

Protest and Repression in Democratic Systems: A Comparative Analysis with a Focus on Brazil

Anna E. Mackin
Nuffield College

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of D.Phil. in
the Department of Politics and International Relations in the Division of Social
Science at the University of Oxford

July 2014

Abstract

This thesis focuses on whether protest affects the levels of repression in electoral democracies and, if so, in what manner. After an overview of the literature, Chapter 2 contains an empirical analysis of the relationship between protest and repression at a global level, using a dataset of 71 democracies over 10 years. The results point to a positive association between protest and repression that is driven primarily by post-1974 democracies. The chapter then develops a theoretical model of the costs and benefits accruing to a democratic leader when deciding whether to repress a protest. The model yields a number of testable hypotheses about which factors will affect the likelihood that repression will be chosen, which are then tested for using cross-national and sub-national data. The impact of constitutional constraints is examined first using the cross-national dataset, which reveals that executives in new democracies centralise power in response to protest. Chapter 4 is a quantitative study of the 27 Brazilian states over a 9-year period using data on the repression of land protesters and political variables. The results indicate that governors with precarious political positions are less likely to promote repressive policing strategies. Chapter 5 uses data drawn from five Brazilian national newspapers to identify whether under-reporting of land protest events might contribute to the level of state repression. Chapter 6 is a qualitative comparison of two states – São Paulo and Pará – and suggests that while tight political control over the police explains repression in the former, the unaccountability of the police and the ideology of the main opposition parties in the state assembly may explain why the latter has a much higher level of repression than would be predicted by political factors alone. Chapter 7 revisits the cross-national dataset of 71 democracies to test whether additional determinants of repression identified in Chapter 6 have an effect at the global level.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Tony and Helen Mackin, whose continued support and encouragement ensured that I saw this project through to the end.

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to a number of people, whose help and support were crucial in the writing of this thesis. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Joe Foweraker, without whose continued guidance, feedback and, most importantly, patience, I would not have been able to finish this work. In addition, I am grateful to Timothy Power for regularly sharing his expertise on Brazil and for his assistance in finding suitable contacts during my field trips to Brazil. I also benefited from comments and feedback on my research given by many visiting Brazilian academics and graduate students who took part in a series of workshops on Brazilian politics organised by Timothy Power at Oxford's Latin America Centre in 2012.

I would like to thank Kerry Papps for his invaluable advice regarding the statistical specifications in Chapters 2 and 4 and for helping me solve complex coding issues in Stata. Sidney Tarrow also provided useful feedback on Chapter 4, during the semester I spent as a visiting fellow at Cornell in 2011.

Special mention must go to Adriana Reis de Santana, who, in addition to teaching me Brazilian Portuguese over many years, accurately translated the audio recordings of the interviews I undertook for Chapter 6 from Portuguese into English.

I would like to thank Artur Zimmerman of the Universidade Federal do ABC São Paulo, who helped put me in touch with the CPT in the South of Pará, and José Batista Afonso of the Marabá branch of the CPT, who arranged my visits to MST encampments in the region.

Finally, I am grateful to the staff of the *Biblioteca do Senado Federal* in Brasília for providing me with access to the many folders of newspaper reports relating the MST and to the staff at the CPT headquarters in Goiânia, who kindly gave me access to more detailed formats of their data.

Table of contents

Glossary of acronyms.....	x
Maps of Brazil... ..	xi
Chapter 1: Protest and the determinants of repression	1
1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 Research design and outline of the thesis.....	2
Chapter 2: Protest and repression in democratic systems: An overview of the literature and a cross-national analysis.....	7
2.1 Literature on regime type and repression.....	7
2.2 The debate over the functional form of the relationship.....	8
2.3 Differentiation between democracies?.....	10
2.4 A preliminary cross-national analysis of the relationship between protest and repression in democracies.....	11
2.5 Econometric specification.....	20
2.6 Results for the whole sample.....	23
2.7 A consideration of the difference between “old” and “new” democracies.....	25
2.8 Developing a theory of repression by democratic governments	29
2.9 A preliminary analysis of the role of horizontal constitutional constraints.....	37
2.10 A brief note about authoritarian preferences among voters.....	42
2.11 Conclusion.....	43
Chapter 3: The MST and land protests in Brazil.....	48
3.1 Introduction.....	48

3.2 Historical context.....	49
3.3 Other movements in the democratic period.....	61
3.4 The growth of occupations over time and across regions.....	62
3.5 Agrarian movements and the government in the contemporary democratic period.....	66
3.6 Conclusion.....	68
Chapter 4: Cyclical accountability and repression in democratic contexts: The case of land protests in Brazil.....	70
4.1 Cyclical accountability and the behaviour of elected governments.....	70
4.2 Governors in Brazil.....	74
4.3 State governors and the military police.....	75
4.4 Dataset and hypotheses.....	77
4.5 Analysis and results.....	86
4.6 Conclusion.....	90
Chapter 5: The media, accountability and repression.	92
5.1 Introduction.....	92
5.2 Regional differences in newspaper coverage.....	98
5.3 Links between reporting rates and repression.....	108
5.4 Conclusion.....	109
Chapter 6: The use of repression on the ground: A qualitative comparison of São Paulo and Pará.....	111
6.1 Introduction.....	111
6.2 Descriptive statistics.....	113

6.3 São Paulo as an illustrative case.....	117
6.4 The media and repression in São Paulo	123
6.5 Explaining Pará, a case of extreme repression.....	126
6.6 Problems of oversight of the military police in Pará.....	131
6.7 Coalition politics in Pará.....	139
6.8 Conclusion.....	141
Chapter 7: Testing the sub-national findings at the cross-national level.....	144
7.1 Introduction.....	144
7.2 Data and hypotheses.....	144
7.3 Results and discussion.....	150
7.4 Conclusion.....	156
Chapter 8: Conclusion.	158
8.1 Aims of the thesis.....	158
8.2 Horizontal constitutional constraints.....	159
8.3 Cyclical costs: legislative and electoral support.....	160
8.4 Media.....	161
8.5 Public support for violent policing of protest.....	162
8.6 What is missing from the model?.....	162
8.7 Concluding remarks.....	165
References	166
Appendices	183

Index of Tables

Table 2.1: Regressions using the political terror scale.....	24
Table 2.2: Variable means for the regression sample.....	27
Table 2.3: Regressions using the political terror scale with interactions for old and new democracies.....	29
Table 2.4: Regressions using executive constraints.....	40
Table 2.5: Regressions using executive constraints with interactions for old and new democracies.....	42
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for variables.....	85
Table 4.2: Fixed effect regression estimates.....	88
Table 7.1: Between estimation of global sample comparing old vs. new interaction terms to alternative dichotomies.....	150
Table 7.2: Within IV estimation of global sample comparing old vs. new interaction terms to alternative dichotomies.....	151
Table 7.3: Tabulations between the three main variables.....	154

Index of Figures

Figure 2.1: Time-averaged political terror scale and number of demonstrations.....	20
Figure 3.1: Total MST occupations vs. other movements by region, 2000-2005.....	63
Figure 3.2: Annual land occupations by MST vs. other movements 2000-2007.....	64
Figure 4.1: Trends in forms of repression over time for all states.....	79
Figure 4.2: Land protest events over time for all states.....	82
Figure 5.1: Newspaper coverage of land protests.....	101
Figure 5.2: Individual newspapers' shares of total newspaper reports.....	102
Figure 5.3: Reporting rates by region.....	103
Figure 5.4: Reporting rates by state.....	104
Figure 5.5: Total events and reported events.....	106
Figure 5.6: Non-reporting rates and mild repression.....	107
Figure 5.7: Non-reporting rates and harsh repression.....	108
Figure 6.1: Land protests in São Paulo and Pará, 2000-2005.....	114
Figure 6.2: Harsh repression in Pará and São Paulo, 1997-2005.....	115
Figure 6.3: Mild repression in São Paulo and Pará, 1997-2005.....	116
Figure 6.4: Police expenditure as proportion of total government spending in R\$, 2008	132
Figure 6.5: Per capita spending on policing in Pará and São Paulo, 2008.....	133

Glossary of Acronyms

CPT	<i>Comissão Pastoral da Terra</i> (Pastoral Land Commission)
CEB	<i>Comunidade Eclesial de Base</i> (Ecclesiastical Base Community)
CUT	<i>Central Única dos Trabalhadores</i> (Central Union of Workers)
CONTAG	<i>Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura</i> (National Confederation of Agricultural Workers)
FETAPE	<i>Federação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura do Estado de Pernambuco</i> (Federation of Agricultural Workers of the State of Pernambuco)
IBGE	<i>Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística</i> (Brazilian institute of Geography and Statistics)
INCRA	<i>Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária</i> (National Institute for Colonisation and Agrarian Reform)
INTERPA	<i>Instituto de Terras do Pará</i> (Land Institute of Pará)
MASTER	<i>Movimento dos Agricultores Sem Terra</i> (Movement of Landless Farmers)
MLST	<i>Movimento de Libertação dos Sem Terra</i> (Movement for the Liberation of the Landless)
MST	<i>Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra</i> (Movement of Landless Workers)
PCB	<i>Partido Comunista Brasileiro</i> or <i>Partido Comunista do Brasil</i> , pre-1958 (Brazilian Communist Party, Communist Party of Brazil)
PDT	<i>Partido Democrático Trabalhista</i> (Democratic Labour Party)
PDS*	<i>Partido Democrático Social</i> (Democratic Social Party)
PFL†	<i>Partido da Frente Liberal</i> (Liberal Front Party)
PL‡	<i>Partido Liberal</i> (Liberal Party)
PM	<i>Polícia Militar</i> (Military Police)
PMDB	<i>Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro</i> (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)
PPB§	<i>Partido Progressista Brasileiro</i> (Brazilian Progressive Party)
PPR	<i>Partido Progressista Reformador</i> (Progressive Reform Party)
PPS	<i>Partido Popular Socialista</i> (Popular Socialist Party)
PSB	<i>Partido Socialista Brasileiro</i> (Brazilian Socialist Party)
PSDB	<i>Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira</i> (Brazilian Social Democratic Party)
PT	<i>Partido dos Trabalhadores</i> (The Workers' Party)
UDR	<i>União Democrática Ruralista</i> (Democratic Association of Ruralists)

* The PDS was preceded by *Aliança Renovadora Nacional* (National Renewal Alliance, ARENA), which was the official party of the military regime from 1965-1979.

† The PFL changed its name to the (DEM) *Democratas* (Democrats) in 2007.

‡ In 2006 the PL merged with (PRONA) *Partido da Reedificação da Ordem Nacional* (The Party of Rebuilding National Order), to become the (PR) *Partido da República* (Party of the Republic).

§ The PRB became the PPB after the first elections used in the analysis in chapter 4, and in 2003 the party changed its name again to the (PP) *Partido Progressista* (Progressive Party).

Maps of Brazil

Political map of Brazil



Source: <<http://www.guianet.com.br>>

The state of Pará



Source: <<http://www.guianet.com.br>>

CHAPTER 1

Protest and the determinants of repression

1.1 Introduction

The right to peaceful protest is widely regarded as an important political freedom to be protected, with clauses protecting the right of assembly appearing in 174 constitutions worldwide.¹ In practice however, the extent to which governments uphold this right is not nearly as uniform. So what do we know about the sources of this variation? The primary focus of previous research has been to identify differences between types of regimes in their proclivity to repress protest. The main conclusions drawn from this literature is that a political protester's chances of experiencing state repression are much smaller if he/she lives under a democratic regime and that there is significant variation among non-democratic regime sub-types, with transitional or "semi-autocratic" regimes being the most repressive (although all types of non-democracy repress protest more, on average, than full democracies).

In contrast, existing research does not have a great deal to say about how a protester's chances of being repressed will differ from democracy to democracy. Does repression of protesters in these countries still take place routinely, but merely with a lower degree of severity than in autocracies? Or is protest generally not met with repression in democracies, except for a few outlier cases? The research in this thesis begins by considering the question: what does the relationship between protest and repression look like, when we use a global sample of democracies *only*? This preliminary question is addressed in a quantitative manner in Chapter 2 by drawing on a cross-national sample of 71 democratic countries over a 10-year period and by using panel data techniques to control for potential reverse causality. The

¹ See <https://www.constituteproject.org>.

findings indicate that for this wholly democratic sample, protesters can indeed still expect to be met with a repressive response from the state. However, it is found that this positive relationship appears to be driven solely by the set of “new” democracies, which democratised after 1974. Nonetheless, democratic longevity itself does not explain the difference between the two groups of democracies. Rather, it appears that certain underlying variables may be key to the decisions made by political leaders regarding how to treat anti-government protesters.

In order to provide a starting point for identifying the contextual factors that may explain why repressive actions occur in new democracies, a theoretical model is developed of the particular costs and benefits that confront a democratic leader when he or she must decide whether to repress a protest. This represents an original contribution of the thesis, as previous models have focused on the costs and benefits faced by autocratic governments, who will opt to repress when they believe it will curtail a protest and prevent a revolution, but do not have to concern themselves with the possibility of losing electoral or legislative support.

This model generates a set of hypotheses, which predict how repression will be affected by: (1) the number of horizontal constitutional constraints acting on the executive; (2) the intensity of media coverage; (3) the extent of public preference for violent policing; (4) the level of support for the executive in the legislature; and (5) the executive’s level of electoral support. These hypotheses are then tested with different sources of data over the remainder of the thesis. The level of analysis used in each case is chosen based on the suitability of the data available for testing the hypothesis in question, as will be explained below.

1.2 Research design and outline of the thesis

In the second part of Chapter 2 the effect of horizontal constitutional constraints on the executive’s ability to repress is examined (Hypothesis 1), using the same cross-national

dataset as before, but with the inclusion of a measure of “executive constraints” taken from the Polity IV dataset. It is appropriate to test for the effect of constitutional constraints at the cross-national level, as although the only data on protest available at this level is based on newspaper reports (and will therefore suffer from a certain degree of bias), there is usually more constitutional variation to be found between countries than within them. Public opinion data from the World Values Survey are then used in a somewhat exploratory manner to assess the differences between old and new democracies in public preferences for authoritarian practices (Hypothesis 3).

The following chapters test the remaining hypotheses using state-level data from Brazil, with Chapter 3 first providing a historical overview of protest for agrarian reform in Brazil. Chapter 4 examines the expected effects of legislative and electoral support on the level of repression by a state governor (Hypotheses 4 and 5). There are many variations in constitutional design between democratic countries that will alter the potential costs of losing legislative or electoral support, for example, the powers granted to the executive by the constitution, whether a system is parliamentary or presidential and whether the system used for electing the legislature is majoritarian or proportional. Consequently, testing for the effect of these variables on repression using cross-national data will introduce a confounding source of variation into the analysis. Therefore, for these particular hypotheses it is analytically advantageous to use sub-national data, where this source of variation is eliminated.

Why Brazil?

Why were the subnational units in Brazil chosen for this task? First, Brazil is a “new” (or post-1974) democracy and therefore belongs to the subset of democratic countries for which a positive relationship between protest and repression was found in the cross-national analysis.

Second, Brazil has sufficient degree of protest for such an inquiry into to be worthwhile, with the fifth highest level of political protest among the countries included in the cross-national analysis in Chapter 3.

Third, Brazil is a federal country, which makes it more plausible that assumptions about how national democratic leaders behave will also translate to the subnational level. While other countries are both federal and have experienced high levels of protest (such as Venezuela, Argentina and Russia), Brazil has the additional advantage of a consistent constitutional structure across its states and governors who wield a sufficient amount of power. Every one of Brazil's 26 states (and the federal district) has a governor elected through a majority run off and a unicameral legislature elected through open list proportional representation. Elections for these offices are held concurrently with those for the state governor and for the branches of the federal government. The constitutional arrangements of Argentinean provinces, on the other hand, differ in a number of significant ways: unicameral or bicameral legislatures, open or closed list electoral systems, with some provinces holding mid-term elections for the legislature whereas others hold elections for all seats every four years (Jones 1998:7). The differences between Russia's sub-national units go beyond electoral rules and it is generally considered a case of asymmetric federalism, with only 21 of its 83 sub-units, the republics, possessing their own constitutions (Hughes 2001: 46-50).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Brazil presents the opportunity to make use of a unique dataset on both protest and repression that is superior to the data available at the cross-national level. This data, which focuses on protests related to agrarian reform, is based on the direct observations of an extensive network of field agents working for a national NGO (the *Comissão Pastoral da Terra*). This means that dataset avoids many of the problems of bias associated with data coded on the basis of newspaper reports.

Brazil is by no means the only case that could have been used to investigate the research question. However, it can be considered an appropriate and useful case, for the reasons outlined above.

Chapter 5 draws on the same dataset on land protest that is used in Chapter 4 as well as additional data on the same protests, which were coded by the author from national newspaper reports. The two sets of data are compared in order to ascertain the level of media coverage given to protest and what factors affect this. The reporting rate is then compared with the level of repression to see whether there is any evidence that low reporting rates may contribute to high levels of repression in a state (Hypothesis 2). The only previous study that has looked at the relationship between reporting rates and repression was carried out in an old democracy (Switzerland), therefore this chapter provides the first evidence on this relationship in a post-1974 democracy. Investigating the relationship in a post 1974 democracy and comparing the results to the original study, makes it possible to draw some preliminary conclusions about the whether differences in media coverage of protest can explain the differences in repression in old and new democracies.

Case selection strategy for a focused comparison

The next empirical chapter, Chapter 6, adopts a nested analysis approach to integrating “small-n” case study-based research with the findings of the statistical analyses, which were conducted at a higher level of analysis. This follows the approach advocated by Lieberman (2005), who argues that selecting a case that adheres well to a statistical model can help us to understand the plausibility of the causal mechanisms believed to be driving the statistical relationship. Accordingly, the state of São Paulo is selected for further investigation, as a case which has an estimated state fixed effect in Chapter 4 that is close to the national average and is therefore representative of Brazil as a whole. In contrast, Lieberman notes that choosing a

case that is an outlier can help refine a theory, by pointing to factors that may not have been included in the original statistical model. Consequently, Pará is also chosen, as it is an outlier which has a great deal of repression that is unexplained by the statistical model used in Chapter 4.

The final Empirical Chapter, Chapter 7, revisits the cross-national dataset used in Chapter 2, in order to determine whether three additional determinates of repression identified in the cases of São Paulo and Pará can also explain variation in repression by democratic governments at the global level.

CHAPTER

Protest and repression in democratic systems: An overview of the literature and a cross-national analysis

2.1 Literature on regime type and repression

How a government chooses to respond to organised political protest often provides a graphic illustration of the differences between the behaviour of autocratic and democratic regimes. One of the anticipated outcomes of a transition to democracy is that governments will have a greater respect for the human rights of their citizens. This is an expectation that has received extensive empirical support, with numerous studies finding that democracies are less likely to repress their citizens than non-democratic or semi-democratic states (Davenport, 1999; Carey, 2006; Fein, 1995; Gupta, Singh and Sprague, 1993; Henderson, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Zanger, 2000).

The causal mechanisms through which democracy is presumed to reduce repression are largely related to the electoral process and the representative functions of a democratic system. Henderson (1991), for example, observes that democratic leaders are forced to be responsive to their citizens, which makes repression a 'less likely' option for democratic governments. Democratic governments are also seen to have fewer incentives to repress political protests because the existence of representative institutions make anti-system challenges less viable. Where formal institutional channels for political opposition are present, there will be fewer 'credible threats' to the government which exist outside these political institutions (Regan and Henderson, 2002).

Many of the studies cited above assume the existence of a simple linear relationship, where incremental improvements in the level of democracy would lead

to a corresponding reduction in the level of repression. Henderson (1991) equates democracy with responsiveness and infers from this that the more responsive a regime is to its citizens' demands the less likely it will be to use repression. Using a cross-sectional dataset of 152 countries, he tests for the influence of democracy along with other variables including the rate of economic growth, the level of socioeconomic development and the level of income inequality. His study finds democracy and inequality to be the most important predictors of repression with the level of democracy exhibiting a strong negative relationship with repression while the level of income inequality has a strong positive association with repression. Similarly, Poe and Tate (1994), using what appears to be the same sample of 152 countries, find strong evidence of a negative relationship between the level democracy (tested using two different scales) and the level of repression, when controlling for the influence of population size, civil war and economic growth. Mitchell and McCormick (1988) also look at economic and political explanations of human rights violations across a sample of 123 countries. However, rather than using a scale indicating the level of democracy, they classify countries as falling into one of three types of regime: liberal, authoritarian and totalitarian. They find that liberal regimes have fewer human rights violations.

2.2 The debate over the functional form of the relationship

Other authors have questioned the assumption of linearity and have found support for what Fein (1995) called the 'more murder in the middle' hypothesis. This predicts that the initial political liberalisation involved in a democratic transition may prompt greater repression from elites still wishing to hold on to power. Fein's study grouped 145 countries according to the Freedom House classifications of 'free' and 'partly-

free' and 'not free' and cross-tabulated them against a six-category score of human rights violations based on Amnesty International reports that ranged from 0-5. Her study found that a greater percentage of partly-free regimes had violations classified at the highest end of the scale (3, 4, and 5) than the not free regimes (69% compared to 59%), whereas free regimes predictably performed better than both these other types, with 77% of this type of regime scoring either 0 or 1, the lowest levels (Fein, 1995, p. 176). Regan and Henderson (2002) develop a further test of this hypothesis which they describe as inverted U-shape relationship between democracy and repression. They look at a sample of 92 less-developed countries over a period of 14 years. They divide these into democracies, semi-democracies and autocracies. The authors find that the inverted U-shaped relationship between regime type and repression still holds while controlling for the level of threat (*i.e.* internal rebellion).

More recently, this inverted U-shaped assumption has been questioned in favour of a threshold model advanced by Davenport and Armstrong (2004), who use a sample of 147 countries over a 21-year period to test the relative explanatory power of three specifications of the relationship: linear, inverted U (quadratic) and a threshold model. They find that the threshold specification performs better than the other two specifications and that the tipping point at which the effect of democracy of begins to decrease, rather than increase, repression is actually quite high.

Although the above studies suggest that it cannot be assumed that the relationship between democracy and repression is strictly linear, as they show that the transition period is often accompanied by more repression, the results are still consistent with those of earlier studies, in that they still show that democracies tend to repress less than all types of non-democratic regimes.

2.3 Differentiation between democracies?

While the explanatory power of regime type as predictor of repression is undeniable, democracies are still a far from homogenous group in terms of how often they use arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and physical or occasionally deadly force against political protesters.

However, explaining why democratic governments differ in their respect for the civil liberties of protesters, despite being subject to the same electoral constraints, remains an under-explored area of repression research. Some empirical studies of repression dynamics have included both democratic and non-democratic regimes in their analyses (Carey, 2006; Franklin, 2008), but few empirical studies have restricted their study of repression to a solely democratic context. White and White (1995) looked at the case of state repression as a response to violent insurgency in Northern Ireland and found unemployment to be a particularly strong predictor of state repression in this case. Francisco (1996) also looked at Northern Ireland, along with Germany, and found evidence that the interactive, or reciprocal, relationships between repression and protest that have been observed under authoritarian contexts can also occur under democratic regimes. Both these studies highlighted the fact that democratic regimes are still capable of using repression against political opponents.

In sum, the previous research on repression (in general and of protest specifically) in democracies has either been cross-national in scope and has compared the extent to which democracies repress protest compared to authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes or has focused on specific cases of protest repression in democratic contexts. The first thing this research seeks to establish is what the relationship looks like when restricted to only democratic states. Francisco (1996) and White and White (1995) show that it is certainly possible for protest to also elicit repression in democratic

contexts, but are these types of democratic cases outliers that go against the relationship for most democracies? What does the nature of the relationship look like, when we test it across a global sample of democratic cases? The following analysis attempts to address these questions, by drawing on cross-national data on repression and protest.

2.4 A preliminary cross-national analysis of the relationship between protest and repression in democracies

The following analysis is performed on a pooled cross-sectional time series (or panel) dataset of 71 countries over the period 1993-2002. This section discusses the main concepts and methods used in the study.

Defining repression

Since explaining state repression or ‘political repression’ within democratic systems is the focal point of this research, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by these terms, which shall be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. One possible reason why the use of political repression within democratic regimes has been under-researched is that the term is often associated with the harsh tactics employed by an authoritarian regime. Besley and Persson’s (2009) definition exemplifies this view: ‘Repression is one-sided use of violence by the incumbent government to stay in office, effectively repressing any latent insurgency by the opposition’ (p. 1). State repression within a democratic system, while similar, is more likely to be carried out by an incumbent government to quell grass-roots opposition to its policies rather than opposition to the democratic regime itself. Besley and Persson’s definition is too narrow as it not only

restricts the focus to acts committed by authoritarian regimes but also to explicitly violent forms of repression.

Broader definitions, such as that of Tilly (1978), would certainly allow for milder forms of coercive tactics used by agents of the state to be included under the heading of repression. He defines repression as ‘any action by another group that raises the contender’s costs of collective action’. Franklin (1997) provides a similar definition:

‘I define political repression as the use of sanctions by a government against its inhabitants. Sanctions include the use of violence meant to kill or otherwise harm the targets and forceful acts meant to limit the freedom of action of the targets.’ (Franklin, 1997, p. 579)

These definitions do not, however, provide much information about the particular forms that repression may take. Among some authors, there has been a move towards a more comprehensive definition of repression that includes arrests as well as more overt forms of repression (Titarenko et al 2001; Henderson, 1991; Oliver, 2008; Earl, 2005). Earl (2005) argues that police may use arbitrary arrest of protesters as a form of “state social control” (p. 133). She cites data from several cases of protest in the US on the percentage of arrests that resulted in conviction to support her argument that police may often use “arrests without conviction” (p. 107).

This study follows the definition laid out by Henderson (1991), as it allows for both forms of repression that are violent as well as other forms of coercion. Moreover, Henderson extends the definition of Stohl and Lopez (1984) to provide some information about observable forms of repressive behaviour:

‘Political repression is the use or threat of coercion in varying degrees applied by government against opponents or potential opponents to weaken their resistance to the will of the authorities... Repression can take multiple forms, but certainly this policy can include arbitrary arrest disappearance, detention torture and political killing.’ (Henderson, 1991, p. 121)

This thesis adds one additional caveat to the definition of repression advanced by Henderson (1991): that a human rights abuse of the type described above can still be considered government repression if it is carried out by non-state actors but the government knowingly allows the repression to take place. This follows Kauzlarich *et al.* (2003), who argue that the state can also be culpable in the human rights abuses committed by non-state actors when the state facilitates these abuses by deliberately neglecting to intervene. They refer to this situation as ‘explicit acts of omission’, stating that ‘OE is often the result of a conscious, often ideological, choice to do nothing about an observable or potentially observable harm’ (Kauzlarich *et al.*, 2003, p. 251).

As Francisco (1995: 278) observes, ideally, the measure of repression used in a study of the relationship between protesters and the government would only record observable acts of repression against protesters. Unfortunately, no such measure exists at the cross-national level, so the measure used in this chapter is a more general measure of political repression which certainly includes acts of state repression against protesters but may include acts of repression perpetrated against other political opponents. Repression is proxied for by the political terror scale of Gibney *et al.* (2008), which is an index of political repression that is coded on the basis of Amnesty International reports (*AIPTS*). Under this, countries are coded on a 1-5 scale where 1 indicates the lowest level of political repression and 5 the highest:

Level 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Level 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. (Gibney *et al.*, 2008)

Alternative measures of repression are available at the cross-national level, in particular Cingranelli and Richards' Physical Integrity measure (CIRI), which is based on both US State Department and Amnesty International sources. However, the political terror scale (PTS), unlike the CIRI, is based on a broad definition of state repression, which is more consistent with the definition adopted in later chapters of the thesis:

'While both datasets attend to state violence, the PTS uses a broader definition of what constitutes violations of citizens' physical integrity rights by the state. Under the PTS approach, the definition of state agents extends to those persons under nominal control of agencies of the state. Thus, the PTS extends state culpability to all actors on which the state (or its subsidiaries) has the capacity to exert significant influence. Examples of this type of state actor include militia or paramilitary organisations that work in association with, or at the behest of the government, military, or some other department therein.' (Wood and Gibney, 2010, p. 288)

Like the PTS data, the repression data from Brazil which are used in Chapter 4 also include repression by 'organisations that work in association with' state agencies, in this case private militia, who are contracted by landlords and often operate closely with the police (and in fact sometimes include off-duty or ex-police officers). In any case, the CIRI is highly correlated with the Amnesty International PTS (Gibney and Wood, 2010, p. 375), so substituting it for the latter is unlikely to significantly alter the results of this chapter.

Defining protest

There is no commonly agreed upon definition of protest. Rucht and Ohlemacher (1992) define a protest event as ‘a distinctive collective action pursuing an explicit goal by the use of confrontative, disruptive or even violent means’ (Rucht and Ohlemacher, 1992, p. 7).

Opp’s (2009) definition is similar to the above, however he also stipulates that the action to be considered a “protest”, it must have a political goal, *i.e.* to influence decision makers: ‘Protest is defined as a joint (*i.e.* collective) action of individuals aimed at achieving their goals by influencing the decision of a target’ (Opp, 2009, p. 38).

Both the above definitions allow for a variety of actions to be considered a “protest”. Some authors, such as Tilly and Tarrow (2007), negate the term altogether, arguing that acts which would normally be considered protest, such as demonstrations, are just one of many different forms of “contentious politics”, along with riots and strikes.

The definition adopted in this thesis, however, follows that of authors such as Franklin (1997), who consider acts of protest to be distinct from acts of collective political violence:

‘Political protest is the public, non-violent, collective expression of disagreement by inhabitants of a political community with the government, its agents, its policies, or the political regime itself... *Turmoil* refers to unorganised and unplanned acts of violence directed at the state. *Organized violence* denotes organized, premeditated use of violence by the inhabitants of a political community against the government, its agents, its policies, or the political regime itself’. (Franklin, 1997, pp. 579-580)

The exclusion of violent actions is necessary in order to clearly distinguish protest acts from riots, acts of terrorism, domestic insurgency and civil war which will

most likely have a separate impact upon a the propensity of a government to respond with repression. Moreover, “threat” based models of repression predict that groups who employ violent tactics will incite greater levels of government repression (Earl, 2003, p. 53).

It should also be noted that for the purposes of this thesis, the term “non-violent” refers to the form of the collective protest event or the strategy of protest activity employed by the majority of the participants in the event. A demonstration or march therefore is a non-violent form of protest even if a minority of participants engages in violent acts. Similarly, violence undertaken by protesters that are acts of self-defence in response to state repression does not constitute a violent strategy if the original protest event was peaceful and the state, rather than the protesters, instigated the violence. Also, following Eisinger (1973), for a collective action aimed at a political target to be considered a non-violent protest does not preclude the protesting group from being perceived as potentially violent, so long as the main protesting strategies do not actually involve violence. Eisinger (1973) states that, although both may involve collective action to achieve a political goal, a key difference between protest and political violence is that protests retain legitimacy by refraining from the use of violence. He notes that while some protests may have an “implicit” threat of violence, ‘Once they employ their threat openly, however they open the way for authorities to suppress their movement or actions’ (Eisinger, 1973, p. 14).

Sources of data on protest activity are scarcer and less reliable than on similar forms of collective action such as strikes. The most common way in which protest has been operationalised for the purposes of quantitative analysis has been through the use of events-based data. The pitfalls of events-based data in terms of measurement validity have attracted considerable attention in recent years (McCarthy *et al.*, 1998;

Earl *et al.*, 2004).² Despite this, events-based data remain the only comparable indicator of protest available for cross-national research. The measure chosen for the following analysis is “anti-government demonstrations” taken from Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, denoted *DEMOS*.³ This records the number of demonstrations with over 100 participants that occur within a country each year and are reported in the *New York Times*.

Control variables

Additional control variables for inclusion in the following analysis were selected based on evidence from the existing literature. These include real G.D.P. per capita (in 2000 U.S. dollars), *GDPCAP*; the Gini coefficient (a measure of income inequality), *GINI*; population, *POP*; a dummy variable for whether a country was a former British colony, *BRITCOL*; a linguistic fractionalization index (a measure of linguistic divisions), *LING*; an ethnic fractionalization index (a measure of ethnic divisions), *ETHNIC*; and a dummy variable indicating the presence of an armed domestic insurgency or civil war, *CIVWAR*. Details of these measures are provided in Table A2. A time trend, *t*, was also included to control for gradual global changes in repression.⁴

Classification of democracies

² The main criticism is that no matter how well designed the coding procedure researchers used to code protest events, researchers have no control over how a newspaper or news agency selects the cases of protest that it decides to report on.

³ The fixed-effects specification used in the cross-national analysis adjusts for any systematic bias in reporting by the *New York Times*. This specification utilises only year-to-year variation within each country, meaning that if protests in specific countries are consistently over-reported, the results will not be affected.

⁴ This allows for a more parsimonious specification than the use of individual year dummies, which would result in a large loss in degrees of freedom. Note that the time trend is excluded from the between estimator as it does not vary across countries.

