THE BARBARIAN SOPHIST

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA'S STROMATEIS AND
THE SECOND SOPHISTIC

Stuart Rowley Thomson
Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford

A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Trinity 2014
ABSTRACT:

Clement of Alexandria, active in the second half of the second century AD, is one of the first Christian authors to explain and defend the nascent religion in the terms of Greek philosophy and in relation to Greek paideia. His major work, the Stromateis, is a lengthy commentary on the true gnostis of the Christian faith, with no apparent overarching structure or organisational principle, replete with quotations from biblical, Jewish, Greek ‘gnostic’ and Christian works of all genres.

This thesis seeks to read this complex and erudite text in conversation with what has been termed the ‘Second Sophistic’, the efflorescence of elite Greek literature under the Roman empire. We will examine the the text as a performance of authorial persona, competing in the agonistic marketplace of Greek paideia. Clement presents himself as a philosophical teacher in a diadoche from the apostles, arrogating to himself a kind of apostolic authority which appeals to both philosophical notions of intellectual credibility and Christian notions of the authentic handing down of tradition. We will also examine how the work engages key thematic concerns of the period, particularly discourses of intellectual eclecticism and ethnicity, challenging both Greek and Roman forms of hegemony to create a space for Christian identity.

Lastly, this thesis will critically examine the Stromateis’ intertextual relationship with the Homeric epics; the Iliad and the Odyssey are used as a testing ground for Christian self-positioning in relation to Greek culture as a whole. As we trace this variable relationship, we will also see the cross-fertilisation of reading strategies between Homer and the bible; these developing complex allegorical methods not only presage the rise of Neoplatonism, but also lay the foundations for changes in cultural authority which accompany the Christianisation of the Roman empire in the centuries after Clement.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Timotheo Whitmarsh et Marco Edwards professoribus, omnium eruditissimis, multas gratias ago, qui non solum de paideia docent, sed etiam eam operibus comprobant. si hic libellus quid veritatis exprimit, filius vel frater verba eorum habeat; sed quacumque erret, vitia cuncta mihi tribuantur.

familiae vero quattuor laudandae sunt; prima in qua natus et primum educatus sum. secunda, discipulorum magistrorumque societas, a qua proficiebam in sapientia aetate: non beneficia Scholae Grammaticae Trinitatis Sanctissimae, Collegii Sancti Pauli, et Collegii Corporis Christi praetermittam vel despiciam. tertiam, ecclesiam Dei commemoror, per quam alebar, fovebar, corroborabar, imprimis Domum Puseianam, sedem pietatis et doctrinae, quo fidem Catholicam didici. quattuor, uxori meae, quamquam haec verba non intellegit, etiam quantum debeam in verbis ego comprehendere non possim, gratias ago et laudem confero.

A.M.D.G.

S.R.T

2.vii.2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 2

PART I: LITERARY PERSONAE

1. Apostolic Authority: Reading and Writing Legitimacy in the *Stromateis* ................................. 54

2. ‘A Patchwork of Gnostic Notes’: Genre as Self-Definition ............................................................. 89

PART II: GREEKS AND BARBARIANS

3. Gathered into the One Race: the Christian Hybrid ......................................................................... 128

4. Cosmopolis: the Christian Athens and the New Jerusalem ............................................................. 159

5. The Trial Of Time: the Origins of Greek Wisdom ............................................................................ 185

PART III: THE CHRISTIAN HOMER

6. The Bible of the Greeks .................................................................................................................. 226

7. From Profane Epic to Catechism ..................................................................................................... 258

8. The Christian Odyssey ................................................................................................................... 282

POSTSCRIPT .................................................................................................................................................. 311

REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................. 319
INTRODUCTION

Clement of Alexandria’s *Stromateis* (at least, our version of Clement’s *Stromateis*; the first page has been lost)\(^1\) begins with an interrogation of the very notion of writing: ‘Should written compositions not be left behind – either at all, or only by some people?’\(^2\) It is difficult for an audience not to proceed to the implied query: should what we are reading have been written at all? We start in medias res; clearly, the dialogue the text proposes has a foregone conclusion: this is (obviously) a public work, bequeathed wholesale and openly to posterity.\(^3\) (Although we do not have the first page of the work: his concern for the dangers which a text might face out of the control of its author are well founded.) The pursuit of this question begins with a weighing up of kinds of writing:

\[
\text{γελοῖον μεντὰν εἴη τὴν τῶν σπουδαίων ἀποδοκιμάζοντα γραφὴν τοὺς μὴ τοιούτους ἀποδέχεσθαι συντάττοντας. ἀλλ' ἀρα Θεοπόμπῳ μὲν καὶ Τιμαίῳ μύθους καὶ βλασφημίας συντάττουσιν, πρὸς δὲ καὶ Ἐπικούρῳ ἀθεότητος κατάρχοντι, ἔτι δὲ Ἰππώνακτι καὶ Ἀρχιλόχῳ αἰσχρῶς ὀὕτως ἔπειτα.}
\]

\[
\text{ποτέρον δ’ οὐδ’ ὅλως ἢ τισὶ καταλειπτέον συγγράμματα;}
\]

Throughout the thesis, all translations are my own unless otherwise noted. In his translation, Ferguson (1991) 23 takes the dative as an indirect object, which is possible, but does not at all fit the context as the passage continues. This is the first full sentence – the very first words are a fragmentary quotation from Hermas, *Shepherd Visions* 5.4. The text as we have it begins on the second page of the manuscript; the first is missing. See Osborn (1959) 335.

\(^1\) The text survives in only two manuscripts, *Laurentianus 5.3* (‘L’), of the 11\(^{th}\) century, and *Paris. Suppl. Graec. 250*, which is a copy of L from the 16\(^{th}\) century. The first page of L is lost, and had already been at the time the second manuscript was copied, and a series of page numbers indicate that no more than one is missing. See Stählin Vol. 1 XL.

\(^2\) Str. 1.1.1.1: πότερον δ’ οὐδ’ ὅλως ἢ τισὶ καταλειπτέον συγγράμματα; Throughout the thesis, all translations are my own unless otherwise noted. In his translation, Ferguson (1991) 23 takes the dative as an indirect object, which is possible, but does not at all fit the context as the passage continues. This is the first full sentence – the very first words are a fragmentary quotation from Hermas, *Shepherd Visions* 5.4. The text as we have it begins on the second page of the manuscript; the first is missing. See Osborn (1959) 335.

\(^3\) At Str. 1.1.14.4, for instance, Clement quotes the Platonic *Ep. 2.314C*: «οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὰ γραφέντα μὴ οὐκ ἐκπεσεῖν» Writing by its very nature must be public; his carefulness in specifying that he is being obscure lest the work be read by the wrong reader in the wrong way show that it has been bequeathed ὅλως: e.g. 1.1.5.1-3; 1.1.14.3; 1.12.55; 4.2.4-4.2.7.
καταλείπειν. οἱ μὲν γε παῖδες σωμάτων, ψυχῆς δὲ ἐγγόνοι οἱ λόγοι. αὐτικά πατέρας τοὺς κατηχήσαντάς φαμεν...

At any rate, it would be comic, if we were to reject the writing of serious authors, to accept those who are quite a different sort of writer. Theopompus and Timaeus, who compose profane stories, and moreover Epicurus, the leading light of godlessness, and even Hipponax and Archilochus – must they be allowed to write so shamefully, while the one who heralds the truth must be prevented from leaving behind to succeeding generations something useful? I think it is a fine thing to bequeath good children to posterity. For there are children of the body; but words are the progeny of the soul. Indeed, we call those who teach us our fathers...

‘Serious’ authors are weighed up against their opposites: Theopompus and Timaeus were historians notorious for scurrility; Hipponax, a ribald poet of the sixth century; Archilochus, famous for his wit. This literary positioning firstly demarcates genres, separating out ἡ τῶν σπουδαίων γραφή, and it demarcates content, disavowing Epicureanism, with its denial of providence; like Christians, Epicureans were apt to be denounced as atheists, with the result that clear differentiation was imperative.

---

4 Str. 1.1.1-2.
5 Mentioned, for example, by Cornelius Nepos, who described them as ‘quidem duo maledicentissimi’ (Alc. 11; BNJ 115 T 267b); see Flower (1994) for a more sympathetic reading of the historian than is generally gleaned from reading of the ancient testimonia. Ferguson (1991) identifies Theopompus as a comic dramatist of the late fifth to early fourth centuries, however, and leaves Timaeus as an unknown.
6 This is Hipponax of Ephesus, rather than Hippon/Hipponax the philosopher of the fifth century from Samos (OCD s.v. ‘Hippon, also called Hipponax’; DK 38); although the latter was given the stock epithet ‘the atheist’ in antiquity, the former is mentioned as the inventor of the choliamb in the same breath as Archilochus at Str. 1.16.79.1. It is, of course, entirely possible that Clement has accidently conflated the two, but here it is clearly the poet’s role as writer of verse that is germane to Clement’s point.
7 ‘I motivi sono indicati nella negazione epicurea della provvidenza e nella divinizzazione del piacere.’ Dessi (1982) 402, speaking of the scholarly consensus on Clement’s rejection of Epicureanism – though Dessi goes on to present a more nuanced picture of Clement’s engagement with the philosophy.
8 Christianity and Epicureanism alike were often tarred as ἄθεος by Greek and Roman commentators; the locus classicus is Lucian’s Alexander, in which both groups are targeted by Alexander as ἄθεος. A desire to distance themselves from Epicureanism may be part of the underlying reason for the strong
Drawing lines around appropriate philosophical content happens at the level of inference as well. The language of τῶν σπουδαίων reminds us of Plato’s seventh epistle, in which serious men, concerned with the most serious subjects, will not commit their highest ideas to writing. Clement appropriately refers to the text here, in an *apologia* for writing. The *topos* that words are the children of the soul is drawn directly from Plato, *Phaedrus* 278a, in a similar contestation of the value of the written word. Writing here is defended as a form of procreation: words are children, and more (as Clement seems to elide writing with teaching) beget children of the soul. The etymological roots of *paideia* are exposed here: education as reaction against it. On the fortunes of Epicurus as an atheist, see Obbink (1989); for an exhaustive index of references to Epicurus’ *atheism*, see Winiarczyk (1984), updated by Winiarczyk (1992b). On ancient atheism in general, see Winiarczyk (1992a), more recently Bremmer (2007), and Whitmarsh (forthcoming).

9 It was the one form of philosophy from which Christians, following in the footsteps of Middle Platonic precursors, explicitly and consistently distanced themselves: e.g. Clement, *Protrep.* 5.665: Ἐπικούρου μὲν γὰρ μόνου καὶ ἑκὼν ἐκλήσομαι, ὃς οὐδὲν μέλειν ὁἴεται τῷ θεῷ, διὰ πάντων ἀσεβῶν. (‘Epicurus alone I shall willingly utterly forget, who thinks nothing is of concern to god, impious beyond all.’) The theme is common in Clement; see Dessi (1982) 402 n.3 for a list of references, and Lilla (1971) 41-51 for antagonism in Clement (and Justin Martyr) towards Epicureanism, with the Middle Platonic background. Cf. de Faye (1906) 163; Wagner (1902) 222; Tollinton (1914) 2.145. The actual use of Epicurean writing and thought by Christians, however, is a more complex picture – see Erler (2009) 160-3; at 161: ‘The Alexandrine theologians occasionally mix vehement polemics against Epicurus’ teachings with respect for his person.’ Occasionally Epicurean doctrines find favour even with Clement, such as the idea of *Prolepsis* at *Str.* 2.4.16.3; Epicurus is quoted favourably at 4.8.69-2-4; without acknowledgement, Clement also uses an Epicurean citation at 6.12.104.3. See also Dessi (1982).

10 *Ep.* 7.344c.

11 The Christian tradition here mirrors the Platonic: Jesus, like Socrates, never wrote (the closest is a finger in the dust in Jn. 8:1-11, itself a wandering pericope: see Barton and Muddiman (2001) *ad loc.*). In some sense the Christian insistence of the fulfillment of prophecy in Jesus’ life is an explanation for this lacuna: his story was already written. Here, however, Clement’s intertexts are entirely Platonic, even if he invokes in his Christian audience a reminiscence of the same dilemma in more specifically Christian terms.

12 δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον ὑπός γνησίους εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐὰν εὐθείας ἐνή, ἐπειτα εἰς τινες τούτου ἕγγον τε καὶ ἀδέλφων ἁμα ἐν ἄλλαισιν ἄλλων ψυχας κατ’ ἄξιαν ἐνέρωσαν. See also *Symposium* 209a-d and *Theaetetus* 150d.
the formation of children. Clement, as a reader of Plato, and therefore a student of Plato, claims descent from him. In building this picture of kinship, the text, assuming a shared education between author and audience, establishes its intellectual credibility. These demarcations of genre and philosophical positioning only make sense when the references are understood and appreciated.

Its presentation of these themes is, moreover, carefully artful. We start with a neatly promoted juxtaposition of γελοῖον and σπουδαίων. There is some ambiguity to γελοῖον here: if we did restrict ourselves to a literary diet of authors known for wit or outrageousness, it would be both ‘ridiculous’, but also in a more literal sense ‘causing laughter’.13 The delay of any negative language about the literature against which Clement defines his kind of writing leaves the possibility of both nuances of γελοῖον open, until βλασφημίας makes his negative judgment clear.

Moreover, by his promotion of γελοῖον at the outset, Clement may well be drawing a comparison between his opening and that of Hecataeus of Miletus, one of the earliest Greek historiographical authors, who begins: τάδε γράφω, ὃς μοι δοκεῖ ἠληθέα εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοὶ τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ώς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν.14 Hecataeus, the only prior historical authority Herodotus cites by name, is generally understood to be a rationalizing and systematizing historical author, critical of the Greek mythographical tradition.15 In this

13 This is primary meaning listed in LSJ.
14 BNJ 1f.1a (=Pseudo-Demetrios, De elocutione 12): ‘I write these things, as they seem to me to be true. For the tales of the Greeks are many and ridiculous, as they seem to me.’ (Trans. BNJ)
15 This is generally the modern consensus, evident particularly in BNJ F19, F26, F27, F30, and F35b; see Drews (1973) 61, and more recently Bertelli (2001) 76-94; see contra e.g. Nicolai (1997) especially at 154-5. See also Fowler (2001) on the relationship between Hecataeus and his poetic predecessors.
fragment, although it is directed towards an audience of Greeks, Hecataeus positions his own authorial voice in opposition to that of the Greeks.\footnote{Fowler (2001) 110-111.} Clement takes up the same stance, even more fiercely un-Greek, and thus foreshadows a re-reading of Greek intellectual traditions.

Not only does this passage demonstrate familiarity with Greek literature, it also shows the skill and wit with which the author can deploy his education; even if the very point is the appropriation and distanciation of that education. This is, after all, the same author who goes on to boast of how his ‘notebooks are well suited for elegant perusal [or ‘the subtlety of contemplation’]: the wealth of refined learning is like some kind of spice mixed in with an athlete’s food’.\footnote{harmazei de kai allwos th twn upoynematon upotypoiei to glafyron ths theorias, autika kai h ths chrestomathias periusia oion hdromata ti estin parapepleymenoan athltov brwmata... Str. 1.1.16.1.} Interestingly, it with almost exactly the same metaphor that Lucian opens his \textit{Verae historiae} (Ἀληθῆ διηγήματα): the variation which the athlete craves, writes Lucian, is provided not just by entertaining stories, but by learned play with received literature.\footnote{Verae historiae 1.1-2.}

There is a similar dichotomy between what is \textit{spoudais} and what is \textit{not}.\footnote{The contrast is also apparent in Xenophon, \textit{Symposium} 1.1, which promotes the value of watching great men not only in their serious deeds (ἔργα τα μετὰ σπουδῆς πραττόμενα), but in their play (τα ἐν ταις παιδιαις), but still contrasts this with the buffoonery (with repeated cognates of γέλοιος) of Phillip in 1.11-15; see Huss (1999) on the combination of the two principles.} In Lucian’s case, it is his own work which is respite from that which is serious, although he is quick to point out it does not limit itself to entertainment, but also gives rise to learned thought.\footnote{Verae historiae 1.2: ἃ μὴ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ ἀστείου τε καὶ χαριντος ψιλὴν παρέξει τὴν ψυχαγωγίαν, ἀλλὰ τινα καὶ θεωρίαν οὐκ ἄμουσον ἐπιδείεται...}

In Clement, these literary themes are subsumed into the language of familial identity; these words are the children of Clement (ψυχῆς δὲ ἓγγονοι οἱ λόγοι), words themselves which, as
we noted above, are the descendents of Plato.\textsuperscript{21} By reading them, Clement’s paternity is extended over us as well: if ‘we call those who teach us our fathers’,\textsuperscript{22} then as our author/teacher, we surely must call Clement our father? We take on a new set of social roles, a new identity, simply by reading what Clement has written. By foregrounding to the reader his or her own role as a reader, and (as we shall see) by constructing the text in such a way as to encourage consciousness of the active role of the reader in decoding the text, Clement ensures that we put our identities on the line when engaging with his words; we cannot avoid refashioning ourselves around the text when we read the \textit{Stromateis}.

\textbf{READING CLEMENT (I)}

Concern with writing mirrors concern for reading; and this is a thesis about reading. It is firstly a particular reading of Clement of Alexandria’s \textit{Stromateis}. It is also about Clement’s reading of his tradition, Jewish, Christian and Greek. More, it is about how Clement encourages, exhorts, steers, the readers of his \textit{Stromateis} to read; he is anxious about how we read his own words, but even more about how we read the traditions behind him, and behind all these words, how we read the ultimate \textit{Logos}, the Word of God. It requires reading in more creative, disruptive ways than patristic literature is usually read – about digging out however much we can from this challenging and disruptive text, and sifting the value of those readings.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Le. Phaedrus} 278a.

\textsuperscript{22} 1.1.1.2: πατέρας τοὺς κατηχήσαντάς φαμεν. On this as the common form of address for pedagogue-instructors, see van den Hoek (1997) 63-4, especially n.24. The title in Latin was probably \textit{papas}: see Juvenal 6.633 and the \textit{OLD} s.v. ‘papas’.
Clement is just as voluble about how we should read as he is about how he should write; time and time again he worries and frets to his audience about their reading. Sometimes his awareness of the multiplicity or varied depth of meanings in texts can seem almost postmodern:

πάντες μὲν οὖν δοσὶ ταῖς δύσει κεχρήμεθα, θεωρούμεν τὰ προσπίπτοντα αὐταῖς, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλων ἑνεκα. αὐτίκα οὖχ ὁμοίως θεωρεῖ τὸ πρόβατον ὁ μάγειρός τε καὶ ὁ ποιημέν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ εἰ πῖόν ἐστι πολυπραγμονεῖ, ὃ δὲ εἰς εὐγένειαν τηρεῖ. τὸ γάλα τοῦ προβάτου ὃ μὲν τις ἄμελξάτω, εἰ χρῆτι τροφῆς, τὸν μᾶλλον κειράτω, εἰ σκέπης δεῖται. ὃδὲ μοι καὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς χρηστομαθίας ὁ καρπὸς προχωρεῖτω. 24

So all of us who use our eyes see what happens to pass in front of them, but different people see only so far as different things. For example, the cook and the shepherd do not see the sheep in the same way; for the one is concerned whether it is fat, whereas the other observes its breeding. If someone needs nourishment, let him drink the milk of the sheep; if he lacks clothing, then let him shear it. Let the fruit of Greek learning proceed thus for me.

It is ambiguous whether the Stromateis or Greek literature is Clement’s metaphorical sheep: that is, whether he will present the positive evaluations he himself has drawn from Greek literature, or whether he is presenting the fruit of Greek learning for his audience to draw on in whatever way is needful for them: the key term is χρηστομαθία, which refers to both the desire for learning itself, as well as the literary texts in which such learning is embedded, and such desire sated or aroused. 25 This ambiguity merely serves to underline its key point of multiplicity of interpretation: either way, the analogy revolves around the possibility of

23 This worry over reading-lists remains a constant tension for Christian authors, particular the more erudite. Augustine’s regrets over too much Vergil (Conf. 1.13.20) and Jerome’s dream in which he is accused of being a Ciceronian rather than a Christian (Ep. 22.30) are the two most famous Latin examples; but Gregory Thaumaturgus’ Panegyric on Origen 14 highlight the same problematics.

24 Str. 1.1.17.1–2.

25 LSJ s.v. χρηστομαθία; e.g. the Χρηστομαθία γραμματική of Proclus. Eusebius uses the word itself to describe the Stromateis itself at Historia ecclesiastica (henceforth HE) 6.13.8.
multiple valid and positive readings of Greek learning. Literature is by its very nature multivalent.

Elsewhere, Clement is more concerned that his audience should grasp the one truth hidden among those manifold possibilities, and less sure of the validity of multiple readings. In this vein, careful reading is described as looking for the nut hidden in its shell, or seeking the true face behind a mask.\(^{26}\) In each of these analogies Clement uses, the hiding of the truth is just as important as the seeking of it: a reader’s own intellectual resources must be used to their capacities before intellectual support should be accepted or given: ἀπορίᾳ γὰρ ἐπαρκεῖν δίκαιον, ἀργίαν δὲ ἐφοδιάζειν οὐ καλὸν.\(^{27}\) The process of seeking for the truth is the activity which renders a reader capable of receiving it.\(^{28}\) Clement’s theorisation of the relationship between author and audience, reader and writer, makes heavy demands on both parties.

Reading and writing, as Jonathan Boyarin has noted, ‘unlike the speed of light, are hardly constant at all times and places.’\(^{29}\) Both practices are embedded in particular cultures, relationships, and social conventions. The *Stromateis* lies on a fault-line of cultures of reading and writing on a number of planes. Firstly, there is the intersection of (traditional, though not static) Greek and (developing) early Christian practices of reading and writing: Christian practices which themselves are liminal, between Jewish and Hellenistic worlds.\(^{30}\) On another level, literate Christian cultures, which, although differing in many respects, all place so

---

\(^{26}\) Str. 1.1.18.1; 2.1.3.5; on the latter passage, see below Chapter 3, 146-51.

\(^{27}\) Str. 1.1.10.3; ‘For it is right to ward off difficulty; but it is not good to sustain laziness.’ (Omitting [οὐ] with Stählin, following Potter.)

\(^{28}\) 2.6.25.4-26.1.

\(^{29}\) Boyarin (1993) 1. See also Chapter 1 (‘Reading as a Sociocultural System’) in Johnson (2010).

much emphasis on the written word and its central place in communal identity, are notable for the interaction they evince between social strata which are normally more sharply differentiated by modes of literacy;\textsuperscript{31} it is with pride that second-century Christians put forward their claim that, in contradistinction to other philosophical schools, even the illiterate and women may become true Christian philosophers.\textsuperscript{32}

This thesis, then, is an attempt to read one particular work as a unique response to a particular intersection of contexts – Greek, Jewish, Alexandrian, ‘Sophistic’, as well as Christian. Clement’s particular response at this intersection, however, should not be read merely as a single or idiosyncratic voice crying in the wilderness, but as an articulation and construction of the nascent Christian community; although variegated in many respects, one of the defining features of Christian communities was that they did see themselves, though scattered throughout the world, as one body.\textsuperscript{33} This particular stepping stone is one of many

\textsuperscript{31} This also stands in contrast to the Jewish position: Rabbinic debate regarding access to sacred texts and the status which such familiarity might impart can be seen in the Talmud, b.Sanh. 58a: a first viewpoint claims that gentiles who read the Torah deserve death; the rejoinder claims that the heathen who reads the Talmud is ‘as a High Priest’. Either argument, however, assumes the exceptionality of such a gentile, and still restricts the status of ‘as a High Priest’ to those sufficiently educated enough to read the Torah.

\textsuperscript{32} E.g. Str. 4.8.58.3-59.1: ἔξεστι γὰρ τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς πολιτευομένῳ καὶ ἄνευ γραμμάτων φιλοσοφεῖν, κἂν βάρβαρος ἢ κἂν Ἑλλην κἂν δοῦλος κἂν γέρων κἂν παιδίον κἂν γυνὴ· κοινὴ γὰρ ἀπάντων τῶν ἄνθρωπων τῶν ἔλεγμένων ὡς ἐμφανεῖται θ’ ἡμῖν τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν κατὰ γένος ἐκαστὸν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἑκάστην ἀρετὴν. (‘For it is possible for one living as a citizen according to our way of life and without learning to engage in philosophy, whether barbarian or Greek, whether slave or old man, or boy, or woman. For self-control is common to all people who choose it; and we admit that the same nature is constant according to each race, and the same virtue.’) Cf. Paedagogus 1.4.10.1-2 and Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 3.4.2. On Clement’s attitude towards the equality of women as regards potential study of philosophy and attainment of moral virtue, alongside his view of their inherent weaknesses, see Kinder (1990).

\textsuperscript{33} This is embedded in foundational biblical texts: e.g. 1 Cor. 12:12-27; Rom. 12:4-5. See Lieu (2004) and Perkins (2009) for broader discussion of unified Christian identity.
on the way to the development of a Christian antiquity which looked markedly different to its pagan predecessor.

Guy Stroumsa, charting the longue durée development of Christianity over its first four centuries, speaks of the ‘hermeneutical revolution’ of a new Christian paideia developing over this period as ‘perhaps the most decisive single step toward the formation of European culture’. This Christian hermeneutical revolution not only established a new literary canon, a double helix, in Stroumsa’s metaphor, of the Bible and Classical literature, but it managed to do it on the basis of new sophisticated reading strategies which insisted on the reading of texts being ethically performative: reading must make one better.

Clement’s Stromateis is one of our earliest extant witnesses to the process of building up this new paideia – a storehouse of things both new and old, Jewish, Christian and pagan – all put to the purpose of building a coherent Christian identity within a Greek intellectual milieu. Reading the Stromateis as a point along the journey of an intellectual history is not necessarily to read it teleologically, however; it also presents what might have been, potentials that could have been developed but were not.

Clement is, to give one example of the road not taken, an outlier in the relationship he presents between institutional ecclesiastical authority and intellectual authority. In him we see the possibility of a Christian continuation of the Greco-Roman distinction between the administrators and practitioners of religious rites and institutions on the one hand, and the

35 Stroumsa (1999).
interpreters of sacred texts and religious meanings on the other. Greco-Roman religion tended to separate out the theoretical aspects of discussing the divine, i.e. philosophy, from the rites and rituals of religious observance – sacrifice and performance of cultic duties; by the third century these aspects at least in Christianity, are combined in the episcopal office.

The form of the work itself is particularly receptive to this kind of analysis; there is no central narrative, no definite conclusion – even almost serendipitously in keeping with its general style, a lost beginning, leaving us with a text which starts with an unframed question. The way in which the text jumps from subject to subject is not quite encyclopedic, but rather miscellanistic. As a genre, miscellany tends towards the provision of resources, but deliberately withholds, or plays with, their classification and organisation. The Stromateis contains in embryo both what becomes Orthodox Christian doctrine, but also the potential for other Christianities and other futures. Thus it is a work that is not merely a significant point on a linear journey; it is an intersection, with many roads converging from different cultural strands feeding into early Christianity, and many paths leading out.

The traditional kinds of questions asked by theologians and patrologists about Clement and his writing – theological and philosophical – will receive relatively little coverage in this thesis. Our focus will be instead literary and contextual: what has been largely neglected hitherto is reading of the text as literature in the context of the second century. Despite the call from Munck (in 1933) to work with ‘der gleichzeitigen Parallelen, der Aussagen des

36 Although there are exceptions – Pythagorean communities seem to have combined the two, as did mystery cults in general, although even then there was separate philosophical explanation of the religious rites.
Klemens über sein Werk, des Stoffes und der Form, most scholarship on the Stromateis has tended to concentrate on the content, isolated from its literary context. Clement is either mined for systematic doctrine or his sources. This thesis will approach the text from the angle of its literary position within the Second Sophistic, recognizing that it has a place within the complex literary and cultural debates that mark the era and are much broader than just the emergence of Christianity.

THE SECOND SOPHISTIC

Clement writes in the midst of the effusive production of Greek literature in the milieu now commonly called the ‘Second Sophistic’. This is, roughly speaking, elite Greek culture under the Roman Empire from the first to third centuries – a period which has received a great deal of scholarly attention over the past thirty years. This attention has been of two broad types, historical and literary – though most studies have combined these two strands in differing proportions. Imperial Greek literature has shed an older reputation as second-rate, unoriginal, derivative pulp, to occupy a privileged position as the playful, intertextual, highly intellectual and creative forerunner of postmodernism. In broad terms, the key themes and features of this kind of literature are a concern for linguistic purity, usually in the form of almost hyper-Atticized Greek and a focus on rhetorical performance, particularly extempore epideictic rhetoric. Culturally, this literature pivots around the

37 Munck (1933) 6.
39 See the Preface in Anderson (1993) ix-x: ‘But literary and historical activities of sophists have tended to be treated as though they belong to separable domains of ‘Greek literature’ and ‘Roman history’...’
negotiation between Greek and Roman identity and power, with the concept of *paideia*, culture or education, as the hinge. This immensely important property was wielded like a weapon or spent like currency by the elite sophists,\textsuperscript{41} and traded in, on a smaller scale, by the penumbra of the *pepaideumenoi* (cultured elite) surrounding them.\textsuperscript{42}

The near-self-parodying 1964 oration of Bernard van Groningen on ‘General literary tendencies of the second century AD’ provides a useful yardstick to measure how much attitudes scholarly attitudes have changed to this field over recent decades.\textsuperscript{43} ‘The Greek of the second century’, van Groningen states, ‘eschews effort; he prefers to move in a fictive reality and tries to compensate the inner poverty by external frippery... Spontaneity is killed, and the intellect which dissipates its strength on worthless objects, loses its energy.’\textsuperscript{44} Glen Bowersock’s influential 1969 *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* opens by referring the reader to van Groningen as proof of the lack of literary value of the period.\textsuperscript{45} The time for a swing of the pendulum had clearly arrived.

By 2001, Tim Whitmarsh could begin the first chapter of *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire* by holding van Groningen’s lecture up for ridicule as ‘a blunt, historically insensitive, and occasionally incoherent diatribe’, and giving a litany of recent scholarship which appreciates

\textsuperscript{41} Part of the dispute over the term Second Sophistic (see below, pp. 16-17) is the question of who actually counts as a ‘Sophist’; it is important to keep in mind that it is generally employed as a derogatory term, and none of those in Philostratus’ *Vitae sophistarum* actually describes himself as a Sophist. On the difficulties of the terminology, see Puech (2002) 5, 15-20; and passim for prosopographical information on those with the greatest claim to be called ‘sophists’.


\textsuperscript{43} van Groningen (1965).

\textsuperscript{44} van Groningen (1965) 54-5.

\textsuperscript{45} Bowersock (1969) 1 n.1.
the literature of the second century as ‘products of literary ingenuity and sophistication’.\textsuperscript{46} The Second Sophistic has thus become one of the trendier areas of classical research \textit{du jour}, in terms both of volume of academic publishing, and of the readiness with which various branches of post-modern literary and critical theory have been applied to the literature of the period.

Despite this recent popularity, the title ‘Second Sophistic’ itself requires a degree of interrogation – its terms of reference are more than somewhat ambiguous, and application of the term is notoriously haphazard. Whitmarsh cautions that there exists ‘no strong consensus among modern scholars as to what the Second Sophistic is, beyond a vague sense that it is localized in the Greek culture of the first three centuries CE’.\textsuperscript{47} The term itself derives from Philostratus’ \textit{Vitae Sophistarum}, first applied to a style of oratory developed in the fourth-century by Aeschines, in which speeches were delivered in the character of historical figures.\textsuperscript{48} Philostratus goes on to characterise the Roman period as the high point of the cultivation of this style of presentation, with its practitioners enumerated by Philostratus in his series of short biographies.

\textsuperscript{46} Whitmarsh (2001) 41-42.
\textsuperscript{47} Whitmarsh (2005) 4.
\textsuperscript{48} VS 481 (cf. also 507): \textit{ἡ} μὲν δὴ \textit{ἀρχαία} σοφιστικὴ καὶ \textit{τὰ} φιλοσοφουμένα \textit{ὑποτιθεμένη} \textit{διή} \textit{αὐτὰ} \textit{ἀποτάδην} καὶ \textit{ἐς} \textit{μῆκος}, \textit{διελέγετο} \textit{μὲν} \textit{γάρ} \textit{περί} \textit{ἀνδρείας}, \textit{διελέγετο} \textit{δὲ} \textit{περὶ} \textit{δικαιότητος}, \textit{ηρώων} \textit{τε} \textit{πέρι} \textit{καὶ} \textit{θεῶν} καὶ \textit{ὅπη} \textit{ἀπεσχημάτισται} \textit{ἡ} \textit{idéa} \textit{τοῦ} \textit{κόσμου}. \textit{ἡ} \textit{δὲ} \textit{μετ′} \textit{ἐκείνη}, \textit{ἡ} \textit{οὐχὶ} νέαν, \textit{ἀρχαία} \textit{γάρ}, \textit{δευτέρα} \textit{δὲ} \textit{μᾶλλον} \textit{προσρητέον}, \textit{τοὺς} \textit{πένητας} \textit{ὑπετυπώσατο} καὶ \textit{τοὺς} \textit{πλουσίους} καὶ \textit{τοὺς} \textit{ἀριστέας} καὶ \textit{τοὺς} \textit{τυράννους} καὶ \textit{τὰς} \textit{ἐς} \textit{ὄνομα} \textit{ὑποθέσεις}, \textit{ἐφ} \textit{ἃς} \textit{ἡ} \textit{ἱστορία} \textit{ἄγει}. (‘On the one hand, the ancient sophistic, even when it suggested philosophical subjects, discussed them prolixly and at length; for there was discussion about courage, discussion about justice, about both heroes and gods, and how the form of the universe has been shaped. On the other hand, the one that followed after that, which must not be called new, for it is old, but rather second, sketched the poor and the rich, both the good and tyrants, and performances in \textit{persona}, towards which historical enquiry leads.’) On the meaning of \textit{τὰς} \textit{ἐς} \textit{ὄνομα} \textit{ὑποθέσεις} see Whitmarsh (2001) 42 n.12, whose conclusion I am inclined to follow.
From this seed the use of the term ‘Second Sophistic’ has grown. At its broadest it has come to be used as a periodization, delineating both Greek literature and culture of roughly the first to third centuries AD; at its narrowest, it is applied more closely to the epideictic oratory of that period, following the lead given by Philostratus. It must be noted, however, that even ‘canonical’ Second Sophistic authors (that is, those mentioned by Philostratus) wrote in a wide variety of genres beyond the oratorical: historiography, tragedy, and even epic. And the ambit of what has been analysed and interpreted within the frame of the Second Sophistics has widened to the Greek novels, and even to authors who seem almost intrinsically non-Sophistic, such as Galen.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to define precisely what the term ‘Second Sophistic’ should mean; as with any heuristic term, the proof is really in the pudding – whether it elucidates or obfuscates the literature under examination. Whitmarsh is quick to point out its dangers as a paradigm, and its potential to serve as a cover for intellectual onanism of the academy:

...we should at least be aware that ‘the Second Sophistic’ is a construction of modern scholarship, formed under the disciplinary influences of the modern academy, and in no sense a translucent window onto the ‘real’ practices of the ancient world.

Whitmarsh is, though, perhaps too quick to disavow the reality of a definable culture and set of practices that ancients, as well as moderns, might have recognised as a functional whole, if not always a coherent one. I will be taking the term, therefore, as a catch-all for Greek

---

50 See Elsner (2009); on poetry in the Second Sophistic, see Bowie (1989).
51 von Staden (1997); although Galen had already been given a chapter in Bowersock (1969) 59-75.
52 Whitmarsh (2001) 43.
literary and intellectual culture around the time of Clement, built on a largely shared and stable educational curriculum, and finding its most most striking voice in epideictic oratory. I am also appropriating the term because of its background in recent scholarship, with its professed tendency to see literary and cultural historical study entwined.

We could, perhaps, talk about a ‘Sophistic spectrum’: on the literary axis, from show-piece rhetorical performances based around an Atticised literary Greek past at one end, and blurring out into almost all other literary forms as we go towards the other end; and on a cultural axis, from the Empire-wide performance politics of the elite orators and canonical Philostratean Sophists, to the activities of minor elites (those with at least enough education to participate in literary culture) on the edges of the Empire whom we see negotiating Greekness, Roman-ness, and other fissures of identity through their inscriptions. What draws them together on the same spectrum is a concern with language as a way to navigate the realities of a trans-cultural Roman empire, and the value of speech (at its most formal, speeches) to present and create identity.

A ‘CHRISTIAN’ SOPHISTIC?

The expansion of the field of ‘Second Sophistic’ studies, however, has until the last decade been almost hermetically sealed within a non-religious casing. This is one aspect of van Groningen’s legacy which endured remarkably well; his approach is brief and pointed: ‘There is hardly any purely religious literature.’ He refers to Plutarch, Numenius, Lucian, and finally Philostratus’ Apollonius, whose ‘gospel’ he describes (quoting A.D. Nock) as
‘intellectual bankruptcy’. But not a mention of any other gospel or its adherents. Although Tim Whitmarsh identifies ‘the removal of some of the hysteria surrounding the historiography of the early church’ as one of the developments helping to shape the debates over the Second Sophistic in recent times, neither his influential Greek Literature and the Roman Empire of 2001, nor his more general survey of 2005, The Second Sophistic, makes reference to a single Christian author. Only 9 pages out of 246 in Graham Anderson’s The Second Sophistic (1993) are devoted to Christian authors, and only three of them to pre-Constantinian writing.

The essentialism of a diverse, inclusive, democratic, Hellenism versus a foreign, authoritarian Christianity still provides the boundaries for assessing literature written by early Christians in the eyes of many scholars. Recent debates over Christianity supposedly bringing about the death of ‘dialogue’ (or ‘the dialogue’ or ‘dialogism’, possibly) simply replay a traditional theme. Christian authors, by and large, have thus continued to be excluded from analysis and discussion of the literary trends of this era: the remarkable rise of Christianity as a phenomenon in the second and third centuries, even amongst literate cultural elites, is often totally ignored as far as literary studies go.

This is perhaps where Whitmarsh’s suspicion of the concept of the ‘Second Sophistic’ is actually most useful; ‘scholars...’ he warns, ‘have a habit of finding themselves in the Second

---

56 Anderson (1993) 206-8: the pre-Constantinian authors mentioned are St. Paul, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian.  
Sophistic. Specifically, Whitmarsh is talking about the engagement of scholars working from the post-structuralist tradition:

For scholars working in this field, theatricality, performance, playfulness, and elusiveness have become indicators not of debased values but of a flourishing, energized culture reflecting actively, if giddily, on its own heritage. Here it is not modernity so much as postmodernism that is mirrored in accounts of the Second Sophistic, now the haunt of knowing, arch hyperintellectuals.

This is no bad thing; after all, at some level, the relevance of classical studies to the modern academy and world at large must rest on its continued power to provoke reflection, engage our interest, and challenge our ways of thinking. Goldhill’s introduction to Being Greek under Rome is quite open about the contemporary interest and implication of this engagement and its potential value for the modern world: ‘It is our hazard that there is still much to be learnt about cultural identity from the writing of the Mother of Empires.’

Given, however, the anti-authoritarian, academically iconoclastic, background of post-structuralism, and of the contemporary academy more generally, it is no wonder, then, that early Christian literature gets short shrift from most scholars of the Second Sophistic. The very fact that the study of a great deal of early Christian literature is placed under the exclusively gendered title of ‘Patristics’ is enough to produce a lowering of the academic temperature; not to mention the historically ambiguous and fraught relationships between

---

60 Williams (2005) has been particularly influential on my thinking here.
61 Goldhill (2001a) 25.
the disciplines of Classics and Theology generally. So until relatively recently, early Christian literature has either been ignored by those Classicists working in the Second Sophistic, or (even in relatively positive accounts) juxtaposed to the playfulness and flair of its pagan counterparts.

Thus Simon Goldhill’s own chapter in Being Greek, ‘The erotic eye’, balances the Greek novel against Clement of Alexandria’s Proptrepticus: ‘[In Heliodorus], as in Achilles Tatius, the scientific knowledge of how the eye works is fully integral to the ludic and collusive deceptions of erotic narrative.’ In Clement?

Even this bare allowance of some praise for art’s skill, however, will turn out to be a foil for a further damning attack on the content of art’s imagery…. The attraction of art [according to Clement] is a seduction towards loss of control. So, don’t look now. The goal of early Christian writers in this view is to simplify, clarify, and short-circuit the unavoidably cultural complexity of the Second Sophistic, although having to engage with it at some level. If (in the terms of this example) sight and the erotic gaze are the area of challenge, crisis and identity problematics, it seems that the Christian response is to pluck out the eye (cf. Mark 9:47). This kind of response is mostly implied to be squarely opposed to the goals and aims of both the modern scholar and the true ‘arch hyperintellectual’

---

62 Classics, just as Philosophy, has often bridled at being relegated to the position of Theology’s mere handmaid. See Goldhill (2011) Part 3 for some of these problematics as they played out in Victorian England.

63 For these recent, more positive, developments, see below pp. 27-9.

64 Goldhill (2001b) 172.

65 Goldhill (2001b) 174, 175.
exemplars of the Second Sophistic valorized by them. In shorthand form: in the Greek novel, scholarship examines ludic textual complexities; in Clement and Tertullian, it instead decodes embedded textual strategies of oppression.

Part of the broader argument of this thesis is to apply a hermeneutic of suspicion to readings which conform to a narrative of ludic pagans and oppressive Christians and take this contrast as both their starting point and their conclusion. Indeed, if we look closer at this passage from the Protrepticus, we in fact discover that it is not Christian repression of pagan play, but an extension of a Greek philosophical argument against the traditional depiction of the gods. It is utilised in this protreptic form of literature to flag its intellectual and generic positioning as philosophy; far from repressing Greek literary flair, the argument is designed to appeal to the literary, philosophical and artistic sensibilities of an elite reader.

Moreover, despite its overt rejection of the artistic depictions of immorality, the catalogue of statues in Protrepticus chapter 4 reads like a cross between a particularly juicy set of ecphrasis and a scurrilous version of the lives of the ancient artists: it requires readers to be familiar with pagan iconography, and encourages them both to construct the statues in their mind’s eye and be amused by their accompanying anecdotes. The distinctions Goldhill draws are real; but they are not distinctions between pagans and Christians, but between different styles of literature and generic expectations.

---

67 This argument is made more fully below, Chapter 6, pp. 247-58.
68 On the complexity of Jewish responses to a world full of idols, with some Christian parallels, see Neis (2013) 170-201. On generic expectations, see below, Chapter 2.
This is not a problem of approach that has its sole home in Classics departments, however. Some of the most energetic theological authors on early Christianity, especially those most widely read across disciplinary boundaries, have themselves come out of post-structuralist traditions. Often they are concerned with exposing a patriarchal manipulation of power inherent in the incipient Christian Catholic tradition, often in contrast to more liberal, open, egalitarian christianities, repressed by the conformist orthodox patriarchy. Again, as with Classics, this is situation that is gradually changing, particularly as the relationship between Greco-Roman philosophy and the development of early Christian thought has been more carefully explored not simply as the pressure of an outside force on an original gospel, but as an integral part of the culture in which Christianity and Judaism existed. Nonetheless, there is still a clear oppositional construct still operative in much scholarship on early Christianity.

Some of the more important figures in this camp are the biblical scholar Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, and on early Christian literature, Elaine Pagels and Denise Kimber Buell. The explicit goals of a number of these works, and implicit in many more, are in the realm of ecclesiastical politics, over issues of gender and sexuality. This work is excellent and incisive scholarship, particularly when read against the genuinely repressive discourses it has sought to challenge. But this trend, particularly in its focus on issues of gender and inclusivity, has contributed to a approach to early Christian literature that sees it mostly through a lens of oppression and occlusion; most of all, it prevents early Christian writing

---

69 I am ventriloquising, but not caricaturing; see Williams (2005).
70 See, for example, the work on Stoicism and early Christianity in Engberg-Pedersen (2000), Thorsteinsson (2010a), and Rasimus, Engberg-Pedersen and Dunderberg (2010).
71 See the illuminating remarks in Buell (2005) xii-xiii.
being read as possessing the same kind of literary qualities we read into other second-century authors.

On the other hand, more traditional patrologists have often ignored writers on the Second Sophistic because literary concerns are seen as irrelevant to the philosophical and theological core of their work. An implicit chasm between Greco-Roman culture and literature, and Christian culture and literature has underpinned this mutual neglect. Study of early Christian literature has often been kept to the traditional concerns of theology, within the bounds of a narrative which looks towards the doctrinal struggles of the great councils of the fourth century.\(^{72}\) Rebecca Lyman has identified the problematics of this traditional drift of patristic scholarship, and is worth quoting at length:

> First, we commonly contrast a diffuse and tolerant Roman Hellenism to an exclusive Christianity characterized through the attributes of later ‘orthodoxy.’ Second, by using essentialized definitions of ‘Judaism,’ ‘Roman Hellenism,’ and ‘Christianity,’ we often set religious identity in late antiquity apart from the surrounding common culture as well as from other contemporary beliefs. Finally, ‘Christianity’ defined as ‘orthodoxy’ rests uncomfortably on a history of inner conflict and persistent multiplicity.\(^{73}\)

Lyman’s recognition and direct challenge to these shortcomings sets out part of the scholarly challenge this thesis is attempting to take up, following the lead of a number of more recent books and articles (discussed below) which have placed Christian and pagan authors in the same frame.

---

\(^{72}\) See, for instance, the standard patrologies of Quasten and Di Berardino (1984-88), Altaner (1960), Moreschini and Norelli (2005) and Drobner (2007).

\(^{73}\) Lyman (2003) 211.
This thesis will thus attempt to read Clement not as a contrast, but as a parallel, to his non-Christian contemporaries. It may well be that Clement is an exceptional author in this regard, and that, in fact, Christianity is and should be seem as the ‘other’ (repressive, dialogue-destroying, monologic) to the play, openness, and complexity of the ‘real’ literature of the period: but I do not think so. Just as the later violent Christian suppression of heresy has parallels and roots in Roman oppression of Christians and Jews, so the complexity and multi-layered artistry of the Second Sophistic has its Christian exemplars. This one case study is proffered as an example of trying to read early Christian literature with new eyes. What Whitmarsh sees as problems with the paradigm of the Second Sophistic are in fact its strength as a heuristic tool in this context. He bids us be conscious of two tendencies which this modern construct has imparted to study in the field: first, applying a term originally descriptive of a (Greek) literary genre to a whole historical period leads to the construction of a binary which pits the entwined pairs of Greek culture and Roman power against one another. Secondly, embedding the word ‘second’ in such a term identifies the period in an essential way with lateness and derivativeness, taken up in either a negative or a positive way – but in either case, underplaying originality, and disregard for or objection to the past.

When reading early Christian literature, on the former objection, the division of a ‘Greco-Roman’ world of early Christianity into fissured Greek and Roman identities is a useful check on a field that has often seen its terrain through the lens of its own Jewish/Greco-Roman dichotomy.74 ‘quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis?’ asks Tertullian; even though he asks in Latin, the distance between Rome (or Carthage) and Athens can almost go unnoticed. Christian construction of identity is neither a monolithic construction in itself, nor is it a

74 See, for example, Young (1999) 81.
construction built in the context of a monolithic Greco-Roman culture. That Christians are participants in this dynamic process, in which ‘Greek’ and ‘Roman’ can be fluid terms,\(^{75}\) and not just the Other to Christianity, is not surprising.\(^{76}\)

In common with other key authors of the Second Sophistic, some of the most prominent second-century Christian authors are from marginal parts of the empire; Tatian from Syria, Justin Martyr from Samaria, just as Lucian hails from Syria, Dio Chrysostom from Bithynia, and Favorinus from Gaul.\(^{77}\) A Christian presenting his new religion to ‘the Greco-Roman world’ \textit{simpliciter} is a chimera:\(^{78}\) both in the sense of fictionality, but also in the sense of a chimerical construct, stitched together from a variety of disparate, clashing, competing limbs of cultural, ethnic and political identity. In reality, the process of constructing Christianity goes on in a world already full of fractured identities.\(^{79}\)

On the second problem Whitmarsh identifies, the ‘lateness’ of the Second Sophistic, this backdrop of Classical Greek literature against which the Second Sophistic is viewed is an important corrective. Early Christian literature can often be interpreted as if written out of a Jewish (biblical) history into a Greek (philosophical) present. But Christian authors writing in Greek were educated within the paradigm of traditional \textit{paideia}, just like their non-Christian contemporaries, and write out of and into this classical tradition. Second-century


\(^{76}\) Lyman (2007).

\(^{77}\) On Clement’s own provenance, see below. Nasrallah (2005) which also appears in a revised format as chapter 2 of Nasrallah (2010) compares Justin, Tatian, and Lucian from the perspective of imperial geography and the marginality of their home provinces.

\(^{78}\) Cameron (1991) 19-21.

Christian authors in particular, unlike their earlier predecessors, especially the writers of the New Testament,\textsuperscript{80} buy into elite Greek identity by their literary style and atticizing posturing.\textsuperscript{81}

More than this, it is not much of a stretch to see Jesus himself, and then Paul, as in some ways mirroring the lives of the canonical Sophists – peripatetic, popular public speakers, extemporising on traditional themes, surrounded by an inner group of disciples.\textsuperscript{82} The episode of Paul speaking at the Areopagus, flattering and challenging the Athenians, quoting snatches of Greek literature in praise of a foreign deity, is perhaps emblematic of the Sophistic potential of the depositum fidei.\textsuperscript{83}

On a literary level, the kind of self-construction, creating and maintaining character and identity through textual practices, that marks out the playfulness of Second Sophistic authors like Lucian, is enacted, sometimes in deadly earnest, in Christian texts: in the most extreme forms, the martyrdom letters of Ignatius of Antioch and the first-person diary of Perpetua leading up to her martyrdom. In the words of Averil Cameron, ‘if ever there was a


\textsuperscript{83} Acts 17. It is illuminating in this connection to note that Stromateis 1.19.91.4-5 is the first extant source which recognises Paul is quoting Aratus in this speech: Ridings (1995) 29.
case of the construction of reality through text, such a case is provided by early Christianity'.

Of course, the Second Sophistic is not the only lens through which to read these commonalities. Christian martyrdom has its Hellenistic Jewish literary forebears, as well as serious exilic accounts of sophists like Dio Chrysostom as parallels; and although Second Sophistic authors foreground textual self-fashioning in a particularly pointed way, such identity politics is not unique to them. The fact remains, however, that both the synchronic connection and thematic crossovers between the two remained by and large unexamined.

There has been, however, in the past decade a notable rise in interaction between Second Sophistic studies and early Christian studies from scholars working on both sides of the disciplinary divide. Lyman argued for just this kind of cross-fertilisation in 2003:

...seeing 'Christianness,' like 'Greekness,' in process through the evidence of individual literary voices encourages us to recover the multiple choices and negotiations—both social and intellectual—that were part of a common cultural process of making meaning and asserting affiliation in the political and religious diversity of the second century.

Lyman's own work on Justin Martyr exemplifies the kind of contextualisation that is possible when taking Christian authors as one set of examples of complex responses to Roman political power and Greek paideia, amongst other comparable sets. Other scholars

---

85 E.g. 4 Maccabees; see most recently Moss (2013) chapters 1-3.
87 See also Lyman (2003) and Lyman (2007).
raising similar issues regarding second-century Christian writing include Timothy Horner, Laura Nasrallah, and Judith Perkins.88

The classics side of the divide has also opened itself up to more interaction with early Christian texts; Vincent Hunink’s recent commentary on Tertullian’s *De pallio* is a fine recent example, as is Jason König’s recent work on sympotic texts,89 for which his earlier introductory survey of Greek literature of this period laid the groundwork.90 Kendra Eshleman’s recent monograph on the social world of intellectuals in the Roman empire follows in the same vein.91 Whitmarsh, too, has approached the religious edges of his earlier work in his more recent volume *Beyond the Second Sophistic*.92 The common thread running through these re-evaluations is precisely what we earlier identified earlier as a key theme of the growth in scholarship on the Second Sophistic: a twin concern for literary and cultural analysis.

Texts are no longer seen as expressions of fixed cultural identities (Christianity as authoritarianism): rather, texts are processes of cultural construction and identity formation, and, perhaps most importantly, Christian/pagan is seen as one gradated axis along with many others – Jewish/gentile, civilised/barbarian, Greek/Roman, elite/common, centre/periphery, old/new. A common concern with these problematics of identification,

90 König (2009).
91 Eshleman (2012).
92 Whitmarsh (2013).
against a remarkably consistent shared educational background and set of literary conventions, is a more important shared playing field than credal affiliation.

CLEMENT, THE ALEXANDRIAN

How do we fit Clement into this cultural milieu of the Second Sophistic? There is, to begin with, very little that can be said with certainty about Clement as an historical figure, and most of what can be said is gleaned directly from his own writings. Eusebius gives Clement a full Roman tria nomina appellation in his titling of the *Stromateis*, Titus Flavius Clemens, suggesting Roman citizenship.\(^{93}\) Although he is known as ‘Clement of Alexandria’, undoubtedly to differentiate him from his famous predecessor Clement of Rome,\(^{94}\) we know little about his connection to the city. Eusebius’ account of the history of Clement and his relationship to the Alexandrian church has long been viewed sceptically; much of the account seems to be Eusebius’ attempt to make sense of the little information he had himself gleaned from reading Clement’s works.\(^{95}\) In the words of Robert M. Grant, ‘Eusebius can

---

\(^{93}\) Τίτου Φλαύιου Κλήμεντος τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθη φιλοσοφίαν γνωστικῶν ὑπομνημάτων στρωματεῖς, *HE* 6.13.1. Cassius Dio (67.14.1-3) speaks of a certain Titus Flavius Clemens, consul in AD 95 and a cousin of Domitian, executed by Domitian for impiety; see also Suetonius, *Domitian* 15.1, describing Clemens as *contemptissimae inertiae*; also Philostratus, *VA* 8.25, where Clemens’ death is the catalyst for the assassination of Domitian. This Clemens’ wife, according to Dio, was exiled, for Jewish sympathies, to Pandateria; Eusebius (*HE* 3.18.4) gives a similar story, although it is a niece, Flavia Domitilla, who is exiled, rather than the wife, and for the cause of her Christianity. Despite the tempting connection, it is more likely than not a red herring; if we are to take Clement’s own autobiographical material seriously, his connection to Christianity is not a family affair, but a personal intellectual one which he developed at a more rather than less advanced stage in his career. It is no more likely a connection than to the Flavius Clemens mentioned by Galen (*De compositione medicamentorum per genera* 1.11, Kuhn XIII, 1026), credited with a rather good recipe for an ointment dealing with athletes’ gout. This material is covered well by Emmett (2001) 1-2.


\(^{95}\) On which see below, Chapter 1; the earliest and still most forceful critic of Eusebius’ account is Bardy (1937); see also Hornschuh (1960). On Eusebius, see Barnes (1981) and Barnes (1994). For further bibliography on Eusebius qua historiographer, see Scholten (1995) 18 and n.8. Cf. van den Hoek (1997) 60-1 n.4.
never be trusted if contradicted by a more reliable witness, hardly ever even if not
contradicted. 96

Epiphanius, later again, provides the possibility of another biographical tradition, speaking
of Κλήμης... ὃν φασί τινες Ἀλεξανδρέα, ἄτεροι δὲ Ἀθηναίον. 97 Some have thus argued for
Athens as Clement’s city of birth, and Alexandria as only the later setting for his major
intellectual activity. 98 Taking Epiphanius as a starting point, the argument is that Clement’s
familiarity with Attic dialect and the physical surrounds of Attica suggest an Athenian
provenance. 99 Given the artificiality of literary Atticism, however, its widespread use
amongst educated Greeks, and the symbolic importance of Athens to Greek literature, these
suggest less his birth-place and more the quality of his education. At any rate, his connection
with Alexandria as the location of most of his literary output is secure: it is both uncontested
and early, and internal evidence suggests its authenticity. 100

His date of birth is unknown, but there is an almost undisputed consensus of about AD 150.
We do not know whether he was brought up a Christian, or was a convert, but the internal
evidence suggests the latter; 101 possibly he was an initiate into the Eleusinian mysteries, of

96 Grant (1971) 142.
97 Epiphanius, Adversus haereses 32.6.
98 The view that Clement hails from Athens ‘has long been accepted as the most probable’, according
to van den Hoek (1990) 179; also Ashwin-Siejkowski (2008) 19, who calls this view ‘generally accepted’.
100 See van den Hoek (1990) for the internal evidence.
101 E.g. Paed. 1.1.1, 2.8.62; see also below on Str. 1.1.11. See Méhat (1966) 43, who in part relies on
Eusebius P.E. 2.2.64. Mondéret (1944) 265, however, doubts the assumption that Clement was a
convert, and suggests his intimacy with the scriptures indicates a Christian upbringing.
which he leaves a detailed account. It has been hypothesized, from his supposedly sympathetic view of married life in Str. 3, that he himself may have been married. We do know that by 215 he had died; Eusebius quotes a letter sent that year to Origen from Alexander, bishop of Jerusalem, and one-time pupil of Clement, in which both Clement and Pantaenus are referred to as ‘those blessed fathers who have trod the road before us and with whom we shall soon be reunited’.

In an earlier letter, sent to the church of Antioch in 211, Alexander (before his translation to Jerusalem, at that time bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia) writes of ‘Clement the blessed prebyter, a man virtuous and approved’, by whose hand the letter apparently came. So evidently by this time Clement had already departed from Alexandria, probably in 202-3 during the Severan persecution, which (according to Eusebius) was particularly fierce in Alexandria. It seems, from the evidence Eusebius preserves at least, that Clement never returned to Alexandria. Early western martyrologies assign his death to the fourth of

---

104 HE 6.14: πατέρας γὰρ ἱκανὸν τοὺς μακαρίους ἐκείνους τοὺς προοδέυσαντας, πρὸς ὧν ἐσόμεθα, Πάνταινον, τὸν μακάριον ἄληθῶς καὶ κύριον, καὶ τὸν ἱερὸν Κλήμεντα κύριόν μου γενόμενο καὶ ῥεῖληλαβάντα με, καὶ εἰ τις ἕτερος τοιοῦτος δι’ ὧν σὲ ἐγνώρια, τὸν κατὰ πάντα ἀριστον καὶ κύριον μου καὶ ἀδελφόν.
105 HE 6.11: τὰ γράμματα ἀπέστειλα διὰ Κλήμεντος τοῦ μακαρίου πρεσβυτέρου, ἀνδρὸς ἐναρέτου καὶ δοκίμου, ὃν Ἰστε καὶ ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐπιγνώσεθε. On Clement’s status as a presbyter, see below Ch. 1.
106 HE 6.1. van den Broek (1990) argues, however, that Eusebius confused the persecutions under the governor Aquila (206 – c. 211) with those in 202, and suggests Clement left during the latter period, giving Eusebius space to posit a direct succession between Clement and Origen. The severity and duration of the persecution of Christians is a matter of some debate; see Moss (2013) generally, and in particular chapter 4.
December, although there seems to be no evidence that he was ever a martyr, or that there was ever popular devotion to him as a saint.\textsuperscript{107}

CLEMENT, THE \textit{PEPAIDEUMENOS}

One key element of Clement’s biography we can fix on with certainty is his education.\textsuperscript{108} His extant works contain references to more than four hundred different literary sources;\textsuperscript{109} he makes reference almost a thousand times to other (non-Christian) Greek writers, and more than two-and-a-half thousand times to the Old and New Testaments.\textsuperscript{110} To St. Jerome he is \textit{omnium eruditissimus};\textsuperscript{111} in the words of Eric Osborn, ‘more than any other early Christian writer, [Clement] knew and enjoyed Greek philosophy and literature’.\textsuperscript{112} Both Jerome and Osborn in these quotations betray their interest in Clement as a theologian, fixed diachronically within the Christian tradition. The more illuminating parallels, however, are not with other early Christian writers, but with Clement’s contemporaries, where we find

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{107} Thus Bede, Florus of Lyons and Usard. Clement was removed from the catalogue of saints and martyrs by Clement VIII (1592-1605), at the prompting of Cesare Cardinal Baronius, who had revised Usard’s matryrology on the basis of newly available eastern sources. See Wagner (1971) 216-17.
\textsuperscript{109} In Stählin’s indices, 462 sources are listed: 42 Old Testament, 25 New Testament, 32 early Christian authors, and 363 non-Christian authors. Tollinton (1914) 157 (working before the publication of Stählin’s edition and therefore from much less satisfactory texts) counts 348 sources, referring to the work of Scheck (1889) 15.
\textsuperscript{110} Ashwin-Siejkowski (2008) 42; van den Hoek (1988) 1-2. Throughout this thesis I will use the terms Old and New Testament to refer to the collections commonly so called in their accepted canonical formations (where is it significant to distinguish the so-called Deuterocanonical books I will do so clearly). Whilst it might be trendier to refer to the ‘Hebrew’ bible and the ‘Greek’ bible, this terminology makes no sense when working with early Christian literature; for Clement, the Old Testament was a Greek bible; it was an Old Testament, forerunner to the New Testament which completed it.
\textsuperscript{111} Jerome, Ep. 70.4.
\textsuperscript{112} Osborn (2005) 2.
\end{footnotes}
amongst the elite pepaideumenoi evidence of much the same kind of wide-ranging literary education.

In his citation of texts that are not specifically Jewish or Christian, Clement is ‘a typical representative of the Hellenistic-Roman tradition’.\textsuperscript{113} Van den Hoek notes that Clement cites the same authors in about the same proportions as Plutarch a century earlier.\textsuperscript{114} Further, Clement’s frequency of quotation of non-Biblical material is extremely interesting compared to other Christian authors; here in chronological order are eight early Christian authors and the figures for their direct citations of various kinds of literature; the first four (in italics) are at least the generation before Clement, and the latter four are either roughly contemporary to or after Clement.\textsuperscript{115}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OT</th>
<th>NT</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Roman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justin</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athenagoras</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theophilus</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{114} van den Hoek (1996) 240 n. 52. Méhat (1966) 188 suggests a comparison to Plutarch and Athenaeus.

\textsuperscript{115} The list is from Krause (1958) 126, apart from the the percentages, which are my own addition; it is excerpted from a larger list beginning with Barnabas; this table is quoted both in van den Hoek (1988) 1-2 n. 1 and Ashwin-Siejkowski (2008) 42 n. 20 (who has taken it from van den Hoek); they both include only the last four authors. Van den Hoek is cautious about the accuracy of these figures, because they only include direct citations, and because they rely on the indices of various published editions which are produced in different ways. Cosaert (2008) 2 n.2 comments on the difficulty of quantifying Clement’s citations, which include direct quotations, adaptations, and allusions; including all three, Osborn (1995) 121 comes up with a figure of approximately 5,000 references to the New Testament and more than 3,200 to the Old Testament.
The absolute number of quotations in Clement in general is much higher, but it is the proportions which are most striking; Clement makes reference to Greek authors only slightly fewer times than he does to the Old Testament; of his contemporaries, Hippolytus comes the closest to echoing this balance, but even there Clement’s predilection for Greek quotation is notably stronger than the heresiologist’s.

The proportions are much more similar in the earlier authors, although they are at an absolute level much smaller. All of these authors survive only through their apologetic literature, works specifically aimed at Greek audiences in defence of Christianity. There is both a reluctance to quote Christian scriptures in these works for outsiders, and a tendency to quote Greek literature in order to mock and attack pagan religion, especially marked in an author like Tatian. These works have a great deal in common with the *Protrepticus*, but that Clement maintains such a striking balance when the majority of his extant writing (i.e. the *Paedagogus* and the *Stromateis*) is directed towards a Christian audience, to whom Clement has no qualms about quoting scripture, makes his citation habits noteworthy.

There is, as we shall see, no clear-cut way of defining how Clement theorizes the relationship between pagan literature and Christianity; but we have concrete evidence of how Clement enacts such a relationship. To judge solely on the numbers, from one perspective, his
approach makes him seem a very typical author of the Second Sophistic; from another, very similar to the fierce apologists of the generation before. Neither of these, of course, prepares the reader for the experience of encountering the Stromateis. In particular: aspects of apology and of contemporary elite Greek education are both present, but what Clement does with his (admittedly rather heavily worn) learning is a unique combination and extension of both of these strands.

CLEMENT THE AUTHOR

Given how little we know of his life, it is unsurprising that we know even less about when and where his texts were written; a brief summary, however, of what is known of Clement’s writing will give some immediate context to the Stromateis, and help to make clear why this work in particular is a worthy focus for an entire thesis.

According to Eusebius, Clement’s oeuvre consisted of ten works, of which half survive;\(^{116}\) alongside the Stromateis are the Protrepticus (Προτρεπτικός πρὸς Ἑλληνας) the Paedagogus (Παιδαγωγός) in three books; a homily on chapter ten of Mark’s gospel, often known under its Latin title, Quis Dives Salvetur? (‘Who is the Rich Man Who is to be Saved?’, or Τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος;), and another brief treatise, ‘Exhortation to Endurance or To the Recently Baptized’ (Προτρεπτικός εἰς ὑπομονὴν ἢ πρὸς τούς νεωστὶ βεβαπτισμένους). Outside of these mentioned by Eusebius are two works commonly attributed to Clement, the Excerpta ex Theodoto, a selection of extracts from the writings of the Valentinian author Theodotus, and another notebook of comments on prophetic writings from the bible, the Eclogae

\(^{116}\) HE 6.13.1-3. The lost works mentioned by Eusebius are the Hypotyposeis, in eight books; On the Pascha; On Fasting; On Slander; and the Ecclesiastical Canon or Against the Judaizers (and not, pace Ashwin-Siejkowski (2008) 28 n.45, ‘the Ecclesiastical Cannon’!).
propheticae. Lastly, in his extant works Clement mentions another two otherwise unattested treatises, On Resurrection and On Continence.\textsuperscript{117}

Undoubtedly, however, the core of his literary output is the ‘trilogy’ made up of the Protrepticus, or Exhortation to the Greeks, the Paedogogus, or Tutor, and the Stromateis. The Protrepticus, in a single book, is an exhortation to the Greeks, couched in the rather strident tones borrowed from philosophical conflict, to reject pagan religion and embrace Christianity. The three-book Paedagogus is an elementary instruction in the Christian faith, giving at times quite detailed instructions for how to behave and deport oneself as a Christian. At several points it draws attention to itself as a book of education, identifying the true pedagogue as Christ himself. We will summarize the content of the Stromateis below, but in short, it is a professedly esoteric exposition of the true gnosis of Christianity.

Not only is the vast majority of Clement’s extant writing contained in these three works, but progressing through them one traces the arc of Clement’s ideal narrative of the Christian life: exhortation from ignorance and paganism, in the state of infancy, through the basic education given by the tutor, to the perfection of Christian ‘gnosticism’.\textsuperscript{118} This image of the human being as a child, requiring education, and needing to be brought up by spiritual parents, resonates clearly in this sequence, from first awakening in the Protrepticus through elementary studies by the Paedagogus, and then advanced study in the Stromateis.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{117} At Paed. 1.471 and Paed. 2.94.1 respectively.

\textsuperscript{118} Using Clement’s phraseology of the perfection of Christian education, which is to become a ‘gnostic’; Osborn (2005) 5-6; cf. Ashwin-Siejkowski (2008) 29 and 147-87.

\textsuperscript{119} This childhood analogy is echoed in Irenaeus; see Adv. Haer. 3.18.1, 5.1.3, 5.12.2. See Harrison (1992), who follows Brown (1989) 70 in seeing the inspiration of the Shepherd of Hermas behind Clement’s use
In the opening of the *Paedagogus* Clement most clearly sets out this three-fold agenda, underscored with the repeated vocabulary reminiscent of the Greek titles of the *Propptrepticus, Paedagogus* – and the *Didascalus*, the teacher. It concludes:

σπεύδων δὲ ἀρα τελειώσαι σωτηρίῳ ἡμᾶς βαθμῷ, καταλλήλῳ εἰς παῖδευσιν ἐνεργῇ τῇ καλῇ συγχρῆται οἰκονομίᾳ ὁ πάντα φιλάνθρωπος λόγος, προτρέπων ἀνωθεν, ἐπειτα παιδαγωγῶν, ἐπὶ πάσιν ἐκδιδασκὼν.\(^{120}\)

Striving to make us perfect, then, by a saving progression, appropriate for effective instruction, the benevolent Word makes use of a beautiful scheme, first exhorting, then tutoring, and finally teaching.

Until the turn of the twentieth century, it was assumed that, given the seemingly unproblematic mapping of the first two lengthy works of Clement onto the two parts of the educative scheme, the *Stromateis* was the ‘*Didascalus*’, third in the trilogy.\(^{121}\) This position was first challenged by de Faye,\(^{122}\) who saw the *Stromateis* as a digression, a necessary prelude to the unwritten *Didascalus*. There has been continuing debate as to whether the *Stromateis* is, in fact, the projected completion of this trilogy;\(^{123}\) it has even been suggested that the

\(^{120}\) *Paed.* 1.1.3.1.

\(^{121}\) The idea that this passage, and the corresponding one at *Paed.* 3.12, was not proposing a trilogy of works at all was suggested by Quatember (1946).

\(^{122}\) de Faye (1906), the first edition of which was published in 1898.

\(^{123}\) Floyd (1971) xxii suggests: ‘Speculation on this topic will probably continue as long as the texts of Clement are extant.’ Important contributions to the debate, containing summaries of the voluminous opinions preceding them, can be found in Méhat (1966) 15-41, Wagner (1968), Osborn (2005) 7-16, and Itter (2009) 15-32.
Protrepticus must have been composed after the first book of the Stromateis, adding yet another variable to the sequence.\textsuperscript{124}

The debate on this question has, I fear, become rather too tangled in its own bibliography, and thereby lost the forest for the trees. The entirety of the argument now hinges on whether the Stromateis ‘teaches’ and therefore conforms to what the preface to the Paedogogus sets out as the task of the projected Didascalus. This is ultimately unanswerable; it is possible that the Stromateis does teach in the way in which Clement envisages the Didascalus, and yet was not intended to be the third part of the trilogy (it is possible for an author to write more than one work of doctrinal theology), or that it does not teach in the way in which Clement intended when he wrote the programmatic passages in the Paedagogus, but is nonetheless the intended third part of the trilogy (it is, after all, not unheard of for proposed books to change their focus in the process of writing).

More to the point, it is difficult to see what advantages we gain in our understanding of Clement’s writing by answering the question of whether the Stromateis is really part of a formal trilogy. What is clear, from the Stromateis itself, is that Clement does intend the work to educate in some way, building up true gnostics. The question of a technical literary trilogy

\textsuperscript{124} Cf. Floyd (1971) xxii n. 4, followed by Grant (1988) 175. An earlier, an influential position (the ‘Wendland-Heussi thesis’) held that the first four books of the Stromateis were composed before the Protrep. and the Paed.; it was only after the completion of the Protrep. that Clement conceived of a trilogy, at which point he wrote the Paed. and Strom. 5-7 as its second and third parts. The thesis was, however, based on inadequate texts, before the edition of Stählin. Stählin’s criticism, along with that of Munck (1933), both on solid textual grounds, effectively put this theory to rest. See Wagner (1968) 252-3. Munck’s own theory supposed two trilogies, neither of which was completed by Clement, one exoteric and one esoteric.
does not impinge on the broader connection between the three works as speaking to different stages of the development of the Christian disciple.

