
Symposion and Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

The present work has a double purpose: to redefine the notion of the 'philosophical symposion', formulated by Wilamowitz, from a larger perspective on the relation between symposion and philosophy; and to study the origins of this phenomenon in Plato's conception of the symposion, especially as illustrated in the Laws. Section i is dedicated to the reconstruction of the philosophical symposion: it analyses the role played by the symposion in the main Hellenistic schools at a relatively early stage after Plato - roughly down to the cessation of scholarchs. The most specific features of the notion which I propose to define result from the fact that philosophers started to take a theoretical approach to the symposion; Chapter I considers this issue. Chapter 2 deals with the philosophical symposion in the literary sense: it presents some of the problems raised by the very fragmentary evidence on 'Symposia' written after Plato in the Academy, Peripatos, Stoa and Garden. Chapter 3 examines the scanty evidence for an early adoption of sympotic practices by philosophers, at school or otherwise. Section ii is devoted to Plato's conception of the symposion. The Athenian's ideas about reforming this institution are analysed in Chapters 4 and 5: each chapter focuses on a paragraph containing a different project. Chapter 6 considers, in the end, a few cases of earlier Platonic imagery, which is relevant to the formation of the theory in the Laws and allows us to integrate it in a broader perspective on Plato. By adopting this order, the present work attempts to present Plato's conception as a part of a much wider phenomenon, generated by Plato himself.

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Introduction

Greeks and Romans used to spend an awful lot of time drinking together. Perhaps we spend as much; but we do not accord to such activities the prestige of the symposion - an institution for ritualised drinking, which absorbed a great part of Greek cultural life known to us.

The details of this odd institution have been studied since Casaubon; they have been methodically collected by the great German scholars of the nineteenth century. But the last two or three decades of classical scholarship have brought a great change: from antiquarian knowledge to a much broader (though specialised) understanding of the social and cultural complexities of the symposion. The subject was, in a sense, rediscovered. Interest was awakened not only by new finds, but also by new ways of looking at things: with the archaeologists' attempt to understand the purpose of relics and the function of space, it started to appear that an impressive array of things, from temple- and house-rooms to pots and pans, had been produced just for use at symposia. When no less a member than poetry joined the list of such products, the cultural and social importance of the phenomenon became apparent. We owe the decoration of many Greek vases, or the ethos of much Greek poetry, to demands imposed by what is now called a 'sympotic audience'. In producing some of the finest pieces of pottery or lyrics, the Greeks were looking ahead to their parties above all else.

But this state of affairs soon revealed dangers. In reconstructing the values of a vanished world, one comes to use calculations and probabilities which lead easily to overstatement and confusion. The symposion is only one species in a wider genus - commensality. A specialised approach is now required; it is of primary importance to bring to light the less known varieties of the species[1].

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[1]. A wonderful example of this kind of study is set by Pauline Schmitt-Pantel's recent book on civic commensality, La Cité au Banquet.

Scattered in different places at different times in the ancient world, one finds many ritualised forms of eating and drinking together: parties of aristocratic clubs, daily military messes such as became part of the Spartan legend, huge feasts displaying the munificence of Hellenistic kings, honorific entertainment of public guests and figures such as the Delphic priest, dinners of the members of professional and religious corporations, ritual temple-dinners following the great sacrificial ceremonies, daily dinners of *prytaneis* or other officials, peasant festivals, funerary banquets, marriage celebrations, and so on. In most, if not all, these cases the Greeks observed a basic distinction between eating and drinking, which they tended to separate out as successive stages: they treated them as different rituals, giving them different degrees of emphasis in different forms of commensality. Eating and drinking create different bonds, and we know best two rituals which seem to represent these poles: sacrificial sharing of meat in the democratic city (almost no wine at all), and aristocratic drinking based on an etiquette of honour and pleasure (food almost completely ignored). The latter is the symposion: the aristocratic drinking-party described by Theognis, Alcaeus, or Pindar.

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I regard the philosophical symposion, broadly, as a subspecies of the symposion; but this entity differs very much from the kind of entity studied by historians.

The phrase 'philosophical symposia' was coined by Wilamowitz. According to this scholar, Plato established a practice of common meals with his disciples in the Academy; two Platonic dialogues, the Symposion and the Laws, give expression to the sense of community created by this practice; after Plato, the practice continued uninterruptedly down to Plutarch and afterwards, and was adopted in the same format by philosophers in all other schools.

Thus conceived, the philosophical symposion is too large in one sense, in another sense it is too narrow. It is too large in supposing that the main schools, from their very beginning, adopted regular common meals. The evidence is far from conclusive; and it is particularly fragile when it comes to Plato. On the other hand, the symposion preoccupied Plato, and exerted an influence on philosophical thought through Plato. It is more as an embodiment of values giving cause for thought that the symposion attracted philosophers. This ideological aspect is more prominent than, and in any case inextricably linked with, the adoption of common meals. Wilamowitz' notion is narrow in that it does not take such aspects into account; it restricts the philosophical symposion to a school-practice. Moreover, the practice as he saw it is uniform, whereas the evidence points rather to variety.

The notion of a 'philosophical symposion' must be defined according to the kinds of influence exerted by this institution on philosophical thought and philosophical life. The criteria for a more rigorous definition are dictated by the main aspects under which the symposion features in philosophy. One is practical: such customs were indeed adopted. Another is theoretical: there were works and disputations around the subject. Thus the phrase 'philosophical symposion' must take a historical sense when applied to objects which reflect the former aspect (such as, say, symposia held by Arcesilaus in the Academy), and a theoretical-literary sense when applied to objects which reflect the latter (such as a work *περὶ Συμποσίου* written by Cleanthes). The two aspects are of course parts of a whole, but it is important to spell out the parts as clearly as possible. The symposia practised by philosophers do not coincide with the symposia which they have written, yet evidence for one has often been interpreted as evidence for the other. Such mistakes are minute, but, taken together, they produce a considerable amount of confusion in the interpretation of ancient texts.

It is equally important to define the philosophical symposion as an entity created by philosophers. The fact that philosophical characters may feature in some fictitious symposion is not particularly relevant from the point of view of the proper, active role played by philosophers.

The starting point in the history of the philosophical symposion is Plato. His Symposion is the most famous symposion ever written by an ancient philosopher, and, among Plato's dialogues, one of the most popular and best known. But Plato's real position in this story will produce some surprise. The Symposion does not convey to us any explicit thought concerning the institution itself. Perhaps this is not surprising; but Plato did entertain a whole theory about reforming the symposion, and dedicated to this project the first two books of the Laws. Unlike the Symposion, the Laws are far from being popular; so that their long sympotic preamble, puzzling though it may be, has never attracted the amount of curiosity required for a study of Plato's conception of the symposion. Yet in so far as this topic is concerned, ancient Greek philosophers seem to have paid the Laws at least as much attention as the Symposion. Neither the theory of symposia in the Laws nor the description in the Symposion reflect any custom in the Academy. Plato's direct influence on the practice of symposia in philosophical schools is doubtful. The direct influence of his Symposion on the literary form of philosophical symposia cannot be detected. But the content of those later works, as well as the nature of philosophical debates on issues concerning the symposion, reveal that philosophical interest had been aroused by the Laws; and it is also possible that, much transformed and at many removes, some of the ideas of the Laws exerted some influence on later forms of school-practice. The debt of the philosophical symposion to Plato is theoretical rather than practical; and the interest on the debt should go to the Laws rather than the Symposion.

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Since Wilamowitz, it has become a matter of tacit agreement that the symposion played some role in the philosophical schools; but its precise contribution has never been studied.

As the title of this work may suggest, I am studying here the philosophical symposion from the perspective of a relation between symposion and philosophy: the notion which I try

to present resulted from contact between a historical institution and the world of ideas. I have organised my material in two sections; each section contains three chapters. In Section i I attempt to reconstruct the philosophical symposion according to the definitions which I have proposed; in Section ii I analyse Plato's conception of the symposion. This unhistorical order presents two advantages. One is in understanding. The philosophical symposion is the larger category; it includes Plato's dealings with this institution. It seems more profitable to understand Plato's conception as part of a whole, and, in the present state of scholarship, the whole is yet to be defined. Once we have grouped together the material which constitutes the philosophical symposion, Plato's historical position will emerge from the analysis of his thought. Thus Section i is also intended to provide a background of fact to integrating Plato into the history of a wider phenomenon, generated by Plato himself. The second advantage is aesthetic: Plato's conception of the symposion throws very interesting light on his own philosophy. His part in this story should be regarded as the most spectacular illustration of the subject-matter.

The philosophical symposion grew into a complex cultural phenomenon, taking on huge proportions in late antiquity. On the other hand, what happened in the historical schools, that is to say, before the end of a succession of scholarchs, is extremely poorly known. This is the period to which the present work is confined; any later phenomena will be examined for purposes of contrast. Also, I shall always pay attention to the problem of origins and its connection with Plato.

The most specific features of the hybrid entity which I have proposed to define result from the fact that philosophers started to take a theoretical approach to the symposion. This is an issue which I consider separately in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 deals with the philosophical symposion in the literary sense: it presents some of the problems raised by the very fragmentary evidence on 'Symposia' written after Plato in the Academy, Peripatos, Stoa and Garden. Chapter 3 examines the scanty evidence for an early adoption of sympotic practices by

philosophers, at school or otherwise. The main question there will be, did Plato introduce such a custom at all? I must warn that these chapters make difficult reading: the only way of building up such a notion is by accumulation of material. A large part of my discussion will involve elucidation of disparate matters of scholarship, which have never been treated from a unitary perspective.

Section ii is devoted to Plato's conception of the symposion. I analyse the Athenian's ideas about reforming this institution in Chapters 4 and 5: each chapter focuses on a paragraph containing a different project. Chapter 6 considers, in the end, a few cases of earlier Platonic imagery - which is relevant to a certain extent to the formation of the theory in the Laws and allows us to integrate it in a broader perspective on Plato.

It may seem puzzling that a work about the philosophical symposion and Plato's contribution to it makes no room for the Symposion. My aim has been to investigate and present Plato's thoughts about this institution, which are for the most part ignored. But such thoughts do not occur in the Symposion. Paradoxical as it may seem, discussing the problems raised by this dialogue takes one far away from the subject 'symposion' itself; and Plato's Symposion has already received a much bigger share than the Laws in the tribute of scholarly attention. It is true that the Symposion opens the series of works which I discuss in Chapter 2; but the disproportion in our knowledge of those pieces compared with knowledge of Plato's would make it inappropriate and frivolous to discuss the Symposion at the same level. It is more profitable to assume this dialogue to be known; thus it may stand in the background of the play without turning up on stage.

Although I appreciate that the reader is under no obligation to consider the appendices, I would recommend them as a useful guide, especially to Chapters 1-3.

I

The Philosophical Symposion in the Hellenistic Schools

Chapter 1

συμποτικὴ ἀρετή: *Symposion and Ethics*

"... δ⌈ι⌋δοὺς ἔτι δ[ὴ] καὶ τὸ δεῖν ἀνιέσθαι καὶ παίζειν ἐν αὐτοῖς [*sc* ἐν συμποσίοις], οὐ δώσω τὸ μ⌈η⌋δεμίαν εἶνα[ι] πρεπωδ[ε]στέραν ἄνεσιν καὶ παιδιὰν τοῦ τὸν μ[ὲν ᾄσαι], τ⌈ὸ⌋ν ⌈δ⌋ὲ κιθαρί[σαι], τ[ὸ]ν [δ]ὲ χορεῦσα[ι· τόδ' οὖν] ἐρ[ῶ δεῖν τοὺς ἀ]μείνους, θεῖναι μ[άλι]⌈σ⌋τὰ μουσικὴν τὴν ἐ[π'] ἀκουσμάτων, οὐ τὴν αὐ[τῶ]ν..."

"... I grant, moreover, that one should relax and play at symposia; but I shall not grant that the form of relaxation and play most suitable to men of valour is to sing, do the accompaniment, and dance. If you ask me, I shall say that the better sort of people should mostly have (symposia with) music to which they listen, not music produced by themselves..."

Hellenistic philosophers, it is well-known, were a very quarrelsome tribe. It is less well-known that they quarrelled about the symposion: disputes on this topic have left only faint and obscure traces, such as in the passage quoted above. It is not surprising that philosophical thought on the symposion attracts so little of the attention devoted nowadays to the role of this institution in the ancient world.

Yet there is evidence that ancient philosophers made the symposion a subject of debate and constructed theories about it. This fact ought to be the starting point in any attempt to define what Wilamowitz has famously termed *das philosophische Symposion*, if indeed this phrase has any plausibility at all. In the following pages I shall try to recover the vanishing trace of a notion which seems to be closely tied to the theoretical life of the symposion in Hellenistic schools: *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή*.

The work from which I quoted is our earliest source and contains our best evidence for *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή*. It is a wholly polemical book, written by one of the fiercest controversialists

of the Hellenistic world: Philodemus of Gadara. Philodemus was an Epicurean devoted to the creed of the Four Great Men, but had learned from the scholarch Zeno of Sidon a brand of Epicureanism more positive towards tradition and culture. This he tried to defend against rival schools and 'heretic' Epicureans alike, in polemical works on a wide range of topics; the one which concerns me in this chapter is a book of commentaries On Music. Philodemus is not an original thinker, but a very prominent figure in intellectual life at the end of the Republic; his circle in Campania exerted a strong influence. And, thanks to the extraordinary fate of Philodemus' library in Herculaneum, we also owe to him the recovery of conceptions advanced by some of his more gifted foes[1].

Outstanding among these was Diogenes of Babylon, disciple of Chrysippus and Antipater's teacher, successor to Zeno of Tarsus at the head of the Stoa in the first half of the second century BC[2]. This was one of Philodemus' chief targets; the material that survives from the commentaries On Music consists in excerpts from a book by Diogenes, followed by the systematic refutation of each argument[3]. It has been claimed that Diogenes used the Stoic

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1. For an introduction to Philodemus, see Philipson [534], Gow [218] ii 371-400 (epigrams in i 351-69), Barnes [251], Sedley [595], Gigante [380]. Most of our knowledge of Philodemus after he became a client of Piso in Rome derives from Cicero (in Pis. 28.68), who counts him among *familiares nostros* (Fin. ii 35.119).

2. Ind. St. xlviii 4-8, *Διογέν[η]ς Ἀρτεμιδώρου Σε[λευκε]ὺς [ἀ]πὸ Τίγριος ὁ [παραλαβὼν Ζή]νωνος τὴν [σχολήν]*. On Diogenes see von Arnim [243] and Schäfer [578]. Diogenes went to Rome on the famous embassy of 155 BC, with Carneades and Critolaus (Plu. Cato Ma. 22, Cic. Tusc. iv 3.5). It is believed that he was dead in 150BC (Glucker [388] 19, n. 18; based on Cic. Sen. 23); Barnes [250] 69-70 n. 76 has suggested to Dorandi [333] 29-30 a more plausible chronology: 230-140 BC. Diogenes' originality in the theory of music, grammar, politics is increasingly recognised; a collection of his fragments is now being prepared by J.-P. Dumont and his team.

3. See the revolutionary reconstruction of this treatise by Delattre [150] (synoptic table on pp. 142-3). Delattre demonstrates that the material in 'Book i' and 'Book iii' (= eight fragmentary papyri: PHerc 1583, 411, 1572, 424, 225, 1578, 1575, 1094) forms in fact the first 109 columns of Book iv (= PHerc 1497: 39 columns, with the number 150 assigned to col xxxvi); and that Philodemus deals here only with the Stoic Diogenes and not, as it was believed by Kemke and Rispoli (esp. [556]), with Academics and Peripatetics (probably discussed in the lost books). The first edition of all the text was made by Kemke [152]. 'Book iv' (PHerc 1497) was recently edited by Neubecker [165], 'Book i' by Rispoli [114], and the remainder 'Book iii' by Delattre ([150] = coll 40*-109* in his provisional notation).

notion of natural affinity (*οἰκείωσις*) to explain the effects of music on the soul[4], and on this basis argued for a thesis whose home should be the Peripatos rather than the Stoa: the emotions stirred by music lead on to virtue[5]. Such ideas, probably supported by cultural and logical proofs, ran for at least three books[6]. In the course of his argument, Diogenes used a set of notions, in particular *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή*, which also show him to be in possession of a theory about the symposion, closely connected to music.

If my reconstruction is right, Philodemus' criticism in my opening quotation reveals that, according to Diogenes, good, educated symposiasts - by which, as we shall see, he means the *ἐλεύθεροι* or the *φρόνιμοι* - ought to create their own 'music'[7]. This is probably a school matter on which the Stoics took their inspiration from Plato; for one of Plutarch's *quaestiones convivales* sets before us two characters *ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς*, quarrelling in typical fashion over two ways of interpreting the famous flute-girl episode of the Symposion (176E) in the light of Socrates' comment on symposia at Protagoras 347C[8]. But the kind of music which Diogenes has in mind consists chiefly in recitations of Homer and traditional poetry - maybe like the

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4. See the column restored by Janko [436] from PHerc 411/ 11B + PHerc 1583/ 1A, and his subsequent discussion (pp. 125-7). This would be very original, but there are not clear signs of the *οἰκείωσις* theory in the text. On *οἰκείωσις* see Engberg-Pedersen [349], and Pembroke in Long [529]. For Diogenes' conception of music see also pp. 15 and 70 in Kemke's edition (*τὸ μέλος ἔχειν τι κινητικὸν καὶ παραστατικὸν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις* and *ὡς τὸ πῦρ... φύσιν ἔχειν καυστικήν*: col. vii, ll. 25-35, one of the three places where Diogenes' name occurs in Philodemus' treatise).

5. Cf. for instance Arist. Pol. 1340^{a}14 on music and *ἀρετή*.

6. Philodemus refers to Book iii thus: *ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ μακρότερα μὲν εἴρηκε καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸ δαιμόνιον μουσικῆς, οὐκ ἀποδεικτικῶς ἀλλ' ἱστορικῶς καὶ ἐξηγητικῶς* (PHerc 411/ 2 = 28 R = 30* D).

7. Col. xvi, ll.21-32; other readings in Neubecker *ad l* (p. 60). I have restored *τόδ' οὖν ἐρῶ... θεῖναι μάλιστα*. 'Music heard' as opposed to 'music played' seems to me, in the context, the most plausible sense for the obscure *ἀκούσματα*. For *θεῖναι μουσικήν* cf. periphrastic phrases of the type *θεῖναι/ θέσθαι θυσίαν, μάχην, γάμον, κρυφήν, σχολήν*, etc (*eg* Pi. O. 7.42, 13.50; S. A. 13, 536; A. Ag. 1095). Note a very similar point made by Polybius in the chapter about training in music in Arcadia: *ὁμοίως γε μὴν καὶ παρ' ὅλον τὸν βίον τὰς ἀγωγὰς τὰς ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις οὐχ οὕτως ποιοῦνται διὰ τῶν ἐπεισάκτων ἀκροάματων ὡς δι' αὐτῶν, ἀνὰ μέρος ᾄδειν ἀλλήλοις προστάττοντες* (iv 20; on the Stoic sources of this chapter see Walbank [634] *ad l*).

8. Quaest. Conv. vii 7; cf. esp. 710B.

poetic contests defended by Plutarch in another *quaestio*[9]. This is implicit in a further remark that the *ἰδιῶται* or ordinary people, no doubt by contrast with the *φρόνιμοι* or wise men, hire professional players (*ἀκροάματα*)[10] for their symposia, but ignore the great poets - *τὸν Ὅμηρον καὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους π[ο]ητὰς τῶν μέτρων καὶ μελῶν*[11]; from which Philodemus moves to a premiss 'Let it be that symposia with productions of such poets are superior'[12]. It will be worth remembering this high-minded standard of sympotic behaviour when we try to understand Diogenes' theory. Philodemus replies in Aristotelian vein that really noble people do not bother with such things; entertainment should be left to professional musicians, of whom there are plenty on the market. He makes a very similar point in other places in the same book[13].

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9. Quaest. Conv. v 2 (674ff - cf. esp. the reference to *ποικιλία*, 674D).

10. For *ἀκρόαμα* in the sense 'professional player' see also Plu. Galba 16.1 (*ἀκρόαμα δὲ ἦν Κάνος εὐδοκιμούμενον*) and Ant. 24.2. In the passage from Polybius quoted in n. 7 (iv 20.10-11) *ἀκροάματα* is derogatory.

11. Col. xvii 6-11. The Oxford disegno tempts me to replace the strange sequence *τὸ σαίνε[σθαι μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκειότητος* (*eg* Neubecker) by something like *τὸ [μέν γ'] αἰνε[ῖν] οἴδ[α]μεν καὶ τοὺς ἰδ[ι]ώτας· ὑπὸ [δ][ὲ] τῆς οἰκειότητος…* (*οἴδαμεν* is a form preferred by Philodemus, *eg* col. xx 11; cf. Crönert [297], p. 270).

12. *βελτίω γὰρ ἔστω{ι} τὰ χρώμενα συμπόσια τοῖς τούτων*, 12-13. The sense of this argument is not very clear (ll. 14-17). The phrase *μουσικοὺς τῶν μέτρων* is obscure: musicians who compose metre (*ie* poetry), or musicians who play metre (poetry), *ie* vocal singers? Considering that Philodemus is always rigorous about the distinction between music (= sounds) and poetry (= words or contents), and that he disagrees with Diogenes in the text of my initial quotation, I suggest the following paraphrase to his argument: 'Let us say that symposia with Homer and the great poets are superior. These symposia introduce poets (*ie* through the mouth of the symposiasts), but not professional deliverers of poetry: in what sense does 'superior' refer to music (and not to poetry) in such cases?' See also n. 86.

13. 'It is the sign of poor spirits who have nothing better to cling to… when they get the habit of labouring over the preparation of their own enjoyment (*διὰ τὴν ἑαυτ[οῖ]ς ποτε παρασκευὴν τ[ῆ]ς τέρψεως*), without noticing the abundance of professional players (*ἀκροαμάτων*) available on public service…' (col.xxxvi 8-26). And a little later, with direct reference to symposia: 'Having something to say and giving the tune (? *ἀπάρχεσθαι*) in symposia and other parties is a feature shared with ordinary people and not valued by everyone, as we have established; perhaps it would indeed be ridiculous if a philosopher were to do such things. The artistic rules (? *τὸ θεωρητικόν*) are not grasped by the majority; to be mastered, they require practice, which alienates one from those things whose outcome is the happy life' (col. xxxviii 12-30; for *θεωρητικόν* possibly used, at least by the Stoics, in the sense 'rules of art' see the transition from *θεωρήματα* to *θεωρητικόν* at DL vii 125-6, suggested to me by David Sedley).

This is an isolated item in a theory which the condition of the text makes quite difficult to reconstruct. All the papyri of Philodemus' book have been carefully reproduced in *disegni*, but most of the fragmentary ones perished when the *disegnatori* were attempting to reach the layer beyond the one they had copied. The sympotic arguments in Philodemus' quotation occur in three very mutilated fragments of such papyri, of which only the third still exists: fragments 3 and 4 of PHerc 1572 and fragment 1 of PHerc 225[14]. Fortunately, Philodemus' refutation of these arguments is in better shape. Philodemus starts to tear into Diogenes' theory of music somewhere around Delattre's columns 45*-48*; the material contained in the three fragments is refuted in columns xvi-xviii of the traditional Book iv, which is one long papyrus: 1497. Gaps assail the reader all the time; the end of columns is almost invariably lost; yet this part of Philodemus' work is preserved much better and allows us to follow a continuous discussion[15].

Unwrapping Diogenes' argument from an opponent may not look a happy solution, but this task is eased by one feature, which gives Philodemus an interesting place in the history of the ancient philosophical book; for Philodemus seems to have borrowed from the philologists of the Alexandrian school a technique of the commentary which he transplanted to

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14. Frr 33, 34, 35 in Rispoli; but concerning 35 I shall contend that PHerc 1572/3 does not join with PHerc 424/5. I have used the disegni reproduced in her edition, [114]. For convenience, I have called these fragments *a* (1572/4), *b* (225/1) and *c* (1572/5). Most of PHerc 424 survived because it was an outer layer (*scorza*); 'oggi si trova nella salla grande dell' Officina dei Papiri' (Rispoli 253-4), and fr. 1 (=*b*) has 5.8 cm width and 6.5 cm height (Delattre p. 61). PHerc 1572 (12 frr, including *a* and *c*) has been entirely destroyed. 424/5 is another 'scorza in cattive condizioni, conservata... nel Cassetto xxiii' (262). The average length of a line in all these papyri is 21 letters. The disegni are done by G. B. Casanova: PHerc 225, in 1822; F. Celentano: PHerc 1572, 1844 (?); and F. Casanova : PHerc 424, before 1835 (Delattre [150] 57-8). According to Delattre, they are careful reproductions of a high quality: 'Je dois avouer qu'à plusieurs reprises j'ai cru lire d'abord au microscope binoculaire certaines lettres qui ne correspondaient pas aux dessins, et un second examen très attentif de l'original m'a contraint de revenir à la lecture du dessinateur' (58-9).

15. PHerc 1497 is the first Herculaneum papyrus ever unrolled, in 1754, on Padre Piaggio's famous machine. Located now in Mobilo xxi of the Officina, it is apparently in good condition (Gigante [379] and Litta [464]). It was drawn by V. Crispino (1863), C. Malesci (1853-5), G.-B. Malesci (1781) and G.-B. Malesci jr (1853-5), and M. Arman (1913). My text relies on the disegno Oxoniese in the Bodleian Library (vol. vi, fogl. 1280-1312).

and adapted for polemical purposes, and which was refined from the second century AD onwards in the great lemmatic commentaries on Plato and Aristotle[16]. This technique imposed on the *περὶ Μουσικῆς* a format which makes Philodemus quote his opponent not once but twice: in the first part he summarises Diogenes' doctrine by quoting its main tenets in infinitive sentences; in the second part he paraphrases or quotes again each relevant line before commenting on it.

The task is further eased by a handful of testimonia which survive from outside this debate. They give us only glimpses of an account, but glimpses which help us to reconstruct *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* and to understand its broader cultural history. The century after Philodemus left four texts which refer to the object of his attack: two divisions made by the Middle Platonists Eudorus and Philo, the chief exponents of the new Stoicising Platonism born far away in Alexandria, on the ashes of the Sceptical Academy; and two definitions of *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* reported by two court philosophers who, in their different styles, give us a flavour of the Stoic tastes of Imperial Rome: Arius Didymus, appointed to a professorship by Augustus, and Cornutus, tutor to the poets Lucan and Persius[17]. The two main sources, the Stoic section in the manual of ethics compiled by Arius and Eudorus' *divisio ethica* excerpted in the introduction to the same work, come down through the handling of an epitomist, Stobaeus, and have the rigid cut of school-book abridgements. To this material we should add a number of allusions in the work of Stoics like Seneca or Epictetus, and in a far-stretching line of later Platonists, pagan and Christian, from Plutarch to Gregory of Nyssa and to Olympiodorus, with his presumed pupils David and Elias in the sixth century AD.

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16. On this see Delattre [150] 'Dossier n. 4', pp. 83-6.

17. Arius and Cornutus are the last names in a list of twenty post-Chrysippean Stoics, added in two mss to the summary of Diogenes Laertius' book of Stoic Lives. The list contains seven known scholarchs and their pupils, six of whom are also recognised by the Ind. Sto. and other sources as students of the Athenian Stoa. It is thus plausible that Arius also studied there, and that the post-Augustan Cornutus was taught by a regular former member of the school (Glucker in discussion of this list, [388] 350-1; see also p. 94 and n. 225 for his arguments against von Arnim's hypothesis that Arius was influenced by Antiochus).

In spite of being ignored by most manuals of ethics, *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* was growing in popularity. Plutarch suggests this in a remarkable passage. Starting his Sympotic Questions with the problem *εἰ δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν παρὰ πότου*, he pleads for it with a nice argument from reciprocity - philosophy does concern itself with the symposion - and then sets out to illustrate his claim with a couple of pretty strange items in the philosophical curriculum of the day: *ζητεῖν... ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς περὶ συμποτικῶν καθηκόντων καὶ τίς ἀρετὴ συμποσίου καὶ πῶς οἴνῳ χρηστέον* (613C).

Plutarch was a Platonist. The mere succession of names which I have given indicates that Platonists had started to take an interest in this subject more than a century before him. But the subject must have been invented by the philosophers of the Porch, as Arius indicates in his Stoic epitome: *ὁμοίως δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ τὴν συμποτικὴν παραλαμβάνουσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρετάς*[18]. In the person of Diogenes, Philodemus attacks the same school to whom Arius attributes the creation of *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή*: the Stoics. We shall see that the symposion occupied a relatively early place in their ethics.

Philodemus makes only one point about the views of the school as a whole (he uses the plural). I shall start from this point, which places the subject in a large but rather uncertain landscape. Next I shall analyse in order the three arguments advanced by Diogenes, which relate the symposion to love, wine, and friendship. Once we have examined the Stoic theory and its background, it will also become possible to understand its attraction for late Platonists.

i

φρόνησις

In a sentence rendered difficult by too many marks of his dissent, Philodemus tells us something quite important: *ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ εἶναι τὴν καλουμένην συμποτικὴν ἀρετήν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ*

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18. St. ii Ch. 7, p. 66 Wachsmuth.

τὴν ὑπὸ τούτ[*ω*]*ν πλασθησομένην ἀπὸ φ*[*ρ*]*ονήσεως, ἡγοῦμαι, τάχα δ᾽* [*ο*]*ὐδὲ πίπτουσαν εἰς φρονίμ*[*ους*] (xvi 7-13). This immediately suggests that the Stoics conceived of sympotic virtue as related in some way to one of their four main virtues, *φρόνησις*. But the obscurity of the sentence and the lack of parallel evidence makes it almost impossible to say in which way.

A satisfactory explanation for the sequence *οὔτ᾽/ ἀλλ᾽ οὐχί* cannot be found. The context requires the progressive or emphatic value of *ἀλλά*, not the adversative; in which case we should certainly expect *ἀλλ᾽ οὐδέ*, not *ἀλλ᾽ οὐχί*[19]. If on the other hand *ἀλλά* were missing, a sequence *οὔτ᾽/ οὐχί/ οὐδέ* would have made sense[20]; but this gives no reason for getting rid of *ἀλλά*.

This difficulty is augmented by syntax and the position of *ἡγοῦμαι*. What is Philodemus denying: (1) that sympotic virtue exists; (2) that sympotic virtue is *ἀπὸ φρονήσεως*; or (3) that sympotic virtue is constructed *ἀπὸ φρονήσεως* by the Stoics?[21] The most plausible course of his thought seems to me as follows. First (*οὔτ᾽*) Philodemus denies, in general, that there is such a thing as sympotic virtue. Next (*ἀλλ᾽ οὐχί*) he refers to the particular brand which he does not allow to exist: sympotic virtue as conceived by the Stoics, *ie ἀπὸ φρονήσεως*. Next (*οὐδέ*) he explains his position by making a brief note on the *φρόνιμοι*:

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19. Cf. Denniston [309] 21-2; Plato uses *οὐ* for *οὐδέ* at R. 470E, but the situation is different. For the sequence *οὔτε/ οὔτε/ ἀλλ᾽ οὐδέ* see also Mayser [492] ii 3 p. 118.

20. With *οὐ*(*χί*) for *οὔτε* without particle, as in poetry, and emphatic *οὐδέ* at the end: cf. Hdt. i 138, *οὔτε/ οὔτε/ οὐ/ ουδέ*. Neubecker prints *οὐδ᾽* for the first negative, where at least the disegno Oxoniese reads very clearly OTT.

21. Von Arnim's punctuation (SVF iii 79 Diog.), isolating *ἀλλ᾽… πλασθησομένην*, suggests (2): 'I do not believe that sympotic virtue is *ἀπὸ φρονήσεως*', probably continuing, 'not (? *ἀλλ᾽ οὐχί*) the one which the Stoics would represent…'. Neubecker's punctuation (no comma between *ἀλλ᾽ οὐχί… ἡγοῦμαι*) rather suggests (3): '… nor do I believe that the brand fashioned by the Stoics is *ἀπὸ φρονήσεως…*'; but she translates (1): 'So glaube ich weder an die Existenz einer sogennante Arete der Symposien, auch nicht einer solchen, die sich nach Ansicht jener Leute von der Vernunft her ausbilden soll…'.

'For my part, I do not believe that the so-called 'sympotic' is a virtue at all, nor indeed (do I believe that 'sympotic virtue' is) the one that these people would aim to construct from wisdom[22], when it probably has nothing to do with the wise'.

πλασθησομένη ἀπὸ φρονήσεως, inspired by or deduced from wisdom[23], opens up an interesting possibility. The Stoics had inherited from the ambiguity of their founder an unending controversy whether virtue was one or many[24]. This was probably one reason why they were preoccupied producing correct divisions to the extent that Stoic ethics appears to us almost like a growing pile of lists: one sees the Stoic soul as a tree of *ἀρεταί* spreading over in mathematical progression. The extant lists, for instance the division of *πρῶται ἀρεταί* into their *ὑποτεταγμέναι* attributed to Chrysippus[25], do not mention anything connected with the symposion. Yet by Philodemus' time sympotic virtue might have entered some division of *φρόνησις* which is now lost[26]. No text confirms such a hypothesis, but its plausibility is increased by two passages in Philo.

In his treatise *περὶ Μέθης* Philo mentions a *συμποτικὴ ἰδέα* (subclass) whose domain is *τὰ συμπόσια καὶ εὐωχίας* (91). It belongs to *ἠθικὴ δύναμις* or *ἠθοποιία*, a practical science of

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22. I find it impossible to explain the future *πλασθησομένη*.

23. Cf. SE HP iii 174, *ἀπὸ τούτων νοεῖν τὸ ἀγαθόν*, probably based on usage such as *φόβος ἀπὸ πολεμίων* (X. Cyr. iii 3 35).

24. For Zeno see Plu. 1034C (= SVF i 200 Z). The famous controversy between Aristo and Zeno is recorded by Galen (PHP vii 182, pp. 430.10-431.17 and 434.30-438.23 De Lacy) and Plutarch (1034C-D). Discussion by Ioppolo [427] 208-43 ('La dottrina della virtù'); some puzzles in Rist [558] 152-72 ('Categories and their Uses').

25. Transmitted by Arius (Stob. ii 60 = SVF iii 264 Chr.): *φρόνησις* contains *εὐβουλία*, *εὐλογιστία*, *ἀγχίνοια*, *νουνέχεια*, [*εὐστοιχία*], *εὐμηχανία*.

26. Neubecker comments 'wie die *ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή*, so gehört auch eine *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* für die Stoa zu den Tugenden' (155-6); but she does not seem to be intrigued that the Tugend in question is the Vernunft of her translation.

behaviour not unlike Stoic *φρόνησις*[27]. *ἠθικὴ δύναμις* has five subclasses - *πολιτική*, *οἰκονομική*, *συμποτική*, *βασιλική*, *νομοθετική*. This forms a homogenous group of *ἐπιστῆμαι* about institutions. The interesting point is that three of his five items also feature as subordinate virtues in a *διαίρεσις* of *φρόνησις*, in Pseudo-Andronicus' treatise *περὶ Παθῶν*: *πολιτική*, *οἰκονομία*, and *βασιλική*[28]; and other sources show that the fifth subclass, *νομοθετική*, can be associated with them in this kind of literature[29]. But so could *ἰδέα συμποτική*; it is perfectly conceivable that the syncretistic ethics of Philo's time comprised an account of *φρόνησις* composed of practical-institutional sciences, which included a science of sympotic behaviour.

This is shifting ground. Philo is a Platonist who often talks in Stoic jargon only because this is the philosophical *κοινή* of his day. He also adheres to leading Stoic doctrines in the Platonic version established by his predecessors, such as Eudorus on the Good and Antiochus on the Criterion. But his original mind adopts many doctrines without leaving any one unchanged; we have a good example even in the *περὶ Μέθης* (162-205)[30]. The combination of these three features does not produce a reliable guide to sources for those lost in the Stoic-Peripatetic mist of the *περὶ Παθῶν*. Philo's present division (88-92) contains five *δυνάμεις* - *εὐσέβεια*, *ὁσιότης*, *φυσιολογία*, *μετεωρολογική*, *ἠθική* - and the five *ἰδέαι* of *ἠθική*. The passage as a whole has a Stoic dress: it rehearses the topos that the only possessor of virtue is the philosopher, and it calls to mind Stoic disputes by claiming that there is a unique *τέχνη-σοφία*

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27. *φρόνησις* is *περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα* (St. ii 60.9); its standard definitions are *ἐπιστήμη ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον* and *ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν* (SE M xi 170, DL vii 92, St. ii 59; cf. Galen PHP vii 2 = SVF i 374 Aristo).

28. P. 241 GT.

29. Clem. Strom. i 24.158.1 and ii 438; Arius in St. ii 94 (*τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι* and *τὸ νομοθετεῖν*).

30. See also his un-Stoic division of the five *ἀρεταί* at Leg. All. i 63-5, or his interesting addition to the Stoic theory of the *πάθη* discussed by Dillon [319] 151-2 (Dillon considers this to be among the 'earliest evidence for modification of Stoic doctrine'). See also Leg. All. ii 22 and 99.

with a plurality of names. But some of the items are defined in non-Stoic terms[31]. The relation between *δυνάμεις* and names may have parallels in Stoicism[32], but the number five recalls other divisions of Philo's *δυνάμεις*, which seem rather influenced by Pythagorean daemonology and Gnostic numerology[33]. To make things worse, Philo ends with a list of nine names supposed to pick up in right order the former ten sciences, but he omits the odd item *συμποτική*[34].

The item is Stoic, but Philo may have taken it from Eudorus, as a part of the Platonic tradition. Was it made to join the other four by Stoics, Peripatetics, Platonists, or by Philo himself? This question remains without an answer.

Yet Philo reappears with a less anonymous testimonial on *φρόνησις* in one of the Biblical treatises inspired by the Stoic method of allegorical interpretation of Homer, and openly competing with that model: De plantatione Noe. Here Philo gives us the fullest ancient record of the disputes generated by Zeno's drunkenness syllogism, to which I shall soon have occasion to return. The orthodox Zenonians claimed that the philosopher never gets drunk; the heretics admitted that he does, but only in some limited sense of the word. Philo assures us that none of the views reported on this matter are his own (149), and his long summary of the two positions (142-5) reveals that Zeno's radical defenders had constructed an argument which appealed to *φρόνησις*. They claimed that the philosopher does not get drunk because his superior wisdom resists the attack of all passions and disorders, such as are produced by wine: *τὴν*

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31. Cf. *εὐσέβεια* and *ὁσιότης* = *δυνάμεις πραγματευομέναι τὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος* : *εὐσέβεια* = *ἐπιστήμη θεῶν θεραπείας*, *ὁσιότης* = *ἐπιστήμη παρεχομένη πιστοὺς καὶ θηροῦντας τὰ πρὸς τὸ δεῖον δίκαια* ([Andr.] viii 2 pp. 253-5 GT = SVF iii 273 Chr.). Unlike the Stoics, Philo gives this virtue the highest place, Spec. Leg. 135. Cf. also *φυσιολογία* = *δύναμις πραγματευομένη τὰ περὶ οὐρανοῦ* (but see Poseidonius, *ἐστι τῆς φυσικὴ θεωρία τὸ σκοπεῖν περί τε οὐσίας οὐρανοῦ... καὶ δυνάμεως... καὶ ποιότητος*, Simpl. in Arist. Phys. 193^{b}23 pp. 291.21-2.31 Diels = fr. 18 Kidd-Edelstein and his note about the division *φυσικὴ θεωρία*/ *φυσιολογία*).

32. Cf. DL vii 147 = SVF ii 1021 Chr. (*ὁ θεὸς προσονομάζεται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις*).

33. Cf. Fug. 94, QE ii 68: Dillon [319] 166.

34. *εὐσέβεια*, *ὁσιότης*, *φυσιολογία*, *μετεωρολογία*, *ἠθοποιία*, *πολιτεία*, *οἰκονομία*, *βασιλική*, *νομοθετική*.

γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ φρόνησιν ἱκανὴν εἶναι... δύναμιν δὲ περιβεβλῆσθαι φρόνησιν παθῶν σβεστήριον εἴτε ὑπὸ φλεγμαίνοντος ἔρωτος οἴστρων εἴτε ὑπὸ πολλοῦ καὶ ζέοντος οἴνου (145).

Apart from suggesting a link between the Stoic philosopher's wisdom and the 'virtue' which he may have wished to acquire or to display at symposia, this argument is interesting because, along with wine, it invokes the effects of love. Its author did not take a random example. We have already seen that Arius introduced *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* in the company of *ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή*[35]; we shall see further that the two stick together very closely. The first thing to be heard from Philodemus about sympotic virtue is that Diogenes considered it *οἰκεία* to the erotic[36]. This tie is reflected in the organisation of sympotic material in the *περὶ Μουσικῆς*. Philodemus applies himself to the subject for about two columns of PHerc 1497, after a long discussion in which, following Diogenes step by step, he has demonstrated that music exerts neither a good nor a bad influence on love (xiii 4-xv 45). In this discussion he refers to *ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή* twice (xiii 10-6:xv 15-20), and the second occurrence belongs in an argument answering the last point made by Diogenes on *ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή* in *a* (PHerc 1572/4, lines 28-32). But the Stoic himself has moved straight to *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* after that point, at the bottom of *a* (32 ff)[37]. This order of subjects became a sort of canon, for the Platonist Eudorus was to adopt it as well, and much to Arius' approval: *κατὰ γειτνίασιν ὑπάγει τὸν περὶ ἔρωτος τόν <τε> περὶ συμποσίων*[38].

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35. St. ii 66W; *supra*, p. 17.

36. ...*ἣν φησιν ο*[*ἰ*]*κείαν αὐτῆς* (*sc ἐρωτικῆς*) *εἶναι, τὴν συμποτικήν...* (col xvi 4-6).

37. The top of the first papyrus with Diogenes' sympotic arguments (PHerc 1572/4) contains the last three steps of this discussion:

PHerc 1572/4.1-5 : xiv 34-70 (*συνουσίαι αἰσχραί*)
PHerc 1572/4.21-? : xv 1-4 (toils of love assuaged)
PHerc 1572/4.28-32 (=*a*) : xv 15-20 (*ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή*)

Of the two phrases (restored by Kemke) one can only read in *a* only [.....]*κην ἀρετήν* and *τὴν συμπο*[.....]*τὴν*.

38. St. ii 7, pp. 43-4W.

Before embarking on ἔρως Diogenes has presented the effects of music on *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία* (xii 4-9). If his praise of music takes the main virtues in order, the erotic and sympotic arguments belong quite plausibly to a section devoted to *φρόνησις*.

ii

Love

The transition from erotic to sympotic virtue did not put an end to the subject of love; the first sympotic argument is based on the relation between the two *ἀρεταί*, as appears from Philodemus' refutation at xv 45-xvi 6. This argument started with the premiss *συν[εργεῖν]* (*sc μέλος*) *πρὸς τὴν συμπο[τικὴν ἀρε]τήν*, quoted by Philodemus in *a* (lines 32-4). Next, Diogenes seems to have said something about love, *τοῦ γὰρ ἔρω[τος καὶ κα]θόλου τῶν ἐρωτ[*. His argument is lost because *a* breaks off at this point, but the Epicurean helps us to recover the Stoic's thought.

Philodemus argues thus: Ἀλλὰ *γὰρ ἐπεὶ πρὸς ἐρωτικὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ φαίνεθ' ἡ μουσικὴ συνερ⌜γ⌝οῦσα* (A), *δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πρὸς... τὴν συμποτικήν, καὶ τὰ συμπόσια κοι⌜νῶ⌝ς* (B).

(A) The idea that music has no effect on love looms large in Philodemus' refutations of Diogenes. It also suits his Epicurean position, which claims that music is limited to sounds and that sounds have no cognitive content or ethical effect[39].

(B) But Philodemus thinks that music is good for the symposion: he will agree *τὴν [μ]ουσικὴν οἰκείαν ε[ἶνα]ι συμποσίων* (xvi 17-21); he will grant (*εἰς*) *συμπόσια ἐναρμόττειν [α]ὐτήν* [*sc μουσικήν*] (xviii 1-2); and a mutilated sentence in col xi said something to the effect that the value or usefulness of music extends to, or goes no further than, the symposion: *...[τοὐ]ναντί[ον δὲ] ὡς πλείστη{νος} ἡ [μου]σικὴ μέχρι τῶν συμποσίων προβαίνουσα* (3-5).

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39. Cf. esp. coll ii-iii, which are crucial to understanding Philodemus' anti-mimetic conception of music.

Thus given two propositions, 'Music benefits erotic virtue or love' (1) and 'Music benefits sympotic virtue or symposia' (2), the conclusion 'It is clear that music does not benefit sympotic virtue or symposia' does not follow from what Philodemus thinks about them. Why does he say this? Either he contradicts himself or the conclusion has some other function than to assert his opinion.

Stoic *ἀνασκευή* applied to a sign P lends the tautology $[P \rightarrow Q] \rightarrow [\neg Q \rightarrow \neg P]$. Let us consider the sentence 'Music benefits sympotic virtue' an antecedent P to some Q. If we apply the test to this sign, we obtain something of the same form as Philodemus' sentence: $\neg Q \rightarrow$ ¬'Music benefits sympotic virtue'. And if Philodemus employs here a strategy similar to that of the Stoic test, the conditional which he is attacking would run,

'If music benefits sympotic virtue or symposia in general, then music benefits erotic virtue'.

Perhaps an Epicurean would not use deliberately the Stoic test, but one need not give it this name. Philodemus' line of thought must have been similar. The reasoning is simple and consistent with his beliefs about the two propositions. But why would Philodemus take such a line? Because it enabled him to expose the absurdity of the opponent's thesis. Supposing that Diogenes argued, 'If music benefits sympotic virtue or symposia in general, then it benefits erotic virtue', Philodemus would have every reason to recognise here what the Stoics themselves defined as a type of *συνημμένον μοχθηρόν*: one which infers from a true antecedent to a false consequent, as in 'If the earth exists, then it flies'[40]. Music does benefit symposia, but it is not right to infer from this that music benefits love.

The dialogue between the Stoic and the Epicurean may have run like this. At some point after the broken sentence in *a*, Diogenes concluded from the last complete sentence which we can read that music benefits erotic virtue or love in general. Philodemus has

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40. SE PH ii 104-6. Note, in addition, that Philodemus thinks that love, unlike music, does not become the symposion: *οὐ[δ]ὲ συμποσίοις ἔρωτας ἐναρμόττ[ε]ιν, ὥς ἂν ⌜τ⌝αρα⌜χ⌝ώδεις καὶ ἀτερπεῖς καὶ διαστατικοὺς τῶν συνόντων ὑπ[ά]ρχοντας* (xvi 13-7).

established already that this proposition is false (xiii 4-xv 45). Now he shows the absurdities into which Diogenes has involved himself; for if his conditional is sound the premiss 'Music benefits symposia' must be false. Then, stumbling into another piece of absurdity, Philodemus stops to say that sympotic virtue does not even exist; but symposia do exist, and it is true that music benefits them, if we take all these words in the normal sense - as illustrated in Homer[41].

In the previous argument Philodemus denied the relevance of Erato on the issue of music being useful to erotic virtue. He brought semantics against etymology: the Muses are not concerned with music, he retorted, but with poetry or philosophy. Diogenes had obviously made up a funny argument from language: the name 'Erato' given to a Muse couches a sort of public confession that music emulates virtue in matters of love - and I suggest the restoration of *τοὔνομα* at *a*. 32[42]. The broken sentence at the end of *a* starts as if it explained something about love - maybe in the light of a new premiss about the next virtue, the sympotic.

Diogenes' purpose throughout this section has been to establish that music has every sort of power over love. The two virtues are *οἰκεῖαι*; I suppose that he used them both in proofs about music being good for love. The Erato and *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* arguments are parallel in Philodemus' quotation - infinitive sentences introduced, as I would restore, by *ἔτι δέ*. Diogenes argued that naming a Muse 'Erato' requires music to be perceived as conducive towards erotic virtue (which has a good effect on love); I think that the proposition *συνεργεῖν*

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41. I should replace the reading generally adopted at xvi 19-20, *κα(ὶ) τὰ παρ' [Ὁμ]ήρωι*, by *καθὰ (τὰ) παρ' [Ὁμ]ήρωι*. Philodemus uses *καθό*, but Epicurus uses both (Ep. ii 103, p. 46, 19, *καθὰ καὶ βροντὴν ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι*). Philodemus defines *καθὸ* as *qua*, 'according as', 'insofar as' (Usener [623] *sv*; cf. de Lacy [162] 220-1). Philodemus' Peripatetic target, Aristoxenus, has found in Homer evidence for his own theory that music at banquets has a complementary effect to wine, and this theory is reported in defence to objections of a Philodemean type (ch. 43 Lasserre of Pseudo-Plutarch' s *περὶ Μουσικῆς*, [178]). Philodemus may have wished to clean out literal Homer from such fancy interpretations, fashionable with his rivals - especially the Stoics, who inspired the Pergamene anomalists. He says here that music is good at banquets just as Homer shows us and no more; the thought behind *καθά* may be that the proposition is correct and it is also correct to quote Homer for it, but this is no basis for further speculation. Another problem is with *παρ'*: ending a line in an elided syllable is extremely unusual, yet Crönert says that 'sunt tamen papyri, in quibus saepius hanc legem librarius migravit' ([297] 12, with examples: *παρ' | Εὐριπίδ[η]*, *παρ' | ἡμῶν*, *καθ' | αὐτάς*).

42. Cf. *ἐπήρατον οὔνομα* in Ap. Rh. iii 5. I should also read *συμ⌈β⌉άλλε[σθ]αι* instead of *συμ⌈β⌉άλλε[τ]αι* in l. 29, where the lacuna leaves room for 2 letters rather than one.

πρὸς τὴν συμποτικὴν ἀρετήν was to him a proof leading to the same conclusion as the name Erato, 'Music benefits erotic virtue'[43].

If this is correct, we can now guess what Diogenes meant by the two virtues being οἰκεῖαι. Sympotic virtue can act as a sign for erotic virtue; the waves of οἰκείωσις are propelled from symposion in the direction of love, and we shall see in *c* that they reach further, embracing friendship. Diogenes seems to have extended to symposion, love, and friendship a notion of affinity which he probably considered to derive from the primary affinity between music and the soul[44].

iii

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Wine

Before reaching friendship Diogenes talks about wine, and I think that his mutilated words in *b* (PHerc 225/1) witness an interesting phase in the history of the drunkenness syllogism. In the light of other testimonia, this part of Diogenes' theory will also enable us to grasp how it may have come about that the ethical system of the Stoics generated a bizarre pair of ἀρεταί, concerned with loving and drinking.

The papyrus exhibits two unfinished sentences. The remainder of the first one forms a self-contained statement about sympotic entertainment, easily completed from a second quotation. Philodemus denied, as we saw, that it is appropriate for the ἐλεύθεροι to produce their own music[45]. This denial meets Diogenes' first claim in *b*: ...οὐ]δ' εὑρεθῆ[ναι βελτίο]ν[α

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43. Instead of ἄξιο[ν], I would read τοῦτ' ἀξιο[ῖ], συν[εργεῖν καὶ] | πρὸς ('he also thinks...'). I fits better than N into the small space between O and Σ shown on the disegno.

44. See *supra* pp. 12-13; but we need not conceive of such affinity in strict terms of οἰκείωσις.

45. Cf. *supra* pp. 11 and 13.

τοῖς] ἐλευθέρο[ις] ἄλλ[η]ν ἄνεσ[ιν] καὶ παιδειά[ν] τοῦ τὸν μὲν ᾆσαι, τὸν δὲ κιθαρίσαι, τὸν δὲ χορεῦσαι.

The second statement of *b* introduces the topic of wine, and has another close paraphrase in PHerc 1497: Philodemus declares, οὐχ ὁμολογήσω δ' οὐ[δ'] ἃ[ν] ἐκκαλεῖσθαι [τὸν] οἶνο[ν] ἐξ ἀ[ν]άγκης καὶ τοὺς φρ[ο]ν[ί]μους ἅπαντα ποιεῖν, ὅσ[α] φη[σιν... ('Neither shall I agree that wine compels even the wise to do all that he (?) says...'). A large gap from line 36 down to the end of col xvi cuts the Epicurean off, and the broken bits of the Stoic's second sentence in *b* cannot be reassembled. Yet it is clear that at this point Diogenes brought in the controversial subject περὶ τοῦ μεθυσθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν.

In spite of the lacuna, Philodemus' position on this matter is quite clear. It is even more explicitly formulated in the de Ira: the philosopher cannot be drawn into irrational states such as anger or drunkenness[46]. This coincides with the orthodox Zenonian view. Philodemus' opponents in the de Ira are his own fellows of the Garden, while here he argues against one of the Porch. An Epicurean defending Zeno's paradox against a Stoic would be an odd situation indeed. But did Diogenes entertain the heretical belief that the philosopher can get drunk?

What Diogenes thought on this matter is suggested, faintly but unambiguously, in the link between his two unfinished sentences, which the parallel text in Philodemus helps us to pin down. Diogenes made his claim through the mouth of Homer, quoting a couple of lines from Odyssey xiv: τὸν οἶνον [ἐγκα]λεῖ[σθα]ι "...πολύφρονά [περ μάλ' ἀεῖσαι] καὶ θ' ἁπαλὸν [γελάσαι καὶ] τ' ὀρχήσασ[θ]αι..."[47]· ταῦ[τα δὲ] ποιεῖν ὡ[ς ἐξ ἀν]άγκ[ης...[48]. This must be the referent of Philodemus' unfinished relative ὅσα φησιν; so this is what wine forces the philosopher to do. But ἀεῖσαι and ὀρχήσασθαι pick up ᾆσαι, κιθαρίσαι and χορεῦσαι in the previous sentence, where this kind of entertainment was very highly prized. Diogenes' position

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46. De ira (PHerc 182), coll xlviii 34-ix 27; refutation of Epicurean argument at xlvi 40-i 17.

47. These lines (463-4) have been restored by Nauck [517] 168-9 (also mentioned by Dorandi [331] 48).

48. Or perhaps, with Rispoli, ὁμ[ῶς]? Delattre reads ταῦτα [δὲ] ποιεῖν οἶ[νον ἀν]άγκ[ηι].

on the paradox becomes interesting. The wise man is not immune to alcohol, yet he does not get drunk. On the contrary, wine has quite nice effects on him: it compels him to adopt the noblest form of *ἄνεσις* and *παιδιά*, relaxation and play, by exercising at symposia his musical culture and skills. The apparent heresy turns out to be a very original defence.

Zeno's syllogism concluded to the paradox that the *ἀστεῖος* or *σοφός* never gets drunk, thus:

τῷ μεθύοντι οὐκ ἄν τις εὐλόγως λόγον ἀπόρρητον παρακάθοιτο·

<τῷ δὲ ἀστείῳ παρακατατίθηται>·

οὐκ ἄρα μεθύει ὁ ἀστεῖος[49].

This optimistic view provoked a lot of reaction. Outside the school it met its *παραβολή* - according to Schofield all these were invented by Alexinus, a pupil of Eubulides[50]. But the paradox also fostered dissent within the school. Chrysippus held against Cleanthes that drunkenness can cause the loss of *ἀρετή*[51]. Von Arnim relates this debate to the syllogism in such a way that Chrysippus would emerge as the champion of anti-Zenonians[52]. But Chrysippus does not say that there is such a thing as a drunken wise man. Another Stoic before him claimed that there is: *καὶ ὁ καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ μεθυσθείη ἄν*. This was Zeno' immediate disciple, Persaeus[53]. Chrysippus probably did not criticize Zeno, but claimed 'drunkenness causes the loss of virtue' in order to prove that the wise man **does not** get drunk (or else he ceases to be wise). But this position can be used in both directions, and it is easy to imagine

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49. Philo de Plant. 176; cf. Sen. Ep. 83.9. For the syllogism see Schofield [588] 41-4; for the disputes around it see von Arnim, 'Das stoische *ζήτημα*: *εἰ μεθυσθήσεται ὁ σοφός* bei Philo de plantatione Noë p. 350-56, 11', in [246] 101-40.

50. Schofield [588] 37; DL ii 109.

51. DL vii 127 (*ἀρετὴν μὲν ἀποβλητόν... διὰ μέθην*).

52. Von Arnim [246] 106.

53. Ath. 607B; *infra*, Ch. 2, p. 59.

how it turned into a weapon against Zeno and Chrysippus: if virtue can be lost, who else would lose it but the only true possessor of virtue, the philosopher? Later Stoics who tried to reconcile the conflicting views may have interpreted Chrysippus along Persaeus' line[54]. The debate has a long history, contaminated with Peripatetic and other traditions; as we see in Philodemus' De Ira, the problem *περὶ τοῦ μεθυσθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν* was used by Epicureans in the first century BC as an *ἐπιλογισμός* (analogical argument?) for the thesis that the *σοφός* can be drawn into anger.

The general strategy adopted against hard-liners by those defenders of the syllogism who compromised with the idea that the philosopher can be affected by drink was to find new meanings for Zeno's words[55]. Thus *μεθύσθαι* became the recipient of the sense forbidden by the original syllogism. Zeno extracted his proof from the fact that the *ἀστεῖος* is always trusted to hold his tongue, or to talk no nonsense (*ληρεῖν*). Accordingly, drunkenness split into the following pair: *μέθη*, ordinary drunkenness, which consists in *ληρεῖν* and does not affect the philosopher; and *οἴνωσις* or drunkenness of the philosophical kind, which has nothing to do with *λήρησις* or *φλυαρία*. Zeno's original conclusion, also quoted by Arius under the form *οὐχ οἷον δὲ μεθυσθήσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα* (ii 109), came to take the edulcorated form recorded by Diogenes Laertius, *καὶ οἰνωθήσεσθαι μέν, οὐ μεθυσθήσεσθαι δέ* (vii 118). Drunkenness certainly has other and worse effects, yet our sources do not bother with them. The syllogism seems to have imposed a definition of bad and unphilosophical drunkenness as *λήρησις*. It is also tempting to think that the exemplary behaviour of Socrates in the Symposion lies somewhere to the background of this sophisticated story[56].

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54. An anti-Zenonian interpretation of Chrysippus must have occurred at some point, because Philo records an argument to the conclusion *μεθυσθήσεται τοιγάρτοι καὶ ὁ ἀστεῖος μηδὲν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποβαλών* (de Plant. 172; *infra*, p. 30).

55. Schofield [588].

56. As suggested to me by David Sedley.

But the elaboration of two meanings of drunkenness was a gradual process. It did not take shape before Diogenes; for, as was shown by Schofield, Poseidonius pursued a similar line of argument but does not seem to have known the distinction[57]. Diogenes Laertius found the formula above (vii 118) in a passage which also concedes that the philosopher may fall, temporarily and against his nature, into the irrational states of λήρησις or μελαγχολία. Its author[58] seems to think that οἰνοῦσθαι differs from μεθύσθαι, but only as a smaller evil, produced by φαντασίαι ἀλλόκοτοι. Oddly, this Stoic saves the philosopher from μέθη, like Zeno, by allowing him precisely what Zeno forbids - λήρησις.

Philo's record of the debate in the περὶ Μέθης contains a unitary section, on the whole favourable to drunkenness, which he calls 'the second etymology of μεθύειν' (165-74). He tells us that this material comes down from a period when philosophers had not made any distinction between two senses of 'drunk': τὸ μεθύειν ἢν τὸ οἰνοῦσθαι (174). It gives us an idea, even if a nebulous one, of the kinds of attack and defence which might have led the Stoics, eventually, to the elaboration of two senses.

Chapters 170-1 record an argument which, in spirit, sums up the whole section. Unmixed wine (ἄκρατος) intensifies (ἐπιτείνειν, σφοδρύνειν) natural dispositions: bad natures are worsened, good natures are improved. Thus drunkenness strengthens the good natural endowments of the philosopher (ἵλεω μᾶλλον ἀπειργάσατο).

Chapters 171-2 quote a Peripatetic-sounding argument with an ambiguous Stoic conclusion. Given two contraries, ἐπειδὰν θάτερον εἶδος ἐφαρμόζῃ πλείοσι, καὶ θάτερον ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβήσεται - for instance if 'white' applies to both φαῦλοι and σπουδαῖοι, so must 'black'. But τό γε νήφειν καὶ τὸ μεθύειν ἐναντία· ὥστε καὶ τὸ μεθύειν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν εἴδων (*ie* φαῦλοι/ σπουδαῖοι) ἐφαρμόττει'. This argument is followed by a double conclusion:

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57. Sen. Ep. 83.10: for this see Schofield [588] 42 ff.

58. DL refers to Apollodorus, a pupil of Diogenes, but he does not make it clear whether he took all the material of this chapter from Apollodorus' Ethics.

μεθυσθήσεται τοιγάρτοι καὶ ὁ ἀστεῖος (i), *μηδὲν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποβαλών* (ii). i, *μεθυσθήσεται ὁ ἀστεῖος*, contradicts Zeno's syllogism, as Philo will recognise in Chapter 178. But ii, *μηδὲν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποβαλών*, contradicts Zeno's opponent on this matter - say, Persaeus or the potential Stoic who carried Chrysippus' position on drunkenness one step further - as this second part of the conclusion indicates that it happened[59].

Let us imagine now three arguments. One claims, like Chrysippus, that *μεθύειν* brings about the loss of *ἀρετή*; another claims, like 171-2, that *μεθύειν* holds both of *φαῦλοι* and of *σπουδαῖοι*; both attack Zeno's conclusion. The third argument replies, like 170-1, that it may be true that *μεθύειν* holds of *φαῦλοι* and *σπουδαῖοι* alike, but it holds in opposite ways, such that the *ἀρετή* of the *σπουδαῖοι* is not lost but increased through *μεθύειν*. The conclusion of the third argument would be one which can accommodate the conclusion which we read now in 171-2: *μεθυσθήσεται τοιγάρτοι καὶ ὁ ἀστεῖος, μηδὲν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποβαλών*. The argument of 170-1 cannot be Stoic, for Stoic *ἀρετή* is a constant value without degrees. Nevertheless it may give ideas to a Stoic who does not yet have two senses at hand in his defence of Zeno; conversely, it may be inspired by a Stoic whose strategy would have been to say that the philosopher does not get drunk because wine is an *ἀδιάφορον*, bad for the *φαῦλοι* but good for the *σπουδαῖοι*.

My third imaginary argument defends the spirit of the original paradox by taking heed of the objection bred by Chrysippus' statement; although it does not purport to distinguish two senses of *μεθύειν*, its manner of turning around the opponent at 171-2 can well lead to such a result. It is made of disparate ideas from different schools; but it helps us to create a possible history for the two senses of *μεθύειν* and to see of what fabric they were made.

Thus at some stage in the debate *μέθη* became identified with *λήρησις*. This material starts to be interesting for Diogenes once we turn away from *μέθη* and ask about the content of

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59. Cf. *supra*, nn. 51, and 54.

the other form of drunkenness, *οἴνωσις*, which the Stoics allowed to affect the philosopher. The first place to go for this is chapter 4 of Plutarch's treatise de Garrulitate, where we read the following formulae: *οἰνώσεως μὲν ἄνεσιν, μέθης δὲ φλυαρίαν* (503E-F). The good sense given to drunkenness in order to balance the bad sense *λήρησις* seems to coincide with one of the terms used by Diogenes to qualify the kinds of behaviour dictated by wine to wise men - *ἄνεσις*.

This suggestion receives very strong support from Philo. The 'second etymology' is inspired by the idea that drunkenness is a relaxation of the soul: *τὴν γὰρ μέθην... νομίζουσί τινες εἰρῆσθαι... ὅτι καὶ μεθέσεως ψυχῆς αἰτία γίγνεται* (165). In the next chapters Philo expands on this view by using the term *ἄνεσις*: *μεθίεται δὲ ὁ μὲν τῶν ἀφρόνων λογισμὸς εἰς πλειόνων χύσιν ἁμαρτημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῶν ἐμφρόνων εἰς ἀνέσεως καὶ εὐθυμίας καὶ ἱλαρότητος ἀπόλαυσιν*; and further, *ἡδίων γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ νήφοντος οἰνωθεὶς ὁ σοφὸς γίνεται, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν ταύτῃ διαμαρτάνοιμεν φάσκοντες ὅτι μεθυσθήσεται* (166); ... *μεθυσθήσεται... τῆς μέθης ἠθοποιούσης καὶ ἄνεσιν καὶ ὠφελίαν ἐργαζομένης* (170). The idea that drunkenness produces *ἄνεσις* seems thus to have played a considerable role in our story: it has lent a content ready to fill in the definition of 'drunkenness' in the positive sense required by those Stoics who had accepted that the philosopher is not immune to alcohol. We shall find it again in the history of the philosophical symposion[60].

There is a strong chance that this idea derives from Diogenes. *ἄνεσις* is a state of mind which recurs in his conception of friendship, considered in relation to music[61]. Such applications of the word seem to be specific to Diogenes; other Stoics used *ἄνεσις* quite often, but coupled it regularly with the correlative *ἐπίτασις*, in very different contexts[62]. Only

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60. *Infra*, Ch. 3, p. 126.

61. *Infra*, p. 54.

62. DL vii 101; Porph. in Arist. Cat. p. 137.29 Busse = SVF iii 525-6 Chr. (and SVF ii 393). The pair applies *eg* to *ἕξεις*, *ποιοί*, or *τέχναι*, which can vary in intensity. The only use which differs from the standard was made by Cleanthes in his Hymn (*ἄλλοι δ' εἰς ἄνεσιν καὶ σώματα ἡδέα ἔργα* (St. i 25 = SVF i 537 Cl.).

Chrysippus, when describing the *τόνος* of the soul and its two movements, represented *ἀτονία* as a relaxation of the mind analogous to muscular relaxation in body[63]. Perhaps this or a similar metaphor inspired his pupil.

We saw that Diogenes quoted two lines from Odyssey xiv. They are appropriate to his argument because they refer to song and dance[64]; but the next line, *καί τι ἔπος προέηκεν ὅ περ τ' ἄρρητον ἄμεινον* (465), leads straight into the Zenonian controversy. The papyrus does not allow us to check whether Diogenes returned to it, but I find it hard to believe that a Stoic would quote such a passage without being aware of the heated issue in which it involved his school. Now Plutarch, when explaining the meaning of *μέθη* and *οἴνωσις* in the De Garrulitate, invokes the same lines. This is a remarkable parallel, and it points to *b* as a very plausible source - even if an indirect one. But Plutarch quotes all three lines; he then comments that, here, *λύων ὁ ποιητὴς οἰνώσεως καὶ μέθης διαφοράν*. Homer, of course, did nothing of the kind; the author who might be said to have 'solved' anything would be an interpreter who used these lines skilfully, turning them to the benefit of a position which eventually came to be summarised in Plutarch's formulae.

The wider context of the argument in *b* is lost. It seems plausible to me that, once he has reached this point in his exposition, Diogenes paused over Homer and made his own stand, perhaps by illustrating with his help the difference between two types of behaviour, dictated by wine to the *φαῦλος* and, respectively, to the *σοφός*. Once he has said that song and dance are the best *ἄνεσις καὶ παιδιά* and that wine compels even the wise to sing and dance, as we see in Homer's Odyssey xiv 463-4, he may add for instance that what Homer claims in the next line does not apply to the wise but to the *ἰδιῶται*, those who bring hired musicians to

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63. Gal. PHP iv 6, p. 270 De Lacy (= SVF iii 473 Chr.): *τῶν νευρῶν... ἀνειμένων*, and *αἰτιᾶται τῶν πραττομένων οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀτονίαν τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν τῆς ψυχῆς*.

64. Incidentally, these lines belong to an 'unheroic' episode which might attract a Stoic with preoccupations for *φιλοφροσύνη* (cf. especially two of the lines atethized by Aristarchus, 503-5, and the commentary in [3] *ad l*).

symposia, ignoring even the great poet. Wine has a necessary effect on the *σοφός*, true, but, far from dragging him into *λήρησις*, it prompts his mind towards the best *ἄνεσις καὶ παιδιά* - which, we shall see, are also conducive to *φιλοφροσύνη* and *φιλία*.

This course of the argument is hypothetical; but in any event *ἄνεσις* seems to have imposed a lasting solution on the issue of Zeno's paradox. Formulations such as *τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐμπρεπὲς ἔργον σοφῷ ἢ παίζειν καὶ γανοῦσθαι καὶ συνευφραίνεσθαι*; (170), which echoes Diogenes quite closely, make me believe that a large part of Philo's 'second etymology' material derives, at several removes and with many contributions from philosophers of other beliefs, from Diogenes of Babylon[65].

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Love and Wine

After quoting the definition of *ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή* in the Stoic part of his compendium, Arius says: *διὸ καί φασιν ἐρασθήσεθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα* (ii 66). This formula is of the same type as the negative conclusion *οὐχ οἷον δὲ μεθυσθήσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα*, which occurs later in the compendium (109). The second time Arius does not mention any *ἀρετή*; but if the conclusion that the philosopher falls in love follows from erotic virtue, and if this one forms a pair with sympotic virtue, we may well feel that a parallel statement about the philosopher not getting drunk was originally related in some way to sympotic virtue.

Arius' account on pages 65-6 of Wachsmuth's edition (chapter vii of Stobaeus' second book) starts with a familiar sound, *πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σοφὸν <κατὰ> πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς*, and promises to display more of the wondrous capacities of the philosopher, *νουνεχόντως καὶ διαλεκτικῶς ποιεῖ καὶ συμποτικῶς καὶ ἐρωτικῶς*, but in fact it confines itself to the twin

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65. Schofield [588] 38 argues from two cases that Diogenes was the key figure in the transmission of Zeno's syllogisms and their counterexamples. Perhaps we have just missed in *b* a third case?

ἀρεταί, *συμποτική* and *ἐρωτική*, whose definitions are bound together in a *τὴν μέν... τὴν δ'* structure. These definitions belong in a summary on the topic of love in Stoicism (65.17-66.2 : 66.9-13), where Arius informs us that *ἔρως* is an *ἀδιάφορον* and can be good or bad.

This is not as trivial as it sounds. Love was another inheritor of Zeno's ambiguities. Its commonest definition in Stoic handbooks is *ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον*, 'an attempt to make friends, on account of beauty being apparent'[66]. Diogenes Laertius attributes to Zeno this same formula in two passages, and it is striking that the first time love is downgraded as *ἐπιθυμία τις οὐχὶ περὶ σπουδαίους* (vii 113), while the second time it is defended against the suspicion that its real purpose may be sex (vii 130). The defensive mood culminated in the Stoic denial that love is a passion at all. Arius reports this position in our passage, *τὸν δὲ ἔρωτα οὔτε ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι οὔτε τινὸς φαύλου πράγματος, ἀλλ' ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλους ἔμφασιν* (66.9-13); but in other parts of the compendium he records the opposite view that love is a *πάθος*[67]. This must have created a serious difficulty[68]. The Stoics approached it by splitting the word in two: 'lover' is said *διχῶ̃*, according to whether he is a *σπουδαῖος* or a *φαῦλος* (65.17-20). It is the same procedure which led to the formation of two senses in the case of *μεθύειν*; more generally, it may account for the Stoic habit of giving unusual senses to common words[69].

But Arius' report suggests to us that this procedure is closely related to the theory of *ἀδιάφορα*: *τὸ δὲ ἐρᾶν αὐτὸ μόνον ἀδιάφορον εἶναι, **ἐπειδὴ** γίνεταί ποτε καὶ περὶ φαύλους* (66.9-11). This opens an interesting perspective on the Stoic symposion. *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* is 'a

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66. St. ii 66.11-3, 91.15, 115.1-5, DL vii 113, 129-30, SE M vii 239, Alex. Aphr. in Top. 139.21 ff, Cic. TD iv 70; cf. Plu. 1073C. See Schofield's interpretation of Stoic love in [587] ('City of love', pp. 22-56), from which I take this translation (p. 29).

67. St. ii 91; cf. also ii 143 (*πάθος* the *ἀρχή* of love).

68. See also DL vii 113, 120, and SE M vii 239.

69. Cf. Plutarch noting that nobody would object to 'love' thus redefined, but nobody would call it 'love' any longer (1073), and Sextus remarking that the Stoics do not understand by *ἐπιστήμη* what everybody does (M ii 6).

science (*ἐπιστήμη*) concerned with what is becoming in a symposion (*τὸ ἐν συμποσίῳ καθῆκον*) - a science about how to conduct symposia and how to drink in company' (*τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ἐξάγεσθαι τὰ συμπόσια καὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ συμπίνειν*, 66.6-6). The elevation of the *ἔρως* of the philosopher to the rank of an *ἀρετή-ἐπιστήμη*, crowned by the conclusion *διὸ καί φασιν ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα*, is linked with the idea that *ἔρως* is an *ἀδιάφορον*. Is not the parallel process, turning into a *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* his capacity to subject drunkenness to the rules of the symposion, linked with a similar conception of wine - or any passions aroused in the symposion?[70]

The hypothesis that the symposion featured among Stoic *ἀδιάφορα* receives indirect support from the first Middle Platonist, Eudorus. Eudorus seems to have studied in Plato's school in Athens, because Arius styles him *Ἀκαδημαϊκός* (ii 46)[71], but it is now well established that his supposed ties to Antiochus, in Athens or Alexandria, and hence his supposed debts to the Fifth Academy, are a fiction of modern scholarship[72]. Eudorus introduced in Alexandria his own blend of Platonic, Stoic and Pythagorean doctrines.

One of his books was a *Διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου* which Arius liked so much that he prefaced his compendium with long extracts from the chapter on ethics. Eudorus divided ethics, apparently, into three original branches[73]. Arius presents some of the subheadings of the first branch, *θεωρητικόν* or *λόγος περὶ θεωρίαν τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον ἀξίας*, commending them as excellent divisions (*εἰς τοσούτους τόπους* ***γενικούς***, 43.14-6). He picks up, in particular, the section *περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν*, as an example of good organisation of very

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70. Cf. also von Arnim [246] 131 ff.

71. Glucker [388] 122 comments: 'All that the title "Academic philosopher" implies is "a philosopher who has studied in the Academy" - and who, presumably, used this epithet as something similar to our MA or PhD'. See his chapter 'Platonici, Academici' (206-25).

72. On the question of Antiochus' school or circle in Alexandria see Glucker [388], 'H. Epilogue: Antiochus in Alexandria' (pp. 90-7); for the general problem of Antiochus' pupils see Barnes [250] 59-62.

73. *θεωρητικόν*, *ὁρμητικόν*, *πρακτικόν*; for the claim that this was a novel division see Dillon [319] 122.

many subjects: his words on this section (43.14-4.2) suggest that Arius admired Eudorus for combining a problem-oriented approach (*προβληματικῶς*, 42.7-10) with the systematic and exhaustive treatment of the subject-matters of philosophy, and I believe that we owe the reference to the symposion to Arius' intention to illustrate this second feature. The section *περὶ ἀγαθῶν* 'embraced many *διαιρέσεις*' (16-17), which Eudorus integrated *ὡς γενικώτατον* (44.1-2); it dealt, for instance, with 'the so-called valuables or preferreds' (*αὐτίκα τὸν [sc τόπον] περὶ τῶν λεγομένων προηγμένων*[74]) - *φιλία, ἡδονή, δόξα, εὐφυΐα*. The subject of friendship (*τόπος περὶ φιλίας*) was in turn subdivided according to a typological criterion (*κατὰ γειτνίασιν*) into *τὸν περὶ ἔρωτος τόν <τε> περὶ συμποσίου.*

Thus Eudorus regarded the symposion as one of the subjects of ethics and included it in a sub-section about *προηγμένα* in his *περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν*. In Stoic theory, *προηγμένα* formed a sub-class of *ἀδιάφορα*: *τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα, τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα* (DL vii 105). But they soon became controversial items; although belonging to the 'indifferents', they could appear to be elusively located somewhere between what is indifferent and what is good. Aristo set himself firmly against Zeno to deny the existence of this compromise class, asserting that *τὸ... ἀδιάφορον ἁπλῶς ἀδιάφορον* [*ἀπολείπει*][75], and the dispute caught up with other schools. Eudorus, at least in this book, uses Stoic terminology quite strictly[76]. It is obvious even from the second title of the *θεωρητικόν* that he understood the *προηγμένα* in strict Stoic orthodoxy; for, as Diogenes Laertius continues, *προηγμένα μὲν*

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74. This is Wachsmuth's reading for the mss *προηγουμένων*.

75. Clem. Str. ii p. 179 Sylb., vol. i p. 497 Pott = SVF i 360 Aristo. This debate is best recorded in Ch. 30 of Plutarch's *Στωϊκῶν ἐναντιωμάτων* (1048A = SVF iii 137 Chr. on Chrysippus' position; cf. SE M xi 63 on Aristo's position; also, DL vii 102-4). See Long and Sedley [220] 354-9 and Ioppolo [427] 208-43.

76. See Dillon [319] 122-3.

τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν, ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα. By accepting the Stoic *προηγμένα*, Eudorus took a stand in a dispute which had already made its way into the Academy[77].

The Stoics themselves debated whether desirable things such as *ὑγίεια*, *ἰσχύς*, or *πλοῦτος* should be considered good (*ἀγαθά*) or indifferent (*ἀδιάφορα*)[78]. In a *Λόγος περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν* and in his *περὶ Ἡδονῆς*, Chrysippus discussed the case of *ἡδονή* in terms similar to those found in Arius about *ἔρως*: pleasure is indifferent: *εἶναι γὰρ καὶ αἰσχρὰς ἡδονάς* (DL vii 103). Coupled with the Stoic account of the two *ἀρεταί* in Arius, Eudorus' division of the *περὶ ἀγαθῶν* suggests that the symposion featured, like pleasure, on the list of these debatable things.

One last problem: where the *περὶ ἀγαθῶν* belonged in Eudorus' treatise is a matter of dispute. Arius mentions it for the first time when he has already gone through the division (65.14). Either he omitted it earlier, or we must think with Zeller and the scholars after him that there is a lacuna after *περιποίησιν*. Eudorus divided the *λόγος περὶ θεωρίας* in two major branches. Zeller and Wachsmuth thought that *περὶ ἀγαθῶν* should go in the first branch (*περὶ τῶν σκοπῶν καὶ τῶν λεγομένων τελῶν τοῦ βίου*)[79]; Giusta, in the second (*περὶ τῶν συμβαλλομένων εἰς τὴν τῶν τελῶν περιποίησιν*)[80]. On this matter I venture the following suggestion.

After the summary, Arius starts to quote from the work. Some manuscripts bear two titles, probably of the chapters from which the extracts were taken: *περὶ τέλους* (45) and *περὶ*

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77. See Barnes [250] 88-9 (on Cic. Leg. i 55): it is interesting that, in rejecting the *προηγμένα*, Antiochus invokes Zeno against Aristo. But Aristo wanted to abolish the difference between *προηγμένα* and *ἀδιάφορα*, while Antiochus on the contrary aimed to reduce the difference between *προηγμένα* and *ἀγαθά*. His position is similar to that of Critolaus - one of those against whom Eudorus probably held the old difference between goods and valuables, to judge from Arius' quotations on p. 46 (3^b). Cf. also DL vii 102-4 on Poseidonius.

78. DL vii 102-4; St. ii 57.19 (= SVF iii 70-1 Chr.); SE M xi 3.

79. This position is best reflected in Wachsmuth's text (cf. also Zeller [652] iii ^{3} 613 n. 1).

80. Giusta [386] i 152 ff (lacuna and Eudorus' table of contents 156-7). Note that in his reconstruction *περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν* has to feature twice - both as a main title and as a sub-title.

ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν (53). The extracts deal with topics related to the τέλος and the ἀγαθά[81], not to the συμβαλλόμενα (means towards the preservation of the τέλος):

common use of the term τέλος (3^a);

Stoic, neo-Peripatetic and Epicurean conception of the τέλος (3^b);

difference between τέλος, σκοπός, and ὑποτελίς (3^c);

εὐδαιμονία and ψυχικὸν τέλος (3^d and ^{e});

the τέλος according to: Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras (3^f),

Aristotle (3^g),

Democritus, and Plato again (3^i);

the ἀγαθά according to Plato, the Stoics, and Aristotle (4^a);

εἰ πᾶν τὸ καλὸν δι᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν according to Plato and Aristotle (4^b).

This indicates to me that Arius intended to give us a gist of the work from the front pages only, and stopped before the second big heading (περὶ τῶν συμβαλλομένων). Neither does he quote from the more advanced parts of the work, ὁρμητικόν and πρακτικόν. I believe that all the excerpts come from the περὶ σκοπῶν καὶ τελῶν. Arius may have skipped through this part in the summary because he was about to quote large portions from it. Alternatively, if there is a lacuna, I would fill it somehow like this:

τὸ γὰρ περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῆς ἑκάστου ἀξίας τὸ μὲν περὶ τῶν σκοπῶν καὶ τῶν λεγομένων τελῶν τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ περὶ τῶν συμβαλλομένων εἰς τὴν τῶν τελῶν περιποίησιν· <καὶ τοῦ περὶ τῶν σκοπῶν καὶ τελῶν, τὸ μέν ἐστι περὶ τέλους (οἷον περὶ εὐδαιμονίας, κτλ), τὸ δὲ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν (οἷον περὶ τοῦ πᾶν τὸ καλὸν δι᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν κτλ[82])· τοῦ δὲ περὶ τῶν συμβαλλομένων εἰς τὴν τῶν τελῶν περιποίησιν,> τὸ μέν ἐστι περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ

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
81. The topic of ἀγαθά is closely related to that of the τέλος: see the transition from 3^i to 4^a (p. 52), with the interpretation of Plato's passage on the two πηγαί (Lg. 636D).

82. An example of problematic arrangement: the summary is not exhaustive, cf. οἷον περὶ δικαιοσύνης... τῶν ἄλλων, ll. 11-3.

κακιῶν, τὸ δὲ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ποιῶν (ὅπερ καὶ καλεῖται χαρακτηρισμόν), τὸ δὲ περὶ τεχνῶν, τὸ δὲ περὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

This yields the division in Fig. 1, which comes close to what we get from Wachsmuth's text[83]:

Figure 1



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According to Arius, the Stoics held that love was an *ἀδιάφορον*. In a section of his ethics inspired by Stoicism, Eudorus classified both love and symposion among the *προηγμένα*. The *γειτνίασις* of the two virtues seems to have a richer background than Diogenes and Philodemus allow us to see. They were probably born in the same kind of process: an attempt to defend Zeno's paradoxes by taming passions, such as are aroused by love or wine, into virtues worthy of the philosopher.

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83. I cannot understand how it was possible for Giusta to conclude that love and symposion were treated in Eudorus' *χαρακτηρισμόν* ([386] ii 69). Giusta gives a different division, but not one that allows him to commute chapters from the *περὶ ἀγαθῶν* into the *περὶ ἀρετῶν* (cf. the table of contents given by Giusta himself, i 156). Giusta's theory about the role of Eudorus' division in the history of ethics made him conclude, further, that the passage about *συμποτικὴ* and *ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή* in Arius' Stoic compendium (St. ii 66) **derives from** Eudorus' *χαρακτηρισμόν*, which he attepted to prove by equating the sequences [*κατὰ*] *πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς* and *κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ποιόν* (Stoic) to *τὸ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ποιῶν* (Eudorus).

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ἐπιστήμη and καθῆκον

There can be little doubt that the striking *καθήκοντα συμποτικά*, which greet us from the start of Plutarch's Sympotic Questions[84], are descendants of the Stoic *ἐπιστήμη* reported by Arius. What kind of science was this?

Just before breaking, *b* lets us read - or rather supply from the beginning of col xvii - the word [*ἀνα*]*στρέφεσθαι*[85]. Col xvii starts after a long lacuna, but the sequence *μὴ σκ*[*αι*]*ὡς ἀλλ' ἐμμελῶς ἀνασ*[*τρέ*]*φεσθαι* (1-2) indicates at least that the Homeric argument led Diogenes into the topic of behaviour at symposia[86]. Such topics must have formed the content of our *ἐπιστήμη-ἀρετή*; the verb occurs in similar form in an account of sympotic virtue given by the freedman Cornutus in his long treatise De Natura Deorum, which is a sort of encyclopaedia of Stoic allegories[87]. In a list of fancy etymologies of the Muses' names, Cornutus produced the following explanation: *Θάλεια δὲ ἤτοι διὰ τὸ θάλλειν αὐτῶν* (*sc ἀνθρώπων*) *τὸν βίον ἢ διὰ τὸ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν συμποτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιδεξίως καὶ εὐμούσως ἐν ταῖς θαλείαις ἀναστρεφομένους* (16.3-6).

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84. 613C; *supra* p. 17.

85. And not [*ἀ*]*π*[*ο*]*στρέφεσθαι* (Rispoli, fr. 34; from the disegno it seems that the papyrus broke before the point where the Π would have been).

86. I have separated *χρηστ*[*ο*]*μαθῶς εἴρηται* in l. 3 from *τὸ μέν γ' αἰνεῖν κτλ* (*supra*, n. 11). These words express approval of what Diogenes' says **above** (not below) - which is probably about the polite and cultivated manner which he expected in a symposion of the *φρόνιμοι*. But Philodemus is not impressed: he remarks in the next sentence that ordinary people think and behave in the same way. The only difference is that they do not spice their symposia with grand poetry; and this leads Philodemus into another attack on the Stoic's conception of music (*supra*, p. 13 and n. 12).

87. '... eine trockene, schulmässige Darstellung der Stoischen Mythendeutung, welche die Göttersagen als allegorische Einkleidung der stoischen Physik betrachtet' (von Arnim [240]; cf. Lang [56] p. 76).

Later texts make me suspect that the Stoics had elaborated a code of behaviour at symposia; for instance, we read in Epictetus,

μέμνησο ὅτι ὡς ἐν συμποσίῳ σε δεῖ ἀναστρέφεσθαι·

1) *περιφερόμενον γέγονέ τι κατὰ σέ· ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα κοσμίως μετάλαβε·*

2) *παρέρχεται· μὴ κάτεχε·*

3) *οὕτω ἥκει· μὴ ἐπίβαλλε πόρρω τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἀλλὰ περίμεινε μέχρις ἂν γένηται κατὰ σέ*[88].

It also seems that the behaviour of the cultivated guest gradually became a standard for all sorts of situations in life. Epictetus advises next *οὕτω πρὸς τέκνα, οὕτω πρὸς γυναῖκα, κτλ*[89]. The simile with the symposion, which is recurrent in this author, marks an interesting phenomenon: the science of the symposion which, to believe Plutarch, formed an object of specialised study in philosophical schools, gave birth to a simile between life and symposion, which passed on to poetry[90]. This reflects no doubt the impact of Stoicism on Roman modes of thought.

When we try to appreciate the place of the symposion in Stoic ethics, we should bear in mind the symbolic value inherent in an analogy of such vast scope. The analogy produced a famous argument on one of the scandalous topics of the Porch. Philosophical suicide is not an invention of French existentialists; the Stoics had been the first defenders of this form of freedom. Some of the situations where they found it justifiable to take one's life have parallels in the philosophical tradition[91], but on this matter the Stoics were far more generous and systematic than others, and inspired a sort of fashion of committing suicide in the traumatic

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88. Ench. 15; more advice on sympotic behaviour at 46 and 35.

89. Cf. also Dissert. fr. 17.

90. Hor. Sat. i 1.119, Ep. ii 2.214-6; Lucr. ii 938 and 954 (*infra*, n. 94).

91. *Eg* suicide committed on behalf of country and friends, also admitted by Aristotle (EN 1169^a19ff), or in cases of incurable illness or old age, admitted by the Cynics (DL vi 18-9 and 68; cf. Pl. Lg. 873C-D); cf. also DL vii 130.

years at the End of the Republic and in the Early Empire[92]. Three texts of the sixth century AD reveal an interesting contribution of sympotic theory to the manner in which the Stoics organised, if not also collected, their cases for legitimate suicide. Starting from the analogy between symposion and life, they reduced them to cases which require the abrupt closing of a symposion: *ἀπείκαζον γὰρ τὸν βίον συμποσίῳ καὶ ἔλεγον ὅτι δι' ὅσας αἰτίας λύεται τὸ συμπόσιον, διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς δεῖ καὶ τὸν βίον λύειν* - as we learn from Olympiodorus and, with slight variations, from his pupils Elias and David[93]. It is not known when this argument was produced, but it was certainly familiar to Stoics in the second half of the first century AD; for Epictetus alludes to the suicidal philosopher in the words 'he who may leave the party whenever it pleases him'[94].