This main aim of this chapter is to look at the nature of the relationship between protest and repression after a democratic transition has taken place (that is, within democratic regimes). Before undertaking such an analysis it is therefore necessary to stipulate what is meant by a democratic transition, specifically what features a regime needs to possess be classified as democratic rather than autocratic. This thesis adopts the minimalist definition of the type favoured by Alvarez *et al.* (1996) and used by most empirical studies of transition to determine the point at which a state can be considered to have completed a transition to a democratic regime. They define a democracy thus:

‘a regime in which some governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections... What is essential to consider a regime democratic is that two kinds of offices are filled directly, or indirectly by elections – the chief executive office and the seats in the effective legislative body – and that the office holders are responsible only to the electors, not to any non-elected powers... [In addition to this,] we classify as democracies only those systems in which incumbent parties lose elections. Alternation in office constitutes prima facie evidence of contestation.’ (Alvarez *et al.*, 1996, p. 4)

This definition restricts the classification of what constitutes a democratic regime to the institutionalisation of political rights, that is, the executive and main national legislative body must be elected through free and fair elections based on universal suffrage, there must be no limits on contestation between parties and the results of national elections must be binding (according to Alvarez *et al.*, this means that if the opposition wins they cannot be prevented from assuming office by the army, for example). The advantage of adopting a purely political definition is that it provides an identifiable cut-off point for determining when a transition to a democratic regime has taken place. It is acknowledged that regimes that meet these minimal criteria may fall short of the meeting more demanding standards required for a regime to be considered a *liberal* democracy. This is in fact a central focus of the thesis. The state repression

of political protesters constitutes a violation of civil liberties or an explicitly illiberal act but it has no bearing on a country's claim to have a regime elected on the basis of free and fair elections. This research therefore aims to identify whether there is variation in repression within regimes that have undergone a transition to electoral democracy and, if evidence of such variation exists, identify the mechanisms that account for it.

Since the question driving the analysis is whether protest within democratic states has an impact on state repression, it is necessary to distinguish between procedurally democratic and non-democratic cases. To this end, the Cheibub and Gandhi (2004) classification of countries into democracies and dictatorships was used. A country is coded as a democracy if it satisfies four conditions: (i) its executive is elected, (ii) its legislature is elected, (iii) there is more than one party competing for office, and (iv) there is evidence of alternation between parties in power.⁵ Cases were only included in the sample if they were democratic (according to this definition) in 1993. There were occasional authoritarian reversals, for example Peru in 1992. Consequently, only cases that were classified as democratic for the entire 1993-2002 period were included in the sample. Some small countries were missing observations for at least one variable for the entire 10-year period and were therefore excluded, leaving 71 cases that were used in at least one specification. These countries are listed in Table A2.1.

Figure 2.1 plots each country's score on the political terror scale against its number of demonstrations, averaged over the time period in the sample. This indicates that there is a clear positive relationship between the number of demonstrations and the political terror scale. The next two sections examine whether this bivariate finding remains after controlling for the influence of other relevant variables.

⁵ These minimal requirements are necessary for establishing the vertical accountability and political rights that underlie a procedural definition of democracy.

in the independent variables over time *within* countries. A practical disadvantage of this technique is that it is not possible to estimate coefficients for the time-invariant variables (ethnic divisions, linguistic divisions and former British colony).

The estimation equation is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 APTS_{it} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 DEMOS_{it} + \beta_2 GINI_{it} + \beta_3 CIVWAR_{it} + \beta_4 \ln GDPCAP_{it} + \beta_5 \ln POP_{it} \\
 & + \beta_6 ETHNIC_i + \beta_7 LING_i + \beta_8 BRITCOL_i + \beta_9 t + \theta_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (2.1)
 \end{aligned}$$

where i denotes country and t denotes year.

In the pooled specification, $\theta_i = 0$, while in the fixed effects (within) specification, θ_i is the coefficient on a country dummy variable. To compare the two specifications, an F -test can be performed for the joint significance of the θ_i terms. For the chosen measure of repression, $APTS_{it}$, the pooled model was rejected.⁶

To assess whether cross-national differences in protest activity explain differences in repression, the between estimator is applied, which involves estimating the time-averaged transformation of the above equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \bar{y}_i = & \tilde{\beta}_0 + \beta_1 \overline{DEMOS}_i + \beta_2 \overline{GINI}_i + \beta_3 \overline{CIVWAR}_i + \beta_4 \overline{\ln GDPCAP}_i + \beta_5 \overline{\ln POP}_i \\
 & + \beta_6 ETHNIC_i + \beta_7 LING_i + \beta_8 BRITCOL_i + \tilde{\varepsilon}_i, \quad (2.2)
 \end{aligned}$$

where $\tilde{\beta}_0 = \beta_0 + \beta_9 \bar{t}$ and $\tilde{\varepsilon}_i = \theta_i + \bar{\varepsilon}_i$.

The effect that repression has on subsequent protest has attracted equal scholarly attention to the effect of protest on inciting repression (Opp and Roehl, 1990; Lichbach, 1987; Manson and Krane, 1989; and Moore, 2000). Other research has suggested that the relationship is an inherently interactive one (Carey, 2006) and therefore even if we are only interested in explaining one side of this relationship, as

⁶ If θ is uncorrelated with the error term, the random effects specification will be more efficient than fixed effects. However, for both dependent variables used here, Hausman tests indicate that random effects estimates will be inconsistent.

is the case here, the specification will need to control for the possibility of endogenous effects. The aim of the preliminary analysis that follows is to establish whether protest still elicits repression when the sample is restricted to only democratic cases (rather than whether repression quells or incites future protest in these countries), but nevertheless the possibility of repression influencing the level of protest needs to be addressed. One way of tackling this issue is to use instrumental variables (IV) estimation. Any variable that only affects the decisions of people to protest, but has no direct effect on the government's decision of whether to repress, will be a valid instrument for *DEMOS*. This includes anything that affects the benefits from the reform/policy change being agitated for or the cost of protest.

One such variable is the presence of protest in a neighbouring country. The protest literature has long recognised the presence of a diffusion of protest cycles across regions. The presence of protest in a neighbouring country is likely to alter the cost-benefit calculation of the protester in one of two ways. Firstly, via the transmission of information, protest (successful or not) by a particular constituency may serve to alert analogous constituencies in neighbouring states to similar grievances. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, if protest is seen to lead to desired reform in one country, similar protest action may be considered more attractive by those in nearby countries. When an individual weighs up the costs relative to the likely benefits of protesting for a particular reform, a successful protest in a neighbouring country will make the likelihood of success in his or her country seem higher than if there had been no prior examples of success in the region. Conversely, if a similar protest was severely repressed in a neighbouring country this may make the perceived costs seem higher. However, the level of protest in a neighbouring country is unlikely to have a *direct* effect on the level of government

limitations on civil liberties since a government will most likely only respond to demands for reform that come from inside their own state.

Therefore, to correct for the potential endogeneity of the demonstrations variable, equation 2.1 was also estimated using two-stage least squares, continuing to allow for country fixed effects. The set of instruments that were used for $DEMOS_{it}$ is: the number of demonstrations in each of the previous three years and the average number of demonstrations in all neighbouring countries in the current and previous three years.⁷ Details of the construction of the neighbouring country variable are provided in Appendix 2.

2.6 Results for the whole sample

Table 2.1 presents the results of the regressions for *AIPTS*. The pooled model results for *AIPTS* are shown in the first column of Table 2.1. Coefficients on the control variables mostly have the expected signs, although not all are significant. Linguistic fractionalisation also has a negative effect on political terror, whereas ethnic fractionalisation is associated with an increase in political terror. Civil war, income inequality and population size are all positive predictors of repression. As predicted, GDP per capita is negatively associated with repression. Interestingly, being a former British colony is a positive predictor of repression, the opposite sign of what was expected. Due to the time-invariant nature of many of these variables, they are not included in the specifications that control for state-specific country effects.

⁷ The lagged values of own country and neighbouring country protest are valid instruments as they are predetermined variables.

Table 2.1: Regressions using the political terror scale

Variable	(i) Pooled	(ii) Between	(iii) Within	(iv) Within IV
Number of demonstrations	0.113*** (0.021)	0.437*** (0.082)	0.001 (0.018)	0.270* (0.163)
Gini coefficient	0.012*** (0.003)	0.009 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.010)
Civil war	1.645*** (0.087)	1.748*** (0.192)	0.842*** (0.136)	0.854*** (0.159)
Linguistic	-0.859*** (0.125)	-0.599** (0.252)		
Ethnic	0.612*** (0.147)	0.487* (0.285)		
Former British colony	0.207*** (0.068)	0.104 (0.133)		
Log of GDP/capita	-0.188*** (0.020)	-0.182*** (0.039)	-0.955*** (0.310)	-0.051 (0.589)
Log of population	0.139*** (0.018)	0.061 (0.038)	-3.085*** (0.700)	-1.449 (1.191)
Time trend	0.031*** (0.009)		0.068*** (0.013)	0.040* (0.021)
<i>R</i> -squared	0.628	0.847	0.811	0.754
Number of observations	696	696	706	694

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

In the fourth model, demonstrations is instrumented for using its first three lags and the average number of demonstrations in neighbouring countries and its first three lags.

Turning to the variable of interest, the coefficient on demonstrations is positive and significant in the pooled model, thus indicating that protest is associated with higher levels of human rights abuses as measured by the political terror scale. The coefficient on protest is stronger when the between estimator is used, however in the fixed effects specification the relationship loses statistical significance. This could indicate that the relationship found in the pooled model is largely being driven by cross-national variation rather than variation over time within countries. However, when the fixed effects specification is estimated using instrumental variables the coefficient on demonstrations increases significantly and is significant at the 10% level, thus suggesting that in the original fixed effects specification the presence of endogeneity may have obscured this association. These results are therefore consistent

with a situation in which governments respond to demands for reform by imposing limitations on civil liberties that are necessary to prevent the reform from taking place.⁸

The results in Table 2.1 show that the basic assumption underpinning the research question is valid. Despite the findings of previous research that democracies as a group repress less than non-democratic regimes, when the sample is restricted to purely democratic countries, political protest still appears to elicit repression, as the coefficient on “number of demonstrations” is positive and significant. So, having found evidence consistent with the basic premise that democracies still respond to protest with repression, we can now move on to consider what may motivate a *democratic* leader to repress and explain why some democratic leaders may be more likely to use repression than others.

2.7 A consideration of the difference between “old” and “new” democracies

Why might some democratic leaders be inclined to respond to protest more violently than others? One factor, which may affect the likelihood of repression being used by a democratic regime, is the age of the democratic regime. Arat (1991, 1999) has hypothesised that leaders in more recently established democratic regimes may be under pressure to respond to forms of social unrest, such as protest, with repression, for fear that outward dissent will be interpreted by the middle classes as a loss of government control. In this sense, protest is more likely to be perceived by newer democracies as representing a threat to the viability of the new democratic regime. Qualitative research that looks at how more established democracies police protests has tended to observe an evolution away from repressive tactics over time. Della Porta

⁸ If these restrictions take the form of direct repression of protesters themselves a slight modification of the theoretical model is required, as discussed in Appendix 1.

et al. (1998) looked at the evolution of protest policing in Italy and France from the post-war period to the 1990s, where both countries moved from more confrontational or repressive strategies towards more cooperative models of protest policing based on formal or informal negotiations between police and protest leaders. They speculate that one reason may be the result of an ‘enlargement of the general understanding of democratic rights [over time]’ (della Porta *et al.*, 1998, p. 126). McPhail, Shweingruber and McCarthy (1998) observed a similar trend in the United States from the 1960s to the 1990s. This suggests that we might expect newer democratic governments to have a greater propensity to repress political protest because it takes time for the right to political protest to gain widespread “legitimacy” (della Porta *et al.*, 1998, p. 127).

The following extension of the analysis attempts to test whether these findings hold true over a large sample. Do older democracies repress less on average than their younger counterparts?

Interacted specification

Cheibub and Gandhi’s data, which were used to select the original set of democratic cases, were also used to create a dummy variable, $NEWD_i$, for those countries (“new democracies”) that experienced a transition in or after 1974, the date at which Huntington (1991, 1993) argues that the most recent “wave”⁹ of democratic

⁹ Huntington (1991) observes that transitions to democracy have tended to come in “waves” (periods in which the global number of democracies increases). Huntington pinpoints the first wave as beginning in the 1820s and ending with a wave of authoritarian reversals that began in the 1920s with Mussolini’s rise to power. The second wave took place from the end of the Second World War until the early 1960s, when it was followed with another reverse wave. He argues that the third and most recent wave of democratisation can be dated from 1974 (Huntington, 1991, p. 12).

Table 2.2: Variable means for the regression sample

Variable	All democracies	New democracies	Old democracies
Political terror scale	1.974 (1.043)	2.310 (0.934)	1.804 (1.195)
Gini coefficient	39.047 (10.573)	41.004 (11.363)	35.863 (8.589)
Civil war	0.086 (0.281)	0.121 (0.326)	0.119 (0.325)
Linguistic	0.296 (0.251)	0.291 (0.253)	0.237 (0.221)
Ethnic	0.348 (0.230)	0.366 (0.224)	0.301 (0.215)
Former British colony	0.296 (0.457)	0.182 (0.386)	0.231 (0.422)
Log of GDP/capita	8.138 (1.458)	7.499 (1.247)	9.370 (1.124)
Log of population	15.346 (2.156)	16.151 (1.405)	16.426 (1.589)
Number of demonstrations	0.509 (1.155)	0.623 (1.240)	0.646 (1.332)
Number of observations	700	440	260

Notes: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.

transitions began, with the fall of Portugal's military regime. The use of this cut-off date is consistent with the choice of previous scholars who have looked at other research questions requiring a distinction between 'old' and 'established' democracies (Catterberg and Moreno, 2006; Dalton And Weldon , 2007; Foweraker and Krznaric, 2002; Kim and Bahry, 2008; Tusalem, 2007; Van Biezen, 2005). Table 2.2 reports means and standard deviations for all variables, separately for old and new democracies. As expected, new democracies have higher values of the political terror scale and the difference in means is significant. New democracies also have significantly more income inequality and linguistic and ethnic divisions and significantly lower levels of gross domestic product (GDP), however there is no significant difference in the level of protest between old and new democracies.

The new democracy dummy variable, $NEWD_i$, was then interacted with protest, giving rise to the following augmented specification:

$$\begin{aligned}
y_{it} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1^N NEWD_i \times DEMOS_{it} + \beta_1^O (1 - NEWD_i) \times DEMOS_{it} + \beta_2 GINI_{it} \\
& + \beta_3 CIVWAR_{it} + \beta_4 \ln GDP_{it} + \beta_5 \ln POP_{it} + \beta_6 ETHNIC_i + \beta_7 LING_i \\
& + \beta_8 BRITCOL_i + \beta_9 t + \theta_i + \varepsilon_{it}. \tag{2.3}
\end{aligned}$$

β_1^N is predicted to indicate a higher level of repression, whereas β_1^O is predicted to indicate a lower level. Hence, it is expected that $\beta_1^O < 0 < \beta_1^N$ for $AIPTS_{it}$.

Since both protest interaction terms may suffer from endogeneity bias, IV was again used. Separate instruments were constructed for the two protest variables as follows. In the first stage, regressions for protest were estimated separately for old and new democracies. These used all exogenous variables plus the same set of instruments used previously. From these, a single predicted variable for protest was created. This variable was then interacted with the new and old democracy dummies, yielding two predicted variables. These were used as the instruments for the two protest interaction terms in equation 3.3. As discussed by Wooldridge (2002, pp. 116-117), this strategy is an example of the method of generated instruments and the usual properties for instrumental variables estimation hold as long as lagged protest and protest in neighbouring countries are not correlated with the error term in the equation for political terror.

As discussed previously however, one would expect such a relationship to be more prevalent among new democracies rather than more mature democracies. Table 2.3 reports the results when equation 2.3 is estimated. These largely bear out the aforementioned hypothesis. In all but one specification, the coefficient on protest is larger for new democracies than for old democracies (in the pooled model for political terror, the coefficients are essentially identical). More importantly a significant (at the 1% level) positive relationship is also found in the within IV specification (which

Table 2.3: Regressions using the political terror scale with interactions for old and new democracies

Variable	(i) Pooled	(ii) Between	(iii) Within	(iv) Within IV
New democracy × number of demonstrations	0.112*** (0.026)	0.501*** (0.103)	0.008 (0.022)	0.375* (0.216)
Old democracy × number of demonstrations	0.114*** (0.030)	0.383*** (0.098)	-0.011 (0.029)	0.143 (0.225)
Gini coefficient	0.012*** (0.003)	0.009 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.010)
Civil war	1.644*** (0.087)	1.789*** (0.196)	0.840*** (0.136)	0.839*** (0.165)
Linguistic	-0.860*** (0.125)	-0.584** (0.252)		
Ethnic	0.612*** (0.147)	0.532* (0.288)		
Former British colony	0.206*** (0.069)	0.126 (0.134)		
Log of GDP/capita	-0.188*** (0.021)	-0.166*** (0.042)	-0.964*** (0.310)	-0.031 (0.609)
Log of population	0.139*** (0.018)	0.058 (0.038)	-3.091*** (0.701)	-1.251 (1.259)
Time trend	0.031*** (0.009)		0.069*** (0.013)	0.040* (0.021)
R-squared	0.628	0.850	0.811	0.739
Number of observations	696	696	706	694

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

In the fourth model, demonstrations is instrumented for using its first three lags and the average number of demonstrations in neighbouring countries and its first three lags.

controls for time invariant state specific factors and endogeneity) new democracies but not for mature democracies.

2.8 Developing a theory of repression by democratic governments

The results above are consistent with the idea that the propensity for governments to respond to protest will fall as a democratic regime matures. Specifically, they suggest that protest may be more likely to be met with government repression in countries that transitioned to democracy from 1974 onwards. The 10-year period analysed here is not sufficient to identify the long-term trends in countries' levels of

repression and hence to determine whether the post-1974 democracies are likely to eventually reach the levels of repression seen in older democracies. However, the fact that the linear time trend that was included in the analysis had a positive coefficient indicates that a simple, irreversible trend towards less repression over time is not a sufficient explanation for the differences between old and new democratic states. It is therefore likely that there are key contextual differences between old and new democracies that make repression of protesters more costly for incumbent governments in the former rather than the latter. Although these differences may evolve over the long term (*i.e.* from generation to generation), they are likely to change only gradually and will essentially be fixed in the short to medium term.

In an attempt to identify the relevant factors that may explain why some democratic leaders choose to use repression against political protesters, the following section outlines a series of linear equations representing the costs and benefits of repression that are specific to *democracies*. Previous rational choice-based models of government repression (of which there are few, compared to models of the costs and benefits of engaging protest) have tended to focus on the consequences of repression for regime stability. A core concern for autocratic leaders is whether or not repression will incite more protest or cause protest to become violent or revolutionary (Rasler, 1996; Grinkel and Smith, 1999). In contrast, the equations presented here attempt to pinpoint those factors that will only alter the costs and benefits of repression in a democratic context.

The following theoretical framework assumes that when deciding to repress a political protest the leaders of democratic governments value the following: (1) avoiding a policy change, (2) being able to govern (*i.e.* having a cooperative legislative branch), and (3) securing re-election.

Assume that each leader places utility C_1 , C_2 and C_3 on these three factors, respectively. Then, whether a leader opts to repress or not will result in different reductions in utility. If he/she abstains from repression, the probabilities of re-election or losing legislative support are unaffected, but there is a probability p_0 that the government will be forced to concede to the protesters' demands and change the disputed policy. Hence, the reduction in the leader's utility is:

$$\Delta U_{not_repress} = -p_0 C_1. \quad (2.4)$$

If the leader chooses to repress, the likelihood of being forced to change policy falls to p_1 (where $p_1 < p_0$).¹⁰ However, being seen to engage in repressive actions is costly in terms of political support. A repressive leader will experience a q increase in the likelihood of losing the cooperation of the legislative branch and an r reduction in the probability of re-election. Hence, the reduction in his/her utility is:

$$\Delta U_{repress} = -p_1 C_1 - q C_2 - r C_3. \quad (2.5)$$

Assuming they are rational, democratic leaders/executives will choose to repress if the loss in utility associated with repression (equation 2.4) is less than the loss in utility associated with not repressing (equation 2.5), that is:

$$(p_0 - p_1) C_1 - q C_2 - r C_3 > 0. \quad (2.6)$$

Equation 2.6 implies that the likelihood of repression will differ whenever – or wherever – the costs or benefits associated with repression differ, or the probabilities associated with these costs and benefits differ. It will be assumed that all democratic

¹⁰ This theoretical framework implicitly assumes that there is sufficient “state capacity”, *i.e.* that executives have the power to order repression to take place and that, if they do, the police or army is sufficiently equipped to carry out these orders. When this assumption is violated (*i.e.* when state capacity is low), it is likely that private agents will have a high degree of influence over the level of repression (Englehart, 2009). Unlike executives, private agents will reap the benefits of repression with none of the electoral costs. This is an issue that will be revisited in Chapter 6.

leaders place the same value on the three factors listed earlier, that is, that C_1 , C_2 and C_3 do not vary across time or space.¹¹

In addition, the reduction in the likelihood of a policy reversal resulting from repression is assumed to be constant, that is:

$$p_0 - p_1 = \alpha_0. \quad (2.7)$$

However, the political costs of repression (q and r) are likely to vary across democratic regimes and over time. Any variables that affect these costs will alter the likelihood of repression.

q is the increase in the probability of losing the ability to pass legislation as a result of repression. It is assumed that this is a function of two types of ‘horizontal’ constraints: the limits the constitution places on the executive, especially vis-à-vis the legislature and courts and the executive’s current level of support in the legislature.

The literature on “horizontal accountability” has looked at both of these types of horizontal constraints acting on democratic leaders. Interest in the apparent deficit of “horizontal accountability” within new democracies was spearheaded by O’Donnell (1994, 1999). He observes that in more established democracies, incumbents are not only held to account periodically by voters on election day, but also by other branches of government between elections:

‘In institutionalized democracies, accountability runs not only vertically, making elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but also horizontally, across a network of relatively autonomous powers (*i.e.*, other institutions) that can call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of a given official.’ (O’Donnell, 1994, p. 61)

Mainwaring (2003) notes that O’Donnell’s original definition of horizontal accountability is very narrow, in that it is restricted to the power of other branches of

¹¹ Obviously, this is untestable and is tantamount to assuming that human nature is the same among all political leaders and that differences in behaviour are driven solely by differences in *environment*.

government or the courts to apply ‘formal sanctions’, such as removing the head of the executive branch and/or his or her ministers ‘because of legal transgressions’ (Mainwaring, 2003, p. 19). This can be clearly seen in O’Donnell’s 1999 definition:

‘Now I define what I mean by horizontal accountability: it is the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful.’ (O’Donnell, 1999, p. 38)

Even where the legislature has the formal power to punish the executive, if there is scope within the constitution for the executive to bypass the legislature altogether, for example through the use of emergency powers or through amendments to weaken the legislature’s power, O’Donnell (1994) argues that horizontal accountability can also be compromised:

‘...since the institutions that make horizontal accountability effective are seen by delegative presidents as unnecessary encumbrances to their “mission,” they make strenuous efforts to hamper the development of such institutions.’ (O’Donnell, 1994, p. 61-62)

In sum, O’Donnell’s original definition focuses on the power of legislatures and courts to use legal sanctions against executives and the extent to which the constitution can be used or modified by the executive to weaken those powers. Other authors have, however, adopted a broader definition of horizontal accountability, which considers actions that are less punitive and might be considered part of the system of checks and balances between branches, to be sanctions too. Schmitter (2004) provides one such example:

‘Horizontal accountability is a matter of interactions, not between rulers and ruled, but between arms or branches of the regime and state acting according to preset constitutional or legal rules. Such regular “checks and balances” are supposed to ensure greater accountability.’

Mainwaring (2003) notes that Kenney (2003), writing in the same volume, draws a line between horizontal accountability and ‘checks and balances’ when he states that ‘if the legislature refuses to approve an executive-sponsored bill, this does not intrinsically constitute a relationship of accountability because it does not involve an element of answerability or sanctioning’ (Kenney, 2003, p. 17). However, Mainwaring (2003) counters that it is hard to draw a clear distinction between formal sanctions and checks and balances as ‘checks and balances can constitute mechanisms of accountability’ (Mainwaring, 2003, p. 17).

Mulgan (2003) observes that legislatures have greater power to scrutinise the executive when opposition parties control the legislature, as ‘the partisan motives encourages opposition legislators to scrutinise the elected leaders of the government.’ (Mulgan, 2003, p. 61). Thus, even where its formal powers to punish the executive are strong and there is little risk of executive encroachment, the likelihood that a legislature will use its formal power to punish and/or investigate will often be dependent on the share of seats held by executive’s party. This is why when creating a typology of executive strength in presidential systems, Shugart and Mainwaring (1997) distinguish between the “constitutional powers” of a president and his or her “partisan powers” (Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997, p. 432).

Both the formal power to punish notion of horizontal accountability and the broader “checks and balances” definition are likely to affect the costs and benefits for a democratic leader choosing whether or not to repress a political protest. Where formal powers to remove executives through impeachment or no confidence votes are strong and/or the powers of the executive to circumvent the legislature are weak or non-existent, we would expect the potential costs of repression to be higher. Similarly,

where an executive lacks majority partisan support, there is a risk that the legislature may retaliate to the repression of opposition by withdrawing support.

The above implies that the probability that an executive will face governability problems as a result of using repression can be considered to be a function of the level of constitutional constraints on the executive (*CONSTI*) and the executive's level of legislative support (*LEG*). This can be represented by the following equation (where country is indexed by *i* and year is indexed by *t*):

$$q = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{CONSTI}_i + \beta_2 \text{LEG}_{it}, \text{ where } \beta_0 > 0, \beta_1 > 0 \text{ and } \beta_2 < 0. \quad (2.8)$$

In equation 2.8, *LEG* has an *it* subscript because it varies across both countries and from election to election, whereas *CONSTI* has only an *i* subscript, as it will vary between countries but is unlikely to change much in the short term. β_1 is positive because stricter constitutional constraints increase the risk of losing the ability to govern, whereas β_2 is negative because leaders with high levels of existing legislative support are less likely to face legislative opposition when they opt to repress.

r is the increase in the probability of losing re-election arising from repression. It is assumed that this is a function of the intensity of media coverage, *MED*, the voters' preference for repressive (*i.e.* authoritarian-style) behaviour, *AUTH*, and the executive's current electoral support, *SUPP* (which varies from electoral cycle to electoral cycle).

Wisler and Giugni (1999) looked at the impact of media coverage on repression in four Swiss cities from 1965 to 1994. Their results showed that increased media coverage of protest was associated with less repression. Therefore, it seems that the media has the potential to act as an additional institution of accountability, by increasing the possibility that engaging in repression will have negative consequences for public opinion.

The degree to which the public supports violent policing will also have implications for electoral costs. Cullen *et al.*'s (1985) study of survey data from Texas found evidence of a link between the level of public "punitiveness" and the severity of law and order policies adopted in the state.¹²

Taking these expected directions of the effects of *MED* and *AUTH* into account, r can be expressed by the following equation:

$$r = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 AUTH_i + \gamma_2 MED_i + \gamma_3 SUPP_{it}, \text{ where } \gamma_0 > 0, \gamma_1 < 0, \gamma_2 > 0, \gamma_3 < 0. \quad (2.9)$$

In equation 6, γ_1 is negative as the stronger the authoritarian preferences of the voters, the less likely repression will harm a leader's re-election chances. γ_2 is positive as the more media coverage of repression, the more likely a leader is to lose re-election as a result. γ_3 is negative, as the higher the level of existing electoral support, the less likely he or she is to lose re-election as a result of repression. Both *AUTH* and *MED* lack t subscripts because although these factors will change in the long term, they will not change substantially in the 9-10 year sample periods used in the chapters of this thesis. *SUPP* has an it subscript as, unlike *MED* and *AUTH*, it will vary with each election cycle as well as across states or countries.

Substituting equations 2.7-2.9 into equation 2.6 reveals that repression will occur if:

$$\alpha_0 C_1 - \beta_0 C_2 - \gamma_0 C_3 - \beta_1 C_2 CONSTI_i - \gamma_1 C_3 AUTH_i - \gamma_2 C_3 MED_i - \beta_2 C_2 LEG_{it} - \gamma_3 C_3 SUPP_{it} > 0. \quad (2.10)$$

Equation 2.10 states that the likelihood of repression in response to a protest will depend on *CONSTI*, *AUTH* and *MED*, all of which are fixed within a state/country, and on *LEG* and *SUPP*, which vary both across states/countries and over time. Since it is assumed that C_1 , C_2 and C_3 are constants, the equation yields the following

¹² The study was related to public attitudes about the severity of sentencing, rather than actions taken by police.

hypotheses regarding the likelihood of repression:

Hypothesis 1: the number of ‘horizontal’ constitutional constraints on the executive (*CONSTI*) will decrease the likelihood of repression;

Hypothesis 2: the intensity of media coverage (*MED*) will decrease the likelihood of repression;

Hypothesis 3: a stronger public preference for a violent response to protest (*AUTH*) will increase the likelihood of repression;

Hypothesis 4: higher levels of partisan support in the legislature (*LEG*) will increase the likelihood of repression; and

Hypothesis 5: previous levels of electoral support (*SUPP*) will increase the likelihood of repression.

The remainder of the thesis attempts to test each of these hypotheses, as well as to identify any other relevant determinants of repression. As explained in the introduction, the most appropriate level of analysis will be used in each case.

2.9 A preliminary analysis of the role of horizontal constitutional constraints

Due to data limitations, it is only possible to examine one of the five hypotheses outlined in the last section at the cross-national level, namely Hypothesis 1, which states that repression should be more likely whenever the formal powers of the courts and legislature are greater, that is, whenever there is more horizontal accountability.

If executives do, in fact, take into account constitutional constraints when deciding whether to repress political protests (as the theoretical framework assumes), then we would expect executives to take advantage of any provisions within the constitution that would allow them bypass horizontal constitutional constraints, such as emergency powers or decree powers, in order to have the freedom to repress protest

without being subject to governability costs. Therefore, although equation 2.10 states that the constitutional rules themselves will be largely constant over time,¹³ in those countries where the constitutional constraints operating on executives are weak, we would expect executives to centralise powers *in response* to protest.

One way to test whether executives take advantage of existing constitutional rules and centralise power in response to protest is to repeat the above analysis but use a measure of constitutional constraints acting on the executive as the dependent variable. This also means that it was not appropriate to include a measure of constitutional executive constraints as an additional predictor of repression in the original analysis because the aim was to capture the *total* effect of protest on repression, regardless of which channel it operates through.

Horizontal constitutional constraints are operationalised by the executive constraint component of the Polity IV index, *EXCONST*.¹⁴ This is not a perfect measure as not all of the constraints captured by the *EXCONST* variable could in fact be changed by the executive in response to protest. However, year-to-year variation in *EXCONST* is highly likely to be the result of the decisions of executives, therefore it is arguably more appropriate within a fixed effects framework. *EXCONST* is a 7-category scale, where 1 equals the minimum and 7 equals the maximum level of horizontal constraints operating on the executive:

(1) Unlimited Authority: There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations). Examples of evidence:

- i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.
- ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative.

¹³ Constitutions do not tend to vary from year to year or from election to election like electoral variables. Rather, they will largely be fixed over any 10-year period, such as the one studied here, and even if change does take place, it will be followed by a period of stability, so that it will be reasonable to treat constitutional effects as fixed over time within the empirical model.

¹⁴ Full details of the construction of these variables are given in Table A2.2 in Appendix 2.

- iii. There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called and dismissed at the executive's pleasure.
- iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can remove them at will.
- v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive.
- vi. Rule by decree is repeatedly used.

2) Intermediate Category

(3) Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority: There are some real but limited restraints on the executive. Evidence:

- i. The legislature initiates some categories of legislation.
- ii. The legislature blocks implementation of executive acts and decrees.
- iii. Attempts by the executive to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term, fail and are not adopted.
- iv. The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive.
- v. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive.
- vi. There is an independent judiciary.
- vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, for all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military.

(4) Intermediate Category

(5) Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority: The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them.

Examples:

- i. A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.
- ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.
- iii. The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts.
- iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.

(6) Intermediate Category

(7) Executive Parity or Subordination: Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity.

Examples of evidence:

- i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation.
- ii. The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems).
- iii. In multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet instability."

Consistent with the idea of reactive concentrations in power, protest is found to be strongly negatively related to the level of executive constraints when pooled estimation is used (as reported in the first column of 2.4). One additional demonstration is expected to reduce a country's score on the Polity IV index by 0.115.

Table 2.4: Regressions using executive constraints

Variable	(i) Pooled	(ii) Between	(iii) Within	(iv) Within IV
Number of demonstrations	-0.115*** (0.026)	-0.377** (0.159)	-0.036*** (0.013)	-0.197* (0.116)
Gini coefficient	0.003 (0.003)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.007)
Civil war	-0.152 (0.109)	0.078 (0.369)	-0.664*** (0.102)	-0.662*** (0.115)
Linguistic	0.304* (0.160)	-0.006 (0.495)		
Ethnic	0.019 (0.185)	0.139 (0.550)		
Former British colony	0.209** (0.087)	0.249 (0.258)		
Log of GDP/capita	0.385*** (0.026)	0.390*** (0.078)	0.663*** (0.232)	0.509 (0.422)
Log of population	-0.049** (0.024)	-0.005 (0.077)	-0.885* (0.523)	-1.931** (0.858)
Time trend	0.013 (0.011)		0.016 (0.010)	0.026* (0.015)
R-squared	0.336	0.412	0.882	0.854
Number of observations	690	690	700	688

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

In the fourth model, demonstrations is instrumented for using its first three lags and the average number of demonstrations in neighbouring countries and its first three lags.

