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Aspects of Faith in the Eunomian Controversy

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ASPECTS OF FAITH IN THE EUNOMIAN CONTROVERSY

Abstract

Despite the intense controversy which surrounded the Eunomian movement at its inception, and the continuing, if sporadic, attention paid it in subsequent centuries, the theology of Eunomius has been relatively neglected. In particular, scholars have concentrated almost entirely on Eunomius' Trinitarian doctrine, and have paid little attention to other aspects of his system. This thesis is an attempt to remedy this neglect. In it we will explore the meaning and function of the various aspects of faith in Eunomian teaching. Particularly, we will try to ascertain its relationship to Eunomius' extensive use of rational argument, and his claim to apprehend the essence of God completely. It is hoped that we will thereby come to a better understanding of the functioning of Eunomianism as a religious system.

Among the reasons why scholars have neglected Eunomius has been the small amount of available evidence, and the unreliable state of what little there is. Much of this thesis, therefore, is concerned with clarifying this evidence. Two parts of this thesis deal with this problem: Part I and the various appendices. The latter include a critical text of the Liber Apologeticus and the Expositio Fidei. Part I concerns itself with each of the
surviving Eunomian works in turn and with some fragmentary material. It attempts to determine the provenance, authenticity, and reliability of each. The appendices deal with other aspects of the same problem.

The second part of the thesis, Part II, deals with the problem of faith itself. In its opening section (by far the longest) it examines the evidence which has been alleged to show that in Eunomius' practice (if not his teaching) faith was completely dominated by reason. After a detailed analysis we are unable to substantiate this allegation, and are forced to the conclusion that the reason for it is as much to be sought in the presuppositions of its authors as in the state of the evidence. The second section attempts to present another solution to this problem, one which looks at it with fresh eyes and from within. Particularly, we examine the Eunomian theory of language and its connection with the problem of revelation, and to the knowledge of God. In the end, we are able to conclude that so far from dominating revelation it is a guarantee of it, and provides us with a surety that a genuine knowledge of God is possible. It is in this context that the soul's ascent to God in faithful contemplation is to be understood. It is to be hoped that in reaching this conclusion, we have helped to clarify in some degree our understanding of this much-neglected, but very interesting ancient theologian.
ASPECTS OF FAITH IN THE EUNOMIAN CONTROVERSY

Submitted to the Faculty of Theology of the University of Oxford in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by

The Revd. Richard Paul Vaggione
Christ Church
Oxford

July, 1976
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1 Separately paginated. Page numbers in the Appendices are differentiated by the addition of an asterisk (*).
ABBREVIATIONS.

I. Authors and Works.

AETIUS ANTIOCHENUS
ep.
Fr.
Syl.
epistula Aetii (apud Basilium et Theodoretum).

ALBINUS
Intr.

AMBROSIUS
de Incarnationis Dominicae Sacramento Liber unus.

AMPHILOCHIUS ICONIENSIS
hom. 1-5.
homiliae.

ANASTASIUS SINAITA (Anast. S.)
hod.
monoph.
hodegos sive viae dux.
contra monophysitas testimonia.

ANONYMUS (Anon.)
in SE

ARISTOTELES (Arist.)
Apo.
Cat.
Top.
Analytica Posteriora.
Categoriae.

ARIS
ep. Const.
op. Misc.
enistula ad Constantinum.

ATHANASIUS ALEXANDRINUS (Ath.)
apol. sec.
apologia (secunda) contra Ari-

Ar. 1-3.
sec.
orationes tres adversus Arianos.
decr.
dial. Trin. 1-5.
de decretis Nicaenae synodi.

BARBARADESARBA "ARBAIA (Barhad.)
r.g.
histottra historicallstica (History of the Holy Fathers Persecut-
ed on behalf of the Truth).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>BASILIUS CAESARIENSIS CAPPADOCIAE</td>
<td>epistulae.</td>
<td>adversus Eunomium libri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>adversus Eunomium libri.</td>
<td>homiliae in Hexaemeron.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>homiliae in Hexaemeron.</td>
<td>liber de Spiritu sancto.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>versus nomion libri.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>homiliae in Matthaeum.</td>
<td>de incomprehensi dei natura seu contra Anomoens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRYSTOSTOMUS, IOANNES (Chrys.)</td>
<td>hom. 1-90 in Mt.</td>
<td>de incomprehensi dei natura seu contra Anomoens.</td>
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<td>hom. 1-32 in Rom.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>incomprehens. 1-5.</td>
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<td>CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS (Clem.)</td>
<td>stiri.</td>
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<td>CLEMENTINA</td>
<td>recognitiones Clementinae.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rec. or Clem. recogn.</td>
<td>Codex Theodosianus.</td>
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<td>CONSTANTINUS HARMENOPULUS (Const. H.)</td>
<td>liber de haeresibus.</td>
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<td>DOCTRINA PATRUM</td>
<td>doctrina patrum de incarnatio-ne verbi.</td>
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<td>Doct. Patr.</td>
<td>panarion seu adversus lxx haereses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>haer.</td>
<td>liber apologeticus.</td>
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<td>apologeticae apologiae.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>expositio fidei.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSEBIUS CAESARIENSIS (Bus.)</td>
<td>historia ecclesiastica.</td>
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<tr>
<td>h.s.</td>
<td>pro defensione trium capitulorum.</td>
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<td>FACUNDUS HERMIANENSIS defens.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Work</td>
<td>References</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faustinus Trinitius</td>
<td>de Trinitate contra Arienos.</td>
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<td>Gennadius Vir inlustus</td>
<td>de viris inlustribus.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgius Hamartolus</td>
<td>chronicon syntomon.</td>
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<td>Gregorius Nazianzenus</td>
<td>carmen de vita sua.</td>
<td>epistulae.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>orationes.</td>
<td>orationes theologicae.</td>
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<td>Gregorius Nyssenus</td>
<td>refutatio confessionis Eunomii.</td>
<td>epistulae.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>contra Eunomium.</td>
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<td>Hierotimus Hieron.</td>
<td>commentarius in Matthaeum.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>de viris illustribus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilarius Pictaviensis</td>
<td>contra Constantium imperatorem.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>historia acephala.</td>
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<td>Iamblichus (Iamb.)</td>
<td>de mysteriis Aegyptiorum.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ioannes Damascenus</td>
<td>contra Iacobitas.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>liber de haeresibus.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Book of Jubilees.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>dialogus cum Tryphone Tudaec.</td>
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<td>Justinus Martyr</td>
<td>de natura hominis.</td>
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<td>Maximus Confessor (Max.)</td>
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<td>Nemesisius Emesenus</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NICETAS ACOMINATUS</strong></td>
<td>thesaurum orthodoxiae seu panoplia dogmatica</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>ORIGENES (Or.)</strong></td>
<td>contra Calsum. commentarii in Ioannem. exhortatio ad martyrium. de oratione. de principiis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHILO IUDAIEUS</strong></td>
<td>de specialibus legibus. historia ecclesiastica.</td>
<td>Spec. Leg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHILOSTORGIVUS (Philost.)</strong></td>
<td>historia ecclesiastica.</td>
<td>h.e.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PHOTIUS CONSTANTINOPOLITANUS</strong></td>
<td>bibliothecae codices.</td>
<td>cod. 1-280.</td>
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<td><strong>PLATO</strong></td>
<td>Cratylus. in Platonis Cratylum commentaria.</td>
<td>Cre.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>PROCLUS (Proc1.)</strong></td>
<td>de adulteratione librorum Origenis. historia ecclesiastica.</td>
<td>in Cre.</td>
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<td><strong>RUPINUS</strong></td>
<td>adversus Mathematicos. historia ecclesiastica.</td>
<td>adult. libr. Orig.</td>
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<td><strong>SEXTUS EMPIRICUS</strong></td>
<td>historia ecclesiastica. epistulae.</td>
<td>M.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>SOCRATES SCHOLASTICUS (Soc.)</strong></td>
<td>Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.</td>
<td>h.e.</td>
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<td><strong>SOZOMENUS SALAMINUS (Soz.)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>h.e.</td>
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<td><strong>SINESTUS CYRIENENSIS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>en. 1-159. Test.</td>
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THEODORUS CYRRHENSIS (Thdt.)
epistulae.
haereticarum fabularum compendium.
Hebr.
commentarium in epistulam ad Habraeos.
h. s.
historia ecclesiastica

THEODORUS BALSAMONUS
com. in canon. II conc. CP
commentarium in canon. II concilii Constantinopolitanian.

THEODORUS LECTOR (Thdr. Lect.)
h. s.
historia ecclesiastica.

THEODORUS MOPSUESTENUS (Thdr. Mops.)
contra Nonomium libri fragmenta (Appendix III).
Run.
commentarium in Ioannem.
Jo.

THEOPHILUS ANTIOCHENUS (Thpl. Ant.)
ad Autolyceum.
Autol.
de receptione haereticorum.

Timotheus Constantinopolitanus presbyter (Tim- CP)
haer.

II. Periodicals and General References.

BJRL Bulletin of the John Rylands Library.
EZ Byzantinische Zeitschrift.
CCL Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina.
CSco Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium.
CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum.
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td><em>Dumbarton Oaks Studies.</em></td>
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<td>EO</td>
<td><em>Échos d'Orient.</em></td>
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<td>I</td>
<td><em>Journal of Theological Studies.</em></td>
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<td>LXX</td>
<td><em>Septuagint.</em></td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td><em>Le Muséon. Revue d'études orientales.</em></td>
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<td>PL</td>
<td><em>Patrologia Latina,</em> ed. Migne.</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td><em>Patrologia Orientalis,</em> ed. R. Graffin, F. Nau.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RB</td>
<td><em>Revue Biblique.</em></td>
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<td>REB</td>
<td><em>Revue des Études Byzantines.</em></td>
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<td>REG</td>
<td><em>Revue des Études Grecques.</em></td>
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<td>RHE</td>
<td><em>Revue d'Histoire Éclesiastique.</em></td>
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<td>RPh</td>
<td><em>Revue de Philologie, de Littérature et d'Histoire Anciennes.</em></td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td><em>Sources Chrét iennes.</em></td>
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<td>SP</td>
<td><em>Studia Patristica.</em></td>
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<td>ST</td>
<td><em>Studi e Testi. Pubblicazioni della Biblioteca Vaticana.</em></td>
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Th.  Theodotionic recension of the LXX.
TU  Texte und Untersuchungen.
ZNTW  Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft.
INTRODUCTION

Of all the participants in the Christian controversies of the latter half of the fourth century, perhaps the most notorious and least understood is Eunomius, the Patriarch Bishop of Cyzicus. Yet, to judge only from the sheer number and violence of the attacks directed against him, his contemporaries regarded his system as worthy of their fullest efforts at refutation, a fact which suggests that in their eyes Eunomius had indeed touched a theological nerve. To mention only those who are recorded as having produced formal refutations of him, we find that Apollinaris, Basil, and Gregory the Great, among the most),...
INTRODUCTION

Of all the participants in the Trinitarian controversies of the latter half of the fourth century, perhaps the most neglected and least understood is Eunomius, the erstwhile Bishop of Cyzicus. Yet, to judge only from the sheer number and violence of the attacks directed against him, his contemporaries regarded his system as worthy of their fullest efforts at rebuttal, a fact which suggests that in their eyes Eunomius had indeed touched a theological nerve. To mention only those who are recorded as having produced formal refutations of him, we find that Apollinaris, Basil the Great, Didymus the Blind, Diodore of Tarsus, Gregory of Nyssa, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus, and Sophronius are all said to have written works Contra Eunomium. Although only the works of Basil and Gregory are now extant in full, the number and eminence of those

1So Philost., h.s. VIII, 12 (GCs 21, 114, 1-5), Hieron., vir. illus. 120 (PL 23, 711A).
4v. Appendix III, pp. 131*-132*.
6v. Appendix III, pp. 69*-200*.
7v. Appendix III, pp. 132*-137*.
8Photius, cod. 5 (Henri I, 8, 8-15), and 138 (Henri II, 107, 31).
who undertook to refute him is sufficient to demonstrate the importance of Eunomius in the eyes of his contemporaries, and to make his neglect by modern scholars all the more curious.

Most studies of Eunomius have seen his position as one of "Logical Arianism," and have been concerned only with his Trinitarian theology. More recently, however, other aspects of his thought have begun to attract attention, particularly in terms of his importance as the foil against which the Orthodox Fathers defined their own understandings of the quest for God. This suggests a fruitful line of enquiry for our own study. Quite apart from his Trinitarian theology, one of the most frequent accusations lodged against Eunomius by his opponents was that he had replaced revelation by rational argument and the Christian's apprehension of God through faith by a purely natural kind of knowledge. If Eunomius did indeed influence his enemies in this matter, even if only per contra, the question of the truth of these accusations and the real nature of Eunomius' understanding of faith becomes an important one.

Our own task, then, will be to examine the available evidence about Eunomius' teaching in this matter, and to try to achieve some grasp of the place of faith in its various aspects in his

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Before we undertake this, however, it will be necessary to take into consideration another aspect of our problem. One of the factors which has discouraged scholars from exploring aspects of Eunomius' thought other than his Trinitarian theology has been that very little information about his system has survived. Since much of this "little" has inevitably been transmitted to us by his enemies, it naturally reflects their own interests and preoccupations. This means that any study which strays from the well-travelled paths of Trinitarian theology must be in large part a study of sources, since until the value of the available evidence has been ascertained, no certain conclusions are possible. Our own study, therefore, will be concerned with two main problems: the nature and reliability of the surviving evidence, and the significance and function of faith in Eunomius' system. The former will be dealt with in the first half of the main text and in a series of (separately paginated) appendices, while the latter will be the concern of the concluding half of the main text. It is to be hoped that by these means we can come to a reasonably reliable understanding of the place of faith in the thought of Eunomius.
PART I: SOURCES.

"Eunomianae superstitionis clerici seu Montanistae consortio vel conversatione civitatum universalum adque urbiem expellantur... Codices sane eorum scelerum omnium doctrinam ac materiam continent et summa sagacitate max quaerint ac prodere auctoritate mandamus sub aspectibus ludicantum incendio max cremandos."

This decree of the Theodosian Code, dated the 4th of March 398, was part of the response of the Emperor Arcadius to renewed heretical activity in the years following the death of Theodosius the Great, and perhaps reveals the influence of the then newly-elected Archbishop of Constantinople, John Chrysostom. It also represents one of the chief difficulties lying in the way of anyone who seeks to understand the thought of Eunomius. Ancient authors mention the burning of Eunomius" own library, and between the efforts of Arcadius' ministers and the vicissitudes of time little now

---

3Consecrated 26 February 398; compare Theodosius' attitude as reported by Sozomen, h.e. VII, 12 (CGS 316, 9-15) and that of Chrysostom in e.g. his hom. 46 in Mt. 1, 2 (PG 58, 477 ad medium); first suggested by C. Baronius, Annales Ecclesiastici (Lucae: typis Leonardi Venturini, 1740), Vol. VI, p. 227, anno 398, section LXVIII.
4Philost., h.e. XI, 5 (CGS 135, 26-27), Nicephorus Callistus, h.e. XIII, 1 (PG 146, 925C).
remains entire of what must once have been a sizable literary inheritance.

A particularly damaging loss is that of all of Eunomius' non-dogmatic treatises. Socrates mentions a work in seven volumes εἰς τὴν πρὸς Ἐρμαίους τοῦ Ἀποστόλου ἐπιστάην, usually designated the Commentary on Romans, although the historian does not in fact indicate its precise character. Philostorgius tells us that the letters of Eunomius surpassed all his other works, and Photius remarks that he had read some forty of them, although he also says that in writing them Eunomius showed his ignorance of the laws of epistolary style. While it is not impossible that a fragment quoted by Socrates may have come from the Commentary, otherwise there is not a single line which can with any certainty be ascribed to these works which has survived. We can gauge the extent of our loss if we think how different our appreciation of the Cappadocians would be if time had preserved to us only their dogmatic treatises and we had lost all of their exegetical, ascetic, and

---

5 Socrates, Η.Ε. IV, 7 (PG 67, 473A).  
6 Philostorgius, Η.Ε. X, 6 (GCS 128, 19-20), as also Nicephorus Callistus, Η.Ε. XII, 19 (PG 146, 840C).  
8 Socrates, Η.Ε. IV, 7 (PG 67, 473A), discussed below pp. 17-22. It is clear that Socrates intended this passage to be taken as a direct quotation, and since the Commentary is the only work he actually mentions, it would be reasonable to believe that this work was his source. However, since Socrates also speaks of "other works" of Eunomius in the same chapter (PG 67, 473A), this must remain only a good possibility.  
9 V. the discussion in Appendix II, pp. 62*-68*.
mystical works.

A. Surviving Fragments.

In addition to the larger works of Emerius which, whether complete or fragmentary, have come down to us, a number of fragments have also been preserved. Two of these are from works which have otherwise been lost. The first is part of a *florilegium* of texts dealing chiefly with the interpretation of Matt. 26:39 (ἐκ ταύτης τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἰδιαίτερα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ) and related passages, and bearing chiefly on the Monophysite and Monothelite controversies. It is to be found in a manuscript which includes it among the works of Anastasius of Sinai.\(^{10}\) Like most of the other texts in the *florilegium*, including two from Aetius,\(^{11}\) it deals with Christ's will in relation to the Father. The fragment itself is preceded by the following title:

Εὐαγγελίου πρωτοστάτου τῆς Ἀρείου θυμελικῆς δράκηστας, ἐκ τῆς περὶ ἱερὸ τρίτου λόγου, κεφ. τσ' \(^{12}\)

"From the nineteenth chapter of the third book 'Concerning the Son' of Emerius, the leader of Arius' theatrical dancing-floor."


\(^{12}\) Anast. S., monoph. (PG 89, I181B); the fragment itself is printed below, p. 15.
Since all but a few of the works quoted in this florilegium are now either wholly or partly lost, it is difficult to ascertain with what accuracy their titles are given. Many of these designations are only generally descriptive, and, indeed, the passages quoted from Aetius are themselves said to come from a work Περί ύλον. Because, then, so many of the headings of these fragments seem to be general descriptions rather than titles strictly so-called, we might be in doubt as to whether the title quoted above refers to an otherwise unknown work of Eunomius or to a known work under a different name,14 were it not for additional information given us by Nicetas Acominatus, quoting the VIIIth book of Philostorgius:

"So then, Apollinarius and Basil wrote against the Apology which Eunomius had brought out, and

13Anast. S., monoph. (PG 89, 1181A/B); other headings are similar: Basil (1184C/D), ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ 'Αρειανὸν λόγου (? = Εἰμ.), Αθανασίου (1185B), ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰς τὸ 'Ενκτος ἐκτίσει με καὶ κατὰ 'Αρειανὸν (? = ΑΕ. ΙΙΙ?); Amphilochoius of Iconium (1189A), ἐκ τοῦ εἰς Γενέσεως λόγου (? Not the extant hom. 1, in Nativitye, PG 39, 36A-34B).

14As already noted by M. Albertz, Untersuchungen über die Schriften des Eunomius (Wittenberg: Harrrose und Ziemen, G. M. B. H., 1908), p. 94.

Gregory... discerning the extent of the gap between his own and his opponent's powers, and desiring nothing but peace, having only refuted some of Eunomius' chapters in the book Concerning the Son as in the shape of a reply to the Anomoeans...

Although this passage is not entirely unambiguous (it is possible to understand it as referring to a book by Gregory of Nazianzus Concerning the Son), when taken together with the title of the fragment found in Anastasius of Sinai it nonetheless seems to confirm the existence of a separate work by Eunomius going under the title Περί τοῦ Ἰουστίου, Concerning the Son. We note that in both these passages the title is identical and the work is spoken of as being divided into κεφάλαια. Albertz, in his somewhat tentative discussion of this fragment, says that it must have belonged to "ein sonst unbekanntes umfangreiches Werk des Eunomius," no doubt basing this description on the mention of a τρίτος λόγος in the title given by Anastasius. However, despite the conventional translation of λόγος by "book" given above, there is no real reason to assume that a large work is intended. This supposition is strengthened by the mention of the κεφάλαια into which the work is divided, since this suggests a treatise divided into relatively small sections in the

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16 As is apparently done by J. Eidez, the editor of the GCS Philostorgius (p. 114, l. 27), since he cites ad loc. Gregory of Nazianzus' third and fourth Theological Orations, De Filio. 17 Albertz, op. cit., p. 54.
manner of the Syntagmation of Eunomius' teacher, Aetius. Thus it seems likely that in the treatise Concerning the Son ascribed to Eunomius we are in fact dealing with a short dogmatic work divided into at least three sections and composed of short "chapters." We may also note another possibility. The Syntagmation of Aetius mentioned above has come down to us as a separate work quoted entire by Epiphanius, but it is also described in the Pseudo-Athanasian Dialogus de Sancta Trinitate as being from a letter of Aetius. Since this is undoubtedly its proper literary form, it is not at all impossible that the treatise Concerning the Son of Eunomius, which is similar to the work of Aetius in other respects, is similar in this as well, and that in this fragment we are in fact dealing with one of the lost letters of Eunomius. Naturally, however, until such time as further fragments are found, this and other speculations can only remain interesting conjectures.

The second of our isolated fragments is contained in the Dialogus de Sancta Trinitate mentioned above in connection with the quotation from the Syntagmation or "letter" of Aetius. It is described in the section of the Dialogus which introduces

18 Epiph., haer. 76, II, 1-12, 37 (GCS III, 351, 21-360, 4).
19 (Ps.-)Athanasius, dial. Trin. II, 5, 10 (PG 28, 1164B, 1173A/B).
it as follows:

"'Ανάγνωσις. Λέβε, ἀνάγνωσθε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν 'Αετίου, καὶ
eπιλέ πρὸς αὐτὴν. "Ορθόδοξος. Αὐτὸς ἀνάγνωσθε.
'Ανών. Εἶλε μετ' αὐτῆς καὶ σχόλια Εὐνομίου. "Ορθ.
καὶ αὐτὰ ἀνάγνωσθε.22"

"Anomoean. Here! Read this letter of Aetius and
see if you can answer that! Orthodox. Read it
yourself. Anom. There are some Scholia of Euno-
mius with it. Orth. Read those too."

The actual Scholia themselves are introduced by the following
title:

Σχόλια Ευνομίου, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ 'Ορθόδοξου.23

"The Scholia of Eunomius and the reply of the Or-
thodox to them."

It seems abundantly clear, then, that we are to understand this
fragment as being a marginal note added to the text of Aetius' letter. That this is indeed the case is confirmed by the fact
that the fragment itself begins with an explanatory "οὖν. The
general intent of the passage is to make an absolute distinc-
tion between the will and the essence of God. The text is as
follows:

"Οὖν ἡ τέλεσις καὶ ἡ βουλήσις οὐ ταῦτα τῇ ὑποσιᾷ τοῦ
θεοῦ · ἡ μὲν γὰρ τέλεσις καὶ ἄρχεται καὶ παύεται · ἡ
dὲ ὑποσιά οὔτε ἄρχεται, οὔτε παύεται · τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον
καὶ παύουσιν τῷ μήτη ἀρχήμενῳ μήτη παυόμενῳ τὸ αὐτὸ
eἶναι οὐ δύναται. Καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ταῦτα ἢ τῇ ὑποσιᾷ
tοῦ θεοῦ ἡ βουλήσις, ἦρθεν μὲν ὑποσιάς μίας ἐνία καὶ
τὴν τέλεσιν · ἐναρκύονται δὲ κατὰ τὴν διδασκαλίαν τοῦ
θεοῦ Γραφῶν, οὐ μία τέλεσις, ἀλλὰ πολλαὶ θελήσεις ·
tῆς Γραφῆς λεγομένης · "Πάντα, ἄσο ἡτέλησαν, ἐποίησα ·"

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22 Ibid. II, 5 (PG 28, 1164D).
23 Ibid. II, 6 (PG 28, 1165A).
Because the will and the purpose of God are not identical with his essence, since the act of willing has both a beginning and an ending while the divine essence neither begins nor ends, and it is impossible that that which begins and ends should be identical with that which has neither beginning nor ending. And besides, if the will of God were identical with his essence, there would have to be a single act of willing belonging to that single essence. But according to holy Scripture we find that there is not a single act of willing but many such acts, for Scripture says: "Whatever he willed to make, he made" (Ps. 113: 11). He willed many things, therefore, and not just one. We can see this even more clearly with regard to the creation of the world: God willed the world to be and it came into existence in accordance with his will, and that which came into existence endured—but the permanence of the creation is not the same thing as the act of willing which created it. God proclaimed likewise that the shape of the world should be transformed; therefore it is because he willed it that it is transformed. But these acts of will are not only numerous, they are also distinct—God willed "heavens," he willed "sun," he willed "earth." Since the things which he willed are distinct, the acts of willing concerning them must be distinguished as well; and the same thing applies in the case of the intelligible beings likewise.

Although short of actually finding the complete document there is no way to be certain, it seems reasonable to suppose that

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Ibid. (FG 28, 1165A-B).
this fragment represents only one of a number of such comments added to Aetius' work. Certainly it cannot be taken as a commentary on the only section of the Syntagmation actually quoted in the Dialogue, the Introduction;\(^\text{25}\) we must therefore assume that it is intended to go with one of the chapters in the main body of the work. That on which it seems to provide the most apposite comment is the central section of caput 18, which seems to imply the same distinction between God's will and his nature:

18. If the ingenerate essence is superior to origination, owing its superiority in itself, it is per se ingenerate essence. For it is not superior to origination because it wills to be, but because it is naturally so.\(^\text{26}\)

Although the connection of our scholia with this passage is naturally conjectural, the opening words of our fragment do seem to flow quite readily from the last part of the quotation: "Or. ἰδίᾳ διέλθωσι καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ζωῆς. It is for this reason that it seems better to take this first line as part of the Scholion proper rather than as its title as suggested by Albertz.\(^\text{27}\)
The next question which naturally arises about these fragments is that of their authenticity. In the case of the second there seems little reason to doubt it. It is quoted together with the Syntagma of Aetius which is certainly genuine, and moreover seems to provide relevant comment on at least one of its chapters. Likewise, we find the ideas which it expresses elsewhere in Eunomius,⁰ and such additions as it makes (notably the idea of the multiplicity of God's acts of will) appear to be logical consequences of his teaching. ¹ The only hesitation we might feel is due to the tendency of obscure authors to be displaced by better known ones in the course of transmission. It is not impossible that these scholia might have been composed by one of Eunomius' more humble followers and subsequently ascribed to the heresiarch himself. However, because the name of the author occurs in the main body of the dialogue and not only in the title (which could be editorial), and the content of the fragment coheres with the rest of Eunomius' teaching, this possibility seems to us unlikely.

When we turn to the first of these fragments, however, we find that despite the similarity of its subject-matter with that just discussed the problems are somewhat different. In the past

⁰ Smag. apol. 23-24 (36*, 7-27*, 18); cf. also apol. apol. III (I II, 22*), 4-14. References to Eunomius' Liber Apologeticus will be to the critical text contained in Appendix I, A (pp. 20*-43*), cited by chapter, page, and line.
¹ Cf., e.g., Eun., apol. apol. I (I II, 72, 12-73, 3).
the chief reason for viewing this fragment with suspicion has been that its title refers to an otherwise unknown work. However, the fact that the existence of this work can apparently be verified from a passage in Philostorgius suggests that this consideration may be given less weight than heretofore (cf. supra pp. 8-9). Moreover, while the teaching found in the fragment is nowhere expressed in so many words in what remains of Eunomius' other writings, it is nonetheless entirely consistent with his position:

"For he says, 'I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of the Father' (Jn. 6: 38). Note that the Word who came down from above set aside his own will, since it was not identical with the uncreated will of the Father; for just as the Word has a created nature, so also he has a created will."

We note here the characteristic Anomoean distinction between κωστής and ἀνωτάτης—the difference of wills flows naturally from the difference between ἀγέννητος and γέννητος. The only reason we might have for hesitating is that the collection from which this fragment comes was made for a specific purpose, the Monothelite and Monophysite controversies, and that several of the other fragments contained in it are suspect or show

signs of tampering. Furthermore, this is the only occurrence of the word ὑέλμια in the extent works of Eunomius; for although we find the word ὑέλμις in Eunomius' scholia on the letter of Aetius, elsewhere the preferred usage is βούλαντις, and γυνώμη. However, in this case the choice of the word seems to have been determined by the biblical quotation on which the fragment is based (Jn. 6:38). Moreover, we note that this passage was in fact one of those used by Arian controversialists. Since, therefore, this fragment comes from a work known from other sources, teaches a doctrine consistent with Eunomius' position, and does not show any obvious signs of tampering, it must be concluded that there is insufficient evidence to doubt its authenticity. We must therefore account

32V. Gruzel, op. cit. (supra p. 7, n. 11), and M. S. Spanneut, Recherches sur les écrits d'Eustathie d'Antioche (Lille: Facultés Catholiques, 1949), pp. 41f., 82, 126.

33Note, however, ἐκκατερομέν in Apol. 23 (37*, 10), where it is derived from Ps. 113:11; other occurrences, apol. 2 (10*, 20) and 9 (17*, 10), do not refer to God.

34(Ps.) Ath., dial. Trin. II, 6 (PG 28, 1165A-B), quoted above pp. 11-12; cf. also apol. apol. III (J II, 61, 13 apparatus), var. ὑέλμια for βούλαντις (though at J II, 62, 3 the same manuscript has var. βούλαντις).

35Eun., apol. 23 (37*, 8, 9), 28 (47*, 20); apol. apol. III (J II, 216, 12; 220, 6; 227, 22); other occurrences, apol. 9 (18*, 10), apol. apol. III (J II, 240, 11), do not refer to God.

36Eun., apol. 23 (37*, 3), 24 (37*, 11/12, 14, 17), 28 (47*, 26); apol. apol. III (J II, 61, 13; 62, 3; 216, 7, 10, 16/17); however, exp. fid. 57*, 8/9 uses βούλαντις.

37Eun., apol. 12 (22*, 13), 14 (21*, 26), 15 (26*, 3, 16), 27 (44*, 6); other occurrences, apol. I (9*, 4, 18), 14 (12*, 13), 6 (13*, 25), 23 (36*, 31), apol. apol. I (J I, 182, 5), II (J I, 282, 9), do not refer to God.

it probably genuine. 39

We must now turn our attention to yet another fragment, one which we have already mentioned as possibly coming from the lost Commentary on Romans. 40 We have delayed discussing it till this point not only because of the intrinsic interest of its content, which seemed to require a fuller discussion, but also because the question of its authenticity is a difficult one to resolve. Yet it is precisely because of its content that its authenticity has been questioned. It is quoted for us by Socrates Scholasticus in his Ecclesiastical History:

"Εινα δὲ μὴ δόξωμεν λογοφιλάς χάριν ταῦτα λέγειν, αὐτής ἐκπόνου τῆς Εὐνόμιος φωνῆς, οὐα συνεξεύμενος περὶ θεοῦ τολμᾷ. Θείῳ γάρ κατὰ λέξιν τάδε: 'Ο θεὸς περὶ τῆς κατοικίας αὐτῆς οἴδεις πλέον ἠμῶν ἐπιστάται; οὐδὲ ἐστὶν αὐτὴ μέλλουν μὴν ἐκεῖνος ἐκτὸς ἦμων γινωσκόμενη. 'Αλλ' ἐπερ' ἄν εἰδοκιμεῖν ἠμὲς περὶ αὐτῆς, τοῦτο πάντως κάπενος οἴδεις; Ο δ' αὐτὸν ἐκείνος, τοῦτο εὑρήσεις ἀπαραλλάκτως ἐν ἡμῖν. Ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ἄλλα πολλά τοιαῦτα Εὐνόμιος συφυλίματα καὶ ὠν ἤσθάντο. 41

"But, so that we should not seem to be saying these things just for the sake of abuse, listen to Eunomius' own voice—the sort of thing which, in his subtlety, he presumes to say about God—for he asserts what follows in these very words: 42 "God

39 As opposed to the other mention of Eunomius by Anastasius of Sinai ( Hod., cap. IV, PG 89, 96D-97A), which is a stereotyped formula yielding no real information: ... καὶ Εὐνόμιος, καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ, κτίσμα λέγοντα τὸν θεὸν δόγον, καὶ μίαν φόρον, καὶ ἐλεημόνα, καὶ ἐνεργεία τῆς θεότητος καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος αὐτοῦ δοματίζοντα. V. E. Richard, "Anastase le Sinaite, l'Hodegos et le Monothélisme," REB 16 (1958), pp. 39-41.
40 V. supra p. 6, n. 6.
41 Socr., h.e. IV, 7 (PG 67, 473A).
42 κατὰ λέξιν. For a discussion of Gregory of Nyssa's use of this phrase, v. infra pp. 70-73.
has not more knowledge about his own essence than do we, nor is that essence better known to him and less to us; rather, whatever we ourselves know about it is exactly the same as what he knows, and conversely, that which he knows you will find without change in us. And, indeed, in producing this and many other similar contrivances, Eunomius did not even recognize them for the absurdities they were.

It has been important in reproducing this passage to cite the surrounding matter as well, for it enables us to see clearly that Socrates definitely understood this passage to be a direct quotation. It has been suggested that this fragment may in fact be simply an expansion of a similar statement ascribed to Eunomius' teacher, Aetius, by Epiphanius. A comparison of the two texts, however, reveals substantial differences between them.

Epiphanius' quotation of Aetius is as follows:

"For afterwards this fellow (he, that is, and those who had been instructed by him) deluded himself to speak thus: "I know God," he says, "with perfect clarity; and I know and understand him to such an extent that I do not understand myself better than I know God.""

It is obvious in reading this passage that it is generally speaking part of the same community of ideas as the previous passage. Moreover, we can see certain verbal resemblances: έκιστάμαι parallels έκιστάμαι, έλεγε and ές parallel έλεγε and

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143 By Albertz, op. cit., p. 54.
144 Epiph., haer. 76, 4, 2 (GC III, 344, 18-21).
...while μᾶλλον is used in both. The fact is, however, that despite these verbal reminiscences the differences are even more striking. Even ignoring the fact that the verbs are used in different persons, there is the striking absence in Socrates' passage of Epiphanius' τηλαγέοιτα, and the addition of such words as γινομένη and ἀπαλλάκτως. All of this goes to show that there cannot be a direct literary link between the two, and this is confirmed by the fact that the only work of Epiphanius with which Socrates shows familiarity is the Ἀνεγράφης. Moreover, there is yet another reason for suggesting that the passage quoted by Socrates cannot be a development, even indirect, of that found in Epiphanius—a reason which is one of our chief grounds for taking Socrates' claim to be quoting Eunomius directly seriously. This is, that Socrates does not portray Eunomius as claiming a perfect knowledge of God in himself, but rather a knowledge of God's οὐσία. It is precisely because he does not mention the οὐσία that one suspects Epiphanius of giving, not a direct quotation, but rather what he (Epiphanius) understands Aetius to be saying. This suspicion is strengthened by his mention of the things he had "heard" (Ἀκολύφονον) about Aetius in the next sentence. Further, we may also note another difference between the ideas expressed in the two passages: Eunomius, according to Socrates,

45 Soc., h.e. V, 24 (PG 67, 649B).
46 Epiph., ἱστ. 76, 4, 2 (GCS III, 344, 22-23).
asserted that he knew God's essence as well as God knew it himself, whereas according to Epiphanius, Aetius said that his knowledge of God was equivalent to his own knowledge of himself. This difference makes it difficult to believe that Socrates' passage depends even indirectly on that of Epiphanius. This impression is strengthened when we discover that there is an independent witness to this tradition given by Theodoret of Cyrus:

"For he dared to assert such things as not one of the Saints ever perceived: that he knows the very essence of God perfectly, and that he has the same knowledge about God as God has about himself! As for those who shared his disfigurement, in their Bacchic frenzy they rushed under his leadership into the same madness, and dared to say outright that they know God as he knows himself."

As in the case of Epiphanius, there are indications that this is not a quotation from a written document, but a statement of Eunomius' position as understood by Theodoret himself. We note, for instance, that in the second part of the statement

47 Thdt., haer. IV, 3 (PG 83, 421A).
48 Ibid. Possibly an allusion to the skin-disease or leprosy of Eunomius, mentioned by Rufinus, h.g. X I, 25 (PL 21, 496B/C), Ch. Nyss., Eun. I (I I, 57, 7-13), and Philost., h.g. X, 6 (GCS 128, 17-18).
49 Cf. Theodoret's mention of oral knowledge in the passage preceding this one, haer. IV, 3 (PG 83, 420D-421A).
which he ascribes to Eunomius, and in that which he attributes to his followers, he describes them as claiming to know God himself rather than the essence of God. There are, however, striking similarities between this passage and that given by Socrates. We note that both use ἵπτωμα in the third person, both speak of the ὄσια of God, and both assert that Eunomius’ knowledge about God is the same as that which God has about himself (i.e., they do not portray Eunomius as claiming that his knowledge of God is as great as his own self-knowledge, as in the passage from Epiphanius). Thus, Theodoret’s statement clearly represents a form, even if a variant one, of the tradition preserved by Socrates. Indeed, one has the feeling that this accusation was one of the stock weapons in the Orthodox arsenal.

These considerations, then, lead us to the conclusion that there is no justification for seeing the passage cited by Socrates as a simple development of that given by Epiphanius. Indeed, Socrates’ whole reason for reproducing the passage at all is that he does believe it to be genuine, and that he can therefore use it as proof that he is not simply inventing his charges. It seems, then, that the chief reason for hesitating before pronouncing this fragment genuine is its content. If we could find a plausible place for this doctrine within Eunomius’ system, presumably we would be justified in accepting it
as genuine. However, since the question of Eunomius' claim to know God is one of the things at issue in this thesis, we shall do well to leave this matter in abeyance until we can examine it in a wider context. For the moment at least we must leave this fragment with a question mark.

With these words we will conclude our discussion of the surviving fragments of Eunomius. There is in fact one further fragment of Eunomius which may have come to us from his Apologiae Apologiae via the Contra Eunomium of Theodore of Mopsuestia. However, the authenticity of this fragment can only be discussed within the wider context of Theodore's work itself. We have therefore relegated it to the Appendix.

E. The Liber Apologeticus.

Fortunately, we are not obliged to obtain all our information about Eunomius from fragments, for we possess at least one unquestionably genuine and complete work, the Liber Apologeticus. Although we will ourselves use this, its traditional name, there is in fact some question as to its exact title. It is referred to by the manuscripts and in the title of Basil's Adversus Eunomium (his own refutation of it) as the

50 V. infra pp. 262-280.
51 Appendix III, pp. 155*-157*.
52 See the apparatus criticus, Eun., apol., tit. (9*, 1).
53 Bas., Eun. I (PG 29, 497-8), though as the editors remark, "Tot sunt fere tituli varii, quot codices."
'Ἀπολογιστικός. However there is some reason to suppose that its real title may have been 'Ἀπολογία.\textsuperscript{54} Since the titles of works in manuscripts are notoriously variable, this suggestion is not \textit{a priori} unlikely. It is based on the title of Eunomius' second apology, his 'Ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀπολογιστικῆς Ἀπολογίας',\textsuperscript{55} as well as attestations by Basil the Great (discussed below), Philostorgius,\textsuperscript{56} and the flat statement of Gregory of Nyssa: 'Ἐπι μὲν τῷ λόγῳ Ἀπολογία τὸ δυνάμα.'\textsuperscript{57} One's immediate reaction is that this clinches the case, and that it is therefore certain that the original title of this work was 'Ἀπολογία. Further thought, however, shows that things are not that simple. Let us look at the evidence.

For one thing, there is good reason to suppose that Gregory of Nyssa did not himself possess a copy of the Liber Apologeticus, and that all of his information about it derived either from Basil or from the second apology of Eunomius which he himself was refuting.\textsuperscript{58} Certainly all seven of his direct quotations of the Liber Apologeticus are also to be found in the Adversus Eunomius of Basil, and in a number of cases display

\textsuperscript{55} infra p. 50, n. 152.
\textsuperscript{56} Philost., h.e. VIII, 12 (GCS 114, 2, 17).
\textsuperscript{57} Greg. Nyss., \textit{Eun. I} (I I, 43, 4-5); cf. also \textit{ibid.} (I I, 45, 5-6).
\textsuperscript{58} We may note that Eunomius himself quotes his earlier work in \textit{apol. apol. II} (I I, 271, 17-22; 272, 13-16), citing \textit{apol. 8} (16\textsuperscript{w}, 1-7).
verbal similarities with those in Basil as well.\textsuperscript{59} Three require special mention. In the first, the seventh chapter of Eunomius' Apology is quoted (15*, 7),\textsuperscript{60} but where Eunomius speaks of the Unbegotten as "following" from his previous argument using the verb \textit{δικολωθεὶ}, Gregory uses (\textit{καρδίεςκει}, in this following not Basil's direct quotation of the Apology, but the paraphrase of it used in the course of his discussion.\textsuperscript{61} In our next passage, Gregory cites the eighth chapter of the Apology (16*, 23-17*, 1);\textsuperscript{62} despite a lacuna in the manuscripts,\textsuperscript{63} it is still obvious that he is following Basil's stream-lined version of this passage\textsuperscript{64} rather than the original: they share the common reading \textit{ομοίως εἰ μήτε} instead of \textit{εἰδοκε μήτε} (16*, 23), and likewise omit the phrases \textit{διος καὶ θεοὶς ἐγείρετο λόγος} (16*, 24-25), \textit{τὸ ἀνένεφθεν} (16*, 25), and \textit{αὐτὸς ἐγείρε} (16*, 29). Finally, in the third passage we find that, while

\textsuperscript{59}Both writers are cited simply and Grg. Nyss., and Basil respectively, referring in each case to their works: 

\textsuperscript{60}Basil, I, 5 (PG 29, 517B, 520A).

\textsuperscript{61}Grg. Nyss., I, 5 (PG 29, 517B, 520A).


\textsuperscript{63}Bid. (J I, 245, 3-4).

\textsuperscript{64}Basil, I, 11 (PG 29, 537A).
the quotation itself (from apol. 19; 31*, 6-9) \(^{65}\) is a paraphrase and omits both the text of the manuscripts and the διάγραμα of Basil, \(^{66}\) in the comments on it which follow \(^{67}\) Gregory reproduces one of Basil's remarks on it almost exactly, \(^{68}\) and therefore gives us good reason to assume that he had the latter's work in front of him while composing this passage. All of this goes to suggest that Gregory did not in fact possess his own copy of the Liber Apologeticus, and that his information about it is not derived from any independent source but is based on that found in Eunomius' later work and in the Adversus Eunomium of Basil. It is to the latter that we must now turn our attention.

We have already noted that in the title of the Adversus Eunomium, Eunomius' work is referred to as the 'Ἀπολογιστικός.' \(^{69}\) In the course of the work itself, however, Basil frequently speaks of an ἀπολογία. It will be necessary to look at these references in some detail. Of the eight mentions of ἀπολογία in Basil's work, seven are in the second chapter of the first book. None refer to the title of the work, but are rather a critique of its literary form, usually expressed by the addition of an uncomplimentary phrase: ἐν ἀπολογίας εἶναι, \(^{70}\) ἐν ἀπολογίας.

\(^{65}\) Greg. Nyss., Eun. III, x (I II, 296, 7-9).
\(^{66}\) Basil, Eun. II, 25 (PG 29, 629C).
\(^{68}\) Basil, Eun. II, 28 (PG 29, 632B-D).
\(^{69}\) V. supra P. 224, cf. 2-53.
The remaining three references all reflect the same pattern, and are part of Basil's attempt to deny Eunomius any right to use this particular literary form. They nowhere specifically state that ἀπολογία was in fact the title of the work. We have already seen that almost all the occurrences of this word are found in the same chapter of Basil's work. This suggests the source of the word ἀπολογία, for it is in this chapter (I, 2) that he discusses the first chapter of Eunomius' own work. In the latter, Eunomius himself describes the function of his work as being ἀπολογίαν. While Basil quotes only the opening section of this chapter, he clearly had the whole in front of him, and there seems every reason to suppose that this is the origin of his own use of the word.

It seems, then, that like Gregory, Basil cannot give us any new information as to the title of Eunomius' work. The same statement also applies to the mention of this work found

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71Ibid. (PG 29, 501D).
72Ibid. (PG 29, 504A).
73Ibid. (PG 29, 501B).
74Ibid. (PG 29, 5051, B); II, 1 (PG 29, 573B).
75The only possible indication to the contrary is Basili, Evn. I, 2 (PG 29, 501B), where Basil specifically refers to a "title": "Ἡ δὲ βασιλεύς ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγους, ἐκ αὐτοῦ τῆς ἑκατοστος τὴν ἄρχην παρασκευῶς. However, since this passage does not mention ἀπολογία, it can only tell us that Basil's manuscript had a title, not what it was.
76Evn., anol. 1 (10*, 6).
in Philostorgius. The two sources which give us our knowledge of this work (Photius' Epitome and Nicetas Acominatus) merely use ἀπολογία to describe the literary character of the work, and shed no new light on its actual title. In the end, then, we are left with the title of the second apology, Ἰναρ τῆς ἀπολογίας ἀπολογία, and it must be confessed that it is difficult to know how to evaluate it. To the reflection that, having called his first work Ἀπολογισμός the author might well have wanted to avoid the ungainly Ἰναρ τοῦ ἀπολογισμοῦ ἀπολογισμός in the second, one can only add that ἀπολογισμός is in fact the title found in several contemporary works. Thus, while we cannot exclude the possibility that ἀπολογία was the original title of the work, the evidence is insufficient to warrant our overturning the unanimous witness of the manuscript tradition.

If questions are raised concerning the precise title of Eunomius' work, those which surround its nature and the occasion which warranted it are even greater. By definition, an "apology" presumes a legal context, if not a trial proper. In their

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78 Philost., h.g. VIII, 12 (GCS 114, 2, 17), quoted in part above p. 8f.
79 Thus, Ath., ἀπολ. sec., Ἀπολογισμός Κατὰ Ἀρειανόν (PG 25, 247/8) and Græc. Naz., ΚΕ, 9, Ἀπολογισμός τῆς τῶν ἑμῖν πατέρα πρηγόριον ... (PG 35, 820A). The title of this last receives independent confirmation from Max., επ. 12 (PG 91, 493D).
80 It is unfortunate in view of this uncertainty that there is a lacuna in the manuscripts of Photius just at the point where he is going to tell us what the title is, cod. 137 (Henri II, 105, 41-42): Ανεγρασὴ μηθυδαρίου Ἐνιθοίου ... οὔ ἐπιγραφ [Ε: ..:].
criticisms of Eunomius, first Basil and then Gregory of Nyssa had contended that he chose this form only to gain sympathy as the injured party and that his so-called "apology" had never in fact been presented in public. Although it is clear that Eunomius must have revised this work for publication, in his second apology he vehemently defended his claim to have actually presented his earlier work at a public trial. It is difficult to see what advantage he might have derived from lying about so professedly public an event (as opposed to giving a tendentious interpretation of it), and it must be said, on their part, Gregory and Basil are disingenuous to say the least. Thus, if we are prepared to take seriously Eunomius' claim that there was a definite occasion on which he presented his "apology," we must face the inevitable question as to where and when that was.

When we try to find an answer, however, we are brought up against a number of inevitable problems. All our knowledge of Eunomius' defence of his position against Basil comes from such portions of it as have been quoted by Gregory of Nyssa. Unfortunately, it is just this portion of the work which Gregory chose

83Note the use of ἐγγέφη... ἐμπέθη... τὴν διολόγιαν in Ep., apol. 1 (10*, 8-10), and in apol. 2 (10*, 24-25) the reference to τρίτης τῆς διαφοράς ἐνυπέρμενους.
84Of the fragments of Ep., apol. apol. I quoted throughout Gr. Nyss., Ep. 1 (J 1, 22, 5-71, 2).
not to quote κατά τὴν τοῦ λόγου τάξιν.\(^{86}\) This makes it extremely difficult in many cases to determine the reference of the quotations. It is our good fortune, therefore, that Basil’s reply to Eunomius, his \textit{Adversus Eunomium}, at least provides us with a \textit{terminus ante quem}. In this work, Basil complains bitterly about the Arian persecutions under Constantius, and mentions in particular the events of 359-60,\(^{87}\) thus making it reasonably probable that he had taken advantage of Julian’s edict of toleration to publish his own work. However, a more precise date than this can be given. We find him mentioning in a letter written about the end of 364 or the beginning of 365 that he had sent a copy of this work ( τὰ πρὸς Εὐνόμιον) to Leontius the Sophist.\(^{88}\) This suggests that Basil had produced this work during the years of monastic solitude at Annesoi, and probably during the period of his retirement from Caesarea in deference to Bishop Eusebius (362-65). We may note in this regard that in a letter written during this period he remarked that every season had its peculiar product: the Spring—time, flowers; the Summer, wheat; the Autumn, fruit; and the Winter, books.\(^{89}\) The probability that the \textit{Adversus Eunomium} was composed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Org. Nyss.}, \textit{Eun.} I (J I, 29, 21).
\item \textit{Basil}, \textit{Eun.} I, 2 (PG 29, 504c-505B).
\item \textit{Basil}, \textit{Eun.} 20, 25-32 (Courtonne I, 51).
\item \textit{Basil}, \textit{Eun.} 13 (Courtonne I, 42); the other examples, being concrete, suggest that \(λόγοι\) here must be more than mere conversation, and this consideration is strengthened by the thought that this is just the sort of letter one would send along with a new treatise.
\end{itemize}
at this date would be raised to near certitude if we could accept the authenticity of Basil's correspondence with Apollinarius, for these letters contain verbal reminiscences of that work and (if authentic) must be dated to about this period. It seems, then, that Eunomius' work must have appeared sometime during the period preceding Basil's retirement, and that we must look for the event which occasioned it in the years immediately preceding 362. There are a number of possibilities, but in considering them it would be well to recognize that the right one may in fact be one about which we now know nothing.

Among these possibilities, two stand out as having a certain prima facie likelihood. Both are to be found in the Ecclesiastical History of Philostorgius. The first is the defence of his position made by Eunomius before Eudoxius and the assembled clergy of Constantinople when accused of heterodoxy by members of his own Church at Cyzicus. The second is an appearance before the Emperor at Antioch in response to an accusation by Acacius of Caesarea. Since the latter failed to

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91 Philost., h. e. VI, 1 (GCS 70, 2-71, 2); also mentioned with considerable differences by Sozomen, h. e. VI, 26 (GCS 273, 7-15) and Theodoret, h. e. II, 29 (GCS 166, 13-167, 6); this is also the occasion accepted by E. Vandenbussche, "La part de la dialectique dans la théologie d'Eunomius 'le technologue,'" RHE 40 (1944/45), p. 61ff., n. 1.
put in an appearance, the matter was still in abeyance when Constantius died in November of 361.92 What makes these two events particularly appealing as loci for Eunomius' apology is Philostorgius' choice of words in describing them: of the one he says, ἐντεῦθεν εἰς ἀπολογίαν ὁ Εὐνόμιος τῷ Κωνσταντινουπόλεως κληρὸν καταστάς . . . ,93 and of the other, καὶ παραγεγονότα εἰς ἀπολογίαν κελέτα καταστήμα . . . ,94 Since his accuser in fact never appeared at the latter, it is unclear as to whether he was ever in fact given the opportunity to present a defence. This makes the former of the two possibilities seem the more likely, especially since, as has been maintained,95 several of the points at issue on that occasion are in fact discussed in the extant apology.

There are, however, other and perhaps more powerful reasons for maintaining that neither of these proposed events could have been the occasion of our apology. We may note first of all, as Basil had already done,96 that the parties to whom this apology is addressed are not clearly delineated—a lack which would be difficult to understand if this address had in fact been presented before the clergy of Constantinople or the chosen

92 Philost., h.e. VI, 4 (GCS 71, 23-73, 6).
93 Ibid. VI, 1 (GCS 70, 12-13).
94 Ibid. VI, 4 (GCS 71, 29-29).
95 Diskamp, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
96 Basil, Ep. 1, 2 (PG 29, 504C).
representatives of the imperial court. 97 A stronger reason, however, is provided by something Eunomius himself says in his second apology:

εἰ γὰρ τὸ δέλοι . . . νίκης δεῖ καὶ νίκης καὶ τέλος τοῦ καθορίσας, ὑπεκαλύπτει δὲ πάντως κατὰ τὴν κατηγορίαν ἡ δίκη, δὲ τὸ δέλοι διδόει καὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν. 98

"If a reward . . . is the token and crown of victory, and a victory indicates a trial, and a trial inevitably implies an accusation, the one who grants the reward must admit that of necessity there was a defence."

In this passage Eunomius is trying to use Basil's own words against him, since in his reply to the first apology Basil had admitted that Eunomius had received the bishopric of Cyzicus as the δέλοι of his impiety. 99 It is true that in that part of the text which Gregory has preserved for us Eunomius only takes advantage of Basil's choice of words and does not actually say that he did receive the bishopric for this reason, but it would rather ruin his point if he did not. If we grant this, we then have to admit that Eunomius must have delivered his apology before he received the bishopric of Cyzicus, in which case he cannot have done so on either of the occasions suggested above, since by then he already was bishop. 100

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98Eun., apol. apol. I (J 1, 60, 12-16).
100That is, assuming with most commentators that Socrates, h.e. IV, 7 (PG 67, 472C), followed by Sozomen, h.e. VI, 8 (GCs 245, 4-11), cf. VII, 6 (GCs 307, 15-18), is wrong in placing this under Valens.
It seems, then, that we must turn our attention to an earlier period. Basil himself suggests two earlier possibilities (and denies both), the councils of Ariminium/Seleucia (September 359) and Constantinople (January 360). As we have already noted, discussion of Eunomius' reaction to Basil's accusations is rendered difficult by the fact that Gregory (deliberately) did not quote them in order, but it seems fairly clear from the surviving fragments that Eunomius discussed both these events, and in the case of the former, probably the events leading up to it as well. This is shown by the fact that in both cases Eunomius takes up Basil's own words. In the case of the first, he replies to Basil's accusation that at Seleucia he had been convicted by default (‘ΑΛΛΑ σωμησαντες διώκοντω) by saying that while indeed this was the case (σωμηντες διώκοντω), faced with a packed jury he could have done nothing else. In the case of the second, although Eunomius did not actually mention the name of the occasion, there is good reason to believe that there too he was replying to Basil. Gregory of Nyssa certainly seems to have thought so,

102v. apol. apol. I (J I, 30, 12-31, 2; 31, 6-12; 41, 14-17) which seems to refer to the conspiracy of Gallus and the council of Ancyra (358).
105 Ibid. (J I, 44, 5; 51, 17-21; cf. also 44, 15-18, 47, 8-11).
106 Ibid. (J I, 49, 9-13; 50, 3).
for in answering him he immediately mentions the council of Constantinople. Moreover, Eunomius again seems to be responding directly to the accusations of Basil. To Basil's demand to know the locale of this trial and the identity of the accusers, he replies that it was a council of great importance, and that its members came from every region. To Basil's charge that in any case no defence was needed there, he answers that indeed there was a mortal combat (τρόπος ἐκχώρισμος) at which Basil himself had been present, and that contrary to his own inclinations he had been forced by intermediaries to make his defence. Furthermore, he says that while he himself presented his arguments at the appropriate time, Basil was too late, apparently meaning by this that he had presented his own arguments before the council while Basil had declined to appear, only putting forth a reply at a much later date. While we must press the

112 Ibid. (J I, 51, 23-26).
113 Ibid.; and cf. Gregory's acidic résumé of the significance of this argument, Eun. I (J I, 51, 6-12).
114 This seems to be the import of his abuse in apol. apol. I (J I, 53, 2-10; 66, 1-3; 68, 17-20; 70, 11-13); V. Wickham, "Apology," p. 236. Gregory, it may be noted, seems to confirm the fact of Basil's silence in Eun. I (J I, 50, 18-23); for a discussion of Basil's role at the council, v. S. Giet, "Saint Basile et le concile de Constantinople de 360," JTS 6 (1955), pp. 94-99.
evidence further than it can take us, it is difficult to find any known event to which it might apply other than the council of Constantinople. Moreover, despite Basil and Gregory's "economic" approach to the narration of these events, it has been shown that this understanding of the events is consistent with their statements. If this is so, then we must admit that Eunomius apparently claimed to have given his apology at the council of Constantinople in January of 360, and received the bishopric of Cyzicus as the reward of a successful defence. It cannot be claimed that this is the only possible interpretation of the information which has come down to us, but on the basis of such evidence as we have it seems the most likely, and thus permits us to place Eunomius' work firmly within the framework of the events of his time. It also permits us to give a probable date for its publication, sometime late in 360 or in 361, Basil's reply appearing during the years immediately following.

If we have at least made an attempt to establish its date and the occasion which demanded it, we must now turn to an examination of the Apology itself. At first sight, its organization seems obvious. At the very beginning of the work, Eunomius presents the basis on which he is to proceed, a short

116 And a defence was needed! On the anti-anomoean tendencies of this council, V. Giet, op. cit., pp. 97-99.
Trinitarian creed which had come down to him from the fathers:117

Πιστεύομεν εἶς θνὰ θεὸν πατέρα παντοκράτορα, εἷς οὗ ἔσται πάντα.
καὶ εἶς θνὰ μονογενὴν υἱὸν θεοῦ, θεὸν λόγον, τὸν ἱερὸν ἐποίηκεν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, εἷς οὗ τὰ πάντα.
καὶ εἶς ὑπὲρ ἅγιον, τὸν παράκλητον, ἐν ὧς πάσης ἁριτοῦ διανομῆς κατὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν πρὸς τὸ σωφρόν
ἐκάστῳ δίδοντα τῷ ἁγίῳ.\textsuperscript{178}

“We believe in one God, the Father almighty,
from whom are all things.
And in one only-begotten Son of God, God the
Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all
things.
And in one holy Spirit, the Counselor, in whom
is given the distribution of all grace according
to that measure which is expedient for each of
the saints.”

Although it is apparent that the ultimate basis of this creed
is I Cor. 8: 6, Basil tells us that this creed was indeed used
by some of the Fathers, and that it was presented to Alexander,
bishop of Alexandria, by Arius in token of his faith.\textsuperscript{119} Euno-
mius says that he has left off some secondary matters (τῶν δευ-
τερῶν) as not yet having been disputed.\textsuperscript{120} It is difficult to
know quite what he means by this, but since Basil does not accuse
him of actually tampering with the text, it seems more likely
that he had left off something at the end of the creed rather
than in the middle. The most likely guess as to what that "some-
thing" may have been is to assume that Eunomius was referring to

\textsuperscript{117} σά πα σάσαν Ξωθεν 

\textsuperscript{119} Basil, \textit{Ep.}, \textit{T}, 4 (PG 29, 509B).

\textsuperscript{120} Eun., \textit{Apol.}, 6 (13*, 8-11).
a final paragraph on the resurrection of the dead and the life everlasting,\(^{121}\) a guess made appreciably more plausible by the fact that Eunomius\(^ '\) own *Expositio Fidei* closes with just such a paragraph.\(^{122}\) At any rate, after asserting that the creed which he had presented is by itself insufficient to convince those who have deliberately set out to distort it,\(^{123}\) he then proceeds to tell us how he intends to use it:

"We shall try, then, insofar as we are able, to bring such opinions as we may hold out into the open. Either we shall first set out the text of the confession and then disclose the meaning, or, first setting out the meaning, we shall then link it to the spoken words ..."

This provides us with the ostensible program on the basis of which Eunomius intended to construct his apology, and, indeed, it does seem to provide us with a very satisfactory analysis of the main outlines of the work:

II. The Father: capita 7-11.


\(^{122}\) *Eun.*, *exp. fid.*, 60\(^ *\), 1-27; the only hesitation one might feel about accepting this is that the point in question was not in fact entirely undisputed--Eunomius himself was accused of heretical opinions on the subject, *Const. H.*, *haer.* 13 (PG 150, 25A).

\(^{123}\) *Eun.*, apol. 6 (13\(^ *\), 24-14\(^ *\), 2).

\(^{124}\) *Ibid.* (14\(^ *\), 2-9).
While this analysis does reflect the external structure of the apology, in other ways it is a less adequate expression of Eunomius' meaning, and in particular his understanding of the nature of theology in the strict sense. However, Eunomius himself has suggested another basis on which an understanding of this work may be achieved in his description of the methods by which theological enquiry is to be pursued:

125 "For there are two ways which have been marked out for us for the discovery of what we seek—one, by means of which we examine the essences themselves and with clear and unadulterated reasoning about them make a judgement on each; the other an enquiry by means of the actions, whereby we distinguish the essence through its products and completed works—and neither of these is sufficient to reveal any similarity of essence!"

Thus, we are presented with two methods of doing theology. The one is a priori, where, by an analysis of the essences as revealed by their names (e.g. ἐγέννης, γέννημα), we come to a knowledge of the things signified; the other is a posteriori, whereby from an analysis of the effects we are able to discern the nature

125 Ibid. 20 (32*, 9-20).
of the essence. On the basis of this distinction in methodology, it is possible to achieve a more satisfactory understanding of the structure of the work:

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Even in this rough outline we can see that the composition of Eunomius' apology is more integrally linked to his basic approach to theology than the more mechanical analysis presented earlier would have us understand. It seems, then, that the Liber Apologisticus itself is a direct reflection of Eunomius' theory of knowledge.

Once we have said this, however, we are still faced with a further problem, that of authenticity. That the work found in our manuscripts is in fact the apology of Eunomius is guaranteed by the quotations of it preserved by Basil of Caesarea. Unfortunately, however, this issue is not quite so simple. Although Basil quotes almost every chapter of the work in the

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126 For a more detailed analysis based on similar principles, cf. Th. Dans, Le controverse Eunomienne (Diss. [place lacking], 1951), pp. 12-17 (there is a copy of this dissertation in the Bodleian Library, Oxford); cf. Wickham, "Syntagmatism," pp. 537-540.
course of his refutation of it, there are some which he passes over, chapters 14, 21-24, and 25-28, some eight in all. Of these, there seems no reason whatsoever to doubt the authenticity of paragraph 14, which fits perfectly into its context, and scarcely less that of paragraphs 21-24, which cannot without violence be separated from the main structure of the work.

Neither of these sections adds a great deal that is new, and this, together with the demonstrated tendency of these authors to quote less fully towards the ends of their works, no doubt


129 V. the remarks of Albertz, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
explains the lacunae.

When we turn to chapters 26-28, however, we are faced with different problems. We can set aside chapter 28 for the moment because it clearly requires special treatment, and deal only with chapters 26 and 27. Among the main reasons for being suspicious of these chapters is that, while the treatise as a whole is, as we have seen, very tightly organized, these passages bear only a very general relationship to what precedes. Indeed, in several places they closely parallel creedal formularies,\textsuperscript{130} and this tends to make the possibility that they circulated separately somewhat more likely. While there is nothing incompatible with Eunomius' teaching in these chapters, it is true that they display distinct differences with respect to the rest of the work. Let us look at the evidence in detail. Either Eunomius or his editor seems to have been aware of the looseness of the connection between these chapters and the rest, for he makes a deliberate attempt to explain his addition at the beginning of the suspected passage:

\begin{quote}
'ΑΛΛ' ᾶνα μὴ τὰ μὴκε τῶν λόγων ἀποκατάσῳμεν τοὺς ἀναλογικοὺς, πάσην ἐνεκαθὲς τῶν θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ τούτου περιλαβὸς τῆς δύναμις φαμέν ἦν καὶ μόνον θεολογικὸν εἶναι τῶν τῶν παντῶν θεῶν ... \textsuperscript{131}
\end{quote}

"But so as not to weary our hearers by the length of these arguments, we will encompass the whole force of our discourse in a few words: We assert that the God of all things is one, and that he is the Only true God ... ."

\textsuperscript{130}Cf. Eun., apol. 26-27 (42*, 4-44*, 32).
\textsuperscript{131}Eid. 26 (42*, 1-6).
It is quite clear that the author of this section knew that he was shifting literary gears, and he therefore presented his justification for doing so as being that he did not wish to tire his readers unduly. We may note that this is also a concern expressed earlier in the work, and that passage too is preparatory to the presentation of a creed.\(^{132}\) If we may for the moment assume that it is Eunomius himself who is speaking here, an explanation for the rapid and clearly self-conscious shift in literary tone immediately presents itself. Many of those who opposed themselves to him were suspicious not only of his theology but also of his theological method, a suspicion which they expressed by calling him the "logic-chopper," \(\tau\epsilon\chi\nu\omega\lambda\delta\gamma\omicron\).\(^{133}\)

And yet the greater part of the \textit{Liber Apologeticus} is in fact taken up by a systematic presentation of his views, a presentation which makes use of that very method for which he had been most criticized. It is easy, then, to understand that in closing his discourse Eunomius might have wanted to soften his critics by giving them a more popular and scriptural (not to mention comprehensible) presentation, one untainted by the presence of the much-maligned \(\tau\epsilon\chi\nu\omicron\). A consideration of the latter part of chapter 27 (clearly the original ending of the work) gives us a further reason for viewing this section's claim to authenticity favorably. If we consider this passage in comparison with the

\(^{132}\text{ Ibid. 4 (12*, 7-14).}\)

\(^{133}\text{infra pp. 238-243.}\)
rest of the work, we can see distinct parallels with the second and third chapters which form part of its introduction: there is the same appeal in both to an audience actually present and to a wider range of potential readers; there is the same exhortation to avoid anything which might distort the judgement, particularly the opinions of men; there is the same dichotomy between present joys and pains and the sure reward promised to the faithful in the future. Parallels so exact must, in the absence of contrary evidence, be taken as indicating that the passages in question come not only from the same author, but from the same work.

The question is, however, is there any such contrary evidence? Let us look at two cases which have been said to provide it. We have already noted above (pp. 41-42) that this closing section of the work is introduced by a passage which expresses a desire on the part of its author not to weary his hearers unduly, and that this is the reason given for so rapid a change in approach. If we turn to the end of the section under discussion, we find another passage in which this reason is reiterated, but this time with a difference:

πούτων ἢ πάντων εὐθυμῶν μὲν καὶ πλατύτερον εὐ ἀπέρς ἤμεν ἀποδεξαίμενοι, ἐν δραχαί ἐκ νῦν πρῶτος ἤμεν ἐμολογημένων, εὐχαριστοῦμε τοὺς τε παρὸντας ὑμᾶς ... 138

134 Bain, apol. 27 (45*), 4-6 = Ibid. 2 (10*, 23-25).
135 Ibid. 27 (45*, 7-16) = Ibid. 2 (10*, 25-11*, 20).
136 Ibid. 27 (45*, 16-46*, 14) = Ibid. 3 (11*, 22-12*, 6).
137 As suggested by Albertz, op. cit., p. 8.
138 Bain, apol. 27 (44*, 32-45*, 5).
"Obviously, we have dealt with these matters in sequence and at greater length *by* év εὑρως but we have now made our profession of faith by way of summary. We beseech not only those of you who are present . . . ."

We have left the phrase év εὑρως untranslated for the moment, for it is the part of this passage in which a significant difference is to be found with respect to the passage discussed earlier. The phrase in question has generally been understood to refer to other, presumably larger, works of Eunomius.\(^{139}\)

If this could be shown to be correct, it would make it unlikely that this section belongs with the rest of the work, for it is a reasonable presumption that the *Liber Apologeticus* was Eunomius' first published literary effort. This is deduced in part from his own statements in the first chapter of his apology,\(^{140}\) for his reasons for attempting a defence at that time would make little sense unless he had not previously done so. It is also derived from a statement of Basil's to the effect that Eunomius had previously hidden his work, and had only now (presumably for the first time) published his ἄθεον πάρρησις.\(^{141}\)

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\(^{140}\) Eun., apol. 1 (9*, 17-10*, 19).

A comparison of this passage with that quoted above on p. 41 from the beginning of the disputed section is sufficient to show that the assumption that ἐν ἐρεύομεν refers to other works is mistaken. That passage clearly presumes an immediately preceding longer discussion. It then goes on to say that in order not to weary the hearers the "force" of the previous arguments will be presented in a few words (ἐν δραχμαῖς). In the present passage, the author begins his appeal to his hearers by saying that he had previously presented his arguments "at greater length" ἐν ἐρεύομεν, and that he had just now made his profession in a few words (ἐν δραχμαῖς). Unless, then, we are prepared to divide this section yet again, and separate the beginning of the passage from its conclusion, we shall have to conclude that both passages refer to the same thing—the earlier part of the work. Thus the correct translation must be as follows:

"Obviously, we have dealt with these matters in sequence and at greater length in the rest of our argument, but we have now made our profession of faith by way of summary. We beseech not only those of you who are present . . ."

This removes one objection to the authenticity of these chapters, but there still remains another. We have already noted\(^{142}\) that Basil quotes virtually every section of Eunomius' apology in his refutation of it. There is a final quotation, however, preserved in the printed text which cannot be

\(^{142}\) V. suura pp. 39-41, especially n. 127.
readily identified with any known section of the work. This has been taken as indicating that a section had dropped out and presumably been replaced by the matter now found in chapters 26 and 27. The quotation in question is that which follows next after that Eunomius' treatment of the Holy Spirit, chapter 25. The text is as follows:

"And don't try any of these little tricks on me again: 'If it (the Holy Spirit) is not a creature, then it must either be begotten or unbegotten; but there is only one who is God without beginning and unbegotten. And surely it is not begotten! What remains, then, is that it must be called "creature" and "product"."

This presumed quotation is part of St. Basil's refutation of Eunomius' doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and comes after several paragraphs of criticism levelled against it. A natural understanding of it in the context is that it is a rebuke of Eunomius and a caution not to use his previous arguments, now proved fruitless. If this interpretation is correct, there ought to be a section of Eunomius' discussion of the Holy Spirit which would

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143 As in Alberts, op. cit., pp. 11-12; he also cites, loc. cit., another fragment of Eunomius as not obviously corresponding to any section of the Apology. This is Basil, En. I, 23 (PG 29, 564A), but it is clearly a paraphrase of apol. 11 (22*, 6-21*, 5), the chapter then being refuted; cf. also Basil En. II, 8 (PG 29, 588B), where the argument of apol. 12 (22*, 3-10) is summarized.

144 We have omitted EN. just before 'Edv as this is a purely editorial addition.

145 Basil, En. III, 6 (PG 29, 665D-668A).
correspond to Basil's paraphrase of it. A perusal of Eunomius' chapter on this subject reveals that there is in fact such a corresponding passage. Indeed, the latter part of it had already been quoted by Basil,\textsuperscript{146} and we can present it here by way of comparison:

\textit{οδηγοὺς} \textit{μὲν} θρησκ. \textit{παρὰ} τὸν θεόν, \textit{ἀγέννητον} \textit{δὲ} (εἰς γὰρ καὶ μόνος \textit{ἀγέννητος} \textit{ἐκ} οὗ τὸ πάντα \textit{γέγονεν}), ή \textit{ἄλλο} \textit{μὲν} \textit{παρὰ} τὸν πάν, \textit{γέννημα} \textit{δὲ} (εἰς γὰρ καὶ \textit{μονογενὲς} \textit{δὶ} \textit{κύριος} \textit{καὶ} \textit{μὸν} \textit{ἀπὸ} τὸ \textit{πάντα}, κατὰ τὸν \textit{ἀπόστολον}, \textit{ἄλλα} \textit{τρίτον} καὶ \textit{φύσις} καὶ \textit{τάξει} . . . \textit{δός} \textit{πρώτον} καὶ \textit{μετ' όν} \textit{πάγων} καὶ \textit{μόνον} \textit{τοιούτου} \textit{τοῦ} \textit{μονογενοῦς} \textit{ποιημα.}\textsuperscript{147}

"Now there cannot be anything which is numerically different from God which is nonetheless unbegotten (for there is one and only one Unbegotten from whom all things came to be), nor yet anything in addition to the Son which is nonetheless begotten (for our Lord is one and the same Only-begotten "through whom are all things" [I Cor. 8:6], as says the Apostle); rather, such a being must be third both in nature and in order . . . the first and greatest work of all, the only one which is the direct product of the Only-begotten." This is in some ways both the culmination and the summary of Eunomius' argument concerning the Holy Spirit. Although Basil has supplied a suppressed premise, he has otherwise followed the argument quite closely (if sarcastically): granted there can be only one Unbegotten, and only one Only-begotten, what remains must be called "creature" and "product." This allows us to give a perfectly reasonable explanation of Basil's passage, but does not force us to postulate an additional, lost

\textsuperscript{146}Ebd. III. 5 (PG 29, 665A-B).
\textsuperscript{147}En., spol. 25 (49\textsuperscript{r}, 35-41\textsuperscript{r}, 7, 9-11).
section not in evidence—entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. Thus the second of our two possible objections to the authenticity of these chapters must be ruled insufficient. In view of the fact, therefore, that there is some positive evidence for the authenticity of these chapters, and a logical place can be found for them within the structure of the Liber Apologeticus itself, they must be accepted as genuine, and can, indeed, be regarded as marking the proper conclusion of the work.148

We must now turn to the one remaining chapter of Eunomius' treatise which has not been discussed, the twenty-eighth. We have left our discussion of this chapter until now because, as has been noted, it forms a distinct unit by itself and has clearly been appended to the original conclusion of the work. It displays distinct creedal characteristics, and may be divided into two paragraphs or sections. The first (47*, 1-36) presents the various ranks of the chain of being, beginning with the Unbegotten and then proceeding to each of the beings derived from him in their proper order, the Son, the Holy Spirit, and other created beings. The second and shorter section (47*, 36-48*, 18) discusses the attributes of each of the three persons individually. It seems unlikely, though perhaps not quite impossible, that

148 We might also add that there is yet another possible allusion by Basil to apol. 26 (43*, 1-3) in Eun. II, 2 (PG 29, 576A), since he there refutes the Eunomian interpretation of Acts 2: 36, a prominent feature of this chapter in the apol.
either of these sections ever circulated independently. If such were the case, however, the more likely candidate of the two would be the second, since it is less elaborately developed than the other, and is more strictly creedal in form. At any rate, they are now closely linked, and the latter summarizes in some respects the more theologically technical discussion of the former. Certainly, both reflect the general teachings of Eunomian theology, and there is nothing in them to contradict the assumption that if they are not the product of Eunomius himself, they at least derive from his school (which, is impossible to determine). The most likely explanation of how they came to be added on to the larger work is that at some stage prior to its inclusion in manuscripts of Basil's Adversus Eunomium, this short chapter followed immediately in the manuscript. A scribe then copied it without realizing that he had passed on to a separate treatise, something particularly easy to do if, as seems likely, this chapter was without title in the manuscripts.

Although it is obvious that Eunomius' treatise was added to manuscripts of Basil early in the history of the tradition, it is virtually impossible to determine how long it circulated independently before that happened. Thus, while there is no question at all that this section represents authentic Eunomian doctrine

149 Appendix I, A, pp. 2*–4*.
150 As happened in manuscript F of the exp. fid.; v. Appendix I, B, p. 51*.
151 Our own title, Confessio Eunomiana, is of course purely editorial.
the possibility cannot be ruled out that it is a product of the Eunomian Church or one of Eunomius' disciples rather than of Eunomius himself. In view of this, the best approach seems to be to use this section as an illustration of the Eunomian position generally, but without trying to base any conclusions on its precise phrasing or vocabulary. With this note of caution, we shall conclude our discussion of Eunomius' earliest extant work.

C. The Apologia Apologiae.

As has already become apparent, Eunomius' *Liber Apologeticus* was promptly answered by St. Basil's treatise *Adversus Eunomium*. This was not, however, by any means the end of the literary duel, and St. Basil was answered in his turn (though not so promptly) by Eunomius' *own* "Ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπολογίας ἀπολογία, *ελεύθερον ἀπολογία*", his "Apology for the Apology." Unfortunately, this work has not been preserved entire, but has come down to us only in more or less extensive quotations in the *Contra Eunomium* of Gregory of Nyssa, who answered it in what proved to be the final riposte of this phase of the controversy.

When we turn to the surviving fragments of Eunomius' work,

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152Gr. Nyss., *Bun.* I (I I, 29, 26; 42, 24-43, 1), and cf. II (I I, 392, 7-10).
153Theodore of Mopsuestia also wrote a *refutation* of this work of Eunomius, and it is not impossible that a fragment apparently preserved for us via this treatise of Theodore's is from the *Apologia Apologiae*; v. Appendix III, pp. 155*-157*.
however, we are immediately faced with a problem, that of the work's precise extent. Gregory of Nyssa\(^{154}\) and Photius\(^{155}\) apparently both speak of it as consisting of three books, while the Eunomian historian Philostorgius mentions five.\(^{156}\) It is certain that we now possess fragments of only three books, but the question is, were there once more? Let us look at the evidence.

When St. Basil wrote his refutation of Eunomius' first apology, he did so by quoting from it and answering each section in turn. It is because Gregory of Nyssa adopted a similar policy with regard to the second that the surviving fragments have come down to us. There is every reason to believe that Eunomius' procedure in this matter was little different from that of his adversaries. We have already seen several instances in which Eunomius clearly based his own words on those of Basil.\(^{157}\) If we examine other cases where there is a clear verbal echo or direct quotation,\(^{158}\) we find that the latest

\(^{154}\)Apart from the mentions of the various books preserved in the titles given by the manuscripts, Grg. Nyss., Eun. I (I I, 22, 2, 4), II (I I, 226, 2), III, i (I II, 3, 2), etc., the books are mentioned in the text as follows: apol. apol. Book I at Ibid. II (I I, 226, 6), Book II at Ibid. II (I I, 226, 10-11; cf. 226, 16; 227, 22), Book III at Ibid. III, i (I II, 3, 6-16; 4, 19).

\(^{155}\)Photius, cod. 138 (Henri II, 106, 12).

\(^{156}\)Philost., e.g. VIII, 12 (GCS II\(^{11}\), 3, 24).

