Stalinist Monumental Art and Architecture, and the "Immortalization of Memory"



Antony Kalashnikov
Nuffield College, University of Oxford
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History
Hilary Term 2019

Short abstract

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This thesis analyzes the "immortalization of memory" policy of the Stalinist regime in the USSR (1932-1954), a program that sought to ensure that contemporaneous events and individuals would be remembered by posterity, in perpetuity. "Immortalization," I argue, was carried out through the construction of dedicated monumental art and architecture, which were built to last for centuries and were placed under a strong preservation regime.

The research proposes a new way to interpret the style and form of Stalinist monumentalism, heretofore analyzed solely in terms of its immediate propaganda functions. I argue that historicism did not pander to backwards-looking, conservative tastes, as is commonly assumed. Rather, Stalinist monumental artists and architects sought a trans-temporal language that would be understandable to posterity, turning to "timeless" styles, whose supposed universality was "proven" by their continuous use throughout the centuries. I also argue that the development of Stalinist monumental practice in many respects revolved around the often contradictory strivings that monuments remain at once distinctive and relevant to posterity.

Sensitivity to "immortalization" challenges the idea that Stalinist visions of the future can be contained in the "striving-towards-communism" model. I argue that the "immortalization" myth was not specific to Stalinism but was a shared response to wider processes of modernization: secularization of ideas about death (whereby "immortal" memory filled the existential vacuum left by declining belief in immortal souls) and rapid social change (in which communication with an imagined posterity gave a sense of stability). Insofar as these problems were particularly pronounced in a society undergoing rapid industrialization, and ruled by a militantly atheistic regime, "immortalization" dynamics achieved impressive dimensions in the Stalinist Soviet Union. This finding (that "immortalization" was a shared, transnational discourse, inflected in the Stalinist context) supports the emerging understanding of Stalinist culture as an expression of "radical modernity."

Long abstract

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This thesis analyzes the "immortalization of memory" under the Stalin regime, a program that sought to ensure that contemporaneous events and individuals would be remembered by posterity, in perpetuity. As I contend, "immortalization" was primarily carried out through the construction of dedicated monumental constructions, from statues to infrastructure mega-projects. Opposing the dominant view that Stalinist monumentalism acted solely as a conduit for state propaganda, this thesis argues that monuments and monumental architecture were also tasked with memorializing contemporary events and individuals, in order that these might be remembered favourably by future generations.

This "immortalization" function was evident on several levels. In Stalinist discourse, monumental constructions were referred to as being "monuments to the epoch," "writing the chronicle of history in stone," and constructing "the pantheon of the Stalinist epoch." This was no mere sloganeering; constructions made use of long-lasting materials and forms, with a view to centuries-long durability. Monuments hastily executed in impermanent materials were later demolished and rebuilt to endure. Appreciating this genuine striving to "build for posterity" challenges reductionist interpretations of "solid" artistic forms as mere assertions of the regime's strength and immutability. Finally, once constructed, monumental objects were immediately placed under a progressively strengthening preservation regime, guaranteeing their indefinite existence as protected national heritage. In the wider historical context, the Stalinist period was distinctive for the orientation of its monumental objects towards future audiences, and the commemoration of contemporary (rather than past) events and individuals.

As this thesis demonstrates, "immortalization" goals had significant effects on the form and style of Stalinist monumentalism. Specifically, "immortalization" can (partially) explain the demise of the avant-garde and the revival of historicism in architectural and artistic practice. Given the lack of time, expertise, and resources, research into durable construction frequently took a shortcut. Rather than develop new materials, forms, and mediums, artists and architects increasingly seized upon those which, in retrospect, had remained physically preserved over the centuries. In seeking an artistic language that would be understandable to posterity, Stalinist monumentalists turned to neoclassicism and, increasingly, to national styles. These two traditions were thought to be "perfect" and "timeless," qualities "proven" by their continual use throughout the centuries. Moreover, I suggest that the global "stripped classical" movement of the 1930s and 1940s, with which the Stalinist monumental style held much in common, may itself have been connected to wider, shared "immortalization" objectives. In so doing, the thesis contributes to a reappraisal of neoclassical and "national" historicism as not necessarily conservative, as is typically assumed, but also paradoxically suited to being a future-oriented style.

The use of retrospective styles for "immortalizing" contemporary events and individuals was not without tensions. How would posterity distinguish Stalinist constructions from past heritage, heritage which in this period was also being carefully restored and reconstructed? As this thesis proposes, common solutions to this problem involved the heavy use of historical props (contemporary clothing, machines, weapons, and the like), a reliance on written inscriptions (as well as of a general "logocentrism" in art), a focus on artistic synthesis (accentuating meaning the use of several artistic mediums

– architecture, sculpture, painting – at once), and a penchant for gigantic dimensions. A related problem consisted of making Stalinist monumental constructions relevant to an imagined posterity, a particularly grave problem given the "museum-like" quality that historicism could imply. Given the impossibility of adjusting the subject of "immortalization," solutions to the problem of relevance included an emphasis on an emotionally-charged romanticism, and a striving for more laconic renderings. These two concerns – relevance and distinctiveness – often came into tension with one another. Indeed, the development of Stalinist monumentalism can be explained to a significant extent by reference to these two opposing criteria.

The thesis also argues that "immortalization" represented a cultural myth, rather than a state policy. In a limited sense, "immortalization" *did* represent an attempt to control the collective memory (and, indirectly, the political culture) of the future, from the present. Yet "immortalization" was a much broader phenomenon. Stalinist political leaders made sure that they were the subjects "immortalized" in monuments and monumental art – an outcome of their personal vanity rather than instrumental, power-maximizing calculations. The executors of "immortalization," art and architecture professionals, were also not disinterested. They saw a chance of themselves being "immortalized" through perdurable creations. Moreover, by creating the first Socialist Realist classics, as well as in laying the foundations of future monumental *ensembles*, art and architecture professionals savoured the possibility of becoming canonized. While the regime used the "immortalization" discourse to demand political conscientiousness and higher quality work, artists also referred to the importance of their duty "before all time," demanding commissions and extra resources. Finally, a core of "true believers" was also genuinely enthusiastic about "immortalization," submitting designs and providing constructive criticism to artists and architects. Indeed, the wide public performance of support for "immortalization" probably convinced the regime that "immortalization" was already a shared value, a self-evident symbolic incentive for labour, loyalty, and military valour.

But why did political leaders, art and architecture professionals, and the wider public care about being "immortalized" in the first place? I argue that "immortalized" memory filled the existential vacuum left by declining belief in immortal souls, a dynamic particularly evident amidst the death and destruction of the Great Patriotic War. The "immortalization" myth also responded to the conditions of rapid social change (particularly the massive dislocations of the "Great Break" and subsequent policies), stabilizing social and individual identities with imagined continuities between present generations and the remembering posterity. These functions of the "immortalization" myth were not specific to Stalinism, although "immortalization" was particularly central to Stalinist culture (as in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany). Challenging "totalitarian" arguments, which interpret the centrality of monumental construction as an outcome of democratic deficit, I argue that the Stalinist Soviet Union (as well as interwar fascist regimes) experienced the secular existential crisis and rapid, disorienting social changes particularly harshly. I further argue that the temporal model suggested by "immortalization" supports the emerging understanding of Stalinist culture as an expression of "radical modernity," rather than a form of "alternative modernity" (or a reversion to primordial patterns, as implied by Stalinism's alleged orientation towards an atemporal "eternity," in reaction to linear models of time). Finally, I note the unique context of the rise and fall of the "immortalization" myth in the Stalinist Soviet Union. I argue that an inverse relationship existed between "immortalization" and communist utopianism, which promised alternative solutions to the problems of death and rapid social change. In so doing, I connect the trajectory of the "immortalization" myth to the broader cultural frameworks dominant in the periods bounding the Stalinist era.

Alongside these direct contributions, the epilogue concludes with an oblique theoretical intervention to the study of collective memory in contemporary Russia. Actors in the Stalinist period expressly intended to intercede in the way that future generations would remember the era. While they would hardly have envisioned contemporary Russia as the intended audience, Stalinist monumental art and architecture may still play some role, however distorted, in present-day collective memory – if only as powerful, emotionally-charged illustrations supplementing current (often apologetic) discourses on Stalinism. Critically reframing these monuments promises to counteract the readings to which these objects predispose themselves, to recover their problematic histories, and to make manifest their intentional attempts to seduce us, the "future generations."

As the first detailed study of the "immortalization" myth and practices under Stalinism, the thesis makes interventions in several questions. Firstly, the study proposes a novel approach to Stalinist monumental art and architecture, highlighting its future-oriented character. Sensitivity to "immortalization" allows for a deeper explanation of the style and form of Stalinist monumentalism, specifically with regards to the search for a trans-temporal artistic language and the striving for distinctiveness and relevance in the eyes of posterity. Secondly, this thesis uses the "immortalization" myth as an entry point for nuancing understandings of Stalinist temporal culture and placing it in a comparative perspective. Thirdly and finally, the thesis considers the continuing role of Stalinism monuments in current collective memory of the period, and ways to counteract these problematic effects.

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List of abbreviations

BSE	*Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia**
KPDA SNK/ SM SSSR	Komitet po delam arkhitektury pri Sovete Narodnykh Kommissarov/ Sovete Ministrov Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik
KPDI SNK/ SM RSFSR	Komitet po delam iskusstv pri Sovete Narodnykh Kommissarov/ Sovete Ministrov Rossiiskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Federativnoi Respubliki
KPDI SNK/ SM SSSR	Komitet po delam iskusstv pri Sovete Narodnykh Kommissarov/ Sovete Ministrov Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik
MGU	Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet
MOSSA	Moskovskoe otdeleniie Soiuza sovetskikh arkhitektorov
MOSSKh	Moskovskoe otdelenie Soiuza sovetskikh khudozhnikov
MSSKh	Moskovskii Soiuz sovetskikh khudozhnikov
SNK/ SM RSFSR	Sovet Narodnykh Kommissarov/ Sovet Ministrov Rossiiskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Federativnoi Respubliki
SNK/ SM SSSR	Sovet Narodnykh Kommissarov/ Sovet Ministrov Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik
SSA (SSSR)	Soiuz sovetskikh arkhitektorov (Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik)
TsK VKP(b)/ KPSS	Tsentral'nyi komitet Vsesoiuznoi kommunistichestkoi partii (bol'shevikov)/ Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza
VSKhV	Vsesoiuznaia sel'skokhoziaistvennaia vystavka

** The transliterations used in thesis follow the Library of Congress style, unless quoting from or citing a source with an alternative transliteration.*

"We cannot build cheap, awkward things in Moscow, for what we build in Moscow is for the centuries, for generations, and the point is […] that we create a genuine monument to the epoch" (Iosif Stalin, 1949).[1]

[1] Qtd. in E. Taranov, "Gorod kommunizma (idei liderov 50-60-kh godov i ikh voploshchenie)," in *Moskovskii arkhiv: Istoriko-kraevedcheskii al'manakh, vyp. 1*, ed. Vladimir Kozlov and et al. (Moscow: Moskovskoe gorodskoe ob"edinenie arkhivov, 1996), 372.

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Research questions and outline of thesis

Why do we care about being remembered favourably, even in the distant future, by a nameless posterity? What motivates a society to take this desire to extremes, consciously attempting to influence the way future generations would look back on their times? This thesis analyzes the "immortalization of memory" (*uvekovechenie pamiati*) as a cultural phenomenon under the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union, in the years 1932-1954. This official program sought to ensure that contemporaneous events and individuals would be remembered by future generations, in perpetuity. "Immortalization," I argue, was primarily carried out through the construction of dedicated monumental art and architecture, built to last for centuries, and to memorialize the present for posterity to look back on. The objectives of my thesis are dual: to trace the effect of the "immortalization" goal on the style and form of Stalinist monumentalism, and to analyze the political and cultural functions of the "immortalization" discourse.

After settling preliminary issues relating to historiography, concepts, and methodology in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 examines Stalinist monumental art and architecture more directly. In extant scholarship, these are analyzed solely in terms of their immediate propaganda functions. By contrast, I argue for a parallel, future-oriented, "immortalizing" role of monumental art and architecture, which was expressed in discourse, in their material characteristics, and in the protection and preservation regime under which they were placed. In this "future orientation," and in the emphasis on memorializing contemporaneous events and individuals, Stalinist monumental culture differed from its precedents and antecedents in Russian/ Soviet history.

As Chapter 3 goes on to argue, "immortalization" had significant effects on the form and style of Stalinist monumentalism. Specifically, the quest for perdurable mediums and forms, as well as for a universal, trans-temporal artistic language that would remain understandable to posterity, biased Stalinist monumentalists in favour of historicism. Forms and mediums which had, in retrospect, remained physically unaltered were employed in "building for posterity," while classicism and the Russian popular style were held up for emulation due to their alleged "timeless" perfection and continuous usage throughout the ages. Thus, the historicism of Stalinist monumentalism was not truly past-oriented and did not represent a capitulation to "backwards" tastes (which challenges prevailing interpretations).

But how would posterity distinguish stylized, historicist constructions from the heritage of the past? As Chapter 4 proposes, common solutions to this problem involved the heavy use of historical props (such as contemporary clothing and weaponry), a reliance on written inscriptions, a synthetic approach to monumental constructions, and a penchant for superior size and central positioning within urban *ensembles*. A related problem consisted of making Stalinist monumental constructions relevant and eye-catching to an imagined posterity. Solutions included an emphasis on an emotionally-charged romanticism, and a striving for laconic renderings. As I argue, these two concerns – distinctiveness and relevance – sometimes came into tension with one another, in a debate substantiating several features of Stalinist monumentalism.

The second major aim of the thesis is to unpack the political and cultural functions of "immortalization." In Chapter 5, I argue that "immortalization" was a shared cultural myth that cannot be reduced to its cynical, instrumental exploitation by the regime. Rather, political leaders, art and architecture professionals, and the wider public all appear to have desired "fame everlasting." This shared value could then be instrumentalized – by the regime (as a

symbolic reward for labour and loyalty) and by art professionals (demanding commissions and resources for "eternal art" from political leaders).

But why did these various groups all desire to be "immortalized" in the first place? Chapter 6 proposes two major frameworks accounting for the "immortalization" myth, which was, in fact, not limited to the Stalinism, but was a shared response to the wider processes of modernization. These were the secularization of ideas about death (whereby "immortal" memory filled the vacuum left by declining belief in "immortal" souls), and the rapid breakdown of traditional social structures (in which communication with an imagined posterity gave a sense of stability). While the "immortalization" myth was not unique to Stalinism (although it did present itself in an augmented way here – as under fascist regimes), the path to it was. I argue that the upsurge of the "immortalization" myth corresponded to the decline of Bolshevik utopianism, which had responded in its own way to secularized understandings of death and to rapid social change.

This thesis is the first study of the "immortalization" program and myth under Stalinism and makes contributions to several areas. Not only does it nuance understandings of Stalinist temporality beyond the "striving-towards-communism" cliché, it places "immortalization" culture in a comparative context, while maintaining sensitivity to the uniqueness of the Stalinist case. Furthermore, the study proposes a novel approach to Stalinist monumental art and architecture, alongside the dominant paradigm which reduces these to their "propaganda" functions. I uncover a parallel process: memorializing (a specific representation of) the present for future generations to look back on, a dynamic which can explain the form and style of Stalinist monumentalism to a significant extent.

Alongside these direct contributions, the epilogue concludes with an oblique theoretical intervention to the study of collective memory in contemporary Russia. Actors in the Stalinist period expressly intended to intercede in the way that future generations would

remember the era. While they would hardly have envisioned contemporary Russia as the intended audience, Stalinist monumental art and architecture may still play some role, however distorted, in present-day collective memory – if only as powerful, emotionally-charged illustrations supplementing current (often apologetic) discourses on Stalinism. Critically reframing these monuments promises to counteract the readings to which these objects predispose themselves, to recover their problematic histories, and to make manifest their intentional attempts to seduce us, the "future generations."

The next section contextualizes the project within the literature on Stalinist temporality, the Stalinist archival regime and Stalinist historical writing, as well as within studies of monumental art and architecture. The succeeding section sets out my "hermeneutic" approach, the project's source-base, and case selection. Methodological questions, particularly my qualified use of the totalitarian model and issues of periodization, receive detailed treatment.

1.2 Literature review

Studies of the relationship of Stalinism to the future are not well developed. Scholarship ubiquitously references the idea that the Stalinist regime pursued a communist utopia and the end of history. This utopian orientation is seemingly confirmed in Karl Marx's postulations concerning the inevitable transformation of capitalist societies, via socialism, to their communist *telos*. The Bolshevik movement was premised on this claim, which was enshrined as dogma and endlessly repeated throughout the entire Soviet period. "Idealist" interpretations take the Stalinist pursuit of a utopian future at its word; "structuralists" doubt the genuineness of this stated goal, pointing instead to the political usefulness of the utopian

promise (motivating labour and loyalty to the communist cause, sidelining the significance of "temporary" privations, instilling confidence in the inevitability of communist triumph).

The "idealist" tradition has produced the only detailed treatments of Stalinist temporality to date. These, however, tend not venture significantly beyond such staple allusions to the Marxist or Stalinist (often used interchangeably) conceptions of the utopian future. Stephen Hanson's *Time and Revolution* explains how the striving for the communist millennium, combined with a "charismatic-rational" understanding of how to reach it, determined the form of Stalinist economic and political institutions. In this narrative, the rapid propulsion of society toward the future utopia became de-linked not only from the specific characteristics of this utopia, but also from any consideration of cause and effect. In the pursuit of ever-increasing *motion*, the actual consequences of policies were largely ignored (hence, for instance, the drive to maximize output leading to wastage of capital and other inputs, poor quality production, and lack of coordination).[1] In Hanson's account, therefore, the Stalinist striving for the future utopia figures as an almost pathological obsession, absolutely central to the shape of the Soviet project.

Evgenii Dobrenko, building on the work of Vladimir Paperny and Boris Groys, proposes an alternate model of Stalinist temporality: "the famous 'abolition' by Stalin of Hegel's law of negation of the negation left without an answer the question of what there would be 'after communism'; the horizon of expectations was directed towards the past, in so far as there was already nothing to 'expect' in the future. Stalin introduced a new temporality: the concluded future (a kind of future pluperfect)."[2] With the utopia "already having been built, the future […] already arrived […] the only thing that remained was to experience

[1] Stephen Hanson, *Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of Soviet Institutions* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 167-170.
[2] Evgenii Dobrenko, *Stalinist Cinema and the Production of History: Museum of the Revolution* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 6.

utopia and equip the world for new and even greater prosperity."[3] Thus, in Dobrenko's significant revision, Stalinism presented itself as an already-achieved future utopia, as a perfect, eternal society (I will return to this idea throughout the thesis).

By contrast, I argue that the relationship of Stalinism to the future cannot be contained in its orientation towards the communist utopia (in either the classical or revised versions). This thesis contends that Stalinist society was broadly concerned with how the present would be remembered by future generations (a generic "posterity" rarely described as living under communism). Moreover, as I argue in Chapter 6, the rise of the "immortalization" myth in fact responded to the *downturn* of communist utopianism, a key characteristic differentiating Stalinist culture from that of other Soviet periods.

Although extant scholarship does not address this hypothesis (the widespread desire to be remembered favourably) in an intentional and sustained manner, fragmentary evidence assembled from disparate bodies of scholarship offers support for my proposition. These literatures include accounts of the Stalinist archival regime and the Stalinist practice of history-writing, and studies of monuments and monumental architecture. Biographers of Stalin note, however briefly, the leader's desire to be remembered well. Dmitrii Volkogonov claims that Stalin "did everything to ensure that his life story would be told in bright colours […] people knew about him only what he wanted them to know."[4] Roy and Zhores Medvedev likewise attest that "Stalin was always concerned about how he would be remembered by future generations."[5]

[3] Evgenii Dobrenko, "Socialist Realism and Stasis," in *Utopian Reality: Reconstructing Culture in Revolutionary Russia and Beyond*, ed. Christina Lodder, Maria Kokkori, and Maria Mileeva (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 194. Also see Boris Groys, *The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond*, trans. Charles Rougle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 47-48, 73; Vladimir Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin: Culture Two*, trans. John Hill and Roann Barris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16-17, 31.
[4] Dmitrii Volkogonov, *Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy*, trans. Harold Shukman (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), xx.
[5] Roy Medvedev and Zhores Medvedev, *The Unknown Stalin* (New York: IB Tauris, 2003), 78.

Some historians support this observation by referring to the Stalinist archival regime, the record that would form the basis for posterity's evaluations. Martin McCauley claims that "Stalin destroyed many documents and materials at the height of his power" in part because he "was conscious of his place in history [...] want[ing] to be painted as a hero."[6] Similarly, Oleg Khlevniuk argues that Stalin's archive was compiled "not least 'for history'."[7] He specifically notes the destruction of Chief Prosecutor Andrei Vyshinskii's correspondence for the year 1937 (the height of the Great Purges). Jan Plamper describes the curation of documents referred to and produced by Stalin's office, which were sent alternately to the "open" archives of Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute and the dictator's personally-controlled, "closed" Central Committee Special Sector – the former cultivating an image of Stalin in part for "posterity."[8]

It is tempting to pursue this line of inquiry further, but a number of challenges arise. Assessing the scale of archival deletions is *a priori* difficult because such documents no longer exist. The best one can do is accumulate trace evidence (such as orders calling for the destruction of documents) and analyze visible gaps in the archival record. Not many have surfaced to date. Furthermore, as Medvedev and Medvedev attest, the picture is complicated by the *posthumous* destruction of documents in Stalin's personal possession, found at his office and dacha.[9] In any case, alongside the desire to doctor posterity's memory through archival deletions, there were perhaps even stronger reasons for conserving even the most incriminating records. Preservation of documents was a way for subordinates to diffuse

[6] Martin McCauley, *Stalin and Stalinism* (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2003), 89.
[7] Oleg Khlevniuk, *Stalin. Zhizn' odnogo vozhdia* (Moscow: Corpus, 2005), 8.
[8] Jan Plamper, *The Stalin Cult: A Study in the Alchemy of Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 125. These documents have since been merged into the Stalin *fond* in RGASPI.
[9] This proceeded for reasons probably unconnected to legacy-making; Stalin's heirs destroyed evidence of their complicity in crimes. Destruction of the archive was also thought of as a safeguard against a revival of Stalin's cult of personality, whereby his writings were prevented from exerting an independent force on Soviet politics (in the same way that Lenin's did), Medvedev and Medvedev, *The Unknown Stalin*, 57-88.

responsibility and minimize their own complicity.[10] Conversely, Stalin often forced his inner circle to co-sign his decrees, binding them to his fate.[11] Finally, the sheer volume of compromising documentation precluded the effectiveness of any significant *ad hoc* deletions. As Medvedev and Medvedev argue, "the head of the Party and state could hardly deal with the flow of incoming and outgoing papers in a spontaneous manner, without a system [...] possibly a few documents were destroyed, but this could only have happened where 'special actions' were concerned, such as the plans to assassinate Trotsky."[12] The intentional destruction of records for the sake of posterity therefore appears as a relatively minor phenomenon. Finally, the curation of a dual archival regime probably had more to do with the day-to-day management of the leader cult than with legacy-fashioning. As Brandenderger demonstrates, the documents of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute were used primarily for preparing Stalin's biographies, produced *within* the dictator's lifetime.[13] There are, at the same time, few indications of Stalin's trust in this dual archival regime being preserved into the indefinite future.

In any case, the "immortalization" impulse was broader than Stalin and his personal vanity. Paperny's work is important in widening the perspective to Stalinist *culture*. For Paperny, concern with future memory is evidenced in part through the writing of histories at the same time as the respective events were unfolding (to pass down a favourable interpretative template to posterity).[14] Nonetheless, this dynamic is often explained more convincingly by the immediate political expedience of such texts. Indeed, Stalin's personal intervention into memory of the Second World War, in the form of the edited volume *The*

[10] Lynne Viola, *The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin's Special Settlements* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 185.
[11] Medvedev and Medvedev, *The Unknown Stalin*, 63, 69-72.
[12] Ibid., 78.
[13] David Brandenberger, "Stalin as Symbol: A Case Study of the Cult of Personality and its Construction," in *Stalin: A New History*, ed. Sarah Davies and James Harris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[14] Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 18; also see Anna Neimark, "The Infrastructural Monument: Stalin's Water Works under Construction and in Representation," *Future Anterior* 9, no. 2 (2013): 4.

Falsifiers of History, was explicitly positioned as a counter to Western propaganda concerning the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, rather than as a definitive, canonical history.[15] In this period, many other histories of recent events responded to Maksim Gor'kii's call for writing contemporaneous "histories of factories and plants." The publishing house created for this venture produced more than 30 history books between 1931 and 1938 (including *How We Built the Metro*, which Paperny refers to).[16] But Gor'kii did not speak of posterity, being concerned rather with raising the class-consciousness of Soviet workers-turned-authors and their readers.[17] Equally importantly, history books as such are ephemeral: they depreciate quickly and rarely hold large audiences, unless made mandatory by school curricula. The Stalinist regime recognized and exploited this impermanence, through careful curation of library holdings: purges of catalogue entries, constant book recalls, the issuing of "updated" editions, and even the physical excision of compromising pages.[18] Therefore, it is unlikely that much faith would have been placed in books as the main medium of communication with future generations.

The strongest suggestions that Stalinist culture was concerned with future memory come rather from monumental art and architecture. After all, this is where Paperny's main evidence is drawn from (although architecture also functions as his "entry point" for analyzing Stalinist culture in all of its facets). Indeed, statements by other art historians

[15] Iosif Stalin, *The Falsifiers of History* (Moscow: Cominform, 1948). A rich literature documents the manipulation of War memory in the immediate postwar years, with casualties downplayed, defeats reinterpreted as "strategic" retreats, and victory ascribed to the superiority of the Soviet order and Stalin's personal genius, Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 196-205; Matthew Gallagher, *The Soviet History of World War II: Myths, Memories, and Realities* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 15-63; Nina Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 98-105. These accounts reveal that interventions into the memory of recent events were used for immediate political objectives, not for communicating with future audiences.

[16] See Cynthia Ruder, *Making History for Stalin: The Story of the Belomor Canal* (Miami: University Press of Florida, 1998), 94-99.

[17] Maksim Gor'kii, "Istoriia fabrik i zavodov," *Pravda*, 7 September 1931; also see Dietmar Neutatz, *Moskovskoe metro: ot pervykh planov do velikoi stroiki stalinizma (1897-1935)*, trans. Iu. Petrov (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2013), 634-641.

[18] Robert Rogers, "Censorship and Libraries in the Soviet Union," *Journal of Library History, Philosophy, and Comparative Librarianship* 8, no. 1 (1973): 24-27.

convey a similar impression. For instance, Mark Neiman argues that beginning with 1930s, "the aims of a memorial were […] transferred to monumental-decorative sculpture."[19] Katerina Clark refers to Stalinist monuments as "bearing witness to an extraordinary time."[20] Vadim Bass, similarly, observes that "Stalinist architecture create[d] 'monuments to its epoch'."[21] More detailed analyses of individual monuments are also indicative. For example, Alexei Tarkhanov and Sergei Kavtaradze describe the Volga-Don Canal as "the Stalinist era's monument to itself," passage through which "was intended as a memorial procession," while Cynthia Ruder argues that the Moscow-Volga Canal expressed "the intention to create […] a deftly woven architectural monument to Stalinism."[22] Anna Kutseleva, for her part, states that "in addition to the memorial function of some stations, the Moscow Metro itself perform[ed] the function of a monument of its era. This [was] a memorial created by the culture to itself."[23]

Unfortunately, scholars do not develop these observations; Paperny is almost alone in so doing, and even so devotes only a few pages to "immortalization" in his magisterial work *Architecture in the Age of Stalin: Culture Two*. Specifically, Paperny refers to the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition (VSKhV) exhibition and the unbuilt Palace of Soviets being designed to stand permanently.[24] He quotes the deputy chairman of the Palace of the Soviets building team as stating: "the structure must not only be durable for a certain period of time, but must

[19] Mark Neiman, "Skul'ptura," in *Istoriia russkogo iskusstva. Tom XII. 1934-1941*, ed. I. Grabar' (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1961), 189.
[20] Katerina Clark, "Socialist Realism and the Sacralizing of Space," in *The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology of Soviet Space*, ed. Evgeny Dobrenko and Eric Naiman (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 9.
[21] Vadim Bass, "Strana pobedivshego man'erizma," in *Arkhitektura Stalinskoi epokhi: opyt istoricheskogo osmysleniia*, ed. Iulia Kosenkova (Moscow: KomKniga, 2010), 106; also see Sergei Ivanov, *Arkhitektura v kul'turotvorchestve totalitarizma. Philosophsko-esteticheskiy analiz* (Kiev: Stilos, 2001), 55-56; Vladimir Tolstoi, *Monumental'noe iskusstvo SSSR* (Moscow: Sovetskii khudozhnik, 1978), 10.
[22] Alexei Tarkhanov and Sergei Kavtaradze, *Architecture of the Stalin Era* (New York: Rizzoli, 1992), 169; Cynthia Ruder, *Building Stalinism: The Moscow Canal and the Creation of Soviet Space* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2018), 176.
[23] Anna Kutseleva, "Mesto moskovskogo metropolitena v sovetskom kul'turnom prostranstve," in *Arkhitektura Stalinskoi epokhi: opyt istoricheskogo osmysleniia.*, ed. Iulia Kosenkova (Moscow: KomKniga, 2010), 182.
[24] Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 17-18.

last forever, as the whole idea of our society is eternal."[25] In these examples, Paperny reads a general cultural tendency for "hardening" and preserving its artifacts. However, Paperny interprets "immortalization" as part of Stalinist culture's general orientation towards "eternity" (as in Groys and Dobrenko's aforementioned conception) rather than on future generations *per se*.[26] Because Stalinism had achieved the basic characteristics of an eternal, "homogenous and unchanging" utopia, the present represented not "the first moment in history, but rather the last."[27] These final great achievements had to be captured and "immortalized."[28]

My conclusions depart from Paperny's model in several respects, not least in the idea of Stalinism as an eternal, completed utopia (I treat "immortalization" as a vehicle for thinking about the future, rather than performing an eternal present). Yet it is difficult to understate the importance of Paperny's brief account in inviting further inquiry. Building on Paperny's identification of "immortalization" as an important facet of Stalinist culture, this thesis examines questions which Paperny's original model did not take into account: the broader cultural context which gave birth to the "immortalization" phenomenon; its development across time; the attitudes of various groups involved in and witnessing the process; the way "immortalization" affected the construction and artistic composition of monumental art and architecture.

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[25] Ibid., 17.
[26] Paperny writes that under Stalinism the "future [became tantamount] to eternity," ibid., 16.
[27] Ibid., 18.
[28] Something similar can be interpreted from Tarkhanov and Kavtaradze's rather opaque statement that "the overriding aim of the [Stalinist] period was to turn itself into a museum: the laws of the dialectic had been changed by official decree and time had stopped," Tarkhanov and Kavtaradze, *Architecture of the Stalin Era*, 160. Paperny's argument is evidently paraphrased in connection to the birth of the Moscow metro by Kutseleva: "A culture presenting itself as […] the final step in world development, is unconsciously afraid of time, and by extension, death and disappearance. The premonition of its imminent demise [...] is realized in the aspiration to fix itself in matter as soon as possible, to escape into timelessness, to send its image to future generations. It is appropriate to recall the feverish records in the construction of the first stage [of the Moscow metro], the canonized history of the 'birth' of the metro, created at the same time as its construction, the choice of materials (concrete, which 'becomes stronger with time,' and marble – an eternal material that does not lend itself to depreciation) because the construction conveyed to the future must exist forever," Kutseleva, "Mesto moskovskogo metropolitena," 182.

Admittedly, the idea that Stalinist monumental art and architecture functioned to "immortalize" the memory of events and individuals is not widespread within the scholarship. Rather, the dominant approach is to treat such objects as instruments of state propaganda, oriented towards contemporaneous audiences. This is suggested by the relationship of the regime towards art in general, embodied most notably in the dictums of Socialist Realism.[29] This term came about in early 1932 but was brought to the fore in Gor'kii's article of the same name in 1933. In 1934, secretary of the Party's Central Committee Andrei Zhdanov expounded Socialist Realism's key tenets at the Conference of the Union of Writers, where it was endorsed officially.[30] It was soon generalized to all fields of Soviet art culture through the other mandatory and all-embracing artistic Unions, established (formally) that same year. Socialist Realism was presented as a method, not a style, with at least three key features. First, art was to be subordinated to central control, namely, to the directives of the Party (*partiinost'*). Second, it had to be accessible and comprehensible to the widest mass of people (*narodnost'*) and had to speak simply (*prosto*). Finally, it had to be a force *influencing* people; artists were therefore to act as "engineers of the human soul." These didactic goals were to be achieved through the depiction of reality "in its revolutionary development."

In keeping with this, most scholars interpret Stalinist monumental art and architecture through the stated goals of Socialist Realism that it claimed to follow. Propaganda goals included inculcating new values such as militarism and nationalism and promoting leader cults. Portrayals of everyday life were "varnished" to hide imperfections. They depicted "an idealized vision of the Communist future as an already achieved reality," demonstrating the

[29] Although it is also a thesis of the "totalitarian model" generally, in line with which Nazi monumentalism is also viewed as propaganda, see Roger Griffin, "Party Time: The Temporal Revolution of the Third Reich," *History Today* 49, no. 4 (1999): 43-44. Moreover, treating monuments as political propaganda represents a broader paradigm, which is employed in other contexts as well, for example, see Sergiusz Michalski, *Public Monuments: Art in Political Bondage, 1870-1997* (London: Reaktion Books, 1998).
[30] Matthew Bown, *Art under Stalin* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1991), 89-90.

beginnings of the future utopia in islets of the present.[31] This squared the poverty and misery of life with official pronouncements; as Helena Goscilo argues, "as in fetishism, enunciation camouflaged lack."[32] Images of the promised land also acted to incentivize labour and loyalty. I do not contest any of these valuable insights. Indeed, "propagandistic" considerations were probably the primary driver in the creation and design of monumental art and architecture. However, I propose a parallel (if secondary) dynamic – the orientation of these objects towards a future audience, for the "immortalization of memory."

My hypothesis with regards to the centrality of monumental art and architecture in "immortalization" dynamics owes as much to theoretical work in collective memory studies as to the idea's treatment in extant historical scholarship. Specifically, I take as my point of departure Alois Riegl's classic 1903 conceptualization of "intentional monuments" as those "creation[s] erected for the specific purpose of keeping single human deeds or events (or a combination thereof) alive in the minds of future generations."[33] These objects reflect the ideal of "international commemorative value," which "makes a claim to immortality, to an eternal present and an unceasing state of becoming [battling] the natural processes of decay which militate against the fulfillment of its claims."[34] However, Riegl discusses this future orientation of monuments only in passing. Subsequent theorization within the field of "memory studies" focuses either on the formal qualities of monuments or on their political dimensions (at the moment of creation or in the contemporary cultural landscape).

[31] Sergei Kruk, "Semiotics of Visual Iconicity in Leninist 'Monumental' Propaganda," *Visual Communication* 7, no. 1 (2008): 27.
[32] Helena Goscilo, "Luxuriating in Lack: Plentitude and Consuming Happiness in Soviet Paintings and Posters, 1930s-1953," in *Petrified Utopia: Happiness Soviet Style*, ed. Marina Balina and Evgeny Dobrenko (London: Anthem Press, 2011), 55.
[33] Alois Riegl, "The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origin," in *Oppositions Reader: Selected Readings from a Journal for Ideas and Criticism in Architecture, 1973-1984*, ed. Kenneth Michael Hays (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998), 621.
[34] Ibid., 638.

One exception is Alexander Etkind's conceptualization of "memory hardware" (physical installations aimed at facilitating public commemoration).[35] These complement "memory software," ephemeral objects and texts: school curricula, media, inscriptions, and other discursive mediums which situate "hardware" within a (historical) narrative. According to Etkind, "hardware" cannot produce collective memory without the interpretative power of "software." However, it does exercise constraints over the way memory coalesces and is therefore a consensus-building force. Without hardware, memory remains "oversaturated and volatile."[36] Thus, "hardware" provides temporal stability, i.e. it projects given narrative parameters into the future. "By building a monument, society attempts to pass on […] consensus to posterity."[37]

In a way, Etkind develops the concept of cultural memory (as opposed to communicative memory) originally proposed by Jan Assmann. In Assmann's definition, cultural memory "is exteriorized, objectified, and stored away in symbolic forms that, unlike the sounds of words or the sight of gestures, are stable and situation-transcendent."[38] Etkind's intervention distinguishes between cultural memory's ephemeral and durable components; while both are exterior, objectified, and symbolic, only the latter (i.e. "hardware") can be considered "stable and situation-transcendent" (and only to a degree).

Although Etkind develops his concepts based on memory of *past* events, this study attempts to extend his theory to the dynamic that I hypothesize: constructing and using "hardware" to project representations of *contemporaneous* events and individuals, for *future*

[35] Alexander Etkind, "Hard and Soft in Cultural Memory: Political Mourning in Russia and Germany," *Grey Room*, no. 16 (2004): 40; Alexander Etkind, *Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 172-195.
[36] Etkind, "Hard and Soft in Cultural Memory," 47.
[37] Alexander Etkind, "Vremia sravnivat' kamni: Postrevoliutsionnaia kul'tura politicheskoi skorbi v postsovetskoi Rossii," *Ab Imperio*, no. 2 (2004): 53.
[38] Jan Assmann, "Communicative and Cultural Memory," ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 110-111. Communicative memory, in turn, "is not formalized and stabilized by any forms of material symbolization; it lives in everyday interaction and communication and, for this very reason, has only a limited time depth which normally reaches no farther back than eighty years, the time span of three interacting generations," ibid., 111.

generations to remember favourably. The Stalinist period stands out (at least within Russian/ Soviet history) for the number of monuments constructed to mark contemporaneous events and individuals[39]; treating these as "memory hardware," as least as an initial hypothesis, offers fresh insight into this cultural phenomenon.

1.3 Theory and methodology

This thesis is centred upon monumental art and architecture in the Stalin period. However, I am interested less in the objects themselves than in the context of their creation or, more precisely, the interplay between these objects and the "immortalization" dynamic which I hypothesize. After all, the questions that I am asking cannot be answered solely by reference to the formal qualities of the art. While valuable from the perspective of art criticism, formal analysis offers little insight into the cultural dynamics (in my case, "immortalization") that were both expressed and constituted by these objects. "Common sense" meanings cannot be derived from the features of art objects alone. Meaning is constructed socially, and to apply the categories of contemporary "common sense" to a society both historically remote and structurally unique is deeply anachronistic. Questions of meaning, agency, and intent – cornerstones of my study of "immortalization" under Stalinism – can be answered only by appreciating the *context* of Stalinist monumental art and architecture.

[39] I have been unable to locate a definitive list of all monuments constructed or commissioned in the Soviet Union in the period 1932-1954, the category being too nebulous and the number of responsible authorities too great. However, according to one KPDI SM SSSR memo from 1946, approximately half of the stand-alone, dedicated monuments commissioned by central decree in the period 1932-1945 "immortalized" contemporary events or individuals ("contemporary" according to the definition set out below), GARF/R5446/50/2826/107-122. To these must be added hundreds of busts to Twice-Heroes of the Soviet Union, and the subjects "immortalized" as part of large monumental projects (canals, metro stations, high-rise buildings), subjects which were overwhelmingly contemporary.

This hermeneutic approach requires engagement with a variety of other sources to analyze cultural artifacts, and a serious engagement with what Plamper calls "a maddeningly complex field of institutional and personal actors" involved in Soviet art production.[40] At the level of the regime which commissioned monumental art and architecture, I look at relevant government decrees and guiding statements (at the Union, republican, and local levels). Particularly salient are central decrees explicitly titled "On the immortalization of memory of [such-and-such event or individual]" and their supporting documentation.

I also examine materials pertaining to the commissioning of specific monuments and monumental constructions (competition guidelines, transcripts of deliberations of the adjudicators, and stenographs of artistic review council meetings). Monumental architecture and construction projects were largely administered at the city level,[41] but were increasingly coordinated by central bodies such as the Committee for Architectural Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (henceforth, KPDA SNK/ SM SSSR) (1943-1949).[42] The commissioning and design of monumental art, in turn, was administered by Glaviskusstvo (1928-1933) and VseKoKhudozhnik (1929-1953), both under the auspices of the Commissariat of Enlightenment of the RSFSR, until the creation the Committee for Arts Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (henceforth, KPDI SNK/ SM SSSR) (1936-1953).

The Party's Central Committee controlled the main developments on art and architectural matters through the art section (*otdel isskustva*) of its agitprop department.[43]

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[40] Plamper, *The Stalin Cult*, 172.

[41] In this period, through the Otdel arkhitekury i plannirovaniia (1932-1939), Arkhitekturno-planirovochnoe upravlenie (1939-1944), Upravlenie po delam arkhitektury (1944-1951), and once again Arkhitekturno-planirovochnoe upravlenie (1951-), intermittently supplemented by special committees and planning bodies.

[42] Succeeded by Ministerstvo po gorodskomu stroitel'stvu SSSR (1949-1950), and Gosudarstvenyi komitet SM SSSR po delam stroitel'stva (Gosstroi SSSR) (1950-).

[43] Variously constituted as the Otdel kul'tury i propagandy TsK VKP(b) (1930-1934), Otdel kul'tury i propagandy leninizma TsK VKP(b) (1934-1935), Otdel partiinoi propagandy i agitatsii TsK VKP(b) (1935-1939), Upravlenie propagandy i agitatsii TsK VKP(b) (1942-1948), Otdel propagandy i agitatsii TsK VKP(b)/ KPSS (1948-). Local Party structures also oversaw projects and policy on the city and regional levels.

This institution normally had a separate visual art subsection, which oversaw monumental art and architecture, and its archives represent a major resource for the project. Important public statements, internal memos, and correspondence of eminent political leaders who intervened in art affairs (Stalin, Zhdanov, the Commissar of Enlightenment Anatolii Lunacharskii, and others), are also considered.

At the level of the art and architecture community, I examine the descriptions/ abstracts accompanying competition entries/ commissions, articles by leading artists and architects in the media, as well as memoirs,[44] and other unpublished materials from their personal archives. Also important are transcripts of meetings, conferences, congresses, special sessions and plenums of artists and architects, at their respective artistic Unions (both local and USSR levels) and Academies.[45] Artistic Unions acted as a "forum for supervised debate […] a medium for communication with the government; an organising and, above all, an evangelising entity."[46] The USSR Academy of Artists (1947-) and the USSR Academy of Architects (1933-), in turn, were pedagogical and research centers, also involved with developing and propagating the "general line" in art policy.

Somewhere in between the Party/ state and the art community stood the media, with its journalists, publicists, and specialist art critics. Given strong censorship and self-censorship, they represented another line of communication between the regime's objectives, the art community in need of "correction," and the public to be inculcated with timely ideological messages. At the same time, the media also functioned as a space for art

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Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, key individuals within artistic and state structures "doubled" as Party members and could thereby be "directed" through the Party chain of command.

[44] These must be approached carefully, as these memoirs were not only products of a later time and context, but frequently made use of ghost writers. I am grateful to Mischa Gabowitsch of the Einstein Forum, Potsdam for alerting me to the latter point.

[45] Because central unions took time to form (in the case of the Union of Artists, for instance, this did not happen until 1957), the Moscow departments – the Moskovskoe otdelenie soiuza sovetskikh khudozhnikov (MOSSKh) (in 1938, renamed Moskovskii soiuz sovetskikh khudozhnikov (MSSKh) (1932-) and Moskovskoe otdeleniie Soiuza Sovetskikh Arkhitektorov (MOSSA) (1932-) – acted as leaders and coordinators among the other Union branches.

[46] Bown, *Art under Stalin*, 87.

professionals to express their viewpoints and reveal the motivation/ meanings behind their works. As philosopher and culturologist Mikhail Ryklin argues (with regards to the Moscow metro), "the infinitude of intentions bound up in the metro finds its fullest expression less in the stations than in the discourse of the builders and the entire apparatus surrounding it, including journalists and writers."[47] Although I use a wide selection of periodicals, I focus particularly on the "thick journals" *Arkhitektura SSSR/ Sovetskaia arkhitektura* (1933-), *Arkhitektura i stroitel'stvo* (1946-1950), and *Iskusstvo* (1933-), as well as the newspapers *Arkhitekturnaia gazeta* (1934-) and *Sovetskoe iskusstvo* (1931-). Most centrally-published monographs relating to monumental art and architecture are also examined.

At the level of the public which looked on the process of "immortalization," I consider relevant letters to the editors of newspapers, to Party/ state institutions, and to political leaders.[48] I also examine remarks left in visitor books of exhibitions profiling models of monuments and completed monumental constructions (such as metro stations). Such comments, Marie Lampard argues, "had the capacity to sway the status quo as well as to affirm it."[49]

My methodological approach to these sources is dual. In reconstructing the sequence of events and chains of causality, assessing agency, establishing the scale of given phenomena, I follow a qualified Rankean empiricist approach. I rely on this particularly in unpacking the *material* dimensions of "immortalization" as a cultural *practice*. In this sense, I am trying not so much to interpret (for which the inadequacies of empiricism have become cliché) as to establish some basic facts and material features which can inform further

[47] Mikhail Ryklin, "'The Best in the World': The Discourse of the Moscow Metro in the 1930s," in *The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology of Soviet Space*, ed. Evgeny Dobrenko and Eric Naiman (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 267.
[48] These (however limited) methods of gathering public opinion under the Soviet authoritarian regime are discussed in Vladimir Kozlov, Sheila Fitzpatrick, and Sergei Mironenko, eds., *Sedition: Everyday Resistance in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).
[49] Qtd. in Marie Lampard, "Larger Than Life: Soviet Monumental Sculpture in the Stalin Period," *Experiment* 18, no. 1 (2012): 214; Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 205-206.

analysis. This is in some sense connected to Leopold von Ranke's project of "showing how things actually happened."[50] Even so, I recognize that the need for source criticism makes subjective judgement ubiquitous, even in establishing the most basic "facts."

Qualitative discourse analysis, by contrast, alerts me to the (stated) motives of actors, to styles of argumentation, conceptual frameworks, and cultural understandings. It deals with the ideal level of "immortalization" as *myth*. I draw inspiration particularly from the Foucauldian program of discourse analysis.[51] Indeed, Foucauldian theory has been used productively in empirical work on the Stalin period, most famously by Stephen Kotkin.[52] This project, however, is more programmatically inspired by Foucault and less of an application of his specific conceptual innovations (such as biopower, sovereignty, or governmentality). The Foucauldian approach to discourse holds up four cornerstone principles. The "principle of specificity" acknowledges that discourse does not reflect a pre-ordered world, but imposes this order in a violent way. The principle is at the heart of my treatment of "immortalization" as a cultural myth. Admittedly, the "invented" character of immortalization is in any case self-evident, if only because the myth was always more enmeshed with normative rather than ontological questions. Second, the "principle of reversal" recognizes the "rarefaction" intrinsic to discourse, establishing not only what can be said, but equally, what cannot. Once again, the case of Stalinism demonstrates the workings of this principle to the extreme (see discussion of "totalitarianism" below). Third, the "principle of discontinuity" recognizes that discourses are multiple and inevitably in tension/ exclusive of one another (there is no unified imaginary body of "all that can be said"). This

[50] Qtd. in Georg Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2005), 24.
[51] Michel Foucault, "Orders of Discourse," *Social Science Information* 10, no. 2 (1971): 21-22.
[52] Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Sergei Prozorov, *The Biopolitics of Stalinism: Ideology and Life in Soviet Socialism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016); also see Jan Plamper, "Foucault's Gulag," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 3, no. 2 (2002); Anna Toropova, "An Inexpiable Debt: Stalinist Cinema, Biopolitics, and the Discourse of Happiness," *The Russian Review* 74, no. 4 (2015).

study situates the "immortalization" myth in the Stalinist Soviet Union in a comparative context, while attempting to remain sensitive to its peculiarities. Finally, "the principle of exteriority" points to the external conditions which give rise to specific discourses. True to this goal, I attempt to situate "immortalization" within the wider (culture and politics of) Stalinist society, and modernization processes generally.

For reasons of scale, I am unable to cover the textual and institutional context of all Stalinist monuments and monumental constructions, and most of my examples are drawn from Moscow. This is done for a number of reasons, both practical and theoretical. Most basically, Moscow monuments allow for a significantly richer analysis. Being prestige objects of all-Union significance, they left a large paper trail in the state and Party archives. They were used as illustrative examples in theoretical discussions of monumentalism. They were extensively covered by the media and discussed by the public.[53] Later, they were specifically alluded to in the memoirs of the leading artists, sculptors, and architects who created them. The multiplicity and diversity of these sources allow for a deeper analysis than would be possible within a regional or local context.

At the same time, it could be countered that the heavy reliance on Moscow undercuts the representativeness of my findings. Was monumental art in provinces really thought about in terms of "immortalization"? Undoubtedly, immortalization dynamics were more pronounced in the capital than elsewhere. But this "unrepresentativeness" (in the classic sense of reproducibility) should not be understood as implying that "immortalization" was somehow a fringe phenomenon. Moscow, as the capital of the Soviet Union (and, after the

[53] Moscow's monumental art and architecture achieved great public resonance, as their representations "were included in school textbooks in the guise of historical documents, served as illustration to scientific works and circulated throughout the country in thousands of copies and millions of reproductions," Igor Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art: In the Soviet Union, the Third Reich, Fascist Italy, and the People's Republic of China*, trans. Robert Chandler (London: Collins Harvill, 2011), 224. Moscow's monumental constructions were also portrayed in handicrafts designs, films, paintings, photo-albums, posters, postcards, postmarks, and other mediums.

War, of the entire socialist world), focused the symbolic efforts of the entire country. "Immortalization" was a pan-Soviet symbolic project; the fact that Moscow was the primary site of its physical incarnation does not mean that the "immortalization" myth was absent from the hinterlands (where it was, in fact, disseminated through central or centrally-controlled mass media).

Further, the focus on Moscow is advantageous in allowing one to see the cultural logic of the "immortalization" at its purest: without the distorting effects of regionalism, jurisdictional overlap, and geographical remoteness. Most importantly, Moscow had the fewest material constraints for realizing planned projects.[54] Indeed, Moscow accounted for approximately half of all centrally-commissioned monuments constructed in the USSR in the period under scrutiny.[55] Projects important to "immortalization," such as the metro, were planned for other cities but carried out only in the capital. Furthermore, Moscow was held up as a model for other cities to follow.[56] Its redesign provided the template for reconstruction not only of Soviet cities, but also of those in Stalinized Eastern Europe.[57] Stalin himself referred to Moscow as the "model for all capitals of the world."[58] Moscow's monumental culture was also trend-setting because many of its objects received the Stalin Prize, which

[54] In a shift away from developing the hinterlands, Moscow given extraordinary political and economic advantages at the party plenum of June 1931, Katerina Clark, "The New Moscow and the New Happiness: Architecture as the Nodal Point in the Stalinist System of Value," in *Petrified Utopia: Happiness Soviet Style*, ed. Marina Balina and Evgeny Dobrenko (London: Anthem Press, 2009), 194.
[55] Not including busts to Twice-Heroes of the Soviet Union, which were built in their respective hero's birthplace.
[56] Rasa Cepaitiene, "In the Shadow of Moscow: The Stalinist Reconstruction of the Capitals of the Soviet Republics," *Journal of Architecture and Urbanism* 39, no. 1 (2015); Clark, "The New Moscow and the New Happiness," 190; Timothy Colton, *Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1995), 249-251.
[57] Gabriele Basilico, *Vertiginous Moscow: Stalin's City Today* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2009), 6; Greg Castillo, "Peoples at an Exhibition: Soviet Architecture and the National Question," in *Socialist Realism without Shores*, ed. Thomas Lahusen and Evgeny Dobrenko (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 739-741; Tarkhanov and Kavtaradze, *Architecture of the Stalin Era*, 144.
[58] Iosif Stalin, "O razrabotke novogo general'nogo plana rekonstruktsii Moskvy," *Gorodskoe khoziastvo Moskvy* 3 (1949): 2. Of course, other cities were not permitted to build monuments upsetting Moscow's hierarchical dominance, Anders Aman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era: An Aspect of Cold War History*, trans. Roger Tanner and Kerstin Tanner (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 243-244; Michalski, *Public Monuments*, 118; Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 76-79.

(according to Marina Frolova-Walker) played a leading, perhaps even determining part in signaling the direction that Soviet art was expected to take.[59]

The objects which I analyze and use to exemplify "immortalization" processes include all of Moscow's monuments and memorial plaques built in the period 1932-1954, and all major monumental constructions in Moscow: the metro, the VSKhV, the Kremlin necropolis, and the Stalinist high-rises. I also look at the few unbuilt major projects, which are crucial for understanding "immortalization" dynamics: the Palace of the Soviets, several unexecuted monuments to the Great Patriotic War, and the "Pantheon – Monument to the Immortal Memory of Great People of the Soviet State" (in which Stalin's embalmed body was to be preserved). Importantly, I examine only those monuments and constructions dedicated to contemporaneous events/ individuals. Figures contemporaneous to the Stalin period are defined as those significantly active for at least some of the years 1932-1954.

Mass-produced sculptures of leaders, which were ubiquitous in the Stalinist city-scape, are not considered in detail. Not only were they impermanent constructions, they were also not considered monuments (*pamiatniki*) by authorities themselves.[60] By contrast, monuments were directly commissioned by the government at central, republican, or local levels.[61] I also disregard those sculptures, busts, and plaques which were intended for interior use in offices, minor public institutions, and art galleries. In the parlance of the time, these were "chamber" (*kamernye*) or "easel" (*stankovye*) works, juxtaposed to monumental ones open to the gaze of large audiences.[62]

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[59] See Marina Frolova-Walker, *Stalin's Music Prize: Soviet Culture and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).

[60] As one 1936 KPDI SNK SSSR memo stated: "objects of mass production […] cannot be considered monuments," RGALI/962/3/51/1-7.

[61] Because of Moscow's significance as capital city, all monuments were commissioned by central (SNK/ SM SSSR) decree. Only some memorial plaques fell in the purview of local authorities. Unfortunately, there is no full official list of Moscow's memorial plaques; I therefore triangulate between various sources, including the reference works published in the early 2000s by the Moscow City Duma Monuments Commission.

[62] Mariia Silina, *Istoriia i ideologiia: monumental'no-dekorativnyi rel'ef 1920-1930-kh godov v SSSR* (Moscow: Buks mart, 2014), 99-101.

Nonetheless, I must confess that for "immortalization" dynamics, this division was not always important. First, easel works could also be thought of as monuments. Thus, for instance, the sculptor Ivan Efimov referred to his sculpture of wartime heroine Zoia Kosmodemianskaia (1942) as a "chamber monument."[63] Similarly, sculptor Vera Mukhina singled out sculptural portraits (busts) as deserving "special attention [as a means of] immortalizing an individual."[64] Busts "are an individual's biography, a portrait of an era, a reflection of a class," seconded her colleague Sergei Merkurov.[65] Sculptures of alumni inside Moscow State University (MGU) Main Building's central hall were said to "immortalize" their memory.[66] Second, chamber works were often the first step in producing enlarged monuments. Sculptor Matvei Manizer's "Zoia Kosmodemianskaia" and "Matvei Kuz'min" statues were created for the "Great Patriotic War" exhibition of 1942. However, following the works' success, enlarged copies were made for "Izmailovskaia" station in the Moscow metro and elsewhere.[67] As a 1952 editorial in *Iskusstvo* proclaimed: chamber and monumental sculpture "are now no longer separated by a stone barrier […] we know several examples when works exhibited as easel ones later function as monuments."[68] At times, I refer to these chamber works insofar as they related to "immortalization."

My analysis is primarily synchronic, seeing the character of "immortalization" as more or less consistent in the period. Diachronic change, as I demonstrate in Section 2.4, occurred insofar as "immortalization" became more central to Stalinist culture, receiving more attention and material resources. The dynamic is therefore primarily one of logical

[63] Qtd. in Anna Matveeva, *Ivan Semenovich Efimov* (Moscow: Sovetskii khkudozhnik, 1965), 88.
[64] Vera Mukhina, "Geroicheskii portret," *Literatura i iskusstvo*, 26 June 1943, 1. Also see her statements to the same effect quoted in Aleksei Zotov, *Mukhina, Vera Ignat'evna, narodnyi khudozhnik SSSR* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1944), 12-13.
[65] Written between 1936-1945, Sergei Merkurov, *Vospominania. Pis'ma. Stat'i. Zametki. Suzhdeniia sovremennikov* (Moscow: Kremlin Multimedia, 2012), 333.
[66] TsGAM/694/1/697/92-93.
[67] Matvei Manizer, *Skul'ptor o svoei rabote. Tom 2* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1952), 29. "Zoia" was also refashioned as a stand-alone monument and placed in Tambov (1947) and Leningrad (1951), see Vera Ermonskaia, *Matvei Genrikovich Manizer* (Moscow: Idatel'stvo Akademii khudozhestv SSSR, 1961), 49-53.
[68] "O monumental'noi skul'pture," *Iskusstvo*, no. 4 (1952): 4.

development and augmentation. My chapters are structured on the analytical issues germane to "immortalization," rather than around a chronological account (although I remain sensitive to the nuances of continuity and change).

Perhaps more contentious is my treatment of the discourse – at any rate, the discourse of the political leadership, the art community, and art critics – as a unified whole. At points, all three offered unique concepts and expressed distinct ideas. Primarily, these are disaggregated in Chapter 5, when I examine the differing motives and attitudes of these groups towards "immortalization." In the remaining chapters, however, I see the pronouncements of all three groups as unified by a similar logic, and use these interchangeably (where the question permits such a methodological stance). I also refrain from lengthy introductions of personalities and the specific context of each of my many sources (though I provide some further biographical information in Appendix B). The reason is that for most intents and purposes (excepting those of Chapter 5), "immortalization" dynamics followed a "totalitarian model" which imposed hegemonic modes of acceptable discourse and practice.

My treatment of the sources through the prism of "totalitarianism" does not reflect *a priori* theoretical predilections. Rather, it arises from the empirical *fact* of an extreme degree of consistency in my sources. This consistency cannot be explained other than by reference to an external power limiting the margins of the possible, enforcing this consistency through censorship (in its various forms, including, self-censorship) and the threat and periodic application of state violence. Nevertheless, the nature of my sources on "immortalization" dynamics (within the broader context of Stalinist monumental art and architecture) does not signify an endorsement of the totalitarian model as applied to other sociocultural phenomena of the period. Neither is my limited use of the "totalitarian" framework meant to imply "natural" affinities with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. In fact, as Chapter 6 argues,

"immortalization" dynamics under Stalinism are best interpreted within the broader context of modernization, rather than democratic deficit.

If anything, the applicability of some aspects of the totalitarian model (specifically, preponderance of top-down power) to the sphere of monumental art and architecture is exceptional. Firstly, the topmost leadership clearly saw these projects as very important, which was, above all, revealed by their astronomical costs. Indeed, Stalin himself was personally interested in art and architecture, particularly the major projects in Moscow, in which he did at times make interventions. His involvement here was in line with both a significant participation in all cultural and artistic matters, and the extreme control of public representations of himself.[69] Stalin's letter to Lazar' Kaganovich, Viacheslav Molotov, and Kliment Voroshilov, in which he expressed his preferences for the design of the Palace of Soviets (the future winner of the competition) has been preserved.[70] The Palace's chief architect Boris Iofan testified to a later meeting with Stalin on the design of the building, in which "with clear directions and advice, [Stalin] suggested the direction our artistic researches should take."[71] He expressed preferences for the proportions and size of the building's tiers, limited the facing of the Palace to only two types of stone, suggested giant external sculptural groups dedicated to the Communist International, and approved the decorative themes for the Main Hall and the foyers, among other suggestions.[72] From numerous eyewitness testimonies, it is evident that Stalin frequently toured works in progress, commenting on them orally; one may imagine the effect of such "suggestions."[73]

[69] For an exposition of Stalin's interventions in culture, see the chapter "Soviet Culture" in Sarah Davies and James Harris, *Stalin's World: Dictating the Soviet Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014). For control of representations of his own person, see the chapter "The Political Is Personal, Art Is Political," in Plamper, *The Stalin Cult*.
[70] Robert Davies et al., *The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931-36* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
[71] RGALI/619/1/1077/9.
[72] RGALI/619/1/1077/17-18.
[73] As the architect of the Kudrin high-rise building Mikhail Posokhin testified: "We, young architects, hear about the tastes of I. V. Stalin from our superiors and colleagues […] His tastes were expressed particularly clearly in the design of Moscow's high-rise buildings, crowned with spires (they said that Stalin liked gothic

Sculptors Mukhina, Nina Zelenskaia, and Zinaida Ivanova, the authors of Moscow's Gor'kii monument, reworked their model in response to Stalin's (presumably oral) remarks.[74] Where Stalin was not personally involved, other Party grandees intervened heavily in the affairs of at and architecture; their opinions carried exceptional weight.[75]

Secondly, the state had the *capacity* to set the tone and monitor monumental art and architecture, simply because of the relatively small number of such projects and their concentration in Moscow. These made them easier to implement and monitor.[76] As Igor Golomstock argues, any of these monumental projects would have been impossible without Stalin's personal approval.[77] Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the regime was able to signal effectively – through landmark projects like the Palace of the Soviets and Moscow metro – what it expected from monumental art and architecture in terms of form and style, as well as these monuments' relation to "immortalization". As Dmitrii Khmel'nitskii argues, "in the Stalin period, each building had an official architect [but] the architect of all architects was Stalin."[78] The very organization of Stalinist art discouraged artistic difference. Frolova-

architecture)," qtd. in Aleksandr Vas'kin, *Shchusev: zodchii vseia Rusi* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2015), 387.