The overarching connection between the three major works is thus thematically important, but its significance can be pushed too far. A recent monograph by Andrew Itter, for instance, reduces the structure of the *Stromateis* to a matter of numerology, its eight books combining with the three of the *Paedagogus* and the single book of the *Protrepticus* to symbolically represent both a Platonic ascent of the soul and an allegorical reading of the priestly activities leading up to Yom Kippur.\(^\text{125}\) Given that we are missing the beginning of the *Stromateis*, and cannot agree on where it ends,\(^\text{126}\) or whether it forms a trilogy with the *Protrepticus* and *Paedagogus*, this seems a rather difficult hypothesis to maintain.

This somewhat complex theory also leaves the structure bearing little or no relation to the actual content of the *Stromateis*: a systematic numerological construction would only seem to be relevant if the content of each book bore a relation to its place in the sequence – and this is sorely lacking in the *Stromateis*.\(^\text{127}\) Hence we turn to the question of why the *Stromateis*, despite fitting generally into a progression with Clement’s other major works, is worthy of individual treatment at thesis length.

\(^{125}\) Itter (2009) 33–77; see in particular the chart at 77.

\(^{126}\) The eighth book preserved in the MSS may not be part of the original work; see Itter (2009) 51–77 on this question and the various hypotheses proposed.

\(^{127}\) Itter tries to have his cake and eat it, too: it is both ‘a mystagogy from the first book through to the eighth in a way that is announced by the number symbolism set out within it’, and also ‘a labyrinth whereby the initiate proceeds through the complex often coming to dead ends and being forced to explore different avenues, yet all the while making some progress towards the goal’. Itter (2009) 74. Given that even Itter cannot (and does not attempt to) demonstrate even a general book-by-book set of steps that progresses towards a goal, this seems tendentious. Either it is a set of logically ordered steps, or it is not.
The difficulties encountered in following Itter’s thesis stem primarily from this disordered content. It is this which makes the *Stromateis* stand out from the other two works in this ‘trilogy’ – its unique miscellanistic structure, which cannot be categorised as step-by-step progression, or even, by and large, by content from book to book. Indeed, it makes the *Stromateis* stand out from all other second-century Christian literature.

**THE STROMATEIS**

Clement’s other works fit within fairly well established Christian genres of writing – the *Protrepticus* and *Paedagogus* can be characterised fairly unproblematically as apologetic works, and both find close parallels in other second-century Christian authors, such as Athenagoras’ *Legatio*, Justin Martyr’s *Apologies*, or Tatian’s *Oratio ad Graecos*. The *Stromateis* is a generic outlier; so much so that a great deal of the discussion which has surrounded the *Stromateis* has been about its status as literature. Clement wrote it as quite a different kind of work than anything else in his oeuvre; similarly, it deserves to be read in a way unique to it.

The *Stromateis* is also worth looking at as a discrete work precisely because many of the traditional ways of looking at Clement rely on the use of his works as a guide to his persona, or the locus of a coherent set of consistent beliefs. Scholars have pronounced, on the basis of the same texts, that he was a heretic, a liberal, or an Oxford don before his time.\(^{128}\) More

---

\(^{128}\) Cardinal Bessarion for the foremost, on which see Wagner (1971). See Tollinton (1914) and Chadwick (1966) for the latter.
recently, interpreters have read through his work to find out what ‘Clement’ believes about anthropology, apophatic theology, or Christology.\textsuperscript{129}

This kind of thinking is clearly illustrated in Ashwin-Siejkowski’s recent monograph: ‘The Classic Dilemma’ is the first subtitle in his introduction. Ashwin-Siejkowski asks: ‘Was Clement of Alexandria a Platonist, who... expressed his faith in a Platonic/Hellenistic form and language? Or, was he a profound Christian who “baptized” Platonism?’\textsuperscript{130} There is much to be gained from asking and answering this kind of question; but at heart it is a style of interpretation which assumes literary works are the ill-ordered emanations of a single intellectual core which not only can but needs to be reconstructed for us to fully appreciate them.

This is not, however, how Clement views literature – and he discusses the reading of literature volubly, as we have noted – and certainly not how he envisages his own being read. Given how central the process of education, of reading and writing, is to Clement’s approach, ignoring how he enacts and frames his content is missing a vital element of what this literature means. For Clement, his work is the production of a relationship between author and reader, a process not of imparting facts or even methods of ascertaining facts, but of forming character. Each individual work is crafted and nuanced for specific kinds of relationships, and the impressing of particular kinds of character on his readers. And in that respect, the \textit{Stromateis} can and should be looked at as an individual work; it not only

\textsuperscript{129} Behr (2000), Hägg (2006), Kindiy (2008)
\textsuperscript{130} Ashwin-Siejkowski (2008) 3.
attempts to speak to a much less obviously defined reader than his other works, but is the
most distinctive and idiosyncratic in its ways of speaking to its audience.

Although the division into books seems arbitrary, and the extent to which each book varies
in its content differs drastically,\textsuperscript{131} an overview will help set the material which follows in
this thesis into context.

• Book One: The relationship between Greek philosophy and Christianity is explored;
this segues into discussion of the comparative antiquity of the Old Testament, the
origins of Greek cultural and intellectual achievements, and the superiority of Moses
as a cultural hero over Greek competitors.

• Book 2: The nature of faith is expounded upon; how it is fundamental to any kind of
knowledge or investigation. The true gnostic is compared to Basilides and
Valentinus on the basis of a proper understanding of faith. A defence of fear as a
proper part of teaching is also given.

• Book 3: This book is concerned mainly with the discussion of sexuality (which in fact
begins in the latter chapters of Book 2). The fraught early Christian question of
whether it is better to marry or to remain chaste is discussed, in which Clement
takes a moderate position, defending both states.

• Book 4 deals with martyrdom, and sets out the duties of Clement’s ‘true gnostic’, as a
witness to the truth, unafraid of death.

• Books 5 (and 6): There are four interconnected strands here:\textsuperscript{132} (i) an exposition of
sound teaching; (ii) the symbolic or allegorical style of writing; (iii) the role of

\textsuperscript{131} Emmett (2001) 72; Méhat (1966) throughout prefers to treat the structure in terms of \textit{kephalaia}, or
chapters, rather than books.
esoteric teaching in the philosophical schools; and (iv) a list of the thefts of the Greeks from the barbarian philosophy, the longest of the themes, which is continued into the first quarter of Book 6.

- Book 6: The remaining portions of this book present a depiction of the characteristics of the 'true gnostic', who must be something of a polymath.

- Book 7: The first half is an apologetic segment, repeating many of the arguments from the Protrepticus. The second half of the book then continues the theme of the 'true gnostic' from Book 6, before presenting responses to a number of heresies. Clement ends Book 7 saying he will make a new beginning.\textsuperscript{133}

- Book 8: There is some debate as to whether this forms part of the Stromateis. It differs wildly in style, and is much shorter than the other books. The book sets out the components of a systematic philosophy; the necessity of clear definitions, and the need for first (unprovable) principles, on which basis the Sceptics are attacked. The methodology of philosophical investigation, speech and causality are also touched upon, but all in a haphazard fashion.

**READING CLEMENT (II)**

Given the sheer volume of disparate material which has been written about Clement in general or the Stromateis in particular over the last hundred and twenty years or so, a brief guide to some of the most important literature, and some of the trends in scholarship, is needed in order to situate the arguments of this thesis. Particularly useful surveys are


\textsuperscript{133} Str. 7.18.111.4.
Wagner (1971), Osborn (1983); Ashwin-Siejkowski (2008) and the first chapter of Itter (2009) both contain full bibliographies and overviews of the more recent scholarly literature. We will accordingly try to keep this survey brief, and general.

As with the readings of the Second Sophistic, interpretations of Clement seem to have been particularly prone to be moulded according to the presuppositions or programmes of his readers – even more so than for many other early Christian authors. This is partly the case because as a pre-Nicene Father he precedes a number of controversies, and is therefore often judged against later yardsticks of orthodoxy, and as a corollary to this, his lack of standing as a ‘Father’ (‘so bold he is denied the title of Church Father at all’ is also problematic.)

Even more of a distracting influence is the towering and controversial figure of Origen whose shadow lies long over his Alexandrian predecessor. Clement’s stock rises or falls as each school of thought fits him into its own narrative: ‘Orthodox theologians tend to avoid him, Roman Catholics approach him warily, Lutherans shrink from him, while with few exceptions Englishmen are far more sympathetic.’ Although the situation is less

\footnote{Wagner (1971), Ridings (1995) 30.}
\footnote{See Lyman (1993) 6-8 on the tendency to view pre-Nicene authors generally through the lens of later developments.}
\footnote{Ridings (1995) 31, referring us to Overbeck (1882) 467, amongst others.}
\footnote{On the taint of heresy, see Ashwin Siejkowski (2010)}
\footnote{Wagner (1971) 211; Hägg (2006) 254-55.}
\footnote{Wagner (1971) 209.}
denominationally defined, forty years or so since Wagner wrote these words, his general observation – the overwhelming importance of prior theological and literary judgments to Clementine scholarship – is still sound.

So, for the late nineteenth-century scholars attempting to strip away layers of Hellenization from the core of a pristine, original, Christian message, Clement’s thought was a departure from the roots of the true faith:

But what use did Clement make of his philosophy? He set entirely upon one side the Father of the New Testament, and launched upon the Church the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the absolute God. At another point the same author, Charles Bigg, laments ‘the straits to which [Clement] was sometimes reduced by his fondness for heathen speculation’. This kind of negative appraisal has roots much deeper than the nineteenth century, however. Photius provides the earliest evidence of the suspicion that Clement bends too much with the prevailing philosophical winds, commenting on the (now lost) Hypotyposes: Καὶ ἐν τισι μὲν αὐτῶν ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ λέγειν, ἐν τισὶ δὲ παντελῶς εἰς ἀσεβεῖς καὶ μυθώδεις λόγους ἐκφέρεται. It may well be the case that Photius merely misread the passage at which he takes umbrage; but ‘the suspicion of heterodoxy is difficult to erase... Photius’ reaction emphasized the acceptability of [Clement’s] ethics, while raising serious doubts about the more speculative aspects of his

---

140 And we might cringe at ‘Englishmen’ – God forbid this sceptred isle should produce a Roman Catholic or a woman scholar!
141 Bigg (1909) 405.
142 Bigg (1909) 409; although at 416 Bigg does suggest in mitigation that ‘his merits are so great and so rare that his readers will find themselves indisposed to take a severe view of his aberrations.’
143 Photius, Bibliotheca 109.89a. ‘And in some of them he appears to speak correctly; but in others he is carried away into impious and fictive sentiments.’
144 Duckworth and Osborn (1985) 77-83, and importantly Ashwin Siejkowski (2010)
What prompts Photius’ unease with Clement’s *Hypotyposes* is the forerunner of what Bigg finds problematic in Clement: the suspicion that the charm of pagan philosophy has inveigled Clement from the path of the true gospel.

More positive evaluations of Clement come from the same starting point – Clement’s evident respect, and even fondness, for (particularly Platonic) philosophy – but see this rather as either an enrichment of Christianity, or a legitimate continuation of the earliest models of Christianity’s interaction with its ambient culture. The work of de Faye,\(^\text{146}\) of seminal importance for later scholarly appreciation of Clement,\(^\text{147}\) sets out the case for the latter attitude: that the liberality of Clement ‘was also the original attitude that the Church took towards secular learning and that Clement was not guilty of compromising Christianity by flirting with Hellenic culture’.\(^\text{148}\) This summary of De Faye encapsulates his tendency to obscure nuance by essentialising – speaking decisively of ‘the Church’, and even ‘Hellenic culture’ in the second century gives a false solidity to fissured and multiple entities.

De Faye was heavily influenced by the earlier scholarship of Franz Overbeck; both through his French follower and independently Overbeck has been an important compass point for

\(^{145}\) Wagner (1971) 213.

\(^{146}\) de Faye (1898).

\(^{147}\) de Faye’s work ‘hat in der Folgezeit, das darf man ohne Übertreibung sagen, die öffentliche Meinung über Clemens gemacht und auf Jahrzehnte hinaus beherrscht.’ Knauber (1977) 156.

more recent work. Overbeck sees Christianity coming into its literary adulthood with its adoption of Greek philosophical discourse:

Hier endlich sind nach den schon oben erwähnten vorbereitenden Stadien der Apologetik und Polemik in der That die Formen der allgemeinen Weltliteratur ein Organ des eigenen inneren Lebens der Kirche selbst geworden.\(^{149}\)

While the question which chiefly concerned Overbeck – when can we say that true ‘Christian literature’ begins? – now seems outdated, and rather arbitrary, his lasting contribution is noting those striking characteristics of Clement which set him apart from his predecessors: sustained, positive, engagement with Greek literature as an explicitly Christian author.

That general observation, originally the great point of condemnation or praise of Clement, became the common ground for later interpretations, less concerned with theological judgment, and more concerned with identifying the balance of influences on Clement, and the relationship between his writing and later developments in theology. Osborn, reviewing the literature up to 1982, frames the general trend of Clementine scholarship as ‘moving from the thesis of the general Athens/Jerusalem question to the antithesis of specific verbal parallels. Then, with a rejection of the purely verbal, the synthesis emerges in the consideration of specific problems.’\(^{151}\) Most of these ‘specific problems’ have been, however,

---

\(^{149}\) See Knauber (1977) who provides both a full account and full criticism of Overbeck’s position. Overbeck is a noteworthy figure in his own right as a theologian and friend of Nietzsche. See Henry (2000) for an introduction to his theological position, and a review of literature on Overbeck in Henry (2007) and Henry (2008).

\(^{150}\) Overbeck (1882) 6.

\(^{151}\) Osborn (1983) 220.
diachronic in nature and concerned with the development of early Christianity; and theological or philosophical in scope.\textsuperscript{152}

In contrast, although we will be engaging extensively with the depositum of scholarship, and often dealing with diachronic questions of Clement’s development or appropriation of his intellectual heritage, we will be much more concerned with synchronic comparison between Clement and his non-Christian contemporaries. Moreover, our focus will be much more on the literary texture of Clement’s work, seeing his relationship with that heritage through the lens of intertexuality rather than dependency.

OVERVIEW

The contribution this thesis aims to make is to set Clement into context at the intersection of a number of important intellectual and cultural strands which run through the Second Sophistic. I will be reading the \textit{Stromateis} as an eclectic construction: eclectic, in that it is a work which both draws selectively from a whole range of variegated traditions; and a construction, pursuing not just the creation of a new work of literature, but a Christian identity.

There is no one theory underlying this thesis; I have proceeded on a principle (following Clement’s lead) of eclecticism, and have brought in differing theoretical perspectives as and when they seem to illuminate previously understudied or misunderstood aspects of

\textsuperscript{152} E.g. Ashwin-Siejkowski (2008) on Clement’s doctrine of perfection and its philosophical antecedents; Bucur (2009) on the Second-Temple Judaic background to Clement’s pneumatology and angelology; in a different vein, both Ridings (1995) and Boys-Stones (2001) deal with Clement’s use of the theft motif as part of a diachronic examination of the theme.
Clement’s work. Various perspectives are therefore involved: identity construction, reader-response theories, theories of genre, theories of cultural capital and so on. My one guiding methodological principle has been close, careful analysis of individual passages: when text is as crucial to self-construction as it is for early Christianity, it behoves us to take their textual and lexical choices extremely seriously. There are two principles we need to bring to bear in such close reading: first, that Clement deliberately tells us he is writing in such a way as to make his meaning not immediately obvious; and secondly, that any text reveals assumptions, cross-references, and intertextualities in spite of what an author may think he is doing. When dealing with the alien culture that is the past, part of the role of the modern interpreter is to uncover the structures of thought and intersecting lines of tradition of which the author may not even have been aware, or which might even undercut his intended message.

This kind of reading will not necessarily lead to a unified view of the author or his work, and sometimes such approaches do not fit easily alongside each other. In any text, however, which is as much a patchwork of intertext and allusion as the *Stromateis*, we should expect to find an excess of meaning; no text can be inoculated against the interpretational choices its audience makes. Clement places a great of trust in his audience’s reading, and as much as he guides and exemplifies where he believes we should go, he leaves it to us to uncover the meaning ourselves. Each of my readings of Clement, then, stands or falls insofar as it convinces and draws out something valuable or understudied in the text; they do not aim for a holistic picture or pre-determined theoretical conclusion regarding Clement or his Christianity.
The thesis is divided into three broad sections. The first, entitled ‘Literary Personae’, examines the *Stromateis*’ self-presentation. The first chapter, ‘Apostolic Authority: Reading and Writing Legitimately’ presents ‘Clement’ as a authorial construct; not so much a biographical sketch, as a literary-biographical sketch, arguing that what Clement presents of himself is as much a positioning within literary tropes as it is a disclosure of factual biographical information.

The second chapter, ‘A Patchwork of Gnostic Notes: Genre as Self-Definition’ explores the importance of genre for understanding the *Stromateis*. The miscellanistic structure is part of Clement’s engagement with the popular aesthetic of the Second Sophistic which valued *poikilia*; it is a self-advertisement of the Clement’s status as a *pepaideumenos*. It is also, however, key to Clement’s paideutic programme, firstly as a textual response to and representation of the political organisation of power and knowledge. But as a corollary to that, the process of reading miscellanistically is part of a process of forming the character of the reader.

The second section, ‘Greeks and Barbarians’ looks at how Clement engages with debates of ethnic and political identity in the Second Sophistic. Chapters 3 and 4 employ Homi K. Bhabha’s concepts of hybridity and mimicry to explore the effect of Clement’s mirroring of Greek cultural identity whilst simultaneously disavowing the label of ‘Greek’. By reproducing in a distorted form the signs of Greek *paideia*, Clement deconstructs stable notions of a unified Greek racial or cultural identity.
Chapter 4 looks more closely at the utilisation of political terminology of citizenship and leadership. The underlying theory of Stoic cosmopolitanism, that human nature is a starting point for a deeper shared citizenship is accepted, but refigured by Clement; the universal 

*polis*, instead of being the self-regulating city of the ordered cosmos, is the heavenly new Jerusalem. Moreover, Greek images of kingship are reinscribed into the leadership of Moses and Jesus. Both of these adaptations of political language are subtly but seriously subversive to totalising claims of Roman power.

Chapter 5 explores Clement’s use of the ‘theft motif’, the idea that Greek philosophy is built around material taken from barbarian sources, and especially from Moses. Clement uses this theme, a common *topos* of Christian apologetic in the second century, to explore the nature of barbarian and Greek character; Clement’s pursuit of Greek dependency is not, I will argue, to devalue Greek philosophy, but rather to make a bold claim that its value lies in its eclectic tendencies to co-opt any idea which seems appealing and subject it to enquiry. Clement’s eclectic tendencies are seen as the culmination of true Greek character.

The third and final section, ‘The Christian Homer’, takes a closer look at Clement’s intertextual relationship with Homer as the premier Greek author and authorising figure. Clement uses the resources of the Greek traditions surrounding Homer to present him as a definitively un-Greek figure. By paralleling Homer and Biblical material, Clement places both of them in subservience to the higher interpretational principle of the Christian *Logos*; at the same time, he makes the appropriation of sophisticated strategies, developed for reading Homer, to Biblical sources seem like a natural progression. Finally, his use of the
philosophically-appropriated figure of Odysseus as the image of the Christian soul makes a bold claim for Christian presence at the heart of Greek literary consciousness.
PART I

LITERARY PERSONAE
I. APOSTOLIC AUTHORITY:
READING AND WRITING LEGITIMACY IN THE STROMATEIS

Few questions surrounding Clement have generated as much debate as his institutional setting. This is partly because the evidence is thin and open to multiple interpretations, but partly also because the answers to such questions open up challenging questions for the narrative of the development of the Christian church: these still have important institutional ramifications, particularly for ecumenical dialogue.¹

That Clement was a teacher is clear enough; but more than that is conjecture based on internal evidence and the account of Eusebius. Nonetheless, the idea of an apostolic succession, the existence of ‘Catholicity’ as opposed to gnosticism, and the parting of the ways between Christianity and Judaism are all implicated in answering such questions. What was Clement’s Alexandrian ‘school’ like in the second century? What was its structure and place within the Christian community? What authority did its teacher(s) exercise in the church?

There is no doubt as to the significance of this Christian intellectual tradition of Alexandria for the church at large;² the development of this ‘school’, if such it was, before the time of

¹ Eshleman (2012) 214 (in passing); specific reference is mystifyingly made to the importance of apostolic succession to ‘Anglo-Catholic ecclesiology’, by which she possibly means ‘English-speaking Roman Catholic ecclesiology’, although its importance to the ecclesiology of Anglo-Catholics (i.e. the Romeward-leaning minority of the Anglican communion and offshoots thereof) cannot be denied: see Rowell (1983). See more extensively Sullivan (2001) which places the debate over ancient origins in the context of modern-day ecumenical efforts.
Origen, however, remains obscure. The account proffered by Eusebius, or at least any face-value reading of it, has long been discredited. While alternative accounts offered by modern scholars have opened up new ways of thinking about the origins of the structures of early Christianity in Alexandria, such as the relationship between school and synagogue, or the influence of philosophical schools, they have done little to illuminate the dynamics within the church or the ways in which different roles were perceived within the church in the second century.

This chapter will attempt to approach the answers to these questions by examining the _Stromateis_ as a textual embodiment of dynamic relationships. Questions of biographical historicism, whilst seemingly straightforward and useful (such as ‘Was Clement a presbyter?’ or ‘Was the school independent or church-sponsored?’) have obscured the textual dynamics of the _Stromateis_ itself. We are attempting to avoid the temptation of pinning down whether Clement was ‘in fact’ a catechist, continuing the role of Jewish synagogue officials, or a philosophical teacher, to focus instead on how Clement’s writings present and construct a Christian author and his relationship to and conception of his textual community.

---

3 _HE_ 5.10–1; 6.3, 6.6, and further throughout Book 6 on Origen’s period.
4 Gustave Bardy was the first modern scholar to voice penetrating criticism of Eusebius’ account, in Bardy (1937). Many of these arguments are recapitulated in Grant (1971). See more recently van den Hoek (1990), van den Hoek (1997), and van den Broek (1996) 197–205. However, a straightforward traditional reading of Eusebius has still been followed by Frend (1984) 286–9, and Quasten in Quasten and Di Berardino (1984–88) 2.5–6, although this is decidedly a minority view.
5 For example, R. van den Broek’s emphasis on the roots of the Alexandrian school in the traditions of the Jewish synagogue, in van den Broek (1990), and Marco Rizzi’s work on the possible parallels between Clement’s school and Middle Platonist philosophical schools (communication at the 16th International Conference on Patristic Studies, 2011).
This reading does not approach the text as passive reflection of reality, but an active attempt to frame and direct its readers’ perception of the community in which they are participating; or even to create the reality of such a community through the process of reading. Rather than seeing the texts only as products of or evidence for particular circumstances, we will analyse them as agents for producing relationships and forming institutions.\(^6\)

Thus rather than merely answering questions about institutions and authority in the second-century Alexandrian church, I am seeking to uncover the tensions and dynamics that emerge between Clement and his audience, and the emerging debates about authority and tradition that these texts encode. In this we may see prefigured the conflict of the succeeding generation between Origen and Demetrius, in which the first indisputably monarchical bishop, Demetrius,\(^7\) clashed so forcefully with the teacher Origen that the latter left the city, and its resolution: Origen’s successor as teacher becomes Demetrius’ successor as bishop.\(^8\) More importantly, we see also the fundamentally important role of textual self-presentation and literary mastery in legitimating authority which undergirds these political relationships.\(^9\)

---

\(^6\) On the importance of textuality for early Christianity, see Lieu (2004) ch. 2 ‘Text and Identity’.


\(^9\) On the broader implications of the development of a specifically Christian paideia that adopted as core cultural resources both the Bible and Classical literature, see Stroumsa (1999).
Our starting point is Clement’s self-presentation. First and foremost he characterises himself as a philosophical teacher: the full title of the *Stromateis* makes this point: Τίτου Φλαυίου Κλήμεντος τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν γνωστικών ὑπομνήματων στρωματείς, ‘the Patchworks of the Gnostic Course-Notes according to the True Philosophy’. Lecture notes or commentaries (ὑπομνήματα) not on Christianity, but the ‘true philosophy’. The opening of the *Stromateis*, after such a title, draws us immediately into a trope of Platonic philosophical teaching: the undesirability of written teaching versus the dynamic spoken word. Indeed, large parts of the first book of the *Stromateis* deal implicitly or explicitly with the Platonic philosophical tradition.

The presentation of Clement’s intellectual journey at *Stromateis* 1.1.11.2-3, for instance, on one level constructs a claim to apostolic authority. It also works, however, to position Clement within a familiar narrative of travel, building on the antecedent of Socrates’ personal search for the truth as described in Plato’s *Apologia*, which signifies intellectual

---

10 This is not an uncommon position for Christian figures of the second century, most notably Justin Martyr, on whom see Young (2006) 486-8, but also a less obvious champion of philosophy, Tertullian – see in particular his *De pallio*. See also Löhr (2010) 160-88.

11 *HE* 6.13.1; cf. Photius *Cod.* 111. For Clement’s own titling of the work, see *Str.* 1.29.182.3 (ὅ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν γνωστικών ὑπομνήματων πρῶτος ἡμῖν Στρωματεύς); 3.18.110.3; 5.14.141.4; 6.1.1.1 (all the same as in Book, but with ‘third’, ‘fifth’, ‘sixth’ respectively); shortened versions appear at e.g. *Str.* 5.1.10.1, 5.14.95.1, 6.2.4.1. On the translation of the word στρωματεύς as ‘patchwork’, see below, Chapter 2. On the use of the term ‘gnostic’ by Clement, see Méhat (1980).

12 On ὑπομνήματα as ‘course notes’, see Bousset (1915) 25, and more extensively on the term below, Chapter 2.


14 See especially Wyrwa (1983).

15 See below, this chapter.

16 Plato *Apol.* 21b- 22e. See Rajak (1999) 64.
mastery and philosophical accomplishment. Clement is describing the importance of these notes in preserving the direct speech he was privileged to hear from ‘blessed and truly remarkable men’:

τούτων [sc. ἀνδρῶν μακαρίων καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀξιολόγων] ὃ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὁ Ἰωνικός, οὗ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς Μεγάλης Ἑλλάδος (τῆς κοίλης θάτερος αὐτῶν Συρίας ἤν, ὃ δὲ ἀπ’ Αἰγύπτου), ἦλθοι δὲ ἀνὰ τὴν ἀνατολήν· καὶ ταύτῃς δὲ μὲν τῆς τῶν Ἀσσυρίων, ὃ δὲ ἐν Παλαιστίνῃ Ἑβραῖος ἄνεκαθεν· ὃς δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀσσυρίων ἤν ἀπ’ Αἰγύπτου, ἄλλοι δὲ ἀνὰ τὴν ἠλέηθοτα. Σικελικὴ τῷ ὄντι ἦν μέλιτα προφητικοῦ τε καὶ ἀποστολικοῦ λειμῶνος τὰ ἀνθῆ δρεπόμενοι ἐνεγέννησε ψυχαῖς.

One of these [blessed and truly remarkable men], in Greece, was an Ionian, others in Magna Graecia (one of them was of Coele-Syria, the other from Egypt), and others through the east; one was of the Assyrian part of the east, and the other in Palestine a Hebrew by origin. And happening upon the last (but this one was first in power) I settled, having hunted him down, hidden in Egypt. He [sc. Pantaenus] was in truth a Sicilian bee; plucking the flowers from the prophetic and apostolic meadow he engendered in the souls of those who heard him a pure store of knowledge.

This passage has been heavily mined in any attempt to sketch a putative vita for Clement, and in fact is the most forthcoming passage in autobiographical terms in the Clementine

---

17 Str. 1.1.11.2. There is an ambiguity here (which I hope I have maintained in my English translation) as to whether the ὑστάτος is referring back to the Ἑβραῖος, or whether this final teacher is another added to the end of the list. Identification of Pantaenus as the ‘Sicilian bee’ is dependent on this latter interpretation – e.g. Bardy (1937) 71; Mondésert and Caster (1951) ad Str. 1.51, n.4. Dawson (1992) 220 and 294 n.64, however, points out that Clement makes no such identification. He is followed by Stroumsa (2005) 116-7, who with Dawson reads this passage as identifying the last teacher with the Palestinian Jew.

18 E.g. Chadwick (1966) 31-2; Osborn (2005) 1-2, the first sentence of which book, based on this passage, characterises Clement as ‘a traveller, always moving on’; Itter (2009) 7 (briefly); Pearson (2006) 342-3, etc.
corpus. Behind the account, however, is a well-established topos, in which an individual tried out different schools in order to find the best philosophy by which to live. The developed topos is found with minor variations across pagan, Christian and Jewish literature in the imperial period; it is a recognisable enough narrative to be the subject of mockery in Lucian’s dialogue *Philosophies for Sale*, and is used by Dio Chrysostom to recast his image and ‘blot out his murky past’. The trope seems to have been particularly appealing to Christian apologists, keen to promote their religion as equivalent to (and indeed the fullest form of) philosophy. Clement was familiar with it from a number of sources; at the very least from Josephus, Justin Martyr, and Justin’s pupil, Tatian.

Clement’s manipulation of the topos is far from standard, however. There is a heavy emphasis on the cumulative diversity and volume of instructors under whom Clement has studied; from the opening partitive genitive, suggesting from the outset that this list itself

---

19 First noted as such in the context of Justin Martyr’s conversion story by Goodenough (1923) 57-61, following Helm (1906) 40–44 on Lucian’s *Menippus*.
21 For example, Lucian’s *Menippus*, Galen’s *De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignitione et curatione* 5.41-2, Dio Chrysostom Or. 13 (De exilio), Justin Martyr’s *Dialogue with Trypho*, Tatian’s *Oratio ad Graecos*, Josephus’ *Vita*: see Goodenough (1923) 59, Nasrallah (2005) 289-90, Sandnes (2009) 33-6, and Moles (1978) on Dio. The trope is even borrowed into rabbinic literature; the types of the true proselytes, Githro, Naaman and Rahab ‘gehen...alle heidnische Culte und Schulen durch, ohne Befriedigung zu finden, am Busen der Bibel und der Propheten finden sie erst Ruhe und Befriedigung, weil nur das heilige Wort allein den Seelenfrieden und Gotteserkennniss gewahren kann’. Goldfahn (1873) 52-3, who makes explicit the connection between the Haggadah and Justin, Tatian and Clement. The same distinctive characteristics of the topos can also be seen in Cicero’s *Pro Archia*, describing the education of the poet Archias.
23 In Or. 13 (De exilio): see Moles (1978) 96-100.
24 See Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho* 8.1-2 and Tatian, *Oratio ad Graecos* 29.1; similar to Justin’s account, rejecting each philosophical school in turn, *Oratio* 2 takes us through a listing of Greek philosophies, although simply in refutation of them, rather than through the narrative of personal experience. See Nasrallah (2005) 289 n.25.
might be only partial, to the almost overly repetitive balancing conjunctive particles (ὅ μέν... ὦ δέ... ἄλλοι δέ... ὄ μέν... ὦ δέ...) finishing with an exhausted ὅστάτῳ δέ... The effect is intensified by the sparsity of verbs; the single unobtrusive ἦν the sole example in the first two sentences. When Clement settles (ἀνεπαυσάμην) with the last of these teachers, the verb is striking; this cessation of movement throws into relief the extent of the geography the text has just covered.

This cumulative approach to different teachers, rather than an agonistic or exclusive one, is a Clementine innovation. The usual approach, anchored in the Platonic model, narrates a movement from teacher to teacher as a series of rejected alternatives – the key structural feature is competition and mutual exclusivity.25 So, in Justin Martyr’s account, seeking wisdom, Justin attempts to learn from, but rejects or is rejected by the Stoics, Peripatetics, Pythagoreans and Platonists, before turning to the teaching of the Christians. There is scope for real engagement with Platonism, which is not seen as entirely in dichotomous terms with Christianity, but the general pattern is one of antagonism. Tatian’s narrative is even starker:

... κατ’ ἐμαυτὸν γενόμενος ἐξήτουν ὅτι τρόπῳ τάληθες ἐξευρεῖν δύνωμαι. περινοοῦντι δὲ μοι τὰ σπουδαία συνέβη γραφαῖς τισιν ἐντυχεῖν βαρβαρικαῖς, πρεσβυτέραις μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὰ Ἑλλήνων δόγματα, θειοτέραις δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν ἑκείνων πλάνην.26

... going into solitude I began to seek in what way I might be able to discover the truth. And while I considered carefully these weighty matters, I chanced to to fall upon certain barbarian writings, too ancient to be compared to the doctrines of the Greeks, too divine to be compared to their error.

25 Goodenough (1923) 59: the trope exists ‘in order to criticize each school’.
26 Oratio ad Graecos 29.
The topos is in effect ‘dramatizing the relations between Christianity and philosophy’.\(^27\) In a Jewish account, that of Josephus,\(^28\) we are not presented with a dichotomy between Judaism and philosophy, but rather with a parallelism between Jewish and philosophical ‘schools’, *haireseis*, a touch of technical vocabulary of the philosophical schools introduced to underscore the analogous systems. But even here, the key point of the passage is mutual exclusivity of the schools;\(^29\) Josephus opts eventually for the school of the Pharisees, which he equates with the Stoics.\(^30\)

Instead of presenting his intellectual biography as a series of rejections of false *haireseis*, Clement avoids positing any dichotomy between Christianity and philosophy. There is no succession of mutually antagonistic alternative schools, and no point of conversion. Although the last teacher is clearly presented as the best, there is no implication that the others are wrong – rather, that the others have provided preparatory guidance to reach this final most elevated stage.

A second key difference in Clement’s appropriation of the trope is his striking emphasis on geography. In failing to name his teachers, Clement is following standard practice, but the

\(^{27}\) Goodenough (1923) 58, referring specifically to Justin.

\(^{28}\) *Vita Josephi* 10-12.

\(^{29}\) *Vita* 10: *περὶ δὲ ἑκκαίδεκα ἔτη γενόμενος ἐβουλήθην τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αἱρέσεων ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν: τρεῖς δ᾽ εἰσὶν αὕτα, Φαρισαίων μὲν ἡ πρώτη, καὶ Σαδδουκαίων ἡ δευτέρα, τρίτη δ᾽ Ἑσσηνῶν, καθὼς πολλάκις εἴπομεν: οὕτως γὰρ ὧν ἄριστην, εἰ πάσας καταμάθωμι.

‘Having reached about sixteen years of age, I decided to become acquainted with our schools; there are three of these – that of the Pharisees is the first, that of the Sadducees the second, and the third is the school of the Essenes, as I have often stated. For thus I thought I could choose the best, if I considered them all.’

\(^{30}\) Again using the terminology of *haireseis* (*Vita* 12): *ἐννεακαίδεκατον δ᾽ ἕτος ἔχων ἠρξάμην τε πολιτεύεσθαι τῇ Φαρισαίων αἱρέσει κατακολουθῶν, ἢ παραπλήσιος ἐστι τῇ παρ᾽ Ἑλλησὶν Στοϊκῆ λεγομένη.
reduction to geographical identification, rather than school, is unusual. In the first few sparse sentences, we are presented almost solely with a list of place-names covering territory from Greece to Egypt, from Magna Graecia to Syria. The whole tenor of this intellectual mini-biography is captured at its close with the juxtaposition of the two participles, θηράσας λεληθότα: Clement has been hunting, far and wide, for that which is hidden.

The geographical terms, however, have more resonance than merely a résumé of Clement’s teachers; their use is motivated by the connotations these names carry. Greece stands for the home of philosophy; Ionia suggests itself as a metonym for the Ionic school of philosophy; with Magna Graecia following, suggesting the Italic origins of Pythagoreans.

The pursuit of the traditional philosophical schools is left behind at this point, with the introduction of a teacher from Coele-Syria and one from Egypt. The search for wisdom is being widened, from standard Greek positions to the borders of the empire. At the same time, the empire-wide spread of places suggests the universality of Christianity; Clement’s Christianity extends throughout and beyond the empire.

---

31 E.g. in Josephus’ account, only one teacher is named (Banus); none are mentioned in the accounts of Justin Martyr or Tatian. In Galen’s account, teachers are identified by school and by whom their own teachers were, but not by name (De propriorum animi cuissilibet affectuum dignotione et curatione 5.41-2). The meaning behind the tradition is unclear, but probably signals respect.

32 Founded by Thales or his student Anaximander Stromateis 1.14; Diogenes Laërtius Vitae Philosophorum (henceforth VP) 1.13.

33 This expansion mirrors, however, a prevalent narrative of the temporal development of wisdom, from sources in the east to Pythagoras and Plato, which will be examined more carefully in Chapter 5.

34 The most famous presentation of the claim is made in the Epistle to Diognetus (probably early second century) 6.1: ἔσπαρται κατὰ πάντων τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν ἡ ψυχῆ, καὶ Χριστιανοὶ κατὰ τὰς τοῦ κόσμου πόλεις.
The last of these teachers (and greatest: δυνάμει δὲ οὗτος πρῶτος ἦν) is a surprising mixture of these different elements. He is discovered in Egypt, but is described as a ‘Sicilian’ bee. Why this particular epithet is used has been explained as merely a poetic way of describing his excellence, a reference to Sicilian honey as a byword for top quality, or taking note of τῷ ὄντι, by positing that Clement’s final teacher happened to come from Sicily. These explanations, however, miss the geographic importance of the epithet in the schema we have been tracing.

At the climax of Clement’s intellectual geography we are led back to Sicily: it is thoroughly, yet ambiguously, Greek (like Alexandria), and deeply bound up with the Greek tradition of philosophy. The Platonic Seventh Epistle, for instance, which forms a crucial background to the discussion of verbal and written teaching earlier in the same chapter, gives a purportedly autobiographical account of Plato’s activity in Syracuse and his part in the intrigues between Dion and Dionysius for control of the city. The pivotal teacher, then, in an intellectual journey inexorably moving outwards from the centre of traditional Greek wisdom is, after all, from Sicily, and found hiding in Egypt: not (the reader is led to infer) in the mysterious upper reaches of the Nile either, but in proudly Greek Alexandria. Clement’s intellectual autobiography thus establishes a symbolic geography of knowledge over which Clement is claiming authority.

---

35 On the significance of bees in this passage and elsewhere in the Stromateis, see below Chapter 2.
36 Varro, de Rustica 3.16.14 notes that siculum mel fert palmam, quod ibi thymum bonum est; cf. Virgil, Eclogues 1.54. We also know that Alexandrian marketplaces of the second century did a roaring trade in Sicilian lampreys (as we are informed by Clement at Paedagogus 2.1).
The intellectual authority and legitimacy of what Clement is teaching is buttressed by the core elements of this autobiographical narrative: personal experience of a wide range of teachers, covering the major schools of philosophical thought, represented geographically. More than that, however, the teacher-student relationship foregrounded by the authorial autobiography is replicated in the implied positioning of the audience. Clement’s journey focuses the reader’s attention on the author as student, travelling to sit at the feet of a succession of teachers; such a configuration is repeated by Clement’s preservation of their words, with the reader taking Clement’s part as the student seeking an appropriate educator.

This echoes and develops the teacher-student theme which Clement builds throughout his earlier works. Both the *Protrepticus* and the *Paedagogus* are titled as familiar philosophical tropes of calling an uncommitted audience to a philosophical life, the original *Protrepticus* being a call to the philosophical life by Aristotle; Galen wrote an exhortation to the study of the arts with the same title, and, later, Iamblichus also wrote a philosophical *Protrepticus*. The use of *Paedagogus* may be a Clementine innovation, but its significance in suggesting progressing philosophical education is obvious.\(^3^7\) The text of the *Stromateis*, often assumed to be written for a mature Christian audience rather than competing for a intellectual consumer, in this biographical vignette and elsewhere, invokes an image of a mixed audience of pagans, Christians and the undecided. At several points Clement deliberately highlights the fact that non-Christians will be reading his text;\(^3^8\) the *Stromateis* is still

\(^{37}\) See van den Hoek (2010).

\(^{38}\) E.g. Str. 6.1.1.4: ἐναργῶς οὖν τῶν Ἑλλήνων μαθόντων ἐκ τῶν λεχθησομένων διὰ τῶν δὲ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἀνοσίως τὸν θεοφιλή διώκοντες ἁσβούσαν αὐτοί.
presenting its author as a philosophical teacher aiming to gain the allegiance of a choosy clientele.

This implicit relationship between Clement and his reader is one that fits neatly within the paradigm of the late antique philosophical school presented by John Dillon: a school grouped around a leader, with a small number of intimate disciples, and a larger penumbra of less committed listeners and casual participants.\textsuperscript{39} This is no firm evidence for what kind of institution Clement is actually participating in; the text may well only be evidence for Clement’s conformity to literary conventions, and an attempt to present what may be (for example) functionally a continuation of the synagogue roles of διδάσκαλοι and πρεσβύτεροι as authentically Greek.\textsuperscript{40} Nonetheless, it presents an ideal image of how Clement envisages his role, and his perception of the intellectual high ground. This self-presentation is both a claim to a social legitimacy for Christianity to a Greek audience, and a claim to elite status for Clement within the Christian community.

**THE PHILOSOPHICAL SUCCESSION**

Clement goes on to place himself in a διάδοχη, a philosophical succession, in the continuation of his sketch of intellectual autobiography.\textsuperscript{41} Describing his own educational journey, he concludes:

---


\textsuperscript{40} This is R. van den Broek’s thesis: van den Broek (1990), and van den Broek (1996) 197-205. Cf. n. 71 below on possible Jewish influences on overall structures of the Alexandrian church.

\textsuperscript{41} See Campenhausen (1969) 159-60 on the philosophical roots of this concept; also Brent (1993) 367-89, and Mansfeld (1992) 20-43. Most recently on the function of the διάδοχη/\textit{successio} in early
ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν τὴν ἀληθὴ τῆς μακαρίας σώζοντες διδασκαλίας παράδοσιν εὐθὺς ἀπὸ Πέτρου τε καὶ Ἰακώβου Ἰωάννου τε καὶ Παύλου τῶν ἁγίων ἀπόστολῶν, παῖς παρὰ πατρὸς ἐκδεχόμενος (όλιγοι δὲ οἱ πατράσιν ὁμοίοι), ἦκον δὴ σὺν θεῷ καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ προγονικὰ ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἀποστολικὰ καταθησόμενοι σπέρματα. καὶ εὐ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἀγαλλιάσονται, οὐχὶ τῇ ἐκφράσει ἥκον δὴ σὺν θεῷ καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ προγονικὰ καὶ ἀποστολικὰ καταθησόμενα σπέρματα. καὶ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἀγαλλιάσονται, οὐχὶ τῇ ἐκφράσει ἥκον δὴ σὺν θεῷ καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ προγονικὰ καὶ ἀποστολικὰ καταθησόμενα σπέρματα. καὶ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἀγαλλιάσονται, οὐχὶ τῇ ἐκφράσει ἥκον δὴ σὺν θεῷ καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ προγονικὰ καὶ ἀποστολικὰ καταθησόμενα σπέρματα. καὶ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἀγαλλιάσονται, οὐχὶ τῇ ἐκφράσει ἥκον δὴ σὺν θεῷ καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ προγονικὰ καὶ ἀποστολικὰ καταθησόμενα σπέρματα. καὶ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἀγαλλιάσονται, οὐχὶ τῇ ἐκφράσει ἥκον δὴ σὺν θεῷ καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ προγονικὰ καὶ ἀποστολικὰ καταθησόμενα σπέρματα. καὶ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἀγαλλιάσονται, οὐχὶ τῇ ἐκφράσει ἥκον δὴ σὺν θεῷ καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ προγονικὰ καὶ ἀποστολικὰ καταθησόμενα σπέρματα. καὶ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἀγαλλιάσονται, οὐχὶ τῇ ἐκφράσει ἥκον δὴ σὺν θεῷ καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ προγονικὰ καὶ ἀποστολικὰ καταθησόμενα σπέρματα. καὶ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἀγαλλιάσονται, οὐχὶ τῇ ἐκφράσει ἥκον δὴ σὺν θεῷ καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ προγονικὰ καὶ ἀποστολικὰ καταθησόμενα σπέρματα. καὶ εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι ἀγαλλιάσονται, οὐχὶ τῇ ἐκφράσει ἥκον δὴ σὺν θεῷ καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ προγονικὰ καὶ ἀποστολικὰ καταθησόμενα σπέρματα.

Well, preserving the true tradition of the blessed doctrine derived directly [διδασκαλίας παράδοσιν εὐθὺς] from the holy apostles, Peter, James, John, and Paul – the sons receiving it from the father (but few were like the fathers) – some came by God’s will to us also to deposit those ancestral and apostolic seeds. And well I know that they will exult; I do not mean delighted with this exposition [ἐκφράσει], but solely on account of the preservation of the truth by this note-taking [μόνῃ δὲ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὑποσημείωσιν τηρήσει]. For such a model as this [ἡ τοιάδε ὑποτύπωσις], will, I think, be agreeable to a soul desirous of guarding, secured, the blessed tradition.

In many ways, this claim looks like the list of Apostolic Succession presented by Clement’s near-contemporary Irenaeus in Adversus haereses 3:

Θεμελιώσαντες οὖν καὶ οἰκοδομήσαντες οἱ μακάριοι ἀπόστολοι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, Λίνῳ τὴν τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς λειτουργίαν ἐνεχείρισαν· τοῦτο τοῦ Λίνου Παῦλος ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Τιμόθεον ἐπιστολαῖς μέμνηται. Διαδέχεται δὲ αὐτὸν Ἀνέγκλητος, μετὰ τούτου δὲ τρίτῳ τόπῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπόστολων τὴν ἐπισκοπὴν κληροῦται Κλήμης, ὁ καὶ ἑωρακὼς τοὺς μακάριους ἀποστόλους καὶ συμβεβληκὼς αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἔτι ἀναφέρεται τὸ κήρυγμα τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ τὴν παράδοσιν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐχον, οὐ μόνος ἔτι γὰρ πολλοὶ ὑπελείποντο τότε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπόστολων δεδιδαχήμενοι... διαδεξαμένου τὸν Ἀνίκητον Σωτῆρος, νῦν δωδεκάτῳ τόπῳ τὸς ἐπισκοπῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπόστολων κατέχει κλήρον Ἐλεύθερος. τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ διδαχῇ ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπόστολων ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ παράδοσις καὶ τῷ τῆς ἀληθείας κήρυγμα κατήντηκεν εἰς

Christian authors, and their non-Christian contemporaries, see Eshleman (2012) 177-258 (Chapters 6 and 7).

42 Str. 1.1.11.2-3.
After founding and building up the church, the blessed apostles delivered the ministry of episcopate to Linus; Paul mentions this Linus in the letters to Timothy. Anacletus succeeded him, and after him, in the third place from the apostles, Clement received the lot of the episcopate; he had seen the apostles and met with them and still had the apostolic preaching in his ears and the tradition before his eyes. He was not alone, for many were then still alive who had been taught by the apostles... After Soter had succeeded Anicetus, now in the twelfth place from the apostles Eleutherus holds the episcopate. With the same sequence and doctrine the tradition from the apostles in the church, and the preaching of truth, has come down to us. There is a complete proof that the life-giving faith is one and the same, preserved and transmitted in truth in the church from the apostles up till now.44

Both accounts pivot around παράδοσις/traditio to establish apostolic authority for a particular position of authority.45 It is a strident enough claim to apostolicity that Sozomen, in the fifth century, can write that Clement ‘followed in the διαδοχή of the apostles’.46

The new inflections which Clement places on Irenaeus’ theme of apostolic succession is particularly interesting if we consider the likelihood that Clement is actually working from an Irenaean starting-point. Irenaeus and Clement are still commonly read as coming from quite distinct, and even contrasting, Christian cultures of the second century; in Robert M. Grant’s words, Irenaeus represents ‘the majority views outside Alexandria, where Christian

43 *Adversus haereses* 3.3.3. The text followed is that of the Sources Chrétienes edition.
44 Trans. Grant (1997).
45 See van den Broek (1996) 200-1, and Eshleman (2012) 177-180, with references, on the general theoretical issues concerning succession lists, and on apostolic claims amongst early Christians, 243-256.
speculative thought was closer to the Gnosticism he fought’.\(^{47}\) This line of doctrinal division between Irenaeus’ identification of philosophical elements (in his heretical construction of ‘Gnosticism’) as part of the cancer of heresy, and Clement’s fascination with and adoption of precisely those same philosophical elements (in his positive version of Christian ‘gnosticism’)\(^{48}\) goes back to luminaries of *Dogmengeschichte* such as Harnack and Loofs,\(^{49}\) a position summed up neatly by one scholar: ‘Lugdunum and Alexandria have seemed remote from one another, apparently going in quite separate ways’.\(^{50}\)

However, there has long been evidence of Clement’s familiarity with Irenaeus; in the networks of early Christianity, Gaul and Egypt could be surprisingly closely connected. Irenaeus’ popularity in Egypt has been confirmed by the discovery of a papyrus fragment which must have ‘reached Oxyrhynchus not long after the ink was dry on the author’s manuscript’;\(^{51}\) reciprocally, Irenaeus seems familiar with treatises recently found in Coptic versions at Nag Hammadi.\(^{52}\) This is merely setting the context; more specifically, as far back as 1902, F.J.A. Hort noted the striking parallel between Clement’s discussion of clean and unclean animals of Leviticus 11:2 (cf. Deuteronomy 14:3) and Irenaeus’.\(^{53}\) Other studies have found remarkable resemblances in the way in which the two authors approach the exegesis

\(^{47}\) Grant (1997) 1.

\(^{48}\) On Clement’s use of the term *gnosis*/gnostic see Méhat (1980).

\(^{49}\) See Harnack (1896-99) Vol. 2, Ch. 5-6; and Loofs’ delineation of the ‘realist’ and ‘spiritualist’ strands of tradition in Loofs (1906).

\(^{50}\) Patterson (1997) 497.

\(^{51}\) P.Oxy. 3.405; Roberts (1979) 23.

\(^{52}\) Grant (1997) 1.

\(^{53}\) *Stromateis* 7.18.109 and *Adversus haereses* 5.8.3. Hort and Mayor (1902) 356-7.
of Genesis 1-2, the incarnation, and the characterisation of Valentinian heresy, all of which can best be explained by Clement’s dependence on Irenaeus.\textsuperscript{54}

The weight of this evidence has pushed the scholarly consensus toward a recognition that Clement knew the work of his near-contemporary and at several points is undeniably directly indebted to him.\textsuperscript{55} This connection is significant for the way we read Clement’s presentation of the relationship between teacher, episcopacy, and Christian community; Clement’s evasion of episcopal authority becomes more polemical and pointed, and his defence of the adoption of philosophy in a project of ‘gnostic’ perfection in the face of Irenaeus’ philosophy-free succession of catholic doctrine more subversively strident.\textsuperscript{56}

Although the main thrust of Irenaeus’ argument is the named and visible διάδοχη, list of succession, which is lacking in Clement, even to the point of the periphrastic omission of the name of his own teacher (the ‘Sicilian bee’, generally assumed to be Pantaenus), the point of the lists is still the same: to establish apostolic authority for a particular role of authority by demonstrating a succession of authentic guardians of the tradition in that role.\textsuperscript{57} Irenaeus is quite clear, too, about the institutional position of that succession:

\textsuperscript{54} Harrison (1992); Patterson (1997); Löhr (1992).
\textsuperscript{55} Most bluntly, Löhr (1992) 383 (and 388 n.15). The tipping point in this consensus was probably Le Boulluec (1985) Vol. 2.
\textsuperscript{56} Eshleman (2012) 245-6 notes the contrast between Irenaeus and Clement over the locus of apostolic authority, without commenting on the connection between them. Similarly, Campenhausen (1969) 200-201 acknowledges Clement’s familiarity with Irenaeus’ concept of episcopal succession and remarks simply that it ‘is never mentioned by him’.
\textsuperscript{57} On this parallel see van den Broek (1996) 200-1. See also Campenhausen (1969) 162, on the refusal to name predecessors.
Traditionem itaque apostolorum in toto mundo manifestatam, in omni Ecclesia adest perspicere omnibus qui vera velint videre, et habemus adnumerare eos qui ab apostolis instituti sunt episcopi in ecclesiis et successores eorum usque ad nos.\textsuperscript{58}

Therefore, that the tradition of the apostles has been made public throughout the whole world is presented for all in the whole church who wish to see the truth to perceive, and we are able to reckon up those who were instituted as bishops in the churches by the apostles, and their successors, even up to our own time.

By contrast, Clement’s account seems much less prescriptive; Kendra Eshlemann suggests that ‘Clement has an expansive notion of apostolic succession, to which teaching and imitation of the apostles, rather ordination, are central’.\textsuperscript{59} This is perhaps casting the net too widely: although not institutionally guaranteed, it is clear that Clement viewed the claim to apostolic succession as just as restricted and limited. The guarantor of fidelity in Clement’s account is not the episcopacy, or any other official role, for that matter, but the preservation of the tradition (defined as teaching) in this particular kind of model, pattern or sketch (ἡ τοιάδε ὑποτύπωσις).

This is deliberate technical literary language, and the passage is marked by several of these significant terms. ὑποτύπωσις is a word explicitly connected to rhetorical education; Quintilian describes the figure of ὑποτύπωσις as a literary form of vivid description.\textsuperscript{60} Clement himself penned a (lost) work titled Hypotyposes, and probably attempted a kind of vivid description in the work – discussions of ‘passages of scripture with interpretation and

\textsuperscript{58} Aversus haereses 3.3.1 (only extant in the Latin).
\textsuperscript{59} Eshleman (2012) 245 n.98.
\textsuperscript{60} Inst.Or. 9.2.40.
detail added. The wider currency of the term is attested by Clement’s contemporary, Sextus Empiricus, titling his work (on Pyrrhonian scepticism) the Hypotyposeis.

Alongside this we have two other technical literary terms – ἔκφρασις, and ὑποσημείωσις. The former of these, like ὑποτύπωσις, was an important term of literary technique: the vivid verbal description of works of art, and formed an important feature of educational progymnasmata, and again later gave rise to whole works entitled Ekphraseis. Then there is the rather recherché ὑποσημείωσις, ‘note-taking’: while not a technical rhetorical term, it sits comfortably alongside this hyper-literary vocabulary. There is one prior attestation of the word in Greek literature, in the neo-Pythagorean Nicomachus’ Harmonicum enchiridion, used at the outset to describe the process of creating a handbook to the subject in question; Diogenes Laërtius, contemporary to Clement, uses it to describe the ‘note-taking’ engaged in by a certain cobbler called Simon, who used to converse with Socrates. The published versions of these notes (according to Diogenes) are the first instances of Socratic dialogue as a literary form. All of these uses imply philosophical and literary overtones, connected to the exposition and tradition of authoritative teaching. The word occurs in one other place

---

61 Osborn (2005) 78; see also Osborn and Duckworth (1985), and Osborn (1990). For more on the genre of the Hypotyposeis, see below Chapter 2.
62 The term originally refers to a rhetorical figure, but later extends to become a title of works characterised by such a technique; the fourth-century Ekphraseis of the Sophist Callistratus, for instance, is a deliberate attempt to follow in the generic footsteps of Philostratus’ Eikones.
63 On the relationship between Clement and Diogenes Laërtius, see below Chapter 3. His floruit is usually dated to the late second or early third century, although there is a degree of dispute over this: Brent (1993) 372.
64 Diogenes Laërtius, VP 2.122.3.
65 After Clement, Iamblichus uses it in a similar way at Vita Plotini 2.104.
in Clement, there specifically in the context of the explication of complex texts which need allegorical or symbolic interpretation.\textsuperscript{66}

Such a concentration of technical rhetorical and literary terminology in this programmatic passage cannot be merely coincidental; the highly polished form and presentation of the work is clearly being emphasized. This is where the force of Clement’s contrast with Irenaeus lies: Clement’s version of apostolic succession is not a broader or more generous one, open to a larger class of successors, nor is it a simple replacement of bishops as successors with teachers as successors. Rather, it is in the particularities of the handing down of the tradition that the proof of genuine filiation lies. Indeed, in many ways, other kinds of apostolic succession which rely on person-to-person lists are open to any Christian grouping to claim,\textsuperscript{67} as Clement points out: Valentinus and Basilides are just as able to claim precise apostolic connections as Irenaeus or the bishops of Rome.\textsuperscript{68}

It is instead the level of \textit{paideia}, the literary and intellectual presentation of the truth handed down, that guarantees the authentic preservation of the apostolic tradition for the Church. This is quite a difficult kind of authority to defend and promote, especially compared to

\textsuperscript{66} Str. 2.1.1.2: καὶ ὡς τὰ μάλιστα τὸ ἐπικεκρυμμένον τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας, τὸ συμβολικὸν τοῦτο καὶ ἀινιγματώδες εἶδος... Lampe (1961) s.v. ὑποσημείωσις refers us to both passages of Clement, glossing the term as ‘summary’ in the former instance, and then ‘explanation’ in the latter; Lampe also refers us to the proem of Cyril of Alexandria’s commentary on the gospel of John, where it refers to Cyril’s summaries of the chapters of the gospel.

\textsuperscript{67} Eshleman (2012) 243–6. Examination of the texts in the Nag Hammadi library shows that the bulk of the dialogues seek to establish apostolic support for their teachings, even though the keynote of unity and agreement found in more ‘catholic’ authors like Clement and Irenaeus is lacking, and the authority of various apostles is sometimes set against each other: see Perkins (1980) and Perkins (1994) 156–64.

\textsuperscript{68} Str. 7.17.106.4, 108.1. This is particularly noteworthy if we accept the argument of Markschies (1992) 299–300 that Clement’s report of the claims of these groups is false.
episcopal or academic succession, but is therefore more secure. It requires an educated elite audience of pepideumenoi who can appreciate and evaluate the paideia of a particular author, and is open to challenge by anyone who considers themselves able to compete on the same plane of competitive intellectual showmanship, as long as they are willing to compete. In many ways, it lies closer to the modern academic approach to theology than the normative approach of the intervening centuries, in which institutional and administrative authority have been generally inseparable from teaching authority in the episcopacy or clergy.

This is, however, unsurprising in the context of the Second Sophistic: displays of rhetorical virtuosity were more often than not agonistic, and the competitive edge to such displays was never far from the surface. Moreover, in the specific context of philosophical education, it was precisely this kind of intellectual aggression, the demonstration of superior education and skill, that provided a teacher with the ability to stand out in the marketplace of ideas and to gather a core of disciples and penumbra of students around him. That a Christian teacher – particularly one with apologetic purposes in mind – should buy into such methods of self-fashioning and even privilege the power of paideia as marker of authority, should not shock us: it is also in this arena of demonstrable education that boundaries can be pushed and marginal identities can argue for their validity and find a public voice.

---

71 Paideia ‘provides the means for the overturning of such hegemonies by making power and prestige accessible to those who are notionally excluded’. Whitmarsh (2001) 130. On the specifically Christian appropriation of designation as philosophy to claim respect in the Roman world, see Löhrr (2010) 166-7.
Thus we see two strands inseparably entwined in Clement’s authorial self-presentation: on the one hand, a philosophical teacher, and on the other, the bearer of the apostolic succession. This still may seem odd to modern scholars, educated in the still-lingering paradigm of the dichotomy between Greco-Roman philosophy and Christian inspiration. Undoubtedly the dual self-conception lies at the heart of modern debates about the formal status of Clement in the church: how does the role of philosophical teacher fit in or conflict with ecclesiastical roles and centres of authority? Often the question of Clement’s relationship to such formal offices has been expressed solely in the narrow biographo-historicist terms of whether Clement himself was a presbyter in the Alexandrian church.

That there was such a formal office, one amongst a number, in the Alexandrian church of the second century is not in dispute.\(^{72}\) Clement quotes as accepted and respected Christian texts the Didache, the epistles of Clement of Rome, and those of Ignatius of Antioch, all of which presuppose ordained offices of episkopos/presbyteros and diakonos (in the case of Ignatius, in a clear three-fold order). Clement’s own usage of terminology, familiar from other second-century (and earlier) sources, of these offices which continued as the ordained

\(^{72}\) The clearest concise introduction to offices in the early church is still Chadwick (1967) 45-53. For a more nuanced and more recent overview, with attendant useful bibliography, see Bradshaw (2002) 192-210, who particularly notes the strong possibility of local diversity in the practices, origins and functions of church offices in the earliest churches. Pearson (2006) (also in Pearson (1986) and Pearson (2007), who notes at 99 that her position has a ‘growing scholarly consensus’), van den Broek (1990) and Ritter (1987) all deal more specifically with the church in Alexandria, and accept a construction which sees the office of presbyter in the second century as a direct descendent of the synagogue role of the same name, contra Bauer (1971) who argued, influentially, for heretical, gnostic origins of Alexandrian Christianity, a history later suppressed after the success of ‘catholic’ Christianity in the third century; a third theory, convincingly refuted in Pearson (2007), is offered by Modrzejewski (1997) 227-31, who argues that an original Jewish Christianity was almost totally wiped out after the revolt of AD115-117 and replaced by a ‘Greek and Egyptian pagano-Christianity’.
leadership of the church,73 and some of which later disappeared, such as widows,74 also argue for a formal hierarchical structure. It is likely that each Christian community in Alexandria was under the direction of its own presbyter,75 and from among these (according to the account given by Jerome) one was chosen to serve as bishop.76 By the third century, however, the model of monarchical episcopacy had gained near-universal approval and adoption,77 including in Alexandria in the person of Bishop Demetrius,78 whose period overlaps with Clement – although Alexandria seemed to maintain more of a collegiate notion of the presbytery, even after Demetrius.79 Clement, however, writes in a period when the scope of the offices delineated by these terms is still a matter of negotiation, and before there is any evidence that Alexandria recognised the office of a single, authoritative bishop.

Arguments over Clement’s clerical status, in the absence of other evidence, revolve primarily around whether the word πρεσβύτερος is applied to Clement,80 and the evidence is

73 Indeed, the use of the word κλῆρος ‘clergy’, ‘as a designation for ordained ministers’ is first attested by Clement (Quis dives salvetur 42) and adopted generally after him: Bradshaw (2002) 204.
74 On which, see below and cf. e.g. Tertullian De virginibus velandis 9, John Chrysostom, Hom. 31 for widows. These had evidently developed from those roles which figure so largely in the Pauline and pastoral epistles, e.g. 1 Cor. 12-13; 1 Tim. 3,5; Titus 1.
75 Following the model of the synagogue, possibly: see van den Broek (1990) 188-91; Ritter (1987) 164.
78 See Pearson (2006) 337-8, who notes that this process of centralisation was not really complete until the time of Dionysius the Great (247-64).
80 The most strident and influential attack on the tradition of Clement as a presbyter comes in Koch (1921). Osborn notes that ‘the claim that Clement was a priest was virtually destroyed by Koch’, but nonetheless seems to tend towards admitting Clement’s clerical status – ‘his role as teacher might be fused with his role as priest’, Osborn (2005) 14 (and n.40). Méhat (1966) 54-8 believes that Clement was a presbyter, as does van den Hoek (1997) 77-8; Cosaert (2008) 8 contends that Clement was a layman, at least while a teacher in Alexandria (that is, he may have been ordained by Alexander following his departure, a hypothesis proposed in an earlier work by Osborn (1957) 4; also the position maintained by Neymeyr (1989) 48-9; van den Broek (1996) 201 is more stridently in the ‘lay’ camp.
scant. A letter of Alexander, bishop of Cappadocia and later of Jerusalem, preserved by Eusebius, and a disputed reading of one passage in Clement’s own writing (which, depending on a single vowel, may lend credence to one side or the other) is all there is to go on.

The most solid conclusion to take from all this, and one hitherto unnoticed in the scholarly literature, is that if Clement was a presbyter, he does not emphasise it or employ his status as such for rhetorical or polemical purposes. It must be that Clement does not make clear his lay or ordained status because such a distinction is not germane to Clement’s priorities. So the facet of the question that concerns us is not whether Clement was ‘ordained’ or exercised some kind of recognisably presbyteral office, but how he negotiates the role of the presbytery and other offices within the church hierarchy with his own, separate, claims to authority.

This question is relevant because in spite of Clement’s silence over his own clerical status, the offices of the church are presented in Clement’s oeuvre as important and even structurally necessary to the authentic Christian community. πρεσβύτερος in Clement’s usage often refers specifically to hierarchical office in the church – more than once in conjunction with other hierarchical terminology, such as ἐπίσκοπος, διάκονος, χήρα, or

---

81 HE 6.11.6.
82 The passage is Paedagogus 1.6.37.3; the disputed reading as to whether Clement refers to himself as a shepherd, or identifies with the flock, is the basis of the conclusions of Koch (1921) 44, and occasioned the rejoinder of Quatember (1946) 15 to Koch’s whole argument: ‘Ist die Stelle unsicher, dann ist sie für alle’. For further bibliography, see Neymeyr (1989) 47-9.
λαϊκός. At the end of the *Paedagogus*, for example, after a concatenation of biblical exhortations to ethical behaviour, Clement summarizes:

μυρίας δὲ ὅσαι ὑποθῆκαι εἰς πρόσωπα ἐκλεκτὰ διατείνουσαι ἐγγεγράφαται ταῖς βιβλίοις ταῖς ἁγίαις, ἂδὲ ἡμῖν πρεσβυτέροις, ἂδὲ ἐπισκόποις, ἄλλα χήραις, περὶ ὧν ἂλλος ἄλλος ἄλλη λέγειν καιρός. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ ἀινιγμάτων, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ παραβολῶν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ἐξεστιν ωφελείσθαι. ἀλλ’ ὅπειρον ἐκεῖνον ἔκαθήμενον καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔκαθήμενον, πρὸς ὃν ἡμῖν βαδιστέον. καὶ δὴ ὡρα γε ἐμοὶ μὲν πεπαῦσθαι τῆς παιδαγωγίας, ὑμᾶς δὲ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ διδάσκαλου.

Numberless such commands are written in the holy books, directed to chosen persons: some to presbyters, some to bishops, some to deacons, others to widows (concerning whom there might be another opportunity to speak). Many things expressed through riddles, and many expressed through parables, are able to benefit those who read them. But it is not up to me, says the tutor, to teach these any longer, and we need a teacher for the interpretation of those sacred words, to whom we must go. And now it is time indeed for me to cease my instruction, and for you to listen to the teacher.

Different parts of scripture pertain to different classes of Christians, and this is clearly a list of delineated offices within a structured church hierarchy. The proper exposition of scripture is worthwhile, runs the logic, because it is of assistance in differing ways to people who hold various formal ecclesial offices. The conclusion, however, presents a challenge: who are the *παιδαγωγός* and the *διδάσκαλος* referred to?

Van den Hoek (admitting ‘the passage is rather complex’) interprets it thus: ‘For their understanding, however, he [sc. Clement] refers not to himself, a mere pedagogue, but to the

---

84 *Paed.* 3.12.97.2-3.
Didaskalos, the Logos itself." More sense can be made of the passage, however, if we also read this as metatextual reference to the titles of Clement’s own works: the text of the Paedagogus itself speaks to us (ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐμόν, φησὶν ὁ Παιδαγωγός), and refers us to the third part of Clement’s trilogy, the Didascalus, probably to be equated to the Stromateis.

At the same time, these titles refer to functions of the divine Logos (this is, after all, why the works are so titled). The elision of Clement’s writings and the educational economy of the Logos as παιδαγωγός and διδάσκαλος is deliberately foregrounded – in the next sentence διδάσκαλος must refer to the Logos, and the conclusory prayer invokes god in these terms: ‘Be gracious to your children, tutor [παιδαγωγός]...’ The role of the human teacher (particularly here as author) is figured as the fundamental conduit between the educative role of the Logos in scripture and the ecclesial hierarchy. The office of ‘teacher’, however, is not itself listed or acknowledged as part of this hierarchy, and is deliberately submerged in the elision of written text and educative Logos.

---

86 The ANF translation seems to suggest this, although rather ambiguously: ‘But it is not my province, says the Instructor, to teach these any longer. But we need a Teacher of the exposition of those sacred words, to whom we must direct our steps.’
87 On the nature of this trilogy and its relationship to Clement’s extant works, see my introduction, pp. 36–40.
88 Paed. 1.1.3 sets out both the educational economy of the Logos and provides the titles of Clement’s major trilogy.
89 Paed. 3.12.98.1: διδασκαλεῖον δὲ ἡ ἐκκλησία ἢδε καὶ ὁ νυμφίος ὁ μόνος διδάσκαλος, ἀγαθὸ πατρὸς ἀγαθὸν θεόν, σοφία γνήσιος, ἀγάμων γνώσεως. (διδασκαλεῖον is Eduard Schwartz’ emendation, followed in Stählin’s critical edition, of ms P’s εἰς καλὸν. The ms reading, however, is compellingly defended by van den Hoek (1997) 65; in either reading, the διδάσκαλος must be the bridegroom and can only be understood as referring to the Logos).
90 Paed. 3.12.101.1: ἱλάθι τοῖς σοῖς, παιδαγωγέ, παιδίοις...
92 Clement refers to himself, as well as Christ, as παιδαγωγός, but reserves the title διδάσκαλος for Christ: van den Hoek (1997) 64. On διδάσκαλος, see Méhat (1966) 61 and Voulet and Le Boulluec (2006) 2.14; on παιδαγωγός, see Marrou (1960) 7–105.
This is particularly interesting in itself, as there was available a model of ‘teacher’ to be found in the Pauline epistles which placed such a role alongside other formal offices which Clement mentions; 1 Cor. 12:28 grades spiritual gifts hierarchically, and places teacher near the top:93 καὶ οὓς μὲν ἔθετο ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ πρῶτον ἀποστόλους, δεύτερον προφήτας, τρίτον διδασκάλους, ἐπεὶ τα δυνάμεις, ἐπεὶ ἀρχισμαται ιμάτων, ἀντιλήψεις, κυβερνήσεις, γένη γλωσσῶν.94 It has also been argued that some Alexandrian congregations had lay teachers who functioned as members of the congregation, and that some teachers functioned as presbyters, following the pattern of synagogue organisation;95 there is some evidence of this pattern continuing in the Egyptian chora into a later period, as when Dionysius refutes the chiliast heresy of Nepos, the bishop of Arsinoe, calling together τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους καὶ διδασκάλους τῶν ἐν ταῖς κώμαις ἀδελφῶν.96 There is no evidence of this office being formally held by anyone in the Alexandrian church, however, until the school of Origen seems to come under episcopal control early in the third century. Certainly, Clement gives no indication of a formal role within the church structures; if it were a continuation of synagogue roles, Clement deliberately overlooks that connection in favour of presenting his authority as ‘soft’ power, wielded by the strength of competitive intellectualism, not by virtue of office.

94 ‘And God has appointed in the church first apostles, second prophets, third teachers; then deeds of power, then gifts of healing, forms of assistance, forms of leadership, various kinds of tongues.’ (NSRV)
96 Eusebius, HE 7.24.6: ‘the presbyters and the teachers of the brethren in the villages’.
Further contours of the relationship between defined ecclesial roles and the Christian teacher can be traced in *Stromateis* 6.13.106.1-2, which talks of the elevation of those who have kept the commandments and lived according to the gospel and Clement’s ‘gnostic’ teaching (κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τελείως βιώσαντας καὶ γνωστικῶς):

οὗτος πρεσβύτερος ἐστι τῷ ὄντι τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ διάκονος ἁληθῆς τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ βουλήσεως, εάν ποιῇ καὶ διδάσκῃ τὰ τοῦ κυρίου, οὐχ ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων χειροτονούμενος ὡδ’, ὃτι πρεσβύτερος, δίκαιος νομιζόμενος, ἀλλ’, ὃτι δίκαιος, ἐν πρεσβυτερίῳ καταλεγόμενος

This man is in reality a presbyter of the church, and a true deacon of the purpose of God, if he does and teaches the things of the lord – not appointed by men, nor considered righteous because he is presbyter, but reckoned in the priesthood because he is righteous.