This suggests that, across the full sample, protest has a negative effect on horizontal accountability.

The second column of Table 2.4 shows that when the between estimator is used, the negative association between protest and executive constraints remains and increases in magnitude, suggesting that protest is a good predictor of long-run differences in horizontal accountability across countries. When country-specific factors are controlled for using the fixed effects model in the third column, the relationship between protest and executive constraints is found to be weaker, but still highly significant. These results suggest that an increase in protest from one year to the next within a single state will result in a fall in the level of executive constraints.

The final column of the table repeats the fixed effects specification using two-stage least squares (with the same instruments as in Table 2.3), which controls for the presence of any endogenous or feedback effects. The effect of protest is found to be larger in magnitude, although slightly weaker in terms of significance. This suggests that the results for the original fixed effects specification were biased towards zero.

If executive constraints are the channel through which different responses to protest are mediated, then we might expect the effect of protest on this variable to mimic the differences seen between old and new democracies in the effect of protest on repression. As a result, we would expect protest to be a much poorer predictor of changes in executive constraints in the old democracies, compared to new ones.

Table 2.5. reports the results when equation 2.3 is estimated using executive constraints as the dependent variable. The results are consistent with the idea that changes in horizontal accountability achieved through the use of decrees etc. could function as a channel through which executives enact repression. There is evidence of a negative relationship between protest and executive constraints for new democracies, both between countries and over time within countries. In contrast, there is no evidence of a significant relationship among old democracies. Therefore, these findings lend support to the idea that in new democracies executives react to anti-government protest by seeking to centralise their own power and bypassing other bodies such as the courts and legislature who might otherwise limit the ability of the executive to use state repression in response to protest. The lack of a significant relationship in pre-1974 democracies suggests that, on average, constitutional constraints are so strong (*i.e.* *CONSTI* is so high in equation 2.10) that executives in these democracies will tend to opt not to repress, as the constitution gives them little scope to bypass the legislature and avoid governability costs.

Table 2.5: Regressions using executive constraints with interactions for old and new democracies

Variable	(i) Pooled	(ii) Between	(iii) Within	(iv) Within IV
New democracy × number of demonstrations	-0.159*** (0.033)	-0.551*** (0.198)	-0.041** (0.017)	-0.364** (0.173)
Old democracy × number of demonstrations	-0.053 (0.038)	-0.232 (0.187)	-0.028 (0.022)	0.008 (0.174)
Gini coefficient	0.003 (0.003)	0.008 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.008)
Civil war	-0.183* (0.109)	-0.038 (0.375)	-0.663*** (0.102)	-0.638*** (0.131)
Linguistic	0.296* (0.160)	-0.061 (0.492)		
Ethnic	-0.027 (0.186)	0.007 (0.553)		
Former British colony	0.184** (0.087)	0.190 (0.259)		
Log of GDP/capita	0.369*** (0.027)	0.340*** (0.085)	0.669*** (0.233)	0.480 (0.481)
Log of population	-0.048** (0.024)	0.008 (0.077)	-0.881* (0.523)	-2.252** (1.004)
Time trend	0.012 (0.011)		0.015 (0.010)	0.025 (0.017)
R-squared	0.341	0.432	0.882	0.811
Number of observations	690	690	700	688

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

In the fourth model, demonstrations is instrumented for using its first three lags and the average number of demonstrations in neighbouring countries and its first three lags.

2.10 A brief note about authoritarian preferences among voters

Hypothesis 5 outlined above is difficult to test because panel data techniques, cannot be used since the relevant surveys are carried out in waves rather than annually. the extent to which the public support the use of authoritarian style policing methods against protesters (*AUTH*) is the hardest factor to measure in equation 2.10. One possible proxy for this is a question about regimes in the World Values Survey. This question asks people to rate military rule as a political system, with the options being: “very good”, “fairly good”, “fairly bad”, “very bad”. However, as this survey is

conducted in 5-year waves, it was not possible to use these data in an analysis with panel data techniques (which require time-varying variables). Also, the question was only asked in around half the countries used in the preceding analysis. For the wave that most closely corresponds to the time period here – the wave that began in 1995 – 13 of the 28 old democracies and 21 of the 44 new democracies used in the regression sample were asked this question. On average, 3.4% and 8.2 % of respondent in old democracies said that they considered military government “very good” and “fairly good”, respectively.¹⁵ For the new democracies, these figures were 6 % and 15.5%. There is insufficient data for a formal test of the role of authoritarian preferences among voters. However, these figures are at least consistent with the possibility that differences in public opinion could be one of the factors behind the significant relationship between protest and repression found in post-1974 democracies.

2.11 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the existing literature on repression. The main focus of this has been on identifying differences in the likelihood of repression between different types of regimes. In contrast, explaining why some democratic leaders are more likely to use repression than others is an under-explored area of research – one which will be explored in this thesis.

In order to identify whether protest continues to elicit repression after a country’s transition to democracy, a cross-national sample of 71 democratic regimes was analysed. The use of panel data techniques allowed for the identification of both cross-sectional and intertemporal associations between protest and repression and, more importantly, has allowed the findings to be generalised to a larger sample of

¹⁵ The percentages for each country surveyed can be found in Appendix 3.

cases than previous empirical studies that have focused on repression in democratic regimes, but have only focused on single cases or a few cases. This analysis also dealt with the possibility that protest is endogenous through the use of instrumental variables estimation and showed the results to be robust to this specification.

The findings for the whole sample point to the existence of a positive association between protest and a country's score on the chosen dimension of repression, meaning that although previous studies have found that democracies tend to repress less than other types of regime, protest does still incite repression within democratic regimes. The use of interaction terms made it possible to isolate differences in this relationship between pre- and post-1974 democracies. Specifically, it was found that, controlling for endogeneity, the positive association between protest and repression was significant (albeit at the 10% level) for the latter group but not the former.

The inclusion of a linear time trend variable in the analysis indicated that a simple trend towards less repression with each passing year cannot account for the differences between pre- and post-1974 democracies. Consequently, the chapter presented a theoretical framework, based on a series of equations that attempt to identify the underlying factors that will affect whether a democratic leader, wishing to prevent reform, will to repress a group protesting for a change in policy.

It was possible to investigate one of these factors using the cross-national dataset: the differences in the ease with which the executive can make use of the constitution to bypass horizontal constraints on his or her power. Based on the direction of effect constitutional constraints (*CONSTI* in equation 2.10) have on the likelihood of repression, it was predicted that executives in new democracies might respond to political protest by bypassing the legislature and/or judiciary in order to have the freedom to respond to protest with repression. The possibility that executives

reactively seek to centralise their power was then tested for by repeating the previous analyses using a measure of constraints operating on the executive as the dependent variable. The findings were consistent with such a scenario. Controlling for endogeneity (that is, the possibility that protest occurs in response to a reduction in executive constraints), protest had a significant negative association with executive constraints. This appeared to be driven by the post-1974 democracies in the sample – the same democracies that appeared to be responsible for the positive association between protest and repression. The lack of a significant relationship in pre-1974 democracies suggests that, on average, the level of constitutional constraints is so high that executives in these democracies will tend to opt not to repress, as there is little room in the constitution that would allow them to bypass the legislature and avoid governability costs.

There are some obvious limitations to a global study such as this. Many of these can be attributed to the trade-off between including a large number of cases in the sample and the level of abstraction at which the concepts are measured. The cross-national measure of protest used, based on *New York Times* reports,¹⁶ is likely to miss a lot of the variation in protest, since very few protests make it into the international press. As previously mentioned, the cross-national measure of repression encompasses all forms of repression, not just those experienced by protesters. Also, where executive constraints are concerned, the cross-national measure did not allow those components which would be sensitive to short-term changes enacted by the

¹⁶ Greater precision of measurement at the cross-national level could be achieved by creating a measure based on several international news sources, rather than just the *New York Times*. However, this would still be prone to the problems of under-reporting and non-random selection of which protests that are inherent to any newspaper based data (Earl *et al.*, 2004). The measure of protest used in Chapter 4 is superior to any such measure available at the cross-national level.

executive to be isolated from those which remain relatively fixed and require constitutional changes.

In response to these criticisms, the subsequent chapters ‘burrow down’ to the sub-national level and consider the case of Brazil, with the aim of providing a more rigorous test of the remaining factors included in equation 2.10, namely, legislative support, electoral support and media intensity. Given that the analysis in this chapter has only found evidence of a link between protest and repression in post-1974 democracies (although age itself does not seem to account for this difference), it makes sense to focus on a new democracy in order to examine further what variables may be responsible for the link in these countries. An additional analytical advantage of testing for the effect of legislative support and electoral support at the sub-national level is that this controls for the effect of constitutional design, which varies substantially between countries and would be a potential confounding variable.

Most importantly, the Brazilian case provides an opportunity to use a superior measure of protest and a measure of repression that specifically records repression of protesters, rather than political repression more generally. Brazil also has the advantage of being a large federal country where sub-national executives possess a great deal of authority, meaning that most of the assumptions adopted in this chapter should still hold at the sub-national level.

The analysis in the next empirical chapter (Chapter 4) therefore, uses sub-national data from Brazil to look at the effect of political constraints on the executive, which vary over time and are represented by *LEG* and *SUPP* in equation 2.10. Chapter 5 then goes on to look at reporting rates of protest for the whole of Brazil, in order to assess whether the effect of media coverage is the same as that found by Wisler and Giugni (1999), who looked at Switzerland – a pre-1974 democracy. Beforehand,

Chapter 3 will provide a historical overview of the issue of agrarian reform in Brazil, and explain how it has prompted protests by landless workers.

CHAPTER 3

The MST and land protests in Brazil

3.1 Introduction

As explained at the end of the previous chapter, the effect of the cyclical political factors in equation 7 – legislative support and electoral support – will be investigated in Chapter 4 using sub-national data from Brazil, a post-1974 democracy. As well as being able to control for constitutional differences, using sub-national data in Brazil has the advantage of providing a superior measure of protest and repression than is available at the cross-national level. These data come from the annual reports on land protests and rural violence compiled by the *Comissão Pastoral da Terra*. The subsequent empirical chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) will focus on the largest of the movements whose protests feature in the data used in Chapter 4, the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* (Movement of Landless Workers, MST).

This chapter provides some background on the interactions between landless protesters and state governments in Brazil, demonstrating why it is consistent with the model described in Chapter 2. To do this, the chapter first provides a historical overview to explain why the issue of land reform has generated protests in Brazil. It also describes the two most recent cycles of land protests in Brazil. The first of these cycles was in the 1950s and 1960s and the second cycle extends from the 1980s democratisation period to the present day.

The chapter then identifies the main groups engaged in land protests in contemporary Brazil, with special reference to the MST as the largest protesting group. Referring back to the model described in Chapter 2, the final part of the chapter then explains the specific contextual reasons why land reform is an issue that

many politicians are unwilling to compromise on, even when protesting groups engage in occupations in their states.

3.2 Historical context

Concentration of land ownership is an enduring feature of Brazilian history. It began in the 16th century under the *sesmaria* system, whereby agents acting on behalf of the Portuguese crown would grant rights to huge areas of land to a few individuals (Meszaros, 2000; Wittman, 2009; Wolford, 2010). In principle, the land rights granted under the *lei das sesmarias* were conditional on the land being put to productive use, and could, in theory, revert to the crown, who could then redistribute a holding in the event that the land went uncultivated (Martins, 2002, p. 304). However, enforcing this conditional aspect of land ownership proved beyond the administrative capacity of the Portuguese state (Meszaros, 2000; Wolford, 2010).

The *sesmaria* system ceased to exist when Brazil attained independence in 1822. There then followed a brief period when access to land could be acquired through the informal process of squatting or occupation, the so-called right of *posse* (informal squatter claims) (Alston *et al.*, 1999, p. 34). Over the next few decades, however, two factors contributed to the demand for a more formal, and less open, system of property rights. The first of these was an increase in the profitability of land in Brazil's coffee growing areas, which led to corresponding upsurge in disputes over land ownership (Alston *et al.*, 1999, p. 35). Second, there was awareness among the landed elite that the use of slave labour in both sugar and coffee would need to be replaced. One way to guarantee a readily available supply of cheap agricultural wage labour to fill this shortfall was to make it more difficult for average members of the rural population, including those recently liberated from slavery, to acquire their own

land (Navarro, 2009; Wegenast, 2010). This was achieved through the land statute of 1850, which conferred official title to both existing *sesmarias* and *posses*, but outlawed the right of *posse* as a means of attaining land in the future, stipulating that purchase would be the only legal method thereafter (Alston *et al.*, 1999, p. 35).

However, despite this long-standing history of concentrated landownership, it was not until the 1950s, when the modernisation of Brazilian agriculture began to gather pace, that grassroots organisations began to mobilise on a scale that made national politicians aware of the need to address the issue of agrarian reform (Ondetti, 2007; Martins, 2002). The 1950s saw a rise in international demand for sugar. In a response to these opportunities for increased profits, landowners in Brazil's sugar producing northeast moved away from using sharecroppers and tenant farmers, who had enjoyed limited rights to cultivate their own produce in return for their labour, in favour of wage labourers (Pereira, 1992, 1999; Maybury-Lewis, 1994). This change in rural employment relations in the northeast prompted the formation of the peasant leagues and rural unions in this region of Brazil (Pereira, 1992, 1999; Maybury-Lewis, 1994). By the beginning of the 1960s, rural activism could also be seen in the south of the country, in Rio Grande do Sul. It was in this state that a sympathetic governor facilitated the establishment of the first movement to use occupation of land as a strategy to pressure the government to expropriate land for agrarian reform, the *Movimento dos Agricultores Sem Terra* (Movement of Landless Farmers, MASTER) (Carter, 2003; Rosa, 2012).

When João Goulart became president in late 1961, he responded to this increased rural mobilisation by attempting to absorb grassroots rural organisations within the system of corporatist control that had been established by Vargas in the early 1940s (Welch, 2006a; Houtzager, 1998). This was first achieved by establishing a system of

legal recognition for rural unions, whereby there could only be one legally recognised union in a given geographic area. This sparked a competition between the Catholic Church and the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), as both organisations vied to have their unions achieve legal recognition (Houtzager, 1998). By 1963, this process was formalised with the passage of the rural land statute, which granted rural workers rights already enjoyed by their urban counterparts, such as redundancy compensation (Sabourin, 2008). The 1963 land statute also created the foundations for the formation of the *Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura* (National Confederation of Agricultural Workers, CONTAG) and intensified the contest between the PCB and the Church, as each tried to gain control of the CONTAG. The PCB, however, gained the upper hand, with a PCB member assuming the leadership of the CONTAG after its founding convention (Welch, 2006b, p. 35).

However, the period that Navarro (1994) refers to as the first of two identifiable cycles of rural protest in Brazil was short lived. It was Goulart's attempt to directly respond to the grassroots demand for land reform, with the draft of the *Estatuto da Terra* (rural land statute) in 1964, which ultimately proved the most controversial of his policies, prompting a military coup. This coup was facilitated by substantial support from the traditional landowning elites (Houtzager, 1998; Pereira, 1999) who would continue to provide crucial support for the two decades of military rule that followed.

This period of military rule (1964-1985) marked the beginnings of state-sanctioned repression of rural organisations in Brazil. Both the Peasant Leagues and the MASTER ceased to exist, with their leaders facing imprisonment, exile or death at the hands of the military and/or private landowners (Pereira, 1999; Rosa, 2012). It is estimated that as many as 1,149 rural workers died as a result of this repression

between 1964 and 1986 (Welch, 2006b). However, rather than abolishing CONTAG, the Military instead choose to purge the confederation of all PCB linked unions and their leaders, in favour of unions controlled by the Catholic Church. This was done in the belief that a limited form of rural union representation would need to be preserved, in order to prevent further strikes and unrest in the Brazilian countryside (Welch, 2006b; Pereira, 1999). So, although the CONTAG-affiliated rural union representation greatly expanded during the authoritarian period, the confederation was never in a position to present a genuine challenge to the agrarian policies of the regime. The CONTAG eschewed direct action as a means of pressing for land reform, in favour mounting challenges from within the labour courts (Ondetti, 2008, p. 54).

In a similar effort to contain rural unrest, the military government also passed its own version of the *Estatuto da Terra* in 1964, shortly after the coup. This law allowed the state to expropriate for agrarian reform those properties that failed to fulfil their “social function”. In its original incarnation, the Land Statute stated that either unproductive farms, or farms that exceeded a certain size, would be eligible for expropriation (Mitchell, 2003). However, while the Land Statute provided the legal basis for land reform, opposition from existing landed elites ensured that that little expropriation was carried in practice under the military regime (Ondetti, 2008).

Despite the severe restrictions on rural political movements, a number of developments that took place during the authoritarian period laid the foundations for a new cycle of rural protest that would emerge towards the end of the regime. Three main factors are so frequently cited, that Wolford (2003) refers to them as the ‘official genesis story’ of the MST. They are: (1) the “conservative” policy of agrarian reform through colonisation, coupled with the strategies of agricultural modernisation pursued by the authoritarian regime; (2) the growing opposition to the regime by

progressive members of the Catholic Church, who had become the principal organiser of rural labour after the suppression of communist unions; (3) the political opportunities that emerged as the regime began to liberalise from the mid-1970s.

Once it had assumed power, the military regime attempted to address the rural unrest that had precipitated the coup. The military regime hoped to dampen demands for agrarian reform by promoting the resettlement of landless and jobless agricultural workers from the south and northeast of Brazil to the Amazon (Navarro, 2009, p. 273). Fernandes Mançando (2000) argues that these colonisation projects were ‘imposed as a way to control the land issue without agrarian reform’ (Fernandes Mançando, 2000, p. 35). Similarly, Martins (1984) observes ‘It was assumed that the social and agricultural problems of the Northeast could be resolved in Amazonia through the occupation of “empty spaces” ’ (Martins, 1984, p. 113). However, these colonisation projects failed for a number of reasons. Firstly, resettlement often took place in areas already claimed as reserves by indigenous communities. In addition to this, the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCRA) and government-funded colonisation companies failed to provide the basic infrastructure necessary to make the colonisation projects viable in the long term. These newly-colonised areas lacked sanitation and access to health services. There was often insufficient funding or technical assistance available and food shortages were also commonplace (Wolford, 2003b; Fernandes Mançano, 2000). This meant that many families were forced to abandon the colonisation projects and return to their home states. The Military began to reverse this policy of small-farmer colonisation towards the end of 1973, effectively abandoning official support for colonisation projects in favour of supporting large-scale agribusiness such as cattle-ranching (Martins, 1984, p. 478).

This shift in priorities brought agricultural policy in the Amazon in line with a wider strategy of agricultural modernisation that the military regime had pursued in other parts of Brazil. This strategy prioritised the development of capital-intensive agriculture for export, with the aim of using the export revenue to finance further industrialisation (Wolford, 2008).

The military government encouraged the development of even larger-scale land holdings by making cheap credit available to producers of major export crops such as soy, corn and wheat (Wolford, 2008; Wolford and Wright, 2003). This made it more difficult for small-scale farmers, who produced crops primarily for the domestic market, to purchase land. Moreover, these agro-export businesses often dumped any surplus product on the domestic market, which forced down the price for domestic crops and caused many smaller-scale farmers to lose their land (Wright and Wolford, 2003, p. 3). An additional mode of small-farmer displacement occurred via the erection of hydroelectric dams. These dams were needed to supply water for the new large-scale plantations but often resulted in the flooding of land belonging to small landowners, who the government frequently failed to relocate afterwards (Sinek, 2007, pp. 10-11).

These policies therefore further concentrated land ownership and exacerbated the problem of landlessness in the countryside. This happened because the traditional large estate, controlled by a single family, made way for ownership of even vaster tracts of land by powerful domestic and international agricultural groups (Robles, 2000; Welch, 2006a).

Progressive clergy also came to play a significant role in the emergence of new forms of rural organisation towards the end of the regime. Prior to the 1964 coup, the Catholic Church had largely positioned itself in opposition to left wing groups, which

was reflected in its competition with the PCB for control over state-recognised rural unions. The Church sought to ally itself with the military government during the early stages of the regime (Houtzager, 2001; Martins, 2002).

A broader theological shift in the Church as a whole occurred following the Second Vatican Council's direct encouragement for Catholics to address issues of "injustice and violence" (Alves, 1984, p. 80). This theological shift was exacerbated by the military regime's repressive tactics, especially in the Amazon, as part of a crackdown on guerrilla opposition. The social consequences of the military regime's agricultural modernisation policy also contributed to the Church's change of position. Factors such as these led to the emergence of a progressive wing of the Church, which, following the influence of liberation theology, sought to organise the rural peasantry and position itself in opposition to the authoritarian military regime. These organising efforts began with the establishment of *Comunidades Eclesiais de Base* (CEBs). The CEBs were intended as a place where Catholics could meet and practice mass without the need for a priest (although priests would often appear at CEB members as ordinary members), thereby making Catholic worship more accessible to the poorer sectors of Brazilian society (Wolford and Wright, 2003, p. 8). They received financial and organisational support from their local parishes. In 1972, the *Comissão Pastoral da Terra* (CPT) was formed by clergy who wanted to assist peasant squatters who were being forcibly evicted in the Amazon Basin region. These evictions were a result of the regime's shift in development priorities, away from small farmer colonisation projects and towards large-scale agro-exports. However, by 1975 the CPT had begun to organise across most of the country (Wolford, 2003b, p. 505).

As Houtzager (2001) argues, the grassroots organisations created by this faction of the Catholic Church served as important “institutional hosts”, when the gradual political opening (discussed below) began. He observes that when the regime began to liberalise ‘the church was the only progressive force in the countryside with national scope’ (Houtzager, 2001, p. 23). Support from these grassroots organisations was thus pivotal to establishing modern-day movements pressing for agrarian reform, such as the MST, which emerged towards the end of the regime.

It should be noted that these mobilisation efforts by the Church coincided with a gradual relaxation of political control by the military regime. Ernesto Geisel, the penultimate president of the dictatorship period, set in motion a gradual process of *distensão* (political liberalisation) after he assumed office in 1974. This *abertura* (liberalisation period) lasted until 1985, culminating in the indirect election of the first civilian president since 1964. The process began with partial reductions in military control over state governments and increases in the number of civilian elite politicians allowed to be nominated in the gubernatorial selection process (Samuels and Abrucio, 2000). However, political opposition movements continually took advantage of the rolling back of political restrictions in order to push for greater concessions from the military regime. As Mainwaring (1986) describes, ‘Every step in the *abertura* provided new possibilities for the opposition and new dilemmas for the regime’ (Mainwaring, 1986, p. 186). The re-emergence of peasant movements agitating for agrarian reform during this period is widely considered to be a response to concurrent changes in the political opportunity structure (Wolford, 2003).

Although locally-based mobilisations of landless peasants had become more common towards the end of the *abertura* period, the foundations of the national movement that would become the MST can be traced to a series of land disputes in

the south of Brazil, which began at the end of 1970s (Ondetti, 2008; Wolford, 2003). Landless peasants had used occupation as a tactic to push for expropriation of unproductive lands in Rio Grande do Sul in the 1960s, with the mobilisations of the MASTER. This may explain why the first mobilisations that would lead to the formation of the MST, emerged in the same state (Rosa, 2012; Navarro, 1994). The first of these occupations, which took place in 1978, was carried out by peasants who had recently been evicted from land they had farmed for several years, after it was decreed part of an indigenous reservation. A group of these families decided to occupy two government-owned farms that had previously been targeted by the MASTER and were now being leased to private owners (Ondetti, 2008; Rosa, 2012). However, this initial occupation was unsuccessful and ended in eviction by the police. This prompted activists involved in local branches of Catholic organisations, the CPT in particular, to help organise subsequent occupations of government-owned land that they believed would be suitable for settling families on.

The first successful land occupation was carried out in September 1979. In executing this, the landless families received organisational support from the CPT, but also from local agricultural economist João Pedro Stédile, who would eventually become one of the national level leaders of the MST, and lawyers who were sympathetic to their plight. It was Stédile who identified two rural properties that the landless might be able to make a legitimate legal claim to. A rural estate had been divided into two farms, known as Brilhante and Macali. These had been ear-marked for expropriation by the civilian government before the 1964 coup. However, Stédile discovered in the course of his employment by the state that the current state government had no intention of expropriating the properties and instead wanted to sell them (Wolford and Wright, 2003, pp. 27-28). This initial occupation involved around

110 landless families who, during the night of 7 September 1979, set up an encampment of black polythene tents on the land of the Brilhante and Macali farms. In a pattern that would typify the MST's style of direct action, all members of the family were active in the occupation. The participation of women and children proved pivotal to the occupation's success, when, 78 days into the occupation, they averted an eviction attempt by the military police by forming a human barrier around the camp (Branford and Rocha, 2002, pp. 12-13). According to Ondetti (2008), this was a tactic designed to elicit public sympathy. Similarly, Navarro (1994) argues that the use of police and federal troops to intimidate the families, at a time when the regime's control was waning, was a "strategic blunder" by the military government and had the effect of generating wider support for the movement from other groups opposed to the regime. In a 2002 interview, Stédile observed that the heavy-handed response of the regime helped transform the encampment into a symbol of resistance against the military regime, which had parallels to the strikes being carried out by unions in automobile factories at the same time and the imprisonment of the then union leader Lula (Stédile, 2002, p. 258). With these eviction attempts proving unsuccessful, one year later the state governor conceded to the demands of the landless occupiers.

This success in Brilhante and Macali inspired a number of similar occupations in Rio Grande do Sul, where groups of landless workers occupied other unproductive rural properties, invoking the Land Statute of 1964 as a justification (Wright and Wolford, 2003, p. 35). Mobilisations also began to take place in other states, but they were still largely concentrated in the south of the country. At this stage, church-based groups still played a significant role in organising the movement, with the CPT contacting local leaders and encouraging meetings between landless groups from different areas (Stédile, 2002, p. 257). In 1984, delegates from landless groups and

pastoral organisations from 12 states met in Cascavel in Paraná, with the aim of creating a national movement of landless workers to campaign for agrarian reform. This meeting officially formed the MST as a national movement. However, at this stage, a landless movement had only been properly organised in the three southern states, with the state of Rio Grande do Sul remaining the focal point of the movement's organisation. Activities in the nine other states remained confined to particular areas (Navarro, 1994). Although there were some calls for the movement to retain a formal link to the CPT, the majority of the delegates decided that the movement should be autonomous from the Church and from existing rural unions and political parties. Stédile notes that it was activists from the Church itself who cautioned that the national movement should avoid retaining formal links to the Church (Stédile, 2002, p. 258). The delegates also decided on an open and inclusive mass movement with no formal membership (Ondetti, 2008; Branford and Rocha, 2002). The following year, the first national congress of the MST was held, again in Paraná, but this time with delegates from 23 of the 27 states in attendance. At this time it was decided that the core aim of the movement would be to put pressure on the government to expropriate unproductive local properties in order to settle landless families, rather than to encourage resettlement in other states. Direct action, through the occupation of unproductive properties was identified as the key tactic the movement's members would employ, in order to agitate for agrarian reform in their home states (Wolford, 2010).

The establishment of the MST overlapped with the acceleration of the process of *abertura* at the elite level. In 1979, restrictions on party competition, which had only allowed two parties to compete for congressional seats since 1964, were lifted. By allowing the formation of new parties, the regime had hoped to preserve its power by

dividing the opposition (Evans, 1986). This strategy backfired, however, when the 1982 elections resulted in the regime's party, PDS (formerly ARENA), controlling fewer seats than the four opposition parties combined. The first gubernatorial elections since the coup were also held in 1982, resulting in wins by candidates who opposed the regime in 11 states (Ondetti, 2008). By 1983, it became clear that rather than dividing the opposition, the reforms had strengthened it. By no longer having a majority in Congress, the Military had 'lost its ability to control the presidential succession' (Mainwaring, 1986). This prompted protests for direct elections in 1984. However, the first civilian president to take since 1964 was chosen by indirect elections in 1985. This was followed by elections in 1986 for a constituent assembly to design the country's new democratic constitution, which was implemented in 1988, with the first direct elections for president taking place the following year.

Grassroots opposition movements began to emerge in response to these changes at the elite level. From 1978 onwards, the metal workers' unions in São Paulo began a series of strikes, which, crucially, were not met with the type of repression that had been used in the earlier years of the dictatorship (Ondetti, 2008). This stimulated the emergence of a variety of new urban and rural movements during the last years of the dictatorship. Prior to this period of accelerated political liberalisation, only the CONTAG was able to represent the demands of rural workers without risking severe repression under the military regime (Rodrigues, 2007, p. 7). Although by this time the CONTAG had recovered much of its independence in terms of electing its leaders (Crocitti and Vallance, 2011, p. 426), it was yet to endorse the occupation of unproductive lands as a tactic, preferring instead to continue pushing for agrarian reform through parliamentary means (Pereira, 1997, p. 108). The CONTAG's lack of success in this approach, particularly in failing to achieve more substantial provisions

for agrarian reform within the 1988 constitution, helped fuel the growth of the MST into an alternative national rural movement during the 1990s (Rodrigues, 2007, p. 7). By the middle of the decade, however, the CONTAG had begun to emulate the MST's tactics of occupying unproductive lands (Baranyi *et al.*, 2004, p. 5).

The agricultural modernisation strategies favouring the development of large mechanised farms to produce crops for export, which had led to the emergence of the MST at the end of the dictatorship, were largely continued by the civilian government during the first decade of the democratic regime. Moreover, as a consequence of the debt crisis, there was a drastic reduction in the availability of agricultural credit in this period. This meant that many small farms could no longer survive and that many farmworkers employed on larger farms lost their jobs (Pereira, 2003).

3.3. Other movements in the democratic period

Over time, MST occupations have encouraged new and existing groups that have been campaigning for agrarian reform to adopt similar tactics. A report by the *Núcleo de Estudos, Pesquisas e Projetos de Reforma Agrária* (NERA) at the *Universidade Estadual Paulista* (UNESP) estimates that in 2007, as many as 93 different organisations (national and local) had participated in acts of occupation.¹⁷ Land occupations have sometimes been directly organised by the CPT and, as mentioned on the preceding page, the more traditional rural unions operating within the CONTAG federation also began to use land occupation as a tactic from the 1990s. Overall, the CONTAG federation is the second largest organisation engaged in land occupations after the MST (Carter, 2010). While the MST maintains a presence in most parts of the country, there are some states in the north and centre-west in which occupations

¹⁷ See http://docs.fct.unesp.br/nera/projetos/dataluta_brasil_2007.pdf.

by CONTAG-affiliated unions and less formally organised local groups outnumber those by the MST (Carter, 2010, p. 195) (see also Figure 3.1).


3.4 The growth of occupations over time and across regions

The land occupations that immediately followed the first successful occupation of Brilhante and Macali in 1978 were concentrated in the southern states of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Paraná, and the south-eastern states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais (Almeida *et al.*, 2000, p. 15; Branford and Rocha, 2002, p. 22). By the time of the 1984 Casacavel meeting, which formally constituted the MST, it was clear that the movement sought to expand beyond the south and south-east regions, to link with trade unionists and CPT members who had been involved in the land conflicts of the Amazonian states (Branford and Rocha, 2002, p. 22). At this first meeting, it was agreed that the MST would send representatives from states where the landless were already organised to help organise peasants at the grassroots level in those states which had no MST presence (Fernandes Mançano, 2000, p. 87). As discussed earlier, the MST's first national congress in 1985 demonstrated even greater aspirations for expansion, by inviting delegates from 23 out of Brazil's 27 states (Branford and Rocha, 2002, p. 27). By the mid-1990s, the movement was organised in 22 out of 27 states and its membership in the north-east of the country had overtaken that in the founding states of the south and south-east, as Figure 3.1 shows.

This expansion of the movement in the 1990s was driven by yet another change in the political opportunity structure. Two massacres of MST protesters were carried out by the military police within the space of a year: one on 19 August 1995 in Corumbiara in Rondônia, in which 11 MST members died, and the other on 17 April 1996 in Eldorado Carajás in Pará, in which 19 died. Ondetti (2006) describes a wave

of public sympathy and an increase in support for agrarian reform after these events.


Figure 3.1: Total MST occupations vs. other movements by region, 2000-2005



Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra

This, coupled with increased exposure of the MST in the Brazilian media and international coverage of the story, put pressure on the president, Cardoso, to make more progress in the area of agrarian reform. He responded to this by making the Federal Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCRA) independent from the Ministry of Agriculture, which had traditionally been opposed to the advancement of agrarian reform. He also met with MST members and promised to speed up the process of agrarian reform and to tackle police violence (Ondetti, 1996, pp. 72-73). Sensing a climate in which such concern about public opinion would result in their occupations being less likely to be met with repression and more likely to end in success, MST occupations increased by 173% between May and October 1996 (Ondetti, 2006, p. 73).

Figure 3.2: Annual land occupations by MST vs. other movements 2000-2007



Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra

Figure 3.2 shows the number of MST occupations and occupations by other movements for the years 2000 to 2007. There is a dip in land protest levels in 2001 and 2002, followed by a sharp rise. This could be accounted for by restrictions that the MST national leadership placed on land occupations during Lula's 2002 presidential campaign in order to help him win that year's election (Folha de Sao Paulo, 03/07/2002, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc0306200204.htm>). However, the decline in occupations during final two years of Cardoso's second term can also be attributed to a policy reversal, after several years of pressure on the government to concede to MST demands in the wake of the events of Corumbiara and Eldorado dos Carajás.

