

Master thesis for Master of Studies in Ancient Philosophy
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford

Title: “Craftsmanship, teleology, and politics in Plato’s *Politicus*”

Assessment Unit Code: PHIL0117

Term: Trinity 2010

Candidate number: 180347

Word count: 14659

Abstract: “Craftsmanship, teleology, and politics in Plato’s *Politicus*”

In this thesis I attempt to bring out some interesting implications of Plato’s political thought as it is presented in the *Politicus*. In particular, I will show how this dialogue provides a new picture of the relation between ruler and ruled; a picture that stresses the importance and responsibility of *every citizen*, not just of the statesman himself. This is achieved by an analysis of the notion of political craftsmanship envisaged by the main speaker of the dialogue, the Eleatic Stranger. However, before I turn to consider the *Politicus* itself, I provide a brief presentation of another Platonic craftsman, the demiurge of the *Timaeus*. As will be clear, the teleological structure, and the accompanying terminology, of his craftsmanship will mirror that of the true statesman and thus help us understand the latter’s political rule. My choice to focus on this aspect of the *Politicus* is motivated by the text itself. For the question of the kind of craftsmanship involved in political rule is picturesquely, yet effectively, brought to the fore by the myth in the early parts of the dialogue, which distinguishes between two rival conceptions and associates the statesman with one of them.

I conclude by reflecting on the significance of my findings for Plato’s political thought as a whole.

Craftsmanship, teleology, and politics in Plato's *Politicus*

Introduction

Plato's dialogue the *Politicus* is presented as an attempt to find and give an account of the "statesman" (τόν πολιτικόν, 257a4; 258b3), which is assumed to be equivalent to giving an account of the political "expert knowledge" or "craft" (e.g. 258b3-5). The search is undertaken by the Eleatic Stranger (henceforth ES) and a young man named Socrates (to be distinguished from his elder, well known namesake, who is also present) with the former leading the way. The path, leading through a series of dialectical "divisions", turns out to be far from straightforward, including a strange myth and being repeatedly interrupted by technical reflections on methodology and the art of philosophical investigation. The picture of the statesman that gradually emerges in the course of the dialogue is crucial to an understanding of Plato's later political thought but has received far less attention than the arguments of the more famous *Republic* and, perhaps to a lesser extent, of the *Laws*.¹

In the present thesis, I will venture to bring out some of the important political implications of the *Politicus* by approaching it from a particular angle. More precisely, I will focus on the *teleological structure of political craftsmanship* as it is presented in the dialogue: how does the statesman, conceived of as a craftsman, achieve his political aim, his *telos*? As I will argue, this take on the *Politicus* fits well with Plato's own exposition. For, on my reading, the dialogue emphatically distinguishes two types of political rule, and their corresponding teleological structure, and associates the statesman with the second. The distinction is motivated by ES' elaborate myth in the early part of the dialogue where the

¹ Annas 1995 (vii): "[The *Politicus*] is certainly the most neglected of Plato's political works". Since 1995 the dialogue has received increased attention, but I trust Annas' assessment still holds true.

two alternative cycles of the cosmos mirror two distinctive kinds of “ruler”. The divine shepherd in the age of Cronus is characterized by what I will call “autarchic teleology” in that it imposes itself upon a passive and undifferentiated “subject matter” and, crucially, achieves its aim without in any way employing or relying on the cooperation of those it rules. The shepherd does not need the help of his “flock”. Importantly, in the *Politicus* this kind of rule is explicitly rejected as an inadequate description of the statesman’s expert knowledge. Instead, another, more fitting, model is introduced, that of the weaver. As this model implies, the statesman is someone who guides and arranges a number of secondary, yet internally autonomous, craftsmen so that they contribute to and support his political *telos* of bringing about a good and happy polis. Thus, the craft of the statesman has, in contrast with that of the shepherd, an “epitactic” structure. It rules by directing, and thus relies on, *other* subordinate crafts that are, in themselves, not essentially aimed at the good of society.

To introduce and prepare us for this second notion of the teleology of the statecraft I begin by briefly relating the central ideas of another Platonic dialogue, the *Timaens* (section I). Here, I will show, we get a clear exposition of both the principles and the terminology of what I will go on to call “epitactic” craftsmanship. In particular, Timaeus presents the divine craftsman as someone who “persuades necessity”, that is, who skillfully arranges the natural tendencies of his materials so as to bring about a good end. Bearing this Timaeian account in mind will, I suggest, help us understand the conception of craftsmanship presented in the *Politicus*. For the statesman too, once the picture of him as a “shepherd of humans” has been rejected (section II), can be seen as similarly “persuading” his materials, something that comes out both in ES’ general description of the relation between the statecraft and its subordinates (section III) and in his concluding exposition of how the citizens of different temperaments are to be genetically “woven” together (section IV). It should be noted that I do not hereby make any strong

assumptions as to the relative date of the two dialogues. My suggestion is simply that the same idea of craftsmanship lies behind both, and that its clear presentation in the *Timaeus* can therefore help us when we turn to consider the *Politicus*.

As I will point out in the course of my argument, and sum up in the final section (section V), this conception of political craftsmanship has important implications. Especially, it leads to a new, and I believe more sympathetic, picture of the relation between the statesman and his citizens, whose specialist skills and individual decisions now yield an indispensable contribution to his political aim, a happy polis. It is here, I suggest, we should see one of the *Politicus*' most important advances in the development of Plato's political thought.

I. Craftsmanship, necessity, and persuasion in the *Timaeus*

In this section I will introduce a theoretical framework that will be of great use when we turn to the task of interpreting the political theory of the *Politicus*. In particular, the central conception of cosmological craftsmanship, which Timaeus presents in the dialogue bearing his name, can, I shall argue, be recognised in the political sphere of the statesman and the craft he exercises. As my main interest in this thesis lies with the latter dialogue, the account in this section will be very general and only touch upon what will be relevant for what follows.

Craftsmanship and necessity

As is well known, in the *Timaeus* we are presented with an account of the cosmos as created by a *divine demiurge*. The preoccupation with the principles and implications of craftsmanship was by no means new for Plato. In the dialogue the *Gorgias* he had already pointed out what the criterion for a craftsman is: that he, unlike such pleasure charlatans as cooks and rhetoricians, knows and can give an account of the *causes* leading to his product, not relying on simple trial and error (*Gorg.* 500e-501a; 503d-e). This idea remains central in the *Timaeus* and its cosmological account which is essentially structured so as to reflect the causal principles involved in the divine demiurgy.²

According to Timaeus, the main speaker of the dialogue, there are two causes in the cosmos. The first of them is described by him at the beginning of his account when he propose to state the reason why the god created the cosmos:

The god wanted everything to be good and nothing to be bad so far as that was possible, and so he took over all that was visible – not at rest but in discordant and disorderly motion –

² Cf. the structure of Cornford's translation (1937).

and brought it from a state of disorder to one of order, because he believed that order was in every way better than disorder. (30a2-6)³

We are here introduced to the central principle of a teleological, divine cause, *aitia*. This idea is closely bound up with the notion of cosmos as created by a craftsman or demiurge for it links the cause of intelligence in the world with the intensions of an intelligent agency.⁴ The reason why the cosmos was created was god's desire for everything to be good, including the "visible disorder" he took over. "Good", for the Timaeon demiurge, implies order, and he brings order into the disordered precosmos because he thinks it "in any way better" (30a6). The first part of Timaeus' account is thus dedicated to explaining how the demiurge created the cosmos in light of this desire to make it as good, that is, as ordered, as possible.

Besides the divine *aitia*, there is another kind of cause in the cosmos. As Johansen points out, it follows more or less directly from the idea of cosmos as a result of craftsmanship that we must posit another principle different from the divine *aitia*. "A craftsman after all needs not just a plan to carry out his work: he also needs materials in which to realize his design" (2004, 92).⁵ This "material principle" is what Timaeus refers to as "necessity" (48a1) or "the wandering cause" (48a7). It is called "necessity", not because it could not be otherwise, but because it possesses causal regularity. If the cause is present, then so is the effect. This is an important property of the demiurge's material. For a craftsman needs reliable materials to work with; materials whose effects can be predicted and planned. But what about "the wandering cause"? The way to understand this puzzling notion is to think in terms of teleology. Thus, "wandering" does not mean "irregular" or "by chance", but rather what is *non-teleological*, that is, what moves in a way independent

³ The translation of the *Timaeus* is Zeyl's from Cooper (ed.) 1997.

⁴ Commentators disagree as to how we should understand Timaeus' divine *aitia* within the Aristotelian fourfold division of causation. There is surely something "final" to it in so far as it aims at what is good. But are we to understand this as "a goal-directed efficient cause" (Sedley 2007, 114) or "an efficient cause with a final cause constituent" (Johansen 2008, 474f)?

⁵ In the following interpretation of the principle of necessity I follow Johansen (*ibid.* 93ff).

of any rational plan or design. So the Timaean principle of necessity is a cause that is regular (has a certain effect) but aimless or “blind”⁶ in that it acts in a purposeless way, without regard for what is good.⁷ Here it differs fundamentally from the divine *aitia* which is, as we saw, essentially aimed at the good.

The principle of necessity becomes clear in the case of the non-teleological nature of the four simple bodies which are “taken over” by demiurge when he creates the world (68e). For these elements, though they have themselves been shaped by the demiurge, retain the non-teleological tendencies of their precosmic condition (52d-53c).⁸ Thus, they each possess a tendency to move in accordance with the principle of “like to like”, a purely mechanical principle that is thus essentially non-teleological. Fire simply attracts fire regardless of whether such attraction is good, and likewise with earth, water, and air. Consequently, if the simple bodies were allowed to move without any rational planning, the result would be a disordered chaos.