Although Osborn cites this passage as demonstrating that Clement’s writing ‘shows no sign of tension between priests and teachers,’ it is difficult not to see a subtle ambivalence about the actual concrete manifestation of the church hierarchy on earth. This status of presbyter ‘in reality’ and ‘true’ deacon is contrasted to their perceptible status; the passage goes on: ‘Even if here on earth he is not honoured with the first seat, he will sit on the twenty-four thrones, judging the people’.

There is an assumed gap between recognition of these roles ‘here on earth’ and the real identity in God’s eyes: real priests and real deacons are not necessarily those recognised as such in the earthly church. So, although the hierarchy of the earthly institution is an

---

97 Str. 6.13.106.1-2:
99 Str. 6.13.106.2: κἂν ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ γῆς πρωτοκαθεδρίᾳ μὴ τιμηθῇ, ἐν τοῖς εῖκοσι καὶ τέσσαρι καθεδεῖται θρόνοις τὸν λαὸν κρίνων, ὡς φησιν ἐν τῇ ἀποκαλύψει Ἰωάννης.
imitation of the hierarchy of the hereafter, it can be an imperfect imitation. The ecclesiastical organisation is affirmed by the acceptance of its offices, whilst a separate, more real, standard for advancement in the faith is opened up, of which the temporal economy of power is but a reflection, seen in a glass darkly.

This earthly reflection is not, however, dispensable. We are presented with a symbiosis between the teaching role, mediating the Logos to the officials of the church, and the earthly ecclesial hierarchy, in turn legitimising the role of the teacher against ‘heretical’ pretenders to that mediatory role. In *Stromateis* 7.17, Clement’s ‘gnostic’ teaching is contrasted to heretical Christianity not because it is itself the locus of truth, but because it enters into the church through the correct door, rather than breaking in through a wall:

\[
\text{ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὴν κλεῖν ἔχοντες αὐτοὶ τῆς εἰσόδου, ψευδὴ δὲ τινα καὶ, ὃς φησιν ἢ συνήθεια, ἀντικλεῖδα, δι’ ἢς οὐ τὴν αὐλείαν ἀναπετάσαντες, ὡσπερ ἡμεῖς διὰ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου παραδόσεως εἴσιμεν, παράθυρον δὲ ἀνατεμόντες καὶ διορύξαντες λάθρᾳ τὸ τειχίον τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ὑπερβαίνοντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν, μυσταγωγοὶ τῆς τῶν ἁσβετῶν ψυχῆς καθίστανται.}
\]

Not having the key to the entrance themselves, however, but a false one (as the saying goes, an ‘anti-key’) with which, not throwing wide the doors, like us as we enter in through the tradition of the lord, but cutting through the side-door and treacherously diggin through the wall of the church, they pass over the truth and set themselves up as mystagogues of the

---

100 *Str.* 6.13.107.2: ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ ἐνταῦθα κατὰ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν προκοπαί ἐπισκόπων, πρεσβυτέρων, διακόνων μιμήματα, οἴμαι, ἀγγελικῆς δόξης κάκεινης τῆς οἰκονομίας τυγχάνουσιν, ἢν ἀναμένειν φαοῖν αἱ γραμμαί τοὺς κατ’ ἱερὸς τῶν ἀποστόλων ἐν τελειώσει δικαιοσύνης κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον βεβιωκότας.

101 On Clement’s adoption of the term ‘gnostic’, see Méhat (1980).
soul of the sacrilegious. To prove that the human assemblies they held are younger than the catholic church, not many words are needed.\textsuperscript{102}

The architectural image is of catholicity as submission to the concrete manifestation of the historically continuous church, as it is. The heretics are described as establishing themselves (καθίστανται) as mystagogues of the souls of the impious, implicitly contrasted to those who undergo baptism as recipients of what is outside of and prior to their school-bound interests. The verb καθίστημι is often used in ecclesiastical terms to denote the appointment of clergy,\textsuperscript{103} and seems to be used here almost ironically to highlight the contrast between legitimate holders of office in the church and those who appoint themselves to parodies of Christian ministry.

This is perhaps where Clement’s refusal to appropriate authority to himself as a teacher qua office-bearer makes more sense; succession of teachers is something that Valentinians and the followers of Basilides can also claim;\textsuperscript{104} it remains the case that the earliest Alexandrian Christian teachers known to us by name are precisely these gnostic ‘heretics’: Basilides, Valentinus and Carpocrates.\textsuperscript{105} The more visible and rigid structures of the ordained formal ministry provide a clearer dividing line to demarcate heresy from orthodoxy. For a more tangible example, \textit{Stromateis} 1.19.96.1 criticizes as heretical the use of bread and water in the Eucharist ‘not according to the rule of the church’ (μὴ κατὰ τὸν κανόνα τῆς ἐκκλησίας), showing an orthopraxy that lies outside the control of Clement’s own school; at no point is the ἐκκλησία constructed as co-terminous with Clement’s teaching or scholarly circle. In

\textsuperscript{102} Str. 7.17.106.2-3.

\textsuperscript{103} E.g. Titus 1:5; this is also the first meaning listed in \textit{LPGL}; see van den Hoek (1997) 66 n.34. It is used in this sense in \textit{Paed.} 3.101.3.

\textsuperscript{104} As Clement suggests they do, at Str. 7.17.106.4, 108.1.

\textsuperscript{105} Pearson (2007) 102.
fact, the evidence of subsidiarity to the wider church structure (including its ordained clergy) and moderated practice is the line of defence that separates the legitimate authoritative teacher from the gnostic heretic. Clement implicitly commits himself, therefore, to a hierarchy larger and more comprehensive than just his school whilst maintaining a parallel authority based around his educative role.

We can see a rather daring variation on this pattern near the beginning of the Stromateis. At 1.1.5.1, Clement constructs a comparison of the process of writing with the reception of Holy Communion. The act of committing memories to writing (ὑπομνήματα καταλιμάνειν) is paralleled to the act of remembering which constitutes the Eucharist. Writing from improper motives is described as violating St. Paul’s strictures against taking the sacrament unworthily in 1 Corinthians. The two processes, Christian teaching, and the offering of the Eucharist, are connected as instances of the handing down of authoritative memory, although in different media. At Stromateis 1.10, Jesus’ words of consecration and the eating of the bread are read metaphorically as good teaching and the doing of good deeds: practice follows knowledge. The words of the teacher mirror the words of Christ and the president of

---

106 Annewies van den Hoek’s examination of the vocabulary Clement uses to describe the church, his own teaching, and the teaching of those Clement deems heretical, supports our conclusions: van den Hoek (1997) 71–5. Pressing the evidence to suggest that Clement’s community is an independent house church, following the lead of Peter Lampe’s analysis of Justin Martyr’s community in Rome in Lampe (2003) would be pushing the Alexandrian evidence too far.

107 The parallelism between the life of the true gnostic and the eucharist is a recurring theme throughout the Stromateis; see Itter (2009) 132–8.

108 1 Cor. 11:27-8 at Str. 1.1.5.3.

109 In saying this, I imply nothing about Clement’s eucharistic theology: he certainly knows well the Pauline account, and mentions specifics of church practice in his day at Paed. 2.2.19.4-20.2 and Str. 1.19.96.1 (quoted above).
the Eucharist, preparing and forming the community: ‘preparing the way, as it were, for doing good and leading those who hear into the performance of good deeds’.  

Those who receive this teaching are then described as ‘those who partake [τοὺς...μεταλαμβάνοντας] of the divine words’.  

Although μεταλαμβάνω is not used in 1 Corinthians to describe sacramental partaking, the verb is used twice in Acts in contexts that are suggestive of eucharistic participation.  

The Stromateis thus parallels such sacramental reception with intellectual adherence to Clement. This imagery becomes increasingly entwined:

καὶ τῷ δντι ‘μακάριοι οἱ εἰρηνοποιοί’, οἱ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα κατά τὸν βίον καὶ τήν πλάνην πρὸς τῆς ἀγνοίας πολεμουμένους μεταδιδάσκοντες καὶ μετάγοντες εἰς εἰρήνην τήν ἐν λόγῳ καὶ βίῳ τῷ κατά τὸν θεόν καὶ τοὺς πεινώντας δικαιοσύνην τρέφοντες τῇ τοῦ ἄρτου διανομῇ, εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ψυχαὶ ιδίας ἔχουσαι τροφάς, αἳ μὲν κατ’ ἐπίγνωσιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην αὔξουσαι, αἳ δὲ κατὰ τήν Ἑλληνικὴν νεμόμεναι φιλοσοφίαν...  

And truly ‘blessed are the peace-makers’, who instructing [μεταδιδάσκοντες] those who are at war in their life and errors here, leading them round to the peace which is in the word and the life following god, and nourishing those ‘that hunger after righteousness’ by the distribution of the bread. For each soul has its own proper nutriment; some growing by knowledge and science, and others feeding on the Hellenic philosophy...  

This vein of description of the authorial work of the Christian teacher systematically connects Clement’s words, the words of Scripture, the divine Logos, and the Bread (of

110 Str. 1.10.64.4: οἷον ἑτοιμάζων τῇ εὐποιίᾳ τήν ὁδὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τήν εὐεργεσίαν ἄγων τοὺς ἄκοιντας.  
111 Str. 1.1.6.3: τοὺς τῶν θείων μεταλαμβάνοντας λόγων.  
112 At 2:46 and 27:33-4. See Johnson (1992) and Fitzmyer (1998) ad loc. The verb is also employed twice in the New Testament when using agricultural produce as a metaphor for spiritual advancement, at Heb. 6:7-8 and 1 Tim. 2:6. Interestingly, this precisely the image by which Clement goes on to describe his work as a writer at Str. 1.7.1: ὁποτέρως δὲν ὁ τοῦ κυρίου ἐργάτης σπείρῃ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς πυρόν καὶ τοὺς στάχυς αὐξήσῃ τε καὶ θερίσῃ, θείος ὄντως ἀναφανήσεται γεωργός.  
113 Str. 1.1.7.2-3.
Clement equates his own act of memorialisation (repeating in written form what has been remembered) to the liturgical action of the Eucharist. Both are forms of mediation of spiritual sustenance from the divine *Logos*. Although the logic of his claim to authority relies on the notion of authority subsiding in the clergy as liturgical presenters of Christ, a parallel and separate authority is claimed for the teacher.\(^{115}\)

This is an interesting line to tread; Clement’s self-positioning sets him against both institutional roles on the one hand, concretizing around the increasingly powerful bishop, Demetrius, as well against against positions taken up by Valentinians and Basilideans, focused on claims to teaching authority similar to Clement’s, on the other. These positions, however, aren’t necessarily themselves historically fixed points of orientation, but rhetorical constructs against which Clement sharpens the outline of his vision of the Christian community. Clement constructs his own role as uniquely able to deal with the intellectual challenge of heresy, both protected within the organisational structures of the ordered, visible church, and at the same time intellectual flexible enough to tackle their teaching head-on, without resorting to only (disputable) claims of institutional filiation.

His creation of the possible balancing role of the Christian teacher, interpreting the scriptures, and reading the Greek philosophical tradition for the Christian community, as separate from the episcopacy as the locus of Church unity, is one that must have appealed to

---

115 There is little doubt that presidency at the Eucharist was by this stage firmly in the hands of the presbyteral hierarchy; cf. Ignatius of Antioch, *Ep*. 6.8, and see Bradshaw (1983) 12–13. Nonetheless, my argument does not rely on this. Even if presidency over the Eucharist were freely exercised, the sacramental act itself is clearly seen as a communal act of the church, and as such governed by authority separate and beyond Clement’s own.
a church which wanted to be a home for the elite and intellectual of Alexandria as well as the poor,\textsuperscript{116} challenged by disintegration into sects and factions. That such an attempted balance would lead to conflict seems, in hindsight, almost inevitable,\textsuperscript{117} if we judge from the expulsion of the charismatic teacher Origen by his bishop, Demetrius; some have even suggested that Clement’s own departure from Alexandria was the result of a similar power struggle.\textsuperscript{118} Nonetheless, Clement’s construction of separated teaching and institutional focuses of authority is one of the more interesting paths of early Christian development never taken.

**CONCLUSION**

The role which Clement played in the Alexandrian church in the second century, and his relationship with the offices of the church, will, undoubtedly, remain unanswerable in most of its details; but whatever the biographical-historical ‘facts’ may have been, what is preserved is a construction of how Clement wanted those facts to be experienced and lived by both his own Christian community, and those who looked in from it edges and from the outside. Most of the approaches taken to Clement and his role in the church have seen his work as a reflection of a progression from one fixed set of definite historical relationships to another, ‘from the Christian community to an institutional church’;\textsuperscript{119} but our approach has seen his texts as dynamic actors in the process of constructing an identity for the church.


\textsuperscript{117} Tension between teachers and ecclesiastical authority in Clement’s day is suggested by Méhat (1966) 56; also by van den Broek (1996) 201.

\textsuperscript{118} Pearson (2006) 242, following Nautin (1961) 18, 140.

Clement positions himself as the guardian of the apostolic tradition, but one who guards that tradition for a church much wider than his school. His works presents a careful negotiation between a teaching authority based on demonstration of elite paideia and an institutional church. Ordained office-holders, an ecclesiastical hierarchy, are present as a necessary institution, but are not presented as authoritative in a teaching or doctrinal capacity: that kind of authority remains the preserve of those who can agonistically prove themselves true successors by demonstrable literary and intellectual prowess. At the same time, the structures of the church and its ministry provide legitimacy for the Christian teacher and a means to distinguish true paideia from the imitations of those deemed heretics. In Clement’s construction, the succession of intellectual Christian teachers, educated above and beyond most ordinary Christians, is a necessary conduit between the Logos and the church, but only insofar as those teachers remain in contact with and under the liturgical authority of the church.

Bradshaw rightly summarizes recent trends in research by noting the increasing recognition of ‘varied patterns of leadership in different early Christian communities, and also of a variety of influences in bringing those patterns about’. 120 This cannot, however, be simply equivalent to talking about different local churches adopting different patterns. Rather, in an highly interconnected second-century Greco-Roman world, networks between Christian centres like Rome, Alexandria, Lyons, Antioch, and Jerusalem are surprisingly close; Clement would eventually cease to be seen as the presiders within a priestly people, and become instead a priesthood acting on behalf of “the laity”.

120 Bradshaw (2002) 194.
is both accepting and reconfiguring textual constructions of the church from Irenaeus in Lyons, Clement of Rome, and Ignatius of Antioch, and balancing them with models of teachers found in philosophical schools. In an era in which boundaries between educated non-Christian, ‘catholic’ Christian, and ‘heretical’ circles of culture and literature are porous, Clement picks from multiple interpretations of existing structures, and constructs authority by his configuration of practices of reading and composition.
2. ‘A PATCHWORK OF Gnostic Notes’
GENRE AS SELF-DEFINITION

Henry Chadwick described it as ‘a baffling and enigmatic work to read,’¹ and David Dawson has pinned it down as ‘a lengthy, rambling series of obscurely arranged ruminations’.² Not only has Clement as an historical figure puzzled commentators, the Stromateis has also presented to its readers as a literary enigma.³ The problem is its structure: a motley compendium of quotations, musings, philosophical speculation, interpretation of texts from both the Classical and the Biblical canons. This seemingly random arrangement is the most distinguishing characteristic of the work; so much so that it often goes by the English generic title of ‘The Miscellanies’, to forewarn readers of its eclectic contents. Properly, however, its title is Τίτου Φλαύιου Κλήμεντος τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν γνωστικῶν ὑπομνημάτων στρωματεῖς, ‘A Patchwork (?) of Gnostic Notes regarding the True Philosophy, by Titus Flavius Clement’,⁴ and it is as a patchwork that this chapter will seek to examine the Stromateis, with a close eye on its generic features.

For all the bafflement, this eclectic style of composition was quite popular in the second century.⁵ It is only recently that this kind of literature from the ancient world has begun to

---

³ A rare exception to the bafflement is Morgan (2011) 51, who describes the work, along with Lucian’s essays as ‘among the most sophisticated productions of the age’.
⁴ On the full title, see above, Chapter 1 n.9. On the translation of the word στρωματείς as ‘patchwork’, see below, this chapter.
⁵ Morgan (2011) 49. Extant examples include works by Aulus Gellius, Aelian, Plutarch and Athenaeus, and many more lost works are attested. See König and Whitmarsh (2007) 3.
receive serious scholarly attention: the literary artistry involved in such projects has increasingly been appreciated, and has been coupled with the broader recognition of the cultural and political significance of the practices of reading and writing. It is within this literary matrix that the oddity starts to make sense, and in the form of the work itself we can see Clement’s negotiations between his Greek cultural identity, Roman political power and his Christian faith. This kind of interrogation of textual form is particularly important for early Christianity, which placed such emphasis on the written articulations of the faith.

The approach most scholars have taken to the Stromateis, however, is to ignore how Clement has written, and instead to mine the text for particular chunks of what Clement has written, either discarding Clement himself as a framework and concentrating on the fragments he preserves; or else rearranging what he says in the search for systematic doctrine. If literary structure is appreciated at all, it is treated as a matter of formal organisation, a static teaching tool. An example of this latter tendency is Louis Roberts’ article on ‘the Literary Form of the Stromateis’, which claims that ‘the sequence of texts in the Stromateis involves logical...development,’ and suggests that there is no disorder in the laying out of the content: ‘the logical succession...gradually brings out what is potentially present in the previous texts.’ In the process of careful reading, an audience can extract from the text its

---

7 See, for example, the work on Aulus Gellius by Holford-Strevens (2003), Keulen (2009) and Gunderson (2009), on Athenaeus by Braund and Wilkins (2002), on Plutarch, Oikonomopoulou (2007) and Klotz and Oikonomopoulou (2011); on the cultural significance as well as the literary definitions of the miscellany, Morgan (2007) 257-73. More broadly, see König and Whitmarsh (2007).
8 Munck (1933) 40.
The problem with Roberts’ interpretation, however, is that no-one has yet been able to demonstrate convincingly any such logical ordering (or at least convincingly enough for anyone else to agree); indeed, it only confronts the issue of the deliberate disorder of the work by denying its existence, claiming that it is not, really, disordered at all.\footnote{For a recent, detailed, but flawed example, see Itter (2009) 33-77; see in particular the chart at 77; the structure of the \textit{Stromateis} is explained by numerology: its eight books combine with the three of the \textit{Paedagogus} and the single book of the \textit{Protrepticus} to symbolically represent both a Platonic ascent of the soul and an allegorical reading of the priestly activities leading up to Yom Kippur. The main objection to the theory, apart from the uncertainly of the identity of the eighth book of the \textit{Stromateis} and the relationship of the ‘trilogy’, is that it leaves structure and content with often no discernible connection. Cf. my comments on this plan in the Introduction to this thesis.}

Is it just not very well written, then? We know, from the other extant works of Clement, that he could construct a structured coherent argument; we know he was well educated, intelligent and sophisticated, if only from the sheer volume of material he must have read to collate what he does \textit{in the way} that he does; St. Jerome calls him ‘omnium eruditissimus.’\footnote{Jerome, \textit{Ep.} 70.4.} The chaotic structure of the \textit{Stromateis}, we should assume, is deliberate and serves some higher intellectual purpose. In this chapter, I hope to unravel at least a little bit of the puzzle about the form of the \textit{Stromateis} by looking at the form as a dynamic strategy used by Clement as part of his programme of education, rather than an ill-made reliquary from which doctrine must be extracted.

The work plays with the tension between order and disorder on a number of levels: in the choice of genre, Clement foregrounds this as a theme, and through manipulation of generic markers and conventions, forces the reader to engage with the construction of the text
itself. Part of Clement’s miscellanistic drive is to create a dynamic between reader and writer, in which authority and interpretation are set up as both a lesson and a challenge for the audience. Further, by putting the text back into its context, the ways in which issues of ordering information and memory will be seen in their political context, as reflections of and responses to imperialising discourses.

**GENERIC EXPECTATIONS**

At inordinatam istam, et confusaneam, quasi silvam, aut farraginem perhiberi, quia non tractim, et continenter, sed saltuatim scribimus, et vellicatim, tantum abest uti doleamus, ut etiam titulum non sane alium, quam miscellaneorum exquisiverimus, in quis graecum tamen Helianum, latinum sequimur Gellium, quorum utriusque libri, varietate sunt, quam ordine blandiores. Quanquam ne Clementis quidem Alexandrini pontificis, apostolicique viri commentaria, quae Στρωματεῖς, quasi stragula picta dixeris, inscribebantur, alium profecto nobis titulum, nisi varietatis istius insinuabant. Etenim de Aristoxeni taceo commentariis, quos pari ferme titulo citat, eo volumine Porphyrius, quod in harmonica Ptolemaei composuit. Denique si varietas ipsa, fastidii expultrix, et lectionis irritatrix in Miscellaneis culpabitur, una opera, reprehendi rerum quoque natura poterit, cuius me quidem profiteor, tali disparilitate discipulum.

But it is so far from causing us grief that it be called disordered and miscellaneous, as if it were a wood, or a medley, because we write not at length and continuously, but by leaps and piecemeal, that we did not even seek out any other title at all, apart from that of *The Miscellanies*. In this we follow Aelian, and Gellius in Latin, both of whose books are agreeable more because of their variety than because of their order. Although not even the commentaries of that apostolic figure, Clement of Alexandria,

---

14 Cameron (1991) 2; work on discourse and power by Foucault (1984) is seminal.
the pontifex, which are inscribed as the *Stromateis*, as if you were speaking of painted bedspreads, recommend a different title to us, if not one of that variety. For truly, I will be silent about the commentaries of Aristoxenus, which Porphyry cites with an altogether similar title in that volume which he composed against the *Harmonies* of Ptolemy. Finally, if variety itself, she who drives out fastidiousness, and who annoys selectivity, is to be blamed for Miscellanies, it will be possible to rebuke together with these works the very nature of the world, of which I freely declare myself a student with this kind of diversity.

This is the list with which Politian, the *Quattrocento* Florentine humanist, introduces his *Miscellanea*.\textsuperscript{16} Despite the wide-spread use of the term ‘miscellany’,\textsuperscript{17} Politian seems to be the first author who uses this (or, in fact, any generic signifier)\textsuperscript{18} for the group of works to which the title is normally applied.\textsuperscript{19} Here we see mixed together Aelian (Helianus), Aulus Gellius, and Clement of Alexandria, all providing the same kind of literary model for Politian. But there is no evidence for any ancient attempt to classify these prose works;\textsuperscript{20} no single term was used in antiquity to refer to the miscellanies to which Clement’s *Stromateis* is often compared.\textsuperscript{21} ‘Genre theory’, analysing text from the perspective of the relationship between texts and between text, author and audience, through the lens of generic choices (at least

\textsuperscript{16} On the popularity of the genre in the renaissance, see Morgan (2011) 54-6.

\textsuperscript{17} König and Whitmarsh (2007) 31; Vardi (2004) 161 n.8.

\textsuperscript{18} Although see below in this chapter on ὑπομνήματα.

\textsuperscript{19} Pfeiffer (1976) 45 n.5.

\textsuperscript{20} Vardi (2004) 161; more generally, Vardi notes that prose literature is less well attested as the subject of generic attribution than poetry, which had a reasonably solid division into genres in the ancient educational curriculum. On broader difficulties in dividing ancient literature up generically, see Horsfall (1992) and 130 on miscellany in particular.

\textsuperscript{21} See König (2007) 43. The term ποικιλία and its variants covered some of the ground, but did not cover all the works which we would group together. Vardi (2004) 171.
insofar as prose works are concerned) is a patrimony inherited more from the Renaissance than its classical heritage.\textsuperscript{22}

In its modern varieties, however, genre criticism has made us aware of the value of understanding generic expectations for the full picture of how any given work functions. As far as the \textit{Stromateis} is concerned, not only are there other extant works which bear a remarkable similarity in many particulars, as Politian observed, it is also quite clear that ancient readers and authors did not simply view these works as disconnected outliers on their literary scene. Amiel Vardi, speaking of Aulus Gellius’ \textit{Noctes Atticae}, contemporaneous with the \textit{Stromateis}, takes the stance that lack of formal generic definition:

\ldots does not mean that Gellius and his contemporaries could not have shared a concept of a literary kind whose definition was never formulated and for which they had no standard tag, but of which they could have framed a certain set of expectations that would influence their reading in the same way as \textit{strictu sensu} generic expectations would function.\textsuperscript{21}

Compositions similar to the \textit{Stromateis} in their eclectic tendencies were popular in the second century, and the composition and consumption of miscellany was a lively literary scene. Although not defined as such in antiquity, then, the ‘genre’ of miscellany was a family of texts which an ancient reader would have recognised as a family and approached with a set of genre-bound expectations.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{24} See Morgan (2007) 331-3.
It is worth expanding on what this phrase ‘generic expectations’ might entail; Alistair Fowler, in his seminal work on genre, suggests that generic categories are ‘so far from being a mere curb on expression that [they make] the expressiveness of literary works possible.’

Rather than a tool of taxonomy, or of classifying and defining by immutable categories, he sees genre itself as a method of communication; it is in modulation of and departure from generic conventions that individual works create meaning. Taxonomies are less important than familial resemblances: texts imitating and evolving from each other. Clement uses the generic frames of literary culture to construct a relationship with his readers, to push them to read in a particular way.

This in turn makes clear the importance of the role of the reader in making genres work; communication can only be successful if the reader is able to pick up and decode the signs that mark out generic affiliation. Fowler terms this ‘generic competence’: the ability of readers to recognise genres, and it is of fundamental importance to understanding how texts function. Conte terms this figuration of the reader the ‘reader-addressee’, who ‘is a form of the text; it is the figure of the recipient as anticipated by the text. To this prefiguration of the reader, all future, virtual readers must adapt themselves.’

---

27 Fowler (1982) 40-44, drawing on the concept of ‘language games’ developed by Wittgenstein and the literature developed therefrom; see Wittgenstein (1953) §§65-77
29 Conte (1994) xviii.
31 Conte (1994) xx.
limited sphere of readers and writers in the ancient world,\textsuperscript{32} and the limitations inherent in the recherché Atticizing style, \textsuperscript{33} Clement’s ‘reader-addressee’ is necessarily the ‘contemporary educated reader’.\textsuperscript{34}

There is some difficulty in identifying the readership of early Christian works any more accurately, as the only evidence we can draw upon is internal. Given that its transmission is due to the church and its associated institutions, we can be sure that all extant early Christian literature was at least read, and valued enough to be copied, by Christians.\textsuperscript{35} It seems to be that this is the audience for which the \textit{Stromateis} is itself primarily written,\textsuperscript{36} but we cannot discount (and Clement certainly did not, as his expressed fears for the work falling into the wrong hands indicate; although an equally good indication that Clement’s primary intended audience was indeed an initiated Christian one)\textsuperscript{37} that it was also potentially read by other segments of the educated classes: pagans of a philosophical bent, pagans of a philosophical bent,

\textsuperscript{32} Harris (1989) 248-84, who suggests the high point of Greco-Roman literacy was the high empire, and in Egypt, the second century. See Dunn (2004) 5 on estimates for literate Christians in Carthage at around the same period; guessing at a total population of 700,000, he posits the tentative conclusion of 230 literate Christians; his guess is built on the figure of 10% literacy of Gamble (1995) 4-5 and the conclusions of Stark (1996) 7 that approximately 0.35% of the population were Christian in the year 200; these figures are evidently highly conjectural.

\textsuperscript{33} Swain (1996) 33-42.

\textsuperscript{34} Harrison (2007) 10. This is not to discount the possibility that there may have been wider circles of dissemination – that the work could have been read aloud to others, themselves not literate; this is certainly the case with, for instance, biblical material: see Harris (1989) 219-221. The length, linguistic and structural complexity, and intertextual depth of the \textit{Stromateis} suggest that would not necessarily lend itself to easy consumption by the uneducated listener, however.


\textsuperscript{36} On the intended audience of the \textit{Stromateis}, see Ridings (1995) 132-9, whose argument is useful for citations, but ultimately rather reductionist: Clement is either primarily writing with Christians or non-Christians ‘in mind’. However, as Clement’s lengthy discussion on the danger of writing makes clear, to write is to send the children of one’s mind into the unknown; both the value and the danger of the written word.

\textsuperscript{37} On which, see below in this chapter.
or those with some interest in Judaism or other monotheistic systems, not to mention their adherents.\textsuperscript{38} What is clear is that the Stromateis is written as literature (the work is too polished and well-finished to suspect anything otherwise) and was undoubtedly designed to be disseminated as such, beyond the scope of Clement’s own personal teaching.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{TAKING NOTES}

Although I (and Clement) refer to his work as the \textit{Stromateis}, in its full title it was not just a patchwork, but a patchwork ‘of gnostic notes’, γνωστικῶν ὑπομνήματων. The use of the word ὑπομνήματα is worth exploring, as Clement uses it not infrequently to refer to the \textit{Stromateis}.\textsuperscript{40} The ‘most influential’ of ancient miscellanies,\textsuperscript{41} the ‘Ιστορικὰ ὑπομνήματα of Pamphile of Epidaurus, is implicated, as is Xenophon’s Απομνημονεύματα; the same title used also by Favorinus, and by Plutarch (\textit{Lamp.} no. 125).\textsuperscript{42} Pamphile’s work, Photius tells us, is a collection of ὑπομνήματα συμμιγῆ in no particular order; she leaves it unsystematised, according the aesthetic norm of ποικιλία.\textsuperscript{43} Ὑπομνήματα is also used as a sub-title to the \textit{Hypotyposes} of Sextus Empiricus,\textsuperscript{44} in keeping with one sense of the word to mean ‘course notes’.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{38} See Str. 2.1. The general scholarly consensus seems to be, however, that Clement had little contact with living Judaism: Runia (1993) 149-150 and van den Broek (1990) 111.

\textsuperscript{39} van den Hoek (1988) 215.

\textsuperscript{40} E.g. Str. 6.1.1.4 quoted below.

\textsuperscript{41} Vardi (2004) 170.

\textsuperscript{42} Vardi (2004) 163.


\textsuperscript{44} Méhat (1966) 106-7.

\textsuperscript{45} Bousset (1915) 25.
In general, there is a scholarly bent to the uses of the title, perhaps suggestive again of philosophy;\(^4^6\) this is certainly the undertones conveyed by Plutarch’s use of the term in the opening of *De tranquillitate animi*.\(^4^7\) The importance of the title is in aligning the work with a literary tradition: it is both an advertisement of the position of his work for potential readers, and a clue to engage a set of expectations on the part of his readership; not only will this work contain a variety of literary sources, it will also participate in philosophical debate with those sources. Clement thus invokes reading strategies of serious intellectual engagement but also foregrounding literary form.

The ὑπομνήματα motif is more than just an allusive title; it also points us towards the construction of a particular kind of literary persona, the compiler of all this information as a character within the work. The writing of the text is justified as the private possession of this persona:

`ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὑπομνήματων γραφὴ ἀσθενής μὲν εὔ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι παραβαλλομένη πρὸς τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκείνο τὸ κεχαριτωμένον, οὐ κατηξιώθημεν ὑπακοῦσαι, εἰκὼν δ᾽ ἂν εἰ ἀναμμηνήσκουσα τοῦ ἀρχετύπου τὸν θύρσον πεπληγότα· «σοφῶ γάρ», φησί, «λάλει, καὶ σοφώτερος ἐστιν,» καὶ «τῷ ἑξοντι δὲ προστεθήσεται». ἐπαγγέλλεται δὲ οὐχ ὡστε ἐρμηνεύσαι τὰ ἀπόρρητα ἰκανώς, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δει, μόνον δὲ τὸ υπομνῆσαι, εἴτε ὅποτε ἐκλαθοίμεθα εἴτε ὅπως μηδὲ ἐκλανθανώμεθα. πολλὰ δὲ`
So the writing of these notes of mine, I fully understand, is weak when compared to that grace-giving spirit to which I was deemed worthy to listen: it may be an image, perhaps, which reminds one struck by the thyrsus of its original. 'For speak to a wise man,' it is said, 'and he will be wiser'; and: 'to the who has, it will be given.' And this is published, not to explain ineffable things fully – it’s far from that! – but only to help the memory, in case we forget anything, or so that we don’t forget. Many things, I well know, have slipped out of our mind, through length of time, and have dropped away unwritten. So, to lighten the load on the weakness of my memory, and provide for myself a salvific reminder for my memory in a systematic arrangement of topics, I am forced to make use of this form.

By no means is the construal of ὑπομνήματα (also here as ὑπομνῆσαι), as aide-mémoire an idle aside: earlier Clement claims, ἥδη δὲ οὐ γραφὴ εἰς ἐπίδειξιν τετεχνασμένη ἢδε ἡ πραγματεία, ἀλλὰ μοι ὑπομνήματα εἰς γῆρας θησαυρίζεται, λήθης φάρμακον. The language in both passages harks back to the discussion of the value of writing in Phaedrus 274e-275b, where writing is described as οὔκουν μνήμης ἀλλὰ ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον, and it is warned that: τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελετησία. The limitations of writing are foregrounded by reference to the Platonic intertext, dovetailing into the apologia for

50 Prov. 9:9.
51 Mt. 13:12.
52 Str. 1.1.11.1; ‘Now this study is not writing crafted for the sake of display, but is being stored up as notes for my memory, as I get older, as a remedy against forgetfulness.’ Cf. 3.5.40.1, 4.1.1.3, 4.2.4.1, 6.1.1.4, all of which refer to the Stromateis as ὑπομνήματα.
53 ‘a drug certainly not of remembering, but of reminding’; ‘it will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who learn it, with a lack of practice of their memory.’ It is odd that Clement reverses the force of the genitive; indicative that he is certainly not working with the Platonic text in front of him, but rather from memory.
writing which consumes much of this opening section of the *Stromateis*. At the same time, this reference positions Clement’s text philosophically, in conversation with Plato. The keeping of notes is defended explicitly as being merely for personal use, and their disorder is explained implicitly, as a guard against the natural dangers of writing.

There is a further resonance of genre here, too: Clement is keying into a miscellanistic trope of ‘jottings’. Pamphile not only has ὑπομνήματα as her title, but also uses this trope of random jottings to aid the memory as the authorial narrative: ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὕσσα λόγου καὶ μνήμης αὐτή ἢξια ἐδόκει, εἰς ὑπομνήματα συμμιγῆ καὶ οὐ πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας ὑποθέσεις διακεκριμένον ἔκαστον διελεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὑστὸς εἰκῇ καὶ ὃς ἑκαστὸν ἔπηλθεν ἀναγράψαι. Aulus Gellius, too, claims that the *Noctes Atticae* were originally scribbled down to remind him of noteworthy bits and pieces of his varied reading, *eaque mihi ad subsidium memoriae quasi quoddam litterarum penus recondebam*.

In all these examples, the claim to be reproducing private notes is attached to or explicitly made the cause of the disorganisation of the work. The commonplace is derived from the habit of excerpting and making notes from reading, as well as from conversation and

54 There is possibly also reminiscence here of Plato, *Ep*. 7.344c-e.
56 *Bibliotheca* 175, 119b 27-30: ‘And all these thing – everything that seemed to her worth writing and remembering – she distributed into her mixture of notes, not even separating them according to each individual subject; rather, she wrote them down at random and as each occurred to her.’
57 *Praef*. 2: ‘And I used to store up these for myself, as an aid for my memory, like some kind of storehouse of literature.’
lectures.\textsuperscript{59} Although based in a real enough practice, it is too simplistic to think that the claim to be publishing personal notes is a slightly embarrassed or falsely modest statement of fact.\textsuperscript{60} It is partly a marker of generic affiliation, but also an element carefully manipulated by Clement as part of the positioning of the \textit{Stromateis} against its literary and cultural background: on the one hand, as we saw in the previous chapter, it functions to connect Clement authoritatively to a respected Christian tradition, taking the notes of those who heard the blessed apostles.

On the other, it allows scope to show off his \textit{paideia} with almost mock-modesty; Laurence Emmett argues that the fiction of the personal \textit{aide-mémoire} builds an image of the author as a truly disinterested benefactor, publishing only unwillingly,\textsuperscript{61} whose words can therefore be implicitly trusted.\textsuperscript{62} But this seems to be underestimating any reasonably literate audience; the topos seems so common that an audience taking the claim at face-value seems naïve. The approach, and the effect, is rather more literary: it is the assumption by Clement of the kind of literary persona that is so much part of the miscellany.\textsuperscript{63} Of the spate of recent works on the \textit{Noctes Atticae}, a great deal of attention is given to the position of Aulus Gellius as a character within his own work.\textsuperscript{64} Similarly for the \textit{Stromateis}, although we know (and the

\textsuperscript{59} Pamphile (Photius, \textit{Bib.} 175, 119b. 20-26) and Clement (\textit{Str.} 1.1.12.1); the idea is implicit in Gellius, as well as Plutarch's \textit{Qu. Conv.}, inter alia, with their emphasis on cultured conversation.

\textsuperscript{60} As Holford-Strevens seems to accept of Gellius; Holford-Strevens (2003) 31-33. Cf. Van der Stockt (1999) and n.43 above.

\textsuperscript{61} Again paralleled in Arrian \textit{Ep. ad L. Gellium}.

\textsuperscript{62} Emmett (2001) 89, citing the \textit{Hieroi Logoi} of Aelius Aristides as a comparandum.

\textsuperscript{63} Cf. Morgan (2011) 58-9: 'scholarly disciplines and scholarly habits of thought were the common currency of educated people. Those habits included the collection and sorting of one's chosen subject matter'.

\textsuperscript{64} ‘One almost invariably identifies Gellius the author, Gellius the narrator, and Gellius the character within the text.’ Gunderson (2009) 8-9; Keulen (2009) is particularly concerned with distinguishing
ancient audience would have known) that much of its contents comes from handbooks and philosophical florilegia, the text presents an image of the eclectically excerpting lucubrator. This is the patrimony into which Clement is affiliating himself with his use of the ὑπομνήματα motif. The constructed character of the miscellanist is a platform, legitimated by a literary tradition, which shows Clement can engage in the same level of reading, writing, and reflection as other pepaideumenoi, and from which he is therefore able to speak authoritatively. Rather than attempting to make his audience believe in the fiction of the miscellanist, Clement is showing his audience that he is cultured enough to be able to construct such a recognisable literary persona of the Second Sophistic. Clement is trying to establish his authority as a virtuoso pepaideumenos conjuring this haphazard collector of the recondite. From one angle, the claims of generic filiation function as revelation: the style of the Stromata (that is, as 'jottings': προϊόντων τῶν ὑπομνημάτων κατὰ τὸν τῶν Στρωματέων χαρακτῆρα) is directly linked to interpretation of the coming of the lord (περὶ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου παρουσίας). From another angle, the same claims appropriate a traditionally Greek, philosophical, kind of authority.

various literary personae. Holford-Strevens (2003) is less careful, e.g. at 31-34; likewise Anderson (1994) 1835, speaking of Gellius’ ‘spontaneous and sincere enthusiasm’.

van den Hoek (1996) 224, who also notes Clement’s wide-ranging first-hand knowledge of texts.

Tradition will develop ‘the Christian iconography of the scholar-saint…seated at his desk, surrounded by his library’. Carey (2003) 2.


Str. 6.1.1.4 – see directly below.
The question of titling is not an unimportant one for Clement, or for miscellany; there is a lively tradition of generic self-reference and recursion found amongst ancient miscellanistic works, which often list titles of other miscellanies. Clement forces us to ponder his own activity as an author by arranging lists of other works which arrange lists of knowledge in a catalogue of miscellany:

... τότε ἡδη, προϊόντων τῶν ὑπομνημάτων κατὰ τὸν τῶν Στρωματέων χαρακτήρα, ἐπιλυτέον τὰ τὲ ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων τὰ τὲ ὑπὸ βαρβάρων προσαπορούμενα ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου παρουσίας. ἔν μὲν οὖν τῷ λειμώνι τὰ άνθη ποικίλως ἀνθοῦντα κἂν τῷ παραδείσῳ ἡ τῶν ἀκροδρύων φυτεία σὺ κατὰ εἴδος ἐκαστον κεχώρισται τῶν ἀλλογενῶν (ἡ καὶ Λειμῶνάς τινες καὶ Ἑλικῶνας καὶ Κηρία καὶ Πέπλους συναγωγάς φιλομαθείς ποικίλως ἐξανθισάμενοι συνεγράψαντο) τοῖς δ' ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐπὶ μνήμην ἔλθον καὶ μήτε τῇ τάξει μήτε τῇ φράσει διακεκαθαρμένοις, διεσπαρμένοις δὲ ἐπίτηδες ἀναμίξῃ, ἡ τῶν Στρωματέων ἡμῖν ὑποτύπως λειμῶνος δίκην πεποίκιλται.71

...then, as the notes go on, in accordance with the style of the Stromateis, we must solve the difficulties raised both by Greeks and Barbarians concerning the coming of the Lord. So, in a meadow, the flowers blooming in their variety, and in a garden, the plantations of fruit trees are not separated according to species from those of other kinds (as some have composed learned collections, Meadows, and Helicons, and Honeycombs, and Robes, by picking flowers with an eye to variety); then, with the things which happen to come to mind, and are pruned neither in arrangement nor expression, but deliberated scattered, all mixed up, the pattern of our Stromateis has been designed for the sake of variety, just like a meadow.

71 Str. 6.1.1.4 - 6.1.2.2.
A similar list of titles occurs in the preface to the *Noctes Atticae*; the *Historia Naturalis* of Pliny, included in Gellius’ list, has its own list, mentioning Κηρίον, Κέρας Ἀμαλθείας, Ἱα, Μοῦσαι, Πανδέκται, Έγχειρία, Λειμῶν, Πίναξ, and Σχεδίων (Honeycomb, Horn of Plenty, Violets, Muses, Pandects, Handbooks, the Meadow, the Tablet, Impromptu). These lists display some notable similarities. Most of the titles collected suggest by their plural form multiplicity in the contents of the works, and many of the titles themselves explicitly refer to their eclectic educative value.

There are also a number of distinct metaphorical strands running through these collections of titles. The imagery of textiles is prominent, which illuminates the choice of Clement’s own title. The word στρωματεύς is derived from στρῶμα, -ατος, but the reason and precise meaning for the shift in form is unknown. It is generally agreed that despite its odd form it is intended to convey something of the patchwork nature of the variety of material composing the work. Philology is of secondary importance here, however; ‘le sens étymologique, quel qu’il soit, est oblitéré par l’histoire littéraire du mot, qui en commande plus directement l’usage.’ The use of the imagery of woven textiles to name works represents the combination of a variety of knowledge; Aulus Gellius makes reference to a

---

72 Praef. 5-9.
73 Praef. 24.
74 Vardi (1993) 299.
75 Méhat (1966) 96-97. The word can even refer to a striped fish found in the Red Sea, by extension of its reference to a striped bag: Artemidorus, *Oneirocriticon* 2.14; Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 7.118. See Hort and Mayor (1902) xi-xii.
76 It is a shame that the common English title tends to be ‘the Miscellanies’; Roberts and Donaldson (1994), König and Whitmarsh (2007); the German ‘die Teppiche’ of Stählin (1936-38) and even Politian’s ‘quasi stragula picta dixeris’ convey more of the original.
77 Méhat (1966) 98 suggests a number of possibilities.
work called the Πέπλος, and we have a fragment of the Κεστοί, denoting stitched or embroidered garments, of Julius Africanus.

The metaphor suggests diversity, the bringing together of different threads, as well as connoting the aesthetic pleasure of rich garments. Importantly, several other works went under the moniker Στρωματεῖς; as well as the later Στρωματεῖς of Origen, there is a Στρωματεῖς listed in the Noctes Atticae, possibly a work by Plutarch, listed in the Lamprias Catalogue (no. 62) as Στρωματεῖς ἰστορικοὶ καὶ ποιητικοὶ. Eusebius claims to quote ἀπὸ τῶν Πλούταρχου Στρωματέων, the fragment (Pr. Ev. 1.8.1-12) is pure doxography, enumerating the opinions of philosophers, although its authenticity is disputed by Diels. Caesellius Vindex's work on ancient words seems also to have gone under the title of Stromateus. Clement is invoking part of the tradition of miscellaneous literature – one that seems to have suggested weightier content, particularly philosophy.

The other notable strand of imagery running through the titles of miscellanies is that of flowers – meadows, violets, honeycomb (culled from flowers); even the terms ‘anthology’ and ‘florilegia’ which invariably crop up in discussions of the genre in English etymologically embed the idea. Although absent from the title, the metaphorical field of flowers (so to

---

78 Noctes Atticae Praef. 6.
79 LSJ s.v. κεστός.
80 Póxy iii.412; see Vardi (1993).
81 Jerome, Ep. 70.4: ‘Hunc [sc. Clementem] imitatus Origines decem scripsit Stromateas.’
82 Praef. 7.
83 See Méhat (1966) 104-106.
84 Pr. Ev. 7.16.
85 ‘nobilissimi scriptoris nomen sine dubio ementitur.’ Diels (1879) 156, citing Volkmann (1869) I.169.
86 Priscian, Inst. 6.18; Diels (1879) 157.
speak...) occurs regularly when Clement speaks of his own compositional practice. So, although the *Stromateis* is not self-proclaimed as a floral composition in its title, it is nonetheless a meadow, albeit by another name.

The imagery of textiles and flowers is combined in Ch. 2 of Book 4; Clement makes explicit the connection to variegation with his implied *figura etymologica* at 4.2.4.1: ἐστω δὲ ἡμῖν τὰ ὑπομνήματα, ως πολλάκις εἶπομεν, διὰ τοὺς ἀνέδην ἀπείρως ἐντυγχάνοντας ποικίλως, ως αὐτὸ ποι ὑπομνήμα φησι, διεστρωμένα, ἀπ' ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο συνεχὲς μετιόντα. He goes on to equate the work to seeds, which although small when sown, will eventually bloom into something far greater:

εἰκότως οὖν τὸ γόνιμον ἐν ὁλίγῳ σπέρμα τῶν ἐμπεριεχομένων τῇ δὲ πραγματείᾳ δογμάτων, «ὡσπερ τὸ παμβότανον τοῦ ἀγροῦ,» φησὶν ἡ γραφή. Ἡ καὶ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν κυρίαν ἔχουσιν οἱ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων Στρωματεῖς ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ἑκείνην ἀπηνθισμένου προσφοράν περὶ ἦς ὁ Σοφοκλῆς γράφει·

Ασις οὖν γὰρ οἶς μαλλός, ἢν δὲ τί εἰς ἀμπέλων
οπονδὴ <τε> καὶ βάξ εὖ τεθησαυρισμένη,
ἐνήν δὲ παγκάρπεια συμμιγής ὀλαίς
λίπος τ' ἐλαίου καὶ τὸ ποικίλωτατον
ξανθῆς μελίσσης κηρόπλαστον ὄργανον. As we might expect, then, the generative power in the small seed of the doctrines encompassed in this study is great, ’as all the herbage of the field,’ as scripture says.

87 ‘Let these notes, as we have often said, on account of those that consult them licentiously and unskillfully, be as the name itself indicates “strewn out” with variety, passing constantly from one thing to another.’
88 Str. 4.2.6.1-3. It is unclear as to what exactly this fragmentary quotation of Sophocles (Fr. 398, from *Manteis/Polyidos*) refers; the verses are also found in Porphyry, *De abst.* 2.19 (whence the attribution to the *Polyidos*) in a context which stresses the antiquity of the type of sacrifice performed: Jebb, Headlam, et al. (1917) 57 characterise it as ‘of a joyful, if primitive, character’.
Indeed, the *Stromateis* of notes have their proper title, plucked without art, like that ancient offering, about which Sophocles writes: ‘The skins of sheep in sacrifice were used, and a libation from the vines, and the grape laid up well in store, and fruits collected in a heap of every kind; and the richness of the olive, and the most variegated wax-moulded work of the yellow bee.’

The quotation is from Job 5:25, and the imagery of seeds and sowing takes the reader back to descriptions of the function of the work, in book one, using exegesis of Matthew 9:37-38//Luke 10:2 (‘the harvest is plentiful, but the labourers are few’) at 1.1.7.1, and the parable of the sower (Matthew 13:1-23),\(^9\) which express unease at the too-open explication of the truth. Thus the work is equated to the *Logos* of the kingdom (τὸν λόγον τῆς βασιλείας, Mt. 13:18), as well as figured as a sacred object, a religious offering (προσφοράν). Alongside the biblical overtones, however, the undertones both here and in Book 1 are of the more genre-influenced imagery of floral diversity,\(^{90}\) signalled by the vocabulary used (ἀπηνθισμένοι) and the foregrounding of the literary function of titles. Even describing the content of his work as ‘small seeds’ has generic significance; the work is made of small, pithy seeds of references and quotations. Clement is simultaneously driving in two directions: pointing towards both an aesthetic function of the structure – the ideal of *poikilia*; but also demonstrating an anxiety about giving away sacred knowledge too easily.

The imagery of bees and honey, introduced in the Sophoclean quotation here, likewise looks to both Christian and non-Christian models of literary composition. Christian readers well-versed in their Septuagint may be put in mind of Proverbs 6:6-8, where the reader is

\(^9\) At 1.1.7.1, and 1.1.9.1 and 1.7.37 respectively.

exhorted to take heed of the ant, who wisely puts aside food to nourish it through winter, as well as the bee, whose diligence is similarly commended. The LXX version reads:

ён поревοθητι πρός τὴν μέλισσαν καὶ μάθε ὡς ἐργάτις ἐστὶν τὴν τε ἐργασίαν ὡς σεμνὴν ποιεῖται, ἢς τοὺς πόνους βασιλείς καὶ ἰδιῶται πρὸς ὕγιειαν προσφέρονται, ποθεινὴ δὲ ἐστὶν πάσιν καὶ ἐπίδοξος καίπερ ὅσα τῇ ῥώμῃ ἀσθενής, τὴν σοφίαν τίμησασα προήχθη.

Or go to the bee, and learn how she works, and how serious is the labour she engages in; whose works kings and ordinary men use for health, and she is desired and respected by all: although she is weak in strength, she is distinguished in honouring wisdom.

Clement refers directly to this passage in the sixth chapter of *Stromateis* 1:

διὸ καὶ φησιν· «Ἰσθι πρὸς τὸν μύρμηκα, ὦ ὀκνηρέ, καὶ γενοῦ ἑκείνου σοφώτερος» δέ πολλήν καὶ παντοδαπήν ἐν τῷ ἀμήτῳ παρατίθεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ χειμῶνος ἁπειλήν τὴν τροφήν, «ἣ πορεύθητι πρὸς τὴν μέλισσαν καὶ μάθε ὡς ἐργάτις ἐστί·» καὶ αὐτὴ γὰρ πάντα τὸν λειμῶνα ἑπινεμομένη ἐν κηρίῳ γεννᾷ. εἰ δὲ ἐν τῷ ταμείῳ εὐχῇ, ὡς ὁ κύριος ἔδιδαξε, πνεύματι προσκυνῶν, οὐκέτι περὶ τὸν οἶκον εἰ ἂν μόνον ἡ οἰκονομία, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, τίνα τε ἐπινεμητέον αὐτῇ καὶ ὅπως καὶ ὅποσον, τίνα τε ἀποθετέον καὶ ἀποθησαυριστέον εἰς αὐτήν, καὶ ὅτε ταῦτα προκομιστέον, καὶ πρὸς οὐσίνας. 91

Therefore they say, ‘Go to the ant, you sluggard, and become wiser than it,’ which prepares much varied food in the harvest for the threat of winter; ‘or go to the bee, and learn how hard she works;’ for feeding on the whole meadow, she produces one honey-comb. And if you pray in your chamber, as the Lord has taught, worshipping in spirit, no longer will just the household be subject to careful regulation, but also

91 Str. 1.6.33.5-6.
the soul: both what it must be fed upon, and how and how much, and what must be put aside and stored up for it, and when they must be brought forth, and for whom.

The broader context of this passage is the argument that preparation – in the form of the hard work of philosophic education – is part of the process of developing as a Christian, hand-in-hand with natural faith. Although the primary emphasis in this particular passage exemplifies the bees because of their methodical work, scouring a whole field to produce only one honeycomb,⁹² the metaphor of the worker bee also suggests the Christian’s selective, judicious engagement with pagan culture: Clement deliberately puns on the ταμεῖον as a storehouse – both the bee-hive and the soul, where knowledge is stored.

The Christian as discerning bee, picking out the flowers of Greek learning,⁹³ also has it roots in Greek literary language and philosophical discourse.⁹⁴ Indeed, given that this verse of the LXX does not appear at all in the Hebrew version of the bible, it may well be the influence of the Greek trope present in the biblical source itself, carried into the translation by the Hellenistic translators. The imagery is used to describe the activity of the well-educated reader extracting from as many sources as possible as much wisdom as possible; this is most likely the force of the otherwise unexplained ‘distinguished in honouring wisdom’ in the proverb – that her wisdom is the judiciousness with which she selects the correct elements from everything present in the field with which she can then produce honey.

⁹² This same passage from Proverbs is quoted at Str. 4.3.9.2-3. On the bee as proverbially φιλότεχνος, see Kerr Borthwick (1991) 22-3.
⁹⁴ On this topos see Gnilka (1984) and Barns (1950) 133-5; see also Barns (1951) for further remarks on the connection between the bee simile and miscellanistic literature, especially in connection with Plutarch.
The locus classicus for the figure in Greek literature is Isocrates Ad Demonicum 51-52:

οἷς δεῖ παραδείγμασι χρώμενόν σ’ ορέγεσθαι τῆς καλοκαγαθίας, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοῖς ύψι' ἡμῶν εἰρημένοις ἐμμένειν ἄλλα καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰ βέλτιστα μανθάνειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σοφιστῶν εἰ τι χρήσιμον εἰρήκασιν ἀναγιγνώσκειν. ὡσπερ γὰρ τὴν μέλιταν ὄρωμεν ἔφ' ἀπαντα μὲν τὰ βλαστήματα καθιζάνουσαν, ἄφ' ἐκάστου δὲ τὰ βέλτιστα λαμβάνουσαν, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ τοὺς παιδείας ὀρεγομένους μηδενὸς μὲν ἀπείρως ἔχειν, πανταχόθεν δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα συλλέγειν. Μόλις γὰρ ἂν τις ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιμελείας τὰς τῆς φύσεως ἁμαρτίας ἐπικρατήσειν.

With these examples before you, you should aspire to nobility of character, and not only abide by what I have said, but acquaint yourself with the best things in the poets as well, and learn from the other wise men also any useful lessons they have taught. For just as we see the bee settling on all the flowers, and sipping the best from each, so also those who aspire to culture ought not to leave anything untasted, but should gather useful knowledge from every source. For hardly even with these pains can they overcome the defects of nature.95

The same literary function of bees is apparent in (Pseudo)-Plutarch De recte ratione audiendi – in two separate places (32e-f and 41f-42a), as well as several other places in the Moralia.96

Lucretius uses it in De rerum natura 3.11-12, and Lucian takes it up in the Piscator 6.97

96 Quomodo adulescenes poetas audire debeat 12 (32e); Quodmodo quis sent. prof. virt. 8 (79a); cf. De tranq. 5 (467c) and De amore prolis 2 (494a). See further on Plutarch and bees Kerr Borthwick (1991) and Barns (1950) and (1951).
97 Barns (1950) 132, who gives a fuller list of both Christian and non-Christian authors who use the topos.
Equally, however, this trope also refers to the aesthetic qualities of the literature which is being plucked for storage and use; it is no coincidence that the literature in which this Greek motif appears is philosophic, or at least proptreptic to philosophy, and is a poetic metaphor to excuse engagement with poetic sources. This is an observation which is borne out not only by the context and referents of the sources antecedent to Clement, but also by Clement’s own comments on the behaviour of bees elsewhere in his work.98

Clement emphasises that the bee’s engagement with flowers is not only a matter of hard work and wisdom, but of sensual pleasure; thus at Paedagogus 2.8.70.1 bees are a paradigm of enjoyment of nature:

μὴ μοι στέφανον ἀμφιθῇς κάρᾳ. ἦρος μὲν γὰρ ὀφρα λειμώσιν ἐνδρόσοις καὶ μαλακοῖς, ποικίλοις χλοάζουσιν ἄνθεσιν, ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι καλόν, αὐτοφυεὶ καὶ εἰλικρινεῖ τινι εὐωδία καθάπερ τὰς μελίττας τρεφομένους

Do not put a wreath around my head. For in the spring time in the dewy soft fields, with variegated flowers blooming, it is a beautiful thing to spend one’s time, just like the bees, cherishing a pure and natural scent.

The vocabulary used in this passage is redolent with significance for literary aesthetics; poikilia is a key value for literary presentation in the Second Sophistic, hence the appearance of works titled Meadows and Honeycomb. There is even a tradition which connects the sweet but deadly singing of the Sirens with bees,100 as creatures of poetic and prophetic

98 Barns (1950) 133 sees the trope in operation at Str. 1.1.11.2; 1.33.6; 6.89.2; cf. 1.43.3; 4.6.2.
99 The purity of the bee was also proverbial in Greek thought: the locus classicus is Euripides Hipp. 73ff.; see Kerr Borthwick (1991) 22 – hence possibly part of the connotations of εἰλικρινεῖ here.
100 See Od. 7.187; see on this Van Liefferinge (2012) 480; on Sirens in Clement, see below, Chapter 8.
symbolism. A key value being foregrounded is literary aesthetic, an emphasis on beauty and sweetness. We have a start on what generic buttons Clement’s *Stromateis* may have pressed, pointing to a tradition of works of a pleasantly variegated nature, drawing on a wide range of sources, and in particular with a philosophical bent.

THE UNIVERSAL LIBRARY

Méhat divides miscellaneous works into historical, grammatical and philosophical categories, but there are also works that could be entered into literary ledgers under columns headed ‘florilegia’, ‘encyclopediae’, or ‘hand-books’. There are undoubtedly other works under none of these heads which we would like to include as miscellany anyway, perhaps by rearranging them chronologically, starting in the fifth century with Hippias’ *Συναγωγή*. That miscellany as a genre, of sorts, should be so amenable to both order and disorder, is understandable – the very family resemblances we are looking for are a concern for reproducing and reconfiguring others’ knowledge in different ways. The *Stromateis* itself plays so self-consciously with the questions raised by the generic expectations it arouses. Clement leads us in a circle: the deployment of generic hints is just as much about pressing his readers to consciously ponder the question of generic ordering as an introduction to his larger project of leading us to question the order and disorder of the whole cosmos.

---

101 See Germain (1954) 387-90 and Telfer (1927)
105 Pfeiffer (1968) 51-54; cf. the fifth-century *Horae* of Prodicus, Pfeiffer (1968) 30-31.
In the very practice of collecting, arranging and listing is evident a self-conscious concern for the status of a work as writing, and its interrelation with other texts: there is in miscellany necessarily something of the archive and the library. It is no surprise for an author with even a tangential connection to the concerns of the Second Sophistic to be overtly literary, to overwhelm with a mass of references to other texts. Miscellany, however, is a peculiarly pointed case of literary self-reference, where listing of prior authorities, including listing lists (Honeycombs, Carpets, Meadow, etc.), is a generic expectation. In the case of the Stromateis, the cataloguing of literature can be seen as a reflection of the mythologised Alexandrian library: a totalising, pan-cultural ordering of human knowledge.

Jack Goody, writing about the proto-history of literacy, argues that the very practice of listing is intimately connected with the development of writing itself, and is a key feature in the development of a literate consciousness.\footnote{Goody (1977) 75.} Listing can ‘raise problems of classification and…push the frontiers of a certain kind of understanding.’\footnote{Goody (1977) 94.} The self-consciousness of the engagement with language characteristic of the Second Sophistic, exemplified by the lexicographically-focussed miscellanies like the Noctes Atticae, suggests that the frontiers of understanding being pushed are those of the organisation and importance of knowledge itself. Pliny’s Historia Naturalis, for example, allied in its eclectic comprehensiveness to miscellany, has been interpreted by Trevor Murphy as ‘a universal Latin text, a book patterned after the vast empire that has made the universe available for knowing.’\footnote{Murphy (2004) 2.} Murphy’s interpretation builds on the seminal work of Claude Nicolet on the politics of
geography in the Roman empire, recognizing that the representation of space is a political act.  

Whereas Murphy traces the imperialism of Pliny’s text in its geographical and ethnographic elements, in the *Stromateis*, the imperial control of the author is exercised primarily over and through the domination of texts. The relationship between textual power and political power, however, is itself embedded in the geography of Alexandria. There is no doubt that the spaces of Alexandria are imperial spaces, ordered around iconography of the emperors and the imperial state, an iconography built onto a substructure established by the Ptolemies. But particularly in a city whose ambivalent history with the Romans is encoded monumentally, definitive interpretations can never be beyond challenge or hostile re-interpretation. It is through the interpretable physical spaces of Alexandria that Clement exerts his own organisational control over the spaces of empire. In a city in which the political geography is dominated by monuments of intellectual control, in the form of the libraries of the Serapeum and Museum, displacing physical displays of imperial power onto a literary field of conflict is possible.

Paying careful attention to how Clement orders and catalogues his literary sources, then, reveals Clement’s engagement with his urban geography and his appropriation of imperialising power. In Str. 1.16, Clement spells out the authoritative sources for his information on barbarian inventions:

---

110 See also Carey (2003) on the drive for totality in the *Historia naturalis*.
111 On the dominance of the cityscape by its libraries, see, for example, Haas (1997) 26-8, and Finneran (2005) 75, on the Museum as ‘the spiritual centre of the city’.
Scamon of Mitylene and Theophrastus of Eresius and Cydippus of Mantinea; also Antiphanes and Aristodemus and Aristotle; and in addition Philostephanus, and even Strato the Peripatetic in the On Inventions, have recorded these things.

The list has a particular emphasis on the Aristotelian tradition: of the eight sources named here, and the three mentioned earlier in the chapter (Hellanicus, Ephorus, and Herodotus), apart from Aristotle himself, Theophrastus and Strato are well-known Peripatetics. The foundation of the Alexandrian library had been, and in Clement’s time was popularly and widely understood to be, closely connected to the Aristotle and his successors. Clement’s bibliography here links to his geography, in a literal sense: writing about not just his books but his library.

The Aristotelian background to the library is well known, and summed up most succinctly by Strabo: ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης... πρῶτος ὄν ἔσων συναγαγὼν βιβλία καὶ διδάξας τούς ἐν

---

112 Str. 1.16.77.1.
113 We know independently that Theophrastus wrote a work titled On Inventions (or On Discoveries) (727 no.11 FHS&G), as did Scamon (476F.2 BNJ = Athenaeus Deipnosophistae 14.28) and Philostephanus (Fr.28 FHG 3.32-3). Müller is uncertain as to whether this passage indicates that Aristotle wrote a work of the same title, but prints it as one regardless (FHG 2.181). The actual title of Strato’s work – also mentioned under the same title at 1.14.61.1 – seems to have been Εὑρημάτων ἔλεγχοι δύο (Diogenes Laërtius, VP 5.60; cf. Pliny the Elder, Historia naturalis. 1.7). See Desclos and Fortenbaugh (2011) nos. 82, 85, and 86.
114 Hellanicus (1.16.76.9), Ephorus, and Herodotus (1.16.75.1).
There is second element, in addition to this Aristotelian foundation narrative, which forms the core of the identity which the Alexandrian library takes on in Greek literature: universality. This was to be a library containing the literature of the whole oikoumene, not just Greek literature: ‘Alexandria was a place where what could be known of Bablyonian, Egyptian, Jewish and Greek thought was strenuously collected, codified, systematized and contained’. Exactly how much foreign literature the library had, and how much was translated into Greek, is a debatable question. Even if the idea of readily available

---

116 Strabo 13.1.54: ‘Aristotle, then… is the first of those we know who collected books and taught the kings in Egypt how to arrange the library.’

117 The currency of the Aristotelian connections in the foundation narrative in Clement’s time can be judged from disparate sources – Diogenes Laertius, VP 5.77 on Demetrius; Athenaeus, Deipnosofistae 1.3, on the acquisition of the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus by Ptolemy Philadelphus, although his account is contradicted by Strabo, Geographica 13.1.54, which ‘modern scholars are more inclined to accept’ (Barnes (2000) 66). On the origins of the Aristotelian works in the library, see Tanner (2000). Strato, successor to Theophrastus as scholiarch of the Peripatos, was for a time employed by Ptolemy I Soter as tutor to his son, Ptolemy II Philadelphus: Dorandi (1999a) 36.

118 Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantii 1043d.


120 Barnes (2000) 67 is sceptical; Maehler (2004) even more so: ‘the Ptolemies embarked on a policy of cultural “apartheid”, and the foundation of the Mouseion with its Library was an essential part of this’. (7) El-Abbadi (2004), however, writing in the same volume, is more positive: ‘a fresh reading of the sources tends to lend support to the ancient claim of universality’ (168).
translations of foreign texts, as later sources suggest was the case, is questionable, the popularity of texts by barbarians and about barbarian traditions is borne out by the evidence.

Undoubtedly the idea of universality was a facet of the perception of the intellectual tradition of the library and its collection. Pliny the Elder makes reference to Hermippus’ commentary on the verses of Zoroaster; Galen claims that Ptolemy III Euergetes ordered all ships coming through the harbour to be searched for books, which were then copied for the library before being returned. The historicity of these stories is irrelevant; this is how the library was perceived, as the international leviathan of literature, its tentacles reaching into waterfront storehouses and the harbour itself.

In the particular case of Jewish and Christian authors, the Letter of Aristeas makes this a central point in the library’s foundation: Κατασταθεὶς ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως βιβλιοθήκης Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐχρηματίσθη πολλὰ διάφορα πρὸς τὸ συναγαγεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν, ἂπαντα

121 Later authors maintain the centrality of the library as a collection of works from foreign cultures, and a centre for translation of such – e.g. George Syncellus (c. 8th-9th century), Chronographia 1.516.3-10; John Tzetzes (12th century), Prooemium 2. Cf. El-Abbadi (2004) 167-70; Barnes (2000) 64-7, who suggests Tzetzes’ information may have come through Alexandrian commentaries on Aristophanes.

122 Momigliano, in casting doubt on the historicity of the Letter of Aristeas, asserts that the lack of reference to the LXX in Greek literature shows that ‘the Greeks expected the Jews not to translate their holy books, but to produce an account of themselves according to the current methods and categories of ethnography’, making reference to Xanthus of Lydia, Manetho, Berrosus, Fabius Pictor, and Hecataeus, amongst others: Momigliano (1975) 92; more generally see 91-96.

123 Historia naturalis 34.
τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην βιβλία. Irenaeus shows how embedded the universalist conception of the library had become by Clement’s day, describing Ptolemy’s motivation for founding the library: φιλοτιμούμενος τὴν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κατεσκευασμένην βιβλιοθήκην ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ κοσμῆσαι τοῖς πάντων ἀνθρώπων συγγράμμασιν ὅσα γε σπουδαία ύπήρχεν. It is not insignificant that the myth of the LXX translation presented by Aristeas itself – and appropriated by Clement, at Str. 1.22 – is ‘quintessentially Alexandrian, fixed in the topography of the city’; Tertullian makes the link between the historical tradition and contemporary topography explicit when he asserts that both the original Septuagint, along with the Hebrew text, are still visible and accessible in Alexandria, hodie apud Serapeum Ptolemaei. The translation of the Torah into Greek not only colours the library as a point of importance, but also island of Pharos as the site of the translation. Philo’s account of the

---

124 Aristae Epistula 9: ‘Demetrius of Phalerum, who was in charge of the king’s library, was furnished with large sums of money, for the purpose of collecting together, as far as it was possible, all the books in the known world.’ On Clement’s own reception of this idea, see Str. 1.22.148-9.
125 Irenaeus apud Eusebius, HE 5.8.11: ‘...ambitious to adorn the library which had been established by him in Alexandria with the writings, everything which was excellent, of all people...’
126 Rajak (2009) 3, and on Aristeas in general, 24-63.
127 Tertullian, Apologeticum 18.8, making explicit reference also to Aristeas. The Serapeum, a temple dedicated to the god Serapis (both the temple and cult statue are described in some depth by Clement at Protrep. 4.48) was the location of what is often referred to as the ‘daughter library’ of the Alexandrian library (following Epiphanius, De mensuris et ponderibus 11 [PG 43 Col. 256b]). It was possibly utilised as an annex because of the need for more space (see Handis (2013) 371), although Fraser suggests it had become the main depository for books in the Imperial period: Fraser (1972) 1:335. On the archaeological remains of the Serapeum, see McKenzie, Gibson, et al. (2004), which supports the claim of its use as a library. It had in Clement’s time been recently been destroyed or damaged by a fire, referred to tangentially by Clement at Protrep. 4.50.3; Jerome in his Chronicon gives the date of the fire as AD 181, a date supported by the archaeological evidence. A new and larger temple was probably under construction and was finished under Caracalla (211-217).
translation puts it in the context of a yearly festival on the island, attended by both Jews and gentiles, ‘honouring the place in which the light of interpretation first shone forth’.  

Regardless of how historically accurate the account in Aristeas may be, the centrality of its narrative to the way Jews and Christians read the topography of Alexandria cannot be underestimated. Given Clement’s familiarity with Philo, and the fact that Tertullian is also adamant that the physical spaces of Alexandria have still-preserved evidence of the miraculous translation of the Septuagint, it is clear that Clement’s own view of the Pharos, Royal Library, and Serapeum is implicitly intertwined with his history of the bible.

The choice of authors named by Clement in his list of authorities on barbarian inventions quoted above taps into this universalist, trans-cultural, perception of the Alexandrian library; it is not solely in their connexion to the Aristotelian school that they are peculiarly Alexandrian. Although they all, as far as we know, wrote in Greek, those whom we can identify are connected to a two-fold tradition of historiography: on the one hand, of non-Greek regions; on the other, of a universal scope. Several of the historians mentioned are obscure (and were uninfluential at the time); others, however, were notable and important names. Hellanicus of Lesbos, a historiographer, also wrote extensively on mythography.

---


129 For a summary of different viewpoints on this highly debated question, see Rajak (2009) 38-63.

130 Antiphanes seems to be otherwise unknown, unless Clement is referring to the author of Περὶ ἐταιρών mentioned by Athenaeus (349F.1,2 BNJ = Deipnosophistae 13.50, 51). Cydippus of Mantinea is likewise unattested elsewhere.

131 Also known as Hellanicus of Mytilene. Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae 15.23 mentions him on a par with Herodotus and Thucydides; extensive fragments can be found under 4 BNJ.
and ethnography; he is referenced several times by Clement, quoting from at least two different works. Ephorus of Cyme was an influential source for later historians, and respected for his accuracy. Scamon, possibly related to Hellanicus, but certainly also from Mytilene, was also noted as a regional historian, as well as authoring a work Περὶ εὑρημάτων. The prevalence of this title, attested in the case of four of the authors mentioned here, seems to privilege a form of literature exploring the achievements of barbarian peoples, either (quasi-)historical and adopted by the Greeks, or foreign and strange to the Greeks.