According to Hochstetler (2008, p. 49), although the MST continued to engage in land occupations after Lula assumed office in 2003, there was a brief "honeymoon

period” in the first year and a half of Lula’s first term. Stédile announced in early 2004 that the MST would no longer occupy offices of federal government agencies, such as INCRA, as an additional means of protesting for agrarian reform, as “the Government is no longer our enemy” (Stédile, 2004, quoted in Hochstetler, 2008). However, by 2004 the MST had grown impatient with the pace of the PT government’s response to agrarian reform and the movement organised an unprecedented number of land occupations in April of that year (Hochstetler, 2008, p. 47), as can be seen in Figure 3.2. Although CPT data show that overall violence against land protesters decreased during Lula’s two terms as president, the reduction was smaller than may have been predicted.¹⁸

Lula oversaw the creation of a federal programme to prevent violence in the countryside, *Programa Paz no Campo*. However, the programme was criticised for only spending a small proportion of the federal funds that it was allocated (Folha de São Paulo, 20/02/2005, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc2002200502.htm>; Folha de São Paulo, 01/07/2011, <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/poder/po0106201119.htm>).

The following section explains why, despite more than a decade of PT presidency, there continues to be a preference among elected politicians for maintaining the status quo with regards to land reform.

¹⁸ According to CPT data, a total of 193 rural activists were murdered during Cardoso’s second term (1999-2002). For Lula’s first term (2003-2006), the total reduced only marginally, to 189. There was a more substantial drop in the second term (2007-2010), to 115, although was still just under 60% of Cardoso’s second term level. Attempted murders actually increased during Lula’s first term and had a modest reduction from Cardoso’s second term level during Lula’s own second term. It also seems that milder forms of repression may have supplanted harsher forms of repression. The total of physical beatings during Cardoso’s second term was 1004; this rose to 1247 in Lula’s first term and 1550 in his second.

3.5 Agrarian movements and the government in the contemporary democratic period

The model outlined in Chapter 2 assumes that the members of the protesting group in question are agitating for a policy change, which the government does not wish to undertake. This assumption largely holds true in the case of agrarian reform in Brazil's most recent democratic period, due to the powerful representation of landowning interests within Brazil's representative institutions.

The *União Democrática Ruralista* (Rural Democratic Union, UDR) is an anti-agrarian reform pressure group, which was formed by a group of farm owners in order to contest the national agrarian reform bill of José Sarney, the first civilian president (Hammond, 2009; Payne, 2000). Through its successful lobbying efforts, UDR was able to extract significant concessions during the 12 redrafts of the bill, resulting in the number of properties regarded as suitable for expropriation being far fewer than that first proposed (Deere, 2003). The UDR then managed to prevent the adoption of clauses in the new 1988 constitution which would have allowed for more substantial agrarian reform. Article 186 of the final constitution restricted expropriations for agrarian reform to those cases that satisfied purposefully vague criteria regarding whether the land was failing to fulfil its "social function" (Payne, 2000), as had been the case under the 1964 Land Statute. Moreover, Article 186 did not provide a basis for expropriation based on the size of a farm, meaning that as long as large farms were deemed productive, they remained immune from the risk of expropriation (Deere, 2003). As a result, the criteria for expropriation were even more restrictive than under the original Land Statute of 1964, which had included excessive size as well as unproductivity (Mitchell, 2003). Following these successes, the UDR was dissolved at the end of 1993.

The organisation was revived in 1996 by landowners in the Pontal do Paranapanema of São Paulo (Ondetti, 2008; Hammond, 2009) as a grassroots-level counter-movement that is explicit about its support of repressive measures against social movements that engage in land occupations (Hammond, 2009). The reconstituted UDR maintains political influence through its close association with the *bancada ruralista* (rural caucus), which is a cross-party group of parliamentarians within the national congress who have their own rural business interests and ‘act as a coherent lobby...whenever threats against their interests come up in the form of government policies’ (Navarro, 2010, p. 198). In an interview with Payne (2000), the president of the UDR, the politician Ronaldo Caiado, claims that he first proposed the idea of creating a cross-party bloc, when he served in the national legislature between 1990 and 1994 (Payne, 2000, p. 108). Since 2006, the *bancada ruralista* has been led by a senator from Tocantins, Katia Abreu, who is also head of the *Confederação da Agricultura e Pecuária do Brasil* (Agriculture and Livestock Confederation of Brazil, CNA) and a former leader of the UDR herself (Carmago, 2009, p. 39).

There is substantial malapportionment in the Brazilian federal legislature, both in the Senate and the lower chamber. Poorer and more rural states are heavily over-represented in the legislature, with deputies from São Paulo, the most populous state, representing 16 times as many citizens as deputies from Roráima, the least populated state (Mainwaring, 1999). This malapportionment allows rural business interests to maintain a consistent level of representation within the congress that amounts to around one fifth of the seats.¹⁹ As a unified block, the rural caucus possesses significant “coalition potential” under Brazil’s system of PR-Presidentialism,

¹⁹ The share of seats in the chamber of deputies was 117 for Cardoso’s first term (1995-99) and 89 for his second term 1999-2003 (89) and, although the number fell to 73 for Lula’s first term (2003-2006), it returned to 116 by his second term 2007-2010 (Carmago, 2009, p. 41).

whereby presidents must form many party coalitions in order to achieve a working majority in the congress. However, the party loyalty of individual legislators is notoriously weak due to the open list electoral system. Fernando Henrique Cardoso was heavily reliant on support from legislators who belonged to the rural caucus during his two consecutive terms of 1995-99 and 1999-2002. Similarly, once the PMDB was incorporated into Lula's coalition in 2005, *ruralista* members of congress accounted for around a quarter of his legislative support (Carmago, 2009, p. 44).

Although information on rural lobbyists at the state level is sparse, there are indications that a similar dynamic takes place. De Almedida Ruela's (2010) study of legislative behaviour in Paraná during the 1999-2002 legislative term showed a similar percentage to that in the federal chamber of deputies (15 of the 54 state deputies) had formed a cross-party rural caucus within the state legislative assembly.

Since all of these deputies were part of the then governor Jaime Learner's coalition, this had a significant impact on his ability to abstain from using repressive measures against landless groups such as the MST (de Almedida Ruela, 2010, p. 83). In sum, it seems reasonable to assume that most governors have a desire to maintain the status quo with regards to land reform.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has documented why the issue of land reform in Brazil has inspired direct action by grassroots organisations since the 1950s. It has noted that land occupations by the MST, the CONTAG and other groups grew considerably in the years immediately following Brazil's transition to democracy and that, while not as high as the peak of 2004, they are likely to continue to be a significant source of political protest in Brazil. Although the model in Chapter 2 assumes that government

leaders do not wish to undertake the policy change desired by the protesters, this chapter has provided some contextual information to explain why this assumption applies to the case of state governors in Brazil.

With this in mind, the next chapter uses quantitative data to test the relationship between the political constraints on a governor and the repression of land reform protests. Chapter 5 then focuses on the MST, the dominant movement, and considers whether there is any link between the level of newspaper coverage of the movement's land occupations and the level of repression. Chapter 6 looks at the relationship between political factors and the repression of land protesters "on the ground" through an in-depth comparison of the states of São Paulo and Pará, with special reference to the MST.

CHAPTER 4

Cyclical accountability and repression in democratic contexts: The case of land protests in Brazil

4.1 Cyclical accountability and the behaviour of elected governments

The theoretical model in Chapter 2 laid out five hypotheses regarding the determinants of repression and tested the two of these (Hypotheses 1 and 3), using cross-national data. This chapter examines the effects of the cyclical political constraints outlined in the model (that is, those variables that have t subscripts in equation 2.10) and therefore provides a test of Hypotheses 4 and 5. The use of sub-national data from Brazil is a more appropriate level at which to test these hypotheses, as there are barely any constitutional differences between 26 states and the federal district and therefore we know that any empirical results will hold this confounding factor (which was already examined in Chapter 2) constant.

Cyclical variation in the strength of vertical and horizontal constraints can occur within the same constitutional context. Not every executive elected under the same system will have the same re-election prospects (assuming a system even permits incumbents to stand for re-election). Similarly, there is variation in the degree of partisan support executives enjoy in their respective legislatures and therefore how willing legislators will be to exercise their powers of oversight. The previous literature on how these types of constraints affect executive decision making is discussed below.

Vertical accountability (electoral concerns)

The notion that electoral pressures can affect the policy decisions of elected politicians has been investigated at length by scholars interested in economic policy in

mature democracies such as the United States. While much of this work is theoretical, there have been some attempts to empirically test for the effect of electoral pressures on politicians' policy decisions. For example, Hibbing (1984) used roll call data for the U.S. Congress from 1973-1980 to investigate the effect of electoral pressures on senators' support for transfer payments and found that senators who are up for re-election will be more likely to vote in favour of transfer payments the closer the time to the next election (Hibbing, 1984, pp. 856-857). However, his results also indicate that senators whose positions are less secure (in that they won their seat by a narrow margin at the previous election) are more likely to vote in favour of transfer of payments as the next election draws closer than senators who achieved a more comfortable margin at the previous election (Hibbing, 1984, p. 855).

There is also evidence that under systems with term limits, as is the case for governors in Brazil, a leader in his or her second term will be under less pressure to respond to the electorate. Besley and Case (1995), for example, look at the effects term limits and restrictions on the number of consecutive terms have on the economic policy choices of U.S. governors over the period 1950-1986. They find that governors in their second term, who are not eligible to stand for re-election, are more likely to adopt unpopular economic policies than governors in their first term. Their results demonstrate that "lame duck" governors in their second terms are associated with higher levels of income and sales tax and a reduction of the minimum wage (Besley and Case, 1995, pp. 779-780).

Horizontal accountability (governability concerns)

Mainwairing and Shugart's (1997) study of presidential executives in Latin America finds that differences in the degree of support that a president enjoys in the

legislature can be just as important a determinant of executive strength as his or her constitutionally-granted powers, such as the right to veto legislation or the ability to rule by decree. They note that the strength of such “partisan powers” is closely related to the degree of multipartism in the national legislature. Nevertheless, partisan powers also vary within a single political system, with some leaders enjoying a greater level of partisan support than others, which has implications for the level of legislative oversight an executive is subject to. Aberbach (2002) focuses on the U.S. Congress and finds that congressional committees in the 1990s – a period of divided government – spent more time on oversight hearings than any period prior to 1961. Similarly, McCarty and Razaghian (1999) find that presidential nominations for the cabinet take longer to be passed by the legislative branch under periods of divided government.

The sub-national level in Brazil is an ideal context in which to examine the role that these types of cyclical vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms have on the ability of elected executives to respond to protest with repression – and therefore to test Hypotheses 4 and 5. Firstly, Brazil is a post-1974 democracy and this group of democracies was found to be solely responsible for the relationship between protest and repression observed in Chapter 2. Secondly, Brazil has often been described as a clear case of “strong federalism”, on account of the fact that its governors possess substantially more power than their counterparts in other federal systems (Samuels and Abrucio, 2000; Cheibub, Figueiredo and Limongi, 2009). This means that many of the assumptions about the behaviour of national executives should also apply to the sub-national level in Brazil.

Thirdly, the constitutions of the states do not vary significantly.²⁰ Consequently the formal powers of governors are largely fixed across cases, allowing the analysis to focus solely on the dimensions of horizontal and vertical accountability that vary sufficiently over time (such as the degree of legislative support that the governor enjoys or how comfortable his or her margin of victory was at the previous election).

Fourthly, as discussed in the previous chapter, the issue of agrarian reform in Brazil has prompted similar forms of protest across all regions. The *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra* (MST) is responsible for around half of all such protests across the country and operates in 24 out of 27 states. The MST advocates the peaceful occupation of unproductive rural properties in order to pressure the state to undertake agrarian reform. Other social movements, CONTAG-affiliated unions and local groups (whose protests also feature in the data used in this chapter) have tended to adopt similar tactics of non-violent land occupations in order to protest for agrarian reform. Previous research has found that differences in the tactics of protesters, in terms of the level of violence used, can affect the likelihood of the government responding with repression (Franklin, 2009; Carey, 2010). Hence, focusing on a single type of protest (concerning a single issue) that tends to be predominantly non-violent will reduce the likelihood that the behaviour of protesters will itself incite repression (rather than a desire by government to prevent a policy concession).

Finally – and most importantly – the case of land reform protests in Brazil provides an opportunity to use a superior measure of both protest and repression than is normally the case. Previous studies (and the analysis in Chapter 2) have relied on

²⁰ The only notable difference in the constitutions of Brazil's subnational units is that 6 of the 27 states of Brazil delegate emergency decree power to the governor, in the form of "provisional measures". However, Ricci and Tomio (2010) found that these have an extremely limited impact and were rarely used and so 'should not be seen as a relevant tool in the hands of the governor for dominance against a legislature'.

data derived from newspapers in order to obtain quantitative measures of both protest and repression (Gupta, Singh and Sprague, 1993; Francisco, 1995, 1996; Moore, 2000; de la Luz Inclán, 2009; Franklin, 2009). However, there is an inherent ‘selection bias’ that exists in this type of events-based data on protest and/or repression. As Earl *et al.* (2004) note, the decision by a news agency to report an event at all differs systematically according to factors that affect the intrinsic newsworthiness of the event, such as the type of protest event or the issue involved. Such biases can be reduced by using a number of different news sources, yet even with this approach a large number of protests are still likely to receive no media coverage. To avoid such problems, this paper makes use of a dataset on both protest and repression that is unique to Brazil. The dataset is based on the direct observations of an extensive network of field agents working for a national NGO. These observations are compiled in an annual report which details the number of land protests that took place and how many – and what type of – acts of repression are experienced by people protesting for agrarian reform. Observations are recorded at the level of the individual farm where the protest took place, listing the municipality and state. As such, these reports provide a far more accurate measure of the variation in protest than newspaper or other media-based indicators.

4.2 Governors in Brazil

Brazilian governors are elected by majority run-off for fixed terms of four years. In each state, a unicameral legislature is elected concurrently but on the basis of open list proportional representation. This means that like Brazil’s president, state governors often have to enter into coalitions in order to forge a governing coalition in the state assembly. Given the findings from the previous studies discussed above,

which look at vertical and horizontal constraints that vary between electoral cycles, we would expect the likelihood of governments using repression against protesters to be a function of the following factors: (1) The length of time until the next election, (2) the margin of victory that the governor achieved at the previous election; (3) whether or not a governor is in his or her second term; and (4) the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor's own party (and the number of seats held by potential coalition partners as well).

The analysis that follows aims to test whether variation in these four types of constraint on gubernatorial authority has any effect on the propensity of governors to promote repression against people involved in protests over land reform, either directly by state agents or indirectly, by the failure of state agents to intervene when private groups engage in repression.

4.3 State governors and the military police

The roll-call and policy data used by Hibbing (1984) and Besley and Case (1995) are measures of *direct* decisions taken by elected politicians. In contrast, the measures of repression against land protesters used in this analysis reflect *indirect* outcomes of decisions taken by state governors regarding the policing of protesters. Consequently, the analysis relies on the assumption that state governors exert a considerable amount of influence over the Brazilian military police.²¹ How valid is such an assumption?

Both Pereira (2008) and Hinton (2006) have described the politicisation of both branches of the Brazilian police at length. Pereira states that 'In Brazil, the police and other public-security institutions are often seen as tools of the government in power'

²¹ At the state level in Brazil, two parallel police forces are maintained: the civil police and the military police. The latter is responsible for patrolling (Caldeira, 2002). This means that it is the military police, rather than the civil police, who will have interactions with land protestors occupying farms.

(Pereira, 2008, p. 199). He cites the example of a PSDB governor in São Paulo who refused to participate in a federal police reform programme during President Lula's first term because the federal government was headed by the opposition PT.

The governor is also responsible for police appointments. The commander of the state military police is appointed by and largely answerable to the state governor (Neme, 1999, p. 28). Governors also appoint the State Secretary of Public Security, who oversees and manages police activities. However, as Hinton (2006) observes, 'more often than not... secretaries are fired summarily, as is also the case with police chiefs and other top security officials' (Hinton, 2006, p. 119). She describes how governors have not only tended to make new appointments upon assuming office but during terms as well – sometimes as frequently as three times in four years (Hinton, 2006: 147). The governor also appoints the judges who sit on the military courts, which are responsible for trying police accused of misconduct (Neme, 1999, p. 78).

Both Hinton (2006) and Pereira (2008) note that the degree of politicisation of the police in Brazil is stark when compared to a country such as the U.K, where (prior to 2012) local police commissioners were appointed by independent regional police authorities and their terms did not coincide with those of local government. However, Pereira observes that the politicisation of the police in Brazil goes beyond the mere power of appointment, by contrasting it with the U.S., where elected mayors in large cities appoint police chiefs but do not tend to involve themselves in the day-to-day management of the police (Pereira, 2008, p. 200). Hinton (2006) makes a similar case, explaining that in the U.S. politicians are more likely to ensure 'a basic continuity in standards, personnel and codes of conduct' is maintained within the police than is the case in Brazil (Hinton, 2006, p. 147).

Moreover, although an extreme example, anecdotal evidence has suggested that one of the most widely-publicised and brutal examples of military police repression against land protesters may have been sanctioned by the state governor. On the 17th of April 1996, 19 members of the MST were killed and 69 were injured after around 1,100 protesters blocked a highway to protest the expropriation of a farm in the state of Pará. According to the broadsheet *Folha de Sao Paulo*, the then-governor of Pará, Almir Gabriel, had directly ordered the military police to visit the site to suppress the demonstrations.²²

It thus seems reasonable to assume that governors exert a substantial degree of influence over the tactics that are used by the state military police when attempting to evict landless protesters from occupied farms. This paper assumes that many governors who are unsympathetic to the goals of landless activists must balance a desire to use state repression to prevent land occupations with a desire to avoid the negative public opinion or opposition from the legislature that might result from such acts of repression. It is predicted that the four factors discussed earlier will influence how much governability and electoral concerns will influence the governor's decision to repress compared to his/her desire to prevent agrarian reform.

4.4 Dataset and hypotheses

The dataset used in this paper has a panel structure. There are observations for each of Brazil's 27 states over a period of nine years, 1997-2005. Ideally, the dataset would begin in 1990, as the first set of gubernatorial elections to be held after the ratification of Brazil's democratic constitution were held that year. Unfortunately,

²² See "Ex-comandante vai aguardar em liberdade julgamento de massacre de Carajás". *Folha de São Paulo*, 25/09/2005 (<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u72710.shtml>).

while the electoral data that form the basis of the political variables are available for all years, data on repression and protest events are only publicly available from 1997. Two observations for the state of Roraima were lost due to missing data on protest and repression, yielding a total sample size of 241.


Repression variables

Two measures of the repression experienced by those engaging in land protests (the dependent variable of interest) were constructed from annual data published by the *Comissão Pastoral da Terra* (CPT). The CPT is a national Brazilian NGO that has endeavoured to collect data relating to all aspects of land protests and conflicts since 1985, with the aim of quantifying the violence that is involved. These data are published online in an annual report entitled *Conflitos no Campo*.²³ The CPT's estimates have frequently been cited in the reports of international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. This annual report records various forms of violence experienced by persons involved in land conflicts (*violência contra a pessoa*), namely murders, attempted murders, acts of torture, physical beatings, arrests, injuries and death threats.

Death threats and injuries were excluded from the analysis because they were considered too vague. The five remaining categories encompass a wide range of levels of severity of actions against protesters. The frequencies of these measures are plotted in Figure 1. As might be expected, the relatively less severe actions – physical beatings and arrests – are found to be far more common forms of repression. They are also seen to follow a similar trend over time. Therefore, for reasons of parsimony, the

²³ Accessed 31/08/2008.

Figure 4.1: Trends in forms of repression over time for all states



Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra.

five categories were grouped into two measures of repressive actions using factor analysis. Murders, attempted murders and death threats form a measure of “harsh” repression (*HARSH*), while arrests and physical beatings form “mild” repression (*MILD*).²⁴

It should be noted that for all measures of repression other than arrests, it is not possible to know whether the perpetrators are the police or members of private security firms or militia hired by landowners. This distinction is often difficult to

²⁴ Results using the separate repression measures are presented in the appendix. Governing party representation is still a significant predictor of repression when the separate categories are used.

make as low police salaries often lead current and former members of the military police to seek private security jobs (Reames, 2008, p. 83). In order to have a better idea of the level of police involvement, a series of tests were carried out on the data.

The annual data provided by the CPT online only gives aggregate totals of each type of repression for each state. More detailed figures were obtained directly from the CPT's offices in 2010. This provided information at the level of the individual farm on land protests for 2000-2009. This extra information made it possible to determine whether other forms of repression tend to happen on farms which also have arrests.²⁵ The arrests variable is the only measure of repression which is definitely carried out by the police. Therefore, by looking at the farm-level data, if other types of repression tend to happen in farms which have experienced arrests, we can be more confident that these instances of repression are either being directly carried out by the police or that the police were complicit in the repression.

Excluding the cases of two farms which had 75 and 100 physical beatings but no arrests and heavily skewed the results, 262 people in this data set were recorded as having experienced physical beatings. Just over 48% of these occurred on farms where arrests had also taken place. Similarly, 163 people were tortured during this period and over 63% of these people were tortured on farms where there had also been arrests.

Murders and attempted murders were slightly less likely to occur on farms where there have been arrests (40.72% of murders and 44.32% of attempted murders). However, although direct involvement by state agents in these types of repression seems less likely, there is evidence suggesting that there is a lack of willingness from

²⁵ This test was carried out using events from 2000-2005 (the dates for which this farm-level data coincide with the years used in the analysis in this chapter).

the state authorities to prevent these murders/murder attempts. The number of murders and attempted murders that took place on encampments which had already experienced similar violence in the previous year can provide a rough indication of the extent to which the police willingly allow repression by private agents to take place. When repeated acts of repression occur on the same protest site over many months, it suggests that the police are willing to turn a “blind eye” and tacitly allow repression by private agents to continue with impunity.


Between 2001-2005, just under 30% of murders took place on an encampment where there had been at least one murder in the previous year. For attempted murders, this number was even higher, with 45 % taking place on an encampment which had had at least one attempted murder in the year before.²⁶

Independent variables

The number of protest events will clearly be positively associated with the number of instances of state repression (Davenport, 1995; Carey, 2006), so a measure of the frequency of protest events needs to be included as an explanatory variable. This was obtained from the CPT, which (in addition to the repression data described above) collects data on the number and location of land protest events. In contrast to most other international sources of data on protest, which are derived solely from newspaper reports, the CPT draws on information gathered by a network of field agents who monitor and record information on land conflicts in each Brazilian state. Consequently, its annual record of the number of land protests in Brazil is far more comprehensive than is the norm for protest data. In its raw form, the CPT data offer

²⁶ 2000 was not included, as no data about the previous year’s repression at the farm level was available before this year.

Figure 4.2: Land protest events over time for all states



Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra

observations coded by the exact date that a land protest occurred and at the level of the individual farm where the land occupation took place. For the purposes of the following analysis, however, the original protest data have been aggregated to the state and year level (*EVENTS*). Figure 4.2 depicts the annual totals of protest events in Brazil for each year in the dataset. Unsurprisingly, the number of protests followed a similar pattern to the mild forms of repression in Figure 4.1, dipping in 2001 and 2002 before rebounding.

Political variables

A set of political variables were chosen to measure both the vertical and horizontal constraints that operate on state governors. They are derived from the raw electoral data for state governors and state assemblies compiled by Jairo Nicolau of

the Institute of Social and Political Studies at the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro.²⁷

There are three measures of vertical constraints (electoral concerns), capturing the extent to which a governor is held accountable to the electorate. The first of these is the percentage of votes that the current governor obtained in the first round of the previous gubernatorial election (*FIRSTRDPER*). Governors with large majorities are expected to be less worried about the possibility that promoting repressive policing strategies will damage their reputation with the wider electorate at the next election. Since gubernatorial (and presidential) elections use a majority run-off system, many elections go to a second round, however the first round vote share is used as it captures the fraction of voters who chose the governor as their first choice candidate.

The second measure of vertical constraints is a dummy variable for whether a governor is in his or her second term (*SECTERM*). Under the Brazilian constitution, governors are only allowed to hold office for two consecutive four-year terms. Hence, a governor in his or her second term is largely insulated from the risk of being punished by the electorate for unpopular measures and would therefore be expected to more likely to preside over higher levels of repression.

The length of time until the next election should also influence the propensity for governors to promote repressive policing policies. Given that negative media publicity surrounding the repression of protesters can often be short lived, it is expected that governors who seek re-election will become more averse to adopting such a strategy as an election approaches. To allow the time until next election to have a non-linear effect on repression, a set of dummies for each year until the next election are created, where *YRSELEC0* denotes an election year, *YRSELEC1* one year before an election

²⁷ The data were accessed from <http://jaironicolau.iesp.uerj.br> on 20/08/2008.

and *YRSELEC2* two years before an election (three years before an election serves as the reference category).²⁸

The political variables also include a measure of the likelihood horizontal constraints will be used by the state assembly. Using state-level data for both the gubernatorial and the state assembly elections, it was possible to construct a measure of the percentage of seats in the state assembly held by the governor's own party (*GOVPARTYREP*). A lower percentage of seats implies a more hostile state assembly and thus more effective horizontal constraints operating on the governor.²⁹ A low percentage is therefore expected to be associated with reduced repression rates and *vice versa*.

Additional control variables

To control for non-political factors that might affect levels of repression, some additional independent variables are also included in the regression analysis in the next section. Real GDP per capita (*GDPPERCAP*), measured in millions of reais, was taken from *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* (IBGE). Previous research has found evidence that higher levels of economic development are associated with lower levels of state repression (Mitchell and McCormick, 1988). A set of nine dummy variables for the governor's own party were also included as the ideology of

²⁸ It is likely that smaller time increments, such as the number of months until an election would be a better predictor of repression but it is not possible to include such a measure in this analysis because the rest of the data in the dataset are aggregated by year.

²⁹ It should be noted that it is the norm for governors to form coalitions with other parties in order to achieve a working majority in the state assembly. It is very difficult, however, to find an accurate measure of the size of the governor's coalition, as it often changes during an electoral term. Two proxies for the size of the governor's coalition are presented as alternative specifications in the appendix.

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for variables

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Protest events (<i>EVENTS</i>)	15.469	23.025	0	165
Real GDP per capita (<i>GDPPERCAP</i>)	4.848	3.487	1.623	23.029
Governing party representation (<i>GOVPARTYREP</i>)	20.983	10.795	0	52.8
Second term (<i>SECTERM</i>)	0.195	0.397	0	1
First round percentage (<i>FIRSTRDPER</i>)	48.546	11.723	23	80.7
Murders	1.440	3.383	0	33
Attempted murders	2.178	5.401	0	52
Acts of torture	1.124	3.456	0	24
Physical beatings	8.232	39.099	0	381
Arrests	13.61	27.38	0	147

Notes: real GDP measured in thousands of reais at constant national 1997 prices.

the governor's party is itself expected to influence a governor's proclivity to repress land protesters. The centre-left *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT), which has historically been sympathetic to the goals of landless movements such as the MST, is used as the reference category, so that coefficients represent the level of repression relative to repression by governors from the PT.

Descriptive statistics

Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables in the model. In terms of the key independent variables, the mean percentage of first round votes for the sample period (48.5%) is not far below the absolute majority required to win an election outright. This suggests that the average governor in the sample has a reasonable level of electoral security. The mean share of seats held by the governor's party during the sample period is just 21%, which is not surprising given that state assembly members are elected on a proportional basis. There is a lot of variation in *GOVPARTYREP*, however, as it varies between no seats and a majority

(52.8%). The mean of *SECTERM* indicates that most governors in the sample are in their first term and must therefore be mindful of their prospects for re-election. The number of protest events varies widely across states, ranging from 0 to 165.

Table 4.1 also reports descriptive statistics for the separate measures of the dependent variable in their raw form before they were reduced using factor analysis. As seen in Table 4.1, the means and standard deviations of physical beatings and arrests are much larger than for the three harsher forms of repression. Nonetheless, all forms of repression vary widely and are zero in some cases.

4.5 Analysis and results

To test how well the political constraints outlined in the previous section predict repression, the following regression equation is used for state i in year t :

$$\begin{aligned}
 REP_{it} = & \alpha GOVPARTYREP_{it} + \beta_1 SECTERM_{it} + \beta_2 FIRSTRDPER_{it} \\
 & + \beta_3 YRSELEC0_t + \beta_4 YRSELEC1_t + \beta_5 YRSELEC2_t + \mathbf{PARTY}_{it} \boldsymbol{\chi} \\
 & + \mathbf{X}_{it} \boldsymbol{\delta} + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (4.1)
 \end{aligned}$$

where *REP* is a measure of repression (either *HARSH* or *MILD*), **PARTY** is a vector of dummies for the governor's party, allowing for the fact that governors of different parties are more or less inclined toward repression because of ideological reasons,³⁰ **X** is a vector of control variables and includes *GDPPERCAP* and *EVENTS*, γ_i represents a state-specific fixed effect and ε_{it} is the error term.

GOVPARTYREP, *SECTERM*, *FIRSTRDPER* and **PARTY** are all constant within each 4-year electoral cycle, whereas the other variables vary annually. The coefficient

³⁰ **PARTY** includes dummy variables for the following parties: PDT, PFL, PL, PMDB, PPB, PPR, PPS, PSB, PSDB, PSL, PTB. The PT is excluded and serves as the reference category, which means that the coefficients on the party dummy variables represent levels of repression, *relative* to governors from the PT.

on *GOVPARTYREP* (α) measures potential governability costs, whereas the coefficients on *SECTERM*, *FIRSTRDPER*, and *YRSELECO-YRSELEC2* (β_1 - β_5) all capture aspects of re-election costs. As noted in the previous section, it is expected that *GOVPARTYREP*, *SECTERM* and *FIRSTRDPER* will be positively associated with both forms of repression. For the *YRSTOELEC* dummies, it is expected that the negative effect on repression will be stronger closer to an election.

Table 4.2 presents the results of estimating equation 4.1 using the fixed effects estimator. *EVENTS* is found to be a strong positive predictor of mild repression but not of harsh repression. This concurs with the findings of Davenport (1995) and Carey (2006). *GOVPARTYREP* is a significant determinant of both types of repression, although it is more significant for the milder forms. This is largely consistent with the prediction outlined earlier, that governors who face less opposition in the state assembly will have a higher propensity to promote repressive policing strategies to deal with land protests. *YRSTOELECT0*, the dummy for the election year, is a significant negative predictor of repression, but only for the milder forms, while the dummies for one and two years before an election are insignificant for both types of repression. The possibility of negative sanctions from an electorate therefore only appears to impact a governor's decisions about repression during an election year

The variables that measure vertical constraints, *FIRSTRDPER* and *SECTERM*, do not have a significant effect on the level of either mild or harsh repression, indicating that governors who won by comfortable majorities or who are in their second terms are no more likely to repress than others. The latter finding could be due to the fact that second-term governors are mindful of the effects that their actions can have on the election prospects of the next candidate from their party. Somewhat surprisingly, GDP per capita is also found to be insignificant.

Table 4.2: Fixed effect regression estimates

Variable	(i) <i>HARSH</i>	(ii) <i>MILD</i>
<i>EVENTS</i>	0.004 (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)
<i>REALGDPCAP</i>	0.060 (0.069)	0.013 (0.030)
<i>YRSELECO</i>	-0.141 (0.132)	-0.180** (0.085)
<i>YRSELEC1</i>	-0.168 (0.114)	-0.117 (0.080)
<i>YRSELEC2</i>	0.125 (0.189)	-0.140 (0.084)
<i>GOVPARTYREP</i>	0.021** (0.008)	0.014*** (0.005)
<i>SECTERM</i>	-0.225 (0.214)	-0.036 (0.087)
<i>FIRSTRDPER</i>	0.001 (0.007)	0.007 (0.005)
PARTY coefficients:		
PDT	0.459* (0.255)	-0.012 (0.137)
PFL	-0.023 (0.181)	0.043 (0.102)
PL	0.443 (0.289)	0.697*** (0.179)
PMDB	-0.059 (0.139)	-0.064 (0.088)
PPB	-0.190 (0.234)	-0.374** (0.162)
PPR	0.071 (0.190)	0.042 (0.144)
PPS	-0.019 (0.194)	0.191* (0.100)
PSB	0.287 (0.178)	-0.077 (0.190)
PSDB	0.357 (0.222)	0.068 (0.150)
PSL	-0.038 (0.350)	-0.303 (0.207)
PTB	-0.366 (0.379)	-0.471** (0.220)
Constant	-0.873 (0.642)	-0.698 (0.323)
R-squared	0.42	0.45
Number of observations	241	241

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

There is evidence that a governor's party has an effect on the level of mild repression. The dummy variable for the PL has a highly significant positive effect, which is expected, since the PL is politically to the right of the PT (the reference category). The PPS party has a weakly significant positive effect. This is more surprising, given that this party is ideologically closer PT. However, this effect is driven by a single state, Matto Grosso, whose governor from January 2003 to March 2010 was Blairo Maggi. In 2010, Maggi left the PPS to join the right-of-centre PR, suggesting that his views may not have been representative of the PPS as a whole.³¹ Similarly, the significant negative effect for the PPB, which also seems counterintuitive, given that the party is to the right of the PT, appears to be driven by a single governor: Neudo Ribeiro Campos, who was re-elected on a PPB ticket as governor of Roraima in 1998, but who had served his previous term as a member of the left of centre PDT.