\(^{157}\)v. supra pp. 32-34.

\(^{158}\)In what follows, Eunomius' Apologia Apologiae and St. Basil's Adversus Eunomium will be referred to as "Eunomius" and "Basil" respectively; the column numbers given for Basil all refer to PG 29. Eunomius I (I I, 16\(^{14}\), 1-5) = Basil I, 4 (continued)
comes from the fourth chapter of Basil's second book. This leaves some thirty chapters of book two and seven of book three for which there is no direct evidence that they were refuted. Unless, therefore, Eunomius refuted under half of the work, this gives us good reason to take Philostorgius' statement seriously. But what of the other evidence? Let us look at that in Photius first. There is every reason to believe that Photius did not himself possess a copy of this apology and that all of his direct information about it is in fact derived from that given by Gregory of Nyssa. A comparison of what the two have to say reveals not only that Photius adds very little which cannot be found in Gregory, but also that there are distinct verbal reminiscences between the two. Photius gives a paraphrase of the statements made by Gregory, rather than an excerpt, but a comparison of the two makes their relationship clear enough. The most convenient way of achieving this will be to present some of the most obvious parallels in tabular form:

(continued) (512B); Eunomius II (I I, 313, 5-6) = Basil I, 7 (524-5); Eunomius II (I I, 328, 14-18) = Basil I, 6 (524B); Eunomius III (I I, 82, 10-14) = Basil II, 2 (576A); Eunomius III (I I, 97, 4-5) = Basil II, 4 (576C); Eunomius III (I I, 112, 20-113, 9) = Basil II, 3 (577A). In several cases these fragments are cited in an order other than that found in their original. The order in which they are cited above is that in which they are found in Gregory. It is not at all clear as to whether the occasional dislocations which this introduces in the order of the citations derives from Eunomius himself or from Gregory. We can note, however, that in each case the dislocation is slight and the passages effected are in close proximity to one another.
These are a few of the more obvious verbal parallels. The parallels in ideas are just as striking: the use of the simile of the children of Babylon dashed against the rock of Christ; the mention of the secrecy with which the work was produced and the joy with which it was received by Eunomius' intimates; the (slightly different) pictures of Basil's ascent to his true home in heaven. The only things which are actually new are the use of the simile of Kronos devouring his children and

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159 Photius, cod. 137 (Henri II, 106, 7-9) // Grg. Nyss.;
Em. I (J I, 24, 10-17).
Em. I (J I, 24, 7-8).
Em. I (J I, 26, 4-6).
Em. I (J I, 24, 26-25, 3).
of course, the definite statement that Eunomius published his work only after the death of Basil. 164 This last assertion, however, is not made by Gregory in any of the places where he discusses the matter, but since it does appear in the title given in the manuscripts of his first book, 165 and might be deduced from a hasty reading of his statements, 166 there is no reason to suppose any additional source for Photius' remarks. In view of all this, we can take it as virtually certain that Photius derived all of his information about the nature of Eunomius' book from Gregory. This greatly simplifies our problem since it reduces the evidence to an opposition between only two authors, Gregory and Philostorgius.

Important to our understanding of the problem which is raised by this opposition is the realization that Gregory nowhere states that there were not five books; he simply makes it clear that he himself possessed not more than three. How is this to be explained? Part of our problem is resolved if we take into consideration the fact that Eunomius' work did not appear as a complete whole, but that the various books were issued individually or in groups over a period of time. Both Philostorgius 167 and Gregory 168 state specifically that the

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164 Ibid. (Henri II, 106, 25-30).
165 Greg. Nyss., Dm. I (I I, 22, 3).
166 Greg., Ibid. (I I, 24, 19-25, 6); cf. also Ibid., ep. 29 (I VIII, pars ii 87, 22-88, 8).
167 Philost., h. e. VIII, 12a (GC, 115, 25).
first two books came out together. The third book appeared at a somewhat later date, as is implied by some statements of Gregory. Furthermore, the work was not easily available to the general public, at least not to begin with--Gregory had some difficulty in obtaining a copy of the first two books, and some of his other statements seem to suggest that initially it was confined to circles likely to be sympathetic. Thus it becomes perfectly understandable that Gregory might know of some parts of the work without having heard of (or at any rate seen) others. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that Philostorgius would have known the work intimately--he was himself a member of the Eunomian Church, had written an encomium of Eunomius, and had even seen him personally as a young man. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to believe that Philostorgius might have been mistaken, or would have

169 Though that does not mean that Gregory answered them together. Because of the short time he was allowed to keep the book by the person who loaned it to him (only 17 days), he was able to reply only to Eunomius' first book, ep. 29 (J VIII, pars ii 87, 8-15); later, urged on by his brother Peter, Ibid., ep. 30 (J VIII, pars ii 90, 13-25), he brought out his answer to the second book in the second book of his own treatise.

170 Greg. Nys., Eun. III, 1 (J II, 3, 5-12; 4, 18-19). There is no evidence, however, to support Jaeger's assertion that Eunomius was moved to produce the rest of his refutation because of Gregory's treatise, J II, p. IX.


172 Greg. Nys., Eun. I (J I, 24, 10-11; 26, 4-6, 15-16), all referring to the joy of Eunomius' intimates on the appearance of his work.

173 Philost., h.s. III, 21 (GCS 49, 1-2).

174 Ibid. X, 6 (GCS 128, 10-20).
accepted a lengthy spurious addition as the genuine work of Eunomius almost within the lifetime of its reputed author. Thus, we may accept it as virtually certain that in its finished form Eunomius' second work consisted of five books. This provides us with a means of understanding more clearly the book's structure. We have already seen that as it now stands in the extant fragments, the last certainly quoted citation of Basil is from the fourth chapter of his second book and that all of the citations given in books one and two of Eunomius are from the first book of Basil. This naturally suggests a very plausible arrangement of Eunomius' response to Basil: books one and two devoted to the refutation of Basil's first book; books three and four given over to answering the second; and book five dealing with Basil's very short third book. In the absence of the work itself, of course, any such reconstruction must remain conjectural, but as an extrapolation of such parts of it as we now possess, it seems entirely likely.

If we have successfully gauged the extent of Eunomius' work, the problem which now faces us is the date of the book's appearance and the occasion which warranted it. That Eunomius' reply to Basil appeared only some years after Basil had launched his attack against him is sufficiently obvious from the jeering comments of Gregory of Nyssa, who makes a series of remarks...

\[175^v\text{ supra pp. 51-52, especially n. 158.}\]
to the effect that Eunomius slaved over it for long years,\textsuperscript{176} that he passed many olympiads in its production,\textsuperscript{177} that, indeed, the whole thing took longer than the Trojan War.\textsuperscript{178} Fortunately, we are in a position to date the work with more precision than is provided by these references, and can assert with some certainty that it appeared sometime around the death of Basil the Great (1 January 379). Whether it was before or after that event, however, is more problematic. Philostorgius implies that it appeared before Basil's death, for he tells us that on reading the first two books Basil died of despair.\textsuperscript{179} On the other hand, both an early editor of Gregory of Nyssa's \textit{Contra Eunomium} and Photius understood Gregory to mean that it appeared only after Basil's death, since the title of the one and the direct statement of the other\textsuperscript{180} assert this to be the case. Gregory himself, however, does not in fact say this. All he says is that his own justification for writing at all is that the great and holy Basil is now dead.\textsuperscript{182} This is presumably the source of Photius' statement and the title found in the manuscripts of the \textit{Contra Eunomium}. Although this is certainly one possible interpretation of Gregory's statements, it

\textsuperscript{176}Grg. Nyss., \textit{Em.} I (J I, 24, 5-10).
\textsuperscript{177}Tbd. (J I, 26, 6-8).
\textsuperscript{178}Tbd. II (J I, 263, 3-6).
\textsuperscript{179}Philost., \textit{Eg.} VIII, 12 (GCS 114, 2-4, 24-26).
\textsuperscript{180}Grg. Nyss., \textit{Em.} I (J I, 22, 3).
\textsuperscript{181}Photius, \textit{cod.} 138 (Henri II, 106, 25-30).
\textsuperscript{182}Grg. Nyss., \textit{Em.} I (J I, 24, 19-25, 6).
is, as we shall see, far from being the only one. This is because although most attempts to solve this problem have been based on statements found in the Contra Eunomium, Gregory in fact makes a much more precise statement elsewhere. In the letter to his brother Peter to which we have already referred several times, Gregory mentions that he had received Eunomius' work at the time of Basil's death (καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ δούλου Βασίλειος τῆς οἰκίας), and that his natural reaction at such a time to the slanders contained in it accounts for the harshness of tone of his own work. Since Gregory had only then just heard of it, it cannot have appeared any great while prior to Basil's death. However, since Gregory mentions various "threats" which accompanied its production, presumably it was an open secret that it was forthcoming. Books one and two, then, of the Apologia Apologiae must have been published sometime during the last few months of 378, the rest appearing at intervals in the years following.

If we have sufficiently resolved the problem of the date of the book's appearance, the next question which must be considered is the occasion of its publication and why it appeared so long after the work it was in fact intended to refute. The years immediately following the publication of Eunomius' first

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183 Guerra p. 54, n. 54, n. 55, m. 169, 171. 184 Gr. Nyss., ed. 29 (I VIII, pars 11 87, 22-36, 8), as already noted by Diakamp., op. cit., pp. 9-10. 185 Gr. Nyss., Eun. I (71 24, 7-8).
apology were sufficiently eventful, both for him personally and for the world at large, to provide a sufficient explanation as to why he did not answer his attacker immediately, but a consideration of the events surrounding the appearance of his second work should enable us to explain the reasons for its publication at that time as well. Philostorgius tells us that Eunomius was exiled to Naxia (almost certainly Naxos) after Modestus had replaced Auxonius as Praetorian Prefect. Modestus became Praefectus Praetorio Orientis in 369; there is, however, some possibility that Eunomius was not exiled until 370, when Demophilus succeeded Eudocius as Bishop of Constantinople, since the former is singled out by Philostorgius as particularly hostile to the Eunomians. We have no direct information about his recall, but just prior to the entry of Theodosius into the city (24 November 380) we find Eunomius at Constantinople, feared by the Orthodox as the hope of the Arian party. This, together with the date previously established for the publication of the second apology, provides us within which to reconstruct some of the reasons which moved Eunomius to bring out this work.

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186 Cf. The medieval forms of the island's name, Naxia, Nasia, Nisla, etc.; P-W 16, 2081, 3-9.
187 Philost., h.s. IX, 11 (GCS 120, 4-7).
188 Philost., h.s. IX, 14 (GCS 122, 1-3). Though we may perhaps wonder how much difference the death of his old protector could have made to Eunomius' situation since he had broken with him sometime previously, and had even joined in consecrating a rival Bishop of Constantinople! Philost., h.s. IX, 4 (GCS 117, 1-3).
189 Soz., h.s. VII, 6 (GCS 307, 13-15).
when he did.

In the aftermath of Adrianople (9 August 378), Gratian is said by Socrates and Sozomen to have recalled the exiles and to have permitted all religious groups to assemble freely with the exception of the Manichaeans, Photinians, and Eunomians. That there was such a decree granting tolerance, described as a rescriptum issued from Sirmium, is sufficiently confirmed by another decree of Gratian's withdrawing it (given at Milan nearly a year later, 3 August 379); the actual law itself has perished. Moreover, both Socrates and Sozomen make it clear that whereas tolerance was not extended to the Manichaeans, Photinians, or Eunomians, the recall from exile was not so restricted, but applied to all. This, taken together with the date established for the publication of Eunomius' work, gives us good reason to believe that Eunomius too took advantage of the decree to return to Constantinople—probably to Chalcedon.

190 Socrates, h.e. V, 2 (PG 67, 568A-B).
191 Sozomen, h.e. VII, 1 (GC 302, 10-11).
192 Note, however, that Rufinus, h.e. XI, 13 (PL 21, 522C) ascribes this recall to a repentant Valens just after the Gothic invasion and does not mention Gratian's law at all.
193 Cod. Theod. XVI, 5, 5. (Mommsen I, pars posterior, p. 856); all ministers of such "perverse superstitions" (apparently Arians and Donatists) are to cease holding assemblies and the earlier decree is to apply only to Catholics. That the decree referred to must be one of Gratian's and not from an earlier emperor is sufficiently shown in Gothofredus VI, pp. 116-7. As for other possible references, there is nothing to indicate what is meant by the mention of a "special rescript obtained by fraud" in Cod. Theod. XVI, 5, 6. (Mommsen I, pars posterior, p. 856), but it seems unlikely that it could refer to our own decree, as implied by a note in the GC Sozomen ad loc. (p. 302).
where he had had a house and garden prior to his exile;¹⁹⁴ at any rate, at a slightly later period we find him described as living in "Bithynia near Constantinople."¹⁹⁵ These events provide us with an excellent scenario on the basis of which to explain Eunomius' actions with regard to the production of his book. No doubt he had made good use of the enforced leisure of his exile to work on a rebuttal of Basil's charges, and had completed or nearly completed the first and second books when news of his release reached him in late September or October of 378 (allowing a certain amount of time for the decree to be promulgated and disseminated). Hastening to Constantinople, he published (at first to sympathetic circles) his Apologia Apologias sometime during November or early December 378 so that a copy of it (or at least word of it) would have reached Gregory of Nyssa about the time of Basil's death on the first of January 379. After this first installment, subsequent volumes would have appeared as completed over the next few years.

¹⁹⁴Philost., h.e.-IX, 4 (GCS 117, 6-9).
¹⁹⁵Soz., h.e.-VII, 6 (GCS 307, 17-19). Although Sozomen apparently knew nothing of an exile to Naxos and visualized Eunomius' residence in Bithynia as extending from his eviction from Cyzicus until the arrival of Theodosius in Constantinople in 380, he clearly implies that the heresiarch was there at the latter date since it was crowds going out to hear him there who first drew the Emperor's attention to him. It is possible, however, that he may have moved at a later period, for he is described in Soz., h.e.-VII, 17 (GCS 324, 17-18) simply as "living in the suburbs" (ἀποστεροῦσα). However Chalcedon, even though separated from Constantinople by the Bosporus, was reckoned as only seven stades from the city (something under a mile), and thus falls well within the definition of "suburb."
If this explains the late appearance of the second apology, we must still attempt to understand more completely what it was Eunomius hoped it might accomplish, as well as the historical context of its continued publication and the use to which Eunomius put it. To do this, we must return to a consideration of the events which surrounded the appearance of the apology. The initial result of Gratian's decree must have been a considerable amount of confusion if not actual chaos. Leaders of the Church did not need the events at Antioch to warn them of the damage which might be done to the Church from the competition of several returned Bishops for the same see, and some at least tried to compose their differences with their rivals in an attempt to remedy the situation. These efforts, however, seem to have been of little avail, and Constantinople in particular (whither Eunomius had immediately gone) is described as being a hot-bed of competing sects. Although the Arian established Church of the previous reign was still officially in power (and, indeed, remained much the largest religious body in the city), the various other parties took advantage of their new freedom to reinforce their positions and gain converts. Thus the Macedonians, for instance, used this opportunity

196 Socrates, h.e. V, 5 (PG 67, 569C-572B); Sozomen, h.e. VII, 3 (GCS 304, 1-21); Thad., h.e. V, 3 (GC 279, 10-232, 8).
197 Soz., h.e. VII, 2 (GCS 303, 18-30).
198 Thad. VII, 4 (GCS 305, 8-12).
to repudiate their previous alliance with the homoousians, while among those attempting to rally their flocks in the city we find not only Eunomius, but at a slightly later date (early 379) Gregory of Nazianzus as well. Moreover, there were rumours of a meeting of Apollinarian bishops and other groups were also active. Eunomius himself was engaged in building up his followers not only in Constantinople, but even went on an organizing tour of the East, putting the affairs of the churches in order. Gregory has given us a vivid picture not only of the divisions which split the capital and the zeal with which religious controversy was pursued, but also of the inherent violence of the situation—he himself was actually mobbed in the course of the Easter celebrations of 379.

It is not without significance that during this period Gregory preached two sermons on Peace and one on Moderation in Disputes.

The problem which faces us now, however, is how we are to place Eunomius in all this. It is significant that during this period...
period an apparent change seems to have come over his approach. To begin with, as we have seen,\(^{210}\) he was extremely cautious and took care to restrict his new work to sympathetic circles. By the latter part of 380, however, we find him openly drawing large crowds to hear him speak.\(^{211}\) Since we are also told that one of his usual means of instruction was the public recitation of his writings,\(^{212}\) it is difficult not to connect a *magnus opus* produced at just this period with this activity. But how are we to account for this apparent change? Let us look again at the progress of events during this period.

When Eunomius first returned to Constantinople, Gratian was still sole Emperor, but on the 19th of January 379 he invested Theodosius with the purple as his eastern colleague. While no one would have been under any illusions as to the probable religious tendencies of a westerner chosen by an Orthodox Emperor, Theodosius' delay in entering his capital city as well as his preoccupation with fighting the barbarians must have permitted the initial chaotic conditions whereby each group was trying to increase its own influence to continue for some time. By the summer of 379, however, things had already begun to change. Quite apart from the repeal of the edict of toleration by the Emperor Gratian (3 August 379),\(^{213}\) we find that Gregory

\(^{210}\) V. supra p. 55.
\(^{211}\) Sozomen, h.e. VII, 6 (GCS 307, 17-20).
\(^{212}\) Socrates, h.e. V, 20 (PG 67, 620B-C); Sozomen, h.e. VII, 17 (GCS 324, 17-20).
\(^{213}\) Cod. Theod. XVI.5.5 (Munson I, pars posterior p. 856).
of Nazianzus had already begun to account the Emperors members of his own party:

"You have your Emperor, and I have mine; you have Ahab, and I Josiah."

If in the Summer of 379 it might still have been possible to take such allusions lightly, the events of the following year were enough to cause second thoughts. In a law dated 27 February 380 and addressed specifically to the people of Constantinople, Theodosius commanded all peoples to follow that faith delivered by the Apostle Peter to the Romans and now followed by Damasus of Rome and Peter Alexandria—further, he declared that only these were to be designated by the title "Catholic Christians." The baptism of Theodosius shortly thereafter by Ascholius, the Orthodox bishop of Thessalonica, must have made things even clearer. While the practical effect of this edict may have been for the moment negligible, it made crystal clear which way things were going. It is fortunate, therefore, that we possess an account of the Arian party's

214 Οργ. Μαξ., vol. 33, 2 (PG 36, 216C); dated to the period after Easter of 379 by P. Gallay, La vie de St. Grégoire de Nazianze (Lyons, Paris: Emmanuel Vitte, Editeur, 1943), pp. 145-146. The reference to Josiah is quite enough to show what Gregory's expectations were, even if at this stage they may have been as much pious hope as sober expectation.

215 Cod. Theod. XVI.1.2 (Mommsen I, pars posterior p. 833).

reaction:

"Εξι d' d' o'toi, plēsos d'vntes en tīs Kōnstantīni kai Θaλάντ-

ος ὥστις, ἀνέκαταν θυμίζοντες απ' ὅσιν καὶ ὁσαίας αὐτοῦ ἐκλέγοντα ἄκοαν ἀποκαλύθαι τοῦ βασιλέας Ἑπισθον 

toiv didexronaiv autóis en tois basileiois. Ἦχοιον γάρ 

ἐπιτελέσθη τῆς ἐπιχείρήσεως τὰ ἐπὶ Κωνσταντῖνος συμβάντα ομοφέντες. τὸτο δ' αὐτὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ καθόλου ἐκκλησίας 

φροντίδας καὶ φόβον ἔκβαινε ὁχ χίμαια ἐκ περιδεσκ ἣσαν 

λογιζόμενοι τὴν ἐν ταῖς διαλέξεις Εὐνομίου δεινότητα.217 

"These (Arians), however (still numerous on account of the influence of Constantius and Valens), were con-

tinuing to meet without fear and discoursing publicly about God and his essence. They persuaded some of 

their co-religionists at court to make an attempt to win over the Emperor. Indeed, looking for precedent 

to what happened under Constantius, they thought they might really succeed in their undertaking—a possi-

bility which caused heart-searchings and fear among the Catholic party, not the least part of whose apprehen-

sion came from their recognition of Eunomius’ formidable skill in debate." 

That such a plan might have succeeded was not an entirely for-

drom hope. Contemporaries did not have our own knowledge of: 

Theodosius’ subsequent policies, and certainly at this early 

date he was inclined to be conciliatory, to judge only from 

Gregory of Nazianzus’ evident dissatisfaction with him.218 

The fear that the reigning monarch might be won over by an he-

retical body seems to have been one of the abiding anxieties 

of late Roman life—even at a period when the Eunomian Church 

was in manifest decline, the Emperor Anastasius is said to have 

been publicly rebuked by the populace for Eunomian leanings, 

a story which, whatever its status as fact, fully reveals the 

217Sozomen, h.e. VII, 6 (CCS 307, 9-15). 
218Greg. Naz., CARM. Vit. 1279-1304 and following (PG 37, 
1117-1118).
reality of the concern. It is interesting from our point of view—not only because it helps us gauge the extent of Eunomius' activity, but also its effect—that it was precisely because of his preaching that Eunomius attracted the Emperor's attention. Indeed, until dissuaded by the Empress Macilla, Theodosius actually expressed a desire to meet him. The failure of the Arian plan does not make it less interesting, for it shows Eunomius as an apparent participant in a plan sponsored by the "official" Arian party—a party headed by that same Demophilus whom Philostorgius had described as a bitter opponent of Eunomius, and perhaps the immediate cause of his exile. Seemingly, then, between the time of Eunomius' cautious arrival in the city and these last desperate efforts of the Arian party to retain power, a reconciliation had taken place, even if only a temporary one.

This conclusion leaves us with a tantalizing possibility. For while the fragmentary state of the evidence makes it inevitably somewhat conjectural, it can (if true) enable us to

219 Aemomvica Valesiana, pars posterior 13, 78.
220 Sozomen, h.e. VII, 6 (GCS 307, 19-23).
221 Philost., h.s. IX, 11 (GCS 120, 4-7); v. supra p. 59. Although Sozomen is obviously ignorant of Eunomius' exile (v. supra p. 61, n. 195), he is clearly aware that a break had existed between Eunomius and the "official" Arians during the time of Eudoxius, h.s. VI, 26 (GCS 273, 10-17). He is not, therefore, likely simply to have confused the two groups. However, he also describes Demophilus and Eunomius as leaders of the Arian and Eunomian parties respectively at Theodosius' "Council of Heresies," h.s. VII, 12 (GCS 316, 1-2); this suggests that whatever modus vivendi may have been achieved previously, it was short-lived.
understand some of Eunomius' purposes in writing his second apology. The main purpose, of course, was the ostensible one—the defence of his own position against a hostile attack. However, in addition to being a step-by-step rebuttal of Basil's treatise, it was also a fairly systematic presentation of Eunomius' own theology. In this guise, there is every reason to suppose that it was used in Eunomius' public meetings as part of his attempts to spread his influence and gain converts. Certainly, he was not without success in this endeavour, and was even able to gain supporters at the Imperial court, a fact which probably explains why he was able to continue publishing his book, and was not immediately exiled. But if this was the most obvious purpose of Eunomius' treatise, the events described above suggest that it may not have been the only one. His Liber Apologeticus was, as we have seen, most probably addressed to the council of Homoean Bishops assembled at Constantinople in 360, while the immediate cause of the exile during which he wrote the first part of the Apologia Apologica was due to the hostility or the "restored Homoean supremacy" under Valens. Yet after his return from exile and the
publication of his book, we find him apparently reconciled, if only briefly, with the leaders of that supremacy. While it is easy to fall into the fallacy of post quod, propter quod, it seems not unlikely that one of the purposes of his work was his own rehabilitation in the eyes of the ruling "orthodoxy"—an aim certainly (and appropriately!) begun during his exile and partially consummated on his recall. Obviously, this conclusion is based on much that is speculative, but in view of the nature of the evidence, it does provide us with a framework within which we may plausibly understand both Eunomius' actions and some of the aims and purposes which moved him to write his second apology.

We have already noted that this work has come down to us only in fragments preserved by Gregory of Nyssa. The next problem which faces us is one which arises directly out of that fact. We must ask ourselves how accurate Gregory's quotations are, and to what extent he has conformed them to his own purposes—but more importantly we must ask how confidently we can use them ourselves. We may note in this regard that Gregory himself was perfectly prepared to accuse Eunomius of misquoting, and shows an awareness that his own accuracy might be called in question. Moreover, Gregory specifically states that at

230 Ibid. III, vii (i II, 228, 5-9), viii (i I, 251, 16-18), ix (i II, 287, 8-11).
least in some respects he is following the practice of Basil,231 and the latter's treatment of the text, while far from cavalier, is nonetheless very selective and often paraphrastic.232 Beyond this, however, Gregory's frequent use of sarcastic misapprehension233 must be taken into consideration, and we have already seen that he is not above "economizing" the truth on occasion.234 The question of accuracy, therefore, is a real one, and must be faced before we can treat the text with any confidence.

When we do look at Gregory's treatment of Eunomius, we find that at least on the surface there is good reason to believe that he does not deliberately misquote Eunomius (as opposed to interpreting him tendentiously!). We find that he several times refers his readers to the original or assumes that they have access to it and are in a position to check him.235 Moreover, when we examine his manner of citation in detail, we find that he frequently gives quite specific indications of the accuracy of his quotations. He makes a careful distinction between those cases where he is reproducing the text of Eunomius with verbatim...

231 Ibid. I (J I, 29. 15-20).
233 E.g., Grg. Nyss.; Eun. I (J I, 156, 4-160, 2; 216, 23-217, 25); II (J I, 282, 29-288, 7; 401, 10-402, 18) etc.
234 V. supra pp. 27-35.
235 Grg. Nyss.; Eun. II (J I, 385, 1-11; cf. 386, 25-29), III, v (J II, 168, 5-6); IV (J II, 287, 8-11); x (J II, 310, 28-311, 3); cf. also Ibid. III, vi (J II, 251, 16-18) where he shows that he is aware that he may be charged with conopavia.
accuracy, and those where he is epitomizing him or merely giving the general sense while using his own style and vocabulary. Insofar as he gives reasons for his practice of paraphrasing, it is generally because he says that to quote verbatim would be too tiring for himself or for his readers, or because he wants to eliminate abusive language, or so that he need not subject his readers to the roughness and verbosity of Eumomius' style. We note, too, that where he says that his paraphrase is intended to make the meaning clearer, it is

236 He expresses this in various ways (the following is virtually, but not necessarily completely exhaustive), most frequently by τὰ λέγειν. Grg. Nyss., Ep. I (J I, 71, 25-26; 142, 27-143, 2; 216, 15-16), II (J I, 262, 28-263, 3; 311, 28-29; 366, 16-18; 374, 2 [Basil]; 379, 32-380, 2), III, iii (J II, 111, 27; 129, 13-14), vi (J II, 200, 25-26), ix (J II, 271, 28-272, 1; 272, 16-17), and word (αὕτη τὴν λέξιν). Ibid. I (J I, 164, 1; 165, 20 [by way of denial]), II (J I, 303, 6; 315, 317; 318, 15-16), III, ii (J II, 52, 3-4; 82, 6-7), vii (J II, 250, 23-24); other less widely used phrases are (ὅστις) ἀπὸ τὰς ἁμαρτίας. Ibid. I (J I, 145, 20-22), II (J I, 406, 26-27), III, ix (J II, 276, 22), ἀπὸ λέξεως. Ibid. II (J I, 347, 3-4), ἀπὸ τὰς ἁμαρτίας. Ibid. III, i (J II, 76, 6-7), ἀπὸ τὰς ἁμαρτίας. Ibid. I (J I, 60, 11-12), αὕτη τὴν λέξιν. Ibid. I (J I, 145, 8-9), ἀπὸ τὰς ἁμαρτίας. Ibid. II (J I, 274, 23-24), τοὺς συνεπείς λόγους. Ibid. II (J I, 408, 12).

237 Usually expressed by the word διάλογον, e.g., Ibid. I (J I, 165, 16-20), II (J I, 347, 3-4), III, ii (J II, 73, 15-16), but also by λατσακοῦν in opposition to τὰ λέγειν. Ibid. II (J I, 366, 30-36), and by τὸν κοῦς τὸν εἰπομένου. Ibid. III, ii (J II, 53, 5-6).

238 Thus, e.g., in addition to those mentioned in the preceding note we find, Ibid. I (J I, 181, 12-18) II (J I, 282, 15-18; 302, 27-28; 372, 5-6; 391, 14-17), III, ii (J II, 116, 29-31, 17; 123, 18-20).

240 Ibid. II (J I, 262, 28-263, 3), III, ii (J II, 73, 14-19).

generally after he has already quoted the passage in full elsewhere.\footnote{242} Thus, while we have no way of checking him, and may be reasonably sure that he was prepared to put Eunomius in the worst light possible, at least on his own say-so Gregory did not substantially distort the text in reworking it. The same is probably true of his direct quotations, although we must be prepared to find some verbal discrepancies. This is illustrated by a case in which Gregory quotes the \textit{Adversus Eunomium} of Basil ἐν λέγεσιν.

Although we find that Gregory's quotation is substantially identical to that found in our own printed editions, there are enough minor discrepancies to show that not all of them can be explained on the basis of manuscript corruption;\footnote{243} the meaning has not been changed, but the precise choice of words is somewhat different. If we find this when Gregory is quoting his "Master," we may be sure of it when he is citing his opponent. The conclusion to be drawn from this seems to be that, while Gregory does not always give us Eunomius' exact words, we

\begin{verbatim}
Basil | Gregory
---+---
ciναι | εἰναι
προσηγορεύοντες | χρώμεναι
ἐπεξεταίνεμεν | ἐπιβάλλεται
τὸν | τῇ
προσηγορεύομεν | προσηγορεύομεν
καὶ | καὶ
θεοροῦντες | θεοροῦντες
ἐκάτερα | ταῦτα
\end{verbatim}
may count on him to give us the thought they represent. Indeed, any other policy would have undermined his whole purpose in writing a refutation.

If we may be confident, therefore, about the substantial veracity of Gregory when he actually quotes Eunomius, we cannot help wondering how much he has given us out of a work said to have extended to "many thousands of lines" (ἐπών). Gregory was presenting a lawyer's case, not a dispassionate disquisition, and it is only natural to suppose that he selected those passages for quotation which were most damaging to his adversary. He himself was obviously aware of the problem of selectivity, and found himself torn between a desire to avoid excessive length and the need to consider all the arguments. There is no question but that he eliminated a great deal. Fortunately, he has given us a description of his policy:

ἐπιθητικά τοίνυν δέ προκειμένων ήμεν, τούτους δέ πάνταν. τῶν λέγων ἑλέειν καὶ τοὺς ἄργον ἀναγκαστέρους μένοις ἐπιθητικά, τοῦ μὲν ἐπαχθέν τοὺς ἄκοσον, τὸ δὲ τοὺς διακάλουσιν ἅπασαν, καλοὶ ἔχειν φθειρά συνέπον τί ἐπιθητικάν ἐκατέρωθεν διότι εἰς τὸ διακόνιον. τῆς οὖν ἡ μέθοδος; πάντως τὸν κατὰ τὸ μάταιον πεπονθημένον αὐτὸ συγκεκρίσας διότι εἰς τὸν πολύν συμπεραθεῖν ἔνα διάλογον ἐπιθητικάν ἕκαστο τὰ νοηματα, διότι

244) Greg. Nyss., Pan. II (I I, 325, 24). The lines referred to, however, may be those of Gregory's refutation, rather than Eunomius' apology.

245) Ibid. II (I I, 324, 30-325, 28), III, ix (I I, 279, 24-280, 17).

246) Thus, e.g., Ibid. II (I I, 341, 22-26), III, v (I I, 182, 19-21), VIII (I I, 247, 14-20), ix (I I, 279, 24-280, 3).
"Two roads, then, lie before us—either to go over the work in complete detail, or to touch only on its stronger points—the one burdensome to the hearers, the other an opening for critics. I think, therefore, a kind of middle way the best, as putting to flight (so far as possible) the accusations of either side. What then is to be our method? Clearing aside as far as we can all the rubbish of his useless productions, we shall briefly touch on the main points of his arguments. Thus we shall neither rashly plunge ourselves into his nonsense, nor pass over any saying unexamined."

Hence, while treating the work sequentially, Gregory will attempt to deal only with its more important arguments, passing over those of lesser significance.

On the whole Gregory’s statement is supported by the evidence of the work itself. It is clear that in general Gregory discusses each part of Demosthenes’ apology in turn. For example, he occasionally gives indications of the structure of the work, and mentions the preface or the end of a book. He frequently draws attention to the fact that his quotations are consecutive by the use of such phrases as "the following" (ἐκκλαμοθεί)," or "after a little he adds," or "immediately".
following."\textsuperscript{252} However, if we can be fairly sure that Gregory follows Eunomius \textit{grosso modo}, the same cannot always be said in detail. Quite apart from the fact that the sheer number of omissions sometimes makes it difficult to follow the train of Eunomius' thought, it is clear that Gregory occasionally re-arranges the argument or cites it only in random fragments. Thus, in his reulation of the opening section of Eunomius' first book, he asks the point of going over the whole thing in order (\textit{κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου τάξιν}).\textsuperscript{253} Indeed, between the very allusive manner of quotation and the fact that Gregory apparently went over the same material several times, it is now virtually impossible to restore the sequence with any confidence. Elsewhere we find several instances of places where Gregory re-arranged the order to suit his own convenience.\textsuperscript{254} Thus, while we may be sure that Gregory follows the main lines of Eunomius' text, there are enough exceptions to make us cautious.

When we turn to Gregory's actual omissions, we find that we can place them under a number of headings. Apart from his use of paraleipsis,\textsuperscript{255} we find that he passes over sections because they are unimportant, stupid or vain,\textsuperscript{256} because they

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{252}Ibid. I (J I, 146, 20-21).
\item \textsuperscript{253}Ibid. (J I, 22, 21-22).
\item \textsuperscript{254}\textit{e.g.}, Ibid. III, 1 (J II, 6, 1-6; omitted passage given 27, 21-22; 47, 21-25), iii (J II, 119, 4-9), viii (J II, 217, 13-16).
\item \textsuperscript{255}\textit{e.g.}, Ibid. II (J I, 311, 18-23; 345, 25-346, 6; 398, 4-6; 399, 16-400, 7).
\item \textsuperscript{256}Ibid. I (J I, 29, 11-17); II (J I, 339, 8-15; 342, 15-21; 403, 5-10); III, 11 (J II, 122, 5-9).
\end{itemize}
are too ridiculous to bother refuting²⁵⁷ because they do not contribute to the argument,²⁵⁸ or might weary his readers,²⁵⁹ because he needs to get on to more important matters,²⁶⁰ or sees no reason to repeat something already refuted,²⁶¹ because he fears to revolt his readers,²⁶² or (most often) does not wish to retail abuse.²⁶³ A varied list, but sufficient to show us the extent of Gregory's omissions as well as the possibility of distortion which may arise from them. It seems, then, that our greatest problems in dealing with the Apologia will arise not from what Gregory gives us, but from what he does not. Within limits we can accept the passages which Gregory does quote as substantially accurate—what we frequently cannot do is judge those quotations within their context, and this must inevitably give rise to distortions. In dealing with this most important of Eunomius' works, then, we shall be able to make substantial use of the text transmitted to us by Gregory, but we must always do so with the proviso that we frequently cannot judge its context, and that many of the

²⁵⁷ Ibid. II (J I, 363, 13-16; 385, 1-11), III, v (J II, 166, 24-156, 2), vii (J II, 205, 9-12).
²⁵⁸ Ibid. II (J I, 360, 10-12).
²⁵⁹ Ibid. II (J I, 323, 16-23; 324, 19-29).
²⁶⁰ Ibid. I (J I, 71, 3-17).
²⁶¹ Ibid. II (J I, 336, 17-20; 378, 14-16), III, vi (J II, 185, 30-10), viii (J II, 247, 14-20).
²⁶² Ibid. II (J I, 393, 1-13), III, v (J II, 168, 8-11).
²⁶³ Ibid. I (J I, 49, 24-50, 2; 53, 11-13; 164, 5-10; 165, 28-165, 2), II (J I, 313, 10-14; 356, 6-7; 357, 9-15; 359, 14-18; 406, 16-18, 23-27; 407, 16-23), III, iii (J II, 117, 15-17).
surviving fragments have been chosen for their damaging potential.

D. The Expositio Fidel.

The conclusions which we have reached in the preceding discussion are naturally only as accurate as we can make them in the absence of the original text. It is therefore fortunate that in the last of Eunomius' surviving works we are able to check Gregory's citations against the independent tradition of the manuscripts.264 The work in question is Eunomius' so-called "Ἑκατειρία τῆς Πίστεως, or Confession of Faith. Its production is connected with the events following the first Council of Constantinople in 381. When Theodosius the Great attempted to put into effect the Council's first Canon re-affirming the Nicene faith and anathematizing all the heresies (including those of the Eunomians and Arians),265 there were severe civil disturbances protesting the eviction of the dissenting bishops from their Churches.266 In an attempt to achieve an accommodation, if not a reconciliation, with the dissident groups,

264 Though it should be noted that this work has actually been transmitted via manuscripts of Gregory's refutation of it; cf. Appendix II, B, pp. 51*-52*. Despite this fact, there seems to have been very little mutual contamination.


266 Socrates, H. e. V, 10 (PG 67, 584A-B), Sozomen, H. e. VII, 12 (GCS 314, 17-19).
Theodosius decided to call a conference of all the sects, and this conference actually met in June during the consulate of Merobaudes (II) and Saturninus (A.D. 383). The initial plan was that there should be a free discussion of the issues, but the Emperor was dissuaded from this by the efforts of the Archbishop, Nectarius, and it was proposed instead that the discussion be based on the writings of those Fathers who had lived before the divisions had arisen in the Church. When the heretics could reach no agreement about this procedure, the Emperor suggested that each group present a written account of its teachings. By thus preventing any free discussion, Nectarius achieved what was no doubt his aim, and effectively frustrated any weakening of Nicene Orthodoxy, as well as any positive result which might have come out of the conference. The upshot of all this was that in the end the Emperor accepted only the profession of faith made by the Novatians (as affirming the Ἀξιότικος), and tore up (ἦλθον) all the others. He then issued an omnius edict against the heretics (25 July 383), followed by another later on in the same year (3 December 383).
ber 383), and others of gradually increasing severity in the years following. Any accommodation which might have existed between Demophilus and Eunomius had by now obviously (and, be it said, understandably) broken up, for we find each representing his respective party at the conference. Eunomius joined with the others in presenting his profession of faith. That the profession then presented to the Emperor and that preserved in our manuscripts are identical is virtually guaranteed by Gregory of Nyssa's quotations and the reference to \( \tau \varepsilon\nu \beta \alpha\varsigma\iota\varsigma\iota\lambda\iota \kappa\iota \pi\rho\sigma\tau\alpha\gamma\iota\dot{e} \) in the confession itself. We may therefore be reasonably confident of the identity as well as of the authenticity of the work under consideration.

When we begin to look at the actual text of this document, we find that it divides easily into a Creed of four main sections, together with an introduction and a conclusion:

\[\text{Cod. Theod. XVI.5.12 (Komm. T., pars posterior, pp. 859-860).}\]
\[\text{Demophilus would scarcely have wished to be associated with a body already increasingly singled out for punitive action by the government. As Gothofredus (Vol. VI, p. 123a) remarks in his comments on Cod. Theot. XVI.5.3, this period sees the beginning of really separate Eunomian activity.}\]
\[\text{Socrates, h.e. V, 10 (PG 67, 588B), Sozomen, h.e. VII, 12 (CGS 316, 1-2).}\]
\[\text{Q. King, op. cit., p. 5\#, n. 1 seems to us to be clearly wrong in referring the Empress Flacilla's successful attempt to prevent the Emperor from seeing Eunomius to this period (Sozomen, h.e. VII, 6; CGS 307, 19-23). Apart from the fact that such an action would have made a conference pointless, Sozomen is clearly referring to an earlier period.}\]
\[\text{Em., ep. fid. 53\#, II-12; as already noted by Valensiuss, PG 67, 592D.}\]
Introduction (53*, 2-14).
II. The Profession of Faith (53*, 15-60*, 27)
A. The One and only true God (53*, 15-
   34*, 24*).
C. The Counselor, the Spirit of Truth
   (58*, 3-59*, 25).
D. The Future Judgement (60*, 1-27).
III. Conclusion (60*, 28-61*, 3).

It is evident that Eunomius had few expectations of actually
conciliating the Emperor. His pointed (and slightly nervous)
citation of Matt. 10: 32-33,278 and defensively emphatic assertion that he had neither omitted or added anything279 bring
this out clearly. On the whole, then, this document is an un-
compromising presentation of Eunomius’ teaching. On the other
hand, it is not a deliberately provocative one, and in many
ways it is chiefly notable for what it does not say. Apart from
a few possibly offensive phrases such as οὗ δύνασθαι τις φησίν
σχετόμενον,280 there is a distinct muting of many of the most
characteristic Eunomian catch-phrases. We find no mention of
γέννημα ή ἀνόμοιος, and even γέννημα281 is played down
in favor of less suspect words such as δὲ παντοκράτορ282 Likewise,
when speaking of the Divine Persons, such words as πατήμα283
and άγγελοι284 are used very cautiously indeed. It is obvious

278 Ibid. 53*, 4-8.
279 Ibid. 60*, 30-34.
280 Ibid. 53*, 26-27.
281 Ibid. 55*, 2; 57*, 1, 2.
282 Ibid. 54*, 4-5; 57*, 25-27; 57*, 2-3.
283 Ibid. 58*, 17.
284 Ibid. 58*, 19.
that wherever possible Eumomius sought to use Scriptural and conciliatory language, but he nowhere retreated from the full rigour of his acknowledged position.

While Eumomius' profession of faith may have been an "occasional" work in one sense, it is clear that it was soon put to use in a broader context. Gregory of Nyssa elected to write a refutation of it largely because it was being used in Eumomian missionary activity and might lead many of the simpler sort astray. It thus provides us with the single instance of a work by Eumomius which has survived both in the quotations of Gregory of Nyssa and in a separate manuscript tradition. Since elsewhere it is impossible to check Gregory's accuracy, this provides us with our sole opportunity to make an estimate of the manner of Gregory's quotations of Eumomius and the accuracy of them. In the past this work has been hampered by the existence of numerous serious discrepancies between the printed text and Gregory's quotations. Indeed, Albertz found them so great that he actually postulated two separate recensions. Examination of the surviving manuscripts, however, reveals that while there are indeed two recensions, one of them is the editor's.

Some of the discrepancies seem due to a slip of
the eye on the part of either the editor or the printers, 288 while others are definitely due to editorial changes. 289 A comparison of the manuscript tradition with Gregory's quotations reveals that all of the remaining discrepancies may be explained on the basis of normal manuscript corruption or the vagaries of Gregory's manner of citation. There is no reason to resort to the hypothesis of two ancient recensions.

In our treatment of Gregory's citations of Eumenius' longer work, we dealt first with his actual quotations, and then passed on to his choice of material and omissions—we shall use a like method here. Of the five cases where the differences between Gregory's readings and those of the manuscripts are of genuine theological significance, three at least prove Gregory to be in the right. Thus, at 55*, 290 we find that Gregory reads νιὸν ἀληθινὸν for the manuscripts' κρύον ἀληθινὸν ὑπὸν. While it is perhaps not impossible that Eumenius' might have been

288 Thus, the omission of τοῦ κυρίου at 53*, 17; of one καὶ at 53*, 28, and another at 54*, 5; the omission of ἔλαιον at 54*, 22; Πατρὸς for πνεύματος at 56*, 1; oδέν for ὁδὲ at 56*, 11; ἐπικύρωσαν for ἐπικύρωσαν at 57*, 10; ἢ for ἢ' at 57*, 21; the omission of ὁμι at 57*, 24 (editorial?); γενομένων ὧστε γενομένων at 60*, 13.

290 Thus καὶ ἢ' for ἢ' καὶ at 53*, 15; ὅπως ἄνευ γεννήσεως πρὸ τοῦ εἰναί, an attempt to correct the obviously wrong ὅπως ἄνευ πρὸ τοῦ εἰναί γεννήσεως at 55*, 4—5; ὑπὲρανγειών at 55*, 7 (there is clearly a mistake in the mss. at this line); παρασκευήν for the difficult παρασκευήν (very near to the correct παρασκευήν) at 60*, 18. It is only fair to mention changes in which Valesius was correct (apart from mere changes in spelling); ἐρᾶνυ for ἐρᾶνυ at 55*, 7; ἀλαγμον for ἀλαγμον at 55*, 21; τοῦ for τοῦ at 60*, 7; ὅν for ὅν at 60*, 31.

290 All numbers in the text refer to the exp. fid. unless it is specifically indicated to the contrary.
prepared (with appropriate qualifications) to speak of "Christ, true God," it seems unlikely that would have done so here—it would have provided such an excellent handle for Gregory! The real source of the discrepancy is not far to seek: at some point in the manuscript tradition, a scribe read the abbreviation IT as EN and a subsequent copyist tried to remedy the matter by adding EN after Δηνεν, thus completing the familiar phrase "true God." Our other two cases are both examples of omissions by the manuscripts which can be supplied from Gregory.291 In the first case, we find at 55*, 3 a line in Gregory which is absent from the manuscripts, Δηνεν γενησενα προ αλωνω. This seems to be the accidental omission of a scribe. Gregory's reading is clearly correct because it makes sense of the following line, ου γενεσενα τον ελεον γενησεως δυσορα-ζωνινου ιουν, which would be difficult to explain coming immediately after χριστου Δηνεν ιουν, ου Γενενον, even if we read the correct ιουν Δηνενον (it would destroy the parallelism). Here again the discrepancy is resolved in Gregory's

291 There is one case, however, where a supposed lacuna in the manuscript text results from a misunderstanding of Gregory. In the text of the Expositio which he reconstructs from the citations found in Gregory's Refutation, Albertz (op. cit., p. 45), after following Gregory's order in reversing ου ευς ου ιουν ευς and ου ευς Δηνενευς Δηνενευς (56*, 34-57*, 1), adds the following reading: ου γε Δηνενευς ιουν Δ ιουν. This is based on Grg. Nyss., conf. (J II, 377, 28), where this line immediately follows ου ευς Δηνενευς Δηνενευς, but the parallelism with a similar case in the preceding line shows that this passage is simply an editorial paraphrase of Gregory's.
favor. The third case, at 58*, 6-7, is one where Gregory gives the reading ἐπὶ τοῦ μονογένου εἰς τοῦ μονογένους for the manuscripts: ἐπὶ τοῦ μονογένους. That Gregory's is the correct reading is obvious. Not only does it fit Eunomius' theology better, but the origin of the error through saut du même au même is fairly clear. We might note, too, that if the error occurred in an uncial manuscript without word-divisions, the scribe's eye would have run easily from τούτον γένος to τούτον γένος. In all three cases under discussion, then, Gregory's reading has shown itself to be accurate, and the discrepancies can be most adequately explained on the basis of manuscript corruption rather than theological bias. The example to which we now turn, however, is somewhat less clear, though its lack of clarity is due rather to variations in the manuscript tradition of Gregory's own treatise than to any doubts about the honesty of his quotation. At any rate, at 53*, 26-27 the manuscripts of the Expositio all read αἷς δόσισες θεῷ σκηνασατόν, as do most of the manuscripts of Gregory's Refutatio. However, one of Gregory's manuscripts, that designated "A" by Jaeger, a manuscript which elsewhere preserves many unique correct readings (as well as not a few incorrect scribal emendations) gives the reading as: αἷς δόσισες θεῷ σκηνασας. Elsewhere the same manuscript reads αἷς.

292 See J II, pp. XLI-XLVII.
Despite the sheer number of witnesses against this reading and a certain amount of inconsistency within the manuscript itself, there is a great likelihood that it is in fact correct. ‘Ὑποστάσεις τρείς’ while hardly an impossibility for its time, is more probably to be explained as a banalization of ἐπόστασιν τρισον than the reverse. Certainly, it is difficult to understand why a later scribe would have changed the familiar ὑποστάσεις τρείς for so authentically archaic a usage of ἐπόστασις. The use of σχισματικόμενον for σχίζομεν is perhaps an attempt to tone down the blasphemous implications of the latter. Moreover, the reading of A fits in much better with Eumenius' aim of bringing out the full Sabellian implications of the Orthodox position, and is in keeping with his usage elsewhere. On the whole, then, although absolute certainty is impossible, the weight of the evidence lies on the side of Gregory. Our final example is more ambiguous than the others in that it involves a change in the order of the words. This alters the emphasis, but does not entirely change the meaning. We have already seen from the

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294 Ibid. (J II, 326, 6-7, 18); note also the reading of L at J II, 326, 6-7, σχιζομενον, and the reading of A, σχιζομενον and σχιζοστα, as opposed to the σχισματικόμενον and σχισματικότερα of all the others at J II, 326, 24 and 327, 2-3 respectively. 295 Cf. also the reading of L cited in the preceding note, as it may give a hint as to the beginning of the process of corruption; a scribe may have assumed that four letters had accidentally dropped out at that point and attempted an emendation. 296ib. apol. II (22*, 5-10); cf. also apol. II (40*, 31), 28 (47*, 17), as well as apol. apol. III (J II, 76, 10).
examples considered earlier that Gregory may largely exonerated from any charge of deliberately altering the text for theological reasons. If this is true grosso modo, however, other evidence suggests that we cannot always be so confident of his accuracy in detail. However innocent his motives, it is clear that at many points he does not always quote completely ad litteram. So here: we find that in his quotation of 56*, 29-32, he first gives the reading in the form ἔμοιον τῇ γεννήσαντι κατ' ἔκατον διοικήτα μᾶς κατὰ τὴν ἱδακοῦσαν ἐννοιαν, while only a few pages later he presents with a reading identical to that which is found in the manuscripts, ἔμοιον ... τῇ γεννήσαντι μᾶς κατʼ ἔκατον διοικήτα κατὰ τὴν ἱδακοῦσαν ἐννοιαν.

It would be easy to take this variation as a simple reflection of a corruption in the manuscript tradition were it the only example. In fact, however, we find that there are several such instances—the citation is given in different forms, only one of which corresponds to that found in our manuscripts. Thus, to begin with an example which would make some difference to our understanding of the text, in his main quotation of 54*, 12-13 Gregory gives the reading exactly as it is found in our manuscripts, ἀλήθεια ἐν ἐργοις, ἀλήθεια ἐν λόγοις, while when he refers back to it in a later discussion, he gives it

298Ibid. (I II, 377, 2-4).
as ἰστός ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἰστός ἐν ἔργοις. This again might be regarded as insufficient to established the existence of a tendency because the great distance which separates the two quotations in Gregory's work might be regarded as supplying an adequate explanation of their differences, but further examples confirm that there in fact is one. To take only the example which displays the greatest number of variants, we find that in citing 51*, 17, Gregory gives the reading round in the manuscripts three times, τὴν ἱςαν ὁδόν, the variant τὴν ἱςαν ὁδόν once, and twice simply τὴν ὁδόν, Very few of the remaining variants are of sufficient importance to do more than alter the mance of a phrase, but they are too numerous to be explained solely on the basis of textual corruption, and thus show us a genuine tendency of Gregory's.

300 Ibid. (J II, 371, 6-7).
301 Ibid. (J II, 334; 8; 336, 2; 337, 23).
302 Ibid. (J II, 335, 1).
303 Ibid. (J II, 335, 10; 337, 4).
304 This at 54*, 4-5 we have. Ibid. (J II, 327, 27), ὁ παντοκράτωρ, while at Ibid. (J II, 303, 22) simply παντοκράτορας as in the mss. at 55*, 27-28, Ibid. (J II, 363, 20; 364, 9-10) gives the mss. ὁ δὲ τοῦ παντοκράτορος, while Ibid. (J II, 363, 7) reads τοῦ παντοκράτορος θεοῦ; at 56*, 24-25 we find at Ibid. (J II, 369, 24-25; 372, 19-20) the order ὁ ὁπλισμός ἐν λόγοις, ὁ ἐν ἔργοις, while Ibid. (J II, 370, 23-24) has that of the mss. (abbreviated), ὁ ποιήματος ἐργοῦ, ἐν λόγοις; the mss.'s reading of 58*, 6-7, ὑπὸ τοῦ μόνου θεοῦ is found at Ibid. (J II, 392, 23-24), but παρὰ τοῦ μόνου θεοῦ at Ibid. (J II, 395, 6-7); at 58*, 13-14, αὐτόν ἐκὼν διεγερτῇ is read, Ibid. (J II, 397, 24-25), while Ibid. (J II, 403, 7-8) reads with the mss. αὐτόν ἐκὼν δίκαιον διεγερτῇ; at 58*, 26-59*, 1, the reading follows the mss.; but at Ibid. (J II, 403, 7-8) we find κεφαλήματος παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ for the correct κεφαλήματος ἐν' αὐτοῖς καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς of Ibid. (J II, 402, 7); finally at 59*, 8-11, Ibid. (J II, 404, 23) reads κατενάθηνα for the mss.'s πρὸς κατανοήσῃ at Ibid. (J II, 405, 9).
If we are unable to find any evidence that the changes introduced by Gregory derive from a theological bias, we must then ask the nature of their real origin. A likely possibility for this would seem to be the manner of the book’s composition. Like many ancient books, Gregory’s work was very probably dictated. Indeed, in a letter apparently referring to his refutation of Eunomius’ larger work, Gregory gives us an insight into his method. In apologizing to friends for the delay in sending them a copy of the work, Gregory complains of the dearth of writers in Cappadocia, and seems to distinguish three stages in the composition of the work: the period of study and preparation, then the actual dictation to a secretary (μεταγραφης), and finally the production of a fair copy by the transcriber and proof-reader (δ μεταγραφης). When we consider the impassioned tone of the work together with its probable oral composition, the source of these variations is not far to seek. We can almost visualize Gregory storming back and forth across the room while dictating and occasionally consulting his opponent’s treatise before launching off on a new tirade. The very nature of the book’s production made minor variations inevitable. It is with some relief, then, that we are able to

306 Ibid. (J VIII, pars ii 48, 23-49, 1).
307 Ibid. (J VIII, pars ii 49, 1-2), parallel by chiasmus with δ τε γραφης of Ibid. (J VIII, pars ii 49, 4).
308 Ibid. (J VIII, pars ii 49, 1), parallel by chiasmus with δ δοκιμαζον τα γεγραμενα of (J VIII, pars ii 49, 1-5).
report that they are minor. We may not always be able to trust Gregory's exact choice of words, but there is no evidence of deliberate misquotation. Within the limits we have established, therefore, we can use Gregory's text with confidence as the basis of our own arguments.

If we may be assured of the value of what Gregory does quote, greater problems arise with what he does not. Before going on to discuss this problem with respect to the *Expositio Fidei*, however, it will be necessary to keep in mind a preliminary caution. Eunomius' confession of his faith is a very short work, and this inevitably means that Gregory must have dealt with it in a manner different from that with which he treated the very much longer *Apologia Apologiae*. We must certainly expect that Gregory quoted a great deal more proportionately of the *Expositio* than of the larger work, but with this proviso our examination of it should still yield us some insight into the manner in which Gregory cites Eunomius. When we actually turn to the examination of the work itself, we find that there are indeed substantial omissions. In fact, these omissions are so substantial that Albertz regarded them as evidence for the existence of two recensions. 309 Indeed, we find that, even apart from a more detailed examination, Gregory does not quote

309 Albertz, op. cit., pp. 47-49; despite his recognition that many lacunae in Gregory must derive from the "fragmentarischen Überlieferung" of the text (p. 47), he seems to consistently assume that what is not actually quoted did not, therefore, exist.
either the Introduction (53*, 2-14), the Conclusion (60*, 28-61*, 3), or the final paragraph of the Creed dealing with the Future Judgement (60*, 1-27). These omissions, however, are in keeping with Gregory's stated policy that he is only going to give a partial quotation of his opponent's text in his own refutation. 

Since none of these paragraphs contain matter under dispute, their omission is perfectly explicable without resorting to Albertz's hypothesis of a lost recension.

When we turn to examine the paragraphs which are quoted in detail, however, we find that they too have substantial lacunae. The first and third paragraphs of the creed proper, those dealing with the Unbegotten and the Counselor, are quoted almost without omission. The same cannot be said by any means of the central and longest paragraph, however, that

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310 Gr. Nysa., conf. (J II, 320, 8-9); in Albertz's defence, however, it must be said that the phrase κατὰ μέρος did not occur in the mss. on which the Migne edition was based (PG 45, 476A).

311 In the first paragraph there is an apparent omission of 54*, 15-16, τροσης καὶ μεταβολῆς ἐλεέος, ὡς ἄκατος. This is partly due to a slip of Jaeger's in not italicizing the line and partly to Gregory's not specifically introducing it as a quotation (J II, 333, 20, 21). In the final paragraph there is another apparent omission at 59*, 17-18, πλακαμένους ἐπιστρέφων (J II, 406, 21), but this is most probably due to an error in the mss. of Gregory, since the missing line is plainly alluded to at J II, 407, 4. Another omission in this paragraph is that at 59*, 7-8, where Gregory apparently omits the phrase τῷ [ἐν]εκάμενῳ διδώντος τὴν κάρα (J II, 404, 20). Although this phrase is somewhat suspect to begin with, we note that it is omitted by mss. FZ, and the phrase may be a gloss (though is J II, 404, 21-22 an echo?)
dealing with the Son. Two substantial omissions are to be found at 56*, 3-18 and 57*, 26-58*, 2, while 56*, 34-57*, 4 is cited only very fragmentarily and 57*, 20-26 is considerably abbreviated.\textsuperscript{312} There are other problems as well, but for the moment we shall limit our discussion to these passages. Despite the fact that Gregory does give a partial quotation of 57*, 20-26, it will be best for our purposes if we treat 57*, 20-26 and 57*, 26-58*, 2 as a single omission, thus reducing the passages under consideration to three. When we do begin to look at these passages on this basis, we find that similar reasons are given for the omission of both the two main omitted sections, 56*, 3-18 and 57*, 20-58*, 2. One of Gregory's problems in refuting Eunomius' treatise was that there were not a few passages to which it would be difficult to take exception (though this certainly did not prevent him from trying!);\textsuperscript{313} passages which were, as he himself puts it, like "bread mixed with sand," sound doctrine with heresy.\textsuperscript{314} He gives us a specific statement as to what

\textsuperscript{312} In addition to the major lacunae mentioned above, there are a number of minor ones: δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διαφώτισε γεννηθέντα τοῦ πατρὸς at 55*, 16-17, and ό τὴν βασιλείαν at 55*, 22. The latter is very probably an oversight or fault in the manuscript tradition (see comment on 59*, 17-18 in the preceding note); the former, however, may not actually have been read by Gregory, and may therefore be a gloss; in introducing 55*, 19, the line which immediately follows, Gregory says, ἂν τὸ εὐπρόσωπον τοῦ εἰρήματος... conf. (\textsuperscript{J} II, 361, 12-13), which may indicate that in his manuscript there was no intervening material.

\textsuperscript{313} Note, e.g., his scurrilous misapprehension of the phrase ἐπάνω ἐξοκομοῦσα (59*, 11) in Grg. Nyss., conf. (\textsuperscript{J} II, 405, 11-18).
his policy is when faced with such passages:

"That which is incoherently set out in the following I think it best to pass over—not as being immune to criticism, but as being the kinds of things which even religious men might say if only they were detached from their malignant context. Indeed, if there is anything put forth by him which might tend to true religion, it is only as bait laid out for the simple, so that they may swallow the hook of impiety along with it."

This is his justification for the omission of 56*, 3-18, but he gives very similar reasons for his decision not to cover 57*, 20-58*, 2 in detail (τὰ ἄστα Ἡσαῦρα): the uncritical will only see the teachings of Holy Scripture, while the discerning will be able to recognize that none of it is free from heretical villainy.316 The only part of this section which he does quote (in an abbreviated form), 57*, 20-26,317 he cites because it is a kind of foundation of their impiety.318 Thus the main reason why these large sections were eliminated, whether in whole or in part, is that fundamentally they were unexceptional apart from the name of their author. It will be important to keep this in mind as we use Gregory's quotations. Such a policy is certainly
perfectly understandable in a refutation, and might even have been supposed a priori, but the evidence for it which we have examined warns us to be conscious at all times of the one-sidedness which this must inevitably introduce into the selection of quotations made on such a basis.

This leaves one of the three passages cited above still to be discussed, 56*, 31-57*, 4*. The problem which it raises is not that it is altogether omitted, but that it is quoted only in a very fragmentary form, and that not in the order found in the manuscripts. Thus, the two parenthetical clauses, ὅπερ ἔστιν ἄγγελος τοῦ παντοκράτορος καὶ χάρις διὰ τῆς συμφωνίας (57*, 2-4), are eliminated altogether, while the main clauses, οὐδὲ δὲ νῦν νῦν (56*, 34) and οὐδὲ ἄγεννήτως ἄγεννήτως (56*, 35-57*, 1), are given in reverse order. There is very little doubt that Gregory's text had the same order as our own, and none at all that it contained the omitted sections: in the first case this is guaranteed by the quotation of another parenthetical clause for which 56*, 35 provides the parallel, ὅπερ ἐκεῖ ὁ πατὴρ (56*, 33-34), and in the second by a manifest allusion to the missing line.

Thus, a genuine change by Gregory is involved here and not a variant manuscript tradition. The reason for the changes is

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319 Ibid. (J II, 377, 11-12).
320 Ibid. (J II, 377, 9-10).
321 Ibid. (J II, 377, 4-5).
322 Ibid. (J II, 378, 25-26).
not far to seek: the citation of the passages has been conformed to the exigencies of the theological discussion. Starting from the mention of an ἐκάπετον διωτόμα at 56*, 30–31, Gregory indulged in an extended discussion of the various meanings of "likeness",\(^3\) in the light of which he then discussed the text of Eunomius, citing only those passages which had relevance for his argument and giving them in the order which that argument required.\(^4\) The result is that while we can catch a glimpse of what Eunomius is trying to say, our detailed understanding of it is impaired. Although we can once again exonerate Gregory of any deliberate attempt to deceive, we must inevitably recognize that if we had been unable to check him against the original, we would have found it very difficult to achieve a complete understanding of Eunomius. It is clear, then, that in dealing with passages cited by Gregory on passant, we are reasonably safe from intentional distortion, but must use them with a consciousness of the selectivity with which they have been chosen.

If this completes our discussion of the main lacunae, there still remain some problems. The first is that of paraphrase. For instance, at 57*, 9–12 we find a gap which has been replaced by Gregory with a paraphrase.\(^5\) In view of the number of times

\(^3\)Ibid. (5 II, 375, 2–376, 28).
\(^4\)Ibid. (5 II, 376, 28–378, 41).
\(^5\)Ibid. (5 II, 383, 6–9).
that this device is used in the Apologia Apologiae, it is unfortunate that this is the only relatively lengthy example of such a technique found in the Expositio. The reason for its adoption at this point is no doubt similar to that given for the use of extensive omissions elsewhere—that of itself it contains nothing objectionable. It is with relief, however, that we may note that while there is very little verbal identity with the original, the thoughts expressed are identical: both mention the flood of Noah, the destruction of the Sodomites, and the judgement of the Egyptians. As an example, this passage is insufficiently large to give us a really firm basis for judgement, but it does provide us with at least some confirmation of Gregory's accuracy.

Our next problem is raised by the passage which immediately follows this one, 57*, 13-18. At first sight it seems to have been omitted altogether. We have already seen, however, examples of passages which Gregory does not quote in proper order, both in Momius' larger work and in that under discussion. A search rapidly reveals that the greatest part of the omitted section (57*, 14-16) had already been quoted at an earlier point in the discussion. The quotation is somewhat paraphrastic and is given only as a by-product of the earlier

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326v. supra pp. 70-72.
327v. supra pp. 71-75.
328v. supra pp. 86-87, mn. 299, 300.
discussion, but the fact that it is out of sequence is clearly indicated by the use of the words ἐν τοῖς ἔντομοι in the introduction,330 and by the specific statement in the introduction of the fragment which follows it that that fragment preceded this one.331 And yet if we did not have the actual text against which to compare the readings, we would be hard put to place the citation properly. It is quoted by Gregory in the context of his discussion of 55*, 24-29,332 and is separated by very nearly two pages in our edition from its actual locus at 57*, 14-16. This is one of the problems we must constantly bear in mind when dealing with the fragments of Eumomius' lost work. There is no apparent attempt to deceive on Gregory's part (since he presumes that his readers have the text), but de facto the sequence of thought has been considerably obscured.

The final problem which is raised by the evidence of the Expositio Fidel is that there may be quotations which in the absence of the text we cannot recognize as such. There are two examples in the text before us, 55*, 7-8 and 56*, 27-29. In each case, though in different ways, we would have found it difficult to recognize a textual allusion if we did not in fact possess the actual text. In the case of the second, 56*, 27-29, we are on somewhat firmer ground since it is made clear by Gregory

\[330\text{Tid.}\quad (II, 363, 1).
\[331\text{Tid.}\quad (II, 363, 4).
\[332\text{Tid.}\quad (II, 361, 25-368, 10).\]
that the sentence does deal with the actual words of Eunomius.\textsuperscript{333} However, almost nothing betrays the fact that the words quoted come from what would be the next line of the \textit{Expositio} following the last discussed by Gregory. Only three words are given, ὑδὲν and μονογενὴς θεός, and without the actual witness of the manuscripts we would find it impossible to identify the line as τοῦτον ὑδὲν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ μονογενὴς θεός. This is doubly true because the words in question occur in the preceding lines of the \textit{Expositio} as well, 56\textsuperscript{a}, 22, 23, 24—since these lines are themselves cited by Gregory,\textsuperscript{334} it would be perfectly natural to assume that the reference was to them. Our other example, 55\textsuperscript{a}, 7-8, is a quotation by Eunomius of Proverbs 8: 22. It would have been even more difficult to discern without the actual text. Gregory does indeed give an extended discussion of the passage,\textsuperscript{335} but introduction to it gives no indication that it actually occurs in the work he is refuting, Ἀλλὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἡγοῦν πάντως προφέρουσιν . . .\textsuperscript{336} Moreover, Gregory quotes the passage of Scripture directly from the Bible,\textsuperscript{337} and not in the abridged form used by Eunomius.\textsuperscript{338} Both these cases call our attention (albeit in different ways) to a single problem—that

\textsuperscript{333}Ibid. (J II, 374, 24–27).

\textsuperscript{334}Ibid. (J II, 369, 20–25).

\textsuperscript{335}Ibid. (J II, 358, 7–360, 14).

\textsuperscript{336}Ibid. (J II, 358, 7).

\textsuperscript{337}Ibid. (J II, 358, 8–9).

\textsuperscript{338}There is, however, something clearly wrong with the text at this point in the manuscripts, though exactly what is difficult to decide. It is nonetheless quite clear that Eunomius did not use a simple quotation of the LXX.
there will be many occasions in our reading of Gregory's treatise against Eunomius where we may not be able to recognize a quotation or allusion. Careful attention to the text may help us to alleviate this in part, but we must be prepared to face the fact that in some cases the quotations are lost beyond recall.

This completes our discussion of Gregory's quotations of the *Expositio Fidel*. It has done much to confirm the conclusions we reached earlier with regard to the *Apologia Apologias*. In general, we may place a great deal of confidence in the accuracy of Gregory's quotations. Although there is a certain amount of variation in presentation of the exact words, there is no evidence of any change made from theological motives. We may occasionally misinterpret Eunomius because of Gregory's quotations (not least because of the tendentious manner in which he sometimes interprets them!), but there is no conscious effort to deceive. This is naturally an enormous advantage to us in our ability to use the text transmitted to us by Gregory, for it means that within limits we can base our argument on the precise wording of the fragments. On the other hand, another of our earlier conclusions has also proved true—that our greatest problems will arise from Gregory's choice of which passages to quote. In the case of the *Expositio Fidel*, we have something under 60% of the whole work, and as we noted when we began this discussion (*supra* p. 89), Gregory is likely to have quoted a
great deal more of it than of the much longer Apologia Apolo-
giae. And yet, still more than the amount which Gregory quotes,
our problem lies in what he quotes. It is not a question of
deliberately suppressing some aspects of Eunomius' system—ra-
ther it is that Gregory's quotations are naturally dictated
by Gregory's own interests. Since Gregory generally passes
over those phrases which in other men would be unobjectionable,
it will be difficult to see those passages which are objection-
able in their proper context. If we are able to overcome this
problem at all, it will only be by a constant awareness of its
existence.

This completes our discussion of Eunomius' surviving works.
As is obvious, very little now remains of what was once a large
literary output. More important than the simple amount of what
has been preserved to us, however, is the fact that it is all of
one kind. This is natural, since the interests of Eunomius'
enemies have dictated which works have survived. The largest
remaining work, the Liber Apologeticus, has come down to us at-
tached to manuscripts of its refutation by Basil, as has the
Expositio Fidelis attached to those of the Refutatio of Gregory.
The surviving fragments of the Apologia Apologetica are again the
gift of Gregory. The remaining smaller fragments are all the
by-blows of other theological controversies. While we have
seen that in general these works and fragments have come down
to us accurately if not always intact, the fact remains that
they are all of one kind—dogmatic. Unless Eunomius was solely a dogmatist—and there is abundant evidence that he was not—there is a serious risk that our understanding of him will be distorted by the one-sidedness of the tradition. Merely being conscious of the problem is already the beginning of a solution, but we cannot hope to redress the balance without further evidence of a more concrete kind. A search for this evidence is the final task which faces us before we can begin our discussion of Eunomius' thought itself.

E. Other Possible Sources.

Obviously the direction of any enquiry into the thought of Eunomius must proceed from that which is more sure to that which is less. No additional source can provide a substitute for the rigorous examination of the system of Eunomius as reflected in his surviving works. Indeed, it is precisely because of its "systematic" nature that we may hope to visualize the teaching of Eunomius as a whole from an intensive study of its surviving parts. The "technical" character of Eunomius' approach to theology suggests that his writings are indeed susceptible of such analysis, but we may also retail in this regard an amusing anecdote from the life of Aetius. At the Synod of Constantinople in 360, Basil of Ancyra accused Aetius before the Emperor Constantius for asserting the Δωμ. 339 Aetius replied that so far

339 Philost., h.s. IV, 12 (GCS 65, 10-12).
from this being the case, he was prepared to affirm the ἀμαλ-λάκτως ἔρωτος.\textsuperscript{340} Constantius did not give him a chance to explain, but promptly had him ejected from the palace, presumably for hypocrisy.\textsuperscript{341} Whatever Aetius may have meant,\textsuperscript{342} this shows the kind of interest in the exact meaning of words which might make the kind of intensive study projected above feasible. Nonetheless, such study is still insufficient to overcome the difficulties discussed earlier; it will still be necessary to have recourse to works outside the immediate Eunomian corpus. Naturally, such works will include those of Eunomius' opponents and other Patristic writers,\textsuperscript{343} but since the information to be derived from them is both fragmentary and of widely varying reliability, it will be necessary to discuss each item individually as it occurs. We will confine our present discussion to works deriving either from a similar milieu, or likely to bear directly on the matter in hand.

The obvious place to begin is with the writings of Eunomius' Opponents.\textsuperscript{344} (GCS 65, 12-14).

\textsuperscript{340} Ibid. (GCS 65, 12-14).

\textsuperscript{341} Ibid. (GCS 65, 11-18).

\textsuperscript{342} Presumably that the Father and Son were indistinguishably alike only in will, not in essence.

\textsuperscript{343} Under this category must apparently now be subsumed the two short works of "Candidus" the Anomoean or Arian included in manuscripts of Marius Victorinus (CSEL 83, 1-14; 49-53). Recently it has been plausibly suggested that "Candidus" is a synonym for Marius himself, and was used by him as a device to present the opposing side. So P. Nautin, "Candidus l'Arien," in L'Homme devant Dieu, mélanges offerts au Père Henri de Lubac (Lyon: Aubier, Editions Montaigne, 1963) 1, pp. 309-320, and, independently, M. Simonetti, "Nota Sull' Arians Candido," Omnia 10 (1963), pp. 151-157; accepted by P. Hadot, Marius Victorinus (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1971), pp. 272-273.
master Aetius. Unfortunately, in dealing with them we face the same problem which confronts us in dealing with Eunomius' own works—that very few have survived. Moreover, those few are often of such obscurity that it is they which need to be illuminated by the works of Eunomius rather than the other way around.

On the other hand, the close relationship between the two men, and the fact that their opinions are singled out as virtually identical by some ancient writers suggests that these works may yield us some additions to the fund of our knowledge about Eunomius. Briefly, then, the works and fragments which remain to us are as follows: the Syntagmation, the only relatively lengthy surviving text, a short work in 37 chapters, on which Eunomius himself wrote scholia; likewise, there are five short fragments of a letter addressed to an otherwise unknown Tribune, Maxon, preserved in the Doctrina Patrum finally, there are two fragments of a work Epistulae to be found in the Contra Monophysitas of Anastasius of Sinai. Unfortunately, several of the fragments seem to have been "touched up" a bit to make them conform better to the purpose for which they were cited (the refutation of the monothelites), and therefore:

\[344\] Soz., h.e. VI, 26 (GCS 273, 16-26), 27 (GCS 274, 27-275, 1), and cf. Thal., h.e. V, 11 (GCS 298, 7-9).


\[346\] Doct. Patr. 41, xxviii-xxxii (Diekamp 311, 1-312, 3);

the "Eunomius" of the next fragment, Ibid. 41, xxxii (Diekamp 312, 9-12), is Eunomius of Beroea.

\[347\] Anast. S., monoph. (PG 89, 1181A-B); v. supra p. 7, n. 10.
must be regarded with some suspicion.\textsuperscript{348} This leaves us with only one other work which has been ascribed to Aetius, but surprisingly enough, despite the fact that if genuine it would be among the longest of the surviving fragments, it has gone almost unnoticed. It will therefore we necessary to discuss this work at somewhat greater length in order to determine its value for our own purposes.

The work in question is the \textit{Expositio Patricii et Aetii qui Eunonio communicaverunt Heliodorio et Stephano}, quoted in the \textit{Historia Aecphala}.\textsuperscript{349} Depending as it does on a single manuscript (as does everything else in the so-called \textit{Theodosian Collection}),\textsuperscript{350} the text of this work is very corrupt; this naturally greatly compounds the difficulties already inherent in interpreting a work which exists only in Latin translation. Despite its obscurity, however, the work is potentially of great interest, and will well repay the labour of examination. It seems difficult to believe that in the form in which it is given in the \textit{Historia Aecphala} this work can represent a complete document. It begins very abruptly with the simple phrase, Quae


\textsuperscript{349} Hist. aecph. 14 in C. H. Turner, Ecclesiae Occidentalis Monumenta Turis Antiquissima (Oxonii: Typographo Claren doniano, 1939) 1, 2, p. 668. All references will be to chapter and line in this edition.

\textsuperscript{350} This \textit{Expositio} must be what is meant by the translators of Gregory of Nyssa's \textit{Contra Eunomium} in LNF 2nd series, Vol. 5, p. 36, n. 7, when they speak (wrongly) of Eunomius' \textit{Expositio Fidei} as being contained in the "Codex Theodosianus."
sunt apud Deum\textsuperscript{351} (editorial?), and terminates equally abruptly with an incomplete discussion of the Son's likeness to the Father in actions (\textit{operationibus}).\textsuperscript{352} The disjointedness of the various sections suggests that what we are in fact dealing with in this document is a series of excerpts rather than a single, continuous quotation. The structure of the work, such as it is, is very much to be seen as "through a glass, darkly," but insofar as it can be discerned at all, it may be roughly outlined as follows:

\textbf{I.} The Attributes of God. 14, 1-6.
\textbf{II.} Christ:
A. His attributes. 6-12.
B. Similar to the Father, not by nature, but \textit{ex opere}. 12-25.
C. The Son is the image of God. 25-40.
D. "Similar in Substance" is blasphemy. 40-47.
E. The Son is similar to the Father in \textit{operationibus}. 47-54.

Even a very cursory reading of this document is sufficient to show that it moves within the Eunomian orbit, but what is its connection with Aetius? The title which heads this \textit{Expositio} is presumably an editorial addition, but it is based on the text of the preceding paragraph:

"\textit{per Endoxium autem exit alia peior heresis adulterina Arrianorum Aetii et Patricii Niceni communica\-\textit{cantium Eunomio Heliogordo et Stephano . . . quorum expositio haec est.}353"

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{351} hist. aequ. 14, 1.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{352} ibid. 14, 47-54.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{353} ibid. 13, 4-7, 14-15.}
The main figures, Eudoxius, Aetius, and Eunomius, are of course immediately recognizable. In addition to them, Heliodorus and Stephen are both well known as members of the "Eunomian" circle; only Patricius is otherwise unknown. The names, however, are often the most corrupt things in this manuscript and the mention of Nicaea in this connection suggests a plausible identification: Hypatius of Nicaea, a known follower of Aetius and an associate of Eunomius.\textsuperscript{355}

The names attached to the document of course confirm its Eunomian associations, but since it was once apparently a fairly substantial document, it seems strange that we should find no mention of it in other ancient writings. In what context, then, are we to place it? The last date mentioned in the preceding paragraph is the 18th day of the Egyptian month Methir (\textit{\ny\rho}) in the consulate of Jovian and Varronianus (14 February 361),\textsuperscript{356} but since the introduction to our section begins with an adversative clause (\textit{Aput Constantinopolim autem Eudoxius ...}), it seems to refer the document to a time prior to that date, which therefore must be taken as a \textit{terminus ante quem}. This introduction itself, however, gives indications of the approximate date of the \textit{expositio} since it refers to Eudoxius' holding

\textsuperscript{354} They are named together, Philost., h.e. VIII, 2 (GCS 105, 23); cf. \textit{Ibid.}, Anhang VII, 31 (GCS 225, 3, cf. also 5).
\textsuperscript{356} \textit{Hist. aepoh.}, 12, 27-28.
\textsuperscript{357} \textit{Ibid.}, 13, 1-2.
Communion with Euzocius of Antioch (Bishop from 361), and mentions the deposition of Semarian leaders after the Synod of Constantinople in 360. The approximate date of this document must therefore be sometime during the years surrounding 360. The question is, is there a known document from this period with which our own might be identified, or to which it would correspond? A perusal of the church historians of the period suggests that there is. We are told that at the Council of Seleucia (September-October 359) the partisans of Eudoxius and Aetius issued their own manifesto asserting the ἀπομονωμένου and sent it everywhere. This accords well with what is implied about this document in the Historia Aecphala, since it seems to be connected with Eudoxius as well as with Aetius and his comrades. Moreover, this would explain how the author of the Historia might have obtained a copy, for the manifest of Eudoxius and Aetius was a circular letter sent to all the Churches. Likewise, the nature of the document itself seems to fit in well with the preoccupations of Seleucia. One of the most recurring themes in it is that of "likeness." Thus, we find that it speaks of

an invariabilem apud patrem similitudinem, non similis deae, nesc naturam, similiter ut pater, similis "similem" ...

