

**Foreign Military Intervention in Response to
Microstate Security Crises:
a Study in Vulnerability and Dependence**

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**St Hugh's College
University of Oxford**

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations
in the Faculty of Social Studies at the University of Oxford



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ABSTRACT

The thesis explores political-security aspects of a late twentieth century phenomenon: the existence of many diminutive and weak, yet ostensibly sovereign and independent, states. The thesis addresses two main questions concerning these "microstates" (with a population of less than one million). What are the principal sources of microstate *vulnerability*? How best can we conceptualize microstates' security *dependence* on larger powers? Foreign military intervention in response to microstate security crises throws these dual issues into sharp relief. The study covers all 55 independent microstates during the years 1960 to 1989, from the conventional beginning of decolonization to the end of the Cold War. Particular attention is paid to four representative case studies: *Vanuatu* (Papua New Guinea's 1980 intervention to quell a secessionist rebellion); *The Gambia* (Senegal's 1981 suppression of a coup attempt); *Grenada* (Cuba's role in respect of the 1983 American invasion); and *the Maldives* (India's thwarting of a 1988 mercenary attack).

The thesis draws on an original data base of microstate security crises, a wide range of academic literature covering International Relations theory and small states, and field work. It tests the propositions that certain typical political, geographical and economic characteristics of microstates played a key role in determining vulnerability to security threats, and that microstates' dependent relationships with larger powers are in keeping with the patron-client model of such unequal associations. The thesis concludes that a mix of typical microstate features heightened their vulnerability, notably disadvantageous colonial legacies; tendencies towards "exaggerated personalism", "leadership longevity", and unrestrained executive power; remote insularity; and extreme government resource constraints. The patron-client model was found to be a useful conceptualization of dependent security relationships with larger powers, in terms of the pervasiveness of the latter's engagement in the microstates, conformity in foreign policy and mutual benefit, but the criterion of informality was frequently not met.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Not since Europe's principalities and city-states thronged the Congress of Vienna in the early nineteenth century,¹ has the international community counted so many diminutive states among its members. Today's microstates, defined here as having a population under one million, are largely recent arrivals, dozens of them having materialized after 1960 from what De Gaulle called the dust of empires.² Notwithstanding their inability to "command adequate economic, human and territorial resources to fulfil the basic functions of statehood,"³ these islands and enclaves have assumed the legal status of sovereign and equal international actors. Many have proved susceptible to threats posed by domestic dissidents or external aggressors and, in times of crisis, have been either quick to call for foreign assistance or powerless to rebuff outside interference.

The recent completion of 35 years in Cyprus by a United Nations peace-keeping force reminds us that microstate security crises have the potential to generate "macro-headaches" for larger neighbours and other interested onlookers. The exasperated British Foreign Secretary complained in 1969 that the minuscule dependency of Anguilla was taking up 40 to 50 per cent of his time during the confrontation over independence

¹Webster, C.K., *The Congress of Vienna, 1814-15*, Oxford University Press, London, 1919, pp. 57, 59

²Watson, Adam, *The Evolution of International Society: a Comparative Historical Analysis*, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 300

³Buzan, Barry, "People, states and fear: the national security problem in the Third World", in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon (eds), *National Security in the Third World: the Management of Internal and External Threats*, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1988, p. 18

proposals,⁴ and, in the 1970s, Oman's Dhofar Rebellion engaged more than ten foreign powers, including Britain, Iran and China.⁵ During the three decades from 1960 to 1989, political upheavals in or, less commonly, attacks on microstates led to foreign military interventions on nearly 40 occasions,⁶ often involving the commitment of substantial resources by the intervener and sometimes sparking intense debate in the wider international community. The fundamental *vulnerability* of most microstates, colourfully referred to by Hughes as so many "exotic and fragile political life-forms stranded on the foreshore of nationhood,"⁷ places them in a position of equally profound *dependence* on the assistance of others to deter or meet threats to their security, raising questions as to the authenticity and viability of their sovereign statehood.

Events in the early 1980s, notably a South African mercenary attack on Seychelles, the Falklands War and the United States intervention in Grenada, attracted considerable official and academic attention to the special security problems of small territories. The resulting studies tended, however, to concentrate on only certain classes or regional groups of microstates - for example, Commonwealth,⁸ island⁹ or African¹⁰ - and to mix independent states with dependent territories.¹¹ In the present study I consider all microstates and use the particular scenario of crises resulting in foreign military

⁴Harden, Sheila (ed.), *Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World*, Frances Pinter, London, 1985, p. 4

⁵Váli, Ferenc A., *Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: the Balances of Power*, The Free Press, New York, 1976, p. 125; Wylie, James H., *The Influence of British Arms: an Analysis of British Military Intervention Since 1956*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1984, p. 93

⁶See Table 1.02. Crawford claims that "not a year has passed since 1960 without some form of external military or paramilitary assistance being given to a small island State." [Crawford, James, "Islands as sovereign nations", *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 38, Part 2, April 1989, p. 288]

⁷Hughes, Arnold, "From colonialism to confederation: the Gambian experience of independence, 1965-1982", in Robin Cohen (ed.), *African Islands and Enclaves*, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1983, p. 57

⁸*Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society: Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group*, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1985

⁹Crawford, "Islands as sovereign nations"

¹⁰Cohen, *African Islands and Enclaves*

¹¹Quester, George H., "Trouble in the islands: defending the micro-states", *International Security*, Vol. 8, No 2, Fall 1983

intervention as a vehicle for examining microstate vulnerability and dependence. I suggest it lends itself to this use in several respects: first, because the motivating crises are at the upper end of the scale of gravity, that is beyond the capacity of microstate governments to cope with alone, they illustrate vividly the features that make microstates prone to political instability and external aggression; second, the subsequent foreign interventions are the most acute manifestations of microstates' dependent security relationships with larger powers;¹² and, third, the typically "quick-decisive"¹³ interventions, and the crises behind them, constitute relatively discrete sets of events, providing a basis for controlled comparison.

I address two central questions: what are the principal sources of microstates' *vulnerability* and how best can we conceptualize their resulting security *dependence* on larger powers. Security is to be understood in the traditional political-military sense. The timeframe for the study is 1960-1989, covering the main period of decolonization through to the end of the Cold War. In respect of microstates' vulnerability, I contend that the defining characteristic of very small size and other typical microstate qualities, such as insularity and high population density, are critical factors that combine to form varying patterns of vulnerability according to individual circumstances. In doing so I draw on literature dealing with the special attributes of politics in very small societies, "security geography", and economic determinants of political instability. I begin my

¹²According to Shoemaker and Spanier, "crises... set and define the precise nature of a patron-client relationship at a given point in history." [Shoemaker, Christopher C. and John Spanier, *Patron-client State Relationships: Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age*, Preager, New York, 1984, p. 68]

¹³The term comes from Jentleson, Bruce W., and Ariel E. Levite, "The analysis of protracted military intervention", in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman (eds), *Foreign Military Intervention: the Dynamics of Protracted Conflict*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, p. 10

discussion of security dependence by reviewing microstates' historical position in international society as a whole and their reliance on the protection afforded by the modern international legal order, before moving on to consider the issue of their dependence on the military power of individual larger states. I identify the patron-client model of relations between unequal states as a broadly applicable description of this dependence. These explorations are pursued in more detail in four representative case studies. The present introductory chapter defines key terms, previews the major questions, and outlines the structure and methodology of the study.

Definition of Key Terms

Vulnerability and Dependence

My definitions take as their starting point the *New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, on which I elaborate when a term is being used in a special way or when it has acquired particular connotations in the academic discipline of International Relations. Thus vulnerability is, at its simplest, "the state or quality of being... liable to damage or harm, especially from aggression or attack."¹⁴ Such aggression or attack can come from forces either outside or within the microstate. Vulnerability derives from relative weaknesses and when it coincides with actual threats creates a condition of insecurity.¹⁵ Dependence

¹⁴*New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (NSOED)*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 3605

¹⁵Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War World*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1991, pp. 112, 141

is "the state or condition of being dependent," viz "resting entirely on someone or something for maintenance, support, or other requirement;... unable to do without someone or something."¹⁶ I do *not* use the word dependence to refer to dependency theory, that body of International Relations literature addressing perceived Western political-economic domination of the developing world.

When it comes to the other three terms central to the study - microstate, security and intervention - one must resign oneself to a lack of established definitions. Connell writes that, "attempts to define micro-states have been fraught with problems, and even the most extensive discussions... have been ultimately inconclusive;"¹⁷ Buzan warns that the attempt to provide a precise definition of security is fruitless;¹⁸ and, of intervention, Little concludes that "the word itself denotes very little."¹⁹ Rather than attempting to distil competing interpretations into single lowest-common-denominators, I sketch below some of the major approaches and then offer definitions of my own, tailored for present requirements.

Microstate

I employ the term microstate to describe the smallest independent entities in the international system. A state, in the sense of the political form of a nation, is taken to be

¹⁶NSOED, p. 636

¹⁷Connell, John, *Sovereignty and Survival: Island Microstates in the Third World*, Research Monograph No 3, Department of Geography, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1988, p. 1

¹⁸Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: the National Security Problem in International Relations*, Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1983, p. 11

¹⁹Little, Richard, *Intervention: External Involvement in Civil Wars*, Martin Robertson [no place of publication given], 1975, p. 2

"a community of people occupying a defined area and organized under one government."²⁰ In International Relations, the states of principal interest are those which are, formally, independent actors on the world stage, that is to say those states exercising sovereignty,²¹ which, according to James, consists of "constitutional separateness", or not being contained... within a wider constitutional scheme."²²

Since smallness is a relative concept, separating out a particular group from any continuum of states is bound to be arbitrary to some degree. It is not surprising, therefore, that in setting the definitional parameters for microstatehood not even the medium of measurement, still less the appropriate cut-off point has been wholly agreed. The most rigorous statistical typology remains Taylor's "cluster analysis" commissioned for a 1969 UNITAR study,²³ in which he defined microstates as having a land area of less than 142,822 kilometres, a population of less than 2,928,000, and a Gross National Product of less than US\$1,583 million (1965/66). However, as Reid suggests, ideal as they may be, such composite measures "tend to be cumbersome and provide only a slight refinement over the use of the single variable of population,"²⁴ which has, in fact, been by far the most commonly adopted ranking system.

Beyond the tendency to use population as a yardstick, a consensus on what constitutes a

²⁰NSOED, p. 3036

²¹Job, Brian L., "The insecurity dilemma: national, regime and state securities in the Third World", in Brian L. Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1992, p. 15

²²James, Alan, *Sovereign Statehood: the Basis of International Society*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1986, p. 24

²³Taylor, Charles, "Statistical typology of micro-states and territories towards a definition of micro-state", in United Nations Institute of Training and Research (UNITAR), *Status and Problems of Very Small States and Territories*, United Nations, New York, 1969 (later republished as Rapaport, Jacques, et al., *Small States and Territories: Status and Problems*, Arno Press, New York, 1971)

²⁴Reid, George L., *The Impact of Very Small Size on the International Behaviour of Microstates*, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1974, p. 11

microstate has been elusive.²⁵ The figure of one million is the benchmark usually employed, largely for reasons of convenience and, over time, convention. The much-cited UNITAR study of "very small" states owns that it chose the one million parameter "without attaching any magical value to it."²⁶ Writing in the early 1970s, Reid²⁷ and Harbert²⁸ appear to have chosen this cut-off point because it provided suitably-sized samples of microstates against which to test their hypotheses. In 1985, Hein uses the one million standard without attempting a justification,²⁹ while Harden plumps for one million in the belief that this has become the "accepted yardstick" at the United Nations and, mistakenly, that it is being used by the Commonwealth Consultative Group on the Special Needs of Small States.³⁰ By 1988, Connell writes that the one million distinction has become "fairly conventional" as a measure of microstatehood.³¹ Among those who ascribe much lower populations to microstates are Caldwell and his colleagues³² (500,000), and Blair³³ and Plischke³⁴ (300,000). The Commonwealth Consultative Group is even more restrictive, assigning the term "mini-state" to entities with populations under 200,000, and "micro-state" to those under 100,000.³⁵

The Consultative Group also, however, attaches significance to the one-million

²⁵See the catalogue of different measures in Hein, Philippe, "The study of microstates", in Edward Dommen and Philippe Hein (eds), *States, Microstates and Islands*, Croom Helm, London, 1985, pp. 23-25.

²⁶Rapaport et al., *Small States and Territories...*, p. 31

²⁷Reid, *The Impact of Very Small Size...*, p. 12

²⁸Harbert, Joseph R., "The behaviour of the ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972", *International Organization*, Vol. 30, No 1, Winter 1976, p. 111

²⁹Hein, "The study of microstates", p. 16

³⁰Harden, *Small is Dangerous...*, p. 9

³¹Connell, *Sovereignty and Survival...*, p. 1

³²Caldwell, John C., Graham E. Harrison and Pat Quiggan, "The demography of micro-states", *World Development*, Vol. 8, No 12, December 1980

³³Blair, Patricia Wohlgemuth, *The Ministate Dilemma*, Occasional Paper No 6, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1967

³⁴Plischke, Elmer, *Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1977

³⁵*Vulnerability...*, p. 9

population mark, which it regards as indicative of a *small* state,³⁶ a conception shared by the Commonwealth itself³⁷ and other multilateral bodies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.³⁸ That such organizations are content blandly to describe, for example, tiny Nauru and Tuvalu (each with 1990 populations of 9,000³⁹), as small states probably reflects diplomatic avoidance of the potentially negative, dismissive overtones of more meaningful terms like "mini-" or "micro-". Academics, too, have sometimes tended towards a broad definition of smallness because of these perceived stigmatic connotations.⁴⁰ In 1987, Clarke and Payne claim that "something of a consensus" has emerged in favour of a population of one million being the upper limit for a small state,⁴¹ though one of the two citations on which they rely is the UNITAR study, which in fact concerned itself with *very* small rather than small states.⁴²

Writing with Sutton in 1993, Payne affirms the one million measure for small states and suggests that the sub-category of microstate "has been quietly allowed to disappear."⁴³ The lapsing of the term microstate, if that is in fact what has happened, is regrettable since the alternative, small states, is problematic on several counts. If the epithet "small" is restricted to those states with populations under one million, how then are we to describe somewhat bigger, but still not "large" or even "middle-sized", states, like

³⁶ibid.

³⁷*Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General 1993*, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1993, p. 49

³⁸Khan, Abdur Rob, and Mohammad Humayun Kabir, "The security of small states: a framework for analysis", in M. Abdul Hafiz and Abdur Rob Khan (eds), *Security of Small States*, University Press, Dhaka, 1987, p. 5

³⁹U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 1990* (Population Series No 120), United Nations, New York, 1991

⁴⁰Khan and Kabir, "The security of small states...", p. 7

⁴¹Clarke, Colin, and Tony Payne, "Introduction", in Colin Clarke and Tony Payne (eds), *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1987, p. xvii. Compare Connell (*Sovereignty and Survival...*, p. 1), who makes the same claim for "microstate".

⁴²Rapaport *et al.*, *Small States and Territories...*, p. 9. The blurring of the distinction may have arisen from the fact that for this later edition the word "very" was dropped from the book's original title (only).

⁴³Sutton, Paul, and Anthony Payne, "Lilliput under threat: the security problems of small island and enclave developing states", *Political Studies*, Vol. XLI, No 4, December 1993, p. 582

Jamaica (1990 population 2,456,000) or Ireland (3,720,000)? Indeed, many writers would be comfortable in applying the label small to countries much further up the scale than these: might not Switzerland and The Netherlands with respective 1990 populations of around seven and 15 millions be reasonably regarded as small when measured against China (1,139 million) or even France (56 million)?⁴⁴

An equally serious shortcoming, from an academic standpoint, is that the term small state is already spoken for in the literature. There is a substantial, prior body of writing on "small states" which does *not* deal with the likes of Nauru and Tuvalu. In Robinson's 1960 collection of essays on the economic consequences of the size of nations, small states are of the order of Australia and Belgium.⁴⁵ Vital regards as small those countries with populations, in the developed world, of 10-15 million or, in the Third World, 20-30 million;⁴⁶ and he chooses Czechoslovakia, Israel and Finland as small state case studies.⁴⁷ For Schou and Brundtland, the Scandinavian countries are small states.⁴⁸ Maniruzzaman, who ranks states according to their "war fighting capabilities", considers nearly 90 per cent of Third World countries to be small states, including, for example, Vietnam, which at the time of his survey had a population of around 50 million.⁴⁹

In short, "small" is an extremely imprecise descriptor that, if anything, implies states with

⁴⁴U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 1990*

⁴⁵Robinson, E.A.G. (ed.), *Economic Consequences of Size of Nations*, Macmillan, London, 1960

⁴⁶Vital, David, *The Inequality of States: a Study of the Small Power in International Relations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967, p. 8

⁴⁷Vital, David, *The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict*, Oxford University Press, London, 1971

⁴⁸Schou, August, and Arne Olav Brundtland (eds), *Small States in International Relations*, Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971

⁴⁹Maniruzzaman, Talukder, *The Security of Small States in the Third World*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 25, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982, pp. 7, 14; U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 1990*

populations considerably in excess of the one-million threshold that appeared to gain currency in international organizations and academic circles in the 1990s. I have no quarrel with the use of the one-million population standard to mark off as a group the smallest entities in the international system, but suggest that, in discussing them, we need to make clear that we mean not just small, but *very* small states, an idea neatly conveyed by the prefix "micro-". Accordingly, I join with Hein, Connell and others in continuing to employ the term microstate and in defining it as a state with a population under one million.

Security

The word "security" can be defined, at the simplest level, as the "condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger,"⁵⁰ but has complex inferences when used in International Relations. In forming my own definition I have used as a framework Job's discussion in his 1992 volume, *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*. I adhere to the realist theoretical approach which has dominated security studies and is outlined by Job as follows:

"Peoples within territorial boundaries are viewed as having singular national identities, which are in turn fostered by the institutions of the state. That is, they are nation-states. Regimes are regarded as legitimate agents for the national interest. A functional social contract operates with citizens ceding rights and resources to the state in return for protection and order in their lives... . In the international milieu, these nation-states interact according to principles of territoriality, sovereignty, and nominal equality. Under this rubric, 'national security' refers to the security of the nation-state, i.e. an externally focused interest derived from the presumption of a unified, self-identifying, and ordered

⁵⁰NSOED, p. 2754

society within the state's borders."⁵¹

I also endorse, however, Job's qualification of the last element of the paradigm: most Third World countries are preoccupied not with external but internal security concerns, such as competing communal groups within their borders, non-acceptance of the regime's legitimacy by significant components of the population, and a lack of effective institutional capacity to provide peace, order and satisfactory living conditions for the population.⁵²

In recent years, security has been thought of in an increasingly broad sense,⁵³ and I am conscious that for many microstates it is not classic political-military threats that pose the greatest menace to their national well-being, but other problems such as environmental degradation and economic under-development.⁵⁴ For purposes of the present study I have chosen to maintain the traditional focus of security studies on *political-military threats*⁵⁵ and the underlying assumption that these threats entail some kind of violence. Factors such as economic deprivation are not ignored but are examined as contributing causes rather than as security threats in themselves.

I define security as the ability of a state to avoid or overcome violent threats to its core values: territorial integrity, political independence, institutional arrangements and public order.⁵⁶ I view any kind of coup attempt or violent assault on the organs of state as a

⁵¹ Job, "The insecurity dilemma...", pp. 16-17

⁵² *ibid.*, pp. 17-18

⁵³ Buzan, *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War World*, p. 12

⁵⁴ Easter, Christopher, "Small states development: a Commonwealth Vulnerability Index", *The Round Table*, No 351, 1999

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 116-19

⁵⁶ Adapted from Maniruzzaman, *The Security of Small States...*, p. 15, and Espindola, Roberto, "Security dilemmas", in

threat to institutional arrangements, regardless of whether the perpetrators aim to change the formal structures of the state or merely to seize control of them. By a microstate's *security environment* I mean the set of circumstances or conditions which affect its prospects for maintaining security, ranging, for example, from its geographical location to its economic situation.

The term *security crisis* requires more careful elaboration. "Crisis" - "a time of trouble, danger or suspense in politics..."⁵⁷ - has a special resonance in International Relations, ranking "among the most widely-used verbal symbols of turmoil in the politics among nations."⁵⁸ Young describes a crisis as "a set of rapidly unfolding events which raise the impact of destabilising forces in the general international system or any of its subsystems substantially above normal (i.e. average) levels and increase the likelihood of violence occurring in the system."⁵⁹ I would stretch his "subsystems" to include individual nation-states, on the grounds that his definition is as applicable to relations between political actors within states as it is to relations between states. Likewise, elements of Brecher and Wilkenfeld's definition of a foreign policy crisis can be transferred to political crises in general: decision-makers perceive a "threat to basic values" and are conscious of a "finite time for response to the external [or internal] value threat," and there is "a high probability of involvement in military hostilities [or civil violence]."⁶⁰ I select the following as key elements of a security crisis: a conflictual situation, in which one of the

Clarke and Payne, *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*, p. 64

⁵⁷ NSOED, pp. 550-51

⁵⁸ Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Framework", in Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld *et al.*, *Crisis, Conflict and Instability*, Pergamon, Oxford, 1989, p. 3

⁵⁹ Young, Oran R., *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967, p. 10

⁶⁰ Brecher and Wilkenfeld, "Framework", p. 5

parties is the government of a microstate; a violent threat to one or more of the microstate's core values; and a sense of urgency deriving from the fast pace of events and/or a finite time in which the government must successfully meet the challenge to those values.

Intervention

The essence of intervention is "the act of coming between or interfering, especially so as to modify or prevent a result... ." ⁶¹ However, because "intervention" has been applied, even within the field of International Relations, to such a broad range of actions, from military invasion, through economic sanctions or aid, down to merely commenting on the affairs of another state, Little concludes that, "like many important terms used very frequently... it has no accepted technical meaning." ⁶² In the International Relations context, the intervening actor is assumed to be a state, or, more precisely, its agents, but the objects of intervention may be, or include, non-state actors. An example of this is the dispatch of troops by Western countries to northern Iraq in 1991 to protect the Kurdish population from the security forces of its own state. Although formal definitions in the International Relations literature usually reserve the term for intercessions aimed at actors within a single target state, it is also sometimes applied to situations involving actors from more than one other state. Higgins, for example, describes as an intervention Britain's interposition of itself between warring Egypt and Israel in 1956, ⁶³ as does Wylie

⁶¹NSOED, p. 1401

⁶²Little, *Intervention...*, p. 2

⁶³Higgins, Rosalyn, *The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations*, Oxford University Press/Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1963, p. 218

the dispatch of British and Arab League forces to deter the Iraqi threat to Kuwait in 1961.⁶⁴

Rosenau, and similarly Young, hold that intervention is an act "directed at changing or preserving the structure of political authority in the target society,"⁶⁵ but I contend that motives for an intervention can fall well short of seeking to achieve or prevent systemic transformation. For example, Egypt's interventions in Cyprus in 1978 and Malta in 1985 sought to resolve stand-offs between local authorities and foreign hijackers, and there was no intention of affecting Cypriot or Maltese political authority structures. I also have doubts about the universality of Little's requirement, even in his civil war context, that the intervener display a bias, that is maintain a relationship with one side (only) in a conflict.⁶⁶ I regard the insertion of a neutral peace-keeping force to separate and disarm belligerents as equally constituting an intervention.

For Rosenau, interventionary behaviour "constitutes a sharp break with then-existing forms."⁶⁷ Likewise, Holsti stipulates that interventions will be "unconventional" occurrences,⁶⁸ which Wylie argues means that they must be of a temporary nature.⁶⁹ I am not persuaded that an act should *by definition* be of any less interventionary because it occurs often or is of more than fleeting duration, but common sense dictates restricting usage so that interventions are distinguished from, on the one hand, routine interactions

⁶⁴Wylie, *The Influence of British Arms...*, p. 62

⁶⁵Rosenau, James N., "Intervention as a scientific concept", in Richard A. Falk (ed.), *The Vietnam War and International Law*, Vol. 2, American Society of International Law/Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1969, p. 998; Young, Oran R., "Intervention and international systems", in Falk, op. cit., p. 1017

⁶⁶Little, *Intervention...*, p. 8

⁶⁷Rosenau, "Intervention as a scientific concept", p. 998

⁶⁸Holsti, K.J., *International Politics: a Framework for Analysis*, Prentice-Hall, London, 1974, p. 279

⁶⁹Wylie, *The Influence of British Arms...*, p. 19

such as defence cooperation programmes and, on the other, more serious involvements such as conquest or long-term garrisoning. Associated with the notion that intervention is an extraordinary action is the assumption that it generally responds to a highly unusual situation in the target state or between states, that is a crisis of some kind.

Haas claims that acts infringing upon domestic jurisdiction "should not count as intervention if the government on whose soil they occur has requested them or expressed its acquiescence unequivocally."⁷⁰ Morgenthau, like Bull, also regards intervention ("as ancient and well established an instrument of foreign policy as... diplomatic pressure and war") as an act against the will of the target state.⁷¹ They are supported by *Oppenheim's International Law*, which holds that intervention is strictly "forcible or dictatorial interference in the affairs of another state, calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences on that other state."⁷² This contention is, however, implicitly rejected by the International Court of Justice, which ruled in the "Military and Paramilitary Activities Case" that "intervention... is already allowable at the request of the government of a State." (In the Court's view, the significance of the element of coercion was that it defined *prohibited* intervention.)⁷³ Similarly, Higgins refers to "intervention on behalf of the government... by invitation of that government,"⁷⁴ and Brownlie to "intervention... with consent of the legitimate government."⁷⁵ I prefer the broader usage of intervention,

⁷⁰Haas, Ernst B., *Beware the Slippery Slope: Notes Towards the Definition of Justifiable Intervention*, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1993, p. 6

⁷¹Morgenthau, Hans J., "To intervene or not to intervene", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 45, No 3, April 1967, p. 425; Bull, Hedley (ed.), *Intervention in World Politics*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 1

⁷²Jennings, Robert, and Arthur Watts, *Oppenheim's International Law* (ninth edition): Vol. I: *Peace: Introduction and Part 1*, Longman, Harlow, Essex, 1992, p. 430

⁷³"Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua", [ICJ] *Reports* (Geneva), 1986, pp. 108, 126

⁷⁴Higgins, Rosalyn, "International law and civil conflict", in Evan Luard (ed.), *The International Regulation of Civil Wars*, Thames and Hudson, London, 1972, p. 172

⁷⁵Brownlie, Ian, *International Law and the Use of Force by States*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p. 321

covering both coercive and cooperative situations, since it safely encompasses controversial cases such as Grenada in 1983, where the existence of a prior, constitutionally valid request for outside assistance is disputed.⁷⁶ The great majority of interventions in microstates have, in fact, been mounted with the consent of the target's government.

Vincent defines *military intervention* as occurring when "troops are dispatched to keep order or support a revolution in a foreign state, or when military aid is given to a government whose position is insecure or which is in conflict with a neighbouring state." Sometimes, "the very presence or display of armed force... has an effect tantamount to intervention."⁷⁷ Military aid could comprise the supply of equipment, stores, transport, or non-combatant personnel such as training officers. Although Tillema regards "all combat-ready foreign military operations undertaken by regular military forces" as acts of intervention,⁷⁸ the term is not normally understood to refer to the deployment of troops by one state across another's border in the course of hostilities between the two. As Haas observes, to count acts of aggression as intervention would be "tantamount to making the concept... coterminous with the ideas of war and of conflict management."⁷⁹

My own definition of military intervention encompasses all instances of foreign military involvement in response to microstate security crises. It is compatible in most respects with the concepts outlined above, but departs from convention in a number of areas. For

⁷⁶For an overview of this issue see Gilmore, William C., *The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation*, Mansell, London, 1984

⁷⁷Vincent, R.J., *Nonintervention and International Order*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1974, p. 9

⁷⁸Tillema, Herbert K., *International Armed Conflict Since 1945: a Bibliographic Handbook of Wars and Military Interventions*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 5

⁷⁹Haas, *Beware the Slippery Slope...*, p. 6

example, I do not apply the criterion that interventions necessarily seek to affect political authority structures in the target state; and neither do I restrict myself to interventions that bear upon relations between actors within a single state. Thus I use the term military intervention to describe the action of one state in dispatching either troops on operational duties or military aid to a microstate in times of crisis in the latter. The intention may be to support either the microstate government or its opponents, in circumstances of civil unrest, rebellion or external threat, or to take action when the authorities in the target microstate are perceived to be unable or unwilling to deal with a security crisis which impinges on the interests of the intervener. Sometimes the mere display of armed force can amount to intervention. Finally, the "dispatch" of troops may involve the mobilization of forces already deployed to the microstate.

Central Questions

Each of the two central questions relates to one of the dual themes: vulnerability and dependence. *What are the principal sources of microstate vulnerability?*; and *How can we best conceptualize microstates' security dependence on larger powers?* Each is taken up in general terms in the next two chapters of the thesis before being addressed in detailed case studies dealing with specific security crises resulting in foreign military intervention.

Vulnerability

In addressing sources of vulnerability, my starting point is the proposition that microstates' defining characteristic - their very small size - carries with it inherent potentials for vulnerability, in the sense both of susceptibility to external attack and of inability to cope with internal rebellion. Although I regard the fact of smallness as the basic determinant of microstate vulnerability, I concur with Sutton's view that it should be seen as part of a "syndrome of interrelated characteristics or as a qualifying feature to tendencies already inherent, rather than as a cause of such features in the first place."⁸⁰ I therefore examine how a range of political, geographical and economic factors, in combination with small size, affect microstate vulnerability.

My discussion of *political* factors affecting security prospects considers, first, the impact of microstates' distinctive decolonization experiences and, second, the influence of the special characteristics of politics in small societies. The tendency not to regard independence as a serious proposition for small colonial territories until very late in the day militated against proper political, administrative and economic tutelage. Neglectful colonial governance in small territories of low economic and strategic value saw some enter into nationhood desperately lacking in the wherewithal for self-reliant development. Colonial policies towards certain small territories, notably the importation of indentured labour to plantation island countries, dramatically altered the demographic status quo. Anomalous or disputed colonial-era border demarcations have proved a dangerous legacy

⁸⁰Sutton, Paul, "Political aspects", in Clarke and Payne, *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*, p. 23

for some microstates. Among the outstanding characteristics of politics in small societies is its intimacy, or the prevalence of "personalism". By promoting greater transparency and accountability in government, this intimacy may foster political harmony. It may also, however, encourage unhealthy tendencies towards nepotism, lack of impartiality in justice and administration, and the perpetuation in office of dominant individuals. Executives in small polities are less likely to be subject to an effective range of checks and balances in the form of independent legislatures, judiciaries and media. Military forces may constitute as much a threat to national security as a bulwark of it in the microstate context. These diverse handicaps deriving from pre-independence experiences and the distinctive characteristics of small polities have helped to make many microstates vulnerable either to internal instability or external aggression.

Relative to more populous and richer countries, microstates have scant ability to temper the security implications of their *geographical* circumstances. Foremost among geographical factors is the fortuitousness of location. Just as the remoteness which is the lot of many island microstates can enhance external security, the proximity or contiguity of other microstates to zones of conflict, or unstable or aggressive neighbours exposes them to negative spillover effects. Location may also carry strategic significance for outsiders: islands have frequently been valued as forward bases, *points d'appui* or sea lane sentinels; enclaves may be valued by others as buffer zones or, like their island counterparts, as forward bases and jumping-off points. These potentials can be a mixed blessing: while another state's vested strategic interests may lead it to adopt a protective and supportive attitude towards the microstate in question, such interests may also

prompt coercive interference when the other state regards domestic political developments or the trend of foreign policy in the microstate as inimical to its interests. The physical character of the microstates' own territories can have considerable security ramifications. In archipelagic microstates, for example, territorial fragmentation and intervening expanses of sea strain governments' ability to prevent external intrusions or to enforce their writ internally. Although very small population size is their defining attribute, most microstates also possess a very small territorial space and thus lack strategic depth, which is one of the reasons microstate governments tend to succumb quickly to a sudden attack. High population densities, particularly prevalent in the island microstates, may place intense pressure on resources and, sometimes, create political friction, especially when there are a number of competing ethnic communities. For the few microstates with a low population density, that is a large territory relative to their small populations, defence tasks such as border patrols may be beyond their financial and manpower resources.

Economic conditions are another key security determinant because of their impact on governments' ability to finance defence measures and because of their potential to bolster or undermine political stability. The great majority of microstates are developing countries and more than a dozen had been accorded Least Developed Country status by the United Nations by the end of the period under consideration.⁸¹ While budgetary strains are felt throughout the developing world, government resources in the smaller and poorer microstates sometimes fall short of the level required to finance even the most

⁸¹U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 1990*, p. 87

rudimentary of modern security forces. In other cases, basic defence requirements consume a seriously disproportionate share of national budgets at the expense of social and economic programmes. Generally speaking, however, I do not argue that microstates' economic problems impact on their security in a way that is distinctive of microstates. Rather, differing economic circumstances help explain varying degrees of vulnerability among microstates. In some, a direct connection can be made between sheer poverty and political unrest: a citizenry with little expectation of an improved standard of living in the ordinary course of events is more likely to spawn or be receptive to groups prepared to adopt radical, non-constitutional methods of achieving change. Even economic advances, however, may threaten political stability because of the disruptive impact of rapid modernization on traditional societies.

Dependence

In analysing microstate's dependence on others in the security sphere I consider the applicability of, in the first instance, three models of unequal relationships: does the typical microstate operate within a larger protector's *sphere of influence*, or is it the lesser party in either a *dominant-subordinate* or a *patron-client* relationship? While all three paradigms have some utility, I conclude that the patron-client model rings truest for microstates and it is on this model that I focus.

As a preliminary to my analysis of microstate's dependence on others in the security sphere, I review the historical position of microstates in international society at large.

Comparison of today's microstates with their historical antecedents reveals a double paradox. Notwithstanding that the separate status of small principalities and city-states of old usually reflected material attributes such as commercial power or strategic value as buffers, they generally only exercised sovereignty under the suzerainty of the great powers of the day. The position of modern microstates is essentially the reverse: while their sovereignty is, in formal terms, unfettered, it often rests, not on any concrete foundations of economic or military self-reliance, but on the international legal principles which gained more or less respectful compliance in the late twentieth century, particularly the right of self-determination and the equality of states. In addition to their general reliance on the contemporary international order's deterrence of aggression, microstates depend on the power of other individual states for assistance in coping with security crises.

Although I accept Jackson's conclusion that Third World countries are generally so deficient in the conventional underpinnings of statehood that they might be regarded as no more than "quasi-states",⁸² I take the view that a lack of self-reliance, even in such a fundamental area as security, does not necessarily negate viability as a separate national entity. Dependence on others in security matters can be seen, not as giving the lie to microstates' sovereignty, but as part of a pragmatic and mutually beneficial relationship, not dissimilar from the suzerainty systems of earlier centuries, and as strands in the web of interdependency binding modern international society ever more closely together. Acceptance, indeed cultivation, of dependent relationships with larger powers through,

⁸²Jackson, Robert H., *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990

for example, coalition and alliance building, may be a rational defence strategy for a vulnerable microstate. Nevertheless, there can be little dispute that microstates are inevitably the junior partners in their relationships with larger powers. Almost all developing microstates fit the bill of Handel's archetypal weak state, which has a very small population and territory, and an unindustrialized, narrow-based economy producing a low GNP. It is incapable of defending itself and has a high degree of dependence on external military assistance. The scope of its international interests is usually limited to neighbouring areas; it has little or no influence on the balance of power; its foreign policy is mainly passive and risk-minimizing; and the state can easily be penetrated by outsiders.⁸³ How then can we best conceptualize the security relationships between these weak states and the larger powers on which they have depended for interventionary assistance in time of crisis? The three principal models can be summarized as follows.

According to Keal, a *sphere of influence* is "a determinate region within which a single external power exerts a predominant influence, which limits the freedom of action of political entities within it."⁸⁴ Some microstate security relationships with larger powers, in the Caribbean and in francophone Africa for example, can be characterized in this way. I contend, however, that the model's utility is limited by its preoccupation with the constraints imposed by larger powers, rather than the not necessarily parallel dynamic of dependence, and by its focus on the relations between competing great powers.

In Abernethy's model *dominant-subordinate relationship*, two states have interacted over

⁸³Handel, Michael I., *Weak States in the International System* (second impression), Frank Cass, London, 1990, pp. 52-

53

⁸⁴Keal, Paul, *Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance*, Macmillan, London, 1983, p. 15

a broad range of issue areas for a long time, with significant consequences for the subordinate state; the dominant state has the capacity and will to force compliance with its wishes; the subordinate state's capacity for independent action is seriously constrained; and representatives of the dominant state's institutions penetrate those of the subordinate state.⁸⁵ Although a number of microstates have external relationships which meet these criteria, for example Monaco, the involvement of larger powers in microstate security has generally had stronger elements of voluntarism and symbiosis than is envisaged in either the dominant-subordinate or sphere of influence models.

This defect is remedied in the final type of unequal association, the *patron-client relationship*, which Bercovitch describes as typically informal, voluntary and mutually valued, and covering a wide range of issue areas.⁸⁶ Microstates' reliance on larger powers for military assistance usually meet these criteria, for example demonstrating a surprising degree of reciprocity, though quite a number of relationships are enunciated in formal agreements rather than being informal.

⁸⁵Abernethy, David B., "Dominant-subordinate state relationships: how shall we define them? How do we compare them?", in Jan F. Triska (ed.), *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: the United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1986, pp. 105-07

⁸⁶Bercovitch, Jacob, "Superpowers and client states: analysing relations and patterns of influence", in Moshe Efrat and Jacob Bercovitch (eds), *Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: the Imbalance of Influence*, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 15

Structure, Sample and Method of the Study

Structure

The main body of the thesis comprises an analysis of microstate security issues in the round (Chapters Two and Three), followed by a series of case studies (Chapters Four to Seven). These principal sections are prefaced by the present introductory chapter and followed by a concluding chapter.

The analysis at the general level has two central foci, corresponding to the themes of vulnerability and dependence outlined above, and each dealt with in a separate chapter. The "vulnerability chapter" (Chapter Two) advances propositions as to the key sources of microstate vulnerability, under political, geographical and economic headings. The companion "dependence chapter" (Chapter Three) traces the historical position of very small states in international society and assesses the nature of modern microstates' security relationships with larger powers in terms of modern International Relations models.

The succeeding case studies consider four microstate security crises which sparked foreign military intervention, with the object of illustrating and testing the conclusions drawn in Chapters Two and Three. The case studies are Vanuatu's 1980 secessionist rebellion, put down with the assistance of Papua New Guinea; The Gambia's 1981 coup, overturned by Senegal; the 1983 bloodshed in Grenada and subsequent multinational

intervention (including the involvement of Cuba); and the 1988 mercenary attack on the Maldives, repulsed by India. Although no case study is attempted for the developed European microstates, because of the virtual absence of security crises in that group in modern times, the circumstances of their creation and survival through the centuries offer insights for the general chapters.

Sample

The study draws on a sample of 55 countries, listed in **Table 1.01**, which were independent microstates during the time-frame 1960-1989. The start date was chosen because the overwhelming majority of microstates have emerged as a result of modern decolonization, which is conventionally regarded as beginning in earnest in 1960, the year of Harold Macmillan's "wind of change" speech and of the coming to independence of almost all of the francophone African territories.⁸⁷ The study concludes three decades later in 1989, coinciding roughly with the end of the Cold War. Extensive use is made of a specially-compiled log of approximately 200 security crises, of which the 37 resulting in foreign intervention are listed in **Table 1.02**.

A few microstates, like Cyprus, are part of the sample for the full three decades; others, like Cape Verde, join part-way through when they attain independence; and some, like Oman, graduate out of the group when their populations pass the one million mark. Although the fact that individual microstates are considered for widely varying time-

⁸⁷ Jackson, Robert H., "Quasi-states, dual regimes, and neoclassical theory: international jurisprudence and the Third World", *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No 4, Autumn 1987, p. 524

spans produces a certain unevenness in the sample, the alternative of including each one in the study for the full period would be even more incongruous. The Republic of the Marshall Islands, for example, did not achieve independence until 1986, and Kuwait had ceased to be a microstate by 1975. Protected states, as opposed to protectorates, are treated as independent entities.⁸⁸ Excluded from the sample are three constitutional oddities which might otherwise be regarded as microstates: Cook Islands and Niue, two "self-governing states in free association with New Zealand," whose status was then regarded as a kind of half-way house between full dependence and full independence;⁸⁹ and the Vatican City, which, despite its formally sovereign status, lacks a permanent population and is more analogous to the headquarters of an international organization than a state.⁹⁰

Method

The methodology adopted in the vulnerability chapter is, first, to survey the actual security records of microstates during 1960-1989; and, second, in light of this experience, suggest which characteristics of microstates, under the broad categories of politics, geography and economy, have been most significant as sources of vulnerability. I consider the

⁸⁸See discussion in Chapter Two.

⁸⁹"Small states and left-overs of empire", *The Round Table*, No 290, April 1984, p. 3. For the distinction between the restricted sovereignty of the Cook Islands and Niue, and the status of the two South Pacific microstates that have entered into "Compacts of Free Association" with the United States, see Michal, Edward J., "Protected states: the political status of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol. 5, No 2, Fall 1993. In an October 1989 policy statement, reproduced as an appendix to the Michal article, the New Zealand government characterized the Cook Islands and Niue as falling short of sovereign independent statehood. Since the end of the period of this study, New Zealand has encouraged the international community to consider the Cooks and Niue as fully sovereign entities, pointing out New Zealand's 1988 Declaration to the United Nations after which no New Zealand treaty action had effect in the Cooks and/or Niue unless expressly extended to cover them, and also drawing attention to the fact that both the Cooks and Niue have acceded to a number of international treaties and become full members of international agencies in their own right.

⁹⁰Mendelson, M.H., "Diminutive states in the United Nations", *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 21, Part 4, October 1972, p. 612

significance of two groups of variables for each of my three categories of contributing factors. For *politics*, these are aspects of colonial experiences and the nature of politics in small societies; for *geography*, location and physical characteristics; for *economy*, government resource constraints and the relationship between underdevelopment and political instability. Apart from my own data base of microstate security crises, I draw on literature dealing with such issues as the special characteristics of politics in small societies, the impact of geography on security prospects and economic determinants of political instability. The diversity of the sample precludes creation of a model of a single archetypal microstate security environment. Rather, I think in terms of a kaleidoscope, with key factors of vulnerability combining in patterns which vary from case to case. Comprehensive data for microstates are often lacking, but where reasonably consistent and reliable statistics are available, I use them to test and illustrate propositions. For example, the United Nations Development Program's "human development index" implicitly supports the notion that underdevelopment has contributed to the serious political instability suffered by microstates like Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau,⁹¹ though the same source also demonstrates the need for caution in interpreting statistical material. Microstates such as Cyprus, Dominica and Seychelles have also had more than their share of domestic security problems, yet score reasonably well on the index.

In the dependence chapter, I set the scene by tracing the historical evolution of very small states' position in international society and by considering their reliance on the protection

⁹¹United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 1990, UNDP/Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford, 1990, p. 180

afforded by the postwar international legal order. I then survey modern microstates' security linkages with larger powers and assess the applicability of three International Relations models: spheres of influence, dominant-subordinate relationships and patron-client relationships, with emphasis on the last of these. I focus on four generic indicators of patron-clientage: the pervasiveness of the larger power's involvement in the microstate; evidence of the microstate's foreign policy conforming with that of the larger power; the extent to which the relationship is formalized; and the degree to which the relationship is mutually beneficial. The principal methodological problem lies in documenting the qualities specified in the models, for example the characteristics of informality and conformity associated with patron-client relationships. In respect of the latter, as Harbert finds in his study of United Nations voting behaviour,⁹² neat patterns of "synchronism",⁹³ that is microstates systematically emulating the positions taken by larger mentors, will not necessarily present themselves in readily-monitored long-term behaviour. More often, one must rely on a patchwork of ad hoc occurrences, such as a microstate's readiness to support a large friend on a specific policy issue of importance to the latter in order to deduce a client-like relationship.

Whereas the general chapters draw on all microstate security crises and on the full range of dependent security relationships with larger powers, the case studies sharpen the focus to individual security crises that were serious enough to require military intervention by a larger power. Continuing the parallel themes of vulnerability and dependence explored in the general chapters, the case studies have a dual interest: first, the original security

⁹²Harbert, "The behaviour of the ministates...", p. 125

⁹³Handel, *Weak States...*, p. 135

crises and their contexts (and whether these demonstrate the sources of microstate vulnerability previously identified); and, second, the subsequent foreign military interventions (and whether they reveal characteristics of patron-client and other models of unequal international relationships). I adopt George's methodological prescription for the case studies, which he sets out in design, execution and interpretation phases.⁹⁴

George's first requirement in *designing the case studies* is to specify the research problems and objectives. The overarching phenomenon being examined here is the paradoxical existence in modern international society of a large number of very small and weak, yet ostensibly sovereign and independent, entities, namely the microstates. The existing theory that bears upon aspects of the phenomenon collectively indicates that, in security terms, microstates are fundamentally vulnerable and dependent on larger states for military assistance in times of crisis. Particular aspects singled out for assessment are the key characteristics of microstates that make them vulnerable to security crises, and the nature of microstates' dependence on larger powers.

The second design requirement in George's schema is specification of the elements to be compared. There are two dependent variables or outcomes to be explained: first, the occurrence of security crises in microstates, and second, foreign military interventions in response to such crises. This crisis-plus-intervention scenario is chosen on the grounds that it throws the issues of both vulnerability and dependence into sharpest relief. I endeavour to explain the crises and interventions in the case studies in terms of my

⁹⁴George, Alexander L., "Case studies and theory development: the method of structured, focused comparison", in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy*, The Free Press, New York, 1979, p. 44

earlier suppositions. That is to say, I ask: 1) whether the variables which lay behind these crises are consistent with my general assessment of salient factors contributing to microstates' vulnerability; and 2) whether the variables underlying the microstate's dependence on the power from which it sought military assistance were consistent with the existence of a patron-client relationship between them.

The third design requirement is selection of appropriate cases for detailed investigation. I have chosen one from each of the four main geographical concentrations of developing country microstates: the South Pacific, Africa, the Caribbean and Asia. The case studies are *Vanuatu's* secession crisis at independence in 1980, which led to intervention by Papua New Guinean forces; the attempted coup in *The Gambia* in 1981, handled with Senegalese assistance; the United States invasion of *Grenada* in 1983, unsuccessfully resisted with the help of Cuban forces; and the 1988 mercenary coup in the Maldives, overturned after Indian intervention. The cases have enough in common to allow meaningful comparison, but at the same time their many differences suggest to the observer the significance of the presence or absence of certain factors. On the one hand, all the microstates involved are developing countries and the crises in question all occurred in a similar global political climate, that is in the 1980s, before the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, the microstates come from four separate regions and have varying geographical configurations and colonial histories. There are a mix of internal and external factors in the security crises but all are sudden and short-lived affairs, in keeping with the typical microstate experience. (Extended conflicts in Cyprus, Djibouti and Oman are among the few exceptions to this pattern.) Similarly, the case studies are

representative in that the interventions are "quick-decisive" operations: they are of short duration, involve relatively few casualties and, with the exception of the Cubans in Grenada, have a positive net outcome for the intervening power in terms of congruity of desired and realized objectives, and of costs incurred.⁹⁵ This compactness of events assists the comparative exercise.

The *execution phase* of the case studies is tackled in two parts: description and explanation. I set out, first, to establish through standard procedures of historical inquiry what actually transpired in each instance; and, second, to account for these events by placing them in the context of broader microstate experience, using the framework developed above. Execution of three case studies - Vanuatu, The Gambia and the Maldives - relies on field work in the microstates and/or intervening countries concerned.

The *interpretation phase* considers the theoretical implications of the case studies. I assess whether the experiences of Vanuatu, The Gambia, Grenada and the Maldives fit my general picture of microstates' vulnerability and dependent security relationships. In some instances it may be deemed appropriate to adjust this general picture in favour of contrary evidence from the case studies; in other instances I may conclude that the weight of contrary evidence is insufficient to warrant this and that the deviant aspects of the case studies should be regarded as atypical.

⁹⁵Jentleson and Levite, "The analysis of protracted military intervention", p. 10

CHAPTER TWO

VULNERABILITY

The present chapter addresses the first of the two central questions identified in the introduction: *what are the principal sources of microstate vulnerability?* I begin with a preliminary overview of the security problems faced by microstates during the study period, 1960-89. This survey rests on a log cataloguing the security crises experienced by microstates during the 30-year time-span. It informs some broad observations about the relative propensity of individual microstates and regional groups to suffer crises, the relative prevalence of internal over external threats, the salience of threats to "institutional arrangements", and the tendency for foreign interventions to be in support of the microstate government of the day.

The survey of microstates' security record provides a backdrop, and a wealth of specific examples, to support the chapter's principal objective of accounting for microstate vulnerability. I focus particularly on the contribution to vulnerability of features which are inherent to microstates themselves: small size in combination with certain other typical political, geographical and economic characteristics. In the *political* field, I consider the impact on security of microstates' colonial experiences and of the special characteristics of politics in small societies. Under the *geographical* heading, I look at the security significance for microstates of their locations and typical physical and demographic characteristics. In the final section, I examine microstates' *economic*

handicaps and their effect on governments' ability to provide adequately for security needs and on political stability.

Microstate security 1960-1989: the record

As set out in **Table 2.01**, each country was considered only for that portion of 1960-89 in which it was a) independent and b) still a microstate. A log was compiled of the approximately 200 security crises observed to have occurred in microstates during the study period, and is reproduced in **Table 2.02**. To qualify for inclusion, a security crisis needed to meet most or all of the criteria developed in Chapter One: it was a conflictual situation, in which one of the parties was the government of a microstate; it involved a violent threat to one or more of the microstate's core values (territorial integrity, political independence, institutional arrangements and public order); and there was a sense of urgency deriving from the fast pace of events and a finite time in which the government needed to successfully meet the challenge to those core values.

There are obvious difficulties in collecting comprehensive and accurate data on all security crises in 55 countries over a 30-year period, particularly when those countries are little-reported microstates. Compilation of the log was further constrained by a methodological problem common to the social sciences, that is the inherent difficulty of quantifying political events whose characterization requires qualitative judgements.¹

¹Friedrich, Carl J., "Some general theoretical reflections on the problems of political data", in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds), *Comparing Nations: the Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-national Research*, Yale University Press, New

Decisions made in compiling the log, such as a determination that event 'x' entailed a threat to a microstate's core values, often required discretionary assessments. It was also difficult to compare long-running security situations, such as fallout from a neighbouring conflict, with individual crises, and to verify alleged coup plots that were sometimes used by governments as justifications for crackdowns on opponents.

Given the patent helplessness of most microstates in the face of hostile external forces, it is unsurprising that the external dimension is emphasized in much of the literature dealing with the security of very small states. Quester points to island microstates' "obvious vulnerability to sudden military conquest,"² and Espíndola, writing in 1985, sees escalating East-West tension and an increase in the use of military force in resolving international disputes as the overarching security threats faced by small states.³ Occasionally, microstate jurisdictions have indeed been infringed by neighbours pursuing enemies across borders,⁴ foreign governments have been implicated in microstate insurgencies or coup attempts,⁵ or a microstate has suffered an unprovoked attack.⁶ Numerous microstates, as listed in **Table 2.03**, have had territorial disputes with neighbours, sometimes resulting in armed clashes or incursions.

The actual record of modern microstates' security crises in **Table 2.02**, however, bears

Haven, 1966, pp. 57-58

²Quester, George H., "Trouble in the islands: defending the micro-states", *International Security*, Vol. 8, No 2, Fall 1983, p. 161

³Espíndola, Roberto, "Security dilemmas", in Colin Clarke and Tony Payne (eds), *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1987, pp. 64-65

⁴For example, Rhodesian/Zimbabwean and South African troops operated illegally in Botswana; Senegal conducted anti-smuggling raids on Gambian territory; and Egypt made an unauthorized raid against hijackers in Cyprus.

⁵For example, France and South Africa in Comoros; South Africa in Seychelles; South Yemen, China and others in Oman; Zaire in São Tomé; and Dominica in Barbados.

⁶For example, in 1980 a Bahamian patrol boat was sunk by the Cuban air force.

out Crawford's assessment that they have not, as a rule, been burdened with what he calls the "‘old-fashioned’ problem of defending themselves against an external predator concerned with territorial expansion or aggrandisement."⁷ In this regard, Jackson's explanation of the relative absence of external threats to sub-Saharan African states in general is equally applicable to most microstates: "in a real sense there is no problem of national security [because they] enjoy an unusual form of external protection. Their security is based partly on their marginal geographical position and the relative indifference of powerful [extra-regional] states, and partly on the democratic norms of postcolonial international society."⁸ As Alford concludes, international strictures against the use of force have made the military conquest of microstates a remote prospect and a much more likely challenge to their security is that of the internal coup d'état.⁹ A breakdown of the log indicates, that over half of the security crises experienced by microstates were of an overwhelmingly domestic character, while about one-quarter involved external threats. Although the remaining quarter entailed a mixture of internal and external crises, the central dynamic was often internal, as in the cases of dissident exiles mounting attacks from abroad or of local conspirators enlisting foreign mercenaries.

Categorising the crises in terms of threats to the "core values" identified in Chapter One yielded the following picture. Just over half the crises entailed threats to *institutional arrangements*, that is, essentially, attempts to overthrow governments. One-quarter

⁷Crawford, James, "Islands as sovereign nations", *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 38, Part 2, April 1989, p. 288

⁸Jackson, Robert H., "The security dilemma in Africa", in Brian L. Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1992, pp. 89-90

⁹Alford, Jonathan, "Security dilemmas of small states", *World Today*, Vol. 40, Nos 8-9, August-September 1984, p. 364

involved threats to *public order*, such as violent demonstrations. In just under one-eighth of the crises, other states posed a threat to microstates' *political independence* or sovereignty, for example by backing local coup attempts. Finally, also in about one-eighth of the crises, overlapping somewhat with the previous category, there was a threat to microstates' *territorial integrity*. Such threats could be external, such as the occupation of disputed territory by a neighbouring country, or internal, as in instances of secessionism.

Sources of microstate vulnerability

What then are the principal sources of microstate vulnerability which underlie these crises? Furthermore, to what extent does the record support the notion that microstates' own inherent qualities have predisposed them to suffer security crises? For example, were the many crises faced by the African microstates simply a function of the economic and political underdevelopment common to almost all states in the region, or did their distinctive attributes as microstates play a significant part in their difficulties? I argue that inherent qualities have indeed been important sources of vulnerability: security prospects have been undermined by microstates' very small size in combination with certain other typical features. In the following pages, keeping in mind the security records of microstates during the study period, I attempt to identify the distinctive microstate political, geographical and economic characteristics which, in combination with small population size, appear to have been salient factors of vulnerability.

Suppositions are supported in this chapter by references to numerous microstates from the total sample of 55, and explored in more detail in the case studies of Vanuatu, The Gambia, Grenada and the Maldives in later chapters.

The matrix of influences on microstate security prospects is often highly complex and it is necessary to piece together a composite picture of vulnerability. There is a good deal of inter-relationship between factors: for example, the common geographical circumstance of remote insularity has often had a multiple impact on security prospects, being responsible, diversely, for colonial-era neglect, strategic significance and retarded economic development. Also, factors that are important in one case are sometimes entirely overshadowed in another. For example, several microstates with seemingly awesome defence challenges are in fact secure in the bosom of powerful friends who have undertaken full responsibility for their external defence, or else are located in benign regions in which their ostensible vulnerability carries little risk. Conversely there are some microstates with territorial defence requirements relative to their populations and resources which, *ceteris paribus*, ought to be manageable, yet they are vulnerable because of their dangerous location.

Political variables

Colonial experiences

The first line of inquiry in the political field concerns the condition and circumstances in

which microstates came to independence (that is the 34 that were colonies or protectorates, as listed in Tables 2.04 and 2.05). To what extent have microstates' security prospects been undermined by handicaps arising from their distinctive colonial experiences? My contention is that, in a good many of the very small territories, *preparations for statehood* were hasty and perfunctory; many knew serious *neglect* of development needs during the colonial period; and some suffered dramatic alterations in their *demographic make-up* as a result of colonial policies. In addition, in an experience not generic to microstates alone, a number of small territories were left with *anomalous or disputed borders*. I suggest that such shortcomings contributed to future political instability in a significant number of microstates. Put another way, many microstates came into being as "weak states", a notion that is further discussed in the following chapter. As Buzan observes, when a state has the misfortune to be both a small power and a weak state its vulnerability is "almost unlimited."¹⁰

Deficiencies in *preparations for statehood* were largely a function of the lateness¹¹ and suddenness of microstates' decolonization. As the ideological shift in favour of an absolute right to self-determination gathered momentum, earlier caveats that the transfer of sovereignty should depend on an empirical capacity for political maturation and a modicum of economic self-reliance were swept aside.¹² Accordingly, after about 1960, most of the remaining small dependencies progressed to statehood within a remarkably

¹⁰Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (second edition), Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 113

¹¹The tendency for microstates to be decolonized later than larger states may be observed in the chronology in Table 2.06. Only eight of the first 50 territories which attained independence after World War Two did so as microstates, compared with 33 of the next group of 41, decolonized between mid-1964 and 1994. Furthermore, 27 of the remaining 29 dependent territories would be microstates were they to become independent now.

¹²The new orthodoxy, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1960, was that "inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." [*Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960]

short period,¹³ as charted in **Table 2.06**. Particularly where there had been tardy recognition of the very possibility of sovereign statehood, preparations for the transition were often hastily mounted. Moreover, as Jackson observes of British policy, by the later stages "decolonization had ceased being a substantive enterprise aimed at state-building and had become a formal activity to transfer... sovereignty." Candidates for decolonization continued to be put through a political education process involving the formation of a legislature, the creation or expansion of an electorate, transfer of control of the executive to the legislature and, finally, independence. After 1960, however, the passage of colonies through these stages was made with "increasing and even unseemly haste".¹⁴

In the Comoro Islands, prospects for a stable future were severely undermined by the abrupt and acrimonious circumstances of decolonization. In the face of French intransigence over granting independence to the island remnants of its colonial empire, the Comorans made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence.¹⁵ They quickly went on to set a new African record of three heads of state in their first six months.¹⁶ President number three instituted an iconoclastic leftist "revolution" in which the economy and government were further decimated,¹⁷ and under his successor, the destitute microstate's

¹³Carrington, C.E., "Decolonization: the last stages", *International Affairs*, Vol. 38, No 1, January 1962, p. 36; Diggines, C.E., "The problems of small states", *The Round Table*, No 295, 1985, pp. 191-92

¹⁴Jackson, Robert H., *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 96; Pakenham, Thomas, *The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1912*, Abacus, London, 1991, pp. 675-676

¹⁵Newitt, Malyn D.D., "The perils of being a microstate: São Tomé and the Comoro Islands since independence", in Helen M. Hintjens and Malyn D.D. Newitt (eds), *The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands*, University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 1992, p. 80

¹⁶France is said to have backed both the coup that toppled independence leader Ahmed Abdallah in August 1975 and the mercenary takeover that reinstated him in May 1978. [Mukonoweshuro, Eliphaz G., "The politics of squalor and dependency: chronic political instability and economic collapse in the Comoro Islands", *African Affairs*, Vol. 89, No 357, October 1990, pp. 559-63]

¹⁷Mukonoweshuro, "The politics of squalor and dependency...", pp. 562-63; Newitt, Malyn D.D., *The Comoro Islands: Struggle Against Dependency in the Indian Ocean*, Gower, Aldershot, 1984, pp. 62-63

security became hostage to an array of foreign actors, including the South African, French and American intelligence services, and notorious international mercenaries.¹⁸ Nor could there be any question of an orderly, planned transition in Guinea-Bissau, one of the only microstates to achieve decolonization by force of arms. Apart from some rearguard measures granting a minor degree of popular representation towards the end of Portuguese rule, the territory received virtually no tutelage in self-government.¹⁹ The fragility of the new microstate's political structures became apparent when, within a few years, coup attempts became a regular occurrence. In one of the first of these, in November 1980, the independence government was overthrown.

Having previously resisted any devolution of power in Equatorial Guinea,²⁰ Spain was, by the 1960s, "manifestly in a hurry" to divest itself of this tiny imperial vestige; its "paramount consideration was to impress the United Nations and further the Spanish cause over Gibraltar."²¹ Internal self-government was implemented in 1964, four years ahead of full independence. Within a few months of the latter event, the new microstate descended into chaotic violence, prompting Madrid to mount a military evacuation of foreign nationals and ushering in an era of brutal dictatorship.²² Cyprus provides a fourth case in which post-independence vulnerability can be attributed at least partly to deficiencies in the decolonization process. After ruling out independence for the "island fortress" until the mid-1950s,²³ Britain scrambled to extricate itself from what had

¹⁸Griffin, Michael, "The politics of isolation", *Africa Report*, Vol. 33, No 1, January-February 1988, p. 55; Mukonoweshuro, "The politics of squalor and dependency...", pp. 564, 573-77; Newitt, *The Comoro Islands...*, pp. 66-68; Terrill, W. Andrew, "The Comoro Islands in South African Regional Strategy", *Africa Today*, Vol. 33, Nos 2/3, 1986

¹⁹Forrest, Joshua B., *Guinea-Bissau: Power, Conflict and Renewal in a West African Nation*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1992, pp. 22, 30

²⁰Liniger-Goumaz, Max, *Small is Not Always Beautiful: the Story of Equatorial Guinea*, Hurst, London, 1986, pp. 45-46

²¹*Africa Confidential*, 14 March 1969

²²*Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Longman, London, 19-26 April 1969, p. 23310

²³Lapping, Brian, *End of Empire*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1985, pp. 321-322

become a bloody quagmire. In doing so, it "left the island with an independence constitution of doubtful validity, its main purpose [being] not to secure good government in Cyprus but to avoid war between Greece and Turkey."²⁴ Three years later, serious inter-communal conflict erupted over proposed constitutional amendments,²⁵ resulting in foreign intervention, one of the longest-running United Nations peace-keeping operations and, ultimately, the *de facto* break-up of the state. Elsewhere, flawed independence settlements were occasionally of a more self-serving and manipulative character, as in Guyana and Lesotho, where Britain's constitutional sleights of hand in favour of chosen "moderates" paved the way for the personal dictatorships of Forbes Burnham and Chief Jonathan.²⁶

While decolonization deficiencies were common in the small territories, the link with post-independence vulnerability is by no means consistent. For example, because it was assumed that Botswana, like Lesotho and Swaziland, would eventually be incorporated into South Africa, Britain had made little effort to develop the protectorate either politically or economically.²⁷ Botswana's minimal experience of Western-type parliamentary institutions prior to independence in 1966²⁸ was matched by an absence of tutelage in the operational aspects of self-government. (In fact, protectorate headquarters

²⁴ibid., p. 349.

²⁵U.N. Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (second edition), United Nations, New York, 1990, pp. 282-83

²⁶Archer, Freddy, "How Burnham came to power in Guyana", *Commonwealth*, Vol. 28, No 3, January 1986, pp 124-25; Ajulu, Rok, and Diana Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland: captive states", in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds), *Frontline Southern Africa: Destructive Engagement*, Four Walls Eight Windows, New York, 1988, pp. 195-97

²⁷Halpern, Jack, *South Africa's Hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1965, p. 52

²⁸Crowder, M., "Botswana and the survival of liberal democracy in Africa", in P. Gifford and R. Louis (eds), *Decolonization and African Independence: the Transfers of Power 1960-80*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988, p. 462

remained across the border in the South African town of Mafeking until 1965.²⁹) Yet Botswana became a paragon of stable, liberal democracy,³⁰ and its security problems stemmed, not from conspicuous colonial shortcomings, but from its unfortunate position as a Frontline State in southern Africa. Another case in point is the former Portuguese territory of Cape Verde, where independence negotiations were conducted barely six months prior to the event, and experience of self-government was limited to the National Council conceded 18 months previously.³¹ Despite this inauspicious beginning, sovereign Cape Verde enjoyed a remarkable degree of political stability and security.

By the same token, there were cases where careful, graduated preparation for self-government was not rewarded by post-independence stability. The capacity for limited self-government of the old-established plantation colonies such as Mauritius (and its Caribbean counterparts) was recognized early on,³² even if full sovereign statehood was not at first contemplated.³³ Universal suffrage and increasing powers of self-government were granted from the early 1950s onwards,³⁴ so that by the time independence approached in 1968 Mauritius had built up solid experience in the operation of democratic political institutions. Mauritians were also well-equipped to meet the administrative demands of self-government: as early as 1950, locally-born officers occupied 75 per cent of senior appointments.³⁵ Yet independence was accompanied by

²⁹Stevens, Richard P., *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Botswana*, Scarecrow, Metuchen, New Jersey, 1975, p. 16

³⁰Holm, John D., "Botswana: one African success story", *Current History*, Vol. 93, No 583, May 1994

³¹Davidson, Basil, *The Fortunate Isles: a Study in African Transformation*, Hutchinson, London, 1989, pp. 107, 124-25

³²Lee, J.M., *Colonial Development and Good Government*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967, p. 219

³³In 1946, for example, London had considered it "clearly impossible in the modern world" for most of the Caribbean colonies "to reach full self-government", and "ludicrous" to imagine Barbados or British Honduras [Belize] "standing on their own feet." ["Federation of West Indies", Colonial Office Memorandum, February 1946, CO 318/466/2, Public Records Office, Kew, reproduced in Porter, A.N., and A.J. Stockwell, *British Imperial Policy and Decolonization 1938-64*, Vol. 1: 1938-51, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1989, p. 233.]

³⁴Wickman, Stephen B., "Mauritius", in Frederica M. Bunge (ed.), *Indian Ocean: Five Island Countries* (second edition), The American University, Washington, D.C., 1983, p. 138

³⁵In Gold Coast (Ghana), the most advanced British territory in continental Africa, only 20 per cent of the higher grades

serious racial rioting and the new state spent much of its first decade under a State of Emergency.³⁶

Neglect was evident in the meagre economic and social infrastructures inherited at independence by many microstates. By the time of decolonization most of the very small territories had long since ceased to hold much economic or strategic value for their colonial masters, and there was little incentive for investment from the metropolises. The natural resources of some had been exhausted; others had been made redundant by shifts in geopolitical or economic circumstances; still others had scarcely ever been more than marginal assets, having only been acquired in the first place as incidental spoils of war or for some other indirect reason of the moment. In some cases, small territories lacked core government and economic facilities because they had been governed as components of or appendages to a larger colonial unit in which such facilities were centralized. While it is true that not just microstates, but almost all the former colonial territories, suffered what in hindsight may be considered neglect ("... infrastructure was scant, and what little existed was designed for swift extraction of natural resources, not for bolstering local trade and civic life..."³⁷), microstates were left at a particular disadvantage because of their lesser capacity to overcome such handicaps.

Nowhere was colonial neglect more evident than in Africa, where emerging states were

of the civil service were filled by locals by 1950. ["Native-born administrators and the Colonial Civil services: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies", 17 July 1950, CAB 129/41, Public Records Office, Kew, reproduced in Porter and Stockwell, *British Imperial Policy...*, pp. 347, 352]

³⁶ *Keesing's*, 16-23 March 1968, p. 22596; Selvon, Sydney, *Historical Dictionary of Mauritius* (second edition), Scarecrow, Metuchen, New Jersey, 1991, pp. 188-89

³⁷ Yergin, Daniel and Joseph Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights*, Touchstone/Simon and Schuster, New York, 1999, p. 83

among the "least-advanced political economies in the world."³⁸ In its former colonial existence, coup-ridden Guinea-Bissau had been "barely supervised, let alone governed" by the Portuguese.³⁹ The Congo had been regarded by French colonial officers as "the dumping ground for the dregs of the service,"⁴⁰ and had been administered with corresponding brutality and incompetence.⁴¹ Its post-independence economic progress was severely retarded by a lack of physical infrastructure and skilled workers, and failed to meet the aspirations of either the urban masses or dwindling rural population.⁴² Comoros' record of "abject poverty and seemingly permanent political crisis" had much to do with its paltry economic inheritance; on seizing statehood in 1975, the Comoros possessed "virtually nothing in the way of infrastructure necessary for economic development."⁴³ Worse, after the islands' Unilateral Declaration of Independence, France suspended aid and withdrew almost all its technical personnel, virtually crippling the new state.⁴⁴ The reality facing Djibouti on independence in 1977 was that even its port, the only substantial enterprise to compensate for the lack of raw materials, markets and industry, was commercially unviable, and a mere 20 per cent of the population were wage-earners.⁴⁵ This was hardly a basis on which to expect Djibouti's rival Afars and Issas to subscribe to the ideal of a common national future.

Again, however, the record is mixed. Common though colonial neglect was in

³⁸Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg, "Sovereignty and underdevelopment: juridical statehood in the African crisis", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 24, No 1, 1986, p. 6

³⁹Fieldhouse, D.K., *The Colonial Empires: a Comparative Survey From the Eighteenth Century* (second edition), Macmillan, London, 1982, p. 350. On the very low levels of Portuguese agricultural and industrial investment see Forrest, *Guinea-Bissau: Power, Conflict and Renewal...*, p. 27

⁴⁰Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule...*, p. 45

⁴¹Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa...*, pp. 639-40

⁴²Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule...*, p. 47

⁴³Mukonoweshuro, "The politics of squalor and dependency...", pp. 555-57

⁴⁴Newitt, *The Comoro Islands...*, p. 61

⁴⁵Fitzgerald, James, "Djibouti: petrodollar protectorate?", *Horn of Africa*, October-December 1978, pp. 27-28

microstates' experience, it did not always noticeably affect their security as independent states. Witness, for example, harmonious Cape Verde, which Davidson singles out as having been the "most fragile and enfeebled" of all the Portuguese territories in Africa: "resourceless, cashless, deprived of everything from any useful goods for sale abroad to the merest structures of a state."⁴⁶ (Lisbon had long considered investment in developing the barren islands pointless and had encouraged Cape Verdians to seek employment elsewhere in the empire.⁴⁷) In the case of The Gambia, Britain had regarded the territory as an anomalous burden ever since the end of slaving, and had adopted the role of parsimonious caretaker.⁴⁸ The lion's share of official expenditure was consumed by administration in the capital,⁴⁹ and "few important assets were inherited at independence, even in the key sectors of health, education and agriculture."⁵⁰ Despite this meagre patrimony, The Gambia coped with economic pressures and enjoyed a high degree of internal political stability until the early 1980s. Nor did the neglect suffered by South Pacific territories such as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands,⁵¹ and Solomon Islands⁵² ("excellent examples of colonies without imperial function"⁵³), or Nauru⁵⁴ appear to have had any substantial after-effect on their stability as independent microstates. Suriname provides an inverse example of a generously-supported small territory which was nevertheless convulsed by political instability within a few years of independence.⁵⁵

⁴⁶Davidson, *The Fortunate Isles...*, p. 129

⁴⁷Newitt, Malyn D.D., *Portugal in Africa: the Last Hundred Years*, Hurst, London, 1981, pp. 217-18

⁴⁸Welch, Claude E., Jr, *Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1966, p. 261

⁴⁹Gailey, Harry A., Jr, *A History of The Gambia*, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, 1964, p. 182

⁵⁰Sallah, Tijan M., "Economics and politics in The Gambia", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 28, No 4, 1990, p. 623

⁵¹Macdonald, Barrie, *Cinderellas of the Empire: Towards a History of Kiribati and Tuvalu*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1982, pp. 184, 233

⁵²Scarr, Deryck, *The History of the Pacific Islands: Kingdoms of the Reefs*, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1990, p. 326

⁵³Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires...*, p. 289

⁵⁴Viviani, Nancy, *Nauru: Phosphate and Political Progress*, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1970

⁵⁵Hoetnik, Harry, "The Dutch Caribbean and its Metropolis", in Emanuel de Kadt (ed.), *Patterns of Foreign Influence in the Caribbean*, Oxford University Press, London, 1972, pp. 113-14, 119. A military coup in February 1980 was followed by years of attempted counter-coups, mercenary attacks and a major insurgency.

The most striking examples of colonial policies altering the *demographic make-up* of small territories are found among the plantation colonies. The practice of boosting limited local labour forces by importing indentured Asian workers to Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius, Suriname and Trinidad fundamentally altered their ethnic composition, with negative consequences for long-term political stability. The problems of Mauritius have already been mentioned. In 1970, Trinidad, too, was disturbed by racially-oriented riots, coupled with mutiny in its security forces.⁵⁶ A perception among indigenous Fijians that the Indian community was threatening their political prerogatives was the major catalyst in the 1987 coups.⁵⁷ In Guyana and Suriname, politics were likewise bitterly divided along racial lines.

Colonial needs also caused demographic dislocation in the French territory of Congo, where the capital, Brazzaville, built up as an administrative centre for the French Equatorial Africa Federation, was a disproportionately large conurbation for the rump microstate. With the dissolution of the Federation, Congo became, at a stroke, "one of the most urbanized and proletarianized countries in Africa."⁵⁸ Brazzaville's mass of rootless, unemployed youth provided a foundation for the rapid radicalization of Congolese politics⁵⁹ and the popular uprising of 1963.⁶⁰ In Guinea-Bissau, the ethnic cleavage arising from Portugal's importation of creole Cape Verdians as auxiliaries to

⁵⁶ Keesing's, June 6-13 1970, p. 24024

⁵⁷ Lawson, Stephanie, *The Failure of Democratic Politics in Fiji*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, pp. 256ff

⁵⁸ Decalo, Samuel, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints* (second edition), Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990, p. 43

⁵⁹ Congo would become "the first sub-Saharan state to declare formally for Marxism." [Decalo, Samuel, *Coups and Army Rule...*, p. 39]

⁶⁰ Keesing's, 28 September-5 October 1963, p. 19659-60

colonial rule was a major factor in the 1980 coup.⁶¹ Similarly, in Djibouti, the divisive consequences of France's promotion of Afars to counter the anti-colonial and pan-Somali tendencies of the Issa majority contributed to long-term discord.⁶²

The final category of blighted colonial legacies comprises microstates left with *anomalous or disputed borders*. It has been said that the European partition of West Africa left "no greater geographic anomaly than [The] Gambia,"⁶³ a serpentine strip of territory hugging the banks of a river of the same name for over 400 kilometres into the interior. Its slim hinterland of flat, sparsely-vegetated savannah offered scarcely any natural frontier with surrounding Senegal, a sure recipe for friction. Altercations over smuggling in the late 1960s and early 1970s saw Gambian sovereignty violated by Senegalese troops on several occasions.⁶⁴ The security of African microstates like The Gambia, and also Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, was further compromised by tribal linkages transcending colonial boundaries. Another class whose national cohesion is, similarly, a fragile colonial construct are political entities created by administrative aggregation, such as groupings of hitherto distinct island peoples.⁶⁵

More serious still was the predicament of microstates whose colonial-era boundaries were actively disputed by irredentist neighbours: Belize's very legitimacy as a separate

⁶¹Forrest, Joshua B., "Guinea-Bissau since independence: a decade of domestic power struggles", *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 25, No 1, 1987, pp. 100-101; Munslow, Barry, "The 1980 coup in Guinea Bissau", *Review of African Political Economy*, No 21, 1981, p. 110

⁶²*Africa Confidential*, 28 April 1978

⁶³Welch, *Dream of Unity...*, p. 250

⁶⁴Renner, F.A., "Ethnic affinity, partition and political integration in Senegambia", in A.I. Asiwaju (ed.), *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984*, Hurst, London/University of Lagos Press, Lagos, 1984, p. 80

⁶⁵May, R.J., and Sione Tupouniua, "The politics of small island states", in R.T. Shand (ed.), *The Island States of the Pacific and Indian Ocean: Anatomy of Development*, Monograph No 23, Development Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1980, p. 425

entity was questioned by Guatemala; Guyana was the subject of claims and border incursions by Venezuela and Suriname; and Mauritania feuded with Mali and Morocco on demarcation issues.⁶⁶ While threats to territorial integrity of this nature were faced by states of all sizes, they were especially daunting for microstates, whose military capacity to withstand such claims was very limited and whose territories were often already so small that any encroachment might threaten their national survival.

Politics in small societies

This sub-section examines the security implications of certain typical characteristics of politics in small societies. It considers the effect of small size on *political harmony*, and the significance of *personalism*, *unrestrained executive power*, *leadership longevity* and *militarization* in the microstate context.

It has been suggested that microstates generally enjoyed what Sutton calls "concerted *political harmony*". He surmises that small states enjoy a greater sense of community, less alienation within their societies, higher degrees of legitimacy and a basic consensus of values.⁶⁷ The intimacy engendered by small size may ensure a transparency that pressures governments to maintain financial propriety, impartial justice and respect for civil and human rights. (A high degree of dependence on international aid and investment is another source of such pressure.) Governments in small polities are more

⁶⁶ Allcock, John B., Guy Arnold, Allan J. Day, D.S. Lewis, Lorimer Poultney, Roland Rance, and D.J. Sagar, *Border and Territorial Disputes* (third edition), Longman, Harlow, 1992; Gerteiny, Alfred G., *Mauritania*, Praeger, New York, 1967, pp. 195, 202; Spinner, Thomas J., Jr, *A Political and Social History of Guyana, 1945-1983*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1984, p. 134

⁶⁷ Sutton, Paul, "Political aspects", in Colin Clarke and Tony Payne (eds), *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1987, pp. 17-18

likely to stay in touch with and respond to public feeling, due to the relative accessibility of politicians and public officials. Consensual politics is further encouraged by the fact that opposition can be more difficult to express in a small community because there is less scope for and tolerance of diversity of opinion, or for finding "allies in dissent."⁶⁸ Job's proposition that Third World states face a chronic "insecurity dilemma" on account of their lack of social and ethnic cohesion, and an established institutional framework,⁶⁹ may not, therefore, ring as true in the case of microstates.