The argument behind these words is more sober. The philosopher may not leave the party as it takes his fancy, but only in a definite set of circumstances. Olympiodorus and Elias give very similar accounts, listing five such circumstances. David adds a sixth one, *διὰ κοινὴν περίστασιν*, but matches suicide with a case which, unlike the others, is not specific to the symposion: *οἷον ἐμπρησμοῦ ἢ ἐπιδρομῆς βαρβάρων*[95]. I think that the argument was based on the five pairs transmitted by Olympiodorus to Elias - who follows Olympiodorus closely as a rule. Elias is, in any case, a less shadowy figure than David: he is the pupil of the great Platonist, and the first Christian professor of Platonism in Alexandria[96].

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92. On the social effect of the Stoic theory of suicide see Griffin [400]. On Stoic suicide see also Hirzel [419], Griset [401], and 'Suicide' in [558] (pp. 233-55).

93. Ol. in Phd. pp. 5-6 Norvin, El. Proleg. phil. ch. 6 (= SVF iii 768), David Proleg. phil. ch. 11.

94. Dissert. 22.16; cf. also Cic. Sen. 84, TD v 41.118 = Epic. fr 499U, St. iii Ch. 1.98 (pp 46-7W = v 67M), Lucr. iii 938; *supra*, n. 90. Von Arnim, followed by Westerink, attributes the simile with the symposion to Chrysippus, but evidence is lacking (discussion and references in Norvin [118] *ad l*).

95. Note that the similar *οὕτως... πολεμίων ἐλθόντων τῇ πόλει* features as a situation for committing suicide, not for closing the symposion.

96. Cf. Westerink [15] (esp. pp. xxxi-ii) and [639] (succession: Ammonius, Eutocius, Olympiodorus, Elias, David, Stephanus - p. 131). Westerink points out close parallels between Olympiodorus and Elias; he also presents four independent places where the names of Elias and David have been exchanged (pp. 130-1).

According to the sources used by Olympidorus and Elias, the five circumstances for acceptable suicide are:

1) necessity to save one's country;

2) captivity wherein one is forced to act against one's will;

3) impending insanity;

4) incurable disease or decrepitude;

5) severe poverty.

And here are the five reasons for interrupting a symposion *εὐλόγως*, to which these circumstances should correspond:

country : a long departed friend suddenly returns (*διὰ παρουσίαν φίλου ἄφνω ἐλθόντος* O, *διὰ παρουσίαν φίλου διὰ χρόνου* E);

captivity : rowdy comasts break in (*διὰ τοὺς ἐπισκωμάζοντας* [*καὶ*, E] *αἰσχρορρημοῦντας* O);

insanity : the symposiasts get drunk (*διὰ καταλαβοῦσαν μέθην* O, *διὰ μέθην* E, case 5);

disease: foods are rotten (*διὰ τὰ παρατιθέμενα νοσερά* or *νεκρὰ καὶ νοσώδη* O, *διὰ τὸ νεκρὰ καὶ νοσώδη εἶναι τὰ παρατιθέμενα* E, case 3);

poverty: foods run out of stock (*δι᾽ ἐνδείαν τῶν παραθεμένων* or *διὰ σπάνιν ἐδεσμάτων* O, *διὰ σπάνιν ἐδεσμάτων* E, case 4).

These examples must have been provided by the science described by Arius: a science with rules about drinking and being a leader. They indicate that *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* dealt with topics such as *παρ᾽* (or *καθ᾽*) *ὅσους τρόπους* (*δια*)*λύεται τὸ συμπόσιον*, and that the Stoics elaborated these topics in great detail.

The analogy between drunkenness and insanity belongs to a cluster of problems revolving around the drunkenness paradox, because the Stoics, like others, perceived these conditions

as being similar. The formula *οἰνωθήσεται μέν, οὐ μεθυσθήσεται δέ* in Diogenes Laertius[97] is taken from a source which goes on to add *ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ μανήσεται*; our Stoic explains that the philosopher may fall only into *μελαγχολία* and *λήρησις*, but cannot get permanently mad or properly drunk. The list of cases for suicide probably resulted from such associations; for captivity and insanity correspond to a complementary pair: a symposion is closed when its members either fall prey to the drunk or get drunk themselves[98].

In the case of disease and poverty the analogy is based on obvious reductions. But the first analogy seems very obscure. Perhaps it sprang from exalted ideas about what is due to country and friends[99]. How the example of the returning friend is related to the symposion is not clear; but we shall see at least that the sympotic *καθῆκον* mentioned by Arius and Plutarch must have been strongly related to another *καθῆκον*, which Diogenes Laertius summarised thus: *τὸ συμπεριφέρεσθαι φίλοις* (vii 108).

φιλία and *φιλοφροσύνη*

In Eudorus' division, *φιλία*, *ἔρως* and *συμπόσιον* form a triangle of subjects. Diogenes draws a more complicated figure. One arrow, as we saw, stretches from symposion to love (*a* : xv 45-xvi 7). The third fragment (*c* = PHerc 1572/3) reveals that there is both an arrow

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97. vii.118; *supra*, p. 30.

98. David does not make this difference: his case 5, *οἱ ἑστιώμενοι ἄρχονται μάχεσθαι ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀθέμιτα πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς διαπράττεσθαι*, is practically equivalent to the previous case in his arrangement, *μεθυόντων τῶν ἑστιωμένων*.

99. David brings in an interesting variant to this case (*διὰ χρείαν μεγάλην*, which he calls *διὰ περίστασίν τινα ἰδικήν*, case 3): instead of receiving the sudden visit of a long departed friend, the symposiarch suddenly falls ill or gets news about the death of friends (*τὸ ἑστιάτωρος ἐξαίφνης ἀρρωστήσαντος ἢ ἀκούσαντος φίλων ἀπώλειαν*). It may be interesting to associate such traditions with the epigram in which Philodemus laments the sudden death of two friends and the attractive parties on the coast, which this loss will force him to miss (Phld. xx Gow-Page, xix 412 AP).

from symposion to friendship (6-10: xviii 1-16), and one from love to friendship (2-6: xvii 35-40). But this papyrus raises a problem connected with the reconstruction of 'Book i', which I must discuss first.

According to Delattre's published results, still provisional in 1989, book iv of Philodemus' treatise On Music consists of nine (or ten) fragmentary papyri containing columns 1* to 109* and followed by PHerc 1497 from column 114 onwards[100]. One of the greatest merits of Delattre's method has been to allow us to discover the real order of the fragments from the numbers assigned to them by the *disegnatori*: in outer layers, copied from centre to periphery, numbers often run backwards[101]. This principle, which applies to all the papyri of 'Book i' except PHerc 225, has produced a consistent rearrangement of the twelve fragments of PHerc 1572, distributed more or less at random in editions so far[102]. Yet an old problem subsists in Delattre' s new columns.

PHerc 1572 starts in col 19*. Its first fragments alternate with the last eight fragments of PHerc 411, and one column (numbered 27* in Delattre) has been restored by joining these two papyri (1572/8 + 411/4B). PHerc 411 ends in col 32*; the remainder of PHerc 1572 alternates with PHerc 225, although between these two there is no join. PHerc 225 is a big piece; it starts, apparently, in column 32*[103] and continues as far as col 109*.

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100. Delattre [150]; see *supra*, n. 3. At that stage Delattre doubted that PHerc 1576 (integrated by Rispoli) belongs to this treatise; on this see also Janko [436] n. 22.

101. For a very lucid summary of Delattre's method see Janko [436] p. 123.

102. Compare Rispoli: 1, 10, 11, 12, 9, 8, 6, 7, 5, 4, 3, 2 with Delattre's sequential order 12 to 1.

103. Delattre discovered two more fragments before 225/1 in col 36*: 225/IA and IB, which he placed in coll 32* and 33*. Unfortunately these fragments do not fall into the range of columns which he edited; they remain completely unknown to me.

Apart from two complete but almost unreadable columns (frr 7 and 6), PHerc 1572 contains bottom[104], middle[105] and top parts[106] of columns which have also lost much on the left or right side. Kemke attempted to join two mutilated bottoms with tops from another papyrus, PHerc 424, producing two new columns, 424/5 + 1572/3 (= *c*) and 424/4 + 1572/2. These pairings are adopted in Rispoli's edition (frr 37 and 35) and in Delattre's table (coll 37* and 39*); moreover, Delattre makes a third joint between 1572/1 and 424/3 (col 41*).

Thus it would seem that 424 joins systematically with 1572. This papyrus had no more than five fragments. On grounds of content, its most plausible place is indeed around this point; 424 must have started, along with 225, after the end of 411. Some of the topics of the first fragment, 5, seem to coincide with topics which occur in book iv before Philodemus' refutation of what Diogenes said in *c* (xvii 35 ff) - for instance Chamaeleon on use of *προσηγορίαι τῶν ἐρώτων*, and notably *ψυχαγωγία*: Philodemus turns to *φιλία* from *ψυχαγωγία*, with the words *πάλι[ν] δ[ὲ λέγομε]ν*, while 424/5 starts with *[ψυχα]γωγίαν*.

Yet the joints originally established by Kemke between 424 and 1572 do not seem to be right. The columns, as shown by the complete fragments of 1572 (6 and 7), contained 46 lines; Kemke gives the right number to his pairs. In the pair which concerns me, this number is obtained by merging the bottom five lines of 424/5 (14 ll) with the top five lines of *c* (37 ll). But something very odd happens in the first double line. Here is how it reads:

in 424/5: .ΥΠ[.....]ΕΙΣΓΑΝΤΑΣΔΕ

in 1572/3 (*c*): ΚΑΙΠΟΤΕ[..(.)]ΠΑ[.

From this, Rispoli reconstructs *καὶ ποτε[ιμῶν], εἰς πάντας δὲ* (fr 35, l 10); she seems to drop ΥΠ and ΓΑ from 424 as if they did not exist. But we can make these letters coincide with ΙΠ

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104. Frr 11, 10, 4, 3, 2 and 1.

105. Frr 12 and 9.

106. Frr 8 and 5.

and IIA in 1572 if we wish - the difference does not matter here; something else leaps to attention. An extraordinary experiment is being proposed: take a letter *x* from a line *y*; tear in two parts the page containing *y*; then imagine that *x* occurs on each part, and that you physically see it **twice**. An alternative to this odd idea would be to think that the library contained two copies of the same book, which happened to break almost, but not exactly, at the same angle and line - so that four letters from two halves of the same column overlap. But this is another miracle. The joint is plainly wrong. The text becomes very strained as a result of putting these fragments together, and lines 12 and 13 in Rispoli have the implausible number of 24 and 26 letters.

Exactly the same happens in the other pair. In her edition of fragment 37 Rispoli leaves empty line 11, where 424/4 should join with 1572/2. But the line in question, supposed to be one and the same, is not empty at all; it reads,

in 424/4: ..Τ.Α.ΥΠΡ.ΥΑ.ΤΩΝΕΡΑ[?

in 1572/2: ....ΤΟ.....ΤΟΥ[?

Also, in completing the next two lines, Rispoli dismisses without a word the ends NE ΑΥΝ and ΟΠΟΡΟΣ, although these letters are quite clear on the disegno of 424/4.

All this indicates that the joint between 424 and 1572, though attractive, is a mistake, and that the place of the whole PHerc 424 in the original roll should be reconsidered. Such a task is, of course, beyond my purpose and competence. I only wish to suggest one possible arrangement, which brings minimal changes to the sequence of columns established by Delattre and seems bibliologically sound[107]:

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107. This is based on a reconstruction of coll 1^{*}-109^{*} which I made according to Delattre's table and measurements (roll = 10.40 m, line = 5.4 cm, intercolumnal space 1.5 cm). It seems to me that, after the end of PHerc 411, which secures a regular alternance, the situation becomes much less clear; several arrangements are possible. I am greatly indebted to Richard Janko, who has helped me to calculate a crucial element: the thickness of the roll. The results are quite interesting. We chose L_1 at coll 10^{*}-12^{*} and L_2 at coll 74^{*}-76^{*}. The total circumference resulted as 15.4 cm at L_1 (8.7 on left + 6.7 on right) and 11.47 cm at L_2 (6.15 on left + 5.32 on right). Thus the circumference must have measured 15.4 : 6.9 = 2.23 columns at L_1 and 11.47 : 6.9 = 1.66 columns at L_2. The last circumference (col 155) measures 3.6 : 6.9 = 0.52 columns. (15.4 - 11.47) : 30 = $2\pi t$ gives a constant (t) not greater than 0.208 mm, by which each circumference was diminished. These calculations confirm Delattre's hypothesis that one circumference contained about half a column towards the end of the roll, but make it very doubtful that a circumference at the beginning of the roll contained as much as five columns.

34* = 424/5

35* = 1572/4

36* = 424/4 + 225/1

37* = 1572/3

38* = 424/3 + 225/2

39* = 1572/2

40* = 424/2A + 223/IIIInf

41* = 424/2B + 1572/1

43* = 225/IIISup

43* = 1578/24

44* = 424/1 + 225/3

45* = 1578/23A

46* = 225/4 + 1578/23B

47* = /

48* = 1578/22 + 225/5A

49* = 1575/23 + 225/5B[108]

Delattre assumes that the outer part was fractured in four pieces per rotation; but in that case 'Book i' should start with an alternation of four papyri instead of two. The circumferences of my 'copy' of the roll cannot be made to diminish gradually from five to four columns and so on.

108. Cf. the corresponding coll in Delattre 1989:
/
1572/4
225/1
424/5 + 1572/3
225/2
424/4 + 1572/2
225/IIIInf
424/3 + 1572/1
225/IIISup
1578/24
225/3 + 225/4
424/2A + 1578/23A
424/2B + 1578/23B
/
424/1 + 1578/22 + 225/5A
1575/23 + 225/5B etc.

Once we abandon the idea that PHerc 424/5 and PHerc 1572/3 (*c*) form a single column, it becomes possible to give a more comprehensible version to Diogenes' argument about *φιλία*. This argument probably started in the second line of *c* and proceeded somehow like this:

[χρησιμεύειν] δ᾽ ἔτι καὶ πρὸς φ[ιλίαν φησι·]

ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πρὸς ἔρ[ωτα, καὶ] πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὐτοῦ [προσφέ]ρειν·

ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπεὶ πρὸς [συμπό]σια, καὶ ⌜π¹ρ⌜ὸ¹[ς] τὸ τέλος [αὐτῶν·

ὃ] φαίνεσθα[ι εἶ]⌜να¹ι φιλο[φροσύ]νην·

εἰ δὲ [πρ]ὸς ταύτη[ν, καὶ] πρὸς φιλίαν.

'And Diogenes says that music also benefits friendship, thus:

If music benefits love, then it benefits the end of love;

And further:

If music benefits symposia, then it benefits the end of symposia; the end of symposia is friendly-mindedness; but if music benefits friendly-mindedness, then it benefits friendship'.

Diogenes brings here two separate proofs to the same conclusion. In this case, the first part presupposes that the end of love is friendship. The idea is not surprising; we find something similar in the Stoic school-book definition of love, *ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποιίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον*[109]. But we should not underestimate Diogenes' originality in applying the notion of *τέλος* to entities such as love or symposion. None of the text-book definitions of

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(I should note that 225/5A which features in col 48* in the table is missing from the edited text).

109. See *supra*, p. 35 and n. 66. Cf. Schofield [587] p. 34 n. 23, in the light of his comments on *ἐπιβολή*, 29-30 n. 14.

love which we possess refers to φιλία in this way. There may be just a step from ἐπιβολή to τέλος, but the Stoics' complicated terminology makes it a relevant step; for it seems that only a τέχνη or an ἐπιστήμη could have a τέλος[110]. As Arius says, some of the Stoic virtues were sciences, others were not[111]; and Arius shows us that sympotic and erotic virtue were of the first kind - sciences with bodies of rules and aiming at a particular goal. I suppose that Diogenes' use of τέλος gives us a *terminus*: the sciences in question definitely existed in the Stoa during, or at least since, his own days.

The first argument is a simple inference. Diogenes argues, 'P; therefore Q'; to this Philodemus replies, 'But not-P; therefore not-Q' (xvii 35-40)[112]. Philodemus believes that music has no effect on friendship for the same reason that it has no effect on love. The next six lines of his reply down to the end of the column are damaged beyond hope. I guess that he continued by explaining his position; at least this is how he proceeds in the next argument. The word συγγενής suggests that he may have referred to the natural bond between friendship and love.

The second argument is similar: in both, Diogenes is led by the thought '*x* benefits *y*' → '*x* benefits the aim of *y*'. But now he infers from two premisses, 'Music benefits symposia' and 'The aim of symposia is φιλοφροσύνη'. His argument is of the form 'P, Q; therefore R (= 'Music benefits φιλοφροσύνη'); therefore S' (= 'Music benefits φιλία'). It seems to have a conjunct premiss, as in indemonstrables of the third type: ['*x* benefits *y*' ∩ 'the aim of *y* is *z*']

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110. On the relation between τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη in Stoicism cf. Mansfeld [485], Isnardi-Parente [430], Giusta [386]. According to Ioppolo [428] 101-2, the difference was precisely that the former had a τέλος while the latter did not; but the situation in the texts is too complicated for me to judge. In Arius (St. ii 58.5 = SVF iii 95) τέχναι are equivalent to ἐπιστῆμαι. But cf. Sextus, M ii 6 (*supra*, n. 69); PH iii 188 (τέχνη; no τέλος); and M ii 10 (τέχνη; τέλος). The problem of classifying the sciences is endemic in late antiquity. ἐπιστήμη - τέχνη reflected for instance the difference between stochastic and non-stochastic arts (see [Gal.] Ἰατρός, ch. 5, εἰ ἐπιστήμη ἰατρικὴ ἢ τέχνη, and *quaestio* ii 16 in Al. Aphr.; also Phld. Rh. ii, PHerc 1674 col ii 11-15 in Sbordone [188] 3, 47).

111. St. ii 8.5 = SVF iii 95 Chr.

112. This is an elliptical form of what the Stoics called the second indemonstrable, ἀναπόδεικτος (*eg* SE M viii 225).

→ '*x* benefits *z*'. Philodemus accepts the first premiss, '(εἰς) *συμπόσια διδόντες ἐναρμόττειν αὐτήν* [*sc μουσικήν*] (xviii 1-2); but he rejects the conclusion and the second premiss, correcting it thus: *τὸ δὲ μ⌜ό⌝νον τέλο*[ς] *αὐτῶν φιλοφροσύ*[*ν*]*ην οὐ τιθέντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τιν' ἕτερα, πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐ πρὸ*[ς] *ἐκείνην* [*sc φιλοφροσύνην*] *χρησιμεύειν ὁμολογήσομεν* (2-7); from which he concludes, *ὥστ' οὐδὲ πρὸς φιλίαν* (7)[113]. Philodemus does not illuminate us on the 'other' states of mind which the symposion is more qualified to produce than a friendly disposition among the guests; they are no doubt related to pleasure, but of no interest to the present argument. The thought about pleasure develops in lines 7-10 along the general Epicurean line, *τό γε ἐπιτερπῶς* [*ἡ*]*μᾶς ἀ*[*κρ*]*οωμένους τῆς μουσικῆς διατίθεσθαι*[114]. Thus the whole basis for Philodemus' attack is Diogenes' premiss that the *τέλος* of the symposion is *φιλοφροσύνη*.

If, in Stoic ethics, friendship may easily be conceived as an end of love, the notion of a *τέλος* of the symposion must have been much less familiar: nothing like the Stoic parallels for a relation between *ἔρως* and *φιλία* is available in the case of the sympotic argument. The word *φιλοφροσύνη*, so far as I know, does not occur in other texts of the Stoics. But *φιλία* was a field so large that Diogenes would have plenty of room to be original in it.

The Stoics considered love to be a variety of friendship, as it was in the Platonic and Peripatetic tradition. But was there some kind of friendship associated with the symposion? Two divisions of *φιλία* in Arius give us a hint. One records six kinds - *γνωριμότης, συνήθεια, ἑταιρία, ξενία, φιλία συγγενική, φιλία ἐρωτική* (ii 74); the other just four - *φιλία ἑταιρική, συγγενική, ξενική, ἐρωτική* (ii 143). In the first division *συνήθεια* appears to be friendship based on acquaintance and habit (*φιλία συνεθισμένων*). It is separate from *ἑταιρία*, friendship

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113. Philodemus' retort resembles (again in elliptical form?) the kind of heterogenous arguments compounded of the second and third indemonstrable: $[P \cap Q] \rightarrow R$; P, $\neg R$; $\neg Q$. Cf. Aenesidemus' argument on the *σημεῖον* in Sextus, M viii 234 sqq.

114. Cf. For Epicurus' conception and attitude to music as an irrational, unharmful and necessary pleasure cf. Plu. Non posse..., Ch. 13 and DL x 6.

based on choice (*φιλία καθ' αἵρεσιν*); but in the second division *συνήθεια* features as the *ἀρχή* of *φιλία ἑταιρική*[115]. Such kinds are certainly not as clearly and well established as *φιλία ἐρωτική*. Would it not be appropriate to describe sympotic ties as a kind of friendship associated with pleasure, habit, and choice, and to call it eitther *συνήθεια* or *ἑταιρία*? Whether the Stoics ever did this, we cannot know; but the situation makes it possible to think that Diogenes either invented a new aspect of friendship specific to the symposion, friendly disposition or *φιλοφροσύνη*, or applied this term to a notion which existed in some vaguer form. In any event, he thought that *φιλοφροσύνη* is the *τέλος* of the symposion: if the word had not been used by Stoics before, this must be his original contribution to sympotic theory.

Diogenes seems to have a specific conception of *φιλοφροσύνη*, related to sympotic entertainment: it is, to him, a state of mind which results in a symposion from the music executed by the guests. This conception emerges quite clearly if we compare the objections raised by Philodemus here with a statement which he reported earlier on: 'the Stoics state that certain songs stir up and stretch the mind towards companionship and amiable behaviour' (*τὴν διάνοιαν ἐντεινόντων πρὸς τὴν ὁμειλίαν καὶ τὴν ἁρ⌜μό⌝ττουσαν ἀναστροφήν*, xii 8-11). But this is exactly what Philodemus denies now: his attack on Diogenes' second premiss (end of symposia) is based on the fact that music does not have such effects, *μηδέποτε μ⌜η⌝δὲν αὐτοῖς*[116] *συνιστορηκέναι πρὸς φιλοφροσύνην ⌜κ⌝αὶ φιλίαν ἐπι[σ]τατικὸν ἐ⌜κ⌝ μελῶν καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἐσχη⌜κ⌝όσιν* (10-4)[117]. Thus the songs in the quote at xii 8-11 must be the sympotic songs of the *τέλος* argument. The Stoic appears to have held that music creates a state specific

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115. Cf also *φιλία ἐκ συνηθείας* in Clement: an inferior type, *καθ' ἡδονὴν τρεπτὸν καὶ μεταβλητόν* (Str. ii 483 = SVF iii 723 Chr.).

116. *αὐτοῖς* in l.11 must refer to the same thing as *ἡμᾶς* in l.8.

117. The explanation continues, but I am not sure that I can follow the text beyond *οὐδ' ἀνείησι δὲ ταῦ ⌜τα⌝ καὶ ἀφι⌜λ⌝[α]ροῖ*. I hope to be able to solve more problems once I see what the papyrus reads in a few places (especially the reading *καθικνεῖσθαι* ascertained by Neubecker [165] on p. 62 of her edition).

to the symposion, which is conducive to goodwill and social grace, and from there on to friendship.

The state in question seems to be connected with the notion which we met in *b* - *ἄνεσις*; for Philodemus is now just about to make a point about this, *οὐδ' ἀνείησι δὲ* ⌜*τ*⌝*α*⌜*ῦτ*⌝*α* (*sc μέλη καὶ ῥυθμοί* ?) *καὶ ἀφι*⌜*λ*⌝*[α]ρ̣οῖ* (xviii 16-9). *ἀνίησιν* also occurs in the corresponding part of *c* (l 20). Even without understanding how Philodemus' sentence continued, it makes good sense to think of 'relaxation' as an element conducive to friendliness. The interesting ingredient is the implicit idea that wine and music may be found at the bottom of a process which ends up in friendship and love; for, as we saw earlier, Diogenes believed that the best kind of *ἄνεσις* is sympotic entertainment - *ᾆσαι, κιθαρίσαι, χορεῦσαι* - and that these activities are prompted by wine[118].

If Diogenes shaped or reshaped a sympotic variety of Stoic friendship and gave it the name *φιλοφροσύνη*, he appealed to the best of Greek traditions: much like *εὐφροσύνη*, the word *φιλοφροσύνη* in classical authors evokes the symposion, especially the pleasant euphoria created by wine[119]. But classical authors were not prompted to speculate about friendship in this connection, and I think that Diogenes did it under the influence of an idea which he found in Plato. The Athenian claims in the Laws that the symposion is a type of community arising in time of peace between friends who share in *φιλοφροσύνη* (*φίλων δ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ πρὸς φίλους κοινωνησόντων φιλοφροσύνης*, 640B7-8). This passage preludes an impressive argument about the effects of wine, which I shall discuss at great length later on. The Athenian will make one or two more cursory references to *φιλία*; friendship, however, is out of the mainstream of his thoughts. But the word *φιλοφροσύνη* is striking in Plato: there are two more occurrences in the

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118. xvii 24-8 and *b*; *supra*, pp. 26-28; see also p. 13.

119. *Eg* Socrates in Xenophon's Symposion: *τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ὁ οἶνος... τὰς δὲ φιλοφροσύνας ὥσπερ ἔλαιον φλόγα ἐγείρει* (ii 24-5; cf. Ion of Chius, frr 26 and 27 Blumenthal, or Critias B6.15-17 Diels-Kranz).

whole corpus[120]. It would catch the eye of a Platonising Stoic with strong views on friendship and who may have read the Laws (as Diogenes no doubt did)[121] at a time when the symposion had become a traditional subject in his own school. In spite of mentioning *φιλοφροσύνη* and *φιλία*, Plato concentrated on the task of forming *αἰδώς*; that would be the main goal of the symposion according to him. *αἰδώς* occurs in a piece of advice on sympotic behaviour in Epictetus' Enchiridion: *καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἑστιάτορα αἰδῶ φυλάξαι* (36). But the Stoics on the whole developed the line neglected by Plato, and cemented friendship with love. Love is a traitor from the enemy's camp; for Plato had also produced the Symposion, a Socratic dialogue about love, while his Athenian does not even mention this subject in the long talk about ideal symposia.

We saw that late Platonists were eager to appropriate Stoic ideas about the symposion and to make them their own. There is a natural explanation for this phenomenon: the Stoics themselves started from Plato. *φιλοφροσύνη* was to enjoy a very privileged status among Platonists. It was assiduously cultivated by an admirer of the philosophical symposion who claimed direct descent from Plato, Plutarch. Gregory of Nyssa in the fourth century thought that *φιλοφροσύνη* accompanies *τῆς φιλοσόφου τραπέζης*[122]. More than a century before him, Clement of Alexandria had made a place for *φιλοφροσύνη* at the very heart of Christian love, dividing *ἡ παρὰ πότον φιλοφροσύνη* into love of God and love of neighbour[123]. But Clement offers us a very interesting combination of Platonic and Stoic traditions on the topic of symposia. The second book of his Paedagogus rehearses this topic thoroughly, taking the

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120. Lg. 628C, 740E; but *φιλοφρονεῖσθαι* is common in the Laws.

121. For instance Diogenes quotes from Lg. 802B-C in PHerc 424/3 and 669B-E in PHerc 1572/1 (Delattre, [150] col 41*; see also his paper on these quotations, [176]).

122. Vita sanctae Macrinae, 37.16-8. Cf also De vita Gergorii Thaumaturgi 46.921.37-9 (*διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων φιλοφροσύνης*) and Oratio consolatoria in Pulcheriam, 9.1.461-72. In late authors references are very numerous; *φιλοφροσύνη* tends to become a term for hospitality, pagan and Christian (DH AR iii 3.2, iv 64.4, xv 15.3.4, xx 4.3; Fl. Jos. AJ 128.3; Eusth., esp. Od. i 31.43-5: *ξενοδοχικὴ φιλοφροσύνη*).

123. ii 4.43.1.1-2.

Athenian as a guide and making permanent reference to the Laws. In the middle of this Christianised and extremely prolific account we find clear echoes of Diogenes; in particular, Clement tells us that *συμποσίου δὲ τὸ τέλος ἡ πρὸς τοὺς συνόντας φιλοφροσύνη*[124]. If Diogenes took *φιλοφροσύνη* from Plato, as I believe, the fact explains why his *τέλος* was capable of surviving under Christian Platonic form. But all this reveals that the Stoic science criticized by Philodemus was to have a strong and far-reaching effect.

The Stoics were interested in the symposion from their earliest days: both Zeno's frivolous friend Persaeus, who became a court-philosopher of Antigonus Gonatas, and Zeno's prolific disciple, Cleanthes, wrote books about it. Cleanthes, in particular, wrote something which may have been a theoretical treatise: a book *περὶ Συμποσίου*. He also wrote two books about love, *περὶ Ἔρωτος* and *Τέχνη Ἐρωτική*, and a book about friendship, *περὶ Φιλίας* (DL vii 175); perhaps all these formed a unitary group. Did *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* already exist, and, if not, when was it put together? We cannot answer these questions because we know nothing about Cleanthes' work. However, this does not leave us in complete darkness. Persaeus, who wrote a Commentary on Plato's Laws in seven books, certainly came across the project of symposia in Plato's dialogue; it would be interesting to know what he had to say about it. Although there is no evidence that Zeno himself dealt with commensal institutions in his writings, it is quite possible that the interest was inspired by him, along with the interest in love[125]. The Stoic theory of the symposion may well have started, like the Stoic theory of love, in an aim to correct Plato's ideal State and to adjust its institutions to the standards of Zeno[126].

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124. ii 7.53.3-4. Note that the twofold division of *φιλοφροσύνη* occurs in a chapter on *Πῶς χρὴ περὶ τὰς ἑστιάσεις ἀνιέσθαι*.

125. Whether it comes from the Republic or not, Zeno's *εἰκὼν νεανίσκου* (fr. 174 Pearson = Clem. Al. Paed. iii 2.74, p.296P 109S) is a typical illustration of the conception of love in a sympotic male club. It also reminds us that his Republic was blamed for *διαμηρισμοί* more suitable *ἐν συμποσίῳ τινι καὶ παιδιᾷ*, Plu. 653E.

126. On Callipolis and Magnesia as a stimulus to Stoic polemical speculation, see Schofield [587], Ch. 2, esp. pp. 35-48.

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The Stoics constructed around the symposion a virtue-science, possibly one attached to *φρόνησις*, which they endowed with a *τέλος* and *καθήκοντα* of its own. *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* was conceived as naturally related to *ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή*, and leading to *φιλία*. It seems that the properties of wine qualified it as an *ἀδιάφορον* or *προηγμένον*, and that sympotic virtue grew out from the Stoic philosopher's attempt to challenge the irrational force of this substance.

Stoic theories about the symposion seem to constitute an original response to Plato. Ethical (and maybe also political) interest in this subject was stimulated in the Porch by the study of the Laws. Zeno's followers reacted against the old Plato and his utopian institutions. One result was that they became open to influence from the earlier Plato: leaving aside the typical Stoic oversophistication in the shaping of the two *ἀρεταί*, just the idea of considering the philosopher's attitude to love and drunkenness from the angle of a twin ideal betrays some admiring recollection of Socrates' behaviour in the Symposion. But we shall see in due course that the Laws is the first text which formulates explicitly and systematically the very striking proposal of cultivating a virtue through exposure to wine at symposia.

Ethical discussions about the symposion started in the Stoa but did not remain confined to it: such ideas were studied, adopted, or refuted in other schools, and became widespread in late antiquity. Although the Stoic theory distorted Plato's views considerably, it was sufficiently akin to his thought to infuse into the sophisticated Platonism of the syncretistic Alexandrian scholars notions which could easily appear to revive the Platonic tradition. But these notions were bound to irritate the crude scientists of the Garden.

In so far as we can guess anything about the earliest phase of Stoic theory, we should say that it goes back to Persaeus and Cleanthes. The next landmark, better known, is Diogenes of Babylon. This leader of the Porch seems to have given a new spur to the study of the

symposion in his school. Just like his predecessors, Diogenes took his start from Plato's Laws, but he probably seized on new possibilities of developing the Athenian's project, which earlier Stoics had not noticed.

Chapter 2

Philosophers in the Tradition of Writing Symposia

I

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A Symposion in the Porch

As I have already said, the first Stoic to express a view which openly contradicted the conclusion of Zeno's drunkenness syllogism was in fact his disciple Persaeus - Zeno's 'slave', as Bion of Borysthenes called him[1]; for here is what this philosopher contended:

καὶ εἰ διαλεκτικοὶ συνελθόντες εἰς πότον περὶ συλλογισμῶν διαλέγοιντο, ἀλλοτρίως ἂν αὐτοὺς ὑπολάβοι τις ποιεῖν περὶ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ, <ὅτε> ***καὶ ὁ καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ μεθυσθείη ἄν.***

Apart from his commentary πρὸς Τοὺς Πλάτωνος Νόμους ζ΄, where he must have discussed the Athenian's proposal for a good use of drunkenness and other sympotic matters in Plato's Laws, Persaeus composed (or compiled) a book about the symposion, and the above sentence, quoted by Athenaeus (607B), belongs to the only fragment which we possess from that work. It deals with the question of what kinds of subject and style are appropriate in a conversation 'over drinks'.

This question acquired increasing importance in sympotic literature, and later sources present many philosophers of the past concerned with it in some way or another. According to Diogenes Laertius (i 69), Chilon recommended *γλώττης κρατεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν συμποσίῳ* - a defensive and rather uncreative rule, reminiscent of the Zenonian fear of *ληρεῖν*. According

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1. Ath. 162D-E.

to Plutarch (10C-D), Socrates did not mind Aristophanes' mockery of him on stage because *ὡς... ἐν συμποσίῳ μεγάλῳ τῷ θεάτρῳ σκώπτομαι* - which suggests that at least some of what is said in a symposion is not to be taken at face value, as if it were really meant. Three stories, on which I shall have more to say in the next chapter, portray philosophers taking a stand or making a point on sympotic conversation. Aristippus let himself be punished by the tyrant of Syracuse, refusing to obey his order, *εἰπεῖν τι τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας*, in a banquet at court[2]. Even worse, Menedemus of Eretria jeopardised his life in Cyprus by insulting the occasion which had brought him there - an annual banquet with philosophers: he told the tyrant that such gatherings are a waste of time if one does not hold them every day[3]. This position suggests that, contrary to Aristippus, Menedemus in a symposion would have much to say *ἐκ φιλοσοφίας*. In another party of philosophers, Arcesilaus apparently turned down a *θεώρημα* given him for solving, on the grounds that the first mark of a philosopher is knowledge and observance of what is appropriate to circumstances (DL iv 41-2): he and Persaeus seem to share an interesting criterion, the *καιρός* of symposia. Plutarch (1095B-6C) blamed Epicurus for offensive advice to kings: even coarse subjects, *στρατιωτικὰ διηγήματα καὶ φορτικὰς βωμολοχίας*, are preferable in a symposion to erudite discussions of musical and philological *προβλήματα*, such as seem to have been in fashion with the Peripatetics. But Plutarch himself, as we had occasion to see, was a strong advocate of philosophising symposia; he regarded even the problem *περὶ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν παρὰ πότου* as one *ἐπὶ χρείᾳ τῇ περὶ τὰ συμπόσια* - on a par, among *λόγοι*, with couches, tables, and other implements necessary in a symposion[4]. We may not trust his partisan authority on other philosophers any more than the historical

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2. DL ii 73, a story also reproduced, in part, by Athenaeus (544C), and believed to come from Hegesander - a collector of sympotic anecdotes dated ii BC, and one of Plato's chief calumniators.

3. DL ii 129-30 - a story generally believed to come from one of Diogenes' main sources for this biography, Heraclides Lembus.

4. This famous opening of Quaest. Conv. ii (629C sqq) has been the object of much speculation (*infra*, p. 63).

faithfulness of anecdotes about them; but the general fact remains that philosophers must have shown some interest in the matter of sympotic talk, and adopted divergent positions. One or two more references to Persaeus' work mention other subjects, but the only original paragraph from it which has managed to reach us deals with conversation.

Persaeus' view is this. Sexual love (*περὶ ἀφροδισίων*), if expounded *ἡμέρως* and *μετρίως*, makes a good topic; rules of inference make a bad one, and so do erotic matters discussed *θηριωδῶς* and *ἀπλήστως*. Two points reveal that Persaeus has an interesting psychological reason for saying this. First, what makes love an appropriate subject is the existence of a natural inclination for it in a symposion; this is aroused by wine (*πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμᾶς ὅταν ὑποπίωμεν ἐπιρρεπεῖ εἶναι*). One may gather that the subject is good when the inclination is tempered by the civilised rule of cultivated conversation. The second point is not explicit; it is exemplified by a story whose moral is that, when people try to suppress this natural tendency completely, they get the same result as the over-indulgent who talk *θηριωδῶς*: *τὴν πᾶσαν ἀσχημοσύνην ἐπιδείκνυνται*. Thus the point to be taken from the story is, roughly, that *συλλογισμοί* are not appropriate in a symposion because, unlike *ἀφροδίσια*, they do not marry well with the natural spirit or *καιρός* of the situation - which is a particular state of mind produced by wine. If this is a development stimulated by the drunkenness syllogism, it is quite unexpected.

The other subjects which, according to a different passage from Athenaeus, Persaeus examines (*ζητεῖ*) in his book are: use of toasts; kinds of dessert, bread, and the like; interpretation of what Socrates said about kisses; and some stage-directions for the symposiasts' behaviour towards a curious group, *τοὺς ὡραίους καὶ τὰς ὡραίας* (162B-E).

Of the books on the symposion that we know to have been written in the Stoa, this is the only case where we have more information than a title. It is minimal information, but quite interesting. In the first place, it matches with, and also enlarges upon, what later sources say about *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή*; for Persaeus must have dealt here with subjects from the discipline

described by Arius. Secondly, the question-form in which Athenaeus lists some of the topics, *eg πῶς ταῖς ἐπιχύσεσι χρηστέον*, has its own interest. Later authors, such as Plutarch, will organise sympotic matters under similar headings. This organisation is usually attributed to the influence of Aristotelian *προβλήματα*. But we should add the probable contribution of Stoic *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* in shaping an autonomous area of questions about the symposion (such as those found in some books of problems in the Aristotelian tradition). Thirdly, if the two passages in Athenaeus refer, as I believe, to the same work, Persaeus appears to have made an interesting combination of 'problems' and 'recollections'; for at least in the one fragment which we have he makes the point, not by using an argument, but through the example of a story narrated in the first person (*ἡμᾶς*). On this I shall say more later.

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i

Literary History and Literary Genre

Joseph Martin is, to my knowledge, the only scholar whom this material prompted to think of *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή*: he saw in Persaeus' fragment a *λόγος περὶ τῆς συμποτικῆς ἀρετῆς*, derived from the Stoic *λόγοι περὶ ἀρετῶν*[5]. But Martin considered *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* a purely rhetorical form; and indeed his study of the symposion is conducted entirely from the rhetorical standpoint of a 'Symposiongattung'.

The recognition of the influence of the symposion on ancient literature was bound with the notion of a 'sympotic genre' from the start. This notion has been gradually imposed by

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5. Martin [489] 184; cf. also 18 ff (esp. 26-7) on the relation between *λόγοι περὶ ἀρετῶν* and *λόγοι περὶ συμποσίων*.

three German scholars: Hirzel, Ullrich, and Martin. Rudolf Hirzel[6] started from a definition of *Συμπόσια Σωκρατικά* given by Hermogenes[7], which made him believe that the symposion was a standard piece of prose in dialogue form[8]. A couple of years later, Friederich Ullrich devoted an independent study to this literature, dividing it into deipnetic and sympotic[9]: the *δεῖπνον*, originating in comic poetry, is a conversational description of banquets; the *συμπόσιον* is a full-blown outcome of *δεῖπνα*. When Martin returned to the subject in 1931, he banished the *δεῖπνον* as 'vielmehr ein Titel': he was not interested in *Symposionwerke* but in search for a *Symposiongattung*, with standard characters and episodes. This orientation made him start, like Hirzel, from Hermogenes' *Συμπόσια Σωκρατικά*. But Martin divided the sympotic tradition into genuine Socratic Symposia and mere collections of *προβλήματα*. Dialogue in his sense is a question-answer pattern integrated in a unitary action and determined by real-life characters. The problems sometimes pretend to have dialogue, action, and characters, but all this is artificial (171-2). Further, Martin split the problematic tradition according to a famous distinction made by Plutarch in the introduction to his second book of Quaestiones Convivales (629D): *συμποτικὰ προβλήματα*, matters concerning the symposion, and *συμποσιακὰ προβλήματα*, alien topics discussed at symposia occasionally. He called Aristotle

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6. Hirzel [418] i 151-9, 359-67, ii 137-48, 224-7, 348-58, 374-6.

7. At *περὶ Μεθόδου Δεινότητος* 6 Hermogenes calls Plato's and Xemophon's Symposia by this phrase and ranges them in the class of *δημηγορία*, *διάλογος*, *κωμῳδία*, *τραγῳδία*, recognising the interweaving of *γελοῖα* and *σπουδαῖα* as their basic principle of composition (*συμποσίου Σωκρατικοῦ πλοκὴ σπουδαῖα καὶ γελοῖα καὶ πρόσωπα καὶ πράγματα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ Ξενοφώντος καὶ ἐν τῷ Πλάτωνος συμποσίῳ*). Plutarch applies the same formula to contemporary banquets in the Academy (686C).

8. '...im Verlauf des Alterthums aus der grosse Masse der Dialoge so selbstandig hervortratten und in solcher Menge vorhanden waren, dass sie zum Rang einer besonderen Literaturgattung unter der Namen "sokratische Symposien" aufstiegen' ([418] i 359).

9. Ullrich [621].

'der Verfasser von eigentlichen *συμποσιακὰ προβλήματα*', and in Persaeus he saw traces of the original *συμποτικὰ προβλήματα*[10].

Whereas our actual knowledge has profited enormously from these studies, it seems to me misconceived to talk about a sympotic 'genre' rather than sympotic literature. The literary tradition of the symposion is vast, and, when we know its purpose and form, extremely varied: it piles up exhortations to war, satiric poems, addresses to a lover, dialogues, collections of riddles, fictitious letters, philosophical debates. The notion of a *Gattung* imposes an artificial unity. These productions have a common factor: they all deal, in one way or another, with the symposion. But the symposion is a regular event, with a fixed ceremonial. Thus if the common factor of sympotic literature may be perceived as a formal element, this element is dictated by a social phenomenon, not by literary features; the 'rules' of the symposion are intrinsic to an event, not to a form of fiction. Throughout the huge variety of the texts, Martin believed he had found strict rules for a sympotic genre based on Socratic dialogue; had he taken Plutarch or Theognis as a standard, he might have discovered other rules. Any such attempt is bound to throw a large part of the sympotic tradition into a mixed bag of failures. Martin in fact treated the later tradition as an ancillary corpus formed under the influence of the 'Socratic symposion' (177). One consequence was to prevent us from appreciating the role played by philosophers in the literary history of the symposion.

Classifications such as into dialogues and problems, satires and serious works, *δεῖπνα* and *συμπόσια*, or verse and prose reflect angles of study rather than describe a state of affairs. The angle which I wish to propose here is that of the role played by the main philosophical schools in the fourth and third centuries in the complex history of sympotic literature. But a minimal outline of this history is neeeded before I start.

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10. Martin [489] 171 ff, but not without confusions; *eg* in claiming that Persaeus' problems belong to the same *Gattung* as Plutarch's, he calls them *συμποσιακά* (p. 178).

As has been acknowledged over the last decades, the finest monodic lyrics and iambo-elegiacs known today were produced for recitation at symposia: poetry constitutes the proper and most ancient domain of sympotic literature, illustrated at its best by Alcaeus or Theognis. This tradition goes back to Tyrtaeus, Archilochus and Terpander in the seventh century; with Bacchylides and Pindar in the fifth, it came to embrace choral lyric[11]. Perhaps the most typical instance of sympotic poetry is the *σκόλιον*, a song associated with Terpander, which enjoyed an exceptionally long life because it proved to have a flexible form[12]. Very broadly speaking, these pieces do not record symposia but embody and transmit, sometimes in normative form, the world of values of an audience restricted to the poets and performers themselves. Sympotic poetry was written from within the symposion and can be regarded as a first ideological offshoot of this widespread social phenomenon. A very different tradition was created by the poets of the Old Comedy, such as Cratinus or Aristophanes, who brought the symposion on stage. Comic authors tended to describe symposia, even in spite of the limitations imposed by their art[13], and their address was public and constructed from the outside. It is along these two lines, and within the many variations and combinations which they permitted, that the subsequent literature on the symposion developed.

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11. The literature on sympotic poets, their audience, their poems and motifs etc is now enormous. A good introduction is Vetta's opening chapter in [626], 'Poesia simposiale nella Grecia arcaica e classica' (pp. xiii-lx). See also his bibliography; more references in section 6 of the bibliography in Murray [509] (pp. 332-5).

12. *Eg* Pd. *frr* 122-8; on choral *σκόλια* and their relation with the *ἐγκώμιον*, *θρῆνος* and *παιάν* see Vetta in [626], pp. xxiv-viii and 119 ff, Harvey [411], van Groningen [168], Bowra [274] (with interesting remarks about the relation between Pindar's *σκόλια* and Aristotle's hymn). The classical studies on the *σκόλιον* have been made by Ilgen [426], Engelbrecht [350], Reizenstein [552], Körte 446 , Jakobstahl [434]; the ancient authorities are Dicaearchus (88W) and Aristoxenus (125W; in Suda and Photius), Plutarch (Quaest. Conv. i 1.5), Clement (Paed. 194), and the scholiasts to Ar. Nu. 1364 and V. 1222. See also Schmid-Stählin [583] i 348-50.

13. Cf. Bowie's paper in [510] (forthcoming).

In the fifth century BC the parodist Hegemon of Thasus devoted an independent poem to the symposion[14]. Hegemon seems to have been a man of exceptional talent and originality[15] ; it is a shame that his poem is completely lost. The writing of *Δεῖπνα* went on at least down to the first century BC, with Timachidas of Rhodes[16]. Some of these works are completely unknown - for instance that of Numenius of Heracleia; the fragments surviving from other *Δεῖπνα*, by fifth and fourth century authors, are very disparate indeed. Matron's *Ἀττικὸν Δεῖπνον* was a brilliant parody, in Homeric style[17], on the theme of 'remarkable symposia', worth recording on account of the quantity of food and the presence of a famous parasite, Chaerephon[18]. There is some confusion between Philoxenus Cytherius and Philoxenus Leucadius, authors of a *Δεῖπνον* each[19]. To judge from the introduction and a couple of fragments, one of these poems may have been 'serious'; perhaps this was also the case with Numenius - a medical scholar, pupil of Dieuches[20]. But the other Philoxenus (Cytherius?), seems to have put together a mock-collection of aphrodisiac recipes[21]. Archestratus too col-

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14. Ath. 5B.

15. Cf. Ath. 406Eff; on Hegemon see Körte [447].

16. On Timachidas cf. Ziegler [657]. The fragments of this poem, all from Athenaeus, are collected in SH pp. 366-7 (frr 769-73 LJ-P).

17. *Δεῖπνα μοι ἔνεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροφα καὶ μάλα πολλά...* (Ath. 134D ff = fr. 534 LJ-P). On Matron see Diehl [314]; the most recent edition of his fragments in SH pp. 259-68 (frr 534-40 LJ-P; see also Brandt [144] 53-95).

18. Fr. 534 LJ-P, ll. 8-10 and 98-9 (Ath. 134E and 136E).

19. Both in Page [180], pp. 423-32 (Cytherius) and 433-41 (Leucadius); but note that Page attributes a *Δεῖπνον* only to the second, leaving out the fragment from Plato Comicus reproduced at Ath. 5B (i 646 K, fr. 173). Yet it seems clear from the fragments at Ath. 5B and 685D (836*a* Page) that there were two distinct poems by these authors: both quotations start from the first line. For the confusion between the two Philoxeni see Ath. 146F.

20. Fr. 596 LJ-P = Ath. 5A; he seems also to have written a *medicamentorum liber* (fr. 595 LJ-P). On Numenius cf. Dow [339] and Diller [317]; fragments in SH pp. 279-86 (568-96 LJ-P).

21. See the fragment at Ath. 5B (i 646K), *ἄρξομαι ἐκ βολβοῖο...*

lected in a similar poem[22] disparate things related to the symposion - pieces of advice on the number of guests[23] or quality of wines[24], and some extravagant recipes[25]. But Archestratus coated his piece in a different presentation: it was the result of a passionate research in food-tasting, which carried him round the world (in other words, the mock-travels of a parasite, of the kind derided by Alexis: *ἐπὶ δεῖπνον εἰς Κόρινθον ἐλθὼν Χαιρεφῶν ἄκλητος· ἤδη γὰρ πέτεται διπόντιος*...[26]). We may suspect that Archestratus stitched together his *varia sympotica* around a theme similar to that used by Matron, 'symposia which I witnessed', thus blending together 'collections' and 'memoirs'. These are two literary conventions which the authors of symposia adopted as readily as the dialogue and used in extremely varied ways, often in combination with the dialogue: no doubt both were adequate to the different requirements imposed by their approach to the subject.

The theme of 'famous symposia' or 'symposia which I witnessed' generated in the prose of the fourth century sympotic letters not dissimilar to the poems mentioned above: for instance the parasite Chaerephon, hero in Matron's *Δεῖπνον* and a butt of comic poets, was in turn the author of an epistolographic *Δεῖπνον* addressed or dedicated to another parasite[27]. This kind of composition is best illustrated by Lynceus' *Ἐπιστολαὶ Δειπνητικαί* to Hip-

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22. The poem of Archestratus of Gela was known under several titles: *Γαστρονομία*, *Ὀψοποιία*, *Δειπνολογία*, *Ἡδυπάθεια* (Ath. 4E). All the fragments come from Athenaeus; see SH pp. 46-74 (frr. 46-74 LJ-P).

23. Ath. 4D-E.

24. Ath. 29B.

25. Ath. 310A-E, 326F.

26. Ath. 165A = Alexis ii 374K (*Συναποθνήσκοντες*).

27. Cf. Ath. 242D, 244A: the letter is recorded in Callimachus' *pinax* (100D8 Schneider); the dedicand is Epicrates, a parasite mentioned by Demosthenes (19.287) and Alexis (ii 359K) under the nick-name Kyrebion (Ath. 242C-D). Alexinus refers to Chaerephon's sympotic exploits in two comedies (ii 374 and 391K = Ath. 164F-5A). Wellmann [637] dates him to the end of iv BC.

polochus[28]. We hear of it again in the first century, represented by a certain Parmeniscus, and maybe also by the unknown 'sophist' Melesermus[29].

This is the satirical end of 'sympotic memoirs'. At the serious end stands another series of travels, by an author who seems to have introduced the symposion in prose: Ion of Chius. His Ἐπιδημίαι or Ὑπομνήματα[30] purport to record remarkable episodes from his youth, one of which is a symposion attended by Sophocles in Chius, on the eve of his military expedition to Lesbos in 440 (Athenaeus 603E-4D); another one may have been a symposion with Cimon in Athens[31]. Ion is a dubious figure and his symposia with famous men are certainly less trustworthy than Xenophon's recollections of Socrates at dinner in the Memorabilia (iii 14), yet a common inspiration has been recognised in both[32].

If we take the recollection of symposia, real or imaginary, as a major heading, an enormous variety of pieces would fall under it: dialogues such as the Symposia by Plato, Xenophon, Plutarch, Lucian, Methodius, or Julian; a good deal of Gellius' Noctes; a few of Horace's Odes; Petronius' Cena; some episodes in Cicero, many in Lucian; Plutarch's Quaestiones, Athenaeus' Deipnosophistai, Macrobius' Saturnalia. But, over the centuries, the convention of 'memoirs' about the symposion was increasingly adopted as a disguise for introducing learned 'collections' or catalogues of various items - foods, vessels, arguments, titles, etymologies, customs, anecdotes, characters, witty replies, textual criticism, poetic quotations. Such are the last works which I mentioned: they accumulate material for potential use in the

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28. Ath. 100F, 101E-F, 128A-B; Harpocr. *sv ἰθύφαλλοι*. For the dating see Körte [448] (also, Susemihl [611]). The magnificent symposia which he describes are given by or to kings (Demetrius Poliorcetes, Antigonus Gonatas, and Ptolemy Soter).

29. Suda records a double collection of Μαγειρικαί and Συμποσιακαὶ Ἐπιστολαί by Melesermus; but Ullrich [621] 39 considers the correct title to be Συμποσιακά. Cf. also Schissel [579].

30. Ἐπιδημίαι: Ath. 603E-4D and schol. in A. Pers. 432; Ὑπομνήματα: Ar. Pax 835.

31. Plu. Cimon 9.

32. See Hirzel [418] i 155 ff and Bruns [281] 483-513.

sort of circumstance which they pretend to record. This is the kind of literature usually labelled 'problematic' - a literature of erudition, addressed to the world of the symposion by somebody within it. On the whole it may be regarded, on a par with archaic sympotic poetry, as a product which reflects the cultural weight and tradition of the symposion, rather than depicting the symposion itself.

Erudite collections seem to appear relatively late: the first known author of such a Συμπόσιον is Heraclides of Tarentum, a sceptic doctor of the first century BC[33], who questioned the medical grounds for well established customs, such as to eat before drinking and to leave dessert to the end, expounded the effects of vinegar and the etymology of cucumber, catalogued the foods which produce semen, and debated whether we should take cold or warm water after eating figs. At about the same time, the grammarian Didymus wrote a book, probably entitled Sympotic Miscellanies[34], discussing etymologies, customs and cultural traditions of the symposion[35]. The other Συμπόσιον by a grammarian, Herodian in the second century AD, from which we have a few fragments, seems to have been much more narrowly and technically concerned with etymologies[36].

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33. Cf. Gossen [391]; the fragments come from Athenaeus, Galen, Aetius, and the Hippiatrica. Cf. also Hirzel [418] i 364, Helm [414] 257, Bompaire [271] 314-5 n. 5. Heraclides' Symposion is considered the source for Athenaeus' quotations from Hippocrates, Diocles, Philonides, Mnesitheus, Erasistratus, Diphilus and Euenor.

34. Σύμμικτα Συμποτικά, Schmidt [67] 368-85. Schmidt argued that this Didymus was not the grammarian but a Pythagorean philosopher, son of Heraclides: the reason why Plutarch did not mention him among other philosophers who wrote symposia (612D-E; see *infra*, pp. 73 ff) would be that he used him as his main source (p. 380).

35. *Eg* the Seven Wise (fr 4), exemplary women (fr 7), sympotic songs (fr 2), explanation of 'Leleges' in relation to Milesian Thesmophoria (fr 6). But a great number of fragments from other works, quoted by Athenaeus, deal invariably with sympotic topics.

36. Cf. Lenz [91] 905-6.

It has been claimed that, when Plato wrote his dialogue, the symposion was a fully established genre which influenced him[37]. This is very misleading. On the fragmentary evidence from Sophron's Mimes, there is no reason to believe that the Symposion owes anything to this author[38]. Athenaeus does not perceive the *Δεῖπνα* as a continuous literary phenomenon: he warns us that pieces such as Matron's were rare in literature (134D). It is true that the authors of *Δεῖπνα* were very popular, but in a fashion which inspired contempt in Aristotle, and probably even more contempt in Plato[39]. On the other hand, independent pieces on the symposion are not recorded in prose until a tradition had already been established by philosophers; and there are indications that even the writing of satirical symposia was emulated by philosophers: the tradition of epistolographic symposia seems to have been created by a student of the Peripatos, Lyncaeus, who is presented in our sources as *Θεοφράστου γνώριμος*[40].

It is assumed that philosophers wrote symposia because they practised them, and that the works in question reflect this fact in some way, or even record historical events[41]. I shall deal with this problem in the next chapter. But we have already seen that the Stoics took a

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37. Geffcken [373] 395-407; an opinion embraced now by Laborderie [451] 19: 'En mettant Socrate en scène dans un tel entretien, le fondateur de l'Académie reprenait une tradition tout en la redressant'.

38. As pleaded, more recently, by Laborderie [451]; but cf. Sophron, frr. 11-3, 15-8, 42, 46, 48, 65, 77, 86, 92, 102, 103, 106, 107, 156, 163.

39. Cf. Aristotle's reference to people who have read nothing but Philoxenus' poem (Ath. 6D = 83 Rose). One of the Philoxeni put in circulation the line *συμβαλοῦμαί τι μέλος ὑμῖν εἰς ἔρωτα* (fr. 833 Page), which Athenaeus quotes as if it had become proverbial (271B and 692D). Plato echoes it in the Symposion, no doubt ironically (185C). We know how well Plato mastered the literary tradition from his extreme irony towards it much more than from the influence it has had on him; and see a good example of patronizing irony towards the stars of the sympotic market at Grg. 493A5 ff.

40. In the Aristotelian fragment about the Rhodian cups Lynceus' name occurs side by side with Aristotle's (**12b** = Ath. 396F = Arist. 111 R). If *ἐπιστολαί* there refers to *Δειπνητικαὶ Ἐπιστολαί*, it seems that apart from the description of long banquets quoted by Athenaeus at 100F sqq Lyncaeus' letters also contained material derived from the Peripatetic tradition of *περὶ Μέθης* (cf. **12a**).

41. So Hirzel (who no doubt derived this idea from Wilamowitz' *θίασοι* theory published in 1881): 'Auch die "Symposien" starben nicht aus, zumahl sie im Leben der Philosophenschulen, an der immer mehr sich ausbildenden Thiasoi, einen starken Rückhalt hatten' ([418] i 344-6, with n. 4 about the Peripatetics). In connection with the philosophers' works, Boyancé [277] 263 refers to the symposion as a 'genre littéraire' born out of social practice.

theoretical interest in the subject, which they shared with Plato. It is more reasonable to think that an interest of this sort led them both to adopt the practice and to write the works, and that the writing of philosophical symposia in other schools was inspired by similar reasons. A note in Schmid-Stählin tells us that, with the philosophical symposion, λόγοι came to replace σκόλια and other forms of sympotic recitation[42]. I am not sure about the thought of this obscure sentence, but I wish to take it as an almost metaphorical abbreviation for the kind of influence exerted by the works of philosophers: they shaped a new ideology. The Stoics set up an ideal standard of the symposion; such theories may be seen as a continuation and replacement of the standards fixed by the poetic tradition. The exemplars of works of sympotic erudition known to us, those of Herodian or Didymus, are, clearly, developments along two lines established by the study of the symposion in the encyclopaedic spirit of the Lyceum.

Several reasons prompted me to select the works written by philosophers in the fourth and third century. Towards the end of antiquity the symposion became a cultural phenomenon of huge proportions. This development was largely due to earlier philosophers, who had inquired into the subject for the first time; but, unlike the voluminous productions of their more successful continuators (Plutarch for instance), the symposia written in the earlier period of the four main schools have vanished for the most part, leaving only a handful of fragments. Understanding of these works is obscured and distorted by a very peculiar fact. The fragments do not come from a neutral context; they are not scattered everywhere in Greek literature. They have been packed in other symposia as in huge Russian dolls, which stamped their trademark on much earlier products of the industry. This is why I have tried in the first place to assemble the fragments in an autonomous corpus, although I shall touch only on a small part of it and on a small number of the questions it raises. Far from encouraging speculations about genre and literary form, this material is irritatingly disparate.

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42. [583] i 349, n. 7.

Another reason for excluding authors like Plutarch or Aulus Gellius, who recollects nice evenings of conversation with Favorinus, or even Apuleius, whose Quaestiones Convivales fared worse even than Speusippus' symposion[43], is that these Platonists no longer represent the living Academy, but a αἵρεσις for which at least Plutarch tends to create a fictitious Academic past in relation to the symposion.

I have also excluded the Cynic symposion. This is a very obscure tradition, believed to have started in the third century BC with Menippus, and to have passed on to authors like Varro, Lucilius and Meleager[44]. What these literary men intended to do in their symposia is extremely unclear to me. Once we start to learn something about the Cynic symposion from Lucian, we may suspect that the phrase renders a confused notion of writing *about* philosophers: Cynic symposia are not composed by philosophers so much as portray them at symposion[45]. But philosophers had been an object of derision in sympotic literature since the Old Comedy; Socrates at dinner, as drawn by Aristophanes, reflects a permanent conflict of values. Just as philosophers tended to despise ordinary banquets, satirists and comic poets showed contempt for the inadequacy of philosophers in the world of the symposion; they made

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43. We know of Apuleius' work only from two references (Apoll. Sidon.ix 13.3 and Macrob. vii 3.23).

44. All that we know about Menippus' Symposion is that he mentioned in it a dance, *κόσμου ἐκπύρωσις* (Ath. 629E-F). A surviving fragment from his Arcesilaus shows a sympotic scene with comasts (Ath. 664E); this must have encouraged the hypothesis that Menippus created a Cynic-satirical tradition of representing philosophers at symposia, a tradition afterwards recognised, *eg*, in frr 11-15 of Lucilius' Satire 28 (fr 15 contains the first reference to Epicurus in Latin literature). Speculation on Lucilius' piece has been pushed very far: it was thought to have been a Stoic-Cynic symposion about Academic leaders like Polemon, dedicated by Lucilius to his friend Panaetius, and an object of entertainment in Scipio's circle (see Charpin [131] *ad l*). This is extremely conjectural. Neither these single lines nor the short quotation from Meleager's Symposion at Ath. 502C (*κἀν τοσούτῳ* [= ?] *πρόποσιν αὐτῷ βαρεῖαν διέδωκε...*), and not even the scraps from Varro's satires, which have suggested a wealth of wonderful associations to Cèbe ([231] i, see esp. 'Agatho', pp. 36-72), allow us to form the faintest idea about what was going on in these symposia. Menippus' Arcesilaus has also been contemplated as a source of inspiration for Timon's Funerary Banquet of Arcesilaus, which thus appears as a Cynic-Sceptic symposion; but cf. *infra*, n. 101. On Cynic symposia see also Hirzel [418] i 365, 368, 451-2 (n. 6), ii 312-3, Helm [414] 356-65, and Bompaire [271] 314-20.

45. See also a useful discussion about the vagueness of the term 'philosopher' in Lucian's time in Hall [407] 151-93 ('Lucian and Philosophy'). On the regular occurrence of Epicureans and Cynics in literary banquets see Helm [414] 260-1 and Bompaire [271] 316 (with further references).

them either vicious parasites at ordinary parties, or ridiculous ascetics in unworldly banquets of their own making. Archestratus proclaimed himself Epicurus' *μαθητής*, and Anaxippus presented a cookery book as a philosophical treatise, *καὐτὸς φιλοσόφων καταλιπεῖν συγγράμματα* (K iii 296); Parmeniscus' epistle *Συμπόσιον τῶν Κυνικῶν* was a witty satire on Cynic philosophers[46]; Lucian made the style extremely popular by ridiculing all the sects of his day[47]. I do not see why any of this should be a part of the tradition of philosophical symposia.

In what follows I shall present the works on the symposion written in the four main schools in relation to their title. The title will help me to identify these works, and its possible relevance on the question of the format of the book will permit us to appreciate the function of the symposion: not as a genre, but as a theme which was adopted in different literary genres and thus came to play a role in the transmission of philosophical knowledge. I shall discuss the *νόμοι συμποτικοί*, the *περίδειπνον*, and the *περὶ Μέθης*; say a few words about Epicurus' Symposion; then return to Persaeus and his 'Memoirs'. I shall end this chapter with the problem of the role of the Socratics in establishing a tradition of philosophical symposia.

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Works and Titles

In the preface to the Sympotic Questions, Plutarch attempts to give this work an illustrous ancestry by showing that great philosophers of the past have not found it beneath their task to record conversations which took place at symposia (*ἀναγράψαι λόγους παρὰ*

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46. Ath. 156D-8A. Cf. Von Fritz [368].

47. Apart from his well-known Symposion, see the sympotic scenes with philosophers at Hermotimus 11, Timon 54-5, and especially Gallus 9-11.

πότον γενομένους, 612D-E). Then he lists a series of examples, starting with the authors of Hermogenes' *Συμπόσια Σωκρατικά* - Plato and Xenophon. He mentions two more Academics - Speusippus and Dio of Alexandria; Aristotle and two other Peripatetics - Hieronymus and Prytanis; and Epicurus.

This is a unique list, and therefore an important piece of evidence for the tradition of writing symposia in the main philosophical schools: it contains most of the relevant names in one place. But we must immediately note that Plutarch refers to the philosophical tradition in very broad terms. He does not specify single works by title, nor does he give them a universal name, say Symposion. This fact presents advantages and disadvantages for us.

It seems that Plutarch here regards the production of philosophical symposia as a continuous phenomenon; unlike modern scholars, he is not disturbed that Plato's work was a dialogue while that of Hieronymus may have been a collection of problems. Coming from the author who has encouraged the modern split between *συμποτικά*/ *συμποσιακά* (629B), this is important. Plutarch' compass is much broader: he seeks his own place in a series of very different works, linked by the common trait that they are devoted to the symposion and written by philosophers.

If the phrase *ἀναγράψαι λόγους παρὰ πότον γενομένους* were an accurate description, these works would have to be classified as recollected symposia, whether in dialogue or any other form. But I doubt that we should take these words at face value. As Plutarch himself adopted the convention of 'memoirs' for his *προβλήματα*, he may have tried to extend it, vaguely, over the tradition where he felt he belonged.

The list is not exhaustive. It can be completed with a few more names, and with individual titles which occur in other catalogues and fragments. But not all the titles are self-explanatory. Plutarch's list is particularly useful for the opaque ones: it allows us to label as 'Symposia', or as possible 'Symposia', pieces which do not contain the word 'symposion' in the title and whose remains are too scanty to be appreciated by themselves alone.

The criterion of the title is very important. Fragments have been sometimes assigned to sympotic works only on the basis of content[48]. This procedure is wrong because statements about the symposion occur in many other works, as Philodemus' *περὶ Μουσικῆς* allowed us to see. Epicurus wrote a *Συμπόσιον*, but also expressed views on the subject in the treatise *περὶ Βασιλείας*; had Plutarch omitted to mention this source, the passage in question would probably feature now among the fragments of the *Συμπόσιον*[49]. The procedure has a dangerous consequence: it makes us appreciate whole works, very poorly preserved, in the light of some doubtful fragment[50]. It also prevents us from seeing that there was a tradition of living debate, which may be different from what we find in the works dedicated to the symposion.

Confronted with other evidence, Plutarch's list takes the following form[51].

A. Three out of the six authors (apart from Plato and Xenophon) can be immediately credited with symposia:

1. Speusippus:

a: *Περίδειπνον* (DL iii 2 = **9**; Ind. Acad. vi 12 = **10**)

b: *Νόμοι Βασιλικοί* (Ath. 3F)

2. Aristotle:

a: *Συμπόσιον α΄* (DL v 22, t.10 = **12**; Ath. 674F-5A = **13**)

b: *περὶ Συσσιτίων ἢ Συμποσίων α΄* (Anon. t. 136 = **12**)

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48. Thus Aristotle's fragments 100, 101, 105, 109 Rose; Theophrastus L131 and L137-40 Fortenbaugh; Aristoxenus 122 Wehrli; Epicurus 21.4 Arrighetti ('Sembra l'unico frammento sicuramente conservato del Simposio nel *π. ῥητ.* di Filodemo'). Sedley [595] 114-5 (n. 40) rightly rejects the attribution of this fragment to the Symposion: it is instructive to read his note in parallel with Arrighetti's commentary (pp. 575-6).

49. Could not the case, for instance, of the Aristotelian fragment quoted at Ath. 178F, which Rose considered to come from Aristotle's Symposium (100R), be similar?

50. Thus the idea that Epicurus dealt with rhetoric in the Symposion (Bignone [267] ii 564), or that music was the main subject of Aristoxenus' Sympotic Miscellanies and therefore one of the subjects of all Peripatetic *περὶ Μέθης* (Wehrli [37] 84; also Hirzel [418] i 345, n. 4).

51. To the fragments which follow (1-11), I attach in bold figures the numbers given in my Appendix ii.

c: Συσσιτικῶν Προβλημάτων γ΄ (Anon. t. 161 = **12**)

d: Νόμος Συσσιτικός α΄ (Anon. t. 130 = **12**)

e: Νόμοι Συσσιτικοί α΄ (DL v 26, t. 139 = **12**)

f: Συσσιτικό(ς/ν) (Procl. in Remp. 350 Bass = **20**)

g: Νόμοι Συμποτικοί (Ath. 186B = **6**)

3. Epicurus: Συμπόσιον (DL x 18, t. 18 = **37**; cf. Athenaeus[52], Plutarch[53], and Philodemus[54]).

B. Nobody records a Symposion by Hieronymus; but he wrote instead a piece whose title can make it a reasonable candidate: περὶ Μέθης; thus,

4. Hieronymus: περὶ Μέθης (Athenaeus[55]).

But περὶ Μέθης is a recurrent type of book in the Peripatos: it goes back to Aristotle, and also features in Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastus' works. Athenaeus' quotations from the περὶ Μέθης by Aristotle, Theophrastus, Hieronymus and Chamaeleon reveal that all these pieces were very similar. If Plutarch had in mind Hieronymus' περὶ Μέθης, we can come back with another title to

2. Aristotle:

h: περὶ Μέθης (Athenaeus, Plutarch, Apollonius[56]),

and we can enlarge Plutarch's list by two more Peripatetics,

5. Theophrastus: περὶ Μέθης (DL v 44, t. 69 = **21**; Athenaeus[57])

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52. **38-41**, **46**.

53. 1109E-10B, 651E-2B: **43** and **45**.

54. Rhetorica ii coll lvi 22 and lvii 22 (where Philodemus shows extreme indignation that his Rhodian colleagues pretend to have found the Master's views on rhetoric expounded in the Symposion): **42**.

55. **34-35**.

56. **14-17**.

57. **22-28**.

6. Chamaeleon: *περὶ Μέθης* (Athenaeus and Clement[58]).

C. There are three more authors of symposia whom Plutarch did not include in his record: a fifth Peripatetic,

7. Aristoxenus: *Σύμμικτα Συμποτικά* (Ath. 632A = **29**)

and the two Stoics whom I have already mentioned,

8. Cleanthes: *περὶ Συμποσίου* (DL vii 175, t. 40 = **47**)

9. Persaeus:

a: *Συμποτικὰ Ὑπομνήματα* (DL vii 1 = **49**, Ath. 607A-E = **48**)

b: *Συμποτικοὶ Διάλογοι* (Ath. 162B-E = **50**)

D. But Plutarch mentions two philosophers whose work is completely unknown - Prytanis and Dio:

10. Prytanis was, according to Polybius, 'one of the most distinguished men of the Peripatetic school', charged with the restoration of Megalopolis in 222 BC (v 93.8). A note in the Suda makes him the teacher of the poet Euphorion, born around 276[59].

11. Dio was a friend and disciple of Antiochus, poisoned in Rome in 56 BC on the occasion of an embassy which he led against Ptolemy Auletes[60]. It is interesting to know that one of the last official pupils of the historical Academy (if Dio was one) wrote a symposion. The work is lost; there is however a chance that we have a quotation from it at 34C, the only place where Athenaeus indicates Dio as a source. The fragment is about the discovery of the vine and the drinking-habits of the Egyptians.

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58. **30-31**.

59. On Prytanis see Ziegler [656], Meineke [13] 6-7, Susemihl [611] i 950; also Glucker [388] 172-3. For a relation with Euphorion see the story at Ath. 477E.

60. See Antiochus' disciples in Phld. Ind. Acad. xxxv 4-10. Glucker [388] 95-6 argues that he too might have turned Peripatetic, like Aristo and Cratippus, but see Barnes [250] 59 and n. 36. Athenaeus calls him *Δίων ὁ ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας* (34B). On Dio cf. von Arnim [244]; other references to sources and literature in Glucker, *loc cit* n. 263.

The story which I have built around Plutarch's list gives rise to difficult questions. Some of the authors offer alternative titles, notably Aristotle. But it is not plausible that Aristotle devoted eight works to the same subject, and we know that his titles are utterly contaminated. Which of them is the symposion meant by Plutarch? In some cases it is not clear that we can even identify the works correctly. For instance: is 6*a*/*b*, or 2*a*/*h*, one or two works? Is *περὶ Μέθης* an alternative title for Aristotle's *Συμπόσιον* or the title of a separate piece? Neither do we know the nature of some of these productions. Is *περὶ Μέθης* a title for dialogues, treatises, collections of problems, commentaries, memoirs? What is meant by the mysterious phrase *Νόμοι Συμποτικοί*? Can the *Περίδειπνον* be considered a legitimate member of the sympotic tradition? To most of these questions we can give only tentative answers, but questions and answers together will increase our awareness of philosophical symposia as an independent body of texts.

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Νόμοι Συμποτικοί

A. In the introduction to the v[th] book of the Deipnosophistai, Athenaeus attributes to Xenocrates and Aristotle something called *νόμοι συμποτικοί*: *τοῦ γοῦν Ξενοκράτους ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ καὶ πάλιν Ἀριστοτέλους συμποτικοί τινες ἦσαν νόμοι* (186B).

B. An unknown source quoted by the epitomist of Athenaeus' first book ascribes *νόμοι βασιλικοί*, apparently as a title, to Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Aristotle: *ὅτι Ξενοκράτης ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος καὶ Σπεύσιππος ὁ Ἀκαδημαικὸς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης βασιλικοὺς νόμους ἔγραψε* (3F)[61].

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61. Speusippus T47 Tarán = 23 Isnardi-Parente = Xenocrates 49 Isnardi-Parente. For this section see also Xenocrates 50 IP and Speusippus T46 T = 24 IP = 64 Lang; Heinze [233] p. 158; and the comments to Speusippus by Tarán pp. 226-7 and 228-35, and by Isnardi-Parente pp. 232-3.

It has been assumed that (a) the two phrases refer to the same works, so that (b) all three philosophers can be credited with the writing of such *νόμοι*.

Speusippus and Aristotle are two of the philosophers who, according to Plutarch, recorded *λόγοι παρὰ πότον*, *ie* wrote symposia. I shall start from Speusippus, who, unlike Aristotle, did not leave behind him a train of titles for potential 'Symposia', from which we can choose: if Plutarch's report is correct, only two of Speusippus' extant titles make plausible candidates for a 'Symposion' - the *Περίδειπνον*, which I shall consider next; and these *νόμοι*, never mentioned except by Athenaeus in **B**. Which of the two works, if any, did Plutarch have in mind? The question is important: if Plutarch meant the second, then we should regard *Νόμοι Βασιλικοί* as a type of work about the symposion called, alternatively, *Νόμοι Συμποτικοί* and produced by three philosophers, and we should add Xenocrates to the list of authors of symposia in the Academy. But I do not think that the balance of evidence inclines to this interpretation.

As might be expected in such a case, scholarly opinion is not very firm. Isnardi-Parente contemplates two possibilities: either the *νόμοι βασιλικοί* given by Athenaeus were identical with the *λόγοι* mentioned by Plutarch, or the former consisted of some sort of orders from the symposiarch whereas the second formed a Symposion in dialogue form[62]. On the subject of the *νόμοι*, Tarán offers the alternative that 'Speusippus may have dealt with the *βασιλικοὶ νόμοι* in his Symposion or may have written a special work on them'[63]. These hypotheses seem reasonable, but *νόμοι βασιλικοί* is a completely unknown item. Nobody has questioned a basic fact: how do we know that *βασιλικοί* in this phrase means *συμποτικοί*?

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62. Notes to frr. 23 and 24. Isnardi-Parente does not pursue these ideas any further; she seems to favour the first solution.

63. Note on T47.

Interestingly, the sense 'sympotic' was first imposed by Bergk in an attempt to defend the manuscript reading *βασιλικούς* against Schweighauser's conjecture *συμποτικούς* at 3F[64]. Bergk's argument was that 'der *συμποσίαρχος* heisst bekanntlich auch *βασιλεύς*' - so 'bekanntlich' that the statement did not seem to him even to require evidence.

Some evidence arguably exists: Plutarch calls the leader by the phrase *συμποσίου δὲ βασιλεύς* (622A). But there is no evidence for such a use of the adjective. When it occurs in the context of a symposion, with nouns such as *τράπεζα*, *κλίνη*, *συμπόσιον* and the like, *βασιλικός* retains its primary sense[65]. It is quite important that the phrase *νόμοι βασιλικοί*, which is attested, refers unmetaphorically and unambiguously to customs and laws[66]. Plutarch's phrase at 622A seems, on the other hand, to be metaphorical; it occurs in a *quaestio* which debated *ποιόν τινα δεῖ τὸν συμποσίαρχον εἶναι* and which, following in the Athenian's steps, expanded upon the analogy between leaders in the real world and leaders of the symposion[67]. The genitive *συμποσίου* does not permit us to deduce that the word *βασιλεύς*, just on its own, could be used in the sense 'symposiarch'[68]. The frequent references to the leader in this *quaestio* probably prompted Plutarch to seek for variety in his expressions. In any event, it

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64. Bergk [260] 67, n. 1.

65. Cf. Ath. 606B (Secundus, *βασιλικὸς οἰνοχόος* to Nicomedes of Bithynia); 602C (royal banquets in Syria); 514E-F (Persian banquets); DS BH xvi 92.3 (*βασιλικὸς πότος* of Philip of Macedonia); xxi 12.5 ('*δεῖπνα* worthier of kings'; cf also Ath. 147F, *βασιλικὸν συμπόσιον*, *ie* sumptuous, given by Cleopatra to Antony). *βασιλικός* seems to have developed a medical sense (Gal. xii 782K, xiii 184); whether this has any use in sympotic literature, it would be very difficult to say (cf. *infra*, p. 114 and n. 161).

66. Isocr. Nic. 56: *ταπεινοὺς μὲν εἶναι χρὴ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν ἐμήν, ἐμμένοντας τοῖς ἔθεσιν καὶ διαφυλάττοντας τοὺς νόμους τοὺς βασιλικούς, λαμπροὺς δ' ἐν ταῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως λειτουργίσαις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ προσταττομένοις* (also, *πείθου μὲν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων κειμένοις*, Dem. 36). Cf. also Dittenberger's comments on *lex regia* in a ii AD Pergamene inscription concerning astynomes ([142] OGI 483.1), and Athanasius, Expositiones in Psalmos pp. 265.8 and 444.14 Migne (MPG vol. 27).

67. *Eg* 620C-D, Pericles. Cf. a similar metaphor, *πρύτανις συμποσίου*, in Ion 1.14: it would be absurd to deduce that *πρυτανικός* means 'sympotic'.

68. Cf. the case of *iecur ficatum*: we would not be able to say that Lat. *ficatum* acquired the meaning of *iecur* before we had the proof that *iecur* has been dropped from the phrase.

is extremely improbable that a phrase like *νόμοι βασιλικοί* was used in place of *νόμοι συμποτικοί*, especially as the established title of a type of work.

The idea that *νόμοι βασιλικοί* is equivalent with *νόμοι συμποτικοί* may come to mind if we equate sentence **B** (3F) with sentence **A** (186B). But the equation is too weak to compensate for the lack of external evidence. **B** is a dubious testimony; to assume that the two sentences refer to the same thing is quite risky. The first book, which is only a very poor epitome, contains about 27 suspended *ὅτι* sentences. **B** is one of these and, like most of them, it is wholly unrelated to its immediate context. It has a very disturbing feature: in all manuscripts except C, the verb which informs us about the supposed literary activity of the three philosophers is in the singular, *ἔγραψε*. Perhaps this is a small palaeographical mistake; perhaps it is a slip due to the suppression of *φησι* or *λέγει* in the *ὅτι* sentences. But what if *ἔγραψε* **is** correct, and the subject **is** Athenaeus? What would be the missing verb? What else can our philosophers have done with *νόμοι συμποτικοί* but write them? It is very uncomfortable to lay all the weight of the hypothesis that *νόμοι βασιλικοί* means *νόμοι συμποτικοί*, and was a work produced by Speusippus, Xenocrates and Aristotle, on a piece of evidence which contains a crucial ambiguity.

Let me venture a hypothesis. Athenaeus makes a eulogy of Larensis, which ends with the appraisal of his learning and collection of books. He calls Larensis *ἐπιστήμων* ***νόμων πολιτικῶν*** (2C); says that his vast knowledge comes from a *συναγωγὴ* ***νόμων*** no longer in circulation (3A); compares his library, favourably, with Aristotle's. Here comes a digression on the fate of Aristotles's library; this involves a ***βασιλεύς***, Ptolemy Philadelphus (3B), and the thread is lost. If in the original book our *ὅτι* sentence at 3F occurred somewhere in the context before the break of subject at 3B in the abbreviated book, would it not be far more likely that Athenaeus used *βασιλικοί* in its usual sense?

The sense 'sympotic' given to *βασιλικοί* seems to be a modern reconstruction. This state of things excludes one candidate for Speusippus' Symposion. But it leaves us with two

authors of *νόμοι συμποτικοί*, Xenocrates and Aristotle, mentioned in **A**, and with the mystery of this title still unsolved.

Athenaeus' phrase *νόμοι συμποτικοί* has been identified with four Aristotelian titles: *συσσιτικῶν προβλημάτων γ΄*[69], *περὶ συσσιτίων ἢ συμποσίων α΄*[70], and the two variants *νόμοι συστατικοί α΄* in the codex of the Diogenian list (t. 139) and *νόμος συστατικός α΄* in the Anonymous list (t. 130)[71]. Moraux believes that these four titles are variants designating the same work: the lost Sympotic Laws of Aristotle; and this was a collection of *προβλήματα*. This is a fascinating hypothesis; unfortunately Moraux does not make the case compelling. He shows us convincingly how a *περί*-title can change into a *προβλήματα*-title, but other questions remain in the air. First and most importantly, how is the relation between *προβλήματα* and *νόμοι* to be explained? In other words, what kind of evidence is there to support the thought that 'laws' are works of a 'problematic' type? The readings *συσσιτικός* and *συσσιτικῶν* in the last two titles have been restored by Rose from the manuscript *συστατικός* and *συστατικῶν*. The restoration is universally accepted, and Moraux dismisses *συστατικός* as 'une erreur de lecture', but the fact that the mistake is repeated in **both** versions of the *νόμος* title and **only** in these does not make him suspicious. Neither does he envisage contaminations. For instance, *συστατικός* also occurs in a title mentioned in the Vita Vulgata, *ἐπιστολαὶ συστατικαί*. The double title *περὶ συσσιτίων ἢ συμποσίων α΄* indicates another possible contamination, between the work in question, whatever we take it to be, and the Symposion recorded by Diogenes (*Συμπόσιον α΄*, t. 10).

If there is a solution to the problem of Aristotle's *νόμοι συμποτικοί*, the key to it must be the meaning of *νόμος* in this curious phrase. Let me return to sentences **A** and **B** in

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69. T. 136 in the Anonymous list; see Moraux [502] 197 and 254.

70. T. 161 in the first appendix to the Anonymous list: Moraux [502] 129.

71. Moraux [502] 120 n. 39.

Athenaeus. Another unchallenged assumption was that *νόμοι συμποτικοί* should be a written work. The thought rests on the former assumption, which I discussed: *νόμοι συμποτικοί* is equivalent to *νόμοι βασιλικοί*. This equivalence allows us to refer the verb *ἔγραψε*, which occurs only in **B**, to the phrase *νόμοι συμποτικοί*, which occurs only in **A**. But let us drop the relation between the two sentences: it immediately appears that, unsupported by *ἔγραψε*, *νόμοι συμποτικοί* at 186B does not impose itself as a title. The text only says that there are *νόμοι συμποτικοί* of, or by, Xenocrates and Aristotle.

A first answer to the question of what can be meant by such *νόμοι* is suggested by the immediate context of **A**. **A** follows (in the manner of an illustration) after the statement that philosophers used to entertain their pupils at symposia on a regular basis: *καὶ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις δὲ ἐπιμελὲς ἦν συνάγουσι τοὺς νέους μετ᾽ αὐτῶν* ***πρός τινα τεταγμένον νόμον*** *εὐωχεῖσθαι.* *νόμος* refers here, obviously, to discipline and ceremonial. In the introductory part to Book Five Athenaeus makes several other claims on the practice of symposia among philosophers, and this material has been supposed to derive from a late second century source[72]. This may be right or wrong; the source may or may not be trustworthy; but the important fact is that *νόμος* could be used in the sense 'practical rule' in talk about the symposia of philosophers. In the light of this occurrence, I believe that the *νόμοι συμποτικοί* attributed to Xenocrates and Aristotle in the next sentence were 'laws' of the same kind - perhaps school-regulations for internal use, concerned with ceremonial that students should learn and observe; in any event, they were not individual works in the usual sense of the word[73].

νόμοι συμποτικοί are much more readily regulations than problems. The phrase was coined quite early, in connection with the games and ceremonials of the symposion - for

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72. An all this see *infra*, Ch. 3, pp. 151 ff.

73. Bergk formulated a similar hypothesis: '...diese *νόμοι συμποτικοί* der Philosophen sich nicht benügten, einfach die Normen des geselligen Verkehrs festzustellen, sondern auch überhaupt einen paraenetischen Charakter hatten...' ([260] 67 n. 1 - cf. *supra*, n. 64). For other tentative formulations after him see *supra*, p. 79 n. 62, and *infra*, Ch. 3 n. 99.

instance the rules of the *kottabos*, as can be seen from a line in Cratinus' *Nemesis*: *τὸν δὲ κότταβον προθέντας συμποτικοῖσι νόμοις* (116K). This line reflects the fact that such rules were perceived as a kind of *νόμος*. Plato is the first philosopher to use the phrase; but it is by no means clear what he had in mind in the unique occurrence at Laws 671C. Fortunately Aristotle seems to know what his teacher meant, for in the Politics he attributes to Plato a *νόμος περὶ τῆς μέθης* which ties in very well with the Athenian's ideas about the symposion: *τὸ τοὺς νέφοντας συμποσιάρχειν* (1274^{b}9). This is a reference to the ideal institution set up in the first book of the Laws, not to any rule introduced by Plato in the Academy; nevertheless it is, in Aristotle's presentation, a practical rule, much more so than Plato's nebulous passage would let us guess. The example is interesting in the first place because it reveals what Aristotle himself may have understood by 'laws' of this kind, and I believe that it supports my interpretation of his own 'sympotic laws'.

A curious testimony corroborates these sparse indications. Gnathaena was one of the courtesans whom the anecdotal tradition made famous by circulating stories about her wit; she lived in the late fourth or early third century[74]. One story, maybe taken from Aristodemus, a compiler of sympotic material which Athenaeus used quite a lot[75], tells us that this lady wrote a *νόμος συσσιτικός* in imitation of the philosophers who had prescribed or composed similar rules (*κατὰ ζῆλον τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα συνταξαμένων φιλοσόφων*, 585 A). The piece started with a proclamation of equality (*ὅδε ὁ νόμος ἴσος ἐγράφη καὶ ὁμοίως*) among the lovers whom it purported to instruct: *ἥτις καὶ νόμον συσσιτικὸν συνέγραψεν, καθ' ὃν δεῖ τοὺς ἐραστὰς ὧν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν θυγατέραν εἰσιέναι. εἰσιέναι* evokes a procession; Gnathaena probably represented the host of lovers entering the bed-room by analogy with students or philosophers entering the

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74. See the anecdotes about her relationship with Diphilus in Lynceus' *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* (Ath. 583E sq) and in Machaon's *Χρεῖαι*. Machaon recounts many other anecdotes about her (Ath. 576 E-81 A). See also references by Anaxilas (K ii 470), Timocles (K ii 464), and Philippides (K iii 302).

75. Aristodemus, dated ii BC by Schwarz [592], made a collection of anecdotes on parasites, courtesans, gourmets etc called *Γελοῖα Ἀπομνημονεύματα*, which is one of Athenaeus' sources.

dining-hall. The initial line seems to prelude a full constitution; and, if we are to believe the source, this piece, which Callimachus recorded in his *pinax*[76], ran to over 320 lines.

To make a good subject for fun, the 'sympotic' or 'syssitic rules' of philosophers must have been quite popular in Gnathaena's time - even if not as popular as the Aristotelian problems at the unknown date when Matreas, a juggler from Alexandria, gained fame by formulating mock problems such as: *διὰ τί ὁ ἥλιος δύνει μὲν κολυμβᾷ δ' οὐ;*[77] The question is, what exactly was the object of Gnathaena's derision in the Νόμος Συσσιτικός? Was it a tradition - say, that philosophers imposed 'dining rules' - or was it a type of work, as was her own? *συνταξαμένων* is remarkably ambiguous; it would cover both cases equally well.