Persuasion of necessity

But, luckily, this world is not without intelligence, and necessity is not allowed free rein.

Rather, as Timaeus explains, both causes are present:

For this ordered world is of mixed birth; it is the offspring of a union of Necessity and Intellect. Intellect prevailed over Necessity by persuading it to direct most of the things that come to be towards what is best, and the result of this subjugation of Necessity to wise persuasion was the initial formation of this universe. (47e5-48a5)

⁶ “Backward-looking” (Johansen, *ibid.* 94).

⁷ Sedley (*ibid.* 144f).

⁸ It is disputed how we should understand this. If the demiurge shaped the simple bodies himself (making them “most excellent” (53e) by using “forms and numbers” (53b)), then how can their nature be referred to as necessity? Johansen may be right to suggest that the demiurge has two separate “take overs”, one where he shapes the bodies, and one where he orders them among each other (68e). On this reading, the necessity of the bodies, after they have been shaped, arises as a sort of “by-product” of their geometrical (rational) shapes (2004, 95-99; 2009, 480f). However, all I need for my present purposes is that the demiurge’s materials represent a principle of necessity understood as non-teleology. Whether this necessity is itself the (unintended) result of an even more fundamental act of intelligence, I leave undecided here.

The cosmos as created by the demiurge is composed of both intelligence and necessity, and intelligence has succeeded in “persuading” necessity to work for the best. It may initially seem puzzling that necessity is something that can be “persuaded”. For that suggests that it possesses certain psychological properties, which Timaeus seems to deny (46d-e; cf. Johansen 2004, 99). I hence follow the majority of commentators in taking “persuasion” here more broadly. Thus, persuading necessity, in contrast with forcing it, amounts to *letting it display its own nature*, not superimposing on it other, alien, activities.⁹ Persuading the principle of necessity consists in allowing it to follow its natural tendency - but in a context where that tendency *supports*, instead of hinders, a rational plan.

Plato has a determinate terminology for this. Thus, in the ordered cosmos (where necessity is persuaded), we can distinguish two kinds of cause.

All of the above¹⁰ are among the contributory causes (τῶν συναιτίων) employed in the service of the god as he does his utmost to bring to completion the character of what is most excellent. But because they make things cold or hot, compact or disperse them, and produce all sorts of similar effects, most people regard them not as contributory causes but as the actual causes of all things (αἰτία). Things like these, however, are totally incapable of possessing any reason or understanding about anything. [...] So anyone who is a lover of understanding and knowledge must of necessity pursue as primary causes those that belong to intelligent nature, and as secondary all those belonging to things that are moved by others and that set still others in motion by necessity. We too, surely, must do likewise: we must describe both types of causes, distinguishing those which possess understanding and thus fashion what is beautiful and good, from those which, when deserted by intelligence, produce only haphazard and disorderly effects every time. (46c7-e6)

Timaeus, in this passage, criticises those who explain the world simply by reference to mechanistic causes¹¹. Instead, he contends, we should learn to distinguish the actual causes, which represent an intelligent agency and aim at the “beautiful and good”, from those that work by blind necessity and would result in disorder if they were not

⁹ Cf. Lennox (1985, 210), Johansen (2004, 99f), and Sedley (*ibid.* 115).

¹⁰ Timaeus has just given an account of the mechanism of sight and how mirror images occur. I shall return to the former below.

¹¹ It thus recalls Socrates’ reflections in *Phaedo* (99a4-b6). The difference, however, is that Timaeus is willing to call the mechanistic causes “causes”, whereas Socrates only refers to them as “necessary conditions” (cf. Sedley *ibid.* 115).

“orchestrated” by an intelligent *aitia* to serve a rational end. If we want to explain why some fire makes something else hot in a way that leads to a good result, we must thus point to not only the purely mechanistic cause, but also the *aitia*, the teleological cause that directed the blind tendencies of this simple body towards the good. Such “persuaded” necessity is referred to by Timaeus as a contributory cause or *synaitia*. Lennox sums it up nicely:

[A] *synaitia* is the physical *agency by means of which* intelligence achieves good ends. Plato doesn’t conceive of *nous* superimposing other kinds of activity on those of matter, but as insuring certain specific interactions will take place among all those possible, namely, just those which will cooperatively produce the best possible cosmos. His model is of a reasonable counsel who accomplishes his ends by *persuading* various agencies to operate cooperatively, according to a plan, for some end. (1985, 211; italics in original)

Our cosmos “of mixed birth” is an ordered and complex whole of *synaitiai* structured by an *aitia* towards the good.¹² Human sight is a case in point. In 45b-46a Timaeus describes how the gods, to whom the demiurge has given the task of constructing the human body (41a-d), fashion the eyes by employing the natural tendencies of light (understood as a “gentle” kind of fire). Thus, “seeing” occurs when the inner light, emanating from the eyes, meets the daylight of the external world. When “like makes contact with like” (ἐκπύπτον ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον, 45c3-4) the impulses from outside are transmitted to the soul and cause us to have visual sensations. The operative principle of “like to like” is, as we saw above, a tendency belonging to bodies as such and describes the works of necessity, not intelligence. So seeing is made possible by the gods’ intelligent ordering (persuasion) of the tendencies of “fire” so as to serve a good end. This end is our ability to, not just see, but be able to watch and study the heavenly movements, and, hopefully, apply to our own soul a similar order (47a-c).

¹² Commentators dispute whether, in our cosmos, *all* necessity have been persuaded to serve as *synaitiai* (Lennox, Sedley) or there is an “irreducible realm where necessity reigns, unpersuaded by intelligence” (Cornfold, Vlastos; the phrase is from Lennox *ibid.*, 210).

Cosmo-political craftsmanship

Commentators have long recognised that the divine demiurge of the *Timaeus* presents us with an interesting cosmological parallel to the political statesman or legislator.¹³ Arguably, both, in each of their particular spheres, can be conceived of as knowledgeable craftsmen who set out to bring rational order out of disorder. It is thus difficult not to follow Andre Laks in seeing Plato's cosmological principles as providing a promising key to the understanding his political thought:

The parallel, which assumes some kind of structural similarity between the political and the cosmic processes, is philosophically promising. One might expect this common structure to give us some clues about the “political” aspect of Plato's cosmological theory as well as about the “cosmological” aspects of his political theory. Furthermore, the cosmo-political parallel might well be founded upon a more general metaphysical scheme that could explain some fundamental features of Plato's political philosophy. (Laks 1990, 209-210)

Laks himself, taking his cue from Morrow, pursues this idea solely in one direction. For him the principal mirror image in the political sphere of the demiurge's work is the legislative scheme presented in the *Laws*. However, while his reading yields interesting results regarding the relationship between this dialogue and the *Republic*, it fails to make much of the details in the model of cosmic craftsmanship taken over from the *Timaeus*. For Laks the decisive characteristic of persuasion simply is that it is opposed to “violence” or “compulsion”: through legal “preambles” the citizens of Magnesia are, as far as possible, persuaded, not forced, to accept the laws (*ibid.* 228). But although this is certainly correct, being non-coercive is merely a formal feature of the Timaeian persuasion, and much more can of course be said about the way the demiurge actually achieves this result. Thus, as I have shown in this section, the notion “persuasion of necessity” in the *Timaeus* refers to the teleological process of “ordering” elements that by themselves are non-teleological. For the divine demiurge “persuading necessity” amounts

¹³ Especially Morrow (1954) and Laks (1990). We should notice that Plato himself sometimes hints at this parallel. The description, for instance, of the fashioning and structuring of human psychology and physiology (*Tim.* 69c-70b) is ripe with political language.

to the orchestration of non-teleology so as to support, by displaying its own natural tendency, a rational and good end.

Laks does not attempt to apply this more substantial idea of demiurgic persuasion to political craftsmanship. This is what I intend to do in the present thesis. However, I suggest that the political application of the idea is perhaps better sought somewhere else than in the *Laws*. To be precise, I believe we should turn to another late Platonic dialogue on political philosophy, the *Politicus*. Here, I will argue, we can discern a more profound similarity between Plato's conceptions of cosmic and political craftsmanship than Laks found in the *Laws*. The crucial notion remains that of "persuasion", which, even if taken in the full sense outlined in this section, will still prove to be highly relevant in a political context. In fact, it will turn out to be a very apt description of the art of the statesman as it is presented in the *Politicus*. And as such, it has, I will argue, profound consequences for the character and implications of Plato's political philosophy.

II. The teleology of shepherding

Prelude: the statesman as herdsman of humans

To become clear on the picture of political craftsmanship that is presented in the *Politicus* it is helpful, I suggest, to begin with the celebrated and strange myth in the early parts of the dialogue. The myth itself is prompted by the result of the preceding dihairetic process of repeated division which has ended up with a candidate for a definition of the statesman, the aim of the dialogue. Thus, in 266e, ES and Young Socrates have reached what at first sight seems to be a satisfactory conclusion: the art of the statesman is the art of herding and rearing humans.

When the expertise of human-herding has thus been brought into the light, one must lift the statesman and king like a charioteer into it and install him there, handing over the reins of the city as belonging to him, and because this expert knowledge is his. (266e7-11)¹⁴

Whereas Young Socrates enthusiastically agrees and expresses his satisfaction with the result (267a1-3), ES himself does not share his interlocutor's optimism. The problem, as he goes on to explain, is that this definition is not precise enough. For around the statesman there will be a crowd of other men of expert knowledge who would all loudly contend his right to be called "human herdsman" and claim that they too merit that title (267e8-268a4). Merchants, farmers, physical trainers as well as doctors and matchmakers all in some sense take care of humans and so the definition would not apply to the statesman alone (268b9-c3).