It seems also that Hellanicus was noted for his development of literary, compilatory history, relying on previous authority rather than independent research. Both Hellanicus and Ephorus have been claimed as the first authors of a universal history, covering both Greek and barbarian regions. Foregrounded is the encyclopedic voraciousness of Clement’s text:

---

132 At 4F.18, 85b, 152a, 178b [the passage quoted above] and 187b BNJ; the Deucalionia and the Carneonicae are each quoted once, and the other three references are unattributed.
133 E.g. Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Nicolaus of Damascus and Plutarch, amongst others. See, for example, Drews (1962).
134 E.g. Josephus Contra Apionem 1.67: οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀκριβέστατοι συγγραφεῖς, ὃν ἔστιν Ἐφορος...
135 Suda, s.v. Ἑλλάνικος Μιτυληναῖος (= 476T2 BNJ).
136 See 476 BNJ; significantly, both Hellanicus and Scamon appear in volume three of BNJ, entitled ‘Geschichte von Städten und Völkern (Horographie und Ethnographie)’.
137 In addition, Ephorus, named earlier, also wrote a Περὶ εὑρημάτων.
138 Didorus Siculus (1.9.3) speaks to the popularity of this kind of work: περὶ δὲ τῆς τοῦ γένους ἀρχαιότητος οὐ μόνον ἀμφισβητοῦσιν Ἐλληνες, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, έαυτούς αὐτόχθονας λέγοντες καὶ πρῶτους τῶν ἀπάντων ἄνθρωπων εὑρετὰς γενέσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ χρησίμων... See on this point von Staden (1992), especially 581.
139 See Str. 6.2.26.4-27.4, where he is accused of plagiarism of older writers, and 4F.72 BNJ (= Porphyry apud Eusebius Pr. Ev. 10.3) where his dependence on Herodotus and Damastes of Sigeum are noted. Cf. Lendle (1992) 68.
140 On the former, see Lendle (1992) 63: ‘Er führte, so kann man sagen, die “Universalhistorie” in die griechische Geschichtsschreibung ein’. For the latter, see Polybius 5.33.2: παρατηροῦμεν τὸν Ἐφορον τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μόνον ἐπιβεβλημένον τὰ καθόλου γράφειν... See also Drews (1963) on Ephorus’ arrangement of his history according to regions.
it is not only a compilation of other compilations, it does so in a way which consumes and internalises the cultural imperialism of the Alexandrian libraries.

The power, political reach and antiquity of Egypt, Greece and Rome are visible to the naked eye, especially in the landmarks of Alexandria; but when what can be seen is sublimated to what must be read, Christianity and its scriptures, as a 'religion of the book',\(^{141}\) can compete against on the library shelves. And the possibility of collapsing geographical thinking into literary thinking is provided by the very context of Alexandria itself, its history and self-conception embedded in the library-dominated cityscape.

**READING AS SELF-FORMATION**

This Christian adaptation of the ideas and institutions of textual comparison and organisation is a careful response to prevailing trends of the genre in which Clement writes: miscellanistic works are always concerned with the collecting and ordering of texts. All such compositions propose that the reader of the miscellany re-read, or read over the shoulder, of the miscellanist, watching the rearrangement of meaning and order.\(^{142}\) Gunderson, writing of the *Noctes Atticae*, presents the ‘frightening thought’ that reading Gellius is entering ‘a world where life is a permanent graduate seminar’.\(^{143}\) If so for the Attic Nights, so much the more for the *Stromateis*, a more deliberate work of advanced teaching: διδάσκων τις μανθάνει πλείον καὶ λέγων συνακροᾶται πολλάκις τοῖς ἐπακούοντοιν αὐτοῦ.\(^{144}\)

---

\(^{141}\) Although the term is modern, coined by Max Müller (1873).


\(^{143}\) Gunderson (2009) 12.

\(^{144}\) Str. 1.1.12.3: ‘Teaching, one learns more, and speaking one also hears many things along with one’s audience.’
There is a consciousness that reading is not a neutral act, disengaged from identity; there is a blurring of life and literature inherent in the programme set out here.\(^{145}\) The intermingling of the textual and the real can be seen as a thread running through the larger movement of the Second Sophistic, not just a concern of miscellany.\(^{146}\) Following his catalogue of miscellany, Clement goes on to describe the function of his own work:

εμοί τε υπομνήματα εἰεν ἃν ζώπυρα, τῷ τε εἰς γνῶσιν ἐπιτηδείῳ, εἰ πως περιτύχοι τούσδε, πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον καὶ ὕφελιμον μετὰ ἰδρωτὸς ἢ ζήτησι γενόσθαι οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν στίων τὸν πόνον, πολὺ δὲ πλέον καὶ τῆς γνώσεως ἥγεσθαι δίκαιον, τοῖς διὰ στενῆς καὶ τεθλιμμένης τῆς κυριακῆς ὄντως ὀδὸν εἰς τὴν ἁίδιον καὶ μακαρίαν παραπεμπόμενος σωτηρίαν.\(^{147}\)

My notes might be glowing coals, and for someone fit for gnosis, if he happens upon them, examining them with exertion will result in benefit and advantage. For it is right that work should precede not only food but, even more so, knowledge, for those being conveyed to the eternal and blessed salvation by the strait and narrow way,\(^{148}\) which is truly the Lord’s.

The Stromateis are envisaged as merely an index to further study which should be followed up for more thought and consideration, following this κυριακὴ ὁδός, ‘royal road’.\(^{149}\) The

\(^{145}\) Gunderson (2009) 14 on Gellius.

\(^{146}\) Whitmarsh (2001) 55-56 on Plutarch; 169-70 on Favorinus, both of the generation before Clement.

\(^{147}\) Str. 6.1.2.2-3.

\(^{148}\) Mt. 7:14.

\(^{149}\) This κυριακὴ ὁδός is possibly connected to the βασιλικὴ ὁδός of Philo; in De posteritate Caini 101 this way is the Royal Road Moses takes through Edom (Num. 20:17) allegorically read as an Aristotelian μέση ὁδός, defined as philosophy; cf. Quod deus sit 162-5 for the same allegorical reading; De spec. leg. 4.102 on the middle way; Deut. 5:32 is also used in Philonic exegesis for the same Aristotelian principle. See Winston (1984) 406-7 and Winston (2008) 203; Pascher (1931) is fundamental on the theme in Philo, though his theory that it speaks of a Philonic Jewish mystery cult is untenable. On the
ζήτησις points us in three directions on this path, all of which Clement recommends elsewhere in the Stromateis, often utilising similar language. First, it involves careful re-examination of the Stromateis, with the knowledge that it deliberately conceals true philosophy within itself;\textsuperscript{150} secondly, wider reading outside the Stromateis, having been told within it that true wisdom can be extracted both from philosophy and the scriptures;\textsuperscript{151} and lastly, the kind of self-examination from which wisdom can be gleaned.\textsuperscript{152}

The metaphor of literature, here condensed and unexplained, as glowing coals recalls us to Clement’s earlier discussion of the purpose of his work: συνεξάπτει δὲ ἡ γραφὴ τὸ ζώπυρον τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ συντείνει τὸ οἰκεῖον ὁμα δρὸς θεωρίαν.\textsuperscript{153} This image of discourse (written or spoken) as kindling for a metaphorical mental or spiritual flame is not unique to Clement. Plutarch, in De Recta Ratione Audiendi,\textsuperscript{154} uses the same imagery: ὁ νοῦς... ὑπεκκαύματος μόνον ὀσπερ ὕλη δεῖται, ὠρμὴν ἐμποιοῦντος εὑρετικὴν καὶ ὅρεξιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.\textsuperscript{155} There is an

---

same theme in Clement, see Lilla (1971) 64-8, citing (inter alia) Paed. 2.16.4; see also Str. 7.12.73.5 and references below.

\textsuperscript{150} E.g. Str. 1.1.15.1; 1.2.20.4; 4.2.4.1ff; as the ‘strait and narrow way’ of Mt. 7:14 and the βασιλικὴ ὁδός at 4.2.5.3-6.1.

\textsuperscript{151} E.g. Str. 1.2.19.4 – 1.2.20.1; 1.5.28.1 – 1.5.32.4; Str. 7.15.91.1-7 speaks of ζήτησις, following the royal road through heresies, not avoiding them, but seeking the elements of truth in them.


\textsuperscript{152} E.g. Str. 1.1.10.1-3; 4.2.4.4ff; see Str. 1.7.38.1-6 on the importance of seeking understanding through faith, using the language of a βασιλικὴ εἴσοδος.

\textsuperscript{153} Str. 1.1.10.4: ‘Writing kindles the glowing coal of the soul and directs the eye, as is proper for it, towards contemplation.’

\textsuperscript{154} Which, as part of the diversity of the Moralia, can be considered as somewhere in the extended family of the miscellany; Jeanneret (1991) 164, speaking of Plutarch (especially the Quaest. Conv.), along with Macrobius and Athenaeus, claims that miscellany ‘is the generic framework in which our grammarians belong’. Cf. König (2007) 47-50.

\textsuperscript{155} 48c: ‘The mind... rather like wood, lacks only fuel to produce an enquiring impulse and a desire for the truth.’ Achilles Tatius notes the power of literature to kindle flame in Leucippe et Clitophon 1.5.6:
ambivalence to the metaphor; Plutarch enlarges upon it to criticize those who merely warm themselves at their neighbours’ hearth rather than kindling some thoughts of their own, but (as the title of the work suggests) is specifically concerned with hearing, and those who do not listen in an engaged and active manner.\footnote{156}

Clement, in parallel, is making the same point about reading, and demands effort on the part of his readers, who cannot (as Plutarch complains) annoy the rest of the audience and sell their own intelligence short by asking for pat answers (48a), or, conversely, hinder themselves by being too afraid to ask questions (47e). The written equivalent, then, of avoiding pre-digested answers, and yet allowing an inquisitive audience to pry further with their questions, is the very structure that we see modelled in the \textit{Stromateis}. The work does provide the necessary \textit{ζώπυρα}, but only to \textit{τῷ … εἰς γνῶσιν ἐπιτηδείω}, one who is prepared to grapple and question. Having to write, rather than teach face-to-face, makes this process even more challenging: \textit{ὁ μὲν οὖν πρὸς παρόντας λέγων καὶ χρόνῳ δοκιμάζει καὶ κρίσει δικάζει καὶ διακρίνει τῶν ἄλλων τὸν οἷόν τε ἀκούειν};\footnote{157} whereas the writer can only hope for a future effect of his work (1.1.9.2). The miscellanistic structure is emphasised as a solution to this problem:

\begin{quote}
κυλιόμενα δὲ [sc. τὰ γραφέντα] ἀεὶ μόνῃ μιᾷ χρώμενα τῇ ἐγγράφῳ φωνῇ πρὸς τὸν ἐπανερόμενον οὐδὲν πλέον παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα ἀποκρίνεται. δεῖται γάρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης
\end{quote}

\footnote{156} There has been a great deal of recent interest in Plutarch on critical, active, reading, following Goldhill (2002). See Hunter (2009) 169-201 on this text, especially 172-4. See also Konstan (2004).

\footnote{157} \textit{Str. 1.1.9.1}: ‘So someone speaking to people who are physically present both tests them over time, and comes to conclusions about them using his judgment, and distinguishes the one who is able to hear from the others.’

124
βοηθοῦ ἦτοι τοῦ συγγραφαμένου ἢ καὶ ἄλλου τοῦ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἵχνος ἐμβεβηκότος.
ἐστι δὲ ἢ καὶ αἰνίξεται μοι γραφή, καὶ τοῖς μὲν παραστήσεται, τὰ δὲ μόνον ἔρει, πειράσεται δὲ καὶ λανθάνουσα εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐπικρυπτομένη ἐκφῆναι καὶ δεῖξαι σιωπῶσα. ¹⁵⁸

But [the things I have written] always being turned over, using just the one inscribed voice, give no answer at all to anyone making inquiries beyond what is written. For they are lacking, unavoidably, the help either of the writer, or of someone else who has walked in his footsteps. Some things my writing will only hint at; on some it will linger; some it will just mention; it will try to speak without being noticed, to reveal while remaining hidden, and to make known while keeping silent.

The deliberately convoluted method of writing is explained as both preventing the lazy reader from taking too easily the fruits of Clement’s knowledge,¹⁵⁹ and, by extension, allowing the one who does wish to question further access to wisdom by encoding it within the work, though hidden and even silent.¹⁶⁰ Reading what Clement reads, over his shoulder, and being pushed to enquire beyond that, is, in a way, walking in his roundabout footsteps; the process of reading through the work Clement forces us to makes up for the lack of a face-to-face teacher. It is the form of the work itself which is intended to mould the reader into the kind of person who is able to read it. This kind of formative reading is inseparable from the theory and practice of allegorical reading and writing, which forms an important part of the development of Christian theology (in which Clement is such an important early witness), and we will treat allegory at greater length in Chapters 7 and 8.

¹⁵⁸ Str. 1.1.14.4 - 1.1.15.1.
¹⁵⁹ Cf. Str. 1.1.10.3: ἀπορίᾳ γὰρ ἐπαρκεῖν [οὐ] δίκαιον, ἀργίαν δὲ ἐφοδιάζειν οὐ καλόν·
¹⁶⁰ Cf. Str. 1.2.20.4 - 1.2.21.1; 4.2.4.1 – 4.2.7.4.
Conclusion

Implicit in the genre of miscellany which the work buys into is a concern with the dynamic relationship between the writer and the reader. There is a constant contest between its eclectic principles and the drive for order, in which the reader must be an active participant. In its dismembering and remembering of knowledge, the Stromateis illustrates not only the mutiplicity that characterizes the state of the cosmos, but also undermines any imperial discourse that attempts to present a totalised and unified oikumene under Rome. On the other hand, it utilizes that discourse of imperial power to show Clement himself as in control of his disparate collection of knowledge, but only as a functionary of the original unitary Logos, the source of all philosophy. Of this, both Roman imperial power and Greek learning are only fragmentary reflections.

His goal is not the dissemination of doctrine or the monumentalizing of truth, the creation of a Christian mirror image of a totalising Roman discourse, but the formation of a particular kind of independent-minded reader, modelled on his own character as the miscellanistic compiler, who is in turn a reflection of the divine teacher: ναὶ μὴν ἑαυτὸν κτίζει καὶ δημιουργεῖ, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἑπαίωντας αὐτοῦ κοσμεῖ ἐξομοιούμενος θεῷ ὁ γνωστικός.

---

161 Pace Lilla (1971) 232.
162 7.3.13.3: ‘Indeed, the gnostic forms and creates himself, and even more, he, having become like God, adorns those who hear him.’
PART II
GREEKS AND BARBARIANS
3. GATHERED INTO THE ONE RACE:
THE CHRISTIAN HYBRID

We have already noted Clement’s self-presentation as a philosopher, and the generic links he draws between the Stromateis and philosophical literature. Whilst this presentation places Clement’s Christianity as a competitor to other philosophical schools, and is seen as the proper culmination of Platonic wisdom, Clement always characterises his philosophy as ‘barbarian’.163 This use of ethno-cultural terminology is fundamental to early Christian self-conception,164 and exploring how Clement appropriates, adapts, and subverts use of such terminology will occupy this section of the thesis.

It is necessary to lay some groundwork for this exploration by first examining both the parameters of ancient debates over ethnicity, as well as the presuppositions with which modern scholars have approached ancient ethnic identity. The idea of ‘ethnicity’ as an immutable characteristic shared by objectively separable ‘races’ of people is no longer tenable – although this characterisation had an influential history in the fields of both classics and theology up until the Second World War. This kind of ‘primordialist’ viewpoint saw ethnicity as ‘a basic and natural unit of history and humanity’,165 often invoked as a decisive explanatory factor of historical development.166

163 E.g. Str. 1.9.44.2; 1.18.89.2; 5.1.9.4; 5.9.56.2; 5.12.79.2; 6.8.67.2; 8.1.1.2, et passim.
166 See Smith (1986) 7; J. Hall (1997) 17 notes Max Weber’s assumption that ethnicity was decisive for the societal developments of ancient Israel, China, India, and, in more recent times, Protestant Europe. Cf. Fishman (1983) 134: ‘Thus, rather ethnicity being merely a passive by-product of more basic political-economic patterns, Weber argued that it helps shape those patterns and makes them assume particular directions, tempos, and styles.’
Although ethnicity has generally been insulated from discussion of religious identity, which was more usually seen as a matter of chosen identity (although the choice could, of course, be influenced by inherent racial characteristics), there have been significant crossovers. Of particular significance for the study of early Christianity is Ernst Renan, who in the immensely popular *Life of Jesus* (1863) identified Jesus as an ‘Aryan’ Jew in contrast to the ‘semitic’ Jewish Pharisees: the split between Christianity and Judaism, and the Roman adoption of the former is thus teleologically assured, as Christianity finds its proper racial home. The more obvious examples of this kind of racialisation of biblical interpretation have long disappeared from the academy, but subtle forms of it have continued, even despite the best intentions of scholars, into currents of contemporary theology.

In contrast, the approach to ethnicity from the middle of the twentieth century reflects ‘ubiquitous antiessentialism’. Ethnic identity is seen as socially constructed, and its presentation as an objectively fixed category masks its actual fluid relationship with political, social and cultural realities and objectives. Recognition of this kind of construction was an important element in the analysis of the development of the modern European nation-state by Anthony Smith and Benedict Anderson. Jonathan Hall’s application of their

---

168 See Nasrallah and Schüssler Fiorenza (2009) and Kelley (2002) whose ‘basic thesis is that modern biblical scholarship is trapped in a racialised discourse’ (211); his argument might seem to push too stridently for the claim that beneath an explicitly pro-equality turn in modern liberal biblical scholarship, the categories utilised ‘implicitly yet forcefully endorse the racialized politics of post-First World War German facism’ (212-13). Even so, the general discussion is both illuminating and challenging.
169 Modern views have been deeply affected by the experience of the Holocaust, predicated on theories of fixed racial identity. See J. Hall (1997) 1-2; the quotation is from Malkin (2001) 1.
work, along with Edith Hall’s nuanced analysis of the process of Greek self-construction through the development of the category of the barbarian, have been of seminal importance in applying this view of ethnicity to the ancient world.

THE EDUCATION OF GREECE

Expansion of Greek education after the conquests of Alexander, followed by the increased travel and interconnectedness of the Greek-speaking east brought about by the pax Romana, meant that by the second century AD, the concept of Hellenicity was a stretched and contested idea. The second-century playing field for debates of Greek identity was marked out by the borders of the Roman empire, and by the literature of fifth- and fourth-century Athens. Competing definitions of Hellenicity of the late classical period are not merely historical background to Clement’s writing; they still provide the core arguments, exempla and proof-texts for contesting Hellenicity, even though the political context and implications of that contestation had changed drastically. Debates over kinship, descent, nomos and phusis took place in and through the literature which was preserved, with its disagreements, as the canonical standard of Second Sophistic education. Although the Greek tradition was influenced and built upon by writing in the interim, this fifth- and fourth-century, mostly Athenian, literature was still the core material for discourse on identity and ethnicity for Greeks under Rome. In Jonathan Hall’s words, ‘the “archaism” exhibited by

---

172 J. Hall (1997) and (2002).
174 See for example the contributions in Malkin (2001).
175 ‘There are certainly authors in the intervening centuries who think about the unity of the human community, but they are not central to the thinking of early imperial authors in the way late fifth- and early fourth-century Athenian intellectuals are.’ Richter (2011) 5.
writers of the Second Sophistic derives from the fact that they are entering into dialogue
with the fifth-century debate on the nature and definitional criteria of Hellenic identity.\(^{176}\)

The fifth century was a rich resource for this kind of reflection, a period of recalibration of
Greek self-definition from a primarily ethnic definition to a group identity based on
education and language.\(^{177}\) The Persian wars gave rise to the utilisation of an oppositional
construction of identity,\(^{178}\) where Hellenicity could be constructed as against a barbarian
other;\(^{179}\) Simon Hornblower sums up: ‘Persia gave the Greeks their identity, or the means of
recognising it.’\(^{180}\) Isocrates’ claim that Hellenicity is a way of thinking and a deposit of
education, deriving from Athens, rather than a racial identity,\(^{181}\) is frequently cited as a
prooftext of this revised oppositional outlook.

Although the original context of these elisions of ‘Hellenicity’ and ‘Athenianism’ was one of
uneasy negotiation and dispute, from the other side of Roman hegemony the supremacy of
Atticism, with its attendant educational curriculum, as the medium of cultured *mimesis*

\(^{176}\) J. Hall (2002) 225.

\(^{177}\) J. Hall (2002) 172-228. See also J. Hall (1997).

\(^{178}\) On ‘oppositional’ as opposed to ‘aggregative’ self-definition, see J. Hall (2002) 179-180, relying on

\(^{179}\) I do not distinguish between ‘Greek’, ‘Hellenic’, ‘Greekness’ or ‘Hellenicity’ in my terminology.


\(^{181}\) Isocrates, *Panegyric* 50: τοσοῦτον δ᾽ ἠπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ὡσθ’ ὦ ταύτης μαθηταὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασι, καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκεν μηκέτι τοῦ γένους, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μάλλον Ἑλλήνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἡτοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας. Isocrates himself is drawing on Thucydides’ version of Pericles’ funeral oration (2.41): ἔνωσιν τε λέγω τὴν τε πάσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν ἐναι. (‘In short, I tell you, this city as a whole is the education of Greece.’) It should be kept in mind that in the Thucydidean text, all the reasons produced for this claim are
military or political, not artistic or cultural: Hornblower (1991-2008) *ad loc.*
survived as common property of all educated Greeks.\textsuperscript{182} Teresa Morgan describes \textit{enkyklios paideia} as ‘a passport to civilised society’,\textsuperscript{183} which neatly captures its ethno-cultural claims; a passport both declares nationality, and stands as a symbol for political identity. As a reasonably stable set of practices and literary accomplishments, as a reified object it stood as a marker of belonging to the Greek world, even though beneath the term could lie a good deal of variation and difference.

This cultural definition of Hellenicity, however, never entirely superseded more purely ethnic, genealogical views of what it meant to call oneself Greek. It is in elite literature, amongst those who can lay claim to \textit{paideia}, that such achievements are touted as being foundational to Hellenicity. Amongst the ordinary masses in the cities of the eastern Roman empire, kinship and descent still had significant sway in determining ethnic identification.\textsuperscript{184} The epigraphical record attests to cities claiming mythologically-based Greek descent and kinship through to the imperial period, even where such claims seemed bizarre. Hadrian’s Panhellenion, requiring demonstration of Greek descent,\textsuperscript{185} included on its roll cities as tenuously Greek as Cibyra, Ptolemais Barca, and even Sardis.\textsuperscript{186} Indeed, the institution of the

\textsuperscript{182} On \textit{paideia}, see the magisterial volumes of Jaeger (1939-45).

\textsuperscript{183} Morgan (2013) 108.

\textsuperscript{184} J. Hall (2002) 189. See also Richter (2011) 8.

\textsuperscript{185} Romeo (2002) 24-6 notes the considerable overlap between founding membership of the Panhellenion and the Delphic Amphictyony, and the importance of the mother-city/colony relationship for membership in both organisations. From p. 26, ‘the ideology of the Hadrianic Panhellenion seems to return to the definition of a concept of \textit{genos} in terms of ancestral blood-ties’; Romeo goes on to note the roots of this in fourth-century discourse.

\textsuperscript{186} Knowledge of the Panhellenion comes almost exclusively from inscriptions which are collected in Oliver (1970) and their interpretation forms the basis of Spawforth and Walker (1985) which gives the list of member cities in Table 1, p. 80, and Spawforth and Walker (1986). On the ethnic requirements of membership, see Romeo (2002), who notes the tension between the requirements for membership and the cultural definition of Hellenicity favoured by some contemporary intellectuals.
Panhellenion not only gives evidence of how various peoples claimed Greek descent, but the importance of establishing a Greek identity in the Roman empire, in the overlap between cultural and political activity.\textsuperscript{187}

The ideology underpinning the Panhellenion, then, was in tension with what was preached by contemporary intellectuals: a particularly direct contrast can be seen in Favorinus’ \textit{Corinthian Oration}, which contrasts Hellenic identity gained by \textit{genos} with that gained by \textit{paideia}.\textsuperscript{188} The speech is dated after Favorinus had fallen out with Hadrian, and can be read as a veiled criticism of the Panhellion’s principles.\textsuperscript{189} So despite the bent of most literary evidence of the Second Sophistic,\textsuperscript{190} the notion of \textit{genos}, in the sense of descent and kinship, as constitutive of Greek identity was still alive and well in the late second century. There was, therefore, a great deal of available material for early Christian authors to draw on to construct their own approach to ethnicity.

A great deal was at stake, however. In Herodotus’ famous summary, what constitutes the Greeks are a common tongue, as well as common shrines of the gods and sacrifices, and a

\textsuperscript{187} Spawforth and Walker (1985) 78.

\textsuperscript{188} Or. 25.27; Gleason (1995) 8-20.

\textsuperscript{189} Romeo (2002) 32; see also Swain (1989) 150-8.

\textsuperscript{190} Although this was not a universal position: Polemo of Laodicea, the great sophist of Asia Minor under Hadrian, posits the superiority of Greeks by race, rather than those who claim to be Greek by education, in his \textit{Physiognomica}. See Romeo (2002) 32-5, who posits a direct connection between Polemo and the principles of the Panhellenikon. Cf. Gleason (1995) 21-54. Biographical information on Polemo is mostly derived from Philostratus \textit{VS} 25; the text of the \textit{Physiognomica} survives in an Arabic translation of 1356, a Greek epitome by a certain Adamantius, of the fourth century, and an anonymous Latin treatise of the fourth century.
common way of life.\(^{191}\) The Panhellenion as an association was, in foundational terms, a religious organisation, continuing the role established by the Olympics and other Panhellenic games in tying Greeks by religious bonds. Greek paideia itself was thus bound not just literally (i.e. the gods of Homer), but in its goals, to polytheistic cult. Clement’s response is to overtly deny Hellenicity, but appropriate the cultural markers used as ethnic determinants. In mimicking the language of Greek identity, but changing their frame of reference, Clement demonstrates their fluidity and opens the possibility for challenge and change. By denying the fixity of even a cultural definition of Hellenicity, Clement reconfigures how religious identity interacts with cultural and ethnic claims.

**THE THIRD RACE**

«νέαν [sc. διαθήκην] ἡμῖν διέθετο· τά γὰρ Ἑλλήνων καὶ Ἰουδαίων παλαιά, ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ καινῶς αὐτὸν τρίτω γένει σεβόμενοι Χριστιανοί.» σαφῶς γὰρ, οἶμαι, ἐδήλωσεν τὸν ἕνα καὶ μόνον θεὸν ὑπὸ μὲν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνικός, ὑπὸ δὲ Ἰουδαίων Ἰουδαϊκός, καινός δὲ ὕψα ἡμῶν καὶ πνευματικός γινωσκόμενον... ἐκ γοῦν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῆς νομικῆς εἰς τὸ ἑνὸς γένος τοῦ σωζομένου συνάγονται λαοῦ οἱ τὴν πίστιν προσιέμενοι, οὐ χρόνῳ διαφορομένων τῶν τριῶν λαῶν, ἵνα τις φύσεις ὑπολάβοι τριττάς, διαφόροις δὲ παιδευομένων διαθήκαις τοῦ ἑνὸς κυρίου.\(^{192}\)

'He made a new covenant with us; for what belonged to the Greeks and the Jews is ancient, but we who worship him in a new way,\(^{193}\) in a third race [or a third kind]\(^{194}\),

---

\(^{191}\) *Hist.* 8.144.2: αὐτίς δὲ τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, ἐὰν ὄμοιόν τε καὶ ὀμόγλωσσον, καὶ θεῶν ἰδρύματα τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι ἤθεα τε ὑμῶτροπα.

\(^{192}\) *Str.* 6.4.41.6-7.

\(^{193}\) *Jer.* 31:31-2. Lieu (2004) 261 notes the possibility that the following phrase (i.e. 'the third race') is not part of the quotation but Clement’s own comment.

\(^{194}\) For this alternate translation, see Lieu (2004) 261.
are Christians."195 For clearly, I think, he made clear that the one and only God was known by the Greeks in a gentile way; by the Jews judaically, and also recently by us, in a spiritual way... Accordingly, out of the Greek education, but also out of the education of the Law, those who accept faith are gathered into the one race of the saved, not of three peoples separated in time, so that someone might understand three natures, but of those educated with different covenants of the one Lord.

Quoting the fragmentary *Preaching of Peter*, Clement explains that despite their theft of barbarian wisdom (a theme we will examine in a subsequent chapter), the Greeks in fact did have knowledge of the one true God: though imperfect, it was genuine. His schema of ethnic terminology seems to be based around education (παιδεία), which is here keyed into bodies of canonical literature. Greek παιδεία refers to a reasonably standard literary curriculum, and νομικός, 'relating to laws', refers in the New Testament to expertise in the Jewish Torah:196 the distinction between these two textual bodies is definitional for a distinction between two ethnic bodies. Both the gentile and the Jewish way refer back to τὰ παλαιά, 'ancient things'; implicitly these things are texts, Greek literature and the Hebrew scriptures.

The Christians, the ‘third race’,197 don’t quite fit this pattern – no particular textual core is suggested for them, but rather a new way of worshipping. This difference in how those who participate in this τρίτον γένος are defined is particularly notable when only Greeks and Jews are mentioned as being gathered ‘into the one race of the saved, not of three peoples’.

---
195 The quotation is from the fragmentary *Kerygma Petri*.
196 E.g. Mt. 22:35.
197 The earliest roots of this phrase seem to be as a term of mockery used by outsiders of Christians: e.g. Tertullian, *Ad nat*. 1.8.1; 20.4; *Scorp*. 10.10; Suetonius, *Nero* 16.2. See Lieu (2004) 262-4, who notes that ‘Christian writers were again boldly redefining the charge as they claimed newness as a virtue, and peoplehood as a source of credit.’ (262)
Although seemingly spoken about as the same category as Jews and Greeks, it is clear that Christian identity functions differently for Clement; it is both an alternative category, a third option alongside Jews and Greeks, but also an absorptive category that is able to co-opt members of the other two, so that, joined by faith, they are not properly understood as three peoples or separate natures, but a single race, τὸ ἑν γένος.

The authorial persona which Clement adopts is also implicated in this discussion; although he parades the cultural traits associated with a Greek ethnic identity, he does so as a self-styled ‘barbarian’ outsider. This demonstration of Greek cultural traits, alongside a disavowal of Greek identity, can be usefully compared to the processes of postcolonialist mimicry and hybridity as described by Homi Bhabha: the key issues are the fissures and overlaps of culture, race and power. By using Bhabha’s categories and conceptual framework we can illuminate some of the less obvious aspects of Clement’s ethnic discourse, particularly its political connotations.

Bhabha introduces and illuminates the concept of hybridity using the image of the printed English book, specifically the bible, ‘an insignia of colonial authority and a signifier of colonial desire and discipline’. This signifier, however, contains an excess of meaning; caught between coloniser and colonised, its value is (in Bhabha’s rather convoluted terms) ‘both less-than-one and doubled’. More simply, the English book, translated and distributed, becomes less than its assumed cultural and political value: its religious truth is

---

198 ‘Signs Taken for Wonders’ in Bhabha (2004).
200 A constant catch-phrase of Bhabha (2004) to speak of the process of hybridity: e.g. 139, 142, 166, 169, 171, etc.
acknowledged, but separated from its connection to the English missionary faith. On the other hand,

Doubling repeats the fixed and empty presence of authority by articulating it syntagmatically with a range of differential knowledges and positionalities that both estrange its ‘identity’ and produce new forms of knowledge, new modes of differentiation, new sites of power.201

This hybridity is an unavoidable fact of all cross-cultural contact: the fraught process of recognition of symbols of power and authority between colonised and colonising cultures. For symbols of power to function, their metonymic relationships (i.e. the bible represents evangelical enlightenment) must be understood; the justification of colonialism, however, relies on the claim of naturalness for that relationship (‘we rule because we bring the light of true religion and advanced civilisation, as the bible shows’). Hybridity is the process of making clear the content of that metonymic relationship, but in so doing, the contingency of the relationship is exposed (that is, the bible as a symbol will not necessarily be read as demonstrating the cultural superiority of the English). Mimicry is the linked and dependent process of copying, but not quite properly reproducing, the language and culture of the colonising power.202 It is both a site of subservience, as it must recognise the dominance and acquiesce to its gaze; but also of the possibility of resistance, in the exploitation of the potential excess of what can be signified by the symbols of dominance.

Can we, though, profitably compare a wealthy, hyper-educated Roman citizen from a well-known and self-consciously Greek city like Alexandria with the subaltern colonised subject

about which Bhabha writes? The fit is in some ways very neat: the kinds of western European knowing (thinking, speaking, writing, self-expressing) about which Bhabha writes are particularly focused around its elite cultural productions and icons: the bible, the printed book, and political discourse. This is the culture of the colonising power which is used as the justification for its superiority, and which must be recognised and then can be mimicked by the colonised subject. The idea of an *enkyklios paideia*, an education that is both rounded, but also all-encompassing, thus very neatly fits this model of imperialism of culture.\(^{203}\) The way in which (professed) non-Greeks mimicked and hybridized this Greco-Roman culture can be seen as a parallel to the Indian adoption of European forms of literary valorisation and political organisation.

Speaking of Christians as ‘colonised’ subjects, however, requires some explanation. While it is possible to identify in quite simplistic terms the coloniser and the colonised in nineteenth-century India, the same is not so true of the world of early Christianity. First, the relationship between Greece and Rome is itself not one that can be collapsed into a ‘Greco-Roman’ oppressor; Second Sophistic literature is as much concerned with resistance of Roman domination of Greek culture as it with acquiescence to Roman rule.\(^{204}\) Where, however, we find articulated defences of Roman imperial power over the east, it is invariably couched in Greek cultural terms, in the same way that articulations of the legitimacy of British colonial power often took the form of promoting European cultural superiority (indeed, not infrequently asserting a classical heritage for the enlightenment which justified colonialism). Rejecting the authoritative power of accepted Greek cultural forms is in effect

---

\(^{203}\) Cf. (again) *paideia* as a passport: Morgan (2013) 108.  
\(^{204}\) See, for instance, the discussion of Greco-Roman fissures in König (2001).
rejecting the structured power of elites in the Greek east, which necessarily implicates Roman political power.

More importantly, an identification of Christians with the dispossessed of colonialisation might seem a stretch. Colonial discrimination of the nineteenth century was enacted structurally on every level (political, social, economic) and was unavoidable; European colonising power also depended in part on an essentialised discourse of race which was by and large not the most influential theory of ethnicity for the ancient world. Repression of Christianity was neither embedded nor systematic in the same way, and (as has recently been argued by Candida Moss) was mostly a constructed fiction anyway.

Christians do present their community as a suffering race, and a beleaguered minority. They were self-professed exiles; they identified themselves with the poor and the outcast; and they did face the prospect of persecution (to greater and lesser degrees) and the possibility of martyrdom, a narrative of which Christians were hyper-conscious. It was foundational for their religion in Christ’s suffering and death, and from the earliest evidence the discourse of Christian martyrdom identifies the martyr (to a degree) with Christ:

---

205 See Perkins (1994) 3, who argues 'that the discursive focus in the second century on the suffering body contributed to Christianity's attainment of social power...'. Her argument is about Christian representation of suffering, rather than the reality.

206 Hebrews 11:13. This language of exile is both a strong motif in the New Testament (see 1 Peter in particular), and more broadly taken up by early Christian writers, especially in the Epistle to Diognetus. See further Norris (2004b). Cf. the remarks of Dunning (2009) 6-7 on the self-identification of Christians as aliens: 'it retains its negative connotations of social estrangement and marginality; while also, and at the same time, being refigured as “a mark of excellence, a source of power”'.

207 Perkins (1994) and more recently Moss (2013).

208 Moss (2010). The clearest examples are the Epistles of Ignatius of Antioch and the Martyrdom of Polycarp.
Therefore being of good courage he [i.e. the martyr] comes to his friend, the lord, on whose account he has willingly given up both his body, and his soul, too, as his judges supposed, and hearing the poetical phrase, ‘dear brother’, from our saviour because of the likeness of their lives. We call martyrdom perfection, now, not because a man comes to the end of his life as everyone else, but because he has exhibited the perfect work of love.

Firstly, even if the Christian discourse of martyrdom is a construction, in an historical reality in which the reality of actual death was unlikely and distant, this does not mean that we should take this self-understanding any less seriously. It is perfectly possible to critique aggressive posturing of ‘us’ and ‘them’ to which the discourse of martyrdom so often gives rise (as Candida Moss does), whilst at the same time recognising the perceived and therefore lived reality of fear of persecution.

Secondly, Moss’s attack is predominantly directed against the claims that Christians faced deliberate repression and persecution, deliberately pursued by a policy of execution. Even Moss, however, admits that ‘Christians were never a beloved group and that during the vast majority of this period they were actively disliked’; indeed, she exemplifies the lack of

---

209 Str. 4.4.14.2-3.
210 Il. 4.155, 5.359.
211 The argument in general of Moss (2013).
persecution by noting that Pliny, after torturing two deaconesses doesn’t actively hate Christianity (merely labels it a superstition), and gives the accused Christians three chances to recant before executing them. It is certainly true that for most Christians, discrimination was only potential, and required self-identification to actually come into force;\(^{213}\) in many parts of the empire at most times in the first three centuries, even this would not have led to any serious dangers.\(^{214}\) Nonetheless, it is still true that throughout this period, discrimination was still an ever-present potential for all Christians. Indeed, Clement ‘who himself had fled martyrdom’ (in Moss’s words)\(^{215}\) to go into exile in the early third century exemplifies the threat under which Christians felt they constantly lived. Even though the persecutions he fled were not part of a systemic or sustained policy against Christianity, it still exemplifies the real and significant dangers to which profession of Christianity exposed one.\(^{216}\) From an etic perspective the risks of Christianity were real, although exaggerated in the construction of Christian identity; from an emic perspective, persecution was a constant presence and possibility.

The most telling parallel Bhabha’s theory raises between early Christianity and the colonial subjects of imperial Britain may be the similar trajectories of their doubling of imperial power: the reduplication of Roman oppression that has characterised a significant proportion of the post-Constantinian history of Christianity is echoed in many decolonised countries by their continuation or creation of hierarchies of elite rulers and dispossessed

\(^{213}\) E.g. Pliny, Ep. 10.96. de Ste. Croix (1963) is still seminal on this point; see more recently Moss (2013).
\(^{214}\) Moss (2013) 144-5.
\(^{215}\) Moss (2013) 195.
\(^{216}\) Indeed, Clement is explicitly critical of those who lose their lives for their faith unnecessarily: Str. 4.4.16-17; see Moss (2013) 194-5, who explains his position as motivated by the risk that in fleeing Clement might have been branded a coward.
underclasses.\footnote{217} Just as the subsequent history of Christianity is a the reapplication of their own experience of persecution to those over whom they eventually held power, so we all too often see post-colonial elites mirroring the tactics of their own repression.

‘PLAYING THE GREEK’

In Clement’s case, as a self-proclaimed outsider, by mimicking the language of both Greek and Roman imperialism, the traditional boundaries between Greek and non-Greek are destabilised. In the passage quoted earlier in this chapter, Greek paideia is taken up as a symbol of Greek cultural power, but re-inscribed, or mimicked, as quite a different kind of text, no longer part of a Greek heritage, nor merely a mixed Greek/Jewish entity, but an entirely new hybrid creation. In Bhabha’s formulation, ‘Hybridity reverses the formal process of disavowal so that the violent dislocation of the act of colonization becomes the conditionality of colonial discourse.’\footnote{218} To unpack Bhabha’s dense language in relation to Clement, rather than positing Greek/Christian opposition (a formal disavowal), the Greek-Christian hybrid displays the uncertainty at the heart of ‘Greek’ cultural domination. By being both almost authentically Greek, enacted in his very language, and also not-quite-Greek, both as an Alexandrian (from a city and intellectual culture of deliberate cultural hybridity), and even more so as a self-proclaimed barbarian, the imagined Greek/barbarian boundary is made unpredictable.

The programmatic opening to the second book of the Stromateis gives a clear example of this hybridised mimicry in action. The chapter claims it will demonstrate ‘that Greeks are thieves

of barbarian philosophy’;²¹⁹ it will, we are told, answer ‘the charges levelled against us by the Greeks’;²²⁰ which will involve an examination of ‘the so-called well-rounded education’.²²¹ In pursuing these goals, Clement tells us he will not ‘play the Greek’²²²: ἔφαμεν δὲ πολλάκις ἢδη μήτε μεμελετηκέναι μήτε μὴν ἐπιτηδεύειν ἐλληνίζειν.²²³

The distance between Greekness and the authorial persona could hardly be emphasized more; at the same time, however, the way in which this disavowal is made demonstrates what should be clear markers for a claim to Hellenicity. The usual signification of ἐλληνίζειν is to speak or write Greek, often with the connotations of linguistic purity: proper, correct, usually Attic, Greek.²²⁴ Clement, however, is obviously writing in Greek, and educated Atticizing Greek, at that; the point must rather be the commonplace of anti-sophistry: that a concentration on form is subjugated to a focus on content.²²⁵ The dual potential of the language lets us catch a glimpse of Clement as the mirror of the Greek subject, however: Clement is both playing the Greek and disavowing it, being both less-than-one, and doubled, as an imperfect reflection of what ‘speaking Greek’ ought to mean.

This mimicry happens on a rhetorical level, too. Proper philosophy, as Clement goes on to explain, profits the intellect, and not the tongue: τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁπίτι φιλοσόφημα οὐκ εἰς τὴν

²¹⁹ 2.1.1.1: ἔξης δ’ ἂν εἶπ διαλαβεῖν, ἐπεὶ «κλέπτας» τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας ἕλληνας εἶναί προσεῖπεν ἢ γραφῆ, ὡς τούτῳ δί’ ὀλίγων δειχθήσεται. On this claim, see Chapter 5 below.
²²⁰ 2.1.2.1: ἐπὶ τούτους ἀκόλουθον οἶμαι ὑπὲρ ὡς κατατρέχουσιν ἦμων ἑλληνικας ἀπολογήσασθαι ὀλίγων συγχρωμένους γραφαῖς...
²²¹ 2.1.2.3: ...πέρι τῆς ἑγκυκλίου καλουμένης παιδείας...
²²² The translation is that of Ferguson (1991); the ANF translation renders it ‘expressing ourselves in pure Greek’.
²²³ 2.1.3.1.
²²⁴ See LSJ s.v. ἑλληνίζω.
²²⁵ Emmett (2001) 34.
It is difficult, however, not to notice the carefully balanced alliteration (εἰς τὴν γλῶσσαν, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὴν γνώμην) in this claim to stylistic unconcern. Indeed, Clement’s Greek has been described as participating in the Second Sophistic cult of linguistic Atticism to the point almost of absurdity.

For the pepaideumenoi, there is also the possibility here of picking out an allusion to to Euripides’ Hippolytus: ἡ γλῶσσ’ ὀμώμοχ’, ἡ δὲ φρήν ἀνώμοτος, working with the same dichotomy of mind and tongue. The context here, of false accusations, misunderstanding, and the value of proper communication, pick out themes from the play which suggests that the possibility of deliberate allusion is more than fanciful. At the same time as he is demonstrating Greek paideia linguistically, rhetorically, and literarily, he explicitly disavows a Greek identity.

This reproduction of Greek culture is thus only partial; it is precisely the kind of ‘negative transparency’ which Bhabha sees in hybridity. That is, for signs of the presence of authority to be recognised as present (i.e transparent), its rules of recognition must also be disclosed (i.e. the fact there is a contingent relationship between signifier and the signified power must be acknowledged: this is Bhabha’s ‘photographic negative’). However, ‘the immediate visibility of such a regime of recognition [can be] resisted’. In this hybrid reproduction, as when Indian recipients of the Bible refuse to acknowledge English

---

226 2.1.3.1: ‘True philosophical demonstration does not profit experts in their expression, but in their understanding.’
228 Line 612.
production or authoritative interpretation of the artefact, the ‘artefact’ Clement puts on show, his Greek paideia (language, rhetoric, and literature), is denied its Greek interpretation – that is, its connection to Greek authorship/authority, and more broadly, Greek identity.

In both parading the markers of Greek identity in linguistic and literary forms, whilst explicitly disavowing the label of Greek, Clement buys Christianity the cultural capital available to the Greek pepaideumenos, but at the same time destabilises the fixed relationship between paideia and Greek ethno-cultural identity. What is at stake here is the unmentioned, hidden correlates of a Greek identity – deference to traditional Greek religious practices in particular. These are the arbitrary rules of paideia as sign of Greek social and political authority that Clement makes explicit.

When Clement, in the passage quoted above, emphasizes that the Greeks knew god in a Greek way, he connects a cultural identity to a religious one; but it is contrasted to the spiritual worship of the third race. The unified Greek identity which concentrates power and authority in Herodotus’ triad of language/cult/customs (all of which are controlled by the elite and demonstrated by paideia) is split apart into constituent elements.

THE TRUTH BEHIND THE MASKS

One of the images Bhabha consistently uses to describe the processes of hybridity and mimicry is that of masks. Speaking of the masks used by Lucian, Simon Goldhill illuminates a set of questions relevant for the Second Sophistic as a whole:

Who is the outsider in the Roman Empire? How does religious syncretism or pluralism become a question for cultural identity? The tension between Lucian’s ironic authorial strategies of self-authorization and claims of truth, on the one hand,
and his anthropological and narratological panache, on the other, produce for the reader an unsettling sense of shifting cultural bearings. Where Plutarch could offer Greek and Roman questions as separate, if related, cultural enquiries, Lucian’s ‘closet of masks’ plays wittily with the problems of secure cultural identification, secure self-positioning.\(^{231}\)

The specific text under the microscope is Lucian’s *De dea Syria*, one of the more closely studied texts of the Second Sophistic.\(^ {232}\) Undoubtedly, its attraction is due to the complexity of the interactions the text generates between author, audience and subject matter – in Simon Goldhill’s words, the ‘closet of masks’;\(^ {233}\) precisely the kind of text against which Christian works are often unfavourably contrasted, as closing down the possibilities for dialogic play and openness. But *De dea Syria* is a particularly apposite text to offer as a comparison to early Christian exploration of ethnicity: its similarity in theme, particularly its concern with marginal religious traditions and affirmation of non-Greek status, mean that ‘the number of correspondences with the Christian writers of later antiquity remains an *explanandum*’.\(^ {234}\)

*De dea Syria* presents a number of paradoxes – is its approach to the cult of Atargatis satiric or laudatory? Is it fictional or factual? Pro-Greek (pro-Roman?) or patriotically Syrian?\(^ {235}\) Is the author even Lucian?\(^ {236}\) Jaś Elsner’s chapter in *Being Greek under Rome*, to which this quotation from Goldhill above serves as prelude, sets out to demonstrate the layers of

\(^ {231}\) Goldhill (2001a) 22.

\(^ {232}\) See in particular the magisterial Lightfoot (2003).

\(^ {233}\) Borrowed from Froma Zeitlin’s classic article on Euripides’ *Orestes*: Zeitlin (1980).

\(^ {234}\) Lightfoot (2003) 199–204 (quotation at 204).

\(^ {235}\) There is some debate as to whether it is even sensible to talk about a ‘Syrian’ identity; see Andrade (2013).

\(^ {236}\) I accept, following the detailed arguments in Lightfoot (2003), the cautious conclusion of Elsner (2001) that the work is Lucian’s.
artistic presentation which constitute this ‘closet of masks’. The role of the modern interpreter is not to explicate the univocal meaning of the text, but to uncover and parade its multivalency, complexity and its deliberate challenge to simplistic systems of meaning.

Thus:

‘[The] author never opens the container... in which his true self lies concealed. In the case of the reader, we face the dilemmas of the king and queen... Like the king’s suspicion of adultery, our reading of the text is always hearsay – susceptible to false accusations and a misleading plethora of alternative versions’.

‘Again, the text’s subtle comparisons of models... reveal an ambivalence about how they should be interpreted... This allows it to be both serious in its explorations of the problematics of national and linguistic identities in the Roman East, and yet humorous at the same time.’

We are pointed to the complexity of an unnamed author, behind the mask of the unnamed Syrian narrator, who may or may not be telling the truth about a real or mostly fictive Syrian cult, behind the mask of a pseudo-Herodotus in [Lucian’s] De dea Syria.

In essence, the work serves as a clever illustration and reflection of tensions of ethnic and cultural identity in the Roman empire, whilst affirming the political order. More, it affirms

---

237 146.
238 148.
239 150.
240 My use of brackets here is to highlight the complexities and uncertainties the text provokes – not to deny its Lucianic authenticity but rather to call to mind that even the authorship is a matter of plausibilities rather than certainties.
241 Elsner (2001) 150. Elsner’s subsidiary argument that the text may be read as opening up ‘a perfect cultural space in which resistance [to the Roman centre] becomes both possible and safe’ (151) I find unconvincing; the idea that the ability to find significance in colourful local custom therefore renders Rome irrelevant seems confused; emphasis on such local colour merely serves to disguise imperialising power and sublimate it, not to resist it or render it neutral.
the cultural order of Greek *paideia*, the imperializing gaze of the Greek ethnographer,\(^{242}\) as the matrix through which all foreignness can be read, understood and evaluated.\(^{243}\) Even though the author of *De dea Syria* may ‘reveal something like a smack of barbarity spreading out subcutaneously under its surface of rhetoric, an inveterate primitivism reminiscent of some of the Oriental cults,’\(^{244}\) he only expresses himself in Herodotean pastiche;\(^{245}\) his own culture viewed through appropriated foreign eyes and language. Even by a self-proclaimed (As)syrian,\(^{246}\) Hierapolitan culture, custom and religion can only be described in Greek terms: both the literature and the subject matter are products of mimicry, repeat the language and the gaze of imperializing Greek culture, and hence solidify its dominance.

Now to the *Stromateis*; Clement, as we have seen, engages the language of race and culture extensively in the opening of the second book; as in Lucian, the narrator remains for the most part unidentified, and although writing in particular literary Greek (in Clement’s case, Atticism), claims a barbarian identity. In contrast to Lucian’s celebrated implicit valorisation of masks, however, Clement instead makes a plea for their removal:

---

\(^{242}\) Elsner (2001) 149; Bhabha (2004) 122: ‘In this comic turn from the high ideals of the colonial imagination to its low mimetic literary effects mimicry emerges as one of the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge.’ On the dual possibilities of mimicry, see 122-3: ‘Mimicry is thus the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which “appropriates” the Other as it visualizes power. Mimicry is also the sign of the inappropriate, however, a difference or recalcitrance which coheres the dominant strategic function of colonial power, intensifies surveillance, and poses an immanent threat to both ‘normalized’ knowledges and disciplinary powers.’

\(^{243}\) Cf. Lightfoot (2003) 179: ‘...let us observe that the display of piety is limited to Greek religion, that the narrator shows no such inhibition with regard to non-Greek cults... He behaves, in this respect, as a Greek abroad. His gaze is that of a Herodotus marvelling at foreign temples.’


\(^{245}\) On whether the text is pastiche or parody, see Lightfoot (2003) 198-9.

\(^{246}\) Even this confusion is a result of Greek ‘literary conceit’; see again Lightfoot (2003) 182-3 and commentary *ad §1.*
They say that birds have the sweetest quality of flesh when, without an abundance of food served up for them, they pick out their food with effort, scratching with their claws. If any one, then, speculating on similarity, is anxious that the truth has escaped attention in the numerous Greek plausibilities, like a real face behind horrific masks, he will hunt it by close enquiry. For the power [or meaning] that appeared in the vision to Hermas said, 'Whatever may be revealed to you, shall be revealed.'

It is a manifesto to get rid of Lucianic games; to de-mask the truth – even to hunt it down (θηράσεται). At the same time, it sets this within the context of the necessity of that truth being hidden. The metaphor of birds scratching in the ground to show that truth is only intellectually nourishing if it has to be sought out echoes Clement’s comments about the composition of his own work in the first chapter of Book 1.

This exhortation to search out the scattered truth is two-fold: it is on the one hand a description of Clement’s own practice in the composition of the Stromateis, seeking the truth hidden in the Greek tradition; on the other hand, it is also a suggestion as to how the earnest

---

247 Str. 2.1.3.4-5.
248 I take the translation of ὑπὸ τοῖς μορμολυκείοις from Ferguson (1991) ad loc., on which see below.
249 Str. 1.1.10.1-5; 1.1.13.1-5; 1.1.15.1; 1.1.16.2-3; 1.1.18.1. See above, Chapter 2 of this thesis.
reader ought to approach the *Stromateis*, as itself only the ground in which the scattered truth may be scratched up by the genuine disciple. Instead of a re-affirmation of Greek cultural dominance, Greek culture is seen as contingent on a deeper, hidden (barbarian) truth: rather than Greek ways of reading and writing controlling the perception of foreign peoples, a foreign philosophical principle is used as the paradigm for correctly reading Greek culture. As the mirror image, the doubled Greek, he shows the possibility of Greek *paideia* signifying more, or at least signifying something quite different, than Greek cultural identity.

The *Stromateis* thus functions not as a show-case of the truth that has been discovered from Greek literature, but as a refracted image of how to seek for the barbarian truth hidden in that *paideia*. At the same time, this work itself is a text which must be read according to the principles of exegesis set out and modelled within it. The work of the divine δόναμις, concealing and revealing truth throughout Greek literature, is modelled by Clement as author, scattering the truth throughout his *Stromateis* in a variety of both open and hidden means: ἔστι δὲ ἃ καὶ αἰνίξεται μοι γραφή, καὶ τοῖς μὲν παραστήσεται, τὰ δὲ μόνον ἐρεῖ, πειράσεται δὲ καὶ ἐπικρυπτομένη ἐκφῆναι καὶ δεῖξαι σιωπῶσα.⁴⁶

Although apparently setting himself up in opposition to the Greeks, he is instead professing himself as the exemplar of hyper-Greek authorship, his own text the model and microcosm of how Greek literature contains the truth and should be read.

⁴⁶ Str. 1.1.15.1: ‘There are things which my writing will hint at, and some things it will present, but others it will simply mention, and it will try to say some things in a hidden way, and to reveal by hiding and to show through silence.’
If Clement’s exhortation to seek out a deeper hidden meaning in texts is guidance for reading his own text, as I argue, we should look for the fruits of such a recursive interpretational strategy. Indeed, we should be expecting, and indeed hunting down, a truth hidden behind a series of masks precisely when he is telling us that this is what his ideal reader should do. The passage continues:

δεῖ δ’, οἶμαι, τὸν ἀληθειάς κηδόμενον οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιβολῆς καὶ φροντίδος τὴν φράσιν συνθεῖναι, πειράσθαι δὲ ὀνομάζειν μόνον ὡς δύναται δι’ ἑαυτῆς τῶν λέξεων ἐχομένους καὶ περὶ ταύτας ἀσχολοῦμένους διαδιδράσκει τὰ πράγματα.251

And he who has a concern for the truth, I think, ought to compose his expression not with design and carefulness, but ought to try just to name what he desires as best he can. For the real issues escape from those who busy themselves with [or: hold back from] words and fuss over them.

Just as it is mistake to read Clement’s refusal to ἔλληνιζειν, ‘play the Greek’, as a refusal to write in Atticizing Greek, so it is a mistake to read his refusal to be concerned with λέξις as a rejection of exceedingly careful word-choice and literary construction. Indeed, the ambiguous construction of ἔχω with a genitive, either to hold oneself back from, which an audience might read into λέξεων ἐχομένους before coming to ἀσχολοῦμένους, or to cleave or cling to, something, should alert us to a deeper compositional strategy here: if the potentially misleading synonym wasn’t necessary for simply asserting Clement’s meaning, why was it there? If it necessary to simply naming what he desires, it is clear that his aim is for a deeper, careful reading of his own text.

251 Str. 2.1.3.2.
Picking through Clement’s words, then, like hungry chickens, we ought find to be able to
nourish ourselves with some deeper knowledge. When Clement speaks of seeking out the
truth hidden in ‘numerous Greek plausibilities’ (ἐν πολλοῖς τοῖς πιθανοῖς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικοῖς)
he uses technical vocabulary from debates between Greek philosophical schools. The
categories of the similar (ὁμοίον) and the persuasive (πιθανόν) are set up against the true
(τὸ ἀληθὲς); the terminology is embedded in the discussion of rhetoric from Aristotle
onwards, and in the later Academy, the sceptic Carneades lends it a further important
epistemic function.

The language of πιθανόν in particular became a bone of contention between Academic
Sceptics and Stoics, centred around the possibility of a truly sceptic viewpoint ever allowing
the potential for action: is ‘the plausible’ enough of a basis upon which to make decisions?
And how can one define plausibility, if not as similarity to truth – and if the truth is
unknowable, does it undercut the principle of scepticism? These debates continued, in
various forms, into the Second Sophistic, as evidenced by the philosophical back-and-forth
over this very terminology between Favorinus and Galen recorded in the latter’s On the Best
Method of Teaching. In both the original Aristotelian use of the term, and the Academic

252 Ferguson (1991) ad loc. translates εἴ τις οὖν τοῦ ὁμοίου θεωρητικὸς as ‘So if anyone considers the
analogy...’, taking ὁμοίον here to refer to the preceding sentences; this is possible, but much less likely
than the combination of technical terms drawn from the philosophical debate between Stoics and
Sceptics over cataleptic impressions discussed here; the ANF translation is preferable here, and hence
closer to my own version: ‘If any one, then, speculating on what is similar...’

253 ἔστω δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. Rhet. 1.2.1; see
also Rhet. 1.1.11, using the terminology of ὁμοίον, and 1.1.14 and 3.1.3 on persuasiveness.

254 Spranzi (2011) 187 n.103. See Bett (1989); Clement certainly knew of Carneades, and mentions him
by name at 1.14.64.1; on Clement’s familiarity with Aristotle’s successors, see Clark (1977) 13-14.


256 See Hankinson (1995) 141-9; interestingly, Plutarch comments on Favorinus: Ὅ δὲ <Φαβωρίνος>
αὐτὸς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα δαιμονιώτατος Ἀριστοτέλους ἔρρωσε ἃστι καὶ τῷ Περιπάτῳ νέµει μερίδα τοῦ
extensions of it, the concept of τὸ πιθανὸν stresses the gap between a potential truth, and the semblance of it – either that which the rhetorician exploits for good or ill, or that which enables the Sceptic’s action whilst guarding his scepticism.

The image Clement then uses to illustrate his point is one keyed precisely to this theme: καθάπερ ὑπὸ τοῖς μορμολυκείοις τὸ πρόσωπον τὸ ἀληθινόν. The term μορμολυκείον points us firmly in the direction of appearance versus reality, especially with its deliberate contrast to the emphatically placed ἀληθινόν. It is always something which causes fear, but by appearance alone, as opposed to the reality. The locus classicus is Plato’s Phaedo, in a passage urging us μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὡσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια;257 in sources contemporary to Clement, Galen describes the faces of women who have smeared their make-up as ὁμοιότατα ἰδεῖν τοῖς μορμολυκείοις,258 and Philostratus, in the most famous episode from the Life of Apollonius,259 describes the illusion-creating, form-shifting vampiress as one of those ἃς λαμίας τε καὶ μορμολυκίας οἱ πολλοὶ ἡγοῦνται.260 Elsewhere, Clement himself uses the term

πιθανοῦ πλείστην Quaestiones Convivales 734f; Glucker (1978) 284 sees here Favorinus’ willingness to extend the concept of τὸ πιθανὸν to the doctrines of the schools themselves, from its original context of action-related impressions. On Second Sophistic engagements with Scepticism, see Hankinson (1995) 150-2 on Lucian.

257 Phaedo 77e: τοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὡσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.

258 Adhortatio ad artes addiscendas 10.

259 ‘This is Philostratus’ own opinion of the episode: τοῦτον τὸν λόγον γνωριμώτατον τῶν Ἀπολλωνίου, Vita Apollonii 4.25.

260 Vita Apollonii 4.25.
twice of the irrational fears of children,\textsuperscript{261} in one case specifically of the unfounded fear of Greek philosophy.\textsuperscript{262}

The term can also refer to the masks of actors,\textsuperscript{263} and this is how the term is taken by both the ANF and by Ferguson in their translations of this passage, presumably following the logical train of thought suggested by πρόσωπον, and it is difficult not to recognise a combination of both aspects of the word here. It is undoubtedly no coincidence that the examples used in philosophical treatises in the back-and-forth between Stoics and Academics over τὸ πιθανόν were drawn from the stage. Thus Admetus’ failure to acknowledge Alcestis as real when Heracles returns her to the living is the failure of a true appearance to be recognised as such; Orestes failing to recognise his sister, and Menelaus’ failure to recognise the real Helen are also used to exemplify the problematics of differentiating what is plausible from what is real.\textsuperscript{264}

The imagery of masks and what lies behind them, is doubly appropriate, as both a metaphorical and metapoetical comment on philosophical debate. Clement is presenting a fractured reflection of Greeks; the process of reading Greek literature is like gazing into a

---

\textsuperscript{261} Paed. 1.6.33.3-4: ... ἄλλα νηπίους μὲν τοὺς ἐν νόμῳ λέγει, οἳ τῷ φόβῳ, καθάπερ οἱ παιδες τοῖς μορμολυκείοις, ἔκταράττονται, ἀνδρας δὲ τοὺς λόγῳ πειθηνίους καὶ αὐτεξουσίους κέκληκεν· οἱ πεπιστεύκαμεν ἑκουσίῳ προαιρέσει σῳζόμενοι, ἐμφρόνως, οὐκ ἀφρόνως, δεδιττόμενοι τῷ φόβῳ.

\textsuperscript{262} Str. 6.10.80.5: ἄλλα καὶ τῇ διαλεκτικῇ προσχρήσεται ὁ γνωστικός, τὴν εἰς εἴδη τῶν γενῶν ἐκλεγόμενον διαίρεσιν, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων προσήσεται διάκρισιν. μέχρις ἄν τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀπλῶν ἔφασιν, οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ καθάπερ οἱ παιδες τὰ μορμολυκεία, οὕτως δεδιασὶ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, φοβούμενοι μὴ ἀπαγάγῃ αὐτούς.

\textsuperscript{263} LSJ refers us to Aristophanes Fr. 31 (where comic is specified) and 131 (where it is not); it is also used of masks – not necessarily comic – in most Greek variants of Aesop’s Fabula 27, ‘The Fox and the Mask’.

mirror – ‘looking into similarity’, the fulness of the resources of the Greek tradition are only sufficient to demonstrate their incapacity to show forth the truth fully.

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

So Greek philosophical debates over epistemology (the real and the seemingly real) are played out with the imagery of the Greek stage; in two senses we are talking about ‘Greek plausibilities’. The author is also doubly wearing the mask of a Greek, sounding like a Greek philosopher, using the imagery of the Greek stage. Here we come back to the use of the adjective Ἑλληνικός: if the authorial voice speaks Greek, and argues in a Greek manner, using Greek cultural icons, but is not (so it seems to claim) actually Greek, what is it?

Despite positing a dichotomy between ‘image’ and ‘reality’, it concludes with an authoritative proof-text from the Shepherd of Hermas which is itself figured as a ‘vision’: φησὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὁράματι τῷ Ἑρμᾷ ἡ δύναμις ἡ φανεῖσα· «ὅ ἐὰν ἐνδέχηται σοι ἀποκαλυφθῆναι, ἀποκαλυφθήσεται.» The conclusive unmasking of the truth behind Greek plausibilities still leaves us with only a semblance or appearance (φανεῖσα) of the unspecified, unnamed reality behind it (ἡ δύναμις). All we are left with is a deferred and very conditional promise: ‘it will be uncovered’. Despite seeming to close down the layered complexity of alternative identities in the hunt for a monolithic, monologic truth, the text leaves us with a set of ambivalences, a puzzle that must be left to the audience to read their way through.

This skilful playing with masks and paideia is not merely incidental, either. The use of this simile of spectres is a deliberate and even controversial choice. The metaphor of 1 Cor. 13:12

\[\text{Str. 2.1.3.4: τοῦ ὁμοίου θεωρητικὸς (quoted in full above).}\]
could have provided a suitable biblical alternative: βλέπομεν γὰρ ὕπτι δι’ ἑσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον. Not only would this have honed, by example, the ostensible point (that beneath pagan plausibilities lies Christian truth), it would also have avoided the potential problems inherent in speaking about the theatrical masks at all. Tertullian, a near contemporary of Clement from further west on the North African coast, in his biting de Spectaculis, says, ‘iam vero ipsum opus personarum quaero an deo placeant, qui omnem similitudinem vetat fieri, quanto magis imaginis suae? Non amat falsum auctor veritatis; adulterium est apud illum omne quod fugitur.’

Speaking about masks at all puts one on dangerous territory in early Christianity. It is true that Clement is, after all, advocating the removal of the masks: but that misses the point of the use of the metaphor. Clement’s uncovering of the face beneath the mask is not, in contrast to Tertullian’s de Spectaculis, a mission to convert actors or prevent Christians from going to see plays. It is precisely the opposite; to demonstrate that underneath the outward show of the Greek dramatists (and poets, and historians), within the texts themselves, can be found intimations of the truth; that some of the ‘plausibilities’ have actually hit upon the truth. That Clement is the source of preservation, rather than eradication of so many fragments of Greek literature, despite his apparent desire to get rid of these masks, is not chance historical irony but purposeful literary irony.

---

266 de Spec. 23. ‘Then this business of masks, I ask if God can be pleased with it, when he forbids the likeness of anything to be made, how much more so his own image. The author of truth does not like the false: everything which is made up is adultery in his sight.’ Trans. Goldhill (2001b) 182.
Bhabha speaks of irony as being one of the key methods through which mimicry functions:267 such irony ‘articulates those disturbances of cultural, racial and historical difference that menaces the narcissistic demand of colonial authority’.268 The completeness of enkyklios paidaia, an ‘all-encompassing’ education, is repeated by an outside voice: both Clement and any self-professed Greek author (see, for instance, Diogenes Laërtius, whose pro-Greek views are discussed in the following chapter) would agree that in the Greek educational tradition the truth is embedded. Its methods, too, are repeated by Clement, in the language of both rhetorical analysis and philosophical discourse.

But what is discovered within that Greek enkyklios paideia, and by its methods, lies outside of it, and in excess of it. That truth is found not only in the authoritative words of a barbarian text, *The Shepherd of Hermas*, but in the dependence of even that text upon an outside, other, unknowable power that promises to reveal. Lucian’s text displays and repeats Greek ethnographic writing, even as a self-professed Syrian, his ‘primary ethnic category and point of reference is Greek’,269 and Greek cultural hegemony is reinscribed: there is no outside voice to Lucian’s text, no competition to Greek ways of viewing and describing.

Clement’s mimicry of Hellenic discourse, however, constantly draws back the frame of reference to where we can see Greece’s contingency: a means of expression (both linguistic and literary), that maintains validity only because there is something non-Greek behind it, a barbarian philosophy both older and deeper. Surprisingly, even that barbarian philosophy itself is not constituted by biblical texts or appeal to structures of ecclesiastical authority; it

is contingent on being revealed by a divine ‘power’. The categories of ethnic identification are exposed as mere *ad hoc* constructions in the light of a divine perspective.
4. COSMOPOLIS:
THE CHRISTIAN ATHENS AND THE NEW JERUSALEM

We concluded the previous chapter by contrasting the limited nature of any representation of cultural completeness; through the hybridity of Greek/Hebrew/Christian, definite possession of paideia is deferred to the divine Logos. A related view of that same dialogical relationship between Greek reflections and the unlimited bounds of Christian reality can be found in Clement’s engagement with polis identity. This chapter will focus on Clement’s engagement with the philosophical discourse of citizenship and kingship, particularly focusing on how Clement negotiates the Stoic idea of cosmopolitanism.

We will start, however, in Athens. As we noted in the previous chapter, Athens functions as the symbol for Greek paideia, and its language the stage for performing Greek identity. It is no surprise, therefore, that its cultural centrality is mimicked by Clement and recast as a Christian locus:

Διό μοι δοκεῖ, ἐπεὶ αὐτὸς ἦκεν ὡς ἡμᾶς ὑφανόθην ὁ λόγος, ἡμᾶς ἐπ’ ἀνθρωπίνην ἱέναι μὴ χρῆναι διδασκαλίαν ἐτί, ἀθήνες καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα, πρὸς δὲ καὶ Ἰωνίαν πολυπραγμονοῦντας. Εἰ γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ διδάσκαλος ὁ πληρώσας τὰ πάντα δυνάμεις ἁγίαις, δημιουργίας εὐεργεσίας, νομοθεσίας προφητείας διδασκαλίας, πάντα νῦν ὁ διδάσκαλος κατηχεῖ, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἢ ἢ ἀθήναι καὶ Ἑλλὰς γέγονεν τῷ λόγῳ. ²⁷⁰

So it seems to me, since the Word himself has thus come from heaven to us, that we do not need to go for human teaching any more, carefully studying Athens and the rest of Greece, and even Ionia. For if our teacher is he who filled all things with his holy powers, with creation and salvation and the provision of good, with law-giving

²⁷⁰ Prot. 11.112.1.
and prophecy and teaching, the teacher now instructs in all things, and the whole universe has become Athens and Greece by the Word.

Christ himself, the *Logos*, is the ultimate διδάσκαλος;\(^{271}\) the efficacy of the teacher is directly linked with δυνάμις, power, itself split into the practical (δημιουργία σωτηρία ευεργεσία) as well as the textual (γνωθεωσία προφητεία διδασκαλία). The passage presents the ideas of power, textuality, teaching and Hellenic identity as intensely interrelated. From an ethnic perspective, Athens, Greece, and Ionia are figured as destinations to aim for, not native homes. Neither geography nor genealogy enter the picture here as constitutive of ethnic identity, which is implicitly figured as shared by all humanity. These Greek cities were approached for ἀνθρωπίνη διδασκαλία: human teaching as opposed to divine, but also human as opposed to ethnically and culturally specific.

Athens is not a city-state here, but a state of education gained by hard study (πολυπραγμονοῦντας). Prior to the descent of the Word from heaven, from the starting point of a shared humanity, by intellectual effort, humans were able to reach the shared cultural goal denoted by ‘Athens’, now displaced by the divine Teacher. The seemingly fixed cultural category of Hellenicity is played back to its own culture, but in a distorted way: in the mimicry, the rehashing, of Athenian imperialism, its claims to hegemony are unbound.

A passage from Athenaeus’ *Deipnosophistae* shows a close parallel of the replacement of Athens, this time with Alexandria. The speaker is an Alexandria musician, Alceides:

---

\(^{271}\) Also παίδαγωγός. See *Paed.* 1.1.1.4 - 1.1.2.1; often the two terms are interchangeable, e.g. *Str.* 7.2.5.6 - 7.2.6.1. See Méhat (1966) 76.
οὐ γάρ οἶδας ἵστοροῦντα Μενεκλέα τὸν Βαρκαίον συγγραφέα ἐτε Ἄνδρωνα ἐν τοῖς Χρονικοῖς τὸν Ἀλεξανδρέα, ὅτι Ἀλεξανδρεῖς εἰσίν οἱ παιδεύσαντες πάντας τοὺς Ἑλλήνας καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ἐκλειπούσης ἤδη τῆς ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας διὰ τὰς γενομένας συνεχείς κινήσεις ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τοὺς Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδόχους χρόνοις. ἐγένετο οὖν ἀνανέωσις πάλιν παιδείας ἀπάσης... 272

For you are not aware that Menecles the historian of Barca, and also Andron of Alexandria in his Chronicles record that the Alexandrians were the educators of all the Greeks and the barbarians, when the enkyklios paideia had fallen into desuetude because of the constantly occurring dangers in the period of the successors of Alexander. So there was a renewal again of all paideia...