One may be tempted to opt for the second solution by the fact that, if we accept Rose's emendation, Aristotle offers us, in a double version, the same title as Gnathaena: if his title Νόμος Συσσιτικός or Νόμοι Συσσιτικοί is not the result of contamination, it must correspond to a written work. No other philosopher has on his record a work of such a title. Thus in a presumptive catalogue of philosophers who issued rules of the syssition, only Aristotle could make us think that the rules in question constituted works of definite authorship. Should we regard Aristotle's piece on the syssition, by analogy with Gnathaena's piece, as a practical treatise on sympotic manners for the internal use of his school, and should we conclude that the *νόμοι συμποτικοί* attributed to him in sentence **A** do correspond to the same work as the syssitic titles on the Aristotelian lists? My answer to these questions is negative.

As we have seen, there are in fact four syssition-titles. According to Moraux, all four are variants of one. Let us suppose that he is right; in this case we know a detail about the presumptive work. In discussion of the *σκοπός* of Plato's Republic, Proclus quotes the *Συσσιτικόν* as a place where Aristotle called Plato's dialogue 'the Republic'[78]. This is so little

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76. Fr. 433 Pfeiffer; see Droysen [341] 591-2.

77. Ath. 19D.

78. Procl. in Remp. 350 Bas = 181 Rose.

that it may be silly to conclude anything from Proclus' testimony. But we know that the syssition features among Plato's prospective institutions in Callipolis, as it will feature again in Magnesia. We also know that Aristotle was very keen on these ideas, historical and utopian alike; he discussed them on several occasions, especially in the Politics[79], and found in them some of Plato's most original contributions to political theory[80]. The interest in alien commensal customs and festal traditions, of which we can catch a glimpse in Plato, will be immensely encouraged by the encyclopaedic spirit of the Peripatetic school. All this makes me think that a work on the syssition by Aristotle, which mentions Plato's Republic, is more likely to deal with something like the Spartan syssition, or the Platonic, than to be a collection of *manières de table*[81].

But perhaps Moraux is wrong? The two *νόμος*-titles, *νόμος συστατικός* (*συσσιτικός*?) *α΄* and *νόμοι συστατικοί* (*συσσιτικοί*?) *α΄*, should rather indicate another work than the problematic titles, *συσσιτικῶν προβλημάτων γ΄* and *περὶ συσσιτίων ἢ συμποσίων α΄*; Proclus meant the latter; and the possibility that the former coincided with the *νόμοι συμποτικοί* of **A**, and was a work of the kind derided by Gnathaena, remains intact. But this is implausible too.

In classical Greek, the term *συσσίτιον* refers predominantly to the Spartan institution, which is wildly different from the Attic symposion. Nobody was more aware of the difference than Plato, who created a powerful rhetorical tool by building the argument of Laws i around it. It is true that, in the Laws, the Athenian once calls symposia 'syssitia' (666B3); but there is no question about the fact that he had very different thoughts about the two institutions. Very much like Plato, Aristotle does not use these words interchangeably. On the other hand, Gnathaena's title betrays no awareness of a difference between *συμποτικός* and *συσσιτικός*.

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79. *Eg* Pol. 1265^{a}8-9, 1294^{b}27, 1313^{a}41; some 30 occurrences.

80. Arist. Pol. 1265^{a}8-9, 1266^{a}35.

81. Cf. also Düring [31] 480 n. 320 (criticized for no good reasons by Guthrie [404] vi 39 n. 1, who does not adduce evidence but only refers to Moraux [502] 129).

This may reflect a change in Hellenistic usage, where *συσσίτιον* increasingly comes to designate the ordinary supper, as *συσσιτεῖν* did in earlier authors[82].

Aristotle, like Plato, uses the term *νόμος* with the sense 'custom' or 'law' in referring to Spartan or Cretan syssitia[83]. If he wrote anything like a *νόμος συσσιτικός*, I would imagine that work dealing with the same subject as the works with problematic titles. This leads us back to Moraux's hypothesis that the four titles refer to the same piece. But the piece in question is not the one he imagined - *προβλήματα* made of what Athenaeus calls *νόμοι συμποτικοί*. One possibility not contemplated by Moraux is this: if Aristotle wrote just one book on the syssition, *νόμοι* might have got mixed up in its title at a date - if such a date ever occurred - when a tradition of 'dining rules' was popular, well established in the Lyceum, and the rules in question could be described, indifferently, by the adjectives *συμποτικός* and *συσσιτικός*.

No title of a work by Aristotle, real or fictitious, corresponds to Athenaeus' *νόμοι συμποτικοί*. The same is true, more plainly, of Xenocrates. If my interpretation of the character of *νόμοι συμποτικοί* is correct, this fact should not surprise us; neither does it mean that Athenaeus' note is a piece of fiction. I think that, instead of trying to see here the unique record of a doubtful type of treatise, we should take **A** as a possible testimony for the existence of informal collections of rules for symposia. The absence of this title from the official lists would not be due, say, to their selective character, but to the fact that *νόμοι συμποτικοί*, even if jotted down, were not proper 'works'. And, if such bodies of rules indeed existed, they could also be considered indirect evidence for a relatively early practice of corporate dinners in the Academy and Lyceum. Evidence for this is precious because, as we shall see in the next chapter, it is extremely rare.

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82. Pl. La. 179B7. This sense occurs for instance at DL iv 22 (daily meals of Arcesilaus, Krantor, Krates and Polemon at Krantor's house - in quotation from Antigonus' Life of Krates; cf. also *ὁσημέραι ἐν ταῖς συσσιτίοις* in the text of the accusation against Aristotle given by Athenaeus, 696B).

83. *Supra*, n. 79; see also *ἐν Τυρρήνων νομίμοις* (607 Rose), which Athenaeus gives as a title (23D).

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Speusippus

Apart from the Symposion written by Plato himself, Plato's Academy seems to have produced only two such works: one by his immediate successor, the other by a presumptive student who was one of the last graduands of the school.

To what does Plutarch's phrase *λόγοι παρὰ πότον γενόμενοι* refer in the case of Speusippus? My previous interpretation rules out one candidate, the *νόμοι βασιλικοί*. The second candidate raises two problems: did Speusippus write a *Περίδειπνον*? And, if he did, what sort of book was that?

Περίδειπνον Πλάτωνος is an extremely obscure work, known to us only from two sources. One of them, the second chapter of Diogenes Laertius' Life of Plato (iii 2), has generated a great amount of confusion. First, the fact that it reported 'rumours in Athens' about the circumstances of Plato's birth has stimulated the widespread opinion that Speusippus was the instigator of Plato's heroisation and the primary source for the legend of his Apollonian birth and other miraculous stories[84]. Secondly, the fact that the official list at iv 4-5 does not record any *Περίδειπνον Πλάτωνος* but mentions a *Πλάτωνος Ἐγκώμιον* by Speusippus, coupled with the joint reference in iii 2 to a *Πλάτωνος Ἐγκώμιον* by a Peripatetic, Clearchus, has produced the suspicion that the two names are confused in our text, and the real author of the *Περίδειπνον* is Clearchus[85].

The second testimony is in fact a double one: it consists of a marginal note in a right-hand intercolumnal space of Philodemus' Index Academicorum (PHerc 1021: *a*), which is

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84. Cf. Boyancé [277] 257-67. This position was more recently adopted by Dörrie [334] 488, but Tarán's arguments against it [205] 229 should be regarded as final.

85. See Lang [65] pp. 32-3. Tarán [205] rightly points out that 'there is nothing to be gained' by this tour of phantasy since a *Περίδειπνον Πλάτωνος* by a Peripatetic makes no better sense than an *Ἐγκώμιον* (note at F1a).

repeated word for word in a fragment from another copy of the same work (PHerc 164, fr 12 Dorandi: *b*). The note occurs in the middle of a list of Plato's pupils in col vi: on the authority of Speusippus' Περίδειπνον, it adds between lines 12 and 13 three names of unknown disciples.

This text has a difficult history, which has bred another confusion: Meckler's first restoration of the fragment (*b*), [ὁ Κυζικηνὸς Τιμό]λαος [καὶ] Διογένη[ς Ἀθ]ηναῖος (ὁ?) Τι[μόλαος ἐν τῶι περι]δείπνωι [ἁπλῶς ἱσ]τορεῖ, Σπευ[σίππου πάν]τα ἐξάραν[τος], suggested to von Fritz a new author of Περίδειπνα in Timolaus[86]. This idea was adopted by Isnardi-Parente in a very odd form[87].

Making Timolaus the author of Plato's Funerary Banquet must have resulted from the legitimate attempt to explain the repetition of a name in a serial list of disciples by differentiating his status. In another attempt, Timolaus was made a host in Plato's Funerary Banquet written by Speusippus. This ingenious idea derives from Crönert's text of *b*, [ὁ Κυζικηνὸς Τιμό]λαος· Καλλιγένη[ς Ἀθ]ηναῖος· [Τι]μόλαος [τοὺ]ς ἐν τῶι π[ερι]δείπνωι [ἑστιάσας, ὡς ἱσ]τορεῖ Σπεύ[σιππος κτλ][88]. Tarán sees the implication and tells us that in this work 'Speusippus described the funeral banquet of Plato (where Timolaus acted as a host)'[89].

It is an extremely attractive hypothesis, which makes the academic fragment flesh out a relevant part of the setting, tempting us to reconstruct Speusippus' lost symposion as a record of λόγοι or ἐγκώμια delivered by Plato's pupils at his death; it may even be represented as a

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86. Von Fritz [369].

87. 'Timolaus, anch' egli autore di Perideipna' ([204] 216; cf. also [429] 290-1). As shown by Giannattanasio [211] n. 10, Isnardi-Parente mistakenly attributes this idea to Crönert; thus her fr. 153 reproduces Crönert's text (*infra*) but gives it a very puzzling translation: 'Timola(o) che rappresentò a convito i personnagi che compaiono nel Bancheto Funebre, come racconta Speusippo'. But, ironically, Giannattanasio makes an error of the same sort as the one imputed by her to Isnardi-Parente: she attributes the idea that Timolaus wrote a Perideipnon to von Arnim instead of von Fritz ([211] n. 9).

88. Crönert [124] 183.

89. Tarán [205] 231 n. 13.

dialogue of the same format as the Symposion. Unfortunately the encouraging *ἑστιάσας* is quite dubious. Giannattanasio objected that *ἑστιάσας ὡς* would make the line implausibly long[90]. A far more satisfactory solution has been offered by Gaiser: 1) *Ἀθηναῖος* refers to *Τιμόλαος* instead of *Καλλιγένης*, with the result that the occurrence of the second Timolaus ceases to be a problem - Timolaus of Cyzicus and Timolaus of Athens are names of distinct pupils[91]; 2) the lacuna before *ἱστορεῖ* is to be filled, not by *ἑστιάσας ὡς* but by *Πλάτωνος*, which renders the full title of Speusippus' piece, which is also recorded in *a*. Thus the parallel fragments read,

a (PHerc 1021 col vi, *additamentum* at l. 12):

[ὁ Κυζικη]νὸς Τιμόλαος, Καλλιγένης, Ἀθηναῖος Τιμόλα̣ς̣, οὓς ἐν τῶι Περιδείπνωι [Πλα]τ̣ω̣ν[ος]

b (PHerc 164 fr 12):

[ὁ Κυζικηνὸς Τιμό]λαος, Καλλιγένη[ς, Ἀθ]ηναῖος Τ[ι]μόλαος, [ὡς] ἐν τῶι Περιδείπνωι [Πλάτωνος ἱσ]τορεῖ Σπεύ[σιππος, Ἀρχύ]τας Ταραν[τῖνος, Χίων ὁ] τὸν ἐν Ἡ[ρακλείαι][92].

This text is entirely accepted by Dorandi in his latest edition of the Index[93]. It tells us that Speusippus records or describes (*ἱστορεῖ*)[94] in this work three more of Plato's disciples. What subsists of the sympotic character of the *Περίδειπνον* after this reconstruction?

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90. Giannattanasio [211] suggests the following text: ... [ὡς] ἐν τῶι [περι]δείπνωι [ἁπλῶς ἱσ]τορεῖ Σ.

91. Note that Dorandi [87] 39 n. 65 gives erroneous references to Lasserre [60] pp. 135-7, 345-7, 573 for Timolaus of Athens. For this Timolaus, cf. DL iii 46 and Ath. 509A (reading Timaeus). The second Timolaus and Calligenes are not known; see Gaiser' s Index ([154] 448).

92. See Gaiser's commentary, [154] 441-3.

93. Dorandi [87]; compare Dorandi [113], fr. 12: Καλλιγένης Ἀθηναῖος and Τ[ι]μόλαος [ὃν] ἐν τῶι Π κτλ. (p. 109).

94. Philodemus uses *ἱστορεῖν* with these senses; cf. in the same work coll iv 43 (*ἱστορεῖται*, translated by Dorandi 'si racconta che') and T 2 (*ἱστορῶν*, 'composte la sua descrizione'). The second sense is potentially interesting for our symposion, especially in the unusual construction with *οὕς* ('whom he depicts...').

The loss of *ἑστιάσας* and of a 'host' is not as destructive as it may appear. *Πλάτωνος Ἐγκώμιον* has been envisaged as: alternative title for the *Περίδειπνον*; title of a different work; or title of the whole work, where *περίδειπνον* was only a part. The complementary option that *ἐγκώμιον* itself was a part of the *Περίδειπνον* seems more reasonable; for it is natural to imagine that the delivery of the speech took place at the funerary banquet. But this whole matter is imposible to decide, and I shall put it aside. The two fragments assure us, in the first place, that Speusippus wrote a *Περίδειπνον*: related or not related to an *Ἐγκώμιον*, Speusippus' *Περίδειπνον* existed. As Tarán has observed, a work of this title must be a sympo-sion - no matter whether Philodemus' source employs *ἑστιάσας* in describing it or not.

The idea that Speusippus' *Περίδειπνον* is a symposion was first advanced by Schmidt in his introduction to the fragments of Didymus' Symposion[95], and it became a matter of controversy which lasted to the present day, involving various hypotheses about the format of the work. Hirzel shared Schmidt's view, adding that the *περίδειπνον* had originally been an independent literary form, swallowed up by the sympotic genre and cast into dialogue[96]. On the other hand, Lang maintained in his edition that there is no sign of the *Περίδειπνον* having anything to do with a symposion (*ad l*). Likewise, Martin considered that it is an error to associate the *περίδειπνον* with sympotic literature. According to him, the *περίδειπνον* belongs to another genre, the *ἐπιτάφιος*: Speusippus' work is not a dialogue but a reported funerary oration, made by one single speaker[97]. Although Boyancé thought firmly that the *Περίδειπνον* is a symposion, Martin's idea must have appealed to him; for this scholar portrays Speusippus suddenly getting up at Plato's funerary banquet and giving the great speech of heroisation

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95. Schmidt [67] 368.

96. Hirzel [418] i 345-6.

97. Martin [489] 162-6.

(257). There is excessive arbitrariness in all these views[98]. Tarán more realistically rejects Martin's classification on the argument that the mere word *περίδειπνον* indicates connection with symposia (231). This is perfectly right; but Tarán adds that 'funeral banquets were as traditional in Greek life and poetry as were encomia', which, like some of the previous interpretations, misses out what is probably the most salient point about Speusippus' Perideipnon.

The *περίδειπνον* was a variety of the Greek banquet: the after-burial meal. Speeches about the dead **may** develop in this kind of context, as they did, apparently, in the Roman *silicernum*[99], but the fact is that our sources do not mention such a development; if it had occurred, Lucian's derision of the consolations customary in a *περίδειπνον* might have taken a different turn[100]. Demosthenes' De Corona 285-8 is probably the only place where funeral eulogy is mentioned in the context of a *περίδειπνον*, but the association is loose and the occasion, highly public, revives a practice established in the Persian wars: Demosthenes surely did not mean that his talk in praise of those who fell in battle took place in his own house, at the funerary banquet, any more than did Pericles' oration. Funeral banquets and funeral enkomia may be traditional, but no tradition associates them in terms of physical location; speeches in commemoration of the dead, related to the burial meal and named after it, simply do not exist.

Thus if Speusippus' commemoration of Plato was a symposion and not a simple enkomion, Speusippus did more than rehearse a traditional pattern. There is only one other occurrence of a *Περίδειπνον* title in the whole of Greek literature. This work is even more obscure and problematic, but we know at least that it was composed by a philosopher at the death of another philosopher: as Diogenes Laertius reports, Timon the Sceptic found words of

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98. See also Dorandi [87] 38, who claims with no evidence or argument that Philodemus found in the *Περίδειπνον* one variant of the stories about Plato's death.

99. According to Vollmer [125], Crawford [296], and Durry [77].

100. De Luctu 24; see also the episode at Ath. 344A-B. Similarly, the authors of the New Comedy refer to cooks and food, not to orations, *eg* Hegesippus K iii fr 1 (ll. 11-6), Anaxippus K iii fr 296 (ll. 41-2), Men. Aspis 233.

praise for Arcesilaus in a Funerary Banquet, after having attacked him bitterly in life[101]. It looks as if we should credit Speusippus with the invention of a kind of subspecies of the philosophical symposion[102].

This is very meagre: we cannot know what happened in this work and how it happened. Does it fit Plutarch's description plausibly enough, or should we throw Speusippus' symposion, together with those of Dion and Prytanis, in the class of works completely lost? I would not be so sceptical. Compared with Ἐγκώμιον, a title Περίδειπνον is much less likely to be invented or mistaken. Just by itself, this title is a sign that our unanswerable questions about the Funerary Banquet of Plato have at least a common referent in the symposion by Speusippus mentioned in Plutarch's note.

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περὶ Μέθης

The situation in Aristotle's school confronts us with another aspect of the same problem. Is περὶ Μέθης identical with the symposion?

The facts of this problem are as follows:

According to Plutarch, three Peripatetics have written symposia. But the only Peripatetic to whom the tradition actually ascribes a Symposion is Aristotle; this title features in all the lists of his works under several variants, as I have already had occasion to say.

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101. DL ix 115; for Timon see SH 368-95 (frr 805-8 on Arcesilaus). Wachsmuth [214] 29-30 considers this work a combination of *laudes* and *deprecationes* (see also a Sceptic interpretation of the denigratory purpose of Timon's Silloi in Long [476]). But if Timon could call Arcesilaus a Sceptic, as Numenius reports in Eusebius (PE xiv 6), I don't see why he could not also write a proper Funerary Banquet for him. Cf. *supra*, n. 44.

102. Hirzel [418] i 345-6 n. 5 considers that Χρυσίππου Ταφαί by the Stoic Aristocreon (p. 72 Comparetti = Epic. p. 59 Usener) was a work of the same type. But the title Ταφαί does not suggest a banquet, whereas Περίδειπνον does.

Unfortunately there is no more than one fragment officially declared to come from Aristotle's Symposion (Ath. 674F-5A). We possess instead several quotations from a περὶ Μέθης by this philosopher. The tradition of Aristotle's titles is one of the richest, yet περὶ Μέθης is completely absent from all the lists. This is a curious phenomenon.

But there are other curious facts about the title itself. Although περὶ Μέθης was a set piece in the Lyceum, it does not normally feature in the 'official lists' transmitted by Diogenes: it so happens that, with one exception, the Peripatetics who wrote books περὶ Μέθης are not among the scholarchs to whom Diogenes devoted separate chapters in his fifth book of Lives. The exception is important: Theophrastus (DL v 44). But it also happens that Theophrastus' name did not come to Plutarch's mind when he made the admittedly selective review at 612D-E[103]. With three exceptions, one invariably comes across fragments said to derive from a περὶ Μέθης in Athenaeus, a compiler of sympotic material who lived in the third century AD. Two other authorities are late Platonists, Plutarch and Clement. A century before Plutarch, the title had been used, for a treatise of his own, by Philo of Alexandria - the Middle Platonist who contributed so much to our knowledge of what philosophers had said on the topic of drunkenness. The earliest direct testimony for a περὶ Μέθης in Aristotle's school is made by Apollonius in the second century BC, and refers to Aristotle himself; Athenaeus, too, must have found the quotations accompanied by this title in earlier sources from which he copied, but it is not possible to see how far back these go.

To make things worse, another Peripatetic not mentioned by Plutarch, Aristoxenus, appears to have devoted to the symposion, neither a περὶ Μέθης nor a Symposion, but a book called Σύμμικτα Συμποτικά.

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103. There is another passage in Plutarch which has been interpreted as a reference to a Symposion by Theophrastus (1095E-6C); but see Chapter 3, p. 139.

In Aristotle's case, von Arnim decided without much ado that *περὶ Μέθης* was a second or alternative title for Symposion[104]. This hypothesis comes naturally to mind and was accepted by most scholars[105]. It is also plausible that Peripatetic symposia acquired the title *περὶ Μέθης* at some later stage, in virtue of common features which distinguished them from other symposia; and perhaps Theophrastus set an example by calling *περὶ Μέθης* a work of the same kind as Aristotle's Symposion. This is an attractive explanation because it would account for all our difficulties.

But it is not the only possible one. The Peripatetics, as has been remarked, had a strong interest in the symposion. On the other hand, their systematic pursuit of research in every conceivable topic led to a large accumulation of sympotic material spread out in books which may have been related to the symposion, but related in very different degrees, which we cannot now appreciate. It is unlikely that the symposion played a leading role in Dicaearchus' *περὶ Μουσικῶν Ἀγώνων* or in Chamaeleon's *περὶ Σιμωνίδου*, although sympotic matters were touched upon in those works[106]; whereas with productions like Clearchus' *περὶ Γρίφων* (84-95W), which became a copious source for compilers of sympotic literature[107], we can be sure at least that the subject itself coincided with a vital aspect of the symposion[108]. Between these

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104. 'Nobody can doubt that the same work [*Συμπόσιον ἢ περὶ Μέθης*] contained not only the etymology [sc of *μέθη*] but also the thought behind it, which betrays Peripatetic character'. The thought would be the one expressed in the *στέφειν* fragment, Ath. 192B ('Bei Athenaeus findet sich derselbe Gedanke noch einmal'; von Arnim [246] 122-3).

105. Cf. Christ-Stählin i 725; Moraux 33; Chroust [292] ii 299, n. 7; Bignone [267] ii 540-1, n. 1 (Bignone argues for the identity of the two titles from a fragment which does not refer us to any work: 102R). Rose and Martin are exceptions.

106. *Eg* Dicaearchus fr 88W, Chamaeleon fr. 33W.

107. See esp. the examples of *γρῖφοι παρὰ πότους* in Ath. 4A, D (= Clearchus frr. 89-90W).

108. Cf. Schol. Ar. V. 20 (= Clearchus 85 Wehrli): *γρῖφοι δὲ λέγεται τὰ ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις προβαλλόμενα αἰνιγματώδη ζητήματα.*

extremes we should perhaps place the Ἐρωτικόν, another standard piece in the Peripatos[109]. But does not the περὶ Μέθης fit better in this category? It can well be construed as a type of work concerned with one single and crucial aspect of the symposion, drink; thus it would stand in close proximity to a 'symposion', without being one in the sense, whatever that be, which Plutarch had in mind when talking about Aristotle.

But how should we calculate such degrees of proximity? The topics of many περὶ Μέθης fragments coincide with topics of fragments from other works, and their treatment does not suggest specific approaches as much as delineate areas of interest, in which debate carried on[110]. Would there be a relevant difference in 'sympoticality' between περὶ Μέθης and books with other titles, such as Ῥιφοί? In order to answer such questions we ought to know the purpose of these works, or at least the larger context from which the fragments have been taken: that would enable us to compare them. In a state of complete ignorance over these issues, to ask whether περὶ Μέθης is or is not identical with the Symposion appears as quibbling about words.

But we should not underestimate the consequences of an answer; and an answer was often presumed just because the titles and the fragments do exist. In the main Diogenian list, Aristotle's Symposium occurs among the first nineteen titles. To judge from the principle followed by the compiler, the works in question seem to have formed a group of dialogues. If we accept this idea and also believe that the Symposion is identical with περὶ Μέθης, we may feel tempted to extend the dialogue form to all treatises περὶ Μέθης. If we accept the idea that Aristotle's Symposion was a dialogue but believe that περὶ Μέθης was a different work, in close but indefinite relation to it, we may feel inclined to look at the latter as 'problems' and to pursue, perhaps, Martin's divisions. As many scholars have made long learned journeys on

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109. *Eg* Aristotle: DL v 43, Ath. 674B; Theophrastus: Ath. 562E, 567B, 606C; Heraclides Ponticus: DL v 87; Clearchus: Ath. 255B etc = 21-35W.

110. Cf. *eg* the famous debate over the word σκόλιον in Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus (Suda = Aristox. 125W + Dic. 88W).

such premisses, it seems worth showing that the starting points of the whole matter are undecidable. I also have a hypothesis to venture in the end, but the main purpose of this discussion is to shake the belief that any conclusion about Peripatetic symposia can be more than provisional.

The thirteenth century Marcianus 448, esteemed by Adler to be one of the worst preserved codices of the Suda, contains a marginal note to *περὶ Μέθης*: *πόθεν ἐκλήθη*. Montanari explains it as 'una semplice indicazione di contenuto (cioè, qui si parla dell' etimologia di *μέθη*)'[111]. Rose attached this note to a fragment which, along with excerpts from Athenaeus and Philo on the Peripatetic etymology of *μεθύειν*, he supposed to come from Aristotle's *περὶ Μέθης*[112]. This may be wrong: neither Suda nor Philo mention Aristotle. But a fragment from Hieronymus' *περὶ μέθης* shows concern for the etymology in question[113]. Since the Suda does not refer to any author in particular, it is possible to think that the annotator attempted to summarise the purpose of a *περὶ Μέθης* in general: the subject of such works was the etymology of *μεθύειν*. This would make good sense: it ties in with the fact that the etymology in question came to acquire the amazing proportions and complexity which we fathom in Philo's De Plantatione, grouping around it every other aspect and problem of drinking. But it also makes it less likely that *περὶ Μέθης* was a title subordinated to Symposion, rather than one in its own right. Unsupported by other evidence, this interpretation of the note in the Suda is hardly more than hazardous; but it can make us question the belief that it is absurd to see two works in Aristotle's Symposion and *περὶ Μέθης*.

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111. *Ad* PTura v, 64, 24-7 (Arist. 16T) in [57] i, pp. 292-3.

112. Fr. 102R.

113. Ath. 499F = Hier. 27W. I think that the quotation from Hieronymus stops before *συγγενές κτλ*: this word refers back to *σκύφος*, whereas Hieronymus does not.

The best argument that I can find in favour of the interpretation that περὶ Μέθης is a Peripatetic variant of *symposia* is the one I used in **B** 4[114]: Hieronymus is one of Plutarch's authors at 612D-E, but there is no Symposion on Hieronymus' record; the only sympotic-sounding title of a work by Hieronymus is περὶ Μέθης. The argument is precarious. Given that we know so little about this dissident Peripatetic and have no ancient catalogue of his works but only random titles, as this or that happened to be quoted, nothing prevents him from having written a 'symposion' as well as the περὶ Μέθης. Rather, if περὶ Μέθης and Symposia were the same thing, it seems a little suspicious that Plutarch jumped from Aristotle to Hieronymus and Prytanis, without mentioning a more prestigious authority of the Lyceum, who also wrote a περὶ Μέθης and was Aristotle's immediate succesor.

The fragments that we possess are extremely varied, but all except one[115] deal with the topic of drinking at symposia, and some of the themes occur several times:

Theophrastus: custom of ἐπιχύσεις; purpose of unmixed wine in προπόσεις; meaning of ζωρός and pure wine[116]; usage of the ῥυτόν; joke on Nymphs as nurses of Dionysus[117]; Euripides as οἰνοχόος; wine and old age;

Chamaeleon: function of the ῥυτόν; relation between ἀκρατέστερον and ἐπισκύθισκον; Cleomenes' madness;

Hieronymus: etymology of μεθύσθαι; Euripides as οἰνοχόος.

Many fragments from Aristotle's περὶ Μέθης are similar, yet comparison suggests two possible points of difference. His topics are roughly of two kinds: names and history of sympotic items, such as ῥοδιακαί or τραγήματα, and physical or physiological facts concern-

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114. *Supra*, p. 76.

115. Chamaeleon fr. 13W.

116. See also Ath. 782A-B.

117. Ath. 465B = L133 F. Fortenbaugh's connection with Philochorus (*ad l*) is far-fetched. The passage does not 'combine biology and mythology'; it is based on word-play similar to that of ἄοινα συμπόσια or ἄοινος μέθη (Plu. 679A and 716A).

ing drunkenness, such as the effects of hot wine or the interaction between drink and body. It seems that the area of Aristotle's *περὶ Μέθης* was not as strictly limited to drinking as his successors made it; for he also dealt with *τραγήματα* and *ἁλμυραὶ τροφαί*. More importantly, Aristotle approached the phenomenon of drinking from two sides, combining the cultural discussion with a scientific analysis of the subject. This second side is absent in the fragments from later *περὶ Μέθης*, which seem entirely concerned with linguistic, social, and anthropological problems[118].

Comparison may also lead us to think that Aristotle's *περὶ Μέθης* was so similar to Aristotle's Symposion that it could well be the same work: like the *περὶ Μέθης* fragments about *τραγήματα* and *ἁλμυραὶ τροφαί*, the fragment from the Symposion (Athenaeus 674F-5A) appears to be concerned with another ritual of the symposion than drinking, *στέφειν*, and the discussion proceeds on a line similar to that of the *τραγήματα* fragment (641D-E). But these are impressions; in the same context, Athenaeus quotes a long extract from Philonides where we can spot a relation made in medical literature between getting drunk and the custom of wearing crowns[119]. In any event, the fragments alone do not allow us to decide whether we are confronted here with one or two works.

The *στέφειν* fragment (Ath. 674F-5A) has given rise to very adventurous interpretations. Because Aristotle quotes here Iliad i 470 and Odyssey viii 170 as evidence that *τὸ δὲ στέφειν πλήρωσίν τινα σημαίνει*, scholars have construed his Symposion as a work of

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118. Compare, *eg*, Thphr. L132 F and Cha. 10 W with Arist. 110R. Wehrli seems to consider that the *Gelagelitteratur* of the Peripatos developed both aspects of Aristotle's legacy: 'Darauf gab Aristoteles seiner Nachfolgern das Vorbild einer kulturgeschichtlichen und physiologischen Behandlung des Themas, die wohl als Grundlager für praktische Anweisungen gedacht war' ([44], p. 73). Even if our material is very fragmentary, I suspect that this is an oversimplification.

119. Cf. Philonides on the origin of *στέφειν* at Ath. 675C-D.

Peripatetic philology on Homer[120]. This guess has wrong foundations. It misunderstands the scope of the lines: the subject of our fragment is *στέφειν*, not Homer[121]. The topic of crowning has also encouraged the thought that Aristotle's Symposion was deeply religious[122] - just the right target for an iconoclastic Symposion by Epicurus[123]. This idea is frivolous: it cannot be legitimate to generalise something which has no other basis but an impression produced by a very small unit of text. Such frustrating attempts show how difficult it is to reconstruct a reliable picture of the whole out of the poor remains available to us.

As I said before, the issue of identity or difference between *περὶ Μέθης* and *Συμπόσια* is important, not so much for establishing the sympotic character of the *περὶ Μέθης* (it is fairly obvious that all these fragments approach their subject with a permanent reference to the symposion), but because it involves the problem of the format of Peripatetic symposia. The strongest and most widely held assumption about Aristotle's Symposion is that it was a dialogue[124]. As a result, each Peripatetic *περὶ Μέθης*, and even Aristoxenus' *Σύμμικτα Συμποτικά*, have been regarded as dialogues[125]. It has also been claimed that these dialogues

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120. Rose, followed by Hirzel and more recently by Moraux, who tells us that "Le dialogue était plein d'analogies avec l'ouvrage homonyme de Platon; d'après les fragments, on voit que les convives discutaient des questions d'interprétation homérique, ainsi que l'on avait coutume de le faire dans l'école' ([502] 33). Such fictions have been already dismissed in a very good discussion by Martin ([489] 204-8).

121. Note that Theophrastus uses the same method when he quotes Empedocles in order to make clearer the meaning of *ζωρότερον* (Ath. 423F-4A = L134 F).

122. *Eg* Moraux [502] 33, 'empreinte d'un profond caractère religieux', as it explains drinking-practices 'par le besoin d'accomplir d'actes agréables aux dieux'.

123. Bignone ii Ch. 11 *passim*; see also Ullrich [621] ii 7.

124. Heitz [413] 168, Bernays [261] 2, Gigon [383] 46-8, Ross [27] vi, Chroust [292] ii 27, Bignone [267] ii 539-71. Jaeger thought that the Symposion was 'naturally suggested' to Aristotle by Plato's Symposion: Aristotle wanted 'to show how the questions discussed in them ought to have been handled' ([432] 30-1). Laurenti [26] formulates reasonable doubts, but offers a definition of dialogue 'intesa in senso lato' which is large beyond measure: 'insomma... il termine vale solo in quanto serve a indicare un certo numero di opere che, fossero dialogi, parenesi, lettere o altro, e per la loro interna struttura e per la forma più curata, non potevano essere situate sullo stesso piano delle altre'.

125. On Aristoxenus see Hiller [100] 88, Hirzel [418] i 345 (and 360 ff), and Wehrli [37] 84-5.

represented people conversing at dinner, as in Plato's Symposion; moreover, we have been asked to believe that such conversations were not fictitious but historical. Thus according to Moraux Aristotle's Symposion reproduced actual discussions in the Peripatos; after comparing the *περί*-variants of Aristotle's sympotic titles with Plutarch's Questions, Moraux also decided that the work was not 'sur des problèmes relatifs aux repas' but 'discutés au cours d'un repas', *ie* symposiastic rather than sympotic (197). I wonder how he knows this. Fortenbaugh commented that Theophrastus' *περὶ Μέθης* was 'ein Dialog, in dem Theophrast selber die Discussion bei einem Symposium leitete' (121).

There is very little on which to base such thoughts. The first person occurs twice, in Theophrastus and Aristoxenus[126]. But this is not necessarily an indication of dialogue going on; ancient authors may well speak in the first person, singular or plural, in 'memoirs' - which a work entitled *Σύμμικτα* has better chances to be. The fragments betray no sign of people taking turns and debating. Compilers chopped off symposia unknown to us and arranged them so as to form 'problems' disguised as 'dialogues'. The result is that, in most cases, we simply cannot know what the original works were like before the operation.

A more plausible alternative than dialogue may be that, as Peripatetic *περί*-titles seem to suggest, *περὶ Μέθης* was a kind of problematic treatise. Some of the fragments can be construed as answers to the aporetic *διὰ τί* exemplified in the Topics (i 4 and 11); all of them give explanations, and one is introduced by the epitomatist as a *διὰ τούτων* account[127]. Imagine a question about *ῥοδιακαὶ χυτρίδες* of the form *διὰ τί εἰς τὰς μέθας παρεισφέρονται μέν, ἧττον δὲ ποιοῦσι μεθύσκειν*; The answer would be the one quoted by Athenaeus at 464C-D. This possibility is strengthened by the following fact. In one of Plutarch's *quaestiones*, Florus shows surprise that Aristotle did not explain in his *περὶ Μέθης* why old people get drunk

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126. Ath. 424E-F (Thphr. L136 F): *πυνθάνομαι δ' ἔγωγε* and 632A (Aristox. 124 W): *ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα*.

127. Ath. 641D-E = 104R: **14a.**

quickly and women slowly[128]: the implication is that *περὶ Μέθης* raised such questions and 'solved' them. But one of the fragments given by Athenaeus reveals that Aristotle has answered the first half of Florus' query: *μεθύσκονταί τε, φησιν, οἱ γεραίτεροι τάχιστα δι' ὀλιγότητα καὶ ἀσθένειαν τοῦ περὶ αὐτοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντος θερμοῦ*[129]. Perhaps he had answered the other half too; from the form of the question in Plutarch and the correspondence between its first part and the answer in Athenaeus we may suspect that this is how the original *περὶ Μέθης* solved problems. Athenaeus may have rearranged it by dropping the second answer and continuing with additional material. This is a physiological problem while *ῥοδιακαὶ χυτρίδαι* has a historical or ethnographical character, but both could belong in a superordinate inquiry about conditions for various degrees of intoxication.

This possibility leads on to another one. In a *quaestio* preoccupied with wine, Plutarch tells us that the physical properties of wine had been a matter of great controversy among Peripatetics, Epicureans, and Pyrrhonians. Then he reproduces a passage from Epicurus' Symposion (651E-2B), which reminds him that he has come across an *Ἀριστοτέλους λόγος περὶ τούτου τοῦ προβλήματος*. If I were inclined to believe that Epicurus took a stand against Aristotle in the Symposion, I would choose the nature of wine as a more obvious subject of quarrel than the ones ingeniously devised by Bignone. But I have something else to suggest.

We have from late antiquity a couple of vague references to a problematic tradition in the Peripatos, which invites natural connections with the symposion. Thus Simplicius and Aspasius explain the notion of *ἐγκύκλια προβλήματα* as born out of something which may look very much like sympotic conversations. This is probably a phantasy, and it may be worth pointing out how much it resembles the modern picture of dialogues staging sympotic discus-

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128. Plu. 650A (108R): **18**.

129. Ath. 429C-D = 107R: **17**.

sions in the Peripatos[130]. But Macrobius tells us something more precise about Aristotle himself: he gives a recognisable description of sympotic problems, *magis quaestiones convivales vel proponas vel ipse dissolvas*, and adds that *Aristoteles de ipsis aliqua conscripserit*[131].

According to Bertier, Aristotle's λόγος on wine mentioned by Plutarch at 652A was a problem in the lost Aristotelian Corpus; Plutarch knew the collection and used it in his Sympotic questions[132]. I think it more probable that the λόγος in question was Aristotle's περὶ Μέθης, also known to Plutarch - for he names it. And if Macrobious refers to the same work as Plutarch, Aristotle's περὶ Μέθης was indeed a collection of problems concerning the symposion and subordinated to drunkenness - the aspect under which Plato considered symposia in the Laws. It may be that, in the περὶ Μέθης, we have lost one big problem of drunkenness, separate from the Corpus, which had been used as a source for the sympotic material of the spurious collection.

Our fragments indicate that all περὶ Μέθης were organised by words rather than subject-matters. This seems also to have been the principle of Aristotle's lost problems, which were arranged alphabetically[133]; by contrast, the apocryphal problems were divided by subject, κατ' εἶδος[134]. But this is the model adopted by late erudite symposia, which organised their material around given topics - as is amply illustrated in Plutarch and Macrobius. These

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130. Cf. Simplicius in De Caelo 288.31-9.1, *ἐγκύκλια δὲ καλεῖ φιλοσοφήματα τὰ κατὰ τάξιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῖς πολλοῖς προτιθέμενα, ἅπερ καὶ ἐξωτερικὰ καὶ συνταγματικὰ τὰ σπουδαιότερα*, and Aspasius in EN 10.30-2 Heylbut, *ἔστι δὲ αὐτοῖς προβλήματα ἐγκύκλια παντοδαπά· διὸ καὶ ἐγκύκλια ὠνομάζετο, διὰ τὸ ἐγκυκλίως αὐτοὺς καθημένους ἐπιχειρεῖν εἰς τὸ προτεθέν· ἢ διὰ τὸ ἐν κύκλῳ περιεστῶτας ἀκροᾶσθαι.* (Interestingly, Moraux too thinks that these explanations are 'fantaisistes'.) Probably things happened the other way round; for, as Bertier notes, Peripatetic problems became a favourite source for later symposia because their own form 'semble préformée pour l'usage qu'en font les convives, comme si leurs apories trouvaient un emploi normal dans des démarches du genre de celles qu'on peut observer dans les Questions' ([24] 156-7).

131. Sat. vii 3.23.

132. [24] 153.

133. *Φυσικῶν κατὰ στοιχεῖον*, DL v 26 (title 120).

134. On all this see Moraux [502] 115-7.

symposia must be, to a large extent, an outcome of the Peripatetic method of research. But we have to be very careful here. Symposia such as Plutarch's Questions are problematic dialogues or problems disguised as conversations. It is tempting to imagine, in Aristotle's school, a type of symposion with a conversation rule according to which each party must come up with a solution to the problem launched by the leader, as happens in Plutarch; but there is no evidence that the Peripatetics ever used their own problems in this way.

Another point is this. The one and only fragment which we can safely attribute to Aristoxenus' Σύμμικτα Συμποτικά[135] differs from the περὶ Μέθης fragments in that its subject is not wine but music. This work has led to the unfounded opinion that music played a large role in the περὶ Μέθης[136]. It is true that, according to Plutarch, musical discussions dominated in the symposia of the Lyceum. But Plutarch refers to symposia as **practised**, not as **written**, and I shall argue in the next chapter that Aristoxenus' fragment may reflect a state of things in the Lyceum. If the preoccupation with music was real, the fact that no περὶ Μέθης reflects it may mean that the symposion interested the Peripatetics under different aspects according to whether they wrote about it or actually engaged in it.

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Epicurus

Epicurus' Symposion is best known and raises numerous problems which require independent treatment. Here I shall content myself with a detail of form, which I consider interesting because it invites comparison with the sympotic προβλήματα of the Peripatos.

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135. The fragment without title at Plu. 1146E-F is considered to belong to the same work (122 W); but it could just as well (if not better) come from the περὶ Μουσικῆς.

136. Hirzel [418] i 345, n. 4; see Wehrli *ad* fr. 127. On this cf. *infra*, Ch. 3, p. 139.

The work is known to us not only from fragments, but also from an unfavourable doxographic account, largely used by Athenaeus. We can see that this Symposion was in dialogue form from Plutarch's quotations at 1109E-1110B (Ὅρα δέ...) and 651E-2B (οἴει γάρ...); also, there can be little doubt that the piece scorned by the anonymous doxographer was a dialogue[137].

Epicurus did not write dialogues; the Symposion seems to be an exception. Yet there may be another one. The extensive fragment on rhetoric which Philodemus quotes at coll x 21-xi 13 in the second book of his own Rhetoric comes from a work which is not the Symposion[138], but which seems to be in dialogue form[139]. This possibility has an important consequence. At some other point in the Rhetoric Philodemus refers to 'Epicurus' dialogue', without giving a title[140]. There seemed to be no reason to doubt that he referred to the Symposion, where Usener has placed the fragment (64 in his numbering); but if Epicurus wrote at least another dialogue, this placement is no longer certain.

The fragment in question preserves the opening sentence of the work: *πρῶτον διομολογησώμεθα τί ἐστιν οὗ χάριν κτλ*. If the work is indeed the Symposion, then these must have been words in which the symposiarch launched the topic; the dialogue would have started, directly, with his proposal. The fragment would be a nice illustration of what the doxographer complained about (and Philodemus perhaps admired in another part of the Rhetoric)[141]: it would make us see with our own eyes that Epicurus did not waste his time on

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137. Ath. 187B, 182A, 177B.

138. The last editor of this fragment does not even question the traditional view (Angeli [111] fr 7 and commentary, pp. 74-6); but Sedley's arguments against it are compelling ([595] n. 40; cf. *supra*, n. 48).

139. As suggested by the words *παρίστησιν ἐλεγχόμενον... τὸν νέον... καὶ [π]οιεῖ τὸν Ἰδομε[νέα] αἰτούμενον συγγνώ[μ]ην... κα[ὶ σ]υνάπτοντά τινα [λόγοις] τοιαῦτα κατὰ λέξιν* (translations differ; cf. Sedley 595 114-5 and Angeli [111] 63 and 75).

140. Sudhaus VR ii fr. 31 (p. 166); but see also ii coll lvi 22 and lvii 22 (=**42**).

141. Ath. 186E: *οὐ προλέγει οὐδέν*; cf. *ἐφοδῶν* in Phld. i 96 col lv Sudhaus (49 + 65 U); but the readings of the papyrus are extremely precarious at this point.

introductions, presentations of characters, time and place of the event, or physical details of the sympotic set-up, such as *σπονδαί* and *ἀπαρχὴ θεοῖς*.

This last omission does not show that the work was primarily and emphatically anti-religious, as Bignone has inferred[142]; it only shows that Epicurus wanted the action of his dialogue to start after libations, which, in the Greek meal, separate *δεῖπνον* from *πότος*. Even to the best Greek religious standards it is decent to eat in silence, not in conversation - as we can see in the Symposion of an author as pious and conservative as Xenophon. But this fact makes the *δεῖπνον* philosophically uninteresting. On the other hand, Epicurus wanted his Symposion to be a record of debates among people of the Garden, as the doxographer reports[143]; he had every reason to discard the silent part of the evening. Epicurus' philosophical contempt for music did not prevent him from enjoying music greatly[144]. Why should his philosophical beliefs about the gods interfere with the exercise of small and indifferent mundane conventions, as *σπονδαί* must have appeared to him?

The symposiarch was probably Epicurus himself, who features among characters such as Polyaenus: we can rely on Plutarch for this, even if fr 64 belonged to a different work[145]. The dialogue depicted a symposion of friends and disciples, with the master playing the role of the symposiarch.

The interesting detail which I announced is this. In one of Plutarch's Questions, the doctor Zopyrus defends Epicurus' Symposion against the charge that it brought up the

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142. Bignone [267] ii 549 ('Orbene è assai significativo, che Ateneo ci dica, con intenzionale carattero polemico, avere Epicuro bandito nel suo Simposio ogni elemento tradizionale religioso dei banchetti.... (see also Ullrich ii 7). How, then, can Bignone claim that 'in verità, il Simposio di Epicuro doveva essere uno di quelli banchetti rituali della *vigessima*? (544; on his opinion that 'I banchettatori erano gli epicurei *Eicadeîs* che festeggiavano il maestro, rinnovando... il costume dei *Noumeniastoi* peripatetici', 544-5, see next chapter, nn. 2, 16, and pp. 144). Martin [489] 210 comments, 'mag ein solches Fehlen auch noch so sehr im Wesen der Epikureischen Lehre begründet sein, hier haben wir es nur mit der Form zu tun'.

143. *συμπόσιον φιλοσόφων μόνων*, Ath. 177B; *προφῆται ἀτόμων*, Ath. 187B.

144. *Supra*, n. 114.

145. Cf. Plu. 1109E-1110B (= 50-60 U = 21.1-3 A).

unbecoming subject of whether it is best to have sex before or after the meal. The defence takes two lines, one on form, the other on content. First, the incriminated subject was not on a par with the others: it was not treated as a *πρόβλημα* and did not arise at table, but during the post-prandial walk. Second, Epicurus gave scientific explanations whose effect would be to encourage moderation. Interestingly, the topic defended here by Zopyrus coincides with the topic recommended by Persaeus for conversation at symposia[146].

Relevant for what I have to say is the first point: it suggests a distinction between the problematic and the non-problematic treatment of a given subject within the frame of action of a symposion. Epicurus did not construct the discussion of sex as a *πρόβλημα* because *οὐ... ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τινος καὶ καταστάσεως...ποιησάμενον εἶτα λόγους ἐπ' αὐτῷ περαινεῖν.* Thus a problem has a starting point which is first posited or defined, then argued all the way to the end. An example of presenting a problem could be the *πρῶτον διομολογησώμεθα* quoted by Philodemus[147]; an example of solving a problem, the longer fragment on the corpuscular properties of wine, reproduced by Plutarch; like Aristotle in the physiological fragments, Epicurus endeavoured to reveal the causes of phenomena (*αἰτίαν ὑπειπών*, 1109E). The non-problematic subject developed, apparently, in a sequence of questions and answers: *ἐπὶ σωφρονισμῷ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀνακρούειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν.* This procedure must have been simpler.

In what exactly *διαλέγεσθαι* differed from the problematic procedure is not very clear; but there is an important difference in the details of the setting. The non-problematic discus-

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146. Ath. 607A-E; *supra*, p. 61.

147. If fr 64 belongs to the Symposion, the subject propounded there may have been the main topic of the dialogue, and the words *οὐ χάριν* do indicate that this topic was in the sphere of the *τέλος* - as Bignone contended. But Bignone tried to push these ideas much too far (*eg* from *τέλος* to pleasure as the main good, [267] ii 550 ff; the only reading which might give us a clue, *σῶμα*, is controversial). The problem of the content and purpose of Epicurus' Symposion is too complicated to be discussed here. Bignone has claimed that Epicurus' Symposion was answering Aristotle's point by point. But the only identifiable polemic is in Epicurus' argument that wine is not made entirely of hot elements (Plu. 651E sqq; cf. 1109E-10B). The famous *λεπτύνειν/ τεπτύνειν* fragment has no counterpart in Aristotle, as Philo does not name him at de Plant. 142 (fr. 102R), etc.

sion did not occur at symposion, but in the walk at the end (*τοὺς νέους ἀνιστάντα μετὰ δεῖπνον εἰς περίπατον*). This walk looks like a philosophical transposition of the *κῶμος*. The division drawn by Zopyrus seems to me on the whole to illustrate an original manner of adapting the formal setting of the symposion to philosophical inquiry.

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Persaeus

Let me return now to Persaeus. Athenaeus attributes the fragment on sympotic conversation, from which I started this chapter, to a work also mentioned by Diogenes Laertius: *Συμποτικὰ Ὑπομνήματα*[148]. But in a different place Athenaeus refers to some *Συμποτικοὶ Διάλογοι* composed (*συντεθέντας*) by Persaeus *ἐκ τῶν Στίλπωνος καὶ Ζήνωνος ἀπομνημονευμάτων*, and assures us that he came across two *συγγράματα* with this title (*ἔχουσι τὸ ἐπίγραμμα συμποτικῶν διαλόγων*, 162B-E). In the Dialogues, Persaeus apparently asked questions on a wide range of topics concerning the symposion, from the behaviour of the guests to matters of scholarship[149]; a question about conversation could easily feature here. And indeed, it is generally assumed that the titles *Διάλογοι* and *Ὑπομνήματα* refer to the same work. Although the matter cannot be decided on the basis of available evidence, this option is the one more likely to be right. But the fact that Persaeus' work might have circulated under such different titles poses interesting problems. The dialogue was not much in favour with the Porch; the only Stoics who feature as authors of 'Dialogues' in the lists transmitted by Diogenes are Sphaerus, Herillus and Aristo[150], but their works are mere titles for

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148. Ath. 607A : DL vii 1.

149. *Supra*, p. 61.

150. DL vii 178, t. 18 (Sphaerus: *Διάλογοι Ἐρωτικοί*), vii 166, t. 12 (Herillus: *Διάλογοι*), vii 163, t. 3 (Aristo: *Διάλογοι*).

us. Should we add Persaeus to the group? Is there any glimpse into the Stoic use of dialogue form that can be won from his symposion?

There is a curious detail about this piece. Although at vii 1 Diogenes confirms one of the titles given by Athenaeus, neither features in the official catalogue of Persaeus' works at vii 36. The catalogue contains instead a title *'Απομνημονεύματα*. But according to Athenaeus' denigratory speaker at 162B-E, Persaeus has used for his *Συμποτικοὶ Διάλογοι* a work of the same title, by Zeno - maybe the *'Απομνημονεύματα Κράτητος* (DL vii 4). Both the *'Απομνημονεύματα* of Zeno and that of Persaeus are completely unknown to us. Köpke suspected, with reason, that the former consisted of 'Erinnerungen aus dieser Zeit seines Verkehrs mit Krates', Zeno's recollections from the period of his attempted training under Krates. Diogenes vii 1 shows us that Persaeus' *'Υπομνήματα Συμποτικά* also contained, apart from the discussion about conversation, recollections about Zeno[151]. Whether from Zeno's stories Persaeus took actual material about Zeno or only a certain pattern of story-telling, it is impossible to say[152]. But any *'Υπομνήματα* may easily get referred to as *'Απομνημονεύματα* on grounds of a relation such as seems to have existed between these two books, especially in the increasing confusion between these two forms in late antiquity.

In 1842 and 1857, August Köpke devoted to the literature of *ὑπομνήματα* and *ἀπομνημονεύματα* two studies[153]. According to him, the type of commentary called *ὑπόμνημα* started in notes similar to those *quae in scholis nostris publicis ex praeceptoris ora consignere solent auditores*, and developed in two directions: *monumenta*, remarkable deeds witnessed by the author himself, and *commentaria*, noteworthy facts *ex operibus perlectis et excerptis*. The second branch developed into *philosophici et grammatici commentarii*, contain-

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151. Cf also Ath. 607E-F.

152. Hirzel [418] 401-2 thinks that Persaeus has taken material from Zeno; Deichgräber [306] 929, on the contrary, presumes that Zeno's work is 'nicht die Quelle, sondern höchstens das Vorbild des Persaeus'.

153. Köpke [445] and [444].

ing the reader's personal notes, especially on ethical works, and uncritical collections made by excerptors who piled up *quae de doctrina aliqua vel de rebus historicis memoratu digna ex diversis scriptoribus collegerant* - *eg* ὑπομνήματα ἱστορικά, τακτικά, θεατρικά, συμποτικά. ἀπομνημονεύειν means 'to quote' or 'call to mind'; accordingly, the first sense of ἀπομνημόνευμα is 'quotation', or thing reported by an aural witness. ἀπομνημονεύματα are similar to χρεῖαι and ἀποφθέγματα, except that they build an anecdote around the famous words; thus an ἀπομνημόνευμα becomes 'eine durch Erinnerung überlieferte, in Erzählungsform mitgetheilete Rede oder Ausgabe'[154]. But ἀπομνημονεύματα gradually extended, like ὑπομνήματα, over things read in books, until the two terms came for the most part to overlap.

Thus there is a high chance that the title Ἀπομνημονεύματα in the Diogenian list refers to the same work which Athenaeus once, and Diogenes himself in another place, identified as Ὑπομνήματα Συμποτικά. But if we decide in favour of a relation between these two titles, we must also decide that Persaeus' symposion was a kind of sympotic memoirs; or, rather, a commentary on the symposion - alternatively, a sympotic collection of sundry notes or problems - which also included episodes in the style of memoirs, perhaps borrowed from his predecessors. How can such a work acquire the title of Dialogues?

Answering this question involves a broader issue. The most interesting side of the evolution which brought ἀπομνημονεύματα and ὑπομνήματα close to each other is the fact that both became assimilated to the dialogue. As Köpke reminds us, Diogenes Laertius called the dialogues of Plato and Aeschines 'Memoirs' of Socrates, Ἀπομνημονεύματα (iii 24). Persaeus apparently used two models or sources: Zeno and Stilpo. Stilpo did not compose ἀπομνημονεύματα but διάλογοι, some of them named after philosophers, *eg* Ἀρίστιππος or Ἀριστοτέλης (DL ii 120). It is reasonable to assume that the term ἀπομνημονεύματα used by

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154. But Nietzsche [521] II 197 thought that χρεῖα and ἀπομνημόνευμα 'solo ambitu, non notione inter se discrepare'.

Athenaeus in reference to Stilpo is a pseudo-title which reflects the same situation as Plato's *ἀπομνημονεύματα*. But if Athenaeus or his source described in this manner a dialogue which, as he claims, served as model for Persaeus' Sympotic Commentaries, we should not be surprised that in the same passage the Commentaries in question are presented as *διάλογοι*.

If we accept this explanation, another question would follow. It is difficult to imagine a substantial relation between 'dialogues' and 'commentaries' or 'notes'. Does the interchangeable use of *ἀπομνημονεύματα*, *διάλογοι*, and *ὑπομνήματα* reflect anything substantial, or is it purely conventional?

Speusippus composed a piece with the very intriguing title *Ὑπομνηματικοὺς Διαλόγους* (DL iv 1). Köpke wants to see here a series of learned commentaries presented, in the Platonic tradition, as discussions between people (7). This is an attractive hypothesis: it suggests how the dialogue might have absorbed the original difference between *ὑπομνήματα* and *ἀπονμημονεύματα*, 'notes' and 'quotes', thereby broadening its own sphere. Unlike Peripatetic symposia, Persaeus' symposion contains a detail which seems to encourage this hypothesis.

Persaeus' aim was not to present the lives of great men, but the 'Anordnung und Einrichtung eines guten Gelages'; inspired by Memoirs written by his teacher and by similar works, he composed Commentaries on the symposion. The influence of *ἀπομνημονεύματα* appears in the use of short stories to exemplify a point, as we see it done in our fragment on conversation. But Köpke ranges Persaeus in the category of uncritical collectors of *ὑπομνήματα* (18-9). He believes that Persaeus chopped off the material of *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* according to his different purpose, and did no more than a work of compilation, not worth recording in an official catalogue. This may be wrong.

Athenaeus' speaker at 162B-E says that Persaeus introduced in his Sympotic Dialogues the discussion of topics such as *πῶς ταῖς ἐπιχύσεσι χρηστέον* and the rest 'so that the symposiasts may not fall asleep'. It has often been questioned whether the story reproduced by

Athenaeus in the other passage (607A-E) indicates that Persaeus represented in his work several symposia, or framed it all by one big symposion; and the answer was, of course, that he did the first. But the question is wasted at that point. Instead, the remark about the symposiasts in the present passage, even if malevolent, may give us an important clue as to the organisation of the whole work: the topics take a question-answer pattern within the frame of a symposion - just as Simplicius, Aspasius, and Moraux imagined with respect to Aristotle. Imagine Persaeus setting up a symposion before us in order to discuss problems concerning the nature of this event, such as toasts and kisses. Each question is construed as a commentary on an episode in the actual symposion: over toasts, people inquire how to make toasts; at dessert, they discuss desserts. The raw event is there in order to be talked about, more or less like an author's text in a commentary. This may be a way in which *διάλογοι* and *ὑπομνήματα* could blend together.

Most of Perseaus' work is lost, and the ancient tradition about it is hopelessly confused. But this confusion reflects a very interesting state of affairs on a wider scale. Persaeus' book is at the crossroads of *Διάλογοι*, *Ὑπομνήματα*, and *Ἀπομνημονεύματα*, and also has common features with the *Προβλήματα*. But these four literary forms have played a leading role in the history and transmission of ancient philosophical thought; and we may find with surprise that the problems, biographies and similar works, customarily perceived by modern scholars as devitalised successors to the brilliant Socratic-Platonic tradition, marked in fact a step further in the progress of ancient prose towards more sophisticated systems of expression, such as the treatise in science and philosophy or the novel in fiction.

iii

Socratic Origins?

The phrase *συμπόσια Σωκρατικά* in Hermogenes and Plutarch has given rise to genetic as well as typological theories: scholars proceeded not only to extract rules from the two samples, but also to search for a 'Socratic' descent of the literary form. Thus in the last century Joël ventured the idea that the Symposia of Plato and Xenophon drew on a lost Symposion of the Seven Sages by Antisthenes, analogous to his dialogue *περὶ παιδοποιίας*[155]. This completely unfounded hypothesis has been refuted[156], but scholars still toy with the idea that 'symposia' were written in the Socratic circle.

Two titles might tempt us to think that this was so. One belongs to Aristippus: *Πρὸς Τὸν ἐπὶ Τῆς Κύλικος*[157]. This may be translated 'To the party-leader' and remind us, even if by default, of the *νόμοι συμποτικοί*: supposing that the work existed and was by Aristippus, we can at best presume that it was a protreptic piece. Unfortunately the title is unreliable: it occurs only in the anonymous part of the list, without being confirmed by Sotion and Panaetius[158]. Exciting as it may be to make a link between the *νόμοι συμποτικοί* and the Socratic tradition, there would be far too much of a guess in the process.

The other title occurs in the last part of the list of Antisthenes' works: *περὶ Οἴνου Χρήσεως ἢ περὶ Μέθης*[159]. This is more solid and more exciting. The title suggests that the

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155. Joël [438] ii 750 sqq.

156. Martin [489] 299; see also Mikolajczak [499] 17 sqq, Fraustadt [362] and Giannantoni [199] iv 252.

157. DL ii 83-5 = 121 Mannebach. Another promising title in the same part of the list is *πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτιμῶντας ὅτι κέκληται οἶνον παλαιὸν καὶ ἑταίρας*.

158. Cf. Mannerbach 79-80. The four sources are analysed by Nietzsche [521] 187-8; a general presentation of the problem of Aristippus' authorship in Giannantoni [110] 55-73.

159. DL vi 15-8 = 1 Decleva Caizzi.

Peripatetic tradition of *περὶ Μέθης* may have had Socratic origins; and Antisthenes definitely wrote the work in question, because we have a fragment from it in Aelius Aristides' quotation, in the third *Ἱερὸς Λόγος*[160]. The fragment narrates how Asclepius cured an athlete by using wine in two stages: he prescribed abstention for a period, then the drinking of a fixed amount, *ἡμίνα βασιλική*. This obscure phrase seems to mean *ἡμικοτύλιον*, which is roughly half a pint[161]. Related to the main title, this episode may indicate that Antisthenes wrote a medical book, perhaps about the uses of wine in cures and recipes. This is pretty implausible; but the book contained a recipe, and this is all that survives from it. The style, context, and date of the quotation do not help us at all to understand the purpose of the work. Yet I should extract a few points from this occurrence:

1. To judge from the fragment, Antisthenes' book cannot be considered a 'symposion' in any sense, simply because (unlike in Peripatetic fragments) there is no sign that Antisthenes treated wine and drinking as a component of the symposion.

2. It would be impossible to say that Antisthenes' book set any kind of example for the Periparetic *περὶ Μέθης*.

3. But, if the title is due to Antisthenes himself, this work creates the precedent of a **secondary title** of the form *περὶ Μέθης*. We should take this into account when we contemplate the possibility of a title of the form *Συμπόσιον ἢ περὶ Μέθης* later on.

4. Another and very interesting precedent which Antisthenes' work may have created is that of a philosopher approaching wine, like doctors, as a *φάρμακον*. This is a vague and maybe hazardous hypothesis, but we shall be able to appreciate its interest for the history of the philosophical symposion once we have discussed Plato's Laws.

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160. 30-33 Keil = 41 Decleva Caizzi; on style and what may have been the quotation from Antisthenes see Hoistad [422] 27-9.

161. IG vii 2712.66 (Acraeph.). *Hemina* is the Sicilian and Latin *κοτύλη*. But I am puzzled about the meaning of *βασιλική* here: in Galen's time this word was also used in medicine, for instance in connection to *φάρμακα* (*eg* xii 601K).

Points 3 and 4 contain the only senses in which it may be possible to speak of a Socratic influence on the philosophical symposion; but this is not of much help to those scholars who believe that some of the less brilliant disciples of Socrates portrayed their master at symposia in dialogues, before Plato did so.

There are indeed elements in Plato's Symposion which come from a common Socratic background. Such is the occurrence of Alcibiades, on whom both Antisthenes and Aeschines wrote dialogues. Aeschines' Aspasia is a plausible prototype for Diotima, because she was presented as Socrates' teacher in matters of love[162]. But the symposion itself had never been a topic or a motif in Socratic dialogues, and does not feature in titles of works by Socrates' pupils, as is still sometimes claimed[163]. The disputants to the position of first writer of a Symposion in the Socratic circle are Plato and Xenophon; and although the question has proved impossible to decide, I believe that the real holder of the title is Plato[164]. The prejudice that other Socratics 'invented' the symposion in dialogue form must be dropped[165].

Perhaps a word should be said here about one kind of λόγος Σωκρατικός, the ἐρωτικός[166]. It is believed that the λόγος ἐρωτικός was a form of discourse which developed

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162. On differences between the treatment by Aeschines and by Antisthenes Natorp [515] 492-3.

163. Cf. Schmitt Pantel [584] 237: 'On sait... qu'un dialogue socratique porte le nom de Symposion' (no references).

164. The bibliography on this issue is monstrous. I have no wish to stir the problem afresh; I simply adopt Dover's position ([338]), sustained by the thought that Xenophon followed Plato here as he did in other cases.

165. Here it is apposite to quote Guthrie's conclusion to his lucid summary of Hug [423] ([404] iii 344-5 n. 2): 'As a form of prose-literature, the symposion is a post-classical phenomenon owing its inspiration entirely to the work of Plato and Xenophon'.

166. Such works are attributed to: Antisthenes, περὶ Παιδοποιίας ἢ περὶ Γάμου· ἐρωτικός (DL vi 16-18; see Giannantoni [199] v A, frr. 56-61, and Adnot. 28; Κῦρος ἢ ἐρώμενος is a very problematic work, on which see Giannantoni Adnot. 31); Euclides and Simias (DL ii 108 and 124); Simon (DL ii 122). On the subject cf Lasserre [456] and Laurenti [26] ii 536-44. Lasserre believes that all the literature on Eros in the Lyceum derives from a sophistic genre, λόγοι ἐρωτικοί, illustrated by Demosthenes and Lysias (in Plato). The phrase occurs indeed in the first lines of the dialogue (172A-B); Aristotle uses it in the same form (plural) in referring to Aristophanes' speech (Pol. 1262^{b}11, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα Ἀριστοφάνη). The same phrase occurs in the Phaedrus, but in the singular (λόγος... οὐκ οἶδ' ὅντινα τρόπον ἐρωτικός, 227A); it seems to designate the subject of conversation at Epicrates' house, not a kind of speech. The hypothesis of an independent sophistic genre, λόγοι ἐρωτικοί, seems dubious from the evidence presented by Lasserre; but I have no intention

from the poetical address to a lover. If this is true, we may suppose that the strong link between erotic poetry and the symposion and its audience survived here in one way or another. But this is a very faint trace, which the Socratic material is far too scanty to allow us to pursue. At any rate, if we accept the theory of λόγοι ἐρωτικοί, the sophistic ἐρωτικοί of Gorgias, Critias, Isocrates or Demosthenes would have as little connection with the symposion as Lysias' speech in the Phaedrus. Perhaps Phaedrus' puzzling complaint in the Symposion, that nobody has sung the praise of Eros so far, should warn us that Plato incorporated in his picture of a symposion an independent rhetorical form, and with its aid turned the poetic dress of Eros at symposia into long lasting prose, for the first time.

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Philosophers did not write symposia before Plato, but there is not much recognisable influence from Plato's Symposion. There may be instead an influence from the Laws, in topics such as sympotic customs, music at symposia, and especially wine and drunkenness.

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of studying this problem.

Chapter 3

Common Meals and the Philosophical Life

The custom of common meals in Greek philosophical schools was first acknowledged by G. Lumbroso in 1873: in the chapter 'Dei sodalizi Alessandrini' of his 'Ricerche Alessandrine', this scholar noted that ancient philosophical schools were organised in 'corporazioni, cioè in sinodi, e syssitia o tiasi'[1]. Only a couple of years later, in 1881, the notion that Greek philosophers adopted the custom of the symposion was integrated by Wilamowitz in a famous thesis, which he propounded in his study of Antigonus of Carystus. As is well-known and rejected by most scholars today, Wilamowitz contended that philosophical schools, starting with Plato's Academy, were formally organised 'corporations', *θίασοι*, endowed with legal status and dedicated to the Muses. Apparently led by the thought that wherever there is a high table there must be a collegiate institution, he used the common meals as a piece of evidence for this theory. In the course of his argument Wilamowitz coined an interesting phrase, 'philosophischen Symposien' (283); but he was not interested in the custom itself and never explained what the phrase was supposed to mean. Moreover, he assumed that the practice of school banquets and dinners should be taken for granted, and he relegated them all to the cult of the Muses. These views have been extremely influential and, in the absence of a historical study of the philosophical symposion, they became acquired ideas outside the scope of Wilamowitz's thesis, surviving its refutation[2]. One of the results has been to regard

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1. Cf. Lumbroso [479] 260 ff, esp. 268.

2. Here are a few examples: Morrison calls the Pythagorean society 'a daily lunch-club under the presidency of a teacher such as Pythagoras' ([503] 181; the phrase 'banquet quotidien' is currently used in connection with Pythagoreans, *eg* Boyancé [277] 237-8, Carcopino [286] 244). Jaeger quotes DL v 39 as proof that the Lyceum 'formed a fraternity (*θίασος*)... As a symbol of their community they had regular monthly social gatherings, either to eat or to drink' ([432] 315). According to Guthrie, 'both Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum were legally registered *θίασοι* and held organised monthly dinners' ([404] iii 373-4; cf. also iv 20-2 and vi 38-9). Gottschalk assumes that 'symposia played a large part in the life of the community' (*ie* of the Lyceum), and that

the production of Symposia by philosophers as an expression of their practice at school[3].

The philosophical symposion is a fluid organisation, poorly attested, and many questions about it must remain without an answer. But it should not be unduly simplified. Commensality was a large-scale practice which, under various forms, embraced the whole society: its mere existence falls short of proving anything. The identity postulated by Wilamowitz between symposion, θίασος and philosophical school presupposes that the symposion was mainly (if not only) a characteristic of the θίασοι. This has led to the reduction of philosophical groups to political parties and religious sects[4]. One general feature of sympotic life is the capacity to reflect the sense of community and the specific nature of the bond between members. But it was characteristic of Greek philosophical schools, even the most technical ones, to

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'Plato and Aristotle took the θίασοι as their model for the social life of the school' ([394] 71-2). Bignone deduces from Wilamowitz [644] 264 and Poland [541] 253 that 'I peripatetici celebravano un rituale banchetto nel giorno della luna nova..., che era la festa celebrata anche dei Numeniastoi' ([267] ii 240; cf. also 544-5, with n. 142 in my previous chapter). Boyancé deserves leadership in this choir for his elaborate theory about Plato's symposia dedicated to the Muses ([277]). He also gives it an appropriate tone: 'Aussi ne peut-on s'empêcher d'accueillir avec faveur l'idée ingénieuse de Wilamowitz...' ([277] 263). More recently, Angeli-Colaizzo has attacked Bignone's position on Epicurus' symposia ([112], commentary to Zeno of Sidon fr. 11, pp. 91-3; with important references to Schmid [582] 747-9); I shall have little to add on this matter (*infra* n. 16 and pp. 144 ff). Cf. also Joel i 254 n. 3, ii 835 and Taylor [615] 147-8, 174-5 on Socrates' school-dinners, see also Reverdin, [553] 104 ff on Plato, and Wehrli's comments to fr 7 Lycon (p. 22) on Peripatetic banquets.

3. See *supra*, Ch. 2, n. 41; thus also Boyancé [277] 263: 'Les innombrables Banquets, plus ou moins philosophiques, sont, dans les lettres, un écho de ces réunions qui tenaient réellement une grande place dans la vie des anciens'. Pohlenz [540] 108-10 believes that Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus was intended for recitation at school feasts. Jaeger [433] ii 176-8 believes that Plato's Laws expressed a 'new code of behaviour at drinking-parties' which 'grew out of the newly established habit of holding symposia as a regular function in the Academy'; cf. also Stenzel [609] 131. Such ideas go back to Wilamowitz: 'Ich kann es nicht beweisen, aber mich dünkt es fast unmittelbar einleuchtend, dass das Symposion das gedicht ist, in welchem der thiasarch des frischgegründeten Musenvereins in der Akademie ein ideales vorbild für die festmale seines thiasos zeichnet, und noch in den untersuchungen περὶ Μέθης im ersten teile der Gesetze scheinen mir thiasotische wünsche und ehrfahrungen vorzuliegen' (282).

4. Thus according to Frischer [366] 27, Plato attempted 'a theoretical reintegration of philosophy and society on the model of Pythagorean *philosophia*, while achieving practical legitimacy for his school in Athens by giving it the substantively inappropriate but legally convenient form of the religious association (θίασος). Hence he draws up precise blue-prints for a just state in the Republic and Laws; hence he goes to Tarentum - and to Syracuse. In Athens he founds the Academy and gives it the legal form of a θίασος whose internal structure is modelled on that of the Pythagorean school'.

promote ideal 'ways of life' connected with their particular beliefs. It is in this light that the common meals of philosophers should be considered.

I must start this chapter with a double warning. Most of the evidence for the practice of symposia among philosophers is anecdotal or conjectural; however careful one may be in handling the sources, there will always remain a serious area of doubt. But what is meant by the mysterious phrase, 'the practice of symposia among philosophers'? The subject itself is slippery. We do not have at our disposal the modern division into public and private affairs. Ordinary meals can easily pass for organised forms of entertainment; random occurrences be constructed as stable events; anonymous figures change into familiar guests. And we may, on the whole, feel inclined to put too much institutional rigour and uniformity in random or diversified instances of sympotic ritual.

The first warning explains why my attitude to this material will be rather sceptical. The second demands that I begin by defining my terms. In the previous chapter I assumed that the phrase 'philosophical symposia', when applied to literary productions, should refer to works about the symposion written by philosophers - and not, for instance, to symposia where philosophers are portrayed[5]. The present chapter deals with actual events, and therefore requires another set of criteria for defining the same phrase. There seem to be at least two conditions under which a dinner-party may reasonably qualify as a philosophical symposion. First, it must be a regular event, with recognisable sympotic ceremonial and the constant ties of membership which the symposion normally requires. Secondly, the group must consist of philosophers, and not just include one or two occasional philosophical guests. Thus the phrase 'philosophical symposion' does not apply mechanically to the same objects of our knowledge (say, testimonials) when we refer to the practice and to the works; for instance, if Plato's Symposion were to be considered as a historical event, the second definition would exclude it from the rank of 'philosophical symposia' in the historical sense, even if the Symposion is a

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5. Ch. 2, p. 72.

'philosophical symposion' in the literary sense and a work of great distinction in the history of philosophy. The difference is important: it should create a barrier against transfers from fiction into reality. In the two definitions which I propose the term 'philosophers' occupies the same position in relation to the terms 'written by' and 'practised by'; it is the difference between these two actions which requires attention and care.

I shall organise my material around a few questions. The central problem is this: how certain can we be that Plato introduced symposia in the Academy, and what do we know about them? This issue is entangled with that of whether the Lyceum borrowed its feasts from the Academy. I shall argue that symposia of philosophers are of many kinds, even in the same school, and that it is inappropriate to assimilate them to feasts in celebration of the Muses and to the banquets of corporations. Finally I shall illustrate the variety of Hellenistic symposia: banquets of Stoic sects, symposia held at court or sponsored by kings, dinners organised by Menedemus for his circle of friends in Eretria. I shall end, as in the previous chapter, with the problem of origins. How far back is it reasonable to push the custom? Did Socrates have a role in this history, and what was it?

The chronological limitations of my material reflect the same principle which I have adopted in Chapter 2. The custom spread in late antiquity, but its origins are obscure and problematic. There is a vast quantity of anecdotes about philosophers drinking together in late Hellenistic and Roman times, such as recorded by Plutarch or Aulus Gellius. Historical or not, I shall not be interested in these. My first aim is to discover as much as possible about the early phases of the practice. In discussion of possible Academic origins, it is instructive to see the variety in the format of symposia adopted by other schools; but I shall try to step as little as possible beyond the natural limit imposed by the cessation of successive scholarchs. On the whole, evidence for later symposia will only be considered when this is relevant for the earlier custom in some way or another.

i: Dining with Plato and Aristotle

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A New Fashion in the Peripatos

It so happens that the Academy and the Lyceum are tied together in the main testimony on Plato's dinners: our source, Antigonus of Carystus, does not give a proper Academic account, but only refers to 'Plato and Speusippus and their followers' by way of contrast: *οὐ γὰρ ἵνα συρρυέντες ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ἕως ὄρθρου γενομένης τραπέζης ἀπολαύσωσιν ἢ χάριν ἐξοινίας ἐποιήσαντο τὰς συνόδους ταύτας οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Σπεύσιππον, ἀλλ' ἵνα φαίνωνται καὶ τὸ θεῖον τιμῶντες καὶ μουσικῶς ἀλλήλοις συμπεριφερόμενοι, καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἕνεκεν ἀνέσεως καὶ φιλολογίας*[6]. But at least Antigonus is more reliable than most biographers who enriched the sympotic tradition with anecdotes about philosophers. Wilamowitz supposed him to be a disciple of Menedemus (140-3) - another philosopher whose symposia Antigonus described in great detail. So far as I know, this hypothesis is not confirmed by ancient texts, but it is chronologically plausible[7]. His affiliation to a circle of philosophers inspired by the Socratic example would lend more credibility to his account. But even if we are sceptical about pupillage, Antigonus still remains one of the best authorities in this kind of literature. Some of his extant fragments, including our passage, contain material to which we

6. Ath. 547F-8A.

7. Antigonus was summoned to Pergamum by Attalus i and spent there the last part of his life, which thus can be dated between 241 and 197 BC. Von Fritz [367] dated Menedemus between 339/7 and 263 BC, and the foundation of his school between 310 and 300. If Antigonus died, say, in 230 aged 70, Menedemus may have joined his circle any time between 283 (references to epigraphical evidence that 'people started on philosophy young' in Barnes [250] 70 n. 76) and 273, the year before the philosopher's exile from Eretria (Menedemus' name features on the list of Delphic *hieromnemones* for that year; cf. Pfeiffer [532] 119 n. 5). On Antigonus see the recent entry by Dorandi in [395]; Dorandi also accepts that 'Dans sa jeunesse il [*sc* Antigonus] avait fait partie du cercle de Ménédème d'Érétrie' (p. 209).

cannot adduce parallels. The most likely explanation is that Antigonus was not compiling from other sources, but writing about customs and events within living memory, if not witnessed by himself; and he probably knew the life-style of the contemporary Academy and Lyceum quite well[8].

Our account derives from a biography of Lycon, fourth scholarch of the Peripatos between 270 and 226BC[9]; Antigonus contrasts the Platonic *σύνοδοι* with the symposia organised by Lycon, which he has described in some detail in the previous passage (157D-F)[10]. As he will say nothing more on Plato, we must start by looking closely at his description.

Lycon's symposia have three remarkable features, which seem to reflect the character of the Lyceum as a technically structured school:

1. The meals are based on small individual contributions of nine obols (*ἐννέα ὀβολῶν ὑποδέχεσθαι*) from the students. The Academy maintained a distinction between current and former disciples[11] which the Peripatos seems to have adopted; and indeed Antigonus mentions the older members of the school, *τοὺς ἐπιμελῶς συναντῶντας τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἰς τὴν σχολήν. ἐπιχειροῦντες* must refer to the students under current training[12]. The interesting fact is that only *οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες* have to pay for the meals; Lycon treats the 'graduates' as guests,

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8. The value of Antigonus as a primary source has been assessed by Wilamowitz [644] 86-94. See also Düring [345] 137, who considers Antigonus 'an exception' for his time and a herald of the good scientific biographical method represented by Hermippus, Satyrus, Sotion and Heraclides Lembus: through their contribution the slanderous works published by their Peripatetic predecessors between 300 and 260BC started to be 'purified' around and after 200BC (pp. 145 ff; but I am not sure about Satyrus' position in this story - cf. pp. 153-4).

9. An interesting fact about Lycon is this. In 247 the Athenian treasurer of military funds, Eucleides son of Micion, launched an appeal for subscriptions between 50 and 200 *drachmae* for the protection of the city, and Lycon donated the maximum sum; his name features on the subscription list among 133 others (*Λύκων φιλόσο*, IG^2 791; on this and 'Lycon's decree', SIG^3 461, cf. Dinsmoor [321] 95 and 141-2).

10. The whole fragment is Ath. 547D1-8B2 = Lykon 7 Wehrli = Wilamowitz [644] 84; **5** in my Appendix iii.

11. Phld. Acad. Ind. col. vi 40-4.

12. On *πρεσβύτατοι* (also perhaps *φίλοι*) / *νεανίσκοι* and *νεανίσκοι* = *ἐπιχειροῦντες* cf. Brink [280] 906 and Wehrli 22 (*ad* fr 7 Lycon): DL v 53, 61, and 69 (wills).

on a par with his personal friends. But if the meals are entirely supported by active students, they must be regular events of the school, in which students are primarily engaged.

2. The organisation of the meal falls under the responsibility of an *ἄρχων*. If we are to believe Diogenes Laertius, archonship existed in the Lyceum from the earliest days: Aristotle borrowed it from the Academy under Xenocrates (v 4). It had been, originally, a function for ten days; Lycon, if not Theophrastus or Straton before him, extended the period to thirty. Thus dinners under Lycon are not an informal affair among students, but events entrenched in the hierarchical organisation of the school.

3. They are also regular, and this is a very important feature. Lycon's dinners always occur on a fixed day, *τῇ ἔνῃ καὶ νέᾳ*. It is possible, I think, to build a new hypothesis around this fact; but there has been too much speculation already on the subject of what was celebrated in Lycon's feasts, and I should preface my hypothesis by warning that Antigonus does not relate them to any particular occasion[13]. Moreover, my hypothesis has an extremely volatile basis: the Athenian calendar[14].

Taken together, the length of the period - thirty days - and the phrase *ἔνη καὶ νέα*, which designates the day of conjunction between the old and the new moon before the proper 'new-moon day', *νουμήνια*[15], suggest that archonship in the Peripatos under Lycon was a monthly function. The succession of archons followed the calendar, not the prytanic months of the official year: the first archon would take office on the first (*νουμήνια*) of Hecatombaion and hold it to the end of that month (*ἔνη καὶ νέα*); then he would be replaced by the next archon on the first of Metageitnion; then a new archon would come on the first of Boedromion, then of Pyanopsion, Maimacteion, Posideon, Gamelion, Anthesterion, Elaphebolion, Mounichion, Thargelion, and Scirophorion. But if the function of archons in the

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13. On the Muses see further, pp. 140 ff.

14. The discussion which follows is based on material provided by Dinsmoor [321] and Mikalson [498].

15. Plu. Solon 25; Dinsmoor [321] 301.

Peripatos was delimited by the first and last day of the month, should we not suspect that the symposia described by Antigonus are connected with the retirement of the current archon?

There were about seven monthly festival days in public Athenian life. These days were placed at the beginning of months, starting on the *νουμήνια* - that is, the next day **after** Lycon's feast[16]. By contrast, on the last days of a month one was free from service in public feasts: only two festivals took place then, the Chalceia on Pyanepsion 30th, and notably the Panathenaea, from 28th to 30th Hecatombaion (if not all the week from 23rd on)[17]. With the exception of Hecatombaion, the 29th and the 30th of every month were used as meeting days for the Ecclesia[18], in particular the last day of the year, Scirophorion 30th[19]. In terms of ritual, the second half of the month leaves the impression of having retained a chthonian character; thus the 27th, 28th and 29th were considered *ἡμέραι ἀποφράδες*, and on the 30th private *δεῖπνα* were given to Hecate[20]. This feature may depend on the fact that the sacred calendar allowed more space for private offerings and celebrations (such as were also the symposia of Peripatetic philosophers) towards the end rather than beginning of a month. In

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16. Evidence and description of Noumenia in Mikalson [498] 14-5 and [497]: this is a public cult associated with the serpent in the Erechtheion (295; for the procession to Acropolis cf. D. 25.99). The 2nd of a month (*δευτέρα ἰσταμένου*) was a festival day for Agathos Daimon; the 3rd (*τρίτη ἰσταμένου*), for Athena's birthday; the 4th (*τετρὰς ἰσταμέμου*), for Heracles, Hermes, Aphrodite, and maybe also Eros; the 6th (*ἕκτη ἰσταμένου*), possibly for Artemis' birthday (6th of Thargelion); the 7th (*ἑβδόμη ἰσταμένου*), for Apollo's birthday (and a Panhellenic feast); the 8th (*ὀγδόη ἰσταμένου*), for Poseidon (also Theseus?); see Mikalson [498] 14-20, 24, and each of these days under individual months in his Chapter iii. When Bignone assumed that the Peripatetic feasts as well as the Epicurian *Εἰκάδες* (on which *infra*, pp. 144 ff.) were 'ritual banquets' of the new moon, like those of the Noumeniastoi ('è chiaro dunque che Epicuro, pur combattendo la scuola avversaria, ne adottò un uso caratteristico', [267] ii 240; cf. *supra*, n. 2) he made a triple mistake. He confounded three days: the 1st with the 29th-30th and the 29th-30th with the 20th; and he also confounded the public Noumenia with the private cult of the Noumeniastoi, also celebrated on the 1st (on the difference, Mikalson [498] 13-4).

17. Mikalson [498] 78; see also 34 and 199.

18. See Mikalson's tables on pp. 184 and 188, and the evidence discussed in Chapter iii. Note, by contrast, only one meeting of the Boule on the 29th of Maimacterion in 140/39 BC (p. 85; also a possible one on the 30th of Posideon 209/8 AD - p. 96).

19. *Ibid*, 180-1; Mikalson plausibly interprets the sacrifice to Zeus Soter mentioned by Lysias (26.6) as a special offering before the last session of the year.

20. *Ibid*, 21-4.

any event, it makes good sense to imagine that a scholarch should impose a rule to the effect that his ἄρχοντες organise a Guest Night for the whole Lyceum on the last evening of their office, entertaining the present and former members, the scholarch, and his personal friends, with only little help from the students. There is no obvious model for this sort of duty on the public scale; but in Hellenistic cities certain magistrates - the priest, the agonothete, and especially the gymnasiarch - do give benefactory feasts related to the term of their magistracy, although the evidence is only for euergetes giving feasts upon entering, not leaving, a function[21].

The only problem with a monthly organisation of archonship seems to be that, if this is what Antigonus means, '30 days' does not represent a real number because some of the months were hollow (*ie* had only 29 days). But it is a minor problem; for it seems that any Athenian would have recognised the calendar month under this approximate description[22]. According to Diogenes Laertius, Thales estimated for the first time that the year has 365 days and the month 30 days (i 24, 29). These are ideal numbers, based on the irreconcilable cycles of sun and moon. Greek astronomers made increasingly accurate descriptions of the real luni-solar year (Hipparchus only fell short of astronomical truth by making the month half a second longer than it actually is); but in doing so they stuck to the ideal number of 30 days to the month[23].

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21. On this see Schmitt Pantel [584] 359-420 ('L'Échange Social'), with full epigraphical documentation - and especially the material presented in 'L'entrée en charge', 372-5: in a number of cases, 'quelle que soit la charge assurée, le don du banquet intervient au moment de l'entrée dans la magistrature' (372) and is designed to give it 'un éclat particulier' (373).

22. According to Mikalson [498] 8-9, Athenian practice with hollow months was to omit, not the ἕνη καὶ νέα (the 30th), but the previous day, δευτέρα φθίνοντος or δευτέρα μετ' εἰκάδας (the 29th in a full month). Which months were hollow and in which system is a matter of dispute (*eg* the discussion of Scirophorion in Dinsmoor [321] 387; for calculations of this kind see Pritchett and Neugebauer [544] 11-14 and Meritt [496] 16-37, referred to in Mikalson [498] 9 n. 1). But there seems to be evidence for almost every '29th' (δευτέρα φθίνοντος) and '30th' (ἕνη καὶ νέα) in the year, whether these represent real or conventional numbers.

23. The Greeks started from the observable fact that the lunar month has about 29½ days, which makes 59 whole days in two months. In the old lunar calendar, this figure produced a regular alternance of hollow (29 days) and full months (30 days), *ie* 354 days to the normal year and 383 or 384 to the intercalary year. Meton adjusted these figures to the cycle of the sun by creating a nominal month of 30 days, then striking off every 64rd day in cycles of 19 years; this apparently allowed for strings of two full months to occur before a hollow month:

Tradition associates the Peripatos with the reform of the Metonic calendar done by the famous astronomer Callippus of Cyzicus and (if Dinsmoor is right)[24] adopted in 330/29 BC: according to Simplicius, it was Aristotle who helped Callippus in this task, which had been started by Eudoxus[25]. Such associations increase perhaps the possibility of finding archonship divided by calendar months in Aristotle's school[26].

Now let us move to Plato. Finishing this account, Antigonus refers by way of contrast to the better days of the Old Academy. His testimony is extremely precious: it tells us that Plato and Speusippus celebrated dinners with their disciples and designed them for ἄνεσις, a quality of the symposion emphasised later on by Stoics and Platonists alike, and φιλολογία, which our fragments from sympotic works by Peripatetic philosophers exemplify through frequent inquiry about names and customs. Antigonus seems to point us to a custom which goes back uninterruptedly to Plato. But his testimony is unique and should be examined with great care.

Antigonus recalls Plato and Speusippus in order to deplore the decay of school-manners. How 'historical' is this evocation? For instance, if symposia were practised in the

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thus out of the 235 months (7 intercalary) of Meton's cycle only 110 were hollow.

24. [321] 362-3.

25. Simpl. Cael. ii 12, p. 493 Heib.; cf. Dinsmoor [321] 361 (who quotes Aristotle's reference to Callippus' contributions in the Peripatos, Met. xi 8, 1073^b) and Dicks [312] Ch. vii ('Callipus and Aristotle', pp. 190-219).

26. I see no reason why we should think that Callippus did not work with the same ideal month of 30 days in mind as Meton, or indeed as any normal Greek. Dinsmoor quotes a passage where Geminus says that 'they' [*ie* Callipus and the astronomers of his school] 'adopted the same [*ie* Metonic] arrangement of the intercalary months' (Εἰσαγωγή 8.57-60). Geminus leaves the impression that Callipus did not alter Meton's system as a whole in this respect. It seems that Callippus took from Eudoxus the figure of 365¼ days to the year, which corrected the 365 and 5/19 days of the Metonic year by the fraction 1/76, but rejected Eudoxus and followed Meton in the actual organisation of the months. (Dinsmoor shows that Eudoxus' cycle was in practice a revival of the old *octaeteris*: 8 years consisting of 99 'deficient' months of 29 and 51/99 days; whereas the Callippic year, truer than the Metonic by some 18 minutes, was a Metonic cycle multiplied by four, *ie* 76 years, 940 months (28 intercalary) and 27,759 days). The Metonic year was longer than the astronomical by 30 minutes and 11 seconds.