[74] RGASPI/17/132/424/55.

[75] Bown, *Art under Stalin*, 58; Andrew Day, "The Rise and Fall of Stalinist Architecture," in *Architectures of Russian Identity*, ed. James Cracraft and Daniel Rowland (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 179; Selim Khan-Magomedov, "'Stalinskii ampir': problemy, techeniia, mastera," in *Arkhitektura Stalinskoi epokhi: opyt istoricheskogo osmysleniia*, ed. Iulia Kosenkova (Moscow: KomKniga, 2010), 17; Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 201. Thus, for instance, the Council on Construction of the Palace of Soviets, created in 1931, included such high-placed officials as Avel Enukidze, Kaganovich, Molotov, and Voroshilov, see Konstantin Akinsha, Grigorii Kozlov, and Sylvia Hochfield, *The Holy Place: Architecture, Ideology, and History in Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 119-120. Lavrentii Beria, Aleksei Kosygin, Molotov, and Voroshilov were involved in approving the guidelines for the commissioning and design of busts to Twice-Heroes of the Soviet Union, see GARF/R5446/48/2190. Even such minor projects as the Monument to the Cheliuskin Expedition (commissioned by Politburo decree in 1935, but never constructed), included such notables as Enukidze, Valerian Kuibyshev, Andrei Andreev, Ivan Akulov, Nikolai Bulganin, and Nikita Khrushchev on the competition jury panel, RGASPI/17/120/163/6-7, GARF/R3316/65/132/1-2. Furthermore, some Party grandees, notably Voroshilov, organized their own artistic patronage networks, see Plamper, *The Stalin Cult*, 145-164; Mischa Gabowitsch, "Patron-Client Networks and the Making of Soviet War Memorials," in *Monument. Central and Eastern Europe 1918-2018* (Warsaw: Xawery Dunikowski Museum of Sculpture, 2019).

[76] Presumably, the case would be somewhat different in the provinces. However, rather than "resistance" and "subversion" of central edicts, one would see much more banal and commonplace issues of insufficient funds, delays, and cover-ups of these.

[77] Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art*, 267.

[78] Dmitrii Khmel'nitskii, *Zodchii Stalin* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2007), 309; also see Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 97.

Walker refers to Socialist Realism as a "coherent narrative framework, evolving slowly, never changing beyond recognition." For most artists, "it was much easier […] to look at the main trends in the awards" (and, I may add, winning designs) and follow these, rather than innovate and risk criticism, ostracism, and even the possibility of repression – all of which ultimately resulted in creative stasis.[79] Equally, the specific organization of monumental art and architecture competitions also encouraged uniformity, as Tat'iana Prudnikova contends. Rather than proclaim a winning design and execute it, entries were used to generate multiple "ideas," which the winner was forced to incorporate into his design before it could be approved. The result was similarity of design, a blending which minimized the expression of personal style on the part of the artist.[80]

All of this is not to say that examining officially-approved archetypes, pronouncements, and preferences would be sufficient for this project. Catherine Cooke and Andrew Day argue convincingly that artists and architects had significant scope in *interpreting* official strictures, and pre-empting official preferences. "In most situations […] official directives and sacred texts provided little help, and regime leaders were too busy to be able to give detailed instructions; architects, planners, and local officials, for example, had almost no such guidance."[81] Professionals were forced to be active and productive (or be branded wreckers), they had to either fall back on precedent, or make a creative interpretation of an inconsequential official remark (the latter was risky, but the payoffs in prestige, power, and material rewards could be large). Cooke (in contradistinction to Prudnikova) argues that originality was in fact valued by the establishment, as it prevented art and architecture from

[79] Frolova-Walker, *Stalin's Music Prize*, 292-293.
[80] The competitions facilitated "a collage design of a collective nameless product, reflective of state priorities in architecture," Tat'iana Prudnikova, "Arkhitekturnyi konkurs v kontekste 'kumuliativizma' (na primere konkursov na proekt rekonstruktsii i zastroiki prospekta im. I. V. Stalina 1940-1950-kh gg.) " *Izvestiia Rossiiskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta*, no. 164 (2014): 126.
[81] Day, "The Rise and Fall of Stalinist Architecture," 188.

becoming stale and out-of-touch with the dynamic transformations of society.[82] Furthermore, bureaucratic disorganization and infighting created the space for some freedom.[83] Thus, Day concludes, professionals' "autonomy was limited, of course, but included, among other things, the right to argue among themselves (and, occasionally, with their politician patrons) about how their profession should build socialism within its area of expertise."[84] However, examining the position of art and architecture professionals is more amenable to questions of the style and form of Stalinist monumentalism, rather than, say, discerning the motives in commissioning this or that monument.

My qualified use of totalitarian precepts regarding regime control of artistic and architectural production does not extend to the regime's control of *culture*. As I argue, "immortalization" as a cultural myth cannot be reduced to "political" forces and motives. In the sphere of "immortalization," I find myself in agreement with Paperny, for whom "political forces […] were manifestations of […] cultural forces."[85] Political leaders did not systematically and artificially produce the "immortalization" myth (neither did artists or architects); rather, they were subject to it, along with others (as I demonstrate in Chapter 5). The preponderance of state power is important here not to account for "immortalization" itself, but to explain the (doubtless artificial) level of consistency in the discourse expressing it and in art and architecture which realized "immortalization" materially. It thereby

[82] Catherine Cooke, "Beauty as a Route to 'the Radiant Future': Responses of Soviet Architecture," *Journal of Design History* 10, no. 2 (1997): 143-144; also see Catherine Cooke, "Socialist Realist Architecture: Theory and Practice," in *Art of the Soviets: Painting, Sculpture and Architecture in a One-Party State, 1917-1992*, ed. Matthew Bown and Brandon Taylor (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).
[83] See Andrew Day, "Building Socialism: The Politics of the Soviet Cityscape in the Stalin Era" (Columbia University, 1998).
[84] Day, "The Rise and Fall of Stalinist Architecture," 189. Examining ideological texts, Caroline Humphrey similarly argues that the seeming homogeneity of the "finished products of ideological efforts" should not obscure the real, contested processes of producing these: "drafts, unsuccessful working papers, reports sent from below, reactions to local conditions and events, censored passages, oral comments, etc," Caroline Humphrey, "The 'Creative Bureaucrat': Conflicts in the Production of Soviet Communist Party Discourse," *Inner Asia* 10, no. 1 (2008): 8.
[85] Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, xxv.

undergirds my methodological predilection for treating the "immortalization" discourse (and its material manifestation) as a consistent, unified whole.

It is important to underscore my use of the term *consistency*, rather than *homogeneity*. The different sources listed above do contribute varied angles on "immortalization" dynamics. But these "angles" were never at odds with one another, and were subsumed within the hegemonic discourse, which precluded meaningful debate and held back the pace of change. Thus, I find it unnecessary to search for contestation, debate, and artificial "groupings," as well as the personal stylistic nuances of individual artists and architects, in "totalitarian" conditions where, I believe, these largely did not exist or did not matter.

My periodization reflects these precepts: I confine my analysis to monumental art and architecture proposed and/ or constructed in Moscow between 1932 and 1954. For the purposes of my research questions, it is possible to treat this period, and this period only, in a synchronic fashion. 1932 is commonly taken as the date from which the Soviet culture can be considered "Stalinized." Having secured political victory in 1928-1929, it took another three years before the monopoly of the Stalin faction (vis-à-vis others) and the power of the central Party-state apparatus (vis-à-vis regional ones) was fully extended into the cultural sphere. The turning-point was the April 23, 1932 decree of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b) "On the reconstruction of literary-artistic organizations." It abolished all autonomous artistic groupings and created mandatory unions for each profession (those relevant to the research project being the Union of Soviet Architects and Union of Soviet Artists) under control and in the pay of the state. Incidentally, the year also coincided with the Construction Directorate of the Palace of the Soviets producing guidelines enshrining a number of key parameters of monumentalism (including, for instance, the "critical utilization of heritage" in style). The design competition for the Palace of the Soviets was itself launched only a year earlier, touching off an unprecedented push for the creation of monuments and monumental

constructions, a moment when "immortalization" trends began coming to the fore (see discussion in Section 2.4).

My account wraps up in 1954, one year after Stalin's death. A number of building projects central to late Stalinism came to fruition during this year; these included, most notably, the completion of the fourth phase of Moscow metro construction and the long-delayed opening of the VSKhV (which had been under reconstruction since the end of the War). 1954 also saw the first phase of the design competition for the (ultimately aborted) "Pantheon – Monument to the Immortal Memory of Great People of the Soviet State," in which Stalin's embalmed body was to be preserved. However, cracks began to appear in the monolithic Stalinist art and architecture establishment, cracks which by 1955 had become serious fissures in the crumbling Stalinist cultural edifice (once again, these developments are described in Section 2.4). To a certain extent, a real debate began emerging amongst higher-level decision makers and within the art community on whether the Stalinist cultural course (including the practice of "immortalization") should be continued. Interpretations of this key period of transition cannot depend upon generalizations, but must be more sensitive to this debate, more focused on institutional contexts and political manoeuvring. The significantly messier dynamics at the fringes of two decades of continuity cannot be dealt with in what is largely a synchronic investigation of the "immortalization" phenomenon.

2.0 Building for posterity: Stalinist monumental art and architecture

As indicated in the previous chapter, extant approaches to Soviet monumental art and architecture focus on their immediate propaganda functions. Accordingly, the gigantic scale of monuments is interpreted as showcasing the power of the state. The heavy, immobile style is said to underscore the solidity of the Stalinist order. The use of utopian imagery is seen as incentivizing labour, while depictions of the New Soviet Man are interpreted as modeling the loyal and productive subject. This chapter makes a different claim, which is central to all subsequent material. Aside from propaganda goals which oriented monumental constructions towards the *contemporary* Soviet public, these objects were also directed towards a *future* audience. As this chapter demonstrates, this future orientation is evidenced by: the discourse surrounding monumental art and architecture; their material dimension; and the protection and preservation regime that these objects were placed under. Monumental art and architecture was, at least in part, built for and oriented towards posterity. The second part of this chapter situates "immortalization" through monumental constructions in the wider context of Soviet history. It demonstrates that while monument-building was a continuous Soviet practice, its relationship to "immortalization" fluctuated. Specifically, monumental art of other Soviet periods lacked a pronounced orientation towards future audiences, and, barring a few exceptions, focused on memorializing the *past* rather than the *present*.

2.1 Building for posterity in Stalinist discourse

On a superficial level, the orientation of Stalinist monumental art and architecture towards a future audience, towards posterity, is evident in the discourse surrounding these objects. Indeed, one sees a veritable explosion in the number of monuments and buildings

explicitly dedicated to memorializing contemporary events and individuals. Most monuments were commissioned by SNK/ SM SSSR decrees specifically entitled "on the immortalization of the memory of…" (for these, see discussion in Section 5.3). The commemorative function of architectural constructions was made clear in other ways: for instance, all the surface vestibules of Moscow's metro stations of the third phase of construction were inscribed with the words "Constructed in the Days of the Great Patriotic War."[1]

Even objects not commemorating specific events or individuals, such as public buildings and large infrastructure projects, were also implicitly framed as monuments. Moscow high-rises, for instance, were widely described as commemorating victory in the Great Patriotic War.[2] Indeed, Russian art historians Sergei Nikitin, Margarita Astaf'eva-Dlugach, and Iurii Volchok contend that nearly all buildings built in the postwar period became monuments of sorts, "combining in [themselves] the main [practical] functions […] with the functions of a secular memorial."[3] Those objects which failed to live up to this unspoken standard were criticized. For instance, "Serpukhovskaia" metro station received a negative review on the pages of *Arkhitektura SSSR* because "it did not tell of even one heroic event in the history of our people, did not immortalize it."[4] Those constructions that did so were pronounced "epic," were said to "enter into history," to write "the chronicle of history in stone," to contribute to the "gold reserve" and "treasury" of Soviet architecture, to represent a "pantheon of the Stalinist epoch," to be "history incarnate in bronze and stone."

[1] Aleksandr Zinov'ev, *Stalinskoe metro. Istoricheskii putevoditel' po Moskovskomu metropolitenu* (Moscow: A. N. Zinov'ev, 2011), 108.
[2] Iakov Kornfel'd, *Laureaty Stalinskoi premii v arkhitekture. 1941-1950* (Moscow: GILSA, 1953), 135; Vladimir Gel'freikh and Mikhail Minkus, "Vysotnoe zdanie i gorodskoi ansambl'," in *Problema ansamblia v sovetskoi arkhitekture*, ed. K. Trapeznikov (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo literatury po stroitel'stvu i arkhitekture, 1952), 55. Also see the memoirs of the architects of some of the high-rises, Dmitrii Chechulin, *Zhizn' i zodchestvo* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1978), 97; Mikhail Posokhin, *Arkhitektura okruzhaiushchei sredy* (Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1989), 198-199, 202.
[3] Qtd. in Sergei Nikitin, "Zdanie-pamiatnik v mirovoi arkhitekturnoi praktike," in *Arkhitektura Stalinskoi epokhi: opyt istoricheskogo osmysleniia*, ed. Iulia Kosenkova (Moscow: KomKniga, 2010), 420; Margarita Astaf'eva-Dlugach and Iurii Volchok, "Tema pobedy v arkhitekture poslevoennoi Moskvy," *Stroitel'stvo i arkhitektura Moskvy*, no. 4 (1985): 10.
[4] Iu. Shaposhnikov, "Dostoinstva i nedostatki arkhitektury novykh stantsii metropolitena," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 4 (1952): 3.

Nearly all major infrastructure projects were touted as "monuments to the era," "immortalizing the Stalinist epoch."[5] The very idea of the "Stalinist epoch," of course, presumed a future audience (or at least an extra-temporal viewpoint), one which would characterize these times as a distinct "stage" in historical development.

The discourse also fetishized hyperbolized images of the longevity of monumental art and architecture. Witness a description of the Palace of Soviets:

> Many centuries will the Palace of the Soviets stand. It will become part of the new world geography. State borders will vanish from the map. The scenery of the planet will change. Communist settlements, not resembling cities, will emerge. Man will conquer space […] People will be born, grow old, generation after generation, but the Palace of Soviets [...] will stand the same as we will see it in the next few years. The centuries will not leave their mark, we will construct it in a way that it stands without aging, eternally.[6]

Such descriptions were not limited to Palace of Soviets, which, of course, held an unique status in the Stalinist imaginary. The supporting statement for architect Leonid Pavlov's design of the Pantheon stated that the building "must stand for millennia."[7] One visitor book entry from the newly-opened "Kievskaia" station in early 1953 reads: "may this metro serve the Soviet people unto eternity."[8]

Monumental art and architecture were understood as superior mediums for communicating with posterity, for reasons aside from their physical durability (discussed in the following section). They were touted as possessing a superior narrative capacity,

[5] Galina Makarova notes the popularization of the term in the early 1930s, and usage through to the end of the Stalin period, Galina Makarova, "'Pamiatniki epokhi' v sovetskoi arkhitekture kontsa 40-kh - nachala 60-kh gg. Poslevoennaia rekonstruktsiia VSKhV (1947-1954 gg.) i proektirovanie vsemirnoi vystavki v Moskve (1961-1962 gg.)" (Kandidat dissertation, Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut teorii arkhitektury i gradostroitel'stva, 1992), 6.
[6] Nikolai Atarov, *Dvorets Sovetov* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1940), 15.
[7] RGAE/339/1/1196/168.
[8] TsGAM/278/1/855/3.

unrivaled by other mediums. In a wartime article, Mukhina proclaimed: "the contemporary life of our people, its suffering and great victories, will be transmitted to posterity primarily through works of art. No scientific or official documents will transmit the spirit of our times as colourfully as artwork."[9] In a wartime draft letter to American artists, she stated that "art is a faithful, undistorted reflection of its time […] let the inhabitants of our planet remember for a long time about the cruel [wartime] years, remember them *vividly*" [italics mine].[10] Mukhina thus underscored art's ability to engage emotions, that is, its agitational power.[11] Similarly, architect Georgii Gol'ts called architecture "the most expressive" monument to the era.[12] As art historian Aleksandr Gabrichevskii argued at a 1946 SSA conference on monumental art, while "all art [aims to] leave behind memory about man, in sculpture and architecture this is somehow felt more sharply and powerfully."[13]

Art and architecture were thought of as sufficiently complex, moreover, to provide an *exhaustive* characterization of their era. As head of the KPDA SNK SSSR Arkadii Mordvinov claimed, "even if only monumental constructions remained from the past – Egyptian pyramids and temples, the Athenian acropolis, Gothic cathedrals or Renaissance palaces – solely based on these monuments, we would be able to understand clearly the lives of the nations and states which created them."[14] Furthermore, alongside their richness and complexity, monumental art and architecture were seen as embodying the overriding aim of being "understandable to all."[15] A final advantage of monumental constructions as a medium

[9] Qtd. in Ol'ga Voronova, *Vera Ignatievna Mukhina* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1976), 172.
[10] Vera Mukhina, "Tema i obraz v monumental'noi skul'pture," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 14 November 1944, 2.
[11] In the prevailing Bolshevik understanding, visual art focused on popular mobilization through emotional appeal (agitation), while text propagandized Marxist-Leninist theory and worldview, see Matthew Lenoe, "Agitation, Propaganda, and the 'Stalinization' of the Soviet Press, 1922-1930," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, no. 1305 (1998): 14-29.
[12] Unpublished notes from Gol'ts' archive, 1936-1946, Georgii Gol'ts, "Chto dolzhen znat' arkhitektor. 1936-1946 gg.," in *Mastera sovetskoi arkhitektury ob arkhitekture. Tom 2*, ed. M. Barkhin and et al. (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1975), 332.
[13] RGALI/674/2/185/9.
[14] Arkadii Mordvinov, *Khudozhestvennye problemy sovetskoi arkhitektury. Doklad vitse-prezidenta Akademii Arkhitektury SSSR A. G. Mordvinova* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe arkhitekturnoe izdatel'stvo, 1944), 6-7.
[15] David Arkin, "Monumenty geroiam Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Zametki o konkurse," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 5 (1944): 3.

for communicating with posterity was thought to be their inescapable presence. As the architect Aleksei Shchusev claimed, "once read, a book can easily languish in the library, whereas architectural monuments stand in the middle of the city and cannot be removed, remaining always a clear reflection of their epoch."[16]

Given the ostensible superiority of monumental art and architecture, their ubiquitous comparison to "books" is ironic. For instance, Mukhina compared the eloquence of monumental art to Plutarch's biographies.[17] Calling monumental art a "stone book," she argued that one "reads the history of cultures in all their variety […] about struggles against conquerors and friendship with neighbours, about man's intimate and social experiences."[18] The architect Viktor Vesnin declared that "the architecture of Soviet, socialist Moscow is the most exciting book of the Stalin epoch."[19] I have already mentioned the currency of the phrase "chronicle of history written in stone." Perhaps this metaphor reflects Stalinist culture's logocentrism and recalls Katerina Clark's analysis of literature as the *primus inter pares* among the arts of the time.[20]

However that may be, one sees that Stalinist discourse *was* fundamentally concerned with "immortalization" and future audiences. However, a focus solely on discourse is insufficient (being defenceless against counter-arguments questioning the integrity of the

[16] Aleksei Shchusev, "Arkhitektura epokhi," *Kommunististicheskaia molodezh*, no. 1 (1935): 46. This was, to some extent, an overstatement, as the Soviet state at that very moment was engaging in a radical transformation of Moscow's urban fabric, destroying monuments such as the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, the Sukharevskaia Tower, the medieval walls of the Kitai-gorod neighbourhood, and many others. Nonetheless, such destruction was untypical in the sense that it required political will; otherwise, Shchusev was perhaps correct that monumental constructions continue to exist almost by default.
[17] Vera Mukhina, *Literaturno-kriticheskoe nasledie* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1960), 158, 161-162.
[18] Vera Mukhina, "Obraz i tema v dekorativnoi skul'pture," in *Voprosy razvitiia sovetskoi skul'ptury. Nauchnaia konferentsiia. 28-30 maia 1952 g*, ed. Matvei Manizer (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii khudozhestv SSSR, 1953), 41; also see Vladimir Sarab'ianov, *Arkhitektura i obshchestvennoe soznanie* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo literatury po stroitel'stvu i arkhitekture, 1952), 38.
[19] RGAE/293/1/212/2.
[20] Katerina Clark, *Moscow as Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution of Soviet Culture, 1931-1941* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 78-104. For a commentary on the general logocentrism of Soviet (and possibly even Russian) culture (as expressed in film), see Mikhail Yampolsky, "Cinema without Cinema," in *Russian Critics on the Cinema of Glasnost*, ed. Michael Brashinsky and Andrew Horton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

above statements and treating them largely as propaganda). After all, *speaking* about "immortalization" may have had political benefits in its own right. Addressing this concern, I look at two more sets of evidence: the durable material qualities of monumental art and architecture, and the extensive protection and preservation regime surrounding these objects.

2.2 Building for posterity – the material dimension

Aside from their superior narrative capacities, accessibility, and physical presence, monumental art and architecture were expected to be durable. Indeed, Stalinist monumental culture is notable for its unsparing use of robust materials – granite, marble, bronze, steel, and the like.[21] To date, scholarship has interpreted this as a reflection of the plebeian tastes of the Stalinist leadership (and of the lower classes from which it originated). According to this view, the value of art was increased through the use of expensive materials.[22] However, this section argues that the choice of these durable materials was also connected to the goal of building lasting monuments for posterity.

It is useful to begin by noting how the very idea of "monumentalism" was understood at the time. Often, this concept is mobilized haphazardly to denote the size, importance, or grandness of whichever Soviet constructions. Unintentionally, this obscures the uniqueness of "monumentalism" in its Stalinist sense; after all, Vladimir Tatlin's design of the "Monument to the Third International" (1920) can also be (and has indeed been) described as "monumental," as can the Kremlin's "Palace of Congresses" (1961). But the point is that the meaning of "monumentality," then as now, was unstable and polyvalent.

[21] Voronov traces this shift to durable materials to the mid-1930s, but stops short of analyzing the significance of the development, Nikita Voronov, *Monumental'noe iskusstvo vchera i segodnia* (Moscow: Znanie, 1988), 9-10.
[22] In the words of Paperny, "artistic worth of a construction increasingly came to be identified with the material value of the materials used in it," Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 229-230.

Indeed, even in the Stalinist period the term was never defined clearly. According to Russian historian Mariia Silina, the meaning of monumentalism only gradually stabilized throughout the 1930s.[23] The 1938 *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (*BSE*) defined "monumentalism" as signifying "depth of idea, an organic unity of form and content, the ability to affect large masses of people at the same time."[24] Nonetheless, at a Moscow Union of Soviet Artists (MSSKh) monumental art conference late that year, artist and art historian Nikolai Chernyshev argued that longevity was also a necessary component of monumentalism. To illustrate this point, he questioned whether Michelangelo's murals could be considered monumental if they had been executed in aniline paints or in pastel, or if "Moses" had been sculpted out of snow.[25] In the early 1940s, Gabrichevskii also argued that monumentality is "closely connected to memory"; he pointed to the linguistic origins of the word – *monere,* meaning "to remind" in Latin.[26] This memorializing function of the artwork necessarily implied durability and longevity, he argued.[27] By the end of the period, in the much longer article devoted to monumentality in the 1954 edition of the *BSE*, it was stated that monumental art is "usually made of long-lasting materials."[28]

Indeed, in the eyes of both the commissioning state and art and architecture professionals, superior durability made monumental constructions the medium of

[23] Silina, *Istoriia i ideologiia*, 99.
[24] "Monumental'nost'," in *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsikolopediia. Tom 40*, ed. O. Shmidt (Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi Institut 'Sovetskaia entsiklopedia', 1938), 155.
[25] RGALI/2943/1/186/4.
[26] Similarly, the connection to remembrance was particularly evident in the Russian word for a monument, *pamiatnik*, which, as Gol'ts noted during the war, "carries within itself an idea of eternity, of idea of time, and an idea of infinity," Gol'ts, "O pamiatnikakh," 340.
[27] Aleksandr Gabrichevskii, "Vvedenie k monografii 'Memorial'naia arkhitektura'," in *Pamiat' i vremia. Iz khudozhestvennogo arkhiva Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 gg.*, ed. Tat'iana Malinina and Elena Ogarkova (Moscow: Galart, 2011 [1943-1946]), 303. Gabrichevskii's comments are extracted from a book commissioned by the Academy of Architecture, which passed review but was not published (as art historian Tat'iana Malinina speculates, due to exceeded length limitations). However, she claims, the manuscripts were frequently consulted by art historians and by architects designing wartime monuments. Furthermore, part of the material made its way to contemporaneous lectures at the SSA SSSR, Tat'iana Malinina and Elena Ogarkova, eds., *Pamiat' i vremia: iz khudozhestvennogo arkhiva Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 gg.* (Moscow: Galart, 2011), 308.
[28] "Monumental'noe iskusstvo," in *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsikolopediia. Tom 28*, ed. B. Vvedenskii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe nauchnoe izdatel'stvo 'Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia', 1954), 263.

"immortalization" *par excellence*. Architecture, proclaimed Lunacharskii, "remains (with some exceptions) an extremely durable monument to the epoch and a witness before posterity of the soaring thoughts and feelings of a given society."[29] It "preserves memory of an epoch and its feats better than other arts [… it does so] for millennia," seconded Mordvinov.[30] Visual art, Mukhina claimed, "is often more eternal than the word, it is the most durable."[31]

Durable materials were specifically sought out by monumental artists and architects. The Palace of the Soviets' various components were to be made of marble, granite, and steel, according to its earliest designs.[32] Marble, glazed tiles, granite, and labradorite were also selected for the Metro for the same reason, according to one of the main architects of the first phase of metro construction Nikolai Kolli.[33] In 1944, with the War still raging, the KPDI SNK SSSR recommended that monuments be made of "granite, labradorite, sandstone, marble, cast iron, copper, stainless steel, majolica, and other materials."[34] Iofan's postwar design proposal for the Kremlin wall necropolis specifically selected granite, labradorite, and porphyry for their durability.[35] In early 1954, with the planning for the Pantheon construction in full swing, there was a call to send out geological expeditions in search of white marble and light-coloured granite.[36]

In all of these, it is difficult to disentangle the normal demands for structural integrity from the extraordinary demands that these objects stand for a *very* long time. However, the latter were often indicated indirectly. In early 1938, architects decided upon granite siding for Palace of Soviets, as this was "the only one guaranteed to last for centuries," with which "in

[29] Anatolii Lunacharskii, "Sotsialisticheskii arkhitekturnyi monument," *Stroitel'stvo Moskvy*, no. 5-6 (1933): 3.
[30] Mordvinov, *Khudozhestvennye problemy sovetskoi arkhitektury*, 6.
[31] Mukhina, *Literaturno-kriticheskoe nasledie*, 157.
[32] RGAE/4372/34/110/25.
[33] Nikolai Kolli, "Arkhitektura metro," in *Kak my stroili metro*, ed. Aleksandr Kosarev (Moscow: Istoriia fabrik i zavodov, 1935), 185.
[34] RGALI/962/6/1402/8. Admittedly, the relative durability of copper and sandstone is debatable.
[35] GARF/R5446/48/2074/17.
[36] RGAE/339/1/1132/179-180.

600 years the building will still be young."[37] Merkurov calculated that the special corrosion-proof outer layer of the Lenin statue overtopping the Palace would guarantee its service for one thousand years.[38] Stainless steel, "which could serve for centuries," was suggested for the monument to the test pilot Valerii Chkalov.[39] In the postwar period, the design directorate for the MGU Main Building decided to construct the four crowning sculptures in a ceramic casing, which Chief Architect Lev Rudnev claimed would stand "eternally – for centuries."[40]

The shift to more permanent materials was approved by the topmost leadership. As early as 1932, Lunacharskii questioned the idea of propagandistic, temporary monuments that were originally envisioned by Lenin's Plan for Monumental Propaganda (discussed in the following section). Rather, he suggested that the Soviet construction industry was now powerful enough to consider creating permanent monuments.[41] Thereafter, the requirement to use durable materials was often decreed in competition guidelines for monuments and monumental constructions. According to the May 29, 1946 SM SSSR decree № 1136, busts of Twice-Heroes of the Soviet Union, cast in bronze, could be placed on pedestals made only of cast iron, granite, marble or other durable types of stone.[42] The competition for monuments to Gor'kii in Moscow, Leningrad, and the city of Gor'kii required that the principal materials be granite and bronze.[43] The same was case for the monument to war-hero Aleksandr Matrosov in Velikie Luki, and for many others.[44]

[37] TsGAM/694/1/137/14.
[38] Sergei Merkurov, "Osnovnaia skul'ptura Dvortsa Sovetov - statuia V. I. Lenina," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 35.
[39] RGALI/2942/1/132/23.
[40] RGALI/2458/1/454/10, RGALI/2943/1/2222/48. Although, in a minority opinion, materials engineer Vsevolod Nasonov expressed reservations about such an assessment, pointing to the lack of experimental data, RGALI/2458/1/454/10. Also see Viacheslav Oltarzhevskii, *Stroitel'stvo vysotnykh zdanii v Moskve* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo literatury po stroitel'stvu i arkhitekture, 1953), 176-178.
[41] Anatolii Lunacharskii, "Ob arkhitekturno-khozhestvennom oformlenii Moskvy," *Stroitel'stvo Moskvy*, no. 6 (1934): 33.
[42] GARF/R5446/1/278/300.
[43] RGALI/962/6/358/7.
[44] RGALI/962/3/1998/209.

Conversely, monuments made of impermanent materials sometimes attracted the criticism of central authorities. Thus, one draft KPDA-KPDI SNK SSSR decree from early 1945 explicitly called for "forbidding *krai*, *oblast*', and city Soviet […] executive committees to construct monuments to Lenin and Stalin out of impermanent materials (concrete, plaster, etc.)."[45] Another draft decree proposed widening this ban to all monuments.[46] Admittedly, the opposition to impermanent construction probably had more to do with concern for the demoralizing effect that derelict monuments could have in the present moment. As a prewar draft memo by the head of the KPDI SNK RSFSR visual arts section stated, such impermanent monuments frequently cracked and chipped, while restoration was unprofessional (often limited to applying a coat of oil paint). Such actions "ignored the huge political responsibilities" involved in constructing monuments to Party and state functionaries.[47]

Preference for durable materials came with a hefty price tag, but one that the leadership was prepared to pay. For instance, explaining the impermanence of a concrete "Monument to the Defenders of the Perekop" (in Crimea), the chairman of the KPDI SNK SSSR requested extra funds to execute the monument in bronze; these funds were granted.[48] This fact is significant, as it does not fit well with the "propaganda model" of totalitarian art. Monuments (and monumental buildings) were massively expensive, far outstripping the costs of any other propaganda medium: film, graphic art, radio, or print. One is therefore forced either to believe that monumental mediums were considered incomparably more effective, or

[45] GARF/R7523/61/14969/11-14.
[46] RGALI/962/3/1367/145. Towards the end of the War, the KPDI SNK SSSR became increasingly concerned with the large number of hastily-constructed, impermanent monuments and memorials. In part under this pretext, it sought to carve out a monopoly on the design of all monuments, RGAE/9432/1/36/133, GARF/R5446/48/2190/15-16, also see RGALI/962/6/402. The Central Museum of the Red Army also expressed concern that wartime monuments were executed in temporary materials, GARF/R7523/61/14969/9, 22.
[47] GARF/A259/38/376/89-105.
[48] GARF/R5446/25/3432/3-4, 6.

that other goals, outside the traditional propaganda model – such as "immortalization" – were present.

Alongside the use of commonly-known durable materials, a substantial amount of experimental research into non-ageing construction was also carried out. This was initiated in the mid-1930s by the Construction Directorate for the Palace of Soviets. This organization developed special metal alloys and cement mixes, eventually creating superior "PS" [Palace of Soviets] grades of steel and cement. "PS" was reported to be 50% stronger than the common M-3 grade of steel.[49] Special anti-corrosion lacquers, coatings, and enamels were also developed.[50] The materials laboratory of the Academy of Architects of the USSR claimed to have made a highly-robust type of asbestos canvases ("which will preserve artwork forever") and promised to create non-electrostatic paints (which would not attract potentially corrosive dust).[51] Hardier fabrics were also being developed for tapestries: wrinkle-free, moth resistant, and impervious to sunlight.[52]

The 1930s also saw the creation of an experimental laboratory for monumental art techniques under the auspices of the city planning department of the Moscow Soviet. This laboratory, among other objectives, sought to develop techniques for fresco and sgraffito painting, more appropriate for a northern climate. In N. Chernyshev's words, this was meant to reverse Lenin's pronouncement that "our climate will hardly allow us to make frescoes."[53] He reported that experiments applying frescoes to concrete and cement were showing good results in prolonging longevity.[54]

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[49] RGAE/4372/34/110/32.
[50] RGAE/4372/34/110/32, Atarov, *Dvorets Sovetov*, 69-70; A Vladimirskii, ed. *Otdelochnye materialy dlia Dvortsa Sovetov* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo akademii arkhitektury SSSR, 1945), 16-17.
[51] A. Peganov, "A. A. Peganov (Moskva)," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 70; also see G. Krasin, "Konstruktsii i materialy. Doklad zam. nachal'nika stroitel'stva Dvotsa Sovetov inzh. G. B. Krasina," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939).
[52] Vladimirskii, *Otdelochnye materialy dlia Dvortsa Sovetov*, 124-130.
[53] Nikolai Chernyshev, "O rabotakh nashikh monumentalistakh," *Iskusstvo*, no. 4 (1934): 33-34.
[54] RGALI/2932/1/99/21-22.

While some of these more fantastic endeavours were stopped short by the war, innovation resumed in the postwar period. 1945 saw the opening of the Laboratory for Stone Construction and Facing, under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Architecture.[55] A particular achievement was the development of durable ceramic facing (see **Figure 1**), which began to be used on most monumental constructions. As the head of construction and the lead engineer of the MGU Main Building recounted:

> As successful as restoration may be, it is much better to get at the original cause of the problem, i.e. to find such materials, as would be distinguished not only by beauty, but by a great durability and resilience in the face of external elements. In the search for the 'eternal' construction material, we had an idea: to try to find it not in the earth's bowels […] but in a laboratory crucible. [The new material, called "diapsidite"] was hit with hammer, immersed in various solutions, subjected to heat and cold, and we came to the conclusion that no better could be found, that nature had been eclipsed! There is no known material which could compare in durability with the new artificial stone […] Even granite is destroyed by time, but time is powerless before [diapsidite].[56]

To be sure, I do not posses the specialist knowledge and means to "fact-check" each of these claims about research and innovation. No doubt many were exaggerated; some were perhaps entirely fabricated. "Diapsidite," after all, was only a fancy name for a quite ordinary ceramic facing, and, as experience has shown, not a high-quality one either.[57] But rather than write off

[55] "Kamen' v arkhitekture," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 12 October 1945, 4.
[56] A. Voronkov and S. Balashov, *Dvorets nauki* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1954), 167-169; also see Boris Iofan, "Arkhitekturnye problemy stroitel'stva mnogoetazhnykh zdanii," *Arkhitektura i stroitel'stvo*, no. 3 (1947): 16; "Kamennoe lit'e," *Arkhitektura i stroitel'stvo*, no. 13 (1946): 22. Research in ceramics built upon that carried out for the Palace of Soviets in the thirties, see N. Bukharev, "Inzh. N. B. Bukharev," in *Otdelochnye materialy dlia Dvortsa Sovetov. Vypusk II. Raboty nauchno-tekhnichekoi konferentsii*, ed. M. Aptekar' (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo akademii arkhitektury SSSR, 1946), 109-111.
[57] Indeed, the very use of stone/ ceramic facing, rather than stone as a structural material, was likely the product of budgetary and time constraints. This is noted by historians of Nazi Germany, where the ideal of solid-stone construction in practice degenerated into mere stone facing of reinforced-concrete structures, Martin Kitchen, *Speer: Hitler's Architect* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 34; Barbara Miller Lane, "Architects in

such exaggerated claims of durability as mere window-dressing, one must admit that *all* claims about industrial and scientific achievements were exaggerated; this does not mean that the "era of socialist construction" saw no progress at all. Furthermore, one must note that the audience of such pronouncements was not exclusively the public. Some were made at closed meetings and conferences of architects, sculptors, and artists, some in briefs circulated amongst committees staffed with senior political functionaries. From this, I infer that at least the *desire* to find new means of "building for the ages" was genuine at some level.

A final practice that gained currency towards the second half of the period at hand was the rebuilding of impermanent monuments in more durable materials. This process was hinted at in Paperny's reference to the transformation of VSKhV exhibition pavilions from temporary wooden buildings in 1923, to ersatz mock-ups of capital structures in 1939, to actual permanent constructions in 1954.[58] The same is noted by Russian art historian Aleksandr Zinov'ev: "all new construction was capital, the wooden buildings were a thing of the past. The postwar era aimed to have its memory last for centuries, which was reflected in the architectural tendencies of the time."[59] But the dynamic was significantly wider than the decision to make one (however important) exhibition space permanent. Many wartime monuments, hastily completed in wood, plaster, cement, and other temporary materials, were in the postwar period rebuilt to last indefinitely; these included the "Triumph of Victory" monument in Moscow, obelisks in Kerch and Chernovtsy, the triumphal arch in Baku, and others.[60] Concomitantly, wooden graveside markers were being replaced with those made of

Power: Politics and Ideology in the Work of Ernst May and Albert Speer," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 17, no. 1 (1986): 302.

[58] Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 150-161.

[59] Aleksandr Zinov'ev, *Ansambl' VSKhV. Arkhitektura i stroitel'stvo* (Moscow: A. Zinov'ev, 2014), 86; also see Makarova, "'Pamiatniki epokhi' v sovetskoi arkhitekture," 26.

[60] Vladislav Tukanov, "Monumenty v sovetskom gradostroitel'stve" (Kandidat dissertation, Moskovskii arkhitekturnyi institut, 1953), 122. Other proposals included restoring the obelisk and rebuilding in permanent materials the monument on the battlefield of the 28 Panfilovtsy (RGALI/2075/7/283/2), replacing the obelisk on the Perekop in Crimea with a permanent one (GARF/A259/6/6867/19), and replacing two dilapidated wooden monuments to Aleksandr Matrosov with a single stone one in Ufa (GARF/R5446/51/3096/50).

stone.[61] In some sense, this was a fulfillment of original wartime aspirations, which were frustrated by the lack of resources.[62] But other monuments were also reconstructed: for instance, Merkurov's iconic Stalin monument at the 1939 VSKhV, made of cement, was to be replaced with a more durable one for the postwar reopening of the exhibition (Stalin's death stopped short the construction of the new monument).[63] At times, such aspirations ventured into the fantastical. For instance, in 1948, head of the Moscow Party committee and chairman of the city Soviet's executive committee Georgii Popov lobbied for the Kremlin's brick walls to be rebuilt in red granite, which would be "capable of standing for centuries."[64]

Some scholars interpret permanent modes of construction not as indicative of a genuine desire for preservation, but as politically instrumental in the here and now. Thus, some scholars argue that the Stalinist "invocation of eternity is […] used to establish the past and future continuity of the regime."[65] Andrew Jenks, for instance, states that "monumental slabs of granite and marble reflected the durability and strength of the new Soviet order."[66] Russian art historian Ol'ga Zinov'eva similarly contends that architecture, "[took] on the character of eternity and immobility […] symbolizing the permanence of the established order."[67] From this perspective, permanent constructions were potent political symbols in their own right. This conception is related to Dobrenko, Groys, and Paperny's understandings of Stalinist temporality. In these accounts, Stalinist culture presented itself as "eternal," "static," and "unchanging." It not only self-aggrandized (by conflating temporal frames:

[61] Marta Poliakova, *Okhrana kul'turnogo naslediia Rossii* (Moscow: Drofa, 2005), 82.
[62] See Lisa Kirschenbaum, *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941–1995: Myth, Memories, and Monuments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 114.
[63] RGAE/7857/1ch3/3793/70-71.
[64] Qtd. in Colton, *Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis*, 353.
[65] James Rann, "Maiakovskii and the Mobile Monument: Alternatives to Iconoclasm in Russian Culture," *Slavic Review* 71, no. 4 (2012): 769.
[66] Andrew Jenks, "A Metro on the Mount: The Underground as a Church of Soviet Civilization," *Technology and Culture* 41, no. 4 (2000): 710; also see Lars Blomquist, "Some Utopian Elements in Stalinist Art," *Russian History* 11, no. 2-3 (1984): 298-299. Relatedly, Golomstock argues that the static and immutable character of monuments was meant to convey the regime's unbending iron will, Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art*, 194; also see Clark, "Socialist Realism," 12-13.
[67] Ol'ga Zinov'eva, "Kontseptsiia vremeni i prostranstva stalinskoi Moskvy," *Al'manakh 'Gorod i vremia'*, no. 2 (2012): 29; Ol'ga Zinov'eva, *Simvoly stalinskoi' Moskvy* (Moscow: Tonchu, 2009), 196.

claiming that the utopian future was already realized in the present, under Stalin's direction), it abolished the possibility of political alternatives, now or ever.[68]

Indeed, from the very beginning, Lunacharskii declared that the Palace of Soviet's "should express the idea of solidity and stability […] it should proclaim 'I exist', 'I stand'."[69] Later on, Gabrichevskii explained this sentiment in less opaque terms: all monuments "express the *idea* of permanence, above all in the choice of material, which must not only be actually durable […] but must '*show*', must *symbolize* this durability," which can be achieved through actively showcasing a material popularly known for its strength, and accentuating the monument's static rootedness to the ground [italics mine].[70] Shortly after Stalin's death, Rudnev, the aforementioned chief architect of the MGU Main Building, confessed that he had envisaged Mukhina's "Eternal Youth of Science" sculptures (placed at the University entrance) to appear "as though they were made a thousand years ago and as though they could stand for another 30 thousand years […] in the same way as Stalin – he is strong because it is as if he was, is, and always will be."[71]

This preoccupation with *showcasing* durability, rather than actually making constructions durable, can also explain the practice of building impermanent structures with ersatz or surface embellishments (e.g. stone facing, plaster mock-ups of columns) to give them a capital, permanent look – as was done in the 1939 iterations of the VSKhV pavilions.[72] Indeed, one Supreme Soviet deputy proclaimed in mid-1938 that the VSKhV "should witness to the immutability and strength of the kolkhoz order."[73] Another example is

[68] Dobrenko, *Stalinist Cinema and the Production of History*, 6; Groys, *The Total Art of Stalinism*, 47-48, 73; Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 16-17, 31.
[69] Anatolii Lunacharskii, "Dvorets Sovetov. Tov. A. V. Lunacharskii ob arkhitekturnysh proektakh," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 26 January 1932, 1.
[70] Gabrichevskii, "Vvedenie k monografii," 304.
[71] RGALI/2943/1/2222/63.
[72] See Andrei Bunin and O Shvidkovskii, "Arkhitektura," in *Istoriia russkogo iskusstva. Tom XII. 1934-1941*, ed. I. Grabar' (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1961), 139-141; Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 150-161.
[73] Glavnyi komitet Vsesoiuznoi sel'skokhoziaistvennoi vystavki, *O podgotovke k Vsesoiuznoi sel'skokhoziaistvennoi vystavke: Sbornik materialov* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1939). Dobrenko

the practice of painting mass-produced cement sculptures to resemble more permanent materials.[74]

Nonetheless, the evidence for an insincere, instrumental attitude towards durable construction remains significantly scanter than for the posterity-oriented argument presented above. Moreover, even if this objection (that permanent structures conveyed the immutability of the Stalinist order) is accepted, it does not significantly undercut my main claim. Building for posterity and showcasing that fact could have gone on in tandem. As was to be expected, corners were cut, and the fact that this was done, say, at the VSKhV – a space whose permanence was in any case never clear[75] – is not of crucial significance.

2.3 Building for posterity – the protection and preservation regime

Finally, the ethos of building for posterity can also be seen in the protection and preservation regime under which newly-built Soviet monuments were placed. This regime was progressively strengthened and widened throughout the period at hand (although it was always of lesser priority than building new constructions).[76] The state's protection of historic monuments can be traced to 1918, but this did not extend to monuments built during Soviet times.[77] 1932 saw the creation of the intergovernmental Committee on the Protection of

specifically sees the structural solidity of the pavilions as showcasing the immutability of the Soviet order, Evgenii Dobrenko, *Politiekonomiia sotsrealizma* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozreniie, 2007), 439.

[74] Tukanov, "Monumenty v sovetskom gradostroitel'stve," 154.

[75] Historically, pavilions have occupied a liminal space between permanence and ephemerality, see Ihor Junyk, "'Not Months but Moments': Ephemerality, Monumentality, and the Pavilion in Ruins," *Open Arts Journal*, no. 2 (2013-2014).

[76] To some extent, this development may be traced to the exhaustion of the revolution's "iconoclastic" currents and their replacement with "monumentalizing" ones, which affirmed the value of cultural artifacts of the past, and sought to build upon them, see Katerina Clark, *Petersburg, Crucible of Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 26-27; Richard Stites, "Iconoclastic Currents in the Russian Revolution," in *Bolshevik Culture: Experiment and Order in the Russian Revolution*, ed. Abbott Gleason, Peter Kenez, and Richard Stites (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1985). On the general protection and preservation regime during these years, see Catriona Kelly, "The Shock of the Old: Architectural Preservation in Soviet Russia," *Nations and Nationalism* 24, no. 1 (2018): 88-97.

[77] See October 5, 1918 decree of the SNK SR "On the registration, enrollment, and protection of the historical and artistic heritage, belonging to private persons, organizations and enterprises." The following year saw the

Revolutionary, Cultural and Artistic Heritage, under the auspices of the All-Union Central Executive Committee. It is at this point that one sees *Soviet* monuments beginning to qualify for protection and restoration privileges alongside earlier heritage, which, as Julie Deschepper notes, represented a "radically reduced timeline between the construction of monuments and their heritagization."[78] Nonetheless, the Committee lacked both resources and the political will to do its job; a 1936 memo estimated that it was able to control only ten percent of the 1 200 objects within its purview, those located mainly in Moscow and Leningrad.[79] The Committee lacked operatives on-the-ground, and relied on other government departments (which often had no interest in preservation) for "sharing" their staff.[80] The Committee was liquidated on June 15, 1938, its functions transferred to the Directorates of Art Affairs at the republican level.[81]

At the same time, throughout the 1930s, the protection of minor monuments devolved to the local level. In 1937, for instance, the Moscow city Soviet restored the city's memorial plaques on its own initiative.[82] In 1940, it attempted to introduce some regularity into its preservation activities, attaching responsibility for each monument and memorial plaque to a given entity, setting up a Special Inspection branch, and reminding the police to continue monitoring the protection of monuments.[83] Within the next two years, however, only a few buildings and gravestones related to the lives of contemporary individuals (Stalin, the party functionary Sergei Kirov, the poet Vladimir Maiakovskii, and those buried in the Kremlin

creation of Central State Restoration Workshops, which were to carry out protection and preservation, GARF/A2306/70/1037/25-26. Also see the January 7, 1924 decree of the SNK RSFSR "On the registration and protection of artistic, historical, and natural heritage."

[78] Julie Deschepper, "Le 'patrimoine soviétique' de l'URSS à la Russie contemporaine: généalogie d'un concept," *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 137, no. 1 (2018): 82.

[79] GARF/R1235/76/117/10-11.

[80] In Rostov, for instance, these functions were vested in the funeral bureau, GARF/R1235/76/117/52-53.

[81] GARF/R1235/76/117.

[82] GARF/R1235/76/117/67.

[83] See the February 29, 1940 Decree № 320 of the Moscow Soviet, "On organizing the protection of monuments and memorial plaques in Moscow," RGALI/962/11/104/1.

Necropolis) were officially listed as protected monuments.[84] All in all, heritage protection in this period suffered great problems. Not only was protection and restoration plagued by under-funding and disorganization, but also the specific heritage objects which qualified for protection and restoration were never clearly defined.

Wartime saw increased attention to the preservation of both historical and contemporary monuments. This happened against the backdrop of a general upsurge in attention to heritage, a consequence of the mobilization of the past for nationalist purposes, and the unprecedented devastation to heritage wrought by the War. Thus, early 1942 saw the establishment of a Group for the Protection of Revolutionary, Historical, and Artistic Heritage under the auspices of the Museum and Local-Historical Section of the Commissariat of Enlightenment.[85] It ordered local offices of the Commissariat to register and protect graveside monuments, as well as to place memorial plaques on battlefields and significant buildings in the rearguard.[86] Another important development was the *public* criticism of the dilapidated state of graveside monuments and other markers around Novorossiisk, published in *Izvestiia* in 1944, and reiterated in *Pravda* the following year.[87] This was paralleled by internal memos in the defence commissariat and government/ Party structures.[88] For instance, according to an early 1949 report prepared by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army, in the Leningrad military district alone, 277 of 394 monuments required repairs and

[84] RGALI/962/11/27/2-3,10-19.
[85] GARF/R10010/1/203/11.
[86] F. Manevskii and I. Kriazhin, *O sbore, uchete i obrabotke materialov o pamiatnikakh i pamiatnykh istoricheskikh mestakh Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Metodicheskoe pis'mo* (Moscow: Muzeino-kraevedcheskoe otdelenie Narkomprosa RSFSR, 1942), 3-6.
[87] I. Morozov, "Oberegat' mogily geroev otechestvennoi voiny," *Izvestiia*, 29 December 1944; V. Malygin, "Pamiatniki slavy," *Pravda*, 20 July 1945. These articles, whose prominent publication was indicative of the concerns of central authorities, were expressly noted at the local level and a decree to rectify the situation was duly enacted by the Krasnodar Krai Soviet. This decree also ordered the construction of proper graveside monuments, a gallery with sculptural portraits of Kuban' war heroes, and monuments on "Malaia Zemlia" and in the city of Krasnodar, GARF/A259/6/1351/22-23.
[88] GARF/R7523/61/14969/3-4, RGASPI/17/125/368/77-78.

restoration.[89] Despite these measures, the lack of resources and personnel hampered meaningful work on this front.

A defining moment for the postwar protection and preservation regime was the October 14, 1948 decree № 3898 of the SM SSSR "On measures ameliorating the protection of cultural heritage." It established clear lines of responsibility, assigning preservation duties to large bodies with adequate staffing – architectural heritage to the KPDA SM SSSR, artistic heritage to the KPDI SM SSSR, and historical and archeological heritage to the republican Committees for Scientific-Cultural Enlightenment. Crucially, for my purposes, it clearly stated that contemporary monuments were to come under the protection regime, including:

> constructions and places connected with the most important historical events in the life of the peoples of the USSR, the revolutionary movement, civil and Great Patriotic wars, and socialist construction; monuments of memorial significance related to the life and work of outstanding state and political figures, popular heroes and famous figures in science, art and technology, their graveside monuments; monuments of the history of technology, military affairs, economy, and everyday life.

Also eligible for protection were public buildings, parks, triumphal arches, and bridges. The decree ordered the registration of all protected heritage by the end of 1949, set up restoration workshops and a special council on preservation and restoration at the USSR Academy of Science, and required republican governments to spend money on protection and restoration.[90]

What did this mean in practice? Monumental art created "for posterity" was to be immediately prioritized for restoration and upkeep. Individuals threatening their safekeeping

[89] GARF/R5446/51/3096/41.
[90] GARF/R5446/1/284-296. Only original artistic monuments were eligible (mass-produced ones were excluded), RGALI/2075/7/266/73.

would be liable to criminal prosecution; organizations would be subjected to fines.[91] According to the follow-up January 13, 1949 decree № 25 of the KPDI SM SSSR, only organizations and persons approved by the committee would be allowed to restore heritage, thereby preventing non-qualified personnel from making any "improvements."[92]

This touched off a wave of activity. According to the afore-mentioned decree of the KPDI SM SSSR, all works of art were to be registered, of which those worthy of protection would later be approved by central authorities.[93] In mid-1951, the RSFSR draft list numbered 152 monuments (not counting statues found in parks and graveside monuments), including all "monuments constructed by decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, busts of Twice-Heroes of the Soviet Union, as well as other highly-artistic monuments."[94] While I have been unable to locate this draft list to ascertain the proportion of contemporary monuments under the new protection regime, the Armenian SSR draft list from early 1950 detailed 30 objects, of which 10 were recently built monuments dedicated to contemporaneous individuals (including busts to Stalin, Molotov, Anastas Mikoian, as well as monuments to Stalin, Kirov, and Mikoian).[95]

While the RSFSR and union-wide lists of protected heritage were never approved by decree until 1960 (possibly due to their constant updating),[96] it appears that at the local level, the regime already began to function. In Moscow, throughout 1949, 1073 objects were entered onto lists of protected monuments.[97] Of these, 63 were large outdoor monuments, and most of the remainder – graveside monuments, of which at least half corresponded to contemporary figures, including "the gravestones of Heroes of the Soviet Union, party

[91] I extrapolate this from mid-1953 applications for use and display of monuments, see TsGAM/429/4/7/1.
[92] RGALI/962/3/1973/83-84.
[93] RGALI/962/3/1973/83-84.
[94] RGALI/962/3/2300/120.
[95] RGALI/962/11/57/1-2.
[96] At that point, contemporary monuments were no longer eligible for protection and preservation. Nonetheless, Soviet monumental constructions (primarily from the 1920s and 1930s) were eventually registered as protected heritage in 1978, see Deschepper, "Le 'patrimoine soviétique' de l'URSS," 86.
[97] TsGAM/P-4/80/10/1-4.

leaders, scientists, writers, visual and performing artists."[98] Some of these protected monuments were assigned to organizations which would be responsible for their upkeep – for instance, the "Triumph of Victory" monument (positioned on a bridge) was placed under the purview of the Gormostekspluatatsiia trust (in charge of all bridge-maintenance in the city).[99] Indeed, due to their less-than-perfect construction, some contemporary monuments were already undergoing restoration during the postwar period. For instance, the Gor'kii monument on Belorusskaia square underwent cleaning, crack-filling, and re-welding of seams from 1953 to 1954.[100] Altogether, by the early 1950s, 22 restoration workshops were created Union-wide, and more than 1500 objects were restored, at the cost of around 600 million rubles.[101] Although the protection and restoration regime worked far better on paper than in practice, it nonetheless signalled a consistent desire to preserve Stalinist monuments indefinitely, for posterity.

It may be that this desire for preservation also extended to objects not traditionally covered by preservation regimes. For instance, in 1939, calling for the construction of a model of the Palace of Soviets foyer, Shchusev assuaged concerns about the extra effort, in part by promising that the model would be donated to a museum.[102] Similarly, in the postwar period, the Museum of the USSR Academy of Architecture petitioned the KPDI SM SSSR to provide it with all the models of monuments and busts to Twice-Heroes of the Soviet Union in its possession.[103] At points, it seems that monuments (of leaders) acquired an almost sacred

[98] TsGAM/P-4/80/10/1-4, TsGAM/150/1/1245/346, TsGAM/2011/1/228.
[99] RGALI/962/11/57/59-64.
[100] TsGAM/429/4/7/3-6.
[101] RGALI/674/3/1893/4-5.
[102] RGALI/962/3/583/38. In fact, an early 1933 citizen's letter to the Director of Construction of the Palace of Soviet argued that "all the smallest details of the construction of the world's first socialist colossus – the Palace of Soviets – should be recorded, because it will serve as a beacon for the proletariat of all countries and for the oppressed peoples of the whole world, and the history of its construction in many, many years will represent a most valuable and most interesting chronicle of immortality," TsGAM/694/1/31/27-28.
[103] RGALI/962/3/2149/47.

standing; to destroy them, by extension, was considered sacrilege.[104] Paperny recounts the anxiety of those involved in the construction of Merkurov's monument of Stalin for the 1939 VSKhV. Upon completion, the smaller model statue, "which no one dared to destroy," was preserved by placing it inside the actual statue itself (although I have been unable to verify this oft-repeated anecdote).[105] Similarly, when the monument was deconstructed (to replace it with a more permanent one), the pieces of the original statue, along with its granite pedestal, were preserved.[106] Thus, the protection and preservation regime (formal and informal) surrounding Stalinist monuments testified to the consistent desire to preserve these for posterity, to "immortalize" the era, its events and "great" individuals.

2.4 "Immortalization" and monumentalism in historical context

I would now like to contextualize chronologically the use of monumental art and architecture for "immortalization" purposes, without dividing my account in the three trajectories outlined above. Broadly speaking, the use of monumental art and architecture for commemorative functions is a universal cultural phenomenon. In Russia, it was clearly pronounced from at least the beginning of the nineteenth century, in the form of dedicated churches, grand palaces, and imposing monuments. In some respects, one sees continuities extending from the Imperial era, through the Revolution of 1917 and the first decade of Bolshevik rule, and into the Stalin period with which I am concerned. Nonetheless, one must

[104] This was part of a general conflation of the real and represented Stalin. Prosecution for attacks on his visual representation are documented, for example, in Davies and Harris, *Stalin's World*, 140-141; Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956. An Experiment in Literary Investigation. I-II*, trans. Thomas Whitney (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 75; Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956. An Experiment in Literary Investigation. III-IV*, trans. Thomas Whitney (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 467; also see Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art*, 295.
[105] Although Paperny connected this less with preservation than with the cultural mythology in which "it would be sufficient to destroy a representation of the god in order to cause harm to the god himself," Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 158.
[106] Zinov'ev, *Ansambl' VSKhV*, 134.

equally appreciate the uniqueness of this moment. While I take up the specificity of "immortalization" under Stalinism in greater detail in Chapter 6, I would like to indicate here two differences with both past tradition and the dynamics of the immediate post-Stalin years. First, as argued above, monumental art and architecture functioned not only for the sake of propaganda, but also as a conduit of "immortalization," oriented towards future audiences. Second, rather than memorializing *past* figures and events, the Stalinist period demonstrated an equal preference for "immortalizing" *contemporary* ones. The prominence of contemporary events and individuals in memorial culture is especially remarkable given the parallel upswing (particularly from the late 1930s onwards) in commemorating the past (through memory "software" and "hardware").[107] These two facets make "immortalization" in the Stalinist period distinct from its precedents and antecedents as well as, perhaps, from the dominant commemorative practices of contemporary Western monumental culture.

I find Paperny's binary division of the Soviet period into two cultural systems generally compelling, at least on the question of "immortalization." Paperny's account proposes "Culture One" and "Culture Two" as structures which coalesced throughout Russian history and came to their full development in the twentieth century. These cultural systems were each unified by a certain worldview and internal logic, which facilitates Paperny's analysis of seemingly unrelated cultural developments as part of larger systems. According to Paperny, "Culture One" dominated the early years of the Revolution and most of the 1920s, re-emerging in the mid-1950s. "The events that took place between 1932 and 1954" (the chronological limits of the study at hand) largely reflect "Culture Two."[108]

[107] See David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); Kevin Platt and David Brandenberger, eds., *Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Serhy Yekelchyk, *Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
[108] Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, xxiii.

