing".¹²⁷ The lawyer describes and arranges these circumstances to interpret the facts of the case in a way that persuasively casts aspersions of guilt, or persuasively deflects them. In Vives's bar fight quoted above, itself both a narrative and the "story" of a crime, we have a chain of causality that braids psychological states with action. The quarrel breaks out due to heated passions triggered by too much dancing, which itself was occasioned by drinking, which they only fell to with such gusto because they were cheerful and maidens were present. The actions of the persons and their mental states render each other believable and make the events themselves more readily brought to mind. Tyler's changes to *Espejo* likewise involve her or her reader inferring characters' psychological states from what

¹²⁷ For the influence of classical juridical rhetoric on the English legal system, see Shapiro, "Classical Rhetoric".

happens in the romance and, in turn, using those reflections about their psychological state as artificial proofs (rhetorical circumstances) to make subsequent events more comprehensible. In so doing, she attempts to deflect humanist arguments about romance's lack of believability and its lack of "strategic thought about literary form".¹²⁸

In both the Spanish and English, when Rosicleer comes to fight the giant Brandagedeon, he exchanges a charged look with Princess Olivia, but only Tyler uses that "arreatada vista" ("snatched look") to create verisimilitude:

Mirror

But Lord, what alteration both of you felt by
the interchange of your looks, which served
likewise for messengers to tell your tales
betwixt you. And yet I cannot deem but that
this love so enraged his courage against
Brandagedeon, as otherwise I may think he
had not done so well.¹²⁹

Espejo

Y no con poca atención la hermosa infanta lo
mirava [. . .] no dexava de pensar en sí quién
aquel cavallero pudiesse ser, paresciéndole
quel corazón se le alterava con su vista.¹³⁰

Using the first- and second-person, as she often does when adding descriptions of characters' interior states, Tyler expands the looks between Rosicleer and Olivia, her description of them as "messengers" making reciprocal what, in the Spanish, is Olivia's reflection alone. Furthermore, Tyler makes the look and "love" entailed within it a circumstance (a motive or *causa*) that explains Rosicleer's courage. In her version, their looks are the *sine qua non* of Rosicleer's

¹²⁸ Davis, *Chivalry and Romance*, 14.

¹²⁹ Tyler, *Mirror*, 144.

¹³⁰ "And not with passing interest did the beautiful princess look at him [. . .] she kept wondering who that knight could be that, looking at her, seemed to make her heart leap". The Spanish is from Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 2, 23.

triumph, the circumstance that explains, and makes verisimilar, his extraordinary defeat of the fearsome giant Brandagedeon.

Tyler tends to add mitigating circumstances (or to underscore existing ones) when the protagonists diverge from their supposed virtue. Towards the end of the book, Emperor Trebatio, having escaped his long enchantment by Lindaraza, chases down some knights who are attempting to kidnap and rape a woman. His reaction is extremely violent: he “cleaved one of them to the skull; and one other from the shoulders downward; the third as he made haste to escape, was taken shorter by the legs”.¹³¹ This is a degree of violence Tyler feels it is necessary to qualify well beyond her source:

Mirror

For the emperor, albeit very inclinable to any reasonable pity, yet was in this point very rigorous, not to spare the dishonourers of virginity. His saying was that it quenched the natural love between father and mother, sister and brother, between kith and kin; that the bastard born seldom came to good purpose; that it was partly the sin of sodomy, and et cetera. And for his own fault, it was indeed mere ignorance, or rather constraint, and thereby the more pardonable. Or perhaps the detesting of it [in]

Espejo

aunque en todo [el emperador] era tan clementísimo, jamás en aquel caso quiso perdonar a nadie, porque decía que era una clemencia aquella muy perjudicial y dañosa para la república y en grande agravio de todas las donzellas.¹³³

¹³¹ Tyler, *Mirror*, 221. The Spanish is similarly gory: “el grande emperador dio al uno dellos de través por el yelmo, y haziéndole dos partes la cabeça, dio con él muerto en tierra. Y aún no parecía que avía acabado de hazer esto quando al otro de los dos da un revés por medio la cintura que le cortó las armas y la carne, y abierto hasta las entrañas cayó en el suelo, donde fue luego muerto”, Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 2, 270–71.

¹³³ “Though in all things he [the emperor] was exceedingly forgiving, in that particular case he never sought to pardon anybody, because he said that such clemency was very harmful and damaging to the republic and an insult to all gentlewomen”. After this sentence in *Espejo*, the emperor returns to fighting the knights. Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 2, 271.

himself made him more severely exact the keeping
of chastity in others.¹³²

Tyler casts Emperor Trebatio—a character who has heretofore shown few moral qualms—as liable to launch into a sermon.¹³⁴ Rarely has “et cetera” done so much characterising work. On a surface level Tyler moves to protect her translation from claims about the immorality of the romance genre by justifying the actions of a character the Ortúñez positions as a hero to be admired. But the way she does this is by supplying circumstances, of temperament and past behaviour, that work to justify his violence within a moral schema of the titular “knightly deedes”.¹³⁵ Most interesting, and wholly original to *Mirror*, is the narrator’s apologia and subsequent conjecture at the end of the excerpt, in which Tyler suggests Trebatio’s reaction could be a response to his previous moral missteps (“his own fault”), namely his having been enchanted by the evil Lindaraza into two decades of adultery at the start of the book. Here, Tyler pre-empts a readerly objection about Trebatio’s own questionable conduct and turns it into an indirect proof that can explain his violent outburst. We can forgive Trebatio’s violence here, Tyler suggests, when we put it in a context of his character and his experiences; his reaction stems, she explains, from his own deep-seated feelings of guilt.

This intervention is notable both for the psychological realism it bestows upon what in *Espejo* is a very roughly sketched character, and for the fact that the intervention is framed as conjecture: “or perhaps”. As in the previous example, where a similar intervention was framed with “I cannot deem but that [. . .]”, Tyler uses the first-person perspective as a means of reflecting upon the events of the romance and, specifically, upon the motivations of the

¹³² Tyler, *Mirror*, 221.

¹³⁴ Trebatio’s first act in the romance is to kill and then impersonate Prince Edward of England with the aim of marrying Princess Briana in his stead. Tyler regularly seeks to mitigate the extremes of his behaviour, excusing his long period of adultery by emphasising that he was under an enchantment.

¹³⁵ These are circumstances “of persons”, described in the Fifth Method of Erasmus’s *De Copia*. See also Shapiro, “Classical Rhetoric”, 62.

characters. Not attributable to the original author, this tendency inserts the translator (or the persona of the translator) as an intermediary reader interpreting the story within the text. I want to suggest now that this ubiquitous “I” models a readerly response that, in its suppositional style, encourages readers to similarly intervene in the text with their own inferences and conjectures about the text, its events, and its characters: with their own “or perhaps”.

We can see how this works when the knights Bargandel and Liriamandro return from their adventures to the court of Princess Olivia and King Oliviero. Their friend Rosicleer has recently left the kingdom after receiving Princess Olivia’s reply to his own abortive letter (in the earlier excerpt)—a rejection of his love which reportedly leaves Rosicleer pale, shaking, and crying.¹³⁶ These particulars are the same in both *Mirroure* and *Espejo*. In *Espejo*, when King Oliviero asks the knights where Rosicleer is, they say they do not know. In *Mirroure*, however, the knights make Rosicleer’s lovesickness part of a conjectural narration of what might have happened:

Mirroure

[Bargandel and Liriamandro], I dare not say, knew the right cause, but conjectured some likely cause by the strangeness it wrought in him, [and] with great grief made a narration of each particular as far as they knew, both what befell him within the realm and in what manner he avoided the realm, as they had heard of others, only in the company of a gentlewoman. And they added, moreover, perhaps of their own heads,

Espejo

Y como les preguntasse [el rey] por Rosicler, ellos con grande pena le contaron todo lo que con él les avía avenido, y cómo avían sabido que era ido fuera del reino, solamente en compañía de una donzella, y que eran muy maravillados de que así se huviesse querido partir dellos; que no podía ser sino que se le huviesse ofrescido alguna grande causa.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Tyler, *Mirror*, 184.

¹³⁸ “And when [the king] asked after Rosicleer, with great sorrow they told him everything that had come to them concerning Rosicleer: how they had learned that he had gone out of the kingdom in the company of a gentlewoman, and that they were most amazed that he had left them in that way, and that it could not be otherwise but that he had had great cause to do so”. The Spanish is from Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 2, 140.

perhaps, as I said before, upon some farther
knowledge, that it could not otherwise be but
that he had some great wrong offered unto him
by some person within the realm.¹³⁷

This passage enacts and indeed references the invention of probable arguments based on circumstantial evidence. The knights, Tyler says, probably *know* the real reason Rosicleer has left, namely Olivia, but they cannot reveal it to the King because he is Princess Olivia's father. They must tell him a white lie, and they want that lie to be convincing. They therefore take the circumstantial evidence of Rosicleer's comportment which Tyler adds to the text ("the strangeness it [the letter] wrought in him"), and use it as the basis to "conjecture some likely cause"—that is to resolve a *coniecturalis*, an issue of fact—by way of a convincing (though false) "narration of each particular".¹³⁹

This language and procedure strongly evokes the *narratio* of classical juridical oratory, in which the facts, alongside the circumstantial proofs we have just been discussing, are selected and arranged in such a way that serves the eventual explanation (or accusation).¹⁴⁰ Lorna Hutson has shown how the participatory justice system of early modern England relied on lay persons exercising and evaluating this kind of forensic rhetoric, and how, as these procedures (the weighing of evidence and construction of probable accounts of events) circulated in the wider culture, they came to be exploited in late-sixteenth-century drama.¹⁴¹ But here too, in a chivalric romance, we unexpectedly find characters "engaged in persuading one another of the truth of

¹³⁷ Ibid., 185. Rosicleer leaves the kingdom in order to assist the "gentlewoman" mentioned here, who ends up leading him into a trap.

¹³⁹ It is no coincidence that *causa* is also the Spanish word for a legal case.

¹⁴⁰ "The *narratio* should then furnish the judge with the salient facts, while persuading him at the same time to accept our version of events", Skinner, *Forensic Shakespeare*, 18. See also Lorna Hutson, *The Invention of Suspicion: Law and Mimesis in Shakespeare and Renaissance Drama* (Oxford University Press, 2007), 121–22.

¹⁴¹ Hutson, *The Invention of Suspicion*.

highly disputable ‘facts’”.¹⁴² In *Espejo*, while the knights report his departure and describe themselves as surprised (“muy maravillados”), they offer no conjecture about the “grande causa” that could have led to Rosicleer’s conduct. In Tyler’s version, Rosicleer’s “strangeness” is a circumstance of “person” that together with the witness’s account of his leaving are arranged into a *narratio* or argument about what might have happened. The result is a white lie that is convincing to the King, but also more verisimilar for readers of the romance because we see the knights enacting mental processes of (feigned) inference and persuasion.

While it is not frequent in *Mirroure* for characters to speculate about other characters or issues of fact in such explicit terms, what is common is the presence of Tyler’s own narratorial conjectures, as here in “I dare not say” and the repeated “perhaps”. In the last sentence, the narrator wonders whether Liriamandro and Bargandel have themselves deduced “of their own heads” that Rosicleer has left because of his rejection by Princess Olivia or whether they know that fact definitively and are concealing it. Are their proofs indirect or direct? That neither possibility is mentioned in the Spanish is particularly interesting. The narrator is not conjecturing about events in the original text, as we have seen in other examples, but about Tyler’s own additions. Here is evidence that the narrator is a device contrived by Tyler, rather than an artless stand-in for her in the text. But, if the narrator is purposefully contrived, what is its function? Most obviously, it makes the characters more true to life. By speculating about the knights’ mental procedures, Tyler limns their inner life. They are presented as thinking, feeling “persons” who can make rational deductions. But this episode also typifies the way that Tyler models through her narrator’s conversational, tentative tone the process of conjecturing coherence by considering the romance narrative a disputed, or at least incomplete, series of “facts” that can be

¹⁴² Ibid., 7. Hutson argues that “[d]ramatists of the 1590s began to focus their attention on the ways in which agents in a story actually gain their knowledge about the events supposed to have taken place in that story and infer, from various speeches and signs, what each other thinks about these events. Such a focus is constitutive both of complex social interaction and of apparent psychological depth”, *ibid.*, 12.

reinterpreted, reordered, or augmented to fill its narratological and psychological “gaps”. As

Hutson notes:

It’s not that we need to *suspend belief*, then, but that our judgement of probability needs to be engaged, even for marvellous things. We don’t want to be *told*, at every turn, where the action now is and how many days have passed—we want to infer and imagine.¹⁴³

Tyler’s narratorial interventions in the text, framed in terms of supposition and belief and in an accessible tone, model an active engagement with the text and encourage her readers to engage their own faculties of judgement and probability.

Tyler’s translation, in spite of her additions and alterations, still leaves ample space for this readerly engagement.¹⁴⁴ For example, when Rosicleer refuses to give Candramarte the merciful death he demands, even after cutting off both his arms, Tyler comments: “But truly, if I had been in Rosicleer’s case, I should not have been so strange, seeing that both it should have been the giant’s last request and so little encumbrance towards me”.¹⁴⁵ This comment draws attention to Rosicleer’s unusually unchivalrous conduct, but does not resolve it. The reader is led to ask themselves: why would he act in this way? Is it perhaps a misguided attempt to impress Princess Olivia? An active reader might make a moral example of this misstep when Candramarte later seeks revenge upon Rosicleer. Gaps, textual quirks or thin spots in plotting or characterisation abound in both versions of the romance. But only in *Mirror* is the reader shown how to use circumstantial proofs to infer incomplete facts, or to infer from known facts circumstances that would make the narrative more verisimilar. Tyler’s interventions encourage readers to approach each episode in the text as just one possible *narratio*: its facts and their arrangement not yet proven or definitive but available to be reinterpreted or augmented in the

¹⁴³ Hutson, *Circumstantial Shakespeare*, 24.

¹⁴⁴ Boro counts more than twenty first-person narratorial interjections and fifteen incidents where the narrator “engages with the readers’ opinions”, Tyler, *Mirror*, 35.

¹⁴⁵ This sentence is absent in the Spanish. Another example, at the level of plot, comes near the conclusion of the romance, where she states that: “The serpent, raising his tail, grasped at the Knight of the Sun, but I can not tell how the knight escaped it”. *Ibid.*, 151 and 196.

search for more probable alternatives. If this does not involve a humanist mastery of the text,¹⁴⁶ nor entail that the romance is apt to supply instructive examples for future acts of private or public employment (as in Hutson's argument about Elizabethan prose fiction),¹⁴⁷ it nonetheless responds to the humanist demand that fictive texts "produce their extraordinary circumstances within a rhetorical structure that might promote strategic thought about literary form".¹⁴⁸

Part 3: Errant debt-collectors

Margaret Tyler, a servant and possibly a merchant's daughter, may seem like an unusual figure to be engaging with legal procedure, but her translation choices and additions offer clear evidence that she was well-versed in legal concepts and vocabulary. This is already evidenced in the circumstantial rhetoric we find in Tyler's narrative additions which I have suggested prompts readers to detect and plug "gaps" in the romance. But there is one final and related addition of Tyler's that we need to consider: her extensive use of legal and financial analogies. This lexicon of case and contract deepens our sense of *Mirror* as a text ideologically at odds with itself, with Tyler's modernising instinct threatening to unravel the chivalric world and its values. As a conclusion to this chapter, I ask what effects Tyler's changes have on the stated aims of her romance translation: to "set on fire the lusty courages of young gentlemen to the advancement of their line".¹⁴⁹ Can a text be a "relatively faithful reproduction" and nevertheless turn its original on its head, and, if so, what does that mean for the way we talk about "derivative" writing?

The surplusage

¹⁴⁶ This is more a *remastering* of the text than a mastery of it towards some external aim, such as the cultivation of a ready repertoire of persuasive rhetoric.

¹⁴⁷ See *The Usurer's Daughter*, chapter 3, 91–114.

¹⁴⁸ Davis, *Chivalry and Romance*, 14.

¹⁴⁹ Tyler, *Mirror*, 49.

Tyler adds legal language throughout the romance, but particularly to scenes of knightly combat. An example occurs midway through the romance as the Knight of the Sun (also called Donzel del Febo) battles the hideous giant Rajartes:

<i>Mirror</i>	<i>Espejo</i>
<p>Again Donzel del Febo repaid him with a <i>plus ultra</i>, the surplusage more than an ordinary interest. And they wounded each other, mangling themselves pitifully.¹⁵⁰</p>	<p>De allí él le bolvió la respuesta, y entrambos se golpean con tanta furia que los huessos y las carnes les parecían molerles.¹⁵¹</p>

Continuing her tendency to increase the register of her source, here Tyler also supplies an original conceit. The blows of the knights are imagined not as “replies”, as they are in the analogy of Ortúñez’s text, but as the means by which debt is incurred or repaid.¹⁵² Each blow places the recipient under an obligation to repay and, as here, it is best if the debt is repaid with interest—a “surplusage”. The Knight of the Sun therefore shows his superlative knightly credentials by paying “more than an ordinary interest”, a “*plus ultra*”.¹⁵³

Credit relationships are legal relationships, and indeed the dual meaning of Tyler’s word “surplusage” (at once a financial surplus and a supernumerary clause in a law) itself evokes this close relation between economics and law.¹⁵⁴ In sixteenth-century England wayward debtors

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 104.

¹⁵¹ “From there [the ground], he gave him reply, and between them they hit each other with such fury that it seemed to grind their bones and flesh”. The Spanish is from Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 1, 171.

¹⁵² Elsewhere they are described as “loan[s]”, see Tyler, *Mirror*, 121.

¹⁵³ Unlike its usual formation *ne plus ultra*, *plus ultra* means instead to go beyond the “furthest point or limit reached or attainable”. This is one of the first uses of this phrase (with or without ‘ne’) listed on EEBO and it predates all OED entries. Interestingly, *plus ultra* is also the national motto of Spain, appearing on the coat of arms, and coined by the chivalric enthusiast Charles V. It refers to the phrase “Non terrae plus ultra” (no land beyond) inscribed on the Pillars of Hercules but, in dropping the first clause, carries a patriotic invocation to “[Go] beyond”. See Earl Rosenthal, “*Plus Ultra, Non Plus Ultra*, and the Columnar Device of Emperor Charles V”, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 34 (1971): 204–28.

¹⁵⁴ “surplusage, *n.*”, 1.a and 1.b, *OED*.

were increasingly subject to legal actions, either to reclaim the amount of the debt (using the writ of debt) or to claim damages beyond that amount (using action on the case). Litigation quadrupled between 1560 and 1580 at the King’s Bench with similarly exponential rates at the Court of Common Pleas, and debt-related cases took up an increasing portion of this growing total, reflecting an expansion of credit as an economic mechanism.¹⁵⁵ Craig Muldrew argues that “[t]he cumulative effect of all these credit relations, and the interpretation of them, was the creation of a new means of social description which redefined both political authority and social relations in extremely legalistic terms, stressing the necessary equality of justice”.¹⁵⁶ It is the resulting “elevat[ion of] the legalism of contract to a privileged position” that makes Tyler’s debt analogy appropriate, in one sense, to a description of acts of chivalry.¹⁵⁷

However, Tyler’s persistent addition of a language of debt and contract, entirely absent in Ortúñez’s text, has repercussions for the feudal values of *Mirrou*’s world and its heroes. We see this when Emperor Trebatio attempts to rescue a gentlewoman from some giants:

Mirrou

without either good-even or good-morrow, he lent the first whom he approached unto such a stroke that the giant would have mortgaged his part in the lady to have made sufficient payment of that blow. For the lifting up his battle axe to

Espejo

E no se queriendo detener con ellos en palabras, al primero que llegó tiró un golpe con tanta presteza que no tuvo otro remedio el jayán para librarse dél sino alçar la hacha e recibirlo en ella, la qual cortó la espada [. . .]¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵ Christopher W. Brooks, *Lanymers, Litigation and English Society since 1450* (The Hambledon Press, 1998), 11 and 17 and Craig Muldrew, *The Economy of Obligation* (Palgrave, 1998), 327.

¹⁵⁶ Muldrew, *Economy of Obligation*, 327.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 315.

¹⁵⁹ “And not wanting to stop to exchange words with them, as soon as he [Trebatio] reached them he so quickly threw a blow that the giant had no other remedy to escape it but to receive it with his axe, which the sword cut [in half]”. The Spanish is from Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 1, 65.

receive the blow, the sword cut it into the
middest [. . .]¹⁵⁸

Again, Tyler frames the violence in the language of debt and repayment. The alternative course of action, not offered in the Spanish, of the giant “mortagag[ing] his part in the lady”, suggests that the giant cannot provide “sufficient [re]payment” of Trebatio’s “blow” without offering as collateral his investment (“part”) in the lady. (To do so would end the fight because the kidnapped lady is exactly what Trebatio seeks to recover). In this schema, Trebatio’s superlative might becomes instead a superlative ability to indebt others to him, and martial contests become financial coming-to-accounts. In Tyler’s translation, Muldrew’s encroaching language of debt and contract turns chivalric protagonists into errant debt-collectors.

Reputation is also seen in terms of this credit-debtor analogy. A knight in the Knight of the Sun’s company is rude to a third, unknown knight, precipitating a fight:

Mirror

And saying no more, he drove at the knight
[who had been rude to him] so strongly that
he clave both shield, helmet, and head unto
the eyes. Oh, what a mischief doth ill speech
breed unto man! And how inexcusable was it
in this knight when he redeemed this frank
speech with his own life and sold to make
payment the life of many others?¹⁶⁰

Espejo

Diziendo esto, sacó una grande y pesada
espada que traía, y alçando el braço tiró un
golpe de alto a baxo al cavallero, que alçando
el escudo para recibirlo en él, se lo cortó por
medio, y descendió al yelmo con tanta furia
que la cabeça le hendió hasta los ojos, y el
cavallero cayó muerto en el agua. ¡O, cuánto
mal haze el mal hablar, y cuánto mal se
escusaría si en todos los hombres huviesse

¹⁵⁸ Tyler, *Mirror*, 65.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 120.

buen comedimiento! Que no sólo a éste le
costó la vida su respuesta mala, mas otros
muchos murieron por su causa.¹⁶¹

While Tyler's text shares Ortúñez's moralising tone, she frames it in financial terms. The knight "redeem[s]", or pays for, his rudeness with his life and with the lives of many of his comrades, the debt incurred by such "inexcusable" speech not being squared with one life alone.

Reputational insult is cast as another way of incurring debt, one that is again repaid—with interest—by the strokes of swords and axes.

Similarly, King Oliverio is said to have "advance[d] his private credit and the honour of his country" by Rosicleer's feats of arms in his court.¹⁶² His daughter Princess Olivia longs to have Rosicleer as a husband, but given his ostensible lack of noble ancestry this is impossible. She complains:

Mirror

Alas, Rosicleer, my father thinks he hath made
a great purchase by thy being here, but I would
to God I might be as sure heir to this purchase,
as I am otherwise certain to repent thy coming
hither! And yet, whatsoever the event be, my
love commands in me the contrary. For is it not
better [. . . that] by the enjoying of his

Espejo

O Rosicler, ¡qué alegría ha dado al rey mi
padre y a todos los cavalleros de su corte tu
venida en esta tierra, y qué amarga ha sido
para mí, y penosa! Mas ¿qué digo yo, cativa?
Quel amoroso fuego en que me abraso me
haze desvariar en lo que digo. [. . .] Pues
sólo en gozar de su estremada vista recibo

¹⁶¹ "Saying this, he pulled out a big heavy sword that he was carrying and, raising his arm, dealt a blow from on high to the knight which cut the knight's raised shield in half and fell onto his helmet with such force that his head split to the eyes and the knight fell dead in the water. Oh, what wrongs wreak wrong speech, and how many wrongs would be avoided were all men to behave well! For not only did this ill response cost this man his life, but many others died for it" The Spanish is from Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 1, 219–20.

¹⁶² Tyler, *Mirror*, 185.

<p>[Rosicleer's] sight I receive such pleasure than never to have seen him, though I lose the hope of augmenting my state? And truly befall what may, in spite of Fortune's rancour, I will stay myself upon this choice and will not exchange it.¹⁶³</p>	<p>tan gran plazer que a haverlo dexado de conoscer, para no poder ser más de lo que antes era, ni esperar de aumentar más mi ser, por pensar que avía nadie que me meresciese. Por cierto, venga lo que viniere, y dure mi penar hasta la muerte; que más quiero vivir con tan gloriosa pena [. . .] que ser libre sin ella.¹⁶⁴</p>
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While in the Spanish, having Rosicleer in court is a “great joy” (“quánta alegría”) for the King, in Tyler’s English, it is instead a “great purchase”: a fortuitous exchange of goods by which his reputation is advanced. Olivia also sees Rosicleer as part of a transaction. She wishes to be the “heir” or recipient of the goods of her father’s bargain, that is, to have Rosicleer as a husband. But knowing the marriage to be impossible, she nevertheless prefers the pain of seeing him to not seeing him at all, saying she will “not exchange it”—or rather, exchange *him*.¹⁶⁵ That Rosicleer can be purchased, inherited, or exchanged recasts his exemplary chivalry as an economic good or service; his effects on Olivia and on Oliverio’s reputation are, in Tyler’s translation, quantifiable. We see this, too, when Princess Olivia watches Rosicleer fight. In the Spanish, her love of him causes her apprehension (“algún recelo”),¹⁶⁶ but in the English we read that “the beautiful Princess Olivia could not but be angered at the new knight’s jeopardous

¹⁶³ Ibid., 155.

¹⁶⁴ “Oh, Rosicleer, how happy your coming to this land has been for the king my father and to all the knights of his court, and how bitter it has been for me, and sorrowful! But, what say I, captive? The amorous fire that I burn in turns what I say into ravings [. . .] From the mere enjoyment of his goodly appearance I get such pleasure that, [I wonder that] had I not met him, I would be nothing more than what I was then—wanting nothing to augment myself and thinking there were none that deserved me. Well, come what may, even if my sorrow lasts unto death, I much prefer to live with that glorious sorrow, [. . .] than to be free from it”. The Spanish is from Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 2, 56.

¹⁶⁵ In the Spanish she prefers (“más quiero”) to suffer than not to see him.

¹⁶⁶ Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 2, 39.

adventure, as if she had had no small title or claim to his person".¹⁶⁷ Rosicleer, though newly arrived in the court at this point, is already a possession and his risking his life in battle is a risk on Olivia's investment.

Action on the case

If, as Fuchs argues, Beaumont's *The Knight of the Burning Pestle* imposes on its Cervantine source an "English commercial subjectivity in contradistinction to the chivalric", then it finds a precedent in the translation of Margaret Tyler.¹⁶⁸ Her changes in diction, often the choice of one alternative over another, adapts Ortúñez's romance to reflect contemporary English concerns. Indeed, *Mirror* is a striking example of the way that, in England, "the legalistic language of credit and contractual discourse had permeated all aspects of early modern culture by the late sixteenth century", including the lives and interests of women like Tyler.¹⁶⁹ Applied to a Spanish chivalric romance, this legalese has unpredictable effects, as indeed its satirical descendants suggest. But before I examine these, I first want to examine one of Tyler's longest additions and her most protracted engagement with contemporary legal procedure. For, unlike her more general references to sale and debt, this common law proceeding is unmistakably English.

Rosicleer is participating in a jousting tournament when he sees Princess Olivia seated in the stands and burns with love. Olivia is then coaxed by Cupid into reciprocating his affection. These particulars appear in both the Spanish and English, but between them Tyler inserts an

¹⁶⁷ Tyler, *Mirror*, 149.

¹⁶⁸ Fuchs, *Poetics of Piracy*, 53.

¹⁶⁹ Muldrew, *Economy of Obligation*, 315.

entire legal proceeding that has no equivalent in her source.¹⁷⁰ Her insertion is indicated below in square brackets:

This was a breathing time for Rosicleer, but yet I am persuaded that it was no playing time although no enemy appeared. For he had a greater conflict within his bones than he professed outwardly, and therefore, his heart, neither fully assured nor yet in danger, gazed upon the beauty of Olivia. Whereby the fire, entering closely by the veins, wasted and consumed his flesh sooner than he felt the flame or could think of remedy. [But better considering that he was within the compass of Love's seigniory, and that his matter was to be tried at the great assize in Love's dominion, he took better advisement to alter it to an action upon the case of covenant against his mistress, the matter arising upon exchange of looks, as you have heard. And for this cause he entertained Sergeant Hope to be his lawyer and feed diverse others to assist him. But Master Despair, an old stager, had won the day of him had not the whole bench, and especially the Chief Justice Desert, stayed upon a demur, which relieved much Rosicleer's courage and made him look more freshly upon Hope to find out better evidence for recovery of his suit. But as Rosicleer thus pled his cause at the bar,] so gentle Cupid attended upon his mistress,

¹⁷⁰ The Spanish reads: 'Pues en este tiempo el corazón de Rosicler, no muy consolado ni seguro, la grande hermosura de Olivia contemplava; que encendido en amoroso fuego se du amor, çufría la pena que la falta del remedio le causava, teniéndose del todo por perdido, paresciéndole quel cercano parentesco que con aquella hermosa infanta tenía impedía qualquier remedio que por su parte pudiesse serle dado. Quanto más, que mirando su tan soberana hermosura, merescimiento le parescía a él faltar para osarse publicar por suyo. La qual, en este tiempo, como los mensageros de Cupido la començassen a tentar, mirando con grande atención su tan estremada dispusición y las altas cavallerías que aquel día avía hecho, paresciéndole así armado ser el mejor de quantos havía visto, ya tenía abierta la puerta y rendidos todos sus sentidos, para que visto su rostro descubierto ser conforme a su gran bondad, sin ninguna resistencia pudiesse el amor entrar en su libre corazón, a hazerla subjecta', Ortúñez de Calahorra, *Espejo*, 2, 25–6.

This is my translation of this passage: "At this time Rosicleer's heart, neither consoled nor assured, contemplated the great beauty of Olivia, and so alight in amorous flames of his love, he suffered for lack of remedy, taking all to be lost, thinking that his close parentage with that beautiful princess prevented any remedy that could, for his part, be offered him. What's more, looking at her sovereign beauty, he felt he lacked the merit to dare to publish his feelings. Meanwhile she, whom the messengers of Cupid were beginning to tempt, was observing with great attention his singular gifts and the high deeds of knighthood he had that day done (seeming the best of the many that day seen), so that already the door was opened and her senses yielded, and—if his face when it was revealed accorded to his great virtue—without any resistance would love enter her free heart and make it subject".

faithfully serving him and beating into her head the remembrance of his acts and the beauty of his personage that, the windows of her desire being set wide open, she viewed her fill, wishing yet to see his face, thereby to comfort herself if his visage were answerable to his virtue.¹⁷¹

The tone is playful, but the case that is fought here reflects real legal procedures and refers to contemporary legal controversy. A few pages earlier, Rosicleer and Olivia have shared a reciprocal “interchange of looks” which, as in the word “exchange” in this passage, turns their looks into goods in a transaction. Here, Rosicleer looks at Olivia but his look is not returned. Like the blows of chivalric combat, Rosicleer’s look incurs a debt that Olivia is obliged, in his mind, to repay. It is this non-payment of debt that is the “matter” litigated in this courtroom episode. On the advice of his lawyer “Sergeant Hope”, Rosicleer pursues “an action upon the case of covenant” at the “great assize in Love’s dominion”. Action on the case responded to a civil wrong and the specification of “covenant” identifies it as a breach of what we would today call contract. Unlike an action or writ of debt, which sought to recover the amount owed, action on the case was often used to seek restitution for damages arising from the non-payment of debt.¹⁷² In other words, to compensate for the damage Rosicleer incurs when he is consumed and burnt by love, he wants more than just a returned look from Olivia. He wants a “surplusage”.

However, Rosicleer’s case does not go well. We are told that “Master Despair, an old stager, had won the day of him” entirely but that the Chief Justice Desert (as in “just deserts”) “stayed upon a demur”, an objection, that awaits the “find[ing] out of better evidence for recovery of his suit”. What is happening here? This case is facetious because “looks” are not

¹⁷¹ Tyler, *Mirror*, 145.

¹⁷² See David Harris Sacks, “The Promise and the Contract in Early Modern England: Slade’s Case in Perspective”, in *Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Victoria Kahn and Lorna Hutson (Yale University Press, 2001), 28–53.

goods that can be transacted, but if we take it seriously on its own terms, it nonetheless engages aspects of legal debates coming to a head in late-sixteenth-century England.¹⁷³ Rosicleer's attempt to sue action on the case, rather using than the traditional writ of debt, reflects a point of particular controversy. The issue was "whether a simple bargain and sale involved an assumpsit", or in other words, "whether when you made a bargain you also implicitly *promised* to uphold your part of it";¹⁷⁴ if a promise *was* involved, then action of the case could be brought and damages sought, but if not, parties only had recourse to the action of debt. In the 1570s, The King's Bench Court held that a promise was implicit in the transaction itself, enabling litigants to pursue an action on the case if they wished to. The Court of Common Pleas disagreed, arguing that an action on the case for assumpsit could only be brought if there had been a promise to repay *subsequent* to the initial transaction that incurred the debt.¹⁷⁵ If there were only the initial transaction, the Court of Common Pleas took the view that there was no subsequent promise and so no grounds for bringing an action on the case.

This technicality is what derails Rosicleer's case in *Mirror*. The judge of an assize court could be sympathetic to either the Common Pleas or the King's Bench, and Chief Justice Desert's "demur" here suggests he favours the Common Pleas.¹⁷⁶ A "demur" or "demurrer" is an objection typically used to challenge the sufficiency of a legal action, to "deny that in law the facts as agreed amounted to a case against him [or her]".¹⁷⁷ Chief Justice Desert indicates Rosicleer's case is not permissible as an action on the case, probably because there is no evidence that Olivia *promised* to repay, only the fact of their initial "exchange" of looks. As such, Rosicleer

¹⁷³ Luke Wilson notes that "[c]ontractualism and contract-related terms like *assumpsit* and *consideration* appear with striking frequency in the non-technical literature of the period; and this sense that new kinds of wrongs might in theory be actionable under assumpsit corresponded with legal fact", "Ben Jonson and the Law of Contract", in *Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Victoria Kahn and Lorna Hutson (Yale University Press, 2001), 143–165: 144.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 150.

¹⁷⁵ See David Ibbetson, "Sixteenth Century Contract Law: Slade's Case in Context", *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 4/3 (1984): 295–317: 296.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 301.

¹⁷⁷ John H. Baker, *An Introduction to English Legal History*, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2019), 84.

enlists Hope to seek out further evidence, such as a further promise from Olivia to repay his love.¹⁷⁸ If Tyler had written Rosicleer's court case thirty years later, it might have had a different result. The impasse between the two courts was resolved in Slade's Case (1596–1602) in favour of action on the case (and *assumpsit*) so that the fact of incurring a debt was decided to itself imply a promise to repay, thus combining "[t]he two old concepts of the covenant and the debt-creating bargain".¹⁷⁹ Rosicleer's gazing upon Olivia, cast as an exchange of goods, would then itself imply a promissory obligation to repay. In the romance, though, we get a different resolution. Rosicleer is "ple[a]d[ing] his cause at the bar", and so is distracted when Olivia finally does return his amorous look, egged on by Cupid. Rosicleer has not won his damages, but the debt has now been repaid.

The fact that Tyler has Rosicleer argue action on the case and then have that action thrown out suggests she followed such cases and the contested legal argumentation behind them with close attention. Certainly, it makes Tyler's familiarity with forensic rhetoric seem less anomalous.¹⁸⁰ We know that the majority of court users were, like Tyler, not members of the gentry.¹⁸¹ While only a small percentage of common law litigants were women,¹⁸² this does not preclude their understanding of the law and there is little reason assume that the growing "law-

¹⁷⁸ That a "promise of love" might be legally actionable is less farcical than it sounds when one considers the potential for hardship (especially for women) when promises of marriages went unfulfilled. Developments in *assumpsit* and the doctrine of "consideration" led to "the extension of promissory liability into areas previously outside the scope of law" especially after Slade's case, and which persists in modern contract law. See Wilson, "Ben Jonson and the Law of Contract", 144, and A. W. B. Simpson, *A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit* (Oxford University Press, 1975), 316, which is the origin of the latter quote. More broadly, see Baker, *An Introduction to English Legal History*, 350–85.

¹⁷⁹ Baker, *An Introduction to English Legal History*, 369.

¹⁸⁰ These two aspects are cooperative. The debt dispute between Rosicleer and Olivia is not resolved by oaths in the ecclesiastical courtroom as it might have been before the early sixteenth century (as in the *fidei laesio*); instead, he must, like jurors in the seventeenth century, find the circumstances and conjecture from those her state of mind—the reality of her promissory obligation to him. That he is ill-equipped to do so provides an analogue with his abortive letter writing. Rosicleer's virtues are not legible in in the emerging legal and social contract of early modern England that Tyler imposes; this is a world that favours the well-stocked mind, rather than honour and the wielding of swords. On the transition between *fidei laesio* and *assumpsit*, see R. H. Helmholz, "Assumpsit and *Fidei laesio*", *The Law Quarterly Review* 91 (1975): 406–32.