Peripatos before Lycon, we may be surprised that Antigonus chose to compare him with Plato and Speusippus instead of former leaders of his own school; just on its own, the passage suggests, rather, that Lycon took the symposia directly from the Academy. But there is more evidence for symposia practised in the early Lyceum than in the early Academy; Lycon himself inherited from his predecessor Strato furniture and other paraphernalia for dinner-parties (DL v 62), whose proper place ought to have been the dining-hall mentioned by Strabo. We must deduce that Antigonus mentions Plato only in order to remind us of the origins of the custom.

The banquets are articulated and well structured. But if symposia had been introduced in the Early Academy under Plato, as Antigonus tells us, did they have, there and then, the same format as Lycon's symposia? With respect to what are the *σύνοδοι* of the past 'of the same kind', and what exactly was 'strange' about them under Lycon? It is impossible to decide whether Antigonus deplores only the luxury and burden of new expenses, or includes in his complaint any of the three institutional features which I listed above. No source mentions contributions or fixed days in connection with the Academy, nor can we find such things at an earlier stage in the Lyceum. Archonship, as I said, preexisted; but we do not know what the responsibilities of an archon were before Lycon's time. Antigonus makes a parenthetical comment to the effect that the archon had been established in order to preserve discipline (*εὐκοσμία*) in the school; to charge him with the burden of symposia may appear to Antigonus as an extravagant novelty. But was Lycon the first to increase the tasks of the archon with a liturgy of school banquets, or did he only make it more public and onerous - say, by adding his own friends, and maybe also former members of the school, to the number of guests? It would be crucial to know whether contributions preexisted or were invented by this scholarch. Does Antigonus consider it an *ἄτοπος ἐθισμός* that the students have to pay at all, that they have to pay more than before, or that the sum raised is too small compared with what the archon has to supply?

The passage from Antigonus gives us a full record of how common meals were organised in a philosophical school, but raises very difficult questions about the transmission of the custom and its original format. It remains to find out whether any of the small or broken pieces of the sympotic tradition can shed some light on these matters.

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Plato's Guests

Stories about Plato playing the guest at Dionysius' court were in circulation as early as the second century BC[27]. The *topos* was equally familiar to detractors and apologists; they transferred it to Plato's immediate successors, Speusippus and Xenocrates; while another group of anecdotes portrayed Plato enjoying the tyrant's hospitality in the company of various members of the Socratic circle. By contrast, the Academy has inspired a very reduced number of dining-in anecdotes: there are only two about this school under Plato and one under Arcesilaus[28].

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27. *Eg* Riginos [555], anecdotes 68 (DL vi 25) and 57 (DL ii 78 and many other sources). See in general her Ch. vii, 'The Sicilian Voyages: Plato at the Syracusan Court', pp. 70-85.

28. Athenaeus records a symposion with disciples under Arcesilaus, where the joke turns on the Good (420D-E; for the pattern of the anecdote see Plu. 461D). According to Diogenes Laertius, Arcesilaus was a permanent guest to supper in Crantor's house, in the company of Polemon and Crates (iv 22). Arcesilaus also inspired the writing of a Perideipnon (Timon) and of an Arcesilaus with a comastic scene (Menippus), while Polemon's name occurs in a line from Lucilius's satire baptised by its editors A Symposion of Philosophers (cf. Ch. 2, pp. 72, 60, nn. 44 and 101). There may be some background of fact to all this, but it is impossible to discover in what it consisted. Crantor died before he could take over the scholarchate (in 276/5 according to Dorandi [87] 58; see also Dorandi [332]). Polemon and Crates were his former teachers; thus Crantor appears as a distinguished member of the Academy entertaining (1) the present scholarch, Polemon, (2) Polemon's close partner Crates, who will survive to lead the Academy for some three years after Polemon's death, and (3) a much younger member, Arcesilaus, to whom these people 'apparvero quali dèi' (Dorandi [87] 52 and n. 140), and who was to succeed Crates in place of an unwilling old member, *Σωκρατίδου τινός, ὃν διὰ τὸ πρεσβύτατον εἶναι προεστήσαθ' ἑαυτῶν οἱ νεανίσκοι συνελθόντες* (Ind. Acad. col xviii 3-7). Crantor's suppers did not take place in the Academy and were restricted to a very small number of members. Did these daily gatherings inspire the anecdotal tradition? Whether Arcesilaus or his predecessors Polemon and Crates also held symposia in the Academy with their disciples, we cannot know.

1. Eudoxus

One of the anecdotes concerning Plato belongs to the biographical tradition of Eudoxus of Cnidus. Diogenes Laertius records it thus: *τινὲς δέ φασι καὶ συμπόσιον ἔχοντι τῷ* Πλάτωνι *αὐτὸν* [*sc* Eudoxus] *τὴν ἡμικύκλιον κατάκλισιν, πολλῶν ὄντων, εἰσηγήσασθαι* ('some say that, once when Eudoxus was at a symposion with Plato, as there were many guests around, he introduced the *sigma*-couch arrangement', viii 87-8). How trustworthy is this story? The sources mentioned by Diogenes in Book Eight are Favorinus, Hermippus, and Eratosthenes, but it is not possible to trace the origin of our anecdote. It is preceded by a dubious reference to the period of tensions between Plato and Eudoxus. August Boeck attempted to place the symposion episode in the years before Eudoxus' departure for Egypt in 373, when Plato was 'showing respect' for him[29], but most scholars are sceptical about the whole problem of their relationship[30].

The story contains an appealing detail: the semicircular arrangement of the *κλίναι*. Perhaps we have here another unique and very precious testimony; for there is no parallel tradition about an Academic dining hall. The story is followed by a statement of Eudoxus' position on pleasure. It invites us to imagine large banquets in the Academy before the middle of the fourth century, where Plato and Eudoxus engaged in the sort of disputes of which one gets a remote echo in the Philebus or Nicomachean Ethics (1101^b27); we may even be tempted to think, as Bignone did with respect to Epicurus' Symposion, that the subject of sympotic discussions in the Academy was none other than the Good. But there may be something to take from the story even on a more sober judgement. Like Lycon's parties, this dinner was attended

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29. Boeckh [269] 156; cf. Eudoxus T7 Lasserre. Eudoxus' *acme* was set by Tannery in 368BC ([613] 296).

30. *Eg* Tannery [613] 296: 'Les récits sur les relations entre Eudoxe et Platon ne se reposent certainement sur aucun fondement sérieux'. Lasserre considers our anecdote 'alles andere als geschichtlich' (*ad* T7, p. 141). Cf. also Heath, [412] 192, Schwegler [72] (commentary on p. 310, vol. iv), and Dicks [312] Ch. vi, p. 152 and n. 232.

by many. Were they disciples or guests, such as Eudoxus himself? Is this an instance of how we should fill in the content of Antigonus' brief remark about dinners designed for *ἄνεσις* and *φιλολογία*? The anecdote is brief too, but, with Eudoxus turning up for a large symposion in the Academy as Plato's friend, it can give an excellent start to our attempts to solve the riddle of Plato's *σύνοδοι* being similar and dissimilar to Lycon's.

Unfortunately the interesting detail about the *κλίναι* makes the testimonial spurious. Lasserre plausibly suspected that the whole story was inspired by the *exedra* in the Academy - a literary invention on the theme of the great master surrounded by disciples[31]. But this scholar formulates only tentative doubts against the hypothesis that the *sigma*-arrangement may have come to replace 'der üblichen im offenen Viereck Platz'. This idea is extremely implausible, and it deserves some comment because, as I already said, there is no other reference to a dining hall in the Academy. Katherine Dunbabin gives the following report: 'Despite the literary evidence for the use of the *sigma* in the first century AD, to the best of my knowledge no rooms are marked out specifically for a *sigma*-couch before the late second or beginning of the third century'[32]. The semicircular or curving *sigma*-couch (*stibadium*) is a Roman invention of the Christian era (in fact Dunbabin says that *sigma* dining-rooms have been taken for Christian chapels for a long time), which grew into fashion in the fourth and fifth centuries AD.

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31. 'Eher schwebt hier das Bild der Philosophenexedra vor...' ([70] 141). On the *exedra* cf. Phld. Ind. Acad. 100 Meckler, Cic. Fin. v 2, Vitr. v 11.2, Str. xvii 1.8.

32. Dunbabin [343] 131-2; for the whole question see this article and her references. The literary evidence is Martial x 48 and xiv 87 (*sigma* inlaid with tortoise shell), and the Younger Pliny, Ep. v 6.36-7. The earliest buildings seem to be the 'House of the Buffet Supper' in Antioch (Severan period) and a ii AD century apsidal room from Sainte-Colombe, Vienne (p. 131; for dating cf. Levi [461] and Lancha [453]). Dunbabin (p. 129) makes it clear that the *sigma*-couch could not have come into use in indoor symposia before the building of apsidal halls; the evidence for these goes back to the first century BC, but apses were not used only for dining (*eg* 'the apse in the "Auditorium of Maecenas" is completely occupied by a *nymphaeum*, while a regular rectangular *triclinium* appears to have been laid out in the main area of the building' (n. 72; cf. also Tamm [612] 148-82). The formal *sigma*-couch appears on the 'Tomb of Vestorius Priscus' in Pompeii, but the symposion represented there takes place outdoors (pp. 133-4 and n. 89).

But Dunbabin considers that the ancestor of the *sigma* was a simple semicircular arrangement of diners reclining on cushions, leaves, or even bare rocks, in rustic picnics and funerary banquets, as they are represented in paintings from the first century AD - 'a simple, apparently impromptu setting'. If this description appeals to our sense of what a *ἡμικύκλιος κατάκλισις* of philosophers might have been like, here is a solution for avoiding the anachronistic *κλίνη*; but then we have to send Plato's Academy to a garden-party outdoors[33]. This would be absurd because, according to the author of our anecdote, the rationale behind Eudoxus' introduction of the *sigma* arrangement was to accomodate a larger number of people, which suggests that the symposion took place indoors. But the explanation itself is extremely dubious. Dunbabin calls our attention to the fact that the *sigma*-couch could not hold many guests; the regular numbers in texts vary from 5 to 8, occasionally 12[34], and archaeology confirms them[35]. Increasing the number of guests in this sort of dining arrangement is done by multiplication of apses[36]. Whether inspired by the exedra or not, our anecdote purports to be about the dining-hall, and Diogenes does not seem to find it implausible. Should we suppose that it was invented at an epoch which had seen the sumptuous multiconch rooms harbouring as many as fifty guests in a *sigma*-arrangement?

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33. The symposia in semicircle gathered by Dunbabin [343] 132-5 and Pls. 32-4, in paintings from Pompeii ('Casa dell'Efebio', 'House of M. Lucretius'), Augustan Rome ('Villa Pamphili'), or Vibia (Banquet of the Blessed in the Hypogaeum), take place outdoors. But such paintings are not earlier than Pompeii.

34. *Ibid*, pp. 129-30 and n. 59.

35. *Eg* 7 places in the 'Villa of the Falconer' in Argos and in the 'Maison du Cerf' in Apamea (both vi AD): Dunbabin [343] 129 and n. 53.

36. *Eg* the 'Palace of Theodoric' at Ravenna (3 apses) and the 'Maison de Bacchus' in Numidia (Djemila; 7 apses 4 m each = 50 guests): Dunbabin [343] 130, with references in nn. 61 and 62.

2. Timotheus

The second anecdote achieved fame: Cicero, Plutarch twice, Aelian, and Athenaeus preserve it for us in five variants, nearly in the same words[37]. It is the story of one dinner to which Plato invited, not another philosopher, but an outstanding character in Athenian mid-fourth century public life: Timotheus, *στρατηγός* between 378 and 356BC. Wilamowitz did not compare Timotheus' dinner directly with Lycon's revelries, but he saw in it a paradigm, even if superficial, of Academic (and therefore philosophical) symposia of all times (283). I shall examine this anecdote in some detail.

The setting seems to be more explicit: the dinner took place *ἐν* Ἀκαδημίᾳ, and Timotheus found himself in the company of *οἱ παρὰ* Πλάτωνι *δειπνοῦντες* (*δειπνήσαντες*). If this is the picture of a circle of disciples at their regular meal, Timotheus would have attended as a supernumerary guest of the scholarch, as did Lycon's personal friends; and the anecdote gives us a meagre but promising glimpse into the inner life of the Early Academy, otherwise irretrievably lost.

The location is vaguer than appears: *ἐν* Ἀκαδημίᾳ can refer to the school founded by Plato or to his own property in the same area[38]. Plato entertained Timotheus either at school or in his own house. On the second option we would have another parallel with Lycon, whose banquets were not held at school, but in a private house 'in a conspicuous part' of Athens - it came into Lycon's possession around 230 BC[39]. The possibility of school-dinners taking place in the private house of the scholarch is still received with prejudice[40]. This prejudice should be

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37. Cic. Tusc. v 100, Plu. 127A-B and 686A-B, Ael. VH ii 18, Ath. 419C-D (**6a-e** in my Appendix iii).

38. Suda *sv*, DL iii 5 and 19-20; cf. Billot in [395], pp. 780-1 and 784-6.

39. Davies [304] 508-9 (Davies attributes this house to Konon 3 and not 2).

40. *Eg* Wehrli 22, who thinks that the location of a school-business in a private house asks for an explanation: 'Conon's house was used for the meetings because of the disintegration of the school-building'.

dropped; it has been instilled by Wilamowitz's conviction that symposia were dedicated to the Muses and therefore should duly take place in the Museion at school[41].

The location does not matter very much, as long as the scholarch presided and students attended. But did they? The words *οἱ παρὰ Πλάτωνι δειπνοῦντες* do not need to refer to anything like a permanent company, and even less to a group of disciples. But let us suppose that they do. First, how plausible is the story? Second, what information can we extract from it?

In order to answer the first question we must weigh the possibility of Timotheus being Plato's guest. Great military men such as Phocion or Chabrias acquired the reputation of having frequented the Academy at some point in their career[42], but Timotheus was not one of them. His relationship with Plato seems more complicated. Timotheus was a pupil of Isocrates[43], paid him fees[44], erected a statue to him[45], and received from him a warm posthumous appraisal[46]. But he was, apparently, an open-minded admirer of the life of learning: an anecdote portrays him stopping in wonder to catch the esoteric conversation of a healthy-looking Plato[47]. A more serious tradition, which starts from Philochorus, makes him one of Plato's defenders in law[48]. Philochorus also claimed that the two men were related, but this does not prejudice the testimony; it is probably an overstatement due to the nature of the

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41. Wilamowitz [644] 265: he also thinks that Antigonus rightly disapproves of the change of location under Lycon. But Antigonus does not indicate a break of traditions in this respect.

42. Plu. adv. Col. Ch. 32 (1126C); cf. Kirchner [440] n° 13700 (pp. 314-8; 'consuetudine utitur Platonis').

43. Plu. 837C, Cic. de Or. iii 139.

44. Phld. R. ii 178 Sudhaus.

45. Plu. 838 D.

46. Isocr. 15.101-39.

47. Aelian VH ii 18.

48. Fr. 223 Jacoby. Be it said that this text is the only real element behind Dusanic's imaginary account of a relationship between Plato and Timotheus in [346].

case. The only problem is that Timotheus' name does not feature in all the variants of the story.

The story in question is the notorious piece of gossip about Aristotle's defection from Plato[49]. Philochorus' arguments in defence of Aristotle are reproduced in all the Aristotelian *Lives*, and the last one runs thus: *ὅτι οὐδὲ εἰκὸς ἦν Ἀριστοτέλη ξένον ὄντα τοῦτο δύνασθαι ποιεῖν κατὰ Πλάτωνος πολίτου τυγχάνοντος καὶ μέγα δυναμένου διὰ Χαβρίαν καὶ Τιμόθεον τοὺς Ἀθήνησι στρατηγήσαντας καὶ κατὰ γένος αὐτῷ προσήκοντας*[50]. This text seems to establish that Chabrias and Timotheus were Plato's protectors. But Aristides in a famous attack on Plato gives us a different version, in which Timotheus has been replaced by his sometime enemy Iphicrates[51]: Chabrias and Iphicrates, taking heed of the revolt (*ἐπανάστασις*) of Plato's closest *ἑταίροι, ἠγανάκτησαν καὶ τὸ ἐντείχισμα διέσπασαν καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ προσέταξαν σωφρονεῖν αὐτοῖς*[52]. In a study of how Porphyry's polemic against Aristides is reflected in Olympiodorus, Behr argues that the source for this variant was a reliable author, Favorinus, and he reconstructs Favorinus' argument thus: 'members of Plato's school attempted the defection during Plato's third trip to Sicily in 360 BC, but (...) their efforts to found a new school were blocked by Chabrias and Iphicrates'[53]. This is a curious reconstruction because, whereas the rest of Olympiodorus' arguments are very close to those of the Vita

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49. Düring [31] 99, 101, 153; cf. Wehrli's comments to Aristoxenus 65 and Jacoby's comments to Philochorus 223. The gossip ran that metic disciples started to build (*ἀντοικοδομεῖν*) a rival school while Plato was in Syracusae. Originally directed against Plato (by Aristoxenus, according to Aristocles), this story turned into a calumny against Aristotle. Many threads are muddled in this confused story. The fact that Philochorus defends Aristotle probably shows that Aristotle's name had already replaced the initial one(s) (Jacoby), rather than that Philochorus introduced it for the first time by mistake (Wehrli). It is curious that all the Aristotelian Vitae mention Aristoxenus and Aristides, who did not refer to Aristotle; the original accuser remains unknown.

50. V. Marc. 13; cf. V. Lat. 12 and V. Vulg. 7, *πῶς γὰρ ἐδύνατο, μέγα τότε δυναμένων Χαβρίου τε καὶ Τιμοθέου στρατηγῶν καὶ τῷ γένει προσηκόντων τῷ Πλατώνι;*

51. See Düring *ad l.* For the relationship between Timotheus and Iphicrates see Corn. Nep. iii 2 and D. ilix 66.

52. *Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων* 443.

53. Behr [255] 195; Ol. In Gorgiam 41. 3 and 9.

(as Behr points out, 194), there is no trace in him of the story of the generals. Behr's parallel seems to indicate, on the contrary, that Favorinus **did not** transmit this story. But even if he did, I would not assume that Favorinus named Iphicrates and not Timotheus. In any event, the idea that Plato's protectors demolished rival walls is a late phantasy; Philochorus' authority prevails. Although the initial accusation is not known, one can guess, with Jacoby, that Philochorus mentioned the generals in order to make a strict legal point. The two names originally given by him must be the right ones.

Thus we can start to envisage the possibility that Plato invited Timotheus to dinner. What, then, do we learn from this episode about Academic banquets in Plato's lifetime?

The complication which one may suspect in Timotheus' appraisal of Plato corresponds to an interesting ambiguity in the anecdote. Aelian and Athenaeus give us a double version, in which Timotheus says that Plato's dinner looked towards the next day **as much as** (a), but also **more than** (b), the present day. (a) is encomiastic, while (b) can easily turn ironic; the other versions follow the encomiastic pattern.

Athenaeus tells us that his (b) version comes from Hegesander of Delphi, an author who reports many anecdotes about philosophers at symposia[54]. Hegesander was extremely hostile to Plato; he showed him celebrating Socrates' death and offering himself as a better leader of the Socratic circle[55]. The (b) version very likely originates in a malicious *bon-mot* about the lack of proper entertainment in Plato's Academy, either made by Hegesander or copied out from one of his sources. One of these is assumed to have been Sotion, because

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54. See Ath. 544 D (Aristippus); 343 C-D (Plato and Aristippus); 419 D-E (Pyrrho); 477 E (Prytanis); 167 E (Demetrius of Phalerum); 162 A (epigram about philosophers' behaviour at symposia). Hegesander was a second century BC collector of sympotic anecdotes (Ὑπομνήματα). The vith book of his work was about philosophers; it may have contained material from Sotion (Susemihl [611] i 489-91, Düring [345] 79, and Wehrli [203]). Düring also considers his book 'one of the few primary sources of Athenaeus'.

55. Athenaeus 507A-E.

Athenaeus invoked both of them in an anecdote about Aristippus' *ὀψοφαγία* at 343C-D[56]. Sotion was another detractor of Plato[57], and his *Διαδοχή* contained sympotic anecdotes. The ironical version of Timotheus' may just as well come from him.

The source for the (a) version is not known, but the context in Athenaeus gives us a possible clue. Timotheus' story is preceded by a piece of advice on moderation from Polemon, the fourth scholarch of the Academy: *φησι παραινεῖν* [*sc* Polemon] *τοῖς ἐπὶ δεῖπνον πορευομένοις φροντίζειν ὅπως ἡδὺν τὸν πότον ποιῶνται μὴ μόνον εἰς τὸ παρόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸν αὔριον*[58]. In a long chain of uncertainly related quotations, these two have a common verbal pattern and make a similar point about 'today' and 'tomorrow', which I have not found illustrated in Greek paroemiology elsewhere. It seems highly plausible to me that the twin sayings of Polemon and Timotheus belonged together in the original source; Athenaeus found them in this order and copied them out, naming his source only at the beginning, and also naming Hegesander as the source on a variant of the second dictum.

This source is a work of doubtful title and disputed attribution, from which Athenaeus excerpted several fragments. He calls it *Ἐρωτικὰ ὅμοια* and ascribes it to the Peripatetic Ariston, a friend or disciple of Lycon[59] from whom Wilamowitz thought that Diogenes might have taken the Peripatetic wills. In Diogenes' list of Ariston's works the piece (if it is the same) features under the slightly different title *Ἐρωτικαὶ διατριβαί*; but Diogenes informs us that the works of the Peripatetic Ariston were falsely attributed to the Stoic Ariston, who

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56. Note that Hegesander's version does not quite make the point which we were prepared to expect. Was he in the habit of modifying anecdotes? Riginos [555] 124 thinks that Athenaeus' version of the Timotheus anecdote 'may reflect Hegesander's own treatment... telling first the story as he found it elsewhere and then giving his own account'. But why would he bother to give the original and then a version modified by his own gossip? Note that Athenaeus mentions him between the two variants, not at the start.

57. Cf. Ath. 505B-C, DL vi 26.

58. 419D = Ariston 24 Wehrli. Wehrli's comment to this is, 'Die Mahnung erinnert an die *νόμοι συσσιτικοί* oder *συμποτικοί*', and is accompanied by references to Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Xenophon (p. 64), on which see Ch. 2 p. 87 and *infra*, n. 99.

59. Themistius *Βασανισμός* 255b = Ariston fr 4 = Lycon fr 9 Wehrli.

seems to have written a book of Ὁμοιώματα. Does the confusion between the two philosophers plead rather for διατριβαί in the genuine title, ὅμοια having resulted from contamination[60]? Ὅμοια is more attractive because it allows us to imagine how Ariston might have drawn some parallel between Timotheus and Polemon making the same point[61]. However this may be, there is a strong possibility that Ariston of Ceos is the source for version (a) in Athenaeus[62]. This pushes our anecdote early into the third century, suggesting that it was known in the Peripatos around Lycon's time.

From here I would venture one step further. The stereotype form of Timotheus' sentence (especially in the double versions in Athenaeus and Aelian), and the parallel case of Polemon, make it obvious that the centre of interest lies in the reply. I think that our story formed around this sentence; it was not primarily concerned with Plato and his Academic dinners, but with Timotheus and his witty words, which enjoyed great reputation[63]. I do not believe, with Riginos, that this is, originally, 'a story set in opposition to the charges of gluttony or Plato's love of luxury in depicting symposia in the Academy as dignified and without excess of indulgence'. Version (a), which is probably the earliest, does not attempt to defend Plato at all; it contrasts the military and the contemplative life, in the manner of an *exemplum* attached to a popular general.

A plausible history of this anecdote is as follows. It formed around a *bon-mot* of Timotheus. Later on it was paired, maybe by Ariston, to a very similar *bon-mot* from a

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60. For the attribution of this work to the Stoic, Mayer [491] 594. Other Peripatetics, *eg* Theophrastus, wrote Ὅμοια too.

61. *Eg* fr 18W, where Ariston aims to show that the same Homeric line takes different meanings in different contexts.

62. According to Düring [345] 145-6, Ariston was one of Plato's calumniators. But this would not matter if at some former stage the anecdote was primarily associated with Polemon and Timotheus, not with Plato (see further).

63. Apart from Aelian, see *eg* the paragraph on Timotheus in the collection of sayings of kings and generals (Plu. 1887B-C).

scholarch of the Academy, Polemon. Thus it made its way into Plato's school; his apologists picked up the story and focused it on Plato. Subsequently, the detractors replied by turning the story into a joke against Plato. Maybe the initial dictum of the general, unknown to us, permitted the transformation.

What about the character of the dinner witnessed by Timotheus? In one of his versions of the anecdote, Plutarch tells us that 'another and no less valuable privilege guaranteed to Plato's guests was that of recalling afterwards what had been said over the drinks' (686B-C). The point reflects, like other comments on the topic of the 'remembering guest', the ideology of Plutarch, Ammonius, or Taurus, amply illustrated in the book. But this is not what Timotheus reveals to us. Taken to a supposed dinner of philosophers in the Academy, this learned man of the world, our only witness at so many removes, was not impressed by its lights, but only by its moderation.

Thus, even if we have complete confidence in Antigonus' statement about Plato's *σύνοδοι*, the evidence does not allow us to conclude that such *σύνοδοι* had any of the features of Lycon's symposia. Several testimonies point to the Academy as a possible source for sympotic customs. But were these borrowings already connected with the practice of the symposion at the time when they were taken into the Peripatos? Even if Aristotle adopted his archons from the Academy, this does not compel us to think that the function involved organisation of symposia before a much later date.

Aristotle is also reported to have taken from Xenocrates the Sympotic Laws, which I discussed in the previous chapter. We may feel that such a notion is naturally inspired by Plato's Laws; yet the Academic figure associated with Sympotic Laws is Xenocrates, not

Plato[64]. One finds no trace of Plato's practical contribution to any sympotic school-ceremonial.

The Lyceum, as I already said, raises the same kind of problems. Earlier evidence for the practice of common meals can be detected, even in fragments from Peripatetic works. Here are two examples. In a passage quoted by Athenaeus, Theophrastus explains the relation between *ἐπίχυσις* and *σπονδή* (427C-D). The manuscript reading *τῶν ἀκροατῶν*, which scholars have tried to replace because they found it puzzling[65], gives in fact an interesting turn to the text: Theophrastus would explain that the custom of toasts and libations **of students** was new. In a fragment from Aristoxenus' *Σύμμικτα Συμποτικά*, someone compares a small group of Greeks surrounded by barbarians with 'us', *ὀλίγοι ἡμεῖς*, on the grounds that *καὶ τὰ θέατρα ἐκβεβαρβάρωται καὶ εἰς μεγάλην διαφορὰν προελήλυθεν ἡ πάνδημος αὐτὴ μουσική, καθ' αὐτοὺς γενόμενοι ὀλίγοι ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα οἵα ἦν ἡ μουσική* (Ath. 632A). This sentence has been taken to indicate that Aristoxenus' symposion had a musical character[66]. But *ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα* seems to allude, not so much to the content of that work, as to what used to happen in the Lyceum, or so Aristoxenus wants to make us believe. This ties in with a reference to Peripatetic symposia where Plutarch tells us that the philosophers of the Lyceum spent their evenings discussing probems of musical theory (1095E). The passage in question generated much controversy in German scholarship of the last century: it was debated whether *ἐν συμποσίῳ* refers to works - Symposia by Theophrastus and others[67] - or to a physical location, parallel with *ἐν θεάτρῳ*[68]. But it seems absurd to think that here Plutarch ascribes to

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64. *Pace* Boyancé, who thinks that these laws were issued by Speusippus, [277] 264, and Wehrli, who associates them with Plato (commentary to fr 7 Lycon).

65. Casaubon conjectured *ἐρώτων*, Toup and Kaibel *ἀκροατοποτῶν*. See Fortenbaugh [224] 325-6.

66. So Hirzel [418] i 361: 'Aristoxenos, der in seinem *Σύμμικτα Συμποτικά* Probleme der musicalischen Theorie erörtete' (see also i 345 n. 4 and Wehrli's comment to Aristoxenus *ad l*, p. 84).

67. Hirzel [418] i 345 n. 1 thinks that this is the only evidence for a Symposion by Theophrastus.

68. Cf. Heitz [413] 193, Hirzel [418] i 4 n. 4, Martin [489] 204-5. See also Nauck [22] p. 24 n. 10.

various Peripatetics musical theories which they developed in Symposia; he obviously means to tell us what they talked about (*διαλεγομένου*) over dinner. Plutarch's report on what philosophers did in a distant past, especially with regard to a custom in which he was himself involved, is much less compelling than his testimony on what they wrote. But in the present case its value derives from the possible association with the fragment from Aristoxenus' Sympotic Miscellanies.

All these hints add up to more evidence for symposia in the Peripatos than there is in the case of the Academy; but they remain thin, questionable, and vague. It is probable that the practice of symposia anteceded Lycon in Aristotle's school; it is possible that it started with Plato in the Academy, as Antigonus reports, and with Theophrastus in the Peripatos (or even with Aristotle, if the libations of students under Theophrastus were not too 'new' to permit the hypothesis). But these facts cannot be proved, nor can we say how Lycon's predecessors organised their banquets. This scholarch despised by his biographer imposed the only common meals in a philosophical school which we can ascertain to have taken an institutional format.

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Symposion and *Musenheiligtum*

At the core of Wilamowitz' conception of the philosophical symposion lies the idea of a religious complex: the cult of the Muses. Lycon's feasts in the Peripatos revealed to him the reason for banquets in the Academy as well: the celebration of the Muses. The birthday of the founder was an alternative reason. Wilamowitz did not link the two explicitly, but regarded both as manifestations of the same religious identity: the ideal example of a feast of the Muses is the symposion in Plutarch's last book of the Quaestiones; the ideal example of a birthday feast is the commemoration of Plato at the beginning of the preceding book; their mirror in real life is Lycon's symposia.

Μουσεῖα of course existed; there is evidence for this feast under Xenocrates[69]. But we should take it for granted that Μουσεῖα existed even if evidence was missing altogether; we know almost nothing about the details of this feast, but we do know (at least since Lynch pointed it out forcefully) that the Muses were duly celebrated in all schools, as traditional patrons of διδασκαλία[70] - probably just as Hermes, Heracles and the Dioscouri were celebrated in *gymnasia*[71]. But this reduces the Μουσεῖα to a standard procedure, in no way characteristic of philosophers. Rather, we should expect that other schools honoured their patrons with greater zeal: subjects such as music or poetry are bound to have priority with the Muses, and I cannot think, *pace* Boyancé, that Plato's esoteric formula of the Phaedo, 'philosophy is the best music', did anything to change the actual state of things.

Any Greek banquet is religious in the sense of being dedicated to some god, but we must distinguish between being religious in a strong sense (such as emerged in the festivals of the classical *polis*, or in those of cultic associations in the Hellenistic *polis*), and in a weak sense (illustrated, for instance, by perfunctory invocations, such as to Agathos Daimon in a symposion). Antigonus mentions the Μουσεῖα in his account: ἱεροποιῆσαί τε καὶ τῶν Μουσείων ἐπιμελητὴν γενέσθαι (547F). If Lycon dedicated his banquets to the Muses, this must be taken here in the weak sense. The symposia took place in his own house; there can be no question of ἱεροποιῆσαι in the proper sense of the word. But I am not sure that the monthly feasts are even related to Peripatetic Μουσεῖα, whatever their manner of celebration at any time might have been. The reference to Μουσεῖα is not clearly connected to the description of Lycon's feasts. Athenaeus embarked on the topic of symposia in order to emphasise how difficult the position of the archon had become under Lycon; maybe he dumped the Μουσεῖα at

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69. Phld. Ind. Acad., col. vii ll. 40-3.

70. Lynch [480] 115 (see especially his reference to the Milesian παιδοτριβής inscription, SIG^3 577).

71. On this see Schmitt Pantel [584] 370.

the end, just by way of indicating that the function involved even more than organising a glamorous monthly banquet. But this is, of course, only a hypothesis.

Glucker has taught us that, as concerns the affairs of Plato's Academy, evidence from Plutarch's time should be put aside. But given that Wilamowitz' ideas about the *Musenheiligtum* still have a strong effect[72], let me pause to consider two symposia after Μουσεῖα, which Plutarch presents at great length in his Quaestiones[73].

The one in book iii is given by a student of music (ἁρμονικός[74]), Erato, to other pupils of his school (νεανίσκοι). It is clearly a feast of the διδασκάλειον, where Ammonius and Plutarch attend as friends of Erato; for Erato reappears as guest in Ammonius' house after the Μουσεῖα in book ix. But Erato's school-companions are not acquainted with Ammonius (646A). In book ix charge of the symposion is taken by Ammonius, but not in his capacity of Platonist or even philosopher. The Μουσεῖα celebrated here is the feast of a famous school, the Diogeneion; Ammonius is the official στρατηγός (736D); and it is in this position that he has visited the ephebes and invited their teachers to the symposion[75]. The public of this feast is composed of φιλόλογοι, συνήθεις, and the εὐδοκιμώτατοι διδάσκαλοι of the Diogeneion, whom Ammonius has chosen according to his taste for learned controversy (736D-E). Wilamowitz proclaimed that the ixth book of Plutarch's Quaestiones is 'die beste Illustration für die philosophischen Symposien jener Zeit'. It may well be - with the literary prefix, like Plato's Symposion. But neither of Plutarch's Μουσεῖα is followed by a gathering of

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72. A very recent instance in an extremely valuable study of commensal practices: 'On sait qu'à l'Académie Platon avait organisé de grands banquets placés sous la protection des Muses' (Schmitt Pantel [584] 237; as the note tells us, she knows this from Professor Reverdin, on whom see *supra* n. 2). Cf. also Boyancé [277] 265, who calls the Muses 'les saintes de l'Académie' and asks the question, 'Mais comment Platon a-t'il conçu l'idée de donner à son école la forme d'un thiase des Muses?'

73. iii 1-2 and all of ix (736C sqq). These episodes are discussed by Glucker ([388] 125 ff); in what follows I shall rehearse some of his points.

74. For this sense of ἁρμονικός cf. Arist. Top. 107^{a}16.

75. See Glucker [388] 126.

philosophers at a symposion; the Academy, as Glucker points out, is conspicuously absent here as in the rest of the Quaestiones; and, as on other occasions, the presence of Plutarch, Ammonius, or Lampsacus in a symposion is that of lettered friends rather than members of an established group of philosophers.

But it must be stressed that this sort of festival is extremely poorly known. The feasts of the *διδασκάλεια* seem to have a 'private' character because they are not run by an official magistrate, such as the *γυμνασίαρχος* in the feasts of the *γυμνάσια* - even those restricted to members of the *γυμνάσιον*[76]. But what exactly is Ammonius' role, as a *στρατηγός*, in the events which precede the symposion? The occasions described by Plutarch are attended by large numbers (more people than take part in the recorded conversations), and seem to have adopted a standard procedure, as in the festivals of the city: *ἔθους δ' ὄντος ἐν τοῖς* Μουσείοις *κλήρους περιφέρεσθαι καὶ τοὺς συλλάχοντας ἀλλήλοις προτείνειν φιλόλογα ζητήματα* (737D-E). Maybe such symposia were celebrated simultaneously in several places, in private houses[77] or in the schools themselves[78].

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Birthdays of Philosophers

In the sixth century Plato's birthday was celebrated by all Athenians, as we learn from the anonymous author of the Prolegomena: *καὶ 'Αθηναῖοι δὲ γενεθλιακὴν αὐτοῦ ἡμέραν*

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76. On public feasts restricted to the members of the *γυμνάσιον* cf. Schmitt Pantel [584] 368-9 and nn. 50 and 62, with evidence from Aegina, Pagae, Salamina, and Eresus (= IG Suppl. 122, apparently the earliest inscription about a banquet offered by a *γυμνασίαρχος*: Aglanor, end of iii BC).

77. So Glucker [388] 125-6: the first in Erato's house, the second in Ammonius' house.

78. Plutarch only indicates the vague location 'in Athens' (645D, 736C).

ἐπιτελοῦντες ἐπᾳδοντες φάσκουσιν· `ἤματι τῷδε Πλάτωνα *θεοὶ δόσαν ἀνθρώποισιν´*[79]. By this date the day in question had already been celebrated by Platonists for some centuries. The two quaestiones at the beginning of Plutarch's Book Eight take place during such a ceremony. Platonists give us a slightly different account from the third century on; they celebrated Plato, not (or not only) with discussions, but with readings - for here is Porphyry: *καίπερ ἐν τοῖς* Πλάτωνος *καὶ* Σωκράτους *παραδεδομένοις γενεθλίοις θύων τε καὶ ἑστιῶν τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὅτε καὶ λόγον ἔδει τῶν ἑταίρων τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν συνελθόντων ἀναγνῶναι*[80]. One of the *δυνατοί* was Porphyry himself, who read his *Φιλόλογος ᾽Ακρόασις* at a session organised by Longinus *τὰ* Πλατώνεια *ἑστιῶν*[81]. These readings and discussions were still practised in the fifth century, for Proclus refers to *ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς τοῦ* Πλάτωνος *διαλεγομένοις*[82].

We may wish to suppose that 'Plato's birthday' had been a feast of the Academy once in the past, but there is no trace of evidence for anything like this. The earliest evidence comes from Plutarch, who organised such events far away from Athens, in his house in Chaeronea[83]. The only philosopher whose birthday was observed, if not during his lifetime, then immediately after his death, is Epicurus. It is not my purpose to analyse here the complicated problem of the nature of symposia practised in the Garden; but a few facts may provide a relevant background to the discussion which follows.

Epicurus left instructions - remarkably, in his will - for the celebration of two different feasts: his own birthday, *τὴν εἰθισμένην ἄγεσθαι γενέθλιον ἡμέραν ἑκάστου ἔτους*, and a monthly gathering of philosophers in the school, which probably was already in practice: *τὴν*

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79. Ch. 6 (with references in Westerink's commentary, [15]); on Plato's birthday not being a feast restricted to the Academy or even an Academic feast, see again Glucker, [388] 264 ff.

80. Porph. V. Plot. ii 40-3.

81. Eus. PE x 3 (464A sqq).

82. Procl. in Remp. i 69.23-4.

83. For the place and probable date of the symposion in Plu. Quaest. Conv. viii 1-2, Glucker *loc cit*.

γινομένην σύνοδον ἑκάστου μηνός... τῶν συμφιλοσοφούντων ἡμῖν[84]. The tradition concerning these feasts is extremely confused. The monthly feast took place on the 20th - *ἑκάστου μηνὸς ταῖς εἰκάσι*. This date occurs in the text of the will and in two other sources, Cicero and Pliny, who, similarly, refer to the two occasions as separate events[85]. By contrast, only the will reproduced by Diogenes gives us a date for the celebration of the birthday. This is, curiously, another 20th: *τῇ προτέρᾳ δεκάτῃ τοῦ Γαμηλιῶνος*. Even more curious is the fact that, according to Apollodorus, Epicurus was not born on the 20th but on the 7th of Gamelion[86].

In mentioning the two feasts, Pliny does not refer, like Cicero and Aelian, to Epicurus' immediate followers, but to what people did in his own time: *natali eius sacrificant, feriasque omni mense post custodiunt, quas ikadas vocant*. He also tells us that *ikades* (*εἰκάδες*) had become a popular designation for Epicurean feasts; we find it in a few other sources, and Athenaeus uses the phrase *τίς εἰκαδιστής* in referring to a philosopher of this sect[87]. But the original meaning of *εἰκάς* in Epicurean circles may have changed. Philodemus

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84. DL x 18.

85. Cf. Cic. Fin. ii 31.101 and Plin. HN xxxv 2.5; also the brief formulation in Aelian, *ἑαυτῷ δὲ δὶς συσσιτεῖν* (fr. 39 Herscher).

86. DL x 14. For *προτέρα δεκάτη* see Mikalson [498] 8 and *passim*. However, Schmidt [581] 43-4 (see esp. n. 2 on p. 43) thought that *τῇ πρωτέρᾳ δεκάτῃ* must be the 10th. This view has been taken by other scholars; see Boyancé [277] 324 n. 2, and especially the commentary to epigram 3305 = Phld. xxiii in the Garland: 'to speak of an "annual" celebration of the "twentieth" is to confuse the two traditions' (Gow-Page [218] 394; the translation proposed there for *ἐνιαύσιον* is 'yearlong'). Apart from generating even more confusion than already exists in the tradition of Epicurus' birthday, interpreting *δεκάτη πρωτέρα* as the 10th is completely unnecessary to Schmidt's argument on pp. 42-3: the 10th was not consecrated to Apollo any more than the 20th, whereas the 7th of every month was (*supra*, n. 16). This should rather make us suspect (if anything) that, in spite of Apollodorus' testimony at DL x 14, Epicurus' genuine birthday was the 20th and not the 7th of Gamelion. (There seems to be a curious component in traditions about Epicurus' relation to particular 'days'; cf. the papyrological testimonial appended by Usener to 'Epicuri Testamentum', [79] 166-7).

87. 298D; cf. Plu. 1089C (= Carneades fr. 71 Wisniewski) and Phld. xxiii G-P (= 3305 = xi 44 AP). For the mss *τῆς/τοῖς κδ΄* at DL x 4 (= *τῆς εἰκάδος* Hübner and Nietzsche), Bignone reads *ἃ ἐστι περὶ τοὺς Εἰκαδεῖς*, arguing that Sotion's Refutations must have dealt with the Epicureans, not with their feast ([267] ii 239-40*). But *Εἰκαδεῖς* is the name of an association dedicated to the cult of Apollo Parnessius (Poland [541] 64), and it is highly unlikely that the Epicureans shared names with this sect (Sotion is malevolent, but note that the name does not occur in his title). Neither is there any reason for comparing the *εἰκάδες* of the Epicureans with the feasts of the *Εἰκαδεῖς* (Bignone [267] ii 241-2). On the contrary, we should be careful to avoid the confusion invited by the many applications of the term *εἰκάς*, which are not at all clear to us. *εἰκάς* also designates a public

invites Piso, in a famous epigram, to join in an *εἰκάδα ἐνιαύσιον*. This must be a reference to the birthday, which was a yearly banquet (unlike the *εἰκάδες*) but also an *εἰκάς*, in virtue of being celebrated on a 20th[88]. We should suspect that, by Philodemus' time, the two testamentary feasts had fused such that Epicurus' birthday became one of the twelve *εἰκάδες* of the year.

Philodemus refers unambiguously to the birthday-*εἰκάς* as a school event, but nobody has questioned whether this is indeed what Epicurus attempted to establish in his will with respect to the feast celebrated on his birthday. Why should he provide for a double set of symposia, monthly and yearly, celebrated by members of the Garden on the same date and, in one case, even on the same day - when in fact the birthday coincides with the *εἰκάς* of Gamelion? The phrase *τῶν συμφιλοσοφούντων ἡμῖν* in the testamentary provision could mark an important distinction between the two feasts. As this phrase does not occur in the instructions for the annual birthday, it is likely that only the monthly *εἰκάδες* were designed to be events of the school, perpetuating - as Epicurus himself indicates - the memory of the founder (after all, he was born on a 20th), together with that of his close associate Metrodorus. By contrast, the celebration of Epicurus' actual birthday was not projected as a symposion of philosophers; it was, more likely, a family feast of the same kind as *τὰ ἐναγίσματα τῷ τε πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς*. The *εἰκάδες* may indeed have been practised by the philosophers of the Garden since the earliest days of this school; but the idea that the same

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feast-day: the 20th of Boedromion, connected with the Eleusinian Mysteries (Plu. Phoc. 28; Mikalson [498] 59 supposes that this was the first day). Perhaps the case is not even unique; since *εἰκάδες* was a collective name (cf. *σελήνην ἄγουσαν εἰκάδας*, Ar. Nu. 17) for any of the seven or eight days after the 21st in a month - days called *μετ' εἰκάδος* - the term could be used for other public festivals too. The occurrence of the term in a title is certainly not unique: Menippus wrote a work about Τὰς *θρησκευομένας ὑπ' αὐτῶν εἰκάδας* (DL vi 101). But who are 'those' who celebrate - Epicureans, Εἰκαδεῖς, or the Μυσταί at Eleusis? - *To correct a minor but irritating inaccuracy in Bignone *loc cit*, read Nietzsche [521] I 639 n. 2: 'Scribendum est *ἃ ἐστι περὶ τῆς εἰκάδος*... dum haec scribo, non satis mihi constat, num primus hanc emendandi viam ingressus sim'. He was not; but obviously he had not seen the second volume of Hübner's edition, published in 1831.

88. 3305 (Phld. xxiii) G-P; see *supra*, n. 86.

philosophers also celebrated the birthday of their master is not sufficiently supported by our texts.

Many strange facts hang around Epicurean symposia. Plutarch refers to a tradition according to which Epicurus, *νοσῶν νόσον ἀσκίτην, τινὰς ἑστιάσεις φίλων συνῆγε καὶ οὐκ ἐφθόνει τῆς προσαγωγῆς τοῦ ὑγροῦ τῷ ὕδρωπι* (1097E). Seneca tells us in an Epistle that, as a matter of exercise in reducing their needs, the Epicureans *omnibus mensis paupertatem imitati prope ad inopiam accesserunt* (viii 6). They observed *aliquot* or *certos dies... quibus maligne fame exstinguerent* (*liberiora alimenta sunt carceris* - runs Seneca's comment, 9-10), treating themselves *minimo ac vilissimo cibo* and *dura atque horrida veste* (5). We may regard Philodemus's epigram of invitation to Piso as a nice dress put on this starvation diet, and Cicero's account of symposia in Piso's house, no doubt attended by Philodemus, as a picture of the same Epicurean frugality, but in a grotesque light[89]. Yet Carneades apparently blamed the *εἰκάδες* for being extravagant, not coarse and frugal parties[90]. This reminds us that Epicurus' original detractors had taken a line which may be the opposite of Cicero's line in denigration of Piso: one of the reasons invoked by Timocrates for deserting Epicurus and *τὰς νυκτερινὰς ἐκείνας φιλοσοφίας* was that the master himself *δὶς... τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμεῖν ἀπὸ τρυφῆς*[91]. But does any of these traditions have anything to do with Epicurus' original monthly *σύνοδοι τῶν συμφιλοσοφούντων ἡμῖν*[92]?

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89. Cic. in Pis. 67 (with Nisbet's commentary on *toreuma*, and his Appendix); for the sake of analogy cf. esp. *multa carne subrancida* and *servi sordidati...nonulli etiam senes*; also the twist given by an obscure reference to *bibitur*.

90. Plu. 1089C: `*ποίας εἰκάδος ἐδείπνησα πολυτελέστατα*´.

91. DL x 7; to all these hints we should probably add the much disputed problem of Epicurus' participation in Nausiphanes' *ἡμεροκωμίαι* (PHerc 1005, fr. 116 Angeli; on this see her commentary [83] and that of Sbordone [151]; also Crönert [124] 174, Vogliano-Salvestroni [149] 80 ff, Longo in Sbordone [188] 12-3, and Angeli-Colaizzo [112] 91-3).

92. There is much fragmentary material on symposia in Herculaneum papyri, *eg* PHerc 1077 (*περὶ Εὐσεβείας*): cf. Gomperz [96] p. 104; PHerc 1232 (*περὶ Ἐπικούρου*): cf. Vogliano [80] p. 70 (col i fr 8); PHerc 1027: cf. Crönert [124] p. 70 (col vii). Bignone [267] *passim* connects all this material with the *εἰκάδες* established by Epicurus (see esp. ii 208 ff, which picks up his conclusions in [268] (on Vogliano; cf. Vogliano's own comment, [80] p. 126: 'Ad diem festum Epicureorum haec rettulerim'). Yet it does not seem to me undisputable that these texts refer to some practice rather than to general advice and remarks on the nature of

Philodemus refers in his epigrams to other symposia, which are certainly different from the atmosphere suggested by the invitation epigram[93]. If, on the other hand, the invitation epigram shows that the *εἰκάδες* had been assimilated to Epicurus' birthday, this transformation should serve as an example. We can hardly expect that Epicurean symposia remained unchanged throughout the centuries. Once a school with the elaborate organisation of the Garden[94] adopted this practice from the outset, it is probable that, in time, it also adapted it to more varied circumstances than the pious commemoration of the founder.

However we may choose to look at Epicurus' *εἰκάδες* for philosophers, there is no ground for comparing them with the monthly feasts of the Peripatos under Lycon[95]. As for the birthday, I do not believe that Epicurus' immediate followers celebrated their founder in this manner any more than did Plato's successors in the Old Academy. Such school-feasts were probably established quite late.

It is important to realize that a symposion in a philosophical school was not necessarily appended to a religious cult, be it of the Muses or of the founder. Even when the celebration of founders became an established school-feast, symposia need not celebrate anything in particular; it is in this respect that we may draw a profitable analogy with what happened in other groups and corporations: in the theatrical guild for instance, 'the inscriptions show the annual *πανήγυρις*, the monthly feasts, celebrations of birthdays of princes and benefactors,

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εὐωχεῖσθαι.

93. Cf. especially the revelries with courtesans, Chian wine and Syrian frankincense at Phld. xxi G-P (xi 34 AP), and the symposia on the beach (*ἐν ἀπόψει… ὡς ἀεί*) at xx G-P (ix 412 AP).

94. Cf. De Witt [311] 211: 'This, then, was the organisation of the Epicurean brotherhood: *σοφός*, *φιλόσοφοι*, *φιλόλογοι*, *καθηγηταί*, *συνήθεις*, and *κατασκευαζόμενοι*. These differed from one another only in the varying degrees of their advancement towards wisdom'.

95. Cf. Angeli-Colaizzo [112] 92 for a good warning against assimilating Academic or Peripatetic symposia to the Epicurean, and also for an attempt to characterise the latter in the spirit of the school.

common dinners, and wine-parties'[96]. The situation in philosophical schools must have been just as varied. Such corporations are a typical phenomenon of the late Hellenistic world.

This brings me back in a circle to Wilamowitz' *θίασοι* and the unilateral relationship which this scholar has accustomed us to make between philosophical symposia and thiasotic corporations. *θίασοι* are religious bands formed for private cult and marginal to the mainstream of official religion, which invaded the late Hellenistic and Roman world. One finds in them indeed general features into which it is easy to fit details of organisation such as displayed by Lycon's symposia - regularity, contributions, archonship[97]. But these features are not specific to the *θίασοι*. There were roughly two kinds of club or society in Hellenistic cities: religious (*θίασοι*, *ἔρανοι*, *ὀργεῶνες*) and professional (*κοινά*, *σύνοδοι*). All had a similar structure and organisation: statutory laws (such as provisions about property), annual officers (*eg* priests or treasurers), functions - which included monthly meetings, sacrifices, common dinners, celebrations of all sorts. Nevertheless these similarities do not reduce the basic difference between professional and religious corporations. Professional clubs are not *θίασοι*; the theatrical *κοινός* may well be patronised by Dionysus, but, as has been duly pointed out, this institution had nothing in common with the *θίασος* of Dionysus' devotees, the *Διονυσιασταί*[98]. In both, organisation of corporate life followed similar patterns; such patterns flourished in the Hellenistic city; and they retained an old and basic element, the common meal. But this element was adapted to different purposes and expressed different relations between the members of the group. The same principle applies to philosophical schools and their celebrations.

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96. Pickard-Cambridge [535] 304.

97. 'The guild is itself almost a city', Pickard-Cambridge [535] 287 - summary of a thesis formulated and illustrated in great detail by Foucart ([359] and [360]). But note that, according to the material gathered by Foucart and to his own conclusions, most offices in thiasotic groups were annual, not monthly ([360] Ch. iv - cf. p. 33). Even the *ἐπιμήνιος* (*eg* the one in charge of monthly sacrifices mentioned on an inscription from Bithynia) 'désignait une charge tantôt civile, tantôt religieuse... elle était mensuelle dans certains cas, et dans d'autres astreignait à des devoirs qui revenaient tous les mois' (pp. 29 and 24-1).

98. Cf. Foucart [359] 29-31 and Pickard-Cambridge [535] 303 n.1.

Thus even if Plato and Aristotle held symposia of exactly the same format as Lycon's, they need have neither created nor imitated the *θίασοι*. But it is very doubtful that they held symposia of Lycon's type. I think that the growing practice of school dinners in Hellenistic times produced the tendency to transform the past by giving it a contemporary dress. I shall make my meaning clearer with an example.

At the beginning of the v[th] book of the Deipnosophistai, Athenaeus reports that Theophrastus has bequeathed (*κατέλιπε*) money to a philosophical sect for the maintenance of symposia (186A). But there is no such provision in Theophrastus' will. Several explanations have been offered for this puzzling story[99]; here is another one which seems plausible. The only testamentary donation made by Theophrastus to any philosophers was not money but his own garden; it did not go to an alien sect but to his own one, the Peripatos; and it was not destined for holding symposia but for continuing research (DL v 39). On the other hand, there is a philosopher who made provisions for symposia in his will: Epicurus. Could it not be that this remarkable occurrence was superimposed on the memory of other donations made by philosophers? Athenaeus tells us in the opening to his v[th] book that the entertainment of disciples in the company of philosophers had become a part of the regular training: *καὶ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις δὲ ἐπιμελὲς ἦν συνάγουσι τοὺς νέους μετ' αὐτῶν πρός τινα τεταγμέμον νόμον εὐωχεῖσθαι* (186B). If one is to postulate a time when the custom of dining with the students was indeed as regular as this sentence suggests, it is possible to see how, maybe under the influence of Epicurus' will, testamentary provisions of larger scope made on behalf of the

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99. Fortenbaugh [224] 123 dismisses the story as pure invention. More interestingly, Gottschalk [393] 316-7 supposes that a mistake intervened in transmission: the donation was not made in the will, but on some other occasion. Düring [345] 93 takes the story to be true and adds to it an extraordinary finish: 'His [*sc* Theophrastus'] nearest disciples used to meet regularly, while he was scholarch in the Lyceum, and in his testament he provided etc. For their meetings he prescribed certain rules, *νόμοι συμποτικοί*'. This is also how Wehrli interprets the adjacent story of the clubs (on which see *infra*, pp. 151 ff); and, to make the confusion total, he adds, 'über diejenigen [*sc νόμοι συμποτικοί*] des Aristoteles DL v 26 und Ath. 186A-B, über die des Theophrast und Xenocrates Ath. 186A-B'; *supra*, n. 58).

school, such as Theophrastus' donation of the garden, came to be recollected as 'testamentary symposia'[100].

We do not know anything about Academic or Peripatetic symposia before Lycon. Even if we assume that this custom goes back to Plato, the institutional features which we find under Lycon are much more likely to have been created or adapted to the symposion, not by Plato or Aristotle, but in the different intellectual climate of the Hellenistic age, which will witness the full development of such features.

ii: Symposia of Philosophers in the Hellenistic World

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Three Stoic Clubs

The material which I have presented so far should make us doubt that the statement in Athenaeus' text at 186B, which I have just quoted, reflects more than a state of things at the date when it was written. The material which I am going to present next will show that Athenaeus' anonymous source compresses a wide diversity of phenomena; the quick glance at Epicurean symposia already prepared us to expect it. I shall treat these phenomena as synchronic, in opposition to the diachronic perspective which the problem of Platonic origins has made me adopt so far.

I have tried to emphasize the independence of the organisational features of Lycon's symposia from those of religious *θίασοι* and professional *κοινά*. Here I shall start, on the contrary, from a case where the philosophical group seems to have come nearest to adopting the format of such associations. This phenomenon deserves to be analysed because, far from

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100. See also *infra*, pp. 159-159.

reflecting a general situation, as Wilamowitz believed[101], it occurs extremely rarely - perhaps no more than twice.

Just before plunging into the implausible story about Theophrastus' will, Athenaeus gives us the names of three clubs of philosophers which, to judge from the previous sentence, he puts in the rank of *θίασοι*, *φρατρικά*, and *ὀργεῶνες*: *Διογενισταί*, *Ἀντιπατρισταί*, *Παναιτιασταί* (186A). It seems that these clubs were located in Athens (*ἐν ἄστει*), had a large number of members (*πολλῶν φιλοσόφων*), and held reunions (*σύνοδοι*). We may also guess that the reunions in question consisted in symposia, and that this was the main activity of the clubs; for although the sentence *ἵν' ἄρα κατὰ τὸν τοῦ συμποσίου λόγον σωφρόνως καὶ πεπαιδευμένως διεξάγωσι* refers to the sect supposed to have received money from Theophrastus, the fact that Athenaeus calls it 'a *σύνοδος* of the same kind' invites us to complete the analogy. This is all that we are told, and the occurrence is unique. But just the existence of philosophical groups with such names is a very remarkable phenomenon.

The suffix *-ι(α)στής* is used in deriving nouns from names of gods. It has produced a large number of individual names of *θίασοι* whose members claim, in principle, descent from a god[102]. The name-type belongs in the area of private cult; it is very striking to find it associated with philosophical sects. As we learn from a classical fragment in Galen, later followers of the main schools of thought had names derived by *-κός* (*Πλατωνικοί*, *Περιπατητικοί*, *Στωϊκοί*) or *-ίειος* (*Ἐπικούρειοι*)[103]. It is true that *-ι(α)στής* could also be used in place of the patronymic *-ίειος*, in derivation from names of people, not of gods, as we see

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101. Wilamowitz [644] 290-1.

102. Cf. Poland [541] 62-3, 73 and Pugliese-Carratelli [545] 188 and n. 8; on affiliation to the suffix *-(ε)τα*, Schwyzer [593] I 499-501.

103. Libr. propr. 50 K; see discussion of the text in Lynch [480] 173-4 and Glucker [388] 189-91.

in a few cases of non-philosophical groups[104]. But this fact should not prompt us to assimilate the exceptionally rare philosophers labelled -ι(α)σταί to the frequent ones labelled -΄ειοι[105]. On the contrary, the adoption of the former procedure seems to indicate that the members of such groups exalted their founders by proclaiming them gods[106], and maybe also declared the religious nature of their community and main tie to the founder. This is quite alien to the spirit of philosophical allegiance even in schools which developed a religious cult of their founder, as did the Garden. But our clubs are plainly Stoic: they take their names from Diogenes, Antipater, and Panaetius, three successive scholarchs of the Porch. This is very odd, because the Stoics never exhibited other tendencies to worship - not even towards Zeno[107].

Neither is the use of the term *σύνοδος* clear: whereas in the first occurrence it seems to mean 'reunions', the second must designate the club itself; otherwise we should understand that Theophrastus bequeathed money for one single meeting. And if Theophrastus' *σύνοδος* is 'of the same kind' (*τὴν τοιαύτην σύνοδον*, 186A5-6), *σύνοδοι* at 186A3 should also refer to the clubs rather than their meetings. This may be a small problem, but it is unusual to call philosophical sects *σύνοδοι*. The normal Greek words for 'sect' are *αἵρεσις* and *ἀγωγή*, which point to the fact that the members have chosen a common way of life and thinking[108]. I doubt

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104. Poland [541] 62; note also a few cases of derivation in -ι(α)στής from numerals and toponymics. Particularly interesting are the cases of Πομπιασταί at Delos (Barnes [252] 12 n. 31: 'un club politique qui favorisait Pompée?') and of Ἡγησιασταί and Τειμο[θε]ασταί in Miletus (Robert [560] p. 269 (n° 196: *νεικήσαντα τὰ μεγάλα Διδύμεια*...; here and on p. 249 Robert comments on the 'cultic and literary' character of the group thus: 'nous supposons que les Timothéastes et les Hégésiastes de Milet formaient des groupements se réunissant dans un sanctuaire de (Timothée et Hégésias) héroïsés, les honorant par des sacrifices et s'exerçant à la poésie et à l'éloquence d'apparat...', p. 249).

105. As does Gigon ([384] 42-3; Ferrary's objection [353] 457-8 n. 80 is certainly right).

106. So Pugliese-Carratelli [545] 188 n. 8, who interprets the derivation in -ι(α)στής 'da nomi di persona' in Rhodian inscriptions as due to 'un ingenuo desiderio di esaltare i fondatori del *κοινόν*'. See Foucart [360] 4 n. 1 for a similar explanation even in the case of our philosophical groups: 'Le même procédé servit aux disciples de quelques philosophes à témoigner leur enthousiasme pour leur maître, qu'ils élévaient au rang des dieux. Tels sont les Διογενιασταί, Ἀντιπατρισταί, Παναιτιασταί etc'.

107. Sedley [595] 119 n. 51.

108. On sects see Glucker [388] 174 ff; also the discussion of terms in Sedley [594] 75 ff.

that *σύνοδος* could be used in the same sense[109]. But here comes a second puzzle. *σύνοδος* is a term of the same kind as *σύλλογος*, *κοινόν*, or *σύστημα*; these nouns usually describe groups of professionals, not religious sects[110]. Thus, whereas the individual names of Athenaeus' clubs suggest the curious phenomenon of philosophers worshipping their founders in the fashion of religious devotees instead of carrying forward their doctrines, the collective name of these clubs invites us to compare them with professional associations. How should we interpret the names? What was the nature of the three Stoic clubs?

These questions are closely connected. Barnes has recently answered a similar pair of questions raised by a second century AD funerary stele from Cumae, on which an unknown Menecles styled himself *Πυρρωνιαστάς*[111].

Barnes calls attention to a passage in Iamblichus according to which Pythagoras' disciples were divided into *Πυθαγόρειοι* and *Πυθαγορισταί* - real and phoney Pythagoreans of some sort, perhaps 'rivals' to the real ones[112]. This makes him consider the possibility that 'un X-*ιστης* est in X-iste de second rang', but he rejects it because he assumes that Menecles could not have intended to present himself as a second-rate philosopher. Here he must be right: the text of the epigram leaves us in no doubt about Menecles' self-esteem. But the issue may not be quite as straightforward; what applies to Menecles may not apply to every other philosopher who was an X-*ι(α)στής*. The description *Εἰκαδιστής*, which we found in Athenaeus attached to an Epicurean, is certainly derogatory[113]. So is the title *Ἡρακλειτιστής* of an unknown

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109. Poland [541] 121 quotes Strabo xvii 794 as a parallel example of a philosophical *σύνοδος*; but Strabo refers to the philologists of the Alexandrinian Musaeum, not to a philosophical school. According to D·uuring [345] 93 'it must be particularly stressed' that this is a 'term of very general sense', but I find this comment quite obscure.

110. Poland [541] 158-63.

111. Barnes [252] with references; discussion of name and club on pp. 10-3.

112. Iambl. VP xviii 88; Barnes [252] 10-11 (more references in his n. 27).

113. 298D; *supra*, p. 145.

Pausanias mentioned by Diogenes Laertius[114]. But Pausanias, for all we know, did not proudly proclaim himself a 'Heracleitist', as did Menecles the 'Pyrrhoniast'; he was most probably nicknamed 'Heracleitist' by others (*ὁ κληθεὶς Ἡρακλειτιστής*). The difference is important. Perhaps Pausanias was one of those fanatics who adore and imitate their master, spending their life in the sacred shadow cast by the great man instead of trying to understand his doctrines properly. Plato's malicious portrait of Apollodorus has made the type famous; but Heraclitus would be more liable than Socrates to attract such disciples, and Pythagoras notoriously did. Applied to a philosopher, the label X-*ι(α)στής* would render very suitably the irony associated with this sort of fanaticism, just in virtue of the nature of the suffix; and I suspect that this is what a philosophical X-*ι(α)στής* originally or primarily meant. At some point new uses may have changed this situation. There seems to be another difference between Pausanias and Menecles. The suffix has a metaphorical quality in the nickname given to the former; Diogenes obviously refers to Pausanias as an individual, not as the member of a community of 'Adorers of Heraclitus', and it would be absurd to deduce that such a club existed. On the contrary, the title which Menecles confers upon himself, *Πυρρωνιαστὰς Μενεκλέης ὅδ' εἰμὶ ἐγώ*, is that of a club-member[115].

Barnes assumes that the club of Pyrrhoniasts at Cumae must have been similar to the clubs of Diogeniasts, Antipatrists, and Panaetiasts in Athens. This is more than reasonable; the question is, how similar and in what respects? Some facts suggest problematic differences.

There is a gap of some four hundred years between Pyrrho and Menecles. We do not know when the club of Cumae was founded; to give it a long history such as to permit us to imagine that the founder was a direct disciple of Pyrrho would certainly be wrong. But Pyrrho never established a school in the proper sense; his vague and controversial memory travelled

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114. DL ix 15; cf. Barnes [252] 11.

115. This difference is not recognised by Ferrary [353] 457-8 n. 80, who doubts 'l'existence de collèges' in both cases - probably because both *Ἡρακλειτιστής* and *Πυρρωνιαστάς* are in the singular. But Ferrary does not pay heed to the difference between the two cases; cf. Barnes [252] 11.

and haunted other places. Pyrrho was ideally suited to invite rediscovery of true Pyrrhonianism at several centuries' remove, especially after the sceptical experiments of the Academy; it is perfectly easy to imagine a fresh group of Pyrrhonists busy organising themselves in Cumae, say, after Aenesidemus' revival of original scepticism.

Would a similar story make sense in the case of followers of Diogenes, Antipater or Panaetius? Here we are faced with three clubs following, in a string, three successive leaders. Comparetti deduced that Diogenes, Antipater and Panaetius 'lasciarono una tradizione ed ebbero aderenti anche nelle epoche posteriore, come rileviamo da Ateneo'[116]. But, as has been pointed out, it is hard to imagine why later Stoics may have suddenly wished to claim descent from any of these particular teachers. It seems more plausible that, unlike the group of Pyrrhoniasts in ii AD Cumae, each of these clubs was founded either by the teacher from whom the name derives or by some direct disciple.

This hypothesis has been formulated by Ferrary, in a new attempt to clarify the position of Diogenes' pupils Mnesarchus and Dardanus. According to this scholar, Mnesarchus and Dardanus, contrary to becoming scholarchs, as was believed, split up with the official

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116. Phld. Ind. Sto. col lii ([164] 526-7); he also thought that the Diogeniasts were contemporaries of Philodemus. Athenaeus' present tense at 186A, *πολλῶν γοῦν εἰσι φιλοσόφων ἐν ἄστει σύνοδοι*, is probably copied from his source; on this procedure cf. Ferrary [353] 458 n. 82 and Glucker [388] 214 (on 509A). Comparetti's view has been attacked by Düring and Ferrary. According to Düring [345] 93-4 and 127, 'After about the year 100 BC it is by no means probable that followers of the three philosophers, who had now been dead for a long time and whose doctrines were already obsolete, met at regular *σύνοδοι*'. Düring thinks that 'These *σύνοδοι* took place at the time when the fame of the three philosophers was at its height and followers and personal disciples were still alive'. He concludes that the meetings of the three clubs 'were being celebrated in the year 145' ('About 150 BC all these philosophers lectured at the same time in Athens, Diogenes more than 80 years old and Panaetius about 35 years old, thus at his *akme*'). But Düring's ideas on *θίασοι* are all derived from Wilamowitz. Düring also attempts to integrate the beginning of Athenaeus' Book Five in a reconstructed Symposion by Herodicus, on which, similarly, he concludes 'without hesitation that the treatise *περὶ Συμποσίων* was written between 150 and 140' (94). But the arrangement of Düring's text of Herodicus is not convincing; I find it difficult to believe for instance that the regular alternation of sentences about philosophers with sentences concerning sacrifice at Ath. 185A-6D comes from one source instead of two. Düring's Herodicus is not even constantly hostile to Plato: from time to time he compares him favourably with Epicurus (*eg* Ath. 186D-E). - Far more plausible is the chronology offered by Ferrary [353] 458-9, on which *infra*, p. 156 and n. 118.

school and founded their own 'Porches'[117]. Thus after Diogenes' death Mnesarchus established an independent rival school whose members claimed to be the true Stoa of Mnesarchus' teacher; these are the Diogeniasts. Dardanus did the same after Antipater's death; the new dissidents are the Antipatrists. Finally, an unknown disciple of Panaetius repeated the story after his master's death; his pupils are the Panaetiasts. Ferrary dates Athenaeus' source immediately after Panaetius' death, concluding, 'on peut envisager l'hypothèse que ces différents collèges aient été liés à la coexistence de plusieurs écoles stoïciennes dans la dernière décennie du II^{e} siècle av. J.-C.'[118].

The most striking fact about Athenaeus' clubs is that all three belong to the same school. The emergence of three Stoic groups affiliated to successive leaders must be a sign of very unusual affairs going on in the Porch. And indeed, the scholarchs in question cover an unusual period in the history of their school: as will happen a little later in Plato's Academy, succession breaks off in the Athenian Stoa after Panaetius, and the new Stoic orthodoxy will not emerge in Athens but in Rome. Glucker already suggested that the formation of the three clubs is an expression of dissensions provoked by deviationist doctrines such as held by Antipater or Panaetius, to which the Stoicism of the Early Empire reacted by returning to Zeno and Chrysippus[119]. The phenomenon may be similar to what happened in the Academy before its disintegration, if it is true that Antiochus did not succeed Philo but founded his own 'Academy'[120].

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117. Ferrary [353] 449-64; his conclusions are entirely accepted by Dorandi [333] 30-31 (with a lucid summary of Ferrary's points and discussion of the textual evidence, esp. Comparetti's restoration of [*τὴν Πα*]*ναι*[*τίου*] and [*διαδεξά*]*μεν*[*ος*] at Ind. Sto. liii 3-7, accepted so far).

118. Ferrary [353] 459-60; cf. n. 84: 'Dans les années 110-100, les Panétiastes pourraient être une école dirigée par un disciple de Panétius, les Diogénistes, l'école de Mnésarchus se réclamant de Diogène, les Antipatristes, l'école de Dardanus se réclamant d'Antipater'.

119. Glucker [388] 223-4, 'there probably was a period when Stoicism was divided into *αἱρέσεις*, following the various streams which appeared in the history of the school'; see also 223 n. 160.

120. On this see the discussion in Barnes [250] 57-8; perhaps Mnesarchus and Dardanus suffered a similar experience of conversion?

Ferrary's hypothesis is not supported by ancient sources; Athenaeus, as may be expected, refers only to clubs of chums, not mentioning any doctrinal divisions. But his hypothesis is plausible, especially if one tries to explain the three names. Athenaeus' clubs gravitated around the Porch without being a real part of it; although attached to Stoic leaders, their members were outsiders to the main school. The names in -ι(α)στα*ί* are deviant (and so is *σύνοδοι*, if this was a description of the groups). They suggest features hard to accommodate in Zeno's school; but these features would easily be associated with dissident groups gathered around disciples whose main claim to authority may have been obedience to their own particular master.

This situation gives a new twist to the question of what the three names can possibly mean. In order to answer it we ought to know who invented them. Did the members of our clubs style themselves Diogeniasts and the like, as will Menecles later, or were these terms malicious nicknames similar to the one acquired by Pausanias - perhaps given, originally, by orthodox members of the disintegrating school? Unfortunately this is not a question which we can answer, but it makes a change to be aware of the alternatives. Equally unanswerable is the question whether our clubs established cults of their founders and were religious in the proper sense: we ought to know how the names were formed and used before we can start thinking about it. I am inclined to believe that the use of the thiasotic suffix for philosophers, whether by members of the sect or by their detractors, has rather metaphorical overtones[121].

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121. So Barnes [252] 12-13: 'Les *σύνοδοι* d'Athénée ont sans doute imité l'appellation des *θίασοι*, mais ils n'ont pas nécessairement conservé l'aspect religieux de leur modèle'. But this is an area of arbitrary speculation, where it is easy to exaggerate one way or another. Thus Foucart [360] 4 n. 1 tells us that 'Ces sociétés n'ont rien de commun avec les thiases et les éranes, si ce n'est que la forme de leur nom'. How does he know this? On the contrary, Ferrary [353] 457 seems to think that 'Les collèges mentionnés par Athénée devraient honorer Diogènes, Antipater et Panétius heroïsés, célébrant probablement le jour anniversaire de leur naissance par des banquets précédés de sacrifices en leur honneur'. Düring [345] 93 notes duly that 'It is not mentioned whether these meetings were coupled with any kind of cult', but adds something quite strange: 'Yet it is impossible to suppose that they met to celebrate the memory of the three founders, as was the case with the Epicureans'. Why not? Because Düring cannot allow these clubs to survive the death of their founders (cf. *supra* n. 116).

Another point is suggested to me by context. After this sentence Athenaeus jumps, as if by natural connection, to Theophrastus' will. Zumpft conjectured for the first time that the three clubs must have been established through some testamentary donation, so as to 'keep alive' the memory of the philosophers in question[122]. Ferrary retains this idea, but thinks that Diogenes, Antipater and Panaetius 'n'avaient pas eux-mêmes laissé un capital de fondation'[123]: he obviously conceives the Stoic *σύνοδοι* to be analogous to the anonymous sect whom Theophrastus endows in the next sentence[124]. But, since in fact Theophrastus only benefits his own school, the analogy may more plausibly be constructed the other way round: Diogenes, Antipater and Panaetius (if not their pupils - say, Mnesarchus, Dardanus and Polemon)[125] provided by will a capital for the meetings and symposia of their followers. In doing so they would have followed the illustrious example of Epicurus; and such occurrences would encourage the later interpretation of Theophrastus' will along similar lines.

Athenaeus not only mentions the names of three clubs of philosophers; he suggests that their members lived in a sort of sympotic communion. The common meals of these Stoics must have followed the same pattern as in other clubs; but Athenaeus also commends them for a sort of philosophical propriety. What could this mean?

An anecdote reports that Antipater *συμπόσιόν ποτε συνάγων συνέταξε τοῖς ἐρωμένοις ὡς περὶ σοφισμάτων ἐρῶσιν*[126]. Whether this is supposed to be a school event or not, the story seems to reflect an older habit of the Stoics; for we should remember that, long before the

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122. Zumpft [658] 16.

123. Ferrary [353] 458 n. 80.

124. Although Ferrary admits on evidence from Gottschalk [393] 316-7 that Theophrastus' donation is dubious.

125. Ath. 234D; on Polemon as a possible Panaetiast see Düring [345] 127.

126. Ath. 186C.

formation of the clubs, Persaeus warned against the use of *συλλογισμοί* at symposia[127], and that, much later, Epictetus complained about people who would demonstrate their competence in logic in such circumstances, *ἐπιδείκνυσθαι θέλων ἐν συμποσίῳ ὅτι οἶδεν τοὺς ὑποθετικούς*[128]. Later still, Lucian will give us funny examples of Stoics in ordinary banquets, doing things such as Epictetus might have had in mind[129]. Did the clubs cultivate such habits with even greater zeal? It is very tempting to see in traditions of this sort the reflection of a sectarianism peculiar to the Stoics, which towards the second century BC drew them into small sympotic clubs baptised after particular teachers.

Three successive leaders of a great school appear as eponyms of *σύνοδοι*. The phenomenon is exceptional; it does not mirror a general situation in the classical sects, but an idiosyncratic process associated with the disintegration of the Porch. This is the only point where the philosophical group can be said, even if in an imprecise sense, to have joined the *θίασος*.

It is also significant that the rare phenomenon of philosophical clubs living in a sympotic communion started around the figure of Diogenes of Babylon, a philosopher who, as we have seen in Chapter 1, promoted a theory of the symposion according to which the goal of such reunions was *φιλοφροσύνη*, and insisted on the musical and cultural side of sympotic behaviour.

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127. Ath. 607A-E; cf. Ch. 2, p. 61.

128. Diatr. i 26.9.

129. *Eg* the moribond Stoic Thesmopolis at *Gallus* 11: *...καὶ ὅλως ἡδίστη τις ἦν ἡ διατριβή, πλὴν ἀλλ' ἕν με ἐλύπει οὐ μετρίως· Θεσμόπολις ἐνοχλῶν καὶ ἀρετήν τινα πρός με διεξιὼν καὶ διδάσκων ὡς αἱ δύο ἀποφάσεις μίαν κατάφασιν ἀποτελοῦσι καὶ ὡς εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστί, νὺξ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐνίστε δὲ καὶ κέρατα ἔφασκεν εἶναί μοι...* But such testimonia are extremely fragile (see *supra*, Ch. 2, p. 72).

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An Old-Fashioned Socratic

Anecdotes may have a kernel of truth, but this is most often lost to us. Not many of the attractive episodes with symposia attended by philosophers can be trusted: they were recorded by late compilers whose primary sources are often unknown. But we have another important testimony from Antigonus Carystus. It concerns Menedemus, the founder of the circle in Eretria, a cultural luminary with Socratic aspirations towards informal oral teaching. According to Antigonus, Menedemus had established and organised a very special ceremonial for the entertainment of his disciples, followers, and friends; and it is believed that Antigonus was one of these[130].

The story is remarkable: it consists in giving the details of a very elaborate and unusual ceremonial - in fact so elaborate and unusual that we may suspect the whole thing to be an invention. Perhaps it was inspired by the comedy Menedemus by Lycophron. There are two versions of Antigonus' account, by Athenaeus and Diogenes, and both end with quotations from this play[131]. According to Wikarjak's ingenious reconstruction of the plot of Menedemus, Lycophron described the symposia of the Eretrian school through an eye-witness which would cast on them the same light as Strepsiades on the *phrontisterion*: Satyrus[132]. Would this mean that Antigonus' account is a literary fabrication?

I very much doubt it. There is a major discrepancy between the testimonies of Diogenes and Athenaeus: the former presents Lycophron's play as an *irrisio*, the latter as a *laudatio*. This problem has attracted a lot of attention from scholars, who have tried to

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130. See *supra*, n. 7.

131. Ath. 419E-20D and DL ii 139-40; Lycophron p. 636 Nauck. Cf. p. 99 Wilamowitz and Wikarjak's attempted reconstruction of the play, [643] 127-31.

132. Wikarjak [643] 131-4.

establish which of the two compilers had got it right[133]. But the disagreement is also interesting from another angle: it contrasts with the fact that, in the actual account of Menedemus' symposia, Diogenes and Athenaeus agree on every detail. This must be the only portion which comes down from Antigonus.

The two accounts do coincide, but the differences of style between Diogenes' version and Athenaeus' version indicate that the story circulated in several intermediary sources unknown to us. According to Wikarjak, Diogenes misrepresents the play because he only knows a few excerpts from it[134]. I am not so sure about this; but it must be right, in principle, to explain the disagreement over *irrisio* and *laudatio* as resulting from some compiler's fragmentary knowledge of the play. Its very occurrence indicates that the reference to Lycophron is not taken from Antigonus; the idea of pairing these two authors so as to form one single testimonial probably occurred to Diogenes or to some earlier compiler (*eg* Heraclides Lembus, if this is indeed the alternative source excerpted by Diogenes for the biography of Menedemus). It proved successful: the compiler used by Athenaeus quotes other lines than the compiler used by Diogenes.

It seems more natural that a comic poet would use material at hand in order to make a classical joke, such as about the poor quality of food in intellectual gatherings (*τραγήματα γὰρ ὁ σωφρονιστὴς πᾶσιν ἐν μέσῳ λόγῳ*), than that a biographer would give a serious turn to a piece of fiction found in some comedy. Also, it makes better sense for an author of comedies to bring on stage something reasonably familiar to his audience. And indeed, added to other evidence, Lycophron's play indicates that Menedemus had acquired some local fame with his parties; for his reputation for being *φιλυπόδοχος* and *πλείω συνάγων συμπόσια* is

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133. Thus Zeller [652] II 1 276-7 n. 5 and Pfeiffer [532] 119 side with Diogenes, whereas Kock [442] 41 and Wikajak [643] 134-7 side with Athenaeus ('dubitari nequit, quin Menedemus a Lycophrone non celebratus sed irrisus sit', 137). According to DL ii 133, Lycophron was one of Menedemus' literary guests (Pfeiffer *loc cit* n. 5). For a summary of positions see Giannantoni [199] Nota 12.

134. 'Hic fabulam integram non novisse, fragmentis autem, quae legit, ironiam inesse non intellexisse videtur' ([643] 136).

confirmed by sources which, unlike Antigonus, do not describe these parties[135]. There is not much reason to suspect Antigonus.

As all these testimonia refer to the same thing, evidence can be combined. Although Antigonus does not tell us whether the dinners were organised for his pupils, we can assume this from an episode narrated by Diogenes, which shows Menedemus with a group of *νεανίσκοι* at *κῶμος* (ii 138). According to another tradition reported by the same authority, Menedemus also entertained his literary friends (ii 133). Are these different reunions, conducted in a different manner? The fluid character of Menedemus' circle seems to defeat the question.

Menedemus' symposia fit very well into the picture of a school devoted to a philosophical ideal of conduct in life rather than to specific doctrines or programmes of research[136]. His reunions do not celebrate any particular occasion; they are spent in the solution of *ζητήσεις*, whatever Antigonus (or rather the compiler who joined Antigonus and Lycophron) may have meant by this. The fixed and complicated ritual, as well as the variations from season to season, suggest that Menedemus' symposia were quite frequent: it takes time for such a ceremonial to become established. A famous anecdote, maybe from Heracleides Lembus[137], supports this guess. Invited to a banquet for philosophers which Nicocreon held monthly at his court in Cyprus, Menedemus remarked that such reunions are no good because *καθ' ἑκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν ἔδει γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἑορτήν*. It should not make any

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135. DL ii 133; but the holding of symposia is ascribed here to a very puzzling reason, *διὰ τὸ νοσῶδες τῆς Ἐρετρίας*. This chapter and the next one give the impression that Menedemus' reputation had strange ups and downs (*ὥστε πταίουσιν οἱ λέγοντες μηδὲν αὐτὸν ἀνεγνωκέναι πλὴν τῆς Μηδείας Εὐριπίδου*, 134). A funny question may be, did malevolent outsiders present the rigid ritual of Menedemus' parties as a sort of quarantine? Alternatively, would there be an obscure Socratic connection - say, the medical use of strict portions of wine, such as Aristippus' *ἡμίνα βασιλική* (cf. Ch. 2, p. 114 and n. 161)?

136. Cf. DL ii 130. On the character of Menedemus' school see Von Arnim [245] 24-5, Reale [549] i 430 and iii 80-2, Giannantoni [199] Nota 12, von Fritz [367].

137. DL ii 129-30.

difference if the details of this story are not true[138]: putting such words in the mouth of a philosopher reputed for his symposia at home is an indirect reflection and comment on his manner of conducting these events.

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Philosophers at Court

In all the cases examined so far, the symposion has appeared to be a corporate activity organised within one philosophical school. But there is also evidence for regular reunions of philosophers of different sects. These events are not a part of school-life in the same sense: they are usually sponsored by kings or tyrants and take place at court. Most of the stories about philosophical symposia at court are unreliable, and often seem to be generated by literary clichés. But even if the details of these anecdotes were demonstrably fictitious, the pattern itself seems to acknowledge a general historical fact: a variety of the symposion, adapted to the cultural circumstances of Hellenistic court-life, started to develop from the mid-fourth century onwards.

The series of stories opens with the Socratic circle. I shall mention just one of them, which contains an interesting detail. The anecdote is transmitted by Hegesander and shows Aristippus being punished by the tyrant of Syracusae with a low seat at table[139]. In the more polished version given by Diogenes, Aristippus earns this by turning down with a witty answer a request from the tyrant *εἰπεῖν τι τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας*. The anecdote illustrates perhaps the *topos* of the philosopher boldly opposing the tyrant[140]. The interesting detail is the word

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138. A very similar anecdote circulated about Anacharsis (DL ix 58, Plu. 449E-F, Cic. Tusc. ii 52, ND 382; this episode is dated by Stählin [607] to 323 BC). In any case, if von Fritz' dates are correct ([367]), the visit to Nicocreon (311) occurred before the foundation of the Eretrian school (310-300).

139. Ath. 544C and DL ii 73.

140. Cf. also Anecdote 57 in Riginos [555] (DL ii 78, SE PH iii 204 and other sources).

ἀναγκαζόμενος: in the context of a symposion ἀναγκάζειν renders the orders of the symposiarch. In other anecdotes the philosophers adopt the traditional duel in poetical quotations[141]; but here it seems that the tyrant wishes to impose some philosophical recital as the 'rule' of the evening.

Another tyrant who was so keen on the company of philosophers as to elicit from them famous insults is Nicocreon of Cyprus, who features in the anecdote about Menedemus' παρρησία[142]. Nicocreon established, like Lykon, a regular monthly banquet (ἐπιμήνιον ἑορτὴν). It was no ordinary feast but one organised πρὸς τὸ διακούειν τῶν φιλοσόφων; Nicocreon apparently surrounded himself only by philosophical guests. We may be sceptical about the details of the confrontation between Menedemus and Nicocreon, but the monthly feast does not seem to be a piece of fiction. Athenaeus refers to another occurrence, where Theophrastus' pupil Lynceus was present[143].

Antigonus Gonatas, a well-known admirer of philosophers, founded an annual symposion (ἐτήσιος ἑορτή) in which members of different schools joined to celebrate the memory of his son Halkyoneus, dead after 240BC. Diogenes refers to this feast as if it was a popular and well established event (v 68), and gives us an account of it full of interesting details (iv 41-2). According to Daebritz, the company consisted of 'Hieronymus' own closed circle of students'[144]. But the implication of Diogenes' remark that 'only Lycon did not turn up' (v 68) seems to be that large numbers of philosophers from all over Greece used to attend Halkyoneus' Day; and indeed, we meet among the guests none other than the scholarch of the Academy, Arcesilaus. This is quite interesting: the episode at iv 41-2 may be added to

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141. *Eg* DL ii 76 and 78.

142. DL ii 129-30 (*supra*, p. 163). Von Fritz [367] col 791 dates the episode to 311/10 BC - cf. *supra*, n. 138.

143. ἐν Κύπρῳ δὲ παρὰ Νικοκρέοντι δειπνεῖν (Ath. 337E).

144. Daebritz [299].

Arcesilaus' many undefinable connections with the symposion, on which I have only touched[145].

The scholarch of the Peripatos would not turn up because these feasts were housed by a dissident from his school: Hieronymus, one of the Peripatetic authors of *περὶ* Μέθης, and member of Antigonus' circle[146]. Although under royal patronage (*ἱκανὰ χρήματα ἀπέστελλεν Ἀντίγονος πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν*), these events did not take place at court.

The episode throws a faded light on the issue of what happened at symposia of this sort. This is the occasion on which Arcesilaus refused to answer various *ἐπικυλίκειοι ἐξηγήσεις* as his turn came; and, when asked to solve a *θεώρημα*, he replied, *ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο μάλιστα φιλοσοφίας ἴδιον, τὸ τὸν καιρὸν ἕκαστον ἐπίστασθαι*[147].

Unfortunately the nature of the *ἐξηγήσεις* and *θεωρήματα* is as mysterious as that of the *ζητήματα* pursued in Menedemus' symposia; but other stories seem to suggest that some contest in arguments was going on on these occasions. According to a fragment from Antigonus' Life of Menedemus, Persaeus was once refuted by Menedemus in a symposion, *παρὰ πότον ὁ Μενέδημος ἐλέγχων αὐτὸν τοῖς λόγοις*[148]. This episode happened during Menedemus' last years, spent in exile in Macedonia: the *πότος* in question must be another court-symposion given by Antigonus Gonatas. This type of story culminates, dramatically, in the tradition of Diodorus Cronus' death. After a party where he lost favour with his protector, Ptolemy Soter, because he could not solve on the spot (*παραχρῆμα*) 'dialectical' problems

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145. See *supra*, n. 28; Ch. 2, nn. 101 and 44.

146. On Hieronymus' *περὶ* Μέθης see Chapter 2, p. 98; on this episode see Hirzel [418] i 361, Daebritz [299], Arrighetti [247].

147. See *supra*, Ch. 2, p. 60. Arrighetti [247] 119-20 considers the contest itself to be a paradigm of a discussion in the Academy, and the episode to demonstrate Hieronymus' more scientific stand and reveal his aversion for 'il sistema pedagogico di Arcesilao'. This is a strange interpretation: Arcesilaus is far from giving here a sample of school exercise. If there is any confrontation, it is between two attitudes to a symposion of this sort.

148. DL ii 144.

asked of him by Stilpo, this logician committed suicide[149]. The anecdote may well be an exercise in imagination, making the inventor of famous *aporiai* die in defeat at the hands of another controversialist. But a symposion with λόγοι διαλεκτικοί and contest in διδασκαλία would be hard to imagine if this kind of event did not occur in the real world[150].