In Paperny's conception, "immortalization" was generally not part of the dominant cultural framework of the 1920s, the few exceptions manifesting a *minority* culture and a premonition of the rise of "Culture Two" in the subsequent decade.[109] Paperny noted that the 1920s "Culture One" was less interested in leaving legacies than it was excited by and oriented towards future developments and the utopian tomorrow. In so far as was possible, it attempted to pre-empt and spur this future onwards. This is reflected in the futuristic, anticipatory aesthetic employed by artists and architects of this time (in contrast to the historicist style of the Stalinist period). "Culture One" was also focused on temporary, flexible, and mobile constructions which precluded static monumentalism and sacred spaces (indeed, even the Lenin Mausoleum was originally conceptualized as a temporary structure).[110]

In the 1920s, "immortalization" stood in conflict with other cultural myths. Ideals of austerity left very little room for monumental decoration of buildings.[111] Maiakovskii, a dominant voice in the cultural community of the 1920s (and a leading representative of "Culture One" in Paperny's model), vehemently opposed monumentalizing. In the poem "Aloud and Straight," he writes: "The hell I care/ for bronze's weight memorial, the hell I care/ for marble's frozen slime!/ We're comrades all-/ so let us share our glory,/ one common monument/ let's have/ to tell our story/ in socialism,/ built in battle for all time."[112] Perhaps paradoxically, Maiakovskii supported preserving the deceased Lenin's memory, albeit in a way not dependent on physical representations of the leader.[113] As Aaron Cohen argues, there

[109] Paperny's model allows for the existence of a "minority culture," see ibid., xxv.
[110] Ibid., 70-104.
[111] V. Lebedeva, *Sovetskoe monumental'noe iskusstvo shestidesiatykh godov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), 9. Thus, in both its constructivist and rationalist variants, avant-garde architecture focused on *byt* reform, facilitating the emergence of the New Soviet Man by changing the lived environment, Victor Buchli, *An Archaeology of Socialism* (Oxford: Berg, 1999); also see Stephen Bittner, "Remembering the Avant-Garde: Moscow Architects and the "Rehabilitation" of Constructivism, 1961-64," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 2, no. 3 (2008).
[112] Vladimir Mayakovsky, *Poems*, trans. Dorian Rottenberg (Moscow: Progress, 1972), 265-266.
[113] Christine Sypnowich, "Death in Utopia: Marxism and the Mortal Self," in *The Social Self*, ed. David Bakhurst and Christine Sypnowich (London: Sage Publications, 1995), 95. Thus, in the poem "Vladimir Il'ich

was an opposition to memorializing and monumentalizing throughout the 1920s, which was tainted by its associations with bourgeois nationalism and imperialism, an attitude which began to change only in the 1930s.[114] What little monumental art was created was either abstract or devoted to representations of past events and generic individuals (such as the New Soviet Man).

Nonetheless, while preserving Paperny's understanding of "immortalization" as a specifically Stalinist phenomenon (for the time being – I qualify this idea in Chapter 6), I would like to note some of "Culture Two's" precedents throughout the 1920s, to which the thesis will at points have need to refer. The first monument-building program, which the Bolshevik state embarked upon almost immediately following the Revolution, became known colloquially as "Lenin's Plan for Monumental Propaganda." Framed both by Soviet and Western scholarship as the origin point of Soviet monumentalism (and, indeed, of Socialist Realist art generally), it is fitting to begin the contextualization here. This "Plan" referred to the April 12, 1918 decree of the SNK RSFSR "On the monuments of the Republic."[115] This decree ordered the destruction of Tsarist monuments and their replacement with newly-commissioned statues and memorial plaques dedicated to revolutionary leaders and progressive cultural figures (a list formalized in late July of the same year).[116] According to Lunacharskii's memoirs, Lenin himself was the key initiator of this policy. Allegedly, he was inspired by Tommaso Campanella's description of the ideal city in his utopian novel *City of the Sun*; there, monuments and wall inscriptions edified citizens.[117] Accordingly, scholars

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Lenin," Maiakovskii writes: "I'm anxious lest rituals,/ mausoleums/ and processions,/ the honeyed incense/ of homage and publicity/ should/ obscure/ Lenin's essential/ simplicity," Mayakovsky, *Poems*, 176. Also see his editorial "Don't Traffic in Lenin" in the journal *LEF*).

[114] Aaron Cohen, "From Bourgeois Militarism to Soviet Patriotism: The Transition to War Monuments in the Soviet Union, 1917-1967," in *ASEEES Annual Convention* (Chicago 2017).

[115] The Directorate of Visual Arts at the Commissariat of Enlightenment was responsible for its implementation, but Lenin personally oversaw the project as well, Oleg Peskov, *Memorial'nye doski Moskvy* (Moscow: Moskvovedenie, 2009), 5.

[116] According to his secretary Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich, Lenin also ordered the construction of memorial plaques and bas-reliefs, Vladimir Bonch-Bruevich, "Lenin i kul'tura," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 21 January 1940, 4.

[117] Anatolii Lunacharskii, "Lenin o monumental'noi propagande," *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, January 29 1933.

point unanimously to "Lenin's Plan" as the harbinger of the didacticism and politicization of Soviet art.[118] In 1918, these political goals included establishing the genealogy of the Soviet state,[119] propagandizing revolutionary ideals, and creating objects dear to workers, who would supposedly defend them valorously against the advancing White armies.[120]

By nearly all estimations, including that of Lenin himself, the initiative was a resounding failure. Monuments were poorly designed, hastily put together, and often executed in an abstract/ futurist style incomprehensible to the public.[121] Due to severe financial limitations, only 25 statues and a few memorial plaques were constructed under the Plan. Even these were executed in cheap, temporary materials and soon fell apart or were demolished.[122] Even though the regime's abilities were severely constrained at the time, the temporary nature of these monuments and the original goals of the Plan suggest that propaganda, rather than "immortalization," was the main objective. As Lunacharskii stated, the Plan was to "serve the aim of extensive propaganda, rather than the aim of immortalization."[123] Similarly, Lenin confessed: "for the moment I am not even thinking in terms of eternity or permanence."[124]

Furthermore, the Plan expressed the desire to commemorate the past more than to "immortalize" the present. Individuals singled out as subjects of monuments and memorial plaques were overwhelmingly figures of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, with only two significantly active during and following the Revolution (the revolutionary V. Volodarskii

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[118] Christina Lodder, "Lenin's Plan for Monumental Propaganda," in *Art of the soviets: Painting, sculture and architecture in a one-party state*, ed. Matthew Bown and Brandon Taylor (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 16; Richard Stites, *Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 88-90.
[119] Catherine Merridale, *Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Russia* (London: Granta, 2000), 121.
[120] Lodder, "Lenin's Plan for Monumental Propaganda," 19-20.
[121] John Bowlt, "Russian Sculpture and Lenin's Plan of Monumental Propaganda," in *Art and Architecture in the Service of Politics*, ed. Henry Millon and Linda Nochlin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978).
[122] Bown, *Art under Stalin*, 26; Liudmila Doronina, "Moskovskaia skul'ptura stalinskoi epokhi (vtoraia polovina 1920-kh - pervaia polovina 1950-kh godov)," *Dom Burganova. Prostranstvo kul'tury* 1 (2010): 100; Lodder, "Lenin's Plan for Monumental Propaganda," 21; Peskov, *Memorial'nye doski Moskvy*, 5.
[123] Qtd. in Lodder, "Lenin's Plan for Monumental Propaganda," 21.
[124] Lunacharskii, "Lenin o monumental'noi propagande," 1.

and the Menshevik philosopher Georgii Plekhanov). Nonetheless, the general goals of the decree did include "producing projects of monuments intended to commemorate the great days of the Russian Socialist revolution."[125] After all, the Plan's central monument was the 1919 "Obelisk to the Soviet Constitution" (and its "Statue of Liberty").

However, even though Tatlin's famous "Monument to the Third International," for example, was also commissioned as part of the Plan,[126] the unexecuted project remained firmly routed in "Culture One" logic.[127] Indeed, as Pamela Kachurin argues, it was "in accordance with the letter (if not the spirit) of Lenin's decree [that] Tatlin dubbed his structure a 'monument'. But […] the Monument was in fact intended as a functional building, which was meant to house Soviet governing bodies."[128] Moreover, the idea of anticipating the future, rather than memorializing the present, was apparent in the futurist style of Tatlin's creation, which "indicated an imaginative grasp at possibilities which, in physical terms, remained just out of reach."[129] Envisioned as a structure of iron and glass, it pre-empted the future industrial base necessary for implementing the design.[130] Equally, in its formal composition, the "theme of intertwined spirals and their steady resolution [signalled] *becoming* rather than *being*," and was essentially "a monument commemorating the future."[131] Indeed, Sergiusz Michalski argues that the question of whether Tatlin's project was even a monument is a "moot point."[132]

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[125] From the April 12, 1918 decree of the SNK RSFSR "On the monuments of the Republic, " qtd. in Bowlt, "Russian Sculpture and Lenin's Plan," 185.
[126] It was originally conceptualized as the "Monument to the Russian Revolution."
[127] See Bowlt, "Russian Sculpture and Lenin's Plan," 185; Bown, *Art under Stalin*, 22; Lodder, "Lenin's Plan for Monumental Propaganda," 18.
[128] Pamela Kachurin, "Working (for) the State: Vladimir Tatlin's Career in Early Soviet Russia and the Origins of The Monument to the Third International," *Modernism/ modernity* 19, no. 1 (2012): 25.
[129] John Milner, *Vladimir Tatlin and the Russian Avant-Garde* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 180.
[130] Norbert Lynton, *Tatlin's Tower: Monument to Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 90-92.
[131] Milner, *Vladimir Tatlin and the Russian Avant-Garde*, 156; Susan Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 139. Katerina Clark also comments on the Monument's iconoclastic properties, an example *par excellence* of its "monumental antimonumentalism," Clark, *Petersburg, Crucible of Cultural Revolution*, 141.
[132] Michalski, *Public Monuments*, 111.

After the first wave of objects commissioned by the "Plan," monumental construction fizzled out and almost disappeared. Indeed, between 1922 and 1932, only 8 monuments were commissioned by central decree.[133] Nonetheless, in an important shift, monumental art that *was* constructed tended to favour recently deceased individuals. Possibly, this represented a development of the Bolshevik funerary tradition, which had its origins in the so-called "red funerals" given to radicals and revolutionaries as early as the 1870s. According to Catherine Merridale, "red funerals" were used more as an excuse for large public gatherings of those opposed to the Tsarist regime, rather than occasions for genuine mourning.[134] From the beginning, "red funerals" alerted Bolsheviks to the political capital that could be made from mourning and memorializing the deceased. With increased state resources following the Revolution, Bolshevik practice shifted from one-time funerals to extending temporally the "presence" of the dead, for which monumental art was a key medium. Already in late 1917, construction began on the "Memorial to the Victims of Revolution" in the Mars Fields of Petrograd, and on the "Kremlin Necropolis." In the following years, there were proposals (although apparently unrealized) to erect monuments to Bolshevik revolutionaries Iakov Sverdlov and Viktor Nogin following their deaths.[135] A monument to Soviet ambassador Vatslav Vorovskii, assassinated in Lausanne in 1923, was unveiled in 1924. There was thus a gradual transition from massive one-time "red funerals" to the creation of permanent and larger monuments and monumental structures to the dead, maintaining their memory beyond the short-term – a (limited) case of the "immortalization" dynamic that would attain a mass character in the Stalinist period.

These hesitant steps into the terrain of "immortalization" attained a clearer direction following Lenin's death. Unsurprisingly, the death of the preeminent Bolshevik could not but

[133] GARF/R8300/26/587/101.
[134] Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 106-114.
[135] Silina, *Istoriia i ideologiia*, 47, 79.

have been a massive public event. A Funeral Commission was immediately set up – but rather than burying Lenin at the "Kremlin Necropolis," next to Sverdlov (as originally planned), Lenin was eventually embalmed and put on permanent display in a series of Mausoleums on the Red Square.[136] The literature is divided in seeing this event as a cynical, top-down attempt to exploit Lenin's memory in the years to come, or as triumph of spontaneous, bottom-up primordial expectations.[137] As an empirically grounded assessment of the genuineness of the Lenin cult is outside the scope of the project, one is tempted to elide the debate by agreeing with Nina Tumarkin that it is "impossible to separate the spontaneous elements from the directed ones."[138] What is crucial for my purposes is that for the first time, one sees an explicit and significant investment on the part of the regime (or general society) to use monumental art (in the form of the permanent Mausoleum and countless incarnations of Lenin in statues and monuments) not only for contemporary audiences, but also for future generations. As Commissar of Foreign Trade Leonid Krasin, in charge of Lenin's embalming, stated: "the [Mausoleum] should be planned and executed to last for centuries, for an entire eternity."[139]

Not only did the regime set up a Funeral Commission, it also established a permanent "Commission for the Immortalization of Memory of V. I. Lenin" (note that "immortalization" is officially invoked). This Commission ordered official photos, busts, drawings, a death

[136] J. Arch Getty, *Practicing Stalinism: Bolsheviks, Boyars, and the Persistence of Tradition* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2013), 70.
[137] For those pointing to the political logic behind the decision to preserve Lenin's body, see Plamper, *The Stalin Cult*, 22. Alexei Yurchak, "Bodies of Lenin: The Hidden Science of Communist Sovereignty," *Representations* 129, no. 1 (2015). For those underscoring the genuine and spontaneous elements leading to Lenin's embalming, see Getty, *Practicing Stalinism*, 67-95; Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 118, 191-195.
[138] Nina Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives!: The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 146. It must be noted, however, that there was some opposition to these proposals, notably from his wife Nadezhda Krupskaia, who, on the pages of *Pravda*, admonished: "do not make him monuments, palaces in his name, pompous celebrations in his memory – he gave all of these so little consideration, they were such a burden to him. Remember, how impoverished and chaotic the country still is," qtd. in ibid., 177.
[139] Jonathan Brooks Platt, "Snow White and the Enchanted Palace: A Reading of Lenin's Architectural Cult," *Representations* 129, no. 1 (2015): 93.

mask, and other memorabilia.[140] Within days of his death, furthermore, the Second Congress of the Soviet of the USSR passed a decree "On the Construction of Monuments to V. I. Lenin," ordering the construction of statues in Moscow, Kharkov, Tiflis, Minsk, Tashkent, and Leningrad, and arguing that "the image of our great leader must be immortalized for all future generations."[141] As Igor' Bondarenko recounts: "the search [for a monument to Lenin] took three major trajectories – the creation of sculptural portrait, architectural monuments, and massive practical buildings named in honour of Lenin."[142]

Importantly, Lenin's "immortalization" was not a one-off event, but rather set the tone for dealing with the deceased throughout the 1920s and into the Stalin period.[143] It is here that one sees most clearly the prelude to the dynamic that would come to the fore in the Stalin period. Nonetheless, it was no more than a prelude. Indeed, several projects were proposed but were *not* carried out: the aforementioned monuments to Sverdlov and Nogin, the "International Red Stadium" in Moscow (which was to be a monument to the October Revolution), and many others. One reason was that the economic costs of the monument-building program (especially if their execution was to be of high quality) were recognized as an undue burden on the struggling economy. Indeed, referring to his "Plan for Monumental Propaganda," Lenin warned: "do not think that I […] imagine marble, granite, and gold letters. For now, we must make everything modestly."[144] On the architectural front, no

[140] Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 189. Although the first cult objects had started appearing before his death (for example, the first memorial plaque honouring Lenin was created in 1919), Peskov, *Memorial'nye doski Moskvy*, 7.
[141] Qtd. in Lampard, "Larger Than Life," 210.
[142] Igor' Bondarenko, *Krasnaia ploshchad' Moskvy: arkhetekturnyi ansambl'* (Moscow: Veche, 2006), 303.
[143] Memorialization typically included a media campaign, biographical publications, annual evenings devoted to the memory of the deceased individual (*vechera pamiati*), meetings in enterprises and Party cells, transfer of personal effects to museums, construction of monuments and transformation of other places into 'sites of memory' through memorial plaques and the renaming of streets/ cities, Ekaterina Krasil'nikova, "'Narodnaia skorb': massovye kommemoratsii, v gorodakh zapadnoi sibiri, priurochennye k pokhoronam i pominoveniiu S. M. Kirova, V. V. Kuibysheva i G. K. Ordzhonikidze (30-e gg. XX v.)," *Vestnik Omskogo universiteta* 71, no. 1 (2014); Ekaterina Krasil'nikova, "Memorializatsiia S. M. Kirova v zapadnoi sibiri (1934 g. – pervaia polovina 1941 g.)," *Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* 36, no. 4 (2015). Mausoleums themselves were not common, although one famous exception was the Mausoleum in which the embalmed body of the assassinated Civil War hero Grigorii Kotovskii was laid to rest in 1925.
[144] Lunacharskii, "Lenin o monumental'noi propagande," 1.

serious construction whatsoever (monumental or otherwise) took place before 1924.[145] If the logic of "immortalization" existed in nascent form, it was stillborn by the low priority accorded to it by decision-makers of the time.

By contrast, the early 1930s saw the solidification of the "immortalization" dynamics analyzed in this thesis. As mentioned in Chapter 1, both contemporary actors and subsequent scholarship saw the design competition for the Palace of the Soviets as crucial in determining the trajectory of Soviet monumentalism. In fact, the competition consisted of four stages: 1) a preliminary one, to determine a suitable location and other guidelines, 2) the well-publicized, international one (which received 272 entries); 3) a closed competition of twelve, in which Iofan's design received the highest rating, but was not declared winner, and 4) a limited competition for 5 work-collectives, after which Iofan's was determined the winner on May 10, 1933.[146]

In several respects, this was a watershed for Soviet monumentalism. First of all, through it monumental art became a central, and perhaps *the* central art form endorsed by the topmost leadership. This was a project of extreme political importance, presented as such by massive media coverage. Most crucial was the astronomical volume of material resources committed to the project, particularly against the backdrop of the extreme dislocations of the First Five-Year Plan and forced collectivization. Furthermore, it set the parameters for monumental art stylistically, particularly in terms of the so-called "critical utilization of heritage," but also in the predilection for gigantic proportions, and the synthesis of architecture, sculpture, and monumental art.[147] Finally, it specifically brought to the fore

[145] Catherine Cooke and Igor Kazus, *Soviet Architectural Competitions, 1924-1936* (London: Phaedon Press, 1992), 9.
[146] Peter Lizon, *The Palace of the Soviets: The Paradigm of Architecture in the USSR* (Colorado Springs, CO: Three Continents Press, 1992).
[147] The report of the Construction Council of the Palace of the Soviets from February 28, 1932 was particularly important in this respect, and was frequently referred to in discussions throughout the next two decades, Sovet stroitel'stva Dvortsa Sovetov, "Ob organizatsii rabot po okonchatel'nomu sostavleniiu proekta Dvortsa sovetov SSSR v gor. Moskve," *Stroitel'stvo Moskvy*, no. 3 (1932): 16.

contemporary events and figures for commemoration. Although officially the project was titled "Palace of the Soviets – a Monument to Lenin," in official pronouncements and the media it was equally described as a monument to the Stalinist epoch, to the era of socialist construction (this development is described and analyzed in greater detail in Section 5.1). The shift to commemorating the contemporaneous alongside figures and events of the past was echoed in other monumental projects. As Silina writes: "by the early 1930s, not the history of the proletariat, but the achievements of socialism, the success of industrialization and kolkhoz construction became the primary subjects [of monumental art]."[148] However, one must not overstate the breadth of this development: the Palace of the Soviets aside, monumental art and architecture were at this point almost non-existent. Moscow's Trust for Sculpture and Facing, for instance, was almost entirely bereft of funds and materials, receiving its production premises only in 1933.[149] From 1932 to 1935, only one monument, and no memorial plaques at all, were constructed in Moscow.

Rather, the impetus for widening the construction of monumental art and architecture beyond the Palace came from the Plan for the Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow (and respective plans for other cities, which were modeled on it), formally enacted in 1935.[150] Indeed, this delay was openly admitted in Soviet discourse at that time, which was eager to underscore the "revolutionary" consequences of such Socialist Reconstruction Plans.[151] The Plan explicitly singled out monumental art as a priority area, "provid[ing] for the construction on public squares, embankments and parks of monuments to outstanding revolutionaries of all ages and all nationalities, to leaders in science, technology, art, to fighters for the

[148] Silina, *Istoriia i ideologiia*, 173.
[149] I. Rakhmanov, "Skul'ptura i gorod. Zadachi tresta skul'ptury," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 2 April 1933, 1.
[150] Its precursor, in the form of Kaganovich's speech at the 1931 Central Committee Plenum "gave no hint of monumentalism or of transforming the city into one dominated by prestige projects" but was concerned with city-dwellers' material needs, Graeme Gill, "Building the Communist Future: Legitimation and the Soviet City," in *Russian Politics from Lenin to Putin*, ed. Stephen Fortescue (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 82.
[151] See, for instance, S. Tavasiev, "Stroitel'stvo novykh pamiatnikov," *Arkhitekturnaia gazeta*, 8 August 1936, 1.

liberation of mankind from oppression both by the social system and from natural disasters."[152] Unlike in years past, several commissioned monuments were actually built. Importantly, the period also saw the construction of the Moscow-Volga Canal and related objects such as the Northern River Terminal, as well as a second group of Moscow metro stations, adorned with monuments and monumental art. Importantly, commemoration of recent events and individuals became as prominent as commemoration of those of the more remote past.[153] In this respect, it is illustrative that while the architect Aleksei Dushkin originally envisioned "Ploshchad' Revolutsii" metro station to commemorate the French, 1905, and 1917 revolutions, this was later changed to chronicle Soviet history to the present moment (1938).[154]

Nonetheless, while the Plan signaled the beginning of monumental construction on a significant scale, it unleashed an even greater flurry of designs that were to remain unrealized. Reasons for the lag included, above all, the lack of financing by the SNK SSSR, which, through the People's Commissariat of Finances and Gosplan, held the ultimate strings to the purse. Another problem was the organizational difficulty of synchronizing monument construction with the chaotic progress of demolition and reconstruction that had enveloped the city. Bureaucratic chaos also played its part in the uncertainty as to which institutions (city or union-level) were in charge of designing and constructing monuments. The role of the KPDI SNK SSSR was undefined, resulting in further disorganization and lack of oversight. The practice of commissioning of individual sculptors (labelled artisanal-ism, or

[152] MOK VKP(b) MGK VKP(b), MS RKKD, "Iz predstavlennoi v SNK SSSR i TsK VKP(b) dokladnoi zapiski Moskovskogo oblastnogo i gorodskogo komitetov VKP(b) i Moskovskogo soveta RK i KD o general'nom plane rekonstruktsii g. Moskvy," in *General'nyi plan rekonstruktsii goroda Moskvy. Postanovleniia i materialy*, ed. Ia. Tsvankin (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1936), 73.
[153] See list of centrally-commissioned monuments, GARF/5446/50/2826/107-122.
[154] See Aleksei Dushkin, "Stantsiia 'Ploshchad' Revoliutsii'. 1935-1938," in *Aleksei Nikolaevich Dushkin. Arkhitektura 1930 – 1950-kh godov. Katalog vystavki*, ed. Natal'ia Dushkina (Moscow: A-Fond, 2004), 156.

kustarshchina), resulted in overloading "famous" sculptors and under-utilizing others. At the same time, all artists complained about inadequate facilities and shortages of materials.

The response from central authorities was slow, even though various audit commissions, oversight institutions, and even the media had been pointing to these problems from the outset. However, a string of measures was enacted on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. January 1941 saw the centralization of all monument design within the KPDI SNK SSSR and its republican/ local equivalents.[155] In February of the same year, the SNK SSSR gave the green light for the KPDI to organize workshops for sculptural monuments, which would put production (of unique sculptures, rather than mass-produced cement castings) on an industrial scale.[156] But these measures were too little and too late.

The outbreak of War completely rearranged political and economic priorities; construction and design of monuments was immediately halted by a KPDI SNK SSSR directive, and even the recent institutional reorganizations mentioned above remained unimplemented.[157] Attempts to restart the construction of monumental art and architecture during the early phases of the war met opposition. At a late-1944 architecture conference, while affirming the necessity of building for posterity, city planner Viktor Baburin called for such monumental functions to be vested solely in public buildings; housing, he argued, should be focused on cheapness and functionality for users.[158] A local engineer and an architect wrote Molotov in late 1943, protesting the construction of a memorial-staircase to the heroes of the Great Patriotic War, designed at the instigation of local authorities. They were outraged by the vast amount of money (5 million rubles), deficit materials (1500 tones of the cement, 350 tones of iron, and 3000 m^3 of gravel) "volunteer" labour, and transport

[155] RGALI/962/6/1402/17. Although, in some senses, this was merely a reaffirmation of an earlier 1937 decree, see RGASPI/17/125/637/76-78.
[156] GARF/R5446/25/134/151.
[157] RGALI/2075/7/51/124-125.
[158] RGAE/9432/1/16/122-123.

required, in a city beset by urgent reconstruction needs and struggling to sustain the war effort.[159]

Nonetheless, the general lack of resources did not wholly hinder "immortalization" through monumental art. This is a crucial change from the situation throughout the 1920s, when resource scarcity was enough to stifle whatever "immortalization" dynamics existed. First, where central authorities *did* focus their efforts, even the costliest construction was carried through. While monuments commissioned at this time were usually constructed only after the conclusion of the war, important monumental projects such as the third phase of Moscow metro construction, the "Triumph of Victory" monumental bridge (also in Moscow), and other objects were constructed during wartime (see discussion in Section 6.1). Moreover, wartime "immortalization" was carried out through different avenues. While the commissioning of monuments proper declined, these years saw an explosion of sculptural portraits (busts) of leading military, cultural, and scientific figures. I have already noted in Section 1.3 that these were also seen as "immortalizing" their subjects and their feats.

Second, resource scarcity did not stop the development of designs and the theory of monumentalism by the art and architecture professions. The "Resolution" of the X Plenum of the SSA declared the "development of theoretical questions [including those concerning] the reflection of images of the Great Patriotic War in monumental art" as one of its main tasks.[160] The 1943 KPDI SNK SSSR and SSA joint circular (*tsirkuliarnoe pis'mo*) went further, elaborating that these questions should include: "the design of monuments to the Heroes of the Patriotic War, the organization of comradely and open competitions on this topic, a broad discussion of the draft designs, the study of compositional issues associated with the

[159] GARF/A259/4/1522/3.
[160] Soiuz Sovetskikh Arkhitektorov, "Zadachi arkhitektorov v dni Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Rezoliutsiia X Plenuma Soiuza sovetskikh arkhitektorov SSSR, 22-25 aprelia 1942 goda," in *Zadachi arkhitektorov v dni Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: Materialy X Plenuma Soiuza sovetskikh arkhitektorov SSSR, 22-25 aprelia 1942 g*, ed. T. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1942), 57-58.

construction of monuments, and the organization of cooperation between architects and sculptors in this matter."[161] In 1943, the Academy of Sciences sponsored a study of historical monuments, while the Academy of Architecture enshrined monument construction as a major focus of its laboratory experimental work and a key area of study for its graduate students.[162]

At the same time, in 1942 the Moscow and Leningrad sections of the SSA launched the first design competitions for monuments to the Great Patriotic War.[163] These, and other entries, were displayed in the exhibitions "25 Years of Soviet Architecture" (December 1942) and "25 years of the Red Army" (February 1943). These local initiatives were eventually joined by the KPDI SNK SSSR, which encouraged the submission of monument designs in the lead-up to the exhibition "Heroic Front and Rearguard," (November 1943 – October 1944) and eventually sponsored design competitions of its own.[164] Meanwhile, the designs of commissioned monuments were "updated" to include the main contemporary event, the Great Patriotic War. Already in early 1942, the design of the Palace of the Soviets (construction materials of which had recently been rerouted for the manufacture of anti-tank obstacles in the defence of Moscow), was altered to reflect and memorialize the Great Patriotic War.[165] Similarly, the metro stations of the third phase of construction were updated to reflect wartime themes.

Third, while central commissioning of monuments declined, the actual volume of constructed monuments grew markedly, the vast majority of these being constructed at the

[161] RGALI/962/6/1052/3.
[162] Tat'iana Malinina, "Proektirovanie pamiatnikov i memorialov v gody voiny," in *40 let velikoi pobedy: arkhitektura*, ed. Iu. Volchok (Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1985), 16-17; Malinina and Ogarkova, *Pamiat' i vremia*, 307-308; Malinina, "Proektirovanie pamiatnikov i memorialov," 16-17.
[163] Malinina, "Proektirovanie pamiatnikov i memorialov," 14.
[164] Ibid., 17.
[165] RGALI/2635/1/64/2, Boris Iofan, "Akademik arkhitektury B. M. Iofan," in *Zadachi arkhitektorov v dni Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: Materialy X Plenuma Soiuza sovetskikh arkhitektorov SSSR, 22-25 aprelia 1942 g*, ed. T. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1942), 35; also see Boris Iofan, "Rabota nad proektom Dvortsa Sovetov," *Izvestiia*, 28 March 1945, 3. One of these designs, according to the memoires of Iofan's secretary Isaak Eigel', added a 2500-3000 person "Hall of State Receptions," thematically dedicated to Great Patriotic War, murals depicting the Battle of Stalingrad, a Memorial Hall to the Heroes and Heroic Feats of the Soviet Era, and 15-metre exterior statues of Great Patriotic War soldiers (among others), Isaak Eigel', *Boris Iofan* (Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1978), 108-116.

initiative of low-level military authorities in conjunction with local governments.[166] This grassroots phenomenon evidently worried central authorities, who were supposedly concerned about the poor artistic quality and impermanence of such monuments. This veritable explosion of grassroots monument-building is discussed in detail in Section 6.1.

By 1944, with victory assured, the "immortalization" drive was given a further boost. That year, work on centrally commissioned pre-war monuments was restarted.[167] In mid-1944, the KPDI SNK SSSR organized a network of State Sculpture Workshops.[168] A number of key actors called for creating an official committee dealing with "immortalization" of the War.[169] These included the Director of Affairs of the Peoples' Commissariat of Defence Lieutenant-General Ivan Naidenov, who was concerned with the state of affairs in the design, construction, and protection of war monuments. In April 1945, he recommended the creation of a Committee for the Affairs of Monuments to the Great Patriotic War under the auspices of the SNK SSSR. Its functions were to include: organizing competitions and lobbying for the commissioning of monuments, museums, and panoramas; protection and restoration of monuments; research and design of monuments; creation of heritage reserves at important battlefields; creation of a production base for monuments and other capital construction; and the management of military museums.[170] This proposal was supported by individuals as high up as Marshals Georgii Zhukov, Ivan Konev, Konstantin Rokossovskii, Rodion Malinovskii,

[166] GARF/R7523/61/14969/2-3, also see Sergei Zmeul, "Arkhitektura pamiatnikov Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny" (Kandidat dissertation, Akademiia arkhitektury SSSR, 1950), 57-58.
[167] GARF/A259/6/1351/8.
[168] These were charged with: "design and construction of monuments and monuments, the production of sculptural and architectural works, decorative sculpture, architectural details and other objects of applied art, reproduction of sculptures, restoration of monuments and original sculptures […] instruction and monitoring of other sculptural workshops," RGALI/962/6/1402/26.
[169] The earliest such proposal known to me dates from 1943, in which military engineer and Stalin prize laureate Ivan Koshechkin wrote to Stalin recommending the creation of a Committee on Immortalizing the Heroism of the Patriotic War, which would: construct monuments, memorial plaques, and billboards honouring heroes, find and record acts of heroism, popularize histories of hero-cities, organize museums, create a "Calendar" of the war, decree and organize new holidays, the renaming of streets and cities, and carry out other commemorative initatives, RGASPI/17/125/216/134-135. Also see a similar proposal from architect Mikhail Khazhakian (March 1944), RGALI/962/6/1160/108.
[170] GARF/R7523/61/14969/1-8.

Lev Mekhlis, and several other leading military figures.[171] A few months later, Army General Andrei Khrulev lobbied for the creation of a similar Committee for the Construction and Protection of Monuments to the Great Patriotic War under the auspices of the SNK SSSR.[172] These initiatives were opposed by the KPDI SNK SSSR and by Chairman of the SNK RSFSR and Politburo Candidate Aleksei Kosygin, but were not ignored – the approval of all monuments was centralized in a later decree and handed over to the KPDI SM SSSR and its republican and local branches.

The postwar period represented the hey-day of "immortalization"; monumental construction was booming. Moscow's Chief Architect Dmitrii Chechulin called for the construction of "hundreds" of decorative and monumental sculptures around the city.[173] Victory Parks were planted in several other Soviet cities (for example, in Leningrad). Construction increased to such a level that by "1952, the government intended to create [monumental art] workshops situated close to railway stations for the delivery of marble and granite."[174] In 1950, the KPDI SM SSSR suggested creating a separate Main Directorate for Monumental Sculpture (which to date was a mere section of the KPDI's Main Directorate for Visual Arts), and the construction of central State Workshops for Monumental Sculpture.[175] In Moscow proper, the eight high-rise buildings represented a truly massive undertaking in monumental architecture, as was the completion of the fourth phase of metro construction, the opening of the reconstructed VSKhV, and the construction of other important monumental projects.

[171] GARF/R7523/61/14969/9, 20-23.
[172] GARF/R5446/48/2190/2-5.
[173] Dmitrii Chechulin, "Moskva Stalinskoi epokhi," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 5 September 1947, 2.
[174] Kruk, "Semiotics of Visual Iconicity," 35; also see Aleksandr Gerasimov, "Vstopitelnoe slovo. A. M. Gerasimov, Prezident Akademii khudozhestv SSSR," in *Voprosy razvitiia sovetskoi skul'ptury. Nauchnaia konferentsiia. 28-30 maia 1952 g*, ed. Matvei Manizer (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii khudozhestv SSSR, 1953), 7-10.
[175] RGASPI/17/132/424/97-100.

Other developments proceeded apace. The Academy of Architecture continued to sponsor research into monumental constructions.[176] A number of competitions for war monuments were held in this period; unlike wartime ones, they were more realistically connected to specific locations and were provided with requirements on materials and resource limitations.[177] This period also saw the development of prefabricated graveside monuments for individual and mass graves.[178] City planning, particularly the reconstruction of destroyed cities, also revolved around memorializing the War. Iuliia Kosenkova argues for the key role of such War monuments in postwar city planning: "projects for monuments [to the Great Patriotic War] might not even be linked to a concrete city planning context, but it was they that served as the core of the form and ideal which, developing spatially and acquiring compositional complexity, determined the main architectural features of cities undergoing reconstruction.[179]

Thus, the competition guidelines for the design of the reconstruction of Stalingrad stated that "the leading theme of the central square needs to be a monument to the heroic defenders of the city," which should be maximally visible from various points in Stalingrad.[180] The May 29, 1946 decree №1136 of the SM SSSR ordered city planners to envision places for monuments in major squares, near highways, and in parks.[181] Iofan, placed in charge of the rebuilding of Novorossiisk and (temporarily) Stalingrad, argued that monuments to the Great Patriotic War "should become the architectural-compositional

[176] Zmeul, "Arkhitektura pamiatnikov," 58-59.
[177] Ibid., 58.
[178] Ibid. Although Zmeul notes that these designs were very preliminary, of poor quality and generally unimplemented, ibid., 73-76.
[179] Iulia Kosenkova, *Sovetskii gorod 1940-kh – pervoi poloviny 1950-kh godov: ot tvorcheskikh poiskov k praktike stroitel'stva* (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2000), 46. For a contemporaneous account, see Zmeul, "Arkhitektura pamiatnikov," 54.
[180] Komitet po delam arkhitektury pri SNK SSSR and Soiuz Sovetskikh Arkhitetktorov SSSR, *Programma i usloviia otkrytogo konkursa na sostavlenie eskiznogo proekta tsentral'noi ploshchadi i monumenta geroicheskim zashchitnikam goroda Stalingrada* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe arkhitekturnoe izdatel'stvo, 1944), 4.
[181] GARF/R5446/1/278/298-299, Tukanov, "Monumenty v sovetskom gradostroitel'stve," 6.

centres of rebuilt cities."[182] While no central victory monument was built in Moscow at this time, the fourth phase of Moscow metro construction, stations of which opened in 1950, was conceptualized as a massive monument to the War and to Victory.

By the late 1940s, the emphasis of the War monument as the center of the city began to decline.[183] While the emphasis shifted back to the House of Soviets as the central edifice, the memorial character of city architecture did not suffer.[184] As Tat'iana Malinina writes, city reconstruction plans "included monuments, triumphal arches, public buildings of a memorial nature, museums, panoramas, pantheons, memorial zones, squares and alleys of heroes, monument-installations, and Victory parks. Non-memorial buildings also acquired monumental features. Grand staircases, colonnades, embankments, lighthouses, bridges all acquired the character of memorials."[185]

The comment alerts us to another development in this period. Memorial forms became generalized almost to the level of fetishism; not utilized for commemoration of anything specific, they nevertheless embellished nearly all constructions. Beginning with "Stalinskaia" station of the third phase of the Moscow metro construction, nearly all stations' surface vestibules were built in the form of triumphal arches.[186] "Undedicated" commemorative rostral columns appeared in front of the main entrance of the MGU Main Building (see **Figure 2**). Obelisks adorned the rooftops and interior design of residential buildings, so much so that Moscow's Chief Architect Chechulin complained in 1948 of being tired of these ever-present "horns."[187] Indeed, Chechulin also spoke out against this memorial suffusion on other occasions. Opposing the supposedly Egyptian themes in Pavel Abrosimov

[182] Boris Iofan, "Plany vosstanovleniia," *Literatura i iskusstvo*, 1 January 1944, 4.
[183] This was probably due to the general demotion of the War as a means of regime legitimation at this time, see Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, 196-205; Maria Ferretti, "Raskolotaia pamiat': Rossiia i voina," *Rossiia XXI*, no. 2 (2010): 72, 74; Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead*, 103-104.
[184] Kosenkova, *Sovetskii gorod 1940-kh*, 141.
[185] Tat'iana Malinina, *Tema pamiati v arkhitekture voennykh let* (Moscow: NII Teorii i isotrii izobrazitel'nykh iskusstv AKh SSSR, 1991), 143.
[186] Zinov'ev, *Stalinskoe metro*, 138.
[187] TsGAM/534/1/132/105.

and Iofan's design for a reconstructed Vakhtangov Theatre, Chechulin exclaimed in exasperation: "Enough graves! They are always shooting, killing. Graves are everywhere. We want to achieve a brilliant, happy life."[188] But even such (half-hearted) opposition to monumentalism often worked within the logic of "immortalization." As the eminent art historian of the time Ivan Matsa argued:

> We, the contemporaries of the Stalin era, will be asked not only about which Parthenons of our own we erected [...] Along with this, we will be asked about what architectural environment architects had created for the everyday life of builders, fighters, heroes of this era. What kind of streets, squares, parks, houses, and everything that is prosaically called "mass and constructions" were built for them? By the kind of answer we will give to these questions, it will be possible to judge whether the architects understood fully the tasks of their era, whether they were able to reflect its greatness.[189]

Thus, even opposition to monumentalism was justified by reference to the judgement of posterity.

Despite the explosion in monumental construction, problems and lags abounded. By late 1952, of a total of 239 monuments (dedicated both to historical and contemporaneous figures and events) decreed by central authorities since 1932, only 55 had been completed.[190] An official audit of the Main Directorate for Visual Arts of the KPDI SM SSSR in late 1952 disparaged this severe lag in design and construction. Indeed, the "Final Report" of the Ministry of State Audits summarized criticisms that had long been circulating within the Party, government, and the artistic Unions. The practice of awarding multiple commissions to

[188] TsGAM/534/1/40/96. In the course of a mid-1948 session of the Architectural-Planning Commission, the draft design of Kaluzhskaia metro station's surface vestibule was also likened to a "graveside monument" and that of the Academy of Sciences building to the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus, TsGAM/534/1/132/106, 109.
[189] Ivan Matsa, "Traditsii i sovremennost'," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 29 March 1946, 2.
[190] GARF/R8300/26/587/101.

famous sculptors had led to severe backlogs and declining quality, the Report argued. It also noted the wastage of funds stemming from work on monuments not commissioned by central authorities, and from the practice of paying for draft designs irrespective of their quality.[191] The KPDI, for its part, defended itself by framing delays as the inevitable outcome of enforcing high quality standards, as well as by pointing to its engagement in other mega-projects (such as the MGU Main Building and the Volga-Don Canal). It complained about the endemic lack of adequate production facilities, and cited difficulties related to financing, as monuments were only sporadically included in central and local budgets.[192] Other problems included perennial shortages of materials and bureaucratic chaos (despite attempts at streamlining, city-planning commissions, the KPDI, the KPDA, the Party and the government, often at incongruent levels, all played a part in commissioning, design, and construction). Thus, the record of actual monument construction remained mixed. It suggests that the "immortalization" *drive* outpaced its material realization, a story repeated with regards to most goals that the overly-optimistic (or overly-bombastic) Stalinist regime set for itself. Moreover, it is important to note that large-scale monumental projects, such as the Moscow high-rises and metro, the Volga-Don Canal, the Leningrad metro – which were priorities for the regime – were completed largely on time.

This hey-day of "immortalization" dynamics is perhaps most vividly encapsulated in the SM SSSR decree to construct the "Pantheon – Monument to the Immoral Memory of Great People of the Soviet State." The competition for the Pantheon, which was to house Stalin's embalmed body (as well as the transferred remains of Lenin and others buried in the Kremlin necropolis) was ordered on March 6, 1953.[193] Stalin had passed away the previous

[191] GARF/R8300/26/587/4-16.
[192] GARF/R8300/26/587/17-25.
[193] The decree was published in central newspapers the following day, see "Postanovlenie tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza i Soveta Ministrov Soiuza SSSR o sooruzhenii Panteona - pamiatnika vechnoi slavy velikikh liudei Sovetskoi strany," *Pravda*, 7 March 1953.

day; what is notable is the phenomenal speed with which such a decree was conceptualized and passed. It suggests that "immortalization" had become ingrained as a routine process, not provoking even the slightest discussion on the part of the leadership. Of course, the idea of the Pantheon was not unconnected to power politics in the wake of Stalin's death. This both created a vacuum of legitimacy for the regime and inaugurated an intense struggle at the pinnacles of power. Accordingly, the Pantheon project provided a stabilizing sense of ideological continuity and was also an outcome of the competition for the title of "Stalin's most loyal successor." Nevertheless, the point is not that the Pantheon project was used instrumentally (it undoubtedly was), but that the myth and practice of "immortalization" was universally assumed to resonate with and inspire the Soviet public (which is precisely what made "immortalization" an important and useful political instrument, as I argue in Chapter 5).

In a pattern that in part reproduced that of the Palace of Soviets competition, the first stage involved formulating the competition guidelines. With input from several leading architects, these were forwarded by Mordvinov to the State Committee for Construction on April 23.[194] The second stage was a closed competition involving 10 architects (who submitted 30 proposals), which concluded on February 1, 1954, and on whose basis guidelines for a second, open competition were formulated. Entries were received by November 1, a massive affair with 957 submissions.[195] Later that month, however, the first salvo at Stalinist architecture was fired by the new political leadership, and the idea was effectively buried herewith.[196]

Indeed, the "immortalization" dynamics specific to the Stalin period began to shift soon after the dictator's death. One of the areas in which the rising First Secretary

[194] RGAE/339/1/1132/268.
[195] RGALI/674/3/1946/1-2.
[196] Dmitrii Khmel'nitskii, *Arkhitektura Stalina. Psikhologiia i stil'* (Moscow: Progress-Traditsiia, 2007), 314.

Khrushchev first intervened was in attacking the architectural establishment. The 1954 Academy of Architecture conference, and the December 1954 "All-Union Conference of Builders, Architects, Workers of Construction-Materials, Equipment, and Road-Building Industries, Project-Management and Research Organizations" were used as venues to denounce the Stalinist style and direction of Soviet architecture. Specifically, monumentalism (in all senses of the term), which had taken ever-increasing proportions and dominated nearly all types of building projects, was mercilessly attacked. Thus, at the Conference, Khrushchev raged: "on the example of master architects many young architects who are barely out of college and haven't yet found their feet, want to design only one-off buildings and hurry to build monuments to themselves, like Pushkin."[197]

The Stalinist monumental "architecture of excess" was abolished entirely the following year, with the disbanding of the Academy of Architecture, and the demotion of architects to the sidelines of the construction process (through standardization and the allocation of greater institutional power to construction bureaucracies), to the point where they faced "virtual professional extinction."[198] Khrushchev's personal architectural tastes played some part in these developments.[199] But more important was a major reorientation of priorities: rather than public buildings, monuments, and prestige projects, the Khrushchev leadership focussed on the practical needs of the public, most notably the housing shortage.[200]

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[197] Qtd. in Iurii Gerchuk, "The Aesthetics of Everyday Life in the Khrushchev Thaw in the USSR (1954-1964)," in *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Meterial Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe*, ed. Susan Reid and David Crowley (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 82-83. This was presumably a reference to the poem "Exegi monumentum," in which Pushkin meditated on how he would be remembered after his death. Similarly, on the pages of *Arkhitektura SSSR*, Rudnev criticized "the vanity of architects, who attempt to immortalize their art even in mundane constructions," which resulted in poor taste and spiralling construction costs, Lev Rudnev, "O formalizme i klassike," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 11 (1954): 31.

[198] Cooke, "Beauty as a Route," 139; also see Ibrecht Martiny, "Housing and Construction in the Period of 'De-Stalinization': The Change in Construction Policy from 1954 to 1957," in *Politics and Participation under Communist Rule*, ed. Peter Potichnyj and Jane Zacek Shapiro (New York: Praeger, 1983).

[199] Khan-Magomedov, "Stalinskii ampir," 17-18.

[200] For detailed studies of the housing construction campaign, see Steven Harris, *Communism on Tomorrow Street: Mass Housing and Everyday Life after Stalin* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2013); Mark Smith, *Property of Communists: The Urban Housing Program from Stalin to Khrushchev* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010).

Above all else, this involved an emphasis on utility over aesthetics (or at least Stalinist aesthetics).[201] Thus, for instance, Russian art historian Nikita Voronov claims that the mid-1950s saw the *de facto* ban on bronze monuments due to scarcity and high cost of the metal, which lasted almost eight years.[202] A parallel shift involved attempts to harness the ideological potential of the built environment in shaping the habits of the New Soviet Man (heralding a return to the problematic of the avant-garde).[203] Whatever the reasons, following the November 4, 1955 decree № 1871 of the SM SSSR "On the elimination of excesses in design and construction," the monumental, "immortalizing" function of capital constructions effectively came to an end.[204] "Monumentalism and triumphalism were out and function was in," as Graham Gill aptly summarizes.[205]

Nonetheless, while monumentalism in architecture was discouraged, the number of monuments proper does not appear to have diminished significantly. In fact, certain developments, such as new local history initiatives, led to an *increase* in museums, memorial plaques, and local monuments.[206] What *did* change, however, was the character of "immortalization." Rather than constructing monuments to contemporary events and figures,

[201] Gerchuk, "The Aesthetics of Everyday Life," 82-89; Gill, "Building the Communist Future," 88-92; Elena Loseva, "Vliianie politicheskikh peremen v Sovetskoi Rossii na transformatsiiu gosudarstvennogo stilia v arkhitekture 1930-1960-kh godov," *Vestnik povolzhskogo instituta upravleniia*, no. 4 (2011): 204-206. Against dominant opinion, Andrew Day argues that the shift to pragmatism happened years earlier (at least from 1949), and that the utility/ aesthetics contradiction had always been present (and never resolved) in Stalinist architectural practice, Day, "The Rise and Fall of Stalinist Architecture." Furthermore, aesthetic considerations were never abolished completely from Khrushchev-era architecture, but these had to be accommodated by prefab building methods and rigid cost constraints, Stephen Bittner, *The Many Lives of Khrushchev's Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow's Arbat* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 105-140.
[202] Voronov, *Monumental'noe iskusstvo vchera i segodnia*, 14. Unfortunately, I have been unable to find independent confirmation of this.
[203] See Buchli, *An Archaeology of Socialism*; Gerchuk, "The Aesthetics of Everyday Life."; Susan Reid, "Communist Comfort: Socialist Modernism and the Making of Cosy Homes in the Khrushchev Era," in *Homes and Homecoming: Gendered Histories of Domesticity and Return*, ed. Karen Adler and Carrie Hamilton (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2010).
[204] For example, the Palace of Soviets project underwent two more rounds of competitions in 1957 and another 1958. All proposals suggested decreasing the size of the building by a factor of 15, employing simpler, prefab components, and eliminating "excesses" and "beautification." It was eventually built not as a monument, but as a purely practical "Palace of Congresses" inside the Kremlin complex, Khmel'nitskii, *Arkhitektura Stalina*, 335-345.
[205] Gill, "Building the Communist Future," 91.
[206] Peskov, *Memorial'nye doski Moskvy*, 6. Also on the upsurge in local history in the 1960s, see Catriona Kelly, *St. Petersburg: Shadows of the Past* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 5-6.

the subjects of these became increasingly distant events, above all the Great Patriotic War, but also the October Revolution, and even older events in the national histories of Soviet republics.[207] Thus, a late 1960s album dedicated to new Soviet monuments, whilst claiming that "contemporary themes […] are becoming in recent years one of the main ones in monumental sculpture," was able to refer to only a few monuments to space exploration as examples of such.[208]

In fact, monuments to cosmonauts do serve as an exception to the abandonment of contemporary events/ figures in favour of commemoration centred overwhelmingly on the Great Patriotic War. One may think particularly of the iconic "Monument to the Conquerors of Space" (1964) in the Ostankino neighbourhood of Moscow, commissioned immediately following the launch of the first satellite Sputnik-1. Nonetheless, space monuments were few and most were constructed from the 1970s onwards, when the great days of Soviet leadership in space exploration had begun to fade into the past. The famous Iurii Gagarin monument in Moscow, for instance, was unveiled only in 1980 (in the lead-up to the Olympic Games), almost two decades after his momentous spaceflight.

This shift away from monuments dedicated to contemporary events and individuals may reflect various changes in "immortalization" dynamics. This may be linked to the discomfort with the role of monuments in cults of personality, which were denounced at the XX Congress of the CPSU in 1956 and even more strongly at the XXI Congress in 1961. It may be related to a loss of self-confidence on the part of the political leadership, and the search for heroic motifs in the past rather than the (perceived or actual) mundane and technocratic present. To Paperny, it manifested the re-emergence of "Culture One," and a renewed focus on anticipating the future, rather than "immortalizing" the present. Although

[207] See John Adams, "Monumentality in Urban Design: The Case of Russia," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 49, no. 3 (2008): 291. Reticence in discussing some aspects of recent history may also have been related to discomfort with the Stalinist past, which was only partially "usable."
[208] A. Khalturin, *Monumenty SSSR* (Moscow: Sovetskii khudozhnik, 1969), 16.

exploring these processes in detail is outside the scope of the project, I will allude to them briefly in my sociocultural explanation of the rise and fall of the "immortalization" myth in the Stalinist Soviet Union in Chapter 6.[209]

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter argued that the orientation of Stalinist monumental art and architecture towards posterity is evident in the discourse surrounding these objects, in the preference for durable materials, and in the protection and restoration regime surrounding these objects. The preponderance of evidence thus allows us to dismiss two possible counter-arguments: that the discourse was disingenuous and solely propagandistic (it was, rather, followed up by tangible and substantial material investments), and that the solidity of monumental construction stemmed solely from the desire to showcase the immutability of the Stalinist order (this dynamic is not mutually exclusive to "building for posterity"). The chapter also demonstrated that despite some precedents and enduring legacies, the years preceding and following the Stalinist period did not manifest "immortalization" in the same sense: monuments and monumental constructions were not oriented towards future audiences and/ or did not "immortalize" contemporary events and individuals to a significant extent.

[209] One must also note the possibility that "immortalization" practices may have shifted to other spheres. For instance, 1967 was marked by a campaign amongst Young Pioneers to bury time-capsules, to be opened on the hundredth anniversary of the October Revolution. Time-capsules, like monuments in the Stalinist Soviet Union, may also be thought of as "messages to posterity." Even so, this practice represents the transmutation of "immortalization" from a central cultural role to the domain of "children's activities," and its degeneration into a wholly artificial, externally-mandated performance. "Immortalization" may also have shifted from collective (state-managed) to private practices. For instance, Mariia Romashova notes that elderly communists and fellow-travelers in Perm often donated their private papers to the archives in the late Soviet period, specifically as a way of coming to terms with their death and "achieving immortality," Mariia Romashova, "'The Heart of a Remarkable Communist Has Ceased to Beat': Grief in the Emotional Repertoire of Elderly Soviet Activists of the 1960s-1980s," in *ASEEES Annual Convention* (Boston, USA 2018).

3.0 The paradox of Stalinist historicism

Stylistically, Stalinist monumentalism was fundamentally historicist, mimicking and eclectically recombining classical and national mediums, forms, and styles. In scholarship, this is explained by reference to the backward tastes of the leadership and the masses, and to Stalinism's inherent conservativism. This embrace of historicism is taken as evidence of Stalinist monumental art and architecture's "orient[ation] on the past more than the future."[1] The previous chapter problematizes this conclusion, but a paradox remains: why did Stalinist monuments, geared as they were to communicating with future generations, rely so heavily on the artistic languages of the past? I attempt to resolve this paradox by arguing that historical mediums and forms were chosen as vehicles for "immortalization" because of their time-tested durability, while neoclassical and national styles were seen as universal, trans-temporal languages that would remain understandable to posterity. The chapter thereby contributes to explanations of Stalinist art and architecture's classical and national revival, and points to the capacity of twentieth-century historicism to express a future-oriented cultural impulse, rather than being inherently conservative.

3.1 The Stalinist style – definitions and explanations

I would like to precede the discussion by clarifying some issues in conceptualizing the style of Stalinist monumentalism, which scholars alternately refer to as "Stalinist neoclassicism," "Stalinist eclecticism," "Stalinist empire," "Stalinist baroque," and "Stalinist gothic."[2] Of course, Stalinist art and architecture referred to itself as "Socialist Realist," but

[1] Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art*, 285.
[2] These are but the most common labels; some art historians have coined new ones or re-combined these terms: for instance, Kavtaradze speaks of "empire neoclassicism," Sergei Kavtaradze, "Khronotopy kul'tury

this progressivist-tinged term concealed a certain retrospective orientation. Above all historical styles, classicism was touted as the highest level of artistic flourishing (doubtless, to be surpassed eventually by Soviet art), held up for careful study and emulation (as I show below). Throughout the 1930s, classical heritage referred to Graeco-Roman classicism, as well as its Renaissance and neoclassical iterations. In art and sculpture, moreover, classicism was understood as the genesis of the realist tradition. Beginning in the late 1930s and reaching its peak in the postwar period, however, the emphasis switched to specifically *Russian* neoclassicism of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, as well as to national/ popular/ folk (*narodnye*) elements not previously encompassed by classicism *per se*. The timing of this shift coincided with the general rise of "National Bolshevism" (as conceptualized by David Brandenberger), a Stalinist ideological hybrid embracing Russian nationalism at the expense of socialist internationalism and class ideology.[3]

This shift in favour of *narodnye* art and architecture did not represent the abandonment of classicism in favour of a national style, but rather produced an amalgamation of the two.[4] Russian art and architecture was posited as the true custodian of the classical legacy (which it allegedly received via Byzantium), while in the West classicism was said to have degenerated.[5] Commonalities between Russian *narodnoe* art and the popular nature of

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stalinizma," *Arkhitektura i stroitel'stvo Moskvy* (1990). For an analysis of this terminological profusion, see Marsel' Iskandarov and Andrei Mikhailov, "Sovetskii neoklassitsizm: issledovatel'skie interpretatsii arkhitektury 1930-1950-kh gg," *Izvestiia Kazanskogo gosudarstvennogo arkhitekturno-stroitel'nogo universiteta* 15, no. 1 (2011).

[3] Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism*; David Brandenberger, *Propaganda State in Crisis: Soviet Ideology, Indoctrination, and Terror under Stalin, 1927-1941* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). Nonetheless, the ground for the shift was prepared as early as 1930, with Stalin's dictum concerning Soviet culture, which was to be "national in form, socialist in content," Erik van Ree, *The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin: A Study in Twentieth Century Revolutionary Patriotism* (London: Routledge, 2003), 191.

[4] Incidentally, the same dynamic was manifest in fascist Italy (where Roman classicism was treated as *the* national tradition) and Nazi Germany (which categorized Ancient Greece as the Aryan forerunner of Germanic culture).

[5] Nikolai Brunov, "Prof. N. I. Brunov," in *Zadachi arkhitektorov v dni Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: Materialy X Plenuma Soiuza sovetskikh arkhitektorov SSSR, 22-25 aprelia 1942 g*, ed. T. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1942), 46; Ivan Zholtovskii, "Traditsii narodnogo iskusstva," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 5 March 1937, 4; Ivan Zholtovskii, "Vospitanie mastera arkhitektury. Doklad na 1-m s"ezde arkhitektorov SSSR," *Arkhitekturnaia gazeta*, 26 June 1937, 3; Ivan Zholtovskii, "Vospitanie zodchego," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 30 November 1945, 2.

Graeco-Roman classicism (and classicism in its subsequent iterations) were also underscored. "One must never oppose classic architecture (specifically, Graeco-Roman classicism) to the line of popular art, for the genuinely-classical was at the same time genuinely popular," warned a 1937 editorial in *Arkhitektura SSSR*.[6] Effectively, Stalinist art and architecture followed in the general classical tradition, embracing purer neoclassical and stripped classical forms throughout the 1930s, and embellishing these with "national" details (notably, ornamentation) in the following years.[7] Similarly, "popular" deviations from the classical, realist tradition in monumental art and sculpture became more permissible from the late 1930s (for instance, the allegorical depiction of contemporary figures in archaic, "national" costumes).

To be sure, Stalinist discourse was multifaceted, and even contradictory, when it came to the relationship with the classical and national traditions. On the one hand, this twin heritage was exalted and set up as a model for Soviet art and architecture to follow. On the other hand, warnings against such imitation abounded. Doing so might be branded "eclecticism," "formalism," "archaism," "restorationism," "academism," stylization," and "retrospectivism," (not to mention liable of being accused of "bourgeois nationalism"). At least two concerns were palpable. The first was that the technological capacities of modernity created new possibilities for art and architecture, implying that continuing to work within the confines of old forms and styles meant stasis and denied the creative impulse, an impulse which socialism had supposedly emancipated from technological and resource constraints. The second concern had to do with social context. Old styles and forms reflected the needs

[6] "Narodnoe tvorchestvo," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 1 (1937): 13, also see Moisei Ginzburg, "Organicheskoe v arkhitekture i prirode," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 3 (1939): 77; Zholtovskii, "Traditsii narodnogo iskusstva," 4.
[7] For discussion of national ornamentation, see Castillo, "Peoples at an Exhibition."; Greg Castillo, "Soviet Orientalism: Socialist Realism and Built Tradition," *Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review* 8, no. 2 (1997). Stalinist architects also justified the increasing shift to vertical compositions by reference to the Russian national architectural tradition, for example, see Mordvinov, *Khudozhestvennye problemy sovetskoi arkhitektury*, 26-27; Anna Opochinskaia, "Ansambl' vysotnykh zdanii Moskvy i natsional'nye traditsii russkikh zodchikh," *Sovetskaia arkhitektura. Ezhegodnik*, no. 5 (1954).

and interests of the elite in class-divided societies, which tainted even *narodnoe* art. Art and architecture in the Soviet Union, by contrast, was to reflect a democratic impulse, being built by and for the people. These democratic ideals were supposed to preclude, for instance, unduly expensive materials and embellishments, as well as designs which impeded functionality. Even on a purely artistic level, old forms would be unable to express the new content of socialist life. Thus, openly embracing historicism was forbidden; all positions had to be "amalgams" between the old and the new. Nonetheless, this chapter focuses on the elements of Stalinist artistic and architectural discourse which supported historicism, as they ultimately exerted greater sway over really-existing Stalinist artistic and architectural practice.

The dictate of the "critical utilization of heritage" (*kriticheskoe osvoenie naslediia proshlovogo*) and the general turn to historicism in architecture is commonly traced to the competition for the Palace of Soviets. Following the second phase of the competition (in which all submissions were rejected), the February 28, 1932 report of the Construction Directorate suggested that in the future, concept development "should focus on the utilization of new techniques, as well as the best of classic architecture."[8] These prescriptions were elaborated in Aleksei Tolstoi's seminal article "In Search of Monumentalism," published in *Izvestia* the previous day.[9] Tolstoi was no architect or architectural theorist, but the "Red Count" writer was known to be close to Party establishment.[10] The choice of Iofan's design as the winning entry of the third phase of the competition, and its final iteration in the fourth, solidified historicism's new status. In 1933, the Union of Soviet Architects initiated a research program into the "utilization of heritage."[11]

[8] Sovetov, "Sovet stroitel'stva Dvortsa Sovetov," 16.
[9] Aleksei Tolstoi, "Poiski monumental'nosti," *Izvestiia*, 27 February 1932.
[10] Indeed, as Tat'iana Samokhina notes, the article used phraseology similar to that of the Directorate's report; they were published within days of each other, Tat'iana Samokhina, ed. *Iz istorii sozdania Soiuza sovetskikh arkhitektorov* (Moscow: Soiuz moskovskikh arkhitektorov, 2007), 11.
[11] Ibid., 17.