¹⁸¹ Brooks, *Lanymers, Litigation and English Society since 1450*, 74 and Christopher W. Brooks, *Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth* (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 59–60. For women's interaction with the law, see Tim Stretton, *Women Waging Law in Elizabethan England* (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

¹⁸² In the Court of Common Pleas, for example, the figure is around five percent, Brooks, *Lanymers, Litigation and English Society since 1450*, 77. Women more commonly made recourse to the Court of Requests, *ibid.*, 71–3.

mindfulness” of early modern English society left women’s minds untouched.¹⁸³ If the supposition that Tyler was the daughter of a merchant family is correct (or if her husband or family had dealings with the law), then a knowledge of legal proceedings surrounding debt and contract specifically might be expected. And yet, the level of detail in this passage would be remarkable for any writer. As Luke Wilson reminds us in his recent warning (using the example of Philip Henslowe’s “law illiteracy”), we are sometimes too eager to read literary texts as “highly sensitive seismograph[s]” alert to legal developments and nuance, but Tyler’s addition suggests exactly that degree of sensitivity while also being, in its levity, decidedly literary.¹⁸⁴

Perhaps more unexpected still is the fact that Tyler incorporates her English legal literacy into a translation of a Spanish chivalric romance. This language and the value system it implies have far-reaching effects on the integrity of Ortúñez’s romance. The insertion of the courtroom scene just before and after Rosicleer defeats a series of foes in one-to-one jousts and combats strongly suggests the insufficiency of those chivalric deeds to recommend him to Olivia’s notice. Hutson argues that the martial feats that allowed a knight to “become visible” to royal patrons like Princess Olivia in the feudal society of the chivalric romance are displaced, in the textualised economy of Renaissance England, by feats of mental prowess.¹⁸⁵ That Tyler’s Rosicleer feels no assurance that his skills in combat will distinguish him thus feels like an anxiety every bit as contemporary as his attempt to remedy it by suing Olivia in court. But as we saw also in his abortive composition of a love letter, his facility with swords does not translate to a facility with words.

¹⁸³ Another example of women’s legal knowledge, though in a higher social class, is Lady Anne Clifford; see Stephanie Elsky, “Lady Anne Clifford’s Common-Law Mind”, *Studies in Philology* 111/3 (2014): 521–46. Laura Gowing notes that female participants in the consistory church courts were “well versed in the rules of litigation”, *Domestic Dangers: Women, Words, and Sex in Early Modern London* (Clarendon Press, 1996), 45. The term “law-mindedness” is from Brooks, *Pettyfoggers*, 9.

¹⁸⁴ Luke Wilson, “Contract”, in *The Oxford Handbook of English Law and Literature, 1500-1700*, edited by Lorna Hutson, (Oxford University Press, 2017), 393–409: 393.

¹⁸⁵ Hutson, *The Usurer’s Daughter*, 101–3.

Who made you a justice?

There are times when penetration of legalistic language into the world of *Mirroure* constitutes an existential threat to the legitimacy of the chivalric knights and the hierarchy that esteems them. This is because, as Muldrew argues, an extension of credit created the need for mechanisms of enforcing credit obligations, resulting in a “redefin[ition of] both political authority and social relations in extremely legalistic terms” that were premised on “the necessary equality of justice”.¹⁸⁶ This “equality of justice” offered an alternative framework through which to measure a person’s moral or social value without reference to nobility—namely the law. In the chivalric romance, noble ancestry and knightly virtue are synonymous,¹⁸⁷ but Tyler’s translation choices evoke a world in which “legal power could subvert conventional hierarchy” and all were “morally equal in their responsibility to honour their bargains”.¹⁸⁸ Only under this alternate model is it conceivable that Princess Olivia might be compelled by her apparent social inferior to carry out a contractual obligation.¹⁸⁹

The clash of these value systems is on full display in an incident where Emperor Trebatio chases down two knights who are attempting to rape a gentlewoman. He remonstrates with them, stating “let this gentlewoman alone, for it is great villainy to force a woman!”. In a line Tyler adds to the English, one of the knights replies: “Who made you a justice? Or do you look for an attorney’s fee?”.¹⁹⁰ This comment is a striking encapsulation of the effect Tyler’s introduction of legal language has on the chivalric world of *Mirroure*. Not only does it import distrust of lawyers and caricatures of their greed from sixteenth-century England, but it

¹⁸⁶ *Economy of Obligation*, 327.

¹⁸⁷ Therein comes the trope of the “fair unknown”, as in *Mirroure* with Rosicleer and the Knight of the Sun, whose obscure origins at first belie their noble comportment before their true descent is revealed and erases the “contradiction”.

¹⁸⁸ Muldrew, *Economy of Obligation*, 316 and 318.

¹⁸⁹ Brooks notes the increasing tendency of litigants in the Common Pleas to target their social superiors from 1560. *Lawyers, Litigation and English Society since 1450*, 15. See also Muldrew, *Economy of Obligation*, 252–53.

¹⁹⁰ Tyler, *Mirror*, 221.

introduces a whole alternate system of moral authority—not nobility or God, but the law.¹⁹¹ We see the same clash of values, from the opposite perspective, in Cervantes’s *Don Quixote*. At risk of arrest, Quixote protests that “knights errant are exempt from all jurisdictional authority [. . .] What knight errant ever paid a tax, a duty, a queen’s levy, a tribute, a tariff, or a toll?”¹⁹² Cervantes’s and Tyler’s delinquent knights each ask: what right do you have to judge? The mere fact of being a knight, or in Trebatio’s case the Emperor of Hungary, has no practical bearing on the parties’ “moral equality” before the law—and the law claims sole right of adjudication. That Trebatio subsequently chops the knights into pieces does not resolve the ideological tensions lingering in the air.

It is unclear whether Tyler set out deliberately to add legal language to her romance, perhaps as an attempt to modernise the concerns of the romance, or whether the proliferation of litigation at the time she was writing simply made those analogies feel present and apt. What is clear, however, is that in doing so Tyler introduces into the chivalric romance a wholly incommensurate set of values, complicating the genre’s nostalgia for a mythical past in which virtue and hierarchical position were perfectly aligned.¹⁹³ If romance, a notoriously difficult genre to pin down, can be defined primarily by the way it “values the antique and the exotic, and expresses a powerful longing for what came before”, or, as Northrop Frye argued, by the way it “undermines the social ideals of the here and now”,¹⁹⁴ then a modernising impulse would seem to be the one alteration that it cannot accommodate. Yet this is what Tyler attempts here, at once acculturating and modernising her source. While the discordance that results did not seem to affect *Mirror*’s commercial success, it nonetheless helps us to understand the coming decline of chivalric romance. Her translation exemplifies how antithetical the values are that characterise,

¹⁹¹ On the perception of lawyers, see Brooks, *Lanyers, Litigation and English Society since 1450*, 22–5.

¹⁹² Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, 397. In the original, “son exentos de todo judicial fuero los caballeros andantes [. . .] ¿Qué caballero andante pagó pecho, alcabala, chapín de la reina, moneda forera, portazgo ni barca?”, Cervantes, *Don Quijote*, 473.

¹⁹³ For these two senses of “pastness”, see Davis, *Chivalry and Romance*, particularly 190.

¹⁹⁴ Barbara Fuchs, *Romance* (Routledge, 2004), 6.

on the one hand, the emerging early modern social order defined by capital, the law, and the state, and, on the other, the romance order of feudal obligation and patrilineal virtue. These are exactly the tensions that texts like Cervantes's *Don Quixote* and Beaumont's *The Knight of the Burning Pestle* (both of which repeatedly reference the *Mirror* series) would exploit in the seventeenth century as the chivalric knight became an object of satire. In the way she anticipates those parodies, Tyler is shown to be a keen observer of both the law and the changing societal values to which the law responds.

My part none therein but the translation

In this chapter I have examined how Tyler affiliates her text with evolving romance traditions through an elevated register; how she attempts to engage with and accommodate humanist literary values and interests; and, finally, how she uses contemporary legal terminology and procedures to analogise chivalric deeds and refigure hierarchical relationships. Often the changes involved are minor, but in composite they posit divergent literary and ideological values that disrupt the imaginative world of *Mirror* and instantiate evaluative criteria inimical to the chivalric genre. Tyler is very much aware that her text may be perceived as obsolete, but, in altering or augmenting the original text, she does not forestall that perception so much as insinuate those objections into the text itself.

Given these conclusions, it might then be worth reconsidering Hutson's claims that the text is "consonant with feudal conceptions of male and female contributions to lineal virtue".¹⁹⁵ Does the text celebrate "physical courage" or "mental readiness"?¹⁹⁶ The translation is more interesting for having no straightforward answer to this question. *Mirror* still recounts a series of exemplary martial triumphs, as promised by Tyler's (but not Ortúñez's) titular mention of "princely deedes". However, Tyler's rhetorised and legalistic language threatens to turn these

¹⁹⁵ Hutson, *The Usurer's Daughter*, 93.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 97.

“deedes” from blows and parries on the medieval battlefield into contracts and claims in the early modern legal system. Tyler might also be said to encourage “mental readiness” through her romance’s modelling of a circumstantial reading that supplies verisimilitude at the level of character psychology and plot. Tyler’s interest in literary believability dovetails with her explicit legal additions, for both derive from recently translated classical treatises on rhetoric, treatises that as we saw in the Introduction analogised rhetorical aptitude with physical strength. Tyler’s knights still win every joust, but she seems eager to find them other, less predictable, contests: with the pen, with the judge, with the criminal who demands a trial.

I have not set out to prove that Tyler’s translation values the Renaissance man over the chivalric knight. However, I have tried to suggest that, by closely examining her English translation against its Spanish source, we reveal a much more vexed relationship than we might assume between Tyler and the ostensibly feudal values of *Mirroure* and its genre. This makes the text a rich source for scholars of early modern women’s writing and for scholars of translation. *Mirroure* demonstrates Tyler has interests and expertise that it has long been assumed women could not have. She is engaged with debates about literary taste, value, and literary form; with the construction of probable arguments influenced by forensic rhetoric; and with the procedures and controversies of the early modern legal system.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, Tyler’s translation shows that a willingness to intervene in foreign texts is not limited to male translators who, we are told in F. O. Matthiessen’s foundational account, “made the foreign classics rich with English associations”, discarding “meticulous imitation” for “the production of a book that would strike into the minds of their countrymen”.¹⁹⁸ Tyler, too, not only reworks Ortúñez’s text with English words but embeds it in English culture, tracking legal, social, and literary developments to create a more modern text that appealed to her readers even as she furnished them with the impossible

¹⁹⁷ In this period, the only woman to bring the law as knowingly to bear on her literary writing as Tyler does here is Isabella Whitney; it is notable both were from the “middling sort”.

¹⁹⁸ Matthiessen, *Translation: An Elizabethan Art*, 4 and 6.

feats and exotic journeys promised by the chivalric romance and by Spain itself. Appeal it did, but even as *Mirror* triggered a fashion for Spanish chivalric romances, it instantiated the ideological values that decades later would make that tradition such rich material for satire.

Critics have taken Tyler at her word when she says in her preface that the “invention, disposition, trimming, and what else in this story is wholly another man’s, my part none therein but the translation”.¹⁹⁹ But translation, by women as well as men, not only invites but necessitates invention, (re-)disposition, and trimming; it is itself an expressive process that partakes of the means and ends of authorship. It is not meaningful to talk about translation in quantified terms of accuracy or faithfulness, whether pejoratively or in praise. What matters are instead the expressive gaps left by the necessarily imperfect equivalence between two cultural and linguistic systems. Those gaps afford translators ample opportunities to exercise literary agency and to define their own *skopos*—opportunities which early modern women, like Margaret Tyler, took.

¹⁹⁹ Tyler, *Mirror*, 49.

CHAPTER 3: VERSIONED HISTORY

Imitation and derivation

So far in this thesis I have called texts “derivative” that are closely modelled on others through paraphrase (an intralingual transformation) or translation (an interlingual transformation), or a mixture of the two. Both, I have argued, involve interpretation and literary choices. I have, however, maintained an implicit distinction between the close relationships derivative texts have with their sources and the more distant resemblances imitative texts have with the texts they emulate. But literary texts frequently have close and distant relationships with other texts simultaneously—they may be both derivative *and* imitative. This chapter explores this phenomenon as a site of authorial agency.

To distinguish between the derivative and the imitative implies a spectrum of intertextual relationships, with the phantom of “original” composition on one end and derivative works on the other. However, we have already seen that the trappings of originality can inhere even in ostensibly dependent works. No viable distinction can therefore be made between derivation and imitation in terms of their degree of originality. Rather, what is at stake is what Reynolds calls “the flickering possibility of identity”, the sense (legitimate or not) that a translation or a paraphrase might be able to stand in for another text—the idea that by reading *War and Peace* in English, we have in fact read Tolstoy.¹ An imitation, conversely, makes no such claim, and in fact often relies for its effect on the reader’s knowledge of and referral to the imitated text.

This distinction is crucial to how I talk about derivation and imitation in Anne Dowriche’s *The French historie, that is; A lamentable Discourse of three of the chiefe, and most famous bloodie broiles that haue happened in France for the Gospell of Jesus Christ* (1589). Her work is a paraphrase of

¹ *The Poetry of Translation*, 24. Reynolds argues that today we perceive translations as more identified with their source texts than paraphrases. I believe things stand differently in early modern literature where paraphrastic “epitomes”, explications, and versifications are popular alternatives to original texts, even in the same language.

The three partes of Commentaries containing the whole and perfect discourse of the ciuill warres of Fraunce (1574),² a chronicle of the French Wars of Religion that is itself a translation by Thomas Tymme of Jean de Serres's *Commentariorum de statu religionis et reipublicae in Regno Galliae* (1571).³ I argue that the variance between *The French historie* and Tymme's *Commentaries*—that is, Dowriche's derivation—is in fact determined primarily by her imitation of another text: John Foxe's *Actes and Monuments*. The kind of imitation involved here is what Melanchthon calls *imitatio specialis*: “think[ing] of an author [. . .] as a series of habitual ways of structuring form, or of patterns of structuration”, as a *forma* or, in other words, “a particular mode of collocation [*collocatio*]” that could be used “as a set of principles for the transformation of texts”.⁴ While the textual material that Dowriche reworks comes exclusively from the *Commentaries*, she selects or departs from that material according to how well it suits, or can be made to suit, a project that is recognisably Foxean in structure and specifically, I will claim, in terms of the structure of its martyrological plots.

Imitation therefore guides derivation. Dowriche implies as much herself when she observes that “[t]he noble Martirs of England are knowen sufficientlie almost to all; these excellent French Histories were seene but of few, being in worthinesse nothing inferior unto the other”.⁵ “[K]nowen sufficientlie almost to all”, Dowriche is not interested in writing a text that stands in for Foxe's book of English martyrs, as we would expect in a derivation, because it

² Anne Dowriche, *The French historie, that is, A lamentable discourse of three of the chiefe, and most famous bloodie broiles that haue happened in France* [. . .] (Exeter and London: Thomas Orwin, 1589) and Jean de Serres, *The three partes of Commentaries containing the whole and perfect discourse of the ciuill warres of Fraunce* [. . .], trans. Thomas Tymme (London: Frances Coldocke, 1574). The *Commentaries* will be referenced throughout this chapter with signature numbers and EEBO image numbers due to that edition's numerous pagination errors.

³ Verbal parallels make clear that Dowriche used Tymme's English. Tymme's translation has a complicated identity. He believes he is translating the work of Petrus Ramus, though it is in fact Serres's. Moreover, the first “book” of Serres's Latin-language *Commentariorum* is itself a translation of Pierre de La Place's French *Commentaires de l'estat de la religion* (Paris, 1565). The subsequent books are Serres's own. In Tymme's translation the tenth “book” is not Serres's either, but a reprint of the separately published English translation of Francis Hotman's *A true and plaine report of the furious outrages of Fraunce* [. . .] (London: Henry Bynneman, 1573).

⁴ Burrow, *Imitating Authors*, 213 and 225.

⁵ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. A4r. Critics have not taken this statement seriously enough. Martin briefly comments that Dowriche “modell[s] her presentation partly on John Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*”, “Anne Dowriche's “The French History”, Christopher Marlowe, and Machiavellian Agency”, *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900* 39/1 (1999): 69–87: 71.

would be superfluous. Everyone already knows Foxe's *Actes and Monuments*. Tymme's French histories, however, "were scene but of few". Dowriche thus proposes to rewrite them "to the better liking of some mens fantasies", styling her new text as a substitute for that more compendious text.⁶

We have seen already that the *how* of derivative writing is a relatively untapped vein of evidence for early modern women's literary agency and the same is true for Dowriche's text. That oversight is a product of the valuation of "original" writing we have already discussed but also the way that, in the field of women's writing where attribution is so often fraught, "original" writing has the added benefit of being unproblematically theirs (or rather hers). The result is a tendency to see derivative (and imitative) texts as less available for claims about literary agency. Randall Martin's otherwise very good essay on *The French Historie* exemplifies that tendency by opposing derivative methods and literary agency; he states:

While she [Dowriche] unavoidably had to rely on male historians for most of her basic facts and, given her deep reformist commitments, for certain shared approaches to presenting her material, by also "chusing and ordering" various analogues of independent female action, she wrests a high degree of autonomy for herself as a writer and historian.⁷

Martin's formulations are particularly notable because they come in an article identifying Dowriche's references to Innocent Gentillet's *Contre-Machiavel*. The use of that source, he argues, attests to her "scholarly ambitions", but her more sustained derivative relationships seem to suggest the opposite.⁸ To "rely on" others through paraphrase is characterised as an undesirable yielding of literary authority, something that Dowriche was "unavoidably" forced to do. In the claim that she *had* to use "basic facts" from other accounts, Martin turns what could be framed as agential selection and elision into a kind of submission—and overlooks many instances in

⁶ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. A4r

⁷ Martin, "Dowriche, Christopher Marlowe", 84. Martin posits Dowriche's poem as an influence for Marlowe's *Massacre at Paris*. See also Randall Martin, "Anne Dowriche's *The French History* and Innocent Gentillet's *Contre-Machiavel*", *Notes and Queries* (1997): 40–2.

⁸ Martin, "Dowriche, Christopher Marlowe", 71.

which Dowriche changes or elides those received facts. Similarly, Martin frames Dowriche's "deep reformist commitments" as necessitating her derivative textual practice, instead of recognising their "shared approach" as a specific and possibly telling literary choice.

This account exhibits a paradox characteristic in criticism of women's writing, especially in the late twentieth century. Because the field for so long directed itself to identifying *oppositional* female agency, instances of women's collaboration and engagement have been occluded. We see this in the freighted opposition of "male historians" and "female action" in the quote above, suggesting the two are *ipso facto* incompatible. The essay wants to advance the cause of women's writing, but because it has set up this opposition, it must resort to a rhetorical sleight of hand. Martin argues that Dowriche uses female characters like Catherine de Medici as "analogues" for female autonomy and thereby "wrests" autonomy for herself as a writer and implicitly for all women. But in *The French historie*, Catherine de Medici is the diabolic antagonist, conniving to destroy the Protestant truth that Dowriche held dear. The suggestion that she would advance Medici as an avatar of female agency is not persuasive, and its premise—that when women write women they are always secretly writing themselves—is regressive. Much twenty-first century scholarship in the field is more amenable to collaboration and the nuances of literary agency, but it has yet to reappraise the close intertextual relationships we find in texts like *The French historie*. This chapter contends that if we attend to Dowriche's collaboration with male-authored writing rather than dismissing or excusing it, we can uncover much richer evidence of women's literary agency and a fuller understanding of the authorial craft of derivative and imitative writing.

I argue that in *The French historie*, Dowriche paraphrases the *Commentaries* to supply the historical incidents that populate her own Foxean plots. In doing so, these incidents come to serve an entirely different model of historical thought, replacing that history's archive of incident with a Foxean emphasis on example, typology, and providence. But Foxe does not wholly determine the parameters of her project. While *The French historie* and the *Acts and Monuments* share an approach to history, they have different concerns. The ecclesiastical history of the *Acts*

and Monuments and its vast catalogue of martyrologies primarily create a genealogy for the English church and nation and in so doing lay the groundwork for a myth of national exceptionalism. Dowriche's *The French historie* instead seeks to create pan-European Protestant solidarity and zeal through affective narratives of Huguenot suffering. This affect is the result of particular literary choices, but the narratives are also plotted in ways that exemplify the wider providential narrative Dowriche is sketching—namely one in which English and French Protestants are interchangeable parts in a preordained, supranational story. As such, derivation and imitation overlap in a sophisticated authorial strategy by which the French plight is rewritten as the plight of her English reader.

Part 1: Framing this work

Virescit vulnere veritas

Anne Dowriche (before 1560—after 1613), *née* Edgcumb, hails from one of the most prominent families in Devon. She has been placed by Micheline White in a network of notable families from or resident around Exeter that share links to nonconformist preachers and causes.

Alongside the lesser-known Rouse and Fulford families, this grouping includes Anne Lock, who moved to Exeter circa 1579, a decade before she published her translation of Huguenot Jean Taffin's *Of the Markes of the children of God*.⁹ The Dowriches shared Lock's puritan convictions. Her close family was linked with nonconformists like Melancthon Jewell,¹⁰ and her husband, Hugh Dowriche, donated funds to the besieged Geneva in a charity drive that “recall[ed] the generosity that Geneva offered to English exiles during the Marian persecution”.¹¹ He also

⁹ White suggests there may have been a social or even a literary relationship between these families. “Women Writers”, 194.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 195.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 203.

dedicated his own book, a sermon advocating spiritual vigilance, to Valentine Knightley who received a royal reprimand for his support of Puritan figures.¹²

The political commitments of Dowriche's social set align with those of *The French historie*. A long verse poem, it recounts three episodes from the preceding two decades of tumultuous French history that tell of the persecution of the Huguenots. Like her husband's later text and those written by her circle, Dowriche's poem targets a specifically godly audience. She states in her prefatory remarks

[t]hat my onlie purpose in collecting & framing this worke, was to edifie, comfort and stirre up the godlie mindes unto care, watchfulnesse, Zeale, & firventnesse in the cause of Gods truth; you shall easilie perceive by the chusing and ordering of these singular examples which hereafter insue.¹³

Her "framing" in fact involves supplying historical events with invented speeches and circumstances that she says function "more lively to set them down in their colors [. . .] so that here are not bare examples of vertue and vice, but also the nature and qualities of those vertues or villanies are manifestly depainted to them that will seeke for it".¹⁴ Her colourful orations hence promise a "lively" enargeia that will hold the reader's attention better than a plain catalogue of deeds. She also dedicates a whole paragraph of her preface to the choice to versify her source. She says she "described it in verse" in part "for the mere noveltie of the thing, and [for verse's] apt facilitie in disposing the matter framed to the better liking of some mens fantasies".¹⁵ For those readers whose tastes do not favour Tymme's long prose account, Dowriche's shorter but embellished verse "framing" thus provides an alternative that, as I have suggested, can stand in for that text. She uses poulter's measure: couplets of alternating

¹² Ibid., 194–95. Her husband's volume contains a poem by Dowriche (marked as "A.D."), Hugh Dowriche, *The jaylors conversion* [. . .] (London: John Windet, 1596), sigs. A6v–7r.

¹³ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. A3v.

¹⁴ Ibid., sig. A4r.

¹⁵ Ibid.

alexandrine and fourteener lines. This metre was so popular in the sixteenth century that Gascoigne could describe it, in 1575, as “the commonest sort of verse which we use now adayes”.¹⁶ It was associated with hymns and versified psalms but is also similar to the ballad’s common metre.¹⁷ Some critics have suggested that Dowriche’s use of this metre in 1589 is retrograde, but her appeal to “some mens fantasies” may suggest a conscious appeal to traditions of religious and popular song, and to its capacity to aid memorisation.¹⁸ Most importantly, her choice of verse form breaks from her lengthy prose source as well as Foxe’s protracted text in order to lower the barriers for readerly entry into French history and martyrology. As such this is a kind of “framing” appropriate to her wish that her French histories are “known sufficientlie”.

The preface is just one of several textual and paratextual “containers” that Dowriche deploys to ease her reader’s entry into her text and to guide their interpretation of it.¹⁹ The title page of *The French historie*, for example, encapsulates the religious convictions of her text and inaugurates one of the poem’s key admonitory strategies: highlighting the divergent situations of her English readers and her French subject. Most apparent is the emblem of personified female Truth (*Veritas*) wearing a crown and with a whip hanging at her back (see Fig. 1), which is also repeated on the last page. This emblem is not used in any other publication by Dowriche’s printer Thomas Orwin, suggesting Dowriche may have proposed it (or indeed had it drawn) especially for her text.²⁰ It is certainly well suited to the religious agenda of her text. Its inscription, “virescit vulnere veritas” (truth grows through injury), glosses the figure and whip

¹⁶ *The poesies of George Gascoigne Esquire*, sig. U2v.

¹⁷ This is discussed in detail in the third part of this chapter.

¹⁸ Beilin describes poulter’s measure as “often scorned” and suggests that the poem may have escaped critical notice for this reason, “Some Freely Spake Their Minde’: Resistance in Anne Dowriche’s *French Historie*”, in *Women, Writing, and the Reproduction of Culture in Tudor and Stuart Britain*, edited by Mary E. Burke et al. (Syracuse University Press, 2000), 119–40: 120.

¹⁹ This emphasis on guiding a reader’s engagements with a text reflects broader concerns about the interpretation of religious books. As Susan Felch observes this is apparent in the paratexts of both scriptural texts (for example the Geneva Bible) and extra-scriptural ones, like the Foxe’s *Actes and Monuments*; “Shaping the Reader in the *Acts and Monuments*”, in *John Foxe and the English Reformation*, edited by D. M. Loades (Ashgate, 1997), 52–65.

²⁰ It is similar to Thomas Creede’s emblem, which it predates. Diegetically the emblem is attributed to the Frenchman, when it reappears at the end of the book with the inscription “Veritie purtrained by the French pilgrime”, Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. L2r.

but also evokes the text's godly audience.²¹ Dowriche often refers to the religious reformers as agents of "Gods truth" in her text, and the emblem suggests that it is the lot of the godly, as champions of truth, to be persecuted. Indeed, the ablative "vulnere" makes persecution the vehicle by which truth comes to flourish. "Virescit" literally refers to the shoots of a plant suggesting that persecuting the godly will only serve to sow more seeds of God's truth. That suffering could not only testify to virtue but propagate it is, of course, exactly the conviction of martyrological writers like Foxe who marshalled accounts of individual deaths towards a wider spiritual conflict.



Fig. 1, Title page emblem.²²

²¹ The motto is a rewriting of the ubiquitous "virescit vulnere virtus" ("virtue grows through injury").

²² Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. A1r.




Fig. 2, Title page contents.²³

The influence of Foxe persists in the way Dowriche lists the contents of her text. Her subtitle reads “[a] lamentable Discourse of three of the chiefe, and most famous bloodie broiles that have happened in *France* for the Gospell of Jesus Christ” before numbering them along with key figures and dates (see Fig. 2). The large chronological gaps between the events listed evoke a typological scheme, like Foxe’s, that is interested in interpreting events as forerunners and types rather than discerning their local cause and effect. The incidents listed are depicted as exemplary (“famous”) and expressed in sensational terms intended to capture a popular market, such as “outrage”, “bloodie broiles” and “bloodie Marriage”. Below these and directly above the emblem, Dowriche includes a reference to what is in fact 2 Timothy 3:12, reading “[a]ll that will live godlie in Jesus Christ, shall suffer persecution”. This verse (from the Geneva translation) allows Dowriche to explicitly target her Puritan audience: those for whom “godlie” was a cognomen. Like the emblem, this verse depicts persecution as a prerequisite of godliness and Calvinist election. In its future tense “will” and “shall”, the verse speaks to the logic of a

²³ Ibid.

providential history which foretells worldly prosecution and a final resurrection with Christ. By equating suffering so explicitly with election and the Huguenots so explicitly with suffering, Dowriche causes the English reader to feel their own relationship with God's truth to be rather more precarious. If as Alexandra Walsham argues, "suffering [. . .] helped to bring the regenerate to an awareness that they numbered among the tiny remnant of those predestined to receive divine grace", then Dowriche's title page might suggest that, relative to the participants in her French histories, her readers have not had the galvanising effect of hardship.²⁴ The green shoots of godly truth may be, in them, retarded.

That the comparison with France might be more chastening than favourable goes against the received wisdom (and pride) of English Protestants, for though critics have argued that English "elect nation" thinking did not truly originate until the seventeenth century, we see its origins in many contemporary texts.²⁵ A paradigmatic example comes from Thomas Churchyard's 1579 *The Miserie of Flaunders, Calamitie of Fraunce, Misfortune of Portugall, Unquietnes of Ireland, Troubles of Scotlande: And the Blessed state of Englande*. Churchyard sees England as insular and insulated from European tumult, as is made abundantly clear in his title and in his dedication to Elizabeth. There he describes his work as construing "Flaunders, Fraunce, Portugall, Irelande, and Scotlande, to bee the shell of a precious Nutte, the sweete Kinnell whereof is the blessed state of ENGLANDE" which "shewes it self so sounde, that Gods greate goodnesse & glorie is partly or altogether therein expressed".²⁶ John Foxe's prefatory dedication makes similar claims

²⁴ "The Happiness of Suffering: Adversity, Providence, and Agency in Early Modern England", in *Suffering and Happiness in England 1550–1850: Narratives and Representations*, edited by Michael J. Braddick and Joanna Innes (Oxford University Press, 2017), 54. Walsham notes that "[p]ostulating an inverse relationship between prosperity and piety, ministers went on to remind their flocks that 'those whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth', those who tasted not of the cup of His wrath were in all likelihood 'bastards, and not sons'", *Providence in Early Modern England* (Oxford University Press, 2001), 16–7. The citation in this quote is from Hebrews 12:6–8.

²⁵ The "elect nation" argument was first made in relation to Foxe's *Actes of Monuments* by William Haller, *Foxe's Book of Martyrs and the Elect Nation* (Jonathan Cape, 1963). Patrick Collinson argues that the assertion "[t]hat England, typologically Israel, was 'an' elect nation was a commonplace, in the pulpit and elsewhere, but except as a rhetorical flourish, 'God is English!,' the claim that England was *the* elect nation, God's exclusive favorite, was rarer", "John Foxe and National Consciousness", in *John Foxe and his World*, edited by Christopher Highley and John N. King (Ashgate, 2002), 10–36: 10. See also Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood*, 263 and 268.

²⁶ Thomas Churchyard, *The miserie of Flaunders [. . .]* (London: Felix Kingston, 1579), sig. A1v.

of exceptionalism. He praises Queen Elizabeth for “these Alcion dayes of yours”, and her “vertuous inclination” and “provident care and Zeale full of solicitude” in “minding (speedely I trust) to furnish all quarters and countreys of this your realme with the voice of Christes Gospel”.²⁷ If his parentheses leaves the door open for doubt, even in the later 1583 edition Foxe is far from suggesting, as Dowriche does in her own preface, that England’s “Alcion dayes” may in fact be inimical to maintaining true religion.²⁸ Turning to French history furnishes Dowriche and her reader with comparable but more recent stories of godly suffering whose ramifications continued to play out across the Channel and were frequently reported in (increasingly prevalent) news pamphlets.²⁹ Such a tactic indicates a key difference from Foxe, who primarily provided English readers and the English church with a sense of lineage that smoothed the rupture of the Reformation.³⁰ Dowriche’s own Protestant lineage is decidedly international and its present far from settled.

Advice from guests

²⁷ John Foxe, *Actes and monuments* [. . .] (London: John Daye, 1583), sigs. *[0]r- *1r.

²⁸ Only in the Latin preface “Ad Christum Eucharisticon” that Foxe adds to his 1583 edition does he begin to address the complacency Dowriche identifies. He notes how contemporary Englishmen fall short of the virtue of their self-sacrificing forbears: “[q]uantum enim intersit discriminis, quam prorsus disconuenit ordine toto nostra consuetudo ab illorum vestigiis & disciplina, pudet profecto referre” (“It is shameful to set out the distance and divide between our experience and that of their famous footsteps and discipline”). But he still lacks Dowriche’s admonitory urgency; after all, the preface is addressing Christ in Latin. The subsequent line reads “[s]ed quid ego tibi referam, cuius nihil non perspicit maiestas ac intuetur?” (“But why should I tell you this, to whom nothing goes unobserved or unconsidered”). *Ibid.*, 2 (no sig.).

²⁹ See Lisa Ferraro Parmelee, *Good News From Fraunce: French anti-league propaganda in late Elizabethan England* (University of Rochester Press, 1996).

³⁰ This emerging complacency suggests that the attempts of Foxe and others to smooth that rupture were successful. Helgerson, conversely, suggests that *Acts and Monuments* devotes much of its energies to “the conflict between the godly and the established authority of the church and state. It thus gives its “invisible” English church a strongly oppositional identity, an identity founded on suffering and resistance and profoundly antithetical to the hierarchical order of the English state”. This argument sits uncomfortably with the placement of Foxe’s text in cathedrals and its own conservative prefatory rhetoric. Dowriche’s, conversely, is more clearly oppositional and activist in its intent. See *Forms of Nationhood*, 268.

Like many others of a “hot” persuasion, then, Dowriche perceives and advocates against a growing complacency in her fellow Englishman.³¹ These emphases are apparent in the invented narrative poem with which Dowriche opens the book proper. The poem is itself a framing device, depicting the titular histories as stories recounted by a French refugee to an Englishman who offers him shelter and respite. Before we consider how this poem guides the reader’s interpretation of her text, though, it is worth considering the literal acts of hospitality it depicts: the kindness and generosity of the Englishman towards the French exile. Christopher Archibald describes the poem as a “transcultural encounter” which “models her [Dowriche’s] commitment to an international Protestant community”.³² We have already observed that commitment in her local set, and it is worth adding that her brother and the poem’s dedicatee Pierce Edgcomb sought to place Huguenot refugees in communities in Devon.³³ This kind of hospitality was not without controversy. In the latter half of the sixteenth century, London was on the receiving end of waves of primarily Dutch and French refugees. Andrew Pettegree estimates that between 1550 and 1585, “perhaps as many as forty or fifty thousand” refugees came to London, including a significant number following the St Bartholomew’s Day massacre in 1572—the subject of Dowriche’s third episode.³⁴ The response to the presence of these “strangers”, as they were called, was mixed.³⁵ The Parliamentary Debate of March 1593 depicts this split opinion, with

³¹ Alexandra Walsham provides many examples of the godly upbraiding spiritual sloth: “Pilkington was already castigating his contemporaries for their ‘cold slacknesse’ and ‘slothful negligence’ in erecting the kingdom of Christ in the early 1560s; a decade later Edward Bush pondered the consequences of ‘our backslyding and backstarting from God’; 1578 saw John Stockwood, headmaster at Tonbridge School, deploring the unholy lifestyles of the majority after no less than twenty years of painful preaching; Anthony Anderson and James Bisse were bewailing the fact that England was waxing weary of the Gospel and relapsing, with ‘a catholike cooling’ of its former zeal, into profanity and paganism in 1581. Time ticked away and 1595 found William Perkins reproving a generation as perverse and unenlightened as its popish ancestors and rehearsing the familiar grievance that religion was made ‘a by-word’ and ‘a mocking-stocke’”, *Providence in Early Modern England*, 296.

³² Christopher Archibald, “Remembering the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in Elizabethan England”, *Studies in Philology* 118/2 (2021): 242–83.

³³ Scott K. Oldenburg, *Alien Albion: literature and immigration in early modern England* (University of Toronto Press, 2014), 60.

³⁴ Andrew Pettegree, *Foreign Protestant Communities in Sixteenth-Century London* (Oxford University Press, 1986), 299. Pettegree notes that the stranger churches were so full that “it was necessary to institute an extra service at seven in the morning to deal with the crush”, *ibid.*, 210.

³⁵ On the term, see the chapter “Alien/Stranger” in Nandini Das et al., *Keywords of Identity, Race, and Human Mobility in Early Modern England* (Amsterdam University Press, 2021), 20–9.

some arguing for solidarity and the benefits of immigration and others, like Sir Walter Raleigh, opposed. Raleigh stated that “in my opinion it is no matter of *Charity* to relieve them. For, such as fly hither have forsaken their own King; and Religion is no pretext for them [. . . for] here they live disliking our Church”.³⁶ For Dowriche and those of her circle, religion overcame national and political differences. Indeed, that refugees “dislik[ed]” aspects of the English church may have been a point of agreement between them and their zealous Protestant sponsors.