It is this dihairetic impasse that gives rise to ES' myth, an elaborate story of great complexity comprising a large and heterogeneous collection of elements from Greek mythology, folklore, and pre-Socratic cosmology.¹⁵ Central in it is the description of two ages of mankind, that of Cronus and Zeus respectively, in which the conditions for life

¹⁴ The translation of the *Politicus* is Rowe's (occasionally slightly modified) from Cooper (ed.) 1997. The Greek text is from Robinson's OCT edition (Duke et.al. 1995).

¹⁵ Kahn (2009, 149f) identifies the various sources.

are very different from each other. On the traditional reading, the two ages are separated by a cosmic reversal of the direction of the universe from being guided and led by god to spinning back on its own.¹⁶ When the universe is about to spin completely out of control the god grabs the tiller again and restores order. In the former divine cycle people lived in a paradisiacal state, tended by minor deities and with an abundance of food, a mild climate, and no wild beasts. In our present age of Zeus, on the other hand, the tending gods have left us, so life is hard, the environment hostile, and work required for survival. To anticipate, the point of the myth in relation to the definition of the statesman as a “herdsman of humans” will be that only in the mythical age of Cronus does this definition unequivocally pick out a single person. Only here will there be no “contenders” disputing his right to the name. However, as I will show, ES, in making this point, also brings to light certain features of human society that a successful definition of the statesman will need to take into account. In particular, on my reading, the myth draws contrast between *two kinds of teleology* and shows how the one that is associated with a craft like shepherding proves inadequate for the purposes of the common search of ES and young Socrates. Thereby, it paves the way for the conception of the statesman, not as a shepherd, but as a weaver.

Cosmic cycles

The first part of ES’ myth (269c4-270a9) introduces the cosmological principle which serves as background for the tale of the two ages. Possibly drawing on Empedoclean

¹⁶ For this traditional reading, which I follow here, see e.g. Cornford (1937, 206f), Skemp (1952, 106f), Lane (1998, 103ff), McCabe (200, 142ff) and Kahn (2009, 150). Alternative readings have been suggested by Brisson (1995), Rowe (1995), and Carone (2005). Typically, they consist in reading into the myth a complex three-stage structure in which the reverse, godless cycle is sandwiched between two divine ones so that our current cosmic era is, after all, guided by god. I believe the problems with this reading have been sufficiently pointed out elsewhere (see Lane, McCabe and Kahn *op. cit.* and Erler 1995), and I will not repeat them here.

sources¹⁷, he asks us to imagine that the cosmos is rotating in different directions at different times. Sometimes the god himself (αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς) guides and leads it in one direction and sometimes he lets go of it so that it spins back on its own (269c4-d1). As we are later told, the divine rotation takes place in the age of Cronus, while the other is associated with our age of Zeus (271c3-d3; 272b1-3).

The cosmos' occasional backwards motion is caused, ES continues, by an innate and necessary principle (διὰ τὸδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔμφυτον, 269d2-3). In particular, the cosmos' embodied state serves to explain its backward rotation (τὴν ἀνακύκλῃσιν, 269e3-4)¹⁸ when god has left it. For, even though the cosmos possesses intelligence and reason (269d1; cf. d8), its share in body, that is, its physical constitution, does not allow it to obtain on its own the divine and stable circular motion it enjoyed under the rule and guidance of the god. Instead, it moves in the way that displays the smallest possible variation (σμικροτάτην παράλλαξιν, 269e4-5) from this previous rotation: reverse circular motion.¹⁹

Now, the idea that the cosmos has a bodily component which partly determines how its rationality is achieved is well known from the *Timaens*. There too, as we saw, the principle of necessity must be taken into account (“persuaded”) by the demiurge in his creation of the cosmos. However, it is important be clear on the exact role played by the bodily principle in the cosmology of the *Politicus* myth. ES draws a distinction between two ways in which the cosmos is ruled. On the one hand, when it is ruled by god, it follows a stable and divine circular motion in which its bodily constitution seems to play no part. Here, stable and divine rationality is momentarily achieved. On the other hand, however, when the cosmos is left to rule itself, its rationality is partly determined by its share in body, and, accordingly, it rotates in reverse. In other words, the principle of necessity

¹⁷ Cf. Kahn 2009, 150f.

¹⁸ As already Campbell (1867 *ad loc.*) rightly pointed out, the prefix ἀνα- here picks up τὸ ἀνάπαλιν ἰέναι in 269d2 and thus indicates *reverse* motion (cf. Robinson 1995, 44; *pase* Vidal-Naquet 1978, 138).

¹⁹ This reading of the passage, which I follow here, is to be found in Campbell (*ibid. ad loc.*), Robinson (1995, 42), and Lane (1998, 102).

arising from the body makes itself felt only at the times when the god is no longer ruling the cosmos.²⁰ It is in these situations that the cosmos must necessarily rotate backwards and risk spinning completely out of control, falling into the “unlimited sea of unlikeness” (273d6-e1). Hence, ES’ cosmological account, it seems, implies a sharp distinction between two kinds of “rule”: one with and one without the presence and influence of a principle of necessity.

How are we to understand this strange implication of the myth’s cosmological background story? In the following, I will suggest that the contrast is best understood as one between two kinds of teleology. This will be clearer once we turn to consider how the same contrast plays out in the human sphere.

Self-sufficient shepherd gods

At the times when the gods leads the cosmos in a divine circular motion humans too are under the tendance of a divine being. ES stresses the close analogy between the rule of god over the cosmos and that of the “shepherd gods” over the classes of living beings, humans included.

Back then, the god first ruled (ἦρχεν... ὁ θεός) and took care of the rotation itself as a whole, and as for the regions, in their turn, it was just the same (ὥς δ’ αὖ ... ταῦτόν), the parts of the world order having everywhere been divided up by gods ruling (θεῶν ἀρχόντων) over them. As for living things, divine spirits had divided them between themselves, like herdsmen (οἶον νομῆς), by kind and by herd, each by himself providing independently (αὐτάρχης) for all the needs of those he tended (ἐνεμεν).

(271d3-8)

When tended by the shepherd gods, humans lived a toilless life of abundance. ES’ description of it brings in many of the traditional elements of this mythical era of Cronus. Food was abundant and sprung spontaneously from the earth by itself (272a2-5);

²⁰ Notice also how in 269e1-5 we are told that the influence of the body makes it impossible (ἀδύνατον, 269e2) for the unguided cosmos to copy completely the divine and stable rotation (cf. 269d5-7). Since the cosmos, when moved by god, *does* rotate like this, it must be because that influence is somehow not present here.

the climate was mild obviating the need for housing and bedding (a6-b1); there were no wild and carnivorous animals (271e1; cf. 274b6-8). Further, people lived in completely harmony with each other, resulting in the absence of war and internal strife (271e1-2), so that there was no need for any kind of political or social institutions (271e8). They did not even have to go through the troubles of procreation. For in this era people were, under the supervision of the shepherd god (274a3-4), born autochthonously from the earth as old and grew young, obviating the need for women and begetting of children (271e8).²¹ In keeping with the conventions of the genre, ES repeatedly describes this life of humans in the Cronian era as “automatic” (271d1; e4; 272a4).²²

The notion of the ruler as a *shepherd* is central to ES’ depiction of the age of Cronus. The language of herding pervades the narrative: the god is “tending” (ἐνεμεν, 271d8; e5; e7) his flock of humans which “graze outdoors” (θυραυλοῦντες ἐνέμοντο, 272a6). Importantly, the shepherd model of ruling carries with it a particular conception of the relation between the ruler and his subjects. As Haubold (2000) shows, the notion “shepherd of the people” itself goes back at least to Homer who regularly uses it as an epithet for, especially, Agamemnon and Menelaus.²³ Here it has connotations both of a highly authoritarian model of kingship and the idea that the ruler, like a shepherd, is single-handedly in charge of, and responsible for, the well-being and safety of his subjects. As Blondell puts it, “Homeric kings are powerful, named individuals, and their subjects for the most part anonymous herd-like masses, who can be treated in many ways like animals” (2005, 24).²⁴ We recognize this ideal in the description of the Cronian

²¹ As I will show in section IV, this aspect of human life (and the changes that occur in relation to it between Cronus and Zeus) will become very important for the political theory of the *Politicus*.

²² The description of a past paradisiacal *Slaraffenland* as “automatic” can be traced back to Hesiod (*Works & Days* 118). For a survey of the idea see Baldry 1953 (50f).

²³ Haubold 2000 (ch. 1); cf. Skemp 1952, 58 and Blondell 2005, 25f.

²⁴ In the second book of the *Iliad*, Thersites, a common soldier (he is given neither patronymic nor place of origin), dares to stand up and speak his mind in front of Agamemnon, “shepherd of the people” (*Il.* 2. 243-77; cf. Kirk 1985 *ad loc.*; Blondell *ibid.* n5). As his subsequent chastisement and beating by Odysseus

herding gods. Thus, ES stresses that the divine shepherd rules and tends his flock “self-sufficiently” (αὐτάρκης, 271d7), that is, by providing everything himself without relying on their contributing anything. The Cronian humans are never ordered to cooperate with or otherwise help the divine shepherd achieve this goal, and he does not rely on them to do so. This emphasis on the self-sufficiency of the ruler and the corresponding passivity of the ruled is an essential aspect of the shepherd model. The shepherd ruler holds both all power and all responsibility for his flock.