Concomitantly, architect Ivan Zholtovskii's Palladian residential house on Mokhovaia street (1934), hailed in the media as "a flagship of Socialist Realism in Soviet architecture" and "a nail in the coffin of constructivism," signalled that historicism would now be compulsory for *all* constructions, monumental or otherwise.[12] Soviet constructivism, on which the European architectural avant-garde centred, and the style in which some important commissions were executed under the First Five-Year Plan, was no longer welcome. The Union of Architects (or, more precisely, its regional departments – the central body was not organized until 1936) put out the message; the threat of professional and even criminal "consequences" ensured a speedy and relatively bloodless transition to the new official style.[13]

What were the motives for the turn towards historicism? One set of explanations refers to the philistine, conservative preferences of Stalin and other high-placed officials.[14] Conversely, avant-garde architects were supported by leaders who had fallen out of favour by the 1930s (such as Lev Trotskii); this association tainted the former, which "played a great role in the avant-garde's decline."[15] A related explanation is that traditionalist architects happened to organize a "bureaucratized oligarchy," which strangled their stylistic competitors.[16] Other accounts refer to "backward" popular preferences; for instance, Le Corbusier, writing in 1935, argued that "a civilization such as the Russian, still in infancy, needs substantial food; it needs to be adorned and made attractive with beauty suitable to

[12] Lizon, *The Palace of the Soviets*, 134; Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 8-9.
[13] See Hugh Hudson, *Blueprints and Blood: The Stalinization of Soviet Architecture, 1917-1937* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Khmel'nitskii, *Zodchii Stalin*.
[14] Boris Groys, "The Art of Totality," in *The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology of Soviet Space*, ed. Evgeny Dobrenko and Eric Naiman (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 111-114; Leonid Heller, "A World of Prettiness: Socialist Realism and Its Aesthetic Charges," in *Socialist Realism without Shores*, ed. Thomas Lahusen and Evgeny Dobrenko (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 699; Khmel'nitskii, *Zodchii Stalin*, 153.
[15] Andrei Ikonnikov, "Andrei Ikonnikov," in *Birth of a Metropolis. Moscow 1930-1955. Recollections and Images*, ed. Alessandra Latour (Moscow: Iskusstvo-XXI vek, 2002), 97.
[16] Frederick Starr, "The Social Character of Stalinist Architecture," *Architecture Association Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (1979): 51-52.

every man's taste. Statues, columns, and gables please more easily than the straight and severe lines, the result of meeting difficult technical problems."[17] This was compounded by the modeling of popular artistic preferences on pre-revolutionary aristocratic tastes.[18] As Frank Lloyd Wright wrote in 1937: "nothing pleases [the Russian masses] so much as the gleam of marble columns under high ceilings, glittering chandeliers, unmistakable luxury, as they had to look up to it when it decided their fate, when they ate at the pleasure of the luxuried if they ate at all."[19]

Perhaps more important than public aesthetic *tastes* (which, in other areas, Soviet artists seemed ready to ignore) was the perceived popular *understandability* of classical and *narodnye* styles.[20] Understandability was particularly important given that the state's "aim to influence mass consciousness led to the search for forms of expression based either on the repetitions of that already familiar, or in metaphorical references to it."[21] In contrast to abstract avant-garde designs, historicist architecture could convey clear meanings. For instance, it could emphasize the Soviet Union's belonging to "a magnificent, centuries-old world culture," or could convey a nationalist mythology with imagined cultural continuities.[22]

A final set of explanations points to the general conservative cultural restoration of the Stalin years. Some see in this a reassertion of traditional Russian cultural patterns.[23] Others note the increasingly authoritarian regime's fear of (bottom-up) innovation and change, which could be disruptive to the *status quo* (as was ultimately the case during the

[17] Qtd. in Lizon, *The Palace of the Soviets*, 99.
[18] Ibid., 23.
[19] Qtd. in ibid., 140-141; also see ibid., 23. For a broader discussion of the (partial) reliance of Stalinist cultural production on popular taste, see Evgenii Dobrenko, "The Disaster of Middlebrow Taste, or, Who 'Invented' Socialist Realism?," in *Socialist Realism without Shores*, ed. Thomas Lahusen and Evgenii Dobrenko (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); also see Stites, "Iconoclastic Currents in the Russian Revolution," 17.
[20] Andrei Ikonnikov, *Arkhitektura XX veka: utopii i real'nost'. Tom I* (Moscow: Progress-Traditsiia, 2001), 404-405; Lizon, *The Palace of the Soviets*, 20-21; Tarkhanov and Kavtaradze, *Architecture of the Stalin Era*, 160.
[21] Ikonnikov, *Arkhitektura XX veka*, 405; Andrei Ikonnikov, *Utopicheskoe myshlenie i arkhitektura* (Moscow: Arkhitektura-S, 2004), 388-389; also see Kenneth Frampton, *Modern Architecture: A Critical History* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2007), 210, 214.
[22] Tarkhanov and Kavtaradze, *Architecture of the Stalin Era*, 110.
[23] Such as, for instance, a modified "critical realist" tradition in literature, see Boris Thomson, *The Premature Revolution: Russian Literature and Society, 1917-1946* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), 298.

Cultural Revolution of the late 1920s/ early 1930s).[24] Still others refer to non-utilitarian considerations, including the shift to a more developmental understanding of the construction of socialism, which required building on, rather than breaking with, old know-how, cadres, and artistic culture.[25] Furthermore, some point to the cultural insecurities of the *vydvizhentsy* and older *apparatchiks*; in their search for status (*kul'turnost'*), they came to genuinely accept the (politically cowed) "mainstream intelligentsia" as the bearer of "real culture."[26]

In these accounts, the revival of historical forms and styles is presented as an outcome of conservative, even reactionary developments, a "retreat" to bourgeois tastes and values, coinciding with the abandonment of revolutionary aspirations and the return to a hierarchical, statist politics. Plotting twentieth-century architecture on the axis of traditionalism-modernism, Anders Aman, for example, places Socialist Realism decidedly in the "traditionalist" camp.[27] Nonetheless, a minority of scholars (not least those dealing with historicism also prevalent in the art and architecture of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany) question this model. Some note that historical styles were "updated" to accommodate modern elements, and in this sense were future-oriented. George Mras argues that Italian fascist architecture "turned to a modernized, simplified classicism to project the image of a state which purported to synthesize the past and present with implications of survival in the future."[28] A similar viewpoint regarding Nazi architecture is encapsulated in Roger Griffin's concepts of "rooted modernism," and "palingenesis" (expectations of national rebirth),

[24] Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art*, 3; Anatole Kopp, *Town and Revolution: Soviet Architecture and City Planning, 1917-1935*, trans. Thomas Burton (New York: Braziller, 1970), 226.
[25] Kavtaradze, "Khronotopy kul'tury stalinizma."; also see Hans Gunther, "Sotsrealizm i utopicheskoe myshlenie," in *Sotsrealisticheskii kanon*, ed. Evgenii Dobrenko and Hans Gunther (St. Petersburg: Akademicheskii proekt, 2000); Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 19-24.
[26] Indeed, the party "lacked the will or resources to deny [the intelligentsia's] cultural authority," Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 245, 256.
[27] Aman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe*.
[28] George Mras, "Italian Fascist Architecture: Theory and Image," *Art Journal* 21, no. 1 (1961): 12. Similarly, Aristotle Kallis argues that "the *stile littorio* sought to overcome the polarity of modernism-versus-tradition by positing a more open horizon of future change that remained rooted in a longer dimension of time that willed backwards as well as forwards," Aristotle Kallis, "Futures Made Present: Architecture, Monument, and the Battle for the 'Third Way' in Fascist Italy," *Fascism* 7, no. 1 (2018): 50.

according to which "the erection of monumental buildings in in a classicizing style" "signified not a nostalgia for the past and reaction against modernity, but a longing for a new civilization which maintained its continuity with a mythic past."[29]

Others go further in such challenges, pointing not to the "compromise" between historicism and modernity (which, to an extent, preserves the teleology while contesting the overall conclusion), but to the quest for a timeless, perfect art. As Andrei Ikonnikov and others argue, "history served as the new material for the creation of images that went beyond the limits of time […] Utopia implies the rejection of time, and thus the future is equal to infinity. The research into history was directed towards the future, which would not know time nor development."[30] A rich literature also documents the same with regards to Nazi German and Italian Fascist art; for instance, Jochen Thies argues that the Nazis believed that "there is only an eternal art which must always return to the formal elements of the buildings of antiquity."[31] Indeed, the alleged timelessness of historical styles, particularly the classical tradition, is asserted even at the present moment in the West.[32] In these analyses, therefore, the revival of historicism is seen not as past-oriented, but rather as the pursuit of a perfect, universal style, which was expected to remain the style of the future. As Groys states, "Stalinist culture looks upon itself as a postapocalyptic culture" in which "'progressive' world culture acquires a superhistorical significance and eternal relevance."[33]

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[29] Roger Griffin, "Building the Visible Immortality of the Nation: The Centrality of 'Rooted Modernism'to the Third Reich's Architectural New Order," *Fascism* 7, no. 1 (2018): 23, 36.
[30] Qtd. in Ikonnikov, "Birth of a Metropolis," 104; also see Ikonnikov, *Arkhitektura XX veka*, 403-435; Ikonnikov, *Utopicheskoe myshlenie i arkhitektura*, 389; Monica Ruthers, "Sovetskaia rodina kak prostranstvo gorodskoi arkhitektury," *Ab Imperio* 2 (2006): 229; Groys, *The Total Art of Stalinism*, 47-48.
[31] Jochen Thies, "Hitler's European Building Programme," *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 3 (1978): 420-421; also see Eric Michaud, *The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 104, 119; Jan Nelis, "Modernist Neo-classicism and Antiquity in the Political Religion of Nazism: Adolf Hitler as Poietes of the Third Reich," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 9, no. 4 (2008): 486; Alex Scobie, *Hitler's State Architecture: The Impact of Classical Antiquity* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 50.
[32] For instance, see Patricia Mainardi, ed. *The Persistence of Classicism* (Williamstown: Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 1995); Robert Stern, *Modern Classicism* (New York: Rizzoli, 1988), 7, 55.
[33] Groys, *The Total Art of Stalinism*, 47-48.

This chapter builds on these insights, which question the dominant interpretation of historicism as "reaction" (and its attendant teleological model). However, I argue that the search for a timeless style was future-oriented not only as a compromise between historical and modern elements, or as a utopian endeavour, but also in a more direct fashion. Specifically, neoclassical and *narodnye* styles were touted as the paramount trans-temporal languages for communicating with a distant (and only vaguely defined) posterity, on account of their alleged aesthetic perfection and their time-tested universality. Additionally, the past was scoured for durable mediums and forms that would ensure that Stalinist monuments would survive *physically* for many generations. This logic – explored in the following two sections – allows one to better account for Stalinism's endorsement of historicism in art and lends a new meaning to such sentiments as expressed by Gol'ts in 1940: "art has a future only when it relies upon the past."[34] Sensitivity to "immortalization" goals thereby helps to explain what seems paradoxical on first impression: Stalinism's future-oriented use of historicism (and, possibly, the similar use of historicism in the monumental practices of interwar Western architecture).

3.2 Perdurability and historical experience

As argued in Section 2.2, the design of monumental art and architecture demonstrated a preoccupation with extraordinary durability, with the ability to withstand the wear and tear of centuries. However, particularly until the postwar period, innovation was limited by the low level of technical sophistication and the endemic lack of resources. Instead, architects and artists turned increasingly to the past to find durable materials,

[34] Qtd. in Nikolai Tret'iakov, *Georgii Gol'ts* (Moscow: Sovetskii khudozhnik, 1969), 176.

construction methods, forms, and artistic mediums which had, in retrospect, withstood the test of time physically.

Aside from technical and financial limitations, why was turning to the past, rather than innovating, more practical? Particularly in the 1930s, with the emphasis on rapid construction of monumental works, it was felt that there was simply no *time* for real experiments. A. Tolstoi's aforementioned article, which attempted to define the new direction of Soviet monumental art, admitted that while "whole epochs shaped architectural styles [and] generations of stonemasons built gothic cathedrals," the current socialist epoch "sets a different pace for art and its implementation." Nonetheless, Soviet monumentalists were to be "aided by all the cultural heritage of the past."[35] "The creation of our classics, our style of monumental-decorative sculpture," proclaimed the 1938 edition of the *BSE*, "would take too long if we did not look back at classical works in all their breadth. This will be of vital importance for the creation of gigantic edifices, particularly the great construction projects of communism."[36] The perceived lack of time was compounded by poor confidence in the ability of "real" laboratory experiments to show the long-term durability of materials, construction methods, structures, and forms. This was the case, for example, with the Palace of Soviets, the general design of which was approved in 1934, with the end of the Third Five-Year Plan (1943) as the expected completion date for all substantial construction. It is unsurprising that the 1938 meeting deciding between marble or granite facing for the Palace closed with the following statement by Iofan, the Chief Architect:

> We live in time and space, we cannot keep making laboratory experiments on marble which do not give us definitive results on the durability of materials. All

[35] Tolstoi, "Poiski monumental'nosti," 2.
[36] "Monumental'nost'," 132.

> of these experiments should be tested by life. Laboratory experiments are insufficiently advanced, they cannot take everything into account.[37]

A final issue was the political and economic importance of monumental constructions, which raised the stakes in the success or failure of innovations. Thus, at the very outset of the Palace project, in 1932, Lunacharskii warned that "one cannot experiment on [the Palace of Soviets], spending colossal resources and materials and dealing a blow to the proletariat's prestige."[38]

In effect, rather than experimenting with new possibilities of the industrial age, architects turned to the materials commonly used in the monumental constructions of the past. Drawing on hindsight, architects sought to employ materials which had "withstood the centuries." The special make of cement developed for the Palace of the Soviets (DS-300) was claimed to have been based on similar ingredients as that of Ancient Rome, "the best cement in the world […] which holds up after a thousand years as after a day, never ages or weakens."[39] In a discussion of Palace materials in the late 1930s, the architect A. Vladimirskii held up the use of coloured metals, employed on the doors of classical palaces and in temples such as the Pantheon in Rome.[40] His colleague Shchusev suggested modeling Moscow's reconstruction in part on Venice, using unfading coloured stucco and other facing, "which is eternal and becomes more wonderful with time" (rather than paint, with which Moscow buildings were typically recoated).[41] Doubtless, the above were often propagandistic claims or mere aspirational sentiments, but they are indicative nevertheless.

But retrospectivism also affected actual decisions, such as in determining which stone would last longest in the northern climate. In the above-mentioned 1938 discussion

[37] TsGAM/694/1/137/17. Also see similar reservations regarding the experiments on affixing stone facing with cement, TsGAM/694/1/137/2.
[38] Lunacharskii, "Dvorets Sovetov," 1. This idea was echoed in future discussions, for example, see Rodionov and Kornfel'd's comments at a meeting of the Artistic Council of the Visual Art and Architecture Division of KPDI SNK SSSR in mid-1938, RGALI/962/3/583/51.
[39] Atarov, *Dvorets Sovetov*, 80.
[40] Vladimirskii, *Otdelochnye materialy dlia Dvortsa Sovetov*, 9.
[41] RGALI/674/2/31/16, taken from a draft speech to be delivered at the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Architects, held in mid-1937. I was unable to establish if this point made it to the actual speech.

concerning the facing of the Palace of the Soviets, a commission put together to study the durability of Leningrad's monuments (St. Isaac's Cathedral, the Marble Palace, and various other aristocratic estates) reported on the unacceptable state of their centuries-old marble facing. It had fractured, chipped, became encrusted, and changed colour, requiring frequent restoration and often complete re-tiling. Granite was recommended as a more durable material.[42] This was seconded by others, who, using similar reasoning, pointed to five-thousand-year-old Egyptian pyramids as evidence of the qualities of granite.[43] Tufa (a variety of limestone) was also tentatively suggested, because a particular Georgian church made of it was well preserved after half a millennium.[44] By the end of the meeting, it was decided to use granite on account of its superior durability, proven by experience.[45]

Monumental artists and architects expressed an equal fascination with the construction methods of the past. As early as 1932, the Deputy Head of Construction of the Palace of Soviets requested that the State Central Archive of the USSR establish how extant Russian historical monuments had been designed so robustly as to have outlasted the centuries. Landmarks to be researched included the Bell Tower of Ivan the Great, the recently-demolished Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, the St. Isaac's Cathedral in Leningrad, Etienne Falconet's "Bronze Horseman" monument, the Peter and Paul Fortress, and others. Engineers and architects of the Palace of Soviets were particularly interested in the type of materials and cements used, the techniques for mounting external facing, and the preservation/ repair needs and measures carried out.[46] The later stages of designing the Palace of Soviets confirmed that "a lot of simple, time-tested labour experience [was to be] applied

[42] TsGAM/694/1/137/5-6.
[43] TsGAM/694/1/137/9-10.
[44] TsGAM/694/1/137/14.
[45] TsGAM/694/1/137/17. A year later this decision was criticized (ineffectually, it seems), according to the same logic: architect Lev Il'in noted that granite darkens over time, pointing out that the Isaakievskii cathedral was originally lighter-coloured, see Lev Il'in, "Prof. L. A. Il'in (Leningrad)," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 43.
[46] GARF/R5325/9/2567/1, 5-6.

in the Palace of the Soviet's construction," including, for instance, dovetail joints for its steel frame ("the most perfect form to [which] the experience of many generations could not add anything").[47] Architects argued for rediscovering the lost techniques of classical and ancient Russian fresco-painting and the paint composition used in thousand-year-old Armenian miniatures, in an effort to secure maximal longevity for the Palace.[48] Extra reason for the Palace of Soviet's gigantic size was inferred from Egyptian sphinxes, whose colossal features could be made out clearly despite millennia of erosion.[49]

The reliance on materials and construction techniques which had "stood the test of time" seemed to be inversely proportional to the confidence that Soviet science and technology gained throughout the period. In the postwar period, key projects showcased innovation (one may recall "diapsidite" facing, rather than granite, in Moscow's high-rise construction projects) rather than tradition. At the same time, even in this later period, historical experience was employed inversely – as revealing what did *not* work and should therefore be avoided by Soviet artists and architects building for posterity. "Diapsidite" was specifically touted as a response to "the stern […] warnings of architectural history: once-elegant Venetian palaces and London churches [made of marble and granite] had become grey, washed-out buildings."[50] Similarly, the following comments prefaced one postwar book on the history of sculpture:

> Studying the sculptural heritage of the past, we need to pay special attention to its "production techniques," which give us invaluable knowledge in sculptural

[47] Atarov, *Dvorets Sovetov*, 106-107.
[48] Respectively, B. Blokhin, "K voprosu o monumental'nom iskusstve," *Iskusstvo*, no. 4 (1934): 3; M. Sar'ian, "Narodnyi khudozhnik Armenii M. S. Sar'ian (Erevan)," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 60; A. Viner, "A. V. Viner (Moskva)," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939). To this end, the All-Union Academy of Architecture planned to create a laboratory for the study of frescoes and monumental art, Blokhin reported.
[49] I. Rakhmanov, "Skul'ptor I. F. Rakhmanov (Moskva)," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 54.
[50] Voronkov and Balashov, *Dvorets nauki*, 167.

> technique. Decades and even centuries placed their mark on a sculpture to a greater or lesser extent (depending on its technical perfection) and revealed a whole line of technical mistakes which our predecessors made. In studying sculpture from this perspective, we learn to avoid such technical mistakes.[51]

As with durable materials and construction methods, Stalinist artists and architects scoured history for durable forms. The sculptor Leonid Shervud, at a discussion at the Moscow Union of Soviet Sculptors and Artists (MOSSKh) in early 1944, referred to Corinthian columns he had seen in Rome: "they are preserved, they stood for tens of centuries, and make up a form that demonstrates that the material is well-utilized and extraordinarily preserved."[52] Within a few years, this sentiment was echoed at the highest level. Aleksandr Gerasimov, President of the USSR Academy of Artists, noted that the "classical column represents a fine mathematical calculation in terms of durability;" even though some may say that classical columns are archaic, he explained, "may we have more such 'archaism'!"[53] The supporting statement for architects Pavel Zinov'ev and Rudnev's 1954 design for the Pantheon stated: "analyzing the history of major monumental buildings of the past, we arrive at the conclusion that not only do the Pantheon's materials need to be chosen for the ability to withstand the ravages of time, but also the treatment of all forms – all the details, cornices, profiles, columns, capitals – must be dominated by the goal of structural longevity."[54]

Finally, a similar logic was in evidence with regards to the *mediums* of monumental art. Thus, for instance, as early as 1935 artists began publicly praising the perdurable qualities

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[51] Igor' Krestovskii, *Monumental'no-dekorativnaia skul'ptura. Tekhnika, tekhnologiia, restavratsiia* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1949), 3. At a 1946 SSA discussion of monuments and memorials, art historian Sergei Toropov expressed a similar idea on the value of studying historical monuments "for how their materials resist time, what their defects are, how one can counteract them, etc.," RGALI/674/2/185/23.
[52] RGALI/2943/1/352/12.
[53] Gerasimov, "A. M. Gerasimov," 154-155.
[54] RGAE/339/1/1196/133.

of mosaics.[55] And indeed, within a few years the practice of secular mosaics was restarted (after a century-long gap in Russian practice), being first implemented in "Maiakovskaia" station of the Moscow subway (1938).[56] In the supporting statement for his design, the Chief Architect of the station Dushkin explained the significance of the mosaic: "what is a mosaic? Cobalt glass, pieces of which are fixed on a cement base to create a picture, the colours of which do not fade. The mosaic is eternal!"[57] Noting their water-resistance in Roman baths, monumental artist Aleksandr Deineka (who designed "Maiakovskaia" station's mosaics) suggested using mosaics above and below water in Soviet swimming pools, in outdoor stadiums, and on public squares.[58] With the success of the "Maiakovskaia" mosaics widely touted, the medium, "conspicuous for its centuries-long permanence," was planned for the Palace of the Soviets where, as Frolov promised in one 1940 article, "the eternal material [would be employed] for highly-artistic portraits of [the] epoch's political functionaries and of important historical events."[59] This logic for using mosaics appears to have endured through to the end of the period: for instance, the chief engineers of the MGU Main Building (1953) praised the sixty-four mosaic portraits of scientists in the assembly hall as resistant to fading and warping, "unchanging in their original appearance for decades."[60]

One sees similar argumentation for reviving the use of outdoor and indoor frescoes, also championed by Deineka as able "to fix for a long time […] economic and cultural achievements"[61] The medium "lives for millennia," and artists of various epochs used

[55] Vladimir Frolov, "Mozaika v arkhitekture," *Arkhitketurnaia gazeta*, 8 February 1935, 3.
[56] Voronov notes that the use of "frescoes, mosaics, encaustic painting, murals" began in the mid-1930s, but does not interpret the significance of this development, Voronov, *Monumental'noe iskusstvo vchera i segodnia*, 9-10.
[57] Dushkin, "Iz poiasnitel'noi zapiski," 173.
[58] Aleksandr Deineka, "Khudozhniki v metro," *Iskusstvo*, no. 6 (1938): 80; also see Aleksandr Deineka, "Mozaika metro," *Tvorchestvo*, no. 11 (1938): 17.
[59] Vladimir Frolov, "Mozaika Dvortsa Sovetov," *Dvorets Sovetov*, 11 January 1940, 3; also see Vladimir Frolov, "Vozrozhdennoe iskusstvo," *Udarnik Metrostroia*, 6 July 1938, 3; Vladimir Frolov, "Prof. V. A. Frolov (Leningrad)," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 73.
[60] Voronkov and Balashov, *Dvorets nauki*, 162-163. Similar comments were made that same year regarding the mosaics at "Kievskaia-kol'tsevaia" metro station, RGALI/2943/1/1527/8, 68.
[61] Aleksandr Deineka, "K voprosu o monumental'nom iskusstve," *Iskusstvo*, no. 4 (1934): 4-5.

frescoes to tell epic stories, claimed the monumental artist Robert Genin. "With the passing of years, the fresco only gains in durability and [depth of] colour," and, thanks to the thin film of crystals coating the surface, "it may be cleaned, washed, and disinfected."[62] Not coincidentally, frescoes were at the forefront of the interior design of the Palace of Soviets. While mosaics and frescoes were the main artistic mediums dredged up from historical experience and revived by Soviet monumentalists, the same logic was also applied to Roman murals, sgraffito, tempera and encaustic painting, and tapestries – all held up for their exceptional durability.[63] Thus, sifting through history to discover perdurable materials, techniques, forms, and mediums in past practice biased Soviet monumental art towards historicism in significant ways.

3.3 The search for a trans-temporal language

Aside from ensuring the permanence of monumental constructions, "building for posterity" also required communicating in an artistic language that would remain understandable to future generations. As mentioned, extant interpretations frame Stalinism's search for a "timeless" style in terms of a utopian quest for perfection, or as the desire to demonstrate the immutability of the Stalinist order. This section argues, however, that what was equally at stake was the pursuit of a trans-temporal artistic language. Specifically, classicism and the Russian national style were seen as "perfect" embodiments of universal laws; they were also time-tested and were expected to remain familiar to people even in the

[62] Robert Genin, "Nastennaia zhivopis' i ee tekhnika," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 6 (1939): 26; also see Robert Genin, "O podgotovke k rospisi Dvortsa Sovetov," *Iskusstvo*, no. 4 (1939): 125. Also see N. Chernyshev's comments at a late-1932 meeting at the Moscow Artists' Club, RGALI/2932/1/99/8-9.
[63] Chernyshev, "O rabotakh nashikh monumentalistakh," 33-34; Boris Iofan and Vladimir Gel'freikh, "Nekotorye problemy stroitel'stva Dvortsa Sovetov," *Stroitel'stvo Moskvy*, no. 5 (1939): 7; S. Tavasiev, "Skul'ptor S. D. Tavasiev (Moskva)," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 72. For tapestries, see Aleksandr Deineka, "Zhivopis' v inter'ere," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 6 (1939): 25. For encaustic painting, see RGALI/2943/1/1527/43-44.

longue durée of cultural development. Because of their ostensible universality and attendant understandability to people past, present and future, "timeless" forms and styles represented the means rather than the end.

An idea shared widely by Stalinist monumentalists was the existence of universal principles and laws of art and architecture. This notion was in evidence throughout the 1930s, although it became formalized at an official level most notably in the postwar period (one of Zhdanov's seminal speeches focused on the immutable "artistic laws and norms" of musical development; this doctrine was duly expounded and transposed to other artistic mediums).[64] These immutable laws – understandable to all times and peoples – were claimed to have been embodied most perfectly in classical art and architecture (which, as was increasingly pointed out, also formed the basis of the Russian popular art tradition). Artist Nikolai Sokolov argued that classicism "retains the character of a norm and an unsurpassed model […] because it discovered objective truths."[65] Shchusev claimed that classical architecture "expresses a number of control criteria that remain valid," its laws being "immutable."[66] Studying classical structures would reveal "the highest wisdom, logic and tectonics of architectural construction," contended Zholtovskii.[67] The Russian popular style also demonstrated "amazing perfection," proclaimed Chechulin in 1947, as nationalist sentiment grew.[68]

The specific principles held up for emulation were copious and varied. In the mid-1930s, Deineka praised the "ideal balance between depth and flatness."[69] Art historian A. Zal'tsman claimed in 1940 that the idea of decreasing horizontal divisions with increasing

[64] Andrei Zhdanov, "Vystuplenie A. A. Zhdanova na soveshchanii deiatelei sovetskoi muzyki v TsK VKP(b) v ianvare 1948 g," in *Stalin i kosmopolity*, ed. O. Selin (Moscow: Algoritm, 2012 [1948]), 145.
[65] Nikolai Sokolov, "Klassika i sovremennost'," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 8 June 1945, 2.
[66] Respectively, RGALI/674/2/31/8-9, Aleksei Shchusev, "Klassiki i my," *Izvestiia*, 9 May 1937, 3.
[67] Ivan Zholtovskii, "O masterstve sovetskogo zodchego," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 29 June 1950, 3.
[68] Dmitrii Chechulin, "Stalinskii plan rekonstruktsii Moskvy v deistvii," *Pravda*, 19 August 1947, 2.
[69] Aleksandr Deineka, "K istorii monumental'noi zhivopisi Italii," in *Zhizn', iskusstvo, vremia: literaturno-khudozhestvennoe nasledie*, ed. Vladimir Sysoev (Leningrad: Khudozhnik RSFSR, 1974 [1936-1938]), 243-244.

vertical height found its "perfect expression in ancient Greece."[70] The principle of the golden ratio, which "acquired wide usage in architecture, beginning in ancient times" also had the "qualities of universality."[71] In 1954, art historian Anna Opochinskaia pointed to several "laws" revealed in the architecture of the Kremlin towers, laws which "could be an unending source of artistic development for Soviet architects in creating high-rise ensembles."[72]

The implications were clear: in seeking a trans-temporal language, Soviet monumental art and architecture was to be modeled on classicism (and its various iterations), as well as on its ultimate expression in the Russian national style, which had discovered and embodied universal artistic principles. Thus, for instance, one of the earliest Moscow subway stations, the "Palace of Soviets," (1935) was said to have retained its artistic value nearly two decades later "only due to its critical use of the laws of classical architecture."[73] In a 1939 article, Merkurov claimed that classicism strove to "maximal formal clarity and harmonious simplicity," which he aimed to reproduce in the gigantic Lenin and Stalin sculptures for the Moscow-Volga canal, "which were to be an eternal reminder and immortalize the memory of the two greatest people."[74]

What logic underlay declarations of classicism's and the Russian popular style's supposed perfection and universality? Fundamentally, these rested on claims of an essential *realism*. Socialist Realist doctrine claimed that aesthetics have an objective dimension, in so far as they (ought to) reflect material reality (namely, nature) and social reality. While the latter changes and corresponds to stages of socio-economic development, it was claimed, the former remains constant: the shapes of crystals, flowers, and trees, the rhythms of waves and

[70] A. Zal'tsman, "Tvorchestvo I. V. Zholtovskogo," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 5 (1940): 40-41.
[71] Ibid., 46. Similarly, Shchusev referred to classicism's flawless mastery of the laws of proportion, Shchusev, "Klassiki i my," 3; also see Zholtovskii, "Vospitanie zodchego," 2.
[72] Opochinskaia, "Ansambl' vysotnykh zdanii Moskvy," 62-63.
[73] Margarita Tosunova, "Razvitie arkhitekturnogo obraza Moskovskogo metropolitena" (Kandidat dissertation, Akademiia Arkhitektury SSSR, 1951), 124.
[74] Sergei Merkurov, "Mysli, menia vdokhnovivshye," *Oktiabr'*, no. 12 (1939): 82.

fluttering leaves, are always the same.[75] "Mimicry of nature was the central tenet of classical aesthetics," explained Zholtovskii in 1945; beauty and harmony was achieved by meticulous observation of it.[76] "Nobody has ever employed the laws of nature in architecture so beautifully as [the Greeks and Romans]," he claimed, although the Russian *narodnyi* style also expressed a deep understanding of "the laws of nature."[77] Secretary of the SSA Karo Alabian stated in 1938 that "a deep understanding of nature is characteristic of Russian architecture."[78] Gol'ts contended that employing "laws, as seen in nature" made the Parthenon, St. Basil's Cathedral, and the Kolomenskoe Palace "'eternal' archetypes."[79] According to this logic, it was the ability to capture perfectly the enduring features of nature that made art universal.

At points, the argument was extended into more dangerous territory – the claim that classicism and the Russian popular style also expressed something of universal *human* nature outside of its socio-economic context. Thus, for Shchusev, the laws of aesthetic mechanics were discovered in Greek classicism by way of "real observations of the properties of materials, of nature, and above all else, of man."[80] Classical principles "originating in human nature" include the basic laws of proportion, which are pleasant to the human eye, he claimed.[81] Zholtovskii too spoke about Greek classicism's expression of not only "the truth of nature" but also "the truth of human existence."[82] This made it truly "understandable to the masses" and "popular [*narodnoe*]" – a model particularly amenable to Soviet artists and architects building for future audiences.[83]

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[75] Aleksei Mikhailov, "O khudozhestvennom obraze v izobrazitel'nom iskusstve," *Iskusstvo*, no. 1 (1941): 15.
[76] Zholtovskii, "Vospitanie zodchego," 2.
[77] Ivan Zholtovskii, "Vospitanie mastera," *Izvestiia*, 14 May 1937, 3; Zholtovskii, "O masterstve sovetskogo zodchego," 3.
[78] Karo Alabian, "O russkoi arkhitekture," *Arkhitekturnaia gazeta*, 12 December 1938, 2.
[79] Georgii Gol'ts, "Ob ideinoski v arkhitekture," *Stroitel'naia gazeta*, 8 March 1940, 3.
[80] RGALI/674/2/31/10.
[81] Shchusev, "Klassiki i my," 3.
[82] Zholtovskii, "Traditsii narodnogo iskusstva," 4.
[83] Respectively, Aleksei Shchusev, "Za pervoe mesto v mire," *Arkhitekturnaia gazeta*, 3 June 1935, 3; Zholtovskii, "Vospitanie mastera arkhitektury," 3.

Yet Stalinist discourse went beyond endorsing "timeless" principles to upholding specific historical forms and styles. A. Tolstoi's aforementioned article commended ancient Greece for creating "forms which are in use even today," while head of the Directorate of Visual Arts of the KPDI SNK SSSR Viacheslav Shkvarikov referred in 1939 to the "ideal forms" of classicism.[84] That same year, architect Moisei Ginzburg listed the peristyle and peripteros as forms which had become firmly embedded in architectural practice and which could be called "universal."[85] During the War, Gabrichevskii contended that there existed certain forms "common to humanity, like, for example, a mound, stella, gravestone or sarcophagus, which in the most varied combinations can be found in all times and among all peoples."[86] Indeed, throughout the Stalinist period, Zholtovskii continued to work within the confines of the (Vitruvian and Palladian) classical order, while architect Ivan Fomin attempted to construct a "red Doric"/ "proletarian classical" hybrid style, believing that "classical architecture is the language understandable at all times and cultural eras, to all peoples."[87] It is therefore unsurprising that the sculptor Nikolai Tomskii believed that the art of the future would be inspired by, and rely on, the Greek classical legacy.[88]

Aside from holding up classical and national heritage as perfect and universal because of their embodiment of timeless laws, historical experience was also brought in as an additional argument (in a logic similar to that detailed in the previous section). Under this conception, why these styles were universal was unimportant. The crucial question was

[84] Tolstoi, "Poiski monumental'nosti," 2; Viacheslav Shkvarikov, "Planirovka i stroitel'stvo russkikh gorodov," in *Russkaia arkhitektura: doklady, prochitannye v sviazi s dekadnikom po russkoĭ arkhitekture v Moskve v aprele 1939 g,* ed. Viacheslav Shkvarnikov (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury SSSR, 1940), 15.
[85] Ginzburg, "Organicheskoe v arkhitekture i prirode," 76.
[86] Gabrichevskii, "Vvedenie k monografii," 306.
[87] Ivan Fomin, "Tvorcheskie puti sovetskoi arkhitektury i problema arkhitekturnogo nasledstva. I. A. Fomin," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 3-4 (1933): 15-16. See discussion of these two approaches in Selim Khan-Magomedov, *Ivan Zholtovskii* (Moscow: S. E. Gordeev, 2010), 93.
[88] Nikolai Tomskii, "Samoe chelovechnoe," *Khudozhnik*, no. 10 (1961): 29-30. Tomskii recollects saying this in a conversation with a colleague in the 1930s.

whether they, like granite, had withstood the test of time *in practice*. Because classical and national forms and styles *had* survived over the centuries, this proved their enduring vitality.

The crude version of the argument simply involved the assertion of this fact. Architects spoke of forms "tested by the centuries,"[89] "sustained by the centuries,"[90] and which had "survived several millennia."[91] Deineka, defending planar architectural decorations (of cornices, floors, and ceilings), contended that their use throughout history "confirmed the vitality of such mediums."[92] "For two thousand years architecture of various periods returned time and again to the extremely stable elements of Greek architecture," argued art historian Georgii Borisovskii in a 1946 article, "the order is a classic example of an architectural form, which existed for centuries and never lost its importance."[93] In a SSA conference on monumental architecture earlier that year, Toropov claimed that Russian monuments and memorials of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries "outlasted the centuries and we still admire the walls, the stone slabs […] which continue to live."[94]

Soviet art and architecture "building for posterity" was expected to mimic these time-hallowed forms and styles. At a 1938 MOSSKh meeting, a representative of the Palace of Soviets Construction Directorate proclaimed that aside from innovative art, the Palace required the "old, tried-and-true."[95] One 1940 book promised to "analyze [artistically-valuable constructions] and the reasons why this or that groups of constructions or a city as a whole became outstanding architectural monuments [and,] summing up this analysis, to

[89] TsGAM/534/1/108/255-268, Zholtovskii, "Vospitanie zodchego," 2.
[90] RGALI/674/2/31/9.
[91] Il'ia Golosov, "O bol'shoi arkhitekturnoi forme," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 5 (1933): 34.
[92] Aleksandr Deineka, "K voprosu o monumental'no-dekorativnoi zhivopisi," in *Monumental'no-dekorativnoe i dekorativno-prikladnoe iskusstvo. Trudy nauchnoi konferentsii Akademii khudozhestv SSSR po monumental'no-dekorativnomu i dekorativno-prikladnomu iskussve, sostoiavsheisia v Moskve 21-24 fevralia 1951 g*, ed. F. Fedorovskii (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii khudozhestv SSSR, 1951), 51.
[93] Georgii Borisovskii, "Narodnoe tvorchestvo, klassicheskii order i sovremennyi standart," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 13 (1946): 30.
[94] RGALI/674/2/185/22.
[95] RGALI/2943/1/187/18.

present conclusions applicable to city planning in the USSR."[96] At the aforementioned 1946 SSA conference, Toropov argued for studying types of graveside monuments "which have existed for many, many years but have not shown any changes to their form."[97] In perhaps one of the oddest examples of this logic, in the postwar period several studies attempted to deduce the "laws of proportion" from unabashedly selective samplings of classical and Russian national monuments and monumental constructions.[98]

A more nuanced logic also existed in parallel. Rather than asserting universality by reference to perfection, or simply the *fact* of its continued endurance and understandability, a more qualified argument pointed to *longue durée* patterns in the artistic language of Russian national culture (and the cultures of other Soviet nationalities). Allegedly, certain traditions had endured for hundreds of years, showing little change, and could be expected to last into the future. In this case too, therefore, historical experience was used to separate long-standing elements from chance fashions.

History was the litmus-test of superior forms, and popular traditions, their receptacle. In 1939, Ginzburg referred to popular art as "sets of artistic devices selected by generations upon generations of people as most appropriate," a "'natural selection' of artistic elements which become models."[99] As Sokolov claimed in 1945, "everything great continues to live not in academies, but in life, in the language and culture of peoples, including in the language of architectural representations."[100] Art historian Mikhail Tsapenko argued in 1952

[96] Andrei Bunin and Mariia Kruglova, *Arkhitekturnaia kompozitsiia gorodov* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury SSSR, 1940), 1.
[97] RGALI/674/2/185/22.
[98] Anna Barkhina, "Zdanie panoramy, kak pamiatnik v gorode-geroe" (Kandidat dissertation, Akademiia arkhitektury SSSR, 1949), 283; Bunin and Kruglova, *Arkhitekturnaia kompozitsiia gorodov*; Mariia Kruglova, *Monumenty v arkhitekture gorodov* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo literatury po stroitel'stvu i arkhitekture, 1952), 94-97; Tukanov, "Monumenty v sovetskom gradostroitel'stve," 163-174. One may also note that this logic (continued use proving universality) was not confined to the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is ironic that the results of the Palace of Soviets design competition caused the bourgeoisie and academicians in Western Europe "huge satisfaction to see that academic architecture is completely immortal," according to a December 1932 letter to the Union of Soviet Architects from Le Corbusier, RGALI/674/1/8/5.
[99] Ginzburg, "Organicheskoe v arkhitekture i prirode," 77.
[100] Sokolov, "Klassika i sovremennost'," 2.

that popular art creates realist representations and forms "because it gradually develops these based on the slow selection of the most reasonable."[101] One *Arkhitektura SSSR* editorial thereby encouraged Soviet architects to approach "old popular art with the yardstick of the present, and assess the monuments of old architecture by living, contemporary popular art."[102] The extension to this argument was that traditions which had already "stood the test of time" would continue to ensure the longevity of Soviet art modeled on them.

Although it was argued that classical forms were preserved in popular traditions, the logic implied that *narodnye* elements were closer and more understandable to their respective nation (although Russian national art, to be sure, was "especially close" to all Soviet people).[103] This mode of reasoning became more prevalent in the late 1930s. Thus, the eminent art historian David Arkin, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Academy of Architecture on September 16, 1947, proclaimed that "the Moscow Kremlin is our Acropolis, closer and dearer to us than all the marble temples and palaces of classical antiquity."[104] In general, however, this logic was used to restrict borrowings from other cultures, rather than from the classical tradition. For instance, sculptor Beatrisa Sandomirskaia was criticized at a 1936 meeting of the Moscow Section of the Union of Soviet Sculptors and Architects for employing "negro culture [sic]" in her work. "Sandomirskaia is not from Africa and therefore cannot understand negro culture," argued her colleague Dmitrii Shvarts."[105] Gabrichevskii's historical survey at the aforementioned 1946 SSA conference on monumental art ignored

[101] Mikhail Tsapenko, *O realisticheskikh osnovakh sovetskoi arkhitektury* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo literatury po stroitel'stvu i arkhitekture, 1952), 349.
[102] "Narodnoe tvorchestvo," 13.
[103] Alabian, "O russkoi arkhitekture," 2. Nevertheless, as art critic Mikhail Rzianin admitted, "each [Soviet] nationality, developing its architecture, socialist in content, national in form, looks firstly to its national heritage as native, close, and understandable," Mikhail Rzianin, "Ob osvoenii klassicheskogo nasledia v sovetskoi arkhitekture," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 12 (1952): 18.
[104] RGAE/293/1/212/29-30.
[105] RGALI/962/6/47/39.

"Far Eastern, Asian and American art, if only because the language of this art is too distant from us and its achievements did not make it deeply into our heritage."[106]

Nonetheless, this ever more ascendant logic revealed a developing tension between assertions of the supposed universality of classicism and the Russian national style, and the special proximity and understandability of popular traditions to their respective nations. This tension was not addressed at the time; but it does signal two important shifts: the growing salience of *nations* and *nationality* in the culture of late Stalinism (evidently linked to the rise of the National Bolshevik ideological hybrid), and the fact that the imagined "posterity" was increasingly thought of in national terms – as remaining Russian, Uzbek, etc. (the significance of which is explored in Chapter 6).

However that may be, trans-temporal popular styles, perfected through history, were judged an effective means of communication with posterity. As Shchusev proclaimed in 1940, new theatre houses "are tasked with describing our epoch in the coming centuries and should, undoubtedly, be marked with pronounced national architectural features."[107] In his 1952 monograph, Tsapenko argued that metro stations, high-rises, and other constructions arrived at their "representations and forms as consistent patterns from the contemporary development of the culture of Soviet socialist nations."[108] Furthermore, he added that such "truly national forms can only be those which are directed not towards the past, but to the present and *future*" [italics mine].[109] The supporting statement for Pavlov's 1954 design of the Pantheon argued that the building "cannot reflect the particular style of a short period of time […but] should be founded on Russian and Soviet traditions," which are more enduring.[110]

[106] RGALI/674/2/185/11-12.
[107] Aleksei Shchusev, "Natsional'naia forma v arkhitekture," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 10 (1940): 57.
[108] Tsapenko, *O realisticheskikh osnovakh*, 63.
[109] Ibid., 64.
[110] RGAE/339/1/1196/168.

The notion of the trans-temporal nature of classical and Russian national styles (due to their perfection, or because of their time-tested qualities) grew out of a fundamentally Eurocentric outlook. To an extent, this was simply a continuation of the prejudices of the Imperial Academies. Architects and artists of both pre- and post-Revolutionary generations had been trained on the examples of the European "greats," often being sent to France and Italy for apprenticeship, a practice which continued until the Great Patriotic War.[111] These experiences left a lasting impression and significantly influenced their subsequent work. "Michelangelo is my god," mused Mukhina in 1939, reminiscing about her visit to Italy twenty-five years earlier.[112] "The Greeks are higher than everyone," recorded Korin in his diary after a visit to the Vatican Museum in 1935.[113] The trips also affected Stalinist monumentalists' ideas about "universal" art. Thus, for instance, Merkurov wrote in 1939 of witnessing "the eternal achievements of human spirit" in the collections of the Louvre.[114] Also in the 1930s, Shchuko lobbied the government to continue to fund such study trips abroad, for "only [in Italy] can [young Soviet architects] study and verify all the secrets of architectural laws."[115] Similarly, at the first All-Union Congress of Soviet Architects in 1937, Shchusev argued that "Italian architecture teaches [the young architect] the art of true harmony between architecture and nature."[116]

There was another source for the valorization of the Italian classical tradition in particular. Paperny notes the significance of the decision in 1935 to send a Soviet delegation to Rome, at the invitation of the National Fascist Union of Architects (no architectural congresses had been attended for decade).[117] The Soviet Union was already an active

[111] Those who went abroad included such eminent Stalinist architects as Vladimir Shchuko, Chechulin, Gol'ts, and Iofan, the monumental artists Evgenii Lansere and Pavel Korin, and the sculptors Konenkov, Merkurov, Mukhina, and Ivan Shadr.
[112] Qtd. in Nikita Voronov, *Vera Mukhina* (Moscow: Izobrazitel'noe iskusstvo, 1989), 13.
[113] Qtd. in Sergei Razgonov, *Vysota: zhizn' i dela Pavla Korina* (Moscow: Sovetskiii khudozhnik, 1978), 67.
[114] Merkurov, "Mysli, menia vdokhnovivshye," 81.
[115] Vladimir Shchuko, "Tvorcheskii otchet," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 6 (1935): 19.
[116] RGALI/674/2/31/15.
[117] Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 31.

participant in the Venice Biennale (from 1924), a place where it "exchange[d] experience" with its Fascist counterparts.[118] After all, Fascist Italy was pioneering the monumental, stripped classical architectural style that was becoming dominant in interwar Europe.[119] Nazi Germany, to be sure, looked towards it as well, not least for it being, in the words of Hitler, "where Fascism immortalizes forces in monumental works."[120] Chapter 6 demonstrates that "immortalization" was a shared, transnational discourse; Italy's attempts at finding adequate stylistic expression for the impulse were at the forefront of Soviet attention.

Neither was the Marxist outlook of Stalinist leaders and cultural intelligentsia irrelevant. After all, Marxism proposed a narrative of global development spearheaded by Europe. The despotic East, by contrast, was mired in stasis and would, at best, passively emulate European trends; it was pointless to search for anything of universal value in its traditions.[121] Further, Marx himself allowed that "some of [art's] peaks by no means correspond to the general development of society [or] to the material substructure," and that the art of Ancient Greece "still give[s] us aesthetic pleasure and [is] in certain respects regarded as a standard and unattainable ideal."[122] A historiographic debate rages as to whether Bolsheviks represented a Westernizing influence by implanting Marxism in Russia. At least in the sphere of monumental art and architecture, Marxism appeared to aggravate an already Eurocentric view held by largely Westernized art and architecture professionals and cultural intelligentsia. Even if other cultures (India, China, and Meso-America) had powerful monumental traditions, they were consciously and subconsciously ignored; ideas about "timelessness" and "universality" were derived exclusively from the European canon.

[118] Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art*, 55.
[119] Franco Borsi even goes so far as to label the entire movement "the Novecento style" (after one of the Italian schools), Franco Borsi, *The Monumental Era: European Architecture and Design, 1929-1939* (New York: Rizzoli, 1987).
[120] Qtd. in Thomas Friedrich, *Hitler's Berlin: Abused City*, trans. Stewart Spencer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 227; also see Scobie, *Hitler's State Architecture*.
[121] See Castillo, "Soviet Orientalism: Socialist Realism and Built Tradition," 34-35.
[122] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *On Literature and Art* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), 82-84.

3.4 Conclusion

To be sure, as with all revivalism, Stalinist historicism presented only attenuated versions of historical styles. The contradiction between contemporary needs and functions, locked in to historical forms, was never overcome. Historical styles were never designed for modern constructions (canal locks, dams, high-rises, and metro stations); Stalinist monumentalism merely embellished these objects, to a greater or lesser extent, with decoration (such as "Maiakovskaia" station's mosaics) and formal elements (such as non-loadbearing classical columns). In this way, the Stalinist use of classicism and *narodnye* styles bordered on kitsch, merely borrowing their formal vocabulary, rather than systems of proportions and harmony (all this despite widespread, mendacious protestations that Stalinist architecture was doing the exact opposite – assimilating the principles but rejecting the forms). This is quite aside from the complete sidelining of the values and ideals undergirding historical styles. Stalinist monumentalists, for instance, did not engage in what Pamela Davidson describes as the "artist's immersion in a fertile climate of ideas linked to the classical revival" widespread during the neoclassical turn in late Imperial Russia.[123] Aside from its uses as a trans-temporal artistic language, Stalinist historicism was also connected to the "regime's wish to be identified with images of imperial greatness."[124]

At rare points throughout the Stalin period, this state of affairs attracted criticism. One 1937 editorial in *Arkhitektura SSSR* attacked the projects of architecture graduate students for near-universally "covering contemporary buildings with 'ancient moss', embellishing them with massive, heavy forms, which could be associated only with ancient monuments – proto-Doric temples, Roman baths, and even the cyclopean constructions of Piranesi's

[123] Pamela Davidson, *Cultural Memory and Survival: The Russian Renaissance of Classical Antiquity in the Twentieth Century* (London: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, UCL, 2009), 5.
[124] Ibid., 17.

imagination."[125] Wartime monument designs were criticized as reconstructions "of never-existing ancient monuments […] perceived through the prism of bookish understandings of classical antiquity."[126] In a 1946 *Arkhitektura SSSR* editorial, postwar urban reconstruction plans were censured for their "inability to match the proposed concrete forms of planning and building the city with the real conditions of construction and the nature of the cities being restored […] the lack of scale, the abstractness of the projected ensembles and individual buildings, the loss of a sense of proportion, [and] the penchant for external effects."[127] Nonetheless, while the problem was periodically evoked, no solutions were forthcoming.

To be sure, the Stalinist monumental style was not an isolated phenomenon but paralleled the global rise of stripped classicism in the interwar period.[128] For art historian Barbara Miller Lane, such

> resemblances among public buildings in almost every Western country during the 1930s and 1940s were […] spurred by similar underlying political and social needs. These were depression years in every Western country. Each government felt the need to assure its citizens of its strength and durability, and each wanted a building style which was both modern and somehow old. Each government also appreciated a building style which seemed both universal and national.[129]

[125] "O nekotorykh tendentsiiakh v nashei arkhitekturnoi shkole," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 4 (1937): 2.
[126] Arkin, "Monumenty geroiam," 5.
[127] "Zhiznennye zadachi arkhitekturnoi praktiki," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 13 (1946): 1.
[128] Several historians likewise attest to broad similarities between Stalinist and global architectural/ artistic practice, see Brittany Bryant, "Reassessing Stripped Classicism within the Narrative of International Modernism" (MA thesis, Savannah College of Art, 2011), 219; Frampton, *Modern Architecture*, 219; Dietmar Schirmer, "State, Volk, and Monumental Architecture in Nazi-Era Berlin," in *Berlin-Washington, 1800–2000: Capital Cities, Cultural Representation, and National Identities*, ed. Andreas Daum and Chistof Mauch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 128.
[129] Lane, "Architects in Power," 307. Similarly, Brittany Bryant argues that disparate countries were "driven by similar political aspirations, the reestablishment of the nation following the total devastation of World War I and the challenges presented by the international economic depression of the 1930s [in the revival of stripped classicism]. Stripped classicism served this end and each nation could identify with its historic connections […] The underlying aspiration of each nation was to create a connection to the great empires of Greece and Rome that had lasted for centuries and whose architectural monuments had stood the test of time," Bryant, "Reassessing Stripped Classicism," 59; also see Borsi, *The Monumental Era*, 196.

On first glance, this observation may call into question the salience of "immortalization" to the development of Stalinist historicism. Lane warns that "historians cannot necessarily believe what the architect himself has said about his work, or what his patrons say about it either," but must look for common determinants in the rise of a global style.[130] However, as I argue in Chapter 6, such common determinant *did* exist, and the "immortalization" myth *was* essentially shared (although it was particularly pronounced in the Stalinist Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy). There is, furthermore, presumptive evidence that "immortalization" predisposed architects and artists to historicism in contexts outside the Stalinist Soviet Union. For instance, Charles Holden, the architect of the Senate House of the University of London (built at the same time as the Palace of Soviets' construction was taking off), "wanted the building to last 500 years, and to insure its perdurability, he largely ignored novel building technologies and employed stone loadbearing walls."[131] Similarly, according to art historian William Rhoads, "the future was important to [the US President Franklin] Roosevelt. He was concerned that new buildings which he sponsored be durable – not only in materials and construction but also in taste. He wished to avoid anything which […] was a passing fashion," promoting the stripped classical style for all Washington government buildings, as well as for others constructed by the New Deal "Public Works Administration."[132] Seen in this light, the oft-noted dominance of neoclassicism in interwar monuments and monumental architecture is perhaps not coincidental.

As this chapter demonstrated, the goal of perdurable construction, as well as the search for a trans-temporal artistic language, significantly biased Stalinist monumentalism in

[130] Lane, "Architects in Power," 309.
[131] Stern, *Modern Classicism*, 35.
[132] William Rhoads, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and Washington Architecture," *Records of the Columbia Historical Society* 52 (1989): 162. In fact, Edwin Heathcote goes so far as to claim that while "grand neoclassicism was almost universal during this period […] its ultimate achievement was not to be seen in Berlin, Rome or Moscow but in Washington DC, the only major capital city which is conceived as a huge monument to a man and an ideal," Edwin Heathcote, *Monument Builders: Modern Architecture and Death* (Chichester: Academy Editions, 1999), 47.

favour of historicism (which it heavily manifested in practice, despite protestations to the contrary). Materials, construction techniques, forms, and mediums which had, in retrospect, remained physically unaltered were employed in "building for posterity." Classicism and Russian *narodnye* traditions were held up for emulation due to their alleged "timeless" perfection and their continual usage throughout the ages. Thus, the embrace of historicism was not past-oriented and did not represent a capitulation to "backwards" tastes. Rather, the "immortalization" goal helps to explain what seems paradoxical on first impression: Stalinism's future-oriented use of historicism (and, possibly, the similar use of historicism in the monumental practices of interwar Western architecture). Nonetheless, as the next chapter demonstrates, a heavy reliance on the past threw up its own set of problems in crafting monuments for a future audience.

4.0 The problem of distinction and the problem of relevance

Communicating with posterity required not only a transtemporal language, but one which would distinguish monumental art and architecture as specifically Stalinist. After all, the point of "immortalization" was not (only) communication with posterity *as such*, but also the memorialization of specific individuals and events of the era. Furthermore, "immortalization" demanded that monumental objects be constructed in a way that would remain revelant and interesting to posterity, rather than appearing boring, stuffy, or antiquated. As this chapter demonstrates, Stalinist urban planners, architects, and artists recognized these problems and developed various solutions, primarily during the War and into the postwar period (as the "immortalization" program became central and began to be discussed in earnest). Solutions to the problem of distinguishing stylized Stalinist constructions from their historical antecedents included: the insertion of representations of contemporary objects (such as clothing and weaponry); a reliance on written inscriptions; a synthetic approach to monumental constructions; and a penchant for superior size and central positioning in urban *ensembles*. These distinctions were especially important as heritage objects (whose style Stalinist monuments were supposed to mimic) were themselves undergoing extensive restoration and reconstruction in the same period. At the same time, an emotionally-charged romanticism and laconic renderings were expected to make Stalinist monumental constructions relevant and eye-catching to posterity. Aside from interpreting these artistic practices from the standpoint of the logic of "immortalization," the chapter also demonstrates that these two goals – distinction and enduring relevance – were often in tension with one another. I argue that the development of Stalinist monumentalism revolved around this distinction-relevance axis to a significant extent.

4.1 The problem of distinction

From the perspective of "immortalization" goals, the historicism of Stalinist art and architecture was not without drawbacks. One central question revolved around the problem of distinction: how would posterity distinguish Stalinist constructions from past heritage? This problem was evoked vividly at the very beginning of the period, in an anonymous worker's visitor-book entry from a 1932-1933 exhibition showcasing designs of the Palace of Soviets:

> Unfortunately, […] most of [the designs] are constructed in the old-fashioned way, only touched-up with a few contemporary features, such projects can not perpetuate the memory of the start of the construction of socialist society […] and therefore I do not think that the Palace of Soviets should be the way many authors think it should. Its task is to tell posterity without words, without a book, about the struggle of two worlds, about those heroes on whom fell such a glorious responsibility of steadfastly guarding the achievements of October, so that in the future every person, young and old, could immediately understand in honour of what it was built and who built it, and in what heated struggle it was constructed.[1]

When Iofan's design was pronounced the winner, a similar visitor-book entry denounced it as "greatly reminiscent of the Tower of Babel, one in which, as a historic monument to socialism, there is nothing new."[2] This criticism was echoed, more diplomatically, in an article by Vesnin (who was soon forced to abandon his constructivist creeds): "the Palace of the Soviets should be a monument to our great epoch. The language of classical forms, however one deploys it, is the language of the past, it must not be used to express the present."[3]

[1] TsGAM/694/1/29/58.
[2] TsGAM/694/1/44/81.
[3] Viktor Vesnin, "Iazyk epokhi," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 15 March 1932, 1.

As the retrospectivist turn only deepened in the following decades, along with the goal of "immortalizing" the present, such criticism hardly abated. Thus, for instance, a group of wartime designs for a Pantheon of Heroes were censured on the pages of *Arkhitektura SSSR*, it being "hard to see representations […] of contemporary heroism […] essentially, these proposed monuments could apply to any heroic event of the past, to any historical situation."[4] Designs for triumphal arches came under similar criticism at the 1946 SSA conference on monumental art, as not reflecting contemporary events, namely, victory in the Great Patriotic War.[5] At the conference, art historian and delegate Mikhail Il'in also claimed that classical obelisks "can relate to any historical event," and that "something must be done to make columns our own, Soviet, contemporary, not evoking uneccessary associations."[6]

Ironically, this meant that "universal," "trans-temporal" aesthetics (which, as the previous chapter demonstrated, were in practice an eclectic historicism), while necessary for communicating with posterity, could also be attacked, and not only for being antiquated. Indeed, the charge of "timelessness" was a major criticism directed at several postwar city reconstruction plans.[7] At this time, for example, the monumental artist Lev Bruni was censured not only for ignoring national features in his art, but also for "timelessness" (*vnevremennost'*); his art demonstrated only a "general kind of beauty" (*krasivoe voobshche*) that did not express anything about its specific historical context.[8] Alabian lamented that "Roman triumphal arcs, Egyptian obelisks and pyramids, Gothic spires, etc. have become ubiquitous, their only function being to dress up the great feelings of the Soviet people in the uneccessary clothing of the past."[9] Rudnev's aforementioned idea of having the MGU Main

[4] Arkin, "Monumenty geroiam," 4.
[5] RGALI/674/2/185/66.
[6] RGALI/674/2/185/32-33.
[7] "Zhiznennye zadachi arkhitekturnoi praktiki," 1.
[8] Osip Beskin, "O monumental'nom iskusstve," *Iskusstvo*, no. 1 (1939): 71.
[9] Karo Alabian, "Aktual'nye voprosy arkhitekturnogo tvorchestva," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 25 October 1946, 2. A similar statement was enshrined in the "Resolution" of the Presidium of the SSA, see Soiuz Sovetskikh Arkhitektorov, *Tvorcheskie voprosy sovetskoi arkhitektury i zadachi Soiuza sovetskikh arkhitektorov. Postanovlenie Prezidiuma Sovetskikh arkhitektorov SSSR 23 oktiabria 1946 goda* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo

Building's "Eternal Youth of Science" sculptures appear ageless was criticized for being "absolutely abstracted" from the concrete, present historical situation.[10] The problem of being at once timeless and expressive of contempary content was perfectly encapsulated in Chechulin's criticism of one residential building: "it would be advisable that this building be sufficiently contemporary, and that it never go out of fashion."[11]

These criticisms did not, however, represent a real debate about the virtues and drawbacks of historicism, but rather reflected the plasticisty of Stalinist discourse, which seemingly "resolved" internal contradictions by denouncing the problems (and, sometimes, the wreckers who had caused them). Officially, architects should have been working towards a uniquely Soviet style of architecture, one which would utilize heritage only discriminately (*kritichno*) and indirectly. Thus, the SSA called for finding new, unique forms for "immortalizing" victory in the Great Patriotic War, rather than using old ones.[12] Nonetheless, it was openly admitted that this new style had yet to be developed. As late as 1948, architect Zinovii Rozenfel'd confessed that "we do not have a clear, fully-formed Soviet architectural style"; in employing classical and Russian national heritage, Soviet architects should at least make sure that this architecture "have something contemporary."[13] Solutions to finding this "something" are the subject of the remainder of this section.