Tim Whitmarsh has noted that this passage is picking up and playing with the trope developed by Isocrates/Thucydides and relocating it east. 273 Alexandria has taken over Athens’ role as the conduit of culture. Athenaeus, a native of Naucratis, in Egypt, is using a trope of Attic superiority in the mouth of an Alexandrian to defend the cultural primacy of Alexandria, at a banquet supposedly held in Rome at the house of a Roman pontifex minor. And all in very sharp Atticizing Greek: a daring claim to cultural hegemony in the face of apparent political subservience.

The difference between this reproduction and what Clement manages is the hybridity of Clement’s representation. In Athenaeus we see a one-to-one ratio of reproduction of Greek culture, which reproduces a hegemonic cultural system in toto, without excess overflowing from the signifier: the enkyklios paideia is an assumed, fixed entity. Further, its relationship with Rome is not one of hybridity, but of implicit dependency: the period of instability of...

272 Deipnosophistae 4.184b = BNJ 270 F9 (Menecles), BNJ 246 F1 (Andron).
273 Whitmarsh (2001) 8; see also above, Chapter 3, pp. 131-3.
Alexander’s successors is contrasted with the stability needed for the preservation of *paideia*; although the rule of the Ptolemies must be understood here, the context cannot but also imply that the peace of Roman rule is the direct continuing cause of the preservation of that uncorrupted culture.

By contrast, Clement’s reproduction of the cultural signifier of Athenian culture and Ionic philosophy is partial and hybrid. Whereas Alexandria merely steps up to take on the role of conservator of the tradition of Greek *paideia*, Christianity, as the new locus of *paideia*, hasn’t taken up that mantel as an inheritor, but as the original source of that *paideia* in the first place: it is both less-than-one, and double. It is less-than-one very obviously, because Greek *paideia* has been superseded. Scripture (νομοθεσία, προφητεία, διδακτική) replaces Greek learning as the prior, and therefore superior, not to mention divine, education – we no longer have need to worry ourselves with Athens and Greece. Despite the claim that Greece is no longer necessary for *paideia*, however, the conclusion is not a diminution of its influence. Rather than shrinking to vanishing point in comparison to the *Logos*, Athens actually expands to encompass τὸ πᾶν; Greek cultural hegemony is reflected, doubled.

Equally, however, Athens only succeeds in this conceptual omnivorousness because it was already in some sense filled with the Word and is in turn expanded by fulfilment of that *Logos*. So the construction of knowledge displays not a simple Greek/Christian binary, but a tension between particularity and universality of knowledge: particular, *polis*-specific ways

---

274 See the previous chapter for more on these terms from Bhabha (2004).
of knowing (Attic Greek? Ionic philosophy?) are subordinated to a universal knowledge, the Logos.

The particular historical, Jewish nature of the Law, the Prophets, and their teaching, is also submerged in their conformity to this Logos. In a subtle way, the passage is speaking of the incarnation, the particularity of the Word ὁ σῶρκι ἐνδεθείς, bound in flesh, as the previous paragraph puts it (Protrep. 11.111.2). The balance between the aorist of ὁ πληρώσας and the definite historical contingency marked by νῦν pivots precisely on this point of the incarnation of the heavenly teacher who can teach face-to-face (κατηχεῖ). But this particularity is lost in the cosmic significance of the Logos – although Clement throughout his works quotes at length the words of Jesus from the Gospels, πάντα here is much more than what is contained in the Gospels. There is a tension between the particularity of a human incarnation of the Word, and the universality of the truth which that event must point to.

This tension is very deliberately constructed: we start at the widest possible expanse – filling all things with holy powers. The double triad which follows is both chronological, but also increasingly specific in scope. Creation is followed by salvation (in the coming of the Logos in the flesh), and continuing εὐεργεσία, in the present of the reader. Law-giving, referring to the Pentateuch, the story of the people of Israel, precedes the prophets, who foreshadow the διδασκαλία. In this context, it is impossible not to see this as a textual reference to the (by

---

275 E.g. 1 Cor. 14:19; Luke 1:4; Acts 21:21
this time reasonably fixed) New Testament writings about the teaching of Jesus. Clement is deliberately drawing us from the widest possible perspective to a particular pivotal moment of history. It is the very specificity and concreteness of the point of accessibility which is emphasized. That is, it is only because of this, single, unique, historical contingency of the person of Jesus that we have access to universalizing knowledge. But equally, the recalibration of the focus back to τὸ πᾶν, reflects the contention that this knowledge is no more bounded by the historical Jesus than paideia is limited to a geographical Athens.

Although the incarnation of the Word, the basis upon which this passage is predicated, is necessarily bound up with Christian language of sonship and filial descent, the language of kinship and genealogy is entirely absent from this passage. Rather, the critical terminology of what might be thought of in ethnic terms, identity as Athenian or Greek, is about literature, education and teaching. Taking these core terms of Greek cultural power and hybridizing them, Clement creates scope for new identities energised by the very culture against which they are pitted, actuated by the potential of Greek paideia to signify beyond what is necessary for Greek hegemony.

---

276 Cosaert (2008) 21-22 on Clement’s use of the New Testament text in particular; although an absolute fixed canon is difficult to assess from his writings, he does use διαθήκη to refer to a collection of writings in the context of NT texts (at Str. 3.6.54.4, 3.11.71.3 and 6.1.3.3). More generally, see Gamble (2002).
Underlying Clement’s particular presentation of Greekness, however, is a deliberate engagement with the vocabulary and conceptual language of Stoic political thought. For the educated reader, Clement’s presentation of the individual’s relationship with the *polis* both invites parallels to Stoic conceptions of citizenship, whilst providing some remarkable contrasts. Clement shares with the Stoics a starting point of seeing common humanity as a more real identity than the arbitrary attachment to an individual city of birth; the basic nature of a human being does not depend on either geography or descent. Rather, humans are figured as potential citizens of an ideal, universal city.

The idea of cosmopolitanism first rears its head in the formative period of the fifth century, and leads to the later Stoic idea of the cosmopolitan, so important to Philo and later St. Paul. Thus the Sophist Antiphon in a papyrus fragment declares all people capable of being Greeks or barbarians by nature, differentiated only by custom. Athenian tragedy points towards the same conclusion in several fragments – addressing ‘the single tribe of humankind’ in one Sophoclean fragment, and proclaiming in a fragment of Euripides that

---

277 Bhabha (2004) constructs the preface of his new edition around the conflict between two forms of cosmopolitanism; one, the neoliberalism of a globalised market, quite happy to celebrate ‘two commonwealths’ as long as specific cultures do not conflict with the universal culture of the free market (xiv-xvi); the other cosmopolitanism is that which Kristeva calls ‘a wounded cosmopolitanism’ which comes from marginalized communities and creates and celebrates hybrid identities, rather than diverse but fixed ones (xvi-xviii). I would not claim that these map directly onto the two different forms of cosmopolitanism I identify in Clement and the Stoics, but there are significant parallels.

278 The idea is one also shared by the Cynics; see Diogenes Laërtius 6.38ff on Diogenes, who may well have coined the term κοσμοπολίτης: Moles (1996) 119, *et passim* on the details and importance of the Cynic roots of the Stoic concept. For the importance of Stoicism to St. Paul, see Engberg-Pedersen (2000) and Thorsteinssson (2010b), and for its influence on early Christianity more generally, Rasimus, Engberg-Pedersen, & Dunderberg (2010).

279 *P.Oxy.* 3647.2 10-15; see J. Hall (2002) 197.
‘the whole earth is the fatherland of the nobleman.’ This was a rather more radical application of the physis/nomos divide which underscores the common physis of humanity over both nomos and geography. It found a chief proponent in Zeno, and took root in the Hellenistic world; the spread of Greek language and culture after the conquests of Alexander provided fertile soil in which the idea could flourish.

It is in this vein that Clement writes of human nature as the common ground for ethical behaviour, and a deeper identity than one’s city or race:

> ἔξεστι γὰρ τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς πολιτευομένῳ καὶ ἀνεύ γραμμάτων φιλοσοφεῖν, κἀν βάρβαρος ἢ κἀν Ἑλλην κἀν δοῦλος κἀν γέρων κἀν παιδίον κἀν γυνή; κοινὴ γὰρ ἀπάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν γε ἐλομένων ἡ σωφροσύνη ἦ ὡμολόγηται δ’ ἡμῖν τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν κατὰ γένος ἐκαστὸν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἑσείν ἀρετήν.

For it is possible for one living as a citizen according to our way of life and without learning to engage in philosophy, whether barbarian or Greek, whether slave or old man, or boy, or woman. For self-control is common to all people who choose it; and we admit that the same nature is constant according to each race, and the same virtue.

The presentation of common φύσις and ἀρετή would have been familiar to any ancient student of philosophy. The corollary of this identification of a common human nature is to act in accordance with it: this is universal citizenship to which cosmopolitanism refers.

Clement’s construction of the relationship between this ideal city (represented by ‘Athens’

---

280 Fr. 532 and 1047 Nauck; J. Hall (2002) 198. See also Democritus, fr. 247 Diels-Kranz.
282 Long (2008); see also Richter (2011) 11-16.
283 Cf. 1.16.77.2 discussed above, Chapter 3.
284 Str. 4.8.58.3-59.1.
from Protrep 11.112 quoted above) and specific earthly cities, however, presents a marked contrast to Stoic teaching.

HEAVENLY CITIZENSHIP

The Stoic cosmopolitan view of the relationship between the commonality of humankind and the specificity of one’s own city, is grounded in the idea of ‘two communities’. In Seneca’s formulation:

duas res publicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam qua di atque homines continentur, in qua non ad huc angulum respicimus aut ad illum sed terminos civitatis nostrae cum sole metimur, alteram cui nos adscriptis condicio nascendi; haec aut Atheniensum erit aut Carthaginiensum aut alterius alicuius urbis quae non ad omnis pertineat homines sed ad certos.

Let us understand two commonwealths: one, great and truly common by which gods and human beings are embraced, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our state by the sun; the other, the one to which the accident of our birth has consigned us: this may be that of the Athenians, or of the Carthaginians, or any other city which does not extend to all people, but only to certain individuals.

From this perspective, whilst the common nature of humanity is emphasized as the first commonwealth, Athenian culture is not a universal paideia, but the specific domain of one group assigned there by birth. Each individual has his or her own specific culture and custom. Service to the one commonwealth is separate and distinct from service to the

---

286 De otio 4.1.
The cosmopolitan is a citizen of any particular polity who has stripped away his or her culture to find the shared, and therefore most important, dictates of reason and nature. This drive to pare back nomos to find the essential laws of human nature gave rise to the accusation that Zeno rejected paideia altogether.

In contrast, in our Clementine passage, the paideia of one particular commonwealth, Athens, a shorthand for wisdom, was the intellectual goal of all the members of the human commonwealth prior to the incarnation. Now that the word has come from heaven, that goal is manifest, still as a process of education, but connected to the Law, the Prophets, and the Christian teaching – figured in the language of a specific polis. Instead of a drive to live in accordance with nature, stripping away the marks of specificity as the basis for one’s exercising of citizenship in the greater res publica (the Stoic view), the imperative offered here is rather to transcend nature by education. Human teaching, in Clement’s view, takes a common humanity as the starting point and by study develops us into ‘Athenians’ (culturally or spiritually, into the earthly or heavenly Athens).

---

287 The relationship between these two commonwealths is probably the distinctive difference between Stoic and (earlier) Cynic cosmopolitanism: Moles (1996) 119-20.
289 Cassius the Sceptic’s first criticism of Zeno was that in his Republic he denies the value of ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία (Diogenes Laertius VP 7.32); I do not necessarily take the criticism as face-value evidence for what Zeno taught, but at the very least it show the direction in which his writing could easily be misconstrued. See further Schofield (1991) 3-21, and (more briefly) Long and Sedley (1987) 2.424.
We can see the distinction even more clearly when Clement himself ventriloquizes Stoicism as a mouthpiece for Christianity:

εἷς δὲ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς παρὰ σφίσι ϛεθειδέας προσαγορεύειν δοκοῦσι καὶ δίους καὶ ἀντιθέους καὶ Δὶ μὴν ἀταλάντους καὶ «θεοὶ ἐναλίγκια μήδε' ἔχοντας» καὶ θεοεικέλους, τὸ «κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὀμοίωσιν» περιτρώγοντες, ὁ μὲν οὖν Εὐριπίδης «χρύσεαι δὴ μοι πτέρυγες περί νῦτω» φησὶ καὶ τὰ Σειρήνων ἔρόντα πέδιλα ἀρμόζεται, βάσομαι τ' ἐς αἰθέρα πουλὺν ἀερθεὶς Ζηνὶ προσμίξων.

ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν εὔξαμιν τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ πετρώσαι μὲ εἰς τὴν ἱερουσαλὴμ τὴν ἐμῆν· λέγουσι γὰρ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν κυρίως πόλιν, τὰ δὲ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐνταῦθα οὐκέτι πόλεις λέγοντες· ὁ δὲ πόλις ἀστεῖον ἀπολιόρκητον ἀτυράννητον πόλις ἐπὶ γῆς, θέλημα θείον ἔπι γῆς ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ.

And the poets, it seems to me, address the elect in their works as godlike and gods, and equal to the gods, and matching Zeus in wisdom, and ‘having counsels like the gods’, and resembling the gods; purloining our ‘in the image and likeness.’ So Euripides says, ‘There are golden wings around my back, and I am fitted with the winged sandals of the Sirens; and I shall go, exalted, into the wide upper air, to engage with Zeus.

But I would pray that the spirit of Christ would fly me to my Jerusalem. For the Stoics say that heaven is properly a city, but those here on earth are not cities; for

291 Str. 4.26.171.4 - 4.27.172.3.
292 Od. 13.89.
293 Gen. 1:26.
294 Euripides, Fr. 911; Nauck prints it amongst the incertarum fabularum fragmenta, although some have attributed it to the Antiope: Kambitsis (1972).
they are called so, but are not. For a city is a morally good thing, and its population a refined composite and multitude of people ordered by law, just as the church is by the word, a city on earth impregnable, free from tyranny; the divine will on earth as in heaven.

Clement shifts from discussion of the creation of Adam in the image and likeness of God and its reflections in pagan literature, to the relationship between earthly cities and the heavenly Jerusalem. The commonality of human nature, and the shared nature between the human and divine, is a secure jumping-off point for an identification of Stoic and Christian doctrine. Clement’s description of the city has been held up as ‘the official Stoic definition’, echoed in more or less exact terms by other writers summarizing the Stoic viewpoint. Both in Clement’s terms, and those of the Stoics, the human city is an imperfect and flawed reflection of a higher city.

These ideal cities, however, are radically different: that of the Stoics is not a future city, or a heavenly city, but the universe itself as a city, a self-regulating polis which follows its own laws and in which human beings can participate by following the Stoic definition of nomos – i.e. not individual local custom, but ‘the internal voice of reason prescribing to each and every person, wherever he or she lives, what should or should not be done’. By contrast, Clement’s is the heavenly Jerusalem of Revelation, a city stripped of its own geography and

296 Arnim (1903-1924) 3.80-1 (Fr. mor. 327-332).
its Jewish *ethnos* and become God’s city of the new creation, in a new heaven and a new earth.\(^{298}\)

Further, in Clement’s view, the Church forms a successful earthly image of the ideal polity because it is ordered by the *Logos*. It is the church which is the impregnable city on earth, untouched by tyranny, the fulfilment of the third petition of the Lord’s prayer (cf. Mt. 6:10). Citizenship in the true commonwealth does not require claims of kinship or descent, but merely obedience to the *logos*. *Logos* here is both Christ the Word, but references the Stoic contention that law (*nomos/* *lex*) was merely right reason (*orthos logos/* *recta ratio*).\(^{299}\) Cicero gives the basic formula *lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria*.\(^{300}\) Clement himself earlier, in the first book of the *Stromateis*, gives this Stoic equation of *nomos* with *orthos logos*: ἧ τινες ἀκολούθως δηλονότι τῇ χρηστῇ δόξῃ λόγον ὅρθον τὸν νόμον ἐφασαν, προστακτικὸν μὲν ὑπὸ ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητέων.\(^{301}\)

---

\(^{298}\) Rev. 21:1-3; cf. Isaiah 65:17.


\(^{300}\) Cicero, *De leg.* 1.18: ‘Law is the highest reason, engrafted in nature, which orders what must be done, and forbids the opposite.’ (= Arnim (1903-1924) 3.78 [*Fr. mor.* 315] quoting *doctissimi viri*, here clearly referring to Stoic philosophers – see Dyck (2004) *ad loc.* Cf. also *Leg.* 1.23, where the more technical *recta ratio* is used.

\(^{301}\) Str. 1.25.166.5: ‘Following which – i.e. good opinion – some have said that law is right reason, commanding those things which ought to be done, and forbidding those which ought not to be done.’ = Arnim (1903-1924) 3.81 (*Fr. mor.* 332). Some have argued that rather than reflecting a Stoic commonplace, Clement here is directly dependent on Philo; Heinisch (1908) 227 and Lilla (1971) 75-6; van den Hoek (1988) notes that both Clement and Philo use the term several times, and sees the term coming from a shared background in Stoic sources rather than a direct dependence, a view which I follow here. Certainly Clement’s use of λόγον ὅρθον is independent of the closest Philonic parallel with which he is working, namely *De vita Mos.* 2.4.
The context of this quotation is praise of Moses’ politeia as the ideal exemplification of enacted Stoic natural law: ὅθεν ὁ νόμος εἰκότως εἰρηται διὰ Μωυσέως δεδόσθαι, κανών τυγχάνων δικαίων τε καὶ ἄδικων. Arnim’s Fragmenta excerpts from this passage a Stoic summary of ideal political life, carefully removing all reference to the context of the passage, that this set of ideal qualities of a state is in fact a description of Moses’ legislation. Clement himself seems to suggest this: the nomos of Moses is discussed as a political entity, a politeia, dealing with the discipline of people in a community, administering both justice and punishment, and there is no hint that he is referring to an historical polis or the nomos of a particular Jewish ethnos. Str. 1.25 is introduced with the words Πλάτων δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος ὑπερβόρεος ἐκ τῶν Μωυσέως τὰ περὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ὑφελθηείς... Moses and Plato are seen as engaging in the same kind of exercise: constructing a vision of an ideal state, based on reason and not tied to specificities of race or geography. In a similar vein, the passage from the end of Book 4 also closes with a reminder that Plato’s vision of the ideal state is a reflection of the heavenly city. In Clement’s eyes, Moses’ politeia, the Pentateuch, is just like Plato’s Politeia: not an historical political entity, but a textual utopia.

302 Str. 1.26.167.1: ‘For which reason it is reasonable to say that the law was given through Moses, as a rule of what is right and wrong.’ Stählin’s edition, interestingly, whilst missing the parallel noted above of Str. 1.25.166.5 with Cic. De leg. 1.18, does however, see a parallel here to De leg. 1.19 (itaque arbitrantur prudentiam esse legem, cuius ea vis sit, ut recte facere iubeat, vetet delinquere.)

303 πολιτείαν γοῦν διηκόνησεν ἀγαθὴν ἣ δὲ ἔστι «τροφὴ ἄνθρωπον» καλὴ κατὰ κοινωνίαν. αὐτίκα τὴν δικαστικὴν μετεχειρίζετο, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν διορθωτικὴν τῶν ἀμαρτανομένων ἕνεκεν τοῦ δικαίου. σύστοιχος δὲ αὐτῇ ἡ κολαστικὴ, τοῦ κατὰ τὰς κολάσεις μέτρου ἐπιστημονικὴ τις οὖσα. (1.26.168.2) Str. 1.25.165.1: ‘Plato the philosopher, having profited from Moses’ books regarding legislation...’

304 Str. 1.25.165.1: ‘...νομοθεσίαν ὑπερβόρεος ἐκ τῶν Μωυσέως τὰ περὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ὑφελθηείς...’

305 Clement makes reference to the Epinomis, Timaeus, Politicus and Republic as works concerned with law and politics.

306 Str. 4.27.127.3: εἰκόνας τῆς πόλεως καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ κτίζουσι γράφοντες αἰ γὰρ Ὄμηρος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης πόλεις καὶ τὰ Ἑλληνικά πεδία δικαίων πολιτεύματα ἢσμεν δὲ καὶ τὴν Πλάτωνος πόλιν παράδειγμα ἐν οὐρανῷ κειμένην.
Clement goes on to further abstraction of the role of Moses the lawgiver from the biblical Jewish community: ὁ νομοθετικός δὲ ἐστιν ὁ τὸ προσῆκον ἐκάστῳ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις ἀπονέμων, Μωυσῆς δὲ συνελόντι εἰπέιν νόμος ἐμψυχος ἦν τῷ χρηστῷ λόγῳ κυβερνώμενος. It is only when read allegorically as government of the soul, ordered by the true logos, that Moses’ legislation can become the shared law required for a true polis. Moreover, the language used here of the parts of the soul and their activities seems to be referring to the discussion of the soul starting in the Republic book 9. The just man is in control of his tripartite soul, and the section concludes with the famous claim that the true city of the philosopher is ‘in words’, and thus he will not engage in the politics of the conrete city of his birth. Socrates goes on to say of this heavenly city, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἰσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένω όραν καὶ ὐρώντι ἕαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. This intertext, for those who recognise it, separates Moses entirely from his particular role as a Jewish leader of his ethnos, and posits him instead as a theoretical philosopher, writing a παράδειγμα rather than administering a community.

---

307 Str. 1.26.167.3: ‘But the lawgiver is the one who apportions what is fitting to each part of the soul and to their functions; and Moses, to put it briefly, was the living law, guided by the true Word [or sound reason].’ Clement here is echoing Philo, particularly De vita Mos. 2.4, where kings in general are named a ‘living law’; see Richardson (1957), Richardson (1962). The Philonic background, along with other Jewish sources on government, especially as channelled through the Letter of Aristeas: see More (2009), are certainly part of the background of this discussion; but these are participating in a general Hellenistic debate over kingship, which Clement is clearly familiar with independently. Clement is also deliberately striking out in a different direction from Philo here: see van den Hoek (1988) 227-9.

308 μανθάνω, ἔφη: ἐν ᾧ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένη, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἴμαι αὐτίνι εἴναι. Resp. 529a.

309 Resp. 529a-b: ‘There is perhaps a pattern laid up in heaven for him who wants to contemplate it, and so contemplating it, to himself become a citizen.’
The Good Shepherd

Clement goes on to further emphasize a difference between possession of the law, and true understanding of the law. The section extends from a quotation of John 10:11, ‘the good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep’:

εἰ δὲ ἡ ποίμνη τῆς ἀλληγορουμένη πρὸς τοῦ κυρίου οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀγέλη τις ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, ὁ αὐτὸς ἡ ποίμνη ἐσται ποιμήν τε καὶ νομοθέτης ἄγαθος μᾶς τῆς ἀγέλης τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐπαϊόντων προβάτων, ὁ εἷς κηδεμών, ὁ τὸ ἀπολωλὸς ἔπιζητῶν τε καὶ ἐυρίσκων νόμῳ καὶ λόγῳ, εἴ γε «ὁ νόμος πνευματικός», καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἂγων· ὁ γὰρ πνεύματι ἄγιῳ γενόμενος πνευματικός, ὁ πρῶτος ὁ τῷ ὑπαγόμενος ἄγων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπίσταται. τούτου καὶ ὁ νόμος τοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντος τὸ σωτήριον πρόσταγμα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπιστήμης πρόσταγμα ὁ νόμος, «δύναμις γὰρ καὶ σοφία ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ.» νόμων τε αὐ τῷ ἔξηγητής αὐτοῦ αὐτὸς, δι' οὗ «ὁ νόμος ἔδόθη», ὁ πρῶτος ἔξηγητής τῶν θείων προσταγμάτων, ὁ τὸν κάλπον τοῦ πατρὸς ἐξηγούμενος υἱὸς μονογενῆς. 310

And if the flock, allegorically understood according to the Lord, is nothing other than a flock of human beings, the same person will be the good shepherd and lawgiver of the one, single flock, of the sheep who know him; the one single guardian, seeking the lost, and finding him by the law and the word, if indeed ‘the law is spiritual’ 311 and leading to blessedness. For that which has arisen through the Holy Spirit is spiritual. And he is truly a lawgiver, who not only commands the good and the noble, but also knows them. The law of this man who possesses knowledge is the saving precept; or rather, the law is the precept of knowledge. For the Word is ‘the power and the wisdom of God’. 312 Again, the interpreter of the laws is the same

310 Str. 1.26.169.3-4.
311 Rom. 7:14.
312 1 Cor. 1:24.
one by whom ‘the law was given'; the first interpreter of the divine commands, who interprets the heart of the Father, the only-begotten Son.

The references to Christ’s suffering – ‘I am the good shepherd...’,\textsuperscript{313} which precede this quotation, are followed by the reminiscence of John 10:27 (‘My sheep listen to my voice; I know them and they follow me’) and Luke’s parable of the lost sheep (Luke 15:4): but here they are used to illustrate a description of Moses as the ideal lawgiver. The language of the ruler as the shepherd, although here cast explicitly in the language of the New Testament, builds on language used traditionally of Moses,\textsuperscript{314} also paralleled in Plato and Homer correlating kingship with shepherding.\textsuperscript{315} Greek ideals of kingship are mixed with the figure of Moses/ Jesus as the shepherd.

Clement’s conflation of Moses and Jesus as the ideal lawgiver continues throughout the passage: the final clause is a reference to John 1:18, the culmination of the prologue which links the eternal Word to the incarnate Christ: ὅτι ὁ νόμος διὰ Μωϋσέως ἐδόθη, ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐγένετο. Θεὸν οὐδείς ἑώρακεν πώποτε: μονογενὴς θεὸς ὁ ὢν εἰς

\textsuperscript{313} Jn. 10:11.

\textsuperscript{314} van den Hoek (1988) 66; e.g. (literally) Ex. 3:1, and figuratively, Num. 27:16-7. The language of shepherding is used throughout the Old Testament as a metaphor for the relationship between ruler and people (David also is a shepherd before becoming king), and between God and his people (most famously in Ps. 23).

\textsuperscript{315} Politicus 265d, 268a; Goodenough (1928) 60ff., 84. Homer’s Agamemnon is ‘the shepherd of the people’, ποιμήν λαῶν (see LSJ s.v. ποιμήν II.); the image is explored in Dio Chrysostom’s Or. 4.43-45. Xenophon’s Socrates responds directly to questions about Agamemnon as shepherd of the people (Mem. 3.2). On the Homeric formula, including comparison to the biblical shepherd, see Haubold (2000). The shepherd/ruler connection is also made in Egyptian art and writing: Wilkinson (1992) 183, Nel (2005) 79.
Whilst Clement emphatically declares that the one by whom the law is given and the who interprets the father’s bosom are one and the same, the text to which he refers is equally emphatic on their distinct difference: the Law versus grace and truth. Nor can it be a case that the whole is unthinkingly meant to refer to Jesus, with the quotation of John 1 simply misremembered; the next paragraph sees Clement criticising the Greeks for not recognising that the law was given by God through Moses.

It is understandable, however, in light of the earlier claim that Moses is νόμος ἄμψυχος, because he was governed by the τῷ χρηστῷ λόγῳ: if, following the Stoic view, true law is merely right reason, then a conflation of Moses as the ‘living Law’ and the incarnate Logos is an understandable step. The two are further connected by iconography: in the figure of the shepherd, we can recognise both Christ and Moses. It is perhaps significant that some of the earliest representations of Christ are as the good shepherd; it is entirely possible that there is a deliberate reference by Clement to Christian iconography here. Indeed, Adam Levine argues that early Christian images could well have deliberately had multiple

---

316 Jn. 1:17-18: ‘The law indeed was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. No one has ever seen God. It is God the only Son, who is close to the Father’s heart, who has made him known.’ (NRSV)

317 Str. 1.26.170.2: μὴ πῇ βούλεσθαι πείθεσθαι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ φασκούσῃ θεότην διὰ Μωυσέως δεδόσθαι τὸν νόμον...

318 Clement also combines two projections of the idealised political state prevalent in Post-Hellenistic philosophy, one onto a past Golden Age, and the other onto the heavenly realm (though of course usually the pantheon): see van Nuffelen (2011) 114–20.

319 For an overview, see Lowrie (1965). This figure too may have been an ambiguous one, preceded as it was by iconography that depicted Hermes as the psychopomp and the earlier tradition of the moschophorus figure: Quasten (1946) and Legner (1959); on the moschophorus figure, Keesling (2003) 117. See Levine (2012) 56–9 for further bibliography.

320 Levine (2012) 10–19 argues cogently for the existence representations of Christ which predate the third century; even if we posit a later emergence of Christian iconography, Clement is writing at the turn of the second to third century, precisely when extant images of Christ begin appearing.
referents, engaging both non-Christian models and combinations of typological figures from Old and New Testaments. The visual parallel functions to support the conceptual one because Moses and Jesus as law-givers both represent a perfected Christian cosmopolitanism: right reason perfectly embodied, and expressed in a law for the community.

Clement’s presentation of both *logos* and *nomos* as working in tandem to produce the conditions for the ideal *politeia* deliberately conflates the Christian and Stoic senses of these terms. The natural law of the Stoics becomes the revealed Law of Moses, properly understood through (Stoic) ‘right reason’, which is also the pre-existing and incarnate *Logos* of God. But by their close association (the lost sheep can only be found by *logos* and *nomos*) the possession of the law, properly speaking, is made contingent on the correct interpretation of it, represented by quotation of the words of Jesus. The giving of the Law is through Moses, but not here to the Jews in particular; the sheep are one, single, human flock, for all of whom the law is appropriate, but amongst whom only those with the true *Logos* can effectively interpret that law.

The intertext of John 1 makes the ethnic undertones of this claim clear: ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτὸν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, οἳ... 321

One of his key examples is an early fourth-century sarcophagus in which conflate Moses and Peter. Levine (2012) 206-10. On multiple interpretational possibilities between Christian and pagan imagery, see the *Historia Augusta* 8.2-4, where the author accuses Christians of splitting their worship between Christ and Sarapis. See Levine (2012) 78-80.

322 This builds on the thrust of Philo’s *De vita Mos.*, in which Philo suggests a unique universalism to the Mosaic law (*De vita Mos.* 2.51), which has been accepted by every nation, though at the same time they reject each others’ laws. *De vita Mos.* 2.17ff. Cf. van den Hoek (1988) 66.
οὐκ ἐξ αἰμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρὸς ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν. ⁳²³ Clement, however, suppresses explicit mention of filiation as an element of political identity here, instead focusing our attention on his use of terminology that speaks in both Stoic and Christian language about identity. That suppression also functions to re-inforce the de-Judaising of the Mosaic law and the incarnation of Christ, however; for at the opening of John’s Gospel, we are carefully reminded of the Jews and Judaea as τὰ ἰδια and οἱ ἰδιοι, God’s particular place and people who fail to recognise him. ⁳²⁴ Clement’s logos is a Stoic cosmopolitan one, without its own particular place or people, and his Mosaic law is a theoretical treatise only interpretable by the church, not the constitution of the Jewish people.

The distinctiveness of Clement’s position becomes even clearer when we compare it to Philo’s De vita Mosis, from which Clement draws extensively in Stromateis 1.22.150–1.29.182. ⁳²⁵ Whereas Philo’s characterisation of Moses establishes him as a legislator, high priest, prophet, and king, ⁳²⁶ Clement adds the roles of military tactician, politician and philosopher; ⁳²⁷ the role of high priest, however, is ‘conspicuously missing’. ⁳²⁸ In Clement’s

---

⁳²³ Jn. 1:12-13: ‘Yet to all who did receive him, to those who believed in his name, he gave the right to become children of God— children born not of natural descent, nor of human decision or a husband’s will, but born of God.’ (NRSV)

⁳²⁴ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν, καὶ ὁ κόσμος δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω. εἰς τὰ ἰδια ἦλθεν, καὶ οἱ ἰδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον. Jn. 1:10-11. τὰ ἰδια is used in some so-called Gnostic sources (Odes Sol. 7.12; 26.1, Madæan Liturgy 114:4-5) as the place for which the soul longs, its heavenly home; but here, the reference is clearly to coming into the world, and is distinguished from ὁ κόσμος. See Moloney (1998) ad loc. and Schnackenburg (1968-1982) 1.259-60.

⁳²⁵ van den Hoek (1988) 49-68; a table of the precise correspondences is given on page 49.

⁳²⁶ De vita Mos. 2.3: ἐγένετο γὰρ προνοία θεοῦ βασιλεύς τε καὶ νομοθέτης καὶ ἄρχων καὶ προφήτης καὶ ἐν ἐκάστητα πρωτεία ἤγεγκατο.

⁳²⁷ Str. 1.24.158: ἕστιν οὖν ὁ Μωυσῆς ἦμιν προφητικός, νομοθετικός, τακτικός, στρατηγικός, πολιτικός, φιλόσοφος. The roles of tactician and politician are Clement’s own original additions, but
vocabulary, only Christ or the logos is given the title of ἀρχιερεύς. Moreover, whilst Moses is described as a pattern of kingship by both Philo and Clement, Clement extends his discussion further to point towards Christ’s as the preeminent and universal kingship. The latent messianic possibilities in Philo’s description of Moses are not only foregrounded in Clement, but made explicitly to refer to Christ.

The ideal Stoic polis is the universe, both human and divine, governed by law, which is accessible to all humans as reason rightly used; hence actual cities are only falsely so called. Clement takes these components and reconfigures them around the Logos: the universal city of the Stoics now becomes the heavenly city of the new creation. Importantly, however, this polis does have a legitimate earthly instantiation – the politeia of Moses, which provides the legislation (when properly understood through the Logos) for the city that is the Church. An audience can read into that Logos from either direction – the Word as Christ, or right reason as the foundation of Stoic natural justice.

that of philosopher is assumed in the Philonic original, which is built around the Platonic recommendation that philosophers must be kings and kings philosophers (Rep. 5.473d).

328 van den Hoek (1988) 64; cf. 58.
329 See Str. 2.5.21.4; see van den Hoek (1988) 64, although once in Clement’s work the title is applied to archangels, Exc. 27.3.
330 Str. 1.24.159.5-6: βασιλεύς τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὁ ἄρχων κατὰ νόμος ὁ τὴν τοῦ ἀρχεῖν ἐκόντων ἑπιστήμην ἔχων, οἶδα ἐστὶν ὁ κύριος τοὺς εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ δὴ αὐτὸν πιστεύοντας προσείμενος. πάντα γὰρ παρέδωκεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ πάντα ὑπέταξεν Χριστῷ τῷ βασιλεῖ ἡμῶν...
331 There is clearly an element of presenting Moses as comparable to other ancient characterisations of the ideal human: Dillon (1977) 153-4 gives Neopythagorean parallels; and there is certainly a divine element in Moses himself (Goodenough (1935) 223ff.; Meeks (1976) 45-9), but the idea of a personal Messiah is probably foreign to Philo: Wolfson (1947) 1.419 suggests that if there is a messianic element, it is in connection with the victory of the Mosaic law, and not regarding Moses himself. See also van den Hoek (1988) 65.
332 See also Str. 2.5.20-21 for a parallel passage which more explicitly sees Christ as surpassing Moses in all these qualities.
The Christian *polis*, then, is not dependent on political entity that was the people of the Hebrews, nor does it seek accommodation with the laws and customs of actual cities and peoples, as the Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism does. Rather, it provides an alternative way for Greek speakers to envisage their connection to both their own individual *poleis* and the Roman state; all earthly commonwealths are subordinate to right reason, which is shown both by philosophical reasoning and divine revelation to be the *Logos*, the son of God. The *polis* created around that *Logos* is the Church, an earthly incomplete foretaste of the heavenly Jerusalem.

**ROMAN POWER AND CHRISTIAN CITIZENSHIP**

The political aspects of this claim to an overarching Christian identity as both superceding Athenian/Hellenic cultural identity, and also extending throughout the cosmos, are implicit, but powerful. The overlap between the theoretical exploration of citizenship and the concrete relationships of power in the Roman empire is unavoidably substantial. It was undoubtedly the clash between what Rome saw as the requirement of citizenship in the empire and what Christians saw as their Christian citizenship in heaven which lay at the root of persecution:³³³ civic cult, and by extension imperial cult, is a means of creating and maintaining group identity. A deliberate rejection of that is not just a potential cause for the disfavour of the gods, it is an ideological threat to the binding and structuring factors of a heterogenous society.

³³³The seminal article on the causes of persecution is de Ste. Croix (1963), whose conclusions are still mirrored in the most recent and fullest exploration of Christian persecution, Moss (2013).
Stoic cosmopolitanism can happily acquiesce to the strictures of two cities, because the universal citizenship consists in more basic common principles, stripping away the specificities of particular political identities to the laws of *physis*. In contrast, Clement speaks of enduring suffering as part of the pursuit of living according to nature;\(^{334}\) that is, in Christian terms, both in the image and likeness of god,\(^{335}\) and as a citizen of heaven.\(^{336}\)

Clement’s adaptation of philosophical terminology of citizenship takes the clash of citizenships even further, however. The images of kingship which he uses to characterise both Moses and Jesus are drawn from contemporary political theory. Both as *nomos* *empsychos* and as the shepherd of the flock, Moses/Jesus replaces earthly rulers as figures of authority and allegiance. The force of this divide can be brought into focus by a sidelong glance to Aelius Aristides. Aristides, too, constructs a symbiotic relationship between *paideia* and imperial power; both authors subsume *paideia* to a broader imperialising discourse, and claim a position of status within that discourse through their ability to mediate and control that *paideia*. The *Panathenaic Oration* opens by talking of Athens as the *tropheus* of all peoples:

\[έξεστιν εἰπεῖν κοινοὺς δὲ ἁπάντων τροφέας ὑμᾶς εἶναι καὶ μόνους καὶ πρὸ γε αὐτῶν ἔτι τῶν τροφέων, ὡσπερ οὐς πατέρας πατέρων καλοῦσιν οἱ ποιηταί\]\(^{337}\)

Charles Behr translates *τροφέας* here as ‘foster-father’, but the force is surely ‘tutor’; it is, in particular, in the

\(^{334}\) Again, I am reminded of the contrast between cosmopolitanisms in Bhabha (2004); the free-market (Stoic?) version of globalisation ‘readily celebrates a world of plural cultures and peoples located at the periphery, so long as they produce healthy profit margins’ (xiv); the (Clementine?) version is one of resistance and activism: ‘more to do with political practices and ethical choices’ (xvii).

\(^{335}\) E.g. *Str.* 4.22.137.1-2; Osborn (2005) 228.

\(^{336}\) *Str.* 4.3.12.6-4.13.1.

\(^{337}\) *Panath.* 1: ‘It is possible to say that you are the tutors shared by all people, you alone and even before the other tutors themselves, just as the poets call them the fathers of fathers.’
furtherance of ‘education and oratory’ (τροφῆς ...τῆς ἐν μαθήμασι καὶ λόγοις [2]) that all Greeks and Barbarians owe a debt to Athens as tropheus.\(^{338}\)

Although praising Athens lavishly in a public forum, the chief virtue he praises is a linguistic purity of which the exemplar is himself; moreover, what he praises is not the language that Athenians actually speak, but a literary dialect which belongs more to a class of highly erudite pepaideumenoi than to contemporary Athens. The purity of the language is directly linked to the geographical purity of Attica, surrounded on all sides by Greeks.\(^{339}\) Yet later in the speech it is precisely the lack of confinement to Attica which is the source of the power of Athens; the linguistic power of the city is actually figured as a military force.\(^{340}\) Hellenism as a linguistic phenomenon is mapped onto the imperial geography of Roman territory:

καὶ οὕτω Ἦρακλέους στήλαι κωλύουσιν οὕτω Λιβύης κολωνιαῖς ταῦτα ὀρίζεται, οὐδ' αὐτοὶ Ἡσαντίρω ὄπωτέρῳ βούλει, οὐδὲ στενοῖς Συρίας καὶ Κιλικίας, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι τῆς γῆς τάξις τίνι θείον ἐπιδρέχεται τῆς ὑμετέρας σοφίας καὶ συνθήειας, καὶ ταύτην μίαν φωνὴν κοινὴν ἅπαντες τοῦ γένους ἐνόμισαν, καὶ δὴ ὑμῶν ὀμόφωνος μὲν πᾶσα γέγονεν ἢ οἰκουμένη.\(^{341}\) (324)

And the pillars of Heracles are no barrier, nor is this power limited by the hills of Africa, nor again by the Bosporus, whichever Bosporus you wish, not by the passes of Syria and Cilicia. But emulation of your wisdom and way of life has spread over

\(^{338}\) The link between the language of procreation and child-rearing with education is a Second Sophistic commonplace: Buell (1999) 119-130.

\(^{339}\) Aristides himself held citizenship in Smyrna, an Attic colony, which is undoubtedly what is referred to by ‘another Greece’ which protects Attica from the barbarians.

\(^{340}\) πάντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλλυθάσιν ὀψερ ὀρὸν τινὰ παιδείας νομίζοντες, ταύτην ἐγὼ τὴν μεγάλην ἄρχῃ καλῶ τὴν λαθηνιών, οὐ τρίηρες διακοσίας, ἢ πλείον, οὐδ' ἑωνίαν, οὐδ' ἐλλήσποντον, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, ἢ μυρίων μεταβέβληκεν ἄρχοντας. (327 = 181 Jebb)

\(^{341}\) Panath. 324.
every land by some divine fortune, and all men have come to believe that this single
dialect is the common speech of the human race. And through you the whole of the
inhabited world has come to speak the same tongue.  

At one and the same time, Attic cultural capital is accessible from every point on the globe:
but is presented as always a co-opting, rather than a co-opted phenomenon. The educational
system necessary for the development of Atticizing style is laid out in its vanguard as
another Greece, pushing back the boundaries of the barbarian. τύχῃ τινὶ θείᾳ, ‘some divine
fortune’, is nothing other than the Pax Romana. Aristides presents an enmeshing of (silent,
implicit) Roman power with a Greek voice. In effect, it is suggested that although a purely
Roman imperium is possible, Greek is needed for there to be an oikoumene, a civilized world.

Clement’s discourse of heavenly citizenship is likewise built from the concept of a
universally accessible paideia, even built around the same conceptual language of Athens.
But rather than being parasitic on Roman hegemony, it stands in conflict with it; the
universal ruler is not the emperor, but the Logos, instantiated by the living law Moses, and
hence available in the scriptures, as well as by the incarnation of Christ. Adherence to this
citizenship may well bring about conflict in allegiances; even to the point of martyrdom:

«ἐμοὶ» γὰρ «κόσμος ἐσταύρωται κἀγὼ τῷ κόσμῳ» λέγει, βιῶ δὲ ἢδη ἐν σαρκὶ ὡν ως
ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτευόμενος, ὅθεν εἰκότως καλούμενος ὁ γνωστικὸς υπακούει ῥαδίως
καὶ τῷ τὸ σωμάτιον αἰτοῦντι φέρων προσδίδωσι.  

343 Str. 4.3.12.6–4.13.1.
‘For the world is crucified to me, and I to the world’,\textsuperscript{344} he says, ‘and already, though in the flesh, I live as a citizen in heaven’.\textsuperscript{345} Hence reasonably when called the gnostic willingly obeys and in suffering hands over his body to him who asks.

\textsuperscript{344} Gal. 6:14.

\textsuperscript{345} This seems to be a quotation, although not put in inverted commas by Stählin; it is reminiscent of Gal. 2:20 and Phil. 3:20, but not a direct quotation. On the perception of persecution as a constant for Christians, see above, Chapter 3, pp. 140-2.
5. THE TRIAL OF TIME:  
THE ORIGINS OF GREEK WISDOM

In his brief summary of the *Stromateis*, Eusebius records that the main thrust of the work is to prove the precedence of the Hebrew over the Greek: πρεσβύτερον τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀρχαιογονίας Μωυσέα τε καὶ τὸ Ἱουδαίων γένος. It is difficult not to agree with Eusebius’ elevation of this claim; Clement repeatedly makes arguments for the ultimate antiquity and authority of what he terms Hebrew philosophy. πάσης σοφίας ἀρχαιότατη ἡ κατὰ Ἑβραίους φιλοσοφία is a constant refrain. The claim, though odd to modern ears, is not incidental to the intellectual goals of the *Stromateis*: it forms the backdrop to the question of how valuable Greek literature and philosophy can be for a Christian.

This chapter will explore this dependency theme, sometimes also referred to as the theft or plagiarism motif: that Greek philosophy is dependent upon Jewish thought or literature. Interpretation of this theme has been core to many readings of Clement since the

---

2 Str. 1.21.101.1: ‘Of all wisdom, the philosophy of the Hebrews is the oldest.’ Cf. 1.15.72.4: τούτων ἀπάντων πρεσβύτατον μικρῷ τὸ Ἱουδαϊκών γένος, καὶ τὴν παρ’ αὐτοῖς φιλοσοφίαν ἐγγραπτὸν γενομένην προκατάρξει τῆς παρ’ Ἐλληνικῆς φιλοσοφίας διὰ πολλῶν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος ὑποδείκνυσι Φίλων, οὗ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ Αριστότελος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς καὶ ἄλλοι πλείους, ἵνα μὴ κατ’ ὅνομα ἔπιστην διατρίβω. ‘The oldest of all of these by far is the Jewish race, and that their written philosophy predates the philosophy of the Greeks Philo the Pythagorean has demonstrated at great length, and indeed Aristobulus the Peripatetic, too, and more besides, so I will not waste time going over them by name.’ *Et passim.* With the partial exception of Books 3 and 7, the theme pervades the work: Munck (1933) 136-42; see also the table of all of Clement’s claims of dependency in Ridings (1995) 112-17.
3 Boys-Stones (2001) 179 notes that the theme ‘has occasioned some interest, and not a little embarrassment’; e.g. Chadwick (1966) 14.
nineteenth century, and continues to be raised as a hotly-contested issue in more recent scholarship. It is by no means a concern unique to Clement, and can be found in almost all the second-century apologists and those they oppose as heretics, with Jewish antecedents or parallels in Philo and Josephus. The claim is even used in reverse by pagan philosophers against Christianity: Celsus, for instance, charges the bible itself with theft, claiming Moses and the gospels plagiarized from Homer and Plato.

At stake in the arguments over dependence and primacy was access to truth; by the period of middle Platonism, it was generally accepted that the study of philosophy was not the gradual, tentative progressive accumulation of truth from first principles. It was instead the rediscovery of truth which had been available in primitive times and hidden or deliberately concealed in myth and tradition. Josephus notes the popularity of claims to antiquity by his time: ἀμέλει πειρώνται τὰ παρ᾽ αὐτοίς ἑκατοντα πρὸς τὸ ἀρχαιότατον ἀνάγειν, ἵνα μὴ μιμεῖσθαι δόξωσιν ἑτέρους, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ τοῦ ζῆν νομίμως ἄλλοις ὑφηγήσασθαι.

---

5 For example, Lilla (1971) 9-59, Droge (1989) and Ridings (1995) 29-139 (on Clement specifically, but passim on the theme in early Christianity in general), and Boys-Stones (2001) on the broader philosophical context.

6 Cf. Boys-Stones (2001) 179 n.3: 'Justin, Tatian, Theophilus, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origen, Eusebius, Theodoretus, Augustine, and, in a word, the whole of the Patristic tradition as well.' For the variants among the heterodox, see Eshleman (2012) 200.

7 Boys-Stones (2001) 76-95 on Jewish exemplars in general. In an odd contrast, McGill (2012) 3 n.8 suggests that Cicero, De fin. 5.74, in which M. Pupius Piso accuses the Stoics of passing off Peripatetic thought as their own is the only example extant from Latin literature which discusses the plagiarism of ideas.

8 E.g. apud Origen, Contra Celsum 4.21, 6.7, 6.16, 7.28. We know Celsus was not alone in this – see for example Tertullian, Apol. 47.2. Later, the Platonist Amelius, a pupil of Plotinus, seems to have argued that John’s gospel lifted the doctrine of the Logos from Heraclitus; see Eusebius Praep. Ev. 11.19.1.


10 Josephus, Contra Apionem 2.152: ‘Indeed, each of these attempts to trace back their institutions to the most ancient times, so that they will not seem to be imitating others, but to have led the way for others in living under a rule of law.’

186
The assumption that truth must be hunted for in the earliest period of human history is echoed clearly in the *Stromateis*:

άλλα κἂν ἐπὶ Πυθαγόραν ἔλθω καὶ Φερεκύδην καὶ θάλητα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους σοφούς, ἵσταμαι τὸν τούτων διδάσκαλον ζητῶν κἂν Αἴγυπτοις εἶπης κἂν Ἰνδοὺς κἂν Βαβυλωνίους κἂν τοὺς Μάγους αὐτούς, οὐ παύσομαι τὸν τούτων διδάσκαλον ἀπαιτῶν, ἀνάγω δὲ σὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν ἄνθρώπων.\(^{11}\)

But even if I come to Pythagoras and Pherecydes and Thales and the first wise men, I come to a halt in my search for their teacher, and if you say the Egyptians or the Indians or the Babylonians and the Magi themselves, I shall not stop enquiring after their teacher, and I lead you back to the first generation of humans.

The original teacher is, of course, Christ the Logos: οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τῶν γενητῶν ἀπάντων διδάσκαλος, ὁ σύμβουλος τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ τὰ πάντα προεγνωκότος.\(^{12}\) In this line of reasoning, connecting the earliest human wisdom with divine dispensation, Clement is echoing groundwork laid by earlier Stoic thought.\(^{13}\) At stake in the claim of antiquity, then, is the most direct access to the original, divine, truth.

The flip-side is the charge of obfuscation and falsification. Newer deviations start their search for the truth in the wrong place, and point in the wrong direction.\(^{14}\) Henry Chadwick writes that for Celsus, the great ancient opponent of Christianity, ‘it is axiomatic that

\(^{11}\) *Str.* 6.7.57.3.

\(^{12}\) 6.7.58.1: ‘He is the one who is the teacher of all created things, the counsellor of God, who foreknew all things.’ Cf. 6.18.166.4.

\(^{13}\) See Boys-Stones (2001) 190 n.19 on this particular claim, referencing Cornutus in particular; and Chapter 1 in general for the Stoic background.

nothing can be both new and true."\textsuperscript{15} From this perspective, ancient Christianity’s Achilles’ heel is its novelty.\textsuperscript{16} Hence the demonstration of the rather paradoxical antiquity of a new faith is a leading concern for early Christian authors.

I will argue that the use of the dependency motif is more complex than a simple pro- or anti-philosophy argument, but instead exposes deeper concerns about what is meant by originality and inspiration. Clement raises the possibility of the unknotting of the nexus between authorial intent, meaning, and interpretation. His sources of wisdom are carefully sifted for what indications they may give towards the truth, both Greek and Hebrew: in play are texts which may or may not contain hidden gems of truth; authors, who often do not understand, or are even themselves actively working against, the Logos; and audiences, who are prone to misunderstand the hidden treasure which is in their possession.

PLAGIARISM OR INSPIRATION?

The swathe of recent writing on Clement’s use of the theft motif, however, has bought into a dichotomy of Christianity/philosophy: Clement is interpreted as either embracing or rejecting the Greek philosophical ‘other’.\textsuperscript{17} On the one end of the spectrum stand those who insist that Clement’s use of the theft motif is a filip to hard-line Christians afraid of engaging with Greek philosophy, disguising Clement’s true attitude: that Greek philosophy is divinely

\footnotetext{15}{Chadwick (1966), referring us in particular to Origen Contra Celsum 4.14; the claim is repeated by Feldman (1990) 109. For a detailed examination of the theme, see Pilhofer (1990).}

\footnotetext{16}{Lieu (2004) 62-97.}

\footnotetext{17}{Ridings (1995) 18-24 gives a comprehensive overview of the status quaeestionis up to that point.}
inspired and on a par with the Old Testament revelation. At the other stand those who argue that the motif serves to devalue Greek thought entirely, with all the pejorative force of the term plagiarism; suggestions of any kind of genuine truth amongst Greek schools of thought serves solely as an apologetic tool.

In the former view, Clement uses the dependency theme to defend the use of Greek philosophy to the simpliciores, the less well-educated majority. To counter their suspicion, philosophy is permitted into Christian thought as stolen goods which in reality belong to the faith; the intellectual necessity of Greek philosophy for the faith of the more educated is retained, but the accusation of plagiarism satisfies puritanal qualms. However, given the complex erudition of Clement’s writing the very claim that simpliciores are reading the text at all must be treated with caution; Clement’s readership must have already bought into Greek paideia to a significant degree.

---

18 de Faye (1906) stands at the root of this line of thought, and is followed by Bousset (1915), Molland (1936), Campenhausen (1956) and Lilla (1971), whose theory that the theft motif can be entirely explained as a response to Celsus is followed by Droge (1989) 150.

19 The term is a fraught one and undoubtedly inadequate to describe the variety of different ways that literary or intellectual dependency might be expressed in the ancient world; see Ridings (1995) 12-16, and more generally on the theoretical issues of plagiarism in the ancient world McGill (2012) 1-30.


22 More idiosyncratically, Bousset’s source-critical attempt to reconstruct the material for Clement’s work dismisses the dependency theme as the work of someone else, inserted uncritically into the Stromateis; Bousset (1915) 205-36. His argument was effectively countered by Munck (1933) 136-42; Chadwick (1966) 33 describes Bousset’s conjectures as ‘one of those acts of folly that distinguished scholars are occasionally allowed to commit so that lesser mortals may continue undiscouraged with their studies’.
Pitted against them are those who maintain that Clement’s use of Greek philosophy is entirely propaedeutic. At heart, Clement believes philosophy is at best an otiose and disposable item, and at worst actively muddies the water for true revelation.\(^{23}\) Clement’s philosophical material, in this view, is directed solely towards outsiders, and only for the purpose of enticing people away from philosophy.\(^{24}\) When Clement seems to defend the use of philosophy, it is only as an evangelistic tool, for attracting people from outside the faith.\(^{25}\)

I will seek to show that in the heat of the debate, the nuance of Clement’s negotiation of Greek and Hebrew heritage has been ignored. Framing the discussion solely in terms of Clement being pro- or anti-philosophy is overly reductionist, particularly when we have seen that Clement himself does so much to destabilise such simple polarities. Underlying my approach is the recognition that Clement’s arguments are \textit{a posteriori}, and not \textit{a priori}. His starting point is not whether Christians should or shouldn’t use non-Christian sources for the development of their faith. Rather, it is an attempt to theorize how it is that the Christian truth visible to greater or lesser degrees in all literature has come to be there. Depending on the moral culpability of how the fragments of truth come to be there, and the balance of truth to deception in the text, the subsequent questions of value and use can be answered.

\(^{23}\) Völker (1952) has had the most influence here, and is followed in his denigration of Clement’s relationship to philosophy by Ridings (1995) and Boys-Stones (2001).


There are three strands to my approach. Firstly, I will argue that his approach to the theft motif is not about the relationship between Greek and Christian thought, but intra-philosophical: it positions the Christian philosophy amongst the schools of Greek philosophy. Clement does use the language of theft, often conjoined with the language of dishonesty and deception, but it is best to see this in the context of differentiation between philosophers and philosophical schools, rather than a judgment of Greek culture as a whole.

Secondly, once we admit that there is not a strict line being drawn being Hebrew and Greek, we can see that the theft motif also enables Clement to clarify the relationship between Christians, Jews, and the Old Testament. Rather than eliding Christian and Jewish possession of the same canon, the intellectual moves required to show Greek lack of understanding of the Christian content of philosophy also explain the Jewish lack of comprehension of their scriptures. Clement can decouple the Hebrew scriptures from the Hebrews, who possessed but did not understand their texts. The Old Testament is precisely that for Clement – defined by its relationship to another, New, revelation.

Finally, the constant focus on Greek borrowing mirrors Clement’s evaluation of cultural identity. Greek literature not only points beyond itself, but attests to (and is often proud of) its own status as borrowed and eclectic. The key observation underpinning my arguments here are that although it has been taken as read that Clement argues for Greek plagiarism of Hebrew thought, almost all of the claimed specific plagiarism is from non-Hebrew barbarians or other Greeks. This is not, from Clement, necessarily a criticism; indeed, it

---

26 On Clement’s relationship with a living Jewish tradition, see Carleton Paget (1998).
provides a defence of his own ‘patchwork’ (as in Stromateis) philosophy as itself in the best Greek traditions. As poikilia, diversity and variegation, is fundamental to Clement’s literary aesthetic, just so is intellectual diversity fundamental to Clement’s philosophical position.

THE TRUTH DISMEMBERED

Running through Clement’s relationship with the past, present and future is the question of how concrete human systems (political, literary, social and philosophical) are related to the Logos. His approach to the theft motif thus begins from a descriptive rather than a normative standpoint; not where we should look for truth, but the delineation of that truth wherever it may be. Scripture is, of course, the prime source: a divine and direct revelation from God and the oldest source of wisdom. Alongside this, however, is the recognition or assumption that there are traces of truth in all philosophies which search for the truth, traces independent of the Jewish wellspring of revelation. The fact that traditions other than the Hebrew lead to wisdom is affirmed in Hebrew scripture itself.27

However, this goes head-to-head with some fairly clear-cut dominical words critical of philosophical wisdom: πάντες δόται ήλθον [πρὸ ἐμοῦ] κλέπται εἰσὶν καὶ λῃσταί.28 Clement can hardly avoid the divine words; he circles back around this quotation time and time again in the context of the scattering of truth in Greek philosophy, and it is clear that the charge exercised him.29 Nonetheless, it is always in the context of the a posteriori established value of the Greek philosophical tradition.

27 E.g. Str. 1.5.28.4 (Prov. 4:8–9); 1.5.29.2-4 (Prov. 4:10-11:21, 4:18, Mt. 23:37) 1.5.29.9 (Prov. 5:20).
28 Jn. 10:8.
29 Twice in Str. 1.17; again at the opening of Book 2; again at Str. 5.14.89.1 and 5.14.140.1.
Clement presents this value as both an implied biographical truth, being the course of his own journey to the truth from Platonism to Christianity, as well as one susceptible of derivation by reading Greek literature itself:

οὕτως οὖν ἡ τῆς Διονύσου μυθολογίας, τῆς δὲ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ὄντος ἁεὶ θεολογίας πεποίηται. ὁ δὲ τὰ διηρημένα συνθεὶς αὐθις καὶ ἐνοποιήσας τέλειον τὸν λόγον ἀκινδύνως εὖ ἰσθ' ὅτι κατόψει, τὴν ἀλήθειαν.\(^{30}\)

So then, philosophy, whether barbarian or Greek, has made the eternal truth some kind of dismemberment, not of the story-telling of Dionysus, but rather of the divine science of the ever existing word. But the one who puts together again the divided parts and makes them one (make no mistake about it!) will without danger regard the perfect word, the truth.

There is truth found scattered throughout disparate nations and philosophical systems, and it can be reconstituted by the dedicated searcher. Despite the negative phrasing (it is, after all, a \textit{sparagmos}) the central point is that the genuine shards of truth hidden almost everywhere can lead back to the \textit{Logos}.\(^{31}\)

There are two passages which are fundamental to any discussion about the origin of Greek philosophy, Str. 1.16.80.5-1.17.81.5, and later and more succinctly, 1.19.94.1-3; we will look in some depth at the former.\(^{32}\) The mechanism for how Greek philosophy has elements of the

\(^{30}\) 1.13.57.6.

\(^{31}\) Similar passages can be found in abundance; e.g. Str. 1.5.32.4 or 1.7.37.1-6, where the parable of the sower is used allegorically to describe the liberal sowing of the \textit{Logos} throughout the universe at different times.

truth is less than clear, and Clement never gives a single definitive answer; both these passages provide a number of possible alternatives.

And so Greek philosophy, according to some, is by chance, somehow or other, in possession of the truth, faintly and not completely; but as others profess, it is set in motion by the devil. And some suppose that all philosophy is inspired by certain inferior powers.

Although there is truth in Greek philosophy, some of these options are more sinister and create a greater sense of suspicion than others.34

Depending on how the Greeks have come by the truth, then, there is the question of whether it is so corrupted by its context, hidden amongst falsehoods, that delving into it may cause more harm than good. Clement’s conclusion rounding off the quotation above is cautious but positive:

But if Greek philosophy does not even possess the full extent of the truth, and is too weak to perform the commandments of the Lord, yet even so it prepares the way for

33 Str. 1.16.80.5.
34 On this passage, see Ridings (1995) 39, with bibliography.
35 Str. 1.16.80.6.
the truly royal teaching, somehow or other chastening and forming the character in advance and preparing the one who extols providence for the reception of the truth.

This summary is even less grudging than a cautious first reading might suggest. Although it seems hedged with disclaimers (μὴ καταλαμβάνει, ἐξασθενεῖ, even the uncertainty of ἀμὴ γέ πη), the language of preparation Clement uses draws parallels between the role of the Hebrew scriptures and Greek philosophy. The phrase προκατασκευάζει τὴν ὁδὸν seems to mirror very closely the synoptic account of the ministry of John the Baptist: ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ ἀποστέλλω τὸν ἀγγελόν μου πρὸ προσώπου σου, ὃς κατασκευάσει τὴν ὁδὸν σου ἔμπροσθέν σου, which itself is a quotation of Malachi 3:1. The insinuation the intertextual resonances make is that philosophy ranks as a kind of preparatory prophecy.

There is a strong case to be made for a second intertextual layer here; whilst προκατασκευάζει parallels κατασκευάσει directly enough for the allusion to John and Malachi to be obvious, the choice of the more recherché form of the verb is interesting. There is only one biblical appearance of it, at the close of the Prologue to Ecclesiasticus (quoted numerous times elsewhere by Clement), where the grandson of ben Sira explains his translation of the work into Greek: καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ παροικίᾳ βουλομένοις φιλομαθεῖν προκατασκευαζομένους τὰ ἠθή ἐννόμως βιοτεύειν. The context seems apposite for the issues Clement is raising, and the two are linked by common vocabulary of the proper

---

36 Mt. 11:10//Mk. 1:2//Lk. 7:27; the last two words are absent from Mark. The verse plays a prominent role in the New Testament; it is the opening claim in the Gospel of Mark, and basic to the characterisation of John the Baptist in Matthew and Luke, who make the words dominical.

37 Although the text shared by the Evangelists is not the same as the LXX text.

38 E.g. Paed. 1.8.62.1, where Ecclus. 21:6 is quoted as ἡ γραφή; later in the same chapter (1.8.66.3), Ecclus. 22:6-8 is quoted as the words of the Lord who is παιδαγωγός. In total, Stählin list 71 references to the book in Clement’s works.

39 ‘for those living abroad who wished to gain learning and are disposed to live according to the law.’ (NRSV)
formation of τὸ ἡθός, preparatory to living according to the Law. Moreover, the issues of translation and cultural relevance (even specifically an Alexandrian culture into which Ecclesiasticus is being translated), which form the main substance of this prologue, thematically link the passages and suggest a deliberate resonance. We are reminded of the opening chapter of Ecclesiasticus, hymning the providence of God: κύριος αὐτὸς... ἐξέχεεν αὐτὴν [sc. σοφία] ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ, | μετὰ πάσης σαρκὸς κατὰ τὴν δόσιν αὐτοῦ.40

The effect of both of these layers of intertextuality does not just accept Greek philosophy as a valid preparation for the fulness of revelation. It also reminds the reader who is immersed enough in the Greek scriptures to pick up on his references that even the Old Testament, even John the Baptist,41 are only partial revelations and preparatory to the advent of Christ, fully understandable only in light of that event. Clement insists, as a necessary result of the Christian revelation, that the scriptures themselves, although a more privileged form of communication than others, are still merely pointers to something beyond themselves, without which they, too, are fruitless to the one who is searching for truth.

This still leaves unanswered the implicit ethical question: even if these texts point towards the divine, can Christian use of them be condoned if they are the corrupted result of culpable theft? Clement does not attempt to avoid or deny the charge that philosophy may be stolen material; but he does at points place the Greeks at a remove from blame:

40 Ecclus. 1:1, 9-10: ‘The Lord...poured her [sc. wisdom] out upon all his works, upon all the living according to his gift.’ (NRSV)
41 Keeping in mind: οὐκ ἐγήγερται ἐν γεννητοῖς γυναικῶν μείζων Ἰωάννου τοῦ βαπτιστοῦ. Mt. 11:11//Lk. 7:28.
ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν προφῆται, ἂτε ἀποσταλέντες καὶ ἐμπνευσθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ κυρίου, οὗ κλέπται, ἀλλὰ διάκονοι. φησὶ γοῦν ἡ γραφή «ἀπέστειλεν ἡ σοφία τοὺς ἐαυτῆς δούλους, συγκαλοῦσα μετὰ υψηλοῦ κηρύγματος ἐπὶ κρατῆρα οἴνου.» φιλοσοφία δὲ οὐκ ἀπεστάλη ὑπὸ κυρίου, ἀλλ’ ἦλθε, φασί, κλαπεῖσα ἢ παρὰ κλέπτου δοθεῖσα, εἴτ’ οὖν δύναμις ἢ ἄγγελος μαθὼν τι τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ μὴ καταμείνας ἐν αὐτῇ, ταῦτα ἐνέπνευσε καὶ κλέψας ἐδίδαξεν. 42

The prophets, however, since they are sent and inspired by the Lord, are not thieves, but servants. Therefore scripture says: ‘Wisdom sent her slaves, calling them together with a loud proclamation to a bowl of wine.’ 43 On the other hand, philosophy was not sent by the Lord, but it came, they say, stolen or given by a thief; therefore, either a power or an angel which had learnt something of the truth and did not remain in it, having stolen these things inspired and taught them.

Wisdom in Greek sources is distinguished from prophecy, which was sent and inspired directly by the Lord; as we shall argue later, there might even be a suggestion that inspired prophecy is not restricted to the Hebrew bible. For the present point, however, it is clear that philosophy, however, was not necessarily stolen by the Greeks themselves; philosophy was the unwitting recipient of stolen goods at the hands of fallen lesser powers. Moreover, the theft was forseen providentially by God, οὐχὶ μὴ εἰδότος τοῦ κυρίου τοῦ καὶ τὰ τέλη τῶν ἐσομένων πρὸ καταβολῆς τοῦ <κόσμου καὶ τοῦ> ἐκαστον εἶναι ἐγνωκότος, ἀλλὰ μὴ κωλύσαντος. 44 Hence the result of it is actually positive: κατευθυνοῦσης δὲ εἰς τὸ συμφέρον τῆς προνοίας τῆς ἐκβασιν τοῦ τολμήματος. 45 The insertion of an intermediary, either fallen

42 Str. 1.17.81.2-4.
43 Prov. 9:3.
44 Str. 1.17.81.4: ‘though the Lord was not unaware, who knew the end of what is before the foundation of the world and each existence, and, however, did not prevent it.’
45 1.17.81.5; ‘but with providence guiding the outcome of the enterprise to advantage.’
angels (a theory deriving originally from the Book of Enoch) or at one point, prophets inspired by the devil, occurs several times in the *Stromateis*. It allows Clement to both make the act of the theft of divine wisdom culpable, but absolves the recipients of such wisdom of blame. It is pertinent, to note, too that this is expressed by Clement as an extreme end of the possibility of Greek possession of truth.

Even here, Providence ensures that even through evil good may be achieved. In effect, Clement argues, if Greek thought is not prophecy (which it might be), and if this theft is morally culpable (although there might be not be culpability on the part of the Greeks), even then the actual results of such theft may well be beneficial to the Christian, and even providentially arranged by God. A later programmatic passage on the dependency theme (which we will explore further below) sums up the position: ἥδη δὲ ὁ κλέπτης ὀπερ ὑφελόμενος ἔχει ἀληθῶς ἔχει, κἂν χρυσίον ἢ κἂν ἄργυρος κἂν λόγος κἂν δόγμα.

To conclude this section, relies on the assumption that the Greek tradition contains slivers of divine wisdom. Though it may be inferior and less complete than the biblical tradition, this does not make it superfluous once the seeker after truth has encountered the scriptures. Rather, like the Hebrew scriptures themselves, Greek texts can only be pointers to the Logos, and neither can be properly understood without the revelation of Christ, to which they both show the way. Equally, there is the implication that within the interpretative frame of Christianity, both the scriptures and Greek tradition are capable of yielding ever deeper

---

46 16:3.
47 E.g. Str. 7.2.6.4 and Str. 5.1.10.2, on which passage and further parallels see Daniélou (1961) 62-4; cf. Ridings (1995) 46 and Lilla (1971) 29.
48 Str. 1.20.100.5: 'But still the thief actually possesses whatever he possesses by theft, whether it be gold or silver or thought or teaching.' On this passage, see Ridings (1995) 45-6.
truth. Lastly, the ethical quandary of using stolen material is dealt with by the utilisation of the Enochic tradition of fallen angels as the culpable intermediaries.

THE STOLEN SPARK

Philosophy (and by extension, all Greek culture which makes claims to wisdom), then, can be a source of truth, although not unproblematically. We have seen the negative end of the spectrum of possibilities, a deliberate ploy by the devil – but it is clearly a spectrum. What becomes clear from Clement’s focus on the dependency motif is that philosophy’s relationship to the truth is not an undifferentiated unity. Examining the origins of philosophical thought allows Clement to differentiate and distinguish between philosophical schools as closer or more distant sources for the divine Logos.

Philosophy, Clement concludes in this first explicit exploration of the origins of Greek philosophy in chapters 16 and 17 of Book 1, is akin to the spark stolen by Prometheus. Though it be just an ember, it is able to be fanned into a flame: ἔστιν οὖν κἀν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τῇ κλαπείσῃ καθάπερ ὑπὸ Προμηθέως, πῦρ ὀλίγον εἰς φῶς ἐπιτήδειον χωρὶς καὶ κίνησις περὶ θεοῦ. The use of the Promethean motif is intriguing. As one of the more ambivalent figures of Greek mythology, his theft of fire is portrayed by Aeschylus in the Prometheus Vinctus as the advent of civilisation, and by Hesiod as the bondage of humanity to toil and pain. Equally ambivalent in early Christian literature, he is used both

---

49 1.17.87.1. ‘There is, therefore, even in philosophy, although stolen by Prometheus, a little fire readily being kindled into a useful light, some trace of wisdom and a movement from [or: directed towards] God.’

50 Theogony 506-616.
as a prefiguration of the creator God,\textsuperscript{51} and possibly seen to foreshadow a suffering Christ,\textsuperscript{52} but also as an example \textit{par excellence} of the foolishness of classical mythology.\textsuperscript{53} Clement does not adjudicate; certainly he lauds the fact that the Promethean spark can be fanned into a flame by God, but the original act he leaves an open question.\textsuperscript{54}

The argument concludes still uncommitted outright to an approval or condemnation of Hellenic wisdom:

\begin{quote}
τάχα δ' ἂν εἶεν «κλέπται καὶ λησταί» οἱ παρ' Ἑλλησ φιλόσοφοι καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου παρουσίας παρὰ τῶν Ἑβραϊκῶν προφητῶν μέρη τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν λαβόντες, ἀλλ' ώς ἰδία σφετερισάμενοι δόγματα, καὶ τὰ μὲν παραχαράξαντες, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ περιεργίας ἀμαθῶς σοφισάμενοι, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξευρόντες ἰσως γὰρ καὶ «πνεῦμα αἰσθήσεως» ἐσχήκασιν. ὡμολόγησε δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τῇ γραφῇ, κλεπτικὴν σοφίας τὴν σοφιστικὴν εἰπών, ὡς προεμηνύσαμεν.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

Well then, let it be that the ‘thieves and robbers’\textsuperscript{56} are the philosophers amongst the Greeks [and those]\textsuperscript{57} who took portions of the truth from the Hebrew prophets before the advent of the Lord without acknowledgement, but appropriated the doctrines as if they were their own, and debased some of them, and speculated ignorantly with over-elaboration about others [or: and altered the appearance of some of them, and became aware in an unlearned way, through curiosity, of others], and discovered others, for perhaps they too have ‘the spirit of understanding.’\textsuperscript{58} And

\begin{footnotes}
\item[51] Tertullian, \textit{Apologia} 18; cf. \textit{Stromateis} 5.14.100.1, 2.
\item[52] Tertullian, \textit{Contra Marcion} 1.1.
\item[53] Tatian, \textit{Oratio ad Graecos} 10.
\item[54] In \textit{Paed.} 2.1.18.1, Clement describes Plato’s use of biblical material as kindling a spark.
\item[55] \textit{Str.} 1.17.87.2-3.
\item[56] Jn. 10:8.
\item[57] The καὶ is omitted by Wilamowitz; even if maintained, the best understanding of the passage is probably to see this as a limiting addition or hendiadys anyway.
\end{footnotes}
Aristotle, too, agreed with scripture, saying that sophistry stole from wisdom, as we indicated beforehand.