Hence, in ES’ myth, the relation between shepherd and flock retains the Homeric emphasis on the self-sufficiency of the ruler but does not thereby paint a picture of despotic rule. Rather, since the shepherd god takes care of humans benignly, they live the “automatic” life of abundance and leisure. Crucially, living in this “the idler’s paradise”²⁵ under the tendance of a divine shepherd, humans have no need for learning or practicing any crafts or expert knowledge (they are ἀμήχανοι and ἄτεχνοι, 274c1). In contrast with the developed polis, there is, within the Cronian flock, no specialization of crafts or division of labor; no need for learning and thinking.²⁶ Instead, as a passive, homogenous mass they can simply lean back and enjoy the all-embracing tendance provided by their divine and self-sufficient shepherd.

Importantly, this allows us to characterize the rule of the shepherd in terms of *teleology*. For, as should by now be clear, in the age of Cronus we see a wide gap between ruler and ruled. Whereas the shepherd is characterized by his “self-sufficiency”, that is, by his ability to provide everything needed without the contribution or cooperation of his

show, such a questioning of, and challenge to, the Homeric ideal of a self-sufficient king over and above an anonymous *laos* was far from popular among the leading class.

²⁵ Baldry’s phrase (1953).

²⁶ As an aside, ES suddenly turns to consider whether the Cronians were in fact happier than people today (272b3-4). Tellingly, no definitive conclusion is reached (d1-4). I see this as an expression of Plato’s ambivalent feelings towards traditional beliefs and folklore relating to a paradisiacal, but primitive, past. On the one hand, the age of Cronus is clearly introduced to represent some ideal past, where there was no need or suffering, but, on the other, Plato was only too aware that what he considered most valuable, philosophy, would seem completely out of place among the primitive and idle Cronians. Thus, I detect here the same irony that pervades his description of the City of Pigs in *Republic* II. (On the ambiguous “shadow over the Platonist Golden Age” see Vidal-Naquet 1978, 139).

subjects, the ruled, correspondingly, exercise no distinctive activities of their own. The former's demiurgic omnipotence leads to the latter's passivity and homogeneity.²⁷ The human flock is like an easily moldable lump of featureless matter the ruler can shape and form in any way he wants. Here, the contrast to the craftsmanship of the Timaeon demiurge is helpful to bear in mind. For the latter, as we saw, needed to *persuade* the natural tendencies of the simple bodies so as to make them support his rational end. For instance, he skillfully employed and relied on these tendencies in his creation of human sight. The Cronian shepherd god, on the other hand, need not work in this indirect way. Since he rules self-sufficiently over a subject matter that is passive and without any internal differentiation, he can impose his rule directly upon it without taking any such differentiation into account. He does, like the demiurge of the *Timaeus*, aim at the best result possible, but for him this teleology need not be achieved indirectly through the "persuasive" arrangement of the forces of necessity he takes over. As the connotations of "ruling as herding" indicate, *he need not rely on the contribution or cooperation of the humans he is tending*. We can, to draw a terminological distinction, speak here of an *autarchic teleology*, contrasting it with the more indirect and "persuasive" teleology of the Timaeon demiurge.²⁸

To return to the cosmic sphere, we can now see how this picture is mirrored in the god's occasional guidance of the cosmos. For, as I argued above, the rule of the god seems to be different from that of the cosmos' own in that the former seems to exclude the presence of a corporeal principle that possesses its own innate tendencies. This is how it is possible for him to achieve a divine and stable rotation. Like the shepherd god, who rules self-sufficiently over a passive, homogeneous flock, so the cosmic god too need not

²⁷ As Blondell 2005 argues, they cannot even be properly distinguished from other living beings, who are similarly tended by gods, enjoy the same vegetarian diet, and even "socialize with humans on an equal footing" (35; cf. 272b10-c2).

²⁸ In the next section, taking my cue from ES' account of the statesman as a weaver, I will refer to this second kind of teleology as "epitactic".

engage with any contrary forces of the body. These two analogous instances of Cronian rule (which are clearly meant to mirror each other, cf. 271d3-8) both display an “autarchic teleology”.

The inadequacy of the herdsman model

To sum up, ES’ description of life in the age of Cronus show us what the craftsmanship and teleology of the statesman looks like when he is conceived of as a “herdsman of humans”. He imposes his rule in a direct way, relying in no way on the cooperation of his subjects or taking into account any differentiation within his “flock”. If the statesman were adequately described as a shepherd, as the provisional conclusion in 266e7-11 suggested, the teleology which characterized his rule would be “autarchic”.

However, the point of ES’ myth is to show that the herdsman model is *not* adequate (cf. 268b9-c4; 274e9-275a3); that we need to think of the teleology involved in statecraft in another way. This is made clear in his description of the shift from the age of Cronus to that of Zeus, our present era, where the cosmos is no longer moved and led by god (272d6-e6). The shepherd gods, who have been tending and herding the living beings, follow him and leave their flock behind (272e6-273a1). This departure has profound consequences for human life and society, and thus for the context in which the statesman is to be found. In particular, the absence of the tendance of the divine shepherd forces humans to take care of themselves (to be “masters of themselves”, αὐτοκράτορα εἶναι, 274a4-b1). In order to survive in the new hostile environment, they begin to learn crafts and skills (274c5-d8): having no automatic abundance of fruits and crops, humans learn to cultivate the earth; being surrounded by wild beasts, they learn to produce weapon and master fire; living in a climate that allows for extreme seasons and temperatures, they manufacture clothes and shoes. As a result, human society goes from

being a passive, undifferentiated mass to autonomously mastering and exercising various different kinds of craftsmanship and knowledge.

This, in turn, brings out the inadequacy of the herdsman model for the age of Zeus. For, as we saw, in a world that includes all sorts of crafts there will surely be someone who would contend the statesman's claim to be the "herdsman of humans" (cf. 267e7-268a4). Only in the Cronian era, where all craftsmanship was restricted to the self-sufficient shepherd god, would this description unequivocally pick out one single person. In our age of Zeus, on the other hand, it will not do. Rather, if we want to give a satisfactory account of statesmanship, we will need a model that can take into account those facts about human society which the myth has made clear: that humans are not a passive and inactive lot; that society includes a long list of autonomous crafts among which that of the statesman must find its proper place. As I will show in the following section, ES does have a model that fits this picture; a model that implies another kind of teleology in the craftsmanship of the statesman.

III. The teleology of weaving

Weaving in the age of Zeus

So this is the world in which we must seek the statesman. As the myth has made clear, the shepherd model is inadequate in a world where humans are not just passively being tended by gods but themselves practise crafts “autonomously” (cf. 274a5). In this age of Zeus, there will indeed be a “thousands of contenders” (268a5), farmers, bakers, and gymnastics trainers, all claiming that they too have a right to be called “herdsmen of humans”.

But who is statesman, then, if not a herdsman? To see this we must briefly look at how ES and young Socrates proceed. As I mentioned, their search for an adequate account of the statesman is conducted through the famous method of division. In the course of the dialogue, ES performs a number of dialectical “cuts” so as to separate other rival crafts from the statesman. It will not be necessary for my present purposes to relate the entire *dibairesis*, but a brief survey will bring out the most important aspects of the picture ES gradually draws of the statesman of the age of Zeus.

The first important division in fact occurs prior to the myth, in 258d-e, and separates off the “theoretical” kinds of knowledge from the “practical”. The former, exemplified by arithmetic, is characterized by simply providing knowledge, whereas the latter, such as carpentry, manually produces a concrete material thing. It is agreed that the art of the statesman belongs in the former kind (259c-d). However, as the next division shows, this does not mean that he has no relation to practical matters. For theoretical knowledge, ES continues, consists of two subgroups, one that calculates and makes judgments about numbers (259e1-8), and one that is related to the practical realm in that it uses its knowledge to “direct” other, practical crafts. Statecraft belongs in this latter group which

is exemplified by the craft of the master-builder (259e9-260b5).²⁹ As Melissa Lane rightly observes, this second division is of great importance for the picture of the statesman that will occur in the course of the dialogue:

This second division of statecraft, establishing it as one of the arts which “rules” and “directs” other arts, is crucial to the success of the final definition. It indicates that whatever the content of the statesman’s knowledge, his mode of exercising it is second-order: he does not produce things by hand himself, but directs others who are producers. His art is indirectly involved in production, though he himself produces nothing. (1998 141)

To find out how the statesman “directs” other crafts, ES in 279a-b proposes that they adopt the art of weaving as a model intended to make the investigation easier. As ES shows by meticulously going through everything involved in producing a garment, weaving stands at the top of a pyramid of various subordinate crafts, which it guides and directs with a view to the final product: the woven garment (281e-283a). The model of weaving, and with it the art of the statesman, as an “epitactic” craft thus has the potential for avoiding the problem with the herdsman model. The complexity of the age of Zeus with its various crafts does not pose the same treat to this model which by its very nature embraces such complexity. In contrast to the “paradigmatic solitude of the herdsman”³⁰, weaving necessitates a hierarchy of other craftsmen if it is to bring about the garment that is its end.

Teleology and crafts

This picture fits well with the statesman. After the long taxonomy of crafts (beginning in 287b)³¹, the statesman finally emerges as someone who directs and guides a large number of other experts towards the good of the polis.

²⁹ As Blondell points out (*ibid.* 38f), this characterization of the statesman, though it occurs prior to the myth’s rejection of the shepherd model, in fact anticipates the later conception of him as someone who gives orders to subordinate workers. (Cf. also Rowe *ad* 292b9-10.)

³⁰ The phrase is Blondell’s (*ibid.* 53).

³¹ For an overview of the crafts involved see Cooper 1999, especially his appendix. But cf. my note 36 below.