Notwithstanding its positive effects, the intimacy of small polities may also foster an unhealthy degree of *personalism*, with its by-products of nepotism, excessive partisanship, and partiality in justice and public administration. Benedict identifies as an "outstanding characteristic of smallness" the overlapping of individuals' roles, which makes impartiality or impersonal role-relationships very difficult to maintain.⁷⁰ Because of the small size of political communities, private roles of kinship and obligation become entangled with public roles of office, and personal antagonisms poison public affairs.⁷¹ The potential for patronage and graft is magnified by the high concentration of economic power in the hands of government. The state's obligation to perform functions which in larger economies would be commercially viable for private operators and to provide a minimum diversity of core services, regardless of tax and population bases, often makes it by far the largest employer in a small society.⁷² In addition, governments' gatekeeper

⁶⁸Dahl, Robert A., and Edward R. Tufte, *Size and Democracy*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1973, pp. 87, 108

⁶⁹Job, Brian L., "The insecurity dilemma: national, regime and state securities in the Third World", in Job, *The Insecurity Dilemma...*, pp. 17-18

⁷⁰Benedict, Burton, "Introduction", in Burton Benedict (ed.), *Problems of Smaller Territories*, Athlone, London, 1967, p. 7

⁷¹Wood, D.P.J., "The smaller territories: some political considerations", in Benedict, *Problems of Smaller Territories*, p.

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⁷²Connell, John, *Sovereignty and Survival: Island Microstates in the Third World*, Research Monograph No 3, Department of Geography, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1988, pp. 4, 7

powers over all-important foreign aid and investment give them considerable control over entrepreneurial, education and other opportunities. Thus Arthur Lewis writes:

*"In a small island of 50,000 to 100,000 people dominated by a single political party, it is very difficult to prevent political abuse. Everybody depends on the government for something, however small, so most are reluctant to offend it. The civil servants live in fear; the police avoid unpleasantness; the trade unions are tied to the party; the newspapers depend on government advertisements; and so on. In cases where they are also corrupt, and playing with public funds, the situation becomes intolerable."*⁷³

Knight observes, further, that it is often difficult for stable, coherent dual-party democracy to flourish in small polities because "populations are simply too small to provide the critical mass of diversity and anonymity", and "familiar and kin ties make secret balloting and privacy elusive goals."⁷⁴ In Singham's view, party politics in small societies tends to degenerate into a distinction between "ins" and "outs". Politicians in power reward their supporters and punish their enemies; politicians out of power have few alternatives open to them, a prospect which encourages them to accumulate enough wealth when in office to sustain themselves when not.⁷⁵ Equally, maintaining an impersonal and effective civil service becomes very difficult, given the small pool of qualified personnel and their lack of anonymity. Scarce talent may be wasted if the individuals concerned are perceived to belong to the "out" party. Studies have suggested that in small political systems administration tends to be sluggish and cautious due to politicization, centralization and the personal involvement of politicians. Aversion to

⁷³Lewis, Arthur, *The Agony of the Eight*, Advocate Commercial Printery, Barbados, 1965, p. 16, cited in Colin Clarke, "Grenada: society and politics in a small state", in Colin Clarke (ed.), *Society and Politics in the Caribbean*, Macmillan, London, 1991, p. 132

⁷⁴Knight, Franklin W., *The Caribbean: the Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism* (second edition), Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, p. 303

⁷⁵Singham, A.W., "Legislative-executive relations in smaller territories", in Benedict, *Problems of Smaller Territories*, pp. 137-138

decision-making may mean failure to grapple with looming crises until too late, with the result that small-state political systems can be susceptible to sudden and dramatic collapse.⁷⁶

Executive power in very small polities, particularly in those that are underdeveloped and of recent independence, is less likely to be subject to an effective range of checks and balances. As Scott, observes of new states in general, there is a tendency for governments to be dominated by a charismatic individual, military regime or single authoritarian party, none of which may be amenable to restraints on the exercise of power.⁷⁷ Microstate governments' patronage monopoly empowers them to buy off or unseat potentially troublesome critics in the legislature and judiciary. Many microstates recruit senior judges from overseas, a practice which though theoretically providing for disinterested oversight, is also open to manipulation: it allows greater scope for replacing uncooperative judges than if the bench was staffed by local judges with entrenched tenures. On the other hand, many Commonwealth microstates have preserved rights of appeal to the Privy Council in London or to regional courts.⁷⁸ Media in microstates often lack the sophistication or independence to constitute a serious restraint on the executive. It may be easier for microstate governments to control the media than in a larger society where opposition and non-state actors are more likely to have access to the resources and technology needed to maintain an alternative media voice. More sinisterly, untrammelled governments may abuse their control over the coercive instruments of the state to silence

⁷⁶Sutton, "Political aspects", pp. 18-19.

⁷⁷Scott, Roger, "A general review", in Roger Scott (ed.), *The Politics of New States*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1970, p. 43

⁷⁸Sutton, "Political aspects", p. 14

critics and eliminate opposition. Witness, for example, the suppression of domestic dissent using government security forces by the Nguemas in Equatorial Guinea, Omar Bongo in Gabon, Eric Gairy in Grenada, Chief Jonathan in Lesotho, and Albert René in Seychelles.

The highly personal nature of microstate politics and governments' considerable "carrot and stick" powers enhance the ability of dominant individuals or ruling cliques to establish tight control over the levers of state, to the exclusion of their rivals. This tendency is illustrated by the common microstate phenomenon of *leadership longevity*, as shown in **Table 2.07**. Even discounting monarchies, it was unusual for microstates' longest-serving leaders to have held office for less than 10 years, and common for them to have been in power for more than 20. As Alker and Russett caution, however, the relationship between leadership longevity and political stability⁷⁹ is complex and does not display any simple correlations.⁸⁰ On the one hand, very long tenures by a single leader may be evidence of political harmony, and may endow the microstates concerned with positive benefits such as continuity in government policy and increasingly experienced statesmanship, as in Botswana under Seretse Khama and Dominica under Eugenia Charles. On the downside, leadership longevity may be indicative of an illegitimate grip on power and the suppression of opposition. Provided the grip can be maintained, such domination may facilitate at least an outward appearance of political stability, as in the cases of Omar Bongo in Gabon and Forbes Burnham in Guyana. More likely, however,

⁷⁹Or, more precisely, in their terminology, the relationship between "executive stability" and "domestic violence".

⁸⁰Alker, Hayward R., Jr and Bruce M. Russett, "Correlations among political and social indices", in Bruce M. Russett and Hayward R. Alker, Jr, Karl W. Deutsch and Harold D. Laswell, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1977 (reprinted from original edition published by Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966), p. 289

is that those who have employed extra-constitutional methods to take and retain power, will face persistent threats to their regimes, as did Albert René in Seychelles and Désiré Bouterse in Suriname. Some, will eventually be overthrown as pent-up opposition boils over, as were Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea and Eric Gairy in Grenada.

The link between the degree of *militarization* and susceptibility to domestic political instability is clouded by a range of other factors such as military alliances, external defence assistance and regional circumstances.⁸¹ There are nevertheless some broad observations that can be made about the potential in small polities for military forces to be as much a threat to security as guardians of it. About one-quarter of microstates⁸² experienced security threats from their own armed forces during the study period. (The proportion would be higher still if one discounted those microstates that did not maintain military or paramilitary forces.) To some extent, the African cases might be accounted for simply in terms of the seeming congenital disposition of armies in that region to mount coups d'état. However, the fact that more than half the microstates with rebellious militaries were *not* African suggests that the importance of regional environment should not be overstated, and that some significance may be attached to the special position of armed forces in very small polities. First, it is often lamentably easy for even a small band of army mutineers to take over a microstate government by occupying a handful of strategic installations, such as the barracks, the radio and television stations, the telephone exchange, the airport and the presidential palace (preferably with the

⁸¹ Alker and Russett, "Correlations among political and social indices", p. 289. Iceland, for example, maintains scarcely any armed forces because its security is guaranteed by NATO, while the very large forces of Persian Gulf microstates are a reflection of their volatile regional environment.

⁸² Bhutan, Comoros, Cyprus, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Seychelles, Suriname and Trinidad.

incumbent inside). Second, the military will often be a unitary force, unchecked by any other armed body, though a number of microstate governments have maintained separate paramilitary forces⁸³ or foreign praetorian guards⁸⁴ for just that reason. Third, the very low ceiling on career advancement in tiny microstate militaries may frustrate ambitious soldiers to the point where they succumb to the temptation of expanding their horizons by seizing executive power from civilians.⁸⁵

Geographical variables

Location

The key element of what Bjøl terms "security geography"⁸⁶ is location: *the kind of "neighbourhood" in which the microstate exists and its position in relation to strategically significant places and features.* Small islands are perhaps the only geographical category in which a particular kind of location and microstatehood are fundamental co-features: insularity entails a location which is separate, and sometimes remote, from other land masses; at the same time, small island countries' immutably circumscribed territorial space means that they can only support a correspondingly small, perhaps "micro-", population. Remoteness is generally a security "plus", as in the case of

⁸³Examples include Equatorial Guinea; Guyana; Seychelles; and Suriname.

⁸⁴Examples include Comoros (foreign mercenaries); Equatorial Guinea (Moroccans); Gabon (Moroccans); The Gambia (Senegalese); São Tomé (Angolans); Seychelles (Tanzanians).

⁸⁵Clarke suggests that "coups and attempted coups in Commonwealth small states... revolve around personal ambition and abuse of power more than any other factors." [Clarke, Colin, "Third World small states: fragile and dependent", *Third World Affairs 1987*, Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies, London, 1987, p. 211] However, because even a highly personal coup attempt will require the support of other malcontents and will inevitably be presented as an act on behalf of an abused populace or interest group, it is difficult to identify such coups with certainty.

⁸⁶Bjøl, Erling, "The small state in international politics", in August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland (eds), *Small States in International Relations*, Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971, p. 32

the South Pacific island microstates, well-removed as they are from theatres of conflict and potential aggressors.⁸⁷ On the other hand, remoteness does not preclude a microstate being caught up in the strategic calculations of others, possibly to the detriment of its own security. It might be argued, for example, that the use of Marshall Islands' Kwajalein Atoll as a inter-continental missile testing range by the former administering power, the United States, is not in the microstate's own long-term best interests.

The remoteness of islands aside, there is no aspect of location that can be described as typical since microstates are found in almost every kind of geographical setting throughout the world. However, the *combination* of happening to be located in a certain place and *also* happening to be a microstate can be significant because microstates, with their severely limited political, economic and military influence are more likely to be "hostages" to their location. An obvious location-related vulnerability is proximity to an unstable or hostile state. Microstates may be powerless to fence themselves off from the spill-over effects of domestic instability and conflict in a neighbouring state, such as influxes of refugees, the use of the microstate's territory by rebels from the neighbouring state and intrusive hot-pursuit raids by the latter's security forces.⁸⁸ Conversely, location in the vicinity of an inter-state conflict or area of strategic competition may work to the advantage of a microstate, as one protagonist or other offers it benefits in the interests of strategic denial.⁸⁹ The most extreme case of "neighbourhood" problems is sharing a

⁸⁷Their distance from the nearest larger neighbours is roughly twice that separating the Caribbean islands from the Americas. [*Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society: Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group*, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1985, p. 12]

⁸⁸Microstates affected in this way include: Belize (refugees from El Salvador); Gabon (refugees from Equatorial Guinea); Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (South African and Rhodesian/Zimbabwean refugees, insurgents, security forces); Gambia (refugees from Senegal); Djibouti (refugees and insurgents from Ethiopia and Somalia); and the Maldives (insurgents from Sri Lanka).

⁸⁹For example, Bhutan's contiguity with old foes, China and India, has earned it the latter's long-term protection and assistance. Such relationships will be discussed in the following chapter.

border with an aggressive and irredentist neighbour, a situation, which may call into question the very survival of the microstate as a separate entity, a predicament in which Belize and Kuwait found themselves. The African microstates were most susceptible to the "bad-neighbourhood factor" because their region as a whole was historically most severely affected by colonial exploitation, underdevelopment and political instability. Moreover, few African microstates enjoyed the protection afforded by remote insularity (compare the South Pacific).

In all regions except Europe and the South Pacific, the majority of microstates held strategic significance for larger states during the study period, as summarized in **Table 2.08**. Geographical position in relation to places of strategic significance to others, such as a conflict zone, a major sea line of communication or air route, or a maritime choke point, endowed microstates with potential as forward bases, staging points, sentinel posts, *points d'appui* and buffer zones. Offshore islands had the advantage of proximity to the strategic objective yet at the same time allowed the interested party to operate at a safe remove from the action on the mainland, as in the case of France's use of Equatorial Guinea as a base for relief flights during the Biafran War. Mid-ocean islands such as the Maldives were attractive as "stationary aircraft carriers", others such as Mauritius and the Seychelles had utility as sites for certain kinds of military communications and surveillance facilities.⁹⁰ Location is not, of course, the sole determinant of strategic significance; other geographical attributes such as "enclaveness" or insularity,⁹¹ as well as

⁹⁰The Maldivian island of Gan was a major British air force staging point until 1976. British and United States forces used airport and naval communications facilities at Vacoas in Mauritius. The United States maintained a satellite tracking station in Seychelles.

⁹¹That is insularity per se, as opposed to the *location* of islands.

political pliability, also play their part.

Being strategically significant to others had both positive and negative implications for microstates' own security prospects. Interested external powers might take a protective and supportive stance towards the microstate, either to reserve to themselves or to deny to others utilization of its strategic potential. On the other hand, the vested strategic interests of outsiders also led them to interfere with, subvert and coerce microstates whose domestic political developments or foreign policy inclinations met with their disapproval. Among the examples of microstates whose security was much enhanced by virtue of their strategic usefulness to others are Djibouti and Gabon (under France's wing); São Tomé and Príncipe (Angola); Iceland (NATO); Bhutan (India); Kuwait (Britain, Saudi Arabia); Marshall Islands and Federated States of Micronesia (United States); and Oman (Britain). The "losers" whose strategic qualities attracted hostile attention include Belize (from Guatemala); Comoros (France, South Africa); Grenada (United States); the Frontline microstates of southern Africa (Rhodesia, South Africa); and United Arab Emirates (Iran).

Physical and demographic characteristics of territories

This sub-section addresses the security significance of the physical geographical characteristics of *insularity*, *land-locked enclaveness* and *small territorial size*. On the demographic side, it examines the impact of low and high *population densities* and of *ethnic heterogeneity*.

Over half the microstates in the study were *islands* or island groups, as can be seen in **Table 2.09**. The important security implications of islands' remote or offshore locations have already been touched on above. Insularity also has significance in a more direct sense. The mere fact of being physically separated from any other land mass provides these microstates with a formidable first line of defence, a natural moat, against external threats. (The same quality coupled with particular locations has endowed some, like Cyprus and Malta, with strategic significance as island fortresses.) While insularity relieves microstates of the necessity of policing and defending land borders, it also imposes certain burdens. The island state bears alone the responsibility of monitoring and preventing the approach of hostile actors, whereas in a continental situation such tasks are shared with neighbours.⁹²

Insularity, of the multiple variety, can also affect domestic security: each of an archipelagic state's constituent parts is literally "an island unto itself", distinct from the rest of the nation and potentially a fully separate entity.⁹³ In the context of the greater manpower and fiscal constraints faced by microstates, such fragmentation presents governments with a heightened challenge in maintaining national unity, enforcing their writ throughout the territory and preventing illicit foreign comings and goings in remoter islands.⁹⁴ It is unsurprising that many were threatened by secessionism, as listed in **Table**

⁹²Sutton, Paul, and Anthony Payne, "Lilliput under threat: the security problems of small island and enclave developing states", *Political Studies*, Vol. XLI, No 4, December 1993, p. 585

⁹³Doumenge, François, "The viability of small intertropical islands", in Edward Dommen and Philippe Hein (eds), *States, Microstates and Islands*, Croom Helm, London, 1985, p. 102

⁹⁴In 1985 the Bahamas Prime Minister told the United Nations General Assembly his 700-island country had been "pressed to the outer limits of its financial and security resources in the attempt to sustain effective interdiction and law enforcement measures against [international drug traffickers]." [Braveboy-Wagner, Jacqueline-Anne, *The Caribbean in World Affairs: the Foreign Policies of the English-speaking States*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1989, p. 51]

2.10. Connell observes that although this splintering impulse might seem irrational in already tiny island microstates, there is in fact no anomaly: "Anguilla, Mayotte, and Tuvalu have each demonstrated how secession in search of identity has brought greater material (and probably cultural) rewards, through direct relations with the outside world, either as a colony or as an independent state, than as a remote outlier of a nearby independent state."⁹⁵ Sometimes secessionist tendencies reflected a desire to break unnatural linkages imposed during colonial times for administrative convenience, as in the "hyphenated states" of the Caribbean, Kiribati's Banaba and Mauritius's Rodrigues.⁹⁶

The physical geographical circumstances of microstates in continental locations, particularly land-locked *enclaves*, are also of security significance. To a greater extent than larger, more powerful land-locked states, the land-locked microstates are at the mercy of neighbours who control their economic lifelines and surround them militarily. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, for example, were reduced by South Africa to something resembling a state of siege during the apartheid era, and were forced to compromise their own security interests and sovereignty.⁹⁷ Botswana was obliged to allow the passage of military convoys to South Africa's base in the Caprivi Strip, and later the development of a road to the base.⁹⁸ Under a secret agreement, South African security services were permitted to act against African National Congress dissidents in Swaziland.⁹⁹

⁹⁵Connell, John, "Island microstates: the mirage of development", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol. 3, No 2, Fall 1991, p. 278. Connell's attribution of such tendencies to "almost all island microstates at one time or another" is too sweeping. Pre-independence cases such as Anguilla, Mayotte and Tuvalu should be treated as a separate class from islands attempting secession from sovereign microstates.

⁹⁶De Smith, Stanley A., *Microstates and Micronesia: Problems of America's Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories*, New York University Press, New York, 1970, p. 70

⁹⁷Ajulu and Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland: captive states", p. 192

⁹⁸*Africa Confidential*, 24 October 1969; 7 September 1973

⁹⁹In return Swaziland was to be ceded two border regions which, inter alia, would have given it access to the sea (the

Some writers regard coastal enclaves, such as The Gambia and Guyana, as in effect "islands", sequestered from their neighbours by topography or by cultural-linguistic and economic differences arising from their historical roles as colonial bridgeheads and entrepôts.¹⁰⁰ They may face some of the same security advantages and disadvantages pertaining to insularity; unlike islands, however, they and their land-locked counterparts have to cope with the "border pressures" arising from co-existence with immediately adjacent larger states. The intensity of these pressures will depend on factors such as the number of neighbouring states, population density ratios, relative military strengths and political dispositions.¹⁰¹

A further aspect of physical geography that bears on security is that of *territorial size*, both in absolute terms and in relation to population. Many microstates, in addition to having very small populations, also have very small territories, 21 in the study having less than 1,000 square kilometres. The lack of strategic depth in such microstates denies their governments defensive flexibility: when attacked by either external forces or internal rebels, they have minimal space into which to retreat and regroup loyal forces for a counter-attack or to hold out until outside assistance arrives. Thus revolts and interventions in microstates tend to be "quick-decisive"¹⁰² affairs. In the Caribbean, for example, Barbados Prime Minister Tom Adams suggested that the first 24 hours were

proposal was, however, abandoned in 1984). [Ajulu and Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland: captive states", pp. 219-22, 224; Daniel, John, and Johnson Vilane, "Swaziland: political crisis, regional dilemma", *Review of African Political Economy*, No 35, 1986, pp. 63-64]

¹⁰⁰Caldwell, John C., Graham E. Harrison and Pat Quiggin, "The demography of microstates", *World Development*, Vol. 8, No 2, December 1980, p. 954

¹⁰¹Sutton and Payne, "Lilliput under threat...", p. 586

¹⁰²The term "quick-decisive" comes from Jentleson, Bruce W., and Ariel E. Levite, "The analysis of protracted foreign military intervention", in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman (eds), *Foreign Military Intervention the Dynamics of Protracted Conflict*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, p. 10

critical in coup attempts.¹⁰³

Largely because of the rigid spatial limits faced by islands, simply having no neighbouring territory into which they can expand, insular microstates tend to have high *population densities*,¹⁰⁴ as shown in **Tables 2.11 and 2.12**. The principal impact of this phenomenon on security prospects lies in its contribution to political instability: intensified competition for land, water and other finite resources increases the potential for inter-communal tensions. Relative to densely populated larger states, microstates are likely to have fewer options for ameliorating such tensions because they lack the critical mass of skilled labour, domestic market and investment capital which would enable them to diversify their economies and provide new avenues of entrepreneurial opportunity and employment. Birth control and migration are among the only instruments by which they can keep population pressures in check.¹⁰⁵

That microstates are, by definition, countries with very small populations does not necessarily mean, however, that they are possessed of similarly diminutive territories. As **Table 2.12** shows, it is, except in Europe, only island microstates that are consistently more densely populated than is normal for their regions. In fact, many continental microstates, Gabon and Suriname for example, occupy territories that are very large in relation to their small populations. Governments of such microstates are confronted with

¹⁰³Norton, Graham, "Defending the Eastern Caribbean", *World Today*, Vol. 40, No 6, June 1984, pp. 258-59

¹⁰⁴Dommen, Edward, "Some distinguishing characteristics of island states", *World Development*, Vol. 8, No 12, December 1989, p. 937

¹⁰⁵Jones, Huw, "The small island factor in modern fertility decline: findings from Mauritius", in Douglas G. Lockhart, David Drakakis-Smith and John Schembri (eds), *The Development Process in Small Island States*, Routledge, London, 1993, p. 161; Connell, John, "Island microstates: development, autonomy and the ties that bind", in Lockhart *et al.*, *The Development Process in Small Island States*, p. 131

the responsibility of policing and defending large tracts of territory with extremely limited manpower and financial resources. Although any country with a low population density faces this challenge to some degree, microstates' populations are often so small that fielding the minimum forces required to perform rudimentary security duties is beyond them. The lower the population density, the more difficult a government will find it to police its territory internally and to defend it from external attack. In sparsely-populated Suriname, for example, the government was hard-pressed to contain the "Boschneger Revolt" of the late-1980s.¹⁰⁶ Botswana's borders were repeatedly violated by Rhodesian/Zimbabwean and South African troops and traversed by tens of thousands of refugees during the region's conflict years.¹⁰⁷ The problems faced by Djibouti and Oman in sealing their lengthy borders were factors in the ability of Afars and Dhofaris to draw on external assistance to sustain their rebellions.¹⁰⁸ The wealth of a few microstates, for instance Brunei and the Persian Gulf emirates, enables them to cope with outsized defence tasks. Others, like the South Pacific microstates with their vast maritime zones and fisheries protection requirements, rely heavily on the assistance of larger friends.

A final issue to be returned to under the geographical heading is that of *ethnic make-up*. Small territories might be expected to be less likely to encompass a number of disparate geographical regions and therefore peoples. This is even truer of islands, like Iceland and many in the South Pacific, whose remoteness has been a natural barrier to population

¹⁰⁶By November 1986, after only four months, rebels controlled most of eastern Suriname and some of the south, together with Moengo, the country's second largest city and centre of its bauxite mining. [*Keesing's*, February 1987, p. 34931]

¹⁰⁷Ajulu and Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland: captive states", p. 214

¹⁰⁸The Afars have enjoyed Ethiopian support [*Keesing's*, 3 February 1978, p. 28812; November 1991, p. 38565]. The Dhofaris received aid from and through the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. [Cottrell, Alvin J., Robert J. Hanks and Frank T. Bray, "Military affairs in the Persian Gulf", in Alvin J. Cottrell, R. Michael Burrell, Keith McLachlan and Roger M. Savory (eds), *The Persian Gulf States: a General Survey*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1980, p. 161]

influxes. In few other categories of microstate, however, is ethnic homogeneity the rule. In continental Africa, porous and arbitrary borders have created a tribal patchwork in populations.¹⁰⁹ Colonial powers, as we have seen, dramatically diversified the ethnic composition of small plantation territories by importing slaves and latterly indentured labourers. In modern times some European and Persian Gulf microstates have accepted huge numbers of foreign guest workers.¹¹⁰

While ethnic plurality is not, of course, an inherently microstate characteristic, its destabilizing potential is heightened in the typical microstate circumstances. It aggravates the problem of very small resource bases, especially where certain occupations are the preserve of particular groups, curtailing competition and social mobility, and increasing political tension.¹¹¹ Frustrations arising from feelings of impotence, dispossession and neglect in the distribution of power and goods may ultimately lead to violent clashes between ethnic groups, a tendency which has been especially prevalent in Africa.¹¹² It is noteworthy that in the tranquil South Pacific the only two microstates to have experienced serious political instability, Fiji and Vanuatu, are also the only two to have major ethnic-linguistic cleavages in their societies, and that these divisions indeed contributed to their security problems. Conversely, in accounting for Botswana's stability, Crowder judges that "perhaps the most important factor... was that at independence it had a relatively small population... largely sharing a common political

¹⁰⁹Asiwaju, A.I., "The conceptual framework", in Asiwaju, *Partitioned Africans...*, pp. 2-4

¹¹⁰For example, in 1982 only 17 per cent of the inhabitants of Monaco were native Monégasque, and only 42 per cent of the United Arab Emirates population were Arabs (of any description). [*The World in Figures* (fifth edition), Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1987]

¹¹¹Benedict, "Introduction", p. 4

¹¹²Olorunsola, Victor A., with Dan Muhwezi, "Security and stability implications of ethnicity and religious factors", in Bruce E. Arlinghaus (ed.), *African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984, p. 141; Smith, M.G., "Pluralism, race and ethnicity in selected African countries", in John Rex and David Mason (eds), *Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 210, 218

culture and for the most part speaking a common language."¹¹³ Inter-ethnic mistrust and rivalry may affect not only domestic political stability, but where there are cross-border linkages, external security, as in the case of tension between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.¹¹⁴

Economic variables

Economics has been integral to a number of the vulnerability factors already discussed: for instance, economic deprivation was the essence of the colonial neglect discussed in the political section, and economic realities have contributed to the dominance of government in small polities. In this final section, I consider further the impact of economic factors on security prospects under two headings: government resource constraints and the link between poverty or under-development and political instability, prefaced by a brief overview of their economic circumstances in general.

Microstates enjoy certain economic advantages. They have tended to attract higher per capita development aid (see **Table 2.13**);¹¹⁵ some have cultivated a lucrative tax haven status; many island microstates have prospered from tourism; some benefit from remittances sent by large immigrant communities overseas; and, for those fortunate few possessing rich natural resources, small populations mean high per capita incomes. Notwithstanding these advantages, the economic outlook for microstates is, on the whole,

¹¹³Crowder, "Botswana and the survival of liberal democracy in Africa", p. 467

¹¹⁴*Africa Confidential*, 22 September, 20 October 1972; Reed, Michael C., "Gabon: a neo-colonial enclave of enduring French interest", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 25, No 2, 1987, p. 303

¹¹⁵Connell, *Sovereignty and Survival...*, p. 2

one of low growth and vulnerability to sudden adverse changes in their external environments. The great majority can be regarded as developing countries. They are handicapped by diseconomies of scale, a paucity and narrow range of natural resources, high reliance on exports of primary produce, unusual dependence on external relations (trade, aid, migration and investment) and, in the case of the islands, high transport and infrastructure costs, and proneness to natural disasters.¹¹⁶

Although, as a rule, living standards in developing microstates tended to be somewhat higher than in larger developing countries,¹¹⁷ some were nevertheless among the poorest nations on earth: more than a dozen¹¹⁸ had Least Developed Country status.¹¹⁹ Microstates' relative positions can be seen in Tables 2.14 and 2.15, showing Gross Domestic Product per capita and "human development" indices. The GDP per capita of 16 microstates surveyed was lower than the developing world average. Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia occupied the bottom three places in the world ranking of human development.

¹¹⁶Cohen, Robin, "Introduction", in Robin Cohen (ed.), *African Islands and Enclaves*, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1983, pp. 10-11; Wood, "The smaller territories: some political considerations", p. 32; Reid, George L., *The Impact of Very Small Size on the International Behaviour of Microstates*, Sage, Beverly Hills, London, 1974, p. 13

¹¹⁷Caldwell *et al.*, p. 957

¹¹⁸Bhutan, Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Lesotho, the Maldives, Mauritania, Samoa, São Tomé, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. [U.N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 1990*, United Nations, New York, 1991, p. 87]

¹¹⁹The term "least developed country" gained currency in the 1960s through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a formal list of 24 Least Developed Countries, since expanded to 42, which typically suffer a low per capita income, a low literacy rate and a low manufacturing output as a proportion of total economic production. [UNCTAD, *The Least Developed Countries: Introduction to the LDCs and to the Substantial New Programme of Action For Them*, United Nations, New York, 1985, pp. 3-4]

Government resource constraints

Generally speaking, the per capita costs of government administration in microstates tend to be inordinately high¹²⁰ due to the requirement to maintain core services irrespective of the population base and to perform roles that in larger countries would be shouldered by the private sector. Sometimes *defence requirements in particular soak up a disproportionate amount of the national budget*.¹²¹ For governments in a threatening security environment, armed forces are one of the core items of expenditure on which they are rarely willing or able to skimp. In the microstate circumstances of a very small tax base, defence can thus take a disproportionate share of resources. For example, in 1988, Botswana and Gabon were in the group of second-highest military spenders in sub-Saharan Africa, relative to national income, each devoting between five and 10 per cent of their Gross National Products to military purposes.¹²² Guyanese military spending peaked at 14.2 per cent of government expenditure in 1976,¹²³ and in 1984 represented 4.8 per cent of Gross National Product compared to neighbouring Venezuela's spending of 1.6 per cent.¹²⁴ High levels of defence spending come at the expense of more "flexible" social and development programmes. Paradoxically, starving the latter may deny opportunities for economic and education advances which, in the long-term are a surer guarantee of political stability and order than are military forces.

¹²⁰De Smith, *Microstates and Micronesia*..., p. 93

¹²¹Rapaport, Jacques, Ernest Muteba and Joseph J. Therattil, *Small States and Territories: Status and Problems*, Amo Press, New York, 1971 [originally published as United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), *Status and Problems of Very Small States and Territories*, United Nations, New York, 1969], p. 172

¹²²Chazan, Naomi, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1992, p. 59

¹²³Danns, "The role of the military in the national security of Guyana", p. 25

¹²⁴Kurian, George Thomas, *The New Book of World Rankings*, Facts on File, New York, 1991, p. 63

Quite a number of microstates, including most of the Caribbean and South Pacific islands, managed to do without any substantial security forces of their own, because they were sufficiently peaceful at home and adequately protected from external threat by isolation or patronage. For the less fortunate majority that did need to maintain armies or paramilitary units, this could be an onerous burden. Severe resource constraints made it a *struggle to finance the minimum security forces* needed to secure borders and maritime zones, and to keep order within.¹²⁵ As discussed above in the geographical section, the magnitude of the defence task was especially daunting for microstates with large territories or maritime jurisdictions relative to their population size. Despite devoting a hefty portion of national resources to defence, microstates like Botswana and Guyana were manifestly unequal to the challenge posed by aggressive neighbours.¹²⁶ An unfortunate fact of life for microstates is that the size and sophistication of the security forces they can afford may be surpassed by quite small groups of lightly-armed local rebels or foreign non-state actors. Comoros, for example, was taken over by 50 mercenary-led attackers in 1975 and again in 1978 by a similar force.¹²⁷ As Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal put it, "it takes only twelve men in a boat to put some of these governments out of business."¹²⁸

¹²⁵Harden, Sheila (ed.), *Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World*, Frances Pinter, London, 1985, p. 13; *Vulnerability...*, pp.15, 76

¹²⁶Botswana suffered repeated incursions by insurgents and government forces from its troubled neighbours, while Guyanese frontiers were violated with impunity by Venezuelan forces. [Ajulu and Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland: captive states", p. 218; Danns, George K., "The role of the military in the national security of Guyana", *Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs*, Vol. 11, No 6, January/February 1986, pp. 31-32]

¹²⁷*Keesing's*, 18-24 August 1975, p. 27283; Mukonoweshuro, "The politics of squalor and dependency...", p. 560, 563. Other microstates which have been threatened by small groups of foreign adventurers include Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, the Maldives, São Tomé, Seychelles, Suriname and Vanuatu.

¹²⁸*Trinidad Express* (Port-of-Spain), 29 November 1983, cited in Lewis, Gordon K., *The Jewel Despoiled*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1987, p. 20

Poverty or under-development and political instability

Although microstate economies do have distinctive characteristics, I do not argue here that their economic disabilities affect their security in any special "microstate" way. Rather, I merely point to ways in which economic factors appear to contribute to differences in levels of vulnerability *among* microstates. In the long run, *poverty* and *stark disparities in the distribution of wealth* inevitably affect the internal political stability of a society,¹²⁹ and leave it vulnerable to externally-sourced aggression and subversion. At the extreme ends of the spectrum, there is a high probability of congruence between a very advanced level of economic development and stable democracy, or, conversely, a very low level of economic development and unstable and undemocratic politics. At the intervening stages, however, the correlation between economic development and political stability is not clear-cut.¹³⁰

Much may depend on the pace at which development has occurred and the stage which societies and economies have reached in their transition from the traditional to the modern.¹³¹ As Huntington puts it, "... modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability;" and, furthermore, "the degree of instability is related to the *rate* of modernization."¹³² With urbanization, growing literacy, and the expansion of the mass media, traditional structures are eclipsed, political consciousness and participation

¹²⁹Lipset, Seymour Martin, "Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LIII, No 1, March 1959, pp. 75, 103

¹³⁰Eckstein, Harry, *Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability and Change*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992, p. 216

¹³¹Alker and Russett, "Correlations among political and social indices", pp. 293, 306-07; Deutsch, Karl W., "Social mobilization and political development, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LV, No 3, September 1961, pp. 502-03

¹³²Huntington, Samuel P., *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Yale University Press, New Haven/London, 1968, pp. 41, 45

increased, and expectations enlarged. Economic progress may meet some of these heightened aspirations, but it can also be a destabilizing factor because of its disruptive impact on traditional social groups, its widening of divisions between rich and poor and its aggravation of existing tensions by opening up competition for resources. Political institutions in developing countries often lack the strength and adaptability to accommodate these rapid changes.¹³³ Another conditioning factor is the degree to which wealth is evenly distributed in the developing society. Alker and Russett confirmed a correlation between distributive inequalities and retarded economic development and, more tentatively, domestic political violence and "executive instability".¹³⁴

How do microstates fit in with this general picture of the developing world? It may be observed, first, that a significant group of microstates fall within the category of *extreme* poverty and underdevelopment, and might therefore be expected to be more likely to exhibit signs of political instability. This is in fact the case for many of those officially designated Least Developed Countries and for half of the bottom ten microstates on the human development index (**Table 2.15**). These include, for example, the seriously unstable microstates of Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. There are, however, exceptions: notably stable microstates such as Cape Verde and Samoa also appear on the LDC list; conversely, the wealthiest South Pacific microstate, Fiji, was also the only one in the region to experience military coups.

Microstate economies arguably have the potential to achieve very rapid rates of

¹³³ibid., pp. 49-50, 55

¹³⁴Alker and Russett, "Correlations among political and social indices", pp. 289, 292

modernization. Their small size means that the introduction of a single new industry or infrastructure improvement can have an enormous impact. For example, modern exploitation of a few key mineral resources in Botswana and Gabon led to greatly accelerated growth after independence, and the construction of international-grade airports in island microstates such as Grenada and the Seychelles provided dramatic boosts to their tourist industries and economies as a whole.¹³⁵ There is some evidence that rapid modernization has been accompanied by political instability in microstates. For example, the economic distortions created by rapid tourism-centric development were cited as one of the grievances against the Seychelles government toppled by a coup in 1976.¹³⁶ In Congo in the 1960s, discussed in the political section above, and The Gambia in the early 1980s, the pace of urbanization contributed to domestic unrest.¹³⁷ As always, however, there are conspicuous exceptions: Botswana, for instance, "enjoyed one of the highest rates of economic growth in the world," yet managed at the same time to maintain "the only uninterrupted liberal democracy in postcolonial Africa."¹³⁸ Mauritius, too, eventually achieved exceptional economic growth combined with political stability in the 1970s, though unrest was only avoided through a combination of good fortune (high international sugar prices) and stiff restrictions on political freedoms.¹³⁹

Cohen observes that in small societies ruling parties tend to be precarious alliances of a local comprador bourgeoisie and its administrative supporters, resulting in a sharp

¹³⁵Cooke, Melinda W., "Seychelles", in Bunge, *Indian Ocean...*, p. 204; "Grenada: tourism: the best kept secret?", *Courier*, No 134, July-August 1992, p. 28

¹³⁶*Keesing's*, 5 August 1977, p. 28485

¹³⁷Sillah, Baba, "Neglected youth", *West Africa*, 20 April 1987, p. 759

¹³⁸Holm, "Botswana: one African success story", p. 198

¹³⁹Latham-Koenig, Alfred, "Mauritius: political volteface in the 'Star of the Indian Ocean'", *The Round Table*, No 290, April 1984; Lempert, David, "A demographic-economic explanation of political stability: Mauritius as a microcosm", *Eastern Africa Economic Review*, Vol. 3, No 1, 1987, p. 82

polarization of wealth and opportunities.¹⁴⁰ Data are not available to enable any systematic analysis of the maldistribution of wealth in microstates or its linkage with vulnerability, but one can cite a number of examples where it has clearly been a factor in political instability, particularly where the position of the wealthy few has been maintained by corruption and oppression. Demonstrations in Qatar in the early 1960s, Oman's Dhofar rebellion and the Zanzibar revolution, were all motivated in part by discontent at the privileges and wealth of autocratic ruling élites.¹⁴¹ The overthrow of Grenada's Gairy regime may be seen in the same light.¹⁴²

A final economic-related factor to touch on is that of illiteracy rates. Substantial levels of illiteracy are not only evidence of economic underdevelopment, but may also constitute a barrier to the establishment of a stable democracy.¹⁴³ Confirmation of these linkages is suggested by **Table 2.16**. Consider, for example, Equatorial Guinea, which in 1980 had an adult illiteracy rate of 63 per cent, and Guinea-Bissau, for which the figure was 80 per cent in 1979. The two countries were the poorest African microstates in the mid-1970s¹⁴⁴ and were also among the most unstable politically. In the South Pacific, the only two microstates that suffered serious security crises, Fiji and Vanuatu had illiteracy rates of 21 and 47 per cent respectively in the mid- to late 1970s. These relatively high figures are in marked contrast with much more stable Tonga's 0.4 per cent illiteracy in 1976 and Western Samoa's 2.2 per cent in 1971. Illiteracy figures are not, of course, uniformly

¹⁴⁰Cohen, "Introduction", pp. 10-11

¹⁴¹Peterson, J.E., *Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging State*, Croom Helm, London, 1978, p. 187-88; Unwin, P.T.H., *Qatar*, Clio, Oxford, 1982, p. xviii

¹⁴²Clarke, "Grenada: society and politics...", p. 134

¹⁴³Lipset, "Some social requisites of democracy...", pp. 79-80. Note also, however, that rapidly increasing literacy, especially when not accompanied by a corresponding increase in appropriate jobs, can be a source of political instability. [Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 47-49]

¹⁴⁴See **Table 2.14**. Note: Lesotho was no longer a microstate by this time.

reliable pointers regarding political stability and democracy. Botswana and Cape Verde recorded rates of illiteracy nearly as high as those of Equatorial Guinea but were very stable. Moreover, Tonga and Samoa, with their traditional hierarchical Polynesian political systems¹⁴⁵ were arguably less democratic than the much less literate Fiji and Vanuatu.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have endeavoured to convey a picture of the security crises faced by microstates during the period 1960-89 and of some of the key elements which combined to produce vulnerability. African microstates were found to have been particularly crisis-prone and, at the other end of the spectrum, European and South Pacific microstates were notably crisis-free. Security crises were predominantly internal in nature and the majority arose from attempts to overthrow governments. Foreign military interventions were, overwhelmingly, in support of beleaguered governments rather than their challengers.

There is considerable diversity in the security environments faced by individual microstates, but the following factors of vulnerability appear to have been salient for significant groups of microstates. Deficient preparations for independence, demographic

¹⁴⁵Jennings, Peter, "Political and constitutional change: a complex agenda", in Peter Polomka (ed.), *The Security of Oceania in the 1990s, Vol. 2: Managing Change* (South Pacific Security Project), Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 68, Australian National University, Canberra, 1990, p. 6

distortions, neglected development needs, and anomalous or contested borders were common, if not universal, elements in the microstate colonial experience and factors in post-independence vulnerability. Also contributing to vulnerability have been certain special characteristics of small polities: heightened degrees of personalism, entrenched and inadequately restrained executives and overweening militaries. Location, that is the kind of "neighbourhood" in which a microstate exists and its position in relation to places of strategic importance to others, has a very considerable bearing on its own security prospects, as have other geographical attributes, such as islandness and high population densities. On the economic side, it was apparent that the limited fiscal capacity of some microstates was unequal to the defence tasks before them, and that poverty played a significant part in domestic political instability. It is not possible to construct from these disparate elements a universally applicable model of sources of microstate vulnerability. Instead, I suggest, one should think in terms of a kaleidoscope in which the various factors combine to form different patterns of vulnerability in individual circumstances.

The following chapter turns to the issue of microstates' dependence on others for assistance with their security problems. In a broad sense, this dependence flows from the condition of endemic vulnerability described in the present chapter: microstates' vulnerability to security threats obliges them to rely on the assistance of larger powers.

CHAPTER THREE

DEPENDENCE

A natural consequence flowing from the vulnerability discussed in the previous chapter is the dependence of microstates on others for security assistance. This brings us to the second of the two central questions identified in Chapter 1: *how can we best conceptualize microstates' security dependence on larger powers?* I begin by tracing the historical position of very small states in international society and describe the relationship of modern microstates to the contemporary international order, to which many may be said to owe their existence and survival. I then turn to microstates' security linkages with larger powers, first surveying the actual record during the period 1960-1989 and next assessing the applicability of three International Relations models of unequal relationships "sphere-of-influence", "dominant-subordinate" and "patron-client" models of unequal relationships.

Small States in international society

Introduction

The existence of small states in international society is hardly a new phenomenon. If anything, it was the nineteenth-century emergence of a handful of extremely large and

powerful states that was the novelty, and the recent proliferation of microstates may be regarded as a reversion to the norm.¹ Ancient Greece comprised some 1,500 *poleis* or city-states, some of them little more than fortified villages, yet each enjoying a "miniature sovereignty"; Renaissance Italy's republics and principalities differed little in scale.² The oldest state in the world today is a microstate, San Marino, founded nearly 17 centuries ago, while others such as Andorra, Bhutan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Maldives, Malta and Monaco have also been distinct and, in varying degrees sovereign, entities for hundreds of years. Some tiny historical states, such as Venice, have been major world commercial, military and cultural powers in their time.

Modern microstates as a group are, however, distinguishable from their diminutive forerunners both quantitatively and qualitatively. The size differentiation between modern microstates and the rest of the international community is much more pronounced than that between their predecessors of past centuries.³ Although, for example, 15th century Venice's population of 150,000⁴ was about the same as that of modern Vanuatu, the latter co-exists with much bigger states. The population of mid-15th century France, a giant in Venice's world, was a mere 10 million,⁵ whereas today's Vanuatu knows leviathans like China with a 1990 population in excess of one billion.⁶

¹Diggines, C.E., "The problems of small states", *The Round Table*, No 295, 1985, p. 191

²Pumell, Robert, *The Society of States: an Introduction to International Politics*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1973, pp. 37, 55. Hinsley, disputes the notion that the Greek *poleis* were actually sovereign or even states, and regards them rather as segments of a single wider Greek society. [Hinsley, F.H., *Sovereignty*, Basic Books, New York, 1966, pp. 28-29]

³Holsti, K.J., *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (fifth edition), Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1988, p. 61

⁴Rapaport, Jacques, Ernest Mutueba and Joseph J. Therattil, *Small States and Territories: Status and Problems*, Amo Press, New York, 1971 [originally published as United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), *Status and Problems of Very Small States and Territories*, United Nations, New York, 1969], p. 11

⁵Grigg, David, *Population Growth and Agrarian Change: an Historical Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, p. 55

⁶U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 1990*, United Nations, New York, 1991

Microstates also represent a striking qualitative change over very small states of old, whose survival rested on genuine attributes of power, such as military capability, strategic importance or commercial pre-eminence, yet whose status was nevertheless usually that of subordinate elements within systems of suzerainty or empire. By contrast modern microstates often lack the conventional economic and military underpinnings of statehood. Their viability is "more dependent on the existence of systemic phenomena than on the capabilities possessed by them."⁷ They have been spawned and sustained by a new international legal order which, at least formally, recognizes their full sovereignty, elevates them to equal status with even the largest states, and protects them from external aggression. In Krasner's view it is this conjuncture of small size and sovereign equality that makes the post-war international system unique.⁸

Microstates and the evolution of the modern state system

The termination of the Thirty Years War, under the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, is conventionally regarded as the coming of age of the European state system⁹ upon which, in turn, the modern international order has been built. By the same token, Westphalia was a milestone in the evolving position of very small states in world society. The struggle between forces tending towards the hegemonial status quo and those demanding a more pluralistic international order was concluded in favour of the latter. The

⁷Reid, George L., *The Impact of Very Small Size on the International Behaviour of Microstates*, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1974, p. 48

⁸Krasner, Stephen D., *The Third World Against Global Liberalism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985, p. 75

⁹Pumell, *The Society of States...*, p. 58

settlement "legitimized a commonwealth of sovereign states" and "marked the triumph of the *stato*, in control of its internal affairs and independent externally."¹⁰ It emphasized the separateness of the European states rather than the unity of Christendom, and rejected the idea that a pope or emperor had some universal authority, or that a dominant state should lay down the law to others.¹¹ To the satisfaction of rivals such as Richelieu's France, the Habsburg-dominated Holy Roman Empire was effectively divided among more than 300 sovereigns, each free to conduct an independent foreign policy to some degree.¹² Under the new order, each state could take a place in the wider international society of Europe commensurate with its own strength and geographical position.¹³ For the small principalities, more than 100 of which were separate, if not fully equal or independent, parties to the peace congress, Westphalia offered a significant enlargement of their freedom of action and sovereign prerogatives.¹⁴ Although the pendulum twice swung backwards under the weight of Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte's imperial ambitions, the anti-hegemonial assumptions of Westphalia prevailed.

Notwithstanding the preservation of respect for the independence of very small states, the nineteenth century saw a diminishment of their numbers and their role as international actors. After the defeat of Napoleon, the five strongest powers established a collective hegemony (the "Concert of Europe"), still tempered by, but nevertheless rolling back, the

¹⁰Watson, Adam, *The Evolution of International Society: a Comparative Historical Analysis*, Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 156, 186. ["The naked power which a (Renaissance) Italian ruler wielded was called a *stato*. The word then meant state or situation, in the sense in which we use the term *status quo*. After several transformations it became our world 'state' in the sense of governmental authority or the political form of a nation."]

¹¹Watson, *The Evolution of International Society...*, p. 188; Nardin, Terry, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States*, Princeton, 1983, p. 51

¹²Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1994, p. 65

¹³Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States*, p. 54. Commenting on the eighteenth century political writings of Christian Wolff, Nardin notes that the idea of formal state equality does not entail substantive equality, it being compatible with extreme differences in territorial extent, population, wealth, religion and government.

¹⁴Watson, *The Evolution of International Society...*, p. 196

18th century balance of power system.¹⁵ Most of the scores of diminutive states which had thronged the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 were subsumed by the German and Italian unifications so that, by the 1870s, Europe consisted of only about 15 sovereign states and the remaining very small states were seen as anomalies.¹⁶ In the spirit of his time, the German historian, Treitschke, asserted that a state not capable of defending itself "may still be termed a kingdom for conventional or courtly reasons but science, whose first duty is accuracy, must boldly declare that in point of fact such a country no longer ranks as a state."¹⁷ As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the great European powers had, through imperial expansion, brought the whole world into a "single net of economic and strategic relations" for the first time,¹⁸ and the process of consolidating diverse non-European entities into global colonial empires reached its apogee. At the same time the gap between the largest powers and the remaining independent small states increased exponentially in terms of the resources, territory and population each controlled.¹⁹

Despite the confident assertion, in 1902, by British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain that the days of "little states" were over,²⁰ the agglomerative trend was about to be reversed. The dissolution or dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian Empires in the aftermath of the First World War restored

¹⁵Wight, Martin, *Power Politics*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1986, pp. 41-42

¹⁶De Smith, Stanley A., *Microstates and Micronesia: Problems of America's Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories*, New York University Press, New York, 1970, p. 7; Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformation* (third edition), Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1989, p. 98, n. 4

¹⁷Treitschke, Heinrich von, *Politics* (translation by B. Dugdale and T. de Bille), Constable, London, 1916, Vol. 1, pp. 29-30, cited in Brewin, Christopher, "Sovereignty", in James Mayall (ed.), *The Community of States: a Study in International Political Theory*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982, p. 43

¹⁸Watson, *The Evolution of International Society...*, p. 265

¹⁹Krasner, *The Third World Against Global Liberalism*, pp. 32-33

²⁰Amery, Julian, *The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol. Four, 1901-1903: At the Height of His Power*, Macmillan, London, 1951, p. 405

independence to a number of small territorial entities in Europe and on its periphery. Self-determination was adopted as a political principle in the British-American Atlantic Charter of 1941²¹ and the United Nations Charter of 1945. By 1960, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted its landmark Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,²² the emancipation of subject territories was becoming a headlong rush.²³ The virtual abandonment of empirical criteria for statehood in the face of international pressure for early and complete decolonization, coupled with the fissiparous tendencies of nationalism, saw the emergence or re-emergence of a large number of microstates as sovereign members of the international community.²⁴

New international institutions, notably the League of Nations, the International Court of Justice and the United Nations, provided permanent forums in which small states could, on a formally equal footing, interact with and seek redress against or protection from stronger powers. Initially, there were reservations about the qualifications of *very* small states for membership of the new world bodies, with critics charging that the institutions would be diluted by a flood of tiny new members with no evident qualifications for statehood and no capacity to contribute to the work of the institutions.²⁵ Liechtenstein, for example, was denied admission to the League of Nations,²⁶ and there was some advocacy in the mid-1960s of a form of secondary or associate membership of the United

²¹While the United States considered that the right to self-determination enunciated in the Atlantic Charter applied to all nations and all peoples, Britain held that it only concerned previously sovereign countries overrun by the Axis powers. [Jackson, Robert, *Quasi-States: International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 88]

²²UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960

²³See **Table 2.06**.

²⁴Carrington, C.E., "Decolonization - the last phase", *International Affairs*, Vol. 38, No 1, January 1962, pp. 31, 36.

²⁵*ibid.*, p. 37

²⁶De Smith, *Microstates and Micronesia...*, p. 8

Nations for microstates.²⁷ The principle of universality nevertheless ruled and microstates continued to be admitted as full and equal members, coming to regard their participation in the United Nations as a touchstone of their new or restored sovereignty, as well as the most economic form of multiple diplomatic representation.²⁸

Microstates and the contemporary international order

On the face of it, microstates could be prime examples of Ferguson and Mansbach's "scarcely independent entities" and "shaky enterprises" spawned by decolonization whose statehood was "nominal rather than viable."²⁹ Herr discerns "a serious lacuna between the expectations of the doctrine of sovereignty and the practice of these sovereign polities," noting that microstate governments may be unable to fend off external interference or uphold their authority domestically.³⁰ It is also questionable whether some microstates can give practical effect to the legal requirement set out in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) that they should have the capacity to enter into relations with other states. A few older microstates such as Liechtenstein and Monaco have expressly ceded certain responsibilities and rights in the conduct of foreign relations to larger neighbours³¹ and most maintain a very low level of

²⁷Blair, Patricia Wohlgemuth, *The Ministate Dilemma*, Occasional Paper No 6, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, October 1967, pp. 18-20; Plischke, Elmer, *Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1977

²⁸Boyce, Peter J., *Foreign Affairs for New States: Some Questions of Credentials*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1977, p. 235

²⁹Ferguson, Yale H. and Richard W. Mansbach, *The State, Conceptual Chaos and the Future of International Relations Theory*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1989, p. 25

³⁰Herr, Richard A., "Microstate sovereignty in the South Pacific: is small practical?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 10, No 2, September 1988, p. 191

³¹Mendelson, M.H., "Diminutive states in the United Nations", *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 21, Part 4, October 1972, p. 615

participation in international affairs.³² Many observers might therefore readily transfer to microstates Jackson's description of African countries as "quasi-states" or mere "juridicial artifacts of a highly accommodating regime of international law and politics which is an expression of a twentieth-century anticolonial ideology of self-determination."³³

Notwithstanding the above scepticism, and despite the tendency for modern microstates to have far less than their predecessors in the way of concrete attributes³⁴ on which to base their status as separate international actors, their formal sovereignty is more durable. Through its twentieth century institutions, the international community committed itself to principles such as the virtually unqualified right to self-determination and the inadmissibility of the use of force, which gave small states an "historically exceptional... degree of immunity from physical coercion."³⁵ The continuing existence of vulnerable microstates may be said to "bear witness to the constraining effect of international law - and morality - in state action."³⁶ The efficacy of this legal scaffolding is demonstrated by the record during the period of the present study. Only one microstate, Zanzibar, disappeared off the political map (through mutually agreed amalgamation rather than conquest) and only one, Cyprus, lost control of substantial territory, despite many being involved in territorial disputes.³⁷

³²Reid, *The Impact of Very Small Size...*, pp. 15, 45; Barston, Ronald P. "The external relations of small states", in August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland (eds), *Small States in International Relations*, Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm, 1971, p. 45

³³Jackson, Robert H., "Quasi-states, dual regimes, and neoclassical theory: international jurisprudence and the Third World", *International Organisation*, Vol. 41, No 4, Autumn 1987, p. 519

³⁴Crawford asserts that a large majority of all modern states have "no independent capacity to maintain their prerogatives to their full extent." [Crawford, James, "Islands as sovereign nations", *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 38, Part 2, April 1989, p. 279]

³⁵Watson, *The Evolution of International Society...*, p. 300

³⁶Purnell, *The Society of States...*, p. 102

³⁷See **Table 2.03**. The annexations of Goa and East Timor prior to decolonization are not counted since they were dependent territories rather than microstates.

The unprecedented protection and support afforded by the modern international legal order was not, however, necessarily sufficient to meet the security needs of individual microstates. The significance of the gap between the theory and practice of microstate sovereignty was accentuated by a parallel disjunction in respect of the international community's collective security arrangements. Despite formal provision for the protection of threatened members, these arrangements did not generally deliver the immediate and unreserved external military assistance required by highly vulnerable microstates facing a security crisis. Lack of consensus meant that United Nations action seldom went beyond General Assembly or Security Council resolutions of doubtful efficacy such as the admonitions to South Africa not to encroach upon the territorial integrity of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.³⁸ Even where the will to act was present, the international community's inability to respond *swiftly* tended to marginalize collective solutions. The ease and speed with which a microstate government could be overwhelmed meant that if external assistance was to be provided at all then, as a rule, it needed to be sent extremely rapidly. As the Barbados Prime Minister, Tom Adams, observed in the aftermath of intervention to support the St Vincent government against secessionists in 1979, in such crises a policy of "wait and see" in effect amounts to a policy of "no assistance".³⁹

Alford notes that when a microstate government is faced with a potentially

³⁸UNGA Resolution 2134 (XXI) of 29 September 1966. An account of South African predations against its neighbouring microstates is provided in Ajulu, Rok, and Diana Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland: Captive States", in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds), *Frontline Southern Africa: Destructive Engagement*, Four Walls Eight Windows, New York, 1988

³⁹Norton, Graham, "Defending the Eastern Caribbean", *World Today*, Vol. 40, No 6, June 1984, p. 259

overwhelming crisis, it will usually be preferable that one capable external friend provides rapid and decisive military reinforcement, though perhaps with some subsequent "window-dressing or legitimization by small regional contingents."⁴⁰ It is noteworthy that although São Tomé and Príncipe reported violations of its sea and airspace to the United Nations Security Council in 1978, alleging an imminent attack by foreign mercenaries, it was the other former Portuguese colonies in Africa to whom it turned for protection.⁴¹ It was sometimes possible for regional organizations to endorse an otherwise bilateral intervention by committing a token force to the operation, as the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States did in Grenada in 1983, or subsequently to relieve the initial intervener, as the Arab League did in Kuwait in 1961.

It follows that rather than relying on universal or bloc security assurances, many microstates found it prudent to maintain some kind of special relationship with a former colonial power or a larger neighbour that facilitated security assistance in times of crisis.⁴² For its part, the protecting power may have perceived a degree of responsibility for the microstate or had vested interests of its own therein, such as political, economic or strategic stakes, or the presence of an expatriate community. It might have regarded the violent disruption of the political status quo in a microstate as a threat to regional stability, because it could encourage like-minded subversive elements in neighbouring states or provide an entrée to the region for undesirable external actors. Occasionally, the former colonial power had residual constitutional or post-independence treaty obligations

⁴⁰ Alford, Jonathan, "Security dilemmas of small states", *World Today*, Vol. 40, Nos 8-9, August-September 1984, p. 368

⁴¹ *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Longman, London, 4 January 1980, p. 30028

⁴² *A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability, Report of a Commonwealth Advisory Group*, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1997, pp. 119-20; Rapaport et al., *Small States and Territories...*, p. 147

from which derived either a duty to assist the microstate (as in Gabon and Mauritius), or even a right to intervene (as in Cyprus), in cases of either external aggression or domestic strife. Sutton and Payne suggest that the availability of such guarantees to microstates will dwindle in future as the colonial and Cold War eras recede into history.⁴³

Microstate security relationships with larger powers

This section of the chapter begins with a survey of the historical record of microstates' security relationships during the study period before assessing the applicability of various models of unequal associations in International Relations theory.

Microstate security relationships with foreign governments 1960-1989: the record

Unsurprisingly, detailed information is often not readily available on the many bilateral defence agreements and other assistance arrangements entered into by microstates, in some cases over 40 years ago. It is sometimes problematic to distinguish between agreements that provided microstates with guarantees of military assistance in times of crisis and those that involved lesser commitments such as ongoing training and supply of equipment (in ambiguous cases the latter was assumed). There was also considerable variance in the nature of foreign access to military facilities, from maintenance of permanent bases staffed by foreign armed forces down to the occasional use of airport

⁴³Sutton, Paul, and Anthony Payne, "Lilliput under threat: the security problems of small island and enclave developing states", *Political Studies*, Vol. XLI, No 4, December 1993, p. 589

and other transit amenities. As noted in Chapter One, there is also a wide range in what may constitute a military intervention. Notwithstanding these difficulties, an attempt has been made in **Table 3.01** to summarize microstates' security relationships with foreign governments during the period studied, which have been divided into formal security guarantees, other defence assistance, foreign military bases or facilities, foreign garrisons assisting microstates and foreign interventions.

As suggested by the density of the table, microstates as a whole maintained very extensive external security links. Apart from the multitude of defence cooperation relationships, a significant number of microstates enjoyed formal security guarantees from external partners. A large proportion of these guarantees was provided by two former colonial powers, France and the United Kingdom. Another numerically significant category was the mutual assistance pacts entered into by microstates in the Eastern Caribbean and Persian Gulf (with the encouragement and/or participation of regional hegemons). Microstates in the South Pacific stand out as having had far fewer formal defence guarantees from foreign countries and having hosted scarcely any foreign military bases or garrisons. This corresponds with the very low level of vulnerability experienced by South Pacific microstates. Chronically unstable microstates such as Comoros and Equatorial Guinea appeared to attract foreign military involvement like the proverbial honey pot for bees. They provide classic examples of external security relationships borne of individual crises and the needs of particular regimes. Elements of Cold War rivalry and ideological or strategic competition were evident in the pattern of foreign involvement in the security of many African microstates.

Formal security guarantees

The record of formal security guarantees to microstates differs considerably from region to region. Africa witnessed a number of bilateral defence treaties beginning with guarantees at independence by France⁴⁴ to Congo, Djibouti and Gabon and Mauritania, by Britain to Mauritius⁴⁵ and by Senegal to The Gambia.⁴⁶ Equivalent agreements between Portugal and the lusophone microstates were understandably lacking, given the suddenness and bitterness of decolonization. The defence component in Spain's independence settlement with Equatorial Guinea appears to have concerned principally the stationing of *Guardia Civil* soldiers for the protection of Spain's own nationals but a new security cooperation agreement in 1981 provided direct military assistance to protect the regime.⁴⁷ African microstates were also party to two regional pacts, the 1961 Defence Council of Equatorial Africa (Congo, Gabon)⁴⁸ and the 1981 defence protocol of the Economic Community of West African States (The Gambia).⁴⁹ The balance of guarantees for African microstates were crisis-related agreements extending Angolan, French, Moroccan and South African protection to Comoros,⁵⁰ Equatorial Guinea,⁵¹ São

⁴⁴Lellouche, Pierre, and Dominique Moisi, "French policy in Africa: a lonely battle against destabilization", *International Security*, Vol. 3, No 4, Spring 1979, pp. 111-15. The year of the Djibouti agreement was 1977 rather than 1978 as stated by Lellouche and Moisi. Such treaties were entered into by all the former French colonies in Africa (except Comoros) at the time of independence.

⁴⁵Rengger, Nicholas (ed.), *Treaties and Alliances of the World* (5th edition), Longman, Harlow, 1990, p. 380-81

⁴⁶The agreement was a mutual assistance pact in respect of external security threats. [Proctor, J.H., "The Gambia's relations with Senegal: the search for partnership", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. 5, No 2, July 1967, pp. 155-56]

⁴⁷"Equatorial Guinea: the buried bitterness", *Africa Confidential*, No 6, 14 March 1969, p. 1; *Keesing's*, 19-26 April 1969, p. 23310; Fegley, Randall, *Equatorial Guinea: an African Tragedy*, Peter Lang, New York, 1989, p. 206

⁴⁸Rengger, *Treaties and Alliances...*, p. 414

⁴⁹Okolo, Julius Emeka, "Securing West Africa: the ECOWAS defence pact", *World Today*, Vol. 39, No 5, May 1983, p. 180-81. The defence protocol provides for joint action in the event of aggression from a non-member state, conflict between members and internal conflict in a member state provided it is sustained from the outside. The two other microstates belonging to ECOWAS, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, declined to sign the agreement.

⁵⁰In 1978, three years after Comoros' Unilateral Declaration of Independence, France signed a military agreement promising aid in the event of external aggression. [Rengger, *Treaties and Alliances...*, p. 426]. The Comoros government is believed to have entered into secret agreements with South Africa in the 1980s which secured the latter's

Tomé and Príncipe,⁵² and Swaziland.⁵³

The picture in the Caribbean is dominated by a collective approach. Six of the 12 microstates in the region were among the founders in 1981 of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States with its Defence and Security Committee to coordinate peace and security efforts.⁵⁴ Under a 1982 Memorandum of Understanding between Barbados and OECS members, this mechanism was supplemented by a Regional Security System providing for mutual assistance in case of "threats to national security."⁵⁵ Barbados had also entered into an MOU with Trinidad and Tobago in 1979 concerning recent adverse security developments in the region, though it is not clear whether the document committed them to mutual assistance in the same way as Barbados's subsequent RSS agreement.⁵⁶ Against the background of the Guatemalan irredentist threat to Belize, Britain agreed at independence in 1981 to keep troops and other armed forces stationed in Belize; with six other Commonwealth countries, including Canada, it also pledged to consult together in the event of an armed attack on Belize.⁵⁷ Two Caribbean microstates, Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago, were parties to the Rio or Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

protection of the regime in return for certain favours. [Mukonoweshuro, Eliphaz G., "The politics of squalor and dependency: chronic political instability and economic collapse in the Comoro Islands", *African Affairs*, Vol. 89, No 357, October 1990, p. 576]

⁵¹Equatorial Guinea signed a mutual defence and non-aggression pact with Nigeria in 1987 [Liniger-Goumaz, Max, *Historical Dictionary of Equatorial Guinea*, Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, New Jersey, 1988, pp. xxv, 127]. After 1979 the regime enjoyed the protection of Moroccan troops under a bilateral agreement of unknown date [Fegley, *Equatorial Guinea*..., p. 219].

⁵²Angola provided troops to São Tomé and Príncipe under a formal agreement in 1978 [Sutton and Payne, "Lilliput under threat...", p. 589].

⁵³Swaziland entered into a secret security pact with South Africa in 1982 [Daniel, John, and Johnson Vilane, "Swaziland: political crisis, regional dilemma", *Review of African Political Economy*, No 35, 1986, p. 63].

⁵⁴Griffith, Ivelaw L., "The RSS: a decade of collective security in the Caribbean", *The Round Table*, No 324, 1992, p. 466

⁵⁵Staff Headquarters RSS, "The roles of the Regional Security System in the Eastern Caribbean", *Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs*, Vol. 11, No 6, January/February 1986, p. 5

⁵⁶Phillips, Dion E., "Barbados and the militarization of the Eastern Caribbean, 1979-85", *Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs*, Vol. 11, No 6, January/February 1986, p. 12

⁵⁷Pickford, John, "Guyana and Belize: how many parallels with the Falklands?", *Commonwealth*, Vol. 25, No 5, April 1983, pp. 147-48; Rengger, *Treaties and Alliances*..., p.380

The only explicit security guarantees extended to South Pacific microstates were those of the United States in respect of its two former Trust Territories, Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Under the Compact of Free Association agreed with each in 1986, the United States undertook to defend the two microstates as if part of its own territory.⁵⁸ New Zealand's 1962 Treaty of Friendship with Western Samoa, while it does not deal directly with defence, symbolizes the very close bilateral relationship.⁵⁹ It may be argued that assurances concerning Western Samoa's defence are implicit in the foreign relations/security clause of the agreement.

The Asian microstates are notable for almost all having had some kind of formal security arrangement with foreign governments. In 1981 Bahrain, Oman and Qatar entered with their larger neighbours into a Gulf Cooperation Council, whose first summit meeting agreed to include defence in the body's purview.⁶⁰ The three microstates, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar, later signed bilateral security agreements with Saudi Arabia⁶¹ and agreed with other GCC members to form a joint "Peninsula Shield" rapid deployment force for response to external aggression.⁶² Britain signed security agreements with Kuwait,⁶³

⁵⁸Michal, Edward J., "Protected States: the political status of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands", *The Contemporary Pacific*, Vol. 5, No 2, Fall 1993, p. 310

⁵⁹*Towards a Pacific Island Community, Report of the South Pacific Review Group*, New Zealand Government, Wellington, May 1990, p. 195

⁶⁰Harden, Sheila (ed.), *Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World*, Frances Pinter, London, 1985, p. 33

⁶¹Ramazani, R.K., "The Gulf Cooperation Council: a search for security", in William L. Dowdy and Russell B. Trood (eds), *The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1985, p. 180-81

⁶²It has been suggested that the force's utility for such purposes was extremely doubtful and its underlying rationale was enhancing military integration with a view to creating an "internal security force" to be rushed to the aid of regimes faced with domestic disturbances. [Acharya, Amitav, "Regionalism and regime security in the Third World: comparing the origins of the ASEAN and the GCC", in Brian L. Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1992, p. 160]

⁶³James, Alan, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, Macmillan/ISS, Basingstoke/London, 1990, p. 93

Brunei⁶⁴ and the Maldives.⁶⁵ Bhutan's 1961 army training agreement with India has been described as bringing Bhutan within the Indian security and defence system.⁶⁶ Under 1959 treaties, Britain, Greece and Turkey agreed to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus; at the same time Greece and Turkey entered into an alliance with Cyprus entailing a commitment to cooperate for their common defence and resist any attack on Cyprus.⁶⁷

The most prominent security guarantees to European microstates were those extended to Iceland and Luxembourg by virtue of their membership since 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and their related bilateral agreements with the United States.⁶⁸ Malta entered into security agreements with the United Kingdom, Italy and Libya.⁶⁹ Monaco and San Marino had long-standing protection from surrounding countries.⁷⁰

⁶⁴Brackman, Arnold C., *Southeast Asia's Second Front: the Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago*, Praeger, New York, 1966, pp. 136, 141

⁶⁵Namboodiri, P.K.S., J.P. Anand and Sreedhar, *Intervention in the Indian Ocean*, ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982, p. 21; Suryanarayan, V., "The Maldives and India's security", in Satish Chandra, B. Arnachalam and V. Suryanarayan, *The Indian Ocean and its Islands: Strategic, Scientific and Historical Perspectives*, Sage, New Delhi, 1993, p. 109

⁶⁶Rose, Leo, *The Politics of Bhutan*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1977, p. 78. Bhutan had already tacitly accepted a 1959 declaration of protection by the Indian Prime Minister and by the mid-1960s Bhutan had adopted a stance of full-scale alignment with India [Rose, Leo, "Foreign relations", in Francis Robinson (ed.), *Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 240]

⁶⁷Rengger, *Treaties and Alliances...*, pp. 381-82

⁶⁸*The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures* (11th edition), NATO, Brussels, 1989, pp. 9, 11, Rengger, *Treaties and Alliances...*, pp. 463, 465

⁶⁹Craig, James, "Malta", in Colin Clarke and Tony Payne (eds), *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1987; Rengger, *Treaties and Alliances...*, p. 360

⁷⁰Monaco is by treaty under the general protection of France [James, Alan, *Sovereign Statehood: the Basis of International Society*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1986, p. 113]. According to Mendelson, San Marino is assured of Italy's "protective friendship" under an 1897 treaty [Mendelson, "Diminutive states...", p. 616]. Duursma notes that while no clear duty of military defence can be deduced from Italy's earlier agreements with San Marino, a 1971 amendment to a 1939 treaty of friendship provides for Italy's "greatest and widest cooperation for the maintenance of San Marino's ancient freedom and independence" [Duursma, Jorri, *Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 224, 233].

Other defence assistance

The general category of "other defence assistance" comprises known instances of microstates receiving military training, equipment and similar ongoing support from foreign governments. It is the largest, yet at the same time probably the least instructive, of the categories. First, there must be doubt as to the comprehensiveness of the data. Because much of this assistance is provided in a routine fashion and is sometimes deliberately downplayed by the parties concerned, one suspects it often goes unchronicled and that the full extent may be considerably greater than suggested by the table. Even when arms transfers have been publicly recorded,⁷¹ the terms on which they occurred is not always clear, that is whether the equipment was given as aid or simply sold to the recipient on commercial terms. Second, the significance of the assistance should not be overstated as it is by no means particular to microstates. Throughout the developing world, many governments receive foreign support for the development of their security forces. Indeed, even amongst developed countries joint military training and other such relationships are commonplace. Of greater relevance for purposes of this study is the *identity* of those individual foreign governments providing support and what this may suggest about their strategic interests in particular microstates or regions. In that regard the ongoing involvement of former colonial powers and rivalry of Cold War foes are notable.

⁷¹For a survey of arms transfers to African countries, including eight microstates, see Clayton, Anthony, "Foreign intervention in Africa", in Simon Baynham (ed.), *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa*, Croom Helm, London/Sydney, 1986, p. 228-248

Foreign military bases or facilities

A foreign military base was deemed to be a facility maintained in a microstate by an external power with the primary purpose of performing functions in the interests of the latter. Included were arrangements giving the right to use facilities when needed without necessarily stationing forces there continuously. In contrast to all other regions, there were no foreign military facilities in South Pacific microstates with the exception of the United States missile test range in Marshall Islands.⁷² In the Caribbean, the United States had military bases in Antigua,⁷³ Bahamas⁷⁴ and Trinidad.⁷⁵ Barbados's strategic airport was utilized by British and Cuban forces⁷⁶ and it is alleged that Guyana also provided transit facilities for Cuban troop flights to Angola.⁷⁷ In Asia, the United Kingdom kept important bases in Cyprus,⁷⁸ the Maldives⁷⁹ and Oman,⁸⁰ while the United States had them in Bahrain⁸¹ and Oman.⁸² Singapore maintained a military training facility in Brunei.⁸³ In Europe, NATO bases were hosted by Iceland, Luxembourg and also Malta.⁸⁴

In Africa, microstates were among the few former French colonies to maintain defence

⁷²Scarr, Deryck, *The History of the Pacific Islands: Kingdoms of the Reefs*, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1990, p. 299

⁷³Connell, John, *Sovereignty and Survival: Island Microstates in the Third World*, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1988, p. 10

⁷⁴Payne, Anthony, and Paul Sutton (eds), *Modern Caribbean Politics*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1993, p. 287

⁷⁵*Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations* (seventh edition), Worldmark/John Wiley, New York, 1988, p. 265

⁷⁶Harden, *Small is Dangerous...*, p. 154; Phillips, "Barbados and the militarization of the Eastern Caribbean...", p. 8

⁷⁷Danns, George K., "The role of the military in the national security of Guyana", *Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs*, Vol. 11, No 6, January/February 1986, p. 34

⁷⁸Rengger, *Treaties and Alliances...*, p. 382

⁷⁹Kaushik, Devendra, *The Indian Ocean: a Strategic Dimension*, Vika, New Delhi, 1983, p. 21

⁸⁰Namboodiri et al., *Intervention in the Indian Ocean*, pp. 70-71

⁸¹Váli, Ferenc, *Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: the Balances of Power*, The Free Press, New York, 1976, pp. 122, 173

⁸²Bowman, Larry W., and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, "The Indian Ocean: US Military and Strategic Perspectives", in Dowdy and Trood, *The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena*, pp. 416-17, 420

⁸³*The Military Balance 1990-91*, IISS, London, 1991, p. 158

⁸⁴Facilities in Iceland included the major US Naval Station at Keflavik [Wahlbäck, Krister, "The Nordic region in Twentieth Century European Politics", in Bengt Sundelius (ed.), *Foreign Policies of Northern Europe*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1982, pp. 19-20]. Malta hosted the headquarters for NATO's Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe until 1971 [*The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures*, p. 84].

agreements signed with Paris at independence and to continue as French bases. Gabon⁸⁵ was used, for example, for operations in Biafra, Angola and Comoros; Djibouti⁸⁶ served as a major French naval and army base protecting sea lines of communication and other interests; and naval access to facilities in Comoros⁸⁷ was also re-established after a short break. The United Kingdom retained the use of facilities in Mauritius,⁸⁸ while the United States had satellite tracking stations in both Mauritius and Seychelles.⁸⁹ In Equatorial Guinea, Spain kept a *Guardia Civil* base for the protection of its nationals for a time after independence;⁹⁰ the Soviet Union is alleged to have maintained naval and intelligence support facilities;⁹¹ and South Africa was said to be developing a satellite tracking station.⁹² Cuba used transit facilities in Equatorial Guinea and Congo to maintain its military presence in Angola and other African countries.⁹³

Foreign garrisons assisting microstates

For purposes of the survey a "garrison" was deemed to be a contingent of foreign military personnel maintained in a microstate for a lengthy period with the primary purpose of

⁸⁵Chipman, John, *French Military Policy and African Security*, Adelphi Paper No 201, IISS, London, Summer 1985, p. 131; "Pointers", *Africa Confidential*, 17 November 1978; Clayton, "Foreign intervention in Africa", p. 214;

Mukonoshewuro, "The politics of squalor and dependency...", p. 560

⁸⁶Zartman, I. William, "Africa and the West: the French connection", in Bruce E. Arlinghaus (ed.), *African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability and Solidarity*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984, p. 53; Fitzgerald, "Djibouti: petrodollar protectorate?", *Horn of Africa*, October-December 1978, pp. 26-27

⁸⁷Newitt, Malyn, *The Comoro Islands: Struggle Against Dependency in the Indian Ocean*, Gower, Aldershot, 1984, p. 66; Houbert, Jean, "France in the Indian Ocean: decolonising without disengaging", *The Round Table*, No 298, 1986, pp. 157-58

⁸⁸Váli, Ferenc, "Western European interests in the Indian Ocean", in Dowdy and Trood, *The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena*, p. 480

⁸⁹Namboodiri et al., *Intervention in the Indian Ocean*, pp. 10, 31; Awati, M.P., "The geopolitical and geo-strategic importance of the islands of the Indian Ocean", in Satish Chandra, B. Arunachalam and V. Suryanarayam, *The Indian Ocean and its Islands: Strategic, Scientific and Historical Perspectives*, Sage, New Delhi, 1993, p. 78

⁹⁰"Equatorial Guinea: the buried bitterness", p. 1

⁹¹Liniger-Goumaz, *Historical Dictionary of Equatorial Guinea*, pp. 9, 169; Fegley, *Equatorial Guinea...*, p. 145

⁹²Sundiata, Ibrahim K., *Equatorial Guinea: Colonialism, State Terror and the Search for Stability*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1990, pp. 85-86

⁹³Clayton, "Foreign intervention in Africa", p. 218; Liniger-Goumaz, *Historical Dictionary of Equatorial Guinea*, p. 45

ensuring the security of the latter (though possibly also benefiting the foreign power). Garrisoning was considered to go beyond the mere provision of military advisers or a one-off intervention, though dividing lines between these activities were sometimes indistinct. There were no foreign garrisons in South Pacific or European microstates. In the Caribbean, the United Kingdom kept substantial forces in Belize to protect its territorial integrity after independence.⁹⁴ Stretching our definition a little, Cuban military advisers in Grenada might also be included on the list of foreign garrisons in light of their active combat role in resisting the United States invasion of 1983.⁹⁵ In Asia, the United Kingdom maintained a battalion in Brunei.⁹⁶ The substantial numbers of personnel provided to Oman by Britain and Iran might also be noted as quasi-garrisons.⁹⁷ Greece, Turkey and the United Nations stationed large forces in Cyprus.⁹⁸ India kept troops in the Maldives for one year after overturning the mercenary coup of 1988.⁹⁹

The list of foreign garrisons in African microstates is more extensive and diverse than in other regions. France maintained garrisons to assist with the security of all African microstates that had been its colonies, that is Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Gabon and Mauritania.¹⁰⁰ South Africa funded a mercenary presidential guard in Comoros and its own military personnel acting as advisers to the government were believed instrumental

⁹⁴Pickford, "Guyana and Belize...", pp. 147-48

⁹⁵Erisman, Michael H., *Cuba's International Relations: the Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1985, p. 146

⁹⁶Rengger, *Treaties and Alliances...*, p. 380

⁹⁷Cottrell, Alvin J., Robert J. Hanks and Frank T. Bray, "Military affairs in the Persian Gulf", in Alvin J. Cottrell, R. Michael Burrell, Keith McLachlan and Roger M. Savory (eds), *The Persian Gulf States: a General Survey*, Johns Hopkins University Press, London, 1980, pp. 160-61; Albaharna, Husain M., *The Arabian Gulf States: their Legal and Political Status and their International Problems* (second edition), Librairie du Liban, Beirut, 1975, p. 54

⁹⁸*The Military Balance 1990-91*, pp. 89-90

⁹⁹*Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs 1988-89*, New Delhi, 1989, p. 2

¹⁰⁰Chipman, John, *French Power in Africa*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, p. 123, 147; Moose, George E., "French military policy in Africa", in William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (eds), *Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985, p. 80; Reed, Michael C., "Gabon: a neo-colonial enclave of enduring French interest", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 25, No 2, 1987, p. 307; *Keessing's Record of World Events*, Longman, London, March 1990, p. 37309

in thwarting a 1987 coup attempt.¹⁰¹ Moroccan troops guarded the new regime in Equatorial Guinea after 1979¹⁰² and also provided the core of the Gabonese Presidential Guard.¹⁰³ Senegal maintained a garrison in The Gambia for some years after the abortive coup of 1981.¹⁰⁴ An Angolan garrison, with some Guinea-Bissau involvement, protected São Tomé following threats to its security in the late 1970s.¹⁰⁵ Tanzania contributed garrisons for Comoros and Seychelles.¹⁰⁶ North Korea also provided a presidential guard in the Seychelles.¹⁰⁷

Foreign interveners

As defined in Chapter 1, an intervention is "the action of one state in dispatching either troops on operational duty or military aid to a microstate in times of crisis in the latter. The intention may be to support either the microstate government or its opponents, in circumstances of civil unrest, rebellion or external threat, or to take action when the authorities in the microstate are perceived to be unwilling or unable to deal with a security crisis which impinges on the interests of the intervener. Sometimes the mere display of armed force can amount to intervention. Finally, the 'dispatch' of troops may involve the mobilization of forces already deployed to the microstate." Details of the interventions experienced by microstates in the period studied are provided in **Table 1.02** and further summarized in the **Table 3.01**.