It seems almost to acquiesce to a simple claim of that all philosophy is theft from the Jews—but instead finishes with its retention of τὰ δὲ καὶ ἔξευρόντες, independent discovery beyond what is merely stolen. The ambivalence is even present at the lexical level, as I have attempted to convey with alternative translations above. As the passage unfolds, we have to constantly revise our estimation of how Greek philosophy relates to the Scriptures.\(^59\)

Initially, the philosophers are described apparently rather negatively as those who have taken without acknowledgement (ἐπίγνωσιν λαβόντες). The vocabulary is inherently ambiguous, however; παραχαράσσω, literally to re-stamp coins, can vary between ‘devalue’ and ‘disguise’,\(^60\) and contemporary sources play on the disjunct between a positive metaphorical use of the word and the negative literal application of it.\(^61\) σοφίζω has, in the same way, a lexical field that ranges from the outright critical to the openly positive. In the LXX the connection to σοφία, wisdom, is always prominent; non-biblical usage, however often connects it with the kinds of sinister connotations that ‘sophistry’ conveys in English.\(^62\)

\(^{59}\) My reading of the passage here is dependent on the kind of reader-response theory offered by Stanley Fish emphasizing the dynamic act of reading as key to the production of meaning; the seminal presentation is Fish (1970).

\(^{60}\) Philo uses it in a vigorously negative sense at de Specialibus Legibus 2.249; Lucian, Demonax 5, uses it in a more positive figurative sense.

\(^{61}\) As in the Cynic slogan of ‘deface the currency’; see the story of Diogenes’ debasing of the currency of Sinope: Diogenes Laërtius 6.20-21, 71; cf. Plutarch, De Alexandri magni fortuna 332c.

\(^{62}\) LSJ s.v. σοφίζω. It is only used twice in the New Testament, in markedly contrasting ways. At 2 Timothy 3:15, speaking of the scriptures as τὰ δυνάμενά σε σοφίσαι εἰς σωτηρίαν, it means ‘to make wise’. Then at 2 Peter 1:16, the participle carries negative overtones as ‘cunningly devised’ (as the Authorized Version, not inaccurately, has it).
The preceding accusation of theft predisposes us toward the more critical end of interpretation, as in the first translation above; and regardless of the connotations of σοφίζω here, περιεργία always implies an undesirable type or level of curiosity. But then ἐξευρόντες interrupts this flow of seemingly negative words; the discovery of truth is precisely the programme which Clement has been urging on his readers; our interpretation of the preceding vocabulary is made uncertain. Rather than ‘debasing’ scripture, were the Greeks merely changing its appearance to fit a new context? Were the Greeks meddling with needless questioning, or were they actually teaching themselves, or becoming wise, even if through a rather fulsome curiosity?

By the time one reads Clement’s supposition that the Greeks might have possessed the spirit of understanding,63 the negativity of the initial premiss, that the Greek were thieves and robbers,64 is at least problematized. The most interesting final twist is still to come; the clinching evidence for Clement’s conclusion is the authority of Aristotle, who confirms that sophistry has stolen from wisdom. Any sense that the value of Greek philosophy has been destroyed in toto by the preceding argument is lost.

Reinterpreting the opening of the passage, we are best not to read it as a comment about Greek philosophers, but rather about a subset of philosophers, only those who without acknowledgement took wisdom from the Hebrew scriptures. Aristotle’s currency is apparently not debased by a general admission of theft by Greek philosophers. It is this vein that we can approach the programmatic passage in chapter 20 of Book 1:

63 On what exactly this might refer to, see Ridings (1995) 41-44, roundly rejecting the contention of Lilla (1971) 16-17 that it is a periphrasis for the Holy Spirit.
64 Jn. 10:8.
ἔμπαλιν οὖν ἀδικεῖ ὁ σφετερισάμενος τὰ βαρβάρων καὶ ψευδόμενος τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὗτος «κλέπτης» ύπό τῆς γραφῆς εἴρηται. φησὶ γοῦν «οὐί, μὴ γίνου ψεύστης· ἵνα τὸ ψεῦσμα πρὸς τὴν κλοπὴν.» ἢδη δὲ ὁ κλέπτης ὑπερ ὕψηλομένος ἔχει ἀληθῶς ἔχει, κάν χρυσίον ἢ κάν ἄργυρος κάν λόγος κἂν δόγμα.\

So on the contrary, he who usurps what belongs to the barbarians and boasts of it as his own does wrong, puffing up his own reputation and falsifying the truth. This man is called a ‘thief’ by scripture. Therefore it says, ‘My son, do not become a liar; for falsehood leads to theft.’ But still the thief actually possesses whatever he possesses by theft, whether it be gold or silver or thought or teaching.

Ridings reads this passage as confirming tout court that philosophers are liars and therefore thieves. But this is not a clear reading of the passage at all; it specifically picks out those who do not acknowledge their debt. As we have seen, however, Aristotle is the authority Clement uses to diagnose the problem; not only does this support Clement’s negative view of sophistry, which steals the truth, but exonerates the great philosopher himself.

We can see the contrast come out in an earlier passage: οὗτος οἴεται ὁ Πλάτων καὶ βαρβάρων φιλοσόφους τινὰς εἶναι, ὃ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔμπαλιν ὑπολαμβάνει μόνους φιλοσοφῆσαι Ἑλλήνας δύνασθαι. The Epicurean denial of even the possibility of barbarian philosophy is both a falsehood; the Christian disavowal of Epicureanism is thus grounded

---

65 Str. 1.20.100.4-5.
66 Did. 3:5.
68 1.15.67.1. ‘So Plato thinks that there are some philosophers even among the barbarians, though Epicurus supposes that Greeks alone are able to philosophize.’
not only in the content of their philosophy,⁶⁹ but in the combination of lying and plagiarism proper which this passage implies.

The case is even more clear-cut for Plato and Pythagoras, whose own words acknowledging debt to more ancient sources of wisdom are prominently paraded by Clement, particular in Str. 1.15. Plato 'does not deny bringing the best elements into his philosophy from amongst the barbarians and confesses that he visited Egypt',⁷⁰ he makes clear his respect for the barbarians, ‘mentioning that both he and Pythagoras learnt the majority and the most noble of both their teachings amongst the barbarians’.⁷¹ The list goes on, referring us to the *Charmides, Republic* and *Timaeus* as also showing Plato’s explicit acknowledged debt to barbarians.⁷² A similar list is made for Pythagoras, making it clear that his debt, too, was acknowledged and explicit.⁷³

The question is more complex for Platonic dependency directly on Moses, a claim also made by Clement,⁷⁴ mostly famously summed up in his quotation of Numenius: τί γάρ ἔστι Πλάτων ἢ Μωυσῆς ἀττικίζων;⁷⁵ Plato’s (true) laws and his conception of the divine are said to have

---

⁶⁹ On which, see above, Introduction nn.8-9.
⁷⁰ 1.15.66.2: Πλάτων δὲ οὐκ ἀρνεῖται τὰ κάλλιστα εἰς φιλοσοφίαν παρὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐμπορεύεσθαι εἰς τε Ἀἴγυπτον ἀφικέσθαι... The claim cannot specifically be found in the extant Platonic works, although passages referring to Egypt in the *Leges* have been taken to implying it.
⁷² 1.15.68.3 (Charmides 156d); 1.15.69.2 (Resp. 10.617d); 1.15.69.3 (Timaeus 22b).
⁷³ 1.15.69.1, as a disciple of the Egyptian prophet Sonchis; 1.15.69.6, his enthusiasm for Zoroaster; that he learnt from the Gauls and the Brahmans, 1.15.70.1.
⁷⁵ Str. 1.22.150.4: ‘What is Plato but an Atticizing Moses?’
benefited from the Hebrews; he relied on Moses’ law-giving in focusing on a single God and directing us to base our actions on righteousness; the ‘place of the forms’ comes from a Mosaic periphrasis for God; Plato’s claim regarding the ineffability of the divine relies on Moses; even the Trinity as found in Plato is dependent on the Hebrew scriptures. In short: καὶ ὅλως ὁ Πυθαγόρας καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ σὺν καὶ Πλάτωνι μᾶλιστα τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων σφόδρα τῷ νομοθέτῃ ὀμίλησαν, ὡς ἔστιν εξ αὐτῶν συμβαλέσθαι τῶν δογμάτων. Here the implication is that the debt to Moses can be seen from examination of the contents of philosophy, rather than by explicit citation, as with other borrowing.

The most plausible reading is not an accusation of plagiarism or theft levelled against Plato, but a recognition the Plato concealed the truth within the text to protect it, in the same way that Clement has within the Stromateis. The vocabulary used in some of these key passages is precisely that of careful allegorical composition: Πόθεν, ὦ Πλάτων, ἀλήθειαν αἰνίττῃ; Plato wants to conceal (ἀποκρύπτειν) his teachers. These passages are explained in Plato’s own words: εἰκότως τοῦν καὶ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς Ἐπιστολαῖς περὶ θεοῦ διαλαμβάνων «φραστέον δή

---

76 Protrep. 6.70.1; neither this reference or the following are specifically linked to a particular passage in Plato.
77 Str. 1.25.165.1-2.
78 Str. 5.11.73.3. This is a puzzling passage; neither the biblical or the Platonic reference is clear; the former is probably dependent on Philo, De somniis 1.61-4, interpreting Gen. 22:3-4. For the Platonic source, Wyrwa (1983) suggests Phaedrus 247c, 248b, Sph. 254b, Leges 517b, and Philb. 64b.
79 Str. 5.12.78.1-5, claiming Plato Timaeus 28c and Ep. 7.341c are dependent on Ex. 19:12 and Ex. 20:21 respectively.
80 Str. 5.14.102.3-103.1. The Trinity is found in Ep. 6.323d, Timaeus 41a and Ep. 2.312e.
81 Str. 5.5.29.3: ‘And in general, Pythagoras and those who followed him, and Plato (in particular of all the philosophers) were thoroughly acquainted with the law-giver, as it is possible to infer from their teachings.’
83 On this, see my remarks on Clement’s approach to allegory below, Chapters 7 and 8.
84 Protrep. 6.70.1: ‘From where, ο Πλάτων, ἀλήθειαν αἰνίττῃ; ἔστιν εξ αὐτῶν συμβαλέσθαι τῶν δογμάτων.’
When Plato hints or only implies contact with the Hebrew scriptures, it is not to prevent inquiry after the truth, but to preserve it only for the one properly prepared for its reception – exactly the claim Clement makes about his own work in the opening chapter of the *Stromateis*.

In this vein, Clement’s final words in the pivotal Book 1 Chapter 17, σοφοὺς δὲ αὑτοὺς λέγουσα ἡ γραφὴ οὐ τοὺς ὀντῶς σοφοὺς διαβάλει, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δοκησόφους, seem to bear a striking similarity to Socrates’ search for those who are truly wise in Plato’s *Apology*. Some philosophers are mere fences, handlers of stolen goods: but only the ones who seem, rather than those who are in truth, wise.

The dependency motif is a mechanism by which Clement can impose a unity on disparate branches of philosophy, based on his own Christian Platonism, and discount philosophical excrescences which do not fit (for example, Epicurean rejection of providence). Dependency, however, is not necessarily theft; Plato and Pythagoras in particular, but also at points Aristotle, can be differentiated from other, lesser exponents of Greek culture and philosophy, as acknowledging and therefore legitimately building upon the barbarian and Hebrew sources of their thought. Although this philosophy is not on a par with revelation, neither is it equivalent to theft; rather, it is a combination of true insights developed both

---

85 Str. 5.10.65.1. ‘It is therefore quite reasonable that Plato when treating divinity says, “Indeed, I must speak to you through riddles, so that if anything should happen to these tablets in the folds of sea or land, whoever reads them might not understand them.”’ The quotation is Ep. 2.312d; he goes on to quote Ep. 2.314b-c which is to much the same effect.

86 1.17.87.7. ‘Scripture, when it says that these are wise, does not reproach those who are really wise, but those who seem wise.’
with independent insight and from material taken from other sources, both barbarian and scriptural.

**The Hebrew Scriptures?**

The entirety of this key section in Book 1 Chapter 17 is built on a supposed objector quoting the words of Jesus from John 10:8: ναὶ φασι γεγράφθαι: «πάντες οἱ πρὸ τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ κυρίου κλέπται εἰσὶ καὶ λῃσταί.» What has gone unremarked in the critical literature is that these words are in fact far more readily applicable to the Hebrew predecessors of Christ than Greek philosophy. A reader with some knowledge of the Old Testament would recognise the intertexts which John’s Jesus is drawing on: Jeremiah 23 and Ezekiel 34, speaking out against the ‘shepherds’ in charge of the people of Israel. In John 10, Christ the true shepherd is distinguishing himself from the false leaders of Israel.

Clement, steeped in the LXX, makes a deliberate choice to read the theme of the dependency of Greek thought back into the gospel passage. It is possible that this verse was being used by contemporaries to attack dependency on Greek philosophy; but a simpler and more effective response, rather than admit the charge and attempt to exonerate the Greeks in spite of it, would surely have been to provide the appropriate reading of the verse as referring to Jewish leaders.

---

87 Str. 1.17.81.1: ‘Surely people say that it is written: ’All those before the advent of the Lord are thieves and robbers.’

88 See particularly Jer. 23:1, 30-32.

89 See Str. 1.17; 2.1.1.1; Str. 5.14.89.1 and 5.14.140.1, all of which quote the verse as if it is directed against Greeks.
Clement, I suggest, takes this verse as his starting point because it emphasizes the subordination of all sources of wisdom to the incarnation of the Logos: that all who came before (οὗτοι δὴ οἱ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ λόγου σαρκώσεως) were thieves and robbers is the face-value reading. There needs to be some special pleading even for biblical text: ἀλλα' οἱ μὲν προφήται, ἀπεσταλέντες καὶ ἐμπνευσθέντες υπὸ τοῦ κυρίου, οὐ κλέπται, ἀλλὰ διάκονοι. This exoneration looks rather weak; but it does serve to emphasize that even scripture itself is subordinate to the incarnation and dependent on it for meaning. Scripture is imbued with and given by Christ: ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν προφητῶν «πάντες» φησὶν «ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτοῦ ἐλάβομεν,» δηλονότι τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Further, the shadow of the intertext here reminds us that behind a façade of a unified ‘barbarian philosophy’ of the Hebrews were divisions and factions amongst the Jewish people: prophets divided against false shepherds they call thieves and robbers. The division Clement is creating is not between Hebrew and Greek wisdom, but between the true recipients of the Christian Logos and the thieves – both Jewish and Greek. Proper understanding and interpretation of the scriptures is not a possession of the Jews, whose own prophets accused their leaders of theft and robbery. When we keep in mind the argument outlined above, that the greatest exponents of Greek philosophy admitted their

---

90 Str. 1.17.81.1: ‘those before the incarnation of the Lord’.
91 Str. 1.17.81.1: ‘But the prophets, since they were sent and inspired by the Lord, are not thieves, but servants.’
92 1.17.87.5 For they [sc. the scriptures] say of the prophets, “We have all received of his fulness” [Jn. 1:16] – that is to say, of Christ’s fulness.’
93 My argument relies on Clement’s attitude towards the Jews as a literary and conceptual people – not too dissimilar to the Brahmans or Celts; the question of his relationship to a living Jewish community is more fraught. His attitude, though at times critical, is in general more positive towards Jews, and certainly more understated, than other early Christian authors, even those like Barnabas and Origen who are temporally and geographically close to Clement. See Carleton Paget (2004) for the most recent in-depth discussion.
dependence on Moses, and legitimately sought after the truth from that point, the contrast becomes clearer. Even before the advent of Christianity, the writings sent by God could be interpreted by non-Jews, because Hebrew scripture is, in fact, not Hebrew, but Christian. True philosophical insight is not Greek, but Christian, too. The thorn in the side of Christian claims to antiquity, that Christians are merely lapsed Jews, is drawn.

This is even clearer as the argument develops in the following chapter: «ἡμεῖς δὲ κηρύσσομεν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐσταυρωμένον, Ἰουδαίοις μὲν σκάνδαλον» διὰ τὸ εἰδότας τὴν προφητείαν μὴ πιστεύειν τῇ ἐκβάσει. The text only has been given to the Jews, not any particular faculty for understanding, which even before the advent of Christ could be supplied by gentiles with a «πνεῦμα αἰσθήσεως» (1.17.87.3). Just as the fragments of truth, when discovered in Greek philosophy, still need proper interpretation through the revelation of the Word, so scripture is susceptible to misunderstanding and improper interpretation if not read through that Christian revelation.

This division, not between Greek and Hebrew, but between legitimate and illegitimate interpretation of the Christian Logos, is most clearly demonstrated in some otherwise inexplicable epithets Clement uses when defending Hebrew antiquity:

τούτων ἀπάντων πρεσβύτατον μακρῷ τὸ Ἰουδαίον γένος, καὶ τὴν παρ’ αὐτοῖς φιλοσοφίαν ἐγγραπτὸν γενομένην προκατάρξαι τῆς παρ’ Ἕλλην φιλοσοφίας διὰ

94 A charge made by Celsus; Origen Contra Celsum II.4.
95 1.18.88.4. ‘We proclaim Jesus Christ crucified, a stumbling block to the Jews’ [1 Cor. 1:23], because although they knew the prophecy, they failed to believe in its fulfilment.’
The oldest of all of these by far is the Jewish race, and that their written philosophy predates the philosophy of the Greeks Philo the Pythagorean has demonstrated at great length, and indeed Aristobulus the Peripatetic, too, and more besides, so I will not waste time going over them by name.

Philo ὁ Πυθαγόρειος, and Aristobulus, ὁ Περιπατητικὸς, are the key defenders of Jewish antiquity. Clement depends on Aristobulus not just for the claim of antiquity; he is quoted authoritatively for the claim that Plato and Pythagoras read Moses, and that Peripatetic thought was based on the Old Testament. Clement’s respect for and extensive use of Philo as a biblical exegete has been well established. By labelling both with Greek philosophical epithets, Clement disassociates them from an exclusively Jewish heritage; their authority derives from their hybridity: a philosophically trained ability to interpret the prophetic texts properly. These developments of Greek/barbarian hybridity (after all, Pythagoras and Aristotle are themselves dependent on barbarian thought) are able to feed back usefully into the Hebrew tradition itself.

96 Str. 1.15.72.4.
97 Clement again refers to him under this epithet at Str. 2.19.100.3; Philo is mentioned by name only four times.
98 Aristobulus is mentioned four times in total by Clement, twice as a Peripatetic, although his credentials as a Jew are clearly implicit: Runia (1995) 8-10.
99 Str. 1.22.150.1-3; 5.14.97.7;
100 Most extensively by van den Hoek (1988).
101 Carleton Paget (2004) 89 floats the idea that knowledge of Philo’s Jewishness had disappeared; however, Clement’s actual uses of Philo ‘indicate that he thought of him as a Jew’ (90 n.15, following Runia (1995) 13-14), towards which there was a reasonably positive attitude. See also Runia (1993) 344-6.
102 Runia (1995) argues that both are so named because of their perceived affinity with these Greek schools of thought, and that Clement, assuming an audience’s familiarity with their ethnicity, uses the epithetic to emphasize in a positive way their extensive learning.
When Clement refers to Philo a second time as a Pythagorean in Str. 2, the context implies a recognition that Philo’s explication of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ is built on Platonic as well as Mosaic foundations. Despite the antiquity of Hebrew wisdom, it is a heritage that can be best interpreted through insight and critical intellectual tools developed from foreign intellectual traditions. Again we are taken back to the image of the dismembered Logos; the recombination and remembering of the scattered limbs of truth are what constitutes wisdom, both for the Greek and the barbarian.

THE BARBARIAN CHARACTER

Whilst Moses might be the most ancient source of wisdom, Clement’s focus in his major presentation of comparative chronology, chapters 14-21 of Book 1, is not merely on a Greek/Hebrew comparison. Once we dispense with this dichotomy, it is clear that the force of the argument is in valorising barbarian inventiveness in general, and demonstrating Greek cultural appropriation of these barbarian inventions and discoveries: φιλοσοφία τοῖνυν πολυωφελές τι χρῆμα πάλαι μὲν ἥκμασε παρὰ βαρβάροις κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη διαλάμψασα, ὃστερον δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἑλληνας κατήλθεν. This does not, however, need to be read as a disparagement of Greek philosophy. ‘Plagiarism’, with its negative connotations, is probably the wrong word; even ‘dependency’ suggests an inferiority of the dependent author or

---

104 As Clement seems to suggest at 1.14.60.1: ως μὲν οὖν κάτω που τῆς Μωσείως ἡλικίας οἱ παρ’ Ἑλληνοί σοφοί γεγόνασι, μικρὸν ὃστερον δειχθήσεται. (So then, it will be shown a little later that the wise men amongst the Greeks were somewhat later than the age of Moses.)
105 Str. 1.15.71.3. ‘Thus philosophy, a most useful possession, came to flower of old among the barbarians, shining over the nations [or: the gentiles], and afterwards it came down to the Greeks.’
culture. A better term, going back to the roots of the term, would be ‘eclecticism’, a discerning picking through and selective sorting of the wheat from the chaff.

It is precisely in the adoption, and development, of a barbarian philosophical patrimony that Greek philosophy can achieve its own excellence:

φιλοσοφίαν δὲ οὐ τὴν Στωϊκὴν λέγω οὐδὲ τὴν Πλατωνικὴν ἢ τὴν Ἐπικούρειόν τε καὶ Ἀριστοτελικὴν, ἀλλ’ ὃσα εἴρηται παρ’ ἑκάστη τῶν αἱρέσεων τούτων καλῶς, δικαιοσύνην μετὰ εὐσεβοῦς ἐπιστήμης ἑκδιδάσκοντα, τοῦτο σύμπαν τὸ ἐκλεκτικὸν φιλοσοφίαν φημί.107

I am not talking about philosophy as Stoic, or Platonic, or Epicurean, or Aristotelian, but whatever is well expressed by each of these sects, teaching righteousness along with an understanding following from piety; this eclectic whole I refer to as philosophy.

As we saw earlier, not only does Greek philosophy ‘pick out’ (as in ἐκλέγω) from barbarian sources, in Plato it is happy to admit it. Such derivation is not per se such a dreadful thing. What various barbarians have done with their scattered pieces of the truth is here portrayed in positive terms; they have made philosophy flower; it has become something which shines. In turn, the reuse, readaption, and rethinking of this wisdom is precisely what gives vitality and strength to Plato’s thought.

107 Str. 1.7.37.6.
The barbarians amongst whom philosophy is said to have flowered are characterised by curious methods of divination, by oddities of lifestyle, and by their involvement in other arts. The wisdom with which Clement is concerned is not merely philosophical: legislation, as well as cultural, agricultural, military and intellectual fields are all discussed over the course of these chapters. To a greater or lesser degree, these Greek/barbarian comparisons are visible in many other sections of the *Stromateis*. In short: οὐ μόνης δὲ φιλοσοφίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσης σχεδὸν τέχνης εὑρεταὶ βάρβαροι. Clement, after this opening to 1.16, proceeds to list the various technical and artistic achievements of, amongst others, the Carians (astrology), Libyans (building boats), Thracians (military technology), and so on. The

---

108 1.15.70.4 on the Sibyl; 1.15.71.4, the Persian Magi guided by a star; 1.72.3, the German soothsayers who prophesy by interpreting streams and eddies.

109 1.15.71.5, the Sarmanae who do not live in cities or houses and wear the bark of trees; 1.15.72.2, the vegetarian Hyperboreans.

110 1.15.73.1, the Idaean Dactyli developing music; 1.15.73.2, the knowledge of heavenly bodies coming to Heracles from the Phrygians.

111 A brief selection of comparanda; where specific literary sources are mentioned, I give the reference from BNJ: 1.15.68-73, a description of various kinds of divination practiced by different nations; specific literary sources are mentioned (BNJ 263F1, 273F94, 665F159, 721F20); 1.21.131-134: mainly a historical section about the oldest poets and writers, then the oldest seers; mostly Greek, but also touching on other nations (cf. BNJ 251F3, 765F30, 4F85b, 392F25b, 328F76); 1.21.142-3: a brief survey of how many languages there are in the world, with reference to Ephorus as an authoritative source (BNJ 70F237); 2.18.92-94: a comparison of the legal and ethical practices enjoined by the scriptures, and those adopted in other cultures – Pythagoreans, Romans, and Greeks; 3.7.60: a discussion about Indian sages’ attitude towards sexual continence and other kinds of abstinence, with Alexander Milesius Polyhistor referenced (273F18) – in this case, very critical towards the Indian practices, rather than merely descriptive, but in the context of attacking the encratite practices of other ‘Christian’ groups; 5.5.27-31 and 5.7.41-5.8.55: a description of the usage of symbolism by the Pythagoreans (ch. 5) and the Egyptians (ch. 7), and then (ch. 8) other barbarians, and finally Greeks; Clement names some literary sources (Aristocritus Milesius at 5.5.31.3 = BNJ 493F6; Pherecydes Lerus at 5.8.44.1-5 = BNJ 475F1; Neanthes Cyzicenus at 5.8.46.4-47.1 = BNJ 84F36); although these are mostly in reference to the Greeks; 6.3.33: a discussion of writers on Britain and Persia regarding natural wonders (specifically natural spaces which produce impressive sounds); 6.4.35-38: a description of sacred Egyptian rites (cf. BNJ 665F37).

112 Str. 1.16.74.1.

113 1.16.74.3: Τυρρηνοὶ δὲ σάλπιγγα ἐπενόησαν καὶ Φρύγες αὐλὸν –

114 1.16.75.3: Ἀτλας δὲ ὁ Λίβως πρῶτος ναῶν ἐναυπηγήσατο καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἐπέλυσεν.
scope of Clement’s ethnographic coverage in these few pages is immense; some twenty-seven different peoples are named in sections 74 to 76.\textsuperscript{116} The catalogue here fits into the genre of technical literature termed \textit{heurēma} literature, \textit{ἐυρήματα}, monographs which collected inventions in various fields, developed from stories establishing or maintaining the prestige of cultural heroes.\textsuperscript{117} No full works of this kind in the Greek tradition have been preserved, but as a \textit{locus communis} accounts of the \textit{πρῶτος εὑρετής} are scattered throughout Greek literature.\textsuperscript{118}

Whereas most uses of the theme are for the purpose of valorising or validating particular cultural heroes,\textsuperscript{119} the claims Clement makes are less about the historical roots of particular cultural traditions, and more about the nature of foreign \textit{τέχνη} in general. The historical examples are merely evidence for a claim about the nature or character to be found amongst barbarians, one just as inventive and beneficial as that possessed by the Greeks:\textsuperscript{120} παρεθέμην δὲ αὐτῶν ὀλίγα εἰς σύστασιν τῆς παρὰ βαρβάροις εὑρετικῆς καὶ βιωφελοῦς φύσεως, παρ’ ὥν Ἕλληνες τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ὑφέληνται.\textsuperscript{121}
No claims of barbarian dependency on Moses or the Hebrew scriptures are made, even though their temporal precedence is established. This might seem like splitting hairs; surely precedence implies origin? Whereas, however, Clement often explicitly claims Greek dependence on barbarian sources, both Hebrew and non-Hebrew, the same claim is never made for barbarians appropriating Hebrew thought or culture. Indeed, if one traces these barbarian sources of wisdom, back beyond the Egyptians and Magi, one does not arrive at Moses, but rather the first generation of humans: οὐ παύσομαι τὸν τούτων διδάσκαλον ἀπαιτῶν, ἀνάγω δὲ σε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν ἀνθρώπων. 122

**THE ORIGINS OF PHILOSOPHY**

The effect of this account is a self-negation of Greek claims to a unified or unifying intellectual tradition, self-sustaining and hermetically sealed from foreign influence. This is not an account imposed upon Greek culture from the outside, as it might be with earlier Jewish exemplars of this theme. φασὶ δὲ Ἑλληνες, opens the fourteenth chapter: ‘The Greeks claim...’. The picture of agglomerative and appropriative Greek wisdom is one with some purchase, although hotly debated. It is difficult to avoid seeing clear parallels between Clement’s ‘the Greeks claim’ and Diogenes Laërtius’ *Vitae Philosophorum*. The figures used to open Str. 1.14 – Ὀρφέα καὶ Λίνον καὶ τοὺς παλαιοτάτους παρὰ σφίσι ποιητὰς – are strikingly similar to the opening of the *Vitae*:

τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἐνσι φασιν ἀπὸ βαρβάρων ἀρξαι... λανθάνουσι δ' αὐτοὺς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων κατορθώματα, ἀφ' ὧν μὴ ὁτι γε φιλοσοφία, ἀλλὰ καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων

122 Str. 6.7.57.3: ‘I shall not stop enquiring after their teacher, and I lead you back to the first generation of humans.’
There are some who say that philosophy began with barbarians... But they do not realise that they are attributing to barbarians the successes of the Greeks, with whom not only philosophy began, but even the race of men. Indeed, Musaeus was born amongst the Athenians, and Linus amongst the Thebans.

The development of the distinctive terminology of philosophy as a discipline is drawn by Diogenes again in terms reminiscent of those used by Clement. Compare Clement: ὅψε δὲ Πυθαγόρας ὁ Φερεκύδου γνώριμος φιλόσοφον ἑαυτὸν πρῶτος ἀνηγόρευσεν, and Diogenes, φιλοσοφίαν δὲ πρῶτος ὑνόμασε Πυθαγόρας καὶ ἑαυτὸν φιλόσοφον.

Exactly what relationship there was between the two is a matter of contention. Although Ursula Treu’s addenda to Stählin’s index of citations gives seven references to Diogenes Laërtius (the current passage is not included amongst them), it would be overly confident on the available evidence to assert a direct relationship between the two authors. Even so, that they were both concerned with exactly the same contentious themes is itself significant. It speaks at least of contemporary debate about and utilisation of precisely these sorts of arguments. Diogenes is undoubtedly the outlier in his claims of a pristine Greek genealogy for all philosophy, but the issue was a live one.

---

123 Diogenes Laërtius, VP 1.1, 3.
124 Str. 1.14.61.4: ‘And later Pythagoras the disciple of Pherecydes was the first to designate himself a philosopher.’
125 VP 1.12: ‘But the first to use the term ‘philosophy’ and to name himself a philosopher was Pythagoras.’ On the nomenclature of ‘philosophy’ see Burkert (1960).
126 Eshleman (2012) 199; Canfora (1994) makes just such a claim, however, positing a reliance of Diogenes on Clement.
Diogenes is working with the the same set of traditional data that Clement is relying on, and the arguments in VP 1.12-20 flow parallel to those of Str. 1.14-15 on the origins of philosophy as a discipline. From an early undifferentiated period where semi-mythical poets and their counterparts, Hesiod and Homer, cannot be distinguished from a separable class of philosophers, a tradition of the study of sophia is gradually discerned, starting with Pythagoras who first coined the terminology of ‘philosophy’ proper. The philosophical tradition from that point on can be analysed in terms of genealogies of schools; in Clement, three schools are posited – the Italic, Ionic and Eleatic; Diogenes provides us with two, the Italic and Ionic. Both authors go on to provide a history organized genealogically along the lineages of the heads of the various schools.

This is where the two diverge. Diogenes, following on from this philosophical family tree, examines the origins of the titles of groups of philosophers, and then analyses the different technical branches of the study of philosophy; and, having divided up the discipline into its three main parts, breaks these down further into individual haireseis and gives the intellectual genealogies of their various leaders. This account gives us an orderly hierarchy

---

128 Schwartz in RE s.v. Diogenes Laertios; Diogenes is himself not really a dedicated philosopher ‘Diogene Laerzio non appartenne a nessuna scuola filosofica, ma fu uomo di molti libri. Non può considerarsi un filosofo sistematico, ma un uomo aristotelicamente curioso dell vita e della dottrina dei filosi eminenti.’ Gigante (1972), quoted in Mejer (1992) 3559.

129 φιλοσοφίας τοίνυν μετά τούς προειρημένους άνδρας τρεῖς γεγόναι διαδοχαὶ επώνυμοι τῶν τόπων περί οὖς διέτριψαν, Ἰταλικὴ μὲν ἡ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου, Ἰωνικὴ δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ Θαλοῦ, Ἐλεατικὴ δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους. (1.14.62.1.)

130 φιλοσοφίας δὲ δύο γεγόναισιν ἄρχαι, ἢ τε ἀπὸ Ἀναξιμάνδρου καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου τοῦ μὲν Θαλοῦ διακηκοότος, Πυθαγόρου δὲ Φερεκύδης καθηγήσατο καὶ ἐκαλεῖτο ἡ ἄρθαλης ἰων ὡν, Μιλήσιος γὰρ, καθηγήσατο Ἀναξιμάνδρου ἡ δὲ Ἰταλικὴ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου, ὅτι τὰ πλεῖστα κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐφιλοσόφησεν. (VP 1.13-14.)
of the development of philosophy, and leads us to a conclusion wherein philosophy stands
alone as a separate and wholly Greek discipline, and every philosopher can be catagorized
and catalogued according to his complex genealogy of *haireseis*. The distinction between
σοφοί and φιλόσοφοι is established in this prologue, and maintained throughout the *Vitae*
as a general theme, as is the structured order of the systematic succession of philosophers.

Clement, although providing a seemingly parallel chronology, actually presents us with an
account of interference, of cross-cultural static. The Diogenic idea of orderly succession and
division into discrete schools of thought is ostensibly what Clement is presenting in Chapter
14: καὶ ἡ μὲν διαδοχὴ τῶν παρ' Ἑλλησι φιλοσόφων ὡς ἐν ἐπιτομῇ ἣδε, οἱ χρόνοι δὲ τῶν
προκαταρξάντων τῆς φιλοσοφίας αὐτῶν ἐπομένως λεκτέοι. What he actually does with
the framework of succession is quite different, however. The introduction of the forerunners
of philosophy proper, the semi-mythical poets and the Seven Sages, is paralleled in
Diogenes; but instead of moving us on from there, as Diogenes does, to clearer delineations
of what becomes philosophy, Clement maintains a confusion of different kinds of wisdom.
The rigidity of Diogenes’ line between philosophers proper and sages, contrasted with the

---

131 Summed up at VP 1:20: αἳδε μὲν ἄρχαι καὶ διαδοχαὶ καὶ τοσαῦτα μέρη καὶ τόσαι φιλοσοφίας
132 On the strong division in Diogenes between σοφοί and φιλόσοφοι, see Warren (2007) 142-3.
133 Sollenberger (1992) 3795.
134 ‘This is the succession of the philosophers amongst the Greeks, in an epitome, as it were, and the
periods of the originators of their philosophies are to be said next.’ 1.14.64.5.
135 The idea of the Seven Sages was evidently already a fixture in Plato’s time: see *Timaeus* 20d-e; cf.
Denyer (2008) ad loc. and Martin (1993) 109. The actual make-up of the list was likely as fluid then as it
was still in Clement’s period. The topos was common: Callimachus plays with the Seven Sages in
*Iambus* 1; Plutarch uses the supposed meeting of the Seven as the basis of his *Septem Sapientum
Convivium*; the parallel in Diogenes Laërtius is at VP 1.40-42. On the common phenomenon of lists of
sayings of the Seven Sages, see Morgan (2013).
136 Eshleman (2012) 195-6, reading *Vitae* 1.6-11.
The fluidity and hybridity of Clement’s approach,\(^ {137}\) marks out Clement’s valorisation of eclecticism. The ‘seven who are called the wise’ are more than just *sophoi*; they are law-givers, poets and prophets as well. In the midst of the discussion of the Seven Sages, Clement refers us to Titus 1:12-13:

...οὗ μέμνηται ὁ ἀπόστολος Παῦλος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Τίτον ἐπιστολῇ, λέγων οὕτως: «ἐξέπεν τις ἐξ αὐτῶν ἴδιος προφήτης οὕτως: Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεύδοται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἄργαί· καὶ ἡ μαρτυρία αὐτή ἐστιν ἁληθῆς.» ὁρᾷς ὅπως κἂν τοῖς Ἑλληνῶν προφήταις δίδωσι τις ἁληθείας καὶ οὐκ ἐπαισχύνεται πρὸς τε οἰκοδομὴν καὶ πρὸς ἐντροπὴν διαλεγόμενος τινος Ἑλληνικοῖς συγχρῆσθαι ποιήμασι.\(^ {138}\)

...whom [sc. Epimenides] the Apostle Paul mentions in the epistle to Titus, saying the following: ‘It was one of them, their own prophets, who said, ‘Cretans are always liars, vicious beasts, lazy bellies.’ And this testimony is true.’ Do you not see how he even gives to the prophets of the Greeks some share of the truth, and is not ashamed in the course of his discussion, both for edification and for humiliation, to make use of Greek poems?

The use of the word *προφήτης* in the biblical source allows Clement to refer to the Seven Sages as prophets; Clement lifts Paul’s *τις ἐξ αὐτῶν ἴδιος προφήτης* to continue then in his own words to talk about ‘the prophets of the Greeks’. He elides the office of prophet with that of poet: making use of the wisdom of the Seven Sages is explicity *τινων Ἑλληνικοῖς συγχρῆσθαι ποιήμασι*. As we saw above, the use of the language of prophecy and prophets is intimately connected with the legitimacy of the wisdom they profess, and so there is suggestion of inspiration here.

\(^{137}\) Eshleman (2012) 201.

\(^{138}\) Str. 1.14.59.2-3.
The presentation is comic, however: Clement disingenuously purports to back up the authority of the Seven Sages with the fact that they are even authoritative for New Testament authors. The moment of bathos is the quotation: a Cretan acknowledging that all Cretans are liars. His conclusion: that these forefathers of Greek philosophy are useful πρὸς τῇ ὁικοδομήν καὶ πρὸς ἐντροπὴν, and in particular, for mocking the Greeks themselves.

There’s more than simple amusement at a ‘Cretan liar’ paradox here, however. The common Patristic interpretation of Titus 1:12 is that Epimenides is criticising his fellow Cretans because of their possession of a tomb of Zeus, in contradiction to the god’s supposed immortality:¹³⁹ Clement’s mockery is not broad-shot, but carefully targeted. Not only does

¹³⁹ E.g. John Chrysostom, *Homilies on Titus* 3; Theodore of Mopsuestia, *Commentary on Titus*. See Gorday (2000) *ad loc.* That this is actually the ‘liar paradox’ seems to be a modern invention. Cf. Callimachus, *Hymn to Zeus* 8; Lucian, *Love of Lies* 3, where the context also does not suggest the liar paradox. Although the liar paradox is known in antiquity, it does not seem to have been attached to Epimenides, and the interpretation of this quotation seems to have unproblematically been that Epimenides was simply accusing his fellow countrymen of being liars, specifically regarding the theological contradiction in having a tomb for an immortal. However, interpretations have been proffered for the line which presuppose an interpretation of it as the liar paradox: in Titus, by Thistleton (1994), and as it appears in Callimachus, *Hymn to Zeus* – e.g. Cuypers (2004) 103-104, Stephens (2003) 85-90, following almost exactly Bing (1988) 76-77 n.42. These interpreters of Callimachus base their arguments on the confident assertion that the line comes from the proem of the *Oracula* of Epimenides, following West (1993) 47-53, himself following Maass (1892) 344-6. That the line can actually securely be attributed to Epimenides is not questioned, but in my opinion rests on shaky foundations. Its first appearance after Callimachus is Titus, where there is no attribution given apart from ‘one of their own prophets’, which, given the context, could mean ‘of the Cretans’ (rejected by Jerome as ‘absurdum’ (*Commentary on Titus, ad loc.*), ‘of the Greeks’, as Clement seems to imply, ‘of the circumcision party’ (which doesn’t seem to make very much sense given the form and content of the line), or (following Jerome), the party of ‘rebellious people’ in the Church in Crete, therefore assumed to be Cretans. Clement is the first to connect it to Epimenides – and as we see here, he has good reason to connect a reference to a (possibly) Cretan ‘prophet’ to one of the Seven; he is followed by Jerome, who is the first to connect it to the *Oracula* of Epimenides – although in fact, Jerome only says ‘Dicitur autem iste versiculus in Epimenidis Cretensis poetae oraculis reperiri,’ (*Commentary on Titus, ad loc.*) making it clear that he himself has not read these Oracles. It may well be that Jerome is basing his attribution on Clement, and simply attributes it to the *Oracula* of Epimenides (known from Plato and Aristotle) by guesswork. It is entirely feasible to conjecture that Paul is quoting an unknown post-Hellenistic pseudo-prophetic source (claiming to be by Orpheus? Linus? A
Clement point out that Greek philosophy at its outset expresses the shortcomings of Greek culture, but that it pinpoints its chief failure: lack of proper comprehension of divinity.

This passage is also drawing on the most well-known of the ancient sources discussing the Seven Sages, Plato’s *Protagoras* 342a-343b. Clement makes explicit reference to his Platonic intertext directly after the passage we have quoted above, in passing, at 1.14.59.5, and then more extensively at 1.14.60.1-2:

> ὁ δὲ τρόπος τῆς παρ’ αὐτοῖς φιλοσοφίας, ὡς Ἑβραϊκὸς καὶ αἰνιγματώδης, ἡδη ἐπισκεπτέος, βραχυλογίαν γοῦν ἠσπάζοντο τὴν παραινετικὴν, τὴν ὑφελιμωτάτην. αὐτίκα Πλάτων πάλαι [τὸ] διὰ σπουδῆς γεγονέναι τόνδε τὸν τρόπον λέγει, κοινῶς μὲν πάσιν Ἐλλησιν, Ἐξαιρέτως δὲ Λακεδαίμονιοι καὶ Κρησὶ τοῖς εὐνομωτάτοις.

And the style of philosophy amongst them, as Hebraical and enigmatic, is now to be examined. For indeed, they kept to speaking pithily for exhortation, as the most useful. At any rate, Plato says that of old this style was in esteem and shared by all the Greeks, and especially the Spartans and the Cretans, as they possessed the best laws.

In the *Protagoras*, Socrates and his interlocuters are arguing over the interpretation of poetry; Socrates opens his speech with a claim about the antiquity of Greek wisdom:

> φιλοσοφία γὰρ ἔστιν παλαιότατη τε καὶ πλείστη τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, καὶ σοφισταὶ πλεῖστοι γῆς ἐκεὶ εἰσίν.¹⁴⁰ Plato’s list of the Seven Sages is pro-circumcision Hellenized Jew? Any of these are possible...), which has constructed the hexameter from the Callimachus half-line and a reference to Hesiod; Clement, seeing an opportunity in the Cretan context, then attributes the hexameter to Epimenides.

¹⁴⁰ 342a.
developed from this praise of Laconic philosophy.\textsuperscript{141} The βραχυλογία which Clement defines as the Hebraical style of philosophy is the same quality of discourse which Plato has Socrates praise amongst the Seven Sages (ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιομνημόνευτα, Prot. 343a). The Laconic is equated to the Hebraic in Clement’s account.\textsuperscript{142}

Unlike Diogenes, Clement is not interested in demarcating sharp categories of wisdom, or showing the narrowing of the field of philosophy from broader traditions of wisdom,\textsuperscript{143} but rather he points up the similarities between supposedly different kinds of wisdom and across cultures.\textsuperscript{144} In doing this, Clement is improvising on a popular theme of a ‘high wisdom tradition’, incorporating poetry, politics, and religious knowledge; a tradition which existed alongside the delineated restriction of wisdom to philosophy which we see in Diogenes.\textsuperscript{145} As canonical figures for a Greek tradition of philosophy, defended so vehemently by Diogenes, how the Seven Sages fit into a narrative and history of wisdom is

---

\textsuperscript{141} Probably mock praise; praising societies known for their indifference to speculative philosophy for being the cradle of that very pursuit. Denyer (2008) ad loc. suggests that ‘a speech about the enormous φιλοσοφία of these societies therefore requires the perverse ingenuity of the sophistic speeches that praised the splendidours of salt, bees, pebbles, ladies or death... So perverse a speech is a fitting prelude to the perverse interpretation of Simonides that Socrates will give’. Clement’s own irony, undercutting the seriousness of the Seven Sages with his quotation from Titus, could be read as a response of one-upmanship to Plato’s own irony in this passage.

\textsuperscript{142} Clement is possibly drawing on the tradition of kinship between the Spartans and the Hebrews; 1 Maccabees 12:1-23.

\textsuperscript{143} The language of differentiation between sophos and philosophos appears at of Str. 1.15.66.1: οἶδε μὲν οἱ χρόνοι τῶν παρ Ἑλληνις πρεσβύτατων σοφῶν τε καὶ φιλοσόφων. Rather than distinguishing the two categories, however, the chapter intermingles poets, prophets and philosophers: Pythagoras, Antisthenes, Orpheus, and even Homer.

\textsuperscript{144} Morgan (2013) notes the parallels between chreiai and gnōmai of the Seven Sages with popular morality, and indeed their longevity across cultures; Clement may be bolstering his appeal to an eclecticism inherent in Greek culture by emphasizing the foreignness of what are basically appeals to common sense.

\textsuperscript{145} Kurke (2011) 95-124; I have employed her terminology.
evidently important for a sense of belonging: does philosophy ‘belong’ to the Greeks; does wisdom belong to ‘philosophy’ as a defined sub-set of personal or academic disciplines?

Clement uses the the Seven Sages as an instrument to critique schematizing systems which can divide wisdom up into a clear and ordered pattern. He attributes to them various pithy statements, *chreiai* or *gnomai*, in which the Seven are functionally interchangeable.\(^{146}\) Not only are the saws interchangeable between these sages, Clement makes ‘Hebraical’ and ‘Laconic’ interchangeable, as we have seen. Teresa Morgan suggests that the authority of these *chreiai* was xenological, that the position of the Sage was authoritative as a deliberate insider/outsider.\(^ {147}\) Clement’s hint towards their interchangeable ethnicity is merely an extension on what was already part of their defining characteristic.\(^ {148}\)

Clement’s account collapses what Diogenes and authors like him might like to say; but at the same time it places Plato in a position of authority over defining who is *sophos* and how *sophia* may be uttered. Again, we see the dependency theme used to navigate between philosophical schools, and to valorise Clement’s particular line of philosophical descent, both for his Christian audience, and against other philosophical schools.

**CONCLUSION**

The dependency theme, as appropriated in the *Stromateis*, establishes that Greek *paideia* is a dependent, conglomerate entity; but it is not a wholesale rejection or celebration of the Greek philosophical tradition. It takes as a starting point the fact of truth scattered...
throughout all peoples, and recognises as an \emph{a posteriori} fact that this truth can be valuable as propaedeusis to the Christian faith. But this is not the sole and only value of the Greek tradition; even for the advancing Christian, there is truth to be gleaned, not because the scriptures are insufficient, but because, although the fulness of Christ is present in the them, they still need interpretation. The Jews are no more capable of interpreting the prophecy vouchsafed to them than any other people; in fact, the confessed interpreters of the Hebrew scriptures, Plato and Pythagoras, have advanced Christian gnosis considerably. This willingness to appropriate, adapt and develop others’ wisdom is precisely what gives vitality and strength to their thought.

Clement’s underlying argument is that Greek culture at its best has been an amalgam of the best that is found in more ancient traditions, weighed by reason and appropriated. Not only does this justify, for a Christian committed to the scriptures, delving into Greek philosophy; it also defends, to the non-Christian educated Greek, the process of assimilation and cultural flexibility needed to accept Christianity. His own eclecticism is placed in the light of sound Greek practice, and his adoption of a new cultural matrix in Christ is not a rejection of his culture, but the natural outworking of it when one has hit upon a source of truth.
PART III

THE CHRISTIAN HOMER
Homer in the Second Sophistic, as now, was the most prominent of Greek authors; he was also in many ways the most problematic, especially to Christians.\(^1\) Greek literate education throughout antiquity was first and foremost Homeric education;\(^2\) and the texts of Homer by Clement’s time had therefore become an icon of Greek identity.\(^3\) Despite this centrality (and often because of it) suspicion of Homer also has a long tradition, most notably expressed in Plato.\(^4\) Christians built upon this Greek foundation of distrust in their own complex reactions to the poet. In Stroumsa’s view of the development of a Christian paideia in late antiquity, one of the most striking aspects of the ‘complex reshuffling of the status of texts and of the relationships between them’ is the effective decanonisation of Homer.\(^5\) However, we see in Clement’s approach precisely the opposite; not the decanonisation of Homer, but his re-

---

\(^1\) On Homer and Christianity in general, see Rahner (1963); MacDonald (1994), especially on biblical interaction with Homer; Taylor (2007), on thematic parallels between Classical literature and the Bible, rather than deliberate intertextuality; Sandnes (2009) and (2011), examining how Christians perceived and interacted with the Greek educational system, and Niehoff (2011) and (2012a), who concentrates on the relationship between Jewish and Homeric interpretational strategies.

\(^2\) On ancient education, see Marrou (1956), and Jaeger (1939-45) and (1961), the latter of which focuses on the development of Christian education; Morgan (1998), and Cribiore (1996), (2001a); both bring important insight from papyrological evidence to bear on our understanding of how education worked in practice.

\(^3\) Although in earlier periods Homer was credited with a large array of works, by Clement’s time, it was generally accepted that only the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were Homeric, with the *Margites* and the *Battle of the Frogs and the Mice* also sometimes accepted, though with reservations, as Homer’s. See West (2003).

\(^4\) Plato, *Resp*. 10.607b is often quoted in this context, ‘that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry’ (ὅτι παλαιὰ μὲν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίας καὶ ποιητικῆ). There is a vast array of literature on this passage and Plato’s attitude to poetry in general; for a good brief introduction, see Asmis (1992) on the passage in *Resp*. 10 in particular, see both Moss (2007) and a very interesting nuanced account in O’Connor (2007).

\(^5\) Stroumsa (1999) 42.
canonisation as a Christian text, and we can see incipient in Clement the same kind of drive which produces Christian Homeric centos several centuries later.\(^6\)

Rather than repudiating Homer outright, as some Christian authors sought to do, Clement reinscribes Homer as a Christian text, not as an apologetic strategy but as an outworking of his theory of divine inspiration being visible in pagan literature. The background of the contested educational centrality of Homer, in conversation with both Platonic and Christian critiques, gives Clement familiar ground on which he can engage his audience’s experience of textual interpretation. Clement’s use of Homer in the *Stromateis*, whilst echoing the general contours of Second Sophistic usage, is distinctly adapted for his own purposes of crafting a Christian identity.

Homer’s central role in the maintenance of Greek identity is deliberately foregrounded, but at the same time Homer’s own Greekness is implicitly and explicitly challenged. Homer, in Clement’s reading, is no longer the fount and source of Greekness, but a bridge between barbarian and Greek, one node in the network of interconnected Jewish/Egyptian/Greek intellectual history that Clement sees as his heritage. Secondly, the Platonic tradition of suspicion and even rejection of Homer is used by Clement as an apologetic strategy in his protreptic works, especially the *Proptrepticus*, not as a rejection of Greek culture, but as a demonstrable engagement with Greek educational debates as a *pepaideumenos*. By contrast, in the *Stromateis*, Clement deliberately engages with positive allegorical interpretations of the text, and appropriates them to show that Homer himself diagnoses the inadequacies of traditional Greek religious representation.

\(^6\) E.g. those of Eudocia; see Usher (1997) and (1998).
The centrality of Homer to the educational system of the ancient world and hence his role as a cultural icon cannot be understated. In the felicitous phrasing of Hegel, ‘Homer is the element in which the Greek world lived, like a human in air’; from a perspective more contemporary to Clement, Quintilian writes (using a Homeric phrase) that Homer is ‘the source of every stream and river, for he has given us a model and an inspiration for every department of eloquence’. Homer stood so centrally in Greek culture primarily because he was integral to all levels of the Greek educational system, a role which he occupied in a fairly stable fashion, though not without critique, from the classical period onwards. Plato (precisely when arguing that he should be removed from the educational curriculum) acknowledges that Homer is touted as the ‘teacher of Greece’.

The Iliad and the Odyssey were consistently present throughout all the stages of Greco-Roman education. Students began learning the alphabet and developing basic literacy in their elementary education using Homeric lists and stories. Their skills in composition were developed in proagymnasmata built up – not exclusively, but prominently – from Homeric material: exercises of writing out and applying Homeric chreiai and gnomai, and epitomising,
commenting upon and reworking epic episodes. The style of teaching focused on ‘copying, imitation, memorisation, reproduction and repetition. The teaching encouraged not grasping but absorption and imitation.' This absorption and imitation was continued throughout the entirety of the educational process, and indeed throughout life. Dio Chrysostom writes of Homer that he is not only the beginning of reading, but also the middle and end text. Homer grows with his students and is never left behind, from youth, to adulthood, to old age. Plato had categorized epic as the genre for old men, but by the time of the Second Sophistic, Homer’s demographic reach had covered all ages. It is the text of a whole life. One of the meanings of *enkyklios paideia*, as well as being an ‘all-encompassing’ education, was as an education which returned again and again to the same texts for deeper meanings – and the prime text was Homer.

The approach to Homer was not, however, a linear reading of the entirely of the two epics; reading was selective, and mixed in with a variety of other literature. Teresa Morgan proposes a model of a core set of educational texts, surrounded by a periphery of optional and changeable texts. Dio Chrysostom’s *Oratio* 18 gives us an example, from the literary evidence, of what the core looked like: Euripides, Menander, Thucydides, Aeschines and Xenophon; but the most important amongst them is Homer. Similar lists are given by

---

12 See Vegge (2006) 121-38 on different kinds of *progymnasmata* and their content.
14 *Or*. 18.8: Ὅμηρος δὲ καὶ πρῶτος καὶ μέσος καὶ ὅστατος, παντὶ παιδί καὶ ἄνδρι καὶ γέροντι τοσοῦτον ἄφ’ αὐτοῦ διδόντως ὅσον ἕκαστος δύναται λαβεῖν.
15 *Leg*. 2 658c-d.
16 Cribiore (2001b) 241; on the concept and definition of *enkyklios paideia* see also Vegge (2006) 235-7.
17 He gives us Euripides (in preference to the other tragedians), Menander in preference to Old Comedy, Thucydides foremost for history, along with Theopompus and Herodotus, Hypereides and Aeschines for oratory, followed by Demosthenes and Lysias, and finally, Xenophon as the best of the
Quintilian and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. These lists are rather too full to be realistic, but they give us an ideal of what education was aiming for, and undoubtedly what those with the greatest educational attainment achieved. In general, however, education was much less uniform and much less thorough than this literary picture would suggest. The evidence gleaned from non-literary sources, primarily papyri and ostraka, show that reading of Homer was patchy: the beginnings of the Iliad and the Odyssey were immensely popular, and a selection of other key scenes were also recurrent. The Iliad is found in papyri three times as frequently as the Odyssey. Nonetheless, the papyri support the basic structure we find in the literary evidence: a selection of Homeric texts were the major part of a core set of educational texts, with other Homeric episodes, alongside other literature, forming a changeable periphery.

The papyrilogical evidence also gives us a better picture of how the Homeric texts were taught and used; the selection that survives suggests a set of literary concerns quite different from what we might expect. Rather than focusing on the overarching plot or

Socrates. This last category is, interestingly, treated in the same fashion as the others – as if it were a genre.

18 Quintilian obviously also including a core of Latin authors – Inst. or. 1.8.1-12, and more fully at 10.1.45, 58. See Morgan (1998) 94.
19 Morgan (1998) 105-15, 309-10 (Tables 11 and 12), and 320 (Table 20), all on schooltext papyri.
20 Interestingly, not the ones modern readers might tend to pick out as the key sections – see Morgan (1998) 111-12; the primary sources of quotations are from the first two books of the Iliad, followed by beginnings of other books, and lists.
21 Morgan (1998): see the tables referred to in n.18 above.
23 Almost half of all literary papyri are Homeric: MacDonald (1994) 17, who quotes Finley (1977) 21. Finley is working from the corpus of papyri published up to 1963; although working with schooltext papyri, the figures in Morgan (1998) support this general picture.
24 Morgan (1998) 97-100; 318-19 (Table 19).
storyline of the *Iliad*, it seems that teaching was focused on very short blocks of texts – often only a few lines long: ancient sound bites, easily quotable and readily applicable phrases or sayings. Very little attention is paid to key thematic concerns and plot lines which are so central to modern study of the texts, such as the embassy in *Iliad* 9; no schooltexts of the now popular *Iliad* 22 or 24 have been found. On the other hand, lists of different kinds are quite common: the catalogue of ships in *Iliad* 2, for instance, and battle scenes listing fallen heroes.

Clement’s usage of Homer is much broader than the selection we find in the schooltext papyri, making reference to or quoting from every book of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* with the exceptions of *Od.* 3, 16 and 24, and thus is closer to the literary evidence. Nonetheless Clement echoes the papyrological record in a number of important ways: his quotations are weighted heavily towards the *Iliad* (almost twice as many as the *Odyssey*); there is a marked weighting towards the books one and two of the *Iliad*; and none of the quotations is longer than a few lines. Clement is thus in some ways typical of how the educated read and used Homer; but the intersection of the cultural importance of Homer and the religious commitments of Christianity colour his use of the material.

---

27 For these, and comparable statistics throughout, I use here the lesser figures of Stählin’s index from the GCS edition, rather than the vaster numbers of references cited in his BKV editions.
28 29 out of 138.
29 The lengthiest Homeric citation is seven verses (Il. 12:322-8, at Str. 6.2.21.3), but the majority of quotations are less than a line. This is Clement’s practice in general in quoting poetry; see Méhat (1966) 182. The longest quotation from Euripides (Clement’s most cited non-Christian author after Homer) is 6 lines, at 5.14.121.3. Quotation from prose authors are also generally kept short, although heretical authors get a little longer. The longest single quotation is Ezechiel’s *Exagoge*, with 25 lines in a row at 1.155.2-5.
The centrality of Homeric literature to the ancient education system gave rise to two phenomena: its integral role in creating a Greek identity, and flowing from that, the belief in Homer as omniscient and/or omnicompetent. Neither of these was uncontested, and the degree to which they were adopted by educated Greeks differed. Whether or not these ideas were accepted, as questions to be answered they were nonetheless unavoidable by-products of the educational programme of the Greeks.

First, Homer is integral to creating a sense of what being Greek is: the connection between education in general and identity is clear, and so the Homeric core of Greek paideia becomes a metonymy for Greek identity. Plato identifies the purpose of education tout court as skill in the realm of reading and interpreting poetry, which ought to lead to virtue. This lies at the heart of Plato’s concerns about Homer, showing the potency of the texts’ place at the heart of Greek education. The reading of Homer was, and was recognised to be, not just character-forming in general, but citizen-forming. As such, the texts were not merely seen or used as literature, in the limited sense that the term conveys in the modern world (recreational, aesthetic, and a matter of taste and choice), but as metonymic for the structures and institutions of Greek character formation. The flow-on effect for those on the margins of the Hellenic world, or those resistant to Greek culture, was to make of Homer a challenging or even threatening textual body, which we will explore further below.

---

50 Cribiore (2001a) 9.
51 Protagoras 338e-339a: Ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδοὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι ἐστιν δὲ τούτο τά ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἰόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἦ τε ὀρθῶς πεποίηται καὶ ἄ μή, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τέ καὶ ἔρωτομενον λόγον δοῦναι. The speaker is Protagoras.
52 Sandnes (2009) 43. See also Jaeger (1961) 91.
Secondly, because of this authoritative position, at the core of Greek education, Greek readers have a tendency to assert Homer’s omniscience, and the all-encompassing nature of his epics. Even the Alexandrian division of his works into twenty-four books, mirroring the twenty-four letters of the Greek alphabet, is ideologically orientated towards expressing the completeness and universality of the Homeric epics. In Xenophon’s *Symposium* Niceratus claims: ‘the sage Homer has written about practically everything pertaining to man’. Plato’s critique of Homer in the *Republic* starts from a similar position – referencing a popular opinion which says that poets know everything about everything, ‘virtue and vice, and all things divine’. Although both Xenophon and Plato are (at least here) implicitly or explicitly critical of this kind of position, it shows that this kind of hyper-valorisation of Homer was prevalent enough to merit a riposte, and it is quite clear that both the extreme claims made for Homer, and objections to them, continued to be the product of a Greek educational experience until late antiquity. There is a clear progression in this valorisation of Homer to far-reaching philosophical and theological claims made for his texts by Neo-Pythagoreans and their Neoplatonic heirs which we will deal with in the following chapter.

---

33 Darshan (2012) 225, following Aristotle’s claims in *Met.* 14.6 (1093b1-5) that the range of Α to Ω represented perfection.

34 *Symp.* 4.6: Τούτε γὰρ δῆσι ὃτι ὁ Ὄμηρος ὁ σοφώτατος πεποίηκε σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων τῶν ἄνθρωπίνων. ὡστὶς ἄν οὖν ὑπὸν βουλήσηται ἢ οἰκονομικὸς ἢ δημογορικὸς ἢ στρατηγικὸς γενέσθαι ἢ δῆμοις ἀρχηγεῖ ἢ Αἱάναν ἢ Νέστορα ἢ Ὅδυσσεῖ, ἔμε θεραπευέτω. ἐγὼ γὰρ ταύτα πάντα ἐπίσταμαι.

35 *Res pub.* 10 598d-e: οὖκ οὖν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, μετὰ τούτο ἐπισκεπτέον τὴν τε τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὸν ἢγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον, ἐπειδὴ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὕτως ο—not. οὐκ εἰσοδέομεν ὃτι οὗτος πᾶσας μὲν τέχνας ἐπίσταται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τὰ πρὸς ἄρετὴν καὶ κακίαν, καὶ τὰ γε θεῖα.
It is tempting, from these traits, to speak of the Homeric epics as the 'Bible of the Greeks', and many scholars have done so;\textsuperscript{36} it is useful way of thinking through how the Homeric texts were used and thought of by the Greeks. Christopher D. Stanley identifies six categories where the comparison between the two is justified and appropriate:\textsuperscript{37}

1) They are ‘primordial’ texts, exercising a formative influence on life and thought from earliest times;

2) Regarded as genuine ‘revelations’ of divine truth, only properly understood by insiders;

3) Fundamental sources regarding divine order, cosmology and proper beahviour;

4) Ingrained in memories and lives from childhood through the central role of these texts in education;

5) Frequently cited as a source of authority recognised by both author and audience;

6) Established in relatively standard textual form by the turn of the era.

\textsuperscript{36} E.g. Taylor (2007) 5, Finkelberg (2003) 91, Procopé (1996) 462, Buffière (1956) 10-12. See also Sandnes (2009) 47. Niehoff (2012a) collects essays on the similarities of approach between interpreters of the Bible and Homer. Taylor (2007) 5 further notes that the parallel extends to the history of criticism; the study of the Homeric Question in the eighteenth century is built upon the critical study of the Old Testament, and modern research into the stratigraphy of both the Pentateuch and the Homeric epics have tended to run in tandem. Heyne comments in the eighteenth century, 'We will not regain the Iliad, as it came from Homer’s mind and lips—that is clear; no more than the books of Moses and the Prophets can be restored as they came from the authors’ hands.' (Quoted in Grafton, Most, et al. (1985) 13); cf. Wolf (1985) [1795] 85, 145-6. Wolf’s Prolegomena to Homer, a hugely influential work in its day and for subsequent generations of Classicists, was directly dependent on Old Testament scholarship, and particularly the work of Johann Gottfried Eichhorn. See Grafton, Most, et al. (1985) 18-26.

\textsuperscript{37} Stanley (1990) 51-2; with the caveat that ‘it is undoubtedly true that no single text played the determinative role in the Greco-Roman world that the Bible did for Jews and Christians’ (51). The three criteria for their comparison set out in Finkelberg (2012) 15-20 are clearer – the text should (1) occupy a central place in education; (2) be the focus of exegetic activity defending it from criticism; and (3) be the vehicle by which the identity of the community is articulated. The advantage of Stanley’s categories, however, is that they also demonstrate why Homer was problematic for Christians.
Christians were thus in a bind: the role of Homer as a primordial, revelatory, religious canon (the first three of the categories listed above), and, to a greater or lesser degree, as an authority (the fifth), was obviously unacceptable to most conceptions of Christianity. A particularly well-known papyrus fragment declares θεὸς οὐδ᾽ ἄνθρωπος Ὄμερος,38 summing up the extent to which Greek hyper-valorisation of Homer was incompatible with Christianity, with its firm adherence to monotheism.39 Moreover, given the centrality of the Bible for Christianity, part of the Christian response is conditioned by the attempt to displace one set of texts with another fulfilling a similar role. On the other hand, the role of the texts as a sign of the civilised citizen and a badge of membership of the educated Greek classes (the latter three categories) could be upheld as important by Christians, especially in a political context where it was precisely Christianity’s lack of civic engagement which was seen as problematic.40

HOMER THE EGYPTIAN

Given the centrality of Homer to the construction of Greek identity, it is no wonder that claims about Homer’s own background – his parents, his place of birth, and his biography, come to be part of the Homeric deposit of Greek education, and part of a lively debate. The flames of this debate were lit by the huge significance of Homer to Greek literature and identity, and fuelled by the total lack of self-disclosure made in the surviving Homeric works. The pseudo-Plutarchan On the Life and Poetry of Homer, which probably dates from the

39 On the familiar phenomenon of the cults of poets in the Greek world see Brink (1972) and Clay (2004).
late second or early third century, thus Keaney and Lamberton (1996) 7-10, disagreeing slightly with the dating of Buffière (1956) 76-77, who dates it to the early second century, and relying on the arguments of Volkmann (1869).

Thus Keaney and Lamberton (1996) 7-10, disagreeing slightly with the dating of Buffière (1956) 76-77, who dates it to the early second century, and relying on the arguments of Volkmann (1869).

It may perhaps seem to some people superfluous to enquire both about Homer’s parentage and place of origin, seeing that he himself did not see fit to speak of his personal details but was so reserved as not even to mention his name. But as a broad survey is useful as an introduction for those in the early stages of education, let us try to state what the ancients have recorded about him.

Homer was thus in some sense a blank slate, on which claims to Greekness could be chalked up – that Homer wrote here, or was born here, or travelled through here. By the Hellenistic and Imperial periods, with the spread of Greek paideia throughout the east, the ambit of these claims widened as well, far beyond the traditional claimants of Chios, Smyrna, and Colophon.

Homer is claimed to hail from Syria, Babylon, Lydia, Egypt, Italy and even Rome itself, and the Homereion, the temple dedicated to Homer by the Hellenistic Egyptian monarch Ptolemy Philopator, apparently depicted Homer surrounded by representations of all the cities which claimed Homer as their own. By the Second Sophistic, the tenuousness

---

41 Thus Keaney and Lamberton (1996) 7-10, disagreeing slightly with the dating of Buffière (1956) 76-77, who dates it to the early second century, and relying on the arguments of Volkmann (1869).

42 De Homero 1.1.

43 Trans. West (2003). For the earliest traditional claimants, see, for example, Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi 2, Anth. Pal. 16.296 (by Antipater).


45 See Vita 6 in West (2003), the account of Hesychius of Miletus, from which the Suda entry is derived, which lists twenty different places as claimants. Although Hesychius dates from the sixth century, most of these are attested much earlier. See Heath (1998) for an overview.

of some of these more extreme claims had become the object of mockery; Lucian, in the
*Verae historiae* (in which everything is self-confessedly a lie), visits Homer in the afterlife,
who admits to him that he is, in fact, from Babylon and his original name was Tigranes (i.e.
after the river Tigris),\(^\text{47}\) playing on the traditional story that Homer’s actual name was
Melesigenes, derived from the river Meles.\(^\text{48}\)

Such a dispute, framed around ethnicity and belonging in the Greek world, is particularly
well suited to Clement’s project of finding space within the Greek tradition for a literature
and a religious identity which might appear decidedly un-Greek at first glance. Clement’s
claim is broader than just Homer:

\[\text{oìde mèn oí chrónoi tòu par' 'Ellhnes presebýtátovn sofrón te kai filosófówn. Ís dê oí}

pleióstoi autós bárbaroi to gênos kai parà bárbaróis paiðeuvbéntes, tì deì kai légein, eì ge}

Τυρρήνος ἢ Τύριος ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἔδεικνυτο, Ἀντισθένης δὲ Φρύξ ἢ καὶ Ὀρφεὺς Ὀδρύσης ἢ
Θρᾶξ; Ὅμηρον γάρ oí pleióstoi Aigýptios phainousin. Thalís δὲ Φοῖνιξ ὃν τὸ gênos kai tòis
Aigýptiwn profohtásis suvběbolekéntai eîrhetai, katháper kai ὁ Πυθαγόρας autós ge tou̱tois,
δο'ouís kai periþetemeto, ἵνα δὴ kai eîs tà òdúta katelbów tòn mústikhn par' Aigýptiwn
ékharoi filosoiφían, Xaldaíwn te kai Mágwn toûs ãrístous suvegeýneto kai tòn ëkklhíasan
tìn vûn oútω kalamúmenh to par' autô ð̄̋̄mακοείον aînîttetai.\(^\text{49}\)

This is the chronology of the most ancient wise men and philosophers amongst the Greeks.
And the majority of them were barbarians by race, and educated by barbarians – is it even
necessary to say, if Pythagoras has been shown to be Tyrrhenian or Tyrian, Antisthenes
Phrygian, and Orpheus Odrysian or Thracian? For the majority demonstrate that Homer is
Egyptian; Thales was Phoenician by race, and is said to have conversed with the prophets of
the Egyptians, just as even Pythagoras with the same men, by whom he was also circumcised,
so that by entering their shrines he might learn mystic philosophy from the Egyptians, and


\(^{49}\) 1.15.66.1-3.
he associated with the best of the Chaldaeans and the Magi, and his common table hints at the church now called thus.