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358 Ibid. 13, 8-9.
359 Ibid. 13, 9-14.
360 Philost. h.e. IV, 11 (GCS 63, 25-27).
362 Ibid. 14, 15-16.
363 Ibid. 14, 25.
non dicit . . sit anathema, qui dixerit . . "similem substantiae" . . blasphemat, similum in operationibus. The question of "similarity" was one of the most hotly debated points at Seleucia, and, indeed, contributed to the break-up of the council without conclusion. Moreover, there are some similarities between our document and statements attributed to Eudoxius at Seleucia. Thus, the exposition asserts of the Son, transit sum pater, and describes the ignorance of each rank of the angelic hierarchy of the nature of the rank above it, including the Son's ignorance of the nature of the Unbegotten God. A similar idea is to be found in an excerpt from a sermon of Eudoxius which was read at the Council: Quantum enim Filius se extendit cognoscere Patrem, tantum Pater superextendit se ne cognitus Filio sit. Likewise, we find that Eudoxius is said to have asserted that the Father and Son are to be compared rather on the basis of their names than on that of their natures, and something like this seems to be the point of the discussion of the application of the word "white" to various objects of differing natures in our own work.

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Finally, for what it is worth, we may note that Eudoxius' crude description of generation as involving "femina ... et conjunctio conjugalis verbi, et blandimentum, et postremum ad generandum naturalis machina,"373 is the same kind of vulgarity employed in the expositio when it speaks of a serpentinam germinationem.374 We might also add that it was at just this period that Aetius was prepared to assert the ἀραράλλαξις 6μονον,375 and that the very phrase is to be found in the expositio: Imbariabilem amit patrem similitudinem.376

All of these considerations do much to strengthen the possibility that we have correctly identified the document, but before we can accept this conclusion with any confidence, there is a difficulty to be considered. The difficulty derives from another incident which almost certainly concerns this document. After the break-up of the Council of Seleucia, representatives of both parties hastened to Constantinople and were received by the Emperor.377 Rastahius of Sebaste accused Eudoxius of blasphemies against the Only-begotten and produced a confession which he claimed was Eudoxius'.378 Eudoxius replied that its real author was Aetius.379 Aetius was then called in, and

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373Hilary, c. Const. 13 (PL 10, 591B).
374Hist. accl. 14, 18.
378Hist. (GCS 159, 21–23).
379Hist. (GCS 160, 6–7).
thinking to gain a reward acknowledged authorship, but was
evicted from the palace and exiled for his pains.380 This in-
terview is almost certainly to be identified with that mentioned
by Philostorgius discussed earlier,381 although we may note that
the reason given by Philostorgius for its occurrence—that Aetius
had forced Basil of Ancyra in debate to admit the ἄνεγόνω(ι)382—
seems wholly fanciful. A selection from the confession which
was read before Constantius is given by Theodoret. He is, how-
ever, careful to indicate that it is a selection and not a
complete document—he says that there were in addition many other
impieties.383 Moreover, what is virtually the same series of
quotations is also given by Basil the Great as being by Aetius
and as coming "from someplace in his letters."384 The difference
in names need not unduly disturb us, since "letter" agrees well
enough with the information that this manifesto was sent every-
where.385 We may also note that in the letter of the Synod of
Constantinople condemning Aetius, special attention is paid to
his "unlawful letters,"386 a concern which would be readily
understandable if a broadcast manifesto had been sent out by
his party not long before. It will facilitate our discussion

380 Ibid. (GCS 160, 19-161, 5), though Theodoret has some-
what telescoped events in making Constantius exile him immediately.
381 supra pp. 100-101.
382 Philost., H. 2- IV, 12 (GCS 65, 2-6), though the word
itself is not used.
383 Thuc. H. 3- II, 27 (GCS 159, 24-160, 1).
384 Basil, Ep., 2 (SC 17bis, 260, 3-10).
385 supra p. 106, H. 360.
386 Thuc. H. 3- II, 28 (GCS 163, 10).
to present both versions of this letter side by side:

**BASIL:**

> τὰ ἀνόμωσι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, ἀνομωτὰς προφέροντα καὶ ἀνάπαθν τὰ ἀνόμωσι προφέροντα, ἀνόμωσι εἶναι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν. Καὶ εἰς μαρτύρια τοῦ λόγου τὸν ὀπισθολογὸν ἑπικατάστασα λέγων τα. "Εἰς θεὸ καὶ πατὴρ 

**THEODORET:**

> τὰ ἀνόμωσι προφέροντα ἀνόμωσι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἦστεν. 

> εἰς θεὸ καὶ πατὴρ 

> κύριος Ἰησοῦς κριτής, δι' ἐμὲ τὰ πάντα. ὡς σὺν ἐξουσίᾳ καὶ φωνῇ πρὸς ἀλληλών, γὰρ ἐξουσίᾳ, φωνῇ, 

> καὶ αὕτη ἀυτῶν σημαντοῦν ἀρσενικοί: ἀνόμωσιν δὲ τὸ 

> εἰς θεὸ καὶ πατὴρ 

> κύριος Ἰησοῦς κριτής, δι' ἐμὲ τὰ πάντα. εἰς τὸν κατὰ τὸν Ἱσωτοργιον 

> τὸ εἰς θεὸ καὶ πατὴρ ἂνομωτὰς προφέροντα, καὶ εἰς 

> κύριος Ἰησοῦς κριτής, δι' ἐμὲ τὰ πάντα.

The differences between the two versions of the letter are not great, and apart from the fact that Theodoret's passage is shorter, the variants consist of minor verbal changes and differences in order. The only one of any real significance is Theodoret's use of ὑσσαὶ for Basil's ὕσσϊν. Slight as the variants are, however, they are enough to indicate that Theodoret is probably not dependent on Basil, and that both have a common source (perhaps a collection of Church documents?). Apart from the fact that Theodoret does not use some of Basil's phrases in those sections common to both, he displays no knowledge at all of those found in Basil alone. Moreover, Theodoret places his quotation

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387Basil, Spir. 2 (SC 17bis, 260, 10–13).
388Thdt., K. 2 II, 28 (GCS 160, 1–4).
in a detailed historical setting of which Basil displays no knowledge. The relationship between the forms of this document found in our two authors is not unlike similar examples of Theodoret's use of sources elsewhere. 389

We have already noted that these passages seem to be a series of excerpts rather than complete wholes. In addition to Theodoret's mention of "many other impieties," 390 an examination of the two passages seems to confirm this. Thus, to take only the most obvious example, we find that although the final few phrases (ἀνάρξεων ἐς ... καὶ πάρη) are given by Theodoret as though they followed immediately on the allusion to I Cor. 8:6 (εἱς ἡθὸς ... τὰ πάντα), they were in fact separated from it by at least as much extra matter as is found in Basil. Moreover, we may note that Basil introduces the citation of I Cor. 8:6 with an editorial comment (καὶ εἰς ... ἀνάρξεως), whereas Theodoret makes it follow immediately on the preceding passage. While it is certainly not impossible that Basil too found these passages following one another immediately, it would be quite reasonable to suppose that the reason for the introduction of an editorial comment at this point was because Basil's eye skipped over several lines and he wished now to introduce a new quotation. It is not impossible either that the phrase ἀνάρξεως is also editorial. We thus have several

389 Cf. Thdt., h.e., GCS (1954), pp. XXII-XXV.
390 Thdt., h.e. II, 27 (GCS 159, 24).
indications that whatever the identity of the document from which our two authors quote, they have treated it very selectively. This is important for our own problem. If we are right in believing that our *expositio* is a selection from the manifesto sent by Eudoxius and his party from Seleucia, and that it was concerning this manifesto that Eudoxius and Aetius were cross-examined by Constantius, we must find some means of explaining why the two quotations are not identical. If the passages quoted by Basil and Theodoret were non-consecutive and fragmentary, and there is reason to believe that the surviving portions of the *expositio* are equally so (*v. supra pp. 103-104*), our problem becomes not insoluble. Since it seems clear enough that, whether or not the *expositio* consists of a series of non-consecutive fragments, it certainly is not as it stands a complete work, it would not at all be unreasonable to believe that the passages of Basil and Theodoret come from another part of the treatise. If so, however, there ought to be at least some affinities between the two sets of documents. An examination of them seems to reveal that there are. For instance, a significant part of the *expositio* revolves around a discussion of the nature of the Son and other created beings as being *ex Deo* or a *Deo*;\(^391\) this discussion ultimately depends on such texts as I Cor. 1: 30 and above all I Cor. 8: 6, the latter of

\(^391\) *hist. aeneh.* 14, 24-25, 26-28, 33, 38.
which is actually quoted by Basil and Theodoret and forms the basis for their own discussion of the issue. Again, the earlier portion of Basil and Theodoret's fragment deals with the ἀνομίας προφοράς, one of the linch-pins of the Eunomian system.\(^{392}\) While in a certain sense this idea underlies virtually everything in the exposition, there are few more concrete echoes of it in the phrase \textit{si dixerimus "Deum" Dei filium, duos sine initio inducimus},\(^{393}\) and in the discussion of the word "whiteness" as applied to objects of differing natures.\(^{394}\)

All of these considerations suggest that our two sets of documents are the imperfect parts of a once greater whole. Unfortunately, in the absence of the document itself we can only say that, while it is possible, and even likely, that our exposition is the manifesto of Eudoxius and Aetius, there is no way that we can demonstrate this beyond all doubt. Indeed, as so often with ancient documents, the real solution may be one which we could never have guessed without being told.\(^{395}\) In spite of this, however, we may regard some of our conclusions as reasonably certain. We may accept the general date and provenance of this document as fairly well established. Again, we may regard it as generally established that this is a "party" document, one on which hands other than those of Aetius have worked (particularly

\[\text{\textsuperscript{392}}\text{Cf. Eun., apol. 19 (30*, 5-31*, 22).}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{393}}\text{Ist. ascph. 14, 36-37.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{394}}\text{Ibid. 14, 42-47.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{395}}\text{Theodoret might, for instance, simply have wrongly identified the document.}\]
those of Eudoxius), and that Aetius himself would no doubt have had to exercise some ingenuity to explain his acceptance of some of its clauses. We cannot, therefore, take it as a straight-forward piece of evidence for Aetius' thought, but must bear in mind in using it that it may represent in part the teaching of others as well. At best, it can be taken as an example of just how far Aetius was prepared to go in some directions if pressed (and that was apparently a lot farther than some of his disciples were prepared to follow him). The expositio, then, is unlikely to shed any light on our immediate problem, and will, it seems, be chiefly useful by way of comparison. With these words we will draw our study of Aetius' works to a close. If we have found much that is of value, we have also found that we must still look farther afield if we are to resolve our problem.

This brings us to the question of other Eunomian literature. The most obvious surviving remnant of it is of course one which has already been cited repeatedly in the course of our study, the Ecclesiastical History of Philostorgius. It is a particularly devastating loss that this work exists only in

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396 As was pointed out at the time, they had only Eudoxius' word that Aetius wrote it. Th. E. II, 27 (GCS 161, 5-9).
398 We might also call attention to a short fragment by the διαλέξεως τῆς πρὸς Ἀετίου τοῦ Ἄρσενος found among the works of St. John Damascene, S. Jacobitas (PG 94, 1489c-1492a). It is ascribed to St. Basil, but is clearly a product of the Monophysite and Monothelite controversies.
the epitome of Photius, supplemented by a few scattered fragments from other sources. While this work is chiefly a history, it is an invaluable source for the life and practice of the Eunomian Church, and to a lesser extent for its doctrine. One caution, however, must be made. This history is a product of the first half of the fifth century (Photius says that it was carried down to the reign of Theodosius II, ending at Theodosius' restoration of Valentinian III, c. A.D. 425). Since we know of divisions and change within the Eunomian movement even before Eunomius' death, we must recognize that some of Philostorgius' information may represent a later elaboration rather than the thought of the founder himself. While the historical nature of the work limits its application to our own problem, it should nonetheless prove a valuable source.

The history of Philostorgius is not, however, the only remaining work which has come down to us from a late-Arian milieu. In 1969 J. Liebaert published for the first time two homilies of Ps.-Chrysostom which he entitled Deux homélies Anomées pour l'octave de Pâques. These two homilies are certainly from an Anomoean source, and are ascribed by their editor to the fourth century. Although it has been suggested that they in fact belong to the fifth century, a fourth century

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399 Photius, cod. 40 (Henri I, 25, 28-33).
400 Cf. Soz., E.g. VII, 17 (GCS 325, 1-326, 7).
401 Liebaert, pp. 33-41.
date is not impossible. Unfortunately, despite the fact that these homilies give us a valuable insight into the devotional side of the Anomoean system, it seems unlikely that they will be able to help us in more than a peripheral way. This is in part due to the nature of their contents, but there is also another reason. These homilies were described by their editor as "Anomoean," and so they are. But the Anomoean movement was not limited to Eunomianism, and this makes it difficult to know whether the teaching found in them can be specifically ascribed to Eunomius. It seems, then, that although useful, these homilies too are unlikely to aid us greatly in our task.

When all this has been said, there is still one final collection of evidence which remains to be examined, and that is the so-called Pseudo-Clementine Literature. Out of this rather mixed bag of documents, two only are of interest to us: the Clementine Recognitions and the Apostolic Constitutions (to the latter of which may be added the Pseudo-Ignatian Epistles if they really are by the same hand). We shall make no attempt to describe these works as a whole, but confine ourselves to their value as evidence for our own purposes. The Recognitions exist only in the Latin translation of Rufinus and in a

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404 The weakness of the 4th century date is the need to excise the mention of Nestorius in hom. anom. II, 125-129, but an argument for the 4th century date is the absence of any allusion to the vigorous government policy of repression after the reign of Theodosius I.

Syriac version.\textsuperscript{106} In the case of the latter, its editor, W. Frankenberg, has provided it with a very useful retranslation into Greek (though naturally it is questionable at points). There is one section of this work, however, which stands out from the rest as distinguished by a special character, Rec. III, 2-11.\textsuperscript{107} The distinction had already come to the attention of the work’s translator, Rufinus, and in his preface he explains that for this reason he is going to omit it from his translation.\textsuperscript{108} Fortunately, a later editor did not feel the same scruples as Rufinus and inserted a translation of it into the text, a translation which some of our manuscripts still preserve.\textsuperscript{109} The nature of this section’s special character is pointed out by Rufinus himself, who remarks in another work on the Eunomian character of the omitted passage.\textsuperscript{110} Even a very rapid reading of this section is sufficient to make a prima facie case for its Eunomian origin, but the labours of John Chapman\textsuperscript{111} and Bernhard Rehm\textsuperscript{112} have placed the identification on a firm basis. Moreover, the fact that we are able to deal with a single definite and coherent passage rather than a

\textsuperscript{107}GCS II, 96, 5-107, 13.
\textsuperscript{108}Rec. prologus (GCS II, 15, 16-20).
\textsuperscript{109}Rehm’s comments, GCS II, pp. XCVI-C.
\textsuperscript{110}Rufinus, adult. libr. Orig. (PG 17, 620B-621A).
\textsuperscript{111}"On the Date of the Clementines," ZNTW 9 (1903), pp. 21-34, especially pp. 21-25.
\textsuperscript{112}"Zur Entstehung der pseudoclementinischen Schriften," ZNTW 37 (1938), pp. 86-98.
series of piece-meal interpolations means that we can make use of this section despite the unsettled state of such questions as the date of the whole, its relationship with the Grundschrift and the Homilies, etc. The main difficulty which will face us in using this passage is the simple fact that it is very obscure, something already noted by Rufinus. It is to be hoped that by a careful attention to the text and with the help of the Syriac we can overcome these difficulties. Even with all the difficulties inherent in understanding this text, it will quite clearly play an important role in our study. Let us hope that we can succeed in understanding it.

If there is a reasonable amount of justification for treating the evidence of this section of the Clementine Recognitions with confidence, the other document from the Clementine literature mentioned above must be treated more cautiously. In a recent article it has been suggested by Georg Wagner that the compiler of the Apostolic Constitutions was a Eunomian. This suggestion is made on the basis of parallels between sections of the seventh and eighth books of the Apostolic Constitutions and passages from the works of Eunomius. On the basis of these parallels, Wagner concludes that the compiler is "... vielleicht

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413 Rec., prologus (GCS II, 4, 17-19).
415 Ibid. pp. 525-528, 529-530, cf. also 536.
Eunomius saloon-odor
ainer-seiner
etreuen
Schulez-
"l é

Needless to say, if this conclusion could be conclusively proved it would be of immense importance to the study of Eunomius, for it would virtually double the amount of material available for the study of the Eunomian Church. Unfortunately, it seems to us that such conclusive proof has not been achieved. The parallels evinced by Wagner are sufficient to cause to consider this suggestion seriously (and perhaps even to regard it as probable), but there is much which stands in the way of our using the Apostolic Constitutions as evidence. Unlike the single coherent passage which confronted us in the Clementine Recognitions, in this work we must deal with a body of traditional literature which has been reworked by an editor (whether Eunomian or no). This would require us to consider the question of the sources and the nature of the process of redaction before we could ever make proper use of it. Moreover, there are textual problems arising from the tendency of copyists to revise their exemplars in a more Orthodox direction, and this too places difficulties in our path.417 That the redactor of the Apostolic Constitutions may have been a Eunomian is an attractive hypothesis (the more so in view of the generally acknowledged link between this work and that of the Clementine

416 Ibid., p. 536.
417 See the following articles by C. H. Turner: "Notes on the Apostolic Constitutions (I & II)," JTS 16 (1914-1915), pp. 54-61, 523-538; "Notes on the Apostolic Constitutions (III)," JTS 31 (1930), pp. 128-141.
Recognitions), but the amount of work necessary to place this hypothesis on a firm basis would amount almost to a thesis in itself. For the moment we must regard it as still sub judice, and will not make use of the Apostolic Constitutions as evidence for Eunomian life and thought.

This marks the completion of our review of the available evidence. If we have been brought to recognize the difficulties of the task, it is to be hoped that we have also seen that we need not despair of a conclusion. With this work behind us to provide a firm foundation for our study, let us proceed to our main concern—the theology of Eunomius himself.

[18] Curiously enough, Wagner himself does not seem to have been aware of (or at least does not mention) the work done on Eunomian interpolation and/or editing of the Recognitions.
PART II: THE PROBLEM OF FAITH.

Scholars both ancient and modern have tended to treat Eunomius as though his thought could be exhausted by the terms of his dogmatic propositions—perhaps because it was in them that he most outraged his contemporaries. As we have seen in Part I, this is to some extent due to the nature of the surviving evidence. Still, Eunomius' adversaries were not unaware that there were in his thought depths which they had not plumbed, and from time to time they directed their attack towards them. One such attack is found in Epiphanius, though in it he is speaking of Eunomius' master Aetius:

"This fellow was the most deluded of men—as his followers are too—in imagining that he knew God, not by way of faith, but naturally by way of knowledge. Indeed, I have already remarked somewhere above on their claim to know God, not with the simple knowledge that comes from faith, but in the way one might know something visible or touchable with the hand, or as one might pick up a stone or piece of wood or an instrument of some other material. So this fine fellow says, 'I know God just

1Epiph., haer. 76.4.17 (GCS III, 411, 22-28). The earlier passage referred to is apparently Ibid. 76.4.2 (GCS III, 344, 18-21), quoted above, p. 18."
as I know myself—indeed, I do not know myself as well as I know God."

Although Epiphanius put the charge in a particularly crude way, he was not alone in making it. We find that John Chrysostom too was prepared to level a charge ἀμαρτία against Eunomius and his followers, not simply because their beliefs were different, but because they seemed to approach belief itself in a different way:

Πάντα γὰρ ποιοῦσι καὶ πραγματεύονται, ἐὰν εἴδεις τῆς τῶν ἐκκλησίων ἔννοιας τῆς πίστεως, ὃς τὰ γένειάν ἔννοιαν ἐκδείξαι ἡγεῖται; ἔτοιμον γὰρ θεός ἑξεταζόμενος τὴν πίστιν, ὅταν γένειατι καὶ ἐκδείξαι τῇ ἔκκλησιν, ἐν πάση πίστει τῷ λέγοντι, ὃν περιστοχεύειν γνωσμάς.²

"How then are we to begin our address against these people? How, but with the charge arising out of unbelief? For everything they do or undertake is to drive faith from the minds of their hearers—and what better evidence of ungodliness could there be than that? For when God reveals something, it behoves us faithfully to accept the saying, not to delve into it rashly."

Chrysostom again and again excoriates the overweening curiosity of his opponents, using the verb περιεργάζομαι⁴ to contrast their attitude with the faith of the believer. In part this no doubt reflects the abiding tension between the highly intellectualized faith of the educated and that of simpler Christians,

³Ibid., "the faith."
a dichotomy which had earlier found expression in Clement of Alexandria\(^5\) and Origen,\(^6\) and which is even echoed by Eunomius himself.\(^7\) If these accusations were limited to the two authors quoted above, we might have taken them as deriving only from this dichotomy, and reflecting the anti-intellectualism of the one and the pastoral and moral preoccupations of the other. We find, however, that even Gregory of Nyssa (himself a likely anti-Origenist target) was prepared to castigate the heretical emphasis on knowledge as opposed to faith:

> "For leaving aside the inquisitiveness of knowledge, Abraham," it says, "believed God and it was reckoned to him as righteousness" (Gen. 15: 6; Rom. 4: 3). Now this was not written for his sake, says the Apostle, but for ours (Rom. 4: 23–24), because it is faith and not knowledge which God reckons to men as righteousness. For knowledge is oriented toward experience, assenting only to what is known.

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\(^5\) E.g., Clem., str. I, 6 (GCS II, 23, 8–10), IV, 18 (GCS II, 298, 18–20).

\(^6\) E.g., Origen, Jo., XX, 33 (GCS 379, 15–29 et sqq.).

\(^7\) Eun., apol. I, τῶν πολλῶν (9*, 11), τῶν ἄκρασιτέρων, (10*, 1) cf. also apol. apol. I (J 8, 54, 7–8).

\(^\) Eun., apol. II (6 I, 253, 28–294, 4, 8–10, 11–13).
but the faith of Christians is not thus . . . Faith makes our own that which escapes our observation, and guarantees by its own assurance that which is not apparent . . . It is a rash man, then, who with his foolishly swollen knowledge claims to be able to discern the divine being."

It seems clear, then, that despite their differing orientations, Eunomius' contemporaries were convinced that his was an attempt to exchange the Christian's dependence on faith for the promptings of "what is falsely called knowledge" (I Tim. 6:20). Yet anyone who reads the works of Eunomius cannot but be aware that "faith" and its synonyms occur frequently in them. Moreover, the mere fact that Eunomius feels a need to justify passing beyond the simple acceptance of a ἀλοιπόνος καὶ κοινὴ πάντων πίστεως shows that he is aware of a problem in doing so. This suggests that the accusations of Eunomius' enemies cannot be taken at face value, and that some more careful enquiry into his meaning must be made. We must ask ourselves whether Eunomius' use of the various words expressing "faith" is simply a remnant of traditional Christian language preserved in a system to which it is otherwise alien, or whether these words reflect something real in his thought, and if so, what that "something" is. Perhaps the best approach will be to first consider in detail the surviving evidence together with the interpretations placed upon it by ancient and modern scholars, and then attempt

9Eun., apol. 6 (13*, 4-14*, 15).
to achieve our own solution. What follows, then, will be divided into two sections: the first and longest will be a consideration of the evidence itself, as well as the extent to which the interpretations placed upon it can be justified; the second will be an attempt to understand the place of faith in the thought of Eunomius on the basis of the preceding section. With this preliminary statement, we will proceed with our study. Perhaps the most obvious place to begin will be with Eunomius' use of the language and vocabulary of faith.

A- The Evidence and its Interpretation.

In whatever way we may understand the rest of Eunomius' uses of "faith" and its synonyms, it is clear that some at least are best understood as reflecting ordinary, non-religious usage. Thus, we find πιστεύω used in the sense of "give credence to" when he speaks of those who believe the calumnies against himself. He describes these calumnies as being: βλασφήμες δὲ τοὺς πιστεύουσιν, and states that one of his purposes in writing his apology is to help such people, ὁτις δὲ τὸ πιστεύει λατρεύει διότι ὁ λατρεύων ἐπὶ τοῦ διὰ τὸ πιστεύων ὁ λατρεύων ἐπὶ τοῦ διὰ τὸ πιστεύων. In a similar way, but in the sense of "to entrust," Basil is spoken of as "entrusting his safety to a secluded cabin, ... οἰκίσκη λατρεύοντι τὴν σεφρίαν πιστεύων." However, the

10 Eun., apol. I (9*, 23).
11 Ibid. (10, 16-17).
12 Eun., apol. apol. I (I, 66, 4).
majority of Eunomius' uses of "faith" are based on traditional Christian usage, and as such witness to his consciousness of the Christian nature of his system, even if they sometimes tell us little about his own ideas. We find that those who accept his teaching are described as πιστοί,13 while his opponents are ranked as ἀπιστοι,14 and are guilty of ἀσωτία.15 Likewise, the object of his own study is described as ἡ πίστις, even at its least complicated level, where it refers simply to a creed.16

Before we go on to explore these ideas in more detail, however, we must halt for a moment to consider a parallel and related usage. This usage is that of the words διαλογία and διαλογίας. We find that even at the very basic level of its meaning as "creed" which we just mentioned, "the faith" is also designated as a "confession," διαλογία,17 and referred to as τῆς πίστεως τῆς διαλογίας.18 Of itself such a parallelism would prove little, and might be taken as simply another conventional usage, but a glance at Eunomius' writings is sufficient to show that the concept is not an unimportant one. Not only does Eunomius quote Matthew 10:32-33 and I Peter 3:15 as standards of faithful

13 Eun., exp. ftd. 59, 9 and 25; cf. also apol. apol. III (J II, 23, 24), τῶν ἑκ τῶν κύριον πεποιθηκότων.

14 Eun., apol. apol. I (J I, 42, 18), III (J II, 116, 3).

15 Eun., apol. IV (J I, 28, 28), III (J II, 112, 21).

16 Eun., apol. IV (J I, 28, 28), III (J II, 112, 21).

17 Eun., apol. IV (J I, 28, 28), III (J II, 112, 21).

18 It should be noted, however, that the basic meaning of διαλογία as "confession" seems less obscured by conventionalization.
Christian behaviour, both of which stress the need to confess the Lord and give an account of the hope that is in us, but he regards the confession of God's being (τὴν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἑκατον δύναμιν) as ἀπὸ πάντων ἀναγκαίωστον διδάσκαλον ἡ ἐκκλησία. Moreover, examination will reveal that, while not identical, the two words and their cognates are used in similar contexts, and that, indeed, of the two διδασκαλία/διδασκάω is the more common. All of this goes to suggest that it will serve our own purposes better to consider these two words together.

We halted our earlier discussion of πίστις at the relatively simple level where it means "creed." We shall now resume our discussion of this and other examples of "faith" and its cognates, including an examination of διδασκαλία/διδασκάω where relevant. Taken by itself, πίστις as a designation for a creed does not tell us a great deal about Romanius' own understanding of the word. However, when we look at this usage compared with that of some related words, we find that we are in a better position to understand it. We find that a distinction seems to be made between πίστις in this sense—a given and "public" thing, a κατάδεσκα ἀνοίγεται ἐν τοῖς πατέρων...- and another, evidently more individual and personal teaching.
designated as ἀληθῆς and γνώμη. Eunomius makes it quite clear that the former is the criterion by which the latter is to be judged. Thus, even at the outset of our enquiry, we find that a distinction is made between an authoritative, revealed tradition handed down "from the fathers," and doctrines apparently more directly connected with personal effort and endeavour, but subject to judgement on the basis of the received tradition.

When we turn our attention to the creeds themselves, we find that their clauses are generally prefaced by the word μονογενής. What this word is intended to express in such a context is presumably the proper attitude which one is to have toward the "ruling tradition" which the creed embodies. When used in a similar context would then be the public acknowledgment and expression of this attitude, the external proclama-

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23Ibid. 1 (10*, 9), 4 (12*, 16), 6 (14*, 5). Ibid. 24 (39*, 11) and 25 (40*, 1), refer to the doctrines of others.
24Ibid. 4 (12*, 13), applied to Eunomius; apol. apol. II (11, 282*, 9), to philosophers; apol. 4 (12*, 14-24), to general opinion. For use with respect to God, v. supra p. 16, n. 37.
25This distinction also appears more ambiguously in the word ἄληθῆς. Most examples seem to refer to the second of our aspects, whether to Eunomius' own teachings, apol. apol. 1 (11, 71, 28), of his opponents, Ibid. II (1, 391*, 20), III (11, 112, 16), or those of a philosopher, Ibid. II (11, 346, 7). The first aspect seems to be intended at Ibid. III (11, 16, 9-10) and perhaps also Ibid. (11, 284*, 24); exp. fid. 56*, 26 may refer to this aspect, or possibly to moral precepts since it is in parallelism with the ἀληθῆς of Ibid. 56*, 27.
26Ibid., apol. 5 (12*, 25); exp. fid. 53*, 15; 54*, 25; 58*, 3; 60*, 1.
tion of an internally accepted truth.\textsuperscript{28} Such considerations help us to understand the close relationship between these two words in general, and, more specifically, how it is that δημολογεῖο can sometimes be used almost as a synonym for πιστεύο.\textsuperscript{29} But if this helps us to achieve the proper orientation for our examination of Eunomius' understanding of faith, it does not answer all of our questions. If faith is the proper attitude which one is to have toward the "ruling tradition," is it necessarily an attitude which is restricted to that tradition? That is, if faith in this sense is a response to revelation as expressed in a tradition, is that response limited to the tradition's primitive form (i.e., as embodied in a creed or the Scriptures), or can it include within its scope other theological statements as well? Our only means of obtaining an answer will be to return once again to the works of Eunomius.

We have already seen, of course, that not all of Eunomius' uses of πιστεύειο are limited to Christian tradition, but as we noted at the time, these examples are more properly related to non-religious usage.\textsuperscript{30} What concerns us here is Eunomius' use of "faith" in the specifically religious sense. That even in this sense faith may not be restricted entirely to the received

\textsuperscript{28}This aspect of δημολογεῖο as public proclamation appears in those instances where Christ is portrayed as publicly acknowledging truths; Eun., apol. 20 (33*, 18), 21 (34*, 16/17), 26 (43*, 20).
\textsuperscript{29}Thus, e.g., Eun., apol. 15 (26*, 8), 21 (34*, 28/29); \textit{exp. fid.} 53*, 13-14; 57*, 9.
\textsuperscript{30}V. supra p. 125, nn. 10 and 11.
tradition is already suggested by an example of the word δημοσιογένεσις.

At the very beginning of the specifically theological section of his Apology, Eunomius gives us a brief summary of the bases on which he rests the opening premise of his system:

κατά τὴν τῶν πατέρων διασκολίαν ἂν μὴν ἀμφιβάλλεται θεός...

Thus, in accordance both with the conception natural to all men and the teaching of the fathers we confess that God is one... 31

What is important at this point is not the precise place of the φυσικὴν ἐννοίαν in Eunomius' system, but the meaning of such an appeal in this context. The idea that there are certain general ideas which all men are naturally predisposed to form, while ultimately of Stoic origin,32 had already been naturalized in Platonism by the time of Albinus. In his system, the Stoic idea was combined with the Platonic doctrine of the intelligible world to become "that which... intellection (i.e., contemplation of the world of forms) is called, after the soul has entered the body..."33 In this sense, then, the φυσικὴν ἐννοίαν implies the inherent knowledge of a higher reality which is natural to man, and hence the common possession of all men. Whether or not they accepted this particular understanding of it, the Church

31 Eun., apol. 7 (14*, 16-19).
32 Cf. S.E., Chrysippus, SVF II, 32, 34.
33 Albinus, Intr. 1, 6 (Henri 17, 5-7); unpublished translation by R. A. Morris, Jr., p. 35. Cf. R. E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1971), pp. 11-12.
Fathers were not slow to realize its value for apologetic purposes. Justin Martyr, for instance, used it to describe those moral convictions which are the common inheritance of mankind, such as that adultery, fornication, and murder are always evil.\(^3\) Clement of Alexandria suggested it as a possible means of understanding the anticipations of divine revelation to be found among the Greeks,\(^3\) while Eusebius used it in his defence of "Christianity as Old as Creation."\(^3\) Likewise, Origen made an appeal to it while arguing against false pagan understandings of God.\(^3\) What is common to all these uses of ἐννοώμενον is that they involve an appeal which takes us outside the bounds of divine revelation strictly so-called, an appeal to the natural understanding of mankind. While it would be misleading (or at any rate anachronistic) to describe this appeal as an appeal to "Natural Theology,"\(^3\) it nonetheless implies the existence of a body of knowledge available to all men which can be known apart from the direct revelation of God.\(^3\) That such an appeal is important to Eunomius is shown not only by his use of ἐννοώμενον in the present passage, but by his appeal

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\(^3\)Justin, dial. 93 (PG 6, 697A).
\(^3\)Clem., 6th, I, 19 (GCS II, 60, 15-19).
\(^3\)Or., hist. I, iv, 4 (GCS II, 40, 2-7).
\(^3\)Or., Cels. IV, 14 (GCS I, 284, 26-28).

Though they would certainly have wanted to assert the providential ordering of God in such knowledge; no one, as Clement remarks, loc. cit. (GCS II, 60, 13-14) would want to deify chance.
elsewhere to the κοινὸν λόγιον, and his specific statement that the teaching of the fathers is not of itself ἀρτέρην πρὸς πιστεύν τῆς ἀληθείας. Thus we find that in addition to tradition, Eunomius was prepared to make an appeal to ordinary human knowledge as well, and (by implication) to the particular understanding of the nature of reality which that knowledge makes available.

If we still continue to limit our discussion to examples which deal with ὑμνογένεσιν and πιστεύω, we find that this is confirmed by still other passages. Thus, in his analysis of the implications of the finite character of the divine act of generation, Eunomius implies that our belief can be based on more than the divine revelation per se:


"For the very act of ceasing to be generated confirms that there is a beginning both of generation and of being generated—things impossible to disbelieve, whether they are considered from the standpoint of nature itself, or from that of the divine commandments."

The "divine commandments" in question are the Pentateuch, and the reference is to Gen. 2: 2-3, as a later passage makes

39 Eun., apol. 10 (19*., 21); cf. also Rec. III, 4, 1 (GCS II, 965, 5); communes cognitiones, rendered by Frankenberg as κοινὸν λόγιον: (TU 48, 3 [1937], 159, 13-14).
40 Eun., apol. 6 (13*., 27-28).
41 Eun., apol. apol. III (d II, 224, 10-14).
The reference to "nature itself" is a reference to the metaphysical principle that the cessation of an action implies its beginning as well as its derivative character (i.e., that its δεχεται lies outside itself). Gregory of Nyssa is probably right in recognizing this as deriving from the Phaedrus of Plato. Here again we find an aspect of faith which seems to include within its scope not only divinely given precepts, but an order of reality revealed by human reason.

In a somewhat different way, this is suggested by another passage. In the course of refuting one of Basil's criticisms, Eunomius makes the following statement:

"But he struggles on with these vanities and says, "I produce the guarantee of my statements both from the realities themselves and from the (divine) oracles which we have believed.""

The context of this statement is a discussion of Eunomius' contention in his first apology that when identical words (such as "light," "life," or "power") are used to describe the Unbegotten and the begotten, they must be understood in accordance with the differing natures of their objects. After an introductory section in which he presents various Biblical passages

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42 Ibid. (I II, 227, 23-228, 14).
43 Greg. Nyss., Em. III, vii (I II, 227, 3-8).
44 Plato, Phaedrus 2456-246A.
45 Eun., apol. apol. III (I II, 299, 21-23).
46 Eun., apol. 19 (30*, 5-31*, 27).
which use the word "light" in differing senses,\(^{131}\) he then goes on to make the statement quoted above. The "oracles which we have believed" appear to refer to the lines which then follow, where Eunomius quotes Jn. 1: 1-14 about the light made incarnate.\(^{132}\) The "realities themselves" would then refer to the actual objects of the discussion, the Unbegotten and the begotten (\(\text{πράγμας}\) would be used here in the sense of \(\text{πράγμα} \text{ vs. } \text{δόγμα}\)). This is confirmed by the conclusion of the argument which then follows, where it is asserted that in view of the impossibility of the "unapproachable light" becoming incarnate, the incarnate "light" referred to by John must be something else (\(\text{πράγμας}\), the one word used by the "oracles" refers to two \(\text{πράγμας}\)).\(^{133}\) Thus, once again we seem to have an act of faith based not only on the Scriptures themselves but on a particular understanding of the reality which underlies them, and by implication a means of knowing that reality.

All of these examples seem to suggest a knowledge of reality not immediately based on the revelation given in Scripture. On the other hand, none of the uses of "faith" which we have seen is sufficient by itself to explain the statements of the Fathers with which we began this second part of our thesis. Indeed, most of the usages which we have seen reflect the common usage of the period, and are in no way remarkable. This means

\(^{131}\)Eun., apol. apol. III (J II, 297, 2-13).
\(^{132}\)Ibid. (J II, 297, 26-300, 4).
\(^{133}\)Ibid. (J II, 301, 7-12; 304, 18-22).
that if we are to find an adequate explanation of their statements, we must presumably try to do so on the basis of the further principle of knowledge which seems to be implied by the passages of Eunomius so far examined. Since as we have seen, most of the accusations actually levelled against Eunomius in the passages from the Fathers quoted earlier seem to deal with such knowledge, this seems like a fruitful possibility.

The question is, what is it that the Fathers were complaining about? If we limit ourselves for the moment to trying to determine the general areas covered by their complaint, we find that it seems to include both the content of Eunomius' teaching and the means by which we arrived at it. This is brought out well by a passage from the fifth book of the Adversus Eunomium of (Ps.--)Basil:

καὶ τὸ ἀθανάτω, ἄρ’ ἐν ἀφελοῦσθαι οἱ τῇ πίστει δηλαδὸντες, ἀπὸ τούτων ἐκπέμπονται οἱ μισοῦσθαι περὶ ἐπιστῆσης καὶ λογομαχίας ἀργὰς, ὡς εἰσὶν ἡ ἀπόστολος. "Ὅτι δὲ φυλής νόσημα ἔστι τῇ κακίᾳ καὶ περιέργειᾳ ζητεῖν περὶ θεοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα μετὰ ἀπίστησις, πᾶσι ψανερίᾳ. Ἐν γὰρ αὐτῷ τῇ παναγίᾳ θεός τὰ περὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιστολαὶ· τὰς τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἡ ἀπόστολον ἀκούσας, λεγόντων ἐν θείᾳ γραφῇ τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν μελλόντων ἠλπίζειν; Πιστεύοι γὰρ ὅτι τὸν προσερχόμενον τὸ θεόν ἔστι. Πιστεύοι· ὥσπερ ἡπιόταις περιεργαζόμενοι ὁ τί ἔστιν· ὥσπερ ὃ τι σοι ἔστιν.

"And strange to say, the very things which profit those who are sound in the faith are harmful to those who, as the Apostle says, are 'sick with craving after investigations and disputes about words'"

50(Ps.--Basil, Eun. V, 2 (PG 29, 752B-C).
For it is obvious to everyone that investigating wickedly and with idle curiosity into what concerns God is a sickness of the soul—especially when it is done with unbelief. For if they do not believe the all-holy God in the things which concern himself, how will they hearken to his prophets and apostles when they speak in the divine Scriptures of the things which concern him and those who come to hope in him? For whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists (Heb. II: 6). Believe! Not meddle faithlessly into what he is, nor, indeed, into what he is not! What he is, he was and is and will be for ever, and since he is by nature God, it is given to all to know his existence.

The affinities of this with the passages of John Chrysostom, Epiphanius, and Gregory quoted above is obvious. Eunomius' method is criticized because instead of accepting the revelation of God with what Gregory of Nyssa at one point calls "unreasoning assent" (ἐλογον συγκατάστασιν), he insists on prying into it curiously. This criticism clearly share the same background as the passage from John Chrysostom cited earlier (p. 122). It rests on the assumption, common to all the participants in the dispute, Basil, and Gregory as well as John, not to mention Eunomius himself, that the proper attitude to God's revelation is one of unquestioning assent. Eunomius' error, then, in the mind of (Ps.-)Basil was that instead of doing this he indulged in "investigations and disputes about words" and poked with idle curiosity.

54 See the passage quoted on the next page.  
55 By implication: cf. his comments at Ep. I, apol. 6 (13*, 11-24).
curiosity into what concerns God. We can illustrate not only the background of this assumption, but the scope of the accusation by considering a passage from St. John Chrysostom:

"He does not say, 'To bring about inquiry and logical argument,' but, 'To bring about obedience' (Rom. 1: 5). Thus, he is saying, 'We were not sent to argue syllogistically, but to hand on that with which we had been entrusted.' For when the Master reveals anything, those who hear it should not meddle or be inquisitive about what is told them, but should simply accept it. The Apostles, indeed, were sent for this very thing—to speak what they had heard and not to add anything of their own, and that we, for our part, should believe."

Although this passage does not refer to Munomius specifically, it brings out well the nature and scope of the complaint against him. Instead of joining the faithful in the simple acceptance of the Master's revelation, he insists on poking into it with inquiry and logical argument and trying to argue syllogistically from it. This criticism, then, is linked to a criticism of Munomius' method—his use of logical demonstration and human reason. It is thus to be connected with the frequent accusation of τίγνη and the famous bon mot of Theodoret that he had changed τέχνη. 

56 Chrys., hom. 1 in Rom., 3 (PG 60, 398 post medium).
Eunomius, then, is charged with subordinating Scripture to logical argument. This accusation, however, does not occur in isolation; it is closely connected with the content of his teaching. Specifically, it is linked with his claim to know the nature of God. The passage from (Ps.--) Basil with which we began our discussion makes this clear when it says that we need not "meddle faithlessly into what he is." Underlying this admonition is the distinction between ἱερατικὸς and ὁμιο, otherwise expressed as between ἀπεικόνισις and ἐπικοινωνία. It had become a philosophical commonplace that whereas we might know the fact of God's existence, we could never attain to a knowledge of his essence. Eunomius' claim that through the ἀγένομον he had achieved a knowledge of this essence naturally caused a considerable amount of outrage. This is clearly the meaning behind the passages quoted from Epiphanius and Gregory above (p. 121f., p. 123f.), but it is also clear that in both cases the knowledge criticized is of a purely natural kind. Certainly, this is the significance of Epiphanius' references to someone picking up "a stone or piece of wood," and of Gregory's mention of his claim to discern the divine being with "his foolishly swollen knowledge." Moreover, as the passage from

57 Théâtre, haer. IV, 3 (PG 83, 420B).
Basil shows, with its complaint about his "faithless meddling," the Fathers connected this claim to knowledge closely with Eunomius' interest in "investigations and disputes about words." Thus we find that the Fathers' complaints about Eunomius seem to cover two distinct but closely related areas. The heresiarch had neglected the revelation of God to base his case on (philosophical) enquiry and logical quibbling, and he had had the audacity to claim that his knowledge extended even to the essence of God himself.

The estimations of Eunomius' understanding of faith by modern scholars have been almost as negative. Klose remarks that Eunomius "...Alles mit dem Verstande hatte begreifen wollen...," and that he "...berog die Offenbarung...blosse auf die reflectirende Erkenntniss," while Harnack describes him as "...openly proclaiming the conversion of religion into morality and syllogistic reasoning," and dismisses his system as mere "logical Arianism." Likewise, the Dictionary of Christian Biography describes his teaching as "...a cold, logical system... (wanting) the elements of vitality..." while Spanneut speaks of "sa tendence logicienne" as the characteristic mark of this theology. However, perhaps
the most explicit statement about Eunomius' rationalist tendencies is to be found in the Church History of J. A. Neander:

"Had Eunomius and Gregory of Nyssa carried out still further this remarkable difference of views, which, however, in the vast compass it embraces, was at that time impracticable, they would have been led back to the question, whether the essence of religion consists in a form of knowing, or in a certain species of inward life and feeling."

It seems, then, that in the hands of many modern scholars the system of Eunomius raises not only the classical problem of faith versus reason, but whether his is properly a religious system at all. If the approach to God for Eunomius is entirely a matter of "investigations and disputes about words," then religion really will have been turned into "morality and syllogistic reasoning." Our task, then, in trying to deal with Eunomius' understanding of faith, will be to try to determine the extent to which these contentions are true. What was the place of logic and reason vis-à-vis divine revelation in the Eunomius system? And, to what extent was it really a religious movement?

Let us now return to a consideration of revelation and rational argument, the two opposing aspects included within the

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64We may note that not all judgements on this have been equally negative. Spannest, loc. cit., for instance recognized that "...l'oeuvre (de Eunomius), malgré les déformations qu'ont pu lui infliger les adversaires, garde une tonalité religieuse."
scope of Eunomius' understanding of faith. At this point, however, we will try to limit ourselves so far as possible to a consideration of Eunomius' method, and take up the Fathers' other complaint, his content, at a later point. A useful beginning will be to cite the views of E. Vandenbussche, who has dealt specifically with the two aspects of Eunomius' thought under consideration. In particular, we may make use of his very clear statement of the problem:

"Mais l'examen de ses écris seul pourra donner la réponse à la question suivante, decisive en la matière: la tradition est-elle pour Eunomius, le principe suprême et intangible de la science théologique? Question decisive en effet, car si la tradition n'a qu'une valeur relative, si on l'utilise uniquement comme une donnée première, qu'on interprète dialectiquement en toute liberté, il ne servira rien d'y faire appel."65

The question before us, then, is to try to determine the relative value of the two sides of Eunomius' thought, and to find out if, as often asserted, human logic has completely overlaid divine revelation. Vandenbussche himself has no doubts:

"En tout cas, il est manifeste que, s'il abandonne les noms traditionels (sg. Père, Fils et Saint-Ésprit), ce n'est qu'après avoir abandonné le principe de tradition et reconnu à leur place la suprématie de la raison. La théologie n'a qu'un seul principe: la raison."66

Let us then try to determine whether Vandenbussche is right and

66 Ibid. p. 66. E.E., however, that in this and the following pages Vandenbussche makes it clear that "reason" for Eunomius is not bare dialectic.
do so by following his own method—the examination of the writings of Eunomius.

It is clear where we must begin. Whenever conclusions we may ultimately reach with regard to the relative importance of reason and revelation in Eunomius' thought, he himself tells us that it is by the first of them, tradition, ὡσεὶ τινα γνώμην καὶ κατανόην, that he is to be judged. Even if, like Vandenzuysch, we eventually come to the conclusion that Eunomius' claim to proceed on this basis cannot be sustained, we must at least begin by taking him at his word. We will therefore begin our enquiry by examining his use of the first of them, τὴν δὲ κατανόην καὶ τὴν πατέρων εὐθεῖαν παράδειγμα.

The natural question which then arises is, exactly what does the word "tradition" encompass? It is clear that not only in the gospels, but also in the law and in the prophets its

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67 Eun. apol. 4 (12*, 21).
68 Eun. apol. 11 (21*, 3-14), 21 (34*, 16-17), 22 (35*, 10), 26 (42*, 26-27); Eun. apol. III (J II, 224, 7; 26*, 4, 249, 9-61); exp. fid. 53*, 2-4, 16-17; 56*, 15-16.
69 Eun. apol. 57*, 13-14; cf. also apol. 21 (34*, 13-14), and apol. III (J II, 224, 14, 227, 22-29). Note also that in Eunomius' exegesis of Exod. 3: 1ff., at apol. apol. III (J II, 273, 24-27), 2; 276, 2-7, 22-25; 277, 26-275, 2), the "angel" who speaks to Moses is plainly the Word.
70 Eun. exp. fid. 57*, 15-16; cf. also apol. 21 (34*, 13-14) 23 (37*, 5-6); perhaps also David, mentioned (by Eunomius or Gregory?) at apol. apol. II (J I, 350, 5-6), is to be placed in this category. The apparent exceptions found at apol. 26 (43*, 4), where Solomon is referred to as ἐν προδόσει τοῦ κυρίου Λέυκο, and at exp. fid. 55*, 27-28, where a phrase of Isaiah's is ascribed directly to the "Almighty," appear to be used ἀνακριτικά.
ultimate source is our Lord Jesus Christ, and it is from him
that it derives its authority. On the other hand, although the
authority of Christ is sufficient of itself to establish a
point, a frequent appeal is made to a teaching which is in τὸν
πατέρα,72 a teaching which is variously described as deriving
from (ἀνευμί) δύσιν,74 or τῶν ἄγιων τῶν ἀνέποιν,75 but
most frequently simply from τῶν ἄγιων.76 Who, then, exactly
are these "saints" to whom such frequent appeal is made? It
seems that in large part they are the authors of holy Scripture,
since the appeal to the saints in many cases seems parallel to
the appeal to the Apostles, Prophets, and Evangelists.77 Cer-
tainly it is in this sense that both Basil78 and Gregory79 seem
to understand his meaning. This is confirmed by the numerous
appeals to the Apostles as individuals. Paul is mentioned, both
by name80 and simply as "the Apostle,"81 as are John82 and

72 cf., e.g., Enum., apol. 25 (40*, 31-35).
73 Enum.: apol. 4 (12*, 19-20), 7 (14*, 17-18).
74 Enum.: apol. apol. III (J II, 113, 12-14, 16-17).
75 Enum.: apol. apol. II (J I, 347, 18).
76 Enum.: apol. apol. III (J I, 315, 16, 12-18; J II, 6, 9-10; 11, 26-28; 11, 28-22).
77 Enum.: apol. apol. II (J I, 315, 2-3; 327, 9-10; J II, 35, 2; 113, 11-13); elsewhere, "saintly men" seems to include
those mentioned in it as well as its authors ibid. (J I, 347, 18-21).
78 Basil, Enum. II, 5 (PC 29, 580C-581C).
79 Or. Myst., Enum. III, 1 (J II, 7, 6-8, 26).
81 Enum., apol. III (J II, 116, 14: 297, 7-8).
82 Enum., apol. 3 (11*, 33), 25 (41*, 5-6), 28 (47*, 37-43*, 1); apol. apol. III (J II, 174, 29-175, 1).
83 Enum., apol. 15 (26*, 8), 26 (43*, 9-10); apol. apol.
III (J II, 116, 10: 299, 26-27).
Peter as well. The "saints" in this sense are the vehicles whereby the teaching of the Lord is transmitted, and it is from him that they derive their authority. The frequent examples of an appeal to Scripture in general, whether it is referred to as τὴς γραφῆς in the singular, or τῶν γραμμάτων in the plural, or designated more obliquely by such phrases as τῶν πνευματικῶν λόγων, τῶν θείων λογίων, or τῆς γραμματείας, are often found in contexts fundamentally identical to those occupied by the appeal to the "saints." It seems, then, that in many cases this appeal can be taken as virtually identical to an appeal to Scripture.

On the other hand, it cannot be entirely limited to Scripture, either. At any rate, at least some of the appeals to the saints cannot refer to the Scriptural writers. For instance, we find that Eunomius at one point claims to produce a demonstration which had formerly been used by the saints, and it is difficult to see this as referring to Scripture. At another point, in appealing to the authority of "holy and blessed men"

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83 Eun., apol. 26 (43*, 1); apol. apol. III (I II, 114, 4); 115, 12-3, 7-8; 149, 12; 150, 13-14; 151, 12; 154, 20; 156, 19-20). Eun., apol. 25 (46*, 25); 26 (42*, 24-43*, 1); apol. apol. II (29*, 4-6). Eun., apol. 10 (19*, 18-19); also 28 (48*, 10-11); apol. apol. II (I I, 202, 14). Eun., apol. 12 (22*, 5); 17 (28*, 17); 21 (34*, 12). Eun., apol. apol. III (I II, 220, 14-15). Eun., apol. apol. II (I I, 312, 30-313, 1). Eun., apol. apol. II (I I, 347, 18). Eun., apol. 15 (25*, 6-9).
for his emphasis on the necessity of exactness in doctrine, he must be referring to something other than Scripture, and this is plainly what Gregory understands him to mean. Again, the tradition which comes down in τον πατέρων seems itself to refer to something which goes beyond Scripture, and there are other, more ambiguous, examples.

In what category are we to place these references? A distinction which is fundamental to Eunomius may help to provide the answer. Eunomius places great emphasis on the necessity of preserving along with the words of the faith their true significance, and it is his contention that his opponents do not do this. The "saints," then, when they are clearly not the authors of Scripture, must presumably mean those non-Scriptural writers who have retained and handed on the "true signification" of Scripture. Certainly, there is no indication that Eunomius followed Basil in making an appeal to την γραμμα την πατέρων μαρτυρίαν, or any other esoteric teaching. It seems, then, that tradition for Eunomius is that body of truth coming down from our Lord which is primarily

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92 Eun., apol. 4 (12*, 19-20), 7 (14*, 17-18).
93 Eun., apol. 6 (13*, 11-15).
embodied in the Scriptures and secondarily in those men who have interpreted them rightly.

Although his doctrine of tradition was not radically different from that of others of his time, Eunomius' claim to appeal to it was hotly contested. Basil insisted that accepting Eunomian doctrine was tantamount to abandoning the Apostolic tradition\(^97\) and both he and Gregory\(^98\) frequently appeal to it against the heresiarch. The battle, however, was not entirely one-sided. Eunomius too charged his enemies with departing from the tradition\(^99\) and condemned Basil in particular for perverting Scripture to his own ends.\(^100\) Indeed, both sides prepared a likely list purporting to explain the "tradition" of the other. Gregory suggested that Eunomius derived his from the likes of Mani, Nicolas, Colluthus, Aetius, and Arius,\(^101\) whereas Eunomius derived Basil's doctrine from the followers of Valentinus, Cerinthus, Basilides, Montanus, and Marcion.\(^102\) It seems unlikely, however, that either of these lists will be of much help in

\(^{97}\) Basil, *En.* I, 3 (PG 29, 508B).


\(^{99}\) As is certainly implied by his statements in *En.* apol. 6 (13*, 12-24).

\(^{100}\) E. E. Hosius, *En.* apol. II (J I, 312, 30-313, 1), III (J II, 113, 9-18; 115, 11-14; 141, 28-142, 1).

\(^{101}\) Gr. Nyss., *En.* III, ix (J II, 284, 29-285, 1).

\(^{102}\) E. E. Hosius, *En.* apol. III (J II, 284, 13-19); cf. also apol. 6 (13*, 29-30), where Sabellius, Marcellus (of Ancyra), and Photinus are singled out as examples of the opposing viewpoint, though in rather a different context.
elucidating Eunomius' understanding and use of tradition. It seems that the most promising approach will be to take up that aspect of the tradition which is most open to our own examination, and for which we have the most evidence: Eunomius' use of holy Scripture.

Whatever else may be said, it is clear that Eunomius' use of Scripture was far from satisfactory to his Orthodox contemporaries. Perhaps a comment of Socrates' will be the best place to begin, for he gives a general idea of the Fathers' objections, while the information he provides has been the basis of most modern accounts. In his chapter on Eunomius, he makes the following statement about the heretic's understanding of Scripture:

"Although (Eunomius) was little instructed in the Sacred Scriptures and unable to understand them, yet he poured out an enormous amount of verbiage about them. He was always circling round and round the same passages, but he was unable to escape their obvious meaning—as the seven books about the Apostle's epistle to the Romans, over which he vainly toiled, showed him. For after wasting a multitude of words on it, he was still unable to grasp the meaning of the epistle."

Socrates also makes a similar statement about Aetius. It seems
that his complaints about Eunomius' use of Scripture can be placed under three headings: 1) Eunomius is ignorant of the actual content of Scripture; 2) he concentrates his attention on a small number of passages; and 3) his interpretation of them is incorrect. These three complaints will provide us with a useful basis on which to conduct our own discussion.

It is very difficult to achieve a definitive resolution of Socrates' first problem since we have virtually no surviving evidence. The only confirmation of his statement which is available to us is a fragment of Theodore of Mopsuestia's *Contra Eunomium*, where Theodore states that as a boy he had met the heresiarch and asked him questions from Scripture which he was unable to answer. It does seem likely, however, that the accusation of ignorance of Scripture is closely connected with Eunomius' different interpretation of it. This is suggested by passages such as those in which Gregory of Nyssa comments on Eunomius' phrase, of σωφρόνον τῆς βασιλείας. Gregory suggests that despite his great "concern" for the divine oracles, Eunomius had never learnt of the numerous passages such as Col. 3:1 and Heb. 12:2 which assert the contrary. Likewise, at another point Gregory comments that Eunomius can keep his arbitrary interpretation of the name "Adam," since the Church follows

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105 Thdr. Mops., Eun., frag. V (Appendix III, p. 102*).
106 Eun., exp. Μαθ. 54*, 2-3.
the Apostle in applying this name prophetically to Christ, and no one would prefer Eunomius' interpretation to Paul's. We may also note that on the opposing side Eunomius himself speaks of Basil as being . . . ἀμαθῇ . . . τὰν ἔκμιν ἀμώτουν . . . no doubt for similar reasons. It seems, then, that while we do not possess enough independent evidence to make our own judgement, most of the accusations of Eunomius' ignorance of Scripture are closely related to his interpretation of it. While it is still possible that he was not, in fact, well acquainted with Scripture, his enemies' statements to that effect cannot be used as evidence for it. The case against him must be regarded as not proved.

This leaves us with the second of Socrates' accusations, and here we may be able to come to a more definite conclusion. There are two things which Socrates might have meant when he said that Eunomius was always "circling round and round the same passages:" he might have meant that the actual number of passages on which Eunomius based his case was small; or he might have meant that in his treatment of a given passage, Eunomius tended to go over the same texts again and again. We will begin our study with the first of these.

Certainly it is the first which seems to be implied by the statements of E. Vandenbussche. Although he recognizes that Eunomius did indeed make use of Scripture, he tells us that "...

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108 Grg. Nyss., Em. II (I I, 356, 7-16).
109 Em., apol. Em. I (I I, 47, 25).
les textes de l'Écriture ne sont que des pièces justificatives
d'une pensée basée sur d'autres principes,\textsuperscript{110} and goes so far
as to assert that the second apology contains no Scriptural ci-
tations at all:\textsuperscript{111} This is certainly wrong; the truth is
much closer to the statement of Th. Dams to the effect that
"... on remarque ... un souci plus grand que dans l'Ap(olo-
gie) de fonder la doctrine sur la révélation."\textsuperscript{112} The easiest
way to resolve this problem will be to try to determine how
much Scripture Eunomius actually used, and what passages were
particularly important to him. The following table is an at-
tempt to do this:

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<th>Eunomius</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>apol. apol. II (3 I, 297, 3-4).</td>
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<td>1: 3ff.</td>
<td>apol. apol. II (3 I, 297, 3-4).</td>
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<td>1: 11-12</td>
<td>apol. apol. II (3 I, 297, 3-4).</td>
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<td>2: 2-3</td>
<td>apol. apol. III (3 I, 297, 3-4).</td>
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\textsuperscript{110}Vandenbussche, op. cit., p. 65.
\textsuperscript{111}Ibid. p. 64. Possibly the source of this statement
is the fact that Jaeger elected not to indicate passages of
Scripture quoted by Eunomius in the apparatus of his edition.
\textsuperscript{112}Th. Dams, La controverse Eunoméenne (Diss. [place
\textsuperscript{113}The following table contains both quotations and al-
lusions, although not all of the latter are of equal probability.
Where reference is made to a lengthy passage whose precise extent
is not clear, only the first verse is indicated, followed by the
sign "ff." All references to the Old Testament are to the se-
venth edition of A. Rahlf's Septuaginta.
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<td>5: 5ff.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(27*, 28), 28 (47*, 7-8); apol. apol. III (J II, 19*, 21-22); exp. fid. 53*, 25, 54*, 11.</td>
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<td>exp. fid. 57*, 12.</td>
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<td>32: 4</td>
<td>exp. fid. 54*, 12.</td>
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<td>II Kingdoms</td>
<td>7: 28</td>
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<td>exp. fid. 54*, 1.</td>
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<td>54: 20</td>
<td>apol. 10 (19*, 19-20).</td>
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<td>73: 12</td>
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<td>apol. 26 (43*, 5); exp. fid. 55*, 7.</td>
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<td>10: 32-33</td>
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<td>10: 18</td>
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114 On this passage, see below pp. 194-197.
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<td>apol. 15 (26*, 6-7), 17 (20*, 4), 24 (38*, 19-20), 26 (42*, 17-18; 43*, 10-12), 28 (47*, 12); apol. apol. III (J II, 115, 21-22)</td>
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<td>apol. apol. III (J II, 114, 16; 116, 12-13; 129 12)</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>apol. 15 (26*, 11), 26 (42*, 16); apol. apol. III (J II, 115, 6); exp. ftd. 54* (26)</td>
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<td>apol. 21 (33*, 17-18), 26 (43*, 16-20)</td>
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<td>6:</td>
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<td>Book</td>
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</table>

*This table is based on the Greek New Testament and Commentary.*
Even allowing for the fact that many of these citations are single phrases or brief allusions, and that phrases found at several points in Scripture have necessarily been repeated in the table, this is a not unimpressive total. We may even add to it by taking into account other passages said to have been used by Eunomius and his followers, or found in extant Eunomian literature:

OTHER PASSAGES OF SCRIPTURE USED BY AETIUS AND THE EUNOMIANS:\n
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scripture</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Genesis</td>
<td>Rec. III, 3, 3 (GCS II, 96, 18-19).</td>
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<td>Rec. III, 10, 9 (GCS II, 105, 13).</td>
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\[115\] This table is based on the remains of Aetius, the Clementine Recognitions (v. supra pp. 116-118), and other isolated texts. We have not used the History of Philostorgius because almost none of the many citations of Scripture found in that work are concerned with theological arguments. We have likewise passed over the two Anastasian Easter Homilies (v. supra pp. 115-116), since although Anastasian, they may not be Eunomian. An asterix (*) indicates a passage also found in the works of Eunomius himself.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book</th>
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<tr>
<td>Psalms</td>
<td>109:1</td>
<td>Rec. III, 10, 6, 9 (GCS II, 105, 4-5, 11).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>23:27</td>
<td>Actius, fr. (Doct. Patr. 41, XXX; 311, 11-12); Hieron., In Matt., II, 256-259 (CCL 77, Pars I, 7, p. 86); 116.</td>
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<td>24:36</td>
<td>Soc., E. VII, 17 (GCS 325, 11-12).</td>
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<td>14:36</td>
<td>Actius, fr. (Doct. Patr. 41, XXX; 311, 22-23); Actius, de Filio (PG 69, 1181B).</td>
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<td>*14:23</td>
<td>Rec. III, 10, 9 (GCS II, 105, 11-12).</td>
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<td>17:2-3</td>
<td>Epiph., haer. 76, 4-7 (GCS III, 345, 10-12).</td>
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<td>*17:3</td>
<td>Actius, syn 37 (Wickham 344; GCS Epipha. III, 359, 23-25).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>*20:17</td>
<td>Actius, de Filio (PG 89, 1211B).</td>
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This table, together with the earlier one, will provide us with a reasonable idea of the extent of Eunomius' use of Scripture, and a basis for discussion of the matter currently in hand.

We started our discussion on the basis of Socrates' statement that Eunomius was always "circling round and round the same passages," and noted that one of the things that might mean was that the actual number of passages used by Eunomius was small. We also noted that this theme of Socrates' was taken up by a modern author, E. Vandenbussche, and saw that in his view the relatively small number of passages used by Eunomius implied that they were wholly secondary to a system actually based on other principles. Thus, the question before us is one of the quantitative amount of Scripture used by Eunomius and also the qualitative value of that Scripture as the basis of his system.

The tables above are sufficient to show that, considered in vacuo, Eunomius cannot be accused of limiting his use of Scripture to a few passages. He cites virtually the whole range of Scripture, and, as far as we know, excluded only one book from consideration, the Epistle to the Hebrews, on the grounds that it was not genuinely apostolic. 117 On the other hand, our tables

117 (Ps.-) Athanasius, dial. Trin. I, 5 (PG 28, 1124C) [cont]
also show us that some passages were more important to Eunomius than others. Obviously, the decision as to whether Eunomius "based" his system on these passages as opposed to others must be made on theological grounds, but we can at least try to determine whether on a purely numerical basis his practice in this regard was radically different from that of his opponents. It does not seem that it was. The best basis for comparison will be to take Eunomius' chief antagonist, Gregory of Nyssa, as our standard.

We will limit ourselves in Gregory's case to the single treatise Contra Eunomium, since in it Gregory is dealing with the same dogmatic problems as Eunomius. For convenience, we will also restrict ourselves to quotations from the New Testament. Since there is no index of Scriptural citations provided in Jaeger's edition, we will make use of that found in the translation of P. Schaff and H. Wace. A perusal of this index...

[cont.] 6 (PG 28, 1125A). The rejection of Hebrews is also ascribed to Arians in general by Thal., Hebr., argumentum (PG 82, 673C). The only contrary evidence is a possible verbal echo of Heb. 1: 2 at Eun., ex. f. 57*, 20-21, but the phrase is so general that the parallel is probably fortuitous. It may not be entirely accidental, however, that there are no citations from Revelation, Jude, or the Johannine epistles, since some of these were still not universally accepted. It is worthy of note in this regard that II Peter, also disputed, is apparently cited at ex. f. 55*, 2k/25.

A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972), second series, Vol. V, pp. 563-565. Since this index prints only page numbers, there will necessarily be some inaccuracy when a quotation appears several times on the same page. However, since our purpose is only to achieve a rough estimate, this should not prevent us from getting some idea of the relative importance of particular passages to Gregory.
reveals that the great majority of passages occur only once, or perhaps twice or three times. It seems, then, that a reliable "threshold" at which we may account a passage important to Gregory's case would be five occurrences. Likewise, where single verses belonging to a larger pericope are cited, it would be better to take them as a group. On this basis we find that by far the most important single chapter of Scripture is the prologue to the Gospel of St. John (1: 1-18), the various verses of which are cited some 44 times. Elsewhere in the same Gospel, chapters 5: 22-23 (9 times) and 14: 9-10 (14 times) seem of special importance, as does 10: 30 (5 times). Likewise, outside of the Gospels, Acts 2: 36 comes in for special attention (8 times), as do Romans 9: 5 (5 times); I Corinthians 1: 24 (7 times), II Corinthians 5: 21 (5 times), and 6: 16 (7 times). Elsewhere, Philippians 2: 5-10 (19 times), Colossians 1: 15-17 (14 times), and Hebrews 1: 3 (13 times) are obviously of special importance. Although the frequency of some of these passages is clearly dictated by the exigencies of controversy (e.g., Acts 2: 36), there is nonetheless no question that most of these passages were regarded by Gregory as fundamental to his case.

When we turn to Eunomius himself, the problem is somewhat more complicated. Because of the great difference in size be-

119 Exclusive of those found in quotations of Eunomius.
tween Gregory's treatise and those which remain of Eunomius', as well as the fragmentary state of the latter, it is impossible to establish any direct ratio. However, taking into account the paucity of the evidence, we should still be able to get a general idea of the extent to which Eunomius circled "round and round the same passages." We will confine ourselves again to texts from the New Testament, merely noting the obvious importance of the first few chapters of Genesis and Proverbs 8: 22. This leaves us with a number of passages clearly of great importance to Eunomius. As with Gregory, chief among them is the prologue to the Gospel according to St. John (Jn. 1: 1-18), the various parts of which are cited some 28 times. Two other obviously important passages are John 17: 3 (5 times) and 20: 17 (twice). When we move outside the Gospels, we find that Acts 2: 36 (6 times) and Philippians 2: 7-8 (12 times) are of particular importance, as are Colossians 1: 15-16 (3 times) and I Timothy 6: 15-16 (4 times). Finally, we may note that I Corinthians 8: 6 is obviously of exceptional importance, not only from a numerical standpoint (it occurs 5 times), but from a theological one, since it is clearly one of the sources which lies behind the short creed presented by Eunomius in the first apology as the embodiment of the "ruling tradition."\(^{120}\)

We must now ask ourselves how we are to interpret this. As

\(^{120}\)Eun., apol. 5 (12*, 25-13*, 3*).
we noted earlier, no direct ratio can be established between the
two authors, and, on the other hand, the main question must be
decided primarily on theological grounds. Nonetheless, we can at
this point achieve some understanding of the evidence considered
simply numerically. Our problem is that although Eunomius
quotes or alludes to a wide range of Scriptural texts, he does
seem to emphasize some more than others. It might be possible,
therefore, to take this as showing that his case is in some sense
"based" on these texts only, and that others are cited only by
way of illustration. At least on a purely numerical basis, a
comparison with the parallel situation in Gregory of Nyssa sug-
gests that this is unlikely. Both authors clearly use some texts
more than others (indeed, often the same texts), but in neither
case can this be accepted as evidence that these texts are the
exclusive basis on which their theological positions are built.
Although the fragmentary nature of Eunomius' remains makes it dif-
cult to establish the exact value of any given text on purely
numerical grounds,121 even with this caveat his practice in this
matter seems little different from Gregory's. Apparently then,
while we may ultimately be driven by our understanding of Eunomius'
theology to accept the contentions of Vandenburghe and others
that Eunomius' case is based on the exegesis of only a few

121 We note, for instance, that several of the most fre-
quently occurring passages (such as Acts 2: 36) are for the most
part used in the course of a single argument.
passages, we cannot do so on the basis of his actual practice in citing them. In this he seems little different from his contemporaries.

These considerations together with the wide range of Scripture found in Eunomius' surviving writings suggest that it is unlikely that what Socrates meant when he criticized Eunomius as "always circling round and round the same passages" was that the actual number of passages on which the heretic based his case was small. It seems, then, that if Socrates' statements about Eunomius' use of Scripture represent something more than mere polemical imagination, what he must have been referring to was the use of Scripture in the course of individual arguments, ascribing to the heresiarch a tendency to go back over the same passages again and again. That this supposition is correct is suggested by one of the few surviving examples of an extensive argument from Scripture by Eunomius—it is to be found in the *Apologia Apologiae*. In the course of this argument, the passages on which it is based, the prologue of St. John (Jn. 1: 1, 3, 14, 18), and Acts 2: 36 and Philippians 2: 7-8 are repeated some 14, 5, and 11 times respectively in the course of only five pages. Since the tables and comparisons which we examined above have shown that Socrates was unlikely to have meant that Eunomius made use of only a few passages for his case in general, this

\[121\] *Eun., apol. apol. III* (I II, 112, 10-116, 28).*
example suggests that the historian was referring to his use of passages in particular arguments. It was in them that he was "always circling round and round the same passages"—it seems, then, that Socrates' statement cannot be used as evidence of any neglect of the testimony of Scripture by Eunomius.

This leaves us with the third of the criticisms lodged against Eunomius by Socrates, his actual interpretation of Scripture. However, before we go on to deal with this problem, there is another which is closely related to that just discussed. It is raised by M. J. van Parys in an article on the use of Scripture in the Contra Eunomium of Gregory of Nyssa:

"Quand on fait l'inventaire des citations scripturaires d'Eunome, on remarque que ces citations n'apportent aucun texte nouveau par rapport aux arguments scripturaires de la première génération arienne. Ceci nous indique déjà qu'Eunome s'est peu préoccupé des fondements bibliques de sa théologie. La place occupée à l'intérieur de ses écrits par ces 'dossiers' scripturaires confirme cette observation. Aussi bien, dans l' 'Apología que dans l' 'Apología ἦπερ τῆς ἀπολογίας, Eunome procède par déduction rationelle alors que les arguments scripturaires forment un appendice destiné à étayer sommairement ses positions doctrinales. Sa 'confession de foi' est un peu différente à cet égard, mais cette différence s'explique par le genre littéraire de l' ἔθεσις πλουτου,'"122

In part, then, Parys' comments are identical with those of E. Vandenbussche and relate to the relative importance of revela-

tion and reason in his system. On the other hand, whereas we have seen that Eunomius' alleged neglect of Scripture cannot be justified numerically in absolute terms, Parys introduces a new reason for accepting such an assertion. In his view, the fact that Eunomius does not introduce any new Scriptural texts to support his case is a sign of his neglect of Scripture as a basis for his theology. It seems to us that this is a very rash statement to make, and that it may be questioned on two grounds—that of the fact itself and that of the interpretation. There is no doubt at all that on the whole the passages of Scripture used by Eunomius are those of Arian tradition. On the other hand, while this is unquestionable, we have virtually no information about the stages at which various texts used by Arian controversialists came into play. Certainly, the evidence cited by Parys himself,¹²³ two lists of Arian texts in the Theological Orations of Gregory Nazianzen,¹²⁴ is in fact contemporary with Eunomius himself. Moreover there is at least some evidence that in those areas of doctrine where Eunomius himself was an innovator (e.g., his theology of language) his interpretation of Scripture was correspondingly innovative (at least vis-à-vis his Arian predecessors). It seems, then, that the evidence is not as clear-cut as Parys appears to assume it to be. But even if it were, the conclusion

¹²³Ibid. p. 173.
¹²⁴Greg. Naz., Or. 29, 18 (Mason 100, 10-101, 4), 30, 7 (Mason 118, 12-13).
which Parys derives from it is by no means obvious. If Eunomius makes use only of those passages of Scripture found in earlier Arian writers, it seems perfectly reasonable to take this as simply confirming his oft-repeated claim to be working within a tradition. While we might eventually come to agree with Parys on other, more theological grounds, there is nothing in the alleged fact itself which compels us to assert that "Eunomie s'est peu préoccupé des fondaments bibliques de sa théologie."

It seems, then, that Eunomius' "ignorance" of Scripture can be seen as a reflection of his interpretation of it, while the actual number and type of his citations cannot be taken by itself as an indication of any alleged neglect of it. This brings us back at last to the third of Socrates' charges, Eunomius' failure to grasp the meaning of Scripture, and the question as to whether his manner of interpreting it can shed any light on the Fathers' criticisms of Eunomius' understanding of faith. The initial question is naturally what Socrates meant when he accused Eunomius of failing to grasp the inner meaning of Scripture. The answer is suggested by the similar accusations which he leveled against Eunomius' teacher Aetius:

οὖν δὲ ἡ διάγνωσις ὧν Ἀέτιος, καὶ τῶν ἑρμήνευσεν Ἐυνώμιος, τὸ ἀρχιτέκτον οὐ ναρκήσατε μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰρωνεύως τις πολὺς εἷς, διὸς τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτον τῶν τῶν ἅρμονικα τὰ λόγια ἐρμηνευομένας ἀκούσας, πολλὰ χαίρειν φράσας τῶν πρὸς Κλήμεντα, καὶ Ἀριστακλέως, καὶ Ἰριγένην, ἀνδρὸς ἁγίας σοφίας ἐπιστημῶν. 125

125 Soc., h.e. II, 35 (PG 67, 300A-B).
"Actius was so uninstructed and so uninitiated in the divine Scriptures (he was accomplished only at captious wrangling—something any plough-boy might do), that he hadn't even had any training in those ancient writers who have expounded the Christian oracles; he completely rejected the followers of Clement, Africanus, and Origen, men acquainted with the whole range of wisdom."

This seems to imply that in Socrates' view Actius failed to understand the meaning of the Scriptures because he rejected a specific tradition of their interpretation, that of Clement, Africanus, and Origen. We noted earlier that the accusation directed by Socrates against Eumonius was that he was unable to understand the meaning of Scripture. That this accusation is closely connected with the similar one leveled against Actius is suggested by another episode in which Socrates informs us that someone failed to understand the "meaning" of Scripture. This is his account of the ejection of Demophilus and the Arians from the Churches of Constantinople by Theodosius the Great. In the course of this narrative, Demophilus is portrayed as citing Matthew 10: 23, and Socrates makes the following comment on it:

"He said these things and went out—but without really understanding the Gospel passage, or recognizing its spiritual meaning, that these men..."

126 Ibid. IV, 7 (PG 67, 473A), quoted above, p. 147.
127 "When they persecute you in one town, flee to the next..."
have fled the way of this world to seek the Jerusalem which is above."

Eunomius was criticized with regard to the Epistle to the Romans with having been unable to grasp the meaning (σκορπός) of a complete book, while Demophilus is said to have failed to grasp the "spiritual meaning" (θεωρία) of a specific passage, and Aetius is accused of completely rejecting "the followers of Clement, Africanus, and Origen." It is very tempting to understand by this that the "meaning" which was missed by Eunomius with respect to the Epistle is related to the "spiritual meaning" which Demophilus was unable to see in the Gospel passage. Whether or not θεωρία in the latter passage should be taken as equivalent to "allegory" in the modern sense, it is clearly used, here as elsewhere, by way of opposition to the literal meaning, and this, together with the specific mention of "Clement, Africanus, and Origen" in Aetius' case, suggests that what Socrates was criticizing in Eunomius was his inability to grasp a meaning which, for lack of a better word, we will call "allegorical." It might be possible, therefore, to see the division between the Scriptural interpretation of Eunomius and that of his opponents as one between the literal and the allegorical meaning.