¹⁰¹Griffin, Michael, "The politics of isolation", *Africa Report*, Vol. 33, No 1, January-February 1988, p. 55; "The Comoros", *Sub-Saharan Africa 1993*, Europa, London, 1992, p. 270

¹⁰²Fegley, *Equatorial Guinea...*, pp. 166, 203

¹⁰³Reed, "A neo-colonial enclave...", p. 284

¹⁰⁴Tennyson, Brian Douglas, "The Gambia: paradise lost?", *The Round Table*, No 311, July 1989, p. 307

¹⁰⁵Hughes, Arnold, and Roy May, "Armies on loan: toward an explanation of transnational military intervention among Black African states, 1960-85, in Baynham, *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa*, p. 184

¹⁰⁶Hughes and May, "Armies on loan...", p. 181

¹⁰⁷*Annual Register 1985*, Longman, Harlow, Essex, 1986, p. 276

Of the 38 foreign military interventions in response to microstate security crises during 1960-89 identified in this study, 20 involved the dispatch of troops on operational duties. In 14 cases foreign military forces had a demonstrative function, either to deter an incipient threat from materializing or to provide reassurance in the aftermath of a crisis. In the remaining four cases, intervention was limited to the provision of military aid such as equipment of advisers. In terms of pro- or anti-government orientation, 28 of the interventions were in support of existing microstate governments, the remaining 10 were split evenly between those backing rebels and those of a relatively neutral character such as the evacuation of nationals or insertion of peace-keeping forces. Interventions occurred in all regions.

Models of unequal associations in International Relations

As foreshadowed in Chapter 1, my overall approach in setting microstate security relationships within the context of International Relations theory is essentially "realist", bearing in mind the historical timeframe and Cold War backdrop of the study. World society is treated as a system of "billiard-ball states in intermittent collision"¹⁰⁸ and nation states as sovereign, independent, coherent and dominant actors, though the occasional important role of other actors such as mercenary groups is acknowledged. Force is seen as a major means of influence, and power, peace and security as the most compelling

¹⁰⁸Banks, Michael, "The inter-paradigm debate", in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds), *International Relations: a Handbook of Current Theory*, Frances Pinter, London, 1985, p. 12

issues around which states interact.¹⁰⁹ My focus is thus on classical military-political threats to security rather than the complex web of economic, social and environmental factors that also contribute to the total picture of vulnerability and dependence.

Microstates are almost invariably "weak powers" under Buzan's definition, that is weak relative to the capabilities commanded by other states, particularly their neighbours and the great powers of the day. Such weakness, according to Buzan, typically stems from being small and/or poorly organized and can only be partly compensated for by wealth, skill, socio-political cohesion and willpower.¹¹⁰ As has been suggested even in respect of cash-rich Brunei, "there is a natural and immutable law which says that a country with a small territory and population will remain permanently weak, both politically and militarily."¹¹¹ In addition, a good number of microstates are also "weak states" in Buzan's sense, that is suffering from underdeveloped and/or malfunctioning political institutions and therefore highly susceptible to domestically generated security threats. Some of the underlying causes of this weakness, and consequent vulnerability, were explored in Chapter Two. Microstates tend to display virtually all the characteristics outlined in Handel's more general conception of weak states: a small population and territory, narrow and underdeveloped economy, limited defence capability and minimal international influence.¹¹² Also very apt in respect of microstates, is Singer's observation that freedom from foreign interference due to remoteness or lack of importance should

¹⁰⁹Bercovitch, Jacob, "Superpowers and client states: analysing relations and patterns of influence", Efrat, Moshe, and Jacob Bercovitch (eds), *Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: the Imbalance of Influence*, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 10

¹¹⁰Buzan, Barry, *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (second edition), Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 113

¹¹¹Krause, Sylvia C., and Gerald H. Krause, *Brunei*, Clio, Oxford, 1988, p. xxxiii

¹¹²Handel, Michael I., *Weak States in the International System* (second impression), Frank Cass, London, 1990, pp. 52-53

not be confused with genuine independence¹¹³ (or long-term security).

Microstates' particular vulnerability makes it all the more likely they will be dependent to some extent on larger powers for security assistance, a condition which Singer attributes to virtually all weaker countries. Assistance may be sought not only as protection against external threats but also to bolster domestic security, the latter sometimes amounting essentially to maintaining the regime in office.¹¹⁴ While a microstate's connection with a larger power may be valued by both, its importance is asymmetric and the motivations of the two parties are rarely the same. As Knudsen observes in respect of great powers and their smaller neighbours, the relationship may be a matter of survival for the latter, yet is rarely crucial for the former.¹¹⁵ In the eyes of the larger power, the microstate's security is unlikely to be consequential for its own sake but to depend primarily on the microstate's strategic, economic and other potential for the larger power and its rivals, though some microstates may parlay that potential into a degree of influence over larger powers.¹¹⁶

I identified three particular models from International Relations theory that appeared to offer helpful characterizations of microstate security relationships with larger powers: "spheres of influence"; "dominant-subordinate relationships"; and "patron-client relationships". In the following sections of the chapter these models are introduced, with special attention to the most apt of them, patron-client relationships. Observations are illustrated by examples drawn from the total sample of microstates (and will be explored

¹¹³Singer, Marshall R., *Weak States in a World of Powers*, The Free Press, New York, 1972, p. 38

¹¹⁴*ibid.*, pp. 274-75, 282

¹¹⁵Knudsen, Olav L., "Of lions and lambs: relations between great powers and their smaller neighbours", *Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Journal of International Politics*, Vol. XXIII, No 3, 1988, p. 112

¹¹⁶Handel, *Weak States...*, p. 51

in more detail in the four case studies in ensuing chapters).

Sphere of influence model

Keal describes a sphere of influence as "a determinate region within which a single external power exerts a predominant influence, which limits the freedom of action of political entities within it."¹¹⁷ The concept has been traced to fifteenth century papal bulls and bilateral agreements assigning rights of conquest to Castile and Portugal, though the actual term "sphere of influence" dates to the second half of the nineteenth century. Mutual recognition by two great powers of respective spheres of influence does not necessarily entail any acknowledgement of legal powers or moral rights, but the powers may come to think of each other as enjoying rights conferred by operational rules or rules of the game. It may be understood that interference by others in each power's sphere would be hazardous, that each should accord the other a "free hand" in its respective sphere and/or possibly that each had certain responsibilities in its sphere.¹¹⁸ The ways in which the influencing power limits the independence of states within its sphere can range from direct action such as armed intervention to more indirect forms such as implicitly dictating their foreign policies.

The sphere of influence model is illustrative of the position in which many microstates found themselves, most obviously the Caribbean microstates vis-à-vis the United States,

¹¹⁷Keal, Paul, *Unspoke Rules and Superpower Dominance*, Macmillan, London, 1983, p. 15

¹¹⁸Bull, Hedley, *The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1977, pp. 219, 221

those in francophone Africa¹¹⁹ vis-à-vis France, those in Europe vis-à-vis the NATO states, and those in the South Pacific vis-à-vis the Western powers. In each case the friction and responses that attended the straying of individual microstates outside their traditional orbits demonstrated the existence and importance of spheres of influence. Grenada's association with the Eastern bloc in the early 1980s ultimately led to invasion by the United States supported by other Caribbean microstates. As described in the previous chapter, Comoros' Unilateral Declaration of Independence was the precursor of years of instability and intrigue during which the former colonial power gradually reasserted its influence and prerogatives, allegedly even by backing coups and mercenary takeovers.¹²⁰ Malta's non-renewal of base agreements with NATO and the United Kingdom, and its dalliances with Libya and other radical regimes, were the source of considerable chagrin in NATO capitals. There followed a complex game of treaties and counter-treaties guaranteeing neutrality in return for the exclusion of superpower navies from Maltese shipyards and the provision of economic aid.¹²¹ Modest Soviet, Cuban and Libyan overtures to South Pacific microstates in the mid-1980s prompted the United States and its allies to step up aid in the region.¹²²

The terms of Marshall Islands and Federated States of Micronesia's 1986 Compacts of Free Association with the United States are examples of a superpower sphere of influence being formally elaborated, in that the agreements specifically precluded

¹¹⁹It might be argued that the scattered francophone microstates do not comprise a "determinate region" as required by Keal.

¹²⁰Mukonoweshuro, "The politics of squalor and dependency...", pp. 559-63

¹²¹*The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures*, pp. 84, 107; Rengger, *Treaties and Alliances...*, p. 360; Craig, "Malta", p. 181-2

¹²²Payne, Anthony, "The politics of small state security in the Pacific", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XXXI, No 2, July 1993, pp. 110-11; Meller, Norman, "The Pacific Island microstates", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Summer/Fall 1987, p. 131; Herr, "Microstate sovereignty in the South Pacific...", pp. 188-89

defence and trade ties with the Soviet Union.¹²³ Other instances of formal constraints are the Maldives' undertaking to Britain not to permit other nations to establish military bases;¹²⁴ the prohibition on Monaco entering into agreements with foreign governments without French concurrence;¹²⁵ Bhutan's obligation to be guided and advised by India in the conduct of its foreign affairs;¹²⁶ and France's right of review in respect of Gabon's foreign policy.¹²⁷ Examples of informal pressures on microstates not to stray into alternative spheres of influence include Brazil's heavy-handed efforts in 1983 to persuade Suriname to halt the expansion of its relations with Cuba.¹²⁸

Notwithstanding the applicability of the sphere of influence concept to the situation of microstates, its utility for modelling their dependent relationships with larger entities is limited. The literature focuses on relations between great powers rather than relations with the small states within their spheres, and it is preoccupied with the constraints imposed by larger powers, rather than the not necessarily parallel dynamic of dependence.

Dominant-subordinate model

In Abernethy's typical dominant-subordinate relationship, two states have interacted over

¹²³Connell, *Sovereignty and Survival...*, p. 11

¹²⁴Adeny, M. and W.K. Carr, "The Maldives Republic", in John M. Ostheimer, *The Politics of the Western Indian Ocean Islands*, Praeger, New York, 1975, p. 149

¹²⁵Mendelson, "Diminutive states...", p. 615

¹²⁶Bhutan has increasingly sought to have the obligation interpreted liberally, ie as a requirement to seek but not necessarily heed the advice of India. [Kohli, Manorama, "Dragon Kingdom's urge for an international role", *India Quarterly*, Vol. XXXVII, No 2, April-June 1981, p. 227]

¹²⁷Barnes, James F. *Gabon: Beyond the Colonial Legacy*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1992, pp. 124-25

¹²⁸*Annual Register 1983*, Longman, Harlow, Essex, 1984, p. 99. Dutch newspaper reports in June 1983 suggested Brazil had threatened to invade Suriname unless the government took steps to limit Cuban influence [*Keesing's*, December 1983, p. 32558].

a broad range of issue areas for a long time, with significant consequences for the subordinate state. The dominant state has the capacity and will to force compliance with its wishes; the subordinate state's capacity for independent action is seriously constrained; and representatives of the dominant state's institutions penetrate the subordinate state. Leaders in the subordinate state must regularly take into serious account the dominant state's possible reactions to proposed changes in the subordinate state's domestic and foreign policies.¹²⁹ In establishing such relationships, the dominant power sets out to minimize political, economic and military dangers to itself by keeping weaker powers in a subordinate position, discouraging them from acting independently and exploiting their capabilities for its own purposes. Triska observes in respect of Latin America and Eastern Europe that the margin of superpower security mostly permits only safe, moderate changes in local social structures and dependency relations. Local dissenters tend to have only gradualist strategies open to them. For a subordinate state the challenge is to extract whatever benefits it can from the relationship and to minimize its dependence and constraints on freedom of action.¹³⁰

Gabon's association with France is one prominent example of a microstate's relations with a larger power that met the criteria elaborated in this second model. Relations between France and its former colony continued to be extremely intimate to the point, some said, of neo-colonialism or relegation of Gabon to the status of a French *chasse gardée* or private hunting reserve.¹³¹ The indebtedness of the first president to France for

¹²⁹ Abernethy, David B., "Dominant-subordinate relationships: how shall we define them? How do we compare them?", in Jan F. Triska (ed.), *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: the United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1986, pp. 105-07

¹³⁰ Triska, Jan. F., "Introduction", in Triska, *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States...*, pp. 8, 11

¹³¹ Chazan, Naomi, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (second edition), Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1992, p. 381

overturning a coup against him permitted the French to anoint a protégé of their own as his successor.¹³² A shadowy and quasi-official French network maintained control over the levers of power in the administration, the economy and the security forces,¹³³ and Gabonese policy was filtered through the French Embassy.¹³⁴ French penetration of Gabon was exemplified and magnified by elements in the independence agreements such as an automatic right of citizenship accorded to French nationals, subjection of Gabon's foreign policy to French review, and France's right of pre-emption of primary materials.¹³⁵ In practice, Gabon acted internationally in almost complete conformity with French interests.¹³⁶ It was, for example, one of the very few countries to join France in recognising Biafra and allowed its territory to be used as a staging point for French arms supplies to Biafra.¹³⁷

Other microstates such as Comoros and Monaco might also be considered to have fitted the rather extreme model of an asymmetrical international relationship represented by the dominant-subordinate concept. In Monaco, for example, the ruling prince was obliged by a treaty of 1918 to exercise his sovereign rights in complete conformity with the political, military, naval and economic interests of France. In addition, the Minister of State who filled the role of prime minister and foreign minister was always a French civil servant selected by the prince from a list of three nominees submitted by the French government.¹³⁸ Generally speaking, however, microstate security relationships with

¹³²Barnes, *Gabon: Beyond the Colonial Legacy*, p. 35; Reed, *Gabon: a neo-colonial enclave...*, p. 287

¹³³The manipulative role of the so-called "*Clan de Gabonais*" was exposed by a French journalist [Péan, Pierre, *Affaires africaines*, Fayard, Paris, 1983].

¹³⁴Birmingham, David, *The Decolonization of Africa*, UCL Press, London, 1995, p. 59

¹³⁵Barnes, *Gabon: Beyond the Colonial Legacy*, pp. 124-25; Gardiner, David E., *Historical Dictionary of Gabon*, Scarecrow, Metuchen, New Jersey, 1981, p. 99. The agreements were revised in 1974.

¹³⁶Aicardi de Saint-Paul, Marc, *Gabon: the Development of a Nation*, Routledge, London, 1989, p. 84

¹³⁷Reed, *"Gabon: a neo-colonial enclave..."*, p. 304

¹³⁸*Keessing's*, 2-9 November 1963, p. 19721

larger powers had stronger elements of voluntarism and symbiosis than is envisaged in either the dominant-subordinate or sphere of influence model. For this reason I have devoted greater attention to the third alternative, the patron-client model, which incorporates these characteristics.

Patron-client model

According to Bercovitch, "patron-client relations involve a special type of interaction between two states of manifestly unequal resources linked together through joint interests or effective bonds to provide mutual services or common goals." They are typically informal, voluntary and mutually valued, and cover a wide range of issue areas.¹³⁹

The patron-client model of asymmetrical interstate relations has its roots in one of the characteristic features of ancient Roman municipal life: the symbiotic relationship between a citizen of standing and another of lesser means and rank.¹⁴⁰ The essential transaction of these relationships was the exchange of rewards (*beneficia*) accorded by the patron, for services (*officia*) performed by the client. As Rome outgrew its neighbours, it was natural that the concept of *clientela* should be extended to its interstate relations. The designation of a cooperative foreign state as an *amicus populi Romani* or friend of the Roman people suggested "recognition for services rendered with a lively sense of favours still to come," and in theory carried no connotation of subservience, though in fact was sometimes a euphemism for a high degree of Roman control.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹Bercovitch, "Superpowers and client states...", p. 15

¹⁴⁰Badian, E., *Foreign Clientelae 24-70 B.C.*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1958, p. 1

¹⁴¹Luttwak, Edward N., *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire From the First Century A.D. to the Third*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1976, pp. 21, 24

State-level replication of the patron-client relationships of individuals can be found in other eras and societies. For example, the pattern of rights and obligations inherent in the relationship between feudal lord and vassal in medieval Europe also found expression in the bonds between suzerain and subject states.¹⁴² In the late 1960s and early 1970s, political scientists drew analogies between patron-client interpersonal relations and broader political life in developing countries.¹⁴³ Modern Latin American countries' client relationships with foreign "paramounts" have been portrayed as reflecting the traditional *patrón-peón* psychology of Latin American society.¹⁴⁴

Handel notes that although a patron-client relationship is based on reciprocity - the provision of material goods or protection by the patron in return for the services, loyalty and deference of the client - there is an imbalance of power and status favouring the patron. While the connection is mutually valued by the parties and the power imbalance between them is not so great as to amount to a pure command relationship,¹⁴⁵ a degree of coercion and manipulation by the patron may nevertheless operate implicitly in the background. Further, there is usually a monopolistic element in the benefits provided by the patron to its client. The extent to which patron and client are bound to each other is determined, on the one hand, by the degree to which the patron depends on the services rendered by the client and, on the other, by the availability to the client of alternative patrons. In International Relations, according to Handel, the main characteristic of

¹⁴²Davies, Norman, *Europe: a History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 311-16

¹⁴³See, for example, Kaufman, Robert R., "The patron-client concept and macro-politics: prospects and problems", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 16, No 3, June 1974, and Lemarchand, René, and Keith Legg, "Political clientalism and development: a preliminary analysis", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 4, No 2, January 1972

¹⁴⁴Bailey, Norman A., *Latin America in World Politics*, Walker, New York, 1967, p. 37

¹⁴⁵Scott makes the same point in respect of patron-client relationships at the Southeast Asian village level, where there is a "certain amount of bargaining and reciprocity rather than command relationships." [Scott, James C., "Patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXVI, No 1, March 1972, p. 93]

patron-client relationships is their informality: rather than entering into an actual alliance, the client simply makes foreign policy decisions with one ear to the wishes of its patron.¹⁴⁶ Others, such as Carney, do not rule out a patron extending a formal security guarantee to a client.¹⁴⁷ In the context of their study of Cold War superpower relations with Third World states, Shoemaker and Spanier hold that another key element of patron-client relationships is that the client plays a prominent role in patron-patron competition.¹⁴⁸

In Handel's ideal patron-client relationship, "the client state voluntarily sets its own limits on action and makes decisions in support of the great power, hoping by such acts either to get immediate positive rewards from the great power or to accumulate goodwill and credit for the future. If the behaviour of the weak state is designed to placate the great power rather than to gain some kind of positive rewards, its intention is to prevent the imposition of negative sanctions."¹⁴⁹ Although client compliance is a critical element in the relationship, this may be a continuum rather than total: the greater the compliance, the stronger the relationship.¹⁵⁰ At the high end of the scale, a client state's observance of its patron's wishes may amount to virtual "synchronism", a term biologists have used to describe the behaviour of pilot fish following a shark, slavishly copying the incessant and irregular changes of direction made by the latter. While client states may behave like a politically penetrated system, adopting policy positions as if the patron state were actually participating in and directing the decision-making process, this cannot go too far.

¹⁴⁶Handel, *Weak States...*, pp. 132-34

¹⁴⁷Carney, Christopher, P., "International patron-client relationships: a conceptual framework", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 24, No 2, Summer 1989, p. 47

¹⁴⁸Shoemaker, Christopher C., and John Spanier, *Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age*, Praeger, New York, 1984, p. 13

¹⁴⁹Handel, *Weak States...*, p. 135

¹⁵⁰Carney, "International patron-client relationships...", p. 45

If the larger power does actually penetrate the system to this extent, then, in Handel's view, the weak state's relationship becomes that of a protectorate, puppet state or satellite rather than a client.¹⁵¹ Others such as Bailey do not regard virtual satellite status as necessarily incompatible with clientship.¹⁵²

There may be a considerable range in the balance of reliance in the relationship. At one extreme, the patron may be sufficiently more powerful than its client, and/or the client sufficiently in need of the benefits extended by the patron, that the onus is overwhelmingly on the client to act in conformity with the interests of the patron. Conversely, the client may be able to exert considerable "pull" over the patron if the power disparity between them is sufficiently narrow, or the client can render services of great value to the patron, or there are competing patrons available.¹⁵³ This accords more with Ramet's scenario, in which the balance in the typical patron-client relationship does not weigh so heavily in favour of the patron that the independence of the client would be unacceptably compromised. Ramet's client state (Syria vis-à-vis the Soviet Union) is obliged to offer only limited foreign policy cooperation in return for its patron's backing and the latter is restricted in the kinds of initiative it may take in the client's region.¹⁵⁴ Bailey's description of the respective values of patron (or "paramount") and client states to each other is broadly applicable:

"Any client expects protection from its paramount in return for general foreign policy support. At a maximum, depending on the importance of the client, it can also expect substantial assistance from the paramount in the technical, military

¹⁵¹Handel, *Weak States...*, pp. 135-37

¹⁵²Bailey, *Latin America in World Politics*, p. 37

¹⁵³Scott, "Patron-client politics...", p. 100

¹⁵⁴Ramet, Pedro, *The Soviet-Syrian Relationship Since 1955: a Troubled Alliance*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1990, pp. 3, 124

*and financial fields... At a minimum, even the smallest and weakest client represents a market for the goods of the paramount and a piece of territory denied to other paramounts. At a maximum, certain clients may be of such vital strategic importance to a paramount, that to interfere with the relationship is to invite the highest intensity of international conflict."*¹⁵⁵

Ramet suggests that the most important thing a patron state can offer a client state is protection from security threats and that the kinds of things a client can offer in return include military bases and facilities, intelligence, the exclusion of the patron's rivals and foreign policy cooperation.¹⁵⁶ Shoemaker and Spanier concur, holding that "security transactions" are the most evident and pervasive aspects of patron-client interstate relationships and that the parties "do not primarily concern themselves with economic or political development issues."¹⁵⁷ Although others, such as Bretton, differ from this view and treat economic assistance to the client as a major element in the benefits offered by patrons,¹⁵⁸ the present study makes no attempt to adjudicate these conflicting notions as to what constitutes the principal subject matter of patron-client relationships. Rather, it deliberately focuses on microstates' security relationships with larger powers, without suggesting that security matters are necessarily the central concern of patrons and their microstates clients in all circumstances.

In assessing the applicability of the patron-client model to microstate security relationships with larger powers I have focused on four main indicators. I considered the *pervasiveness* (breadth, depth and duration) of the relationship for the microstates;

¹⁵⁵Bailey, *Latin America in World Politics*, p. 37

¹⁵⁶Ramet, *The Soviet-Syrian Relationship...*, pp. 3, 257

¹⁵⁷Shoemaker and Spanier, *Patron-Client State Relationships...*, pp. 14-15

¹⁵⁸Bretton, Henry, L., *Patron-client relations: middle Africa and the Powers*, General Learning Press, New York, 1971

evidence of the microstates behaving in *conformity* with the interests of their putative patrons; whether there was a tendency towards *informal* relationships rather than alliances; and whether the relationships were *mutually beneficial*.

On the question of the *pervasiveness* of microstates' relations with individual larger powers it may be noted that in many cases regional patrons, particularly former colonial powers, were very closely involved over long periods in microstates. Relationships commonly covered the whole gambit of linkages identified by Singer: perceptual and identity ties through shared history, language, race, class (amongst élites), ideology and education; economic ties through investment and aid; military ties; and political ties through personal and party links, membership of international associations such as the Commonwealth, and convergent foreign policy interests.¹⁵⁹ Prominent examples include France's ongoing relationships with its former territories in Africa after independence and the roles of Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific Islands, and of first the United Kingdom and more recently the United States in the Caribbean microstates.

In some cases the pervasiveness of these ties may have amounted to a degree of penetration by the larger state that goes beyond that of a patron-client relationship, though the exact threshold is difficult to define. Rosenau describes a penetrated political system as one in which "nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals."¹⁶⁰ One

¹⁵⁹Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers*

¹⁶⁰Rosenau, James N., "Pre-theories and theories of foreign policy", in Barry R. Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1966, p. 65

example might be French influence in Gabon, discussed above, which Péan referred to as an "extreme case, verging on caricature, of neo-colonialism."¹⁶¹ Reid notes that a shortage of resources or capabilities, as is typically faced by microstates, increases the potential for penetration by another state and the scale of microstate societies makes the penetration relatively more pervasive.¹⁶² Sutton and Payne point to the disproportionate reliance of small island and enclave developing states on foreign nationals to fill senior administrative and military positions and the corresponding influence of these individuals.¹⁶³ The utilization of foreign personnel in senior armed forces positions in Oman, Comoros, Gabon, The Gambia, Fiji, Vanuatu and other South Pacific microstates are instances of such reliance.

Evidence of *conformity* of microstates' foreign policies with those of larger powers is a critical indicator yet, as Handel notes, because "the unequal nature of the patron-client relationship is contrary to the accepted norms of international conduct... both sides try to cover it up, and that makes it all the more difficult to study or document." That such relationships are characteristically informal in nature adds still more to that obstacle.¹⁶⁴ It is also the case that, while it may not be possible to discern a pattern of synchronism in microstates' total foreign policies in relation to those of their patrons, such conformity may be evident if one homes in on issue areas of key importance to individual patrons.

For example, Harbert's analysis of microstates' overall voting behaviour in the United

¹⁶¹Péan, *Affaires africaines*, p. 20

¹⁶²Reid, *The Impact of Very Small Size...*, p. 33

¹⁶³Sutton and Payne, "Lilliput under threat...", p. 583

¹⁶⁴Handel, *Weak States...*, p. 133-34

Nations in the early 1970s found quite diverse patterns, with most microstates sharing Soviet positions on colonial and economic questions but aligned with the United States and colonial powers on social, humanitarian and cultural issues.¹⁶⁵ It is only when one descends to the level of individual microstates and their patrons, and particular issues, that their clientage becomes clear. In the case of United Nations voting, one example is that of Equatorial Guinea's support for Morocco on the Western Sahara issue in return for a Moroccan praetorian guard after 1979.¹⁶⁶ In the early 1960s Gabon was only one of many francophone African countries comprising the "Brazzaville Group" which supported French positions at the United Nations to the annoyance of other developing countries. However, in the mid-1970s, Gabon was the only African country not to vote in favour of the General Assembly resolution recognising Comoros' right to self-determination (opposed by France) and one of only two to disassociate themselves from the Decolonization Committee's support for self-determination in the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (Djibouti).¹⁶⁷ The collaboration of Comoros,¹⁶⁸ Equatorial Guinea,¹⁶⁹ Gabon¹⁷⁰ and Swaziland¹⁷¹ with the apartheid regime in South Africa is another striking instance of microstates adopting anomalous foreign policy stances for the sake of patronage. In the same vein, the Maldives had the distinction of being the sole Islamic state to maintain relations with Israel.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁵Harbert, Joseph R., "The behaviour of the ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972", *International Organization*, Vol. 30, No 1, Winter 1976

¹⁶⁶Liniger-Goumaz, *Historical Dictionary of Equatorial Guinea*, p. 114. Equatorial Guinea's UN voting record can be traced in Djonovich, Dusan J. (ed.), *United Nations Resolutions: Series I: Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly*, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York [annual or bi-annual volumes]. See especially Vols XVII:71-72 (1978-79) and XVIII:70 (1979-80).

¹⁶⁷Smout, Marie-Claude, "Bilateral relations and world diplomacy: Franco-African relations on trial at the UN", in W.H. Morris-Jones and Georges Fischer (eds), *Decolonization and After: the British and French Experience*, Frank Cass, London, 1980, pp. 351-54, 362 n.5,

¹⁶⁸Terrill, W. Andrew, "The Comoro Islands in South African Regional Strategy", *Africa Today*, Vol. 33, Nos 2/3, 1986

¹⁶⁹Sundiata, *Equatorial Guinea...*, p. 85

¹⁷⁰Reed, "Gabon: a neo-colonial enclave...", p. 302; Smout, "Bilateral relations and world diplomacy...", p. 356

¹⁷¹Ajulu and Cammack, "Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland: Captive States", p. 221

¹⁷²*Daily Telegraph*, 14 March 1975

Because of the very stark disparities in relative power and mutual reliance, microstates tend to find themselves in patron-client relationships in which the balance of power weighs very heavily in favour of the patron. This is not to suggest, however, they are necessarily completely docile respondents to their patrons' wishes. Many African countries, even Gabon to some extent, eventually rescinded or scaled back defence agreements signed with France at the time of independence. Trinidad ejected United States bases¹⁷³ and Malta, as noted above, took an uncooperative attitude towards the military basing interests of its traditional patrons. While stopping short of overtly using the US military base at Keflavik as a bargaining chip, Iceland caused discomfort for its security patrons by bringing its fisheries dispute with Britain into the NATO arena, boycotting alliance activities and complaining to the United Nations Security Council.¹⁷⁴ Such divergences and conflicts with friendly larger powers are indicative of the retention of freedom of action and support the notion that the microstates in question were not puppets or satellites.

Notwithstanding Sutton and Payne's conclusion that small states have generally proved reluctant to enter into formal alliances,¹⁷⁵ the *informality* criterion of the patron-client model is perhaps the least certain in its applicability to microstates. As indicated in **Table 3.01**, their reliance on security treaties was in fact extensive. In several instances such agreements were the basis for foreign military interventions in microstate security crises, including in Kuwait,¹⁷⁶ Brunei,¹⁷⁷ Gabon,¹⁷⁸ The Gambia,¹⁷⁹ and Cyprus.¹⁸⁰ The

¹⁷³Worldmark, 1988, p. 265

¹⁷⁴Barston, R.P., and Hjalmar W. Hannesson, "The Anglo-Icelandic fisheries dispute", *International Relations*, Vol. IV, No 6, November 1974, p. 577-78

¹⁷⁵Sutton and Payne, "Lilliput under threat...", pp. 588-89

¹⁷⁶On the basis of a treaty signed only a week or two previously, British forces were dispatched to Kuwait in June 1961 to counter an Iraqi invasion threat [James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, p. 93].

picture needs to be tempered somewhat by recognition that a significant proportion of the agreements were multilateral pacts with neighbouring microstates rather than bilateral guarantees from large external patrons. In the Caribbean, for example, the only formal security agreements besides the guarantees provided to Belize, were the Eastern Caribbean microstates' membership of the OECS and Regional Security System, which did not include large potential patrons such as the United States, United Kingdom or Cuba. Similarly, although the Gulf Cooperation Council and Peninsula Shield force did include one local "patron state" (Saudi Arabia), remaining members were all current or former microstates.

It should also be noted in respect of another significant group of treaties, the independence-era agreements between francophone African microstates and Paris, that even formal assurances of support in dealing with domestic threats were not entirely reliable, because such intervention was subject to a decision by the French President.¹⁸¹ In 1963 de Gaulle declined to assist when the beleaguered leader of a former microstate, Abbé Youlou of Congo, sought to invoke the 1961 defence agreement providing for the use of French troops to assist in maintaining internal security.¹⁸² Conversely, only the following year the French did intervene in neighbouring Gabon to save President M'Ba

¹⁷⁷ British troops helped suppress a December 1962 rebellion in accordance with a 1959 treaty [Brackman, *Southeast Asia's Second Front*, p. 141].

¹⁷⁸ On the basis of its 1960 defence agreement with Gabon France intervened militarily to overturn a coup against President Mba in February 1964 ["What happened in Gabon?", *West Africa*, 29 February 1964, p. 227].

¹⁷⁹ The Gambian government justified its appeal for Senegalese intervention in 1981 (and also 1980) on its 1965 defence agreement with Dakar, though the legitimacy of this appeal was challenged by opposition groups [Hughes, Arnold, *The Gambia: Studies in Society and Politics*, Centre for West African Studies, University of Birmingham, 1991, p. 102].

¹⁸⁰ In 1963 Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom provided peace-keeping troops to Cyprus on the basis of the 1960 Treaties of Alliance and Establishment. Turkey justified its 1974 intervention in terms of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee [U.N. Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (second edition), United Nations, New York, 1990, pp. 283, 301].

¹⁸¹ Chipman, *French Power in Africa*, p. 117

¹⁸² *Keesing's*, 28 September-5 October 1963, p. 19659

under the terms of their 1960 defence agreement (notwithstanding the absence of an official request for assistance!).¹⁸³

If microstates' security relationships do not always meet the patron-client model's informality requirement, they frequently comply with the remaining key indicator, the existence of *mutual benefit*. While the security assistance, economic aid and other advantages that larger friends can offer microstates are self-evident, the benefits they may obtain in return for their patronage are perhaps less obvious. Some of the most significant tradable assets possessed by microstates derive from the sheer fact of their existence as separate and independent entities. Their sovereignty endows them with certain "goods", such as United Nations voting rights, jurisdiction over strategic land, sea and air spaces, and flags of convenience, which can be used as bargaining chips so that their relationships with more powerful states are not completely one-sided.¹⁸⁴ Particularly relevant in terms of security relationships is the strategic value of many microstates to their patrons, as summarized in **Table 2.08**.

Among the most vividly illustrative of these was the importance attached by the United Kingdom to Kuwait. In 1960, the year before the British intervention to shield the emirate against Iraqi aggression, a senior diplomat had advised London that "Britain's irreducible interest [is that] Kuwait shall remain an independent state having an oil policy conducted by a government independent of other Middle East producers... and also having a policy independent of communist or satellite influence... A corollary of this is

¹⁸³Chipman, *French power in Africa*, p. 123; Reed, "Gabon: a neo-colonial enclave...", p. 297

¹⁸⁴Quester, George H., "Trouble in the islands: defending the microstates", *International Security*, Vol. 8, No 2, Fall 1983, p. 161; James, *Sovereign Statehood...*, pp. 180ff

that Kuwaiti independence will not be preserved unless any government, which might wish to subvert or overthrow it, is convinced of Her Majesty's Government's willingness and ability to defend Kuwait by force of arms if necessary."¹⁸⁵ United States military facilities in Iceland, Marshall Islands and Bahamas, and the French naval base in Djibouti and uranium interests in Gabon provide other instances of major powers having crucial strategic interests in microstates. Of course not all acts of patronage yielded such handsome returns. At the other end of the scale, Angola gained little from its costly assistance to São Tomé in the 1980s, except a friendly foreign policy stance by the latter and reassurance that it was guarding its own flank against a common threat of subversion.¹⁸⁶

Conclusion

In this chapter I have depicted the historical and contemporary position of microstates in international society, contrasting the materially-based, yet circumscribed, sovereignty of small territories of the past with the insubstantial practical attributes, yet legally-robust sovereignty, of modern microstates. I have documented their extensive security relationships with other governments and sought to place these in the context of relevant International Relations theory, in particular patron-client model. It remains to explore the applicability of the latter, together with the conclusions concerning vulnerability from

¹⁸⁵Sir Richard Beaumont, British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf [*The Times*, 1 January 1991]

¹⁸⁶Newitt, Malyn, "The perils of being a microstate: São Tomé and the Comoro Islands since independence", in Helen M. Hintjens and Malyn D.D. Newitt (eds), *The Political Economy of Small Tropical Islands*, University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 1992, p. 85; Hughes and May, "Armies on loan...", p. 193

Chapter Two, in respect of the four case studies dealing with specific military interventions in response to microstate security crises.

Individual crises provide useful litmus tests because they tend to reveal the nature and extent of the patron-client relationship like a camera flash illuminating, for an instant, an otherwise murky scene. The ability of a client microstate to call on a patron for military assistance at short notice, the patron's willingness to oblige, and the concessions expected by the patron in the aftermath, reveal much about their relationship. From the client's perspective, the crisis may involve the very survival of the state, or at least that of its governing regime, and it will accordingly be prepared to offer substantial inducements to secure its patron's assistance. For its part, the patron is compelled to make an "immediate and thorough reevaluation of its role and goals, and the level of support it is willing to render in order to sustain the relationship."¹⁸⁷

Each of the four case studies - Vanuatu, The Gambia, Grenada and the Maldives - is different in its own way, reflecting its regional setting, historical background and the circumstances of the crisis in question. At the same time, all illustrate many of generic factors of microstate vulnerability and features of security relationships with larger powers identified in the introductory chapters.

¹⁸⁷ Shoemaker and Spanier, *Patron-Client State Relationships...*, pp. 71-72

CHAPTER FOUR

SOUTH PACIFIC CASE STUDY

VANUATU

In May 1980, on the eve of independence in the South Pacific island state of Vanuatu, the leaders of the indigenous Nagriamel land movement on the island of Espiritu Santo proclaimed a break-away republic of "Vermarana", with the encouragement of European settlers, an obscure group of right-wing libertarians and French officials. The response of the outgoing colonial powers was ambivalent and ineffectual, and it was left to the nascent state to call on its Melanesian neighbour, Papua New Guinea, for troops to put down the rebellion. After providing a factual account of the crisis and intervention,¹ I examine their significance for the overall study. The crisis is analysed in terms of the sources of microstate vulnerability highlighted in Chapter Two. The intervention and its aftermath are assessed in light of the characteristics of patron-client relationships introduced in Chapter Three.

¹For a more detailed account see Gubb, Matthew, *Vanuatu's 1980 Santo Rebellion: International Responses to a Microstate Security Crisis*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 107, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994.

Background

Geographical setting²

The Republic of Vanuatu comprises an archipelago of some 80 high islands and coral atolls, covering a land area of about 12,000 square kilometres. Nearest neighbours are Fiji to the east, Solomon Islands to the north-west and New Caledonia to the south. At the time of the 1979 Census, the country's population was just over 110,000, about 94 per cent being indigenous Melanesians³ and the rest being mainly European or from other Pacific Islands.⁴ The national language is Bislama, a kind of Pidgin English, with English and French also official languages. Most of the population professes Christianity, the largest denomination being Presbyterian. The capital, Port Vila, is located on the island of Efate and in 1979 had a population of about 15,000. The only other sizeable settlement is Luganville or Santo Town (5,000 inhabitants), on the largest island, Espiritu Santo.⁵

History

Under the name New Hebrides, Vanuatu was governed by an Anglo-French Condominium, or joint administration, from 1906 until its independence in July 1980. Unwilling to concede dominion to each other, yet perceiving a need to impose European authority, Britain and France had agreed in 1887 to establish a Joint Naval

²See **Figures 4.01 and 4.02.**

³With the creation of the independent state of Vanuatu, the indigenous Melanesian population became known as *ni-Vanuatu*.

⁴Bedford, Richard (ed.), *Population of Vanuatu: Analysis of the 1979 Census*, Population Monograph No.2 South Pacific Commission, Noumea, New Caledonia, December 1989, p. 3

⁵*ibid*, p. 76

Commission "charged with the duty of maintaining order, and of protecting the lives and property of British and French subjects."⁶ British and French Resident Commissioners were appointed for the territory in 1902 and, in October 1906, the two metropolises took a more pervasive grip on the islands by establishing the Condominium under a New Hebrides Convention. A response to years of pressure from French land speculators, Presbyterian missionaries and francophobic Australian colonial governments, the Convention sought to resolve difficulties arising from the absence of jurisdiction over the indigenous inhabitants of the islands, especially uncertainty over the legitimacy of land claims. A Protocol updating the Convention was ratified in 1922.⁷

As pressures for decolonization grew in the 1960s the divergence in the agendas of the Condominium powers became increasingly apparent, with Britain relaxed, even enthusiastic, at the prospect of granting independence, but France reluctant. The British community in the New Hebrides had always been smaller and less established than that of the French, who made up the bulk of planters and merchants.⁸ By the late 1970s Britain had already decolonized its other South Pacific dependencies, save tiny Pitcairn, and was keen to shed its remaining colonial responsibilities. The main obstacle to a precipitate departure from the New Hebrides was the requirement to move in tandem with the Condominium partner, a constraint reinforced by Britain's

⁶Forster, R.A.S., "Vanuatu, the end of an episode of schizophrenic colonialism", *The Round Table*, Vol.LXX, No.280, October 1980, p. 368

⁷Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *A Year Book of the Commonwealth 1981*, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1981, p. 375

⁸Forster, "Vanuatu, the end of an episode...", p. 369. In the 1979 Census, for example, 682 New Hebrides residents were French-born, and 230 British-born. (There was no break-down of the national ancestry of ethnic Europeans born in the New Hebrides.) [*Republic of Vanuatu: Report on the Census of Population 1979, Vol.1: Basic Tables*, National Planning and Statistics Office, Port Vila, June 1983, p. 148]

reliance on French goodwill in the European Economic Community and the attitude of regional onlookers.⁹

France, on the other hand, stalled moves towards independence while at the same time trying to build up a francophone majority, for example by investing heavily in schools from the late 1960s.¹⁰ The New Hebrides was regarded by Paris as part of an overall South Pacific, indeed global, presence, which it was determined to preserve; in the national psyche, overseas possessions were one of the foundations of France's claim to great power status. Decolonization of the New Hebrides would risk encouraging indigenous Melanesian *indépendantistes* in France's nearby territory of New Caledonia and might even threaten the long-term future of French Polynesia, home of the strategic Moruroa nuclear testing facility.¹¹ The sizeable French community in the New Hebrides had many sympathizers in the metropole and in New Caledonia.

Resistance to colonial policies in the New Hebrides was manifested in the 1960s by the emergence of the Nagriamel movement under Jimmy Tubou Stevens. An outgrowth of the cargo cults that sprang up after the Pacific War, Nagriamel emphasized *kastom* or traditional ways. A former bulldozer driver of mixed race, Stevens had been accorded a *kastom* title for leading opposition to the expansion of cattle ranchers into the interior and planters' attempts to convert Joint Court land

⁹Britain had been inclined to pull out of the New Hebrides in the early 1970s, but had been pressured not to by Australia and New Zealand, which feared that the French, if left in sole control, would never grant independence. (Interview with veteran Vanuatu politician, Donald Kalpokas, November 1993.)

¹⁰Bonnemaïson, Joël, "Vanuatu: la coutume et l'indépendance", *Hérodote: Revue de géographie et de géopolitique*, Nos 37-38, 2^e-3^e trimestres, 1985, p. 151; Forster, "Vanuatu, the end of an episode...", p. 370

¹¹For an overview of French security policy in the region, see Methuen, Phillip, "In deference to De Gaulle: the French approach to security in the South Pacific", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol.10, No.4, March 1989.

decisions into possession.¹² The land issue became increasingly heated as *colons* sought to sell their holdings to property developers such as the American, Eugene Peacock, and in 1971 Nagriamel petitioned the United Nations to prevent more sales. Concerned themselves at the impact of unfettered speculation, the Condominium authorities eventually promulgated retroactive restrictions on land subdivisions by expatriates, effectively rendering many titles worthless. Paradoxically, *colons* and American land-sharks came to see Stevens as a counterpoise to the authorities, a confluence of interests that would have fateful repercussions.¹³

In the early 1970s, the linguistic communities formed political parties with the tacit encouragement of the British and French Residencies. The anglophone New Hebrides National Party (NHNP), established in August 1971¹⁴ as a modern, democratic alternative to the uncompromisingly traditional Nagriamel,¹⁵ began pushing for early independence and a halt to the alienation of land. For Nagriamel and other traditionalists, like the "John Frum" millenarists on the southern island of Tanna, *kastom* was a literal prescription for political and social organization. By contrast, the NHNP regarded it as a symbolic and cultural underpinning of national identity and questioned the authenticity of the *kastom* precepts advocated by the likes of Jimmy Stevens. NHNP members were mainly anglophones from Presbyterian and Anglican mission areas and most of its leaders were British Residency employees, Presbyterian elders and pastors or Anglican priests.¹⁶ Many were young, some of

¹²Scarr, Deryck, *The History of the Pacific Islands: Kingdoms of the Reefs*, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1990, p. 329

¹³*Ibid*, p. 330

¹⁴For an account of the party's formation, see Lini, Walter, *Beyond Pandemonium: From the New Hebrides to Vanuatu*, Asia Pacific Books, Wellington, in association with the Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1980, pp. 24-25.

¹⁵November 1993 interview with Donald Kalpokas, one of the founders of the New Hebrides Cultural Association which evolved into the NHNP.

¹⁶Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), "Vanuatu independence", *Australian Foreign Affairs Record* (AFAR), Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, August 1980, p. 271

them still receiving tertiary education overseas,¹⁷ and in the early years the party tended to the left of the political spectrum. The NHNP changed its name to Vanua'aku Pati (VP) in 1977, Vanua'aku meaning "our land".

Reacting against the NHNP's radical dogma and anglophone stamp, French authorities encouraged the emergence of several small rightist parties opposed to early independence, which allied themselves to Nagriamel and its counterpart on Tanna to form a united opposition to the NHNP.¹⁸ One of these new francophone parties was the Santo-based *Mouvement pour l'autonomie des Nouvelles-Hebrides* (MANH) formed in 1974, the word "autonomy" counterbalancing the seductive term "independence" used by the NHNP.¹⁹ By offering small concessions in land matters, planters' groups such as MANH were able to develop a working relationship with Nagriamel.²⁰ The French Residency also courted Nagriamel by providing aid and services to the group at its headquarters at Vanafo on Santo.²¹

In 1975, the NHNP won a comfortable majority in the first national election but this entitled it to only half the seats in the Assembly, which it later boycotted as part of its campaign for early independence. The VP's subsequent landslide win of 26 out of 39 seats (64 per cent of the vote) in the November 1979 pre-independence election led to rioting on Santo by Nagriamel supporters, despite United Nations observers' endorsement of the result and the fact that even on Santo the VP had secured over 50

¹⁷Walter Lini, for example, had graduated from St John's Theological College in Auckland in 1968. He was only 32 when he became the party's first president in January 1974.

¹⁸Forster, "Vanuatu, the end of an episode...", pp. 372-73

¹⁹Scarr, *The History of the Pacific Islands...*, p. 327

²⁰Lini., *Beyond Pandemonium...*, p. 29 (Background note by Kalkot Matas Kele-kele)

²¹Beasant, John, *The Santo Rebellion: an Imperial Reckoning*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu/Heinemann, Richmond, Victoria, 1984, p. 27

per cent of the vote.²² It also won slim majorities on both the regional councils - Tanna and Santo - which the French had insisted on creating in the belief that anti-VP parties would dominate them. The VP leader, Father Walter Lini, became Chief Minister on 29 November.

The 1980 Santo Rebellion and foreign intervention

Rebellion breaks out

Talks to resolve differences in the final lead-up to independence broke down in late April 1980. In the face of the VP's substantial electoral majority, the opposition New Hebrides Federal Party, an alliance of predominantly francophone "Moderate" parties, invoked *kastom* and the Melanesian requirement for consensus,²³ espousing a confederal system with a weak central government and strong regional assemblies. But VP leaders were reluctant to share power with their defeated opponents or to make specific commitments on administrative decentralization until after independence. Simultaneously, relations with the French government were further strained when Lini declined to meet with Paul Dijoud, the Secretary of State for Overseas Territories to discuss post-independence aid and the date for independence (which, as far as the VP and the British were concerned, was already set for 30 July 1980). Tensions came to a head on 28 May when about 800 rebels took control of Luganville, detaining the District Commissioner and other Melanesian British

²²U.N. Document A/34/852; Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (JCFAD), Sub-Committee on Defence Matters, *Official Hansard Transcript of Evidence, April 1980-March 1981, Vol.2*, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1981, p. 1109

²³Bonnemaïson, "Vanuatu: la coutume et l'indépendance", p. 153

administration officials, occupying the police station and severing communications with Vila.²⁴ On 1 June, Nagriamel's Jimmy Stevens announced the formation of a "provisional government of the independent state of Vermarana".²⁵

Notwithstanding Stevens's high profile, there were in fact three distinct groups involved, of which Nagriamel was merely the most visible. Stevens's claim at his trial in December 1980 that his people had been encouraged to rebel by outsiders is supported by an Australian government assessment that he "had little to do with the planning and execution of the rebellion, which was inspired and directed by a number of expatriates... who had consistently opposed the VP."²⁶ Nagriamel had 2-3,000 supporters out of a total Santo population of about 16,000, but at the heart of the trouble was the smaller Vermarana movement with about 600 adherents (including women and children), half of them from a single village in northern Santo. Its hard core comprised about 30 *colons*, some of mixed race and others of purely European extraction.²⁷ Based on the former MANH party, Vermarana was driven by resentment of the ascendancy of the nationalist, Melanesian, anglophone, VP central government,²⁸ and by an anticipated threat to *colon* property rights and francophone employment in the public sector. Vermarana had little in common with Nagriamel besides hostility to the VP, but found Nagriamel a convenient front and source of manpower.²⁹

²⁴French officials and property were unmolested. [Molisa, Grace, Nikenike Vurobaravu and Howard Van Trease, "The hidden agenda", in Lini., *Beyond Pandemonium*..., p. 58]

²⁵He had made at least four other previous Unilateral Declarations of Independence in as many years [Standish, Bill, *Melanesian Neighbours: the Politics of Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and the Republic of Vanuatu* (Regional Survey No.1: Melanesia; Basic Paper No.9), Foreign Affairs Group, Legislative Research Service, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Australia, 1984, p. 142].

²⁶DFAT, "Vanuatu independence", *AFAR*, August 1980, p. 273

²⁷JCFAD, *Official Hansard*..., p. 1111

²⁸Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), *Backgrounder*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 17 September 1980, p. 9

²⁹DFAT, *Backgrounder*, 17 September 1980, p. 10

The Australian foreign ministry had "no hesitation in saying that [the Vermarana *colons*] were being led by various people in the French Residency to think that if they were strong enough in their determination to secede they would be successful, rather as happened in the Mayotte situation in the Comoro Islands."³⁰ Stevens was also led on by an American right-wing libertarian group, the Phoenix Foundation, which aimed to create a tax-free utopia in his new state, echoing its principals' attempt to engineer a secession in another island microstate, Bahamas, five years previously.³¹ Since 1975, it had funded Nagriamel to the tune of US\$200,000,³² providing passports and other trappings of statehood, constitutional advice, travel to the United States, radio equipment and arms.³³ The Phoenix Foundation was, however, never more than a marginal contributor to the rebellion on the ground.³⁴

In the week following the outbreak of the rebellion, about 1,400 tourists, other foreign nationals, police and administration personnel were evacuated from Santo under British organization, though the British were prevented by French veto from taking paramilitary action against the secession itself.³⁵ The New Hebrides government imposed a blockade on the island, called on the Condominium authorities to act against the rebels and appealed to the South Pacific Forum³⁶ and the United Nations for assistance.

³⁰JCFAD, *Official Hansard*..., p. 1111.

³¹St George, Andrew, "The amazing new-country caper: capitalist revolution, the ultimate solution", *Esquire*, Vol.LXXXIII, No.2, February 1975; Salmon, Malcolm, "New Hebrides: whether Peacock or Phoenix, a bird of ill omen", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, June 1980, p. 18

³²JCFAD, *Official Hansard*..., p. 1110

³³*Guardian*, 5 August 1980; *Fiji Times*, 6 August 1980; "PNG soldiers restore government control on Vanuatu rebel island", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, October 1980

³⁴DFAT, *Background*, 17 September 1980, p. 10

³⁵Bonnemaizon, "Vanuatu: la coutume et l'indépendance", p. 155

³⁶The South Pacific Forum was established in 1971 by the five independent or self-governing island microstates (Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, Tonga and Western Samoa) as an entity distinct from the South Pacific Commission, whose membership included the colonial powers of the region and whose agenda was largely confined to economic development matters (with "political" matters explicitly excluded). The two metropolitan countries of the region, Australia and New Zealand, received special invitations to join the Forum. By 1980, Kiribati, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu had also acceded to membership. Vanuatu joined in 1980, bringing the total to 13.

On the island of Tanna, secessionist action on 26 May had been thwarted by police under British command,³⁷ though violence flared again on the night of 10-11 June when rebels freed comrades from police custody and a prominent opposition politician, Alexis Youlou, was shot dead in the ensuing fracas. Both British and French police were dispatched on this second occasion. The Tanna insurrection was centred on the John Frum movement, which did not coordinate its actions with Nagriamel and whose opposition to the central authorities had a long and separate history.³⁸ Police also prevented an attempt to seize control of Aoba Island on 27 June and were on hand when anti-government demonstrations occurred on Malekula on 28 June. Would-be secessionists on Ambryn, Aoba and Malekula nevertheless declared nominal provisional governments and participated in a "grand meeting" in Luganville on 20 July, at which a "provisional government of the Northern Islands" was proclaimed.³⁹

Talks held on 19 June between a New Hebrides government representative, Sela Molisa, and the rebels had produced no result. The government could not accept rebel demands for confederation or a *kastom* style of leadership, which it regarded as incompatible with democratic government.⁴⁰ Lini rejected suggestions that he appoint a member of the opposition to Cabinet, or support an opposition candidate for the Presidency of the Republic. His only concession would be to endorse the

³⁷Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), "South Pacific: New Hebrides", *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review (NZFAR)*, Government Printing Office, Wellington, April-June 1980, p. 48

³⁸Bonnemaison, "Vanuatu: la coutume et l'indépendance", pp. 154, 157

³⁹MacClancy, Jeremy, *To Kill a Bird With Two Stones: a Short History of Vanuatu*, Vanuatu Cultural Centre Publications, Port Vila, 1980, p. 143

⁴⁰*Report of the [PNG] Parliamentary Delegation...* (1980:14)

appointment of an opposition member as Speaker of the Assembly.⁴¹ The stage was set for the internationalization of the crisis and its eventual resolution by force.

The Condominium powers respond

During the weeks following the Santo action, Dijoud and his British counterpart, Peter Blaker, the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office⁴² met several times to discuss the crisis. Relations between Britain and France were already in a somewhat bruised condition after recent disagreement over the EEC budget⁴³ and, from the first there were differences over handling the New Hebrides crisis. British spokesmen, for example, described military intervention as a last resort, but the French appeared to rule it out altogether.⁴⁴

According to the Australians, when the rebellion broke out, French officials "just stood by and tolerated it" and tried "to use it... to get concessions for the francophones, to guarantee the *colons* title in perpetuity to their holdings and so forth."⁴⁵ Fresh in French minds would have been events in Comoros where, just five years previously, France had condoned the separation of Mayotte, which alone favoured continued links with the metropole in the face of a 95 per cent pro-independence vote in the colony as a whole.⁴⁶ Bitterly contested by the Comoros government, the move protected the interests of Mayotte *colons* and preserved naval access to the strategic archipelago at a time when France had recently lost its Diego

⁴¹DFAT, "New Hebrides: internal security", *AFAR*, June 1980, p. 219

⁴²In effect, junior Minister at the Foreign Office.

⁴³*Guardian*, 7 August 1980

⁴⁴*Keesing's*, 1981, p. 30642

⁴⁵JCFAD, *Official Hansard...*, p. 1111

⁴⁶Newitt, Malyn, *The Comoro Islands: Struggle Against Dependency in the Indian Ocean*, Gower, Aldershot, 1984, pp. 58-59

Suarez base in nearby Madagascar.⁴⁷ Both the French Resident Commissioner in the New Hebrides, Jean-Jacques Robert, and his senior colleague on Santo itself had served in the Comoros at the time of the Mayotte secession.⁴⁸

By contrast, London was not in the least disposed to entertain secessionist aspirations. It had been hardened by fruitless attempts to avoid fragmentation of Caribbean island territories during decolonization, culminating in the Anguilla debacle of 1969.⁴⁹ Even now, the young hyphenated states of the West Indies were regularly unsettled by secessionist rumblings: only six months before the New Hebrides crisis, newly independent St Vincent and the Grenadines had appealed to Britain for assistance against armed separatists.⁵⁰ In the Indian Ocean, London had in 1968 resisted the aspirations of francophone Rodrigues for separate independence from Mauritius and, in the South Pacific, the Banabans had been similarly blocked in the late 1960s.⁵¹ Only in rare cases, like those of the far-flung and ethnically distinct Gilbert and Ellice Islands,⁵² and strategic Diego Garcia,⁵³ would Britain countenance the splintering of tiny island territories.

From the outset, Lini called for military intervention by the Condominium powers to end the revolt and for the declaration of a state of emergency. He even wrote

⁴⁷Lellouche, Pierre, and Dominique Moisi, "French policy in Africa: a lonely battle against destabilization", *International Security*, Vol.3, No.4, Spring 1979, n17

⁴⁸Van Trease, Howard, *The Politics of Land in Vanuatu: From Colony to Independence*, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1987, p. 255

⁴⁹Suppression of Anguilla's bid for independence in its own right rather than as part of St Kitts and Nevis had ultimately required the dispatch of British troops and police. [For a colourful account of the affair see, Westlake, Donald E., *Under an English Heaven*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1972]

⁵⁰The attempted secession of Union Island in December 1979 was eventually put down by Vincentian police backed by Barbadian troops. [Phillips, Fred, *West Indian Constitutions: Post Independence Reform*, Oceana, New York, 1985, p. 88]

⁵¹De Smith, Stanley A., *Microstates and Micronesia: Problems in America's Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories*, New York University Press, New York, 1970, p. 70

⁵²The Gilbert and Ellice Islands attained separate independence as Kiribati and Tuvalu in 1979 and 1978 respectively.

⁵³Prior to granting independence to Mauritius in 1968, Britain detached the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, and incorporated it in the British Indian Ocean Territory.

confidentially to the British Resident Commissioner urging unilateral military action, a request politely ignored in London.⁵⁴ According to a study group chaired by Blaker some years later, Stevens was at first regarded as a "curious rococo figure" and "some kind of practical joke."⁵⁵ It was not until the death of Alexis Youlou on 11 June that the Residencies were finally spurred to recommend the earliest possible posting of British and French troops and to promulgate a Joint Regulation providing for the declaration of an emergency if need be.⁵⁶ Notwithstanding a contretemps between the Condominium partners over the nature of the forces required,⁵⁷ several hundred troops were positioned in the region on standby. In light of the failure of Lini's envoy, Sela Molisa, to make any progress in talks with the rebels, London and Paris also sent a four-member joint negotiating mission to the New Hebrides but its meetings proved similarly inconclusive.

In Beasant's view, the turning point in Lini's dealings with the Condominium powers was the visit to Vila in mid-July by the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) commander, Brigadier-General Ted Diro. Diro persuaded the New Hebrides Cabinet that Britain and France would be galvanized by the prospect of Papua New Guinea intervention, and on 17 July he left for home with a formal request from Lini for military assistance.⁵⁸ Two days later, London and Paris publicly committed themselves to adhering to 30 July as the date for independence and, on 24 July, 100 French paratroops and a like number of British Marines were deployed to Luganville under French command. But any expectations that the Anglo-French force would

⁵⁴Beasant, *The Santo Rebellion*..., p. 110

⁵⁵Harden, Sheila (ed.), *Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World (Report of a Study Group of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies)*, Frances Pinter, London, 1985, p. 11

⁵⁶Beasant, *The Santo Rebellion*..., p. 111

⁵⁷Gubb, *Vanuatu's 1980 Santo Rebellion*..., pp. 14-15

⁵⁸Beasant, *The Santo Rebellion*..., p. 120

quickly suppress the rebellion were short-lived: the troops' move to Santo "appeared to exhaust their operational activity," for the soldiers "stood around on corners" rather than making any move against rebel strongholds, illegal radio stations or even disorderliness in Luganville itself.⁵⁹

While the Diro strategy could be judged a success in that it may have been partly responsible for the dispatch, at last, of Condominium forces to Santo, this achievement clearly had its limitations. The French had no intention of moving forcefully against their own nationals who formed the backbone of the revolt, and the British could not act without French acquiescence. In any case, London may have regarded the Papua New Guinea offer to intervene as letting Britain off the hook rather than compelling it to take substantive action itself. As one British officer commented, "We came here to do nothing and that is exactly what we did. We did it very well."⁶⁰ British willingness to give way to the PNGDF would have been heightened by the cost of deploying and maintaining forces so far from home. (France, by contrast, had a military base with full support facilities in nearby New Caledonia.)

Lini had initially demanded the withdrawal of Condominium forces immediately after independence, but delays in Port Moresby obliged him to ask that British and French troops remain on Santo until the Papua New Guinea force could be deployed. A brief agreement was concluded with Britain covering the post-independence presence of its troops, though, unlike Papua New Guinea, Britain refused to subordinate its

⁵⁹JCFAD, *Official Hansard*..., pp. 1112-13; MacQueen, Norman, "Beyond Tok Win: the Papua New Guinea intervention in Vanuatu, 1980", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.61, No.2, Summer 1988, p. 248

⁶⁰Beasant, *The Santo Rebellion*..., p. 109

commander to the guidance of the Vanuatu National Security Council, a small "war cabinet" consisting of Lini and his most senior political colleagues and advisers.⁶¹ France declined to sign any agreement at all.⁶² The handover to the PNGDF eventually took place on 19 August.

The Papua New Guinea intervention

In the weeks after the outbreak of the rebellion, Papua New Guinea adopted a cautious position, saying it looked to Britain and France to do their best to handle the situation.⁶³ PNGDF contingency planners had nevertheless been keeping a wary eye on tensions in the Condominium since the November 1979 election,⁶⁴ and the government had been apprised of a possible request for security assistance as early as March 1980 when the then Prime Minister, Michael Somare, was asked, during a stop-over in Vila, to consider providing police help.⁶⁵

The new Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, received a briefing from Barak Sope, the VP Secretary-General, on 30 June, the same day a bomb blast damaged the government radio station in Vila. Announcing a major defence review a few days later, Chan spoke of the need to maintain a force capable of fulfilling international obligations, and endorsed his defence minister's call for the long-term expansion of the PNGDF, without which "it would not be possible... to make men available for

⁶¹MacQueen, "Beyond Tok Win...", n25; *Republic of Vanuatu Parliament: Summarized Record of Proceedings, 1st Extraordinary Session, 7-13 August 1980*, Port Vila, 1980, p. 2

⁶²*Vanuatu Parliament... Proceedings*, pp. 2, 8

⁶³"Political currents", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, June 1980, p. 21

⁶⁴November 1993 interview with Tony Huai, who was PNGDF Director of Land Operations at the time in question, and later commanded the Santo contingent.

⁶⁵Interview with Nikenike Vurobaravu, sometime Vanuatu Secretary of Foreign Affairs, November 1993. On his arrival back in Port Moresby, Somare lost the premiership to Julius Chan.

Commonwealth or United Nations peacekeeping forces."⁶⁶ On 7 July, opposition leader Somare urged that Papua New Guinea provide military or police assistance "under international supervision,"⁶⁷ and, shortly afterwards, Chan himself stated that a PNGDF peacekeeping force would be dispatched if the South Pacific Forum agreed.⁶⁸

The watershed came at the Forum's annual meeting held in Tarawa, the Kiribati capital, where on 14 July Chan and Diro met privately with Lini and Sope, and gave an in-principle commitment to provide troops on a *bilateral* basis, subject to Diro's first-hand assessment of the situation and the approval of the Papua New Guinea Parliament. Diro accompanied Sope to Vila and then continued on to Port Moresby, carrying with him Lini's formal request for military aid. Lini's letter portrayed the Santo rebellion as a threat to the stability of the Pacific region and explained his recourse to Papua New Guinea in terms of Vanuatu's vulnerability to subversion and a desire to minimize big-power intervention.⁶⁹

In spite of his undertaking in Tarawa, which was picked up by Australian journalists, Chan played down the likelihood of PNGDF intervention. He reportedly told Prime Minister Mara of Fiji that Papua New Guinea troops would only be used if this was recommended by a consensus of Forum members or the United Nations,⁷⁰ and his foreign minister took the unusual step of personally telephoning the *Sydney Morning Herald* to suggest that what Chan had actually discussed in Tarawa was the deployment of the PNGDF "under U.N. supervision."⁷¹ Visiting Australia on his

⁶⁶ PNG Post-Courier, 7 July 1980

⁶⁷ PNG Post-Courier, 8 July 1980

⁶⁸ PNG Post-Courier, 10 July 1980

⁶⁹ Papua New Guinea National Parliament Hansard, Port Moresby, 7 August 1980, p. 11/2/2-3

⁷⁰ Fiji Times, 18 July 1980

⁷¹ Sydney Morning Herald, 29 July 1980

homeward journey, Chan insisted that the PNGDF would go to the New Hebrides "solely to blow the pipes" at the independence celebrations, and that Papua New Guinea had no intention of displaying military might or practising gunboat diplomacy.⁷² Back in Port Moresby on 22 July, however, Chan told the press that, "if [Lini] asks us to assist in the maintenance of law in his independent state... then I think I am prepared to respond."⁷³

Chan's equivocation most likely stemmed from a desire to wait for Diro's personal assessment of the military task, for Lini's formal request and for the opportunity to consult ministerial colleagues and officials on return to Port Moresby. The stalling may also have been a tactical avoidance of an overt military commitment until it was absolutely clear that Britain and France were not going to end the rebellion before independence on 30 July. It possibly reflected, too, lingering doubts about the proposed PNGDF operation and thoughts as to whether a multilateral alternative might yet be possible. Chan was apparently greatly concerned about the political implications at home of PNGDF casualties⁷⁴ and required repeated assurances from Diro that all would be well.⁷⁵ Wheels were finally set in motion when, on 25 July, a day after the start of the half-hearted Anglo-French military operation on Santo, the Papua New Guinea Governor-General issued an emergency recall of Parliament to consider legislation authorizing deployment of the PNGDF. When Parliament convened on 5 August, the opposition exploited a low turn-out of government MPs to block the introduction of Chan's enabling legislation, but by the time Parliament

⁷²*West Australian*, 19 July 1980

⁷³*Fiji Times*, 23 July 1980; Lini had already made his formal request by now, but this had not been publicly revealed.

⁷⁴*National*, 31 December 1993

⁷⁵Dorney, Sean, *Papua New Guinea: People, Politics and History Since 1975*, Random House, Australia, 1990, p. 190

gathered again two days later, the government had managed to rally its forces by dispatching an aircraft to scour the provinces for absent backbenchers.⁷⁶

Chan presented assistance to Vanuatu as translating into concrete action long-standing verbal support to "Pacific peoples seeking to run their own affairs."⁷⁷ Papua New Guinea had geographical, racial and cultural ties with Vanuatu and "responsibilities and moral commitments arising out of [its] foreign policies and [its own] good fortune in achieving a peaceful transition to independence."⁷⁸ Accepting such responsibilities was a sign of maturity. Chan dismissed the idea of a joint Forum peacekeeping force as a soft option that had never got off the ground. Among the island countries, Papua New Guinea had the largest forces and a corresponding capacity to move quickly in response to Lini's urgent request. Momis argued that while the Forum had not expressly authorized intervention, Papua New Guinea was acting within the spirit of Forum resolutions backing the New Hebrides government. "The possibility of physical aid" had been "considered and supported in principle." In his view, the thoroughness of discussions already held in Tarawa and the long delays inherent in any multinational peacekeeping effort meant that opposition talk of seeking a United Nations force or reconvening the South Pacific Forum was "impractical and misleading."⁷⁹

Somare and his colleagues accused Chan of "DC3 diplomacy"⁸⁰ and questioned the legality of Lini making his request while still only Chief Minister of the New Hebrides, the constitutionality of sending the PNGDF abroad, and Chan's authority to

⁷⁶Wolfers, E.P., "Papua New Guinea in 1980", *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXI, No.2, February 1981, p. 281

⁷⁷PNG Hansard, 7 August 1980, p. 11/2/1

⁷⁸PNG Hansard, 7 August 1980, p. 12/2/1

⁷⁹PNG Hansard, 7 August 1980, p. 25/2/1

⁸⁰As in the DC3 *Dakota* military transport aircraft used by the PNGDF. [PNG Hansard, 7 August 1980, p. 15/2/1]

accede to Lini's request without prior reference to Ministers and Parliament. Chan was accused of harming relations with Fiji and Indonesia,⁸¹ and damaging Papua New Guinea's international standing. Somare held that the Bill to authorize the PNGDF deployment was so constitutionally flawed that it should be withdrawn and presented in redrafted form to the next session of Parliament (some weeks away). In the meantime, the government should seek a special meeting of the Forum to consider a joint regional peacekeeping force. The cost of the PNGDF operation and its potential impact on development spending at home was criticized, as was the propriety of dispatching troops to deal with another country's law and order problems when Papua New Guinea itself had the "biggest law and order problem in the entire Pacific area."⁸²

Somare failed in an attempt to have the legislation referred to the Supreme Court⁸³ and the Defence Forces (Presence Abroad) Bill was duly passed into Papua New Guinea law. Parliamentary approval had been secured for the deployment of up to 300 PNGDF troops,⁸⁴ two patrol boats and four aircraft on peacekeeping duties in Vanuatu. On 9 August, having been flown to Port Moresby by PNGDF DC3, Lini signed an interim defence agreement covering the deployment of Papua New Guinea troops to Vanuatu.⁸⁵ A bill ratifying both the Papua New Guinea agreement and another concerning the interim presence of British forces was passed by the Vanuatu Parliament on 13 August, the first act carried since independence.⁸⁶ Lini had stressed that the agreement did not allow the PNGDF a free hand, since his government had

⁸¹Fiji disapproved of the plan to use the PNGDF. In the case of Indonesia, the concern was that Papua New Guinean assistance to Vanuatu might be seen by Jakarta as implying a similar disposition to lend military assistance to Melanesian rebels in Irian Jaya (Indonesia).

⁸²*PNG Hansard*, 7 August 1980, p. 22/2/1

⁸³The opposition subsequently mounted a rearguard Supreme Court action against the government but was unable to obtain an unjunction.

⁸⁴412 troops, including 290 combat and 122 support personnel, were eventually sent to Vanuatu. [*PNG Hansard*, 4 November 1980, p. 9/2/4]

⁸⁵Wolfers, "Papua New Guinea in 1980", p. 281

⁸⁶*Australian*, 14 August 1980

insisted on a clause placing the force under the general direction of the Vanuatu National Security Council.⁸⁷ Vanuatu opposition leaders later said that they had resigned themselves to the PNGDF presence but maintained to the end that the "natural political process should have been allowed to evolve without threat or interference by any outside body."⁸⁸

The Papua New Guinea troops, designated Kumul Force after their national emblem, the bird of paradise, assembled in Vila on 11 August,⁸⁹ and relieved the Anglo-French force on 19 August. Over the next few weeks the PNGDF set about capturing the secessionists, making about 100 arrests on Santo in the first three days. Seven French detainees were released after the French ambassador protested at ill-treatment in Vila's gaol. On 31 August, Papua New Guinea forces surrounded and captured the secessionist headquarters at Vanafo without casualties, arresting Stevens and about 70 followers. A further 130 were arrested the following week and, in a final operation on Malekula on 24 September, another 130 were detained. The single fatality during the operation was Stevens's son, who was killed after driving through a check-point. The bulk of the PNGDF force was withdrawn from Vanuatu on 27 September.⁹⁰

Diro's biggest fear was that the PNGDF would be faced with a French counter-intervention.⁹¹ The French government had said it "would not abandon" its 3,000 nationals⁹² and Robert had told rebels that French paratroops would protect them

⁸⁷ *Vanuatu Parliament... Proceedings*, 13 August 1980, p. 2

⁸⁸ *Report of the Parliamentary Delegation to the Independent State of Vanuatu from 27 August to 1 September 1980*, Papua New Guinea National Parliament, Port Moresby, 1980, p. 19

⁸⁹ "PNG soldiers restore Government control..." , p. 19. 150 soldiers and a considerable amount of equipment were already in place: the contingent sent earlier for the independence celebrations had been fully armed in anticipation both of the possibility of trouble on independence day, and of the subsequent Santo operation. [Interview with Diro, November 1993]

⁹⁰ DFAT, *Backgrounder*, 8 October 1980, p. 8

⁹¹ *National*, 30 December 1993

⁹² *PNG Post-Courier*, 7 July 1980

from Papua New Guinea forces. On 29 July, Olivier Stirn, the French deputy foreign minister and one of President Giscard d'Estaing's closest confidants,⁹³ declared in Vila that his government would not tolerate any military action against French citizens on Santo who were backing Jimmy Stevens, saying, "I guarantee the protection of all French people on Santo if they are in danger, even after independence... If French citizens are threatened or put in danger we will defend them with the utmost vigour."⁹⁴ According to Diro, there were a number of sharp exchanges with the French command during planning for the hand-over to the PNGDF.⁹⁵ Diro has claimed that the French tried to delay the PNGDF deployment, implicitly to allow the prior arrival of a ship carrying arms for the rebels.⁹⁶ When the day came, British forces departed Santo almost immediately, but, according to the PNGDF contingent's commander, the French dragged their heels and appeared most reluctant to leave.⁹⁷

It seems unlikely, however, that France would seriously have contemplated direct confrontation with Papua New Guinea forces operating at the express invitation of the Vanuatu government. As it turned out, a lot of the "troublesome French" were evacuated the weekend before the PNGDF took over⁹⁸ and, even when some French citizens were roughly handled by the Vanuatu authorities, there was no question of forcible French intervention to protect them. The new French ambassador, Yves Rodriguez, had flown to Santo on 17 August, immediately before the arrival of the PNGDF, to reassure his countrymen and "remind them of the importance the French government attached to them remaining neutral in the internal affairs of the

⁹³ *Guardian*, 7 August 1980

⁹⁴ *Age*, 30 July 1980

⁹⁵ MacQueen, "Beyond Tok Win...", p. 249

⁹⁶ *National*, 3 January 1994

⁹⁷ Interview with Tony Huai, November 1993

⁹⁸ JCFAD, *Official Hansard*..., pp. 1114-15. A French military aircraft flew a group of *colons* from Santo to New Caledonia on 17 August, and more left on a French warship. [*Dominion*, 18 August 1980; Dorney, *Papua New Guinea*..., p. 191]

independent Republic of Vanuatu." He went also to "tell them of the advantages of the law of 1961 if any French national chooses to leave Vanuatu." The law, passed at the time of Algerian independence provided for the repatriation of French citizens.⁹⁹ During the course of the rebellion and in the aftermath, "some 700 named opponents of VP... fled to New Caledonia or were deported, with an additional hundred declared prohibited immigrants."¹⁰⁰

The estimated Australian \$1 million core cost of the operation, was borne by Papua New Guinea.¹⁰¹ A large proportion of the financial burden was met by cancelling a PNGDF battalion exercise planned for 1981. Australia continued to pay the salaries of its "loan personnel" who served with the PNGDF in Vanuatu and the operating costs of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aircraft, the main carriers of equipment for the PNGDF mission.¹⁰² Port Moresby was not altogether gracious in acknowledging Australia's substantial assistance with the Santo operation. Foreign minister Levi complained of the lack of support in the region for Papua New Guinea's actions, singling out Fiji and New Zealand for giving nothing in the way of aid but also criticizing Australia for only providing loan personnel rather than direct assistance.¹⁰³ In 1988, reflecting proudly on Papua New Guinea's achievements in Vanuatu, which he equated with the American intervention in Grenada and Britain's recovery of the Falklands, Chan reproached other states for their lack of cooperation: "... the attitude of the metropolitan governments to our involvement in Vanuatu was totally unhelpful. When they should have been decisive, they hesitated and played

⁹⁹*Australian* (18.8.80)

¹⁰⁰Standish, *Melanesian Neighbours...*, p. 143; Bonnemaïson holds that virtually the entire French population of Santo, some 2,000 individuals, left or were expelled from Vanuatu [Bonnemaïson, "Vanuatu: la coutume et l'indépendance", p. 155].

¹⁰¹JCFAD, *Official Hansard...*, p. 1125

¹⁰²Standish, *Melanesian Neighbours...*, p. 73

¹⁰³*Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 August 1980

with the winds of diplomacy... It was we who acted in Vanuatu in 1980, while others stood still..."¹⁰⁴

Vanuatu as a case of microstate vulnerability

Chapter Two highlighted a series of key variables contributing to microstate vulnerability. Under the *political* heading these were colonial experiences and the special characteristics of small societies. *Geographical* factors were location and physical characteristics. In the *economic* area, government resource constraints and the link between poverty and political instability were examined. As will be explained in the remaining part of the present chapter, these factors of vulnerability were present to a very considerable extent in the case of the 1980 secession crisis in Vanuatu.

Political variables

Colonial experiences

Vanuatu's colonial history was clearly central to the vulnerability that underlay the crisis attending its transition to statehood. The lack of *preparation for statehood* and the general *neglect* experienced by the New Hebrides was fairly typical of the record of colonial powers in respect of other small territories. In the New Hebrides, these deficiencies were given a particular edge by the unusual Condominium arrangement

¹⁰⁴Chan, Julius, "Developing a Pacific security strategy for peace", speech at an Institute of Public Affairs seminar, Melbourne, 21 March 1988, pp. 10, 12, 13)

and the contradictory policies of Britain and France. The territory's *demographic make-up* was not altered in the sense of changing the ethnic balance but the Condominium powers did foster a new and major linguistic-religious division. Although the grouping of the New Hebrides islands into a single territorial entity was an entirely colonial construct and Vanuatu had limited natural coherence as a state, its *anomalous borders* were perhaps no more remarkable than those of other Melanesian and Micronesian island states.