F-tests indicate that the state-specific effects are jointly significant in both the mild repression and harsh repression models, suggesting that a pooled model is inappropriate. Nonetheless, the results of the pooled model are presented in Appendix 4 (Table A4.1) for comparative purposes. The lack of significant results is unsurprising, given that the presence of state-specific factors is likely to obscure the relationship between repression and the political constraint variables. The above specification was also repeated using the individual measures of repression in place of the two grouped measures. The results for the individual measures (which are reported in Table A4.2) are similar to those reported in Table 4.2.

Although equation 4.1 controls for all state-specific factors (both observed and unobserved) through the inclusion of state fixed effects, the results presented in Table

³¹ The PR is a party formed from the merger of the right of centre PL and PRONA in 2006.

4.2 might still suffer from omitted variables bias if other relevant factors causing repression that vary over time are left out of the model. The current specification does not include a measure of the size of the governor's coalition, which could alter the degree of horizontal constraints operating on the governor³². Unfortunately, the only available data are on *pre*-electoral coalitions, which may not reflect the coalitions that are actually formed. When the share of seats won by a governor's *pre*-electoral coalition (*COALITIONREP*) was included as a regressor, it was found to have an insignificant effect on both mild and harsh repression and it did not alter the main findings from the original specification (see Table A4.3).

Another potentially important political variable that was excluded from the original model was whether a governor intended to stand for re-election. Although *SECTERM* captures the effect of second-term governors, it is possible that some first-term governors never intend to stand for re-election and are thus less motivated to court popularity within the electorate. In appendix Table A4.4, the regressions were repeated with a dummy for whether or not a governor stood for re-election at the next election (*REELECTION*). The re-election variable is not found to be a significant predictor of either form of repression.

4.6 Conclusion

Using sub-national data from Brazil, which provides superior information on protest and repression than can be found at the cross-national level, this chapter has tested the hypotheses that differences in the levels of cyclical horizontal and vertical constraints that an executive is subject to may influence the freedom that he or she has

³² The effect on repression of the size of the governor's *coalition* may not be as clear-cut as that of his/her own party. A coalition comprising parties with similar ideologies may largely mimic the effect of the size of governor's own party. In the case of a more ideologically disparate coalition however, there may be the reverse effect, whereby the governor abstains from promoting repressive policing policies for fear that some parties may leave his/her coalition as a result.

in responding to political protest with repression (Hypotheses 4 and 5 from Chapter 2). The results indicate that electoral sanctions and the risk of legislative oversight may indeed limit the opportunities for repression.

There are three main empirical findings. First, governors whose parties occupy a larger share of seats in the state legislature appear to preside over greater levels of repression against land protesters. Second, repression against land protesters is less prevalent in an election year. Third, less severe forms of repression appear to be more strongly influenced by these constraints than more extreme practices, such as torture and murder.

However, F-tests for this analysis indicated that the state-specific effects are jointly significant, which suggests that a fixed effects specification is appropriate and that there are state-specific factors influencing repression that are not explained by the political variables used in this chapter. One case in particular that seems to warrant further consideration is Pará, which has a far higher level of repression than would be predicted by the political variables alone. For this reason, Pará forms part of an in-depth qualitative analysis in Chapter 6, where it is contrasted with São Paulo, which has a fixed effect close to the average across the full sample of 27 states. First, however, Chapter 5 examines one possible explanation for the presence of significant state fixed effects: differences in media intensity between the states, focussing on media coverage of occupations carried out by the largest and most well-known movement in Brazil – the MST.

CHAPTER 5

The media, accountability and repression

5.1 Introduction

The findings of the previous chapter lend support to the idea that cyclical political factors influence the proclivity for governors to respond to land protests with repression. However, in the regression analysis presented, state-specific fixed effects were also found to be jointly significant. This means that there are factors that are specific to certain states and that vary little over time but which are nonetheless important in explaining differences in the level of repression of land protests between states. The purpose of this and the following chapter is to examine possible variables that might be driving these state-specific effects. This chapter focuses on the role of the media plays in determining a democratic executive's decision to use repression. In doing so, it provides a test of Hypothesis 2 from Chapter 2, namely that in polities with greater levels of media coverage, repression is less likely to occur (holding all else equal).

The media is closely related to vertical accountability, in that having a well-functioning media sector which provides effective coverage of protest events is necessary in order for voters to have information about any repression that takes place. In a 2002 essay, the economists Besley, Burges and Prat, discuss their own research on how the media enables the electorate to effectively hold governments to account. The authors summarise their argument thus: 'at the heart of these papers is the idea that citizens have imperfect information about government actions, and that mass media can therefore enhance citizens' abilities to scrutinize governments' (Besley *et al.*, 2002, p. 45). In this view, voters can only sanction governments

through the ballot box, on the basis of information that they have about government actions. A negative public response to political repression of land protesters will therefore be dependent on public access to information about such repression, which in turn depends on the degree of freedom the press has from political influence. Thus, it is plausible that long-standing disparities between states in the effectiveness of media coverage might account for some of the differences between states in the prevalence of repression.

There are two ways in which the scope of media coverage of land protests might be limited. The first might be considered intentional, in that it is the result of conscious decisions by media organisations not to report certain events, acting under political influence or bias. Under the second scenario, however, underreporting might be the result of geographical and economic factors, which might mean that it is easier for journalists to access information on land protest events in some locations compared to others.

Besley *et al.* (2002) have written extensively about the first type of limitations on media coverage. To be considered “formally democratic”, media outlets in a particular state must be free from state control or state censorship. However, the authors note that, even after the establishment of a procedural democracy, more subtle limitations on the effectiveness of the media can persist. They observe that many countries that are considered to have formally democratic or “free” governments by the Freedom House Index, are still only ranked as partially free, according to the component Freedom House measure of press freedom (Besley *et al.*, 2002, p. 50). Besley *et al.* refer to these more subtle limitations on the media’s ability to provide complete information to voters about government actions as “media capture” (Besley *et al.*, 2002, p. 50). Media capture refers to ‘whether [an] incumbent finds that buying off

the media industry is profitable or not' (Besley *et al.*, 2002, p. 51); in other words, how insulated the media is from political influence. Besley *et al.* argue that media capture will be affected by a number of variables: (1) media industry concentration, since fewer payments are required to silence a story when there are fewer media outlets; (2) transaction costs for transfer payments from the government to media outlets, since it is easier for an incumbent to pass regulations favouring the owners' interests when a media outlet is owned by a family as opposed to a corporation with a wide number of shareholders; and (3) the profitability of audience revenues for the media relative to these rents. They also present cross-country empirical evidence that suggests that there is a positive association between these three capture risk factors and a country's corruption ranking, according to the International Country Risk Guide.

Matos's (2008) and Ameral's (2002) descriptions of the Brazilian media suggest that many of the factors that Besley *et al.* (2002) suggest will raise the probability of media capture by politicians are present in Brazil. Both authors observe that media ownership is highly concentrated in Brazil. Moreover, Matos describes how, in the Brazilian case, the few media corporations that dominate the mainstream media tend to be family owned:

'A limited number of families own the Brazilian Mainstream media. The Marinho family own Globo Organizations (Globo, TV, the newspapers O Globo, Extra, and Valor Econômico, Rádio Globo and CNB, the publisher Editora Globo, the magazine *Época*, the web portal Globo.com, the cable TV Net, and a number of shares in non-media firms); the Civitas the main publishing magazine company, the Abril group, which publishes *Veja* and a total of 90 entertainment and lifestyle magazines; the Mesquitas (Estado de São Paulo, Agência Estado, Estado.com); the Frias (folha de São Paulo, the web portal UOL, Agência Folha, *Diário Popular*, Valor Econômico (with Globo); Nascimento Brito and Nelson Tarnure (the former owned *Jornal do Brasil* and sold it to the latter), and Silvio Santos (SBT TV).' (Matos, 2008, p. 21)

Domination of the media by a small number of family-owned companies should, according to Besley *et al.*'s model, put the mainstream media in Brazil at a higher risk of media capture. However, these problems are, according to Matos (2008), more acutely felt at the state level with massive disparities between national and local newspapers in terms of freedom from political control. She argues that while newspapers based in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, which have a national circulation, have gradually gained 'more political and economic independence', regionally-based media organisations, such as those in the states of Bahia, Maranhão and Alagoas are controlled by 'oligarchic politicians' (Matos, 2008, p. 21).

Whereas the situation described above might be described as overt underreporting, or underreporting due to political influence, it is also possible that the media is simply less effective in some states than others due to reasons related to geography and economics. There are great disparities in economic development between states in Brazil. For example, according to 2008 figures from the *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* (IBGE), the GDP for the State of São Paulo is almost six-and-a-half times larger than the combined GDP of the seven states that comprise Brazil's North region and two-and-a-half times larger than the combined GDP of the eight states that make up the Northeast region. Furthermore, the four states of the Southeast region, which include São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, collectively account for just over 56% of Brazil's GDP. States in the north of the country also have a much lower population density than those in the south, which could also limit the ability of the press to gain information on protest events. If a governor knows that there is a low chance of media coverage of repressive actions by the police, either because he/she has political influence over the local media or

because media coverage in his/her state is not very effective, the governor's propensity to respond to protest with repression would be expected to be higher.

Data limitations affect the extent these two sources of underreporting can be investigated in this chapter. A rigorous statistical analysis of the relationship between reporting rates and repressive state responses to protests would require a dataset of newspaper articles to be constructed for multiple years – a task which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, the data analysed here cover much shorter time periods – either five months or one year – and the analysis is exploratory in nature. Rather than testing for the presence of a statistical association between reporting rates and repression, the aim of this chapter is to identify any patterns that are consistent with the possibility that media coverage affects the level of state repression of land protests. This should offer some tentative evidence of whether differences in media coverage underlie the long-term differences in the level of repression that are observed between states.

In addition to the limitations imposed by the longitudinal coverage of the data, the analysis is also restricted to national rather than local newspapers. This means that it is better suited to investigating the second factor behind underreporting, *i.e.* whether reporting rates are lower in less economically developed states or states with lower population density and in turn, identifying whether these reporting rates are related to levels of repression. The likelihood of “media capture” affecting state differences in reporting rates is probably higher for intra-state media organisations, as they would be subject to changes in legislation by state level governments. A thorough investigation of the differences in extent for the “media capture” between states would require access to state-level newspaper data for all 27 states of Brazil, an

undertaking which, as with acquiring a full 10 year longitudinal coverage, is a task that is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Nevertheless, national reporting rates may provide some indication of state-level media capture, given that many local media outlets in Brazil are affiliates of national media organisations and national newspapers are likely to source reports from more remote states from their affiliates in those states. Therefore, if underreporting occurs because of political influence over the local media, it may have a knock-on effect on the likelihood of the same event receiving attention in the national press. Since there is no way to directly test for the influence of media capture using the national newspaper data, this topic will be explored in greater depth in the following chapter, which is a focused qualitative comparison of two individual states. However, this chapter does examine whether there is any indirect evidence that is consistent with the presence of media capture in the national print media.

This chapter looks at data from four national newspapers in order to identify the differences in reporting rates between regions and to identify what other characteristics of a protest (*e.g.* the size of the protest) raise its likelihood of being reported in the national press. It also considers the possibility of media capture at the state level by comparing the likelihood of a protest being reported in conservative vs. non-conservative newspapers. The chapter then links the information on reporting rates back to the original research question by investigating whether any association exists between reporting rates in the national press and levels of repression of land protesters. This is a similar exercise to that undertaken by Wisler and Giugni (1999). Therefore, comparing their findings to Brazil, a post-1974 democracy, can provide clues as to whether this is one of the factors driving the differences in repression rates between old and new democracies.

5.2 Regional differences in newspaper coverage

This section provides an assessment of the extent of newspaper coverage of land protest events and identifies those attributes of protests that determine whether they receive print media coverage in the national press. To do this, data on land protests taken from national newspaper articles are matched to the full population of protest events. While the previous chapter focused on land occupations by all movements engaging in such protests across Brazil, this chapter and the next chapter focus solely on land protests conducted by the MST. As explained in Chapters 3 and 4, the MST accounts for around half of all land protests that take place in Brazil. As the largest single organisation engaging in land occupations, acts of land protest conducted by members of the MST are more likely to receive attention in the national press than those occupations carried out by smaller movements or local groups. Similarly, the fact that the MST is organised in all but 3 of Brazil's 27 states motivated the decision to focus only on occupations by the MST in the following chapter, which is a focused comparison of two states.

The full record of events against which newspaper reports are compared is provided by the data from the CPT that were used in the statistical analysis in the previous chapter. The data collected by the CPT on protest events are some of the most comprehensive of their kind. Since 1988, the CPT has produced annual reports on the number of land occupations for every state in Brazil and the acts of repression experienced by those protesters involved. These data are recorded at the level of the individual farm at which a land occupation takes place and contain information on the number of families involved, the date of the occupation, the land area of the farm occupied and (from 2000 onwards) the movement(s) responsible for the land occupation. The CPT is able to record these events with such precision because, rather

than relying on secondary sources to gather information about land protests, the data are obtained by individual field agents who visit the sites of the land occupations. The CPT data were restricted to those events that were recorded as being instigated by the MST (either solely or in conjunction with other movements).³³

Given the comprehensive nature of the data, it is therefore possible to treat the events recorded by the CPT as the universe of cases against which newspaper reports of protests can be compared. A similar exercise was carried out by McCarthy *et al.* (1996), who compared newspaper coverage of protest events in Washington, DC in 1982 and 1991 against police records of protest permits from the same years in order to identify the selection bias in the newspaper reporting of protest events. However, rather than a covering a single urban area, the data compared in this chapter encompass the whole of Brazil.

The newspaper data were obtained from a series of folders compiled by staff at the *Biblioteca do Senado Federal* (Library of Congress) in Brasilia. Prior to mid-2000 (when the library started to compile an online database of articles from multiple newspapers), staff at the Library were required to search a number of newspapers every day (except Sunday) for specific subjects and compile annual folders of the newspaper articles pertaining to these subjects. One of these folders focused on the MST and contained articles from the four national newspapers with the largest circulation in Brazil (*O Globo*, *O Jornal do Brasil*, *A Folha de São Paulo* and *O Estado de São Paulo*), along with two Brasilia newspapers (*Correio Braziliense* and *O Jornal de Brasilia*). Articles from these newspapers that referred to the MST in any part of the text were added to the folder for the period January 1998-May 2000. Photographic copies of all these articles were made during a visit to the Library in the

³³ The only exception to this was that one land occupation was included even though the CPT data listed only the MLST as being involved, since a newspaper article on the event reported the involvement of the MST.

summer of 2008. The folders contained articles about all aspects of the MST, so it was necessary to identify only those that described incidents of land occupations.³⁴ For each article that referred to a land protest, the following information was recorded: the article date, the name of the farm or property occupied, the number of headings and subheadings in the article, the number of newspaper columns the article spanned, the number of rows in the body of the article and whether a photograph accompanied the article.

The CPT only recorded the names of the particular movements that took part in each land occupation in its reports for 2000 onwards. Since the newspaper data only include articles about the MST up to the end of May 2000, the first five months of 2000 is the only period where the information from the two data sources overlap³⁵. Consequently, the newspaper data are compared to the CPT data for the period 1 January 2000-31 May 2000. The newspaper records were successfully matched to the CPT data in all but three instances.³⁶ To the best of author's knowledge there were no external events that occurred during this period that would have affected the MST's proclivity to protest, such as national elections. However, the sample period does include a single day (17 April 2000) on which the MST simultaneously launched a very large number of land occupations (mainly in the state of Pernambuco).

Figure 5.1 below shows the percentage of events recorded by the CPT that were actually reported in the six Brazilian newspapers between January and May 2000.


³⁴ Articles which were excluded as a result of this process included those focusing on topics such as the movement's organisation, negotiations by the movement's leaders with members of the state and federal government, the criminal trials of movement leaders and other types of protest activity such as marches, vigils, the looting of trucks containing agricultural produce and the creation of road blocks.

³⁵ The reason for selecting this sample period is that the CPT only started to record the individual movements that took part in each land occupation from 2000 onwards and since the newspaper data only cover articles about the MST to the end of May 2000, the first five months of 2000 is the only period where the information from these two sources overlaps.

³⁶ Three articles referred to farms that were not found in the CPT data.

What is strikingly apparent is the very low rate of reporting of MST protests by the

Figure 5.1: Newspaper coverage of land protests




Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra and newspaper data collected by author

national print media: less than 15% of the total 163 events in this five month period was reported by these six newspapers. This is slightly more than the percentage of events reported by McCarthy *et al.* (1996) in their study of media coverage of protests in Washington, DC. The majority of those protests which were reported in the press appeared in only a single newspaper.

Figure 5.2 shows that reporting rates vary widely across newspapers. *O Estado de São Paulo* accounts for 45% of reports, whereas *O Globo* accounts for just 3% despite having similar circulation figures. The newspapers can be divided into those that are widely considered to have a conservative editorial stance (*O Estado de São Paulo* and *O Globo*) and those that are not (*A Folha de São Paulo*, *O Jornal do Brasil* and *Correio Braziliense*, *O Journal de Brasilia*). Notably, the two conservative newspapers collectively account for almost half of the events reported during the sample period.

Figure 5.2: Individual newspapers' shares of total newspaper reports




Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra and newspaper data collected by author

In order to test for media bias in reporting rates, two dummy variables were created: one for whether an MST protest was reported in a conservative newspaper and one for whether an MST protest was reported in a non-conservative newspaper. A paired t-test revealed that the difference between the means of these dummy variables was not statistically significant. Hence, although one conservative newspaper had a particularly high level of coverage of land protests, there is little overall evidence consistent with a situation in which political bias influences newspapers' decisions to report on land protests at the national level.

As Earl *et al.* (2004) note, a news agency's decision whether to report an event is a significant source of selection bias. News agencies do not adopt purely random sampling strategies in deciding which of a range of possible events to include in their reports. Indeed, extraneous factors appeared to play a major role in determining which protests received press attention during the sample period. One example is the occupations of Fazenda Santa Maria in São Paulo in February and April 2000. These

garnered a lot of coverage due to the fact that the farm had belonged to a recently-

Figure 5.3: Reporting rates by region




Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra and newspaper data collected by author

deceased former governor of the state of Abreu Sodré and because one of the heirs to the property was an associate of the then-president Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

Figure 5.3 depicts the regional patterns in the reporting of MST protests. Despite the majority of the protests recorded by the CPT taking place in the Northeast region, the press coverage of protest events is most comprehensive for the southeast of Brazil, with the six newspapers reporting almost half of the protests there. t-tests reveal that the difference between the reporting rate for this region and the reporting rate for the rest of Brazil is highly significant. This may partly be attributed to the fact that the four largest newspapers are based in the south-eastern states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. However, the two remaining newspapers are based in the centre-west region, which has the second-lowest reporting rate in the country. Furthermore, *O Globo*, *O*

Jornal do Brasil, *A Folha de São Paulo* and *O Estado de São Paulo* have a wide circulation throughout Brazil, not just within their own states. Therefore, it seems

Figure 5.4: Reporting rates by state



Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra and newspaper data collected by author


likely that the trends depicted in Figure 5.3 reflect a bias towards reporting those protest events that take place in Brazil's most economically developed and highly-populated region.

Figure 5.4 shows the reporting rates for individual states over the 5-month sample period. Although 18 states experienced MST protests during this period, Figure 5.4 only depicts the reporting rates for the 15 states that experienced at least 2 protests. In more than half of these states, the MST protests received no coverage at all in the national press. Unsurprisingly, São Paulo has the highest reporting rate among the states, with 66% of protests by the MST receiving coverage in the newspapers sampled. This is consistent once again with the hypothesis that the poorer and less-densely populated states receive less attention in the national press.

Also striking is how few reports covered protests from the north-eastern state of Pernambuco, despite the high level of protest activity in this state. This may be an illustration of the overall lack of attention given to the north and northeast of Brazil by the national print media. Pernambuco had the largest number of occupations recorded in the CPT dataset for the 5-month period, accounting for 90 of the national total of 163 occupations. Each year, the MST coordinates occupations across a number of states as part of what they term “Red April”. According to the CPT data, in 2000 the movement organised 109 occupations in 13 states during April, which accounted for 68% of all occupations during the 5-month sample period. 78 of the April occupations took place in Pernambuco and while the next highest was São Paulo with 9 (the other states that experienced occupations in this month of coordinated action were Alagoas, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Paraíba, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, Santa Catarina and Tocantins). 72 of the 78 April land occupations in Pernambuco occurred on a single day (17 April). However, only three of these actions were reported in the national print media. The properties that were involved in these events were all mills under the control of two trade union federations: the *Central Unica dos Trabalhadores* (CUT), a large national union federation, and the *Federação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura do Estado de Pernambuco* (Fetape), a local federation of rural workers’ unions. The potential for confrontation between movements may explain why these particular incidents attracted press attention.

The size of a protest also appears to influence its likelihood of being reported in the press. The mean number of families that participated in those events that were reported during the sample period was 331, compared to 211 in the unreported events. Although this difference was only marginally significant (at the 10% level), it

Figure 5.5: Total events and reported events



Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra and newspaper data collected by author


provides tentative support for a positive relationship between the size of a protest and the likelihood of it being reported.

Figure 5.5 plots the number of events recorded by the CPT over time against those reported in the press, excluding 17 April when 84 protests took place in a single day. This figure suggests that the reporting rate is roughly constant over time.³⁷

Even among those events that are reported, there is variation in the prominence afforded to the story, such as the length of the article and its placement within the newspaper. Measures of the importance placed on each article that were identifiable from the photocopies of the newspaper articles were the number of rows in the main body of the article, the number of columns that the newspaper occupied, whether or

³⁷ This implies that the fixed effects estimation (which controls for country-specific factors) used in the previous chapter may be a good approach to alleviating the bias in newspaper data.

Figure 5.6: Non-reporting rates and mild repression




Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra and newspaper data collected by author

not the article had an accompanying photograph and whether there was a subheading in addition to the main headline.³⁸

Among those protests reported, the mean number of families involved was 378 in the case of articles that were accompanied by photographs compared to 322 for those articles which did not have accompanying photographs. There is a positive correlation between the number of families involved in a protest and both the number of rows and the number of columns in an article. These results were slightly outside the 10% level of significance, which is unsurprising, given the small number of protests that were reported on in the first place.

³⁸ Page number would be another desirable measure of article prominence, however this is not available for the majority of the articles in the archive, as the number is not visible on the newspaper clipping.

Figure 5.7: Non-reporting rates and harsh repression



Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra and newspaper data collected by author

5.3 Links between reporting rates and repression

As the CPT data on repression are annual, it was necessary to have data covering a whole year of newspaper reports on protest in order to identify any patterns between reporting rates and levels of repression across states. Using the online archives of *A Folha de São Paulo*, a newspaper with one of the largest circulations in Brazil, newspaper reports were compared to the records of CPT for 2005 only. All articles containing the keyword “MST” were examined and those containing information about any MST occupations were matched to the CPT data. In Figures 5.6 and 5.7, the percentage of non-reported protests in each state is plotted against the 2005 factor scores for mild and harsh repression from Chapter 4. The graphs do not suggest that any overall pattern exists, although a few extreme cases stand out. Pará (‘PA’), for

example, has high levels of repression and receives no coverage in the national press. It is possible that the lack of a clear overall pattern may be the result of having only one year of observations.

5.4 Conclusion

The comparison of newspaper reports and CPT land occupation data presented here has revealed that only a small fraction of MST land occupations are reported in the national newspapers, with the overall reporting rate remarkably similar to that found by previous studies using U.S. data. There is statistically significant evidence that larger protests are more likely to be reported and the observed patterns also suggest that possible confrontations with existing movements and/or politicians may raise the likelihood of an MST protest being reported in the national press. It is also likely that the probability of overt confrontation increases the intrinsic ‘newsworthiness’ of a protest.

At the beginning of the chapter, two possible causes of underreporting were discussed: “media capture”, or politicisation of the media, and the presence of geographic disparities between states, in terms of both wealth and infrastructure. Although a definitive test was not possible, given the short time period covered by the data, the regional patterns in underreporting presented here seem to be consistent with the idea that media coverage is less comprehensive in states with lower incomes or lower population densities. On the other hand, there does not seem to be any evidence that is consistent with political bias influencing newspapers’ decisions to report land protests at the national level. It should be noted, however, that this chapter has not looked at the local press, which might be more vulnerable to media capture effects.

This is an issue that will be investigated in the next chapter, which focuses on the two states of Pará and São Paulo.

In terms of addressing the question of whether reporting rates underpin the state-specific effects identified in the previous chapter, the evidence presented here is inconclusive. The state-by-state reporting rates do not appear to be associated with state levels of repression. This stands in contrast to the results of Wisler and Giugni (1999), whose study of Switzerland found evidence of a significant negative effect of reporting rates on protest repression.

This chapter also identified São Paulo as the having the highest reporting rate in the national press. This means that if media coverage did have the expected effect of reducing repression, then it would be expected that the state-specific fixed effect for São Paulo in the empirical model of Chapter 4 would be large and negative.³⁹ In fact, the state fixed effect that was found for São Paulo was quite close to zero, which means that its fixed effect is close to that of the average across the full sample of 27 states. This suggests that São Paulo might provide a useful case to examine why Hypothesis 2 does not appear to hold in Brazil, that is, why media coverage does not have a negative effect on repression levels (holding other factors constant). This question will be explored as part of the in-depth comparison of São Paulo and Pará in the next chapter.

³⁹ This is effect of the state dummy for São Paulo in the repression regression, controlling for political factors and the other controls from Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 6

The use of repression on the ground: A qualitative comparison of São Paulo and Pará

6.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a qualitative comparison of the states of São Paulo and Pará. The purpose of this chapter is to address unanswered questions raised by the statistical analyses in Chapters 4 and 5. There are three main objectives: (1) to examine how governors influence the level of repression in practice, thereby uncovering the mechanisms by which the positive causal relationship established in Chapter 4 manifests itself; (2) to identify what factors might be responsible for the large persistent differences in levels of repression that were found to exist between states in Chapter 4, even after controlling for political factors; (3) to explore further why the findings regarding media coverage of repression in Chapter 5 are inconclusive. To achieve this, the chapter focuses on the states of São Paulo and Pará. The reasons why these two states serve as useful cases for the purposes of this chapter are outlined below.

São Paulo had a small estimated fixed effect in the repression models estimated in Chapter 4, meaning that the political variables relating to executive accountability explain a relatively large fraction of repression and that the fixed effect in São Paulo is close to the average fixed effect for the whole sample of 27 states. By conducting a ‘small-n’ study of São Paulo, it will be possible to get an idea of the exact causal mechanisms via which the governor influences the level of police repression in a state that is representative of the country as a whole.

São Paulo is also a useful test case for understanding why media coverage does not seem to raise the costs of repression, as predicted by the theoretical framework in

Chapter 2 (and, in particular, Hypothesis 2). Previous studies have found a negative relationship between media influence and repression, for example Wisler and Giugni (1999), who showed that increased media coverage of protest was associated with less repression in Switzerland. Chapter 5, however, found no evidence of a similar relationship in Brazil. São Paulo is a good setting in which to explore this issue further, as it has the most extensive media coverage of protest events in Brazil; therefore, if media coverage deterred repression, one would expect it to have a large *negative* state-specific fixed effect. While São Paulo's level of repression is not especially high relative to other states, there is no evidence of state-specific factors contributing to a lower level of repression. Indeed, as noted above, its estimated fixed effect in analysis of Chapter 4 was quite close to zero, indicating that its long-run level of repression is close to the national average. Investigating this case in more depth should identify some plausible reasons why greater media coverage does not result in less state repression.

Pará was chosen in order to understand why the cyclical political factors included in Chapter 4 do not explain repression very well there. Possible contextual factors which could account for Pará's large state-specific effect are considered. However, the consequences of Pará's historical experience, which might be termed one of a state of lawlessness, and the effect that this has on the use of repression are by no means unique to this state. It is therefore possible to draw some wider inferences from this case.

This small-n comparison cannot claim to identify any causal relationships. However, it can contextualise the findings of the statistical analysis in Chapter 4 and thereby provide more evidence of their plausibility. It can also uncover factors that have not been explained by the statistical results in the previous chapters but might

explain why media coverage does not seem to have a deterrent effect in São Paulo and why Pará has a high level of violence that cannot be accounted for by the political factors.


The chapter begins by presenting some descriptive statistics on repression and protest in São Paulo and Pará, based on the same CPT data used in Chapters 4 and 5. It then proceeds to provide a qualitative account of the factors relating to the use of repression against land protesters in each state. The main source material used for the construction of these accounts is a collection of open-ended interviews conducted in both states in the spring and early summer of 2010. Interviews were carried out with members of the CPT and MST in both states (including both activists and lawyers working for these organisations), and also policy makers from INCRA in Pará. In São Paulo, interviews were also conducted with advisors to deputies in the state assembly from both the PT and the PSDB. In Pará, interviews were conducted with state deputies themselves. Relevant academic texts about land protests and the history of the police are also cited, along with data that were obtained during the period of fieldwork about the percentage of the annual budget in each state that is devoted to policing.

6.2 Descriptive statistics

As with the previous chapter, the focus of this chapter is on the MST and the repression of its members. The MST is the largest protest movement in Brazil (accounting for 54.9% of all land protests between 2000 and 2005)⁴⁰ and it also has the widest geographical spread, being active in 24 out of 27 states. Since the MST is a

⁴⁰ This figure also includes protests which involved the MST in conjunction with other movements in addition to those solely carried out by the MST. The CPT only began recording which movement participated in a protest in 2000.

Figure 6.1: Land protests in São Paulo and Pará, 2000-2005




Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra

centrally organised movement, it may be assumed that protest activities conducted by the MST in different states will be broadly comparable.

Figure 6.1 depicts the presence of the movement in each state. As shown, over this 6-year period there were 223 land protests in São Paulo (almost 11% of all the protest events in Brazil), compared to 152 in Pará (just over 7% of all events). In São Paulo, 73% of protests were carried out by the MST, compared with just under 18% in Pará. This can be accounted for by the fact that the MST has a much larger presence in the south of the country, which is where it was founded. In contrast, the MST did not consolidate a presence in Pará until the mid-1990s and due to the high level of conflicts between squatters and landowners in the state it has had to compete with many other local social movements who also engage in similar acts of land occupation to agitate for agrarian reform.

Figure 6.2: Harsh repression in Pará and São Paulo, 1997-2005




Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra

The data for repression have a slightly longer time period (1997-2005). For the full 9-year time period used in the analysis in Chapter 4, Pará accounts for just 6% of protest but 37% of all murders during this period. In contrast, São Paulo accounts for just 2% of all murders.

As shown in Figure 6.2, Pará accounts for just over 19% of all acts of torture, while São Paulo accounts for just over 1%. ‘Attempted murders’ is the only measure of harsh repression for which these states are similar, with Pará accounting for just over 16% and São Paulo, 14%.

Figure 6.3 shows that Pará accounts for about 16 % of all physical beatings and just under 17% of all arrests, whereas São Paulo accounts for 1.5% and 11.6%, respectively. Pará has a much higher arrest rate, with almost two arrests for every

Figure 6.3: Mild repression in São Paulo and Pará, 1997-2005



Source: Comissão Pastoral da Terra

protest (554 arrests of land protesters at 229 protest events). In São Paulo, there was only about one arrest per protest (379 arrests at 369 protest events). Pará also accounts for 16% of all physical beatings of protesters, compared to just 1.5% for São Paulo.

In this 9-year period, just over 6% of all land protest events took place in Pará, compared to almost 10% in São Paulo. Despite this, as these figures show, Pará accounts for a disproportionately large share of the repressive acts recorded during this period. Its large fixed effect cannot therefore simply be attributed to a higher level of protest activities in this state. The CPT data indicate that protesting for land reform in Pará is much more likely to result in repression, especially extreme forms of repression, such as murder. Possible contextual factors that might account for why Pará is such an extreme case will be discussed in Section 6.4. First, São Paulo is

considered in depth, as an average case, to see how closely events described on the ground adhere to the overall relationships presented in Chapter 4.

6.3 São Paulo as an illustrative case

As explained previously, São Paulo has a small fixed effect, meaning that it is close in size to the average for the sample of all 27 states in Brazil. This makes it an ideal case to use to check whether some of the assumptions behind the analysis in Chapter 4 are valid. The association between the share of the governor's party and the level of repression was interpreted as evidence that governors' decisions to repress protest are influenced by the likelihood of experiencing governability problems after repression takes place. This interpretation is based on the assumption that governors have the power to alter the level of repression used against protesters by the police. The following interview evidence, suggests that in the average case of São Paulo, this does appear to be the case. However, it will be shown that the way in which the governor influences the level of repression is not as straightforward as simply ordering its use (as is assumed in the original theoretical framework).

When asked how much influence they thought that the governor of São Paulo had over the military police (and the violence perpetrated by the military police against members of the MST), nearly all of the interviewees agreed that the governor exerted a significant amount of control over the police. However, the picture that emerged of the governor's influence over the use of police repression was more nuanced than the simple relationship presented in Chapter 4. The military police in São Paulo was described as an inherently violent institution that had failed to adequately reform practices established during Brazil's military dictatorship and whose members would always be inclined to respond to land protests with excessive force. The governor's

influence over repression did not therefore manifest itself by his/her ordering of the use of repression, but by how he/she wished to reign in the inherently repressive tendencies of the police or exploit and encourage these repressive tendencies for political purposes.