This possibility is made more attractive when we take into consideration what little is known of the background of Eunomian Scriptural exegesis. Although we know very little about Eunomius'
own education in this respect, Philostorgius gives us detailed information about that of his master, Aetius:

While he (Aetius) was in hiding there (at Anabarmus), he became acquainted with Athanasius, who had been one of the disciples of the martyr Lucian and was then bishop of Anabarmus. With him he read the Evangelists, and after learning them in complete detail, he went on to Tarsus to be with Antony. He too had been one of the companions of Lucian. Under him he was instructed in the epistles of the apostle, and spent a long time with him during the period when he was still exercising the office of presbyter. However, when Antony became a bishop, and it was no longer possible for him to be occupied with giving Aetius instruction, Aetius went back again to Antioch to attend the lectures of Leontius. Leontius was at that time a presbyter, and was himself reckoned among the disciples of Lucian. He instructed him in the interpretation of the prophets and especially of Ezekiel."

G. Bardy has the following comment to make about this description of Aetius' education:

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131Philost., P.e. III, 15 (GCS 46, 1-12).
"L'Écriture Sainte forme ainsi le thème des leçons que reçoit Aèce, et l'on échappe difficilement à l'impression que ces leçons s'organisent suivant un plan assez rigoureux : ce sont d'abord les Évangiles, les livres les plus faciles et en même temps les plus indispensables au chrétien, ceux qui contiennent l'authe nique enseignement du Seigneur ; puis viennent les Épitres, plus compliquées déjà, mais où la doctrine est présentée sous une forme plus nette, mieux définie. Les prophètes terminent la série, bien que leurs œuvres aient été composées les premières; c'est qu'on les interprète de manière plus exacte lorsqu'on sait déjà l'histoire de celui qui les a réalisées."

Aetius is thus portrayed as receiving a complete and systematic education in a particular school of Biblical exegesis, that of Lucian of Antioch. Since one of the chief features of this school is generally reckoned to be its preference for the literal as opposed to the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, this information seems to strengthen the supposition that Aetius' own disciple Eunomius was chiefly separated from his opponents by a preference for the literal as opposed to the allegorical interpretation of Scripture.

On the other hand, even if true, this possibility of itself raises other problems. That Aetius should have been indebted to the school of Lucian of Antioch is not of itself remarkable, since Arius himself had expressed his own debt to this school by describing himself as being, together with Eusebius of Nicomedia


133 Ibid., p. 181.
a συλλογικανιστά.\(^\text{134}\) On the other hand, if Aetius and Eunomius were indeed indebted to the school of Lucian for their Scriptural exegesis, and hence presumably divided from the Orthodox by an adherence to a literal as opposed to an "allegorical" type of exegesis,\(^\text{135}\) we are still faced with the problem of what such an opposition might mean. More specifically, we must ask ourselves what is meant by "allegorical" in such an instance.

We can get some idea of the answer by examining some of Eunomius’ opponents. A passage found in the Adversus Eunomium of St. Basil suggests the nature of the Orthodox complaints:

\[\text{πάν γάρ που τὸ ἕναντιν, εἰςάς αὐτὴν μὴν τὴν ὑστάς ἀπερίσκοις εἶναι παντί, τὸν εἰ τὸ Μονογενῆ καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι - ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἐνεργείαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀναγομένους ἡμᾶς, καὶ διὰ τῶν ποιητῶν τὸν ποιητὴν ἐννοοῦντος, τῆς ἐξαόρτικας αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας λαμβάνειν τὴν σύνεσιν. Τούτο γάρ ἔστι τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐάν πλὴν ἀνθρώπος δ' θεὸς ἐκανέρωσεν. Ἐκεῖ γὰρ διὰ καὶ τοῖς θεολόγοις ποιέστας ἐκανείγασαι δοκεῖ τροπολογίαις τοιαῖς ἐκ δὲ ἀλληγορίαις, ὥστε ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας κατὰ τὴν πράξειν ἐνεργών φύλακα παράταται φιλανθρωπίᾳ τῷ γράμματι, πρὸς ἀνοικτοῖς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔφοιτος αὐτῶν ἐκτραπεῖς, πετοχες παντελῶς τῶν ἄξων περὶ θεοῦ νομίμων κατηγόρασεν.}\(^\text{136}\)

\(^{134}\)Aetius, ep. Bis., apud Thdtr., h.e. I, 5 (GCS 27, 7).


"For I take it that it is altogether the opposite—surely the essence (of God) itself is incomprehensible to all but the Only-begotten and the Holy Spirit. Rather, once we have been led upward by the activities of God, and have formed a notion of the Maker from the things which are made, we come to apprehend the significance of his goodness and wisdom. This is that which can be known about God, and which God has shown to all men (cf. Rom. 1: 19). Since, then, everything which appears to have been written by the prophets about the essence of God is by way of figures of speech and allegories, their expressions point toward another meaning. The result is that should anyone strive contentiously and without due examination to set them out according to the meaning obvious in the bare letter, wandering into Jewish myths and old wives' tales (cf. I Tim. 4: 7, II Tim. 4: 4, Tit. 1: 14), he would grow old altogether deprived of the proper concepts about God."

Thus, Basil speaks clearly of an opposition between the literal meaning of Scripture and an interpretation of it described as "allegorical"—the former presumably that favored by his opponents. In the passage which follows that quoted, Basil portrays these adversaries as accepting literally the visions of God afforded to Ezekiel (Ezek. 8: 2), Moses (Deut. 4: 24), and Daniel (Dan. 7: 9), and thus believing that God is made of amber or fire or other such things. Although this is clearly an attempt at a reductio ad absurdum, it does bring out the nature of his opponents' system as Basil sees it. They take the language of Scripture about God as referring to God's nature directly and not by means of "figures" and "allegories." In Basil's view, this language cannot bring us to a direct knowledge of God, but only leads us to "apprehend the
significance of his goodness and wisdom." In part, then, the point at issue is two different theories of language, and how this language relates to God, but Basil's statement also helps us to get a better idea of the meaning of "allegory" in this context. It does not seem to refer to the detailed exegesis of extensive passages by allegorical means so much as to the general proposition that Scriptural statements about God are to be taken as symbols of the realities rather than as directly revelatory of those realities themselves, i.e., the "expressions point toward another meaning." This more general understanding of "allegory" agrees closely enough with the comment of Socrates on Demophilus and suggests that he was thinking of something similar in the cases of Aetius and Eunomius. Thus, while there is an opposition between the literal and the allegorical interpretation of Scripture at issue here, it is an opposition of a far more general kind than might be otherwise understood from the simple statement that the opposition is as between the exegesis of Lucian and Origen.

In the passage from St. Basil quoted above the problem at issue was that of language about God, and in that case the literalism of Eunomius separated him from the Orthodox by insisting that Scriptural language about God should be taken as referring to him directly. Other passages suggest that this literalism was more subtle than this might give us to understand, and that it might be applied differently in other instances. An example
of this is provided by Epiphanius, who also gives us a better idea of the kinds of passages at issue than does the reductio ad absurdum of Basil:

"Accordingly, the dignity (of sonship) is not ascribed to the offspring by way of bare designation, for in that case he would have many brothers like himself after him—as is already found in the saying, "Sons have I begotten and brought up" (Isa. 1: 2), and again, "he who begets the drops of dew" (Job 38: 28), and again, "from whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named" (Eph. 3: 15), and again, "Have you not all one father?" (Mal. 2: 10), and again, "Jacob my child" (Isa. 4: 2), and again, "Israel is my first-born son" (Ex. 4: 22). Not all of these are so designated by way of the literal meaning only, since they show a development with respect to the advance from non-being to being; they are not so ascribed with respect to the essence and by way of a true designation, but only by way of the literal meaning and according to grace. Thus, they were created through the action of the one who is named ("Son") neither according to grace nor by way of bare designation, but who really is such—being created from the One and through the One and with him who proceeds from him and takes what is his."

In this case Epiphanius criticizes Aetius for sticking only to

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138Epiphanius, haer. 76.25.7-8 (GCS III, 372, 26-373, 6).
the literal meaning (ψιλωκ λέξεις) because he takes all of these passages univocally. In Epiphanius' view, these texts are similar only in the bare letter, and cannot be applied directly to the Sonship of the Only-begotten since they are used figuratively. Aetius, on the other hand, is portrayed as proceeding by way of an analysis of the literal meaning of the various passages of Scripture dealing with begetting and sonship and reaching a general conclusion about the meaning of such passages when they refer to God and his relationship with the created order. The conclusion which Aetius would have us draw is that this meaning also applies to those cases where Scripture uses such terms of the "generation" of the Only-begotten. Epiphanius would presumably have wanted to say that by taking the meaning found in the bare letter of these passages and applying it univocally to the Son of God, Aetius had failed to grasp their higher meaning.

That Epomius in fact differed from his opponents in holding to a literal interpretation of Scripture is made abundantly clear from his surviving writings. In his view, by the providence of God, words in general, and Scriptural words in particular,

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139 N.B., however, that although this argument accurately reflects the anomoean approach in general, the argument itself is not actually found in the Syntagmation of Aetius which Epiphanius was at that point refuting. 140 Cum., apol. apol. II (II I, 282, 8-9). 141 &; "true words," words that are proper designations of their objects; not all words which may be used to describe an object truly reveal its inner reality.
refer directly to their objects, and thus link us directly to their nature or essence. In Eunomius' view, this is not a personal interpretation, but the authentic teaching of Scripture about its own interpretation. This naturally makes it impossible for the expression of Scripture to "point toward another meaning" since they are already the direct expressions of the realities to which they point. In such a context Scriptural interpretation will inevitably mean the elucidation of the various levels of meaning inherent in the literal text—discerning the realities to which the words refer and clearing up apparent contradictions and difficulties. Thus, even though at one point Eunomius refers toiphysopaue with respect to a Scriptural passage (Gen. 1:1ff.), he is referring to a higher meaning in general rather than to Basil's "figures of speech and allegories"—in his view, it is not possible for those words which really are the proper designations of their objects to "point toward another meaning." Basil was prepared to make such an assertion largely because to his mind there can be no direct connection between the words of Scripture and the

\[142\] Eun., apol. 9 (18*, 3-15), 24 (38*, 30-39*, 11); apol. apol. I (J I, 72, 5-10), II (J I, 282, 1-14), etc.
\[143\] Eun., apol. apol. II (J I, 315, 16-18; 315, 31-316, 3).
\[144\] Eun., apol. apol. II (J I, 366, 18-25).
\[145\]Unless the word is in fact Gregory's.
\[146\] Eun., apol. apol. II (J I, 282, 3).
\[147\] As opposed to other words, not properly designatory of their objects, which certainly do; cf. Eun., apol. apol. III (J II, 46, 21-47, 16).
realities to which they refer. Scriptural language, like all language, is a product of the human understanding (νε' πνευματ) and is subject to the limits of that understanding—it cannot link us directly to the underlying realities. For Basil as for Eunomius this is not a personal interpretation, but the authentic teaching of Scripture about its own meaning. If it is to bring us to divine realities, it cannot do so directly, but only by way of "figures of speech and allegories." Thus, analogy as an interpretative technique is as intrinsic a part of Basil's understanding of Scripture as it is alien to Eunomius—a point not missed by Gregory of Nyssa, who is vehement in his master's defence. It seems, then, that in their respective interpretations of Scripture, we have finally come across one of the major points separating Eunomius from his Orthodox opponents.

If we have identified one of the main issues in their debate, however, we must ask ourselves whether this issue is sufficient of itself explain the opposing positions of the two protagonists. That is, on the assumption that each man approached Scripture from the standpoint of his respective interpretation, can we assume that he reached his conclusions solely on this basis without introducing other considerations? It is difficult to believe that we can. While the different understandings of divine

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148 Basil, Ἐπιστ. I, 5-8 (PG 29, 520C-529C).
149 Ibid. I, 7 (PG 29, 524C-525B).
150 "And even so they bring us only to "the significance of his goodness and wisdom."
151 Ἐπιστ. III, v (J II, 163, 1-166, 10).
revelation adopted by Anomoean and Orthodox seem sufficient to explain much that divides them, it is apparent that they are not sufficient to explain the whole. Let us start with the position of Basil of Caesarea. We have seen that in his view the words used by Scripture about God point to another meaning. Thus, when he encounters words in Scripture which, if taken literally, would be inapplicable to God, he tells us that we must take them in a sense worthy of him.\footnote{Basil, \\emph{Basil.}, \\emph{Basil.} II, 16 (PG 29, 604C-605A).} We are able to recognize words which must be taken as "figures of speech and allegories" because we also recognize that they cannot worthily be applied directly to God. As Gregory of Nyssa puts it, when we find Scripture describing God corporeally in terms of eyes, eyelids, ears, fingers, hands, feet, etc., we must not think of these things as applying to him \emph{κατά τὴν πρόχειρον έννοιαν.}\footnote{Greg. Nyss., \\emph{Basil.} III, vi (J II, 192, 10-15); a point on which Eunomius would have emphatically agreed with him, and for the same reasons! \\emph{apol.} apol. III (J II, 46, 25-47, 9).} Rather, to return to Basil, we must take them in a sense which is worthy of God, one which portrays him as ἀκείμενος, ἀμφίπορος, ἀναληπτός, ἀληθινός etc.\footnote{Basil, \\emph{Basil.} II, 16 (PG 29, 604C).} In other words, we approach these passages with certain conceptions as to what can worthily be applied to God.\footnote{Conceptions apparently not shared by the pious Egyptian monks who besieged Theophilus of Alexandria in his palace on just this point! \\emph{Sum.}, \\emph{Sum.} VII, 11 (GCS 353, 26-364, 17).} This is all a natural consequence of Basil's understanding of Scripture. But as Basil himself points out when discussing the \emph{crux inter-}
pretext of the ancients, Proverbs 8: 22, there are parts of Scripture which are so enigmatically expressed in terms of proverbs, parables, dark sayings and riddles that ησαν διακωμολητοι ηπειρηματικα και
σημαντικα και ειναι λαμβαναν. Indeed, Basil goes so far as to tell us that the true understanding of such passages is reserved for the next life:

και μηδες ολοσθενες δειναι της διακωμολητι την ορουμαν τον κιημα ειναι τα πνευμα. Εθεσοντες γαρ εκει διανοιας τα διακωμολητα και τας δυνατας ζωοτητας ειληφθηκεν το αυτο πνευμα, καυταστα ας την διακωμολητα διας και διαριθκη καταλημα εις ταν ουτερον διαινοειναι αλλα. δεν, διαβαντες τα δι' εσπερου και αναγκασας δρασι την ηλιδηλιαν, της προδοσιν ηθος αειωθαμνον.

"And let no one suppose that denying the Spirit to be a creature is a rejection of his individual existence. For it is the property of a pious mind to be cautious in applying to the Holy Spirit unexplained passages in Holy Writ, but rather to be convinced that our experience and complete understanding of him is laid up for us in that future age when, having passed beyond glimpsing the truth in a mirror, dimly, we shall have been counted worthy of that vision which is face to face (1 Cor. 13: 12)."

Thus, although Scripture contains "not one idle syllable," the pious man recognizes that there is much in it which is not immediately comprehensible. Nonetheless, he does not allow himself to be drawn away from the truth by the arguments of heretics when presented with such passages, but rather takes them in accordance with the witness of the rest of Scripture and of the conceptions

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156 Basil, Ex. II, 20 (PG 29, 616B).
157 Ibid. III, 7 (PG 29, 669C-D).
158 Basil, Hom. VI, 11 (PG 29, 114C).
common to mankind, \(^{159}\) holding fast to a predisposition based on faith which is stronger than any argument based on reason—for what reasoning is strong enough to survive their attack? \(^{160}\) Basil, then, does not derive his position only from a particular manner of interpreting Scripture, nor from arguments based on specific passages, but presupposes as a background to all this a definite understanding of Scripture taken as a whole, together with a particular present and continuing religious experience founded on faith which enables us to interpret that Scripture properly.

This brings us back to Eunomius himself. As with Basil, there is no question that much of what separates him from his adversaries is explicable on the basis of his particular understanding of Scripture, but again as with Basil, it is clear that this understanding is not of itself sufficient to explain his position as a whole. We can illustrate this by examining some of Eunomius' arguments from Scripture in greater detail. In the second apology Eunomius makes an examination of the various Scriptural meanings of the word "light":

\[ \cdots \]

\(^{159}\) Basil, ep. 236, 2, 31-34 (Courtonne III, 48).
\(^{160}\) Ibid., 236, 2, 14-18 (Courtonne III, 48).
So then, once this absurdity had been brought to light as a consequence of his assertions, Eunomius tried to undo their effect by way of the verbal subtlety of his arguments, speaking as follows:

"For we know: we know the "true light" (Jn. 1: 9); we know him who created the "light" after the heaven and the earth (Gen. 1: 3); we have heard Christ "the life and truth" itself (cf. Jn. 14: 6), saying to his disciples, "You are the light of the world" (Matt. 5: 14); we have received instruction from the blessed Paul when he describes "the God who is over all" (Rom. 9: 5) as "unapproachable light" (I Tim. 6: 16), thereby both establishing a distinction by means of the qualification and expressing the pre-eminence of the "light" in question. Accordingly, since we have learned that there is so great a difference between this "light" and all others, we will not endure even to hear that "light" in all these instances has one and the same meaning."

Of itself, this passage represents a good example of the aims of Eunomian exegesis--to discern the various levels of meaning inherent in Scriptural terms, and to discover the extent to which these terms do or do not apply directly to their objects (τῶν ταύτων λόγων δινομάτων). 162 In the present instance, the problem being dealt with is that Scripture often makes use of equivocal terms (δυονυμίαι), 163 terms which, although identical in sound, nonetheless vary in meaning. Although the word "light"
is used in all the examples quoted above by Eunomius, it is clear that the object to which the word refers in each case is different. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the simple assertion that words in general refer directly to their objects is not of itself a sufficient exegetical principle to explain the basis on which Eunomius is able to discern the various meanings of the words. There must be some further principle on the basis of which Eunomius is enabled to make these distinctions. What that principle is, is made clear from a passage in the first apology:

Εἴποι δ’ ἐν τῷ Τάξις πρὸς Ἀντιλογίαν ἡμονμένοις, δὲ εἶπεν δὲ τοῖς διόιμαι προσέχειν, καὶ ἐὰν τοῖς προσ-ἀγεσθαι ταῖς τῶν ἐποκειμένων ἐννοιαῖς, καθὼς μὲν ἀγέννητον καὶ γεννητὸν παραλάβας φαίμην, καθ’ ἐὰν φὰς καὶ φῶς, ἢ τὸ καὶ ἡ ἀνάμικτη ἀναλύειν. ἀλλὰ δὴν φαμεν... ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀγέννητον φας τὸ δὲ γεννητὸν. πάτερον ἀλλ’ ὁ σημαίνει τὸ φῶς ἐκ’ ἀγεννητοῦ λεγόμενον παρὰ τὸ γεννητὸν ἢ ταυτὸν ἐκατέ-ρον; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἑτέρον τι καὶ ἑτέρον, εὐθύλιον ὅτι καὶ σύνθετον τὸ ἑς ἑτέρου καὶ ἑτέρου συνεκείμενον, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον σύν ἀγέννητον. εἰ δὲ ταυτόν, θάνος παραλ-λακται τὸ ἀγέννητον πρὸς τὸ γεννητὸν τοσοῦτον παραλ-λάξει δὲ καὶ τὸ φᾶς πρὸς τὸ φᾶς καὶ τὴν τήν ἄναμικτην τῆς τῶν ἐποκειμένων ἐπίθεως καὶ τοῦ τῶν τολμῶν διάλυσις. εἰ τούτων παῦν δὲ πάρει λέγειν τῆς τῆς παράδος σημαίνει τὸν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν τῆς σημαίνης ἀναλύειν τῷ ἀγέννητῳ διὰ τὸ ἄμεμα ἢ καὶ ἀναλύοντος, κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἀπότομον λόγον καὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἀρτα[ν] τῇ γεννήματι.

"But perhaps someone who has been goaded by all this into responding will say, 'Even granted the necessity of paying attention to names and being brought by them to the meanings of the underlying realities, still, by the same token that we say the unbegotten is different from the begotten, we also say that

"light" and "light," "life" and "life," "power" and "power" are alike with respect to both. Our reply... to such a person is to say that the one 'light' is unbegotten and the other begotten. Does 'light' mean something different when applied to the Unbegotten from what it does when applied to the begotten? Or does it apply to both alike? If 'light' means one thing when applied to the one and something different when applied to the other, then obviously, since the 'light' is made up of two different things, it is composite, and that which is composite cannot be Unbegotten. On the other hand, if 'light' has the same meaning in both cases, then 'light' and 'light,' 'life' and 'life,' and 'power' and 'power' must be separate from each other in the same degree that the Unbegotten is separated from the begotten. And indeed, the same rule and method applies for the resolution of all such problems. If, then, because he is without parts and uncomposed, the inner meaning of every word spoken of the essence of the Father is equivalent in force of signification to 'Unbegotten,' by the same argument that same word applied to the Only-begotten is equivalent to 'offspring.'

Thus, even though Scripture may use the same name in many different ways, we must always read it with a consciousness of the nature of the God to whom it refers. We must always preserve a sense of the "proportion" (τὰ ἀνάλογα, ἀνάλογον) which exists between the Unbegotten and the begotten and understand the words accordingly. "Light" must be applied to the Father in a unique "agennetic" way, just as it must be applied to the Son in a "gennetic" way appropriate to his own nature.

The doctrine that words apply to God in a way unique to himself is by no means limited to Eunomius, and is found in a similar

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165Eun., apol. 17 (29*, 6); apol. apol. II (I, 316, 7; 324, 3); cf. also Ibid. (I, 332, 21), where Basil is accused of conceiving of Christ according to "certain proportions."
form in Gregory of Nyssa.\textsuperscript{166} What is of interest to us is the way in which this doctrine is applied. Behind the doctrine itself lies a particular conception of the nature of God which enables us to understand the proper meaning of these words when applied to him. It is not this doctrine which divides the two adversaries, but the background against which they apply it. This is apparent again when we consider the opposing problem of "synonyms,"\textsuperscript{167} words which despite their varying surface meanings nonetheless refer to the same object. Basil had criticized Eunomius' assertion that words refer directly to their objects by pointing out that while some words do indeed do this, there are others which primarily indicate a relationship, and that "offspring" is such a word. We cannot think of the product of a generation without at the same time thinking of the one who begot that product.\textsuperscript{168} "Father" and "Son" do not, therefore, refer to differing essences but to different characteristic properties and relationships.\textsuperscript{169} Eunomius replied to this that, indeed, Scripture used many terms to describe the Only-begotten (such as "stone," "axe," "rock," "foundation," etc.) which could not in their πρᾶξεων σημασίαν be applied to him at all by a pious mind.\textsuperscript{170} In such cases we are required to understand

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{166}Grøg. Nyss., \textit{Dun.} I (J I, 204, 29-206, 6).
\item \textsuperscript{167}The word itself does not occur.
\item \textsuperscript{168}Basil, \textit{Dun.} II, 9 (PG 29, 588B-589A).
\item \textsuperscript{169}\textit{Ibid.} II, 5 (PG 29, 580C).
\item \textsuperscript{170}\textit{Dun.}, apol. apol. III (J II, 46, 21-27).
\end{itemize}
them in a sense which is appropriate to their object:

αλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ θεοπρεπέστερον τῆς τῶν δυνάμεων τοιτῶν μετεγκαθότες ἐμφάνισες ἔλλο τι νοοῦμεν, κἂν ὦτω κατονομάζωμεν, ὅδ' ἐς τά δε τοιτῶν κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ' ἐς τά ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενον, ἔλλο δὲ τι παρὰ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν λεγόμενων νοοῦμενον.171

"Rather, we transfer the apparent significance of these words to one more befitting God and understand them to refer to something else. Even if we do apply such names to God, it is not because he actually is any one of them in the inner principle of his nature, but rather because even though he is called by such names, he is understood by means of them to be something other than the things to which they refer."

Thus, all such terms must be understood as applying to God in a sense which is δυνατόν τε καὶ θύλον διπλών τε καὶ ἀποχαμάτσιστον.172 We must pass beyond the πρόχειρον σημασίαν or τόπον τῶν δυνάμεων173 to arrive at an understanding of Scripture which is truly worthy of God.174 In understanding what Scripture says of the generation of the Son, for instance, we must not "suppose that the generation is a bodily one,"175 but must take it in a sense which is consonant with the pre-eminent unity and dignity of the Divinity, a sense which is ἐπὶ τὸ θεοπρεπέστερον. Thus, as with Basil there stands behind these assertions a particular understanding of what can and cannot properly be applied to God, as well

171 Ibid. (J II, 47, 4-9). 172 Ibid. (J II, 26, 28-29).
173 Ibid. II (J I, 398, 7; 299, 24), III (J II, 6, 11).
At Ibid. II (J I, 271, 12), the word seems to refer to the "form" of words previously used in apol. I (16*, 4-7) and quoted by Eunomius at J I, 271, 20-22.
174 But unlike Basil we achieve a knowledge which is εἰς τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἐσμενίαν, Βου., apol. apol. III (J II, 47, 13-14).
175 Βου., apol. 12 (21*, 23-22*, 1).
as a particular understanding of the import of Scripture taken as a whole.

To give a few examples, we find, for instance, that when refuting at length an argument of Basil's based primarily on Jn. 1:1ff., Phil. 2:7, and Acts 2:36, Eunomius accuses his adversary of "substituting his own mind for the intention of the Apostles." Indeed, by interpreting these passages alternately in terms of the divine and human in Christ, Basil had in effect introduced two Christs and thereby undermined the whole basis of salvation by making it the work of a man and not of the divine Word. This is indeed to "misrepresent the divine oracles," and "conform their interpretation to one's own point of view," as Eunomius says at other points. There is no doubt, then, that in Eunomius' view Basil had twisted the objective meaning of Scripture to make it conformable to his own ends. What is interesting is the motive to which the actions of Basil and his followers are ascribed. The type of person in question cannot recognize the truth because "he contentiously remains in his own opinions;" his interpretation of Scripture is "the work of a soul justly deprived of a sound mind, one which examines the words

177 Eun., apol. apol. III (J II, 113, 10; 115, 12).
178 Ibid. (J II, 112, 10-20).
179 Ibid. (J II, 113, 28-114, 11).
180 Ibid. II (J I, 312, 30-313, 1).
181 Ibid. (J I, 281, 25-26).
of the Lord with a sick understanding and a dishonest habit of mind." Thus, if one were to characterize the attitude of such people by a single word, that attitude would have to be one of ἀμφιβολία, the wilful perversion of Scripture to their own way of thinking. Instead of accepting humbly the revelation of Scripture in the sense in which God gave it (τῷ τῶν ἀποστόλων διαθήκης), they force it into their own way of thinking, and it is this which merits them the designation of ἀμφιβολία and their system that of ἀμφιβολία. On the other hand, when we turn to the attitude characteristic of those who accept Eunomius' understanding of Scripture, the situation is just the opposite. It is they who are attentive to the mind of the Apostles, and preserve with the terms of the faith its true signification undisturbed. This, therefore, is that attitude which characterizes "the mind of those who have believed in the Lord," that they humbly accept the revelation of God in the sense in which God revealed it by displaying an attitude of ἀμφιβολία towards it. It is just

183 Ecumen. apol. II (J I, 316, 8-11).
184 Ecumen. apol. III (J II, 238, 8).
186 Thid. III (J II, 113, 10; 115, 12).
188 Thid. I (J I, 28, 28).
189 Thid. III (J II, 11, 11).
190 Ecumen. apol. 6 (13*, 14-15).
192 Ecumen. apol. 20 (32*, 25).
this kind of acceptance of the revelation which characterized the "saints," and which is now a mark of the "faithful." We remarked earlier in our study that in the context of a creed presumably meant "the proper attitude which one is to have toward the 'ruling tradition' which the creed embodies." In the present, wider context we can see that that attitude involves both the humble acceptance of the tradition as well as a concrete view of the meaning of revelation taken as a whole—a view which is based on a mental disposition of κυριεύω and under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, who is κυριεύω τοῦ καισαρίου καὶ εὐφράζων τῶν διακονίας. It seems, then, that like Basil Eunomius does not derive his position only from his manner of interpreting Scripture, but presupposes as a background to it a definite understanding of Scripture taken as a whole, together with a particular present and continuing religious experience founded on faith which enables him to interpret that Scripture in its proper sense.

This brings us back to a problem which we considered from another standpoint earlier—Eunomius' use of arguments based on particular passages and his emphasis on some passages more than others. In our earlier discussion, we noted that from a

193 supra pp. 142-146.
194 ibid., exp. fid. 59*, 9 and 25.
195 supra p. 123.
196 ibid., exp. fid. 59*, 8-10.
197 supra pp. 156-162.
purely numerical standpoint Eunomius' practice in this regard did not appear to be greatly different from that of his Orthodox contemporaries; from this standpoint, then, it is not possible to say that Eunomius' position was "based" solely on an exegesis of these passages. On the other hand, it might be possible to make such an assertion on the basis of Eunomius' theological use of the passages, particularly if we can show a deliberate exclusion or alteration of parts of Scripture by Eunomius in the interests of his case. As we have already seen, there is no question of the fact that Eunomius used some passages more than others, but the problem is the real significance of this fact. This problem particularly arises with regard to Eunomius' use of I Cor. 8: 6, which is the basis of the creed which Eunomius sets forth ἐν οἴκῳ τινὶ γνώμονα καὶ κατέξαυθον of the faith, \(^{198}\) and which thus constitutes a kind of evangelium in evangelion. Vandenbussche, for instance, makes the following remark with respect to it:

"... on ne voit pas comment le Credo qu'il allège aurait pu servir de norme pour juger de l'orthodoxie d'un exposé théologique trinitaire. En vérité sa terminologie paulinienne est susceptible de toutes les interprétations et s'accommode aussi bien d'une doctrine modaliste ou subordinationiste, que d'une théologie orthodoxe. Il en résulte que ce n'est pas la principi qui libérera Eunomius des entraves d'une vaine dialectique, que ce n'est pas la soumission à son autorité qui le sauvera de la technologie."\(^{199}\)

\(^{198}\) Eun., apol. 4 (12*, 21).
\(^{199}\) Vandenhussche, op. cit., p. 64.
This seems clearly linked with Vandenbussche's other remark that the texts of Scripture cited by Eunomius are "que des pièces justificatives d'une pensée basée sur d'autres principes;" the implication would appear to be that not only does Eunomius set up a deliberately vague passage as a "norm or rule," but he selects other passages of Scripture entirely on the basis of an external preconceived criterion. Now in our earlier study of both Basil and Eunomius, we saw that in neither case was their particular use of Scripture sufficient to explain their whole position, but that behind each man's interpretation stood a particular understanding of the meaning of Scripture as a whole as well as a present religious experience grounded in faith which made it possible to interpret that Scripture properly. In particular we noted that Basil recognized that there were in Scripture passages to which no clear meaning could be assigned (with regard to the context of Prov. 8: 22), or which could be twisted by heretics (with regard to Mk. 10: 18). In such cases, the pious man takes them in accordance with the witness of the rest of Scripture and with the conceptions common to mankind, holding fast to a predisposition based on faith. Presumably what this means is that when faced with a passage which if taken at face value would yield a difficult or impossible meaning, the Christian falls back on others which express the meaning of Scripture

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\(^{200}\) Ibid. p. 65.

\(^{201}\) For this and the following, *supra* pp. 176-178
more clearly. Since we have seen that Eunomius' use of specific passages is not in numerical terms strikingly different from that of his Orthodox contemporaries, it would be reasonable to suppose that the theological motive behind his use of particular passages is similar to theirs as well. In order to impugn this position, it would be necessary to show that, quite apart from simply interpreting them differently, Eunomius deliberately altered or rejected passages of Scripture in the interests of his case. In the absence of such evidence, there would seem to be every reason to assume that the same motives lie behind Eunomius' choice of passages as lie behind that of Basil and his followers. The only question is, is there in fact any evidence that Eunomius did deliberately reject or alter passages of Scripture?

In our earlier discussion, we saw that Eunomius did exclude the Epistle to the Hebrews from the canon, but this can hardly be used as evidence for our purposes in view of the widespread and long-continuing doubts about this epistle's authenticity current in the ancient world. Again, there is a description of the anomoian response to Orthodox arguments from Scripture given by Epiphanius which may bear on our problem:

\[\text{εκκοπήσας μὲν υἱὸν προφητῶν διάματα καὶ ἀποστέλλων, ἐταίρει...}\]

202. Epiph., Hær. 76-54.30 (GCS III, 413, 24-28).

203. ...
"For when they are refuted by people and put out of countenance, they blaspheme the words of the Prophets and Apostles and give up the struggle, making their retort by saying, 'The Apostle said this speaking as a man,' or again, 'Why bring up to me what is found in the Old Testament?'

However, although this passage has the ring of genuine experience about it, it is very difficult to know what to make of Epiphanius' statements since he gives no hint of their context. The first clearly has behind it the genuinely Pauline distinction found at I Cor. 7:6, 25 and in such passages as Rom. 3:5, I Cor. 9:8, Gal. 1:11-12, and 3:15, but there is nothing to indicate whether the anomoeon applied it in any wider context than did the Apostle. Again, the second example too is given without context, and this makes it difficult to know whether it refers to anything more than the common principle that the normative interpreter of the Old Testament is the New. Other minor variations such as the conflation of Jn. 14:28 and 14:24, or the misreading of I Tim. 6:16 (gleefully pounced on by Gregory), seem unlikely to provide us with any more conclusive example. It seems, then, that if we are to find any positive evidence that Eunomius did indeed alter or reject some parts of Scripture to make them better fit his case, there is only one passage in which such a possibility can be reasonably entertained: the baptismal formula of

\[\text{Eunomius, apol. III (21*, 4-5).}\]
\[\text{Eunomius, apol. III (11, 297*, 8).}\]
\[\text{Gregory Nyss., Eun. III, x (11, 299, 10-14).}\]
Matthew 28:19.

There is a consistent tradition among the opponents of the Eunomians that they not only changed the practice of baptism, but altered the baptismal formula as well. Since this formula is undeniably a pivotal element of traditional Christianity, evidence that it had been altered or abandoned would greatly strengthen the case of those who assert that Eunomius imposed his own mind on Scripture from without. Unfortunately, despite the frequent assertions that the formula was changed, the sources are not completely unanimous as to what that change was. Epiphanius, for instance, gives the following as the Eunomian baptismal formula:

ενεματίζειε δὲ αὐτὸς εἰς ἵνα ὁ θεός ἐκτίτος καὶ εἰς ἱνα ἐκτίτος κεντισμένον καὶ εἰς ἱνα ἐκτίτος κεντισμένον υἱόν κτισθέντος.207

"He rebaptized them 'In the name of the uncreated God, and in the name of the created Son, and in the name of the sanctifying Spirit, him who was created by the created Son.'"

This, however, is almost certainly the result of a misunderstanding or conjecture since there is no other evidence for the use of such a formula by the Eunomians. The most likely explanation for this formula is that it is based on some such comment as that found in (Ps.-)Basil, but misunderstood as representing the actual practice of the Eunomian Church:

207Epiph., haer. 76.5.33 (GCS III, 414, 3-5).
"If God is Unbegotten in his essence, and the Son begotten in his, and the Paraclete a creature in its, then 'Father, Son, and Holy Spirit' are only names separated from their essences. Let them therefore baptize people into the Unbegotten and the Begotten and the Creature!"

Still, by far the most common formula ascribed to the Eunomians is that of baptism "into the death of Christ," and this is the form in which it is found in Socrates,\textsuperscript{209} Sozomen,\textsuperscript{210} Theodoret,\textsuperscript{211} Philostorgius,\textsuperscript{212} and Agapius.\textsuperscript{213} Bar Hebraeus also speaks of a baptism "into the death of Christ," but he seems to have understood the actual formula as involving the use of "three Sons" (?) in the invocation of the Trinity: "In the name of the Son, and of the Son, and of the Son?".\textsuperscript{214} This last is certainly a misunderstanding, but there is no reason to doubt (particularly in view of the testimony of Philostorgius) that there is some basis in fact for the accusation that the Eunomians baptized "into the death of Christ." We may note that if this did indeed involve

\textsuperscript{208}(Ps—)Basil, \textit{Ep.} IV, 2 (PG 29, 685A); cf. also Basil, \textit{Ep.} I, 5 (PG 29, 517A). A similar passage is found at Græc. Hyss., \textit{Ep.} III, ix (J II, 287, 12-15). Jaeger is in our view wrong to italicize εἰς δυνατοῦν καὶ κατ' Θεῷ (16)—Eunomius' words begin only at οὐ μόνον ματέρα (16-17) and are apparently taken from the passage found at \textit{Ep.} III, x (J II, 291, 26-297, 7; cf. 289, 3-13). \textsuperscript{209} Socr., H.G. V, 24 (PG 67, 649A). \textsuperscript{210} Soc., H.G. VI, 26 (GCS 273, 6-7). \textsuperscript{211} Thad., \textit{haer.} IV, 3 (PG 83, 4:205). \textsuperscript{212} Philost., H.G. X, 4 (GCS 127, 15). \textsuperscript{213} Agapius (Mahboub de Menhid), \textit{Histoire Universelle}, Pars II (PO 7, 575, 7-8). \textsuperscript{214} Bar Hebraeus, \textit{haer.} 24 (PO 13, 261, 5-6).
a change in the baptismal formula, it was less the rejection of a part of Scripture than the substitution of one passage for another, for "into the death of Christ" is a clear echo of Rom. 6: 3. The motives behind such a change need be no more sinister than those which have moved the editors of some modern breviaries to eliminate some of the less edifying psalms (ob quamdam difficultatem psychologicam).215 On the other hand, there still remain two questions to be resolved: 1) was Eunomius himself actually responsible for the changes in the practice of baptism? and 2) did baptism "into the death of Christ" involve an actual change of the baptismal formula?

With respect to the first of these, there is good reason to believe that Eunomius himself did not institute major changes in the practice of baptism, at least as regards its formula. We note, for instance, that a fragment deriving probably from the Contra Eunomium of Theodore of Mopsuestia makes no mention of such a change, despite the fact that it ascribes other innovations to Eunomius.216 More to the point, we find that Socrates makes no mention of it at all in his main chapter on Eunomius,217 and only introduces the alleged change in connection with the Eunomian sub-groups founded by TheophrONUS and Eutychius.218

216Thdr. Mops., Eun., frag. VI, 11, 4-11 (Appendix III, pp. 104*-105*).
217Soc., h-e, IV, 7 (PG 67, 472C-473C).
Sozomen makes explicit the implied conclusion of Socrates, and states that although some people assert that it had been Eunomius himself who had introduced changes into the practice of baptism, it was his own belief that these changes were only introduced later by Theophronius and Eutychius.219 In Sozomen's view, then, Eunomius retained the traditional baptismal practice of the Church unaltered (at least in this respect), and changes were only introduced at a later stage of the Eunomian movement.

Our second question was whether baptism "into the death of Christ" necessarily involved a change in the actual form. There is some reason to believe that it did not. Our problem would be resolved if we could show that Eunomius himself was prepared to make use of this formula, at least in its Biblical form, and if we could arrive at some plausible explanation of how baptism "into the death of Christ" is related to it. We will deal with the latter in due course, and consider only the former now.

Since there is nothing intrinsically unlikely about an Arian making use of Matthew 28:19 (it was in fact used by Arius himself),220 the question resolves itself into one of whether there is any evidence that Eunomius actually did so. Possibly there is. In the Expositio Fidei published at the so-called "Council of Heresies" in June of 383, Eunomius described the final events of

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219Soz., h.9, VI, 26 (GCs 272, 21-25; 273, 2-8).
the life of our Lord as follows:

tὸν γενέμενον ὄψιμον μέχρι σταυροῦ καὶ θανάτου, καὶ μὴ Ἰδώνα διασφόραν, ἀλλ' ἀνασάντα τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν ἡμερῶν, καὶ μετὰ τὸν ἀνάστασιν ἀνασφαλισμένον τοῖς ἐκτοῦ τὸ μυστήριον . . . 221

"He became obedient unto the cross and unto death, and yet he did not see corruption, but rose again the third day, and after his resurrection summed up the mystery for those who were his own."

The question is, what precisely was the "mystery," which our Lord summed up for his followers? In the view of J. van Parys, the mystery in question was that revealed by the risen Christ to Mary Magdalene when he told her to say to his brethren, "I am ascending to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God" (Jn. 20: 17). 222 Since this passage was used explicitly by Eunomius on at least two occasions, 223 and was clearly of importance to him, this is not an unreasonable suggestion. We might well ask ourselves, however, whether what is in effect an obiter dictum of our Lord can be regarded as of sufficient importance to warrant mention along with the crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension as the significant features of his final days on earth? A query all the more pointed when we realize that there is in Matthew 28: 18-20 a far more prominent passage which would fit quite naturally into such a sequence. Then again, we note that when, at the beginning

221 5ün., exp. fid. 57*, 29-35.
223 5ün., apol. 21 (34*, 17-18); apol. apol. III (J II, 291, 26-292, 7; cf. 289, 3-13).
of his first apology, Eunomius desired to present the Christian faith in a summary form (ὡς ἐν ἑπτάδε ἐπιθυμεῖτο ἐλθεῖν εἰς τοὺς, 224 he did so by means of a trinitarian creed based on I Corinthians 8: 6. 225 It would be natural to assume that when our Lord "summed up" the mystery after his resurrection, he too used a trinitarian formula. These considerations do much to confirm the quite plausible supposition that when Eunomius described the risen Christ as summing up the "mystery" for those who were his own, he was in fact referring to the traditional baptismal formula of the Church, Matthew 28: 19. Examination of Eunomius' other uses of the word μυστηρίου in his surviving writings does much to confirm this supposition, as well as to deepen our understanding of the "mystery" of which our Lord's formula is the summary. Almost all of the available examples seem to be used in a sacramental context. In the two cases where μυστηρίου is used in the plural the reference is clearly to the communicio in sacris, either with respect to the Church in general or to Eunomius' own adherents. 226 More importantly for our own problem, the only other example of the word in the Expositio Fidelis describes the work of the Paraclete as μυστηρίου τοῦ προσώπου της μυστηρίου, 227 and it is difficult to see what this could refer

224 Eun., apol. 6 (13*, 7-3).
225 Eun., apol. 5 (12*, 25-13*, 3).
226 Eun., apol. 6 (13*, 33), 27 (45*, 5-6).
227 Eun., exp. fidel. 59*, 5-6.
to other than the baptismal mystery. This interpretation is confirmed by a passage of Gregory's which, while not a direct quotation, nonetheless clearly reflects the genuine language of Eunomius. The passage itself is probably based on Eunomius' description of his own baptism, and in it Gregory speaks mockingly of the "inexpressible initiation, and what they were taught by the august hierophant of the mysteries, the manner of baptisms, and the advocacy of nature, and all that."228 Here we have a passage where the language of initiation and mystery is clearly and explicitly linked with the administration of Holy Baptism. Taken together with the other passages we have examined, this seems to us to make it extremely likely that the summation of the mystery which our Lord gave his disciples was in fact the baptismal formula of Matthew 28: 19.

If this conclusion exonerates our heretic of having wilfully rejected a fundamental passage of Scripture, we must still show the sense in which Eunomius could have accepted it in connection not only with baptism "into the death of Christ" but with his theology as a whole. We will start with the latter by considering the relationship between Matthew 28: 19 and the clearly important John 20: 17. This in turn brings us to the one remaining example of Eunomius' use of the word μορφήν. Although this passage is of interest for other reasons as well, we will confine

our attention to its import for Eunomius' understanding of "mystery." Unfortunately for us, it occurs in a section of Eunomius' second apology which Gregory of Nyssa elected to "pass over briefly," and this makes its context difficult to determine. Nonetheless, since Gregory himself possessed the passage as a whole, careful examination of the text in the light of his comments should enable us to get at Eunomius' meaning. The phrase which particularly interests us at this point is that in which Eunomius states that "... neither do we assert that the 'mystery of godliness' is to be dominated ... by our reverence for the Names" (οὐτε ἐμὴ ἔμπνευσι τῶν δυομάτων ... κυριεύειν ψαμν ὁ τῆς ἐκκέρασις μυστηρίου). The rest of the passage and Gregory's comments make it clear that the general context is sacramental with particular emphasis on baptism. Gregory takes the "Names" to be those of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, clearly placing them in a baptismal context, and at a later point citing Matthew 28:19. It seems, then, that here we have a "mystery of godliness" which is at least partially independent of the actual words of the dominical formula. Of itself this is scarcely surprising; we have already seen in the passage.

229 [Greek references and page numbers]
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from the Expositio Fidel that it was by these words that our Lord "summed up" the mystery. But what does the phrase mean? The phrase itself is obviously based on 1 Timothy 3: 16, and as such: presumably refers to that "economy" whereby Christ was manifested in the flesh, vindicated in the Spirit, seen by angels, preached among the nations, believed on in the world, taken up in glory." In other words, "our reverence for the Names" is not to lead us into overthrowing the very divine dispensation whereby we are saved. The general context in which this is to be understood is clear from our earlier study. As we noted above, Scripture can only be interpreted in its proper sense when it is approached with an attitude of goodwill and faithful acceptance. This applies no less to a "summary" of faith. As Eunomius remarked with respect to another such summary, the creed with which he prefaced his apology, its bare words were not of themselves sufficient for the confirmation of the truth when they are approached with ill-will. In the present instance, then, although Matthew 28: 19 of itself is a perfect summation of the mystery, it can be perverted by those who, while remaining externally faithful to the words of the formula, willfully take it in a sense other than that in which our Lord revealed it. It is in this sense that one can allow one's "reverence for the Names" to dominate the "mystery of

235 supra pp. 178-186.
236 Eun., apol. 6 (13*, 11-15, 24-28).
godliness." In the passages which follow that under discussion Eunomius apparently tried to clarify the sense in which the Lord's summation of the mystery was to be understood. Although Gregory has preserved these passages only in a very fragmentary manner, it is still possible to get some idea of the drift of the argument. Moreover, we will also be able to gain an understanding of the relation of John 20: 17 to the "mystery." It is apparent that in the pages which followed the statement examined above, Eunomius entered into a discussion of the relationships between the divine persons. Gregory alludes to this discussion by speaking of τῇ τοῦ γεννητοῦ καὶ γεννήτου τεχνολογίᾳ,237 and quotes Eunomius as describing God as ὁ μόνον πατέρα . . . τοῦ μονογενοῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεόν.238 This is a clear allusion to John 20: 17, and from the more extensive passages which follow it is evident that Eunomius introduced a fairly extensive discussion of it at this point.239 The reason for citing such a passage at this point becomes clear if we take into consideration some of our earlier conclusions. We noted above in other passages the necessity of interpreting Scripture in the light of the ἀνάλογον which exists between the Unbegotten and the Only-begotten God,240 and this necessity is no less imperative in the

237 Mun., anol. anol. III (I II, 287, 5-6).
238 Ibid. (I II, 287, 16-17). In our view Jaeger was mistaken in italicizing the preceding phrase (σὺς ἐνυπαρχοὺς καὶ ἐνύπαρξον), since it is almost certainly an interpretation of Gregory.
239 Ibid. (I II, 291, 26-297, 7; cf. 289, 3-13).
present instance than in others. Since in Eunomius' view John 20: 17 expressed this "analogy" in a particularly clear way, it was natural for him to appeal to it at this point. It was Eunomius' intention to use this passage as a clarification of Matthew 28: 19, not as a substitute for it.

If this somewhat clarifies the sense in which Eunomius understood the baptismal formula as a "summation" of the mystery, it still leaves us to deal with the sense in which that understanding is related to baptism "into the death of Christ." It is fortunate, therefore, that there is a passage in the Apostolic Constitutions which (whether that work was edited by a Eunomian or no) gives us some idea of what that relationship is. The passage itself is as follows:

... καὶ λεξέντες ἐντολὴν παρ’ αὐτοῦ κηρύξας τὸ εὐαγγέλιον εἰς ἄλλον τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ μαθητεύον πάντα τὰ ἑως καὶ ματτίσας εἰς τὸν αὐτὸς διάκονον ἐπὶ αὐθεντία τοῦ ὅσον τῷ κόσμῳ, δὲ ἐκεῖνον αὐτοῦ πατήρ, καὶ μαρτυρία κυρίων, δὲ ἐκεῖνον καρδιάτης.241

"... and we (the Apostles) received a commandment from him to preach the gospel to the whole world and to make disciples of all nations, and to baptize them into his death by the authority of the God of the universe, and by the testimony of the Spirit who is his Counselor."

Since there can be no doubt whatsoever that this passage refers to Matthew 28: 19, it gives us a reasonable explanation of the use of the traditional baptismal formula which is also consistent

241 Apostolic Constitutions V, 7 (Funk I, 263, 7-11); cf. also Ibid. III, 17 (Funk I, 211, 18-213, 4).
with Eunomian theology. One is indeed baptized "into the death of Christ," but such baptism does not necessitate a new baptismal formula, but a proper understanding of the old one—one which is not so "dominated . . . by our reverence for the Names" as to destroy the "mystery of godliness." It seems, then, that although the Fathers correctly reported that Eunomians spoke of baptism "into the death of Christ," they were mistaken in believing that this involved an alteration in the baptismal formula. Eunomius can be exonerated in this instance from the charge of having willfully tailored Scripture to his own needs.

With these words we shall draw our discussion of Eunomius' use of Scripture to a close. Despite the numerous complaints of his critics, both ancient and modern, we have been unable to find any conclusive evidence that he deliberately distorted or misused Scripture. While his understanding of the nature of the revelation was clearly different from that of his Orthodox opponents, this difference is not of itself sufficient to explain his position. Even after a detailed examination, the evidence has not permitted us to substantiate charges that Eunomius was willfully neglectful or selective in his use of Scripture. We have found, however, that this use of Scripture itself presupposes a definite attitude of faithful acceptance, and that this attitude is understood to entail a specific understanding of the nature of God and the meaning of Scripture as a whole. Such a conclusion is not of itself surprising, and, indeed, we have
seen that a similar conclusion is possible with regard to Basil and Gregory, but it does bring us back to some of the passages which we examined at the beginning of this part of our thesis. At that time we noted a definite link between the attitude of faithful acceptance of the divine revelation and an order of reality revealed by human reason. Further examination of the writings of Eunomius reveals a similar link at other points.

Moreover, when we turn to the consideration of our one surviving relatively extensive complete work, the Liber Apologeticus, we are faced with the undeniable fact that there the appeal to revelation is vastly overborne by arguments based on reason. In view of our own earlier conclusion that Eunomius' interpretation of Scripture presupposes a specific understanding of the nature of God and of the divine "economy," it would be reasonable to suppose that so prominent an appeal to reason in fact lies behind this understanding, and that Eunomius' teaching is in this case based on reason. By extrapolating from the evidence provided by a single work, we would be enabled to reach the conclusion expressed succinctly by E. Vandenbussche, that for Eunomius "la théologie n'a qu'un seul principe: la raison." Thus, although we have seen that there is nothing in Eunomius' treatment of Scripture taken by itself to justify such a conclusion,

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242 supra pp. 130-134.
243 Eun., apol. apol. III (5 II, 4, 20-21; 6, 7-10; 115, 11-11b).
244 Vandenbussche, op. cit., p. 66.
we might still be moved to accept it on the basis of the relative importance of Scripture and reason. Since, then, there is at least one work of Eunomius in which reason is clearly predominant, it behoves us, as the first order of priority, to determine the context in which that predominance is to be understood.

We can best approach our problem by returning to the nature of the attitude of faithful acceptance which we have already discussed. At that time we noted that for Eunomius the mark of the faithful Christian is that he is attentive to the mind of the Apostles, and that he accepts the revelation of God in the sense in which God revealed it by displaying an attitude of ἱστορεῖν toward it.245 Thus the proper attitude toward Scripture also carries with it a definite understanding of Scripture's meaning. The Christian must not only accept the bare words of the faith, but must also ἀναγνωστέων συνδιασάζων τὸν θρόνον τοῦ άληθος διάλογον.246 On the other hand, as we also noted in our earlier discussion, there are also men who do not do this, who do not accept the revelation in its proper sense, but who misrepresent the divine oracles and conform their interpretation to their own point of view.247 Their motive for doing this is also indicated, and it is precisely the opposite of that which moves the "pious:"

245 supra pp. 185-186.
246 Enn., apol. 6 (13*; 13-15).
247 supra pp. 184-185.
they are moved by 

In other words, these men have deliberately perverted the 

through ill-will, just as those who accept it in its proper sense do so through their 

Eunomius' problem is that in the absence of this required 

the words of the divine revelation are not per se 

This makes it necessary to introduce some principle going beyond revelation strictly so-called in order to provide this 

In the context of his first apology, Eunomius refers to this principle as 

or 

As we saw in our study of the several examples with which we began our discussion of Eunomius' understanding of faith, these "more exact words" involve an appeal to an order of reality based on knowledge available to all men (as, 

as well as a particular metaphysical understanding of that reality discoverable by human reason. While Eunomius would undoubtedly have wanted to say that for anyone approaching the divine revelation with the proper attitude (πίστευω) no such appeal to human reason would be necessary, the fact that there were people prepared to deliberately dis-

248 Eun., apol. 6 (13*, 25-26).
249 Tired. 2 (11*, 16-17).
250 Tired. 6 (13*, 27-28).
251 Tired. (13*, 36-37*, 1).
252 Tired. 7 (13*, 16-17).
253 supra p. 130-134.
tort that revelation for their own purposes made it necessary to supply a πίστις for it.

Perhaps we can place the problem with which Eunomius was trying to deal in clearer perspective if we look at another author. There is a passage in St. Athanasius in which the Saint describes the reasons which moved the fathers at the Council of Nicaea to insert certain clauses into their creed:

"It was the Council’s intention to do away with the impious phrases of the Arians and write instead the acknowledged words of Scripture—that the Son is not from nothing but ‘from God,’ that he is ‘Word’ and ‘Wisdom’ and not a creature or thing made, but the proper offspring of the Father. The followers of Eusebius, however, drawn on by their long-standing error, wanted to take the ‘from God’ as applying to ourselves and to the Word of God in the same sense, so that not even in this is he different from us since it is written, ‘there is one God from whom are all things’ (I Cor. 8: 6), and ‘the old has passed away, behold, the new has come, but everything is from God’ (II Cor. 5: 17-13). But the Council Fa-

254 Ath., decr. 19, 1 (Opitz 2, 15, 36-16, 8).
thers, perceiving their guile and the cunning of their impiety, were finally forced to express the 'from God' more clearly, and write that the Son is 'from the essence of God.' This was so that 'from God' could not be reckoned as applying to the Son and to created beings in one and the same sense, but rather that all other things might be accounted creatures and the Word only believed to be 'from' the Father.

The Council Fathers, then, found that the ϕωνής of Scripture were an insufficient defence against the willful (ἐδοθεντο) misinterpretation of the Eusebians. This being the case, they were forced to explain themselves more clearly (λαμπιστρον) and could only do so by appealing to some principle outside of Scripture itself, the word ὅτα and the particular understanding of metaphysical reality implied by it. As Athanasius remarks elsewhere, this appeal expresses the genuine διάνοια of the Scriptures, and one needs only ἵνα ἅπασα τὴν ἐκείνη διάνοιαν to perceive this fact.\textsuperscript{255} The parallels of all this with the problem faced by Eunomius are unmistakable. He too must deal with the apparent fact that the ϕωνή of revelation are not of themselves sufficient to guarantee their own διάνοια.\textsuperscript{257} Thus, like the Council Fathers, he is forced to explain himself more clearly (ἀπομητροτροφο λόγων)\textsuperscript{258} and can only do so by appealing to some further principle of knowledge which:

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{255} Ibid. 21, 2 (Opitz 2, 18, 6-7).
    \item \textsuperscript{256} Eun. apol. 6 (13*, 13).
    \item \textsuperscript{257} Ibid. (13*, 15).
    \item \textsuperscript{258} Ibid. (14*, 1), and cf. 7 (15*, 16-17).
\end{itemize}
will provide the faith with a "confirmation" (πιστολυπα)\(^{259}\) and a "guarantee" (πιστωτις)\(^{260}\) in the face of the ill-will of its enemies. This provides us with the context in which Eunomius' use of a principle going beyond divine revelation can be understood. He is trying to deal with the problem common to all of the theologians engaged in the Arian controversy: that Scripture of itself is insufficient to guarantee its own proper interpretation in the face of manifest ill-will. Eunomius' introduction of a "further principle" is an attempt to provide that guarantee.

If this, then, provides us with a context in which to interpret Eunomius' appeal to human reason, how are we to explain the undeniable fact that in the Liber Apologeticus the place of Scripture is clearly secondary to this appeal? In that work, indeed, there is even a case where Scripture is brought in as an ἀποκλεισμος of reason.\(^{261}\) The answer is suggested by a remark of M. J. van Parys' where he explains that Eunomius' "con- fession de foi est une peu [1] diferente a cet egard" because of its "genre litteraire."\(^{262}\) The same consideration which enables us to understand why the Expositio Fidei is a veritable thicket of Scriptural citations also enables us to understand

\(^{259}\)Ibid. 6 (13*, 28).
\(^{260}\)Em., apol. apol. III (I II, 299, 23).
\(^{261}\)Em., apol. 21 (3*, 7-13).
\(^{262}\)M. J. van Parys, Exégèse et théologie, p. 170.
why in the Apologeticus these same citations are secondary: the Apologeticus is indeed an "apology!" Despite the uncertainties which surround its precise historical setting, there is abundant evidence that in it Eunomius was defending a minority position before a sceptical if not hostile audience. At several points in the work, Eunomius mentions the number and eminence of his opponents, exhorting us not to base our judgements on mere numbers while remarking on the worthlessness of such a criterion. Moreover, in stating the purpose of his work, Eunomius presents us with a statement of faith based on I Cor. 8: 6 and informs us that it represents the "pious and ruling tradition which has come down from the fathers," that "simpler faith which is common to all who are concerned to be Christians," but, as we have seen, he also tells us that this faith is not "οικείας λύων μεταξύ τῶν θεοφανείων,"266 The purpose of the Liber Apologeticus as a whole is to provide that πίστις. In view of the problems faced by all the participants in this controversy in their use of Scripture, as well as the avowed intent of Eunomius in writing this work, the prominent position

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263 supra pp. 27-35
265 ibid. 2 (10*, 25-11*, 2).
266 ibid. 2 (11*, 10-11), 4 (12*, 17-18), 25 (39*, 15-40*).
267 ibid. 1 (5*, 35-46*, 1).
268 ibid. 5 (12*, 25-13*, 3).
269 ibid. 4 (12*, 19-20*).
270 ibid. 6 (13*, 4-7*).
given in it to arguments based on grounds outside of Scripture is scarcely surprising. Since the problem was the context in which the various passages were to be understood, analysis of the passages themselves could not establish it. In appealing to rational argument at such a juncture, Eunomius was introducing no novelty (even if he applied it more systematically), but imitating the practice of previous apologists. This is illustrated by one of the passages from the Liber Apologeticus which we examined earlier. In it we noted that Eunomius established his opening premise on the double foundation of the teaching of the fathers and the ϕωνὴ ἐννοεῖν. Similar appeals to the common experience of mankind are found elsewhere. When we looked into the background of the ϕωνὴ ἐννοεῖν we found that, while it had its roots in Stoic and Middle Platonic thought, it was early adopted by the Fathers for apologetic purposes. Their problem and that faced by Eunomius were similar. They could make no direct appeal to the authority of the Scriptures since they were trying to convince men who did not accept that authority, and they therefore had to defend their position by appealing to a more generally accepted criterion. Although Eunomius' opponents accepted the authority of Scripture, the point which divided him from them was the context in which Scripture was to

271Ibid. 7 (14*, 16-19), quoted above p. 130.
273V. supra pp. 130-131.
be understood; since in the absence of such a context arguments based on specific passages were unlikely to be compelling, Eunomius was forced to appeal to a more widely accepted criterion. Moreover, if the dominant place accorded reason in the *Liber Apologeticus* seems understandable enough in view of its purpose, there is no conclusive evidence that it occupied a similarly dominant position in the other works of Eunomius. In the *Apologie Apolo- giae*, for instance, it is apparent that despite its fragmentary state Scripture occupied a far more prominent place than it did in Eunomius' earlier work, while the *Expositio Fidei* is virtually a cento of Scriptural citations and allusions. It seems, then, that while reason undoubtedly occupies a dominant place in the *Liber Apologeticus*, no conclusions can be based on this fact as to the place of reason in Eunomius' system as a whole.

With these words we may well turn our attention back to the conclusions arrived at by many modern critics with regard to the place of reason in the thought of Eunomius. In the earlier part of this chapter we saw that most such critics accepted with varying degrees of explicitness a position most trenchantly expressed by E. Vandenbussche, who asserted that Eunomius' "... théologie n'a qu'un seul principe: la raison." These critics apparently meant by this that Eunomius arrived at his conclusions on the

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274 The remark of Th. Dams quoted above p. 150 and the table of Scriptural citations on pp. 150-154.
275 E. Vandenbussche, op. cit., p. 66; v. supra pp. 139-140.
basis of rational, philosophical enquiry, and appealed to Scripture to support these conclusions only after having established them on entirely different grounds. Our own detailed investigation has revealed that, while reason undoubtedly occupies an important place in the thought of Eunomius, there is no objective evidence which conclusively shows that he "based" his system on it, and there is some evidence to the contrary. If some modern critics, then, assert that Eunomius in fact did so, we may well ask ourselves whether their reasons for saying this do not derive as much from the presuppositions with which they approach their task as from the evidence itself. These presuppositions seem to cover two distinct but related areas, the one historical, and the other psychological or epistemological. In the historical area, these critics appear to have adopted a presupposition shared by all of the ancient participants in this controversy, whether heretical or Orthodox; this presupposition is that standards of orthodoxy current in their own age were either explicitly present from the beginning, or so implicitly present as to be undeniable by anyone genuinely holding the Christian faith. If someone does reject these standards, or fails to recognize immediately the authoritative character of the definitions which make them explicit, then (since the problem cannot lie in any ambiguity in the standards themselves) appeal must be made to some external factor sufficient to explain the denial or lack of recognition. Ancient authors generally assumed that this external factor was a moral
If modern scholars are more prepared than their predecessors to accept the possibility that a heretic may err in good faith, they nonetheless share with them the need to find an external factor sufficient to explain the heretic's departure from the tradition. In Eunomius' case, this external factor is the use of rational argument, undeniably an important feature of his system. We may ask ourselves, however, whether Catholic doctrine did in fact develop by means of so linear a progression. It might reasonably be supposed that there were many stages in the Church's doctrinal development in which there were ambiguities in her doctrinal standards, ambiguities only resolved after lengthy discussion. A natural consequence of such a supposition would be that the solution of these ambiguities was by no means obvious to contemporaries, and that radically different solutions might be proposed without any conscious intention of departing from the faith on the part of those who suggested them. Thus, even solutions ultimately rejected by the Church may represent possible solutions of earlier ambiguities. In this event, we would be under no obligation to assume that the proposed solution was based on some dominant external factor unless compelled to do so by the evidence. Since in Eunomius' case we have been unable to find any unambiguous evidence of such dominance, it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his system was based on many factors, of which reason was one, no one
of which is sufficient to explain the whole.

This brings us to a second and related presupposition, one which we described earlier as "psychological" or "epistemological." This presupposition appears to be that the factors which move a man to adopt a particular intellectual position are sufficiently explicit that his system can be completely understood in terms of them. It may reasonably be questioned, however, whether this is necessarily the case. Basil, for instance, spoke of a "predisposition based on faith" as being stronger than any argument based on reason,276 and appealed to the witness of Scripture as a whole and the conceptions common to mankind when faced with heretical arguments based on specific passages.277 Thus, in addition to his explicit arguments, Basil could also base conclusions on a series of implicit beliefs which together went to make up his conceptual framework, and in terms of which he judged individual arguments. Our study of the writings of Eunomius has revealed a similar situation there.278 Basil, however, gives us a partial description of the origin and nature of this framework when we speak of "that which from a child we have heard from the Fathers, and which, on account of our love for what is good, we have received without question."279 Basil’s

276Basil, op. 236, 2, 15-18 (Courtonne III, 48).
277 Ibid. 235, 2, 31-34 (Courtonne III, 48); x. supra pp. 177-178, 278 x. supra pp. 178-186.
279 Basil, op. 236, 2, 11-13 (Courtonne III, 47-48).
intellectual position, then, was adopted partly on the basis of explicit arguments, and partly on the basis of a conceptual framework which was his inheritance as a member of a particular community. It thus appears that there was a significant area of his thought which was "tacit," i.e., which he either could or did not make explicit. If, as we have reason to believe, the position of Eunomius was not dissimilar, it would seem that the respective intellectual positions of both men were composite wholes, consisting of both implicit and explicit elements, no single one of which is sufficient to explain them completely. 

These considerations have an immediate effect on our own problem. If, as we have seen, many of the elements which go to make up the system of Eunomius are tacit rather than explicit, it is questionable how far the assertion that this system is "based" on some one of them can be meaningful. Granted that it is not, our problem would then be one of ascertaining the relationships existing between the various elements of a complex whole, rather than isolating some single one of them to explain a presumed conscious departure from previous Christian tradition. In the present case, we have already seen that faith is for Eunomius the proper attitude which one is to have toward the divine revelation, and that this attitude involves both the humble ac-

ceptance of revelation as well as a definite view of its meaning taken as a whole.\textsuperscript{281} If we assume that this attitude reflects a fundamental religious experience for Eunomius, and that it is founded partly on "that which from a child he had heard from the Fathers, and which, on account of his love for what is good, he had received without question," and partly on personal religious experience, we may ask what the relation of reason is to such an attitude without having to ascribe an artificial position of dominance to it.

With these words we will draw this first section of the second part of our thesis to a close. In it we have examined much of the surviving evidence dealing with the relationship of faith and reason in the system of Eunomius as well as the interpretations placed on that evidence by scholars both ancient and modern. Since these scholars have generally asserted that in Eunomius' system faith was in fact subordinate to reason, we felt compelled to review the objective evidence for this assertion in great detail. Even after a very careful analysis, however, we were unable to substantiate these charges, and therefore concluded that the reasons for them were to be sought rather in the presuppositions of their authors than in the evidence itself. This being the case, the task which now lies before us is try to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of Eunomius' teaching

\textsuperscript{281}V. supra pp. 128, 185-186.
on this matter, and to try to relate it to other aspects of his system as well as to his understanding of the religious quest itself. To do this will involve not only a re-examination of the evidence we have already seen, but an attempt to place it in a wider theological and philosophical context. With this thought in mind, let us go on with our study.

E. A Proposed Solution.

A convenient place to begin a study of the place of faith and rational argument in the system of Eumenius will be with the actual accusations levelled against him by the Fathers. In great part these accusations dealt with Eumenius' use of secular learning. Gregory of Nyssa, for instance, speaks of his writings as patchworks of bits and pieces borrowed from other authors,282 and describes them as picked and culled from many books.283 Gregory makes frequent allusion to Eumenius' use of ideas deriving from ἧ ἤχεων λόγος,284 and speaks forcefully of the parallels between his ideas and those of Hellenism,285 thus confirming the majority opinion of the Fathers that Eumenius garnered his teachings ex philosophiae traditionibus.286 Among the specific sources actually mentioned we find such distinguished figures as Isocrates,287

283Ibid. I (j I, 26, 11-15).
284Greg. Nyss., Eun. I (j I, 32, 10), II (j I, 228, 28-229, 1), III, vi (j II, 208, 2), VIII (j II, 255, 4),
285Ibid. III, ix (j II, 286, 13, 19); conf. (j II, 332, 13).
Philo Judaeus, Demosthenes. However, while some references are probably not to be taken literally, such as that to the "new" Stoics and Epicureans, and others, particularly those to Epicurus, are apparently purely conventional, there are two whose prominence is unquestioned. One, naturally, is Plato, who is mentioned at several points, and two of whose dialogues, the Cratylus and the Phaedrus, are mentioned by name, but it is to the other, Aristotle, that the vast majority of the references refer. The historians Socrates and Sozomen as well as Epiphanius lay great emphasis on the use of Aristotle made by Eunomius' master Aetius, and speak of his studies at Alexandria, then a center of Aristotelian studies. General references to Aristotle abound in the Contra Eunomium of Gregory of Nyssa, and it is apparent that, like John Damascene, he regarded the Stagirite as the fons et...
origo of the whole system. It must be said, however, that this accusation is not lodged solely against Eunomius, but is part of a wider polemic. The author of the third century tract against Artemon, "The Little Labyrinth," already speaks of that heretic and his followers as admiring Aristotle and Theophrastus, while Faustinus describes Aristotle as the very "bishop" of the Arians. Jerome goes so far as to see the Philosopher's teaching as the common refuge of Pagans, Jews, and Heretics:

"Omnia enim dogmata eorum [s.c. Paganorum, Iudaeorum, haereticorum] cum frigent, et volare non possint, sedem sibi et requiem interf Aristotelis et Chrysippi spinetas referunt. Inde Eunomius profert: Quod natum est, non fuit antequam nascitur." 303

It is all the more surprising, then, that we can find no evidence of the major themes of Aristotle's philosophy in the works of Eunomius. As H. A. Wolfson remarks with regard to Arian use of the Philosopher in general:

"... when we study the passages in which Aristotle is mentioned as the source of this heresy, we are surprised to discover that the reference is not to any particular theory with which the name of Aristotle is generally associated ... but only to the Aristotelian method of reasoning." 304

That it is to this method of reasoning that these frequent references to Aristotle refer is confirmed by the fact that his name

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301 Faustinus, Trin. 12 (PL 13, 60B).
302 Eusebius, h.e. V, 28 (GCS II, 1, 504, 19-20).
303 Hieron., In Naum 676-679 (CCL 76A, Pars I, 6, p. 571).
is linked with that of the other great symbol of ancient logic, Chrysippus, both by Jerome (in the passage quoted above) and by Basil.\footnote{Basil, \textit{Ein.} I, 5 (PG 29, 516B-C).} Moreover, the only work of Aristotle's which the sources actually mention by name is the \textit{Categories}, which is spoken of by Socrates,\footnote{Basil, \textit{Ein.} I, 9 (PG 29, 532A).} Basil,\footnote{Greg. Nyss., \textit{Ein.} III, x (1 II, 309, 10).} and Gregory.\footnote{J. Daniélou, "\textit{Mnôme l'Arien et l'exégèse platonicienne du Cratyle}," \textit{REG} 69 (1956), pp. 412-432.} There seems no question, then, that when the Fathers speak of Aristotle in connection with Aetius and Eunomius, they are chiefly referring to that philosopher's method of logical reasoning.

Taking into account, therefore, the various criticisms levelled against Eunomius for his use of the teachings of the philosophers, we can treat this use under two headings: that of content, and that of method. Let us concern ourselves for the moment with the former. The aspect of Eunomius' teaching which most provoked the Fathers to accuse him of introducing the doctrines of the philosophers into Christianity was his theory of the nature of language. In our discussion of Eunomius' use of Scripture, we have already had occasion to note that in his view names properly so-called referred directly to their objects, and that this position was denied by Gregory and Basil.\footnote{Greg. Nyss., \textit{Ein.} III, x (1 II, 309, 10).} Since, as Daniélou has shown, there is no doubt that the general
philosophical background of this theory is the Neo-Platonic exegesis of the Cratylus, the question which faces us is how this background is related to Eunomius' use of Scripture and his understanding of the nature of revelation generally. In Gregory of Nyssa's view, there was no question as to what this relationship was: after becoming acquainted with the theory of language found in Plato's Cratylus, Eunomius deemed it fitting to make this philosophy the doctrine of the Church.311 Gregory himself, however, is not immune to a similar criticism—at least one modern scholar has asserted that "... but for some few orthodox dogmas, which he could not circumvent, Gregory ... merely applied Christian names to Plato's doctrines and called it Christian theology ..."312—and this, together with the results of our earlier discussions, ought to give us pause before accepting such a conclusion. If it seems unlikely, then, that Eunomius simply intruded an alien philosophy into Christianity, we may ask ourselves in what context he himself understood his theory? We can only begin by returning to his own statements.

Again and again throughout his writings, Eunomius exorcises his opponents for saying that human language, and hence human knowledge, is based solely on human invention (ως ἐπισκοπή).313

313 Epim., apol. 8 (15*,19-20; 16*,1, 23); apol. apol. II (J I, 276, 22-23; 313, 16-18; 316, 1-2; 326, 22; 341, 10-11).
Language in this sense, because it is based only on the activity of the human mind, can exist only in προσωποδ and ἐναντίον, and is dissolved along with the sounds of which it is composed. No true knowledge of reality can be derived from names established on such a basis; at best they can have a meaning peculiar to themselves when they refer to such things as colossi, pygmies, multiple-headed creatures, half-beasts, etc. All these things are based purely on linguistic manipulation, and have no real existence in the external world. Thus, Eunomius’ estimate of the ability of the unaided human understanding to achieve real knowledge is a decidedly limited one. Real knowledge can only be possible if the words which are its vehicle in fact refer to real things. It is Eunomius’ conviction that they do. In his view, by the providence of God, names (at least, those which properly are such) refer directly to the natures or essences of their objects. Since their authority does not derive from the mind of man but from the express purpose of God, they make a genuine knowledge of reality possible. These words are not dissolved along with the sounds of which they are composed, and are not to be completely identified with them. These sounds are the

311 Eun. apol. 16 (27*, 10, 19); apol. apol. II (J I, 276, 23-24).
312 Eun. apol. 16 (27*, 18), 17 (27*, 26-27).
313 Ibid. 8 (16*, 1-4).
314 Eun. apol. apol. II (J I, 276, 22-30).
315 Ibid. (J I, 282, 1-14).
316 Eun. apol. 9 (18*, 3-15), 24 (38*, 34-37); apol. apol. II (J I, 282, 1-14), etc.
means whereby a genuine and really existing meaning (ἐννοεῖ)\textsuperscript{320} and signification (σημαδεύει)\textsuperscript{321} is expressed, a meaning which exists independently of the sounds themselves.\textsuperscript{322} Thus, words are metaphysical entities in their own right as expressions of that which underlies them (τὸ εννοεῖ).\textsuperscript{323} and bring us to a genuine knowledge of the fundamental principle (διὰ τοῦ)\textsuperscript{324} of their essence and nature. Such a theory, then, provides a guarantee of the ability of language to provide us with an objective knowledge of reality. Inevitably, the actual working out of this theory will be complex, and we have already seen with regard to its application to the exegesis of Scripture that it involves the necessity of discerning the various levels of meaning inherent in words, of deciding which apply directly to their objects and which do not, etc.\textsuperscript{325} For our own purposes, however, once we have established the general principle, it is not necessary to follow its specific application. Our interest is rather in what Eumomus supposed the authority for this principle to be.
and in what context we are to understand his obvious use of philosophical argument in elucidating it.

It seems clear that, whatever place such argument held in Enomius' system, he himself did not believe that he was introducing anything new into Christianity. He regarded any such importation, particularly from pagan philosophy, as illicit in itself. Thus, he plainly rejects the doctrine of the eternity of matter κατα τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν φύσιν, and flatly denies the premise on which, in accordance with τούτων Ἑλλήνων σοφίστων, the doctrine is based (that the energies of an essence are united directly with it);[327] elsewhere he speaks emphatically of the gulf which separates Christianity from the Cynicism of Diogenes.[328] Indeed, it is with regard to his theory of language that Enomius brings Basil himself into court, and accuses him of following τῇ ἤπαθεν . . . φιλοσοφίᾳ.[329] By introducing the theory that language is ἄμα τελειον Basil had effectively denied the reality of divine Providence, and thus shown himself to be a follower of Epicurus and Aristotle.[330] Enomius, then, clearly believed that his own doctrine was the authentic teaching of Scripture, and pointedly asked Basil which of the saints could

326 En., apol. 16 (27*, 5-6); cf. exp. fid. 54, 21-23.
327 En., apol. 22 (35*, 21-22); cf. apol. apol. II (I I, 362, 7-9).
328 En., apol. 19 (30*, 13-17).
329 En.; apol. apol. II (I I, 282, 3-4).
330 Ibid. (I I, 345, 25-345, 11); the two philosophers are mentioned only as conventional symbols of a denial of providence, and none of their specific doctrines are intended.
be brought forward to bear witness to the application of names to the Lord ψατίκ τοῦ Πολυκάρπου.\textsuperscript{331} This is confirmed by the surviving examples of Biblical texts used by Eunomius in defence of his doctrine. He seems to have derived it chiefly from the exegesis of the opening chapters of Genesis. In his view, the opening verse of the first chapter of this book (Gen. 1:1-13) refer to a pre-temporal creation (i.e., prior to χρόνος) since "time is a certain motion of the stars, but the stars came into being not only later than the essence of the Unbegotten and all intelligible beings, but even later than the first corporeal bodies."\textsuperscript{332} Since Eunomius makes a clear distinction between χρόνος in this sense and αἴλων,\textsuperscript{333} he apparently has in mind a teaching similar to that expressed by Basil to the effect that ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσχροτάτων ὁ χρόνος, τούτο ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπερομοσιοποίητων ἐπὶ τῶν αἴλων ὀφείλει ἑστιν.\textsuperscript{334} Genesis 1:1-13, then, refers to the αἴλων that which takes place ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπερομοσιοποίητων. God himself exists from before the ages,\textsuperscript{335} and the Only-begotten too is ἀληθικὴ γεννηθέντα πρὸ αἴλων.\textsuperscript{336} The αἴλων is the locus of the creation of "all intelligible beings" as well as of "the

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid. (I 1, 313, 16-18).
\textsuperscript{332} Eun., apol. 10 (19*, 12-17).
\textsuperscript{333} Ibid. (19*, 17-22).
\textsuperscript{334} Basil., Eun. II, 13 (PG 29, 596B).
\textsuperscript{335} Eun., apol. 10 (19*, 17-22).
\textsuperscript{336} Eun., apol. 10 (19*, 17-22).
first corporeal objects." Such a division of the stages of creation is not of itself remarkable, but more interesting from our own standpoint is Eunomius' interpretation of the divine commands interspersed throughout both stages. After accusing Basil of having followed pagan philosophy and joined the company of the godless, Eunomius confutes his adversary with the authentic teaching of Scripture:

... oñ ἐπεσκεμμένον τοὺς πρώτους τῶν λόγων, ὅτι μή-
πω παρεκάθεντο τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς γένεσιν ἢ τοῦ καρπός καὶ
tοῦ σπέρματος ἐπισωμία παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς Ἀναγέννησις.337

... καὶ ὁ χρόνος περί τῶν Κατά τὰ διαφόρα μονάδα ἡ ἡ παρά
εἰς τὸ θεόν, καὶ προσέγγισα τὰ δόματα, τὸ Γεννήθηκεν φῶς καὶ
Γεννήθηκεν στέρωμα καὶ Ενακμάθητα τὰ δόματα καὶ ὁ ὡραίων ἢ
ἐξωραίων καὶ Ελατστάθητα καὶ καὶ Ἐκαγαγάτω τὰ δόματα καὶ πάν-
tα ὡς καθεξῆς ἀναγέννηται.339

"... not having taken into consideration the initial passages of the sacred oracles, in that, at a time when men had not yet been brought into existence, the name of 'fruit' and 'seed' is spoken of by holy Scripture (Gen. 1:11-12)."