The Condominium arrangement was not unique to the New Hebrides, another contemporary example being the Anglo-Egyptian governance of the Sudan (1899-1956). There were even minor instances elsewhere in the South Pacific: the joint control exercised by Germany, Great Britain and the United States over the Samoan Islands from 1889 to 1899, and the compromise Anglo-American jurisdiction over Canton and Enderbury Islands agreed in 1939. Where the New Hebrides was unmatched was in its elaborate administrative superstructure of parallel British, French and joint institutions, which has been described as "one of the most bizarre arrangements ever to have been incubated in the womb of European imperialism."¹⁰⁵ In practice, *joint* administration meant a "systematised process of separate Frenchisation and Britishisation of the New Hebridean peoples,"¹⁰⁶ and their division into Franco-Catholic and Anglo-Protestant camps.

Beasant describes the Condominium administration as characterized by "apathy and neglect... interlaced with national rivalry."¹⁰⁷ This was reflected in the typically late

¹⁰⁵Beasant, *The Santo Rebellion...*, p. 1

¹⁰⁶Matas Kele-kele, Kalkot, "The emergence of political parties" in Chris Plant (ed.), *New Hebrides: the Road to Independence*, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, in association with the South Pacific Social Sciences Association, Suva, 1977, p. 17

¹⁰⁷Beasant, *The Santo Rebellion...*, p. 150

and minimalist preparations for statehood. Little was done to prepare ni-Vanuatu to fill senior posts in government or establish a unified and functioning administration for the new state.¹⁰⁸ Largely at Britain's behest,¹⁰⁹ efforts were made to introduce democracy towards the end of the Condominium period: an Advisory Council with some Melanesian members was created in 1957 and enlarged in 1969; local councils were set up in 1957; and in 1960 a nominated Legislative Council was established. However, such bodies had limited powers and were intended less as preparatory schools for fostering democracy than to maintain law and order.¹¹⁰ The measures failed to satisfy growing nationalist aspirations of ni-Vanuatu leaders whose repeated requests for the reforms needed to move the territory towards independence were refused by the Condominium authorities.¹¹¹ In contrast to Britain's approach in the somewhat more populous Solomon Islands, where almost complete representative self-government was granted by late 1974, the New Hebrides authorities' strategy was to move towards representative government only in small steps in order to ensure participants in the new institutions held moderate views and that constitutional change was gradual and orderly.¹¹²

It was not until 1975 that the first partly-elected Representative Assembly was established and only in 1978 was a degree of genuine self-government introduced through the creation of a Council of Ministers led by a Chief Minister. Vanuatu thus approached independence in 1980 without an entrenched constitutional framework or an electorate accustomed to the democratic model. So it was that the defeated

¹⁰⁸Molisa *et al.*, "Vanuatu: overcoming pandemonium", p. 112, MacClancy, *To Kill a Bird with Two Stones...*, p. 140

¹⁰⁹Forster, "Vanuatu, the end of an episode...", p. 370. Forster served as a British official in the New Hebrides.

¹¹⁰Premdas and Howard, "Vanuatu's foreign policy...", p. 178

¹¹¹Molisa, Grace, Nikenike Vurobaravu and Howard Van Trease, "Vanuatu: overcoming pandemonium", in R.G. Crocombe and Ahmed Ali (eds), *Politics in Melanesia*, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1982, p. 86; Henningham, Stephen, "Pluralism and party politics in a South Pacific State: Vanuatu's ruling Vanua'aku Pati and its rivals", *Conflict*, Vol. 9, No 2, 1989, pp. 172-73

¹¹²Henningham, "Pluralism and party politics in a South Pacific State...", p. 174

opposition parties could not come to terms with the Vanua'aku Pati's resounding victory in the 1979 election and sought to negotiate an alternative political structure, allowing a greater role for *kastom* and substantial regional devolution.

In common with many other small, isolated and resourceless colonial territories, the New Hebrides never amounted to much in the imperial scheme of things and was correspondingly neglected. Apart from a brief boom in the 1940s due to the presence of American troops and a surge in international demand for copra,¹¹³ there was little economic growth until the 1970s when higher spending by the colonial administration and the territory's tax haven status had an impact.¹¹⁴ The main beneficiaries were the European settler population and government officials. Writing a few years after independence, Robertson observes that lack of economic development in the colonial era had left 90 per cent of the labour force still engaged in subsistence agriculture and only 17 per cent of the arable land cultivated.¹¹⁵

Vanuatu was unusual in experiencing not just colonial neglect, but an acrimonious break-down in relations with the outgoing colonial powers.¹¹⁶ While Britain was anxious to quit the territory as soon as possible and reluctant to take responsibility for ensuring a successful transition, France indulged in active sabotage to protect its own interests and those of its nationals at the expense of the new state. In the years preceding independence the Condominium powers' divergent agendas had encouraged

¹¹³Dried coconut kernels, from which oil is obtained.

¹¹⁴Premdas, Ralph, and Michael C. Howard, "Vanuatu's foreign policy: contradictions and constraints", *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 39, No 3, December 1985, p. 177

¹¹⁵Robertson, R.T., "Vanuatu: fragile foreign policy initiatives", *Development and Change*, Vol. 19, No 4, October 1988, p. 618

¹¹⁶Besides Vanuatu, the only other microstates which had serious fallings out with colonial powers in the lead-up to or immediately after independence, were a handful in Africa: Comoros made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence; Guinea-Bissau fought a war of independence; São Tomé and Cape Verde virtually seized independence after the implosion of the Portuguese political order; and in Equatorial Guinea, President Macias Nguema fell out with the Spanish, prompting Franco to mount a military evacuation of nationals.

the division of ni-Vanuatu into rival camps and hampered the development of a sense of national unity and acceptance of a common political framework. When the secession crisis came, the colonial authorities failed to uphold the rule of law and instructed such troops that were eventually sent to play an entirely passive role.

While there is no evidence that the French government systematically conspired to effect the separation of Santo from Vanuatu, the complicity of individual French officials, especially the Resident Commissioner, Robert, appears incontrovertible. At his trial, Stevens claimed that the people of Santo had been "told to rise in opposition to the legal government" by Robert. According to Lini, when he conveyed the VP decision to boycott talks with Dijoud in May, Robert had retorted that "he did not care if civil war broke out in the New Hebrides" and that in his view "whoever won the war had the right to rule."¹¹⁷ In Noumea, Robert and Dijoud met with a number of Santo *colons*, including Guy Prevot and Jean-Marie Leye, who were later to play a leading role in the revolt. The day before the outbreak of the rebellion, Prevot and Leye were secretly and illegally flown back to Santo in a French government aircraft¹¹⁸ and Melanesian police under French command were withdrawn from Santo.¹¹⁹

Robert made a radio broadcast on 6 June to his "dear compatriots" on Santo, in which he described the Lini government's blockade as "unjust and vexatious." On 24 July, just before the arrival of the Anglo-French force on the island, he made an inflammatory speech to the secessionists, claiming that France had assumed direction

¹¹⁷Lini., *Beyond Pandemonium*..., p. 51

¹¹⁸*Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 December 1980. As an international flight, the aircraft ought first to have landed at Vila to clear customs and immigration. ["Chapter and verse on outside meddling in the New Hebrides", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, August 1980, p. 30]

¹¹⁹Molisa et al., "The hidden agenda", p. 101

of the joint force operation to prevent a massacre and violent reconquest of the island by English commandos supported by Papua New Guinea, Fijian, Australian and other regional expeditionary forces. Australia was accused of "directing" a South Pacific Forum decision to carry out this reconquest.¹²⁰ Robert gave the rebel *colons* to understand that, if no settlement was reached before independence, then Condominium troops would stay on indefinitely.¹²¹ The sympathies of French negotiator, Arnaud Lizop, also clearly lay with the VP's opponents. The month before the revolt he had written to a leading Santo rebel urging that a "defence plan" be drawn up and promising that he (Lizop) and certain senior French politicians and officials would sabotage Lini's aid agreements with Paris and secure recognition for the secession. On his return to Paris, Lizop was active in the National Assembly trying to organize opposition to New Hebrides independence.¹²²

Politics in small societies

In considering the Vanuatu case in light of the special characteristics of small societies that help determine vulnerability, it is necessary to recall that at the time of the secession crisis and foreign intervention the country was a brand new state with very little prior experience of self-government. The typical characteristics identified in Chapter Two are not as readily assessed as would be the case for a longer established independent polity, though some of these features may be discerned more clearly in the years following the Santo crisis.

¹²⁰Smales, Angus, "Nationhood comes to troubled Vanuatu", *Pacific Islands Monthly*, September 1980, p. 13

¹²¹MacClancy, *To Kill a Bird With Two Stones*, p. 144; Molisa *et al.*, "Vanuatu: overcoming pandemonium", p. 109

¹²²Beasant, *The Santo Rebellion...*, p. 98; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 December 1980

Vanuatu displayed a degree of *political harmony* in the sense that the Vanua'aku Pati had secured the endorsement of a substantial majority of the electorate for its vision of the new state. The country's difficult path to independence was itself a unifying factor. On the other hand, as the Santo crisis demonstrated, there were significant dissident groups who were prepared to take their opposition to the independence government to the point of rebellion. Vanuatu's subsequent instability in the late 1980s, including several breakdowns in public order and a series of unstable coalition governments, reinforces the notion that the 1980 secession crisis was indicative of a lack of a basic national consensus of values. A ni-Vanuatu's typical Melanesian loyalty to his or her own particular "*wantok*" (home community or island) ahead of almost all other considerations was an underlying cultural norm that militated against any rapid evolution of a strong sense of nationhood.¹²³ Unusually in the South Pacific, Vanuatu might be judged closer to Job's Third World norm of a chronic "insecurity dilemma" than the "concerted political harmony" attributed to small states by Sutton.¹²⁴

The "*exaggerated personalism*" attributed to small polities has parallels with the "big man" system of political power Sahlins ascribed to Melanesian island communities. In Sahlins' stereotype,¹²⁵ those who cultivated loyalty and obligation through favours and conspicuous consumption were catapulted to power, rather than inherited status being recognized as a basis for leadership.¹²⁶ The prevalence of family ties in

¹²³Henningham, "Pluralism and party politics in a South Pacific State...", pp. 171-72

¹²⁴Job, Brian L., "The insecurity dilemma: national, regime and state securities in the Third World", in Brian L. Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1992, p. 17-18; Sutton, Paul, "Political aspects", in Colin Clarke and Tony Payne (eds), *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1987, pp. 17-18

¹²⁵Sahlins, Marshall D., "Poor man, rich man, chief: political types in Melanesia and Polynesia", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 5, 1963. See also Bonnemaïson, "Vanuatu: la coutume et l'indépendance", p. 148.

¹²⁶More recent writers have suggested that in the case of Vanuatu (and Solomon Islands) Sahlins downplayed too much the significance of hereditary rank and chieftainship [Douglas, Bronwen, "Rank, power, authority: a reassessment of traditional leaderships in South Pacific societies", *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. XIV, Part 1, 1979,

Vanuatu politics¹²⁷ also suggests that personalism was a strong feature of the political scene. Three strong-willed and charismatic individuals, Walter Lini, Jimmy Stevens and Jean-Jacques Robert, certainly exercised considerable influence over the course of events in the Santo affair, though the crisis was not contingent on them. A clearer example of personalism contributing to instability is provided by the Lini-Sope rivalry that dominated Vanuatu politics by 1988.¹²⁸

As self-government had only become a reality in November 1979, six months before the secession crisis, there is little basis on which to assess whether Vanuatu at this time demonstrated evidence of "*unrestrained executive power*". All that can be said is that the Vermarana rebels seemed to anticipate such a proclivity on the part of the anglophone Vanua'aku Pati once it had taken hold of the levers of power, and were worried about colon property rights and the exclusion of francophones from employment opportunities. Arguably, a perception of the potential for abuse of executive power by the ruling party was therefore a contributing factor in Vanuatu's political instability in 1980. Although, on the whole, constitutional conventions were upheld, the somewhat autocratic behaviour of Vanuatu governments in later years, notably in the treatment of foreign media and diplomats, suggests that such fears were not unfounded. As early as 1982 Lini was accused of dictatorial behaviour for his sackings of ministerial colleagues¹²⁹ and towards the end of his tenure in the late 1980s he was similarly criticized for his periodic refusal to abide by party decisions.¹³⁰

p. 5; Meller, Norman, "Traditional leaders and modern Pacific Island governance", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIV, No 7, July 1984, p. 766].

¹²⁷For example, Walter Lini's sister, Hilda, also held government office; Barak Sope's *kastom* uncle Ati George Sokomanu served as President; husband and wife Sela and Grace Molisa were both prominent Vanua'aku Pati figures.

¹²⁸Henningham, "Pluralism and party politics in a South Pacific State...", pp. 185-86

¹²⁹MacClancy, J.V., "Vanuatu since independence: 1980-83", *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. XIX, No 2, April 1984, pp. 104, 106

¹³⁰Premdas, Ralph R., "Vanuatu: Melanesian socialism and political change", *The Round Table*, No 304, 1987, p. 504

Vanuatu shares the characteristic of *leadership longevity* that is common to microstates in general. Walter Lini was the founding president of the Vanua'aku Pati from 1974 to 1979 and served as Chief/Prime Minister for 12 years from 1979 to 1991. The detrimental effects of power being concentrated in the hands of a single individual for so long were not an issue at the time of the Santo Rebellion, which occurred in the early years of Lini's leadership, but were perhaps evident towards the end of his political career, particularly following his stroke in February 1987.

Militarization as a destabilizing factor in small societies was not an issue in Vanuatu in 1980 as the government's security resources were limited to 160 general police and some small paramilitary units. During the remaining years of the period studied, the police and later Mobile Force stayed loyal to the government, including during the testing time of the 1988 civil disturbances and political crisis.

Geographical variables

Location

As noted in Chapter Two, because microstates are so constrained in their ability to influence their external environments, the simple fact of their particular location can have a very significant bearing on vulnerability to security threats. The neighbourhood in which Vanuatu was placed affected its security in both negative and a positive ways. The negative was its proximity to the French Overseas Territory of New Caledonia. This heightened French sensitivity about the implications of events

in Vanuatu whose rapid move to independence, and the setback for French *colon* interests, could have increased pressure from Melanesian *indépendantistes* in New Caledonia. At a practical level, the proximity of New Caledonia allowed sympathizers to keep in close contact with *colons* in the New Hebrides and to supply moral and material support.

The positive aspect of Vanuatu's location was its enjoyment of a supportive regional environment. The region's principal political body, the South Pacific Forum, had expressed strong support for Vanuatu's territorial integrity. In the United Nations Decolonization Committee,¹³¹ members from the South Pacific region, Australia and Fiji, and non-members New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Samoa, worked to draw attention to the plight of the government. The resolution passed by the Committee in June¹³² expressed deep concern about developments and, in August, Australia managed, controversially, to have the Committee adopt a report implicitly censuring the former Condominium powers.¹³³ Two regional countries, Papua New Guinea and Australia, which each had a vested interest in avoiding instability in Vanuatu were prepared to provide military assistance. Solomon Islands, the other independent Melanesian state, voiced unconditional support for the Papua New Guinea intervention,¹³⁴ implemented sanctions against Santo and expressed willingness to send observers.¹³⁵

¹³¹viz the 'special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' or the "Committee of 24"

¹³²U.N. Document A/AC.109/607

¹³³U.N. Documents A/AC.109/L.1372; A/AC.109/PV.1179; A/AC.109/PV.1180

¹³⁴MacQueen, "Beyond Tok Win...", p. 244

¹³⁵*Fiji Times*, 7 June 1980

Physical and demographic characteristics

With its 80-odd islands set in an Exclusive Economic Zone of almost 700,000 square kilometres, Vanuatu is a classic example of a microstate challenged by its *archipelagic configuration*. As Britain had discovered in the Caribbean, archipelagic microstates pose a particular nation-building challenge and secessionist impulses are rife.¹³⁶ Vanuatu's fragmentation into many islands and further division by rugged terrain has been described as fundamental to understanding Vanuatu politics.¹³⁷ The confinement of isolated communities' political and economic relations to their immediate neighbourhoods in the pre-industrial era, due to topographical constraints, retarded popular identification with the modern nation state.

Even the binding force of common Melanesian *ethnicity* was tempered by the fact that the ni-Vanuatu actually comprised about 100 different ethnic and linguistic sub-groups (having more languages per capita than any other country)¹³⁸ and were further divided by their colonial experience into anglo-Protestant and franco-catholic, and educated-urban and *kastom* camps. While the destabilizing effect of ethnic or cultural-linguistic cleavages is not unique to microstates, or even Third World states, it stands to be intensified, sometimes dangerously, within in the microstate context.¹³⁹

Territorial fragmentation and intervening expanses of sea strain the capacity of a microstate government such as Vanuatu's to enforce its writ throughout the nation, or

¹³⁶Besides Vanuatu, archipelagic microstates that experienced separatist rumblings included Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Comoros, Fiji, the Maldives, Mauritius, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

¹³⁷Molisa et al., "Vanuatu: overcoming pandemonium", p. 84

¹³⁸Connell, John, *Sovereignty and Survival: Island Microstates in the Third World*, Research Monograph No.3, Department of Geography, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1988, p. 4

¹³⁹Benedict, Burton (ed.), *Problems of Smaller Territories*, Athlone, London, 1967, p. 4

to prevent external intrusions. Unsurprisingly, it proved impossible for the Lini administration to maintain its authority in the face of determined opposition in outlying islands, or to prevent the rebels from receiving succour from New Caledonian and American sympathizers. The government's powerlessness to enforce the blockade of Santo declared in May 1980 saw guns ferried in from New Caledonia on a private launch to add to the American-sourced arsenal.¹⁴⁰ In Luganville the rebels helped themselves to ammunition and explosives from the official customs depot.¹⁴¹ Although Vanuatu did not suffer from the constraints and pressures of *small territorial size* and *high population density* that contributed to vulnerability in other microstates, there was perhaps an inverse impact in that the country's relatively large territory and scattered population further strained the government's meagre ability to secure its territory and borders.

Economic variables

Government resource constraints

The struggle of microstate governments to field minimum security forces was epitomized by Vanuatu in 1980. Despite early talk by Vanua'aku Pati leaders of recruiting a local force if the Condominium authorities refused to act,¹⁴² there was no possibility of the government being able to restore order on Santo by itself or to interdict weapons and other supplies being sent to the island from abroad. Prior to independence, the only personnel available to it were 160 general police. The more

¹⁴⁰MacClancy, *To Kill a Bord with Two Stones...*, p. 142; Dorney, *Papua New Guinea...*, p. 189; East, C.H.A., "The Vanuatu affair - the inside story", *Pacific Defence Reporter*, July 1981, p. 72

¹⁴¹Molisa et al., "Vanuatu: overcoming pandemonium", p. 97

¹⁴²Beasant, *The Santo Rebellion...*, p. 95

capable paramilitary Police Mobile Units were to remain under Condominium control and, even when handed over at independence, their effectiveness was constrained by their small size and lack of officers.¹⁴³ As noted above, the challenge was all the greater on account of the country's archipelagic configuration, relatively large territory and scattered population. The helplessness of the government is underlined by the fact that the rebellion was driven by a hard core of only about 30 individuals, a group that despite its small size was capable of threatening Vanuatu's territorial integrity.

Poverty/under-development and political instability

Vanuatu, a Least Developed Country, was among the poorest in the South Pacific region and at the time of the Santo crisis almost 86 per cent of the indigenous population lived in small rural villages, commonly of under 100 people.¹⁴⁴ One particular aspect of underdevelopment and poverty bearing on political stability is well illustrated by the Vanuatu case study. The country's high illiteracy level of 47 per cent in 1979¹⁴⁵ may be assumed to have been a factor in adherence among the populations of outlying islands to the various *kastom*, cargo cult and millenarist movements that played a part in the 1980 crisis. It doubtless also made it easier for outsiders to exploit and manipulate these groups for their own ends. More generally, poverty increased Nagriamel's susceptibility to the financial inducements offered by the French Residency and the Phoenix Foundation and heightened the anxieties of

¹⁴³JCFAD, *Official Hansard*..., pp. 1112, 1114

¹⁴⁴Bedford, *Population of Vanuatu*..., p. 8; Premdas and Howard, "Vanuatu's foreign policy...", p. 177

¹⁴⁵U.N. Department of Social and Economic Development Statistical Office, *Statistical Yearbook 1988-89*, United Nations, New York, 1992.

francophone Melanesians that they would be excluded from employment opportunities by the anglophone-dominated central government.

Vanuatu as a case of microstate dependence

Analysis of the Vanuatu case study for insights into the nature of microstates' security dependence on larger states is complicated by the fact that Vanuatu's newly independent status in 1980 means there was no prior state-to-state relationship with Papua New Guinea. It is necessary therefore to consider the development of their relations in the years after the crisis and also to bear in mind the role of Australia, as the facilitator of the 1980 intervention and as an interested party in respect of Vanuatu's subsequent security problems.

Vanuatu's 1980 experience exemplifies the limited reliability of potential regional or multilateral assistance for microstates facing security crises. Within days of the outbreak of rebellion on 28 May, Lini had asked South Pacific Forum members to send observers to monitor Britain and France's transfer of power and the situation on Santo, and on 29 June he approached them again seeking military help if the rebellion had not been quelled before independence. However, Lini was advised that it would take a long time for agreement to be reached on collective assistance¹⁴⁶ and at the Forum's annual summit meeting in Kiribati two weeks later he did not formally pursue his request. He seems to have realized the futility of seeking collective

¹⁴⁶Vanuatu Parliament... Proceedings, 11 August 1980, p. 2

regional assistance and instead made his bilateral arrangement with Chan in the wings of the meeting.

Papua New Guinea berated the Forum for its failure to act,¹⁴⁷ but the organization's ability to be of material assistance was constrained from the outset by limitations inherent in its organizational structure, mode of decision-making and mandate, and its lack of any previous experience in handling a regional security crisis. Unlike the United Nations, or even the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, the Forum had no permanent central body with responsibility for coordinating a joint response to a security crisis. Since not all members of the Forum had diplomatic representation in Suva (its headquarters), neither was it feasible to hold ad hoc meetings to discuss urgent issues. In any case, the Forum's consensual "Pacific Way" approach to decision-making meant that agreement on a joint peacekeeping force would have been a slow, if not impossible, task. One influential island member, Fiji, had already made clear its reservations about military action. As MacQueen observes, Fiji shared with Polynesian island members an essentially "minimalist" view of the Forum's proper responsibilities.¹⁴⁸ Any direct involvement, let alone military intervention, in the domestic problems of a member state would have been seen as well beyond its purview.

Lini also approached the United Nations for military assistance, immediately the secessionist revolt began and again at the end of June,¹⁴⁹ but these appeals did not make it on to the Security Council agenda.¹⁵⁰ A basic obstacle was that, until

¹⁴⁷Foreign minister Noel Levi said the Forum's future was in question as far as Papua New Guinea was concerned. [Sydney Morning Herald, 26 August 1980]

¹⁴⁸MacQueen, "Beyond Tok Win...", p. 242

¹⁴⁹"Chapter and verse...", p. 30; *Vanuatu Parliament... Proceedings*, 11 August 1980, p. 2

¹⁵⁰MacQueen, "Beyond Tok Win...", p. 239

independence, the authority to make such requests lay with the administering Condominium powers rather than the New Hebrides government. And, after independence, any Vanuatu request could still have been vetoed in the Council by Britain and France, who might have regarded consenting to United Nations involvement in Vanuatu as tantamount to an admission of failure. Even if the Council did agree to assist, Lini's loss of control could have become irrevocable in the time taken to organize a United Nations operation.

Given Australia's own interest in the suppression of the Santo rebellion¹⁵¹ and the heavy reliance of the PNGDF on Australian logistical support, one might be tempted to characterize the Santo intervention as a case of vicarious patronage, with Papua New Guinea merely an instrument of Australian policy in Vanuatu. In Australian eyes, a divided Vanuatu promised to be a lasting source of friction within the region and with France, and boded a radicalization of Melanesia with worrying implications for the future of New Caledonia. Canberra was concerned at the example secession might set for disaffected groups in other loosely-knit island countries, and the aid implications of the proliferation of tiny, economically unviable states. It was also apprehensive at the potential entrée for undesirable external powers provided by a fragmented and unstable Vanuatu. Moreover, the Lini administration was the legitimate government of the whole of Vanuatu and was seen as deserving of Australia's support against unrepresentative, externally-backed rebels. Broader foreign policy considerations nevertheless dictated the avoidance of direct involvement which could expose Australia to charges of neo-colonialist interference or jeopardize its delicate relations with France. In the circumstances, the Papua New

¹⁵¹Gubb, *Vanuatu's 1980 Santo rebellion...*, pp. 28-29

Guinea action was a godsend for Canberra¹⁵² but this is not to say the former acted as some kind of Australian surrogate. It should be remembered that Vanuatu approached Papua New Guinea, not Australia,¹⁵³ for assistance; that the intervention was very much an initiative of the government in Port Moresby; and that Australian officials initially hesitated to endorse the operation.¹⁵⁴

Turning now to Vanuatu's relationship with Papua New Guinea, I consider this in terms of the patron-client indicators identified in Chapter Three: *pervasiveness*; *conformity*; *informality*; and *mutual benefit*. Statements in Port Moresby at the time of the Santo intervention reveal pretensions to regional leadership. Papua New Guinea was the largest and wealthiest of the developing island states in the region and one of only two with significant military capability (the other being Fiji). A member of Chan's Cabinet, Wiwa Korowi, told parliament the government had had no choice but to respond positively to Vanuatu's call for assistance and could expect requests from other small countries in the future. "Papua New Guinea being the biggest country... is the leader in Pacific affairs," and had to "face up to its responsibilities." It was the "big brother of the other smaller countries of the region."¹⁵⁵ It is nevertheless doubtful, as indicated below, that Papua New Guinea's military assistance to Vanuatu can be characterized as having paved the way for a subsequent patron-client relationship in the sense of the academic model.

¹⁵²Dorney, *Papua New Guinea...*, p. 192

¹⁵³JCFAD, *Official Hansard...*, p. 1116

¹⁵⁴Canberra had sensed Port Moresby was taking Australian assistance for granted and worried it had not thought through potential political repercussions or operational difficulties, such as adverse French or Indonesian reactions or the risk of long-term entanglement in Vanuatu. [Gubb, *Vanuatu's 1980 Santo Rebellion...*, p. 30]

¹⁵⁵PNG Hansard, 3 November 1980, p. 13/1/2-3

Pervasiveness

The links between the two newly independent states of Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu were not pervasive in the direct and penetrating manner of many former colonial powers' ongoing relations with microstates. Papua New Guineans were not, for example, prevalent in the Vanuatu administration, security forces and economy, either before or after the Santo intervention. There were, however, underlying ties of race, culture, politics, education,¹⁵⁶ neighbourhood and shared colonial history between the two Melanesian states that prompted Lini to look first to Port Moresby for aid and for the latter to respond positively. Chan and his ministers cited these ties with "brother Melanesians" among the justifications for the deployment of the PNGDF.¹⁵⁷ The intervention had a considerable effect on subsequent relations with Vanuatu, though more in the sense of enhancing solidarity between the two states on issues of common interest such as opposition to French colonialism in the region,¹⁵⁸ rather than developing into an ongoing patron-client relationship. Minor exceptions were the patron-like role played by Papua New Guinea in training Vanuatu's new paramilitary force soon after the Santo affair,¹⁵⁹ and in occasionally providing personnel for the Vanuatu Department of Justice, including a judge and several magistrates.¹⁶⁰ Although after independence expatriates continued to fill the key senior positions in the Vanuatu security establishment, such as Commander of the

¹⁵⁶ Although prior to independence more leading Vanua'aku Pati figures had attended the University of the South Pacific (UPS) in Suva, one key party organizer, Kalkot Matas Kele-kele, attended the University of Papua New Guinea. Silas Hakwa, a future Attorney-General, and Joe Natuman, a future head of the foreign affairs department and Lini's office, were also at UPNG. Sope, a USP graduate, participated in UPNG's annual "Waigani Seminar". During this period UPNG was known for its radical anti-colonialism, conceptualization of the "Melanesian Way" and espousal of Nyerere's Tanzanian socialist model. Hilda Lini went to UPNG in the 1980s. [Huffer, Elise, *Grands Hommes et Petites Iles: La Politique Extérieure de Fidji, de Tonga et du Vanuatu*, ORSTOM, Paris, 1993, p. 95; correspondence with Ken Ross, New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, June 2000]

¹⁵⁷ PNG Hansard, 7 August 1980, pp. 12/2/1, 24/2/3

¹⁵⁸ MacQueen, "Sharpening the spearhead: subregionalism in Melanesia", *Pacific Studies*, Vol. 12, No 2, March 1989, pp. 34-35

¹⁵⁹ The training was supported by Australian and New Zealand funding [PNG Hansard 3 November 1980, p. 9/2/6].

¹⁶⁰ Huffer, *Grands Hommes et Petites Iles...*, p. 267; correspondence with Ken Ross, June 2000

Mobile Force, Commissioner of Police and head of the police Special Branch,¹⁶¹ these individuals were provided by the metropolitan powers rather than Papua New Guinea.

Conformity

Lini was notable as one of the few to support the Papua New Guinea prime minister's proposal to establish a permanent regional peacekeeping force,¹⁶² their two governments were among the most vociferous critics of French policy in New Caledonia and nuclear testing, and Vanuatu participated in the Melanesian Spearhead grouping initiated by Papua New Guinea. There was not, however, a great deal of client-like conformity by Vanuatu in relation to Papua New Guinean foreign policy interests. On the contrary the two countries maintained distinctly different international profiles, with Papua New Guinea fundamentally pro-Western while Vanuatu adopted a radical Non-Aligned stance.¹⁶³ Moreover, it was Papua New Guinea that followed Vanuatu in eventually joining the Non-Aligned Movement.¹⁶⁴ Vanuatu's uncompromising non-alignment, association with the likes of Cuba and Libya, and vigorous support for decolonization causes was a natural response to its own difficult independence struggle.¹⁶⁵ From time to time, Port Vila was outspoken on subjects of considerable sensitivity for Port Moresby, as in the former's support for Irian Jayan and East Timorese freedom fighters in Indonesia.¹⁶⁶ In its first two years at the United Nations General Assembly, in 1981 and 1982, Vanuatu voted in favour

¹⁶¹Premdas and Howard, "Vanuatu's foreign policy...", p. 182

¹⁶²Payne, Anthony, "The politics of small state security in the Pacific", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XXXI, No 2, July 1993, p. 128

¹⁶³MacQueen, "Sharpening the spearhead...", pp. 38, 45

¹⁶⁴Henningham, Stephen, *The Pacific Island States: Security and Sovereignty in the Post-Cold War World*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1995, p. 39

¹⁶⁵Natuman, Joe, "Vanuatu's sovereignty in jeopardy", in Howard Van Trease (ed.), *Melanesian Politics: Stael Blong Vanuatu*, University of Canterbury, Christchurch/University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1992, pp. 413, 415

¹⁶⁶Premdas and Howard, "Vanuatu's foreign policy...", p. 184

of the resolution championing self-determination for East Timor while Papua New Guinea voted against.¹⁶⁷

Informality

In contrast to the less remote and more tightly clustered Caribbean microstates, the South Pacific island states have not been inclined to worry about flow-on effects from each other's problems or to contemplate either formal security cooperation arrangements or direct involvement in domestic crises occurring in their region. The Papua New Guinea-Vanuatu security relationship was not based on any long-term formal pact, though the 1980 intervention was the subject of a formal prior "interim defence agreement" and authorized by Parliaments in both countries. The clause in the agreement making the intervention force subject to the general direction of the Vanuatu National Security Council (a provision to which the Lini government attached great importance¹⁶⁸) meant that, at least formally, the PNGDF was not given a free hand.

Vanuatu, along with Solomon Islands, participated in the Melanesian Spearhead Group initiated by Papua New Guinea as a reaction to the perceived conservatism of Polynesian governments on issues such as New Caledonia and French nuclear testing. The group met for the first time in Suva in 1986 prior to a South Pacific Forum meeting and in March 1988 signed Agreed Principles for Cooperation. These principles were not, however, formal binding commitments and did not cover security

¹⁶⁷Djonovich, Dusan J. (ed.), *United Nations Resolutions, Series I: Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly*, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York [Volumes XX and XXI]

¹⁶⁸*Vanuatu Parliament... Proceedings*, 13 August 1980, p. 2

cooperation.¹⁶⁹ Changes of government in Port Moresby and Paris in 1988 removed the main internal and external forces behind the Spearhead's emergence.¹⁷⁰ In addition, from 1989 the secessionist rebellion on the island of Bougainville absorbed Port Moresby's attention, the poor performance of the PNGDF on Bougainville called into question its capacity to provide assistance to others in the region, and relations with Solomon Islands were strained over Bougainville-related border clashes.

Mutual benefit

In respect of the 1980 intervention, there was clearly mutual benefit for the two countries. Papua New Guinea quelled secessionist instability in a neighbouring Melanesian state that could have encouraged separatism at home. At the same time it boosted its regional standing, and the government enjoyed domestic political support for its anti-colonialist stance and Melanesian solidarity. Prime Minister Chan characterized the intervention as supportive of Papua New Guinea's own security interests and a touchstone of its national defence capabilities. He told Parliament "The Government believes that maintaining the security of Vanuatu is maintaining the security of Papua New Guinea and the Pacific region. If we cannot protect the stability of a small country how can we protect the stability of a larger region?"¹⁷¹

For its part, Vanuatu gained much needed security assistance to preserve its territorial integrity. Papua New Guinea, as another young Melanesian state, was a more politically acceptable source of foreign military intervention than one of the

¹⁶⁹MacQueen, "Sharpening the spearhead...", p. 39, footnote 15

¹⁷⁰Payne, "The politics of small state security in the Pacific", p. 129

¹⁷¹PNG *Hansard*, 15 August 1980, p. 32/7/1

metropolitan powers. The ability to rely on this prompt and politically viable assistance enabled the Vanuatu government to assert itself in the face of the Condominium powers' abrogation of their responsibilities and, in France's case, subversive stance.

Evidence of a mutually beneficial patron-client security relationship in the longer term is harder to discern. One essential point is that Papua New Guinea's ability to deliver the services expected of a patron rapidly decreased. It faced frequent changes of government and political instability at home. The Defence Force soon became almost completely absorbed in domestic security challenges and its operational effectiveness also greatly diminished during the ensuing decade. As early as 1983, the Secretary for Defence admitted publicly that the PNGDF was no longer capable of another Santo operation.¹⁷² Notwithstanding these practical limitations, Papua New Guinea did continue to act supportively in respect of Vanuatu's domestic security problems. At the time of the next major crisis in Vanuatu, civil disturbances in May 1988, Papua New Guinea promptly voiced its support for the Lini government¹⁷³ and offered to send police.¹⁷⁴ Prime Minister Wingti declared, "If they ask for help, we have to help the elected government."¹⁷⁵

¹⁷²Dorney, *Papua New Guinea...*, p. 192

¹⁷³"Vanuatu", *The Far East and Australasia* 1992, Europa, London, 1991, p. 799

¹⁷⁴Consideration was given to using Australian aircraft to transport Papua New Guinea police. Deployment of PNGDF troops was ruled out by the delay inherent in having to summon Parliament to secure approval. [*Weekend Australian*, 21-22 May 1988; *Canberra Times*, 23 May 1988].

¹⁷⁵*Australian*, 23 May 1988

CHAPTER FIVE

AFRICAN CASE STUDY

THE GAMBIA

In contrast to Vanuatu, The Gambia¹ case study involves a continental enclave whose troubles were of a more exclusively home-grown variety and occurred many years after the departure of the colonial power. The Gambia's putative patron, Senegal, was much more pervasively involved, and over a longer period, in the affairs of its microstate client than was Papua New Guinea in Vanuatu, and the Gambia-Senegal relationship was given more formal expression. Although Gambian politics exhibited the personalism, unchecked power and leadership longevity typical to microstates, President Jawara's responsible governance meant that these attributes did not necessarily contribute to vulnerability. For nearly three decades after independence, The Gambia maintained a record of stable, competitive party democracy unmatched in mainland Africa, except by fellow microstate Botswana. Until a coup in July 1994, The Gambia's unusually strong adherence to constitutionalism saw all changes to its formal institutional structure achieved in strict compliance with constitutional procedure.² On only one previous occasion, the subject of this case study, was there a serious challenge to the established political order.

¹The formal country name current during the period covered by this study, "The Gambia", is used here. The country was also informally referred to as "Gambia" and this name has since entered into official usage.

²Wiseman, John A., "The role of the House of Representatives in the Gambian political system," in Arnold Hughes (ed.), *The Gambia: Studies in Society and Politics* (Birmingham University African Studies Series 3), Centre of West African Studies, University of Birmingham, 1991, p. 81

In July 1981, during the absence overseas of President Jawara, a coup attempt was launched by left-wing civilians. After a day of looting and violence, armed forces from neighbouring Senegal intervened in support of the government and quickly restored order. In the wake of the crisis, the two countries were drawn closer together and formed a nominal Confederation of Senegambia. After providing an account of the crisis and intervention, I examine their significance for the overall study. The crisis is analysed in terms of the sources of microstate vulnerability highlighted in Chapter Two. The Senegalese intervention and its aftermath are assessed in light of the characteristics of patron-client relationships introduced in Chapter Three.

Background

Geographical setting³

Occupying a serpentine strip along the river of the same name, the republic of The Gambia is among the smallest and most densely populated states in Africa.⁴ Its land area of 11,295 square kilometres⁵ was inhabited at independence in 1965 by a population of just over 400,000. By the 1983 Census it had risen to around 690,000⁶ and a decade later

³See **Figures 5.01 and 5.02**.

⁴"The Gambia", *The Courier*, No 142, November-December 1993, p. 13. Since independence, its population density has been between three and four times the continental average, though this pressure is offset by The Gambia also possessing three times the average proportion of arable land. [*Philip's Geographical Digest 1992-93*, Heinemann, Oxford, 1992, pp. 30,49]

⁵Harrison-Church, R.J., "The Gambia: Physical and Social Geography", *Africa South of the Sahara 1994*, Europa, London, 1993, p. 392

⁶Gamble, David P., *The Gambia*, Clio, Oxford/Santa Barbara, 1988, p. xv

had topped one million.⁷ Excepting its 50-kilometre Atlantic Ocean frontage at the river mouth, The Gambia is entirely surrounded by southern Senegal, which it penetrates, dagger-like, for 470 kilometres.⁸ Abutting the coast to the north is Senegal's Siné-Saloum delta and, to the south, its swampy Casamance region. Inland, the countryside along the river is mostly flat and sandy with the low, sparse vegetation of the Senegambian savannah.⁹ The Gambia's overwhelmingly coastal and riverine topography has earned it a place on a United Nations list of ten countries most threatened by sea level rises through global warming.¹⁰ The capital, Banjul, formerly Bathurst, lies near the mouth of the Gambia River and its 1983 population was 44,500, or 110,000 if one included surrounding urban areas.¹¹

For centuries, the easy movement of men, animals and goods over the Senegambian savannah fostered the intermingling of different peoples¹² and in 1983 the Gambian population was divided among the principal ethnic groups as follows: Mandinka (40.4 percent), Fulbe (18.8), Wolof (14.6), Jola (10.3) and Serahuli (8.2).¹³ Although urban drift had begun to erode the distinction, the Mandinka were historically a rural people while Wolof and Aku (Creoles) dominated the capital and, by extension, the Gambian

⁷Provisional figure from the April 1993 Census, cited in *The Gambia, Mauritania: Country Profile 1993/94*, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1993, p. 6. This unexpectedly high figure reflects an increased birth rate and immigration during 1983-93.

⁸Harrison-Church, "The Gambia", p. 392

⁹Rice, Berkeley, *Enter Gambia: the Birth of an Improbable Nation*, Angus & Robertson, London, 1968, p. 3

¹⁰Criteria for the list included not only vulnerability to sea-level rises in absolute terms but also an *inability to pay* for either protective measures or a planned relocation to higher ground. [Kennedy, Paul, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, Harper Collins, Toronto, 1993, pp. 110-11]

¹¹*The World in Figures* (fifth edition), Hodder & Stoughton for the *The Economist*, 1987, p. 72)

¹²Renner, F.A., "Ethnic affinity, partition and political integration in Senegambia," in A.I. Asiwaju (ed.) *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984*, C. Hurst & Co., London/University of Lagos Press, Lagos, 1984, pp. 72-73

¹³1983 Census figures cited by Gamble, *The Gambia*, p. xv

middle class. In the 1963 Census, for example, Wolof and Aku together made up 70 per cent of the population in the Bathurst-Kombo St Mary conurbation.¹⁴

History

The Phoenicians, Greeks and Carthaginians reached the Gambia River mouth in ancient times¹⁵ and stone circles in the Senegambia region from about the first century AD imply the existence of an early indigenous civilization. The Empire of Ghana, established towards the end of the third century AD dominated part of the region until the advance of Muslim Arabs in the tenth century. In the south the Mandé tribes resisted the influence of Islam and during medieval times the region was the seat of an empire known as Songhai.¹⁶ Gold-seeking explorers in Portuguese service, who ventured up the river in the fifteenth century, concluded treaties with local chiefs and introduced the groundnut or peanut.¹⁷ In the mid-sixteenth century, England and France began to infringe Portugal's trading monopoly on the West Africa coast and in 1587 the first English expedition entered the Gambia.

The succeeding two centuries saw a complicated, often bloody, rivalry between Portuguese, English, French, Dutch, Hanseatic and Couronian¹⁸ interests in the region. From the end of the sixteenth century, the English Crown granted privileges or

¹⁴Hughes, Arnold, "From green uprising to national reconciliation: the People's Progressive Party in the Gambia, 1959-1973", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 9, No 1, 1975, p. 63

¹⁵Rice, *Enter Gambia...*, p. 56

¹⁶Gravette, Andy, "Pre-history and the great empires," in Philip Sweeney (ed.), *The Gambia and Senegal*, APA Publications, Hong Kong, 1990, pp. 26-27

¹⁷Rice, *Enter Gambia...*, pp. 56-58

¹⁸viz the Duchy of Courland, which was located in parts of present-day Latvia and Lithuania

monopolies of the West African trade to private companies, engaged mainly in the supply of slaves for plantations in the New World¹⁹ and of spirit gum to Europe for the silk printing process.²⁰ Based at the former Couronian fort on James Island, about twenty miles up the Gambia River, these enterprises dominated trade for nearly a century from about 1660, though contending with a rival French presence on the northern bank of the river at Albreda. Having seized all French bases in West Africa in 1758, the British created the colony of Senegambia, their first in Africa. Its innovative but cumbersome constitutional set-up was the precursor of the 1774 Quebec Act system devised for Canada and of Crown Colony government in the nineteenth century.²¹ When French territories were restored under the 1783 Treaty of Versailles, Britain retained only the Gambia, which continued as a royal colony but was handed over to the Company of Merchants for more economical administration.

The territory's role as a slaving entrepôt took on an inverted importance after Britain's abolition of the trade in 1807. It was in order to enforce this prohibition that a fort commanding the mouth of the river was constructed on the site of present-day Banjul. Although the resulting settlement of Bathurst and its environs constituted the actual Crown Colony, they accounted for only two per cent of the eventual land area of the modern Gambian state.²² The remainder of the territory, that is the "Protectorate", was acquired piecemeal, partly through negotiations with the French and partly as a result of interventions in local disputes. There was much fighting in the interior during the

¹⁹Rice, *Enter Gambia...*, p. 65

²⁰Fieldhouse, D.K., *The Colonial Empires: a Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century* (second edition), Macmillan, London & Basingstoke, 1982, p. 131

²¹Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires...*, pp. 131-32

²²Hughes, "From green uprising to national reconciliation....," p. 63

nineteenth century occasioned by the spread of Islam and revolts against traditional hereditary chiefs. To quell this turmoil and safeguard the river trading route, the British entered into protectorate treaties with local warlords²³ and by the end of the nineteenth century held sway over the entire river valley.

The Gambia was run by the British as a kind of province of the Colony of Sierra Leone from 1821 to 1843 and again from 1866 to 1888. The up-river districts of the Protectorate were formally organized under Bathurst's administration in 1901. In keeping with Lord Lugard's system of indirect rule, British colonial administrators of the Gambia harnessed the authority of local *seyfolu* or chiefs. In contrast to the French in neighbouring Senegal, who regarded their African agents as mere tools chosen to serve French interests, the British allowed Gambian *seyfolu* a fair amount of officially sanctioned initiative in formulating or carrying out policy at the local level, including the holding of their own courts.²⁴

Despite a British parliamentary decision in 1865 in favour of ultimate withdrawal from The Gambia,²⁵ negotiations with the French during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to rationalize colonial holdings, for example to exchange the Gambia for Gabon or the Ivory Coast, came to nothing.²⁶ The Gambia's status as a long-established colony made it difficult to dispense with the territory on account of the full British citizenship of

²³Price, J.H., *Political Institutions of West Africa*, Hutchinson, London, 1975, p. 42

²⁴Renner, "Ethnic affinity...", p. 76

²⁵Faal, Dawda, *Peoples and Empires of Senegambia: Senegambia in History, AD 1000-1900*, Dawda Faal, Banjul, 1991, p. 113

²⁶Welch, Claude E., Jr, *Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1966, pp. 257,259; Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa*, p. 675

its inhabitants and the established commercial interests of its resident merchants.²⁷ In 1889, the border with Senegal was demarcated by an Anglo-French commission, leaving The Gambia with boundaries that, "even by the standards of rest of Africa [were] extraordinary".²⁸ The settlement was regarded as a temporary measure and as late as 1915 there were still proposals on the table concerning the cession of Britain's entire Gambian territory to France.²⁹ Gambian soldiers fought for Britain during both World Wars and Bathurst was an important naval and air base during the Second World War.

The Gambia in the modern era

The Gambia attained self-government on 4 October 1963 and independence on 18 February 1965. Following a referendum, the country became a republic on 24 April 1970 with a new constitution providing for a President to be elected by the House of Representatives. Further revisions in 1982 had the President elected by universal suffrage, as in Senegal, for a five year term. The Gambia was among the very few African countries to succeed in maintaining a multiparty democracy for a sustained period after independence, though in practice pluralism existed in the context of one-party domination.³⁰

²⁷Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires...*, p. 132. One plan to swap The Gambia for a slice of French territory elsewhere in Africa was thwarted when the citizens of Bathurst petitioned Queen Victoria [*Africa Confidential*, 14 March 1969].

²⁸Robson, Peter, *Integration, Development and Equity: Economic Integration in West Africa*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1983, p. 124

²⁹Welch, *Dream of Unity...*, pp. 257,259

³⁰Chazan, Naomi, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (second edition), Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1992, pp. 63, 141

The pivotal figure in modern Gambian politics was Sir Dawda Jawara³¹ who led the country from 1963 until deposed in July 1994. A Mandinka from the up-river village of Barajally, Jawara was born in 1924, the son of a prosperous but low-caste trader/farmer. After training as a veterinary officer in Ghana and Glasgow, he returned to The Gambia in 1954 to work with the Agriculture Department. He married the daughter of a prominent Bathurst Aku, Sir John Mahoney, who went on to become Speaker of the first House of Representatives in 1960. Jawara led the newly formed People's Progressive Party in the country's first nationwide election in 1960. The PPP won 10 seats and Jawara was made Minister of Education, but he resigned after the Governor appointed as Chief Minister his opponent, the United Party's P.S. N'Jie. In the election of 1962, the PPP won 18 seats to the UP's 13, and Jawara became Chief Minister.

In the first decade after independence Britain provided 80 percent of foreign aid to The Gambia;³² this development assistance and subsidization of the Gambian budget was critical in maintaining the country's economic viability. In 1980, more than 80 per cent of "economically active" Gambians were still employed in agriculture,³³ with groundnuts being the long-standing principal export crop.³⁴ Tourism had also been contributing significantly to the economy since the 1970s and by 1986 was generating 7 percent of Gross Domestic Product.³⁵ The dominance of groundnut production, sometimes accounting for as much as 95 percent of export earnings, exposed The Gambia to severe

³¹For a biographical sketch see "Jawara of Gambia", *Africa Institute Bulletin*, Vol. 5, July 1967.

³²Nyang, Sulayman, S., "After the rebellion", *Africa Report*, November-December 1981, p. 49

³³*Philip's Geographical Digest*, p. 50

³⁴In 1981 agriculture accounted for 58 percent of The Gambia's Gross National Product, of which groundnuts alone comprised 37 percent [Sallah, Tijan M., "Economics and politics in The Gambia", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 28, No 4, December 1990, p. 625].

³⁵Sallah, "Economics and politics in The Gambia", p. 626

income fluctuations due to the unpredictable output and earnings of the industry.³⁶ Between 1969 and 1977, severe droughts caused annual economic growth to fall below population growth rates.³⁷ The value of the 1979-80 groundnut crop, was 40 per cent less than the previous year due to continuing bad weather, pests, poor quality seeds, inadequate fertilizers and a fall in world prices.³⁸ Despite buoyant tourism, by the early 1980s the groundnut industry's problems, inflation, excessive imports, and an over-sized public service left the country suffering a serious financial crisis which required an International Monetary Fund/World Bank recovery programme.³⁹

Relations with Senegal

Relations with Senegal were "one of the most delicate and difficult problems to be solved by the leaders of an independent Gambia."⁴⁰ The prevailing wisdom among both British officials and the Gambian elite in the 1950s was that The Gambia would not be viable as an independent state. A number of alternatives such as federation with other anglophone states in West Africa or direct representation in Westminster were discussed, but ultimately it came to be considered that some form of association with Senegal was the most sensible, indeed inevitable, course. There were obvious economic arguments in favour of a common market, joint development of the Gambia river's potential as a regional transport artery, rationalization of the groundnut industry and shared

³⁶Hughes, Arnold, "The Gambia", in Colin Clarke and Tony Payne (eds), *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1987, p. 142

³⁷Sallah, "Economics and politics in The Gambia", p. 625. The difficult economic situation in the countryside was a contributing factor in urban drift and the build-up of a large body of idle youth in the towns [interview with former Gambian Police Inspector-General M'Boob, Banjul, January 1995].

³⁸*The Annual Register: a Record of World Events 1980*, Longman, Harlow, Essex, 1981, p. 234

³⁹Sallah, "Economics and politics in The Gambia", p. 628

⁴⁰Price, *Political Institutions...*, p. 95

administration.⁴¹ For its part, Senegal was keen to establish a road link through The Gambia to its southern province of Casamance and to put an end to the smuggling of goods from The Gambia.⁴²

Notwithstanding the prospective advantages, Gambians were wary of closer association. Gambian politicians were unlikely to secure many senior positions in a federated Senegambia, and professionals such as lawyers, teachers and civil servants might have been similarly marginalized in francophone Senegal. Tribal leaders in The Gambia, who had retained more importance than their Senegalese counterparts, thanks to the British system of indirect rule, feared their status would be threatened.⁴³ Authoritarian tendencies in Senegalese politics compared unfavourably with The Gambia's own vigorous, if fledgling, multi-party parliamentary system.⁴⁴ Leftists and nationalists in Bathurst regarded Senegal as under a French neocolonialist yoke and saw little sense in exchanging rule from London with rule from Dakar/Paris. Meanwhile, the increasing number of other small territories attaining independence in the 1960s encouraged Gambians to be more positive about their own prospects for going it alone.⁴⁵ On the economic side, Banjul's laissez-faire attitude contrasted with the *dirigiste* approach in Dakar⁴⁶ and the two countries' disparity in size would make it difficult to protect

⁴¹Proctor, J.H., "The Gambia's relations with Senegal: the search for partnership," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. 5, No 2, July 1967, pp. 144-45

⁴²Van Mook, H.J., et al., *Report on the Alternatives for Association Between The Gambia and Senegal Prepared for the Government of The Gambia and Senegal by Hubertus J. van Mook et al., Appointed Under the United Nations Programme of Technical Assistance, Report No TAO/GAMBIA/SENEGAL/1*, United Nations, New York, 16 March 1964, pp. 18-19

⁴³Price, *Political Institutions...*, pp. 42-43,90; Renner. "Ethnic affinity...", p. 76

⁴⁴One observer in the late 1960s saw The Gambia as "without doubt Africa's best example of a parliamentary democracy" and having the "most riotously free press on the continent", whereas Senegal was a "one-party state with meaningless elections and a largely supine press." [*Africa Confidential*, 14 March 69]

⁴⁵Proctor, "The Gambia's relations with Senegal...", pp. 145-48

⁴⁶*Africa Confidential*, 14 March 1969

Gambian interests.⁴⁷ Adoption of Senegal's over-valued franc would be inflationary and disrupt The Gambia's overseas trade and aid links, as would conforming to Senegal's protectionist and discriminatory (pro-French) commercial policy. The dismantling of borders would end overnight The Gambia's lucrative smuggling or "re-export" trade.⁴⁸

At Jawara's suggestion, the United Nations was asked to draw up a blueprint for cooperation and, to this end, a four-man Dutch/Swiss mission spent two months in The Gambia and Senegal in late 1963. Of three possibilities foreseen, integration, federation and a simple entente, the mission favoured a loose political federation, with each state retaining sovereignty but proceeding to economic integration, including a customs union.⁴⁹ In subsequent discussions, The Gambia came out against the customs union and also a Senegalese conception of Union Government, in which Gambians would have had proportionate representation in the Senegalese Cabinet and National Assembly, retaining control over only internal affairs (police, education, justice and the civil service). It should be noted that the Senegalese, too, had reason to hesitate, as the net benefits of closer association with The Gambia were not assured. Facilitating greater use of the Gambia River as a regional transport artery might have adversely affected Senegal's own ports and railways and the precedent of Gambian autonomy within a federal structure might have attracted demands for similar treatment from parts of Senegal.⁵⁰

⁴⁷In 1962 The Gambia's Gross Domestic Product was nine million pounds, compared to Senegal's 167 million pounds [Proctor, "The Gambia's relations with Senegal...", p. 145].

⁴⁸Proctor, "The Gambia's relations with Senegal...", pp. 145-48; Richmond, Edmund B., "Senegambia and the Confederation: history, expectations and disillusion", *Journal of Third World Studies*, Vol. X, No 2, Fall 1993, pp. 179-80

⁴⁹Van Mook, H.J., *et al.*, *Report on the Alternatives for Association...*

⁵⁰Welch, *Dream of Unity...*, pp. 278-79

In June 1964, agreement was reached on more modest cooperation objectives in line with the minimalist entente option identified in the United Nations report. Agreements on Cooperation on Foreign Policy⁵¹ and in Matters of Defence and Security⁵² were signed on The Gambia's independence day, 18 February 1965. Also signed was a convention setting up a sub-Committee of the Senegalo-Gambian Inter-Ministerial Committee (dating from the early 1960s) which would be responsible for issues concerning development of the Gambia River basin.⁵³ In 1967, a further Treaty of Association⁵⁴ provided a framework for detailed cooperation in almost all fields, leading later to several minor agreements on matters such as health, broadcasting and cultural affairs. The Treaty also established structures for annual meetings of the heads of state and an inter-ministerial committee, as well as a Senegalo-Gambian secretariat to service the committee.⁵⁵ A trade agreement was concluded in 1970 and in 1976 a convention was signed for development of the Gambia River basin.

Relations with Senegal during the first decade after The Gambia's independence were punctuated by numerous outbreaks of tension over smuggling, which Dakar portrayed as sabotaging its economy, but was inevitable as long as the two neighbours maintained differentiated pricing and customs regimes. The practice had been rife even in colonial times, as farmers on either side of the porous border transferred their groundnut harvests

⁵¹The agreement dealt with representation in each other's capital, joint representation abroad and joint consultations on foreign policy ["Accord numéro I: Accord de coopération en matière de Politique étrangère, 18 février 1965", *Accords signés entre le Sénégal et la Gambie, 1965-1976*, Gambia National Archives, Banjul].

⁵²The agreement provided that the two Governments would, on request, 'assist each other to secure their external security and defence against any form of threat' ["Accord numéro II: Accord de coopération en matière de Défense et de Sécurité, 18 février 1965", *Accords signés entre le Sénégal et la Gambie...*].

⁵³"Accord numéro III: Accord sur le développement intégré du bassin du Fleuve Gambie, 18 février 1965", *Accords signés entre le Sénégal et la Gambie...*

⁵⁴"Accord numéro VII: Traité d'Association, 19 avril 1967", *Accords signés entre le Sénégal et la Gambie...*

⁵⁵Sy, Sedina, "Senegambian co-operation: operation and perspectives", in R.C. Bridges (ed.), *Senegambia: Proceedings of a Colloquium at the University of Aberdeen, April 1974*, Aberdeen University African Studies Group, Aberdeen, 1974, p. 128-29

to whichever jurisdiction offered a better price. In the decade before 1967, French subsidies had attracted a good deal of the Gambian groundnut production, but after this date the tide turned. Senegal faced a serious drain on its harvest because the Gambian market offered generally higher prices and immediate cash payments,⁵⁶ not to mention cheaper consumer goods on which to spend these proceeds.⁵⁷

A crisis was precipitated in 1969 when the Senegalese Finance Minister, Jean Colin, declared smuggling was an "act of economic aggression" perpetrated by Gambians, and a "moral peril" to the Senegalese state.⁵⁸ On an official visit to Banjul, Senegalese President Senghor was greeted by hostile demonstrators who burnt Senegalese flags and vandalized a recently-opened French bank.⁵⁹ In January 1971, Senegalese army units ventured into Gambian territory and took suspected smugglers into custody, a violation that prompted Banjul to denounce the incursion to the United Nations and appeal for military assistance from Britain and Nigeria.⁶⁰ Although this dispute was settled by diplomatic means, repeated border incidents in the early 1970s kept the smuggling issue alive.⁶¹ A particularly serious incident in July 1974 involving further arrests of Gambians on Gambian territory led Jawara to complain of Senegalese "acts of banditry and brutality akin to the strong arm tactics Hitler used against those who were weak."⁶² By the 1980s,

⁵⁶Because the inefficient and corrupt Senegalese state buying organization gave farmers IOUs, which it sometimes took months to honour, the Gambian market could be more attractive even when its prices were lower. [*Africa Confidential*, 14 March 1969]

⁵⁷Renner, "Ethnic affinity...", pp. 79-80

⁵⁸"Senegambia: the smuggling question: 1", *West Africa*, 12 April 1969, p. 403

⁵⁹*Africa Confidential*, 14 March 1969

⁶⁰Richmond, "Senegambia and the Confederation...", p. 182

⁶¹Renner, "Ethnic affinity...", p. 80; Tillema, Herbert K., *International Armed Conflict Since 1945: a Bibliographic Handbook of Wars and Military Interventions*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 65

⁶²Official Gambian press release of 2 August 1974 cited in Gomez, Solomon, *The Gambia's External Relations: a Study of the Internal and External Factors that Influenced Foreign Policy Positions, 1965-1975*, dissertation submitted to the Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Baltimore, Maryland, 1977, p. 294

the importation of goods by Gambian businesses and onward smuggling into Senegal had become a major element in the Gambian economy.⁶³ Some businessmen claimed that this "re-export" trade had become so important that its elimination through the harmonization of customs would threaten the country's viability, or as one put it, "The day that customs levies are the same here and in Senegal, Gambia will become a Senegalese province."⁶⁴

1980 security crisis

The turmoil of the 1981 coup attempt was foreshadowed the previous year by a crisis surrounding the murder on 27 October 1980 of the Field Force deputy commander, Eku Mahoney, by a recently disciplined sentry. This was interpreted by the authorities as the first act in a plot against the government itself.⁶⁵ The late 1970s had seen the emergence of two Marxist-oriented opposition groups, the Gambian Socialist Revolutionary Party (GSRP) and the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA). Responsibility for a robbery of the Field Force's armoury earlier that year was believed to lie with the MOJA,⁶⁶ whose Liberian counterparts had overthrown the government in Monrovia. Adding to government uneasiness was the possibility of Libyan involvement: a number of Gambians had allegedly received military training in Libya under the auspices of a Senegalese Islamic fundamentalist opposition figure and the Libyan embassy in Banjul was suspected of subversive activities.⁶⁷ It was speculated that Tripoli hoped a Gambian

⁶³*Le Monde*, 4 November, 1980. Having circumvented Senegal's higher tariffs, the smuggled goods were competitive on that country's market. Dakar's chagrin at missing out on the customs revenue from these foreign goods would have been heightened by the knowledge that Banjul had reaped import duties from the goods on their initial arrival in The Gambia.

⁶⁴*International Herald Tribune*, 16 November 1988

⁶⁵*Keesing's*, 30 January 1981, p. 30687

⁶⁶*Sunday Telegraph*, 2 August 1981

⁶⁷Nyang, "After the rebellion", p. 48; *International Herald Tribune*, 3 November 1980

coup would divert diplomatic attention from its intervention in Chad's civil war.⁶⁸ Banjul broke off relations with Tripoli on 29 October, matching the step taken by Dakar in July.

When it was feared that Gambian conspirators were planning to make their move before the departure of the Libyans and to stage a revolt during the funeral for the murdered Field Force officer on Friday 31 October, Jawara called on Dakar for assistance, invoking the 1965 mutual defence agreement. About 150 Senegalese troops arrived on the day of the funeral, their mission being to "stiffen the morale and counter possible wider disaffection within the Field Force."⁶⁹ They took up positions at strategic locations and stayed for one week before withdrawing. On 1 November most of the MOJA and GSRP leaders were arrested⁷⁰ and the parties were banned.

The events of October 1980 revealed both the beginning of a dangerous convergence of disaffected elements within the security forces and civilian society⁷¹ and the microstate's dependence on Senegal in military matters. While there was not in fact any widespread discontent in the Field Force and Mahoney's assailant always insisted his action had not been part of a coup attempt,⁷² the political militants who began plotting a real coup in the months afterwards were able to capitalize on the now unsettled state of the Field Force.⁷³ Similarly, the banning of what had hitherto been minor radical parties helped create a

⁶⁸*Daily Telegraph*, 11 November 1980

⁶⁹Hughes, Arnold, "The attempted Gambian *coup d'état* of 30 July 1980", in Hughes, *The Gambia: Studies in Society and Politics*, p. 97

⁷⁰*Le Monde*, 4 November 1980

⁷¹Hughes, "The attempted Gambian *coup d'état*...", p. 98

⁷²Interview with Baboucar Gaye, a Banjul journalist formerly of the *Senegambia Sun* and a BBC and *West Africa* stringer, January 1995

⁷³Interview with Deyda Heydara, a prominent local journalist and editor of *The Point* newspaper, Banjul, January 1995

more tense and unstable political environment and lent credibility to groups that had previously lacked it.⁷⁴

The 1981 coup attempt and Senegalese intervention

The coup attempt

The coup was launched by left-wing elements in the early morning of Thursday, 30 July 1981,⁷⁵ while President Jawara was in London for the wedding of the Prince and Princess of Wales. Unusual for its civilian character and high casualty rate, the rebellion has been described as "one of the most disastrous attempts to overthrow elected leaders in Africa's recent history."⁷⁶

Notwithstanding The Gambia's well-earned reputation for stable constitutional democracy, there had been a radical strain in youth politics⁷⁷ as far back as the pre-independence period when the PPP had harnessed the resentment of provincial youth against colonial rule and the prospect of power being transferred to the urban elite. Militant political clubs developed in urban neighbourhoods, drawing ideological

⁷⁴Interview with Halifah Sallah, member of the editorial committee of *Foroyaa* (Freedom) newsletter (People's Democratic Organization for Independence and Socialism), Banjul, January 1995

⁷⁵Regarding the timing of the coup, the prosecuting council at the subsequent trial observed that, "My Lord it would appear that the date for the attempted coup was the result of advise [sic] from a gentleman called a 'marabout', a fortune-teller or a 'jujuman'. His advice it would appear has not been of the highest quality in the event, but there it is." [Bakaar, S., *The Law of Treason in "The Republic of The Gambia vs Alieu Sallah and 6 Revolutionists*, compilation of trial transcripts, Gambia National Archives, Banjul, p. 4]

⁷⁶Sallah, "Economics and politics in The Gambia", p. 638

⁷⁷For a more detailed discussion of the development of radical youth politics in The Gambia see Hughes, "The attempted Gambian *coup d'état...*", pp. 94-97.

inspiration from Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, American Black Power and Frantz Fanon. During the 1970s, youth activists contested elections as Independents, through the National Convention Party (a PPP breakaway led by former Vice-President Sheriff Dibba) and the radical National Liberation Party under Pap Secka. By the end of the decade, however, the militants were increasingly frustrated by their inability to make headway at the ballot box and the failure of moderate political movements to adopt more radical policies. Approximately two-thirds of the Gambian population was under 25 years of age at this time.⁷⁸ Around 1979 there emerged new forms of direct action, such as an underground journal, graffiti and vandalism of government property, and new political organizations, the most prominent being MOJA and the GRSP (the two parties banned after the 1980 security crisis). The former had some intellectual credibility and popularity among disaffected youth while the latter, founded by a disgruntled small-time businessman, was seen as "faintly ludicrous."⁷⁹

The coup leader was one Kukoi Samba Sanyang, a little-known 28 year-old member of the GRSP. Sanyang had been an unsuccessful candidate for the National Convention Party in 1977 and in 1980 joined the GRSP.⁸⁰ The conspiracy was hatched within the GRSP in early 1981 and involved about a dozen people, all Jola residents of the township of Serekunda on the outskirts of Banjul. Jola were a low status ethnic group comprising only 10 percent of the population⁸¹ and arguably had benefited least from the

⁷⁸*Population and Housing Census 1983: General Report: Volume 1: Administrative and Analytical Procedures*, Central Statistics Department, Ministry of Economic Planning and Industrial Development, October 1987, p. 65

⁷⁹Hughes, "The attempted Gambian *coup d'état*...", p. 97

⁸⁰*ibid.*, pp. 96-97

⁸¹*Population and Housing Census 1983*

intercommunal coalition governing the country since independence.⁸² The inner circle of conspirators comprised mostly illiterate taxi drivers and former Field Force members. Others associated with the coup such as the GRSP founder, Gibril George, Pap Secka and a dismissed Field Force officer, Ousman Bojang,⁸³ were not Jola. Once the coup was under way, many police and about half the Field Force's 500 members threw in their lot with the rebels, indicating a general absence of commitment to the government among the security forces if not any conscious and organized dissent.

Sallah suggests four main reasons for the coup attempt: economic hardship; the ethnic Jola factor; the personal ambition of Kukoi Sanyang; and external interference.⁸⁴ That the rebels could hope to capitalize on public discontent with corruption, economic problems and the tough budget recently handed down by the government⁸⁵ is clear, but this should probably be regarded as a facilitating factor rather than a primary motivation for the coup. The significance of the Jola connection tends to be played down by other commentators and it is noteworthy that once the coup was under way there was no apparent ethnic dimension such as the rounding up or settling of scores with prominent Mandinka.⁸⁶ Despite the reliance of the Gambian and Senegalese governments on allegations of foreign involvement in the coup as a justification for invoking the 1965 defence agreement, there is little evidence of such interference.⁸⁷ Hughes concludes the coup was "a domestic affair, plotted by a politically obscure group of individuals, civilian

⁸²Hughes, Arnold, "From colonialism to confederation: the Gambian experience of independence, 1965-1982", in Robin Cohen (ed.), *African Islands and Enclaves*, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1983, p. 69

⁸³Bojang, the only (former) Field Force participant of senior rank, had been dismissed earlier in the year for corruption [Wiseman, John A., "Attempted coup in The Gambia: Marxist revolution or punk rebellion?", *Communist Affairs*, Vol. I, 1982, p. 437].

⁸⁴Sallah, "Economics and politics in The Gambia", pp. 635ff

⁸⁵*The Annual Register...* 1981, p. 236

⁸⁶Gaye interview, January 1995

⁸⁷Hughes, "The attempted Gambian *coup d'état*...", pp. 101-02

and paramilitary, with mixed motives, but who, in their different ways, hoped to gain personally as much as ideologically from overthrowing the government. Others, radicals or non-politicals, opportunistically joined the fighting once it had begun, but these too were local people..."⁸⁶ There was little public understanding of the coup and one observer has described the local reactions as a mixture of indifference and excitement akin to watching a football match without knowing either of the teams.⁸⁹ An additional factor surmised by Wiseman is that the young radicals who conspired with disaffected Field Force lower ranks may have been stimulated by the coups of Rawlings in Ghana and Doe in Liberia.⁹⁰

After seizing the Field Force depot and armoury, the rebels fanned out to secure strategic objectives such as the airport, Radio Gambia and central Banjul and to arrest government ministers and senior police officers. The capture and effective use of Radio Gambia was a major success but, significantly, the rebels failed to take the central police station where the vice-president and other senior members of the government were able to take refuge, direct resistance operations and maintain communications with the outside world via the Senegalese high commission and the United States, Chinese and other embassies.⁹¹ By mid-morning arms were being handed out and public order and rebel discipline began to deteriorate, especially after the emptying of Mile Two prison. Widespread looting and killing followed. Many Gambians and Senegalese were forced to denounce the Jawara

⁸⁶Hughes, "The attempted Gambian *coup d'état*...", p. 104

⁸⁹Halifah Sallah interview, January 1995

⁹⁰Wiseman, John A., "Revolt in The Gambia: a pointless tragedy", *The Round Table*, No 284, October 1981, p. 378-79

⁹¹Dabo, Bakary, *et al.*, *The Voice of the People: the Story of the PPP, 1959-1989*, Baroueli, Banjul, 1992, pp. 100-02; M'Boob interview, January 1995

administration on the radio and 105 hostages were detained at the Field Force depot, including Lady Chilel Jawara and eight of the president's children.

The Senegalese intervention

Within 24 hours of the coup, the Gambian Government had once again invoked the 1965 Mutual Defence Agreement, under which both parties had pledged to "assist each other to secure their external security and defence against any form of threat."⁹² The exact circumstances of the formal request are unclear. One source suggests that Jawara himself made the request from London on the day of the coup, 30 July,⁹³ while another has him doing so in Dakar after flying there by chartered aircraft.⁹⁴ A former senior Jawara official has said the request came from Musa Camara, the Vice-President (and Acting President) in Banjul.⁹⁵ Others highlight the role of the Gambian foreign ministry,⁹⁶ particularly its allegedly pro-Senegalese Permanent Secretary, Ibou Taal, whose actions it is said left Jawara with little choice when confronted with a letter for his signature requesting military assistance.⁹⁷ The reality may be that there were several requests of varying degrees of formality and perhaps the only truly significant element in the confused accounts is the suggestion that Jawara may have been railroaded into seeking Senegalese aid by Taal (and later regretted this).

⁹²Proctor, "The Gambia's relations with Senegal...", p. 156

⁹³Keesing's, 6 November 1981, p. 31165

⁹⁴Hughes, "The attempted Gambian *coup d'état*...", p. 100

⁹⁵Interview with Swaebou Conateh, former Director of Broadcasting and Public Information, Banjul, January 1995

⁹⁶Heydara interview, January

⁹⁷*Africa Confidential*, 4 July 1984

The Gambian crisis provided Diouf with an opportunity to prove his mettle after having assumed the Senegalese presidency only six months previously on the retirement of his mentor, the independence leader and elder statesman, Léopold Senghor. Diouf said he "did not hesitate for a second" in approving the intervention, though worried about the possibility of other unfriendly countries responding to the rebels' call for assistance.⁹⁸ Jawara characterized the Senegalese intervention as honouring a moral and legal obligation under the mutual defence agreement⁹⁹ but Diouf was frank in referring to Senegal's self-interest in the matter.

In a remarkably swift response, Senegal intervened on the second day of the coup, 31 July, deploying 3,000 troops (over one third of its total military strength).¹⁰⁰ Paratroops landing at Yundum airport suffered casualties and also faced resistance in the Banjul-Kanifing area and the Western Division. As the Senegalese took control, the insurgents pulled out of Banjul and had fallen back to the Field Force depot by the morning of Sunday 2 August. Jawara returned to Banjul that day and the coup leaders fled to Guinea-Bissau via Casamance, though the Field Force depot was not finally recovered until 6 August. Some estimates put the death toll as high as 1,000 and damage to property and goods at 10 million pounds,¹⁰¹ while others suggest that less than 500 people died.¹⁰² A Senegalese diplomat explained some years later that the degree of bloodshed (allegedly 200 casualties in the first day) had been a major factor in prompting the

⁹⁸"Diouf: sleepless nights", p. 2021-22

⁹⁹Comments by President Jawara at a press conference on 8 August reported in Fadugba, "Battle for Banjul", p. 17

¹⁰⁰According to Heydara (interview January 1995) the Senegalese troops deployed as a precautionary measure in 1980 had been instructed to undertake reconnaissance activities with a view to possible future deployments.

¹⁰¹*The Annual Register...* 1981, p. 236; Hughes, "From colonialism to confederation...", p. 69

¹⁰²M'Boob interview; Sallah, "Economics and politics in The Gambia", p. 638

Senegalese intervention.¹⁰³ The official death toll among Senegalese troops was 30, a sacrifice recognized by a payment of \$1 million from the Jawara government to the Senegalese army for services rendered.

Popular belief in the complicity of Guinea-Bissau's Vice-Minister for the Armed Forces was given some credence by the rebels' visit to the Guinea-Bissau ambassador's residence on the first day of the coup, and by his government's condemnation of the Senegalese intervention and later refusal to hand over the fugitive coup plotters.¹⁰⁴ However, the coup leaders' desperate appeals for assistance from the Soviet Union, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Libya after the arrival of Senegalese forces¹⁰⁵ suggest that prior external involvement in the coup attempt was limited or non-existent. Jawara nevertheless alleged the coup attempt had been made "with encouragement and support from outside the country" and afterwards asserted there was "ample evidence to show that those who staged the coup had extensive and intensive training outside [The Gambia]... and advice, equipment, armourment and ammunition to carry out their plot."¹⁰⁶ Dakar radio also asserted there was a foreign link, noting the rebels were armed with Soviet weapons and vehicles.¹⁰⁷ President Diouf of Senegal continued after the intervention to insist the coup attempt had been "inspired, conceived and planned from abroad."¹⁰⁸ An official Senegalese statement stressed that the 1965 agreement provided for mutual help against any threat, which included not only external aggression but also destabilization. The

¹⁰³Interview with Muctar Kebbe, Senegalese High Commissioner in Banjul, January 1995

¹⁰⁴Hughes, "The attempted Gambian *coup d'état*...", pp. 100-01; Bakaar, *The Law of Treason*..., p. 21

¹⁰⁵Fadugba, "Battle for Banjul", p. 16

¹⁰⁶Comments by President Jawara at a press conference on 8 August reported in Fadugba, Nick, "Battle for Banjul", *African Affairs*, No 121, September 1981, p. 17

¹⁰⁷It later transpired these weapons were simply those obtained by the rebels from the Field Force armoury and vehicles had been recently imported by regular Lada agents in the area ["Gambie: vers l'union avec le Sénégal?", *Afrique Contemporaine*, No 117, September-October 1981, p. 26].

¹⁰⁸"Diouf: sleepless nights", *West Africa*, 31 August 1981, p. 2021

events in The Gambia, quite apart from the dangers they posed for Senegal itself, had been "incontestably within the field covered by the agreement."¹⁰⁹

The aftermath: Senegambia Confederation revived

The coup attempt in The Gambia and Senegal's intervention dramatically revived the impetus for closer bilateral relations. Speaking in Dakar in August 1981, Jawara said the crisis had "opened our eyes to the need to go further" in joining Senegal. "Our duty is to find a better form of cooperation which goes beyond the integration of security forces," he said.¹¹⁰ The occasion was the announcement of plans for a Senegambia Confederation, for which an agreement was signed in late 1981 and came into effect the following February.¹¹¹ The agreement established a confederal constitution providing for consultation and cooperation on foreign, defence and economic policy and a confederal legislature, with members drawn from the national parliaments on the basis of two thirds of the seats being allocated to Senegal. Also agreed was a theoretical framework for a future single government, even while stressing that each of the states maintained "independence and sovereignty." The President of Senegal was the President of the Confederation and the President of The Gambia was the Vice-President.

Between 1982 and 1985 protocols were agreed on common policies in the fields of defence and security, external relations, communications and information, but there was

¹⁰⁹"Gambia", *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 18, No 8, 1-31 August 1981, p. 6138

¹¹⁰"The Gambia", *Africa Research Bulletin*, p. 6139

¹¹¹Confederation agreement concluded between President Diouf of Senegal and President Jawara of The Gambia, 14 November 1981 [reproduced in *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 14, 1981-82]. Other accounts have the agreement signed on 17 December. The distinction between the two occasions is not clear.

little progress on two critical issues for Senegal: a customs union and a bridge over the River Gambia on the trans-Gambia highway to provide better access to Casamance.¹¹² The defence and security protocols provided for integrated confederal armed and security forces and, in effect, the stationing of Senegalese troops on Gambian territory.¹¹³ Cooperation in external relations entailed coordination of policies and some joint representation, without surrendering individual sovereignty.

Although the Confederation lasted until the end of 1989, little progress was made towards actual integration and there were early signs of friction in the relationship. In February 1985, the Gambian government demanded the recall of Senegal's High Commissioner after he ordered Senegalese troops to surround Banjul stadium during a tense soccer match between the two countries.¹¹⁴ The allegedly high-handed attitude of the Senegalese troops stationed in The Gambia had been causing resentment, and relations between the two governments were feeling the strain of prolonged negotiations on economic and monetary union.¹¹⁵ The latter had long been earnestly desired by the Senegalese who were frustrated by what they saw as foot-dragging by Banjul,¹¹⁶ but the idea attracted little support amongst Gambians whose re-export trade would be wiped out

¹¹²Phillips, "The Senegambia Confederation", p. 187-89

¹¹³Protocol on confederal defence and the integration of the Armed Forces of the Republic of the Gambia and the Republic of Senegal for the establishment of the Armed Forces of the Senegambia Confederation, 12 January 1983 and Protocol on confederal security and the integration of the Security Forces of the Republic of the Gambia and the Republic of Senegal for the establishment of the Security Forces of the Senegambia Confederation, 12 January 1983, reproduced in the *Official Gazette of the Senegambia Confederation*, Dakar, 5 May 1983. The confederal forces were assigned to duty stations in The Gambia [President of the Confederation Act Nos 27 and 28, *Official Gazette*..., 29 November 1984].