The poem itself is a complaint in the form of a *chanson d’aventure*. An Englishman overhears the laments of a French refugee, observes him for some time and then engages him in conversation, offering assistance and hospitality, but also stating that “of these warres I greatly long to hear”.³⁷ The Englishman stands in for Dowriche’s ideal reader: one that is not only hospitable to others but attentive to the causes of their plight and so able to ward against them. Dowriche wants to elicit a kind of compassion that, in one definition, “understands such a thing could happen to him, or to one of his own”; in other words, to generate sympathy *and* reflection on how events come to pass and how they might be interpreted as iterative parts of a providential historical process.³⁸ To produce this effect, Dowriche adjusts some of the topoi afforded by the complaint genre. The poem begins: “As walking on a daie, the woods and forrests nie: / In shrilling voyce, and mournfull tunes, me thought I heard one crie”.³⁹ The chance encounter, as well as the pastoral setting and even the archaism of terms like “wight”, is typical of the complaint, appearing in texts from Churchyard’s *Shores Wife* to Spenser’s “Ruines

³⁶ See Simonds d’Ewes, “Journal of the House of Commons: March 1593”, *The Journals of All the Parliaments During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth* (Irish University Press, 1682), 479–513, <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/jrnl-parliament-eliz1/pp479-513> accessed 28 November 2019. Some more favourable accounts are recorded in Patrick Collinson, “The Elizabethan Puritans and the Foreign Reformed Churches in London”, *Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London*, 20 (1958–64): 528–55.

³⁷ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. B2v.

³⁸ Cited in Katherine Ibbett, *Compassion’s Edge: Fellow-Feeling and Its Limits in Early Modern France* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 9. This quote is from César-Pierre Richelet’s definition of compassion in 1680 and I use it here to describe Dowriche’s text rather than to suggest that she would necessarily have shared the same definition. As Ibbett notes, taxonomies of emotion that develop in the seventeenth century are contested and often differ from our own, including in a blurred line between our hierarchical distinction between pity and compassion, *ibid.*, 8.

³⁹ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. B1r.

of Time” and Shakespeare’s “A Lover’s Complaint”.⁴⁰ That the complainant is a Frenchman is, however, atypical. Usually complaints depict woebegone women encountered by men and derive from that dynamic a libidinal dimension. Here, though, two men encounter one another. Moreover, the Frenchman laments not a lost lover, another complaint trope, but France’s fall from grace: “O noble *France* (quod he) that bor’st sometime the bell, / And for thy pleasure and thy wealth all Nations didst excell!”⁴¹ The image of “bearing the bell”, “worn by the leading cow or sheep”, chimes with the complaint’s pastoral tendencies, but projects them onto the herd of European nations where France placed, until recently, in the leading position.⁴² The Frenchman and by extension France therefore occupies the disempowered position usually filled by the lamenting woman. The typical complainant’s vulnerability—at once physical (she is isolated), psychological (she is distressed) and socio-political (her gender and social position limits her means of redress)—is projected onto a personified France to whom, by merit of being represented as male, those iniquities are especially rankling and thus especially pathetic.

If the Frenchman occupies the position usually assigned to the forlorn woman, the Englishman appears to more easily fit the role of the male witness, who is able to offer solace or assistance. In a literal sense, this is true: he offers shelter and provisions.⁴³ However, Dowriche undercuts the assuredness that this role might seem to entail. The Englishman is, in fact, on edge. When he hears the Frenchman’s cry we hear that “sodaine feare so dasht / my blood and senses all” and “[a] thousand thoughts opprest my fearfull wavering braine”.⁴⁴ His salubrious “walking on a daie” in nearby woods quickly becomes threatening:

I fearde least theeves had robd and cast some man aside:

Because it was the common waie where men did use to ride.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² “bell, *n.*”, III, 7, *OED*.

⁴³ See Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. B2v but also sig. L1v where the Englishman says that “[f]or thy discourse take this reward”.

⁴⁴ Ibid., sig. B1r.

Among the savage beasts that in these woods remaine,

I doubted least some travler stood in danger to be slaine.⁴⁵

This opening is, as Sidney L. Sondergard has noted, “proto-Gothic”.⁴⁶ The “Edenic vision of England is considerably destabilized” as the pastoral forests reveal hidden dangers that cast doubt on England’s status as sanctuary.⁴⁷ The Frenchman asks of his nation, “[w]here is thy vernant hiew? thy fresh and flowring fame”,⁴⁸ but England’s own verdant forests have their own perils, complicating the expected dynamic between refugee and host, country fled and country fled to.

I would suggest, though, that these perils are not so much a comment on England’s upheaval as a reflection of the Englishman’s exemplary vigilance. The dangers identified are not realised in the poem but are only evoked by the mind of the Englishman: it is he that is fearing, doubting and speculating. The Englishman is Dowriche’s ideal reader in the sense that he is not at all complacent. He has, in essence, already internalised the Frenchman’s *de casibus* warning about the transience of good fortune and is thus primed for the similar lessons contained in *The French historie* as a whole. The main repository of *de casibus* narratives in English, *A myrroure for magistrates* (1563), carries in most of its editions the motto “*Felix quem faciunt aliena pericula cautum*”—“happy are they made cautious by the plight of others”—a sentence that would be fitting on the title page of *The French historie*.⁴⁹ While the Englishman is not jovial, his situation is *felix* in its other sense of auspicious or favourable because by attending to the hardships of others he better wards against them himself. Already well-apprised of local disasters, he is eager for

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Sidney L. Sondergard, *Sharpening Her Pen: strategies of rhetorical violence by early modern English women writers* (Susquehanna University Press, 2002), 73.

⁴⁷ Beilin, “Some Freely Spake Their Minde”, 130.

⁴⁸ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. B1r.

⁴⁹ William Baldwin, *A myrroure for magistrates* [...] (London: Thomas Marshe, 1563), title page.

information on their international counterparts. “Oh happie then am I: my frend”, he declares, “Come goe with me, for of these warres I greatly long to hear”.⁵⁰

What the Englishman requests is in fact a circumstantial oration of all particulars, instructing his interlocutor to “first of all describe the matter, and the man, / The place, the time, the manner how this Civill warre began”.⁵¹ He asks the Frenchman to explain the *causa* of the French wars in reference to the places of argument described in Cicero and Quintilian, and in Erasmus’s *De copia* as the “[q]uis quoties occasio ubi cur quomodo quando”.⁵² On one level, the Englishman’s request “explains” the vivid theatricality of the subsequent episodes, justifying the artificial means Dowriche will bring to their representation. These are the attributes that will make the Frenchman’s discourse believable and vivid and so make its lessons legible and memorable. But those attributes will also allow the particulars of his tale to be used to construct future arguments around issues of fact (conjectures), for example for readers to recognise the signs of coming civil and religious strife in England. The Englishman’s keen interest in peril makes him ideally placed to seek out the *aliena pericula* that excite but also chasten and warn. He thus exemplifies and models the kind of analogic thinking on which the message of *The French historie* relies, namely a turn of thought that witnesses other’s past misfortunes and triumphs and extrapolates from them templates for future events and future conduct. By attending to the Frenchman’s martyrologies as the Englishman does here, the reader is encouraged to view themselves as similarly emplotted within a providential view of history.

It is not surprising, given this concern, that Dowriche has the Frenchman depict his plight in ways that pique the interest and concern of his English auditor and her English readers. This involves removing any cultural or linguistic obstacles that might interpose, effecting an easy

⁵⁰ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. B2v.

⁵¹ Ibid. Dowriche describes her authorial role as making “fully & amplie expressed” episodes that were, in her sources “in substance lightly touched”, or were “set downe without amplifying the circumstance”, *ibid.*, sig. A4r.

⁵² “Who, how often, [what] occasion, where, why, in what way, when”. From Johannes Velcurio’s commentary in Desiderius Erasmus, *De duplici copia verborum ac rerum* [. . .] (London: Henry Middleton, 1573), sig. R8v; see also Hutson, *Circumstantial Shakespeare*, especially the introduction.

solidarity that elides difference.⁵³ The Frenchman's lament about his nation's former status is readily applicable to an English audience:

Where is the mutuall love that Prince and people had?
Where is the noble union, that makes the Countrie glad?
Where is the due regard that Princes ought to haue;
From all the bands of tyrannie their people for to save?
[. . .]
But these of late to thee ô *France* have bid adieu
That rigor reignes in mercies seate: alas, it is too true.⁵⁴

Again we have a universalising *de casibus* emphasis on loss and on reversals of fortune, as the neat metrical repetition in “rigor reignes in mercies seat” coincides with a reversal of signification.

These lines resemble radical Huguenot texts like Bèze's *Du droit des magistrats sur leurs sujets* (1574) and Hotman's *Francogallia* (1573) which challenged the authority of monarchs by locating in the “good laws and statutes of our ancestors”⁵⁵ a precedent for resisting sovereign overreach, influenced in part by Calvin's discussion of “popular magistrates” in his *Institutes*.⁵⁶ As J. H. M. Salmon notes, following the St Bartholomew's Massacre, Huguenot theorists:

continued to employ their constitutional myths of the power of the Estates General and to quote historical precedents to disguise revolutionary action as conservatism [. . .] [t]hey wove rational arguments to show that the community in its corporate capacity possessed

⁵³ Though there is no indication of a language barrier in this poem, that barrier is, conversely, often referenced in discussions of the stranger churches in London and seen as an obstacle to integration, see “A complaynt of the Cytizens of London against the great number of strangers in and about this cytty”, PRO, SP12/81/29, cited in Luu Lien Bich Luu, “Migration and change: Religious refugees and the London economy, 1550-1600”, *Critical Survey* 8/1 (1996): 93–102.

⁵⁴ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. B1v.

⁵⁵ Cited in Arlette Jouanna, *The Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre: the mysteries of a crime of state* (Manchester University Press, 2013), 199 ff.

⁵⁶ “We are subject to the men who rule over us, but subject only in the Lord. If they command anything against Him let us not pay the least regard to it [. . .]. On this ground Daniel denies that he had sinned in any respect against the king when he refused to obey his impious decree (Dan. vi:22), because the king had exceeded his limits, and not only been injurious to men, but, by raising his horn against God, had virtually abrogated his own power,” John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, trans. Henry Beveridge (Eerdmans, 1989), 2.675.

an ultimate sovereignty which enabled its representatives to discipline or depose the ruler.⁵⁷

Dowriche, too, predicates the “mutuall love” between sovereign and nation on the former’s fulfilment of their duties: their “due regard” to protect the people. Not only has that duty been neglected, but “rigor reignes”—the monarch has imposed the very “bands of tyrannie” they are supposed to ward against. Like the treatises of Bèze and Hotman, then, Dowriche appears to see the monarchy in a “noble union” with the people only in so far as the sovereign obeys a system of rules and conventions, suggesting a kind of ancient constitution that determines what the monarch *ought* and *ought not* do. If she safely confines this radical argument to the Frenchman, it is nonetheless expressed in language that makes it readily transposable to an English setting, lacking the particulars of Estates General or popular magistrates that might circumscribe it. Reading past the differences between France and England is exactly what Dowriche wants her readers to do.

The framing complaint poem thus lends the paraphrastic episodes that follow a clear interpretative framework. The Englishman models an ideal reader who is attentive to the woes of the Frenchman and alert to the lessons to be gleaned from the experiences of others. Moreover, the Frenchman couches the plight of his nation in comprehensible and mobile terms. If Foxe’s English narratives are more obviously relevant to English readers, Dowriche’s French subject matter requires that she more explicitly dramatise the analogic turn of thought that will make her episodes pertinent to her own audience. Her choice of a complaint poem is key to this. Complaints depict and amplify a character’s distress to elicit pity. As Augustine observes, “[w]hat is pity except a kind of fellow-feeling in our own hearts for the sufferings of others”, or as Ibbett describes it, “a movement across difference”.⁵⁸ Here pity is used to bridge the literal and cultural gaps between England and France, as indeed it is in all the subsequent narratives. That emotional

⁵⁷ J. H. M. Salmon, *The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought* (The Clarendon Press, 1959), 7.

⁵⁸ *Compassion’s Edge*, 4 and 10. Ibbett is citing the *City of God*.

response is not only aesthetic or cathartic. For, unlike readers of texts like the *Heroides* who can do nothing to redress the abandonment of Ovid's female speakers, in *The French historie* Dowriche recounts the plight of the Huguenots in order to elicit a particular way of thinking: a salutary compassion that "understands such a thing could happen to him, or to one of his own" and thus guards against it.⁵⁹ As the French refugee concludes at the end of *The French historie*: "And that in wofull *France* the troubles that we see, / To *England* for to shun the like, may now a warning be".⁶⁰

Part 2: Constant Martirdome

If Dowriche warns England to "shun the like", we must ask what she means by that "like". To answer this, we need to turn to her derivative method—to which episodes she chooses to paraphrase and to what she adds to or preserves from her source, Tymme's *Commentaries*. While Dowriche's selected episodes, or parts of them, are indeed enlarged in *The French historie*, they have been extracted from a much longer text with much more encyclopaedic aspirations. The *Commentaries* moves chronologically from monarch to monarch, as indicated by a regnal header on each page. It includes numerous primary texts extracted at some length, for example correspondence between key figures, the text of proclamations or edicts and petitions to monarchs. Addenda volumes were released after its initial publication, marking the continued religious strife (the text's primary subject) and, more simply, the march of time.⁶¹ Conversely, Dowriche chooses to paraphrase only three episodes that span three monarchs.⁶² These episodes she supplies with a tight, formulaic structure that aligns with Foxe's martyrological plots. William Haller famously argued that *Actes and Monuments* sought to make readers "more conscious of

⁵⁹ Ibid., 9.

⁶⁰ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. L1v.

⁶¹ Tymme published a "fourth parte" of Serres's work in 1576 and his work is recapitulated and then extended to cover more recent events by Edward Grimeston in 1607 and 1624.

⁶² The middle episode pertaining to Anne de Bourg spans the death of Henry II and the accession of Francis II.

England as an entity by itself and of themselves as a people set apart from all others”, but here even as she imitates Foxe’s plots, Dowriche seeks to undermine the narrative of England’s separate destiny to which he contributed.⁶³

Anne du Bourg

I want to turn first to Dowriche’s second episode because of the three she selects this is the one that is most recognisably a martyr narrative in her source.⁶⁴ It therefore provides us a case of minimal difference between her version and her sources that can help us to isolate her derivative and imitative practice. The episode concerns Anne du Bourg, a godly French magistrate who challenged Henry II for his oppression of Protestant reformers. Du Bourg was tried and executed as a result. In recounting this event, both *The French historie* and the *Commentaries* include many of the formulaic elements associated with martyrology that we find in the leading English repository of that form, Foxe’s *Acts and Monuments*, namely:

the apprehension of alleged heretics, imprisonment, heresy examination (sometimes in the presence of torture), clerical appeal for recantation, refusal to recant (sometimes after an initial recantation), conviction, chaining to the stake, recitation of Psalm 51 (a confession of sin and penitential lamentation), and final prayerful utterances.⁶⁵

⁶³ Haller, *Foxe’s Book of Martyrs* 225.

⁶⁴ That Tymme is her source is evidenced by numerous textual borrowings from the *Commentaries* in Dowriche’s version, as we shall see. However it is also worth noting that in the 1570, 1576 and 1583 editions of Foxe’s *Acts and Monuments*, multiple mentions of Anne du Bourg are made in a sub-section of Queen Mary’s reign called “The stroke of Gods hand upon Henry .2. French king” (in the 1583 edition, sig. CCCCC1r–v). Foxe’s account includes details about Henry II’s accidental death and about the providential comeuppance received by one of du Bourg’s leading prosecutors, President Minard. These details are not included in Dowriche or in Tymme. Though there are similarities between Dowriche’s and Foxe’s account of du Bourg’s martyrdom, these similarities do not indicate in this case that she used Foxe directly, but instead that Foxe used the same sources as Serres used. Foxe includes some Latin verses which he says were “printed in the French story booke” and indeed this is a reference not to Serres’s text—which Foxe’s 1570 edition predates by a year—but to the source for Serres’s first book of commentaries: the French *Commentaires de l’estat de la religion* of 1565 by Pierre de La Place. La Place’s text includes the same Latin verse: see the 19th century historical anthology: *Choix de Chroniques et Mémoires sur L’Histoire de France*, ed. J. A. C. Buchon (A. Desrez, 1836), 77. Those Latin verses are translated into English in Tymme’s translation, *Commentaries*, sig. P1r (EEBO img. 65).

⁶⁵ John Foxe, *Foxe’s Book of Martyrs: Select Narratives* ed. John N. King (Oxford University Press, 2009), xxviii–xxix.

In Foxe, and in Dowriche's own episodes, these elements come to form a recognisable martyr plot that follows the apocalyptic trajectory from suffering to death and salvation. As we shall see, Dowriche strongly foregrounds these elements and plot points, departing from the broader historical interests of the *Commentaries*. As with any work of plotting, this involves the "imbuing of an apparently natural temporal sequence with a heightened sense of causality", as Dowriche wrests from the events a sense of inevitable momentum.⁶⁶

The most obvious of Dowriche's alterations is that she assigns Anne du Bourg a discrete section of her narrative. On her frontispiece the section is called "[t]he constant Martirdome of *Annas Burgeus* one of the K. Councell, 1559", but it is also separately titled within the text proper as "[t]he notable, famous, and constant Martirdome of Annas Burgeus, which, being one of the Kings Councell, was burnt for the gospel of Jesus Christ".⁶⁷ These titles follow a precise Foxean structure. In *Acts and Monuments*, Foxe always names the martyr in question, and often provides a date and some brief detail about the identity of that martyr, for example his or her occupation, as in "The history of D. Rouland Taylor, which suffered for the truth of Gods word, under the tyranny of the Romayne Byshop. 1555. the 9. day of February" and "The Life and Martyrdome of Mayster John Hooper *Bishop of Worcester and Gloucester*, burnt for the defence of the Gospell at Gloucester. Anno 1555. February".⁶⁸ This recognisable formula is one Dowriche replicates right down to the use of a set phrase about the martyr dying for God's truth or the gospel. The reforming commitments of the martyrs are never left implicit and each title provides a precis of the narrative to come.

Conversely, in Tymme (and in Serres's original) there is no title to demarcate the story of Anne du Bourg. Indeed, in the *Commentaries* his story is interrupted by other material. Its account of his initial stand against King Henry II states:

⁶⁶ Hutson, *The Invention of Suspicion*, 115.

⁶⁷ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. D1r.

⁶⁸ Foxe, *Actes and monuments*, sigs. TTTt5r and SSSs3r respectively.

Annas Burgaeus, a man very godly & wel learned [. . .] exhorted the King to bend his minde, and give good care to so great & urgent cause (being in deede the cause of our Lord Jesus Christ, which ought to be defended by the patrocinie & garde of Kings) [and he] very boldly and freely uttered his minde [. . .] that the punishments then used toward the *Lutheranes*, for that time should surcease.⁶⁹

This opening promises the distinction of “a man very godly” and du Bourg’s brazen defence of the gospel foreshadows—or rather forebodes—a martyrological narrative to come. Subsequent to this quote, however, his story is interrupted for several pages by a digression beginning “[a]bout the same time almost, a Synode was helde at *Paris*” and including a list of points agreed at the synod, discussions had therein between the king and various parties, and a brief retelling of Henry II’s accidental death.⁷⁰ Only then does the text return to Anne du Bourg and his degradation (that is, the formal removal of his clerical status) by the Bishop of Paris.⁷¹ In the *Commentaries*, the true chronology of events wins out over narrative consideration: the meanwhile trumps the individual story.⁷²

Dowriche, conversely, brooks no interruptions to her martyr narratives. She untangles contemporaneous events described in the *Commentaries* to create a contiguous and compelling martyrological narrative for Anne du Bourg. Moreover, she vividly expands key moments in the

⁶⁹ *Commentaries*, sigs. D1v–2r (EEBO img. 22).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, sigs. D2r ff. (EEBO img. 22 ff.).

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, sigs. D4v (EEBO img. 25).

⁷² This is a choice the *Commentaries* wears openly. Earlier the *Commentaries* mentions reprisals against early religious reformists but indicates that “these first beginnings are particularly touched in other bookes, in the which the noble and excellent triumphes of Martyrs are described”, *ibid.*, sigs. A2v–3r (EEBO img. 11). Here the reader is referred to Jean Crespin’s very popular *Histoire des martyrs* which contains a very extended account of Anne du Bourg’s martyrdom. This may have been a source for what martyrological material there is in the *Commentaries*, via Serres and Pierre la Place (see footnote 3); however, if Crespin’s text was used, it was very selectively, for the lengthy and repeated examinations in Crespin here appear in a very compressed form. Ephemeral ballads, news pamphlets, letters, and oral transmission are possible alternative sources. Dowriche herself does not seem to have had access to Crespin’s text, as I explore in discussing her first episode (see footnote 98). While it seems probable that Dowriche would speak French, her formulations clearly come from Tymme’s translation.

The first edition of Crespin’s text was printed in Geneva in 1554. There were multiple subsequent editions with varying titles. For the account of Anne du Bourg’s martyrdom, see Jean Crespin, *Cinquieme partie du Recueil des martyrs* (Geneva: Jean Crespin, 1564), 460–516. After his death in 1572, Crespin’s project was continued by Simon Goulart, who included the victims of the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre; see Jouanna, *Saint Bartholomew’s Day*, 186–87. For a discussion of Crespin’s work, see Catharine Randall Coats, “Reconstituting the Textual Body in Jean Crespin’s *Histoire des martyrs* (1564)”, *Renaissance Quarterly* 44/1 (1991): 62–85.

martyrological pattern which in the *Commentaries* are only briefly mentioned. One example comes at a key point in the Foxean martyr narrative: the heresy examination. Du Bourg is brought before the Senate of Paris to be questioned, but the incident is recounted quite differently in her version:

The French historie

Then questions were proposde of Saints, and Popish Masse,
Of Purgatorie, and such trash as then in credit was.
Wherof he spake his minde, and freeleie did protest;
That all these leaud and filthie toyes in heart he did detest.
'I serve' (said he) 'no Saint, but Christ my onelie staie;
I will not yeeld to anie man his honor to betraie.
He is the Sacrifice by death that made me free;
He is the onelie Paschall Lambe that shed his blood for me;
He is the onelie heate by faith that purgeth sinne
In them that now beleewe, or those that heretofore have bin.
Therefore I doo defie your popish trifles all,
And thanke the God that gives me grace to come when he doth call.'
Which answere being made, to sentence they proceede;
Who was condemned then: for that the King had so decreed.⁷³

Commentaries

they demaunding of him, he made
aunswere to all those principall
points of Popish religion, which
are at this day in controversis: as
to the traditions of the Church, to
invocation of Saints, to
Purgatorie, to the Masse, and to
the rest. All the which he
dislyking and gaynsaying, was at
the last condemned by the Bishop
of *Paris*, for an heretike.⁷⁴

Dowriche is certainly writing more “fully & amplie” than her source and her passage is complexly structured. We are first confronted by the difference the verse form and choice of direct speech makes to the vividness of this episode, fulfilling her prefatory promise to have virtue (and vice) “manifestly depainted” in speeches.⁷⁵ Du Bourg’s rhetoric is sharpened by the

⁷³ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. E1r.

⁷⁴ *Commentaries*, sig. C1r (EEBO img. 25).

⁷⁵ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. A4r.

language of the popular invective against Catholic “trifles” and “filthie toyes”. These rhetorical jabs, including the narrator’s own reference to “such trash as then in credit was”, have the effect of giving narrative space and dramatic effect to the heresy examination.⁷⁶ Rather than Tymme’s short and somewhat peevish “dislyking and gaynsaying”, du Bourg in Dowriche’s version is sharp on Catholic missteps and sincere on Protestant doctrine. In the *Commentaries* he merely rejects “Popish religion”, but in *The French historie* his reformist beliefs are positively articulated as, for example, he upholds the *in solo christo* doctrine (“no saint, but Christ”) and targets indulgences (“[h]e is the onlie heate by faith that purgeth sinne”).⁷⁷ These articulations are literarily crafted in grammatically parallel cola that depict them as pillars of faith. Her amplifying paraphrase suggests that while the *Commentaries* includes the heresy examination as just one more incident, in *The French historie* Dowriche it is a crux of her martyrological plot.

⁷⁶ Crespin’s version of du Bourg’s martyrdom is a vivid representation of just how much textual space some writers thought such examinations deserved; in later editions of his martyrology, each stage of the process is delineated in sections and annotations, Jean Crespin, *Histoire des martyres: persecutez et mis à mort [...]* (Geneva: Eustace Vignon[?], 1582), fols. 471r–79r. Dowriche herself further indicates the importance of the heresy examination by glossing it in the margins: “Burgaeus’[s] protestation concerning Poperie & Popish ceremonies”, *The French historie*, sig. E1r.

⁷⁷ These points she also prioritises with a marginal note, stating “Christ our onlie Purgatorie. Heb. 1.3”, *The French historie*, sig. E1r.



(Fig. 3: Execution of Anne du Bourg, 1559)⁷⁸

Another telling point of divergence comes during the degradation ceremony which for clerical victims “represented an additional first act” of martyrdom.⁷⁹ This ceremony gets rather more attention from the *Commentaries* than the examination and Dowriche consequently preserves much from her source, including phrasing.⁸⁰ The preservation of content can be as revealing as its expansion or expurgation, and it is no surprise that Dowriche sticks closest to her source when it aligns with her Foxean imitation. However even here she changes the emphases of the *Commentaries*, reordering and eliding unflattering historical details. The *Commentaries* notes that “[d]ivers thought *Burgaens* used many appeals to put of[f] his adversaries, that thereby he might delay the time & prolong his life”, but also notes a rebuttal from du Bourg who in his letters “affirmed that he did it not to preserve or prolong his life, the which he wold willingly

⁷⁸ Frans Hogenberg, *Frans Hogenberg: broadsheets*, ed. Ursula Mielke (Sound and Vision Rijksprentenkabinet, 2009), 26.

⁷⁹ David Nicholls, “The Theatre of Martyrdom in the French Reformation”, *Past & Present* /121 (1988): 49–73: 52.

⁸⁰ Both, for example, refer to his clerical trappings as “badges of the Beast”, in league with the “Antichrist”. *Commentaries*, sig. C2r (EEBO img. 26), and Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. E1v.

bestow for the gospels sake, but rather th[a]t he might [. . .] defende his right”.⁸¹ These doubts about his intention register in *The French historie* only in diluted form (there is no suggestion there that he is proliferating appeals to save his life), but do so some lines before the degradation ceremony, leaving this key moment in the martyrological scheme untarnished.⁸² Moreover, Dowriche completely removes an incident in which du Bourg is persuaded by friends to recant before then retracting that recantation.⁸³ Instead she supplies him with an invented speech: a powerful rhetorical set piece that extends the degradation ceremony, burnishes du Bourg’s godly and martyrological credentials, and prioritises affect. Du Bourg concludes that speech with a call for his sentence to be declared, stating: “And in defence of this thy truth, my stake shall I imbrace. / Now Sathan doo thy worst, I will appeale no more”.⁸⁴ Not only are his appeals equated with his rousing speech rather than desperate acts of self-preservation, but he heroically renounces them.⁸⁵ In the final passages of the episodes, Dowriche underscores Du Bourg’s death sentence by italicising it in the text and adding a marginal reference with the date and place (a nod to the calendrical apparatus of Foxe’s text). The same occurs with his last words which, as is typical of martyr narratives, take the form of prayer. *The French historie* thus makes of its source a leaner and less equivocal martyrology that ends by asserting du Bourg’s spiritual exemplarity: “For Christ admist the fierie flame, he yelded up his life”.⁸⁶

Exemplary reading

⁸¹ *Commentaries*, sigs. C2r–v (EEBO imgs. 26–27).

⁸² See Dowriche’s marginal reference to the way “Burgeaus appealed often from this unjust sentence: but seeing his appellations could not bee admitted, he lastlie appealed to Jesus Christ”. In the text proper, his appeals are refigured as skirmishes against Satan’s power: “And though *Burgaus* did from sentence oft appeale; / Yet Sathan seeking for his blood this thing could not prevaile”, *The French historie*, sig. E1r.

⁸³ Foxe was known to make similar redactions to preserve a martyr’s moral credentials; see John R. Knott, *Discourses of Martyrdom in English Literature, 1563–1694* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 23.

⁸⁴ *The French historie*, sig. E1v.

⁸⁵ Though she changes its valence, the fact that Dowriche is driven to mention appeals at all suggests she feels obliged to adhere in some way to her historical sources.

⁸⁶ *The French historie*, sig. E4v.

Martyr narratives, like Anne du Bourg's, seek to galvanise a reader's faith by illustrating the martyr's exemplary goodness against the persecutors' similarly exemplary cruelty. "All Christian martyrdom", Knott observes, "is in some sense an *imitatio Christi*, because the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ established the pattern of winning spiritual victory through suffering".⁸⁷ Dowriche preserves this formula throughout her text, but she does not simply offer three discrete martyrologies from French history. Instead, her first and third episode tell similar stories of group persecution, with the latter construed as a magnified version of the former. I suggest that this is Dowriche's attempt, as foreshadowed in her framing apparatus, to prompt her readers to be alert to the repeated patterns in events and so be better prepared to identify and "shun the like". If this is a lesson Foxe conveys in part through the sheer length of his *Actes and Monuments*, the close resemblance between these two episodes suggests that Dowriche is similarly plotting her briefer history towards an apocalyptic vision of the future, reading in the past intimations of what is to come.

The first episode of *The French historie* describes the Rue St Jacques incident of 1557, in which a meeting of the godly in a private residence was disrupted by a mob, the attendees imprisoned and a handful of them executed. Dowriche's account portrays the godly as inadvertently aggravating the Catholic "common sort" "[w]hose follie thus abusde, which furie did incense, / With weapons rann, as if these men had done some great offence".⁸⁸ Here, as throughout, Dowriche stresses martyrological components that are negligible in her source. Rather than simply "repeat[ing] their former prayers", as they do in the *Commentaries*, in her version the godly immediately assume a sacrificial posture: "To God they did commend their bodies and their life, / And with humble sutes assaid, to swage their raging strife".⁸⁹ In the *Commentaries*, when the godly are surrounded and blocked on all sides, their prayers implicitly

⁸⁷ Knott, *Discourses*, 2.

⁸⁸ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. B4v.

⁸⁹ *Commentaries*, sig. A3v (EEBO img. 12), and Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. B4v respectively.

cause a gate to be “wonderfully opened”. *The French historie*, however, more explicitly identifies providence working on behalf of the godly, as it had for the Peter in Acts 12:

But God that never failes his servants at their neede,
By stretching out his helping hand, did stand them now in steed.
For as to *Peter* once in prison closelie pent,
To lose his lockes and set him free an Angel there was sent.⁹⁰

As in all martyr stories, though, their opponents are implacable. In Dowriche’s text, the exemplary behaviour of the prisoners—prayer and psalm singing—is misrepresented by no less than the Devil himself. Dowriche reminds her reader to “marke the creeping craft of Sathan in this case / How he by false report doth seeke the truth for to deface”.⁹¹ Satan indirectly prejudices “the Kings affected mind” against the godly appeals for justice: “[t]hus while the Godlie worke their causes to defend, / The wicked impes of Sathan lurke to bring them to their end”.⁹²

Against these threats, the godly uphold their convictions in Foxean terms. The victims of the Rue St Jacques incident affirm:

The French historie

And though our bodies be consumed in the flame,
Yet of our ashes God will raise that shall defend the same.
To shade the shining light, no wit can well prevaile:
So vaine, to strive to staie the truth which God doth nowe reveale.⁹³

Commentaries

[that] afflictions cannot abolish &
destroy the Church of God [. . .] it
is neither fire, nor sworde, nor any
maner of punishment that can
terrifie us.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. B4v–C1r.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, sig. C1v.

⁹² *Ibid.*, sig. C3r.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Commentaries*, sig. B2r (*EEBO* img. 14).

Dowriche's version references the martyr narrative of Hugh Latimer and Nicholas Ridley in *Actes and Monuments*, in which Latimer famously says to Ridley just before they are burnt at the stake in 1555 that "we shall this day light such a candle by God's grace in England, as (I trust) shall never be put out".⁹⁵ Both allude to Matthew 5:14–16 and their interpretations are very similar: the physical body serves as fuel for a newly dazzling "shining light" of truth that cannot be suppressed (or "shaded" in Dowriche's neat alliterations).⁹⁶ The result is much more dramatic than the description in the *Commentaries* and it does more martyrological work. While the *Commentaries* merely reports the bravery of the godly, Dowriche's version links their sacrifice to the dissemination of godly truth and shows the sympathetic working of providence. They are "raise[d]" from terrestrial death ("our ashes") into a refined, spiritual force that continues the battle for God's truth.

Finally, Dowriche adds to her version perhaps the most crucial element of an effective martyrology: stirring final words. The *Commentaries* reports that those convicted "were burnt with fire: and suffering most excellent Martyrdome by death, they woonderfullye triumphed of the crueltie of their enimies",⁹⁷ but Dowriche instead furnishes them with a fifty-three line invented speech.⁹⁸ This speech is prefaced by the phrase "[t]hey knowing sure their causes good, this or the like did say". Her brief disclaimer "this or the like" is telling, for even as she acknowledges the speech to be an invention, Dowriche does not admit the possibility that the godly said nothing. Their identification as martyrs, for Dowriche, necessitates not only that they say something, but that they produce an oration that is suitably martyrological. That the oration in

⁹⁵ Foxe, *Actes and monuments*, sig. SSS5r.

⁹⁶ Matthew 5:14-16 reads in the Geneva version: "Ye are the light of the world. A cite that is set on a hill, can not be hid. Nether do men light a candel, and put it under a bushel, but on a candlesticke, & it giveth light unto all that are in the house. Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good workes, & glorifie your father which is in heaven", *The Bible*, sig. AA3v.

⁹⁷ *Commentaries*, sig. B3v (EEBO img. 16).

⁹⁸ This speech and this first episode generally strongly suggest that Dowriche did not use Jean Crespin's martyrology because that text provides detailed accounts, including names, of specific martyrs from the Rue St Jacques incident that she would doubtless have included if she had used the source. For example, Crespin's account of a martyr from this event, Phillipe de Luns, involves an extended dialogue that Dowriche could have used to inform the speeches in this episode (as she does with du Bourg's speeches using the *Commentaries*). Others named in Crespin are René du Seau and Jean Amalric. For Phillip de Luns, see Crespin, *Histoire des Martyrs*, fols. 434v–35r.

this case is, rather unbelievably, spoken by an entire group of people is beside the point, which is not historical truth (as prioritised by the *Commentaries*) but that which best serves to animate God's truth.⁹⁹

The St Bartholomew's Day Massacre

The first of *The French historie's* three episodes therefore provides more "noble Martirs", Dowriche isolating or augmenting the tropes and emphases core to the martyrology as it is received in England through Foxe. But this first episode is also structurally mirrored—and magnified—by her third episode about St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre. The Massacre occurred in 1572 as a result of a series of misunderstandings and miscalculations that followed the wedding of King Charles IX's sister, Margaret, to the Protestant Henry III of Navarre, an event that had been intended to mollify interconfessional tensions. Charles IX ordered a more limited strike on Huguenot leaders that spiralled into the mob slaughter of thousands of Protestants in Paris and subsequently many other French cities. The event prompted alarm from abroad, including from Elizabeth I, and was popularly seen as a machination of Catherine de Medici and the hated Guise family.¹⁰⁰ The Massacre's infamy would have made it a selling point for *The French historie*, but also a logical place to end Dowriche's narrative. It is, after all, the bloodiest of her three "broiles" and so most powerfully conveys the suffering of the Huguenots and hence her warning to the English godly. But, the many similarities between this third episode and her first, the Rue St Jacques incident, make clear why she chose that relatively unknown incident as her first episode. This is not simply a case of using what is available in the *Commentaries*, for the incidents are in the first and tenth book of the volume respectively and are separated by some

⁹⁹ Here Dowriche departs from Foxe, who took pains to accurately represent the deeds and words of his martyrs and to defend the veracity of his accounts from his detractors. See, for example, Felch, "Shaping the Reader", 57–8.