One means of adding specificity to what was being memorialized were contemporary props, which involved depicting "immortalized" individuals with contemporary clothing, power tools, vehicles, weapons, and other attributes specific to the time. "Historical concreteness" was, of course, a general requirement of Socialist Realism; props were thought

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Akademii arkhitektury SSSR, 1946), 12-13. Also see Karo Alabian, "Arkhitekturnaia praktika v svete reshenii TsK VKP(b) o literature i iskusstve," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 14 (1947): 4.

[10] RGALI/2943/1/2222/63.

[11] TsGAM/534/1/110/153. Intriguingly, this very tension (being distinct and recognizable to posterity) was also manifest in the Nazi Germany's contradictory attitude towards modernism, see Barbara Miller Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918-1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 189, 214.

[12] Arkhitektorov, *Tvorcheskie voprosy*, 12; Alabian, "Arkhitekturnaia praktika," 4.

[13] TsGAM/534/1/132/18.

to deepen such semantic content.[14] Thus, for instance, Mukhina reminisced that the state commission approving her "Worker and Kolkhoz Woman" sculpture for the Soviet pavilion at the 1937 Paris Expo required her to "clothe" her previously naked subjects. "That will make it clear that he is a worker," the commission's representive supposedly explained.[15]

To be sure, there was hostility towards depicting the nude body in a general atmosphere of "prudery and anti-eroticism" (sex being viewed as a distraction), which dominated after the 1934 ban on pornography.[16] Although this restriction was not comprehensive (nudes were permitted to demonstrate the advantages of hygiene and sport), there was "less scope for sculpture, usually located in urban settings, to create or be seen in a narrative context in which nudity might be presented as materially logical or plausible," summarizes art historian Pat Simpson.[17] A contrasting position is presented by Mikhail Zolotonosov, whose analysis of Moscow's Gor'kii Park sculpture reveals the prominence of nude representations (as well as implicit sexual references in some sculptures), which generated "sexual affect and energy […and] channeled [it] into childbirth [and] labour."[18]

However that may be, nudity in sculpture was not a "closed question," and was discussed to some extent throughout the Stalinist period, including in its relation to "immortalization" (which nude representations were thought to hamper). Clothes and drapery

[14] Manizer, *Skul'ptor o svoei rabote. Tom 2*, 38.
[15] Vera Mukhina, "'Rabochii i kolkhoznitsa': Otryvok iz ustnykh vospominanii V. I. Mukhinoi, zapisannykh v 1939-1940 godakh, zapisannykh pisateliami L. Toom i A. Bekom," *Iskusstvo*, no. 8 (1957): 36. The same appears to have happened at a 1951 meeting of the KPDI SM SSSR, in which it was decided that Mukhina's brigade should "work on the clothing of the figures [for the monument "Young Transformers of Nature" for Moscow State University, for] it is necessary to find costumes, characteristic of our epoch," TsGAM/694/1/697/82, RGALI/2458/1/454/26. Although Mukhina was forced to comply, she generally opposed the use of props, see discussion in Section 4.2.
[16] Pat Simpson, "The Nude in Soviet Socialist Realism: Eugenics and Images of the New Person in the 1920s-1940s," *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Art* 5, no. 1 (2004): 118-119.
[17] Ibid., 129; also see Susan Reid, "In the Name of the People: The Manège Affair Revisited," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 6, no. 4 (2006): 706-709. Artistic representations of nudity, moreover, became less acceptable in the 1930s due to their associations with eugenics (and the fascist politics they came to imply), Pat Simpson, "The New Person's Body: Drapery and Disclosure in Stalinist Monumental Sculpture 1937-44," *Sculpture Journal* 15, no. 1 (2006): 46-48.
[18] Mikhail Zolotonosov, *Gliptokratos. Issledovanie nemogo diskursa: annotirovannyi katalog sadovo-parkovoi skul'ptury stalinskogo vremeni* (St. Petersburg: Inopress, 1999), 8.

"express the style of the [given] epoch," argued Merkurov.[19] However, these had to be contemporary; Manizer criticized "timeless clothing."[20] By contrast, in Nazi Germany, "nudity was considered to be the most effective sign of that eternal character [of the Aryan genius…] lifting the image of the community out of any concrete historical temporality that would inevitably be conferred upon it by clothing" – an effect which Stalinist art, pursuing "immortalization," expressly sought to avoid.[21]

Along with clothing, other props were also expected to add historical specificity. The sculptor Evgenii Vuchetich and the architect Iakov Belopol'skii argued these can "help transmit the spirit of the epoch."[22] In early 1944, a KPDI SNK SSSR memo recommended the construction of monuments and monumental constructions into which "authentic contemporary weaponry, made from eternal materials, would be inserted."[23] When reviewing models of monuments, expert commissions frequently recommended insertions of such props. At a 1939 discussion of a memorial plaque dedicated to Chkalov, the sculptor Dmitrii Tsaplin suggested shaping the plaque in the form of a plane. "Even if time erases [the inscription], they will still see the silhouette and will learn who Chkalov was."[24] Similarly, in early 1948, a committee discussing the pedestal for the Chkalov monument agreed that his achievements must be somehow evoked visually in it, either by a map or a mosaic depicting his feats.[25] Discussing the graveside monument for the sculptor Nikolai Andreev, the expert commission recommended props at several stages of the review; these would "make it

[19] This remark is dated to the 1940s, Merkurov, *Vospominania. Pis'ma. Stat'i*, 340.
[20] Matvei Manizer, *Skul'ptor o svoei rabote. Tom 1* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1940), 36. Conversely, in a bout of self-criticism, Manizer later confessed that his nudes lacked "historical concreteness," Manizer, *Skul'ptor o svoei rabote. Tom 2*, 38.
[21] Michaud, *The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany*, 119.
[22] Evgenii Vuchetich and Iakov Belopol'skii, "Pamiatnik general-leitenantu Efremovu," *Iskusstvo*, no. 3 (1947): 29.
[23] RGALI/962/6/1402/8.
[24] RGALI/2942/1/139/29.
[25] TsGAM/534/1/131/274-276.

evident that this is a sculptor [and would] express the epoch, express Andreev," as well as "underscore the role, meaning, and tenor [of the monument]."[26]

"Synthesis" was posited as another solution to the problem of distinction. In the theory and practice of Stalinist art, synthesis referred to uniting the efforts of architects, artists, and sculptors (this ideal was also voiced by the Bauhaus movement at the time).[27] Rather than simply "decorating" a finished architectural construction, sculpture and monumental art was placed on an equal footing with architecture in formulating the concept and drafting the design. The aims of synthesis were multifaceted, not all related to the problems of "immortalization." Above all, synthesis sought to heighten the emotional/ agitational appeal of art. N. Chernyshev explained: "if we understand synthesis as a combination of different kinds of art in a single complex, to enhance the ideological and artistic impact on the viewer, the mutual influence of several art forms increases not as a sum of parts but grows in a geometric progression. This is the whole force and justification of synthesis."[28] Further, using the more obviously semantic representations available to visual art, synthesis made architectural construction more "close and understandable to the wider masses."[29] Relatedly, this also allowed for a more exhaustive, "full and multifaceted" development of a given artistic theme.[30] Most importantly for the purposes of "immortalization," the figurative capacities of synthetic works added (historical) specificities.

[26] RGALI/2458/2/1534/32, 34, RGALI/2458/2/1527/186-187.
[27] This idea was related to the concept of *Gesamtkunstwerk*, or "total work art." However, in scholarship, *Gesamtkunstwerk* is typically used to refer to the simultaneous politicization of art and aestheticization of politics under totalitarian regimes, see Groys, *The Total Art of Stalinism*; Gunther, "Totalitarnoe gosudarstvo kak sintez iskusstv."
[28] Nikolai Chernyshev, "Mastera iskusstva o Moskovskom metro," *Iskusstvo*, no. 4 (1935): 27; also see Grigorii Zakharov, "Arkhitekturnyi ansambl' v zastroike gorogov. Doklad sekretaria Pravleniia Soiuza sovetskikh arkhitektorov SSSR G. A. Zakharova," in *Arkhitekturnyi ansambl' v stroitel'stve gorodov: Materialy XIV plenuma Pravl. Soiuza sovetskikh arkhitektorov SSSR (2-5 iiunia 1952 g.)*, ed. G. Morozova (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo literatury po stroitel'stvu i arkhitekture, 1952), 16.
[29] Boris Iofan, "O novatorstve v arkhitekture," *Stroitel'naia gazeta*, 24 May 1940, 2. Thus, for instance, the Palace of the Soviets was called a "grandiose symphony of mute stone," which sculpture would "animate," Boris Korolev, "Skul'ptura Dvortsa Dovetov. Gruppy i barel'efy," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 6 (1939): 18.
[30] Viktor Vesnin, "Dvorets Sovetov i sotrudnichestvo iskusstv. Vstupitel'noe slovo akademika arkhitektury V. A. Vesnina," in *Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 5.

As art historian I. Sosfenov explained, even though architectural constructions "become the main witness to one's epoch in subsequent centuries […] the content of an architectural representation is highly circumscribed." Architects, he went on, "turn to art and sculpture [for] at the heart of synthesis […] is the desire for development and specification of the ideal and representational content of architecture."[31] This "representational content" was the subject of "immortalization," for which synthesis was indispensable.

Synthesis, it was argued, was largely what *made* architectural constructions into monuments. As art historian Margarita Tosunova noted in 1952, Moscow's metro stations of the first phase of construction were representationally indistinct, and only those of the third, wartime phase became specific through the use of synthesis. It was only through this greater specificity that these stations "wholly reflected reality [and became] monuments to great historical events."[32] "Confident and clear architecture, supplemented by eloquent, heroic statuary, bas-reliefs, multicoloured mosaics, [made the wartime stations] epically expressive monuments to the epoch," seconded her colleague Iakov Kornfel'd.[33] As Arkin stated, "the synthetic unification of art is necessary for the most complete, comprehensive coverage and realistic representation of an artistic idea, with a large field of action [throughout] time."[34]

Although there were precursors to synthesis in the artistic practice of the 1920s, Silina argues that it began to be conceptualized explicitly only with the launching of the Palace of Soviets design competition.[35] Indeed, one finds evidence that synthesis here was posited specifically as a solution to the "problem of distinction." As Iofan himself stated, the "subjects of sculptural groups and bas-reliefs reveal the Palace of Soviets as a monument to

[31] I. Sosfenov, "Problema sinteza v metro. Sintez v oformlenii stantsii 'Ploshchad' revoliutsii' Moskovskogo metro," *Iskusstvo*, no. 2 (1938): 29-30.
[32] Margarita Tosunova, "Arkhitekturnyi obraz stantsii Moskovskogo metropolitena," *Sovetskaia arkhitektura. Ezhegodnik*, no. 3 (1952): 10-11.
[33] Kornfel'd, *Laureaty Stalinskoi premii v arkhitekture*, 83.
[34] David Arkin, "Arkhitektura i problema sinteza iskusstv," in *Voprosy sinteza iskusstv. Materialy pervogo tvorcheskogo soveshchania arkhitektorov, skul'ptorov i zhivopistsev (o kadrakh khudozhnikov-monumentalistov)*, ed. M. Zhitomirskii (Moscow: IZOGIZ, 1936), 10.
[35] Silina, *Istoriia i ideologiia*, 105.

the Great October Socialist Revolution, a monument of the Stalin era."[36] Art historian Boris Ternovets, referring in 1939 to the several kilometers (sic) of planned sculptural friezes around the base of the Palace of Soviets, waxed lyrical: "in this monumental chronicle [the sculptor] can tell of the epic events of the Lenin-Stalin epoch." He envisioned a chronological recounting of key episodes, which would, like the great monuments of the past, be "full of internal meaning, unpacking the deep ideational content of the monument [and] the worldview of its epoch."[37] Indeed, according to 1939 projections, the Palace was to have 31 500 m^2 of wall paintings, 3 800 m^2 of mosaics, 4 800 m^2 of majolica, 11 000 m^2 of interior bas-reliefs, 72 large sculptures, 650 busts and smaller sculptures, and 19 monumental sculptural groups standing 10-14 metres tall.[38] Thus, in the words of monumental artist Evgenii Lansere, "the greatest synthesis of architecture, technology and fine arts" would be harnessed to "tell future generations about [this] great time, about the building of communism, about the indestructible power of the teachings of Lenin and Stalin."[39]

Beginning in the mid-1930s, with the launch of the Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow, "synthesis" became official doctrine. In 1935, for instance, the Architecture Institute opened a Workshop of Monumental Art under its auspices (it was transferred to the Academy of Architecture in 1938). Nonetheless, according to Russian art historian Tat'iana Astrakhantseva, architects, artists and sculptors began working on a truly equal footing only in the postwar era.[40] Voronov argues that by the tail end of the period, the previous preponderance of architecture was fully reversed, with sculpture now "dominant, while the

[36] Boris Iofan, "Stroitel'stvo Dvortsa Sovetov i sodruzhestvo iskusstv. Doklad akademika arkhitekury B. M. Iofana," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 12.
[37] Boris Ternovets, "Zadachi skul'ptury," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 6 (1939): 21; also see Korolev, "Skul'ptura Dvortsa Dovetov," 19.
[38] Evgenii Lansere, "Monumental'naia zhivopis'," *Izvestiia*, 30 June 1939, 3; Iofan, "Stroitel'stvo Dvortsa Sovetov," 20.
[39] Lansere, "Monumental'naia zhivopis'," 3.
[40] Tat'iana Astrakhantseva, "Stil' 'Pobeda' v dekorativno-ornamental'nom iskusstve 1940-1950-kh godov: k probleme definitsii v sovetskom iskusstve stalinskoi epokhi," in *Arkhitektura Stalinskoi epokhi: opyt istoricheskogo osmysleniia*, ed. Iulia Kosenkova (Moscow: KomKniga, 2010), 145.

[architectural] construction itself became something of a secondary detail of the gigantic monument."[41] This development can be seen clearly in the evolution of the Moscow subway: as noted above, stations of the first phase of construction eschewed sculpture or monumental art (with the exception of "Komsomol'skaia" station's majolica panels). Stations of the second phase of construction, unveiled in the late-1930s, saw important experiments with mosaics (for instance, at "Maiakovskaia" station), sculpture ("Ploshchad' Revolutsii" station), and other mediums of monumental art. Stations built during the third, wartime phase developed synthesis further, while stations of the fourth phase of construction overflowed with sculpture, decorative art, mosaics, and other visual art at a level later branded "excessive."[42] Nonetheless, however pronounced synthesis became in the final years of the period, one sees it employed in at least a nascent form in nearly all Stalinist monumental constructions from the 1930s onwards (in canal systems, public buildings, and others infrastructure), and particularly in objects "immortalizing" the era and its leaders.

Yet another solution to the "problem of distinction" involved imparting specific meaning to monuments through the written word. In some sense, this was expressive of the general logocentrism of Stalinist culture.[43] According to Ikonnikov and Paperny, this logocentrism became an important feature of architecture from the early 1930s. "Architecture [...] was forced to search for semiotic-symbolic analogues to verbal rhetoric, to 'struggle for embodying in the language of architecture the great slogans of our epoch.'"[44] Indeed, the belief that the word was the most clear and understandable medium of communication with the masses – contemporary or future – appears to have been axiomatic for monumental art

[41] Nikita Voronov, *Sovetskaia monumental'naia skul'ptura* (Moscow: Znanie, 1976), 7.
[42] As Makarova muses with the regards to the "excessive" architecture of the 1954 VSKhV: "'excess', if we consider the exhibition as a 'monument to the epoch,' was not excessive. The 'memorial' program itself presupposed an extremely detailed narrative," which was to be expressed through synthetic representations, Makarova, "'Pamiatniki epokhi' v sovetskoi arkhitekture," 37.
[43] See Clark, *Moscow as Fourth Rome*.
[44] Ikonnikov, *Arkhitektura XX veka*, 405; also see Ikonnikov, *Utopicheskoe myshlenie i arkhitektura*, 388-389; Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 175-190.

and architecture.[45] In the face of the "problem of distinction," words allowed for specifying otherwise nondescript historicist monuments and imparting particular content about the individuals and events that they "immortalized." Thus, as a 1950 dissertation on Great Patriotic War monuments (the first systematic study of these in the Soviet Union) explained:

> It is evident that epitaphs and memorial inscriptions on monuments to the Patriotic War play a large and important role in […] more fully representing the heroes of the Patriotic War or reporting specific information about historical events to which this or that monument is dedicated. It is difficult to overestimate the […] purely historical importance of these epitaphs and inscriptions that immortalize on stone tablets the details of events and individuals' statements.[46]

This logic suggested that if monuments themselves were insufficiently clear or specific, words "inscribed on stone […] will tell posterity of the heroic struggle of the peoples of the USSR."[47]

In practice as well, Stalinist monumental constructions were suffused with words. Passages from the Constitution of 1936, for instance, were planned on a wide scale for the Palace of the Soviets,[48] and found their way into "Izmailovskaia" metro station and the tower of the MGU Main Building. Texts of the national anthem adorned the "Ploshchad' Revoliutsii," "Kievskaia-Kol'tsevaia," and "Kaluzhskaia" metro stations.[49] As mentioned, each of the wartime stations bore the memorial plaque "Constructed in the days of the Great Patriotic War." The wartime "Triumph of Victory" monument was a veritable billboard, displaying four lengthy slogans proclaimed by the Central Committee on the 25th

[45] I focus here more on the use of words proper in Stalinist monumentalism, rather than "word-like" sculpture and architecture, which was also in evidence.
[46] Zmeul, "Arkhitektura pamiatnikov," 233, 282.
[47] Il'ia Katsen and Konstantin Ryzhkov, *Moskovskii Metropoliten* (Moscow: Izdatel' stvo Akademii Arkhitektury SSSR, 1948), 15.
[48] RGAE/552/1/164.
[49] Zinov'ev, *Stalinskoe metro*, 203-204.

Anniversary of the October Revolution and on the 25th and 26th Anniversaries of the Red Army. Quotes from Stalin's speeches were found in "Komsomol'skaia-kol'tsevaia" station,[50] in the gallery of the MGU Main Building,[51] and were planned for the Hall of the Stalin Constitution in the Palace of Soviets.[52] Perhaps the most vivid example of logocentrism was the Volga-Don Canal, explicitly intended as a means of "immortalizing" events of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars. Nearly every canal lock, monument, triumphal arc, bust, obelisk and other commemorative object had a supporting textual inscription (usually connected, in some way, to Stalin), ratified at the highest levels by a SM SSSR decree.[53] Finally, the practice of labeling artwork, to aid in its reading, also gained currency. At a 1953 meeting discussing the design of "Kievskaia-kol'tsevaia" metro station, it was stated that "there must be a text inscribed on marble […] we had a discussion on how to make a painting understandable. As [Il'ia Repin's] "Zaporozhtsy" is understandable with its inscription; even Michelangelo's monumental paintings have all the prophets labeled, to avoid any mistakes."[54]

More radical proposals for integrating words into monuments and monumental architecture abounded. The design of monuments to Twice-Heroes of the Soviet Union, which featured a plaque bearing the state decree awarding the Order, was criticized for not "providing even the shortest description of the heroic feats," which could have increased their "historical value" to posterity.[55] Mukhina, noting the wide use of commemorative inscriptions in the past (on cartouches, walls, and columns), called for inscribing the names of construction workers on the stone walls of canals and hydro-electric dams.[56] It was similarly suggested at various points that the names of metro architects and artists be affixed on a

[50] Ibid., 182.
[51] Silina, *Istoriia i ideologiia*, 232-233.
[52] N. Miliutin, "N. A. Miliutin (nachal'nik khudozhestvennoi chasti stroitel'stva Dvortsa Sovetov)," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 43.
[53] GARF/R5446/86/2441/44.
[54] RGALI/2943/1/1527/20.
[55] Zmeul, "Arkhitektura pamiatnikov," 178.
[56] Vera Mukhina, "Zametki khudozhnika," *Pravda*, 19 September 1951, 3.

memorial plaque, so that they "may enter history."[57] In late 1947, the KPDA SM SSSR even proposed affixing memorial plaques to all major buildings constructed in the Soviet period.[58]

The desire for integrating museums with monuments, to facilitate the latter's proper "reading," was also expressed. Many public proposals for the monument to the Cheliuskin expedition envisioned designs including museums (and in one proposal, even a library devoted to Arctic studies).[59] Malinina notes a similar trend in the development of monuments to the Great Patriotic war, seeing a general movement towards complex designs which included exhibition spaces and lecture halls.[60] Shortly after the war, Gabrichevskii discussed the development of unique, distinguishing features for Soviet memorials; it is revealing that he suggested that Soviet architecture focus on the written word (for instance, inscribing poetry onto monuments).[61]

The problem of distinction was particularly pressing in monumental architecture, where, aside from the valorization of retrospective styles, "immortalization" proceeded alongside the restoration and reconstruction of older, Russian heritage. Historically-stylized Stalinist constructions were in danger of blending in with historical constructions, which were also "here to stay." This was not initially the case: the 1930s saw a wave of demolition (primarily motivated by the functional concerns of city planning, supported by radical, "cultural revolution" activism).[62] As demonstrated in Chapter 2, attempts at a systematic preservation policy were made sporadically throughout this period, but ultimately to little

[57] RGALI/2932/1/777/28; TsGAM/278/1/851/31. There are many such suggestions in visitor-book comments, but the "memorial" function of such plaques seems secondary to the contemporary public wanting to know the names of architects/ sculptors.
[58] TsGAM/534/1/110/153-156.
[59] GARF/R3316/27/262.
[60] Malinina, *Tema pamiati v arkhitekture*, 146-155.
[61] RGALI/674/2/185/21. It is also noteworthy that Etkind's hardware/ software distinction becomes less useful when considering the logocentrism of Stalinist art; discourse became very literally inseparable from the objects that bore it. One can therefore challenge the claim that "monuments are pieces of art […they] do not make truth claims [and do not] have a figurative, historical meaning," Etkind, *Warped Mourning*, 183. Indeed, Etkind elsewhere admits that Soviet monuments are "multifigured and descriptive," ibid., 185.
[62] Catherine Merridale, *Red Fortress: The Secret Heart of Russia's History* (London: Penguin, 2013), 303-306.

effect (although a few buildings were saved from demolition by relocating them). By contrast, the postwar period saw a sustained policy of restoring and reconstructing pre-Soviet architectural heritage.[63] These efforts ranged from simple renovations and cleanings to large-scale transformations (often at the expense of buildings' historical integrity). Such reconstructions reflected a striving for monumentality and grandeur, expressed in the addition of storeys and the embellishment of facades. This was evident, for example, in the postwar reconstruction of the building of the Moscow Soviet (which was the eighteenth-century residence of the Governor General). This building had been "rolled away" to make way for the reconstructed Gor'kii Street in 1937 and was now outfitted with an extensive non-loadbearing colonnade, bas-reliefs on its façade, and an entrance in the shape of triumphal arch. The height of the building was also increased by two levels.

Yet reconstruction was also motivated by another concern: *ensemble* construction, that is, the goal of making groups of buildings (comprising a street, neighbourhood, or even a city) harmonize with one another and imbue the locale with a unified character.[64] This search for common themes encouraged stylistic eclecticism. Thus, for instance, the height of the Moscow Soviet building was raised specifically to harmonize with the new scale of Gor'kii Street, while bas-reliefs were added to give the construction a more contemporary identity.

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[63] See, for instance, Steven Maddox, *Saving Stalin's Imperial City: Historic Preservation in Leningrad, 1930–1950* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014). In Moscow, the September 16, 1949 Resolution № 48/16 of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet underscored that protected heritage had inviolable land rights, that neighbouring constructions were subject to height restrictions, and that "all city planning organizations should factor in the necessity of preserving heritage when designing [new] construction projects," TsGAM/150/1/1245/341.

[64] The impetus for *ensemble* construction originated with the 1935 Plan for the Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow. Rather than conserving a "museum-like old city," or embarking on a modernist project of radical urban renewal, the Plan decreed it "necessary to proceed by preserving the foundations of the historically-formed city, but radically re-planning it through a decisive re-ordering of streets and public squares," Viacheslav Molotov and Iosif Stalin, "Postanovlenie SNK SSSK i TsK VKP(b). 10 iulia 1935," in *General'nyi plan rekonstruktsii goroda Moskvy. Postanovleniia i materialy*, ed. Ia. Tsvankin (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1936), 2. This rather sporadic and haphazard approach to *ensemble* construction was strengthened in 1939 with the creation of the central Directorate for Architectural Affairs, and with the new practice of commissioning single architectural bureaus for the design of entire streets and neighbourhoods, see Anatolii Zhuravlev, *Dmitriii Chechulin* (Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1985), 55. But the idea of a city-wide ensemble with no building left behind found particular expression in the postwar period, with the push for restoration and an unprecedented level of monumental construction.

Crucially, the dictate of the *ensemble* influenced not only the character of reconstruction, but also acted to inhibit the distinctiveness of new, Stalinist constructions. Thus, Stalinist buildings were not only liable to "blend in" with restored and reconstructed heritage (on account of their overall historicism, outlined in the previous chapter), but were *expected* to do so. "When designing new buildings that make up common ensembles with ancient monuments, it is necessary to give the modern buildings features that are related to the architecture of valuable historical buildings," explained Shchusev.[65]

Ensemble construction was thought to create a united architectural idea (*obraz*), rather than a cacophony of competing, and ultimately incoherent, images expressed by each individual construction.[66] Like *synthesis*, mobilizing past and present urban architecture towards a single purpose was thought to "ultimately increase the architectural means of influencing [the public], which would be greater than that of a single architectural monument."[67] The resonance of heritage, presented in this way, would increase and then be harnessed to the nationalist political project. As Arkin proclaimed in 1947: "before our eyes, a new city has grown – and in this new architectural organism, remarkable monuments of Moscow's glorious historical past have been preserved and shine with a new brilliance."[68] While new constructions would preserve continuities (further contributing to the appearance of a national tradition), a gentle "contrast with new architecture [would] give an elegant and instructive illustration of the development of the city's architecture," suggesting the ultimate superiority of Stalinist constructions.[69] This would at the same time create the appearance of an unbroken national architectural tradition (a primordial Great Russian essence), and

[65] Aleksei Shchusev and V. Lavrov, "General'nyi plan Novgoroda," *Arkhitektura i stroitel'stvo*, no. 5 (1946): 4-5.
[66] Lev Il'in, "Ansambl' v arkhitekture goroda," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 5 (1935): 50.
[67] Ibid.
[68] RGAE/293/1/212/40.
[69] Aleksei Shchusev, "Arkhitekturnaia organizatsiia goroda," in *Mastera sovetskoi arkhitektury ob arkhitekture. Tom 1*, ed. M. Barkhin and et al. (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1975), 178.

demonstrate its apogee (rather than negation) as Soviet architecture under Stalinism. The endorsement of the *ensemble* doctrine was part of a wider embrace of Russian nationalist rhetoric, in an attempt to harness it to the Soviet nation-building project and provide more effective avenues of legitimation and popular mobilization.[70]

The dictate of *ensemble* construction was therefore yet another factor binding Stalinist monumentalism to historicism, inhibiting its distinctiveness and originally. Thus, while lauding sensitivity to *ensemble* construction, art historian Iulii Savitskii noted that "a number of new buildings [are] built in the style of old constructions [and] a person without experience in architecture would be unable to notice the difference between old and new buildings."[71] To be sure, this problem was usually discussed in terms of its immediate implications (rather than the effect on future viewers). However, monuments and monumental art played a particular role as *solutions* to this "problem of distinction." Such solutions all revolved around the idea of minimizing the influence of heritage over contemporary construction within an *ensemble*.[72] After all, Soviet constructions were expected to dominate and breathe new meaning into the old city-scape. Contemporaneous accounts particularly lauded the effects of the Lenin Mausoleum on the Red Square, which, while preserving old heritage, "conquered the whole square," transforming it into a "sombre forum of Soviet Moscow."[73]

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[70] For a key exponent of this argument, see Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism*.

[71] Iulii Savitskii, "Ansambl' v sovetskom gradostroitel'stve," in *Problema ansamblia v sovetskoi arkhitekture. Sbornik statei*, ed. K. Trapeznikov (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo literatury po stroitel'stvu i arkhitekture, 1952), 8.

[72] There was also a temptation to resolve the problem by abolishing it. "Preserving all of the most valuable in historical-revolutionary and artistic respects, we do not stop before the demolition of this or that structure, when it becomes a hindrance to the living development of the city," – was a fairly accurate description of dominant practice, at least in the pre-war period, Sergei Chernyshev, *General'nyi plan rekonstruktsii Moskvy i voprosy planirovki gorodov SSSR. Doklad prof. S. E. Chernysheva na Vsesoiuznom s"ezde sovetskikh arkhitektorov* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vsesoiuznoi akademii arkhitektury, 1937), 11. Less radically, for instance, in 1944, the Architectural Council of the Architectural Directorate of the Moscow Soviet debated whether a small church in Moscow's city centre should determine the composition of new, incongruously larger buildings going up around it. The Chief Architect acquiesced that heritage objects of secondary importance would be preserved, while clarifying that they "will not be [made] into an *ensemble* for the whole city," TsGAM/534/1/40/5-6.

[73] M. Il'in and Iu. Shaposhnikov, "Istoricheskie etapy planirovki i arkhitektury Moskvy," *Arkhitektura i stroitel'stvo*, no. 6 (1947): 8.

It was superior size and central positioning that were expected to give Stalinist architecture the upper hand within the *ensemble*. Massive monumental constructions would be more evocative of progress (and state power), and would, crucially, be more visible, thereby improving the balance of any given ensemble in favour of similarly-styled, but undeniably larger Stalinist architecture.[74] Architects of the Central Theatre of the Red Army, for example, proudly purported that the Theatre "dominates" the neighbourhood and would be the centre of the newly-fashioned *ensemble*.[75] Perhaps most important were Moscow's postwar high-rise buildings, whose effect on the *ensembles* of outlying areas and their contribution to a unified composition (*obraz*) of the city was endlessly proclaimed.[76] These eight high-rises were commissioned in 1947 to mark the 800-year anniversary since Moscow's foundation. An enormous drain on the national construction budgets throughout the subsequent decade, these were truly massive affairs, which were intended to provide visual "support" for the vertical maker that the Palace of Soviets would introduce into the cityscape. The two hotels, three elite residential complexes, the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the MGU Main Building were built by various ministries/ organizations and were designed by different architects, but their close curation by central authorities resulted in a highly-coordinated end product (see **Figure 3**).

[74] Opposition to this approach, while in evidence, was rather muted. At least in the case of Voronezh (with whose rebuilding he was tasked), Rudnev argued for only a fractionally larger Soviet city-centre, instead of "trying to suppress all the surroundings with huge forms," qtd. in Akademiia arkhitektury SSSR, *Materialy VI sessii Akademii arkhitektury SSSR. Voprosy vosstanovitel'nogo stroitel'stva* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1945), 33. Alabian criticized "the majority of architects, in whom monumentality is expressed as gigantomania and excessive embellishment," the "supermonumental" size being used to "out-shout" (*perekrichat'*) heritage, Karo Alabian, "Tvorcheskie zadachi sovetskoi arkhitektury. Vsesoiuznoe tvorcheskoe soveshchanie arkhitektorov v Leningrade 20-32 maia 1935 g," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 7 (1935): 6; also see Karo Alabian, *Zadachi sovetskoi arkhitektury. Doklad K. S. Alaiana na Pervom vsesoiuznom S"ezde Sovetskikh Arkhitektorov* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1937), 15-16.

[75] Karo Alabian and Vasilii Simbirtsev, "Arkhitekturnyi pamiatnik Krasnoi Armii," *Planirovka i stroitel'stvo gorodov*, no. 10 (1934): 22.

[76] See the comments of some of their architects: Dmitrii Chechulin, "Arkhitektura Moskvy," *Arkhitektura i stroitel'stvo*, no. 11 (1947): 12; Vladimir Gel'freikh and Mikhail Minkus, "Vystonye zdaniia v ansamble goroda," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 12 December 1951, 2; Boris Iofan, "Novyi siluet stolitsy," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 18 July 1947, 2.

Being massively taller than any existing buildings, these high-rises were described as "'centres of gravity' for Moscow's *ensembles*" in their own right.[77] As Opochinskaia argued, the influence of the high-rises went far beyond the *ensembles* in their immediate vicinity, determining the character of whole neighbourhoods. They had the capacity not only to influence the surrounding city-scape, "but also to radically change its overall character […] expressing its social and ideal-artistic content."[78] As a result of high-rise construction, it was enthusiastically proclaimed, the role of old towers and bell-towers diminished.[79] In the words of architect Sergei Chernyshev, high-rises represented "a decisive move away from the creation of individual local ensembles in order to create a spatial ensemble of the entire city […] bind[ing it] together."[80] Together with a completed Palace of Soviets, high-rises were expected to eventually "subdue and unify the city."[81]

In Moscow, the main vertical landmark influencing the overall character of the city was undoubtedly, the Kremlin; the high-rises and, above all, the Palace of Soviets were implicitly framed in competition with this centre of gravity. This challenges Merridale's argument that all along, city planners "were trying to create a modern city of concentric circles, the focal point of which would be the Kremlin."[82] Rather, according to the General Plan for the Reconstruction of Moscow, streets were being reconstructed radially from the Palace of the Soviets (such that, coupled with its height, the latter would be ever-present, visible even on the most far-away, curving, and topographically hidden streets of the city).[83] Thus, "the grandiose, dominating vertical axis that is the Palace of Soviets" was expected to

[77] B. Rubanenko, "Ideino-khudozhestvennye osnovy arkhitektury vysotnykh zdanii stolitsy," *Sovetskaia arkhitektura. Ezhegodnik*, no. 4 (1953): 14.
[78] Opochinskaia, "Ansambl' vysotnykh zdanii Moskvy," 60-61.
[79] L. Kulaga, "Russkie traditsii v sovetskom gradostroitel'stve," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 11 (1952): 29.
[80] Qtd. in Ivan Lykoshin and Irina Cheredina, *Sergey Chernyshev: Architect of the New Moscow* (Berlin: DOM Publishers, 2015), 211.
[81] Tukanov, "Monumenty v sovetskom gradostroitel'stve," 75.
[82] Merridale, *Red Fortress*, 306.
[83] K. Topuridze, "Prospekt i ploshchad' Dvortsa Sovetov," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 4 (1940): 17; also see MGK VKP(b), "Iz predstavlennoi v SNK SSSR i TsK VKP(b) dokladnoi zapiski," 84; Molotov and Stalin, "Postanovlenie SNK SSSK," 7; Atarov, *Dvorets Sovetov*, 147.

"become [Moscow's] organizational centre," seizing the initiative from the nearby Kremlin.[84] In the postwar period, six high-rises ringed Moscow's city-centre, the MGU Main Building overlooked the entire city from the Lenin Hills, while the eighth 32-story Zariad'e Administrative Building rose steadily on the Kremlin's very doorstep. Even though the Kremlin was also continually reconstructed (its character "edited" through the demolition of several churches and monasteries), it was never considered "the perfect focal point […] of Stalin's capital," although it did (grudgingly) continue to act as one, as neither the Palace of Soviets, nor the Zariad'e high-rise, were ultimately completed.[85]

But large monumental constructions were not only mere means of dominating over heritage. Massive monuments were implicitly seen as marking out distinctiveness in the eyes of *future* viewers as well, though the outlook was often pessimistic. In the future, dimensions were expected to increase even further, likely dwarfing the size of Stalinist monuments and monumental constructions. In 1939, Mukhina's proposal to adorn one of Moscow's bridges with a monument to the October Revolution was met with opposition. Architect Pavel Aleshin explained that a monument to the October Revolution required superior dimensions, which the bridge restricted. "In many years, [this bridge] may look like a toy [therefore] we can only build decorative monuments on bridges."[86] Likewise, Politburo member and Deputy Chairman of the SNK SSSR Vlas Chubar' criticized the insufficient dimensions of the rather sizeable Lenin Library. According to him, it did not account for the "grandiose opportunities of tomorrow": the buildings and boulevards that were going to be built next to it would eventually render the Library a "low-rise" building.[87] Likely, it was the rising Palace of the

[84] Otdel tekhpropagandy Stroitel'sva Dvortsa Sovetov, *Dvorets Sovetov* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vsesoiuznoi akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 20.
[85] Merridale, *Red Fortress*, 312.
[86] RGALI/962/3/560/32.
[87] Vlas Chubar', "Rech' zamestitelia Predsedatelia Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov SSSR tov. V. Ia. Chubaria," in *Postanovleniia i materialy. Pervyi vsesoiuznyi s"ezd sovetskikh arkhitektorov*, ed. A. Barkhudarian and N. Kirsanova (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1937), 30.

Soviets that was on Chubar's mind, but also, potentially, constructions of the more distant future.

The other solution to the problem of distinction within the *ensemble* consisted of choosing a favourable, central location for Stalinist monumental constructions. After all, it was argued, it was its central positioning that gave the relatively small Lenin Mausoleum a commanding presence in the Red Square.[88] Similarly, Mordvinov stated in 1945 that "five or six well-executed and correctly located public buildings determine the character of the city."[89] These buildings were to be placed in central, highly-visible areas.[90] The central square, main thoroughfare, and the central train station had to be contemporary, as this "compositional core" determined the character of the city.[91] Thus, in city planning, "special attention [had to] be paid to the central urban *ensembles*, its public centres" explained Kolli, as these were crucial "to defining and creating the specific character of the city."[92]

Consequently, there were concerted attempts to make new Soviet constructions the centre of the city, displacing historic neighbourhoods. By building the Palace of the Soviets, it was claimed, the Kremlin would no longer be the centre of Moscow.[93] Injecting Soviet content into the old city centre was another approach. Thus, one of the favoured locations for the proposed Pantheon was, uncoincidentally, the Red Square.[94] A compromise solution was taken in plans for the reconstruction of Novgorod, where the new Victory square (along with its surrounding public buildings, monuments, and podiums) was planned near the old city

[88] Il'in and Shaposhnikov, "Istoricheskie etapy planirovki," 8.
[89] Arkadii Mordvinov, "O stroitel'stve gorodov," *Pravda*, 19 August 1945, 4.
[90] Visibility was also a key concern in the design of high-rise buildings in the late 1940s, see Vladimir Gel'freikh and Mikhail Minkus, "Administrativnoe zdanie na Smolenskoi ploshchadi," *Arkhitektura i stroitel'stvo*, no. 6 (1949): 13-14.
[91] Mordvinov, "O stroitel'stve gorodov," 4.
[92] Nikolai Kolli, *Obshchestvennye tsentry gorodov. Doklad deistvitel'nogo chlena Akademii Arkhitektury SSSR na VII sessii Akademii Arkhitektury SSSR* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1946), 9.
[93] Iosif Romanovskii, *Novaia Moskva. Ploshchadi i magistrali* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1938), 118. Indeed, as Lunacharskii explained, the Cathedral of Christ of Saviour was demolished to clear this central and visible location for the Palace of Soviets, Lunacharskii, "Sotsialisticheskii arkhitekturnyi monument," 4.
[94] RGAE/339/1/1132/270. It was alternately argued that new monumental constructions such as the Pantheon should be "concentrated" to make a new, Soviet city-centre, RGAE/339/1/1132/249-250.

square, to be "compositionally united" with it, more subtly shifting the old centre to the new.[95]

Another major practice in subduing and dominating old ensembles involved placing monuments in the centre of squares and in parks, which would infuse the surrounding architecture with new meaning. As V. Tolstoi notes, "in the 1930s, sculptural monuments increasingly became an important organizing element of urban ensembles."[96] One contemporary *Iskusstvo* editorial suggested that "the monument should be the compositional centre of the given square, the given street, organizing the surrounding space, dominating over it, constituting the core content of the whole complex."[97] Mukhina argued that monuments should be "central psychological points in the construction of urban ensembles."[98] Placed in key nodes of the city, "triumphal columns and obelisks, which always have a memorial significance, become visual accents in parks and city ensembles due to their height and strong vertical dynamics. A correctly placed obelisk nearly always defines the square or intersection."[99]

As with size, architects and artists sometimes questioned whether centrality would work as a solution to the problem of distinction with the passage of time. At a 1939 KPDI SNK SSSR meeting on monument construction in Moscow, it was suggested that the "Monument to 1905" be placed in a central location, to which it was replied that the city will grow and what is now far away will become central.[100] At the same time, it was confessed

[95] Aleksei Shchusev, "Pamiatniki zodchestva v sotsialisticheskoi rekonstruktsii goroda," *Arkhitektura i stroitel'stvo*, no. 12 (1948): 4.
[96] Tolstoi, *Monumental'noe iskusstvo SSSR*, 59.
[97] "Tvorcheskie pobedy sovetskikh khudozhnikov," *Iskusstvo*, no. 3 (1947): 4; also see Kruglova, *Monumenty v arkhitekture gorodov*, 22; Tukanov, "Monumenty v sovetskom gradostroitel'stve," 202.
[98] Mukhina, "Tema i obraz v monumental'noi skul'pture," 2; also see Boris Korolev, "Skul'ptura v zodchestve," *Stroitel'naia gazeta*, 6 January 1940, 2.
[99] Vera Mukhina, "Monumental'no dekorativnoe iskusstvo v ansamble goroda," in *Problema ansamblia v sovetskoi arkhitekture. Sbornik statei*, ed. K. Trapeznikov (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo literatury po stroitel'stvu i arkhitekture, 1952), 89. Arkin spoke of the need of placing Great Patriotic War monuments in squares, parks, and highways, David Arkin, "Zodchii - Sovetskoi Armii," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 21 February 1948, 3.
[100] RGALI/962/3/560/34. In this case, the question remained unresolved and the monument was not constructed in this period.

that predicting the future development of the city was difficult; the safer bet was to stick with the contemporary city-centre.[101] In these ways, Stalinist artists and architects put forward various solutions to the "problem of distinction," which included the use of props and the written word. In connection to the particular variation of the problem relating to urban *ensembles*, increased size and central location were proposed as solutions.

4.2 The problem of relevance

A parallel problem in communicating with posterity related to making monuments relevant and interesting to future audiences. In general, this anxiety was directed at two issues: the very subject of immortalization, and the artistic means of representation. For one thing, the goal of making monuments relevant to posterity sometimes conflicted with confidence in the purportedly trans-temporal language outlined in the previous chapter. Such doubts, for instance, were voiced by a representative of the Construction Directorate of the Palace of the Soviets at a 1938 conference on monumental art. For all the focus on centuries-long durability, he noted that there may be "a certain gap between the longevity of the material and the longevity of its artistic effect on viewers."[102] Historicist styles risked appearing old and stuffy, being associated with ruins and museums. At a 1946 conference on monumentalism, M. Il'in argued that classical obelisks "leave us completely cold."[103] Criticizing Grigorii Zakharov's design of the surface vestibule of "Kurskaia" metro station, Rozenfel'd contended that the Greek-style peristyle imparts "a museum-like impression."[104]

[101] RGAE/339/1/1132/249. Of course, the focus on the city centre was overdetermined, reflecting the general centralization of Stalinist culture, in which "concentric circles [around Stalin] became the dominating pattern of spatial organization," Plamper, *The Stalin Cult*, 97.
[102] RGALI/2943/1/187/21.
[103] RGALI/674/2/185/32.
[104] TsGAM/534/1/108/256.

Furthermore, some artistic solutions offered to the problem of distinction discussed above were, ironically, also problematic from the standpoint of relevance to posterity. Overly specific information, while telling more about the "immortalized" individuals and events, could overload and repel the future viewer. The use of props, in particular, came under criticism.[105] For instance, the value of depicting a contemporary airplane in the monument to Chkalov, and part of the stratostat vehicle in the "Monument to Hero-Stratonauts," was questioned on the grounds that this technology would eventually become obsolete, and "the future viewer would not be able to understand" these objects.[106] Mukhina, for her part, opposed the use of contemporary clothing in sculpture. While noting that it can "aquaint the viewer with the [epoch's] historical costume," she argued that clothing increases the value of a sculpture when it is "not only a label of the time, but when it adds to the overall representation and has great value plastically." At most, she allowed an "auxiliary historical role" for clothes.[107]

Mukhina's criticism brought up a wider problem: artists frequently pointed out that in order to retain their relevance, the very *subject* of "immortalization" could not be limited to petty, one-to-one representations of individuals or events, but had to be elevated to general ideas characterizing the era. Only such "generalized representations," (*sobiratel'nye/ obobshchennye obrazy*) were to remain interesting to posterity.[108] Thus, Mukhina argued: "posterity will be uninterested in petty detailing of faces. For the viewer, what is important is

[105] This catch-22 situation was not unprecedented. For instance, as Michalski recounts, in the monuments of the French Third Republic, "of crucial importance was the sitter's conventional, 'timeless' attire, presenting a synthetic image without striking personal attributes [although some monuments] presented convivial details of costume and lifestyle […and] everyday objects [which] could sometimes provide the starting points for a historical narrative," Michalski, *Public Monuments*, 25.
[106] Quoted in RGALI/962/6/910/37, RGALI/2942/1/132/31.
[107] Mukhina, "Tema i obraz v monumental'noi skul'pture," 2.
[108] To some extent, perhaps, such comments related to the template-like, ritualistic, formulaic qualities of Socialist Realist cultural production generally. As Katerina Clark argues, while artists were free to invent new artistic devices and specific representations, "extraordinary measures were taken to ensure the purity of the formulas" (a proper "language" and "syntax" of sorts), a canon which "generalization representations" could aspire to join, Katerina Clark, *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 10, 13.

the generalized image that he loves, which excites, agitates, and exhorts him. Protocol-like representation is interesting only to contemporaries who are personally acquainted with the subject, or to a scrupulous historian, but this is in any case not the domain of art."[109] Clothes and other props "die with their alloted time," she argued, "but general representations – never."[110]

Gol'ts similarly spoke of the foolishness of "immortalizing" transient objects, exemplifying this by once militarily important, but now entirely forgotten, catapults. "In order to immortalize itself, an epoch does not need to create its archetypical temple in the form of catapult," but should strive towards more universal representations, like the Parthenon, which effectively became one of the most exciting creations of human culture.[111] In order to capture an event "for the centuries," argued Lansere, the representation "should be raised above the level of ordinary, the everyday, it must be moved to some distance, so one can feel its significance."[112] The fact that monumental art is made for centuries means that the "idea, theme and subject need to be truly universal," contended art historian Osip Beskin.[113]

Accordingly, many artists argued that the true subjects of "immortalization," in order to remain relevant, ought to be the new socialist culture, the New Soviet man, rather than individual achievements, victories, and individual heroes.[114] Creating "general representations" called for a greater level of abstractness, transcending the one-to-one

[109] Mukhina, "Tema i obraz v monumental'noi skul'pture," 2; also see Mukhina, *Literaturno-kriticheskoe nasledie*, 136-137.
[110] Mukhina, "Tema i obraz v monumental'noi skul'pture," 2.
[111] Georgii Gol'ts, "Uroki proshlogo," in *Voprosy sinteza iskusstv. Materialy pervogo tvorcheskogo soveshchania arkhitektorov, skul'ptorov i zhivopistsev (o kadrakh khudozhnikov-monumentalistov)*, ed. M. Zhitomirskii (Moscow: IZOGIZ, 1936), 70-71.
[112] Evgenii Lansere, "O monumental'noi zhivopisi," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 19 April 1945, 3.
[113] Beskin, "O monumental'nom iskusstve," 74.
[114] "We need to transmit the ideals of our worldview, the representation of a free-thinking and freely labouring person. We need to transmit all the romanticism and creative passion of our days," argued Mukhina, Vera Mukhina, "Skul'ptor V. I. Mukhina (Moskva)," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 45.

renderings of the subjects of "immortalization."[115] As Mukhina wrote in 1945: "it is important for posterity to see the general image of our time in portrayals of these times, ones which would agitate, excite them, make them follow our lead. Therefore, in creating the general image, the artist should not slavishly reproduce his individual subject."[116]

Nonetheless, while the creation of "generalized images" was widely supported, radically adjusting the subject of "immortalization" was not possible. For instance, during a discussion of the sculptural decorations for the Moskvoretskii bridge, one of the commissioned sculptors Zinaida Ivanova argued against Shchusev's proposal for Victory-themed sculptures (a rare and brave act of dissent, as Shchusev had the support of a commission chaired by Voroshilov himself). "Time moves quickly, and contemporary themes become a little outdated in future," she argued. Instead of commemorating historical events, she suggested the "theme of peaceful labour, which, in its content, is eternal."[117] Unsurprisingly, the proposal was unsuccessful.[118] After all, the subjects of "immortalization" were set by official commissions chaired by political functionaries, who followed a different logic, explored in the subsequent chapter.

Because the subjects of "immortalization" remained specific events and individuals, subject to official approval, "general representations" could only *build* upon these (although what this meant was never clarified). At times, this seemed to call for combining the un-combinable. For instance, art historian Nikolai Mashkovtsev claimed that monuments to the Great Patriotic War

[115] There were also practical reasons for creating unspecific, more abstract monuments, for instance, given the need for "immortalizing" unidentified fallen soldiers (namely, in memorials by mass graves), Manizer, *Skul'ptor o svoei rabote. Tom 2*, 36.
[116] Mukhina, *Literaturno-kriticheskoe nasledie*, 136.
[117] TsGAM/534/1/110/186.
[118] There was little consensus on which subject would be more amenable to creating "generalized representations." For instance, in discussions of mosaics for the "Kievskaia-kol'tsevaia," art historian Vladimir Tolstoi considered industrial, labour themes short-lived, and supported depicting (presumably, specific) individuals, RGALI/2943/1/1527/37.

> [demand] an extremely generalized, figuratively expressed large idea. At the same time, the unique individual traits of a specific human character should not be erased or lost. The demands of portrait-like rendering should be firmly applied to such monuments [...] The necessary task of the contemporary sculptor is to render the images of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War on a strict portrait-like basis, glorifying them, and transmitting their features for the centuries. The artist has no right to sacrifice portrait-like resemblance. He cannot defend himself by pointing to the artistic success of the generalized image.[119]

In this return of the problem of distinction, artists had to twist themselves into middle-ground positions. Thus, in an early 1945 article, Mukhina stated: "future generations want to know the character of the heroes of our days. In all my sculptural portraits […] I aimed to give not only individualized portraits of my distinguished contemporaries, but to create generalized representations of the people of our time."[120] These two objectives – individualized rendering and more abstract, generalized representations – embodied solutions to two problems of "immortalization": the problem of distinction and the problem of relevance.

Combining these in a non-contradictory fashion required artistic *means* that could go beyond (what was at times pejoratively labeled) "photographic" or "naturalistic" representation, while remaining faithful to the individual subject. One such solution advocated imbuing monuments with a greater emotional charge (although this was a constant goal in Soviet art, not reducible to the problems of "immortalization"). This was expected to create a more general representation with greater appeal to posterity. For instance, in a letter to Army General Filipp Golikov (of whom he crafted a bust in 1944), Vuchetich wrote:

> Centuries will pass... Numerous architectural constructions, monuments to heroes and events of our epoch will remain; they will 'tell' the descendants about the

[119] Nikolai Mashkovtsev, "Proekty novykh pamiatnikov," *Iskusstvo*, no. 3 (1947): 34.
[120] Mukhina, *Literaturno-kriticheskoe nasledie*, 136.

> great deeds of their ancestors [...] And young people will have to read in these images all the passion of our time, great love and hatred, all the greatness of the spirit of these people. There will be no question of congruence (which is necessary nowadays), many other questions will not arise, but our flaming epoch should breathe in these portraits, in facial expressions [...] The more characteristic the representation, the more temperamental and passionate, the closer this representation to the spirit of its time, the longer it will live, and a true work of art work lives forever, because even time is powerless against it.[121]

The need for a grandiose, romantic tone was similarly defended by Merkurov, writing in 1943-1944: "we must transmit general representations of [our] heroes to the ages. The passion of our epoch should sound through the centuries in granite and bronze. There is no room for chaff and chicks. The range of our creativity must have a huge scope: from the sound of trumpets bringing down the walls of ancient Jericho, to the victorious fanfares of our era."[122] Mukhina similarly emphasized emotion, even bombast: monuments "immortalize the past, but with a passionate appeal for future generations, and therefore these monuments do not lose their impact for centuries."[123]

These comments implicitly justified a certain poetic license: minor adjustments could be made to the realist renderings of subjects. Mukhina argued that "the artist has the right to imagination, and the strength and persuasiveness of the images created by him depends on the power of his imagination. [...] Idealization is intrinsic to general representations in monumental sculpture."[124] Similarly, Rudnev spoke of the prerogative to make adjustments

[121] Qtd. in Ivan Shevtsov, *Evgenii Viktorovich Vuchetich* (Leningrad: Khudozhnik RSFSR, 1960), 8. There is some trouble with dating the letter. Golikov held the rank of Army General from 1959, but it is possible that Shevtsov simply used his current title when transcribing the letter, so it could have been written earlier (possibly during the War, when Vuchetich was working on Golikov's sculptural portrait).
[122] Merkurov, *Vospominania. Pis'ma. Stat'i*, 405.
[123] Mukhina, "Tema i obraz v monumental'noi skul'pture," 2.
[124] Mukhina, *Literaturno-kriticheskoe nasledie*, 136-137.

in line with "artistic imagination," and "a poetic realism." He referred to Michelangelo's alleged riposte, when the latter was pressed about why he depicted the hunchbacked Medici as handsome: "who will know this in 500 years?"[125]

However, such romantic embellishment was in tension with the dogmas of Socialist Realism; despite increasing the relevance of monuments to posterity, it could not be wholeheartedly accepted. A departure from mimetic, realistic representation was always dangerous. While a blind eye was turned to "lacquering," or beautification,[126] greater abstraction involved greater risks. While Mukhina's "Worker and Kolkhoz Woman" sculpture was used ubiquitously as an example of a successful "generalized representation," other works were not so lucky. For instance, Lansere's use of traditional allegorical symbols, exemplified in his monumental frescoes at Moscow's Kazan' Railway Station (which "immortalized" wartime Victory and postwar Peace by depicting a warrior of ancient Rus' and a Madonna-esque woman bearing a child, respectively) was questioned on the pages of *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*.[127] Clearly, however, criticism was inconsistent and unpredictable, as Vuchetich's monument of the Warrior-Liberator in Berlin (1949), which also depicted anachronistically a Soviet soldier with a sword, was universally praised.[128]

Furthermore, romanticized renderings of the "immortalized" subject *at the expense* of realism was decidedly disallowed. Minutes of the Artistic-Expert Council of the KPDI SNK/ SM SSSR, which had final say on the artistic qualities of commissioned monuments, reflect a great preoccupation with the "portrait resemblance" (*portretnoe skhodstvo*) of

[125] Lev Rudnev, "L. V. Rudnev," in *Voprosy razvitiia sovetskoi skul'ptury. Nauchnaia konferentsiia. 28-30 maia 1952 g.*, ed. Matvei Manizer (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii khudozhestv SSSR, 1953), 77.
[126] See Svetlana Boym, "The Paradoxes of Unified Culture: From Stalin's Fairy Tale to Molotov's Lacquer Box," in *Socialist Realism without Shores*, ed. Thomas Lahusen and Evgeny Dobrenko (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).
[127] See V. Gaposhkin, "Eshche o monumental'noi zhivopisi," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 8 June 1945 1945, 2; "Novye temy i starye atributy," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 29 June 1945, 4.
[128] In fact, Vuchetich and Belopol'skii received a Stalin Prize First Class for the memorial.

"immortalized" subjects.[129] Sculptures without this "portrait resemblance" were not allowed to be reproduced *en masse*.[130] The model for Moscow's Gor'kii monument (by Mukhina, Ivanova, and Zelenskaia) was censured by a SM SSSR decree (note the high level of involvement) in 1949 for "overly-emphasized and exaggerated features [that] violate the requirements of realistic truth and resemblance to life;" the sculptors were subsequently ordered to rework it.[131] Wartime monuments to Twice-Heroes of the Soviet Union were reported to have been delayed due to the subjects still being at the front and unable to pose (mere photographs were seen as inadequate models).[132] The political leadership was even willing to go to the effort of replacing monuments deemed insufficiently realistic. In mid-1952, a former acquaintance of Kirov complained to the CPSU Central Committee that his monument in Riga "distorts [Kirov's image] to the point of being unrecognizable […] viewers [wonder] if it depicts [Latvia's pre-Soviet authoritarian leader Karlis] Ulmanis or a bourgeois kulak-woman." The monument was immediately removed and those responsible investigated.[133]

Another means of representation that was thought to increase relevance to posterity was laconicism. Rather than idealize and exaggerate representations to give them a romantic, emotional charge, monuments could achieve greater expressiveness by saying less. Commenting on his Lenin and Stalin monuments for the Moscow-Volga Canal, Merkurov argued: "poor would be the monument if, when one looks at it, the first thing one would notice would be, say, the eyes or the overly precisely captured age of [...] the leader."[134]

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[129] See RGALI/962/6, RGALI/2329/4, RGALI/2458/2. In fact, the Council frequently invited relatives of the deceased subject to attest to the likeness of the monument's representation.
[130] For instance, see RGASPI/17/133/337/38.
[131] GARF/R5446/1/365/326-327, RGALI/962/3/2228/75.
[132] GARF/A259/6/1351/9-10.
[133] RGASPI/17/133/375/145-146. Such public criticisms often betrayed sexual/ gender anxieties. For instance, as Simpson recounts, in 1937 "the Karelian Party ObKom Secretary was denounced to Zhdanov, on the grounds of negligence in allowing the installation of a statue of Kirov represented with one hand in his pocket, which gave the impression of male genitals" – in this case, however, the complaint was ignored, Simpson, "The Nude in Soviet Socialist Realism," 128.
[134] Sergei Merkurov, "Monumenty Lenina i Stalina," *Arkhitekturnaia gazeta*, 12 August 1937, 1.

Furthermore, it was increasingly recognized that monuments' capacity to convey complex ideas and narratives was limited. At best, they "could commit to eternity a small time-slice, sometimes a single idea, a single moment. Everything transient, accidental, modish, and mannerist should be swept away," argued Gol'ts during the war.[135] Ivanova contended that laconicism was necessary to concentrate all the expressive force on the public dimensions of the "immortalized" subject.[136] Finally, the striving toward laconicism expressed an anxiety that anything specific (so important within the problem of distinction) would become, by definition, eventually outmoded. In a meeting discussing the design of the Pantheon, Rudnev opined: "The pantheon should be modern now, in 100 years, in 200, in 1000 years, etc. It must be terribly laconic [...] I restrained myself in not allowing a single sculpture [...] Some ascetic technique must be found, which would be acceptable both today and in the future."[137]

Laconicism was sometimes endorsed at higher levels. Thus, for instance, Iofan noted the Construction Council's emphasis on making the architecture of the Palace of the Soviets "laconic."[138] In the 1945 competitions for monuments to the War, the guidelines specifically called for "simple and clear architectural forms."[139] One can find other examples of austere forms in the corpus of what is otherwise known as the Stalinist "wedding-cake" architecture of excess.

Within the logic of "immortalization," if the tendency to laconicism was a function of the problem of relevance, then the problem of distinction (and its solutions, such as synthesis) can be said to have contributed to this excess – ultimately exerting a greater pull. Arkin argued that abstract representations of soldiers lowers "memorial efficacy."[140] In some interpretations, suffusion of information was not seen as endangering relevance to posterity.

[135] Gol'ts, "O pamiatnikakh," 340.
[136] RGALI/2943/1/2222/19.
[137] RGAE/339/1/1132/137-139.
[138] Iofan, "Stroitel'stvo Dvortsa Sovetov," 11.
[139] RGALI/674/3/1951/1.
[140] Arkin, "Monumenty geroiam," 7.

For instance, monumental artist Oksana Pavlenko argued: "abstract, non-specific, conventional images of a person, things, nature are of no interest to anyone. Such images do not tell anything to our contemporaries or to our descendants."[141] Similarly, a 1945 memo to the TsK KPSS from Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Gundorov (Chairman of the Pan-Slavic Committee) argued that military monuments with inscribed names of the fallen had historically had a stronger emotional effect on the public than depersonalized monuments to unknown soldiers.[142] Thus, given the impossibility of adjusting the subject of "immortalization," heightened expressivity and laconicism were proposed as solutions to the problem of relevance. These sat in tension with some elements of Socialist Realist doctrine generally, and with the problem of distinction specifically.