Such stories tempt me to think that symposia at court reflected the rivalries and διαφωνίαι between schools and philosophers under the form of a contest in arguments. In this competitive feature may lie the difference between philosophical school- and court-dinners; the difference may in turn illustrate, if not be due to, an ambivalent attitude of some philosophers towards the social phenomenon of the symposion, according to whether it was an event of the outside world or one organised in their own school, or even perhaps only in their own mind[151]. The seeds of this double attitude must have been sown by Plato, the first philosopher to express a strong desire to reform the time-honoured institution of the symposion, which, as we shall see, he held in very low esteem.

iii: Socrates as Host

The issue of the custom of common meals having Platonic origins is problematic. But some traditions claim that sympotic life started even earlier among philosophers[152], and this view has been embraced by modern scholars - especially those who think that Plato's

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149. DL ii 111-2. On Diodorus' reputation and contributions to Hellenistic philosophy see Sedley [594] (Conclusions on p. 104). Sedley locates the episode in Alexandria before the death of Ptolemy Soter in 283/2, giving 284 as a convenient approximate date for Diodorus' own death (p. 80). On other positions see his n. 37 (also Giannantoni [199] Nota 7).

150. Sedley's comments on the historical reliability of this episode are relevant to the whole class: '...as often happens in such cases of distortion, the historical facts of the encounter, in particular the date and setting, have been accurately preserved' ([594] 80; see also his nice example of Diderot at the court of Catherine the Great in 1774).

151. Cf. Ch. 2, pp. 59-61.

152. *Eg* Ath. 463C, *ἐποιοῦντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ἑπτὰ καλούμενοι σοφοὶ συμποτικὰς ὁμιλίας.*

Pythagorean ties were very strong[153]. The evidence for Pythagorean common messes is utterly unreliable[154]. There are instead some suggestions to the effect that Socrates took his disciples to common meals at home. These hints are fewer and less conclusive than currently admitted[155]; nevertheless we should examine them and assess rather than inflate their value.

Only two testimonia seem to be unambiguous: Aristophanes's parody of the *phrontisterion*[156] and two consecutive scenes with Socrates as host in Xenophon[157]. Just on their own, the comic lines do not constitute a piece of evidence[158]; but the two accounts work well together. Xenophon can make us believe that the dinners parodied by Aristophanes are not pure fiction, and Aristophanes adds an important fact, which Xenophon does not make clear although it may be natural to suppose it: the dinners in question were attended by Socrates' pupils.

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153. See *supra*, nn. 2 and 4.

154. Morrison [503] thinks that the Pythagorean *ὁμακόϊον* had a foundation of mathematical training 'issuing in political action', and that it adopted a compound variety of Ionian-Dorian common meals, which served this foundation well. But the evidence for Pythagorean commensality relies entirely on Iamblichus, who is a dubious source; *pace* Boyancé, the reading-parties at VP 21 do not have the authority of Aristoxenus.

155. DL ii 34 portrays Socrates among 'rich guests' at supper: these may or may not be pupils. Plu. 461 D-E exhibits him returning an invitation to one single person, Euthydemus (cf. DL ii 24 for a story with the same pattern).

156. Ar. Nu. 176-9:
[Μα.] *ἐχθὲς δέ γ' ἡμῖν δεῖπνον οὐκ ἦν ἑσπέρας.*
[Στ.] *εἶεν. τί οὖν πρὸς τἄλφιτ' ἐπαλαμήσατο;*
[Μα.] *κατὰ τῆς τραπέζης καταπάσας λεπτὴν τέφραν,*
κάμψας ὀβελίσκον, εἶτα διαβήτην λαβών,
ἐκ τῆς παλαίστρας θοἰμάτιον ὑφείλετο.

157. Mem. iii 14.1-4; for the second scene cf. the variant at Ath. 186D.

158. As Taylor wants to take them, [615] 147-8: as a matter of principle, what makes the success of a comic poet does not also make a historical proof. Without the support of Antigonus, Lycophron's picture of Menedemus' symposia would not reveal anything of historical interest to us (*supra*, p. 162). The fact that Socrates could be caricatured in certain ways shows, at most, that Socrates appeared to the Athenians as an intriguing character, which is no great news. But what can it mean, in historical terms, to say that the Socratic circle was similar to the Pythagorean *ὁμακόϊον* and to the Athenian *Κακοδαιμονιασταί*?

Socrates did nothing but philosophy, and his philosophical mood contaminated everything that Socrates touched in his life. There is a tradition ascribed to Dicaearchus, which, in Plutarch's nice paraphrase, says that Socrates *πρῶτος ἀποδείξας τὸν βίον ἅπαντι χρόνῳ καὶ μέρει καὶ πάθεσι καὶ πράγμασιν ἁπλῶς ἅπασι φιλοσοφίαν δεχόμενον*[159]. Among the examples of ordinary activity which Socrates would have thus turned philosophical is, according to this text, the drinking together with pupils (*συμπίνειν*). And indeed, Xenophon's Socrates continues, at table, to converse and give ironical lessons, as if he were in the *agora*; both symposia show him practising definitions - the discussion in the first scene is even labelled *περὶ ὀνομάτων*. The symposion seems to be a continuation of his usual activity. But the 'search' is no longer for the Socratic notions familiar to us. The terms defined concern food and eating, as if the topics were dictated by the immediate circumstance. As we have already seen, this phenomenon occurs, under various forms, in symposia written later by philosophers. Concern for what happens at table is quite different from what Xenophon or Plato may let us guess, even if through the veil of fiction, about Socrates' behaviour at parties given by other people, where his own attendance was exceptional. But do not the familiar topics, courage, piety, or friendship, emerge from immediate circumstances in the Socratic dialogues known to us - Plato's early dialogues for instance? Is this by any chance an aspect of what the ancients meant when saying that Socrates had made philosophy a permanent mode of living? It may be too adventurous to interpret the form of Plato's dialogues in any way other than literary. Even so, Socrates seems to have made it possible that an institution previously reserved to the poets, the symposion, became open towards philosophy. This is an important fact from the perspective of a growing tradition of philosophers who adopted the common meal.

But there is no indication that Socrates favoured this type of gathering above others; and he certainly did not institutionalise it. The words by which Xenophon introduces the two

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159. Plu. 796C = Dicaearchus 29W.

episodes, *ὁπότε δὲ* and *ἄλλον δέ ποτε*, suggest that dinners of this sort were not unique events; but the formula *οἱ συνιόντες ἐπὶ δεῖπνον* is far from indicating 'a regular practice', as Guthrie claims[160]. Dicaearchus' fragment contrasts the formal teaching of later times with Socrates' manner of doing things with his disciples *ὅτι τύχοι*. Although this is not a specific testimony, it strengthens the impression that the meals were occasional, like everything else that Socrates did.

The point is important because the topic of Socratic commensality, opened by Taylor and Joël, has given occasion to comments which, having no support in ancient texts, can go very far indeed. Rossetti in a recent paper has tried to reshape the figure of Socrates by proving that his circle was at once a party-club and a formal school[161]. According to this scholar, Socrates received in food and drink what the professional teachers received in money; his symposia were those of a political leader and professional teacher. This may please our imagination: another example of Socrates' vicious attempt to undermine democracy, by tailoring the systematic methods of the sophists back into the aristocratic moulds of a vanished world. Unfortunately the texts adduced by Rossetti refuse to support his ingenious idea[162]. His relatively large corpus of testimonia on regular commensal activities in the Socratic circle is based on a misinterpretation of the word *ἑταῖρος*, especially in Plato's eristic dialogues[163]. It is true that each pupil contributed by bringing in his own food. This is a sign of simplicity; peasants did the same in *ἔρανοι*. As we can gather from Xenophon, the principle was adopted in order to level the social heterogeneity of Socrates' disciples, as long as they were together at table. It does not mark out the Socratics as a formal school and political club.

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160. Guthrie [404] iii 373 n. 3.

161. Rossetti [565].

162. DL ii 74; schol. ad Ael. Arist. Or. 46 (p. 171 Dindorf); X. Mem. ii 8; Sen. de Benef. i 8.1-2.

163. Cf. Calhoun's section on the terminology of Athenian political clubs, [284] 4-9 (for non-political uses: 'As "friend", "comrade", "age-fellow", or "pupil", *ἑταῖρος* is found in the literature of every period', p. 5 n. 3). See also Finsler [355] 314.

Neither is there anything to substantiate Joël's speculations about the Cynic vegetarianism of Socrates, or Taylor's claim that Socratic symposia betray a 'private religion of an ascetic type'[164]. Xenophon's Socrates advocates, as being healthier for the body, a diet which does not mix up many tastes and is not based on excessive eating[165]. His dinners with disciples must have been frugal, not ascetic in any religious or moral sense. If Aristophanes made starvation and gibberish out of them, it is because this was his business as a comic poet.

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The symposion of philosophers, understood as a regular custom with more or less 'institutional' features or established rituals, is not known to us before the third century BC. A good example of this practice is the monthly banquet given in the Peripatos under Lycon by every archon, perhaps on the occasion of having completed the function. It is not possible to say whether such customs had been adopted in the early phase of any philosophical school except the Garden. There are hints at, but no clear evidence for, the maintenance of regular symposia in the historical Academy; nor even in the Peripatos before Lycon; and there is no trace of sympotic customs connected with the Stoa, until the time of Diogenes of Babylon - the earliest that can be conceded.

The notions used so far in evaluation of the form and character of the philosophical symposion are inappropriate and should be discarded. The celebration of the Muses is marginal to the life of philosophical communities and irrelevant to their practice of symposia. The birthday of the founder occurs very late as a school-feast, even probably in the Garden.

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164. Joël [438] ii 835; Taylor [615] 174-5.

165. This principle is formulated at DL ii 27: *ἥδιστα ἐσθίων ἥκιστα ὅσων προσδεῖται, ἥδιστα πίων ἥκιστα τὸ μὴ παρόντον πότον ἀναμένειν.*

Symposia of philosophers permit analogy with symposia of thiasotic corporations only in an isolated case, obscurely associated with events which led to the disintegration of the Stoa.

If we take Lycon's feasts as an example, we are forced to see that other regular symposia, for instance those of Menedemus or Epicurus' followers, differed considerably, both from Lycon's banquets and among themselves. Combined with general knowledge about the organisation, character and doctrines of the schools, the little (or very little) that we are told about the common meals of philosophers still allows us to relate such customs to aims, structures, bonds between members and forms of committement to the original leader, which are specific to each sect. In contrast to this kind of customs, a competitive type of symposion developed at the court of Hellenistic kings and tyrants, who sponsored regular confrontations between philosophers of different beliefs.

Plato's influence on the theoretical development of the symposion shines out, and his leading role in the literary production of symposia by later philosophers, although less clear to analysis, cannot be disputed. But Plato has left no visible sign in the history of sympotic customs practised in any community of philosophers. His *σύνοδοι*, mentioned casually by Antigonus, or his entertainment of occasional guests, such as Timotheus, can stir our imagination, but do not help us to reconstruct any constant and regular practice of symposia in the Academy. In the vague sense of offering an illuminating anticipatory example, Socrates seems to have stronger claims than Plato to a role in the later development of the custom.

If we start from the premiss that the symposion was sooner or later adopted by most philosophers, this state of things opens two complementary questions concerning the relation between Plato's practical and theoretical (or literary) symposia. What made Plato's theoretical influence so powerful, when his influence on the actual custom was unremarkable? Conversely, if Plato held a theory of the symposion which proved to exert a strong influence, why do we not find it reflected in the life of his school?

Plato entertained a complicated relationship with the institution of the symposion; the thought that the Symposion and Laws i-ii reflect a practice of the Academy is naive. I hope

that my next chapters will provide answers to both questions by explaining the nature of these complications and the novelty and interest of the theory presented in the Laws.

II

The Symposion in Plato

Chapter 4

Laws *665A8-6D2: Symposion and Music*

i: Introduction

Plato's Laws have a striking preamble. On the premiss that no symposion in the real world was ever performed well (639D5-E3), the Athenian starts to invent a good symposion. The exposition is extremely difficult to follow. Plato's tendency to anticipate distant thoughts and develop tangential ones methodically is no longer compensated for by lucid returns to intermediary stages abandoned in the progress of the argument; instead, several resumptions of the initial point present it from such different angles that we begin to doubt whether the object of inquiry is still the same. The topic of symposia hangs over two books, but only four passages actually deal with it, two in each book. We are told that this topic is very important in spite of its seeming triviality (642A1-3), and so difficult to understand that other matters must be clarified first (641D6-9, 652a6-B1). But most of the discussion is taken up by background matters. The symposion is first mentioned in Book One quite late (637A), then further delayed by numerous anticipations and revisions; even the attempt to make it a legitimate subject for incredulous interlocutors has a protracting effect[1]. For a large section of the second book, symposia vanish out of sight. Once the topic is officially closed[2], the Athenian forgets all about it: symposia will not feature in the ten books to come. Neither would there be any room left, for the Magnesians will have to spend the year celebrating more than three hundred and

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1. See especially the solemn renewal of ancient hospitality ties between interlocutors at 642B2-3A1.

2. *κολοφών*: 673D10, 674C5.

sixty-five feasts (828A1-D5)[3], which they must squeeze in along with compulsory daily common messes[4] - neither of which bear any resemblance to the wine-parties of the first books.

Not surprisingly, Plato's conception of symposia in the Laws has been misunderstood or ignored; it can easily appear to us as the *radotage* of an old man. It is, however, important - the Athenian was perfectly right.

It is important in two respects. One is philosophical. The theory of symposia has an intrinsic value: it brings about two new ideas which, even if imperfectly worked out, help us to understand the development of Plato's thought on some very important and much broader ethical issues, which have undergone substantial change from the early and middle dialogues. These ideas are: demand for a training in pleasure and use of wine as a physical drug.

The second aspect is historical; it is related to the problem of Plato's influence on the three kinds of tradition which I tried to spell out in the previous section. In the light of the material which I have already presented, analysis of the present text will allow us to appreciate what the theoretical and literary approaches to the symposion by later philosophers may owe to the Athenian's discussion in the Laws. It will also make us see more clearly what is Plato's position in the history of the *philosophischen Symposion* meant by Wilamowitz - a custom practised in philosophical schools. I have concluded in the previous chapter that there is no reliable historical evidence for Plato's own adoption of such customs. But can the theory of the Laws be regarded as an indirect proof - the expression of anything that Plato was doing with his students in the Academy? Conversely, can this theory have exerted an influence on the

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3. 828A1-D5. This is the final version of a programme initiated in book v. After establishing a city, the first task of a legislator is to organise sacrificial ceremonies (738B2-E8) by assigning (*προστάσσειν*) each division of the population to its appropriate god. This line is elaborated upon in book vi (771C7-E1) and leads to a theory of the 'right assignment' of dance (*ὄρχησις*) and music (*μέλη καὶ ῥήματα*; 799A4-B8, 812E10-3A3). Dominant in the huge complex of feasts of the Laws seems to be the idea of 'consecrating' the assignment of songs and dances (*καθιερῶσαι*). By consecrating the Athenian intends to make mimetic expressions unchangeable in order that the pleasure attached to them may be diminished through repetition (cf. 814D7-6D2, 816C5-D2 and 797B1-2).

4. 762B6-E1, 780A1-B2, 806D7-7A6.

adoption of symposia by later philosophers? These are two separate questions, to which I shall return in the end.

The present chapter and the next one are devoted to the analysis of Plato's conception of the symposion, as it is formulated in the Laws. As I have already said, discussion of this topic concentrates on four passages. Let me start by presenting these passages in the context of the two books.

A: 639A2-41A2. The symposion makes its way into conversation as an example of the most intense pleasures, *αἱ μέγισταιι ἡδοναί*, adduced by the Spartan interlocutor (637A-B). The Athenian picks it up for purposes of method: he intends to build around it a model discussion of institutions (*ὀρθὴ μέθοδος*, 638E4)[5]. If we were to judge by the standards of the Politicus, we might say that the main feature which a symposion has in common with other items is the need for a leader, while its own distinctive feature is drunkenness (640A8-C7). These features establish what the proper line of inquiry should be; but inquiry only starts when the project of considering the potential goodness of a symposion has been accepted.

B: 645D1-50B10. It starts, in fact, from a question asked by Cleinias: *συμποσίου δὲ ὀρθῶς παιδαγωγηθέντος **τί μέγα** ἰδιώταις ἢ τῇ πόλει γίγνοιτ᾽ ἄν*; (641B1-2). The first answer to this question suggests that the main good of the symposion lies in a relation with *παιδεία* (641B3-D2). And indeed, the Athenian insists that the route leading to Dionysus is *παιδεία* (643A6-7). On the whole, he constructs a situation where we should expect **B** to illustrate the claim that these two subject-matters are linked by some natural order (645C1-4). Yet the main thread of the book so far has not been *παιδεία* but the principle of *ἄρχειν ἑαυτοῦ*[6], which also dominates in the passage immediately preceding **B** - a famous analogy between man and puppet (644B6-5C8). On the other hand, the 'route' through *παιδεία* must also lead through *μουσική*, which is in the province of *παιδεία* (641E-2A). We are at a very

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5. 637B-8E (see esp. the section from 638B7 on, *πρῶτον δ᾽ ἀκούσατε...*).

6. *Eg* 626D1-E5, 633D5-E6.

large crossroad of subjects here. **B** concentrates on the chief characteristic of symposia enunciated in **A**, drunkenness, and attempts to prove that wine should be used for the formation of *αἰσχύνη* or *αἰδώς* in the soul. This conclusion is partly obscured by the tangential thought that wine is also a good test of character; the role of the leader has not been explained; the connection with *παιδεία* remains vague; nevertheless, we finish the first book with the feeling that Cleinias has received the best part of any possible answer.

C: 665A8-6D2. But this feeling is defeated right at the start of the second book: far from moving to a new topic, the Athenian announces afresh that the greatest benefit of symposia is to be expounded only now. The benefit in question (*ὠφελία*) is conservation of *παιδεία* (652A-3A). This brings us back in a circle to the initial stage, sweeping **B** aside; and indeed, two similar replies made by Cleinias at 641C8-D2 and 653A4 reveal that the problem of *παιδεία* has not made great progress in the course of **B**. The Athenian returns to symposia after a long detour on music. Practice of the symposion is now restricted to a group of men between thirty and sixty, 'the Choir of Dionysus', whom wine enables to sing by diminishing their *αἰσχύνη*. The function of their songs is to instil the belief that the life of the greatest *ἀρετή* is also the most pleasant (664B3-C2). The musical competence of this choir is reflected both in the production of the best *ᾠδαί* and in a capacity to judge what is good and bad in music - a field of vital importance in Magnesia (670E4-7[7] : 812B9-C8). Thus **C** is followed by a long attempt to define the expertise of these wondrous musicologists (666D3-71A1).

D: 671A1-2D10. What brings back the symposion for the last time is the Athenian's wish to test the fact that Cleinias' question at 641B1-2 has been answered; in other words **D** purports to gather old points without making new ones. On the whole, **D** completes the idea of using wine as in **B** with the initial requirement for leadership made in **A**; thus **D** is consistent with **B**, although it develops some points in slightly different directions and makes substantial

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7. *τοῖς δὲ* refers to the third choir. According to Saunders, *τὸ γὰρ τρίτον* here refers back to 669A7-B3 (the three areas of competence of the *κριτής*). But *τὰ τρία* at 669 are general, whereas 670E4-7 refers to specific knowledge of the branches of music - rhythm (*πρῶτον*) and harmony (*δεύτερον*, 670E6).

additions which remain unexplained - such as the obscure item of *νόμοι συμποτικοί*. But, although in the middle of a discussion about music, the Athenian leaves out from this recapitulation the superior task of the singers in **C** - the main contribution of symposia to *παιδεία*. Its only echo, a metaphor of the soul melting, is now related to the process of **B** (666B7-C2 : 671B8-10). The subject ends with a glorious praise of wine as medicine for health in body and *αἰδώς* in soul, which does not square at all with the line of Book Two up to this point.

Out of the four accounts, **A** is introductory, **D** conclusive. The Athenian expounds his arguments mainly in **B** and **C**, and I shall construct my two chapters around these passages.

The problem of unity in Plato's account of symposia has been raised, but scholars measure this account by books: are the symposia of Book One consistent with the symposia of Book Two?

In **C**, wine must diminish *αἰσχύνη*; in **B** and **D** it creates *αἰσχύνη*. The end of the process described in **C** is musical performance; in **B** and **D** it is acquisition of self-control. Self-control does not feature in **C**, nor music in **B** or **D**. We must conclude that the choir of Dionysus illustrates another function of wine and symposia than **B** and **D**. Yet the regulations of age at 666A2-B2 exclude the possibility of symposia in other groups than the Choir of Dionysus. The primary feature of the symposion is drunkenness; but people under thirty (the lower age-limit in the choir) must refrain from drunkenness, *μέθης δὲ καὶ πολυοινίας τὸ παράπαν τὸν νέον ἀπέχεσθαι* (B1-2).

I shall adopt the view that the account is not unitary; but the only divergent part is **C** - a part insulated between the end of Book One and the end of Book Two. I shall try to prove that Plato worked out all this having in mind two separate functions for the reformed symposion. These functions illustrate opposite aspects of pleasure; thus they generated incompatible paradigms of symposia, but they belong in a unitary theory.

I shall consider **B** (with completions from **D**) to form the main account, because it explores the specific nature of the symposion; but I shall reserve for it the next chapter. It

seems best to start from **C** because, while the function of the symposion itself is narrower, more precise and easier to follow in **C**, the wider breadth of this passage as it emerges from context forces on us immediately the new aspect of Plato's conception of pleasure. But I must warn that the elucidation of Plato's thought in this passage requires much background detail on tangential matters, which sometimes will carry my argument into quite remote topics.

ii: The Argument

C arises in response to Cleinias: Cleinias has shown surprise at the thought that the third and best choir should belong to Dionysus (665A8-B9)[8]. The Athenian reminds him that all the city must sing (665C2-9)[9], then launches a startling question: **where** should the third choir sing? (D1-8). The answer will be, *ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις* (6B2-3). In the flowery growth of the argument after 666A2, this must be a conclusion which puts an end to Cleinias' doubts: the choir is affiliated to Dionysus because its place of performance is the symposion[10].

Why is this the right answer? Because, as we learn from the relative *ἥν* onwards (B5-C6), this choir cannot perform without taking wine. The best singers suffer from a paradoxical deficiency, which renders them incapable of singing in natural circumstances (D9-E4); and this fact explains why the *πού*-question has arisen at all. Its emphatic position in the argument reveals two things. First, the function of the symposion is to repair a deficiency. The other choirs did not raise such problems; we can suppose that they deliver their songs in well-defined circumstances, but this need not be discussed. The Athenian's argument for symposia

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8. On *λέγεσθαι* cf. England *ad l* and Saunders' translation.

9. Cf. also 664C4 sqq.

10. It is mistaken to picture the choir of Dionysus performing at Dionysia or any festivals (Belfiore [258]). The Athenian is quite clear on this point: *οὐκοῦν ἐν θεάτρῳ γε καὶ παντοίοις ἀνθρώποις*, 665E5. See *infra*, pp. 192 ff.

is more in the nature of an excuse. Secondly, the symposion does not have a purpose of its own, but is subordinated to a task which the Dionysian singers share with two inferior choirs: the production of songs.

iii: The Best Performances

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The Role of Music in the Organisation of Pleasure

Let us recapitulate: the Athenian wants to demonstrate the part played by the symposion in the preservation (*σωτηρία*) of the *ὀρθὴ παιδεία*[11] - a function heralded as higher than the one discovered in the first book: *ἦ καί τι μέγεθος ὠφελίας ἄξιον πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἔνεστ' ἐν τῇ κατ' ὀρθὸν χρείᾳ τῆς ἐν οἴνῳ συνουσίας* (652A3-5). And indeed, the Choir of Dionysus is first introduced (*καὶ δὴ καὶ τρίτον ἔφαμεν, εἰ μεμνήμεθα, Διόνυσον* 665A5-6) after a recapitulation of what *παιδεία* is (64E3-5A7).

We have been told many times that there is a relation between symposion and *παιδεία*, but the Athenian has not exhibited any intention to expand on this question[12]. At the first stage of inquiry Cleinias remarked: *δοκεῖς ἡμῶν, ὦ φίλε, τὴν ἐν τοῖς οἴνοις κοινὴν διατριβὴν ὡς εἰς παιδείας μεγάλην μοῖραν τείνουσαν λέγειν, ἂν ὀρθῶς γίγνηται* (641C8-D2). This impression, encouraged by the Athenian, was not, however, justified. The Athenian has not explained what the benefit of a good symposion would be; he has only made an analogy between the efficiency of *παιδεία* on one, instead of all, young men and the efficiency of the unknown property of a good symposion, when present in one, instead of all, symposia

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11. Cf. *σωτηρία* at R. 429C-D: *ἀνδρεία* = **retaining** one's beliefs about what is and what is not to be feared in situations of danger.

12. *Supra*, p. 177.

(641B3-C7). The fact that many good symposia are more beneficial than just one neither shows in what respect they are beneficient nor establishes any relation between symposia and *παιδεία*.

But **C** finally clarifies this matter; for the Choir of Dionysus must hold symposia in order to produce the best songs, and songs lie at the heart of a conception of *παιδεία* which is crucial to the Laws and different from its earlier Platonic versions. This conception is elaborated with great care in the first books: the discussion starts in Book One (643D-B4), to be several times resumed in Book Two, with didactic repetitions and changes of emphasis which fix every single point (653A5-C4, 653D7-4A7, 659C9-60A8, 664E3-5A6, 672E1-3D9). One end of this topic is childhood and the primary drives; another is *ὅλη χορεία* (or, according to 672E5, *ὅλη παίδευσις*), whose two branches, *μουσική* and *γυμναστική*, will absorb the Magnesians' whole life.

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Pleasure

The notion of *παιδεία* rests on a paradox. *ἀρετή* is a function of the highest rational faculty and is formed in accordance with its prescriptions. This faculty is *νοῦς* - perhaps an equivalent to *φρόνησις*, which is in turn the best part of *ἀρετή* (688A-B, 963A). But it is impossible for the mature individual to reach *νοῦς* or *φρόνησις* without a preliminary grasp of *ἀρετή* in childhood, because what happens in childhood determines the whole course of life (765E-6A). At the same time childhood is completely irrational (691C); the new-born has only a perception of pleasure and pain. Thus, in the absence of its relevant faculty (*φρόνησις*), *ἀρετή* must be constructed only with the assistance of a *πρώτη αἴσθησις* which is about pleasure and pain: *λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ* **ἐν οἷς** *ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον* (653A5-6).

This conception about attaining *ἀρετή* involves an important reconsideration of pleasure as an elementary drive. As we might expect in Plato, pleasure remains a chief evil (863A-D): it can lead to the worst crimes (869E sqq) and drag human beings into a state of pure beastliness (808B). But now pleasure also functions as a primary source-material for the reasoning principle; it is a *πηγὴ τοῦ φρονεῖν* which only awaits to be pushed in the right direction (*κατηρτυμένη*, 808D).

The fact that Plato locates the emergence of reason in the primitive instincts of the child is a big step away from earlier dialogues. There is an aspect in which the Laws differ strikingly from the rest of Plato: time and again, this huge work asserts with vigour that the mind cannot be made to progress to anything higher in the absence of pleasure. The Republic has established the canon of three basic functions of the epithymetic soul, which might be classified today as drives of the individual (Food) and drives of the species (Sex). The same functions, *ἐδωδή* and *πόσις*, and, last to emerge but the strongest, *ὁ περὶ τὴν τοῦ γένους σποράν*, are regarded in the Laws from two angles: they are *νοσήματα* (as Socrates in the Republic would no doubt agree), but they are also as faculties indispensable to the cultivation of excellence, *δι᾽ ὧν ἀρετήν* (782D10-3B1).

This seems to be Plato's final bow to the primacy of the instincts. In the Protagoras, Socrates had constructed an argument on the fact that the ultimate goal (*τέλος*, 354B7) which motivates the actions of ordinary people is pleasure: this goal dictates the giving of names such as 'good' and 'bad', which conceal the hedonistic nature of the goal (354B4-C2)[13]. In the Phaedo, Socrates seemed to show contempt for those who are led by such goals; for the people who, he says, achieve self-control by self-indulgence, trading in pleasures (68E-9A), must be the ordinary people of the Protagoras - those who call 'good' what in fact leads to pleasure.

The only currency approved of in the Phaedo is *φρόνησις*. By the time of writing the Philebus,

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13. Cf. also 354E8-5A2 and 356A5-6 (all this belongs to a discussion of *τὸ ἥττω/ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι* which starts at 352D; it is meant to explain the relation of *ἀνδρεία* to other forms of *ἀρετή*).

Plato has become more tolerant: gods alone have the freedom of choosing a life of *φρόνησις* exempt from pleasure and pain (33A-B). The Laws now show us that Plato eventually adopted a position quite close to that of the Protagoras. He does not, of course, recommend the pursuit of pleasure as a goal, but he seems to think that nobody is better than the ordinary people of the Protagoras; given our deficient ('mortal') constitution, it cannot be helped that our actions are ultimately determined by the pursuit of pleasure and (even more strongly) by the avoidance of pain: *ἔστιν δὴ φύσει ἀνθρώπειον μάλιστα ἡδοναὶ καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι, ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν ζῷον ἀτεχνῶς οἷον ἐξηρτῆσθαί τε καὶ ἐκκρεμάμενον εἶναι σπουδαῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις· δεῖ δὴ τὸν κάλλιστον βίον ἐπαινεῖν, μὴ μόνον ὅτι τῷ σχήματι κρατεῖ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς... κρατεῖ καὶ τούτῳ ὃ πάντες ζητοῦμεν, τῷ χαίρειν πλείω, ἐλάττω δὲ λυπεῖσθαι παρὰ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα* (732E4-3A4)[14].

The idea that the best advertisement for the life of reason and justice is to proclaim its superiority with respect to pleasure, on which the Athenian insists[15], is familiar to us from the Republic. In both dialogues, such ideas are on a dangerous line between encouraging freedom of thought and promoting indoctrination, into which the Laws lapse frequently. In spite of this, the change in Plato's attitude to pleasure is deep and substantial. This change is reflected in the fact that the Laws show for the first time a practical concern with problems raised by inferior functions of the soul: unlike the younger Plato of the Republic, the Athenian is prepared to converse with them and entertains a vast project for their education. With *παιδεία*, Plato takes trouble to put to literal use what was in the Republic only a passing metaphor - the metaphor of 'rechannelling' the energies of the mind (485D-E); for *παιδεία* turns out to be the laborious process of modelling *ἡδονή* into something which, when the time comes, will prove

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14. This passage does not refer to specific pleasures; but the leading example in the account of lives down to 734E2 is the pair *σώφρων/ ἀκόλαστος βίος*, which indicates that Plato has in mind throughout the inferior pleasures of the epithymetic soul.

15. Cf. 662E10-3A1: *τί ποτ' ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς κρεῖττον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν ὁ νόμος ἐνὸν ἐπαινεῖ;*

to be compatible with *ἀρετή*: *τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς* [*sc ἀρετῆς*] *ὀρθῶς…, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων*…(653B6-C3).

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παιδεία

The growth of a positive aspect of pleasure has deep consequences for Plato's conception of *παιδεία*. Let me now consider the nature of *παιδεία* in the Laws.

In defining this notion, the Athenian starts from a limitation which he maintains firmly throughout: *παιδεία* must remain confined to childhood, *τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν* ***ἐκ παίδων*** *παιδείαν* (645E4-6); *παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον* ***παισὶν*** *ἀρετήν* (653B1-2)[16].

A later passage recommends the method of avoiding both *δούλωσις* (791D) and *τρυφή* (791D sqq). The primary form of *ἀρετή* achieved by this and other methods consists in *μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλος, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν* (653C1-2). This principle occurs already in the Republic, in the context of conflict in the soul (401E-2A). In the passage which I have just quoted the Athenian speaks of it in the kindred terminology of *συμφωνία* - a term by which the Republic designated, especially in the definition of *σωφροσύνη*, the agreement of inferior faculties to the command of the best. I shall come back to the principle of loving correctly in the next chapter.

The relation between *ἡδονή* and *ἀρετή* is not very clear, and a second formulation introduces a worrying element, *νόμος*[17]; but the problem whether *ἀρετή* is collective *νόμος* enforced upon the individual or *νόμος* is rather an expansion of 'natural' *ἀρετή* to the whole city is beyond my concern. What needs to be pointed out here is the consequence of confining

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16. See also, much later, 854E.

17. 659D: *ἵν᾽ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παιδὸς μὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐθίζηται τῷ νόμῳ.*

παιδεία to the child. *παιδεία* becomes a process entirely subordinated to pleasure, and its mechanism is that of pleasure itself: persuasion. In the Laws, *παιδεία* is a *ὁλκή* and *ἀγωγή* (659D1-2) which works through forms of pleasure adapted to various stages of the soul prior to the attainment of reasoned understanding[18]. Specific forms of play (*παιδιαί*) will be required for children between three and six years (793D-4A), and others must take over from there onwards. If *παιδεία* may be regarded as a process continuing throughout the whole life, it is only to the extent that a certain dose of 'childhood' will always subsist in our soul. This makes *παιδεία* coextensive with the form of play predominant among the adult population of Magnesia - *χορεία* (672E, 835D)[19]. There is deep reason behind the celebrated word-play *παιδεία-παιδιά*, in which Plato indulges a great number of times in this work.

It is important to appreciate the position of *παιδεία* in the Laws. On the way up to the late dialogues, we find Plato inclined to relate *παιδεία* to high studies and methods[20]; on the contrary, the Laws lower it to a purely ethical grade[21]. It is an indispensable process, among the *σπουδαιότατα* of all things (803D), and its ministers will become top officials in Magnesia (951D-3D). But *παιδεία* is not, as has been claimed, 'the greatest blessing man can receive'[22]. Its aim is not to produce *φρόνησις* - it would not know how to do it; *παιδεία* only creates a

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18. See, *eg*, the explanation at 659E: *διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδὴν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς*.

19. Cf. 803D-E (play on *παιδεία-παιδιά* referred to song, dance, and sacrifice - predominant activities in times of peace). Cf. also 801D: the job of the *ἐπιμελητής παιδείας* is supervision of dance and music (with the help of *νομοθέται περὶ τὰ μουσικά*).

20. See the Republic's transformation of the traditional divisions of *παιδεία* (376E, 410B-C, 412A, 441E-2A) into the curriculum which culminates with dialectic (531C-4D). Cf. Tht. 167A, Sph. 229C-30D.

21. In a loose sense, *παιδεία* is also coextensive with inferior virtues and skills (*σωφρονεῖν*, 836A; *παιδεία πολεμική*, 832D - for which cf. *παιδεία* and *ἀνδρεία* at R. 429C).

22. As in England's note at 643B1 *τοῦτον* at 643B1 means that *παιδεία* is the first stage on the way to

predisposition towards *φρόνησις*[23]. It is true that the compulsory curriculum will include subjects such as calculation, but this kind of knowledge is minimal (809A-22D). When at last the Athenian turns his mind to a higher curriculum for the Nocturnal Council, his legislative thoughts come to an end (965A sqq). Throughout the Laws, *παιδεία* remains faithful to its definition in book two - whether we choose to call this thing *παιδεία* or only *πρώτη παιδεία* (654A5-6)[24].

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Music

Closer examination of the mechanisms of *παιδεία* reveals that the privileged place of music in Magnesia is due to a specific role of music in organising and refining the sense of pleasure, in which we may find elements not connected with music in Plato's earlier thought.

The form of persuasion most typical of *παιδεία* is achieved through songs or charms: *ἃς ᾠδὰς καλοῦμεν, ὄντως μὲν ἐπωδαὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὗται νῦν γεγονέναι... διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδὴν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχάς, παιδιαί τε καὶ ᾠδαὶ καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττεσθαι* (659E).

The Republic was very severe with the poets, but it aimed, similarly, at making a good use of *μουσική* in *παιδεία* (401D-2A). This analogy puts us on an interesting line. Music in the Republic has an enormous power over the soul (as it has in other dialogues)[25]; and this power derives from rhythm and harmony. But in the second book of the Laws rhythm and harmony are, more than features of music, the main tools of *παιδεία*.

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23. I should interpret *ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης* at 644A4 as depending on *σοφίαν* (for a different interpretation see England *ad l*).

24. See *supra*, n. 22.

25. *μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς*; cf also Ti. 47C-D.

It is traditional in Greek culture to associate *παιδεία* with the right use of *μέλη* and *ῥυθμοί*; Plato himself echoes such traditions[26]. But the Laws introduce here an original element, which explains with greater precision why songs are so efficient on the soul[27]:

ἁρμονία and *ῥυθμός* are, like *ἡδονή*, two *αἰσθήσεις*; but unlike it they are given to human beings alone. They pick up two disordered items in the constitution of the child, voice (*φωνή*) and movement (*κίνησις*), and cast them into regular shapes (*τάξις*)[28]. Thus rhythm and harmony become first agents of *φρόνησις*, which set the child on the right road. The Athenian does not spell out the relation between the two superior *αἰσθήσεις* of rhythm and harmony and the more basic one, pleasure[29], but he makes it clear enough that any human being who has attained normal development is the product of a joint work exerted by these three faculties. The backbone of his new model of *παιδεία* is the notion of assigning to *ἁρμονία* and *ῥυθμός* two primary items, *φωνή* and *κίνησις*, in which we can discern an element from the nebulous ontology of the Timaeus[30].

At a first stage, the Athenian locates these items in two places, *σῶμα* and *φωνή*[31]. Maybe the second place is in the soul; for other passages suggest that the principles of rhythm

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26. *Eg* Smp. 187C-D.

27. Cf. the account of *παιδεία* at 653D7-4A5 and 664E3-5 and the brief summary at the end of book ii (673C9-D5). This theory is partly recalled at the end of **D** (672C2-6).

28. *...αἴσθησιν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν τάξεων... οἷς δὴ ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα καὶ ἁρμονία* (653E, with omission of *φωνή*); *τῇ δὴ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἴη, τῇ δὲ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς... ἁρμονία ὄνομα προαγορεύοιτο* (664E-5A). *ἀτάκτως* (with reference to voice and movement) recurs at 653E, 664E, 672C.

29. *τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς* (654A). For instance, are there progressive stages? 673D suggests that rhythm is prior to harmony, which it awakes by association; but is there a stage prior to rhythm?

30. *φθέγγοιτο... καὶ πηδῷ* (E6); *κινεῖσθαι... καὶ φθέγγεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἁλλόμενα καὶ σκιρτῶντα,... τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα πάσας φωνάς* (653E); *πᾶν μαίνεταί τε καὶ βοᾷ ἀτάκτως, ἀτάκτως αὖ πηδᾷ* (672C = **D**); and, later on, *φωνή* and *κίνησις* as sources of dance (816A). Cf. the irrational movements of the new-born creature and the subsequent effects of *τροφή* in the Timaeus (42E sqq).

31. *τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς*, 653D8-9; *κατὰ τὸ σῶμα... κατὰ τὴν φωνήν*, 664E5.

and harmony belong respectively to body and soul[32]. But the body-soul divide is as fluid in the Laws as the divisions of the soul itself.

As we advance in the Laws, dance becomes increasingly important. Numerous types of military exercise will blend in, forming *γυμναστική*[33]. *μουσική* and *ὄρχησις* are equally vital branches of *χορεία*[34]; together, they will embody most if not all the *μαθήματα* of the Magnesians (795D6-8). But in the second book dance is entirely subordinated to music: it is as parts of *μουσική* that *ἁρμονία* and *ῥυθμός* feature in the educational process[35]. The first explicit reference to *ὄρχησις* occurs just before the end of Book Two[36]: the Athenian suddenly remembers that there are in fact two kinds of *ῥυθμός*, one specific to music, another to dance[37]. *παιδεία* as defined by him in this book operates through songs alone.

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The Best Songs

Before returning to our symposiasts, let us ascertain the nature of their songs.

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32. Cf. the first classification of *χορεία* (672E5 sqq; esp. *τὰ μὲν τοίνυν τῆς φωνῆς μέχρι τῆς* (?) *ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδείας... ὠνομάσαμεν μουσικήν*, 3A3-5.

33. 795D: *γυμναστική* consists of *ὄρχησις* and *πάλη*; 813D: *γυμναστική* consists of *ὄρχησις* and *τὰ πολεμικά*, which comprise *πάλη* and *ταξική*, *ῥίψις*, *πελταστική*, *ὁπλομαχία*, *διέξοδοι τακτικαί*, *πορεία στρατοπέδων*, *στρατοπέδευσις*, and *ἱππική*. For *ὄρχησις*, cf. 814D7-6D2.

34. Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

35. Cf. esp. the transition *ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς ῥήμασι... ἔν τε ῥυθμοῖς σχήματα καὶ ἐν ἁρμονίαισιν μέλη* (660A).

36. 673A7-8: *ἃ παιζόντων ὄρχησιν εἴπομεν.*

37. 673A7-8: *ἃ παιζόντων ὄρχησιν εἴπομεν. σχῆμα* at 672E9 means 'gesture' (England) and not 'concern' (Saunders).

The main task of songs is to charm (671A1) the soul into adopting the cardinal belief that the life of virtue gives most pleasure[38]. The model recommended by Plato for such songs is myth (663E7-8): the legislator's *ἐπῳδαί* should have the same force as, for instance, the Oedipus myth has proved to have over incestuous desires (838C). A good example of charms are the Athenian's own *προοίμια* to laws in the Laws (722D sqq) - the first if not only book shortlisted by Plato for required reading in Magnesia (811C-2A). The argument to the young atheist in book x is followed by such a *προοίμιον*, with an explanatory introduction: *τῷ γε βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸν μὴ λέγειν ὀρθῶς· ἐπῳδῶν γε μὴν προσδεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ μύθων ἔτι τινῶν* (903A10-B2). The principle is the same one which we have met before - *μᾶλλον πείσομεν οὓς δεῖ πείθειν ἢ ἐὰν ἄλλως πως φθεγγώμεθα λέγοντες*. In other words, *ἐπᾴδειν* is more efficient than argument on the young, *ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων*[39].

Plato's theoretical position has not changed: persuasion does not guarantee truth (663D6-E4). Even if lies happen to be good, like the famous noble lie of the Republic (414B sqq), *ἐπῳδαί* remain as dangerous as any of the mimetic procedures which Plato was so accustomed to rejecting[40]. What has changed considerably is the emphasis on the good use of such procedures: the best aim of the legislator is ***πείθειν*** *πρὸς ἀρετήν* (718C8-10).

The new status of persuasive methods is reflected in an interesting analogy with the medical art. *ἐπῳδαί*, says the Athenian, work on the same principle as drugs (659E5-60A3)[41]. Yet later on it turns out that the legislator's efforts to persuade are analogous to the 'didactic' sessions between doctor and patient, not to the drugs themselves (720A2-E8, 857C-E). Per-

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38. 664B: *τὸν αὐτὸν ἥδιστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον ὑπὸ θεῶν βίον λέγεσθαι φάσκοντες*. (Cf. 660D11-4B2 and the kinds of life, 732D8 sqq).

39. 664B-C; cf. 659E and *supra*, p. 186 and n. 18.

40. Cf. 909B (for analogy, R. 364B), and especially the passage about the *ἐπῳδαί* of the wicked souls at 906B-C. In Magnesia, the use of *ἐπῳδαί*, *μαγγανεῖαι*, and *καταδέσεις* falls into the section of law dealing with cases of poisoning and is liable to the death penalty (933A-E).

41. A very early anticipation of this idea occurs at Chrm. 155E-8C and 175E-6B.

haps it is hazardous to imagine that the term corresponding to actual drugs would be actual laws; but in the long course of reading the Athenian's legislation one does have the feeling that therapy of soul sinks back from time to time into the familiar territory of punishment.

The passage concerning the Choir of Dionysus, to which I return now, contains a crucial ambiguity. Did Plato think that songs are useful because sounds have a deep effect on the soul, or because songs are an appropriate medium for the transmission and fixation of a doctrine? Do the Athenian's best songs act on the soul through representation (such as of good characters, 660A), or through statements supported by divine oaths (664C-D)? The lax notion of music inherited by Plato, against which Philodemus was to react, is a natural medium for the perpetration of such confusions.

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The Choir of Dionysus

The role of music in the process of *παιδεία* makes it perfectly reasonable for the Muses and Apollo to have official leadership over two choirs (665A8-B1)[42]. But why should the choir of the best singers take its name from a non-musical god, Dionysus? Cleinias was right to show surprise at such news. This is an important problem, but it is best to discuss it when we have learned enough about the two kinds of symposia of the Laws. Now I am going to examine how the theory of *παιδεία* takes shape under the best musicians - the Choir of Dionysus.

This is where problems start to appear. The singers come on stage in three successive age-groups: it seems now that Apollo, the Muses and Dionysus not only lead three choirs, but also embody different stages in *παιδεία*. Nothing in the previous theory has led us to expect this development. Far from explaining it, the Athenian makes it almost impossible to

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42. 654A6-7, *θῶμεν παιδείαν εἶναι πρώτην* **διὰ** *Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος*. Cf. 664B and 783A-B.

understand how his choirs, in particular the third one, are supposed to work. The difficulty about the Choir of Dionysus is this:

A. One condition under which its members can perform is to be *οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς ἀλλὰ ἐν μετρίοις, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἀλλοτρίοις ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἰκείοις* (666C4-5). This description, which suits the symposion perfectly, suggests that the songs have no audience; the best singers can only sing among themselves. The age span between thirty and sixty is large; if the choir of Dionysus is not homogeneous[43], perhaps *νεωτέροις* at 670D7-E1 implies that the older members should sing to the younger ones. And indeed, at 665C3-4 the Athenian has referred to 'the city' (*ie* all three choirs) as an entity which sings **to itself**: *ὅλην τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν* ***αὑτῇ*** *ἐπᾴδουσαν*. This sentence suggests that the songs are not wasted even if they have no audience apart from the performers themselves.

B. But, apart from *ἥδονται καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις* at 670D7-E1, two other phrases give the impression that the Choir of Dionysus must sing to children or very young men: *ἔτι νέαις οὔσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἁπαλαῖς* ***τῶν παίδων*** (664B4-5); *ἱκανὸν ἐπῳδὸν γίγνεσθαι* ***νέοις*** *πρὸς ἀρετήν* (671A1). This is the only specific recollection from the discussion of symposia which the Athenian uses later in the Laws: he will depict how Dionysus' choir *εἰς μέσον ὑμνῇ καὶ ἐπᾴδῃ ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς* (812C).

A and B raise the following question: Does the Choir of Dionysus have an audience or does it perform for its own benefit and enjoyment? Let us consider both cases.

1. There is an audience for all choirs, and it is always the same: old men, young people, and children, sing to the children. The three stages of *παιδεία* embodied in the choirs correspond to different manners of persuading the same soul (*ie* the same age).

This case is not easy:

(a) What is the difference between children as an audience and children as members of the first choir?

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43. Cf. 670A, which suggested to England a subdivision at the age of fifty.

There could be one, but we have to invent it. The formulation referring to children as an audience at 664B4-5 presents them as a passive object of *παιδεία*. This cannot be the only way (not even the main way) in which rhythm and harmony work on the soul. The organisation of the two irrational components must proceed from within, because the components are in the child: *παιδεία* ought to make him sing and dance instead of, and with greater pleasure than, shouting and jumping. Perhaps the children of the first choir should perform, exercising the sense of rhythm and harmony which they have acquired, then take a seat in the audience or go to the symposion and listen to the older and better choirs.

(b) Why is there a need for three kinds of song? Should not the best kind suffice?

A reason for having different age-groups of singers can be *ποικιλία* - a principle of variety explained by the Athenian thus: *ὥστε ἀπληστίαν εἶναί τινα τῶν ὕμνων τοῖς ᾄδουσιν καὶ ἡδονήν* (665C5-7). This is remarkable: it is, so far as I know, the only place where Plato refers to *ἀπληστία* as a positive feature of pleasure[44], and also the only time in the Laws when he recommends variety in the experiencing of pleasure[45].

2. There is no audience apart from the performers, and each choir sings to itself. The three stages of *παιδεία* embodied in the choirs correspond to different phases of the soul (*ie* ages).

This may satisfy the principle of variety better, because a later passage suggests that *παιδιαί* should be differentiated according to the subject's age (793D-4A). But the interpretation cannot hold. The theory of *παιδεία* asks for some occurrence of children in **all** choirs, if only in a passive form. People in the second choir are under thirty and, by a stretch of language, can be described as *παῖδες*: they could perhaps 'charm children's souls' by 'singing

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44. The classical place for *ἀπληστία* is the passage of the sieve in the Gorgias (493B), which renders metaphorically what in the Philebus becomes the main feature of pleasure: insatiability (in virtue of this feature *ἡδονή* belongs to the *ἄπειρον γένος*). Cf. also R. 555B, 562B-C, 586B, 590B, Ti. 73A, Lg. 736E, 831D.

45. Cf. my references in n. 3.

to themselves'. But this possibility is out of the question even with the youngest Dionysian singers, people between thirty and forty.

The choirs are muddled; neither interpretation can be entirely consistent. The rigid cuts into age-groups stand on a basis which is largely symbolic. The Laws have absorbed fundamental elements from Plato's earlier thought on body and soul and recast them into a more consistent and unitary conception of the individual; the travels of the soul across a metaphysical boundary are now replaced by one continuous journey with different stages, all in one world. Childhood and old age are two ends in the life of the mind; conversely, they sometimes function as abstract principles[46]. Confusions such as reflected in the phrase *αὐτὴν αὐτῇ* (665C4) may be due to the fact that Plato's ages, childhood in particular, oscillate permanently between a literal and a metaphorical sense.

But if we take *παῖδες* in the literal sense, interpretation 1, which is the more plausible, yields an unexpected picture. Plato did not want to make his best choir either stand before a large audience at festivals or entertain its own members behind closed doors. He seems to have had in mind symposia of elderly men with children in the audience[47]. In this case, he was inspired by Spartan and Cretan traditions, according to which children attended the adult mess for the benefit of their education[48].

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46. *Eg* 965A, where old men are compared with *νοῦς*.

47. Belfiore [258] argues that the choir was meant to perform at Dionysia (cf. *infra*, p. 205); but this goes against the text (*supra*, n. 10). England [221] i 314-5 more ingeniously imagined that the best songs would be produced at symposia in private, but 'published' by the *νομοθέτης* afterwards.

48. Cf. Plutarch's celebrated account of Spartan syssitia in Ch. 12 of Lycurgus: *εἰς δὲ τὰ συσσίτια καὶ παῖδες ἐφοίτων, ὥσπερ εἰς διδασκαλεῖα σωφροσύνης ἀγόμενοι, καὶ λόγων ἠκροῶντο πολιτικῶν καὶ παιδευτὰς ἐλευθερίας ἑώρων, αὐτοί τε παίζειν εἰθίζοντο καὶ σκώπτειν ἄνευ βωμολοχίας καὶ σκωπτόμενοι μὴ δυσχεραίνειν.* Discussion of this feature of Spartan syssitia in David [302] (esp. 7-8, with further references).

iv: A Diet for the Best Singers

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A Few Medical Facts

The glorious role played by the Dionysian singers in the city imparts glamour to their symposia: the position of the *ποῦ* question in the argument[49] makes us aware that the best songs are produced in one place only - the symposion. But the reason for this is less glorious. It is a fact which the Athenian presents in medical terms: the main condition under which the choir can perform is that its members must have taken wine before the performance.

The Athenian refers to wine as a *φάρμακον* (666B6)[50], as medical authors did, and assigns it a role which seems immediately obvious. As a result, our passage has been interpreted in terms vaguely related to Greek medical ideas, and these ideas have also been applied to the less obvious process described in the previous passage, **B**[51]. But such interpretations do not help us very much in understanding Plato's thought. The two passages present processes of very different natures; the function of wine in **C** is not as obvious as it seems; and Plato's debt to medicine is fragmentary, creative, and difficult to reconstruct.

I shall try in what follows to analyse the problem of wine in **C**. We have seen so far what is the general function of the symposia in the Choir of Dionysus. Wine will make us understand their specific function; it will clear the road towards the very different argument on wine in **B**; and it will give us a more precise idea about Plato's metaphorical play with the ages.

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49. *Supra*, pp. 180-181 f.

50. *τὸν οἶνον* has been bracketed by Peipers and England. I prefer to retain it on Richards' emendation (*ἥς* for *ἤν*).

51. See especially Belfiore [258], Pigeaud [537] 478-96 ('La connaissance indirecte par le vin') and Bertier [24] 57-86 ('L'enseignement de Mnésithée sur le vin').

Let me start in the text. For the Choir of Dionysus, the purpose of drinking is *ἀνηβᾶν* (B6). This is not much; but the regulations for the previous choirs give three important clues. First, the nature of wine is fiery (*πῦρ*, A5): its rejuvenating work must be a form of heating. Second, the nature of the young is fiery (*ἐπὶ πῦρ*, A5): the Dionysian singers must be cold. Third, fire must not be brought upon fire either in body or in soul (*οὐ χρῆ πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ ὀχετεύειν*, A5): the good administration of wine must be governed by the principle of balance between contraries, *contraria contrariis curantur*.

It has been acknowledged that, in treating wine as a hot element and in representing its action on body and soul in terms of contraries, Plato was indebted to the medical tradition. Health is a state of balance between opposites: when some factor *x* upsets this balance, health is restored through the action of a factor opposite to *x*[52]. The formula *πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ* applied by the Athenian to the counter-indicated process suggests that Plato had in mind a principle of this sort. *αὐστηρότης*, *δυσθυμία* and *σκληρότης* are characteristics of old age which wine turns into the opposite, as shown in one pair - *μαλακώτερον ἐκ σκληροτέρου*. The melting metaphor attached to this pair (*καθάπερ εἰς πῦρ σίδηρον ἐντεθέντα γιγνόμενον*, C1-2) renders the mutual work of opposites required in the process of *ἀνηβᾶν*.

But this principle is broad enough to accommodate false parallels to Plato's text[53]. It is commonplace in medicine, and probably passed into popular knowledge; for a scholiast tells us that the formula *πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ* was proverbial[54].

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52. This principle goes back to Alcmaeon of Croton (*ἰσονομία-μουναρχία*); cf. two formulations: *τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστιν ἰήματα· ἰητρικὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἀφαίρεσις πρόσθεσις, ἀφαίρεσις μὲν τῶν πλεοναζόντων, πρόσθεσις δὲ τῶν ἐλλειπόντων* (Flat. 1); *ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ὑγίειαν φυλάττειν διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων, τὴν δὲ νόσον ἀναιρεῖ διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων* (Mnesitheus fr. 11 Bertier). On similars and opposites cf. Vlastos [628]; Hutchinson [425] in Hankinson [410]; Mau-Schmidt [490].

53. Such is the metaphor of melting in Reg. 13, considered by Bertier and Belfiore a Hippocratic source for **C**. Reg. 13 compares the child with iron; Plato compares the old with iron (666C1) - his children are 'fiery' (666A5). But wine does not even feature at Reg. 13. How did this text inspire Plato?

54. Schol. *παροιμία· κακὸν ἐπὶ κακόν*.

On the other hand, the fact that wine has a heating effect is a piece of commonsense observation. Medical authors studied it, but they made elaborate classifications where wine was analysed, not just as hot, but by clusters of properties[55]; or, they made equally elaborate prescriptions[56]. If inspired by dietetics or prognosis, Plato's regulation of wine is surprisingly plain. Greek doctors took a simplified approach in discussion of the pathological effects of drunkenness, which does not concern Plato at all[57].

On closer inspection, some of the elements which constitute **C** are impossible to reconcile with various threads scattered in the Hippocratic collection. The Athenian claims that a starvation diet would render his elderly singers even more reluctant to sing (665E8-10). The view taken in the Aphorisms is that the old can endure lack of food better than other ages: the little heat left in them needs little substance to preserve it (i 13). But the Aphorisms do recommend starvation (*λιμός*) to old people, and to moist bodies in general, because of its drying effect[58]; the author of the work probably takes the view that the old are cold and moist (or wet). We find this view in several other anonymous doctors[59]. On the contrary, Plato's singers

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55. *Eg* Reg. 79-83: the secondary charateristics of colour and taste (*αὐστηρός/ μαλακός, μέλας/ ὑδαρής*) create specific compounds suitable for specific constitutions: *κοίλαι ψυχραὶ καὶ ὑγραί/ ξηραί; κοίλαι θερμαὶ κτλ*. Cf. also Acut. 50-2 and, in Galen, Euch. 11 (CMG v 4.2) and Lept. 87-113 AF i 1.39 (vi 475K).

56. *Eg* Salubr. 5: 'After bathing in warm water, let the patient first drink a cotyle of neat wine; then let him eat food of all sorts and not drink either with the food or after it, but wait enough time to walk ten stades; then mix three wines, dry, sweet, and acidic, and give him these to drink, first rather neat and in small sips and at long intervals, then more diluted, more quickly, and in larger quantities' (Lloyd's translation in [471] 20 n. 64). Cf. also the treatise on Internal diseases (*περὶ τῶν ἐντὸς παθῶν*), *passim*. An interesting late testimony on the vogue of medicinal wines in Dioscorides MM v 19; cf. Riddle [554] 144-6.

57. See *eg* Galen de Temperamentis p. 95 Helmreich: when taken in too great quantities, wine produces cold diseases, contrary to its hot nature (... *τοσοῦτον ἀποδεῖ τοῦ θερμαίνειν τὸ ζῷον ὥστε καὶ πάθη ψυχρότατα γεννᾷ· ἀποπληξία καὶ τέτανοι ταῖς ἀμέτροις οἴνου πόσεσιν ἕπονται, ψυχρὰ πάντα πάθη*).

58. vii 60 (*ξηραίνει τὰ σώματα*). On starvation diets see Lloyd 19-20 and n. 62.

59. Cf. Reg. 33 (*οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι ψυχροὶ καὶ ὑγροί*), Salubr. 2 (*τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους... τὰ γὰρ σώματα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίῃ ὑγρὰ καὶ μαλακὰ καὶ ψυχρά*). Lloyd's remarks on the ambivalence of 'wet' and 'dry' help us greatly to understand how such permutations were possible ([470] 101). Lloyd believes that the view of the Regimen and Regimen in Health 'runs counter to the generally accepted Greek notions' (n. 43). But cf. also Hebd. 22 and Nat. Hom. 17. If Lloyd is right, we must understand by 'Greek notions' non-medical notions ingrained by empirical observation, such as expressed by the poets of his examples (Od. xiii 392 sqq, S. El. 819: p. 101). If other camps of doctors in Plato's time followed the popular view that, as one comes closer to the age of dying, one becomes more like a dead body, *ie* cold and dry, the voice of their opponents must have been strong

are not moist at all: *σκληρότης*, and the corresponding image of iron melting in fire, indicate that he represented old age to be hard and dry[60].

But if the despondency of old age results from chill and dryness, is wine an appropriate remedy? As the treatise on Nutriment tells us, *ἄλλοισι δὲ οἶνος τροφή, καὶ ἄλλοισιν οὐχί* (33). Wine has a nutritious side according to all dieticians[61]; but its prevalent action is cathartic. The Regimen contains a section on wine which explains this state of things as resulting from two main features of wine, *οἶνος θερμὸς καὶ ξηρός*: *ξηραίνειν* follows *θερμαίνειν* almost as a regular effect[62]. Our singers need nutriment and moisture, not purgation. The author of the Nutriment would probably say that wine has the best chances of putting them in the state which the Athenian tries to avoid: *ἄσιτοι* and *ἰσχνοί*[63].

Prescribing wine before a vocal performance seems to be a novelty in itself. The Athenian says that choirs training for performances (*πεφωνασκεκότας*) adopt a starvation diet. We know very little about such practices, and *φωνασκεύειν* or family-related words do not occur in authors of the Hippocratic collection or elsewhere in Plato. But the xi[th] Problem of the Aristotelian corpus, concerned with the voice, seems to confirm the Athenian's statement:

καὶ πάντας ἂν ἴδοιμεν τοὺς φωνασκοῦντας, οἷον ὑποκριτὰς καὶ χορευτὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους

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enough to cover them. It is in the nature of science to work with counter-intuitive hypotheses; perhaps the idea that the old are cold and wet is one such hypothesis in early Greek medicine. On this issue, Plato seems to side with the poets rather than the scientists.

60. Plato also applies *σκληρότης* to character (R. 411A-B, Lg. 645A: the strings of the puppet are *σκληρὰς καὶ σιδηράς*). He uses *σκληρός*/ *ὑγρός* as a couple of opposites in the famous wax-tablet (Tht. 194E-5A).

61. *Eg* Mnesitheus, fr. 41 Bertier: *τροφήν τε γὰρ δίδωσι τοῖσι χρωμένοις*. Galen records a debate whether wine was *τροφή* or not (CMG v 4.2.387.7 sqq).

62. Ch. 52: *οἱ μέλανες αὐστηροί· **ξηραίνουσι δὲ τῇ θερμασίᾳ**, τὸ ὑγρὸν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος καταναλίσκοντες*. Even the moistening wine, weak or sweet (either red or white), dries up the body. Best for our singers would be mulled wine, *ἕψημα· θερμαίνει καὶ ὑγραίνει*. Note that Rufus will praise the heating effect of wine because *πέψαι... τὴν τροφὴν δι' ὅλου* (*ap* Orib. v 7 = CMG vi 1.1.126).

63. Cf. also Salubr. 1-2: in winter, old people must drink *ὡς ἐλάχιστα, εἶναι δὲ τὸ πῶμα ὡς ἀκρητέστατον*.

τοὺς τοιούτους, **ἔωθεν τε καὶ νήστεις ὄντας τὰς μελέτας ποιουμένους** (901[b])[64]. This Problem also tells us that rehearsals never take place after meals (904[b]1 sqq): the voice cracks (ἀπορρήγνυται) more easily when drunken, and shouting at such times spoils it[65]. Pharmacologists of the first and later centuries produced very elaborate recipes for potions to be taken by singers 'before and after the contest'; these potions contain wine, but only in small doses and mixed with many other substances[66]. The Athenian's diet for the best choir seems to be at odds both with the professional standards of singing and with various medical prescriptions of his time which happen to have reached us.

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A Medical Criterion: Age

The principle of opposites and the hotness of wine create obvious links with medicine. There is another link, less obvious but more interesting: the adoption of the criterion of age.

In our passage the Athenian restricts use of wine to the old. He also endeavours to consider its effect on other age-groups (666A2-C2): wine is entirely destructive for young people under eighteen, and forbidden; still dangerous between eighteen and thirty, it is allowed with caution. The idea of looking at the effects of wine through the variable of age is the most conspicuous feature of the passage. The impression that the symposiasts of **B** and **D** must be the Dionysian singers - the only people permitted to get drunk - is produced by this feature.

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64. Plutarch (349A-B) complains that Athenian χορηγοί have treated their people during the period of training to a lavish diet (ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον φωνασκουμένους καὶ τρυφῶντας): ἐγχέλεια (eels), θριδακίη (lettuce), σκελίδες (cloves of garlic), and μυελός (marrow). Was this in compensation for the starving before rehearsals?

65. Cf. also 900[a]17-8 and 901[a]35-[b]4.

66. *Eg* an excerpt from Charixenus' ἀρτηριακά, quoted by Galen in a work on the composition of drugs (K xiii 49): ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς φωνασκουμένους πρὸ τῶν ἀγώνων καὶ μετὰ τοὺς ἀγῶνας διδομένη: the prescription is made of κόμμεως + τραγακάνθης 3 στ΄, λιβάνου + σμύρνης 3 α΄ + τριώβολον, κρόκου + ὑποκυστίδος + χύλου 3 α΄, and **γλυκέος Σκυβελίτου ἢ Θηραίου ξέστας στ΄**. In the same work Galen quotes six similar prescriptions from Mithridates, Crito, and Charixenus (pp. 6-7, 8, 35-6, 49, 50, 54-6).

The importance of age among the factors affecting health was an established fact in all medical groups[67]; but study of the interaction between wine and age does not seem to have come under the focus of any writer of the Hippocratic collection. I think that this idea belongs to Plato. The famous pseudo-Aristotelian Problem on melancholy offers a close parallel to the Athenian's rule concerning the young: *σβέννυσι γὰρ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου θερμότητος τὴν φυσικὴν θερμότητα* (954^{b}40-5^{a}1). The parallel is interesting. It shows us that, even long after Plato, the connection between wine and age was not an established fact. The author of the Problem does not make it; on all this page he talks indifferently about young and old alike.

It seems to me that the Platonic origin of a 'medical' association between wine and age is also suggested by a passage in Galen. Rather than attaching Plato to the train of medical thought, this element points to the originality of **C**. In a treatise arguing for the somatic origin of mental disease[68], Galen enlists among his predecessors Plato who, in spite of believing that soul is immortal (Ch. 3), has done much to reveal the role of *τροφή* in the formation of psychic dispositions and faculties (Ch. 9)[69]. Of the many illustrations at hand (*οὐ ἅπαξ ἢ δὶς ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἔγραψε περὶ τούτων*), Galen quotes two: a passage from the Timaeus on the humoural aetiology of affections in the soul (86E5-7A7: Ch. 6), and the regulation of wine in our passage (666A2 sqq: Ch. 10). He seems to consider only the first one self-explanatory or well-known; for he comments only on the second. And in fact all that Galen says is about the relation between wine and age - a criterion to which he draws attention from the start: *ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ῥήσεως μεμνῆσθαι παρακαλῶ τοὺς γενναίους Πλατωνικοὺς οὐ μόνον ἃ λέλεκται περὶ πόσεως οἴνου κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἡλικιῶν διαφορᾶς.*

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67. Cf. Aph. i 17, Hum. 16, Nat. Hom. 9, Reg. San. 2, Morb. i 22, Mnesitheus fr 11B.

68. Quod animi mores..., Marquardt [50] ii.

69. *Eg τροφὴν δύνασθαι τοὺς μὲν σωφρονεστέρους, τοὺς δὲ ἀκολαστοτέρους ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀκρατεστέρους, τοὺς δὲ ἐγκρατεστέρους, ἐρισικούς τε καὶ φιλονείκους*. He plays on the two senses of *τροφή*. Cf. Hutchinson's general interpretation in [425] 19 and n. 4; on Galen's treatment of the authorities which he quotes, see Lloyd [469].

The comment proceeds in two stages. Galen takes the features ascribed by Plato to ages and translates them into the language of the *κρᾶσις*: Plato called youth *ἐμμανή* because it is hot and has an excess of blood, *θερμὴ καὶ πολύαιμος*; he called old age *αὐστηρὰν δὲ καὶ δύσθυμον καὶ σκληράν* because it is cold and has a deficit of blood, *ὀλίγαιμός τε καὶ ψυχρά*. Next, Galen translates in the same language the effect of wine: *καὶ διὰ τοῦτό γ' αὖ τοῖς μὲν γέρουσιν ὠφέλιμος οἴνου πόσις εἰς συμμετρίαν θερμασίας ἐπανάγουσα τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἡλικίας ψυχρότητα, τοῖς δ' αὐξανομένοις ἐναντιωτάτη· ζέουσαν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν καὶ σφοδρῶς κινουμένην ὑπερθερμαίνει τε καὶ εἰς ἀμέτρους καὶ σφοδρὰς ἐκβαίνει κινήσεις.*

Further in the same chapter, Galen turns to another passage in the Laws, the last paragraph of Book Two (*τὸν τῶν* Καρχηδονίων *νόμον*), and tries to explain the effects of wine on soul in terms of the Platonic tripartition[70]. Galen has warned us that his choice from the range of issues in Plato's Laws is selective[71]. It is quite likely that the two topics which he considered to require an interpretation, effects of wine on age and effects of wine on soul, appeared, from a medical perspective, as novelties discovered by Plato.

Indirectly, Galen puts us on another interesting track. He speaks about two opposite 'natures', *ἡ τῶν μειρακίων φύσις* and *ἡ τῶν γερόντων φύσις*. This is a reduction; Plato wanted three choirs, not two. But the 'ages' of Greek doctors (Galen included) are neither two nor three; they are four. The four ages, according to the many and quarrelsome groups of doctors gathered in the Hippocratic corpus, are: childhood, youth, manhood, old age. One of the best references to this topic is Chapter 33 of the Regimen, which ascribes to each age the following pair of characteristics:

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70. *ἡγεῖται [γὰρ] τὸν οἶνον ἀτμῶν θερμῶν ὅλον τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ μάλιστα τὴν κεφαλὴν πληροῦντα κινήσεως μὲν ἀμετροτέρας αἴτιον τῷ τ' ἐπιθυμητικῷ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, βουλῆς δὲ προπετεστέρας τῷ λογιστικῷ.*

71. *ἀλλὰ Πλάτωνι μὲν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν* Νόμων *εἴρηται, περὶ πόσεως οἴνου τοῖς βουλομένοις ἀναγιγνώσκειν ὠφέλιμα.*

παῖς : *θερμός* + *ὑγρός*;

νεηνίσκος: *θερμός* + *ξηρός*;

ἀνήρ : *ψυχρός* + *ξηρός*;

πρεσβύτης: *ψυχρός* + *ὑγρός* (33)[72].

It is curious that the Athenian jumps from young to old in his division. His age-groups omit the *ἀνήρ*; the city seems to have no adult male singers.

But does the Choir of Dionysus correspond, technically, to what doctors such as the author of the Regimen would have classified under *πρεσβύτης*?

I have said earlier that *σκληρότης* indicates divergence between Plato's conception of old age and the views of at least those doctors who considered it to be wet or moist[73]. But, in combination with the 'coldness' of our singers[74], *σκληρότης* leads to a pair similar to *ψυχρός*-*ξηρός*; and the Regimen and other treatises attribute such features to manhood or the third *ἡλικία*. Did Plato style as old an age which corresponded in fact to Hippocratic manhood? I incline to think so for two reasons.

1. The Choir of Dionysus comprises men between thirty and sixty. Although among the authors in the Hippocratic collection there is of course no consensus on an official limit where old age starts, the various figures which we have come quite close to sixty - the upper limit of Plato's third choir[75]: old age starts around sixty, not at thirty. Aristotle gives similar figures[76].

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72. For the terms, cf. also Aph. i 13 (*τὰ παιδία, τὰ μειράκια, οἱ καθεστηκότες, οἱ γέροντες*) and iii 18 (*οἱ μέσοι τῇσιν ἡλικίῃσιν* = third age). Transferred to the four humours (blood, phlegm, yellow bile, black bile), this pattern has produced Galen's famous theory of the temperaments (Galen's old age is cold and dry: ST v 3 = vi 319K).

73. *Supra*, p. 197 and n. 59.

74. An implicit feature, see *supra*, p. 196, and Galen's commentary.

75. *Eg* Art. 41 = 60 years; Coac. 5.xxx = 63 years. See Byl [283] 86-7, with references to diseases of old age.

76. Cf. Pol. 1335^{a-b}, Rh. ii 14: biological *acme* for man 37-54/5; intellectual *acme* 49/50. Aristotle's ages, like Plato's choirs, are three (Rh. $1388^{b}16$: *νεότης, ἀκμή, γῆρας*).

2. At 664D1-4, the Athenian refers to a category of people who are over sixty and do not sing at all; they only tell stories. The reference is cursory, no doubt because the Athenian was too absorbed in *μουσική*. But we discover in **D** that these people have the best claim to the leadership of symposia (671E1)[77]. Thus, although the Dionysian singers form the last choir, they are not, in the Athenian's conception, either the oldest or (in terms of knowledge and wisdom) the 'best' age-group.

Galen acknowledges that *σκληρότης*, *αὐστηρότης*, and *δυσθυμία* were properties of old age according to Plato, but he does not find it futile to explain them. These features are not associated with old age in the extant texts attributed to the Hippocratics. *αὐστηρότης* is a term of taste[78], and this is how Plato normally used it[79]. It may be interesting to find it in this particular context, because the pair *αὐστηρός-γλυκύς* formed a major criterion in classifications of wines[80]. On *δυσθυμία* there is more to come.

The influence of medical thought and practice on Plato does not come in one recognizable block; it consists of small fragments, difficult to disentangle. Neither was the medical tradition unitary. The evidence which I have quoted represents polemical views rather than the established canon of a leading school.

I suspect that, in creating his age-groups, Plato has combined beyond recognition two kinds of story. Having a Spartan and a Cretan interlocutor makes the Athenian very polemical, as we shall see in the next chapter, but it also gives an unusual foreign twist to his ideas. Earlier on, we seem to have detected in his project an element from Spartan syssitia (and Cretan

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77. *Infra*, p. 240.

78. And not 'sécheresse', Bertier [24] 66.

79. Cf. Ti. 65D, *στρυφνός/ αὐστηρός*; Lg. 897A8-9, *αὐστηρόν/ γλυκύ*. The use in **C** is metaphorical; other metaphors at R. 398A, *αὐστηρότερος καὶ ἀηδέστερος ποιητής*, and Phlb. 61C, *αὐστηρὸν καὶ ὑγιεινὸν ὕδωρ* (=*τῆς φρονήσεως*).

80. Even Plato used it at Tht. 178C-D.

phiditia): the attendance of children[81]. This element can now be paired; for the basic arrangement in three choirs, if not also the age-limits which divide them, is not inspired by doctors, but most probably by Spartan festivals[82]. At the same time the competing 'diets' launched by rival doctors and groups of the day seem to have brought a substantive change to the idea of the choirs: they suggested to Plato an original use of age as a criterion for what he wanted to produce in **C** - a medical regulation of wine-drinking.

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δυσθυμία

But these are matters of detail. It is now time to ask the main question: why do the members of the Choir of Dionysus need wine for their songs, and how does wine help them?

The Athenian tells us that the best singers are ashamed to sing (*αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον*, 665E2), and wine diminishes their shame (*ἧττον αἰσχυνόμενος*, 666C4). This looks very odd in face of the excellence of the choir and seriousness of their job. Look at what the Athenian recommends here: the choir of Dionysus must incur the shame of drunkenness in order to overcome the shame of singing. How can this be? Why should respectable old men - to use England's words - be less ashamed of getting drunk than of delivering the best *ᾠδαί* for the best purpose of *παιδεία*?

Scholars have sought for an answer in *δυσθυμία*. This item has captured most of the little attention paid to symposia in the Laws and has generated, to my mind, the most serious misinterpretation of this topic.

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81. See *supra*, p. 194 and n. 48.

82. Very interesting to compare with **C** is another Chapter of Plutarch's Lycurgus, 21. It records a contest in 'boasts' between three choirs, during festivals in Sparta: *τριῶν γὰρ χορῶν κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς ἡλικίας συνισταμένων ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς, ὁ μὲν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχόμενος ἄδειν· Ἄμμες πόκ' ἄλκιμοι νεανίαι· ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀκμαζόντων ἀμειβόμενος ἔλεγεν· Ἄμμες δέ γ' εἰμνέν· αἱ δὲ λῆς, αὐγάσδεο· ὁ δὲ τρίτος ὁ τῶν παίδων· Ἄμμες δέ γ' ἐσσόμεσθα πολλῷ κάρροντες.*

In a paper which presents Plato's 'views on drunkenness' in the Laws as a 'neglected source' for Aristotle's psychological and aesthetic theories, Belfiore offers the following interpretation: 'The physical dryness, hardness and coldness of the old people of the Laws produces the psychic disorder of despondency (*dysthymia*). Wine helps to remedy this disorder by making the soul more fiery and liquid, creating a condition in which an individual's own reason is no longer in control, that is, a temporary "viciousness", and also making the soul more malleable, more ready to accept another's control... It thus contributes to the process of emotional *catharsis* that results in psychic equilibrium. In this process, the soul is first purged of excessive shame and despondency and is then strengthened in the good kind of shame, *aidos*, by the symposiarch's training'[83]. This is a unitarian view of symposia, where **C** and **B/D** are linked as two consecutive stages.

The most obvious difficulty with this interpretation is that it forces Belfiore to ignore the main task of the Dionysian singers. In our passage the soul is softened indeed (*εὐπλαστότερον*, 6C2); but it undergoes this process in order to sing, not in order to accept another's control. Accepting control and getting strength from the good kind of shame is a different process - the more strikingly so as forms related to *πλάττειν* occur in both places (**C**: 666C2 / **D**: 671C2-3). Belfiore is primarily interested in the aesthetic implications of her theory and portays the third group as a performing choir; she claims that 'Plato leaves us in no doubt that his symposia are part of a festival of Dionysus' (434) where 'staid elders temporarily take on the persona of mad young children in order to... renew their education[84] through song and dance' (436). In spite of this, the production of songs features nowhere in her account. Instead, Belfiore's interpretation reduces the Choir of Dionysus to a group of neurotic old men, who must be cured from a mysterious mental disease - *δυσθυμία*. Such an

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83. Belfiore [258] 433. These ideas are now integrated in her book on Aristotle, [257] 30-9 ('A Medicine to Produce Aidos').

84. *Ie*, I suppose, their own education? Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

interpretation raises more puzzles than it offers to solve, because the 'staid elders' are the wisest and ablest musicians in the city. Or perhaps we should give in to the popular thought that the creative mind is (not in the complimentary sense of the Phaedrus) deranged?

The basis for Belfiore's interpretation is a shared assumption that *δυσθυμία* refers to some pathological disease. But the Athenian presents *δυσθυμία* in **C** as a feature of age, not as a malady. The deficiency exhibited by the symposiasts is limited to the public performance of songs. What is the reason for regarding this as 'psychic disorder'?

δυσθυμία is easy to misinterpret. It occurs in Plato only twice, and the other occurrence is nebulous enough to invite parallels with humoural theories of mental disease. The passage in question is the one quoted by Galen from the Timaeus (86E-7A) in the chapter to which I referred earlier[85]. Plato illustrates in it how various bodily components, notably the humours, can cause psychic disorder. He starts from a principle of classification which is difficult to follow on the few examples given[86]. *δυσθυμία* features in the group of maladies caused by pain. This group looks more systematic and has been analysed into three pairs: each pair would be a function of one part of soul[87] and, according to Tracy, an *ἄπειρον* of the kind postulated by Socrates at Philebus 25C, such that the two terms 'are related by way of excess and deficiency', *μᾶλλον-ἧττον*[88]. *δυσθυμία*, then, would be a malady of the deficient type, produced by the cold humour, phlegm, located in the vegetative soul, and opposite to *δυσκολία*[89]. There is here too little concern for the actual content of these notions and far

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85. *Supra*, p. 200.

86. See *infra*, p. 258 and n. 73.

87. Taylor *ad l.*

88. Tracy [620] 128.

89. The vegetative malady of the excessive type, produced by the hot humour, bile: Tracy [620] 130.

more geometry than the loose notion of humours in the Timaeus would bear[90]. Tracy attempts artificially to harmonise this passage with others[91], including **C**[92].

The 'psychic disorder' closest to *δυσθυμία*, according to Greek doctors, would be melancholy.

In the Republic (573C), Socrates identified a melancholic streak in the erotic, alcoholic, and tyrannical - constitutions which have hardly anything in common with our shameful singers. But we should not tie Plato to one view; the melancholic temperament is large and embraces the extremes. The Pseudo-Aristotelian Problem on melancholy (xxx) claims that the *γέροντες* are *δυσθυμότεροι* because cold (955[a]17), and that pathological (*ἄλογος*) *δυσθυμία* occurs when black bile, cold by nature (954[a]19-20), becomes 'colder than the *καιρός* demands' ([b]35-6). This is, so far as I know, the only parallel to one of the properties of old age in **C**[93]. The Problem on melancholy is generously used in discussion of Plato's ideas on wine; but how relevant are such parallels, taken from much later humoural speculation? In order to explain the functioning of black bile, this Problem collects many illustrations which are not cases of melancholy but display its permanent features in a temporary format. The method produced a far-ranging and quite confusing circle of analogies. We are not greatly advanced if the old are not melancholic but only similar to the melancholic in some general respect, such as by being cold and disheartened.

But let us consider medical background closer to Plato.

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90. See esp. 81E-7B: the transformations of substance; the aetiologies; the combinations of phlegm with the *χολαί* and with blood, serum, etc; taste and colour main criteria in classification. It is not clear what the humours are, how many there are, and what relation they bear to the four elements.

91. *Eg δυσκολία* in the R., notably at 587C and 590A, which does not want to obey Tracy's classification at all (it is, if anything, a kind of *πλήρωσις* and 'excess').

92. Tracy [620] 132 n. 42.

93. Note, also, that melancholics (but not the old) are *σκληρότεροι*, 954[a]10.

1. According to Galen, Hippocrates judged that the symptoms of melancholics could be reduced to *δυσυθυμία* and *φόβος*[94]. *φόβοι* prevail among the symptoms associated with *δυσθυμία*[95]. But a Hippocratic aphorism (vi 23.1) repeated by Galen several times[96] states that we can speak properly of a melancholic condition only if *δυσθυμία* and *φόβοι* persist. Is *δυσθυμία* a pervasive condition of the Dionysian singers? Is it accompanied by *φόβοι*? The Athenian says nothing to suggest an affirmative answer to either of these questions.

2. There are seven occurrences of *δυσθυμία* in the texts attributed to the Hippocratics. In none of these cases is *δυσθυμία* treated as an independent affection, but only as a symptom among others[97].

3. *δυσθυμία* was not always the sign of a clinical state; even in the doctors' language, it designated sometimes a benign indisposition[98], caused by breaks of routine such as missing lunch[99]. I incline to think that the case in **C** is similar.

The Athenian's old men are not ashamed in general, but ashamed of singing. *δυσθυμίας λήθη* is an effect of wine-drinking which produces, in turn, the soul's transformation into *μαλακώτερον ἐκ σκληροτέρου*. Singing aloud may be an aggravating circumstance for *δυσθυμία*. But the **cause** for not singing is not *δυσθυμία*; it is *αἰσχύνη*. And *αἰσχύνη* must not be confounded with *δυσθυμία*, because *αἰσχύνη* is a part of *σωφροσύνη*[100].

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94. Loc. Affect. viii 190K.

95. Spasms at night, followed by fever in the morning; sweating; disturbances of sense-perception; *ἄκρεα ψυχρά*; *ἄση*, *ἰλλιγγιᾶν*; *σκοτοδίνη* (Epid. iii cases 6 and 11, Mul. 182.3).

96. Kuhn vii 203.3 (Sympt. Caus.), viii 1886 (Loc. Affect.), xviii 1 35.11 and 143.4 (in Hpp. Aph. Comm.).

97. *Supra*, n. 95.

98. Cf. Galen Quod animi (Kuhn iv 777.8 sqq); note also that *λύπη* and *δυσθυμία* are said to be relieved by wine.

99. Ancient Medicine 10.

100. 665E3; cf. *infra*, p. 246.

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A Raucous Choir?

What, then, is the answer? Why is the Choir of Dionysus ashamed to sing until it has taken wine? The relationship between voice and old age may provide a simpler solution than the detour through mental *δυσθυμία*.

The discussion of musical education in Aristotle's Politics ends on a remark which suggests that some connection was made between musical scales and ages. Old people are too weak to sing *σύντονοι ἁρμονίαι* (high-pitched); they should stick to the *ἀνειμέναι* (low and relaxed), such as the Chalaro-Lydian[101]. Interestingly, this paragraph refers to people who had objected that Socrates' banishment of *ἀνειμέναι ἁρμονίαι* from Callipolis would prevent elderly people from singing.

It is commonplace in the Aristotelian corpus to regard the old as possessing a voice endowed with the characteristics of feeble creatures (young, female, castrated). This view goes back to Aristotle, who treated voice as one of the secondary sexual characteristics in living organisms and made it vary, accordingly, with sex and age[102]. Characteristic to man is the deep voice[103] - the voice of a nobler kind[104] - which is lost in old age with the semen. The deep voice (*βαρεῖα*) develops from and recedes into the high or shrill (*ὀξεῖα*): this is the voice

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101. Arist. Pol. 1342^{b}19sqq. On *σύντονοι* and *ἀνειμέναι ἁρμονίαι* in Plato and Aristotle as terms referring to pitch see Adam [237] and his Appendix ii to R. iii.

102. Aristotle discusses the subject of *φωνή* ('soulful' sound) in a section of the treatise On Soul (ii 8) and in three zoological works: Parts (ii 16-17 and iii 3), Generation (v 7), and History of Animals (vii 1). He deals with three issues: properties of voice; dependence of voice on the organs of articulation and breathing (lips, tongue, larynx; for lungs see de An. ii 80); relation of voice to sex and sexual development (on this see also HA 538^{b}12, 564^{a}15 and GA 776^{b}15).

103. But cf. GA 787^{a}24-5.

104. GA 786^{b}35-7^{a}3; cf. also EN 1125^{a}13.

of young and old people. The high or shrill voice is invariably endowed, in the Aristotelian tradition, with the same properties as old age: weakness and chill[105]. The Problem on harmony (xix) makes an interesting distinction between the high voice, which indicates weakness, and the capacity to reach high notes, which indicates great control, such notes being difficult[106]. Putting all this together, we can reason with Aristotle (or the author of the last paragraph of his Politics) that old people with shrill voices would better stick to low notes; they should certainly not try a song like the Orthian[107].

Here are two interesting details. According to a pseudo-Aristotelian treatise[108], old men lose the clarity of voice; but this quality, according to Aristotle, depends on the lips being *ὑγρὰ καὶ μαλακά* (659^{b}27-30^{a}8), the tongue, *πλατεῖα καὶ μαλακά* (660^{a}17-29), and the larynx, *λεῖον* (663^{a}37-^{b}3) - features associated with the humid element which Plato's singers seem to have lost. We also learn from the de Generatione that, if the organ is hard (*σκληρός*), the singer has no control over the notes, and his voice becomes 'inflexible'. Perhaps the *σκληρότης* of the Athenian's elders damaged their larynx rather than their soul.

I do not know if such notions were popular. The third book of the Rhetoric suggests that they are trivial and neglected[109]. But the discussion in the de Generatione sounds polemical: Aristotle seems to be arguing against the same theorists of sound and harmony who, according to the Topics, had established that *ὀξύ* means *εὐήκοον* (107^{a}14). The reference in the Politics to *ἁρμονίαι* specific to ages, and even to a criticism raised against Plato's Republic

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105. *Eg* Phgn. 806^{b}26-8l; Pr. iv 876^{b}36, v 880^{b}31, 901^{a}30-1, 903^{b}30, xi 899^{b}9-11, 906^{a}.

106. 920^{b}16 sqq: *διὰ τί τοῦ ἐν φωνῇ ὀξώος ὄντος κατὰ τὸ ὀλίγον, τοῦ δὲ βαρέος κατὰ τὸ πολὺ... ἔργον μᾶλλον ᾄδειν τὰ ὀξέα ἢ τὰ βαρέα, καὶ ὀλίγοι τὰ ἄνω δύνανται ᾄδειν, καὶ οἱ νόμοι ὄρθιοι καὶ οἱ ὀξεῖς χαλεποὶ ᾄσαι διὰ τὸ ἀνατεταμένοι εἶναι*; This passage is interesting to compare with Arist. GA v 7.

107. Apart from the passage which I just quoted (n. 106), cf. also the reference to the Orthian at Aud. 920^{b}16-28.

108. Aud. 801^{b}2 sqq. See also Pr. vii 886^{b}9 sqq (*τραχεῖα φωνή*) and Aud. 802^{a}3-4.

109. 1403^{b}15-4^{a}19: delivery in performance, voice in delivery, pitch and volume in voice.

from this point of view, may indicate a preoccupation with defining types of voice according to an established canon of age, volume and pitch[110].

The recommendation of the Chalaro-Lydian has given ground to the suspicion that the Politics was finished by someone other than Aristotle[111]. It is arguable whether Aristotle would accept the (Chalaro-)Lydian or not; but we cannot think for a moment that Plato would ever consider casting his best songs into a Chalarian scale. He would much rather try to change the voice of old men.

Plato represented the members of the Choir of Dionysus as being old. It seems plausible to me that a very good reason why shame due to *σωφροσύνη* should give these people an *ὄκνος πρὸς τὰς ᾠδάς* is the natural condition of their voice. People over sixty have no duty to sing at symposia because, says the Athenian, *οὐ... ἔτι* ***δυνατοὶ φέρειν ᾠδάς*** (664D3). The Choir of Dionysus is not compelled to perform in front of a large audience[112], yet it cannot get away just with telling stories; and the dangers of a shrill voice would be a sensible object

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110. Lord [478] 41 attributes such preoccupations to Aristoxenus - and the whole passage at the end of the Politics; cf. next note.

111. Discussion of this problem in Lord [478] 40-1. The suspicion does not seem to me justified. 1. Aristotle has advised that people should give up playing instruments, not singing in choirs: it is only the professional exercise of music that he considers unbecoming with age (cf. $1340^{b}20$ sqq). 2. It does not seem legitimate to suppose that Aristotle might have wished to reject the Lydian, simply because he does not mention it before this point. The Mixo-Lydian, to which he refers at $1340^{a}42$ sqq, is a different scale, as we can gather from the famous passage on *ἁρμονίαι* in the Republic (398D-9C): Plato calls the Lydian 'sympotic', the Mixo-Lydian 'threnotic'. Moreover, it is not clear that Aristotle would raise objections even to the Mixo-Lydian (which he describes in terms similar to Plato's): the only scale which Aristotle openly condemns at 1340^{b} is the Phrygian, accepted by Socrates in the Republic passage. According to Aristotle, the Dorian alone is best among relaxed *ἁρμονίαι* (*ἀνειμέναι*: Chalarian?) and scales such as the 'mournful-solemn' Mixo-Lydian; and, given the scope of this classification, there is no reason why the Mixo-Lydian should not be a second-best scale. Plato wanted to purify the city of both 'mournful' and 'sympotic' scales; but the case of the Phrygian shows that Aristotle does not entirely agree with his master on this topic. I am inclined to regard the description of the Lydian at $1342^{b}29$ sqq. as another departure from Plato's views. On Plato, cf. Adam [226] I 202 and [237].