For what is really kingship must not itself perform practical tasks, but control those with the capacity to perform them (ἄρχειν τῶν δυναμένων πράττειν), because it knows when it is the right time to begin and set in motion the most important things in cities, and when it is the wrong time; and the others must do what has been prescribed for them. (305d1-5; cf. 304b11-c2)

The general knows how to wage war, but the statesman knows when it beneficial to do so (304e-305a; cf. 304c-e, 305b-c).³²

Reflections on this relation between epistemic guidance and practical skills allow us to make an important distinction in terms of teleology as regards the statecraft and its subordinate crafts. Both display, qua crafts, a teleological structure; a craft as such aims at some end product or state of affairs. But this aim can be viewed from different perspectives. To be precise, the aim of a given craft can be seen both from within the craft itself and from some external, and superior, perspective. Thus, the *telos* of carpentry is to bring about a well-made wooden table (say). But from the perspective of the interior designer this activity in itself is not teleological. For, if the table is placed in the wrong part of the room, it may ruin the *feng shui* effect which *he* aims at. For it to be teleological from the point of view of the interior designer it must not just come to be, but come to be in the right place in the room, according to his master plan. Hence, we can speak to two levels of teleology, the “internal teleology” of the subordinate craft and the “holistic teleology” of the superior craft.

This distinction applies to the relation between statecraft and its subordinates. As ES describes the latter:

Therefore, then, the sorts of expertise we have just examined [of the rhetorician, general, and judge] control neither each other nor themselves, but each is concerned with some individual practical activity of its own (περὶ δὲ τινα ἰδίαν αὐτῆς οὐσα ἐκάστη πράξις), and in accordance with the individual nature of the activities in question has appropriately acquired a name that is individual for it. (305d7-10)

³² This “architectonic” conception of statesmanship had already made its (aporetic) appearance in the *Euthydemus* (cf. Skemp 152, 31f and 46f; Schofield 2006, 150ff).

The subordinate crafts of rhetorician, general, and judge display teleology in so far as they aim at their individual *telos* (their *idia praxis*). However, from the perspective of the statesman, who aims at the good (293e1; 296e4-297b3) and happiness (301d4-6) of the whole polis, they are not by themselves teleological. On the contrary, the art of rhetoric, say, can be skilfully exercised in a way that works directly against this goal (as Plato was acutely aware, cf. e.g. *Phaedr.* 261c-d)³³. Only when directed according to the aim of *the statesman* will they display holistic teleology. Thus, we can, in a certain qualified sense, speak of the individual crafts of the polis as “non-teleological”; their exercise does not necessarily aim at or support the overall goal of the statesman.

Contributory causes in the *Politicus*

The close parallel with the principles of the *Timaeus* can be seen in the very terminology used by ES to describe the relation between the superior and subordinate crafts of the polis. Thus, in 281c he introduces the notion of *synaitia* for subordinate crafts that contribute to the work of the statesman, who is himself described as an *aitia* (281e4). As we saw, on the Timaeian account too, *synaitia* refers to the non-teleological elements once they have been arranged and directed so as to support a good end.³⁴

However, we need to briefly consider ES’ exact use of this terminology. On closer inspection, it initially seems as if the distinction drawn by him in the *Politicus* is slightly different from what we expect from the *Timaeus*. For he seems to restrict the label *synaitia* to a particular subset of crafts, those that bring about the “tools” of the polis, and to contrast these with the higher crafts of the polis collectively called *aitiai* (281e4-5), among which (but not alone) is the statecraft. With the *Timaeus* in mind we would expect the

³³ The sophist Gorgias expresses a similar sentiment in the dialogue bearing his name (*Gorg.* 456b-457c). In his defense of the teachers of rhetoric he points out that the aim of this craft, successful persuasion, is not necessarily in accordance with some higher teleology. Like boxers or wrestlers, rhetoricians can exercise the *telos* of their craft in way that runs counter to the (superior) aim of society, order and peace.

³⁴ Rowe’s commentary (*ad loc.*) also refers to the *Timaeus*.

term *synaitia* to cover all of the subordinate crafts directed by the statesman, and he alone to merit the name *aitia*.

We need not see any serious discrepancy here, however. For ES himself gives us several hints that this narrow use of *synaitia* is simply a matter of perspective. Thus, from the perspective of the higher crafts of the polis taken as a group, the tool producing crafts are the *synaitiai*; they are epitactically directed and guided so as to aid the work of these higher crafts.³⁵ But when the art of the statesman is isolated and contrasted with *all* of his subordinate crafts, the latter as a group are tellingly called *synergoi* (280b3) suggesting that, from this holistic perspective, they are all “contributory”. This fits well with ES’ summary at 305c10-e6 where the statesman is finally considered in isolation and said to rule over and direct “*all* the sorts of expert knowledge that have been discussed” (συναπάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας αἱ εἴρηται, c10-11) and “take care of every aspects of things in the city” (σμπάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἐπιμελουμένην, e3). Here, from the sole point of view of the statesman, all the other crafts seem to be subordinate and contributory in the same sense (if with different degrees of importance). Furthermore, this reading is supported by the fact that the art of weaving, which from its own perspective is the superior *aitia* in the production of a garment (283a), also appears among the *synaitiai* of the statecraft (288b7). Thus, it plays two different roles depending on the teleological context it appears in. As a general point, we can say that a particular craft’s role as *synaitia* or *aitia* is determined by the perspective from which it is understood.³⁶

³⁵ Cf. *Crat.* 390b where it is established that a weaver gives overall directions to the carpenter who produces the shuttle.

³⁶ Cooper (1999, 172-180) attempts to ascribe to ES a fixed terminological model where the crafts of the polis fall in three groups: contributory causes, “co-causes” (Cooper’s term, not Plato’s), and the superior cause of the statecraft. The first includes only tool producers whereas the second group comprises the statesman’s closest associates, the rhetorician, general, and judge. However, Cooper gets into difficulties when he tries to account for the status of the crafts that fall in between the first and second group (calling them simply “contributory causes of one sort or another” (178) while acknowledging that they cannot really be said to produce “tools”). Furthermore, his support for the claim that the rhetorician, general, and judge belong to an essentially different group than the other subordinate crafts rests mainly on his reading of 303e7-304a2. But being “akin to” (συγγενή, 303e9-10) can just as well serve to locate something at the extreme end of a *continuum* of subordinate crafts (the general is clearly *more closely related* to the statesman

So, on my reading, ES' terminology, though *prima facie* slightly different from that of the *Timaeus*, strongly suggests that he conceives of the relation between subordinate and superior crafts along Timaeian lines. Both dialogues agree on the same general distinction: contributory causes are the non-teleological elements that, when arranged and ordered by a teleological cause, come to support the aim of that latter cause. From the perspective of the higher crafts of the polis (taken as a group) these are the tool producers; from that of the statesman alone they are the whole class of subordinate crafts.

The craftsmanship of the statesman

This leads us to another aspect of the political craft as envisaged by ES. For it is important to note that the statesman does not in any way change the nature of the various subordinate crafts or impose on them an activity contrary to their nature. ES makes clear that it remains the privilege of the rhetorician to know *how* to persuade the public (304c10-d3), that of the general to know *how* to wage war (304e5-8). This insistence on the autonomy of each craft when it comes to its actual exercise is brought out emphatically in an earlier passage where ES and young Socrates discuss the relation between expert knowledge and written law. ES asks us to imagine a situation where the manner in which crafts achieve their aim was not left to the appropriate craftsmen themselves but decided in a public assembly of non-experts and subsequently codified (298a-299e). Hence, for instance, the practise of medicine (bringing about health) would no longer be up to the doctor himself but dictated by the laws laid down by an assembly of non-doctors. Having incredulously listened to ES' description of this strange situation, young Socrates is clear in his judgement:

than the farmer). If, as I suggest, we take the ascription of "contributory cause" to be a matter of teleological perspective, not as fixed to certain types of crafts, we can steer clear of these problems.

It's clear that we should see all the various sorts of expertise completely destroyed [...] so that life, which even now is difficult, in such a time would be altogether unliveable. (299e6-10)

The purpose of ES' story of the codified crafts is to establish that it is an essential fact about crafts that the craftsman himself best knows how to achieve his aim.³⁷ As ES puts it, recalling the myth's description of the situation after the cosmic reversal, the crafts must necessarily remain "autonomous" within their own sphere (298c1; 299c1; cf. Rowe *ad loc.*). It is the doctor, no one else, who knows how to heal. Accordingly, the statesman will not force the general, for instance, to do anything other than exercise his art of waging war. Rather, he will take his starting point in each individual craft's "capacity" (*dynamis*, cf. 305d2), that is, its particular and unique ability to bring something about, and employ this capacity in the service of the good of the polis.

This brings out clearly the crucial difference between the teleology that characterises the ages of Cronus and Zeus, respectively. As we saw, the shepherd model of ruling implied a political situation where teleology was simply "imposed" on a passive, homogeneous "flock" without in any way relying on the contribution or cooperation of that flock. This autarchic teleology of shepherding, however, turned out to be inadequate in the age of Zeus where humans are no longer passive, characterless sheep but possess and exercise a variety of crafts themselves. The weaver model of the statesman fits this new picture. Unlike the shepherd, he achieves teleology, not by simple imposition, but by ordering and arranging a number of individual crafts that remain autonomous within their own sphere. In the terminology from above, he orders the (holistically) non-teleological crafts of the polis so as to let them serve his political *telos*. In this, we recognise the method of the divine demiurge as he was presented in the *Timaean*. He too brings about order, not simply by forcing the non-teleological elements of the disordered precosmos into order,

³⁷ Cf. Cooper 1999, 176.

but by “persuading” them, that is, by using their own particular natures in a way that supports his rational design.