4.3 Conclusion

It is true that the above tendencies in the theory of Stalinist monumentalism – props, synthesis, logocentrism, large size and central placement, expressivity, laconicism – had a significantly more complex relationship with really-existing practice. After all, Stalinist monumental art and architecture was overdetermined by several goals (not least the immediate, propagandistic ones), and these goals carried their own internal tensions and competed amongst themselves. For instance, an alternative way of accounting for some of the above developments could be provided by reference to the contradiction between the "realist" and "romantic" elements of Socialist Realism, which was also in evidence throughout the entire period.[143] According to this model, techniques for making art more relevant to posterity

[141] Oksana Pavlenko, "Radost' tvorchestva," in *Voprosy sinteza iskusstv. Materialy pervogo tvorcheskogo soveshchania arkhitektorov, skul'ptorov i zhivopistsev (o kadrakh khudozhnikov-monumentalistov)*, ed. M. Zhitomirskii (Moscow: IZOGIZ, 1936), 115.
[142] RGASPI/17/125/368/6-11.
[143] Davies and Harris, *Stalin's World*, 251.

could be interpreted rather as a part of the general, romantic quest for greater emotional resonance. By contrast, making monuments distinctive and informative could be seen as a part of a larger "realist" trend. While not diminishing the value of such alternative models, this chapter has contended that a more specific logic was at play from the perspective of the problems of "immortalization."

At the end of the day, Stalinist artistic practice did not resolve the contradictions of relevance and distinction, romanticism and realism. The fact that it never swung entirely to either pole testifies to the multiple arguments for preserving both dimensions (including those arguments attributable to the "immortalization" impulse). Within these antinomies, artists and architects enjoyed some limited freedoms (at least, the freedom of elaborating the details of preconceived goals), but also risked criticism and professional consequences for failing to heed the opposing proscriptions.

5.0 "Immortalization" as cultural myth

In this chapter, I examine the relationship of the regime, art and architecture professionals, and the Soviet public towards the "immortalization" program. I argue that "immortalization" represented a broadly-accepted cultural myth, rather than an artificial imposition on the part of the regime. I am not revising my earlier contention that the Stalinist political leadership was the prime mover in "immortalization" dynamics. However, I nuance this traditionally "totalitarian" contention by eschewing a purely regime-centred analysis and instead examining the reception of "immortalization" amongst other groups. This approach demonstrates that political leaders did not (only) use "immortalization" in a cynical, self-serving fashion, but were themselves beholden to its logic and system of values, as was, broadly speaking, Soviet society as a whole.

While opposing the reduction of the "immortalization" program to "propaganda," I would like to underscore that the concept of propaganda is both inescapable and useful. This chapter begins by demonstrating that the propagandistic aspects of "immortalization" were present even in its orientation towards posterity. However, as I demonstrate, "immortalization" represented a shared cultural "myth" (internalized by art professionals and the wider Soviet public) and it is precisely its shared nature which allowed various actors (not only the regime) to deploy it strategically in the pursuit of alternate goals.

Eliding the complex, unresolved (and, as with most semantic questions, unresolvable) debate over what myth "really" is, my use of the term seizes upon two uncontroversial facets. First is the idea of myth as a reflection of social values: "coalesc[ing] social values or projections,"[1] "embodying common values and ideals,"[2] and "[dramatizing the] conscious or

[1] William Doty, *Myth: A Handbook* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), 19-20.
[2] John Rogerson, "Slippery Words: Myth," in *Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory of Myth*, ed. Alan Dundes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 66.

unconscious values of a group."[3] The second aspect of my usage goes beyond the idea of myth as a mere "reflection" to a functionalist understanding of its *active* role in constituting social life/ practice. According to this approach, pioneered by anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, myth is "not an idle tale, but a hard-worked active force."[4] "Myth is an energy-charged […] idea, that has the power to move and direct the soul,"[5] which "give[s] support to accepted patterns of behaviour [… and] sustain[s] institutions."[6] The "immortalization" myth played definite functions in Stalinist society, but these are largely taken up in Chapter Six.

5.1 The regime

In explaining the motives of the regime directing the "immortalization" program, the "propaganda thesis" is on its strongest ground. The rhetoric and logic of agitprop veritably oozes from the sources; the fact that monumental art and architecture were meant to influence the masses and inculcate a worldview expedient to the Stalinist project is indisputable. Indeed, the regime was always open about such intentions, especially in the Socialist Realist doctrine of *partiinost'* which guided monumental art and architecture, along with other branches of Stalinist cultural/ artistic production.

Examining Stalinist monumentalism in light of "immortalization" not only challenges the blanket application of the "propaganda thesis" (as I did in Chapter 2) but also provides opportunities to deepen and nuance this classic argument. Many analyses treat "propaganda" in a de-temporalized, synchronic fashion, taking for granted the absence of any significant time-lag between the creation of a propaganda medium and the dissemination of its message.

[3] James Hollis, *Tracking the Gods: The Place of Myth in Modern Life* (Toronto: Inner City, 1995), 12.
[4] Bronislaw Malinowski, *Magic Science and Religion and Other Essays* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954 [1926]), 101.
[5] James Hollis, *What Matters Most: Living a More Considered Life* (New York: Gotham, 2009), 159.
[6] Lauri Honko, "The Problem of Defining Myth," in *Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory of Myth*, ed. Alan Dundes (Berkley: University of California Press, 1984), 47.

This assumption is understandable given that it was ephemeral mass media (such as print, radio, and television) that made state propaganda a central institution of twentieth century authoritarian regimes. Ephemeral "propaganda" interpellated its intended audience immediately or almost immediately; the question of time is irrelevant here.

Monumental art and architecture, however, are not ephemeral, and thus de-temporalized readings of it are incomplete. Time passes between the construction of a monument or public building, and a critical mass of citizens having seen it and experienced its propaganda effects. This is important, because it clarifies what monumental art and architecture were supposed to do. Rather than being yet another propagandistic medium, functionally no different from ephemera, monumental constructions represented a "delayed-action" propaganda, one geared towards interpellating not only present audiences, but also future ones (as the discussion in Chapter 2 demonstrated).[7] After all, as Dushkin reflected on his metro stations: "the ideological influence of architectural works is uninterrupted, and the years do not weaken it."[8]

Nurturing Stalinist values in future generations was an explicit goal for monumental constructions, their didactic bend clear. As Lenin noted, monumental art "participates in the task of education, of nurturing [*vospitanie*] of new generations."[9] Mukhina argued that monuments to the War represent a call-to-arms to future generations," teaching "valour and civil duty," through which "the government [makes] vivid and long-lasting role model[s]" of immortalized individuals.[10] "It is natural for people not only to bow before the great, but also to seek to emulate them," she explained, and this "desire […] is the engine which [will drive]

[7] This function is reflected upon in studies of monumental art in other contexts. For example, Catherine Moriarty treats European monuments to the First World War in light of their "longer-term considerations […] to create an exemplar of collective service and duty for future generations," Catherine Moriarty, "'Remnants of Patriotism': The Commemorative Representation of the Greatcoat after the First World War," *Oxford Art Journal* 27, no. 3 (2004): 293.
[8] Aleksei Dushkin, "Beseda korrespondenta zhurnala 'Metrostroi' S. Ponomarenko s laureatom Gosudarstvennykh premii professorom A. N. Dushkinym," *Metrostroi*, no. 5 (1973): 29.
[9] Lunacharskii, "Lenin o monumental'noi propagande," 1.
[10] Mukhina, *Literaturno-kriticheskoe nasledie*, 137, 158, 145.

humanity to progress and to light."[11] Similarly, Vuchetich argued that monumental art should use "the example of the best people to nurture in contemporaries and future generations a great love for and loyalty to the motherland" and, "stepping over the ridges of the centuries, awaken in the future individual the same feelings which filled the hearts of our heroes, who sacrificed their burning lives for the homeland."[12]

In the eyes of the Stalinist leadership, these "delayed-action" propagandistic effects were confirmed by the apparently enduring mobilizing power of the monuments of the past. Indeed, the upsurge in historical preservation was in part a consequence of realizing the contemporary political value of heritage (particularly in building national consciousness and pride). Thus, for instance, Mordvinov's draft speech to the 1944 VI Session of the USSR Academy of Architecture argued that "a beautiful city […] arouses feelings of pride and local patriotism," so "Leningrad, if it was not so beautiful, would not have been so defendable" during the War.[13] Similarly, the aforementioned Chairman of the Pan-Slavic Committee Gundorov's 1945 memo to the Central Committee noted that old Russian monuments in Bulgaria, built by the Tsarist regime after the 1877-1878 war of liberation, positively affected current Bulgarian attitudes towards the Soviet army. Gundorov lobbied for a wide program of monument construction all over Eastern Europe in order to secure goodwill towards the USSR in the future, a proposal which was eventually carried out.[14] Indeed, the first major War monuments commissioned by the Soviet government were constructed in Eastern and Central European capitals – such as Vienna, Warsaw, and Berlin – rather than in the USSR proper.[15]

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[11] Qtd. in Zotov, *Mukhina, Vera Ignat'evna*, 12-13.
[12] Qtd. in Margarita Nekhezina, *Russkii Mikelandzhelo: o tvorchestve Evgeniia Vucheticha* (Volgograd: Izdatel', 2011), 19; Vuchetich and Belopol'skii, "Pamiatnik general-leitenantu Efremovu," 29.
[13] RGASPI/17/125/299/39-79.
[14] Though not explicitly in response to Gundorov's memo, RGASPI/17/125/368/6-11.
[15] Nataliya Danilova, *The Politics of War Commemoration in the UK and Russia* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 149-150; Petr Suzdalev, *Sovetskoe iskusstvo perioda Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny* (Moscow: Sovetskii khudozhnik, 1965), 214-215; Serhy Yekelchyk, *Stalin's Citizens: Everyday Politics in the Wake of Total War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 62.

Applying Pierre Bourdieu's concept, Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson refer to monuments as "symbolic capital."[16] Extending this metaphor, monuments binding future generations to the Stalinist political project were regarded as a form of capital investment with potentially immense future political returns. As mentioned, the costs of this monumental construction program were colossal, dwarfing the operating expenses of radio and print. Monumental art and architecture's field of action, however, was temporally indefinite. Thus, in at least some sense, "immortalization" represented an investment in future "propaganda" returns (the effectiveness of which I speculate on in the epilogue).

Despite reconciling the "propaganda thesis" with genuine "immortalization" goals, "immortalization" cannot be reduced entirely to its instrumental uses. I would like to return to an issue identified in Section 1.3, namely, the remarkable level of involvement of the political leadership in the "immortalization" program. It presents an opportunity to think not only about the interests of the regime in general, but also to see how these were defined (and subverted to personal ends) by the narrow, oligarchical elite which controlled it. The remainder of this section argues that political leaders and functionaries themselves desired to be "immortalized," and that this desire characterizes them as subjects, rather than solely purveyors, of the "immortalization" myth.

From the 1930s, the subject matter of Soviet monumentalism shifted markedly in favour of representing political leaders over abstract ideas or collective groups.[17] Under functionalist readings of leader cults, Stalinist monuments were key means for establishing the legitimacy of the regime and its rulers. But sensitivity to "immortalization," and the future-oriented nature of these objects, allows one to see them not only as instrumental (for instance, as investments in future memory), but also as ends in themselves. I draw on

[16] Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, "Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet–Era Monuments and Post–Soviet National Identity in Moscow," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 92, no. 3 (2002): 527.
[17] Cohen, "From Bourgeois Militarism to Soviet Patriotism."

sociologist Charles Horton Cooley's characterization of such desires: people "will always feel the need to believe in the appreciation of posterity; they will appeal from the present to the future […] The desire for fame is simply a larger form of personal ambition […] it reflects the need to associate ourselves with some enduring reality, raised above the accidents of time […] All of us would regard it as the mark of a superior mind to wish to *be* something of imperishable worth, but social beings as we are, we can hardly separate this wish from that for social recognition of the worth."[18]

As mentioned in Section 1.2, biographers of Stalin refer to the dictator's desire for fame everlasting. Furthermore, contemporaries who knew Stalin best acted as though the fantasy of being remembered well would appeal to him. Thus, for instance, in a desperate attempt to regain the good graces of Stalin, the soon-to-be-executed Karl Radek penned the lengthy article "The Architect of Socialist Society*."* Radek's utopian vision of the Soviet future was framed as a 1967 history lecture by a professor who points out Stalin's pivotal role in the attainment of world communism. It was evidently well-received and was published prominently in *Pravda,* as well as in stand-alone editions.[19] Similarly, NKVD chief Lavrentii Beriia's birthday greetings to Stalin waxed eloquent: "only future generations will be able to entirely comprehend the full picture of the historical process of communist construction, which was inspired and organized by comrade Stalin."[20]

In monumental art and architecture, key turning-points (the commissioning of the Palace of Soviets, and the launch of the Pantheon design competition) were explicitly linked to "immortalizing" the memory of Stalin. The proportion of monuments, statues, memorial plaques, and visual representations of Stalin (which were only at rare points second to Lenin)

[18] Charles Horton Cooley, "From 'Social Process'," in *The Collective Memory Reader*, ed. Jeffrey Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 135.
[19] Karl Radek, "Zodchii sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva," *Pravda*, 1 January 1934; also see Robert Tucker, *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1992), 244-247.
[20] Lavrentii Beriia, "Velichaishii chelovek istorii," in *Stalin. K 60-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia. Sbornik statei "Pravdy"* (Moscow: Pravda, 1940), 102.

is also noteworthy. Already in the mid-1930s, Moscow was replete with mass-produced sculptures of Stalin and other leaders.[21] From 1938-1941, the factory "Monumentskul'ptura" alone produced 2647 statues and 4096 busts of Stalin, 859 statues and 80 busts of Kirov, 1124 statues and 2580 busts of Kalinin, and 754 busts of Voroshilov.[22] As John Steinbeck commented in his travel diary in 1947: "everything in the Soviet Union takes place under fixed stare of the plaster, bronze, drawn or embroidered eye of Stalin […] Statues of him dignify the façade of every public building. His bust stands in front of all airports, railway and bus stations […] In parks, he sits on plaster benches and discusses something or other with Lenin […] He is everywhere."[23]

The desire for immortal fame was by no means limited to Stalin. Getty and others speak of "little Stalins," secondary functionaries at the top or eminent regional satraps, with their own minor cults.[24] Their representations in monumental art, Zolotonosov notes, were organized by "a strict rank […] as follows: full statue, bust, bas-relief. Say, in Moscow and Leningrad Voroshilov could not have a full statue, and Kaganovich could count only on a bas-relief."[25] The value placed on legacy-building may also be extrapolated from communists' vindictive actions towards their deceased comrades, who were compromised retroactively. For instance, Robert Tucker recounts that "Nestor Lakoba, the popular party chief of Georgia's Abkhazia region […] was poisoned on Beriia's orders in 1936, buried with

[21] RGALI/962/3/51/7.
[22] Zolotonosov, *Gliptokratos. Issledovanie nemogo diskursa*, 137. Statistics for the "Vsekokhudoznik" trust and Moscow's "Skul'ptura" cooperative (*tovarishchestvo*) show comparable numbers: hundreds of half-figure sculptures and thousands of busts of Stalin, Kirov, Ordzhonikidze and others produced in 1939 alone, GARF/A259/38/376/74-88.
[23] Qtd. in Bown, *Art under Stalin*, 175.
[24] Getty, *Practicing Stalinism*, 167; Malte Rolf, "The Leader's Many Bodies: Leader Cults and Mass Festivals in Voronezh, Novosibirsk, and Kemerovo in the 1930s," in *Personality Cults in Stalinism*, ed. Jan Plamper and Klaus Heller (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2004); Tucker, *Stalin in Power*, 564-565.
[25] Zolotonosov, *Gliptokratos. Issledovanie nemogo diskursa*, 137; also see Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art*, 232-233.

honors, only to be exhumed in 1937 and posthumously execrated as an enemy of the people."[26]

The "immortalization" program was, of course, broader than Stalin and the topmost leadership, as I go on to demonstrate. The practice of "immortalizing" was bureaucratically regularized and did not always require Politburo participation (Stalin's signature is notably absent even from Politburo-approved "immortalization" decrees). However, representations of other "immortalized" subjects were often linked back to Stalin. As Golomstock observes, "the depiction of any historical event or real situation [was] like an individual flourish in a splendid frame surrounding the portrait of the leader."[27]

Various means were used to "insert" Stalin into the most varied subjects of "immortalization." His visage – frescoed, painted, sculpted – was truly ubiquitous, adorning the interiors of most monumental constructions. Sometimes, it was placed in a dialogue of sorts with the specific "immortalized" subject. Thus, for instance, the statue of war heroine Zoia Kosmodemianskaia faced Stalin's portrait on the platform of Moscow's "Izmailovskii PKiO im. Stalina" metro station.[28] At the same station, Manizer's sculpture "The Partisans" was also over-topped by a bas-relief of Stalin on the wall behind it.[29] As Zolotonosov observes, the famous "Worker and Kolkhoz Woman" statue subtly alluded to the dictator through its choice of material (stainless steel) and the profile view of the hammer and sickle, which formed the Cyrillic letters "CT."[30] Stalin's "signature" could also be appended by means of inscriptions: quotations from his speeches and writings, with attributions. One may likewise point to the Stalin quotations engraved in subway stations, on the face of the

[26] Tucker, *Stalin in Power*, 488., also see GARF/R3316/30/545/1 This is aside from the obvious need to "update" cities named in honour of those now fallen from grace. Thus, the city of Lakoba reverted to Gudauta, just as Zinov'evsk was renamed to Kirovo.
[27] Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art*, 235; also see Plamper, *The Stalin Cult*, 40-41.
[28] Adrienne Harris, "Memorializations of a Martyr and Her Mutilated Bodies: Public Monuments to Soviet War Hero Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, 1942 to the Present," *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 5, no. 1 (2012): 77.
[29] Zinov'ev, *Stalinskoe metro*, 140.
[30] Zolotonosov, *Gliptokratos. Issledovanie nemogo diskursa*, 108-109.

monumental Frunze Military Academy building, on the locks of Volga-Don Canal, on monuments to the War, and elsewhere.

At other times, particularly in larger monumental compositions, Stalin monuments were constructed to dominate over the entire *ensemble*. One such towered over the 1939 VSKhV at a height of over 25 metres.[31] In designing MGU Main Building, the Construction Directorate proposed a crowning Stalin statue (which was ultimately rejected in favour of the alternative, spire topped design, perhaps in the interests of harmonizing with other high-rises).[32] In Erevan, however, the "Victory Monument to the Great Patriotic War" (1950) effectively became a 29-metre pedestal for Merkurov's enormous statue of Stalin (see **Figure 4**).

In some cases, the insertion of Stalin into the subject of "immortalization" bordered on a takeover of the entire theme. The paramount example is perhaps the design of the Palace of Soviets. I have already noted how the Palace of the Soviets was adapted during the Great Patriotic War to memorialize contemporary themes. Yet an even stronger, parallel process involved the gradual transmutation of the building conceived of and officially named the "Palace of the Soviets – A Monument to Lenin," into a veritable monument to *Stalin*. At an exhibition of Iofan's designs in early 1934, one visitor-book entry lamented the lack of Stalin representations.[33] By the 1939 V Plenum of the SSA SSSR Directorate (a conference which focused on the Palace of Soviets design), the case was the opposite: at the expense of Lenin, the design increasingly referenced Stalin. The main entrance's six massive columns were to be dedicated to and inscribed with Stalin's six oaths made at Lenin's funeral.[34] The Palace's second-largest chamber was named the Hall of the Stalin Constitution, to be decorated

[31] Its successor was to be 15-17 metre bronze statue on a granite pedestal, towering to a total of 28-30 metres, see GARF/R5446/86/2448/73, GARF/R5446/86/3314/29-30.
[32] TsGAM/694/1/697/143.
[33] TsGAM/694/1/44/82.
[34] RGASPI/17/132/424/13; Atarov, *Dvorets Sovetov*, 19.

accordingly.[35] In its 1938 iteration, the planned "Museum of Soviet Socialist Culture" (located on the upper levels of the Palace) was to have devoted half of its exhibition space to "the implementation of Lenin's ideas and complete triumph of socialism in the USSR under the leadership of Stalin."[36] Given Stalin's thematic takeover, it is unsurprising that speeches at the V Plenum referred to the Palace not only as a memorial to Lenin, but also a monument to the "triumphs of socialism and the Stalin Constitution,"[37] "to the Stalin epoch,"[38] "to the Lenin-Stalin epoch,"[39] "to the power and might of the Stalin epoch,"[40] and "to socialism and communism, to the great Stalin epoch."[41]

The transmutation of the "Palace of the Soviets – a Monument to Lenin" into a monument to Stalin and his epoch was not only a "takeover." It can also be viewed in the context of what anthropologist Sergei Oushakine conceptualizes as "chronographical suturing": "by bringing the two separate time frames together, this chronographic suturing, this temporal montage of two autonomous time frames (past and present), simultaneously leaves out all traces of historical, political, or […] ideological incommensurability of the two periods. The formal semblance […] is presented as an indication of a more profound – substantive – similarity."[42] "Chronographical suturing" was a technique in the wider arsenal

[35] Vladimir Gel'freikh, "Arkhitekura inter'erov. Doklad prof. V. G. Gel'freikha," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 31.
[36] This included such themes as Stalin's [sic] struggle for industrialization (250-300 m^2), Stalin's struggle for collectivization (250-300 m^2), Stalin's struggle for completing the construction of a socialist society and creating the new Constitution (750 m^2), as well as rooms devoted to both Lenin and Stalin's print works, dedicated art, along with movie theatres for screening documentaries about their lives, TsGAM/694/1/136/3-7, 36-37.
[37] Andrei Prokof'ev, *The Palace of Soviets* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing, 1939), 6.
[38] Gel'freikh, "Arkhitekura inter'erov," 26, 32; Iofan, "Stroitel'stvo Dvortsa Sovetov," 12; Boris Korolev, "Skul'ptury Dvotsa. Doklad skul'ptora B. D. Koroleva (Moskovskii Soiuz sovetskikh khudozhnikov-skul'ptorov)," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR.*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 41.
[39] Lansere, "Monumental'naia zhivopis'," 36.
[40] V. Valev, "Skul'ptor V. Ts. Valev (Moskva)," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 68.
[41] A. Zaslavskii, "Arkh. A. M. Zaslavskii (Moskva)," in *Arkhitektura Dvortsa Sovetov. Materialy V plenuma Pravleniia SSA SSSR*, ed. I. Sushkevich (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1939), 81.
[42] Serguei Oushakine, "Remembering in Public: On the Affective Management of History," *Ab Imperio* 2013, no. 1 (2013): 273.

of Stalinist historical politics. History was mobilized to demonstrate the continuity of statehood and nationhood across the 1917 divide, as well as to minimize the shift from Leninist to Stalinist political practice. In such narratives, the final, Stalin epoch was presented as the glorious culmination of all preceding history. In the case of the Palace of the Soviets, the insertion of Stalin into an ostensible monument to Lenin strengthened Stalin's legitimacy by presenting him as Lenin's "true" heir. It also allowed Stalin to capitalize on the (both spontaneous and artificially-manufactured) popularity of Lenin.

Stalin was also "chronographically sutured" to other "immortalized" events. Moscow's "Ploshchad' Revoliutsii" metro station, whose 76 bronze sculptures chronicled Soviet history, concluded with a bas-relief of Stalin holding the Constitution, at the end of the platform.[43] "Kievskaia-kol'tsevaia" station's 18 mosaics depicted important events in the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations; Stalin's image found its way into "I. V. Lenin's Proclamation of Soviet Power in Ukraine. October 1917," and "The Unification of the Entire Ukrainian People into a Single Ukraine Soviet State."[44] "Komsomol'skaia-kol'tsevaia's" 8 mosaics illustrated Russia's military tradition, featuring Aleksandr Nevskii, Dmitrii Donskoi, Kuz'ma Minin and Dmitrii Pozharskii, Aleksandr Suvorov, and Mikhail Kutuzov. Stalin concluded this glorious line, being featured in the final three (!) mosaics: "Presenting the Banner" (depicting the famous November 1941 parade on the Red Square), "The Capture of the Reichstag," and "The Victory Day Parade."[45]

Of course, ubiquitous references to Stalin can still be interpreted through the functionalist lens (as part of the leader cult). However, as mentioned, such interpretations ignore the specificity of monumental constructions as future-oriented objects, which is hard

[43] Dushkin, "Stantsiia 'Ploshchad' Revoliutsii'. 1935-1938," 151. A similar concept informed the design of "Elektrozavodskaia" station, whose sculptures depict military and civilian industrial production, concluding with an image of Stalin at the end of the platform, Zinov'ev, *Stalinskoe metro*, 134.
[44] Zinov'ev, *Stalinskoe metro*, 204.
[45] Ibid., 177-178.

to reconcile with the "leader cult" interpretation. What pragmatic, political goals could perdurable representations of Stalin achieve in the distant future? A deceased dictator is unable to capitalize on cult objects, and his successors, only in a limited way. Taken together, indirect testimonials to Stalin's vanity, and the penchant of Soviet leaders for durable, monumental representations of themselves, support the idea that the political leadership itself believed in the "immortalization" myth, desiring fame everlasting, quite apart from any pragmatic, instrumental considerations.

5.2 Artists and architects

The producers of monumental art and architecture responded enthusiastically to the "immortalization" program. After all, building perdurable objects for posterity offered sculptors, monumental artists, and architects the chance to have their work and names "immortalized." Moreover, by creating the first Socialist Realist classics, as well as in laying the foundations of future monumental *ensembles*, art and architecture professionals savoured the opportunity of becoming canonized, of being a key reference point in all future artistic/ architectural creation. The regime recognized the "immortalization" program's inherent appeal to artists and architects, and cleverly used it to demand greater quality and political conscientiousness of them, for their creations had a heightened, historical importance. But art professionals also used the shared "immortalization" myth strategically, demanding commissions and extra resources from political leaders, for work of such eternal significance.

On a superficial, performative level, the art and architecture professions appeared excited about the prospect of moulding future memory and satisfied with their preeminent position in fashioning the definitive and lasting representation of their times. In the early 1930s, Zholtovskii confessed: "with the passage of time I feel more deeply and sharply the

greatness and responsibility of the social role of the architect, [for] the history of our epoch may be read in the future from our architectural monuments."[46] Mukhina spoke of the "immortalization" of Great Patriotic War heroes as a "soul-deep need," which would be carried out with "enthusiasm […] great zeal and love."[47] Sculptor Ivan Shadr's explanatory note accompanying his model of the Chkalov monument bombastically proclaimed: "The sculptor INJECTS LIFE INTO STONE! To him ETERNITY is subject! He has the power to brand his enemy with shame for time eternal, and to passionately glorify his hero-friend in a Bronze legend."[48]

But proclamations of this sort may have concealed ulterior motives. Monumental constructions would go down in history not only as monuments to the *subjects* they "immortalized," but also as "artistic monuments," durable testaments to the work of artists and architects.[49] Lansere's earliest diary entries exemplify artists' ambitions of being "immortalized," of going down in history. "I want to serve humanity, to be great and to be preserved in history [...] Art is the only immortal history (at least it seems so), it is the voice of the People, it is the voice of God! I want to be an artist, and a great one, the greatest artist!" he recorded in 1893.[50] Later that year, he elaborated: "I must remain after my death for millennia. I do not desire […] wealth, glamour, fame during my life. I'd rather starve to death in an attic, but then, to have my name thunder through the universe and remain forever

[46] Ivan Zholtovskii, "Printsip zodchestva," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 5 (1933): 28.
[47] Mukhina, *Literaturno-kriticheskoe nasledie*, 145, 160.
[48] Ivan Shadr, *Literaturnoe nasledie. Perepiska. Vospominaniia o skul'ptore* (Moscow: Izobrazitel'noe iskusstvo, 1978), 140., also see RGALI/2942/1/132/26
[49] Thus, for instance, the sculptor Boris Korolev argued that while "the Palace of the Soviets is the greatest monument to the Stalin epoch […] we do not doubt that it will also become the greatest monument of our art," Korolev, "Skul'ptura Dvortsa Dovetov," 19; Korolev, "Skul'ptury Dvotsa," 41.
[50] Evgenii Lansere, *Dnevniki. Kniga pervaia. Vospitanie chuvstv* (Moscow: Iskusstvo-XXI vek, 2008), 23-24.

great and unshakable."[51] More modestly, Deineka suggested that he "would like to show his biography through [his] works."[52]

In this context, monumental art and constructions, which were to stand for centuries, were seen as vehicles for "immortalizing" their creators' names. In 1951, sculptor Sergei Konenkov had the audacity to state this explicitly in an argument with the Artistic-Expert Council of the KPDI SM SSSR, which was reviewing his monument to the gynecologist Vladimir Snegirev. "An artist must do as he wanted to originally, he notes all the criticism and does as he wishes, because this is not a monument to Snegirev, this is a moment to Konenkov. They don't say the Medici monument; they say Michelangelo's monument."[53] In 1941, at Shadr's funeral, Mukhina publicly pledged to finish the Gor'kii monument, on which he had been working, "in his [Shadr's] memory."[54] Five years later, Mukhina complained in a 1946 letter to Stalin that several of her own monumental projects were languishing without a decision to go ahead. Urging speedy decisions, she confessed: "I am already 57 years old and I want to succeed in leaving something behind for the country."[55]

Aside from being physically permanent testaments to their creators, monuments and monumental constructions could potentially join the emerging Soviet artistic canon – an even more powerful way of sustaining the artist's legacy. After all, canons functioned not only as a censorship device but, as Hans Gunther notes, also created "barriers (if not a dam) against the flow of time and change[, having] a stabilizing function."[56] With Socialist Realism proclaimed early in this period, artists and architects were fascinated by the opportunity to consciously fashion a new, stable canon, a lasting template that would affect all subsequent

[51] Ibid., 98.
[52] Aleksandr Deineka, "Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Deineka," in *Mastera sovetskogo izobrazitel'nogo iskusstva: proizvedeniia i avtobiograficheskie ocherki*, ed. P. Sysoev and Viacheslav Shkvarikov (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1951), 230.
[53] RGALI/2458/2/1526/256.
[54] RGALI/3024/1/20/1.
[55] RGASPI/17/125/466/93.
[56] Hans Gunther, "Zhiznennye fazy sotsrealisticheskogo kanona," in *Sotrealisticheskii kanon*, ed. Evgenii Dobrenko and Hans Gunther (St. Petersburg: Akademicheskii proekt, 2000), 281.

art. Stalin himself had called for the creation of "Soviet classics" in 1936 (in a conversation with the author Mikhail Sholokhov and directors of the opera "Quiet Flows the Don"), a slogan thereafter endlessly repeated.[57] The excitement of art and architecture professionals in defining Socialist Realism can be felt clearly, but for many, "pathbreaking" was coupled with the opportunity for "trendsetting." Deineka, for instance, felt that he and other Soviet artists were "pioneers and in this sense people will learn from us."[58] Manizer was even more explicit: "We are standing at the doorstep of the new, remarkable art of a communist society. We cannot but feel satisfaction from the awareness that the foundations of this art are being laid by *us*" [italics mine].[59]

Artists and architects were cognisant that their creations would become the templates that would be copied subsequently. This was particularly so given the formulaic, ritualized, iconic quality of Socialist Realist artistic production, which rested fundamentally on the mimicry of canonical "proper language […] and syntax."[60] The Palace of Soviets, it was said, would stand "in the centuries as a classical model of Socialist Realism."[61] Monumental artist Isaak Rabinovich referred to the Moscow metro as a "sketch […] of the great socialist style of the future."[62] At a 1950 meeting discussing the Michurin monument for the VSKhV, it was stated that in the future, "everyone will be aligning themselves with our sculpture."[63] Merkurov was even accosted by jealous colleagues for his "monopoly" on making death masks of Soviet leaders.[64]

[57] "Na puti k sovetskoi klassike," *Iskusstvo,* no. 5 (1951): 4.
[58] Qtd. in Christina Kiaer, "Was Socialist Realism Forced Labour? The Case of Aleksandr Deineka in the 1930s," *Oxford Art Journal* 28, no. 3 (2005): 338.
[59] Manizer, *Skul'ptor o svoei rabote. Tom 2*, 50.
[60] Clark, *The Soviet Novel*, 13.
[61] Valev, "Skul'ptor V. Ts. Valev," 68-69.
[62] RGALI/2932/1/777/21. Similarly, one visitor-book comment from the opening of the metro stations of the second phase of construction (1938) proclaimed: "[This is] the art of the future, the foundations of which are being laid today," TsGAM/278/1/124/7.
[63] RGAE/7857/1ch3/3789/34-35.
[64] RGALI/962/6/50/23.

Architectural creations could achieve canonicity in an additional way: through the dictates of *ensemble* construction. *Ensembles*, as previously explained, demanded that the architecture of a given area be coherent and complimentary. The form and style of contemporary constructions was in part limited by its historical antecedents, although through superior size and central location, it could (and was expected to) dominate the *ensemble*. Given that a similar attitude towards *ensembles* was expected in the future, these contemporary monumental constructions would set the tone for the *future* architecture of the surrounding areas.

Thus, Iofan explained, "it is our monumental structures that will influence decisively the crystallization of the new Soviet architectural style, the character [*obraz*] of our new and reconstructed cities."[65] "A new page in the history of architecture is opened" by Soviet monumental buildings, for they "determine the composition of the city for decades and centuries to come."[66] Thus, the Palace of Soviets would "determine the style of Moscow."[67] Its sheer size demanded "boulevards, parterres, sculpture, fountains, and pools," as well as a string of large, monumental public buildings – of which the postwar high-rises were an example.[68] These high-rises, in turn, were expected to determine the future development of their surrounding neighbourhoods. "The high-rises initiate, rather than conclude, a most important period in Moscow's reconstruction, they become a powerful point of departure for the radical reconstruction of large adjacent neighbourhoods," stated Kolli.[69] "These buildings […] open entirely new prospects for the further development of the city as a huge holistic

[65] Boris Iofan, "Vosstanovlenie nashikh gorodov i zadachi arkhitektury," *Izvestiia*, 12 September 1944, 3.
[66] Respectively, ibid.; L. Perchik, *Bol'shevistskii plan rekonstruktsii Moskvy* (Moscow: Partizdat, 1935), 98; ibid.
[67] Ivan Zholtovskii, "Klassika zhivet," *Sovetskoe iskusstvo*, 15 March 1932, 1.
[68] Boris Iofan, "Ploshchad' i prospekt Dvotsa Sovetov," *Arkhitektura SSSR*, no. 11 (1935): 28.
[69] Nikolai Kolli, "O nekotorykh osobennostiakh ansamblevoi zastroiki gorodov," in *Problema ansamblia v sovetskoi arkhitekture. Sbornik statei*, ed. K. Trapeznikov (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo literatury po stroitel'stvu i arkhitekture, 1952), 30; also see Gel'freikh and Minkus, "Vystonye zdaniia v ansamble goroda," 2.

ensemble," agreed Zakharov.[70] Thus, new monumental constructions were expected to become in some sense canonical, remaining the reference point for generations of builders to come.

The regime recognized the desire of artists and architects to be "immortalized" through their work and used this yearning to its advantage. The opportunity to participate in the "immortalization" program (and by extension, to be "immortalized") was framed as a gift from the state.[71] As then-Vice President of the Academy of Architecture summarized: "the Party and government create all the conditions for fruitful work for Moscow architects, for implementing great creative ideas, which will immortalize the great feats of the Lenin-Stalin epoch."[72] "The socialist state provides architects with everything for creating unified ensembles subordinated to their organized creative will," one critic proclaimed.[73] Editorials in professional periodicals referred to the "honourable and important" roles, the "historically unprecedented task of exceptional influence in the future" that artists and architects had been given through their commission to build for the centuries.[74]

At points, the regime directly facilitated artists' ambitions for personal "immortalization." Following the deaths of Shchusev and Vesnin, the Council of Ministers decreed that memorial plaques be affixed to the architects' major constructions.[75] As mentioned, the KPDA SM SSSR even discussed regularizing the procedure (although this initiative eventually stalled). Not only was it suggested that memorial plaques be affixed to major Soviet buildings immediately at their unveiling, architects were to design their own text for the plaque.[76] The state also dangled the prospect of "immortalization" to interest

[70] Zakharov, "Arkhitekturnyi ansambl' v zastroike," 10.
[71] Or as gifts within the patron-client relationship that characterized the patronage networks of Stalinist artistic production generally, see Plamper, *The Stalin Cult*, 145-164.
[72] Karo Alabian, "Perveishii dolg arkhitektorov," *Moskovskii stroitel'*, 28 March 1953, 2.
[73] Kornfel'd, *Laureaty Stalinskoi premii v arkhitekture*, 17.
[74] "O monumental'noi skul'pture," 6; "Zhiznennye zadachi arkhitekturnoi praktiki," 1.
[75] GARF/R5446/51/3099/5-6; GARF/R5446/80/3090/9.
[76] TsGAM/534/1/110/164. Considering that engineers would be offended if their work went unacknowledged, it was decided to recognize lead engineers on such plaques as well, TsGAM/534/1/110/156.

artists and architects in its projects. Thus, for instance, Lansere's diary testifies to the admonitions of the artistic director of the Palace of the Soviets construction, who confronted Lansere's lack of interest: "How can you be so petty! The Bolshoi theatre [the reconstruction of which Lansere was working on – A.K.] – that is, perhaps, for 100 years, but the Palace of the Soviets – that is for 1000 years. The [Lenin] library will disappear [with time], the Bolshoi Theatre will disappear, but the Palace of the Soviets will stand!" Lansere remained unconvinced about the value of the Palace, but, importantly, only insofar as it was a poor means to building his own legacy. "The subjects of the Palace of the Soviets are boring and false, how is one to be inspired by them… [it is] scholasticism, which with the passage of time will perhaps become as abstract [as] anything."[77]

The regime also employed the "immortalization" myth in an attempt to convince artists and architects of the need for higher quality work. Being a monument to the epoch "lays an extra responsibility on creators of [the Moscow metro]," cautioned Tosunova.[78] An early 1947 report of the Ministry of State Audits, which criticized the state of artistic production, also included a reminder that immortalization "requires of artists a deep appreciation and understanding of their responsibility before the people, before history."[79] Monumental art and architecture were permanent; therefore, any imperfections would be preserved for centuries. As a 1946 Resolution of the SSA stated: "the Soviet architect should remember that each of his works is not only a part of his personal artistic portfolio, but is above all a part of the Soviet construction project, into which are invested the resources and efforts of the whole people, and that every architectural mistake, executed in concrete and stone, is almost impossible to fix."[80] A representative of the KPDI SNK SSSR, in the 1937

[77] Evgenii Lansere, *Dnevniki. Kniga tret'ia. Khudozhnik i gosudarstvo* (Moscow: Iskusstvo-XXI vek, 2009), 454.
[78] Tosunova, "Arkhitekturnyi obraz stantsii," 22.
[79] RGASPI/17/125/572/64.
[80] Arkhitektorov, *Tvorcheskie voprosy*, 6; also see Alabian, "Aktual'nye voprosy arkhitekturnogo tvorchestva," 2.

competition for the Gor'kii monument, explained that unlike mass sculptures, "monuments are made of durable materials and are intended to last many decades and centuries." A monument cannot be simply "replaced by a better one" if it turns out to be poor, and "that is why […] we are so careful and so highly critical towards each entry."[81]

Because of their profound effects on canon formation and the future *ensembles*, monumental constructions could also jeopardize future developments. Thus, an opponent of Iofan's Palace of Soviets design, the artist Boris Chernyshev, warned in 1934 that "in the case of [the design's] implementation, it will leave a heavy mark on all architecture and art in the coming years."[82] To be sure, the approval of monumental constructions was heavily curated, and the Stalinist artistic canon was malleable enough to accommodate retroactive exclusions (once again, at the behest of political powers). Exhortations to higher quality acted as a subtle reminder that the regime held the ultimate keys to the "immortalization" of artists' and architects' works and names.

However, the idea that "immortalization" demanded higher quality was itself coopted by artists and architects, and was used to criticize the works of their colleagues in the competitive environment of Stalinist art production. At a meeting discussing Moscow's wartime exhibition "Heroic Front and Rearguard," Merkurov argued that the majority of works were mediocre and "could serve history only as auxiliary material for major works in the future."[83] Merkurov applied the same logic in explaining why Iofan should not take offence at criticism of his postwar plans for the reconstruction of the Vakhtangov Theatre. It is important that people a century later would stop at the sight of the building and praise the work of the architect, Merkurov explained, "and that they may pause and say – what a fine fellow – that is why we must criticize [Iofan]"[84] At an early 1949 meeting of Moscow's

[81] RGALI/2942/1/104/3.
[82] TsGAM/694/1/44/80.
[83] Merkurov, *Vospominania. Pis'ma. Stat'i*, 405.
[84] TsGAM/534/1/40/94.

Architectural Council discussing V. Duvidzon's design of a residential building, the chairman and Lead Architect of Moscow was merciless:

> We are not allowed to make architectural and planning mistakes […] The house should stand for centuries, for no one gave us the right to build houses which, by their architecture, become outdated [...] We would like to leave this meeting having endorsed your design [but] I would have to present this design to the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Soviet, to defend it as a project of high Soviet architectural quality, as a building that will stand for centuries. I'm sure that if I do that, they'll turn their backs on me.[85]

Yet artists and architects also used the "immortalization" myth strategically in interactions with the regime itself, to pressure leaders for more commissions and resources. Thus, for instance, the painter Evgenii Katsman, petitioning Voroshilov to paint Stalin from life, argued that he "[is waiting] for those hours when we can do the kind of work that our contemporaries and descendants will be grateful for."[86] Similarly, artists from MOSSKh lobbied Voroshilov for permission to take sketches of Kirov at his funeral, arguing that the "immortalization in the fine arts of S. M. Kirov's memory is indispensable."[87] In the late 1930s, worrying about finding an adequate location and plinth for her "Worker and Kolkhoz Woman" monument in Moscow, Mukhina considered suggesting that the pedestal function as monument to the Constitution, with the text engraved in steel lettering.[88] Deineka, for his part, recommended that the funds spent on ephemeral outdoor decorations (for mass festivities), could instead "be used more rationally and seriously if they were directed towards creation of outdoor frescoes executed in durable materials."[89]

[85] TsGAM/534/1/157/38, 43.
[86] Qtd. in Plamper, *The Stalin Cult*, 144.
[87] Qtd. in ibid., 150.
[88] Mukhina, *Literaturno-kriticheskoe nasledie*, 106.
[89] Deineka, "K voprosu o monumental'nom iskusstve," 5.

As shown above, the "immortalization" program spoke directly to the personal ambitions of artists and architects. "Immortalization" was intended to perpetuate the memory of events and individuals, but for art and architecture professionals, it presented an opportunity to "immortalize" their artistic creations and names. Not only would perdurable monumental constructions remain physically preserved, they could also enter the Soviet artistic canon and determine the character of the future *ensembles*. The fact that the "immortalization" was widely desired by artists and architects allowed the regime to harness this ambition to its own ends. Participation in the monument-building "immortalization" program was presented as a gift from the state, but one which was dependent on high-quality artistic output (and, to be sure, political conscientiousness). But artists and architects also navigated the "immortalization" myth strategically, deploying it to criticize the work of their competitors, and to press the regime for commissions. Artists and architects knew that that the leaders wanted to be "immortalized," but the regime knew that the same was true of them.

5.3 The Soviet public

Unsurprisingly, gauging the attitudes of the Soviet public toward "immortalization" is a difficult methodological question, particularly given the shortage of "private" testimony. Nonetheless, in line with previous approaches to public opinion in this time-period, the public performance of "true believers" may provide some insights, however limited. As this section will demonstrate, a substantial record documents attempts to participate in the "immortalization" process on the part of a significant segment of the Soviet public. Moreover, this level of (performed or genuine) support probably convinced the regime that "immortalization," collective or individual, was widely desired. Therefore, regime propaganda focused not on explaining *why* "immortalization" was desirable – which it took

for granted – but on showcasing its efforts to "immortalize" deserving individuals and the collective achievements of the Soviet people.

Focusing solely on individuals who left a public record (in letters to newspapers, Party-state institutions, political functionaries, artists and architects, as well as comments left in visitor books), reveals support for the "immortalization" program and myth (or, at any rate, an enthusiastic reproduction of the officially-sanctioned "immortalization" discourse). Public viewings of models of monuments and monumental constructions were frequently organized and evidently were well attended. These included exhibitions of designs from the second and fourth phases of the Palace of the Soviets competition, models of the 1938 competition for Gor'kii monuments, and many others. Indeed, a 1941 KPDI SNK SSSR decree ordered competition organizers to hold public exhibitions of all submitted monument designs of "significant social-political interest."[90] Such public viewings usually offered the opportunity of commenting in visitor-books.

The practice of "open competitions" provided another avenue for public participation in "immortalization." The 1932 open competition for the Palace of Soviets attracted over one hundred and fifty designs from workers.[91] In 1935, the youth newspaper *Kolkhoznye rebiata* solicited design proposals for the Pavlik Morozov monument, receiving over 500 designs from Young Pioneers.[92] By the tail end of the period (February 1955), the second, open round of the Pantheon design competition received 957 public submissions.[93] These were in addition to over fifteen hundred unsolicited suggestions received during the preceding, closed phase of the competition.[94]

[90] RGALI/962/6/1402/17. The 1943 Resolution of the All-Union Conference on Sculpture widened this to include commissioned sculptures that would be mass-produced, RGALI/962/6/1118/4.
[91] Tolstoi, "Poiski monumental'nosti," 3; also see N. Bekker, "Dvorets Sovetov i tvorcheskaia samodeiatel'nost' trudiashchikhsia," *Sovetskaia arkhitektura*, no. 2-3 (1932).
[92] "Pamiatnik Pavliku Morozovu," *Pravda*, July 24 1935.
[93] RGALI/674/3/1946/1-2.
[94] RGAE/339/1/1132/196.

Naturally, such public expressions suffer from "response bias." As Bown warns, "the available evidence of letters to the press, visitors' books and so on can only give a limited and risky view" of public opinion.[95] In the context of the Stalinist terror, critical letters could be traced back to their owners. Similarly, as Plamper reveals, visitor-books at exhibitions were often signed under the watchful eye of guards posted nearby.[96] Critical comments were sometimes redacted from visitor books. The perceived function of visitor-comments also influenced content. For instance, one visitor to the All-Union Art Exhibition of 1950 was openly self-conscious about the significance of the visitor-book as a future source for historians, urging his fellow commentators: "Comrade viewers! More genuine, honest, and cultured critiques! The people's visitor comment book is a document of our times, not a joke."[97] It is therefore unsurprising that public expressions dovetailed with the major themes of the "immortalization" program.

Nonetheless, as Devlin argues, "unsolicited demonstrations of loyalty were reassuring confirmations that the oft-repeated public professions of faith and loyalty were not wholly without substance."[98] After all, letters and visitor-book comments were never compulsory. Equally significant is the absence of tangible ulterior "rewards" for such expressions. Thus, as Susan Reid argues, visitor-books represent "one of the few material records we have of Soviet society representing itself, talking to itself, and articulating its identities and divisions without the intervention of an editor."[99] Similarly, writes Sheila Fitzpatrick, "letters to the authorities is as close to a public sphere as one is likely to get during the Stalin period."[100] Indeed, a considerable number of *unprompted* proposals and suggestions for monuments

[95] Bown, *Art under Stalin*, 95.
[96] Plamper, *The Stalin Cult*, 206.
[97] RGALI/2458/2/210/31.
[98] Judith Devlin, "Soviet Power and Its Images: Celebrating Stalin's Seventieth Birthday," in *War of Words: Culture and the Mass Media in the Making of the Cold War in Europe*, ed. Judith Devlin and Christoph Muller (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2013), 34.
[99] Reid, "In the Name of the People," 680.
[100] Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s," *Slavic Review* 55, no. 1 (1996): 80.

made their way to individual artists and political leaders, Party-state institutions, and newspapers.[101] Merkurov testified to receiving vast quantities of letters with suggestions about his work on the Palace of Soviets, and even complained about this to Voroshilov.[102]

The genuineness and spontaneity of these proposals is also suggested by their amateurism, a naïve confidence that any "good idea" could be implemented, regardless of technical feasibility. The 1937 public discussion of Cheliuskin monuments yielded dozens of highly unusual proposals, including a monument next to and at least as high as the Palace of Soviets,[103] a model ship (containing a museum and library) suspended by chains from a model airplane,[104] a 10-storied iceberg-building (doubling as a research institute and residence for Cheliuskin expedition members),[105] and others. The wartime period saw even more fantastical suggestions. One proposal called for a 150-metre pyramidal Victory monument with sculpted waves and a spiraling staircase topped by a sculpture of Stalin holding a globe.[106] Another suggested forming a giant mound on the Red Square out of 16 monoliths transported from each Union republic, under which a chronicle of each republic would be buried.[107] Perhaps the most radical proposal concerned the proclamation of a "Cult of the Sacred Motherland" with its own central Temple, largely themed on the "heroism of the [Great] Patriotic War."[108]

Another indicator of the genuineness of "true believers" is their occasional, apparently innocent political "unorthodoxy." In 1937, for instance, one letter-writer to *Izvestiia* suggested constructing collaboratively-designed, matching monuments to Chkalov's polar

[101] For example, in 1936, several proposals suggested constructing a monument to the Stalin constitution, although the political leadership was not considering one, GARF/R3316/29/821, also see B. Durov, "Obelisk konstitutsii," *Izvestiia*, 18 December 1936; Sergei Merkurov, "Vnoshu predlozhenie," *Pravda*, 8 October 1936.
[102] Merkurov, "Osnovnaia skul'ptura Dvortsa Sovetov," 36; Merkurov, *Vospominania. Pis'ma. Stat'i*, 271-272.
[103] GARF/R3316/27/262/32-33.
[104] GARF/R3316/27/262/50-51.
[105] GARF/R3316/27/262/55.
[106] RGALI/962/3/1685/29-32.
[107] RGASPI/17/125/572/40-52.
[108] Qtd. in A. Chaldymov, "Pis'mo nachal'nika Glavnogo Upravleniia uchebnykh zdanii Komiteta po delam arkhitektury pri SM SSSR A. K. Chaldymova I. V. Stalinu. 19 oktiabria 1944 g," *Stolitsa*, no. 39 (1992): 14.

overflight, in the Soviet Union and in America.[109] A similar 1943 proposal called for the erection of matching "Pillars of Friendship, Victory and Peace," in Moscow, London, and Washington.[110] Needless to say, Stalinist internationalism never extended so far.

The regime expended efforts to *appear* attentive to public participation in "immortalization" dynamics. The "immortalization" program, as I have detailed, was highly centralized, but, as in other spheres of public life, popular mobilization required engagement from the top. Accordingly, for instance, representatives of the KPDI SM SSSR met with a group of veterans submitting a war monument proposal, giving them a positive response but explaining that without SM SSSR sanction, their hands were tied.[111] In 1944, a group of disabled officers petitioning Stalin to construct a commemorative theme park (entitled "Heroism of the Patriotic Wars") were met with a similar response. This fantastic ten-page proposal called for monuments, several museums, memorial halls, panoramas, trophy weapons (including German steamships and submarines), movie theatres, lecture halls, shooting ranges, parachute towers, equine parks, ski hills, ice rinks, circuses, dance floors, officer clubs, beaches, amusement rides, a library, publishing house, art gallery, sanatorium, military college, stadium, airfield, "Pioneer's Palace," its own hydro-power station, and a 30-50 metre raised monorail.[112] Stalin's secretary Aleksandr Poskrebyshev forwarded the letter to Politburo candidate member and head of the army's Political Directorate Aleksandr Shcherbakov. While none too pleased, Shcherbakov commented that "it is necessary to explain (politely) to the letter's authors that currently and in the near future the country faces more pressing issues"; the order was promptly carried out.[113]

[109] GARF/R3316/30/904/2.
[110] RGAE/9432/1/261a.
[111] RGALI/962/3/1685/166.
[112] RGASPI/17/125/299/28-37.
[113] RGASPI/17/125/299/24, 38.

Nonetheless, the regime did not keep up with the volume of proposals and suggestions, which usually included a plea that the addressee (political leader or institution) reply with their remarks.[114] Such pleas, and the efforts occasionally expended to receive a reply, also testify to some individuals' strong emotional investment in "immortalization." An early 1940 letter to no less than the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from one amateur designer of a Chkalov monument testifies to his odyssey through the Kafka-esque labyrinth of Soviet bureaucracy in the quest for a reply. Having sent the proposal a year ago to the newspaper *Krasnaia zvezda*, the author followed-up with the editorial office after a lengthy silence. He was informed that the project was forwarded to the KPDI SNK SSSR. The latter, however, denied having received it. An approach to the Secretariat of the SNK yielded nothing but a demand for the date and code-number of the letter (from *Krasnaia Zvezda*). Miraculously, the author was able to establish these and forward them to the Secretariat, but having still not received a reply, was compelled to write to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.[115] An analogous letter to the Deputy Chairman of the SNK SSSR from an amateur designer of a Gor'kii and Ordzhonikidze monuments concluded dejectedly: "I have doubts that workers' opinions are being considered."[116] On a less personal level, enthusiasm for "immortalization" could also turn to criticism of delays in constructing already-commissioned monuments.[117] Thus, one sees that at points, the regime had trouble keeping up with "immortalization" enthusiasts.[118] Weighing the balance of evidence,

[114] See, for instance, collection of design proposals for the Pavlik Morozov monument (1934), RGALI/1923/2/1932, and for the monument to the Cheliuskin expedition (1937), GARF/R3316/27/262. The same can be found in some visitor-book comments, for instance, one veteran writing in Tret"iakov Gallery visitor-book asked for a reply regarding his suggestion of commissioning a sculpture of the war hero Aleksandr Matrosov, ORGTG/8II/1/12/186.
[115] GARF/R7523/11/131/11-14.
[116] RGALI/962/3/183/17.
[117] See, for instance, the collective letter to *Izvestiia* expressing outrage over the lagging construction of Kazan's monument to the poet Gabdulla Tukai, RGALI/2075/7/282/16-19.
[118] The decline of working-class, true-believer mobilization as a tool of policy implementation (upon completion of the First Five-Year Plan) is explored in Lynne Viola, *The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), esp. 213.

therefore, ones sees a pool of "true believers" who were (probably) genuinely excited by, and even attempted to get involved in, the "immortalization" projects of the day.[119]

Leaving aside the question of belief, which in any case can never be resolved conclusively, I would like to examine the implications of this high *level* of (performed or genuine) public support for "immortalization." But rather than examining the numbers of submitted monument designs, visitors to this or that exhibition, or unsolicited letters to professionals and Party-state entities, I propose an alternative approach, focusing on the way that the regime *conceived of* popular attitudes towards "immortalization." I see great significance in the fact that the regime employed "immortalization" as an individual and collective symbolic reward, incentivizing self-sacrificial labour, loyalty, and military valour.[120] In doing so, it likely assumed that "immortalization" was something already widely desired. Accordingly, propaganda efforts focused not on disseminating the "immortalization" myth itself (as with other official doctrines, such as the idea of the "New Soviet Man"), but on showcasing the state's efforts to "immortalize" deserving individuals and the collective achievements of the Soviet people.

One form of incentivization was targeted at individual, deserving subjects. Here it is perhaps useful employ Elizabeth Armstrong and Suzanna Crage's concept of the "hierarchy

[119] Nonetheless, powerful arguments to doubt the genuineness of performed enthusiasm remain unresolved. After all, "true believers'" enthusiastic participation in "immortalization" could have had less to do with "immortalization" specifically and more with "participation" as such. For instance, as Plamper notes, due to "the publication of visitor comments in the newspapers and through the public shaming of some artists via these comments, the act of commenting in a comment book was generally endowed with the meaning of participation or even empowerment," Plamper, *The Stalin Cult*, 218. Thus, individuals mailing in amateur monument designs could equally have written in with suggestions on improving the quality of stockings, or in support of applying the "highest measure of social defence" against Trotskyite wreckers. My conclusion regarding genuine "immortalization" enthusiasts therefore remains provisional.

[120] "Immortalization" as a symbolic reward must be seen in the context of a general search for incentives, which began with the Revolution but accelerated with the ever-increasing stratification of Soviet society. The introduction of graduated material incentives under Stalinism is examined in the work of Jukka Gronow and Vera Dunham, see Jukka Gronow, *Caviar with Champagne: Common Luxury and the Ideals of the Good Life in Stalin's Russia* (Oxford: Berg, 2003); Vera Dunham, *In Stalin's Time: Middle-Class Values in Soviet Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). Symbolic incentives, of which "immortalization" was part of, were manifest in the shock-worker campaigns of the Cultural Revolution (and their Stakhanovite successors), in the increased differentiation of military ranks and uniforms enacted in 1943, and in other policies.

of commemorability," the criteria according to which some events and individuals are preserved in memory and while others are consigned to oblivion.[121] It is unsurprising that the "hierarchy of commemorability" according to which the "immortalization" program operated, expressed Stalinist values, rewarding labour, self-sacrifice, and loyalty, particularly among political functionaries and the technical and artistic intelligentsia. Referring to **Appendix C**, one sees that the ranks of those "immortalized" through dedicated personal monuments and memorial plaques were split evenly between political and intelligentsia figures, supplemented by a few local war heroes. Workers and peasants were almost entirely excluded (though notable exceptions included Chkalov and Pavel Morozov, the Young Pioneer martyred for denouncing his kulak family). This focus on the *vydvyzhentsy* and intelligentsia is in line with what Vera Dunham labelled Stalinism's "Big Deal," the regime's alliance with a new Soviet middle class, which helped stabilize the postwar order.[122] The exclusion of other demographics (e.g. women, ethnic minorities) is probably a secondary outcome of their under-representation in the middle class itself. The under-representation of the military (only a few minor monuments; none to the military top brass) is perhaps reflective of the leadership's fear of a competing source of authority and power.

The chief vehicle for "immortalizing" individuals were government decrees (sometimes supported by Politburo resolutions) entitled "on the immortalization of memory of…" which were enacted upon the decease of individuals with an impeccable political and labour record.[123] In most cases, these subjects were the afore-mentioned technical and scientific intelligentsia and political functionaries.[124] Nearly all of Moscow's dedicated

[121] Elizabeth Armstrong and Suzanna Crage, "Movements and Memory: The Making of the Stonewall Myth," *American Sociological Review* 71, no. 5 (2006).
[122] Dunham, *In Stalin's Time*.
[123] In a rare exception, the Politburo voted to immortalize the memory of Maksim Gor'kii through the construction of monuments in Moscow, Leningrad, and Gor'kii, four days *before* his death (14 June 1936), RGASPI/17/3/978/57.
[124] Administratively, these decrees were typically drafted by the ministries in whose employ the individual had been, or within whose purview their activities were (Unions and Academies also had this power). In the case of Party and state functionaries, "immortalization" decrees could be passed at the city, *oblast'*, or *krai* Soviets or

monuments and memorial plaques were commissioned through such "immortalization" decrees.[125] Aside from ordering the construction of monuments and memorial plaques, these decrees typically contained a number of provisions, which could include: a state-funded funeral, a lying-in-state, graveside monument, publication (or translation) of major writings, renaming of enterprises, schools, colleges, military units and geographical locations, creation of memorial scholarships and prizes, opening of a house-museum, transfer of brain to the Brain Institute, commissioning of a plaster death mask, and publication of biographies. "Immortalization" decrees were usually accompanied by a series of provisions for the family of the deceased, establishing personalized (and often lifelong) pensions, providing one-off payments, and allowing the family to keep their state residences, chauffeured car, special shop, healthcare, cafeteria, and other privileges.[126] These decrees were prominently published in the central and regional newspapers (although family "benefits," beyond pensions and one-off payments, were not).[127] On occasion, "immortalization" decrees were enacted to commemorate events (such as the Battle of Lake Khasan with the Japanese, by Politburo

executive committees (*ispolkom*), and be approved at higher levels. The key link was the SNK/ SM SSSR, which had the power of the purse, so all "immortalization" decrees had to be ratified by it. In the case where the central Union government developed its own "immortalization of memory" proposals, these were usually drafted by the funeral commission, appointed by the SNK/SM SSSR (sometimes nominated by the Politburo in the first instance). Where measures were solely concerned with renaming or bestowing the name of the official (such as on an enterprise), these could be forwarded directly to the Prezidium TsIK. Proposed "immortalization" decrees could also be introduced directly by a Politburo member, which in general guaranteed success (and which reinforced clientelist relationships). Typically, decrees were accepted without changes, although measures deemed too extravagant were cut back. For instance, the 1936 decree on the immortalization of biologist Ivan Pavlov's memory (submitted to the Politburo) had the following points redacted from the draft (by Molotov's hand): renaming the city of Riazan' to Pavlov, the creation of a large international tri-annual physiology prize of 10 000 gold rubles, the nationalization of his archives and library, and permission for his widow to keep their flat in the Academy of Sciences building, RGASPI/17/163/1097/110-111.