"... and he says that 'Moses proclaimed these things explicitly when he said,' "God said" (Gen. 1:3, 6, etc.), and added his words: "Let there be light" (Gen. 1:3), and "Let there be a firmament" (Gen. 1:6), and "Let the waters ... be gathered together ... and let the dry land appear" (Gen. 1:9), and "Let the earth put forth vegetation" (Gen. 1:11), and "Let the waters bring forth" (Gen. 1:20), and everything else which is written down in order.""

If we assume that Eunomius could not really have accepted the position which Gregory ascribes to him, that God has windpipe, tongue,

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337 Eun., apol. 10 (19*, 15-17).
338 Eun., apol. apol. (J 1, 282, 11-14).
339 Ibid. (J 1, 284, 29-285, 3); these passages were apparently consecutive (or almost so) in the original.
teeth, and mouth, \(^{340}\) then the ἐπιφανή of God must be classed along with "all intelligible beings" and be part of the intelligible world. As such they are presumably the conceptualizations of the essences to which they are linked, and are to be distinguished from the φανέ by which they are expressed. It would be reasonable to suppose that words in this sense are closely connected with the idea of the φυσικήν ἐννοίαν, \(^{341}\) which, as we saw earlier, is described by Albinus as "that which . . . intellection (i.e., contemplation of the world of forms) is called, after the soul has entered the body." \(^{342}\) Man is endowed with these names at his creation, and through them is enabled to "contemplate the world of forms." This is borne out by Eunomius' continuing exegesis of Genesis:

"But he confidently affirms that Moses himself bears witness to the fact that the manner of use of the things named and of their names was given to man by him who ordered nature (Gen. 2: 19–20), and that in any case the naming of the things which were given occurred before the creation of those who were to use them. \(^{343}\) He speaks thus of all these things word-for-word."

Thus, Eunomius understood the naming of the animals by Adam to


\(^{341}\) Eun., apol. 7 (14*, 17); apol. apol. I (J I, 201, 4).

\(^{342}\) Albinus, Intr. 4, 6 (Henri 17, 5–7); v. supra pp.

\(^{343}\) Eun., apol. apol. II (J I, 302, 28–303, 6).
refer to the bestowal by the Only-begotten 344 not only of the power to use the things which he had created, but the knowledge of the pre-existent names which expressed their essences, so that "whatever the man called every living creature, that was its name" (Gen. 2: 19). Man was granted knowledge of the created world even as he was given power over it. Since the pre-existent names belong to the intelligible order, it must be Adam who "embodied in the sounds and syllables that name which is fitted by nature for each object." 345 Thus, we get a complete and self-consistent picture of Eunomius' understanding of the Creation narratives. In order to complete it, however, we must ask ourselves what the language was which resulted from Adam's embodying in sounds and syllables the names revealed to him by God. Here we are on somewhat more difficult ground, for Eunomius' argument is preserved to us only in very fragmentary form. We have noted elsewhere, however, that at least in one case and possibly in others Gregory presents the actual arguments of Eunomius in a hypothetical form. 346 This suggests that a careful consideration of the points refuted by Gregory will give us an idea of the arguments of Eunomius which lie behind them. There are two passages which are of interest to us.

344 It is apparently he who is meant by τοῦ δημιουργοῦντός τῶν φύσεων, since he is the principal agent of Creation and is described as ἐπίκοος πρὸς ... δημιουργόν in exp. fid. 56*, 10-19. 345 Ib. 346 Y. supra p. 97, and Appendix III, pp. 194*-195*, n. 203.
The first concerns the Tower of Babel (Gen. 11: 1-9), a story so exactly fitted to Eunomius' purpose that it is difficult to believe he made no mention of it. Gregory tried to show that despite the fact that Scripture speaks of the whole earth as being "of one language and of one speech" (Gen. 11: 1, 6), the language in question was not the direct creation of God, but, like all others, the invention of the human mind. A reasonable supposition would be that Eunomius asserted the contrary, and that he believed that this story witnessed to the fact that the language revealed by God to Adam remained the speech of the whole earth until God confused the tongues at Babel. It is interesting, then, that there is a consistent tradition that this language was that which became the vehicle of the Biblical revelation, Hebrew, and that it was either preserved intact by the Hebrews or revealed anew to Abraham at his call. This tradition is found in both the Book of Jubilees and a form of The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, and had already passed into Christian tradition with Origen. More to the point, it is also found in the Clementine Recognitions, a work known to have been used in Eunomian circles, and would have fitted in neatly with Eunomian literalism in the interpretation of the

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347 Græg. Nyss., Dum. II (J I, 300, 1-26).
349 Test., Append. 8: 4-6 (Charles II, 363).
350 Origen, Cels. V, 30-31
352 supra pp. 116-118.
Scriptures. Furthermore, such a tradition would dovetail quite naturally with the philosophical background of Eunomius' theory since, as we shall see,\textsuperscript{353} it is in part concerned to justify the use and efficacy of "barbarian" names. It is all the more significant, then, that it is just this tradition which Gregory chose to combat \textit{in extenso} in the second of our passages.\textsuperscript{354} It is difficult to believe that Gregory would waste so much space on an argument not in fact used by his adversary. Moreover, Eunomius himself seems to confirm the continuing efficacy of the language revealed at creation for the purpose of revelation when we find him vehemently challenging Basil to prove from Scripture that the "saints" (as opposed to God) ever discovered any new words,\textsuperscript{355} and linking God's ability to communicate with his servants to his initial gift to them of a language fit for that purpose.\textsuperscript{356} Thus, while we can find no direct assertion by Eunomius that Hebrew was the original language of mankind, as well as the continuing vehicle of revelation, it is extremely likely that he thought that it was.

This completes our review of the Biblical basis of Eunomius' theory of language. Not only did he himself regard this theory as the authentic teaching of Scripture, but we are required only to take into consideration such passages as Ps. 146: 4, Isa. 40:

\textsuperscript{353} V. infra pp. 232-236.
\textsuperscript{354} \textit{Org.-Nyss.}, \textit{Eun.} II (J I, 300, 27-302, 24).
\textsuperscript{355} \textit{Eun.}, \textit{apol. apol.} II (J I, 347, 17-21).
\textsuperscript{356} \textit{Ibid.} (J I, 348, 6-10).
26, Eccles. 6:10, or the numerous detailed explanations of personal names throughout the Old Testament to realize that his claim is not entirely without basis in Scripture itself. Furthermore, quite apart from the passage quoted earlier concerning the primeval origin of Hebrew, it is apparent that his understanding of Genesis was grounded directly in at least some earlier Christian exegesis, for we find a very similar interpretation in Theophilus of Antioch:

"'Εδάπαξες ὃν θεοῦ, ουτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ἄτοτε, φαγών δὲ πέρι λόγου ἐν οἰκήματι συνεχομένῳ, ξυφών γὰρ ὁ Ὀμοίων, παιδὶ μὲν τοῦ κόσμου ποιήσας καὶ τὸ μὲν φῶς ὁ Θεὸς ἐκάλεσεν ἡμέραν, τὸ δὲ σκότος νύκτα. Ἐκ τοῦ γε θυραποῦσα ὁμιλὴν ἡμέραν τὸ φῶς ἡμέραν, ἐκ τοῦ σκότος νύκτα. ᾿Αλλ’ συνετὸς μὲν τὰ λογία, εἰ μὴ τὶν δυναμάνει εἰλήφῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτά θεοῦ." 357

"Thus, the Command of God (i.e., His Word) appeared like a lamp in an enclosed room (cf. II Pet. 1:19) and shone under heaven, effecting the creation apart from the world. 'And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night' (Gen. 1:5)—Because man would not have known how to call the light Day or the darkness Night (or any of the other things either), unless he had received their names from the God who made them."

There seems to be no question, then, that Eunomius based his position on Scripture as interpreted by a long Christian tradition, and that he had no conscious intention of innovating. His understanding of the function of language, and particularly of Scriptural language, was part of his fundamental religious attitude, and implicit in the "proper attitude" toward divine

revelation which constitutes faith. It was because of this that he criticized Basil for importing Greek philosophy into Christianity. Like the critics of Eunomius himself whom we examined earlier, he was so convinced that his understanding of Scripture was present either implicitly or explicitly in Christianity from the beginning that he could only explain Basil's departure from it on the basis of some external factor. The external factor was precisely the charge levelled against him by his own adversaries: the introduction of Greek philosophy.

If this helps us to understand Eunomius' own view of the origins of his theory of language, it cannot obscure the fact that the background and terminology of this theory reflect an extensive use of Greek philosophical categories. In what context are we to understand this? We can get part of the answer by looking into the views of some of the Pagan authors who held similar theories. In the De Mysteriis of (Ps.-?) Iamblichus, for instance, we find that the discussion centers around the use and value of the traditional names of the gods, and deals particularly with the problem of those which are incomprehensible and why they are for this reason especially effectual in theurgy. Iamblichus remarks that there are in fact two kinds of divine names, those which are apparently incomprehensible because their interpretation is unknown to us, and those whose

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meaning has been revealed by the gods themselves.360 Although the former are all the more august for their apparent incomprehensibility since they must represent a mystery too excellent for our feeble understanding,361 it is the latter which are particularly interesting for our own purposes. Iamblichus makes the following comment about them:

'Επ' δὲν γε μὴν παραλίκωσαμεν τὴν ἐξέτημα τῆς ἀναλήξιοις, ἐπὶ τούτων τῆς θείας αἴσθησις καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ τέλεως ἔχομεν θάνατον ἐν τῷ δυσμοί τὴς εὐθύμησις. Καὶ ξεκάθαραν τὴν μυστικὴν καὶ ἀπαράπτικον εἰδὴ τῶν θεῶν ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ διαφώτισσαν, καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀν' αὐτῶν ἀνάγκην ἐπὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ἀνακράτεις κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τοὺς θεοὺς συναφοῖσθεν.362

"But at least in the cases of those names about whose interpretation we have been granted an understanding—in those cases we possess in the name a knowledge of the whole divine essence and power and order. More, we preserve complete in our souls the mystical and inexpressible image of the gods; through their names we lift up the soul to the gods, and after it has been lifted up, we unite it to the gods according to its capacity."

The many parallels of this passage with the thought of Eunomius are obvious, and clearly at a later point we will want to return to it,363 but for the moment it is sufficient to observe that although Iamblichus' statement plainly has behind it a complete theory of language, its main preoccupation in the present instance is with the virtue and power of divine names. A similar interest is found in Proclus, where, in the midst of an extensive

360 v. Inira pp. 277-279.
discussion of the nature of language, we find an assertion of the abiding value of using their native tongues to designate the κατακερκυλ of the nations. When we turn to Christian authors, however, we find many of the same preoccupations. Clement of Alexandria, for instance, alludes to the idea that prayers may be more efficacious when recited in a barbarian tongue. It is in the works of Origen, however, that we find the theme fully developed. There we find the same concern for the efficacy of divine names as agents of magic, the value of barbarian tongues, and the power of the mysterious names of the angels, not to mention that of our Lord Jesus Christ. However, if Origen shares many themes with his pagan counterparts, there is also a significant difference. In the passage quoted above from Iamblichus, as well as in that of Proclus, the gods in question are clearly the subordinate deities of the universe—those whom another Platonist, Celsus, refers to as "the satraps and ministers of the air and earth." None of their statements are intended to apply to the One who is the source of all reality. It is all the more remarkable, then, that Origen

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364 Procl., in Cra. 57 (Pasquali 25, 13-16).
365 Clem., Str. I, 21 (GCS II, 89, 5-7).
366 Or., Cels. I, 24 (GCS I, 74, 17-75, 18), 25 (GCS I, 76, 16-22); V, 45 (GCS II, 48, 11-18).
367 Ibid., I, 24 (GCS I, 74, 19-21).
368 Ibid., I, 25 (GCS I, 76, 8-12).
369 Ibid. (GCS I, 76, 12-15).
370 Ibid., VIII, 35 (GCS II, 250, 19-20).
applied his own very similar theory not only to angels and pagan gods, but to the Creator of the universe himself:

By considerations of this kind we would in this way defend the fact that Christians strive to the point of death to avoid calling God Zeus or naming him in any other language. For either they use the ordinary name 'God' without qualification, or with the addition of the words 'the Creator of the universe, the Maker of heaven and earth, who sent down to the human race such and such wise men'. And when the name 'God' is linked with the names of these men a miraculous effect is produced among men.'

Although there is still obvious concern for the efficacious use of names in prayer, and Origen expands elsewhere on the value of linking God's name with those of saints and prophets, it is clear where his main interest lies. Origen plainly regarded his theory as a defence of the uniqueness of Christianity. Celsus had maintained that it made no difference by what name one called the supreme God, whether that name was the one in use among the Greeks, Egyptians, or Indians. Behind his assertion lay the common ancient doctrine that the One is both poly-onomous and

372 Ibid. V, 45 (GCS II, 49, 3-18).
373 Ibid. I, 24 (GCS I, 73, 7-10); V, 45 (GCS II, 48, 5-7).
A doctrine so conducive to syncretism would have been highly corrosive of Christianity's claim to be the unique revelation of God, and of the individual Christian's consciousness of his separation from pagan society. It is all the more significant, then, that both here and in his *Exhortation to Martyrdom* Origen should have given his theory of language a prominent place. The unique value of the divine Name was closely linked to the unique value of Scripture as the true revelation of God, and, as Frend has remarked, Christianity's claim to possess such a revelation and knowledge of God's name was not an insignificant factor in bringing some parts of society to the Church. Thus, among the motives which stood behind Origen's adoption of this theory of language was the need to defend the absolute character of the Christian revelation as embodied in the Name of the God who was its author. When it entered Christianity, then, this philosophy of language already shared with its Greek counterparts the desire to explain and defend the use of the divine names.

No one reading the works of Eunomius can be unaware of the importance of the divine Name in his theology, particularly as it is expressed in the word ἀγάλματις, and it seems, therefore,

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375 *Cf.* mart. 46 (GCS I, 42, 4-28).
that in this respect too his theory of language resembled that of his predecessors. As in the case of the ἄγενρος διὸνος discussed above, Eunomius' insistence upon the unique value of the divine Name and his use of philosophical argument to defend it represents the turning of older Christian apologetic to a new purpose. Like Origen, Eunomius regarded the divine Name as a guarantee of the absolute unicity of God, and he employed similar means to defend it. It seems, then, that since there is every evidence that Eunomius sincerely believed his doctrine was the actual teaching of Scripture, and that his choice of arguments was based on earlier Christian teaching, his reasons for employing Greek philosophical argument in this case were largely apologetic ones. Eunomius no more than Gregory was guilty of "merely applying Christian names to Plato's doctrines and calling it Christian theology."

But if this is our general conclusion, it does not solve all our problems. If we cannot find any evidence that Eunomius simply imposed Greek philosophical doctrines on a Christian framework, it cannot be denied that in his use of these doctrines he often displays more than a purely apologetic interest, and that the argument often seems to be pursued for its own sake. Moreover, the ἄγενρος, the divine Name so hotly defended in these arguments is not itself found in Scripture, so that even if

377 supra pp. 130-132, 210-211.
Eunomius started with the data of revelation, it cannot be denied that much of what he made of it was based on rational argument and philosophical enquiry. This suggests that if we are to understand Eunomius’ use of such argument we must come to deal with the second of our two headings, and discuss Eunomius’ method. As in our earlier consideration of the place of Greek philosophical content in Eunomius’ system, the most convenient place to begin will be with the accusations of his enemies.

There can be no question but that the Fathers believed Eunomius had arrived at his theological position exclusively on the basis of rational argument. Basil expresses their view as well as anyone when he comments on the Eunomian treatment of the divine generation:

Εἴ γάρ μέλλομεν πάντα τῇ καταλήψει μετρεῖν, καὶ τὸ τοῦτο λογισμὸς ἀποκάλυπτων μηδὲ εἶναι τὸ καράπαν ἐπικαλμάτων, οὐχ ἡ δὲ τῆς πίστεως, οὐχ ἡ δὲ τῆς ἔλεγχος μισθοῦς. Πῶς ὁ γὰρ ἐξήκοντο οὐ τὸν μακριπνόν ἔχειν, τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει τὸν ἀφετέρου ἀποκάλυμμον, οὐ μόνον τοῦτο καὶ λόγισμον ἐναργεῖσα πειθοῦντο; ἡ δὲ ἑπικαλλείτω τὰ ξύλα, καὶ ἑποκαθίσσον οἱ λαοῦς τοῖς εἰς τὸν λόγισμον φανομένοις ἀκολουθοῦντες, τῷ μηρύμαι τῷ πνεύματος ἀπειδοθεία; 378

“For if we were to measure everything by direct apprehension, and account what cannot be grasped by reason as entirely unworthy of acceptance, the recompense of faith would be undone, as would that of hope. How could we still be worthy of the blessings laid in store for faith in the unseen when we give assent only to that which is obvious according to reason? How came it that the Gentiles became futile in their thinking and their senseless minds

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were darkened' (Rom. 1: 21)? Was it not because they followed what seemed clear from reason, and were not obedient to the Spirit's proclamation?"

If our earlier study does not enable us to sustain the charge that reason was simply substituted for revelation by Eunomius, we can at least attempt to discover what the Fathers meant when they accused him of it. Theodoret put their common belief most pungently when he accused Eunomius with a famous bon mot: ὅτι τὴν ἡλεολογίαν τεχνολογίαν ἐπέφυσε. Theodoret's emphasis on τεχνολογία is not an isolated example, and although the word is found but once in the Contra Eunomium of Basil, it occurs time and time again in that of Gregory of Nyssa. It is clear from the fact that this word is linked with the name of Aristotle, and given the specification λογική τεχνολογίας that the target of this accusation was a particular method of reasoning. Obviously, not all of the charges of Eunomius' opponents are to be treated with equal seriousness, and it is apparent that in many cases their use of this and other similar phrases reflects less a specific indictment of his method than a general dissatisfaction with his conclusions. This is undoubtedly the

379 That., heer. IV, 3 (PG 83, 420B).
381 Greg. Nyss., Ep. I (I I, 17, 25; 109, 17; 190, 19); II (I I, 323, 15; 362, 14; 392, 10, 19; 462, 3); III, 1 (I I, 7, 5-6; 9, 23; 26, 26); iv (I I, 77, 3; 88, 17; 101, 24-25); v (I I, 162, 11); vi (I I, 199, 14); ix (I I, 273, 1; 280, 25; 257, 5); x (I I, 397, 11).
382 Tat., III, v (I II, 162, 11); x (I II, 397, 11).
383 Tat., III, vii (I II, 88, 17); ix (I II, 280, 25).
case with respect to such phrases as ματαιοτεχνιας,\textsuperscript{384} the various derivatives of ματαιοσκευας,\textsuperscript{385} and the description of Eunomius himself as φιλοσκευοσθα,\textsuperscript{386} The majority of these accusations, however, undoubtedly represent the genuine belief of the Church Fathers that, even apart from his actual conclusions, Eunomius' theological method represented something fundamentally unfaithful to Christianity. This is confirmed by the numerous variations on the theme τεχνολογία found throughout the works of the anti-Eunomian writers. Eunomius is a τεχνολογος,\textsuperscript{387} his method is referred to by such verbs as τεχνολογεῖ,\textsuperscript{388} and τεχνάω,\textsuperscript{389} his arguments are described as τέχναεμ,\textsuperscript{390} Even his Arian co-religionists had reservations about this aspect of his thought and mocked him and his party as μεταφορέσσας,\textsuperscript{391} and ὀμάνοματας.\textsuperscript{392} An examination of the qualifications which surround these phrases soon makes clear the nature of the complaint.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Basil, \textit{Eun.} II, 10 (PG 29, 589A).
\item Grg. Nyss., \textit{Eun.} I (J I, 41, 1-5); III, i (J II, 3, 15); ματαιοσκεύας, Basil, \textit{Eun.} I, 9 (PG 29, 533A); II, 24 (PG 29, 626B), cf. IV, 2 (PG 29, 697B); Grg. Nyss., \textit{Eun.} I (J I, 23, 11-12).
\item Grg. Nyss., \textit{Eun.} I (J I, 150, 23).
\item \textit{Ibid.} II (J I, 402, 28).
\item \textit{Ibid.} II (J I, 240, 7; 244, 29; 372, 3; 395, 23; 398, 26; 400, 6), III, i (J II, 7; 3, 33, 18), ii (J II, 60, 8-9), v (J II, 182, 18).
\item \textit{Ibid.} II (J I, 339, 22), iii, vi (J II, 197, 3).
\item \textit{Ibid.} I (J I, 96, 24), ii (J I, 392, 5); Basil, \textit{Eun.} I, 8 (PG 29, 528A), 9 (PG 29, 533A), 13 (PG 29, 553B), ii, ii (PG 29, 704B), 25 (PG 29, 629B), 27 (PG 29, 638A).
\item Philost. \textit{h.e.}, X, 1 (GCS 126, 12).
\item \textit{Ibid.} IX, 3 (GCS 116, 18); on the background of these epithets, J. de Ghellinck, "Quelques appréciations de la dialectique d'Aristote dans les conflits trinitaires du IVe siècle," \textit{RHE} 26 (1930), pp. 21-22.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Eunomius is spoken of time and time again as possessing a "dialectical and technical wit,"\(^393\) and the other occasions on which "technology" and dialectic are linked\(^394\) as well as the simple frequency of the word "dialectic" itself\(^395\) confirm that a major part of what Eunomius' opponents complained about in his system was his use of this method. Specifically (to judge by the frequency of its mention), they objected to his employment of the syllogistic method of reasoning,\(^396\) and to the interest in γνῶμαι τεχνολογία\(^397\) which they believed to be inseparable from it. Thus, despite the fact that most of the actual occurrences of the word τεχνη refer to artistic or creative activity in general, whether it be that of God,\(^398\) the devil,\(^399\) the goldsmithery of Aetius,\(^400\) or any other similar activity,\(^401\) when

\(^{393}\) Grg. Nyss., Em. I (J I, 193, 17-18), II (J I, 321, 15; 376, 1), III, i (J II, 3, 18), 11 (J II, 85, 12).

\(^{394}\) Ibid. III, II (J I, 276, 18-19; 369, 12; 316, 11-12).

\(^{395}\) Ibid. I (J I, 198, 26; 202, 9); II (J I, 313, 12; 375, 11), III, i (J II, 83, 8; 85, 22; 89, 2), vii (J II, 224, 1-2), viii (J II, 262, 8).

\(^{396}\) Ibid. I (J I, 60, 10; 61, 14-15; 185, 9; 186, 2, 26; 193, 5, 14; 197, 24; 201, 25), II (J I, 256, 25-26; 251, 13; 321, 27; 408, 25; 407, 18-19; 408, 20), III, i (J II, 56, 18), 7 (J II, 152, 11), v (J II, 162, 1-2), vi (J II, 205, 9), vii (J II, 220, 26; 266, 30; 224, 2), viii (J II, 261, 21), x (J II, 236, 12).

\(^{397}\) Ibid. III, i (J II, 7, 5).

\(^{398}\) Basil. Em. I, 8 (PG 29, 528C), III, 7 (PG 29, 669B).

\(^{399}\) Basil. Em. I, 1 (PG 29, 500A).

\(^{400}\) Grg. Nyss., Em. I (J I, 35, 9, 14; 36, 3, 12, 18; 37, 5).

\(^{401}\) Basil. Em. I, 18 (PG 29, 552C), II, 16 (PG 29, 605A), 19 (PG 29, 613C), 26 (PG 29, 632C), 32 (PG 29, 648A bis); Grg. Nyss., Em. I (J I, 18, 7; 141, 18, 20, 23; 150, 13; 158, 12), II (J I, 278, 7, 10, 11, 16, 279, 6, 10, 14, 18, 293, 5; 335, 11).
the word is used to describe the theological method of Eunomius, it refers to the systematic application of logic and syllogistic reasoning to the data of revelation. Once we have come to this conclusion, however, we must still ask ourselves whether this exhausts the meaning of τήρεμα. Apparently it does not.

This is made clear from a consideration of other aspects of the anti-Eunomian polemic. One of the most commonly reiterated features of the patristic attack on Eunomius was the accusation of "sophistry," as expressed by such words as ωφίζω, ωφίκες, ωφίσμα, and ωφίστικας. Since this accusation is by no means limited to one side, and is in fact leveled by Eunomius
himself against Basil,\(^{407}\) it would be easy to take it as one more example of a common polemical theme. However, the sheer number of the occurrences, as well as instances in which it is clearly joined to the accusation of \(\tau\epsilon\chi\nu\rho\),\(^{408}\) indicate that we must take it more seriously. It would seem that the Fathers connected Eunomius' use of logical argument with his employment of the literally "sophistical" techniques of the schools of rhetoric. That this was in fact the case is confirmed by the various slighting references to Eunomius as a "grammarien,"\(^{409}\) and the sarcastic allusions to his rhetorical techniques\(^{410}\) and his own position as a "rhetor."\(^{411}\) It seems, then, that in addition to the use of syllogistic reasoning and logical argument, \(\tau\epsilon\chi\nu\rho\) implies the wider frame of reference of the teaching of the rhetorical schools.\(^{412}\)

If this gives us some understanding of the range of meanings behind the Fathers' accusation of \(\tau\epsilon\nu\nu\lambda\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\alpha\), it does not wholly explain the nature of their complaint. It seems difficult to

\(^{407}\) Basi., apol. apol. I (J II, 5; 7; 60, 1).

\(^{408}\) Basi., apol. I (J II, 5; 7; 60, 1) (J I, 364); \(\epsilon\xi\kappa\), Græc. Nyss., Eufr. I (J I, 364); \(\epsilon\xi\kappa\), Græc. Nyss., Eufr. II (J II, 364); 277, 2).

\(^{410}\) Basi., apol. apol. I (J II, 5; 7; 60, 1) (J I, 364); \(\epsilon\xi\kappa\), Græc. Nyss., Eufr. II (J II, 364); 277, 2).

\(^{412}\) Basi., apol. apol. I (J II, 5; 7; 60, 1) (J I, 364); \(\epsilon\xi\kappa\), Græc. Nyss., Eufr. II (J II, 364); 277, 2).
believe, for instance, that they objected to the use of logic in itself. We note that Gregory of Nyssa speaks quite approvingly of the use of τέχνη at a number of points,413 and that in one of the chapter headings of his first book Contra Eunomium414 he describes his own argument as an ἐκδοσις τεχνη τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν δοματίων.415 Likewise, we find that one of the compliments rendered Basil by Gregory of Nazianzus is the praise of his grasp of dialectic,416 and Eusebius of Caesarea had earlier paid the same compliment to Anatolius, as having been deemed worthy to establish the school of the Aristotelian succession at Alexandria.417 Indeed, it is apparent that it was partly due to its prominence among the Arians that the use of dialectic and logical argument became more widespread among the Fathers.418 It seems, then, that the Fathers objected not so much to the use of such methods per se, as to the ends for which they were employed. Basil had remarked that the Eunomians used Greek philosophy only when it served their own ends,419 and part of the Fathers' objections to

413Græc. Nyss., Rm. II (I I, 339, 17-18; 387, 23), III, 1 (I II, 418, 2).
414The chapter headings of this book are the work of Gregory himself; v. I II, pp. IX, XVI-XVII.
416Græc. Naz., op. 43, 23 (PG 36, 528A-B).
417Eus., h.e. VII, 32 (GCS II, 718, 13-21).
419Basil, Rm. II, 28 (PG 29, 637A).
the Eunomian use of logic and rational argument was certainly based on the doctrines it was meant to defend. The main objection, however, seems to have been the attitude toward divine revelation which the use of such argument implied. This attitude, in the eyes of its opponents, was one of overweening curiosity, an officious meddling with the mysteries of God's revelation which could only be described by such words as πολυπαραγωγή and πολυπαραγόμενος. Thus, the real objection of the Fathers to the method of Eunomius was that expressed by John Chrysostom in one of the passages with which we began the present discussion, that in using the techniques of rational enquiry, the Eunomians were delving into a mystery which they ought to have accepted in simple faith. Gregory of Nyssa spoke for them all when he voiced the wish that they ought never to have made the enquiry at all.

When we turn to the works of Eunomius himself, it takes little to prove that logic and philosophical enquiry occupied an important place in his system. We note, for instance, that he...
made use of Aristotle's teaching on the nature of privation, and that the distinction between the inductive and deductive approaches to knowledge which is the organizational basis of the Apology is likewise Aristotelian. Again, we find that his treatment of the various ways in which to combine or separate to form purely fictitious mental concepts displays an obvious acquaintance with ancient grammatical theory. Above all, we have the witness of his own Liber Apologeticus and the Syntagmation of his master Aetius, both of which are extended examples of a tightly organized and intricate logical progression. If there is no question, then, that Eunomius made extensive use of rational argument, it is equally apparent that his dialectical skill deeply impressed his contemporaries, for even his enemies comment on it. Sozomen describes the fear which Eunomius' mastery of this skill excited among the Orthodox, and describes the Empress Flacilla as sufficiently convinced of the efficacy of his methods as to prevent any contact between him and Theodosius. Again, Theodore of Mopsuestia speaks of the continuing popularity of his writings, while

424 Eun., apol. 8 (16*, 8-10); cf. Arist., Cat. 12a26-34.
426 Eun., apol. 20 (32*, 9-20); cf., e.g., Arist., Afo 81a40-81b15, Ton. 157a21-24.
427 Eun., apol. II (J I, 276, 22-30); cf. Sextus Empiricus, M. II, 58; Diogenes Laertius VII, 52.
428 Soz., h.e. VII, 6 (GCS 307, 13-19).
429 Ibid. (GCS 307, 19-23).
430 Thdr. Mops., Jo., praf. (CSCO 115, 3, 11-13; trans... CSCO 116, 1).
Nemesius of Buesa pays him the compliment of calling him ἀξιός.\textsuperscript{431} Perhaps the best indication of the esteem in which Eunomius' use of dialectic was held is that his teaching was deemed worthy of discussion from within the Aristotelian tradition itself. In a 4th century commentary on Aristotle which is based in part on 4th century sources we find a Eunomian syllogism introduced as a basis of discussion.\textsuperscript{432} However, if there is no question that Eunomius used logical argument or that his contemporaries respected his skill in it, a more important consideration from our own standpoint is the obvious fact that such study was pursued beyond what can be regarded as necessary for apologetic purposes. We note, for instance, that one of Eunomius' followers, Theophronius the Cappadocian, wrote a book based on Aristotelian principles entitled ἡερὶ γυμνασίας νοῦ,\textsuperscript{433} and that this work apparently dealt with the nature of time and God's knowledge of it.\textsuperscript{434} That speculation of this kind was by no means an isolated example is shown by the fact that another of Eunomius' followers, one Euty- chius, indulged in similar conjectures and was excommunicated for his pains.\textsuperscript{435} The esteem in which dialectical ability was held by the Eunomians is shown by the way in which Philostorgius boasts of Aetius' defeat of Aphthonius the Manichee\textsuperscript{436} and Basil

\textsuperscript{431}Nemesius, nat. hom. 2 (PG 40, 572A).
\textsuperscript{432}Anon. in SE, Comm. in Arist. Gr. 23, pars iv, 12, 24–32.
\textsuperscript{433}Soz., H.e. VII, 17 (GCS 325, 1–5).
\textsuperscript{434}Ibid. (GCS 325, 5–12).
\textsuperscript{435}Ibid. (GCS 325, 12–25).
\textsuperscript{436}Philost., H.e. III, 15 (GCS 46, 23–47, 9).
of Ancyra and Eustathius of Sebaste\textsuperscript{437} (even his enemies bear witness to this interest when they gloat over Eunomius' repeated refusal to dispute with the formidable Novatian Bishop Sisin- ius).\textsuperscript{438} Perhaps the most revealing evidence, however, is provided by an incident in the life of Aetius:

\textquote[Εκείθεν οὖν την Κηλιδίαν καταλαμβάνει· καὶ τις τοῦ Βορθορίους, λόγοις αὐτῷ ὑπὲρ τῆς λαίας ὅπες συμμε- 

αίς, εἰς ἑκάστην κατάντησεν ἦταν. ἐγὼ ὄνομα τε

αὐτὸν κατέγιγνα καὶ τοῦ ζητεὶ ἄνεκαν ἰμέτα, δρᾶν το

φέδος τῆς ἐπαθίας ἐπιφανεστέρων. όμως οὖ τῷ Ἀετίῳ

dιακειμένη ὁπτασίᾳ τις, ὡς οἴων κεραυνοῖς, ἐξεύθεν 

λόγου τῆς ἔντυμαν, συμβόλαις παρεχόμενη τῇ ἀναταγώ-

νιστὸν τῆς ἐκ παρεμεταίρνηαι σωφίας. καὶ ηὗτῳ παρα-

tηγηγένετο τῷ Ἀετίῳ ὁ μηδενὸς εἰς συμπλοκαῖς ἕτταθαι 

λόγοι.\textsuperscript{439}]

"At all events, from there he reached Cilicia, and one of the Borborians engaged him in a controversy concerning his own opinion and in the end overcame him. Whereupon a depression seized hold of him and he no longer thought it bearable to live, for he had seen falsehood more powerful than truth. While Aetius was in this state, however, there appeared to him a kind of vision (so this fellow describes the marvel) which released him from the depression, and promised him by means of portents that the wisdom he had already been promised would henceforth be invincible. So in that place Aetius received the gift of never being overcome in controversy."

A similar incident may have happened to Eunomius, but most unfortunately Gregory of Nyssa elected to pass over "the long account of his dream."\textsuperscript{440} What is interesting to us, however, is not the significance attached to dreams and visions, fascinating as

\textsuperscript{437} Ibid. III, 16 (GCS 46, 23-47, 9).
\textsuperscript{438} Soz., h.e. VIII, 1 (GCS 348, 15-19).
\textsuperscript{439} Philost., h.e. III, 15 (GCS 46, 15-23).
\textsuperscript{440} Grg. Nyss., Bm. I (I 1, 30, 1-2).
that may be, but rather the attitude which their presence implies in this case. People do not have (or are not portrayed as having) dreams about things which are completely unimportant to them. If Aetius is portrayed by Eunomian literary tradition as virtually prepared to commit suicide because he was unable to defeat a falsehood by rational argument, and that God himself promised him invincibility in such argument, then clearly in the eyes of the community which produced the tradition argument of this kind occupied an important place. There seems no question, then, that Eunomius and his followers held the use of logic and rational enquiry in high esteem, and to this extent at least the Fathers' criticisms seem to be justified. On the other hand, there is nothing in any of this which would confirm their main contention, that such study was pursued out of idle curiosity. Indeed, in the incident from the life of Aetius recounted above, it is apparent that the reason for his depression is less the defeat of his argument per se, than the fact that such argument did not lead to truth. What, then, is the function of this kind of argument in the teaching of Eunomius?

To a certain extent we have already answered the question. We have seen that there is no meaningful sense in which Eunomius' system could be said to be based on such argument, and that in fact he quite sincerely believed it was the authentic teaching of Scripture recognizable by anyone possessing the proper attitude of faithful acceptance, εὐνοµία. Almost all of the examples
which we have examined where there is a direct connection between reason and this attitude. have been concerned to supply what the attitude itself would tell us anyway if only we possessed it. To the extent, then, that Eunomius used rational argument to commend the reasonability of his faith in the divine revelation, his use of it was apologetic. However, what we need to consider is why such an apologetic should be necessary, and particularly why it should be necessary with regard to those who "profess and call themselves Christians." The answer is apparent from the nature of revelation itself, particularly as it finds expression in its primary vehicle, holy Scripture. Scripture inevitably makes extensive use of words and phrases whose surface meaning cannot be understood ἀπ’ ἐκ τῆς ἀποκάλυψεως. If Eunomius is nonetheless firmly convinced that words link us directly to the natures which underlie them, and this theory is Scripture's own guarantee of the possibility of a genuine divine revelation, then the painstaking and careful use of grammatical and logical analysis is an inherent necessity of the system. While such analysis may not be necessary to establish the fundamental truths of the Gospel for those who accept it in faith, the nature of the revelation in which that Gospel finds expression requires it not only for the conviction of unbelievers but for the full expression

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441 supra pp. 130-134, 204-211.
442 cf. the implied distinction, Run., apol. 6 (13*, 5-7).
443 Run., apol. apol. III (1 II, 47, 4), v. supra pp. 182-183.
of the faith itself. Thus, even though logical and grammatical argument adds nothing to the basic revelation which was not there implicitly already, it does make possible a necessary elucidation of the revelation’s full meaning. This fuller meaning is itself included within the proper attitude of faithful acceptance. This can be illustrated by an episode from the Eunomian interpolation in the Clementine Recognitions.\textsuperscript{444} In the course of what is ostensibly a discourse by the Apostle Peter on the nature of the divine generation,\textsuperscript{445} the Apostle is portrayed as calling to mind an objection of Simon Magus. Simon had asserted that when Christians speak of a “Son” of God, they are making God equivalent to men or plants.\textsuperscript{446} Peter makes the following reply to this accusation:\textsuperscript{447}

\textbf{LATIN:}  
"Manifesta est huius incredulitatis via, o Aquila et ceteri, qui enim pro certo nescieritis, opinione autem usque ad auditum susceperitis, crederetimet;

cum facile possit excusationem ipsius incredulitatis a se alicare, prae gaudio eius quod promittitur assumptus publicare" 

\textbf{SYRIAC:}  
"Aquila and you others, this is obviously the path of unbelief. For the man who does not really understand (εἰδο), and who receives (this teaching) into his hearing by way of report only (τὸν ὄγον) is afraid to believe. However, when he is made exuberant because he is able to put away from himself the charge of unbelief, for joy at this

\textsuperscript{444}\textsuperscript{v} supra pp. 116-118. 
\textsuperscript{445}Rec. III, 7, 1-11, 8 (GCS II, 101, 4-107, 1). 
\textsuperscript{446}Eld. III, 8, 10 (GCS II, 103, 3-5). 
\textsuperscript{447}The Greek words included in the Syriac column are those of Frankenberg’s retranslation, and should not be taken as original.
promises he makes diligent endeavour, and, in his eager desire to learn, does not disdain to conceal his unbelief concerning that which he seeks—for the diseases of unbelief are many. But we will hold our discussion of this subject later lest it attract us to the empty expectation of faith, and bring us to enquiry before faith. For in every instance we must put God and enquiry about him in first place.\textsuperscript{449}

Despite the manifest obscurity of the Latin translation, the background of this passage is clearly the story of Simon Magus as recounted in Acts 8: 9–24, and refers to Simon’s apparent conversion to the Christian faith. What is interesting is the context in which the author places Simon’s apparent faith. It appears to be that of the distinction between the ωφικε of the faith and its ἀληθὴ διάσωσι found, e.g., in the Apology.\textsuperscript{450} Even though Simon had taken in the verbal meaning of the Apostle’s words, he was afraid to believe, i.e., to respond to them in the sense in which they were revealed. Thus, he remained only at the level of the surface meaning of the revelation and could not pass beyond it to a genuine faith; all he could possess was the "empty expectation of faith," but because he had not gone on to "understand" he could not receive the reality. The reasons why he seeks this

\textsuperscript{448}Eun., apol. 6 (13*, 11-15).
faith are equally interesting. He is motivated by his cupiditate discendi (Frankenberg, ϕιλομαθέας). In other words, he was drawn to the Christian faith in search of knowledge, but his fault was that of which Peter had warned his disciples—that he had come to enquiry (Frankenberg, ζήτων) before he had achieved faith. No philosophical enquiry, then, into the meaning of revelation can be fruitful unless it presupposes an attitude of faithful acceptance toward it. This is confirmed by another passage from the same section of the Clementine Recognitions where Peter makes the following comment:

LATIN:  
"ita et unigenitus ipse quidem ingenitus non est, ingeniti vero tetam in se demonstrat virtutem cum sit talis ac tantus deltam. ab his vero qui non diligenter inquisierunt ingenitus suspicabatur, apud quos vero praecedit ipsam inquisitionem timor de, non solum dicere aliquid tale recusant, sed etiam cogitare carent." 451

SYRIAC:  
"He is not the unbegotten essence—rather, he is the fullness of his power in both essence and deity and displays this just as it is. He is regarded as unbegotten essence by those who do not make accurate enquiry, but those whom the fear of God precedes in their enquiry not only refuse to say anything of the kind, but guard against even thinking it." 452

The search for truth, then, must be preceded by the fear of God, and has its roots in the fundamental attitude of faithful acceptance of God's revelation. Simon's problem was that, although motivated by an eager desire to learn, he began with enquiry;

452 Ibid. (TU 46, 3 [1937], 168, 3-8).
as a result, all he could have was an "empty expectation of faith," and not faith itself. For the "orthodox," however, the situation is just the reverse. He starts with the "fear of God," and his enquiry about God is rooted in the fundamental act of accepting God's revelation which constitutes faith. When he does go on to pursue "enquiry," he does so under the guidance of the holy Spirit. It is the Spirit's function to be ἡ λεη-θείας καθηγόμενος.\textsuperscript{453} It is he who is συνεργῶν τοῖς πιστοῖς πρὸς κατανόησιν καὶ θεωρίαν τῶν διατεταγμένων,\textsuperscript{454} and καθαίρων τοῖς λογισμοῖς.\textsuperscript{455} Thus, contrary to the assumptions of many modern critics (\textit{v. supra} pp. 139-140), Eunomius placed his use of philosophical enquiry and logical analysis within a thoroughly religious context. It was an activity grounded in a basic (and quite specific) response to God's revelation, and which (through the agency of the holy Spirit) was under the guidance of God himself. Thus, the formidable display of logical technique which is so prominent a feature of Eunomius' method was itself seen as grounded in faith, so that, when rightly pursued in the fear of God and under the guidance of the holy Spirit, it could lead πρὸς κατανόησιν καὶ θεωρίαν τῶν διατεταγμένων.

If this gives us some idea of the place of rational argument within the system of Eunomius as a kind of journey from faith to faith, it ought also to enable us to understand some of his

\textsuperscript{453} Eun., \textit{exp. fidi.} 59*, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{454} \textit{Ibid.} 59*, 8-10.
\textsuperscript{455} \textit{Ibid.} 59*, 14-15.
actual teachings. This is particularly true since, as we noted earlier, the Fathers' criticisms of Eunomius' method were closely connected to those of his content. Specifically, these criticisms were levelled against Eunomius' claim to know the essence of God himself. The Fathers objected to this teaching on two grounds: first, because it seemed to imply a purely natural knowledge of God (ἀληθεία, a knowledge analogous to that of someone "picking up a stone or piece of wood or an instrument of some other material), and secondly, because the desire to know the essence of God—impossible in itself to any creature—implied an overweening curiosity about mysteries beyond human ken (κοίλωραγμοσίν). Both objections involved a charge of unbelief. Since our examination of Eunomius' method has revealed that, while there is some basis for the Fathers' accusations in that he made extensive use of logical methods and philosophical inquiry, they were mistaken in thinking that this was a substitute for faith, we may ask whether their objections are wholly accurate in this case either? As in our earlier study, the only place to begin is with the writings of Eunomius himself.

Since much of the earlier part of Eunomius' Apology is devoted to demonstrating that God is ὁ ἄγνωστος, and this knowledge is closely connected with the use of the designation

456 supra pp. 135-139.
457See the passage from Epiphanius quoted above p. 121f.
458See the passage from Gregory quoted above p. 123f.
459De.loc. 8 (17*, 1).
there seems no doubt either that Eunomius claimed in some sense to know the essence of God, or that that claim was connected with his theory of language. Since both the Pagan and Christian background of this theory was concerned with the revelatory character of divine names, it would be reasonable to ask whether Eunomius believed that ἄγνωστος was in fact the name of God? It would be surprising if it were. The whole theory on which the use of such names is based presupposes that they were directly revealed by the divine personages to whom they refer. It is, however, an undeniable fact (and one which the Fathers were by no means bashful in pointing out) that the name ἄγνωστος does not itself occur in Scripture. If Eunomius was working within a tradition which attached great importance to the fact that divine names were directly revealed, it is strange that he would adopt a name not explicitly attested by the revelation itself. Moreover, we find that Origen states quite explicitly that there is one name of God for ever, δὲ. Since Eunomius was undoubtedly working within a similar tradition, we may well ask ourselves why he did not make use of a name more clearly designated by Scripture than any other as the name of God? The best place, then, to begin our study of Eunomius' understanding of the divine

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\[460e2+\text{Ibid. 9 (18v, 3-15).}\]
\[461\text{supra pp. 232-236.}\]
\[462\text{supra pp. 232-236.}\]
\[463\text{Iamb., Myst. VII, 4; 254, 16-18 (Places 191).}\]
\[464\text{Gr. Nyss., Eun. II (11, 317, 4-24).}\]
\[465\text{or. 24, 2 (SCS II, 354, 8-10).}\]
\[466\text{supra pp. 234-236.}\]
name will be with his actual exegesis of Exodus 3: 1-14, the story of the burning bush.

We will be somewhat hindered in this course by the fact that Eunomius' exegesis of this passage is (as so often) only fragmentarily preserved. Nonetheless, sufficient remains to enable us to reconstruct the main lines of the argument. It is clear that, in keeping with his own assertion that it was the Son who was τῶν θεόν τοῦ νόμου κατ' ἐπιταγήν τοῦ σιωνίου ἐκού, Eunomius believed that it was the Only-begotten God who appeared to Moses in the bush, and he therefore used this account as an opportunity to discuss the divine hierarchy. Specifically, he took note of the fact that the subject of the theophany is described as an Angel in Exodus 3: 2 but as Lord and God everywhere else to reach the conclusion that the Son is the Angel of the God who is over all, but is himself the God of everything else. Thus, when the Son says, Ἔγω εἰμί καὶ ἐγέρση (Exodus 3: 14), he does so not in his own person, but as the Angel of the highest God—he does not appropriate this name to himself. The name itself is the particular attribute and dignity of the Father, and is τῇ κατα τὴν μόνη κατ' ἐξίμαν διελεύσθην ἐπανομήν. There seems no question, then, that Eunomius regarded this name as of
pre-eminent importance, and also in some sense uniquely the name of God.

This, however, leaves us with the problem of the δέωντος. Where does it come from, and on what is it established? Part of the answer, of course, is that it is self-evident and has no need of proof. Even Eunomius' Orthodox opponents made no demur to this; what they objected to was the use Eunomius made of it, and the fact that it was not found in holy Scripture—Basil, indeed, was prepared on these grounds to ban its use altogether. There was no way, of course, that Eunomius could deny that δέωντος was not found explicitly in holy Scripture, but in view of the importance of the concept for his system, it would be surprising indeed if he thought it had no basis in Scripture at all. Moreover, at the beginning of his argument concerning the δέωντος in the Apology, he starts not only from the προσκυνεῖν Εὐσελού but from τὴν τῶν πατέρων διασφαλίας, which implies a concern to base his teaching on that of the men "who have interpreted Scripture rightly." Granted this is so, however, in what context are we to understand it? Taking into account our earlier conclusions on the place of reason in Eunomius' system, a possibility is

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471 Em., apol. 7 (15*, 9-17).
472 Basil, Em., I, 5 (PG 29, 516B-C).
473 Ibid. (PG 29, 517A).
474 At least, his argument against Basil as transmitted by Gregory made no mention of it: Em., apol. apol. I (I I, 186, 3-10; 188, 188-189, 11; 192, 20-193, 1, etc.).
475 Em., apol. 7 (14*, 10-19).
476 supra pp. 142-146.
suggested by the example of the corresponding term, γέννημα.
Eunomius says that τὰς τῶν ἀγίων φωνὰς describe the Son both as γέννημα and ποίημα.477 and later on he specifically says that γέννημα is κατὰ τὴν τῶν γραφῶν ὑποσχαλίαν.478 It is difficult to believe that he thought that the Scriptures actually used these words of Christ. The New Testament, for instance, uses the word γέννημα only to describe the "generation of vipers" (Matt. 8: 7; 12: 34; 28: 33; Lk. 3: 7), while ποίημα occurs only twice (Rom. 1: 20; Eph. 2: 10), in neither instance referring to Christ. None of the examples of the word in the Old Testament seem likely to explain Eunomius' assertion. If, in spite of this, Eunomius was still prepared to describe his use of the word γέννημα as κατὰ τὴν τῶν γραφῶν ὑποσχαλίαν, it must have been because he included within the scope of that phrase not only what is "read therein," but what "may be proved thereby." This is entirely in accordance with our earlier conclusions about the positive function of reason in the elucidation of revelation. Presumably starting from those passages which speak of the begetting of the Son (e.g., Ps. 2: 7; Matt. 1: 16; Lk. 1: 35; Jn. 18: 37, etc.), he came to the conclusion that the Son could properly be called γέννημα. Similarly, basing his reasoning on some such passage as Acts 2: 36, he was able to conclude that the Son might also be called ποίημα. Thus, in Eunomius' view the fuller meaning

477 Eun., apost. 12 (21, 16-20).
478 Ibid. (22, 3-5).
discovered by investigation is itself part of Scripture. If this is so, it would be reasonable to suppose that \( \Delta \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \gamma \iota \sigma \) is based on a similar line of reasoning. In such a case, however, we ought to be able to identify the passage or passages on which it is based. There is at least one we can rule out from the beginning. Eunomius could not have derived his teaching from an analysis of the word "Father," since he quite clearly understands the two words to be in opposition.\(^{479}\) The only really likely passages of Scripture from which Eunomius could have derived his teaching are those which assert the unicity of God, and this is confirmed by the fact that Eunomius begins his discussion of the \( \Delta \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \gamma \iota \sigma \) with the statement that "God is one."\(^{480}\) It was in drawing out the full implications of this teaching that Eunomius was enabled to reach the conclusion that God is \( \Delta \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \gamma \iota \sigma \). In keeping with his own view on the value of investigation in the interpretation of Scripture, he would have regarded this conclusion as no less the teaching of Scripture than the assertion that "God is one" itself. Thus, like \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \mu \alpha \), \( \Delta \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \gamma \iota \sigma \) is \( \pi \tau \o \tau \iota \nu \gamma \aleph \omega \delta \iota \alpha \varepsilon \tau \alpha \mu \lambda \iota \nu \), and genuinely the authentic revelation of God.

If we may take it as reasonably certain, then, that Eunomius regarded the \( \Delta \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \gamma \iota \sigma \) as based on Scripture even if not explicitly mentioned there, the question still remains as to how this name is related to that of \( \delta \varepsilon \nu \). Part of the answer is readily

\(^{480}\) Eun., apol. 7 (14*, 16).
We noted earlier that some words are synonyms, i.e., they refer to an identical object despite their external differences. In one of the chapters of the Apology, Eunomius applies this principle to the various designations of God:

Τὰ δὲ πολλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐκφώνησιν μεχρισμένα τὴν ἁγίαν ἔχει σημασίαν, δὴ τῷ ὑπὸ καὶ μόνος Ἀληθινὸς Θεός. 482

"On the other hand, there are many words which are different in their verbal meaning but which have the same signification—such as 'I AM' (Exod. 3:14), and 'Only true God' (Jn. 17:3)."

If Ἀληθινὸς is really a proper designation of God, it must be like the others in being synonymous with other such designations. The reason for this is undoubtedly that which moved Origen to describe ὁ ὅτι as the unique name of God: because it applies to a changeless and absolutely singular being. 483 If other names are to be applied to such a being, they can only be taken as synonymous, for they refer to that which is utterly simple. If this, however, is part of the answer, there are indications that the matter is more complicated than we might suppose. We find, for instance, that there are a number of passages which seem to imply a deeper significance for ὁ ὅτι than simply a synonym for other divine names. Thus, we are told that God is Ἀληθινὸς ὁ ὅτι εἶναι ὁ ἐστιν ἀι ναὶ διακρίνεται, 484 and find that the "debt which of all others is most due God" is τῦν τοῦ εἶναι ὁ ἐστιν ὑπολογίαν. 485

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481 E. supra p. 132ff.
482 Eun., apol. 17 (27*, 26-29).
483 Or., or. 24, 2 (GCS 11, 284, 8-10).
484 Eun., apol. 17 (15*, 21-23).
This clearly suggests that δ'ω played a greater role in Eunomius' system than simply being one of the synonyms for the Only true God. Moreover, Eunomius' apparent conviction that Hebrew was the chosen vehicle of divine revelation, together with the prominence given this name in tradition both Jewish and Christian makes it difficult to believe it occupied any other than a central position. Finally, we may remark that, while the various names of God must indeed be synonyms in that they refer to a single divine essence, there would be no necessity for them at all if their various surface meanings did not in some way convey to us different aspects of the same underlying reality. All of this goes to show that if we have found part of the answer, we have not found all of it. Perhaps the best place to begin will be to try to place this question within the larger context of Eunomius' claim to know the essence of God.

We have already seen that there is no question that Eunomius claimed in some sense to know the essence of God, and that this claim was related to his theory of language. What we need to consider now are the further claims which Eunomius made about this knowledge. This brings us back to a series of passages which we examined earlier in connection with our study of Eunomian literature. Chief among them is a passage said by Socrates to be a verbatim quotation of Eunomius. The pertinent section is as

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486v. supra pp. 228-230.
487v. supra pp. 17-22.
"God has no more knowledge about his own essence than do we, nor is that essence better known to him and less to us; rather, whatever we ourselves know about it is exactly the same as what he knows, and conversely, that which he knows you will find without change in us."

What is essentially the same teaching is found in Epiphanius and Theodoret, as well as in John Chrysostom and Ps.-Athanasius. In our earlier discussion we came to the conclusion that the tradition in the form found in Socrates and Theodoret was that most likely to represent something which Eunomius could have said. This is confirmed by the similar information given in Chrysostom and Ps.-Athanaseus. In this form, the tradition portrays Eunomius as claiming to know the essence of God (and not necessarily God himself) as well as God knows it himself. At the time, we left the question of authenticity in abeyance because, despite the fact that we could find no evidence on literary grounds to doubt it, the content of the doctrine itself seemed difficult. Having now, however, reached a point in our study where we have seen that Eunomius claimed to know the essence of God in some sense, the

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question resolves itself into one of whether he could have claimed to do so in this sense. Presumably, we would have our answer if we could but find a philosophical or religious background against which to understand so apparently audacious a claim. The question is, however, is there such a background? It seems there is. One of the fundamental preoccupations of later Platonic philosophy is described by R. T. Wallis as follows:

"A primary aim of the Middle Platonic tradition had been to restate the far from conclusive arguments of the Phaedo and Phaedrus in a more systematic and less vulnerable form. The results . . . became the common property of the European metaphysical tradition. Perhaps most influential among them were Phaedrus 245-6's conception of the soul as self-moved, and hence inherently endowed with life . . . and Phaedo 78B's argument that the soul is without parts, and hence indissoluble . . . The dependence of the Neoplatonists' notion of auto-constitution on Plato's doctrine of self-motion is obvious enough; their development of the Phaedo argument is more complicated. That incorporeal substances must be indivisible followed for a Neoplatonist from their power of self-contemplation; for as Platonists, accepting the Sceptical challenge had argued, only beings entirely without parts are capable of such contemplation. Hence, Porphyry had maintained, self-knowledge is possible only to those powers, like Intelligence, which have no bodily concomitants and are thus entirely free from spatial division."493

That such a doctrine could provide a plausible context in which the doctrine ascribed to Anomius by Socrates and Theodoret might be understood is already suggested by the fact that the Heresiarch made use of just this passage from the Phaedrus in his own discussion

of the generation of the Son. As a Christian, Eunomius felt obliged to reject the doctrine of the eternity of matter, and to assert the created status of intelligible beings. Since one of the major tenets of his system was that even the Son was begotten of the Father, this doctrine of the eternity of matter, none of those entities which were the main concern of the non-Christian Neo-

platonists could in fact be capable of self-contemplation. Thus, there remained only one being capable of genuine self-knowledge, one who was \( \text{ἀνάρχος} \) \( \text{ἀτόμος} \) \( \text{ἀτελεύτης} \) \( \text{μόνος} \) - o b i n t h e n o b i o s t o n k a s t o n ἓσσε ἐν ἐρ χαρακτημένον ..., ἢ τοῦ εἴναι ἢ ἐστὶν ἀνερ-

ωτιστάμενον. The Only true God, \( \text{ὁ ὅς} \). In view of the obvious connection between Eunomius' theory of language and his claim to know the essence of God, these considerations not only provide a plausible background to the statements of Socrates and Theodoret, but go a long way toward explaining the meaning and function of \( \text{ὁ ὅς} \) in his system. It seems, then, that there is a strong probability that the doctrine ascribed to Eunomius by Socrates and others was genuinely his.

If this gives us the beginning of an answer to our problem, it still leaves us with the question of the sense in which Eunomius

\[491^{*}\text{Eun}, \text{apol. apol. III (II II, 224, 5-14), v. supra pp. 132-133.}\]
\[492^{*}\text{Eun}, \text{apol. 16 (27*, 2-6); exp. fid. 54*, 21-23.}\]
\[493^{*}\text{Eun}, \text{apol. 10 (19*, 12-17).}\]
\[494^{*}\text{Ibid. 12 (22*, 11-12).}\]
\[495^{*}\text{Cf. Gregory of Nyssa's claim that Eunomius knew the Father better than the Son, Eun. I (I I, 160, 7-9).}\]
\[496^{*}\text{Eun. exp. fid. 53*, 21-23, 25.}\]
claimed to know the essence of God and the divine self-contemplation. The Fathers themselves had few doubts. They believed that Eunomius claimed that in knowing the ἄγεώντας, he knew the τί ἐστίν of God, 500 i.e., that he not only knew what God's nature is, but that he completely understood it as well. This is made abundantly clear from their polemic, and is in large part responsible for their contention that Eunomius claimed a purely natural knowledge of God. Epiphanius, for instance, in the passage with which we began this chapter, accused Aetius of claiming to know God "in the way one might know something visible or touchable with the hand." 501 Similarly, both Gregory of Nyssa 502 and Basil 503 used the argument against Eunomius to the effect that, since we cannot even understand the natures of created beings, we cannot possibly understand that of God. Again, John Chrysostom attacked the heresiarch by asking how, when even the angels and archangels are unable to withstand the vision of God, a mere man can claim to do so? 504 All of these arguments presume that Eunomius not only claimed to know the identity of the divine essence, but that he claimed to comprehend it as well. The same presumption has become the common standpoint from which most

500 cf., e.g., Basil, En. I, 12 (PG 29, 540/448A); also (Ps.) Basil, En. V. 2 (PG 29, 752B-C), quoted above pp. 135-136, and cf. comments pp. 138-139.
501 cf. supra pp. 121-122.
503 Basil, En. I, 12-13 (PG 29, 540C-544A).
modern critics have approached the problem. Franzelin, for instance, attempted to understand Eunomius' position on the basis of the Scholastic distinction between the universal act of being as known to us by way of abstraction, and the positive vision of the divine perfection given to us by grace:

"Ultima nimirum radix erroris Eunomianorum in societ, quod Deum putarent illud esse univans et abstractum, quod primum a nobis concipiatur, et sub cuius ratione intelligimus, quidquid intelligimus. Noius esse abstraeti simplicitas negativa cum non sit posita in infinitate perfectionis, sed in abstractione ab omni perfectione determinata, relicta salioet unica simplicissima notione "esse" in oppositione ad non esse; sana hoc tale esse adeque comprehendimus, et longe perfectius quam nosmetipso, ut illi aiebant."

What is virtually the same argument, based on the idea of the abstract simplicity of the divine being and stripped of Franzelin's Scholastic terminology, is found in the Protestant theologian, J. A. Dorner:

"If the divine essence is nothing more than the abstractly simple independence of the primitive, fixed, ungenerated Monad; and if, by applying this meagre category to the idea of God, all higher categories are anticipatorily excluded, it is a small or even a trivial thing thoroughly to know such a God."

Both these arguments are framed to explain not only that Eunomius knew the identity of the divine essence, but that he also understood

that essence completely. The same can be said of the approach taken by F. Diekamp to this problem:

"Wenn nämlich das abstract einfache δυ oder διέγενετο das Wesen Gottes vollkommen ausdrückt, so bleibt nur die Alternative, das Wesen der Gottheit für vollkommen begreiflich oder für ganz unerkennbar zu erklären. Wer Gott nicht begreift, kennt ihn gar nicht; wer aber durch das logische Denken zu seiner Kenntniss gelangt ist, kennt ihn auf die denkbar vollkommenste Weise und ist berechtigt, mit den Eunomianern sich zu rühmen, er kenne Gott so gut, wie Gott sich selbst kenne."\(^{507}\)

All of these authors have concentrated on the divine simplicity as a means of understanding Eunomius' teaching, and in doing so are undoubtedly partially correct. We note, however, that in each case Eunomius' knowledge of the divine simplicity is assumed to be a purely natural one, derived from rational argument and logical analysis. Since our own study has revealed that Eunomius' use of such argument is far more complicated, it is interesting that there is another tradition of interpretation which places far more emphasis on his use of revelation. This approach was first adopted by D. Petavius,\(^{508}\) and subsequently developed by J. M. Piccirelli.\(^{509}\) What is interesting from the standpoint of our present problem, however, is that these authors too, despite


some differences, take Eunomius' meaning to be that he understood not only the identity of the divine nature, but comprehended it as well, even if only abstractly. Thus Piccirelli says:

"Verum, quamvis hoc ita sit, convenit fere apud plurimos, haereticos istos non somniasse propriam dictam visionem intuitivam divinae essentiae; sed perfectam solam eam cognitionem abstractivam, vi cuius de re simplicissima et quae tota in hoc, quod ingenita sit, consistat, non solum propria scientia scirent: quod sit, sed etiam: Quid sit, ac ipsam prorsus comprehenderent."\(^{510}\)

Even though Piccirelli differs from Franzelin and others in not ascribing to the heretics the *visionem intuitivam divinae essentiae*, he nonetheless believes that the abstract knowledge of that essence which they do claim involves not only the *quod sit*, but the *quid sit* as well. It seems, then, that there is a consistent tradition among both the ancient and modern interpreters of Eunomius that in claiming to know the identity of the divine essence he claimed to know what God is as well. The question which now faces us is whether that is in fact so, and what Eunomius did mean when he claimed to know the essence of God.

Our task is by no means an easy one. Eunomius' surviving works make it abundantly clear that he claimed a knowledge of the divine essence. Unfortunately, the arguments found in these works are all part of an attempt, whether for apologetic or other reasons, to expound the true nature of the Godhead. They do not

\(^{510}\) Piccirelli, *op. cit.*, no. 298, p. 337.
attempt to deal with the full implications of knowledge of the divine essence, or with its subjective value for the individual. Moreover, we cannot hope to overcome this defect by appealing to the general Arian background of Eunomius' thought, for it is abundantly clear that this is one of the respects in which Eunomius differed radically from his predecessor. Arius had taught that the Logos neither saw nor knew the Father ἔλειψεν καὶ ἐφήβασκε, but only ἀναλάμψει τοῖς θειοίς μέτροις. Thus, although the Son's knowledge of the Father reflects the eminence of his position in the created order, he no more than any other creature understands him completely. This position was sharply rejected by the Eunomians. Philostorgius criticized not only Eusebius Pamphylius, but Arius himself ὅτι ἐγνώτω τὸ τὰν θεῖν καὶ ἀνεκτίθην θανάτου καὶ ἀνευνμόνον εἰσαχθεῖ τα. While this makes clear in an emphatic manner the importance of this doctrine for Eunomius, it also means that we can safely rely only on acknowledged Eunomian sources to understand it. Since none of the writings of Eunomius himself are likely to help us unequivocally, we are left with more peripheral sources and particularly the Clementine Recognitions. It is fortunate, then, that the Eunomian section of this document does indeed deal with this problem.

In our examination of the interpretations of Eunomius' teaching

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511 Ath., Ap. I, 6 (PG 26, 244A).
512 Philost. h.e. I, 2 (GCS 6, 1-5).
513 Ibid. II, 3 (GCS 14, 1-9); cf. also X, 2 (GCS 126, 14-127, 2).
made by both ancient and modern scholars we saw that there was a general consensus that what Eunomius meant when he claimed to know the divine nature was that he not only knew its identity, but that he also understood what it is. It is therefore all the more interesting that in the *Clementine Recognitions* this is specifically denied:

**LATTIN:**

"sine principio igitur dicimus deum ineffabili providentia demonstrante; non a se ipso factus est nec a se ipso genitus; est enim sine principio et ingenitus. ingeniti autem appellatio non quid sit, nobis intelligere dat, sed quod non est factus; autopoietae vero aut autogenetum, hoc est ipsum sibi patrem ipsumque sibi filium qui vocaverunt illud quod est ingenitum, contumeliam facere conati sunt dubilis deserviente rationibus." 14

**SYRIAC:**

"We say, therefore, that God is without beginning, as with incorruptible care we go forward step by step and draw near to him; he is not the cause of himself nor yet the begetter of himself, for he is without beginning and is unbegotten essence. And this unbegotten does not bring us to understand what he is (οὗ τὸ τι ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἄφθος, but rather that he did not come to be. And those who call the unbegotten essence 'Father of itself' and 'begetter of itself' dare to falsify it, and are enslaved by sickly notions and thoughts." 15

This passage contradicts all of the traditional interpretations of Eunomius' meaning. Not only does it deny that he knows the τι ἐστιν of God, but it teaches us that the ἀγέννητος tells us not what God is, but what he is not! The question is, does it also contradict the teaching of Eunomius himself? At first

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51*Euseb.* *Recog.* III. 3, 7-8 (GC5 II, 97, 5-12).
51b*ibid.* (TU 43, 3 [1937], 156, 30-158, 3).
sight it certainly seems to. In his first Apology, Eunomius specifically tells us that ἄγέννητος is not privative:

δ ἐξ θεοῦ ... ἢ τι καὶ ξένην ἄγέννητος. ἀλλὰ μὲν ὑμῖν ῥᾳδὶ κατὰ στέρεσιν · εἰ γε τἀν κατὰ φύσιν αἰ στερήσεις εἰς στερῆσις καὶ τὸν ἔκτον ἑκτεραῖ. οὐκ ἐδ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ τις τῷ θεῷ γέννῃς ὡς προτέραν ἐκχων ταῦταν εἰς στερησης γέγονε τὸ ἄγέννητος.516

"But God ... both was and is Unbegotten. He is not such, however, by way of privation. For if privatives are privatives with respect to the inherent properties of something, then they are secondary to their positives. But birth has never been an inherent property of God! He was not first begotten, and then deprived on this quality so as to become unbegotten!"

This appears to be a flat contradiction of the teaching of the Recognitions that the ἄγέννητος tells us not what God is, but what he is not. If we are to resolve the problem, the only solution will be to place it in a wider context—one which will, if possible, enable us to understand both statements more precisely. It seems that once again the Clementine Recognitions provides us with such a context, and the following passage may enable us to resolve our difficulty:

LATIN: SYRIAC:

"et Petrus animadvertens ait: Non modicum periculum est de eo, quod sine principio est, Ioci vel audire, vos vero pro desiderio eorum quae dicta sunt, in immensitatem immersae periclitamini; et"

"And Peter took notice and said: There is no little danger in talking about or hearing of that which is without beginning. But you, because of your pleasure in, and love for that which

516 Eun. apol. 8 (16*,4-13).
It is immediately obvious that the attitude of reticence in the face of the divine nature which this passage displays both compliments and confirms our own conclusions about Eunomius' attitude toward philosophical enquiry. What is more interesting, however, from the standpoint of our immediate problem is that the general context of this passage is quite clearly the same as that of the passage from the Apology quoted above. We note, for instance,

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that where the **Clementine Recognitions** tells us that God is not to be "honoured by a bare name," the Apology makes the assertion that he is not to be "honoured by a name based only on human invention."\(^519\) Moreover, both statements occur in the context of a discussion of the divine unity and this suggests that they have a common background. It ought to be possible, therefore, to use this background as a means of explaining the two apparently diametrically opposed statements under consideration. If we look at the passage from the Apology quoted above (p. 272), we note that it refers to the property of being unbegotten insofar as this is possessed by God himself. The introduction of a principle of formal logic into the argument is somewhat misleading, but a consideration of the general context reveals that this can only be an example of "contentual" logic, i.e., logic which in some way mirrors the structure of reality, and is not simply a summary of the rules of the art of thinking.\(^520\) Thus, Eunomius apparently shares with Proclus the tendency to make ontology the "projected shadow of logic."\(^521\) In denying that \(\delta\gamma\nu\nu\nu\upsilon\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\) is privative, then, Eunomius was not making a statement about the value of that word for human knowledge, but of its place in the life of God.

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\(^519\) *Clement. recogn.* III, 7, 4 (GCS II, 101, 11-12) // *Bn.*, apol. 8 (18-20).


The Clementine Recognitions, on the other hand, take precisely the opposite approach—they are dealing with the question of the value of the word ἀγέννητος for human knowledge. From this standpoint, ἀγέννητος tells us not what God is, but what he is not. Thus, despite apparent differences, the teaching of the two documents is in fact complementary. In view of the fact that these works clearly share a common background and context, this suggests that by employing information provided by both we should be enabled to clarify not only Eunomius’ understanding of the relationship between δ ἡν and ἀγέννητος, but the sense in which he claimed to know God. The test will be whether we can construct a self-consistent picture of his system on this basis which will enable us both to explain and understand the available evidence.

As recognized by almost all of the modern authors whom we examined earlier,522 the starting point must be the idea of divine simplicity. The nature of this simplicity is indicated by the Eunomian objection to the use of the terms autogenero and autogenes.523 A being which is truly ἀγέννητος can have no cause whatsoever, not even itself, but simply ἦν. Thus, δ ἡν is the supreme revelation of the divine unity and simplicity, and this enables us to explain the emphasis laid on the fact that God is

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522 supra pp. 266-269.
523 Clement. recogn. III, 3, 8 (GCS II, 97, 9), 4, 3 (GCS II, 98, 9); cf. Aetius, Syn. 36, where Bardy and Holl read ἀγεννητοσ ἦνος (GCS Epiphanius III, 359, 23); Wickham, Syntagma-tion, p. 514 is certainly right in reading ἀντὶ ἀγέννητος. Cf. his argument Ibid. pp. 568-569.
what he is.\textsuperscript{524} Acknowledgement of this fact is indeed τὸ παντιον ἀναγκαίον δομέμα τῷ θεῷ,\textsuperscript{525} for it is the response to God's fundamental revelation of himself as God. Hence, we can also understand Philostorgius' emphatic rejection of any assertion that God is ἄγνωστος, ἀκατάληπτος, ἀνενθίστος.\textsuperscript{526} As with Origen's denial that the divine power ἀπειρός any such doctrine would mean that one would have to say of that power that ἄναγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ἔστην νοστή, since τῷ γὰρ φόσον τὸ ἀπειρόν ἀκατάληπτον.\textsuperscript{527} Indeed, a God who is ἀκατάληπτος and ἀνενθίστος could neither know himself,\textsuperscript{528} or reveals himself to others. Philostorgius' denial of this is an integral part of his defence of the value of the Christian revelation, or indeed, of the possibility of any genuine revelation at all.\textsuperscript{529} God's name is both the vehicle and the guarantee of such a revelation. Because of the simplicity of his nature, God is indeed ὁ ὅν, and it is in knowing this that we know the divine self-contemplation. This is the sense in which you will find that which he knows of himself ἀπαραλλάκτις ἐν ἁμν.\textsuperscript{530} Obviously, names which apply to such a being can only be synonyms, drawing us back to that utterly simple nature. On the other hand, the

\textsuperscript{524}\textsuperscript{Pun.}, apol. 8 (15* 23); exp. fid. 53*, 25.\textsuperscript{525}\textsuperscript{Pun.}, apol. 8 (15* 21-22), supra p. 270.\textsuperscript{526}\textsuperscript{Gr. E. Ottis, "Cappadocian Thought as a Coherent System," DOP 12 (1958), p. 106: "...Eunomius... returned to Origen's doctrine of divine finitude...", though some of his other statements are less happy.}\textsuperscript{530}\textsuperscript{Gr. E. Ottis, "Cappadocian Thought as a Coherent System," DOP 12 (1958), p. 106: "...Eunomius... returned to Origen's doctrine of divine finitude...", though some of his other statements are less happy.}
mere fact that there are such synonyms suggests that they may have differing values for ourselves. If words do indeed bring us directly to the natures which they designate, how is it, then, that, knowing the name of God, we yet cannot claim to know his ρέσσια? A consideration of the philosophical background of this theory of language may enable us to provide an answer. When we looked at this theory as found in Iamblichus, we noted that one of the things it was chiefly designed to explain was the significance of divine names. These names, all of which had been revealed by the gods themselves, were of two kinds: those whose interpretation is known to us and those whose interpretation is not. The mere existence of the latter, then, shows that the inherent revelatory character of such names is not dependent on our knowing their meaning--Iamblichus himself remarks that in such cases they can only be unknown because they conceal a more excellent mystery. Proclus, indeed, goes so far as to compare words with the statues of the gods, so that they are in effect "statues in sound." In revealing the divine Name, God has chosen to give us not only a guarantee of the absolute character of revelation, but the perfect expression of his own nature, so that we may indeed "know what we worship" (Jn. 4: 22). The

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531 supra pp. 232-233
532 Tamb., myst. VII, 4; 254, 16-18 (Placae 191).
533 Ibid.; 255, 11-14 (Placae 192).
534 Procl., In Cra. 51 (Pasquali 19, 12-19).
full comprehension of that nature, however, remains as far beyond us as its simplicity is above us. By the providence of God, to know the divine name is to know the nature of God as God knows it himself, but the simplicity which makes such knowledge possible is itself beyond the capacity of our minds to fully understand, and is in that sense inexpressible (ineffable).\textsuperscript{536} We can place all of this in sharper focus if we remember the general philosophical purpose of the theory of language which underlies it. One of the criticisms levelled against Eunomius was that, since he could not fully comprehend even the natures of created things, he could hardly be expected to do so in the case of their Creator.\textsuperscript{537} Although Eunomius undoubtedly believed that even the names of created things were fully revelatory of their natures, it is difficult to believe that he thereby claimed to understand them fully. The purpose of this theory of language was surely not to claim an exhaustive knowledge of reality, but to make a knowledge of reality possible at all by guaranteeing the objective reference of words. We may note, indeed, that it was just such a purpose which moved the young Bertrand Russell to adopt a theory of the real value of words almost as radical as that of Eunomius himself.\textsuperscript{538} To claim that knowledge of God's name carries with it the full knowledge

\textsuperscript{536}Clement, \textit{recogn.} III, 7, 2 (GCS II, 101, 9).
\textsuperscript{537}E.g., Basil, \textit{Enu.} I, 12-13 (PG 29, 540C-544A); Grq. Nyss., \textit{Enu.} II (J I, 257, 26-262, 15).
of his essence in no way involves the claim to know exhaustively what God is—it is the guarantee that we can know him at all.

We can see, then, that so far from involving the introduction of a purely natural knowledge in the place of faith, Eunomius' claim to know the essence of God was in fact fundamental to faith, for it provided an ultimate guarantee for the validity of revelation. In this sense, it was the necessary correlate of the act of faithful acceptance which is at the root of all faith. The faithful soul is enabled by virtue of this acceptance to pursue the full meaning of the revelation in logical analysis and philosophical enquiry, and comes at last to the One who is the source of all things—not moved by any *ipsius essentiae curiositas*, but drawn on by him who is καταλήματα τῶν φυσικῶν δια τοῦ διακόσμου τουτοῦ καὶ τοῦ διασφαλίζουσα φωτός.