Importantly, this “epitactic” conception of teleology serves to endow the subordinate crafts with some degree of *responsibility*. On the shepherd model, the sheep themselves contribute nothing to the bringing about of order and rationality. They are simply there to be ordered and led. When the statesman is conceived of as an epitactic weaver, on the other hand, we can see how the knowledge and expertise of the individual craftsmen become essential for the success of his political project. Like the Timaeon demiurge, who relies on the causally predictable tendencies of the simple bodies, the statesman must rely on the subordinate craftsmen’s competent and autonomous exercise of their skills if he is to bring about happiness in the polis. The transition from shepherd to weaver brings with it a devolution of responsibility from the ruler to his subjects. The ultimate authority, of course, rests with the former, but, unlike the solitary shepherd, he cannot achieve his goals alone. He needs the contribution of his subjects.

Summary

To sum up, I have argued that the craftsmanship of the statesman in the age of Zeus displays a similar causal structure as we saw in the *Timaeus*. In both contexts the relevant demiurgy consists in directing and ordering elements that are, from the relevant perspective, non-teleological.³⁸ In the *Timaeus*, the divine demiurge persuades the tendencies of the simple bodies to support his rational design. In the *Politicus* the statesman, likewise, guides and directs his subordinate crafts, which are in themselves not aimed at the good of the polis in which they exist, so that they come to work for this

³⁸ Recall again the qualification made above that teleology in a political context (“holistic teleology”) relates to the good of the polis. The subordinate crafts do, of course, have a teleological structure, but the point is that it is restricted to their own sphere. Likewise, we may perhaps say that the movements of the simple bodies are teleological, their *telos* being proximity to what is “like”. But from the “holistic” perspective of the divine demiurge, these tendencies are “blind”.

end. The crafts of rhetoric and generalship are aimed at public persuasion and warfare, respectively, but it is the job of the statesman to make sure that they are exercised only in the time and circumstances where it benefits their polis.

Furthermore, we can now see how the myth serves to stress this conception of the craftsmanship of the statesman. For as we saw, it emphatically rejects the shepherd model with its autarchic teleology and thus paves the way for the introduction of the weaver model and its epitactic teleology. Implied in this shift, moreover, is the new emphasis on human autonomy (274a4-b1; cf. 298c1; 299c1). From being simply a characterless flock, the people that make up society now emerge as fulfilling different, important functions. As autonomous craftsmen, they know best how the aim of their craft is achieved (cf. 298a-299e). When their work, which does not itself display holistic teleology, is directed by the statesman, they make an important contribution to the good of their polis.

Before I draw the more general political implications of this conception of political craftsmanship, I will, in the following section, show how we can find the same pattern in another aspect of the art of the statesman.

IV. Eugenics and teleology

Courage and moderation

Towards the end of the *Politicus* ES and Young Socrates finally reach what will turn out to be the final account of the statesman and his political craftsmanship (running from 305e8-311c10). ES proceeds by initially identifying a problem threatening the polis. The citizens of the polis can be divided into two factions according to their character and temperament, the courageous and the moderate, and the difference between them comes out in the way they evaluate the same actions differently. For instance, the courageous will judge a particular action to be “cowardly” while the moderate will see it as “fine” and *vice versa* (307c9-d4). Now, when either one of the temperaments is allowed free rein it will lead to disaster for the polis. The example ES uses to illustrate this is foreign policy. If the moderate group come to dominate the polis, they will make it weak and vulnerable, always preferring a policy of appeasement when dealing with foreign states; a policy which will eventually lead to the enslavement of polis and citizens by a stronger, more aggressive neighbour (307e1-308a2). However, the prospect is no less attractive in a polis dominated by courageous people. Driven by their vigour and aggressive nature they will inevitably draw the polis into war with enemies that are both more numerous and more powerful and, consequently, destroy themselves and their fatherland (308a4-9). Young Socrates’ response emphasises the undesirability of either of these virtues (and their corresponding policies) taken in this radicalized form (308a3). However, ES also stresses that the two temperaments are both very much needed in the polis (otherwise they presumably would not be called “virtues” at all). They have each their merits:

For the dispositions of moderate people when in office are markedly cautious, just, and conservative, but they lack bite, and a certain sharp and practical keenness. [...] And the dispositions of the courageous, in their turn, are inferior to the others in relation to justice and caution, but have an exceptional degree of keenness when it comes to action. Everything

in cities cannot go well, either on the private or on the public level, unless both these groups are there to give their help. (311a6-b5)

The polis needs both temperaments, courage as well as moderation.³⁹ The task of the statesman is to facilitate this co-existence (the “weaving together”) of the two groups while preventing them from radicalizing into those extreme forms that lead to disaster.

The problem of procreation

But how does such radicalization come about in a polis? The problem, ES later points out, lies in the way people “do not bind themselves together in the right way with respect to the procreation of children” (οὐκ ὀρθῶς συνδοῦνται πρὸς τὴν τῶν παίδων γέννησιν, b3-5). When people choose partners they choose those that are as much like themselves as possible (310c4-7).⁴⁰ Thus, a moderate person chooses another moderate person, and *vice versa* with the courageous. Young Socrates asks why this is a problem. ES:

Because it is in the nature of courage that when it is reproduced over many generations (ἐν πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν) without being mixed with a moderate nature, it comes to a peak of power at first, but in the end it bursts out completely in fits of madness. [...] And in its turn the soul that is full of reserve and has no admixture of courageous initiative, and is reproduced over many generations in this way (ἐπὶ γενεὰς πολλὰς), by nature grows (φύεσθαι) more sluggish than is timely and then in the end is completely crippled. (310d6-e3)

ES here presents a quasi-biological theory of “genetic virtue accumulation”. On this theory, a character trait can be inherited and gradually strengthened through generations so as to become more and more extreme. When moderate and courageous people only mate within their own closed group, their respective virtue will in turn increasingly come to dominate the group, ending in disaster.⁴¹

³⁹ Lane stresses this aspect and observes how it differs from “the canons of Greek political argumentation” where the two policies (aggression and appeasement, Alcibiades and Nicias) were seen as mutually exclusive (1995, 280f).

⁴⁰ I return to discuss this passage below.

⁴¹ The phrase “quasi-biological” is from Mishima 1995. Notice that this explanation of the radicalization of character trait can be discerned in ES’s introductory description of the two temperaments. Extreme moderation will be the downfall of the polis because the citizens are being “unwarlike, and making the young men the same” (τοὺς νέους ὡσαύτως διατιθέντες, 307e8-9).

We can now see how this problem, which it will be the statesman's task to address, picks up on a conspicuous aspect of the myth (see my section II). The shift from Cronus to Zeus meant that humans would no longer originate automatically from the earth under the supervision of the shepherd god.⁴² Instead, they now have to engage in the troubles of mating and breeding on their own. As ES' account at the end of the dialogue shows, *this practise of human procreation, like the autonomous crafts, represents a non-teleological element in human society*. For when left to itself, it naturally (φύεσθαι, 310e2) works in a way that is independent of any rational order; in fact, like the cosmos when the bodily element takes over, the workings of this non-teleological element in society will turn out to be the ruin of the polis. So ES' final account of the statesman introduces another important element of societal "necessity" (besides the presence of "non-teleological" crafts discussed above) which he must somehow "persuade" if he is to bring order in society.⁴³

We should note that this principle of non-teleology differs somewhat from the "conceptual" non-teleology discussed in the previous section. The subordinate crafts of the polis are, as we saw, holistically non-teleological in so far as they are not essentially aimed at the good of human society. The general wages war, but war is not necessarily beneficial for the polis. Human procreation, on the other hand, is an instance of what we might call "dynamic" non-teleology in that it refers to a tendency in society that expresses its non-teleology over time. The mating habits of the citizenry lead, in time, to disorder and destruction. Crucially, however, the manner in which the statesman deals with these two kinds of societal non-teleology will turn out to be very similar, as I will

⁴² See also 268a8-b2 where the herdsman is said to be in charge of the breeding of his flock.

⁴³ From the perspective of a modern reader this challenge to the statesman might seem so narrow and specialized so as not to merit the central position it holds at the climatic end of the dialogue. However, we should bear in mind that the focus on and preoccupation with human procreation is by no means an isolated, curious feature particular to the *Politicus*. In the *Republic*, too, eugenic control holds a prominent place in the Kallipolis (458d-460b). In fact, when it suffers its eventual and inevitable corruption and is transformed to the inferior timocratic *politeia*, it is precisely because of the rulers' failure to adequately control this aspect of human society (546a-547a). In this light, it should not surprise us that eugenic concerns turn out to occupy a high priority on the agenda for the statesman of the *Politicus* too.

argue. For in both cases non-teleology is in the same way “persuaded” to serve the statesman’s end.

Divine and human bonds

How does the statesman counter the unfortunate consequences of people’s matchmaking habits and secure that they do not always marry and procreate only within their own group? He does so, ES answers, by “weaving” the two groups together with “divine and human bonds”. As it turns out, the divine bonds consist in a shared education (309d4), while the human bonds are those of “intermarriage and sharing of children”⁴⁴ (310b2). When the former is in place, ES contends, it will be easy to secure the latter and thus avoid the character radicalization that would lead to the ruin of the polis (310d5-6).⁴⁵

To secure the right education the statesman arranges and directs the relevant crafts, those of pedagogues and teachers.