¹⁰⁰ See, for example, Henri Estienne, *A marvelous discourse vpon the lyfe, deedes, and behaviours of Katherine de Medicis* [. . .] (London: Henry Middleton[?], 1575).

fifteen years as well as three discrete periods of war described in the interim.¹⁰¹ Rather, the parallels between these episodes suggest she saw the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre as existing in a pseudo-typological relationship with the Rue St Jacques incident. That is to say, the latter event "'fulfilled' the promise of that past without being an 'effect' of that past".¹⁰²

The two episodes share many elements but differ in scale. While in the first episode a single godly home is raided, the third episode involves numerous incidents where the Guises (leaders of the hard-line Catholic faction around the Charles IX) and their loyalists break into houses and kill the unsuspecting godly. "This Rout in *Paris* streats" Dowriche states, "which posted up and downe, / Foure hundred houses sacked have within that wicked towne".¹⁰³ The Rue St Jacques incident was limited to Paris, but now Dowriche's Charles IX orders the godly be persecuted across the country. Moreover, Satan, somewhat tacked on to the first episode, becomes the "bloody captaine" who directly orchestrates events.¹⁰⁴ The "wicked impes"¹⁰⁵ at his diabolical command in the first episode are, in the third, no longer peripheral agents but are named figures at the heart of the French monarchy, including the Queen Mother (Catherine de Medici), King Charles IX himself, and the Duke of Guise, and are described as "all his mates".¹⁰⁶ His machinations are also amplified. While in the events of 1557 Satan tarnishes the truth "by false report" via shadowy intermediaries, in 1572 he appears in person to order the king to embark on a misinformation campaign:

¹⁰¹ The tenth book of the *Commentaries* that is her source for the Massacre is in fact a reprint of a translation of François Hotman's *A true and plaine report of the furious outrages of Fraunce* published a year earlier in 1573. This volume was published in English a year before Serres's volume; its original title is *De furoribus Gallicis*.

¹⁰² Daniel Woolf, "From Hystories to the Historical: Five Transitions in Thinking about the Past, 1500–1700", in *The Uses of History in Early Modern England*, edited by Paulina Kewes (Huntington Library, 2006), 31–68: 42.

¹⁰³ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. I3v.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, sig. F2v.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, sig. C3r.

¹⁰⁶ This episode has an unusual parallel in a short introductory section Dowriche places between the framing complaint and the first episode where another Satanic meeting is convened. This feels out of place at this stage in the narrative, especially because characters like the "Mother Queene" (Catherine de Medici) get no showing until much later in the piece. Perhaps this is an attempt to foreshadow the extremity that her narratives reaches by this culminating episode and so to shape the book into a more narratively cohesive whole. *Ibid.*, sig. F2v.

[¶]The King as chiefest man this plaie must first begin,
 By loving letters, words, and cheere at first to bring them in.
 [. . .]
 The worst of all their band the King must intertaine
 With such good will, that no mistrust in anie maie remaine.
 And he must make them know, as though of late he felt
 Some pricke in conscience for the cause against the which hee delt.[¶]¹⁰⁷

The third episode therefore echoes but magnifies the first, signalling how in the intervening years, corruption has advanced unchecked in the kingdom. The movement from the persecution of a single Parisian house to a whole country makes clear that if Dowriche sees the Massacre as unrivalled in cruelty, then they are nonetheless preceded in ways that can spur alert readers to be suitably *cantum*.

Dowriche's account of the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre is also the high point of her martyrological derivative method, in spite of the fact that there is much about that event that would seem to preclude the typical structure of the martyr narrative. There is, for instance, no single victim whose conduct can be observed and admired, and the indiscriminate killings perpetrated on French streets lacked any of the ritual of trial, examination, conviction, and execution we associate with that form. While the Rue St Jacques incident also lacked a single victim, their group imprisonment and the prolonged adjudication of their fate by judges and the king allowed narrative space to describe their faithful suffering and their faithful resignation to death. This is not the case in the account of St Bartholomew's Day contained in the tenth book of the *Commentaries*, nor, interestingly, in Foxe's own account of the Massacre that appears near the conclusion to the 1583 edition of *Actes and Monuments* in a section entitled "A briefe Note

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., sigs. F2v–3r.

concerning the horrible Massaker in Fraunce an. 1572”.¹⁰⁸ This addendum is suggestive of the notoriety of the event, for while Foxe is willing to include some foreign events in his massive history, he quickly returns to “occupy my self with our own domestical matters, here done at home”.¹⁰⁹ In his retelling of the Massacre, though, he omits many of the martyrological elements for which his volume was known, perhaps struggling to integrate the massacre into his usual narrative pattern. Mob violence was incommensurate with traditional martyrological tropes.¹¹⁰ Dowriche’s version of the Massacre, conversely, dilates the final moments of victims who are named, often only in passing, in her source. She includes six invented or greatly expanded speeches that turn six of the deaths mentioned glancingly in Hotman’s part of the *Commentaries* into mini-martyrdoms that lack the usual legal procedures of martyr narratives but retain their emotional core: the stirring speeches of the condemned faithful.¹¹¹ By lacking the “civilised” procedures of examination, conviction, and sentencing, though, they feel all the more immediate than the martyrdoms of the first two episodes of *The French historie* and so provide a suitable apotheosis of her “bloody broiles”.¹¹²

The death of Francis Collut, along with his two sons, is particularly affecting. In the *Commentaries*, Hotman describes how “their three bodies hard knit together, yelded a piteous spectacle”.¹¹³ Ibbett describes the “pitiful spectacle” as a topos in writing of the French Wars of Religion that is involved in “apportioning and directing of pity”, “delineating the pitier [. . .] the

¹⁰⁸ Foxe’s retelling of the Massacre is brief and it reminds the reader that “the true narration of this lamentable story is set forth in english at large, in a booke by it selfe, and extant in print already”, likely a reference to Hotman’s *Furious outrages*. That is, the same text that forms book ten of the *Commentaries. Actes and monuments*, sigs. FFFFF3v–4v.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, sig. GGG6v.

¹¹⁰ For this representational difficulty, see Archibald, “St. Bartholomew’s Day”, 262.

¹¹¹ Martin notes how Dowriche’s “reconstructions of first-person speeches and her sometimes gruesome focus on physical torment likewise clarify human motives and generate a poignant sense of lived sacrifice more engaging than the chronicles’ loosely digested details”; of course this is also the *modus operandi* of Foxe’s text, Martin, “Dowriche, Christopher Marlowe”, 72.

¹¹² The figures in question are first Admiral Coligny, and then De Nance, Téligny, Monsieur de Pilles, Francis Collut, and Mansion de Rivers.

¹¹³ *Commentaries*, sig. F2r (EBO img. 472). Signature numbers reset in the tenth book of the *Commentaries*.

pitied, and the pitiless” in a way that demarcates political allegiance.¹¹⁴ But if Hotman in the *Commentaries* allows the “piteous spectacle” to speak for itself or, as Ibbett suggests, to demand speech on the part of its reader, Dowriche makes the victims speak “for themselves”. She invents a speech that interprets their lives and deaths as part of a spiritual commitment which endows them with meaning, pathos, and an imitable exemplarity.¹¹⁵ She has Collut state:

[.]Now is our harvest in, now must our fruite appeere,
Now wil the Lord require accompt how we have lived here.
The finall axe is laid to roote of falling tree;
And how we hav the truth imbrac’t, the world forthwith must see.[.]¹¹⁶

Dowriche’s added “finall” and the demand for “accompt” make this an apocalyptic rewriting of Matthew 3:10 (“And now also is the axe put to the root of the trees: therefore everie tre[e] which bringeth not forthe good frute, is hewen downe, and cast into the fyre”).¹¹⁷ In the context of the biblical verse, John the Baptist rejects claims by the Pharisees and Sadducees that they are saved simply by merit of descending from Abraham. This is apt for Collut, a father killed along with his sons, and it strongly evokes Dowriche’s polemic that the English godly should not rest on the laurels of their parents’ and grandparents’ religious fervour for their salvation. Passive identification is not enough; it must be continually enacted, here by sacrificing one’s life for God. For Dowriche, a barren fruit tree is not a fruit tree at all.¹¹⁸

The analogous relationship between the first and third episode gives her readers a second opportunity to draw their shared lesson: distrust of the monarchy. In the Rue St Jacques incident, the victims appeal to God to save (by reforming) the king:

¹¹⁴ *Compassion’s Edge*, 29 and 32.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹¹⁶ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. K1r.

¹¹⁷ *The Bible*, sig. AA3r.

¹¹⁸ Dowriche also invents a speech for Monsieur de Pilles, described in Hotman as “much lamented of many [. . .] in whome it is harde to expresse whether there were more godlie zeale in Religion or prowesse in warre”, *Commentaries*, sig. D3v (EEBO img. 466). In *The French historie* he has a long invective contrasting the responsibility of kingship with the Popish “false dissembling race” before finally turning to God and the assurance of divine retribution, Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. I3r.

And for the King & Commons all they praied with watrie eies:
That God would yet withhold his just revenging hand,
And blesse with perfect truth & peace, their King, & eke their land.¹¹⁹

They request the king to “trie their deedes” and write letters in the expectation that they can “change the Kings affected minde”.¹²⁰ This misplaced faith in the sovereign’s sympathy to all his subjects is exactly what Satan and his retinue exploit to carry out the Massacre in the third episode. As Catherine de Medici says, following Machiavelli, in the most accomplished invented speech in the *The French historie*: “wisdom doth allow the Prince to plaie the Foxe”. The success of the Massacre is due to King Charles feigning a reconciliation between the Huguenots and the crown.¹²¹ It is not surprising, given this explanation of the Massacre, that Dowriche’s invented speeches in the last episode underscore the risks of blind trust in monarchs. Upon his death, Téliigny, the son-in-law of Admiral Coligny (one of the principal targets of the Massacre), laments his gullibility:

[?]How oft did I commend the Kings assured love?
How did I thinke that nothing might us from the same remove?
How oft did I recount the Kings repeated oath?
How many frendly signes were scene of force to bind us both?
How often did I urge there was no cause of feare,
Because for this we saw the King most willing for to sweare?

¹¹⁹ Ibid., sigs. C1r–v.

¹²⁰ Ibid., sigs. C2r–v.

¹²¹ Ibid., sig. G3v. For discussion of Dowriche’s pioneering use of Machiavelli and the dramatic qualities of this speech, see Martin, “Dowriche, Christopher Marlowe” and “Dowriche and Innocent Gentillet’s *Contre-Machiavel*”.

But sith it is too late this error to lament,

My trusting hath deserved death; and therefore am content.[?]¹²²

These are questions the reader might ask of themselves in their experience of reading *The French historie*, where expectations of sovereign justice are repeatedly raised and disappointed. But Dowriche might also expect them to take the more radical and seditious step of transposing those insights onto English history. She makes explicit at this late stage a key object of her admonition to vigilance: namely, that trust is misplaced except in God. Dowriche depicts the captain of the guard, De Nance, going to his death because he refuses to kill against his moral convictions. He asks: “A murder to be done the King doth now request, / My God commands the contrary: now which to chuse wer best?”¹²³ The answer to Dowriche’s attentive reader is abundantly clear. From the opening complaint, *The French historie* has made clear that the “mutuall love” between sovereign and citizen is contingent and fickle and thus necessarily secondary to a love and trust of God.

The three episodes told in *The French historie* describe the fate of “wofull France” that the French refugee warns England to avoid.¹²⁴ They recreate scenes of godly persecution and monarchical betrayal and vividly demonstrate the dangers of allowing corruption to fester. Each of her episodes has lessons for the reader, but so too does the overall structure of *The French historie*. By ending with the notorious St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, Dowriche piques her audience’s interest and then situates it alongside two events that, while less well-known, provide intimations of that later tragedy. She imitates from Foxe’s hugely popular *Actes and Monuments* a “a series of habitual ways of structuring form, or of patterns of structuration”: specifically the

¹²² Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. I2r. In the reprint of *Furious outrages* in the *Commentaries*, we can see some of the material Dowriche used to produce her own version; Hotman writes “*Thebigny* the Admirals sonne in lawe, a yong man of singular towardnesse both of wit and courage, to whom the King these many yeres had both in words & countenance made shew of so gret good wil, as that no man was thought to be more highly in his favor. He crying out, that it was now grievous to him to live, for that he had ever commended to his father in lawe the faithfulnessse of the King, refused not the deathe offered him”, *Commentaries*, sig. D3r. Dowriche also makes reference to him as “a rare and passing youth / Who for his manlie heart and courage did excell”, *The French historie*, sig. I1v.

¹²³ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. I1r.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, sig. L1v.

form of the martyrological plot, which she then imposes on her paraphrase of the *Commentaries*.¹²⁵ That structure instantiates a view of providential history that proceeds by example, finding in the past the promise of the future. This interpretative manoeuvre, once internalised, is not easily contained within national boundaries. It is exactly this mental leap between nations that Dowriche hopes her English reader will perform, dislodging their complacency and prompting them to greater godly zeal.

Part 3: Just judgements of God¹²⁶

Typology

We have seen how the structural mirroring between Dowriche's episodes encourages her readers to analogise a "like" scenario with a "like" outcome and to act accordingly. That logic is further reinforced by her frequent recourse to biblical typology and to narratives of retributive providence. Typology as an exegetical procedure sees New Testament figures and narratives as fulfilments of Old Testament prophecy. However, that same principle can also be used in a somewhat looser sense to link scriptural and "secular" events as two versions of the same story repeating within providential history. To a degree this is another of Dowriche's imitations of Foxe, who frames his martyrologies with paratextual and interpretative tools, like the *Kalender*, that "epitomize[] the idea that scriptural history explicates ecclesiastical history, chronicle history and martyrological history".¹²⁷ The purpose of imitating this aspect of Foxe's procedure is two-fold. Firstly, and fittingly for a "*Historie*", typology has a temporal function that recognises the "interchangeability of past and present" and so suggests the past has lessons for the present.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ Burrow, *Imitating Authors*, 213.

¹²⁶ This quote comes from Dowriche's preface, where she advertises that she has "for the more terror unto the wicked, diligentlie collected the great plagues and just judgements of God shewed against the persecutors in every severall History, & have set them downe so in order, and amplified them by the like judgments against sinners out of the word and other histories", *The French historie*, sig. A4r.

¹²⁷ See Christine E. Hutchins's discussion of the *Kalender* and other concordances; "Sacred Concordances: Figuring Scripture and History in Foxe's Acts and Monuments", *Reformation* 8/1: 41–62: 46 and passim.

¹²⁸ Walsham, *Providence in Early Modern England*, 286.

Secondly, because the application of typological logic to terrestrial events presupposes God's guiding hand in all happenings, it bridges the spatial distance between England and France. In other words, all events become universally applicable, with French history just as apt an intimation of the English future as its own past. Thus, by reading France as a comparator for England and both as types of the biblical past, she offers two palms in which the fate of the English godly can be read.

One of the most extensive passages of scriptural allusion and typology occurs in Dowriche's second episode about Anne du Bourg, when he exhorts King Henry II to "bend his willing eare" to the godly cause and to renounce what the French refugee earlier called the "bands of tyrannie".¹²⁹ While the *Commentaries* simply has du Bourg "freely utter[ing] his minde", here he engages in an extended oration that demonstrates his command of scripture.¹³⁰ This is, of course, part of his martyrological exemplarity—scriptural recall is an apt skill for a Protestant martyr to have. But he also describes a typological scheme. This section begins "[t]he cause saith he is Christs which we have now in hand" and continues through a series of scriptural allusions, denoted in the margins, that each begin "[t]his is" (see Fig. 3).¹³¹

¹²⁹ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sigs. D2v and B1v respectively.

¹³⁰ *Commentaries*, sig. D2r (EEBO img. 22).

¹³¹ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. D2v.

The French Historie.

Yet there were some which now a noble courage take,
Annas Burgeus as the chiefe this doubtful silence brake.

^aThe not-
 a-
 ble
 Oration
 of
 Annas
 Burgeus,
 deliuered
 before the
 King in the
 Senat house.
^b He setteth
 out the po-
 wer & Ver-
 tue of the
 word of god,
 and what a
 blessing it
 bringeth to
 them that
 ioyfullie re-
 ceiue it. 2.
 Sam. 6. 11.
 1. Cron. 15.
 21. & 16.
 38.
 c 2. Kinges.
 22. 8.
 d Iudg. 6. 11
 e Numb. 22
 23. 28.
 f Jerem. 20.
 9.
 g Psal. 42. 1.
 & 119.
 105.
 h Exod. 13.
 21.
 i 1. Kinges.
 18. 31.
 k 2. King. 1.
 10.
 Numb. 16. 15. 1 Psalm. 119. 5. 9. m Esa. 55. 1. n 1 Per. 2. 22. o *Hofhea the King and all Isra-
 el were carried captiue to Babylon by the King of the Assyrians for despising the Word and Comman-
 dements of the Lord. 2. Kinges 17. 4, 5, 6.*

“^a Who lifting vp his hands, in heart began to praie,
 “ With thanks to God that he did liue to see that happie date
 “ Wherein the Lord had wrought such care within his grace,
 “ That he would bed his willing care to iudge so weightie case.
 “ The cause faith he is Christs which we haue now in hand,
 “ For which the Lord wil surely blesse both you & eke your lad.
 “ This is the blessed ^b Arke that came to *Edomes* hall,
 “ For which the Lord hath blessing sent on him, his house & al.
 “ This is the dustie booke which good ^c *Hilkiah* found :
 “ Which read before the King, did giue a sweet & siluer sound.
 “ This is the Angel which to ^d *Gedeon* did appeare :
 “ This is the deaw vpon the fleccc, which set him void of feare.
 “ This is the sword that made blinde ^e *Balaams* Assse to speake.
 “ This is the flame the Prophet forst his silence for to breake.
 “ This is the sliuelie spring, which cooles the thirtie heate
 “ This is the shining lantern, which giues light vnto our secte.
 “ This is the flame that earst by night did shew the way :
 “ This is the blessed cloud that led Gods chosen in the day.
 “ This is ^f *Elgathes* flake that made his offering fume :
 “ And this the ^g blast which fro the Lord great rebels did consume.
 “ This is the mightie ^h voyce that makes the mountaines shake,
 “ This makes the Liban cedars stoop, & fearful hinds to quake.
 “ And this the pleasant ⁱ wine to weake that comfort giues :
 “ And this the wholsom ^j milk wherby the sucking Infant liues.
 “ Now as the Lord doth blesse the land that loues the same :
 “ So for contemners of his truth he still provides a shame.
 “ For why came ^k *Asshur* vp Gods chosen to molest,
 “ And led the King with Commons all in *Babel* for to rest?

But

Fig. 3.¹³²

These allusions, to the Ark of the Covenant (2 Samuel 6), the Book of Law (2 Kings 22:8), and the Angel of the Lord (Judges 6:11), depict decisive moments in which human actors recognise God’s truth and its messengers,¹³³ and accompany Du Bourg’s anaphoric catalogue of God’s blessings, such as: “This is the Angel which to Gedeon did appear” and “This is the flame

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ As Anne Lake Prescott observes, “[h]er marginal commentary, in visual and rhetorical style, is not unlike that of the Geneva Bible and must have added to the impression of God’s providence at work”; Anne Lake Prescott, “Mary Sidney’s ‘Antonius’ and the Ambiguities of French History”, *The Yearbook of English Studies* 38/1/2 (2008): 216–233: 220.

the Prophet forst his silence for to break”.¹³⁴ Du Bourg thus calls on Henry II to recognise the French godly as rightful heirs to those acts of grace. He also sketches the respective position of himself and the king within those typological narratives, concluding his speech by alluding to biblical passages where the Lord offers succour to believers or where he punishes “contemners of his truth”, figuring the godly and their adversaries.¹³⁵ This long series of scriptural allusions ends (at least for a while) with explicit warnings to the French king and a reference to Revelations. Having described King Hoshea’s fall (2 Kings 17:7), du Bourg states:

And if he doo not spare a King; oh King take heed:
If people all to thralldome goe; this land, oh Lord had neede
To weigh the cursed cause of this their finall fall
Least for the like, the like consume our King and Commons all.¹³⁶

If the admonitory function of du Bourg’s citations were not already clear to the reader, Dowriche makes patent the deductive reasoning she expects her readers to emulate. The reader must “weigh the cursed cause”; that is, they must construct an argument that explains it (or at least accept Dowriche’s). The fact that God does not spare King Hoshea entails typologically that King Henry is similarly vulnerable to His judgements. Similarly, the thralldom of Israel under Babylon in 2 Kings omits no person nor personage, analogically threatening the French “King and Commons all”.

Elaine Beilin has argued for the English valence of “Commons” in this last line, contending that Dowriche is intervening in contemporary parliamentary debates about Elizabeth’s assertion of royal prerogative over religious matters.¹³⁷ But I would suggest that Dowriche is less interested in directing her readers to a specific contemporary incident than schooling them in a procedure of historical thought. French history here becomes a type of

¹³⁴ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. D2v.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid., sig. D3r.

¹³⁷ Beilin, “Some Freely Spake Their Minde”, 137 and *passim*.

scriptural histories whose outcomes and lessons are already known. The sense of predetermination that this creates is reflected in the prosody of the lines. The protases that break off at the caesura of the eighth syllable feel the inexorable pull of Dowriche’s poulter’s measure, driving on to their shorter apodoses with similarly neat rhyme words “heed / neede” and “fall / all”.¹³⁸ The subsequent lines provide their own satisfactions, the alliterative noun phrases in the third of these lines meting out an equal number of syllables. The poetic balance created here, not to mention the word “weigh”, evokes an equilibrium of justice whose workings are known and assured and must thus be included in any subsequent earthly calculation. Moreover, while the previous conditional clauses warn against specific outcomes (the fall of kings, the threat of tyranny), the last conditional “[l]east for the like” warns against the very iterability of history. Dowriche thus has Du Bourg not only craft his argument from scriptural examples, but advocate that his auditors (and her readers) must attend to the resonance of scriptural types in history—to learn to recognise like causes and to ward against like results.

The typological relationships that du Bourg advances are, in *The French historie* as a whole, most forcefully articulated in the passages that Dowriche adds to the end of each of her episodes, entitled “The judgements of God [. . .]”. In du Bourg’s episode, the full title is:

*The judgements of the Lord which fell upon King Henrie the second after he had caused Burgæus to be imprisoned Anno 15[5]9. Dilated by the examples of Ahab, Amaziah, and Zedechiah, wicked Kings, which used the like crueltie against the word.*¹³⁹

Readers are again taught to see the specifics of the present as just one iteration of a wider pattern of good and evil. Henry II is just one more “wicked king”. Dowriche makes these comparisons by referencing God’s speech in 1 Samuel 2:30. She writes:

But they that doo despise my word, my law, and will;
They shall be sure of everie man to be abhored still.

¹³⁸ The protases continue in Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. D3r.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, sig. F1r.

Which sentence of the Lord for ever shall be true:

As by examples we may see of such as doo insue.¹⁴⁰

This is not typology as fulfilment; Dowriche does not have Henry II supersede Ahab and the other kings, but rather has the latter prefigure the former. In this Dowriche makes the same careful distinction as Foxe, whose *Kalender of martyrs*

was an interpretive device figuring the latter-day martyrs' godly fulfilment of scriptural martyrs, but not equating their human martyrdoms with sacred martyrdoms in Scripture [. . .] latter-day martyrs were godly, scriptural martyrs were divine: both shared in the promise, but they were historically and substantively distinct.¹⁴¹

That shared "promise" is, as Richard Helgerson argues, "[f]undamental to apocalyptic as a narrative form [. . .] the continuing struggle between mighty opposites: Christ and Antichrist, God and Satan".¹⁴² In these sections, Dowriche casts her French histories as one more proof that the "sentence of the Lord" remains in force and that the struggle of the godly is ongoing. Her three episodes are thus projected onto a moral and indeed cosmic framework of interpretation. This framework makes Dowriche's message intrinsically mobile and applicable to her English readers, for scripture is the "master text" from which all worldly incident derives.

Just deserts

If Dowriche's "judgement" sections are, on the one hand, another opportunity to inculcate a particular turn of historical thought, they also fulfil a more immediate readerly desire for retribution against those that persecute the godly. Helgerson identifies similar episodes of comeuppance in Foxe's *Acts and Monuments* as serving to "reassure the suffering elect that the deaths of their fellow Protestants have not been in vain, [to] maintain the apocalyptic hope on

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Hutchins, "Sacred Concordances", 50.

¹⁴² Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood*, 256.

which such self-sacrifice depends, [and] keep believers believing”.¹⁴³ These retributive providences in Foxe’s text constitute at best a “strong countertheme” to the suffering of martyrs, but Dowriche makes it par for the course by supplying a “judgements” section to each of her three episodes.¹⁴⁴ In each of these, Dowriche lists Old Testament retributions before turning, on the “so” or “like” of her analogical logic, onto the “just desert[s]” of the French perpetrators.¹⁴⁵

That divine retribution “never faile[s] to follow them, which doo his truth pursue”¹⁴⁶ aligns Dowriche’s text with a proliferation of popular texts that, as Alexandra Walsham argues, “belied the spiritual axiom that the Lord’s ways were beyond human comprehension”.¹⁴⁷ Walsham discusses Beard’s later *Theatre of Gods Judgements* (first published in 1597 but often republished in the seventeenth century) alongside a popular tradition in ballads that “telescoped [the] time-frame between wicked act and heavenly revenge” in “a strategy employed to enhance the teleological link between cause and effect”.¹⁴⁸ *The French historie* achieves the same effect by placing her “judgements” immediately after each episode of godly suffering and by including numerous pithy one or two line statements that link sin to punishment. We have already seen examples of this, and they abound. In the third episode’s “judgement” section, we get a typical segue from the Old Testament to the present, in this case from Abimelech killing his seventy brothers in Judges 9:5 to Charles IX’s death.¹⁴⁹ She writes “Our Charles like unto this from Gods revenging hand / By bloodie death, repaies the blood he shed within his land.”¹⁵⁰ Each of the persecutions Dowriche describes are thus projected into a timeless pattern that offers an equally

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 255.

¹⁴⁵ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. C4v.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., sig. C4r.

¹⁴⁷ Walsham, *Providence in Early Modern England*, 69.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 76.

¹⁴⁹ Between these two points she also includes Triphon’s killing of Jonathan and Aristobolus’s killing of his brother Antigonus. These are extra-biblical narratives of Jewish history and she notes their source as Titus Flavius Josephus’s *The Antiquities of the Jews*.

¹⁵⁰ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. K4v.

timeless pattern of comeuppance or, as Helgerson describes them in Foxe, “local intimations of the final victory”.¹⁵¹

As *The French historie* itself shows, this appetite for settling dues is not a phenomenon exclusive to the seventeenth century that Walsham discusses. From the smaller corpus of extant sixteenth century ballads, we can distinguish a strand of texts with which this aspect of Dowriche’s text would feel at ease, and that it perhaps explicitly imitates. One 1586 ballad, entitled “A proper newe sonet declaring the lamentation of Beckles Suffolke, which was in the great winde upon S. Andrewes eve last past most pittifully burned with fire [. . .]” invites the reader to listen to his misfortune:

With sobbing sighes, and trickling tears
My state I doe lament
Perceiving how God’s heavie wrath
Against my sinnes is bent;
Let all men viewe my woefull fall,
and rue my woefull case,
And learne hereby in speedy sort
Repentaunce to embrace.¹⁵²

The narrator here seeks the auditor’s sympathy by recognising how his own sins have brought about disaster but the writer of this ballad, like Dowriche, does so to teach a lesson about the surety of divine retribution. An earlier ballad, 1559’s “The wonders of England” sees Mary’s reign as divine punishment against England’s sins and Elizabeth’s accession as a divine reward.¹⁵³ A third, “A godly ballad declaring by the Scriptures the plagues that have insued whordome” makes a strident appeal against immorality with a litany of Old Testament analogues, viewing the

¹⁵¹ Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood*, 256.

¹⁵² Joseph Lilly, ed., *A Collection of Seventy-Nine Black-Letter Ballads and Broad-sides Printed in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, Between the Years 1559 and 1597* (Joseph Lilly, 1867), 81.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 94–7.

Flood as a product of comparable sin: “Remember eke that in Noes dayes, / When vice through lust was rifly growne”.¹⁵⁴

It is clear that *The French historie* has much in common with these ballads, which also sees in present and past events divine admonitions, punishments, and rewards. But these texts also share a very similar verse form, which she identifies as “to the better liking of some mens fantasies”, suggesting Dowriche seeks to position her text as a more ambitious example of a popular contemporary tradition of godly writing.¹⁵⁵ Indeed the French refugee describes “his” chosen verse form as a “rude & rustick song”, differentiating Dowriche’s paraphrase from the dry *Commentaries* and even from the influence of the more popular but still forbidding *Acts and Monuments*.¹⁵⁶ The fourteeners that make up one half of Dowriche’s poulter measure are split across two lines in the ballad metre, but her lines preserve an echo of that line break in their frequent use of caesura at the eighth syllable. This means that along with their shared iambic prosody, each verse form tends to produce similar syntactic structures. Beyond its greater accessibility, this choice of verse form creates a prosodic inevitability that aligns with her depiction of inescapable providences. We see this in lines like “[b]ut if you shun this profered grace, beware the paines of hell” and in “[s]o was his fierce & wicked life repaide with worthie death”, where the eighth syllable signals a move from human act to divine response.¹⁵⁷ This can also play out over multiple lines such as “[b]ut they that doo despise my word, my law, and will; / They shall be sure of everie man to be abhored still”.¹⁵⁸ As Pérez Fernández observes “[t]he underlying rhythm in poulter’s measure, as well as in fourteener couplets, was [. . .] the four-by-

¹⁵⁴ Nor is this the only Old Testament parallel the author makes. They also turn to the plagues on Egypt, the destruction of the Sodomites and King Abimelech, among others. He has an interesting apologetic for David in Psalm 51: “Bathesba, naked in bath, / Bewitched so king Davids brain, / That giltless he procured hath / Her husband Ury to be slain”, *ibid.*, 101–4.

¹⁵⁵ We see nods to these popular forms, too, in Dowriche’s emphasis on spectacle. Walsham notes how this popular providence literature “intermingled gratuitous circumstantial detail with stern spiritual admonition”, and Dowriche too does not shy away from the bodily, especially in her gory depiction of the death of Charles IX (sig. L1r). Walsham, *Providence in Early Modern England*, 75.

¹⁵⁶ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. L1v.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, sigs. E3v and K4v.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, sig. F1r.

four structure that characterized popular song. The fact that this rhythm was couched in two long lines, instead of four short ones could not repress its saliency”.¹⁵⁹ Its “saliency” may have precipitated its eventual decline, for poulter’s measure was a form that “continually made its presence felt” and so could produce an intrusive effect.¹⁶⁰ But that is exactly how Dowriche wanted to characterise God’s presence in the world: as persistent, pervasive, and indefatigable. The strictures of her verse form align with the similarly rigid strictures of providence. Together they come to structure her history.

Conclusion

The French historie imbues the “natural temporal sequence” of events found in the *Commentaries* “with a heightened sense of causality” through her imitation of English martyrologies.¹⁶¹ It is a striking example of how plotting can dovetail with, and indeed espouse, one’s political programme. Dowriche saw the advancement of God’s truth as an intrinsically international concern. Her versified episodes are designed to appeal to a popular English audience and to foster coreligionist sympathy and solidarity with her French subjects. But the French setting conceals a more radical warning about the divergence of terrestrial and celestial duties. While Englishmen may enjoy relatively “Alcion dayes”, they must ward against the corruption of divine truth in themselves and in their betters—including the crown.¹⁶² Dowriche calls her readers to vigilance but also to zeal. Though her structure is Foxean and much of her material is Tymme’s, this is very much Dowriche’s text and this polemic is her own. *The French historie* forges its own identity, even as it bears delible signs of its textual ancestry. Indeed it is those intertextual mediations that most powerfully testify to Dowriche as an author.

¹⁵⁹ José-María Pérez Fernández, “Translation and Metrical Experimentation in Sixteenth-Century English Poetry: The Case of Surrey’s Biblical Paraphrases”, *Cahiers Elisabéthains: A Biannual Journal of English Renaissance Studies* 71 (2007): 1–13: 4.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁶¹ Hutson, *The Invention of Suspicion*, 115.

¹⁶² Foxe, *Actes and monuments*, sigs. *[0]r- *1r.

CHAPTER 4: THE DANGERS OF DERIVATION

Ingenium

In *The Institution of Christian Matrimony*, Erasmus advises that those well-off families wanting to help their daughters “to cheat boredom”

would do even better to have them instructed in the humanities. Weaving, for example, is an occupation that leaves the mind free to listen to young men’s chatter and to reply to their banter, but a girl intent on her books has not thought for anything else. What is more, once she begins to enjoy study, it will sharpen and stimulate her mind more than any other occupation; others may discourage idleness, but study has the advantage that the more you do the greater the pleasure you obtain, and it will keep you occupied even into old age.¹

Erasmus recommends study not only because it will ward against bantering young men, but because he recognises that women have minds that can be bored, stimulated, or sharpened: minds that might relish a lifetime of application. The “study” Erasmus is prescribing involves writing; his Latin begins “[a]dde quod studia, si coeperunt adlubescere, vehementiore quodam oestro percellunt animum, quam ulla caeterarum artium”,² where “oestro” refers to the frenzied inspiration that urges (“percellunt”) the poet or prophet not to silent study, but to speech—or writing.³ Given its frequent association with weaving, translation may be the kind of writing Erasmus had in mind as a preferable alternative. In 1605, the prolific Nicholas Breton would

¹ Desiderius Erasmus, *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 69, ed. Louis Perraud and John W. O’Malley (University of Toronto Press, 1999), 319.

² Desiderius Erasmus, *Opera Omnia*, vol. 5:6 (Elsevier, 2008), 156.

³ Statius in *Thebiad* looks forward to his future writing “fortior oestro facta canam”, “when I will more strongly sing” the deeds of the emperor Domitian, *Thebiad: Books 1–7*, trans. D. R. Shackleton Bailey (Harvard University Press, 2004), 1.32–3. Juvenal in *Satires* refers to consul Veiento “fanaticus oestro percussus”, “goaded into a prophetic frenzy”, *Juvenal and Persius*, trans. Susanna Morton Braund (Harvard University Press, 2004), 4.123–24. See also “oestrus” in E. A. Andrews et al., eds. *Harpers’ Latin Dictionary* (Harper & Brothers, 1879), 1258.

explicitly advise husbands of learned wives to “perswade her to translation, it will keepe her from Idlenes”.⁴ Weaving occupies the hands, but translation also occupies and animates the mind.

So far in this thesis I have described translation as a derivative kind of writing that responds to a cultural investment in, and pedagogical directive to, *imitatio*. I have extended to derivative texts the ability to exhibit the *vis* and *ingenium* that was associated in antiquity with rhetorical mastery and that we now tend to associate with original authorship. In other words, I have attempted to dissociate “genius”—scion of the Latin *ingenium*—from the model of single-author “original” authorship, and argued that the intellectual and creative achievement we associate with genius and authorship in fact appear in works and in writers that radically diverge from our post-Romantic understanding of those categories. Erasmus and Breton’s accounts seem to support this recognition in so far as they represent studious writing like translation as intellectually engaged, not passive but pleasurable.

This chapter continues to advance that argument in relation to perhaps the most intellectually ambitious woman writer in the period. However, I also want to propose another reason that modern literary criticism has struggled to recognise derivation as partaking in the means and ends of authorship. This reason inheres in the double meaning of the Latin *ingenium*. That word does not only refer to an “inimitable talent” or “indefinable genius”,⁵ but also to “character”, “inclination” or “disposition”.⁶ When Cicero and Quintilian talk about the ingredients of successful *imitatio*, I would suggest that by *ingenium* they refer not only to intellectual or artistic merit but to the way one’s oratory or writing feels peculiarly their own—to the way that talent or genius communicates itself as character, so that craft seems to evoke a craftsman. When people today attend to a work of apparently original genius, they often do so as

⁴ Nicholas Breton, *An olde mans lesson* [. . .] (London: E. Alde, 1605), sigs. E4r–v.

⁵ Burrow, *Imitating Authors*, 7.

⁶ Cicero writes “inverecundum animi ingenium” (“the temper of his mind”) in *De inventione*, 1.83. In Terence, we find “ipest ingenio bono” (“he’s a good-natured young man”), *The Woman of Andros*, trans. John Barsby (Harvard University Press, 2001), 104–5, l. 487. And Livy writes “Nec ita multo post Volscis levatis metu suum rediit ingenium” (“Yet it was not long before the Volsci, no longer alarmed, returned to *their old ways*”—my translation and emphasis), *History of Rome*, trans. B. O. Foster, vol. 1 (Harvard University Press, 1919), II, 286.

much for the way it is thought to reflect its creator as for the particulars of the creation. We feel we can see Shakespeare in his plays, even when we are literally seeing Hamlet, Lear, or Lady Macbeth. As Quintilian wrote of *ethos* in oratory, so too does literary writing allow the author's character to "shine[] through" and be "somehow recognised" by the reader.⁷ This phenomenon means that it is not enough to argue, as I have, that derivative writers are creative and literary; they will only be fully appreciated as authors if we perceive an authorial persona or character emerging from their texts.⁸

That sense of character or personality has been particularly difficult for critics to appreciate in translations by women. For Neil Rhodes, translation provides "pragmatic support for the generation of [literary] resources" and in this support women are depersonalised: they are "reproducers" of others' resources and their participation in this "communal labour of nation-building" is styled as anonymous and corporate, rather than individual.⁹ Massimiliano Morini asserts that while men's translation involved "a personal contribution, an infusion, as it were, of their personality in the final result [. . .] with women things stood differently":

translation, particularly if exercised within a devout sphere, could be the only activity permitted to women, for in this case it could be seen as a mechanical exercise, one that would occupy the mind and body much as embroidery did.¹⁰

Denying to women the intellectual satisfactions identified by Erasmus, Morini sees their translations as particularly unthinking, unfeeling, and impersonal. As I suggested in my introduction, this treatment of women's translations may have its origin in "the strangely gendered vocabulary of [classical] imitation" in which analogies of paternity trumped maternity

⁷ Quintilian, *The Orator's Education*, 6.2.13.