[125] This policy began early on, although the number of subjects, and the lavishness of "immortalization" measures, increased with time. The first SNK SSSR decree concerned the "immortalization of the memory" of professor of thermal engineering Karl Kirsh, in whose honour an institute was to be renamed, was issued in mid-1920, "Postanovlenie Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov ob uvekovechenii pamiati professor Kirsha," *Izvestiia*, 3 August 1920, 2.

[126] Typically, these would be granted to the widow, to all retired and disabled members of the household, and to children until coming of age.

[127] For instance, in the case of Chkalov's "immortalization," none of the benefits offered to the family (including a twenty-thousand-ruble grant, lifelong pensions to Chkalov's widow, mother, and children, and permissioned to keep using the state-owned dacha) were to be published in the press, by Politburo order, RGASPI/17/163/1206/77-78.

decree on 30 May 1939, which was "immortalized" through, among other measures, the designation of August 6 as a national holiday).[128]

In exceptional cases, "immortalization" decrees could be reissued for the same individual, as proposals came in "from below." Thus, for instance, the Politburo considered and approved twenty such decrees within a year of Kirov's death (and each decree was already an amalgamation of several proposals).[129] New "immortalization" decrees were sometimes issued on anniversaries of the subject's death or birth. From early 1941, this practice contravened a joint SNK SSSR – TsK VKP(b) decree which mandated a 25-year moratorium on further immortalization measures following the death of "great individuals" (*velikikh liudei*).[130] In any case, the meaning of such "immortalization" decrees was clear: individuals would be recognized posthumously for their labour (in higher-level, "important" sectors) and political loyalty. Along with limited material rewards during their lifetime, they would also be symbolically rewarded by the prospect of a grateful posterity. This prospect was assumed to appeal to significant sections of Soviet society.

A few other avenues existed for "immortalization," which attempted to broaden this incentive to the masses. One of these was the construction of bronze busts to "Twice Heroes of the Soviet Union" at their place of birth, decreed in 1939. This practice was significant for "immortalizing" Heroes during their lifetime; design and construction would begin immediately following their second Award. According to the same decree, Thrice-Heroes of the Soviet Union would have their bust placed on a column-like pedestal in front of the Palace of Soviets.[131] Sometime in the postwar period (according to some secondary sources –

[128] RGASPI/17/3/1010/21, also see GARF/R7523/10/262/2. Similarly-titled decrees, it must be noted, were also passed to commemorate past historical events and individuals as well, notably those relating to the Revolution and Civil War, and those part of the 19th century Russian artistic and scientific canon.
[129] See RGASPI/17/3.
[130] RGASPI/17/132/205/48.
[131] GARF/R7523/4/18/25.

1946), Twice-Heroes of Socialist Labour became eligible for analogous monuments.[132] The construction of busts to wartime Twice-Heroes of the Soviet Union was completed, after many delays, in the mid-1950s; the construction of busts to Twice-Heroes of Socialist Labour remained in the planning stage until the scheme was abandoned in post-Stalin period.[133]

Other initiatives were also proposed. The interior design of the Palace of Soviets was also to have included a "huge number of portraits, busts, sculptural figures of our heroes, Stakhanovites, important people of the land of socialism."[134] The pre-war design of Moscow's "Elektrozavodskaia" metro station (ultimately completed in 1943) saw another attempt at incentivization through "immortalization." As one of the architects Igor' Rozhin later reminisced, the original design concept involved placing busts of Stakhanovites into niches along the platform. Nonetheless, "when it came to determine the 'list' of those to be depicted, the idea was abandoned, as the ratifying authorities could not agree on who specifically should be immortalized in sculpture."[135] In the postwar period, Mukhina suggested engraving the names of construction workers on canal locks and the faces of hydroelectric dams.[136]

To a certain extent, such schemes were prefigured by the so-called "Alley of Shock-Workers," which opened in mid-1931 in Moscow's Central Park of Culture and Leisure (known from the following year as Gor'kii Park). This alley consisted of sixteen busts of

[132] Although, to my knowledge, no decree was passed to this effect by the Council of Ministers, this policy is mentioned in several documents, for instance, in the KPDI SM SSSR chairman's letter to Central Committee secretary Mikhail Suslov in 1950, RGASPI/17/132/424/97-100. Also see RGALI/2943/1/2171.
[133] A parallel initiative was decreed in late 1943, with the establishment of the new "Order of Victory" for top military commanders. Recipients were to have a memorial plaque placed in the Great Kremlin Palace, GARF/R7523/4/199/44. Ultimately, eleven Soviet marshals and generals (including Stalin) and five foreign military and political leaders were awarded the Order. The ante-chamber of the Great Kremlin Palace, where the plaques were to be mounted, was to be renamed the "Victory Chamber"; however, implementation was halted in 1954 and was never restarted, GARF/R7523/83/3617/11-14.
[134] Korolev, "Skul'ptury Dvotsa," 41.
[135] Igor' Rozhin, "Iz moego opyta raboty v metro," in *Arkhitektura moskovskogo metro. Teksty k al'bomu po arkhitekture metro* (1988); also see Zinov'ev, *Stalinskoe metro*, 132. Interestingly, a proposal that each metro station would have a memorial plaque with the names of Stakhanovites who participated in its construction was also voiced in a visitor-book comment in 1953, TsGAM/278/1/854/21.
[136] Mukhina, "Zametki khudozhnika," 3.

leading shock-workers of the First Five-Year Plan, who had been awarded the Order of Lenin or the Order of the Red Banner of Labour.[137] Nevertheless, being executed in plaster, and by one contemporary account "constructed in haste, which decreased their quality," these cannot be seen as preludes to "immortalization" in the fullest sense.[138]

Furthermore, aside from enticing individuals to labour and loyalty with the prospect of individual "immortalization," there was also a more diffuse way in which "immortalization" was expected to incentivize. After all, Stalinist monumental constructions commemorated not only individuals but also events, and, by implication, collective actors. The regime was quick to underscore that its monuments were really monuments to the whole people. Thus, Lunacharskii assured that the Palace of Soviets "will speak through the centuries about how courageous and successful were the first attempts of the new society to create its architectural ideological reflection."[139] One art historian waxed lyrical: "the builders of our country will appear as titans to future generations. [Posterity] will be jealous of the current Soviet generation."[140] For the regime, therefore, it appears that high cost of the "immortalization" program was to some extent recouped by the massive, collective symbolic rewards it was expected to generate.

Thus, there is a high likelihood that the level of support for "immortalization" was substantial enough to convince the regime of the widespread appeal of "immortalization" (in its individual and collective forms). Taking this appeal for granted, the regime did not use propaganda to demonstrate *why* "immortalization" was intrinsically good or desirable, but rather employed "immortalization" as a self-evident symbolic reward with which to motivate individual and collective labour and loyalty, at a time when material incentives were unavailable. Of course, regime perceptions do not reveal whether such support for

[137] Anatolii Paramonov, *Zinovii Vilenskii* (Moscow: Izobrazitel'noe iskusstvo, 1971), 24.
[138] Rakhmanov, "Skul'ptura i gorod," 1.
[139] Lunacharskii, "Sotsialisticheskii arkhitekturnyi monument," 10.
[140] S. Dinamov, "O stile sovetskogo iskusstva," *Iskusstvo*, no. 4 (1935): 4.

"immortalization" was performed or genuine. Nonetheless, there is a presumptive case that "true believers" were enthusiastic about the "immortalization" program, which supports the conclusion that "immortalization" represented a shared cultural myth.

5.4 Conclusion

For the regime, "immortalization" represented an investment into future propaganda returns, but political leaders (especially Stalin) also sought unfading glory quite apart from any pragmatic considerations. In the eyes of artists and architects, the "immortalization" program presented a means of "immortalizing" their own artistic creations and names, as well as creating canonical works and laying foundations of future *ensembles*, thereby influencing the long-term trajectory of Soviet art and architecture. The regime saw through these aspirations, using the discourse of "immortalization" to demand political conscientiousness and higher quality in artworks slated "for the ages." Yet art and architecture professionals also manipulated political leaders' desire to be "immortalized," using this strategically to demand commissions and superior resources. Furthermore, a core group of "true believers" amongst the Soviet public were genuinely excited by regime-sponsored "immortalization" processes. Even if, at times, this enthusiasm was feigned, the high level of performed support probably convinced the regime that the desirability of "immortalization" did not require further substantiation through propaganda, but that it represented a self-evident symbolic reward for individual and collective labour and loyalty.

The evidence presented in this chapter allows one to conclude that "immortalization" represented a shared cultural myth. As demonstrated, it was precisely this shared nature that allowed, for example, artists and architects to manipulate this myth in demanding commissions from the political leadership. Equally, it meant that the regime could

instrumentalize "immortalization" for its own ends. Indeed, the inability to voice opposition to "immortalization" in discursive terms other than its own reveals the myth's *de facto* internalization as "the rules of the game."[141] Specific "immortalization" measures could still be contested, but only in terms of being ineffective or counter-productive at "immortalizing." As demonstrated in Section 2.4, criticism of wartime monumental megaprojects, for example, invoked posterity's harsh judgement of such heavy expenditures amidst poverty and ruination. Similarly, as noted in Section 5.2, Lansere spurned work on the Palace of Soviets because it did not promise the conditions for him to leave an (artistically) significant legacy. "Immortalization" therefore appears as a cultural myth which structured social action (including actions instrumentalizing the "immortalization" program for ulterior ends), rather than a contestable doctrine with proponents and detractors.

[141] See the key chapter "Speaking Bolshevik," in Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*, 198-237; also see Sarah Davies, *Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934-1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 183-185; Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 360-361.

6.0 Accounting for "immortalization"

The previous chapter argued that "immortalization" was a cultural myth, shared by the leadership of the Stalinist regime, art and architecture professionals, and the wider Soviet public. I demonstrated that all three strove (or were expected to strive) towards being "immortalized." But why was "immortalization" desirable in the first place? This chapter investigates the socio-cultural forces that resulted in the birth and rise of the "immortalization" myth. This approach follows in the functionalist tradition of anthropology/ cultural studies, which sets as its goal the "reconstruction of those events which were most decisive in the formation of the myths[, these being] appraised in the light of their historical background."[1]

I begin the analysis of the sociocultural functions of the "immortalization" myth by situating it in a broader, comparative context. I argue that the "immortalization" myth was transnational, responding as it did to wider processes of modernization: secularization (whereby "immortal" memory filled the existential vacuum left by declining belief in "immortal" souls) and social change and upheaval (whereby communicating with an imagined posterity gave a sense of stability in a rapidly changing world). Insofar as these problems were particularly pronounced in a society undergoing forced-pace industrialization, and ruled by a militantly atheistic regime, "immortalization" dynamics achieved particularly impressive dimensions in the Stalinist Soviet Union.

I go on to argue that "immortalization" was central to the cultures of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy for similar reasons, and much less because of their "totalitarian," undemocratic affinities with the Stalinist Soviet Union. This comparative analysis of the "immortalization" myth also supports the emerging understanding of Stalinist culture as an

[1] Honko, "The Problem of Defining Myth," 47-48.

expression of "radical modernity" (rather than a form of "alternative modernity"). Further, the temporal model suggested by the "immortalization" myth does not support the idea of Stalinism's orientation towards "eternity," but rather confirms its belonging to the modernist, linear conception of time.

Finally, I contend that while the "immortalization" myth was not specifically Stalinist, the path to it in the Soviet Union was fundamentally shaped by the Bolshevik experience. Specifically, the rise of "immortalization" correlated with the disappointment of utopian communist hopes, which had promised the eventual achievement of physical immortality and a stable, harmonious society. This inverse relationship between utopianism and the "immortalization" myth provides an explanation of the rise and fall of "immortalization," as well as connecting it to broader Soviet cultural patterns.

6.1 Modernity and "immortalization"

Officially, monumental construction was said to express the Soviet people's growing confidence, a sentiment demanded of citizens by the 1936 Constitution of "victorious socialism" (*Konstitutsiia pobedivshego sotsializma*), Stalin's slogan that "life has become more joyous," and various subsequent affirmations. Thus, Mukhina characterized Soviet art as "the art of popular happiness," for "the people has triumphed and wants to immortalize its deeds."[2] Similarly, for instance, one of Moscow's postwar high-rises was described as "immortalizing" the era, "reflecting socialist society's feeling of triumph."[3] Russian art historian Liudmila Doronina contends that postwar Stalinist monuments "affirmed the main ideas of the era: the victorious army, the patriotism and solidarity of the Soviet people, the

[2] Qtd. in Voronova, *Vera Ignatievna Mukhina*, 124.
[3] Kornfel'd, *Laureaty Stalinskoi premii v arkhitekture*, 135.

achievements of national science, culture, technology and agriculture."[4] Thus, it is tempting to explain the "immortalization" drive as predicated on feelings of overwhelming confidence.

Despite its intuitive plausibility, such an approach is problematic. For one thing, it conflates the ideas that a given monument may "express," with the motivations behind the monument-building *program*. The latter, demanding vast resources and complex state coordination, cannot be reduced to something as passive as the "expression" of confidence. Rather, it would be more convincing to treat monumental construction as an *active* attempt to *instil* feelings of confidence in Soviet citizens. This approach, for example, is taken by Ruder towards the Lenin and Stalin monuments on the Moscow-Volga Canal. These, she writes, "*promoted* the idea that Soviet society had already achieved great things and was poised to achieve even more" [italics mine].[5] Another problem with the idea of monumental construction as expressive of Soviet confidence is that, despite regime rhetoric, these years were not characterized by joyousness, assurance, and the triumph of an existential mission. After all, the two decades of Stalinism buffeted Soviet society from one crisis to the next, and even the relative postwar stabilization hid underlying popular dissatisfaction and anxieties.[6] "Immortalization," as I will argue, was indeed connected to "confidence," but had a compensatory function; affirmations of confidence were necessary precisely because of widespread anxiety.

Finally, as briefly alluded to in Section 3.4 (where the use of stripped classicism for "immortalization" purposes was considered in a global perspective), the desire to memorialize the present for the sake of posterity was not unique to Stalinism. Indeed, "immortalization" in the Stalinist Soviet Union paralleled sentiments also manifest, to an

[4] Doronina, "Moskovskaia skul'ptura stalinskoi epokhi," 107.
[5] Ruder, *Building Stalinism*, 185.
[6] See Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, 195-232; Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead*, 95-106; Elena Zubkova, *Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions and Disappointments, 1945-1957*, trans. Hugh Ragsdale (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1998).

extent, in the interwar West. Iofan characterized the "architecture of US government buildings [in Washington as] a monumental decoration aimed at persuading the ordinary American of the permanence of the existing political order" (thereby expressing the cynical interpretation of "immortalization" dynamics, discussed with regards to Stalinist monumentalism in Section 2.2).[7] Indeed, as Rhoads recounts, President Roosevelt himself was not above self-monumentalizing. "Roosevelt carefully considered the site and form of his own monument in Washington" expressing a number of specific preferences."[8] Thus, if "immortalization" was a shared, transnational cultural myth, one cannot account for it solely by reference to the peculiarities of Stalinist culture.

I believe that "immortalization" impulses, in the Stalinist Soviet Union, in the fascist dictatorships of central and southern Europe, and in the liberal democratic West, can be traced to the shared processes of modernization. In analyzing the cultural meanings and functions of the "immortalization" myth, a strong scholarly tradition points to the relationship between death and memory against the background of secularization. As the sociologist Anthony Smith argues:

> With the waning of beliefs in heaven and hell, the privatization of beliefs and the reaction against 'meaningless rituals,' […] men and women have had to look elsewhere for that immortality which so many desire. Many have found it in the idea of posterity. It is in and through offspring that deeds live on and memories are kept alive. [… The] sense of futility engendered by the removal of any vision of an existence after death [is overcome] by linking individuals to persisting

[7] Qtd. in Yuri Slezkine, *The House of Government: A Saga of the Russian Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 591.
[8] Rhoads, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and Washington," 162. These wishes were honoured in the design of the Roosevelt memorial (1965).

> communities whose generations form indissoluble links in a chain of memories and identities.[9]

Individual commemoration, however, is limited to those personally acquainted with the deceased (who will also die eventually), and therefore can act only as a stop-gap measure. A key facet of the "immortalization" myth, by contrast, was its focus on *collective* remembrance. Philosopher Avishai Margalit notes that while "we do not expect to be remembered individually by the nation […] we shall be remembered by taking part in events that will be remembered for their significance in the life of the collective."[10] Commemoration of select, "great" individuals achieves the same purpose for the wider public, for they "[offer] images of a symbolic immortality available to a select group of individuals who best incarnate the cultural essence of the people," writes Jonathan Brooks Platt.[11]

Further, the fantasy of future remembrance implies that there will be a collective to do the remembering as such, thereby acting as an assurance of collective survival. Indeed, this connection between death and the compensatory fantasy of such an "eternal" collective (which is constituted through enduring memories) is integral to nationalist ideology, according to political theorist Benedict Anderson.[12] Collective commemoration also sustains the modernist, progress-centered salvation myth. "The work of commemoration comes to terms with transience through the simultaneous acquiescence to time and achievement of symbolic mastery over it," argues Platt. When "heroes live on in collective memory [they anchor] a narrative of historical growth and development, transforming the continuous dissipation of time as transience into the productive temporality of progress."[13]

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[9] Anthony Smith, "From The Ethnic Origins of Nations," in *The Collective Memory Reader*, ed. Jeffrey Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 233.
[10] Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 52-53.
[11] Jonathan Brooks Platt, "Feast in the Time of Terror: Stalinist Temporal Paradox and the 1937 Pushkin Jubilee" (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 2008), 162.
[12] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 11-12.
[13] Platt, "Feast in the Time of Terror," 162-163.

In the Western tradition, monuments are the means *par excellence* of "immortalizing" both individuals and collective events. According to Lewis Mumford, "the human impulse to create everlasting monuments springs perhaps out of the desire of the living to perpetuate themselves: to overcome the flux and evanescence of all living forms." But this happens not only through "the transmission of the social heritage through memory, imitation, and the written record [but also…] by a process of architectural mummification" in the form of monuments and monumental constructions."[14] This idea hearkens back to the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, which elucidated the Stalinist regime's rationale in choosing monumental art and architecture as the chief vehicles for "immortalization."

Examining the practice of "immortalization" under Stalinism, one notes its strong connection to death. Soviet power not only came on the heels of declining faith in Russian Orthodoxy (and attendant Orthodox understandings of (im)mortality), but also actively strove to "[wrench] apart the web of ritual […] surrounding death."[15] However, as Merridale notes, "Bolshevism could not afford to dispense with the eternal afterlife of memory. Heaven could be destroyed, but not the pantheon of revolutionary heroes, the Communist Valhalla."[16]

This sheds some light on the connection of "immortalization" to the Bolshevik funerary tradition, as well as on the program's turning-points, linked as they were to death (Lenin's Mausoleum and his ostensible monument – the Palace of the Soviets, Stalin's Pantheon, etc.), recounted in Chapter 2. The program's chief institutional vehicle, government and Politburo decrees "on the immortalization of…" were passed, as mentioned in Section 5.3, immediately following the death of the person concerned (or, on rare occasions, on anniversaries of their death). The meaning was clear: deserving individuals

[14] Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities* (New York: Harcourt, 1970), 433-434.
[15] Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 11.
[16] Ibid., 181. Although Merridale ignores the popular character of the "immortalization" myth, which leads her to claim that under Stalinism "eternal life had been abolished for the masses, so the mourners could only really focus on their work," ibid., 337.

could die assured that their memory would be preserved by the Soviet collective, in perpetuity.[17]

These "immortalized" individuals were expected to act as representatives of the undying immortal people. Zubkova recounts the outpouring of popular initiatives for "immortalizing" Stalin upon the dictator's death:

> Thousands of letters and telegrams express[ed] the sincerest condolences and the indispensable demand to perpetuate the memory of the departed leader. One of the more frequent variants of this demand was the building of a pantheon […] Among other popular ideas were the proposal to establish an Order of Stalin, to open Stalin museums in various Soviet cities, and to write books and make films about him.[18]

Such manifestations had been modeled for decades through orchestrated wakes, ritualized condolences, and conscriptions into "evenings of memory" which followed the deaths of Stalinist leaders.[19]

Yet the organic connection between death and "immortalization" under Stalinism can be seen most clearly in the massive and spontaneous monument-building amidst the death and destruction of the Great Patriotic War, alluded to in Section 2.4. This provides further support for the notion that "immortalization" represented a cultural myth, rather than a top-down state policy. Sources are full of accounts of servicemen and the public (sometimes with the help of local Soviets) improvising memorials to their fallen comrades. Indeed, this movement occurred against a marked drop in officially-commissioned monuments.[20]

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[17] Conversely, on a more sinister level, those designated counter-revolutionaries or enemies-of-the people faced a "double murder," not only excised from the body of the nation but also consigned to oblivion, see Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory*, 20-23.
[18] Qtd. in Zubkova, *Russia After the War*, 153; also see Polly Jones, *Myth, Memory, Trauma: Rethinking the Stalinist Past in the Soviet Union, 1953-70* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 4; Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 334-336; Plamper, *The Stalin Cult*, 47.
[19] Krasil'nikova, "Memorializatsiia S. M. Kirova," 24.
[20] GARF/R7523/61/14969/2-3, Liudmila Doronina, *Skul'ptura stalinskoi epokhi (1930–1950-e gody)* (Moscow: Moskovskii gorodskoi pedagogicheskii universitet, 2013), 8.

Centrally unsanctioned tombstones, monuments, and memorials were of a haphazard character: of variable artistic quality, utilizing temporary materials available close at hand, and often following archetypical national designs.[21] According to incomplete military data compiled in 1949, there existed 752 such stand-alone monuments to the Great Patriotic War, as well as countless memorials on mass and individual graves (there were 8049 of these in the Kiev military district alone).[22] The following year, Zmeul (who, as mentioned, carried out the first academic study of Soviet war monuments) referred to tens to hundreds of thousands of registered graveside monuments, the majority of which were constructed independently and spontaneously by servicemen and the public.[23]

In fact, the scale of spontaneous wartime monument construction eventually prompted a hostile response from the central authorities. In early 1944, the KPDI SNK SSSR chairman Mikhail Khrapchenko approached Stalin with a proposed decree to restore the center's monopoly on commissioning monuments. He noted that "local institutions, the public, and Red Army servicemen take the initiative, constructing many monuments and tombstones."[24] However, the design and construction "is carried out without state and artistic control and very often brings unsatisfactory results."[25] I have been unable to establish whether a decree reaffirming the requirement that all monument designs be ratified by the KPDI SNK/ SM SSSR was ever issued; in any case, this procedure had already been codified in 1939, and remained in force.[26]

Of course, where grassroots monuments conflicted with political priorities, central authorities intervened. Thus, for instance, "in an orchestrated campaign around 1950, Stalin's

[21] Malinina, *Tema pamiati v arkhitekture*, 53; Suzdalev, *Sovetskoe iskusstvo perioda Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny*, 214-215; Zmeul, "Arkhitektura pamiatnikov," 73.
[22] GARF/R5446/51/3096/53.
[23] Zmeul, "Arkhitektura pamiatnikov," 72.
[24] RGALI/962/3/1367/30.
[25] RGALI/962/3/1367/31.
[26] Indeed, in May 1953, the TsK KPSS Department of Science and Culture complained to Khrushchev that despite the "contravention of the established order," local Soviets continued to commission and construct monuments without central approval, RGANI/5/17/447/48-49.

police destroyed almost all provisional memorials and commemorative plaques which the surviving Jewish communities had erected spontaneously in the first postwar years."[27] Nonetheless, rather than opposing grassroots "immortalization," in most cases authorities "realized the propagandistic significance of memorial architecture [and were] guided by usual cynical calculations [...] Military memorials were the only type of architectural structures which could arouse natural, human feelings in Soviet people," writes Khmel'nitskii.[28] These "natural human feelings," one may infer, were the aforementioned understanding of collective remembrance (with monuments as its conduit) as a response to secularized understandings of death.

In the context of the War, preserving the memory of the fallen also supported the fantasy of an enduring remembering community. As Lisa Kirschenbaum observes, "commemoration, after all, usually assumes an 'after', not only survival but also victory."[29] One unsolicited proposal for a Victory monument, submitted to Stalin in early 1947, confessed: "the idea of creating this monument came to us back in 1942, during the winter blockade of Leningrad, when we wore military uniform, and […] on the verge of death by starvation and enemy bombardments, dreamed of bright, happy days of victory."[30] Chechulin later described the construction of his wartime metro stations as "evidencing strong faith in an immanent and final victory," while Zmeul characterized wartime monument construction as "reflect[ing] the people's [...] unshakable confidence in the victorious outcome of the

[27] Michalski, *Public Monuments*, 131-132.
[28] Khmel'nitskii, *Zodchii Stalin*, 215. Harris' account of the commemoration of Soviet partisan Zoia Kosmodemianskaia illustrates one such case of rechannelling popular, grassroots commemoration for political advantage. "The village of Petrishchevo initially developed comparatively organically into a site significant to Zoya's cult […] As early as 1942, compelled by a need to mourn Zoya and countless other victims, Soviet citizens began travelling to Petrishchevo to honour Zoya, to retrace her barefoot steps and to speak with witnesses. Aware of the significance of this site and the nation's pre-revolutionary mourning rituals, Communist Party officials quickly began discussions to transform Petrishchevo into a political site. While citizens continued to come to venerate and mourn Zoya individually, in 1944 the Komsomol began shaping Petrishchevo into a monument," Harris, "Memorializations of a Martyr," 77.
[29] Kirschenbaum, *The Legacy of the Siege*, 80-81.
[30] RGASPI/17/125/572/34.

grandiose battle."[31] In this light, one can appreciate the logic of official monument competitions, the first of which was held in 1942, arguably the most difficult year of the war. Clearly, submitted designs were never meant to be realized (thus, for instance, there were no restrictions on the resources which designs could demand).[32] Yet such competitions performed an important function: imagining "future commemoration" represented a fantasy of a war "already won" and the survival of the national collective.

Indeed, Anderson's analysis of the connection between nationalism and the hope of collective survival (nations presumed to be eternal) can go some way towards explaining the rise of Soviet nationalism (or National Bolshevism) during the War.[33] Scholars typically frame this development as stemming from the regime's realization that nationalism was more adept at popular mobilization than communist/ class ideology. However, historiography ignores the question of *why* nationalism was more effective, or, more precisely, whether it became more effective during wartime specifically. Appreciating the idea of national survival (implicit in all nationalisms) as a psychological crutch at a moment of mortal danger, which widespread "immortalization" dynamics testify to, provides a partial answer. Thus, the organic, bottom-up desire for "immortalization" represented a cultural response to anxieties surrounding individual and collective finitude.

In addition to the connection between memory and secular understandings of death, I believe that the sociocultural functions of the "immortalization" myth under Stalinism can also be accounted for in another way. My approach is indebted to an understanding developed in memory studies, which, I believe, can and should be extended to encompass imaginings of the future. Scholarship sees the construction of continuities between past and

[31] Chechulin, *Zhizn' i zodchestvo*, 87-88; Zmeul, "Arkhitektura pamiatnikov," 65.
[32] Akademiia arkhitektury SSSR, *Konkurs na sostavlenie proektov monumentov geroiam Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii arkhitektury, 1942), 5; also seeTumarkin, *The Living and the Dead*, 83.
[33] 1943 is commonly cited as the turning point in this respect (excepting the work of Brandenberger, who dates this shift to the late 1930s). Among other developments, 1943 saw the renaming of the Worker-Peasant Red Army as the Soviet Army, and the signing of a concordat with the Russian Orthodox Church.

present (often through national myths) as a way of stabilizing identities in times of rapid social change (hence, for instance, the recent "memory boom" in our increasingly accelerating society). As with commemorating a primordial past, I believe, imagining a continuous future – one in which the memory of the present would be preserved and revered – also acts to stabilize uncertain identities in times of upheaval. Fundamentally, monuments memorializing the present for the sake of posterity are similar to "monuments to predecessors" because they are also "organizers of continuity, fictitious indicators of the uninterruptedness of time" constructing "a metaphorical family."[34] "Immortalization" in this sense acts not as a solution to individual finitude, but rather assuages the disruption of continuities in social structures and myths. Thus, for instance, Dietmar Shirmer notes that "modern existence multiplies and disintegrates each individual into a crowd of role takers [while…] the semantics of nation-ness pins down the swirling bundle that is modern society, unifies what is differentiated, and gives it boundaries, place, and purpose, makes it an entity in space and time." Establishing links with the past or (as in the case at hand) the future is not only about grounding identity in something long-term and stable. According to Christopher Clark, it also facilitates a "flight from history," deemphasizing the experience of the traumatic present realities.[35]

Scholarship on monuments specifically notes their role in fostering feelings of stability and continuity. For philosopher Hannah Arendt: "the reality and reliability of the human world rests primarily on the fact that we are surrounded by things more permanent than the activity by which they were produced, and potentially even more permanent than the

[34] Mikhail Yampolsky, "In the Shadow of Monuments: Notes on Iconoclasm and Time," in *Soviet Hieroglyphics: Visual Culture in Late Twentieth-Century Russia*, ed. Nancy Condee (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 104.
[35] Christopher Clark, "Time of the Nazis: Past and Present in the Third Reich," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 25 (2015): 179-180. Clark argues that imagining historical "continuity [had] a therapeutic potential" for nations in which "calendrical markers signif[ied] defeat and invasion."

lives of their authors."[36] More specifically, Yampolsky writes that "the commemorative function of the [totalitarian] monument" always yielded "room to […] the symbolism of eternity as such," which created an "atemporal expanse […] around the monument."[37] Although he sees this as specific to communist ideology, and refers to "eternity," arguments which this thesis rejects, his comments do elucidate a certain sense of temporal stability that monuments foster.

In the Soviet Union, the entire Stalin period was a sequence of social dislocations and upheavals, beginning with the Great Break, through the Cultural Revolution, forced collectivization, mass purges, wartime destruction, and continued postwar breakneck industrialization and social engineering (through an expanded Gulag and the violent reabsorption of territories annexed before the German invasion). Indeed, Moshe Lewin's characterization of early 1930s Soviet Union as a "quicksand society" (one in which "social, administrative, industrial, and political structures were all in flux") could well be extended to the entire Stalin period.[38] Further, it could be said that the regime exacerbated the experience of rapid, disorienting change by intentionally trying to "accelerate" time itself (for instance, through the drive to complete the First-Five Year Plan in only four years).[39] While the specific dates of commissioning and unveiling monumental constructions do not match up exactly with these events, the general upsurge of "immortalization" practices can be traced to the early 1930s, continuing and growing throughout this tumultuous period.[40]

6.2 Totalitarianism and "immortalization"

[36] Hannah Arendt, *On the Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013 [1958]), 95-96.
[37] Yampolsky, "In the Shadow of Monuments," 99.
[38] Moshe Lewin, *The Making of the Soviet System* (London: Methuen, 1985), 221.
[39] Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, 79-80; Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe*, 37-39.
[40] See GARF/5446/50/2826/107-122.

If "immortalization" through monumental art and architecture was a shared response to processes linked to modernization (a response to mortality in a secularizing world, and to the unprecedented pace of social change), in its Stalinist variant it stood out for the centrality that it assumed in public life (as in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany). The sheer volume of resources committed to the "immortalization" program is doubly astounding given the context of widespread poverty and economic dislocation in the Soviet Union. As Khan-Magomedov notes, the state turned away from "the creation of special objects of a socially-just society to the creation of architectural ensembles glorifying the victory of socialism, and then victory in the Great Patriotic War."[41] The competition for the Palace of the Soviets was proclaimed concomitantly with the start of forced collectivization. Sculptor Vladimir Frolov's mosaics, slated for Moscow's "Novokuznetskaia" metro station, were considered important enough to be airlifted from besieged Leningrad in 1943.[42] The decision to build the eight Stalinist high-rises in Moscow was made at the height of the postwar famine (1947).

Of course, the leadership's heedlessness of the lives and livelihood of Soviet citizens is unsurprising. Journalist and writer Il'ia Erenburg, for instance, later attested to a train car of vintage 1891 Bordeaux also "rescued" from blockaded Leningrad across Lake Ladoga, at the same time as the aforementioned mosaics.[43] What is remarkable is that unlike the anecdote of the "rescued" wine (which came as a Khrushchev-era revelation), there was no sense on the part of the authorities that trumpeting the expense (financial and otherwise) of monumental constructions would generate resentment among the Soviet public. Decisions to prioritize monumental projects were not concealed, and indeed were often propagandized. As one postwar dissertation proudly proclaimed: "it would seem that the difficult war that our

[41] Khan-Magomedov, "Stalinskii ampir," 17.
[42] Dushkin, "Stantsiia metro 'Zavod imeni Stalina'," 195; Vladimir Tolstoi, "Leninskii plan monumental'noi propagandy v deistvii," *Iskusstvo*, no. 1 (1952): 64; also see Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art*, 170.
[43] After the fact, Erenburg and A. Tolstoi were asked to check the quality of the wine; it had, incidentally, gone sour, Il'ia Erenburg, *Sobranie sochinenii v deviate tomakh. Tom 8* (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1966), 11.

country was waging with [fascism] would halt the construction of the metro […but] the Soviet government approached this question in a different way [... demanding] the creation of elevated artistic ensembles that would serve as architectural monuments to the heroic era of the Great Patriotic War."[44] Similarly, as noted in Section 5.3, published "immortalization of memory" decrees unashamedly proclaimed the commissioning of costly monuments to deceased individuals, but redacted other measures, such as maintaining family members' access to special shops, flats, *dachas*, and chauffeured cars. The leadership was confident that the "immortalization" myth was sufficiently popular, and that "immortalization" on a grandiose scale, even amongst everyday deprivation (and perhaps, as suggested, in part because of it) would be received favourably.

"Immortalization" dynamics were similarly pronounced in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Launching the reconstruction of Rome in 1924, Mussolini proclaimed it "necessary to create the monumental Rome of the 20th century […] in order to hand [it] down, as a heritage of the fascist era, to the generations to come."[45] Already in 1931, the city plan (*Piano Regulatore*) for Rome referred to itself as "the necessary basis that will allow the posterity of distant ages to identify alongside the Rome of the Caesars, and the Rome of Sixtus V, the Rome of Mussolini renewed and surpassing ancient greatness."[46] The fascist period saw the construction of several obelisks to the Leader and his victories, countless shrines to the memory of fascist martyrs, and the commissioning of an 86-metre bronze "Colossus of Fascism" to mark the conquest of Abyssinia.[47] The projected Everlasting Lictoral Tower (*Eternale Mole Littoria*) was of a striking similarity to the Palace of Soviets,

[44] M. Klimov, "Ideino-khudozhestvennye problemy arkhitektury Moskovskogo metropolitena (3-4 ocheredi)" (Kandidat dissertation, Akademiia obshchestvennykh nauk pri TsK VKP(b), 1952), 53.
[45] Qtd. in Borden Painter, *Mussolini's Rome: Rebuilding the Eternal City* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 4.
[46] Qtd. in ibid., 18.
[47] Ibid., 28; Eugene Pooley, "Mussolini and the City of Rome," in *The Cult of the Duce: Mussolini and the Italians*, ed. Christopher Duggan, Stephen Gundle, and Giuliana Pieri (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 214, 219-220; Scobie, *Hitler's State Architecture*, 135.

also intended as the central national monument.[48] The 1933 competition guidelines for the design of the Palace of Fascism (*Palazzo del Littorio*) required that "the grand edifice should be worthy of handing down to future generations."[49] Rome's Universal Exposition (EUR) grounds were characterized in 1938 as an "imposing work destined to convey to future centuries the Mussolinian era."[50]

The predilection for constructing monumental rather than functional buildings in Nazi Germany has also been widely noted.[51] In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler lamented that "works are not built for eternity, but at most for the need of the moment."[52] The dictator's annual speeches at Nurnberg often dwelt on these anxieties. In 1933, he claimed that "a people that has not placed the construction of its own monument among the values of its culture is deemed by history to be hardly worthy of mention."[53] In 1937, he promised that Nazi monuments "shall satisfy the requirements of eternity […] these buildings of ours should not be conceived for the year 1942 nor for the year 2000, but […] shall stretch into the millennia of the future."[54] Monuments, he underscored, "remain for thousands of years as an unquestionable testimony not only to the greatness of a people, but also to their moral right to exist."[55]

The ambitions of the Nazi "immortalization" programme – mostly unrealized due to the War – were Napoleonic. As Frederic Spotts relates, in Berlin alone "the world would have seen […] at every turn vast plazas, gigantic state buildings, great thoroughfares, columns, towers, statues, reliefs, arches, baths, theatres, forums, temples, memorials, bridges,

[48] Emilio Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*, trans. Keith Botsford (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 121-131.
[49] Qtd. in Aristotle Kallis, *The Third Rome, 1922-1943: The Making of the Fascist Capital* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 135.
[50] Qtd. in Richard Etlin, *Modernism in Italian Architecture, 1890-1940* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 485.
[51] Lisa Pine, *Hitler's 'National Community': Society and Culture in Nazi Germany* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2007), 208; also see Berthold Hinz, *Art in the Third Reich*, trans. Robert Kimber and Rita Kimber (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979), 191-194.
[52] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001 [1925-1926]), 265.
[53] Qtd. in Michaud, *The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany*, 208.
[54] Qtd. in Peter Adam, *Art of the Third Reich* (New York: Harry N. Abrams Inc. Publishers, 1992), 225.
[55] Qtd. in Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany*, 188.

palaces, museums, stadiums, tombs, fountains, galleries, obelisks," constructed for the eternal glory of the Reich.[56] The Nazi "immortalizing" impulse was most apparent in the infamous notion of "ruin value" (the idea that buildings should be constructed in a way that even their ruins would be picturesque) which was endorsed by Hitler himself.[57] Building according to the "law of ruins" favoured the use of stone (particularly granite) as the main structural material.[58] Indeed, even with the wide use of forced labour in quarries, the stone shortage became so pronounced that shipyards were founded for the purpose of building a fleet to transport Scandinavian, Belgian, Dutch, and Italian granite to Germany.[59]

Indeed, monuments often came even at the expense of the war effort. "In December 1941," Golomstock recounts, "when Guderian's tanks had exhausted their supplies of fuel and come to a stop on the outskirts of Moscow, when tens of thousands of hungry and poorly clothed German soldiers were dying in the frosts, a German train arrived at a local station. Instead of fuel, winter clothing or provisions for the dying army, it was loaded with slabs of red marble with which to construct a monument to Hitler in Moscow."[60] Hitler's growing obsession with designs for monumental constructions, as Germany reeled from a series of military disasters, is widely recorded.

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[56] Frederic Spotts, *Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics* (Woodstock: The Overlook Press, 2003), 368.
[57] As Speer later recounted in his memoires: "Buildings of modern construction were poorly suited to form that 'bridge of tradition' to future generations which Hitler was calling for […] By using special materials and by applying certain principles of statics, we should be able to build structures which even in a state of decay, after hundreds or (such were our reckoning) thousands of years would more or less resemble Roman models. [Hitler] accepted my ideas as logical and illuminating. He gave orders that in the future the important buildings of the Reich were to be erected in keeping with the principles of the 'law of ruins'," Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs*, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 56. Some note that far from expressing the ultimate futility of Nazi/ human endeavours, the idea of "ruin value" was extra hubristic in its attempt to control how monuments would look, and what feelings they would inspire, even after they succumbed to decay, see Mark Featherstone, "Ruin Value," *Journal for Cultural Research* 9, no. 3 (2005): 303; William Viney, "The Future of Ruins," in *Aesthetic Fatigue: Modernity and the Language of Waste*, ed. John Scanlan and John Clark (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 149-150.
[58] Paul Jaskot, *The Architecture of Oppression. The SS, Forced Labor and the Nazi Monumental Building Economy* (London: Routledge, 2000), 17; Jochen Thies, *Hitler's Plans for Global Domination: Nazi Architecture and Ultimate War Aims*, trans. Ian Cooke and Mary-Beth Friedrich (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 77; also see Albert Speer. "The Fuhrer's Buildings," *German Propaganda Archive*, 1998 [1936], accessed 20 July 2018, http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/ahbuild.htm.
[59] Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, 144, 154, 181; Scobie, *Hitler's State Architecture*, 130-131; also see Jaskot, *The Architecture of Oppression*.
[60] Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art*, 170.

While "immortalization" was similarly central to the Stalinist Soviet Union, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany, I disagree with Golomstock's contention that "the need of ordinary people for elementary comforts was considered by totalitarianism to be one of 'the small changing needs of everyday life' that were so insignificant before the face of eternity."[61] In my understanding, the point was not the undemocratic character of totalitarian regimes, which, without public accountability, could prioritize hubristic prestige projects over the basic needs of their citizens. Rather, I believe that the disproportionate place accorded to "immortalization" grew out of these societies' violently secularizing policies, and the rapid social change experienced shortly before or during the rule of these dictatorships.

In all of these regimes, collective commemoration of death took place against the backdrop of extensive secularization. In Nazi Germany, which waged a continuous but indirect struggle against Christianity, Hitler proclaimed: "to the Christian doctrine of the infinite significance of the individual human soul […] I oppose with icy clarity the saving doctrine of the nothingness and insignificance of the individual human being, and of his continued existence in the visible immortality of the nation."[62] In Fascist Italy, where the relationship with Christianity was one of strained coexistence, the "adoption in 1926 of a new party statute that defined fascism as 'fundamentally a faith' reinforced the sacred tenor of party life and provided the impetus for the proliferation of ceremonies and altars dedicated to so-called fascist martyrs throughout Italy."[63] In both dictatorships this resulted in various "immortalization" measures which bordered on a veritable cult of the dead: altars, chapels,

[61] Ibid., 283. Dejan Sudjic's account similarly connects super-monumental building projects to unbounded autocratic power, see Deyan Sudjic, *The Edifice Complex: How the Rich and Powerful - And Their Architects - Shape the World* (London: Penguin, 2011).
[62] Qtd. in Hermann Rauschning, ed. *Hitler Speaks: A Series of Political Conversations with Adolf Hitler on his Real Aims* (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1939), 222.
[63] Lucy Maulsby, *Fascism, Architecture, and the Claiming of Modern Milan, 1922-1943* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 57. Fascism openly referred to itself as a faith, but rather than opposing Catholicism, it sought to integrate and subsume it within the broader fascist ideology, Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*, 53-56.

and shrines to fascist "martyrs," lavish military cemeteries, extensive plans for mausoleums and other monuments.[64]

"Immortalization," and its physical incarnation in monumental art and architecture, also provided a sense of stability, of continuity between present and future, against the backdrop of rapid social change. "The great cultural documents of humanity, built of granite and marble [are the only] truly stable element in the rush of all other phenomena," Hitler reassured his listeners at a 1937 Nuremberg rally.[65] Indeed, Nazi architects "sought to generate an image of profound wholeness that could remain resistant to the chaos of modernity […] a neurotic response to the natural history of transience that produce[d] a symptomatology of permanence, totality, and eternity," writes Featherstone.[66] Aristotle Kallis similarly argues that through building "edifices […] that would defy time [and] editing out differences through demolitions," Italian Fascist city planners attempted to create "a sense of mythical time – the magical 'now' that levels out the differences of conventional time and reunites segments of past, present, and future into a symbolic concurrent experience."[67]

Monumental constructions did provide a sense of stability, but I am skeptical of the connection to "eternity" that scholars often read into them.[68] This alleged temporal conflation of past, present, and future, and the subversion of linear models of temporality is used to support the idea of totalitarianism as attempting to usher in a fundamentally different, eternal sense of time.[69] As alluded to previously, in the case of Stalinism, this idea of temporal

[64] Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*, 66-68; Mark Neocleous, "Long Live Death! Fascism, Resurrection, Immortality," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 10, no. 1 (2005): 35.
[65] Qtd. in Hinz, *Art in the Third Reich*, 197.
[66] Featherstone, "Ruin Value," 302-303; also see Griffin, "Building the Visible Immortality," 25; Roger Griffin, "Fixing Solutions: Fascist Temporalities as Remedies for Liquid Modernity," *Journal of Modern European History* 13, no. 1 (2015).
[67] Kallis, *The Third Rome*, 31-32. Also see ibid., 75-76.
[68] In Section 2.2, I problematized one corollary of this argument: that the "eternity" expressed by monumental constructions was used instrumentally to express the immutable strength of the regime.
[69] For an example of this thesis as applied to Nazi Germany, see Clark, "Time of the Nazis." Also see Mocanescu's study of "atemporality" in Ceausescu's Romania, in which "time had no longer a linear dimension, but rather a static, compressed one […which] altered the perception of historical time […] and facilitated the manoeuvring of different historical periods, their appropriation, and an arbitrary intervention upon them," Alice

conflation and "orientation towards eternity" is related to the idea of Stalinism as an accomplished utopia.[70] After all, the very etymology of the key concept *uvekovechenie*, heretofore translated idiomatically as "immortalization," contains an ambiguity which could favour such a reading, referring as it does both to "centur(ies)" (*vek*) and "eternity" (*vechnost'*). In such conceptions, therefore, Stalinist monumentalism was fundamentally anti-modern. Indeed, Mumford broadens this argument, contending that all contemporary monuments are "the hollow echoes of an expiring breath […] the notion of a modern monument is veritably a contradiction in terms: if it is a monument it is not modern, and if it is modern, it cannot be a monument." While "civilizations of the past have sacrificed a good part of their life, their income, their ideologic energy to the monument," he writes, today, "beholding the world with eyes awakened by a Buffon, a Goethe, a Darwin, a profound change has come about in our biological conception of death and immortality: a change that robs monumentalism of its main meaning."[71]

Such readings, however, overlook the general explosion in monument-building throughout the nineteenth century, and its apogee in the 1930s-1950s under "high modernism." It also ignores the character of monumental culture, which reflected and attempted to reproduce the imagined unity and indivisibility of the (national) community, a crucial facet of "high modernity" (as opposed to the more polyvalent and fragmented remembrance practices characteristic of post-modernity). But perhaps most importantly, such understandings ignore the fact that totalitarian regimes continued to work within the linear model of time, above all, in remaining firmly married to the "cult of historical progress" (perhaps to an even greater extent than their liberal-democratic counterparts).[72] Close

Mocanescu, "Practising Immortality: Schemes for Conquering 'Time' during the Ceauşescu Era," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 10, no. 3 (2010): 415-416.

[70] See Dobrenko, *Stalinist Cinema and the Production of History*, 6; Groys, *The Total Art of Stalinism*, 47-48, 73; Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*, 31.

[71] Mumford, *The Culture of Cities*, 435-438.

[72] Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe*, 68.

attention to the "immortalization" myth under Stalinism demonstrates that this modern, linear model of time (with clearly delineated progress through past, present, and future) was preserved: the distinction between "the Stalinist epoch" and the "future generations"/ "posterity" that would remember it was fundamental. Moreover, as demonstrated in Section 4.1, artists and architects were specifically tasked with making monuments appear distinct, marking out the present from preceding heritage and the constructions to come; "timeless" and "eternal" renderings were discouraged. Thus, seeking continuities between past, present, and future (all the more necessary under the extreme conditions of rapid social change inaugurated by fascist and Stalinist social engineering) did not involve a retreat into primordial, "eternal" time, but preserved a fundamentally modern understanding of temporality.

This conclusion contributes, if indirectly, to the debate surrounding the relationship between Stalinism and modernity.[73] Few serious scholars would claim that modernity entirely passed the Stalinist Soviet Union by (although this may be implicit in accounts highlighting the reversion to a primordial, "eternal" temporality).[74] However, there is a controversy surrounding what kind of "alternative modernity" Stalinism represented. One tradition posits that an "alternative modernity" developed at the crossroads between modernization and persisting traditional structures.[75] Others, particularly critical of the Eurocentric biases present in the conception of modernity *as such*, point to the Bolshevik/ socialist version of

[73] For an exhausting and penetrating analysis of this controversy, see Michael David-Fox, *Crossing Borders: Modernity, Ideology, and Culture in Russia and the Soviet Union* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 21-47.
[74] Richard Shorten, *Modernism and Totalitarianism: Rethinking the Intellectual Sources of Nazism and Stalinism, 1945 to the Present* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1.
[75] Neo-traditional societies, argues Terry Martin, "represent an alternative form of modernization, one that includes the most characteristic processes of market-driven modernization (industrialization, urbanization, secularization, universal education and literacy), but one which likewise produces a variety of practices that bear a striking resemblance to characteristic features of traditional pre-modern societies," Terry Martin, "Modernization or Neo-Traditionalism? Ascribed Nationality and Soviet Primordialism," in *Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices*, ed. David Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 175. A similar argument is made in Roger Griffin, "Modernity Under the New Order: The Fascist Project for Managing the Future," in *A Fascist Century. Essays by Roger Griffin*, ed. Matthew Feldman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 28-31.

modernity, which was different but no less modern.[76] Finally, some see Stalinist modernity, and that of its totalitarian cousins, as an "illiberal modernity," founded upon shared post- and counter-Enlightenment values (an unholy marriage of utopianism, scientism, and revolutionary violence).[77] At the same time, a myriad of synthetic approaches also attempt to analytically integrate the shared, universal elements of "modernity" with those "peculiarly Russian, specifically Soviet, or illiberal."[78]

An opposing historiographic tradition rejects the idea of Stalinism as an "alternative modernity" of whatever ilk, arguing that Stalinism (and totalitarianism generally) represented a particularly pronounced, "radical" version of modernity (universally defined). The obvious dissimilarities between Stalinism and liberal democracies are thereby treated less as qualitative differences that those of extent. The outlines of this approach were conceptualized by sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, who characterized Stalinism and Nazism as "the most consistent, uninhibited expressions of [the spirit of modernity]" primarily because of their "absolute power absolute enough and a monopolistic agency monopolistic enough" to fulfill modernity's ambition of a "fully designed, fully controlled world."[79] Bauman's ideas of the modern "gardening state" are applied to the Stalinist Soviet Union specifically by Michael Holquist, Amir Weiner, and others.[80]

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[76] Anna Krylova, "Soviet Modernity: Stephen Kotkin and the Bolshevik Predicament," *Contemporary European History* 23, no. 2 (2014); Stephen Kotkin, "Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjuncture," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 2, no. 1 (2001).
[77] For example, see Shorten, *Modernism and Totalitarianism*.
[78] David-Fox, *Crossing Borders*, 38. Examples of this synthesis can be seen in David Hoffmann, *Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); David Hoffmann, *Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
[79] Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 93. Parallel arguments on the philosophical terrain are made in Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Michael Halberstam, *Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
[80] Peter Holquist, "'Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work': Bolshevik Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context," *The Journal of Modern History* 69, no. 3 (1997); Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton University Press, 2012), 21-39; also see Amir Weiner, ed. *Landscaping the Human Garden: Twentieth-Century Management in a Comparative Framework* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

As it stands, however, the "alternative" versus "radical" modernity debate is limited to an almost exclusive focus on state interventionism and violence, seen as the defining feature of modernity. I agree with Michael David-Fox that examining the "nonstatist features of modernity […including] the social and spiritual" can nuance and further the discussion.[81] Specifically, as one sees, in the sphere of temporal understandings, the universality of the "immortalization" myth supports the understanding of Stalinist culture (as well as that of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) as an expression of "radical modernity" – due to the relative centrality of an essentially shared myth – rather than a distinct "alternative modernity." Furthermore, this overblown importance of "immortalization" under Stalinism was due, in large part, to the *increased state capacity* to hasten the broad processes of modernization (in this case, secularization and the rapid social changes accompanying industrialization). The uniqueness of the cultural importance attached to "immortalization," and the causes for this, reflect differences in the extent, not character, of the underlying processes of modernization. In no way does this observation, however, entail an attempt to relativize Stalinism or, conversely, to impute liberal democratic modernity by association.

6.3 Utopianism and the Soviet path to "immortalization"

While the "immortalization" myth was not specific to Stalinism, the path to it was conditioned by the Bolshevik experience. Specifically, this section argues that communist utopianism presented an alternative way of dealing with the secularized understandings of mortality and with rapid social change. The "immortalization" myth took root in the wake of these disappointed hopes and began to recede as these hopes once again re-emerged (in a reconstituted way) under de-Stalinization. The following account demonstrates the organic

[81] David-Fox, *Crossing Borders*, 30.

connections between "immortalization" and Culture Two, and the impossibility of "immortalization" in the Culture One system. This supplements Paperny's account, where "immortalization" is not directly related to the internal logic of either system, figuring simply as a peculiar feature of Culture Two. It also provides a way of accounting historically for the oscillations of Culture One and Culture Two, which rescues Paperny's account from potential accusations of having reified these cultural forces (because it does not account for these diachronic shifts).

In the face of declining belief in immortal souls, many Bolsheviks originally responded not by embracing the "immortalization" myth, but rather the ideas of the futurist philosopher Nikolai Fedorov. Specifically, Fedorov advocated conducting scientific research into this-worldly physical immortality and resurrection. Maiakovskii, Lunacharskii, Krasin, Marxist historian Mikhail Pokrovskii, and other eminent Bolsheviks were particularly beholden to Fedorov's mystical ideas about science's inevitable triumph against death.[82] In 1920, Gor'kii voiced his expectations that humans would achieve immortality "probably in two hundred years."[83]

Why were Bolsheviks particularly interested in the problem of death, and in Fedorovism as a solution? Peter Wiles sees what he calls the "Russo-Marxist death syndrome" as an outgrowth of not only "atheistic persuasion," but also, crucially, "religious temperament."[84] According to Wiles, Bolsheviks sought to "make men materially immortal and then they will themselves constitute the desired materialist god-substitute."[85] Similarly, Irene Masing-Delic emphasizes the connection between attempts to conquer death and

[82] Frederick Starr, *Melnikov: Solo Architect in a Mass Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 245-248; also see Dmitry Shlapentokh, "Bolshevism as a Fedorovian Regime," *Cahiers du monde russe* 37, no. 4 (1996).
[83] Qtd. in Robert Williams, "The Russian Revolution and the End of Time: 1900-1940," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 43, no. 3 (1995): 382.
[84] The millenarian "religious temperament" of Bolshevism is also explored in Slezkine, *The House of Government*.
[85] Peter Wiles, "On Physical Immortality: Materialism and Transcendence," *Survey*, no. 56 (1965): 125.

Bolshevik utopianism: "the creative and artistic sectors of the intelligentsia […] saw old death not only as out of place in a new world but also as incongruous in a world where material justice had allegedly triumphed. For death marks the ultimate stage of pauperism, robbing poor mortals of their very last garment – their flesh."[86] This utopian impulse was also energized by death on a scale previously unseen, in the carnage of the First World War and the Civil War.[87] But Bolshevism did not merely give expression to the universal, timeless hope for immortality. Rather, "the ideal of controlling and manipulating life processes that underpinned early twentieth-century biomedical research fit in well with the Bolsheviks' general technocratic and utilitarian attitudes toward science and its place in the new social order they were creating."[88] The new socialist society thought to accommodate immortality research particularly well, for success could be achieved "only in a society that believes in the limitless power of mankind and that has replaced traditional faith in an omnipotent deity with the 'knowledge' of man's (ultimate) omnipotence [and one which] can cooperate in achieving great goals […] organiz[ing] research on a vast scale."[89]

This impulse touched off a wave of research into life prolongation and rejuvenation in the 1920s and early 1930s, including anabiosis, cryogenics, and hormone therapy.[90] Some of the more colourful experiments involved trying to hybridize humans and apes, and using pregnant women's urine ("Gravidan") for rejuvenation (patients included Gor'kii and Politburo member Valerian Kuibyshev).[91] In fact, faith that the progress of science would

[86] Irene Masing-Delic, *Abolishing Death: A Salvation Myth of Russian Twentieth-Century Literature* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 5; also see Nikolai Krementsov, *Revolutionary Experiments: The Quest for Immortality in Bolshevik Science and Fiction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 28-29; Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 118; Sypnowich, "Death in Utopia."
[87] Krementsov, *Revolutionary Experiments:*, 27.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Masing-Delic, *Abolishing Death*, 17.
[90] Krementsov, *Revolutionary Experiments:*, 8.
[91] Alexander Etkind, "Beyond Eugenics: The Forgotten Scandal of Hybridizing Humans and Apes," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 39, no. 2 (2008): 207-208; Mikhail Zolotonosov, "Masturbanizatsiia: 'Erogennye zony' sovetskoi kul'tury 1920-1930-kh godov," in *Erotika v russkoi literature: ot Barkova do nashikh dnei*, ed. I. Prokhorova and et al. (Moscow: Literaturnoe obozrenie, 1992), 97-98; also see Eric Naiman, *Sex in Public: The Incarnation of Early Soviet Ideology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 144-147.

eventually allow for reanimating the dead was a major argument in favour of embalming Lenin's body in 1924.[92] Importantly, these were not fringe phenomena, but were broadly reflective of a cultural ethos, as demonstrated through the large number of for-profit publications (during the NEP period) discussing the possibilities of life-prolongation and immortality.[93]

These initiatives were ultimately fruitless. The disappointment of utopian hopes in physical immortality broadly paralleled the death of communist utopianism *as such* (following a brief period of rebirth during the Cultural Revolution/ Great Break).[94] At the same time, "public infatuation with the dreams of rejuvenation and immortality subsided dramatically, overtaken by the daily struggle for survival."[95] Scientific experimentation became more dangerous; while such charlatans as Trofim Lysenko managed to build a successful career, others were not so lucky. Aleksei Zamkov, the inventor of "Gravidan," was professionally disgraced and fell into oblivion. Endocrinologist Ignatii Kazakov, who proposed a unique rejuvenation method and gained popularity amongst the Soviet elite throughout the 1930s, was executed following the third Moscow show-trial in 1938.[96]

Ultimately, these disappointments opened the way for the rising myth of the "immortalization of memory." Nonetheless, after Stalin's death, utopian expectations were again briefly rekindled, displacing the "immortalization" myth. This was triggered not only by de-Stalinization, but also due to several momentous breakthroughs in science and technology. Masing-Delic notes that physical immortality became avidly discussed again in

[92] Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 192; Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives!*, 181.
[93] Krementsov, *Revolutionary Experiments:*, 32, 34; Naiman, *Sex in Public*, 144.
[94] Both Richard Stites and Yuri Slezkine see the end of the Cultural Revolution as the nail in the coffin of utopianism. For Slezkine, the "Great Disappointment" had its origins in NEP's reestablishment of capitalist relations and the resumption of "petty," everyday life. Stites, by contrast, sees the relative liberalization of NEP as facilitating spontaneous utopian currents, while at the same time fueling them with anger at NEP's "retreat," see Slezkine, *The House of Government*, 220-271, 481; Richard Stites, "Stalinism and the Restructuring of Revolutionary Utopianism," in *The Culture of the Stalin Period*, ed. Hans Gunther (London: Macmillan, 1990).
[95] Krementsov, *Revolutionary Experiments:*, 197.
[96] Zolotonosov, "Masturbanizatsiia," 96-97.

the 1960s.[97] Wiles also argues that the Stalin years represented only a temporary "freeze of thought and activity [in life-prolongation]."[98] It therefore appears that utopian hopes of "conquering death" and the "immortalization" myth were inversely related.[99]

Utopianism, furthermore, presented an alternative way of dealing with the anxieties of modernization's rapid social change, offering a fundamentally hopeful outlook on the future. As philosopher Susan Buck-Morss comments, "the inherent transience of modern life, the constantly changing conditions […] imperil traditional culture [but can do so] in a positive sense, because constant change allows hope that the future can be better."[100] Moreover, this hoped-for future – the communist utopia – was conceived of as ultimately static and unchanging. Thus, paradoxically, while Culture One utopianism embraced the ever-increasing tempo of change, it wished for an eventual "final resolution" of the problem of time. This is conceptualized by Platt as "the ecstatic attitude toward time [which] rejects transience fundamentally, either as a flaw in the architecture of creation or in our perception of it. The ecstatic dream is for time to halt in a single, violent rupture, restoring or revealing

[97] Masing-Delic, *Abolishing Death*, 1-2.
[98] Peter Wiles, "On Physical Immortality, II," *Survey*, no. 57 (1965): 156.
[99] At the same time, moreover, Merridale and others chronicle the development of new Soviet funerary rituals initiated by Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign, beginning in the late 1950s – the precise moment when "immortalization" through monumental art and architecture was on the wane, Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 353-359; Anna Sokolova, "Pokhorony bez pokoinika: transformatsii traditsionnogo pokhoronnogo obriada," *Antropologicheskii forum*, no. 15 (2011); also see Victoria Smolkin, *A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: A History of Soviet Atheism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 165-193. However, success in developing Soviet funerial rites was dubious: they received insufficient attention from authorities (in comparison to rituals accompanying births and weddings) and were hampered by organizational and infrastructural problems, see Romashova, "The Heart of a Remarkable Communist"; Sokolova, "Pokhorony bez pokoinika," 192-193.
[100] Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe*, x-xi.

an eternal order of pure forms."[101] In a related fashion, Yuri Slezkine speaks of Bolsheviks' millenarian, "end-time" strivings and expectations.[102]

The utopian vision of an atemporal "promised land," arrived at through a *temporary* embrace of rapid change, gradually fizzled out (at least by the end of the First Five-Year Plan). This was not only due to general disillusionment (utopia looked increasingly unrealizable in the context of the collectivization debacle, the mixed record of the Great Break, and in the lead-up and aftermath of the War). Utopian thinking was consciously discouraged by the Stalinist regime. After all, detailed depictions of the communist utopia would contrast with everyday privations, potentially raising dissatisfaction.[103] Utopia was also thought to distract from important issues of the day.[104] Finally, the authoritarian regime feared experimentation and the dangers of an uncontrolled imagination, which were instead supplanted by an arid realism.[105]

Thus, in the "immortalization" myth under Stalinism, visions of the future were deliberately hollow, subsumed under such vague labels as "posterity" and "future generations." Unlike the 1920s, when architects and city planners were explicitly discussing "future users" and the needs of people living under communism, the Stalinist period saw

[101] Jonathan Brooks Platt, "Pushkin Now and Then: Images of Temporal Paradox in the 1937 Pushkin Jubilee," *The Russian Review* 67, no. 4 (2008): 640. In Platt's analysis, this "escatological" view of time coexisted with the "monumentalist" one (which in his conceptualization bears some similarity to what I call the "immortalization" myth) in Stalinist culture, Jonathan Brooks Platt, *Greetings, Pushkin!: Stalinist Cultural Politics and the Russian National Bard* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016). However, I believe that Platt reads too much into his sources. For him, the difference between the statements "Pushkin lives on in our memory" and "Pushkin is alive" is qualitative (and expressive of two temporal outlooks), whereas I see the latter simply as a metaphor for the former. Nobody *really* believed that Pushkin was truly "alive" and "resurrected."