Clement is not the only one who claims an Egyptian background for Homer; most famous is Heliodorus’ *Aethiopica*, in which the Egyptian priest Calasiris proves that Homer is Egyptian through a combination of etymological proof and close reading of *Iliad* 1.200, although this is itself (like Lucian’s version above) an ironic take on the propensity of claimants to ‘discover’ that Homer happened to have been a fellow-countryman.\(^\text{50}\) An epigram from the *Palatine Anthology* of unknown date claims Homer for Egyptian Thebes,\(^\text{51}\) and Eustathius gives the credit for the theory to one Alexander of Paphos, possibly to be equated with the first-century AD Alexander of Myndos.\(^\text{52}\) The pseudo-Lucianic *Demosthenis encomium* makes reference to the Egyptian origins of Homer,\(^\text{53}\) as does Aulus Gellius.\(^\text{54}\)

It is notable, however, that when Clement takes up the claim he puts it forward so baldly, as an accepted *communis opinio*. It is evident that he is aware of the maelstrom of dispute that surrounded the origins of Homer: he is familiar with and quotes large chunks of Tatian’s *Oratio ad Graecos*, which promenades the ongoing dispute about Homer’s origins, parentage and dating, naming a string of Greek authorities who disagree over the issues.\(^\text{55}\) Clement himself, in a segment in which he quotes Tatian extensively, provides a list of authorities

---

\(^{50}\) *Aeth.* 3.13-4. The tale is clearly fanciful, and designed to imitate Calasiris’ own back-story and the literary themes of the novel itself; see Winkler (1982) and Whitmarsh (1998).


\(^{52}\) Skiadas (1965) 30 n. 4.

\(^{53}\) *Dem. enc.* 9.

\(^{54}\) *Noctes Atticae* 3.11.6.

\(^{55}\) *Or. Ad Graecos* 31.2: περὶ γὰρ τῆς Ὀμήρου ποιήσεως γένους τε αὐτοῦ καὶ χρόνου καθ’ ὃν ἦκμασεν προηρεύνησαν πρεσβύτατοι μὲν Θεαγένης τε Ὁργίνος κατὰ Καμβύσην γεγονὼς Στησίμβροτος ὁ Ῥῆγινος καὶ Ἀντίμαχος ὁ Κολοφώνιος Ἡρόδοτός τε ὁ Ἀλικαρνασσεὺς καὶ Διονύσιος ὁ Ὀλύνθιος, μετὰ δὲ ἐκείνους Ἐφορὸς ὁ Κυμαῖος καὶ Φιλόχορος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος Μεγακλείδης τε καὶ Χαμαιλέων οἱ Περιπατητικοῖ
and conclusions, differing from Tatian’s, regarding the dispute over when Homer should be dated: \(^{56}\) ten authorities are cited, for six of whom specific works are also mentioned. \(^{57}\) Either Clement is combining another epitomising source with Tatian, or is working from his own knowledge and research – in either scenario, he is aware from at least two different sources of a large number of disagreements over Homer’s biography, and has gone to the effort of modifying and expanding upon the list of contradictory versions that Tatian provides. So we can be sure that Clement is aware of alternative traditions for Homer’s birthplace, and fully cognisant that οἱ πλεῖστοι would not claim Homer as an Egyptian.

So why the unnuanced bluntness here at 5.16? Absent are the Clementine commonplaces of extensive short quotations and references to other published authorities. The tenuousness of the claim that Homer is Egyptian is not the only extreme position of ethnic identification taken in these few lines; most of the information presented would have seemed strikingly skewed to an ancient audience. Pythagoras was known in antiquity to have been born in Samos, although his school was found in Italy; Tyrhennian might seem, therefore, to be slightly tendentious. Antisthenes, a putative founder of the Cynics, is another interesting case: Diogenes Laërtius records that he was Athenian, but that there was a story that his mother was Thracian (rather than Phrygian); when reproached with this fact, he is said to have replied, καὶ ἡ μήτηρ τῶν θεῶν Φρυγία ἐστίν.\(^{58}\) Antisthenes’ life as recorded by Diogenes is, in fact, replete with ambivalences about his status as an Athenian. His bravery at the

\(^{56}\) Str. 1.21.117. Some of this material is contradictory to Tatian’s account – see Stählin \textit{ad loc.}

\(^{57}\) Philochorus, Aristarchus (\textit{Notes on Archilochus}), Apollodorus, Euthymenes (\textit{History}), Archemachus (\textit{History of Euboea}), Crates the Grammarian, Eratosthenes, Theopompus (\textit{History of Philip}), Euphorion (\textit{History of the Aleuadae}), Sosibius of Sparta (\textit{Chronological Table}). Five of these ten are also mentioned by Tatian.

\(^{58}\) VP 6.1.
battle of Tanagra causes Socrates to remark that the son of two Athenians could not have been so brave; his withering remark regarding the autochthony of the Athenians is to point out that they are no more noble than snails and locusts; his chief exemplars of virtue are Heracles and Cyrus (one Greek and one barbarian, Diogenes explicitly points out).

Orpheus is less problematic, although the claim that he was Odrysian seems slightly out of place when Thrace was almost universally asserted as his home. Thales could certainly be accepted as being Phoenician ‘by race’ (τὸ γένος), but only by virtue of his descent from Cadmus; he is, from Plato and Herodotus onwards at least, Thales of Miletus, and is referred to as such by Clement in the chapter immediately preceding. Claiming Thales as barbarian puts a question mark over the ‘Greekness’ of a great number of Greeks, if even these qualifications cannot establish Hellenic identity for Thales. One could add into the mix Thales’ own attitude to Greekness as reported in the Vitae philosophorum:

Εἴρημπος δὲ ἐν τοῖς Βίοις εἰς τοῦτον ἀναφέρει τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τινῶν περὶ Σωκράτους. ἐφάσκε γάρ, φασί, τριῶν τούτων ἔνεκα χάριν ἔχειν τῇ Τύχῃ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος ἐγενόμην καὶ οὐθηρίον, εἶτα δὲ ἄνηρ καὶ οὐ γυνή, τρίτον δὲ Ἰππέα καὶ οὐ βάρβαρος.

Hermippus, in the Lives, attributes to him [sc. Thales] something reported by others about Socrates. For, so he says, he used to affirm that he gave thanks to Fortune for these three things: first, that he was born a human being and not a beast; then, that he was a man and not a woman; thirdly, that he was a Greek, and not a barbarian.
Clement does know Hermippus, and quotes him only a little further on at Str. 1.15.73.3, so it is not unthinkable that this anecdote forms part of Clement’s conception of Thales. Certainly it fits with a catalogue of racially problematic ‘Greeks’. Clement is staking out an extreme position on the edges of the feasible intellectual discussion of these seminal characters. The almost ridiculous definitiveness with which he stamps these barbarian racial labels onto the ‘most ancient wise men and philosophers amongst the Greeks’ deliberately highlights the very contestation of their origins.

The passage is less about the actual provenance of these cultural archetypes of philosophers and poets, and much more a programmatic expression of the flimsiness of the nexus between civilisation, education, Greekness and a legitimate speaking voice in the public sphere. One strand of that argument is the presentation of Moses as a competitor with Greek models for the exemplary king, general, and philosopher, which Clement does elsewhere; but far more effective is the argument internal to the world of Greek paideia which, as here, deconstructs Greek hegemony over culture through its own authorising figures.

In this presentation of cultural icons, Christianity is not a ‘foreign’ religion imposed upon the hermetically sealed Greek world; the meeting of the Greek philosopher’s logos with the Yahweh of the Old Testament is not the combining or the clash of two cultures. Rather, Clement presents as his premiss a rich patchwork of cultures, resulting from the cross-fertilisation of languages, cultures, and genres. This claiming of Homer for Egypt, then, is

---

65 Clement mistakenly calls him Hermippus of Berytus, rather than Smyrna – see Stählin ad loc. Cf. BNf III.35, and III.54F82.
66 Str. 1.23-26, especially the direct comparison between Moses and Minos and Lycurgus in 1.26. See Chapter 4 above for more discussion of Moses as paradigmatic philosopher-king.
quite different from other claims to the poet; elsewhere Homer is claimed as ‘ours’, the claim serving to affirm the unity of a fringe people as regards Greek culture (be it Babylon, Rome or Egypt), and the unity of Greek identity in general. This is most striking in Roman claims for Homer, which in parallel with attempts to claim Greek descent for the Romans, can be seen as part of an attempt to ‘create a global and unitary vision of the Greco-Roman world’. Clement, in contrast, emphasizes the fragmentary nature of all earthly political and ethnic identifications – his unitary vision lies on a plane above. It is in the repeated patterns of that patchwork, the golden threads linking Moses to Plato, Homeric poetry to Egyptian wisdom, that Clement finds proof for his Christianity. Although the discovery of the underlying logos that makes sense of this patchwork might be alien to the modern reader, the deconstruction of solidified cultural and ethnic identities seems strangely post-modern, and his unravelling of a hermetically sealed ‘Classical’ literature or culture echoes scholarly movements of the past few decades.

RESPONSES TO HOMER FROM THE MARGINS

So far we have looked at Clement’s response to Homer as an authorising cultural figure. Of even more importance, however, was how the Iliad and the Odyssey themselves, rather than just the figure of their purported author, were received and read by Clement and his audiences. Earlier Jewish responses to Homer, and those of others on the margins of the Hellenic world, provide the backdrop against which Christians were able to formulate their responses to this ‘bible of the Greeks’.

---

67 Most notably made by Aristodemos of Nysa; see Dubuisson (1987) and Haslam (1986).
Evidence from Philo’s *In Flaccum* and *De legatione ad Gaium* shows how Greek education, with Homer at its core, could hold particular significance for marginalized groups on the edges of Greek civic identity. In the unrest in Alexandria between Jews and Greeks in the first century AD, the question of Jewish citizenship was an issue of debate;\(^6^9\) the resolution brought about by Claudius signals respect for Jews, but insists any candidate for citizenship must have been an *ephebos* – that is, a student in a traditional *gymnasion* with the implications of the attendant literary education.\(^7^0\) The introduction of the Greek *gymnasion* into Jerusalem, as recounted by 2 Maccabees, is seen as so fundamentally formative of Greekness that it cannot be reconciled to a continued Jewish identity, and hence sparks a revolt.\(^7^1\) Although these examples cannot show us how Jewish communities felt towards the texts of Homer in themselves, they show the political importance of the Greek educational curriculum, for which Homer often acted as a metonym, in the context of assimilation into Hellenic cultural norms.

The flip-side of this is of course those communities which saw themselves, and desperately wished others to see them, as Greek, and utilised Homer as their vehicle for claiming Hellenicity. Dio Chrysostom’s *Borysthenic Oration* (*Or. 36*) is probably the most well-known example of such a situation, in which the exiled orator finds, at the extreme edge of the world,\(^7^2\) a city lacking evidence of Greek civilisation but whose inhabitants are obsessed with Homer (to the exclusion of almost all other literature).\(^7^3\) Although they no longer speak Greek properly, nor dress as Greeks, they still maintain a Greek identity through their

---

\(^6^9\) See Philo, *De legatione ad Gaium* 23.153-8 and *In Flaccum* 8.53-7.
\(^7^0\) Sandnes (2009) 47. For Claudius’ letter, see Tcherikover and Fuks (1960) 36-55.
\(^7^1\) 2 Macc. 4:12-15.
\(^7^2\) So in Propertius 1.12.4.
\(^7^3\) Goldhill (2001b) 158-9; Zeitlin (2001) 203. See also Anderson (1986) 241-57.
connection with Homer. Dio uses this extreme example to critique an over-reliance on Homer and discuss in broader terms what it means to be a Greek, and what it means to be civilised. On the margins of the Greek world, either as a possession to be embraced, or an oppressor to be rejected, Homer was seen as a shorthand for all of Greek paideia.

There were other, and on the Jewish front, more positive, direct forms of interaction. Eusebius quotes what seem to be two Jewish epic poets writing in the Homeric genre – Philo’s On Jerusalem,4 and a comparable work on Sichem by Theodotus.5 We also have a tantalising glimpse in the Excerpta Latina Barbari, a seventh or eighth century Latin translation of a lost Greek chronicle of the early fifth century, of a certain Sosates, who wrote before the first century BC and is referred to as the ‘Jewish Homer’.6 Exactly how these texts may have interacted with Homeric originals is unknown, but certainly it shows that, particularly in the Jewish diaspora, Homer was read and studied to the extent that his style could be imitated, and that it was thought there was an audience with a taste for such an exercise.

On the level of engagement with the critical tradition, there are hints that even in Palestine, the influence of the Homeric texts as culturally foundational was felt by biblical scholars, both in the Hellenistic period of canon formation, and for later rabbinic interpretation

4 Praep. Ev. 9.20, 24, 37. This is possibly the same Philo the Elder (FGrH 729) mentioned by Clement himself at Str. 1.21.141 and Josephus Contra Apion 1.23 (= Eusebius Praep. Ev. 9.42), though this is disputed by Wandrey (2005-) in the New Pauly. Both are probably drawing on Alexander Polyhistor, rather than relying on the original.
5 Praep. Ev. 9.22.
6 See Fraser (1972) 2.986-7 n. 202 and Cohen (1981). Conjectures for the nature of his writing are summarized in Frick (1892): either a Homeric summary of biblical history, or (less likely) that Sosates is in fact the author of the Pseudo-Phocylidea.
under the Roman empire. Homer is the only Greek author mentioned by name in rabbinic literature, and 'quite surprisingly, despite their conspicuous pagan character there is no explicit condemnation of the books of Homer'. Some even goes so far as to suggest that texts of Homer circulated in rabbinic circles, although this view has not found wide favour. Possibly, too, at an earlier period, the division of the Jewish bible into 24 books deliberately echoed (or competed with) the pattern set by the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. That the codification of Homer, and Greek literature in general, by Aristophanes of Byzantium and Callimachus happened in the third century, when Israel was ruled by the Egyptian Ptolemies, makes a case for the dissemination of these techniques of cataloguing, collecting and preserving literature a plausible one. Still, many of these hints are indirect and inconclusive; at most we can posit a somewhat shared intellectual background for those in the ancient near east with an interest in the canonicity of texts.

In Alexandria itself, there is more concrete evidence of deliberate Jewish reflection on the value of Greek literary texts, and Homer in particular. Aristobulus, in the third or second century BC, was read and quoted by Clement; in the extracts preserved in Eusebius, it is clear that Aristobulus was a firm proponent of the dependency motif connecting Hesiod and Homer to the Hebrew tradition. Philo of Alexandria provides us with a further model of how an educated Jewish author could engage quite comfortably with Homeric criticism. He not

---

77 Several essays in Niehoff (2012a) with their associated bibliographies provide the fullest recent discussions on this topic; see in particular Furstenberg (2012) and Paz (2012).
78 Naeh (2011).
80 See Darshan (2007) and Darshan (2012).
82 Praep. ev. 13.12.
only defends Homer from those who would argue for his immorality, but is happy to use Homeric verses to support his own interpretations of biblical material. In the background to any Christian response, then, are strategies both of incorporation and rejection available.

‘CEASE SINGING, HOMER!’

One Christian response to this Homeric challenge is, then, outright rejection, and this is sometimes assumed to be the sum total of Christian engagement with the epics. This rejection primarily takes the form of complaint about the moral influence exerted: the characters in Homer, especially the gods, model and therefore encourage immorality. Often this is twinned with the complaint that the representation of divinity is false, misleading and blasphemous.

There is also a Christian argument that the representation of the Greek gods is accurate, but that rather than deities, they are demons. See, for example, Justin Martyr 1 Apol. 5 where the immoral acts of demons are mistaken for and recorded as divine acts. Clement must be familiar with this argument from Justin, but touches on it only once, and even there Clement’s line of reasoning quickly shifts back to the claim that these gods are the work of human hands, rather than real malevolent spirits. We will therefore not deal with the claim of Homeric gods as demons; when Clement is critical of Homer, it is because his poetry blasphemously misrepresents divinity.

---

83 E.g. De providentia 2.40-41.
84 E.g. De fuga §61; Quaestiones in Genesin 4.2; see Niehoff (2012c), Taylor (2007) 6, and Boitani (1999) 10.
85 E.g. Tatian, Tertullian.
86 Cf. 1 Apol. 54 where demons inspire men with false stories. See MacDonald (1994) 20.
87 Protrep. 4.55, quoting ll.1.222, picking up the terminology of daimones.
88 Pace van der Poll (2001) 186-7, who claims that this argument is ‘an important weapon in his attack against the gods of polytheistic religion’.
This strand of engagement can be seen most clearly and most frequently in Clement’s *Protrepticus*, and so before moving on to look at how the *Stromateis* approaches Homer, we will spend some time looking at this earlier work as a contrast to the choices Clement makes in his later work. The attack on Homer is first introduced as part of a general attack on the existence of the Greek gods and their morality:89

ἐκτὸς ἐστὶν εἰσηγητικός τρόπος ἀπάτης, θεῶν περιποιητικός, καθ’ ὅν ἀριθμοῦσι θεοὺς τοὺς δώδεκα· ὑν καὶ θεογονίαν Ἡσίοδος ἔδει τὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁσα θεολογεῖ Ὁμήρος· αὐτὰς μὲν αἱ ὁλίσθηραὶ τε καὶ ἐπιβλαβεῖς παρεκβάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας, καθέλκουσαν οὐρανὸθεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ εἰς βάραθρον περιτρέπουσαν.90

There is a sixth way of introducing error and producing divinities, by which they number twelve gods, of whom Hesiod writes in his *Theogony*, and are the sum of what Homer says about divinity... These are the slippery and hurtful deviations from the truth which drag humanity down from heaven, and cause him to deviate to ruin.

This kind of complaint echoes the Christian apologists earlier in second century: Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Aristides, Tatian, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Minucius Felix all utilise a similar set of confrontational arguments in their overt rejection of Homer.91

This is not, however, a specifically Christian response directed against Greek culture; it is better characterised as part of a lively debate within Greek literary culture. Precisely the same kind of ethical complaints are made by earlier and contemporary non-Christian

---

90 *Protrep.* 2.26-7.
authors, even those who use Homer liberally themselves. The *locus classicus* for this kind of complaint is Plato. To take one example of many, speaking of Homer and Hesiod in the *Republic*:

οὐδὲ λεκτέον νέῳ ἀκούοντι ὡς ἀδικών τὰ ἔσχατα οὐδὲν ἄν θαυμαστόν ποιοῖ, οὐ δὴ ἀδικοῦντα πατέρα κολάζων παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἀλλὰ δρῶν ἄν διπέρ θεῶν οἱ πρώτοι τε καὶ μέγιστοι.92

Nor should a young person hear it said that in committing the worst crimes he’s doing nothing out of the ordinary, or that if he inflicts every kind of punishment on an unjust father, he’s only doing the same as the first and greatest of the gods.93

At several other points in Plato the same kind of ethical concerns about what people learn from the stories of Homer are expressed, particularly in the *Protagoras* and later on in the tenth book of the *Republic*. Even Plato’s criticisms aren’t the first we know of – Xenophanes of Colophon in the mid-sixth century BC seems to have been heavily critical of Homer and his anthropomorphic representation of the gods as a model for human behaviour.94

This line of criticism surfaces within Greek literature throughout the Hellenistic period up until Clement’s day; a strong interest in moral questions characterises many scholia.95

---

92 *Res publica* 2 378b.
93 Trans. G.M.A. Grube, revised by C.D.C. Reeve.
94 Jaeger (1961) 48. See in particular DK Fr. 10-12. Text and translation can be found in Lesher (1992), with commentary on pp. 81-85. Clement himself is the source of several fragments of Xenophanes (14-16, 23), on the nature of god, but not dealing with poetic representation; other fragments are, ironically, preserved in the Homeric scholia (fragments 17, 21, 21a, 32 and 45). Xenophanes is well known into the imperial period as a critic of Homer, and the comeuppance that he receives at the hands of Hieron in Plutarch’s *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* 175c (= DK A11) shows him put firmly in his place.
Despite the ambivalence which Plato shows towards Homer and poetry,\footnote{96} and despite an early refutation by Aristotle,\footnote{97} the continued centrality of Plato’s original texts to philosophical education meant that his criticisms were given a fresh reading by each generation of highly literate Greeks.\footnote{98} The intellectual arsenal Christians direct against Homer is made up not of Christian, but Greek, arguments.\footnote{99} Well might Tertullian say to his educated audience: de vestris sumus: fiunt, non nascuntur Christiani.\footnote{100}

Two examples from mainstream Second Sophistic authors give us a useful comparison for Clement: Dio Chrysostom’s Trojan Oration (Or. 11), maintaining that Homer was a liar, and Lucian’s Menippus, a dialogue recounting Menippus’ visit to Hades. Dio’s discourse is notable in that it criticises Homer primarily on grounds quite dissimilar to the traditional complaints about morality, instead attacking the poet for his lack of veracity as a historian.\footnote{101} That said, the criticism of Homer as failing to portray an accurate picture of divinity, and instead giving us a false and immoral picture of the gods, is given in passing, more than once, as if it needs no justification:

\footnote{96}{For a nuanced reading of Plato’s approach to poetry which sees it as ‘a complex of resistance and attraction’, see Halliwell (2012) chapter 4.}
\footnote{97}{In the Aporemata Homerica and chapter 25 of the Poetics. See Niehoff (2011) 9-12 and Richardson (1992); for an overview of Aristotle’s approach to Homer, Heath (2011).}
\footnote{98}{This historical development from Plato’s time to the period of Second Sophistic has been well covered elsewhere, and so will not be repeated here: seminally, Buffière (1956); see also Lamberton (1986), who concentrates on the positive reception of Homer; Hunter and Russell (2011) 2-17, on the background and influenced on Plutarch’s De audiendis poetis; and Sandnes (2009), who deals with the background of suspicion for a Christian response.}
\footnote{99}{Cf. Jacobsen (2009) 102.}
\footnote{100}{Apol. 18.4: ‘Our origin is in you: Christians are made, not born.’}
\footnote{101}{Kim (2010) 85-139.
And as regards the gods, practically every man, including his warmest admirers, admits that Homer does not speak a word of truth...

And having once given himself the liberty of making this misrepresentation, he went on to distort the entire story. At this point he makes the gods fight with one another, thus virtually acknowledging his utter disregard for the truth.

But I wish to offer a defence in behalf of Homer by saying that there is nothing wrong in accepting his fictions. First, they are much less serious than the falsehoods told about the gods.

Dio’s tour de force of Homeric criticism plays off an accepted set of criticisms of Homer – his misrepresentation of the gods and the ethical implications of the example thus set – to construct a different criticism, that of Homer as a lying witness giving evidence before the court of Dio’s audience. Even though Dio, in general, is an ardent admirer of Homer and in particular often praises the ethical content of his poetry, where it suits him (as here), he is more than prepared to insert a recognised and almost formulaic criticism of Homer on precisely those ethical grounds.

---

102 Or. 11.17.
103 Or. 11.104.
104 Or. 11.147.
106 Or. 53 is an obvious example of Dio’s positive appraisal of Homer. See also Kim (2010) 86; Kindstrand (1973) 33, 138–9.
Lucian’s criticism of Homer caricatures Homer’s depiction of the gods, and the morality represented through their actions. With mock naïveté Menippus explains his attempts to use Homer as a blueprint for morality:

While I was a boy, when I read Homer and Hesiod about wars and quarrels, not only of the demigods but of the gods themselves, and besides about their amours and assaults and abductions and lawsuits and banishing fathers and marrying sisters, I thought that all these things were right, and I felt an uncommon impulsion toward them. But when I came of age, I found that the laws contradicted the poets and forbade adultery, quarrelling, and theft. So, I was plunged into great uncertainty, not knowing how to deal with my own case; for the gods would never have committed adultery and quarrelled with each other, I thought, unless they

---

107 Kim (2010) 140-1, and 140-174 specifically on the *Verae historiae*. Other examples of this critical attitude in Lucian include *Dialogues of the Dead* and *Marine Dialogues*, which send up the incongruities of Homer’s gods, on which see Branham (1989) 127-77; and see *Juppiter tragœdas* 39-40 for another example of criticism of the morality demonstrated by the gods.

108 Menippus 3-4.
deemed these actions right, and the lawgivers would not recommend the opposite course unless they supposed it to be advantageous. Since I was in a dilemma, I resolved to go to the men whom thy call philosophers and put myself in their hands, begging them to deal with me as they would, and to show me a plain, solid path in life.

That was what I had in mind when I went to them, but I was unconsciously struggling out of the smoke, as the proverb goes, right into the fire! For I found in the course of my investigation that among these men in particular the ignorance and perplexity was greater than elsewhere, so they speedily convinced me that the ordinary man’s way of living is as good as gold.  

Of course, Menippus’ rejection of Homeric ethics in Lucian’s dialogue is coloured in deeply satirical tones; the whole dialogue is playing with Homer’s *katabasis* of *Odyssey* 11, replete with Homeric quotations and references, and its serious critical power is distanced by its form as a comic dialogue. Rejection of Homer is a literary pose, effective as such because it is a recognisable intellectual position to take, even if here it is exaggerated to grotesquerie. The ethical problematics of Homer are such a well-known chestnut that the argument is a building block for larger rhetorical constructions, part of the arsenal of rhetorical tropes of the *pepaideumenos*, just as Homeric *chreiai* themselves were.

This is not, despite first appearances, so very different from the utilisation of the motif in Clement’s *Protrepticus*. In one striking passage Clement berates Homer directly:

```
αὐτὰρ ὁ φορμίζων ἀνεβάλλετο καλὸν ἀεὶδειν ἄσον ἡμῖν, Ὀμηρε, τὴν φωνὴν τὴν καλὴν,
ἀμφ’ Ἀρείων φιλότητος ἐστεφάνοι τ’ Ἀφροδίτης
ὡς τὰ πρῶτα μίγησαν ἐν Ἱηρότοιο δόμοισι
λάθρη πολλὰ δ’ ἔδωκε, λέχος δ’ ἠχοῦσα καὶ εὐνήν
```

‘Ἡφαίστοιο ἄνακτος.
κατάπαυσον, Ὠμηρε, τὴν ὀδὴν ὦκ ἑστὶ καλῆ, μοιχείαν διδάσκει πορνεύειν δὲ ἡμεῖς καὶ τὰ ὅτα παρητήμεθα’.

Then, playing the harp, he began to sing beautifully,’ [Od. 8.266] Sing for us the beautiful song, Homer: ‘About the love of Ares and Aphrodite with the beautiful girdle; how they first met in secret in the house of Hephaestus. He gave many gifts and shamed the bed and couch of king Hephaestus.’ [Od. 8.267-70] Cease singing, Homer! It is not beautiful; it teaches adultery, and we avert our ears from fornication.

The rejection of Homer is almost theatrical; the apostrophe is florid, echoing the same figure used by Pindar in dealing with a similarly awkward story of Heracles making war against the gods in Olympian 9: ἀπὸ μοι λόγον τοῦτον, στόμα, ῥῆψον, claiming that the to represent the gods thus is an ἐχθρὰ σοφία. There is also a parallel to a fragment of Callimachus’ Aetia, in which Callimachus in feigned modesty breaks off from speaking about the love-making of Hera and Zeus before their wedding, Clement’s shift in tone is comically bathetic, feigning surprised embarrassment to draw attention to the story. Like Lucian, we begin with a figure of studied naiveté, and then come to a surprised halt at the discovery of vice. In

110 Protrep. 4.59.
111 Pindar, Olympian 9:35-6: ‘My mouth, fling this story away from me!’
113 Fr. 75; see Cameron (1995) 20-1.
114 A similar passage, including the direct address of Homer (followed by a lewder descent into bathos) is Protrep. 2.32: καὶ οὐ, ὦ Ὠμηρε, τεθαύμακα τὰ ποιήματα· ἡ, καὶ κυανέῃσιν ἐπ’ ὀφρύσι Κρονίων· ἀμβρόσιαι δ’ ἀρα χαίται ἐπερρώσαντο ἀνακτος κρατὸς ἀρ’ ἀθανάτοιο μέγαν δ’ ἐλέλιξεν Ὄλυμπον.
116 Σεμνὸν ἀναπλάττεις, Ὠμηρε, τὸν Δία καὶ νεῦμα περιάπτεται αὐτῷ τετιμημένον. Ἀλλ’ ἓν ἐπιδείξεις μόνον, ἄνθρωπε, τὸν κεστὸν, ἐξελέγχεται καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ή κόμη καταισχύνεται.
117 ‘And as for you, Homer – I am amazed at your poetry; ‘The son of Cronus spoke and nodded with his dark eyebrows. And the ambrosial hair of the king streamed from his immortal head. And he made great Olympus tremble.’ [Il. 1.528-30] You portray Zeus as august, Homer, and the nod you attribute to him is respected. But if you just show him a girdle, my friend, Zeus is confounded and his locks are dishonoured.’
118 van der Poll (2001) 186.
Lucian’s case, both the set up and the fall are comically rendered: both the desire to find a moral code simpistically embedded in Homer, and the total rejection of it when that quest fails are mocked. Likewise, the conceit of Dio’s *Trojan Oration* is raising a laugh at the expense of those who would find in Homer an authority on every subject, rather than at the expense of the *Iliad* itself. By contrast, in Clement, there would seem to be more of a serious edge to the rejection – at least in this passage.

We shouldn’t take this as a definitive position, however: without even delving into positive uses of Homer, we can see elsewhere in Clement playful uses of Homer which undercut the stern admonitions in the *Protrepticus* and rely on an audience’s familiarity with the intertext, without a hint of embarassment at the seeming contradiction. Two examples from *Paedagogus* 2 give the flavour. In the first, Clement is criticising the propensity for expensive and elaborate clothing and adornment, which, he regrets, has spread even to the military: ἠδὴ δὲ καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται χρυσίῳ κεκοσμῆσθαι βούλονται, οὔδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνεγνωκότες τὸ ποιητικόν, «ὁς καὶ χρυσὸν ἔχων πόλεμον κίεν ἡπτε κούρη | νηπίη».116 Although it is excess in dress that Clement criticises, here it is also couched as criticism of ignorance of an Homeric maxim. Furthermore, the full impact of the quotation is increased when we finish the Homeric line: οὐδὲ τί οἱ τό γ᾽ ἐπήρκεσε λυγρὸν ὀλεθρόν.117 Undoubtedly, it is this ominous threat, on top of the charge of effeminacy, which makes the line apt for the context here.

There is an expectation that an educated audience can supply the rest of the verse; at the least, there is an intertextual payoff in being able to do so. Facility with the text of Homer

116 Paed. 2.12/13.121.5. ‘And now even soldiers desire to be adorned with gold, ignorant of that poetic line: “And he came with gold to the war like a childish girl”.’ [Il. 2.872-3]

117 Il. 2.873: ‘nor could anything ward off baneful death from him.’
and demonstration of its memorisation are literary staples, modelled particularly in miscellanistic and sympotic literature which reflected idealised elite literary conversation. Athenaeus, for instance, recounts challenges of guests having to recite succeeding lines of Homer in turn, or to quote Homeric lines beginning and ending with the same letter, and so on. Clement would not be asking too much of an audience to expect them to complete Homeric lines themselves, especially, as we noted above, given how popular and well-read the first two books of the *Iliad* were.

Earlier on in book 2, in a similar context of concern about ostentatious dress, Clement admonishes wealthy women for their propensity to wear purple:

> αἱ δὲ ἄλλοι κομιδὴ τὸ λοιπὸν τῆς ἀμπεχόνης ύφαινουσι τὸ πᾶν ἀλουργές εἰργάσαντο ἐκφλέγουσι τὰς ῥᾳθυμίας, καὶ δῆτα αὐτὰς περὶ τὰς μεμωρημένας ταύτας καὶ ἀβρὰς ἀλυσός πορφύρας κατὰ τὸ ποιητικὸν δὴ ἔλλαβε πορφύρεος θάνατος.

But just so these women, weaving the rest of their clothing, have made everything purple, enflaming heedlessness, and indeed, as the poetic line runs, ‘purple death has seized’ [*Il. 5.83*] those who are crazy about these stupid luxurious purples.

A verse describing the bloody death of Homeric heroes has been flipped to refer instead to a feminine fashion craze. Familiarity with the epics is assumed, and there is again an extra comedic twist for those able to compare the original context to its current positioning. The

---

119 *Deip.* 10.457e, 458a-f. For not dissimilar bandying of Homeric lines, see also Lucian *Symposium* 12.
120 *Paed.* 2.10/11.114.4.
121 A comparison to Jerome’s satires of Roman matrons is interesting; see especially *Adversus Jovinianum*. Jerome seems the much fiercer, but is only so when following pre-Christian satirical models for which vitriol against women was characteristic. He is also quite free in quoting his pagan satirist predecessors to support Christian values (e.g. *Ep.* 58.11, quoting Horace, *Serm.* 1.9.59-60), as Clement does with Homer here. In both authors, where they seem most repressive to the Classical openness is where they are in fact conforming to pre-Christian models. See Clark (2005).
use of Homer is playful and positive, and the full brunt of the satiric attack here cannot be appreciated without a shared knowledge of Homer, so assumed that τὸ ποιητικὸν is more than enough for its attribution.

What is common to Lucian, Dio and Clement, is the motif of Homer as a purveyor of falsehoods and encourager of immoral behaviour, alongside an expectation and even reliance on an audience’s familiarity with the texts. The immorality of Homer is a recognisable rhetorical building-block which can be cemented into discussions about education and disputes over the interpretation of poetry, even when the overall picture created of Homer is not necessarily negative. It makes a great deal of sense, therefore, to read Clement’s use of the motif in a similar way to how we might read his two contemporaries, in a more sophisticated, playful way. This is not to deny the genuineness of concerns about Homer (in Christian or non-Christian authors); but in Clement, at least, it goes hand-in-hand with a remarkable propensity to use Homeric quotations as the bread and butter of his rhetorical style – that is, exactly the way that every other educated Greek was taught to use Homer.

The final point to be made as regards this rejection motif is that all the evidence we have drawn on is not from the *Stromateis* at all, but rather the *Prottepticus*. Neither the *Paedagogus* or *Stromateis* criticize Homer on ethical grounds or accuse him of misrepresenting divinity. It is a motif that Clement’s apologetic work shares with the other Christian apologists of the second century, works directed deliberately (or at least ostensibly) at educated non-Christian Greeks, but does not carry through to those works directed more to those who already identify themselves as Christian. At first glance this might seem counterintuitive –
what seems to be the most combatative and caustic method of engagement with 'the bible of
the Greeks' is only seen in works directed to those Greeks. Given, however, the Greek
philosophical and literary background for the rejection motif, it begins to make more sense:
the rejection of Homer is not a rejection of Greekness, but a performance of Greekness. It is
an easily recognisable way of showing that Christianity is in touch with the ethico-literary
concerns that exercised Greek writers, whilst contributing to the presentation of Christians
as philosophers.

CONCLUSION: THE PRIMER OF THE GREEKS

Clement’s engagement with debates over Homer himself and Homeric criticism might be
best summed up by suggesting that Clement saw Homer not as the bible of the Greeks, but as
a preparatory text for Christianity for the Greeks. The doubtful ethnic origins of Homer
demonstrate the constructedness and porousness of Greek identity, and hence the
legitimacy of a foreign text as the authority for authentically Greek wisdom. Engagement
with Greek tropes of rejection of Homer on ethical grounds is more than just a performance
of Clement’s identity as a philosopher in the Platonic tradition and demonstration of his
status as a pepaideumenos; on a more sophisticated level, it parades the necessity of deeper
reading strategies if Homer is to be salvaged as an educational text at all.
7. FROM PROFANE EPIC TO CATECHISM

In contrast to what we seen from the Protrepticus, Clement elsewhere presents an almost wholly positive view of Homer; his words are frequently quoted as examples of parallels to biblical texts. In the Paedagogus, for instance, Clement writes about the building up of new Christians on ‘the Word, the milk of Christ’:

τοιούτον τι καὶ Ὁμήρος ἄκων μαντεύεται τοὺς δικαίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ τοῦ Κήρυγμα

Such a thing even Homer prophesies, against his will, when he calls the righteous amongst men ‘milk-fed’ [Il. 13.6]. It is possible to understand scripture thus, too: ‘And I, brothers, could not speak to you as spiritual, but as carnal, as infants in Christ’ [1 Cor. 3:1].

Clement includes Homer as a witness for the Christian truth, both paralleling scriptural authority and calling upon us to heed scripture: the milk is figuratively explained further on as τὸ κήρυγμα. The struggle between a Christian tradition suspicious of Homer, and the influence of a Greek education built on that author are here illuminated by the single word ἄκων. The unwillingness extends beyond Homer. Clement is unwilling to dismiss Homer entirely, but also unwilling to be seen capitulating to the hyper-valorisation of Homer which was so common. Although Clement’s Christian audience was more likely to be a particularly sceptical one when it came to Homer, the question of how to read his epics properly (or why not to) was nonetheless one for which they needed an answer.

---

1 Paed. 1.6.36.
2 Paed. 1.6.38.1.
Given the criticisms which the text faced, it is unsurprising that a number of different responses developed, each of which attempted to save Homer from his detractors and maintain the texts as core to Greek identity: by excising dubious passages, downplaying their moral turpitude by literary analysis, or rereading them as theological or cosmological allegories. Homeric scholarship thus developed not only as a method to elucidate unclear parts of the text, but as part of a program attempting ‘to extract from this fundamentally profane epic a veritable catechism’.³

By the second century, the scope of these Homeric studies was massively varied, and various strands were often in bitter conflict with each other. Froma Zeitlin notes that ‘Greek culture never developed the notion of a sacred book, whose authority would rely on its status as divine revelation and on its textual claims to unvarying truth.’⁴ Zeitlin is surely right about Homer; but the casual remark that the notion of a sacred book forecloses interpretational difficulties by ‘textual claims to unvarying truth’ are given the lie by even the most conservative history of biblical interpretation in Jewish or Christian traditions. It is precisely because the biblical texts present truth variably that the resources of Homeric interpretation are so useful to Christian scholars. Indeed, one of the most obvious ways in which Homer might be sensibly described as the bible of the Greeks is that both texts gave rise systems of interpretation which relativise the face-value of the text. So although Clement’s Christian audience may have been sceptical about the possibly of divine

³ Marrou (1956) 10.
inspiration for Homer, they are perhaps more attuned than many other readers to the possibility of divine inspiration being hidden in a text.

CLEMENT AND THE SCHOLIASTS

The most basic kinds of questions which the Homeric text was wont to give rise, especially for students, were linguistic ones: unusual forms, *hapax legomenoi*, and odd uses of grammar and vocabulary. The Alexandrian tradition was particularly concerned with these issues in its text-critical and exegetical efforts, finding their greatest exponents in Aristophanes of Byzantium and his successor, Aristarchus. These issues are the therefore ones that tend to receive coverage in the earliest strata of scholia, stemming from this Alexandrian tradition, and were marked out by the development of critical signs for Homer by Zenodotus, Aristophanes and Aristarchus in the third and second centuries BC. But these questions only arise because the Homeric texts are already assumed to be fundamentally part of the educational curriculum, and valuable in themselves – hence their proper form and a proper linguistic understanding of them are matters worthy of debate.

In keeping with this, Homer, to Clement, is ὁ ποιητῶν πρεσβύτατος (5.1.2.2); this is not merely a generic adjective to denote respect for Homer, but a specifically directed claim about the authority of Homer as a standard reference tool.

«Μακάριος ὁ λέγων εἰς ὥτα ἀκουόντων» πίστις δὲ ὥτα ψυχής, καὶ ταῦτα αἰνίσσεται τὴν πίστιν ὁ κύριος λέγων «ὁ ἔχων ὥτα ἀκούειν ἀκουότων», ἵνα δὴ πιστεύσας συνῆ ἐ̣ λέγει, ὡς λέγει. ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὢμηρος ὁ ποιητῶν πρεσβύτατος ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ἀκούειν, εἰδικῶ ἀντὶ γενικοῦ, χρησάμενος «μᾶλλον ἡ φράσεις· τοῦ ἐκλεμυν αὐτοῖς» γράφει.⁵

⁵ Str. 5.1.2.1-2.
‘Happy is the one who speaks in the ears of those who hear’. Now faith is the ears of the soul, and this faith is what the Lord hints at when he says, ‘He that has ears to hear, let him hear’; so that by believing he may comprehend what he says, as he says it. Indeed, even Homer, the oldest of the poets, using the word ‘hear’ instead of ‘perceive’ – the specific for the generic term--writes: ‘Him most they heard’.

The collection of quotations here is a paradigmatic example of the combined use of the key sources of literary authority available to an early Greek Christian – the LXX, the New Testament, and the Odyssey. Clement inserts them near the opening of a lengthy and complex discussion on faith, which runs the whole chapter: he argues that faith is the necessary prerequisite for being able to properly hear and receive knowledge regarding God, and is two-fold: it exists in an initial state, and is capable of improvement. The references to ears and hearing in the biblical quotations are read as referring to faith (that which allows perception) and comprehension (the act of making sense of what is said). What is ostensibly solid practical advice from Sirach is interpreted here as a spiritual allegory.

Homer is adduced here only to lend weight to Clement’s interpretation of these biblical passages; he claims that ἀκούειν legitimately can be interpreted as αἰθάνεοθαι more generally, because such an interpretation is true in the case of the text of the Odyssey. This is a methodological interjection of Homeric interpretation, directly applied to biblical criticism. One of the key principles of interpreting Homer properly was the maxim,

---

6 Sirach 25:9. In the received text of the LXX the verse reads: μακάριος ὁς εἴρετο φρόνησιν, καὶ ὁ δηγούμενος εἰς ἅτα ἀκουόντων·
7 Mt. 11:15 et alia.
8 Odyssey 6.185.
9 Mt. 11:15; Mk. 4:9; Rev. 2:29; etc.
‘elucidate Homer from Homer’, possibly originating with Aristarchus; here the principle is implicitly extended to the elucidation of one inspired text by another inspired text. The audience’s experience of Homeric interpretational strategies is brought to bear on unfamiliar material, possibly rendering the biblical texts as equally authoritative, but certainly making the application of sophisticated reading strategies seem natural.

The more closely one looks at Clement’s choice of intertext, the more interesting this interpretational cross-fertilisation becomes. The line of Homer quoted is a textual crux; the passage is from Odyssey 6:

οὐ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γε κρείσσον καὶ ἄρειον,  
ἡ δὲ ὁμοφρονέοντε νοήμασιν ὁίκον ἔχετον  
ἀνὴρ ἤδε γυνὴ: πόλλα ἀλγει δυσμενέσσω,  
χάρματα δ᾽ εὐμενέτεσσι, μάλιστα δὲ τ᾽ ἐκλυον αὐτοί.  

For there is nothing greater or better than this, when man and wife inhabit their home, at unity in their thoughts; it is a great grief to their foes, but a joy to those who wish them well, and they know it best themselves.

The exact meaning of the last clause presents difficulties. Does it mean ‘they have the highest reputation’, with κλύω functioning as the passive of λέγω? Or does it mean ‘they recognise it best themselves’. The passage is puzzling to modern commentators, and evidently the sense needed some explanation to ancient readers as well – there is a scholion

10 Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὅμηρου σαφηνίζειν. In fact, the phrase is first found in the text of Porphyry Qu. Hom., and even there not in reference to Aristarchus or his scholarship; still, ‘the sense of his formula does not disagree with Aristarchus’ opinion’. Pfeiffer (1968) 226, who goes on to list parallels in the scholia.
11 Od. 6.182-5.
12 So Hooker (1980).
13 The comments in various commentaries ad loc. all say much the same regarding the interpretational difficulty – e.g. Garvie (1994), Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989), Stanford (1947).
which glosses ἔκλυνον as αἰσθάνονται.\textsuperscript{14} This is precisely the word Clement reads into the passage; it would be no stretch to suggest that Clement is actually working from an annotated Alexandrian copy of the Odyssey with some variant of the scholion as we have it.\textsuperscript{15} Clement could have reused συνίημι as the verb of perception/understanding from the sentence before; it is possible that it is merely a change of verb for the sake of variatio; but then the point of the passage is the applicability of a fixed exchange between words which ‘hint at’ (αἰνίσσεται) another level of meaning; repetition would be entirely appropriate (and we already have a great deal of repetition of ἀκούω, ὄτα and λέγω). So the likelihood is that Clement is demonstrating a direct engagement with known, mainstream, Homeric scholarship.

Even if the connection to this scholion must remain inconclusive, the verb αἰνίσσομαι, used here by Clement in explaining the biblical passage, is an interpretational term used extensively in scholia. It covers a range of meanings, from ‘hint at’, to ‘allude to’, to ‘express allegorically’,\textsuperscript{16} and becomes almost a technical term for allegorical interpretation for the Neo-Platonists.\textsuperscript{17} Whilst the interpretation here does not engage in allegorical interpretation of the Homeric text, it does point towards technical scholarly interpretation of the biblical text.

\textsuperscript{14} A number of scholia provide roughly similar glosses: ἢτοι αἰσθάνονται καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς ὑφελείας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλους καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν. This is the reading of EP and Q; B. reads very similarly: Dindorf (1855) 310. For the D Scholia, see Ernst (2006) 161.

\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, Plutarch, in Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat, has passages close or identical to the D and bT scholia. See Hunter and Russell (2011) 9-10.


\textsuperscript{17} It is used from the time of Plato (and even earlier) to mark out secondary meanings of myths or stories: Lamberton (1986) 48.
The reference to Homeric scholarship within the context of this technical vocabulary seems to be a deliberate attempt to draw a connection between the kinds of reading that an educated Alexandrian is used to associating with Homer and the reading that is possible of the bible. The Homeric quotation only goes to demonstrate a minor detail of the allegorical interpretation provided, the key point of which is the interpretation of ‘ears’ as ‘faith’. Homer is adduced less to provide support for a lexical argument, than to provide a gateway for legitimizing a particular kind of approach to the biblical text.

CLEMENT AND THE ALLEGORISTS

Allegorical interpretations of Homer possess a long and distinguished pedigree; whilst allegory is a notoriously difficult term to define, I use it here in its broadest capacity, an approach to literature which sees beneath the surface meaning of the text a deeper and truer meaning. Many of the examples of allegory I take up in this chapter and the next are on the border between full-blown allegoresis, poetic illustration, and descriptive metaphor, but it is clear that all these appropriations of Homer are on a continuum and feed into one another.

Whilst some forms of allegorical interpretation are clearly rooted in a desire to rescue Homer (and other poets) from charges of immorality levelled by the philosophers, as a method of reading it may well predate most of these concerns, and certainly stands as an

---


19 See Montiglio (2011) 17.
independent strain of ancient literary criticism. A scholion attributes the earliest allegorical interpretations to Theagenes of Rhegium, in the sixth century BC, although it has been argued that it could predate even that, with some evidence that Pherecydes of Syros, born not much later than 600 BC, may have interpreted some mythic sections of Homer allegorically. It seems clear from a celebrated passage in the Republic that by Plato’s time, the whole of both the Iliad and the Odyssey had undergone allegorical interpretation.

Allegorical exegetes were also more than aware of what was at stake in their interpretations of Homer; one of the fiercest later commentators on Homer is quite prepared to admit that the value of Homeric literature stands or falls on whether it can be read allegorically. A face-value reading fails the ethical text which was, as we have seen, core to the case of his detractors:

μέγας ἀπ’ οὐρανοῦ καὶ χαλεπός ἄγων Ὅμηρῳ καταγγέλλεται περὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον ὀλιγωρίας πάντα γὰρ ἡσέβησεν, εἰ μηδὲν ἠλληγόρησεν. ἱερόσυλοι δὲ μούθοι καὶ θεομάχου γέμοντες ἀπονοίας δι’ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν σωματίων μεμήνασιν.

It is a weighty and damaging charge that heaven brings against Homer for his disrespect of the divine. If he meant nothing allegorically, he was impious through and through, and sacrilegious fables, loaded with blasphemous folly, run riot through both epics.

---

20 Some scholars still follow a schema dividing allegoresis into ‘defensive’ and ‘positive’ camps, as described in Trapp (1996) although a convincing critique is offered in the introduction to Struck (2004), especially at 14-15. Modern scholarly discussion of allegoresis owes much to the pioneering work of Buffière (1956) and Pépin (1958) both of whom focused on myth. More recently attention has been given to allegorical interpretation as a literary-critical practice, in particular by Lamberton (1986) and Struck (2004).
21 A D-Scholion on Il. 20.67; see van der Poll (2001) 188 n.35.
22 Tate (1927).
23 Resp. 2.378d; see Lamberton (1986) ix.
24 Heraclitus, Quaestiones Homericae 1.1-3.
The Stoic allegorical reader is calling the bluff of Epicurean and Academic critics of allegory: either accept both Homer and allegory, or reject Homer entirely. Some of the resultant readings seem, to modern eyes, rather forced, although this may not have been the case in antiquity. Certainly they gained wide currency and are well represented, not only in extreme texts like Heraclitus’, but also in more moderate defences of the poet, such as Plutarch’s *Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat*.

On the other hand, it does not give our intellectual forebears enough credit to assume that what seem to us clearly outlandish readings of poetic texts were swallowed hook, line and sinker. The complaint levelled against Stoic allegory in Cicero’s *De natura deorum* by Velleius is that ‘even the remotest poets appear to have been Stoics, even though they had never dreamed of such doctrines’. Allegorical readings were also, from very early on, disputed as too subtle or unconvincingly applied; Plato, again, provides the locus classicus for the case against:

26 See Brisson (2004) 41-55. Some Epicureans were more than happy to take this choice and reject Homer: Epicurus reportedly told his disciple Pythocles *παιδείαν πᾶσαν...φεῦγε τάκάτιον ἀράμενος* (Fr. 162 Usener). See Asmis (1991).

27 Cf. Lamberton (1986) viii on ‘formulations and exegeses that are not without an element of the absurd’. But see the defence of the reasonableness of ancient allegorists in Laird (2003), especially 155-173.

28 E.g. his use of the episode of the Sirens in *Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat* 15d: the young student is Odysseus, the Sirens are poetry, and the mast is the upright standard of reason to which he is tied by the oversight of his elders. Although Plutarch himself seems to reject allegorical reading tout court in *Quomodo adolescens* 19e-f, he is more specifically taking aim at the kind of cosmic allegorical readings employed by authors like Heraclitus; see Hunter (2009) 177. For the popularity of allegoresis in antiquity, see Struck (2004) 17-18; it is not uncommon to find this method of interpretation used as one tool amongst a number – on which see ibid. pp. 18-19.

29 *De natura deorum* 1.41, translation from Brisson (2004) 50; see also Boys-Stones (2003) 189 on the same passage, who notes the same criticism ‘still resonates in discussions of allegory in ancient philosophy’.
We won’t admit stories – whether allegorical or not – about Hera being chained by her son, not about Hephaestus being hurled from Heaven when he tried to help his mother, who was being beaten, nor about the battle of the gods in Homer. The young cannot distinguish what is allegorical from what is not, and the opinions they absorb at that age are hard to erase and apt to become unalterable.

Plato’s criticism is actually quite reserved; rather than rejecting the truth of the assertion of allegorical meaning, he points out the danger of its failure to be recognised.

Later critics are more aggressive. Tatian, the Christian apologist, points out the contradiction exposed if references to the gods are explained allegorically as explanations of cosmology or nature – what can then be behind the shrines and groves to these Olympian divinities who are known principally through myth?

And Metrodorus of Lampsacus, in his treatise concerning Homer, has argued very foolishly, turning everything into allegory. For he says that neither Hera, nor Athena, nor Zeus are

30 Resp. 378d.
31 Oratio ad Graecos 21.3-4.
what those persons suppose who consecrate to them sacred enclosures and groves, but parts of nature and certain arrangements of the elements... But these things we have put forth only for argument's sake; for it is not allowable even to compare our notion of God with those who are wallowing in matter and mud.

What Tatian criticises here is no straw man; Heraclitus engages in precisely this kind of allegorizing, explaining the binding of Hera as referring to the elements (i.e. by etymology, aer): this is the stock-in-trade of Stoic allegoresis, giving physical explanations for divine narratives. His criticism echoes Epicurean attacks on Stoic allegory as preserved by Cicero: *quo quid absurdius quam aut res sordidas atque deformis deorum honore adficere aut homines iam morte deletos reponere in deos, quorum omnis cultus esset futurus in luctu?* Athenagoras presents a similar kind of criticism; after the obligatory moral criticism of the behaviour of the gods in myth and literature, he turns his attack on to allegorical interpreters: if the 'gods' of Homeric myth stand for the elements, then what conception of divinity stands behind them?

εἰ τοίνυν Ζεῦς μὲν τὸ πῦρ, Ἡρα δὲ ἡ γῆ καὶ ὁ ἀήρ Ἀϊδωνεύς καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ Νῆστις, στοιχεῖα δὲ ταῦτα, τὸ πῦρ, τὸ ὕδωρ, ὁ ἀήρ, οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν θεός, οὔτε Ζεῦς, οὔτε Ἡρα, οὔτε Ἀϊδωνεύς ἀπὸ γάρ τῆς ὑλῆς διακριθείσης ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ τούτων σύστασις τε καὶ γένεσις...

If, then, Zeus is fire, and Hera the earth, and Aïdoneus the air, and Nestis water, and these are elements (fire, water, air), none of them is a god, neither Zeus, nor Hera, nor Aïdoneus; for their constitution and origen is from matter separated into parts by god...

---

32 Heraclitus, Quaest. Hom. 22-3:
33 Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.15.38: 'But what could be more ridiculous than this, either to attach divine honour to base and ugly things, or to substitute men now destroyed by death for gods, all of whose worship would be in lamentation?'
34 *Leg.* 21.
35 *Leg.* 22.1: Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἰσως πλάνη ποιητική, φυσικός δὲ τις ἐπ’αὐτοῖς καὶ τοιοῦτος λόγος.
36 *Leg.* 22.2.
Allegorical reading is rejected because (at best) it fails to give a compelling account of divinity, and at worst encourages false worship of created matter. Both of these Christian authors exemplify the Christian approach before Clement: the focus is primarily on the ethical shortcomings of Homer, and sees allegoresis as an (unconvincing) response to charges on those grounds.

Clement builds on these moves; rather than using allegory as ‘defensive’ (i.e. rescuing the poet from charges of naivety or impiety) or supporting it as ‘positive’ (i.e. claiming the poet’s authority for a set of doctrines),37 he rather takes it as diagnostic:

ἄθεοι μὲν δὴ καὶ οὗτοι, σοφία τινὶ άσοφῳ τὴν ὅλην προσκυνήσαντες καὶ λίθους μὲν ἢ ἔξωλα οὐ τιμήσαντες, γήν δὲ τὴν τούτων μητέρα ἑκθειῶσαντες καὶ Ποσειδῶνα μὲν οὐκ ἀναπλάττοντες, ὕδωρ δὲ αὐτὸ προστρεπόμενοι. τί γάρ ἐστι ποτε ἔτερον Ποσειδῶν ἢ ὄγρα τις οὐσία ἐκ τῆς πόσεως ὄνοματοποιουμένη; ὡσπερ ἀμέλει ὁ πολέμιος Ἀρης ἀπὸ τῆς ἄρσεως καὶ ἀναιρέσεως κεκλημένος.38

Indeed, these are atheists, who in some unwise wisdom worshipped matter and though not honouring either stones nor wood, instead deified the earth, the mother of these things, and did not invent Poseidon, but supplicated water itself. For what else is Poseidon other than some moist substance, with the name derived from posis? Just as, for instance, warlike Ares, named from arsis and anairesis.

Rather than mocking the style of interpretation exemplified by Metrodorus, as Tatian does, Clement accepts it as an etymological explanation of where the errors of Greek religion have arisen. The text no longer becomes (as for Tatian and Athenagoras) a dangerous invitation to effective atheism, but a careful diagnosis of, and historical explanation for, the fact of Greek

37 I take these definitions from Trapp (1996); although, as I note earlier, as a definitive schema this is a flawed distinction, in particular circumstances the difference is useful to note.
38 Protrep. 5.64.
atheism. No longer a defensive move to protect the text from charges of immorality, nor a
positive move to show Homeric support for cosmological claims of particular philosophical
schools (as in Metrodorus himself), the allegorical reading becomes a protreptic move,
showing the falseness of Greek religion and therefore pointing us upwards to the true logos.

As an explanation of natural phenomenon, however, Homer also becomes a witness for
Christianity when read in conjunction with the bible, using just the kinds of cosmological
allegoresis as Metrodorus. The logic seems rather inverted to modern ears; but if Homer can
be preserved because, when seeming to talk about the gods, he is actually describing the
physical origins of the universe, then credence can be given to the bible if its account of the
physical world matches the science of the allegorised Homeric passages. Hence:

οὐχὶ καὶ Ὅμηρος, παραφράζων τὸν χωρισμὸν τοῦ ὕδατος ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν
tὴν ἐμφανὴ τῆς ξηρᾶς.

Isn’t even Homer, paraphrasing the retreat of water from land and the clear uncovering of
dry land, when he says of Tethys and Oceanus: ‘For a long time now they abstain from each
other, from their bed and from love.’ [Il. 14.206-7]

The interpretational approach here is a combination of allegorical reading and an
implication of dependency. That is, the creation account of the appearance of land at Genesis
1:9-10 is copied by Homer, and then disguised in allegory. This section is scaffolded around Clement’s appropriation of Aristobulus, one of the earliest Jewish
writers to claim a direct dependence of the Greek tradition on Moses: Str. 5.14.99.3; cf. Eusebius Praep.
ev. 13.12.3ff.

39 Str. 5.14.100.5
40 This section is scaffolded around Clement’s appropriation of Aristobulus, one of the earliest Jewish
strategy in reading the shield of Achilles; it is evidence of divine creation, in accordance with Moses:

καὶ πρὸ τούτου δὲ Ὁμηρος ἐπὶ τῆς ἡφαιστοτεύκτου ἀσπίδος κοσμοποιῶν κατὰ Μωυσέα

ἐν μὲν γαῖαν ἔτευξ', ἐν δ' οὐρανόν, ἐν δὲ θάλασσαν φησίν,

ἐν δὲ τὰ τείρεα πάντα, τὰ τ' οὐρανὸς ἑστεφάνωται.

ὁ γὰρ διὰ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ καταλογάδην συγγραμμάτων ἄδομενος Ζεὺς τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν ἀναφέρει.

And before him [sc. Aratus] Homer, creating the world upon the shield made by Hephaestus, following Moses, says, ‘On it he fashioned earth, and sky, and sea, and all the signs with which the heaven is crowned.’ For Zeus, celebrated through poems and compositions in prose, leads the understanding up to god.

Here most explicitly, Homer is figured as a protreptic text; when understood properly, using the allegorical tools already used by Greek interpreters, the foundational Greek epics are in fact pointing towards the god of the barbarian philosophy.

Elsewhere he gives an account of more deliberate allegorical composition, pointing the way towards the divine; although not specifically relating to Homer, the kind of etymological allegorising is precisely the kind of interpretation we have seen Clement taking from the Stoic readers of the Iliad and the Odyssey:⁴¹

⁴¹ Boys-Stones (2003) draws a distinction between two types of Stoic allegory: an earlier form, which saw truths concealed in poetical texts unbeknownst to their authors as echoes of ancient wisdom, and a latter form which saw the ancient poets deliberately concealing truth. Clement never definitively commits to either side of this divide, and contains elements of both.
πάντες οὖν, ως ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οἱ θεολογήσαντες βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἑλληνες τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπέκρυψαν, τὴν δὲ ἀλήθειαν αἰνίγμασι καὶ συμβόλοις ἀλληγορίας τε αὕ καὶ μεταφοράς καὶ τοιούτοις τισὶ τρόποις παραδεδώκασιν, ὅπως καὶ παρ' Ἑλληνες τὰ μαντεῖα καὶ ὁ γε Ἀπάλλων ὁ Πῦθιος Λοξίας λέγεται. 42

All, then, to put it concisely, who have spoken of the divine, both barbarians and Greeks, have hidden the first principles of things, and delivered the truth in riddles, and symbols, and allegories, [cf. Proverbs 1:6] and metaphors, and tropes like these; such are the oracles among the Greeks, and indeed Pythian Apollo is called Loxias [i.e. crooked or riddling].

Clement goes on to gloss several of the more well-known Pythian utterances - χρόνου φείδου, γνῶθι σαυτὸν – as deliberately short and confusing messages within which deeper meaning is contained. The conclusion, an explanation for an epithet of Apollo, is the interpretative key to the passage. The explanation of Loxias, ‘the elliptical’, is not only evidence for but an exemplification of allegorical reading. Cornutus, the first-century AD etymologising interpreter of myth, explains the cult name in the same way, as against others who explain the epithet by reference to the elliptical orbit of the sun. 43 Clement deliberately makes reference to a tradition of etymological allegory to undergird his argument for the importance of hidden truths in general, which can then be applied to his biblical interpretation. 44

---

42 Str. 5.4.21.4
43 Cf. LSJ s.v. Λοξίας and λοξός; see also Dawson (1992) 24-38, especially 37 on Cornutus’ interpretation of Apollo.
44 If not Cornutus, reference to whom is absent otherwise from Clement’s text, then another exemplar of this strand of mythical interpretation.
THE FUNCTION OF ALLEGORY

All these explanations provide a mechanism as to how the allegorical meanings are there, floating below the poetic surface; but the entire enterprise of allegoresis is still pursued by Plato’s criticism: “The young cannot distinguish what is allegorical from what is not, and the opinions they absorb at that age are hard to erase and apt to become unalterable.” Various reasons are given in the Greek allegorical tradition to explain this compositional quirk. It could be explained as essentially a stylistic choice: either allegory is the method of expression that a philosophical poet would naturally adopt, as Heraclitus claims; or, as Dio Chrysostom suggests, it might be merely a reflection of the then-current fashion; or that the elevated style of allegory is an appropriate reflection of the sublimity of the topics under discussion. Are these stylistic reasons, however, really compelling enough for the dangers which allegory produces?

More convincing explanations from ancient authors stress, as Clement does, the value of concealment – the inspired poets, prophets and philosophers veiled their truths in allegory because they were deliberately attempting to conceal them from the profane:

οὐ μόνοι ἂρα οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων τὰ πολλὰ ἐπεκρύπτοντο, ἄλλα καὶ οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι φασὶ τινα καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἀπόρρητα εἶναι καὶ μὴ πᾶσιν ἐπιτρέπειν ἐντυγχάνειν τούτοις τοῖς γράμμασιν. Άλλα καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ λέγουσι Ζήνωνι τῷ

45 Resp. 378d, quoted above.
47 Quaestiones Homericae 24.
48 Or. 53.3.
49 E.g. Demetrius, On Style 99-102; Hermogenes, On Types 246.
51 It would make a great deal of sense, in my opinion, to emend ἐπιτρέπειν to ἐπιπρέπειν in this line; the change in subject, and absence a direct object, or failure to make ἐπιπρέπειν passive and continue
The Pythagoreans and Plato, then, were not alone in concealing many things, but the Epicureans, too, say both that certain things about him [sc. Epicurus] are unutterable, and that they did not allow everyone to read those writings. The Stoics, however, also say that certain things were written by the first Zeno which they do not lightly entrust to their disciples to read, without them first having given proof as to whether they were legitimately engaged in philosophy. And the Aristotelians claim that some of Aristotle’s treatises are esoteric, while others are common and exoteric.

But even those who put in place the mysteries, as they were philosophers, buried their doctrines under myths, so they would not be clear to everyone. Did they then, by hiding human notions, prevent the unlearned from happening upon them, and was it not useful above all that the holy and blessed vision of things as they really are was hidden away?

---

with τινα as subject, reads awkwardly; for ἐπιτρέπουσι from the following sentence to have been read back in a line or two above would explain the error. The translation would thus read, ‘...and that it was not proper for everyone to read those writings.’

52 5.9.58.1-5; he goes on to say the same about the myths of Plato. On this remarkable passage, see the commentary in Voulet and Le Boulluec (2006) ad loc.
Galen (taught by the Middle Platonist Albinus) explains Hippocrates’ deliberate obscurity: the subject matter is difficult, and expert knowledge is reserved for the *cognoscenti*. Cicero explains *obscuritas*, undoubtedly speaking out of a philosophical tradition, in *De fin.* 2.15:

... sit aliqua culpa eius [sc. Epicuri], qui ita loquat ur, ut non intellegatur. Quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, ‘cognomento qui σκοτεινός perhibetur quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit’, aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis.

... there might be some fault on Epicurus’ part, who speaks in such a way that he cannot be understood. This can be done without reprimand in two ways, either if you do it purposefully, like Heraclitus, ‘who is assigned the surname of the Obscure because he spoke about nature too obscurely’, or when the obscurity is of the subject, and not the words, such as in Plato’s Timaeus.

Plato himself, and Aristotle, also defend the obscurity of their forerunners as deliberate. Plato’s Protagoras catalogues a list of authorities who hide their true meaning; Aristotle can explain the true meaning of the early philosophers even though they wrote in unclear ways.

There are intimations of this from the Derveni papyrus through to the Neoplatonists, with the trope echoed, with slightly differing emphases, by Philo, Origen, Numenius, Varro, and

---

54 *Prot.* 316d. See also *Theaet.* 180c-d.  
the pseudo-Plutarchan *On the Poetry of Homer*. The Stoic philosopher Chaeremon of Alexandria claimed that the ancient Egyptian scribes expressed themselves symbolically in order to hide their wisdom. Wisdom is concealed, it is suggested, either to restrict it to only the appropriate audience, or to protect its abuse by those who do not understand it properly, or to protect people from a dangerously superficial understanding of it.

Chaeremon is an interesting parallel to Clement; he was a first-century AD Egyptian priest (ἱερογραμματεύς) and Stoic philosopher, who, according to the Suda, taught Nero, probably prior to Seneca taking that role in 49, and had been head of the Alexandrian school of grammarians. His writings, now only fragmentary, include allegorizing interpretations of Egyptian religion that saw all its elements as representing the interrelations of the physical world, interpreting ὅλως πάντα εἰς τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ οὐδὲν εἰς ἀσωμάτους καὶ ζώσας οὐσίας.

Most importantly, however, he wrote a work on hieroglyphs which it is likely Clement relies upon in Str. 5.4:

> αὐτίκα οἱ παιδευόμενοι πρῶτον μὲν πάντων τὴν Ἀιγυπτίων γραμμάτων μέθοδον ἐκμαθάνουσι, τὴν ἑπιστολογραφικὴν καλουμένην δευτέραν δὲ τὴν ἱερατικὴν, ἣν χρύνται οἱ ἱερογραμματεῖς ὡστάτην δὲ καὶ τελευταίαν τὴν ἱερογλυφικὴν, ἣς ἢ μὲν ἐστὶ διὰ τῶν πρῶτων στοιχείων κυριολογικὴ, ἢ δὲ συμβολικὴ. τῆς δὲ συμβολικῆς ἢ μὲν κυριολογεῖται

---

60 van der Horst (1984) 9–10 and Test. 1–4 (= Suda s.v. Χαιρήμων, ἱερογλυφικά, Ἀλέξανδρος Αἰγαῖος, and Διονύσιος Ἀλεξανδρεύς).
62 van der Horst (1982).
κατὰ μίμησιν, ἢ δὲ ὡσπερ τροπικῶς γράφεται, ἢ δὲ ἀντικρὺς ἀλληγορεῖται κατὰ τινας ἀινιγμούς.

Now the educated among the Egyptians learn first the system of Egyptian writing called the Epistolographic; secondly, the Hieratic, which the sacred scribes use; and finally, and last of all, the Hieroglyphic, of which one kind in its primary elements is literal, and the other symbolic. And of the Symbolic, one kind speaks literally by imitation, and another is written as it were figuratively; and another is quite allegorical, using certain enigmas.

For an educated audience of the Second Sophistic, this deliberate complexity makes sense: when the cultural achievement of mastery of Greek paideia represents a hefty financial investment and is part of the zero-sum competitive environment of Greek culture, wide dissemination necessarily implies devaluation. It is, in fact, one of the key criticisms made of Christianity by Celsus. Part of Origen’s response buys into this eristic culture, claiming extra levels of insight for the educated who come to Christianity, above and beyond the revelation that is understandable by all.

Clement reminds us frequently of this principle of higher knowledge accessible to advanced Christians. Giving and receiving knowledge too freely is as abhorrent as dispensing and receiving the Eucharist unworthily (1.1.5.1-3; cf. 1 Cor. 11), and as dangerous as giving a knife to a child (1.1.14.3); the ears as well as the tongue must be purified if we are to engage

---

63 Str. 5.4.20.3. This is the only passage in an ancient author which distinguishes correctly between the three types of Egyptian script: van der Horst (1982) 116 and 121 n.12.

64 My thoughts here are particularly influenced by Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital. Cf. Iversen (1961) 24 on the increasing complexity and use of cryptography in Egyptian script from the beginning of the Hellenistic period: ‘its priestly guardians... wanted it to be primarily an instrument of displaying their professional mythical knowledge, and took pains to make the actual writing more complex and intricate, so as to add to the exclusiveness of their art.’

65 E.g. Origen, Contra Celsum 3.44, 45, 49.

66 E.g. Origen, Contra Celsum 3.48-9.
with the truth (1.12.55, cf. Is. 6:6). This has, says Clement, hindered him from writing freely; he might be casting pearls before swine (1.12.55; cf. Matthew 7:6); the Stromateis does have truth hidden in it, but it needs hard work to be discovered – the way to it is narrow, but those who seek shall find (4.2.4-4.2.7). This last passage quotes a string of authorities – Heraclitus, utterances of the Delphic oracle, Sophocles and Timocles, a comic playwright; but it too, like the other passage I have listed, secures its argument around biblical authority.67 So the most advanced Christian teaching is reserved for those who have the ability, educational background and leisure to seek it out, a message warranted by biblical texts and implicitly encouraged by couching it amongst snippets of elite literature.

There is also, however, core to the Christian tradition a high estimation placed on wisdom being accessible to even (and even especially) those who are not the elite and the highly cultured. When Celsus claims that Christians appeal to the simple, women, and the uneducated, he expects the Greek elite to read it as a criticism; but it is in fact a Christian boast made both in the New Testament and by the second-century apologists. St Paul’s explicit rejection of traditional cultural divisions,68 as well as his valorisation of the uneducated as able to access wisdom,69 build on Jesus’ words as reported in the gospels, go against the grain of this kind of exclusionary compositional practice.70 This radical opennes of Christianity is fiercely defended by the apologists:

... φιλοσοφοῦσί τε οὐ μόνον οἱ πλουτοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ πένητες προῖκα τῆς
didaskalías ἀπολαύσωσιν· τὰ γὰρ παρὰ θεοῦ τῆς ἐν κόσμῳ δωρεᾶς ὑπερπαίει τὴν

67 Matt. 7:14, 11:12, and 7:7, and Job 5:25. On the latter part of this passage, see above Ch. 2.
68 E.g. Gal. 3:28: οὐκ ἐνὶ Ἰουδαίος οὐδὲ Ἑλλην, οὐκ ἐνὶ δοῦλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἐνὶ ἄρσεν καὶ θηλυκόν τῶν ἡμῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.
69 E.g. 1 Cor. 1:18-25.
70 E.g. Mt. 11:25.
ἄμοιβήν. τούς δὲ ἀκροάσθαι βουλομένους πάντας οὕτως προσιέμεθα κἀν πρεσβύτιδες ὡς κἀν μειράκια... 71

Not only do the wealthy philosophize, but the poor, too, have the benefit of instruction for free; for the things which come from God surpass the payment of gifts of this world. So we allow those who desire to hear, even old women and youths...

Thus a defence of allegory as a mechanism to hide the truth from the majority, whilst compatible with Christianity insofar as it presents itself as a religion of initiation, does not sit comfortably with Christianity’s self-presentation as a system of truth accessible to everyone.

Even more, whilst from an etic perspective it is easy to see why there was such fierce objection to wide dissemination of philosophical truth, in order to gain a competitive advantage, it is difficult to find an ancient emic perspective that could defend it consistently. What, exactly, is the problem with disseminating truth? This is a particularly pointed question when the alternative is to disguise the truth allegorically in stories which at face value disseminate bad morals instead. We are back to Plato’s criticism. It also lays allegorising philosophers open to the charge, made frequently in the Second Sophistic, of being more concerned with the externals of philosophy (the beard, the cloak, and the language) than the moral content.