The following extract from an April 2010 interview with ‘Carlão’ and ‘Max’, two advisors (in the area of agrarian reform) to the PT in the Legislative Assembly of São Paulo, illustrate this view of the way in which the governor influences the use of police repression:

Max: In all these actions when there is a social movement acting and police intervention is necessary... [it is] the governor ultimately who decides and gives orders... [so] whether the confrontation will be violent depend on higher orders ... but the police’s predisposition is always to beat... them... they have this predisposition... because they learn it when [they are] training to become police... it is unfortunately a police culture which comes from the time of the dictatorship... they learn to see the people as an enemy, so how one would treat an enemy? With violence, isn’t that the case? And this unfortunately, this [is the] training we have in our ostensibly preventative police, which is the military police... then, when they go to confront organised social movements, they go with this predisposition... but they depend on a higher order.... The governor has a relative influence because the culture and background of the military police which is something that needs to be changed with time. When there was a secretary [for public security] with this concern the conflicts were smaller... but we do not see any continuity on this transformation of the police, currently there is a tendency to be the police to be intransigent once again... Yeah, the police are more or less violent according to the will of the government.

According to the will of the government, if the government wants a cop that uses less violence [then] it will change the education and training of the police. The government determines, and can change, whether or not there will be any punishment [for the use of excessive violence by the police]. But if the government is not worried about it [then], he [the governor] crosses his arms and lets the police work as it wishes, that is what is happening now... The police acts the way it wants, the government will not interfere and lets the police work, no matter whether it is violent, no matter if it is killing people on the street, and the government does not do anything to stop it. This is currently the case, the police are freely doing a lot of insanity and the governor is watching it all happen with his arms tied up and he does nothing. This is what is happening today in São Paulo.

Another interview the same month with Mauro Achilles, an advisor to state deputy Pedro Tobias of the PSDB, reiterated the view that as an organisation the

military police has a long-standing culture of violence and that the control that governors in the state of São Paulo have over the use of violence has been through initiatives to punish the use of violence by the police:

The police do not have 'autonomy', but [the organisation] has much '*esprit de corps*.' It is very corporate. In fact, the colonels who command the police are trained people, but the '*Tropa de choque*' [elite police squad] in itself, the *Tropa* is better at achieving this ideal. So, there is a huge [amount of] oversight over the police. There are a huge amount of police officers who are fired; police officers [who are] are arrested... The state of São Paulo, and I am just talking about the state of São Paulo. In the state of São Paulo control is sought, but the civil police in São Paulo is very corrupt... and the military police is fascist in nature... [The] Police in São Paulo, compared with other states, is more controlled. It's more under the control of the government. But even in this case, it is independent.

Juvelino Stronzake, a lawyer who worked in the human rights division of the MST's central offices, also believed that a governor's decision regarding whether to attempt to reduce police violence was largely a function of political factors:

It is true that the governors, if they wished, could fundamentally alter the behaviour of military police. But this work is long term and difficult to do... And the governors of the State of São Paulo, all [the ones] who went on to run for president, they never had any interest in changing that behaviour.

The recent history of the relationship between the governors and the police in São Paulo appears to reflect this view. Caldeira (2000) collated various sources to arrive at an estimate of the annual number of murders committed by the police in the state of São Paulo from 1981 to 1992, a period that includes the years 1981-1984 before Brazil had completed its transition from a military dictatorship to an electoral democracy. Her data show that in 1991 and 1992 there was a significant increase in civilian deaths attributed to the police (1,140 in 1991 and 1,470 in 1992, compared to 585 in 1990), with a sharp reduction (to 409) in 1993. She argues that these variations can be understood when they are considered in the context of the diverging public

security policies of the governors who held office during this period (Caldeira, 2000, pp. 162-164).

Democratisation at the sub-national level in Brazil was established before the federal level, with the first elections for governors since the establishment of military rule being held at the end of 1982. The first governor to be elected in São Paulo since military rule, André Franco Montoro, assumed office in 1983. Montoro was a well-known critic of the military regime who, according to Caldeira (2000), ‘took seriously the task of building a rule of law and a democratic government, and in his view this task included controlling the police’ (Caldeira, 2000, p. 165). Montoro’s administration sought to establish better oversight of the police through the establishment of more effective punishment for human rights abuses and greater control over the use of weapons by the military police (Caldeira, 2000, p. 167). Although the level of violent acts committed by police remained high, Caldeira (2000) observes that under Montoro ‘the number of policemen punished increased, and the number of people killed by the police decreased’ (Caldeira, 2000, p. 167). Her data show a 32% decrease in civilian deaths in 1986.

In contrast, the two governors who followed Montoro – Orestes Quércia (in office from 1987-1990) and Luís Antonio Fleury (1991-1995) – favoured a “tough” policy on law and order. Reversing the trend established under Montoro, there was an increase in deaths caused by the police under Quércia and a particularly rapid escalation in the first two years of Fleury’s term as governor (Caldeira, 2000, p. 164). Caldeira argues that the massacre of 111 prisoners in São Paulo’s main prison on 2 October 1992 ‘symbolised the culmination of Fleury and Pedro de Campos’s [Fleury’s secretary for public security] policy of tolerating police abuses’ (Caldeira, 2000, pp. 175-176). It was only in the wake of mass press coverage and a fear of a

backlash in public opinion that Fleury had to ‘change his policy of tolerating police violence’ (Caldeira, 2000, p. 179). To do this, he replaced his secretary for public security with Michel Temer, who had previously held the post in Montoro’s administration. Caldeira’s data show that this change in policy had an almost immediate effect, with a sharp reduction in deaths caused by the police in 1993 (to 409 from a high of 1,470 in 1992). According to Caldeira, the administration that followed under Mario Covas (in office from 1995-2001) was also committed to curbing excessive violence by the police. This was reflected by further reductions in civilian deaths caused by police from 1995 onwards according to her data (Caldeira, 2000, p. 179).

Overall, the interview evidence appears consistent with the idea that the extent of police repression used against land protesters in the state of São Paulo is influenced by the governor. As commanders of an inherently violent institution, it seems that governors have the option to leave the police to their own devices or to attempt to curb police violence.

The most important finding in Chapter 4 was the significant positive association between the share of seats held by a governor’s own party in the state assembly and the level of repression used against land protesters. Over the period covered by the analysis in Chapter 4, the average share of the seats held by the São Paulo governor’s party was 20.3%, which is very close to the average share for the whole sample (20.98%). This share of seats has also been fairly stable from electoral cycle to electoral cycle, ranging from 18.1% to 22.3% during the sample period. In contrast, the governor’s share of seats in Pará ranged from 4.9% to 19.5% over this time.⁴¹ According to the theory in Chapter 2, the consistently larger share of seats controlled

⁴¹ For the gubernatorial term during which the interviews this chapter took place (2006-2010), the shares of seats were 25.5% in São Paulo and 14.6% in Pará.

by São Paulo's governor should allow him or her greater freedom to repress protesters, in order to prevent agrarian reform. Given the relative magnitudes of the estimated state fixed effects in Chapter 4, this does not appear to explain the persistent differences in repression levels between the two states.

For simplicity's sake, the model in Chapter 2 assumes that governors will always want to repress to prevent reform and will be deterred from repression by electoral and governability costs. Chapter 4 did, however, include dummy variables for the governors' party to control for the effect of different ideological inclinations towards the use of repression. Yet, in São Paulo over the period studied all of the governors were from the same party – the PSDB – and the share of seats held by this party was reasonably stable between elections. Since potential governability costs and party ideology are held constant, it is possible to identify other factors that were not included in the statistical model but may explain changes in repression over time within the state.

The interview evidence presented here suggests that the preferences of individual governors in São Paulo have influenced the amount of repression used by the police against land protesters in this state. As a result, levels of repression may change from election cycle to election cycle, even when the party affiliation of the governor does not change. It would be difficult to measure each governor's attitude towards repression – and we would normally expect party dummies to capture this effect. However, in Brazil, politicians' party loyalties are notoriously weak and it has one of the highest global rates of party switching in its national legislature (Desposato, 2006). It is therefore likely that this particular effect would not be found in other contexts.

6.4 The media and repression in São Paulo

Given that land protests in São Paulo are much more likely to be reported on than in other states (as shown in Chapter 5), one would expect that this would have a large negative effect on the level of police violence used against land protesters. The responses from the São Paulo interviewees provided some insight into why the high level of media coverage of land protests in the state does not act as a deterrent to repression. In the previous chapter, it was assumed that the level of media independence in a state, would affect the rate at which protests were reported. Therefore, a greater coverage of land protests should reduce repression because the media would act as an additional agent of accountability, informing the public of any human rights violations that took place. The responses from the interviews however, suggest that a lack of media independence does not affect the probability of protests being reported on but does affect the *way* in which they are reported. The media in São Paulo was repeatedly described as lacking sufficient political independence and, as a consequence, being extremely biased against land protests. It was implied that the biased media coverage of occupations by the MST puts pressure on the governor to respond to these protests with repression. Consequently, rather than acting as an extra instrument of oversight, the media actively encourages government repression by covering land conflicts in a way that ensures the public will not oppose the violence and may even support it.

Carlão: The media in Brazil and mainly in the state of Sao Paulo clearly represents the interests of agribusiness and large estates. It is unabashed opponent of [the] social movements that seek to change the agrarian structure. There is a belief within the media that there is no need for land reform and the development [goals] of Brazil should be in order to supply the world through large-scale production, with this model of agriculture that we know through extensive use of pesticides and exploitation of the labour force.

The media has a clearly defined position in Brazil. The consequence is always negative. The most recent example is the occupation of an orange farm there

[in the] interior of São Paulo, in which the movement, after occupying the same farm several times with no results, resorted to a tactic of pulling off oranges, destruction of [the] production of oranges. Well, it's clear that this occupation had a great impact because they [the Media] took advantage of the fact that it involved the destruction of part of the production on the farm by the movement, to show that the occupation has no defined goals, they want to destroy existing things, to destroy machines and such. Nobody explained why they were doing this, the cause or the reasons behind the occupation and why they took that attitude. There is no such reflection by the media.

In reality, [that area] is public land from the federal government, which had already been recognized as such by the Court; INCRA even issued a possession document, but then they reversed the ruling and it is still being processed in court. And a defined legal position has not been established yet due to the sheer economic power of the group (...), we are unable to make a legal demand there and it could continue for years without a solution...

The media certainly press the government to act more quickly and to act in accordance with its the objectives.

Max: And often it [the media] demands that the government beat people.

Juvelino Stronzake said he believed that the media in São Paulo selectively reports facts about the MST's protest events and deliberately omits any mention of police violence:

I do not know if one can measure the effect of public opinion about the violence against the MST, against the farmers. But the press does not give much attention to the violence of the military police against [landless] farmers. The focal point of the press coverage is on the action of the [landless] farmers in land occupations. So the violence of the military police against [landless] farmers is not emphasised. There is very little disclosure of such violence.

The occupations have declined somewhat on the past years and so this has also greatly diminished the violence of the military police. But when it has happened, in recent years, the press does not turn the violence into news. In the interior of São Paulo, several times when the military police undertook evictions and they used too much violence, with dogs, tear gas, arrests of militants, but these facts did not become news right? The press never reported this violence. There is an understanding within the press that when the acts of violence are communicated to their towns' residents, the movement ends up being a victim. And society as a whole, it is very welcoming, it has a great identification of sympathy with the victim. So the press do not disclose violence, [to] avoiding turning movements and the MST into victims. When social movements are victims, they have greater support from society. [So] the press is always careful to not disclose such violence.

It should be acknowledged that these descriptions are inherently subjective; nonetheless, they are consistent with the findings of Hammond (2004), who used content analysis to study the way in which the media reported on the MST. His study looked at daily editions of two São Paulo based national newspapers (*Folha de São Paulo* and *Estado de São Paulo*) between 1997 and 2001 in order to identify the most common “frames” used by the Brazilian press to characterise the movement and its objectives. His study identified five main frames: four of which were sympathetic and one which was unsympathetic. Hammond termed the unsympathetic frame a “demonisation frame”:

‘ “Demonization.” The final frame presents the MST as a lawbreaker and provoker of violence that prevents authorities from peacefully carrying out their responsibility to provide land for the landless. The movement is, by definition, lawless. It does not “occupy” land; it “invades” land’. (Hammond, 2004, p. 79)

According to Hammond, this frame appeared most frequently in the two São Paulo newspapers, ‘probably accounting for more newspaper reports than the other four combined’ (Hammond, 2004, p. 89). On balance, Hammond’s account seems to offer a plausible explanation as to why greater media coverage of land protest in São Paulo does not seem to reduce the level of repression against land protesters in this state. If, as suggested, the print media in São Paulo deliberately omit details of police violence against land protesters, then the net effect on public opinion would be the same as if the protests had not been reported on at all. This type of reporting would serve to further reduce accountability rather than enhance it.

The chapter will now move on to consider possible explanations for another area left unexplained by the previous chapters, the exceptionally high level of state-specific repression against land protesters in the northern state of Pará.

6.5 Explaining Pará, a case of extreme repression

Pará was chosen as a second case study as it was found to have a large positive fixed effect in the estimated repression models in Chapter 4. The purpose of looking at this case “on the ground”, therefore, was to try to identify some plausible reasons that might explain why the state experienced a persistently high level of repression of land protesters, unexplained by the cyclical political factors included in the statistical model in Chapter 4. Interviews were conducted in late May and early June 2010 and took place in two locations in Pará. Interviews with members of the MST, CPT and with a regional director for INCRA were carried out in Marabá, a town that is a locus of many violent land conflicts in the state. Interviews were also carried out with two state deputies in Belém, the state capital.

In the interviews conducted in Pará, as in São Paulo, the military police were also described as having an inherent proclivity to respond to land protesters with repression. However, in contrast to São Paulo the military police were seen as being largely unaccountable to the state government. Although ultimate responsibility for police violence lies with the governor of Pará, in contrast to São Paulo there appears to have been a lack of initiatives from the state government that aim to control the police. This fact is elucidated in following quote by José Batista Afonso, a lawyer working for the CPT in Marabá:

The Government, the governor, according to the Brazilian Constitution, they are the head of the state police, [which means that] they are responsible for commanding the police. So [in the case of] any illegal act that is committed by the police, the responsibility also indirectly rests with the governor.

So [given that they are legally] responsible, they should have to have a better plan [to address] the actions of the police, considering that we are in a state where the level of corruption within the police is enormous. This is a Brazilian reality, but here in the state of Pará [it] is worse than in the other states of Brazil. So there is a need for better planning, a better equipped [police force], and better training for the police, naming commanders, [who are] shall we say, more disciplined, less violent, and a clear policy on public safety, respect for

social movements, human rights; but this unfortunately we cannot see [at the present moment].

So [when] considering the violent acts [of the] police, we have to understand that it is also [a result of the] irresponsibility of the state government, because as the commander of the police it [the government] should therefore have a firmer, tougher [policy] in regards to the control of police activities.

Chapter 4 showed that being in an election year had a weak negative effect on mild forms of repression. This is consistent with a situation in which governors actively try to rein in repressive acts by the military police against land protesters for fear of possible negative electoral consequences. In Pará, however, it would seem that governors lack the power to reduce police violence as an election approaches, as these quotes show:

José Batista: In an election year, no one wants to create a situation that can generate damage in polls or political losses. So those most conflictive situations, they are [ideally] put to one side until after the elections. And this is an orientation from government to its subordinates, and to police itself. To the police itself, it does not matter very much. They are concerned about evicting, arresting, beating worker at any time before or after the elections, but they should be subordinate to the head [of the government] and the head in this case is the governor.

‘Tim Maia’ (pseudonym) a local MST leader in Marabá: I think that ... this is exactly like they say: "We are here with a mandate to take [you] off [the land], we'll take it [your production] out. You've got to go. We are here fulfilling an order". There is nothing to talk about. The guys all armed... they come to take [the movement off the land], [they] are here to fulfil orders. They do it anyway, be it or not an election year.

The impression that governors in Pará lack the ability to hold the military police to account is further reinforced by the fact that most interviewees said that there had not been any noticeable decline in the level of repression after a governor from the PT, Ana Júlia Carepa, was elected in 2006. The PT has strong historic links with the MST and, as Vergara-Camus (2009) notes, the MST has even fielded candidates for the PT in elections in some southern states. Given this affinity, one might therefore expect that the election of a PT governor would result in a significant reduction in

repression against the MST and other landless movements. However, José Batista Afonso, who has observed land conflicts in and around Marabá, suggested that there were significant long-standing political barriers in Pará that limited the ability of any governor to reduce police violence against land protesters in the state:

No, it [having a governor from the PT] has not decreased the rate of violence. This has not happened under the current governor, there was no significant or qualitative change which could lead to the reduction of the conflicts in the field and faster resolution of conflicts. [The] current policy does not differ much from [that of] previous governments. The policy still being used is to suppress the action of social movements. The police commanders often have great difficulty in establishing a dialogue with social movements, and [this] social problem is [still] being seen as a police matter, not as a social problem that must be resolved by public policy. But unfortunately the conception held by the state [authorities] in the area of public security, is that the social problem [of land occupations] is also a police problem, to be resolved by police action.

And we [the CPT] have noticed that many situations of conflict here in the region should be resolved in another way, and [dealt with by] the responsible bodies, like the Instituto de Terras do Pará (INTERPA), INCRA – the federal body that takes care of this question of land reform, the Ombudsman of the state of Pará, and other [institutional] organs related to this issue, [who] should be more capable action, but unfortunately these organs are scrapped, they have [too] few resources to be able to go ahead with these activities and also it ends up just not being a priority because the government does not [wish to] have a policy to stir [up] the question of land concentration. There is no interest in making land reform, to intervene in the concentration of land, democratise access to land.

The government does not want to disturb the rural sector because these people have a strong economic power, funding election campaigns, and also many people on the rural sector are deputies who will also align with the government to approve projects [which are of] interest of the government.

These political relationships make it unviable to have more serious policies to combat violence on the field and the implementation of agrarian reform.

This was a view shared by PSDB state deputy, José Megale, who believed that the excess violence used by the military police against agrarian movements had not been affected by the change in government:

No, I do not see a big difference [since 2007]. I think the failures occurred in the past and occur in [the] present. I think that here, in Pará, we did not

manage to establish normality in dealing with repossession, with the way the Military Police treats [people]. Moreover, [considering] the issue of the military police in the state, I think [there] is a deficiency in every respect. Our police have very big inadequacies and this includes their treatment of social movements linked to land [issues].

Perhaps more importantly, MST members who had participated in occupations during this period themselves perceived no reduction in state violence. A local MST leader who used the pseudonym “Tim Maia” was interviewed at an encampment near Marabá. He felt that while there was rhetoric from the then-governor Ana Júlia Carepa about reducing violence from the military police against landless movements, the reality experienced by land protesters on the ground was much the same as it was before her period in office:

The governor says that in her period of governance there will be no violent evictions but planned acts, [she says] a lot of things. But this is just theory, in reality this does not happen, does it?... [The situation has] not improved. Right now [the state] is experiencing a round of evictions. In an area here in Marabá, 170 km [away] the police, violently took away the production the movement had there... Now at the moment, she does not want the Rural Union to look around and say that she is not complying with the mandates [for repossession], right? It’s an election year here, so she wants to engage in brokerage, and they [evictions] are happening. [So] the [police] troops in this region, if they can perform a lot of evictions, then they will.

A different view was presented when Bernadete Ten Caten, a state deputy for the PT and former superintendent for INCRA in Marabá, was asked if there had been a reduction in violent acts during Ana Júlia Carepa’s term in office:

We do not have doubts about that. And [I am not saying it] because I am a deputy of the allied base of the governor. Although I am from the same party as the governor, this is not the reason why I say this. There are still violent behaviours, such as torture within the police, especially in situations of jails and in the prison system, and also sporadically in some situations where the police should represent security. The police still instils fear on the population. There is not a balanced situation where a policeman in fact carries out his [designated] role - protecting society, arresting criminals. But it needs to be done lawfully. We had a positive evolution, there is no doubt. And this, in my understanding, happened thanks to the government of the state [under Ana

Júlia] who has been promoting various skills and qualifications within the organisation [of the police].

Rosinete Lima Da Silva, the regional coordinator for INCRA in the South of Pará also believed that there had been a modest improvement in the incidence of violent repression against rural protesters under the PT government, but that impunity for the perpetrators of repression still remained a significant problem:

The state government today is a different, for example, from the previous government; because [then] the police killed over 19 landless as happened in just one circumstance in the massacre of Eldorado do Carajás. The [current] governor went there and built the best school, a model school. Summarising, we had the previous government and [then] this government. This government, I believe it is more on the side of the worker, politically. Of course, we have got to enforce the law,... Moreover, [address] the impunity that is still very strong in the state. Recently a [rural] unionist, Alcântara was murdered. Until today, nobody could reach the perpetrators. Impunity is still very large...but it has improved a lot during the current government.

How can these two contradictory accounts of the PT's period in office be reconciled? It could be an indication that the administration's reforms were not translated into any observable reduction of violence against MST protesters on the ground (as perceived by MST activists themselves, the CPT field agents observing evictions or members of other political parties) and were purely cosmetic and ineffective. Another possibility is that even if there was a small reduction in the level of repression against land protesters during Ana Júlia's period in office, the overall effect would be scarcely visible, given the already high level of violence in the state. Looking at the more recent CPT data, the latter appears to be the case. For 2006-2010, there was an overall reduction in the level of violence, compared to the 2003-06 administration. However, for some of the most severe types of violence, the PT-led government failed to restore violence to the levels they were at when the previous governor took office. Even where there was a reduction below the level of *both*

previous administrations, as was the case for physical beatings and arrests, the numbers remained high.

Overall, the account given in most of the interviews seems to suggest that, even under a governor who might wish to substantially reduce violence (either carried out by the police or in which the police were complicit), the police in Pará have remained largely unaccountable to the state government and the level of violence against land protesters in the state has not decreased significantly.

The next section considers some possible contextual reasons that may explain why the governor of Pará would have greater difficulty in exercising authority over the military police than the governor of São Paulo, in particular, the lack of “state capacity” in terms of the accountability of the police to the state governor and the particular conditions for coalition building in the state assembly.

6.6 Problems of oversight of the military police in Pará


Differences in the murder rates in Pará and São Paulo could be a possible contextual factor that explains the high level of repression in Pará. Previous research has found that higher murder rates are associated with greater use of violence by police in the same area (Terrill and Reisig 2003). However, the state-by-state data on murder rates compiled by the “Mapa da Violencia” Project suggests that this cannot account for Pará’s high state fixed effect, as during the time period spanned by the analysis in Chapter 4, the murder rates per 100,000 people in the two states were quite similar.⁴² The average annual murder rate for the interior of Pará for 2000-2005 was 16.3, whereas it was 16.75 for São Paulo. However, after 2005, the murder rates began to diverge markedly, so that by the electoral term of 2007-2010, when the

⁴² Data were available at: http://www.mapadaviolencia.org.br/pdf2012/mapa2012_ro.pdf.

interviews for this chapter took place, the average annual homicide rate for Pará was 31.9, compared to 11 in São Paulo.

One other factor that might account for the apparent difference in the capacity of the governor to exercise oversight over the police in Pará compared to São Paulo is the money available to each state government to spend on policing.


Figure 6.4: Police expenditure as proportion of total government spending in R\$, 2008



Source: Official press office of the government of the state of São Paulo (http://www.imprensaoficial.com.br/PortalIO/Home_1_0.aspx#25/04/2011) and government of state of Pará, Ministry of Finance, Board of Accounting and Fiscal Management 2008.

As shown in Figure 6.4, in 2008, São Paulo spent 7.6% of its total outgoings on policing and Pará spent around 6%. At first glance, this would seem to indicate a similar level of police “effectiveness” in the two states. However, Pará’s budget is less than a tenth of São Paulo’s, even though its population is around a fifth. When police expenditures are expressed in terms of reais per capita (as depicted in Figure 6.5), it is evident that Pará spent 40% less than São Paulo (R\$81 per capita in Pará, compared

Figure 6.5: Per capita spending on policing in Pará and São Paulo, 2008



Source: Official press office of the government of the state of São Paulo (http://www.imprensaoficial.com.br/PortallIO/Home_1_0.aspx#25/04/2011) government of state of Pará, Ministry of Finance, Board of Accounting and Fiscal Management 2008.

to R\$211 in São Paulo). A substantial difference remains, even when the relatively lower cost of living in Pará is taken into account. According to data from the *Consumer Expenditure Survey 2008-2009*, published by IBGE, the cost of living in Pará is 60% of that in São Paulo.⁴³ However, according to the spending data obtained

⁴³ Source: IBGE, *Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Trabalho e Rendimento, Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares*, 2008-2009.

from both state governments, the amount spent per capita on policing in Pará is only 40% of that in São Paulo.

Pará's lower per capita police expenditure presumably means either that it has fewer police per capita or that police officers there tend to be paid less than their São Paulo counterparts. Either possibility has a negative implication for the state government's ability to hold the police to account. Low pay would make the police in Pará more vulnerable to corruption than in São Paulo. If there are fewer police, then each member of the police is likely to be responsible to a larger geographical area, meaning that individual police officers are more likely to be isolated and responsible for patrolling areas by themselves, with no supervision and/or witnesses to their actions (Weisheit *et al.*, 1994). Patrolling with few or no colleagues is likely to raise the likelihood of corruption, as it reduces the likelihood of corruption being detected. These issues are likely to be compounded by the fact that Pará also has a much lower population density than São Paulo (5.7 people per square kilometre, compared to 160.4). Since it is harder to police more sparsely populated areas, this means that the government of Pará would have to spend a larger amount per capita on policing in order to have the same effective level of policing as São Paulo.

An examination of the recent history of Pará provides additional evidence that there are many sections of society who have a vested interest in paying police to brutalise landless protesters. The origin of the high level of violence in the state can be found in the conflicting policies for development of the Amazon region that were pursued during the military regime of 1964-1985, when at the same time a dysfunctional property rights regime was in existence. According to Schmink and Wood (1992), during the earlier part of the dictatorship the government sought to pursue a policy of colonisation based on small landholdings in the state of Pará. This

initial policy was motivated by a desire to protect Brazil's borders and as a way to diffuse agrarian conflicts in the north-east of the country without engaging in genuine agrarian reform in this region (Schmink and Wood, 1992, pp. 69-70). This policy triggered a massive influx of migration into the state. After 1974, there was a 'shift in development priorities' (Schmink and Wood, 1992, p. 78), whereby large subsidies were offered for the establishment of capital intensive agricultural projects such as cattle ranching, however this change in policy did not halt the migration of peasants from other parts of Brazil hoping to gain access to land. Foweraker (1981) notes that both the state and federal governments indiscriminately issued legal titles to land in Pará and it was not uncommon for more than one party to possess a title to the same area. It was also not unusual for land speculators to bribe public officials to assist in forging titles to make them appear older (Foweraker, 1981, pp. 109-111).

The confusion over land titles in Pará has implications for the response of other land users to occupations by social movements such as the MST in the state. When the legitimacy of a farm owner's original title to a given plot of land is more likely to be in question, he/she has a much stronger incentive to evict an occupying social movement before the dispute is referred to INCRA for an assessment of the farm's eligibility for expropriation. Since the police are poorly funded, they are likely to prove relatively receptive to bribes from landowners to perform the evictions. In effect, the supply of corrupt police in Pará is likely to meet the high demand created by the insecurity of property rights in the state. Until recently, it was common for off-duty members of the police in Pará to work as hired gunmen, paid by landowners to evict members of social movements such as the MST. Although this practice has declined in recent years, police bribery still contributes to repression by promoting collusion between hired gunmen and the police, as José Batista explained:

Look, until recently, the police and gunman were difficult to separate. Because police generally, or the gunmen, usually, were the police themselves. Most of them. It was common for farmers to go in the barracks to check which officers were off duty or on vacation to hire them to work as a gunman from his farm. Most crimes here in the region were committed by police officers acting as hit men.

Until a short time ago was very difficult to separate the gunman from police. Today, with the pressure [which is] very strong [from] national and international levels, the greater presence of the press, denouncing these cases, and human rights organisations, the participation of the police in such violent acts... decreased, and what stands out most [now] is the action taken by the gunman himself, who is a professional hired for that crime. But there is still participation, [in the form of] a collusion between gunmen and police here in the region, over the indiscriminate use of force.

In recounting the recent shooting of a fellow member of the MST on a farm occupied near Belém, the MST leader “Tim Maia” describes how, in practice, collusion between police and hired gunmen functions to maintain a high level of repression against the movement:

There have been reports of crimes committed, and there are a lot of open enquiries regarding the private security that exists on farms. On the farm Espirito Santo: they shot a member of ours, the bullet was stuck in his heart. Luckily he was taken in a hurry to Marabá, and from Marabá to Belém, then managed to survive. But he was ill, until now [and] the consequences are great. He has been operated on...

[Because of] armed security, to go out on your own is a problem. All [of them are] armed ... Because can I say...there is a ‘legal’ security, but within this security there is a group which is not legal, which enables it [the security firm] do its job...The owner of the security company in this case is a retired police officer. There have been a lot of investigations, but they have never led to a satisfactory result.

In addition to helping to ensure impunity for acts of repression undertaken by private militias, bribery of the police by local landowners can also increase the incentives for the police themselves to respond to protests by social movements with excessive force, once they are given the legal authority by the state government to intervene in a land protest. This means that there are incentives beyond the inherent institutional proclivity of the military police to respond to land protests with violence.

One example is the notorious incidence of violence against landless protesters in Pará in April 1996 in the town of Eldorado dos Carajás, when 19 members of the MST were shot and killed by the military police. These MST protesters were part of a group who had blocked the main transport link between Marabá and the region of Carajás, National Highway 150, as part of a protest to demand the expropriation of a local estate. It has been claimed that this occurred at the behest of the then-governor, Almir Gabriel, who allegedly ordered the military police “to clear the road at any cost” (Ondetti *et al.*, 2008, p. 271). However, Ondetti *et al.* (2008) argue that there is evidence to suggest that police corruption, rather than simply the governor’s authorisation to act, was the reason for the excessively violent response by the military police. They state that ‘an informant told investigators that police were paid by landowners to commit the massacre aimed at intimidating the MST’ (Ondetti *et al.*, 2008, p. 272). The authors observe that ‘despite the fact that this allegation is as yet still unproven it does not seem so absurd, considering the history of police violence and its long collusion with the interests of agrarian elite of Para’ (Ondetti *et al.*, 2008, p. 272).

The theoretical framework in Chapter 2 implicitly assumes that there is sufficient “state capacity”, that is, that the government has the ability to control the organs of the state, and in particular, the state’s coercive apparatus. The above account suggests however, that there are state-specific factors, namely the underfunding of the police and high incentives for landowners to fund repression due to disputed land titles, which mean that it may not be valid to assume that governors have a high capacity to control their coercive agents in Pará. Hence, a lack of state capacity may contribute to the high positive fixed effect in Pará. Moreover, this situation is consistent with previous research about the association between weak “state capacity” and human

rights violations. For example Englehart (2009), who builds on previous “principal agent” models that have been applied to explaining state abuses of human rights, which suggest that governments, as “principals” may opt to lose control over their “agents” (police or military) ‘in the expectation that they will likely commit abuses’. (Englehart, 2009, p. 165) He notes that it is equally plausible that governments could involuntarily lose control over their “agents” in a context where state capacity is weak and incentives to repress come from forces external to the government:

‘Such circumstances are sadly common: poorly paid state employees are weakly incentivized by their official salaries to follow the rules and often face little oversight. They may choose to use their power to commit abuses, either for profit or out of innate cruelty, and there are few disincentives to deter them. State officials may also be bribed by private parties to commit abuses or ignore them.’ (Englehart, 2009, p. 165)

Englehart then tests the relationship between state capacity and the severity of human rights abuses using a global dataset of 140 countries and finds that three proxies for state capacity are indeed consistent predictors of better human rights protection (fewer human rights abuses).⁴⁴ Based on the descriptions presented here, Pará would seem to conform to Englehart’s finding. In terms of what this means for the original theoretical framework, if, in Pará, private actors have a large degree of influence over whether the police use repression, then these actors (in this case landowners) stand to benefit from avoiding the policy change (*i.e.* land reform taking place) but they are not subject to any of the potential (electoral or governability) costs that an elected executive is.

⁴⁴ The three proxies for state capacity used by Englehart are: Political Risk Service’s (PRS) Law and Order measure, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and a country’s tax revenue as a proportion of its gross domestic product.

6.7 Coalition politics in Pará

Thus far, this chapter has suggested that despite the same formal powers, governors may have less control over the police in Pará in practice, than in São Paulo, on account of the relative lack of state capacity in Pará.

In addition to the violation of the state capacity assumption, it seems that another assumption did not hold during this period in Pará. The theoretical framework predicts that governors who have lower shares of seats in the legislature belonging to their own parties will face a greater risk of governability problem if they choose to repress, *i.e.* that the legislature would be less likely to co-operate with the governor, as a result of the governor using repression against protesters. The reverse appeared to be the case in Pará. Governors there tended to have a smaller share of seats relative to their São Paulo counterparts. However, it seems that governors who chose *not* to repress land protests were likely to face governability problems as a result. José Batista's account (see p. 128) alluded to political factors that would prevent the governor from reducing repression substantially. These are considered in more detail here.