Thus, finally, by the power of the divine name the soul passes beyond the Son who was its "angel," and who is "the image and . . . the seal of the whole activity and power of the Almighty," to achieve at last the vision of that ultimate mystery who "loves to be honoured by silence:"

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539 *Clement. recogn. III, 7, 6 (GCS II, 101, 19).*
540 *Ibid. apol. apol. III (I II, 240, 13-14).*
541 *Ibid. (I II, 273, 24-274, 21-276, 4-7, 22-24).*
542 *Ibid. exp. fid. 5, 4-7.*
543 *Clement. recogn. III, 7, 8 (GCS II, 101, 21-22).*
"For the mind of those who have believed in the Lord, overpassing every sensible and intelligible essence, is by nature unable to stop even at the generation of the Son, but shoots beyond even that, striving to encounter the First in its yearning for everlasting life."

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CONCLUSION

At this point we must draw our study to a close, though with a consciousness that much remains to be done. Nonetheless, it is our hope that we have made a contributions to the understanding of this misunderstood and strangely neglected figure. The significance of Eunomius' doctrine of faith has been a recurrent problem since the seventeenth century, and, indeed, the increased interest of modern scholars in the mysticism and spirituality of the fourth century has made it a more important problem than ever. It is all the more remarkable, then, that there has been no real effort to explore this aspect of Eunomius' thought. In part this has been due to the many difficulties which stand in the way of such an investigation. As with any reconstruction based on fragmentary evidence, a necessary preliminary is the placing of that evidence in its proper historical and contextual framework. Moreover, the relatively small amount of available material means that a correspondingly greater importance must be attached to it, and some confidence in the integrity of its text must be achieved before conclusions can be drawn from it. It is our hope that our own textual and historical studies have contributed to the resolution of this problem, and enabled us to place the examination of the evidence on a firmer basis. Another problem which has undoubtedly contributed to the difficulty in understanding Eunomius' thought has been that, since almost all of the evidence is
provided by his adversaries, modern scholars have often (if unconsciously) adopted their presuppositions in examining him. In our own study, after discussing in some detail the objective basis of these presuppositions, we have been able to show that taking them at their face value must inevitably lead to distortions. In trying to look at the evidence with fresh eyes and from within, we have come to see that Eunomius' understanding of faith was not only far more varied and less rationalistic than usually supposed, but also in many ways far more intentionally Christian. If we cannot ignore the fact that this understanding was part of a system early condemned by the Church, no more can we ignore the equally apparent fact that for many of its contemporaries it represented a genuine and attractive Christian option. It is our hope that in attempting to study the various aspects of faith as they are found in the system of Eunomius, we have contributed to the understanding of that option.
There have been several attempts in this century to produce a critical text of the surviving works of Numonius. A French
Numonianum was projected early in this century by Milewowski-
Meullendorf,1 but never carried out. Likewise, Werner Jaeger
had intended to produce an edition of the Liber Apologiae in
connection with his own studies in the Apologiae Apologicae since
as he remarked, "editionem quae adSele exspectat saccatio-
ris librorum sec. non praebet.2 However, at the time of his
death this intention had still not been realized. More recently,
a critical edition of the Liber Numonius was planned by Per-
cardo Deiermann,3 but had to be abandoned for personal
reasons. The following edition of the two fully extant works of
Numonius, then, is an attempt to fill a long-standing need. If
we cannot but be aware of the great amount which remains to be
done, we can at least hope to have brought the desired goal one
step closer to fulfillment.

A. NUMONIE LIBER APOLLOGIAE.

Before we attempt to list the manuscripts on which our ed-

1 See E. Vander Laure, "La part de la dialectique dans la
theologie d'Numonius "de theologumus,"
77, n. 1.
2 W. Jaeger, Gregory Nazianzen Opera (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
3 See J. van Parra, Gregoire de Nazan. Deduction de la
profession de foi d'Antonius (unpublished thesis, Universite de
Appendix I:

OPERA QUAE PLENE EXSTANT EU'NOMII

There have been several attempts in this century to produce a critical text of the surviving works of Eunomius. A Corpus Eunomianum was projected early in this century by Willamowitz-Moellendorf, but never carried out. Likewise, Werner Jaeger had intended to produce an edition of the Liber Apologeticus in connection with his own studies in the Apologia Apologiae since, as he remarked, "editiones quae adhuc extant sinceram recensionem librorum mss. non praebent;" however, at the time of his death this intention had still not been realized. More recently, a critical edition of the works of Eunomius was planned by Bernard C. Barmann, but had to be discontinued for personal reasons. The following edition of the two fully extant works of Eunomius, then, is an attempt to fill a long-standing need. If we cannot but be aware of the great amount which remains to be done, we can at least hope to have brought the desired goal one step closer to fulfilment.

A. EU'NOMII LIBER APOLOGETICUS.

Before we attempt to list the manuscripts on which our edi-

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tion is based, a number of general comments need to be made about the means by which these manuscripts have come down to us. There was no incentive for Orthodox scribes to copy heretical literature unless they had some specific purpose in doing so. In the case of the Liber Apologeticus of Eunomius, this purpose was to illustrate the arguments of Basil of Caesarea in his refutation of it. This is made clear by the fact that several of our manuscripts (IGABOSV) call attention to the passages refuted by Basil by means of marginal notations. It is apparent, then, that the Liber Apologeticus has survived only because it was included in some manuscripts of the Adversus Eunomium of Basil. Since, as far as we have been able to determine, there are only two surviving manuscripts in which this is the case (CI), it is obvious that by no means all of the manuscripts of Basil's work contained the treatise of Eunomius. However, both these manuscripts belong to the same family of the manuscripts of Basil, that designated "Family Beta" by W. M. Hayes. It is a reasonable supposition that the remaining manuscripts, all of which transmit the treatise of Eunomius separately, ultimately derive from a lost or not yet identified member of this same family. This is confirmed by the evidence of the manuscripts themselves, for it is obvious that all of the separately transmitted manuscripts derive, directly or

indirectly, from a common exemplar. This leaves us with three distinct groups of manuscripts: two (consisting of one manuscript each) represent different branches of a family of manuscripts in Basil, and the third (by far the most numerous) consists of the various descendants of another such branch.

Because of the difficulties inherent in dealing with a tradition of this kind, we have not attempted to construct a stemma. Rather, in the following table of sigla we have included a brief comment on each of the manuscripts attempting to show the manuscript's distinctive features and its general relationship with respect to the others.

CONSPectus siglorum

Group I:

C  codex Parisinus (olim Colbertinus) graecus 965, ff. 1r-17v.
    saec. XI.

This manuscript, by far the oldest known to us, displays numerous unique readings, though most are minor orthographical variations. Some, however, are almost certainly correct. Some caution must be used in dealing with this manuscript since it is apparent that in a number of cases its readings have been conformed to those of the Adversus Eunomium of Basil which accompanies it. An early reader has added a series of highly uncomplimentary marginal comments, of which the following may be regarded as typical (f. 7r): ἄναθεμάτω τοι καὶ τῇ σφατικῇ. Likewise, ff. 17v-6v were at some point heavily annotated by one of the manuscript's earlier possessors (Colbert?) in Latin.

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5I am most grateful to Mr. Nigel Wilson of Lincoln College, Oxford for examining all of these manuscripts (as well as those of the Expositio Fidei) with an eye to verifying their dates and provenance. The suggested dates and indications of the possible identity of some scribes are based on his conclusions.
Group E:
codex Athous monasterii Iviron 376 (Lampros 4474), ff. 1r-15v. ut videtur, saec. XIV.

Although this manuscript has a number of unique readings, it also displays a sufficient number of agreements with GABMSV against C to show that it is not unrelated to the exemplar of group III.

Group III:
a. sub-group 1.

G codex Gudianus graecus 85, ff. 1r-9v. saec. XIV medii vel exeuntis.

This manuscript is by far the best representative of group III, although it agrees with C and I against ABMSV often enough to show that it derives from a different copy. This manuscript is apparently the codex Gudii which is the main basis of the printed edition.

b. sub-group 2.

General characteristics of this sub-group: All of the following manuscripts derive directly or indirectly from the same common exemplar, as witnessed by a series of readings in which they differ from C and G. With the exception of A (which is in a somewhat different category), these manuscripts also agree to a certain extent in their other contents. They possess the following treatises in common:

1. Hermiae Philosophi Irrisio Gentili, found in BMSV
2. Dialogus S. Basili et Gregorii Theologi, found in BSV
3. Mercurii Trismegisti poemander ad illium suum Tat, found in MS

It would be reasonable to suppose that some or all of these treatises were included in the common ancestor of this sub-group and that at that time the Liber Apologeticus was already circulating as part of a collection.

A codex Ambrosianus graecus C 255 inf., ff. 91r-100r. saec. XVI.

There is no question but that the main exemplar of this manuscript was a member of this sub-group. On the other hand, it also possesses a number of individual readings
which are not entirely limited to orthographical variations, and sometimes agrees with I and/or C against GBHSV. This suggests that the scribe also consulted another manuscript not belonging to this group, and that he occasionally introduced readings from that manuscript into his text. A possible confirmation of this is found in the colophon of this manuscript, which is unique. The scribe has underlined those words which have no counterparts in the other manuscripts of this group (BMSV): τέλος τοῦ ὄνοματος καὶ κολλάνης καλοκαιρίνου τοῖς μνήμονεσι.—A possible explanation is that the indicated words were added from another manuscript not belonging to the same group.

B codex Monacensis (sive Bavaria) graecus 512, ff. 1r-18v. saec. XV. Fortasse a manño Ioannis Scutaristes scriptus.

This manuscript has almost no individual readings (i.e., all of its special readings are those of its group or sub-group), although it does possess a few readings in common with M.

M codex Monacensis (sive Bavaria) graecus 58, ff. 294r-308v. saec. XVI.

This manuscript has numerous unique readings, most of them errors in orthography, none of any independent value.

S codex Vescionius Sequanorum graecus 408 (Suppl. Gr. D 13), ff. 141r-151v. saec. XVI.

This manuscript contains numerous errors of orthography and substance, and some omissions or transpositions. None are major, but none are of any independent value either.

V codex Vussianus graecus Q 13, ff. 22r-38v. saec. XVI.

This manuscript has some minor variations in orthography, though again none of any independent value. It is of interest chiefly because either it or its apograph T (see below) was apparently the source of the translation made by W. Whiston.

OTHER SIGLA:

D Excerpta quae in Basilii Adversus Eunomium libro inveniuntur.

Some caution must be exercised in using these quotations. Not only is it apparent that Basil was not always concerned with verbal accuracy, but the absence of a critical text makes it difficult to be confident of the readings. We have noted all significant variations, but have not included those which are obviously fortuitous or due to the requirements of Basil's syntax.

E Excerpta quae in Gregorii Nysseni Contra Eunomium libro inveniuntur.

Since there is good reason to believe that Gregory derived most of his quotations from the Adversus Eunomium of Basil, they are of value only for establishing the text of the latter. The only exceptions are those cases where Gregory cites a quotation of the Liber Apologeticus by Eunomius himself; in these cases we may be able to get behind the readings of the lost exemplar from which all our manuscripts ultimately derive.

V Textus vulgatus.

The vulgate text was originally established by J. A. Fabricius, and subsequently reprinted with some alterations by Migne (PG 30, 8361-8630). Reference in the critical apparatus is always to the latter except in those instances where the text in Migne is a mere misprint, in which case the discrepancy is noted by the siglum, √; underlined numbers in the margin refer to columns in Migne.

MANUSCRIPTS NOT USED IN THE APPARATUS:

O codex Vaticanus Ottobonianus graecus 112, ff. 16r-28r. saec. XVI (A.D. 1542-1543). Fortasse a collega Valeriani Albinini scriptus.

This manuscript came to my attention too late to be included in the edition. It clearly belongs with the sub-group

ABMSV. There are two hands, one that of the scribe, the other that of a corrector. The former is very similar to and possibly identical with that of S.

L  codex Lindenbrogiius graecus, Hamburg Cod. Theol. 1518 in 40. saec. XVII.

A direct copy of G with a facing Latin translation (that of Holsatius). This appears to be the Ms. Lindenbrogii used by V.

N  codex Parisinim suppl. graecus 270, ff. 272r-279v. saec. XVII.

A direct copy of V, as the Latin note on the opening folio informs us: ex cod. MSTi Isacii Vossii.

T  codex Tennysonius graecus, Lambeth 802, ff. 1-22v. saec. XVII.

Another direct copy of V, as a note on the final page (f. 22v) informs us: "Vossius a le manuscrit m... (forn) l'a fait copier." Immediately after this manuscript in the same volume comes a second copy with a facing Latin translation (not that of Holsatius); it is separately paginated (82 pages), and lacks chapters 1-5 and 28. The first copy (T) appears to be the Ms. Tennysonii used by V. Either this manuscript or V seems to have been the source from which Whiston made his translation (V. supra p. 6*, n. 6).

W  codex Gudianus graecus 100, pp. 1-147. saec. XVII.

A direct copy of G with facing Latin translation (that of Holsatius). I am informed by Dr. Wolfgang Milde, director of the library in which this manuscript is kept, the Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel, that another manuscript, codex Gudianus graecus 89, is a direct copy of W.

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8 In a personal letter dated 13 February 1974.
1. Since we can see that slandering or defaming anyone because of an unbridled tongue and ungrateful disposition is a work for knaves and wranglers, we can also see that (in those who are slanderingly reputed wicked) trying to repel the falsehood by argument is a work for prudent men, men who by their personal discretion set great store on the common welfare. We used to hope, indeed, that we could keep our knowledge of both these things verbal only, and having no part in the former, escape the trial of the latter as well. Events, however, did not turn out as we intended, for craftily and with varied cunning, both by words and actions and by a great many people, a lying allegation had been trumped up against us, not only painful

837 1. τὰ μὲν αὐθοποικεῖον καὶ αὐθαξιόλατρον τινὸς ἐκ ἀκόλουθου γλώττης καὶ γυμνὸς ἀγνώμονος
5 μοχθρόν καὶ φιλαπεχθημένων ἔργον ἐλάτος, τὸ δὲ τούτο ἐν δίασβολής εἶναι δόξαντες κονιόροις πέλερ προσώπως πεπέρασα τὸ φέρον τοις ἐλέγχους ἀποτρέπειν
10 ἀνδρόν σωφρόνων καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἱδρύς εὐκοιλίας τήν τῶν πολλῶν διάφανων περὶ πολλοῦ πολυμένων, πολυμέθεα μὲν λόγῳ τὴν γνώσιν ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντες, μήτε τῆς
15 προτέρας ποτὲ γενεσθαι μόρας καὶ τῆς ἀστέρας τῆς πεπέρας διάφανεν. ἔπειτ' ὡς μὴ κατὰ γνώμην ἔκβησιν συνέβη τὸ τέλος, πολυκλέας καὶ πολυκλέας διὰ τε
20 λόγων καί πράξεως παρὰ πολλοῦς καταπαύσασθαι ἡμῶν φθείρους διασφαλίας, ἀλλ' εὐγενεῖς μὲν ἐκους πλαζόμεναι δὲ τοις πιστεύομεν, ἢττο τῶν τοινκαὶ μηδὲν
25 δικαστῶν πένθος γ' ἐπέτευρ


Tit. GAMSV post εὐνομίαν add τοῦ δυσεπεῖος. GAMSV post Ἀπολογιτικὸς add πρὸς νὰ ἔγραφε τοῦς ἀντιρρητικῶς δὲ μέγας, Basilius, sed νὰ habet ἔγραφεν ἀντιρρητικόν. Cf. tit. Eunomii Apologiae secundae. Ἐνάρ τῆς ἀντιρρητικῆς, εὐνομίας, at Basilii Run. I, 2 (PG 29, 501B, C, 504A, B, 505A, B) III, 1 (PG 29, 503B), Gregorii Nissii, Run. I (J 13, 14, 2; 45, 5-6) atque Philostorgii h.e. VIII, 12 (GCS 114, 2, 17); fortasse pro Ἀπολογιτικῆς: Ἀπολογία legendum est. Post titulum νὰ add monitium sequentem a margine manuscripti s ablatum: ὡθεῖς δ' ἐρώτησας αὐτός, τὸν εὐνομίαν δ' ἐγγυώμενον, ἐὰν ἴσως εἰς τὸν ἀντιρρητικὸν τοῦτον πιστεύειν.
to ourselves, but harmful to those who believed it—an allegation concocted by the kind of good-for-nothings who won't scruple to say or do anything, and taken up by the simpler sort, who, measuring truth by partisan accusations, accepted without judgment the slanders against us. Because of these things, we have thought to profit ourselves by way of apology, and those who without due examination have accepted these charges by way of caution, in setting out for you a profession of our sentiments in writing. Perhaps by this means we can turn back this blasphemy (even where it has already been accepted), and, for the rest, may be able to make the wicked less daring and the reckless more cautious, demonstrating the ineptitude of those who spread the lie, and teaching caution to those who believe it. Thus, in showing the truth of our own position, we shall also demonstrate what correction is due them both, for fellowship in a common lie will work in both a common retribution.

2. We particularly desire, therefore, both you who are about to hear us at this time, as well as any who may come across this
work later, not to distinguish truth from falsehood by numbers, confusing the better with the more numerous part, nor so to take into consideration some people's reputation or boastfulness that you dim your own understanding thereby, nor to ascribe so much to the position of earlier speakers that you shut your eyes to those who come after. Rather, you should honor the teaching of our Saviour Jesus Christ above any mere number of men, above every consideration of dignity or love of rivalry, indeed, above every relation and kindness, or to put it briefly, above anything which darkens the soul's power of judgement; honoring it by giving judgement on what is said with a partiality for the truth—for the greatest part of the discarnment of truth is to adopt her as one's own.

3. In addition to this we ask you not to deal harshly with us, ignoring arrogance and fear, we prefer the assurance of things to come to any present favor or security, and if we reckon the threats leveled against the ungodly more fearful than any earthly suffering or temporal death, and so lay out unveiled the naked truth. For, as the Apostle says, the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed, nor is the whole world with all
κόσμος προς ἀπόλυσιν καὶ ὀσσοποτείναι ἱδορόν ἀντάλλαγμα τῆς ἱδέας ἑκάστου ψυχῆς, οὐδὲν ἀνάτερον ἀπόλλυσιν τοι καὶ κόσμων ὑπερβαλλόντων τὰ παρόντα τῶν προσδοκώμενον.

4. 'Αλλ' ἔνα γε μὴ τούτοις ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐνδυατρίβοντες πέρα τοῦ μέτρου μικρόνισμον τοῦ λόγου, ἣν τοῦτον ἐριν ἔκατον, ἐπὶ λόγον ἰδιωτικόν καὶ ἀπλάνοιαν ὑπερβαλλόντων τὰ παρόντα τῶν προσδοκώμενον.

5. Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἑναθεόν πατέρα παντοκράτορα, εἷς ὁ πάντα, τούτων πάντων ἡμῶν κυρίων ἐπισκόπου, ὁ δ' ὁ πάντα παράκλητον, ἐν θαυμάσιοι ἑναθεὸς ἐκείνου, τοῦ παράκλητον, ἐν θαυμάσιῳ οὐδάμαν σεῖς καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἄλλοι τοῖς ἂντεις ἐκείνοις ἐκείνων ἔκατον, συνεχείς ἀρχαίοις κριτήρια πρὸς τὴν παραδοσίαν ἐπικρίνειν.

25 5. We believe in one God, the Father almighty, from whom are all things.

5. But not to waste further time on these things and unduly prolong the discourse, let us turn to that very confession of faith by which those who wish to do so may acquire a convenient and easy knowledge of our opinion. For it behoves those who are to discourse of such things and to present an account of their thought not to surrender heedlessly to the opinions of the many, but rather to set forth that pious and ruling tradition which has come down from the fathers as a kind of norm or rule, and to give that out as the exact standard by which to judge what is said:


3. tov AEK. 6 προσδοκώμενον S. 8 πέρα : παρά S. 12 ἀν τοις : συνεχείς S. 17 μὴ : καὶ C. 18 οἰκείοις V. 19 ἐκ : παρά b. 22 προειστευόμενος C. προειστευόμενον b. 23 συνεχείς ὁμ b.; χρησμοῦ b. 29 τῷ πρὸς υἱὸν add by. 33 τῇ Ch.
χήρωτος διανομή κατά τὴν συμ-
μετρίαν πρὸς τὸ συμβέβηκεν ἐκάστο γίότος τῶν ἀγίων.

6. 'Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπλουστέρα καὶ
5 κοινὴ πάντων πίστες βάσει τὸ δο-
κέν ἥ τοῦ εἰνά τροχεῖος ἐπί-
μελέτη (ὅς ἐν ἐπιθρόμη κεφαλαίω-
δέστερον εἰπετον) ἀπήτη, λειτομένων
ἐτὶ τῶν δευτέρων ὑπὸ διὰ τὸ τέως
10 ἀναμφοβήτητον παρέσχειν ήγοδέμα
τὴν μνήμην. ήμετ' ε' ἦν μὲν ἐφάρμο-
μέν ἐπάνογκες εἰναὶ τοὺς ἁπα-
τὰς φωνὰς παραδεχαμένης ἀπαρα-
τητον συνειδάσκετον τοῖς δυνάμαι
15 τὴν ἀληθὴ διάνοιαν. ἡ τοῦ ἡμᾶς
ἀτελείας γραψὶ τραφεροῦσα μετὰ
841 τὴν διαλογίαν ταύτην ἐλευθέρους
ἀφίέντας τῶν ἐγκλημάτων καθαρι-
οῦσας αὐτῶν τὴν διανοίας πάσης
20 καὶ μήν πουράς ἰδιοκοὶς, ταυ-
τὸν ὄρον καὶ πέρας τῶν ἱδιῶν ἦν
ἐπανασέμαθα λόγων, ἀπαλή τὴν
ὑσυχίαν ἢμεν ἐγγυομένης τῆς δια-
λογίας. ἐπειδὴ δὲ μὴ εἶτε διὰ
25 κανόνιον τὴν γὰρ γνώσης κοινωrick
ἐτέρων παρατρέπειν καὶ διαφέρεται
ἐν τῇ ἐνοικίᾳ ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀπάθηνες
πρὸς πίστις τῆς ἐκκλησίας (οὐ γὰρ
ἀν Σαβάσσων ὁ ἀβύθος καὶ Μάρκελος
30 δ' ἡ Παλάτθη καὶ Φωτείνης ή τις ἄλλος
τῶν τὴν αὐθεντὸς μὲν τοὺς με-
νέντων συλλόγων ἠρατικῶν καὶ κο-
νοικίας μυστηρίων καὶ περιβλώ
κηλισταστικών ἐργοῦτο) μὴ δὲ
35 ἢμεν ἢμεν γὰρ ὁποῖος ἢμεν τῶν ἐγκλῆμα-
τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, ἀλλὰ δεῖς τινών
the distribution of all grace
according to that measure
which is expedient for each
of the saints.

6. This then (to speak sum-
marily and more generally) is
that simpler faith which is com-
mon to all who are concerned
either to appear or to be Chris-
tians—though leaving off those
secondary matters which, because
they are thus far undisputed, we
have decided not to mention. In-
deed, if we could see that those
who had once taken in the sounds
necessarily preserved with the
terms their true signification
undisturbed, or that once we had
presented this confession those
brining the indictment of im-
piety against us would let us go
free of these charges, their
minds cleansed of evil suspicions,
we would have made this the mea-
sure and term of our own words,
the confession itself being a
pledge of safety and peace. In
fact, however, such a confession
is neither capable of bringing to
a belief in the truth those who
through illwill or any other fail-
ure of judgment have set about
to pervert or distort its signifi-
cance, nor does it suffice us for
the destruction of these conten-
tious accusations (for if it were
able to convince such people,
Neither Sabellius the Libyan, nor Marcellus the Galatian, nor Photinus, nor indeed any of those who join them in their mad rage would ever have seceded from the priesty assemblies, or from the fellowship of the sacraments, or from the ecclesiastical precincts; rather, some more exact words are needed to elucidate the meaning. We shall try then, insofar as we are able, to bring such opinions as we may hold out into the open. Either we shall first set out the text of the confession, and then disclose its meaning, or, first setting out the meaning, we shall then link it to the spoken words—nor will this change of order distort the truth, but will provide us with a method clearly sufficient for our own defence and for the refutation of our accusers.

Thus, in accordance both with the conception natural to all men and the teaching of the fathers, we confess that God is one, neither created by his own act nor by that of any other, each of these being equally impossible: in fact the maker must pre-exist that which is made, just as the thing made must be secondary to its maker; nothing can exist before or after itself, and nothing at all before God. Shouldn't it be obvious that the one who existed before the other must have been the one to have the dignity of the Godhead?


1 τῆς om M, add in marg. 2 τιμωρων V. 3 ματαίων V. 4 ένηγέν ἐν V. 5 εχοντες S. 6 μπρος πιεντες CG; προσπιεντες IA. 16 τοίνυ V; τῆς ante φυσικήν add A. 23 γενομένου sic DV; γενομένου mess. 26 δε αὐτὸ lv. 28 ή IGAMV; ή S.
Anything that can truly be said to have come into existence by the action of something else has itself to be placed among created beings and must properly be ranked among those which have come into existence by the action of God. Well then, if it has been demonstrated that neither he himself nor anything else existed before him, then he must be before all things! What follows from this is the Unbegotten—rather that he is Unbegotten essence. It will seem unnecessary and prolix to some to work up an argument for what is commonly acknowledged, as though there were any doubt. There isn't. But because of those who think it wisdom to contest the obvious, or who have readied their slanders and objections, some more exact remarks are necessary.

8. When we speak of "the Unbegotten," however, we do not imagine that we ought to honour him by a name based merely on human invention. On the contrary, we are speaking in accordance

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3 ταύτητοι Μ. 3/4 "Αρ’ οὖν δ. 4 ει μήτε : ετείς τε CARMSS; μήτε : μήτε δ. 7 αποκλεισθ. : ετείς ad I I, 214, 21/22 habet & sed ad I I, 215, 13 παρέκκειαι legitur. Procul dubio haec verba sunt a Basilii refutatione ablata, ubi Basilius verbo ἐπάμενοι utatur, I I (PG 29, 517C-520A); ἀγέννων CE.

8 αύτν μ. 8/2 ἀγέννως I. 10 παρέκκεια A, sed o inter linneas insertur. 14 φερέα A. 19 κατεπράσπολον S.

20 ομογένες C. 21 αποτελέον. . .
17


2. μόνον ότι τῷ super lineam additur C. 3 ἐγώστας S.


with reality and must repay that debt which of all others is most due God: the confession that he is what he is. For sayings based on invention have their existence in name and utterance only, and by their nature are dissolved along with the sounds themselves; but God—whether such sounds are silent, sounding, or have even come into existence, and before anything was created—both was and is Unbegotten. He is not such, however, by way of privation. For if privatives are privatives with respect to the inherent properties of something, then they are secondary to their positives. But birth has never been an inherent property of God! He was not first begotten, and then deprived of this quality so as to become unbegotten! Indeed, if to say that God has been deprived of anything at all is impious in the extreme as being destructive of the true notion of God and his perfection (or rather, destructive
of the minds of those who invent such a thing), obviously it must be impious to say so with respect to something pertaining to his nature. For no one of sound mind would say that a thing had been deprived of something which it did not previously possess. So then, if "the Unbegotten" is based neither on invention nor on privation—as the preceding argument has shown—and is not applied to a part of him only (for he is without parts), and does not exist in him as something external (for he is simple and uncompounded), and is no other beside him (for he is one and only he is unbegotten), then "the Unbegotten" must be unbegotten essence!

9. But, if he is unbegotten in the sense shown by the foregoing demonstration, he can never undergo a generation which involves the sharing of his own distinctive nature with the offspring of that generation, and cannot admit of any comparison or association with what is begotten. For if anyone did want to make this essence a common property with some other or give something else a share in it, he would have to argue either on the basis of contrast and division or on the basis of comparison. Yet whichever of these he chooses, the argument...
will result in manifold absurdities, or rather, blasphemies. For if this essence were made a common property with something else by being contrasted or divided, it could not be already unbegotten (not having been such before, since it is the contrast which makes it so), and certainly could not be incorruptible, since division is destructive of the whole principle of incorruption. On the other hand, if the essence were made patient of a comparison with something else, and the comparison could not be made between things with nothing in common, the fundamental principle of the essence would also be made common. But if that happened, then the name would be made common as well, and those who persisted in this line of reasoning would of necessity be obliged either to keep the designation uncommon if they wanted to keep the essence uncommon too, or, if they tried to share it out with something, to share out the designation just as they do the essence. For if it were in name only that the one were pre-eminent and the other less, the ambition to supply the other part with the grace which it lacked would be injurious to them both, and the verbal distinction would not work out correctly either, assuming they pursue the investigation about the designation exactly. But, if the reasoning on which this argument is based compels them

\[
\begin{align*}
1 \text{ ɒστε ν.} & \quad 2 \text{ ἀφθαρσίας Μ.} & \quad 3 \text{ δέχοτα : δέχον Α.} \\
\text{4} & \quad \text{άκοινωσιν Α.} & \quad \text{7} & \quad \text{δέχεται Β.} \\
\text{10} & \quad \text{άκοινωσιν Σ.} & \quad \text{12/13} & \quad \text{μεταδόναι Υ.} \\
\text{20} & \quad \text{όνομα Μ.} & \quad \text{22} & \quad \text{μεταδίδοναί CX.} \\
\text{23} & \quad \text{φιλοτιμήτερον GABMSV.}
\end{align*}
\]
10. They certainly cannot say that, since the essence is common to both, it is in the order, and in a superiority based on time that the one is first and the other second, for of necessity the cause of the pre-eminence must exist before the things which are pre-eminent. But neither time, nor age, nor order has ever been joined to the essence of God. Order is secondary to the one who orders, but nothing which pertains to God has ever been ordered by another. Time is a certain motion of the stars, but the stars came into being not only later than the essence of the Unbegotten and all intelligible beings, but even later than the first corporal objects. As for the ages, what is it necessary to say? The Scriptures clearly state, "God exists from before the ages," and the common reckoning of mankind confirms them. For it is not only impious, it is positively ridiculous for those who have once accepted the one

to share out the vocable it-
self, let them the more am-
bitiously share out the equal-
ity as well, since nothing has
been found on which they can
establish a pre-eminence.

10. Où γάρ δὴ τοῦτο ἐν εἰ-
πολεί, δέ καὶ οὐκ ἐμφανίζην ἢ
οὕσα τάξει δε καὶ τοῖς ἐν χρό-
νοι προερχομένη δὲ μὲν ἐστὶν πρῶτος
5 καὶ δὲ δεύτερος, ἐπειδῆ γε δεῖ
προςεῖναι πάντως τριῶν ἀπερχόμενος
τῷ τῆς ἐπιρροής σείτοι, οὐ συν-
ήσκομαι δὲ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ
οὐχ χρόνους, οὐκ ἀλών, ὁδῷ τάξεις.
10 ἢ τε γάρ τάξις δεύτερα τῶν τάτ-
τοντος, οὐδέν δὲ τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ
δὲ ἐπόρου τέτακται. 8 του χρό-
νος ἀστέρων ποιά τέ τε κίνη-
σεω, διαστάσεως ὑποτιτλοῦν
15 οὐδὲν τὰς οὐσίας καὶ νοητὰν ἀπάντων
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρῶτων σωμάτων γε-
γόνως ὑπάρχον. καὶ γὰρ ἀλώ-
να τί δὲ καὶ λέγωμεν, σαφῶς τῆς
γορικῆς γιαγορευόμενοι τε τῶν
20 ἀλώνων ἀπάρχειν τῷ θεόν, καὶ
τῶν κοινῶν λογισμῶν ἐμπαρχομένων:
οὐ γάρ ἰδίων ἀπαρχῶν ἀλλὰ
καὶ οὐδὲς καταγέλαστον τοὺς ἐν
μόνον παράκεισθαις ἀγάνηντον
25 αὐτοῖς προσώπως τούτου φάσειν
ἢ συνυπάρχειν ἐπιτριόν, εἰτε γὰρ
προσώπως τοῖς, τούτου δικαίως
λέγοιτ, ἢ ἀγάνηντον οὐ καὶ δεύ-
τερον ἡ συναρχία τῇ πρὸς
30 ἀνατομία κοινωνία τοῦ συνυπάρχειν
ἐπανάρρητοι διαφοροθέτεται τῷ ἔν

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1 τουτ’ εἰπον ἐν Κ.; εἰπομένι Β.; Θ. ἐπροείναι . . . τοῖς
προσήφοιν τοῖς. 4. βί Κ. τέ καὶ πάντως Β. 9 GAGMSV. 10 ἢ τε
οὖτε Α.; 14 μῦνον. 18:19 Τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν μυστηρίων τῶν. 23
συνυπάρχει Β. 26-27 ἐπέτερον . . . προσώπως. Κ.; Ω. ἀγάνηντον Ι.;
οὐ καὶ συν-
υπάρχει Μ. 29-30 τῇ . . . κοινωνίᾳ τῇ. . . κοινωνίᾳ
GAGMSV. 31 διεσφαριζόται Β.
mánon eînai kai to ãkýnntov éi-
nuì, oú ði meta tìs òðas àpi-
klírosw tì s và perièrmav
águvoi sunéites eino, sunëhímu tì 5 su kai tòv tìs sunëhímu aètìou.

and only Unbegotten to then
say that something else exists
either before it or along with
it. For if something else
exists before the Unbegotten,
it is that which must properly
be called "unbegotten" and not
the second. On the other hand,
if something else exists along
with it, the qualities of being
"one" and "only" and "unbegot-
ten" would be done away by that
same association whereby each
c-o-exists with the other—in
other words, in conjunction with
the essence an apportionment and
circumscription of both would
be introduced, and hence com-
position along with the one
causing the composition.

11. But then again, it is
not even possible for something
to inhere in this essence—shape
let us say, or mass and size—
since God is altogether free
from composition. But, if it nei-
ther is, nor ever could be law-
ful to conceive of any of these
things or anything like them
as joined to the essence of God,
what further argument is there
which will permit the likening
of the unbegotten to the begot-
ten essence? For any similarity,
comparison, or association in
essence leaves no place for a

6-21*, 5 Basilii Enn. I, 22 (PG 29, 560C-561E); cf. I, 23 (PG 29,
564A-C).
...
The difference of essence as well). However, because there are people who suppose that the generation is a bodily one and stumble at the use of equivocal terms, it will be necessary to speak briefly about them as well. We assert, then, that the Son is "offspring" in accordance with the teaching of the Scriptures. We do not understand his essence to be one thing and the meaning of the word which designates it to be another by way of contrast. Rather, we take it that, as the designation truly represents the essence, the substance is the very same as that which is signified by the name. Accordingly, we assert that when this substance was begotten, it had not yet been in existence prior to its own origination, but rather that it was begotten before all things by the will of its God and Father.

13. But if this statement seems rash to anyone, let him consider within himself whether it is in fact true or false. If the former, its audacity is blameless by his own judgement since nothing true, when spoken at the proper time and in the proper measure, is blameworthy. On the other hand, if it is false, doubtless he will admit the absolute necessity of accept-

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4 τον Υιον σαρμ. 4-6 την . . . μεν ως. 4-6 την . . . μεν ως ομ S. 6 τυ. post μεν add by: νοσσοντς CIGABMSV. 7 αυθον CAGMSV. 2 έπα τα-

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αλθευσεις S. 10/11 τατην δι: την ωσιαν τον Υιον Ε. 11 γεγυγησαν CAGMSV; προς M. 12 ωσιας αντε ιειας add A. 13 γεγυγησαν S. 14 θεο και om b ad 592B. 15 δε τη: 6 δε τω CAGMSV. 24 δε C. 25 γεγυγησαν C.
ing the opposite to be true—<br>that the Son was begotten after<br>he was already in existence—<br>and that would involve not only<br>the ultimate in absurdity or<br>blasphemy, but would be complete-<br>ly ridiculous as well. What need<br>of begetting has something which<br>already exists? Unless perchance<br>it is transformed into something<br>else in the way of animate or<br>inanimate bodies—they might<br>really be said to be "born," since<br>although they are what they are<br>already, they are not what they<br>will become. The seed is not the<br>man nor the stone the house,<br>but each comes to be such—the one<br>a man, the other a house. If<br>there is to be such—of which<br>in any case it is completely<br>impious to compare the begetting<br>of the Son—was not what it sub-<br>sequently became (for it could<br>not become what it already was),<br>what remedy will the man accept<br>who asserts that the Son was be-<br>gotten after he was already in<br>existence? If he existed before<br>his begetting, he was unabegotten;<br>14. But it was only just now<br>conceded that there is no unbeg-<br>otten other than God. Let them<br>therefore either retract this<br>concession and bring in some
other unbegotten or else (since there is no common ground between the designation of "Son" and "offspring" and that of "unbegotten") let them abide by what has been said and refuse to speak of the Son as being begotten after he was already in existence. For there would indeed be a complete confusion both of the names and of their objects if, even though the Unbegotten both is and is called a single essence, there were included within the scope of the word "unbegotten" yet another essence and that essence called "begotten;" the names would then be according to them (if the Son in fact wasn't begotten in any real sense), "Son who was not begotten," and, "Father who did not beget." On the other hand, if someone were to understand this generation as being by way of augmentation or transformation (curing one ill by another, as the saying is, the lesser by the greater), he wouldn't even understand it properly with regard to other things—for if anything does grow by augmentation, it is by the addition of something from outside itself that it does so. And where is this addition going to come from if we do not postulate the existence of some other object? But if this is so, it is then necessary to assume that numerous beings and many unbe-
15. 'Αλλ' οὖν μὲν τάσπα τὸν ἄπειρον ἔντες ὑπέδυεν καὶ πᾶσαν ἁμαρτίαν ἐκλείσας σφαγή αὐτοῦ, σὺν ημῶν τόλμης εὐθύνας. 

5 οὐκ τούτοις ὑπάγοντες ἀλλ' ἐπισκόποις ἐσπερείας ἐγκήλισαν, ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγίων πάλαι καὶ ἀνωθεν ἂντίκειν ἀποθεοειμένοις ἀπειλοῦμεν, μήτε τῆς οὖσας τοῦ θεοῦ προσευμένης γένεσιν (ὡς ἀγεννητοῦ) μήτε ἐκπαύσασιν ἡ μεριμνά. (ὡς ἀφθάρτου) μήτε μὴν ἐπέμενα τινῶς προσευμένης εἰς ὑπὸ πάντα, μὴ δύναμεν γεγεννηθῆναι τὸν ἰδίῳ, 

10 οὐκ οἰκουμενούντες οὐδὲ τοῦ μονογενοῦς τὴν οὖσαν πρὸς τὰ ἐκ μῆ 

15 γοττένοις ἀρκέτας τινος ἰδίως ἐκ μῆ 

διήνυσεν έκπειτε οὖσα τὸ μὴ δὲν ἦν ὑμῖν τῷ ποίησασθεὶς γενόμενοι τῆς διάφοραν τοὺς πᾶσιν ὑπερέχον ἤς τούτον ἀναγκαίον τῶν ἱκετήσεων τῶν ποιητῶν. πάντα γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ γεγενήθηκαν κατὰ τὸν μακάριον Ἰωάννῃ δοροφούμενοι, συμποιηρητικοὶ διώκοντος ἀνέφηκαν αὐτῷ τῆς δημιουργίας δυνάμεως ὅσιαν τὸν ἴδιον ὑπερέχονς τῶν μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἕνας γενομένων. μόνος γὰρ τοῦ ἀνεπιστροφοῦ δυνατός γεννηθείς καὶ νεανίσκες, τελείωτα τοῖς γέγονεν ὑποηργός πρὸς πᾶσαν δημιουργίαν καὶ γενόμενην τοῦ πατρὸς.

16. Εἰ δὲ διὰ καθή καὶ νόης, διὰ τούτο ἀνθρώπων καὶ σωμάτων κάθ' ἥμαρτεν ἐννοεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπωι γενόμενων ἄναγομενίκητα; οὐσία.  

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2-14 τῷ δὲ … διειρεθείς σοι ἔκ τοῦ ἐν Χριστότητος νοεῖν διὰ αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς ὑποδημήνων καὶ τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ ὑποδημήνων. 13 ἢ τοῦτο γὰρ … Μονογενὴς, ἐξειδίκευσε, μόνος παρὰ μόνον τῷ ἔν τις καὶ μοῦ ἄνθρωπον καὶ σωματικὸν ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ Χριστῷ ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ Χριστῷ.
ménous tois tís metousías dynámati kai páthesin ópágësin tón theó kai
theó kai diplomougydós tón theó wálh

5 diplougydés. Oí theó hén

10 diplougydés. Oí theó hén

15 diplougydés. Oí theó hén

20 diplougydés. Oí theó hén

25 diplougydés. Oí theó hén

17. Tá dé pollá kata tihn eph- phéniasan kemerímera tihn úntó

20 lexitéi patér kouíntou énnoeión chrí

and on the analogy of begetting
among human beings to subject
God to the names and passions
of a communication of essence,
then, since God is also a "ma-
kér," it is necessary to pre-
suppose matter for the produc-
tion of the things made in accordance
with the error of the Greeks—
for the same man who begets out
of his own substance would be
unable to make anything apart
from matter. But if they reject
this and pay no attention to the
verbal meaning of the words, but
rather preserve the meaning which
is appropriate to God and refer
creation to his power alone, how
can the passion of a communi-
cation of essence have any place
in God on account of the design-
ation "Father?" What well-dis-
posed man would not acknowledge
that there are some words which
are related to one another in
sound and utterance only and not
at all in signification? For
instance, "eye" is used of both
man and God, but in the one case
it signifies a certain member,
while in the other it means some-
times God's care and protection
of the righteous, sometimes his
knowledge of events.

17. On the other hand, there
are many words which are different
in their verbal meaning but which
have the same signification—such
as "I AM" and "Only true God." Accordingly, it is by no means
necessary, when God is called "Father," to understand this activity as having the same meaning that it does with men, and as involving in both cases the idea of mutability or passion--for the one activity is impassible, while the other involves passion. Again, when God is called "spirit," this does not imply that he is of the same nature as other beings which are called "spirits." Rather, in every case we preserve the proportionate relationship, and are not at all disturbed when we hear the Son called a "thing made"--as though his essence had actually been made the same as other such things because they share the same names! For the Son is the "offspring" and "thing made" of the Unbegotten and Un-made, while heaven and angels and every other "thing made" whatsoever are things made by this "thing made"--"made through him" at the command of the Father. In this way the inerrancy of the Scriptures can be preserved when they call the Son "thing made" and "offspring," while we ourselves will not be moved from our own sound conclusions--neither ascribing members to God, nor laying down his own essence as a substratum for generation or matter for creation. For it is on the basis of these things that a distinction in the names naturally arises.

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4 Jn. 4: 24.
16 Jn. 1: 3.
18. But, if in begotting God does not impart his own nature after the manner of men (for he is unbegotten), and has no need of any material substratum for creation (for he is without need and mighty), then the rejection of the word "creation" with respect to him is wholly irrational. Accordingly, once we have shown, on the basis of these and other similar arguments, that there is no necessity either to try to fully accommodate the real significance of these expressions to the words which designate them, or to introduce a difference into that of differing expressions, we can, on the contrary, direct our attention to the meaning of their underlying objects and accommodate the designations accordingly—for the nature of the underlying objects is not naturally consequent on the verbal expressions; rather, the force of the words is conform- ed to the objects in accordance with their dignity. Indeed, one could find not a little fault with those who both accept that the Son is "offspring" and "thing made" and agree that God is unbegotten and uncreated, but who set themselves up against what they earlier acknowledged by adding qualifications and using the phrase "likeness in essence."


1 γεν. 2 τ. κατά τ. ο. μ. 9 εύχην ante μ. add 9, fortasse recte, si non ut detractionem hanc sententiam accepere debamus. 11 παραλλατέστων C. 11/12 παραλλαγέων V. 14 εμπρόσθεν S. 26/27 et μέν τις 14/15 επέρ b. 30 ἡ mss.; 31 omnis CHSEV. 31 εφυλάττων M, ἐφύλαττος S, ἐφύλατον V. 32/33 διδόντες 1.
Such people, if they really did have any concern for the truth, ought rather to have acknowledged that since the names are different, the essences are different as well. Certainly, this is the only way they could have kept the right order, and rendered to each of the persons that acknowledgement which is properly his. But if they took no notice of this, they ought at least to have kept to the logical sequence of their own thought and not altered the language which fitted it by rejecting the phrase "identity of nature"—especially since we ourselves have shown throughout the preceding arguments that the designations are in fact indicative of the essences themselves.

19. But perhaps someone who has been goaded by all this into responding will say, "Even granted the necessity of paying attention to names and being brought by them to the meanings of the underlying realities, still, by the same token that we say the unheavened is different from the beheavened, we also say that 'light' and 'light,' 'life' and 'life,' 'power' and 'power' are alike with respect to both." Our reply is not to substitute the rod for an answer in the manner of the admirer of Diogenes (for the philosophy of the Cynics is far removed from Christianity), but rather to emulate the blessed...
Paul who said that we must correct our opponents with great patience—our response, then, to such a person is to say that the one "light" is unbegotten and the other begotten. Does "light" mean something different when applied to the Unbegotten from what it does when applied to the begotten? Or does it apply to both alike? If "light" means one thing when applied to the one and something different when applied to the other, then obviously, since the "light" is made up of two different things, it is composite, and that which is composite cannot be unbegotten. On the other hand, if "light" has the same meaning in both cases, then "light" and "light," "life" and "life," and "power" and "power" must be separate from one another in the same degree that the Unbegotten is separated from the begotten. And indeed, the same rule and method applies for the resolution of all such problems. If, then, because he is without parts and uncomposed, the inner meaning of every word spoken of the essence of the Father is equivalent in force of signification to "Unbegotten," by the same argument that same word applied to the Only-begotten is equivalent to "offspring." And yet, even they say that these things are to be distinguished! What argument is there which will
then still permit a similarity of essence? or which will allow anyone to define its relatively greater superiority—when all mass, all time, and everything like them have been excluded, and this essence both is and is reckoned to be simple and alone?

20. On the contrary, it seems to us to begin with that those who presume to compare that essence which is unmastered, superior to all cause, and unbound by any laws to that which is begotten and serves the laws of the Father have neither really examined the nature of the universe or made distinctions about these things with honest minds. For there are two ways which have been marked out for us for the discovery of what we seek—one, by means of which we examine the essences themselves and with clear and unadulterated reasoning about them make a judgement on each; the other an enquiry by means of the actions, whereby we distinguish the essence through its products and completed works—and neither of these is sufficient to reveal any similarity of essence! For if anyone begins his enquiry from the essences, he finds that that
essence which is the higher is incapable of experiencing any dominion not its own or undergoing any act of generation—this essence educates the mind approaching these matters with good will, and commands it to reject any comparison with something else as being wholly alien to the law of its nature; consequently, it compels us to recognize that the action too conforms to the dignity of the essence. On the other hand, if anyone begins his study from the things which have been made, and is led up from them to the essences, he discovers that the Son is the "thing made" of the Unbegotten, and the Advocate that of the Only-begotten; thus, having confirmed the difference in their activities from the pre-eminence of the Only-begotten, he accepts as indisputable the distinction in their essences as well. And this is without even mentioning a third consideration, that he who creates by his own power is entirely different from him who does so at the Father's command and acknowledges that he can do nothing of his own accord, and that the one worshipped is different from the one who worships.

21. Hence, if they do not account it ridiculous to attribute the same qualities equally to both, such as essence, action,
authority, or name—thereby doing away with the differences between the names and their objects—let them clearly speak of two Unbegotten. But if this idea is manifestly irreligious, let them not change what is acknowledged by everyone into an impiety under cover of the word "similarity." But last we ourselves, at any rate, should seem to pervert the truth by our choice of words or use of arguments (such is the charge brought against us and commonly bandied about), we will establish the proof of these things from the Scripturines themselves. The God who is proclaimed by both Law and Prophets is one. That this God is also the God of the Only-begotten is acknowledged by the Saviour himself, for he says, I am going "to my God and your God." This is the Only true God, the only wise God, who alone is good, alone mighty, who alone has immortality. But let no one be disturbed, and let not your minds be troubled. We have not used these expressions in order to take away the Godhead of the Only-begotten, or his wisdom, or his immortality, or his goodness—but in order to distinguish these things with respect to the preeminence of the Father. For we too confess that the Lord Jesus is the Only-begotten God, and is
immortal and deathless, wise, good; but we also say that the Father is the source of his very existence and of all that he is, and that he does not possess the cause of his own essence or goodness as though he were Unbegotten, for this is the understanding to which the preceding arguments have brought us.

22. So then, if only God is true and wise because only he is Unbegotten, the Only-begotten Son, because only he is the offspring of the Unbegotten, would be nothing as an individual if his nature had been made a common property with something else by means of a "similarity." It therefore behoves us to do away with any idea of a "similarity of essence," and receive the Son's relationship to the Father in accordance with his own account. Thus, we actually mount up to the sole and only cause of all things, for in that account the Son is clearly subordinated to the Father. Having therefore stringently purified our minds with respect to these things, we must understand the mode of this action in a sense which is not human, but rather, effortless and divine. We do not at all suppose that this action is some kind of division or motion of the essence— which is what those who are led along by the contrivances of the Greeks have to assume, since they have united the action to the essence and therefore present the
world as coeval with God, and yet not even so have they escaped the absurdity arising from this assertion. Once they recognize the cessation of the creative act, they cannot deny its beginning; for it could not have come to an end had it not started from some beginning.

23. But on the contrary these people have neither perceived the difference in the beings with wholesome eyes nor shown themselves right-minded judges of the actual objects. Let them therefore abandon their efforts, since Justice has concealed the truth from them on account of their ill-will. We ourselves, however, judge the action from its works in accordance with the principle just discussed above, and do not consider it unhazardous to have to unite the action to the essence. We recognize that although the essence is without beginning, simple, and unending, its action is not without beginning—for if it were the work would be without beginning as well. Again, we do not regard the action as unending since, granted that the works themselves cease, the action which produced them cannot be unceasing either. Indeed, since no work can exist unbegotten or unendingly, it would really be childish and infantile to say that the action is unbegotten and unending, and thereby
make it identical with the essence. Two distinct possibilities follow from these conclusions: either the action of God is idle, or its product is unbegotten. If both of these possibilities are admitted, ridiculous, that which remains must be correct: that since the works had a beginning, the action is not without one, and that since the works come to an end, the action is not unending either. Accordingly, there is no reason for us to accept the insufficiently examined opinions of others and unite the action to the essence. Rather, we must believe that the action which is the truest and most befitting God is his will, and that that will is sufficient to bring into existence and to redeem all things. The voice of the prophet also bears witness to this when it says, "Whatever he wills to do, he does." For he needs nothing to bring what he intends into existence; on the contrary, at the same moment he intends it, it comes into existence exactly as he willed it.

24. Accordingly, if this argument has demonstrated that God's will is an action, and that that action is not the essence, but that the Only-begotten exists by virtue of the will of the Father, then the Son necessarily preserves his likeness, not with respect to his essence, but with respect to his essence.
that action which is also his will. Continuing on the basis of these conclusions, however, we must also preserve a right understanding of the word "image." The blessed Paul himself has explained this when he says, "He is the image of the Invisible God, the first-born of all creation; for in him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible." This is why he is called "image." But it is not the Unbegotten essence which the blessed Paul designates by the phrases "all things were created in him" together with "first-born" (for that essence does not accord with these things), but rather the action through which the Son "in whom are all things" came to be. The word "image" would not refer the similarity back to God's essence, but to the action unbegottenly stored up in the fore-knowledge of the Father prior to the existence of the First-born as well as to that of the things created "in him." Indeed, what man who knew the Only-begotten himself and then took into consideration all the things which were made through him would not acknowledge that "in him" he had seen all the power of the Father? When the most blessed Paul perceived this, he said not "through him" but "in him," though he added the title
first-born" so that by including the Only-begotten himself along with the things which had been made through him, he might make known to all who could comprehend these things the action of the Father. We use the word "image," therefore, not as comparing the Offspring to the Unbegotten (which in any case is both incongruous and impossible for any creature), but as comparing the Only-begotten Son and First-born to the Father. By using the designation "Son" we make his own essence clear, and by using that of "Father" we manifest the action of the one who begot him. However, if there is anyone who still holds contentious to his own opinions, and, paying no attention to what has been said, still insists that the designation "Father" is indicative of God's essence, let him give the Son this same designation too, since he previously gave him the same essence. Indeed, let him give each of them a share in both the names—the Father in that of the Son, and the Son in that of the Father—for the idea of a "similarity of essence" will force those who hold such an opinion about them to give the same designations to both.

25. However, if these arguments will suffice us for the Only-begotten, logical order requires us in what remains to say something about the Counselor as


1 tot ante patrds add v. 9/10 ἀναγάξετ ἘΜῸV. 12 adversus hunc locum habent paene omnes mss. adnotationem in marg.: περὶ τοῦ ἄγιου πνεύματος I, σημείωσαν CGAES, cf. v ad s. 24 (38*, 31).
13 καὶ ὁμ. B. 14 τοῖς: τοῖς S.
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... In doing so, however, we will not follow the thoughtless opinions of the multitude, but will hold to the teaching of the saints in all things. Since from them we learn that he is third both in dignity and order, we believe that he is third in nature as well. For the dignities of the different persons have not been bestowed on each nature in turn the way political office is changed among men, nor has the order of the persons been altered in opposition to their essences. The way it is in the creation. Rather, the order of each conforms harmoniously to its subject, so that the first in order is not second in nature, and the first in nature is certainly not allotted second or third place in the order. Now if the order in question is really the best with respect to the creation of the intelligible beings, then since the Holy Spirit is third in order, he cannot be first in nature, for that is God, the Father. And indeed, wouldn’t it be both ridiculous and silly to say that the very same thing occupied first place at one instant and third at another, so that the two beings—both him who is worshipped and the one "in whom"...
he is worshipped—are identical?  And this distinction between him who is worshipped and the one "in whom" he is worshipped is in accordance with the Lord's own statement: "God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth." Again, the Counselor is certainly not identical with the Only-begotten, for otherwise he would not have been numbered after him as possessing his own substance. Indeed, the Saviour's own voice is sufficient argument on behalf of these things, for he stated clearly that the one who would be sent to bring to the Apostles' remembrance all he had said and to teach them was "another." Now the Holy Spirit cannot be numerically different from God and yet nonetheless un-begotten (for there is one and only one Unbegotten from whom all things came to be), nor yet is he in addition to the Son but yet nonetheless begotten (for our Lord is one and the same Only-begotten "through whom are all things", as says the Apostle); rather, he must be third both in nature and in order, since he was brought into existence by the action of the Son at the command of the Father. He is honoured in third place as the first and greatest work of all, the only one which is the direct product of the Only-begotten. Although he lacks the Godhead and

5 1 Cor. 8: 6.  6-13 Basilii Eun. III, 5 (PG 29, 665A-B).
6 καὶ ἀντὶ τρίτου add CY; καὶ ἀντὶ φώς om nonnulli mss. B.
10 ἐνέργειαν S. 10 μετὰ om B; χλιδοῦ C, χλιδῶ IGABMSV; tolousto CY. 12 μὲν om B.
26. 'All' what the Son of God has been filled with that power which is for sanctification and instruction. But as for those who believe that the Counselor is some kind of action of God, but nonetheless include him in the order after the two genuine essences, they are so completely ridiculous and so wholly debarred from the truth that it would undoubtedly require a lengthy discussion to attempt to refute them now.

26. But so as not to weary our hearers by the length of these arguments, we will encompass the whole force of our discourse in a few words: We assert that the God of all things is one, and that he is the Only true God, unbegotten, without beginning, incomparable, superior to all cause and the cause of existence in all beings. He did not accomplish the creation of these beings by intercourse with some other; he did not obtain the foremost place from the requirements of order, nor superiority with respect to all other things from comparison. Rather, it was in accordance with the incomparable pre-eminence of his essence, power, and authority that he begot and created before all things the Only-begotten God, our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom all things were made, the image and seal of his own power and action. The Only-begotten is comparable.
in essence neither to the one who begat him nor to the Holy Spirit who was made through him; for he is less than the one in being a "thing made," and greater than the other in being a maker. Peter is a trustworthy witness to the fact that he was made, for the Lord himself testified that he had received his knowledge from God. Peter said, "Let all the house of Israel therefore know assuredly that God has made him both Lord and Christ." One who spoke as in the person of the Lord also bore witness and said, "The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways." However, the witness to the fact that he made the Holy Spirit is the one who said, "There is one God, the Father from whom are all things, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things." The blessed John likewise said, "All things were made through him and without him not one thing was made." On the basis of these passages it ought to follow either that one says the Holy Spirit is unbegotten (which is blasphemous), or that, having been made, he was made "through him." We confess, therefore, that only the Son was begotten of the Father, and that he is subject to him both in essence and in will—indeed, he himself acknowledged that he "lived because of the

1-3 Acts 2: 36. 5-10 Prov. 8: 22. 18-20 Jn. 1: 3. 5: 2 I Cor. 8: 6. 10-12 Jn. 1: 3. 5: 2 I Cor. 8: 6.

1 επιηθεν CS. 5 έπιηθεν Τ. 6 πεπαλαιναι V. 8 Ιησους 5:11 εγενετο S. 12 ἑκαλοῦθον V. 14 γέγονεν C, γέγονεν 5:15 δο τον qu 5:16 ενέγοναται EMG, ενέγοναται G, sed v inter lineas inseritur—-an ab alia manu? 20 μη διωωσιαν post διωωσιαν add v.
27. Yet the Father is not begotten, neither is the Son unbegotten—rather, that which he is in himself everlastingly is what he is in fact properly called: Offspring, obedient Son. Most perfect minister, subservient for the accomplishment of the whole creation and will of the Father. Subservient for the maintenance and preservation of all existing things, for the giving of the Law to men, for the ordering of the world and all providential care. He makes use of the Counselor as his own servant for the sanctification, instruction, and assurance of believers. In these last days he was born of the holy Virgin, lived in holiness in accordance with the laws of men, was crucified, died, rose again the third day, and went up into heaven. He will come again to judge both living and dead by a righteous retribution of both faith and practice, and he will reign as king for ever. In all these things the pre-eminence and sole supremacy of God is preserved, and the Holy Spirit is manifestly Father" and that he could "do nothing of his own accord." However, we do not acknowledge him to be of the same substance as the Father since this would imply a generation and division of essence on the part of the one, and an equality on the part of the other;
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subject to Christ, as are all things. The Son himself, however, is subject to his God and Father in accordance with the teaching of the blessed Paul, who said: "When all things are subjected to him, then the Son himself will also be subjected to him who put all things under him, that God may be everything to everyone." Obviously, we have dealt with these matters in sequence and at greater length in the rest of our argument, but we have now made our profession of faith by way of summary. We beseech not only those of you who are present, but all of those who are partakers with us of the same sacraments, not to fear the censure of men, nor be deceived by their sophistries, nor led astray by their flatteries. Put what we have said to the test in accordance with a true and right judgement, for the better part is manifestly convincing to everyone. Prefer right reason above the persons of those who trouble you, and flee all the traps and snares which are laid for men by the devil, who has made it his purpose either to terrify or entice many who fail to put what is right before what is pleasurable, or account things present more certain than things which are to come. But if, because the majority have agreed in a lie and fought against the truth, preferring their present
safety and glory to what is pleasing to God and commonly accounted fitting, the worse part should triumph among some people (God forbid the fulfillment of these words!), I beseech my own followers, at least, to preserve the faith unshaken and steadfast for the one who gave it to them, awaiting the judgment-seat of Christ our Saviour. For from that tribunal pretence, conjecture, and falsehood have been entirely done away, and those who are judged are stripped of all power, attendance, and flattery—there neither a numerous retinue nor wealth are a sufficient appeal, be they never so esteemed among men. Indeed, a whole crowd of distinguished men is not the equal in intercession of a single poor and religious man when Truth itself is judge, for religion joins its plea with his in conformity with the recompense which is proper for those who now count even death a gain in its behalf. The rewards of these contests are given by Christ, who both in ages past and in the present offers his rewards: to those who have laboured for the truth, the genuine liberty and kingship of heaven; to those who through ill-will have dishonoured it, inexorable punishment. Let these two alternatives be mentioned before you but once, and may the outcome go to the better part.

3 Cf. Phil. l: 21.
6 ἀληθευόντος: ἀληθεύοντος M. 8 πονήσας V.
10 ἀπιμάζασιν M. 13 denotat A litteras ἐκ- in verbo ἐκβαιν. am ut non in uno alterove exemplare inventas?
28. God is one, both unbegotten and without beginning, neither admitting of any being prior to himself (for nothing can exist prior to the Unbegotten), nor with himself (for he is one, and only the Unbegotten is God), nor in himself (for he is simple and uncompounded). Because He IS, one and only and always the same, he is the God, creator and maker of all things—primarily and in a special sense of the Only-begotten, but also in a sense appropriate to his own person of the things which were made through the Only-begotten. For he begot and created and made the Son by his own power and action alone before all things and before all creation, though without sharing his own substance with the one begotten—God is immortal, un divided, and indivisible, and what is immortal cannot share its own essence. He has not established any other like himself (only he is unbegotten, and nothing can be begotten like the unbegotten essence), nor has he established another using his own essence; rather, he has done so by his will alone. He has not begotten anything like his own essence, but as he willed, so he begot. It was through the Son also that he made the Holy

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5. μόν μι, sed corr inter lineas. 
12 ἀριθμός τῆς ἡμέρας: τῆς. S. 
15 ἐγέννησεν C. 16 ἐκτίσεν C. 12 ἀνεθάνατος: ἀνέθη S. 
20 ὁ Κ. 28 ἐγέννησεν C. 21 ἐκνοτή V.
Spirit, the first and greatest of all his works, creating him by his own authority and commandment, but by means of the action and power of the Son. After the Holy Spirit, he made through the Son all the other things which are in heaven and on earth, things seen and unseen, corporeal and incorporeal. "There is one God, the Father, from whom are all things," as says the Apostle, "and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things." Hence, there is "one God," unbegotten, uncreated, and unmade, and "one Lord, Jesus Christ," the Son of God, the offspring of the Unbegotten (but not like any other offspring), the creature of the Uncreated (but not like any other creature), the "thing made" of the Unmade (but not like any other "thing made"). As Holy Scripture proclaims, "The Lord created me as the beginning of his ways, before eternity he set me up, before all the hills he brought me forth." There is also one Holy Spirit, the first and greatest creature of all, the work of the Only-begotten, made at the command of the Father by the action and power of the Son.

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11-14 Prov. 8: 22, 23, 25b.

9 ἀποικητὸς: ποιήτος CIGABSV. 11 ἐκτείνει C, ἐκτείνεται V.
13 ἐκείνῳ C. 15 τῶν ἀντε τοῦ add v. 16 ἐργον v.
18 post γενόμενον explicat his liber in CIP; add τέλος τοῦ εὐνο-
μενον Β, ἔλος τοῦ εὐνομίου ε, τέλος τοῦ διυστεβοῦς ἀπολογητικοῦ Μ, τέλος τοῦ δυσεσθεῖν καὶ πολλάκις κακοδαμὸν εὐνομία τοῦ καρδιο-
νας A.
B. EUNOMII EXPOSITIO FIDEI

Before we go on to a presentation of the manuscripts on which the following edition is based, it would be well to take into consideration the reasons which have permitted the survival of this second of Eunomius' extant complete works. As we remarked with regard to the Liber Apologeticus, there was no incentive for Orthodox scribes to copy heretical literature unless they had some specific purpose in doing so. In the case of the Liber Apologeticus this purpose was to provide an illustration for the arguments of St. Basil in his refutation of it. Similar motives have governed the preservation of the Expositio Fidei. This work has survived only because at a very early period in the history of its transmission it was included in manuscripts of its refutation by Gregory of Nyssa, his Refutatio Confessio-
nis Eunomii (previously known as Book II of his Contra Eunomium).1 Of the four surviving manuscripts which we have thus far been able to locate, three (LPZ) are still bound up with this work. Partly because of this fact, and partly because of the small number of manuscripts involved, we have not attempted to construct a stemma. However, we have been able to draw a number of conclusions about the general relationships of the manuscripts to one another, and we have tried to indicate this by dividing them into groups and sub-groups. Likewise, in the following table

of sigla we have included a brief comment on each of the manuscripts attempting to show the manuscript's distinctive features and its relationship to the others.

CONSPERCTUS SIGLORUM

Group I:

a. sub-group 1.

L codex Laurentianus Mediceus plur. VI, 17, ff. 1V-5V. ut videtur, saec. XI medii.

This manuscript displays few unique readings, and it is perhaps the best representative of its group. Through a copy (p) it is the ultimate source of the printed text, for a few of whose errors it must be held responsible.

P codex Parisinus suppl. graecus 270, ff. 466r-467v. saec. XVII.

This manuscript is a direct copy of L, as a Latin note on its opening folio indicates: ex ms. do cod. Biblioth. Florentiae / iacobs Gretsuer in proliformes alt hanc expositionem Funomii haereticici in biblioth. bavarica et in codice Livinell post Nyssei in Eunomianis liberos. ex cod. ms. Flor. transcriptur. This copy was made by E. Bigotius (Emery Bigot of Rouen, 1626-1689) and is the direct source of the printed text (see the discussion under v below). It contains relatively few errors, and on the whole accurately represents the text of L from which it was copied.

b. sub-group 2.

P codex Patmensis (P) 46 monasterii S. Ioannis, ff. 238v-241r. saec. X-XI.

Although the text of this manuscript displays enough similarities with that of L to show that it must derive from the same group of manuscripts, it also possesses sufficient distinctive readings to show that it comes

\[^2\text{v. p. 4*}, \text{ n. 5 above.}\]
from a different branch of the tradition. At several points it enables us to correct the readings of L, although it also possesses errors of its own, notably by way of omission.

Z  codex Vaticanus graecus 1773, ff. 149\textsuperscript{v}-151\textsuperscript{v}. saec. XVI.

This manuscript is a direct copy of P, and apart from a few minor variants, faithfully reflects the readings of that manuscript.

**Group II**

F  codex Parisinus suppl. graecus 19\textsuperscript{r}, ff. 146\textsuperscript{r}-151\textsuperscript{v}. saec. XVI, fortasse ineuntis.

The numerous differences which this manuscript displays from both \textit{P} and \textit{PZ} are sufficient to show that it must derive from a distinctive branch of the manuscript tradition. It is also the only manuscript (other than \textit{P}) in which Eunomius' work circulates independently of the Refutatio of Gregory of Nyssa, though we may reasonably assume that it derives from an exemplar which originally contained it. Although it shares a number of errors with the other manuscripts and contains some of its own, it is also at several points the unique witness to what must certainly be the correct reading. It is therefore all the more regrettable that at f. 146\textsuperscript{r} (59*, 8) the scribe apparently turned two consecutive pages in his exemplar and continued copying from the following treatise. Thus the manuscript now reads: \ldots τοῦ διδόντος τὴν γάρ τὸ \ldots τὸ \ldots τὸ κείμενον καὶ τὸ διάκειμενον \ldots etc. In view of the value of this manuscript, it is to be hoped that at some point either the exemplar or another copy of the same family will become available.

**OTHER SIGLA**

E  Excerpta quae in Gregorii Nysseni Refutationis Confessio-
nis Eunomii libro inveniuntur.

In the course of his refutation, Gregory of Nyssa quotes the greater part of the work. Although Gregory did not always strive for verbatim accuracy, the quotations found in his work are generally accurate, and at a number of points enable us to get behind the manuscripts to what is unquestionably the correct reading. Since Gregory's citations are scattered and fragmentary, we will not attempt to list them separately, but will cite the references
in the body of the apparatus. Where the same passage is quoted several times, we will refer either to the first or to the most complete, noting variants as they occur.

**Textus vulgatus.**

The edition of this work originally appeared in the notes of Valesius' edition of the Ecclesiastical History of Socrates, and was subsequently reprinted by Migne in PG 67, 587B-592D. Reference is generally to the latter except in those cases where the text in Migne is a simple misprint, in which case it is distinguished by the siglum **v**. Valesius makes the following comment about the source of his text: *Hanc fidelis expositionem manusciptam benedixi, beneficio viri clarissimi accedentes fuerint.* In codice cuido Bavario, et in exemplari Livinian, subjecta erat libris Gregorii Nysseni Contra Eunomium, ut testatur Graecus, verum in codice Florentino, ex quo Epistola sae descriptum, prae- dicta erat libris (PG 67, 587B/6). Epistola's transcription is our own manuscript p discussed above. Valesius' text is marred by numerous serious errors (the most blatant of which is the omission of the word "not" at 57*, 24*). Some errors are editorial changes or derived from his exemplar, but the majority appear to be due to simple carelessness on the part of Valesius or his printers.

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3Henricus Valesius, Socratis Scholastici et Hermiae Socomenida Historia Ecclesiastica (Parisii: exudebat Antonio Vitre, Regis & Claric Gallican Typographus, 1668), notae pp. 61-64.

4This is apparently erroneous. I am informed by Dr. K. Dachs, Director of the Department of Manuscripts of the Bayerische Staatbibliothek München (in a letter dated 25 February 1974) that the manuscript in question (cod. Bavarius graecus 92) does not in fact contain a copy of the *Expositio Fidelis.*

5Apparently our own manuscript 2; cf. the comments of Jaeger, op. cit., Vol. II, p. LXIV.

6In the introduction to the 1613 supplement to the 1615 edition of the *Contra Eunomium* of Gregory; cf. Jaeger, loc. cit.
Since our God and Saviour Jesus Christ by just decree has said that he will acknowledge before his God and Father every one who acknowledges him before men, and will deny those who deny him; and since apostolic teaching urges us always to be prepared to make a defence to anyone who asks us for an account; and, moreover, since the Imperial Edicts have asked for just such a confession, we readily acknowledge that which we also profess:

That we too believe in the one and only true God, in accordance with the Lord's own teaching; nor do we honour him with lying voice, for he himself never lies, but is in very truth both by nature and in glory, one God: alone without beginning, from everlasting without ending. Nor is the essence in virtue of which he is one to be divided or separated into many, or at any time become another, or be changed from what it is, or out of one substance be split into a three-fold entity; for he is absolutely and
altogether one, and in the same way and in like manner remains alone, none partaking of his Godhead, none dividing his glory, none co-inheriting his authority, none sharing the throne of his kingdom. For he is one, and he alone is God Almighty, God of gods, and King of kings, and Lord of lords, Most High over all the earth, Most High in the heavens, Most High in the highest, heavenly, true in that he is what he is and remains thus forever, true in his works, true in his words; superior to all rule, subjection, power, and kingship, and free from change or alteration, for he is uncompounded. In the act of generation he does not divide his own substance, nor is he who begets the same as him who is begotten, nor do Father and Son exist in the same way, for he is incorruptible, and needs no matter, part, or physical instrument in creating, for he is without need of anything.

We also believe in the Son of God, the only-begotten God,
the first-born of all creation, true Son, but not unbegotten, truly begotten before the ages, but without an act of begetting prior to his own existence not to be called "Son," brought into being before all creation, but not uncreated, the beginning of the works of the ways of God and existing in the beginning, but not without beginning, living Wisdom, active Truth, subsisting Power, begotten Life; as God's Son the life-source of living creatures and the giver of life to the dead, the true light that enlightens every man coming into the world, himself good, and the bountiful supplier of good things, since he was begotten of the Father in goodness and in power. He does not, however, partake of the dignity of the one who begat him, nor in anything else share the Father's substance or his kingdom; rather, it is because of his generation that he is honourable and the Lord of glory, for although he receives glory from the Father he does not actually participate in his glory,


2 uuidοληγεινναυν sic g (J II, 342, 19), ἀνέχετο δὲ λήμνων δήν τῷ ΛΠΖΕΠΥ. 4 ἀνάγον... ἀνέχον sic e (J II, 342, 19-20), om ΛΠΖΕΠΥ. 7 τῆς τῇ ἔρχεται ΛΠΖΕΠΥ., άρον ἔχον ΛΠΖΕΠΥ. δέσσασαι ἀπασχολήσειν om v. 7 ἐρχεται ΛΠΖΕΠΥ., ἐροντι τινόν. 17 λέγον ποτέ δύναται add ΛΠΖΕΠΥ., om e (J II, 360, 5). 12 ὅτι δυνατόν e (J II, 361, 7). 14 ἠπέδροστος ἡ δύναμις τοῦ πνευμόνως, καθὼς εἰπ. 23 τὸν καθὼς εἰπ. 30 δόξαν om FZ. 31 τῶν om ΛΡ (J II, 361, 15). 30/73 δοξαζόμενον ΛΣΕΠΥ..
for the glory of the Almighty is incommunicable, as he himself says: My glory I will not give to another. He was glorified by the Father before all ages, and is eternally glorified by the Spirit and by every rational and begotten being; he is attended by the whole heavenly army, for he is the Lord, and the King of glory, being both Son of God and God; maker of things immortal and mortal, maker of spiritual beings and of all flesh, for all things were made through him, and without him was not one thing made. Over all things which were made through him he is king and Lord of life and breath, for according to his own holy voice, the Father has given him all things, and the Father has given all things into his hand; obedient with regard to the ordering and creation of all existing things; obedient with regard to all governance; not made Son or God because of his obedience, but because he is the Son and was brought forth as Only-begotten God, made obedient in his actions, obedient in his words, mediator in doctrine, mediator in law, whom we acknowledge as both Son of God and Only-begotten

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EUONMII EXPOSITIO FIDEI 56*

διὸ τὸν πνεῦματος δὲ αἵλωνος καὶ πᾶσας λογικῆς καὶ γεννητῆς οὕτως, δοριφοροῦμεν ὑπὸ πᾶσας ἐπιμερείας σφρατίας.

5 κύριος γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ βασιλέας τῆς δόξης, ὡς ὑλὸς θεοῦ καὶ θεός: ὁμιλουργὸς ἀνθέων καὶ θυμίας, ὁμιλουργὸς τῶν πνευμάτων καὶ πᾶσις σαιράς: πάντα γὰρ αὐτῷ παρε-10 δόθη παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς κατὰ τὴν ἀγίαν αὐτοῦ φωνήν, καὶ πάντα δέσιμον ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ δικαίως πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄνων ὅμιλουργῶν καὶ γένεσιν, 20 δικαίως πρὸς πᾶσαν διακυβέρνησιν, οὐκ ἐν τῷ δικαίῳ προσόλαβο, τὰ δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐξήγησιν προσλαμβάνει, εἰν τῷ υἱῷ εἰναι καὶ γεννη-θῆναι μονογενῆς θεός, γενόμενο-25 νας δικαίως ἐν ἑργοῖς, δικαίως ἐν λόγοις, μετατίθεντας ἐν ἀδικίασι, μεσίστης ἐν νόμισμας, τὸ τοῦτον ἐν καθήκοντας υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ μονο-γενῆ θεόν, τὸ τοῦτον δομοῦν τῷ

30 γεννήσαντι μονὸν κατʼ ἐκτέλεσιν κατὰ τὴν ἑκάτερον ἑννοίαν, οὐδὲ διὰ πατρὶ πατέρα (οὐ γὰρ εἰς τὸ δόο πατέρας), οὐδὲ ως ὑλὴ υἱὸν

35 (οὐκ δυνάτον δόο υἱῶν), οὐδὲ

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5/6 Ps. 23: 7-10. 16/16 Jn. 1: 3. 1/3 Jn. 1: 3. 2-1L Jn. 1: 3. 15/15 Jn. 13: 3.

1 διὸ τοῦ πατρὸς Υ. 2 γεννητῆς Ι. 3 δοριφορούμενος Ρζ.

5/6 Ps. 23: 7-10. 16/16 Jn. 1: 3. 1/3 Jn. 1: 3. 2-1L Jn. 1: 3. 15/15 Jn. 13: 3.

1 διὸ τοῦ πατρὸς Υ. 2 γεννητῆς Ι. 3 δοριφορούμενος Ρζ.

5/6 Ps. 23: 7-10. 16/16 Jn. 1: 3. 1/3 Jn. 1: 3. 2-1L Jn. 1: 3. 15/15 Jn. 13: 3.

1 διὸ τοῦ πατρὸς Υ. 2 γεννητῆς Ι. 3 δοριφορούμενος Ρζ.

5/6 Ps. 23: 7-10. 16/16 Jn. 1: 3. 1/3 Jn. 1: 3. 2-1L Jn. 1: 3. 15/15 Jn. 13: 3.