¹¹⁴The High Commissioner, Mbaye Mbenge, was later summarily retired by President Diouf as a result of this misstep [Omole, Tale, "The Senegambia Confederation, 1982-1987", *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 254, No 1480, May 1989, p. 261].

¹¹⁵*Times*, 3 April 1985

¹¹⁶Sallah, "Economics and politics in The Gambia", p. 642

overnight. More generally, the Confederation itself was seen as a Senegalese imposition that portended ethnic Wolof domination.¹¹⁷

The Confederation began to unravel when, on 19 August 1989, Senegal withdrew some of its troops from The Gambia, including those serving as presidential guard for Jawara. When the Gambian government complained that it had not been notified, the movement was suspended and the Senegalese defence minister met with President Jawara on 22 August to explain that the troops were required in connection with Senegal's dispute with Mauritania.¹¹⁸ Senegalese troops were also in demand for duty in Casamance¹¹⁹ where the secessionist insurgency had become a persistent irritant since its rekindling in December 1982.¹²⁰ On 24 August 1989, President Diouf suddenly declared in a televised address that the Confederation had not met its objectives and should be "frozen". He said the withdrawal of Senegalese troops from The Gambia would be the first step in the process and this resumed on 30 August.¹²¹ The Senegalese had reportedly been irritated by Jawara's recent request for a revision of the Confederation agreement so that the Confederation Presidency alternated between the two countries¹²² and for a reduction in the number of Senegalese troops stationed in The Gambia.¹²³ On 31 December 1989 the Confederation was formally dissolved. It was succeeded by a more modest treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in January 1991.

¹¹⁷Tennyson, Brian Douglas, "The Gambia: paradise lost?", *The Round Table*, No 311, July 1989, p. 307

¹¹⁸The confrontation with Mauritania was the most serious crisis in Senegalese history - there had been many deaths in ethnic fighting in the border region in April and an airlift to repatriate citizens of the two countries [Phillips, "The Senegambia Confederation", p. 175].

¹¹⁹Sallah, "Economics and politics in The Gambia", pp. 642-43

¹²⁰*Africa Confidential*, 23 November 1990; da Costa, Peter, "Casamance under siege", *West Africa*, January/February 1991, p. 101; Englebert, Pierre, "Senegal: recent history", *Africa South of the Sahara 1994*, Europa, London, 1993, p.

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¹²¹*Keesing's*, August 1989, p. 36840

¹²²Phillips suggests that this proposal was made by Jawara in retaliation for the abrupt withdrawal of Senegalese troops [Phillips, "The Senegambia Confederation", p. 175].

¹²³*Keesing's*, August 1989, p. 36840

Postscript

An anti-government plot uncovered at the end of January 1988 allegedly involved Kukoi Samba Sanyang and the recruitment of Gambian and Senegalese dissidents for training in Libya.¹²⁴ Disgruntled Gambian veterans of the Liberian peacekeeping operation staged pay protests in mid-June 1991 and February 1992. Later in 1992 there was a further threat linked to Kukoi, this time an alleged Libyan-backed invasion plot.¹²⁵ Finally, on 22 July 1994, The Gambia's 29-year record of constitutional government was brought to an abrupt end when a group of young army officers led by Lieutenant Yaya Jammeh staged a spontaneous coup. The rebels claimed to be acting against corruption in government and the coup came at a time of renewed economic stress in The Gambia.¹²⁶ Jammeh, a Jola, said that being disarmed and searched when they had gone to the airport to witness the return of the president from overseas the previous day had been the last straw.¹²⁷ Jawara, his Vice-President and other close associates took refuge on a visiting American warship¹²⁸ and were taken to Dakar. The Senegalese government declined to intervene, probably reflecting the generally poor state of relations following the collapse of the confederation in 1989 and a judgement that the army rebels were more palatable than the leftist radicals against whom Senegal had intervened in 1980 and 1981. When Jawara reached Dakar, the Senegalese authorities installed him in a house without a

¹²⁴ Keesing's, August 1988, pp. 36082-83

¹²⁵ Hughes, Arnold, "The Gambia: recent history", *Africa South of the Sahara 1994*, Europa, London, 1993, p. 393

¹²⁶ Da Costa, Peter, "The squeeze on the Gambia", *Africa Report*, March/April 1994, pp. 16-17

¹²⁷ Sieh, Rodney D., and Momodou Musa Secka, "Who is Lt Yaya Jammeh?", *West Africa*, 1-7 August 1994, pp. 1347-48

¹²⁸ A planned joint exercise with the Americans had provided the rebels with a pretext for access to weapons and even transport for their advance on State House.

telephone, from which he was unable to leave or speak to anyone other than his family for several weeks.¹²⁹

The Gambia as a case of microstate vulnerability

To recapitulate the overall approach for the case studies, The Gambia will now be assessed in light of the key variables contributing to microstate vulnerability that were highlighted in Chapter Two (and vice versa). Under the *political* heading these were colonial experiences and the special characteristics of politics in small societies. *Geographical* factors were location and physical characteristics. In the *economic* area, these were government resource constraints and the link between poverty/under-development and political instability. The 1981 coup attempt in The Gambia demonstrates the vulnerability even of a long-established and seemingly stable microstate government to a sudden threat from a small group of civilian radicals. As in Vanuatu, the generic factors of vulnerability identified in Chapter Two were evident to a great extent.

¹²⁹*The Independent*, 26 September 1994

Political variables

Colonial experience

In common with most microstates, The Gambia was not highly valued by its colonial master and neither was granting it independence seriously considered until a few years before the event. For the last 150 years prior to Gambian independence, Britain's continued possession of the territory reflected pre-1815 commercial interests, and even those early slaving interests had not been particularly strong given the general failure of the merchant adventurer companies.¹³⁰ Like other small British territories in West Africa, The Gambia did not control enough of its hinterland or seaboard to generate sufficient tax revenue to cover running costs and it came to be regarded as a liability ("fever-ridden, impoverished, boxed in by Senegal"),¹³¹ hence efforts in the late nineteenth century to exchange The Gambia for an alternative piece of colonial real estate. Without adequate use of the river, the territory remained economically stagnant and British administration operated in caretaker mode, focusing mainly on the Bathurst-centred Colony and making little change to the upriver way of life.¹³² That The Gambia was one of four small territories in the third of three grades of British colonial governorships in Africa provides a further indication of its low status.¹³³

¹³⁰Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires...*, pp. 129-30, 287

¹³¹Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa...*, p. 188

¹³²Welch, *Dream of Unity...*, pp. 260-61

¹³³Royle, Trevor, *Winds of Change: the End of Empire in Africa*, John Murray, London, 1996, p. 61

Given its small size and questionable economic viability, The Gambia was naturally among those colonial territories for which independence was only considered at a very late stage. Gambian statehood, or preferably federation with a larger state such as Senegal, only became a real prospect in the late 1950s, following the failure of the "Malta scheme" in 1956,¹³⁴ decisions to grant independence to other West African countries, and the willingness of Macmillan government to proceed with wholesale decolonization forthwith.¹³⁵ When the Labour government elected in Britain in late 1964 took up the business of decolonization unfinished by the Conservatives, its decision to deem The Gambia fit for independence confirmed the abandonment of all paternalistic criteria for readiness or viability.¹³⁶

There had been little pressure from Gambians themselves for self-government, since they saw continued British rule as a safeguard against Franco-Senegalese domination.¹³⁷ The record of political *preparation for self-government* in The Gambia, at least in respect of the Colony, was nevertheless reasonably positive compared to the experience of other mainland African microstates,¹³⁸ if not the larger West African colonies.¹³⁹ As early as 1888 a few educated Africans in Bathurst had been nominated to serve on the Legislative Council, though the Protectorate was not represented in this way for another 60 years.¹⁴⁰ The Constitution of 1888, modified in 1902, remained in force until after World War II, when a rapid succession of reforms gave Gambians progressively greater representation

¹³⁴The "Malta scheme" would have allowed the Maltese to send to Westminster three Members of Parliament as an alternative to independent statehood but the proposal was rejected by the Maltese government.

¹³⁵Welch, *Dream of Unity*..., pp. 270ff

¹³⁶Porter, A.N., and A.J. Stockwell (eds), *British Imperial Policy and Decolonization 1938-64, Vol. 2: 1951-64*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1989, pp. 82-83

¹³⁷Price, *Political Institutions*..., p. 43

¹³⁸See discussion in Chapter Two.

¹³⁹Price, *Political Institutions*..., p. 43

¹⁴⁰Hughes, "From green uprising to national reconciliation...", p. 62

in government and control over their own affairs. From 1947 the Colony was able to elect one representative to the otherwise appointed legislature and this was increased to three elected representatives in 1951. Also at this time the Governor effectively handed over day-to-day executive functions to a "Vice-President" of the Legislative Council, an office filled by a Gambian from the outset. Constitutional revisions in 1954 saw the number of elected representatives rise to 14 and the achievement of significant internal autonomy. From 1960, elected members of the Council, now renamed the House of Representatives, numbered 19, including 12 from the Protectorate to which universal adult suffrage was extended for the first time. In 1961, a Gambian was appointed Chief Minister, an office which would become Premier and, after independence, Prime Minister. By 1963 the country could be regarded as internally self-governing except in police matters, which, with defence and external affairs, remained the Governor's responsibility.¹⁴¹ The Gambia became fully independent on 18 February 1965 though, like many other Commonwealth countries, retained the British monarch as Head of State until a referendum endorsed a change to a republic in 1970.

Notwithstanding the record of steady progress towards self-government in the Colony, the extension of political representation to the Protectorate lagged well behind. Although there was a limited franchise in the Protectorate prior to the 1960 Constitution, the vote was restricted to "male yard owners" whereas all adults over 25 in the Colony were enfranchised.¹⁴² Even when universal adult suffrage was extended to the Protectorate in 1960, its restriction to those literate in English effectively excluded many of the

¹⁴¹Price, *Political Institutions...*, p. 91-94

¹⁴²"Politics in the Gambia", *West Africa*, 21 May 1960, p. 563

traditional leadership.¹⁴³ The differentiation between Colony and Protectorate and the formal ban on political parties campaigning in Protectorate areas before about 1960 ensured a heavy political bias towards Colony interests in the lead-up to independence and the advent of the PPP under Jawara.¹⁴⁴ This was a major cause of polarization in Gambian society,¹⁴⁵ given that the Bathurst/Kombo St Mary area, roughly equivalent to the Colony, comprised less than eight per cent of the total Gambian population at the time of the 1963 Census.

Similarly, the British authorities demonstrated a systematic approach to preparing Gambians for responsibility in the civil service but the lack of educational opportunity in the Protectorate meant that the Bathurst-based Aku and Wolof communities were much better represented than the Protectorate-based Mandinka (who made up almost half the Gambian population in the 1963 Census). This imbalance is illustrated graphically by the fact that as late as 1960 Jawara was still one of only two Mandinka university graduates.¹⁴⁶ In the final, independence-year report on "Gambianization of the civil service" to the House of Representatives,¹⁴⁷ covering June 1964 to June 1965, it was recorded that the following departments had been completely Gambianized: Accountant-General's, Customs, Education (except Yundum College), Labour, Land Office, Printing, Prisons and Surveys. Of the 24 officers in the Administrative Service, 13 were Gambians, though nine of these had less than three years' experience. The previous

¹⁴³Price, *Political Institutions...*, p. 93

¹⁴⁴Sallah, "Economics and politics in The Gambia", p. 622

¹⁴⁵Hughes, "From green uprising to national reconciliation...", p. 62

¹⁴⁶*ibid.*, p. 64

¹⁴⁷*The Gambianization of the Civil Service*, House of Representatives Sessional Paper No 15, 1965, Government Printer, Bathurst

report¹⁴⁸ stated the number of Gambians occupying more senior, pensionable positions in the civil service as follows: 17 in 1949; 53 in 1959; 78 in 1962; and 100 in 1964. The virtual doubling of the number in the last five years before independence implies a certain hastiness in Gambianization though presumably a proportion would have been gaining experience in lesser, non-pensionable positions for some years previously. Also of interest are the figures for pensionable non-Gambians who still numbered 47 in 1964, occupying about one-third of the pensionable positions and representing a relatively modest decline from the 1949 number of 79.

The Gambia's low value as a colonial asset was inevitably accompanied by *neglect* of economic and social infrastructure development. The French record in neighbouring Senegal has been judged much more favourably than that of the British in The Gambia, where the latter "did little to lay the foundations of a strong economy upon which could be built a viable nation."¹⁴⁹ By the time of independence, industrial development was limited to "two small peanut oil mills, a small fisheries plant and a small factory turning out shirts, singlets, umbrellas and plastic shoes."¹⁵⁰ Although the British government had invested generously in an attempt to develop an egg-producing industry, this ill-advised scheme had been abandoned with the loss of £5 million and the sale of not a single egg.¹⁵¹ It should also be noted that the meagre patrimony left by departing British was in part compensated by a relatively generous aid commitment to the new nation in its formative years.¹⁵² Perhaps inevitably, in light of the The Gambia's lack of natural resources on

¹⁴⁸*The Gambianization of the Civil Service*, House of Representatives Sessional Paper No 20, 1964, Government Printer, Bathurst

¹⁴⁹Editorial, *African Affairs*, No 121, September 1981, p. 18

¹⁵⁰Rice, *Enter Gambia...*, p. 1

¹⁵¹Wilson, H.S., *African Decolonization*, Edward Arnold, London, 1994, p. 150

¹⁵²Sallah, "Economics and politics in The Gambia", pp. 623-24

which to build economic activity, administration in The Gambia consumed a disproportionately large share of government expenditure (in 1960 salaries accounted for 46 per cent of the budget) and at the same time many essential services could not be afforded. The British have nevertheless been faulted for bequeathing a bloated administrative structure to independent Gambia and for not establishing common services among their West African colonies as they had done in East and Central Africa and as the French had maintained in West and Equatorial Africa.¹⁵³ In the provision of social infrastructure there was a marked difference between the Colony, where most schools and medical facilities were concentrated, and the Protectorate where social services lagged.¹⁵⁴ In its successful 1960 electoral campaign, the PPP held that the Protectorate had been "shamefully neglected in the past" and said its own political programme would emphasize the need to bring Protectorate educational and health facilities up to Bathurst standards.¹⁵⁵

Colonial policy was responsible for altering the *demographic make-up* of The Gambia to only a minor, but politically significant, degree. Due to the British arrangement of administering The Gambia as part of Sierra Leone for almost 50 years during the nineteenth century, a community of Sierra Leonean creoles, the Aku, was established in Bathurst and came to occupy most official positions.¹⁵⁶ The dichotomy between rural Mandinka and the urban Aku and Wolof was accentuated by the British colonial approach of dividing The Gambia into Colony and Protectorate. As noted above, the

¹⁵³Welch, *Dream of Unity*..., pp. 262-63

¹⁵⁴Gamble, *The Gambia*, p. xxxi

¹⁵⁵"Politics in the Gambia", *West Africa*, 21 May 1960, p. 563

¹⁵⁶Welch, *Dream of Unity*..., p. 255

Colony enjoyed the lion's share of British resources and attention and at Independence its population was consequently far more commercially, politically and educationally advanced than that of the Protectorate. A further historical division stemmed from the era of the Atlantic slave trade when coastal dwellers had had few scruples about capturing and selling hinterland peoples, whom they regarded as inferior.¹⁵⁷

Monopolization of the civil service by the Christian, educated and anglophile Aku, together with the Bathurst Wolof community, did not become as serious a point of contention as in nearby Guinea-Bissau where resentment of domination by the descendants of Cape Verdeans imported by the Portuguese as colonial auxiliaries was a major cause of the 1980 coup.¹⁵⁸ That the situation did not become similarly divisive in The Gambia was due largely to the concerted effort of the PPP under Jawara¹⁵⁹ to broaden its appeal beyond its original Mandinka base and to integrate other ethnic groups. It changed its name from Protectorate People's Party to People's Progressive Party and the government distributed political offices on an inter-communal basis.¹⁶⁰ The PPP succeeded in transforming itself from a Mandinka rural party into a "coalition of all ethnic groups, held together by an alliance of communal leaders sharing political office and selectively redistributing economic patronage to their constituencies."¹⁶¹ A significant early step in this direction was the PPP's merger with the Democratic-Congress Alliance, an urban coalition formed to oppose the stronger United Party.¹⁶² In

¹⁵⁷ Renner, "Ethnic affinity...", p. 74

¹⁵⁸ Forrest, Joshua B., "Guinea-Bissau since independence: a decade of domestic power struggles", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 25, No 1, 1987, p. 100-01; Munslow, Barry, "The 1980 coup in Guinea-Bissau", *Review of African Political Economy*, No 21, 1981, p. 110

¹⁵⁹ Wiseman judges that "no African leader has worked harder than [Jawara] to avoid any form of ethnic discrimination in public life [Wiseman, "Revolt in The Gambia...", p. 375].

¹⁶⁰ Hughes, "The Gambia: recent history", p. 392

¹⁶¹ Hughes, "The Gambia", p. 149

¹⁶² Nyang, Sulayman S., "Ten years of Gambia's independence", *Présence Africaine*, No 104, 4th quarter, 1977, p. 33-34

part this reflected the simple fact that the modest educational background and lack of experience in government of most Mandinka made it impractical to pass over Aku and urban Wolof who had the necessary skills. As late as 1974, there was still only one Mandinka at the most senior level of the bureaucracy and he had been appointed by the British. Inter-ethnic personal links, including Jawara's own marriage to the daughter of a leading Aku politician, were another factor militating against excessive "Mandinka'ization" after the PPP came to power.¹⁶³

The Gambia's *anomalous borders* delineated as a result of Anglo-French bargaining in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and has been described as a colonial *reductio ad absurdum*.¹⁶⁴ Phillips, a lone dissenting voice, points out that the seemingly arbitrary colonial borders did have an underlying political and economic logic, based on control of strategic coastal trading centres, that still resonates today.¹⁶⁵ The security implications of The Gambia's borders will be discussed below in the geographical section.

Politics in small societies

Had it not been for the uncharacteristic turmoil of 1980-1981, The Gambia would rank as a prime example of "*concerted political harmony*" in a small society. The microstate's small size, along with the imperative of distinguishing itself from all-enveloping Senegal, clearly helped foster a sense of common identity or "Gambian-ness".¹⁶⁶ Despite the

¹⁶³Hughes, "From green uprising to national reconciliation...", pp. 67, 70

¹⁶⁴Pakenham, Thomas, *The Scramble for Africa, 1876-1912*, Abacus, London, 1991, p. 675

¹⁶⁵Phillips, Lucie Colvin, "The Senegambia Federation", in Christopher L. Delgado and Sidi Jammeh (eds), *The Political Economy of Senegal Under Structural Adjustment*, Praeger, New York, 1991, p. 176

¹⁶⁶Hughes, "From colonialism to confederation...", p. 79; Hughes, "The Gambia", p. 149

potential for inter-tribal tensions, The Gambia managed to maintain one of the few stable, constitutional democracies in Africa. Unfortunately the the PPP's success in forging an intercommunal coalition was not complete enough to avoid the emergence of an underclass of disaffected urban youth, with fateful political repercussions in 1981. It has been suggested, with the benefit of hindsight, that the political stability ensured by the PPP's grip on the Mandinka vote rendered Gambian democracy a "shadow pluralism" that masked unhealthy realities of self-enrichment by a corrupt elite and a failure to apply generous overseas aid to real development.¹⁶⁷

It is possible to make the case that the "*exaggerated personalism*" typical of politics in small societies contributed to The Gambia's vulnerability in 1981. The PPP under Jawara had dominated the scene since 1962 with only minor challenges such as the former Vice-President Sheriff Dibba's breakaway party in the early 1970s. Saine judges that, by the mid-1970s, distinctions between Jawara's party and state leadership roles had become blurred and he was the central force around which all else revolved.¹⁶⁸ Hughes refers to Jawara's "personalist presidential leadership" and links the breakdown of political order to the narrowing of decision-making to "no more than a few dozen persons in the state and party apparatus with access to the President..."¹⁶⁹ On the other hand, it is pertinent to note that the personalism associated with Jawara's rule was also a positive, stabilizing force rather than being the anti-constitutional and authoritarian "personal rule" typical to Africa. Wiseman observes that Jawara occupied an "absolutely pivotal role" in Gambian

¹⁶⁷Scudder, Brian, "Reality hits home", *African Business*, February 1995, p. 18

¹⁶⁸Saine, Abdoulaye S.M., "The coup d'état in The Gambia, 1994: the end of the first Republic", *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 23, No 1, Fall 1996, pp. 99, 108 note 5

¹⁶⁹Hughes, "The Gambia", pp. 149-151

politics, including in the maintenance of a constitutional multi-party system. Through many shifting alliances Jawara remained the one fixed point. Wiseman has little doubt that changes in personnel, for example the move of former Vice-Presidents into opposition, had more to do with personal relationships with Jawara than ideological conversions. In his view, Jawara's conciliatory and pluralistic approach to politics was a major safeguard against the development of more authoritarian trends.¹⁷⁰

A similar assessment for The Gambia might be made in respect of "*leadership longevity*" as a factor of vulnerability in small polities. Jawara had already been in office for 19 years by the time of the 1981 coup attempt and had served a total of 32 years when toppled in the 1994 coup, but few would suggest that his extended hold on power was anything but generally beneficial. He was widely recognized for his role in defusing potential intercommunal rivalry and forging a national consensus. Criticism of the government by rebel elements in 1981 was directed more at Jawara's Ministers, the principal ones of whom had been in office since the early 1970s.¹⁷¹ A reluctant Jawara had to be persuaded by his party to run for re-election in 1992 and even the soldiers who seized power in 1994 urged Jawara to return as an honoured adviser and "father of the nation."¹⁷²

Apart from some alleged cronyism, for example in respect of inappropriate exploitation of Nigerian oil concessions by certain senior government figures during the 1980s, and

¹⁷⁰Wiseman, "The role of the House of Representatives...", pp. 82-83

¹⁷¹*Africa Confidential*, 19 August 1981

¹⁷²"Sir Dawda breaks his silence", *West Africa*, October 1994, p. 1747

use of patronage to entice opposition politicians to change their allegiance,¹⁷³ "*unrestrained executive power*" was not generally apparent in The Gambia. On the contrary, the Jawara government won plaudits from donors and human rights observers for its adherence to democratic processes, respect for individuals' rights, free press and relatively clean administration.

The final political vulnerability factor to examine is the potential perils of *militarization* in a small society. Along with fellow microstates, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, The Gambia was one of a small handful of African countries which did not engage in the construction and expansion of the military during the first two decades of independence.¹⁷⁴ At the time of the 1981 crisis, The Gambia remained very unmilitarized, with security forces limited to the 500-strong paramilitary Field Force and 650 police. Although the Field Force had recently begun to engage in annual joint exercises with the Senegalese army,¹⁷⁵ it does not appear to have developed much beyond the role for it drolly described in 1967: "backing up the police in case of riots (rare) or parades (frequent)... specializes in close drill, performs at most public functions and guards Government House."¹⁷⁶ The relaxed attitude to security was evident in President Jawara's practice of shopping at the local supermarket and the scanty detachment of less than a dozen Field Force personnel guarding his official residence.¹⁷⁷ On the other hand, the absence of substantial military forces could not protect The Gambia from extra-constitutional threats to political order indefinitely. Even the limited Field Force, half of

¹⁷³Hughes, "From green uprising to national reconciliation...", p. 71

¹⁷⁴Chazan *et al.*, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, p. 57

¹⁷⁵Ministry of External Affairs file MEA 6030 ("Senegalo - Cooperation - Police & Military"), Gambia National Archives

¹⁷⁶Rice, *Enter Gambia: the Birth of an Improbable Nation*, p. 16

¹⁷⁷Heydara interview, January 1994; Wiseman, "Revolt in The Gambia...", p. 375

whose members joined the coup in 1981,¹⁷⁸ proved a danger to the civilian authorities in the long run.

Subsequent events reinforce the point that militarization often undermines as much as bolsters security in small polities. Hughes was prophetic in that regard when he asked in 1991, "did the fledgling Gambian democracy narrowly overcome one danger only to expose itself to a future challenge from those very instruments created to counter that danger?"¹⁷⁹ Although the new forces created after the 1981 crisis were carefully balanced between gendarmerie, army and presidential guard, and Gambian military expenditure as a proportion of Gross National Product remained notably low by African standards,¹⁸⁰ it was not long before the military again challenged civilian authorities with pay protests in the early 1990s and the successful coup of 1994.

Geographical variables

Location

Like most microstates, The Gambia was to some extent a hostage to its location and unable to influence its external environment to any great degree. On the positive side, being located almost entirely within Senegalese territory created an automatic security

¹⁷⁸Faal, Ndey Aja, "That revolt in The Gambia: you can be a virgin only once", *New African*, No 168, September 1981, p. 48

¹⁷⁹Hughes, "The attempted Gambian coup d'état...", p. 106

¹⁸⁰Chazan *et al.*, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, p. 59

cushion, that is an ability to rely on Senegalese assistance, assuming commonality of interests (usually the case). As a strategically positioned entrepôt, The Gambia was able to carry on a lucrative re-export trade that became an important supplement to its limited economic resources. The same circumstance could, however, be a source of vulnerability as demonstrated by the Senegalese incursions against alleged Gambian smugglers that led Banjul to appeal to the United Nations, Britain and Nigeria in 1971. Close proximity to the rebellious Senegalese region of Casamance caused discomfort from time to time when Banjul became subject to Senegalese pressure to act against alleged Casamançais *indépendantiste* activity on Gambian soil. The wider West African region was also occasionally a source of insecurity: the radical MOJA opposition group was Liberian-inspired; the 1981 coup plotters may have been influenced by events in Liberia and Ghana and were alleged to have the support of influential figures in Guinea-Bissau where some of the conspirators found refuge; and the Gambian authorities sometimes had to contend with gun-runners and other illicit actors from Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau.¹⁸¹

Physical and demographic characteristics

The Gambia's peculiar physical configuration must be counted as a source of vulnerability. The separation of the River Gambia from its hinterland severely handicapped its potential as a regional transport artery (one of the finest navigable waterways in Africa¹⁸²) and dented The Gambia's economic prospects. As noted in

¹⁸¹The problem of gun-running associated with the Guinea-Bissau opposition group, FLING, is covered in the minutes of a meeting of the Senegalo-Gambian Joint Committee for Defence held in Banjul on 8-9 March 1976 [Ministry of External Affairs file MEA 6030 ("Senegalo - Cooperation - Police & Military"), Gambia National Archives]

¹⁸²Harrison-Church, "The Gambia, p. 392; Welch, *Dream of Unity...*, p. 252

Chapter Two, the lack of natural frontiers on the Senegambian savannah and consequent permeability of the borders presented great difficulties for police, customs and immigration officials while the ambiguity of demarcation occasionally caused tension with the Senegalese. The Gambia's elongated shape created exceptionally long borders relative to its land area and the narrowness of the territory left the country with virtually no strategic depth. The fact that in geographical terms Gambian territory is indistinguishable from the larger Senegambian region,¹⁸³ had implications for the political debate over The Gambia's continuance as a fully separate political entity.

As elsewhere in Africa, tribal linkages in The Gambia's region transcended national frontiers,¹⁸⁴ giving rise to the popular saying that, "every Gambian has a Senegalese cousin."¹⁸⁵ For example, the Wolof are not only a significant ethnic group in The Gambia, but comprise a major part of the population of Senegal (some 35 per cent in 1980). Similarly, the Mandinka people are well represented in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Mali, and the Fulbe are found throughout the region, notably in Guinea-Bissau, where they accounted for nearly a quarter of the population in 1980.¹⁸⁶ On occasion, cross-border connections of the Wolof and Jola communities aroused suspicion of divided loyalties, for example with Wolof accused of pushing integration with Senegal¹⁸⁷ and Jola considered to have undesirable links with Casamançais and Guinea-Bissau subversives.

¹⁸³Senghor, Jeggan C., "Senegambia - the logical bases for integration", *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, No 1, 1983, p. 6

¹⁸⁴See Asiwaju, *Partitioned Africans...* for a general perspective on trans-border ethnic relations in Africa.

¹⁸⁵Welch, *Dream of Unity...*, pp. 250-51

¹⁸⁶*The World in Figures*, p. 72

¹⁸⁷*Africa Confidential*, 1 July 1984

Economic variables

Government resource constraints

The inability to afford the creation of an army prior to the events of 1981 provides one early indicator of the government's struggle to meet its security needs. In the late 1950s the British had decided, for financial reasons, to disband the Royal West African Frontier Force, which had included a battalion unit in The Gambia,¹⁸⁸ and an army was not re-established at independence. With only just over 1,000 (mainly Banjul-based) police and Field Force personnel available to it, the government was in no position to ensure effective control of its national borders which extended inland for nearly 500 kilometres on either side of the river. Notwithstanding some spectacular early successes for its first patrol boat delivered in 1977,¹⁸⁹ neither was the government able to safeguard its offshore fishery grounds from poaching or to police its 320-kilometre offshore economic zone.¹⁹⁰ On the other hand, as noted above, the maintenance of substantial military forces does not necessarily guarantee security and, particularly in the context of a small polity, can sometimes have quite the opposite effect.

¹⁸⁸Gomez, *The Gambia's External Relations...*, p. 291

¹⁸⁹On its first mission the vessel arrested a poaching Polish factory ship and the out of court settlement of D750,000 paid almost the whole cost of the patrol boat ["Naval boat that makes a profit", *West Africa*, 12 June 1978, p. 1111].

¹⁹⁰Hughes, "The Gambia", p. 143

Poverty/under-development and political instability

In terms of the potential for poverty or under-development to contribute to political instability, The Gambia might be regarded as having been particularly vulnerable. A Least Developed Country, it ranked third to bottom of all states surveyed in the United Nations Development Programme's 1990 human development index (see **Table 2.15**). In 1959-1960, at the beginning of the period covered by this study, less than 25 percent of the school-age population in The Gambia (and similarly in Senegal) attended classes, resulting in almost total illiteracy in a European language outside urban centres.¹⁹¹ By 1991, the end of our period, The Gambia's literacy rate was still below 20 percent.¹⁹² The fact that The Gambia nevertheless managed to maintain political stability to such an extent is therefore noteworthy.

The backdrop of economic hardship against which the 1981 coup attempt took place nevertheless ensured a considerable degree of popular collaboration in the initial stages, as evidenced by widespread participation in looting. Preceding years had seen a rapid increase in the "low income consumer price index" and 1980 and 1981 had recorded export returns about half the level of 1979 mainly due to a drop in groundnut exports on which the small and undiversified Gambian economy was so dependent.¹⁹³ Unemployment had risen sharply and there was a severe shortage of essential goods such as meat, cooking oil, sugar and locally-produced foodstuffs.¹⁹⁴ It was in this deteriorating

¹⁹¹Welch, *Dream of Unity...*, p. 270

¹⁹²Da Costa, Peter, "The invisible opposition", *Africa Report*, March-April 1991, p. 46

¹⁹³*Quarterly Economic Review of Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Liberia, Annual Supplement 1982*, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1982, p. 34

¹⁹⁴Faal, "That revolt in The Gambia...", p. 48

economic environment that the tone of political dissent sharpened and a number of radical opposition groups, including the GRSP, sprang up among the young urban unemployed in the late 1970s.¹⁹⁵ On the face of it, the link between poverty and political instability in The Gambia of 1981 seems fairly clear, though Wiseman makes the valid point that some of the key supporters of the coup were Field Force members on a steady wage and that the rural peasantry most directly affected by the economic downturn did not support the coup.¹⁹⁶

The Gambia as a case of microstate dependence

In contrast to Vanuatu's slim relationship with its 1980 protector, Papua New Guinea, the relationship between The Gambia and Senegal was much more extensive and in the aftermath of the 1981 insurrection constituted an acute case of dependence arising from security needs. For a time, the Gambian authorities found themselves in a position of total reliance on the political and military backing of Senegal.¹⁹⁷ It remains to assess this relationship in terms of the indicators associated with the patron-client model outlined in Chapter Three: pervasiveness, conformity, informality and mutual benefit.

¹⁹⁵Dabo, *The Voice of the People...*, pp. 93-96

¹⁹⁶Wiseman, "Revolt in The Gambia...", p. 377

¹⁹⁷Hughes, "The Gambia at the crossroads", p. 227

Pervasiveness

At the most general level, Senegalese had a pervasive presence in Gambian society through the constant and age-old intermingling of the two populations. As a result, indigenous languages, religious beliefs, social values, patterns of living, traditional social and political organization were approximately the same within each ethnic group and across political boundaries.¹⁹⁸ The Senegalese High Commissioner in 1995 went so far as to describe Senegalese and Gambians as one people constituted in two states, citing the example that each other's radio stations were indistinguishable when broadcasting in indigenous languages.¹⁹⁹ At the time of the 1963 Census, one of every fifteen residents of The Gambia was Senegalese.²⁰⁰ The Senegalese community in Banjul tended to control most of the retail trade and skilled labour²⁰¹ and the Gambian economy as a whole was much more dependent on commerce with Senegal than vice versa.

There is anecdotal evidence from the pre-independence era of deep patron-like penetration of the Gambian political system by Senegal. The disposition of the first Chief Minister, P.S. N'jie, to entertain the possibility of federation with Senegal was alleged to stem from his kinship with Senegal's Wolof interior minister.²⁰² Around the same time, it has been claimed, Jawara's fledgling political career was supported by President Léopold Senghor who gave him a large sum of money to contest the 1962 general election. The money was supposedly used to build up Jawara's personal

¹⁹⁸Senghor, "Senegambia - the logical bases for integration", p. 8

¹⁹⁹Kebbe interview, January 1995

²⁰⁰Welch, *Dream of Unity...*, p. 250

²⁰¹Gaye interview, January 1995

²⁰²Welch, *Dream of Unity...*, p. 277

following in the countryside where his low-caste status had sometimes been an obstacle to endorsement by Mandinka chiefs and elders.²⁰³

The many joint ministerial and officials' committees set up under the treaties of the mid-1960s might also be seen as indicating a considerable degree of political integration and a potential for Senegalese domination. An instance of the latter was Senegal's unilateral announcement during a visit to Dakar by Jawara in 1968 that it had appointed one of its officials, Sedina Sy, to head the new Senegalo-Gambian secretariat in Banjul.²⁰⁴ In reality, little of substance emerged from the committees' deliberations, and cooperation agreements tended to gather dust.²⁰⁵ For example, provisions of the 1965 foreign affairs agreement for Senegalese training of Gambian diplomatic and consular officers had still not been implemented by the mid-70s.²⁰⁶ Provision had also been made for each country's High Commissioner to the other to attend Cabinet meetings in Banjul and Dakar but the idea was a non-starter.²⁰⁷ Sy, by then a Senegalese ambassador in Europe, told an academic colloquium in 1974 that the common will of the authorities to progress towards closer cooperation was "often crippled by bureaucratic dilatoriness" and senior officials represented "by far the most serious and tenacious barrier to the achievement of Senegambia."²⁰⁸

²⁰³Hughes, "From green uprising to national reconciliation...", p. 69, footnote 29

²⁰⁴*Africa Confidential*, 12 April 1968

²⁰⁵Halifah Sallah interview, January 1995, and Kebbe interview, January 1995

²⁰⁶Gomez, *The Gambia's External Relations...*, p. 532

²⁰⁷The Gambian High Commissioner was also foreign minister and seldom in Dakar while his Senegalese counterpart in Banjul did not speak English [Hughes, "Senegambia revisited...", p150, footnote 1].

²⁰⁸Sy, "Senegambian co-operation...", p. 131

Similarly, in the pre-1981 years, Senegalese penetration of the Gambian security establishment was negligible. Under the 1965 defence agreement Senegal was to provide technical assistance for the organization, staffing and instruction of any Gambian military or paramilitary units, and to provide training for Gambians in Senegalese military colleges,²⁰⁹ but government papers in the Gambia National Archives for the period reveal very little cooperation.²¹⁰ Proctor puts the lack of progress down to the inefficiency of the Senegalese bureaucracy, a lack of will on the part of the Senegalese leadership since the benefits of closer defence cooperation would lie mainly on the Gambian side, and the fact that the agreements laid out a more elaborate structure than actually necessary.²¹¹ Among the very few instances of practical cooperation on record are visits by Senegalese technicians to repair vehicles belonging to the Gambian police and Field Force in 1968 and 1976. In 1976, the Gambians conceded they had "not fully exploited" training offers made by Senegal but this was because they were not sure what was on offer.²¹² Contact was gradually stepped up in the mid- to late 1970s, with an official visit by the Gambian Inspector-General of Police to Senegal in February 1976 and a reciprocal mission by the Senegalese Armed Forces Chief of Staff the following month. Another high-ranking Senegalese officer came to The Gambia in September 1977 to discuss modalities of cooperation and the Gambians were invited to attend Senegalese military manoeuvres in October. The Gambian Field Force participated in a military exercise in Casamance with the Senegalese and French armed forces in 1979.

²⁰⁹Gomez, *The Gambia's External Relations...*, pp. 292-93

²¹⁰Ministry of External Affairs file series MEA 6030 ("Senegalo - Cooperation - Police & Military"), Gambia National Archives, Banjul

²¹¹Proctor, "The Gambia's relations with Senegal...", pp. 157-59

²¹²Minutes for a meeting of the Senegalo-Gambian Joint Committee for Defence, Banjul, 8-9 March 1976, Gambia National Archives, Banjul

The situation in the 1980s was altogether different, with the Senegalese maintaining a sizeable and much resented military force in The Gambia.²¹³ Immediately after the 1981 coup attempt Dakar established a pervasive military presence in Banjul that extended to the highest levels of government. Diouf placed 50 members of his own Presidential Guard and security services at Jawara's disposal²¹⁴ and a few weeks after the crisis a Senegalese army major was appointed as military adviser to Jawara.²¹⁵ The confederation agreement concluded at the end of 1981 provided for integration of the two countries' armed and security forces under the command of the President of Senegal as Confederation President.²¹⁶ Protocols signed in January 1983²¹⁷ elaborated the terms of the confederal forces based on integration of parts of the armed and security forces of each country under Senegalese leadership,²¹⁸ and provided a formal basis for the continuous stationing of Senegalese troops on Gambian territory.²¹⁹ In late 1984, after the post-coup situation had stabilized, the numbers for Senegalese participation in the new confederal forces were fixed at 470 troops and 273 gendarmes,²²⁰ though the actual numbers seem to have fluctuated and were said to total upwards of 1,200 at the time of the confederation's collapse in 1989.²²¹ Also created in 1984 was a Senegalese-led "confederal security squad" responsible for carrying out investigations, centralizing information and repressing all threats to the security of the Confederation.²²²

²¹³*Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde: Country Report No 3, 1989*, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1989, p. 14

²¹⁴"Diouf: sleepless nights", p. 2022

²¹⁵The officer was also designated assistant secretary in the Senegalo-Gambian secretariat, a post provided for under the 1965 mutual defence agreement but not previously filled [*Keesing's*, 6 November 1981, p. 31166].

²¹⁶The agreement also provided for the Gambian President to continue as commander in chief of the Gambian armed forces as distinct from confederal forces.

²¹⁷*Official Gazette*..., 5 May 1983

²¹⁸President of the Confederation Act Nos 33 and 35, *Official Gazette*..., 29 November 1984

²¹⁹The confederal forces were assigned to duty stations in The Gambia [President of the Confederation Act Nos 27 and 28, *Official Gazette*..., 29 November 1984].

²²⁰Confederal Minister of Defence Order Nos 007 and 008, *Official Gazette*..., 29 November 1984

²²¹300 troops and 900 other security personnel [*Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde: Country Report No 3, 1989*, p. 13]; *Keesing's*, August 1989, p. 36840

²²²President of the Confederation Act Nos 30 and 31, *Official Gazette*..., 29 November 1984

The Senegalese presence in the confederal armed and security forces was roughly three times that of Gambian personnel²²³ and Banjul resisted a proposal to integrate fully its soldiers within Senegalese units, preferring to maintain a separate Gambian company.²²⁴ As the new Gambian National Army developed in the second half of the 1980s, the dominant Senegalese presence was offset by the growing Gambian force which, by 1989, comprised an 820-strong infantry battalion and a marine unit of approximately 80 men equipped with three Chinese-built inshore patrol vessels. Training and equipment for the army were deliberately sourced from partners other than Senegal, including Britain, France, the United States, Morocco and Pakistan.²²⁵ In addition, a new paramilitary *gendarmerie* trained by Senegal fielded some 600 men, of whom approximately 100 served in the Presidential Guard alongside a larger Senegalese contingent.²²⁶

Conformity

To a large extent, the orientation of Gambian foreign policy in the first decade after independence followed the African mainstream, for example in respect of the Nigerian civil war (supporting the federal government), Rhodesia, apartheid and Portuguese decolonization. Gambian positions at the United Nations were closely identifiable with those of the emerging U.N. Africa Group and of the Council of Ministers of the

²²³Establishments in late 1984 were as follows. Confederal Infantry Battalion: 620 including 470 Senegalese and 150 Gambians. Confederal Gendarmerie Group: 383 including 273 Senegalese and 110 Gambian [Confederal Minister of Defence Order Nos 007 and 008, *Official Gazette*..., 29 November 1984].

²²⁴Phillips, "The Senegambia Confederation", p. 188

²²⁵Hughes, "The Gambia," p. 154

²²⁶*The Gambia, Mauritania: Country Profile 1993/94*, p. 6; Omole, "The Senegambia Confederation, 1982-1987", pp. 259-60

Organization of African Unity (OAU).²²⁷ The Gambia also saw eye to eye with Senegal on most foreign policy issues, both governments being moderate and pro-Western, and sharing a fear of destabilization by Libya and the communist world.²²⁸ Foreign policy commonality between Banjul and Dakar was particularly noticeable following the 1981 Senegalese intervention and confederation agreement. Both allowed Britain to use their airports during the Falklands War in 1982. Common positions were formally adopted for the 1983 Belgrade conference on North-South dialogue and in relations with the Arab Islamic states and Palestine Liberation Organization. Together Senegal and The Gambia stood apart from other African states in opposing admission of the Saharawi Democratic Republic to the Organization of African Unity in 1983,²²⁹ whereas their positions on the Western Sahara issue had previously differed.²³⁰

On earlier occasions, however, The Gambia adopted an idiosyncratic approach reflecting economic self-interest and the pragmatic philosophy of the long-serving foreign minister, A.B. Njie, who placed external assistance opportunities ahead of ideological considerations.²³¹ Warm relations with Israel were maintained from shortly after independence until 1972 (and yielded Israeli technical assistance in the agricultural sector) until The Gambia broke off relations at the time of the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973. Banjul had fallen into line with the OAU and responded to Arab pressure exerted through the Economic Commission for Africa. It subsequently joined the

²²⁷Gomez, *The Gambia's External Relations...*, pp. 364, 394

²²⁸Hughes, "The Senegambia Confederation", *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 244, No 1417, February 1984, p. 85

²²⁹Omole, "The Senegambia Confederation, 1982-1987", pp. 261-62

²³⁰See voting records at the United Nations General Assembly in 1979 and 1981 [Djonovich, Dusan J. (ed.), *United Nations Resolutions, Series I, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, Vols. XVIII and XX (1979-80 and 1981-82)*, Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, New York]

²³¹Gomez, *The Gambia's External Relations...*, p. 393

Organization of the Islamic Conference and secured bilateral aid from Libya and Saudi Arabia, and access to African Development Bank funds provided by Arab oil producers.²³² By 1981 almost 30 percent of The Gambia's foreign aid was coming from the Arab states.²³³ Similarly, The Gambia established diplomatic relations with Taiwan and received valuable technical assistance in improving rice yields until it abruptly transferred recognition to the People's Republic of China in December 1974, being one of the last African states to do so. Beijing quickly provided replacement advisers, a large loan and agricultural equipment.²³⁴ In the United Nations General Assembly in 1971, The Gambia had voted against recognition of the People's Republic of China while Senegal had voted in favour.²³⁵

Following the tension in relations with Senegal during 1969-71, Banjul sought to replace the sometimes stifling Dakar connection with a broader array of external relationships.²³⁶ Jawara embarked on a series of State Visits around the region and received the heads of state of Nigeria and Liberia. Old ties with, for example, Sierra Leone, were revitalized and new links were forged with Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania and Liberia.²³⁷ Closer Gambian ties with the radical regime in Guinea were particularly significant given the friction between Guinea and Senegal. A key catalyst in developing Gambia-Guinea relations was the decision to deport a number of exiled Guinean opposition activists from Banjul to Conakry (despite Senegalese protests).²³⁸ The Gambia also became an advocate

²³²ibid., pp. 365-82; *Africa Confidential*, 7 February 1975

²³³Nyang, "After the rebellion", p. 49

²³⁴Gomez, *The Gambia's External Relations...*, pp. 387-394

²³⁵Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971 [Djonovich, *United Nations Resolutions...*, Vol. X (1971-72), Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, New York]

²³⁶Hughes, Arnold, "Senegambia revisited or changing Gambian perceptions of integration with Senegal", in Bridges, *Senegambia...*, p. 140

²³⁷Hughes, "Senegambia revisited...", p. 153

²³⁸*Africa Confidential*, 28 May 1971

of regionalism, for example, being an early supporter, unlike Senegal, of the Nigeria-Togo initiative that ultimately led to the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).²³⁹ Participation in a broader regional framework was seen as less constricting than over-reliance on economic links with Senegal. After the collapse of the Senegambia Confederation, Jawara courted the protection of Nigeria to offset the chill in relations with Dakar.²⁴⁰

Banjul displayed sensitivity to perceptions that it was kow-towing to Dakar, as on the occasion of its breaking off relations with Tripoli in October 1980. The government strenuously denied media allegations that the move was a response to representations from Dakar which had taken a similar diplomatic step three months previously.²⁴¹ From time to time Banjul acted contrary to Dakar's wishes, for example in 1989 when it declined to meet a Senegalese request for a token Gambian force to be deployed to the troubled Senegal-Guinea-Bissau border.²⁴² In early 1989, Banjul had also refused a demand from Dakar to expel Mauritians from The Gambia at a time when they were being thrown out of Senegal in response to Mauritania's mass expulsion of black Mauritians into Senegal.²⁴³ The granting of refugee status by the Gambian government to Casamançais irritated the Senegalese authorities by implicitly internationalizing the Casamance insurgency.²⁴⁴ A long-standing litmus test of Gambian conformity is

²³⁹Robson, *Integration, Development and Equity...*, p. 127

²⁴⁰The closeness of security cooperation was evident in the provision of a Nigerian secondee to take over command of the Gambian army after pay protests in June 1991 [*Keesing's*, August 1991, p. 38381]. These and subsequent events in the 1990s are beyond the scope of this study but it is worth noting that Jawara's strategy of engaging alternative patrons may ultimately have been his downfall. Resentment of the Nigerian presence in the Gambian army was a major catalyst behind the July 1994 coup which overthrew Jawara [*Africa Confidential*, 2 December 1994]. Far from intervening in support of Jawara, Nigeria discreetly withdrew its military advisers from Banjul.

²⁴¹*Keesing's*, 30 January 1981, p. 30687

²⁴²*Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde: Country Report No 3, 1989*, p. 26

²⁴³Richmond, "Senegambia and the Confederation...", pp. 183-84

²⁴⁴Faye, Osseynou, "La crise casamançaise et les relations du Sénégal avec la Gambie et la Guinée-Bissau (1980-1992)", in Momar-Coumba Diop (ed.), *Le Sénégal et ses voisins*, Société-Espaces-Temps, Dakar, 1994, p. 202

provided by its lack of cooperation on a Transgambia bridge, a project keenly pursued by Senegal for both strategic and economic reasons. Despite a bilateral convention on the subject in 1975²⁴⁵ and numerous discussions over the years, the project never got off the ground due to Gambian resistance.²⁴⁶

Finally, the circumstances of the creation and dissolution of the confederation in the 1980s offer telling insights into the Banjul-Dakar relationship. The agreement has often been described as the price the Gambian government was forced to pay in return for Senegalese intervention to thwart the 1981 coup attempt.²⁴⁷ However, a number of sources suggest that confederation was not a Senegalese diktat but was in fact proposed by Jawara,²⁴⁸ albeit in rather disadvantageous circumstances.²⁴⁹ Jawara acknowledged that the Confederation would entail some loss of sovereignty but said this was inevitable in any such cooperation or coming together of two or more states, citing the examples of ECOWAS and the EEC.²⁵⁰ When the confederation was "summarily abandoned as a waste of time and money" by Diouf in 1989,²⁵¹ this was largely due to Senegalese

²⁴⁵ "Accord numéro XXII: Convention concernant l'Utilisation du Pont trans-Gambie, 13 novembre 1975", *Accords signés entre le Sénégal et la Gambie...*

²⁴⁶ Whiteman, Kaye, "Independence", in Philip Sweeney (ed.), *The Gambia and Senegal*, APA Publications, Hong Kong, 1990, p. 66; Sallah, "Economics and politics in The Gambia", p. 641

²⁴⁷ *Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde: Country Report No 3*, 1989, p. 14; Sallah, "Economics and politics in The Gambia", p. 640; Richmond, "Senegambia and the confederation...", p. 182; Pap Secka, one of the opposition personalities associated with the coup (interviewed January 1995) alleges that Dakar made the confederation agreement a precondition of its intervention; another leading opposition figure, Sheriff Dibba (interviewed January 1995), describes confederation as the quid pro quo for Senegalese reinstatement of Jawara.

²⁴⁸ Senegalese High Commissioner Kebbe (interviewed January 1995); Renner holds that confederation was broached by Jawara after the crisis [Renner, "Ethnic affinity...", p. 83 footnote 1]; Dibba (interviewed January 1995) while considering Jawara had little choice, surmises that he may have offered confederation at the beginning of the crisis as a carrot to entice Senegalese intervention.

²⁴⁹ Halifah Sallah (interviewed January 1995) considers Jawara offered confederation in panic because he realised Gambian security was now totally in the hands of Senegal. One Western diplomat commented, "I don't see how you can have a confederation when one state is so superior in all respects. The Gambians have no cards in their hands." [*International Herald Tribune*, 25 November 1981].

²⁵⁰ Comments by President Jawara at a press conference on 8 August reported in Fadugba, "Battle for Banjul", p. 17

²⁵¹ Whiteman, "Independence", p. 59

frustration at Gambian procrastination in realizing its more meaningful economic objectives and Gambian demands such as rotation of the presidency.

Informality

Whereas the Gambia-Senegal connection displayed significant elements of the pervasiveness and conformity attributed to patron-client relationships, it emphatically did not meet the criterion of informality. On the contrary, relations between the two states were marked by a plethora of formal treaties from the moment of Gambian independence. As described elsewhere in the chapter, these included the wide-ranging 1967 Treaty of Association and 1981 Confederation Agreement as well as several ambitious accords aiming to coordinate normally sovereign areas such as defence and foreign affairs. The 1965 defence agreement was an unusual instance of African states underwriting each other's security at independence when entering into agreements with the former colonial powers was more common.²⁵² By the same token, the 1983 defence and security protocols foreshadowed a rare degree of integration among the forces of two sovereign states, even if, in practice, each government was careful to retain its freedom of action (in Banjul's case by insisting on a separate Gambian company within the confederal forces and also on establishing new national forces of its own). Similarly, the elaborate joint secretariat and committee structures envisaged in the agreements such as the Senegalo-Gambian Joint Committee for Defence²⁵³ and the Confederal Defence and Security Council²⁵⁴ had little impact.

²⁵²See **Table 3.01**.

²⁵³Established under the 1965 defence agreement

²⁵⁴Established under President of the Confederation Act No 14, *Official Gazette*, 3 May 1984

Mutual benefit

The final indicator of a patron-client relationship, mutual benefit, is strongly in evidence in the case of The Gambia and Senegal. At the community level, Hughes observes that clientage and reciprocity are part of the political culture of both the Mandinka and the Wolof peoples, the two dominant ethnic groups in The Gambia and Senegal respectively.²⁵⁵ At the level of inter-state relations, the mutual benefits of cooperation in the security sphere between The Gambia and its much larger neighbour are clear. For the government in Banjul, reliance on Senegalese military might was a matter of survival in 1981 (and potentially in 1980 if the feared Libyan inspired coup attempt had come to pass). Senegal provided an effective security net in the fragile period after the 1981 coup attempt, including supplying a presidential guard, and gave the Gambian government a breathing space while the latter purged and reorganized its own security forces.

Dakar's vested interest in maintaining a stable and responsible government in Banjul was also self-evident. As Jawara put it in 1981, "the security of Senegal and The Gambia are intertwined... If security in The Gambia goes by the board naturally Senegal will feel threatened... if things in The Gambia are chaotic, Senegal will not escape the repercussions."²⁵⁶ At various times Dakar was concerned The Gambia might become a base for subversion by other African countries of a more radical political stripe such as Libya, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Guinea.²⁵⁷ It was also acutely conscious of the

²⁵⁵Hughes, "From green uprising to national reconciliation...", p. 67, footnote 23

²⁵⁶Comments by President Jawara at a press conference on 8 August reported in Fadugba, "Battle for Banjul", p. 17

²⁵⁷Robson, *Integration, Development and Equity...*, p. 125

potential for Senegalese dissidents such as the Islamic fundamentalist Ahmed Niasse or the Casamance separatists to utilize The Gambia as a refuge, recruiting ground and operations base. The seizure of power in Banjul by radical leftists would have sharply increased the likelihood of The Gambia becoming a haven for such subversives; and closure of the borders by a hostile regime in Banjul would have had a severe strategic and economic impact on Senegal.²⁵⁸ It is ironic, however, that the opportunity provided by the 1981 crisis for Senegal to station forces in The Gambia, where they would be well positioned to take action in Casamance,²⁵⁹ was closely followed by a resurgence of the *Casamançais indépendantistes*.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁸Hughes, Arnold, and Roy May, "Armies on loan: toward an explanation of trans-national military intervention among black African states, 1960-1985", in Simon Baynham (ed.), *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa*, Croom Helm, London, 1986, p. 193; Fadguba, "Battle for Banjul", p. 16

²⁵⁹Hughes, "The Senegambia Confederation", p. 84

²⁶⁰Sall, Ebrima, and Halifa Sallah, "Senegal and the Gambia: the politics of integration", in Diop, *Le Sénégal et ses voisins*, p. 134-35

CHAPTER SIX

CARIBBEAN CASE STUDY

GRENADA

In October 1983 a bloody power struggle within the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada prompted invasion by military forces of the United States and certain member countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. The intervention of the Grenadian regime's principal supporter, Havana, was limited to defence of Cuban positions on the island and the revolutionary government was swept aside four years after seizing power in a coup d'état. Grenada has the distinction of generating the one of the single most prominent microstate security crises of the period and its political life was internationalized to a much greater degree than any of the other case study microstates. Events in Grenada were a major catalyst for the attention devoted to the security problems of small states by the international and academic communities in the late 1980s, the 1985 Commonwealth study on vulnerability being a prominent example.

The Grenada case study is more complex than that of The Gambia, the Maldives and Vanuatu in terms of both the crisis itself and the role of Grenada's patron. In Grenada's case, the crisis had two major dimensions: a fratricidal struggle within the country's own leadership, followed by unsolicited foreign intervention. Further, the significance of the dependent relationship with Cuba, was clouded by the fact that, when the dual crisis came in 1983, Cuba was unable to play a leading role due to ignorance of, and

unwillingness to engage in, the internal struggle, and to impotence in respect of the American-led invasion. Ironically, while the Cuba-Grenada link was perhaps the most classic exposition of the patron-client model, it was also the one relationship among the case studies that failed to deliver the essential client benefit of regime survival. Grenada is assessed in terms of the typical factors of microstate vulnerability outlined in Chapter Two, and its relationship with Cuba is considered in light of the patron-client model introduced in Chapter Three.

Background

Geographical setting¹

Located in the eastern Caribbean, Grenada is the most southerly of the Windward Islands. Trinidad lies 150 kilometres to the south and St Vincent 100 kilometres to the north. The country comprises the main island of Grenada and the two smaller islands of Carriacou and Petite Martinique, covering a total of 344 kilometres. Grenada itself is mountainous with rainforest at the centre and the capital, St George's, is situated on a harbour in the south-east.

Grenada, with a population of approximately 90,000 at the time of the 1983 crisis, had one of the smallest and most densely populated territories of the Caribbean microstates.

¹See Figures 6.01 and 6.02.

The great majority of the population lived on the island of Grenada itself² but remained largely rural, with only 7,500 concentrated in the capital, this constituting a very low level of urbanization by Caribbean standards.³ Significant emigration had blunted the impact of natural increase for much of the twentieth century, and in the 1970s the population actually decreased due to a sudden drop in the birth rate and rise in emigration.⁴ Grenadians are of predominantly African descent. In 1980, ethnic Africans made up 84 per cent of the population, mulattos 11 per cent, Indians three per cent and Europeans one per cent. Grenada's main exports were cocoa, spices (for example, nutmeg and mace) and bananas. Tourism was also becoming important and grew significantly after the completion of the new international airport at Point Salines in 1985.

History

Grenada was settled, perhaps as early as the first century A.D., by Arawak people originating from the Amazon Basin. Around 1000 A.D. they were replaced by the more warlike Caribs. The first European to sight Grenada was Christopher Columbus in 1498. After an abortive English attempt to establish a colony in 1609, the French succeeded in establishing a foothold in 1650, though had to contend with vigorous resistance from the Carib population, which they ultimately all but exterminated.⁵ Grenada was a colony of the French Crown from 1674 to 1763, when the island was ceded to Britain under the

²98 percent in 1992 ["Grenada: political and economic renewal", *The Courier*, No 134, July-August 1992, p. 30].

³Pool, Gail R., "Shifts in Grenadian migration: an historical perspective", *International Migration Review*, Vol. 23, No 2, Summer 1989, p. 241

⁴Pool, "Shifts in Grenadian migration...", pp. 247-49

⁵Brizan, George, *Grenada: Island of Conflict: From Amerindians to People's Revolution, 1498-1979*, Zed Books, London, 1984, pp. 1-20

Treaty of Paris as a result of a long war in which France lost almost all its Caribbean possessions.⁶ France recaptured Grenada in 1779 but returned it to Britain under a further peace settlement four years later.⁷ The British faced one more serious threat to their control, in 1795-1796, when the "Fedon revolt" by freed coloureds, slaves and French sympathisers caused major loss of life and destruction of plantation estates.

Like the other "ceded islands" of Dominica, St Vincent and Tobago, Grenada was given a representative assembly along the lines of those already established in the older British colonies of the region. However, the small size of the free landholding population in the ceded islands hampered the functioning of the assemblies and development of a viable system of local government. In the post-emancipation era the limitations of a system of self-government, designed originally for colonies of Englishmen and representative only of the white oligarchy, became more pronounced in the Caribbean. After civil unrest in Jamaica in the 1860s there was a constitutional reorganization in the British Caribbean. Only Barbados retained its representative assembly while most others, such as the Windward Islands (the administrative grouping which included Grenada⁸) were placed under full administration by the Crown.⁹ Partial representative government was restored in Grenada through constitutional amendments in 1924 and 1936. Although the latter reform saw the number of elected members equal that of ex officio and nominated members for the first time, the Governor's reserve powers enabled him to push through

⁶Knight, Franklin W., *The Caribbean: the Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism* (second edition), Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, pp. 336-37; Brizan, *Grenada: Island of Conflict...*, p. 21

⁷Brizan, *Grenada: Island of Conflict...*, pp. 43-48

⁸Grenada became a Crown Colony in 1879.

⁹Knight, *The Caribbean...*, pp. 280-83. Archer suggests that Grenada's old representative assembly willingly surrendered its power to the Governor and his appointed Legislative Council in the face of growing pressure from excluded groups to liberalize the franchise [Archer, Ewart, "Gairicism, revolution and reorganisation: three decades of turbulence in Grenada", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XXIII, No 2, July 1985, p. 93].

rejected legislation, and the franchise remained limited to property owners.¹⁰

Britain did not initially envisage its Caribbean island territories achieving separate independence and regarded federation as a more viable model for decolonization. In 1958 it created the West Indies Federation comprising Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands. In the mid-1950s Grenada had been mooted as the possible site for the federal capital,¹¹ but Trinidad became the seat of government. The federation broke up following Jamaica's referendum decision to withdraw in 1961 and Trinidad's subsequent departure (both became independent in their own right in 1962). Barbados and the Windward and Leewards continued as a rump federation, but the independence of Barbados in 1966 spelled the end of efforts at union. The remaining federation members were each granted "associated statehood" and internal self-government. Grenada, an associated state since March 1967, became the first to move to full independence in February 1974.

Military service abroad in the First World War radicalized segments of the nonwhite population and their political agitation amongst workers in the economically depressed territories laid the groundwork for the generation of Caribbean politicians, such as Grenada's Eric Gairy, that later oversaw the dismantling of colonialism. From the early 1950s Grenadian politics was dominated by Gairy, who had returned from working in the Dutch Caribbean oil fields in 1949 at the age of 27. Active in organizing opposition of

¹⁰Singham, A.W., "Legislative-Executive relations in smaller territories", in Burton Benedict (ed.), *Problems of Smaller Territories*, Athlone Press, London, 1967, pp. 110-11

¹¹Porter, A.N., and A.J. Stockwell (eds), *British Imperial Policy and Decolonization 1938-64*, Vol. 2: 1951-64, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1989, pp. 414-15

estate workers to planters and British colonial administration, he built up a devoted following. Trade union-based parties were at the forefront of early political activity in the Caribbean territories and Gairy's Grenada United Labour Party grew out of the Grenada Manual and Mental Workers Union that he formed in July 1950.¹²

The sudden emergence of a militant labour movement coincided with the granting of universal adult suffrage in Grenada. Gairy played a prominent role in the turbulent general strike of 1951 that prompted the declaration of a state of emergency, deployment of British troops and his own detention. He was elected to the Legislative Council in the 1951 election and his party held power until 1957, when Gairy was banned from politics for five years for violence against his opponents. Constitutional changes in 1959 meant that when Gairy returned to office in 1961 it was as Chief Minister, though he was suspended the following year for corruption.¹³ Gairy nevertheless went on to lead the country to independence in 1974 and became its first Prime Minister.

Grenada in the modern era

The Gairy years after independence, 1974-79

Released from the fetters of associated statehood with Britain, Gairy was free to exploit his position more than ever. He expropriated much of the US\$10 million grant provided by Britain at independence and used his Haitian-style "mongoose gang" to terrorize

¹²Knight, *The Caribbean...*, pp. 287, 290-91, 297, 300, 328

¹³Lewis, David E., *Reform and Revolution in Grenada, 1950 to 1981*, Casa de las Americas, Havana, 1984, pp. 16-19, 34; Brizan, *Grenada: Island of Conflict...*, pp. 321-23

political opponents and extort money from local businesses. The economy and social services declined under the weight of government corruption and mismanagement, with per capita income falling by three per cent per annum during the 1970s and unemployment reaching 50 per cent of the labour force by 1979.¹⁴ Economic "policy" was reduced to a desperate search for foreign aid to plug the government's fiscal gap.¹⁵ Cohen concludes that the Gairy regime was "simply incompetent, where it was not corrupt and autocratic."¹⁶

An environment of constant political unrest and escalating rounds of repression led to ever greater resistance against the regime.¹⁷ Opposition groups from both ends of the political spectrum, that is the established parties of the conservative oligarchy and the recently formed leftist New Jewel Movement (NJM), joined forces in the 1976 election to secure six parliamentary seats out of 15. They alleged Gairy had cheated them of a further three through electoral malpractice. With 35 per cent of the vote and three seats of its own, the NJM under Maurice Bishop became the official opposition.¹⁸ Bishop himself had earlier links to the Black Power movement¹⁹ and his party was the most radical of the groups that had demonstrated against Gairy in pre-independence unrest in 1973.²⁰ It had been founded that year in a merger of two smaller parties and followed a Commonwealth Caribbean trend for "new left" political groupings of middle-class

¹⁴Clarke, Colin, "Grenada: society and politics in a small state", in Colin Clarke (ed.), *Society and Politics in the Caribbean*, Macmillan, London, 1991, p. 134

¹⁵Kirton, Claremont D., "Development planning in the Grenada revolution", *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 38, No 3, 1989, p. 6

¹⁶Cohen, Robin, "Unmaking Grenada's revolution", *New Society*, 3 November 1983, p. 196

¹⁷Pryor, Frederic L., *Revolutionary Grenada: a Study in Political Economy*, Praeger, New York, 1986, p. 3

¹⁸Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", pp. 181, 190

¹⁹Archer, "Gairicism, revolution and reorganisation...", p. 97

²⁰Fraser, Peter, "A revolutionary Governor-General? The Grenada crisis of 1983", in D.A. Low (ed.), *Constitutional Heads and Political Crises: Commonwealth Episodes, 1945-85*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988, p. 142

previously been beaten and jailed by the regime.²⁴ Other sources speculate that an unexpected investigation into NJM arms smuggling activities may have precipitated the group's coup against Gairy. On 12 March 1979 Grenadian police working with investigators from the United States Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms arrested one NJM leader and interrogated others.²⁵ That night the leadership decided to move immediately to overthrow the government and in the early hours of 13 March small groups of NJM supporters successfully carried out the first ever coup d'état in the English-speaking Caribbean,²⁶ proclaiming a "People's Revolutionary Government" (PRG). In a significant indication of their differing approaches, which would be echoed in the regime's self-destruction four years later, Bishop had voted against proceeding with a coup, while Coard and others had voted to go ahead.²⁷ Gairy, who had been out of the country to address the United Nations General Assembly in New York, appealed in vain for American military intervention.²⁸

Notwithstanding the small number of individuals involved and Gairy's enduring support from among the black peasantry, Manigat suggests that, in its immediate aftermath, the coup enjoyed a high level of popular support (perhaps 85 per cent), as a blow against "personal dictatorship, external dependence, economic exploitation, social injustice, and national misdevelopment."²⁹ Even the business community and "many respectable, middle class professionals, bureaucrats and white collar workers welcomed the Bishop

²⁴O'Keefe, Phil, John Soussan and Paul Susman, "A sad note for Grenada", *Political Geographical Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No 2, April 1984, p. 153

²⁵Pastor, Robert A., *Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1992, p. 147

²⁶"Grenada: political and economic renewal", p. 19

²⁷Pastor, *Whirlpool...*, p. 148

²⁸*Keesing's*, 29 June 1979

²⁹Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 190

regime... as restoring some kind of rationality to the economic and political process." For them Gairy had become an embarrassing relic whose random excesses and eccentricities were an affront to their sense of morality and their national pride.³⁰ The NJM would later confuse this middle-class relief at the removal of Gairy with support for socialist change.³¹

The PRG years, 1979-83

By some accounts, the PRG applied itself effectively in its first three years to improving the economy. Replacing Gairy-era corruption with managerial competence, hard work and systematic development planning saw GNP rise, it is claimed, three per cent in 1981 and more than 5.5 per cent in 1982 despite a regional recession. An increased budget surplus was achieved in 1982, while at the same time ambitious social programmes in education, health, housing, employment and culture were pursued.³² Grenada's economy was ostensibly restored to a level comparable with regional counterparts and unemployment was reduced from 50 per cent in 1979 to 15 per cent in 1982.³³ In order to calm potential international hostility, the PRG had included several local business figures in its initial administration, a decision which Bishop later contrasted with the provocative move by the 1981 coup conspirators in The Gambia of immediately declaring their Marxist-Leninist affinity.³⁴ While it is true that the PRG's performance attracted plaudits

³⁰Cohen, "Unmaking Grenada's revolution", p. 196

³¹Maingot, "Cuba and the Commonwealth Caribbean...", p. 27

³²Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 183-84

³³When one took into account the much higher proportion of Grenadians in the armed forces the real figure was in the 15 to 20 per cent range which was standard for the region at the time [Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", p. 146].

³⁴"Line of March for the Party presented by Comrade Maurice Bishop... to General Meeting of the Party on Monday 13th September 1982", *Grenada Documents: an Overview and Selection*, U.S. Departments of State and Defense, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 1:19-20

from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, doubt was subsequently cast on the regime's achievements by some observers. Archer, for example, suggests that economic growth was similar to levels recorded in Gairy's final years, that PRG social accomplishments such as the abolition of secondary school fees had already been scheduled by the old regime, and that the PRG's main success was attracting substantially increased foreign aid.³⁵

Actual development of the economy was a taller order, however, and by 1982 the PRG's popular support was beginning to level off. Falling business confidence due to suspicion of the regime's intentions towards the private sector was exacerbated by a world recession and declining prices for export commodities.³⁶ The government's centrepiece infrastructure project, the construction of a new international airport, was causing a serious balance of payments and liquidity problem³⁷ and a sharp increase in the public sector deficit in 1982 required IMF assistance.³⁸ Against this backdrop, the PRG was failing to mobilize public support, apart from amongst unemployed urban youth. Significant numbers of the rural poor remained faithful to "Gairicism" (black peasant populism) if not to Gairy personally, while the churches, business community and population at large were increasingly hostile to the regime's communist orientation and its failure to restore constitutional processes.³⁹ The PRG's attempt to organize the masses in a militia and women's and youth groups had been poorly supported.⁴⁰ Despite its

³⁵Archer, "Gairicism, revolution and reorganisation...", p. 105

³⁶Thorndike, Tony, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1985, p. 73

³⁷Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", pp. 146-47

³⁸*Keesing's*, January 1984

³⁹Maingot, "Cuba and the Commonwealth Caribbean...", p. 27; Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 198; Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 73

⁴⁰Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", p. 147

seemingly successful economic management and social programmes, the regime became increasingly fixated by its own radical rhetoric⁴¹ and failed to move beyond its initial reliance on rule by decree towards a "routinized" administration.⁴²

Manigat suggests that by 1982 the regime's popularity was "melting like snow under the sun" and the leadership rightly feared an imminent collapse of the revolution.⁴³ To keep this in perspective, however, it should be noted that later opinion surveys revealed considerable popular backing for the PRG. Pool found in the mid-1983 that 63.3 per cent of Grenadians interviewed felt that life had improved in Grenada⁴⁴ and the following year, in the aftermath of American military intervention, 73.8 per cent of respondents told Barriteau and Clarke they considered the PRG had had very good levels of support. The latter survey also underlined the public's distinction between the PRG's achievements in the socio-economic sphere and its political shortcomings in failing to schedule elections, diminishing freedom of speech and becoming overly dependent on Cuba.⁴⁵

Hostility on the part of the United States and Grenada's Commonwealth Caribbean neighbours and fear of a Gairy-inspired mercenary invasion prompted the PRG to embark on a major militarization programme with assistance from Cuba and other Eastern bloc countries. Incidents such as a bomb explosion at a government political rally in June 1980, increased the regime's obsession with security threats.⁴⁶ The former police service

⁴¹Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 184

⁴²Cohen, "Unmaking Grenada's revolution", p. 197

⁴³Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 197

⁴⁴Pool, "Shifts in Grenadian migration...", pp. 251-52

⁴⁵Barriteau, Eudine, and Roberta Clarke, "Grenadian perceptions of the People's Revolutionary Government and its policies", *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. 38, No 3, 1989, pp. 58, 85

⁴⁶Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", p. 144

and army were disbanded⁴⁷ and new People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (PRAF) established. The latter was initially built up to a strength of about 1,000, the same size as the former armed forces, drawing recruits mainly from young unemployed or under-employed and the Rastafarian movement.⁴⁸ By 1983 the PRAF had grown to nearly 2,000 and there were plans for further rapid expansion to a total of 11,000 (15 per cent of the adult population) by 1985.⁴⁹ Large quantities of armaments were imported.

The United States was deeply suspicious of the PRG's warm relations with Havana and especially of the Point Salines international airport project pursued with Cuban material assistance. The airport had been mooted by the British colonial authorities as early as 1926 and endorsed in studies carried out by Canada, the World Bank and others before finally being commenced under Gairy in the 1970s.⁵⁰ Despite Grenadian protestations that the new airport was essential for the expansion of the tourism industry and was not a military facility, Washington foresaw Point Salines being utilized by the Cubans and Soviets as a staging point for military deployments to Latin America and Africa. One United States diplomat described the facility as a "stationary aircraft carrier."⁵¹ It was also seen as a threat to sea lanes and oil transport routes of direct commercial and strategic importance to the United States,⁵² as well as to the oilfields of Venezuela and Trinidad.⁵³ Experts including the British electronics contractors testified to the absence

⁴⁷Pastor, *Whirlpool...*, p. 149

⁴⁸Keesing's, 29 June 1979

⁴⁹Thomdike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 121

⁵⁰Ironically, the NJM had opposed the project but once in power realised its economic importance [Thomdike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 125].

⁵¹Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, pp. 110-11. Anderson provides a projection of the range of Cuban MIG-23 fighter planes from Point Salines [Anderson, Thomas D., *Geopolitics of the Caribbean: Ministates in a Wider World*, Praeger, New York, 1984, p. 135].

⁵²Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 188; Sutton, Paul, "The politics of small state security in the Caribbean", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XXXI, No 2, July 1993, p. 4

⁵³Thomdike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 128

of military-standard features in the construction, though the Grenadian public assumed the airport would indeed be used by the Cuban and Soviet military when completed⁵⁴ and even the PRG leadership occasionally conceded this likelihood.⁵⁵

The United States suspended virtually all aid to Grenada, excluded it from post-hurricane assistance, vetoed US\$4 million aid from Caribbean Development Bank in 1982, excluded Grenada from President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative in February 1982, and pressed the EEC, IMF and World Bank not to grant assistance to Grenada in the early 1980s.⁵⁶ The British government exerted similar pressure⁵⁷ while Commonwealth Caribbean neighbours gave the PRG the cold shoulder, fearing that its extra-constitutional behaviour could be emulated in their own countries or that Grenada might become a base for subversive activities around the region.⁵⁸ Ominously foreshadowing its actions in 1983, the United States staged a military exercise off Puerto Rico in 1981 simulating the invasion of a fictitious Amber and the Amberines to overthrow a Marxist regime.⁵⁹

It has been speculated that Cuba may have given the NJM prior encouragement to mount its coup, but no evidence of direct Cuban complicity has been presented.⁶⁰ Cuba nevertheless stepped in immediately to recognize and assist the revolutionary regime

⁵⁴Falcoff, Mark, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada: notes towards a inner history", in Howard J. Wiarda and Mark Falcoff, with Ernest Evans and Jiri and Virginia Valenta, *The Communist Challenge in the Caribbean and Central America*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC, 1987, p. 189

⁵⁵Mertine, John W., "Soviet-Cuban foreign policy in the Caribbean: was Grenada a setback?", in Scott MacDonald, Harald M. Sandstrom and Paul B. Goodwin (eds), *The Caribbean After Grenada: Revolution, Conflict and Democracy*, Praeger, New York, 1988, p. 259

⁵⁶Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 189-90

⁵⁷Payne, Anthony, "The Grenada crisis in British politics", *The Round Table*, No 292, October 1984, p. 404

⁵⁸Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 57, 127

⁵⁹Connell-Smith, Gordon, "The Grenada invasion in historical perspective: from Monroe to Reagan", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No 2, April 1984, p. 442

⁶⁰Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 183

with early shipments of arms and technical advisers, as discussed below. Other Eastern bloc countries such as East Germany and North Korea also offered material support. The Soviet Union, though somewhat ambivalent towards Grenada, eventually provided significant additional military and other assistance.⁶¹

The crisis of October 1983 and Cuba's role

The crisis unfolds

As the PRG's difficulties multiplied in 1982 the regime's internal cohesion was also strained. Increasing friction over party leadership, organization and discipline saw opposing factions coalesce around the pragmatic and charismatic Bishop on the one hand and the dogmatic Leninist Coard on the other. A key member of the Coard faction was General Hudson Austin, commander of the army. While Bishop was inclined to relieve external and domestic pressure on the PRG by drafting an electoral timetable and seeking rapprochement with the United States, the Coard faction was bent on further radicalization according to Leninist principles and rigid alignment with the Eastern bloc. At first it seemed Bishop had the upper hand, and Coard resigned from the party's Central Committee in October 1982.

At the Central Committee's next meeting in July 1983 there was great concern and

⁶¹Erisman, H. Michael, *Cuba's International Relations: the Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1985, p. 145

argument about the party's course, its fading popular support and failure to move forward ideologically and organizationally. In August, Bishop admitted the party was close to disintegration.⁶² At a further meeting of the Central Committee from 14-17 September 1983, Coard's return was agreed and it was decided to transfer control of economic and party matters to him, though leaving Bishop as party leader. When the party membership met on 25 September, Bishop reluctantly accepted the principle of joint leadership before departing on a foreign tour that kept him out of the country until 8 October. In Bishop's absence Coard had his own supporters take over key positions.

By now, tension between Coard and Bishop factions was so great that both sides feared assassination by the other. On 14 October the Central Committee placed Bishop under house arrest after he had renounced his earlier agreement to joint leadership. Meetings between Bishop and the Central Committee majority who opposed him continued, but on 19 October a crowd of Bishop's supporters freed him and took over the military headquarters at Fort Rupert.⁶³ During the military's retaking of the fort the same day, Bishop and a number of his close associates were killed (including three ministers), as well as more than 50 demonstrators.⁶⁴ The army took control and formed a short-lived Revolutionary Military Council headed by Austin.

⁶²Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", pp. 149-50

⁶³ibid., pp. 150-51

⁶⁴Ironically, the fort had been renamed by the PRG to commemorate Bishop's father, Rupert, who was killed by Gairy's police during a 1974 demonstration [Brizan, *Grenada: Island of Conflict...*, p. 26].

Regional reaction and invasion

Regional opinion was outraged by the brutal elimination of Bishop and his colleagues, and emergency sessions were convened of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) on 21 October and of the Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM) on 22-23 October. Grenada was suspended from membership of the latter; air and sea links were cut; and Jamaica and Dominica broke diplomatic links with St George's. CARICOM was divided, however, on the question of possible military intervention, with Jamaica, Barbados and Dominica the leading advocates, Guyana opposed, and Trinidad, Bahamas and Belize having strong reservations. By contrast, within the OECS, comprising Grenada's neighbouring small island states, there was a consensus in favour of prompt and forceful action against the new military regime in St George's which in practice meant looking to the United States to intervene.