112. The best voice for dramatic performances with a large audience is, according to Aristotle, the strong, *μεγάλη* (Rh. $1414^{a}14$ sqq).

of apprehension in people gifted with the finest knowledge of what is good and bad in music (812B-C)[113].

In this case, the Problem on voice (xi) makes it possible to think of wine as having more than the effect of a disinhibitor. The Problem claims that the voice can become deeper as a result of drinking. This statement occurs in two fanciful variants: the first attributes the deepening effect to wine, vomiting, and cold weather[114]; the second, to wine and hot weather[115]. One may feel inclined to dismiss such inconsistencies, but the explanation given to the phenomenon in the first variant is of medical interest: *βραδυτέρα γίνεται ἡ φορὰ τοῦ πνεύματος· ἡ δὲ βραδεῖα φορὰ καὶ βαρεῖαν ποιεῖ φωνήν*. This idea is reminiscent of a passage in the Regimen. Diet has its limitations, says the anonymous author; voice itself cannot be modified; yet it can be improved or worsened by making its passages *λειότεροι* or *τραχύτεροι* (36). Thus narrowing or broadening the *πόροι τοῦ πνεύματος* can produce temporary changes to the voice. The Regimen does not tell us by what means this could be done, but the idea that wine deepens the voice may derive from this kind of context.

There is a tendency to represent the process in **C** as a psychological process, and the terms involved as psychological terms[116]. The problem of separating body from soul in ancient medicine is very complicated[117]; perhaps we should use terms such as 'psychological' or 'somatic' in talk about disease and cure only in order to indicate the main tendency in com-

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113. Note the ambivalence of *ἀηδῶς* at 665E9: it means that the Choir of Dionysus would sing either without pleasure (*supra*, p. 197) or **unpleasantly**.

114. Ch. 18 ($900^{b}40$-$1^{a}7$): *διὰ τί ἐκ τῶν πότων καὶ τῶν ἐμέτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς ψύχεσι βαρύτερον φθέγγονται;*

115. Ch. 56 ($905^{a}24$-9): *διὰ τί τοῦ μὲν χειμῶνος ὀξύτερον φθέγγονται καὶ νήφοντες, θέρους δὲ καὶ μεθύοντες βαρύτερον;*

116. *Eg* Bertier [24] 66, 'Platon entend "sécheresse" au sens psychologique.'

117. Cf. Lloyd [471] 11-21 ('Disease'); Temkin [618], 'The Medicine of the Body and the Medicine of the Soul'.

plexes of what the Greeks perceived as natural and divine factors, inextricably linked. On a convention of this kind, I would much rather recognize in **C** the intention to make a somatic use of wine. This is most probably why, in the final praise of 'Dionysus' gift', the Athenian concluded that wine is 'a medicine for health and strength of body', *φάρμακον... σώματος δὲ ὑγιείας τε καὶ ἰσχύος* (762D7-9); no passage in the Laws except **C** would justify these words[118]. The ultimate purpose of the cure is psychological: wine makes the elderly singers 'forget' their age and thus it reduces their shame. But the cure itself consists in some interaction between wine and body - the whole body or just a part, for instance one connected with the emission of sounds (such as the larynx); or, say, the blood[119]. Plato is vague; but he makes wine operate in **C** through a physical property which may, in general, have psychological effects but does not feature at all in the 'psychological' process of **B**: hotness.

I conclude that, in discussion of symposia for the Choir of Dionysus, Plato considers drunkenness mainly under a somatic aspect. Alluring or not, the prospect of a deep psychology dive into *δυσθυμία* and the black waters of melancholy must be forgotten.

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The immediate role of the symposion in **C** derives from the effect of wine on the singers: by heating the body, wine diminishes in elderly people the shame of singing aloud. This process is related to the voice rather than to mental states.

But the symposia described in **C** have a general aim connected with *παιδεία* and the process of organising the primitive pleasures of the child. This aim is to produce the best

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118. Mnesitheus (a Dogmatist in the Platonic tradition according to Galen) will say that wine brings *ἰσχύν τε ταῖς ψυχαῖς(ι?) **καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν*** (fr. 41B). Much later on the same line cf Rufus (*ap* Orib. v 7 = CMG vi 1.1.126: *ἀνάψαι τὸ θερμόν* and *ἰσχύος δ' ἐμπλῆσαι τὸ σῶμα*).

119. Cf. *infra*, Ch. 5, p. 228 and n. 17. Many ideas of this sort circulated; at Pr. xi 905^{b}36-8 for instance wine is said to improve stammering (another form of chill).

ᾠδαί. When Diogenes of Babylon came to read Plato's Laws, he must have been extremely pleased with the idea of using the symposion to a purpose which benefited music so greatly.

Chapter 5

Laws *645D1-50B10: Symposion and Wine*

i: Introduction

I am going now to analyse the main account, **B** (639A2-41A2). This account closes Book One. First I shall rehearse what is the main link between **B** and and the conversation which has preceded[1].

Megillus has referred to symposia for the first time: this was his best example of *ὁπόσα... πάσας ἡδονὰς κινεῖ κατὰ δύναμιν* - situations rightfully forbidden by the Spartan legislator, where *μάλιστ᾽ ἄνθρωποι καὶ μεγίσταις προσπίπτουσιν ἡδοναῖς* (637A). The Athenian does not deny that such is indeed the nature of the symposion; he starts to argue for its utility as an institution which promotes pleasure.

The example marks a serious impasse in the discussion. Megillus has presented victory over enemies in war as the end of legislation; courage as the supreme virtue; and syssitia, accompanied by military training, as an institution designed to cultivate courage. Everybody is now agreed that only the last point was right: war is only a means to peace (628); the end of legislation is acquisition of all virtue (630); victory over oneself comes closer to this end than victory over others (627); and victory over oneself consists, entirely or for the most part, in the conquest of pleasure (633). To keep the Spartan thus far on his side, the Athenian has used the trick of disguising *σωφροσύνη* under the more appealing form of *ἀνδρεία*. The trick, as we shall see, is not idle. But when the Athenian starts to ask questions about a **separate** institution designed to cultivate *σωφροσύνη* (*μετ᾽ ἀνδρείαν γὰρ δὴ σωφροσύνης πέρι λέγωμεν*, 635E5-6),

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1. Cf. *supra*, Ch. 4, p. 177.

it turns out that the interlocutors have no proper answer (634B7-C4); they attempt to use the same institutions for the new purpose (636A2-3). The Athenian rejects this idea: syssitia may be good for training in courage, but they encourage homosexual intercourse and civil strife, two plagues for *σωφροσύνη* (636A4-E3). The kind of institution which he has in mind must, specifically, cultivate resistance (*κρατεῖν*, *νικᾶν*, *καρτερεῖν*) to pleasure (634A6-5D8). The great surprise here is not in the demand itself, but in the method: for, in order to achieve resistance of this kind, the Athenian recommends exposure (*ἄγοντα εἰς μέσας*) to the experience of the most intense pleasures (*τῶν μεγίστων ἡδονῶν*). He describes the process in a combined language of food administration (*γεύοντα*, *γεύεσθαι*) and training (*ἄπειροι*, *ἀμελέτητοι*) - a metaphor which responds to the leading image of Book One, military exercise; and in the course of **B** this image will move from war into the sphere of dietetics (*γυμνάσια* and *πόνοι*).

The impasse is this. Cleinias and Megillus are always ready to agree that one should resist pleasure[2], but more than reluctant about the procedure which the Athenian contemplates: *περὶ δὲ τηλικούτων εὐθὺς πεπιστευκέναι ῥαδίως μὴ νέων τε ἧ μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνοήτων* (635E1-3). They think, as the Athenian puts it, that the safest route with pleasure is complete avoidance and abstinence (*ἀπέχεσθαι*, *φεύγειν*). The main difference between the two notions of resisting pleasure concentrates in one single word, *ἀπαθής*, which occurs in a formulation towards the end: real self-control is not achieved *ἀπαθὴς ὢν πάντων τῶν τοιούτων* (647D7).

Socrates too has warned us in the Republic that ***βίᾳ*** *ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἡδονῶν* is not true *σωφροσύνη* (558D). But never before has Plato evisaged the **experiencing** of pleasure as a positive method. It is impressive that his last spokesman should take an approach to pleasure which resolves the large lifelong theme of *ἑαυτοῦ κρατεῖν* in this way. But before trying to evaluate this fact let us see what exactly must happen in his symposion and what kind of exercise can be taken with the drug of wine.

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2. Cf. 633E (nothing is worse than to be overcome by pleasure) and their enthusiasm at 626D.

ii: The Argument

The Athenian has presented the symposion as an institution or social custom (*ἐπιτήδευμα*)[3]; it is, in fact, the institutional counterpart of the syssition, and mirrors it by taking a symmetrical place in the box of virtues. But the defence of symposia is constructed entirely around the effects of wine.

The argument proceeds in four movements:

1: effects of wine on soul (645D1-6B8)

2: medical hypothesis (646B9-E2)

3: definition of *αἰδώς* (646E3-7C2)

4: use of wine in forming of *αἰδώς* (647C3-50B10),

which can be divided in three parts:

a: the rule (647C3-D8)

b: hypothetical application of the rule to *ἀνδρεία* (647E1-8E7)

c: analogous application of the rule to *αἰδώς* (649A1-0B10).

For purposes of clarity, I shall summarise each of these headings as follows:

1 (effects of wine on soul, 645D1-6B8):

wine strengthens pleasure and other functions of the epithymetic soul and weakens the functions of the intellectual soul; thus it produces a temporary diminution of *ἐγκράτεια*; diminution of *ἐγκράτεια* is *πονηρία* of soul;

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3. Cf. esp. the famous argument for method at 638C2 sqq in introduction of **A**, and the institutional features in **A** (*κοινωνία*, *ἄρχων*). See *supra*, Ch. 4, p. 177.

2 (medical hypothesis, 646B9-E2):

but there is an example of useful *πονηρία*: the temporary *πονηρία* produced by *φάρμακα* and *σωμασκία* leads to cure in physical illness; can the temporary *πονηρία* produced by wine lead to cure in illness of soul?

3 (definition of *αἰδώς*, 646E3-7C2):

ἀνδρεία and *αἰδώς* are the two factors which secure and preserve victory over the enemy;

there are two kinds of fear (*φόβος*), Bad Fear and Good Fear, and two kinds of confidence (*θάρρος*), Bad Confidence and Good Confidence; *αἰδώς* or *αἰσχύνη* is Good Fear, *ἀναίδεια* is Bad Confidence; Good Fear and Bad Fear differ in that the objects of 'fearing' are roughly opposite (*eg* it is Good Fear to fear your friends, Bad Fear to fear your enemies); the contrary of Good Fear is Bad Confidence; and, needless to say, the contrary of Bad Fear is courage (*ἀνδρεία*);

how can one cultivate *ἀνδρεία* and *αἰδώς* in citizens?

4a (use of wine in forming of *αἰδώς*; the rule, 647C3-D8):

as you have established yourselves, *ἀνδρεία* arises in conditions where one experiences the contrary of *ἀνδρεία*, Bad Fear: Bad Fear calls out *δειλία* in oneself, and *ἀνδρεία* results from systematic training in fighting and winning over *δειλία*;

αἰδώς must arise, similarly, in conditions where one experiences the contrary of *αἰδώς*, Bad Confidence; Bad Confidence calls out *ἀναισχυντία* in oneself, and *αἰδώς* would result from systematic training in fighting and winning over *ἀναισχυντία*;

thus in order to form *αἰδώς* in citizens one should make them experience Bad Confidence;

if Bad Fear is experienced in contact with pain, danger, and hardship, Bad Confidence is experienced in contact with pleasure (it is clear from the relations established in **3** that the

process of forming *ἀνδρεία* and the process of forming *αἰδώς* should require opposite circumstances, such as pain-pleasure);

4b (hypothetical application of the rule to *ἀνδρεία*, 647E1-8E7):

let us suppose that there is a drug *x* (*φόβου φάρμακον*) such that anyone who drinks *x* undergoes the experience of Bad Fear without coming into contact with pain, danger and hardship; drinking *x* would call out *δειλία* just by putting the patient in a fearful state of mind, so that the method presented above would work in the same way;

it would be more convenient to create the impression of danger in the patient's mind than to organise actual circumstances of danger; *x* would have an advantage over the present methods of training;

x could also be used in order to test the courage of citizens;

4c (analogous application of the rule to *αἰδώς*, 649A1-0B10):

there is no such thing as *x*, but there is a drink with opposite effects, wine: wine gives pleasure, as established (**1**), and namely by increasing *ἐλπίδες ἀγαθῶν*; thus wine makes the patient undergo the experience of Bad Confidence in the absence of other pleasures;

it is more convenient to create in the patient a state of mind which calls out *ἀναισχυντία* than to organise actual circumstances which would give him pleasure; thus wine would be an ideal medicine in cure of *ἀναίδεια* and formation of *αἰδώς*;

wine could also be used in order to test the character of citizens.

And (the Athenian does not come back to this) if put to such use, the temporary *πονηρία* caused by wine to the soul would be of the same kind as the temporary *πονηρία* caused by medicine to the body: a stage towards healing.

iii: The Cure

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The Medical Hypothesis

The Athenian casts different lights on his subject as he goes on: the process appears to be a form of training through exercise in pleasure; a therapy for the incontinent who are not ashamed; a test of character; and, as we shall see in **D**, a part of *παιδεία*. But the general line of the argument shows that Plato intended in the first place to build a possible therapy. His main thought is to test the hypothesis advanced at stage **2** (646B9-E2) by demonstrating how it is possible for wine to be a *φάρμακον*. His ideas are far from clear-cut; he does not use medical concepts, he rather gropes for them, building up his cure out of metaphorical transpositions from, and into, medicine. The interpretation of **B** (and **D**) must be done with extreme care.

B is an attempt to make a case for drunkenness as a method of healing the soul. One can hardly exaggerate the novelty of this idea. I have already discussed the role of wine in **C**, but a crucial fact remains to be added. Greek doctors used wine extensively as a drug, but there is no trace of such intentions in the Platonic corpus outside the Laws. There is instead every indication that Plato regarded drunkenness as an entirely depraved affair and would not even start thinking to make any good of it. The soul and its health concerned Plato greatly; he represented disease of soul in several ways and suggested several cures, from punishment to persuasion[4]. But it is an entirely new enterprise on his part to claim that physical entities such as drugs have a therapeutic effect on the soul and should be used in this capacity[5]. Neither does Plato's negative attitude to drugs encourage us to expect such a development[6].

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4. See Nussbaum [526] on therapeutic arguments in Greek philosophers and, with reference to Plato, Ch. 4 and 6.

5. In discussion of Platonic therapy, Laín-Entralgo [452] insists on the role of *φάρμακα* at Cha. 155E-7C. But there is no physical drug in the Charmides: all the therapy is effected by *ἐπῳδαί, ie λόγοι καλοί*.

6. *Eg* Ti. 89A8.

The principle at the heart of **B** is clearly illustrated by two formulations:

1: *καὶ μὴν ἄφοβόν γε ἕκαστον βουληθέντες ποιεῖν φόβων πολλῶν τινων, εἰς φόβον ἄγοντες αὐτὸν μετὰ νόμου, τοιοῦτον ἀπεργαζόμεθα* (647C3-5);

2: *τήν τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν ἀφοβίαν ἐν τοῖς φόβοις δεῖ καταμελετᾶσθαι* (9C3-4).

I should compare this idea with the conception of drugs as purges in Nature of Man: *τὸ γὰρ φάρμακον, ὅταν ἐσελθῃ ἐς τὸ σῶμα, πρῶτον μὲν ἄγει* ***ὃ ἂν αὐτῷ κατὰ φύσιν μάλιστα ἧ*** *τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνεόντων, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τἄλλα ἕλκει τε καὶ καθαίρει* (Ch. 6). This conception points to the main difference between the use of opposites in **B** and in **C**. In **C**, that which has heat or fire must not be given more heat or fire, and that which lacks heat must be given heat. In **B**, that which has excessive fear must be given more fear, and that which has excessive self-confidence must be given more self-confidence. Thus the process effected by contraries in **C** is 'allopathic', in **B** 'homoeopathic'[7].

I shall start from the main hypothesis of the argument, **2** (646B9-E2). The leading principle is that of putting to good use a diseased state, *πονηρία* (646B9). But wine has a specific *πονηρία* related to it (646A2): *ἄπασα φαυλότης* of the soul (646B6). In **D**, the Athenian will use the metaphor of melting in order to describe this state from the angle of therapy: *καθάπερ τινὰ σίδηρον τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πινόντων διαπύρους γιγνομένας μαλθακωτέρας γίγνεσθαι καὶ νεωτέρας, ὥστε εὐαγώγους συμβαίνειν κτλ* (671B8-19). The softened soul is being diseased in so far as it is incapable of self-control (*πονηρός*); the softened soul is getting cured in so far as it is capable of change (*εὐάγωγος*).

The main idea is that drugs in disease and prophylactic elements of the regimen start by aggravating the symptoms of the condition which is to be cured or prevented - *λεπτότης*,

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7. In using such terms we must bear in mind that Plato was far from aware of the procedures in question. Scholars who have opted for 'allopathic' or 'homoeopathic' in both cases are bound to disagree; these terms are helpful precisely as labels for the main difference between the two processes envisaged by Plato. But they describe only one side of the process in each case: the 'allopathic' process in **C** is also one of repletion (wine brings in a missing element), while the 'homoeopathic' process in **B** is also one of evacuation (wine forces out an excessive element).

αἶσχος, ἀδυναμία; they behave for a time in the manner of pathogenic factors. This is not a discovery made by Plato. The passage from the Nature of Man which I have quoted shows that Greek doctors entertained some thought that drugs contain the features of the disease which they are meant to cure. But Hippocratic pharmacology was far from operating on well-defined principles and methods, and such ideas are vaguer than they might seem today; they were probably still attached to the ambivalence of φάρμακα and the strong feelings aroused by the synonymic relation between drug, poison and talisman[8]. On the other hand, the Gorgias gives us in embryo a very plain version of the same thought: medical treatment is unpleasant but beneficial in the long run (478B7-C3). How specifically 'pharmaceutic' is Plato's thought in the present passage?

Plato's general approach **is** medical: the Athenian wants to establish the proper use of wine as a drug and forbids any other use. This is why in the end he will attack both the current view that wine produces madness (672A sqq) and the current practice of symposia, where wine is used for idle entertainment (673E sqq). But let us look at two points in his argument.

1. The first application of the 'homoeopathic' principle occurs at **4a** (647C3-6): the evil of δειλία cannot be eliminated or cured except by exposure to aggravating circumstances. But the Athenian applies the principle in such a way as to pick up, eloquently, the main point made by the Spartan and Cretan interlocutors on their most familiar topic: military training. One acquires courage by being exposed to dangerous exercise, such as in the famous κρύπτεια[9].

2. There are two examples of somatic treatment at **2**: φαρμακοποσία and σωμασκία (πόνοι καὶ γυμνάσια). These examples are not similar. Dietetics is prophylactic: if drugs 'aggravate' an existing ill condition, prophylactic exercise does not aggravate anything; it produces the temporary 'illness' entirely. But this example creates the same kind of bridge

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8. On the ambivalence of φάρμακον see especially Artelt [248].

9. Cf. 625C-E and 633B-C.

with the previous discussion as **4a** will. *γυμνάσια* and *πόνοι* do not produce courage; yet *σωμασκία* has an element in common with military training to the extent that both attempt to strengthen nature through exercise. These facts call our attention to the possible role of the imagery of fighting in the formation of the medical hypothesis.

The principle behind the therapy recommended in **B** is neither invented by Plato nor even formulated in proper pharmaceutical terms. Yet Plato's hypothesis is very original: it extends the principle of drugs to soul and wine (646D2-6). The thought is roughly this. If drugs heal the body by provoking temporary symptoms of somatic disease, and wine provokes temporary symptoms of psychic disease, may wine not be used in healing the soul? This possibility gives rise to a systematic interpretation of the *πονηρία* induced by wine as part of a therapy which, so far as I know, has no parallel in the medical practice of Plato's day.

Both physical exercise and wine were current items of the Hippocratic regimen, recommended according to season and constitution[10]. Plato picks up readily available examples. But what he does with them would probably seem strange to a doctor, Hippocratic or not: on the one hand he compares wine with the *γυμνάσια* of the regimen; on the other hand he seems to compare the *γυμνάσια* of the regimen with *γυμνάσια* on the military camp.

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The Puppet and the Structure of the Soul

So much for the general rule. Now I shall try to present another general problem, which prepares us for understanding the specific role of wine in this therapy. As can be seen at 645D1, the argument of **B** emerges from an *εἰκών* between man and puppet: *θαῦμα μὲν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἡγησώμεθα τῶν ζῴων θεῖον* (644D6 sqq). This simile shows how the mind looks before the start of the cure.

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10. Cf. *supra*, Ch. 4, n. 56.

There is a preliminary account (644C1-D6) on the basis of which one may write names in the diagram of the puppet (D7-5C8). In this diagram, the puppet has strings of two kinds: of gold and iron. There are several iron strings but the golden is just one, with a name of its own: it is the string of reason, *λογισμός-νόμος*. The preliminary account speaks of three layers, no strings; but the occurrence of *λογισμός-νόμος* in both parts (644D2-3 = 645A1-2) guarantees that we are dealing here with two descriptions of the same thing. The inferior strings of the puppet have no specific number or name - they are *πάθη* of various kinds. But these *πάθη* must correspond to the contents of the primary layers: *ἡδονή-λύπη* in the first (664C6-7), *θάρρος-φόβος* in the second (664C9-D1). Thus the puppet is pulled by five strings.

The basic difference gold-iron points to a bipartite model of the soul; so too does the grouping of the symptoms of wine in **1** (645D1-6A1)[11]. For simplification I shall call the two parts 'rational' and 'irrational': the string of reason (which can easily represent the *λογιστικόν* of the Republic)[12], and the 'child' at 645E5-6.

The two inferior pairs seem to point to a secondary division, which takes place in the irrational part. One pair consists of pleasure and pain; the other consists of beliefs (*δόξαι*), which are expectations of pleasure and pain (*ἐλπίδες*). There must be a difference between the experience of pleasure or pain and the feelings aroused in anticipation. But there must also be a difference between experiencing or anticipating pleasure and experiencing or anticipating pain. Each member of the second pair can equally be paired to a member of the first pair, because *θάρρος* is about *ἡδονή* and *φόβος* is about *λύπη*. This means that irrational processes can be divided along the two following lines:

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11. Cf. also 726B (*διττά*).

12. It is legitimate to use this term, I think, even outside tripartition. Besides, it does not make any practical difference to the *λογιστικόν* (as it does to the *θυμοειδές*) whether the soul is tripartite or bipartite (*eg* R. x).

1. From 633D-E on, the Athenian has insisted on breaking *ἑαυτοῦ κρατεῖν* into two halves, so as to focus on one alone. Control over pleasure must be constructed as a subject in its own right, independent from control over pain: it is more important, less well explored, and more difficult to achieve[13]. The vertical pairing *ἡδονή-θάρρος*, running parallel to *λύπη-φόβος*, shows exactly how this can be done.

2. But *θάρρος* differs in nature from its correlative *ἡδονή*, and so does *φόβος* from *λύπη*. In one case, the pull of pleasure and pain is direct: the puppet is thrown into actions dictated by one or the other. In the second case, the puppet acts on expectations: hope for pleasure in the future, fear of pain to come. Pleasure and pain are still in action, but their pull is only at first remove.

The Athenian describes the two *ἐλπίδες* thus: *κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δέ, φόβος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου.* This phrasing comes very close to that used in the Philebus for anticipatory pleasure: *τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν* (32C). It seems to me that the horizontal line which the pairing *ἡδονή-λύπη/ θάρρος-φόβος* requires us to draw divides the irrational soul according to a criterion suggested by anticipatory pleasure in the Philebus. In fact, there are earlier indications that Plato may have attempted to introduce, in his division of the soul, new criteria amounting to a similar result. The Timaeus, which reasserts tripartition, also draws a picture of the 'mortal soul'. The content of this parallel entity is disposed in five layers: *ἡδονή, λύπαι, θάρρος, θυμὸς δυσπαραμύθητος, ἐλπὶς εὐπαράγωγος* (69D). It is easy to see how the two top and the three bottom layers may be compressed and rearranged so as to fall exactly into the puppet metaphor.

Thus the irrational soul of the puppet seems to have two different contents, *ἡδονή* and *λύπη*, and two kinds of process related to each, *ἥδεσθαι/λυπεῖσθαι* and *δοξάζειν* = *ἐλπίζεσθαι*. If this is the thought, one wishes that Plato had expressed it more clearly; for

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13. Cf. also, later on, 840C and 918B-C.

ἡδονή and λύπη only feature once, as nouns. But the text would not make much sense if the thought was different.

Even if such things express tendencies on which Plato did not elaborate, they are entitled, I think, to some elaboration on our part. I have no intention to renew debate about whether Plato had or had not abandoned tripartition at the time of the Laws. Traces can be discovered, and we probably have one in this place[14]. But such survivals are not meaningful in themselves. Plato was perfectly capable of abandoning one part of the soul whenever the dual scheme served the subject better, and this tended to be the case when the subject was not the soul itself[15]. The account of conflict in the Republic suggests to me that he had little use for the θυμοειδές. But the waverings between tripartition and bipartition leave Plato's soul with a blank space, which invites us to discover how he may wish at various stages to fill it.

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The Effects of Wine on the Soul

The strings of the puppet show us in which area of the soul wine is going to operate, and what kind of process is involved in the therapy.

One fact is immediately obvious. The object of the Athenian's therapy is to form αἰδώς, and step **3** (646E3-7C2) defines both this notion and its contrary, ἀναίδεια, in terms of the puppet's second pair of strings.

Let us look at the relations established in **3**. As 'fear', shame is roughly opposed to ordinary fear (or fear with a negative value): the phrase σχεδὸν ἐναντία (646E4) must refer to the difference which separates members of the same class. But shame has a contrary of its

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14. Cf. also the pair ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας and θυμοὺς καὶ ἔρωτας at 45D7. On tripartition or bipartition in the Laws see Saunders [574] and Rees [550].

15. *Eg*, even in the Republic, the last argument against mimetic poetry in x (603B9 sqq).

own: over-confidence (or confidence with a negative value). So has the member correlated to shame in the class of fear, Bad Fear: its contrary is courage (although the Athenian does not bother to repeat such a trivial thing). The relation between courage and the contrary of shame (Bad Confidence) must be the same as the relation between shame and the contrary of courage (Bad Fear): they are *σχεδὸν ἐναντία εἴδη*, *ie* not contraries, but roughly opposed members of the same class. Thus one gets two opposite classes, *φόβος* and *θάρρος*; two pairs of items, one in each class: Bad *φόβος*-Good *φόβος* (*δειλία-αἰδώς*), Bad *θάρρος*-Good *θάρρος* (*ἀναίδεια-ἀνδρεία*); and two pairs of opposites across classes: Bad *φόβος*-Good *θάρρος* (*δειλία-ἀνδρεία*), Good *φόβος*-Bad *θάρρος* (*αἰδώς-ἀναίδεια*). This neat symmetry will allow the Athenian to draw the unknown process - formation of *αἰδώς* - from the mirror image of the known one - formation of *ἀνδρεία*.

But one also gets a pair of negative values, *ἀναίδεια* (=*θάρρος*)-*δειλία* (=*φόβος*), synonymous with the puppet's second pair, and a pair of positive values, *ἀνδρεία* (=*θάρρος*)-*αἰδώς* (=*φόβος*), where each member is an antonym to the puppet's homonymous cord in the same pair. These relations make clear an important fact. The *φάρμακον* of **B** is intended to correct only the pullings of one member of the second pair; it works on that region of the soul which is under the sway, not of the direct experience of pleasure, but of beliefs about, or expectations of, pleasure. The Athenian has in mind a precise destination for his symposion.

Step **4c** (649B) confirms this fact. Only one feature of wine counts in this cure: *πλειόνων* ***ἐλπίδων*** *ἀγαθῶν πληροῦσθαι καὶ δυνάμεως* ***εἰς δόξαν***. This means that wine affects the string connected with *ἐλπὶς πρὸ ἡδονῆς*; but *ἐλπὶς πρὸ ἡδονῆς* is *θάρρος* (44C10-D1), and *θάρρος* (or *ἀναισχυντία*) is the evil (*πονηρία*) for which the cure is being sought.

Wine gives pleasure, but pleasure of an imaginary kind: the relevant feature of wine is its power to intensify the expectation of pleasure, or to bring pleasant images before the soul. According to **1** (645D1-6B8), in drunkenness the intellect becomes inactive, while the inferior soul is being replenished; it must be, in fact, invaded by pictures of desires being satisfied, rather than by actual replenishments.

This brings us in the territory of anticipatory pleasure. The discussion of false concomitant beliefs in the Philebus (38A) shows that pleasures have built-in *δόξαι*: this is a good start for understanding the nature of a *δόξα* which is an *ἐλπὶς πρὸ ἡδονῆς*. No matter how such beliefs may be related to anticipatory pleasure in the Philebus (if at all), the main problem raised by the latter is its unreality: this is another good start for understanding the Athenian's project. I do not mean that we can discover more by pressing matters in this direction. The Athenian is obviously not concerned with senses in which pleasure may be unreal or false; he has a practical end, for which he uses old notions simplified. My starting points are no more than tags for huge areas on the map of pleasure, where the Athenian drew his puppet and the experiment of **B**.

There is an interesting parallel in the Hippocratic treatise *περὶ Φυσῶν* - one of the very few which it is possible to adduce for **B** from contemporary medicine - which describes and explains the effects of wine thus: *πάλιν ἐν τῇσι μέθῃσι πλέονος ἐξαίφνης γενομένου τοῦ αἵματος μεταπίπτουσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ ἐν τῇσι ψυχῇσι φρονήματα, καὶ γίνονται τῶν μὲν παρεόντων κακῶν ἐπιλήσμονες, τῶν δὲ μελλόντων εὐέλπιδες ἀγαθῶν*[16]. This text indicates that the idea of connecting wine to anticipatory pleasures may have been suggested to Plato by medical speculation on wine. But it is also interesting to note the differences. The phrase *τῶν δὲ μελλόντων εὐέλπιδες ἀγαθῶν* is very close to the Athenian's formulation *πλειόνων ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν πληροῦσθαι*. But, according to the author of the treatise, thoughts about what is real and unpleasant in the present (*τὰ παρεόντα κακά*) are replaced in drunkenness by thoughts about what is pleasant in a plausible future (*τὰ μέλλοντα ἀγαθά*). Plato considers the *ἐλπίδες* to be false, and he does not refer at all to the present condition. Secondly, the contexts are very different. The ambition of the treatise was to prove that blood was the primary factor in determining alterations (*ἀπαλλαγαί*) of *φρόνησις*, and this was one example. The

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16. Ch. 6 Jones = vi 112 Littré. This treatise is dated by Jones to late vth century (Jones thinks that it was rather written by a sophist, like the Ancient Medicine).

Athenian presents the symptoms of intoxication in roughly the same way, but makes them part of a healing process[17].

But the symptoms caused by wine raise a difficult problem. According to the introductory passage (**1**: 645D1-6A1), inebriation is a double process, one may say of repletion and evacuation, such that every faculty is disturbed: *ἡδοναί*, *λύπαι*, *θυμοί*, *ἔρωτες* grow stronger, *αἰσθήσεις*, *μνῆμαι*, *δόξαι*, *φρονήσεις* become slow. The topic recurs in the last step (**4c**: 649A8-B7), then again in **D** (71B3-160, C4-7). In these passages the Athenian has selected a limited set of symptoms, related, as we have already seen, to pleasure (*ἴλεων*, *πλειόνων ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν πληροῦσθαι*), and also descriptive of what happens at symposia (*παρρησία*, *ἐλευθηρία* 9B3-4, *παρρησία*, *ἀνηκουστία* 1B4). So far so good; *παρρησία* or drunken behaviour of any kind (even inspired) presupposes disturbances of perception, memory, and thought. But what has happened to *λύπη*? Does the Athenian leave it out of account because it is not interesting, or is the sound of drunken lamentations unknown to his ears?

To exclude the case of *λύπη* growing stronger under the effect of wine is to say that, in spite of the premiss at 645D1-6A1 (1), drunkenness does not affect the entire soul: pain and grief remain untouched, and *λύπαι* feature in our text by mistake. But it is hardly plausible that Plato entertained such a bizarre thought. *λύπη* forms a natural pair with *ἡδονή*: it is not possible to have one affected while the other remains neutral; Plato often objected to pleasure on this ground[18].

Perhaps not all the effects of wine are to be used in the therapy; perhaps the magnification of *λύπαι* occurs but is therapeutically irrelevant? We cannot assume this either: something very odd would result. If wine is also capable of increasing *λύπαι*, the recourse to *φόβου*

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17. This passage attributes the effects of wine to a sudden increase in the quantity of blood; Galen also refers to blood in his commentary of **C**, which I presented in the previous chapter (*supra*, p. 201). If such theories were known to Plato, he may have had them in mind in writing **C**.

18. *Eg* Grg. 496C sqq, R. 584A sqq, Phlb. 44D sqq.

φάρμακον in **4b** (647E1-8E7) becomes futile: *φόβου φάρμακον* would exist and be wine[19]; for *φόβου φάρμακον* works by making you *δυστυχής* (47E3-4).

But maybe there is a third possibility: λύπας is right and something else is wrong at **1** (645D1-6A1). As a rule, terms are complementary in the pair pleasure-pain: when one goes high the other goes low. Perhaps *σφοδροτέρας* is a loose description, and is incorrect in the case of λύπας. The effect of wine is not to increase pleasure for me and pain for you, but to increase pleasure and to diminish grief in everybody. This would explain both why λύπη is not interesting and why *φόβου φάρμακον* is the opposite of wine. But **1** (645D1-6B8) has distributed the effects of wine along the main division of the soul, and it is not clear how this interpretation would accommodate the λογιστικόν: does wine act on pleasures in a manner opposite to how it acts on griefs and thoughts taken together?

All this shows that the place of λύπη in our argument is unclear. What seems to be clear so far is that the Athenian wanted to limit the function of the symposion to pleasure. Wine acts on only one string of the puppet - a string which is not *ἡδονή* but bears on *ἡδονή* indirectly. To this problem I shall return.

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The Disease and its Medicine

The Athenian does not explain what kind of medicine wine is, but he allows us to make a few guesses. Let us start by seeing what disease he is trying to cure.

In the symposion, *ἀναισχυντία* shows itself in the breaking of rules: in terms of behaviour, this is *λέγειν ἢ πάσχειν ἢ καὶ δρᾶν αἰσχρὸν ὁτιοῦν* (649D1-2), or, *οὐκ ἐθέλοντα*

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19. Nevertheless, this is an interesting possibility, forbidden only by the artificial division of *σωφροσύνη* according to pleasure and pain. It explains, maybe, why the two cures are complementary; and note that we learn more about the imaginary than about the real one.

τάξιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος σιγῆς καὶ λόγου καὶ πόσεως καὶ μούσης ὑπομένειν (671C6-7)[20]. The first thought that comes to mind is that the disease which manifests itself under this form would be one specifically related to wine: drunkenness or alcoholism. Perhaps what the Athenian meant by cultivation of *αἰδώς* was to accustom people to resist the temptation of alcohol: however much wine there is in a symposion, you should not drink more than a certain amount.

This might have been the case if wine acted directly on *ἡδονή*; but it acts on *θάρρος* or *ἐλπίς*, and the case is very different. What causes the puppet to behave *ἀναισχύντως* is not wine, but a lack of restraint (*ἐγκράτεια, ἑαυτοῦ κρατεῖν*) about pleasure which wine brings out. At **4c**, the Athenian gives two examples: *δυσκόλου ψυχῆς καὶ ἀγρίας* (649E2-3) and *πρὸς τἀφροδίσια ἡττημένης τινὸς ψυχῆς* (650A2). These are particular reasons for, or explanations of, *ἀναισχυντία*. But the examples pick up two items on a list of situations which, according to the Athenian, provoke the same kind of behaviour as wine: *θυμός, ἔρως, ὕβρις*, and so on (649D4-7). *πρὸς τἀφροδίσια ἡττημένης τινὸς ψυχῆς* is a description of the erotic incontinent; his *ἀναισχυντία* would be increased by the second item on the list, while the *ἀναισχυντία* of *δυσκόλου ψυχῆς καὶ ἀγρίας* would be increased by a different item - the first one on the list.

The list and the two examples point us to the kind of thing which the Athenian aimed to cure: the tendency to incontinent behaviour specific in each case (*τινός*). Plato did not mean his therapy as a course in proper drinking, but conceived of wine as a universal medicine for any disease which the expectation of pleasure may breed in individual souls.

But this state of things gives wine a very peculiar status. What properties should be expected in a drug which can cure such diseases?

An implicit rule of the therapy must be that, for any incontinent patient, only one feature (or circumstance on the list) would provoke (or aggravate; then cure) incontinence; it

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20. 671C6-7; cf. also B3-6.

would be irrelevant, for instance, to expose the erotic incontinent to situations which stir up his anger. This rule has two interesting consequences for wine.

Unlike *θυμός* or *ἔρως*, wine does not act on a tendency related to wine-drinking, (say, immoderation in drink), but on tendencies primarily related to some other factor, such as *θυμός*; its agency is vicarious. And, unlike *θυμός*, wine acts on the erotic as well as on the frantic: its power is not limited to some tendencies, but universal. This is consistent with the location of the therapy at the level of *θάρρος*. Wine does not give pleasure in the same sense as the real events on the list do; it only gives the illusion (*δύναμις εἰς δόξαν*) or the expectation (*ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί*) of desires being satisfied.

Plato does not give us a definite idea about what it is for wine to be a drug, but an interesting notion struggles to come to the surface. At 643A1-E6 the Athenian gives the example of forming skills in childhood: this would be achieved by directing pleasure towards the skill in question with the help of toy imitations of real-life tools. If this model holds for *παιδεία*, in which the virtues begin; if the task of symposia in **B** is to produce a part of a virtue; if wine works by bringing your soul to the condition of a child's soul; and if the effect of wine is to be compared with that of the circumstances listed at 649D; is it not reasonable to think that wine operates on a mimetic principle similar to that of toys? Both act vicariously; wine is connected to the pleasurable properties of real events by contiguity, just as toys are related to the properties of real tools.

This impression is strengthened by another element. There is a metaphorical side to the relation between wine and the situations on the Athenian's list: the latter belong to a category of events which can make you **drunk with pleasure** (*δι' ἡδονῆς αὖ μεθύσκοντα*, 49D6-7)[21].

This is an interesting addition: some of Plato's references to wine and drunkenness occur in

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21. But note that the list contains items such as *ἀμαθία* and *δειλία*, which may well push the puppet to *ἀναισχυντία*, but not through pleasure, as required at **4a**. Here again the vertical division corresponding to separate halves of self-mastery proves to be artificial; the compass of drunkenness is larger than that of pleasure (cf. *supra*, pp. 229 ff).

metaphors[22], and in most cases the metaphorical term corresponds to states of mind produced by agents like *ἡδονή*, *τρυφή*, *ἐλευθερία*, or *φόβος*. But *ἐλευθερία*, *φόβος* and *τρυφή* feature among the Athenian's items[23]. The metaphor of drunkenness renders a universal which Plato did not formulate, yet probably recognised in such situations.

The use of wine as *φάρμακον* in **B** is founded, I think, on a combination of mimetic and anticipatory features. This grasp of the notion of *φάρμακον* is, basically, metaphorical.

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Wine as *βάσανος*

Governed by the metaphor of drunkenness, the idea that one substance can encapsulate a group of features scattered in a plurality of events in the world has in it a precious element of scientific intuition. The intuition is very confused; it leads to a parallel conclusion which runs before, and nearly stifles, the main conclusion which the Athenian has aimed so far to reach. But this intuition is linked with the fact that, in Plato's terms, the therapy must use anticipations instead of actual events. It gives a half-medical foundation to this idea; and it may help us next to reconstruct the possible factor which makes the process work. The Athenian's conclusions are couched in a long nebulous sentence in question form, which starts at 649D7. I shall try to make the thought clearer by breaking the two halves before and after *πλήν* into smaller units, which can be paraphrased thus:

i, 1 *τούτων δὲ εὐτελῆ τε καὶ ἀσινεστέραν* (*sc ἡδονήν*): compared with the pleasure which arises in situations such as those listed above (*θυμός*, *ἔρως* and so on), the pleasure produced in wine-drinking is of a cheap and safer nature;

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22. *Eg* Lys. 222C, Phd. 79D (simile), Criti. 121A, R. 562D, Lg. 773D. Note also, in Book One, 639B (*ὑπὸ μέθης τοῦ φόβου*).

23. The 'list' has two parts: 1. *θυμός*, *ἔρως*, *ὕβρις*, *ἀμαθία*, *φιλοκέρδεια*, *δειλία*; 2. *πλοῦτος*, *κάλλος*, *ἰσχύς*.

2 *πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τὸ λαμβάνειν πεῖραν, εἶτα εἰς τὸ μελετᾶν*: the pleasure produced in wine-drinking is of a cheap and safer nature, first with regard to the testing of character, second with regard to training in pleasure;

ii, 2 *τίνα ἔχομεν ἡδονὴν εἰπεῖν ἔμμετρον μᾶλλον*: which pleasure can we more aptly describe as suitable to the purposes of testing character and training in pleasure,

1 *πλὴν τῆς ἐν οἴνῳ βασάνου καὶ παιδείας*: other than the pleasure produced in wine-drinking (which is a pleasure related to *βάσανος* and *παιδιά* [*παιδεία*?]),

3 *ἂν καὶ ὁπωστιοῦν μετ' εὐλαβείας γίγνηται*: provided that one takes good care in handling this situation?

ἔμμετρον in ii, 2 is cut off from the two conclusions, but the idea must be that wine-drinking is better adapted than other circumstances to achieve the two purposes.

The Guardians of the Republic had to pass tests in pleasure and pain too (413D-4A, 503A and E); but *βάσανος* seems to have been used by Greek doctors for pharmaceutic experiments, and this use fits better in our context[24]. There is however an important difference: doctors tested the drugs[25], whereas the Athenian wants to test the patients. His procedure is more like diagnosis than experimentation.

βάσανος is related to the idea that it is safer and cheaper to produce pleasure by using wine than by using anger, love, wealth, and so on. It has been claimed that, in recommending wine as a cheap and safe experiment, the Athenian makes a calculation proper to scientists[26]; 'cheaper and safer' would measure the difference between Hiroshima and nuclear experiments

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24. *Eg βάσανος ἀκριβής* in Galen xi K. 418-9; equivalent terms are *πειρασμός* and *δοκιμασία* (cf. Dioscorides' Praefatio 2 and 5). The connection between Plato's *βάσανος* and medical experimentation has been made by Pigeaud [537] 490-1, who argues that here 'Platon est à la recherche du qualitatif'. Given the level reached by ancient experimentation, *à la recherche* is a fortunate phrase. Less fortunate is the fact that Pigeaud fashions this into a well cut idea, to which he reduces all the argument of **B**.

25. Cf. Dioscorides' Praefatio 2: *τὰς δὲ τῶν φαρμάκων δυνάμεις καὶ δοκιμασίας* ('properties and testing', Riddle [554] 11); also Galen's Praefatio 11 to Simpl. med. vi (*σκευασία*).

26. Pigeaud *loc cit*.

in the laboratory. In the hypothetical case of *φόβου φάρμακον*, the idea of testing courage (*πρῶτον μὲν... βάσανον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαμβάνειν ἀνδρείας τε πέρι καὶ δειλίας*) is prompted by similar considerations of safety and expediency (648B4-5, C7-8). Such considerations occur in the main hypothesis of the argument, **2**: if wine is a drug, it is a superior one because it does not give pain (646D8-10). These associations indicate that the *βάσανος* idea was indeed drawn into the conclusion by a scientific criterion.

But the sentence which I have paraphrased indicates that a difference such as between Hiroshima and nuclear laboratory was not at all clear cut in the Athenian's mind. The thought underlying *μᾶλλον* ought to be that wine and the real-life situations on the list share some property. Yet the Athenian compares them with respect to no property, but only to use: *ἀσινεστέραν... πρὸς τὸ λαμβάνειν πεῖραν/ προς τὸ μελετᾶν*. This is to ask us to imagine real events - marriage and all sorts of contract - from the angle of therapy; but this is absurd. Wine-drinking can take the form of an experiment in the artificial and closed world of the symposion[27], and this is why wine cannot be compared, with respect to use, with the situations on the Athenian's list. The symposiarch may stir *θυμός* in his choleric symposiasts in order to cure this form of intemperance; going with him *εἰς τὰ συμβόλαια* cannot be a part of any therapy. The conclusion of **B** indicates that the parallel between symposion and situations of pleasure in real life moved Plato one step away from the main idea of the cure and brought to the forefront a secondary medical thought.

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The Mechanism of the Therapy

The Athenian does not tell us very much about what happens to the patient in the course of this cure. In **4b** (*φόβου φάρμακον*) he describes a climax of fear followed by an anti-climax, thus: *ἐκοιμηθέντα δὲ καὶ τοῦ πώματος ἀπαλλαγέντα πάλιν ἑκάστοτε τὸν αὐτὸν*


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27. On the difference between symposion and the 'real world' see Murray [508].

γίγνεσθαι (648A2-3). The role of the two opposite drinks in the two opposite experiments is equivalent; for simplification, I shall refer to both as one single process.

The effects of the drink vanish by themselves during sleep. The exercise seems to consist in arousing the patient's fears up to the limit of his endurance, then in restoring his normal or sober condition (*τὸν αὐτόν*). The cure has two phases. The patient travels between health and disease in the sequence health (A) disease (B) health (C), on a triangle as in **Fig. 2**:

Figure 2



But what is the point of this exercise, if the terminal states are identical? If the condition of the patient on waking up is 'the same' as before drinking, where is the progress achieved through therapy?

The Athenian presents the imaginary drink as a drug with the same effect as military training: it cultivates *ἀνδρεία*. Military training consists in confronting danger, hardship and pain, as in the examples reviewed by Megillus at 633B-C. But take the young Spartan who has successfully carried out his *κρύπτεια*: if he stops fearing the dangers of this game once the period of training is over, *τὸν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι* could be said of him in the same sense as it is said of the patient who has reached position C: the young Spartan would be 'the same' in that he feels to be no longer under the pressure of danger. He must, however, be different: he has


acquired courage. Whenever a situation like *κρύπτεια* occurs again, he would have greater control over his emotions.

Let us transfer this process to *φόβου φάρμακον*, which, likewise, should produce courage. In spite of the patient's waking up 'the same', an important change must have taken place in him: his lack of fear (or health at point A) is less easily shaken after each session. And indeed, the Athenian suggests that the trained patient has acquired more *δύναμις* or *δύναμις* over more drink - although there always remains a limit which he would not be able to trespass (*ἐσχάτη πόσις*, 648D-E).

Considering the two variables of this situation, therapy ought to follow one of the following courses:

1. The patient starts by bringing himself to the limit (*ἐσχάτη πόσις*), and continues to drink the same amount every session. The effect of the drink would be progressively reduced, as shown in **Fig. 3**:

Figure 3




x: time (five sessions)

y: effects of set amount of drink

a: approximate rate of change of *y* with *x*

2. The patient drinks as much as to reach his limit of endurance every time. In this case, his increasing control would make him ask for larger amounts of drink in each session, as shown in **Fig. 4**:

Figure 4



x: time (five sessions)

y: amount of drink for maximum effect

b: approximate rate of change of *y* with *x*

But the case of the young Spartan points to a positive difference of method between achieving virtue through training and achieving virtue through a therapeutic process. The φόβος experienced in κρύπτεια is inspired by real danger, just as the θάρρος experienced in the situations on the Athenian's list at **4c** (649D) is inspired by real pleasure. The Spartan acquires courage by getting used to facing actual danger; he accustoms his string λύπη not to pull too forcibly. On the contrary, φόβου φάρμακον causes the patient to experience fear in the absence of a real cause. φόβου φάρμακον acts on the strings of an ἐλπίς. In the course of drinking the patient cannot learn how to face actual danger, but something else. The Athenian does not seem to know what that is; perhaps to feel 'the same' on waking up involves some recognition of the imaginary nature of one's fears - or even of their dormant content, as modern psychologists might be tempted to think. Plato does not have such notions at hand. We do discern here a connection, even if loose, between being a drug for the soul and acting on false anticipations. But the most important feature of the therapy is this. On the expectation of

his fears being fulfilled, the patient behaves in a cowardly fashion. The exercise does not attempt to extirpate these impulses, but to accustom the patient not to act on them[28].

The Athenian's notion of self-control differs indeed from that of his interlocutors. According to them, shameful tendencies should be locked up and denied, because they are dangerous; according to him, they should be brought to light and entertained until they become less dangerous. This is the most advanced position reached by Plato on the topic of self-control. The Athenian advertises it in a remarkable passage, right at the opening of the Laws: the example of the quarrelling brothers (627D11-8A5). Three solutions lay ahead when the good brothers have defeated the bad. The winners may kill the rebellious prisoners, or may allow them a life spent in unconsenting subjection (*ἄκοντας*)[29]. But it would be far better if they tried to persuade these enemies into becoming friends (*ὥστε εἶναι φίλους*), on the same side of the law. Reconciliation is distinctly superior; it is the solution encouraged by the main character of the Laws, the *δικαστὴς πρὸς ἀρετήν* himself. It is not relevant that the example does not refer to the individual and his inner struggles, for the Athenian has just given the name *στάσις* to conflict both within and among individuals: this example shows us how to deal with the whole class of inner struggles.

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The Leader

The cure depends so far on the patient alone. But this cannot be right: the Athenian has imposed his subject on the principle that what determines the goodness of a symposion is a

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28. This is worth comparing with Aristotle's more explicit comment on *ἀνδρεία* at EE iii 1: the brave man is admirable because he is simultaneously afraid *qua* man and not afraid *qua* brave (cf. also EN ii 5: what deserves praise or blame is not what you feel but how you feel it).

29. *ἄκοντας* is Ritter's conjecture for the mss *ἑκόντας* (followed by Burnet).

leader (**A**). This character does not feature in **B**, but the final account in **D** restores him to a position of ultimate responsibility. However, things do not fit together very well.

The identity of the symposiarch is blurred by what looks rather like a hierarchy of rulers: at one end, the exercise falls under the direction of the legislator himself, *τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην* (671C3); at the other end, all the symposiasts whose training is sufficiently advanced to enable them to resist throughout the session (*τοὺς ἀθορύβους καὶ νήφοντας*) are asked to act as *στρατηγοί* and *νομοφύλακες* (D5-7)[30]. Such people can be *ἄρχοντες* only if we turn the plurals into the singular; the Athenian no longer describes the model symposion, but has in mind a long series where each symposion is being led by its own general and guardian. But these terms seem to be metaphorical descriptions of the job rather than to indicate clear positions; the leading image of Book One is fight, and in **A** the Athenian has used extensively the example of the *στρατηγός* in making preliminary points about the *χρηστὸς ἄρχων* (39A9)[31]. As for the *νομοθέτης*, it would be absurd to conceive him as the actual leader of all good symposia. 'Symposiarch' suits him as an honorific title, because he has invented a legislation of the symposion, *νόμοι συμποτικοί*; and the title may suit in the same manner the *νομοφύλακες*, who have contributed (*συνδημιουργοὶ αὐτοῖς*, D6).

The people who seem to have the best claim to the position of actual leaders are those designated by the words *τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν τοῖς τοῦ Διονύσου, τοῖς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονόσιν* (D9-E1). The description 'leaders of Dionysus' is appropriate, especially as, in coming close to the legend of Dionysus' madness, the Athenian seems to be in a mood for naming sympotic items (such as wine) by periphrases which bring out their affiliation with the god (*Διονύσου δωρεᾶς*, 2A5).

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30. A minor problem: the sequence *τούτοις καὶ τοῖς* (D9) suggests that the *στρατηγοί* and the *ἡγεμόνες* are independent characters. But if the Athenian let himself be carried away by the *μάχη* comparison which starts after *στρατηγούς* (7-8), *καὶ* in D9 may connect the same items as *ἤ* in E2; in which case the referent of *τούτοις* might be the same as in *τοῖς τοῦ Ἄρεως... ἄρχουσιν* (E2-3).

31. Cf. 639B5-7, developed at 640A-B.

The Athenian has explained in **A** that leadership is vital in a symposion because the distinguishing mark of this *κοινωνία* is *μέθη* (**A** 40C1-2). This suggests that wine, although 'cheap and safe', has a dangerous side. This aspect of wine breaks out in **D**, in a language of fighting which is now entirely related to the leader. Thus **D** completes **B** by picking up two important threads from **A**.

Yet this last picture contains some puzzling departures from **B**. The fight, instead of occurring in the patient, takes place between him and the leader (*οὐκ ἐθέλοντα/ ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν πάντα τούτοις ἐναντία*, 671C6-8). *αἰσχύνη* is no longer presented as a feeling which must arise in the patient, but as a weapon which the leader can use against him (*εἰσιόντι τῷ μὴ καλῷ θάρρει τὸν κάλλιστον διαμαχόμενον φόβον εἰσπέμπειν*, C8-D1). The leader has a task to perform: *παιδεύειν* and *πλάττειν*. However vague, this formula suggests that his ultimate end is not to make the patient ashamed, but rather to implant new contents in his soul. Nonetheless the first half of the general conclusion of **D** reasserts the primacy of *αἰδώς* as a goal: *οἶνον... αἰδοῦς μὲν ψυχῆς κτήσεως ἕνεκα δεδόσθαι.*

The discrepancies between **D** and **B** seem on the whole to reflect different degrees of the patient's involvement in his cure. **B** sets before us an active patient, who more or less cures himself by fighting the disordered motions induced by wine in his expectations. There could be much here for a leader to do; he might for instance control the amount of wine and prescribe the appropriate strength of the admixture, the standard task of a symposiarch and an object of vivid interest for doctors[32]. The leader steps into the symposion at a stage when the patient has become too passive to take care of himself: he releases pressure on the string, or he lets himself be imbued with beliefs and desires which recast his soul in a new mould.

These discrepancies cannot be explained away; but they would be much reduced if the two pictures can be represented as different stages in the therapy. The new patient trains him-

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32. See *eg* Aph. vii 56 on the therapeutic effects of the combination *ἴσον ἴσῳ*. On this problem see Bertier's analysis in [24] 71-7 ('Les formules du mélange du vin et d'eau et leurs effets'; table of proportions on pp. 74-5).

self as in **B** until he acquires *αἰδώς*; once *αἰδώς* is formed, the symposiarch moves to a higher stage, related to *παιδεία* (such as perhaps planting new pleasures and desires into the patient's soul, if we judge by the account of *παιδεία* in Book Two); in addition, he can always use the existing *αἰδώς* whenever the situation requires. The Athenian does not say any of this, but the elaborate example of the *φόβου φάρμακον* (**4b**) hints at a possible organisation of the treatment in gradual stages.

It is a tantalizing hint. The text falls into three parts: 648B7-C5 (a), D1-5 (b), D5-E5 (c); each part touches on a different aspect of the administration of *φόβου φάρμακον*:

(a): a symposion under the supervision of the *νομοθέτης*;

(b): a solitary patient in the first stages of his training;

(c): a well-trained symposiast showing off among his peers[33].

εἴτε... εἴτε suggests that (b) and (c) are alternatives: it is possible to choose between training on one's own and training in a group. But the patient who features in (c) can afford to drink in company because he has reached a superior level of control. He may be more gifted by nature, but it is certain that he has also trained (*ἑαυτῷ πιστεύων φύσει καὶ μελέτῃ*, D5). A patient such as in (b) would probably reach a similar degree of confidence by secret training. Thus the two members of *εἴτε... εἴτε* seem to be successive rather than optional.

(a) is different: it presents the situation from the angle of a *νομοθέτης*. This is the nearest to a 'symposiarch' that we can find in **B**. Another difference is that (a) starts as an illustration of the advantages of *φόβου φάρμακον* for testing (*βάσανον... λαμβάνειν ἀνδρείας τε πέρι καὶ δειλίας*, B1-2), and this use brings in methods which **B** did not prepare us to expect. The legislator would force (*ἀναγκάζειν*) his patients into *ἀνδρεία* by distributing punishments and rewards (*νουθετῶν καὶ τιμῶν; ἀτιμάζων; ἀζήμιον/ ζημία ἐπιτιθείς*).

If (b) and (c) are successive stages, where does (a) fit in?

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33. Saunders' translation 'wine' for *πώματος* at 648D7 is cetainly wrong: we are in the anti-wine example here.

Perhaps (a) would make best sense after (c): the legislator would not apply his tests indiscriminately; only the symposiasts at (c) are worthy of testing. But if the course of the therapy is as described at 647E1-8A3, testing must be only a minimal part of the leader's contribution to it. Taking heed of all the factors,

1. It is possible to limit the occurrences of the legislator: he occurs only at the last stage and applies *βάσανοι*. He is only one kind of leader; the therapeutic exercise is supervised by others up to the stage of testing;

2. It is also possible to limit the duration of the process described in **Figs. 3-4** (647E1-8A3): it plays a dominant role at the initial stage (b), but recedes in favour of other factors at more advanced stages. When people have reached their maximum level of self-control, it becomes more important to display the technique acquired (c) and to compete for prizes and rewards (a).

Limited from these two sides, (a), (b), and (c) can be combined in the following variants:

A. The therapy has two phases: (b) and (c); (a) is,

1: another description of (c),

2: a description of a part of the total process in (c), or

3: a description of something not connected with (c) at all - a parallel thought about how to use, as a legislator, the results of the cure.

B. The therapy has three phases: (b), (c), (a), where (a) is a sort of final examination intended to diagnose patients when the cure has been completed.

We cannot do more than ask these questions and figure out possible answers. Patient and leader are two ends which fail to meet. There is no definite and satisfactory way to relate (a) to (b)-(c), or **D** to **B**; not because such relations cannot be conceived, but because there is little ground for one choice rather than another. But (b)-(c)/ (a) shows at least that, in the *φόβου φάρμακον* example, the Athenian had in mind a course of treatment which proceeded

by stages, and that these stages involved the leader in different aspects and to different degrees.

The term 'patient', perfectly suitable in discussion of **B**, sounds a little out of place in **D**; 'pupil' would probably render the object of the Athenian's present thought more faithfully. The medical nature of the process is no longer obvious, and *παιδεύειν* indicates that the general advancement of the subject of *παιδεία* in the second book may be a reason. Yet the conclusion is very clear about the fact that wine **is** a *φάρμακον*, both for soul and for body.

iii: *αἰδώς* and the Therapy of Soul

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The Achievements of Shame

It remains now to discuss the goal of the symposion. The Athenian wants to reform this institution, and the use of wine, in order to cultivate *αἰσχύνη* or *αἰδώς* in citizens. What is so desirable about *αἰδώς*?

To the end of **3**, the Athenian presents *αἰσχύνη* as that which ensures *τὴν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ... σωτηρίαν* (647B). A similar claim occurs in Thucydides[34]. But *αἰσχύνη* as defined previously in **3** seems to be more a form of socialisation - respect for your friends; and *αἰσχύνη* which takes shape further in therapy is something entirely oriented to the subject, shame of oneself[35].

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34. *αἰσχύνεσθαι* is one of three virtues required for victory in war at Th. v 99.

35. Cf. also Democritus B 262 and 264; Diphilus fr 92; and Dover's interpretation of *αἰσχύνη* in these passages as 'self-respect', [337] 121.

Greek 'shame' has inspired much theory: it is, like guilt, a kind of topic predestined to make us discover, according to desire, universal or transient features in human nature[36]. Were Homer's heroes more sensitive to 'what people say' than Aristotle's contemporaries, or than Victorian gentlemen? Or perhaps their sense of shame was nobler than ours, more like a sense of honour and awe, more naturally related to one's self and to one's god - if not something altogether incomprehensible, a feeling such as might never come in the compass of our experience? Both types of question reflect what is already plain from the texts: in Greek mentality shame was a cardinal value. But it is less obvious that this thing should have much appeal for philosophers.

According to Aristotle, *αἰσχύνη* is only a *πάθος* of the *λογιστικόν* and a prerequisite for virtue. It is a good thing to have, especially for the young; and it is, like the virtues, a mean between two correlative forms of excess, shamelessness (*ἀναισχυντία*) and intimidation (*κατάπληξις*)[37]. But Aristotle denies several times that shame is a virtue[38], and his main point is this: *εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές*. Nor is *ἐγκράτεια* a virtue[39]. On the whole, Aristotle's mode of referring to *αἰσχύνη*, reminiscent of Plato, may suggest that the problems debated in **3** were more widely discussed than we know.

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36. On *αἰσχύνη* see Dodds [323], Erffa [351], Adkins [238], Lloyd-Jones [472]; especially Dover [337]; more recently Williams [648].

37. Cf. the list of *μεσότητες* in EE ii 2. Aristotle treats *αἰσχύνη* and *ἀναίσχυντία* mainly in terms of respect for, or damage done to, other people (Rh. 1380^{a}19-21: *ἡ δ' ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία καὶ καταφρόνησις* - contrast *ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια*, Rh. 1383^{b}14-5; cf. also Rh. 1368^{b}22-3). Damaging to oneself seems to be *κατάπληξις* (EE 1233^{b}27-9, EN 1108^{a}33-4).

38. EN 1108^{a}31-2, 1128^{b}10-1; cf. also EE 1234^{a}32.

39. EN 1128^{b}31-4; *οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή*.

Plato presents *αἰσχύνη* under what may appear to be its least creative aspect: a form of fear[40]. Aristotle says in the Topics that *αἰσχύνη* is not, properly speaking, a *φόβος*; they belong to different genera, the *λογιστικόν* and the *θυμοειδές*[41]. Yet he acknowledges that there is a great resemblance between them and that they have common features, especially the physiological effect of 'blushing'.

Aristotle objects to the view that *αἰσχύνη* is a virtue affiliated to *σωφροσύνη*[42]. Leaving 'virtue' apart, the affiliation itself would come naturally to the Greek mind[43]. Plato takes it for granted[44]. In his dialogues *αἰσχύνη* is associated mostly with observance of social norms[45] and sexual restraint[46]. But the role of *αἰσχύνη* is unimportant; it has nothing of the aura of *σωφροσύνη* in earlier dialogues.

There is, however, a passage in the Sophist which reveals that the Athenian expected an important achievement from *αἰσχύνη*: the correction of deviant mental processes (230B4-D4). Socrates presents dialectical refutation there as a form of *παιδεία* belonging to 'purification', *καθαρτική*: its function is not, as one might expect, to teach anything, but to prepare the mind for future teaching by removing false beliefs. False *δόξαι* have great power to cling to the mind - they are *σκληραί*; and, as we know from the Republic, the agencies which produce

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40. The notion of good fear occurs already in the Protagoras (360A sqq. Cf the good fear inspired by laws at Lg. 699B.

41. *ἐὰν οὖν τις τὴν αἰσχύνην φόβον εἴπῃ... οὐ συμβήσεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος ὑπάρχειν*, 126[a]6-7.

42. *διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τὴν σωφροσύνην* (EE 1234[a]32-3).

43. See, *eg*, E. IA 379, or Th. 1.84.3 (a Spartan point of view: *αἰδὼς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐτυχία*). The vice related to *αἰσχύνη*, disregard for opinion and public image, and the vice related to *σωφροσύνη*, incapacity to overcome an immediate impulse, amounted in practice to the same thing: acting against one's best interests, *ie* unintelligent or 'mad' action: see Dover [337] 124-9.

44. Cf. the phrase *τιμῆς ἐραστὴς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς* (Phdr. 253D). At Cha. 160E3-4, Lysis envisages *αἰσχύνη/αἰδώς* as a term in the definition of *σωφροσύνη*; similar connections occur in the Laws.

45. Cf. Lg. 698B, 837C-D.

46. Smp. 192A, Phdr. 251A. The sight of too great enjoyment produces *αἰσχύνη* (Phlb. 66A).

them are related to pleasure and pain[47]. Like malignant cells, false beliefs block the passage-way towards understanding, making teaching impossible. *αἰσχύνη* has a very interesting role. It creates a state of mind where the subject feels compelled to examine himself instead of turning against the opponent: *ἑαυτοῖς χαλεπαίνουσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμεροῦνται*. But this is the only method by which the passage-way can be unblocked. Socrates commends it as superior to corrective education, *νουθετητική*, because it makes the subject abandon false beliefs of his own will - which shows that the believer's consent is essential. *αἰσχύνη* in the Sophist allows us to bring into one picture the two ends which the Athenian does not reconcile in his account of symposia: the active role of both partners. As the patient resists, the dialectician does not launch at him a set of true propositions, but leads him to discover that his own beliefs are inconsistent. The compelling force of the elenchus is due to *αἰσχύνη* aroused in the patient.

The exercise through refutation in the Sophist and the exercise through wine in the Laws have in common the item *αἰσχύνη*. This is an interesting situation, because the nature of the exercise in the Sophist is very different. Making the opponent ashamed operates on inconsistent beliefs. It is limited to the correction of intellectual 'ugliness', *αἶσχος*, which Socrates makes solidly distinct from ethical *νόσος*; and it is striking that, when it comes to proper *νόσος*, he will recommend no better methods than the traditional *νουθετητική*, which was found unhelpful in the case of *ἀμαθία*[48]. On the other hand, the *καθαρμός* of *παιδεία* is inspired by the familiar analogy between health-disease in body and health-disease in soul, and resembles medical procedure quite closely[49]. With the Laws, it seems that Plato at last

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47. At R. 413B1-C4 Socrates attributes the following causes to the process of *μεταδοξάζειν* (adopting false beliefs): persuasion or forgetfulness (*μεταπεισθέντας, ἐπιλανθανομένους*); suffering (*βιασθέντας λέγω οὓς ὀδύνη τις ἢ ἀλγηδὼν μεταδοξάσθαι ποιήσῃ*); pleasure and fear (*οἳ ἂν μεταδοξάσωσιν ἢ ὑφ' ἡδονῆς κηληθέντες ἢ ὑπὸ φόβου τι δείσαντες*). These agencies have the capacity to steal, banish, and charm away true beliefs.

48. *πάτριον γένος*: *ἐξαμαρτάνειν, παραμυθεῖν*, 229E4-30A3.

49. *ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νενομίκασι μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶμα, πρὶν ἂν τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐντός τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταὐτὸν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς*. Cf. *τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασι ἐμποδίους δόξας*, 230D2; *τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα*, C6. See the simile between *ἰατρός* and *σοφιστής* at Tht. 166D5-7B.

extended to the diseased soul and its ethical virtues the more efficient method presented in the Sophist as intellectual *παιδεία*.

Two passages in the Republic throw a side-light on the feature of *αἰσχύνη* which will become relevant in therapy. *σωφροσύνη* is killed in the tyrannical soul by destroying the *δόξαι* and *ἐπιθυμίαι ἐπαισχυνομέναι* (573A-B). Conversely, order can be temporarily restored in the democratic soul through a withdrawal of epithymetic desires which is accompanied by *αἰδώς*: *καί τινες τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν διεφθάρησαν, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξέπεσον, αἰδοῦς τινος ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ* (560A). Thus *αἰδώς* seems to be a basic mechanism which secures the good functioning of *σωφροσύνη* as a whole.

The features of pleasure analysed in the first book of the Laws are resistance to *καρτερεῖν* and *γλυκυθυμία* (635C7-8) - which must be that by virtue of which one cannot but follow pleasure wherever it may lead[50]; and the Athenian refers to 'doing shameful deeds'. If the basic work of *αἰσχύνη* in relation to pleasure is to produce a withdrawal of the elementary desires and to impose a natural limit on *γλυκυθυμία*, the acquisition of *αἰσχύνη* must be indeed an indispensable step in acquisition of self-control. And, as with *παιδεία καθαρτική* in the Sophist, this step is superior to external constraint - the only **practical** method contemplated in the Republic for restoring *σωφροσύνη* or *δικαιοσύνη* in the erring soul (591A-B).

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A Common Territory Between Two Virtues

A curious feature about *αἰδώς*, which occurs only in the Laws, is that it seems to depend on two distinct virtues. Throughout Book One the Athenian has led us carefully to expect a 'model discussion' on institutions designed to cultivate *σωφροσύνη* separately from

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50. *Eg* 831C-D. *γλυκυθυμία* is a hapax in Plato.

ἀνδρεία. He recalls this aim at **4a**[51]; but **B** on the whole ignores *σωφροσύνη*. It concentrates on *αἰδώς* alone; moreover, it defines *αἰδώς* in relation to *ἀνδρεία*.

In **3** the Athenian defines two opposite classes, *φόβος* and *θάρρος*; two pairs of items related as members of the same class: *δειλία-αἰδώς* (= bad and good *φόβος*), *ἀναίδεια-ἀνδρεία* (= bad and good *θάρρος*); and two pairs of opposites from both classes: *δειλία-ἀνδρεία* (= bad *φόβος* and *θάρρος*), *αἰδώς-ἀναίδεια* (= good *φόβος* and *θάρρος*)[52]. By looking at the opposites, one immediately recognises two familiar virtues: the pair *δειλία-ἀνδρεία* covers the field of courage, the pair *αἰδώς-ἀναίδεια* belongs to *σωφροσύνη*. Thus the two symmetrical classes, *φόβος* and *θάρρος*, have been created by pairing together items from two different virtues. As I said before, this arrangement allows the Athenian to approach the formation of *αἰδώς* as a process which mirrors exactly the formation of *ἀνδρεία*. But the hypothesis of the argument (**2**) gave him a broader start. Why does he stick to comparing these processes so closely?

One answer is obvious. The Athenian has very stubborn interlocutors, who pick up his points only when they are levelled at the comprehensible standards of *ἀνδρεία*. But is this all?

The Laws reflect some change in the relation between *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία*: control over pleasures is secured by *σωφροσύνη*, but control over pains tends to fall under *ἀνδρεία*. Aristotle will draw this distinction clearly[53]. The Laws are less clear: Plato's notion of 'pain' cannot dissociate itself from the pair *λύπη-ἡδονή* in order to follow *ἀνδρεία* consistently. We

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51. *οὕτω... πρὸς ἀνδρείαν/ σώφρων δὲ ἄρα*: 647D1, 3-4.

52. Cf. *supra*, p. 226.

53. Cf. EN ii 8, 10, EE iii 1. Also, Aristotle recognises a kind of fear, *φόβος τῆς ἀδοξίας*, which comes very near to the Athenian's *αἰσχύνη* and produces *πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία* or 'social courage'. This is probably the closest that a *πάθος* may come to a virtue; but the virtue in question is *ἀνδρεία*, not *σωφροσύνη* (cf. EN 1128[b]10 sqq: *ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον*). In Aristotle, *αἰσχύνη* features in several types of inferior courage, which indicates some affiliation with *ἀνδρεία*.

have already come across one problem caused by this fact[54]. Now we shall face another one, which has more interesting consequences.

But it may be worth recalling, first, two aspects of the relation between temperance and courage drawn in the Politicus (306A5 sqq). First, they stand at opposite ends on the spectrum of virtue. To observe that they are related (*τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια... που φίλα*) is ordinary; the Stranger on the contrary gives an extraordinary account[55], *ὡς ἐστὸν κατὰ δή τινα τρόπον εὖ μάλα πρὸς ἀλλήλας* ***ἔχθραν καὶ στάσιν*** *ἐναντίαν ἔχοντε ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων* (306B-C). These opposites reach beyond the accustomed borders of virtue: they are universal properties of human action (6C7-7B4)[56].

Secondly, each member of the pair has, not a contrary, but a sort of negative (307B5-D5); and each negative is a form of excess or predominance over the opposite virtue (310D6-E4). Thus in order to curb the process by which the virtues may degenerate, the Stranger contemplates mixed marriages between the brave and the temperate. In the pair *ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνη*, each member seems to counteract a sort of negative side in the other.

B3 presupposes a similar combination of four terms. But in Book One the virtues are not opposed, and the Athenian seems to push 'the ordinary account' in a new direction. The discussion has started from *ἀνδρεία* as conceived by Megillus and Cleinias - a straightforward notion which, as Socrates puts it in the Cratylus, implies battles in the world of flux (414E):

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54. See *supra*, pp. 229 ff. North [524] 190 explains to us that 'both [*sc* forms of control] can be brought under one heading, self-mastery, resistance to pain (*andreia*) and to pleasure (*sophrosyne*)...'. But this is precisely what Plato tries to undo in the Laws. As for the heading 'self-mastery', in most of Plato self-mastery **is** sophrosyne.

55. *θαυμαστόν τινα λόγον; οὐκ εἰωθότα... οὐδαμῶς* (306B6-13).

56. Socrates takes a similar approach in the Republic (410D6-2A3); he treats *τὸ ἀνδρεῖον* and *τὸ σῶφρον* (*ἥμερον*) as products of *γυμναστική* and *μουσική* respectively. Tripartition has not yet been established, and the description of the degenerating effect of music on the philosophical nature indicates to me that there may be at this stage an affinity between what will become the extreme opposites of soul - its intellectual and desiderative parts.

ἀνδρεία is a military virtue which aims at physical victory over enemies[57]. The Athenian completes this notion by adding a more refined meaning to the simplistic picture of conflict drawn by his interlocutors. The new meaning, obtained from progressive reductions of the field - πόλις, οἰκία, κώμη, ἀνήρ εἷς - is 'enmity to **oneself**': αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν... ὡς πολεμίῳ πρὸς πολέμιον (D1-2). This creates a secondary series of values for ἀνδρεία, all related to the self. Next, the Athenian goes back from individual to πόλις, giving distinct names to the two kinds of conflict: πόλεμος and στάσις (628A9 sqq).

Does the series prefixed by 'self' belong to ἀνδρεία or to σωφροσύνη? Properly speaking, it should belong to the latter; the Athenian indicates this at 635E5-6: μετ' ἀνδρείαν γὰρ δὴ σωφροσύνης πέρι λέγωμεν. If ἀνδρεία deals with situations of πόλεμος, we should expect στάσις or internal conflict to fall in the province of σωφροσύνη. But at **4b** the Athenian uses the phrase ἡ ἐν ἑαυτῷ δειλία in talking about courage. Is this because he aims, as before, to reach a point where discussion of σωφροσύνη is possible with a Spartan and Cretan interlocutor, or because indeed he incorporates in the field of ἀνδρεία a part of what used to belong to σωφροσύνη?

Plato does not let us see any clear position here; but there seems to be a precise element which draws the two virtues together. Both in acquiring Courage and in acquiring Good Fear the soul must fight (633C8-E6). Under various shapes, this image dominates Book One. Fight lies at the core of ἑαυτοῦ κρατεῖν; but at the core of the therapy propounded in **B** lies the image of the organism fighting its own disease, which is best described with reference to proper courage[58]. There is an early suggestion along this line in the Gorgias - the first dialogue where Plato endorses the standard equation of σωφροσύνη with ἑαυτοῦ κρατεῖν:

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57. Cf. the Athenian's summary at 626B6-C2, which refers to ἀνδρεία: ὥστε πολέμῳ νικᾶν τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις. See Aristotle on ἀνδρεία as a state related to feelings about death aroused in battle, EN iii 6 (esp. $1114^{b}32$-5).

58. τῇ μὲν δειλίᾳ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ προσμαχόμενον καὶ νικῶντα αὐτὴν δεῖ τέλεον οὕτω γίγνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, 647C10-D1. Fighting pleasure is not an unusual metaphor; cf. Antiphon fr. 52.

Socrates tells us that *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀνδρεία* have in common the mechanism of *καρτερεῖν* (507A-C). Now, in the Laws, *αἰσχύνη* seems to cover precisely this common area, and to be concerned with 'fight'.

A quick rehearsal of the soul's struggles in the Phaedrus can make us grasp what Plato meant by this sort of fight. Reaching the plain of truth, starting to remember, resisting the constant demands of the horse: three mental processes of great difficulty and pain. But in the Phaedrus these are steps on the way to philosophy. 'Fighting' in Laws i is for an ethical goal, and takes a medical course.

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Fighting and Mental Health

The series of conflicts prefixed by 'self' and called *στάσεις* (628A9) picks up the topic of disease in soul, to which Plato gave the same name, *στάσις*, and the same content, conflict[59]. The pair *στάσις-πόλεμος* calls forth associations with both *ἀνδρεία* and *κρατεῖν*; but these associations point to the increasing importance of *κρατεῖν* in the development of Plato's ideas on mental health and disease.

'Health of soul' first occurs in the Charmides: it is a state dependent on *σωφροσύνη* (155E-7C). This notion is half-metaphorical. The discussion becomes substantively medical from the Gorgias onwards, but *σωφροσύνη* will not regain its leading role until the Laws. It is true that a metaphorical link between *σωφροσύνη* and *ὑγίεια τῆς ψυχῆς* survives in the Gorgias, and the Republic states that *σωφροσύνη* accompanies a *ὑγιὲς καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος* (490C) - it is, in fact, an equivalent for physical health (404E). The exalted status of *σωφροσύνη* at this stage is largely due to such associations. But the effective agents of health and disease in

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59. The best definition of disease occurs in the Sophist: *στάσις* is a *διαφορά* (disagreement) resulting from the *διαφθορά* (dissolution) of elements *φύσει συγγενῆ* (kindred), such as *δόξαι-ἐπιθυμίαι*, *θυμός-ἡδοναί*, *λόγος-λύπαι*. The reading was restored from Galen; the mss have these terms reversed, *διαφθορὰ διαφορᾶς*.

both dialogues are *δικαιοσύνη* and *ἀδικία*, broadly identifiable with *ἀρετή* and *κακία*[60]. *δικαιοσύνη* imposes quite different therapeutic methods from *σωφροσύνη*: the former simply excises the disobedient elements[61], while the latter makes them all assent to the rule of the best (*κόσμος*, *τάξις*, *συμφωνία*)[62].

Yet the Republic contains an articulate notion of **somatic** health and disease: *ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιεῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάναι* ***κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι*** *ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ δὲ νόσον παρὰ φύσιν* ***ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι*** *ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου* (444D). This recalls the Hippocratic *κρᾶσις*: the typical action of drugs, diseases, or foods is to overcome some correlate[63]. But *σωφροσύνη* is *κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ*, *ἐγκράτεια*, and even *κράτος*. This association is extremely important for its later medical career. *σωφροσύνη* resembles 'health' better than anything else because it is an 'order' between consenting elements; and, if *σωφροσύνη* is also a relation of *κρατεῖν*, its work on the soul can be analogous to that of *φάρμακα*.

The absence of a clinical term for mental disease and the indiscriminate use of *νόσος* in Greek can explain away a good deal of Plato's 'diseases' of the soul as an inherited manner of speech, endowed with no medical significance. But Plato endeavoured to perceive these phenomena from a medical angle, which he reached in the late dialogues: Timaeus makes a pertinent distinction between *νόσος* as a medical condition and the ethical form in which it

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60. 444B-E (*τήν τε ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶσαν κακίαν*, B7-8) and *ἀδικία*, *ἀμαθία*, *δειλία*, *ἀκολασία* (Grg. 477B-E; but *ἀδικία* is the main disease, 480B).

61. Cf. Grg. 480C-D: *πληγαί*, *δεσμός*, *ζημία*, *φυγή*, *θάνατος*. *ὑγιὴς γενέσθαι* is achieved by *νουθετεῖσθαι* and *κολάζεσθαι* and corresponds to *κάειν* or *τέμνειν* in medicine: *δίκη* is *ἰατρικὴ πονηρίας* and has in common with *ἰατρική* the operation of excising the diseased part.

62. *Eg* Grg. 494D, 507A.

63. Cf. Aer. 9 (*στασιάζει κρατέει*), Acut. 16; VM 5 (*φύσις*), Morb. ii 6; Judic. 5 (*χολὴ κρατεῖ*), Gland. 7.

appears to laymen - *πονηρία* (86B). The Timaeus also brings along a change in therapeutic methods such as even Galen could appreciate[64].

Plato's psychology would not have allowed the formation of a medical conception of mental health, illness, or cure at an earlier stage. Let us contrast two positions. In the Gorgias the natural condition of the soul is healthy and therapy is the second best thing: it is much better not to need the surgery of *δικαιοσύνη* at all[65]. Natural 'health' is simply a matter of choosing not to do wrong. But in the Timaeus there is no such thing as a naturally healthy soul: *ἄνους ψυχὴ γίγνεται τὸ πρῶτον ὅταν εἰς σῶμα ἐνδεθῇ θνητόν* (44A-C). The non-divine activities and functions of the soul have taken a prominent position; birth is a traumatic blow to the immortal principle; childhood, a doomed period of sickness; and the entire lifespan, a struggle for recovery[66]. This perspective explains why Plato can envisage the formation of *αἰσχύνη* as a fully therapeutic process.

iv: The Pleasures of the Symposion

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Music and Shame: Two Kinds of Therapy?

The two kinds of symposion which I have examined seem to be destined for incompatible worlds. In one world, only a limited group of people is allowed this privilege: the best singers of the city, men between thirty and sixty. Wine diminishes their shame of singing aloud. It is, most probably, only a remedy for their voice; but the songs which wine enables them to produce are among the most beneficial agents in the progressive refinement of

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64. *κινήσεις* and *τροφαί* are *θεραπεία παντὶ παντός* (90C6-7); each part of the soul must be given appropriate exercise, *γυμνάσια*, so as to make the motions in all three *πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμέτρους* (90A1-2). This must owe some influence to dietetics.

65. 478C1-6: *εὐδαμονέστατος... ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ.*

66. Cf. also the simile at Laws 628D2-5.

the instinct for pleasure. Pleasure in this variant is a very good thing, indispensable to human progress. In another variant, pleasure is the most dangerous enemy; it must be defeated in open combat before we can make friends with it. The chief weapon in the fight is a sense of shame about our actions - the basic mechanism of self-control. In this world, wine does not diminish shame; on the contrary, it is a medicine apt to cultivate shame. The symposion is not a stage-performance for the best experts in music, but a laboratory for systematic exercise in resisting the shameful or asocial temptations aroused by wine.

The acquisition of self-control is a therapeutic process: one is cured from the particular evil which hangs over one's soul. But, if the soul is diseased at birth, even the primary acquisition of *παιδεία* must be therapeutic. On the other hand, being a *φάρμακον* is the only hypothesis which makes possible the reconsideration of wine; both accounts have in common this basic fact. In the rest of this chapter I shall draw a very wide perspective for the problem of therapy in the Laws, which can incorporate harmoniously, if only tentatively, the incompatible symposia and their more general therapeutic purpose. Let me return to the symposion.

C starts from a very justified question: why should the best singers take their name from the god of wine[67]? The Athenian has a satisfactory answer: because they cannot sing without wine. But in **D**, right before the end, he makes two comments which suggest a closer relationship between the three divine conductors:

1. The gods who have bestowed on us *τὴν ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας αἴσθησιν* are Apollo, the Muses, **and** Dionysus (672C8-D3);

2. There is some relation between the benefits of music and the benefits of wine (672C8-D9).

The link between the effects of music and the effects of wine is not obvious; neither is Dionysus a constant member in the group. The three names occur for the first time at the

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67. 665A8-B9; cf. *supra*, Ch. 4, pp. 180-181 and 191.

beginning of Book Two: the Athenian explains to what purpose the gods have given us *ἑορταί* (653C4-D5). Then he offers to compare this tradition with his own account of *παιδεία*[68]. He never does this explicitly, and he drops Dionysus' name right from the start of his account (654A).

Yet all these threads may come together. The purpose of feasting at 653C-D is not only to form and keep *παιδεία*, but also to restore it, *ἵν' ἐπανορθῶνται*[69]. Formation of *παιδεία*, the chief subject of the book, is restricted, as we have seen, to children. It would encompass the symposia of **C**, where the symposiasts sing, apparently, for the benefit of children. But what is the restoration of *παιδεία*? I suggest that this function corresponds to what we have just read at the end of the previous book. The process in **B** can be considered from two theraputic angles: acquisition of self-control and restoration of *παιδεία*; and **D** helps us to see the latter[70]. Relating the symposia of Laws i-ii to the two goals enunciated at 653C-D, formation (**C**) and restoration (**B-D**) of *παιδεία*, is the first step towards the broader perspective which I have promised. It can make us see more clearly (perhaps more clearly than the Athenian did) what is common to the two functions and what is specific to each.

Music transforms and gives shape to the primitive instincts of the child. But wine also brings out the 'child' in us (45E5-6). The leader 'educates' him (71C1); moreover, *τοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν πλάστην τὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τότε, τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην* (2-3). There is a very broad sense in which the two symposia can appear as parts of a continuous process - *παιδεία*. Drunkenness is an artificial and temporary return to the primary stage where the soul was completely dominated by pleasure. *παιδεία* has done its first work, but its effects are bound to

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68. *ὁρᾶν ἃ χρὴ πότερον ἀληθὴς ἡμῖν κατὰ φύσιν ὁ λόγος ὑμνεῖται τὰ νῦν, ἢ πῶς*, 653D5-7. The *λόγος* to be checked is, I think, this one on *ἑορταί* (*ὑμνεῖται τὰ νῦν*), and not (England) the interrupted one on *παιδεία*· *ὑμνεῖται* refers to the traditional representation of feasts as *ἀναπαῦλαι* and *ἀμοιβαί* (cf. Th. ii 38).

69. 653C7-D5; on *σωτηρία* see *supra*, Ch. 4, p. 181 and n. 11.

70. Cf. *παιδεύειν* at 671C1; see *supra*, p. 244.

wear off; besides, the child is never completely tamed. *παιδεία* must be permanently restored and continued.

Yet wine is not similar to the first agents of *παιδεία*. Rhythm and harmony do not provoke hidden irrational tendencies to come to the surface; they organise an openly and completely irrational soul. The activation of latent symptoms marks a crucial difference between wine and music. The child has experienced *παιδεία* once; he is not going to be lured by rhythm and harmony, with which he is acquainted, but by a more dangerous substance, somehow akin to his residual diseases. This aspect of wine appears in **D**. There is, then, another sense in which the therapeutic effects of music (**C**) are distinct from the therapeutic effects of wine (**B**), and one must try to separate them clearly.

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Wrong Love and Actions Committed Against Oneself

And now I shall try to answer a question which suggests a possible manner of integrating the two models of symposia in books i-ii in the broader frame of the Laws - although Plato makes no such integration, nor even gives a clear answer to my question. The question is, in how many ways does pleasure hurt? It seems to me that, in the Laws, Plato came to the point of distinguishing between two chief harms done by the wrong functioning of the instinct for pleasure. One is familiar to us, the other is less so. This will involve a brief discussion of the 'causes of evil', *αἰτίαι ἁμαρτημάτων*.

It is very popular with the Greeks to reason that 'bad' is 'mad', and most often due to a cause where moralising is apposite, such as lack of restraint in short-term pleasure[71]. In the middle dialogues, Plato stretched to the limit the use of the label 'mad' in such situations: he constructed the celebrated argument that the main victim of crime is the murderer; the tyrant is

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71. See Dover [337] 125.

729 times unhappier than the lawful king; doing wrong to others affects nothing as deeply as your own soul.

Equating insanity with wrong-doing, and with *ἀκράτεια ἡδονῶν*, is relatively familiar in Plato[72]. But so is the Socratic axiom that no one does wrong knowingly: pleasure may be a superficial cause of wrong-doing, but the real, deeper reason is ignorance. In the later dialogues, however, Plato makes increasing room for pleasure (and pain) as an independent cause of evil and insanity. The result of this anti-Socratic tendency is a rather confusing series of classifications of mental disease[73]. The tendency is strongest in the Laws. But it seems that, in the Laws, Plato not only wants to regard ignorance and pleasure-pain as separate causes; sometimes he even contemplates pleasure as a superordinate cause. It is a step further in completing an anti-Socratic cycle: pleasure would be the ultimate cause of ignorance. This is the less familiar harm which I announced. I shall put together a couple of passages which can give us an insight into these matters. But I must warn that, throughout the whole Laws, such distictions are much less clear than I make them appear here.