⁸ Of course this persona or ethos is a fictional construct, a composite of all a writer's implied authors. Wayne Booth termed this the "career author", referring not as the phrase rather awkwardly implies to the flesh-and-blood writer, but to how "he" contrives to come across in the totality of his works; see Wayne Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 270–71.

⁹ Rhodes, *Common*, 120 and 122.

¹⁰ Morini, *Tudor Translation*, 24.

and textual “[c]hildren resembled their fathers, not their mothers”.¹¹ The upshot, however, is that for many critics translations by women are assumed to give no sense of an emergent authorial “she” and for this reason are relegated to a secondary order of literary value.

While my previous chapters have already given examples of translation choices that vividly evoke their translators, this final chapter takes as its subject the varied ways that subjectivity can emerge in derivative texts, as well as how the process of derivative writing itself might come to inform that subjectivity. I concern myself with both senses of *ingenium*—genius and character—and argue that derivative writing can exhibit and shape both. Indeed this conviction is central to the humanist curriculum, which saw literary manipulations as both mind-expanding and character-building. One follows the other: working intimately and persistently with other texts, and especially with rich and difficult texts, leaves its mark. The analogies surrounding *imitatio* make this clear, as in the image of paternal resemblance, or in the digestive metaphors in which classical texts give up nourishment. Often these analogies are mixed together, as in Jonson’s injunction to become “very He”.¹² Here I argue that in becoming “very He” through their close engagement with men’s texts, women translators also became “very She”: forging their own authorial identity in their derivative writing.

As ever, while the humanist classroom imparted its curriculum only to boys, its methods and values were not contained by its walls. They reached girls and women, too. Figures like Erasmus, not to mention his many followers in the vernaculars, disseminated that education and its values through the printing press. Educated men who became clergy deployed their learning at the pulpit, and when, in Stuart England, those posts became scarce, some found audiences as roaming preachers.¹³ Still other men became tutors to notable families, training their sons—and

¹¹ Burrow, *Imitating Authors*, 294. The persistence of this hierarchy reinforces the sexist dyad between women and translation as each secondary, famously articulated by Florio’s description of translation as a “reputed femall”, Montaigne, *The essays*, sig. A2r.

¹² Jonson, *Workes*, 127.

¹³ See Mark H. Curtis, “The Alienated Intellectuals of Early Stuart England”, *Past & Present* 23 (1962): 25–43.

sometimes their daughters—in much the same way that they themselves had been trained at school. One such daughter was Lucy Hutchinson.¹⁴

Lucy Hutchinson

Lucy Hutchinson (née Apsley, 1620–1681) is an enigmatic figure. High Calvinist, wife of regicide John Hutchinson, and first translator of Lucretius’s *De rerum natura* (*On The Nature of Things*) into English verse, she was first known to literary history for her hagiographic biography of her husband and account of the Civil Wars (here referred to as the *Memoirs*) which does not mention the Lucretius translation and does not present Hutchinson or her life as fertile ground for such an endeavour. “No two writers could seem more at odds than the puritan Lucy Hutchinson and the pagan Lucretius”, commented Reid Barbour in 1991.¹⁵ Archival recovery of her writing, led by David Norbrook, has transformed our understanding of her oeuvre. In her youth in the 1630s, Hutchinson composed songs and her commonplace book which dates primarily from that period is catholic in its tastes, including psalm translations, John Denham and Sidney Godolphin’s translation of Virgil’s *Aeneid*, and long extracts from Nicholas Caussin’s *The Holy Court*, “the textbook of Stuart courtly *préciosité*”.¹⁶ She wrote the Lucretius translation in the 1650s, while raising multiple children. In the 1660s she may have begun writing her biblical verse paraphrase-cum-epic *Order and Disorder*, but she continued it into her old age; by the end of her life it was still unfinished but came to twenty cantos in length (she published the first five cantos in 1679).¹⁷ Her husband Colonel John Hutchinson, a signatory of Charles I’s death warrant, died

¹⁴ Sarah C. E. Ross identifies Hutchinson as “an exception to the rule that women wrote from a position of relative intellectual deprivation”, *Women, Poetry, and Politics*, 174.

¹⁵ Reid Barbour, “Between Atoms and the Spirit: Lucy Hutchinson’s Translation of Lucretius”, *Renaissance Papers* 1994, 1–16: 1.

¹⁶ Jerome De Groot, “John Denham and Lucy Hutchinson’s Commonplace Book”, *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900* 48/1 (2008): 147–63: 150.

¹⁷ The copy of the first cantos of *Order and Disorder* circulated to the Countess of Rochester is inscribed with the date 1664, but this date is uncertain. Norbrook takes the 1679 publication of the first five cantos as Hutchinson’s final intentions and contends that she wrote the latter cantos into her old age; for these arguments and a chronological bibliography, see *Order and Disorder*, ed. David Norbrook (Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001), ix–xi and liii–lv.

in prison in 1664, spurring her to write the *Memoirs* and the sequence of “Elegies”. In this post-Restoration period she also undertook numerous translation projects, writing versions of John Calvin’s *Institutes* and *Centum aphorismi*, and John Owen’s polymathic *Theologoumena pantodapa*, among others.

It has proven tempting to divide this corpus in two halves, with an early period of poetic and classical exploration ending with the Lucretius translation and, following that, a period of narrowing sympathies and growing puritanism after her husband’s death. This division seems to be supported by Hutchinson’s own dismissive remarks about the Lucretius translation in its 1675 Dedication where she styles that project as a “wanton dalliance with impious bookes” and a product of her “youthfull curiositie”.¹⁸ Some critics suggest her translation was part-and-parcel of the fashion for Epicureanism in the mid-seventeenth century and point to aristocratic women’s participation in questions of natural philosophy.¹⁹ Another critic suggests that she might have appreciated Lucretius’s anti-war stance.²⁰ These are slight explanations for such an extensive and laborious translation project, and they locate the appeal of Lucretius exclusively in the context and interests of Hutchinson as she was in the 1650s. In the context of her personal grief and deepening religiosity after 1664 (not to mention that period’s backlash against Epicureanism) critics see little place for Lucretius. But we know she was engaged with Lucretius in the 1670s. Hutchinson wrote the repudiatory Dedication in 1675 after having returned to her two-decade old project to add her marginal comments, rework the end of book 4 and probably also to

¹⁸ Reid Barbour and David Norbrook, eds., *The Works of Lucy Hutchinson*, vol. 1, Part 1 (Oxford University Press, 2012), 13 and 7.

¹⁹ See Robert Wilcher, “Lucy Hutchinson”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern English Literature and Religion*, edited by Andrew Hiscock and Helen Wilcox (Oxford University Press, 2017), 360–73; and Reid Barbour, who comments “Hutchinson’s translation was as typical of her social circles and intellectual milieu as it was exceptional for a seventeenth-century woman operating within the culturally bounded masculine jurisdiction of both amateur science and classicism”, “Lucy Hutchinson, Atomism and the Atheist Dog”, in *Women, Science and Medicine, 1500–1700: mothers and sisters of the Royal Society*, edited by Lynette Hunter and Sarah Hutton (Sutton Publishing, 1997), 122–37: 123. More recent studies have revealed the extent of early modern women’s engagement with natural philosophy; for an overview, see Kate Allan, “Poetry and Science”, in *The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Early Modern Women’s Writing in English*, edited by Sarah C. E. Ross and Jake Arthur (Palgrave, forthcoming 2022).

²⁰ See Barbour, “Between Atoms”, 10–2.

translate part of the final (sixth) book.²¹ A scribe was responsible for transcribing most of the manuscript, but she wrote out the sixth book, the marginalia, and the introductory prose arguments herself.²² She then circulated the finished translation and Dedication to an important literary patron, the Earl of Anglesey. Hutchinson's account of the translation as a "wanton dalliance", a product of its times and her age, does not explain why she returned to it in the 1670s, long after the initial Epicurean craze and the tumults of the Civil War. Most importantly they cannot explain why, if she really did disdain the text, she chose to finish and circulate it.

Jonathan Goldberg complains that critics of Hutchinson, most notably David Norbrook and Reid Barbour, insist on seeing the repudiatory 1675 Dedication as "the vantage point from which the [Lucretian] endeavour must be viewed. Both parse and quote from the prefatory letter; indeed, it almost seems as if the letter *is* the Lucretius".²³ Goldberg argues:

Reading the significance of Lucretius as anything but Lucretian forecloses the possibility that Hutchinson's faithful translation of Lucretius is just that, faithful, responsive, engaged; it seems worthwhile, therefore, to suspend the notion that her later repudiations are built into the translation or ultimately determine its meaning.²⁴

Cassandra Gorman answers this call most effectively. She make a compelling case that

Lucretius's materialist interests align with Hutchinson's theology. Across her oeuvre, "material

²¹ The version of Book 4 in the extant manuscript removes the description of sexual pleasure, with a marginal comment noting they have been "left out"; the line count provided in the manuscript continues through that lacuna within her typical ratio of original to translated lines, suggesting she did originally translate them but redacted them from the manuscript she sent to Anglesey. That Book 6 may have been completed at this later point is suggested by her switch in edition from the 1631 Pareus edition to the 1570 or 1583 Lambinus edition in this last book. The sixth book is the only book written in the manuscript in her own hand, again suggesting some break in her composition; see Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, lii.

²² It is possible she also wrote the arguments preceding each book at this time, though the fact that the marginalia and the arguments often do not concur even while summarising the same arguments suggests they were not written at the same time. Norbrook suggests the marginalia were written later, *ibid.*, cxxiii. Germaine Greer et al. suggest the arguments might have been written for the Anglesey manuscript specifically, *Kissing the Rod*, 218.

²³ Jonathan Goldberg, *The Seeds of Things: theorizing sexuality and materiality in Renaissance representations* (Fordham University Press, 2009), 157.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 157 and 154. In arguing against the way Norbrook and Barbour "attempt to sustain an ongoing contradiction" between her translation and her life, Goldberg makes his own essentially biographical argument. He reinterprets the way Hutchinson depicts herself as her husband's "shadow" as instead a case of her writing materialising (in a playfully Lucretian sense) their relationship. His belletristic account no longer sustains that "ongoing contradiction", then, but it is not an answer in the more traditional historicist and literary critical terms that interest me here.

forms and operations endow spiritual conceptions with meanings” even as “it is the spiritual that brings significance to the material world”; in other words Hutchinson agrees with Lucretius that existence is material, but she sees those corporeal forms as tools to conduct a supra-material spiritual life.²⁵ David Norbrook and Reid Barbour’s compendious edition of Hutchinson’s Lucretius translation, part of the ongoing multi-volume project *The Collected Works of Lucy Hutchinson*, also partly addresses Goldberg’s criticisms. Their volume considers the translation from a large array of contexts and provides a very extensive critical apparatus. But it (rightly) remains an edition, not an interpretation. Goldberg is still right that most existing criticism about the Lucretius translation tries to explain (and often explain it away) its existence, rather than granting the translation its own power to illuminate Hutchinson’s life and her other writing. And yet, to do that fairly, we also cannot simply discard Hutchinson’s dedicatory refutations or assume they have nothing relevant to tell us about her project or her views on it. Gorman’s account, for example, makes the Dedication the anomalous text; she writes that “[d]espite Hutchinson’s protestations” in the Dedication, her “soteriological materialism” is inflected by Lucretius, just as earlier critics set aside her Lucretius translation to characterise her as a strident Calvinist.²⁶ We need an argument that contextualises her translation of *De rerum natura* in her writing life without simply dismissing, or accepting, the received story of anomaly that surrounds it.

I would argue that the problematised status of Hutchinson’s Lucretius has a lot to do with the way critics have struggled to recognise translation as authorship. Though she was well into her thirties at the time, it has been easy to accept Hutchinson’s identification of *De rerum natura* as a kind of juvenilia because translations are so often regarded as a formative stage in an author’s development, rather than themselves properly formed and authored. A reason for this may be the way derivative texts obfuscate the perception of an authorial personality belonging to

²⁵ “Lucy Hutchinson, Lucretius and Soteriological Materialism”, *The Seventeenth Century* 28/3 (2013): 293–309: 306.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 299.

the translator. It is true that while in “original” writing every aspect of the text is evidence of literary agency and characterises its (implied) author, this evidence is complicated by the close intertextual relationships on which derivative texts rely. But that agency is by no means absent. I have already shown that by comparing source and target texts we can recover that agency and reveal translations to be composed of literary choices not dissimilar from those involved in what we call “original” composition. Moreover other recognisably authorial choices are available to writers of derivative texts, though they are not always legible in the same way. So, “original” writers choose their subject matter and approach, but translators or paraphrasts do something similar when they choose their source text or indeed combine source texts. All writers, derivative or otherwise, adopt an attitude towards those texts, not only in how they are written, but in how they are presented to readers through paratextual texts or framing devices. Finally, much as critics parse an “original” author’s works for how the same idea, theme, image, or style appears or is reworked over an oeuvre and draw from that a deepened sense of the author and their interests, so too do the interests of derivative texts leave traces on other works by the same translator or paraphrast, thus contributing to our sense of their authorial personality—their *ingenium*.

In the first section of this chapter I challenge the critical narrative of anomaly surrounding Hutchinson’s Lucretius translation by arguing that she sought to publish the work, therefore contextualising her prefatory apologetics. This enables me, in my second section, to examine her writing in translation as authorial and her *De rerum natura* as authored, rather than reckless or recanted. There, I look to how the Dedication and her translation choices in *De rerum natura* speak to her attempts to reconcile humanist classical recovery and her own intellectual ambition with the promotion of Christian truth. In my third and final section I show how, in the challenging process of rewriting *De rerum natura*, her authorial character is re-formed, so that she and her writing become indelibly marked by her deep engagement with Lucretius. This involves internalising and imitating Lucretius’s characteristic interests and style, but also adopting his

rhetoric of authorship: one whereby public comment is refracted through commitment to private retreat.

Part 1: Circulating Lucretius

There is only one extant manuscript of Hutchinson's Lucretius translation; it is a presentation copy circulated and dedicated to Arthur Annesley, the Earl of Anglesey, in 1675. In the accompanying text, which I refer to as the Dedication, Hutchinson styles her translation as a regrettable mistake.²⁷ This narrative has proven persuasive to critics and the effect has been to forestall accounts of how the Lucretius translation might fit with her wider oeuvre and writing.²⁸ The translation does not need to fit because Hutchinson herself tells us it is an anomaly. In this first section of my chapter, I turn this argument on its head by arguing that there is clear evidence in the Dedication that Hutchinson sought a much wider audience for her translation than Anglesey alone. I suggest that its apologetics are wholly conventional for writers entering the public domain with a controversial text like *De rerum natura*. We must view Hutchinson's anti-Lucretian polemic with a sceptical eye, as part of a "dissimulatory code".²⁹ This new interpretation of the Dedication allows us to reassess her relationship with *De rerum natura* and to begin to recognise her translation as properly authorial.

Danger by an ill booke

²⁷ The given title is "To The Right Honourable Arthur Earle of Anglesey Lord Keeper of his Majesties Privie Seale & One of His Majesties Most Honorable Privie Councill".

²⁸ See, for example, Charles Kay Smith who notes that "the more she translated the more she grew to hate epicurean ideas", "French Philosophy and English Politics in Interregnum Poetry", in *The Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and Political Culture*, edited by R. Malcolm Smuts (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 177–209: 200. David Hopkins suggests she "had originally been more open-minded", with Epicureanism becoming "repellent" and tainted by libertinism, "The English voices of Lucretius from Lucy Hutchinson to John Mason Good", in *The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius*, edited by Stuart Gillespie and Philip Hardie (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 254–73: 255

²⁹ This formulation is from Valentina Prospero, "Lucretius in the Italian Renaissance", in *The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius*, edited by Stuart Gillespie and Philip Hardie (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 214–26: 214.

Scholars first approached the Lucretius translation through the prism of Hutchinson’s well-known *Memoirs*, a puritan text devoted to the republican cause and to commemorating her husband’s virtue and piety.³⁰ Against that backdrop, the translation seemed anomalous *prima facie*. Hutchinson’s Dedication does nothing to disabuse that impression; in fact its aim of exonerating her from any impropriety is predicated on creating a sense of anomaly. The stakes were high: Lucretius was a singularly controversial figure. In the run-up to the Roman civil wars of the 40s, Lucretius (c. 99–c.55 BC) in *De rerum natura* set out to make the philosophy of the Greek philosopher Epicurus palatable to a Roman audience.³¹ He did so by greatly abridging and reshaping the fifteen books of Epicurus’s now lost prose opus, *On Nature*, turning it into a six-book epic of Latin verse.³² The aim of Epicurean philosophy was *ataraxia*, or freedom from mental or physical disturbance. Epicurus and Lucretius located those disturbances in what they thought of as irrational human fears, namely the fear of death and in the fear of the gods and divine punishment (*religio*). Unsurprisingly, this proved controversial to early modern readers. In the Dedication, Hutchinson neatly summarises the Epicurean position:

[D]eriding Heaven & Hell, Eternall Rewards & Punishments, as fictions in the whole [. . .] they [Epicureans] fancied another kind of heaven & hell, in the internall peace or horror of the conscience, upon which account they urgd the persuite of vertue and the avoyding of vice, as the spring of joy or sorrow, & defind vertue to be all those things that are just equall & profitable to humane Society, wherein this Poet makes true religion to consist, & not in superstitious cerimonies, which he makes to have had their originall from the vaine dread of men, imputing those events to the wrath of Gods, which proceeded from naturall Causes whereof they were ignorant[.]³³

³⁰ This text was unpublishable in her lifetime for obvious reasons. After its publication by Julius Hutchinson in 1806, it quickly became a classic of Civil War history from the republican perspective.

³¹ Datings of *De rerum natura*’s composition vary, to the 50s before the conflict or at its outset; see G. O. Hutchinson, “The Date of *De Rerum Natura*”, *The Classical Quarterly* 51/1 (2001): 150–62.

³² For a detailed reconstruction of the relationship between *De rerum natura* and *On Nature*, see D. N. Sedley, *Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom* (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

³³ From the Dedication to the Earl of Anglesey, Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 11.

For Lucretius, superstitions about afterlives and divine punishment create a hell on earth because they cause needless distress. Heaven and hell are a terrestrial state of mind. These superstitions stem from man's ignorance of the causes of natural events, leading them to "imput[e] those events to the wrath of Gods". Thus, to achieve *ataraxia*, Epicurus and Lucretius demystify worldly phenomena that create fear by explaining their true "naturall Causes" in reference to a materialist universe of atoms combining, colliding, and swerving through the void. This demystification was anathema to early modern Christian thought that saw events like thunder, floods, and shipwrecks as the workings of providence by secondary causes.³⁴ But in practice Epicurean thought went further, claiming that gods had no role in the world whatsoever.³⁵ This derogation of the divine involved one more heresy: that the soul, like the body, was mortal.

Given Lucretius's heterodoxy and what we know about his reception in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, if it was unexpected that someone like Lucy Hutchinson would translate *De rerum natura*, her polemics in the Dedication have by contrast seemed entirely predictable and thus convincing. The Dedication to the Earl of Anglesey is a tightly argued missive that characterises her translation as a "youthfull curiositie" since regretted, Lucretius as "that Monster", and *De rerum natura* as "Pagan mud" riddled with "Atheismes & impieties".³⁶ Hutchinson attacks her translation from a godly position in which scripture is the only true wisdom. As such, all classical philosophers are blameworthy:

All these, and all the other poore deluded instructors of the Gentiles, are guilty of no lesse Impiety, ignorance & folly then this Lunatick [Lucretius], who not able to dive into

³⁴ In early modern England, "[m]ost examples of providential interference were [taken to be] *miranda* not *miracula*, preternatural wonders brought about by divine manipulation of secondary causes and elemental forces", Walsham, *Providence in Early Modern England*, 230.

³⁵ Gods still exist, but Lucretius writes that "nothing at any time impairs their peace of mind" ("neque ulla / res animi pacem delibat tempore in ullo"), Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, trans. W. H. D. Rouse and Martin Ferguson Smith (Harvard University Press, 1975), 190–91, 3.23–24.

³⁶ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 7, 15, 9, and 7, respectively.

the true Originall & Cause of Beings & Accidents, admires them who devizd this Casuall, Irrationall dance of Attomes.³⁷

Evoking Jerome's apocryphal account of Lucretius being driven to madness by a love potion, Hutchinson claims the terms of *De rerum natura*—origins, causes, and accidents—instead for Christianity, leaving Lucretius in a random dance that evokes another strand of ire in the Dedication: her derision of Restoration wits.³⁸

This broad attack develops into a critique of the classicism that would seem to also underlie her own translation. She writes

I am perswaded, that the Encomiums given to these Pagan Poets & Philosophers, wherewith Tutors put them into the hands of their pupills, yet unsetled in Principles of Devine Truth, is one greate means of debauching the learned world, at least of confirming them in that debauchery of soule, which their first sin led them into, & of hindring their recovery, while they puddle all the streames of Truth, that flow downe to them from devine Grace, with this Pagan mud.³⁹

Her attack is not merely on Lucretius, but on the vaunted place in humanist education that pagan authors occupied. But it is the way she homes in on the vulnerability of youth, as in her description of the translation as the work of her “youthfull curiositie”, that is key to how she construes her own relationship with Lucretius. The work of the translation is (she claims) confined to a period before her “judgement grew riper; & my mind was fixt in more profitable contemplations”.⁴⁰ When she speaks of pupils misled, then, she is also talking about herself, suggesting that Lucretius led *her* into sin and hindered *her* recovery.

³⁷ Ibid., 7–9.

³⁸ More on Restoration wits later. For a discussion of Jerome's account, from his version of Eusebius's *Chronicle*, see Luciano Canfora, *Vita di Lucrezio* (Sellerio, 1993). As Norbrook observes of *Order and Disorder*, wit “is condemned again and again in the poem”, *Order and Disorder*, xxix.

³⁹ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 9.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 7.

In her depiction of a believer “div[ing]” into divine truth, as opposed to misled pupils “puddl[ing] all the streams of Truth”, we find classical knowledge compared bathetically with Christian wisdom. She returns to this water imagery at the end of the Dedication, attacking “vaignoriorous schollars” who “while they tipple att their celebrated Helicon, they loose their lives, and fill themselves with poyson, drowning their spirits in those pudled waters”.⁴¹ Against the thirst-quenching, life-giving qualities of divine truth, antiquity offers a muddy sip that causes poisoning. This strand of imagery persists throughout the Dedication and evokes Lucretius’s famous depiction of his verse as honey on the cup of his medicinal Epicurean philosophy:

as with children, when physicians try to administer rank wormwood, they first touch the rims about the cup with the sweet yellow fluid of honey, that unthinking childhood be deluded as far as the lips, and meanwhile may drink up the bitter juice of wormwood [. . .] and regain health.⁴²

In the Dedication, though, both his medicine (his atomism) and honey (his poetic vehicle) are represented as toxic. The childlike scholars put themselves at peril because they mistake the poetic inspiration symbolised by Helicon for a font of truth. Her Dedication is cast as an “antidote” to these poisons and it particularly attends to the young or naïve.⁴³ In a revision of Lucretius’s atomism, Hutchinson thus warns her readers to look from appearances to an unseen reality, from the honey to the bitter juice.

In her distrust of the classics, Hutchinson relitigates a centuries old debate about the relationship between Rome, Athens, and Jerusalem. This was a debate that early modern editions of Lucretius in Latin also entertained, but defused. One example is the Daniel Pareus edition from which Hutchinson translated the first five books of *De rerum natura*.⁴⁴ That edition includes the “Testimonia”, a long catalogue of citations from classical or patristic authors that mention

⁴¹ Ibid., 15.

⁴² Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 79.

⁴³ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 15.

⁴⁴ The second half of the sixth book was translated from the 1570 or 1583 Lambinus edition.

Lucretius. While Pareus does not comment on or endorse any of their sentiments and though those do vary, the overwhelming impression is a defence of Lucretius and his text on the basis of its poetic merit. Citations move from Cicero’s “Lucretii poemata, ut scribis, non ita sunt multis luminibus ingenii, multae tamen artis” (“the poetry of Lucretius is not rich in the glories of genius, but full however of much art”) to the so-called Christian Cicero, Lactantius, who states “Epicuri sunt omnia, quae delirat Lucretius” (“everything that maddens Lucretius is Epicurus’s”), selecting Lucretius’s poetry for praise much more than his philosophy.⁴⁵ One visceral image to this effect is Dutch humanist Lambert Ludolf Helm’s suggestion that, for authors like Lucretius, “solitus est [. . .] similibus Ethnicorum scriptorum stercoribus gemmas colligere” (“one should] be in the habit of collecting gems out of the dung of heathen authors”).⁴⁶ This image exemplifies the way Christian scholars and then Renaissance humanists “justif[ied] the Christian’s claim to the intellectual, especially literary, property of classical antiquity”—what Erasmus called the *supellex bonarum litterarum* (the furniture of good learning)—by citing the Hebrews stealing valuables from the Egyptians in Exodus 3 or the story of the captive gentile woman in Deuteronomy 21.⁴⁷ For Helm and others in the “Testimonia”, the goods worth stealing from Lucretius are specifically poetic rather than moral. Thomas Creech, whose translation of Lucretius was first published in 1682, similarly defends the text’s poetic merit. He evokes the humanist commonplace, deriving from Seneca, in which readers figure as bees taking nectar from a florilegium of good authors.⁴⁸ The reader, not Lucretius, is the responsible party in this analogy, with Creech arguing that a “corrupt mind may suck *Poyson* from the sweetest flowers of

⁴⁵ Titus Lucretius Carus, *Titi Lucreti Cari Philosophi & Poëta antiquissimi De Rerum Natura Libri Sex* [. . .], ed. Daniel Pareus (Frankfurt: William Fitzer, 1631), 29 and 35.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁴⁷ The *supellex* phrase is from Erasmus’s *Antibarbari*; for this quote and the argument, see Kathy Eden, *Friends Hold All Things in Common* (Yale University Press, 2017), 19–23.

⁴⁸ Seneca’s apian metaphors were revised in antiquity and by their later inheritors, especially in terms of whether the nectar was collected in order to be transformed into something else (i.e. into the honey of “original” composition) or to be deployed intact (i.e., something more like the gem image in a more derivative or commonplacating tradition). See Pigman, “Versions of Imitation”.

the Poet”.⁴⁹ Hutchinson’s 1675 depiction, however, denudes these conventional defences of Lucretius and indeed all “heathen” authors by presenting their nectar as inherently poisonous.⁵⁰ Only an especially pious constitution, or an especially alchemical intelligence, could transmute its poison. Fortunately her dedicatee, Anglesey, is one such person; he “hath skill to render that which in it selfe is poysonous, many wayes usefull & medicinall”.⁵¹

Wherever your Lordship shall dispose this booke

That *De rerum natura* is dangerously unchristian, part of a classical tradition that is itself suspect, is taken by many critics to represent Lucy Hutchinson’s considered reflection on her translation. But I would instead suggest those sentiments and their vehemence must be understood in the context of Hutchinson’s expectation—and her hope—that the translation would soon meet with a wider audience. Critics have sometimes wondered whether Hutchinson intended a wider readership for her Lucretius, but they have never taken seriously its implications.⁵² I believe, however, that there is ample evidence that she intended Anglesey to publish her translation. This is important because it changes the context of her Dedication from a private correspondence to a literary debut. In a public context, her cutting repudiation of Lucretius is not revealed to be insincere *per se*, but to be conventional in how it tries to effect “protection against all the censures a booke might expose me to”, as she herself phrases it.⁵³ By establishing this context, we can

⁴⁹ Thomas Creech, *Titus Lucretius Carus the Epicurean philospher* [. . .], trans. Thomas Creech, 1st ed. (Oxford: L. Lichfield, 1682), sig. b4r.

⁵⁰ In this move, she immediately takes on the more antagonistic position Creech adopts only from his second, more defensive edition of 1683, where he acknowledges that his translation was a “venomed Pill, and needs a Piety of strong constitution to swallow and digest it”; Thomas Creech, *Titus Lucretius Carus, the Epicurean philospher* [. . .], trans. Thomas Creech, 2nd ed. (Oxford: L. Lichfield, 1683), sig. A2v.

⁵¹ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 15.

⁵² Wilcher notes that “[s]he clearly does not expect the new copy to sit unopened on Anglesey’s shelves, since she begs him to include her repudiation of its atheistic contents”, “Lucy Hutchinson”, 372. Robert Mayer also notes that “Hutchinson’s comments on her translation of Lucretius suggest that in respect to that poem at least she understands that her giving the manuscript to Anglesey amounts to its presentation to a potentially wide readership”, “Lucy Hutchinson: A Life of Writing”, *The Seventeenth Century* 22/2 (2007): 305–35: 324. Norbrook, too, acknowledges that “Hutchinson may conceivably have thought that Anglesey might consider her Lucretius worth printing”, but does not examine what this would mean for account of her life and her relationship with Lucretius, Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, cxxiii.

⁵³ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 15.

consider how the Dedication and translation might work in concert, rather than the former repudiating the evidence of the latter.

The most immediate evidence that Hutchinson seeks publication is the fact that she circulates the translation at all—and to whom. Scholars inside and outside the field of early modern women’s writing have long demonstrated that manuscript circulation was a form of publication that could have significant reach.⁵⁴ Circulation of this kind sought to retain greater control over the works in question by operating along networks of sociable exchange; however these were not watertight, as Hutchinson herself notes in her reference to a putative “lost copie”.⁵⁵ That comment suggests her Anglesey manuscript is one of at least two, but probably multiple, circulating copies of her *De rerum natura*. She must have circulated at least one manuscript, probably multiple times, in order to elicit what she calls the “little glory I had among some few of my intimate friends, for understanding this crabbed poet”.⁵⁶ Her desire for, or at least her acquiescence to, greater circulation of her translation is also strongly implied by her decision to send it to Anglesey. Anglesey moved in a wider range of social circles than Hutchinson’s own; he was a royalist, though he was sympathetic to republicans and to the Hutchinsons in particular.⁵⁷ He was also an active literary patron with connections to John Milton and Andrew Marvell.⁵⁸ As Norbrook notes, “Anglesey had a record of helping with the

⁵⁴ See, for example, Harold Love, *Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England* (Clarendon Press, 1993), Arthur F. Marotti, *Manuscript, Print, and the English Renaissance Lyric* (Cornell University Press, 1995) and Victoria E. Burke and Jonathan Gibson, eds., *Early Modern Women’s Manuscript Writing: selected papers from the Trinity/Trent Colloquium* (Ashgate, 2004).

⁵⁵ The “lost copie” may itself be a fiction, in that it provides an excuse to seek publication by correcting or framing the bootlegged text; Anne Bradstreet appears to have made a similar fictive gambit in the first edition of her poems, *The Tenth Muse*. The Oxford edition of Hutchinson’s translation corroborates this phenomenon, “[t]he claim that a writer has been forced into print because of the unsanctioned circulation of manuscript copies was something of a convention in the early modern period, not always to be taken at face value”; it also notes that no such copy has been traced, Reid Barbour and David Norbrook, eds., *The Works of Lucy Hutchinson*, vol. 1, Part 2 (Oxford University Press, 2012), 460, note 13.

⁵⁶ These may be the friends who stoked her initial interest in Lucretius, from whom she “heard so much discourse [. . .] at second hand”, *ibid.*, 1, Part 1: 13 and 7.

⁵⁷ See *ibid.*, cxii–cxix, where Norbrook suggests Anglesey may have intervened on her husband’s behalf and notes that in his own diaries he comments favourably on having been “much delighted in reading pious M^{rs} Hutesons diary and put thereby in mind of close walking with God as she did”.

⁵⁸ See Annabel Patterson and Martin Dzelzainis, “Marvell and the Earl of Anglesey: A Chapter in the History of Reading”, *The Historical Journal* 44/3 (2001): 703–26.

publication of books which for different reasons might cause offence [. . .] and Hutchinson may conceivably have thought that Anglesey might consider her Lucretius worth printing”.⁵⁹ Fittingly she describes him in her Dedication as the “the justly celebrated Mæcenas of our dayes”.⁶⁰ She may also have known Anglesey had a particular interest in Lucretius (his library had some six editions at his death) and thus that he may have been participant in a network interested in Lucretian material to whom her work could be circulated.⁶¹

The formality of her address to Anglesey is also suggestive of its wider audience. The tone is notable because Hutchinson was close to his wife, Lady Annesley, Countess of Anglesey. As Crawford Gribben explores, in 1673 Hutchinson began to attend puritan John Owen’s London congregation along with Lady Annesley, who was a member of the church.⁶² A hotspot for nonconformists, Lady Annesley would later be arrested at that church. While the decorousness of Hutchinson’s Dedication might still have been seen as fitting for an appeal to a man of higher rank and means, many aspects of her self-justification would seem to be redundant if the context were indeed assuredly private. It is unclear, for example, why Hutchinson would feel the need to reiterate the firmness of her own faith to a man who not only knew her husband’s godly reputation, but knew of her own activist participation in nonconformity through his wife.⁶³

Indeed much of the Dedication appears to move beyond Anglesey’s household and address a wider audience to whom the affirmations of piety would be more applicable. Hutchinson asks that her Dedication be preserved in any subsequent transmission of her Lucretius, writing “I beseech your Lordship to reward my obedience, by indulging me the further honor to preserve, wherever your Lordship shall dispose of this book, this record with it, that I

⁵⁹ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, cxxiii.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, cxv.

⁶² See Crawford Gribben, “John Owen, Lucy Hutchinson and the experience of defeat”, *The Seventeenth Century* 30/2 (2015): 179–90.

⁶³ For an intimation that Anglesey knew of Lucy Hutchinson’s piety, see footnote 57, above.

abhorre all the Atheismes & impieties in it”.⁶⁴ This expectation of future readership aligns with the way the second half of the Dedication warns against delving into classical philosophy at a young age before one has confirmed themselves in faith. Her self-presentation as a woman reformed is part of her emphasis that her translation could be dangerous for younger readers, as indeed the allusion to Lucretius’s honeyed medicine, administered to the pre-rational child, suggests. Anglesey himself was 61 in 1675 and she makes clear that she “say[s] not this to your Lordship, though I leave it in your booke, as an antidote against the poyson of it, for any novice who by chance might prie into it”.⁶⁵ Her mention of chancing “novices” reveals it to be a preface that expects readers, and arguably suggests an expectation of uncontrolled circulation, possibly even in print. If she expected Anglesey to “dispose” her book in limited, judicious ways, such an antidote would seem superfluous. We get a similar sense when she writes that she

could not but in charity sett up this seamarke, to warne incautious travellers, and leave a testimony, that those walkes of witt which poore vaine glorious schollars call the Muses groves, are enchanted thickets.⁶⁶

Hutchinson aligns herself in favour of divine, rather than classical, knowledge; but again her reference to “incautious travellers” suggests her translation, too, may travel far and incautiously.

Hutchinson claims to set up her “seamarke” to warn others reading her translation, but the Dedication also serves as a “seamarke” for her, in that it deflects and redirects criticism of her as translator towards society’s prioritisation of pagan classical authors, and towards Anglesey’s (assumed) endorsement as her patron. The penultimate sentence of the Dedication effects this shift, returning to the apologetics (and the addressee) that opened the text, by saying “it would be greate ingratitude to doubt your Lordships protection against all the censures a

⁶⁴ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 7. It is important to note that this record, kept with the translation, not only performs an apologetic function but in so doing attributes the work to the L. H. who initials the Dedication and there names herself a woman. It could also be interpreted as a direction to a future printer.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

booke might expose me to".⁶⁷ This sentiment is wholly conventional for women's translations in publication, as in Margaret Tyler appealing to Lord Thomas Howard ("Under your honour's protection I shall less fear the assault of the envious")⁶⁸ and Anne Dowriche's appeal to Pearse Edgcombe ("This Booke which proceedes under your protection").⁶⁹ Hutchinson very much accords here with the careful, tentative language of women entering print, as typically conducted via performatively commending or condemning their works to male patrons.

But, as in all those prefaces, even in the act of deprecating their work, women writers claim it as their own.⁷⁰ Hutchinson ties the translation closely in with the recognisably particulars of her life and circumstances. Her anonymous publication in 1679 of the first five cantos of her biblical verse paraphrase, *Order and Disorder*, also claims the translation. The fact this published volume exists shows she had nothing against print *per se*, and its preface explicitly shapes itself in relation to her Lucretian translation and the Dedication she wanted "dispose[d]" with it:

Lest that arrive by misadventure, which never shall by my consent, that any of the puddled water my wanton youth drew from the profane Helicon of ancient poets should be sprinkled about the world, I have for prevention sent for this essay, with a profession that I disclaim all doctrines of God and his works, but what I learnt out of his own word, and have experienced it to be a very unsafe and unprofitable thing for those that are young, before their faith be fixed, to exercise themselves in the study of vain, foolish, atheistical poetry.⁷¹

If the denial of consent is again conventional, here we see repeated both the expectation that Hutchinson's Lucretius translation will find a wide audience and the specific language of the Dedication. She may still have expected in the late 1670s that Anglesey would at some point

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Tyler, *Mirror*, 48.