Part of the attraction and purchase of Christianity amongst broader swathes of the population must have been the decoupling of access to philosophical truth from a

71 Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos 32.
prerequisite of expensive education. The solution the *Stromateis* presents both manages to preserve an intellectual elitism, but also presents the possibility of more open access to higher truth:

ἄλλα καὶ οἱ παρὰ τούτων τῶν προφητῶν τὴν θεολογίαν δεδιδαγμένοι ποιηταὶ δι᾿ ὑπονοίας πολλὰ φιλοσοφοῦσιν, τὸν Ὅρφεα λέγω, τὸν Λίνον, τὸν Μουσαίον, τὸν Ὄμηρον καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ταύτῃ σοφοὺς. παραπέτασμα δὲ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἡ ποιητικὴ ψυχαγωγία· διενέχονται οἱ ποιηταὶ ὑπονοίας φιλοσοφοῦσιν. Ὅρφεα λέγω, Ὀρφέα, Ὅμηρον, Ἡσίοδον ὁμοίως, τὸν Λίνον, τὸν Μουσαίον, τὸν Ὄμηρον καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ τοὺς ταύτῃ σοφοὺς.

But the poets, taught in theology by these prophets, philosophize many things by covert meaning: I am speaking of Orpheus, Linus, Musaeus, Homer, and Hesiod, and those wise in this way. Poetic persuasion is for them a veil for the many. Dreams and signs are all more or less obscure to humans, not from jealousy (for it is not right to conceive of God as subject to passions), but in order that the act of searching, leading into the understanding of puzzles, might rise up to the discovery of truth.

The importance of the act of concealment is not only that it protects the truth for those who are not prepared for it; it also prepares people for the full reception of the truth. It is protreptic and pedagogical as well as protective. If we envisage the truth as dialogic rather than propositional, the art of concealment makes sense. Unlike traditions which Clement earlier references (the Egyptian and the Hebrew), where access behind the veil, παραπέτασμα, is restricted to particular priestly classes, here, the lifting of the veil is achieved by the process of recognising the veiled nature of the truth and attempting to

---

72 Str. 5.4.24.1-2.
73 Str. 5.4.19.3-4.
uncover it: εὑρεσις is dependent upon ζήτησις. All that is required is a desire to search, which will unlock the truth.

CONCLUSION

Clement’s utilisation of Homeric interpretational methods for reading the bible place these two textual bodies on an equal footing. The reading strategies necessary for Christian appropriation of the Old Testament are thus normalised and seen not as forced allegoresis, but necessary and natural tools for the reading of any inspired text. Clement, moreover, provides a more convincing reason for the concealment of truth in allegory – the idea that reading is itself formative of character and identity. The moral dangers of which Plato warns are real and present; but they are an unavoidable part of the process of developing the truth as a reader; all one needs is to seek the truth, and discovery will result.

Moreover, Clement extends this from an interpretational principle into a compositional principle. Rather than drawing a divide between his own work and canonical predecessors, he equates his writing with the authoritative tradition – just as he conflates his writing with the spoken authority of his teachers.74 Clement encourages us to approach the Stromateis in precisely the same way, with the same hermeneutical reverence, with which we should approach Homer or Isaiah. How, then, should we approach them? Clement, Plato, Homer, and the scriptures, according to the Stromateis, all draw their authority from a common source, the unitary Logos, a divine voice which speaks through all literature that contains the truth, however fragmentary.

74 See above, Chapter 1.
Nowhere is the influence of allegorical reading more evident than in the interpretation of the character of Odysseus. This chapter will focus on Odyssean themes and tropes as an acute case of the reappropriation and re-adoption of Homer as a Christian protreptic. The figure of Odysseus is particularly good ground in which to work. First, the depth of the philosophical tradition built up around the character gives us more opportunity to watch Clement co-opting and resisting the Greek philosophical tradition in which he is so embedded. Philosophers, in the words of Silvia Montiglio, found Odysseus ‘good to think with’, and that continues with Christian interpreters. Just as importantly, whereas most of the engagement with Homer we have seen so far relies on brief quotations and short, sharp borrowings in pursuit of broader points, in the case of Odysseus we have some of the few examples of Clement dealing at greater length with interpretation of broader swathes of narrative. Moreover, we see Clement coming back to the same texts more than once to re-interpret and re-use Homeric material for different purposes.

Odysseus, in Laura Nasrallah’s terminology, is the original ‘Vitruvian man’ and the figure who becomes the ‘creator of a Greek understanding of space and the organizer of a Greek space of understanding’; Strabo states that ἀρχηγέτην εἶναι τῆς γεωγραφικῆς ἐμπειρίας Ὅμηρον. When so much of the Christian project for any early Christian author, but Clement in particular, is reshaping the geographical contours of the world around its margins, and

---

1 Montiglio (2011) 2.
4 Geographica 1.1.2: ‘Homer is the founder of the science of geography.’
relativising claims of race and citizenship, a character whose *mythos* encapsulates these very things is a precious resource. More so when that character’s key trait, from his earliest Homeric presentation onwards, is adaptability;¹ he is, according to the analogies offered by readers as widely dispersed as Eustathius and Theognis,⁶ like a chameleon or an octopus (reputed to change its colour to match the rocks to which it clings),⁷ and therefore no bad exemplar for a Greek author claiming to be both a Roman citizen and a barbarian philosopher.

A Christian interpretation and adoption of the figure of Odysseus is staking a claim of Christian identity in the heartland of Greek literary self-consciousness, a direct counter-attack on the kinds of criticism aired by Celsus on the foreignness of Christianity.⁸ In many ways, however, the appropriation of the character is not just tendentious but most apposite for Christianity: Odysseus, the archetypal wandering exile, prefigures the New Testament language of the exilic nature of Christian identity which echoes powerfully throughout early Christian literature.⁹ There was even a popular etymology of the name Ulixes which claimed it was derived from ὅλων χένος, ‘a stranger to all things’.¹⁰ Clement, too, on another level is an exilic figure, not only because of his self-presentation as a barbarian from within Greek culture, but also because from a broader perspective he stands at a liminal point in the

---

⁵ Stanford (1963) 7.
⁶ Stanford (1963) 118.
⁷ Theognis 215-18; cf. Odyssey 5.432-3, where Odysseus is likened to an octopus clinging to the sea-rocks. See Nagy (1985) 75-6.
⁸ E.g. apud Origen, *Contra Celsum* 5.25, 33.
⁹ E.g. 1 Peter 2:11 and Hebrews 11. See Norris (2004b) 71-2 on the theme of exile in early Christian literature. This is, of course, not a theme unique to Christians; The figure of the exiled philosopher as a paradigm of integrity appears in Musonius Rufus’ *That Exile is not an Evil*, Dio Chrysostom’s thirteenth oration, and Favorinus’ *On Exile*; see Whitmarsh (2001) 133-80.
development of a new late-antique intellectual culture.\textsuperscript{11} Standing in between Stoic moral allegory and Neo-Platonic metaphysical allegory, Clement borrows elements of the one and prefigures elements of the other, but often not in clear or obvious ways. His approach to the Homeric text is often subtle and requires careful parallel reading of the two texts side-by-side to understand the nuances of his appropriations.

**ODYSSEUS AS THE ARCHETYPE OF THE SOUL.**

By the time of the Second Sophistic, Odysseus had been adopted by the philosophical schools:

... all of which regarded him as the embodiment of their ideal of humanity: a cynical Odysseus, a beggar in his own palace, stoical in his ability to endure, scorning pleasure, and a butt of hostile fortune; an Odysseus able to resist the attraction of the Siren temptations; an allegory now of pleasure, now of poetry and knowledge.\textsuperscript{12}

This is not merely a modern judgment; the ancients were themselves conscious of the Protean nature of Odysseus:

nam modo Stoicum illum faciunt, virtutem solam probantem et voluptates refugientem et ab honesto ne inmortalitatis quidem pretio recedentem, modo Epicureum, laudantem statum quietae civitatis et inter convivia cantusque vitam exigentis, modo Peripateticum, tria bonorum genera inducentem, modo Academicum, omnia incerta dicentem.\textsuperscript{13}

For sometimes they make him a Stoic, approving nothing but virtue and fleeing pleasures, and departing from honour not even for the gain of immortality; sometimes they make him an Epicurean, praising the condition of a state in repose, and leading life amongst banquets and singing; sometimes a Peripatetic, setting out three kinds of goodness; sometimes an Academic, saying all things are uncertain.

\textsuperscript{11} Stroumsa (1999) \textit{2 et passim} on the ‘new paideia’ of Christian antiquity.

\textsuperscript{12} Hartog (2001) 35.

\textsuperscript{13} Seneca, \textit{Epistle 88.5}
Although the subject of Seneca’s statement here is Homer himself, rather than Odysseus, it is clear from the episodes glossed here that the character of Odysseus is foremost in Seneca’s mind; indeed, ‘to identify Odysseus’ wisdom with Homer’s own was becoming a fashionable exercise.’ Odysseus, for the philosophers, was the figure of the archetypal human, travelling (or travailling) through its earthly existence. By the Imperial period, this figure of Odysseus was not merely prevalent in the philosophical schools, but extended into school teaching, and even popular artistic culture: the series of Odyssey landscapes on the Esquiline from around 30 BC assumes some knowledge of the philosophical Odysseus.

Unlike the majority of Stoic allegory, especially of the Iliad, understanding elements of Homeric myth as referring to physical realities or cosmogenic truths, the narrative of Odysseus was also given moral, and later, metaphysical, significance. Prior to the Neo-Platonist interpretations, Odysseus is the ideal man, and the challenges he faces are moral

---

14 Montiglio (2011) 93; Buffière (1956) 321 n.72. Cf. also De const. sap. 2.1: nullam enim sapientem nec iniuriam accipere nec contumeliam posse, Catonem autem certius exemplar sapientis uiri nobis deos inmortalis dedisse quam Vlixem et Herculem prioribus saeculis. Hos enim Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiauerunt, invictos laboribus et contemptores voluptatis et uictores omnium terrorum.
15 Montiglio (2011) 125.
16 This philosophical interpretation of the figure of Odysseus first seems to appear amongst the followers of Socrates in response to a general suspicion of the character found in much of fifth-century literature; although earlier forebears of philosophy (as a self-conscious discipline) seem to have built aspects of their self presentation as ‘the knowledgeable man’ or the inquisitive traveller on Odysseus. See Montiglio (2011) 12-13, and Marincola (2007) 6-7 on Parmenides and Democritus.
18 O’Sullivan (2007); see also Montiglio (2011) 124-5.
19 Although distinct from the physical allegory of the Stoics, it is nonetheless evident from the earliest Stoic approaches to Homer, with Odysseus as the ideal homo viator. Zeno emphasized the moral value of the poem; though nothing of his specific references to Odysseus survives, there are indications of this in the preserved fragments (SVF 1.66-7). Epictetus, following in these footsteps, sees Odysseus as a type of the Stoic Citizen of the World (Discourses 3.24.13), exemplifying Stoic virtues: his piety (Discourses 1.12.3); his self reliance when naked on shore of Phaeacia (3.26.33-4); an exemplar of manliness – as apparent in beggar’s rags as princely robes (fr. 11, 26); Epictetus even criticises Homer for misrepresenting him, because a true Stoic would not have cried so much (Arrian, Diss. 3.24.18-20). See Stanford (1963) 121.
obstacles to gaining one’s inner self, fulfilling one’s obligations as a citizen, or maintaining steadiness of mind – all Stoic readings of ‘Ithaca’. By the time of the Neo-Platonists, however, Ithaca became a metaphysical fatherland and Odysseus not merely man, but the soul. This allegoresis assumed the survival of the soul after death, and this world is seen not as the soul’s true home, but a place of dangerous exile.

Silvia Montiglio sees this shift to Neo-Platonic metaphysical allegoresis as a ‘major break in the history of [Odysseus’] interpretations’. Although the ground for this move is laid by the Middle Platonists and Neo-Pythagoreans, especially Maximus of Tyre and Numenius, none of the earlier philosophical interpreters go so far as to make Ithaca a metaphysical homeland. We will see that Clement, influenced as he was by that Middle Platonic tradition, straddles this decisive break in allegorical interpretation. A generation before the flowering of Neo-Platonic exegesis we see in Clement a forerunner of their interpretational methods and metaphysical approach to inspired literature.

The overarching metaphor common to both Neo-Platonists and their predecessors is of life as a journey, travelling towards its true home beyond the strictures of its current state (metaphysically or morally), represented by the dangers of the sea. This metaphor exists in Greek literature (and early Christian literature) independently of the Odysseus myth; Clement combines it with Christian imagery in his hymn to Christ the saviour:

---

20 E.g. Seneca, Ep. 123.12; 66.26; Epictetus apud Arrian Diss. 2.23.36-9; see Montiglio (2011) 13; 84-92.
22 Montiglio (2011) 13-14; Lamberton (1986) 54-77 on Numenius; Lamberton notes the difficulty in assessing Numenius’ own contribution to the development of Homeric allegory, as our major source are repeated but non-direct references in Porphyry’s Cave of the Nymphs.
23 Cf. Berthelot (2012) who argues similarly that ‘Philo can... be considered closer to the Neo-Platonic tradition of allegorical interpretation... than to the Stoic one’ (155).
ἁλιεῦ ἡμέρων
τῶν σωζόμενων
πελάγους κακίας,
ιχθὺς ἁγνὸς
κύματος ἐχθροῦ
γλυκῆς ζωῆς δελεάζων.  

Fisher of mortals saved from the sea of evil, catching the holy fish from the hostile swell with sweet life.

The primary reference is biblical, the calling of Simon Peter and Andrew at Matt. 4:18-20, which is itself tied to a history of early Christian symbolism of fish, both literary and pictorial, rooted partly in Old Testament imagery.  

This is combined, however, with distinctly Hellenic philosophical elements, the figuration of the sea as representative of the mortal peril from which we are saved. The connections between this and Neo-Pythagorean and later Neo-Platonic interpretation which saw the sea as representative of material, as opposed to spiritual, existence, are clear: Clement’s near-contemporary Numenius interprets the prophecy that Odysseus will end his life amongst people ‘who do not know the sea’ as a shift from material to spiritual existence.

Thus as the quintessential seafarer Odysseus is never far from hand as the archetype of the human life beset by dangers. The force of this allegorical interpretation of Odysseus as the soul is perhaps seen most clearly in Clement’s writing where Odysseus is, in fact, rejected as

---

26 Odyssey 11.122-3.
27 Des Places (1973) Fr. 33; see 84 n.2 for Platonic interpretation of the sea as the material world. See also van der Poll (2001) 193.
an exemplar. In the *Protrepticus*, Clement contrasts the attitude of the Christian with that of the hero:

«ἡλπίκαμεν γὰρ ἐπὶ θεῷ ζῶντι, δὲ ἐστὶ σωτήρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων, μάλιστα πιστῶν.» οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι περιπεφυκότες τῷ κόσμῳ, οία φυκία τινὰ ἐνάλοις πέτραις, ἀθανασίας ολιγωροῦσιν, καθάπερ ὁ Ἰθακήσιος γέρων ὁ οὗ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἐν οὐρανῷ πατρίδος, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος Ἰμείρομενοι φωτός, ἀλλὰ τοῦ καπνοῦ.28

'I for we trust in the living god, who is the saviour of all men, especially of those who believe.' [I Tim. 4:10] But the others, clinging to the world, like some kind of seaweed to rocks by the ocean, care little for immortality, just like the ancient from Ithaca not longing for the truth or for their homeland in heaven, not even for the true light, but for smoke.

On one level, this kind of anti-Odyssean and anti-Homeric stance fits with our earlier comments on Clement’s pose in the *Protrepticus*; here, though, rather than a principled Platonic stand, there are greater resonances with the Second Sophistic orators;29 Dio Chrysostom’s *Oratio* 11 mocks all the achievements of the Homeric heroes, and criticises Homer for being, like his favourite hero, a liar;30 Lucian makes the same charge when he has Homer reclining at feast in the place above Odysseus.31 It seems that there was heated debate in the early Imperial period over Odysseus’ praise of the good life in *Odyssey* 9, much of which targeted Odysseus’ hedonistic leanings;32 for Lucian, Odysseus even becomes the exemplar of the parasite in *De parasito*. Once again, what looks like the rejection of Greek culture is in fact self-construction as an intellectual within the debates of Imperial Greek literary interpretation.

28 9.86.1-2.
29 See Montiglio (2011) 125; Stanford (1963) 146.
30 Or. 11.17, 34; cf 11.134.
31 *Verae historiae* 2.15; cf. 1.3 and 2.20.
32 The scholion on Od. 9.5 gives a synopsis of the complaints; cf. Asmis (1991).
The charge of laxity is functioning, however, on a philosophical level: Odysseus is the type of the soul concerned only for his temporal, rather than an everlasting, home. Clement’s criticism implies a traditional Stoic kind of allegory of Odysseus – that his challenges are human and moral ones; but this, for Clement, is a cause for blame rather than praise. The kind of Stoic oikeiosis that sees man finding his proper place within the confines of the world as it is is insufficient for Clement’s view of man with an immortal soul. It is an adoption of a recognised style of Stoic reading, the effect of which is to radically undermine the Stoic position.

Moreover, the ammunition which Clement uses for this ambush is taken from within the Greek philosophical tradition itself: the simile of the seaweed and rocks derives from the picture of the soul in in Plato’s *Republic*. Clement’s point of entry into the Odyssean narrative is Plato’s exhortation to examine the soul only when raised out of the sea in which it is mired and cleansed of its rocks and barnacles. The attack against Greek exemplars is in fact on closer reading an exemplification of the shortcomings of Stoic moral philosophy. Although Clement comes across as forcefully anti-Homeric, taking a Platonic stand against the epics, the possibility of a positive allegorical reading is implicit even here – if we can go so far as to equate the sea with the exigencies of bodily existence, then it is a natural step to equate the longed-for Ithaca as the release from them in our true heavenly home, and Odysseus as the ideal of the Christian soul.

---

33 See Montiglio (2011) 66-94 with references.
34 This is similar to the contrast noted earlier in Chapter 4 between the Stoic cosmopolitan view of the cosmic city (i.e. one’s part in the ordered universe), and Clement’s heavenly version.
35 *Resp.* 611d-612a.
We see a glimpse of this equation early in the *Stromateis*, where Odysseus is modelled as the ideal Christian gnostic:


We also praise the experienced helmsman, who has seen ‘the cities of many peoples’ [Odyssey 1.3], and the doctor who has developed a great deal of experience; thus some imagine the empiric physician. But the one bringing to bear every example, taking them both from the Greeks and from the barbarians, on an upright life - this man is an experienced tracker of the truth and is truly the ‘many-wiled’ [Iliad 1.311 et passim], just like the touchstone (which is the Lydian stone believed to distinguish false from genuine gold); and he is capable, our ‘man of many skills’ [Od. 15.459], our gnostic, of distinguishing sophistry from philosophy, the art of embellishment from athletics, cookery from medical skill, and rhetoric from dialectic, and beyond the others, even the other sects following the barbarian philosophy from the truth.

Two specific references to Homeric descriptions of Odysseus are used here to describe the γνωστικός, the Christian gnostic who is the end-product of Clement’s educational process; one of them an oft-used epithet, the other from the programmatic opening of the Odyssey.36

More than that, what is praised here is the application of experience and breadth of knowledge to the development of one’s thought and character. Core to the Christian claims

36 πολύιδρις is a less clear reference; it occurs twice in the Odyssey (15.458, 23.82) and is a striking piece of epic diction to use, but does not describe Odysseus – rather, it refers to the deceptive Phoenecian in Eumaeus’ tale; it may be that the trickery of the Phoenecian has elided in Clement’s memory with Odysseus’ propensity for such behaviour.
to knowledge is a willingness to utilise foreign sources, and it is in pursuit of this that Odysseus is brought to bear as an exemplar.

**AVOIDING THE SIRENS**

No Odyssean episode gained greater popularity than the episode of the Sirens; it functions almost as a shorthand for the hardships suffered in Odysseus’ *nostos*. The theme is found repeatedly in artistic representations, either of the Sirens themselves, or the mariner tied to his mast, on bowls, lamps, cake moulds, gems, and the graves and sarcophagi of the late Hellenistic period. Despite the variety of ancient philosophical appropriations of Odysseus, both the importance of this episode, and the general contours of its interpretation, Odysseus’ resistance to pleasure, is largely common ground. The Odyssean encounter with the Sirens occurs in early Christian literature not only as an object for allegorical interpretation, but as literary adornment, occasion for geographical asides, or the cause of a comic anecdote – Synesius recalls a slave tied to a mast on sea-voyage to prevent him from breaking into the wine-jars in the hold, bringing Odysseus to mind. This variety of uses demonstrates the wide currency of the myth; that it should be used more extensively as a tool of theological symbolism is therefore not entirely surprising.

---

37 E.g. it is the first specific Odyssean episode mentioned by Horace in his Ep. 1.2, as a summary of his wanderings. See Pépin (1958) 144-5 and Kaiser (1964a) 109-110: ‘In einem erstaunlichen Maße wurde die Auffassung der homerischen Epen durch solche Topoi bestimmt.’
38 Rahner (1963) 339; E. Wüst’s article in *Realencyklopädie* XVII col. 1974, ll. 60ff.
40 E.g. Origen, *Contra Celsum* 2.76; Libanius writing to Basil in Basil’s *Epistula* 354 (PG 32.1089B).
41 Jerome, *Apologia adversos libros Rufini* 22 (PL 23.473B). This is not, however, solely a geographical aside; Jerome is travelling to Bethlehem and thinks on his schoolroom education as he passes through the straits of Messina; the physical journey from Rome to the Holy Land is figured as a literary journey out of the dangers of pagan writings.
42 *Epistula* 32 (PG 66.1361B).
43 Rahner (1963) 340.
This episode in particular, for Homer’s ancient philosophical readers, encapsulated the essence of the dangers that the soul faced going through life:

\[
\text{ad summam sapiens eris, si cluseris aures, quibus ceram parum est obdere: firmiore spissamento opus est quam in sociis usum Ulixem ferunt. Ila vox quae timebatur erat blanda, non tamen publica: at haec quae timenda est non ex uno scopulo sed ex omni terrarum parte circumsonat.}^{44}
\]

You will be the pinnacle of wisdom, if you block your ears; wax is not enough to stop them up: there is a need for a sturdier plug than they say Odysseus had for the use of his companions. That voice which was feared was alluring, but not broadcast in the open: but that which we must fear doesn’t echo just from one rock, but every part of the world.

If Odysseus is the soul, seeking its homecoming through the changes and chances of this fleeting world, the episode of the Sirens presents one of the most interesting challenges. They are a mixture of the alluring and the dangerous; but more than this, they are a danger which Odysseus deliberately courts.

Originally the Sirens are chthonic entities, vampire-like creatures feeding on the dead, but in the vision of the archaic poets (Homer, but even more so Hesiod and Alcman), and especially through the comedians, ‘these grisly bird-like spectres became, as it were, beautified and were given a somewhat milder character’.\(^{45}\) Through these representations, the Sirens, etymologically ‘entanglers’ or ‘binders’, \(^{46}\) are increasingly associated with erotic

---


\(^{45}\) Rahner (1963) 354; the debate over the physical characteristics of the Sirens (in what proportions they are birds or women) is not relevant here, but see on this question Gresseth (1970).

\(^{46}\) Van Liefferinge (2012) 485; cf. Chantraine (1968-1980) s.v. Σειρήν, connecting it to σείρη; alternatively, it may be connected to Σείριοι – i.e. the great heat of the day, which Plato seems to be
entanglement.\textsuperscript{47} Clement’s first extended reading of the Sirens sees them as symbols of deadly lust, the pleasures of beauty and the flesh which distract us from our heavenly goal, and he exhorts us (in much the same way as Seneca) to take great pains to avoid them:

\begin{verbatim}

φύγωμεν οὖν τὴν συνήθειαν, φύγωμεν ὄλον ἄκραν χαλεπῆν ἢ Χαρύβδεως ἀπειλήν ἢ Ἡσιπήν, μωθικὰς ἄγχει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποτρέπει, ἀπάγει τῆς ἡμῶς, παγίς ἐστιν, βάραθρος ἐστί, λίχνον ἐστὶν κακὸν ἢ συνήθεια: κείνου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἔρευγε νῆα.

φύγωμεν, ὦ συνναῦται, φεύγωμεν τὸ κῦμα τοῦτο, πῦρ ἐρεύγεται, νῆσος ἐστι πονηρὰ ὀστοῖς καὶ νεκροῖς σεσωρευμένη, ἄγχει τὴν ἡμῶς, τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποτρέπει, ἀπάγει τῆς ζωῆς, παγίς ἐστιν, βάραθρος ἐστί, βόθρος ἐστί, λίχνον ἐστὶν κακὸν ἡ συνήθεια·

δεῦρ' ἅγι' ἱών, πολύαιν' Ὀδυσσεί, μέγα κῦδος Ἀχαιῶν, νῆα κατάστησον, ἵνα θειότερην ὀπ' ἀκούσῃς.

ἔπαινε σε, ὦ ναῦτα, καὶ πολυφύλητον λέγει, καὶ τὸ κῦμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἢ πόρνη σφετερίζεται· ἔασον αὐτὴν ἐπινέμεσθαι τοὺς νεκροὺς, πνεῦμά σοι οὐράνιον βοηθεῖ· πάριθι τὴν ἡδονήν, μηδὲ γυνὴ σε νόον πυγοστόλος ἐξαπατάτω, αἷμυλα κωτίλλουσα, τεὴν διφῶσα καλιήν. παράπλει τὴν ψείδην, θάνατον ἐργάζεται.\textsuperscript{48}

Let us flee from custom, let us flee it like a dangerous headland or the threat of Charybdis or the mythical Sirens. It strangles a man, it turns him away from the truth, it leads him away from life, it is a trap, it is a pit; a greedy evil is custom. ‘Steer the ship away from that smoke and wave’ [Od. 12.219-20]. Let us flee, fellow sailors, let us flee that wave; it spews fire, it is an evil island strewn with bones and corpses, and on it sings Pleasure, a harlot in her
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{47} See Kaiser (1964a) on this development; a clear parallel early Christian example of this kind of reading can be found in Ambrose, \textit{De fide ad Gratianum} 3.1.4.

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Protrep.} 12.118.1-3.

\textsuperscript{49} Making allusion to in the \textit{Phaedrus} 259a-d. Marót (1960) 142-9 suggests a Semitic, rather than a Greek, derivation for the name; Gresseth (1970) 204 n.5 describes his argument as ‘\textit{improbabilia per improbabilia}’.
prime, delighting in her vulgar music. 'Come here, renowned Odysseus, great glory of the Achaeans, moor your ship, so that you may hear the divine voice.' [Od. 12.184-5] She praises you, sailor, and she calls you renowned in song, and the whore makes the glory of the Greeks her own. Let her feed on the corpses, a heavenly wind helps you. Pass by Pleasure, it deceives. 'Let a loose woman not deceive your mind, coaxing with wheedling words, searching out your barn.' [Hesiod, Works and Days 373-4] Sail past the song, it works death.49

Although Clement here starts by speaking of συνήθεια as a general concept, the sexual implications of the word come into prominence as the passage progresses.50 This reaches its bluntest, most concrete form with the Hesiodic quotation: μηδὲ γυνὴ σε νόον πυγοστόλος ἐξαπατάτω. Hellenistic allegories tend to focus on this erotic element of the Sirens; Heraclitus the paradoxographer defines the Sirens in much the same language as Clement here, as ἐταίραι ἐκπρεπεῖς.51 Clement also mixes in a line referring to Scylla and Charybdis (Od. 12.219-20), also interpreted as the danger of sensual temptation in Stoic allegory.52 The Neo-Platonists follow suit and the Sirens become symbols of worldly desire which tie the spirit to the earth.53 In the visual arts, the erotic allure of the Sirens is expressed in the figure of a dancing Siren from Memphis and in a sarcophagus statue from Hellenistic Egypt.54

Clement’s description of the Siren as a πόρνη would to a Christian audience be reminiscent of the Whore of Babylon from Rev. 17:1-6, and the echo is probably deliberate;55 the Sirens are already connected to the symbol of Babylon in the Septuagint. In prophetic passages

50 See LSJ s.v. συνήθεια I.1.b.
51 De incredibilitibus 14.
52 Heraclitus, Quaest. Hom. 70.10-11.
53 E.g. Proclus, Comment. in Platonis Cratylium 156; In Rempubl. 34.10.
54 Weicker (1902) 180-1, Figs. 90 and 91.
speaking of Babylon desolate and destroyed, the ruins are said to be inhabited by Sirens.\textsuperscript{56}

The overtones here are not merely of the troubles which a loose woman will cause you in the here-and-now (the obvious force of Hesiod’s words) but eschatologically as one sails over the seas of life towards τοῖς λιμέσι ...τῶν οὐρανῶν.\textsuperscript{57}

The outstanding feature of Clement’s reading of the Siren episode here, however, is the moral exhortation he draws from the story – the Sirens are to be avoided at all costs: ‘Pass by Pleasure! ... Sail past the song, it works death!’ Odysseus’ behaviour, the one who insists on listening to the song, is exactly what Clement exhorts his readers not to do. Clement’s words of advice to his reader echo those of Circe to Odysseus,\textsuperscript{58} in a more concentrated fashion. This is not an unusual way of reading the episode, with a focus on the dangers which the Sirens present, rather than on the behaviour of Odysseus; as a brief literary illustration, this is often how it is used, including by Plato.\textsuperscript{59} Circe’s advice, in this style of reading, is read purely as a warning, and the narrative is one of avoidance of destruction. Circe’s conditional, ἀτὰρ αὐτὸς ἄκουέμεν αἲ κʹ ἔθέλησθα...\textsuperscript{60} and the following action of Odysseus to ensure that he does hear the Sirens, is skipped over in such readings, or even made the subject of criticism.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{56} Isaiah 13:21, 34:13; Jeremiah 50:39. The LXX is translating tannîm and benôt ya’anâh, obscure terms but literally ‘jackals’ and ‘hen ostriches’. Rahner (1963) 357.

\textsuperscript{57} Protrep. 12.118.4.

\textsuperscript{58} Odyssey 12.39-54. Clement quotes directly from this advice, although the warning regarding Scylla and Charybdis, at Str. 3.5.42.4; in a similar vein to here, the advice of the passage is to shun pleasures and lusts entirely.

\textsuperscript{59} Thus Plato: Symposium 216a, Phaedrus 259a; cf. Proclus’ reading of Plato’s Sirens in Comment. in Platonis Cratylum 157; In Rempubl. 34.10; for Christian examples, Ps-Justin Martyr, Cohortatio ad Gentiles 36 (= Morel 34B).

\textsuperscript{60} Odyssey 12.49.

\textsuperscript{61} E.g. Ps-Justin Martyr, Oratio ad gentiles 1 (=Morel 38A): ὅτι δὲ ἀγαθῆς φρονήσεως ἄµοιρος ἦν, ὁ κατὰ τὰς Σειρῆνας διάπλους ἐδήλωσεν, ὅτε μὴ ἡδυνήθη φρονήσει ἐμφράξαι τὴν ἀκοήν.
Oddly enough, however, this advice on how to listen to, rather than avoid, the Sirens is refigured and placed as the culmination of Clement’s appropriation of the episode:

ἐὰν ἐθέλῃς μόνον, νενίκηκας τὴν ἀπώλειαν καὶ τῷ ξύλῳ προσδεδεμένος ἀπό τῆς φθοράς λειψανόν, κυβερνήσει σε ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τοῖς λιμέσι καθορμίσει τῶν οὐρανῶν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον.  

If only you desire it, having conquered destruction and bound to the wood, you will be released from all death, the word of god will steer you and the Holy Spirit will bring you to anchor in the harbours of heaven.

At a first reading, the meaning seems to be that all that is required for salvation is a desire for it, and the weak soul is saved through the Logos and the Holy Spirit; the allegory functions by taking the mast to which Odysseus is tied as a type of the cross of Christ. As befits a protreptic, the danger is described and the remedy prescribed. Clement could merely have exhorted his readers to block their ears, as Plato does in the examples mentioned above; but the parallel of the cross to the yard-arm hammers the point home as not merely a moral point but an eschatological one.

Why then does Clement begin with ἐὰν ἐθέλης μόνον? It is unavoidably a direct verbal reference to Circe’s advice:

...ἀτὰρ αὐτὸς ἀκουέμεν αἱ κ' ἐθέλησθα
δησάντων σ' ἐν νηῒ θοῇ χεῖράς τε πόδας τε

---

62 Protrep. 12.118.4, following on directly from the quotation above.
63 On the mast as the cross of Christ, see Rahner (1963) 371-83, especially 376-7 on this passage.
If you yourself desire to listen, then let them bind you hand and foot in the swift ship,
upright in the mast housing, and let them fasten the rope-ends to the mast itself, so you can
delight in hearing the Sirens’ voices.

The structure of the exhortation subtly points up this echo, paralleling Clement’s warning
and Circe’s. In the Homeric original, Circe first warns of the terrible danger of the Sirens
(12.36-46) and then gives advice on how to prevent his companions from being beguiled by
their song (12.47-49). It is then that the conditional is offered – ‘if you youself desire to
listen...’ What is clear is that Odysseus is tied to the mast, and the Christian to the cross, not
in order to avoid destruction but in order to listen to the Siren-song. The Homeric text is
unforthcoming as to why Circe gives the advice in this way; why she assumes Odysseus will
want to listen to these voices of destruction; and what drives Odysseus himself to such a
desire. Later interpreters were willing to supply the want; but in doing so, they required a
reading of the Sirens that saw them as more than objects of physical lust.

The appeal of the Sirens was not always seen as sensual, but intellectual; what they tempt
with is knowledge. Cicero’s celebrated remarks in De finibus 5.18.49 summarize this strand
of thought: neque enim vocum suavitate videntur aut novitate quadam et varietate cantandi
revocare eos solitae, qui praetervehebantur, sed quia multa se scire profitebantur, ut homines ad

---

64 Od. 12.50-2.
65 Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.6.11-12 suggests that the Sirens attract by appealing to their listeners’
pride, in particular, to τοῖς ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ φιλοτιμουμένοις.
earum saxa discendi cupiditate adhaerescerent. In the Siren-songs are seen the danger of too much knowledge than is really good for us: even in the Odyssey itself what they sing is just as much the lure as the sweetness of their song. The sirens are an antitype of the Muses, the melodious singers who know all things. Thus Odysseus’ desire to hear the Sirens without being lured in to them is part of Odysseus’ characterisation as a lover of knowledge; Cicero finishes his remarks on the Sirens by saying: Atque omnia quidem scire, cuiuscumque modi sint, cupere curiosorum, duci vero maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem scientiae summorum virorum est putandum.

Clement, at least here at face value, is unprepared to go that far – his advice is to shun custom (συνήθεια, with its sensual overtones here) entirely, and no mention is made of knowledge as the attractive feature of the Sirens at all. For Clement, the advantage of being lashed to the mast is the avoidance of destruction, rather than the gain of pleasure from the Sirens which Odysseus is offered. What is implied here, however, to the reader sensitive to

---

67 ‘For it does not seem that they used to attract those who passed by the sweetness of their voice or some kind of novelty or variety of their singing, but because they declared that they knew many things, so that men would cling to their rocks from desire for learning.’

68 Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) ad versum 184. It is this tradition of interpretation which bears fruit later in the Christian tradition as heresy becomes the Siren-song. The earliest example of this trope is Clement’s contemporary Hippolytus, Refutatio omnium haeresium 7.13.1-3, who makes the degree to which one should block out the Siren-song dependent on one’s relative strength: ‘only to the strong and wise then is it vouchsafed to listen to the heretics without peril to the soul.’ Rahner (1963) 363.

69 Pucci (1979) 126-8, who refers to the arguments in Buschor (1944).

70 E.g. Il. 2.484ff.; Od. 8.63, 73ff.; 24.60ff.

71 De Finibus 5.18.49: ‘And, indeed, to desire to know all things, whatever kind they might be, is a mark of the inquisitive; but to be led, by study of greater matters, to desire for knowledge should be considered the mark of the greatest men.’ This is similar to Heraclitus’ reading of the Siren; he does not comment on their danger at all, but uses the Sirens to describe the extent of Odysseus’ wisdom; Quaest. Hom. 70, Russell and Konstan (2005) 112-3: Τίς δὲ Σειρήνων ἀκούει, τὰς πολυπείρους ἱστορίας παντὸς αἰῶνος ἐκμαθών; (‘But who listens to the Sirens, learning the varied histories of every age?’).
the Homeric intertext, is precisely the possibility of pleasure, or of some kind of value, in listening to the Siren-song.

Indeed, there seems to be a subtle train of thought following the idea of song as Clement continues: τότε μου κατοπτεύσεις τὸν θεόν καὶ τοῖς ἄγιοις ἑκείνοις τελεσθήσῃ μυστηρίοις καὶ τῶν ἐν οὐρανοῖς ἀπολαύσεις ἀποκεκρυμένων, τῶν ἐμοὶ τετηρημένων, «ὁ οὐτε οὐς ἦκουσεν οὔτε ἐπὶ καρδίαιν ἀνέβη» τινὸς.72 Clement briefly describes Christianity as a superior replacement of the Dionysiac mysteries, with Christians as the true Bacchant, and ends with an eschatological peroration: ὁ χορὸς οἱ δίκαιοι, τὸ ᾄσμα ὑμνος ἔστι τοῦ πάντων βασιλέως; ψάλλουσιν αἱ κόραι, δοξάζουσιν ἄγγελοι, προφῆται λαλοῦσιν, ἡχὸς στέλλεται μουσικῆς, δρόμω τὸν θίασον διώκουσιν, σπεύδουσιν οἱ κεκλημένοι πατέρα ποθοῦντες ἀπολαβεῖν.73

The references to music are used to segue from the Sirens to the antitype of their song, the music of the heavens. The verbal parallels between them are prominent: ἔδει δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ πορνίδιον ὑμνόν, ἡδονή, πανδήμῳ τερπόμενον μουσικῇ is inverted by τὸ ᾄσμα of the chorus of the righteous and the ἠχος... μουσικῆς; the verbs of motion from earlier: φύγωμεν... φύγωμεν... φεύγωμεν, ὦ συνναύται, φεύγωμεν... πάριθ τὴν ἡδονήν... παράπλει τὴν ὑδήν (all iussives or imperatives) are contrasted to the eschatological vision: δρόμω... διώκουσιν, σπεύδουσιν. It is quite clear that this whole section is interconnected, but not in the most obvious way. What we have cannot be a simple contrast between the devil’s tune of συνήθεια

72 Protrep. 12.118.4: ‘Then shall you see my God, and be initiated into those holy mysteries, and have the enjoyment of those things kept hidden in the heavens, reserved for me, “which ear has not heard, nor have they entered into the heart” [1 Cor. 2:9] of any.’
73 Protrep. 12.119.2: ‘The righteous are the chorus, the music is a hymn of the king of all things; the girls play the lyre, the angels give praise, the prophets give utterance; the sound of music issues forth, they pursue at a run the Bacchic troop, those that are called make haste, eagerly desiring to receive the father.’
and the heavenly chorus of oi δίκαιοι: not with Clement’s clear deliberate reference to the Odyssean advice to listen, but to listen tied tight to the mast.

Clement is building on a long-established slippage between the Sirens and the Muses. 74 It is again Plato who provides the most important link in the chain of reception here; 75 such a slippage is implied in the mention of the Muses in the Phaedrus referred to earlier, 76 but the key passage here is of course from the ‘Myth of Er’ in Republic 10: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων αὐτοῦ ἄνωθεν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου βεβηκέναι Σειρῆνα συμπεριφερομένην, φωνὴν μίαν ἱεῖσαν, ἕνα τόνον: ἐκ πασῶν δὲ ὦντων μίαν ἀρμονίαν συμφωνεῖν. 77 Clement himself is referencing a similarly positive, heavenly, image of the Sirens, when he preserves a fragment of Euripides at Str. 4.26.172.1:

χρύσεαι δή μοι πτέρυγες περὶ νώτῳ
καὶ τὰ Σειρῆνων ἐρόεντα πέδιλα ἁρμόζεται,
βάσομαι τ’ ἐς αἰθέρα πουλὺν ἀερθεὶς
Ζηνὶ προσμίξων. 78

And now golden wings are fitted together my back and the sweet sandals [or ‘rhythms’] of the Sirens. I will step into the wide upper air, raised aloft, to become the companion of Zeus.

74 Buschor (1944) proposes a particularly strong version of this theory, suggesting that originally they were infernal counterparts of the Muses, who charmed the dead in the underworld and guided souls from this world to th next; his work is trenchantly criticised by Pollard (1952), but only the grounds of the origins of the Sirens; even in Alcman (Fr. 7B Bergk) there is evidence of the slippage between Muses and Sirens.

75 On the development of the meaning of the Muses in Greek culture, up to and including the Second Sophistic, see Murray (2004).

76 259a-d; on this passage, see Assaël (2003) and Montiglio (2011) 133.

77 Plato, Resp. 10.617b: ‘And upon the upper part of each circle is a siren, going round with them, uttering one sound, a single note: from all eight there is one harmony sounding together.’

78 = Euripides Fr. inc. 911.
The relationship between this celestial type of the Siren and the Homeric version exercised ancient commentators; Plutarch, for example, finds the contrast notable, and harmonizes the accounts (not without dispute, however) in his *Quaestiones Conviviales*, and Philo brings them together in *In Genesim* 3.3. Proclus goes so far as to divide Sirens into three classes to accommodate his rapprochement between epic and philosophy. The common thread to these syntheses, influenced by Neo-Pythagoreanism, is that ‘the voice of the Sirens... could be benevolent and even divinely inspired to the point of bringing the souls back to their heavenly home’.

Given Clement’s extensive knowledge of both Plato and Philo, his reading of the Homeric episode is coloured by these interpretations (and foreshadows the Neo-Platonic developments) that see the Sirens not only as in symbiosis but even as synonymous with the Muses. His utilisation of a Pythagorean saying is, in this context, illuminating:

...ἐπεὶ μήτε ἐκείνη καλὴ σκευασία τροφῆς ἢ πλείω τῶν τρεφόντων ἔχουσα τὰ ἡδόναμα μήτε λόγου χρήσι τροφῆς ἢ τέρπειν μᾶλλον ἢ ὡφελέσθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας δυναμένη. Μούσας οἰκεῖσθαι Πυθαγόρας παραινεῖ, τὰς σοφίας ἀσκεῖν μὴ μετὰ ἡδονῆς διδάσκων, ἀπατηλῶν δὲ τὴν ἄλλην διελέγχων ψυχαγωγίαν. Σειρῆνας δὲ παραπλεύσας εἷς ἀρκεῖ, καὶ τῇ Σφιγγῇ ὑποκρινάμενος ἄλλος εἷς, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε μηδὲ εἷς.

Since neither is a recipe for food is good which has more seasoning than nourishment; nor is the cultured use of language which has the power to delight rather than to aid those who

---

80 The Sirens from the Myth of Er probably also underlie Philo’s remarks in *De somniis* 1.35. See Lamberton (1986) 52, and more extensively, Berthelot (2012) 161-3.
83 Berthelot (2012) 162.
84 Str. 1.10.48.5-6.
listen. Pythagoras advises us to regard the Muses as sweeter than the Sirens, teaching us not to dress up wisdom with pleasure, and rejecting other persuasion as deceitful. It suffices that one sails past the Sirens, and another one answers the Sphinx, or (if you please) not even one.

The division between the Muses and the Sirens is not one of content, but of form. The tipping point between what is Siren-song and what is the Muses’ music is when pleasure is outweighed by profit;\(^5\) that calculus, of course, will differ between readers. His conclusion is not that the Sirens (which are here elegant and adorned language) should be shunned entirely, but that they should be avoided by the majority; it is enough that one man should sail past them, presumably to cull the wisdom therefrom without undue danger (or pleasure).

Clement, both in this passage just noted, and in the reading of the Sirens episode in the *Protrepticus*, is constructing a hierarchy of access to Greek myths, literature and culture: a somewhat broadened version of συνήθεια. His vision, throughout the *Protrepticus*- *Paedagogus-Stromateis* trilogy is one of educational progression, of deeper and clearer knowledge and understanding; it is a theme he repeats at length in Book 1 of the *Stromateis*, and which recurs throughout the work. Thus although the rejection of συνήθεια seems total in the *Protrepticus*, it is a message linked specifically to his audience: those who are weakest in faith, not yet Christians. But crucially, the hints are planted for the more discerning audience that this is not a total rejection, and the more nuanced reading of the episode of the Sirens which comes out in the *Stromateis* is hinted at here.

\(^5\) Rahner (1963) 361.
What is so surprising about this hint is that it makes the secondary meaning (that we, like Odysseus, should listen to the Sirens, albeit under particularly safe conditions) apparent not through coded biblical language, but to those who are familiar with the language of the original passage in Homer. The key conditional ἐὰν ἠθέλης μόνον is only recognisable as advice to one who wants to listen (ἀκουέμεν) if one supplies the context from Circe’s conditional. Like the Homeric references we saw in the previous chapter which contain an extra pay-off for those who are familiar with the quotations in their original context, so here we understand a more nuanced moral message if we can supply the original Homeric words in parallel to Clement’s. The clever manipulation of the Homeric intertext is aimed at competing in the public religious marketplace for the custom of the pepaideumenoi. 86

PROMISCUITY: GOOD FOR THE SOUL

Clement re-interprets the Siren episode in the Stromateis, but this time the submerged hint that Odysseus’ actions are worthy of emulation, but only for the advanced, is made explicit:

άλλ’, ὡς ἐσικεῖν, οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τὸ ὄνομα ἐπιγραφομένων καθάπερ οἱ τοῦ Ὅδυσσεως ἐταίροι ἀγροίκως μετίασα τὸν λόγον, οὐ τὰς Σειρῆνας, ἀλλὰ τὸν ρυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέλος παρερχόμενοι, ἀμαθία βύσαντες τὰ ὄντα, ἐπείπερ ἰσαίαν οὐ δυσνόησίμοι τὰς ὀποιώς τὰς ἀκοὰς Ἐλληνικοῖς μαθήμασι μετά ταῦτά ὑπὸ τὸ νόστοι τιχείν. τῷ δ’ ἀπανθιζομένῳ τὸ χρειῶδες εἰς ὑφέλειαν τῶν κατηχουμένων καὶ μάλιστα Ἐλλήνων ὄντων («τοῦ κυρίου δὲ οὐ δικτιστέον ἐρανιστέον. πλὴν οὐδαμῶς τοῖς ἐπαΐουσιν βοηθήματα ἐρανιστέον. 86 My thoughts here are influenced by the comments of Edmonds (2013) 129 on the Derveni papyrus, which he similarly sees not as an esoteric text expressing secrets to the select, but as a piece of savvy marketing.
δύνασθαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν, πείσμα τῇ ψυχῇ βέβαιον τὴν ἐκ πάντων ἀσφάλειαν 
πεπορισμένους. Ἀπέτεν ἄρα μουσικῆς εἰς κατακόσμησιν ἔργους καὶ καταστολήν.  

But, as seems, the most of those who are inscribed with the Name, like the companions of 
Ulysses, handle the word unskilfully, passing by not the Sirens, but the rhythm and the 
melody, stopping their ears with ignorance; since they know that, after lending their ears to 
Hellenic studies, they will never subsequently be able to retrace their steps. But he who culls 
what is useful for the advantage of the catechumens, and especially when they are Greeks 
(and the earth is the Lord’s, and the fulness thereof), must not abstain from erudition, like 
irrational animals; but he must collect as many aids as possible for his hearers. But he must 
by no means linger over these studies, except solely for the advantage accruing from them; 
so that, on grasping and obtaining this, he may be able to take his departure home to the true 
philosophy, which is a strong cable for the soul, providing security from everything. Music is 
then to be handled for the sake of the embellishment and composure of character. 

There is overlap between the literal music, ostensibly what Clement is referring to, and 
music as a metonym for all Greek culture. The sirens are ‘Greek learning’ and ‘love of 
learning’; but also the aesthetic adornment of education, the literal rhythms and melodies of 
Greek literature. The sensual allure of the Sirens is mixed here with their intellectual 
attraction. Clement now in his warning is not a more forceful Circe, but her antitype. 
Contrary to the advice given by the enchantress, Clement’s hearers are warned against 
*falling* to listen to the Sirens. The response of blocking one’s ears to their song is condemned 
as ἄμαθία. There is an an echo here of Epicurus’ warning to shun poetry like the Sirens, an 

---

87 Str. 6.11.89.1-4. 
88 Ps. 24:1, quoted in 1 Cor. 10:26. 
89 This, too, can be read into the Homeric episode itself: the Sirens’ lines in the Odyssey are noticeably 
euphonious: how they sing is beautifully poetic; e.g. Odyssey 12.184-191. Holford-Strevens (2006) 17; 
this includes playing with Iliadic references: Pucci (1979). 
90 Heraclitus, Quaest. Hom. 79, 4 (= Fr. 229 Usener), rejecting poetry in general; the allusions to Sirens 
can be found in Epicurus’ letter to Pythocles, 10.6 (= Fr. 163 Usener; also quoted by Quintilian 12.2.24): 

304
attitude which was condemned in antiquity under much the same language as Clement uses here. The audience is instead exhorted to remain an audience, to listen (though carefully) copying the example of Odysseus rather than his crew. The good Christian convert, in this schema, is exhorted to spend at least some time in pleasurable dalliance with an alluring seductress.

The meta-textual aspects of this exposition are striking: Odysseus (a figure for Homer himself) is urged upon us as the exemplar after whom we should model our own relationship with Greek culture, for which Homer often stands as a shorthand. A full appreciation of this passage presupposes that the reader has already in some sense unstopped his ears and has heard the siren-song of the Homeric tradition. To Christian critics of Clement’s reasonably open attitude to Greek learning, it would have been subtle but definite mockery; to the pepaideumenoi, an unexpected but well-crafted sophistic irony. This kind of play, on the intellectual journey that is constituted by the experience of reading the *Stromateis*, is in itself another expression of the kind of pleasure that is implicit in the Christian Odyssey.

Furthermore, we cannot avoid the sexual undertones of the Sirens here. This eroticisation of Christian exegesis of pagan texts could seem bizarre; but the association of the intellectual and the sexual is not uncommon. Philo’s *De congressu eruditionis gratia*, for instance, is an

παιδεῖαῶ δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεῦγε τάκατιν ἀράμενος. (‘Flee all education, blessed one, hoisting the sail’). See Asmis (1991).

extended allegorical reading of the Genesis story of Abraham’s sexual relationships with Hagar and Sarah as representing preliminary studies and philosophy. We should expect this combination even more with the motif of the Sirens, with their history of both sensual and intellectual interpretations. Theodoret, though writing some two-hundred years after Clement, uses the same Pythagorean quotation as Clement above, that the Muses are to be preferred to the Sirens, undoubtedly relying on Clement for it, and differentiates the Sirens as standing for ‘ingenious and wanton speeches’, whereas the Muses are ‘those who exhibit the naked beauty of the truth’. Theology is refigured as nude, sensualised beauty.

The same subtle sexual undertones can be seen in a much briefer dalliance with a Homeric text later in the Stromateis. When warning his audience against the wiles of alternative Christian haireseis, Clement illustrates his point with reference to the introduction of Circe in Odyssey 10:

πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώπων τὴν αὐτὴν κρίσιν ἐχόντων οἱ μὲν ἄκολουθοντες τῷ αἰροῦντι λόγῳ ποιοῦνται τὰς πίστεις, οἱ δὲ ἣδονας σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐκδεδωκότες βιάζονται πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὴν γραφὴν. δεὶ δ’, οἶμαι, τῷ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐραστῆς ψυχικῆς εὐτονίας ... καθάπερ οὖν εἰ τις ἐξ ἀνθρώπου θηρίον γένοιτο παραπλησίως τὸν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς έριδον καὶ πιστὸς τῷ κυρίῳ διαμένειν ὁ ἀναλακτίσας τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν παράδοσιν καὶ ἀποσκιρτήσας εἰς δόξας αἰρέσεων ἄνθρωπίνων. ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἰουδαίας ἔρει ἐκ τῆς Κίρκης φαρμαχθεῖσιν οὐδὲν ὁ ἀναλακτίσας τὴν ἐν προφητείᾳ παράδοσιν καὶ ἀποσκιρτήσας εἰς δόξας αἰρέσεων ἄνθρωπίνων. ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἰουδαίας ἔρει ἐκ τῆς Κίρκης φαρμαχθεῖσιν οὐδὲν ὁ ἀναλακτίσας τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν παράδοσιν καὶ ἀποσκιρτήσας εἰς δόξας αἰρέσεων ἄνθρωπίνων. ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἰουδαίας ἔρει ἐκ τῆς Κίρκης φαρμαχθεῖσιν οὐδὲν ὁ ἀναλακτίσας τὴν ἐν προφητείᾳ παράδοσιν καὶ ἀποσκιρτήσας εἰς δόξας αἰρέσεων ἄνθρωπίνων.

92 Theodoret’s major sources for the Graecarum affectionum curatio are Clement’s Stromateis and Eusebius’ Praeparatio: Roos (1883) and more recently Ulrich (2009) 120-1.
93 Graecarum affectionum curatio 8.1: οἶμαι αὐτὴν Σειρῆσι μὲν ἀπεικάσαι τοὺς κεκομψευμένους καὶ κατεγλωττισμένους λόγους, Μούσαις δὲ τοὺς ἐπείσακτους μὲν οὐδὲν ἔχοντας, γιούνον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ κάλλος ἐπιδεικνύντας.
94 See on this Rahner (1963) 206-8, whose interpretation of the passage differs somewhat from mine.
Although all people possess the same faculty of judgment, some (those who follow the persuasive Word), accept the pledges of faith; others, those who give themselves up to pleasures, twist scripture for their desires [cf. 2 Pet. 3:16]. But, I think, the lover of truth must have spiritual vigour... As if, therefore, someone should turn from a man into a beast, just like those drugged by Circe; thus he has destroyed his existence as a man and his continuing faithfulness to the Lord, he who has kicked off the tradition of the church and has skipped off to the teaching of schismatic men. But he who has returned from this deception, having obeyed the scriptures and turned his life towards the truth, is perfected as a god from a man, as it were.

The elements of the allegory are clear: the follower of ‘the persuasive word’ builds on traditional descriptions of Odysseus, and the ἡδοναῖς, once we read on to the mention of Circe, clearly echo the characterisation of Odysseus’ companions as greedy, the fault that traps them in Circe’s wiles (as it is with the Lotus-eaters and the cattle of Helios); their behaviour is even playfully characterised as that of skipping sheep or goats with ἀποσκιρτήσας. The word ἐραστής is key, however; the lover of the truth is, in truth, the lover of Circe (Od. 10.302-47). The consumption of the Moly is replaced by obedience to the scriptures and orientation towards the truth: as with the Sirens, such dalliance is dangerous without proper Christian preparation. Moly, implied rather than specified here, has a long Stoic tradition of being allegorised in a very similar sense; Cleanthes is said to have claimed that Moly was an allegory of the logos, by which the base passions are made weaker,

95 Str. 7.16.94.4, 95.1-2.
96 This is the reading of the episode Xenophon attributes to Socrates at Memorabilia 1.3.7. Cf. Heraclitus, Quaest. Hom. 70.12, 72.2-3.
μωλύονται. Even more similar to Clement’s reading, the Neo-Platonists interpreted Moly as paideia, and in particular salvific paideia. The reward (union with Calypso? Odysseus’ eventual return?) is allegorised as being raised from man to god.

The Stoic tradition of allegory saw in the consumption of Moly Odysseus’ redemption from degradation to the bestial state in that it made him ἀπαθής, passionless, and the tradition almost universally sees Circe as an embodiment of evil, or at least as wicked, with Hermes playing a key role as her opposite. But none of this evident in Clement’s reading, in which Hermes is not mentioned and Circe is mentioned only as the one who drugs the companions. Instead, the role played here by the nymph is parallel to that of the Sirens; she is to be approached, symbol of lust that she is, with proper preparation and due caution.

The τελείωσις from human to divine is more difficult to understand; perhaps Circe is mixed here with a reminiscence of Calypso, and her promise of immortality? It is possible that it refers not to the approach to Circe, but to a Christianised take on the effect of the Moly. Given, however, the repetition of verbs of motion (παλινδρομήσας, ἐπιτρέπας) and the implication in κατακούσας τῶν γραφῶν that obedience to the scriptures must be obedience

97 Cleanthes, Arnim (1903-1924) Fr. 526, preserved by the sophist Apollonius; according to Rahner (1963) 193 ‘we are here concerned with a genuine piece of old Stoic teaching.’ Closer to Clement’s time, Heraclitus interprets Moly as ‘wisdom’, but describes it as an educative process; the black root and white flower refer to initial hard work and difficulty which leads then to ‘a harvest of benefits’ (Quaest. Hom. 73; Russell and Konstan (2005)118-9).

99 E.g. Themistius, Oratio 27 340A-D.

98 E.g. Themistius, Oratio 27 340A-D.

99 There is perhaps even reference to Circe’s offer of seduction (δόφρα μιγέντε | εὖνή καὶ φιλότητι πεποίθομεν ἄλληλουσιν, Od. 10.334-5) at the opening with ποιοῦνται τὰς πίστεις.

100 E.g. Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 1.10E.

101 See for example, Heraclitus, Quaest. Hom. 72. Extensive examples are cited in Rahner (1963) 192-205. See also Lamberton (1986) 115-119 on Porphyry’s allegory of the episode, apud Stobaeus, Ecl. 1.41.60.
under some ongoing circumstance, the allegory Clement presents is too firmly embedded in the narrative drive of the intertext, tracing the steps of Homer from the boat, via Hermes, and towards Circe, to avoid the audience following it all the way into her bed. More likely, in my opinion, is a simple parallel: proper dalliance with Circe is the inversion of degradation of man to beast, the elevation of man to god.

What is interesting is the way Clement (and Theodoret, presumably following him) foregrounds the erotic side of his intellectual activity. As titillating religious advertising, it manages to fit both into an elite literary niche of intertextual play, and present Christianity as urbane, sophisticated and intellectually seductive. Thus also Clement’s allegorical interpretation of the story of Hagar and Sarah (itself based on Philo’s De congressu) can be read in a new light (Str. 1.5.30.1-31.4). Faithful Wisdom (Sarah) remains patiently at home, while the Christian disciple consorts wantonly with the knowledge of this world. Rather than a condemnation of promiscuity, dalliance with the things of this world is seen as an appropriate preparation for the marital relationship with wisdom. A simplistic reading of this as getting rid of embarrassing sex stories from the Bible by allegorical tight-rope-walking is an overly reductionist account and misses much of the subtext developed by interaction with the literary tradition.

CONCLUSION

Odysseus is the figure who circumscribes and defines the Greek world by traversing its limits; ‘creator of a Greek understanding of space and the organizer of a Greek space of
understanding’ in Hartog’s words. By appropriating Odysseus, Clement makes a determined claim for Christian intellectual legitimacy in the midst of Greek literary culture. Following on from the potential of allegorical reading we saw raised in the previous chapter, the narrative of Odysseus is re-read as a moral allegory of the soul’s progress. Exactly how this is used differs from place to place in Clement’s writing; in the more protreptic work (following a common theme) Odysseus is rejected as a moral exemplar, desiring only an earthly home, rather than seeking his spiritual home. But in the *Stromateis*, Ithaca becomes the soul’s destination in God. The Sirens are symbolic of the dangers of this world, luring us away from that goal. They represent both carnal temptations, but also the intellectual pleasures which might drag us from the path. In a twist to our expectations, however, we are not warned to avoid them, but rather warned of the dangers of not listening to them: the Sirens (as the mirror of the Muses) represent both the dangers and pleasures of delving into philosophy, in which intellectual pleasure is figured as sensual delight. It is both a provocative and an alluring presentation of the Christian truth, but one not utterly out of character for a subtle and urbane *pepaideumenos*.

---

Clement’s *Stromateis*, despite what it may at times claim to be, is not a simple collection of jottings for an ageing scholar with scattered interests. It is not, despite what some critics have claimed, a (derivative and poorly written) Christian philosophical text-book, or even a highly-structured coded initiatory text. Nor is it, as comparable miscellanies might lead us to assume, a reference guide for the gentleman of imperial times to brush up on pleasant conversation topics for formal dinner parties.¹ It certainly engages with all these tropes; it draws on the *aide-mémoire* tradition of *hypomnemata*; it links itself generically with philosophical note-books; it speaks in codes of initiation and secret teachings, whilst also describing itself as οἷον ἡδυσμά τί ἐστιν παραπεπλεγμένον ἀθλητοῦ βρώματι.² In so doing it is showing its debt to and engagement with the literary milieu of Clement’s education and background; but it also points beyond this, manipulating these tropes to challenge the reader on issues of textual authority, authorial identity, and cultural integration and disintegration.

This thesis has attempted to pursue what the *Stromateis* does, rather than static description of what it is. Implicit in the genre of miscellany which the work buys into is a concern with the dynamic relationship between the writer and the reader. There is a constant contest between its eclectic principles and the drive for order, in which the reader is an active participant – because of the amorphous plurality of miscellanistic literature as a genre, this is most obviously the case in the identification and classification of the *Stromateis* in the first place. This is precisely what Clement seems to be aiming for, however: his goal is not the

---

² Str. 1.1.16.1.
dissemination of doctrine or the monumentalizing of truth, but the formation of a particular kind of reader, modelled on his own character as the miscellanistic compiler, who is in turn a reflection of the divine teacher; ναὶ μὴν ἑαυτὸν κτίζει καὶ δημιουργεῖ, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίοντας αὐτοῦ κοσμεῖ ἐξομοιούμενος θεῷ ὁ γνωστικός.

This authorial persona is not merely a reflection of a static, historic fact of Clement as a teacher; it is a deliberate claim to authority as a philosophical teacher, in a diodoche of Christian philosophy, stretching back to the apostolic exemplars. The characterisation looks two ways: on the one hand, it is the competitive agonistic posing of the pepaideumenos, competing for the approbation, and the intellectual allegiance of his audience. Clement deliberate picks up and plays with the tropes and topical language of the philosophical schools and their literature to set himself up in competition with them; Christianity is performed as a intellectual competitive posture to take up as a pepaideumenos.

On the other hand, it presents a claim of authority to a Christian audience; Clement, whilst acknowledging and affirming the hierarchical structures of the church, establishes himself as an apostolic authority, competing with the episcopal apostolic succession which Irenaeus has been in the process of constructing in the decades previous to Clement. We can see here the possibilities of power struggles in the early church not as a simple zero-sum game for possession of undifferentiated ‘power’, but as negotiations for different kinds of authority in different configurations of parts of the Christian community. Clement as an authoritative teacher foreshadows much more modern ecclesial power structures where organisational

---

3 Pace Lilla (1971) 232.
4 7.3.13.3.
and liturgical authority is found in different loci from teaching and interpretational authority. The shadow of a possible alternative to the Christianity of monarchical episcopacy can be seen.

Even whilst presenting himself in the guise of Greek philosopher, however, Clement simultaneously undercuts the possibility of a unified, authoritative Greek paideia; indeed, the very notion of a Greek cultural identity is problematized. This de- construction of identity is not merely an academic exercise; König and Whitmarsh note that ‘particular conceptions of knowledge and particular ways of textualising knowledge were entwined with social and political practices and ideals within the Roman Imperial period,’ following the lead given by postcolonialist theory; the way in which knowledge is arranged and transmitted forms the conditions in which identity can be formed. In its dismembering and remembering of knowledge, the Stromateis illustrates not only the multiplicity that characterizes the state of the cosmos, but also undermines any imperial discourse that attempts to present a totalised and unified oikumene under Rome.

Clement does take up the language of Stoic cosmopolitanism: particular cultures and the laws of particular poleis as, in this view, contingent, and a deeper citizenship of the cosmos is grounded in shared human reason in accordance with nature. But whereas the stoic cosmopolis is simply acquiescence in the ordered cosmos (right reason in accordance with nature), Clement’s is the promise of the heavenly Jerusalem, proleptically realised in the polis of the Church. By also adopting the language of kingship and political authority from Greek

---

6 Bhabha (2012), although Said (1978) and (1993) are the basis for the claims of König and Whitmarsh.
political discourse into Christian ethnic discourse, Clement denies space for Rome to claim a
totalising authority as it does in Stoicism, by engaging itself in the world as part of its order.
Instead, both as citizens of a heavenly Jerusalem, and as subjects of a shepherd of the people
who is both the incarnate Christ, and the divine Logos, Roman demands for particular kinds of
spiritual submission in civic or imperial cult must be resisted.

On the other hand, it utilizes that discourse of imperial power to show Clement himself as in
control of his disparate collection of knowledge, but only as a functionary of the original
unitary Logos, the source of all philosophy. Of this, both Roman imperial power and Greek
learning are only fragmentary reflections. Indeed, even the Hebrew scriptures themselves
are subservient to the Logos; possession of the scriptures did not necessarily grant them
understanding of it, and it is only the revelation of the incarnate Logos that the value of the
Hebrew bible can truly be discerned. Even then, for the Christian gnostic, because faith is
capable of improvement, it is necessary to keep searching through any source to find more of
the fragmented truth: thus it is that Clement’s most oft-quoted Jewish sources are positively
described as Peripatetic or Pythagorean: they exemplify the necessary eclecticism of sources
and methods needed to gather together the scattered, dismembered Logos.

There is no race which cannot become Christian philosophers, and no culture in which
intimations of that divine philosophy cannot be found. In this eclectic and relativist drive,
paradoxically powered by an absolutist conception of the truth (though possibly one
unobtainable in this life?), which values the search and not the source, both the multicultural
and multi-ethnic success of the Church in late antiquity is seen in potential here. We can also
see the possibility of totalising ecclesiastical dominance, too: the ruthlessness with which
difference could be and was at times rooted out in and by the Church, on the basis of a
totalising 'truth'.

The friction of centripetal force of the particular and specific, however, acting against the
centrifugal forces of the totalizing and unifying – the isolated text against an encompassing
genre; individual facts and quotations spilling out of a central hermeneutical principle; logoi
or Logos? – is precisely what gives this work its motive power. Clement does not attempt to
resolve the tension, but to form readers who can make sense out of a universe of
dismembered knowledge.

Clement’s text is not merely the creation of relationships with those in his present: just as his
relationship with Greek philosophy and Hebrew scripture necessarily encompasses the past,
so his drive to search out the truth wherever it may be hidden implicates the future. This is
most clearly seen in Clement’s relationship with Homer. It is here we can see the Christian
eclecticism of method as well as source: the cross-fertilisation of types of reading strategy
borrowed from Homeric criticism is a major resource for Alexandrian Jewish exegetes, but
becomes increasingly important for Christians from Clement onwards. Clement borrows
freely, but often subverting the original intentions of such exegetes: etymological and
physical allegorizing are used to diagnose Greek culture of their inadequate perceptions of
the gods. But it is in moral allaegory that the greatest Christian confluence of the Homeric
and the biblical can take place. The full-blown allegoresis of the Neo-Platonists can be seen
on the horizon of Clement’s works, as can the development of Origen’s biblical scholarship.
It is in this diachronic relationship between Clement and those who come after him that new vistas are opened up by this thesis. Clement stands at the cusp of a significant hermeneutical revolution, directly connected to the kinds of intellectual questions with which he was concerned – what kinds of texts are authoritative, and what with what kinds of authority can and should we impose them? Where are the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable readings of texts for Christians, and who polices those borders?

Examination of the motifs of tragedy in the *Stromateis* would probably have yielded different answers to those questions than our exploration of epic: after all, tragedy can be read as much more theologically nuanced than epic, in which the behaviour of the gods is an embarrassment. We touched briefly on Prometheus, but what does Clement do with Dionysus and Pentheus? Apart from being figured in his dismembered corpse, where is the Christian truth of the *Bacchae*? Or the *Medea*, or the *Oresteia*...?

The afterlife of Clement’s connections with these questions is also worth pursuing: I quite deliberately delimited myself from using Clement as merely a step in a diachronic narrative, but now more of him has been uncovered, and we are free from merely seeing him as the depository of embryonic doctrines, but the performer of particular kinds of debates and self-positionings around the flexible content of *paideia*, Clement’s place in a cultural history of the development of Christianity would be a productive starting point to delve into a number of subsequent authors who continue the break-down of a Greek/Christian binary – Origen (with his Egyptian name, born of Horus), Methodius of Olympus, and his Christian *symposion*, or the Greek verse of the Cappadocians...
Clement himself, following his intellectual father, Plato, was deeply concerned about the posterity of his work. He worried, as we have seen, about the opportunities and dangers of writing: once spoken discourse has been captured on paper, its afterlife is a dangerous and unpredictable thing: our words, which are the children of our souls, we can no longer look after or be responsible for.\(^7\) They can be mis-read, mis-interpreted; pages may be lost, passages may be corrupted, generic signals may be intercepted, intertexts may be missed. I have deliberately titled this final section 'Postscript' rather than 'Conclusion'; this is not an ending, a cutting off, but merely one iteration of the after-written. In this sense, this whole thesis is a postscript to Clement: another response in the ongoing dialogue which the *Stromateis* precipitates between text, reader, and meaning.

This image of the relationship between writer and reader as filiation has reappeared again and again. Children are words of the soul, and those who teach us through their texts we call father;\(^8\) Clement was sure that the apostles, passing on the tradition from father to son, would be delighted with his exposition.\(^9\) Unavoidably, in Clement’s schema, I am in some sense both his child, and the custodian of his written children: whether or not he would delight in my exposition, or recognise the preservation of his tradition in my \(\upsilon\rho\sigma\mu\eta\iota\mu\epsilon\iota\sigma\omega\varsigma\), I am uncertain. At the very least, however, I hope that Clement would recognise my attempt to try to extricate the flesh of the nut from its shell; to search diligently through whatever sources were available to try to trace the elusive ‘meaning’ of his text – not a set of

\(^7\) Str. 1.1.1.1-2. See the introduction on this passage.

\(^8\) Str. 1.1.1.1-2.

\(^9\) Str. 1.1.11.2-3. See Chapter 1.
propositions, but a dynamic interjection into the intellectual life of the second century, and the scholarship on the second century, creating new kinds of identity and relationships between texts, authors and reader.
REFERENCES

ABBREVIATIONS


BNP Brill’s New Pauly: encyclopaedia of the ancient world. Edited by H. Cancik and H. Schneider. Leiden: Brill, 2002-


BIBLIOGRAPHY


COHEN, S. 1981. 'Sosates the Jewish Homer', Harvard Theological Review 74.4: 391-396.


1996. Writing, Teachers, and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt. Atlanta: Scholars Press.


——— 1963. 'Ephorus and Written History KATA GENOS', American Journal of Philology 84.3: 244-255.


GOLDFAHN, A.H. 1873. 'Justinus Martyr und die Agada', Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 22.2: 49-60.


--- 1971. 'Early Alexandrian Christianity', *Church History* 40: 133-144.


HASLAM, M.W. 1986. 'POxy. 3710', *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* Part LIII: 89-112.


HEINISCH, P. 1908. *Der Einfluss Philos auf die älteste christliche Exegese (Barnabas, Justin und Clemens von Alexandria)*. Münster: Aschendorff.


NEIS, R. 2013. The Sense of Sight in Rabbinic Culture: Jewish Ways of Seeing in Late Antiquity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


——— 1957. 'The Philonic Patriarchs as Νόμος Ἐμψυχος', Studia Patristica 1: 515-525.


STANLEY, C.D. 1990. 'Paul and Homer: Graeco-Roman Citation Practice in the First Century CE', Novum Testamentum 32.1: 48-78.