God. Only he resembles his progenitor in characteristic likeness and proper significations: not as Father to Father (for there are not two Fathers), nor yet as Son to Son (for there are not two Sons), neither as Unbegotten to Unbegotten (for there is only one Unbegotten, the Almighty, and there is only one Son, the Only-begotten), but as Son to Father, as the image and as the seal of the whole activity and power of the Almighty, the seal of the Father’s actions, words, and counsels. Him we confess to be the very one who overwhelmed the earth beneath the waters, who consumed the Sodomites by fire, who laid just retribution upon the Egyptians, who gave the Law at the command of the everlasting God, who in the time of the prophets spoke to the men of old, who called back the unbelievers, who received the whole power of judgement (for the Father judges no one, but has given all judgement to the Son), and who in these last days was born in the flesh, born of a woman, born a man for the freedom and salvation of our race, but not taking upon Him the Man made up of body and soul. In voice and speech


1 ὃς γεννητὸν ἀγέννητον (μένος γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀγέννητος δ’ ὅπως πατράς καὶ μόνος υἷς δ’ ἀνθρώπους), ἀλλ’ ὃς υἱὸν πατρός, ἐς εἰκόνα
5 καὶ ὃς συφαγέως πάσης τῆς τοῖς πατοκράτοροι ἀνεργίας καὶ δυνάμεως, σφαγέως τῶν τούτων πατρὸς ἔργων καὶ λόγων καὶ βουλευμάτων - τούτων διεξάγοντας ένα τούν
10 ἐν θάνατον ἐπικινδύνεαν τῇ γῇ, τοῖς μορίς καταφέρειν δοσιμάτος, τῶν ἐπιθέντας ἐκείνην θεομορφίας, τῶν θεόποντα τοῦ νίκους κατ’ ἐπιτάγην τοῦ ἀλείου θεοῦ, τόν
15 ἐπὶ τῶν προφητῶν δικάζουσαν τοὺς παλαιοὺς, τῶν καλέσαντα τοὺς ἀκελθοῦντας, τῶν λαβόντα πάσαν τοῦ κρίσεως τῆς ἐξουσίας (ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ κρίνει οὐδένα, τὴν κρίσιν
20 γὰρ πάσαν ἀδίκειαν τῇ ψεύδῃ), τῶν ἐπὶ ζήσαντα τῶν ἡμερῶν γενόμενον ἐν σαρκί, γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικῶς, γενόμενον ἐνθρόωμοι ἐπὶ ἐλευθερία τινάτα ἀπετύχουσα τινάτα τῆς γένους ημῶν, οὕτω
25 ἀναλαβόντα τὸν ἐν φωτὶ καὶ σάματος ἀνθρωπον - τῶν διὰ γλάσσης καὶ στόματος εὐαγγελισάμενον τῆς εἰρήμην τοῖς ἐγγὺς καὶ τοῖς μακρῶν, τὸν γενόμενον ἐκ μακρῶν
30 μέχρι σταυροῦ καὶ δακτόν, καὶ μή λόγιν διψαφών, ἀλλ’ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν ἡμερῶν, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀδάστασιν ἀνακελακαλω-
35 σάμενον τοῖς δακτοῖς τὸ μνημό- 

1 Δς γεννητόν ἀγεννητόν Λπδ; Δς ἀγεννητόν ἀγεννητόν Υ; οὕτω δς
υὸς υἷς ἐς (I ΙΙ, 377, 11-12) 3 υὸς om ΡΖ, post μονογένης add γεννητός; ὥς δια repetitum F. 10 ἐπικινδύνεαν υ᾽. 13 νομοθε-
21-22 γενέμενοι . . γνωσιά om g (Ι ΙΙ, 384, 29-30). 23 ἐπὶ υ. 
24 ἐπὶ . . . ἡμῶν om g (Ι ΙΙ, 384, 30). 24 om om υ. 
22 τῆς F. 32 τρεῖμενον ΡΖ.
kai metá toútov πιστεόμενον εἰς τὸν παράλληλον, τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς
5 ἀληθείας, τὸν καθηγητὴν τῆς εὐαγγειλίας, γενόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ μόνου ἐξου διὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς καὶ τοῦτον καθαίραν δυστεκμένον: οὔτε κατὰ τὸν πατέρα οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ συναρμο-
10 λόμενον: εἰς γὰρ εἰσὶ καὶ μόνος πατήρ ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς: οὔτε τῷ ὑιῷ συνεξεσάμονέν: μονογενής γὰρ ἐστὶν: ὁ υἱὸς οὕδενα ἔχων ἀδελφῶν δυογενῆ: οὔτε μὴν ἄλλο
15 τινὶ συντασσόμενον: ἀπάντων γὰρ ἀναβεβλημένον διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ γενο
μένων ποιμάτων γενόσει καὶ φύσει καὶ δόξῃ καὶ γνώσει, διὸς κρίτων ἔργων καὶ κράτιστον τοῦ μονογε-
νοῦς: μεγάλων τὸ καὶ κάλλιστον: εἰς δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἡν καὶ πρῶτος καὶ μόνος, καὶ πάντων κρίσεις τῶν τοῦ υἱοῦ ποιμάτων κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἄξον, κάσων
20 ἐνεργειαν καὶ διδασκαλίαν ἔξανεν κατὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τῷ υἱῷ, πεπάθημεν

he preached peace to those who were near and to those who were far off. He became obedient unto the cross and unto death, and yet he did not see corruption, but rose again the third day, and after his resurrection summed up the mystery for those who were his own. He is seated at the right hand of God and will come again to judge the living and the dead.

And after him we believe in the Counselor, the Spirit of truth, the teacher of godliness, who was brought forth by the sole God through the Only-begotten and was made subject to him once and for all. He is neither on the same level as the Father nor is he to be reckoned with the Father, for the Father is the one and only God who is over all; neither is he to be made equal with the Son, for the Son is the Only-begotten, and has no brother to share his nature. He is not, moreover, to be ranked with anything else, since he transcends all the creatures which were made through the Son both in origin and in nature, in glory and in knowledge, being the first and most mighty work of the Only-begotten, the greatest and most beautiful. He also is one and first and only and is the
chiefest of the works of the Son both in substance and in the dignity of his nature. He brings every activity and teaching to completion in accordance with the Son’s will: he is sent by him, and takes what is his and declares it to those who are being instructed, and is the guide of truth. It is he who sanctifies the saints; he who initiatives those approaching the Mystery; he who at the command of the giver of grace distributes every gift; who works togeth in those who believe for the apprehension and contemplation of what has been commanded; who moves those who pray; who leads men to that which is advantageous; who strengthens them in godliness; who enlightens souls with the light of knowledge; who destroys vain arguments. It is he, too, who binds demons and heals the sick; who cures the diseased; who brings back the wandering; who comforts the distressed; who raises the fallen; who refreshes the weary; who encourages the struggling; who cheers the faint-hearted. He is the guardians of all, and exercises every care and solicitude for the advancement of the better-disposed, and for the protection of the more faithful.
In addition to these things, we also believe in the future resurrection, through our Saviour, of our dissolved bodies together with their own proper parts and members, neither lacking nor altered in anything which went to make up the body of each in this present life. Moreover, we believe that after these things will come the judgement of those who have thought or lived wickedly; a judgement upon every action, word, and activity, upon all the deeds, conceptions, and thoughts together which have been done in this present existence; a judgement in which not one thing will be forgotten, either great or small, nothing overlooked, lawful or unlawful, which has been done or accomplished. The proper and appropriate retribution will be meted out to each: those who have lived godlessly and remained in sin to the very end will be sent to everlasting punishment; those who have lived devout and righteous lives will be borne up to everlasting life.

These things, then, we profess, having learned them from the saints, and, professing them, believe. Neither have we been constrained by shame or fear that we should pass over anything which we have learned nor been urged on by shame or contentiousness that
we should add or distort anything; nor have we taken cognizance of any of the discord or calumny which has been fabricated against us by detractors or slanderers—their condemnation is just.
Appendix II:

ALLEGED UNPUBLISHED FRAGMENTS OF EUNOMIUS.

The possible existence of unpublished fragments of the lost works of Eunomius has been suggested repeatedly over the past century and a half. The issue was originally raised in the Bibliotheca Graeca of Fabricius/Hareles,¹ and subsequently taken up by both M. Albertz² and L. Abramowski.³ It must now be reported that none of the possibilities suggested by Fabricius/Hareles shed any new light on Eunomius' literary remains. In what follows, we shall discuss each of the suggested possibilities in turn (including some not mentioned by Fabricius/Hareles) and attempt to identify the manuscript in question and evaluate its authenticity:⁴


The manuscript described by Fabricius/Hareles following Montfaucon⁵ is to be identified as Ms. Escorial Gr. 371, ff. 421r-423r,⁶ and is a re-arranged version of the second of the five

⁴The headings which precede nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 are the descriptions given by Fabricius/Hareles, loc. cit.
Pseudo-Athanasian Dialogi de Sancta Trinitate (PG 28, 1157D-1201C). The "impii Actii epistola" is that found at PG 28, 1173A/B, and begins the dialogue. Thus, in this manuscript the single Dialogue II is broken up into two separate dialogues in the following order: Dialogue I (f. 42r) = PG 28, 1173A-1201C; Dialogue II (f. 42v) = PG 28, 1157D-1173A.


This manuscript is to be identified as Codex Oxon. Bodleianus Cromwell 7, pp. 579-581, and contains a short dialogue entitled 'Εροτημὶς Ευνομίου πρὸς τῶν μέγαν Βασίλειον. While this dialogue was apparently composed for didactic purposes, it contains no fragments of Eunomius; his participation is limited to the asking of short questions, of which the first may be taken as representative: Τι ἐστι θεὸς τὸ πᾶσι περιπεπόθοιν;

3. Codex Oxon. Bodleianus Canon 41, ff. 83r-84r.

Although this manuscript is mentioned neither by Fabricius/Hareles nor by his modern followers, it contains a short dialogue entitled, Ευνομίου αἱρετικὸς ἐρότημα πρὸς τὸν ἄγιον Ἀμφιλόχιον ἀνὰ τῶν εὐαγγέλιων διημέτειν. It is similar in character to the preceding dialogue, and like it contains no independent information about Eunomius.

8 Ibid., Vol. I, col. 45.

This manuscript, described in the catalogue mentioned by Fabricius/Hareles as Eunomii catechesis religionis christiana, is to be identified as Ms. Voss. Gr. Q. 13, ff. 22r-38v. It is in fact a copy of the Liber Apologeticus and is the manuscript designated V in our own edition.10

5. "et p. 397. citatur Eunomius de mercede meretricis non admissenda in templum, graece."

The title, Eunomius, de mercede meretricis non admissenda in templum, is derived from an early catalogue of the Library of the University of Leiden.11 The manuscript in question is undoubtedly Ms. Voss. Gr. Q. 30, ff. 256r-259v,12 and is in fact a Pseudo-Philonic work based on a passage in the De Specialibus Legibus.13

6. "Vindobon. in cod. caesar XLI. nr. 6 sunt Mathusalae monachi montis Sinai excerpta de S. Trinitate ex Her-mete Trismegisto, Platone, Aristotele et Eunomio. v Lambe. comm VII. p. 175."

This manuscript is to be identified as Ms. Vindobonensis

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9 Catalogi Librorum Manuscriptorum Angliae et Hiberniae (Oxoniae: E Theatro Sheldoniano, 1697), Vol. II, p. 60, no. 2210. 10v. supra p. 6*.

11 Catalogi Librorum ... Bibliothecae Publicae Universitatis Lugdun-Batavae (Lugduni apud Batavos: Sumptibus Petri Vander Aa, 1716), p. 397.


It contains a fragment ascribed to a "Eunomius" which is part of a collection entitled, Πλούταρχος ἀποδέγματα φιλοσοφών περὶ τριάδος. The fragment itself reads as follows: Εὐνομίου τοῦ ὄμπριάτου τῶν ἑλων αἰτίου, προσεπινεύστηκαν οδύνα. ἄλλο δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐκ αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος ὁ πάντων ἀλλος:—

As the title of the collection indicates, this fragment is part of a series of attestations of the doctrine of the Trinity by Greek philosophers. Apart from that ascribed to Eunomius himself, the other philosophers cited in the collection are (Ps.-) Plato, (Ps.-) Aristotle, and Hermes Trismegistus. This, together with the announced purpose of the collection itself, goes to suggest that the "Eunomius" in question is not the heretical Bishop of Cyzicus, but a Greek philosopher of the same name. In view of this, the most likely possibility would be that this fragment is derived from a Neo-Pythagorian source, and that the "Eunomius" who is named as its author is in fact Ἐὐνομός described in the tradition as the brother of Pythagoras. 

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15 What are fundamentally the same fragments are found in a somewhat different form in Richard Bentley's De Tennes Mala- lae Chronographia Eoistola: (Ps.-) Plato at PG 97, 724B; (Ps.-) Aristotle at PG 97, 722B; and Hermes Trismegistus at PG 97, 722C. That ascribed to "Eunomius" is not included.
16 Cf. Diogenes Laertius VIII, 2, and the Suda Νευκάγορας (A. Adler, ed., Suidae Lexicon [Lipsiae: in Aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1931], Pars IV, no. 3120, p. 262, l. 23); Cf. also the following entry, which gives another similarly ascribed fragment in a collection of pagan authors.
7. Gregorii Abu-l-Faraq (Barhebraeus), Liber Candelabri Sanctuarii, pars III (P0 27, 582, 25-27).

Although this reference was unknown to Fabricius/Hareles, it is well worth our attention because, like entry no. 6, it contains a quotation of someone called "Eunomius." The quotation is one of a series listed under the heading "Pagan Witnesses," and intended to illustrate a discussion of the procession of the Holy Spirit. Other witnesses cited include Hermes Trismegistus (P0 27, 582, 13; 584, 4),17 An Oracle of Elea (P0 27, 582, 20), (Ps.-)Plutarch (P0 27, 584, 1), (Ps.-)Aristotle (P0 27, 584, 10), (Ps.-)Sophocles (P0 27, 584, 12), and (Ps.-) Plato (P0 27, 584, 15). Our own fragment is as follows:

"Witness Three: The Philosopher Eunomius said, 'The fountain of the Father is incorruptible, its flow everlasting. By this device he possessed a power equal in force (to himself), so that the Almighty Word is from him by nature, since he also is Omnipotent by nature.'"

The general context in which this fragment is found, as well as the designation of the "Eunomius" in question as "The Philosopher," is sufficient to show that the reference cannot be to our own

17 The line numbers indicate the opening line.
heresiarch, and, indeed, must be to a non-Christian. It is a reasonable supposition, then, that, as in the case of our earlier example, the "Eunomius" intended is the brother of Pythagoras, and that the fragment found in Barhebraeus is yet another sample of Neo-Pythagorean literature. 18

8. "In Nicetae Choniatae Aecominti panoplia dogmatica, (cod. Baluze) tom. V. est enarratio de Aetii et Eunomii haeresi; dainceps capita, quibus Eunomius probere nimitur, filium post patrem ortum remque esse creatum: sub haec propositiones quaedam haelectiae Aetii et Eunomii, earumque refutationes, teste Montfaucon. in palaeographia gr. pag. 329."

This manuscript is to be identified as Ms. Parisinus Gr. 1234, 19 and is a copy of the Thesaurus Orthodoxae of Nicetas Acominatus which has been heavily interleaved with extraneous matter. As noted by Montfaucon 20 this manuscript does indeed contain a series of "propositions" ascribed to Eunomius, however they are identical with those in the printed text of the Thesaurus at V, 41-53 (PG 139, 1:01C-14:18A). These are of so general a nature that it is impossible to believe that they are direct quotations of a specific work. Rather, they are to be taken as propositions assembled by Nicetas as generally

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18 On this and the preceding entry, see Hasmut Erbse, Fragmente griechischer Theosophien (Hamburg: Hansischer Gil- denverlag, 1941), pp. 138-319, especially p. 138, n. 279.
illustrative of the Eunomian position, and intended to form the basis of his own refutation.

9. Cod. Vaticanus Graecus 495, F. 227r. 21

This manuscript contains a passage entitled παραλογισμὸς Ἐνωμίου. Unfortunately, upon examination it proves to contain no words at all other than those incidental to its purpose. It is in fact a small diagram dealing with the relationship between the natures of Father and Son according to Eunomius. It contains no quotations whatsoever.

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Appendix III:

SOME UNNOTICED FRAGMENTS OF
THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA'S CONTRA EUNOMIUM

Among the many now lost treatises written against the heretic Eunomius, the destruction of that by Theodore of Mopsuestia is perhaps most to be regretted. This is true not only for students of Theodore himself, but for those interested in Eunomius as well. Theodore's treatise, like that of Gregory of Nyssa, was written against the lost Apologia Apologiae of Eunomius; the latter's refutation in five books of Basil's Adversus Eunomium. Since our only remaining sources for the reconstruction of Eunomius' work are the section of it quoted by Gregory, the loss of Theodore's Contra Eunomium is doubly to be regretted. One of the few things we are told about it is that, by contrast with Gregory, it refuted Eunomius virtually word-for-word (καὶ ἐξῆν ὑπ' ἕνας). Of this work, there now remain two recognized fragments.

One, from the tenth book, is preserved in the writings of Facundus Hermianensis, and the other, from the eighteenth book, has been discovered by Luise Abramowski in a manuscript of the Cambridge University Library. More recently, some information on the contents of the fifth book has been provided by E. Bihain, using information derived from fragments of an epitome of the Historia Tripartita of Theodore the Lector. All told, it is a very

*For the notes to this Appendix, see pp. 176*-200* below.
meagre remnant of what was once a major work. It is our purpose in this appendix to show that this list does not exhaust the available fragments, and that by a comparison of yet other authors further examples may be isolated.

Before we go on to examine these authors and the fragments which they may preserve for us, it would be well to have in mind another passage bearing on the contents of the lost work. This passage is to be found in the Contra Haereses of Theodoret of Cyrus, who mentions that in his work against Eunomius, Theodore, like Gregory of Nyssa, dealt with the life and manners of Eunomius' teacher Aetius:

Τότε τὸν παιδήμιον 'Ελευθίον ἐξαγαγὼν τῆς Κυζίκου, τὸν Εὐνόμιον, ἐχειροτόνησεν ἀντὶ ἑκέινου. Ὁ δὲ Εὐνόμιος ἐξελέξε τὸν Εὐρούν διδασκάλον, οὗ τὸν τρισάθλιον μίου, καὶ μετῆλεν ἐκπετεύματα, καὶ Ἰργύριος ὁ Νυσαις καὶ Ἀκάθαρος ὁ Μόπσουστιας, ἐν οἷς καὶ Εὐνόμιον συνέγραψαν, ἐκδόταν ἐκρίβως.

"Then he (go. Eudoxius) drove the praise-worthy Eleusius from Cyzicus and consecrated Eunomius in his stead. This Eunomius used to boast that his teacher was Aetius the Syrian (whose thrice-wretched life and the pursuits he followed both Gregory of Nyssa and Theodore of Mopsuestia have accurately
described in the works which they wrote against Eunomius."

Since there is no question of the accuracy of Theodoret's information with regard to Gregory of Nyssa,⁸ there seems to be every reason to accept what he says about Theodore of Mopsuestia as well. This is a useful piece of information for our own purposes, since, as we shall see, two of our own fragments exactly fit this description.

The sources of our information are the Thesaurus Orthodoxiae of the 13th century Byzantine historian, Nicetas Acominatos (d. circa 1210),⁹ and the Ecclesiastical History of the 6th century Nestorian author, Barpadhešaba 'Arbaia,¹⁰ both of whom specifically mention Theodore of Mopsuestia. Nicetas in particular makes it clear that Theodore is among his sources, for he begins his discussion of the Anomoeans in the latter part of his fifth book with a list of the writers on whom his work is based:

 Грάφουσι μὲν τὰ περὶ Ἀπειλοῦ καὶ Εὐνομίου διὰ πλείοναν
 λόγων ὑπὸ Ἕλευσος Ἐκκλησιαστικοῦ ἔκδοτος, γράφει δὲ καὶ Ἐκκλησιαστικὸν Ἐκκλησιαστικὸν Ἐκκλησιαστικὸν τῷ Κύπρῳ καὶ Ἐκκλησιαστικὸν τῷ Κύρος¹² καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἐκκλησιαστικῶν ἑσπεριδοῦν συγγραφέων ἑπταετημένος¹³ ἀπὸ τὸν Ἰστορικὸν ἑμεῖς ἡρώους ἡμέρας τὸ ἑσπεριδοῦν ἑπταετημένος.¹⁴
"While St. Gregory of Nyssa and Theodore of Mopsuestia wrote more fully about the matter of Aetius and Eunomius, Epiphanius of Cyprus, Theodoret of Cyrus, and the ecclesiastical historians have written briefly as well. We ourselves have collected from all of these whatever seemed most useful."

This list (which appears virtually exhaustive for the part of the work to which it pertains) greatly facilitates the task of determining the presence of fragments of Theodore. As we shall see, apart from the fragments cited below, all of the relevant passages can reasonably be ascribed to one or another of the authors mentioned. The "ecclesiastical historians" appear to be Socrates and Sozomen; Philostorgius, who is cited twice (always by name), is perhaps also to be included under this heading. The one question which might arise is with regard to Theodoret of Cyrus, who is also known to be the author of a now lost Contra Eunomium. However, since all of the passages in Nicetas can be explained on the basis of the Ecclesiastical History, and Theodoret is ranked among those authors who wrote only "briefly," it seems this possibility can be ruled out. It is the position of Theodore himself which is chiefly worthy of attention. It is important to note that he is specifically mentioned along with Gregory of Nyssa as one who has written about
Aetius and Eunomius "more fully" (ὅσα πληρώσω λόγω), and this by way of contrast with the other authors mentioned. Since there is no question in Gregory's case but that his own Contra Eunomium is intended (it is in fact quoted),\textsuperscript{18} it seems difficult to escape the same conclusion in the case of Theodore.

These fragments had already come to the attention of L. Parmentier early in this century as the source of certain passages in Theodoret,\textsuperscript{19} and he apparently recognized them as coming from the lost Contra Eunomium of Theodore of Mopsuestia.\textsuperscript{20} However, while some of the correspondances between Theodoret and the fragments preserved in Nicetas are unquestionable, others are more problematic. In particular, it seems to us that at least some of the passages ascribed by Parmentier to Theodore may as easily be based on Theodoret himself. We have therefore decided to approach our fragments on a "worst case" basis, and will include only that material which it seems impossible to ascribe to any other source. Those passages which seem to us uncertain will be either bracketed or treated separately.

Unlike Nicetas, our other author, Barḥadbešabba, does not give us a list of his sources, and this naturally increases the difficulty of isolating the fragments of any lost authors which he may contain. However, he does give us reason to at least suspect that one of those authors is Theodore. At the end of his two chapters on Aetius and Eunomius respectively, he
specifically mentions the lost work, and describes it, along with that of Basil, as "overthrowing his entire error."

"The other was Theodore (now amongst the saints); he was like a light for the Church, for he possessed invincible power against the heretics. He wrote a book against Eunomius in forty thousand lines, and taught other things as well, overthrowing his entire error."

This passage raises certain other problems which we shall discuss in due course, but for the moment it is sufficient to note that the reference is quite clearly to a formal refutation of Eunomius "in forty thousand lines." Moreover, we find that there is at least one passage in the part of the work to which this quotation belongs which is headed, "And as the blessed Theodore ... says ..."22 There is thus every reason to suppose that at least part of this section of the work is derived from Theodore, and more than likely from that very treatise which is so highly praised by Barḥadbešabba. The probability of this
is greatly increased when we discover that these chapters on Aetius and Eunomius contain a series of passages which are largely parallel to those in Nicetas. Indeed, one of these parallel passages is specifically identified by Nicetas as coming from Theodore. There thus seems good reason to believe that Nicetas' reference, both here and in the list of sources which we discussed earlier, is to the same book which Barḥadbešabba describes as having been written against Eunomius in four thousand lines.

The fragments to be found in Barḥadbešabba can be isolated fairly readily. They are entirely surrounded by matter derived from the *Ecclesiastical History* of Socrates. However, once we have said this, there is still a further problem to be faced. As we noted earlier, Barḥadbešabba, unlike Nicetas, does not give us a list of his sources, and this greatly complicates our task. When we have identified the various passages which derive from Socrates, we are left with five fragments, four of which are unknown and unidentified, and one of which is ascribed to Theodore of Mopsuestia. The three longest unidentified sections (Fragments I, III, and IV) are in great part parallel to corresponding passages of Nicetas. However, two of them (Fragments III and IV) contain additional matter as well. It is this additional matter, together with the remaining non-parallel passage (Fragment VI), which constitutes our problem. Does it or does it not derive
from Theodore? Naturally, this is a question which cannot be answered until we have examined the fragments themselves. However, since the additional matter in Fragments III and IV is at least contiguous, if not continuous, with the rest of the fragments, we shall print it out in full as it occurs in Barḥadbesabba, and leave the problem of how much of it is Theodore to a later discussion. The matter contained in Fragment VI is naturally more problematic, since it is neither identified as Theodore's nor paralleled in Nicetas. However, as there remains some reason to think that it too may come from Theodore, we have decided to include it as a separate fragment, merely calling attention to its more questionable nature. Once we have actually examined it, we will give it a full discussion.

With these comments, let us now go on to examine the fragments themselves. Those which occur in both Nicetas and Barḥadbesabba will be presented in parallel columns, the Greek of Nicetas on the left and the Syriac of Barḥadbesabba on the right. All of the fragments will be followed by a translation.

**FRAGMENT I.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nicetas:</th>
<th>Barḥadbesabba:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>δὲ ὁ δὲ Ἡγούμενος λέγει,</td>
<td>אֲחֵאֵי בַּּבּוֹרֶד בֶּשָּׁבָּבָּה</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>πατρὸς ἐλευθέρου μέν, κρυ-</td>
<td>לאָבָּבּוֹרֶד בֶּשָּׁבָּבָּה</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σοχόν δὲ 23 τῆς τέχνης,</td>
<td>מַּבּוֹרֶד בֶּשָּׁבָּבָּה</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τὸν σταυρὸν καὶ τῇ θεῷ</td>
<td>نُبْلُيْلُوُتْبُهُبُوُرُبُمْ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
πυλεοναρίου

(τούτους οικίαν
οὐκ ἔχοντος, ἀλλ’ ἐπιφερομένου
πατηλεόντα τρίχενον εἰτ’ οὖν
σκηνήν εὔτελήν), στρεφομένου
τοῖς κατὰ τὰς πανηγυρεῖς καὶ
10 βραχυτάτους ἔργους τῇ ἡμερη-
σίᾳ ποριζομένου τρωφῆν.

δς καὶ τῶν οὐδὲν έχων ἐπάθενον,
ἐκδίδας καὶ τὸ τεχνὴρίον,24
ἐπούδασε δὲ καὶ τὰ πρῶτα
15 γράμματα διδαχήτων τοῦτον25
πρὸς τὸ καταγράφεσθαι τοὺς τῶν
συναλαγμάτων λόγους.

(Cf. lines 8-11 above)
[ότι δὲ χρυσοχόδος ὃ 'Αέτλως

hydrate καὶ Φιλοστέργος]

20 ὡς τοῦτο σὺμφωνον ἐν τῷ

τρίτῳ τῆς ἱστορίας λέγει:

χωρίζει γοῦν, 26 φησὶν, ἐπὶ

χρυσοχώδην ὃ 27 'Αέτλως,

ἀκρότατος γέγονε χρυσόθ

25 χειρουργῶς. 28

δολώσας δὲ τοῖς πεπιστευ-

μένων ἔργων, σφραγίζων εἰκότως

ἐπειράθη μαστίγων. 29

ἔπειτα βλέπων μὲν 29 δαυτὸν

30 διαζύγηται γλείσχρος ἀπὸ τῆς
tέχνης, τοὺς δὲ Χριστιανοὺς

ἐξ θείᾳ φιλανθρωπίᾳ χρωμένους

πρὸς 30 πάντας μὲν, μάλιστα

οὲ τοὺς δαυτὸν ὁμοδόξους,

35 ἔρρεθε τὴν τέχνην καὶ ἤμειψε
τὸ σχῆμα· φιλόσοφοι δὲ καὶ Χριστιανικοὶ βίον ὑποκρινόμενος, πολλοὺς εὑρὲ τοὺς θεραπεύοντας.
"As Mopsuestia says, he (Aetius) came of a free father who was, however, a goldsmith by trade, a 'puleonarius' (that is, one who doesn't have a house, but who carries around a ragged 'papuleon,' or cheap tent). He used to make the rounds of the festivals and earn his daily bread by the most trifling jobs. He had his son following him around and taught him his little
craft. He was eager for him to be taught his abc's so that he could write down the words of contracts.

He was taught his abc's at the instigation of his father so that he could write down the words of exchanges and sales as he followed his father around. Such is the custom of those who (go about) in the cities and towns to set up their tents of hair at the festivals. In the shards of (broken) vessels they hide sparks of fire in the straw and in blowing on them they rill their faces with soot and their mouths with air until their cheeks burst, in hope of a profit, and gain two, or at most, three small coins.

[Philostorgius, his co-religionist, is wit-
mess that Aetius was a goldsmith in the third book of his history. 'Aetius, then,' he says, "went on to goldsmithery, and became a first-class goldsmith." He faked one of the jobs with which he was entrusted, and naturally received a heavy beating.

Then, when he saw that he was living shabbily from his trade, and that the Christians acted with great humanity towards everyone, especially those of their own persuasion, he threw over his trade, changed his whole style, and, after aping the philosophical and Christian life, acquired many followers. Because after the death of his father, he was unable to live and feed himself because of the paltriness of his trade, he was emboldened to do business (μαρτυρία) after another manner. When he saw the great humanity with which the Christians (Χριστιανος) acted towards their own associates, and that they were no longer...
persecuted as before for their religion, he changed his whole style— not for perfection, but in external appearance (σχήμα) only. But that he hadn't given up his business (μακροδοτία), I will show from the following:

A man well known in the city, whose name was Marinus, gave him a golden necklace which was broken so he could repair it. The clever Aetius, however, cut off a great deal of gold from it, and then stretched out the surrounding areas and filled it in, but without paying any attention to its shape (σχήμα). When its owner noticed this, he
seized hold of his body to beat him. After he had given him what he deserved, he heard that the Steward of the Church was feeding him, and, using heavy abuse and dire threats, drove him completely out of his house, and even out of his town. Such was the skill of Aetius."

FRAGMENT II.

καὶ δὲς φησὶ θεόδωρος ὁ Ἑβουνεστίας, τὸ τὰς ἀντιψάνων τῆς φαλασάδας εἶδος ἐκ τῆς Εὔρων εἰς τὴν 'Ελλάδα γλῶσσαν μετεβίβασαν, μυροῦ δὲ ἀνωτάτου ἐκ πάντων τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἡπασί τῷ θαυμασίῳ τοῦτον ἔργον φανέρως τὰς γεννητορες. καὶ μὴν ὁ ἐπερεύσαστος ἔλεγον, ἀδώκα πατρὶ δὴ νόθον ἐν ἀγίῳ πνεύματι· ἀλαμβανός δὲ πρῶτος εἴπε, ἀδώκα πατρὶ καὶ νόθον ἀγίῳ πνεύματι.

[τὸν τοῦ 'Αέτους ὁποδεξαμένος, καθ' ἐνθίλθοτα, ἄνθυτος, διάκονος ἐκειροτάνησεν· ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ πολλῶν] καὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἀναχωρήσειν ἀπειλοῦντων καὶ
μάλιστα ἔλαβανον καὶ ἀλοδόρου τοῦτο πράξειν ἐπιχειροῦντων καὶ τὴν αὐρειόν ἐλεγχόντων ἱετέου (τὸ μὲν τι καὶ ὀδηγὸς ὁ λεσυλος, τὸ δὲ τι καὶ ἐμπαράσπευον 46 αὐτῷ), πρὸς τὰ ἔξοχα μηχανώμενω ἠπαυσε μὲν τὴς διακονίας αὐτῶν, 15 ὅτε δὲ διὰ πλεύνους τιμῆς.

FRAGMENT III.

Nicetas:

ὁ δὲ ὁ 'Αλέκτος ἵππῳ καὶ
εὐτράπελος καὶ μυκρολογίας
καὶ πράξει καὶ σχῆμασι
χαῖρων ἄσέμνοις.

Barhadbešabba:

খুশীন চে তুলে।
চুক্তি: নিয়ন্ত্রণ
একরা। এক টাকা
ঁজেনার পাঁচ টাকা একরা, ১১৮০ স্কুলান এক টাকা।

সেই স্কুলার জন্য একটিটা করতন একরা, ১১৮০ স্কুলান এক টাকা।

ঁজেনার মিখাল শতাক্ষরের পাঁচটিটা স্কুলান এক টাকা ১১৮০ স্কুলান এক টাকা।

ফ্রাংকে সমস্ত এক টাকা ১১৮০ স্কুলান এক টাকা শতাক্ষরের পাঁচটিটা স্কুলান।

লোকের মিখাল শতাক্ষরের পাঁচটিটা স্কুলান এক টাকা ১১৮০ স্কুলান এক টাকা।

লোকের মিখাল শতাক্ষরের পাঁচটিটা স্কুলান এক টাকা ১১৮০ স্কুলান এক টাকা শতাক্ষরের পাঁচটিটা স্কুলান।
5 τὴν γὰρ ἐνθήτα μέχρι τῶν ἑσχῆν ἄδρων, γύρνοις ἐπε-
κρότει τοῖς μπρότες τὰς χεῖρας· οὔτερον δὲ τοῖν
παθοῦν αὐτῶν, τὴν γαστέρα
10 ἐπέτοπε καὶ ἐπέρθεν.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς συμποσίοις γε-
λοιάζων ἐλέγε τοῖς παρόσιοι,
Εἶ βουλέσθη, διδάξω ὅμοι τὸ
όδγει· καὶ τρεῖς πνεύμα-
15 τὰ ἄνευς ἁμαίνουσας προϊήμενος
φίλους ἔρεα, Ἡδον τὸ τῶν
'Ορθοκύκλων ὁδικα (τοῖς
'Ορθοδόξως οὕτω καλῶν κατά
μεταποθέσιον), εἶτα πάλιν

15 αὐτὴν τῇ ζωῇ ἐν,
100 ἐπετέσθη.

107 ἐπετέσθη.

30 ἐπετέσθη.

35 ἐπετέσθη.
"And as Theodore of Mopsuestia says, they \(^{50}\) transposed the manner of singing the psalms antiphonally from the Syrian to the Greek tongue. Certainly, it was they above almost all others who appeared to everyone in the whole civilized world as the authors of this wonderful work. And indeed, the heteroousiastae used to say, 'Glory to the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit.' Flavian was the first to say, 'Glory to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit.'"
[Moreover, after receiving Aetius, as has been shown, Leontius ordained him deacon. But when many people objected and threatened to leave the Church, and especially when Flavian and Diodore undertook to do this and refuted Aetius' heresy (for Leontius was afraid of the one thing and the other was got ready for him), in his scheming for the future he deprived him of the diaconate, but indeed, did so through even greater honour.]

Translation: Fragment III.

"Aetius was reckless, slippery, and delighting in pettiness, trickery and indecent gestures."51

"By his habits and manner of teaching he filled up the measure of these things. He used to frequent the offices of physicians and scribes, for he was always laughing and acting very lewdly. He used to wander around the squares and taverns (ωάπηςς) in the manner (τάξις) of shepherds and ploughmen looking to fill his belly. His appearance
He used to lift up his clothing right to the hips, and slap his hands on his thighs. Then lifting up his feet, he would make his stomach resound with a blow and break wind.

At dinner parties, he used to say jokingly to (σχήμα) was after the manner (τάξις) of clowns (μίμος). He used to go to dinner-parties not only when invited, but even crashed them by force and went in. He also increased his relations with those who lived disorderly lives. When he wanted to display the content of his faith, he used to pull up the skirt of his clothing right to the hips and slap his thighs. Indeed, he would lift up a foot and break wind to make the bystanders laugh.

Whether by nature or because he used to work at it, he had a great facility for these things. He would say to those who
those who were present, 'If you want, I'll teach you doctrine.' Then, letting go with three equal sounds, he would shout, 'Look! The teaching of the Ortho-cycles!' (this is what he called the Orthodox by way of transposition). Then, letting go again with three unequal ones, he would say, 'Look! Now that's ours!' were present in the dining room, 'What faith do you want me to show you? Ours, or the heretics'? This is what he made of the rule (τὰ ἱκά) of faith. He would lift up his foot and break wind while pressing his stomach. If they came out all alike, he would say, 'This is the faith of the ἑρτγαλίτις' 54 (i.e., of the heretics ἀλτομωρ — that's what he called us). His own error was based on things unequal, so when he offered to demonstrate it, 55 he did so with unequal sounds. That is, the first large, the second smaller than the large one, and the third less than both of them, in accordance with
his opinion about the Trinity. But if it happened that the first was not the largest, but the middle one instead, and sometimes that the last was larger than both the others, or that two would come out the same, in accordance with the forces pushing from within, he would say, 'That's like the Mephisto!'\textsuperscript{56} This is why he was given the name Pilestén,\textsuperscript{57} that is, 'he who breaks wind.' And because he had a dog-like desire for meat, and was afraid of fasts, he used to call ours, 'lentileness, 'bean-ness,' 'chick pea(-ness)',\textsuperscript{58}--as if they didn't really produce in-
telligence. He was not reproached for the food of Daniel and his friends, (who told) what knowledge they had received. 59 As for women who did not possess a name for virginity on account of good works, and who used to go in to him, I forbear even to speak," 60
Δήμος Ευρωπέαν και Απολογίων των Βασιλέων του μεγάλου προγόνων.

Δωρεά το πρώτο τούτον και 5 δεκαεννεύοντες γράμματα, προς την των ταξινόμων διάκρισην.
τελευταίων δὲ αὐτῶν, εἰς Κωνσταντινούπολιν ἀφίκετο
10 καὶ ἐσέφρησεν θαυμώδες οἰκήματι, μεγίστην, παιδαγωγεῖν τε παρὰ
tοῦ αὐτῆς ἐπετράπη δεσπότου
τοῦ ἐκείνου παῖδας, οἷς
ἐπόμενον ἐν παιδαγωγοῦ τάξει
15 τῆς παιδείας ἑκοίμασε, καὶ
tετεῦθεν ἐγείρατο λόγων γραμ-
ματικῶν καὶ ἡπτομικῶν.

καταλαμβάνω δὲ τούτο τοῦτον
δὲ τῆς οἰκίας δεσπότης πλήμ-
20 μελοῦντα τί περὶ τῶν παιδάς,
τὸ μὲν καταραμένης τοιοῦτον τὸ
γεγονός ἀτιμίας ἡγήσατο τὸν
παιδῶν τοῖς ἀνωπόδομον δὲ
αὐτὸν μάστιξιν, τῆς πόλεως
25 ἐξελεύσθη ἐκπέλλωσεν πρὸς τιμω-
ρίας ὀνομασίας ἀπειλήσας
ἐνδώσειν εἰ διατρίβοντα τὸ δὲ
λόγιον αὐτὸν γνώρι.

οὕτως ὡν ἀλώμενος εἰς ἀν-
30 τιμές ἀφίκετο καὶ τὴν
'Αρεινικῆ ὑποθέσες ὅταν,
'Αετίων γυναῖκος ἐντεῦθεν
καὶ Εὐδοξῆς γίνεται, δὲ καὶ
τῷ τοῦ διανόου τουτοῦ
35 ἐτίμησαν ἐξώματι, ἐπειτα
καὶ τῷ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου.63

60 ὑπάρχοντο καὶ λατρεύοι
ἑαυτοὶ οἱ λατρευόντες αὐτῶν
τῷ τοῦ κυρίου τουτοῦ.

32 Στίχος 32: "καὶ ἐπεκαίνεν εἰς τὴν
Βασίλειαν τοῦ θεοῦ πᾶν ἐπιστήμου τῆς
γραμματείας."
Translation.

"In the history (written) about the accursed Eunomius, it is said that when his mother was pregnant with him she saw in a dream that what she was carrying in her womb was like a serpent. Now it happened that there was a priest in the village, an excellent man, and in her concern she went to him and showed him her dream, asking him to offer
"The parents of Eunomius were freedmen of the forebears of Basil the Great. After their death, he was brought up in Constantinople and introduced himself into a great house. He was charged by its master to attend his children.

Having of course taught him his abc's, they introduced him into the profession of shorthand writers.

prayer for her in the Church. He explained the meaning of her dream to her and said, 'He that shall be born of you is to become a serpent for the Church.'

By race (γένος) he was descended from slaves attached to the great house of the family of Basil. His parents appeared pleasing in the eyes of Basil's family, and so they made them freedmen. After Eunomius was born, his parents took him to learn writing, and then (to work) in the company of a writer.

In accordance with the custom in force
After their death, he came to Constantinople and introduced himself into a great house. He was charged by its master to attend his children. Following them about in the capacity of pedagogue, he partook of their education, and thereupon got a taste of grammatical and rhetorical learning.

There, he used to go to the Church, but got no profit from it, for he did not understand the custom of youth to practice perfection (for if it had not been Jews educated as children in the law (ὡς), they would not have crucified the Christ).

After the death of his parents, he left his family, came to Constantinople, and introduced himself into a great house, promising to be serviceable in all he was commanded. Now there were young children there who had to be instructed in the education of noblemen, and their father ordered him to be their...
However, the master of the house caught him offending in some way with regard to the children. He decided that to make what had been done public would dishonour the children; however, after punishing him with the lash, he ordered him out of town, and threatened to hand him over to public retribution if he ever again found him staying there.

And so, wandering around pedagogue. And so Eunomius, because he loved the pagan learning, himself shared with them in their education in grammar (γραμματική) and rhetoric (ῥητορική). But when he had waxed fat and kicked, their father caught him in some fault with the children (about which it is not fitting to deride him). The master of the house decided that to judge him or turn him in for punishment would mean dishonour for the children and shame for himself, but he nonetheless beat him with heavy blows and threw him out of the city.

After this had happened
in this way, he came to Antioch. After he had sunk to the Arian doctrine, he came to know Aetius and Eudoxius, who also honoured him with the dignity of the diaconate and afterwards of the priesthood.

to him, he came to Antioch, and went to a man who had recently begun to be a sophist (σωφιστής). Because this man had more zeal than his predecessor, he did not accept a fee, but on the contrary gave one himself in order to collect students. After a while, however, he gradually acquired eloquence, and became skillful in the power of speech, so he turned around and accepted a fee from his students. Since Buncmius did not have the fee and (the teacher) would not teach without one, while he himself had not yet begun to learn, he rushed to
Eudoxius, who was infected with the opinion of the Arians, so as to be able to live with Aetius, the ministrant of other people's pains. He honoured him with the dignity of the diaconate."

FRAGMENT V.

"And the blessed Theodore is a true witness of this, for he says, 'When I was a boy, and he with the height of a man full-grown, I asked him questions from Scripture and he did not know how to answer them. Instead, he asked if he could learn them from me.'"
So then, we have five fragments taken from two otherwise unconnected authors of which three are found in closely parallel forms in both. The remaining two are both of them identified as coming from Theodore, as is the first of the others. While we can identify with reasonable certainty the sources of all of the other relevant passages in these authors, these five—together with a sixth which we shall soon examine—cannot be ascribed to any of them. Moreover, while one author, Barḥadbeshabba, specifically mentions Theodore's lost work, the other strongly implies that this work is in fact among his sources. Finally, two of our fragments contain matter which we are specifically told by Theodoret was in the book. It seems, then, that there is strong justification for accepting the underlying source of the greater part of these passages as being Theodore of Mopsuestia's Contra Eunomium.

However, in addition to these passages there remains yet another still to be examined—a passage which is much more problematic than those we have already seen. It is to be found in Barḥadbeshabba, where it forms, together with Fragments I, III, and IV, the only unidentified material. As the possibility cannot be ruled out that it too comes from Theodore's lost work, we will include it here as a sixth fragment, merely using brackets to call attention to its more questionable nature.
 Fragment VI.

لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.

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**Note:** The text appears to be a page from a book in Arabic script, but due to the quality of the image, it is unrecognizable. The page number is 104.
Translation.

"Eunomius devised these things and many others yet when he gave the lie to this (passage), 'No one knows the Father except the Son,' and this, 'No person knows a man's thoughts except his own spirit. So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except his Spirit.' He also commanded at first that baptism be administered behind a man's head (as though the soul resided in the heart, and intelligence in the brain, and that from the navel down the members were impure and could not receive sanctification). However, when he saw that many people were uncovering themselves, he commanded them to wrap the unclean members in bands of cloth, and that thereafter the whole (person) be baptized, but upright for fear that the baptism touch the whole (body). It is said of the unclean mystery that he would butcher a lamb on a table, and pour some of its blood in a cup. Then he would give the people bread and wine mixed with blood, but they did not eat the flesh (unless the priests did so). And because he was afraid lest his abomination be discovered, he commanded it to be done only once in the year. However, when these things were repeated to them by the faithful, they
denied it, (saying) that this was not in fact true. In them was accomplished this (saying), 'It is a shame even to speak of the things they do in secret,' because 'they sacrifice to demons and not to God.' This is why God said to them, 'Woe to them! I will avenge myself upon them.'

This completes our presentation of the text of these fragments. It is obvious, however, that many problems still remain, of which two will occupy our immediate attention. One has already been alluded to, that of the non-parallel matter in Barbadbešabba; the other is related to it. We have already several times remarked on the similarities which exist between the two forms of these fragments when they are found in both authors. Indeed, it seems to us virtually inescapable that the same source lies behind both. It is equally inescapable, however, that these forms, while similar, are not identical. Not only does Nicetas present a shorter form of the fragments than Barbadbešabba, but we find that in one case (Fragment I) the order is different as well. This naturally raises questions about the usefulness of these texts for the reconstruction of Theodore's lost work, and a detailed examination will be necessary before we can use them with any confidence.

We will begin with the fragments as they occur in Nicetas. Not only do these in many ways present the most problems, but the
presence of a list of sources greatly facilitates their examination. The problems are already suggested by Nicetas' own description of his method (ἀφ’ ἐν ἀπάντων ἡμεῖς ἡμανςάμεθα τὰ χρειωθέτατα) which implies high selectivity combined with a certain freedom in arranging materials. Even a cursory examination reveals that this expectation is not likely to be disappointed. It seems, then, that the best procedure will be to take a representative passage based on known sources and, by comparing it with its original, attempt to understand how Nicetas makes use of his material. It is to this that we now turn.

The passage which we have chosen for examination is a relatively simple one which nonetheless provides us with a good idea of Nicetas' editorial methods. It is his account of Aetius' break with the followers of Arius, and, apart from one phrase, is entirely based on Socrates II, 35:

Nicetas: Sources:

(Socrates)
(Sozomen)

επερηκάσατα ἐν τῇ διηλογίᾳ τῆς πίστεως πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Κωνσταντίνου,

"οὕτω, φησίν, ἑκτὸροικησαν, ἥνικα μεταμεληθείς δμόως ἡνικα μεταμεληθείς δμόως

Konstantínou to basilei súv-

10 ὅμη φρονεῖν τοῖς ἐν Νίκαιᾷ

suvelpluthos,

(Socrates)

Ἀρείου γὰρ, δὲ πρῶτον ἔφην, ἄτερα κατὰ διάνοιαν

φρονοῦν ἄτερα τῇ φωνῇ ὅμωλο-

15 γησεν, ὑπὸ τὸν ἐν Νικαίᾳ
tῆς συνόδου τόπον δεχόμενος

καθ'ὑπόγραφε, τὸν ἄτερον

βασιλέα ηλικόν. Διατόθης
mὲν οὖν καὶ Ἀρείου πρῶτος

20 Ἀρείανοῦ διεκρίνετο. ἦν
dὲ καὶ πρῶτον Ἀρείου

αἱρετικὸς ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τῷ

Ἀμφοῖν δόγματι συνηγορεῖν

διατύπωσε ἐπευδέν. ἦν

ἐν

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς Ἀλεξαν-

25 γὰρ τῆς Ἀλεξανδρείας μικρὰ

ἀρείας ἀπάρας

παιδευθεὶς ἀναξιογνώνη

καὶ καταλαβὼν τὴν ἐν Ἑλλά

15 αὐθεν τῆς Ἀμφιδέξεαι ἄρ

Ἀμφιδέξεαι, ἐνετεύθεν γὰρ.
Nicetas' compression of his sources is amply illustrated by the reduction of 26 lines of Socrates and 5 of Sozomen to 18 lines of text. However, apart from the question of compression (which we might have expected anyway) this passage teaches us a great deal about Nicetas' methods, both as regards his actual use of his sources and the order in which he presents them.

To take the latter point first, we find that ll. 18-24 of Socrates have been combined with ll. 1-7 (which they in large part repeat) to form a new sentence making use of aspects of both. Elsewhere, perhaps partly for stylistic reasons, the order of Socrates' account of Arius' deception of the Emperor (ll. 15-18) and his description of the heretic's mental reservations (ll. 12-15) has been reversed. In this case, however, features of the parallel passage in Sozomen have been edited in, and this too may help to account for the change. It is clear that even when using one author as his primary source, he has others in front of him and is prepared to make use of any additional information they may provide. Further, it is equally clear that none of this has been done haphazardly, but is the result of careful thought. An illustration of this, which also illustrates some of the pitfalls involved in making use of Nicetas,
is to be found in the final line of the passage quoted. We notice that the mention of Aetius' ordination to the diaconate found in Socrates has apparently been omitted. A closer examination, however, reveals that this is not in fact the case. The phrase in question has been moved to a point where it can provide the background for the account of the controversy which Aetius' ordination raised—an account which forms part of the bracketed portion of our own Fragment II. 88

This passage, then, does much to confirm the impression derived from the others that Nicetas was a careful and thorough worker, and one who was thoroughly familiar with his sources and prepared to use them intelligently and freely. However, it also does much to illustrate the problems which face us. We cannot count on finding a simple series of more or less unaltered excerpts strung together with "scissors and paste." We must always take into account the possibility that material from another source or sources has been edited in or that the order has been changed. Indeed, it is this very thing which, as we shall see, sometimes makes it difficult to know whether one is dealing with a passage derived from some known source treated freely, or whether discrepancies must be explained on the basis of some other, genuinely unknown but parallel one. Finally, we may note an additional problem. The treatment given by Nicetas to the final line of the passage under
consideration warns us against the facile assumption that passages continuous in his own narrative were necessarily so in their original. While Nicetas' thoughtful and non-arbitrary arrangement of his materials may be some protection against this, it is a problem which must always be kept in mind. Perhaps the most extreme example of this difficulty is a passage in which Nicetas has knit into a seamless whole two sentences taken from opposite ends of the extensive chapter on the Anomoeans by Epiphanius. It is worth reflecting that if we did not ourselves possess the original, there would be nothing to indicate that the order was ever anything other than that in which Nicetas gives it.

If we have begun to grasp some of Nicetas' methods in arranging his materials, we must still consider the related problem of the extent of verbal identity between his own narrative and that of his sources. A glance at the underlined sections of the passage quoted above is sufficient to show that it is considerable. Disregarding minor grammatical variations, we find that there is a significant amount of verbal agreement between Nicetas and his originals, even in places where the narrative has been compressed or rearranged. Moreover, the areas of agreement can be greatly increased if we take into account passages where the meaning is identical (or virtually so) but expressed in different words. Most of these changes
seem to be the result of a desire for conciseness. Thus, we find the more precise statements of Sozomen (II. 9-11) and Socrates (II. 15-17) about the creed of the Council of Nicaea changed to a simple ἐν τῇ ὑμολογίᾳ τῆς πίστεως (II. 7-8), while Socrates' τῇ φωνῇ ὑμολόγησεν in II. 14-15 is reduced to a mere εἶποντα (II. 11). Other changes again, such as that from Socrates' τῆς Ἀντιοχείας (II. 30) to Nicetas' τῶν Ἀντιοχείων (II. 18), seem more or less fortuitous. There are, however, instances of deliberate changes in the wording which reflect more than an attempt to achieve brevity. Thus, at II. 25-26 Socrates' allusion to Aetius' education at Alexandria has been omitted (II. 12-13), presumably because the subject had been dealt with earlier. Likewise, Socrates' phrase ἐνετούσαν γὰρ ἦν (II. 28-29) has been changed to the more explicit ἔστι Χριστός (II. 15-16) in the interest of greater clarity. Nowhere is there any evidence of deliberate distortion. If many words and phrases have been omitted or changed, no special bias (other than that of Orthodoxy itself) has dictated their selection, and little of importance seems to have been lost. The conclusion to which these considerations lead seems to be that, while we cannot count on finding a verbatim transcription of any of Nicetas' sources, we can expect to find a large percentage of their wording and the greater part of their meaning intact. Used with caution, then,
Nicetas can be expected to provide us with a reasonably clear, if abbreviated, insight into the contents of the lost work of Theodore which underlies his own account.

When we turn to our other author, Barhadbešabba, however, even a preliminary examination reveals an approach to editing very different from that of Nicetas. Indeed, Barhadbešabba himself gives us a confirmation of this, since he makes an allusion to his method in his introduction:

"For since there are few people who come to read the extensive and full-scale works in which the victory of the Saints is made manifest, I have taken great pains about this—and not only with respect to (whole) sections! But if there is even a single phrase in the works of others by which the diligence of the fathers is revealed, I have taken care to set it out here ..."

Barhadbešabba's work, then, would seem to be primarily composed of more or less extensive "sections" or excerpts, together with
some words and phrases taken from other sources. Moreover, the implication seems to be that while there is some mixing, there is not that complex interweaving of sources which makes the Quellenscheidung of Nicetas so difficult. If this is so, our own chapters ought to be composed of a series of relatively distinct "sections" together with other isolated phrases and some comments attributable to Barhadbešaba himself.

When we put this expectation to the proof, we discover that it is amply justified. Indeed, not a few of the "sections" are from a known source, the Ecclesiastical History of Socrates. Thus, apart from passages clearly to be ascribed to Barhadbešaba and three others whose provenance is not so easily determined, virtually the entire two chapters can be divided between our own fragments and passages from Socrates' history. This can be represented schematically as follows:

Chapter 13: Aetius.

PO 23, 271, 2-11 = Introduction (Barhadbešaba).

271, 12-13 = Socrates, h.g. II, 35
(PG 67, 297A).

271, 13-273, 6 = Fragment I.

273, 7-274, 8 = Socrates, h.g. II, 35
(PG 67, 297B-300A).

274, 8-9 = Abridgement of Socrates,
Chapter 14: Eunomius.

PO 23, 277, 4-11 = Introduction (Barḥadebe-šabba).

274, 9-10 = Source uncertain.93
274, 11-276, 7 = Fragment III.
276, 7-12 = Conclusion (Barḥadebe-šabba).

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h.2. II, 35 (PG 67, 300B) with the addition of one epithet.

277, 12-279, 12 = Fragment IV.
277, 12-280, 2 = Socrates, h.2. IV, 7
(PG 67, 472C-473A).
280, 2-4 = Fragment V.
280, 4-281, 8 = Socrates, h.2. IV, 7
(PG 67, 473A-B) with the addition of one sentence, source unknown.

281, 8-282, 8 = Fragment VI.
282, 8-9 = Probably an expansion of Socrates V, 20 (PG 67, 620B).
282, 10-283, 2 = Conclusion (Barḥadebe-šabba).
This outline is sufficient to show that while Barḥadbešabba is not simply a compiler mechanically stringing together excerpts, he is much more inclined than Nicetas to keep his "sections" intact. In examining his work, then, we can expect to deal with occasional interpolations in otherwise more or less self-contained units rather than a tangled web of conflated passages. This greatly facilitates the task at hand. However, before we can undertake it, we must still face another question—the accuracy of Barḥadbešabba's use of his sources. Since we cannot answer this question directly with respect to our unknown fragments, we must try to do so indirectly through an examination of Barḥadbešabba's quotations of Socrates.

One of the most notable things about these quotations is apparent even from our outline: all of the quotations occur in their proper order, just as they appear in Socrates. This bodes very well for the accuracy of Barḥadbešabba's quotations, but for the moment we are more interested in the places where he has departed from his original. They are not numerous. As with Nicetas, most of the changes seem to be the result of a desire for greater brevity. Thus, at the beginning of his chapter on Aetius, Barḥadbešabba translates only one of the two parallel phrases given by Socrates. Likewise, in the following chapter...
on Eunomius, we find an epithet used by Socrates or Aetius and a reference to his earlier discussion of him omitted, while a few lines further on Barbadbeşaba reduces to a single phrase two parallel ones in Socrates. Again, the introduction to Socrates' quotation of Eunomius himself has been compressed and slightly paraphrased. Other changes seem to result from the process of translation itself, or are attendant upon changes in the text elsewhere. Thus, the mention of Aetius' departure from Alexandria is omitted, presumably because it can be inferred from the description of his arrival at Antioch. Likewise, as the result of a more lengthy omission elsewhere, the pronoun with which Socrates indicates that Aetius was expelled from the Arian Church is omitted, and the passage comes to refer to the Church in general. Yet other changes seem to be either accidental or reflect variants in the manuscripts. Thus, we find that of the two philosophers mentioned by Socrates, Plato and Plotinus, the latter is omitted. Again, somewhat further on, the omission of a pronoun changes a statement in which Socrates describes Eunomius' initiation into Aetius' sophistry to one which speaks only of his sophistic education in general.

None of these passages seem to reflect a deliberate desire to change or alter the meaning of the text. Even where they in fact do so, the changes seem to be the secondary results of other processes. There is, however, another category of changes
which displays a more obvious purpose. Most of these changes are the result of paraphrase, as in Barḥadbeṣṣaba's version of Eunomius' expulsion from Cyzicus, where the text of Socrates has been treated rather loosely. Such paraphrases seem to result partly from an attempt to avoid ideas unfamiliar to his readers, and partly from the difficulty of expressing some things directly in Syriac. Thus, we find that Socrates' "Ephectic" philosophers have become simply "others among the Philosophers," while his ἁ ἶπολυμακαλοιων has been reduced to mere "heresy." If we can pass over two further examples of paraphrase, and one more or less fortuitous addition, we find other changes which result from a desire to make the narrative clearer. This is the purpose behind the only discernible example of the conflation of passages to be found in these chapters. In his account of Eunomius' intrusion into the bishopric of Cyzicus, he takes care to add information about the identity of Eleusius and his attacker Eudoxius derived from a passage of Socrates which had been passed over earlier. While none of these changes reflect any particular doctrinal preoccupations, there is at least one passage which is less innocent. If we pass over a similar omission which is probably another example of the desire for brevity, we find that there is almost certainly a doctrinal motive behind Barḥadbeṣṣaba's elimination of Socrates' favorable references to the works of
Moreover, we find that these references have been replaced by the flat statement that Aetius was "the offspring of Satan." Apart from this solitary exception, however, these chapters display no discernible tendency to alter the text on doctrinal grounds. While this possibility must be kept in mind, there seems to be no reason why it should be a major preoccupation in our examination of the fragments of Theodore.

If these examples are sufficient to show that Barthadbebba does not wilfully alter his sources, they also demonstrate that he is more than a mere translator. As an editor, he felt able to abridge, paraphrase, clarify, or even supplement his sources on occasion. This is illustrated by the three passages in our outline about whose origin there is some question. In one case, there is no question at all that the passage is derived from an unknown source. This is a quotation of Eunomius inserted into the narrative just before Socrates' own quotation of the heretic, and will require special discussion later. The others, however, are more uncertain, and appear to be passages of Socrates which have been reworked or expanded. This seems particularly likely in the case of the account of Eunomius' exile. While the language is not identical, much of the information is, and the differences may be the result of the compression of a paragraph into a few lines. The final example, however, is more
problematic—it is the story of Eudoxius' acquiescence in Aetius' deposition. \textsuperscript{115} While it may have been introduced at this point under the influence of some passages in Socrates,\textsuperscript{116} these passages themselves are not sufficient to explain all of the material found there. This is especially true of the description of Eudoxius' "signing" of Aetius' deposition, a scene found in no other source in exactly this form. The closest parallel is to be found in the Ecclesiastical History of Theodoret,\textsuperscript{117} but his account displays a number of differences from that found in Barḥadbešabbā. These considerations suggest that the passage in question is one of those "single phrases" of which Barḥadbešabbā spoke in his introduction. In this case, however, the source of the phrase is still very much at issue. It is not impossible that it was Theodore's Contra Eunomium, but there is no way to be sure (it is worth noting in this connection that Theodore's work was itself a source of Theodoret's History).\textsuperscript{118} In the absence of any clear evidence, however, it seems best to leave this surmise in the realm of possibility, and not attempt to make any more definite statement.

Our examination of Barḥadbešabbā's chapters on Aetius and Eunomius has done much to confirm the description of his method with which we began our study of them. We have found that they consist in large part of relatively well-defined "sections" which (where they can be checked) represent their originals with substantial, though not complete, accuracy. The "single
phrases," while sometimes difficult to identify, are not numerous, and should not cause us undue difficulty as long as we keep them in mind. It seems, then, that within the limits we have established, we can accept Barhadbešabba's fragments as representing with considerable accuracy the source which underlies them.

The problem which now faces us is whether the editorial methods we have been studying are sufficient to explain the discrepancies between the two forms of the text, or whether some more complicated process must be postulated. It is our contention in what follows that no such postulation is necessary, and that (where they are directly parallel) the two forms of the text are mutually explanatory. In approaching this problem, we will take as our working hypothesis that Barhadbešabba's version is a close approximation of Theodore's text and that most of the differences between the two accounts are the result of changes by Nicetas. The most obvious place to begin will be with the most difficult example, Fragment I, since it displays not only differences of wording but differences of order as well. The simplest approach will be to go through Nicetas' narrative in order, and try to determine the extent to which what is found there can be explained on the basis of the version of Barhadbešabba.

Almost the first thing which meets the eye when we begin
to do so is that the opening lines of Nicetas (11. 1-4) contain a significant amount of material not to be found in Barhadbešabba, and that this material is specifically designated as coming from Theodore of Mopsuestia. Perhaps the most notable departure is the statement that Aetius was the son of a free father. A consideration of the statement's context, however, helps us to clear up the problem. The fragment of Theodore immediately follows a section of Nicetas which is based on Gregory of Nyssa's story that Aetius had been the slave of a woman named "Japelis." The statement in question, then, does not represent a direct assertion by Mopsuestia, but an inference drawn by Nicetas to enable him to overcome the discrepancies between the two accounts. The other main discrepancy to be found in these lines is Nicetas' direct statement that Aetius' father was a "goldsmith"—an assertion not present in Barhadbešabba, though perhaps implied in other parts of his narrative. It seems to us that this word must be taken in connection with the lines that follow those under discussion (11. 5-11) which together form an explanatory gloss on the rare word τιμεώνου (1. 4). The equivalent of this word in Barhadbešabba can only be "tent-craft" or "craft of tents" in the second line of his column, and it seems very likely that this was in fact the only description of the trade of Aetius' father to be found at this point in Theodore's narrative. The origin of the word "goldsmith" is to be sought
not in Theodore, but in the excerpt from Philostorgius which Nicetas has inserted into the narrative a few lines later (ll. 18-25). When we turn to the explanatory matter which follows ὑπέκειται ἐπὶ (ll. 5-11), we find that although in its present form it is obviously the work of Nicetas himself, it is based on information found in Theodore, as ll. 11-24 of Barhadbešabba witness. Indeed, we can even detect a textual variant: it is clear from Barhadbešabba's "tents of hair" (ll. 13-14) that he read τρίχωνος for Nicetas' τρίχωνος (l. 7). In the lines which follow (ll. 12-17) there is only one significant difference between the two versions. Nicetas gives us a phrase which is lacking in Barhadbešabba to the effect that Actius' father had "taught him his little craft" (l. 13). This seems almost certainly one of those cases in which Nicetas preserves a phrase which Barhadbešabba has passed over. If we now disregard the clearly marked interpolation of Philostorgius, we find in what follows that Barhadbešabba's lengthy story about Actius' attempted fraud (ll. 41-58) has been condensed into a mere three lines (ll. 26-28) by Nicetas. Moreover, the order has been changed as well—probably to bring all matter dealing with the same subject into the same place. The abridgement of Barhadbešabba's story may be due not only to a desire for brevity, but to avoid having to deal with the discrepancies between Theodore's account of this event and
Gregory of Nyssa's similar one. In the final paragraph of Nicetas' column (ll. 29-39) we find that the two versions, while different in detail, are fundamentally the same. The most important change is the omission of the death of Aetius' father found in Barḥadbešabbā (l. 25), though this may be the incidental result of Nicetas' rearrangement of the order. Most of the other changes and omissions seem to be the result of Nicetas' characteristic desire for brevity. The last few lines (ll. 36-39) contain a statement about Aetius' numerous followers which is absent from Barḥadbešabbā, and show other differences as well. It seems very likely that it is Barḥadbešabbā who has indulged in paraphrase here, if only because his characteristically Syriac "perfection" seems less authentic than Nicetas' "philosophical and Christian life." On the other hand, it is more difficult to interpret Nicetas' extra line. It may be something which he added to provide a conclusion to his rearranged paragraph, but since it would fit well enough into Barḥadbešabbā's narrative (at l. 39), it may well be another example of a genuine phrase of Theodore's which has been omitted.

It seems, then, that our "working hypothesis" has served us well. If we have found occasional points of uncertainty, we have encountered nothing which takes us outside the known editorial methods of our authors. Since the first fragment
is by far the most complicated, it seems reasonable to expect that the same conclusion applies to the others. To be sure that this is actually so, we will examine them, but in less detail, commenting only on the more important passages.

When we turn to the first of our remaining fragments, number III, we find that the opening section in the two versions (Nicetas ll. 1-4, Barhad. ll. 1-13) is quite different. However, since it has other features better discussed elsewhere, we will delay its examination for the moment. In the remainder of the fragment, there seems little that Nicetas' desire for brevity cannot explain. The only alteration in order is the transposition of Barhadbeṣabba’s description of Aetius "pressing his stomach" (ll. 41-42) to an earlier point in the narrative (Nicetas ll. 9-10), a common technique of Nicetas. Thus, we again find nothing contrary to our "working hypothesis."

The same seems true of Fragment IV, the remaining portion of Theodore's work found in both authors. In the main parallel sections (Nicetas ll. 1-28, Barhad. ll. 16-26, 37-63), Nicetas' desire for brevity seems again a sufficient explanation of any discrepancies. In only one case do we find that Nicetas (ll. 27-28) possesses matter not found in Barhadbeṣabba (l. 63), and this is almost certainly because the latter has elected to translate only one of two parallel phrases. Only in the
final paragraph (Nicetas ll. 29-36, Barḥad. ll. 64-88) do we find any really significant differences. Nicetas has paraphrased the opening and closing lines of Barḥadbešabba's account (ll. 64-65, 82-88), but has completely omitted his central narrative about Eunomius' instruction in eloquence (ll. 65-82). The question which naturally arises is whether this is an addition by Barḥadbešabba or an omission by Nicetas? There is good reason to believe that the latter is in fact the case. As we shall see, in other places where large blocks of material are absent from Nicetas, there is generally a clean-cut beginning and ending to the omitted passage. Here, however, it is difficult to suggest any obvious natural boundaries which might cause us to suspect an interpolation. To all appearances Barḥadbešabba's narrative is a seamless whole. Taking into consideration, then, the editorial techniques of both authors, our "working hypothesis" still seems to provide us with the best answer: this is another example of an omission by Nicetas--an omission, indeed, no more radical than many others to be found in his work elsewhere.

If our "working hypothesis" has stood the test, and we may feel fairly confident that the matter in the directly parallel passages is mutually explanatory, there still remain questions to be answered. Chief among them is that of the origin of the matter in Barḥadbešabba which is not found in Nicetas. Are these
passages further excerpts from Theodore's lost work, or do they come from another source altogether? Obviously, in the absence of the original, a definitive answer to this question is difficult, but we can attempt to establish the probabilities involved. Before we do this, however, we must first be clear about exactly which passages are under discussion.

When we first began our discussion of Barḥadbehšabba's work, we noted that his own statement gave us reason to expect it to consist mainly of fairly extensive "sections" with the occasional interpolation of individual words or phrases.125 Nothing in our subsequent examination has changed that estimate, and there is every reason to expect it to apply in the present case as well. On this basis we find that there are three clearly defined "sections" which are entirely without parallel in Nicetas: the account of Aetius' gluttony in Fragment III (ll. 65-77),126a and two pericopes about his birth and childhood in Fragment IV (ll. 1-15 and 27-36).

When we actually begin our examination of these passages, we find that, while they are relatively distinct from the surrounding narrative, they are nonetheless connected with it in varying degrees. We note, for instance, that although the story of Aetius' gluttony and his fear of fasting in Fragment III is a complete and recognizable unit, it also forms a natural sequel to the earlier account of Aetius' behavior at dinner
Indeed, we find that the two sections share a number of features in common in that they both portray Actius as delighting in word-plays and neologisms.\textsuperscript{126b} A similar link between the passages in Fragment IV and the surrounding narrative is to be observed there as well, inasmuch as the stories in question form part of a series relating the events of Eunomius' pre- and post-natal career. If these two sections are indeed from a different source than the parallel passage which intervenes between them (\textsection\textsection 11-16-26), then we must postulate a lost account of Eunomius' birth to maintain the sequence. Moreover, we note that these two passages are themselves interconnected in that they presuppose a common locale, that of a small village centered on its church.\textsuperscript{127a} It seems that here too the links binding our "sections" to their surroundings are not so easily broken.

All of the positive evidence, then, seems to incline us toward accepting these "sections" as genuine, while our reasons for doubting them are largely negative—their absence from Niceas. This places the burden of proof firmly on the side of those who would deny their authenticity. While the positive evidence as such is not conclusive, it does indicate that the probability that these passages are genuine is quite high. Until such time, then, as positive evidence to the contrary is adduced, we will be justified in treating these "sections" as
authentic parts of the fragments to which they belong.

Our one remaining unidentified passage, Fragment VI, is more problematic. Although it resembles the others in being both unidentified and without parallel in Nicetas, it is unlike them in not being continuous with any of the passages identified as Theodore's. This makes it impossible for us to try to determine its authenticity by the same means we used with the others, and some more oblique approach is necessary. We must begin with an examination of the fragment itself.

If we disregard the scriptural quotations in the opening and closing lines (ll. 1-4, 19-22), we find that the fragment consists of two distinct pericopes: the first (ll. 4-11) is an account of Eunomian baptism, while the other (ll. 11-19) deals with what is described as "the unclean mystery" (l. 12). The latter is entirely without parallel in any of the surviving literature dealing with Eunomius. The only thing that can be said of it is that, even if the Eunomians themselves had not denied it (ll. 17-19), it is an extremely unlikely story. The account of the baptism, however, seems much more promising for our purposes, and it is to this that we will now turn.

Eunomian changes in the Church's baptismal rite deeply shocked contemporary opinion (even if Eunomius himself may not have been responsible for them). The two changes which seem to have been most offensive were the omission of the
triple immersion and the baptism of the candidate "into the death of Christ" rather than in the name of the Trinity.\textsuperscript{128} It is therefore all the more remarkable that neither of these is mentioned in our own fragment. All of the emphasis is on the slightly comic manner in which the baptismal water was prevented from touching any of the "unclean members." However, the most distinctive feature of the fragment is its account of the progressive alterations in the rite. We find that to begin with Eunomius is said to have ordered baptism to be performed "behind the head" (ll. 4–8), but subsequently, "when he saw that many people were uncovering themselves," he ordered them to wrap "the unclean members" in bands of cloth (ll. 8–11). As we shall see, with one exception this progression is unique to Barhadde\textsuperscript{\textregistered}abba.

We must now ask ourselves what possible sources there are for this account. Naturally, this is a dangerous approach, but in the absence of other evidence it seems the only one open to us. On the other hand, while there is always the possibility that this excerpt is from a source about which we now know nothing, the number of known, lost anti-Eunomian works is in fact quite limited, and this suggests that our case is far from hopeless. If we leave aside the works of Apollinarius\textsuperscript{129} and Sophronius\textsuperscript{130} as being unlikely, and that of Didymus the blind\textsuperscript{131} as only slightly less so, we are left with three possibilities:
Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Theodoret of Cyrus. Let us see if this list can be further reduced.

At first sight, the lost anti-Eunomian work by Diodore of Tarsus seems a good possibility. This is particularly true since we know that Barhadbešabba himself had access to the book—after giving a partial list of some of Diodore's works, he remarks that there were only four of these then remaining: the anti-Eunomian work, and the treatises On Providence, Against the Chaldaeans, and Against Mani. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that this work is the source of the present passage. If we look at the precise title of the work as given by Barhadbešabba, we find that the treatise was written Against the Anomoeans in the plural. In the same way, we find that our other witness for the existence of this work, Ebedjesus, also gives the title in the plural as Against the Eunomians. This strongly suggests a work written against the Anomoean or Eunomian position in general, rather than a reply to some specific treatise by Eunomius himself. This impression is confirmed by the different forms of the title given in the two authors. We find that in Ebedjesus the treatise is said to have been directed specifically Against the Eunomians, whereas Barhadbešabba speaks only of a work Against the Anomoeans. The confusion of the two groups in later authors is not uncommon, and eventually "Eunomian" became the common designation of
anyone holding anomalos opinions. 135 Since it is easier to understand how "Anomoeans" could be transformed into "Eunomians" than the other way around, the less specific designation seems more likely to be original. This again speaks for a treatise directed more against a general theological position than a single individual.

All of this is important because Fragment VI does seem to be chiefly concerned with the activity of Eunomius as an individual. He is portrayed as ordering the various changes in the baptismal rite and as himself performing the "unclean mystery." Indeed, the various episodes seem to be reported less for their intrinsic interest than because they reflect on the character of the heresiarch. This makes it difficult to understand this fragment as part of a work directed against the general theological position of the Anomoeans as a group. While there is nothing in the fragment which is absolutely impossible in such a work, it is more easily understood in the context of a treatise directed against Eunomius personally. Since what evidence there is indicates that Diodore's lost book was of a more general nature, it seems likely that we must look elsewhere to find a source for our fragment.

When we turn to Theodoret of Cyrus' refutation of Eunomius, we again find a work which at first sight looks promising. We have good reason to believe that Barhebraeus made use of at
least one other work by Theodoret, and it seems not at all unlikely that he should have done so here as well. More importantly, however, we find that there is one passage in Theodoret which displays a number of parallels with our fragment. It is well worth quoting in full:

ἀδεδε καὶ τοῦ ἀγίου βαπτίσματος ἀνέτρεψε τὸν ἄνεκαθεν παρὰ τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ ἀποστόλων παραδοθέντα θεσμίν, καὶ ἀντικρυς ἀνυκομοθέτησε, μὴ χρήσαντι λέγων τρεῖς καταβείνειν τὸν βαπτιζόμενον, μηδὲ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν τῆς Τριάδος ἐπίκλησιν. ἐκ δὲ βαπτίζοντες δὲ μέχρι τῶν στέρνων, τῷ θατρὶ δεδουσί, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μορίοις τοῦ σώματος δὲ ἐναγέσα προσφέρειν τὸ ὑδάτι ἀπαγορεύσωσιν. οὐ δὲ χάριν, ἐκείνα μὲν εἰς πύσιον ἐμπατίζουν, ἔξω τὸν ἄνδρα ταύτης στόχαντες, τὴν τοῦτον κεφαλήν μέχρι τοῦ στήθους ἐπαξ εἰς τὸ ὑδάτι κατήγον. Ἐπειδ' δὲ τίνα συνέβη τραυματίαν γενέσθαι τῆς κεφαλῆς τῇ πυέλῳ προσφαχθήσεσθαι, ἔτερον εἰδος βαπτίσματος ἐπενόησαν. Ἐπὶ βάθρου γὰρ τινος προῆ τῶν ἄνθρωπων διατένοντες, ἔξω δὲ τοῦτον τὴν κεφαλὴν αἴωροντες, καταχέουσι τὸ ὑδάτι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἄλλου μορίου προσφαζοῦν. Τινὲς δὲ δὲ ἀυτῶν καὶ ἔτερον τρόπον ἐξεύρον βαπτίσματος. Ταῦταν γὰρ μαρτυρῶν κατασκευάσαντες, καὶ ταύτῃ καθημερῶς ἐλέητος ταύτῃ τῶν ἄνθρωπων μέχρι τῶν ὄντων, ἀπὸ τοῦ στήθους ἐρεῖμεν, εἰπ' οὕτως προσφέρονσι τῷ ὑδάτι τῆς κατάχωσιν. Ταῦτα δὲ μετημνήσαν τῷ τῆς ἑκάτον πεφευγοῦσις ἀδεβελον.
καὶ τοῖς τοῖς Ἐπτήροις καὶ ἦσον ἡμῖν συναρτήτης προβάτας.
καὶ ἄλλο δὲ τι τολμάσσαι παρ’ αὐτῶν λέγουσιν, ὅποι ἐν τολμήσαι μιργγαρσίς παραδούναι· ἣν ἄρ᾽ ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ μυσκοῦ ἀκολούθης τὸν λογισμὸν. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εἴτε τολμάται παρ’ αὐτῶν, εἴτε καὶ μὴ, ἐγὼ μὲν ὅτι ἡ ἐκτυφισάμενη· ἀκίνητος δὲ ὅμως αὐτὰ παρ’ ἄνδρον ἀκαταμάχει τὰ ἐκείνων ἐπισταμένων. 137

"He (Eunomius) also subverted the law of holy baptism originally handed down from our Lord and the Apostles and openly set up a contrary law, saying it was unnecessary to immerse the person being baptized three times or to make the invocation of the Trinity, but only to baptize him once 'into the death of Christ.' And so, baptizing him up to the chest, they immerse him in the water, but they forbid the water to touch the other members of his body as being impure. On this account, when they used to baptize in a bathing-tub, they made the man stand outside of it and bent his head down once into the water up to his chest. However, after it happened that some wound resulted from the head having been dashed against the tub, they contrived another form of baptism: stretching the man out face down on some support but extending his head beyond it,"
they pour out the water without letting it touch any other member. Some of them, on the other hand, have invented another way of baptism: getting ready an enormous band of cloth and consecrating it, they wrap the man up in it right down to the toe-nails starting from the chest—then they administer in that way the affusion of the water. These things have been disclosed by those who fled their impiety and joined themselves to the flocks of our Saviour and God. They also say that there is something else which they have the audacity to do which I dare not set out in writing—the mere report of the loathsomeness would be enough to foul the mind. On the other hand, while I am unable to say definitely whether these things are done by them or not, I have nonetheless heard about them from men who are intimately acquainted with what concerns these people."

Although Theodoret's account is much more extensive than that in Barhebraeus, the two passages display a number of similarities. We note, for instance, that the passage quoted is apparently the only other independent source for the practice of wrapping the lower parts of the body in bands of cloth, and that, more importantly, it is the only other known description of a progression in Eunomian baptismal practice. Moreover, it is
difficult not to be tantalized by Theodoret's allusion to "something else," since Barḥadbedešaḥba's "unclean mystery" would adequately represent the "loathsomeness" of which Theodoret refused to speak. Unfortunately, there is no way of determining this with any certainty, and in the absence of any definite information, all we can do is regret Theodoret's solicitude for his readers' sensibilities.