While the PMDB has not won the governorship of Pará since 1989, it remains one of the largest parties in the state assembly in terms of its share of seats (usually the largest or second-largest party). The average share of seats in Pará belonging to the governor's party over the four electoral terms included in Chapter 4 (1995-1998, 1998-2002, 2003-2006 and 2007-2010) was 14.025%, compared to an average of 21.25% in São Paulo. In Pará, the average share of seats for the PMDB, who did not hold the governorship, was 20.725%. In every one of the elections except 2006, it obtained an equal or greater number of seats than the governor's party. Even in 2006,

when the PMDB's share fell to 12.2%, the governor Ana Júlia Carepa's PT had only 14.6% of seats and the support of the PMDB was necessary in order for her to be able to govern effectively without the support of the main opposition candidate's party, the PSDB.

Due to its consistently large share of seats, the PMDB was therefore a crucial coalition partner for PSDB governors from 1995-2006 and the PT governor, Ana Júlia Carepa from 2007-2010. The regional head of the PMDB in Pará at the time of the PT government of 2007-10 (and at present) is former governor Jader Barbalho,⁴⁵ currently a senator for the state and himself a landowner who has had his properties in the state occupied by the MST.⁴⁶ The PT only had 6 seats in the state assembly from 2007-10, which meant that Carepa was reliant on a coalition of many parties (of which the PMDB and also the right of centre PFL/DEM were the largest). Towards the end of the last year of her electoral term, both these parties left the coalition and she then had a minority coalition in the assembly.⁴⁷ Hence, the governor's reliance on a party with ties to landowners in forming a governing coalition in the assembly may well explain why her government was not able to significantly reduce violence against landless movements. This suggests that, in addition to weak state capacity, the consistently high seat share of the PMDB in Pará may contribute to the large positive fixed effect for Pará.

The particular context of coalition formation in the state assembly of Pará does, nevertheless, demonstrate how in a democratic context, the executive's cost-benefit analysis about whether or not to repress may be influenced by concerns about

⁴⁵ See <http://pmdb.org.br/institucional/diretorios/>.

⁴⁶ Luís Indriunas, "MST invade fazenda de Jader Barbalho no Pará", *Folha de São Paulo*, 01/05/2001 (<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u19207.shtml>).

⁴⁷ Ronaldo Brasiliense, "Ana Júlia perdeu maioria na Assembléia Legislativa", *O Paranaense* online news blog, 07/06/2010 (<http://www.oparaense.com.br>), accessed 20/06/2012.

governability, *i.e.* possible retaliation by the legislative branch. However, in this case it appears that when a governor lacks sufficient support in the legislature, he or she may face governability costs if he or she abstains from repression.

6.8 Conclusion

The evidence from Pará and São Paulo has provided an insight into the mechanisms on the ground that are reflected in the statistical results in Chapters 4 and 5. São Paulo was chosen as it had a small estimated fixed effect in the repression model of Chapter 4, meaning that the proportion of repression of land protesters explained by state-specific fixed effects, as opposed to the political variables, was close to the national average. In addition, according to the data presented in Chapter 4, land protests in São Paulo are more likely to be reported than anywhere else. Given that São Paulo did not have the large negative fixed effect that would be expected if increased media coverage reduced repression, the in-depth analysis also provided an opportunity to investigate why media coverage of protest events in Brazil does not seem to have the same deterrent effect on repression that it appears to have in mature democracies.

Pará, on the other hand, was chosen because of its lack of fit with the statistical model of Chapter 4. In this case, there was a high level of state-specific repression left unexplained by the political variables used in Chapter 5. Looking at Pará in detail allowed for the identification of possible omitted variables influencing the use of state repression against protesters, which had not been considered in the previous chapters.

The picture given of events on the ground in São Paulo showed that the way in which a governor may influence the use of police repression is more complex than suggested by the results in Chapter 4. It was revealed that a governor does not

influence repression simply by ordering its use. Instead, the governor is placed in charge of a state security apparatus that has an institutional proclivity towards the excessive use of violence, resulting from institutional structures and practices developed during the military regime. In this context, a governor knows that the natural approach of the military police when responding to protesters will be one of excessive force. The options available to governors who may wish to increase or reduce repression of land protesters depending on the concern given to electoral/governability costs versus preventing land reform are therefore as follows: (1) to allow the police to respond to land protests as they wish in the knowledge that the police have a preference for the use of excessive force; or (2) to introduce measures that increase the likelihood of police who use excessive force against protesters being punished, as an attempt to curb the use of violence against land protesters.

The evidence from São Paulo also indicated that even when two governors belong to the same party, differences in their individual preferences for using repression can affect the level of repression used. However, this effect is likely to be specific to this context, as politicians' ideological ties to particular parties are notoriously weak in Brazil.

This chapter has also provided a plausible explanation for why the findings of Chapter 5 are inconclusive and do not bear out the findings of previous studies into the relationship between media coverage and repression. If media coverage of protest is to have a significant effect on reducing the use of state repression by protesters then the media needs to have achieved a sufficient degree of political independence first, which does not appear to be the case in São Paulo. In fact, the opposite appears to be the case, with heavily-politicised media organisations having helped to perpetuate the

use of repression against land protesters by selectively reporting details of protest events and neglecting to report incidences of police repression against land protesters.

The case of São Paulo demonstrated that when a governor has a stable and adequate share of seats in the assembly, he/she is able to increase or decrease the level of repression used by the police against land protesters according to his or her preferences. However, Pará demonstrated that perhaps the worst-case scenario of state repression in a democratic context is a situation where the executive lacks the ability to hold the police to account: one of weak “state capacity”. In such a situation, private agents may have a greater influence over the use of repression than politicians and, since they do not have to face the political costs that an elected leader does, they are more likely to desire repressive actions.

The context of coalition politics in Pará suggests that the assumption made in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 that opposition parties in the legislature will tend to punish repressive behaviour sanctioned by the executive may not be valid in every case. Instead, the ideology of the opposition parties is another factor that executives may need to take into account when deciding whether or not to repress.

The evidence from these two case studies points to the need to look at faults in accountability at all levels. Constraints on the governor do appear to be important but constraints on and oversight of the police as well as independence of the media also have roles in explaining why repression against protesters may continue to be used in a democratic context.

CHAPTER 7

Testing the sub-national findings at the cross-national level

7.1 Introduction

The in-depth comparison of São Paulo and Pará in the previous chapter uncovered a number of factors that may be missing from the original model, as expressed in equation 2.10 (p 36). However, an inherent problem with studies based on a small number of cases is that it is difficult to know how generalisable the findings are. Lieberman (2005) recommends that when adopting a “nested” research design, such as the design chosen for this thesis, where the case study portion of the research ‘suggests a new model’ then it is worth returning to the large-N (cross-national) level to test these new hypotheses, assuming suitable cross-national indicators are available (Lieberman, 2009, p. 449). The purpose of this final empirical chapter, therefore, is to test some of the additional hypotheses generated from Chapter 6 at the cross-national level, using the same dataset of 71 countries from the original large-N analysis in Chapter 2.

7.2 Data and hypotheses

The expected effect of media coverage on the costs of democratic executives who use repression, as expressed in equation 2.10, assumes the existence of a media that is both willing and able to report on acts of state repression against protesters. The interview evidence from São Paulo in Chapter 6, however, suggests that when the main media outlets lack political independence then this may neutralise the possible raised costs associated with media coverage, as news agencies will be unlikely to report acts of repression committed against protesters by police, when they do decide report on a given protest. This yields the following testable hypothesis.

H6: When media independence is low there will be a greater level of protest repression.

The discussion of Pará pointed to another assumption adopted by the theoretical framework (as expressed in equation 2.10) which may not always hold true: that the executive has ultimate authority over the security apparatus in his or her state. When this assumption is violated, however, it means that it may not make sense to focus purely on the decision making of the executive when trying to explain when state agents will use repression against protesters. The case of landowners in Pará suggested that when private actors are able to heavily influence the police's use repression, then repression against protesters will be higher, as these private agents stand to reap the gains from police repression by avoiding a policy change, but they will not be subject to the same political costs as a democratic executive (electoral or governability). This predicted effect of state capacity can be expressed as follows:

H 7: Where state capacity is weak, repression of protesters by state agents will be higher.

Lastly, Chapter 6 suggested that ideology may also influence repression. On p. 32 it is stated that the model adopts the simplifying assumption that all leaders place the same value on avoiding a policy change. However, the evidence from São Paulo indicated that some executives may have a stronger preference for "tougher" policing than others, that is, they place a higher value on preventing reform than the potential governability and electoral costs associated with using repression.

Similarly, equation 2.10 assumes that the opposition parties in the legislature will always seek to punish executives who use repression against protesters, yet the discussion of the role of coalition politics in the State Assembly of Pará suggested that when the opposition has a preference for tough policing then this could modify the potential governability costs and benefits. This means that when an executive lacks a majority and the largest opposition parties support the use of repression to prevent policy change, lower levels of legislative support will increase rather than decrease the likelihood of state repression against protesters.

The expected effect of ideology can therefore be summarised as:

H8: An ideological preference for using repression to prevent reform, within either the executive or main opposition parties, will increase the likelihood of protest repression.

The aim of the following analysis is to test whether these additional hypotheses derived from the nested case studies also hold at the global level, and whether they might also account for some of the differences observed between old and new democracies' use of repression against protest that was observed in Chapter 2. To do this, three cross-national measures that attempt to capture these factors were used to create alternative dichotomous groups of democracies. This makes it possible to see if these different dichotomies: low vs. high state capacity, low vs. high media freedom and centre/left vs. right executives, correspond to the original findings of Chapter 2 (where the number of demonstrations was interacted with the "old" vs. "new" democracy dummy variables). A close adherence to the original findings would allow us to infer with greater confidence that these factors may be additional characteristics that underpin the observed differences between "old" and "new" democracies. The cross-national measures that were used to create the new dichotomous dummy variables are described below.

State capacity

“State capacity” was defined earlier in Chapter 6 (p. 137) as ‘the ability of the government to control the organs of the state, and, in particular, the state’s coercive apparatus.’ The most appropriate cross-national measure that captures this concept is the “rule of law” indicator from the World Bank’s database of “Worldwide Governance Indicators”. This measure is defined in the Worldwide Governance Indicators codebook as follows:

‘Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.’

This is a composite measure based on a number of sources (8-10 depending on the year⁴⁸). The index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher scores indicating a better quality of “the rule of law”, as defined above. Each country’s average score on this rule of law index for the years available, 1996-2000, was calculated. The median value for these average scores was 0.418, with the lowest score for the sample of country years being -1.389 and the highest being 1.925. Countries at or above the median value were coded as 1 for the dummy variable “high rule of law” whereas countries below the median value were coded as 1 for the “low rule of law” dummy variable.

⁴⁸ One possible problem with this composite measure is that it includes the Cingranelli and Richards’ Physical Integrity index as one of the sources used to derive the composite “rule of law” measure. As stated on p. 14, this measure is positively correlated with the AIPTS and captures a lot of the same underlying variation. However, this only counts for 1/6 of the composite measure, at most, depending on the country and year, so is unlikely to cause substantial bias in the overall rule of law scores that were used to create the two groups of “high” and “low” rule of law. Lists of the composite measures used for each country can be found at: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports> .

Media independence

Media independence was measured using The Freedom House, Freedom of the Press Index. Although the “World Press Freedom Index” provides a similar perception based index of media freedom, scores for the World Press Freedom index only begin in 2002, the final year in the dataset used in Chapter 2. The Freedom House measure is therefore the most appropriate as it covers the whole sample period.

‘The *Freedom of the Press* index, is an annual survey of media independence in 197 countries and territories, is at the core of Freedom House's press freedom project...The index assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and internet freedom in every country in the world, analyzing the events of each calendar year. It provides numerical rankings and rates each country's media as "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free." Country narratives examine the legal environment for the media, political pressures that influence reporting, and economic factors that affect access to information.’

Freedom House rates countries as being only “partly free” if they score above 30 on this index and “not free” if they score above 60 (only 1 country in the sample fell into the latter category). The average media freedom score for the 10 year period was calculated and countries with an average score above 30 were coded as 1 for the “low press freedom” dummy variable, whereas countries with an average score below 30 were coded as 1 for the “high press freedom” dummy.

Ideology

There is no readily available cross-national indicator of opposition parties’ ideology, so it is not possible to test for the effect of opposition ideology using the original cross-national dataset. However, the World Bank Database of Political Institutions has a suitable cross-national measure of the ideology of a country’s executive for all the sample years, which is defined as follows⁴⁹:

⁴⁹ It should be noted that in the São Paulo case, these ideological differences were present despite all governors coming from the same party. It was also explained that this is likely to be specific to Brazil, on account of party

‘EXECRLC

Right (1); Left (3); Center (2); No information (0); No executive (NA)

Party orientation with respect to economic policy, coded based on the description of the party in the sources, using the following criteria:

Right: for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing.

Left: for parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing.

Center: for parties that are defined as centrist or when party position can best be described as centrist (e.g. party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context). Not described as centrist if competing factions “average out” to a centrist position (e.g. a party of “right-wing Muslims and Beijing-oriented Marxists”).

0: for all those cases which do not fit into the above-mentioned category (i.e. party’s platform does not focus on economic issues, or there are competing wings), or no information.’

To create the dummy variables for the ideology of the executive, the centre and left categories were combined into a single dummy variable and the right wing dummy was created by using the countries coded as 1 in the original measure. Country-year pairs coded as “0” by the EXECRLC measure were coded as missing. It should be noted that these dummy variables (centre/left executive and right executive) are different to the other dummy variables in that they may vary across country-year combinations, as a country may move from a centre or left-wing government to a right-wing one (or vice versa) during the 10-year sample period.

labels being notoriously weak. Measuring the ideology of the executive according to his or her party, as the World Bank does with this measure, should, however, work for most other democracies.

7.3 Results and discussion

Table 7.1 Between estimation of global sample comparing old vs. new interaction terms to alternative dichotomies

Variable	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
Old democracy × number of demonstrations	0.383***			
	(0.098)			
New democracy × number of demonstrations	0.501***			
	(0.103)			
High rule of law × number of demonstrations		0.295**		
		(0.120)		
Low rule of law × number of demonstrations		0.502***		
		(0.091)		
High press freedom × number of demonstrations			0.273**	
			(0.107)	
Low press freedom × number of demonstrations			0.535***	
			(0.090)	
Centre/left executive × number of demonstrations				0.167
				(0.182)
Right executive × number of demonstrations				0.675***
				(0.133)
Gini coefficient	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Civil war	1.789***	1.764***	1.771***	1.602***
	(0.196)	(0.190)	(0.186)	(0.236)
Linguistic	-0.584**	-0.519**	-0.518**	-0.665
	(0.252)	(0.253)	(0.246)	(0.290)
Ethnic	0.532*	0.443	0.493*	0.576
	(0.288)	(0.282)	(0.275)	(0.351)
Former British Colony	0.126	0.128	0.148	0.255
	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.174)
Log of GDP/capita	-0.166***	-0.154**	-0.149***	-0.187***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.051)
Log of population	0.058	0.060	0.052	0.115**
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.047)
R-squared	0.850	0.853	0.859	0.804
Number of observations	696	696	696	581

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Specification (iv) has fewer observations due to missing observations in the World Bank executive ideology data for the following country years: Armenia, 1995-2002; Bangladesh, 1993-2002; Bulgaria, 1993-1996; Central African Republic, 1993; Cyprus, 1993; Estonia, 2002; Ghana, 1993-2000; Guatemala 1993-1995; Lithuania, 1998-2002; Lesotho, 1993; Madagascar, 1994-1996 & 2002; Mongolia, 1994-2002.

Table 7.2. Within IV estimation of global sample comparing old vs. new interaction terms to alternative dichotomies

Variable	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
Old democracy × number of demonstrations	0.143 (0.225)			
New democracy × number of demonstrations	0.375* (0.216)			
High rule of law × number of demonstrations		0.249 (0.216)		
Low rule of law × number of demonstrations		-0.152 (0.230)		
High press freedom × number of demonstrations			0.180 (0.133)	
Low press freedom × number of demonstrations			-0.123 (0.247)	
Centre/left executive × number of demonstrations				-0.010 (0.066)
Right executive × number of demonstrations				0.076 (0.057)
Gini coefficient	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.010)
Civil war	0.839*** (0.165)	0.811*** (0.157)	0.798*** (0.155)	0.955*** (0.168)
Log of GDP/capita	-0.031 (0.609)	0.022 (0.720)	-0.186 (0.530)	-1.057** (0.426)
Log of population	-1.251 (1.259)	-1.658 (1.335)	-2.129** (1.044)	-3.109*** (0.975)
Time trend	0.040* (0.021)	0.031 (0.025)	0.040** (0.020)	0.069*** (0.018)
<i>R</i> -squared	0.739	0.768	0.7885	0.8239
Number of observations	694	694	694	585

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

In each model, demonstrations is instrumented for using its first three lags and the average number of demonstrations in neighbouring countries.

Specification (iv) has fewer observations due to missing observations in the World Bank executive ideology data for the following country years: Armenia, 1995-2002; Bangladesh, 1993-2002; Bulgaria, 1993-1996; Central African Republic, 1993; Cyprus, 1993; Estonia, 2002; Ghana, 1993-2000; Guatemala 1993-1995; Lithuania, 1998-2002; Lesotho, 1993; Madagascar, 1994-1996 & 2002; Mongolia, 1994-2002; Nicaragua 1993-1996 & 2002; Panama, 1995-1999; Papua New Guinea, 1998-1999; Slovakia, 1999-2002; Switzerland, 1993-2002; Thailand, 2001-2002 and Venezuela, 1994-2002.

The rule of law and press freedom regressions used the same sample of 44 new democracies and 27 old democracies. Both these measures had a strong correspondence with the original “old” and “new” classifications. New democracies accounted for 86.1% of

countries with low press freedom (below 30 on the Freedom House measure) and 86.2% of cases having low “rule of law” (below the median score for the sample).

The results using the between (or time-averaged estimator) in Table 7.1 show that for the rule of law and press freedom regressions the coefficients for both the high and low interaction terms are significant and positive, but the coefficients for the low interaction terms are larger and more significant (at the 1% level compared to the 5% level in both cases), which is consistent with the predictions of hypotheses 6 and 7

For ideology, there is a significant positive effect for the right-wing executive interaction term at the 1% level, but no significant effect at all for left and centre governments. This is in keeping with the predictions of hypothesis 8. Unlike the other two measures, ideology does not have same correspondence with the old and new democracy groups, as new democracies are only slightly better represented within the group of right-wing executives compared to the proportion they account for within the group of left and centre executives (61.22% compared to 53.58%).⁵⁰ This is not problematic, however, as it was explained in the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2 that the effect of old and new democracies was actually likely to be driven by differences in key factors that affect the costs and benefits of repression. The fact that new democracies accounted for only a slightly larger share of right-wing governments than they did for old suggests that the ideology of the executive is an additional factor that may affect the potential costs and benefits of repression, but unlike rule of law and press freedom this factor is unlikely to be one of the factors captured by the original old/new division.

⁵⁰ Unlike rule of law and media freedom, the ideology dummies can vary over time within countries if, for example, a country changed from a left to a right wing government (or vice versa) during the 10 years, so the percentages for this measure described here refers to country-year combinations, rather than countries in the sample. Also it should be noted that due to data limitations, for this measure there were only 25 old democracies and the number of new democracies varied from 32 to 37 depending on the year.

As explained in Chapter 2 (p 20), the within estimator is a more powerful specification as it controls for all country-specific factors, whether observable or unobservable. It examines the relationship between the independent variables and repression over time in each country, whereas the between estimator merely examines the relationship between the time-averaged values of each variable. Finding a significant effect using the within estimator is therefore a more convincing test of the influence that these factors may have on repression.

Table 7.2 presents the results of the within estimator for each of the three interaction specifications. As explained on p.21, the potential endogeneity in the relationship between protest and repression means that it is appropriate to use instrumental variables (IV) estimation for the within specification. Consequently, these regressions instrument for the number of demonstrations using the same variables as in Chapter 2 (lags of a country demonstrations, neighbouring countries' demonstrations and lags of neighbouring countries' demonstrations).

None of the new factors used to classify the 71 democracies (or 57-62 democracies, depending on the year for the ideology regressions) is found to have a significant effect for the within estimator. This result could be interpreted as lending support to the original idea expressed in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2: that the observed differences between “old” and “new” democracies are, in fact, the product of a number of different factors that will alter the potential costs and benefits accruing to executives when they decide whether or not to repress a protest, some of which are time varying and some of which do not vary much over time. This suggests that no single explanatory variable will be as powerful as dividing the sample by the old and new categories, which reflect differences across a range of factors. Splitting the sample according to only one potential factor also means that its effect could potentially be cancelled out by other relevant factors. For example, a country with high press

freedom may nonetheless have low rule of law, or vice versa. Indeed, there are a number of observations like these in the panel dataset, as shown in the tabulations between the three main variables in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3. Tabulations between the three main variables

		Right wing executive		<i>Total</i>
		0	1	
Low rule of law	0	183	144	327
	1	138	119	257
<i>Total</i>		321	263	584

		Low press freedom		<i>Total</i>
		0	1	
Low rule of law	0	324	20	344
	1	86	264	350
<i>Total</i>		410	284	694

		Right wing executive		<i>Total</i>
		0	1	
Low press freedom	0	224	160	384
	1	97	103	200
<i>Total</i>		321	263	584

There are also problems that are inherent to using cross-national data which may account for the lack of any significant results for these factors in the within-IV specification. Measures available at the cross-national level tend to suffer from a wider gap between the original concept and the variable used to measure that concept. This problem is particularly true regarding the ideology measure. The qualitative findings from São Paulo in Chapter 6 suggest that an executive's preference for using repression could also be important. Ideally, what we want to measure at the cross-national level in order to test hypothesis 8 is the degree of ideological preference that an executive has towards tougher policing. This is unlikely to be adequately captured by a measure that simply classifies the executive's party as left, centre

or right according to a left/right spectrum. For example, for eight years of the sample, both Chile and Sweden had executives identified as “left” by the World Bank measure. If this simple left/right classification was a perfect proxy for the executive’s ideological preference for repression, then we would expect presidents from the Concertación’s coalition to have the same preference for using repression as prime ministers from Sweden’s Social Democratic party. Moreover, Chapter 6 showed that in the Brazilian case even looking at the executive’s party may not serve as a sufficient guide to an individual executive’s preferences in all cases. The qualitative account in Chapter 6 indicated that while governors in São Paulo have come from the same party, the individual preference for tougher policing has differed with each governor. This means that the ideology of the executive’s party may not perform well as a measure of his or her preference for repression in other countries where party labels are similarly weak.

Another large-N problem is that testing for the effect of these factors by using indicators aggregated at the cross-national level may obscure important sub-national variation. Brazil’s average rule of law score for the sample period was -0.31, well below the median value for the sample. Even so, the evidence from Chapter 6 suggests that this obscures wide variation in state capacity across the Brazilian states. This same chapter identified the relative lack of authority that Pará’s governor had over the police compared to other states as the most likely explanation for that state’s consistently high level of repression. If many of the countries included in the analysis are heterogeneous on the variables of interest at the sub-national level, then we may lose a significant amount of variation by using national averages. This would reduce the likelihood of finding significant regression results.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to test whether factors identified as contributing to higher repression in the São Paulo and Pará comparative case studies – limited media freedom, low state capacity and the extent of an executive’s ideological preference – were also associated with increased repression at the cross-national level (Hypotheses 6-8). An additional aim of the chapter was to see how closely the effect of these factors corresponded to the original “old” and “new” democracy classifications that were used in the original analysis in Chapter 2. To do this, three new dichotomous sets of interaction terms were created using the most suitable measures of the three factors above. The effects of these alternative factors were then tested using the same set of 71 democracies over 10 years that was used for the analysis in Chapter 2.

In terms of explaining cross-sectional variation in the repression of protest between democratic countries, there is evidence that protest is, indeed, more likely to be repressed in countries with low rule of law (state capacity), low levels of press freedom and countries with right of centre executives. However, the first two factors have a much greater correspondence with the group of new democracies than the last. This lends credence to the view that the original old vs. new findings were the product of a number of factors affecting the costs and benefits of repression, which tend to coalesce around old and new, rather than age of democracy itself affecting repression. State capacity and press freedom appear to be factors that were subsumed under the original old and new distinction, whereas ideology is an additional significant factor, which is no more likely to be present in old democracies than in new ones.

Nevertheless, despite the expected patterns being observed when the between estimator was used, the results of the within-IV estimator show that none of these factors remain significant when controlling for country specific effects in order to examine the effects of

these factors on year-to-year variation in repression within countries (as opposed to the difference in time averaged repression scores between countries). This means that none of these factors, by itself, is as powerful as the old and new distinction, which is most likely a product of a number of different factors, the effect of which may cancel each other out when estimated separately. It was noted that problems inherent to using cross-national data may also account for the lack of within country results, such as the increased gap between concepts and measures and the loss of sub-national variation that occurs when variables are measured at the national level. Overall, this reinforces the need to test for factors affecting democratic governments' use of repression at a variety of levels of analysis.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

8.1 Aims of the thesis

Chapter 2 presented an overview of the research on government repression of political protest. It became clear that until now the focus has been on gauging the tendency to repress of different political regimes; and that there is a strong consensus that democratic governments tend to repress less than authoritarian or indeed semi-democratic ones. However, those studies which focus exclusively on democratic governments have not attempted to explain why some such governments appear more likely to repress protest than others. This is the question that this thesis sets out to answer, once it is established that protest continues to elicit some degree of repression among democratic governments alone. So the first step was to test this proposition by conducting a cross-national analysis of a restricted set of seventy-one democratic countries over ten years, using panel data techniques to control for reverse causality. The results clearly indicated that in this purely democratic sample protest is still positively associated with repression, though the variations in repression between democratic governments remain to be explained.

It might be thought that democratic longevity provides the most plausible explanation, with democratic governments learning to be less repressive over time. To test this hypothesis the cross-national analysis was repeated with interaction terms for pre- and post-1974 democracies and it was found that the positive relationship between protest and repression was restricted to the post-1974 democracies. Yet this is not the whole story, for the difference between pre- and post- 1974 democracies remained even when a time trend variable was included to control for incremental

changes in the proclivity to repress from one year to the next. Clearly a fuller explanation was required for the variable tendency of democratic governments to repress protest.

Previous studies had focussed mainly on the costs and benefits accruing to autocratic governments which choose to repress protest in an effort to contain it and so prevent revolution. A distinctive contribution of this thesis is the construction of a model that can identify the particular set of costs and benefits facing democratic governments when deciding whether or not to repress protest. This model (as expressed in equation 7 in Chapter 2) contained a number of hypotheses, as follows: (1) the number of ‘horizontal’ constitutional constraints on the executive will reduce the likelihood of repression; (2) the intensity of media coverage will do the same; (3) a stronger public preference for a violent response to protest, to the contrary, will make repression more likely; (4) as will higher levels of partisan support in the legislature; and (5) previous levels of electoral support (by reducing the potential costs of repression). Subsequently the thesis set out to test these hypotheses with data generated at cross-national, national and subnational levels. Different hypotheses were tested with different data sets, with the level of analysis determined by the adequacy of the data for testing the particular hypothesis in question.

8.2 Horizontal constitutional constraints

The effect of horizontal constitutional constraints was investigated at the cross-national level because there is an appropriate measure – *EXCONST* – available in the Polity IV dataset. All things equal these constraints should reduce the likelihood of repression, since executives will not be able to bypass the legislature through decree powers and so forth – so avoiding the costs of achieving legislative support for the

decision to repress. Testing for variation of *EXCONST* in response to protest can reveal whether executives tend to centralise power – while still adhering to existing constitutional rules – in order to repress such protest. The results confirmed this tendency – after controlling for endogeneity – but only for post-1974 democracies, thereby suggesting that constitutional constraints explain at least some of the difference in the readiness to repress of pre- and post-1974 democracies.

8.3 Cyclical costs: legislative and electoral support

The relevance of partisan and electoral support (hypotheses 3 and 4) was investigated using data from Brazil at the sub-national level. It makes good analytical sense to examine this in a ‘new’ or post-1974 democracy such as Brazil because – although democratic longevity does not by itself explain the different tendencies to repress of pre- and post-1974 regimes – the positive relationship between protest and repression was restricted to the post-1974 set.

Fluctuating levels of legislative and electoral support provide a measure of ‘cyclical variation’ in the political costs of repression. Comparative measures of these costs could be constructed from data available for the different states of the Brazilian federation, each of which has its own elections for both its governor and its legislature. The share of seats held by the governor’s party in the assembly provided a measure of legislative support, while the share of the vote won by the governor in the first round of the preceding election did the same for electoral support. The analysis also encompassed measures of whether and how soon the governor would face an election, namely whether the governor was in his or her second term, with dummy variables to specify the non-linear effect of the number of years to the next election.

The results showed that the lower the level of partisan support in the legislature the lower the likelihood of repression, though neither the previous level of electoral support nor whether the governor was in her first or second term appeared to have any discernible effect – with the exception that governors appeared just slightly less ready to repress in election years. And it seems plausible that concerns over electoral outcomes may only begin to take effect as the election itself draws close. But, overall, it is clear that legislative support has a more powerful effect than electoral support on the proclivity to repress protest in Brazil. What cannot be clear is just how far these results depend on contextual variables that are specific to Brazil, such as the particular electoral arrangements at state level, where the members of the legislature are elected by open-list PR, while the executive is elected by majority run-off. But state governors in Brazil are recognised to have strong executive powers and the level of partisan support in the legislature should only grow in importance where there are stronger constitutional constraints on executive decision-making.

8.4 Media

Wisler and Marco Giugni's (1999) study of Switzerland found that greater media coverage of protests tended to deter police repression. However, the analysis in Chapter 4 comparing national newspaper reporting of MST protests with reports from the CPT did not confirm these findings in the Brazilian case. A closer focus on the state of São Paulo in Chapter 6 suggested that it may be the relative lack of press freedom in Brazil, and in particular media reluctance to report on police violence, that explains the discrepancy. So it is possible that differences in the degree of political influence over the content of media reporting may contribute to explain the different responses to protest in pre- and post-1974 democracies identified in Chapter 2. But

evidence drawn from different studies of just two cases makes this a very tentative suggestion.

8.5 Public support for violent policing of protest

As suggested in Chapter 2, public support for the violent repression of protest is difficult to measure. So any examination of the effects of public opinion on the tendency to repress will inevitably be highly speculative. It was noted that data from the World Values Survey indicated that the number of respondents rating a military regime (where violent policing should be more likely) as ‘very good’ or ‘good’ was consistently higher in post-1974 democracies, a finding that is at least congruent with the predicted effect of public support. But the data for a convincing statistical analysis are simply not available. Similarly speculative is the thought that it may be strong public support for harsh repression of protest that underpins some of the statistically significant state-specific fixed effects found in the comparative analysis of Chapter 4. Furthermore, some of the anecdotal evidence in Chapter 6 suggested that the importance of public opinion may depend on the degree of press freedom and media independence from political influence. The triangular relationship between public opinion, press freedom, and the repression of protest might provide a productive focus for future research.

8.6 What is missing from the model?

The in-depth comparison of just two states of the Brazilian federation in Chapter 6 suggested two other possible explanations for the variable tendency of democratic governments to repress protest, namely state capacity and ideology. The model tends to focus on the accountability of executives and so assumes – at least implicitly – that

the security apparatus is sufficiently accountable to the executive. But the evidence from Pará suggests that the high levels of police violence in that state can only be explained by ineffective government control of the security forces, and especially by corporate or private control over these forces. Since private actors do not incur the same political or electoral costs as the executive it may make less sense in contexts of weak state capacity to focus exclusively on these costs; and this may explain a good part of the statistically strong and positive fixed effect noted in the case of Pará.

It transpired that ideology may be important to the executive's tendency to repress protest, and, in the case of Para, it is the ideology of the main opposition party that may matter most. The model assumes that opposition parties in the legislature are likely to resist executive decisions to repress, but the main opposition party in Pará – the PMDB – has strong ties to landed interests in the state and so appears to favour harsh repression of rural protests of different kinds. Indeed, its sizeable presence in the legislature could increase the political costs of any executive reluctance to repress. Thus, although the basic presumption of the model is that a lack of legislative support will influence the executive tendency to repress protest, in this case it works to increase rather than reduce that tendency.

In São Paulo, to the contrary, it is the ideology of the executive that appears to be significant, with the tendency to repress explained in some degree by the individual preferences of the governor. The analysis of Chapter 4 did include dummy variables for the governor's party, but party labels and discipline are notoriously weak in Brazil, and the finding from São Paulo holds true even though successive governors have come from the same party.

Finally, the model seeks to identify the potential costs incurred by democratic executives in choosing to repress protest, but gives no indication of how these

executives make a practical impact on the practice of repression itself. Here the presumption is that many post-1974 democracies will have inherited a security apparatus from military or other types of authoritarian regime, along with a police force that is accustomed to exercising force with no thought of accountability for their acts. Hence, as Chapter 6 suggested for the case of São Paulo, rather than taking a proactive decision to repress, it is more likely that the executive has to decide whether to prevent or restrain repression, or simply let the police act according to their own lights and with their customary degree of violence. This may be the typical choice facing executives in many of the post-1974 democracies.

Chapter 7 returned to the original cross-national dataset of 71 countries from Chapter 2, in order to see if some of these key missing factors identified in Chapter 6 — State Capacity, Media Independence and the Executive’s ideological preference for using repression — can also account for variation at the global level. The results show that these factors do, indeed, behave in the expected ways, when we are trying to explain differences in protest repression between countries: Low state capacity, low levels of media freedom and having a right-wing executive, all had a more significant positive effect than their opposites. However, as none of these factors can also account for within country variation in repression, their explanatory power at the global level appears to be limited. This could be because each factor represents just one of the many factors underpinning the original effect of new democracies observed in Chapter 2. Alternatively, the lack on within country results could be a product of the less precise measures available at the cross-national level, and/or the fact that global analyses have the potential to ignore important variation in these variables at the sub-national level. This reinforces the need to triangulate information from a variety of levels of analysis when investigating this research question.