Washington needed no encouragement, having been waiting for just such an opportunity to deal with the irksome leftist regime in Grenada. In October 1983 there was a propitious convergence of circumstances in favour of American military intervention. These included the bloody conflict within the revolutionary leadership in Grenada itself; receptive public opinion at home and abroad following the recent Soviet downing of a South Korean airliner and the bombing of the U.S. Marines headquarters in Beirut; and the extension of a specific invitation for an American-led invasion by the OECS.⁶⁵ An alleged requirement to protect United States citizens in Grenada, notably 600 students

⁶⁵Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 204

attending the private medical school in St George's, provided a further justification for action. Later, it was also claimed that the Grenadian Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, had sought the assistance of the OECS and United States, though the timing and form of these alleged requests was disputed.⁶⁶ The collective request of the Eastern Caribbean states was based on the somewhat shaky legal grounds of Article 8 of the June 1981 OECS charter and also the October 1982 Memorandum of Understanding on security cooperation signed by Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St Lucia and St Vincent in October 1982.⁶⁷ The NJM coup of 1979 in Grenada and increasing disquiet over the PRG had been among the original motivations for the formation of the OECS, with its Defence and Security Committee, and the Regional Security System established by the 1982 Memorandum of Understanding.⁶⁸

Beginning 25 October 1983, the United States military mounted Operation Urgent Fury, invading Grenada with a force of 6,000 American soldiers⁶⁹ accompanied by token contingents from Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia and St Vincent.⁷⁰ Fighting was all over in St George's by 27 October, though a few pockets of resistance remained elsewhere. Amongst the fiercest engagements were those with the small units of Cubans defending their own bases around Salines, the first time United States regular troops had engaged Fidel Castro's forces in combat.⁷¹ Hudson and Coard were taken into U.S. custody on 30 and 31

⁶⁶Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, pp. 317-18; Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", p. 156

⁶⁷Harden, Sheila (ed.), *Small is Dangerous: Microstates in a Macro World*, Frances Pinter, London, 1985, pp. 64-65

⁶⁸Lewis, Gary P., "Prospects for a regional security system in the Eastern Caribbean", *The Round Table*, No. 298, 1986, p. 171; Pastor, *Whirlpool...*, p. 159; Grant, C.H., "Ideological pluralism in the Caribbean: challenges and prospects", *The Round Table*, No 290, April 1984, p. 181

⁶⁹Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 212

⁷⁰Erisman, *Cuba's International Relations...*, p. 147; Griffith, "The RSS: a decade of collective security in the Caribbean", p. 470

⁷¹Erisman, *Cuba's International Relations...*, p. 146

October respectively. Grenadian public opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of the American intervention,⁷² Bishop's execution having caused a dramatic falling away of popular support for the PRG/RMC.⁷³ An estimated 67 Grenadians died during the invasion, including 17 in the accidental bombing of a mental hospital, and about 360 were wounded or injured.⁷⁴ American casualties were 18 dead and 113 wounded.⁷⁵

Cuba's role

After his release from detention, Bishop had appealed for Cuban support against his opponents but Castro refused to allow Cuban personnel to become involved in Grenada's internal turmoil.⁷⁶ Castro made clear his displeasure at Bishop's subsequent murder ("no doctrine, no principle, no opinion calling itself revolutionary and no internal split can justify such atrocious acts"⁷⁷) and rebuffed the persistent pleas of the new RMC for reinforcements. Although Cuba would do its utmost diplomatically to prevent outside, especially United States, intervention, Castro decreed that the Cuban personnel in Grenada would defend only themselves and only if directly attacked.⁷⁸ The Cuban military presence remained small and they, with the construction workers,⁷⁹ were only to engage in defending their own camp at the airport construction site in Salines and the nearby Cuban mission headquarters. The only additional measure taken by Havana was

⁷²Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 212

⁷³For example, only 250 of the 3,000 militia members responded to the RMC's mobilization appeals to resist the invasion [Adkin, *Urgent Fury*..., p. 157].

⁷⁴Adkin, *Urgent Fury*..., p. 308

⁷⁵Enisman, *Cuba's International Relations*..., p. 146

⁷⁶Adkin, *Urgent Fury*..., p. 53

⁷⁷Official Cuban government statement, 20 October 1983, believed to have been penned by Castro himself, cited in Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 164-65. By contrast, the Soviet Union congratulated the Grenadian military for its defence of the revolution [O'Keefe et al., "A sad note for Grenada", p. 156].

⁷⁸Adkin, *Urgent Fury*..., pp. 89, 91, 159-61

⁷⁹Many of the construction workers had previous combat experience from Africa [Gonzalez, Edward, "The Cuban and Soviet challenge in the Caribbean Basin", *Orbis*, Vol. 29, No 1, Spring 1985, pp. 92-93].

to send a seasoned colonel, Pedro Tortolo Comas (formerly head of the Cuban military mission in Grenada), and some assistants to take charge of any Cuban resistance that became necessary and to ensure the RMC understood Cuba's position. The Cuban defence was stronger than anticipated and set back the American invasion timetable but, after a severe pounding, the Cubans either surrendered or took refuge in the Soviet embassy; 24 had been killed and 59 wounded.⁸⁰

Postscript

When Grenada was left without a government following the arrest of the remnants of the NJM, the Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, assumed full executive and legislative authority. Scoon, a survivor from the Gairy era, governed with the assistance of an advisory council under the leadership of a Grenadian former Commonwealth official, Nicholas Braithwaite, until a new anti-Gairy/anti-NJM coalition government led by Herbert Blaize was installed after elections in December 1984. After the withdrawal of United States combat troops in November 1983, security was maintained by 300 United States military police, over 320 Jamaican soldiers and some 200 troops from the other five contributing Caribbean island states.⁸¹ The so-called Caribbean Peacekeeping Force stayed in Grenada until September 1985 and at one point numbered 900 personnel.⁸²

⁸⁰Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, pp. 162, 204-05, 228, 262-63, 308

⁸¹*Keesing's*, May 1984

⁸²Griffith, "The RSS: a decade of collective security in the Caribbean", p. 470

Grenada as a case of microstate vulnerability

In the following section the prolonged instability that characterized Grenada's first decade of independence is considered in the light of the typical factors of microstate vulnerability identified in Chapter Two. In the political realm these were colonial experience and the special features of politics in small societies. Geographical considerations were location and other physical or demographic circumstances. Under the economic heading came government resource constraints and the link between poverty or under-development and instability.

Political variables

Colonial experience

Despite an auspicious beginning, when Grenada, as a Caribbean plantation colony, had been among that most prized category of French overseas possessions,⁸³ the *territory's value as a colonial asset* steadily decreased after its takeover by Britain in the late eighteenth century. The Caribbean colonies held little importance for Britain after 1815 due to the collapse of the sugar boom, the basis of their prosperity. The abolition of slavery in 1838 and withdrawal of imperial preferences after 1846 hastened their decline, turning what had been the pride of the empire into its slums.⁸⁴ Territories such as

⁸³Fieldhouse, D.K., *The Colonial Empires: a Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century* (second edition), Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1982, pp. 35, 35; Sherlock, Philip, "The Caribbean: a region in its own right", *The Courier*, No 132, March-April 1992, p. 51

⁸⁴Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires...*, p. 287

Grenada became imperial charges rather than assets.⁸⁵ Will suggests that Grenada and the other smaller Caribbean island territories "suffered inordinately from the ravages of colonialism" and tended to be sent governors of lesser calibre and sensitivity than those who administered the larger territories. In his view, the Crown colony system of governance led to each territory being run as a single microscopic unit and fostered an "environment of impotence and frustration for local leadership."⁸⁶

Although separate independence for each of the British territories in the Caribbean was not contemplated until the break-up of the West Indies Federation in the early 1960s,⁸⁷ this still left Grenada with a lead time of over 10 years until its eventual independence in 1974. Relative to some other microstates, Grenada thus had a reasonably long period in which to *prepare for statehood*. However, as in the case of The Gambia, the granting of separate independence to Grenada was forced upon Britain by the failure of an attempt at federation. By the late 1960s, after Anguilla's attempted secession from St Kitts and Nevis had necessitated British armed intervention in 1969, London was becoming increasingly anxious to escape the toils of the system of Associated Statehood in the Caribbean. It proceeded to offer rapid constitutional decolonization on demand, for which Grenada became the first candidate.⁸⁸ Gairy had concluded that independence was a financially attractive proposition, for example because it would increase the pool of potential aid donors beyond Britain,⁸⁹ but Grenadians at large were ambivalent. Many

⁸⁵Knight, *The Caribbean...*, p. 276

⁸⁶Will, W. Marvin, "From authoritarianism to political democracy in Grenada: some questions for US policy", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 26, No 3, Fall 1991, p. 32

⁸⁷Clarke, "Grenada: society and politics in a small state", p. 131

⁸⁸Clarke, Colin, "Europe in the Caribbean", in Daniel Van Eewen and Yolande Pizetty van Eewen (eds), *Caraibes-Amerique Centrale, 1980-1990: Le Sang et les Urnes*, Annales des Pays d'Amerique Centrale et des Caraibes, No 10, 1991, p. 234

⁸⁹Pryor, *Revolutionary Grenada...*, p. 44

were opposed to independence due to uncertainty as to Grenada's economic viability and apprehensiveness at the prospect of Gairy's autocratic and repressive regime no longer being checked by the restraining hand of the colonial authorities.⁹⁰ On a previous occasion, in 1962, the British had felt obliged to suspend Gairy from his post of Chief Minister for "violating the principles of honest government"⁹¹ and the question arises as to whether Britain should be blamed for "... passing Grenada unprotected into the hands of the notorious... Gairy"⁹² at independence a decade later. Without Gairy there would have been no NJM "revolution" and the turmoil that followed.⁹³

In contrast to the microstates considered in the other case studies, the Grenadian public had had quite a long experience of democratic processes, universal suffrage having been introduced in 1951 over 20 years prior to independence. Will, however, holds that the extension of suffrage did little to stabilize governance in Grenada and the territory had less political order and legitimacy than any of its Caribbean counterparts except perhaps Guyana.⁹⁴ Singham observes that Britain imposed an overly elaborate Westminster governmental structure on its small Caribbean territories, introducing models devised for larger colonies in Africa and Asia with little modification.⁹⁵ In small developing countries the system was open to manipulation by charismatic and unscrupulous political leaders, in the absence of the checks and balances available in developed countries, such as a vigorous, independent press, an academic community and organized lobby groups.⁹⁶

⁹⁰"Grenada", *The Courier*, p. 30

⁹¹Clarke, "Grenada: society and politics in a small state", p. 132

⁹²Payne, "The Grenada crisis in British politics", p. 403

⁹³Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 179

⁹⁴Will, "From authoritarianism to political democracy in Grenada...", p. 33

⁹⁵Singham, A.W., *The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, pp. 12-13

⁹⁶Archer, "Gairyism, revolution and reorganisation...", p. 94

Grenadian tendencies for authoritarian government and state repression have also been attributed to the territory's long experience of plantation organization and Crown Colony rule.⁹⁷ Smith suggests that, paradoxically, the breakdown, after about 1930, of the old order with its symbiotic and paternalistic planter-peasant relationship contributed to friction and instability in Grenadian society and politics.⁹⁸

When the PRG set aside the constitution, parliament and elections in 1979, it retained one significant institutional component of the Westminster system inherited from Britain, that of the office of Governor-General. Ironically this largely symbolic post emerged as the single enduring feature of the pre-coup political order, and played a key role in justifying the United States invasion and restoring constitutional processes in its aftermath.⁹⁹ Grenada was relatively well prepared for independence in terms of the availability of a cadre of educated nationals capable of assuming full administrative authority. Expanded educational and economic opportunities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had helped create a new and broader-based middle and professional class throughout the Caribbean.¹⁰⁰

Like many other small territories, Grenada suffered from *neglect* of its economic development needs prior to independence. With cocoa, nutmeg and bananas comprising 90 percent of exports in 1974,¹⁰¹ the country was at the mercy of the international commodity markets. The one major opportunity for economic diversification, tourism,

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, pp. 91-93

⁹⁸ Smith, MG., *Stratification in Grenada*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1965, p. 13

⁹⁹ Cash, William, "Grenada: constitutional upset that a revolution can bring", *Commonwealth*, Vol. 26, No 5, April 1984, pp. 168-70

¹⁰⁰ Knight, *The Caribbean...*, pp. 283-84, 293

¹⁰¹ Clarke, "Grenada: society and politics in a small state", p. 133

could not be effectively expanded without construction of a new airport at Point Salines but the project did not proceed until after independence, despite repeated favourable reports on the proposal dating back to 1926.¹⁰² In assigning culpability for Grenada's parlous economic state it is difficult to distinguish possible shortcomings on the part of the colonial authorities from Gairy's mismanagement, which, by the time of the 1979 coup had together created a situation of "needless misery and underused capacity, ...unoccupied hotels, fruit dropping off the trees, unworked land, overwhelming reliance on imported goods, half the population unemployed, poor health, housing and schools, and a virtually stillborn industrial base."¹⁰³ The extent to which Britain could be considered responsible for neglect turns to some extent on the question posed above as to whether it should have prevented Gairy from maintaining his exploitative grip on power.

The *ethnically stratified make-up* of the Grenada's population reflected the country's history as a plantation colony. In common with other Caribbean countries, Grenadian society featured a pyramid at the top of which were a small Europeanized élite of whites and browns, separated by a sharp social and cultural divide from the black masses.¹⁰⁴ This stratification was mirrored in Grenada's political life. Grenada inherited relatively coherent *territorial borders* and, apart from a minor dispute with Trinidad, these were not a source of vulnerability to security threats.

¹⁰²Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 124-25

¹⁰³Cohen, "Unmaking Grenada's revolution", p. 196

¹⁰⁴Clarke, "Grenada: society and politics in a small state", p. 133

Special characteristics of small states

Grenada clearly did not share the putative microstate characteristic of "*concerted political harmony*" during the tumultuous years from 1979 to 1983. It might be argued that Gairy's solid support base among the rural masses, stretching back 20 years before independence, qualified as a demonstration of such harmony during the pre-coup era, though the outward vestiges of consensus for Gairyism depended partly on the suppression of dissent.

By contrast, Grenada and its Caribbean neighbours have been regarded as the archetypal examples of the microstate tendency toward *exaggerated personalism*. It was Grenada that Lewis had in mind when he wrote of the dangers of political abuse in a small island dominated by a single party, as cited in Chapter Two.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, Knight chose Grenada to exemplify the constraints on healthy political development in the Caribbean: "In the smaller islands, a number of factors have coincided to make dual-party, democratic politics a difficult achievement. In some cases the populations are simply too small to provide the critical mass of diversity and anonymity. Familiar and kin relations make secret balloting and privacy elusive goals... As a result, political stability and coherence of the type found in the larger units have been elusive..."¹⁰⁶

There were also personalistic elements in Grenada's political culture that were common to many Caribbean states. The region produced an unusually large number of

¹⁰⁵ibid., p. 132

¹⁰⁶Knight, *The Caribbean...*, p. 303

charismatic, caudillo-style politicians, including Grenada's Gairy and Bishop. Thorndike sees charismatic leadership as a natural tendency in small island societies such as Grenada, where there is little privacy or institutional impersonality to act as a counterforce, and he holds that charisma was a virtually omnipresent factor in the modernization process since the granting of self-government to Caribbean territories.¹⁰⁷ Knight suggests the appeal of charismatic individuals reflected the colonial experience of authoritarian rule vested in governors, the oligarchic nature of representative assemblies in British territories, and the requirement for new nationalist leaders to establish their legitimacy by popular acceptance. In the absence of any deep-rooted notion of the state, the illiterate masses looked to the caudillo personally to deliver betterment and protection, as they had looked to the *patrón*, priest or plantation owner in the past.¹⁰⁸ There was a distinct tendency towards authoritarianism in the personal political organizations that became a typical feature of Caribbean politics in general and Grenadian politics in particular.¹⁰⁹

Gairy applied François Duvalier's brutal Haitian model of personal rule,¹¹⁰ instituting a "reign of terror that culminated in injury, torture and murder."¹¹¹ In its own way, the PRG also governed in a remote and dictatorial manner. The governing party was a "fundamentally personalistic, self-styled vanguard... behind whom rested no substantial, organized popular movement."¹¹² At the time of the regime's collapse in 1983, the NJM comprised only 350 members, or less than one per cent of Grenada's population, and only

¹⁰⁷Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 183

¹⁰⁸Knight, *The Caribbean...*, p. 315

¹⁰⁹Maingot, "Cuba and the Commonwealth Caribbean...", p. 29

¹¹⁰Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 180

¹¹¹Will, "From authoritarianism to political democracy in Grenada...", p. 36

¹¹²Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada...", p. 193

74 people were full members. The party's ideologically-obsessed Central Committee of only 15 members was further isolated from the masses.¹¹³ Secrecy and lack of consultation were intrinsic to the party's belief in its role as the vanguard of a backward working class that lacked the ideological development and experience to build socialism on its own¹¹⁴ or the maturity to handle a free press or democratic elections.¹¹⁵ Together with personal rivalry amongst the party leadership,¹¹⁶ it was the Coard faction's complete disregard for public opinion in their decision to unseat and arrest the massively popular Bishop¹¹⁷ that led to the regime's ultimate destruction. Barriteau and Clarke nevertheless distinguish the PRG from its predecessor in the sense that while Bishop was a charismatic leader he did not individually exercise the same kind of stranglehold over both the public and private sectors as had Gairy.¹¹⁸

Gairy's ruthless domination of Grenadian politics from the early 1950s until his overthrow nearly two decades later certainly qualifies as an instance of *leadership longevity* affecting national well-being. By 1979 an atrophied economy, growing discontent and pressure for change¹¹⁹ provided the necessary preconditions for the successful coup d'état. Gairy also provides a classic example of the destructive impact of *unrestrained executive power* in a small society. His tendencies in this regard were evident from an early stage, for example in the abuse of his position as Chief Minister and Minister of Finance revealed in the "Squandermania Report" of 1962.¹²⁰ After

¹¹³Clarke, "Grenada: society and politics in a small state", p. 137

¹¹⁴"Line of March for the Party...", *Grenada Documents: an Overview and Selection*, pp. 1:17-18

¹¹⁵Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", pp. 145-48; Maingot, "Cuba and the Commonwealth Caribbean...", p. 28

¹¹⁶Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", pp. 191ff

¹¹⁷Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 72, 157

¹¹⁸Barriteau and Clarke, "Grenadian perceptions of the People's Revolutionary Government and its policies", p. 88

¹¹⁹Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", p. 142

¹²⁰Brizan, *Grenada: Island of Conflict...*, pp. 321-23; Singham, "Legislative-Executive relations...", pp. 143-44

independence, as noted above, Gairy expropriated large sums of British aid money and continued to use his Haitian-style "mongoose gang" to extort money from local businesses.¹²¹ In 1975 the Duffus Report charged Gairy with victimization of public servants, making selective concessions to favoured business partners, imprisonment without bail or trial, police brutality and other excesses.¹²² The malpractice of his government contributed to a three per cent per annum decline in Grenada's per capita income in the 1970s¹²³ and as early as 1973 his abuses were creating political instability in the form of popular demonstrations.¹²⁴ His alleged "theft" of the 1976 election closed a safety valve that could have allowed a peaceful transition to alternative government and avoided the NJM revolution. Neither was the revolutionary government above abusing its power: independent newspapers were shut down;¹²⁵ the property of critics was seized;¹²⁶ and citizens were subject to arbitrary detention and torture.¹²⁷ Within party circles, Bishop was frank about the suppression of opponents: "you get detained when I sign the order after discussing it with the National Security Committee of the Party or with a higher Party body. Once I sign it - like it or don't like it - it's up the hill [to prison] for them."¹²⁸

The risks of *militarization* in a small society were vividly demonstrated in Grenada in 1983 when army leaders sided with the Coard faction in ousting Bishop and later had him murdered. The PRG's efforts to organize the populace into militias were unpopular;¹²⁹ the

¹²¹Clarke, "Grenada: society and politics in a small state", p. 134

¹²²Will, "From authoritarianism to political democracy in Grenada...", p. 36

¹²³Clarke, "Grenada: society and politics in a small state", p. 134

¹²⁴Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", p. 142

¹²⁵Archer, "Gairism, revolution and reorganisation...", p. 100

¹²⁶Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", p. 145

¹²⁷Archer, "Gairism, revolution and reorganisation...", p. 100

¹²⁸"Line of March for the Party...", *Grenada Documents: an Overview and Selection*, pp. 1:25

¹²⁹Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, p. 156

military pillar of the revolution was exaggerated at the expense of other priorities such as economic development; and there was over-reliance on military solutions to non-military problems (for example, the PRG was contemplating introducing a labour army and national service).¹³⁰

Geographical variables

Location

Grenada's location contributed to its vulnerability to external security threats in a curiously inverted way. The 1983 invasion was prompted by the perception of Commonwealth Caribbean neighbours that *Grenada* posed a threat to their internal security and by the regional hegemon's concern that Grenada's foreign alignments threatened American strategic interests.¹³¹ President Reagan alleged Grenada was being used as a "Soviet-Cuban colony" and as a "major military bastion" from which to export revolution throughout the Caribbean.¹³² As noted above, Washington was also anxious that Grenada's location gave it potential to threaten important sea lines of communication and oil fields in the region. Although there was no conclusive evidence of any immediate, direct threat to U.S. security interests, Valenta concludes, on the basis of captured PRG documents detailing its Cuban- and Soviet-backed military build-up, that Grenada did indeed pose a serious threat to its East Caribbean neighbours and,

¹³⁰Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", p. 144

¹³¹Domínguez, Jorge I., "Cuba's relations with Caribbean and Central American countries", *Cuban Studies*, Vol. 13, No 2, Summer 1983, p. 94; Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", pp. 186, 211

¹³²Shearman, "The Soviet Union and Grenada...", p. 661

ultimately, to U.S. security and regional interests.¹³³

Physical and demographic characteristics

Other geographical attributes did not contribute notably to Grenada's vulnerability. Although its small island territory afforded no strategic depth, the massive force used in the 1983 invasion meant that this was of little relevance. Potentially destabilizing pressures on Grenada's scant economic resources due to its status as the second most densely populated microstate in the Caribbean were relieved to some extent by the significant outmigration that allowed it to maintain stable population levels.

Economic variables

Government resource constraints

Gairy maintained a relatively large security force totalling about 1,000 personnel, but this proved inadequate to withstand a surprise onslaught by less than 200 lightly armed NJM supporters in the early hours of 13 March 1979. Starting at 4 am, one group of about 45 rebels armed with petrol bombs and grenades attacked the army barracks and police headquarters, a second took the radio station and a third rounded up government ministers and officials. The assault on the army and police lasted 30 minutes, the

¹³³Valenta, Jiri, "Military interventions: doctrines, motivations, goals and outcomes", in Jan F. Triska (ed.), *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: the United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1986, p. 274

decisive first phase of the operation was over within two hours,¹³⁴ and the last loyalist police station was in rebel hands after 12 hours.¹³⁵ The larger forces created by the PRG to counter anticipated mercenary attacks were sufficient to maintain a tight grip on domestic security but were of course completely overwhelmed by the American invasion of October 1983.¹³⁶

Poverty/under-development and political stability

Grenada, with Haiti, was among the poorest of Caribbean societies¹³⁷ and in 1975 had the lowest per capita Gross Domestic Product of the Caribbean microstates.¹³⁸ Gairy's ability to manipulate the poor rural peasantry kept him in power for over 25 years, to the detriment of the country's political and economic development. Although Grenada's population was ostensibly one of the most educated among all microstates, with only 2.2 per cent illiterate in 1970,¹³⁹ the 1981 census showed that only 14.6 per cent of the resident population had secondary or higher education.¹⁴⁰ Economic hardship aggravated by Gairy's mismanagement was a factor in initial popular enthusiasm for the NJM coup in 1979. Similarly, the mounting economic difficulties faced by Grenada by 1982 contributed to the populace's disaffection with the PRG regime, which in turn was a major cause of the destructive crisis of leadership and direction within the NJM.¹⁴¹

¹³⁴Keesing's, 29 June 1979; Maingot, "Cuba and the Commonwealth Caribbean...", p. 27; Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 182

¹³⁵Lewis, David E., *Reform and revolution in Grenada...*, p. 151

¹³⁶Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, pp. 21, 157-58

¹³⁷Maingot, "Cuba and the Commonwealth Caribbean...", p. 27

¹³⁸See Table 2.14.

¹³⁹See Table 2.16.

¹⁴⁰Pryor, *Revolutionary Grenada...*, p. 26; Singham, *The Hero and the Crowd...*, pp. 76-81

¹⁴¹Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", p. 147; Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 197

Grenada's poverty also exposed it to pressure from external political opponents, notably the United States and Britain which both withheld aid and lobbied multilateral financial institutions to refrain from assisting Grenada.

Grenada as a case of microstate dependence

The final section of the chapter examines Grenada's dependence on Cuba in light of the patron-client model introduced in Chapter Three, focusing on the key indicators of pervasiveness, conformity, informality and mutual benefit. The Grenada-Cuba nexus is an example of a patron-client relationship that manifestly failed to deliver protection to the client after the latter set in train a disastrous series of events.

According to Domínguez, Cuba's principal foreign policy goals under Castro were survival of the revolutionary regime and securing economic resources from patrons such as the Soviet Union in order to sustain growth and fund the government's social commitments. A second tier of goals included seeking good relations and influence over other governments and within international political movements of the Left, and supporting revolutions (survival of the revolution in the face of United States hostility required a global search for allies).¹⁴² Falcoff notes that export of the revolution also provided a means of historical and ideological self-justification and a substitute for economic success at home.¹⁴³ The commitment of troops in November 1975 to defend Angola against South African invasion marked an outward turn in Cuban foreign policy,

¹⁴²Domínguez, "Cuba's relations with Caribbean and Central American countries", pp. 80-81

¹⁴³Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada...", p. 187

and by the end of the 1970s there were about 50,000 Cubans serving in 37 countries as doctors, nurses, dentists, teachers, construction workers and soldiers. The NJM coup in Grenada coincided with renewed Cuban support for revolutionary movements in the region after 1978.¹⁴⁴ By the early 1980s, with Soviet assistance, Cuba had developed the most potent military force in Latin America after Brazil, and was logistically capable of rapid military intervention to aid a regional ally such as Grenada or Nicaragua.¹⁴⁵ Cuban prestige in the developing world was confirmed by Castro's accession to the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement at its summit in Havana in September 1979.¹⁴⁶

Notwithstanding Cuba's predisposition in the late 1970s to support the likes of Grenada, it was St George's that first courted Havana, rather than the reverse.¹⁴⁷ After seizing power in March 1979, the PRG had immediately appealed for assistance in countering the threat of a Gairy-organized mercenary attack, and it was Cuba that quickly responded by providing arms and other aid while Grenada's traditional partners stood back¹⁴⁸ from the new regime.¹⁴⁹ The relationship with Cuba rapidly blossomed into Grenada's principal foreign association and yielded considerable benefits in military, economic and political support. The link between St George's and Havana was underpinned by a warm

¹⁴⁴Domínguez, "Cuba's relations with Caribbean and Central American countries", p. 82

¹⁴⁵Anderson, *Geopolitics of the Caribbean...*, p. 133-34; Gonzalez, "The Cuban and Soviet challenge...", pp. 90-91

¹⁴⁶Payne, Anthony, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, Croom Helm, London, 1984, p. 72

¹⁴⁷Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 135

¹⁴⁸Pastor alleges that the PRG secretly invited and received Cuban arms before seeking Western military aid and did not pursue initial requests for US and British military aid [Pastor, *Whirlpool...*, p. 162]. Allain suggests the PRG only sought military aid from the West with the intention of using the anticipated refusal as an excuse for inviting Cuban assistance [Allain, *Cuban Foreign Policy in the Caribbean...*, p. 106].

¹⁴⁹Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, p. 81. Ironically, the coup leaders' recourse to Castro's Cuba echoed a move by Gairy two years previously to supplement Grenada's security links with Britain by establishing military cooperation with another regional strongman on the political fringe, General Augusto Pinochet [Braveboy-Wagner, Jacqueline Anne, *The Caribbean in World Affairs: the Foreign Policies of the English-speaking States*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1989, p. 49].

personal rapport between Bishop and Castro and the NJM leadership's admiration for the Cuban revolutionary model. Paradoxically, it was the same close and beneficial relationship with Cuba that exposed Grenada to the hostility of the United States, culminating in the invasion of 1983 that swept the remnants of the NJM from power. Disgusted by the Grenadian regime's ousting and execution of Bishop, and coldly realistic in the face of American military might, Havana abandoned its client in its hour of need. "It is not the new Grenadan Government we must think of now, but of Cuba....," said a government statement.¹⁵⁰

Pervasiveness

It was only after 1972 when Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Barbados and Guyana established diplomatic relations with Havana (despite inter-American sanctions against Cuba) that the English-speaking Caribbean began to be directly affected by Cuban foreign policy. Prior to that there had been very little diplomatic or economic contact.¹⁵¹ It appears that, soon after this opening up of links, Cuba had supported and encouraged the nascent NJM¹⁵² and Pastor suggests Havana may have assured the Grenadians that if they were able to seize and hold power Cuba would soon come to their aid.¹⁵³ Manigat surmises that the NJM may have benefited from Cuban technical advice and assistance in the lead-up to the coup and notes that the rapidity of the establishment of a Cuban

¹⁵⁰Cuban Government statement of 25 October cited in Gonzalez, "The Cuban and Soviet challenge...", p. 93

¹⁵¹Allain, Joe Terence, *Cuban Foreign Policy in the Caribbean...*, p. 85; Domínguez, "Cuba's relations with Caribbean and Central American countries", p. 93

¹⁵²Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, pp. 21-22

¹⁵³Pastor, Robert A., "Cuba and the Soviet Union", in Barry B. Levine, *The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean*, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, pp. 197-98

presence and official recognition after the event could indicate prior collaboration.¹⁵⁴ Others insist there is no evidence of Cuban complicity in the overthrow of Gairy,¹⁵⁵ and that the coup in fact caught Havana by surprise.¹⁵⁶

Chronology aside, what is incontrovertible is that there was great admiration for Castro and Cuba amongst the PRG leadership from the outset.¹⁵⁷ Bishop was an especially enthusiastic exponent, calling Cuba the "best example in the world of what a small country under socialism can achieve" and "one of the major sources of inspiration for our country and our process."¹⁵⁸ The PRG structure owed much to the Cuban model, to which many NJM members had been exposed while training or holidaying in Cuba.¹⁵⁹ An "intensely pro-Castroite climate [was] created in Grenada to the point of assimilating the revolution in St George's to the one in Havana"; there was a kind of "Cuban fixation" in Grenada.¹⁶⁰ To what extent did this fixation provide an entrée for the Cubans to play a pervasive role in Grenada?

Clearly Cuba was the PRG's "foremost friend and sponsor" from the outset and exerted a profound influence as a role model.¹⁶¹ Havana was the first to provide substantial assistance to the PRG. Within weeks of the March 1979 coup, shipments of arms, with military specialists, began arriving from Cuba,¹⁶² and by year's end a Cuban aid

¹⁵⁴Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", pp. 182-83

¹⁵⁵Domínguez, "Cuba's relations with Caribbean and Central American countries", p. 93; Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 57

¹⁵⁶Erisman, *Cuba's International Relations...*, p. 145

¹⁵⁷Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 135, 178

¹⁵⁸Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, p. 82

¹⁵⁹Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, pp. 71ff

¹⁶⁰Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 187

¹⁶¹Sandford and Vigilante, *Grenada: the Untold Story*, p. 89

¹⁶²Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, p. 22

programme covering medicine, fishing, construction and irrigation was in place.¹⁶³ In late 1979, Cuba became the first country to open a full and permanent diplomatic mission in St George's¹⁶⁴ and also opened an office of the Cuban news agency, *Prensa Latina*.¹⁶⁵ Weekly direct flights were introduced and entry visa requirements dropped between Cuba and Grenada in 1981.¹⁶⁶ By 1982 over 250 Grenadians were studying in Cuba.¹⁶⁷ Some aspects of the assistance to Grenada, which in 1982 spanned 137 items,¹⁶⁸ were not radically different from Cuba's links to other Caribbean states, but what set the Grenada connection apart was the degree of interpenetration of ruling parties/governments. For example, the Cuban Communist Party and NJM had a secret agreement covering joint plans for 1983 and providing for Cuban bodies such as the Workers' Central Union to advise the Grenadians.¹⁶⁹ The main practical focus of cooperation was the new international airport at Point Salines for which skilled workers, construction equipment, expertise and funding from Cuba were essential, notwithstanding contributions from other donors.¹⁷⁰ At the time of the invasion there were about 784 Cubans in Grenada, including 636 building the airport, 22 serving as military advisers, 17 physicians and dentists, and others working as teachers and advisers to government departments.¹⁷¹

Military assistance was another key element in the relationship. Some 100 Cuban

¹⁶³Domínguez, "Cuba's relations with Caribbean and Central American countries", p. 93

¹⁶⁴Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, p. 83

¹⁶⁵Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 121

¹⁶⁶Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, p. 84

¹⁶⁷Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 136

¹⁶⁸Domínguez, "Cuba's relations with Caribbean and Central American countries", p. 93

¹⁶⁹Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada...", pp. 189-90. An example of the intimate involvement of the Cuban Communist Party in Grenada's affairs is provided by its October 1982 report on Grenadian churches, in which visiting Cuban officials advised the PRG on tighter control measures [*Grenada Documents: an Overview and Selection*, pp. 2:8-10]

¹⁷⁰Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada...", p. 189; Bryan, "Cuba's impact in the Caribbean", p. 343

¹⁷¹Pryor, *Revolutionary Grenada...*, p. 56

military advisers began training Grenada's PRAF during 1980¹⁷² and it was formally agreed in late 1981 or early 1982 to establish a 27-strong permanent Cuban military mission in Grenada.¹⁷³ Provision was also made for Grenadians to be trained at Cuban military institutions.¹⁷⁴ The extent of Cuba's role in the development of Grenada's armed forces can be judged by the fact that in April 1982 the entire Grenadian military hierarchy, including Bishop, travelled to Havana to meet with the vice-Minister of the Cuban armed forces. Conscious of the PRAF's shortcomings, such as the lack of popular enthusiasm for militia duties, it was agreed that Cuba's training role should be stepped up, Cuban construction workers would be armed, high-frequency radio links between the two countries would be established, and additional Cuban troops would be sent to Grenada.¹⁷⁵

Cuba's substantial physical presence in Grenada and involvement in key sectors of government activity did not, however, amount to a degree penetration or control that, under Handel's definition, would take Grenada beyond clientage to the condition of a mere satellite or puppet.¹⁷⁶ For example, much has been made of the importance of the personal rapport between Castro and Bishop with Falcoff going so far as to claim that Cuban support for the NJM was purely on the basis of Castro's friendship with Bishop¹⁷⁷ and Gonzalez describing Bishop as a "virtual protégé of Castro."¹⁷⁸ The Cuban

¹⁷²Bryan, Anthony T., "Cuba's impact in the Caribbean", *International Journal*, Vol. XL, No 2, Spring 1985; Braveboy-Wagner, *The Caribbean in World Affairs...*, p. 49

¹⁷³Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, p. 22

¹⁷⁴Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada...", p. 190

¹⁷⁵All measures except the dispatch of additional troops had been implemented by October 1983 [Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, p. 156].

¹⁷⁶Sandford and Vigilante, *Grenada: the Untold Story*, p. 89; Handel, Michael I., *Weak States in the International System* (second edition), Frank Cass, London, 1990, p. 137

¹⁷⁷Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada...", p. 193

¹⁷⁸Gonzalez, "The Cuban and Soviet challenge...", p. 92

ambassador in St George's, Julien Torres Rizo, was also reputed to be highly influential.¹⁷⁹ It might be assumed that this intimacy at the highest levels provided a tremendous opportunity for Havana to anticipate and influence political developments in St George's. It is not at all clear, however, that this was the case, as the Cubans appear to have been oblivious to the crisis brewing in October 1983 and either unwilling or unable to control events.

That Castro was caught by surprise by the fratricidal conflict in the PRG is underlined by the retribution later visited upon the responsible senior Cuban officials. The Interior Ministry general in charge of intelligence from Grenada lost his Central Committee position and the ambassador in St George's was severely disciplined.¹⁸⁰ In early October Castro himself had met with Bishop on the latter's way back to Grenada before the final clash with his opponents but said Bishop had not even mentioned the struggle going on within the NJM.¹⁸¹ Bishop only confided in the Cuban ambassador on 12 October, by which time the leadership crisis had been in its acute phase for a month.¹⁸² Visiting Rizo, prior to the Central Committee meeting at which he would reject joint leadership, Bishop told the ambassador of the divisions within the party, but did not ask for his opinion or cooperation, citing respect for Cuba's policy of non-interference.¹⁸³ Castro allegedly tried to influence developments in Grenada in support of Bishop, by attempting to shore up the Grenadian leader's position in the party by receiving him warmly in Havana in September

¹⁷⁹Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 124

¹⁸⁰Domínguez, Jorge I., "Cuba in the 1980s", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, No 1, Fall 1986, p. 121; Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, p. 90

¹⁸¹"Letter from Castro to NJM Central Committee, 15 October 1983", *The Grenada Documents*, Sherwood Press, London, 1997, p. 152

¹⁸²Fraser, "A revolutionary Governor-General...", p. 149

¹⁸³Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 154

1983, following his cool reception in Moscow.¹⁸⁴ However, in his letter to the NJM Central Committee on 15 October, Castro said Cuba would not under any circumstances interfere in the party's leadership dispute and confined himself to the observation that Bishop was very well regarded in Cuba and events would be difficult to explain.¹⁸⁵

Conformity

According to Falcoff, the Cubans acted as Grenada's guide to world politics, for example briefing Grenadian delegations en route to international meetings, and advising the PRG in its dealing with the Soviets.¹⁸⁶ For its part, Grenada acted in almost complete conformity with Cuba on international issues.¹⁸⁷ Like Castro, Bishop recognized and engaged with the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, supported revolutionary groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Polisario Front, denounced the Camp David Accord, and called for independence for Puerto Rico and the return of the United States base at Guantánamo. The most prominent example of Grenadian conformity came in January 1980, when Grenada and Cuba were alone among Caribbean states and the Non-Aligned Movement in voting against a United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.¹⁸⁸ The majority of non-aligned developing countries either voted for the resolution or abstained, and even Sandinista Nicaragua and Manley's Jamaica abstained.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁴Gonzalez, "The Cuban and Soviet challenge...", p. 92

¹⁸⁵"Letter from Castro to NJM Central Committee, 15 October 1983", *The Grenada Documents*, p. 152

¹⁸⁶Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada...", pp. 190-92

¹⁸⁷Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 124

¹⁸⁸Allain, *Cuban Foreign Policy in the Caribbean...*, p. 159

¹⁸⁹Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 185

It might be noted, however, that Grenada's vote on Afghanistan was as much an attempt to please the Soviets (who had yet to respond very enthusiastically to Grenada's requests for assistance) as it was an example of conformity with Cuba.¹⁹⁰ Payne, Sutton and Thorndike also caution that the notion of a "Grenadian proxy" belies the considerable efforts made by Bishop to maintain good relations with Western Europe, especially France, and that "in the final analysis... Grenadian foreign policy was based on considerations no different from those guiding the other Eastern Caribbean states - above all, the imperative of acquiring development assistance in a world of diminishing resources."¹⁹¹ The same exigency has been observed in respect of the occasionally idiosyncratic foreign policy decisions of The Gambia and the Maldives in previous chapters.

Informality

The Cuba-Grenada relationship meets the patron-client model's informality criterion, insofar as Havana did not provide St George's with any formal security guarantee. The two governments nevertheless entered into three military cooperation agreements:¹⁹² arms supply agreements in March 1979 and 1981, and an agreement in late 1981 or early 1982 on training, including the establishment of a Cuban military mission in Grenada.¹⁹³ In addition, annual agreements covered the extensive economic, technical and scientific

¹⁹⁰Sandford and Vigilante, *Grenada: the Untold Story*, p. 94

¹⁹¹Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, pp. 85-87

¹⁹²Agreements were contained in secret protocols to main treaties. There were also military supply agreements with the Soviet Union and North Korea [Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, p. 84]. Combined Cuban-Soviet deliveries of mainly second-hand, reconditioned small arms are estimated to have been worth US\$25.8 million [Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 120-21].

¹⁹³Thorndike, *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 120-21; Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, p. 22. A copy of the third agreement is reproduced in *Grenada Document: an Overview and Selection*, pp. 16:1-7

assistance provided by Havana.¹⁹⁴

Mutual benefit

Unlike the other case study microstates' security links with larger powers, the Cuba-Grenada relationship failed to deliver the essential client benefit, regime survival, when the crisis came in October 1983. The RMC's increasingly desperate pleas for military assistance after the events of 19 October were flatly rejected by Castro, who judged that sending reinforcements was "impossible and unthinkable"¹⁹⁵ in the face of overwhelming American air and naval superiority in the area. In any case, Castro considered the RMC entirely responsible for the "disadvantageous and difficult situation" in which the regime found itself.¹⁹⁶

At this final juncture, the relationship also proved a disaster for the patron in terms of the loss of substantial economic resources poured into Grenada,¹⁹⁷ and the serious setback for Cuba's regional and international standing. Lewis judges that no other defeat of a revolutionary regime dealt such a serious blow to Cuban foreign policy as the Grenada crisis.¹⁹⁸ Havana had shown itself incapable of rendering any significant military protection in the face of American intervention, and the affair cast serious doubt on its prospects for exerting major influence in the Caribbean Basin. Most of the English-

¹⁹⁴Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, pp. 83-84

¹⁹⁵Cuban Government statement of 25 October cited in Gonzalez, "The Cuban and Soviet challenge...", p. 93

¹⁹⁶Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 206

¹⁹⁷Castro claimed Cuban material, designs and labour contributed to the airport project alone had amounted to US\$60 million at international prices or over US\$500 per inhabitant [Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, p. 318]. The dispatch of construction workers to Grenada was itself noteworthy given their importance in meeting Cuba's own housing shortage [Falk, Pamela, *Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest*, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1986, p. 47].

¹⁹⁸Lewis, David E., "From revolutionary solidarity to military defeat: the foreign policy of Grenada, 1979-1983", in MacDonald, Sandstrom and Goodwin (eds), *The Caribbean After Grenada...*, p. 64

speaking island states, already suspicious of, and hostile to, the PRG and its relationship with Cuba, either supported or acquiesced in the United States invasion. Six of them even contributed troops to the operation.¹⁹⁹ Soon after the Grenada crisis, Cuba also "lost" Suriname, whose military leader, Désiré Bouterse, found it politic to reorient his regime to the Western camp and expelled 25 Cuban diplomats and 80 advisers.²⁰⁰

Prior to the October 1983 crisis, the Cuba-Grenada association did, however, yield the mutual benefits typical of a patron-client relationship. For Cuba, the advent of the PRG in Grenada in March 1979 offered a rare opportunity to make political inroads in the English-speaking Caribbean. For the first time in the sub-region there was suddenly a Marxist-Leninist regime "committed to restructuring society along Eastern bloc lines and to becoming a full partner in the Soviet International alliance."²⁰¹ The Nicaraguan revolution of July 1979 provided a further boost, transforming in a matter of months Cuba's position as the sole revolutionary regime in the Caribbean basin to one in which it could count on two dependable allies.²⁰²

Solidarity with other revolutionary governments such as Grenada was pursued by Cuba as a matter of principle, but also as a pragmatic means of building alliances and strengthening Cuba's own international position,²⁰³ by enhancing its prestige as a leader of Third World revolution and increasing its regional influence.²⁰⁴ In contrast to Washington's negative attitude to the new PRG, Havana immediately recognized that

¹⁹⁹Erisman, *Cuba's International Relations...*, p. 147

²⁰⁰Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 210, 214

²⁰¹Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada...", p. 188

²⁰²Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, p. 79

²⁰³Domínguez, "Cuba's relations with Caribbean and Central American countries", p. 81

²⁰⁴Sandford and Vigilante, *Grenada: the Untold Story*, p. 89

even modest amounts of development assistance could have a major impact in a country the size of Grenada, and saw its potential as a showcase for other Caribbean small island developing states of the benefits of cooperation with Cuba.²⁰⁵

Havana's new friends did not appear a moment too soon, as it quickly found itself increasingly isolated in the region and developing world. Cuba's support for the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a blow to its own standing in the Third World, and cost it the support of Non-Aligned countries for election to the Security Council.²⁰⁶ Cuba's stock in the Caribbean dropped even lower after a May 1980 incident in which the Cuban air force sunk a Bahamian coast guard vessel that had arrested two Cuban fishing boats in Bahamian waters. At home, the same month, the Castro regime was contending with a mass invasion of the Peruvian embassy in Havana that eventually led to the chaotic departure of 125,000 Cubans to the United States.²⁰⁷ Several elections in the region saw a swing to the right, and in 1981 the Seaga government of Jamaica, along with Colombia and Costa Rica, broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba; and there were also setbacks in Cuban relations with Venezuela and Panama.²⁰⁸

In the circumstances, Cuba's relationship with tiny Grenada took on a disproportionate importance which St George's did its best to justify. Bishop privately assured Castro that, "in whatever ways and at whatever price the heroic internationalist people of Cuba can always count on [the] total solidarity, support and cooperation of the Grenada

²⁰⁵Erisman, *Cuba's International Relations...*, p. 145

²⁰⁶Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, p. 73, 80

²⁰⁷Domínguez, "Cuba's relations with Caribbean and Central American countries", p. 94

²⁰⁸Payne, Sutton and Thorndike, *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*, p. 80-81

revolution."²⁰⁹ The PRG not only joined Havana in opposing censure of the Afghanistan invasion at the United Nations General Assembly in January 1980, but also tried to help deal with fallout from the Bahamas affair by arranging for Bahamian socialists and trade unionists to visit Cuba, and tried to facilitate contacts for Cuba with Commonwealth Caribbean on other occasions.²¹⁰ Cuba was also permitted to establish a powerful radio station in Grenada to broadcast to the English-speaking Caribbean, Central America and parts of the United States²¹¹

The material benefits enjoyed by Grenada as a Cuban client were both considerable and politically important. Because the NJM was a small group of political radicals without a broad support base, it needed quickly to win a popular following by ensuring early delivery of economic benefits. Given its limited ability to do so in the impoverished Grenada context, the availability of immediate and efficient Cuban aid was crucial.²¹² Havana was Grenada's single largest benefactor during the PRG years, providing just over 50 percent of economic and military aid, though the value of Soviet military supplies was over three times those from Cuba.²¹³

The range and scale of Cuban support for the Grenadian economy, social service sector and military have been noted above. In addition, Cuba acted as the conduit for aid to Grenada from the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries. In part this was a

²⁰⁹Sandford and Vigilante, *Grenada: the Untold Story*, p. 89

²¹⁰Sandford and Vigilante, *Grenada: the Untold Story*, p. 90

²¹¹Domínguez, "Cuba's relations with Caribbean and Central American countries", p. 94

²¹²Maingot, "Cuba and the Commonwealth Caribbean...", p. 29

²¹³During 1979 to 1983 Cuba provided 107.3 million of the 209.9 million Eastern Caribbean Dollars in foreign economic and military aid received by Grenada, though Cuba's military contribution of 8.5 million was dwarfed by the 28 million Eastern Caribbean Dollars worth of hardware provided by the Soviets [Pryor, *Revolutionary Grenada...*, p. 46].

practical matter, for example utilizing Cuba's superior transshipment infrastructure, and in part reflected a Soviet desire to maintain a low profile. Cuba also acted as an advocate on Grenada's behalf with Moscow. The Soviet Union regarded Grenada as Cuba's "project" and was content to have Cuba act as its proxy there. Notwithstanding eventual arms transfers and provision of scholarships to Soviet institutions, Moscow was not enthusiastic in providing Grenada with material assistance.²¹⁴ The Soviet Union provided the PRG with little more than verbal encouragement in its first three years, and it was only after Cuban encouragement and Bishop's July 1982 visit to Moscow that significant formal agreements were announced.²¹⁵

²¹⁴Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada...", p. 191-92, 194; Shearman, "The Soviet Union and Grenada...", p. 667

²¹⁵Erisman, *Cuba's International Relations...*, p. 145; Shearman, "The Soviet Union and Grenada...", p. 668

CHAPTER SEVEN

ASIAN CASE STUDY

THE MALDIVES

In the early hours of 3 November 1988 the capital of the Indian Ocean island Republic of Maldives¹ came under attack by a band of Sri Lankan mercenaries led by a disgruntled Maldivian. Within 24 hours, a lightning military intervention by the dominant regional power, India, had decisively overturned the attempted mercenary takeover. The crisis was a dramatic example of the vulnerability of microstates to even small and lightly-armed groups of assailants and India's intervention illustrates the way in which an understated or latent patron-client relationship can translate into critical security assistance in times of need.

Unlike Vanuatu, The Gambia and Grenada, the Asian case study deals with a microstate facing a sudden security threat posed by external non-state actors. The Maldives may also be distinguished from the other case studies microstates in that it was one of the few microstates that had formerly been independent Protected States rather than colonies or protectorates. India's military assistance was similar to the "quick-decisive" and essential 1981 intervention of Senegal in The Gambia, but the Maldives government, conscious of the islands' ancient independence, was more careful to keep its protector at arm's length. As in the preceding case studies, this chapter provides an account of the Maldives crisis and intervention before assessing them in terms of the factors of vulnerability and patron-client characteristics outlined

¹The more familiar, informal name, "the Maldives", is used in this study.

in Chapters Two and Three.

Background

Geographical setting²

The Maldives comprises a scattered Indian Ocean archipelago, its capital, Malé, lying approximately 600 kilometres south of the Indian mainland and 670 kilometres west of Sri Lanka. About 200 of its 1,200 tiny coral islands are inhabited,³ and its land mass of only 300 square kilometres is set within a massive Exclusive Economic Zone of 900,000 square kilometres.⁴ The islands rise only a few feet above sea-level and many are mere reefs or shifting sandbanks washed by the ocean.⁵ International studies have warned that global warming could see the Maldives submerged within 100 years.⁶ The islands are grouped in 26 atolls⁷ which are treated as 19 administrative districts, with Malé constituting a twentieth.⁸ In 1989, Malé was home to more than a quarter of the Maldives' total population of just over 200,000.⁹

"Maldives" is a foreign appellation, probably derived from the Sanskrit *maladvipa*,

²See **Figures 7.01 and 7.02.**

³Kurian, George Thomas (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Third World, Vol. II, Guinea to Pakistan* (fourth edition), Facts on File, New York, 1992, p. 1219. The transient nature of some of the islands and difficulty of distinguishing islets from reefs and sandbanks may explain the wide variations in estimates of their number. Chander and Namboodiri, for example, credit the Maldives with 2,000 islands. [Chander, Parkash, "The Maldives", in J.C. Johari (ed.), *Governments and Politics of South Asia*, Sterling, New Delhi, 1991, p.589; Namboodiri, P.K.S., "India and the security of Indian Ocean Islands", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. VI, No 6, September 1982, p. 384]

⁴Phadnis, Umashankar, "Maldives making progress", *World Focus*, Vol. 10, Nos 11-12, November-December 1990, p. 74

⁵Reynolds, C.H.B., *Maldives*, Clio, Oxford, 1993, p. xiii

⁶Kennedy, Paul, *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century*, Harper Collins, Toronto, 1993, pp. 110

⁷The word "atoll" is in fact Maldivian. ["Maldives", *Far East and Australasia 1992*, Europa, London, 1991, p. 574]

⁸Aryasinha, Ravintha P., "Indo-Maldives relations and the relevance of the Sri Lankan factor", in Bertram Bastiampillai (ed.), *India and Her South Asian Neighbours*, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike National Memorial Foundation, Colombo, 1992, p. 92

⁹Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 92

"garland of islands", and its indigenous name is "*Divehi Rajje*", meaning "island realm".¹⁰ Most Maldivians are of similar stock to the peoples of South India and Sri Lanka, their ancestors having migrated to the islands in ancient times, but Maldivian culture has also been shaped by centuries of contact with the Arab world and by strong adherence to Islam, embraced after the sultan's conversion in 1153.¹¹ The Maldivian islands' position straddling historic trade routes to the spice islands of Sri Lanka and the East Indies exposed them to a multitude of influences, as reflected in the present ethnic composition of the Maldivian people, which includes Arab, African, Malay, Portuguese and South Asian elements.¹² Ethnic Dravidian strains are most evident in the northern islands, Arab in the centre and Sinhalese in the south.¹³ The modern Maldivian language of Divehi is a fusion of the local Sinhalese dialect with Persian and Hindustani.¹⁴

The Maldivian practice of Islam has more in common with that of Southeast Asia than the Middle East.¹⁵ A relatively easy-going version of the Sunni Moslem tradition evolved in the Maldives, where a moderate form of Shariat law featured neither capital punishment nor, flogging aside, the other harsh physical penalties meted out in Middle Eastern societies.¹⁶ Similarly, Maldivian women are among the most emancipated in the Islamic world.¹⁷ The near universality of the Islamic creed and Divehi language endows the Maldives with a cultural homogeneity and strength of

¹⁰Forbes, A.D.W., "Maldives: history and social organisation", in C.E. Bosworth *et al.* (eds), *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. VI, *Mahk-Mid*, Brill, Leiden, 1991, p. 245

¹¹Maloney, Clarence, "The Maldives: new stresses in an old nation", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XVI, No 7, July 1976, p. 655; U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984: Report Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, and Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives*, U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1985, p. 1323

¹²Taylor, Iain, "Rebellion in paradise", *Geographical*, March 1989, p. 36

¹³Kurian, *Encyclopedia of the Third World*, p. 1221

¹⁴Phadnis, Umashankar, "Maldives making progress", p. 74

¹⁵Hewitt, Vernon Marston, *The International Politics of South Asia*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992, pp. 96-97

¹⁶Taylor, "Rebellion in paradise", p. 36; Phadnis, Umashankar, "Maldives making progress", p. 74

¹⁷Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 92; Chander, "The Maldives", p. 591

national identity that sets it apart from other South Asian states.¹⁸ In modern times the country's Islamic culture has been protected from disruptive foreign influences by a quarantine system concentrating foreign tourists on self-contained resort islands.

History

Apart from about 150 years' feudatory subordination to the southern Indian state of Kannanur in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and a brief period under Portuguese occupation, 1558-1573, the Maldives has remained effectively independent throughout recorded history.¹⁹ The Sultanate did, however, come under the sway of Ceylon's Dutch rulers in the seventeenth century and within Britain's sphere of influence at the end of the next, when the British established complete control over Ceylon. A symbolic tribute paid by the Maldives to the Dutch governor of Ceylon, first recorded in 1645,²⁰ continued to be paid to British governors in their turn until Ceylon's independence in 1947.²¹

In 1887, Britain signed a treaty²² with the Sultan confirming protection "from all foreign enemies" and monopolizing the Maldives' foreign affairs, yet disclaiming any right to interfere in the "local affairs" of the islands, an arrangement similar to those concluded with some Indian princely states, Himalayan kingdoms and Gulf sheikdoms. London had found it desirable to place relations on a more formal footing

¹⁸Husain, Syed Anwar, "Ethnicity and the security of small states: South Asian context", in M. Abdul Hafiz and Abdur Rob Khan (eds), *Security of Small States*, University Press in association with the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Dhaka, 1987, p. 47

¹⁹Forbes, "Maldives: history and social organisation", p. 245

²⁰Tribute had previously been paid to the Maldives' western Indian and Portuguese overlords. [Phadnis, Urmila, and Ela Dutt Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change in an Atoll State*, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, p17-18]

²¹Maloney, Clarence, *People of the Maldive Islands*, Orient Longman, Bombay, 1980, pp. 127-28; Reynolds, *Maldives*, Clio, p. xv

²²The treaty comprised an exchange of letters between the Maldivian Sultan and the British Governor of Ceylon in December 1887 [reproduced in Phadnis and Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, pp. 107-08].

in order to cement its political influence in the Maldives, with an eye to the growing numbers of British subjects conducting business there and to sea lines of communication passing through the archipelago.²³ For his part, the Sultan hoped to bolster his position in the face of internal unrest fanned by the political and fiscal machinations of the powerful Borah²⁴ merchant community.²⁵ The Sultan acknowledged British authority over the islands and, "with the object of preventing further disputes among [his] people", asked that he and his successors be formally installed in the office of Sultan by the British government in Ceylon.²⁶ Notwithstanding the non-interference proviso of the 1887 treaty, this kingmaking function in practice drew Britain into Maldivian politics from time to time. For example, the colonial government in Colombo played a significant role in bringing about the Maldivian constitutional reforms in the 1930s.²⁷ Generally, however, because the British took no hand in internal administration and there was no scope for missionary activity, the Maldives does not bear the colonial imprint evident in other parts of Asia.²⁸

A court rebellion in 1932 had forced the Sultan to accept a constitution ostensibly curtailing his authority, though Urmila Phadnis and Ela Dutt Luithui characterize it as more in the nature of legalizing the Sultan's privileges "in a garb of liberal democracy".²⁹ A republic declared in 1953 lasted only a year but the position of

²³Phadnis and Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 19

²⁴The Borahs (or Bohoras, Bohras, Burahs), a Moslem community originating in Western India, had been permitted to establish themselves in the Maldives in the 1860s. Mainly of Hindu descent, with some admixture of Yemenite Arab blood, the Borahs were for the most part Shi'is of the Ismaili sect (cf the Sunni Maldivians). Their name denotes a "trader" or "merchant", from the Gujarati *vohorvu*, "to trade". Borahs typically formed themselves into guilds and had little to do with other communities. ["Bohoras", in H.A.R. Gibb et al. (eds), *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Volume I: A-B*, Brill, Leiden, 1960, pp. 1254-55; Phadnis and Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 18]

²⁵Maloney, *People of the Maldive Islands*, p. 121; Phadnis and Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 18

²⁶1887 British-Maldives Agreement

²⁷Phadnis and Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 20

²⁸Maloney, *People of the Maldive Islands*, p. 129

²⁹Phadnis and Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 22

Sultan was thereafter reduced to one of titular head of state.³⁰ The short-lived republic had been headed by Amin Didi (or Muhammad Amin), a visionary but intolerant modernizer, who was deposed and exiled, and ultimately died after being stoned by a mob during a comeback attempt.³¹

On the eve of Ceylon's independence in 1948, the Maldives signed an agreement maintaining the Protected State arrangement with Britain. The Sultan's objective was probably to offset deep trade dependence on Ceylon and vulnerability to Ceylonese political interference,³² a prudent precaution given Colombo's latent territorial ambitions in respect of the Maldives.³³ Britain's interests were by this time more expressly strategic. It had already operated makeshift airfields in the Maldives during the Second World War and the 1948 agreement secured for Britain the right to establish and maintain such facilities as it, in consultation with the Sultan, determined were needed for the defence of the Maldivian Islands "or of any part of His [Britannic] Majesty's dominions."³⁴

After Britain was obliged in 1956 to close its military bases in Ceylon, the wartime airfield on the island of Gan, in the Maldives' southern Addu group, became an essential link in the chain of bases connecting Britain to its interests in South-east Asia, the Far East and Australasia, and as a provider of air cover for the Royal Navy in the Indian Ocean.³⁵ Fitted with the latest navigational and landing aids, Gan could

³⁰Chander, "The Maldives", p. 590

³¹Maloney, *People of the Maldivian Islands*, p. 201

³²Phadnis, Urmila, "Areas of cooperation among India and her Indian Ocean neighbours", in Shanti Sadiq Ali and R.R. Ramachandani (eds), *India and the Western Indian Ocean States: Towards Regional Cooperation in Development*, Allied, New Delhi, 1981, p. 210

³³In 1957 the Ceylonese Prime Minister spoke in parliament of her interest in pursuing a claim to the islands [Gupta, Ranjan, *The Indian Ocean...*, pp. 15-16].

³⁴The agreement is reproduced in Phadnis and Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, pp. 107-08.

³⁵Kaushik, Devendra, *The Indian Ocean: a Strategic Dimension*, Vikas, New Delhi, 1983, p. 21; Váli, Ferenc A., *Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: the Balances of Power*, The Free Press, New York, 1976, p. 202

handle the most sophisticated aircraft,³⁶ and in the mid-1970s had between 3,000 and 4,000 air movements a year.³⁷ Other assets established in Addu included radio facilities on Hittadu Island and naval fuel depots.³⁸ When the Maldives government declined to ratify the preliminary agreement initialled by its predecessor in 1956 and sought more favourable terms, the British nonetheless proceeded with construction. After much acrimony a revised deal was concluded in 1960, with a further financial settlement on the Maldives' resumption of full independence five years later. Gan was "ceded" to Britain until 1986 for £100,000, plus £750,000 development aid over five years.³⁹ In addition, Maldivian foreign exchange reserves were boosted by the wages of the approximately 900 local workers employed at the British installations, which by 1975 amounted to £25,000 a month.⁴⁰ Accusations of British complicity in an attempted secession by the Adduans created such bad feeling in late 1962 that London felt it necessary to dispatch naval vessels to the Maldives to protect British nationals.⁴¹

The Maldives in the modern era

When the Sultanate ceased to be a British Protected State on 26 July 1965, it had a population of around 90,000. The accession to the United Nations that year of the Maldives and The Gambia raised the question of whether such very small states should be accorded full membership of the organization. Fruitless American and

³⁶Suryanarayan, V., "The Maldives and India's security", in Satish Chandra, B. Arunachalam and V. Suryanarayan (eds), *The Indian Ocean and its Islands: Strategic, Scientific and Historical Perspectives*, Sage, New Delhi, 1993, p. 109

³⁷*Telegraph*, 11 March 1975

³⁸Bhattacharya, S.S., "Geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. IX, No 7, October 1991, p. 812; "Maldives", *Far East and Australasia* 1992, p. 574

³⁹"Maldives", *Far East and Australasia* 1992, p. 574

⁴⁰Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 95; *Times*, 11 March 1975

⁴¹*Daily Telegraph*, 7 January 1963; *Times*, 9 January 1963

British advocacy in the Security Council of a form of restricted membership was, however, in the nature of attempting to shut the stable door after several horses had already bolted. The Maldives and The Gambia had been preceded into the General Assembly by 10 other states with populations under one million,⁴² and, as it turned out, would be followed by an inexorable flow of other diminutive territories.⁴³ The debate surrounding the Maldives and The Gambia's entry into the United Nations in 1965 can be regarded as having launched the microstate "problem" as a subject of academic inquiry.⁴⁴

Maldivian politics was dominated for a quarter of a century by the autocratic Amir Ibrahim Nasir, who became Prime Minister in 1957 and President upon the proclamation of a second republic in 1968. Nasir accelerated modernization begun under Amin Didi, expelled the Borah and Sri Lankan Moorish communities, and established a government monopoly over foreign trade.⁴⁵ Constitutional reforms in 1972 recreated the office of Prime Minister (filled by Nasir's close associate, Ahmed Zaki) but, in February 1975, Nasir invoked emergency powers to resume all executive responsibilities in response to popular unrest over high food prices and dissent within the Government.⁴⁶ In this upheaval, known as "Big Troubles Thursday", the prime ministership was abolished and the recently re-elected Zaki was consigned to internal exile with 11 other top officials.⁴⁷ Zaki's rising popularity had made him a potential

⁴²Prior to 1965, states which had acceded to the United Nations when they had populations under one million were Iceland and Luxembourg (1945); Congo, Cyprus and Gabon (1960); Mongolia and Mauritania (1961); Trinidad (1962); Kuwait (1963); and Malta (1964). [*Statesman's Year-book 1992-93*, Macmillan, London, 1992, pp. 7-8]

⁴³Crawford, James, *The Creation of States in International Law*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, pp. 139-40; De Smith, S.A., "Exceeding small", in J.E.S. Fawcett and Rosalyn Higgins (eds), *International Organizations: Law in Movement*, Oxford University Press, London, 1974, p. 65; Rapoport, Jacques, Ernest Mutueba and Joseph J. Therattil, *Small States and Territories: Status and Problems*, Arno Press, New York, 1971, p. 13

⁴⁴Rapaport et al., *Small States and Territories...*, p. 13

⁴⁵Reynolds, C.H.B., "Maldives", in Francis Robinson (ed.), *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 228

⁴⁶Maloney, *People of the Maldivian Islands*, p. 201; Phadnis and Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 40

⁴⁷*Times*, 11 March 1975

rival and a focus for the President's opponents.⁴⁸ After abruptly stepping down in 1978, allegedly to avoid a corruption investigation, Nasir moved to Singapore, from where his hand was still seen to dabble sinisterly in Maldivian affairs.

His more enlightened successor, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, was repeatedly re-elected after assuming the Presidency in 1978.⁴⁹ He introduced limited political liberalization, for example, by opening up *Majlis* proceedings to public scrutiny and increasing freedom of expression in the chamber.⁵⁰ A former academic and diplomat, Gayoom raised the Maldives' profile through increased participation in international organizations and advocacy on behalf of small island states. Prior to the 1988 mercenary attack, Gayoom had already faced two other coup conspiracies, the more serious being Nasir's alleged contracting of British mercenaries to seize, and probably assassinate him, in February 1980.⁵¹ Later that year Gayoom appointed a commission to investigate corruption allegations against the former President, who had amassed a large fortune during his rule.⁵² A 1983 plot was dismissed by Gayoom as "not serious at all."⁵³

After a decade of decline, reflecting setbacks such as Sri Lanka's sudden discontinuation of dried fish purchases in 1972 and the unexpected British withdrawal from Gan in 1976, the Maldivian economy enjoyed average annual growth of nearly 10 per cent in the 1980s.⁵⁴ Although rated among the Least Developed Countries,⁵⁵

⁴⁸ Some sources allege that Zaki was planning a vote of no confidence against Nasir in the *Majlis* or a *de facto* coup d'état [Gupta, Ranjan, *The Indian Ocean: a Political Geography*, Marwah, New Delhi, 1979, pp. 14-15; Mahoney, *People of the Maldivian Islands*, pp. 207-8].

⁴⁹ The (mostly elected) Citizens' *Majlis* or Parliament nominates only one Presidential candidate, whom the electorate then votes for or against. In the unprecedented event that he failed to receive majority approval, an alternative candidate would be offered. [Chander, "The Maldives", p. 591]

⁵⁰ Phadnis and Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 43

⁵¹ *Sunday Times*, 4 May 1980; *Telegraph*, 28 April 1980

⁵² "Maldives", *Far East and Australasia* 1992, p. 575

⁵³ *Guardian*, 10 September 1983

⁵⁴ "Maldives", *Far East and Australasia* 1992, p. 575

the republic had a 1988 per capita Gross National Product of US\$380 that was the second highest among member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).⁵⁶ Overcoming a downturn caused by the political turmoil in Sri Lanka, tourism had by 1989 outstripped fishing as the Maldives' biggest foreign exchange earner. With visitor arrivals approaching 200,000 a year, the industry contributed an estimated 17.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product, compared to fishing's 15.7 per cent. A third important sector, shipping, suffered a decline in the 1980s due to adverse international market conditions.⁵⁷

Initially, the Maldives' only overseas diplomatic post was in Colombo. The establishment of a mission to the United Nations, with Gayoom as Permanent Representative, and enlistment in the Non-Aligned Movement in 1976 heralded an expansion of international ties. In 1978 the Maldives joined the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and in 1985 became a founding member of SAARC and upgraded to full membership of the Commonwealth.⁵⁸ The republic pursued a steadfastly neutral foreign policy, maintaining a wide range of external ties in order to maximize aid receipts and promote a peaceful Indian Ocean region. By late 1990, the Maldives had diplomatic relations with over 100 countries, compared to only 54 in 1982.⁵⁹ It espoused the concepts of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in South Asia.

⁵⁵U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 1990*, United Nations, New York, 1991, p. 87

⁵⁶*The World Bank Atlas 1990*, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1990. SAARC links Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

⁵⁷"Maldives", *Far East and Australasia* 1992, p. 576

⁵⁸The Maldives had initially joined the Commonwealth in 1982 as a "special member", one of the limitations of which was non-participation in Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings.

⁵⁹"Maldives", *Far East and Australasia* 1992, p. 574; "Maldives in the 1990s", *Spotlight on Regional Affairs*, Vol. XI, No 3, March 1992, p. 11

The crisis of November 1988 and Indian Intervention

The mercenary attack

At 4.15 am on Thursday, 3 November, 1988, Malé was attacked by Tamil mercenaries armed with assault rifles, rocket launchers and grenades. About 80 of the men had arrived direct from Sri Lanka in two fishing trawlers to link up with an advance party, numbering perhaps as many as 120, which had infiltrated the country in the guise of foreign workers and tourists.⁶⁰ The assault coincided with the changing of shifts at the Maldives' National Security Service (NSS) headquarters, when about 400 personnel were inside.⁶¹ Although nominally 1,500-strong, the NSS's effective paramilitary force numbered only about 500, since most personnel performed routine duties such as policing, fire-fighting and coast guard work.⁶² With the NSS headquarters surrounded and under fire, the mercenaries were free to move about central Malé.⁶³

President Gayoom's curious last-minute postponement of an official visit to India scheduled for the same week led to speculation that Malé had had some inkling of the impending attack.⁶⁴ The presidential palace, and the radio and television stations were quickly taken over by the mercenaries, and the capital's utilities cut off, but the NSS building remained in Government hands. Gayoom who eschewed the palace for a

⁶⁰Estimates of numbers vary considerably. The above figures are a distillation from the following sources: Abraham, Thomas, "The Sri Lankan link", *Frontline*, 26 November-9 December 1988, p. 32; Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", pp. 101-2; Joshi, Manoj, "The military muscle", *Frontline*, 26 November-9 December 1988, p. 28; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Longman, Harlow, Essex, December 1988, p. 36350

⁶¹*Statesman*, 8 November 1988

⁶²Gupta, Shekhar, "Maldives: a close shave", *India Today*, 30 November 1988, p. 28; "Maldives: Operation Cactus", *Indian Defence Review*, January 1989, p. 17; Joshi, "The military muscle", p. 28; U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984...*, p. 1323. By contrast, the *Independent* [4 November 1988] claimed that the NSS had only 100 men, armed with pistols, based in Malé.

⁶³*Statesman*, 8 November 1988

⁶⁴*Times of India*, 4 November 1988

more modest residence was alerted in time to slip away before the invaders could reach him.⁶⁵ Sporadic firing by the mercenaries continued throughout Thursday 3 November, intensified in the evening, and ceased around 1 am Friday when Indian troops reached Malé.⁶⁶ At the time of the attack there were upwards of 20,000 foreign tourists in the Maldives,⁶⁷ including 1,000 Westerners of whom 450 were British.⁶⁸ The great majority were well out of harm's way, being located on the self-contained resort islands rather than in Malé.

Apart from their major miscalculation of discounting the possibility of international military assistance reaching the Maldives government so rapidly, the mercenaries made three serious practical omissions in their operation: they neglected to disable international telecommunications, Hulule Airport and the watercraft providing transport from the airport to Malé. As a consequence, Gayoom was able to contact the Maldives' two overseas diplomatic missions in New York and Colombo almost immediately and, through them, send distress calls to many countries, including the United States, Britain, Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia and Singapore.⁶⁹ His foreign minister, Fathullah Jameel, got through to Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi at 5.30 am.⁷⁰ That evening, Indian forces landed at Hulule Airport unopposed and made their way across the water to Malé without difficulty. The mercenaries' failure to sever communications may have stemmed from their own need to confer with associates in Sri Lanka.⁷¹ There is some evidence that they were in fact alive to the possibility of

⁶⁵*Hindu*, 7 November 1988; Mukherjee, Alok, "Maldives drama", *Frontline*, 26 November-9 December, 1988, p. 25. Private sources have indicated to this author that Gayoom was warned by a Colombo-based European ambassador shortly before the assault.

⁶⁶Mukherjee, "Maldives drama", p. 2

⁶⁷Relying on an estimate provided by Colombo travel agents, London's *Financial Times* of 4 November 1988 put the tourist total at 25,000. A *Times of India* [4 November 1988] figure of 40,000 seems implausibly high, given that annual visitor arrivals were only about 200,000 in the late 1980s.

⁶⁸*Independent*, 4 November 1988

⁶⁹"Maldives in the 1990s", p. 16

⁷⁰Gupta, Shekhar, "Maldives: a close shave", p. 29

⁷¹Mukherjee, "Maldives drama", p. 2

foreign military aid been flown in: one source claims that a mercenary bid to seize the airport was beaten back by NSS guards.⁷²

India's intervention

Within eight hours of the assault, New Delhi had formally decided to intervene, and within 22 hours (around 2.30 am on Friday 4 November), an advance force of 300 airborne Indian troops⁷³ had retaken government buildings in Malé, ensured the safety of the president and, in effect, routed the coup attempt. Over three days, the Indian Air Force's Southern Command carried out 210 sorties, moving 3,000 troops and 240 tonnes of material, including heavy guns, vehicles, munitions, medical supplies and food. Approximately 1,100 troops and about 80 tonnes of load were positioned in Malé, the rest being retained at Trivandrum in India as a reserve.⁷⁴ The Indian Army had considered two options: flying in combat-ready troops from the Indian Peace-keeping Force (IPKF) in nearby Sri Lanka, or dispatching the 50th Parachute Brigade from Agra, 250 kilometres south-east of New Delhi and nearly 3,000 kilometres from Malé. The latter was chosen on the grounds that it was better equipped and trained for the mission, which might have required a paradrop if Hulule Airport turned out to be under mercenary control. The Brigade was the Army's nearest equivalent to a rapid deployment force and Agra was the Air Force's main strategic transport base.⁷⁵

In scenes reminiscent of Grenada, where all branches of the American military

⁷²*Statesman*, 8 November 1988

⁷³"Prime Minister's Statement on Developments in Maldives" [in Parliament, 4 November 1988], *Foreign Affairs Record*, External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Vol. XXXIV, November 1988, pp. 365-66

⁷⁴Raj, N. Gopal, "A job well done", *Frontline*, 26 November-9 December 1988, p. 31. Aryasinha ["Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 102] puts the in-country troop total at 1,600.

⁷⁵Joshi, "The military muscle", p. 29; "Operation Cactus": Indian armed forces combined operations in Maldives: November 1988", *Vayu Aerospace Review*, VI/1988, p. 13; *Statesman*, 10 November 1988

appeared to scramble for a "piece of the action",⁷⁶ Even Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft were even dispatched to Hulule in a show of force and for "familiarization."⁷⁷ India's Home Minister offered to send in the National Security Guard, fresh from Operation Black Thunder in Amritsar's Golden Temple, and small force of élite commandos was actually airlifted to Trivandrum.⁷⁸ At least five substantial Indian naval vessels were deployed in pursuit of the mercenaries. In addition, an aircraft carrier, which happened to be in dry-dock, was reportedly warned for possible participation in the Maldives operation.⁷⁹

The arrival of the Indian paratroops effectively ended the drama in the Maldives itself, save for hunting down those mercenaries who had taken refuge on surrounding islands, and the main action now shifted to the high seas. The sound of the first Indian troop transport landing at Hulule, and a 9.00 pm BBC radio report shortly afterwards, had alerted the mercenaries to their imminent danger. Around midnight on Thursday 3 November about 70 put to sea in a commandeered Maldivian commercial vessel,⁸⁰ the 5,000 tonne *Progress Light*, taking with them 27 hostages, including the Maldivian Minister of Transport and Shipping and his Swiss wife, the Education Minister, a member of the *Majlis*, and three Indian nationals.⁸¹ Two Indian naval training vessels, *INSS Betwa* and *Tir*, and the guided missile frigate, *INS Godavari*, were diverted to intercept the freighter under the direction of maritime patrol aircraft, while two vessels from the eastern fleet, *INSS Rajput* and *Udaygiri*,

⁷⁶Adkin, Mark, *Urgent Fury: the Battle for Grenada*, Leo Cooper, London, 1989, pp. 343-47

⁷⁷Gupta, Shekhar, "Maldives: a close shave", p. 32; "Operation Cactus": Indian armed forces combined operations in Maldives...", p. 14

⁷⁸Joshi, "The military muscle", p. 29

⁷⁹Interview with Shreedhar Rao, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, January 1994

⁸⁰*Keesing's* reports that 67 mercenaries were arrested when the ship was finally stormed [*Keesing's*, December 1988, p. 36350]. The *Indian Defence Review* puts the number of mercenaries on the ship at only 46 ["Maldives: Operation Cactus", p. 18].

⁸¹Gupta, Shekhar, "Maldives: a close shave", p. 29; *Times of India*, 8 November 1988

were dispatched south to patrol other possible escape routes. A team of Maldives government negotiators was conveyed by helicopter to the *Godavari* which, with the *Betwa*, closed on the fugitive freighter off the Sri Lankan coast on the Saturday evening.

The mercenaries on board the *Progress Light* demanded they be allowed to go to Colombo and hold talks in the presence of the British and Indian High Commissioners and other international representatives, but were informed at 1 am that they could be taken to India but not to Sri Lanka.⁸² About this time the captain of the freighter reported that two hostages had been executed, though afterwards he revealed that he had done so under duress and only one hostage had in fact been killed.⁸³ The Navy then opened fire at and around the freighter, dislodging its speedboat, the mercenaries' only hope of escape. At dawn on Sunday 6 November, *Godavari's* Sea King helicopter dropped depth charges around the *Progress Light*, severely buffeting the ship and panicking the mercenaries, who by 9.30 am agreed to give themselves up. Marine commandos boarded the vessel, bringing the affair to a close just over three days after the mercenary attack had commenced. An estimated 30 to 40 people were killed as a result of the crisis. These included at least four or five hostages killed on the *Progress Light*, mainly by flying shrapnel; eight NSS guards and 13 civilians in Malé; and seven or eight mercenaries.⁸⁴

India's principal public justification of its actions came in the form of a Prime Ministerial statement in both Houses of Parliament on Friday 4 November 1988, the

⁸²*Statesman*, 7 November 1988

⁸³*Times of India*, 11 November 1988

⁸⁴*Statesman*, 8 November 1988 and *Sunday Statesman*, 6 November 1988. By contrast, the *Telegraph* of 7 November 1988 reported that President Gayoom had announced a final death toll of only four civilians, eight NSS members and at least three mercenaries. This tally may not have included *Progress Light* casualties.

day after the attack and the launching of the Indian military response. Mr Gandhi told Parliament:

*"Maldives is a peaceful country, with no Armed Forces except a small force to maintain law and order. President Gayoom is the democratically elected and popular President of this friendly neighbour of ours. He was re-elected for a third term in office as recently as September 23, 1988, securing over 95% of the votes polled. Maldives is also one of our closest and friendliest neighbours. It appealed to us in its grave hour of need. After carefully considering this appeal, we felt that we must respond positively and go to the aid of a friendly neighbour facing a threat to its sovereignty and its democratic order."*⁸⁵

Gandhi characterized the Indian action as South Asia solving its own crises without external interference, referring to his government's "belief that countries in the region can resolve their problems in a spirit of friendship and cooperation, free of outside influence."⁸⁶ He later said, "when a friendly neighbour asks for help, you cannot sit back and watch them being slaughtered," and denied the opposition's charge that India was emerging as the "big brother" in South Asia."⁸⁷

Origin and motives of the attackers

The chief organizers of the mercenary expedition were Abdullah Luthufi,⁸⁸ a colourful and disreputable Maldivian entrepreneur, and Uma Maheswaran,⁸⁹ leader of a Sri Lankan separatist faction, the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). The terms of their collaboration were that Luthufi would take power in the Maldives and Maheswaran would receive, in return for providing the mercenary

⁸⁵"Prime Minister's Statement On Developments in Maldives"

⁸⁶ibid.