The Athenian discusses the *αἰτίαι τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων* from 863B1 onwards, in order to establish correct punishments. The kinds are three, each one related to 'something in the *φύσις* of the soul', *εἴτε πάθος εἴτε μέρος* (863B2-3):

1: *θυμός* (861B1-4)

2. *ἡδονή* (B6-9)

3. *ἄγνοια* (C1-D4),

presented at 864B thus:

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72. For instance, Plato discusses shameless behaviour in terms of insanity: R. 571C-D, Lg. 919B-C.

73. *νόσος* in the Sophist includes, as before, *ὕβρις*, *ἀδικία*, *δειλία*, *ἀκολασία*, but **not** *ἄγνοια* (227D13 on, esp. 228D6-8, E2-4, and 229A3). On the contrary, in the Timaeus *ἄνοια* is the main disease. It contains two subclasses, *ἀμαθία* (ignorance) and *μανία* (*ie* the old vices; 86B). Every disease, including ignorance, is caused by pleasure and pain; the worst, by excess - *ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ὑπερβαλλούσας*. All disease is processed in the body, *eg σπέρμα πολὺ καὶ ῥυῶδες περὶ τῶν μυελῶν* for excess of pleasure, *ἕξις ῥυώδης καὶ ὑγραίνουσα* (resulting from *μανότης ὀστῶν*) for *περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολασία*.

1: *λύπης μὲν οὖν, ἣν θυμὸν καὶ φόβον ἐπονομάζομεν, ἓν εἶδος ἡμῖν ἐστιν·*

2: *ἡδονῆς δ᾽ αὖ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν δεύτερον·*

3: *ἐλπίδων δὲ καὶ δόξης τῆς ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὸ ἄριστον ἔφεσις τρίτον ἕτερον.*

At 863B-C the Athenian groups the first two *εἴδη* together, on the grounds that, in cases of pleasure or pain, one is overcome, while in cases of ignorance one is not:

1-2: *ἡδονῆς μὲν τοίνυν καὶ θυμοῦ λέγομεν σχεδὸν ἅπαντες ὡς ὁ μὲν κρείττων ἡμῶν, ὁ δὲ ἥττων ἐστιν· καὶ ἔχει ταύτῃ·*

3: *ἀγνοίας δέ γε ὡς ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν κρείττων, ὁ δὲ ἥττων, οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν πώποτε.*

All three *εἴδη* have a common trait. Any wrong-doer acts against a faculty in himself, *βούλησις*: *πάντα δέ γε προτρέπειν ταὐτά φαμεν εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν ἐπισπώμενον εἰς τἀναντία πολλάκις ἅμα* (863A2-3). The first two *εἴδη* are distinct: *θυμός* (or *λύπη*) acts on the soul through *βία*; *ἡδονή* acts through *πειθώ*. This distinction is reflected in the evaluation of the correlative types of murder: murders inspired by *θυμός* are almost as innocent as the involuntary (866D-9E); murders dictated by pleasure are the most abominable[74]. But there is a more important difference between these two *εἴδη* and the third: the wrong-doer in 1 and 2 is overcome by the *αἰτία* of his action; the wrong-doer in 3 is not overcome - or at least not by his own *αἰτία*. The pair *κρείττων-ἥττων* does not apply to *ἄγνοια*. *ἄγνοια* (863C) bears a striking resemblance to the *αἶσχος* of *ἄνοια* in the Sophist, which has the same kinds[75].

There is enough in the Laws to suggest that Plato has come to group lack of restraint (in pleasure or pain) and ignorance as separate and chief sources of mental disease and wrong-doing. For instance, in the presentation of the atheist at 886A-B, the Athenian insists that this is not a criminal of the first type but of the second, and we should better get him right:

ἡγεῖσθε ***ἀκρατείᾳ μόνων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν*** *ἐπὶ τὸν ἀσεβῆ βίον ὁρμᾶσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς*

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74. 869E sqq (see esp. 870A). Note the clear distinction between the mechanisms of *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* in this paragraph; also, *φόβος* and *θυμός* belong to *λύπη*. See *supra*, p. 249 and Ch. 4, pp. 229 ff.

75. But at 863C6-D4 and 864B8-C2 the Athenian introduces a new division: the *ἀμαθία* of the weak and strong character.

αὐτῶν - while in fact what makes you deny that gods exist is ***ἀμαθία*** *τις μάλα χαλεπή, δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγίστη φρόνησις*. Other passages suggest that *ἀκράτεια τῶν ἡδονῶν* is independent from *ἀμαθία* or *ἄγνοια*, but the relation between them is not defined with any rigour[76]. From time to time, the Athenian gives signs of regarding ignorance as the result of pleasure and pain. This line is full of uncertainties and aporiae which it is beyond my present purpose to discuss; but it shows the old vice of ignorance in a new light, which deserves some attention from the Dionysian singers in **C**.

The Athenian declares at 734B4-6 that one is *ἀκόλαστος* for three reasons: *ἢ γὰρ δι' ἀμαθίαν ἢ δι' ἀκράτειαν ἢ δι' ἀμφότερα* (734B4-6). This is the only place in the Laws where *ἀκολασία* is more or less explicitly related to the *αἰτίαι ἁμαρτημάτων*, but we are used to the thought that *ἀκολασία* is a serious *νόσος*[77]; also, the hierarchy of crimes and punishments justifies its leading position. Yet Platonic *ἀκολασία*, as we know it from the middle dialogues, is limited to 'ethical' disease, and in no way distinct from *ἀκράτεια*[78]. The sentence at 734B4 suggests a new state of affairs. *ἀκολασία* is no longer coextensive with *ἀκράτεια*; it is a superordinate cause of evil, and it governs intemperance and ignorance alike. But how can *ἀκολασία* govern errors or diseases of the intellect?

At 689A-B, the Athenian explains *μεγίστη* or *ἐσχάτη ἀμαθία* (*ἄγνοια*) as a state of disagreement (*διαφωνία*) between pleasure-pain and the beliefs of reason (*πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν*), which he describes in the language of conflict familiar from the Republic. Yet in the classification which I presented there seems to be no conflict in *ἀμαθία* (863D); the ignorant man acts against something in himself without being overcome.

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76. *Eg* 934A (punishments for stealing and violent attack): *ὁ μὲν ἀνοίᾳ κακουργήσας ἁλλοτρίᾳ, πειθοῖ διὰ νεότητι ἤ τι τοιοῦτον χρησάμενος; ὁ δὲ διὰ οἰκείαν ἄνοιαν ἢ δι' ἀκράτειαν ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν, ἐν φόβοις δειλίας ἤ τισιν ἐπιθυμίαις ἢ φθόνοις ἢ θυμοῖς δυσιάτοις γιγνόμενος*.

77. *Eg* R. 405A; *ἀκολασία* also generates *ἀδικία*, 402E-3A, 444B-E.

78. *Eg* R. 402E-3A: *ἀκολασία* is a state where pleasure is in excess (*ἡδονῇ ὑπερβαλούσῃ*); *ἀκολασία* is the standard correlate of *σωφροσύνη* (*eg* R. 404E, Grg. 493D, 507D), and the pleasures under the concern of *σωφροσύνη* are *περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδάς*, R. 389D-E, cf. Ti. 72E.

'Overcoming' seems to be in the nature of pleasure and pain. If the ultimate cause of ἀμαθία is in this province, the ignorant will not be overcome by his own disease; still, he will be overcome by pleasure and pain. This raises two questions. In what does someone affected by ἀμαθία differ from someone affected by ἀκράτεια ἡδονῶν? And, to return to the main point, how can pleasure cause anything like ignorance? The ἀμαθής of the Sophist, as the exercise shows, does not make logical connections between his beliefs. How can Plato conceive that such a disease is caused by pleasure?

This is the most abstruse part of the story. Let us take another look at the atheist. His ignorance (ἀμαθία... δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγίστη φρόνησις) is of the kind presented at 863C-4 as 'double' or worst: ὅταν ἀμαθαίνῃ τις μὴ μόνον ἀγνοίᾳ συνεχόμενος ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξῃ σοφίας, ὡς εἰδὼς παντελῶς περὶ ἃ μηδαμῶς οἶδεν. This is also the most dangerous ἀμαθία of the Sophist - a permanent *acte manqué* with regard to 'hitting' the truth[79]; and a very Socratic notion. But what is an atheist? Atheists are people who did not let themselves be persuaded in childhood about the true nature of things, couched in simple forms adapted to their age: οὐ πειθόμενοι τοῖς μύθοις οὓς ἐκ νέων παίδων ἔτι ἐν γάλαξι τρεφόμενοι τροφῶν τε ἤκουον καὶ μητέρων (887D2-3). This is one class of adults whom the Athenian would attempt to persuade, like children, not (or not mainly) by arguments, but by 'charms': prooimia to the laws, myths about incest, or the best songs of the Dionysian singers[80].

And now let us return to one point which I made earlier about παιδεία. The Athenian formulates in Book Two a principle of 'loving and hating correctly' to which he refers several times as a specific task of παιδεία: ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν (53B7-C2)[81]; ἵνα τὴν μὲν ἀσπάζωνται, τὴν δὲ μισεῖν

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79. Cf. Sph. and Lg. 864B6-7.

80. *Supra*, ch. 4, p. 190.

81. And, shortly above in the sentence, ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται, B2-3.

ὀρθῶς ἐθίζωνται (660A2-3). Thus one task of παιδεία is to direct the πρώτη αἴσθησις of the child, pleasure, towards worthy objects of love. To judge from what has happened to the atheist, ἀμαθία arises precisely when παιδεία fails at this task; for the corruption of the atheist's beliefs starts in the cradle. On this account, the ultimate cause of ἀμαθία or ἄνοια would be a faulty education of the primary αἴσθησις for pleasure, such that pleasure compels you to 'hate' what you should 'love' (say, the gods), and to 'love' what you should 'hate' (say, tyranny). In other words, the ἀμαθής would be one who adopts principles based on distorted affections in his soul and, failing to see this, believes the principles in question to be intrinsically right - δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγίστη φρόνησις[82]. It is interesting to think that Plato might have come to look in this light at the new generation of sophists of the Callicles-type - the liberated intellectual of an aggressive cast of mind, who chases Socrates in the early and middle dialogues and makes him defend traditional positions in a rather extravagant way[83].

The intemperate character is much more familiar; one point, however, should be made about his particular disease (902A-B). The premiss of an atheist, says the Athenian, is that gods resemble the worst people (φαυλότατοι). Who are the worst people? Those overcome by pleasures or pains (διά τινας ἥττας ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν); that is, the intemperate. How do such people conduct their life? εἰδότες ἄλλα εἶναι βελτίω πράττειν ὧν δὴ πράττουσιν... οὐ ποιεῖν. This character seems to act very much like Aristotle's acratic man: against his true and best knowledge[84].

On this reading, both ἀμαθία and ἀκράτεια may appear to be disturbances caused by pleasure. But the ἀκρατής and the ἀμαθής are affected in different ways: one is overcome by pleasure or pain, the other has them connected upside down. This is how ἀμαθία can be a

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82. ἀμαθία can be 'stupidity' or 'foolishness'; see Th. iii 37 (ἀμαθία combined with σωφροσύνη). On ἀμαθία see also 689A sqq.

83. Cf. also *infra*, n. 8.

84. Robinson [562] 156 estimates Aristotle's position as basically Socratic. Is it more Socratic than Plato's position here?

source of evil distinct from ἀκράτεια, and yet depend, together with ἀκράτεια, on a common cause related to pleasure-pain. ἀκράτεια and ἀμαθία operate on different mechanisms, but arise in the same region, pleasure.

This is to say far more than Plato did. Even the fact that Plato speaks about the causes of evil through images which resemble each other very much shows that his thoughts were far from settled. The boundary between the two causes, and even the notion of a 'cause of evil', do not lie on solid ground. This is, nevertheless, a direction of thought which deserves to be spelled out; but I am not sure to what extent it marks a departure from earlier Platonic positions, rather than developing a side which is almost completely buried under texts which are much more familar to us.

The explanation of ἀμαθία as caused by pleasure has at least potentially disturbing effects. In the Republic's account of conflict in the soul (436A-41C), Socrates tells us that desire is blind or unqualified: if, when I am thirsty, my thirst would be for good drink, then all desire would be good, as some people claim; but in fact all that I desire, when I am thirsty, is drink - which is of many sorts (438A). Plato was perfectly aware that the same principle applies to the operations of the λογιστικόν: the products of one's thinking or judging are not unqualifiedly good any more than the objects of one's desiring. Plato is constantly preoccupied with false judgement and wrong belief, and once in the Republic he attributes the phenomenon of losing true belief to affections caused by pleasure and pain[85] - a course akin to the fate of the ἀμαθής. But, for some reason, the λογιστικόν does not display this feature at all in the account of conflict. According to 439C-D, conflict arises when you have attached your unqualified desire (thirst) to a wrong object (poisonous drink). But the man in conflict has in himself a faculty which always knows the real state of affairs; he can trust his reason; whenever reason assents or dissents to desire, reason is right. Beneficial action is rational; but the omniscience of the λογιστικόν leaves the impression that the goodness of rational decisions

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85. R. 413B-C; *supra*, n. 47.

guarantees to Plato a sort of *apriori* goodness of the individual faculty which should take them.

Like the man in conflict in the Republic, the atheist has also attached his 'love' to wrong objects; but, unlike him, the atheist does not have a λογιστικόν who knows the right decision. The inferior part of his soul has now a more pernicious effect; it causes a similar attachment to wrong objects even in his λογιστικόν. If the atheist is ever in conflict, he cannot trust the decisions taken by his reason.

There is a small but interesting sign of the degree of imprecision and ambivalence of all these thoughts. The presentation of αἰτίαι ἁμαρτημάτων in the passage from which I have started (863B1 sqq) recalls the puppet passage. The first two evils are caused by ἡδονή-λύπη; the third is caused by ἐλπίδες. But here comes an interesting variation. In the original puppet, the wrong 'hopes' are about pleasure and pain[86]. This might indicate that the ultimate cause is pleasure. In our passage, the wrong 'hopes' are about δόξα ἡ ἀληθής or δόξα περὶ τὸ ἄριστον. What might this indicate?

Now I return to the symposion. Let us imagine a very broad programme intended to encourage and promote the sense of pleasure, and to prevent mental illness and social disorder generated by pleasure. Such a programme may have two main branches. One branch would stretch in the direction emphasised in Book One through παιδεία: ἄγνοια or ἀμαθία, understood as a lack of love for what is good. An item on this agenda would be to take children to the symposia of the best singers, who (if they have taken enough wine and their voice is not cracking) can implant in the children's souls the earliest and most irresistible love for the life of ἀρετή. The other branch would seize, as in Book One, upon any tendencies to ἀκράτεια ἡδονῶν, which for various reasons do survive the first corrections of παιδεία. The main concern here would be to cure the evil before it has a chance to be fostered by

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86. 644C-D; cf. *supra*, pp. 224 ff.

appropriate circumstances and break out; and this is best done by using an artificial environment, the symposion, where the latent diseases get activated by wine. Both forming and restoring *παιδεία* are preventative cures. The soul has its diseases implanted at birth; but the patients with a deficit in *αἰσχύνη*, who embark on the first session of **B**, do not seem to have committed any of the horrible crimes of intemperance to which the Athenian will dedicate himself minutely in the later books; and we should hope that no atheist or professed tyrant would ever arise from the ranks of children who have heard the best songs in **C**.

All this can be reduced to very simple propositions: good music cultivates good affections in your soul, drunkenness teaches you how to refrain from acting against yourself. Two perfectly reasonable claims.

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Greek philosophers may not have looked at Plato's symposia from this angle, but the Laws certainly gave them some important ideas - in fact the most important ideas which can be gathered from the material which I presented in the previous section. Let me rehearse them briefly.

The Stoics related the symposion to a virtue-science which they made a part of their ethics. They conceived of *φιλοφροσύνη* and *φιλία* as an aim of the symposion. They concerned themselves with the effects of wine on sages, and thought that symposia give to sages good opportunity to exercise their superior musical taste and skill. The Peripatetics despised the professional standards of the Third Choir no less than Epicureans would; they developed instead (or so it seems) a habit of discussing, or solving, musical problems in the symposion. These philosophers took a straightforward cut: they reduced the symposion to its main feature, *μέθη*, and set out to write books *περὶ* Μέθης, in which they dealt methodically with the effects of wine and its cultural traditions. But the topic of wine and drunkenness caught all the schools

in a huge debate, 'the etymology of *μεθύειν*'. So, too, did other topics originally taken from the Laws. Platonists, for instance, started to regard *συμποτικὴ ἀρετή* as a plant grown in their own garden rather than plucked from the tree of Stoic virtues; and, on the issue of how the effects of wine can interfere with the effects of music in a symposion, the Stoic Diogenes succeeded in generating a theory even more sophisticated than Aristotle's pupil Aristoxenus.

All this concerns the theoretical and literary life of the philosophical symposion. But Wilamowitz has left us with two questions related to the history of the custom in philosophical schools[87].

Can Laws i-ii express, indirectly, a practice adopted by Plato in the Academy? The answer is: most certainly not. If exercises of the kind advertised here were to take place in the Academy, the Athenian would know and describe them less nebulously. But it seems frivolous even to start imagining such a thing. On the other hand, it is no less frivolous to suppose that, had Plato indeed established a tradition of philosophical symposia such as Timotheus or Eudoxus might ever attend, this 'reform' would have anything to do with the reforms proposed in the Laws.

Perhaps the Laws exerted, nevertheless, a distant influence on the school-symposia of later philosophers. Only one element suggests this: the use which philosophers seem to have made of the phrase *νόμοι συμποτικοί*. The survival itself of *νόμοι συμποτικοί* is remarkable. The Athenian throws in this item right before the end of Book Two. He leaves no doubt that it is something crucial, but does not even say what sort of thing it is. The phrase is a hapax in Plato, and, in the language of the Laws, it can mean either 'laws' or 'songs' - if not both[88]. The sparse hints which I have examined suggest that *νόμοι συμποτικοί* developed subsequently in philosophical schools, most likely as bodies of rules for symposia. We have also come across a late testimonial to the effect that the discipline of the symposion had become a regular

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87. *Supra*, Ch. 4, p. 176.

88. Cf. 700A-B, 722D sqq, 734E, 799E-800A, 954C-D.

part of the philosophical training. Ancient philosophers presented themselves, after all, as therapeutists; their schools competed in offering the best recipe for the happy life. It makes sense to imagine that the reiterated reading of Plato's Laws gradually led philosophers to regard the discipline embodied by *νόμοι συμποτικοί* in their schools as a means intended to build character in their disciples. If this guess has any chance of being right, it would appear that Plato's influence on the practice of philosophical symposia increased in reverse proportion to time.

Chapter 6

The Symposion between Image and Concept

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i: Introduction

Plato's interest in the symposion, manifest throughout his work, is paradoxical. It has been claimed that Plato considered the symposion to be an ideal place for philosophical debate: 'Le symposion, comme pratique sociale, est d'abord une réunion entre amis où l'on peut atteindre l'ivresse et les plaisirs des sens. Mais il est aussi, et surtout chez Platon, le lieu des discours et en particulier du discours philosophique'[1]. This interpretation originates in Wilamowitz' thought that the Symposion celebrated a practice introduced in the Academy and put into practice Platonic beliefs formulated in the Phaedrus[2].

Plato's own text speaks otherwise. The interest exhibited by the Athenian is plainly ethical. But this is the most constant feature in Plato's approach to the symposion; not even the Laws can be novel here. Cephalus evokes the pleasures of symposion in the opening of the Republic, and his tripartite formula, *ἀφροδίσια, πότοι, εὐωχίαι* (329A4-8), echoes closely the standard description of the epithymetic desires which concern *σωφροσύνη* (389E1-2). This is

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1. Schmitt-Pantel [584] 237 (with a reference to my paper in [509]; though it is incorrect to quote it in support of this view).

2. 'Die Formen für die wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeiten, ein potenziertes sokratisches *διαλέγεσθαι*, der Eros als Mittler nicht bloss zwischen Himmel und Erde, sondern auch zwischen Lehrer und Schuler... , und der Dienst der Musen, die nun nicht mehr am Ilisos aufgesucht werden, sondern des Hauses und Herdes Göttinnen geworden sind, all das ward zur Tat durch die Akademie' (282).

the main line, and it leads straight into the Laws. Far from regarding the symposion as 'le lieu du discours philosophique', Plato associated it, like Megillus, with sensory pleasure, and his earlier work shows only slightly more sympathy for this institution than the Athenian's stubborn interlocutors. The symposion evokes for Plato, for instance, the evils of political litigation: according to Socrates in the Theaetetus, true philosophers do not go to symposia (173D).

But it is exceptional to come across a direct statement of opinion such as the one above[3]. Before the Laws, Plato was not greatly concerned to express views on the subject of the symposion; not even in the Symposion does he do this. What he thinks is, at best, implicit; for in most cases the symposion features in Plato's text as metaphor or example for some other referend. Most uses belong to the continuum of analogical procedures described by Robinson, which goes all the way from *ἐπαγωγή* to imagery[4].

The Laws bring two major changes to Plato's approach to the symposion: an explicit theoretical treatment and a positive evaluation. The symposion of the Laws is a concept grown out of an image.

This situation promises to be interesting. But it must be said in the first place that the notion of symposia in the Laws consists itself, to a large extent, in a complex of images; it is not a scientific construction of the sort which the Athenian has intended. He professes in **A** to follow a scientific method[5], which has been found surprisingly similar to that of the Ancient Medicine[6]. England has made a clear case for this method: 'you mustn't select a rotten apple when you want to condemn apples as such'. Similarly, one must watch a symposion 'properly conducted under favourable circumstances' before deciding that *αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα* is bad (i

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3. More or less transparent evaluative remarks are made at Prt. 347C-D (on which see *infra*, p. 284), Crito 53E4-6, Phd. 116E1-7A3, and Phdr. 276D5-8.

4. Robinson [563] 41-2.

5. *ὀρθὴν μέθοδον*, 638E; cf. 641D7-9.

6. 638C2 sqq; cf AM 20 and Bertier [24] 64-5 and n. 30.

242). All this is fine. But the Athenian persuades his interlocutors to lend an ear to his incredible subject by claiming that no good symposion has ever been witnessed (639): he makes them curious to hear entirely new things. There is a great difference between experimental procedure and what Plato offers to do here: unlike England's good apple, good symposia do not exist. They are not objects available for scientific scrutiny, but imaginary items waiting for the Athenian to build them up. Callipolis is invented too; but if just states do not exist, some states do at least tend to justice (such as Sparta, in Plato's eyes) - whereas real symposia tend to the opposite of what the Athenian will claim to be their real nature. With the help of the symposion, he will bring before the eye hypothetical processes in the soul related to pleasure.

Here I shall examine some of the metaphors and examples which have led to the unexpected development of the symposion in the Laws, and I shall try to appreciate the significance of this institution for Plato.

ii

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The Tyrannical Soul

In the Republic Socrates presents the birth of the tyrannical soul, or rather its degeneracy from a democratic constitution, thus: … *ὅταν δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν βομβοῦσαι αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, θυμιαμάτων τε γέμουσαι καὶ μύρων καὶ στεφάνων καὶ οἴνων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν ἀνειμένων* (573A4-B4). The tyrannical soul is the one in which the epithymetic part has taken full command; it is not possible to reach any lower[7]. Translated

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7. The five constitutions do match the three parts of soul very well. Aristocrat, oligarch and tyrant are pure types; timocrat and democrat are transitional stages. The pure types are non-conflictual: each one is entirely dominated by one part of soul - *λογιστικόν* (aristocrat), *θυμοειδές* (oligarch), *ἐπιθυμητικόν* (tyrant). On the other hand, timocrat and democrat live in conflict between the higher tendency which they have inherited from the father and the lower tendency which will take over in the son.

into another metaphor which will occur soon, a man falls into this state by 'feeding his beast'[8]. In the high-flown imagery of the present passage, he goes to symposia and turns out 'tyrannical'. This seems to be the reverse of the exercise in the Laws. But of course Plato does not mean here that one actually becomes a tyrant by this method. It does not matter whether the transition from democracy to tyranny has anything to do with wine-parties and debauchery; it is only that the kind of process involved in the transition can be appropriately represented as taking place there. The symposion is an imaginary stage where the epithymetic pleasures perform; for, if we look at the subject of the sentence, it appears that the symposiasts engaged in this strange midwifery are not actual people (such as the mercenary companions at 568E3, 569A6-7, and 572), but desires in the new tyrant's soul. The leader of this Choir of Pleasures is Eros - a traditional 'leader' in the symposion[9], and also the most powerful element in the epithymetic soul.

Next to birth, Socrates depicts in the same fashion the life-style of the tyrant (*τρόπος τοῦ βίου, πῶς ζῇ*): *οἶμαι γὰρ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑορταὶ γίγνονται παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κῶμοι καὶ θαλίαι καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὧν ἂν Ἔρως τύραννος ἔνδον οἰκῶν διακυβερνᾷ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα* (573D2-5). *παρ' αὐτοῖς* refers this time to the tyrant's old companions, the 'symposiasts' whom we have met at the end of Book Eight. This part of the story is less metaphorical; the tyrant leads indeed a life of permanent revelry. Perhaps this suggested the metaphor in the first place. The symposion is a symbol for the *ἐπιθυμητικόν*, or for the entire

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8. *τὸ παντοδαπὸν θηρίον εὐωχοῦντι ποιεῖν ἰσχυτὸν καὶ τὸν λέοντα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα*, 588E. The *εἰκών* of the Beast (588B-9B) incorporates advice which Socrates would give to anyone who does not know (as we should, after nine books of the Republic) what is going to happen to his soul if he does this, and claims, like Thrasymachus, that injustice is beneficial. The man for whom Socrates stages the performance of the Beast at 588C-E seems to be a younger brother of the atheist in the Laws (*supra*, Ch. 5, pp. 261 ff).

9. Cf. Agathon at Smp. 197D and Diotima's version at 203B-C.

soul fallen over its dominance[10]. Plato identified the pleasures of the symposion with desires and processes which happen in the epithymetic soul[11].

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A Better Polity

The timocrat is not an ideal character; he is, however, much to be preferred to his offspring. On the good side, he retains a habit which he must have acquired under the enlightened rule of his father: the timocrat attends common messes, *συσσίτια* (547D4-8). His own kingdom is orderly, but no longer enlightened. One can imagine that syssitia would now breed capital evils, as the Athenian will argue in the Laws. Yet the syssition remains a good thing, which Socrates contemplates introducing in the best polity, no less than the Athenian, in the next best polity[12]. The syssition seems to be associated with the discipline of faculties in the soul superior to the *ἐπιθυμητικόν*.

The reconstruction of history from the perspective of the Five Constitutions reflects the logical priority of soul in explaining the text written on the bigger tablet of the state. The five constitutions enact, as Nettleship has put it, an ideal 'history of evil'[13]. Symposion and syssition feature in this history as expressions of life-style; but the value attached to these symbols seems to derive from a relation between forms of commensality and processes located in various parts of the soul. When in the Laws Plato calls syssitia 'one of the parts of the virtue' (*sc* courage), *μερῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς* (633A), he must have in mind a relation of this kind. But, as

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10. Note that, during periods of domination from the *ἐπιθυμητικόν*, the democrat, too, *διαζῇ... τοτὲ μὲν μεθύων καὶ καταυλούμενος*, (561C6-D2). Cf. also R. 571D-2B, 586A1-2, 611E1-2A3.

11. *Eg* R. 437D.

12. *Eg* R. 416E4, 458C6-D7; Lg. 762B6-E1, 780A1-B2, 806D7-7A6.

13. Nettleship [519] 295.

we can already see, such a relation assigns very different values to the symbols of commensality.

Apart from contemplating unfinished projects of syssitia in several formats (for instance, the famous syssitia for women), between books v and viii of the Laws the Athenian becomes increasingly absorbed in a vast programme of organising for the Magnesians public feasts and sacrifices, *θυσίαι* and *ἑορταί*[14]. There is a tendency to assimilate the symposion in Books One and Two either to feasts or to syssitia, if not to ignore these distinctions altogether[15]. It is true that, from the all-embracing perspective of the gods, which opens the second book[16], all celebrations come under the same rule; and in a previous chapter I have myself pointed to the links between *χορεία* and *παιδεία*[17]. But the three projects do not have the same ends and means; they differ both in character and in the details of organisation. The calendar of feasts could appear, at most, as a huge elaboration of the Athenian's thoughts on the choir of young people, led by Apollo. As for the gap between symposion and syssition, Book One alone should suffice to demonstrate it; the later books only make it wider[18].

One ought instead to appreciate the fact that the Laws give opportunity for such talk. The symposion of Books One and Two shares with the syssitia and feasts of the later books a feature which is very new indeed: the Athenian contemplates it as a desirable institution. There would be no question of Socrates doing such a thing in the Republic. Sympotic imagery often

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14. *Supra*, Ch. 4, n. 3.

15. Thus Morrow [505] 297-398 ('Education'; esp. 316-8); Schmitt-Pantel [584] 234-7.

16. 653C-D; cf. *supra*, Ch. 5, p. 256.

17. See *supra*, Ch. 4, p. 186.

18. In Book One, syssitia lead, by symmetry, to *ἀνδρεία*; they lead to nothing of the kind in Magnesia. Far from curing or training, the syssition is enforced upon citizens for the open purpose of controlling private life. Wine is not even mentioned, and the leader acts as a watchful punishing guardian. An interesting difference between symposion and the syssition of later books appears at 832C2-D5. All that derives from adopting syssitia is congenial; but, to have it adopted, you have to pass a law such as to forbid uncongeniality in your citizens. There are no coercive ideas about imposing the symposion in Books One or Two.

develops within a contrast between symposion and some kindred ritual - one endowed with the aura of dignity or remoteness, in time or space - such as Homeric banquets, Spartan syssitia, or hospitality and civic festivals in Athens. Dichotomies as between syssitia under aristocracy and timocracy and symposia under democracy and tyranny are simple and obvious[19]. But other cases are so discrete that the difference has passed unnoticed; such is the case which I am now to present.

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Symposion and *ἑστίασις*

There is a nice example of contrastive imagistic use of commensality at the beginning of Republic iv. Socrates corrects Adeimantus by drawing a series of pictures which make palpable the wrong point. One of these is a symposion of potters (420E1-1A2), another is a *ἑστίασις* or public banquet (421A8-B3). Let us see how each one conveys the error.

Adeimantus has raised an objection concerning the happiness of the Guardians: living as we have just seen at the end of Book Three would not appear to them very attractive (419). Socrates first states the position, reminding Adeimantus of some basic premisses on which they have agreed: they are looking for justice in the whole city; the city is entirely just if it is entirely happy. This is not a real city but one built by Socrates, from scratch, *ἐν λόγῳ* (369C); in order to find in it what they are looking for, justice, they must 'make' the city happy as a whole (420B5-C1).

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19. It is noticeable, too, that Socrates would envisage for his best class, apart from syssitia, several features of heroic banquets (*eg* diet, 404B-C, feasts of rewards, 468D7-E2), while banishing any feature connected with the contemporary Attic symposion (*eg* musical modes, 398E9-10, diet, 403E-4E, or even 'drinking from golden cups', 417A4-5). Note, also, frugal banquets in the First City (372A-C), luxurious symposia in the Feverish (372E-3A); or, in the Critias, the contrast between Athenian syssitia and the strange banquets of the Atlantid kings (112B5-C7 : 119E5-20C4).

The first picture portrays potters at symposion, thus: *τοὺς κεραμέας κατακλίναντες ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ διαπίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους, τὸν τροχὸν παραθεμένους, ὅσον ἂν ἐπιθυμῶσι κεραμεύειν* (420E1-1A2). The potters are 'happy' according to Adeimantus' notion of happiness. One sees immediately what is wrong. The potters do a very odd thing: they make their pots in the symposion; they work and feast at the same time. This *adynaton* must point out something in Adeimantus' objection which, on the agreed premisses, is absurd. And indeed, if happiness results in the whole city from everyone's doing one job (as will become clear when justice is found), it is absurd to worry about the happiness of one class of citizens before you define their job. Socrates was in the process of defining such jobs - rulers *qua* rulers, or potters *qua* potters. The *adynaton* points to Adeimantus that his request for piecemeal happiness amounts to making happiness the main condition for doing one's job: it is as if potters could only do their pots reclining and drinking, in the euphoria of the symposion.

The point is more difficult to get in the picture of *ἑστίασις*. *ἑστιάτορας εὐδαίμονας* at 421B3 seems so puzzling that some scholars have attempted to emend the text[20]. But the point is clear and pertinent if we interpret the sentence correctly.

Potters are a relatively insignificant class; Socrates moves now, in didactic order, to the problem of 'depicting' the most important people. *ἑστιάτορας* refers (together with the preceding *γεωργούς*) to the Guardians themselves. Unemended, the text has suggested that *ἑστιάτορας* and *εὐδαίμονας* form a unit meaning something like 'happy feasters': 'farmers and **happy feasters**, as it were in a festival' (Shory); 'des laboureurs et **d'heureux convives** en fête' (Chambry); 'thinking of peasants at a festival, who are enjoying a life of revelry' (Jowett). On this line of interpretation, it is altogether wrong to represent the Guardians as *ἑστιάτορες*; the position does not suit them any better than that of *γεωργοί*[21]. To put the

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20. Thus Madvig: *εὔδαιμον ἄλλο ἄν κτλ*; Wyttenbach: *ἑστιάτορας καὶ δαιτυμόνας* (transmitted reading, but not by first witnesses). For textual variants see Adam's 'Appendix to Book IV', p. 269.

21. Adam's parallels with 420A and 612A reflect the same interpretation.

Guardians in such a position is to do to your best class something equivalent to what we have just seen done to the unimportant class of potters.

But the case is quite different. *ἑστιάτωρ* cannot be just a 'feaster' - an irresponsible idler, or, even worse, Jowett's reveller. *ἑστιάτωρ*, a technical word rare in literary texts, was the title attached to a very responsible, prestigious and costly liturgy, *ἑστίασις*: *ἑστιάτορες* had to act as hosts at the Great Dionysia and Panathenaea, entertaining at their own expense all the members of their tribe[22]. Plato does not show enthusiasm for the great men of the past who have performed this function, such as Cimon or Pericles: he compares them, in the Gorgias, with food-retailers whose 'feastings' have poisoned the city[23]. But even in this disparaging passage, Plato understands by *ἑστιάτορες* providers or hosts, not ordinary feasters or guests. There is no such use of the word in Greek.

In the previous case, Socrates did not suggest that the potters should not recline and drink; he only implied that this aspect of their life is irrelevant to what makes them potters. Acting as a *ἑστιάτωρ* is different from reclining and drinking precisely in this respect: we should expect *ἑστίασις* to be one of the duties which in principle define a ruler. Socrates may or may not envisage such duties for his Guardians, but he has every reason to use *ἑστίασις* as an appropriate example in discussion of leaders[24].

I think that the point of the example is this. "Take *ἑστίασις*. In a *ἑστίασις* it would be normal to find our Guardians acting as providers, *ἑστιάτορες*. On the notion of happiness advocated by Adeimantus, we have to give them some other role, so that they may enjoy themselves and do nothing, as if they were *γεωργοί*; but this is wrong". I would separate

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22. Schol. in D. Lept. 21. For a complete study of *ἑστίασις*, see Schmitt-Pantel [584] 121-31 ('La Liturgie de l'*Hestiasis*').

23. *ἑστιῶντας*, *εἱστιάκασις εὐωχοῦντες*, Grg. 518B-9B.

24. Cf. also the metaphoric use at Ti. 17A.

εὐδαίμονας from ἑστιάτορας, relate it to λέγων (ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνο λέγων, εὐδαίμονας [*sc* εἶναι])[25], and translate thus: '... but anyone who thinks otherwise and calls them 'happy' having in mind something like farmers in a festival, not entertainers in a city,...'[26]. Far from evoking revelry, ἑστίασις, a solemn occasion associated with great festvals, affords a good example in talk about the distribution of roles in the city[27].

These pictures use two cases of feasting, symposion and ἑστίασις; both are meant to illustrate the same error; and the difference between symposion and ἑστίασις appears in the fact that each one of them dictates a different construction of the error.

But there is also a difference between pictures used in this manner and images such as the symposion of Pleasures in the tyrannical soul - or, for that matter, the Beast. The present images are elaborate, but they focus on one precise point; they come very close to simple cases, except that their point is not stated. The previous images are to a greater extent 'persuasive' in the sense which Plato finds dangerous.

Socrates has started this discussion by comparing the whole procedure of creating a city 'in words' with the making of statues faithful to the original (420D). Concentrating on the happiness of its best class would be equivalent to making the eyes implausibly beautiful. The city is a mental picture; to remain consistent, it must be governed by rules of verisimilitude. The potters and the ἑστιάτορες are governed by the same rules, but these pictures are meant for correction. A similar manner of expanding the example into a picture where hypotheses or mistakes can be 'seen' in better light and analysed has produced some of Plato's most famous

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25. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν πόλει ἑστιάτορας is a unit, where ἐν πόλει and ἑστιάτορας answer chiastically to γεωργούς... ἐν πανηγύρει. πανήγυρις is low popular entertainment.

26. Note that the γεωργός is normally contrasted with the 'craftsman', τεχνίτης, by Aristotle (*eg* Pol. $1262^{b}26$; cf. also X. Oec. vi 6).

27. Cf. Aristotle's simile at Pol. $1321^{a}35$-40.

εἰκόνες - the Lyre and Coat in the Phaedo or the Wax and Aviary in the Theaetetus. The procedure is not heuristic, but of great didactic value.

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Doing One's Job

The potters may be entitled to their parties, but their private merriment has nothing to do with them as potters; consequently, it should not interfere with the definition of this capacity.

The symposion seems to provide Plato with a good example of whatever it is that is not in the nature of a *τέχνη*; the features of *τέχναι* appear in good relief when contrasted with the joblessness of the symposiast. Another passage in the Republic bears a striking resemblance in this respect to the potters passage, although both the structure of the image and the nature of the argument are different. Let us stop for a while on the example of the guest (*δαιτυμών*) at Republic 345B9-D1. Together with the businessman (*χρηματιστής*), this character embodies an interesting aspect of Plato's conception of *τέχνη*.

Plato makes Socrates refute the position advanced by Thrasymachus, 'justice is the interest of the stronger', from one of the most familiar Socratic standpoints, and one which is consistent with the forthcoming definition of justice. Running the affairs of a city is (or rather should be) as much of a *τέχνη* as possible; and Socrates explains here the business of ruling by close analogy with the medical art. The argument proceeds in two long parts, with an interruption (341B-2E and 344D-7E), and the example of the *δαιτυμών* occurs at the beginning of the second part.

The discussion is, in outline, this:

1. *τέχνη* aims to benefit (or bring profit, *συμφέρον*, to) its object (341D7-8, 342B4-5); *τέχνη* is stronger than its object (342C8-9); therefore *τέχνη* aims to benefit that which is

weaker than itself (*ie*, in the case put by Thrasymachus, if ruling is a *τέχνη*, ruling benefits not the ruler but the ruled).

Severely rebuked by Thrasymachus for being vicious, Socrates comes back to the notion of profit or benefit thus:

2. each *τέχνη* produces one and only one benefit, and each benefit is specific to one and only one *τέχνη* (*ἰδία ὠφελία*, 346A6-7, D3-6); money (*μισθός*) is a specific benefit; therefore money-earning is a separate *τέχνη* (*μισθωτική*, *μισθαρνητική*, 346C9-11 and 346B1, D3);

it is not in the nature of any *τέχνη* other than money-earning to produce money (346D1; cf. 341C4-6, 342D6-7);

but money-earning can be attached to any *ἰδία τέχνη* in so far as the *τεχνίτης* chooses to get payment; money-earning differs from the others in being a *κοινὴ τέχνη* (346C5-7).

Socrates' conception of *τέχνη* as it emerges in this discussion appears to be based on an interesting distinction between two kinds of benefit, or rather between two angles of looking at benefit, as something produced for *x*, or as something produced by *x*. Thrasymachus' notion of benefiting is limited to a reflexive relation: according to him, one always benefits oneself. But Socrates argues that the exercise of an art or profession implies on the part of the agent creation of an independent value which, in terms of benefit, is irreflexive: the 'benefit' encoded in the rules of an art stretches towards other objects than the artist himself. If in the process the artist finds himself benefited in some way, we should not think that his art was designed with any view to such effects; the benefit comes from another source. Thus Socrates very didactically encloses Thrasymachus' notion of benefit in the precise boundaries of a separate *τέχνη*, slightly different from the others in that it is general or additional, but also, as one can see, an 'art' with no independent status. With respect to the agent, Socrates regards the product of this art, money, not so much as 'benefit' in Thrasymachus' sense, but as a form of social contract: payment acts as a reminder of one's abilities, through which Socrates contemplates 'forcing' the good *τεχνῖται* (such as good rulers) to do the job (347B9-C1).

And now to the examples: *ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν τὸ πρῶτον ὁριζόμενος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα οὐκέτι ᾧου δεῖν ὕστερον ἀκριβῶς φυλάξαι, ἀλλὰ πιαίνειν οἴει αὐτὸν τὰ πρόβατα, καθ᾽ ὅσον ποιμήν ἐστιν, οὐ πρὸς τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα ἀλλ᾽, ὥσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ μέλλοντα ἑστιάσεσθαι, πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἢ αὖ πρὸς τὸ ἀποδόσθαι, ὥσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ποιμένα* (345C1-D1).

The *δαιτυμών* and the *χρηματιστής* illustrate the consequence of applying to an art the simplistic or reductionist conception of benefit which lies at the bottom of Thrasymachus' apparent liberalism. A shepherd *qua* shepherd looks after the sheep; selling for profit or eating them is not in the nature of shepherdry. But these are deviations of two different kinds. What Socrates defines as *μισθαρνητική* comes quite close to the profession of the *χρηματιστής*, yet businessmanship must be, like shepherdry, an *ἰδία τέχνη*. The shepherd of this example meddles in two jobs instead of doing his own; he is a *πολυπράγμων*. On the other hand, the shepherd of the previous example does not do any job at all; he treats the objects of his *τέχνη* as a guest in someone else's feast; he must be *ἄτεχνος* or *ἀργός*.

But the relation of the shepherd to shepherdry illustrated by the example of the *δαιτυμών* is as inconsequential as a relation to pottery whereby potters would take the wheel to the symposion. In both cases, the mistake which Socrates brings before his opponents' eyes through the example of the symposion pertains to an inadequate conception of professionalism which corresponds in practice to the political amateurism of Athenian democracy; for Plato could not have made much difference between rhetors and demagogues and the shepherds who feast on the flock of sheep under their care.

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Experts of the Symposion

It is dangerous to bring into one thing the exercise of a *τέχνη* and the enjoyment of being a guest. But there seem to exist forms of expertise related to the symposion. This is a

hint so meagre that, even by discussing the cases, one creates an artificial figure out of microscopic features blown up. The figure contains nevertheless an important element from the perspective of the Laws.

An expert of *θοίνη* is the cook at Theaetetus 178D8-10 - one in a series of five examples of correct estimate of future events. The point is humble: given a cook and a guest, the former has the better judgement (*κρίσις*) on a form of pleasure which the latter expects from the banquet: taste. This example seems to be provoked by the vogue of an opposite view, recorded by Aristotle: the guest knows better than the cook[28]. It invites us to imagine Plato's famous measurements and calculations of pleasure applied to banquets and parties; and it draws a line between producing pleasure for the future and enjoying present events. An earlier expert in the same field is the doctor, called upon in an example of the Gorgias to distribute food and drink according to individual constitutions (490B1-C7). The cook is, in the Gorgias, a non-expert rival of the doctor. Such characters have hardly any significance at all, but the idea of expertise in pleasure seems to have played an important part in the development of Plato's thoughts about the symposion.

There is, however, an expert who is important as such: the wine-pourer or cup-bearer, *οἰνοχόος*. Plato's *οἰνοχόοι* stick in the mind through the rhetorical force of images, calling attention to the crucial role assigned in the Laws to the leader's capacity to conduct the 'fight' against wine. The *οἰνοχόος* is a typical figure of the symposion; *οἰνοχόοι* around the *κρατήρ* is an extremely popular image on Greek vases. In Plato's metaphors, the *οἰνοχόος* seems to be responsible for the strength of the admixture (a matter which was in fact decided by the symposiarch): thus in democracy the city has evil wine-pourers who make it drunk[29]. Intoxication is produced here by an excess of the good specific to democracy - freedom (562A10 sqq). The ritual of mixing wine and water does not feature in the Laws, but I suspect that it played a

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28. Pol. 1282[a]22; cf. Newman *ad l*, who refers to Alexis 135M.

29. R. 562C8-D4.

great role in the backdrop to the medical metamorphosis of Plato's symposion. Doctors too were interested in this ritual[30]; Plato may have related it directly to the Hippocratic *κρᾶσις*. The Politicus recommends marriage between characters dominated by the opposites *ἀνδρεῖον* and *σῶφρον*, as a measure of preventing the degeneration of virtue. The Athenian envisages a similar system of marriages, but his thought is now governed by an analogy between city and *krater* which, as he confesses, does not come easily to one's thought: *οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πόλιν εἶναι δεῖ δίκην κρατῆρος κεκραμένην* (773C8-D1)[31]. But it is in the Philebus that the good expertise of the wine-pourers shows at its best: the two *οἰνοχόοι* at 61C have a no lesser task than to mingle the honey of the *ἡδοναί* with harsh and sober waters of *φρόνησις*. The metaphor of the *κρατήρ* appears now to be related to correct mixtures which are crucial to the happy life, and to one of the *μέγιστα γένη* of the Philebus and Sophist. The drink taken in the symposion has not only sheer natural force, but also the sophistication of a 'mixture', made emphatic by rituals such as those embodied in the *οἰνοχόοι*. This second feature may have its share in the growth of Plato's idea that mastering the effects of wine on oneself and others is a 'divine' power, capable of transforming the soul.

*

Food and Conversation

With the examples and metaphors of the previous section I have reached a positive line in Plato's thoughts about the symposion prior to the Laws. There is more on this line. But the good experts whom we have met so far are distributors of food and, preponderantly, of drink,

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30. *Supra*, n. 32.

31. Cf. the symbolic value of the *κρατήρ* as a recipient where the ingredients of creation are mixed at Ti. 41 (but no other connections with the symposion).

not dialecticians. Is there anything on the positive line to indicate that Plato may have wished to use the symposion as a place for education in good philosophical argument?

Other forms of commensality than the symposion seem to have inspired Plato to a metaphor which may give us ideas in this direction. Three of Plato's dialogues take place at the time of some festival: the characters occasionally connect the two events, presenting their own conversation as a 'feast of words'. This Popean metaphor invites us to transform the scene of the dialogue into an imaginary banquet - as Socrates almost does when inviting Gorgias or Callicles to call up the characters of the scolion at 452A1-2[32] and to imagine the example of the symposion at 490B[33]. The three dialogues whose narrative contains a built-in feast with such metaphorical effects are the Lysis[34], Republic i[35], and especially the Timaeus, which, if we are to believe Athenaeus, came to be taken for a piece of sympotic literature: in late antiquity it was performed at symposia by learned cooks[36]. Such metaphors are inspired

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32. *εἴ σοι αὐτίκα παρασταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων ὧν ἐπήνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκόλιον ποιήσας...*

33. *ἐὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἁτρόοι, καὶ ἡμῖν ᾖ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά...*

34. 211C11-D1: *τί ὑμεῖς αὐτὼ μόνω ἑστιᾶσθον, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μεταδίδοτον τῶν λόγων*; Ctesippus refers to conversation as if it was food. This playful metaphor reminds us that the young men are celebrating the Hermaea (206D-E, 223A6-B3).

35. 352B3-6, *εὐωχοῦ τοῦ λόγου*, 354A, *ἑστιάσθω ἐν τοῖς Βενδιδίοις* (Thrasymachus, defeated). Socrates picks up the joke: he calls *ἑστίασις* the remainder of the debate and compares his method with the behaviour of greedy guests (354A-B). Cf. also Adam's comments on *ὑποκατακλίνομαι* at 336C and E and *εἰσοίσομεν* at 337D. All this is related, of course, to the festival of Bendideia.

36. Ath. ix 381F-2B. The characters of the trilogy are 'hosts' and 'guests' (*δαιτυμόνες*, *ἑστιάτορες*); the forthcoming presentation by Timaeus (and also perhaps by Critias and Hermocrates) is 'gifts (or a banquet) of hospitality made of speeches', *τὰ τῶν λόγων ξένια* (20C1), offered to Socrates in return for his own; the subject-matter of the trilogy is a 'feast of speeches', *τὴν τῶν λόγων ἑστίασιν* (27B7-8); the correct distribution of speeches among interlocutors is an 'arrangement of the gifts', *τὴν τῶν ξενίων διάθεσιν* (27A2). This time the metaphor underlines the solemnity of the occasion. The Timaeus is dedicated to a festival of Athena (20E3-1A3, 26E2-5) impossible to identify (scholars have suggested Bendideia, Panathenaea, or Thargelia). It corresponds to the Apatouria where Solon has delivered the speech which inspires the subject (21A7-B7). Vagueness about the present festival is no doubt deliberate on Plato's part. The atmosphere of hospitality recalls the opening of two other late dialogues, the Parmenides and the Sophist (Prm. 137B; cf. the paraphrase of Od. ix 270-1 and xvii 485-7 at Sph. 216A-B and Apelt *ad l.* See also Lg. 642D-E); here Socrates seems to pay this courtesy to another great Stranger - Timaeus of Locri. But Plato undermines the plausibility of any event suggested by the metaphor of feasting. Timaeus could only take part in a festival in Athens as an honorific guest of the city, *ἐπὶ ξένια* (not *ἐπὶ δεῖπνον*, as Socrates or Critias would). But the Timaeus presents itself, metaphorically, as a banquet of hospitality given by a citizen of Locri, Timaeus, to a citizen of Athens, Socrates, on the occasion of a civic celebration of Athena in Athens.

by civic feasting rather than symposion, and perhaps by an even wider analogy between food and λόγοι (words, or reason) as fillings for different parts of soul[37]. In virtue of its relation to pleasure, the ideal image for such 'fillings' is the symposion[38].

There is, however, one passage where Plato commends and recommends the symposion for its intellectual qualities: Protagoras 347C3-8A2. Here Socrates differentiates between 'uneducated' and 'educated' symposiasts: the latter do not hire flute-players, but are capable of providing the entertainment themselves.

On a closer look, this passage is quite disparaging. Socrates reacts here to the idea of spending time in discussion of Simonides' poem to Scopas (339A sqq); people such as Protagoras and Socrates should better use their own minds when they come together. But the poem to Scopas was very popular at symposia; the light tone and learned manner of the comments and jokes in the Protagoras would suit an intellectual symposion of the kind described by Ion of Chios[39]. The highest level achieved by sympotic conversation corresponds in fact to the low level of the conversation criticised here by Socrates.

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The fact that Socratic inquiry (and Plato's method in general) is not compatible with the symposion is confessed by the Symposion itself - the only dialogue in which Socrates is not allowed to proceed in his usual manner: Phaedrus, a weak symposiarch who needs a spokesman in order to impose a subject most dear to his heart (177A), finds, however, the nerve to

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37. See also the banquet of the Olympian gods on the summit of heaven (*πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην ἴωσιν*) at Phdr. 247A8-B3, which is doubled or echoed by a food metaphor (*τρεφομένη*, D1, *τρέφεται*, D4, *ἑστιαθεῖσα*, E3).

38. Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

39. Ath. xiii 603E-604D; *supra*, Ch. 2, p. .

protect the programme of the symposion from Socratic attack (194D-E). We owe Diotima partly to this. Socrates, in his turn, is disappointed with the kind of speech required in the symposion no less than he is with the literary conversation of the Protagoras, and his complaints reveal that he considers the encomiastic style and setting of the symposion incompatible with the search for truth (198C-D).

This is only the backbone. The full story is much deeper. This symposion is not meant to be ordinary at all. Its highest intellectual quality makes it a memorable event - some people believe that it happened only yesterday (172A-3B); and, far from resembling traditional parties of Athenian aristocrats, it cultivates a streak of non-conformism (176A sqq). By sending out the flute-girl, Eryximachus invites the company to behave as in the 'educated' symposia which Socrates himself has praised in the Protagoras. But Eryximachus insists on the novelty of praising Eros (177A); his programme is, surely, more ambitious than in the Protagoras. Socrates may grumble, yet he stays on and delivers a speech in which he gets much more physical in description of a Form than we could ever expect. He also takes the trouble to correct mistakes made by other speakers. However ironical Socrates may be, so far as the symposion is concerned his speech should be regarded as a 'reform'; for it instils in this traditional place of love an anti-sympotic conception of Eros - whom Diotima, with pedagogic love and tact, represents as 'born' in a symposion of the gods (203B). Eryximachus' unorthodox ambitions triumph with Socrates, even if this is not an achievement which Socrates himself would rank very high.

But the triumph is ephemeral; the reform cannot withstand the pressures of tradition. Alcibiades breaks in and appoints himself symposiarch (213E) - a bad habit: it was reported in court that he had done exactly the same in the Affair of the Mysteries[40]. Under his new rule, conversation switches back to personal address and the loves of the symposion, presented in their most seductive dress; for Alcibiades' speech is not a poor match for that of Socrates. And

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40. And. 1 11-12: Alcibiades seems to have taken on the role of the hierophant.

his drinking rule reinstates normal procedure, as it had governed Agathon's party the day before. Under a second wave of revellers, Eryxmachus' ambitious symposion sinks in drunkenness, as any of the parties from which Alcibiades might have emerged.

The Stoics, guided by their sense of allegory, would certainly admire Socrates' unflinching endurance throughout such changes of fortune; and the last scene of the dialogue confirms what Eryximachus - a doctor - had just said about Socrates: to this philosopher it made no difference whether he took any wine. There is much else that one cannot help admiring. But we can be sure that the Symposion does not represent Plato's ideal of philosophical debate in the Academy.

APPENDIX I

Commentaries on Music

Diogenes of Babylon

Philodemus of Gadara

a: PHerc 1572 fr 4 ll 28-36

PHerc 1497 col xv ll 15-21

He also claims that]	*νεσθαι.* [*ἔτι*] *δὲ*	*φορμας. ἡ μέντοι*	As concerns Erato, I
the name of one of	*τὸ* [*μέλος συμ*] | [28]	*γ' Ερατώ{ϊ}*, | [15]	should inquire, in what
the Muses, "Erato",	⌈*β*⌉*άλλε*[*σθ*]*αι προ*⌈*ς*⌉	*ζητῶ, πῶς τὸ*	sense is she said to
assumes on appro-	[*τὴν ἐρωτι*] | [29]	*συμβαλέσθα*[*ι*] | [16]	prove that what con-
priate grounds that	*κὴν ἀρετὴν αἰ*[*τεῖν*	*τὴν ἰδίως*	tributes to erotic virtue
song contributes to	*προση*] | [30]	*καλουμένην* | [17]	is the specific thing
erotic virtue;	*κόντως καὶ μιᾶ*[*ς*	*μ*[*ουσ*]*ικὴν πρὸς*	called music, rather
	τῶν Μου] | [31]	*τὴν ἐρωτ*[*ι*] | [18]	than poetry or (better
	σῶν ``Ερατώ´ γε	*κὴν ἀρετὴν*	still) philosophy (?)?
	το[*ὔνομα·*	*ἐρρήθη δη* | [19]	
		λοῦ[*ν*] *μ*[*ᾶ*]*λλον*	
		ἢ τὴν ποητι | [20]	
		κὴν ἢ βέλτιον ἔ[*τι*...]	
		ποσοφίαν; | [21]	

coll xv 45-xvii 17

..ς ὀνο[μ]α[ζ]όμενα.[... called...

.]

and he also thinks that song benefits sympotic virtue; for love's...

ἔτι] | [32]
δὲ τοῦτ' ἀξιο[ῖ], | [33]
συν[εργεῖν] | [34]
πρὸς τὴν συμ-
πο[τικὴν ἀρε] | [35]
τὴν· τοῦ γὰρ
ἔρω[τος καὶ κα] | [36]
θόλου τῶν
ἐρωτ[.....] |

α(λ) | [xv 45]
λὰ γὰρ ἐπεὶ πρὸς
ἐρωτικὴν | [xvi 1]
ἀρε[τ]ὴν οὐ
φαίνεθ' ἡ μουσι | [2]
κὴ συνερ[γ]οῦσα,
δῆλον ὡς | [3]
οὐδὲ πρὸς ἥν
φησιν ο[ἰ]κείαν | [4]
αὐτῆς εἶναι,
τὴν συμποτι | [5]
κήν, καὶ τὰ συμ-
πόσια κοι[νῶ]ς. | [6]
ἐγὼ δ' οὐτ'
εἶναι τὴν καλου | [7]
μένην συμποτικὴν
ἀρε | [8]
τ[ή]ν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ
τὴν ὑπ̣ὸ τού | [9]
τ[ω]ν πλασθησο-

But since music does not appear to improve erotic virtue, neither should it improve sympotic virtue, it is clear (this being a virtue 'affiliated' to the former, as he claims), or symposia in general.

For my part, I do not believe that the so-called 'sympotic' is a virtue at all - not indeed the one that these people would aim to construct, drawn

μένην ἀπὸ | 10	from wisdom, when it
φ[ρ]ονήσεως,	probably has nothing
ἠγοῦμαι, τάχα | 11	to do with the wise;
δ᾽ [ο]ὐδὲ	
πίπτουσαν εἰς	
φρονί | 12	
μ[ους]· οὐ[δ]ὲ	and I do not think that
συμποσίοις ἔρω | 13	passions are welcome at
τας ἐναρμότ[ε]ιν	symposia, as they dis-
ὡς ἂν ⌈τ⌉α | 14	turb, are disgraceful,
ρα⌈χ⌉ ὠδεις καὶ	and bring discord
ἀτερπεῖς καὶ | 15	among the guests.
διαστατικοὺς	
τῶν συνόν | 16	
των ὑπ[ά]ρχοντας.	
τὴν μὲν | 17	[I agree that] music is
τ[οι μ]ουσικὴν	affiliated to the sympo-
οἰκείαν μὲν | 18	sion, in the sense which
ε[ἶνα]ι συμποσίων	we find correctly indi-
κα⌈θ⌉ὰ (τὰ) παρ᾽ | 19	cated in Homer;
[Ὅμ]ήρωι δεόντως	
ἐπ[ι]σεσή | 20	
μανται, δ⌈ι⌉δοὺς	I also agree that one
ἔτι δ[ὴ] καὶ | 21	should relax and play in
τὸ δεῖν ἀνιέσθαι	the symposion;

καὶ παί | 22

ζειν ἐν αὐτοῖς,

b: PHerc 225

fr 1

…not found a better	[ ]αλλμ[.....οὐ] | 1	οὐ δώσω τὸ | 23	but I shall not agree that
form of relaxation and	δ'εὑρεθῆ[ναι βελ-	μ[η]δεμίαν εἶνα[ι]	no form of relaxation
play for men of valour	τίο]ν[α τοῖς] | 2	πρεπω | 24	and play becomes noble
than to sing, do the	ελευθέρο[ις]	δ[ε]στέραν ἐλευ-	men better than to sing,
accompaniment, and	ἄλλ[η]ν ἄνεσ[ιν] | 3	θέροις ἄνε | 25	do the accompaniment,
dance;	καὶ παιδειά[ν] τοῦ	σι[ν καὶ π]αιδιὰν	and dance;
	τὸν μὲν ᾧ | 4	τοῦ τὸν [ᾧ] | 26	
	σαι, τὸν δὲ κιθα-	[σαι] μ[έν], τ[ὸ]ν	
	ρίσαι, τὸν δὲ | 5	[δ]ὲ κιθαρί | 27	
	χορεῦσαι·	[σαι], τ[ὸ]ν [δ]ὲ	
		χορεῦσα[ι]·	
		[τόδ' οὖν] | 28	if you ask me, I shall
		ἐρ[ῶ δεῖν τοὺς	say that the better
		ἀ]μείνους, θ[εῖ] | 29	people should mostly
		ναι μ[άλι][σ]τα	[have symposia with]
		μουσικὴν | 30	music to which they
		τὴν ἐ[π'] ἀκουσμάτων,	listen, not with music
		οὐ τὴν | 31	produced by them-
		αὑ[τῶ]ν.	selves.

[and he claims that],	*καὶ γὰρ εἰ μή*	*οὐχ ὁμο[λ]ογήσω* | 32	Further, I shall not
[?] even if you don't	*τις ἐπι* | 6	*δ'οὐ[δ'] ἂ[ν]*	grant that even the wise
have such habits, wine	*τηδεύοι, τὸν οἶνον*	*ἐκκαλεῖσθαι*	do by necessity all the
bids you 'to sing and	*[ἐκκα]λλεῖ[σ* | 7	*[τὸν] οἷ* | 33	things which, he tells
laugh softly and to	*[θα]ι πολύφρονα*	*νο[ν] ἐξ ἀνάγκης*	us, wine elicits. What
stand up and dance,	*[περ μάλ' ἀεῖ]* | 8	*καὶ τοὺς* | 34	he (?) says…
aye, even though ye be	*[σαι] καὶ θ' ἁπαλὸν*	*φρ[ο]ν[ί]μους*	
right wise'; wine	*[γελάσαι]* | 9	*ἅπαντα ποι* | 35	
elicits all these	*[καὶ] τ' ὀρχήσασ[θ]αι,*	*εἶν ὅσα φη[σι]*	
things by necessity…	*ταῦ[τα δὲ]* | 10	*α[.....]απρο* | 36	
	ποιεῖν ὡ[ς ἐξ	*κλε[.....]ου[....]*	
	ἀν]άγκ[ης, οὐχ ὅ] | 11	*εδολιε* | 37	
	λης δὲ δι[αγωγῆ]ς	*νονη[...]δι[ ]*	
	οὐ[.....] | 12	*ωντ ὑπ[ά]ρχων* | 38	
		τε [...]το[ ]ει	
		[....] μενον | 39	
		γα[.....]ει[ ]	
		ητουτνερ | 40	
		[ ]ωτι[...]	
		υμεναλ[...] | 41	
		νε[.....]νσ	
		[..]κλ[....] | 42	
		ψια[.....]	
		ιφε[.....] | 43	
		[.....]	

	ειμ[....]	[44]
λως η[.....]*δενα*	*μὴ σκ*[*αι*]*ῶς ἀλλ'*	… not to be out of
[.....*ἀνα*]	[13] *ἐμμελῶς ἀ*	[xvii 1] place but act with
στρέφεσ⌈*θ*⌉*α*[*ι*]	*νασ*[*τρέ*]*φεσθαι,*	exquisite politeness;
φιλοπ[.....]	[14] *κἀκεῖνο δ*[*ὲ*]	[2] [?] this, too, is said
[..]*ναι π*[.....]*σ*	*χρηστ*[*o*]*μαθῶς*	with love of learning.
τ[...?	[15] *εἴρηται·*	

c: PHerc 1572

fr 3

καιποτε[..]*πα*	*τὸ* [*μέν*]	[3] We know that laymen
[.....]	[1] ⌈*γ'*⌉ *αἰνε*[*ῖν*]	praise this too, and
τὴν ἰδιότητα.	*οἴδ*⌉*α*⌈*μεν καὶ*	that, led by the natural
	τοὺς ἰδ[*ι*]	[4] affiliation [of music to
	ώτας, ὑπὸ [*δ*]⌈*ὲ*⌉	symposia], they hire
	τῆς οἰκειότητος	[5] professional players
	παρα⌈*λ*⌉*αμβάνειν*	for their parties, but
	γε τοι καὶ	[6] that they are wrong in
	ἀκροάματ' εἰς	not introducing Homer,
	τὰ συμπόσι	[7] Hesiod, and other
	[*α*], *διαπίπτειν*	authors of poems and
	δὲ τῶι μὴ	[8] songs.

τὸν Ὅμηρον καὶ

τὸν Ἡσίο | 9

δον καὶ τοὺς

ἄλλους π[ο]ητὰς | 10

τῶν μέτρων

καὶ μελῶν· | 11

βελτίω γὰρ ἔστω{ι} Let us grant that sym-

τὰ χρώμε | 12 posia which use pieces

να συμπόσια by these authors are

τοῖς τούτων· | 13 superior: in what sense

μουσικῇ(ι) δὲ πῶς is it a superior use of

ἀμεινόν[ως] | 14 music to bring in [lines

χρῆται ποητὰς, from] these poets, but

ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μου | 15 not the professionals

σικοὺς τοὺς γε who should play them?

τῶν μέτρων | 16

εἰσά[γ]οντα; … | 17

coll xvii 35-xviii 33

And he claims that [*χρησιμεύειν*] | 2 *πάλι[ν]* | 35 We repeat: we would

music also benefits *δ᾽ ἔτι καὶ πρὸς* [*δὲ λέγομε*]*ν*, find that music is not

friendship, thus: if *φ[ιλίαν φησι·]* | 3 *ἐπεὶ πρὸς τὸν* | 36 beneficial to love;

music benefits love, *ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πρὸς* *ἔρωτα τὴ[ν]* therefore it has no

then it benefits
love's end;

ἔρ[ωτα, καὶ] | [4]
πρὸς τὸ τέλος
αὐτοῦ [**προσφέ**] | [5]
ρειν·

μουσικὴν οὐ | [37]
θὲν ἂν ε[ὔρο]ιμ[εν]
χ[ρη]σι | [38]
μεύουσα[ν, οὐ]δὲ
πρὸς φιλί | [39]
αν οἰκε[ίως]
προσφέρ[ε]σθαι· | [40]
[π]αντ[.....ο]ὐ τοῦ
ταύ[τ]ην | [41]
[..]ω[.....]ν δὲ
μὴ τιθέ | [42]
μεν[οι.....] οὐκ
ἐοίκαμεν | [43]
σ[ἶ]δα[.....]
[..]ωι συγγενής | [44]
[..]φ[.....]ιειν
κα[ὶ σ]υνε[ργ--] | [45]
[.....]τεσε[..]
δια[.]πε | [46]
[.....]π
[...]ηο[.]
τοῦ | [47]

benefit to impart, in
virtue of affiliation,
to friendship…

and if music benefits
symposia, then it be-
nefits their end too;

ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ
πρὸς [συμπό] | [6]
σια, καὶ [π]ρ[ὸ][ς]

(εἰς) συμπόσια
διδόντες ἐναρ | [xviii 1]
μό[τ]τειν [α]ὐτήν,

We accept that music
suits the symposion,
but we don't take it

the end of the sympo-	*τὸ τέλος [αὐτῶν· ὃ]* | 7	*τὸ δὲ μ⌈ό⌉* | 2	that the only end of
sion is friendly-	*φαίνεσθα[ι εἶ]⌈ναι⌉*	*νον τέλο[ς] αὐτῶν*	symposia is friendly-
mindedness;	*φιλο[φροσύ]* | 8	*εἶναι φι* | 3	mindedness; preponde-
	νην·	*λοφροσύ[ν]ην*	rant are other states
		οὐ τιθέντες, | 4	(?). It is for pleasure,
		ἀλλὰ καὶ τιν'	then, and not for
		ἕτερα, πρὸς τὴν | 5	friendly-mindedness,
		ἡδονὴν, οὐ πρὸ[ς]	that we will concede
		ἐκείνην, χρη | 6	music (?) to be useful.
		σιμεύειν	Hence, music does not
		ὁμολογήσομεν·	benefit friendship.
but if music benefits	*εἰ δὲ [πρ]ὸς*	*ὥσ* | 7	
friendly-mindedness,	*ταύτη[ν, καὶ]* | 9	*τ' οὐδὲ*	
then it benefits	*πρὸς φιλίαν.*	*πρὸς φιλίαν·*	
friendship.			
		καὶ τούτων | 8	Two facts are clear:
		ἐναργὲς ἑκάτερον	that, as we listen
		εἶναι· τό γε | 9	to music, we find our-
		ἐπιτερπῶς [ἡ]μᾶς	selves in a pleasurable
		ἀ[κρ]οωμέ | 10	state of mind; and that
		νους τῆς μουσικῆς	we are unaware of deri-
		διατίθε | 11	ving from melodies and
		σθαι, καὶ τὸ	rhythms any impulse to
		μηδέποτε μ⌈η⌉δὲν | 12	friendly-mindedness
		αὐτοῖς	and friendship.
		συνιστορηκέναι	

πρὸς | [13]

φιλοφροσύνην

⌜κ⌝αὶ φιλίαν ἐ | [14]

πι[σ]τατικὸν ἐ⌜κ⌝

μελῶν καὶ ῥυ | [15]

θμῶν ἐσχη⌜κ⌝όσιν.

ἄλλως [δὲ καὶ] | [10]

τὴν [ψυχὴ]ν ἀνίησιν

[τε καὶ] | [11]

[.....]ασδια

[.....] | [12]

[.....]αλλω

[.....] | [13]

οὐδ' ἂν | [16]

εἰησι δὲ ταῦ⌜τ⌝α

καὶ ἀφι⌜λ⌝[α]ροῖ, | [17]

τὰ δὲ

συμπεπλεγμένα αὐ | [18]

τοῖς διανοήμα[τ',

ἀ]λλὰ τοὐ | [19]

ναντίον,

ἀναμελ⌜π⌝εταί τ[ε] | [20]

καὶ ἀ⌜κ⌝ου[ό]μ[ε]ν[α]

καθικνεῖ | [21]

σθαι πά[ντω]ν

ἀνειμένων{ι} | [22]

καὶ διακε[ιμέ]ν[ων]

⌜λ⌝αρως. | [23]

οὐ μὴ[ν] ἀλ[λ]ὰ Even if it (?) relaxed

[κἂν] ἀνιῆ(ι) καὶ | [24] and brought on the face

⌈ἱλ⌉αροὺς π̣[οι]ῆ(ι)	the expression of
καθ̣άπ[ερ] ἀπ⌈ό⌉ | 25	relaxation, as…
λαυσ[ις π]ο[..]	
τσ[.]ε[...]βρωχ̣ | 26	
των καὶ [πᾶσα	
ἡδον]ή̣, φιλίας | 27	…we don't consider it
καὶ ὁμ̣[ονοίας	(?) to be the only (?)
οὐ]κ ἂν αἰτί | 28	cause of friendship and
α[ν ν]ομ̣ [ίζοιμεν]	concord…
οὐ̣[δ]ὲ τ̣αύτη[ν] | 29	
μόν[η]ν, ο̣[....]	
λαωλ κατὰ | 30	
[τ]ᾳ̣ς ἰ[λ]αρ⌈ο⌉τη	
[τας]σιμας μά | 31	
[λι]στα γίνεσθ̣[α]ι	
διαλυτι | 32	
κούς.	

[.....] Λακεδαιμο[...] [Λακ[εδ]αιμονίους \| 33

] \| 14

Conventions:

[α] = missing

α = damaged

⌜α⌝ = replaced

(α) = added

{α} = to be omitted

α = new reading

| = end of line

(?) = sense of previous word uncertain

[?] = sense of following sentence uncertain

APPENDIX II

Philosophical Symposia: Works

Socratics

Aristippus

1. DL ii 83-5 = A 121 Mannerbach:

τοῦ δὴ Κυρηναϊκοῦ φιλοσόφου φέρεται βιβλία τρία μὲν ἱστορίας τῶν κατὰ Λιβύην ἀπεσταλμένα Διονυσίῳ· ἓν δὲ ἐν ᾧ διάλογοι πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν, οἱ μὲν Ἀτθίδι οἱ δὲ Δωρίδι διαλέκτῳ γεγραμμένοι, οἵδε·

Ἀρτάβαζος

Πρὸς τοὺς ναυαγούς

Πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας

Πρὸς πτωχῶν

Πρὸς Λαΐδα

Πρὸς Πῶρον

Πρὸς Λαΐδα περὶ τῆς κατόπτρου

Ἑρμείας

Ἐνύπνιον

Πρὸς τὸν ἐπὶ κύλικος

Φιλόμηλος

Πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτιμῶντας ὅτι κέκτηται οἶνον παλαιὸν καὶ ἑταίρας

Πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτιμῶντας ὅτι πολυτελῶς ὀψωνεῖ

Ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Ἀρήτην τὴν θυγατέρα

Πρὸς τὸν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν γυμνάζοντα ἑαυτόν

Ἐρώτησις

Ἄλλη Ἐρώτησις

Χρεία πρὸς Διονύσιον

Ἄλλη ἐπὶ τῆς εἰκόνος

Ἄλλη ἐπὶ τῆς Διονυσίου θυγατρός

Πρὸς τὸν οἰόμενον ἀτιμάζεσθαι

Πρὸς τὸν συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειροῦντα.

ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ διατριβῶν αὐτόν φασιν ἓξ γεγραφέναι, οἱ δ' οὐδ' ὅλως γράψαι· ὧν ἐστι καὶ Σωσικράτης ὁ Ῥόδιος.

κατὰ δὲ Σωτίωνα ἐν δευτέρῳ καὶ Παναίτιον ἔστιν αὐτῷ συγγράμματα τάδε·

Περὶ παιδείας

Περὶ ἀρετῆς

Προτρεπτικός

Ἀρτάβαζος

Ναυαγοί

Φυγάδες

Διατριβῶν ἓξ

Χρειῶν τρία

Πρὸς Λαΐδα

Πρὸς Πῶρον

Πρὸς Σωκράτην

Περὶ τύχης.

Antisthenes

2. DL vi 15-8 = 1. 56-7 Decleva-Caizzi:

φέροντα δ' αὐτοῦ συγγράμματα τόμοι δέκα·

(...) Τόμος ἕνατος ἐν ᾧ·

Περὶ Ὀδυσσείας

Περὶ τῆς ῥάβδου

Ἀθηνᾶ ἢ περὶ Τηλεμάχου

Περὶ Ἑλένης καὶ Πηνελόπης

Περὶ Πρωτέως

Κύκλος ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως

Περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως ἢ περὶ μέθης ἢ περὶ τοῦ Κύκλωπος

Περὶ Κίρκης

Περὶ Ἀμφιαράου

Περὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως καὶ Πηνελόπης καὶ περὶ τοῦ κυνός.

3. Ael. Aristid. *Ἱερὸν Λόγον* Γ = 41 DC = 49.30-3 Keil = p. 28 Winckelmann:

ὅτε δὲ συνέχεια τῶν κατάρρων ἦν καὶ ἡ ὑπερῴα πυρίκαυτος, καὶ σταφυλὴ ἐφειστήκει, καὶ φλέβες οὐκ ἐπεῖχον τεινόμεναι, βιβλίον το τῶν σπουδαίων ἔδοξα ἀναγιγνώσκειν, οὗ τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστον, πάλιν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐρῶ λόγον, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν. πῶς γὰρ τοσοῦτόν γε ὕστερον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τὸ τῇ μνήμῃ προσέχειν ἀφελομένης; ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει τοῦ βιβλίου τοιάδε μάλιστα ἐνῆν. ἦν δὲ ὡς ἐπί τινος τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν λεγόμενα. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ὁ θεὸς συλλογισάμενος καὶ ὁρῶν τὸ ῥεῦμα ἄρδην φερόμενον προσέταξεν ὕδωρ πίνειν, οἴνου δὲ ἀπέχεσθαι, εἴτι δεῖται νικῆσαι· ἃ δὴ καὶ σοί, ἔφη, ἔξεστι μιμησαμένῳ στεφανοῦσθαι ἢ συστεφανοῦσθαι. ἐνταῦτα ἔληγεν. εἶθ' ὑπεγέγραπτο τοῦ λόγου δὴ τοὐπίγραμμα, φιλοστέφανος, ἢ φιλησιστέφανος. ὅσον μὲν οὖν τινα χρόνον διήνεγκε τὴν ὑδροποσίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔχω λέγειν· ὅτι δ' εὐκόλως ἀεί πως πρότερον δυσχεραίνων τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ναυτιῶν. ὡς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐλελειτούργητο, τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος ἀφίησί με,

οἴνου δὲ ἔταξε μέτρον, καὶ ἦν γε τὸ ῥῆμα ἡμίνα βασιλικὴ γνώρομον δή που ὅτι ἔφραζεν ἡμικοτύλιον. ἐχρώμην τούτῳ καὶ οὕτως ἤρκει ὡς οὐκ ἤρκει πρότερον τὸ διπλάσιον, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε καὶ φειδομένῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεδιέναι μὴ ἐπιλείπῃ περιῆν. οὐ μὲν τοῦτό γε ἐποιούμην ἐξαίρετον εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔδει τῷ μέτρῳ στέργειν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ταύτην εἶχε τὴν πεῖραν, ἀφίησιν ἤδη πίνειν πρὸς ἐξουσίαν, οὕτωσί πως χαριεντσάμενος, ὅτι μάταιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶεν ὅσοι τῶν ἱκανῶν εὐποροῦντες μὴ τολμῶσιν ἐλευθέρως χρῆσαι. καὶ τὸ βιβλίον αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔδοκε εἶναι Ἀντισθένους **περὶ Χρήσεως**· ἔφερε δὲ εἰς οἶνον καὶ Διονύσου προσῆν τινα σύμβολα.

Academy, Peripatos, Garden

4. Plu. 612D-E = Sp. 64 Lang, 24 IP, T46 T:

ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν μὲν ἀτόπων ἠλήθη τῷ ὄντι σοφὴ κατ᾽ Εὐριπίδην εἶναι, τὸ δ᾽ ὅλως ἀμνημονεῖν τῶν ἐν οἴνῳ μὴ μόνον τῷ φιλοποιῷ λεγομένῳ μάχεσθαι τῆς τραπέζης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς ἐλλογιμωτάτους ἀντιμαρτυροῦντας ἔχειν, Πλάτωνα καὶ Ξενοφῶντα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Σπεύσιππον Ἐπίκουρόν τε καὶ Πρύτανιν καὶ Ἱερώνυμον καὶ Δίωνα τὸν ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας, ὡς ἄξιόν τινος σπουδῆς πεποιημένους ἔργον ἀναγράψασθαι λόγους παρὰ πότον γενομένους...

5. Ath. 3F = Sp. 23 IP, T47 T = Xen. 49 IP:

ὅτι Χενοκράτης ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος καὶ Σπεύσιππος ὁ Ἀκαδημαϊκῶς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης **Βασιλικοὺς Νόμους** ἔγραψε.

6. Ath. 186B = Xen. 50 IP:

τοῦ γοῦν Χενοκράτους ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ καὶ πάλιν Ἀριστοτέλους ***συμποτικοί*** τινες ἦσαν ***νόμοι***.

Academy

Speusippus

7 = **4**.

8 = **5**.

9. DL iii 2 = Sp 27 Lang, 147 IP, F1a T:

Σπεύσιππος δ' *ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ* **Πλάτωνος Περιδείπνῳ** *καὶ* Κλέαρχος *ἐν τῷ* Πλάτωνος Ἐγκώμιον *καὶ* Ἀναξιλαΐδης *ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Φιλοσόφων φασιν ὡς* Ἀθήνησιν *ἦν λόγος, ὡραίαν οὖσαν τὴν* Περικτιόνην, *βιάζεσθαι τὸν* Ἀριστώνα *καὶ μὴ τυγχάνειν· παυόμενόν τε τῆς βίας ἰδεῖν τὴν τοῦ* Ἀπώλλονος *ὄφιν· ὅθεν καθαρὰν γάμου φυλάξαι ἕως τῆς ἀποκυήσεως.*

10. Phld. Index Acad.:

a. PHerc 1021 col vi 12, *additamentum*:

[ὁ Κυζικη]νὸς Τιμόλαος, Καλλιγένης, Ἀθηναῖος Τομόλας, οὓς *ἐν τῷι* Περιδείπνωι [Πλα]τ̣ω̣ν[ος]

b. PHerc 164 fr 12:

[ὁ Κυζικηνὸς Τιμό]λαος, Καλλιγένη[ς, Ἀθ]ηναῖος Τ[ι]μόλαος, [ὡς] *ἐν τῷι* Περιδείπνωι [Πλάτωνος *ἱσ]τορεῖ* Σπεύ[σιππος, Ἀρχύ]τας Ταραν[τῖνος, Χίων ὁ] *τὸν ἐν* Ἡ[ρακλείαι]

Peripatos

Aristotle

11 = **4**.

12. Titles:

a. DL v 22, t, 10: ***Συμπόσιον α΄***; cf. **13**

b. Anon. t. 136: ***περὶ Συσσιτίων ἢ Συμποσίων α΄***

c. Anon. t. 161: ***Συσσιτικῶν Προβλημάτων γ΄***

d. Anon. t. 130: **Νόμος *Συσσιτκός α΄***

e. DL v 26, t. 139: **Νόμοι *Συσσιτικοί α΄***

f = 21.

g = 6.

13. Ath. 674F-5A = 101 R:

῾Αριστοτέλης δ᾽ ἐν τῷ **Συμποσίῳ** *φησὶν ὅτι οὐδὲν κολοβὸν προσφέρομεν πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἀλλὰ τέλεια καὶ ὅλά. τὸ δὲ πλῆρες τέλειον ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ στέφειν πλήρωσίν τινα σημαίνει. ῞Ομερος·*

῾κοῦροι δὲ κρητῆρας ἐπεστέψαντο ποτοῖο΄,

καὶ

῾ἀλλὰ θεὸς μορφὴν ἔπεσι στέφει΄.

῾τοὺς γὰρ αὖ τὴν ὄψιν ἀμόρφους, φησίν, ἀναπληροῖ ἠτοῦ λέγειν πιθανότης ἔοικε οὖν ὁ στέφανος τοῦτο ποιεῖν βούλεσθαι. διὸ καὶ περὶ τὰ πένθη τοὐναντίον παρασκευάζομεν. ὁμοπαθείᾳ γὰρ τοῦ κεκμηκότος κολοβοῦμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς τῇ τε κουρᾷ τῶν τριχῶν καὶ τῇ τῶν στεφάνων ἀφαιρέσει΄.

14a. Ath. 641D-E = 104 R:

῾Αριστοτέλης δ᾽ ἐν τῷ **περὶ Μέθης** *παραπλησίως ἡμῖν δευτέρας τραπέζας προσαγορεύει διὰ τούτων·*

῾τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅλον διαφέρειν τράγημα βρώματος νομισθέον ὅσον ἔδεσμα τρωγαλίου. τοῦτο γὰρ πάτριον τοὔνομα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἐπεὶ ἐν τραγήμασι [τὰ βρώματα] παρατίθενται. διόπερ οὐ κακῶς ἔοικεν εἰπεῖν ὁ πεῶτος δευτέραν τράπεζαν προσαγορεύσας τράπεζαν· ὄντως γὰρ ἐπιδορπισμός τις ὁ τραγηματισμός ἐστιν, καὶ δεῖπνον ἕτερον παρατίθεται <τὰ> τραγήματα.

14b. Ath. 641B = 104 R:

᾽Αριστοτέλης δ᾽ *ἐν τῷ* **περὶ Μέθης** *τὰ τραγήματά φησι λέγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων τρωγάλια· ὡσεὶ γὰρ ἐπιδορπισμὸν εἶναι.*

15a. Ath. 464C-D = 110R:

καὶ ᾽Αριστοτέλης *ἐν τῷ* **περὶ Μέθης** *᾽αἱ ῾Ροδιακαί᾽, φησί, προσαγορευόμεναι χυτρίδες διά τε τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὰς μέθας παρεισφέρονται καὶ διὰ τὸ θερμαινομένας τὸν οἶνον ἧττον ποιεῖν μεθύσκειν. σμύρνης γὰρ καὶ σχοίνου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἑτέρων εἰς ὕδωρ ἐμβληθέντων ἕψονται καὶ παραχεόντων εἰς τὸν οἶνον ἧττον μεθύσκουσιν᾽. κἀν ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει φησίν· ᾽αἱ ῾Ροδιακαὶ χυτρίδες γίνονται σμύρνης, σχοίνου, ἀνήθου, κρόκου, βαλσάμου, ἀμόμου, κιναμμώμου συνεψηθέντων· ἀφ᾽ ὧν τὸ γινόμενον τῷ οἴνῳ παραχυθὲν οὕτω <τὰς> μέθας ἵστησιν ὥστε καὶ τῶν ἀφροδισίων παραλύειν τὰ πνεύματα πέττον᾽.*

15b. Ath. 496F = 111 R:

μνημονεύει δ᾽ αὐτῶν [sc τῶν ῾Ροδιακῶν] καὶ ᾽Αριστοτέλης *ἐν τῷ* **περὶ Μέθης**, Λυγκεύς *τε ὁ Σάμιος ἐν ταῖς* ῾Επιστολαῖς.

16. Ath. 447A = 106 R:

ἀλλ᾽, *ὡς φησιν* ᾽Αριστοτέλης *ἐν τῷ* **περὶ Μέθης**, *εἰς τὰ νῶτα καταπίπτουσιν οἱ τὸ κρίθινον πεπωκότες, ὃν πῖνον καλοῦσι, λέγων οὕτως· ᾽πλὴν ἴδιόν τι συμβαίνει περὶ τῶν τὰς κριθῶν, τὸ καλούμενον πῖνον. ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν λοιπῶν τε καὶ μεθυστικῶν οἱ μεθυσθέντες ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ μέρη πίπτουσι· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀριστερὰ καὶ δεξιὰ καὶ πρηνεῖς καὶ ὕπτιοι. μόνοι δὲ οἱ τῷ πίνῳ μεθυσθέντες εἰς τοὐπίσω καὶ ὕπτιοι κλίνονται.*

17. Ath. 429C-D = 107R:

᾽Αριστοτέλης δ᾽ *ἐν τῷ* **περὶ Μέθης** *φησίν· ᾽εἰ ὁ οἶνος μετρίως ἀφεψηθείη, πινόμενος ἧττον μεθύσκει· τὴν γὰρ δύναμιν ἀφεψηθένος αὐτοῦ ἀστενέστεραν γίγνεσθαι· μεθύσκονταί τε, φησίν, οἱ γεραίτεροι τάχιστα δι᾽*

ὀλιγότητα καὶ ἀσθένειαν τοῦ περὶ αὐτοῦς ἐνυπάρχοντος φύσει θερμοῦ. καὶ οἱ παντελῶς δὲ νέοι τάχιον μεθύσκονται διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος θερμοῦ· τῷ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ οἴνου προγινομένῳ κρατοῦνται ῥᾳδίως. μεθύσκονται δὲ κἀν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις ὗες μὲν σταφυλῆς στεμφύλης στεμφύλων χορτασθέντες καὶ τὸ κοράκων καὶ τῶν κύνων γένος τὴν οἰνοῦτταν καλουμένην φαγόντα βοτάνην, πίθηκος δὲ καὶ ἐλέφας πιόντες οἶνον· διὸ καὶ τὰς θήρας ποιοῦνται τῶν πιθήκων καὶ τῶν κοράκων μεθυσθέντων, τῶν μὲν οἴνῳ τῶν δὲ οἰνούττῃ΄.

17a. Plu. 652A:

`μέμνημαι μὲν οὖν΄ ἔφην ἐγὼ `καὶ ᾽Αριστοτέλους ἐντυχὼν οὐ νεωστὶ λόγῳ περὶ τούτου τοῦ προβλήματος [cf. **43b**] ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανὸς πάλαι΄.

18. Plu. 650A = 108R:

᾽Εθαύμαζε <Φλῶρος>, εἰ γεγρφὼς ᾽Αριστπτέλης ἐν τῷ **περὶ Μέθης**, ὅτι μάλιστα μὲν οἱ γέτοντες ἥκιστα δ᾽ αἱ γυναῖκες ὑπὸ μέθης ἁλίσκονται, τὴν αἰτίαν οὐκ ἐχειργάσατο μηδὲν εἰωθὼς προΐεσθαι τῶν τοιούτων· εἶτα μέντοι προὔβαλεν ἐν μέσῳ σκοπεῖν τοῖς παροῦσιν.

19a. Ath. 44D-E = 103 R; cf. SE PH i 84:

᾽Αριστοτέλης δ᾽ ἐν τῷ **περὶ Μέθης** φησὶν ὅτι ἁλμυράς τινες προσφερόμενοι τροφὰς ἄδιψοι διέμειναν· ὧν ἦν ᾽Αρχωνίδης ὁ ᾽Αργεῖος. Μάγων δὲ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος τρὶς τὴν ἄνυδρον διῆλθεν ἅλφιτα ξηρὰ σιτούμενος καὶ μὴ πίνων.

19b. Apollon. Mir. 25 = 103 R:

᾽Αριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ **περὶ Μέθης** `῞Ανδρων΄ φησὶν ``Αργεῖος ἐσθίων πολλὰ καὶ ἁλμυρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ βίου ἄδιψος καὶ ἄποτος διετέλεσεν. ἔτι δὶς ποτευθεὶς εἰ ῾Αμμωνα διὰ τῆς ἀνύδρου ἅλφιτα ξηρὰ σιτούμενος οὐ προσηνέγκατο ὑγρόν΄.