⁶⁹ Dowriche, *The French historie*, sig. A2r.

⁷⁰ For a fuller discussion of women's prefatory rhetoric, see Patricia Pender, *Early Modern Women's Writing and the Rhetoric of Modesty* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

⁷¹ Hutchinson, *Order and Disorder*, 4.

circulate or print her translation along with the Dedication and therefore sought to link its translator (“L.H.” in the Dedication) with the unnamed author of *Order and Disorder*. Alternately, her repeated polemics here might suggest she feared it would circulate without the prophylactic Dedication. In so far as *De rerum natura* offers an account of creation and of the development of human society, *Order and Disorder* provides a Christian alternative and one that often evokes Lucretian interests and imagery; by bringing them into conversation in this preface, Hutchinson seems to underscore their parallels.⁷² It is clear from this preface that in at least one unmistakably public occasion, Hutchinson actively links herself with Lucretius, even if she there makes sure to performatively reject him. The similarity of these two prefatory texts, not just in language but in their emphasis on protecting the young suggests that if one is certainly designed for publication, the other might also have had that in mind.

Animadversions

The anti-Lucretian sentiments of the Dedication, fierce in the context of a wholly private correspondence, are typical for a public presentation of Lucretius in a vernacular language. John Evelyn’s first book of *De rerum natura* (1656), for example, included more commentary than it had poem.⁷³ His neutralising “Animadversions” are preceded by a note from “The Stationer to the Reader” which states that “it was the Authors express desire I should totally suppress” the 89 carefully argued pages because they “might importune the Learned”, but the stationer claims he chose to print them anyway to use up the space.⁷⁴ This sounds like a fiction, and it is. In a letter to Jeremy Taylor, Evelyn wrote, “My essay upon *Lucretius* [. . .] is now printing [. . .] My Animadvers[i]ons upon it will I hope provide against all the ill consequences, and totally acquit

⁷² On the Lucretian aspects of *Order and Disorder*, see Shannon Miller, “Maternity, Marriage, and Contract: Lucy Hutchinson’s Response to Patriarchal Theory in ‘Order and Disorder’”, *Studies in Philology* 102/3 (2005): 340–77, and Alvin Snider, “Hutchinson and the Lucretian Body”, in *The New Science and Women’s Literary Discourse: Prefiguring Frankenstein*, edited by Judy A. Hayden (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 29–46.

⁷³ 89 pages of commentary and 77 pages of poem, and those latter in side-by-side Latin and English.

⁷⁴ John Evelyn, *An Essay on the First Book of T. Lucretius Carus De Rerum Natura* (London: Gabriel Bedle and Thomas Collins, 1656), 80 (sig. F8v).

me either of glory or Impiety”.⁷⁵ Indeed while the “Animadversions” explain the text’s arguments and influences, their main purpose is to draw a sharp distinction between Evelyn himself and the “I” of his translation: Evelyn is the Christian commentator, Lucretius the “wary *Atheist*”.⁷⁶ In his letters, Evelyn explicitly evokes the passage from Deuteronomy 21 the Church Fathers had used to justify the use of pagan wisdom, writing that Lucretius was to have, like “the Captive Woman was in the old law [. . .] her excrescencies pared off before she was brought as a bride to the bed of her Lord”.⁷⁷ Two decades later, he is less sure that he managed to reform his captive. In a letter to Meric Casaubon dated July 1674, Evelyn repents that he had been “very Young, and therefore very rash, or ambitious, when I adventur’d upon that knotty piece”, noting that while he translated the remaining books of Lucretius’s poem during the “sad, and calamitous times” of the civil war, he never published it, letting it lie “in the dust of my study, where ’tis like to be forever buried”.⁷⁸ In his recourse to his youth, ambition and poor judgement now repented, Evelyn shares Hutchinson’s apologetic strategy, but unlike her, shies away from publishing his whole translation.⁷⁹

Evelyn was encouraged to translate Lucretius by the success of the French translator Michel de Marolles, though Marolles too became more cautious about his work.⁸⁰ In his 1650 translation of Lucretius, Marolles defended Lucretius on the conventional grounds that he was, foremost, a poet.⁸¹ Lucretius had much to teach about beauty, and, as for the philosophy, “his conceptions are so far-fetched and fantastical that they are evidently disqualified, and destroy themselves”.⁸² A subsequent edition in 1659 would supply a critical commentary and a *discours*

⁷⁵ Douglas D. C. Chambers and David Galbraith, *The Letterbooks of John Evelyn* (University of Toronto Press, 2016), Letter 94 [91], 171.

⁷⁶ Evelyn, *An Essay*, 111 (sig. G8r).

⁷⁷ Chambers and Galbraith, *Letterbooks*, Letter 94 [91], 171.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Letter 370 [367], 557.

⁷⁹ His full translation was edited and published in 2000, Michael M. Repetzki, ed., *John Evelyn’s Translation of Titus Lucretius Carus “De rerum natura”: an old-spelling critical edition* (Peter Lang, 2000).

⁸⁰ Line Cottegnies, “Michel de Marolles’s 1650 French Translation of Lucretius and its Reception in England”, in *Lucretius and the Early Modern*, edited by David Norbrook et al. (Oxford University Press, 2015), 161–89: 172.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 166.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 167.

apologétique to further ward against criticism.⁸³ Thomas Creech, too, altered his apologia in subsequent editions. His first in 1682 contains a preface that begins by suggesting that the “best Method to overthrow the *Epicurean Hypothesis* (I mean as it stands opposite to *Religion*) is to expose a full system of it to publick view” but as we have seen he then moves to defend Lucretius, placing responsibility with the corrupt reader for “suck[ing] *Poyson* from the sweetest flowers of the Poet” and suggesting that “there is nothing in our *Poet*, but what is frequently heard and refuted from the *Pulpit* and the *Desk*”.⁸⁴ From his second edition on, the preface is replaced with others’ encomia about his translation, shoring up the enterprise’s legitimacy or at least dispersing criticism of it amongst his various backers. At the same time, Creech’s explanatory notes grow from 46 pages in the first edition to 60 by the third. These have an antagonistic tone, as in his note to Book 5 which opens “Here begins his *Impiety* anew, and he endeavours to raise a dust, and blind mens understandings”.⁸⁵

These manoeuvres remind us that derivative texts like translations were not straightforwardly authorised by merit of being attributable to someone else. Men and women alike disclaimed their responsibility for Lucretius’s profanity and they used very similar language. Line Cottagnies sees Evelyn’s edition as “schizophrenic”, half-praising and half-damning, whereas in Creech’s she sees “no praise of Lucretius, no playful excusing of his impiety [. . .] his aim, like Lucy Hutchinson’s, is nothing more or less than ‘to overthrow’ Epicurus”.⁸⁶ But it is worth reassessing this verdict. For, in the light of the apologetic strategies of her contemporaries, Hutchinson’s Dedication does not seem at all anomalous. As prophylactic paratexts go, hers makes up for its brevity with robust argumentation, but there is nothing in her translation equivalent to the long commentaries of Evelyn and Creech. Instead, she provides only a very few

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 170.

⁸⁴ Creech, *Lucretius* (1st ed.), sigs. b2r, b4r, and b3v respectively. In some copies of the first edition, he indicated that Dryden in particular was more impudent than Lucretius; he was counselled to remove this comment by a friend, see Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, cxxi, note 324.

⁸⁵ Thomas Creech, *Titus Lucretius Carus His Six Books of Epicurean Philosophy* [. . .], 3rd ed., trans. Thomas Creech (London: Anthony Stephens, 1683), in “Notes”, sig. f4r.

⁸⁶ Cottagnies, “Michel de Marolles”, 188.

indications of dissent in the margins of her text—seven in total—and, as we will see shortly, her translation choices do not downplay the many blasphemies of Lucretius’s text. The only part of *De rerum natura* Hutchinson does redact is Book 4’s description of sex and sexual pleasure; however she is joined in doing so by Marolles, Evelyn, and Creech.⁸⁷ This is not a prudishness particular to her. Seen in the context of other vernacular translations of Lucretius, the sense of contradiction produced by her Dedication is revealed as not only conventional but generic. The appearance of contradiction is exactly what translators of controversial texts set out to create in their paratexts, for only then was translator sufficiently distanced from their text.

The compelling evidence that Hutchinson sought the wider circulation or possibly the print publication of her translation thus casts doubt on how completely she rejected the work. That critics have nonetheless continued to see the Lucretius translation as a problem to be solved demonstrates that Hutchinson’s Dedication is a singularly convincing act of authorial self-fashioning—that it is itself a work of *ingenium*. The journey she plots herself on, from a precocious tippler of the Helicon to godly matron, is winningly personal and accords with her self-presentation in *Memoirs* and with the preface of *Order and Disorder*. But there are gaps: the story is itself formulaic (as shown by Evelyn writing a version of it in his correspondence with Casaubon); Hutchinson stresses her youth but she may have been working on the first tranche of her translation in 1658 or later, when she was 38 years old;⁸⁸ and finally, though she claims to now have her mind “fixt in more profitable contemplations”, we know that she saw fit to go back to it in the 1670s, when she completed her translation, revised the fourth book and finished the sixth, while also transcribing the latter and adding the marginal notes and possibly the arguments.⁸⁹ This evidence demonstrates, for example, that she is not telling the truth when she claims “I thought this booke not worthy either of review or correction, the whole worke being

⁸⁷ See footnote 21.

⁸⁸ Norbrook describes “[t]he youthfulness of the translator” as “a rhetorical exaggeration”, *Works*, 1, Part 1, cxvii. The 1658 date is suggested by the mention of her translation in Cockayne’s poem, discussed later.

⁸⁹ See footnote 22.

one fault”.⁹⁰ These gaps do not mean that the Dedication has nothing to tell us, or that it is entirely fictive; rather they suggest that it must be read as a text crafted for a public context, with particular rhetorical and generic aims. The narrative she tells there is compelling but it is not an entirely accurate account of what we now know about her life and her writing. Any fuller account must deal with the translation itself.

Part 2: Authoring Lucretius

If then we cannot wholly trust this aspect of the Dedication, it is worth imagining what appeal a less dogmatic Hutchinson might have found in Lucretius and *De rerum natura*, not just in the 1650s but well beyond. While as a “misstep” it is difficult to situate the translation’s interests or influence in her life and her writing, as a work for which she sought publication it can offer new insights. Norbrook comments that “[t]he manuscript she presented to Anglesey reveals an unusual combination of detachment and investment”.⁹¹ The nature and cause of that “detachment” has been thoroughly described; here instead I want to trace her “investment”.

In this second part of this chapter, I first try to recover the appeal of Lucretius for Hutchinson by turning to her exceptional education and aptitude, and to the clues we have of her intellectual ambition. I then ask what that ambition had to contend with in the translation itself, demonstrating how she rose to the formidable challenges the work involved and arguing that she did so with a recognisably humanist sense of inquiry that left intact even the most heretical parts of the text. Finally, I argue that those translation choices might help explain what she means in the Dedication when she talks about the “usefull[ness]” of Lucretius. In doing so I pose a new solution to the enigma of why Hutchinson translated *De rerum natura*.

With powerful mind to build a poem

⁹⁰ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 7.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, cxxii.

By the mid-seventeenth century as atomist and atomist-adjacent sciences like corpuscular theory gained prominence, the balance tipped in favour of a freer dissemination of *De rerum natura*. The preservation of the text in the less hospitable intellectual environment of the Middle Ages and Renaissance was, however, primarily a reflection of its linguistic value rather than an endorsement of its philosophy or atomism. Early readers valued its language, both in its provision of rare and archaic Latin words that piqued scholastic and humanist interest and in its poetic elegance.⁹² But even for adept readers of Latin, the barriers were high. The text of *De rerum natura* was in poor condition with few extant manuscripts, meaning there was little recourse to correct the numerous scribal errors and lacunae in the text.⁹³ Moreover, the censorship or self-censorship of the text via the “dissimulatory code” had limited its study, leaving few commentaries or glossaries to help readers with its famously “crabbed” language.⁹⁴ For these reasons as well as its controversy “Lucretius was the last major Latin epic poet to remain untranslated” into English.⁹⁵

Those same obstacles made translating Lucretius a prize for the humanist scholar. In 1601, Philemon Holland makes a case for English pens to “triumph now over the Romans in subduing their literature [. . .] in requitall of the conquest sometime over this Island”, asking “[a]re we the onely nation under heaven unworthie to tast of such knowledge? or is our language so barbarous, that it will not admit in proper tearms a forreine phrase?”⁹⁶ These are issues with which *De rerum natura* itself is directly engaged. Lucretius comments explicitly on the (in)capacities of language, often noting the difficulty of expressing scientific and philosophical

⁹² For the linguistic interest in Lucretius, see the annotators described in Ada Palmer, *Reading Lucretius in the Renaissance* (Harvard University Press, 2014).

⁹³ For a discussion of the extant manuscripts, their transmission and reconstruction, see David Butterfield, *The Early Textual History of Lucretius’ De rerum natura* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁹⁴ Norbrook describes notes that for early readers “large tracts of the poem are harsh in texture—‘crabbed’ was the standard early modern English description—and uncompromisingly technical”, David Norbrook et al., eds., *Lucretius and the Early Modern* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 3.

⁹⁵ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, xxii.

⁹⁶ Pliny, *The historie of the world: commonly called, The naturall historie*, trans. Philemon Holland (London: Adam Islip, 1634), sig. [3v].

concepts in the vulgar language of Latin, rather than Epicurus's Greek.⁹⁷ Like Holland in England, he seeks to enrich Rome by enriching the Roman language—pushing the limits of what is thinkable and communicable in Latin. Lucretius adds to his own challenge by writing in verse, a choice in which he appears to take pleasure and pride. In Book 5 he asks, rhetorically, “quis potis est dignum pollenti pectore carmen / condere pro rerum maiestate hisque repertis?”: “who is able with powerful mind to build a poem to match the grandeur of the subject and these discoveries?”⁹⁸ Any translator of *De rerum natura* into English must see themselves, like Lucretius did, as the answer to this question. While Holland's military formulations would seem to evoke the Sidnean soldier-courtier, we have seen in this thesis that the status and stakes of translation were also enticing to early modern women.⁹⁹ As we will see, the glory of translating the stubborn Lucretius held a lasting appeal for Hutchinson.

More than ordinarily apprehensive

In her autobiographical fragment, taken from a now lost manuscript, Hutchinson describes how:

My mother, while she was with child of me, dreamt that she was walking in the garden with my father, and that a starre came down into her hand [. . .] my father told her, her dreame signified she should have a daughter of some extraordinary eminency, which thing, like such vaine prophecies, wrought as farre as it could its own accomplishment; for my father and mother fancying me then beautifull, and more than ordinarily apprehensive, applied all their cares and spar'd no cost to emprove me in my education, which procur'd me the admiration of those that flatter'd my parents.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ See, for example, *On the Nature of Things*, 1.139, 1.831, and 3.260.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 378–79, 5.1–2. The English here is my own.

⁹⁹ See for example Tyler describing her translation work as that of a “trumpeter or drumslare in the war” that aids in “the prince's and country's quarrel”, Tyler, *Mirror*, 49.

¹⁰⁰ The original manuscript that contained this fragment is now lost, but it was published in the 1806 edition of *Memoirs* and reprinted in the 1973 edition. Lucy Hutchinson, *Memoirs of the Life of John Hutchinson*, ed. James Sutherland (Oxford University Press, 1973), 287–88.

While the tone here is wry, Hutchinson does not shy away from acknowledging her unusual intelligence. Her education was similarly unusual. She says that at one point she had eight tutors.¹⁰¹ She writes that “[m]y father would have me learne Latine, and I was so apt that I outstrip my brothers who were at schoole” and that this “very well pleas’d my father, tho’ my mother would have bene contented I had not so wholly addicted myselfe to that [Latin] as to neglect my other quallities”.¹⁰² In other words, the humanist classroom came to her and she excelled in it.

As in the passage above, Hutchinson often references how her studies earned her the admiration of others. She writes that she could recite sermons from a young age, where “the love of praise tickled me and made me attend more heedfully”.¹⁰³ It is her Latin books and her reputation of being “reserv’d and studious”, and “shun[ning] the converse of men as the plague” that first attracts the attention of her future husband, John Hutchinson.¹⁰⁴ When he hears a song written by the then Lucy Apsley and “fanc[ies] something of rationally in the sonnet, beyond the customary reach of a she witt” he declares “I cannot be at rest till [. . .] I may be acquainted with her”.¹⁰⁵ Their marriage was clearly an intellectual partnership, in the facts if not in her subservient rhetoric, as when she counsels her husband against infant baptism or in her practice of writing official letters for him.¹⁰⁶ Her reputation for learning extended beyond her family. The Dedication suggests that a close set of friends encouraged and praised her Lucretius translation; she writes of her remorse that when, years later, “I grew in Light & Love, the little glory I had among some few of my intimate friends, for understanding this crabbed poet, became my

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 288.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 28–9.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 29. This incident is itself suggestive of how *ingenium* communicates itself as character.

¹⁰⁶ On infant baptism, see *ibid.*, 169. Norbrook calls her practice of writing official letters on his behalf “distinctly unusual”, David Norbrook, “Memoirs and Oblivion: Lucy Hutchinson and the Restoration”, *The Huntington Library Quarterly* 75/2 (2012): 233–82: 238. On her repeated endorsements of the patriarchal hierarchy in marriage, see N. H. Keeble, “‘The Colonel’s Shadow’: Lucy Hutchinson, women’s writing and the Civil War”, in *Literature and the English Civil War*, edited by Thomas Healy and Jonathan Sawday (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 227–47.

shame”.¹⁰⁷ While this “shame” does not prevent her from demonstrating her understanding of Lucretius to Anglesey, this passage does present a vivid picture of Hutchinson at the intellectual centre of a network of other inquisitive, if perhaps less extraordinarily educated, women.

Hutchinson saves some of her most bracing critique for her own precocity. She writes that she “entertain’d myselfe with elder company, to whom I was very acceptable” and that, listening to the “very profitable serious discourses being frequent at my father’s table and in my mother’s drawing roome, I was very attentive to all, and gather’d up things that I would utter againe to great admiration of many that tooke my memory and imitation for witt”.¹⁰⁸ It is striking that Hutchinson turns her sharp tongue on herself in these terms, for they closely resemble the prescriptions of the humanist classroom. Attentive gathering, memory and imitation were exactly the habits of mind that, in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, had been seen as constitutive of “wit”, rather than substituting for it. Her disdain for them here evokes the attack on humanist education in the Dedication where she sees the “encomia” with which pagan poets are lauded as having adverse moral effects on the young student. In both contexts the target of her ire is the way humanist instruction can encourage younger students to value and repeat, rather than interrogate, classical wisdom.

In her adult life, as this self-critical account suggests, Hutchinson continually examined and re-examined her own convictions and lauded her husband for doing the same.¹⁰⁹ As Mayer comments in a survey of her writing:

A person who stipulates her own religious views at length five times in less than a decade is doubtless someone who has a strong sense of that faith being under stress, and

¹⁰⁷ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 13.

¹⁰⁸ Hutchinson, *Memoirs* [1973], 288.

¹⁰⁹ She writes that her husband took two years in which he “employ’d his whole study in laying in a foundation of sound and necessary principles” that he continued to hone throughout his life, “[b]ut this was only a time of dawning, and he by degrees was led up into the brighter sunshine with which it pleas’d the Lord to enlighten him”, *ibid.*, 34–5.

needing always to be examined and affirmed, and also someone who uses writing to clarify and ground her personal beliefs.¹¹⁰

This latter insight is also applicable, I think, to her interest in translation. Whether she was first exposed to Lucretius in her young life or “at second hand” in conversations while dining with guests at her home at Owthorpe, it is clear that she came to find it unsatisfying and problematic to simply repeat others’ knowledge.¹¹¹ But, rejecting this sort of conversational commonplacing, she chose to more thoroughly interrogate that knowledge by turning to another loftier but still recognisably humanist procedure: translation. Hutchinson is not only, as Mayer implies, clarifying her views or grounding her belief when she writes and rewrites direct statements of her religious belief, but also when she engages in her enormously sophisticated derivative projects, as in her translation of Calvin’s foundational *Institutes*, of Owen’s *Theologoumena pantodapa* with its complex exegesis and polyglot citations, and of Lucretius’s mind-bending *De rerum natura*. Hutchinson mocks her old habits of learning, but not her own aptitude, which she applies to more ambitious and protracted engagements with ideas in their original sources.¹¹² The interests and capacities that in her youth elicited praise became the basis of the more serious investigations in her adulthood and both periods are marked by a lifelong passion for Latin.

Glorying

Hutchinson’s oeuvre testifies to her erudition, but the Dedication also speaks to a degree of competitiveness. Never one to make a proto-feminist case, she proudly distinguishes herself

¹¹⁰ Mayer, “Lucy Hutchinson”, 322.

¹¹¹ A possible prompt for her scientific interest in Lucretius may have been her mother, who funded Walter Raleigh’s chemistry experiments while he was imprisoned at the Tower, “partly to comfort and divert the poore prisoners, and partly to gaine the knowledge of their experiments, and the medicines to helpe such poore people as were not able to seek phisitions. By these means she acquir’d a great deale of skill, which was very profitable to many all her life,” Hutchinson, *Memoirs [1973]*, 286–87. The “second hand” comment is from the Dedication, Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 7.

¹¹² De Quehen has characterised this as her “Puritan drive towards truth and the concomitant distrust of intermediaries”, Hugh De Quehen, ed., *Lucy Hutchinson’s Translation of Lucretius: De rerum natura* (The University of Michigan Press, 1996), 1.

from the mainstream of women who “esteem’d no advantage” in her intellectual pursuits as well as from the men she outstrips.¹¹³ Just as, by underscoring her supposed youth, the Dedication’s narrative of growing maturity makes her translation of Lucretius look all the more impressive, so too does she use expectations about gender to cast her achievement into greater relief. She writes in the Dedication that

even at first I did not employ any serious studie in [it], for I turned it into English in a roome where my children practizd the severall quallities they were taught, with their Tutors, & I numbred the sillables of my translation by the threds of the canvas I wrought in, & sett them downe with a pen & inke that stood by me.¹¹⁴

On the one hand, these rhetorical moves are defensive. The domestic scene asserts that she remembers her female duties; she is watching over her children and practicing appropriate household labour. But doing these tasks alongside the translation of a famously difficult Latin poet suggests a virtuosity of learning—and indeed of divided attention—that is anything but conventional. Erasmus recommends wealthy daughters be taught the humanities, for “a girl intent on her books has not thought for anything else”,¹¹⁵ but Hutchinson seems to mock these prescriptions by having thought enough to work her canvas while also “subduing [Roman] literature under the dent of the English pen”.¹¹⁶

In context, it is difficult not to read this passage as a dig at “masculine wits” like rival translator John Evelyn whom she scorns for depicting himself with a poetic wreath on the frontispiece of his published translation of just one of the six books of *De rerum natura*.¹¹⁷ She writes that she is “so farre from glorijng in my six”, “though a masculine Witt hath thought it worth printing his head in a lawrell crowne for the version of one of these bookes”.¹¹⁸ Her

¹¹³ Hutchinson, *Memoirs* [1973], 29.

¹¹⁴ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 7.

¹¹⁵ Erasmus, *The Institution of Christian Matrimony* 69, 319–20.

¹¹⁶ Pliny, *The naturall historie*, sig. [3v].

¹¹⁷ Evelyn, *An Essay*.

¹¹⁸ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 5.

translation cannot help but seem a little less “unworthy” for being six books, rather than one, especially given that Evelyn’s lesser achievement has been framed with such bombastic, and perhaps specifically “masculine”, theatrics. Her translation of all six books is located not in a tableau of classical inspiration, but in the chaos of the sitting-room. (She does not mention that in a portrait from the 1640s or 50s by Robert Walker, she is pictured with a laurel wreath in her lap.) In another sense, though, her dual tasks are apt, because as we have repeatedly seen, textile-making is also a popular analogy for translation, both involved in reworking materials for new functions or contexts. Here her hands seem to sew and write simultaneously, literalising the conceit to represent her mastery of tenor and vehicle together. Her oeuvre gives us a clear sense of her preferred task—as she says in *Memoirs*, “and [as] for my needle, I absolutely hated it”.¹¹⁹

In targeting Evelyn and “masculine Witt”, she may have also been thinking of another male competitor and would-be Lucretian translator, Alexander Brome. A poem written by Sir Aston Cockayne and published in 1658 provides the only surviving contemporary response to Hutchinson’s translation.¹²⁰ It reads in full:

I know a Lady that hath been about
 The same designe, but she must needs give out:
 Your Poet strikes too boldly home sometimes,
 In geniall things, t’appear in womens rhimes,
 The task is masculine, and he that can
 Translate Lucretius, is an able man
 And such are you; whose rich poetick vein,
 And general Learning perfectly can plain,
 And smooth your Authors roughness, and give
 Him such a robe of *English* as will live,

¹¹⁹ Hutchinson, *Memoirs* [1973], 288.

¹²⁰ This poem is Norbrook’s discovery, see *Works*, 1, Part 1, xxiv.

Out-wear, and all such works exceed, and prove

This nations wonder, and this nations Love.

Therefore proceed, (my friend) and soon erect

This Pyramid of our best Dialect.¹²¹

Cockayne advises Hutchinson give up because the poem is inappropriate for women, in terms of ability and propriety (likely alluding to the Book 4 passages Hutchinson would redact). Indeed the observation that the “task is masculine” seems like exactly the sentiment that Hutchinson’s embroidery image rejects. We do not know whether the fact that both Brome and Evelyn “give out” was satisfying to Hutchinson, but this poem nonetheless remind us of what her translation represented. It was an achievement at once humanist, a testament to learning and the contribution of translation to the common by “smooth[ing]” and “plain[ing]” Lucretius’s Latin, and a national monument: nothing less than a pyramid for England. That Hutchinson is dismissive of the intellectual labour her translation involved has the rhetorical effect of making her a particularly “able man” and is again generic, typical of the affected humility of translator’s prefaces. Though Hutchinson denies “glorjng” in her translation and dismisses the “little glory” in it she found from her friends’ praise, these self-reproaches do not fully expunge the sense that Hutchinson continued to take pride in and, I will later suggest, a kind of identity from, her own part in conquering the Latin tongue and in doing so contrary to the expectations of her gender. I now turn to what conquering Lucretius actually involved.

Extream difficult

Hutchinson’s translation has been characterised as accurate, faithful, and concise. As discussed in Chapter 2, the under-specification of “accuracy” can be misleading; rather than a quantifiable fidelity to the source text it is better conceived in terms of a translator choosing particular

¹²¹ Aston Cockayne, *Small poems of divers sorts* [. . .] (London: William Godbid, 1658), 204 (sig. O6v).

aspects of a source that they attempt to preserve. Hutchinson's translation does not digress significantly from the substance and organisation of ideas in her original and only at one point redacts significantly from Lucretius. But as we will see, because so many passages are obscure or textually corrupted, this approach in fact entails intervention. Lucretius, Thomas Creech complains, is "extream difficult to be follow'd", and notes that Meric Casaubon thought there was no point trying to translate him.¹²² Hutchinson's own translation shows her attempting to wrest a logical development of Lucretius's ideas from the partial text and scholarship available to her.

Her translation may also be termed accurate in its choice to keep *De rerum natura* in verse, even while it turns the almost untranslatable dactylic hexameters of the Latin into English heroic couplets in fashion in the second half of the seventeenth century. That choice informs another key priority—concision. Latin is semantically dense and as a result English translations of Latin texts are often much longer than their originals. The modern Loeb edition of *De rerum natura* is in prose and far longer than the facing Latin; so too is the modern Penguin translation in verse, which uses fourteeners and feels turgid.¹²³ Length is the temporal dimension of the reading experience, and it is finely balanced in *De rerum natura*. Traditionally the poem was thought to alternate between technical content and the poetic "purple passages".¹²⁴ But modern versions are paced very differently and the technical passages swell ponderously. That the books of Hutchinson's translation are on average only 44 lines longer than the equivalent Latin is therefore not mere equivalence but a specific and very demanding literary choice. In this way, even "accurate" translation involves recognisably authorial decisions. Assessing the source's priorities, in content and style, and then deciding line by line on how to recreate those priorities gives translators significant scope and results in quite distinct texts. As we will see, the choices

¹²² Creech, *Lucretius* (1st ed.), sig. b4r.

¹²³ Lucretius, *The Nature of Things*, trans. A. E. Stallings (Penguin, 2007).

¹²⁴ Joseph Farrell, "Lucretian architecture: the structure and argument of the *De rerum natura*", in *The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius*, edited by Stuart Gillespie and Philip R. Hardie (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 76–91: 88.

Hutchinson makes in her translation evince her humanist ambitions, while also suggesting an abiding attachment to her source.

We can see an example of these aspects of her “accuracy” in Book 1, where after explaining that the universe is made of two components, void and atoms, Lucretius confutes Heraclitus’s belief that fire is the *arche*, or underlying substance, of the world.

Lucretius

Quapropter, qui materiem rerum esse putarunt
 Ignem, atque ex igni summam consistere solo:
 Magnopere à vera lapsi ratione videntur:
 Heraclitus init quorum dux prœlia primus,
 Clarus ob obscuram linguam magis inter inanes
 Quam de gravis inter Graios, qui vera requirunt.
 Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur, amantque,
 Inversis quae sub verbis latitantia cernunt,
 Veraque constituunt, quæ bellè tangere possunt
 Aures, & lepidò quæ sunt fucata sonore.¹²⁵

Hutchinson

Wherefore they erre, who fire first matter call
 And unto it ascribe th’originall
 And cause of every thing. In which van came
 The old Heraclitus of nobler fame
 With empty men, for language darke and new,
 Then with sage Greekes, who did the truth persue.
 All things which in ambiguous words lie hid
 Only fooles love, & admiration breed,
 Who for the pleasant sound the matter prize
 And thinke all truth which welltund words disguise.¹²⁶

Here Hutchinson matches Lucretius’s line count and even broadly matches his syntax, ending her English sentences at the same point as his Latin. But this treatment is not, for its accuracy on these counts, less involved. Her concision relies on construing Lucretius’s meaning and finding a briefer formulation for it, saving syllables where possible to reallocate them to passages that cannot be condensed. So Heraclitus in “van came” (that is, in the vanguard), rather than “open[ing] the fray as first champion” as the Loeb translation renders the Latin.¹²⁷ Lucretius’s

¹²⁵ This quote is taken from the Pareus’s 1631 text as edited in Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 52–4, 1.635–44.

¹²⁶ Here and throughout, I quote from the edited version of Hutchinson’s translation in *ibid.*, 53–55, 1.639–48.

¹²⁷ Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 52–3, 1.638.

final line is dense, benefiting from Latin’s inflectional endings; he describes ears tickled by words dyed with pleasant sounds. Hutchinson chooses brevity and consequently a more direct approach. She invents the phrase “welltund words disguise”, linking firmly to “in ambiguous words lie hid” and reiterating a sense of specious display she first evoked in her added qualification of “language darke *and new*” (my emphasis). In doing so, she finds an analogue for the passage while also looking towards Lucretius’s own careful distinction, particularly explored in Book 4, between the evidence of our senses and the rational interpretation of those perceptions.¹²⁸

Lucretius recognises that his prescription for demystifying the universe, atomism, could be mystifyingly technical. His verse acts as the “honey on the cup” of his difficult lessons. In spite of its clearly pagan content and purposes, Hutchinson’s translation attempts to preserve not only the cogency of his arguments but the rewards of his poetic form. This is accurate in the sense that it reproduces Lucretius’s stated intentions, but it is not passive, for the differing resources of English and Latin demand she make recourse to quite different poetic means. Early in Book 1, Lucretius pre-empts his readers’ scepticism about atomism, saying:

Lucretius

Ne qua forte tamen cœptes diffidere dictis:
 Quòd nequeunt oculis rerum primordia cerni;
 Accipe præterea, quæ corpora tute necesse est
 Confitere esse in rebus nec posse videri.¹²⁹

Loeb translation

that you may not by any chance begin
 nevertheless to distrust my words, because the
 first-beginnings of things [i.e. atoms] cannot be
 distinguished by the eye, learn in addition of
 bodies which you must yourself of necessity

¹²⁸ On this distinction, see Elizabeth Asmis, “Epicurean epistemology”, in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, edited by Jaap Mansfeld et al. (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 260–94.

¹²⁹ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 32, 1.267–70.

confess to be numbered amongst things and yet
impossible to be seen.¹³⁰

Hutchinson's much briefer version of this passage reads:

Yet least my sayings find no faith with you,
Because first bodies are from outward view
Conceald, attend and you your selfe shall learne
There are some bodies eies cannot discerne.¹³¹

Lucretius's last two lines make use of their own enjambment between "necesse est / confiteare esse" ("it is necessary to confess there to be"). "Necesse est" (it is necessary) resembles in sound and appearance the negative phrases *nec esse* (it is not) or *nec esse est* (it is not to be). Coming after a proliferation of all that it is not possible to make, see, or believe ("ne", "nequent" and in the preceding lines "non posse" and "de nilo neque" [1.265–66]), Lucretius uses this verbal play to underscore his point that what does not appear to be there (*nec esse*) is in fact *necesse*: necessary and necessarily extant. His enjambing last lines literally mean that it is necessary to confess there are unseen things, but ludically, he calls the reader to admit there *is* what at first inspection *is* not. Hutchinson's version matches the number of Lucretius's lines, retaining his poetic immediacy, and supplies its own poetic "honey". Her enjambment between "outward view" and "conceald" aptly withholds the verb until the next line just as atoms are in effect withheld from our sight. Her caesura in "conceald, attend" turns from the problem to its solution, namely that Lucretius's examples will mitigate the limitations of the readers' vision by helping them "learne" to "discerne", as in the rhymes of the last couplet. Hutchinson supplies her own poetic means to comparably transmit Lucretius's ideas in their new English vehicle.

¹³⁰ Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 25.

¹³¹ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 33, 1.274–77.

In the passage that follows, which exemplifies these unseen forces through the battering wind, Hutchinson's modern editors note that she "tries to catch some of Lucretius's sound-patterns, here with heavy alliteration and two spondees followed by dactyls",¹³² as in her line describing how the wind "strews it [the land] with torne up trees, the groves destroys".¹³³ She also actively clarifies Lucretius's ideas. She writes:

And [wind] rages through the hills with horrid noyse
And furious blasts, nor in the Oceans waves
With milder gusts or lesser terror raves;
And yet the winds concealed bodies be
Which passe unseene through heaven, earth & sea;
But with no lesser force and fury goe
The inundations which from mountains flow[.]¹³⁴

Hutchinson's discursive markers "And yet" and "But" in "But with no lesser force and fury go" draw attention to the paradox on which this argument for atomism relies: that invisible forces create visible and indeed violent effects in the world. Lucretius's own treatment is less suasive. Instead of "And yet", he has "igitur" (therefore), in "therefore undoubtedly there are unseen bodies".¹³⁵ Similarly, while Lucretius also compares the invisible wind to visible water, his version reads "and not in a different way does water flow and deal devastation" ("nec ratione fluunt alia stragemque propagant [. . .] natura aquae").¹³⁶ In both cases, Hutchinson's treatment makes the passage feel like a live question, directed to a sceptical reader who must be persuaded to overlook the obvious differences between air and water. The way she signals these important premises with further corroboration or sharpening suggests she, like Lucretius's implied reader,

¹³² Ibid., 1, Part 2: 489–90.

¹³³ Ibid., 1, Part 1: 33, 1.280.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 33–5, 1.281–87.

¹³⁵ Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 25. The Latin is "sunt igitur venti nimirum corpora caeca", *ibid.*, 24, 1.277.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 24–5, 1.280–81. The English translation is my own.

is closely attending to his argument; moreover, the poetic means she supplies (in her concision, alliteration and triplets) suggests she recognises Lucretius's poetry contributes to that argument, rather than merely ornamenting it.