⁸⁷*Statesman*, 12 November 1988

⁸⁸Sometimes spelt Luthufee.

⁸⁹Sometimes spelt Maheshwaran.

manpower, US\$2.5 million in cash, the use of Malé port as a transit point for gun and drug running, and two Maldivian islands, one to be employed as a training facility and the other as a cash-generating tourist resort.⁹⁰

Luthufi's chequered history had included several serious brushes with the authorities. After a youthful career in the illegal export trade, he was in 1968 arrested smuggling a pistol into the Maldives and jailed for involvement in a coup conspiracy. Released under a general amnesty in 1973, he drew another eight-month prison term for alleged complicity in a further coup plot in 1975. An indictment for bank fraud in Singapore in 1981 saw him jump bail and use a false passport to return to the Maldives, where he set up a tropical fish exporting business. He subsequently established himself in Sri Lanka, developing a poultry farm and fish factory near Colombo.⁹¹ Along with Maldivian cohorts in the 1988 venture against their homeland, Sagar Ahmed Nassir⁹² and Ibrahim Manik, Luthufi had previously had a lengthy association with Sri Lankan militants in gun-running and drug-smuggling activities.⁹³

While some recognized the mercenary expedition as a "typical hot-headed Luthufi scheme,"⁹⁴ the Maldivian was possibly also spurred by personal grievances on this occasion. Arun Banerjee, Indian High Commissioner to the Maldives at the time of the crisis, recalls Luthufi as a "failed businessman with a grudge."⁹⁵ Luthufi's resentment may have stemmed not only from his periods of incarceration, but from more recent setbacks such as the Maldivian Trade Minister's refusal, in accordance

⁹⁰ *Guardian*, 27 March 1989; Gupta, Shekhar, "Maldives: a close shave", p. 29

⁹¹ *Times*, 9 November 1988

⁹² Also referred to as Shagar Nasir, Sagar Ahmed Nasir and Sagar Naswer.

⁹³ *Times*, 8 November 1988

⁹⁴ *Statesman*, 14 November 1988

⁹⁵ Interview with Arun Banerjee, New Delhi, 13 January 1994.

with the law, to grant him permission to export live turtles.⁹⁶ Umashankar Phadnis attaches significance also to Luthufi's Adduan origins.⁹⁷ Speculation that Luthufi was connected with previous coup-backer and ex-President, Ibrahim Nasir, can probably be discounted either as a confusion of the former leader with his namesake, Luthufi's lieutenant,⁹⁸ or a tenuous extrapolation from the fact that Luthufi was believed to have travelled via Singapore on his way to Malé to await the mercenaries.⁹⁹ Ibrahim Nasir seems an unlikely partner in crime considering that Luthufi had twice been imprisoned for plotting against Nasir's regime and that Luthufi was from Addu, whose people had been the object of Nasir's vengeance.

While Luthufi's recruiting success in a Sri Lanka swarming with well-armed guerrillas surprised no one, the particular source of his mercenaries came as a shock to Indian authorities, the PLOTE being, embarrassingly, one of the factions backed by New Delhi in the Sri Lankan conflict.¹⁰⁰ Hagerty concludes that the mercenaries were "likely trained by Indians on Indian territory, with at least the acquiescence (and initially outright support) of the Indian government."¹⁰¹ The willingness of Maheswaran to join Luthufi in the risky Maldives venture probably reflected the PLOTE's flagging fortunes at home. While still the best equipped and organized of the Tamil militant groups after the Tamil Tigers, the PLOTE had become increasingly marginalized after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement the previous year.¹⁰² It had lost ground to the Tigers and had also been pushed back by the IPKF after

⁹⁶*Times of India*, 13 November 1988

⁹⁷Phadnis, Umashakar, "Maldives making progress", p. 73

⁹⁸*Keesing's*, December 1988, p. 36350; *Times of India*, 4 November 1988; *Le Monde*, 5 November 1988; Kurian, *Encyclopedia of the Third World*, p. 1221

⁹⁹Abraham, "The Sri Lankan link", p. 32. Nasir, it will be recalled, had settled in Singapore after relinquishing the Presidency in 1978.

¹⁰⁰Bilveer, S., "Operation Cactus: India's 'prompt-action' in Maldives", *Asian Defence Journal*, February 1989, p. 32. For one, deeply sceptical, account of India's involvement in Sri Lanka, see Munro, Ross H., "Superpower rising", *Time* (Asian edition), 3 April 1989, pp. 10-11

¹⁰¹Hagerty, Devin T., "India's regional security doctrine", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXI, No 4, April 1991, p. 362

¹⁰²Abraham, "The Sri Lankan link", p. 32; *Times of India*, 8 November 1988

complaints of extortion and harrassment,¹⁰³ leaving it with a greatly reduced presence in the critical northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka.¹⁰⁴ This pressure would have been relieved by gaining an offshore base in the Maldives to replace former havens in southern India's Tamil Nadu state, denied to the separatists since the Indo-Sri Lankan accord.¹⁰⁵

It seems Maheswaran led planning of the Maldives venture¹⁰⁶ but did not take part in the actual operation, which was directed by Luthufi. The seaborne party left the western Sri Lankan smuggling ports of Kalpitiya and Putalamport on 1 November to link up with Luthufi and the bulk of his force in Malé two days later.¹⁰⁷ During the initial assault Luthufi was observed brandishing a gun and leading the mercenaries through the streets of the capital.¹⁰⁸ However, according to the captain of the *Progress Light*, Luthufi quickly lost his nerve during the retreat and it was the mercenaries who were in control during the dénouement on the freighter.¹⁰⁹

President Gayoom dismissed any notion that Maldivian political dissidence was behind the mercenary attack,¹¹⁰ and his foreign minister claimed that those locals who took part "could be counted on the fingers."¹¹¹ However, by Tuesday 8 November, there were between 30 and 40 Maldivian citizens among the 150-odd people detained after a house-to-house search of Malé by Indian and Maldivian forces.¹¹² The potential for fugitive mercenaries to melt into the large Sri Lankan guest worker

¹⁰³*Times of India*, 8 November 1988

¹⁰⁴Abraham, "The Sri Lankan link", p. 32

¹⁰⁵*Statesman*, 9 November 1988

¹⁰⁶*Guardian*, 2 February 1989

¹⁰⁷Abraham, "The Sri Lankan link", p. 32; Joshi, "The military muscle", p. 28; *Times of India*, 8 November 1988

¹⁰⁸Tripathi, Deepak, "India's Maldives mission and after", *World Today*, January 1989, p. 3; *Times*, 10 November 1988

¹⁰⁹*Times of India*, 11 November 1988

¹¹⁰*ibid.*, 13 November 1988

¹¹¹*Hindu*, 7 November 1988

¹¹²*Times of India*, 9 November 1988

community in Maldives, and suspicions that some of these guest workers may in fact have been planning to link with their invading compatriots, prompted close checking of Sri Lankan citizens and large scale expulsions.¹¹³ Nearly 4,000 Sri Lankan "non-professional" workers were asked to leave the country within six months.¹¹⁴

Postscript

President Gayoom was sworn in for a third term as scheduled on 11 November 1988. The ceremony was attended by representatives of nearly 50 countries, including the Indian foreign minister, but was shorn of most of the usual celebratory trappings as a mark of respect for those slain in the mercenary attack the previous week. The president explained that he had sought Indian military assistance "by virtue of the powers and authority vested in [him] by the constitution, as it was [his] immediate duty to defend the sovereignty and independence of [the] republic." He characterized the mercenary assault not as a coup attempt but as aggression by foreign terrorists.¹¹⁵

About 70 people were tried in connection with the mercenary attack and, on 17 August 1989, 16 of the defendants, including Luthufi and three other Maldivians, were sentenced to death, while the majority of others received prison terms. Gayoom subsequently commuted the death sentences to life imprisonment. Uma Maheswaran was not brought to trial in the Maldives but was assassinated in Sri Lanka in July 1989.¹¹⁶ As part of its overhaul of the NSS, the Maldives government added six British vessels to its existing force, acquired four armoured cars, increased personnel

¹¹³"Maldives", *Asia 1989 Yearbook*, Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, 1989, p. 176

¹¹⁴"Maldives in the 1990s", p. 18

¹¹⁵*Times of India*, 12 November 1988

¹¹⁶*Keesing's*, December 1989, p. 37092

levels to 2,000 men under arms, sent pilots abroad for airborne surveillance training, and created a Defence Intelligence Agency.¹¹⁷

Following the November 1988 crisis, the Maldives became a leading advocate of multilateral measures to enhance small state security. In 1989, with Indian backing, it hosted the first international conference of small states threatened by rising sea levels.¹¹⁸ The Malé gathering was followed up by a series of other activities and sowed the seeds for the creation of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) at the second World Climate Conference in Geneva in November 1990.¹¹⁹

The Maldives as a case of microstate vulnerability

To what extent did the sources of vulnerability for the Maldives match the factors typical to microstates as outlined in Chapter Two? The following section makes the comparison under the established headings: *political* (colonial experience, special characteristics of politics in small societies), *geographical* (location, physical and demographic characteristics) and *economic* (government resource constraints, linkage between poverty/under-development and political instability).

¹¹⁷"Maldives in the 1990s", pp. 17-18

¹¹⁸Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 106; *Times*, 17 November 1989; *Sunday Telegraph*, 21 January 1990

¹¹⁹Van Lierop, Robert F., "What future for small island states after UNCED?", *Rio Reviews 1992*, The Centre for Our Common Future, Geneva, p. 31

Political Variables

Colonial experience

Uniquely among the four cases studies, the Maldives was a Protected State rather than a colony or protectorate and therefore never relinquished sovereignty nor responsibility for its own internal administration.¹²⁰ Because the Maldives' "colonial" experience was of a much more limited nature than that of Vanuatu, The Gambia and Grenada, questions of the impact of colonial neglect, late preparation for statehood, demographic alteration and anomalous colonial-era borders are largely irrelevant to the present case. However, there was one major exception to the general non-involvement of the quasi-colonial power, Britain, in the Maldives and this did have a political and socio-economic impact that was both considerable and contentious. The exception was the establishment in the late 1950s of the large and strategically important British airbase on the island of Gan.

The local Adduan people had historically maintained an identity somewhat distinct from that of the rest of the Maldives: the southern atolls were, for example, never controlled by the Portuguese, and the people spoke a different dialect.¹²¹ The southerners welcomed the British as a source of lucrative employment and training opportunities, but their eagerness to work on the construction of the base put them in direct conflict with the government in Malé, which sought to delay construction until a favourable agreement with the British had been secured. Relations between the central government and the southern islanders broke down completely when Malé

¹²⁰See notes to **Table 2.05** for a fuller account of the distinction.

¹²¹Maloney, *People of the Maldiv Islands*, p. 203

withheld relief during a famine in 1958-59, increased transport charges and taxes, and issued an edict requiring the dried fish trade to be routed through the capital.¹²² One Afif Didi led the people of Addu and neighbouring Huvadu Atoll in a purported secession, declaring a "United Suvadivan Republic", in January 1959.

Dependent on local labour, the British sought to maintain good relations with the "Suvadivans", without recognizing their separation, and at the same time continued to make obeisances to Malé. The government nevertheless accused Britain of complicity in the revolt and of supporting the rebels as a means of exerting pressure in negotiations for the base agreement. A violent assault on the populous rebel island of Suvadiva¹²³ by government forces in July 1959 prompted a stiff British warning against repeating such an action which, it was held, would endanger Britain's rightful use of its installations; the point was reinforced by the deployment of a company of British troops and a destroyer.¹²⁴ The British persuaded Malé to offer the southern rebels an amnesty, but the stalemate continued until 1963 when Britain provided Afif Didi and his family with passage to pensioned exile in the Seychelles.

Ironically the closure of the Gan facilities in March 1976 as part of Britain's military withdrawal "east of Suez" also had a significant disruptive impact. It left a large economic gap, despite supplementary British development aid to cushion the blow. The southern islanders had abandoned their traditional pursuits of fishing and farming because of the alternative employment offered by Britain over two decades, and the principal farming land had been destroyed to make way for the airfield on Gan. Their

¹²²*Guardian*, 21 March 1977; Phadnis and Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 31

¹²³Maloney [*People of the Maldiv Islands*, p. 204] refers to the island as Huvaru Tinadu, the capital of Huvadu Atoll.

¹²⁴*Guardian*, 22 March 1977

plight was aggravated by a population explosion, from 6,000 to 17,000,¹²⁵ due to prosperity and the availability of modern medical services during the British years. Many southerners moved to Malé, which in turn suffered severe population pressure: the capital grew from 11,000 inhabitants in 1967 to 35,000 in 1987.¹²⁶ Matters were made still worse by the vindictive attitude of the Government, which closed the Gan airfield and stripped the base of all movable equipment, including educational and medical items.¹²⁷ Malé's strict non-aligned and anti-militarization stance also made it deaf to several proposals which would have seen early reutilization of the facilities, including a 1977 Soviet offer to lease Gan as a fishing base for US\$1 million per annum,¹²⁸ and an Australian entrepreneur's scheme to develop recreational facilities for American troops from Diego Garcia.¹²⁹ There was even speculation that Britain would seek to reopen its base on Gan in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.¹³⁰ Plans announced in 1981 to convert Gan into a Free Enterprise Zone led eventually to reactivation of the airport for civilian use and establishment of Hong Kong-financed textile factories in the surplus aircraft hangars.¹³¹

Politics in small societies

On the face of it, the Maldives appears to have enjoyed to a considerable extent the "*concerted political harmony*" regarded by Sutton as a hallmark of small societies.¹³²

¹²⁵ibid.

¹²⁶Reynolds, "Maldives", *The Cambridge Encyclopedia...*, p. 241; Taylor, "Rebellion in paradise", p. 38

¹²⁷*Guardian*, 22 March 1977

¹²⁸Phadnis, Urmila, "Areas of cooperation among India and her Indian Ocean neighbours", p. 214. The Soviets had reportedly shown an interest in establishing a military base in the Maldives as early as 1962. [Dikshit, "Maldivian islands: the harbinger of Cold War in the Indian realm", *The Indian Geographical Journal*, Vol. XLI, Nos 1 and 2, January-March and April-June 1966, p. 32]

¹²⁹Phadnis and Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 84

¹³⁰*Sunday Telegraph*, 27 January 1980; Taylor, "Rebellion in paradise", p. 37

¹³¹*Telegraph*, 26 January 1981; "Maldives", *Far East and Australasia* 1992, p. 574; Taylor, "Rebellion in paradise", p. 37

¹³²Sutton, Paul, "Political aspects", in Colin Clarke and Tony Payne (eds), *Politics, Security and Development in Small States*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1987, pp. 17-18

This harmony was reflected in a high degree of continuity in government and a low incidence of serious domestic unrest. (Notwithstanding Gupta's 1979 attribution of the region's highest "coup-average" to the Maldives,¹³³ the only significant popular disturbances were the Addu secession crisis of the early 1960s and the food price demonstrations of mid-1974.) To some degree this relative harmony reflects the positive underpinnings of cultural and ethnic homogeneity and a basic consensus of values amongst the Maldivian people. On the other hand, it was undoubtedly also a reflection of a limited tolerance for diversity of opinion and a heavy-handed enforcement of conformity by the state. For example, it was legally impossible for a citizen to be of any other religion than Islam;¹³⁴ citizens were subject to very tight administrative control through the atoll headman system and faced internal exile for misdemeanours; criticism of the government and failure to report such criticism were illegal;¹³⁵ and there were no political parties in the Maldives.¹³⁶ In the short term the Maldives' somewhat artificial "harmony" may have contributed to political stability though one suspects that ultimately the imposed conformity might make the country vulnerable to a sudden eruption of suppressed discontent.

In common with other Indian Ocean island states, the Maldives featured a highly personalized political system¹³⁷ that qualified it for the description "*exaggerated personalism*" accorded to small societies in the academic literature. This was particularly true of Nasir's rule, which has been described as a period of "commercial despotism" in which the economic life of the Maldives was "run as a private fiefdom

¹³³Gupta, Ranjan, *The Indian Ocean...*, p. 17. There were alleged conspiracies against the Nasir government in 1967, 1968, 1972 and 1975 [Maloney, "The Maldives: new stresses in an old nation", p. 657; *Statesman*, 14 November 1988; Maloney, *People of the Maldive Islands*, pp. 201, 206].

¹³⁴Reynolds, "Maldives", *Clio*, p. xiii

¹³⁵Maloney, "The Maldives: new stresses in an old nation", pp. 658-59, 667

¹³⁶Political parties were not, however, constitutionally barred. Gayoom ascribed their absence to socio-cultural homogeneity and a lack of ideological diversity Chander, "The Maldives", p. 593-94

¹³⁷Gupta, Ranjan, *The Indian Ocean...*, p. 10

of the head of state."¹³⁸ Nasir, a member of the traditional ruling family,¹³⁹ had become prime minister in 1957 at the age of 30 and ruled in that capacity, and as president, until 1978 in an autocratic style reminiscent of the old sultans. Aided by his considerable political powers (discussed below), Nasir dominated the shipping and tourist industries¹⁴⁰ and operated an oligarchic system of government.¹⁴¹ With Nasir and Gayoom each holding office for over 20 years, the Maldives also displayed the typical microstate characteristic of "*leadership longevity*," though their success in maintaining domestic harmony, including by suppressing dissent, obscures any linkage between an excessively long grip on power and vulnerability to political instability.

As might be expected in light of the above, the Maldives also exhibited classic signs of "*unrestrained executive power*". The heavily centralized system of government gave ample opportunity for abuse of authority. Although the president was elected (for a five-year term) on the basis of universal suffrage, elections were more in the nature of a referendum because the *Majlis* nominated only one candidate and voters simply voted for or against. No nominee was rejected and the candidate always polled over 90 per cent of the vote.¹⁴² Maloney reports that in one atoll two headmen who voted "no" soon lost their jobs for "incompetence."¹⁴³ Administration was carried out by the president with the assistance of a Council of Ministers (cabinet) who, along with the prime minister, vice-president(s) and judges, were appointed by him. Other presidential powers included supreme authority to "propagate the religion

¹³⁸Taylor, "Rebellion in paradise", p. 38

¹³⁹Nutter, John, *The Maldiv Islands: a Neglected Responsibility*, Bow Group, London, 31 January 1960, p. 1

¹⁴⁰Maloney, "The Maldives: new stresses in an old nation", p. 669

¹⁴¹Phadnis, Urmila, and Ela Dutt Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, pp. 49-50

¹⁴²Chander, "The Maldives", p. 592-93

¹⁴³Maloney, "The Maldives: new stresses in an old nation", p. 667

of Islam in the Maldives"; to "proclaim temporary emergency orders that do not contravene the Constitution;" and to have the Constitution amended by convening a special body. Constitutional amendments introduced in 1975 allowed for even more centralization of authority.¹⁴⁴ Under Nasir foreign trade was made a government monopoly.¹⁴⁵

Although cabinet members did not need to be members of the *Majlis* they were individually responsible to it. By contrast, the president wielded virtually absolute powers and was not accountable to the *Majlis* which, under Nasir's rule, had the reputation of a "mere rubber-stamp authority."¹⁴⁶ The president initiated most legislative proposals; these were adopted without much discussion¹⁴⁷ and were subject to his final assent. *Majlis* members were not exempt from the threat of banishment, though a reform introduced by Gayoom in January 1979 provided that members could not be penalized for expressing an opinion or voting in a particular way (unless they contravened Islamic principles).¹⁴⁸

Nasir amassed a vast personal fortune by questionable means and rode roughshod over opposition, making liberal use of his powers of banishment to deal with dissenters and ultimately declaring a state of emergency in 1975 to ensure his political survival.¹⁴⁹ Gayoom, by contrast was an academic, administrator and diplomat by background and had no private commercial interests to speak of,¹⁵⁰ though he, too,

¹⁴⁴ibid., pp. 657-58; Helmuth, Hecker, "The Maldives" in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz (eds), *Constitutions of the World*, Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1986

¹⁴⁵Reynolds, "Maldives", *The Cambridge Encyclopedia*..., p. 228

¹⁴⁶Phadnis, Urmila, and Ela Dutt Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change*..., p. 42

¹⁴⁷The *Majlis* met infrequently and briefly. For example, its session on 13 September 1975 lasted only 24 minutes but passed four important bills, unanimously and virtually without debate [Maloney, "The Maldives: new stresses in an old nation", p. 669]. See also Adeney, M., and W.K. Carr, "The Maldives Republic", in John M. Ostheimer (ed.), *The Politics of the Western Indian Ocean Islands*, Praeger, New York, 1975, p. 151

¹⁴⁸Phadnis, Urmila, and Ela Dutt Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change*..., p. 43

¹⁴⁹Suryanarayan, "The Maldives in India's security", p. 110

¹⁵⁰Phadnis, Urmila, and Ela Dutt Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change*..., pp. 49-50

was not above using the traditional prerogative of banishment to suppress rivals.¹⁵¹ He maintained a fairly restrictive approach to dissent, for example in 1989 arresting the editor of the *Sangu* news journal for exposing the corrupt practices of the president's brother-in-law, Ilyas Ibrahim, the Minister of Defence, Trade and Industries. The government invoked Article 38 of the Constitution under which anyone who "by spoken or written word or sign arouses anti-government feelings" could be punished.¹⁵²

Perhaps the most striking example of unrestrained executive power exercised during the Nasir era was his summary handling of the apparent threat posed by his popular prime minister Ahmed Zaki in 1975.¹⁵³ Acting under the Constitution's provision for the proclamation of temporary orders "in event of emergencies confronting the state,"¹⁵⁴ Nasir sent Zaki and 11 other high officials sent into internal exile. He took direct control of all the important government ministries, each of which became a department of the President's Office and was run by an under-secretary not empowered to make decisions without the president's authority. Nasir then had the constitution amended by a special *Majlis* which, after virtually no discussion, accorded him the power to nominate eight *Majlis* members formerly elected by Malé and eliminated the post of prime minister.¹⁵⁵ Luthufi's reputed grudge against the government following his incarceration at this time provides a tenuous link between heavy-handed exercise of executive power and the 1988 mercenary threat to the

¹⁵¹Gayoom [Percy, Steve, "Estrangement in paradise", *New Statesman and Society*, 17 September 1993

¹⁵²Phadnis, Umashankar, "Maldives making progress", p. 75. Four years later it was the turn of Ibrahim to feel the wrath of Gayoom when he was sentenced in absentia to over 15 years of internal exile for attempting to influence the *Majlis* presidential nomination for which Ibrahim was competing against Gayoom [Percy, "Estrangement in paradise"].

¹⁵³A commission of inquiry set up by Nasir's successor in 1980 charged him with violating the constitution in banning Zaki [Phadnis, Urmila, and Ela Dutt Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 42].

¹⁵⁴*Guardian*, 11 March 1975

¹⁵⁵Maloney, "The Maldives: new stresses in an old nation", pp. 668

Maldives.

During the period studied, the perils of *militarization* in small societies were not an issue for the Maldives which maintained very modest security forces. Prior to the 1988 crisis there was a 1,000-strong National Security Service responsible for all the full range of security duties including maintaining law and order, protecting the president, defending the country, and guarding fishing grounds from foreign encroachment.¹⁵⁶ After 1988 the Service was doubled in size.¹⁵⁷ There was no instance of the security forces threatening the established political order.

Geographical variables

Location

For two millenia the islands had been strewn across international lines of communication, endowing them with trade and in, modern times, strategic importance disproportionate to the territory's size and resources.¹⁵⁸ This geographical location was one of the principal reasons the sultanate enjoyed formal British protection from 1887 to 1965. However, Britain's interest towards the end of the period in the island of Gan was viewed as a negative security factor, undermining the central government's authority and encouraging secessionism. The Maldives' decision, after Britain's 1976 withdrawal, to refuse Gan to other military powers such as the Soviet Union largely neutralized its strategic significance to the wider international

¹⁵⁶U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984...*, p. 1323

¹⁵⁷"Maldives in the 1990s", pp. 17-18

¹⁵⁸Adeney and Carr, "The Maldives Republic", p. 139

community but within the region the Maldives continued to hold considerable strategic importance for India in particular (discussed below). In 1988, the Maldives' location, in terms of its immediate neighbourhood, proved both a negative and a positive factor in respect of vulnerability. On the one hand its proximity to strife-torn Sri Lanka exposed it to the mercenary attack but, on the other hand, its closeness to India enabled it to receive speedy and forceful assistance in overcoming the threat. The events of 1988 also underline that the remoteness of the Maldives from other states strictly limited its options for external military assistance in times of crisis (and may also have encouraged the mercenaries to believe they could rule out any immediate intervention by a third party¹⁵⁹). Given the lesser military capabilities of Sri Lanka and its own internal preoccupations, the only realistic possibility of help was intervention by India.

Physical and demographic characteristics

With its land area of only 300 square kilometres scattered over 1,200 islands, the Maldives represents the most extreme example of archipelagic fragmentation of any microstate. It was also among the most densely populated microstates and was five times as densely populated as the Asian average,¹⁶⁰ with the capital island of Malé experiencing particularly rapid population growth in the 1970s and 1980s. On the face of it, however, the country seemed to defy the associated vulnerabilities one might have expected to prevail, such as inadequate policing over such a large spread of islands and political tensions caused by the socio-economic impact of population pressures. The Maldives' unusually high degree of ethno-cultural homogeneity,

¹⁵⁹*Hindu*, 6 November 1988

¹⁶⁰See Tables 2.11 and 2.12.

together with very strong central government, the intrusive system for controlling people's movement and place of abode through atoll headmen, and the large-scale resort to internal exile as a means of containing dissent,¹⁶¹ may explain the archipelago's relative cohesiveness and political stability. The attempted Adduan secession of the early 1960s appears to have been the only serious exception to the record. Similarly, the government overcame the country's extreme lack of strategic depth on the one occasion it faced a serious threat of being overthrown, that is in November 1988. Gayoom successfully managed to avoid capture, continue to direct resistance and maintain external communications for almost 24 hours until relieved by Indian forces, despite Malé's size of only about one square kilometre.

Economic variables

Government resource constraints

Security resources available to the government in 1988 were clearly inadequate in the face of an attack by 200 well-armed and battle-seasoned Sri Lankan mercenaries, even if the latter had not enjoyed the advantage of surprise. Neither was Maldivian police intelligence able to anticipate the threat despite the prior entry of many mercenaries in the guise of tourists and guest workers. On the other hand, as noted above, the authorities coped remarkably well in maintaining internal security in challenging geographical circumstances. For example, the unrest over rising food prices in June 1974 was firmly handled thanks to advance warning provided by the president's system of informers: a planned public demonstration was pre-empted and

¹⁶¹At one time in 1975 from one atoll there were 250 people in exile and from another over 100, the majority being "political" cases [Maloney, "The Maldives: new stresses in an old nation", p. 660].

the police made mass arrests leading to the immediate banishment of 200 protesters.¹⁶² The government was also successful in thwarting a number of coup conspiracies, including one involving Luthufi in the late 1960s. It is noteworthy, however, that in 1972 the government was officially spending more on internal security than on either education, health, transport/communications or agriculture/fisheries.¹⁶³

Poverty/under-development and political stability

The question of whether poverty and under-development made the Maldives vulnerable to domestic political instability is largely irrelevant in respect of the 1988 crisis since the threat on that occasion essentially came from external opportunists (including a few disaffected Maldivian expatriates). That the popular unrest in 1974 was the only notable manifestation of instability linked to economic hardship may be explained partly by the efficiency of the government's methods of containing dissent and partly by the Maldives' relatively prosperous circumstances. Officially it remained a Least Developed Country and was rated by the United Nations Development Programme as particularly disadvantaged due to the subsistence nature of its agriculture and its narrow industrial base, weak administration, acute shortage of trained manpower, and inadequate transport and communication.¹⁶⁴ The Maldives nevertheless enjoyed a Gross Domestic Product per capita in the 1980s second only to that of Sri Lanka in the region¹⁶⁵ and virtually full employment, thanks to steadily growing tourism. The Maldives also scored relatively highly on the UNDP Human Development Index for 1990, coming in towards the top of the bottom half of

¹⁶²Maloney, "The Maldives: new stresses in an old nation", p. 667

¹⁶³Adeney and Carr, "The Maldives Republic", p. 150

¹⁶⁴Phadnis, Urmila, and Ela Dutt Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 54

¹⁶⁵*World Bank Atlas 1990*, World Bank, Washington DC, 1989

countries.¹⁶⁶ **Table 2.13** indicates the Maldives did not do particularly well in the foreign aid stakes compared to South Pacific, Caribbean or even African microstates, though this may be more a reflection of healthy self-reliance than deprivation.

An unusually high literacy rate of 94 per cent¹⁶⁷ provides a further indicator of development progress. However, Maloney, writing in the mid-1970s, suggests this literacy had little modernizing effect since its principal purpose was religious and in most islands there was nothing to read except the Koran and a few religious booklets.¹⁶⁸ Umashankar Phadnis also notes, in 1990, that Maldivian education imparted merely functional literacy with only 0.5 per cent of youth reaching the secondary level and a bare handful attending university.¹⁶⁹

By the end of the period studied, commentators were beginning to warn that the unequal distribution of development benefits could presage political instability in the future. A 1989 World Bank report catalogued the major imbalance between the level of development in Malé and that in the outer islands, with per capita income being four times as high in the capital.¹⁷⁰ In the early 1990s, President Gayoom's principal political rival, Ilyas Ibrahim would seek to exploit this disparity by cultivating the support of leaders in the outer islands.¹⁷¹ The lack of opportunity for political expression and dissent in the Maldives' literate but closely controlled society was seen as risking a dangerous build-up of pressure.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁶See **Table 2.15**.

¹⁶⁷Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 92

¹⁶⁸Maloney, "The Maldives: new stresses in an old nation", p. 659

¹⁶⁹Phadnis, Umashankur, "Maldives making progress", p. 74

¹⁷⁰ibid., p. 75

¹⁷¹Percy, "Estrangement in paradise"

¹⁷²Phadnis, Umashankur, "Maldives making progress", p. 74

The Maldives as a case of microstate dependence

In the aftermath of the 1988 security crisis, Gayoom said India had been the "logical choice" for help in foiling the mercenaries.¹⁷³ Despite reports that the government had also sought military assistance from Britain, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the United States,¹⁷⁴ Gayoom preferred to characterize these approaches as part of a general appeal, and said India alone had been asked for actual military help.¹⁷⁵ Once New Delhi had decided to respond to Gayoom's appeal, the American and Soviet ambassadors were briefed on Indian intentions. Moscow's response was that it would go along with whatever New Delhi thought was best for regional stability.¹⁷⁶ Washington fully endorsed India's response to the Maldives' request for help, and stood ready to provide back-up.¹⁷⁷ The Maldives foreign minister denied that U.S. warships had participated in the operation against the mercenaries but said considerable support had been received from Diego Garcia.¹⁷⁸ President Reagan's praise for India's action as a "valuable contribution to regional stability,"¹⁷⁹ was a magnanimous tribute when compared to India's criticism of the Reagan Administration's own intervention in Grenada just five years previously.¹⁸⁰ The Maldives' former protector, Britain, considered sending military assistance¹⁸¹ but, as Prime Minister Thatcher later told the Indian High Commissioner in London, distance

¹⁷³"Maldives in the 1990s", p. 18

¹⁷⁴"Maldives", *Asia 1989 Yearbook*, p. 176; Hewitt, *The International Politics of South Asia*, p. 198; Joshi, "The military muscle", p. 29; *Statesman*, 4 November 1988

¹⁷⁵*Hindu*, 7 November 1988

¹⁷⁶Sareen and de Silva, "Playing at cops", p. 15

¹⁷⁷"Maldives: Operation Cactus", p. 18, n. 1; *Times of India*, 12 November 1988

¹⁷⁸*Hindu*, 7 November 1988. It has been surmised that U.S. support took the form, principally, of provision of meteorological information, which might have been critical if an Indian paradrop had been required on the relatively small target of Hulule island [Interview with Dr Manoj Singh, Senior Editor, *Times of India*, New Delhi, January 1994]. However, former High Commissioner Banerjee, who was intimately involved in management of the Indian operation, says he was unaware of any such American input [Interview with Mr Arun Banerjee, New Delhi, January 1994].

¹⁷⁹*Times of India*, 8 November 1988

¹⁸⁰India voted in favour of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 38/7 condemning the American invasion of Grenada [Djonovich, Dusan J. (ed.), *United Nations Resolutions, Series I, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, Vol. XXII (1983-84)*, Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, New York].

¹⁸¹*Statesman*, 4 November 1988

precluded the dispatch of British troops in good time.¹⁸²

With the exception of Pakistan, which went so far as to accuse its arch-rival, India, of having stage managed the coup attempt,¹⁸³ regional governments were also supportive of the Indian intervention. Sri Lanka's President Junius Jayewardene was apparently the first foreign leader spoken to by Gayoom after the launching of the mercenary attack¹⁸⁴ and his government prepared to send 150 police commandos to the Maldives, only to be superseded, to its relief, by India.¹⁸⁵ Sri Lanka's role was ultimately confined to making facilities available for Indian use and keeping out of the way of Indian forces.¹⁸⁶ The irony that India should be hailed for delivering the Maldives from the clutches of Sri Lankan mercenaries, when India itself was viewed by some as the "nursery of Sri Lankan terrorism", was not lost on the editor of Sri Lanka's *Island* newspaper.¹⁸⁷

Gayoom acknowledged the limitations of regional or multilateral international arrangements to meet such threats and noted that while assistance from a United Nations force was theoretically possible, its deployment would face lengthy procedural delays such as the need to obtain Security Council authorization.¹⁸⁸ Before ordering the dispatch of Indian troops, Prime Minister Gandhi reportedly obtained a "green light" from the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Shridath Ramphal.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸²Rasgotra, M.K., "India's security and the sea", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XIV, No 9, Decembr 1991, p. 1037

¹⁸³Munro, "Superpower rising", p. 7. This inference is also made, without elaboration by Razvi [Razvi, S.M.

Mujtaba, "India and the security of Indian Ocean/South Asian States", *The Round Table*, No 311, 1989, p. 321].

¹⁸⁴"Maldives", *Asia 1989 Yearbook*, p. 176

¹⁸⁵Sareen, Rajendra, and Manik de Silva, "Playing at cops", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 November 1988;

"Maldives", *Asia 1989 Yearbook*, p. 176; *Hindustan Times*, 5 November 1988

¹⁸⁶Sareen and de Silva, "Playing at cops", p. 15; *Statesman*, 7 November 1988; "Maldives", *Asia 1989 Yearbook*, p. 176

¹⁸⁷Cited in "Maldives", *Asia 1989 Yearbook*, p. 176

¹⁸⁸*Times of India*, 14 November 1988

¹⁸⁹*Le Monde*, 5 November 1988

Notwithstanding his earlier criticism of United States intervention in Grenada,¹⁹⁰ Ramphal was warmly supportive of India's action in the Maldives¹⁹¹ and saw the microstate's predicament as highlighting the need for a permanent mechanism - "an international 999 system" - that would enable emergency help to be rendered to governments of small countries.¹⁹² Although SAARC had recently moved beyond its original economic mandate when a Regional Convention on Supression of Terrorism was adopted at its Kathmandu summit the previous year, India was at pains to point out there was no provision in the SAARC charter for military cooperation¹⁹³ and discouraged the notion of sending a regional force to the Maldives.¹⁹⁴

As in the cases of Vanuatu and The Gambia, it is clear that what proved essential for the Maldives government's survival in 1988 was the swift response of a single capable and friendly neighbour. It remains to consider the Maldives' dependence on India in light of the patron-client model described in Chapter Three. The following section assesses the two countries' relationship in terms of the *pervasiveness* of India's presence in the Maldives, the degree of *conformity* displayed by the Maldives in respect of Indian foreign policy interests, the relative *informality* of their links, and the extent to which their association was *mutually beneficial*.

Pervasiveness

Despite cultural-linguistic affinities, Indian ties with the Maldives, for reasons of history and geography, lacked the depth and breadth of Sri Lankan-Maldivian

¹⁹⁰ *Sunday Telegraph*, 6 November 1988

¹⁹¹ "Operation Cactus: Indian armed forces combined operations in Maldives...", p. 14

¹⁹² "Maldives invasion shows vulnerability of the small", *Commonwealth Currents*, December 1988, p. 3

¹⁹³ "Maldives", *Asia 1989 Yearbook*, p.176; Sareen and de Silva, "Playing at cops", p. 15

¹⁹⁴ *Independent*, 5 November 1988

relations. Sri Lanka¹⁹⁵ had long been the Maldives' principal foreign interlocutor, trading partner and gateway to the world.¹⁹⁶ Many Maldivians, including President Gayoom, received education in Sri Lanka¹⁹⁷ and Sri Lankans featured prominently in the Maldives' managerial and professional ranks and in its garment industry workforce.¹⁹⁸ In 1991, Sri Lanka was still the Maldives' fourth largest trading partner, after the United States, Britain and Thailand.¹⁹⁹ Historically, interaction between India and the Maldives had been largely limited to the unhappy experiences of Maldivian vassalage to the Indian state of Kannanur in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and piratical attacks from the Malabar coast.²⁰⁰ From 1887 to 1965 the Maldives' foreign relations were formally the purview of the British colonial government in Colombo and India was itself under British rule until 1947.

In the modern era one of the first recorded political contacts between Malé and New Delhi was the occasion in 1959 when a Maldivian representative briefed the Indian prime minister on the Addu secession issue. During the 1960s, interaction between India and the Maldives was largely in the socio-political spheres and limited to the Malabar coast and the adjacent Minicoy and Lakshadeep Islands²⁰¹ but by the 1970s there had been a marked rise in both official and private contacts. In 1974-1975, India assisted the Maldives in developing a fish-canning plant, with teacher training and with communication equipment. By 1976, 50 Maldivians had studied in India under Colombo Plan auspices and India had loaned 20 experts to the Maldives.²⁰² In

¹⁹⁵Ceylon changed its name to Sri Lanka in 1972.

¹⁹⁶Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 100; Phadnis, Urmila, and Ela Dutt Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 78

¹⁹⁷Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 100

¹⁹⁸Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 100

¹⁹⁹"Maldives in the 1990s", p. 12

²⁰⁰Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 93-94; Phadnis and Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change...*, p. 17

²⁰¹Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", pp. 95-96

²⁰²Vohra, Dewan C., *India's Aid Diplomacy in the Third World*, Vikas, New Delhi, 1980, pp. 122, 149, 160

1976 India became the first country to set up a resident diplomatic mission in Malé²⁰³ and the first foreign bank was also Indian.²⁰⁴ The establishment of air links in the mid-1970s opened up the Maldives to Indian tourists and mutual visa requirements were abolished in 1980. Various trade and other cooperation agreements were signed in the early 1980s and India was responsible for upgrading the Maldivian capital's airport, Hulule, and funding a new hospital.²⁰⁵

The expansion of ties with India was part of a broader Maldivian impetus to diversify international ties due to economic exigency. In 1972 Sri Lanka had suddenly discontinued bulk purchases of Maldivian dried fish, the islands' principal export for over a century and which had been channelled entirely through Colombo. In response, Malé leased fish-processing rights to a Japanese company and sought to develop tourism.²⁰⁶ On the political plane it looked to India, as well as the Middle East and East Asia, for new relationships beyond its traditional Sri Lankan orbit. This new internationalism coincided with the short-lived premiership of the outward-looking Ahmed Zaki who made official visits to India (the first visit abroad by a Maldivian leader²⁰⁷) and Sri Lanka and was scheduled to go to Pakistan before his deposition.²⁰⁸ The Indian and Sri Lankan prime ministers made reciprocal visits to Malé in the mid-1970s,²⁰⁹ a symptom of the implicit rivalry between the two larger countries in developing relations with the Maldives at this time.²¹⁰ It is doubtful,

²⁰³"Maldives in the 1990s", p. 14. One source reports that the Republic of China (Taiwan) previously maintained an embassy in Malé [Adeney and Carr, "The Maldives Republic", p. 157]

²⁰⁴Gupta, Ranjan, p. 16

²⁰⁵"Maldives in the 1990s", p. 14. The airport upgrade was a commercial project undertaken by the International Airport Authority of India. The hospital was part of a US\$17 million Indian aid package agreed in 1986, and was completed in 1992. [Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", pp. 99, 106; Kurian, *Encyclopedia of the Third World*, p. 1229]

²⁰⁶Reynolds, "Maldives", *Cambridge Encyclopedia...*, pp. 228-29

²⁰⁷Adeney and Carr, "The Maldives Republic", p. 157

²⁰⁸Gupta, Ranjan, *The Indian Ocean...*, pp. 14-16.

²⁰⁹Maloney, *People of the Maldive Islands*, p. 207

²¹⁰Gupta, Ranjan, *The Indian Ocean...*, p. 16

however, that increasingly close relations entailed a pervasive Indian presence in or penetration of Maldivian political life or institutions prior to 1988. In the security sphere one telling indicator was the Indian military's lack of operational knowledge of the Maldives when preparing to intervene. Despite the proximity and strategic significance of the islands, Indian Air Force planners apparently lacked appropriate maps of the Maldives,²¹¹ all the more surprising when the Indian government had been responsible for upgrading Hulule airport only seven years previously²¹² and maintained a naval base in the Laccadive Islands.²¹³

As with The Gambia's relationship with Senegal after the latter's 1981 intervention, the events of November 1988 precipitated a qualitative change in the Maldives' relations with India, which Gayoom described in January 1990 as excellent and "unmatched by any other country."²¹⁴ The most tangible manifestation of this new closeness was the physical presence in Malé of an Indian garrison, initially 250-strong, which remained in the Maldives for one year "at the express request" of President Gayoom,²¹⁵ who also sought Indian assistance in training the Maldivian National Security Service.²¹⁶ Gayoom was nevertheless said to be somewhat nervous of over-dependence on Indian protection and keen to ensure the prompt departure of the troops.²¹⁷ The Maldives government's subsequent efforts to muster the support of the international community for a mechanism to protect small states from external threats has been seen as at least partly motivated by a desire to dilute India's future

²¹¹"Maldives in the 1990s", p. 17

²¹²Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 99. Indian shortcomings can be compared with the failure of the United States intelligence community regarding Grenada in 1983, notwithstanding years of concern in Washington about the leftist Grenadian government and the military implications of its new airport being built with Cuban assistance [Adkin, *Urgent Fury...*, p. 336].

²¹³Adeney and Carr, "The Maldives Republic", p. 149

²¹⁴Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 105

²¹⁵*Annual Report, [Indian] Ministry of External Affairs 1988-89*, p. 2

²¹⁶Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 105

²¹⁷Hewitt, *The International Politics of South Asia*, pp. 57, 198

role in the islands' own security.²¹⁸

Gayoom began to make annual visits to India²¹⁹ and was honoured with an invitation to be chief guest at the 1991 Republic Day parade in New Delhi.²²⁰ The Indian leadership, too, demonstrated the new priority attached to relations with the Maldives: after the National Front Government took office in New Delhi in November 1989, foreign minister I.K. Gurjal's first overseas visit was to the Maldives and, when V.P. Singh became prime minister, the Maldives was the first neighbouring country he visited.²²¹ In 1990 an agreement was signed providing for Maldivian diplomats and civil servants to be sent to New Delhi for training and an Indo-Maldives Ministerial Level Joint Commission for Economic and Technical Cooperation, created in 1986 but not used, met for the first time.²²² Indian development aid for 1989-1990 was increased by over 25 per cent to 50 million rupees.²²³

Conformity

Emerging from nearly a century of formal British oversight of its external relations, it was only in the 1970s that the Maldives began to operate a foreign policy of its own. It did so with the underlying premises of non-alignment, Third World solidarity, neutrality in regional disputes²²⁴ and pragmatic self-interest. An example of the latter was the Maldives' ambivalent relations with other Islamic states. It avoided taking

²¹⁸Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 111

²¹⁹*Keesing's*, December 1989, p. 37092; Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 107

²²⁰Phadnis, Umashankar, "Maldives making progress", p. 75

²²¹Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 106

²²²*ibid.*, pp. 106-07

²²³Kumar, Satish (ed.), *Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy*, Tata-McGraw Hill, New Delhi [1989 and 1990-91 editions]

²²⁴"Maldives in the 1990s", p. 13

sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict²²⁵ and in the 1970s was boycotted by the Arab League as the only Islamic state to maintain relations with Israel.²²⁶ Relations with the major Islamic power in its own region, Pakistan, remained thin²²⁷ and Malé declined to support Islamabad over New Delhi on the Kashmir issue in international fora such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference.²²⁸ In 1974 the Maldives government refused an invitation to attend an Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore.²²⁹

The brief hint of tension over ownership of India's (ethnically Maldivian) Minicoy Islands aside, the Maldives was unique in the region in having no significant bilateral disputes with India.²³⁰ Aryasinha asserts that the attitude of India and the Maldives to most international and regional problems was identical.²³¹ The Maldives supported the concept of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace²³² which, although formally put forward in international forums by Sri Lanka at first, owed much to Indian design in its delineation, articulation, and sustenance as part of a worldwide debate on strategic issues.²³³ In its cautious approach to the Kashmir issue Malé was clearly mindful of Indian sensitivities. Gayoom downplayed the sectarian dimension of the conflict and urged India and Pakistan to resolve it bilaterally.²³⁴ Rare examples of foreign policy divergence between Malé and New Delhi were the former's support, as a small state,

²²⁵Váli, *Politics of the Indian Ocean Region*..., p. 201

²²⁶*Telegraph*, 14 March 1975

²²⁷The modest links between the two go back to the 1940s when Pakistanis were employed by the British at Gan, an association commemorated by the facility of many local islanders in the Urdu tongue ["Maldives in the 1990s", p. 12; Phadnis, Umashankar, "Maldives making progress", p. 74]. Political ties were nurtured in the early 1980s by the exchange of presidential visits and signing of various cooperation agreements ["Maldives in the 1990s", p. 13].

²²⁸"Maldives in the 1990s", p. 13; Phadnis, Umashankar, "Maldives making progress", p. 75

²²⁹Váli, *Politics of the Indian Ocean Region*..., p. 201

²³⁰"Maldives in the 1990s", p. 14; Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 100; *Statesman*, 5 November 1988. The Minicoy Islands formed part of the Maldives until the eighteenth century but are now encompassed by India's Lakshadweep territory [Reynolds, *Maldives*, Clio, p. xiii].

²³¹Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 91

²³²Adeney and Carr, "The Maldives Republic", p. 157

²³³Marwah, Onkar, "India's strategic perspectives on the Indian Ocean", in William L. Dowdy and Russell B. Trood (eds), *The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1985, p. 301

²³⁴"Maldives in the 1990s", p. 13

for the regional Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone proposed by Pakistan,²³⁵ and its censure of the Viet Nameese presence in Kampuchea.²³⁶

Informality

Formal agreements between the Maldives and India were limited to the socio-economic sphere and included a 1976 trilateral maritime agreement between India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives demarcating territorial waters;²³⁷ 1980 bilateral trade²³⁸ and visa abolition²³⁹ agreements; and a 1983 cultural agreement.²⁴⁰ In keeping with the patron-client model, India's 1988 intervention in the Maldives was not based on any prior security pact. Even after the crisis had demonstrated Maldivian dependence on Indian assistance in meeting external threats, Malé proved reluctant to place itself under New Delhi's formal protection. Despite clear Indian offers to come to a comprehensive security arrangement during 1989,²⁴¹ Gayoom ruled out a defence treaty and limited himself to seeking Indian (and British) training assistance for the National Security Service. He held that "the excellent rapport with New Delhi, the direct communication channel... established between the two countries and the strengthening of the National Security set up would take care of every contingency."²⁴² At the same time the Maldives took the lead in calling for the international community to do more on a collective basis to guarantee the security of small states.

²³⁵Phadnis, Urmila, "Areas of cooperation among India and her Indian Ocean neighbours", p. 213

²³⁶In United Nations General Assembly votes during the 1980s, the Maldives supported resolutions condemning the presence of foreign troops in Kampuchea while India abstained [Djonovich, *United Nations Resolutions...*, Vols XVIII to XXIV (1979-86)].

²³⁷"Maldives in the 1990s", p. 12

²³⁸*ibid.*, p. 14

²³⁹Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 99

²⁴⁰Phadnis, Urmila, and Ela Dutt Luithui, *Maldives: Winds of Change ...*, p. 79

²⁴¹Hewitt, *The International Politics of South Asia*, p. 198

²⁴²Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 105

Mutual benefit

As with the other microstate case studies, there was clearly a degree of mutual benefit evident in the Maldives' relationship with India. In respect of the 1988 crisis, the Indian intervention of was, for the Maldives government, a matter of survival in the face of a sudden, violent threat. The intervention also served as a sharp warning for any future assailants. The immediate advantages for New Delhi included an opportunity to burnish the image of the Indian military after its inconclusive and compromised operation in Sri Lanka, and also to bolster the position of Prime Minister Gandhi as he approached a difficult election with his popularity at a low ebb.²⁴³ In addition, the intervention demonstrated to international observers India's political determination and military capability to project power in her sphere of influence."²⁴⁴

Looking at the relationship over the longer term, a key benefit for the Maldives in its association with India appears to have been diversification of international links away from its former excessive reliance on Sri Lanka. Over time, India had also become a significant source of incoming tourists, educational opportunities, foreign aid and services such as banking. Until 1988, however, there had been no evident security benefits for the Maldives in its relationship with India. Conversely, to the extent that the Maldives featured at all in India's consciousness, it was the islands' strategic potential that mattered. Although the islands had only been of marginal foreign policy interest to New Delhi prior to the 1988 crisis,²⁴⁵ there was an appreciation that

²⁴³*Le Monde*, 5 November 1988

²⁴⁴Bruce, Robert, "Indian military developments and Australian security in the 1990s", *Indian Ocean Review*, March 1991, p. 28; Thomas, Mathew, "India as a regional superpower", *Indian Defence Review*, July 1989, p. 9

²⁴⁵Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 91

they straddled important trade routes, both leading to the subcontinent and globally, and provided the only stopping point between India and the American military base of Diego Garcia."²⁴⁶ As Umashankar Phadnis puts it, the Maldives were "sensitively located on the inner periphery of [India's] strategic perimeter in the Indian Ocean."²⁴⁷

Britain's retention of its base in Gan after the Maldives resumed full independence in 1965 evoked no protest from New Delhi²⁴⁸ but British plans for withdrawal a decade made India anxious about the possibility the Soviets or others would seek to establish in Gan their own "Diego Garcia" in the region.²⁴⁹ The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi, had pointedly visited the Maldives shortly after London's public announcement in December 1974 of its intended withdrawal, and New Delhi's concerns were raised in Indo-British talks in March 1975.²⁵⁰ The Indian government later urged Malé to reject a Soviet overture for access rights to Gan.²⁵¹ Indian development aid to the Maldives was partly in recognition of its resistance to extra-regional intrusions of this kind.²⁵² Such considerations went to the heart of India's strategic policies, of which an elemental premise was to deny any intermediary role to external powers in the affairs of South Asia.²⁵³ That some other power might have come to Gayoom's aid in November 1988 as he desperately called for international help was a sobering thought that prompted an immediate pre-emptive intervention from New Delhi and demanded its renewed attention to the Maldives in the aftermath.

²⁴⁶Namboodiri *et al.*, *Intervention in the Indian Ocean*, p. 15; Gupta, Shekhar, "Maldives: a close shave", *India Today*, 30 November 1988, p. 32

²⁴⁷Phadnis, Umashakar, "Maldives making progress", p. 73

²⁴⁸Kaushik, *The Indian Ocean: a Strategic Dimension*, p. 89

²⁴⁹Marwah, "India's strategic perspectives on the Indian Ocean", p. 311; Navartne, Gamini, "In the Maldivian Islands a bloodless coup may alter the Indian Ocean defence situation", *Commonwealth*, June/July 1975, p. 19

²⁵⁰*Telegraph*, 11 March 1975

²⁵¹Rose, Leo E., "Foreign relations", in Robinson, *The Cambridge Encyclopedia...*, p. 241

²⁵²Aryasinha, "Indo-Maldives relations...", p. 98

²⁵³Marwah, "India's strategic perspectives on the Indian Ocean", p. 301

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored political-security aspects of a late twentieth century phenomenon, namely the existence of a large number of very small and weak, yet ostensibly sovereign and independent, states. These "microstates", defined as having a population of less than one million, are fundamentally vulnerable and dependent on larger states for military assistance. Foreign military intervention in response to microstate security crises, a circumstance not previously examined in a systematic or thematic way, was chosen as a vehicle for the study because it throws into sharp relief the dual microstate burdens of *vulnerability* and *dependence*. The study has covered the years 1960 to 1989, a three-decade period from the conventional beginning of decolonization to the end of the Cold War. The present concluding chapter returns to the central questions posed in Chapter One. *What are the principal sources of microstate vulnerability? How best can we conceptualize microstates' security dependence on larger powers?* The two issues were examined in the broad in Chapters Two ("Vulnerability") and Three ("Dependence") and then taken up in each of the four case studies, Vanuatu, The Gambia, Grenada and the Maldives.

Vulnerability

In my initial consideration of the sources of microstate vulnerability in Chapter Two, I highlighted a series of political, geographical and economic factors as pre-eminent

determinants. *Political* factors comprised colonial experience and the special characteristics of politics in small societies (concerted political harmony, exaggerated personalism, unrestrained executive power and the perils of militarization). *Geographical* factors were location and physical or demographic features. Under the *economic* heading, the focus was on government resource constraints and the link between poverty or under-development and instability. In identifying these dominant factors, I acknowledged the difficulty of determining a single universally applicable model and anticipated the range of factors forming different patterns of vulnerability in individual circumstances.

The four case studies reinforced the notion of microstates being highly vulnerable to security threats, even from quite small groups. While confirming both the prevalence of the contributing factors highlighted in Chapter Two, they also underscored the diversity of microstates' security environments. The 1980 secession crisis in *Vanuatu* was a more deep-seated and complicated crisis than those in the other case studies, the Santo rebellion manifesting an incomplete consensus around the idea of Vanuatu as a unitary and independent nation state, and threatening the country's territorial integrity. The attempted coup in *The Gambia* in 1981 was a sudden insurrection by a small group of self-interested conspirators, even if there was considerable popular involvement in the accompanying mayhem and opportunistic looting. The domestic political developments in *Grenada*, that culminated in 1983 in the disintegration of the revolutionary government and subsequent foreign invasion, were notable for the degree to which they attracted the intense interest of foreign governments, including the United States. The 1988 mercenary invasion of the *Maldives* stands apart from

the other case studies as an almost entirely external threat, notwithstanding the organizing role played by an expatriate adventurer.

Political

Colonial experience

In Chapter Two I contended that the future security of microstates was adversely affected by *inadequate preparations for statehood* and *neglect of development needs* by colonial authorities, and in some cases *alterations to their ethnic make-up* and the *creation of anomalous or disputed borders* during the colonial period. None of the case studies involved all four of these factors but in each one colonial experience played a significant part in vulnerability. This was most dramatically so in Vanuatu, where schizophrenic Condominium administration, together with half-hearted British and downright obstructive French behaviour, were major causes of the division and dissent underlying the attempted secession. In The Gambia, the key colonial impact was the country's highly unusual territorial configuration that inevitably led to occasional friction with neighbouring Senegal. For Grenada the most significant colonial legacy was the political environment that spawned the authoritarian and corrupt Gairy regime and, in turn, the coup d'état of 1979. Colonial experience was least significant in the Maldives, due to it being an independent Protected State rather than a colony, but Britain's air base at Gan contributed to domestic political volatility in respect of the Adduan secession crisis of the early 1960s. While acknowledging that some colonial era handicaps such as neglected development were not unique to microstates, the generally low value of these territories to the colonial powers and the

belated recognition of their destiny as independent states tended to put them at a greater disadvantage than other formerly dependent territories.

Special characteristics of politics in small societies

Because each of the case studies was selected as an example of a serious security crisis, and each crisis had at least a partial domestic dimension, it was inevitable the reputed microstate attribute of "*concerted political harmony*" would be found lacking to some degree. It was necessary therefore to look beyond the turmoil of the individual crises. Jawara's Gambia maintained a post-independence record of stability and democracy that was almost unmatched in Africa. Vanuatu, having survived the trauma of the Santo rebellion at independence, initially conformed to the tranquil image of its South Pacific region, but later began to experience sustained political instability. The Maldives was outwardly more harmonious, even if this achievement relied to some extent on suppression of dissent. By contrast, Grenada's domestic political scene was notably turbulent, due to the excesses of Gairy and the revolutionary agenda of his usurpers. The mixed record of the case studies and the wider sample of microstates throws doubt on the general applicability of the perceived microstate characteristic of concerted political harmony. A significant number of microstates, particularly in Africa, suffered from prolonged periods of domestic political conflict, as evidenced by the fact that over half the microstate security crises in the period studied were of a wholly domestic nature. It is not clear, therefore, that microstates as a category can be distinguished from other Third World countries suffering from Job's "chronic insecurity dilemma."

The phenomenon of "*exaggerated personalism*" was present in all four case studies but its significance varied considerably. Grenada's political leaders provided an archetype of personalism, while in Vanuatu personalism only became a notable feature towards the end of the 1980s when rivalry between Lini and Sope dominated the political scene. In both cases the effect was clearly detrimental to political stability. The Gambia, too, demonstrated a strong tendency towards personalism but it may be argued that Jawara's dominance contributed to, rather than undermined, stability. While the record of the Maldives conforms to the microstate norm, the negative impact of exaggerated personalism under Nasir (and to a lesser extent Gayoom) is difficult to assess due to their ability to suppress domestic dissent. In sum, personalism was confirmed as a prevalent characteristic of small polities, though this did not necessarily heighten vulnerability to domestic political instability.

Grenada provides an extreme example of "*unrestrained executive power*," which was undoubtedly a factor behind the NJM coup d'état. In the Maldives, however, there was little co-relation between heavy-handed government and vulnerability (except tenuously in the sense of Luthufi's grudge against the government being one apparent motive for the 1988 mercenary attack). Unrestrained executive power was less evident in Vanuatu and The Gambia, though Lini's alleged authoritarianism within the ruling Vanua'aku party and possible cronyism amongst Jawara's ministers contributed to political friction. Among the wider sample of microstates there were a number of cases of abuse of power ultimately leading to serious domestic security crises, Equatorial Guinea being the most graphic example of repression followed by revolt.

All four cases studies involved individual heads of government who amply demonstrated the microstate characteristic of "*leadership longevity*" (Lini 12 years, Jawara 31 years, Gairy 13 years,¹ and Nasir 21 years). Only in respect of Gairy in Grenada was there an obvious link between an extended grip on power and vulnerability to political instability, since his removal was a central objective of the NJM coup conspirators. It might also be argued that Lini's unwillingness to step down after his stroke in 1987 contributed to the political tension and domestic unrest experienced by Vanuatu in the late 1980s. In The Gambia, however, there appeared to be little connection between Jawara's long, and generally creditable, tenure as head of government (and state) and the upheaval of 1981, notwithstanding the occasional allegation that Jawara and his lieutenants had lost touch with grassroots political opinion. In the case of the Maldives, it is also difficult to associate Nasir's lengthy monopolization of power with vulnerability to security threats, though it might be observed that not long after the unrest of the mid-1970s he was effectively forced into exile. The case studies confirmed the dichotomy identified in Chapter Two that while in some instances leadership longevity indicates an unhealthy monopolization of power that may ultimately lead to an eruption of pent-up dissent, in other cases it may be evidence of popular and stable governance.

The record among the case study microstates was similarly mixed in respect of the *perils of militarization in a small society*. The small paramilitary forces in Vanuatu and the Maldives presented no threat to political stability. In The Gambia, the Field Force was not the original source of the 1981 coup attempt, but it did prove a liability to the government after approximately half its personnel threw in their lot with the

¹Gairy's total refers only to his years as Chief and Prime Minister. He in fact dominated Grenadian politics for nearly 30 years from 1950.

conspirators. While the implosion of the People's Revolutionary Government in Grenada in October 1983 was caused primarily by friction between the Coard and Bishop factions, senior military figures such as Austin played a key role, including in the murder of Bishop after which the regime's position deteriorated precipitately.

Geographical

Location

I suggested in Chapter Two that location was a critical factor for microstates because they were less able to influence their external environments. In all of the case studies location was found to be a major contributor to vulnerability. Vanuatu and the Maldives suffered directly from their close proximity to territories harbouring hostile actors, the *colon* sympathisers of New Caledonia and the Tamil insurgents of Sri Lanka. Grenada's strategic location at the eastern end of the Caribbean, coupled with its close relationship with Cuba, was a key motivation for the United States invasion. Apart from the tenuous connection of the coup conspirators with nearby Guinea-Bissau, location was not a significant element in The Gambia's vulnerability to the 1981 insurrection, but on other occasions envelopment by Senegal exposed it to cross-border anti-smuggling raids and fallout from the Casamance insurgency. Strategic significance was a salient factor in heightening or reducing the vulnerability of Grenada and the Maldives and its importance as a corollary of location for the wider sample of microstates should be noted.

Other physical and demographic factors

Vanuatu and the Maldives are good examples of the vulnerability associated with an archipelagic configuration. Both faced secession attempts by outlying islands and were strained by the challenge of policing their fragmented territories. The Gambia's vulnerability was heightened by the porous character of its frontiers and the cross-border ethnic linkages of its population. Ethno-cultural homogeneity was a significant factor in reducing vulnerability in the Maldives. Despite high population densities in the Maldives and Grenada this factor did not appear to have contributed significantly to political instability in either case.

Economic

Government resource constraints

All the case study microstates demonstrated vulnerability deriving from their governments' sheer inability to field security forces capable of withstanding the threat posed by relatively small groups of adversaries. In Vanuatu and the Maldives the forces available to the governments were manifestly unequal to the challenges presented by the Santo rebellion and the PLOTE mercenary attack. This was even more true for Grenada, despite the PRG's substantial investment in military preparedness (though it should be acknowledged that fullscale invasion by a superpower falls well outside the range of threats which most microstates might reasonably be expected to anticipate). Earlier, Gairy's security forces had been unable to withstand the assault of a small group of lightly armed NJM "revolutionaries".

Although The Gambia had been obliged for cost reasons to forego the establishment of an army that might have neutralized the disloyal Field Force members whose actions threatened the government in 1981, subsequent events proved that maintaining a full and counter-balanced security establishment was no guarantee against a military coup.

Link between poverty/under-development and political instability

In none of the case studies was it possible to identify poverty or under-development as a direct cause of the major security crisis, but this factor often appeared to contribute to vulnerability by providing a background conducive to instability. Vanuatu's relative poverty and educational backwardness may have increased the susceptibility of its rural population to manipulation by outside interests in the lead-up to the Santo rebellion. In The Gambia it was suggested that a recent period of economic hardship fuelled popular participation in the civil disorder associated with the 1981 coup attempt. While the NJM coup in Grenada was driven by ideological fervour, the mismanagement of the Gairy regime and decline in the country's already precarious economic fortunes conditioned the population to welcome the takeover. By the same token, economic difficulties were one factor in the later crisis of confidence, leadership and direction within the PRG regime. Public anger over rising food prices in the Maldives in 1974 was the source of one of the few instances of significant unrest there.

Dependence

In Chapter Three, after surveying microstates' position in international society, I placed their dependent security relationships with larger states in the context of the patron-client model. Four key indicators were highlighted: the *pervasiveness* of the relationships for the microstates; evidence of the microstates behaving in *conformity* with the interests of their putative patrons; a tendency towards *informality* in the relationships rather than alliances; and whether the relationships were *mutually beneficial*.

The case studies affirmed the pertinence of individual elements of the patron-client model but fell short of vindicating it as a uniformly applicable characterization of microstates' dependent security relationships. Papua New Guinean military intervention was critical in assuring the territorial integrity of its fellow Melanesian state, *Vanuatu*, during the latter's difficult transition to independence, but thereafter their relationship was thin relative to those of other case study microstates and their larger friends. Throughout the period studied, *The Gambia's* relationship with Senegal was particularly intimate due to their interlocked geographical position. Senegalese military intervention saved the Jawara government from being overthrown in 1981 and in the succeeding years the two states experimented with confederation. Paradoxically, Cuba and *Grenada* maintained an almost textbook patron-client relationship from 1979 to 1983, yet this failed to deliver the crucial client benefit of regime survival when the microstate was invaded. Conversely, India rescued the *Maldives* government from imminent destruction by foreign mercenaries in 1988, but the microstate was careful to resist becoming too much in the thrall of its protector.

Pervasiveness

The Gambia was the clearest example of a pervasive presence on the part of a patron in a microstate's society and government. Geographical circumstances and ethnic interconnection ensured a high degree of people-to-people contact, and an elaborate series of inter-governmental agreements provided for extensive consultation and joint action (at least in theory). Following the attempted coup of 1981, the Senegalese established an ongoing military presence in The Gambia, including in the presidential guard. In Grenada, too, the patron played a pervasive role. Due to their involvement in the government's key infrastructure project, the Point Salines international airport, Cubans had a strong numerical presence. More significantly, the ideological commonality between St George's and Havana ensured intimate relations between the two regimes, and the Grenadian leadership saw Cuba as a role model and mentor. In the Maldives, India had been steadily increasing its presence and economic role during the decade prior to its 1988 military intervention, and ties between the two governments became much closer in the aftermath. However, little evidence emerged in the study of a pervasive Indian role in the sense of a large and influential presence, perhaps because of distance, limited Indian resources and Maldivian reticence. In Vanuatu, once the Santo crisis was over, a pervasive role for Papua New Guinea was even less apparent, being limited to sporadic involvement in areas such as security force training and staffing the justice apparatus.

Conformity

Grenada overtly and consistently conformed with Cuban foreign policy stances, most dramatically on the question of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and there is evidence of direct Cuban tutelage of Grenadian international delegations. In emulating Cuba, Grenada made a sharp break with its traditional external partners and Commonwealth Caribbean neighbours. The record of the other case study microstates is less clear. In respect of Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea, it is especially necessary to bear in mind that common positions could be indications of genuine likemindedness as much as conformity. Moreover, the South Pacific microstate appeared to drive as much as follow the "Melanesian" positions which it and Papua New Guinea shared on regional issues such as New Caledonian decolonization and French nuclear testing. Vanuatu generally pursued a more radical foreign policy line and from time to time pronounced on issues of considerable sensitivity to Papua New Guinea, including by voting differently on East Timor at the United Nations General Assembly. The Gambia and Senegal went so far as to present formally coordinated foreign policy positions during the confederation years, though Banjul had earlier consciously sought to diversify its foreign relations to avoid over-reliance on Dakar and to convey an impression of a distinct and independent policy. Resulting associations with governments such as Guinea and Nigeria occasionally caused discomfort for Dakar. The Maldives appeared to avoid offending India by taking a low and sympathetic profile on the Kashmir issue and keeping its distance from Pakistan, but parted company from Delhi on at least one important regional foreign policy issue, the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposed by Islamabad. It was difficult to measure foreign policy conformity by using one theoretically clear-cut

criterion, that of voting in the United Nations General Assembly, because sometimes the natural likemindedness among regional states or political groupings could not confidently be interpreted as conformity, and also because microstates were frequently absent from the Assembly.

Informality

Again Grenada provides the most apt example, having maintained an intimate and extensive relationship with Cuba that was not, however, consummated by a formal security guarantee. The Maldives' post-crisis reluctance to contemplate placing itself formally under the protection of India is similarly in keeping with the patron-client model. Vanuatu also meets the informality criterion in its relations with Papua New Guinea, notwithstanding the "interim defence agreement" governing the latter's 1980 intervention. In Vanuatu's case, however, the absence of a formal defence pact might be seen as a further indication of the slimness of links with Papua New Guinea, rather than corroboration of an informal patron-client relationship. In marked contrast to the other case studies, The Gambia entered into a mutual defence pact with Senegal and later a confederation treaty involving the integration of some of their respective armed forces. The defence pact was successfully invoked by Banjul in both 1980 and 1981. As was seen in **Table 3.01**, summarizing the external security relationships of all microstates, The Gambia was far from alone in relying on formal defence guarantees. On balance, one concludes that microstates as a whole frequently did not meet the informality criteria of the patron-client model, though as noted in Chapter Three not all commentators regard this as an essential element in the model.

Mutual benefit

In each of the case studies, not only the microstate but also its larger protector benefited from their security relationship. Papua New Guinea's support enabled the Vanuatu government to uphold its authority and preserve the country's territorial integrity, while the Papua New Guinea government won regional kudos and domestic political benefits. In much the same vein, the Gayoom government in the Maldives was rescued from the clutches of mercenary attackers and the Gandhi government bolstered its domestic standing and India's regional stature. In The Gambia, the Jawara government was preserved from the threat of overthrow by radical leftists, while Senegal ensured stability in the strategic Gambian enclave within its borders and achieved the closer political integration it had long been seeking. Initially, the new revolutionary regime in Grenada obtained much needed political and material backing from Cuba and the latter gained a steadfast ally in its hostile home region. However, the crisis of October 1983 found Cuba an insufficiently strong and committed patron to provide the protection sought by its protégé, resulting in the overthrow of the People's Revolutionary Government and in considerable damage to Cuba's regional standing.

To conclude, although microstates have their small size and many other political, geographical and economic features in common, the typology cannot be taken too far. Inevitably, with a sample of over 50 individual microstates from diverse regions, considered over a 30-year period, and even among the smaller group of the four case studies, there was considerable variety in the features and experiences of the subjects.

It was usually possible to find examples both to support and to discount any theoretical linkage between microstate characteristics and *vulnerability*, and difficult to quantify the relative weight of contradictory evidence. There was nevertheless sufficient evidence to support the notion that certain typical microstate features, notably their disadvantageous colonial legacies, and tendencies towards exaggerated personalism, leadership longevity and unrestrained executive power heightened their vulnerability to political instability. Typical geographical and economic circumstances, such as remote islandness and extreme government resource constraints, frequently accentuated vulnerability, including to external security threats.

Similarly, the great range of experience among the many microstates defied any neat characterization of their *dependence* on larger states for military assistance. The examination of these unequal associations nevertheless suggested that the patron-client model did indeed have utility as a description of microstates' relationship with protecting powers. Among the four case studies, Vanuatu provided the least vindication of the model, but this was due as much to the thinness of its relationship with Papua New Guinea as to the inapplicability of the model. Other case studies provided substantial evidence of pervasiveness, conformity and mutual benefit. The

Gambia, together with many microstates in the wider sample, did not meet the classic patron-client criterion of informality.

The passage of time will doubtless reduce the significance of colonial handicaps and the end of Cold War competition has removed one of the major incentives for potential patrons to engage microstates. Unsurprisingly, the attention of the international and academic communities in the 1990s was drawn increasingly to microstates' economic and environmental vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, as recent events in Fiji, Solomon Islands and Comoros have demonstrated, the fundamental weaknesses of microstates, and the systemic limitations on multilateral action, suggest that the traditional political-security dimension of threat is unlikely to lose its resonance in the near future, and that dependence on larger states for military assistance will be an enduring reality.

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Table 1.01: The microstates

The study covers the thirty years, 1960-1989. Excluding three entities whose constitutional and practical status during the period is regarded as falling somewhat short of a fully independent state, 55 independent microstates are considered.

AFRICA (16)

Botswana
Cape Verde
Comoros
Congo
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
The Gambia
Guinea-Bissau
Lesotho
Mauritania
Mauritius
São Tomé & Príncipe
Seychelles
Swaziland
Zanzibar

CARIBBEAN (12)

Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Dominica
Grenada
Guyana
St Kitts & Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent & the Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago

SOUTH PACIFIC (10)

Federated States of Micronesia
Fiji
Kiribati
Republic of the Marshall Islands
Nauru
Solomon Islands
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Western Samoa (now known as Samoa)

ASIA (10)

Bahrain
Bhutan
Brunei Darussalam
Cyprus
Kuwait
Mongolia
Maldives
Oman
Qatar
United Arab Emirates

EUROPE (7)

Andorra
Iceland
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Malta
Monaco
San Marino

EXCLUDED (3)

Cook Islands
Niue
Vatican City

Table 1.02: Foreign military interventions in response to microstate security crises, 1960-1989

1961	Kuwait	UK and Arab League send troops to deter Iraq
1961	Mauritania	France helps contain tribal agitation
1962	Brunei	UK helps suppress rebellion
1962	Gabon	France helps suppress riots
1962	Maldives	UK dispatches naval vessels to protect nationals
1963	Cyprus	UK, Greece and Turkey try to stem communal violence; UN later steps in
1964	Gabon	French troops restore President after coup
1968	Mauritius	UK troops quell race riots on independence eve and stay on afterwards
1969	Equatorial Guinea	Foreigners evacuated by Spanish military after violent clashes with regime
1970	Trinidad & Tobago	US sends arms to local security forces after army mutiny and Black Power unrest. UK dispatches Marines to the vicinity
1970s	Oman	UK, India, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and US help combat communist insurgency backed by China, East Germany, South Yemen and others
1973	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia sends troops after Iraq seizes border posts
1974	Cyprus	Turkey intervenes after Greek Cypriot coup
1975	Comoros	Tanzania sends troops to back new regime after coup
1976	Equatorial Guinea	Nigeria evacuates 25,000 nationals victimised by Government
1977	Seychelles	Tanzania sends troops to back new regime after coup
1978	Cyprus	Egyptian commandos attempt to storm hijacked aircraft against Cypriot wishes
1978	São Tomé & Príncipe	Angola and Guinea-Bissau send troops to deter mercenary invasion threat

1979	Equatorial Guinea	Morocco and Gabon send troops to back coup
1979	St Vincent & the Grenadines	Barbados sends troops after attempted secession
1979	Seychelles	Tanzania sends more troops to deter counter-coup
1980	The Gambia	Senegal sends troops to pre-empt army mutiny
1980	Vanuatu	Papua New Guinea, with Australian help, quells secession, relieving Anglo-French force
1981	Dominica	After coup plot, Barbados sends troops (US funding)
1981	The Gambia	Senegal and UK restore President after coup
1981	Seychelles	Tanzanian garrison helps thwart mercenary attack
1982	St Lucia	During election violence, Barbados stations coastguard vessel offshore
1982	Seychelles	Tanzanian garrison helps quell army mutiny; France deploys warship in support
1983	Guinea-Bissau	Soviet warship lingers to back Government facing coup
1983	Grenada	US and OECS intervene against Cuban resistance after deposition and murder of Prime Minister
1985	Comoros	French military intelligence help foil coup
1985	Malta	Egyptian commandos storm hijacked aircraft with Maltese consent
1986	Equatorial Guinea	Moroccan presidential guard thwarts coup attempt
1987	Comoros	South African military advisers help thwart coup
1987	Fiji	Australia and New Zealand send naval vessels for possible protection of nationals after coups
1988	Maldives	India repels mercenaries
1988	Vanuatu	Australia and New Zealand send equipment to reinforce Vanuatu paramilitary police after riot
1989	Comoros	After President murdered, France forces out mercenary cabal, sends own troops

*Table 2.01: Periods studied in each microstate
and median populations*

	Start	Stop	Mths	Median Year	Median Pop.
<u>Africa</u>					
Botswana	30.09.66	31.12.83	207	1975	755,000
Cape Verde	05.07.75	31.12.89	174	1982	302,000
Comoros	06.07.75	31.12.89	174	1982	405,000
Congo	17.08.60	31.12.61	16	1961	1,011,000
Djibouti	27.06.77	31.12.89	150	1983	333,000
Eq. Guinea	12.10.68	31.12.89	255	1979	232,000
Gabon	17.08.60	31.12.86	316	1974	607,000
The Gambia	18.02.65	31.12.89	298	1977	583,000
Guinea-Bissau	24.09.74	31.12.89	183	1982	825,000
Lesotho	04.10.66	31.12.67	15	1967	1,002,000
Mauritania	28.11.60	31.12.61	13	1961	1,011,000
Mauritius	12.03.68	31.12.84	202	1976	906,000
São Tomé	12.07.75	31.12.89	174	1982	99,000
Seychelles	29.06.76	31.12.89	162	1983	64,000
Swaziland	06.09.68	31.12.89	256	1979	545,000
Zanzibar	01.01.60	26.04.64	52	1962	333,000
<u>Caribbean</u>					
Antigua & Barb.	01.11.81	31.12.89	98	1985	76,000
Bahamas	10.07.73	31.12.89	198	1981	214,000
Barbados	30.11.66	31.12.89	277	1978	248,000
Belize	21.09.81	31.12.89	99	1985	166,000
Dominica	03.11.78	31.12.89	134	1984	79,000
Grenada	07.02.74	31.12.89	191	1982	89,000
Guyana	26.05.66	31.12.89	283	1978	749,000
St Kitts & Nevis	19.09.83	31.12.89	75	1986	44,000
St Lucia	22.02.79	31.12.89	130	1984	134,000
St Vincent	27.10.79	31.12.89	122	1984	108,000
Suriname	25.11.75	31.12.89	169	1982	364,000
Trinidad	31.08.62	31.12.74	148	1968	955,000
<u>South Pacific</u>					
Fiji	10.10.70	31.12.89	231	1980	634,000
Kiribati	12.07.79	31.12.89	126	1984	62,000
Marshall Islds	21.10.86	31.12.89	38	1988	37,000
FS Micronesia	03.11.86	31.12.89	38	1988	94,000
Nauru	31.01.68	31.12.89	263	1979	8,000
Solomon Islds	07.07.78	31.12.89	138	1984	261,000
Tonga	01.01.60	31.12.89	360	1975	87,000
Tuvalu	01.10.78	31.12.89	135	1984	8,000
Vanuatu	30.07.80	31.12.89	113	1985	136,000
W. Samoa	01.06.62	31.12.89	331	1976	150,000

	Start	Stop	Mths	Median Year	Median Pop.
<u>Asia</u>					
Bahrain	01.01.60	31.12.89	360	1975	272,000
Bhutan	01.01.60	31.12.68	108	1964	933,000
Brunei	01.01.60	31.12.89	360	1975	156,000
Cyprus	16.08.60	31.12.89	352	1975	609,000
Kuwait	01.01.60	31.12.75	192	1968	673,000
Maldives	01.01.60	31.12.89	360	1975	133,000
Mongolia	01.01.60	31.12.62	36	1961	984,000
Oman	01.01.60	31.12.81	264	1971	675,000
Qatar	01.01.60	31.12.89	360	1975	171,000
UA Emirates	01.01.60	31.12.80	252	1970	223,000
<u>Europe</u>					
Andorra	01.01.60	31.12.89	360	1975	27,000
Iceland	01.01.60	31.12.89	360	1975	218,000
Liechtenstein	01.01.60	31.12.89	360	1975	24,000
Luxembourg	01.01.60	31.12.89	360	1975	362,000
Malta	21.09.64	31.12.89	303	1977	342,000
Monaco	01.01.60	31.12.89	360	1975	25,000
San Marino	01.01.60	31.12.89	360	1975	20,000

Notes

The study covers from 1 January 1960 to 31 December 1989, with the following adjustments for individual cases. *Start date*: if the microstate did not become independent until after 1 January 1960, then its record is instead considered from independence onwards. Protected States (cf protectorates) are considered already independent before the termination of this special status (see Table 2.06). *Stop date*: if the microstate's population passed one million (viz. it ceased to be a microstate), before 31 December 1989, then its record is considered only up until 31 December in the year it is estimated to have crossed that population threshold. Consideration of Zanzibar ceases with the termination of its independent existence. *Part months* are rounded up or down. The total of months is used in calculating crisis propensity quotients.