20. Procl. in Remp. 350 Bass = 181 R:

καὶ ἐν τῷ **Συσσιτικῷ** τοῦτον αὐτὴν [*sc* τὴν πολιτείαν] προσαγορεύει τὸν τρόπον.

Theophrastus

21. DL v 44, t. 69: **περὶ Μέθης**

22. Ath. 427C-D = L130 F:

ἦσαν δ' αἱ τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἐπιχύσεις, ὥς φησι Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ **περὶ Μέθης**, οὐ παλαιαί· ἀλλ' ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸ μὲν σπένδειν ἀποδεδομένον τοῖς θεοῖς, ὁ δὲ κότταβος τοῖς ἐρωμένοις.

23. Ath. 693C-D = L132 F; cf. Ath. 782A-B, 429A-B, Ael. VH ii 37-8:

Θεόφραστος δ' ἐν τῷ **περὶ Μέθης** `τὸν ἄκρατον' φησὶν `οἶνον τὸν ἐπὶ τῷ δείπνῳ διδόμενον, ὃν δὴ λέγουσιν 'Αγαθοῦ Δαίμονος εἶναι πρόποσιν, ὀλίγον τε προσφέρουσιν, ὥσπερ ἀναμιμνήσκοντες μόνον τῇ γεύσει τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δορεάν, καὶ μετὰ τὴν πλήρωσιν διδόασιν, ὅπως ἐλάχιστον ᾖ τὸ πινόμενον· καὶ τρίτον προσκυνήσαντες λαμβάνουσιν ἀπὸ τῆς τραπέζης, [καὶ] ὥστε ἱκετείαν τινὰ ποιούμενοι τοῦ θεοῦ μηθὲν ἀσχημονεῖν μηδ' ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰν ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ πότου τούτου καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ καλὰ καὶ χρήσιμα'.

24. Ath. 423F-4A = L134 F:

Θεόφραστος δ' ἐν τῷ **περὶ Μέθης** ζωρότερόν φησιν εἶναι τὸ κεκραμένον, παρατιθέμενος 'Εμπεδοκλέους τάδε·

`αἶψα δὲ θνητὰ φύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι,

ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα, διαλλάσσοντα κελεύθους.

25. Ath. 497E = L 135 F; cf. **30**:

Θεόφραστος δ' ἐν τῷ **περὶ Μέθης** τὸ ῥυθόν φησιν ὀνομαζόμενον ποτήριον τοῖς ἥρωσι μόνοις ἀποδίδοσθαι.

26. Ath. 463C = L 129 F; cf. Pl. Lg. 666B-C:

`παραμυθεῖται γὰρ ὁ οἶνος καὶ τὴν τοῦ γήρως δυσθυμίαˊ φησὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ ***περὶ Μέθης****.*

27. Ath. 465B = L 133 F:

καὶ Θεόφραστος δ' ἐν τῷ ***περὶ Μέθης*** *φησὶν ὅτι `τοῦ Διονύσου τροφοὶ αἱ Νύμφαι κατ' ἀλήθειαν. αἱ γὰρ ἄμπελοι πλεῖστον ὑγρὸν χέουσι τεμνόμεναι καὶ κατὰ φύσιν δακρύουσιˊ.*

28. Ath. 424E-F = L 136 F; cf. **35**:

Θεόφραστος γοῦν ἐν τῷ ***περὶ Μέθης*** *φησίˊ `πυνμθάνομαι δ' ἔγωγε καὶ Εὐριπίδην τὸν ποιητὴν οἰνοχοεῖν Ἀθήνησι τοῖς ὀρχησταῖς καλουμένοις. ὠρχοῦντο δὲ οὗτοι περὶ τὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος νεὼν τῶν Δηλίου τῶν πρώτων ὄντες Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἐνεδύοντο ἱμάτια τῶν Θηραικῶν. ὁ δὲ Ἀπόλλων ἐστιν ᾧ τὰ Θαργήλια ἄγουσι, καὶ διασῴζεται Φλυῆσιν ἐν τῷ δαφνηφορείῳ γραφὴ περὶ τούτωνˊ.*

Aristoxenus

29. Ath. 632A-B = Aristox. 124 W:

διόπερ Ἀριστόξενος ἐν τοῖς ***Συμμίκτοις Συμποτικοῖς*** *`ὅμοιονˊ φησὶ `ποιοῦμεν Ποσειδωνιάταις τοῖς ἐν τῷ Τυρσηνικῷ κατοικοῦσιν. οἷς συνέβη τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς Ἕλλησιν οὖσιν ἐκβεβαρβαρῶσθαι Τυρρηνοῖς [ἢ Ῥωμαίοις] γεγονόσι, καὶ τήν τε φωνὴν μεταβεβληκέναι τά τε λοιπὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἄγει δὲ μίαν, τινὰ αὐτοὺς τῶν ἑορτῶν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ἐν ᾗ συνιόντες ἀναμιμνήσκονται τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐκείνων τε καὶ νομίμων καὶ ἀπολοφυράμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀποδακρύσαντες ἀπέρχονται. οὕτω δὴ οὖνˊ φησὶ `καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ θέατρα ἐκβεβαρβάρωται καὶ εἰς μεγάλην διαφορὰν προελήλυθεν ἡ πάνδημος αὕτη μουσική, καθ' αὐτοὺς γενόμενοι ὀλίγοι ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα οἵα ἦν ἡ μουσικήˊ. ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἀριστόξενος.*

Chamaeleon

30. Ath. 461A-C = Cha. 9 W; cf. **23**:

Χαμαιλέων δ' ὁ Ἡρακλεώτης *ἐν τῷ* **περὶ Μέθης**, *εἴ γε τῆς φωνῆς μνημονεύω, φησί· `εἰ δὲ οἱ ταῖς ἐξουσίαις χρώμενοι καὶ τῷ πλουτεῖν προτιμῶσι τὴν μέθην ταύτην, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. οὐκ ἔχοντες γὰρ ἡδονὴν ταύτης καλλίω οὐδὲ μᾶλλον εὐχερῆ καταφεύγουσιν εἰκότως ἐπὶ τὸν οἶνον. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τὰ μεγάλα τῶν ἐκπωμάτων ἐπιχώρια γέγονε τοῖς δυνάσταις. οὐ γὰρ παλαιὸν οὐδὲ τοῦτό γέ ἐστι παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλὰ νεωστὶ εὑρέθη πεμφθὲν ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἀπεστερημένοι τῆς παιδείας ὁρμῶσιν ἐπὶ τὸν πολὺν οἶνον καὶ πορίζονται τροφὰς περιέργους καὶ παντοίας. ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόποις οὔτ' ἐν γραφαῖς οὔτ'* [lacuna] *ἐπὶ τῶν πρότερον εὑρήσομεν ποτήριον εὐμέγεθες εἰργασμένον πλὴν τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡροικοῖς. τὸ γὰρ ῥυτὸν ὀνομαζόμενον μόνοις τοῖς ἥρωσιν ἀπεδίδοσαν. ὃ καὶ δόξει τισὶν ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, εἰ μή τις ἄρα φήσειε διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς ἐπιφανείας τῶν δαιμόνων καταδειχθῆναι τοῦτο. χαλεποὺς γὰρ καὶ πλήκτας τοὺς ἥρωας νομίζουσι καὶ μᾶλλον νύκτωρ ἢ μεθ' ἡμέραν. ὅπως οὖν μὴ διὰ τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μέθην φαίνωνται τοιοῦτοι, δημιουργοῦσιν αὐτοὺς πίνοντας ἐκπώμασι μεγάλοις. καὶ μοι δοκοῦσι λέγειν οὐ κακῶς οἱ φάσκοντες τὸ μέγα ποτέριον γρέαρ `αργυροῦν εἶναί'.*

31. Ath. 427B-C = Cha. 10 W:

Χαμαιλέων γοῦν ὁ Ἡρακλεώτης *ἐν τῷ* **περὶ Μέθης** *περὶ τούτων οὕτως γράφει· `ἐπεὶ καὶ Κλεομένη τὸν Σπαρτιάτην φασὶν οἱ Λάκωνες μανῆναι διὰ τὸ Σκύθαις ὁμιλήσαντα μαθεῖν ἀκρατοποτεῖν ὅθεν ὅταν βούλωνται πιεῖν ἀκρατέστερον, "ἐπισκύθισκον" λέγουσιν.*

32. Clem. **Str.** i 170.3 = Cha. 13 W:

τόν τε Μίνω παρὰ Διὸς δι' ἐνάτου ἔτους λαμβάνειν τοὺς νόμους ἱστοροῦσι φποτῶντα εἰς τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄντρον, τόν τε αὖ Λυκοῦργον τὰ νομοθετικὰ εἰς Δελφοὺς πρὸς τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα συνεχὲς ἀπιόντα παιδεύεσθαι γράφουσι Πλάτων τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἔφορος, Χαμαιλέων τε ὁ Ἡραλκεώτης ἐν τῷ **περὶ Μέθης** *καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ Λοκρῶν Πολιτείᾳ Ζάλευκον τὸν Λοκρὸν παρὰ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τοὺς ν όμους λαμβάνειν ἀπομνημονεύουσιν.*

Hieronymus

33 = 4.

34. Ath. 499F = Hier. 27 W; cf. **31**:

Ἱερόνυμος δ' ὁ Ῥόδιος ἐν τῷ **περὶ Μέθης** *καὶ τὸ μεθύσθαι σκυθίσαι φήσι.*

35. Ath. 424F = Hier. 28 W; cf. **28**:

τὰ αὐτὰ ἱστορεῖ καὶ Ἱερόνυμος ὁ Ῥόδιος Ἀριστοτέλους ὢν μαθητής, καὶ οὗτος ἐν τῷ **περὶ Μέθης**.

Garden: Epicurus

36 = 4.

37. DL x 28, t. 18: ***Συμπόσιον***

38a. Ath. 177B:

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ **Συμπόσιον** *φιλοσόφων μόνον πεποίηται.*

38b. Ath. 187B:

ὁ δ' Ἐπίκουρος ἅπαντας εἰσήγαγε προφήτας ἀτόμων καὶ ταῦτ' ἔχων παραδείγματα τὴν τε τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν συμποσίων ποικιλίαν καὶ τὴν Πλάτωνός *τε καὶ Ξενοφῶντος χάριν.*

39. Ath. 182A:

ἐν δὲ τῷ Ἐπικουρείῳ **Συμποσίῳ** *κολάκων ἐστὶν ἄγυρις ἀλλήλους ἐπαινούντων.*

40a. Ath. 179D:

... ἅπερ [*sc* Od. ix 231, Il. ix 219, 175] καὶ Πλάτων φυλάσσει κατὰ τὸ Συμπόσιον... [= 176A]. παρὰ δ᾽ Ἐπικούρῳ οὐ σπονδή, οὐκ ἀπαρχὴ θεοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ Σιμωνίδης περὶ τῆς ἀκόσμου γυναικός,

᾽ἄθυστα δ᾽ ἱρὰ πολλάκις καθεσθίει...΄

40b. Ath. 186E:

Ἐπίκουρος δὲ οὐ τόπον, οὐ χρόνον ἀφορίζει, οὐ προλέγει οὐδέν.

41. Ath. 187C:

τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτρέχουσαν τῇ λέξει ἀρρυθμίαν τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν;

42a. Phld. Rhet. Sudhaus ii fr. 31 = 64U:

Πρῶτων διωμολογησώ[με]θα τί ἐστιν οὗ χάριν [ἅπαν]τα πράττομεν, ἵ[να καὶ] εἰδήσω [μεν]...

42b. Phld. Rhet. ii col lvi 22:

[ἐγ]ὼ δ᾽ [ἀ]μέλει καὶ τῶν ἀλουστῶν μὲν ἄγαμαι τοῦ σχολάζοντος Ἀθήνησιν ἀ[ν]δρός· ὧν [ὁ] μὲ[ν ἐ]ν τῷ **Συμποσίω[ι]** [π]£≥[ὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆ[ς] ἔφη [συγ]γεγράφθαι πιστεύειν...

42c. Phld. Rhet. ii col lvii 22:

οὐκ ἐν τῷ **Συμποσίῳ** λέγομεν κτλ.

43a. Plu. 1109E-1110B = 58-60 U, 21.1-3A:

Ὅρα δὲ ἃ περὶ τοῦ οἴνου τῆς θερμότητος ἐν τῷ **Συμποσίῳ** Πολύαινον αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενον Ἐπίκουρος πεποίηκε. λέγοντος γὰρ·

᾽οὐ φῂς εἶναι, ὦ Ἐπίκουρε, τὰς ὑπὸτοῦ οἴνου διαθερμασίας;΄

ὑπέλαβε·

`τίς σε τοκαθόλου θερμαντικὸν ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν οἶνον εἶναι;´

καὶ μετὰ σμικρόν·

`φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸ καθόλου σύκ εἶναι θερμθντικὸς ὁ οἶνος, τοῦδε δέ τινος ὁ τοσοῦτος εἶναι θερμαντικὸς ἂν ῥηθείη´.

καὶ πάλιν αἰτίαν ὑπειπὼν θλίψεις τε καὶ διασπορὰς ἀτόμων, ἑτέτων δὲ συμμίξεις καὶ παραζεύξεις αἰτιασάμενος ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καταμίξει τοῦ οἴνου, ἐπιλέγει·

`διὸ δὴ καθόλου μὲν οὐ ῥητέον τὸν οἶνον εἶναι θερμαντικόν, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης φύσεως καὶ τῆς οὕτω διακειμένης θερμαντικὸν τὸν τοσοῦτον ἢ τῆσδε τὸν τοσοῦτον εἶναι ψυκτικόν. ἔνεισι γὰρ καὶ τοιαῖται ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀθροίσματι φύσεις, ἐξ ὧν ἂν ψυχρὸν συσταίη, <ἢ αἵ> εἰς δέον γε ἑτέραις παραζυγεῖσαι ψυχρασίας φύσιν ἀποτελέσειαν· ὅθεν ἐξαπατώμενοι οἱ μὲν ψυκτικὸν τὸ καθόλου φασὶν εἶναι τὸν οἶνον οἱ δὲ θερμαντικόν´.

ὁ δὴ λέγων ἐξηπατῆσθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς τὸ θερμαῖνον ἢ τὸ ψῦχον ψυκτικὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντας, εἰ μὴ νομίζοι τό `μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον ἢ τοῖον ἕκαστον´ ἀκολουθεῖν οἷς εἴρηκεν, αὐτὸς ἐξεπάτηται. Προστίθησι δ' ὅτι

`πολλάκις οὐδ' ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ σῶμα θερμαντικὴν ἐπιφέρων ἢ ψυκτικὴν δύναμιν ὁ οἶνος, ἀλλὰ κινηθέντος τοῦ ὄγκου καὶ γενομένης τῶν σωμάτων μεταστάσεως αἱ ποιοῦσαι τὸ θερμὸν ἄτομοι νῦν μὲν συνῆλθον εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ παρέσχον ὑπὸ πλήθους θερμότητα καὶ πύρωσιν τῷ σώματι, νῦν δ' ἐκπεσοῦσαι κατέψυξαν´.

43b. Plu. 652A-B = 61U:

διείλεκται δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ **Συμποσίῳ** *πολλοῦς λόγους, ὧν τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστιν ὥς ἐγᾦμαι τοιόνδε. φησὶ γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι θερμὸν τὸν οἶνον, ἀλλ' ἔχειν τινὰς ἀτόμους ἐν αὐτῷ θερμασίας ἀποτελεστικὰς ἑτέρας δ' αὖ ψυχρότητος· ὧν τὰς μὲν ἀποβάλλειν, ὅταν εἰς τὸ σῶμα παραγένηται, τὰς δὲ προσλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, ὥς ἂν ἔχουσι κράσεως ἡμῖν ἢ φύσεως ὁμιλήσῃ, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἐκθερμαίνεσθαι τοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον πάσχειν μεθυσκομένους´.*

44. DL x 110 = 63 U; cf. Philo, Plant. 142-3 and 163-5 (= Arist. 102 R):

οὐδὲ μὴν τηρήσειν [λῃρήσειν Hermann] *ἐν μέθῃ φησὶν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ* **Συμποσίῳ**.

45a. Plu. 653B-D:

Νεανίσκοι τινὲς οὐ πάλαι τοῖς παλαιοῖς λόγοις προσπεφοιτηκότες ἐσπάταττον τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, ὥς οὐ καλὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐμβεβληκότα λόγον περὶ καιροῦ συνουσίας εἰς τὸ **Συμπόσιον**· μιμνήσκεσθαι γὰρ ἀφροδοσίων ἄνδρα πρεσβύτερον ἐν δείπνῳ μειρακίων παρόντων καὶ διαπορεῖν, πότερον μετὰ δεῖπνον ἢ πρὸ δείπνου χρηστέον, ἐσχάτης ἀκολασίας εἶναι. πρὸς ταῦθ' οἱ μὲν τὸν Ξενοφῶντα παρέλαβον ὥς ἀπάγοντα τοὺς συμπότας μετὰ δεῖπνον οὐχὶ βάδην ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἵππων ἐπὶ συνουσίας πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας. Ζώπυρος δ' ὁ ἰατρός, εὖ μάλα τοῖς Ἐπικούρου λόγοις ἐνωμιληκώς, οὐκ ἔφη προσέχοντας αὐτοὺς ἀνεγνωκέναι τὸ Ἐπικούρου **Συμπόσιον**· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τινος καὶ καταστάσεως τοῦτο πρόβλημα ποιησάμενον εἶτα λόγους ἐπ' αὐτῷ περαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς νέους ἀνιστάντα μετὰ δεῖπνον εἰς περίπατον ἐπὶ σωφρονισμῷ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀνακρούειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὥς ἀεὶ μὲν ἐπισφαλοῦς εἰς βλάβην τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος, κάκιστα δὲ τοὺς περὶ πότον καὶ ἐδωδὴν χρωμένους αὐτῷ διατιθέντος.

45b. Plu. 653D-E:

[Zopyrus]: `... ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ τοὐναντίον ἄν τις ἐγκαλέσαι φιλοσόφῳ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐν τῇ διατριβῇ πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων παρόντων περὶ τούτου διαλεγομένῳ, κύλικος δὲ προκειμέμης ἐν συνήθεσι καὶ φίλοις,... πῶς αἰσχρὸν εἰπεῖν τι καὶ ἀκοῦσαι εἰς συνουσίας χρῆσιν ὠφελίμως λεγόμενον;´

45c. Plu. 653E-4A:

τῶν ἄλλων τὸν Ζώπυρον ἀξιούντων τοὺς περὶ τούτου λόγους Ἐπικούρου διελθεῖν, ἔφη τῶν μὲν κατὰ μέρος <οὐκ> ἀκριβῶς μνημονεύειν, οἴεσθαι δὲ τὸν ἄνδρα τὰς ἐκ τῆς συνουσίας πληγὰς δεδιέναι διὰ τὸν τῶν σωμάτων παλμὸν εἰς ταραχὴν καὶ σάλον ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ βαδιζόντων. καθόλου μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἕδρας τὰ σώματα μεθιστάναι πλήκτην ὄντα καὶ κινητικὸν ταραχῆς τὸν ἄκρατον· ἂν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα τὸν ὄγκον ἡμῶν γαλήνη <μὴ> παραλάβῃ καὶ ὕπνος, ἀλλ' ἕτεραι διὰ τῶν ἀφροδισίων κινήσεις, ἐκθλιβομένων καὶ μοχλευομένων τῶν μάλιστα συνδεῖν καὶ κολλᾶν τὸ σῶμα πεφυκότων, κίνδυνος ἐστιν ἀνέδραστον γίνεσθαι τὸν ὄγκον, ὥσπερ <οἶκον> ἐκ θεμελίων κινούμενον· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖ ῥεῖν τηνικαῦτα τὴν γονήν, σφηνώσεως διὰ τὴν πλησμονὴν οὔσης, ἀλλὰ βίᾳ καὶ συμπεφυρμένην ἀποσπᾶσθαι· διὸ χρῆναί φησιν ὁ ἀνήρ, ὅταν ἡσυχία γένηται περὶ τπ` σῶμα καὶ

λωφήσωσιν αἱ τῆς τροφῆς ἀναδόσεις καὶ τὰ ῥεύματα διεξιούσης καὶ φευγούσης, τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν, πρὶν ἑτέρας αὖ πάλιν τροφῆς ἐνδεὲς γενέσθαι τὸ σῶμα.

46. Ath. 187C = 57U:

πάλιν Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ **Συμποσίῳ** ζητεῖ περὶ δυσπεψίας ὥστ᾽ οἰωνίσασθαι, εἶθ᾽ ἑξῆς περὶ πυρετῶν.

Porch

Cleanthes

47. DL vii 175, t. 40: ***περὶ Συμποσίου***

Persaeus

48. Ath. 607A-E:

ὑμεῖς δέ, ὦ φιλόσοφοι, καὶ τῶν δελφίνων καὶ τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἐστὲ κατὰ τὴν γνώμην ἀγριώτεροι ἔτι τε ἀνημερώτεροι, καίτοι Περσαίου τοῦ Κιτιέως ἐν τοῖς **Συμποτικοῖς Ὑπομνήμασιν** βοῶντος καὶ λέγοντος· ᾽περὶ ἀφροδισίων ἁρμοστὸν εἶναι ἐν τῷ οἴνῳ μνείαν ποιεῖσθαι· καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμὰς ὅταν ὑποπίωμεν ἐπιρρεπεῖ εἶναι. καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς μὲν ἡμέρως τε καὶ μετρίως αὐτοῖς χρωμένους ἐπαινεῖν δεῖ, τοὺς δὲ θεριωδῶς καὶ ἀπλήστως ψέγειν. καὶ εἰ διαλεκτικοῖ συνελθόντες εἰξ πότον περὶ συλλογισμῶν διαλέγοιντο, ἀλλορείως ἂν αὐτοὺς ὑπολάβοι τις ποιεῖν τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ, <ὅτε> καὶ ὁ καοῶς καγαθῶξ ἀνὴρ μεθυσθείη ἄν. οἱ γε βουλόμενοι σωφρονικοὶ εἶναι σφόδρα μέχρι τινος διατηροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς πότοις τὸ τοιοῦτον· εἶθ᾽ ὅταν παρεισδύῃ τὸ οἰνάριον, τὴν πάσαν ἀσχημοσύνην ἐπιδείκνυνται· ὃ καὶ πρώην ἐγένετο ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ Ἀρκαδίαξ θεωρῶν πρὸς Ἀντίγονον παραγενομένων. ἐκεῖνοι [τε] γὰρ ἠρίστων σφόδρα σκυθρωπῶς καὶ εὐσχημόνως, ὥς ᾠοντο, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμῶν τινα προσβλήποντες, ἀλλ᾽ οδὲ ἀλλήλους. ὡς δὲ ὁ πότος προέβαινεν καὶ εἰσῆλθεν ἄλλα τε ἀκροάματα καὶ αἱ Θετταλαὶ αὗται ὀρχηστρίδες, καθάπερ αὐταῖς ἔθος ἐστίν, ἐν ταῖς διαζώστραις γυμναὶ ὠρχοῦντο, οὐκ ἔτι

κατεῖχον αὐτοῦς οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ ἐκ τῶν κλινῶν ἀνώρμων καὶ ἐβόων ὡς θαυμαστόν τι θέαμα θεώμενοι· καὶ μακάριον τὸν βασιλέα ἀπεκάλουν, ὅτι ἔξεστιν αὐτῷ τούτων ἀπολαύειν, καὶ ἕτερα τούτοις παραπλήσια πάνυ πολλὰ τῶν φορτικῶν ἐποίουν. τῶν φιλοσόφων δέ τις συμπίνων ἡμῖν εἰσελθούσης αὐλητρίδος καὶ οὔσης εὐρυχωρίας παρ᾽ αὐτῷ, βουλομένης τῆς παιδίσκης παρακαθίσαι οὐκ ἐπέτρεψεν, ἀλλὰ σκληρὸν αὐτὸν εἰσῆγεν. εἶθ᾽ ὕστερον πωλουμένης τῆς αὐλητρίδος, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς πότοις γίνεσθαι, ἐν τε τῷ ἀγοράζειν πάνυ νεανικὸς ἦν καὶ τῷ πωλοῦντι, ἄλλῳ τινὶ θᾶττον προσθέντι, ἠμφισβήτει καὶ οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸν πεπρακέναι· καὶ τέλος εἰς πυγμὰς ἦλθεν ὁ σκληρὸς ἐκεῖνος φιλόσοφος καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ οὐδ᾽ ἂν παρακαθίσαι ἐπιτρέπων τῇ αὐλητρίδι´.

49. DL vii 1:

καὶ ᾽Απολλώνιος δέ φησιν ὁ Τύριος ὅτι [*sc* Zeno] *ἰσχνὸβ ἦν, ὑπομήκης, μελάγχρως - ὅθεν τις αὐτὸν εἶπεν Αἰγυπτίαν κλῆματίδα, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ* Παροιμιῶν *- παχύκνημός τε καὶ ἀπαγὴς καὶ ἀσθενής· διὸ καί φησι* Περσαῖος *ἐν* **῾Υπομνήμασι Συμποτικοῖς** *τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτὸν δεῖπνα παραιτεῖσθαι.*

50. Ath. 162B-E:

᾽Αρχέστρατος τε ὁ Γελῷος *ἐν τῇ* Γαστρολογίᾳ *- ἠῆν μόνην ὕμεῖς ῥαψῳδίαν οἱ σοφοὶ ἀσπάζεσθε, μόνον τοῦτο πυθαγορίζοντες τὸ σιῶπαν, δι᾽ ἀσθένειαν λόγων τοῦτο ποιοῦντες, ἔτι τε τὴν* Σφοδρίου *τοῦ κυνικοῦ τέχνην ἐρωτικὴν καὶ τὰς* Πρωταγορίδου *ἀκροάσεις ἐρωτικὰς* Περσαίου *τε τοῦ καλοῦ φιλοσόφου* **Συμποτικοὺς Διαλόγους** *συντεθέντας ἐκ τῶν* Στίλπωνος *καὶ* Ζήνωνος *ἀπομνημονευμάτων, ἐν οἷς ζητεῖ, ὅπως ἂν νὴ κατακοιμηθῶσιν οἱ συμπόται,* [*καὶ*] *πῶς τὰς ἐπιχύσεσι ζρηστέον πηνίκα τε εἰσακτέον τοὺς ὡραίους καὶ τὰς ὡραίας εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον καὶ πότε αὐτοὺς προσδεκτέον καὶ πότε παραπεμπτέον ὡς ὑπερορῶντας, καὶ περὶ προσοψημάτων καὶ περὶ ἄρτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τε περιεργότερον περὶ φιλημάτων εἴρηκεν ὁ* Σωφρονίσκου *φιλόσοφος, ὃς περὶ ταῦτα τὴν διάνοιαν ἀεὶ στρέφων πιστευθείς…*

APPENDIX III

Philosophical Symposia: the Practice

A. At School

1. Ath. 186A:

καὶ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις δὲ ἐπιμελὲς ἦν συνάγουσι τοὺς νέους μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πρός τινα τεταγμένον νόμον εὐωχεῖσθαι.

Socrates

2. Ar. Nu. 171-9:

[Μα.] *ζητοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῆς σελήνης τὰς ὁδοὺς*

καὶ τὰς περιφοράς, εἶτ᾽ ἄνω κεχηνότος

ἀπὸ τῆς ὀροφῆς νύκτωρ γαλεώτης κατέχεσεν.

[Στ.] *ἥσθην γαλεώτῃ καταχέσαντι Σωκράτους.*

[Μα.] *ἐχθὲς δέ γ᾽ ἡμῖν δεῖπνον οὐκ ἦν ἑσπέρας.*

[Στ.] *εἶέν. τί οὖν πρὸς τἄλφιτ᾽ ἐπαλαμήσατο;*

[Μα.] *κατὰ τῆς τραπέζης καταπάσας λεπτὴν τέφραν,*

κάμψας ὀβελίσκον, εἶτα διαβήτην λαβών,

ἐκ τῆς παλαίστρας θοἰμάτιον ὑφείλετο.

3. X. Mem. iii 14.1-6:

ὁπότε δὲ τῶν συνιόντων ἐπὶ δεῖπνον οἱ μὲν μικρὸν ὄψον, οἱ δὲ πολὺ φέροιεν, ἐκέλευεν ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν παῖδα τὸ μικρὸν ἢ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέναι ἢ διανέμειν ἑκάστῳ τὸ μέρος. οἱ οὖν τὸ πολὺ φέροντες ἡσχύνοντο <τό>

τε μὴ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ ἑαυτῶν εἰς τὸ κοινόν. καὶ ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν πλέον εἶχον τῶν μικρὸν φερομένων, ἐπαύοντο πολλοῦ ὀψωνοῦντες. καταμαθὼν δέ ποτε τῶν συνδειπνούντων τινὰ τοῦ μὲν σίτου πεπαύμενον, τὸ δὲ ὄψον αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἐσθίοντα, λόγου ὄντος περὶ ὀνομάτων, ἐφ᾽ οἵῳ ἔργῳ ἕκαστον εἴη·

ἔχοιμεν ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰπεῖν, ἐπὶ ποίῳ ποτὲ ἔργῳ ἄνθρωπος ὀψοφάγος καλεῖται; ἐσθίουσι μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντες ἐπὶ τῷ σίτῳ ὄψον, ὅταν παρῇ· ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ οἶμαι πω ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὀψοφάγοι καλοῦνται.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη τις τῶν παρόντων.

τί γάρ; ἔφη, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τοῦ σίτου τὸ ὄψον αὐτὸ ἐσθίῃ, μὴ ἀσκήσεως, ἀλλ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα, πότερον ὀψοφάγος εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ οὔ; σχολῇ γ᾽ ἄν, ἔφη, ἄλλος τις ὀψοφάγος εἴη.

καί τις ἄλλος τῶν παρόντων·

ὁ δὲ μικρῷ σίτῳ, ἔφη, πολὺ ὄψον ἐπεσθίων;

ἐμοὶ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ οὗτος δοκεῖ δικαίως ἂν ὀψοφάγος καλεῖσθαι· καὶ ὅταν γε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχωνται πολυκαρπίαν, εἰκότως ἂν οὗτος πολυοψίαν εὔχοιτο.

ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ Σωκράτους εἰπόντος, νομίσας νεανίσκος εἰς αὐτὸν εἰρῆσθαι τὰ λεχθέντα, τὸ μὲν ὄψον οὐκ ἐπαύσατο ἐσθίων, ἄρτον δὲ προσέλαβε. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης καταμαθών·

παρατηρεῖτ᾽, ἔφη, τοῦτον οἱ πλησίον, ὁπότερα τῷ σίτῳ ὄψῳ ἢ τῷ ὄψῳ σίτῳ χρήσεται.

ἄλλον δὲ ποτε τῶν συνδείπνων ἰδὼν ἐπὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ψωμῷ πλειόνων ὄψον γευόμενον·

ἆρα γένοιτ᾽ ἄν, ἔφη, πολυτελεστέρα ὀψοποιία ἢ μᾶλλον τὰ ὄψα λυμαινομένη, ἢ ἣν ὀψοποιεῖται ὁ ἅμα πολλὰ ἐσθίων καὶ ἅμα παντοδαπὰ ἡδύσματα εἰς τὸ στόμα λαμβάνων; πλείω μέν γε τῶν ὀψοποιῶν συμμιγνύων πολυτελέστερα ποιεῖ· ἃ δὲ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ συμμιγνύουσιν, ὡς οὐχ ἁρμόττοντα, ὁ συμμιγνύων, εἴπερ ἐκεῖνοι ὀρθῶς ποιοῦσιν, ἁμαρτάνει τε καὶ καταλύει τὴν τέχνην αὐτῶν. καίτοι πῶς οὐ γελοῖόν ἐστι παρασκευάζεσθαι μὲν ὀψοποιοὺς τοὺς ἄριστα ἐπισταμένους, αὐτὸν δὲ μηδ᾽ ἀντιποιούμενον τῆς τέχνης ταύτης τὰ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων ποιούμενα μετατιθέναι; καὶ ἄλλο δέ τι προσγίγνεται τῷ ἅμα πολλὰ ἐσθίειν ἐθισθέντι· μὴ παρόντων γὰρ πολλῶν μειονεκτεῖν ἄν τι δοκοίη ποθῶν τὸ σύνηθες· ὁ δὲ συνεθισθεὶς τὸν ἕνα ψωμὸν ἑνὶ ὄψῳ προπέμπειν, ὅτε μὴ παρείη πολλά, δύναιτ᾽ ἂν ἀλύπως τῷ ἑνὶ χρῆσθαι.

Academy and Lyceum: Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle

5. Ath. 547D1-8B2 = Lycon 7 Wehrli, AC p. 84 Wilamowitz:

καὶ Λύκων δὲ ὁ Περιπατητικός, ὥς φησιν Ἀντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος, κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐπιδημήσας παιδείας ἕνεκα ταῖς Ἀθήναις περὶ συμβολικοῦ κώθωνος καὶ πόσον ἑκάστη τῶν ἑταιρουσῶν ἐπράττετο μίσθωμα ἀκριβῶς ἠπίστατο. ὕστερον δὲ καὶ τοῦ περιπάτου προστὰς ἐδείπνιζε τοὺς φίλους ἀλαζονείᾳ καὶ πολυτελείᾳ πολλῇ χρώμενος. χωρὶς γὰρ τῶν παραλαμβανομένων εἰς αὐτὰ ἀκροαμάτων καὶ ἀργυρωμάτων καὶ στρωμνῆς ἡ λοιπὴ παρασκευὴ καὶ ἡ τῶν δείπνων περιεργία καὶ ἡ τῶν τραπεζοποιῶν καὶ μαγείρων ὄχλος τοσοῦτος ἦν ὥστε πολλοὺς ὀρρωδεῖν καὶ βουλομένους προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν διατριβὴν ἀνακόπτεσθαι, <καὶ> καθάπερ εἰς πολίτευμα πονηρὸν καὶ χωρηγιῶν καὶ λειτουργιῶν πλῆρες εὐλαβουμένους προσάγειν. ἔδει γὰρ ἄρξαι τε τὴν νομιζομένην ἐν τῷ Περιπάτῳ ἀρχήν (αὕτη δ' ἦν ἐπὶ τῆς εὐκοσμίας τῶν ἐπιχειρούντων) τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας, εἶτα τῇ ἔννῃ καὶ νέᾳ λαβόντα ἀφ' ἑκαστου τῶν ἐπιχειρούντων ἐννέα ὀβολοὺς ὑποδέξασθαι μὴ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς τὴν συμβολὴν εἰσενεγκόντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὓς παρακαλέσειεν ὁ Λύκων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιμελῶς συναντῶντας τῶν πρεσβυτέων εἰς τὴν σχολήν, ὥστε γίνεσθαι μηδὲ εἰς τὸν μυρισμὸν καὶ τοὺς στεφάνους ἱκανὸν τὸ ἐκλεγόμενον ἀργύριον· ἱεροποιῆσαί τε καὶ τῶν Μουσείων ἐπιμελητὴν γενέσθαι. ἃ δὴ πάντα ἐφαίνετο λόγου μὲν ἀλλότρια καὶ φιλοσοφίας εἶναι, τρυφῆς δὲ καὶ περιστάσεως οἰκειότερα. καὶ γὰρ εἰ παρίεντό τινες τῶν μὴ δυναμένων εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλίσκειν ἀπὸ βραχείας καὶ τῆς τυχούσης ὁρμώμενοι χορηγίας, ὅ γ' ἐθισμὸς ἱκανὸς ἦν ἄτοπος. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα συρρυέντες ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ἑως ὄρθρου γενομένης τραπέζης ἀπολαύσωσιν ἢ χάριν ἐξοινίας ἐποιήσαντο τὰς συνόδους ταύτας οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Σπεύσιππον, ἀλλ' ἵνα φαίνωνται καὶ τὸ θεῖον τιμῶντες καὶ μουσικῶς ἀλλήλοις συμπεριφερόμενοι, καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἕνεκεν ἀνέσεως καὶ φιλολογίας. ἃ δὴ πάντα γέγονεν δεύτερα παρὰ τοῖς ὕστερον τῶν τε χλανίδων καὶ τῆς πολυτελείας τῆς εἰρημένης· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε τοὺς λοιποὺς ὑπεξαιροῦμαι. ὁ δὲ Λύκων ὑπ' ἀλαζονείας καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπιφανεστάτῳ τῆς πόλεως τόπῳ ἐν τῇ Κόνωνος οἰκίᾳ εἶχεν εἰκοσίκλινον οἶκον, ὃς ἦν ἐπιτήδειος αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰς ὑποδοχάς. ἦν δὲ ὁ Λύκων καὶ σφαιριστὴς ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐπιδέξιος.

Academy

Plato

5. DL viii 87-8 = Eudoxus T7 Lasserre:

ἔπειτ᾽ οὕτως ἐπανελθεῖν Ἀθήναζε, πάνυ πολλοὺς περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔχοντα μαθητάς, ὥς φασί τινες, ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνα λυπῆσαι, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν παρεπέμψατο. τινὲς δέ φασι καὶ συμπόσιον ἔχοντι τῷ Πλάττωνι αὐτὸν τὴν ἡμικύκλιον κατάκλισιν, πολλῶν ὄντων, εἰσηγήσασθαι.

6a. Cic. Tusc. v 100:

Timotheum clarum hominem Athenis et principem civitatis, ferunt, cum cenavisset apud Platonem eoque convivio admodum delectatus esset vidissetque eum postridie, dixisset, Vestraequidem cenae non solum in praesentia sed etiam postero die iucundae sunt.

6b. Plu. 127A-B:

ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ Τιμόθεος εἶπε τῇ προρεταίᾳ δεδειπνηκὼς ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ παρὰ Πλάτωνι μουσικὸν καὶ λιτὸν δεῖπνον, ὡς οἱ παρὰ Πλάτωνι δειπνήσαντες καὶ εἰς αὔριον ἡδέως γίγνονται.

6c. Plu. 686A-B:

Τιμόθεον τὸν Κόνωνος, ὦ Σόσσιε Σενεκίων, ὡς ἐκ πολυτελῶν καὶ στρατηγικῶν δείπνων ἀναλαβὼν ὁ Πλάτων ἐδείπνισεν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ μουσικῶς καὶ ἀφελῶς 'ταῖς ἀφλεγμάντοις' ὥς φησιν ὁ Ἴων 'τραπέζαις', αἷς ὕπνοι τε καθαροὶ καὶ βραχυόνειροι φαντασίαι, τοῦ σώματος εὐωδίαν καὶ γαλήνην ἔχοντος, μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν <οὖν> ὁ Τιμόθεος αἰσθόμενος τῆς διαφορᾶς ἔφη τοὺς παρὰ Πλάτωνι δειπνήσαντας καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ καλῶς γίνεσθαι. μετὰ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐημερίας ἐφόδιον εὐκρασία σώματος ἀβαπτίστου καὶ ἐλαφροῦ καὶ παρεστῶτος ἀνυπόπτως ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐνέργειαν. ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον οὐκ ἔλαττον ὑπῆρχε τοῦτο τοῖς παρὰ Πλάρωνι δειπνήσασιν, ἡ τῶν λαληθέντων παρὰ πότον ἀναθεώρησις…

5d. Ael. VH ii 18:

Τιμόθεος ὁ Κόνωνος, *στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἀποστάς ποτε τῶν δείπνων τῶν πολυτελῶν καὶ τῶν ἑστιάσεων τῶν στρατηγικῶν ἐκείνων, παραληφθεὶς ὑπὸ* Πλάτωνος *εἰς τὸ ἐν Ἀκαδεμίᾳ συμπόσιον καὶ ἑστιαθεὶς ἀφελῶς ἅμα καὶ μουσικῶς ἔφη πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπανελθὼν ὅτι ἄρα οἱ παρὰ* Πλάτωνι *δειπνοῦντες καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ καλῶς διάγουσιν. ἐκ δὲ τούτου διέβαλλε εὐφραίνοντα. λόγος δὲ, καὶ ἐκείνος ἀδελφὸς τῷ προειρημένῳ καὶ ταὐτὸν νοῶν, οὐ μὲν τὰ αὐτυὰ λέγων περίεισιν, ὅτι ἄρα τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ὁ* Τιμόθεος *περιτυχὼν τῷ* Πλάτωνι, *εἶπεν· ὑμεῖς, ὦ* Πλάτων, *εὖ δειπνεῖτε μᾶλλον εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν ἢ εἰς τὴν παροῦσαν.*

6e. Ath. 419C-D:

Τιμόθεος δ' ὁ Κόνωνος *ἐκ τῶν πολυτελῶν καὶ στρατηγικῶν δείπνων παραληφθεὶς ὑπὸ* Πλάτωνος *εἰς τὸ ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ συμπόσιον καὶ ἑστιαθεῖς ἀφελῶς καὶ μουσικῶς ἔγη ὡς οἱ παρὰ* Πλάτωνι *δειπνοῦντες καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ καλῶς γίγνονται. ὁ δ' Ἡγήσανδρος ἐν τοῖς* Ὑπομνήμασιν *ἔφη ὡς καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ὁ* Τιμόθεος *ἀπαντήσας τῷ* Πλάτωνι *εἶπεν· ὑμεῖς, ὦ* Πλάτων, *εὖ δειπνεῖτε μᾶλλον εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν ἢ τὴν παροῦσαν ἡμέραν.*

Arcesilaus

7. Ath. 420D-E (cf. 420C-D):

ἄλλοτε δὲ ὁ Αρκεσίλαος *δ' Ἀπελλῆ τῷ γνωρίμῳ προστάξας καθυλλίσαι τὸν οἶνον, ἐπειδὲ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ἐκεῖνος τὰ μὲν ἐτάραττεν, τὰ δ' ἐξέχει, καὶ πολὺ θολώτερος ἐφαινετο ὁ οἶνος, ὑπομειδιάσας ἔφη· `ἐγὼ δὲ καθυλίσαι προσέταξα ἀνθρώπῳ μηδὲν ἑωρακότι ἀγαθὸν ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐγώ. ἀνάστηθι οὖν σύ, Ἀρίδεικες· σὺ δὲ ἀπελθὼν τὰ ἐκτὰ τρύπα'. ταῦτα δ' οὕτως εὔφραινε καὶ ἐξιλάρου τοὺς παρόντας ὡς εὐθυμίας πληροῦσθαι.*

Lyceum after Aristotle

8. Plu. 1095E-6C:

τί λέγεις, ὦ Ἐπίκουρε; κιθαρῳδῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν ἔωθεν ἀκροασόμενος εἰς τὸ θέατρον βαδίζεις, ἐν δὲ συμποσίῳ Θεωφράστου περὶ συμφωνιῶν διαλεγομένου καὶ Ἀριστοξένου περὶ μεταβολῶν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ Ὁμήρου τὰ ὦτα καταλήψῃ ταῖς χερσὶ δυσχεραίνων καὶ βδελυττόμενος... ποῖος γὰρ ἂν αὐλὸς ἢ κιθάρα διηρμοσμένη πρὸς ᾠδὴν ἢ τίς χορός 'εὐρύοπα κέλαδον ἀκροσόφων ἀγνύμενον διὰ στομάτων' φθεγγόμενος οὕτως εὔφραινεν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ Μητρόδωρον, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ Θεόφραστον καὶ Δικαίαρχον καὶ Ἱερώνυμον οἱ περὶ χορῶν λόγοι καὶ διδασκαλιῶν καὶ τὰ <δι'> αὐλῶν προβλήματα καὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονιῶν; οἷον διὰ τί τῶν ἴσων αὐλῶν ὁ στενότερος <ὀξύτερον, ὁ δ' εὐρύτερος> βαρύτερον φθέγγεται· καὶ διὰ τί, τῆς σύριγγος ἀνασπωμένης, πᾶσιν ὀξύνεται τοῖς φθόγγοις κλινομένης δὲ πάλιν βαρύνεται, καὶ συναχθεὶς πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον <βαρύτερον>, διαχθεὶς δ' ὀξύτερον ἠχεῖ· καὶ τί δήποτε τῶν θεάτρων ἂν ἄχυρα τῆς ὀρχήστρας κατασκεδάσῃς, ὁ ἦχος τυφλοῦται, καὶ χαλκοῦν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐν Πέλλῃ βουλόμενον ποιῆσαι τὸ προσκήνιον οὐκ εἴασεν ὁ τεχνίτης ὡς διαφθεροῦντα τῶν ὑποκριτῶν τὴν φωνήν· καὶ τί δήποτε τῶν γενῶν διαχεῖ τὸ χρωματικόν, ἡ δ' ἁρμονία συνίστησιν. ἤθη δὲ ποιητῶν καὶ πλάσματα καὶ διαφοραὶ χαρακτήρων καὶ λύσεις ἀπορίων ἐμ τῷ πρέποντι καὶ γλαφυρῷ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἅμα καὶ πιθανὸν ἔχουσαι τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφῶντος ἐκεῖνο δοκοῦσι καὶ τὸν ἐρῶντα ποιεῖν ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι· τοσοῦτο ἡδονῇ κρατοῦσιν.

9. Ath. 427C-D = Thphr. L130 Fortenbaugh:

ἦσαν δ' αἱ τῶν ἀκροατῶν ἐπιχύσεις, ἕς φησι Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ <u>περὶ Μέθης</u>, οὐ παλαιαί· ἀλλ' ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸ μὲν σπένδειν ἀποδεδομένον τοῖς θεοῖς, ὁ δὲ κότταβος τοῖς ἐρωμένοις.

10. Ath. 632A = Aristoxenus 124 Wehrli:

διόπερ Ἀροστόξενος ἐν τοῖς **Σύμμικτοις Συμποτικοῖς***· ὅμοιον, φησί, ποιοῦμεν* Ποσειδωνιάταις *τοῖς ἐν Τυρσηνικῷ κόλπῳ κατοικοῦσιν... οὕτω δὴ οὖν, φησί, καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ θέατρα ἐκβεβαρβάρωται καὶ εἰς μεγάλην διαφθορὰν προελήλυθεν ἡ πάνδημος αὕτη μουσική, καθ' αὑτοὺς γενόμενοι ὀλίγοι ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα οἵα ἦν ἡ μουσική. ταῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἀριστόξενος.*

Socratic schools: Menedemus

11a. Ath. 419E-20C = p. 99 Wilamowitz + Lycophron, TGF pp. 817-8 Nauck:

Ἀντίγονος δ' ὁ Καρύστιος ἐν τῷ **Μενεδήμου βίῳ** τὴν διάταξιν διηγούμενος τοῦ παρὰ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ συμποσίου φησὶν ὅτι ἠρίστα μὲν δεύτερος ἢ τρίτος καθ' αὑτόν· κἆτ' ἔδει καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς παρεῖναι δεδειπνηκότας. ἦν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Μενεδήμου τοιοῦτον ἄριστον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰσεκάλουν τοὺς παραγιγνομένους· ὧν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτε προτερήσειαν ἔνιοι τῆς ὥρας, ἀνακάμπτοντες παρὰ τὰς θύρας ἀνεπυνθάνοντο τῶν ἐξιόντων παίδων τί τὸ παρακείμενον εἴη καὶ πῶς ἔχοι τῆς τοῦ χρόνου συμμετρίας τὸ ἄριστον. ὅτε μὲν οὖν ἀκούσειαν λάχανον ἢ τάριχος, ἀνεχώρουν, ὅτε δ' ὅτι κρεᾶδιον, εἰσῄεσαν εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦτο παρεσκευασμένον οἶκον. ἦν δὲ τοῦ μὲν θέρους ἡτοιμασμένη ψίαθος ἐφ' ἑκάστης κλίνης, τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος κώδιον· προσκεφάλαιον δὲ αὐτὸν φέρειν ἕκαστν ἔδει. τὸν δὲ περιαγόμενον ποτήριον οὐ μεῖζον ἦν κοτυλιαίου, τράγημα δὲ θέρμος μὲν κύαμος συνεχῶς, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὡρίων εἰσεφέρετό τι, τοῦ μὲν θέρους ἄπιος ἢ ῥόα, τοῦ δ' ἔαρος ὦχροι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν χειμερινὴν ὥραν ἰσχάδες. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτων Λυκόφρων ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς σατύρους **Μενέδημον**, ἐν οἷς φησιν·

[Σιληνὸς πρὸς τοὺς σατύρους]

παῖδες κρατίστου πατρὸς ἐωλέστατοι,

ἐγὼ μὲν ὑμῖν, ὡς ὁρᾶτε, στρηνιῶ·

δεῖπνον γὰρ οὔτ' ἐν Καρίᾳ, μὰ τοὺς Θεούς,

κατέχω δεδειπνηκώς. Ἄπολλον, ὡς καλόν.

καὶ προελθών·

... ἀλλὰ κυλίσκιον

ὑδαρὲς ὁ παῖς περιῆγε τοῦ πεντοβόλου,

ἀτρέμα παρεχεστηκώς· ὅ τ' ἀλιτήριος

καὶ δημόκοινος ἐπεχόρευε δαψιλὴς

θέρμος, πενήτων καὶ τρικλίνου συμπότης.

ἐξῆς δέ φησιν ὅτι χητήσεις ἦσαν παρὰ πότον·

... τράγημα γὰρ

ὁ σωφρονιστὴς πᾶσιν ἐν μέσῳ λόγος.

ἱστορεῖται δὲ καὶ ὅτι πολλάκις συνόντας αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ πλεῖον

... ὁ τὴν ἕω καλῶν

κατέλαβεν ὄρνις· τοῖσι δὲ οὐδέπω κόρος...

11b. DL ii 139-40:

τὰ δὲ συμπόσια τοῦτον ἐποιεῖτο τὸν τρόπον· προηρίστα μετὰ δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν ἕως βραδέως ἦν τῆς ἡμέρας· ἔπειτά τις ἐκάλει τοὺς παραγενομένους καὶ αὐτοὺς ἤδη δεδειπνηκότας· ὥστ᾽ εἴ τις ἔλθοι θᾶττον, ἀνακάμπτων ἐπυνθάνετο τῶν ἐξιόντων τ᾽ εἴη παρακείμενον καὶ πῶς ἔχοι τὸ τοῦ χρόνου· εἰ μὲν οὖν λαχάνιον ἢ ταρίχιον, ἀνεχώρουν· εἰ δὲ κρεᾶδιον, εἰσῄεσαν. ἦν δὲ τοῦ μὲν θέρους ψίαθος ἐπὶ τῶν κλινῶν, τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος κώδιον· προσκεφάλαιον αὐτῷ φέρειν ἔδει. τό τε περιαγόμενον ποτήριον οὐ μεῖζον ἦν κοτυλιαίου· τράγημα θέρμος ἢ κύαμος, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε καὶ τῶν ὡρίων ἄπιος ἢ ῥοιὰ ἢ ὦχροι ἢ νὴ Δι᾽ ἰσχάδες. ἃ πάντα φησὶν ὁ Λυκόφρων ἐν τοῖς πεποιημένοις σατύροις αὐτῷ, οὓς <u>Μενέδημος</u> ἐπέγραφεν, ἐγκώμιον τοῦ φιλοσόφου ποιήσας τὸ δρᾶμα· ὧν καί τινά ἐστι τοιαυτί·

ὡς ἐκ βραχείας δαιτὸς ἡ βαιὰ κύλιξ

αὐτοῖς κυκλεῖται πρὸς μέτρον, τράγημα δὲ

ὁ σωφρονιστὴς τοῖς φιληκόοις λόγος.

12. DL ii 133:

ἦν δὲ καὶ φιλυπόδοχος καὶ διὰ τὸ νοσῶδες τῆς Ἐρετρίας πλείω συνάγων συμπόσια· ἐν οἷς καὶ ποιητῶν καὶ μουσικῶν. ἠσπάζετο δὲ καὶ Ἄρατον καὶ Λυκόφρονα τὸν τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητὴν καὶ τὸν Ῥόδιον

Ἀνταγόραν...

13. DL ii 138:

ὅτε μετὰ χρόνον ἐλθόντος ἐπὶ κῶμον ἐρωμένου τοῦ Ἀσκληπιάδου καὶ τῶν νεανίσκων ἀποκλειόντων αὐτόν, ὁ Μενέδημος ἐκέλευσεν εἰσέξασθαι, εἰπὼν ὅτι Ἀσκληπιάδης αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ γῆς ὢν τὰς θύρας ἀνοίγει.

Garden

14. DL x 18:

ἐκ δὲ τῶν γιγνομένων προσόδων τῶν δεδομένων ἀφ᾽ Ἀμυνομάχῳ καὶ Τιμοκράτει *κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν μεριζέσθωσαν μεθ᾽ Ἑρμάρχου σκοπούμενοι αἷς τε τὰ ἐναγίσματα τῷ τε πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, καὶ ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν εἰθισμένην ἄγεσθαι γενέθλιον ἡμέραν ἑκάστου ἔτους τῇ προτεραίᾳ δεκάτῃ τοῦ* Γαμηλιῶνος, *ὥσπερ καὶ εἰς τὴν γινομένην σύνοδον ἑκάστου μηνὸς ταῖς εἰκάσι τῶν συμφιλοσοφούντων ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν ἡμῶν τε καὶ* Μετροδώρου *<μηήμην> κατατεταγμένην. συντελείτωσαν δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἡμέραν τοῦ* Ποσειδεῶνος· *συντελείτωσαν δὲ καὶ τὴν* Πολυαίνου *τοῦ* Μεταγειτνιῶνος *καθάπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς.*

15. Plu. 1089C = 436 Usener:

... οὔτε τοὺς μετρίους καὶ σώφρονας εἰκὸς ἐνδιατρίβειν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲ ἅπερ ἔσκωπτε τὶν Ἐπίκουρον Καρνεάδης πράττοντας οἷον ἐξ ἐφημερίδων ἀναλέγεσθαι· ποσάκις Ἡδεία καὶ Λεοντίῳ συνῆλθον; ἢ· ποῦ Θάσιον ἔπιον; ἢ· ποίας εἰκάδος ἀδείπνησα πολυτελέστατα;

16. Phld. xxiii 3305 G-P:

αὔριον εἰς λιτήν σε καλιάδα, φίλτατε Πείσων,
ἐξ ἐνάτης ἕλκει μουσοφιλὴς ἕταρος
εἰκάδα δειπνίζων ἐνιαύσιον· εἰ δ᾽ ἀπολείψεις
οὔθατα καὶ Βρομίου Χιογενῆ πρόποσιν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἑτάρους ὄψει παναληθέας, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπακούσῃ
Φαιήκων γαίης πουλὺ μελιχρότερα·
ἢν δέ ποτε στρέψῃς καὶ ἐς ἡμέας ὄμματα, Πείσων,
ἄξομεν ἐκ λιτῆς εἰκάδα πιστέρην.

Stoa

17. Ath. 186A:

πολλῶν γοῦν εἰσι φιλοσόφων ἐν ἄστει σύνοδοι τῶν μὲν Διογενιστῶν, τῶν δὲ Ἀντιπατριστῶν λεγομένων, τῶν δὲ Παναιτιαστῶν. *κατέλιπε δὲ καὶ* Θεόφραστος *εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην σύνοδον χρήματα, μὰ Δι᾽ οὐχ ἵνα ἀκολασταίνωσι συνιόντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα τὰ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ συμποσίου νόμον σωφρόνως καὶ πεπαιδευμένως διεξάγωσι.*

18. Ath. 186C:

Ἀντίπατρος δ᾽ ὁ φιλόσοφος συμπόσιόν ποτε συνάγων συνέταξε τοῖς ἐρχομένοις ὡς περὶ σοφισμάτων ἐροῦσιν.

B. At Court

Dionysius, Syracusae

19a. DL ii 73: *Ἀναγκαζόμενος ποτε* [*sc* Aristippus] *ὑπὸ Διονυσίου εἰπεῖν τι τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, `γελοῖον΄ ἔφη `εἰ τὸ λέγειν μὲν παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ πυνθάνῃ, τὸ δὲ πότε δεῖ λέγειν σύ με διδάσκεις΄. ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ διαγανακτήσαντα τὸν Διονύσιον ἔσχατον αὐτὸν κατακλῖναι· καὶ τόν· `ἐνδοξότερον΄ φάναι `τὸν τόπον ἠθέλησας ποιῆσαι΄.*

19b. Ath. 544C:

Ἡγήσανδρος γοῦν φησιν ὡς καὶ ἀδόξου ποτὲ κλισίας παρ᾽ αὐτῷ [*sc* Dionysius] *τυχών* [*sc* Aristippus] *ἤνεγκεν ἐρωτήσαντός τε τοῦ Διονυσίου τί φαίνεται ἡ κατάκλισις πρὸς τὴν χθὲς ἔφεσεν παραπλησίαν εἶναι. `ἐκεῖνο τε γὰρ΄ ἔφησεν ` ἀδοξεῖ τήμερον χωρισθεῖσα ἐμοῦ, χθὲς δὲ πασῶν ἦν ἐνδοξοτάτη δι᾽ ἡμᾶς, αὕτη τε τήμερον καὶ ἔνδοξος γέγονεν διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν παρουσίαν, χθὲς δὲ ἠδόξει μὴ παρόντος ἐμοῦ΄.*

20. DL ii 76:

καὶ ποτε παρὰ πότον κελεύσαντος Διονυσίου εκαστον ἐν πρφυρᾷ ἐσθῆτι ὀρχήσασθαι, τὸν μὲν Πλάτωνα *μὴ προσέσθαι, εἴποντα·*

οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην θῆλυν ἐνδῦναι στολήν [= E. Ba. 836]·

τὸν δ᾽ Ἀρίστιππον λαβόντα καὶ μέλλοντα ὀρχήσασθαι εὐστόχως εἰπεῖν·

καὶ γὰρ ἐν βακχεύμασιν

οὖσ᾽ ἡ γε σώφρων οὐ διαφθαρήσεται [E. Ba. 317-8].

Nicocreon, Cyprus

21a. DL ii 129-30:

διὰ οὖν δὴ τὸ παρρεσιαστικὸν τοῦτο μικροῦ καὶ καὶ ἐκινδύνευσεν [*sc* Menedemus of Eretria] *ἐν* Κύπρῳ *παρὰ* Νικοκρέοντι *σὺν* Ἀσκληπιάδῃ *τῷ φίλῳ. τοῦ γὰρ τοι βασιλέως ἐπιμήνιον ἑορτὴν τελοῦντος καὶ καλέσαντος καὶ τούτους ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοσόφους, τὸν* Μενέδημον *εἶπεῖν ὡς εἰ καλὸν ἦν ἡ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνδρῶν συναγωγή, καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἔδει γίνεσθαι τὴν ἑορτήν· εἰ δ᾽ οὔ, περιττῶς καὶ νῦν. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο ἀπαντήσαντος τοῦ τυράννου καὶ εἰπόντος ὡς ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν ἔχοι σχολάζουσαν πρὸς τὸ διακούειν φιλοσόφων, ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον αὐστηρότερον ἐνέκειτο, δεικνὺς ἐπὶ τῆς θυσίας ὡς χρὴ πάντα καιρὸν φιλοσόφων ἀκούειν· ἕως εἰ μή τις αὐλητὴς αὐτοὺς διεπέμψατο, κἂν ἀπόλοιντο.*

21b. Ath. 337E:

ἐν Κύπρῳ *παρὰ* Νικοκρέοντι *δειπνῶν* [*sc* Lyncaeus] *ἐπήνεσε ποτήριόν τι. καὶ ὁ* Νικοκρέων *ἔφη· `ἐὰν βούλῃ, ὁ αὐτὸς τεχνίτης ποιήσει σοι ἕτερον΄. `σοί γέ΄ ἔφη, `ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο δός΄…*

Antigonus Gonatas, Macedon

22a. DL iv 41-2:

μάλιστα δὲ ἐπετίθεντο αὐτῷ [*sc* Arcesilaus] *οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἱερώνυμον τὸν Περιπατητικόν, ὁπότε συνάγοι τοὺς γίλους εἰς τὴν Ἀλκυόνεως τοῦ Ἀντιγόνου υἱοῦ ἡμέραν, εἰς ἣν ἱκανὰ χρήματα ἀπέστελλεν Ἀντίγονος πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν. ἔνθα καὶ παραιτούμενος ἑκάστοτε τὰς ἐπικυλικείους ἐξηγήσεις πρὸς Ἀρίδηλον προτείνοντά τι θεώρημα καὶ ἀξιοῦντα εἰς αὐτὸ λέγειν εἰπεῖν, `ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο μάλιστα φιλοσοφίας ἴδιον, τὸ καιρὸν ἕκαστον ἐπίστασθαι´.*

22b. DL v 68:

οὕτω δ' ἦν ἐχθρὸς [*sc* Lycon] *Ἱερωνύμῳ τῷ Περιπατητικῷ, ὥς μόνον μὴ ἀπαντᾶν πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν ἐτήσιον ἡμέραν, περὶ ἧς ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἀρκησιλάου βίῳ διειλέγμεθα.*

23. DL ii 144:

διὸ καί ποτε παρὰ πότον ὁ Μενέδημος ἐλέγξας αὐτὸν [*sc* Pesaeus] *ἐν λόγοις τά τε ἄλλα ἔφη καὶ δὴ καί· `φιλόσοφος μέντοι οὗτος, ἀνὴρ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γενησομένων κάκιστος´.*

Ptolemy Soter, Alexandria

24. DL ii 111-2:

οὗτος [*sc* Diodorus Cronus] *παρὰ Πτολεμαίῳ τῷ Σωτῆρι διατρίβων λόγους τινὰς διαλεκτικοὺς ἠρωτήθη πρὸς Στίλπωνος· καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος παραχρῆμα διαλύσασθαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως τά τε ἄλλα ἐπετιμήθη καὶ δὴ καὶ Κρόνος ἤκουσεν ἐν σκώμματος μέρει. ἐξελθὼν δὴ τοῦ συμποσίου καὶ λόγον γρ´ψας περὶ τοῦ προβλήματος ἀθυμίᾳ τὸν βίον κατέστρεψε.*

APPENDIX IV

Terms for Commensality in Plato

δαίς

'Banquet'; poetic; no institutional connotations. It designates the consumption of meat after sacrifice (Il. xv 19, xxiv 69 - ceremonial of sharing; cf. also, for savage banquets, S. Ph. 954 and A. Ag. 1242, 1593 [Thyestes]).

Plato:

Symposion 174A6-D1: ironical - misquotation of proverb

Phaedrus 247A8-B3: divine banquet in myth of the soul

δαιτυμών

'Guest'; pretentious (Od. vii 102, Alcman 39P, Hdt. i 173, Arist. Pol. $1282^{a}22$).

Plato:

Republic 345B9-D1: in argument (Socrates)

Timaeus 17A1-B4: metaphor related to dialogue as a whole

δαπάνη

'Expenditure'; often for banquets (Aeschin. Tim. 65.2, Arist. Pol. $1281^{b}3$, $1309^{a}18$), hence by extension 'banquet' (Anaximenes Rh. ii 9.4: *τοὺς θεοὺς χαίρειν ταῖς δαπάναις τῶν θυομένων*).

Plato:

Phaedrus 233D8-E5[1]: example in Lysias' speech

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1. 'Expenditure for dinner'; some five other occurrences have nothing to do with the symposion.

δεῖπνον

'Meal', as opposed to *συμπόσιον* (Thgn. i 999, E. Ion 1032, *πρὸς δεῖπνα θυσίας θ'* , *ie* before the drinks); also, general term for supper. Widest area - it can be applied to any ritual, including the symposion (cf. Pi. P. 9.10; fr. 124)[2]. Often used for: official receptions in the Athenian prytaneion, civic dinners, (Antiphanes 44.3: *ἐπὶ δεῖπνον εἰς τὰ φειδίτια*), military messes (very frequent in Xenophon); cf also the standard invitation for ordinary citizens *ἐπὶ δεῖπνον καλεῖν*, both in official documents and in private invitations (private: Hdt. i 119.4, iii 42.11, X. Mem. i 3.6.2, ii 3.11.4, Cyr. i 30.2, Alexis 210.1). *Deipnon* and *symposion* are good **modern** labels for the two parts of a Greek banquet, but Greek language does not express this cleavage in the same way.

Plato:

Crito 53E4-6: exhortation of the Athenian Laws

Symposion 174A6-D1 (see *δαίς*), 174E9-11, 175B5-C1, 175E7-10: reference to Agathon's party[3]

Republic 327A1-3: reference to dialogue

Theaetetus 173D4-6: example

Critias 119E5-20C4: royal banquet in myth of Atlantid kings

ἑορτή

'Feast', religious, public - typical use for a ceremonial complex such as Thargelia (Arist. Ath. 56.5.3), Panathenaea (D. Phil. i 35), Bouphonia (Hyperides 81.1)[4]; god or hero often mentioned, Anacr. 65.2, Pd. N. xi 27, Th. vii 73. Frequently associated with the synonymous *πανήγυρις* (X. Cyr. vi 1.10.7, Hdt. ii 60, Hippocr. De purg. 11.4) and especially with *θυσία*, 'sacrifice' (X. Hell. ii 40.20.6, Cyr. vi 2.6.1, Th. *lc*, Isocr. Big. 34-6.). Abundant in poetry (Homer) and prose (historical, oratorical). Interesting secondary sense, 'in joke' (*ἐν*

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2. 'Le terme a içi un sens large de repas-buverie' (Van Groningen; but not because the Lydians would not separate, comme les Grecs, 'le deipnon du symposion').

3. The first three are variants of the invitation formula (*δεῖπνον* for the whole party). In the last occurrence *δεῖπνον* is restricted to the meal (*πρῶτα τρέτου*).

4. Also Plato: Delia (Phd. 61A5), Bendideia, Apatouria.

παιδιᾷ, *ἐν γέλωτι*, *ἐν ἑορτῇ*, Arist. Rh. 1380^{b}3; *ἑορτὴ ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ τὰ δέοντα πράξαι*, Th. i 70), also recorded in Plato (*παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ἑορτῆς χάριν*, Phdr. 276B5[5]).

Plato[6]:

Gorgias 447A1-6: ironical use of proverbial phrase

Symposion 197D1-3: Eros in Agathon's speech

Republic 327A1-3 (see *δεῖπνον*)

Republic 364B5-C5: popular account of justice (Adeimantus)

Republic 459E5-60A6: project for marriage in Callipolis

Republic 573D2-5: tyrannical life-style

Timaeus 21A8-B4: reference to the dialogue

Laws 653C7-D5: argument on *παιδεία*

Laws 799A4-B8, 809D1-E2, 816C1-D2, 828A1-C6, 834D8-5B4, 835D3-E2: projects for public feasts in Magnesia

ἑστίασις

'Public entertainment'; technical word, relatively rare in literary sources. Liturgy associated with Dionysia and Panathenaea - details obscure. *ἑστίασις* is a public meal given to the tribe by a wealthy member, after the sacrifice. Event of great social importance in Athenian life.

Plato:

Republic 352B3-6: metaphor related to the dialogue

Republic 404B10-E1: Homeric dinners recommended for the Guardians' diet

Republic 479B11-C5: example

Republic 611E1-2A3: metaphor

Timaeus 27B7-9: metaphor related to the dialogue

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5. Not to be confounded with the proverbial phrase at Grg. 447a and its use by Socrates.

6. 23 occurrences.

Laws 775A4-B1: project for wedding-parties in Magnesia

ἑστιάτωρ

Person charged with the liturgy of *ἑστίασις*; honorific position, not permanent.

Plato:

Republic 421A8-B3: example (Socrates)

Timaeus 17A1-B4: metaphor (see *δαιτυμών*)

ἑστιᾶν

'Invite, entertain'; wide[7], but the active participle used sometimes for *ἑστιάτωρ*. By Plato's time the middle and passive ('be invited, be a guest, be feasted') do not seem to have acquired the secondary sense 'enjoy', although this is perhaps preluded in a few metaphors (Ar. Pax 340-5 and X. Smp. ii 3.2).

Plato:

Lysis 211C10-D4: metaphor related to the dialogue

Gorgias 518C7-E3: example (Socrates)

Symposion 174A6-D1: ironical reference to Homeric feasts (see *δαίς*)

Symposion 203B2-7: divine banquet in myth of Eros

Republic 345B9-D1 (see *δαιτυμών*)

Republic 354A10-C3: metaphor related to the dialogue

Republic 404B10-E1 (see *ἑστίασις*)

Republic 458A1-2: metaphor in example about method

Republic 571D6-2B1: metaphor in argument by Socrates

Republic 611E1-2A3 (see *ἑστίασις*)

Phaedrus 227B6-7: metaphor in introductory scene

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7. Weddings, victory celebrations, sacrifice, birthdays, club-gatherings, official meals; cf. Ar. Av. 132, E. HF 483; D. 59.33.9, X. Cyr. viii 4.1.1; Arist. EN $1122^{b}22$-3, Isa. iii 80.1; X. Cyr. i 3.10.5; Epich. 87.1, Arist. EN $1123^{a}22$; Hyperides fr 139.1f.

Phaedrus 247D5-E4: metaphor in myth of soul

Theaetetus 178D8-10: example (Socrates)

Timaeus 17A1-B4 (*ἀνταφεστιᾶν*; see *δαιτυμών*, *ἀστιάτωρ*)

εὐωχία

'Party, merry feast' (*εὐ ἔχειν*). Wide (*θύσαντες δέ... βους... εὐωχίαν παρεῖχον... ἐδείπνουν καὶ ἔπιον*, X. Anab. vi 1.4.1-3; cf. also ii 3.21-3). Often designates military dinners (X. Cyr. ii 3.23.6-7, iv 2.38.8, v 2.19.4-5), sometimes orgiastic parties (Italian: Ar. fr. 216, Persian: X. Cyr. i 5.1.4 sqq.); hence derogatory (Arist. EN 1148^{b}23 sqq; cf. Hippocr. Aff. 27 and 15-18). No poetical ancestry; first occurrence in Aristophanes; long survival in Christian authors.

Plato:

Symposion 203B2-7: divine banquet (see *ἑστιᾶν*)

Symposion 219E7-20A5: military dinners (Alcibiades' recollections of Socrates)

Republic 329A4-8: example

Republic 345B9-D1: argument (see *δαιτυμών*, *ἑστιᾶν*)

Republic 586A1-B4: argument (Socrates)

vii Letter 326B6-D6: Sicillian recollections

εὐωχεῖν

'To feast, revel'; also 'feed' (active) and 'eat' (middle)[8] - senses which also occur in Plato (R. 588E and 411C). More common than the noun; not poetic, but used in a food metaphor by Metagenes (Old Comedy): *πολλαῖσι καὶ καιναῖς εὐωχήσω τὸν θέατρον* (i 14K). This is the only parallel to Platonic usage which I found.

8. Ar. V. 1306, X. Mem. iii 14.7, Cyr. i 3.6.2, Anab. v 3.11.25 sqq. Ambiguous cases: Alexis 49, X. Cyr. iv 5.7.2.

Plato[9]:

Crito 53E4-6 (see *δεῖπνον*)

Republic 352B3-6: metaphor (see *ἑστίασις*)

Republic 372A5-E1: life in First City

Republic 420E1-1A2: potters' banquet

Laws 666B3: Third Choir

θαλία

'Feast' (Hdt. iii 27); and, like *εὐωχία*, the state of mind attached to it (Ar. Av. 733). Unlike *εὐωχία*, *θαλία* is an old poetic term, rare in prose (Od. xi 602-3: banquets of gods; Pi. O. x 34: feasting in the 'Hyperborean paradise'; Ar. Pax 780: banquets of the Blessed). Dionysus and wine frequently evoked (Xenoph. fr 1.12; E. Ba. 384; Ion of Chius, 26.3-4W; Ar. Nu. 309).

Plato:

Republic 573D2-5[10]: tyrant (see *ἑορτή*)

θοίνη

'Sacrificial banquet' (A. Pr. 530; Epich. fr. i 148K). More often related to the first part of the banquet[11]. Sometimes used, like *δαίς*, for foul meals (Hdt. i 119.19: Harpagus' dinner; Timoth. 15.2.138P: predators feasting on human flesh). Poetic, but non-Homeric; suitable in mythologic context (Bacchyl. fr 33, A. fr. 350.7, quoted by Plato: marrige of Thetis and Peleus, R. 383b7). Theognis uses this term referring to aristocratic

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9. 11 occurrences; only 5 related to commensality, which is indicated by context.

10. But this case is difficult: one ms reads *θαλιαι*, all others read *θαλειαι*, and mss do not give accents. *θάλειαι* was universally adopted until Stallbaum. *θάλειος* is a regular epic and lyric epithet of the feast (Il. vii 475, Od. iii 420, S. fr 605), but not used as a noun (except for the Muse); I would prefer *θαλία*. See Adam *ad l.*

11. *ἐκ μὲν θυσίας θοίνα, ἐκ δὲ θοίνας πόσις ἐγένετο*, Epich. *lc*. In Philoxenus' Deipnon *πόσις*, *κότταβος* and *λόγοι* come after *θοίνη* (3.48).

symposia by this name (i 239-40), and Alcman to syssitia (according to Strabo; but his example is dubious; see fr 39P).

Plato:

Symposion 174A6-D1: Agamemnon and Agathon' s feast (see *δαίς*, *δεῖπνον*, *ἑστιᾶν*)

Phaedrus 236E7-8: metaphor

Phaedrus 247A8-B3: divine banquet (see *δαίς*)

Theaetetus 178D8-10: example (see *ἑστιᾶν*)

Sophist 251B5-6: metaphor[12]

θυσία

'Sacrifice', cf. Hdt. i 132, Pd. O. vii 47), most usually immolation of a living animal (E. IT 1081, Hdt. iv 63), followed by ritual consumption at banquet (see *eg θυσία*, *δεῖπνον*, *πίνειν*, D. 19.135). Current practice vital to Greeks life (cf. Th. ii 38.1, Isoc. iv 43.6, S. OT 1006sq). Sometimes it designates (like *ἱερεῖα*) the animal or the meat (also *θύμα*).

Plato[13]:

Symposion 174A6-D1: Agamemnon's feast (see *δαίς*, *ἑστιᾶν*, *θοίνη*)

Symposion 197D1-3: Agathon (see *ἑορτή*)

Republic 364B5-C5: Adeimantus (see *ἑορτή*)

Republic 419A1-20A1: example

Republic 459E5-60A6: Adeimantus (objection to Socrates)

Republic 468D7-E2: project for feasts in Callipolis; Homer

Timaeus 26E2-5: reference to the dialogue

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12. 'Magnificent entertainment', Cornford - use similar to La. 406C, Phdr. 236E (*ἑορτῆς χάριν*) and Lg. 649A4 (*οὐκ ἐν θοίνῃ λέγω*, 'I don't take seriously' = *ἐν παιδιᾷ, οὐκ ἐν σπουδῇ*; both *θοίνη* and *ἑορτή* developed this sense). This occurrence should not be compared with *θοίνη* at Smp. 174C (England).

13. 54 occurrences (27 in the Laws); I leave out many (*eg* festivals mentioned cursorily: Delia, Phd. 61B3, Nemaea, Lg. 950E; or, Corybantic rites, Lg. 790D, relation between sacrifice and belief, Lg. 738C3, etc).

Laws 799A4-B8, 816C1-D2, 828A1-C6, 829B2-C5, 835D3-E2: projects for feasts in Magnesia (see *ἑορτή*)

θύειν

'To sacrifice'.

Plato[14]:

Lysis 205C6-D4: reference to the dialogue (Hermaea)

Symposion 173A5-7: reference to Agathon's victory feast

Republic 328C1-4: reference to the dialogue (Bendideia?)

Critias 119E5-C4: preliminaries to Atlantid banquet (see *δεῖπνον*)

κρατήρ

'Mixing-bowl', the vessel for mixing wine and water; one of the most typical objects of the symposion - it has no use in the outside world. It never came to mean 'banquet' (as *τράπεζα* did), but it evoks the symposion automatically (*eg* *παρὰ κρητῆρι*, Anacr. 56.1G6).

Plato

Critias 119E5-20C4: banquet of Atlantid kings (see *δεῖπνον*)

Laws 773C8-D4: simile in prooemion on the theme of marriage

κῶμος

'Group' (hoard, community)[15]; 'procession at feasts' (*eg* Dionysia, E. Ba. 1167; Hyakinthia, E. Hel. 1469). The most popular use is for the drunken procession out of house, in which many symposia ended (Thgn. 940, 1046; cf. Hdt. i 21, X. Smp. ii 1).

Plato:

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14. 34 occurrences.

15. A. Ag. 1189, E. Tr. 1184, Hipp. 55 etc. The word is related to *κοινός*.

Republic 573D2-5: the tyrant (see *ἑορτή*, *θαλία*)

Theaetetus 173D4-6 (see *δεῖπνον*)

κωμασταί

'Band of revellers'.

Plato:

Symposion 212C4-8, 223B2-6: references to the dialogue

κωμάζειν

'Go out in drunken procession'.

Plato:

Laws 636E8-7C1: example (Megillus)

μέθη, -αι

'Drunkenness'; originally, 'strong fermented drink'. Old; primarily related to honey; precedes the introduction of the vine-plant in the Western Mediterranean (but 'wine' in Homer, Il. 9.469). Much used in philosophical and medical texts; not poetic. Plural: secondary sense 'carousals' (Democr. B159, *ταῖς μέθαις*, and perhaps also Diog. A19, *ἐν ταῖς μέθαις ἧττον φρονεῖν*; cf. Arist. Probl. 875^{b}28, 903^{b}8, fr viii 44.588.7R - probably as in expressions like *ἐπ' οἴνῳ*, Pherecr. 153.9).

Plato:

Phaedrus 256B7-C7: example

Laws 637D3-E7, 642A1-7: defining the subject of the book

οἰνοχόος

'Wine-pourer, cup-bearer' (Hdt. iii 34, X. HG vii 1.38); typical figure in the symposion, represented in myth and iconography as an attractive boy. Poetic term (Il. ii 128, Od. ix 8 [quoted by Plato, R. 562D1], E. Cyc. 560, Ion 2.2, Critias 33D; cf. Hermes as *οἰνοχόος*, Alcaeus 447V, Sappho 141V).

Plato:

Republic 562C8-D4: democracy

Philebus 61C4-8: mixing pleasure and wisdom

ξένια

Neutre plural used as a noun, often in the sense 'gifts of hospitality' (X. Hell. i 1.9, 4.8.2, Cyr. v 4.14, Anab. v 5.2, vi 1.3; D. 19.166, 168; Lys. 18.12.3; E. Hel. 480, Cyc. 301, 342), especially in food and wine (X. Anab. vi 2.3 & 4, Hell. vii 2.4)[16]. The most typical gift to be made to a *ξένος* is a 'feast of hospitality' (Il. xi 779, xviii 387, Od. xv 188, xiv 404, ix 229, 517, Hdt. ii 119, v 18, vi 35, vii 29, ix 15; X. Anab. vi 1.3, vii 6.3, Hell. iii 1.24; D. 7.20.3; Aeschin. FL 39.7, 162.4, E. IT 949, Alc. 754). The city offered hospitality as a great honour, on single occasions; such meals took place in the Prytaneion, on a standard invitation formula different from invitations addressed to citizens: *ἐπὶ ξένια*. Banquets of hospitality in fiction reflect the strength of hospitality ties; they are offered to gods (*ξένια* for *θεοξένια*, E. Hel. 1668), beggars (Eumaeus to Odysseus, Od. xiv 404), and criminals alike (Athenians to Orestes, E. IT 949); the murderous host is more horrifying than the average criminal (A. Ag. 1590, Hdt. ii 107).

Plato:

Timaeus 20B7-1A3, 27A2-3: metaphors related to the dialogue

ξενισμός

Feasts (not official meals) given by the city; obscure[17]. The only literary evidence is Lucian and a scholion to Pindar, which explains *ξενισμός* as *θυσία* to the Dioscuri (O. iii 67); an inscription from Cos refers (like Plato) to a *ξενισμός* for Heracles.

Plato:

Lysis 205C6-D4: reference to poem on Heracles recited at symposia

16. Possible confusion with *ξενία*: Hdt. iv 154, vii 39.

17. Cf. also the *hapax ξένισις* in Th. vi 42.

ξενίζειν

'To entertain', very much like *ἑστιᾶν*[18]. Stylistic variants: *ξενοῦν* (for hospitality between cities), *ξενοδοκεῖν*.

Plato:

Timaeus 17A1-B4: metaphor (see *δαιτυμών*, *ἑστιάτωρ*, *ἑστιᾶν*)

πανήγυρις

'Gathering' - in all senses[19]; crowds in a festival, and thus 'festival'. Very close to *ἑορτή* (Hippocr. Epist. xi 105; Arist. Rh. 1406[a]22, Isoc. Big. 32.2.8, D. Phil. xiv 50.2), *πανήγυρις* and *θυσία* (Hdt. ii 62.6, D. 19.192.6, Or. vi 5.5); but related to the agonistic more than the sacrificial aspect of a feast (Ar. Pax 342, Lys. Or. vi 5.5).

Plato[20]:

Republic 421A8-B3: example (see *ἑστιάτωρ*)

Timaeus 20D7-1A3: reference to dialogue

πόσις

'Drinking': Thgn. i 837, Anacr. fr. 11b3P, Antiph. Chor. 22.6, Arist. HA 519[a]13, Hippocr. Flat. i 24; also, Pl. R. 580E, Lg. 662B, 782E, 783C. Also, 'drink': Il. viii 190 [=wine], Hippocr. Morb. Acut. 10.56)[21]. Secondary sense 'wine-party' (= *εὐωχία*: Hipp. Aff. 27.15; part of *θυσία*: Epich. 148.1-2; of *ἑορτή*: Th. vii

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18. Perhaps in *ἑστιᾶν* the emphasis is on the bestower (who entertains his own people, Ar. fr. 408.1, X. Cyr. i 3.10.5; viii 4.1.1, Arist. EN 1123[a]22, but also strangers, Ar. Lys. 1058, E. Alc. 765-6, Lys. 12.8.2; 19.27.6, etc), on the recipient (a stranger) in *ξενίζειν*.

19. Cf. A. Ag. 845, Th. 220, E. Heracl. 239, HF 1283; also Plato (R. 614E3).

20. See also R. 604E4, Laws 947A1.

21. Sometimes gulp, A. Ch. 578, Hippocr. Morb. 5.1.34.3, Pl. Lg. 647E, 648E. For this sense, the standard use since Homer is in pair with *βρῶσις* (Il. xix 210, Od. i 191, vi 209, Thgn. i 115, Hippocr. Morb. Acut. 9.8.

73.2.7), clear in prepositional phrases: *συγγίνεσθαι ἐν πόσιν* (Hdt. i 172), *παρὰ τὴν πόσιν ἠσπάζοντο* (ii 121), *πρὸς πόσιν τετράφθαι* (Th. *lc*), *ἐν πόσιν ἰέναι* (Hipp. Acut. 18.38).

Plato:

Symposion 213E9-10: reference to the dialogue

Laws 641A3-D2: preliminary discussion on the purpose of the symposion

πότος

'Drink(ing)', quickly developed into 'carousal', 'wine-party'; cf. Aeschin. Tim. 168.4, FL 47.5, 157.7, Demades 48.2, 49.3F, Isoc. Dem. 32.1, Antid. 286.2. Five century prose[22], often medical (*πότος* = *ποτόν*: Hippocr. Aff. Int. 34.8, Loc. Hom. 26.7, [Arist.] Probl. $901^{a}3$); cf. Arist. fr i 16.102, X. Smp. viii 41.2, Anab. ii 3.15.6, vii 3.26.1, Arist. EN $1114^{a}6$, Isoc. 1.32, Lys. 16.11.3, Crat. 187.2 & 5, Ar. Nu. 1073, Alexis 9.9 and 11, Antiph. 115.1, 124.2.

Plato:

Protagoras 347C3-8A2: example (Socrates)

Symposion 176A5-B4: reference to Agathon's party on the previous day

Republic 329A4-8 (see *εὐωχία*)

vii Letter 326B6-D6 (see *εὐωχία*)

σίτησις

'Eating': Hdt. iv 17.8; 'food': Hdt. iii 23.4); 'diet': Pl. R. 404D11. No occurrence in poetry. Technical term for a prestigious right accorded by Athens: free daily meals in the Prytaneion. Until the end of the fourth century there were only four categories of permanent guests: the priests at Eleusis, the male descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, Apollo's *μάντεις*, and the victors at Olympia, Pythia, Isthmia, and Nemaea. *σίτησις* maintained a link between aristocratic and democratic privileges. It must not be confounded with *ξένια* for

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22. Exception: Critias vi 27.

occasional guests or regular meals in the Tholos for prytans on duty. Cf. Aeschin. FL 80.5, Ctes. 178.6, 196.2, And. Alc. 31.3, Isa. 5.47.4, Lyc. Leoc. 88.1, Dinarchus Dem. 43.3, and especially Demosthenes.

Plato:

Apology 36E1-7A1: Socrates' request for *σίτησις*

συμπόσιον

First recorded in Alcaeus (70.3, 368.2P). Rare in archaic poetry; occurs a few times in choral lyric (Pindar, Bacchylides), comedy (Aristophanes, Alexis) and prose (Xenophon). Main contextual associations with song (Alc. 70.3, B. 4.79, Pi. N. 9.48, Criti. fr 1.6, Ar. V. 1260, Eq. 529) and drink (Thgn. i 496, Ion 26.14, Alexis fr 9.3).

Plato:

Protagoras 347C3-8A2: example (see *πότος*)

Gorgias 451D9-E5: example (Socrates)

Republic 363C3-D2: reference to Orphic tradition (Adeimantus)

Phaedrus 276D5-8: example (writing)

Laws 636E8-7C1: example (see *κωμάζειν*)

Laws 639D (**A**): defining the symposion

Laws 641A3-D2: purpose of the symposion (see *πόσις*)

συμπότης

'Fellow in a symposion'.

Plato:

Republic 568E2-9A7: metaphor related to the tyrant

Laws 639D (see *συμπόσιον*)

Laws 671E: end of subject of symposion

συμποτικός

'For use at the symposion'.

Plato:

Republic 398E9-10: reference to sympotic music (the education of the Guardians)

Laws 671C4: *νόμοι συμποτικοί*

συσσίτια

'Common messes' in Sparta (and Crete): compulsory daily meals attended by the whole citizen-body. It seems to have differed from other forms of commensality in crucial respects (adolescents present among elders; division eating/ drinking not observed). The most extensive treatment of the syssition is in Aristotle's Politics (some 30 occurrences). The term is late (earlier equivalents: *ἀνδρεῖον* and *φιδίτιον*) and extremely rare in poetry (E. Ion 1165, Anaxillas 19.3). A special note concerning Plato's Laws: the contributions lists to syssitia transmitted to us indicate that drinking at syssitia was quite heavy.

Plato[23]:

Republic 416E3-7A5: project for Guardians' life

Republic 458C6-D4: project for syssitia for women

Republic 547D4-8: example (timocrat)

Critias 112B5-C7: account of legendary Athens

Laws 666B (C): reference to symposia (Third Choir)

Laws 762B6-D1, 780A1-1D6, 806D7-7B3, 839C2-D3, 842B1-8: Magnesian projects

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23. 19 occurrences in the Laws. Here I skip thtrough the ones in Book One (625C6, E2, 6B1-2) and Twelve (948E2, 55E3).

σύσσιτος

'Fellow at syssitia' (X. Cyr. viii 7.14, Hdt. v 24), but also synonim for *συμπότης* (Thgn. 309, Ar. Ra. 1075); ancient.

Plato:

Laws 806D7-7B3 (see *συνσσίτια*)

τράπεζα

Tables are essential pieces of furniture (Il. xxiv 476, Xenoph. fr 1.9, Pherecr. 67.1.3, Od. i 111, xv 333, Sim. 26.1, Pi. O. iii 40, S. El. 362, Od. xi 419 [*τράπεζα* and *κρατήρ*]); thus *τράπεζα* acquires a metonymical sense 'meal, banquet' (Ar. Pax 770, *κἀπὶ τραπέζῃ καὶ συμποσίῳ*; E. fr 147.1N, *ἀμφὶ δαῖτα καὶ τράπεζαν*; Pi. P. iii 16 FL 22). Later on, *δευτέραι τράπεζαι* becomes a technical phrase meaning 'second course' (Philoxenus, Nicostratus; discussed by Aristotle). Derogatory in comedy, solemn in high poetry and oratory (*τράπεζα δημοσία, κοινή*). The phrase *Συρακοσία τράπεζα* (Ar. Ra. 518) is of the same type as *Περσικὴ τράπεζα* (Th. i 130), and probably standard in Plato's time.

Plato:

Republic 404B10-E1: Syracusan dinners (diet for Guardians; see *ἑστίασις, ἑστιᾶν*)

vii Letter 326B6-D6 (see *εὐωχία, πότος*)

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