It’s quite clear that it will first put them to the test in play, and after the test it will turn them over those with the capacity to educate (τοῖς δυναμένοις παιδεύειν) them and serve it [the art of the statesman] towards this particular end. It will itself lay down prescriptions for the educators and direct them (ὑπηρετεῖν πρὸς τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ), in the same way that weaving follows along with the carders, and those who prepare the other things it needs for its work, prescribing for and directing them, giving indications to each group to finish their products in whatever way it thinks suitable for its own interweaving. (308d3-e2)

Here we witness the statesman’s teleological arrangement and directing of subordinate crafts discussed in the previous section. In this case, as we shall see, the ordering of these crafts contributes to his “persuasion” of another non-teleological element, human procreation. For giving the citizens the correct education will be crucial for the success

⁴⁴ As Rowe points out in his commentary (*ad loc.*), we are to read παίδων κοινωνήσεων, not as suggesting a radical measure of abolition of parenthood as in the *Republic*, but rather as “sharing of children between the groups through intermarriage”.

⁴⁵ As Scheid & Svenbro (1996) remark, the art of weaving as a political metaphor was traditionally associated by marriage. The *peplos* woven by the women of Elis to Hera was associated both with the reconciliation of Elis and Pisa and the marriage of Hippodameia and Pelops (10f).

of the statesman's eugenic design. Consider ES's description of the way matchmaking is performed by "most people" (οἱ πολλοί, 310b3).

They go for what is immediately easiest, welcoming those who are muck like them (τοὺς προσομοίους αὐτοῖς), and not liking those who are unlike them (τοὺς ἀνομοίους), assigning the largest part of their decision to antipathy. [...] The moderate, presumably, look out for people with the disposition they themselves possess, and so far as they can they marry from among these and marry off the daughters they are giving away back to people of this sort. The courageous type does just the same thing, seeking after one with its own nature, when both types should do completely the opposite of this. (310c4-7)

People choose partners that are like themselves. Normally, this would make each group stick to its own members. However, as ES explicitly says, after the citizens have received the education the statesman devised for them, it will be "no difficulty" (χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν, 310e5-6) to have them enter into marriage with members of the other group. Why would it be easy now? Since ES does not mention any other principle by which the educated citizens choose partners, we are left to assume that the same principle ("like to like") still applies.⁴⁶ Thus, presumably, the result of the shared education is that the members of the two groups now feel more "like" each other; so much so that they occasionally allow for the marriage of one of their daughters to a member of the other group. And indeed, after they have been educated, the citizens are said to have "like opinions" (ὁμοδοξίαις, 310e9-10) and be "likeminded" (ὁμονοία, 311b9). So, in an intellectual way, the two groups have indeed become "like" each other, which allows for the possibility of intermarriage even by the usual principle of matchmaking. And, as we saw, these essential injections of material from the opposite gene pool curb the radicalization of temperaments that threatened the security of the polis and lead to social stability.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ ES says in 310c4 that people normally choose partners οὐδ' ἐξ ἑνὸς ὀρθοῦ λόγου. Does this not imply that they ought to employ another principle? I do not think so. *Logos* might just as well refer to how the citizens in fact understands that principle, that is, what they take "likeness" to consist in: similar temperament.

⁴⁷ My focus here is on this eugenic consequence of the shared education. However, it should be noted that ES also intends it to have a directly moderating effect on the temperament of the educated citizen (cf. 309d1-4; d10-e3).

Educating the citizenry

How does the right education make the citizens more intellectually “like” each other? ES, somewhat vaguely, says that it induces into their souls “a true and secure opinion about what is fine, just, and good” (τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων περὶ καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀληθὴ δόξαν, 309c5-7). Commentators often read this as simply stating that the citizens should be educated so that they come (as far as possible) to have the same evaluative outlook as to what is fine, just, and good.⁴⁸ There is, however, an obvious problem with this reading. For as I mentioned above, what distinguished the two groups was how they evaluated different actions (307c9-d4). Thus, a courageous man would perceive action X as “cowardly”, while his moderate counterpart would perceive it as “fine” or “good”. Now, what would happen if the two were to have the same opinion about these things? In that case, presumably, they would follow each other in perceiving X as either “cowardly” or “fine”. But if so, they would no longer be of different temperaments.⁴⁹ And ES makes clear that both of them, in virtue of their distinct characters, are needed for the well being of the polis (311a6-b5, see above), a fact which is also implied by the weaver analogy and its need for both warp and weft (309b). So it does not seem right to think of the education of the citizens as simply aiming at giving them identical evaluative outlook.

Instead, we should presumably understand the result of the shared education as bringing the citizens together on a higher ideological level. On this interpretation⁵⁰, the “divine bonds” consist in teaching each group how its particular character trait is closely linked to that of the other, both being integral parts of virtue, and that both are needed if the

⁴⁸ E.g. Bobonich 1995 and, presumably, Skemp, who takes the shared education to aim at giving the citizens “the same ideals” (1952, 118).

⁴⁹ There seems to be an intellectualist assumption lurking here, but if so, it belongs to ES’s theory and not my interpretation. According to ES, the evaluation of actions simply is the way to distinguish the groups (cf. 307c9-d4). Furthermore, in a political context such intellectualist assumptions are less problematic. For the temperament of persons is here mainly relevant in the context of *political deliberation and decision-making* (“should we go to war?”). Thus, a person’s evaluation of an action would indeed be the relevant expression of his temperament.

⁵⁰ The clearest proponent of it is Lane 1995 and 1998.

polis is to survive and prosper. Thus, the two groups maintain their distinctive character and evaluative outlooks (to a moderate degree), but the shared education allows them to have something in common, that is, to be “like” each other in a certain sense (by political *ὁμοιότης* and *φιλία*, 311b9). They both represent an aspect of virtue; and both aspects are essential for the polis of which they are all citizens.⁵¹

This represents an attractive way of understanding the education of citizens in the *Politicus*. And it helps us understand how the two groups come to see each other as “like”. For the “divine bonds”, if thus understood, would allow the citizens to feel a sense of unity (“likeness”) and thus allow for intermarriage between the groups, but still keep their distinctive character traits which are so important for the polis. Their feeling of “likeness” is on a higher political level: by being all citizens of the same polis, which needs them all, they have more in common than what separates them. If such a feeling gets a foothold within the two factions, the courageous and the moderate, it is, I take it, not implausible that this will allow the occasional intermarriage which prevents the disastrous radicalization of character traits.

Summary

If this reading is correct, we have, in these final pages of the *Politicus* (306a1-311c10), a clear instance of the statesman’s craftsmanship understood along Timaeian lines. His “persuasion” of the non-teleological elements of society takes place on two levels. Firstly,

⁵¹ This education of the citizens in virtue represents a (for us) sympathetic development in Plato’s political thought. For in an infamous passage in the *Republic* (414b-415d) Plato attempts to achieve the same result (a feeling of unity without diluting political division) by somewhat more dubious means: a “noble lie” (cf. 382a-d). The shared autochthony of the Kallipolians, they are told, makes them all brothers, but their metallurgic composition reminds them of their different roles and status. In the *Politicus*, by contrast, where the theory of hierarchical social classes is absent and where both parties will contribute equally to the good of the polis, the ruler does not need to lie anymore. Instead, by pointing out how the opposing traits of the groups are in fact both integral parts of virtue, he secures the feeling of unity and common purpose by “honest” means alone.

We should not get carried away with the political ideal of the *Politicus* though. Another part of the weaver analogy implies getting rid of all “bad materials”, that is, killing, exiling, or enslaving those who do not meet the standard for virtue (308e9-309a3).

he arranges the educational crafts of the polis so as to fulfil the beneficial function of giving the citizens the right education. This is thus an instance of the statesman's epitactic craftsmanship (directing subordinate crafts towards a good end) that was sketched in taxonomical parts of the dialogue (see previous section). Secondly, we see the same principle of "persuasion" applied to another feature of society: human procreation. Here, too, the statesman achieves his goal by giving the non-teleological elements a rational context in which to work. For, as I argued above, the statesman does not practice his genetic weaving by autocratically making marital decisions on behalf of the citizens. They themselves are free to marry whomever they want.⁵² But the statesman has arranged society, in particular the educational institutions, so that the (essentially non-teleological) principle by which people naturally choose their partners come to serve the good of the polis. When they choose someone "like themselves", they choose, sometimes at least, members of the other group because their shared education has made them perceive these as "like" themselves in the sense of "fellow-citizens". Thus, the procreation habits of the citizenry, itself non-teleological, has been made into a support for the statesman's aim to bring about the finely woven fabric of the happy polis.

The resemblance with the Timaeon demiurge is difficult to miss. As we saw, he employed the non-teleological properties of light in a way that serves his rational end: the creation of human sight and thus of our ability to find the path to philosophy by studying the harmony and order of the cosmos. Notably, moreover, the principle by which light moves is the very same principle that guides the citizens of ES' polis in their search for a partner: the principle that like attracts like (cf. *Tim* 45c3-4). Thus, we find that in this sense too the final account of the statesman reflects the principles of cosmological craftsmanship as it is presented in the *Timaeus*: the elemental dynamics of the cosmos are

⁵² Or rather, as is probably more appropriate in a Greek context, their *father* was free to do so.

mirrored in the elements of the polis, its citizens. A demiurge, cosmic or political, is needed to “persuade” them.