If any translator worth their salt must be an attentive reader, Hutchinson sometimes has to turn scholar to reconstruct obscure or corrupted passages. One difficulty she encounters comes midway through Book 1 where Lucretius confutes an unattributed philosophical position which contends that events or conditions like “paupertas divitiaeque, libertas bellum concordia” have material existence in the world.¹³⁷ Lucretius follows Aristotle in distinguishing between essential and accidental properties; the essential is “that which without destructive dissolution can never be separated and disjoined” and the accidental, like wealth or poverty, “may come and go while the nature of things remains intact”.¹³⁸ For Lucretius, these properties must belong to either atoms or the void, for that is all that exists. Conversely, his unnamed interlocutors say that, for example, “the rape of Tyndareus’ daughter and the conquest of war of the Trojan tribes *are* facts [. . .] that these things *are* of themselves” rather than being accidental properties of other things, and therefore either have their own a positive existence made up of atoms or are constituted by a third essential nature that is neither atom nor void.¹³⁹ This must be so, these interlocutors argue, because those events persist after “those generations of men, of whom these were [supposedly] accidents, the irrevocable ages past have already carried away”.¹⁴⁰ Lucretius, conversely, maintains that there is no third nature and responds, in a difficult line, “namque aliud terris, alius regionibus ipsis / eventum dici poterit quodcumque erit actum”—that, in fact, “whatever has been done may be called an accident either of the whole earth or of the actual regions in which it occurred”.¹⁴¹ Accidents do not only pertain to persons, he argues, but also to

¹³⁷ “[P]overty and riches, freedom, war, concord”, *ibid.*, 38–9, 1.455–56.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.* Jacques Lezra identifies the idea “that *events* have a substantial existence as bodies” as a Stoic viewpoint. *Unspeakable Subjects: the genealogy of the event in early modern Europe* (Stanford University Press, 1997), 3.

¹⁴⁰ Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 39.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 38–41, 1.469–70.

places, and this is why historical incidents can be seen to persist long after the deaths of their participants.

In her translation of this section, Hutchinson is philosophically astute in translating Lucretius's *eventa* as "accident" at a crucial moment, as do modern translations, but she also reveals real insight in the way she deals with an error in her source. Her Latin edition reads not "terris" (earth) in the lines above, but "rebus" (thing, event, condition, property). This is contradictory because it could suggest exactly the third nature which Lucretius is arguing against (that is, that events are extant things in the world with their own properties or accidents), or a tautological "rebus eventum", an accident of accident.¹⁴² Hutchinson reconstructs Lucretius's Aristotelian logic and perhaps refers to the categories of accident in circumstantial argument in order to deftly translate: "For all former transactions were th'events / Some of the places, of the persons some".¹⁴³ Substituting the ambiguous "rebus" with "persons", she neatly summarises Lucretius's two categories of accidents: those of person and those of place. Events in the world can be said to exist only in so far as they are tied to one or the other. The Trojan conquest may no longer be an accident of person because all the participants have died, but it remains for Lucretius an accident of place ("regionibus" or "terris"), rather than a further essential thing-in-the-world that would break his bipartite materialist scheme. Moreover, though Hutchinson's last line, "[s]ome of the places, of the persons some", may look a little awkward, the chiasmus actually affords a sense of conclusion sorely lacking from the Latin, which abruptly turns back to corroborating the existence of atom and void.

This is far from the only time that Hutchinson engages in higher level analytical and reconstructive work. At the end of Book 1 she identifies and signals what is now accepted as an lacuna in the text but that was not marked as such in the Pareus edition she worked from.¹⁴⁴ This

¹⁴² The possibility for tautology lies in the fact that both *rebus* and *eventum* could be construed as denoting "accident": a property or condition of something else. Again that tautology might suggest to a less careful reader of Lucretius that events have a material existence, alongside atoms and void.

¹⁴³ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 45, 1.473–74.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 79, 1.1110–115.

in effect mitigates what Evelyn calls “one of the most obscure passages in our *Author*” and, in the words of her modern editors, demonstrates “scholarly rigour”.¹⁴⁵ She also creates a neat transition between two sections interrupted by a lacuna of fifty-two lines in Book 2.¹⁴⁶ This is not to say that she does not, like her contemporaries, err in her translation; nor are all her attempts at reconstruction successful. In a passage in Book 1 which Evelyn finds “obscure”, “and even modern editorial commentaries seem to involve some strain” in glossing, Lucretius defends his theory that all bodies degrade and are resupplied by new atoms speeding randomly through the void.¹⁴⁷ This he maintains against interlocutors (again unidentified) whose argument is subtly different. They suggest that bodies are preserved by “*plagae* [. . .] *extrinsecus*”; that is, by atoms colliding with and buttressing those bodies, giving them no space to decay in the first place and hence no need for new supplies.¹⁴⁸ Lucretius admits that such collisions *could* delay the degradation of bodies, but in fact atoms always move and rebound rather than continually enclosing bodies, thus at times affording space (void) into which bodies would indeed disintegrate. That they do not appear to be falling apart around us is, in Lucretius’s view, because they are “accustomed to replace in season all that has been lost” from the universe’s infinite supply.¹⁴⁹

Hutchinson, her modern editors comment, “fails to make sense of the passage, not helped by [. . . her edition’s] reading *intrinsecus* against the normal *extrinsecus*”, so that bodies seem to be (impossibly) battered by atoms from within.¹⁵⁰ Given this textual error it is unsurprising that Hutchinson does not fully grasp Lucretius’s point, but her version is nonetheless a cogent

¹⁴⁵ See *ibid.*, 1, Part 2: 525.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 1, Part 1: 93, 2.161–63; in the Latin, the lacuna lies at 2.164–65. Norbrook and Barbour comment that the “second line [l. 162] reads like her own attempt to write a coherent transition into the text, moving from physics to the theology of movement”, *ibid.*, 1, Part 2: 541.

¹⁴⁷ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 2, 524.

¹⁴⁸ Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 86, 1.1042.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹⁵⁰ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 2, 524.

attempt at reconstructing some sense from this enigmatic passage and from the textual corruption of her source. She begins:

For as each creatures bodie, kept from food,
Would perish, and dissolve, soe allsoe wou'd
The universe it selfe consume away,
If matter did not feed that vast decay.¹⁵¹

So far, she is in line with Lucretius's argument that bodies do not decay because they are continually supplied with new matter. But she continues:

Further if regions of matter never can
All parts contract in themselves reteine,
They oft may mint new parts, sometimes stope some,
Till others to compleate the whole worke come[.]¹⁵²

Failing to recognise that a new point is being introduced, here against the buttressing of bodies by external collision, Hutchinson assumes Lucretius is returning to a previous target of his ire, the Greek philosopher Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras's theory of *homoeomeria* contends that things are made up of smaller versions of themselves—"that bones are made of very small and minute bones, flesh of very small and minute particles of flesh".¹⁵³ It is this idea, and Lucretius's previous rejection of it, that Hutchinson reiterates in her lines "never can / All parts contract in themselves reteine".¹⁵⁴ Unable to fully decipher Lucretius's meaning or his interlocutor, she sensibly turns back to the rival he most recently confuted and uses that point to reconstruct a logical counter-argument. In her version, bodies do not decay, either because they repair their injuries by "mint[ing] new parts" or (and in this her argument resembles Lucretius's own) by waiting, dormant, for wandering atoms to supply the missing parts. Thus though not fully

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 1, Part 1: 77, 1.1051–54

¹⁵² Ibid., 77, 1.1055–58.

¹⁵³ Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 69.

¹⁵⁴ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 77, ll. 1055–56.

capturing Lucretius's argument, her attempt tells us much about the rigorous way that she tried to do justice to its often obscure ideas.

As this brief discussion has shown, translating Latin verse into English verse, and doing so concisely, is demanding work—especially when the Latin in question is *De rerum natura*. Like all literary work, derivative writing involves choices, literary and intellectual, which are not dissimilar from the operations we associate with (original) authorship. That Hutchinson seems so determined to faithfully transmit the ideas of Lucretius's text, and to approximate its poetic vehicle, tells us much about her attitude to his text and indeed her own personality as a writer. This is revealing evidence that we must weigh against the Dedication's polemics.

Indeed, if we approach her translation through the repudiatory Dedication, as readers of the modern edition necessarily do, we might be surprised to find that she is not particularly antagonistic towards her source. Looking to her actual translation choices lends further support to the argument that her polemics in the Dedication are conventional, for in fact Hutchinson never redacts the many aspects of *De rerum natura* that were considered heretical. In Book 3 when describing the mortality of the soul, which “had attracted point-by-point refutations since Lactantius” that were referenced in the edition she worked from, her own translation shows no sign of resistance.¹⁵⁵ She translates:

Thus minds and soules a constant league maintaine

Proceed we now in order to explaine

How both are native, and both mortall be.¹⁵⁶

This formulation is in fact much blunter than Lucretius's more coaxing “[l]isten now: that you may be able to recognize that the minds and light spirits of living creatures are born and are mortal”.¹⁵⁷ Similarly, her translation registers no objection to Lucretius's argument that the divine

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 1, Part 2: 602.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 1, Part 1: 177, 3.427–29. Her use of “native” for born is current at the time, see “native”, II. 5., *OED*.

¹⁵⁷ “Nunc age, nativos animantibus et mortalibus / esse animos animasque levis ut noscere possis”, Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 220–21, 3.417–18.

lives “eternally in peaceful quiettnesse, / Nor is concernd in mortall mens affairs” in Book 2,¹⁵⁸ nor does she reject (as Evelyn does) the anti-teleological case Lucretius makes against the faculty of sight proving the divine creation of the eye.¹⁵⁹ In Book 5, she follows Lucretius in asserting that the gods are unreachable, that they were not involved in creating nature and that humans are instead products of nature’s womb. Hutchinson bluntly translates, “their fraile unperfect state / Shewes noe immortall power did them create”.¹⁶⁰

Though Hutchinson herself vehemently disagrees with Lucretius on all these points, she nonetheless translates them and the reasoning behind them with great care. These are choices that, in their very “accuracy”, testify to an authorial personality. Her approach shows respect for the integrity of the textual artefact and enacts a humanist vision of translation that prioritises dissemination and something like Rhodes’s “common”: “a broader ethos of communication which presents study as vital to the common good”.¹⁶¹ Hutchinson mitigates the text’s corruption, clarifying its ideas and trying to preserve something of its poetry. She does not adulterate Lucretius’s ideas, but in fact strains to reconstruct them even at their most controversial. This approach reflects her tendency to interrogate alternate views at their source as a means of refining her own; it also might reflect, along with her expectation that Anglesey will circulate the manuscript, a desire to be recognised for her intellect and so to be associated with a signal humanist achievement.

Nature’s dim candle

¹⁵⁸ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 119, 2.651–52.

¹⁵⁹ Hutchinson’s translation, along with a marginal comment saying much the same, has “Condemne we here their false opinion [. . .] Who say the splendid eies were made for sight” *ibid.*, 269–71, 4.872–74. Hutchinson’s editors note that other translators commentary on this point “reflects how repugnant Lucretius’s argument is to seventeenth-century notions of a providential cosmos in which all things are invested with a purpose”, see *ibid.*, 1, Part 2: 663–64.

¹⁶⁰ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 311, 5.214–15.

¹⁶¹ Rhodes, *Common*, 21.

That Hutchinson saw translating Lucretius as a personal and humanist achievement does not explain, however, why she commends her translation to mature believers like Anglesey as in “many wayes usefull & medicinall”.¹⁶² What good could *De rerum natura* do her fellow Christians? The answer, I believe, lies in her attack on Restoration “wits” and nascent forms of disbelief. She writes in the Dedication that Lucretius’s “sencelesse superstitions drive carnall reason into Atheisme”; his text is a vivid demonstration of the “insufficiency of humane reason [. . .] to arrive to any pure & simple Truth, with all its helps of Art & Studie”.¹⁶³ This “insufficiency” she characterises as the “Maze of Error” wandered by walkers “who toylt themselves in vaine to search out Truth”.¹⁶⁴ In a striking passage in the Dedication, Hutchinson describes how thinkers in the ancient world

could never discover her [Truth] by Natures dimme candle, which proovd only an Ignis fatui to lead them into quagmires & precipices, and to this day is no better to their admirers, who manifest they are still in their naturall blindnesse, and never saw the Sun, that can soe extoll corrupt glowworms.¹⁶⁵

Hutchinson spares a thought for ancient authors, viewing “with sad compassion the uncomfortable shadow of death wherein they [ancient philosophers] consume their lives, that are alienated from the knowledge of God”.¹⁶⁶ But if their error is partly mitigated by their ignorance of the Christian God, she directs her most biting criticism to those that “should be so presumptuously wicked” to persist in that error in “these dayes of the Gospell”.¹⁶⁷ Hutchinson observes “how greate an Idoll soever it is now become among the gowne-men” to prioritise human reason above divine revelation.¹⁶⁸ This is an attack on contemporary Epicureans, neo-

¹⁶² Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 15.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

Stoics, and “atheists” broadly conceived, but also adherents of natural theology, who held that knowledge of God could be rationally derived from creation.¹⁶⁹ This was emerging as a commonplace of late-seventeenth-century belief and Hutchinson parodies it here: by centring earthly creation, one risks mistaking the glow-worm for the metaphorical “Sun” of revealed (scriptural) truth.¹⁷⁰

It is exactly the prominence of these heterodoxies that makes her Lucretian project newly relevant in 1675. Too many people were being seduced. When she first turned to Lucretius “to understand things I heard so much discourse of at second hand”, she too was in danger, but she writes that she “by rich grace scapd the shipwreck of my soule among those vaine Philosophers”. Consequently, she declares that “I could not but in charity sett up this seamarke”.¹⁷¹ Most critics have presumed the “seamarke” refers to the Dedication, but I want to suggest here that the translation might also function in this way. For those confirmed in their faith (and it is exclusively to these few that she commends it), her translation clearly transmits Lucretius’s honeyed logic and so demonstrates how what she calls “unregenerate, unsanctified reason” might lead one to err.¹⁷² Hutchinson says she “scaped” Lucretius, but her persistent work on *De rerum natura* suggests this does not mean to say that she was untouched by that encounter: rather, understanding the precise coordinates of its missteps allowed her to strengthen her faith. The deep engagement entailed by derivative writing had always enabled her to clarify her beliefs with and against the greatest thinkers, including Calvin, Owen, and Lucretius. As she writes in her preface to *Order and Disorder*, “I have not studied to utter anything that I have not really taken in”.¹⁷³ By supplying her translation with the Dedication and a few choice annotations, she seeks

¹⁶⁹ See *ibid.*, cxix, where the editors argue that the Dedication is primarily “a polemical intervention in the debates of the 1670s” targeting neo-Stoics, latitudinarians, and Hobbesians, rather than Lucretius and his ideas.

¹⁷⁰ This was one of the subjects of Owen’s *Theologoumena pantodapa* that Hutchinson would translate, but she articulates her own privileging of revealed theology in the preface to *Order and Disorder*. There she writes “I found I could know nothing but what God taught me, so I resolved never to search after any knowledge of him and his productions, but what he himself hath given forth”, see Norbrook in Hutchinson, *Order and Disorder*, xix and 3.

¹⁷¹ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 15.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁷³ Hutchinson, *Order and Disorder*, 5.

to similarly inoculate her readers, but ultimately she preserves Lucretius's atheistic vision because she believed it had to be understood to be confronted. Hutchinson's translation could aid godly readers in understanding the heresy they saw growing around them in the Restoration.

That Hutchinson saw her translation operating as a "seamarke" is evidenced by marginal comments that come at critical moments in the translation. In Book 3, Lucretius tries to reason his reader out of fearing death, which he saw as an obstacle to *ataraxia*. He argues that this fear is itself incoherent, for "[He] [w]ho hath no being, feeles noe calamitie".¹⁷⁴ People fear death because they fear how it will *feel* to be dead, when in reality death is the cessation of all feeling. Hutchinson's translation here reads:

Further when men an indignation have
To thinke their bodies must corrupt i'the grave,
Consume in scorching flames, or feed wild beasts,
A secrett error lurketh in their brests,
Which, though they contrarie beliefes may feigne,
Perswades them they some sence in death reteine.
That something beyond humane life extends,
And part of them the mortall bound transcends.¹⁷⁵

In the margins of this passage Hutchinson inserts one of only seven critical annotations, in which she exclaims: "How much this poore deluded bewicht mad wretch strives to put out the dimme light of nature which[,] while he contends against[,] he acknowledges".¹⁷⁶ Revising the metaphor in the Dedication of "Natures dimme candle" we saw earlier, Hutchinson suggests that man's instinctive "indignation" about death is not a "secrett error", but an urging towards God. Unlike Restoration followers of natural theology who emphasised God's presence in the

¹⁷⁴ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 205, 3.945.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 205, 3.950–57.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 205. Hutchinson was perhaps thinking of her libertine cousin, the Earl of Rochester, *ibid.*, cxi–cxiv.

experience of the created body and its senses, this innate knowledge of God is one that Calvinists like Hutchinson subordinated to scriptural revelation. But even this spark, the slightest echo in creation of the “Light” and “Sun” of God, Hutchinson accuses Lucretius of snuffing out.¹⁷⁷ Lucretius, she says, “acknowledges” the ubiquity of the fear of death but misinterprets it as a logical fallacy, rather than a symptom of a deeper Christian truth. That Hutchinson sees fit to intervene at this point might suggest that she thought the argument too dangerous—and perhaps too attractive—to go without correction. Indeed she may have seen this view as the logical extension of the premises of natural theology that she already viewed as fallacious. By commenting here, she reminds the “incautious traveller” of her translation that in reasoning ourselves out of innate fears and anxieties, they risk reasoning themselves out of what she elsewhere calls “God’s more radiant light”.¹⁷⁸

Roughly 100 lines after this intervention, Hutchinson makes another when Lucretius confutes fear of the gods (“divom metus”) and dismisses tales of divine punishment as mere analogies for worldly troubles. So, among others, Tantalus with a rock suspended above him (as in the Greek lyric tradition) is in fact a parable about the immobilising fear of misfortune; Tityos eternally attacked by birds is an analogy for a man beset by lovesickness; and Sisyphus rolling the stone up the hill is the man “qui petere a populo fasces” (“seeking public office”) whose career will inevitably end in failure. Hutchinson’s comment comes just before these examples, alongside this passage:

After our deaths we in silent grave,
 Of future ages shall no knowledge have.
 Doe former woes or terrors our sence wound?
 Are they not all in sleepe like stillnesse drown’d?

¹⁷⁷ Norbrook notes that, for Hutchinson, “while the natural world did reveal enough of God to make idolatry and atheism ‘unexcusable’, divine grace alone produced salvation”, *Order and Disorder*, xxxv.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 15, 1.220.

But in this present life those miseries reigne
Which men in Acherons darke prisons feigne,
No Tantalus there, afflicted with vaine dread
Feares hanging rocks, should fall upon his head.
Tis superstition in this life creates
Those causelesse terrors of ensuing fates.¹⁷⁹

She comments in the margin, beginning in the style of her usual marginal synopses, “[t]hat the plagues of hell are but allegories of the miseries of this life” before adding, “[m]any a wicked soule who would ease it selfe with thinking soe will find it otherwise”.¹⁸⁰ Again, Hutchinson chooses to comment at a time when Lucretius is particularly practical, his teaching particularly attractive. Here we are far from void and atoms and closer to something like Judaeo-Christian Wisdom literature: advice on how to live. But, interestingly, this is also a passage she has expanded and clarified. She adds the first line and the word “drownd”, smoothing the transition between two distinct ideas: the fear of death and fear of the gods. She also adds the verb “reigne” midway through the passage, reinforcing Lucretius’s sense that our travails become tyrannies over the present and, further, ones that we irrationally project beyond death. The margin’s interest in defusing Lucretius does not extend to bowdlerizing his argument. Quite the opposite: Hutchinson clarifies the argument so that it can be properly rejected. Her marginal comments remind the reader that Lucretius’s argument is exactly the kind of bromide a sinner would use to sooth their fears of the real, waiting Hell.

Hutchinson’s modern editors suggest of this second marginal intervention that she shares John Owen’s concern here “that attacks on superstition could lead to more far-reaching doubts”.¹⁸¹ To attack Acheron was not so far removed from attacking Hell; if one could be a

¹⁷⁹ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 211, 3.1054–63.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 211.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 1, Part 2: 626.

fancy, could not the other be the same? Certainly these comments, so close together, suggest that she identified this point in Book 3 as especially perilous for her readers. Lucretius's account could be seen to lend support to the view that religion or superstition was a form of social control.¹⁸² But for Hutchinson, guilt and remorse are, like the fear of death, instead intimations of a Christian universe that Lucretius seeks to extinguish by misplaced reason. Without that "dimme light", fatal error becomes inescapable. As such she reserves special ire for such efforts in her Dedication when she attacks her learned contemporaries who "employ the most excellent gifts of humane understanding, witt, & all the other noble endowments of the soule, as weapons against him that gave them".¹⁸³ Her preface to *Order and Disorder* warns against the same, saying how she

disdained the wisdom fools so much admire themselves for [. . . they] may hug their philosophical clouds, but let them take heed they find not themselves without God in the world, adoring figments of their own brains, instead of the living and true God.¹⁸⁴

Hutchinson's few critical annotations come at times where Lucretius's logic is most dangerous: when it aligns with emerging forms of disbelief. Natural theology was flawed, but she recognised that its premises of rational deduction from nature could be perverted even further to call into question God's very existence. When Lucretius desacralises (by psychologising) even the human urging to *religio* (religious feeling or superstition), Hutchinson intervenes.

Hutchinson styles *De rerum natura* as a demonstration of how rational endowments can be misused, but if she leaves Lucretius's logic intact for this purpose, she nonetheless feels fit to remind readers that they are to find their reading salutary, not seductive. Only then will it be "usefull & medicinal". The admonitory rhetoric of the Dedication cautions readers to "take heed", to trace Lucretius's errors without being caught up in them. In this way she seeks to

¹⁸² Hutchinson's translation acknowledges this in its analogy of irrational fears with state violence: "Whips, tortures, racks, flames, coulter pitch, and all / Those plagues which former ages did invent, / For no lesse scourges guilty minds torment", *ibid.*, 1, Part 1: 213, 3.1099–101.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 13

¹⁸⁴ Hutchinson, *Order and Disorder*, 3–4.

replace Lucretius's authorial intentions with her own, not now advocating *ataraxia*, but informed wariness—"a seamarke"—against rising tides of disbelief. Her translation therefore shows that, in adopting an attitude to their own text in their translation choices and prefatory framings, translators are able to appropriate the authorial power to shape readers' interpretations.

Part 3: The shipwreck and the shore

We have seen that Hutchinson vehemently rejected many tenets of Epicurean philosophy, but also that her translation applies itself, intellectually and creatively, to carefully rendering Lucretius's ideas and poetry. She translates with the *vis* and *ingenium* that we associate with rhetorical mastery and authorship. This means that she turns her keen intellectual faculties to the work of translation, but also that those choices and the attitude she adopts to her text evince her authorial personality. The final part of this chapter flips the evidentiary vector of my argument, by tracing in Hutchinson's other works the way that *De rerum natura* affected her and her writing, rather than how she and the way she translates affected *De rerum natura*. In short, I contend that Hutchinson is a different writer for having translated Lucretius.¹⁸⁵ This is further proof that derivative writing is authorial. Critics often look for the way the same habits of style, or the same set of ideas and themes are reworked across an "original" author's works because they assume that those works will, to some degree, cohere. Derivative writing is rarely subject to this kind of analysis or these assumptions, as we saw with Ringler's account of Philip Sidney's psalms or indeed with the narrative of anomaly that surrounds Hutchinson's Lucretius translation. I suggest, conversely, that as a properly authorial form of writing, translations and paraphrases can also be viewed as formative and integral to a writer's oeuvre—and thus as revelatory of their persistent interests and concerns. For all their differences, Hutchinson and Lucretius each found

¹⁸⁵ This is similar to how Colin Burrow describes Ben Jonson's use of Martial as akin to making "*imitatio* a process of inventing a poetical character for yourself which would differentiate you from your contemporaries at the same time as establishing a relationship with classical writers". Hutchinson too reforges her *ingenium*—her authorial character—in the crucible of classical translation. *Imitating Authors*, 277.

themselves alienated from the establishment and enduring times of civil strife. They responded to their tumultuous times by retreating, not only physically but poetically. Hutchinson imitates and Christianises a specifically Lucretian model of retreat. In her “Elegies”, this becomes a shared rhetoric of authorship as she follows Lucretius in refracting political comment through commitment to private retreat.

Lucretian retreat

By describing in the Dedication how she “scapd the shipwreck of my soule” and elected to set up this “seamarke”, Hutchinson invokes the quintessential Epicurean image of man’s troubles. So foundational was the shipwreck image to Epicurean thinking that its opposite, *ataraxia*, was itself “probably a metaphor derived from calm water and weather”.¹⁸⁶ Ubiquitous in *De rerum natura*, the most famous iteration of rough seas comes in the proem to Book 2. A philosopher, perhaps Epicurus or perhaps Lucretius himself, watches with pleasure from the land as sailors are caught in high seas. The passage, beginning “suave mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis”, was known as much for its voyeurism as its poetic quality.¹⁸⁷ Hutchinson’s own translation of the passage reads:

Pleasant it is, when rough winds seas deforme,
On shore to see men labour in the storme;
Not that our pleasure springs from their distresse,
But from the safetie we our selves possesse.¹⁸⁸

For Lucretius, the passage represents the pleasurable freedom from physical or mental disturbance that was the aim of Epicurean teaching. The seafaring analogy worked on multiple

¹⁸⁶ Martin F. Smith, “Three Textual Notes on Lucretius”, *The Classical Review* 16/3 (1966): 264–66: 265.

¹⁸⁷ Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 94-5, 2.1 ff.; Dryden located a “malignant joy in that excellent description”, John Dryden, *Aureng-Zebe: a tragedy* [. . .] (London: Thomas Newcomb, 1676), sig. A3v. A translation of the passage in Tottel’s has the line “Our gladnes groweth to see their harmes, and yet to fele no part”, *Songes and sonettes*, sig. R1r.

¹⁸⁸ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 2.1–4.

levels. Ancient thinkers often saw seafaring as an affront to nature and one that the gods might rightly punish with a shipwreck. But *De rerum natura* also dismisses as an unnecessary source of anxiety the superstitions that assigned shipwrecks to angry gods. The sailors suffer because they live in fear of an ocean they do not understand and to which they ascribe malicious agency.¹⁸⁹ Lucretius rejected the role of the gods in doling out punishments like rough seas and thunder by instead accounting for those phenomena in his atomistic account of the universe. By understanding the material forces that constitute the world, those forces and their effects could be observed with the calm of a philosopher. From their retreat on the shore, the philosopher is not only physically protected, but is able to see clearly the way things really are.

Retreat became an exigency of life for many in seventeenth-century England. In the 1640s and 50s, royalists sought refuge in their country estates and their writing popularised retirement as a literary topos, often in Horatian visions of *otium*. Perhaps not coincidentally, this mid-century period also witnessed increasing interest in Epicureanism and the tendency of royalists in retirement to engage in or sponsor experiments in natural philosophy. Soon after Cromwell established the Protectorate, some of his stalwart supporters began to feel similarly disenfranchised by his concentration of power and his failures to enact their desired program of religious reform. The republican Hutchinsons were among them. In the *Memoirs*, Lucy Hutchinson notes that “the hand of God was mightily scene in prospering and preserving the Parliament, till Cromwell’s Ambition unhappily interrupted them”.¹⁹⁰ John Hutchinson’s own warnings to Cromwell, that his actions would lead “to certeine and unavoydable destruction, not only of themselves but of the whole Parliament party and their cause” went unheeded, and by 1653, John Hutchinson had retired from public life to the family’s estate in Owthorpe.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ “[T]hey eschew the treacherous deep, with her snares, her violence, and her fraud, and never trust her at any time when the calm sea shows her false alluring smile”, Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 139. The Latin is *ibid.*, 138, 2.556–59.

¹⁹⁰ Hutchinson, *Memoirs* [1973], 191.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 211.

While Epicureanism is often linked with royalist writers, Lucy Hutchinson's choice to begin to translate *De rerum natura* in the 1650s may have felt very apt given their early alienation from the Protectorate. Hutchinson's version of the proem to Book 2 is inflected with her own experience of political retreat:

But nothing a more pleasant prospect yeilds,
Then that high tower which wise mens learning builds,
Where well secur'd, we wandring troopes survey,
Who in a maze of error search their way,
For witt and glorie earnestly contend,
Both day and night in vaine endeavors spend,
To hord up wealth, and swim in full delights.
O wretched soules whom ignorance benights!
To what vast perills are your lives exposd,
With what darke mists is your whole age enclosd?¹⁹²

In this passage, the spectator moves their gaze from the sea to the land, but Hutchinson has added the word “troopes”, reviving Lucretius's earlier image of a battle to identify the soldiers with following “vaine endeavors”. This is important because when at the end of this extract she adds the phrase “your whole age enclosed”, she addresses the troops specifically—it is they who are subject to the “darke mists” of ignorance. The “vast perills” that in the Latin have no clear referent are, in Hutchinson's translation, specifically the perils of violence and warfare.¹⁹³ A similar emphasis occurs in her translation of the opening to Book 1 where she modifies the invocation to “lett not warrs harsh sounds disturbe my muse”, adding the reference to the muse to suggest war is incompatible with creative endeavour.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 85, 2.7–16.

¹⁹³ The Latin has “qualibus in tenebris vitae quantisque periclis / degitur hoc aevi quodcumquest!”, Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 94, 2.15–6.

¹⁹⁴ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 9, 1.28.

If, then, Hutchinson seems to orient her version of the philosopher's (and the writer's) life against the conflict she lived through, she also adds a distinctly Christian component. In the passage from Book 2 cited above, her "high tower which wise mens learning builds" is a translation of "edita doctrina sapientum templa serena".¹⁹⁵ Her opening "Pleasant it is" already has something of scripture's sweeping assertion, but translating *templa* as "high tower" and following it with images of confused "wandering" and the "maze of error" explicitly evokes the Tower of Babel story. In the Dedication the same phrase, the "Maze of Error", refers to the fate of those who "toyl'd themselves in vaine to search out Truth" using the fallen capacities of human reason.¹⁹⁶ Similarly, in the Tower of Babel story in Genesis, God enforces human submission to his will by confusing human language. Evoking Babel in this passage reminds the reader of this higher order of wisdom and of the hubris of human aspirations. Source and target text both admonish their readers, but while Lucretius counsels against public life, Hutchinson goes further. Lucretius warns the sailors from the shore, but Hutchinson warns that without faith the shore itself is unsteady, the "high tower" as fragile as the ship's mast. Within her translation, then, she begins to carve out a Christian version of Lucretian retreat that we will find revised in her other works.

Lucretian revisions

Hutchinson's version of Lucretian retreat does not only appear in her translation of *De rerum natura*, but across many of her works; it constitutes a recurring intellectual debt which shapes how we receive her as an author. One such work is an untitled poem by Hutchinson, included in a lost manuscript that also contained her autobiography.¹⁹⁷ The poem begins "All sorts of men through various labours presse / To the same end, contented quietnesse".¹⁹⁸ Contrasting

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 85, 1.8 and Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 94, 2.8.

¹⁹⁶ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 9.

¹⁹⁷ This poem is included in the Appendix.

¹⁹⁸ Lucy Hutchinson, *Memoirs of the life of Colonel Hutchinson* (J.M. Dent & Co., 1913), 445, ll. 1–2.

“labours” and “contended quietnesse”, the poem proceeds in a catalogue of misspent lives. Some of the poem’s images are typical of poems in a Horatian vein of rural retreat in vogue for royalist writers, for example in bucolic lines like “Sleep to the cottage bringeth happie nights”.¹⁹⁹ But most of the poem is explicitly Lucretian because instead of weighing the merits of city life against the country, it counterpoises ambition with *ataraxia*. She reuses choice Lucretian images in the poem, for example “Great princes [who] vex their labouring thoughts to be / Possesst of an unbounded soveraigntie”; the “hardie soldier” who toils “That he may conquer first, and after raigne”; and of the merchant “plough[ing] the angrie seas / That he may bring home wealth, and live at ease”.²⁰⁰ But in all these cases ease is that “[w]hich none of them attaine”.²⁰¹ At times her poem seems to summarise passages in *De rerum natura*:

Hutchinson’s “All sorts of men”

Ambition doth incessantly aspire,

And each advance leads on to new desire;

Nor yet can riches av’rice satisfie,

For want and wealth together multiplie[.]²⁰²

Hutchinson’s *De Rerum Natura*

All humane life repeats but still the same

And no time ever can new pleasures frame,

Those joys seeme best which wanting we persue,

But once obteind, we thirst againe for new

Thus life is but a progress of desires

Which evermore supplied, new things require[.]²⁰³

These are men caught in the “maze of error” of public life that Lucretius characterises, at the beginning of Book 2, as “the strife of wits, the fight for precedence, all labour night and day with surpassing toil to mount upon the pinnacle of riches and to lay hold on power”.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., l. 13.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., ll. 3–8.

²⁰¹ Ibid., l. 9.

²⁰² Ibid., ll. 21–4.

²⁰³ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 217, 3.1168–73.

²⁰⁴ Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, 95.

The close proximity of this poem to the sentiments of the Lucretius translation suggests it might have been written in the same 1650s period, which would also align with John Hutchinson's retirement in 1653. Indeed the poem at times seems specifically to celebrate his abandonment of public life. When she writes "[h]e's only rich who knows no want; he raignes / Whose will no severe tyranny constreins", she may have in mind the Cromwell's increasingly dictatorial Protectorate.²⁰⁵ The poem has a particular emphasis on political power, condensing a number of images from Book 5 where Lucretius traces the evolution of society and its concurrent corruption by public concerns. Her poem tells how on the unambitious man "[n]o spies nor traitors on his trencher waite / Nor is his mirth confin'd to rules of state",²⁰⁶ evoking the lines in Book 5 where "mankind stir'd with strife [. . .] Bound up themselves, of their owne free accord / Within strict laws".²⁰⁷ In the poem she writes that the life of the private man is better "[t]hen his who weares th' imperiall diadem, / Whom the rude multitude doe still condemne", because, in his case, "[t]he vulgar breath doth not his thoughts elate, / Nor can be o'whelmd by their hate".²⁰⁸ These sentiments evoke a similar passage in Book 5 of *De rerum natura*, in which the "base vulgar"

[. . .] most insultingly trampled on those
 They lately feard. [T]hus did those falls expose
 Sovereigne powers, which every one persued,
 To the base dreggs of men, the multitude.²⁰⁹

Hutchinson appears to choose those images and expressions of Lucretian retreat most applicable to the growing tyranny she and her husband perceived in Cromwell's rule. As such she makes *De rerum natura*, or this aspect of it, what Burrow calls a "*genus dicendi*, a way of writing" that can be

²⁰⁵ Hutchinson, *Memoirs [1913]*, 445, ll. 27–8.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 446, ll. 39–40.

²⁰⁷ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 365, 5.1190–193.

²⁰⁸ Hutchinson, *Memoirs [1913]*, 446, ll. 55–6 and 51–2.

²⁰⁹ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 365, 5.1184–187.

applied resonantly to new contexts in new poems.²¹⁰ Her work on the translation enables her to write imitations that take Lucretius as a learned habit of thought and style.

She gives those Lucretian interests a Christian twist late in her writing career, in the penultimate canto of the biblical verse paraphrase *Order and Disorder*, which was likely written in the 1670s. This canto depicts the story of Jacob as he flees to Haran, from Genesis 28. Jacob sleeps peacefully on rocks, and the narrator explains “O how are mean men, if they know it, blessed!” for “They on hard earth can find pleasant rest / When princes, rolling in their beds of plume, / With waking cares the tedious night consume”.²¹¹ Anxiety and restless sleep is the price of public life, but Hutchinson’s qualification “if they know it” is explicitly Lucretian because it makes clear that what spares men like Jacob from anxiety is not their “meanness” but their philosophy. The canto continues with a catalogue of men beset by anxious dreams:

The gripple usurer of his coming gain,
The labourer of his toil, the awful slave
Of the last harsh commands his stern lord gave
[. . .]
Seamen that the rough winds the seas deform
And all the billows crowd into a storm,
Of distant shores, strange islands, horrid rocks
Deep gulfs, and all the ocean’s monstrous flocks[.]²¹²

Borrowing Lucretian images and language, Hutchinson equates dreaming of ill-won profit, toil, subjection, and storms with manifesting them in the present, turning restful sleep into restless cares.²¹³ Again, this strongly evokes Lucretius’s argument that Hell is in fact the psychic experience of fearing hell. In *Order and Disorder*, though, the same argument does not endorse

²¹⁰ Burrow, *Imitating Authors*, 256; see also 223–27.

²¹¹ Hutchinson, *Order and Disorder*, 240, 19.9–12.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 241, 19.38–41, 19.47–50.

²¹³ Indeed the latter lines above are a paraphrase of her translation of the proem to Book 2.

Epicurean philosophy, but Christian faith. She writes that “[t]here are no terrors when the soul is pure”:

God represents to the unbusied mind
In visions the events which he prepares,
For mortal men the ways of bliss declares,
Or else discovers hidden mysteries
Wherein his dear saints’ consolation lies.²¹⁴

Jacob is one such soul, and he is offered a vision of God. Lucretius advocates for the serene life of the philosopher, shorn of worldly and divine anxieties, but Hutchinson finds that serenity in a Calvinist election as one of God’s “dear saints”. The devotional purposes of *Order and Disorder* do not then preclude Hutchinson from imitating *De rerum natura*. Indeed her persistent recourse to Epicurean themes and images that repudiate public life indicate that her engagement with Lucretius outlasted the 1650s and that *De rerum natura* continued to form part of her imaginative and intellectual world—just as we would expect of any extended authored work.