In spite of these similarities, however, there are also numerous differences. Unless we are prepared to accept a sudden and radical change in Barḥadbedešaḥba's editorial practice at this point, we cannot accept this passage as itself the source of Fragment VI. We might, however, ask ourselves whether the differences could best be explained by supposing that Barḥadbedešaḥba took his information from a similar account in some other work by Theodoret. The most natural place for such an account would presumably be his lost work against the Eunomians.

There are two reasons why this is unlikely. First, the differences between the two accounts are not confined to their length or phrasing, but include matters of substance as well. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that Theodoret makes no mention of the need to prevent people from uncovering themselves as the reason for wrapping them in bands of cloth. His own reason for the change in Eunomian baptismal practice is quite different. More importantly, however, Theodoret's
own references to his book imply a work in which the present passage would be inappropriate. While he is not altogether consistent with regard to plurals and singulars, he does make it clear that the book was directed at Arians in general as well as Eunomians. Thus, at one point he speaks of the works he had brought out ἐν 'Ἀρείου καὶ Εὐνόμου, while elsewhere he speaks of writings ἐν 'Ἀρείανος καὶ Εὐνομιανος. Again, in one case he speaks of a book κατὰ 'Ἀρείου καὶ Εὐνομίου, while still elsewhere of one ἐν Τὸν Ἰεροσολυμόν αὐτός ἐξ οἰκοδομεμένως. Whatever the differences of detail among them, all of these descriptions suggest that Theodoret's lost work was, like Diodore's a general attack on the extreme Arian theological position rather than a specific one on Eunomius himself. If this is so, the same conclusions apply here as applied in the case of Diodore: while there is nothing in our fragment which is absolutely impossible in a more general work, it is more easily understood as part of a treatise directed against Eunomius personally. In view of the apparent generalized nature of Theodoret's work, it seems most unlikely that it was the source of Barhabaseabba's fragment.

So then, of the three works which we mentioned initially, we have found that two, while they cannot be excluded absolutely, are nonetheless unlikely as the source of the present fragment. This brings us back again to the lost Contra Eunomium
of Theodore of Mopsuestia. We have found good reason to believe that this work is the source of much else in these two chapters, and we have been unable to find any other source which could explain the present passage. Moreover, the passage itself shows much the same polemical interests as those already identified as coming from Theodore of Mopsuestia, and the prominence which it gives to Eunomius personally would make it fit in naturally enough with them.

If this gives us some reason to think that Theodore's lost work may be the source of our present passage, there still remains a problem: how are we to explain, then, the parallels between our fragment and the description of Eunomian baptism in Theodoret? An answer suggests itself if we look at Theodoret's account more closely. Despite his statement that his information derives ultimately from those "who fled . . . (the Eunomian) impiety," it is clear from his disavowal of personal responsibility for it that he did not receive it from them directly. Rather, he has "heard about them from men who are intimately acquainted with" the Eunomians. The implication is that his account is based on information derived from several sources, some of them oral, though not necessarily so. If we look for some indication of what these sources may have been, we are again brought back to the Contra Eunomium of Theodore of Mopsuestia, for we find a reference to the work in the opening
paragraph or the very chapter to which our passage belongs.\textsuperscript{113} Since it is not at all unreasonable to suppose that at least part of this chapter is based on Theodore's lost work, this provides us with a means of explaining both the similarities and differences between the two passages under consideration.

If we work on the assumption that Theodoret combined all of the information available to him about Eunomian baptismal practice into a single passage, and that some of that information came from the same lost work as that (putatively) used by Barṣadbeṣṣāba, the parallels between the two accounts are readily explainable. More importantly, however, the apparent presence of several underlying sources helps us to explain the differences as well. We noted, for instance, earlier (p. 68) that one of the major differences between the account of the change in Eunomian baptismal practice in Theodoret and that in Barṣadbeṣṣāba is the reason given for the change. If we assume that Theodoret in fact had two accounts of this change which had to be harmonized—one similar to that now found in Barṣadbeṣṣāba, and the other the story of the wound in the bathing-tub—his omission of the problem of people "uncovering" themselves becomes comprehensible. Having already included the story of the bathing-tub, he cannot then introduce a new reason for the supposed change without inconsistency, and solves the problem by introducing a transitional phrase of
his own: "Some of them, on the other hand, have another way of
baptism . . . ." Other differences seem explicable on the basis
of the kinds of editorial techniques we examined earlier. This
leaves us with a plausible explanation of the variants between
our two passages, an explanation, moreover, which does much to
strengthen the argument that Fragment VI is indeed an excerpt
of Theodore of Mopsuestia's lost Contra Eunomium.

Our examination of the evidence, then, has provided us with
a number of reasons to think our proposed identification not only
possible, but even probable. We have been unable to discover any
likely alternate source for Barhadbe słabba's passage, and have, in-
deed, discovered some positive reasons for accepting it as
genuinely derived from Theodore. Unfortunately, the kind of
approach forced on us by the nature of the evidence makes cer-
tainty impossible. In the absence of the kind of exhaustive
list of sources we found in Nicetas, or any definite parallel
or ascription, we cannot entirely exclude other possibilities.
This means that our cautionary brackets must remain, and our
final conclusion must be that although there is a strong pos-
sibility, and even probability, that this fragment is from
Theodore, some doubt remains.

The parallels noted between Fragment VI and a passage of
Theodoret raise the question of other possible passages which
may bear on the sources used by him. The probability that the
Contra Eunomium of Theodore of Mopsuestia was among them has already been noticed by several scholars.\textsuperscript{114} There is little question that at least some of the passages in Theodore quoted by Nicetas are the source of the corresponding sections of Theodoret's Ecclesiastical History;\textsuperscript{115} an examination of one of the passages quoted by Barḥadbešabba reveals that it too is the apparent source of a passage in Theodoret. The passage in question was passed over in our earlier discussion (p. 57) so that we could examine it in the context of other parallels with Theodoret.

This passage forms the opening paragraph of Fragment III (Nicetas \textsc{II}. 1-4, Barḥad. \textsc{II}. 1-13). As we noted earlier, the two forms of the fragment display considerable differences at this point; for Barḥadbešabba's more detailed account, Nicetas has only a generalized characterization of Aetius. This characterization, while showing some similarities with the passage in Barḥadbešabba, is almost certainly a free composition based on his sources by Nicetas himself and is designed to provide an introduction to the matter immediately following. On the other hand, there seems no real reason to doubt the authenticity of Barḥadbešabba's account and its connection with the rest of the fragment. Certainly the matter from 1. 13 onwards must be taken with the following account of Aetius' behavior at dinner parties, and there seems no real reason to take this line as a break in
the narrative. The opening paragraph itself seems to provide a useful introduction to the account of Actius' table behavior which follows, and in the absence of any clear indication to the contrary, we are justified in treating this paragraph as an authentic part of the fragment to which it belongs.

The passage of Theodoret which provides a parallel to this fragment is found in the second book of his *Ecclesiastical History*:

... καὶ τὸν Εὐδόξιον εὐρών διόρρων καὶ πρὸς τῇ δυσσεβείᾳ καὶ Εὐπαριτίκης κεχρημένον χαλέβι, πάντων προθέτημε τὴν ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ διατρεῖλαν καὶ σὺν Εὐνομίᾳ ταῖς ἱκείνον προσηλοθεὶς σπιδαί. τὸν γὰρ τὸν κολάκιον ἐξηλώθη βίον, καὶ οὗ μὲν καὶ τοῦτον ὑπὲρ ἐκείνον διετέλει σχόλιον τὸ καὶ γαστριζήμενον. 146

"... and when he discovered that Eudoxius was a co-religionist, and that in addition to his impiety he lived in Sybaritic luxury, he came to prefer the life at Antioch to any other, and, together with Eunomius, was practically nailed to the fellow's couches—for he affected the life of a professional hanger-on, and was constantly roaming about filling his belly, now with this person, now with that."

The picture of Actius painted in this passage, particularly in the last few lines, is remarkably similar to that in our own
fragment. Aetius is described as "roaming about filling his belly" in much the same way that Fragment III portrays him as "wander(ing) around the squares and taverns . . . looking to fill his belly." There may even be some similarity in the context, since in the lines which immediately precede this fragment Barhadbe'shabba mentions Eudoxius' signing of Aetius' deposition under duress, also the general context of this passage in Theodoret. All of this, when taken with the presence of other passages in the same book probably based on Theodoret's *Contra Eunomium* (see below), suggests that it is not unlikely that this work is the source of the present passage as well.

The evidence for the other parallels is all derived from Nicetas. Unfortunately, as we noted earlier, this presents special problems. Since we know that Nicetas used both Theodore of Mopsuestia and the *Ecclesiastical History* of Theodoret, it is sometimes difficult to know which is behind any given passage, particularly in view of Nicetas' free treatment of his sources. Several of these parallels were identified early in this century by L. Parmentier, and some of them seem quite likely. This is particularly true of the matter contained in our own Fragment II. The first part of the fragment (ll. 1-7) seems clearly derived from the same source as that which lies behind two passages of Theodoret: II. 1-5 = Thdt., h.e. II, 24, 8-9 (GCS 154, 1-20), and II. 5-7 = Thdt., h.e. II, 24, 3 (GCS 173, 8-11).
While the first five lines of the fragment are guaranteed as Theodore's by Nicetas' specific ascription (l. 1), the remaining three lines (5-7) must also be his because it is only just within the realms of possibility that they could be constructed on the basis of the passage in Theodoret. The lines which follow (8-17, bracketed in the text) are more problematic. They are directly parallel to Thdt., Η.ο. ΗΙ, 24, 6-8 (GCS 133, 25-151, 11), a passage occupying a position between (but not contiguous with) the two other parallel passages in Theodoret. Unfortunately, since there is little in these lines which cannot be found in Theodoret, it is difficult to decide whether he or Theodore is the source. Certainly, almost all of the differences between Nicetas and Theodoret can be explained on the basis of the kinds of editorial techniques which we have already seen that Nicetas employs. The only points which give us pause in this conclusion are Nicetas' omission of any mention of Flavian and Diodore's threat to expose Leontius' "tyrannical deeds" in the West (which would have made his own account clearer), and his addition of the phrase πρὸς τὰ ἔξης ἀναφάνειν (l. 14). However, it is possible that these too are simply the result of editorial activity. Thus it seems that while we cannot exclude the possibility that Nicetas derived these lines from Theodore, it is equally possible that he based his account entirely on Theodoret.
There still remains a passage of Nicetas which has been ascribed to Theodore of Mopsuestia. L. Parmentier remarks with regard to Nicetas' account of the intrigue of Stephen of Antioch against Euphrates and Vincent that he bases it on "... einer Quelle, die weder Gregor noch Theodoret ist und daher Theodorus sein muss. Dieser ist also auch hier die Quelle des Theodoret." However, this conclusion fails to take into account Nicetas' editorial technique and his frequent conflation of sources. Too long to quote entire, the central passage of this account is as follows:

Μετά γάρ τήν ἐν Σαρδίκῃ σύνοδον Κάστανας δὲ τῆς 'Ῥώμης εὐ-σεβῆς βασιλέως ἔγραψε πρὸς τὸν Ἰδων ἀδελφὸν Κωνστάντιον ὕπερ 'Ἀθανασίου καὶ Παύλου τοὺς δὲ γράμμασιν ἐπίσκοποι διηκόνους Εὐφρατῆς καλοῦσαι καὶ Βικέντιος καὶ στρατηγὸς

5 ἐκ 157 συνήν αὐτοῖς ἄνωμα Σαλένος· οἱ καταλαβόντες τὴν 'Αντιόχου δὲ ἐκείς Κωνστάντιον τότε διατίρισον τοὺς καταγωγης, δὲ κατάρατος Στέφανος πόρνην διά τοῦ Ὀνα-γραφοῦ μεσθασάμενος παρεκπέλουσεν εἰσαχθήναι νυκτὶς ἐκείνης κατέλυσαν οἱ ἐπίσκοποι καὶ τινὰς ἐπὶ τοὔτῃ παρέκτισαν

10 βασιλέως δὲ εἰς παρὰ τοῖς ἐπισκόποις ἡ πόρνη· κρατασι-τερον δὲ διατεθεῖτε οἱ ἐπίσκοποι καὶ οἱ αὐτοῖς κατέσχον τήν πόρνην καὶ τοὺς αὐτὰς συνεργοῦντας. οὔτε τοῦ δράματος ἐπὶ τοῦ Κωνστάντιου ἀνενεχθέντος ὁ ἀλι- 

τήρος κατηρθείς Στέφανος.
"For after the synod at Sardica, the pious emperor of Rome Constans wrote to his own brother Constantius concerning Athanasius and Paul. The bishops named Euphrates and Vincent delivered the letters, and there was also a military officer named Salinus with them. When they arrived at Antioch, which was where Constantius was staying and happened to have his residence, the abominable Stephen gave order that a prostitute hired by Onager be introduced by night into the place where the bishops were staying, and that certain men standing by for just that purpose should raise the cry as though the prostitute were with the bishops. However, the bishops and those who were with them were the more effectively organized and apprehended the prostitute and her accomplices. Thus the whole business was brought up before Constantius and the wicked Stephen was deposed."

It seems to us that, taking into account Nicetas' normal editorial technique, this passage and its surrounding matter can be entirely explained as a conflation of two passages from Sozomen and Theodoret. Lines 1-3 seem based on a section of Sozomen, h.e. III, 20, 1 (GCS 133, 29-134, 2) and phrases from Theodoret, h.e. II, 8, 54 (GCS 118, 10-12). Lines 3-5 seem
based on the same passage of Theodoret (GCS 118, 12-16), but
with the names of the bishops supplied from the following chapter, h.e. II, 9, 5 (GCS 120, 10-12). The lines which follow,
5-7, seem to be derived from Theodoret, h.e. II, 8, 56 (GCS
119, 6-7, cf. ἐπτύχανεν 1. 7) with perhaps the addition of a
phrase from Sozomen, h.e. III, 20, 4 (GCS 134, 11-12, cf.
especially ἀπετραπεύ 1. 12). It seems to us that everything
in the rest of Nicetas' narrative can be explained as an abridge-
ment of the extensive account in Theodoret, h.e. II, 9, 3-10, 2
(GCS 119, 23-121, 22). Thus, while certainty in such cases is
difficult, it seems to us that this passage can be reasonably
explained without resorting to the hypothesis that an unknown
source lies behind it. This conclusion is strengthened by Ni-
cetas' introduction a few lines further on of a sentence begin-
ning, "And as Theodore of Mopsuestia says . . ." (Fragment II,
1. 1 above), thus implying that the material which precedes it
is from a different source. Although it is still possible that
Theodoret derived his material from Theodore of Mopsuestia,161
it cannot be shown in this case that Nicetas did so. With this
comment we shall bring our discussion of these fragments' paral-
lels with Theodoret to a close.162

In the preceding discussion we have found abundant reasons
for accepting these fragments as genuinely derived from Theodore
of Mopsuestia's lost refutation of Eunomius. The question which
now faces us is whether, granting this is so, we can assign these fragments some definite place in the book. Although we are specifically told by Theodoret that at least some of the matter found in our own fragments was found in Theodore's work, it has been denied that this work contained any historical material at all. Since almost all of the fragments which we have discovered deal with the life of Aetius and Eunomius, the problem of whether we can place them in the book takes on some importance. It is our contention that most of the material contained in these fragments can be assigned a place in Theodore's work with some certainty--let us examine the evidence, and determine if this is so.

At the beginning of this article we noted that one of the few things known about Theodore's lost *Contra Eunomium* is that it refuted Eunomius' second apology virtually word-for-word. This presumably means that if we can show that these fragments refute some definite section of Eunomius' work, we ought to be able to determine at least the relative place of the passage in Theodore's refutation. Unfortunately, Eunomius' *Apologia Apologiae* is as lost as the work of Theodore which answered it, and we are entirely dependent on quotations by Gregory of Nyssa for our knowledge of it. These quotations are, however, sufficient to enable us to determine the part of the work to which our own fragments belong.
Gregory makes it clear that Eunomius' first book was divided into two main sections: the first, described as the "preface," consisted mostly of an attack on Basil and a defence of his own contention that he had presented his first apology at a public "trial;" the remaining section is the main body of the work, replying to Basil's theological criticisms. Unfortunately, in the case of the "preface," we are handicapped by the fact that it is at just this point that Gregory elected not to quote his opponent "according to the order of the work." This means that while we may be able to assign our fragments to the proper section of the work, we will have more difficulty placing them within the section. In spite of this, Gregory gives us enough information to say with considerable confidence that most of our own fragments derive from a refutation of this opening section of Eunomius' work.

It is clear that in defending himself against Basil's accusation that the public presentation implied in his first apology was a literary fiction, Eunomius gave an extensive review of the events which led up to the occasion on which he presented his defence, even though he did not name that occasion in so many words. This review went at least as far back as the Gallus affair, and perhaps earlier. After apparently dealing with the happenings at Ancyra in 358, Eunomius then recounted his own exile to his homeland in Phrygia, and used this as an excuse to introduce a certain amount of autobiographical detail.
While Gregory gives us only a small amount of this autobiographical material, and does not tell us whether Eunomius dealt with the life of Aetius as well, it is clear that this part of the work provided him with his own opportunity to recount the lives of the two heresiarchs.\(^{176}\) This gives us every reason to believe that this is the part of Eunomius' work to which our own Fragments I, III, and IV are intended to provide an answer.

This supposition is greatly strengthened when we consider that much of the material in these fragments and in Gregory is in fact parallel. This is most obvious in the account of Aetius' attempted fraud found in Fragment I (Barhad. \(\text{II}.\) 41-58), a story also found in Gregory (I I, 36, 3-20). Although there are many differences in detail, the story itself is fundamentally the same in both: in both Aetius perpetrates a fraud with regard to a golden necklace of some kind, and, on being apprehended, is severely punished. The fraud itself, however, is slightly different; in Barhadbesabba (II. 45-57) Aetius merely removes some of the excess gold from the necklace, whereas in Gregory (I I, 36, 6-10) he substitutes a different necklace altogether. Likewise, in Barhadbešabba (II. 41-43) the necklace is the property of a certain Marinus and it is he who administers the required punishment (II. 49-57), whereas in Gregory (I I, 36, 4) it belongs to a "soldier's woman," and it is a group of soldiers who bring Aetius to justice (I I, 36, 14-20). Although these
two stories, then, display the same basic features, the differences are sufficient to show that they are not directly connected. The same conclusion applies to the earlier part of this same fragment (Nicetas 11. 1-17; Barḥad. 11. 1-24) where the description of Aetius' father in the pursuit of his trade is basically the same as that of Aetius himself in Gregory (J I, 35, 13-36, 2). Again, at another point Gregory (J I, 39, 21-23; cf. 56, 20-24) makes a clear allusion to Eunomius' misadventures at Constantinople, and seems to refer to some such story as that found in our own Fragment IV (Nicetas 11. 8-28; Barḥad. 11. 37-63). Other parallels, again, shed light on our own rather ribald Fragment III, for while there is no direct parallel to this fragment in Gregory, many of his polemical themes are similar. Thus we find that Aetius is portrayed as a flatterer fattening at the board of George of Cappadocia, while the theme of the drunken dinner party crops up several times, and much is made of Eunomius' theatrical manner. It may not be entirely without interest in the literal meaning of the word that Gregory at one point describes Eunomius as an ἐγγεγενημυθος. All of this goes to show that at least Fragments I, III, and IV must belong to this opening section of the work. We can also probably include Fragment II in the same section since, as we pointed out earlier, Eunomius indulged in an extensive review of the events leading up to his own trial, and a mention of
Flavian and Diodore in the course of it would have been perfectly natural. But what of Fragments V and VI? Unfortunately, in their case a definite answer is more difficult. In the case of Fragment V, the most that can be said is that, as it would be easy to understand this passage as a personal anecdote interjected into a biography of Eunomius, it probably belongs to the same part of the work as the others. With Fragment VI, on the other hand, we may be able to make a more definite statement. Gregory gives us a number of rather enigmatic hints as to the existence of a passage in this part of the work to which Fragment VI may have been intended to provide an answer. After alluding to Eunomius' experiences at Constantinople, he describes how the heresiarch attached himself to Aetius; then, after a certain amount of intervening matter, he goes on to announce that he will keep silence about "the inexpressable initiation, and what they were taught by the august hierophant of the mysteries, the manner of baptisms and the advocacy of nature, and all that." Now, while the reference of some of the phrases may be obscure, it seems perfectly clear that they reflect something in the text Gregory had in front of him, probably an allusion to Eunomius' own baptism. If so, this would provide us with an excellent context in which to understand Fragment VI, and, indeed, would provide us with another reason for accepting its authenticity. The only problem is that here, as often, the reference underlying Gregory's
statement is obscure. There is a strong probability that this is the locus of Fragment VI, but it is difficult to be certain. If it seems reasonable, then, to suppose that Fragments I–IV certainly, and Fragments V and VI probably, derive from a refutation of Eunomius' "preface," the next question which faces us is whether we can place these passages more accurately in the book. As we noted earlier, the two previously recognized fragments can be assigned to the tenth and eighteenth books of this work respectively; is there any possibility that we can assign our own fragments a similarly definite place in the work? Within limits, it seems it is. Let us look at the evidence.

At the beginning of this appendix, we had occasion to refer to an article by Ernest Bihain dealing with the Contra Eunomium of Theodore of Mopsuestia as the source of a passage in Sozomen and Theodoret.\(^{185}\) M. Bihain bases his argument in part on information provided by an epitome of the Historia Tripartita of Theodore the Lector.\(^{186}\) This epitome informs us that in the fifth book of his Contra Eunomium, Theodore of Mopsuestia discussed the affair of Cyril (of Jerusalem) and Acacius (of Cæsarea) "in detail."\(^{187}\) There seems no question as to where to place such an account in a refutation of Eunomius' second apology. The affair in question took place as part of the controversy surrounding the Council of Seleucia (Sept.–Dec. 359) and
the rump Council of Constantinople (Jan. 360). Since the latter is the most likely occasion on which Eunomius presented his first apology, there seems no reason to doubt that he discussed it in his second. Moreover, since he apparently indulged in an extensive review of the events leading up to this occasion, there is every reason to believe that an account of the Council of Seleucia was included, and this would have given Theodore his own opportunity to discuss the affair. Thus, it seems virtually certain that in his fifth book Theodore was still dealing with Eunomius' "preface," the same part of the work to which our own fragments must be assigned. Since as we saw earlier the autobiographical material in this preface was apparently introduced in connection with the events at Ancyra in 358, it seems likely that it preceded the discussion of the Council of Seleucia/Constantinople, and formed an excursus between the description of the two events. This means that Theodore's comments on the lives of Aetius and Eunomius probably preceded his discussion of the affair of Cyril and Acacius, and this gives us a relative location for our fragments: they are most likely to be assigned a place somewhere in Books III to V.

If then we have succeeded in showing the general location of our fragments in Theodore's book, and that they are all part of a refutation of Eunomius' "preface," the question which naturally arises is whether this section was all that our authors possessed of the book. There is reason to believe that it was
not. In the case of Nicetas this can only be a reasonable conjecture, partly because of the problems raised by his editorial technique, and partly because the list of sources which made our own analysis possible seems to apply to only part of his discussion of Eunomius. Thus, while it seems entirely likely that Nicetas made a more extensive use of Theodore than our own fragments would suggest, it would require an extensive and minute analysis of the remaining chapters of his treatise in order to confirm this, an analysis which would take us far beyond the bounds of this article. With Barhadbešabbaba, however, we may be able to make a more definite statement, and this brings us back to a passage we passed over earlier.

In the course of our analysis of the two chapters on Aetius and Eunomius by Barhadbešabbaba we noted that whereas most of the material in these chapters can be assigned either to our fragments or to a known author, there are three passages more difficult to identify. Two of these were discussed earlier, while the third was reserved for a later discussion. The latter is a quotation of Eunomius himself inserted into a narrative which is otherwise based entirely on Socrates, and added just before Socrates' own quotation of the heretic. The text of the passage is as follows:
"For he said, 'The Father created only the Son, and the Son the Holy Spirit'—indeed, he indeed poured the whole power of God into the Son, for he is "the power and the wisdom of God" (I Cor. 1: 24)."

There is no question that Barbadbešabba considered this a genuine quotation of Eunomius. In his introduction to it he claims to be giving Eunomius' "very words," and while this phrase is really from Socrates and applied originally to Socrates' quotation of Eunomius, there is no reason to doubt that Barbadbešabba intended it to apply to his own as well. The question is, was he justified in believing this?

Probably he was. At any rate, there is nothing in the fragment which is inconsistent with Eunomius' thought, and much that is closely parallel. The crucial phrase in this respect is the second one, to the effect that the Father had "poured the whole power of God into the Son." In what context are we to see it?

A passage in Eunomius' Expositio Fidel suggests part of the answer, for the Son is there described as being ... ἐγείροντας ταῖς τοῦ παντομορφοῦς ἐνεργείας καὶ συνεμπορίας ... An even closer parallel is to be found in the Liber Apologeticus, for in that work Eunomius asks, τις γὰρ αὕτην τινι μονογενῆς γινόμενον ... οὐκ ἐν διαλογίσειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνεργεῖαι πάσαν τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς δύνασιν; These passages undoubtedly give us the kind of context in which a statement such as that
found in our fragment is to be understood. It seems, then, that
while there is no known example of precisely this way of putting
it in the surviving works of Eunomius, and no entirely certain
use of I Cor. 1: 24, there is nothing in this passage which
is inconsistent with its being by Eunomius.

The question which this naturally raises is, where did
Barḥadbešaba get such a fragment? Obviously no certain answer
is possible, but we can weigh the probabilities. He may have
taken it from some completely unknown work, and simply inserted
it as one of the "single phrases" which he mentions in his pre-
face. Since it is very doubtful that he would have leafed
through some full-scale refutation of Eunomius looking for an
appropriate quotation, and very unlikely that he possessed any
actual work of Eunomius, some kind of florilegium would be
a good guess for such a work. On the other hand, the most
likely possibility is also the most convenient—the same trea-
tise which had been the source of so much else in these chapters,
the Contra Eunomium of Theodore of Mopsuestia. In that case,
this quotation can only have come from a refutation of the more
properly theological section of Eunomius' work and must be taken
as evidence that Barḥadbešaba possessed more than the first
five books. Unfortunately, here as so often we can only guess,
but it seems entirely likely that the beginning was not all that
Barḥadbešaba possessed of Theodore's great lost work.
These considerations, however, do not exhaust the information which can be derived from Barḥadbeḥabbā. As we noted at the beginning of this appendix, the description of Theodore's book given by Barḥadbeḥabbā is not without its own problems, and it is our hope that the resolution of these may shed some further light on the nature of this work. Perhaps the most obvious, and interesting, problem raised by this passage is the stichometric number given for the book: "forty thousand lines," or, more literally, "four myriads." What are we to make of this number, and how long a book does it imply? Let us see if we can supply the answer.

Information published by C. Graux in an article on stichometry may provide us with a basis of comparison. In this article, he gives a list of stichometric numbers of almost all of the orations of Gregory Nazianzen. By comparing these numbers with the number of columns occupied by these orations in Migne, we should be able to get a rough idea of the size of the works indicated. The results abundantly justify the attempt. We find, for instance, that the two homilies with stichometric numbers in the vicinity of one hundred, Homilies I (108) and X (100), occupy 3 and 2 1/2 columns of Migne respectively, while slightly higher numbers, such as those for Homilies III (142), IX (148), and XII (150), take up four columns. Again, if we look at the various homilies with numbers in the vicinity of
five to six hundred, the same relationships seem to apply. Thus, Homily VI (62") equals 17 columns, Homily VIII (569) equals 13\(\frac{1}{2}\), Homily XIV (626) 14\(\frac{1}{2}\), Homily XXIV (495) 12, Homily XXV (569) 14, Homily XXVI (523) 12\(\frac{1}{2}\), Homily XXIX (590) 15, Homily XXX (600) 15, and Homily XXXIX (508) 12\(\frac{1}{2}\). This seems to indicate that, allowing for differences in the size of columns and inaccuracies in the original count, a fairly constant ratio can be established. This is confirmed when we turn to the larger numbers around one thousand. There we find that Homily V (1,042 lines) equals 23 columns, while Homily XIV (1,107) equals 26, Homily XVIII (1,238) 28\(\frac{1}{2}\), Homily XXI (961) 23, and Homily XXVIII (959) 23\(\frac{1}{2}\). Taking into account, then, the variations mentioned above, this seems to give us a rough ratio of about 24 to 28 columns of Migne per thousand lines.

We can get some idea of this ratio for our own purposes by comparing it with the Contra Eunomium of Gregory of Nyssa. Making an allowance for the fact that there are fewer notes attached to the columns of this work than to those of Gregory Nazianzen, a good working figure would seem to be 25 columns per thousand lines. In Migne's edition, the three books of Gregory's work have the following numbers of columns: Book I = 108 cols.; Book II = 106\(\frac{1}{2}\) cols.; Book III = 162 cols. Working on a ratio of 25 columns per thousand lines, this gives figures of something slightly over 4,000 lines for Books I and II, and about
6,480 for Book III, thus making something under 17,000 for the whole. This is an interesting number in itself, for it is also the total given for Theodore's lost De Incarnatione, and tells us that that work was approximately the size of Gregory of Nyssa's Contra Eunomium. More importantly, it also tells us that a work of 40,000 lines would be well over twice the size of Gregory's work, almost a thousand columns of Migne! This would be a sizable volume even in a modern edition, and the question naturally presents itself as to how credible it would be in an ancient one. This brings us back to another problem with regard to this passage in Barhadbešabba.

As we have seen, the passage under discussion says that Theodore "... wrote a book against Eunomius in forty thousand lines ..." Our problem is the phrase translated "a book," which is caused by the fact that Syriac word for "one" can also be used as the indefinite article, so that the phrase given above might be translated either "a writing against Eunomius" (i.e., a treatise in general), or "one book against Eunomius" (i.e., a specific volume). Now while forty thousand lines might be just barely conceivable in the first case, it would be utterly impossible in the second. The question is, which is meant here? The passage which immediately precedes the one under discussion gives the probable answer. Barhadbešabba's statement about Theodore does not stand by itself,
but is the second of two passages describing the chief opponents of Eunomius. The first of these describes the work of "... the Cappadocian Basil the Great, who clothed himself with invincible armour against the error of Eunomius and also composed two books against him." There is no question that this refers to our own extant treatise *Adversus Eunomium* in PG 29, 497-773. Although our own printed text gives five books for this work, it is generally acknowledged that the last two are spurious, while there is good evidence that Book III was either originally part of Book II or added later. It seems then that Barhadbehaba's information is probably correct, and that he is referring to a single treatise of Basil in two books. Since he then immediately introduces the passage about Theodore of Mopsuestia, the implication is that having just spoken of two books by Basil, he now wants to speak of one book by Theodore. In that case, of course, the number 40,000, already difficult, is rendered absolutely impossible, and we must find some other means of explaining it.

As we noted above, the numeral given is literally, "four myriads." The simplest change which would produce a more believable figure would be "four thousands." The only question is, how are we to account for such a change? It seems very difficult to believe that "thousands" could be corrupted into "myriads," and although the difference between
the Syriac alphabetic numerals for four and forty thousand is very slight, there is no reason to believe that this number was ever expressed in them. On the other hand, Barhadbešabbâ's work exists only in a unique manuscript and the phrase in question forms the three first words of a folio (British Museum Gr. 6714, f. 130v); the figure may be the result of a combination of psychological and mechanical errors which we can no longer fully explain. It seems, then, that the transition from forty to four thousand is not a simple one.

If Syriac provides us with no readily convincing explanation, the other possibility is that the number 40,000 may be the result of an error in the Greek. This leaves two possibilities, numerals and written numbers. In the case of the latter, a confusion between four and forty thousand would be relatively easy to explain. All we need do is assume that a scribe read ΤΕΤΠΑΙΚΕΙΩΝΙΟΙ as ΤΕΤΠΑΙΜΕΠΙΟΙ, an error all the more likely since confusions between ΧΙΩ and ΨΙΩ do in fact occur.21 On the other hand, if the error resulted from a numeral, the possibilities are more difficult to assess. Perhaps the simplest would be to assume that a scribe read \( \upsilon \) (10,000) as \( \upomega \) (40,000). Again we seem to have found no completely satisfactory solution.

Our apparent impasse, however, need not be completely fruitless. Neither of these numbers is an impossibility for a single
volume, though perhaps not one of the same kind. As we saw earlier, 4,000 lines represents the approximate length of one of the first two books of Gregory of Nyssa's *Contra Eunomium*. If the single book mentioned by Barhadbešabba was only 4,000 lines long, it might well represent one section of a longer work (i.e., it would be a "book" in the same sense as the two books of Basil mentioned immediately before this passage). On the other hand, a book of ten thousand lines or more (irrespective of whether or not this particular figure is correct) is more likely to represent a complete work (i.e., a "book" in the sense of a complete volume). That a work of this size could be comprehended in a single volume is clearly indicated by the fact that Theodore's treatise *De Incarnatione*, which we know to have extended to 15,000 lines, also consisted of only one book. Thus, a choice between the two figures (or two types of figures) represents a choice between two different understandings of Barhadbešabba's meaning, between two different kinds of "books."

The need to decide between these two figures, then, is motivated by more than idle curiosity. The answer to this question will considerably affect our understanding of the book as Barhadbešabba possessed it, and the place of our fragments in that book. This, however, is all part of a larger question. Ever since the issue was first raised in the eighteenth century
by J. S. Assemani,\textsuperscript{220} there has been considerable debate as to whether or not Theodore wrote two works against Eunomius. This hypothesis has been denied by H. B. Swete,\textsuperscript{221} asserted by R. Devresse,\textsuperscript{222} and denied again by L. Abramowski,\textsuperscript{223} to name only a few. It is of obvious importance to our own study to determine whether there were two treatises, and if there were, to find out which is the source of our fragments. The question of what Barḥadbešabella meant when he spoke of his "one book," and how long that book was is clearly germane to the issue. However, in view of the ambiguities which surround Barḥadbešabella's statement, the only way to resolve the issue will be to try to examine the information he gives in light of the totality of the evidence.

Most of the information available to us about Theodore's lost treatise comes to us from the Bibliotheca of Photius. There we are told at one point that this work consisted of 25 books (\(\lambda\gamma\omicron\nu\iota\),\textsuperscript{224}) and at another that it was made up of 28.\textsuperscript{225} Whenever of these is exactly correct, the general figure is quite believable and fits in with what we have learned from the available fragments. Our own, as we have seen,\textsuperscript{226} apparently come from books III-V, while the others are from books X and XVIII respectively.\textsuperscript{227} Additional confirmation of the number 25, however, is provided by Barḥadbešabella himself. He quotes Cyril of Alexandria to the effect that Theodore's work against Eunomius consisted of 25 "discourses" (\(\textit{\iota\omicron\nu\iota\nu\iota}, \lambda\gamma\omicron\nu\iota\)).\textsuperscript{228} This might
be taken to indicate that the book possessed by Barḥadbešabba himself was made up of 25 discourses. In that case, the number four thousand for the work would be very unlikely, though not impossible. Each of the books would be approximately 160 lines long—about the size of one of the smaller speeches of Gregory Nazianzen (4 cols. of Migne). On the other hand, a figure of from ten to fifteen thousand would give us books of 400 to 600 lines (12 to 15 cols. of Migne), about the size of most of the "tones" of Gregory of Nyssa's third book Contra Eunomium (notably tomes iii-v, vii-x; only i, ii, and vi are larger, the latter only slightly). Unfortunately, Barḥadbešabba's quotation can only be used to show that he knew of 25 books, not that he had 25. Quite apart from the fact that the passage in question is a quotation of Cyril, it is virtually certain that Barḥadbešabba derived his information from the lost Defence of Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia by Theodoret.229 Thus, once again we are unable to say clearly what Barḥadbešabba had in his one book of Theodore. That he had at least five books we can be fairly certain, that he had more is probable,230 but while we can say that he knew of twenty-five, we cannot say that he actually possessed them.

On the other hand, we may be able to say something about the size of the lost work as a whole. Photius lists three works against Eunomius, those of Theodore, Sophronius, and Gregory of Nyssa, and gives the same title for each, 'Ὑψό"
It is difficult to ascertain whether or not this was the actual title of any one of them; it may simply have a general designation adopted by Photius to indicate refutations of Eunomius' second apology. More importantly for our own purposes, however, Photius gives us a general idea of the relative sizes of each. Gregory is "... shorter than Theodore, but longer than Sophronius ..." Presumably then, if we take the number ascertained for Gregory's work earlier, 15,000 lines (v. supra p. 91f.), we ought to be able to say that Theodore's work was longer. Things are not, however, so simple. Immediately after the paragraph in which he gives us our information about relative sizes, Photius goes on to speak of another work by Gregory of Nyssa on the same subject. What work was that? Fortunately, Jaeger, in the introduction to his edition of Gregory's treatise, has cleared this matter up. The "other work" to which Photius refers is our own Book II (vulgate XIIb or XIII), which, like all the other volumes of Gregory's work, originally circulated separately. The volume to which Photius refers in his statement about relative sizes consisted of our Book I, plus the Refutatio Confessionis Eunomii (vulgate Book II), plus Book III (vulgate Books III to XIIa). Allowing approximately 2,200 lines to the Refutatio (c. 5½ cols. of Migne), and just over 4,000 to Book I, with 6,480 for Book III, we can assume that Photius' volume was somewhere in the vicinity of 12,680 lines. This means that if Theodore's work was larger,
but not spectacularly larger, than Photius' copy of Gregory, it must have been somewhere in the vicinity of fifteen to seventeen thousand lines, or approximately the size of our own version of Gregory's work plus the Refutatio. That such a work could be included in a single volume, albeit a large one, is suggested by the similar size of Theodore's De Incarnatione. Thus, if we have not yet resolved the difficulty, we have at least clarified the choice.

At this point it would be tempting to close the discussion with a certain amount of frustration. We have seen that Barḥadbešabba speaks of only one book, and that there is an error in his stichometric number which we are apparently unable to resolve conclusively. On the other hand, we know that Barḥadbešabba had at least the opening sections of this work, and that its original size would have permitted it to fit into a single volume, if only just. The simplest solution, then, would seem to be to disregard the parallel of Theodore's "book" with Basil's "books," admit defeat in the matter of the number, and conclude that Barḥadbešabba possessed the entire work. Unfortunately, to do this we would have to ignore almost all of the evidence on which those who believe there were two works against Eunomius base their case. Perhaps a study of this information will enable us to resolve our difficulties more adequately.

The most important single piece of evidence for this position
is the list of the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia given by the
thirteenth century Nestorian Bishop Ebed-jesus (Abdh-isho bar
Berikha). In this list, Ebed-jesus speaks of a work Against
Eunomius which is, by contrast with the treatise On the In-
carnation, in two volumes. 236 On the other hand, some seven
entries later, he speaks of a work On Behalf of Basil in one
volume. 237 The question naturally arises as to what is in-
tended by the latter work. A possible solution is suggested
by the title given by Photius for the three anti-Eunomian works
which he mentions, On Behalf of Basil, Against Eunomius. 238
Even if it is difficult to be certain whether this was the
exact title of Theodore's work (though it may well have been),
239 it certainly indicates the only likely controversy "on behalf
of Basil" in which Theodore might have been involved—the de-
fence of Basil against an attack by Eunomius. That being the
case, the work mentioned by Ebed-jesus must also be a treatise
dealing with the Eunomian controversy.

This does not exhaust the available evidence. There still
remain two valuable pieces of information about chronology. One
is a statement by Theodore himself in the preface to his Commen-
tary on St. John. In this work he remarks to his correspondent,
the bishop Porphyrius, that his earlier intention had been to
write another work, one defending the words of Basil against
"the contentious Eunomius." 240 Since this commentary was
probably written sometime between 400 and 410, this passage not only shows that Theodore associated the Eunomian controversy with the defence of Basil, but that some twenty to thirty years after that controversy's beginning he still regarded it as worth writing about. Although he does not actually say that he fulfilled his intention, the fact that such a treatise existed is ample proof that he did so. On the other hand, we have the statement by a scholiast to the effect that both Theodore of Mopsuestia and Gregory of Nyssa wrote against Eunomius, \ldots \tauου Θεοδώρου Βασιλείου τελευτήσαντος \ldots \), \textit{i.e.}, shortly after 379, at the very beginning of the controversy. Since the scholiast is entirely correct about Gregory of Nyssa, one cannot help wondering if he is not equally accurate about Theodore of Mopsuestia. The two works mentioned by Ebed-jesus would provide a natural explanation of the discrepancies between the two statements. Since Theodore specifically mentions defending Basil in his commentary, it has usually been assumed that the \textit{Contra Eunomium} was written first and that the \textit{Pro Basilio} came only later; however, since the subject matter appears to have been much the same in both there seems no real reason to hold to this conclusion. Perhaps the best that can be said is that, in any case, these two passages when taken together provide some confirmation for the existence of two works dealing with the Eunomian controversy.
The question which naturally arises after this is whether Barḥadbešabba himself gives us any reason to believe that he knew of more material against Eunomius than he actually possessed. Just possibly he did. His complete statement about Theodore's work is to the effect that "... he wrote one book against Eunomius in four [myriads] of lines, and taught other things as well, overthrowing his entire error."²⁴⁵ The interesting phrase here is the rather enigmatic, "and taught other things as well." In the context, it is difficult to see how it could refer to anything but literary activity since it is linked with the book previously mentioned as "overthrowing his entire error." In that case, it would refer either to Theodore's literary activity in general, or to some specific treatise or treatises. Since the phrase occurs in the context of "overthrowing" Eunomius' "entire error," the latter would seem the more likely. The passage might then refer either to treatises on other subjects which, like the De Incarnatione,²⁴⁶ dealt with the Eunomians in passing, or (if they existed) it might refer to further treatises directed at Eunomius. It does in any case seem to provide evidence that Barḥadbešabba knew of more material than he himself possessed (or at any rate used).

Once again a firm conclusion has escaped us. We have, however, now reviewed all of the available evidence. Opponents of the "two-book theory" do not base their case on any direct evidence— that is, there is nowhere any definite statement that
there was only one book. Their opposition is based on the general difficulty of explaining why Theodore would write two separate treatises on the same subject. This naturally puts them in the position of having to explain away the statements of Ebed-jesus, the scholiast, and Theodore himself. The question which now faces us is whether there is any reconstruction of the events which will answer this objection and at the same time account for all of the evidence? It seems to us that there is. Let us now review the various stages of this controversy.

The second apology of Eunomius, a reply to the Adversus Eunomium of Basil, made its first appearance shortly before the death of the Saint on 1 January 379. Although the entire work ultimately extended to five books, only the first two appeared at this time. There had been a number of indications that such a work was forthcoming, but to begin with it seems to have been limited to sympathetic circles—at any rate Gregory of Nyssa had great difficulty in obtaining a copy. This work, particularly in its opening sections, was highly abusive of Basil, and provoked an equally violent reaction from its opponents; indeed, Gregory of Nyssa was somewhat apologetic about the strength of his own language. He had responded to Eunomius' challenge almost immediately, but had only had time to refute the heretic's first book. This refutation is the first book our own Contra Eunomium, and was, as we have seen, something just over 4,000 lines long.
same time, Theodore too obtained a copy of Eunomius' book, and like Gregory was moved to issue a reply. This he did in a single volume some 4,000 lines long which refuted at least Eunomius' first book and possibly his second as well. It was this volume which was possessed by Barhadbešabba and which was subsequently designated by Ebed-jesus as the *Pro Basilio*. This accounts for our own fragments (all refuting the preface of Eunomius' first book), the statements of Barhadbešabba, Ebed-jesus, and the scholiast, and provides a basis for understanding a stichometric number of only 4,000 lines.

However, this was not the end of the controversy. Gregory, at the behest of his brother Peter, now issued a refutation of Eunomius' second book (our Book II), while Eunomius himself brought out a third. Gregory responded to this in turn and thus completed the three volumes of this work as we possess it (though the separate volumes continued to circulate independently). Theodore did not at this time attempt to answer Eunomius' further efforts, possibly because he had become aware of the works of Gregory directed toward the same end. Twenty years later, however, the situation had changed entirely. Both Gregory and Eunomius were dead (c. 395), but the works of Eunomius still retained their popularity. Theodore therefore determined to refute the remaining books of Eunomius (in the mean while a fourth and fifth book had appeared). Sometime after the year 400, he issued two more volumes against Eunomius,
and so completed his refutation of the heretic. These are the two volumes entitled by Ebed-jesus *Contra Eunomium*. Thus we have an explanation for both the statements of Ebed-jesus and Theodore and can connect them with the evidence provided by the scholiast and Barḥadbeṣabba. We are also in a position to explain why Theodore should have issued two different works against the same treatise.

There remains only one problem to be solved. As we saw earlier, our own fragments probably come from somewhere in the third to fifth books of the work, and these books are probably the third to fifth books of a complete treatise known to Cyril and Photius in twenty-five. How are we to explain the apparent fact that the single treatise known to Cyril and Photius is also to be identified with the two works mentioned by Ebed-jesus? Taking account of the parallel fortunes of the *Contra Eunomium* of Gregory of Nyssa, a probable explanation can be achieved.

When originally issued, both Theodore's refutation of Eunomius' first (and second?) books and his refutation of the third and following books constituted separate works. The first of these almost certainly, and the second probably, were already divided into a number of λόγοι. Within twenty to thirty years after the composition of the second treatise, these two works had been brought together to form a new composite whole consisting of twenty-five λόγοι. This was the form of the work known to Cyril and Photius. On the other hand, the earlier,
separate editions did not for that reason go out of existence; they still continued to circulate separately, and, like the individual volumes of Gregory of Nyssa's work, sustained very different fortunes. As we have seen, the first section, that possessed by Barḥadbešabba, was a refutation of at least Eunomius' first book, and as such contained extensive narrative sections. The remaining books refuted Eunomius' later volumes and were therefore presumably more strictly theological. If, as seems likely, Barḥadbešabba had only the Pro Basilio, this probably indicates that, as in the case of Gregory of Nyssa's first and third books,\(^\text{266}\) its less technical nature caused it to circulate more widely. The books Contra Eunomium, however, were of a more strictly theological nature, and as such of interest only to a limited circle; thus, like the second book of Gregory's great work,\(^\text{267}\) they tended to be much less frequently copied. This accounts for the fact that Barḥadbešabba had only the one work, whereas Ebed-jesus had both.\(^\text{268}\) Moreover, the solution suggested above helps us account for the different descriptions of Theodore's work given by Photius and Cyril on the one hand and by Barḥadbešabba and Ebed-jesus on the other, and does so on the basis of an editorial process far less complicated than that actually undergone by the Contra Eunomium of Gregory of Nyssa. It seems then that this theory provides us with a very plausible picture of the process of transmission of this work.

Our reconstruction of the events surrounding the appearance
and dissemination of these anti-heretical treatises seems to have served us well. It has accounted for all of the available evidence while not requiring us to explain any of that evidence away. By helping us to determine the nature of the "one book" mentioned by Barṭadbešabba, it has enabled us to decide between two conflicting types of stichometric totals. Finally, it has enabled us to provide a plausible answer to the primary objection raised against previous "two-book" theories: why Theodore should have written two works on the same subject. It seems, then, that we can regard this proposed reconstruction as probably representing with reasonable accuracy a close approximation of the facts.

With these words we will bring our study to a close. It has been an extensive project, but the results have more than justified the effort. Though much uncertainty remains, we have clarified many of the issues which surround the nature and manner of appearance of this work. If we cannot but regret that the fragments which we have isolated are not of a more theological nature, we can at least console ourselves that they have taught us much more than we were ever able to learn without them about the great lost treatise from which they come.
NOTES.

1This appendix is a greatly expanded form of a paper presented at the Seventh International Conference on Patristic Studies at Oxford in September 1975.

2So correctly Philost., h.e. VIII, 12 (CCS 114, 3, 24), as opposed to Photius, cod. 138 (Henri II, 106, 12), who speaks of only three.

3Photius, cod. 4 (Henri I, 8, 2-3); cf. also cod. 6 (Henri I, 8, 20-21).

4Pro Defensione Trium Capitulorum (hereafter defens.) IX, 3 (PL 67, 754B-C).


7Thdt., haer. IV, 3 (PG 83, 417A).


9PG 139 and 140. The first five books of the Thesaurus, including the sections in which we ourselves are interested, have been published only in the Latin translation of Pierre Morreau. Our own text will be based on two of the oldest manuscripts: Codex Vaticanus Graecus 680 = V (13th c.), and Codex Bodleianus


11 Ἐγνος om R.
12 καὶ θεοδόριτος δ Κόρου om R.
13 ἐπιτεταμένος R.
14 Nicetas Acominatos, thes. V, 30 (PG 139, 1389A).
15 Apparently it applies only to the first part of Nicetas' treatment of the Anomoeans. The latter part, which begins at thes. V. 40 (PG 139, 1400D), obviously contains other sources (cf., e.g., the mention of Gregory [Nazianzen] in V, 43; PG 139, 1403D).
16 Nicetas, thes. V, 30 (PG 139, 1389C) = Philost., h.e. VIII, 11a; 12a = Philost., h.e. VIII, 11b and 12a (GCS 112, 30-113, 33; 114, 15-26).
17 V. infra pp. 132*-137*
18 Nicetas, thes. V, 30 (PG 139, 1389A-B) = Græ. Nyss.,
Eun. I (I I, 35, 3-36, 2).
19 See the introduction to his 1911 edition of Theodoret's
Ecclesiastical History (GCS 19, p. XCI ff.) where he prints out
our own Fragment II (pp. 83*-85* below). The same fragment is
published in the revised 1934 edition (GCS 44) by F. Scheidweiler
on p. XXIV. Unless indicated to the contrary all references
to Theodoret's history of the Church are to the latter.
20 This is much clearer from his statements in his arti-
those in the introduction to his edition of Theodoret mentioned
in the previous note. In the former, he also published our own
Fragment III (pp. 85*-88*) as found in Nicetas.
21 Barhad., h.e. 14 (PO 23, 282, 13-283, 2).
22 Cf. Fragment V, below p. 102*.
23 ἰκ om R.
24 ῥευστήριον R.
25 πρᾶσιν R.
26 οὖν R.
27 ἔντον R.
28 Philost., h. e. III, 15a (GCS 44, 23-26).
29 μὲν bis V.
30 οἱ ante πρᾶσιν add R.
31 Nicetas, thes. V, 30 (PG 139, 1389E-C).
32 Barhad., h.e. 13 (PO 23, 271, 13-273, 6).
This statement is probably a connective gloss to harmonize the following with the immediately preceding story taken from Gregory of Nyssa, *Eun.* I (I I, 35, 10-11) that Aetius had been the slave of one Ampelis; *infra* p. 122*.

"Craft of tents," probably an attempt to translate 'puleonarius.'

Although this explanatory gloss is clearly the work of Nicetas, the parallels with Barhadbesabba show that it is based on Theodore; *infra* p. 123*.

*i.e.*, τρίχωνον *cf.* Nicetas I. 7 above.

"market days," almost certainly a rendering of πανηγύρες, Nicetas I. 9 above.

This is very obscure. It apparently refers to the activities of Aetius' father as a "goldsmith," but the precise meaning is unclear. I am grateful to the Revd. R. C. Dentan of the General Theological Seminary for pointing out to me that pot-sherds were often used for carrying coals and the like in ancient times. Possibly this is a sarcastic comment on the tinker's diminutive smithy.

Greek words actually occurring in the Syriac text will be included in the translation in parentheses. It should be noted, however, that such words are often the common manner of expressing something in Syriac and may not necessarily represent the Greek word used by Theodore.
It is difficult to know whether this comment is from Barḥadbešaba or his source. If the former, it may indicate that he has passed over something. On the other hand, elsewhere he translates verbatim one of the editorial remarks of his source in the first person; v. Barḥad., h.e. 14 (P0 23, 281, 1-2) = Socrates, h.e. IV, 7 (PG 67, 473A).

1. Flavian of Antioch and Diodore of Tarsus.

2. οἰκουμήνην V.

3. τὸν om R.

4. Ἀλτίου supra lineam additur V.

5. Nicetas thes. V, 30 (PG 139, 1389D); 11. 8-9 are clearly editorial.

6. παρασκευήν V.

7. Nicetas, thes. V, 30-31 (PG 139, 1390C-D). Because of the contiguity of this and the following Fragment in Nicetas, the translation will be delayed until both have been presented. We may also remark that it is just possible that the sentence preceding the first words of the Syriac column may also be from Theodore, v. p. 119* below.

8. Nicetas, thes. V, 31 (PG 139, 1390D-1391A). Compare 11. 19-22 of Nicetas and 46-54 of Barḥadbešaba with the following gloss which occurs in the margin of a ms. of the Historia Tripartita of Theodore the Lector, book II, epitome 92 (GCS p. 44, apparatus): οὗτος ὁ μαρτύρος ἀληθινὸς εἰς τὰ θεία...
πνεύματα γάρ τρία κάτω έκρηγνυτος, μέγα - μικρόν - καὶ μικρότερον, παρέ-
βαλε ταῦτα τοῖς δῆλοις ὀρεινοίς τῷ δόγματι καὶ δαιμονῶν τῇ
παραβολῇ. I owe this reference to the kindness of the Revd.
L. R. Wickham of the U. of Southampton.

149Barḥad., h.e. 13 (P0 23, 274, 11-276, 7).

50I.e., Flavian of Antioch and Diodore of Tarsus.

51 Although it shares some characteristics in common
with the parallel passage in Barḥadbešaba, it is difficult to
know whether these lines of Nicetas are in fact based on the
underlying text of Theodore or are merely a general characteri-

52Lit., "the banquet hall, dining room."

53Lit., "genitals."

54 One cannot help wondering if this was
not once written ἀναλεκταία (see), "abominations; even so
there seems little reason to doubt that it is an attempt to render
ἀποκαταλαλάθημα... Nau (P0 23, 275, note) suggested ὀφθαλμοῦ.

55Lit., "his own (error)."

56 Probably something like μαθηταίοι, "vain
chatterers," from μαθητής and ἀκλόσμον.

57 Perhaps this should be ψαλτήριον, "delighting in groans."

58 Perhaps some such story as that recounted by Epiphanius
is intended, V. haer. 76.4.3-9 (GCS III, 345, 12-21).

61 τὸ om V.
Possibly a word has dropped out so that νεμωνιατον, "abc's" ought to be read as in Frag. I, Barhad.

66 Lit., "from his going to Church."

67 Connection obscure. Perhaps, as suggested by F. Nau (PO 23, 278, n. 2), the author is trying to show the defects of a bad education.

68 Cf. Deut. 32: 15.

69 Lit., "without a fee."

70 Possibly a snide reference to Aetius' activities as a physician, though it may be intended only figuratively.

71 Eudosius?

72 Barhad., h.e. 14 (PO 23, 280, 2-4).

73 i.e., of Eunomius' ignorance of the scriptures. This fragment is inserted into a passage of Socrates (h.e. IV, 7; PG 67, 473A) by way of confirmation of the latter's similar statement.

74 Unfortunately Theodore does not tell us when this was. However, from the respective ages implied it must have been early in Eunomius' career. The most likely possibility would have been his stay in Antioch as part of Eudosius' entourage c. 358-360. Eunomius would then have been in his middle or late
twenties, while Theodore would have been about 18.

75 Barpad., h.e. 14 (Po 23, 281, 8-282, 8).
76 Matt. 11: 27.
77 I Cor. 2: 11. These passages are probably a connective gloss added by Barpadhešabba.

78 Ephes. 5: 12.
79 Cf. Deut. 32, 17.
80 Cf. Deut. 32: 35, Rom. 12: 19. Probably this last short canto is the work of Barpadhešabba.

81 Quoted above pp. 71*-72*.
82 Cf., Sources, 11. 22-24 below.
83 Sozomen, h.e. IV, 12; 2 (GCS 154, 20-22).
84 καὶ ἓπερ... ναί αὐτῶν om R.
85 Cf., Nicetas, 11. 1-2 above.
86 Nicetas, the? V, 30 (PG 139, 1389D).
87 Socrates, h.2. II, 35 (PG 67, 297A-B).
88 Y. P. 84* above. Whatever the status of the rest of this passage, the phrase ἤδη ὅπων ἤξιστος αὐτος at least derives from Socrates.
89 Nicetas, the? V, 32 (PG 139, 1392A-B) = Epiphanius, haer. 76.54.30 (GCS III, 413, 24-28) plus haer. 76.4.7 (GCS III, 314.5, 7-12).
90 Some of them, however, may reflect variants in the manuscript traditions of the underlying authors.
91 Nicetas, the? V, 30 (PG 139, 1389C-D).
Barhad., h.e., Introduction (P0 9, 496, 7-10).

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Introduction

Below.

Barhad., h.e. 13 (P0 23, 271, 13) = Soc., h.e. II, 35 (PG 67, 297A), where he translates only οὗτος τὰ αὐτὰ ἔστηκε
'Αρείφ, omitting καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν συνεκράτησα δόξαν. This abridge-
ment may also be the cause of another change in the same line
where the resulting short phrase is tacked on to the preceding
sentence by way of a causal connective inferred from Socrates' 
two sentences.

Barhad., h.e. 13 (P0 23, 273, 8) = Soc., h.e. II, 35 (PG 67, 297B), διὰ λεοντίου τοῦ τότε τῆς 'Ἀντιοχείας ἐπισκόπου.

Barhad., h.e. 14 (P0 23, 279, 13) = Soc., h.e. IV, 7 (PG 67, 472C) omitting the phrase τοῦ ἐπιληθέντος 'Αδέου, οὗ καὶ
ἀνωτέρα πεποιήθησα μνήμην. Similar reasoning probably accounts
for the omission of a sentence about Eunomius' verbosity at
Barhad., h.e. 14 (P0 23, 280, 9) = Soc., h.e. IV, 7 (PG 67, 473A).

Barhad., h.e. 14 (P0 23, 279, 16) = Soc., h.e. IV, 7 (PG 67, 472D-473A), where cíc ἐλαφομήνατ ἐξέσσε, τὸ 'Αρείου
μὲν ἀγαμα ζηλῶν becomes simply, "he fell into the blasphemy
of Arius."

Barhad., h.e. 14 (P0 23, 281, 1-2) = Soc., h.e. IV, 7 (PG 67, 473B), where αὐτῆς ἐπάκουε τῆς Εὐνομίου φωνῆς, αἷν σοφι-
ζόμενος περὶ θεοῦ λέγειν τολμᾶ. ὥστε γὰρ κατά λέξιν τάδε . . .
becomes simply ". . . I am setting out his (own) words. For he
says . . . ." The elimination of the words κατὰ λέξιν may be
more significant since he in fact inserts a new passage at this point; v. infra pp. 155*-157*.

99Barḥad., h.e. 13 (Po 23, 273, 7) = Soc., h.e. II, 35 (PG 67, 297B). The phrase ἐναζεύων is omitted.

100Barḥad., h.e. 13 (Po 23, 274, 9) = Soc., h.e. II, 35 (PG 67, 300B), where Barḥadbeṣabba eliminates the αὐτῶν from Socrates' phrase τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκλητικὸν.

101Barḥad., h.e. 13 (Po 23, 274, 2) = Soc., h.e. II, 35 (PG 67, 300A). It should be noted that the two names are very similar in Syriac.

102Barḥad., h.e. 14 (Po 23, 279, 14) = Soc., h.e. IV, 7 (PG 67, 472C).

103Barḥad., h.e. 14 (Po 23, 280, 11-14) = Soc., h.e. IV, 7 (PG 67, 473A/B). The passage has been compressed and turned into a single sentence, while Socrates' mention of τῇ ὑπήκοοι ἐκλητικῇ has been changed to a simple "when he spoke in his accustomed manner."

104Barḥad., h.e. 13 (Po 23, 274, 1-4 bis) = Soc., h.e. II, 35 (PG 67, 297C-300A).

105Barḥad., h.e. 13 (Po 23, 271, 7) = Soc., h.e. II, 35 (PG 67, 300A).

106Barḥad., h.e. 13 (Po 23, 273, 12) = Soc., h.e. II, 35 (PG 67, 297B), and Barḥad., h.e. 14 (Po 23, 279, 14) = Soc., h.e. IV, 7 (PG 67, 472A), both probably to avoid the need to render the Greek paraphrastically in Syriac.
107 Barbad., h.e. 13 (P0 23, 274, 1) = Soc., h.e. II, 35 (PG 67, 2970). The added phrase is that Aristotle worked "by means of his skillfulness."

108 Barbad., h.e. 14 (P0 23, 280, 9-11) = Soc., h.e. IV, 7 (PG 67, 473A and 472A).

109 Barbad., h.e. 13 (P0 23, 273, 7), a resumption of Socrates' narrative which omits his description of Aetius' break with the Arians, h.e. II, 35 (PG 67, 297B).

110 At Barbad., h.e. 13 (P0 23, 274, 8), Soc., h.e. II, 35 (PG 67, 300A-B) has been omitted.

111 Barbad., h.e. 13 (P0 23, 274, 8-9).

112 See below pp. 155*-157*.

113 Barbad., h.e. 14 (P0 23, 282, 8-9), cf. Soc., h.e. V, 20 (PG 67, 620B).

114 Note especially the mention of Arian and Eunomian tumults early in the chapter, Soc., V, 20 (PG 67, 620A-B). The only thing which might be new is the mention of a general protest to the Emperor in Barbadbešaba (P0 23, 282, 9), though whether this is an added "word" or an inference from Socrates is hard to say.

115 Barbad., h.e. 13 (P0 23, 274, 9-10).

116 Notably Soc., h.e. II, 37 (PG 67, 304A/B); cf., IV, 13 (PG 67, 496B-C).

117 That., h.e. II, 27, 13-16 (GCS 161, 4-18).
118 See the articles by E. Bihain and L. Parmentier cited above pp. 69* and 73*, nn. 6, 19, and 20, and pp. 140*-147* below.
119 Such as is visible in other chapters of Barhadbesabba; v. L. Abramowski, "Untersuchungen zum Liber Heraclidis des Nestorius," CSCO, Subsidia 22, pp. 33-103, which gives a detailed analysis of the chapters dealing with Nestorius (this work will be referred to hereafter as "Untersuchungen").
120 Nicetas, thes. V, 30 (PG 139, 1389A-B), from Græ- Nyss., Ep. I (I I, 35, 10-36, 2).
121 Notably the obscure 11. 15-24 which seem to refer to gold-smithery.
122 Although the word from which this designation is constructed, παππλά (other forms, παππια, παππλο, παππλα, all from Latin papilla), is well enough attested, we have been unable to locate another occurrence of this word. Probably it is a piece of contemporary slang.
124 See below pp. 141*-143*.
125 v. supra pp. 113*.
126 Although 11. 54-64 of this fragment are also without parallel in Nicetas, they are obviously a continuation of the preceding account and together with it form a complete pericope.
126b Thus, the various Greek word-plays coined at 11. 44 and 61 are similar to the neologisms of Aetius at 11. 69 and 70.
127a Note Μ on at 1.6 and the Church (building) at 11. 11, 28, and 31.
127b Cf. Soz., h.e. VI, 26 (GCS 273, 2-10, 17-20).

128 As, e.g., Soc., h.e. V, 24 (PG 67, 649a) and Soz., h.e. VI, 26 (GCS 273, 2-7), who mention the change in the baptismal formula, while Tim. CP, haer. (PG 86, 24B-C) mentions the single immersion and Thdt., haer. IV, 3 (PG 83, 420E) mentions both. Epiphanius, haer. 76.54.32-35 (GCS III, 413, 31-414, 11) does not mention the single immersion but gives yet another baptismal formula, as well as a description of the manner of baptism which has some similarities to that in our own fragment.

129 Philost., h.e. VIII, 12 (GCS 114, 1-5); Hieron., vir. illus. 120 (PL 23, 711A).

130 Photius, cod. 5 (Henri I, 8, 8-15), and cod. 138 (Henri II, 107, 31). Otherwise unknown.

131 Hieron., vir. illus. 109 (PL 23, 705A) and 120 (PL 23, 711A).

132 Barḥad., h.e. 17 (PO 23, 315, 13-316, 2).

133 Ibid. (PO 23, 315, 13).


135 Thus Theodore Balsamon, comm. in can. II conc. CP II
(PG 137, 312C) speaks of "Eudoxians" and "Eunomians" as being interchangeable, while George Hamartolus, _chron._ IV, 180 (PG 110, 608B) actually speaks of Eudoxius as μοναχός Ευνομίου.


Thdt., _haer._ IV, 3 (PG 83, 4:20B-421A).

The only possible exception is the description of Eunomian baptism in the _Universal History_ of Agapius (Mahboub of Menbijd), pars II (PG 7; 574, 7-11); however, it is quite possible that the differences between the two are the work of Agapius himself. The two most notable ones are that the two manners of baptism are as between child and adult, and that the water in the case of the latter was poured over hands, breast and head.

Thdt., _haer._ V, 2 (PG 83, 449C).

Thdt., _en._ 113 (SC 111, 64, 11-12).

Thdt., _en._ 116 (SC 111, 70, 26).

Thdt., _en._ 116 (SC 111, 176, 18-19).

Thdt., _en._ 116 quoted above p. 70*.

See the articles by E. Bihain and L. Parmentier cited above, p. 69*, n. 6, and p. 73*, nn. 19 and 20.

Discussed below pp. 143*-147*.

Thdt., _haer._ II, 27, 9 (GCS 150, 14-19).

Fragment III, _Barḥad._ 11. 8-11, p. 85* above.

_Barḥad._, _haer._ 13 (PG 23, 274, 9-10).
That., h.e. II, 27 (GCS 158, 19-162, 24). On these lines of Barḥadbesabba see p. 120* above; it is not impossible that they too are based on Theodore.

See above, p. 73*.

See the passage quoted above pp. 71* and 72*.

See the articles cited above p. 73*; mm. 19 and 20.

This remains true even if Nicetas had Soz., h.e. III, 20 (GCS 135, 9-11) in front of him when he wrote. Since E. Bihain, in the article cited above p. 69*, n. 6 has suggested that Theodore’s lost work is behind a passage in both Theodoret and Sozomen, it may be that this is the case in the present passage also. Since neither of these passages is quite as specific as our fragment, it may be that Nicetas (as frequently) has expressed himself more clearly than his source.

That., h.e. II, 24, 7 (GCS 154, 8-9).

It should be kept in mind, however, that this argument (even if it were conclusive) applies only to whether Nicetas used Theodore as his source. It is still perfectly possible that Theodoret did so. The same conclusion applies to what follows as well.

L. Parmentier, GCS vol. 19, p. XXII.

bē om R.

μη om R.

Nicetas, thes. V, 30 (PG 139, 1390A-B).

Tbid. (PG 139, 1389D-1390A) = Soz., h.e. III, 20 (GCS
and an abridgement of Thdt., h.e. II, 9, 1-2 (GCS 119, 12-22); Nicetas, thes. V, 30 (PG 139, 1390B-C) = an abridgement of Thdt., h.e. II, 24, 1-2 (GCS 152, 21-153, 5).

161 See p. 144*, n. 155 above.

162 Parmentier, GCS vol. 19, pp. XCIII-XCIV raises the issue of passages based on Theodore of Mopsuestia in other parts of Nicetas' work. While this is quite probable (especially in the second half of Book V, beginning at c. iv0; PG 139, 11400D), the examples he mentions, V, 9 (PG 139, 1379B) and V, 7 (PG 139, 1367Bff.), are too vaguely ascribed to be assigned to any specific work, and are subject to the same problems of identification which we have already found in other passages.

163 Quoted above, p. 70*.

164 H. G. Opitz, art. "Theodoros h2," P-W, 20nd series, V, 1888, 4-12; 1889, 43-64; he seems to have been unaware of the passage of Theodoret cited in the previous note.

165 V, supra p. 69*, n. 3.

166 Grs. Nyss., Eun. I (I I, 27, 11-12; 28, 27; 29, 25; 42, 18; 163, 28).

167 On the problems raised by this contention see L. R. Wickham, "The Date of Eunomius' Apology: A Reconsideration," JTS 20 (1969), pp. 231-240.

168 Beginning with the passage quoted by Gregory at Eun. I (I I, 71, 28-73, 15).

At least, this is what seems to be behind the rather obscure statements found at GrG. Nyss., Eun. I (J I, 30, 12–31, 2–32, 5–9; 32, 16–33, 2).

One cannot help wondering, however, if there is not some indirect connection. Gregory tells us that his own sources are the (oral?) teaching of Athanasius of Ancyra and a letter of George of Laodicea, Eun. I (J I, 35, 3–7); possibly there was some connection between one or the other of these and Theodore.


188 See the article by L. R. Wickham cited above p. 149*, n. 167.*
189 Though without mentioning it by name, Grē. Nyss.,
Pan. I (I, 49, 9-13; 50, 3-4).
190 See p. 149* above.
191 If Photius is right in saying that Theodore refuted
Eunomius: καὶ λέγει τὸ σχέδιον (cod. 4; Henri I, 8, 2-3), the
possibility that the Cyril/Acadius affair in Book V was a
"flash-back" treated out of order is minimal.
192 * supra* p. 149*.
193 See p. 72*, n. 15 above.
194 See above p. 119*.
195 Barbad., h.e. 14 (Po 23, 281, 2-4); for emendation,
see next note.
196 This translation is based on the emendation printed
above. As the text stands in the manuscript it is very difficult
to make sense of it. F. Nau (Po 23, 281, trans. 3-4) translates,
"Le Père (a rapport) au Fils seulment et celui-ci au Saint-
Esprit." It is difficult to know what that might mean even in
translation! Another possibility might be, "The Father (is the
Father) with respect to the Son only, and he to the Holy Spirit."
This makes sense of the first clause (by reading a lot into it)
but leaves the second obscure. A further consideration is the
reason behind an interpolation at this point. Socrates used his quotation as an illustration of the enormity of Eunomius' heresy. If Barhadbesabba has amplified this, it is probably because he nowhere else does more than hint at Eunomius' heresy and needed something which would indicate his general position. In that case, one would expect the inserted phrase to reflect the main point of the heresy, not one of its more obscure dicta. Since the printed text is based on a unique manuscript, the probability of corruption is quite good. I have assumed that the verb \(\text{to create}\) dropped out from before \(\text{the Son}\), so that we ought to read as printed above. This has the advantage of making good sense, fulfilling the expectations mentioned earlier, and explaining the error. It seems to us very probably correct.

197 Apparently, the Father.
198 The Son.
199 Barhad., h.e. 14 (P 0 23, 281, 2).
200 Soc., h.e. IV, 7 (P G 67, 473B).
201 Eun., exp. fid. 57*, 4-7; cf. also apol. 26 (4:2*, 18-20).
202 Eun., apol. 24 (38*, 18-23).
203 There is, however, some evidence that Eunomius used it in his third book. After quoting a fragment in which Eunomius appeals to "the usage of the Saints" (Ort. Nyss., Eun. III, 1; J II, 6, 9-10), i.e., of the Scriptures, Gregory denies at length that any such usage exists (Ibid.; J II, 7, 14-10, 21). He then
introduces a hypothetical argument from Scripture based on Prov. 8: 21 and I Cor. 1: 24 (Ibid.; I II, 11, 1-8ff.). Since a similarly hypothetical argument given in another work (conf.; I II, 358, 7ff.) in fact reflects the actual words of Eunomius (Eun., ep. 14. 55*, 7-8), and we know that Eunomius appealed to Scripture at this point, it seems probable that Gregory is giving us Eunomius' actual argument under a hypothetical form. Although the argument is different from that presupposed in our fragment, it does give us an example of Eunomius' use of the text.

204 Quoted above p. 123*.

205 Though this is not quite impossible. Eunomius' Apology has come down to us in manuscripts of Basil's refutation of it, and since we have reason to believe that Barḥadbešabba possessed that work (cf. h.e. 14; Po 23, 282, 11-13), it is possible that Eunomius' treatise was included. Unfortunately, this work is not the source of our fragment.

206 Such as that which contains one of the other fragments of Eunomius, Anastasius of Sinai's, Contra Monophysitas (PG 89. 1181B-C).

207 V. supra p. 74*.

208 Barḥad., h.e. 14 (Po 23, 283, 1); quoted above p. 74*.


210 Fractions of columns are only roughly indicated; "¼ means anything more than ¼ and less than 3/4."
That is, giving the more accurate arrangement of the books found in Jaeger's edition with the numbers of columns in Migne, PG 145, 237-1122 (Book I = Book I in PG; Book II = Book XII; Book III = Books III-XI).

212 So Genadius, vir. inlus. 12 (TU 14, 65, 30-31).
213 Barhad., h.e. 14 (F0 23, 283, 1).
214 Ibid. (F0 23, 282, 11-13).
216 This seems to be what is behind Nau's translation of the phrase as "quatre mille" in F0 23, 283, trans. 2, although he gives no explanation.
217 Cf., e.g. Aristophanes, Acharnenses 1055 variant (Coulon I, 59, apparatus).
218 V. supra, p. 92, n. 112.
219 Ebed-jesus, Carmen 19 (Assemani III, i, 33, 19).
220 Ibid. (Assemani III, i, 34ff., n. 4).
224 Photius, cod. 4 (Henri I, 7, 40-41).
225 Ibid., cod. 177 (Henri II, 181, 23-24).
226 V. suprâ pp. 153*-154*.
227 V. suprâ p. 69*, nn. 4 and 5.
228 Barhad., h. e. 19 (Po 9, 510, 5-6). What is fundamentally the same quotation but less specifically expressed (20 forte et adhuc amplius libri) is given by Paundus, defens. VIII, 6 (PL 67, 729D); cf. also III, 3 (PL 67, 589E), 5 (PL 67, 599A/B).
229 V. L. Abramowski, "Untersuchungen" pp. 90-94.
230 V. suprâ pp. 154*-157*.
231 Photius, cod. 4 (Henri I, 7, 40-41), cod. 5 (Henri I, 8, 8-9), cod. 6 (Henri I, 8, 16-17).
232 Ibid., cod. 6 (Henri I, 8, 21-22).
233 Ibid., cod. 7 (Henri I, 9, 28-33).
234 Jaeger II, pp. XVI-XVIII.
236 Bede-Jesus, Carmen 19 (Assemani III, 1, 33, 20).
237 Ibid. (Assemani III, 1, 34, 9).
238 V. suprâ p. 165* f., A, 231.
239 Although Photius uses this title as a designation for all three works, only Theodore's work is given this title absolute; the other two are both introduced with the phrase ἀπόσεως (Henri I, 8, 8, 17). It may be that Photius used the actual title of Theodore's treatise as a general description for the others.
240 Théodr. Mops., Io., praefatio (CSCO 115, 3, 7-13; trans. CSCO 116, 1).


242 His reason for this intended treatise is quite interesting: "because I saw many delighting to hear the discourses which this heretic wrote." It indicates the continuing popularity of Eunomius' works even after his death (c. 395).

243 Devresse, op. cit., p. 50, n. 1.

244 Ibid., p. 50.

245 Barhad., h.e. 14 (P0 23, 283, 1-2).

246 Gennadius, vir. influs. 12 (TU 14, 65, 29-30).

247 See the comments of Swete and Abramowski cited above p. 164*, nn. 221, 223.

248 So Philost., h.e. VIII, 12 (GCS 114, 2-4, 24-26), confirmed by Grg. Nyss., ep. 29 (J VIII, 11, 87, 22-38, 8); Photius' statement in cod. 138 (Henri II, 106, 25-30) that it appeared only after Basil's death is due to a misunderstanding on his part of statements in the Contra Eunomium of Gregory.

249 Y. supra p. 69*, n. 2.

250 Philost., h.e. VIII, 12 (GCS 114, 25), and Grg. Nyss., ep. 29 (J VIII, 11, 87, 8-9, 14-15).


253 Cf. e.a., Grg. Nyss., Em. I (I I, 54, 6-17).
254 Grg. Nyss., ep. 29 (I VIII, ii, 87, 22-88, 8).
255 Ibid. (I VIII, ii, 87, 8-15).
256 v. supra p. 159 ff.
257 That is, because if this work did not refute the entire work of Eunomius, it was "one book" in the same sense that the "two books" of Basil were "books;" v. supra pp. 160*-163*.
259 Though there is no evidence to show (pace W. Jaeger, J II, p. IX) that it was a response to Gregory's rebuttal; it seems to have been part of the continuing response to Basil.
260 Books I and III seem to have been brought together early, whereas Book II continued to circulate separately, cf. J II, pp. XVI-XVIII.
261 Despite the fact that they are similar in many respects, our own fragments give no indication that Theodore had any knowledge of Gregory's work; v. supra pp. 150*-151*.
263 v. supra pp. 153*-154*.
264 The first at least must have been so divided since it is unlikely that an editor would have introduced such an arrangement de novo. On the other hand, it is not necessary to suppose that the later treatise was divided in the same way; the book divisions in the latter could have been introduced
by the editor who combined the two works, just as were the chapter headings of Gregory of Nyssa's second and third books (J II, p. XVI).

265 i.e., prior to the beginning of the Nestorian controversy, and probably before the composition of Cyril's Contra Diodorum et Theodorum c. 438 (it is difficult, but not impossible, to imagine him speaking glowingly of any work of Theodore's after that).

266 Cf. J II, pp. XVII-XVIII, XXII.
267 Ibid.
268 i.e., one book Pro Basilio and two Contra Eunomium. This may also explain Barḥadbešabba's mention of "other things" (v. supra p. 170*). If he possessed only one volume containing a limited number of λόγοι, but knew from the passage of Cyril which he himself quotes that there were as many as twenty-five, his rather vague statement would be perfectly comprehensible.
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(A) also A.T. DECEMBRE.

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(Graduate in Philae)


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EUSEBIUS CAESARIENSIS

(historia ecclesiastica)

GENNADIUS

(de viribus illustribus)

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(orationes theologicae)

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