V. Political implications

Statesman and citizens

The picture of the statesman and his method which has emerged in the two previous sections has profound implications for the character and outlook of Platonic political philosophy. In the *Republic*, the knowledge of the philosopher-rulers is described in extremely theoretical and otherworldly phrases. As is well known, their ability to rule the polis comes from their insight into the true being of things, the form of the good (*Resp.* 505e1-506b1). The resulting philosophical understanding shapes the philosopher's character and values, and he, in turn, shapes his society so as to make its organization and institutions reflect the same divine values (500c-d).⁵³ Thus, the ruler of the Kallipolis appears like “a figure of sacral authority: a divine incarnation, a lawgiving prophet like Moses” (Schofield 2006, 162). The latter, political side of being a philosopher, however, is not something the ruler enjoys or wishes to do. Rather, his interest is predominantly directed at the theoretical sphere, and, with his mind fully occupied with contemplating reality, he has no wish to “glance down at the affairs of men” (*Resp.* 500c1-2).⁵⁴ This naturally leads to a severe downgrading of the life and work of the majority of citizens. Conspicuously, there is no focus on the philosopher-ruler's directing or guiding any *other* expertises in the polis. Only one kind of knowledge matters: philosophy.⁵⁵ As the very structure of the *Republic* bears witness to (the detailed description of the education of the guardian rulers bulks large), the well being of the polis stands and falls alone with the philosopher's overarching knowledge of the truth of matters.

⁵³ Cf. e.g. Kahn 1995, 51.

⁵⁴ Which, however, he eventually has to. The philosopher, though preferring to keep philosophizing, must serve his time as ruler of the Kallipolis (519d-521a).

⁵⁵ Cf. *Resp.* 434a where Socrates and Glaucon agree that the competent or incompetent exercise of inferior crafts plays no (or only an extremely insignificant) role in bringing about the Kallipolis.

In the *Politicus* we get a markedly different emphasis on the relation between the statesman and the citizens⁵⁶, underlined by the myth's explicit rejection of the shepherd model in favour of the weaver. As I have argued, the statesman's craft consists in arranging and ordering the (non-teleological) elements of society so as to let them support his rational aim, the good of the polis; he is, with Malcolm Schofield's phrase, "the supreme orchestrator" (*ibid.* 168). But an orchestrator does not play the instruments himself. He directs and guides the musicians who, by his instructions, perform the musical piece. Likewise with the statesman of the *Politicus*: he needs all of his subordinates if he is to bring about the happy polis. Thus, every citizen makes a direct and necessary contribution to this end by exercising his or her craft. When the statesman decides that war is good, the general gathers his troops and marches off to engage the enemy. At this point, the outcome depends on the skill of the general, not that of the statesman. As we saw, the Timaeon demiurge needed to rely on the natural tendencies of the simple bodies when fashioning the human eye. Likewise, part of the statesman's success depends on the reliability of *his* "materials", the specialist crafts of the polis.⁵⁷

Something very similar can be observed in the case of the statesman's teleological arrangement of human procreation. As I argued, the statesman does not autocratically control with whom people marry and have children. This is left to themselves. But he arranges the educational context so that their individual choices support his eugenic aim of securing a citizenry of appropriately courageous and moderate persons. As such, *their* decisions have a direct impact on "the greatest things" (306d), the very survival or destruction of the polis.

⁵⁶ I speak of no more than a change of emphasis here. For the *Republic* does imply that the work of the lower classes is a necessary condition, if nothing more.

⁵⁷ Cf. Blondell 2005: "The central point of the paradigm of weaving is that the finished product requires the co-operation of many skilled agents besides the actual weaver of warp and woof. The weaver is a specialist. He does not share his subordinates' particular skill or directs them in the specific practices of their craft. He therefore cannot apply his own expertise without their help. All the participants are indispensable partners in the grand task of weaving" (67). Cf. also Annas 1995, xiii.

In both cases we notice a conspicuous devolution of responsibility to the citizens of the polis. The ultimate control, of course, lies with the statesman himself, but primarily as providing the context in which society works. He does not tell the general *how* to wage war, or the father *to whom* he should marry his son or daughter. Even if the final authority in the polis remains the expert ruler (Plato is Plato, after all), his ultimate reliance on the specialist knowledge and individual decisions of the citizens does paint a less authoritarian and theocratic picture of the Platonic political ideal than we are familiar with from *Republic*.

The advent of the law-based society as political ideal?

To conclude, let us reflect on how this conclusion might fit into a broader context of Plato's late political thought. In his later dialogues Plato contemplated more seriously the idea of a *politeia* based on *laws*, not the authority of a knowledgeable ruler. In the *Laws*, he seems to have taken the consequences of considerations of practicality and presents his Magnesia as such a law-based society. He has not gone that far in the *Politicus*, where his preference for the statesman as above the laws is still heavily emphasised.⁵⁸ However, he does present a strictly law-abiding *politeia* as the second-best solution (297e1-5; 300c2-3), and, reflecting on the reading of his political craftsmanship suggested in this thesis, we may be able to discern a reason why he began to recognise the rule of law as a feasible alternative should the true statesman fail to show up (cf. 301d8-e4).

In 295b-c the statesman is compared to doctors and gymnastics trainers who cannot be everywhere at the same time and therefore sometimes need to leave written instructions for their "subjects" to follow (cf. 294a). However, even if this situation is not optimal, the statesman does not need to fear that society will immediately collapse in his absence.

⁵⁸ For the shifting emphasis in Plato's view on the law-based society in *Politicus* and *Laws*, respectively, see e.g. Kahn 2009, 161; 163; cf. 1995, 51f.

For among his subordinate crafts is that of the judges, which is described in the following way:

Well then, does its capacity extend to anything more than taking over from the legislator-king all those things that are established as lawful in relation to contracts, and judging by reference to these things that have been prescribed as just and unjust, providing its own individual excellence by virtue of the fact that it would not be willing to decide the complaints of one citizen against another contrary to the prescription of the legislator through being overcome by presents of some sort, or fears, or feelings of compassion, or again by enmity or friendship?

- No, the function of this capacity extends, roughly speaking, to what you have said.

(305b4-c5)

In the absence of the statesman, his judges can, in virtue of their craft, serve as incorruptible and impartial administrators of justice. Of course, they still need the lawgiver to lay down prescriptions in the first place, but ES' confidence that they will successfully manage to follow these prescriptions reveals his recognition of the strength and political potential of legal institutions. Here, as in other areas, he can trust the competences and abilities of non-philosophical citizens. From this, there is not a long way to simply imagining an ideal polis without a philosophical leader but with laws as the supreme authority. If we can rely on the work of judges and officials to interpret them and carry out the daily administration, a well-ordered society may be able to function, at least for some time, without the presence of the supervising statesman.

Bibliography

- Annas, J. (1995), *Plato. Statesman*, Cambridge University Press
- Baldry, H.C. (1953), "The Idler's Paradise in Attic Comedy", *Greece & Rome*, 22
- Blondell, R. (2005), "From Fleece to Fabric: Weaving culture in Plato's *Statesman*", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 28
- Bobonich, C. (1995), "The Virtue of Ordinary People in Plato's *Statesman*", in Rowe (ed) 1995
- Brisson, L. (1995), "Interpretation du mythe du *Politique*", in Rowe 1995 (ed.)
- Campbell, L. (1867), *The Sophistes and the Politicus of Plato*, Oxford University Press
- Carone, G.R. (2005), *Plato's Cosmology and its Ethical Dimensions*, Cambridge University Press
- Cooper, J.S. (1997) (ed.), *Plato. Complete Works*, Hackett
- (1999), "Plato's *Statesman* and Politics", from *Reason and Emotion. Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory*, Princeton University Press (originally appeared in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 13, 1997)
- Cornford, F.M. (1937), *Plato's Cosmology*, Routledge
- Duke, E.A. et. al. (1995), *Platonis Opera*, Tomus I, *Oxford Classical Texts* (OCT), Oxford University Press
- Erlar, M. (1995), "Kommentar zu Brisson und Dillon", in Rowe (ed) 1995
- Fine, G. (2008) (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Plato*, Oxford University Press
- Haubold, J. (2000), *Homer's People*, Cambridge University Press
- Johansen, T.K. (2004), *Plato's Natural Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press
- (2008), "The *Timaeus* on the Principles of Cosmology", in Fine (ed.) 2008
- Kahn, C.H. (1995), "The Place of the *Statesman* in Plato's Later Work", in Rowe (ed.) 1995
- (2009), "The Myth of the *Statesman*", in Partenie (ed.) 2009
- Kirk, G.S. (1985), *The Iliad. A Commentary. Vol. 1: books 1-4*, Cambridge University Press
- Laks, A. (1990), "Legislation and Demiurgy. On the relationship between Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*", *Classical Antiquity*, Vol. 9, No. 2
- Lane, M.S. (1995), "A New Angle on Utopia: the Political Theory of the *Statesman*", in Rowe (ed) 1995
- (1998), *Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman*, Cambridge University Press

- Lennox, J. (1985), "Plato's Unnatural Teleology" in D.J. O'Meara (ed.), *Platonic Investigations*, Catholic University of America Press
- McCabe, M.M. (2000), *Plato and his Predecessors*, Cambridge University Press
- Mishima, T. (1995), "Courage and Moderation in the *Statesman*", in Rowe (ed.) 1995
- Morrow, G. (1954), "The Demiurge in Politics: The *Timaens* and the *Laws*", *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 27
- Partenie, C. (2009) (ed.), *Plato's Myths*, Cambridge University Press
- Robinson, D. (1995), "The New *Oxford Text* of Plato's *Statesman*. Editor's Comments", in Rowe (ed.) 1995
- Rowe, C.J. (1995), *Plato. Statesman*, Aris & Phillips
 - (1995) (ed.), *Reading the Statesman*, Proceedings of the III Symposium Platonicum, vol. 4, Sankt Augustin
- Scheid J. & Svenbro J. (1996), *The Craft of Zeus*, Harvard University Press
- Schofield, M. (2006), *Plato. Political Philosophy*, Oxford University Press
- Sedley, D. (2007), *Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity*, University of California Press
- Skemp, J.B. (1952), *Plato's Statesman*, Routledge
- Vidal-Naquet, P. (1978), "Plato's Myth of the *Statesman*: The Ambiguities of the Golden Age and of History", *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 98