Rhetoric of retreat

The “seamarke” image evokes a paradox similar to that of the Epicurean philosopher, at once safely on shore and looking to warn those at sea. The proem to Book 2 of *De rerum natura* has been described as “the wise man’s view from *terra firma* over the stormy seas of the unenlightened [. . .] For Lucretius, once the battle against ignorance has been won, the philosopher retreats from the world”.²¹⁵ But does Lucretius really advocate abandoning the world? What is at issue is when (or whether) one can say that “the battle against ignorance has been won”. Is it when the philosopher has overcome their ignorance, or does the philosopher

²¹⁴ Hutchinson, *Order and Disorder*, 240–41, 19.21 and 19.60–64

²¹⁵ Stuart Gillespie and Philip R. Hardie, *The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 13–4.

have an obligation to enlighten others? *De rerum natura* suggests the latter. It addresses Memmius, a devotee of Greek literature and a praetor seeking the consulship, and its advocacy of a life of Epicurean philosophy is made more urgent by its probable context in the lead up to the civil war between Caesar and Pompey from 49 BC. Lucretius is, like the spectator, “shored up” by Epicurean philosophy, but he is not passive; in designing fictive episodes that celebrate philosophical retreat, Lucretius is in fact actively engaged in saving distressed sailors like Memmius.²¹⁶

In the period immediately following the Restoration, Hutchinson imitates Lucretius in staging retreat as a site of political comment. John Hutchinson’s country retirement had once been a choice, but after 1660, it was a necessity. The parliament called by the new monarch, Charles II, quickly sought revenge on republicans. Many were hanged or drawn and quartered. John Owen, author of *Theologoumena pantodapa* and an associate of Cromwell who preached his support of the king’s execution to parliament, was in the Restoration “living with the threat of government reprisal”, writing that “I am worth nothing and live quietly and in obscurity”.²¹⁷ As a signatory of Charles I’s death warrant, John Hutchinson was in mortal peril. Lucy Hutchinson acted in his defence. She forged a letter to parliament in her husband’s name seeking leniency, which Norbrook suggests was likely “far more abject” than she admits in *Memoirs*.²¹⁸ Parliament did grant John Hutchinson an exemption under the Acts of Oblivion, but nonetheless he was soon imprisoned in the Tower of London on dubious charges, and died there in 1664.

Epicureanism resounds in Hutchinson’s political writings of the 1660s. Crawford Gribben characterises John Hutchinson after the Restoration in a “neo-Stoic withdrawal from public life”, but in fact it is his wife who characterises that withdrawal in terms of *ataraxia*, a

²¹⁶ I have already suggested that Hutchinson in her Lucretius translation does something similar, working to expose the fashionable fallacies of natural theology, and that it may have envisaged doing so for a large audience in print. Like Lucretius, then, Hutchinson sees the philosopher as an advocate.

²¹⁷ Gribben, “John Owen, Lucy Hutchinson”, 182. His later writing reflected what Christopher Hill calls his “experience of defeat”, including his *Theologoumena pantodapa* that Hutchinson would begin translating from 1673, which interpreted the world (and knowledge of God) in a long decline beginning with Genesis.

²¹⁸ Norbrook, “Memoirs and Oblivion”, 234.

shared aim of stoicism and Epicureanism.²¹⁹ He is said to repent that “ever he forsooke his owne blessed quiett to embarque in such a troubled sea where he had made shipwrack of all things but a good conscience”.²²⁰ Norbrook comments that “like a good Epicurean, he aims at the ‘peacefull quiettnesse’” of *De rerum natura*’s distant and indifferent gods. But these are not John’s words, as Norbrook implies, but Lucy’s.²²¹ It is she that frames John Hutchinson’s political life in the Lucretian terms of troubled seas and shipwrecks. After all, *De rerum natura* had spoken amply to such reversals of fortune as when, in Book 5:

Slaine kings, thrones, scepters, orewhelmd maiestie,
 All, then did in contemned ruins lie;
 The bloodie crowne the fate of greatnesse mound
 Beneath the feete of the base vulgar spurnd.²²²

After her husband’s death, these lines would have felt newly pertinent to Hutchinson, and she would return both to the translation itself and to the authorial position of the Epicurean philosopher, appropriating it for her affecting political commentaries in her “Elegies” particularly.

Kate Lilley has argued that the genre of “[e]legy engages persistently with the figuration of desire under the aspect of lack, or interdiction, and the quest for a sufficiently reparative language”.²²³ The twenty-two poems that make up Hutchinson’s “Elegies” (the title is a critical invention) proliferate attempts to find such a language.²²⁴ One of those languages is Lucretian and it manifests in the image of the garden, and specifically the Hutchinsons’ garden at

²¹⁹ Crawford Gribben, “Lucy Hutchinson’s Theological Writings”, *The Review of English Studies* 71/299 (2020): 292–306: 294.

²²⁰ Norbrook, “Memoirs and Oblivion”, 258.

²²¹ *Works*, 1, Part 1, xxvii, citing Hutchinson, *Memoirs* [1973], 228.

²²² Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 365, 5.1180–84.

²²³ Kate Lilley, “True state within: Women’s elegy 1640–1700”, in *Women, Writing, History: 1640–1740*, edited by Isobel Grundy and Susan Wiseman (The University of Georgia Press, 1992), 72–92: 73.

²²⁴ The Elegies were first published in David Norbrook, “Lucy Hutchinson’s “Elegies” and the Situation of the Republican Woman Writer (with text)”, *English Literary Renaissance* 27/3 (1997): 468–521. I use the edited version in Sarah C. E. Ross and Elizabeth Scott-Baumann, eds., *Women Poets of the English Civil War* (Manchester University Press, 2018).

Owthorpe. In poem 7, “To the Garden at Owthorpe”, Hutchinson finds in the disordered garden an analogy of “the disordered passions of my mind”, as well as political comment.²²⁵ The garden’s “better ordered ranks” are the irrevocable past of Owthorpe’s present decay.²²⁶ Now the garden is a place of “pernicious growth” which has “o’errun all the sweet fragrant banks”.²²⁷ Elizabeth Scott-Baumann finds in these poems an association with the country house poem, in which the descriptions of the grounds create “the anticipation of the estate poem genre [in order] to emphasize the absence at the core of her poem”, namely the absence of her husband.²²⁸ In poem 12, “Musings in my Evening Walks at Owthorpe”, the estate is reduced to an “empty pile” surrounded by trees “drooping for want of that kind hand / That set and cherished them before”.²²⁹ Without John Hutchinson’s ministrations as gardener and husband, the autobiographical female speaker answers her question, “shall we prostitute those joys again” in the negative: “’Tis now our best grace to be wild and rude”.²³⁰ In the country house poem, female chastity and *oikonomia* “mediate between the domestic and the public, projecting the ‘realities’ of the estate as an ideal model for the state”.²³¹ In Ben Jonson’s “To Penhurst”, for example, Lady Sidney’s “high huswifery” is put to the test by King James’s unexpected visit, the estate modelling and facilitating the smooth operation of the nation. Conversely in the “Elegies” without John Hutchinson who “planted in me all that yielded praise”,²³² Hutchinson’s speaker inverts the topos of wife and estate as “a map of the integrity of the state” and characterises all three in disintegration.²³³

²²⁵ Ross and Scott-Baumann, *Women Poets*, 286, l. 32. The text of elegies 7 and 12 are included in the Appendix.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 285, l. 30.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, ll. 28–9.

²²⁸ Scott-Baumann, *Forms of Engagement*, 155.

²²⁹ Ross and Scott-Baumann, *Women Poets*, 290, ll. 23 and 10–1.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 285, ll. 7 and 10.

²³¹ Hugh Jenkins, *Feigned Commonwealths: The Country-House Poem and the Fashioning of the Ideal Community* (Duchesne University Press, 1998), 26.

²³² Ross and Scott-Baumann, *Women Poets*, 285, l. 14.

²³³ Peter Stallybrass, “Patriarchal Territories: The Body Enclosed”, in *Rewriting the Renaissance: Discourses of Sexual Difference in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Margaret W. Ferguson et al. (The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 123–42: 129.

Hutchinson therefore analogises her husband's gardening in these elegies (following Adam's cultivation of Eden in Genesis 2:15) with an ideal stewardship of the English nation that has been lost. This signification derives from a typology with Eden. Sarah C. E. Ross describes poem 7 in particular as "[r]edolent with a postlapsarian language of foulness", with John Hutchinson depicted as an "Adamic male cultivator".²³⁴ As Hutchinson comments in her potted history of England in her autobiographical fragment,:

Britaine hath bene as a garden enclosed, wherein all things that man can wish to make a pleasant life are planted and grow [. . .] God in comparison with other countries hath made this as a paradise, so, to compleate the parallell, the serpent hath in all times been busy to seduce, and not unsuccessfull, ever stirring up opposers to the infant truths of Christ.²³⁵

In addition to being a powerful image of widowhood, the disordered garden at her estate at Owthorpe therefore comes to stand in for a disordered England under the decadent rule of Charles II (and at risk of falling under positively devilish rule in his Catholic heir, James II).

Hutchinson's garden language is also Epicurean. Gardens were the privileged site of philosophical reflection in Ancient Greece, and one of the few things known about Epicurus the man was that he was the first to have a philosopher's garden in Athens. Seneca notes that at the entrance of Epicurus's garden was a sign reading "hospes hic bene manebis hic summum bonum voluptas est" ("Stranger, your time will be pleasant here. Here the highest good is pleasure").²³⁶ A 1689 publication comments

Epicurus passed His Life wholly in His Garden; there He Studied, there He Exercised, there He taught His Philosophy; and indeed, no other sort of Abode seems to contribute

²³⁴ Ross, *Women, Poetry, and Politics*, 187–88.

²³⁵ Hutchinson, *Memoirs* [1973], 279–81.

²³⁶ Cited in Diskin Clay, "The Athenian Garden", in *The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism*, edited by James Warren, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 9–28: 9.

so much, to both the Tranquility of Mind, and Indolence of Body, which He made His Chief Ends.²³⁷

Our erstwhile Lucretian translator, John Evelyn, created two Epicurean themed gardens in a neoclassical style, replete with “retirements” and, at his Wotton garden, with a prominent statue of Venus—the deity invoked at the opening of *De rerum natura*.²³⁸ Some classical sources give Epicurus’s garden a distinctly political valence. Cicero in *De legibus* dismisses the Epicureans, writing:

let us, even if they are right (for there is no need to quarrel with them here), bid them carry on their discussions in their own gardens, and even request them to abstain for a while from taking any part in matters affecting the State, which they neither understand nor have wished to understand.²³⁹

The garden is a site of retreat, but it is one that does not reliably contain political comment; it may be its own little world, but it has views on the world beyond its hedges.

Like Epicurus and his seventeenth-century followers, Hutchinson in the “Elegies” found the garden a place for reflection and thought that, after her husband’s death, turns to one of pain. She writes: “[w]here’er I go affliction still / Takes up my walks and still I find / Something that calls my loss to mind”.²⁴⁰ Pensive walks are overtaken by grief and study has become impossible. She writes:

Even my books that used to be
The solace of my life while he
Was my instructor and approved
The pleasant lines I chose and loved,

²³⁷ William Sir Temple, *Miscellanea. in four essays* (London: J. R., 1690), 94.

²³⁸ See Alastair Small and Carola Small, “John Evelyn and the Garden of Epicurus”, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 60 (1997): 194–214.

²³⁹ Cicero, *On the Laws*, trans. Clinton W. Keyes (Harvard University Press, 2000), 339, 1.39.

²⁴⁰ Ross and Scott-Baumann, *Women Poets*, 290, ll. 26–8.

No more my sick thoughts recreate
Who all my old delights now hate.²⁴¹

Epicurus referred to his school as a society of friends or relatives, a *philoï*, and as Seneca comments of Epicurus's followers, "it was not the school of Epicurus that made Metrodorus, Hermarchus and Polyaeus great men but their shared life".²⁴² So with the Hutchinsons. As cultivator of the garden, John Hutchinson is not only a symbol of religious and political virtue but a fellow philosopher, an "instructor" without whom Lucy Hutchinson's own life in the philosopher's garden has become impossible. The loss of these intellectual delights, alongside the analogised disorder of the garden and the estate, becomes one more means of emphasising how her husband's death signals a wider calamity: her own experience of defeat.²⁴³ The multivalent garden image in the "Elegies" also comes to represent the poetic and intellectual endeavours, perhaps including the Lucretius translation, that are now lacking, now interdicted, due to her husband's death.

This collapse of garden and nation, of country house poem and the philosopher's *locus amoenus*, speaks again to the paradox I have identified in Lucretius's promotion of Epicurean wisdom to Memmius. Epicurus had enjoined his followers not to involve themselves in public life, but by writing *De rerum natura* and addressing it to a praetor with political aspirations, Lucretius would seem to contravene that principle.²⁴⁴ His repeated passages advocating retreat and exposing the unnecessary turmoil of public life suggest polemical purpose. Writing before the outbreak of civil war in Rome, Lucretius counselled peace and philosophy by appealing to

²⁴¹ Ibid., 291, ll. 37–42.

²⁴² Cited in Clay, "The Athenian Garden", 15 and 26.

²⁴³ Christopher Hill considers in his *The Experience of Defeat* how republicans reacted in their writing to the failure of their cause. "Lucy Hutchinson should have been a candidate," he notes, "but in her *Memoirs* of her husband she is far too concerned to cover up the Colonel's weaknesses to allow her own views to come through." An enlarged understanding of her corpus reveals much more about her own views. *The Experience of Defeat* (Verso, 2016 [1984]), 7.

²⁴⁴ On Epicurus's injunction, see Clay, "The Athenian Garden", 10. Epicurus, too, promoted his philosophy through numerous letters, including the still extant letter to Diogenes Laërtius, and in effect broke his own rule, as Plutarch observed. Ibid., 19.

what he saw as the pathologies, of body and mind, in the lives of his countrymen.²⁴⁵ Hutchinson borrows this writerly position. Like Lucretius's philosopher on the shore, and Epicurus in his garden in Athens, Hutchinson styles herself as writing from retreat. In the Dedication, she describes herself participating in the republic of letters from the busy sitting room; in the *Memoirs*, she is her husband's "shade" even as she writes him in to existence; and in the "Elegies" she turns the garden, a site of retreat, into an emblem of national as well as domestic collapse.²⁴⁶ *De rerum natura* supplies Hutchinson with images and ideas that are reworked throughout her oeuvre, but also with a rhetoric of authorship where public comment is staged through a commitment to private retreat. As a non-conformist and republican who wrote most of her works after the Restoration, and as a woman writer, this may have been the most useful piece of Lucretius's mental furniture, the *supellex bonarum litterarum* that she, following Exodus 3, took from the gentiles.

Conclusion

Hutchinson never exiles Lucretius from her mental world. In the tenth elegy, "The Recovery", she writes of her husband's death in Lucretian terms:

My love, life, crown, peace, treasure, joys were lost
And, seeking them, long was my frail bark tossed
On sorrow's raging flood where storms prevailed,
And poor leaking vessel every way assailed.
The cordage cracked, the shrouds and main mast tore,
Vain skill and industry could help me no more.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁵ Cicero's comment from *De legibus* suggests he was not alone in finding a political platform in Epicurean thought, or at least in its proponents.

²⁴⁶ For a discussion of her self-fashioning as a "shade", see Keeble, "The Colonel's Shadow".

²⁴⁷ Ross and Scott-Baumann, *Women Poets*, 287, ll. 1–6.

Hutchinson describes herself as Lucretius's sailor, not because her husband and former happiness is gone, but because she persists in "seeking them" after they are lost. She is become Lucretius's vain man, anxious about what cannot be changed. Her remedy is just that which Lucretius offers to "sick minds" in Book 3: to cast away all other things and "[d]ive into nature's mysteries".²⁴⁸ For Hutchinson, the greatest mystery is God, but the way she approaches God is strongly inflected by her humanist education and the projects of derivative writing through which she tested and affirmed her convictions. One of those projects was her translation of Lucretius. It is past time to properly integrate that translation into an understanding of her life and work and, I have argued, into her life-in-writing: the authorial character fashioned in and by her works both "original" and "derivative".

²⁴⁸ Barbour and Norbrook, *Works*, 1, Part 1, 217, 3.1158-160.

CONCLUSION

When Mary Sidney refers to “The stuffe not ours” she claims that though she and her brother have “denized” the Hebrew in English, that does not mean that they now own it. The implication is that there is something essential to a text that is not reducible to the individual words of which it is made—even if each one is altered, for example from Hebrew to English, its identity remains unchanged. There is a textual essence the “warp[ing]” and “weav[ing]” of derivative procedures do not touch. Every writer discussed in this thesis denies ownership of their texts in some way, from Anne Lock’s fictional “frend” to Hutchinson’s regret. The stuff, they all tell us, is never theirs.

This rhetoric was one that twentieth century critics took at face value, interpreting those disavowals of ownership as an abrogation of intellectual property. With originality as much a legal as a literary taxonomy, and before the emergence of translation studies, derivative writing was only marginally recognised as creative and literary work. As Lawrence Venuti famously observed in 1995, the translator is often entirely invisible, though every word is theirs.¹ To be original was to be creative, ingenious, and authentic; but to be derivative was to be hackneyed, banal, or worst of all, plagiaristic. Under such a regime, the rhetoric of modesty used by early modern translators and paraphrasts seemed transparently true. When that rhetoric was deployed by women, it was even easier to accept. It is not that scholars—and here I refer to men and women alike—did not want women to exist in literary history, but that the prior assumption that they did not led them to accept those disavowals without the requisite scrutiny. This held true even for feminist scholars because the woman’s voice they sought to recover was seen to be silenced by the male text through which it spoke.

¹ Venuti, *The Translator’s Invisibility*.

Long after inquiry into (canonical) men's derivative and imitative writing has become *de rigueur*, women's own writing in these modes still lack fulsome reappraisal. Work on rhetoric and humanist thought has led to a new understanding of the value placed on *imitatio*, whether it be a broad reception or emulation of antiquity, the imitation of a classical authorial *vis* or *ingenium*, or (and often also) the derivation at the level of diction and form. We now recognise derivation and imitation as integral to the literary practice of even the most canonical of early modern authors. This is an important challenge to post-Romantic hierarchies of literary value, and it is one that women's literary production should also benefit from. In terms of democratising the reach of literary agency, scholarship on material practices like commonplacing, marginalia, and literary circulation is more advanced, and now includes as a matter of course canonical and non-canonical writers and both men and women. Translations and paraphrases are amenable to this scholarship's interest in collaboration, reader response, and literary networks, but we must also view these texts—even when they are by women—as of a piece with (supposedly) elite discourses of humanism and with institutional practices of *imitatio*. That is what this thesis has tried to do.

The need for this expanded intellectual context is stipulated by the texts themselves. My chapters have shown the huge and varied literary and intellectual interests that can exist in the liminal zone of derivative texts. At times it seems that it is exactly their liminality of ownership that enables the most radical interventions. The women in this thesis pass exegetical, legal and political comment; they write inventive fictions and make literary choices; and they engage in contemporary intellectual debates. In the act of rewriting, they become writers themselves in the fullest sense. By that token, they could be said to also take ownership of their texts. And yet, this thesis has set out not to simply shift our ideas of textual "ownership" to more favourable coordinates for early modern women, but to demonstrate the limitations of that term and its associated language in accounting for the interests of derivative texts more broadly. If we let

them, these texts can expose the taxonomies and hierarchies that govern how we think about literature with ramifications for the study of writing by men and women alike.

A more theoretically minded study would dig deeper into the dyad between ownership and authorship. To attribute a text is to make a claim about (original) authorship and we see in scholarship on collaborative plays, for example, how obsessive that desire can become in scene-by-scene and line-by-line attribution. This thesis has not conceptually challenged that compulsion in its own line-by-line untangling of source and target text, but there is good cause to do so, for that phenomenon suggests that our critical paradigms and perhaps also our cultural inclinations are still ill-equipped to reckon with collaboration, distributed authorship, or indeed the limitations of authorship and originality as an ontology. We see those limitations when we try to identify the point at which a curriculum of *imitatio* might morph into a mental habit that produces “original” writing. This has always intrigued Renaissance scholarship, for the drills and exercises of the humanist classroom have often seemed infertile ground for the works of inventive genius produced by its former students. Such an inquiry seems more likely to unravel the category of the “original” altogether than to reveal the *eureka* moment of original genius. At the right degree of magnification, even the most finely woven fabric will reveal its warp and weft. If it is true that “original” belongs, as I have used it, in quotation marks, where does it leave whole critical edifices that we have designed around originality and authorship?

The scope of my thesis is narrower but it offers its own provocation to the field. This is that the dual priorities of “original” authorship and female authenticity have led us to look at women’s derivative writing with disappointment, with the result that a large proportion of their work has been radically overlooked. A corollary has been unwittingly to reinforce a narrative of patriarchal subjugation and resistance that has curtailed our perception of women’s intellectual and literary enterprises. I have tried to show the wealth of interest that these assumptions have occluded and to advance a close, comparative methodology as the best way to make those interests transparent. Indeed some of the texts covered here pose such a rich and unexpected

variety of evidence about early modern women's lives and minds that further discoveries might demand we revise existing accounts of women's education and their exposure to literary and intellectual (especially humanist) culture. There are many, many more texts to be considered. There is Anne Bradstreet's "The Four Monarchies", a paraphrase-cum-summary of Walter Raleigh's *Historie of the World*.² There is Agnes Wenman's enormous translation of Johannes Zonaras's *Epitome Historion* in manuscripts at Cambridge University Library.³ There is Scottish writer Anna Hume's published translations of Petrarch's *Triumphs*, Judith Man's "epitome" of the romance *Argenis*, and Lady Lumley's translations from Isocrates and of Euripides' *Iphigeneia at Aulis*.⁴ There are a large number of engaging biblical verse paraphrases, from the many evocative lyrics penned by Elizabeth Melville to the idiosyncratic Decalogue rewriting by Lady Anne Southwell. Many texts remain to be studied even by the women in this thesis: there are, for example, Mary Sidney's Petrarch, Anne Lock's Calvin and Taffin, and Hutchinson's Owen and Calvin translations. Derivative writing by women is a rich vein of inquiry that this thesis has in no way exhausted.

The rewards of this approach do, however, show the exhaustion of regressive strands of feminist criticism that would return to the 1980s and 1990s vogue of seeing women's texts as veiled but authentic women's voices. A recent prize-winning article proposes a feminist formalism that "takes gender as a central category of analysis" and "insists that the meaning of a text is produced through the complex intersection between form and gendered ideologies".⁵ Paradoxically, it then positions this axiom as a means of "address[ing] the persistent challenges

² This text is found in Anne Bradstreet, *The tenth muse [. . .]* (London: n.p., 1650). It is edited in part in Ross and Scott-Baumann, *Women Poets*, 34–46.

³ There is autograph manuscript (MS Mm.3.32) and a scribal fair copy in two parts (MS Dd.1.18 and MS Dd.1.19), all held at Cambridge University Library.

⁴ Francesco Petrarch, *The triumphs of love: chastitie: death [. . .]*, trans. Anna Hume (Edinburgh: Evan Tyler, 1644); John Barclay, *An epitome of the history of faire Argenis and Polyarchus [. . .]*, ed. Judith Man (London: E. Griffin, 1640); Lady Jane Lumley, British Library, MS Royal 15.A.IX

⁵ Lara Dodds and Michelle M. Dowd, "Happy Accidents: Critical Belatedness, Feminist Formalism, and Early Modern Women's Writing", *Criticism* 62/2 (2020): 169–93: 170 and 178.

of integrating women's writing into the larger field".⁶ While I agree that there is a strategic need to pay more attention to women's texts in response to their absence or dearth in existing critical accounts, to do so by passing their writing exclusively through the lens of gender ("as cultural construct, as a component of representation, or as a material condition of literary production") risks exactly the balkanisation of literary scholarship that has meant women need to be "integrated" into the field in the first place.⁷ Of course these factors are relevant, but this kind of scholarship delimits *a priori* the interest of women's writing to our assumptions about gender now and our assumptions about gender in the past. In response we might turn back to Denise Riley's argument that "being a woman is inconstant, and can't provide an ontological foundation", as well as her rousing question: "[a]t this instant, am I a woman as distinct from a human being?"⁸ By making gender the criterion of selection *and* interpretation, we will only end up looking in the mirror, as indeed that recent article's ensuing discussion of erotics, affect, and embodiment strongly suggest.

Most literary critical methodologies can be made to yield something if only by the force of their rhetoric, but one way to recognise a methodology working more empirically is if it yields surprises. The comparative methodology deployed here does exactly that, not only at the level of individual literary choices, but in the way those choices indicate a much greater range of women's learning and interest than one might expect. That Tyler, a "servant", would have intricate knowledge of contract law is so surprising that it would be unconvincing were it not for the stark evidence that this methodology can marshal to that conclusion. Indeed what has been striking in these chapters is not a sense of a distinct, female tradition of writing, but the continuity of women's engagements with the intellectual mainstream. Their exclusion from the humanist classroom, for example, does not seem to have excluded them from habits of thought

⁶ Ibid., 170.

⁷ Ibid., 178.

⁸ Denise Riley, *'Am I That Name?': Feminism and the Category of 'Women' in History* (The Macmillan Press, 1988), 2 and 6.

and of literary engagement we associate with humanism, nor indeed from engagement with humanist thinkers. This thesis has not so much suggested that we need to shift our idea of the mainstream to include women, but that the mainstream we know was never entirely masculine to begin with. It is my hope that further studies on writing by women and men will interrogate this further, but I am convinced that studying derivative texts in this way provides an exceptionally sensitive register of writers' cultural and intellectual commitments and their literary agency.

In the passage from *Don Quixote* with which I opened this thesis, where translation is compared to weaving Flemish tapestries, the bumbling knight exclaims to the translator:

—Osaré yo jurar [. . .] que no es vuesa merced conocido en el mundo, enemigo siempre de premiar los floridos ingenios ni los loables trabajos. ¡Qué de habilidades hay perdidas por ahí! Qué de ingenios arrinconados! ¡Qué de virtudes menospreciadas!⁹

I would be so bold as to warrant [. . .] that your grace is not known to the world, which is always averse to prizing rare genius and praiseworthy enterprises. What abilities are lost that way! What genius neglected! What virtues belittled!

Here Quixote declares that, if only we would deign to notice it, the work of translation would be recognised as the work of genius. In typical Quixotic fashion, however, he then goes on to contradict himself, arguing that most translation “ni arguye ingenio ni elocución, como no le arguye el que traslada ni el que copia un papel de otro papel”—that it in fact it “argues no more for talent nor eloquence than he who copies from one piece of paper to another”.¹⁰ Cervantes thus condenses and parodies the seesawing reception of translation: for some an overlooked art and for others an overegged mechanical task. In this lengthy critical history, at least as old as the Tower of Babel legend, this thesis is one more intervention. It firmly sides with the Quixote that recognises rewriting as a work of *habilidad*, *ingenio*, and *virtud*, worthy of being *conocido en el mundo*.

⁹ Cervantes, *Don Quijote*, 1032.

¹⁰ Ibid.

But it has sought to shore up that recognition, welcome as it is, with a detailed inquiry into the craft of derivative writing and into its resemblance with the skill and creativity we more confidently ascribe to “original” writing. Translation and paraphrase are skilled and ingenious literary practices. So too are its practitioners: the individual translators and paraphrasts, men and women, who deserve to be “known to the world”.

Appendix

This appendix contains shorter but difficult to find poems that are discussed in this thesis. Anne Lock's sonnet sequence is available online (via Luminarium) in addition to published scholarly editions cited in the bibliography. Anne Dowriche's *The French historie* is available through *EEBO*, as is Tyler's translation. Lucy Hutchinson's Lucretius translation is available online via *Oxford Scholarly Editions Online* or in the equivalent printed editions, again cited in the bibliography.

Mary Sidney

Psalm 58 (Si vere utique)

And call yee this to utter what is just,
 you that of justice hold the sov'raign throne?
and call yee this to yeld, O sonnes of dust,
 to wronged brethren ev'ry man his own?
 O no: it is your long malicious will
 now to the world to make by practize known
 with whose oppression you the ballance fill,
 Just to your selves, indiff'r'ent els to none.

But what could they, who ev'n in birth declin'd
 from truth and right to lies and injuries?
to shew the venim of their canc'red mynd
 the Adders image scarcely can suffice.
 nay scarce the Aspick may with them contend,
 on whom the charmer all in vaine applies
 his skillful's't spells: ay missing of his end,
 while shee self-deaff, and unaffected lies.

Lord crack their teeth, lord crush these lions jawes,
 soe lett them sinck as water in the sand:
when deadly bow their aiming fury drawes,
 shiver the shaft er past the shooters hand.
 so make them melt as the dishowsed snaile
 or as the Embrio, whose vitall band
 breakes er it holdes, and formlesse eyes doe faile
 to see the sunn, though brought to lightfull land.

O lett their brood, a brood of springing thornes,
 be by untymely rooting overthrowne
er bushes waxt, they push with pricking hornes,
 as fruites yet greene are of by tempest blowne
 the good with gladnes this reveng shall see,
 and bath his feete in bloud of wicked one.
 while all shall say: the just rewarded be
 there is a god that carves to each his own.

Source: Margaret P. Hannay et al., eds., *The Collected Works of Mary Sidney Herbert, Countess of Pembroke*, vol. 2 (Clarendon Press, 1998), 61–2.

Lucy Hutchinson

Untitled (Poem on retirement)

All sorts of men through various labours presse
To the same end, contented quietnesse;
Great princes vex their labouring thoughts to be
Possesst of an unbounded soveraigntie;
The hardie souldier doth all toyles susteine
That he may conquer first, and after raigne;
Th' industrious merchant ploughs the angrie seas
That he may bring home wealth, and live at ease,
Which none of them attaine; for sweete repose
But seldome to the splendid pallace goes;
A troope of restlesse passions wander there,
And private lives are only free from care.
Sleep to the cottage bringeth happie nights,
But to the court, hung round with flaring lights,
Which th' office of the vanisht day supplie,
His image only comes to close the eie,
But gives the troubled mind no ease of care;
While countrie slumbers undisturbed are;
Where, if the active fancie dreames present,
They bring no horrors to the innocent.
Ambition doth incessantly aspire,
And each advance leads on to new desire;
Nor yet can riches av'rice satisfie,
For want and wealth together multiplie:
Nor can voluptuous men more fullnesse find,
For enjoy'd pleasures leave their stings behind.
He's only rich who knows no want; he raignes
Whose will no severe tyranny constreins;
And he alone possesseth true delight
Whose spotlesse soule no guiltie feares affright.
This freedome in the countrie life is found,
Where innocence and safe delights abound:
Here man's a prince; his subjects ne'er repine
When on his back their wealthy fleeces shine:
If for his appetite the fattest die,
Those who survive will rayse no mutinie:
His table is with home-gott dainties crown'd,
With friends, not flatterers, encompast round;
No spies nor traitors on his trencher waite,
Nor is his mirth confin'd to rules of state;
An armed guard he neither hath nor needs,
Nor fears a poyson'd morsell when he feeds;
Bright constellations hang above his head,
Beneath his feete are flourie carpetts spred;
The merrie birds delight him with their songs,
And healthfull ayre his happie life prolongs.

Att harvest merrily his flocks he sheares,
And in cold weather their warme fleeces weares;
Unto his ease he fashions all his clothes;
His cup with uninfected liquor flows:
The vulgar breath doth not his thoughts elate,
Nor can he be o'erwhelmed by their hate;
Yet, if ambitiously he seeks for fame,
One village feast shall gaine a greater name
Then his who weares th' imperiall diadem,
Whom the rude multitude doe still condemne.
Sweete peace and joy his blest companions are;
Feare, sorrow, envie, lust, revenge, and care,
And all that troope which breeds the world's offence,
With pomp and maiestie, are banisht thence.
What court then can such libertie afford?
Or where is man so uncontrould a lord?

Source: Lucy Hutchinson, *Memoirs of the life of Colonel Hutchinson* (J.M. Dent & Co., 1913), 445–46.

Elegy 7. To the Garden at Owthorpe

Poor desolate garden, smile no more on me
To whom glad looks rude entertainments be.
While thou and I for thy dear master mourn
That's best becoming that doth least adorn.
Shall we for any meaner eyes be dressed
Who had the glory once to please the best?
Or shall we prostitute those joys again
Which once his noble soul did entertain?
Forbid it, honour and just gratitude,
'Tis now our best grace to be wild and rude.
He that impaled you from the common ground,
Who all thy walls with shining fruit trees crowned,
Me also above vulgar girls did raise
And planted in me all that yielded praise;
He that with various beauties decked thy face,
Gave my youth lustre and becoming grace;
But he is gone and these gone with him too.
Let now thy flowers rise, charged with weeping dew
And missing him shrink back into their beds;
So my poor virgins hang their drooping heads
And, missing the dear object of their sight,
Close up their eyes in sorrow's gloomy night.
Let thy young trees, which, sad and fading, stand,
Dried up since they lost his refreshing hand,
Tell me too sadly how your noblest plant
Degenerates if it usual culture want.
There spreading weeds which while his watchful eyes
Checked their pernicious growth durst never rise
Let them o'errun all the sweet fragrant banks,
And hide what grows in better ordered ranks.
Too much, alas, this parallel I find
In the disordered passions of my mind
But thy late loveliness is only hid,
Mine like the shadow with its substance fled.
Another gardener and another spring
May into you new grace and new lustre bring,
While beauty's seeds do yet remain alive.
But ah, my glories never can revive
No more than new leaves or new smiling fruit
Can reinvest that tree that's dead at root.
When to his worthy memory thou then
Hast offered one year's fruit, thou mayst again
In gaudy dresses to thy next lord shine
And show weak semblance of his grace in thine.
For all that's generous, healthful, sweet and fair,
Imperfect emblems of his virtue are
But could I call back hasty flying time
The vanished glories that decked once my prime,
To me that resurrection would be vain

And like ungathered flowers would die again.
In vain would doting time, which can no more
Give such a lover, loveliness restore.

Source: Sarah C. E. Ross and Elizabeth Scott-Baumann, eds., *Women Poets of the English Civil War* (Manchester University Press, 2018), 285–86.

Elegy 12. Musings in my Evening Walks at Owthorpe

With unseen tears and unheard groans
O'er those cold ashes and dried bones
I weep my wretched life away.
No joy comes with the cheerful day,
No rest comes with the silent night;
What terrors my dark soul affright,
What ever doth it self present
Brings food unto my discontent.
The trees about the garden stand
Drooping for want of that kind hand
That set and cherished them before
And praised the grateful fruits they bore.
The flowers hang down their drooping heads
And languish on their undressed beds,
Which now no more retain that grace
His presence brought to every place.
The murmuring springs rise and complain
Then shrink into the earth again
Lest they foul mixtures should endure
Since he who kept their channels pure
No more on their green banks appears.
The clouds offer to lend me tears
While they sail o'er the empty pile
Which his loved presence did erewhile
So gloriously adorn and fill.
Where'er I go affliction still
Takes up my walks and still I find
Something that calls my loss to mind.
His dispersed image which I see
Amongst his children joys not me
Who pine with an unfilled desire,
Which seeks him in each one entire.
It grieves me that a generous plant
Should his one skilful culture want
And grow in an infectious air
Which the best natures will impair.
Even my books that used to be
The solace of my life while he
Was my instructor and approved
The pleasant lines I chose and loved
No more my sick thoughts recreate
Who all my old delights now hate
And all the new ones I have found
Doe but unrep my heart's deep wound
While with his memory I converse
His glories to my self rehearse
Hoping they should my grief abate
I add to my own sorrow's weight
What though those glories were my crown

His death hath thrown my empire down
And better never to have been
Raised high than live a fallen queen.
Ill grieves not him who good ne'er knows
But past joys heighten present woes
Ah me, where shall I seek relief
If even my pleasures feed my grief
Where ere I look, above, below,
In every side beset with woe,
All men from my misfortune run
The prosperous still the wretched shun
No friends to comfort me abide
They flowed out with my ebbing tide
The proud my humble state despise
My sorrow glads my enemies,
They who with envy lately burned,
To scorn have all their envy turned.
Yet do my ills exceed their curse
Who most hate cannot wish me worse.
My flatterers who did adore
My happier state know me no more.
You servile slaves where are you all
Who once did me your princess call.
Even then I loathed your flatteries
And now your sick souls despise.

Source: Sarah C. E. Ross and Elizabeth Scott-Baumann, eds., *Women Poets of the English Civil War* (Manchester University Press, 2018), 290–91.

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