Population figures are for each microstate's median year and are calculated from U.N. Department of Economic & Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 1990*, United Nations, New York, 1991. Zanzibar's population was extrapolated from the 1958 Census figure in Junod, Violaine I., *The Handbook of Africa*, New York University Press, New York, 1963, p. 441, using the 1955-65 growth rate for Tanzania in the U.N. publication.

Table 2.02: Security crisis log, 1960-1989

Source of threat	Core value threatened
E = External	O = Public order
I = Internal	R = Institutional arrangements/regime survival
	S = Political independence/sovereignty
	T = Territorial integrity

AFRICA

Botswana 30.09.66 through 1983

Throughout the period Botswana suffered border incursions (about 100) by combatants and influxes of refugees (30,000 in camps by 1979) as a result of conflict in neighbouring Rhodesia and South Africa. Complained to UN Security Council in late 1976 about Rhodesian border violations. E S

1983 (November/December) Clashes with Zimbabwean troops inside border. E S

Cape Verde 05.07.75 through 1989

1977 (June) Coup plot involving foreign mercenary intervention. I/E R

1981 Coup plot. Linked to Cape Verdean community in Portugal, US and with far right in Portugal. I/E R

Violent anti-land reform protest on Sant'Antao. One person killed. I O

Comoros 06.07.75 through 1989 (174 months)

1975 (3 August) Coup in capital deposes President Ahmed Abdallah while away visiting native island of Anjouan. (Supporters of rival politician, Prince Said Mohammed Jaffar, plus mercenaries commanded by Colonel Bob Denard.) Mop-up operation on 21 September to end *de facto* secession of Anjouan. Tanzania sends about 100 troops to back new regime. I/E R/T

1976 (January) Jaffar ousted by Defence Minister, Ali Soilih. I R

(April) Alleged plot by Abdallah partisans. I R

1977 (10 March) Government uncovers "special network" preparing coup using mercenaries recruited in France and including some Comorans. I/E R

(4 June) Attempted coup on Anjouan Island. I R

(December) Army restores Government authority on island of Moheli after serious peasant revolt lasting some weeks. **I O**

1978 (January) Alleged plot. **I R**

(March) 12 people killed in clashes between militia and fishermen resisting government measures at village of Iconi on Grand Comoro. **I O**

(12-13 May) Mercenary takeover on behalf of ex-President Abdallah (led by Denard, allegedly backed by French secret service, then South Africa). President Soilih killed a fortnight later. **I/E R**

1981 (February) 150 arrested after reported coup attempt. **I R**

1983 (March) Coup plot involving British mercenaries acting on behalf of former Comoran diplomat, Said Ali Kemal. Leaders arrested in Australia, sent for trial in December 1983. Alleged US (CIA) involvement. **I/E R**

1984 (November) Alleged coup plot involving Soilih supporters. **I R**

1985 (March) Attempted coup by Presidential Guard while Abdallah abroad put down by mercenary members of the Guard, with logistical support from French intelligence. Results in political ascendancy of mercenaries. **I R**

1987 (November) Attempted left-wing coup by former members of Presidential Guard and members of armed forces while Abdallah abroad. French mercenaries and South African military advisers help thwart. **I R**

1989 (November) Denard stages coup after Abdallah killed by Presidential Guard. Under pressure from France and South Africa, Denard agrees to withdraw. Comorans agree to presence of 50 French paratroopers for up to two years for purpose of training local security forces. **I/E R**

Congo

17.08.60 through 1961

1960 Riots/tribal conflict. **I O**

Djibouti

27.06.77 through 1989

1977 (late) French pilot and mother of Issa Minister of Justice murdered by Ethiopian Afars. French teacher and Djibouti soldier killed by Afars. Two French personnel killed, 15 wounded in café bombing. Afari unrest reportedly suppressed with French assistance, but France denies. **I/E R/T**

1987 (April) Bomb attack on café frequented by French troops kills 11. **I R/T**

1989 (April) Inter-tribal hostilities in Djibouti City and elsewhere. **I R/T**

(October) Violent clashes between clans in Djibouti City. **I R/T**

Equatorial Guinea

12.10.68 through 1989

- 1969 (February) Crisis in relations with Spain. Foreign nationals evacuated under Spanish military protection. 7,000 out of 8,000 Spaniards leave. Spanish troops occupy airports and other strategic points. **I/E O**
- (5 March) Senior politicians, including foreign minister, Atanasio Ndongo, attempt coup. **I R**
- 1972 50 Nigerian workers killed in demonstrations over arrest of compatriots. **I O**
- (August) Gabon sends troops to disputed islands after Gabonese fishermen allegedly harassed by armed groups from Equatorial Guinea. Gabonese troops occupy islands of Conga, Cocottiers and Mbane. Tension continues for several months with mutual threats of invasion. Gabon still occupying disputed territories as of 1987. **E T**
- (December) Coup plot involving European and Dahomey mercenaries. **E R**
- 1974 (June) Prison mutiny becomes attempted revolt. 18 killed. **I O/R**
- 1976 (January) Evacuation of 25,000 nationals by Nigeria after ill-treatment. 11 Nigerians killed when Equatorial Guinean soldiers open fire on Nigerian embassy in Malabo. **I O**
- (mid-1976) Gabon-based Equatorial Guinean exiles attack garrison in Evinayong, killing about 10 National Guards. **I/E R**
- 1979 (August) President Macias Nguema overthrown by nephew Obiang Nguema. Joint Gabonese-Equatorial Guinean force occupies Macias's Mongomo region. Gabonese army helps arrest Macias Nguéma. 180 Moroccan soldiers arrive on 23 September to protect new government as Macias trial begins; are used for execution of Macias; stay on as President's "Moroccan Guard". Spain also thought to have played some covert role. **I/E R**
- 1981 (April) Alleged coup attempt followed by arrest of officers and civil servants loyal to Maye Ela (Nguema family member and former vice-president). **I R**
- 1983 (20 May) Attempted military coup. **I R**
- (July) Plot to assassinate President. **I R**
- 1985 (February) Nigeria evacuates more nationals. **I O**
- (June) Alleged coup attempt. **I R**
- 1986 (February) Nigeria evacuates 200 workers from Fernando Po, after one murdered. **I O**
- (July) Coup attempt by Mbá Onana thwarted by Moroccan guards. **I R**

(September) Alleged coup attempt. **I R**

1988 (August) Alleged coup attempt. **I R**

Nigeria threatens invasion to eject South African personnel in Equatorial Guinea allegedly working on satellite-tracking station and extending Malebo airport for assault on oil fields of Niger delta. **E S**

Gabon

17.08.60 through 1986

1960 Riots. **I O**

1962 (September) French help suppress riots, retaliatory attacks on Congolese in Gabon following brawl at Congo-Gabon soccer match in Brazzaville. **I O**

1964 (February) President M'ba deposed in military coup but restored with help of French paratroops on basis of defence treaty, which implicitly provided for personal protection of Gabonese president by French. **I R**

1970s Up to 60,000 Equatorial Guineans to take refuge within Gabon to escape repression at home. **E O**

1972 (September) Gabon sends troops to disputed islands after Gabonese fishermen allegedly harassed by armed groups from Equatorial Guinea. Tension continues for several months with mutual threats of invasion. Gabon still occupying disputed territories as of 1987. **E T**

1975 (January) Foreign commercial retailers attacked during tension over exorbitant prices. **I O**

1978 (July) Looting, violence against Benin citizens after allegations of Gabonese complicity in January 1977 invasion of Benin. **I O**

1980s (early, especially December 1981) Serious unrest against President Bongo and his French advisers. **I O**

1981 (May) Anti-foreigner violence in Gabon after Cameroun vs Gabon soccer match. Cameroun evacuates 6,000 nationals. **I O**

1985 (January) Vandalising and looting of Lebanese businesses following inflammatory speech by Bongo. **I O**

(August) Air Force officer shot for plotting coup. **I R**

The Gambia

18.02.65 through 1989

1969 Senegal accuses The Gambia of "economic aggression" due to smuggling. Senegalese army units violate borders. Demonstrations in The Gambia during visit of Senegal's President Senghor. **E S**

- 1971 Senegal raids after smuggling dispute. **E S**
- 1973 Further border incident. **E S**
- 1974 Further border incident. **E S**
- 1980 (October) Senegal assists in forestalling mutiny. Libyan link alleged. **I R**
- 1981 (30 July) Attempted coup while President Jawara in London. Overturned by Senegalese troops plus British SAS unit. **I R**
- 1980s (early) Coup plot by one of the 1981 conspirators who had fled to Guinea-Bissau. **I/E R**
- 1987 (late) Rumour of imminent coup attempt, to be launched from outside The Gambia by dissident Gambians, trained and equipped by an unidentified foreign government. Reported robbery of a military armoury in the S n galese town of Thi s added credence. **I/E R**
- 1988 (January) Coup plot uncovered. Involved recruitment of Gambian and Senegalese dissidents for military training in Libya. **I/E R**

Guinea-Bissau

24.09.74 through 1989

- 1978 (November) Coup attempt launched by Malam Sanha from Senegal. Group captured near Bissau. **I/E R**
- 1980 (14 November) Coup by PM Joao Vieira deposes President Luis Cabral. **I R**
- 1981 (February) School children protest against Cuban methods of educational assessment. Vehicles damaged and documents burnt. **I O**
- 1982 (March) Coup attempt by Army commander, Paulo Correia. **I R**
- (July) Rumoured coup plots. Several Cabral era leaders arrested. **I R**
- 1983 (June) Threatened military coup. Soviet warship asked to remain in port by government for support. **I R**
- 1984 (January) In a fishing dispute, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau mass troops and tanks on their borders before diplomatic resolution. **E S**
- (March) Dismissed PM Saude Maria takes refuge in Portuguese Embassy (accused of corruption and plotting coup). **I R**
- 1985 (November) Coup attempt by First Vice-President Correia and senior military officers ("November plot"). **I R**
- 1987 (August) Rumoured coup attempt. **I R**

Lesotho

04.10.66 through 1967

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Mauritania

28.11.60 through 1961

1960 Clashes with Mali on Mauritania's eastern border. **E T**

1961 Clashes with Mali on Mauritania's eastern border. **E T**

1961 France intervenes to help control tribal agitation. **I O**

Mauritius

12.03.68 through 1984

1968 (March) Racial rioting, which began in January, continues beyond independence (12 March). British troops brought in from Singapore in January. State of Emergency January 1968-31 December 1970. **I O**

1971 (December) State of Emergency imposed after wave of strikes and not finally revoked until March 1978. **I O**

1978 (*circa*) Apparent coup attempt. Armed militants arrested on stairs to parliament public galleries. **I R**

São Tomé & Príncipe

12.07.75 through 1989

1977 (July) Alleged coup plot linked with "Cobra '77" conspiracy against MLPA Government of Angola (backed by Zaire). STP Minister of Social Affairs, da Graca, later charged with complicity. **I/E R**

1978 (14 February) São Tomé informs UN Security Council that unidentified ships and aircraft have been violating its territorial waters and airspace, and calls on Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau for military aid against threatened invasion by foreign mercenaries. **E R**

1979 (August) Popular discontent erupts as government attempts census. Former PM Trouvada accused of involvement in this and earlier coup plot. **I O/R**

1980 (November) Alleged coup conspiracy. Two Portuguese arrested. **I/E R**

1981 (December) Food shortage riot in Príncipe; calls for independence. **I O/T**

1988 (8 March) Failed invasion by rightist opponents of government and foreign mercenaries. **I/E R**

Seychelles

29.06.76 through 1989

1977 (5 June) Coup. President James Mancham deposed while in London for CHOGM. Albert René installed as President. Some coup participants trained

in Tanzania. 12 Tanzanian military advisers arrive 22 June to train new militia. Tanzania later provides several hundred troops. **I/E R**

- 1978 (April) Alleged coup plot by ex-Minister, David Joubert. 21 arrested. Two US civilians employed at USAF tracking station deported for alleged involvement. Mancham and Kenyan government also accused. **I/E R**

Second coup plot. **I R**

- 1979 (October) Violent protests over planned compulsory national service. **I O**

(November) Alleged coup plot involving mercenaries backed by businessmen wanting to make Seychelles into casino and arms trade centre. Mancham and Adnan Kashoggi later accused. Tanzania sends more troops. **I/E R**

- 1981 (July) Coup attempt. **I R**

(November) Abortive attack by South African and other mercenaries under Colonel "Mad Mike" Hoare. Mancham, Kashoggi and South African Government implicated. Tanzanian garrison helps foil mercenaries. **E R**

- 1982 (early) Failed attack of 1981 followed by six months of bombing and arson against government targets. Alleged South African involvement. **I/E R**

(August) Army mutiny. Tanzanians (now 100) help thwart. French warship sent to Seychelles at President René's request. **I R**

(October) Coup plot involving South African mercenaries. Two conspirators killed in accidental explosion on Seychelles beach. **I/E R**

- 1983 (November) Coup attempt. **I R**

- 1986 (September) Failed coup attempt involving Defence Minister while René at NAM summit in Zimbabwe. India facilitates René's swift return. **I R**

- 1987 Plot to overthrow Seychelles Government uncovered in UK. **I/E R**

Swaziland

6.09.68 through 1989

- 1973 Constitutional coup. King Sobhuza abolishes parliamentary system, bans political parties, introduces state of emergency, forms national army, vests all state power in himself. **I R**

- 1981 (late) Series of raids by South Africa on ANC residences in Swaziland. **E S**

- 1982 Death of King Sobhuza followed by three years of coups, counter-coups, royal intrigue over succession. **I R**

- 1984 (April) Suppression of ANC sparks civil unrest. South African security personnel involved in the anti-ANC operations. **I/E O/S**

(November) Serious student riots. **I O**

Zanzibar

01.01.60 to 26.4.64

1961 (1 June) Election day riots; 68 killed. **I O**

1964 (12 January) Sultan deposed in coup. **I R**

CARIBBEAN

Antigua & Barbuda

01.11.81 through 1989

1987 (December) Alleged plot to assassinate three Ministers and other dissenters in ruling Antigua Labour Party critical of Vere Bird, Jr (a Minister and son of Prime Minister), who had recently been censured for corruption. **I R**

Bahamas

10.07.73 through 1989

1974 Group of US businessmen and adventurers seek to subvert and seize by military force the Abaco Islands. Islanders enjoined to fight for self-governing status in order to further conspirators' plans. **E T**

1980 (May) Bahamian patrol boat sunk by Cuban air force after arresting a Cuban fishing boat in Bahamian waters. Cuban troops land by helicopter on Ragged Island (Bahamas) to pursue patrol boat survivors. **E S**

Barbados

30.11.66 through 1989

1976 (October) Plan by two US citizens to launch mercenary invasion. **E R**

(October) Cuban airliner blown up on take-off from Barbados. **E S**

1978 (December) Coup plot involving expatriate arms dealer, mercenaries. **E R**

1979 (May) Dominican/South African plot for mercenary attack, headed by Barbadian revealed. **I/E R**

Belize

21.09.81 through 1989

Irredentist threat until Guatemala declared willingness to recognise Belize's right to self-determination in August 1991. **E T**

Insurgents use Belizean territory for operations in neighbouring countries. Also refugee problem relating to conflict in nearby countries, eg El Salvador. **E S**

Dominica

03.11.78 through 1989

1979 (January) Coup threat. **I R**

- 1979 (May) Police fire on demonstrators protesting limits on union activities and press freedom. Simultaneously government's secret ties with South Africa disclosed, including involvement of Dominican premier in plan for mercenary attack on Barbados. Further rioting in June to pressure Government to resign. PM Patrick John and Cabinet forced to step down. **I O/R**
- 1981 (February) Armed Rastafarians kidnap local farmer (subsequently murdered). (March) Links between Rastafarians and Defence Force, and plot to overthrow Government uncovered. US right-wing group involved. Defence Force disbanded. State of Emergency February-July 1981. **I/E O/R**
- (December) Former Air Force head implicated in plot to free Patrick John from jail. French citizens involved. French authorities in nearby Martinique assist Dominican Government. State of Emergency 19 December-31 March 1982. United States funds dispatch of Barbados security forces. **I/E R**
- 1983 (10 January) State of Emergency renewed for another 12 months. **I O/R**

Grenada

07.02.74 through 1989

- 1979 (13 March) Almost bloodless coup by left-wing New Jewel Movement overthrows discredited Government of PM Eric Gairy. **I R**
- 1983 (October) Fratricidal conflict within ruling party leads to deposition and murder of PM Maurice Bishop. US intervention (with Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St Lucia, St Vincent & the Grenadines). Last forces withdrawn during 1985. **I/E R**

Guyana

26.05.66 through 1989

- 1966 (September/October) Venezuelan troops occupy Guyanese half of Ankoko Island, situated in one of border rivers. **E T**
- 1967 (December) Guyana expels Surinamese allegedly surveying for hydroelectric dam. Suriname threatens to expel all 2,000 Guyanese workers. **E S**
- 1969 (January) Brief secessionist revolt by ranchers in Rupununi region suppressed by force. Ranchers allegedly supported by Venezuela. Flee to Brazil. **I/E T**
- (August) Guyanese armed force ejects Surinamese settlers allegedly armed and intent on building an airstrip and military camp. **E T**
- 1970 Venezuelan army launches mortar attack on Guyanese border post. **E S**
- 1975 Guyana accuses Brazil of border violations. **E S**
- 1980s (early) Strikes and protests re economic policy brutally suppressed. **I O**
- 1981 (April) Venezuela ups ante in territorial claims for Essequibo. **E T**

1982 (May and September) Border incursions by Venezuelan armed forces. Guyana protests to UNSC. **E T**

1983 (December) Guyanese conspirators, Canadians, American arrested in US and Canada in connection with plot to assassinate PM Burnham and topple Guyanese regime. US Government complicity alleged. **I/E R**

Saint Kitts & Nevis

19.09.83 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Saint Lucia

22.02.79 through 1989

1982 (May) Violence during election campaign. Barbados stations coast guard vessel offshore. **I O**

1983 (August). Prime Minister Compton claims Libya providing terrorist training to St Lucian and other East Caribbean nationals (referring to scholarships given by Libya to supporters of Opposition Labour Party). **I/E R/S**

St Vincent & the Grenadines

27.10.79 through 1989

1979 (7 Dec) Union Island seized by armed Rastafarians linked to Grenada. Barbados sends troops. State of Emergency until 16 May 1980. **I/E O/T**

1981 (June) Mass protests of up to 15,000 people after Government attempts to impose repressive public order legislation. Widespread disorder and looting during police strike on 23 June. **I O**

(August) Government claims discovery of a coup plot. **I R**

Suriname

25.11.75 through 1989

1980 (25 February) PM Henck Arron overthrown in military coup led by Sergeant-Major Desiré Bouterse. Dutch military mission allegedly involved. State of Emergency until February 1986. **I/E R**

(April/May) Attempted counter-attack by foreign mercenaries entering from French Guiana. Suriname MPs implicated. **I/E R**

(May) Military plot. **I R**

(August) Bouterse dissolves legislature and declares state of emergency (in force until February 1986). Alleges coup plot involving army NCOs, MPs and foreign elements (NCOs linked to Cuba, Jamaica, Nicaragua). **I/E R**

1981 (March) Attempted coup. Hindustani-inspired. Organized by right-wing elements. Led by Sergeant-Major Wilfred Hawker. **I R**

1982 (March) Major army mutiny. Hawker executed for involvement. Bouterse declares state of siege and imposes martial law. **I R**

(October-December) Alleged coup plots involving foreign mercenaries and Surinamese exiles. **I/E R**

(December) Tension between Government and unions/opposition groups culminates in "December murders". **I O**

1983 (June) Brazil reportedly threatens to invade unless Bourtese takes action to limit Cuban influence. Cuban embassy downgraded in October. **E S**

(November) Alleged coup plot involving Surinamese exiles. **I/E R**

1986 (July) Armed group under former soldier Ronnie Brunswijk, aided by foreign mercenaries and funded by exile groups in Netherlands, begins a campaign of harassment from bases in French Guiana ("Boschneger Revolt"). US mercenaries arrested as setting off from US. (December) State of emergency reimposed in south and east of country. France and Netherlands accused of supporting rebels. Insurgency continues until March 1991 accord. 10,000 refugees in French Guiana at one point. **I/E O/R**

Trinidad and Tobago

31.08.62 through 1974

1970 Army mutiny and Black Power demonstrations. State of Emergency declared. United States and Venezuela send small arms and equipment to reinforce local armed forces and police. Britain sends Marines to the region. **I O/R**

SOUTH PACIFIC

Federated States of Micronesia

03.11.86 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Fiji

10.10.70 through 1989

1987 (May) Military coup deposes newly elected Labour Government. Former PM Ratu Mara installed as interim PM. **I R**

(August) Military reasserts authority and takes power again. Mild secession crisis (Rotuma) in aftermath. **I R**

1988 (May) Australian Customs intercepts arms destined for Fiji. Indian Government complicity alleged. **I/E R**

Kiribati

12.07.79 through 1989

1980 (July) Strike leads to arson, intimidation. 120 special police sworn in. **I O**

Marshall Islands 21.10.86 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Nauru 31.01.68 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Solomon Islands 07.07.78 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Tonga 01.01.60 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Tuvalu 01.10.78 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Vanuatu 30.07.80 through 1989

1980 Secessionist rebellion with French complicity on island of Santo put down by Papua New Guinea using Australian transport. I/E T

1988 (May) Australia and New Zealand send equipment and offer support in wake of land riot and unrest. I O

(December) Attempted constitutional coup by President. I R

Western Samoa 1.6.62 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

ASIA (10)

Bahrain 01.01.60 through 1989

1961 10-year State of Emergency begins after pan-Arabist unrest. I/E R

1981 (December) Alleged Iranian-backed plot to overthrow Government. I/E R

1984 Discovery of arms allegedly supplied by Iran to Islamic militants. I/E R

1985 (June) Coup plot discovered. Reportedly sponsored by Iran. I/E R

1986 (April) Qatari soldiers confront Bahraini personnel at construction/reclamation project on one of disputed Hawar Islands. E T

1987 (December) Alleged Iranian plot to blow up refinery. E S

Bhutan

01.01.60 through 1968

1964 (5 April) PM Jigme Dorji assassinated. Army Chief of General Staff subsequently executed for role. I R

1965 (November) Alleged attempt on King's life. I R

Brunei Darussalam

01.01.60 through 1989

1962 (December) Serious internal rebellion with Indonesian, Malaysian and Philippines links, put down with British military assistance. I/E R

Cyprus

16.08.60 through 1989

1963 (December) Turkish Cypriots withdraw from central government and inter-communal violence breaks out. Britain, Greece, Turkey intervene before UNICYP established March 1964. I O

1971 Independence guerrilla leader, General Grivas, returns to Cyprus, revives terrorist campaign for *Enosis* (unification) against Makarios government. Apparently supported by military regime in Greece. I/E T

1974 (15 July) President Makarios deposed in coup led by Greek officers of Cypriot National Guard. Turkish army occupies northern third of country to protect Turkish Cypriots and prevent *de facto* Greek takeover. Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) declared in February 1975. I/E R/T

1978 (February) Hostage crisis at Larnaca airport following assassination by Abu Nidal group in Nicosia. Egyptian commandos attempt to intervene but are bloodily repulsed by Cypriot National Guard. E S

1983 (15 November) TFSC makes unilateral declaration of independence as Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Only recognised by Turkey. Condemned by UN Security Council. I/E T

Kuwait

01.01.60 through 1975

1961 Iraqi invasion threat deterred by British military intervention and later an Arab League force comprising Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAR and Sudan. Withdrawn February 1963. E T

1972 (March) Iraqis seize border posts at Sametah. Saudi Arabia deploys troops to Kuwait. Situation resolved after PLO mediation. E T

Maldives

01.01.60 through 1989

1960s (early) Addu secession crisis (January 1959-1963). I T

- 1962 (November) Britain dispatches naval vessels to protect nationals after anti-British demonstrations in Malé (related to Addu dispute). I/E S
- 1967 Assassination plot against President Nasir. I R
- 1968 Coup plot. 16 Maldivians including Abdullah Luthufi jailed. I R
- 1972 Plot against Nasir. I R
- 1974 (24 June) Large demonstration against high food prices, possibly intended to develop into attempt to overthrow government but was nipped in bud. I O
- 1975 (March) Alleged plot. President Nasir invokes emergency powers. Dismisses PM Zaki, exiles to remote atoll. Office of PM abolished. I R
- 1980 (April) Abortive coup conspiracy by former President Nasir using European mercenaries. I/E R
- 1983 Further plot. I R
- 1988 (November) India routs coup attempt by Sri Lankan mercenaries recruited by disaffected Maldivian businessman. Indian troops stay for one year. I/E R

Mongolia

01.01.60 through 1962

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Oman

01.01.60 through 1981

- 1965 (June) Rebel attacks on Government installations throughout Dhofar. I/E R
- 1970 (23 July) Sultan deposed by son in palace coup. I R
- 1970s (early) Communist-supported insurgency intensifies in Dhofar province. Britain, US, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Pakistan and India assist government. Rebels supported by South Yemen, China, Soviet Union, East Germany and Iraq. I/E R

Qatar

01.01.60 through 1989

- 1963 Popular demonstrations demanding political and social reform. I O
- 1972 (February) Amir deposed by Crown Prince/PM in bloodless coup. I R
- 1986 (April) Confrontation with Bahrain over Hawar Islands (no casualties). E T

United Arab Emirates

01.01.60 through 1980

- 1966 Palace coup in Abu Dhabi. I R

1970s (early) Dispute with Iran over ownership of islands at entrance of Persian Gulf begins. Iranian troops occupy Tunb islands in November 1971. **E T**

1972 (January) Ruler of Sharjah killed by rebels but they fail to gain power. Sheikh's brother takes over instead. **I R**

Disputes between sheikdoms of Sharja and Fujaira over Sheikh of Fujaira's move to give date garden to ruler of Abu Dhabi as a gift. 20 killed. **I O**

1978 Internal unrest and strains in UAE Federal Defence Force over senior appointment. **I O**

EUROPE (7)

Andorra 01.01.60 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Iceland 01.01.60 through 1989

1972 Cod War flare-up. High level of tension over British and West German right to fish in Icelandic waters. **E S**

Liechtenstein 01.01.60 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Luxembourg 01.01.60 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Malta 21.09.64 through 1989

1980 (August-September) Maltese oil rig harassed by Libyan warships; Maltese air force placed on alert. Oil rights arbitrated by ICJ in 1984. **E T**

1984 (September-December) Numerous anti-government bomb attacks. **I O**

1985 (24 November) Egypt intervenes (with Malta's consent) against hijackers. **E O**

1986 (November/December) Violent political clashes. **I O**

Monaco 01.01.60 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

San Marino 01.01.60 through 1989

No security crises recorded during period studied.

Table 2.03: Border and territorial disputes

Microstates which have been party to border or territorial disputes (including over maritime jurisdictions) with other party/parties (at right):

Africa

Comoros	France
Djibouti	Ethiopia, Somalia
Equatorial Guinea	Gabon
Gabon	Equatorial Guinea
Guinea-Bissau	Senegal
Lesotho	South Africa
Mauritania	Mali, ^a Morocco ^b
Mauritius	France, Madagascar, United Kingdom
Swaziland	South Africa

Caribbean

Belize	Guatemala
Guyana	Brazil ^c , Suriname, Venezuela
Suriname	France, Guyana

South Pacific

Kiribati	United States ^d
Tuvalu	United States ^e
Vanuatu	France

Asia

Bahrain	Iran, Qatar
Bhutan	China
Brunei	[re Spratly Islands] ^f
Cyprus	Turkey
Kuwait	Iran, ^g Iraq, Saudi Arabia
Maldives	India
Oman	Saudi Arabia, Yemen
Qatar	Bahrain, Iran
United Arab Emirates	Iran, Saudi Arabia

Europe

Iceland	West Germany, United Kingdom
Malta	Libya

Source (unless otherwise noted below)

Allcock, John B., Guy Arnold, Allan J. Day, D.S. Lewis, Lorimer Poultney, Roland Rance, and D.J. Sagar, *Border and Territorial Disputes*, Longman, Harlow, 1992

Notes

- a Gerteiny, Alfred G., *Mauritania*, Praeger, New York, 1967, p. 202
- b *ibid.*, p. 195
- c Danns, George K., "The role of the military in the national security of Guyana", *Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs*, Vol. 11, No 6, January/February 1986, p. 34
- d Meller, Norman, "The Pacific Island microstates", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 41, No 1, Summer/Fall 1987, p. 113, n. 6
- e *ibid.*
- f Brunei has declared jurisdiction over part of this island group, which is the subject of competing claims from many countries in the region. [*World Factbook 1994*, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., 1994, p. 369]
- g Litwak, Robert, *Security in the Persian Gulf 2: Sources of Interstate Conflict*, Gower, Aldershot, 1981, p. 37

Table 2.04: Pre-Independence constitutional status

<u>Long independent</u> (including * Protected States)		<u>Colonies</u>	
Andorra		Antigua & Barbuda	UK
Bahrain*	UK	Bahamas	UK
Bhutan*	UK/I	Barbados	UK
Brunei*	UK	Belize	UK
Kuwait*	UK	Cape Verde	P
Liechtenstein		Comoros	F
Luxembourg		Congo	F
Maldives*	UK	Cyprus	UK
Monaco		Djibouti	F
Oman*	UK	Dominica	UK
Qatar*	UK	Equatorial Guinea	S
San Marino		Fiji	UK
Tonga*	UK	Gabon	F
UA Emirates*	UK	The Gambia (part)	UK
Zanzibar*	UK	Grenada	UK
		Guinea-Bissau	P
		Guyana	UK
		Kiribati	UK
		Lesotho	UK
		Malta	UK
		Mauritania	F
		Mauritius	UK
		São Tomé & Príncipe	P
		St Kitts & Nevis	UK
		St Lucia	UK
		St Vincent	UK
		Seychelles	UK
		Suriname	N
		Trinidad & Tobago	UK
		Tuvalu	UK
<u>Protectorates</u>		<u>United Nations Mandate Territories</u>	
Botswana	UK	Marshall Islands	US
The Gambia (part)	UK	Federated States of Micronesia	US
Solomon Islands	UK	Nauru	A
Swaziland	UK	Western Samoa	NZ
<u>Condominium</u>		<u>External Territories</u>	
Vanuatu	UK/F	Iceland	D
		Mongolia	C

Notes

* Protected States (see Table 2.06).

Colonial, administering or protecting powers: Australia (A), China (C), Denmark (D), France (F), India (I), Netherlands (N), New Zealand (NZ), Portugal (P), Spain (S), United Kingdom (UK), United States (US)

En route to independence, the Portuguese and Spanish colonies became "overseas provinces" of the metropolises, most French African colonies were granted "autonomy within the French Community", and many British Caribbean colonies spent some years as "associated states".

Table 2.05: Protected States and Protectorates

<u>Protected States</u>	<u>Protector</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Authority</u>
Bahrain	UK	1871-1971	Crawford, James
Bhutan	UK	1910-1949	Crawford
	India	1949-	Crawford
Brunei	UK	1888-1984	Roberts-Wray
Kuwait	UK	1899-1961	Crawford
Maldives	UK	1887-1965	Roberts-Wray
Oman	UK	1891-1951	Peterson
Qatar	UK	1916-1971	Crawford
Tonga	UK	1900-1970	James, Roberts-Wray
United Arab Emirates	UK	1892-1971	James
Zanzibar	UK	1890-1963	James, Roberts-Wray
<u>Protectorates</u>			
Botswana	UK	1885-1966	Roberts-Wray
The Gambia ^a	UK	1889-1965	Gailey
Solomon Islands	UK	1899-1978	Roberts-Wray
Swaziland ^b	UK	1903-1968	Roberts-Wray

Although in international law, any country under another's protection may be termed a "protectorate," British constitutional law divides such entities into two main classes, "protected states" and "protectorates."^c This often-blurred distinction is important because it bears on the date from which the territories in question may be regarded as sovereign, and thus included in our study. Protected states and protectorates alike have abjured certain prerogatives, usually control over defence and foreign relations, and it is common to speak of both as lacking independent status until such time as their relationships with protecting powers are terminated. Legally, however, protected states are *already* independent, not having relinquished their sovereign status when they entered into the protective relationship.^d A protected state has its "own ruler, together with regularly constituted executive government, legislature and courts" and the protecting power's jurisdiction over internal affairs is either non-existent or expressly delimited.^e Protectorates, by contrast, are analagous to colonies: a protecting power has established sway over an area not internationally recognized as a state, and has thereafter had unlimited jurisdiction over both its external and internal affairs (though sometimes signing a quasi-treaty with and allowing a measure of continuing autonomy to local potentates).^f

There is disagreement as to which territories meet the protected state criteria. James and Roberts-Wray include Brunei and Zanzibar, despite the official nomenclature ("protectorate") of the latter, but Crawford regards them, and similarly Maldives, as "international protectorates" retaining a separate international status but lacking in some respect the qualification for statehood.^g The intricacies of the debate are beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the above determinations have been made on the basis of the authorities cited.

In addition, the Anglo-French Condominium over the New Hebrides (Vanuatu), may be regarded as akin to a protectorate.^h Some writers consider Andorra's relationship with France and Spain to be that of a *de facto* protected state or protectorate, and, likewise, Liechtenstein's with Switzerland, Monaco's with France, and San Marino's with Italy. After the United Nations mandate territory of Western Samoa achieved independence in 1962, it entered into a special relationship with its former administrator, New Zealand, which some regard as tantamount to protected statehood.ⁱ The date at which Bhutan ceased to be a protected state is unclear, the relevant treaty not having been terminated, but rather interpreted increasingly liberally by the Bhutanese.^j

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Notes

- a The Gambia was part colony and part protectorate.
- b Swaziland was also a Protected State for about 18 months prior to independence in 1968. [Grotmeter, *Historical Dictionary of Swaziland*, p. 132]
- c Roberts-Wray, *Commonwealth and Comparative Law*, p. 47
- d James, *Sovereign Statehood...*, p. 100
- e Roberts-Wray, *Commonwealth and Comparative Law*, p. 48
- f Crawford, *The Creation of States...* , p. 199; Parry *et al.*, *Parry and Grant Encyclopaedic Dictionary...* , p. 309; Roberts-Wray, *Commonwealth and Comparative Law*, p. 48
- g James, *Sovereign Statehood...*, p. 100-01; Roberts-Wray, *Commonwealth and Comparative Law*, p. 49; Crawford, *The Creation of States...*, p. 198
- h Roberts-Wray, *Commonwealth and Comparative Law*, p. 50
- i Crawford, *The Creation of States...*, p. 190
- j Kohli, "Bhutan's strategic environment... ", p. 149

Table 2.06: Post-War decolonization

The table shows the date independence was achieved by each of the states decolonized, or which had mandate or protectorate status terminated, between the end of the Second World War and 31 December 1994. The name of the former colonial or administrating power is shown at right. Microstates are highlighted.

<u>Iceland</u>	17 Jun 1944	Denmark
Viet Nam ^a	02 Sep 1945	France
<u>Mongolia</u>	05 Jan 1946	China
Jordan	22 Mar 1946	UK
Syria	17 Apr 1946	France
Philippines	04 Jul 1946	US
India	15 Aug 1947	UK
Pakistan ^b	15 Aug 1947	UK
Myanmar	04 Jan 1948	UK
Sri Lanka	04 Feb 1948	UK
Israel	14 May 1948	UK
South Korea	15 Aug 1948	UN
North Korea	09 Sep 1948	UN
Indonesia ^c	27 Dec 1949	Netherlands
Libya	24 Dec 1951	France/UK ^d
Laos	22 Oct 1953	France
Cambodia	09 Nov 1953	France
Tunisia	20 Mar 1956	France
Ghana	06 Mar 1957	UK
Malaysia ^e	31 Aug 1957	UK
Guinea	02 Oct 1958	France
Cameroon ^f	01 Jan 1960	France
Togo	27 Apr 1960	France
Mali ^g	20 Jun 1960	France
Senegal ^g	20 Jun 1960	France
Zaire/DR Congo	30 Jun 1960	Belgium
Madagascar	26 Jun 1960	France
Somalia	01 Jul 1960	Italy/UK
Benin	01 Aug 1960	France
Niger	03 Aug 1960	France
Burkina Faso	05 Aug 1960	France
Côte d'Ivoire	07 Aug 1960	France
Chad	11 Aug 1960	France
Central African Republic	13 Aug 1960	France
<u>Cyprus</u>	16 Aug 1960	UK
<u>Congo</u>	17 Aug 1960	France
<u>Gabon</u>	17 Aug 1960	France
Nigeria ^h	01 Oct 1960	UK
<u>Mauritania</u>	28 Nov 1960	France
Sierra Leone	27 Apr 1961	UK
Tanzania ⁱ	09 Dec 1961	UK
<u>Western Samoa</u>	01 Jan 1962	New Zealand
Burundi	01 Jul 1962	Belgium
Rwanda	01 Jul 1962	Belgium
Algeria	03 Jul 1962	France
Jamaica	06 Aug 1962	UK

<u>Trinidad</u>	31 Aug 1962	UK
Uganda	09 Oct 1962	UK
Malawi	06 Jul 1964	UK
<u>Malta</u>	21 Sep 1964	UK
Zambia	24 Oct 1964	UK
<u>The Gambia</u>	18 Feb 1965	UK
Singapore ^j	09 Aug 1965	UK
<u>Guyana</u>	26 May 1966	UK
<u>Lesotho</u>	04 May 1966	UK
<u>Botswana</u>	30 Sep 1966	UK
<u>Barbados</u>	30 Nov 1966	UK
South Yemen ^k	30 Nov 1967	UK
<u>Mauritius</u>	12 Mar 1968	UK
<u>Nauru</u>	31 Jul 1968	Australia
<u>Swaziland</u>	06 Sep 1968	UK
<u>Equatorial Guinea</u>	12 Oct 1968	Spain
<u>Fiji</u>	10 Oct 1970	UK
Bangladesh ^l	26 Mar 1971	Pakistan
<u>Bahamas</u>	10 Jul 1973	UK
<u>Grenada</u>	07 Feb 1974	UK
<u>Guinea-Bissau</u>	10 Sep 1974	Portugal
Mozambique	25 Jun 1975	Portugal
<u>Cape Verde</u>	05 Jul 1975	Portugal
<u>São Tomé</u>	12 Jul 1975	Portugal
<u>Comoros</u> ^m	06 Jul 1975	France
Papua New Guinea	16 Sep 1975	Australia
<u>Suriname</u>	25 Nov 1975	Netherlands
<u>Seychelles</u>	29 Jun 1976	UK
<u>Djibouti</u>	27 Jun 1977	France
<u>Solomon Islands</u>	07 Jul 1978	UK
<u>Dominica</u>	03 Sep 1978	UK
<u>Tuvalu</u>	01 Oct 1978	UK
<u>St Lucia</u>	22 Feb 1979	UK
<u>Kiribati</u>	12 Jul 1979	UK
<u>St Vincent</u>	27 Oct 1979	UK
Zimbabwe ⁿ	18 Apr 1980	UK
<u>Vanuatu</u>	30 Jul 1980	France/UK
<u>Belize</u>	21 Sep 1981	UK
<u>Antigua & Barbuda</u>	01 Nov 1981	UK
<u>St Kitts & Nevis</u>	19 Sep 1983	UK
Angola	11 Nov 1985	Portugal
<u>Marshall Islands</u>	21 Oct 1986	US
<u>FS Micronesia</u>	03 Nov 1986	US
Eritrea	24 May 1993	Ethiopia
<u>Palau</u>	01 Oct 1994	USA

Remaining dependent territories

Territories which would have been microstates if independent are in italics (i.e. all but Hong Kong and Puerto Rico).

<i>Faroe Islands</i>	Denmark
<i>Greenland</i>	Denmark
<i>French Guiana</i>	France
<i>French Polynesia</i>	France
<i>Guadeloupe</i>	France
<i>Martinique</i>	France
<i>New Caledonia</i>	France
<i>Réunion</i>	France
<i>St Pierre & Miquelon</i>	France
<i>Wallis & Futuna</i>	France
<i>Aruba</i>	Netherlands
<i>Netherlands Antilles</i>	Netherlands
[<i>Cook Islands</i> ^o	New Zealand]
[<i>Niue</i> ^o	New Zealand]
<i>Tokelau</i>	New Zealand
<i>Macau</i>	Portugal
<i>Anguilla</i>	UK
<i>Bermuda</i>	UK
<i>British Indian Ocean Territory</i>	UK
<i>British Virgin Islands</i>	UK
<i>Cayman Islands</i>	UK
<i>Falkland Islands</i>	UK
<i>Gibraltar</i>	UK
<i>Hong Kong</i>	UK
<i>Montserrat</i>	UK
<i>Pitcairn Islands</i>	UK
<i>American Samoa</i>	US
<i>Guam</i>	US
<i>Puerto Rico</i>	US

Principal source

Europa World Yearbook 1994, Europa, London, 1993

Notes

- a Viet Nam made a unilateral declaration of independence on this date.
- b Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan on 26 March 1971.
- c Indonesia's independence was formally agreed to by the Netherlands on this date. Nationalists had made a unilateral declaration of independence on 17 August 1945.
- d France and the United Kingdom took over the administration of Libya from Italy as a result of the Second World War.
- e The core state of Malaya achieved independence on this date. The Federation of Malaysia was not formed until 16 December 1963.
- f Part of the former British Cameroon elected to join the (formerly French) Republic of Cameroon on 1 October 1961.
- g As French Sudan, Mali had, with Senegal, formed the Federation of Mali in April 1959. The Federation moved to full independence from France on 20 June 1960 but broke up soon afterwards. After Senegal withdrew from the union on 20 August 1960, the former French Sudan declared itself the Republic of Mali on 22 September 1960.
- h Part of the former British Cameroon elected to join Nigeria on 1 October 1961.
- i Originally Tanganyika (adopting its present name on merging with Zanzibar on 26 April 1964).
- j Initially part of the Federation of Malaysia, from which it withdrew on 9 August 1965.
- k Merged with North Yemen in May 1990.
- l On this date Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan, which accepted the move on 16 December 1971.
- m Comoros made a unilateral declaration of independence on this date.
- n The former colony of Rhodesia had made a unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965.
- o See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the status of Cook Islands and Niue (self-governing in free association with New Zealand).

Table 2.07: Leadership longevity

	Leader	In office	No of Years
<u>Africa</u>			
Botswana	Seretse Khama	1965-80	15
Cape Verde	Aristides Pereira	1975-91	16
Comoros	Ahmed Abdallah	1975, 78-89	11
Congo	Abbé Fulbert Youlou	1958-63	5
Djibouti	Hassan Gouled Aptidon	1977-99	20
Eq. Guinea	Macias Nguema	1968-79	11
Gabon	Omar Bongo	1967-	33+
The Gambia	Dawda Jawara	1963-94	31
Guinea-Bissau	Joao Vieira	1980-99	19
Lesotho	L. Jonathan Molapo	1965-86	21
Mauritania	Moktar Ould Daddah	1960-78	18
Mauritius	S. Ramgoolam	1961-82	21
São Tomé	M. Pinto da Costa	1975-91	16
Seychelles	Albert René	1977-	23+
Swaziland	King Sobhuza II	1921-82	61
Zanzibar	Sultan Abdullah	1960-63	3
<u>Caribbean</u>			
Antigua & Barbuda	Vere Bird	1960-94	34
Bahamas	Lynden Pindling	1967-92	25
Barbados	Tom Adams	1976-85	9
Belize	George Price	1961-84, 89-93	27
Dominica	Eugenia Charles	1980-95	15
Grenada	Eric Gairy	1961-62, 67-79	13
Guyana	Forbes Burnham	1964-85	21
St Kitts & Nevis	Robert Bradshaw	1966-78	12
St Lucia	John Compton	1964-79, 82-97	30
St Vincent	James Mitchell	1972-74, 84-	13+
Suriname	Henck Arron	1970-80	10
Trinidad	Eric Williams	1956-81	25
<u>South Pacific</u>			
Fiji	Kamisese Mara	1967-92	25
Kiribati	Ieremia Tabai	1978-91	13
Marshall Islds	Amata Kabua	1980-	15+
FS Micronesia	John Haglelgam	1987-91	4
Nauru	Hammer deRoburt	1956-76, 78-79	21
Solomon Islds	Solomon Mamaloni	1974-76, 81-84 89-93, 94-97	12
Tonga	King T. Tupou IV	1965-	30+
Tuvalu	Tomasi Puapua	1981-89	8
Vanuatu	Walter Lini	1979-91	12
Western Samoa	Fiame Mata'afa	1959-70, 73-75	13

	Leader	In office	No of Years
<u>Asia</u>			
Bahrain	Amir Isa bin Sulman	1961-	39+
Bhutan	King Jigme Singye	1972-	28+
Brunei	Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah	1967-86	19
Cyprus	Archbishop Makarios	1959-77	18
Kuwait	Amir Jabir as-Sabah	1977-	23+
Maldives	Ibrahim Nasir	1957-78	21
Mongolia	Y. Tsendenbal	1952-74	22
Oman	Sultan Qabus	1970-	30+
Qatar	Amir Khalifa	1972-95	23
UA Emirates	Sultan al-Nahyan	1971-	29+

Europe

Andorra	Oscar Ribas Reig	1982-84, 90-94	6
Iceland	S. Hermannsson	1983-87, 88-91	7
Liechtenstein	Hans Brunhart	1978-93	15
Luxembourg	Pierre Werner	1959-74, 79-84	20
Malta	Dom Mintoff	1955-58, 71-84	16
Monaco	Prince Ranier	1949-	51+
San Marino*	N/A	N/A	N/A

Notes

To present a clearer picture of the dominance of individuals, the survey covers the pre-independence period and extends beyond the time when the countries ceased to be microstates. To be included, however, the leader's time in office had to include a significant portion within the period of this study, 1960-89. Thus Sultan Abdullah of Zanzibar (1960-63) is selected over his predecessor (1911-60). The longest serving leader for each country during the study period is given, except in the case of Congo where Fulbert Youlou was selected because his period in office coincides with the period Congo was a microstate.

Usually, the leader is Head of Government, that is Chief Minister, Premier or Prime Minister. In a few cases, such as the Persian Gulf emirates and Moncao, the Head of State is listed instead, if he/she exercised substantial executive power. Some Heads of Government, like Fiji's Mara and Mauritius's Ramgoolam later went on to become Heads of State, but the dates given refer only to their period in office as Heads of Government. Where no end-date is given, the incumbent was still in office as of 2000.

* San Marino's government is headed by two "Captains-Regent" for only six months at a time.

Table 2.08: Strategic significance

The list below shows microstates of strategic interest to other countries during the period 1960-1989.

Africa

Botswana	Frontline State vis-à-vis both South Africa and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe
Cape Verde	Sal airport the main stop-over for South African Airways flights to Europe and US
Comoros	Astride Mozambique Channel, one of world's most vital sea lanes (NB oil); also South African intelligence post, arms conduit
Congo	Staging-post for Cuban forces in Angola
Djibouti	<i>Point d'appui</i> for Middle East and sentinel vis-à-vis Red Sea entrance
Equatorial Guinea	Used for humanitarian flights to Biafra during Nigerian civil war; host to various South African and Soviet activities with military potential, Cuban staging point for Angola
Gabon	Strategic minerals (manganese, uranium); French military and intelligence base/conduit, used, eg, re Angola, Biafra, Comoros
The Gambia	British air staging point during Falklands War; US space shuttle emergency landing strip
Lesotho	Frontline State
Mauritius	UK and US militaries use airport and naval communications facilities; Soviet fishing fleet access
São Tomé	Unconfirmed reports of Soviet military facilities being established in mid-1980s; considered by Angola as part of its own flank, potential <i>point d'appui</i> for enemies
Seychelles	Straddles important sea lanes; US satellite tracking station
Swaziland	Frontline State

Caribbean

General	US desires strategic denial
Antigua & Barbuda	US military technical facilities, staging point for flights to South Atlantic
Bahamas	US military technical facilities vital for antisubmarine warfare research
Barbados	Airport used by Cuban, UK and US military flights (eg re Angola, Falklands, Grenada)
Belize	Used as a base by insurgents operating in other Central American

	countries
Dominica	Allegedly an arms conduit for independence movements in Guadeloupe and Martinique
Grenada	Staging point for Cuban military flights to Africa
Guyana	Staging point for Cuban military flights to Africa
Suriname	Brazil and France nervous at instability and leftist leanings in Suriname; NB proximity of French Guiana, site of Kourou space station (vital French interest) and vulnerability of remote northern provinces of Brazil
Trinidad	US military base, tracking and navigation stations

South Pacific

General	Australia, New Zealand and Western allies desire strategic denial, Kermadec Trench near Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu alleged nuclear submarine route
Kiribati	Japanese satellite tracking station; Soviet fishing agreement in mid-1980s alleged to have underlying military/intelligence significance
Marshall Islands	US missile test range at Kwajalein Atoll; US has full responsibility for defence under 1986 Compact of Free Association
FS Micronesia	US has full responsibility for defence under 1986 Compact of Free Association
Vanuatu	Soviet fishing agreement in mid-1980s alleged to have underlying military/intelligence significance

Asia

Bahrain	UK naval base and aircraft staging point until 1971; US Middle East Force home port
Bhutan	Buffer state occupying High Himalayas between China and India
Brunei	Training site for Singapore Defence Force
Cyprus	UK retained sovereign base areas after independence: staging point for military flights to Gulf and Far East; base for V-bomber strategic deterrent; communications centre; part of NATO south-eastern flank
Kuwait	UK and others consider its continuation as an independent oil producer vital
Maldives	Straddles important sea lines of communication; UK air force staging point at Gan until 1976
Mongolia	Buffer state between China and Soviet Union
Oman	UK air force bases at Salalah and Masirah Island; latter commands approaches to Gulf and was staging points on British air route to Far

	East; former UK facilities taken over by US
United Arab Emirates	Islands control entrance to Persian Gulf (ownership disputed with Iran)

Europe

Iceland	Critical NATO base (controls "Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap")
Luxembourg	Located in NATO heartland
Malta	British and NATO base (HQ Southern Command) until 1971

Table 2.09: Geographical Configuration

Microstates are categorized as either (predominantly) enclaves ("E") or islands ("I").

	Form	Area (km ²)	Description
<u>Africa</u>			
Botswana	E	600,732	Land-locked
Cape Verde	I	4,033	10 islands, 5 islets
Comoros	I	1,862	3 main islands
Congo	E	342,000	Coastal
Djibouti	E	22,000	Coastal
Equatorial Guinea	E/I	28,051	Coastal enclave, 2 islands
Gabon	E	267,667	Coastal
The Gambia	E	11,295	Coastal
Guinea-Bissau	E	36,125	Coastal
Lesotho	E	30,355	Land-locked
Mauritania	E	1,030,700	Coastal
Mauritius	I	2,040	4 main islands
São Tomé & Príncipe	I	964	2 main islands
Seychelles	I	453	Approx 100 islands
Swaziland	E	17,364	Land-locked
Zanzibar	I	2,461	3 main islands
<u>Caribbean</u>			
Antigua & Barbuda	I	440	2 main islands
Bahamas	I	13,935	Approx 700 islands
Barbados	I	430	1 main island
Belize	E	22,963	Coastal
Dominica	I	751	1 main island
Grenada	I	344	1 main island
Guyana	E	215,000	Coastal
St Kitts & Nevis	I	269	2 main islands
St Lucia	I	616	1 main island
St Vincent	I	389	1 main island
Suriname	E	163,265	Coastal
Trinidad & Tobago	I	5,128	2 main islands
<u>South Pacific</u>			
Fiji	I	18,274	Approx 840 islands/islets
Kiribati	I	728	33 main islands
Marshall Islands	I	181	29 atolls, five islands
FS Micronesia	I	700	Approx 600 islands
Nauru	I	21	1 main island
Solomon Islands	I	28,446	6 main islands
Tonga	I	747	Approx 150 islands
Tuvalu	I	25	9 main islands
Vanuatu	I	12,189	12 main islands
Western Samoa	I	2,842	9 main islands

	Form	Area (km ²)	Description
<u>Asia</u>			
Bahrain	I	622	33 islands
Bhutan	E	47,000	Land-locked
Brunei	E	5,765	Coastal
Cyprus	I	9,251	1 main island
Kuwait	E	17,818	Coastal
Maldives	I	298	Approx. 1,200 islands
Mongolia	E	1,565,000	Land-locked
Oman	E	212,457	Coastal
Qatar	E	11,000	Coastal
UA Emirates	E	83,600	Coastal
<u>Europe</u>			
Andorra	E	468	Land-locked
Iceland	I	103,000	1 main island
Liechtenstein	E	160	Land-locked
Luxembourg	E	2,586	Land-locked
Malta	I	316	3 main islands
Monaco	E	2	Coastal
San Marino	E	61	Land-locked

Sources

Whitaker's Almanack 1993, Whitaker's, London, 1992

The World in Figures, Hodder & Stoughton. London, 1987 (fifth edition)

Table 2.10: Secessionism

Microstates which have experienced the threat of secession:

Africa

Comoros (Anjouan *et al.*)
Mauritius (Rodrigues)
São Tomé & Príncipe (Príncipe)

Caribbean

Antigua & Barbuda (Barbuda)
Bahamas (Abaco)
St Kitts & Nevis (Nevis)
St Vincent & the Grenadines (Union Island)

South Pacific

Kiribati (Banaba)
Fiji (Rotuma)
Solomon Islands (Western Islands)
Vanuatu (Espíritu Santo *et al.*)

Asia

Cyprus (ethnic Turkish zone)
Maldives (Addu *et al.*)

Table 2.11: Population density: microstate comparisons

Density figures are for each microstate's *median year* (see Table 2.01) and are expressed in terms of the number of people per square kilometre of territory.

Alphabetical order by region

Numerical order by region

Africa

Botswana	1.26	Mauritius	444.12
Cape Verde	74.88	Comoros	217.51
Comoros	217.51	Seychelles	141.28
Congo	2.96	Zanzibar	135.31
Djibouti	15.14	São Tomé	102.70
Equatorial Guinea	8.28	Cape Verde	74.88
Gabon	2.27	The Gambia	51.62
The Gambia	51.62	Lesotho	33.00
Guinea-Bissau	22.84	Swaziland	27.76
Lesotho	33.00	Guinea-Bissau	22.84
Mauritania	0.98	Djibouti	15.14
Mauritius	444.12	Equatorial Guinea	8.28
São Tomé	102.70	Congo	2.96
Seychelles	141.28	Gabon	2.27
Swaziland	27.76	Botswana	1.26
Zanzibar	135.31	Mauritania	0.98

Caribbean

Antigua & Barbuda	172.73	Barbados	576.74
Bahamas	15.36	St Vincent	277.63
Barbados	576.74	Grenada	258.72
Belize	7.23	St Lucia	217.53
Dominica	105.19	Trinidad	186.23
Grenada	258.72	Antigua & Barbuda	172.73
Guyana	3.49	St Kitts & Nevis	163.57
St Kitts & Nevis	163.57	Dominica	105.19
St Lucia	217.53	Bahamas	15.36
St Vincent	277.63	Belize	7.23
Suriname	2.23	Guyana	3.49
Trinidad	186.23	Suriname	2.23

Alphabetical order by region

Numerical order by region

South Pacific

Fiji	34.69	Nauru	380.95
Kiribati	85.16	Tuvalu	320.00
Marshall Islands	204.42	Marshall Islands	204.42
FS Micronesia	134.29	FS Micronesia	134.29
Nauru	380.95	Tonga	116.47
Solomon Islands	9.18	Kiribati	85.16
Tonga	116.47	Western Samoa	52.78
Tuvalu	320.00	Fiji	34.69
Vanuatu	11.16	Vanuatu	11.16
Western Samoa	52.78	Solomon Islands	9.18

Asia

Bahrain	437.30	Maldives	446.31
Bhutan	19.85	Bahrain	437.30
Brunei	27.06	Cyprus	65.83
Cyprus	65.83	Kuwait	37.77
Kuwait	37.77	Brunei	27.06
Maldives	446.31	Bhutan	19.85
Mongolia	0.63	Qatar	15.55
Oman	3.18	Oman	3.18
Qatar	15.55	UA Emirates	2.67
United Arab Emirates	2.67	Mongolia	0.63

Europe

Andorra	57.69	Monaco	12,500.00
Iceland	2.17	Malta	1,082.28
Liechtenstein	150.00	San Marino	327.87
Luxembourg	139.98	Liechtenstein	150.00
Malta	1,082.28	Luxembourg	139.98
Monaco	12,500.00	Andorra	57.69
San Marino	327.87	Iceland	2.17

Sources

Junod, Violaine I., *The Handbook of Africa*, New York University Press, New York 1963

U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 1990*, United Nations, New York, 1991

Whitaker's Almanack 1993, Whitaker's, London, 1992

The World in Figures, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1987 (fifth edition)

Table 2.12: Population density: world comparisons

Density figures refer to number of inhabitants per square kilometre of land territory in 1975.

<i>Individual microstates</i>		<i>Regional averages & all-region comparisons</i>	
<u>Africa</u>			
Botswana	1.5		
Cape Verde	69.0		
Comoros	149.0		
Congo	4.5	microstates	68.8
Djibouti	10.0	island	173.8
Equatorial Guinea	9.0	non-island	16.3
Gabon	2.5		
The Gambia	49.0		
Guinea-Bissau	18.5	Africa	14.0
Lesotho	39.5		
Mauritania	1.5		
Mauritius	439.5		
São Tomé	82.5		
Seychelles	129.0		
Swaziland	27.0		
<u>Caribbean</u>			
Antigua & Barbuda	176.5		
Bahamas	13.5	microstates	164.5
Barbados	567.0	islands	218.2
Belize	5.5	Belize	5.5
Dominica	96.0	Guyana & Suriname	2.8
Grenada	292.0		
Guyana	3.5		
St Kitts & Nevis	198.0	Americas	12.0
St Lucia	179.5		
St Vincent	241.0		
Suriname	2.0		
Trinidad	200.0		

Individual microstates

*Regional averages &
all-region comparisons*

South Pacific

Fiji	31.5		
Kiribati	74.5	microstates	92.3
Marshall Islands	149.0	Melanesia	15.2
FS Micronesia	97.0	Micronesia	354.0
Nauru	350.0	Polynesia	68.8
Solomon Islands	7.0		
Tonga	121.0		
Tuvalu	27.0	Oceania	2.5
Vanuatu	7.0		
Western Samoa	58.5		

Asia

Bahrain	418.0		
Bhutan	24.0		
Brunei	34.0	microstates	107.7
Cyprus	67.0	Persian Gulf	100.9
Kuwait	59.5		
Maldives	446.5		
Mongolia	1.0	Asia	85.0
Oman	4.0		
Qatar	15.5		
United Arab Emirates	7.5		

Europe

Andorra	56.0		
Iceland	2.0	microstates	2,122.4
Liechtenstein	147.0		
Luxembourg	136.0		
Malta	1,038.0	Europe	91.0
Monaco	13,158.0		
San Marino	319.5		

Sources

Philip's Geographical Digest 1992-93, Heinemann, Oxford, 1992

U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 1990*, United Nations, New York, 1991.

The World in Figures, Hodder & Stoughton. London, 1987 (fifth edition)

Table 2.13: Per capita aid receipts

Figures are in United States Dollars and are annual per capita averages for the median period 1974-76.

Africa

Botswana	68	
Cape Verde	27	
Comoros	60	
Congo	55	Average annual per capita
Djibouti*	124	aid (1974-76):
Equatorial Guinea	-1	
Gabon	171	African microstates 57
The Gambia	17	
Guinea-Bissau	18	<i>cf non-microstates^a</i> 30
Lesotho	23	
Mauritania	24	
Mauritius	33	
São Tomé	9	
Seychelles*	187	
Swaziland	40	

Caribbean

Antigua & Barbuda*	43	
Bahamas	1,573	
Barbados	23	
Belize*	84	Average annual per capita
Dominica*	85	aid (1974-76):
Grenada	25	
Guyana	37	Caribbean microstates 189
St Kitts & Nevis	56	or, excluding Bahamas 63
St Lucia*	80	
St Vincent*	48	<i>cf non-microstates^b</i> 14
Suriname	199	
Trinidad	15	

South Pacific

Fiji	55	
Kiribati*	94	Average annual per capita
Solomon Islands*	80	aid (1974-76):
Tonga	41	
Tuvalu*	167	Sth Pacific microstates 110
Vanuatu*	268	
Western Samoa	68	<i>cf non-microstate^c</i> 112

Asia

Bahrain	-9	Average annual per capita aid (1974-76):	
Bhutan	2		
Brunei	-111		
Cyprus	57		
Kuwait	-21	Asian microstates	65
Maldives	23	cf non-microstates ^d	24
Oman	211		
Qatar	177		
UA Emirates	260		

Europe

Malta	91	Average annual per capita aid (1974-76):	
		cf non-microstates ^e	24

Sources

Aid figures from *Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee: 1977 Review*, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, November 1977; population figures from U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects 1990*, United Nations, New York, 1991.

Notes

The aid figures are in United States dollars and represent an annual average for the years 1974-76 of the "total recorded net flow of resources to individual developing countries and territories *from DAC countries* [members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee] *and multilateral agencies*." In addition to official development assistance, the figures include grants from private agencies and certain transactions on commercial terms (export credits; bilateral portfolio investment by residents or institutions in DAC countries; and direct investment and purchases of securities by international organizations active in development.

Rather than calculating aid flows for each microstate's own median year (ie the median of the years it qualified for inclusion in the overall study), a uniform median was used in order to avoid data incompatibility. A weakness of the approach is that the resulting picture neglects particular circumstances which may have distorted aid figures for a given microstate at the time of the survey. For example, very low aid figures for the former Portuguese overseas provinces reflect the tumult of their summary decolonization in the mid-1970s.

- *** Asterisked microstates had not yet attained independence at the time of this aid survey. Monies they received in 1975 as dependent territories may differ to some extent from what they might have expected to receive as independent entities. Similarly, a number of countries included in the list of microstates for purposes of this table had passed the one million population threshold and were therefore, technically, no longer microstates.
- a** Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- b** Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica
- c** Papua New Guinea
- d** Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Korea (South), Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Vietnam (North South combined), Yemen (North and South). NB China and Taiwan are not included.
- e** Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia

Table 2.14: Gross Domestic Product per capita

Figures are in United States Dollars and for the uniform median year of 1975.

<u>Africa</u>		<u>Caribbean</u>	
Lesotho	128	Grenada	340
Equatorial Guinea	176	St Vincent	387
Guinea-Bissau	176	Dominica	403
Comoros	217	St Lucia	514
Cape Verde	251	Guyana	646
The Gambia	273	St Kitts & Nevis	667
São Tomé	300	Belize	794
Mauritania	336	Antigua & Barbuda	986
Botswana	489	Suriname	1,427
Congo	567	Barbados	1,634
Swaziland	602	Trinidad	2,420
Mauritius	726	Bahamas	3,696
Seychelles	793		
Djibouti	794		
Gabon	2,152		
<u>South Pacific</u>		<u>Asia</u>	
Solomon Islands	345	Bhutan	90
Tonga	375	Maldives	203
Western Samoa	653	Mongolia	512
Vanuatu	948	Cyprus	1,146
Kiribati	1,019	Oman	2,740
Fiji	1,186	Bahrain	4,353
		Brunei	7,391
		Kuwait	11,933
		Qatar	14,439
		United Arab Emirates	19,727
<u>Europe</u>		<u>World averages</u>	
Iceland	6,055	World average	1,520
Luxembourg	6,497	Developed world	5,620
Malta	1,254	Developing world	500

Source: *National Account Statistics: Analysis of Main Aggregates, 1985*, United Nations, New York, 1988

Notes: Gross Domestic Product is an estimate of incomes accruing to residents and generated within the country only (cf Gross National Product). Data were not available for Andorra, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, FS Micronesia, Monaco, San Marino, Tuvalu and Zanzibar.

Table 2.15: Human Development Index

The table shows the score and ranking, from lowest to highest, of 44 microstates (or former microstates) on the United Nations Development Programme's world "human development index" for 1990.

Rank		Score	Rank		Score
1	Djibouti	0.073	91	St Vincent	0.775
2	Guinea-Bissau	0.074	92	United Arab Emirates	0.782
3	The Gambia	0.094	96=	Mauritius	0.788
11	Mauritania	0.208	96=	Suriname	0.788
14	Equatorial Guinea	0.229	98	St Lucia	0.789
16	Bhutan	0.236	103	St Kitts & Nevis	0.801
30	Swaziland	0.329	105	Belize	0.805
33	Solomon Islands	0.349	106=	Western Samoa	0.806
39	Congo	0.395	106=	Fiji	0.806
40	Comoros	0.399	107	Guyana	0.808
54	Vanuatu	0.521	108	Seychelles	0.817
55	Gabon	0.525	111	Kuwait	0.839
56	Cape Verde	0.534	112	Grenada	0.849
57	Oman	0.535	117	Bahamas	0.880
61	São Tomé	0.576	119	Trinidad	0.885
63	Lesotho	0.580	120=	Antigua & Barbuda	0.898
66	Qatar	0.594	120=	Malta	0.898
69	Botswana	0.646	125	Dominica	0.906
74	Maldives	0.692	134	Barbados	0.925
82=	Bahrain	0.737	135	Cyprus	0.928
82=	Mongolia	0.737	138	Luxembourg	0.934
90	Brunei	0.770	156	Iceland	0.975

Source

United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990

Notes

The Human Development Index is a statistical formulation designed to measure the deprivation suffered by 162 countries of the world in three basic variables: life expectancy (1988), literacy (1985) and real Gross Domestic Product per capita (1987).

Not included: Andorra, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, San Marino, Tonga, Tuvalu, Zanzibar.

Table 2.16: Illiteracy

The table shows the percentage of population above a certain age in selected microstates which was illiterate.

	Data Year	Age Group	% Illiterate
<u>Africa</u>			
Botswana	1971	15+	59.0
Cape Verde	1970	14+	63.1
Comoros	1980	15+	52.1
Equatorial Guinea	1980	15+	63.0
Guinea-Bissau	1979	15+	80.0
Mauritania	1976	6+	82.6
São Tomé	1981	15+	42.6
Seychelles	1971	15+	42.3
Swaziland	1976	15+	44.8
<u>Caribbean</u>			
Barbados	1970	15+	0.7
Belize	1970	15+	8.8
Dominica	1970	15+	5.9
Grenada	1970	15+	2.2
Guyana	1970	15+	8.4
St Kitts & Nevis	1970	15+	2.4
St Lucia	1970	15+	18.3
St Vincent	1970	15+	4.4
Suriname	1978	15-59	35.0
Trinidad	1970	15+	7.8
<u>South Pacific</u>			
Fiji	1976	15+	21.0
Tonga	1976	15+	0.4
Vanuatu	1979	15+	47.1
Western Samoa	1971	15+	2.2
<u>Asia</u>			
Bahrain	1971	15+	59.8
Brunei	1981	15+	22.2
Cyprus	1976	10+	11.0
Kuwait	1975	15+	40.4
Maldives	1977	15+	17.6
Qatar	1981	10+	48.9
UA Emirates	1975	15+	46.5

Source: U.N. Department of Economic and Social Development Statistical Office, *Statistical Yearbook 1988-89*, United Nations, New York, 1992

Table 3.01: Microstates' security relationships with foreign governments

Microstate	Formal security guarantees	Other defence cooperation	Foreign bases or use of facilities	Foreign garrisons assisting microstates	Foreign interveners
<u>Africa</u>					
Botswana		UK, US, USSR, China, India			
Cape Verde		Portugal			
Comoros	France '78 South Africa '80s	France, Tanzania	France	France South Africa Tanzania	Tanzania '75 France '85 South Africa '87 France '89
Congo	France '60, C.A.R., Chad, Gabon '61		Cuba	France	
Djibouti	France '77	France, Libya	France	France	
Equatorial Guinea	Morocco ca '79 Nigeria '87	France, Spain, China, Cuba, DPRK, Ethiopia/OAU, USSR	Cuba South Africa Spain USSR	Morocco	Spain '69 Nigeria '76 Morocco, Gabon '79 Morocco '86
Gabon	France '60, '74, C.A.R., Chad, Congo '61	France, FRG, US	France	France Morocco	France '62 '64

The Gambia	Senegal '65 ECOWAS '81 Senegal '81	China, France, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, UK, US	Senegal	Senegal '80 Senegal, UK '81
Guinea-Bissau		Cuba, France, Portugal, USSR		USSR '83
Lesotho				
Mauritania	France '61		France	France '61
Mauritius	UK '68	France, UK	UK, US	UK '68
São Tomé & Príncipe	Angola '78	Angola, Cuba, Mozambique, US	Angola	Angola, Guinea- Bissau '78
Seychelles		Algeria, China, France, India, Tanzania, UK, USSR	Tanzania, DPRK	Tanzania '77, '79, '81 Tanzania, France '82
Swaziland	South Africa '82	UK		
Zanzibar		China, Cuba, USSR		

Microstate	Formal security guarantees	Other defence cooperation	Foreign bases or use of facilities	Foreign garrisons assisting microstates	Foreign interveners
<u>Caribbean</u>					
Antigua & Barbuda	OECS '81, RSS '82	US	US		
Bahamas	Rio Treaty '82	UK, US	US		
Barbados	RSS '82	Trinidad, UK, US	Cuba, US, UK		
Belize	Bahamas, Barbados Canada, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad, UK '81	Canada, Jamaica, Panama, UK, US		UK	
Dominica	OECS '81, RSS '82	US			Barbados '81
Grenada	OECS '81, RSS '85	Canada, Chile, Cuba Czechoslovakia, DPRK GDR, UK, US, USSR		Cuba	US, OECS '83
Guyana		Brazil, Cuba, DPRK, US	Cuba		
St Kitts & Nevis	OECS '81, RSS '84	US			
St Lucia	OECS '81, RSS '82	US			Barbados '82
St Vincent	OECS '81, RSS '82	US			Barbados '79
Suriname		Brazil, Netherlands			
Trinidad	Rio Treaty '67	Barbados, Canada UK, US, Venezuela	US		UK, US, Venezuela '70

<i>Microstate</i>	<i>Formal security guarantees</i>	<i>Other defence cooperation</i>	<i>Foreign bases or use of facilities</i>	<i>Foreign garrisons assisting microstates</i>	<i>Foreign interveners</i>
<u>South Pacific</u>					
Fiji		Australia, NZ			Australia, NZ '87
Kiribati					
Marshall Islands	US '86		US		
FS Micronesia	US '86				
Nauru					
Solomon Islands		Australia, NZ			
Tonga		Australia, NZ			
Tuvalu					
Vanuatu		Australia, NZ			PNG, Australia '80 Australia, NZ '88
Western Samoa	[NZ '62]	Australia, NZ			

<i>Microstate</i>	<i>Formal security guarantees</i>	<i>Other defence cooperation</i>	<i>Foreign bases or use of facilities</i>	<i>Foreign garrisons assisting microstates</i>	<i>Foreign interveners</i>
<u>Asia</u>					
Bahrain	Saudi Arabia '81 GCC '81		US		
Bhutan	India '61	India			
Brunei Darussalam	UK '59, 83		Singapore	UK	UK '62
Cyprus	Greece, Turkey UK '59		UK	Greece, Turkey, UN	UK, Greece, Turkey '63 UNFICYP '64 Turkey '74 Egypt '78
Kuwait	UK '61				UK, Arab League '61 Saudi Arabia '73
Maldives	UK 1887		UK	India	UK '62, India '88
Mongolia	USSR '36				
Oman	Saudi Arabia '81 GCC '81	UK	UK, US	Iran, UK	UK, India, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, US, China, East Germany, South Yemen et al. '70s
Qatar	Saudi Arabia '81 GCC '81				
United Arab Emirates					

<i>Microstate</i>	<i>Formal security guarantees</i>	<i>Other defence cooperation</i>	<i>Foreign bases or use of facilities</i>	<i>Foreign garrisons assisting microstates</i>	<i>Foreign interveners</i>
<u>Europe</u>					
Andorra					
Iceland	NATO '49, US '51		NATO		
Liechtenstein					
Luxembourg	Belgium, France, Netherlands, UK '48 NATO '49, US '50		NATO		
Malta	UK '64, Italy '80, Libya '84		NATO, UK		Egypt '85
Monaco	France '18				
San Marino	[Italy '71]				

Notes

Individual cut-off dates mean that some similar agreements are not recorded, eg membership of the GCC and bilateral agreements with Saudi Arabia are noted for some Gulf microstates but not UAE because by 1981 it was no longer a microstate. If an agreement signed before a microstate's individual start-date continued in effect during the period studied then it is included in the table.




Figure 4.01: South-west Pacific




Figure 4.02: Vanuatu




Figure 5.01: Africa




Figure 5.02: The Gambia




Figure 6.01: Caribbean Basin




Figure 6.02: Grenada



Figure 7.01: Northern Indian Ocean




Figure 7.02: The Maldives

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Interviews

Vanuatu (November 1993)

Donald Kalpokas, veteran Vanuatu politician and co-founder of the New Hebrides Cultural Association
 Nikenike Vurobaravu, former Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Papua New Guinea (November 1993)

Brigadier-General Ted Diro (rtd), former commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force
 Col. Tony Huai (rtd), former Director of Land Operations, Papua New Guinea Defence Force

The Gambia (January 1995)

Sheriff Dibba, former Vice-President and leading opposition figure
 Adlai M'Boob, former Inspector-General of Police
 Swaebou Conateh, former Director of Broadcasting and Public Information
 Deyda Heydara, editor of *The Point* newspaper, Banjul
 Baboucar Gaye, Banjul journalist formerly of the *Senegambia Sun*, and BBC and *West Africa* stringer
 Halifah Sallah, member of the editorial committee of the *Foroyaa* (Freedom) newsletter
 Pap Secka, radical Banjul lawyer accused of involvement in the 1981 coup
 Moctar Kebbe, Senegalese High Commissioner to The Gambia

India (January 1994)

Arun Banerjee, former Indian High Commissioner to the Maldives
 Dr Manoj Singh, senior editor of the *Times of India*, New Delhi
 Shreedhar Rao, senior associate, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

graduates who considered the older generation of political leaders had achieved only nominal decolonization.²¹ As its strong showing in the 1976 election had demonstrated, the NJM was a significant threat to the governing party because it appealed to the same peasant grassroots section of the population that Gairy himself relied upon.²²

The two NJM precursors (Unison Whiteman's Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education and Liberation or JEWEL, and Bishop's Movement for Assemblies of the People or MAP) were originally non-ideological reformist movements, but after the NJM's failure in the 1973 general election the new movement began to take on a Leninist organizational structure. Although the NJM decided internally in 1975 to opt for Marxism, it did not have a correspondingly radical public image. Its leading figures, Bishop (a lawyer), Whiteman (an economist) and Bernard Coard (a university lecturer) were members of the professional class and regarded as well-intentioned young technocrats opposing the excesses of Gairyism. As official Leader of the Opposition, Bishop had a formal responsibility within the existing political system. After Coard joined the NJM in 1976, it became progressively more radical²³ and by the late 1970s was secretly gathering arms.

It has been alleged that the NJM's coup was prompted by an order from Gairy on 10 March 1979 for the arrest and liquidation of the party's leaders, several of whom had

²¹Keesing's, 29 June 1979; Maingot, "Cuba and the Commonwealth Caribbean...", p. 27-28

²²Manigat, Leslie, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", in Jorge Heine and Leslie Manigat (eds), *The Caribbean and World Politics*, Holmes and Meier, New York, 1988, p. 180

²³Manigat, "Grenada: revolutionary shockwave, crisis and intervention", p. 181; Shearman, Peter, "The Soviet Union and Grenada under the New Jewel Movement", *International Affairs*, Vol. 61, No 4, Autumn 1985, p. 664