[102] See Slezkine, *The House of Government*; Williams, "The Russian Revolution and the End of Time: 1900-1940."

[103] Leonid Geller, *Vselennaia za predelom dogmy: razmyshleniia o sovetskoi fantastike* (London: Overseas Publications Interchange Ltd., 1985), 69; John Glad, "Brave New Worlds," *Wilson Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (1983): 74; Stites, *Revolutionary Dreams*, 236; Richard Stites, "World Outlook and Inner Fears in Soviet Science Fiction," in *Science and the Soviet Social Order*, ed. Loren Graham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 304.

[104] Patrick McGuire, *Red Stars: Political Aspects of Soviet Science Fiction* (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1985), 14-15.

[105] Geller, *Vselennaia za predelom dogmy*, 71; McGuire, *Red Stars*, 14-15; Stites, *Revolutionary Dreams*, 241, 246.

nothing of the like.[106] By contrast, Stalinist architects made only a few off-hand remarks about the inevitable expansion of city size and the dimensions of monumental constructions. From the endorsement of "national" styles as trans-temporal artistic languages, we may also deduce that "posterity" was sometimes imagined in its "pre-communist" phase (where national distinctions still mattered).[107] Altogether, though, through the "immortalization" myth, Stalinist culture could continue to speak about the future, but without saying anything specific. Thereby, the future was still mobilized as a solution to the problem of rapid social change, but in a cardinally different way from that of utopian communist culture. Conversely, during de-Stalinization, communist utopianism and optimism about the future once again returned (although the idea that communist society would be static and "boring" was often – and largely ineffectively – denied).

Thus, I have argued that that the "immortalization" myth was a widespread, transnational response to the shifts accompanying modernization: secularization of ideas about death (whereby "immortal" memory filled the vacuum left by the abandonment of belief in "immortal" souls), and rapid social change (in which communication with an imagined posterity gave a sense of stability). While the "immortalization" myth was not specific to Stalinism (although it did present itself in an augmented way – as under fascist regimes), the path to it was. I argued that "immortalization" followed on the heals of disappointed utopian hopes, which had proposed their own responses to secularized understandings of mortality and to rapid social change.

6.4 Summary of findings

[106] For instance, see discussion in Slezkine, *The House of Government*, 333-347.
[107] The eventual "fusion of nations" (once communism had triumphed globally) was increasingly pushed to a more distant time-frame, but remained a consistent tenet of the official Stalinist doctrine on nationalities, van Ree, *The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin*, 191-196.

This thesis has analyzed the "immortalization of memory" under the Stalin regime, a program that sought to ensure that contemporaneous events and individuals would be remembered by posterity, in perpetuity. As I have argued, "immortalization" was primarily carried out through the construction of dedicated monumental constructions, from statues to infrastructure mega-projects. Opposing the dominant view that Stalinist monumentalism acted solely as a conduit for state propaganda, this thesis argued that monuments and monumental architecture were also tasked with memorializing contemporary events and individuals, in order that these might be remembered favourably by future generations.

This "immortalization" function was evident on several levels. In Stalinist discourse, monumental constructions were referred to as being "monuments to the epoch," "writing the chronicle of history in stone," and constructing "the pantheon of the Stalinist epoch." This was no mere sloganeering; constructions made use of long-lasting materials and forms, with a view to centuries-long durability. Monuments hastily executed in impermanent materials were later demolished and rebuilt to endure. Appreciating this genuine striving to "build for posterity" challenges reductionist interpretations of "solid" artistic forms as mere assertions of the regime's strength and immutability. Finally, once constructed, monumental objects were immediately placed under a progressively strengthening preservation regime, guaranteeing their indefinite existence as protected national heritage. In the wider historical context, the Stalinist period was distinctive for the orientation of its monumental objects towards future audiences, and the commemoration of contemporary (rather than past) events and individuals.

As demonstrated above, "immortalization" goals had significant effects on the form and style of Stalinist monumentalism. Specifically, "immortalization" can (partially) explain the demise of the avant-garde and the revival of historicism in architectural and artistic practice. Given the lack of time, expertise, and resources, research into durable construction

frequently took a shortcut. Rather than develop new materials, forms, and mediums, artists and architects increasingly seized upon those which, in retrospect, had remained physically preserved over the centuries. In seeking an artistic language that would be understandable to posterity, Stalinist monumentalists turned to neoclassicism and, increasingly, to national styles. These two traditions were thought to be "perfect" and "timeless," qualities "proven" by their continual use throughout the centuries. Moreover, I suggested that the global "stripped classical" movement of the 1930s and 1940s, with which the Stalinist monumental style held much in common, may itself have been connected to wider, shared "immortalization" objectives. In so doing, the thesis contributed to a reappraisal of neoclassical and "national" historicism as not necessarily conservative, as is typically assumed, but also paradoxically suited to being a future-oriented style.

The use of retrospective styles for "immortalizing" contemporary events and individuals was not without tensions. How would posterity distinguish Stalinist constructions from past heritage, heritage which in this period was also being carefully restored and reconstructed? As this thesis has proposed, common solutions to this problem involved the heavy use of historical props (contemporary clothing, machines, weapons, and the like), a reliance on written inscriptions (as well as of a general "logocentrism" in art), a focus on artistic synthesis (accentuating meaning the use of several artistic mediums – architecture, sculpture, painting – at once), and a penchant for gigantic dimensions. A related problem consisted of making Stalinist monumental constructions relevant to an imagined posterity, a particularly grave problem given the "museum-like" quality that historicism could imply. Given the impossibility of adjusting the subject of "immortalization," solutions to the problem of relevance included an emphasis on an emotionally-charged romanticism, and a striving for more laconic renderings. These two concerns – relevance and distinctiveness – often came into tension with one another. Indeed, the development of Stalinist

monumentalism can be explained to a significant extent by reference to these two opposing criteria.

The thesis also argued that "immortalization" represented a cultural myth, rather than a state policy. In a limited sense, "immortalization" *did* represent an attempt to control the collective memory (and, indirectly, the political culture) of the future, from the present. Yet "immortalization" was a much broader phenomenon. Stalinist political leaders made sure that they were the subjects "immortalized" in monuments and monumental art – an outcome of their personal vanity rather than instrumental, power-maximizing calculations. The executors of "immortalization," art and architecture professionals, were also not disinterested. They saw a chance of themselves being "immortalized" through perdurable creations. Moreover, by creating the first Socialist Realist classics, as well as in laying the foundations of future monumental *ensembles*, art and architecture professionals savoured the possibility of becoming canonized. While the regime used the "immortalization" discourse to demand political conscientiousness and higher quality work, artists also referred to the importance of their duty "before all time," demanding commissions and extra resources. A core of "true believers" was also genuinely enthusiastic about "immortalization," submitting designs and providing constructive criticism to artists and architects. Indeed, the wide public performance of support for "immortalization" probably convinced the regime that "immortalization" was already a shared value, a self-evident symbolic incentive for labour, loyalty, and military valour,

But why did political leaders, art and architecture professionals, and the wider public care about being "immortalized" in the first place? I argued that "immortalized" memory filled the existential vacuum left by declining belief in immortal souls, a dynamic particularly evident amidst the death and destruction of the Great Patriotic War. The "immortalization" myth also responded to the conditions of rapid social change (particularly the massive

dislocations of the "Great Break" and subsequent policies), stabilizing social and individual identities with imagined continuities between present generations and the remembering posterity. These functions of the "immortalization" myth were not specific to Stalinism, although "immortalization" was particularly central to Stalinist culture (as in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany). Challenging "totalitarian" arguments, which interpret the centrality of construction as an outcome of democratic deficit, I argued that the Stalinist Soviet Union (as well as interwar fascist regimes) experienced the secular existential crisis and rapid, disorienting social changes particularly harshly. I further argued that the temporal model suggested by "immortalization" supports the understanding of Stalinist culture as an expression of "radical modernity," rather than an "alternative modernity" (or a reversion to primordial patterns, as implied by Stalinism's alleged orientation towards an atemporal "eternity," in reaction to linear models of time). Finally, I noted the unique context of the rise and fall of the "immortalization" myth in the Stalinist Soviet Union. I argued that an inverse relationship existed between "immortalization" and communist utopianism, which promised alternative solutions to the problems of death and rapid social change. In so doing, I connected the trajectory of the "immortalization" myth to the broader cultural frameworks dominant in the periods bounding the Stalinist era.

As the first detailed study of the "immortalization" myth and practices under Stalinism, the thesis has made interventions in several questions. First, the study proposed a novel approach to Stalinist monumental art and architecture. As noted, conventionally these have been interpreted solely in instrumental terms, as propaganda objects interpellating contemporary audiences. This thesis uncovered a parallel process: memorializing (idealized representations of) the present for future generations to look back on. Second, sensitivity to this dynamic allowed for a deeper explanation of the style and form of Stalinist monumentalism. It particularly draws attention to the quest for durability and the search for a

trans-temporal artistic language, as well as explaining certain features of Stalinist monumentalism in terms of the problems of distinctiveness and relevance to posterity. Third, this thesis used the "immortalization" myth as an entry point for nuancing understandings of Stalinist temporality, which have previously been compressed into the "striving towards communism" cliché," or the notion of "Stalinism as completed, eternal utopia." Rather, I demonstrated that the "immortalization" myth was inversely related to communist utopianism. The centrality of this fundamentality modern myth contributes to emerging understandings of Stalinist culture as an expression of "radical modernity."

7.0 Epilogue: Stalinist monuments and contemporary collective memory

This thesis demonstrated that the Stalinist regime attempted to influence the way in which future generations would remember the era. Almost naturally, this calls up a further set of questions: how do these self-representations of Stalinism – these "intentional monuments" – relate to contemporary Russian memory of Stalinism? While successive waves of de-Stalinization have destroyed the Stalinist political system and sidelined its ideology and mythology, powerful representations of Stalinism remain prominent in the monuments and architecture of the post-Soviet cityscape. By way of epilogue, I argue that Stalinist monumental art and architecture continue to carry out their "immortalizing" functions – if only as emotionally powerful illustrations supporting contemporary (apologetic) discourses on the Stalinist era. To neutralize this effect, or rather, to harness its potential towards a *critical* public discussion of Stalinism and legacies, these objects must be contextualized and re-framed.

As durable memory "hardware," Stalinist monuments have largely resisted attrition. "Contemporary Muscovites […] perceive and confront […] Soviet memorial sites and sacred spaces," writes David Webber.[1] As Merridale seconds, "post-Soviet Russian culture will end up preserving the concrete and steel that the Stalinists built. War memorial complexes and windswept parades of marble will survive even after the new capitalists have forgotten what they used to mean."[2] "Hardware" becomes part of the *status quo*, requiring significant effort to dismantle. This is particularly true of Stalinist monumental objects, in which "the cults of eternity and of vastness went together."[3] For example, the enormous 100-foot granite statue

[1] David Webber, "Changing Sacredness and Historical Memory of Moscow's Red Square," *Studies in Slavic Cultures* 1 (2009): 47.
[2] Catherine Merridale, "Revolution Among the Dead: Cemeteries in Twentieth-Century Russia," *Mortality* 8, no. 2 (2003): 187.
[3] Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art*, 281.

of Stalin that dominated the Prague cityscape required a full 1 600 pounds of explosives to destroy; the process of demolition took an entire month. The plinth, perhaps due to its size, remained untouched.[4] Indeed, several fragments of the statue itself were preserved, and were recently exhibited.[5] Practicalities aside, "hardware" takes significant political will (and – in democracies – a baseline level of social consensus) to dismantle. Visual references to, and representations of, Stalin and his closest associates were largely destroyed in the de-Stalinization campaigns of the 1950s and early 1960s, and in the brief period accompanying the collapse of the Soviet regime. Nonetheless, Stalinist monumental art of more general character remains largely untouched, as do architectural constructions, most of which preserve their original functions. Thus, as Kathleen Smith argues, "unlike holiday parades and demonstrations, which only fleetingly transform a city's surface, the construction, destruction, and renovation of pieces of the built landscape have the potential to alter the city's visage over the long run."[6]

Yet perhaps one should not overstate the significance of enduring Stalinist monuments, especially those from which direct references to the dictator have been excised. After all, as writer Robert Musil famously quipped, "there is nothing in this world as invisible as a monument."[7] Stalinist edifices may be peripheral to the everyday life of Muscovites, even as they commute through the opulent metro station and bustle down stately boulevards.

[4] Paulina Bren, *The Greengrocer and His TV: The Culture of Communism after the 1968 Prague Spring* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 1-2; Hana Pichova, "The Lineup for Meat: The Stalin Statue in Prague," *PMLA* 123, no. 3 (2008); also see Beverley James, *Imagining Postcommunism: Visual Narratives of Hungary's 1956 Revolution* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005), 54-60. Pedestals of the Dzerzhinskii monument on Moscow's Lubianka square, and of Tallinn's Lenin monument, also remained untouched for some time, Yampolsky, "In the Shadow of Monuments," 106-107.

[5] Robert Tait. "Stalin Rubble Throws into Focus Czechs' 20th-Century Struggles," *The Guardian*, September 30, 2018, accessed March 15, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/30/stalin-rubble-throws-into-focus-czechs-20th-century-struggles

[6] Kathleen Smith, *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin era* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 102.

[7] Robert Musil, *Posthumous Papers of a Living Author*, trans. Peter Wortsman (London: Penguin, 1995), 61.

But Musil's argument is often taken out of context. In fact, he specifically noted that "forceful monuments do exist," although such monuments require "very particular preparations."[8] This thesis has demonstrated that Stalinist monumentalists did just that, carefully considering how to make these understandable and relevant to future viewers. In some sense, these efforts appear not to have been in vain. The superior dimensions of landmark Stalinist constructions make them supremely visible and secure their dominance in the city's *ensemble.* Magdalena Zabrowska suggests that the Palace of Culture "has become an integral part of Warsaw" because "it is simply too big and too weird to be ignored."[9] Specifically, Michal Murawski estimates that "45% of Varsovians can see the Palace from their windows, either at home or at work."[10] The *ensemble* effects of Stalinist high-rises were officially recognized in the Moscow 2020 Municipal Development Plan (which also accentuated their role by means of an extensive lighting programme).[11] As Gill contends, "the faded grandeur of the [VSKhV/ VDNKh ...] the evocative aura of the Lenin Mausoleum and its immediate surrounds, and the still-soaring gigantism of Stalin's skyscrapers give the city a tangible sense of Sovietness which cannot be eliminated."[12]

Similarly, the gamble on traditional, historicist aesthetics has seemingly paid off. One 2009 poll, for example, reflected Muscovites' distinct aesthetic preference for Stalin-era metro stations.[13] The Stalinist style also holds particular appeal for tourists.[14] Indeed, the

[8] Ibid., 62-63.
[9] Magdalena Zaborowska, "The Height of (Architectural) Seduction: Reading the 'Changes' through Stalin's Palace in Warsaw, Poland," *Journal of Architectural Education* 54, no. 4 (2001): 210.
[10] Michal Murawski, "The Palace Complex: A Stalinist Social Condenser in Warsaw," *The Journal of Architecture* 22, no. 3 (2017): 471-472.
[11] Marina Dmitrieva, "Moscow Architecture between Stalinism and Modernism," *International Review of Sociology* 16, no. 2 (2006): 433. Conversely, Murawski characterizes the contest for neutralizing the Palace of Culture's "stranglehold over the city centre" as the focus of Warsaw's city planning agenda, Michal Murawski, "From Iconicity to Dominationality: The Palace of Culture and Science and Contemporary Warsaw," *Informationen zur modernen Stadtgeschichte*, no. 2 (2011): 59.
[12] Graeme Gill, *Symbolism and Regime Change in Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 211.
[13] Elena Dzhandzhugazova, "Moskovskoe metro: puteshestvie vo vremeni i prostranstve," *Sovremennye problemy servisa i turizma* 1 (2010): 70-71.
[14] Marius Czepczyński, *Cultural Landscapes of Post-Socialist Cities: Representation of Power and Needs* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 133.

Stalinist style is generally regarded as a marker of quality and class, as demonstrated by the construction of new architecture in the Stalinist style, perhaps most notably Moscow's "Triumph-Palace" high-rise (see **Figure 6**). Gill refers to the increasing popularity of "the so-called Soviet Empire style […] in decorating circles,"[15] while Zinov'eva notes that "present-day Moscow companies not only turn to the style of [Stalinist] classicism, but also advertise it, marketing their buildings in the terminology of Stalin era. These are the 'Eighth high-rise,' the 'Near Dacha' and many others."[16] Russian art historian Natal'ia Shashkova notes a general "increase of interest in the monuments of the Stalin era on the part of both art specialists and the public" which are beginning to see them as "outstanding objects of national cultural […] heritage."[17]

And yet these objects are not always regarded in a wholly positive fashion. In August 2009, for instance, the renovation of "Kurskaia-kol'tsevaia" metro station's surface vestibule, in which lyrics from the Soviet anthem "Stalin reared us on loyalty to the people and inspired us to labour and heroism," were re-inscribed (having been erased in the first wave of de-Stalinization), ignited a public controversy (see **Figure 5**).[18] Conversely, in a 2014 protest against Russian policy towards Ukraine, the star adorning one Stalinist high-rise (the residential complex on the Kotel'nicheskaia embankment) was painted to resemble the Ukrainian flag (which was also hoisted onto the spire).[19] Whether because of their aesthetic

[15] Gill, *Symbolism and Regime Change*, 211.
[16] Zinov'eva, *Simvoly stalinskoi' Moskvy*, 10; also see Susan Corbesero, "History, Myth, and Memory: A Biography of a Stalin Portrait," *Russian History* 38, no. 1 (2011): 75; Dmitrieva, "Moscow Architecture between Stalinism and Modernism," 442; Karl Schlögel, "Planet Moscow, a Guide to the Changing Landscape of Power," *International Journal of Urban Sciences* 19, no. 1 (2015): 70-71.
[17] Natal'ia Shashkova, "Istoriia, istoriko-kul'turnoe znachenie i sovremennoe ispol'zovanie naslediia sovetskoi arkhitektury: gostinitsa 'Leningradskaia'," *Prostranstvo i vremia* 15, no. 1 (2014): 176.
[18] See, for example, Vladimir Kara-Murza. "Restavratsiia Stalina," *Radio Svoboda*, August 27, 2009, https://www.svoboda.org/a/1808805.html; "Stalin v metro." *Interfax*, August 27, 2009, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/97678 ; "Slova sovetskogo gimna iz moskovskogo metro mogut ubrat'." *RIA Novosti*, October 21, 2009, accessed March 15, 2019, https://ria.ru/20091021/189891982.html.
[19] "Zvezda na vysotke na Kotel'nicheskoi naberezhnoi pokrashena v pervonachal'nyi tsvet." *TASS*, August 20, 2014, https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/1390086

reputation or as objects of political controversy, Stalinist monuments are clearly not "invisible."

But do Stalinist monumental objects have an independent effect on contemporary collective memory of Stalinism – in other words, do they directly shape public perceptions of the era, or do they remain peripheral or epiphenomenal to memory dynamics? After all, the restored inscriptions in "Kurskaia" station's vestibule did not *produce* discourses about Stalinism but galvanized already-existing, opposing attitudes towards the Stalinist past. The high-rise on Kotel'nicheskaia embankment acted as a *canvass* for a political action, even if it was (possibly) chosen to highlight continuities in Russian imperialism. Similarly, the admiration for Stalinist aesthetics could have little to do with attitudes towards the regime which spawned them. Indeed, scholarship on Russian memory of Stalinism treats memory solely as the product of *current* socio-political determinants.[20]

The correspondence between the intended meaning vested in monuments by the Stalin regime and their current interpretation is unlikely. As mentioned, Stalinist monuments have not remained unaltered: their semiotic system was crucially changed by the removal of references to the dictator and his regime. In the 1950s and early 1960s, nearly all depictions of Stalin's likeness were destroyed; over one hundred statues and panels were removed from the Moscow metro alone.[21] As mentioned, this iconoclastic process continued in the post-Soviet period, while many other objects simply became derelict.[22] Conversely, Stalinist

[20] For an overview of the literature, see Antony Kalashnikov, "Stalinist Crimes and the Ethics of Memory," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 19, no. 3 (2018). Forest and Johnson are, to my knowledge, the only ones to engage with the reception of Soviet monuments today. However, their analysis focuses on the actions of the state, political parties, and civil society *upon* these monuments, ignoring the issue of whether the latter constitute an independent force, Forest and Johnson, "Unraveling the Threads of History."; Benjamin Forest, Juliet Johnson, and Karen Till, "Post-Totalitarian National Identity: Public Memory in Germany and Russia," *Social & Cultural Geography* 5, no. 3 (2004).
[21] Kruk, "Semiotics of Visual Iconicity," 48.
[22] For instance, some memorial plaques are destroyed along with old buildings Peskov, *Memorial'nye doski Moskvy*, 6. Less well known Stalinist residential buildings are also at risk of being torn down and redeveloped, Nikolai Kruzhkov, *Vysotnye zdaniia stalinskoi Moskvy: fakty iz istorii proektirovaniia i stroitel'stva* (Samara: Vodolei, 2011), 265-266.

constructions have been modified in a wider process of commercialization of post-socialist urban landscapes.[23] For example, a giant Mercedez-Benz logo adorned the famous "House on the Embankment" for a decade (it was removed in 2011). Zaborowska documents Warsaw's Palace of Culture's "incredible transformation into a slick 'convention center' and western free-market stronghold [now housing] the World Business Center, Coca-Cola Poland, and a casino."[24] These transformations, both of a formal character and in terms of function, "re-codify" the meaning of these objects.[25]

Equally importantly, the discursive lens ("software," to use Etkind's term) through which Stalinist monumental art and architecture are interpreted has shifted significantly from the Stalin era. "Monuments turn into relics once formulaic truths are disputed or discarded, and the traditional relapses into the merely customary or habitual," writes the social theorist Anthony Giddens.[26] After all, the Stalinist regime hardly envisioned post-Soviet Russia as the intended "future audience." More specifically, Clark argues, "architecture cannot, per se, narrate a biography, or at any rate can do so to only a very restricted degree. The [Stalin] regime needed not just beautiful buildings [but also] a narrative […] to give it order, cogency and, above all, *meaning*."[27] The Stalinist narrative no longer exists (even the few remaining committed Stalinists espouse a highly "revisionist" ideology), and Stalinist monumental objects are interpreted through new discourses. Furthermore, meanings themselves are always contested. Zaborowska argues that through the years, the Palace of Culture's "actual

[23] See John Czaplicka, Nida Gelazis, and Blair Ruble, *Cities after the Fall of Communism: Reshaping Cultural Landscapes and European Identity* (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009).
[24] Zaborowska, "The Height of (Architectural) Seduction," 210; also see Marcin Kula, *Messages of Stones: The Changing Symbolism of the Urban Landscape in Warsaw in the Post-Communist Era* (Trondheim: Program on East European Cultures and Societies, 2007), 3-4.
[25] Czepczyński, *Cultural Landscapes of Post-Socialist Cities: Representation of Power and Needs*, 126; also see Mariusz Czepczyński and Helen Sooväli-Sepping, "From Sacrum to Profanum: Reinterpretation of Communist Places of Power in Baltic Cities," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 47, no. 2 (2016).
[26] Anthony Giddens, "Living in a Post-Traditional Society," in *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, ed. Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 104.
[27] Clark, "The New Moscow and the New Happiness," 199; also see Aman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe*, 257; Golomstock, *Totalitarian Art*, 306.

appearance has been less significant than its hybridic ability to encode different meanings."[28] These meanings are often entirely prosaic and apolitical – being used as a sites for arranging meetings or for pastimes such as skateboarding.[29] Even in their day, Stalinist monuments never carried a singular meaning, and could be interpreted subversively.[30] Ultimately, therefore, "immortalization" under Stalinism was overly optimistic, and appears to bear out Volkogonov's verdict that "people's attempts to build monuments to themselves while they are still alive are fruitless, ephemeral, and illusive."[31] As Mumford warns:

> Stone gives a false sense of continuity, and a deceptive assurance of life: the shell seems to pledge continuity by the fact that it continues to exist, outwardly unaffected by the passage of events. But the fact is that exterior form can only confirm an inner life: it is not a substitute. All living beliefs, all living desires and ideas, must be perpetually renewed, from generation to generation: re-thought, re-considered, re-willed, re-built, if they are to endure.[32]

It would therefore be misguided to search for an independent, unidirectional effect of Stalinist "hardware" on contemporary collective memory. But does that mean that this "hardware" is entirely passive, a forgotten relic or the mere terrain of today's memory wars? To answer this question more conclusively, further research should explore the relationship between leftover Stalinist "hardware" and contemporary readings of them through new "software," as well as

[28] Zaborowska, "The Height of (Architectural) Seduction," 210.
[29] See, for example, Ewa Ochman, "Spaces of Nationhood and Contested Soviet War Monuments in Poland: The Warsaw Monument to the Brotherhood in Arms," in *The Palgrave Handbook of State-Sponsored History After 1945*, ed. Berber Bevernage and Nico Wouters (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
[30] Thus for instance, they could become the butt of jokes (see Jonathan Waterlow, *It's Only a Joke, Comrade! Humour, Trust and Everyday Life under Stalin* (Oxford: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2018), 35, 135), be reinterpreted (see Dan Healey's on queer receptions Deineka's work (Dan Healey, *Russian Homophobia from Stalin to Sochi* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 114) or perceived with hostility, such as Warsaw's Palace of Culture, widely seen as an imperialist imposition.
[31] Dmitrii Volkogonov, *Stalin. Politicheskii portret* (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), 4-5.
[32] Mumford, *The Culture of Cities*, 435.

the ideologies which this memory work undergirds. Nonetheless, a few cautious observations can be made.

In dominant discourse, Stalinist monumental constructions often appear as testaments to national greatness, both in and of themselves (as beautiful and imposing monuments), and through the achievements that they memorialize. It is perhaps not coincidental that Stalinist monumental heritage is subject to extensive restoration efforts bankrolled by the state, while heritage of other Soviet periods suffers "abandonment, rejection and [only] fragmented restoration."[33] For instance, the extensive restoration of the VSKhV (now VDNKh) exhibition grounds has largely focused on recreating their 1939 or 1954 appearance, often by demolishing pavilions and facades built in the post-Stalin period.[34] Julie Deschepper reads in this "the aim […] to remind [of] the aspirations of greatness represented by the most famous Stalinian buildings."[35] Dmitrieva also sees the construction of new buildings in a quasi-Stalinist style as an "attempt to legitimise the new state" and display "the continuity of political power."[36]

To an extent, Stalinist monumental art and architecture predisposes itself to such triumphal readings. It is, after all, not wholly devoid of independent semantic content. "Hardware" and "software" are ideal types; in reality, there are "contacts and intersections between them."[37] As demonstrated in Section 4.1, Stalinist monumental art and architecture widely employed the written word, specifically in order to stabilize meaning temporally. Where they survive, such inscriptions continue to "suggest" avenues of interpretation. In

[33] Deschepper, "Le 'patrimoine soviétique' de l'URSS," 19; also see Julie Deschepper, "Mémoires plurielles et patrimoines dissonants : l'héritage architectural soviétique dans la Russie poutinienne," *Le Mouvement Social*, no. 260 (2017). This was not the case in the initial post-Soviet period, see Calder Loth, "Architecture of the Stalin Period: Appreciating Reality," in *Moscow Heritage at Crisis Point, 2004-2007*, ed. Edmund Harris and Clementine Cecil (Moscow: MAPS, 2007).
[34] Ol'ga Zinov'eva and Alexander Lobodanov, "VDNKh Exhibition: Stalinist Main Propaganda Venue and Its Transformations of Today," *Mesto a dejiny*, no. 2 (2016): 45.
[35] Deschepper, "Mémoires plurielles et patrimoines dissonants," 39; also see Zinov'eva and Lobodanov, "VDNKh Exhibition," 44.
[36] Dmitrieva, "Moscow Architecture between Stalinism and Modernism," 445.
[37] Etkind, "Vremia sravnivat' kamni," 73.

glorifying the Leader and the communist cause, they perhaps hit a dead end (they cannot, by themselves, resurrect discourses and mythologies which are effectively dead), but in extolling individual feats and the achievements of "the people," they fall on more fertile ground. Moreover, Stalinist art utilized heavily what Elena Bykova calls "reduction": "distilling the complex into the simple […] into the rigid [binary] schema of 'good'-'bad'."[38] This makes Stalinist monuments difficult to integrate into nuanced narratives. Ironically, this semantic inflexibility appears as a key factor in the widespread destruction of Soviet monuments in Eastern European and in some post-Soviet states (the Baltic countries, Georgia, and more recently, Ukraine), where they were seen as "intrinsically hostile" to new national identities (discussed below).[39]

Furthermore, both "software" and "hardware" are palimpsestic. Remaining Stalinist "hardware" coexists with that of earlier and later periods, but the same is true of discourses, mythologies, and practices.[40] Dominant attitudes towards the past are, in the absence of intentional revisions, path dependent, being reproduced in cultural and communicative memory. Even if they are revised, today's revisions are in dialogue with yesterday's historical narratives.[41] Thus, Smith contends: "images of the past are not infinitely malleable. The Russian experience shows that politicians can neither escape the past nor mold it completely to their will. Collective memories are shaped gradually."[42] For example, as scholarship notes, many of the tropes of the Great Patriotic War myth manifest great

[38] Elena Bykova, "Modul'nyi memorial'nyi tekst kak monumental'naia propaganda," *Izvestiia Rossiiskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta*, no. 131 (2011): 133.
[39] Other Soviet republics, however, *have* managed to integrate objects of the Stalinist and Soviet cityscape into new national urban identities, see Nelly Bekus, "Ideological Recycling of the Socialist Legacy: Reading Townscapes of Minsk and Astana," *Europe-Asia Studies* 69, no. 5 (2017).
[40] For a study of the affinity of contemporary Russian politics and society with "deep structures" also present in the Stalinist period, see Getty, *Practicing Stalinism*. Also see Galina Mikhaleva, ed. *Preodolenie Stalinizma* (Moscow: RODP "Iabloko", 2009).
[41] Khrushchev-era discourses on Stalinism influenced Brezhnev-era perceptions, which in turn affected memory politics under Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and current dynamics in Putin's Russia, see Polly Jones, "Between Post-Stalinist Legitimacy and Stalin's Authority: Memories of 1941 from Late Socialism to the Post-Soviet Era," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 54, no. 3-4 (2012); also see Christian Volk, "Stalinism, Memory and Commemoration: Russia's Dealing with the Past," *The New School Psychology Bulletin* 6, no. 2 (2009).
[42] Smith, *Mythmaking in the New Russia*, 184.

continuity.[43] Similarly, apologetic historical narratives justifying, minimizing, and denying Stalinist crimes – by no means a fringe phenomenon in Russia – often draw upon myths formulated by the Stalinist regime itself. Therefore, modified (but not beyond recognition) "software" may provide the baseline narrative lens through which Stalinist monumental objects can be read and made sense of as triumphal attestations to national greatness.

Even aside from their positive semantic content (mediated by contemporary discourses), Stalinist monumental art and architecture affect collective memory through what they obscure. I have already mentioned the "hierarchies of commemorability," which meant that only a narrow spectrum of subjects was deemed fit for "immortalization." Thus, for instance, the decorative and monumental artwork in the Moscow metro portray Komsomol *metrostroevtsy*; convict labourers involved in metro construction are, unsurprisingly, not depicted. Likewise, the context in which monumental objects were constructed remains opaque. For example, the atrocious labour conditions and disorganization which accompanied metro construction are not depicted.[44] The purge of the architectural community, which was a precondition to the establishment of the Stalinist style[45] is not related, neither is the diversion of key resources away from peoples' primary needs towards such landmark projects. Naturally, existing Stalinist monumental constructions also hide what was lost in order to make them possible: spatially, and even in terms of the construction material. Entire neighbourhoods in Moscow and other cities were razed to make room for new developments. Most famously, marble from the dynamited Cathedral of Christ the Saviour was used for "Okhotnyi Riad" and "Dvorets Sovetov" metro stations (as well as for the Lenin Library), but in fact a full fifty churches were cannibalized for construction materials during the

[43] See for instance, Corbesero, "History, Myth, and Memory."; Ferretti, "Raskolotaia pamiat'."
[44] For detailed studies of the problems of early metro construction, see Neutatz, *Moskovskoe metro*; William Wolf, "Russia's Revolutionary Underground: The Construction of the Moscow Subway, 1931-35" (PhD thesis, Ohio State University, 1994).
[45] Bown, *Art under Stalin*, 126-135; Hudson, *Blueprints and Blood*.

construction of the Moscow metro.[46] The list of what Stalinist monumental objects do not reflect could be continued – but they fundamentally work to obscure the ecosystem of violence which was inseparable from the Stalinist project. This has definite effects on collective memory dynamics. As Valery Lazarev observes: "it is easy to misjudge the Gulag's contribution because its more lasting monuments – the Moscow metro, the Moscow University, and the Norilsk Nickel Kombinat – are what remain. Forgotten are the 'roads to nowhere,' long fallen into […] decay."[47]

Stalinist monumental art and architecture are therefore not mere passive material upon which contemporary discourses operate. While one cannot speak of their "independent" effect on Russian collective memory because their effect is always in conjunction with and mediated by contemporary memory "software," they nonetheless may play a role in contemporary memory of the Stalin period. Indeed, aside from their semantic role ("narrating" their era), as objects of monumental art, they also appeal to emotion, thereby speaking "louder" than textual narratives. As discussed in Section 2.1, this effect was something that Stalinist actors anticipated and consciously sought to harness. Anna Sorokina's study of youth attitudes towards the Soviet past notes that while they recognize the tragedy of Stalinist repressions, they nonetheless hold that at least Moscow has the best metro system in the world, in part thanks to the leader.[48] Thus, one can agree (with some qualifications) with Zinov'eva, who claims that Stalinist art and architecture "do not fall silent with regime change or the death of their creator but continue in one measure or another to exert a great influence on subsequent generations."[49]

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[46] Neutatz, *Moskovskoe metro*, 167-168; Sudjic, *The Edifice Complex*, 74; Wolf, "Russia's Revolutionary Underground," 307-308. Cemetery marble and bronze was also used in metro construction, Merridale, "Revolution Among the Dead," 181; also see Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 174.
[47] Valery Lazarev, "Conclusions," in *The Economics of Forced Labor: The Soviet Gulag*, ed. Paul Gregory and Valery Lazarev (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2003), 196.
[48] Anna Sorokina, "Syndrome of Soviet Nostalgia among the Younger Generation of Russians," in *IX ICCEES* (Makuhari, Japan 2015).
[49] Ol'ga Zinov'eva, "Unasledovannye politicheskie tekhnologii: monumental'naia propaganda stalinskoi Moskvy," *Vestnik Rossiiskogo gosudarstvennogo gumanitarnogo universiteta* 44, no. 1 (2010): 10.

Finally, then, how might the role of Stalinist monuments in sustaining a favourable memory of that period be countered? Some post-socialist states have passed decommunization laws (notably, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine), which have mandated the demolition and removal from public spaces of Soviet monuments and monumental art. This has proceeded alongside spontaneous vandalism and destruction of these objects by activists, most recently in Ukraine's so-called "Leninfall."[50] But I am not convinced that this is the way to proceed. For one thing, demolition is not feasible in a number of cases (how does one de-Stalinize the Moscow metro, or the facades of Stalinist high-rises?). It also sidelines the objective aesthetic value of these objects. But most importantly, destruction squanders an opportunity to critically reflect on these objects, and the wider history of Stalinism from which they are inseparable. After all, demolition follows a logic fundamentally similar to that employed in the Stalinist Soviet Union: silencing and destroying the carriers of foreign ideologies, rather than engaging in an open confrontation with them, with all the risks and benefits that this may involve.[51]

Rather, I believe, reframing and contextualizing Stalinist monumental art and architecture represents a more fruitful way of engaging with these objects. It can counter the readings which Stalinist monuments predispose themselves to. It can reveal the sinister context of these objects' creation. It can bring attention to the fact that these objects were intentionally created to falsify and distort history. It can be argued that this strategy is superior to demolition and related approaches (for instance, attempts to "hide" or dissipate the visual impact of Stalinist constructions by constructing modern skyscrapers nearby – such as those in close proximity to the Palace of Culture in Warsaw).

[50] See Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik, "Dissonant Heritage: Soviet Monuments in Central and Eastern Europe," in *Historical Memory of Central and East European Communism*, ed. Agnieszka Mrozik and Stanislav Holubec (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 107-108; Tadeusz Olszanski, *The Great Decommunisation: Ukraine's Wartime Historical Policy* (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2017), 17-25.
[51] Clinton Buhler, "Written on a Memory: Stalinist Monumental Propaganda and the Post-communist Situation" (Masters thesis, Ohio State University 2008), 45-46.

There are, of course, multiple ways to reframe Stalinist monumental art and architecture. Monuments, for instance, can be removed to statue parks; most famously, this has been done in Lithuania's "Grutas Park," Budapest's "Szobor Park", and Moscow's "Muzeon – Park of Arts". By creating a special, demarcated place for these objects, they are symbolically separated from public life and robbed of some of their political salience.[52] This, of course, is no guarantee of effectiveness; they may continue to act as places of pilgrimage for devotees.[53] Equally, the character of reframing, within these statue parks, is crucial: Moscow's "Park of Arts" provides only minimal historical context about its monuments,[54] while the Lithuanian and Hungarian variants suffer from sensationalizing and commercializing Soviet heritage.[55] In any case, the "Park of Arts" contains only a fraction of Stalinist monuments and monumental art.

Counter-monuments constitute another mode of reframing. One of the earliest examples of such is the placement of a memorial stone brought from the Solovki archipelago (the birthplace of the Gulag) in front of the former NKVD (now FSB) headquarters on the Lubianka Square in 1991. In the "Park of Arts," another counter-monument to the victims of Stalinism was unveiled directly in front of the Stalin monument, in 1998. Such counter-monuments may be particularly suitable as a critical backdrop for large-scale Stalinist infrastructure projects (the Moscow metro, the high-rises), in which prisoner labour was often used. As Ruder observes, for instance, "in constructing [the Moscow-Volga Canal], the Stalinist system in spite of itself created fertile ground for planting and nurturing the memory of and memorials to those who suffered and died in the quest to build that which had not been

[52] James, *Imagining Postcommunism*, 32.
[53] Megan Dietrich, "Monuments on the Move: Post-communist Statue Parks in Russia, Lithuania and Hungary" (Master's thesis, McGill University, 2011), 89-90.
[54] Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 83-91.
[55] Dietrich, "Monuments on the Move," 52.

built before in the USSR."[56] Nonetheless, counter-monuments to Stalinist crimes remain markedly few in Russia.

Museums may also provide context for Stalinist monumental art and architecture, but here too there is a notable dearth of permanent exhibits and displays, even where one may expect such. The chronological coverage of the Museum of Moscow's permanent exhibition ends in the Petrine era. Despite its namesake, neither does the Shchusev State Museum of Architecture have a permanent exhibition on Stalinist architecture. The giant VSKhV (now VDNKh) exhibition space has not the smallest display devoted to its own history. The pediment of the "Worker and Kolkhoz Women" statue, which in the years 2010-17 hosted a display on the history of the statue, is now an open exhibition space. Mukhina's workshop functions as a museum of Orthodox iconography. The Moscow Metro Professional Centre does host a small exhibit on metro history (while the Museum of the Moscow Metro undergoes reconstruction) but takes a rather superficial approach to its Stalinist history. For instance, it capitalizes on the "retro appeal" of Stalinist propaganda posters and photographs, which are reproduced in a vast collage, running along the perimeter of the exhibition space. Another exhibit displays Vuchetich's 1935 carved bust of Feliks Dzerzhinskii ("a notable political, state, and economic functionary"), which had been "saved for posterity" by metro workers following the reconstruction of the "Lubianka" metro station. The displays leave one entirely ignorant of any "peculiarities" of Stalinist metro construction, and how this might affect its legacy.

Explanatory plaques and information may also be affixed to monuments and monumental constructions to frame them historically.[57] The *Uznai Moskvu* initiative goes some way towards this. A collaborative project between the municipality's departments of

[56] Ruder, *Building Stalinism*, 176.
[57] For example, in Vienna, an explanatory plaque detailing Stalin's crimes has been affixed below one the few existing plaques commemorating Stalin, see Elisa Kriza, "The Memorial as a Magnifying Glass: Interpreting the Stalin Plaque in Vienna," *German Life and Letters* 68, no. 3 (2015).

Education, Culture, Heritage, and IT, this interactive mobile app enables the public to get detailed information about the city's monuments by scanning QR-codes. However, these information blurbs are usually limited to describing the technical specifications and formal features of the monuments, usually in a neutral but sometimes exultant tone (the latter, presumably, due to the touristic mission of the *Uznai Moskvu* project). Thus, for instance, the text accompanying the Stalinist "Ukraina Hotel" high-rise explains that "for Russia, 'Stalinist classicism' and 'Stalinist architecture' have now become art, objects of national pride."[58] Nonetheless, some texts do refer to the use of prisoner labour,[59] to repressions against the architectural community,[60] and to the destruction of heritage in making way for Stalinist constructions,[61] if only in passing.

Stalinist monumental art and architecture was intentionally built in order that posterity would remember the era favourably. While these constructions cannot directly influence the collective memory of a radically changed society, they may continue to act as emotionally charged illustrations supporting current (often apologetic) discourses on Stalinism. In order to counter this effect, more must be done to reframe these objects. Such an approach promises to counteract the readings that these monuments predispose themselves to, to recover their problematic histories, and to make manifest their intentional attempts to seduce us, the "future generations."

[58] Iuliia Pirozhkova. "Gostinitsa 'Ukraina'," *Uznai Moskvu*, accessed March 15, 2019, https://um.mos.ru/houses/gostinitsa_ukraina/?sphrase_id=438088
[59] Evgeniia Stakhanova. "Vysotka na Kotel'nicheskoi naberezhnoi," *Uznai Moskvu*, accessed March 15, 2019, https://um.mos.ru/houses/vysotka_na_kotelnicheskoy_naberezhnoy/?sphrase_id=438088
[60] Tat'iana Vorontsova and Irina Trubetskaia. "VSKhV-VDNKh," *Uznai Moskvu*, accessed March 15, 2019, https://um.mos.ru/places/vskhv_vdnkh/?sphrase_id=438090; Irina Trubetskaia. "Arka severnogo vkhoda na VDNKh," *Uznai Moskvu*, accessed March 15, 2019, https://um.mos.ru/houses/arka_severnogo_vkhoda_na_vdnkh/?sphrase_.
[61] "Pavil'on stantsii metro 'Novokuznetksaia'." *Uznai Moskvu*, accessed March 15, 2019, https://um.mos.ru/houses/pavilon_stantsii_metro_novokuznetskaya/?sph; Tat'iana Vorontsova. "Stantsiia metro 'Kropotkinskaia'," *Uznai Moskvu*, accessed March 15, 2019, https://um.mos.ru/houses/stantsiya-metro-kropotkinskaya/?sphrase_id=4.


Appendix A: Illustrations

Figure 1: Mounting "diapsidite" facing on the MGU Main Building[1]




[1] Voronkov and Balashov, *Dvorets nauki*, 228.

Figure 2: "Undedicated" commemorative rostral column in front of the MGU Main Building[2]




[2] V. Kuleshov and A. Pozdnev, *Vysotnye zdaniia Moskvy* (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1954), 30.

Figure 3: Stalinist high-rises planned for the Moscow *ensemble* in the postwar period[3]



[3] Source: Wikimedia commons open source.

Figure 4: Stalin statue atop the "Victory Monument to the Great Patriotic War" in Erevan[4]



[4] Source: Wikimedia commons open source.

Figure 5: Vestibule of "Kurskaia-kol'tsevaia" station following restoration in 2009[5]



[5] Source: Wikimedia commons open source.

Figure 6: Triumph-Palace Apartment Complex[6]



[6] Source: Wikimedia commons open source.

Appendix B: Glossary of select Stalinist art and architecture professionals

Alabian, Karo (1897-1959): architect, head of the SSA (1932-1950), vice-president of the Academy of Architecture of the USSR (1949-1953), notable works in this period: Central Theatre of the Red Army (1940), Armenian Pavilion at the VSKhV (1939, 1954)

Arkin, David (1899-1957): leading art historian, professor of Moscow Architecture Institute (1934-)

Chechulin, Dmitrii (1901-1981): architect, Chief Architect of Moscow (1945-1949), notable works in the period: Komsomol'skaia metro station (1935), Triumph of Victory monument (1943), Kotel'nicheskaia embankment high-rise (1952), "Ukrainian SSR" pavilion at the VSKhV (1954)

Chernyshev, Sergei (1881-1963): architect, Chief Architect of Moscow (1934-1941), author of the General Plan of the Reconstruction of Moscow (1935), head of the SSA (1950-1955), notable works in the period: Moscow State University Main Building (1953)

Chernyshev, Nikolai (1885-1973): artist and art historian, instructor at Moscow Art College (1936-1949), active in the Directorate of Construction of the Palace of Soviets' monumental art workshop (1938-1941)

Deineka, Aleksandr (1899-1969): artist, notable works in the period: designs for mosaics decorating "Maiakovskaia" metro station (1938), "Novokuznetskaia" metro station (1943), and the Central Hall of the Moscow State University Main Building (1956)

Dushkin, Aleksei (1904-1977): architect, notable works in the period: "Ploshchad' Revoliutsii" metro station (1938), "Maiakovskaia" metro station (1938), "Zavod im. Stalina" metro station (1943), "Novoslobodskaia" metro station (1952), "Krasnye vorota" high-rise (1953)

Gabrichevskii, Aleksandr (1891-1968): leading art historian, instructor at the Moscow Architectural Institute

Ginzburg, Moisei (1892-1946): architect, notable works in the period: obelisks in Sebastopol (1944), Kerch (1944)

Gol'ts, Georgii (1893-1946): architect, worked primarily on civil and housing construction projects during this period

Il'in, Mikhail (1903-1981): art historian, instructor at Moscow Architectural Institute

Iofan, Boris (1891-1976) – architect, notable works in the period: Soviet pavilion at the Paris World Fair (1937), "Baumanskaia" metro station (1944), design of the Palace of Soviets (unrealized)

Ivanova, Zinaida (1897-1979): sculptor, notable works in this period: Gor'kii monument in Moscow (1952)

Lansere, Evgenii (1875-1946): monumental artist, notable works in this period: wall paintings for "Kazanskii" railway station (1934, 1946), Hotel "Moskva" (1937)

Khrapchenko, Mikhail (1904-1986): literary scholar, Chairman of the KPDI SSSR (1939-1948)

Kolli, Nikolai (1894-1966): architect, head of Moscow Section of the SSA (1935-1951), instructor at the Moscow Architectural Institute (1931-1941), notable works in the period: Kirovskaia metro station (1935), "Smolenskaia" metro station (1935), "Paveletskaia-Kol'tsevaia" (1950)

Konenkov, Sergei (1874-1971): sculptor, notable works in this period: wartime busts of Marshals Georgii Zhukov, Konstantin Rokossovskii, Ivan Konev, and Rodion Malinovskii

Korin, Pavel (1892-1967): monumental artist, notable works in this period: mosaics in "Komsomol'skaia-kol'tsevaia" (1952), "Smolenskaia," (1953) and "Paveletskaia-kol'tsevaia" (1953) metro stations, stained glass windows in "Novoslobodskaia" (1952) metro station.

Manizer, Matvei (1891-1966): sculptor, head of Leningrad Section of the Union of Artists of RSFSR (1937-1941), vice-president of Union of Artists (1947-1966), notable works in the period: Kuibyshev monument in Samara (1938), Kirov monument in Kirovsk (1938), sculptures in "Ploshchad' Revoliutsii" metro station (1938), Pavlov monument in Riazan' (1949)

Merkurov, Sergei (1881-1952): sculptor, notable works in this period: Stalin monuments on the Moscow-Volga Canal (1937), at the VSKhV (1939), and Erevan (1950), Kalinin monument in Moscow (1947), Burdenko monument in Moscow (1949), numerous death masks, graveside monuments

Mordvinov, Arkadii (1896-1964): architect, Chairman of the KPDA SSSR (1943-1947), President of Academy of Architecture of the USSR (1950-1955), notable works in this period: "Ukraina" hotel high-rise (1957)

Mukhina, Vera (1889-1953): sculptor, notable works in this period: “Worker and Kolkhoz Woman” (1937), Gor'kii monuments in Moscow (1951) and Gor'kii (1952), "Eternal Youth of Science” sculptural groups at MGU (1953), numerous sculptural portraits, graveside monuments

Opochinskaia, Anna (?-?): art historian

Pavlov, Leonid (1909-1990): architect, notable works in this period: Petrozavodsk Theatre (1946), "Serpukhovskaia" metro station (1950)

Rozenfel’d, Zinovii (1904-1990): architect, worked primarily on civil and housing construction projects during this period

Rudnev, Lev (1885-1956): architect, professor at the Moscow Architectural Institute (1948-1952), notable works in this period: Government House in Baku (1952), MGU Main Building (1953), Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw (1955)

Shadr, Ivan (1887-1941): sculptor, notable works in the period included several graveside monuments, preliminary designs for Gor'kii monument in Moscow

Shchusev, Aleksei (1873-1949): architect, instructor at the Moscow Architectural Institute (1948-1949), notable works in this period: "Moskva" hotel (1935), “Komsomol’skaia-kol’tsevaia” metro station (1952)

Shchuko, Vladimir (1878-1939): architect, notable works in the period: VSKhV main pavilion (1939), Lenin Library (1941), "Elekrozavodskaia" metro station (1944), design of the Palace of Soviets (unrealized)

Sokolov, Nikolai (1903-2000): artist, notable works in the period: various easel and graphic artwork, as well as political caricature as part of the "Kukryniks" art collective

Toropov, Sergei (1882-1964): architect

Tosunova, Margarita (?-?): art historian

Tsapenko, Mikhail (1907-1977): art historian, head of the Institute of the Theory and History of Architecture at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR

Vesnin, Viktor (1882-1950): architect, chairman of the SSA (1937-1949), President of the Academy of Architecture of the USSR (1936-1949), notable works in this period: primarily industrial projects

Vuchetich, Evgenii (1908-1974): sculptor, main sculptor of the VSKhV (1948-1954?), notable works in this period: Efremov monument in Viaz'ma (1946), Vatunin monument in Kiev (1948), sculptures in Trepower Park (1949), numerous sculptural portraits of contemporary figures

Zelenskaia, Nina (1898-1986): sculptor, notable works in this period: Gor'kii monument in Moscow (1951), various sculptural portraits and graveside monuments

Zholtovskii, Ivan (1867-1959): architect, notable works in this period: residential house on Mokhovaia street, Moscow (1934)

Zakharov, Grigorii (1910-1982): architect, notable works in this period: "Kurskaia-kol'tsevaia" metro station (1950), "Belarussian SSR" pavilion at VSKhV (1954)

Appendix C: Monuments and memorial plaques constructed in Moscow, 1932-1953, dedicated to "contemporaneous" events and individuals (incomplete list)

Date unveiled	Object	Authors
1934	Monument to the explorers of the stratosphere (Volokolamskoe shosse, 88)	Unknown
1935	Kirov monument (Ulitsa Leningradskaia sloboda, in the courtyard of the Kirov-Dinamo factory)	Sculptor Zinovii Vilenskii
1935	Stalin monument (Izmailovskii park kul'tury i otdykha)	Sculptor Sergei Merkurov
1938	Stalin monument (in front of Tretiakov art gallery)	Sculptor Sergei Merkurov
1939	Stalin monument at the VSKhV	Sculptor Sergei Merkurov
1939	Stalin monument (on the Moscow-Volga canal)	Sculptor Sergei Merkurov
1939	Kirov monument at the VSKhV	Sculptor Nikolai Tomskii, architect Evgenii Levinson
1940	Memorial plaque dedicated to Nikolai Ostrovskii (Tverskaia ulitsa, 14)	Sculptor Sergei Konenkov
1943	"Triumph of Victory" monument (Leningradskoe shosse, 8)	Sculptor Nikolai Tomskii, architect Dmitrii Chechulin
1944	Sergei Spasokukotskii monument (Leninskii prospekt, 8-10)	Sculptors Vsevolod Lishev, Ekaterina Belasheva, Aleksandr Belashev
1944	Memorial plaque dedicated to Konstatin Stanislavskii (Leon't'evskii pereulok, 6/1)	Sculptor Sergei Merkurov
1945	Memorial plaque dedicated to Vladimir Komarov (Leninskii prospekt, 33)	Unknown
1945	Liubov' Kulakova monument (Bol'shaia Cherkizovskaia ulitsa 125)	Unknown
1946	Memorial plaque dedicated to Maksim Gor'kii (Malaia Nikitskaia ulitsa, 6/2)	Sculptor Sergei Mograchev
1946	Memorial plaque dedicated to Mikhail Kalinin (Mokhovaia ulitsa, 7)	Sculptor Sergei Merkurov, architect Iasnov.
1946	Memorial plaque dedicated to Aleksandr Bogomolets (Sivtsev Vrazhek pereulok, 4)	Unknown
1947	Vasilii Vil'iams monument (Timiriazevskaia ulitsa, 49)	Sculptor Samuil Makhtin, architect Isidor Frantsuz
1947	Memorial plaque dedicated to Rozalia Zemliachka (Piatnitskaia ulitsa, 64)	Sculptor Vaagn Terzibashian, architect Isidor Frantsuz
1947	Mikhail Kalinin monument (Aviamotornaia ulitsa, 41b)	Sculptor Sergei Merkurov, architect Isidor Frantsuz
1947	Memorial plaque dedicated to Prov Sadovskii (Spiridon'evskii pereulok, 8)	Unknown

1948	Pavel Morozov monument (in Pavel Morozov Detskii park)	Sculptor Iosif Rabinovich, architect Mikhail Olenev
1949	Nikolai Burdenko monument (Ulitsa Fadeeva, 5)	Sculptor Sergei Merkurov, architect Arkadii Baranskii
1949	Mikhail Kalinin monument (Kalinin Weaving Factory, Varshavskoe shosse 25a)	Sculptor Nikolai Sarkisov
1949	Memorial plaque dedicated to Romain Rolland (Ulitsa Malaia nikitskaia, 6/2)	Unknown
194?	Memorial plaque dedicated to Aleksei Bakh (Ulitsa Vorontsovo pole, 10)	Unknown
194?	Monument on mass grave of Panfilov division (Ulitsa Klinskaia, 2)	Unknown
194?	Memorial plaque dedicated to Mikhail Kalinin (Skladochnaia ulitsa, 6)	Unknown
194?	Memorial plaque dedicated to Zoia Kosmodemianskaia (Aleksandrovskii proezd, 7)	Unknown
194?	Memorial plaque dedicated to Zoia Kosmodemianskaia (Staropetrovskii pereulok, 3)	Unknown
194?	Memorial plaque dedicated to Aleksei Tolskoi (Ulitsa Alekseia Tolstogo, 4)	Unknown
1950	Monument to *opolchentsy* of the Moscow "Kalibr" Instrumental Factory (Ulitsa Godovinova, 9)	Unknown
1950	Memorial plaque dedicated to Sergei Chaplygin (Ulitsa Chaplygina, 1a)	Architect Lev Iastrzhembskii
1950	Memorial plaque dedicated to Leonid Sobinov (Kamergerskii pereulok, 5)	Architect Lev Iastrzhembskii
1951	Maksim Gor'kii monument (Ploshchad' Tverskaia Zastava)	Sculptors Vera Mukhina, Ivan Shadr, Zinaida Ivanova, Nina Zelenskaia, architect Zinovii Rozenfel'd
1951	Aleksandr Vishnevskii monument (Bol'shaia Serpukhovskaia ulitsa, 27)	Sculptor Sergei Konenkov, architect Vasilii Shalashov
1951	Memorial plaque dedicated to Viacheslav Shishkov (Tveskaia ulitsa, 8)	Sculptors Vaagn Terzibash'ian, V. M. Shishkov, architect Isidor Frantsuz
1952	Mikhail Averbakh monument (Chernogriazskaia ulitsa, 14/10)	Sculptor Sergei Merkurov. architect Isidor Frantsuz
1953	Vitalii Popkov monument (Samotechnaia ploshchad')	Sculptor Lev Kerbel', architect Lev Golubovskii
1953	Memorial plaque dedicated to Evegenii Krasnushkin (Ulitsa 8 Marta, 1)	Unknown
1953	Ivan Pavlov monument on MGU Main Building grounds	Sculptor Matvei Manizer
1953	Ivan Michurin monument on MGU Main Building grounds	Sculptor Matvei Manizer

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- f. R1235. All-Russian Central Executive Soviet of Worker, Peasant, and Red Army Deputies (VTsIK)
- f. R3316. Central Executive Committee of the USSR (TsIK SSSR)
- f. R5325. Main Archival Directorate of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (GLAVARKhIV SSSR)
- f. R5446. Council of Ministers of the USSR (SM SSSR)
- f. R7523. Supreme Soviet of the USSR
- f. R8300. Ministry of State Audits of the USSR

RGAE (Russian State Archive of the Economy)
- f. 293. Academy of Construction and Architecture of the USSR
- f. 339. State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Construction Affairs (Gosstroi)
- f. 552. Construction Directorate of the Palace of the Soviets
- f. 4372. State Planning Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Gosplan)
- f. 7857. All-Union Agricultural Exhibition (VSKhV) of the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR
- f. 9432. Committee for Architecture Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

RGALI (Russian State Archive of Literature and Art)
- f. 619. Editorial Office of the Journal *Oktiabr'*
- f. 674. Union of the Architects of the USSR
- f. 962. Committee for Arts Affairs of the Council of the Ministers of the USSR
- f. 1923. Eizenshtein Sergei Mikhailovich (1898-1948) - cinematic director
- f. 2075. Committee for Arts Affairs of the Council of the Ministers of the RSFSR
- f. 2329. Ministry of Culture of the USSR
- f. 2458. Directorate for Art Exhibitions and Panoramas of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR
- f. 2635. Rabinovich Isaak Moiseevich (1894-1961) – artist
- f. 2932. Central House for Art Professionals of the USSR (TsDRI)
- f. 2942. Art organizations – predecessors of the Moscow branch of the Union of Artists of the RSFSR (amalgamated *fond*)
- f. 2943. Moscow branch of the Union of Artists of the RSFSR (MOSKh)
- f. 3024. Zelenskaia Nina Germanovna (1898-1986), Ivanova Zinaida Grigor'evna (1897-1979) – sculptor

RGASPI (Russian State Archive of Social and Political History)
- f. 17. Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (TsK KPSS)

ORGTG (Manuscript Division of the State Tret'iakov Gallery)
- f. 8II. Scientific Departments of the State Tret'iakov Gallery

TsGAM (Central State Archive of Moscow)

f. P-4. Moscow city committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (MGK KPSS)

f. 150. Moscow City Soviet (Mossovet)

f. 278. Directorate of the Moscow Metro

f. 429. Directorate of Culture of the Moscow City Executive Committee (Mosgorispolkom)

f. 534. Main Architectural-Planning Directorate of the Moscow City Executive Committee

f. 694. Construction Directorate of the Palace of the Soviets of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

f. 2011. Directorate of Cultural-Enlightenment Enterprises of the Moscow City Executive Committee

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