8.7 Concluding remarks

In sum, this thesis has shown that considering the particular constraints that democratic leaders are subject to may be a fruitful avenue for research, if we wish to understand the basis on which leaders choose to repress and what factors influence their decisions. The thesis has presented some original evidence of which determinants of repression are most significant among new democracies. However, there are a number of avenues for future research. For example, collecting richer data on newspaper reports would permit a more detailed analysis of the importance of bias in reports of protest and how this influences repression. An analysis of repression of MST protests in Brazil at the *farm* level would provide information about how protestors and police learn from previous encounters in the local area. Finally, while this thesis has uncovered some of the factors that cause repression in new democracies, future research should examine whether over the long term these factors are likely to improve and as a result whether the countries in question will become more like mature democracies.

References

- Aberbach, J. 2002. What's Happened to the Watchful Eye? *Congress & the Presidency*, 29 (1), pp. 3-23.
- de Almeida, L. Ruiz Sánchez, F. and Hallewell, L. 2000. The Landless Workers' Movement and Social Struggles against Neoliberalism. *Latin American Perspectives*, 27 (5), pp. 11-32.
- Alston, L., Libecap, G. , and Mueller, B. 1999. A model of rural conflict: violence and land reform policy in Brazil. *Environment and Development Economics*, 4, pp. 135-160.
- Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J., Limongi, F. and Przeworski, A. 1996. Classifying political regimes. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 31 (2), pp. 1-37.
- Alves, H. 1984. Grassroots Organizations, Trade Unions and the Church: A challenge to the Controlled Abertura in Brazil *Latin American Perspectives*, 11 (1), pp. 73-102.
- Ameral, R. 2002. Mass Media in Brazil. In: Fox, E. and Waisbord, S., eds. *Latin Politics, Global Media*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, pp. 38-46.
- Arat, Z. 1991. *Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- _____. 1999. Human Rights and Democracy: Expanding or Contracting. *Polity*, 32 (1), pp.119-144.
- Baranyi, S. Deere, C. D. and Morales, M. 2004. *Land & Development In Latin America: Issues and Openings for Policy Research* IDRC, Canada.
- Banks, A. 2005. *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, 1815-2003* [electronic resource]. Binghamton, NY: Databanks International.

- Besley, T. and Case, A. 1995. Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110 (3), pp. 769-798.
- Besley, T. and Persson, T. 2009. State Capacity, Conflict and Development. *NBER Working Paper No. w15088*. Available from: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w15088.pdf>. Accessed: 01/03/2011.
- Besley, T. Burgess, R and Prat, A. .2002. Mass Media and Political Accountability. In: Islam, R. ed. *The Right to Tell: The role of Mass Media in Economic Development*. Washington DC: The World Bank, pp. 45-60.
- Branford, S. and Rocha, J. 2002. *Cutting the Wire: The Story of the Landless Movement in Brazil*. London: Latin America Bureau.
- Caldeira, T. 2000. *City of walls: Crime, segregation and citizenship in São Paulo*. Berkeley, C.A: University of California Press.
- _____. 2002. The paradox of police violence in democratic Brazil. *Ethnography*, 3 (3), pp. 235-263.
- Camargo, O .2009. *Elite politica brasileira e a renegociação das dividas do credito rural : o caso da bancada ruralista*. Dissertação (Mestrado em Sociologia). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Universidade Estadual de Campinas.
- Carey, S. 2006. The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression. *Political Research Quarterly*, 59 (1), pp. 1-11.
- _____. 2010. The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent. *Political Studies*, 58 (1), pp. 167–186.

- Carter, M. 2003. The Origins of Brazil's Landless Rural Workers' Movement (MST): The Natalino Episode in Rio Grande do Sul (1981-84). A Case of Ideal Interest Mobilization. Working Paper Number CBS-43-03, Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford, 2003.
- _____. 2010. The Landless Rural Workers Movement and Democracy in Brazil. *Latin American Research Review* 45.4 (2010), pp. 186-217.
- Catterberg, G. and Moreno A. 2006. The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New and Established Democracies, *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 18 (1), pp. 31-48
- Cheibub, J., Figueiredo, A. and Limongi, F. 2009. Political Parties and Governors as Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2006. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 51, pp.1-30
- Cheibub, J. and Gandhi, J. 2004. Classifying Political Regimes: A Six-fold Classification of Democracies and Dictatorships. *Paper presented at the Annual APSA Meeting*, Chicago, IL, September.
- Crocitti, J. and Vallance, M. 2011. *Brazil Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Republic*, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO,
- Cullen, F., Clark, G., and Wozniak, J. 1985. Explaining the Get Tough Movement: Can the Public be Blamed, *Federal Probation*, 49, pp. 16-24
- Dalton, R. and Weldon, S. .2007 Partisanship and Party System Institutionalization. *Party Politics*, 13 (2), pp. 179-196
- DATA LUTA, .2007. http://docs.fct.unesp.br/nera/projetos/dataluta_brasil_2007.pdf.

- Davenport, C. and Armstrong D. 2004. Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48 (3), pp. 538–554..
- Davenport, C., 1995. Multi-dimensional threat perception and state repression: An inquiry into why states apply negative sanctions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39, pp. 683-713
- _____. 1999. Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43 (1), pp. 92-116.
- _____. 2007. *State repression and the domestic democratic peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- de Almeida Ruela, A. 2010. *Competitividade Parlamentar da Oposição na Assembléia Legislativa do Paraná (1999 -2003)* Master's Dissertation, Universidade Federal Do Paraná
- de la Luz Inclán, M. 2009. Repressive Threats, Procedural Concessions, and the Zapatista Cycle of Protests, 1994—2003. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53 (2), pp. 794-819.
- Deere, C. 2003. Women's Land Rights and Rural Social Movements in the Brazilian Agrarian Reform. *Journal of Agrarian Change* 3(1/2), pp. 257-288
- Della Porta, D. 1998. Police Knowledge and Protest Policing: Some reflections on the Italian Case. In: Porta, D. and Reiter, H., eds. *Policing protest: the control of mass demonstrations in Western democracies*. Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 228-252.
- Della Porta, D., Fillieule, O. and Reiter, H., 1998. Policing Protest in France and Italy: From Intimidation to Cooperation. In: Meyer D and Tarrow, S. eds.: *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for the New Century*, Lanham, MD:

- Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 111-130
- Desposato, S. 2006. Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50 (1), pp. 62-80
- Earl, J. 2003. Tanks, tear gas, and taxes: Toward a theory of movement repression. *Sociological Theory*, 21(1), pp. 44-68.
- _____. 2005. You can beat the rap, but you can't beat the ride: bringing arrests back into research on repression. *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change*, 26, pp. 101-139
- Earl, J. McCarthy, J. and Soule, S. 2004. The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30, pp. 65-80.
- Eisinger P. 1973. The conditions of protest behavior in American cities. *American Political Science Review*, 81, pp. 11 – 28.
- Englehart, N. 2009. State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46 (2), pp. 163-180.
- Evans, P. 1986. Three Views of Regime Change and Party Organization in Brazil: An Introduction. *Politics & Society*, 15, pp. 1-21
- Fein, H. 1995. More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 17 (1), pp. 170-191
- Fernandes, B. M. 2000. *A formação do MST no Brasil*. Petrópolis: Vozes.
- Folha de São Paulo.(20/02/(2005),
[http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc\(2002\(200502.htm](http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc(2002(200502.htm)
 _____ . 01/07/(2011),
[http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/poder/po0106\(2011\(19.htm](http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/poder/po0106(2011(19.htm)

_____. 03/07/(2002),

[http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc0306\(200\(204.htm](http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc0306(200(204.htm).

Foweraker, J. 1981. *The struggle for land: A political economy of the pioneer frontier in Brazil from 1930 to the present day*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 2001 Grassroots Movements and Political Activism in Latin America: a Critical Comparison of Chile and Brazil. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 33 (4), pp. 839-865.

Foweraker, J. and Krznic, R. 2001. How to Construct a Database of Liberal Democratic Performance. *Democratization*, 8 (1), pp. 1-25.

_____. 2002. The Uneven Performance of Third Wave Democracies: Electoral Politics and the Imperfect Rule of Law in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society* , 44 (3), pp. 29-60.

Francisco, R. 1995 The Relationship between Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Evaluation in Three Coercive States. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39 (2), pp. 263-282

_____. 1996. Coercion and Protest: An Empirical Test in Two Democratic States. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40 (4), pp. 1179-1204.

Franklin, James C. 1997. IMF Conditionality, Threat Perception and Political Repression: A Cross-National Analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 30 (5), pp. 576-606.

_____. 2009. Contentious Challenges and Government Responses in Latin America, *Political Research Quarterly*, 62 (4), pp. 700-714.

Gibney, M., Cornett L. and Wood, R. 2008. *Political Terror Scale 1976-2006*.

Retrieved 19 June 2008, from the Political Terror Scale website:

<http://www.politicalterroryscale.org>.

- Gibney, M. and Wood, R. 2010. The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and a Comparison to CIRI, *Human Rights Quarterly*, 32 (2), pp.:367-400.
- Ginkel, J. and Smith, A. 1999. So You Say You Want a Revolution , *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43, pp. 291-316
- Gleditsch, N. Wallensteen, P. Eriksson, M, Sollenberg M, and Strand, H. .2002. Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39 (5), pp. 615-637.
- Gupta, D., Singh, H. and Sprague, T. 1993. Government Coercion of Dissidents: Deterrence or Provocation? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37 (2), pp. 301-339.
- Hammond, J. 2004. The MST and the Media: Competing Images of the Brazilian Landless Farmworkers' Movement. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 46 (4), pp. 61-90.
- _____. 2009. Land occupations, violence, and the politics of agrarian reform in Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, 36 (4), pp. 156-177.
- Henderson, C. 1991. Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35 (1), pp. 120-142.
- Hibbing, J. 1984. The Liberal Hour: Electoral Pressures and Transfer Payment Voting in the United States Congress. *The Journal of Politics*, 46 (3), pp. 846-865.
- Hinton, M. 2006. *The State on the Streets: Police and Politics in Argentina and Brazil*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.
- Hochstetler, K. 2008. Organized Civil Society in Lula's Brazil. In: Kingstone, P. and Power, T. eds. *Democratic Brazil Revisited*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 33-53.
- Houtzager, P. 1998. State and Unions in the Transformation of the Brazilian Countryside, 1964-1979, *Latin American Research Review*, 33 (2), pp. 103-142.

- _____. 2001. Collective Action and Political Authority: Rural Workers, Church, and State in Brazil, *Theory and Society*, 30 (1), pp. 1-45.
- Hughes, J. 2001. Managing Secession Potential in the Russian Federation. *Regional and Federal Studies*, 11 (3), pp. 36-68.
- Huntington, S. 1991. *Democracy's Third Wave*. *The Journal of Democracy*, 2 (2), pp. 12-34.
- _____. 1993. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma
- Indriunas, L. 2001. MST invade fazenda de Jader Barbalho no Pará Folha de São Paulo: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u19207.shtml>
- Jones, M. 1998. Gender Quotas, Electoral Laws, and the Election of Women: Lessons from the Argentine Provinces *Comparative Political Studies*, 31, pp. 3-21.
- Kenney, C. 2003. Horizontal Accountability: Concepts and Conflicts. In Mainwaring, S. and Welna, C. eds. *Democratic Accountability in Latin America* . Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 55-76.
- Kauzlarich, D., Mullins, C., and Matthews, R. 2003. A complicity continuum of state crime. *Contemporary Justice Review*, 6 (3), pp. 241-254.
- Kim, Y. and Bahry, D. 2008. Interrupted Presidencies in Third Wave Democracies. *The Journal of Politics*, 70 (3), pp. 807-822.
- Lieberman, E. 2005. Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research. *American Political Science Review*, 99 (3), pp. 435-452.
- Lichbach, M. 1987. Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 31 (20), pp. 266-297.

- Mainwaring, S. 1986. *Grassroots popular movements, identity, and democratization in Brazil*, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame
- _____. 1999 *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization. The Case of Brazil*. Stanford, California:Stanford University Press.
- _____. 2003 Introduction: Democratic Accountability in Latin America. In: Mainwaring, S. and Welna, C. eds. *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3 – 33
- Mainwaring, S, and Shugart, M. S. eds. .1997. *Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Martins, J de S. 1984. The state and the militarization of the agrarian question in Brazil: In: Smink, M. and Wood, C. eds. *Frontier Expansion in Amazonia* eds. Florida: University Press of Florida, pp. 463-490.
- _____. 2002. Representing the peasantry? Struggles for/about land in Brazil. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* , 29 (3-4), pp. 300-335
- Mason, T. and Krane, D. .1989. The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror. *International Studies Quarterly*, 33 (2), pp. 175-198.
- Matos, C. 2008. *Journalism and Political Democracy in Brazil*. Plymouth: Lexington Books.
- Maybury-Lewis, B. 1994. *The Politics of the Possible: The Brazilian Rural Workers' Trade Union Movement, 1964-1985*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

- McCarthy, J. McPhail, C. and Smith, J. 1996. Images of Protest: Dimensions of Selection Bias in Media Coverage of Washington Demonstrations, 1982 and 1991. *American Sociological Review*, 61 (3), pp. 478-499.
- McCarthy, J. McPhail, C. Smith, J. and Crishock, L. 1998. Electronic and Print Media Representations of Washington D.C. Demonstrations, 1982 and 1991: A Demography of Description Bias. In: Rucht, D. Koopmans, R and Neidhardt, F. eds. *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 90-112.
- McCarthy, N. and Razaghian, R. 1999. Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations 1885- 1996. *American Journal of Political Science*, 43 (4), pp. 1122-1143.
- McPhail, C., Schweingruber D, and McCarthy, J. 1998. Policing Protest in the United States: 1960–1995, in D. della Porta and H. Reiter .eds: *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 49–69.
- Meszaros. G. 2000. No ordinary revolution: Brazil’s landless workers’ movement. *Race & Class* 42 (2), pp. 1-18.
- Mitchell, K. 2003. Market-Assisted Land Reform in Brazil: A New Approach to Address an Old Problem. *New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law*. 2, pp. 557.
- Mitchell, N. and McCormick, J. 1988. Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations. *World Politics*, 40 (4), pp.476-498.
- Moore, W. 1998. Repression and Dissent: Substitution Context and Timing. *American Journal of Political Science*, 42 (3), pp. 851-873.

- Mulgan, R. 2003. *Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Navarro, Z. 1994. Democracy, Citizenship and Representation: Rural Social Movements in Southern Brazil, 1978-1990, *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 13 (2), pp. 129-54.
- _____. 2009. Expropriating land in Brazil: Principles and practices. In: Binswanger-Mkhize H., Bourguignon, C. and van der Brink R. eds. *Agricultural land redistribution: Toward greater consensus*. Washington DC: World Bank Publication.
- _____. 2010. The Brazilian Landless Movement (MST): critical times, *REDES*, 15 (1), pp. 196 – 223.
- Moore, W. 2000. The Repression of Dissent A Substitution Model of Government Coercion *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44 (1), pp.107-127.
- Neme, C. 1999. *A Instituição Policial na Ordem Democrática: o caso da Polícia Militar do Estado de São Paulo*. Master's Thesis, Dissertação de mestrado. Universidade de São Paulo.
- O'Donnell, G. 1994 Delegative Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (1), pp. 55-69.
- _____. 1999. Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. In: Schedler, A. Diamond, L. and Plattner Marc eds. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*. London: Lynne Rienner Publications, pp. 29-52.
- Official press office of the government of the state of São Paulo
<[http://www.imprensaoficial.com.br/PortalIO/Home_1_0.aspx#25/04/\(2011](http://www.imprensaoficial.com.br/PortalIO/Home_1_0.aspx#25/04/(2011)

- Oliver, P. 2008 Repression and Crime Control: Why Social Movements Scholars Should Pay Attention to Mass Incarceration as a Form of Repression. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 13 (1), pp. 1-24.
- Oliver, P. and Maney, G. 2000. Coverage of Protest Events: From Selection Bias to Triadic Interactions. *American Journal of Sociology*, 106.(2), pp. 463-505 .
- Ondetti, G. 2006. Repression, Opportunity, and Protest: Explaining the Takeoff of Brazil's Landless Movement. *Latin American Politics and Society* Volume 48 (2), pp. 61–94.
- _____. 2007. An Ambivalent Legacy: Cardoso and Land Reform. *Latin American Perspectives* 34(9), pp. 9-25
- _____. 2008. *Land, Protest, and Politics. The Landless Movements and the Struggle for Agrarian Reform in Brazil*. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University.
- Ondetti, G. Wambergue, E. and Batista, J. 2008. De posseiro sem-terra: o impato da luta pela terra do MST no Pará. in Carter, M. ed. 2008. *Combatando a desigualdade social: o MST e reform agrariá no Brasil*. São Paulo: Editoria UNESP, pp. 257-284.
- Opp, K-D. 2009. *Theories of political P rotest and social Movements. A multidisciplinary Introduction, Critique, and Synthesis*. London: Routledge
- Opp, K-D. and Roehl, W. 1990. Repression, Micromobilisation and Political protest. *Social Forces*, 69 (2), pp. 521-547
- Payne, L. 2000. *Uncivil Movements : the Armed Right Wing and Democracy In Latin America*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press,

- Pereira, A. 1992. Agrarian Reform and the Rural Workers' Unions of the Pernambuco Sugar Zone, Brazil 1985-1988. *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 26(2), pp.169-192,
- _____. 1997. *The End of the Peasantry: The Rural Labor Movement in Northeast Brazil, 1961-1988*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997.
- _____. 1999. God, the devil, and development in northeast Brazil. *Praxis: The Fletcher Journal of Development Studies*, 15, pp. 1-18.
- _____. 2003. Brazil's Agrarian Reform: Democratic Innovation or Oligarchic Exclusion Redux. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 45, pp. 41-65.
- _____. 2008. Public Security, Private Interests, and Police reform in Brazil in Kingstone, P. and Power, T. eds. *Democratic Brazil Revisited*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh press, pp. 185-208.
- Poe, S. and Tate, N. 1994. Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis. *The American Political Science Review*, 88 (4), pp. 853-872
- Poe, S., Tate, N and Keith, L. 1999. Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993. *International Studies Quarterly*, 43 (2), pp 291–313.
- Rasler, K. 1996. Concessions, repression, and political protest in the Iranian revolution. *American Sociological Review* 61 (1), pp. 132 - 152
- Regan, P. and Henderson E. 2002. Democracy, threats and political repression in developing countries: Are democracies internally less violent? *Third World Quarterly*, 23, (1), pp. 119 – 136.
- Robles, W., 2000. Beyond the politics of protest: The landless rural workers movement of Brazil. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 21 (3), pp. 657–

- Rodrigues, F. 2007. *Capitalismo sem risco*. Folha de S. Paulo, São Paulo, 9 maio 2007, pp A-2
- Ronaldo Brasiliense 2012. Ana Júlia perdeu maioria na Assembléia Legislativa. 7th of June (2010 In: *O Paraneze* online news blog. <http://www.oparaense.com.br> accessed (20/06/2012)
- Rosa M. 2012. Reforma agrária e land reform: movimentos sociais e o sentido de ser um sem-terra no Brasil e na África do Sul. *CADERNO CRH*, 5 (64) janeiro/abril, pp 99-114.
- Rucht, D., and Ohlemacher. T., 1992. Protest Event Data: Collection, Uses and Perspectives. In ed. Diani, M. and Eyerman, Ron. eds. *Studying Collective Action*, London: Sage.
- Samuels, D. and Abrucio, F. L. 2000. Federalism and Democratic Transitions: The New Politics of the Governors in Brazil. *Publius*, 30 (2), pp. 43-62.
- Sabourin, E. 2008. Agrarian Reform in Brazil: a series of missed appointments between social movements and state policies. *Estudos Sociedade e Agricultura*, 4.
- Schmink, M. and Wood, C. 1992. *Contested frontiers in Amazonia*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Schmitter, P. 2004. The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability, *Journal of Democracy*, 15 (4), pp. 47 -60.
- Shugart, M and Mainwaring, S . 1997. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Sinek, W. 2007. *Coalitional Choices and Strategic Challenges: The Landless Movement in Brazil, 1970–2005* (September 1, 2007). Center for Latin American Studies. CLAS Working Papers. Paper 19. <http://repositories.cdlib.org/clas/wp/19>

- Stédile, J. 2002. Landless battalions. The Sem Terra of Brazil. *New Left Review* 15 (May–June)
- Stinnett, D., Tir, J., Schafer, P., Diehl, P., and Gochman, C., (2002). The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 19(2), pp. 58-66.
- Stohl, M. and Lopez, G. 1984. *The State as Terrorist: Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Terrill, W. and Reisig, M. 2003. Neighborhood Context and Police Use of Force. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 40(3), pp. 291 – 321.
- Tilly, C. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. New York NY: Longman,
- Tilly, C. and Tarrow S. 2007. *Contentious Politics*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers,
- Titarenko, L., McCarthy, J., McPhail, C. and Augustyn, B. 2001. The Interaction of State Repression, Protest Form and Protest Sponsor Strength During the Transition from Communism in Minsk, Belarus, 1990-1995, 6 (2), pp. 129 – 150.
- Tomio, F. and Ricci, P. (2010). Executive Decree Power (Provisional Measures).and State Decision Process in Brazil: a comparative study of the delegation of legislative powers and decision making in the Brazilian States. *Paper presented at the 2010 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association*, Toronto, ON.
- Tusalem, R. 2007. A Boon or a Bane ? The Role of Civil Society in Third- and Fourth- Wave Democracies. *International Political Science Review*, 28 (3), pp. 361-386.
- Van Biezen, I. 2005. On the theory and practice of party formation and adaptation in new democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44, (1), pp. 147–174.

- Vergara-Camus, L. 2009. The politics of the MST: Autonomous rural communities, the state, and electoral politics. *Latin American Perspectives*, 36 (4), pp. 178-191.
- Wegenast, T. 2010. Cana, Café, Cacao: Agrarian Structure and Educational Inequalities in Brazil. *Revista de Historia Economica. Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*, pp. 1-35.
- Weisheit, R., Wells, L.m and Falcone D. 1994. Community Policing in Small Town and Rural America. *Crime & Delinquency* October, 40 (4), pp. 549-567.
- Welch, C. 2006a. A Preliminary Historiography of the Brazil's Landless Laborers' Movement (MST). *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 4 (1), pp. 198-210
- _____. 2006b. Globalization and the Transformation of Work in Rural Brazil, *International Labor and Working Class History*, 70 (1), pp. 35-60
- White, R. and White, T. 1995. Repression and the Liberal State: The Case of Northern Ireland, 1969-1972. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39 (2), pp. 330-352 .
- Wisler D. and Giugni, M. 1999. Under The Spotlight: The Impact of Media Attention on Protest Policing. *Mobilization: An International Journal*, 4 (2), pp. 171-187.
- Wittman, H. 2009. Reworking the metabolic rift: La Vía Campesina, agrarian citizenship, and food sovereignty. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36(4), pp. 805-826.
- Wolford, W. 2003 Families, fields, and fighting for land: The spatial dynamics of contention in rural Brazil. *Mobilization: An International Journal*: 8 (2): 157–73
- _____. 2003b. Producing community: the MST and land reform settlements in Brazil. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 3 (4), pp. 500-520.
- _____. 2008. Environmental Justice and the Construction of Scale in Brazilian Agriculture. *Society & Natural Resources*, 21 (7), pp. 641-655

_____. 2010. *This Land Is Ours Now: Social Mobilization and the Meanings of Land in Brazil*. Duke University Press.

Wolford, W. and Wright, A. 2003. *To Inherit the Earth: The Landless Movement and the Struggle for a New Brazil*. Oakland, CA: Food First Books

Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Zanger, Sabine, C., 2000 A Global Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977-93. *Journal of Peace Research*, 37, pp. 213-233.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Construction of the dataset for Chapter 2

A set of countries that were procedural democracies throughout the 1993-2002 sample period was formed, using the definition of Cheibub and Gandhi (2004). These were divided into those countries that became democratic before 1974 and those that became democratic in or after 1974. The countries that were used in the analysis are listed in Table A2.1, along with a note on the nature of the democratic transition for the pre-1974 democracies.⁵¹ The following countries were excluded from the regression analysis because they had missing values for at least one variable in all 10 sample years: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Cape Verde, Czech Republic, Dominica, Grenada, Iceland, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Namibia, Nauru, San Marino, Sao Tome, Solomon Islands, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Vanuatu. These countries collectively accounted for 0.83% of the world's democratic population in 2002.

For the selected countries, annual data for a range of variables were collected for 1993-2002, as described in Table A2.2. Linear interpolation was used to complete missing interior values for *GINI* and *EXCONST*, with the earliest and latest non-missing values filled forward or back to fill in missing end values. Where possible, the political terror scale data coded using U.S. State Department information was used to fill in missing values for *AIPTS*. Some missing values remain in the final sample. El Salvador has missing data for *LINGUISTIC* for all years and is thus dropped from the pooled and between estimators. The Bahamas and Luxembourg have missing data

⁵¹ Background information on the democratic transition was taken from the *C.I.A. World Factbook*.

for *EXCONST* for all years and are thus dropped from Tables 2.4 and 2.5. For *AIPTS*, Mauritius has missing data for all years and Slovenia has missing data for 1993-1996, meaning that these observations are dropped from Tables 2.1 and 2.3.

In addition to the variables listed in Table A2.2, two sets of instrumental variables were constructed. The first was the average number of demonstrations among a country's nearest neighbours in the current and three previous years. To define 'neighbours', data on country contiguity from the Correlates of War Project (see Stinnett *et al.* 2002) were used. If a country has a land or river border with at least one other country, it/they were taken as the country's neighbours. If a country has no land borders, countries separated by 12 miles of water or less were used instead. Similarly, if a country has no neighbours within 12 miles, the definition was widened to 24 miles, 150 miles and 400 miles, in turn. Alone in the dataset, New Zealand has no neighbouring country within a 400 miles radius, so Australia was assigned as its neighbour, based on geographical proximity and cultural ties. When constructing the lags of this variable, the values for Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia are used for each of their constituent countries, prior to the countries' dissolutions.

The second instrument was the number of demonstrations in a country in the previous three years. This meant using data as far back as 1990. When doing this, the recorded number of demonstrations for Czechoslovakia (in 1989-1992), the U.S.S.R. (in 1989-1990), and Yugoslavia (in 1989-1991) are allocated proportionally among their constituent countries, according to these countries' 1993 populations. Neither the U.S.S.R. nor its constituent republics were included in the demonstration data for 1991. This meant that in the I.V. regressions, observations for Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine were lost for 1993 and 1994.

Appendix 2: Additional tables for Chapter 2

Table A2.1: Countries used in the analysis

Country	Code	Regime started	Details
<i>New democracies</i>			
Albania	ALB	1992	End of communist rule; free and fair elections
Argentina	ARG	1983	Restoration of democracy after period of authoritarian rule (presidential and legislative elections)
Armenia	ARM	1991	Independence from U.S.S.R.
Bangladesh	BNG	1991	Restoration of democracy after period of authoritarian rule (popular elections)
Bolivia	BOL	1982	Restoration of democracy after period of military rule (1980 election presidential results were upheld)
Brazil	BRA	1989	Popular elections for executive mark end of protracted transition from authoritarian rule which began in 1979 (date coded by ACLP)
Bulgaria	BUL	1990	End of communist rule; free and fair elections
Central African Republic	CEN	1993	Civilian rule established (subsequent coup in 2003 but democratic during 1993-2002 sample period)
Chile	CHL	1990	Restoration of democracy after period of authoritarian rule; freely-elected president installed
Croatia	CRO	1992	Independence from Yugoslavia and first elections
Cyprus	CYP	1983	Secession of Turkish north
El Salvador	SAL	1984	Restoration of democracy after extended period of authoritarian rule (presidential elections)
Estonia	EST	1992	First parliamentary election since independence from U.S.S.R. in 1991
Germany	GMY	1990	Date of reunification (although West Germany democratic since 1949)
Ghana	GHA	1993	Multi-party elections for executive mark end of one-party rule
Greece	GRC	1974	Restoration of democracy after period of military rule (parliamentary elections held)
Guatemala	GUA	1986	Transition from dictatorship to democracy (inauguration of first civilian-elected president since 1966)
Guyana	GUY	1992	First free and fair elections for president since independence
Honduras	HON	1982	Freely-elected government came to power after two decades of military rule
Hungary	HUN	1990	End of communist rule; free and fair elections
Korea, South	ROK	1988	Koreans voted directly for president in free and fair elections at end of 1987 for first time in 16 years
Latvia	LAT	1991	Independence from U.S.S.R. (elections in 1990 and first post-independence elections 1993)

Lesotho	LES	1993	Parliamentary elections in mark the return to civilian rule
Lithuania	LIT	1992	Independence from U.S.S.R. (first post-independence elections)
Madagascar	MAG	1993	17 years of one-party rule comes to end when free and fair legislative and executive elections held in 1992-1993
Mali	MLI	1992	Transition from authoritarian rule (first democratic presidential election)
Mongolia	MON	1992	Adoption of democratic constitution and parliamentary elections
Nicaragua	NIC	1984	Establishment of free and fair elections for executive after prolonged period of authoritarian governments
Panama	PAN	1989	Dictator removed with help of U.S. intervention; replaced with popularly-elected president
Papua New Guinea	PNG	1975	Independence from Australian-administered U.N. trusteeship
Philippines	PHI	1986	Opposition leader replaces dictator as president
Poland	POL	1989	Transfer of power from communist to civilian government, soon followed by elections in 1990
Portugal	POR	1976	Restoration of democracy marked by first presidential elections since authoritarian rule ended in 1974
Romania	RUM	1990	First presidential elections after end of communist rule
Russia	RUS	1991	First presidential elections after collapse of U.S.S.R.
Slovakia	SLO	1993	New state created from former Czechoslovakia
Slovenia	SLV	1991	Independence from Yugoslavia in 1991; elections in 1992
Spain	SPN	1977	First democratic elections after death of dictator
Sri Lanka	SRI	1989	Elections since 1977 but nature of civil-military relations means country fails to meet minimal criteria prior to 1989
Thailand	THI	1992	First elections since 1991 coup (subsequent coup in 2006 but democratic during 1993-2002 sample period)
Turkey	TUR	1983	Re-establishment of elected civilian government after period of military rule
Ukraine	UKR	1991	Independence from U.S.S.R. and presidential elections
Uruguay	URU	1984	First presidential elections after period of authoritarian rule
Zambia	ZAM	1991	One-party rule ended with multi-party elections
<i>Old democracies</i>			
Australia	AUL	1909	
Austria	AUS	1955	
Bahamas	BHM	1973	
Belgium	BEL	1948	
Canada	CAN	1940	
Colombia	COL	1958	
Costa Rica	COS	1949	

Denmark	DEN	1915	
Dominican Republic	DOM	1966	
Finland	FIN	1917	
France	FRN	1944	
India	IND	1947	
Ireland	IRE	1922	
Israel	ISR	1948	
Italy	ITA	1945	
Jamaica	JAM	1962	
Japan	JPN	1947	
Luxembourg	LUX	1919	
Mauritius	MAS	1968	
Netherlands	NTH	1945	
New Zealand	NEW	1893	
Norway	NOR	1945	
Sweden	SWD	1919	
Switzerland	SWZ	1971	
Trinidad and Tobago	TRI	1962	
United Kingdom	UKG	1928	
United States	USA	1920	
Venezuela	VEN	1959	

Note: Due to data availability, the sample for the regressions in Chapter 2 varied slightly according to whether the political terror scale (AIPTS) or executive constraints (EXCONST) was used as the dependent variable. Luxembourg and the Bahamas are included in the AIPTS regressions (Tables 2.1 and 2.3), but not the EXCONST regressions (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Conversely, Mauritius is included in the executive constraint regressions, but not the political terror scale regressions.

Table A2.2: Variable definitions

Variable	Description	Definition	Source
<i>EXCONST</i>	Executive constraints	Extent of institutionalised constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executive, 1-7 scale	Marshall and Jagers (2002)
<i>AIPTS</i>	Political terror scale	Amnesty International reports of human rights violations on a 1-5 scale; missing values from U.S. State Department	Gibney <i>et al.</i> (2008)
<i>DEMOS</i>	Number of demonstrations	Number of peaceful gatherings of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature	Banks (2005)
<i>GDPCAP</i>	Real G.D.P. per capita	G.D.P. per capita in 2000 U.S. dollars	World Bank
<i>GINI</i>	Gini coefficient	Gini coefficient: 0 indicates total equality; 1 indicates total inequality	Milanovic (2005)
<i>POP</i>	Population	Total population	World Bank
<i>BRITCOL</i>	Former British colony	Former British-administered territory or Commonwealth country	Institute of Commonwealth Studies
<i>ETHNIC</i>	Ethnic fractionalisation index	Index of ethnic divisions on a 0-1 scale, where 1 indicates maximum division	Alesina <i>et al.</i> (2003)
<i>LING</i>	Linguistic fractionalisation index	Index of language-based divisions on a 0-1 scale, where 1 indicates maximum division	Alesina <i>et al.</i> (2003)
<i>CIVWAR</i>	Civil war	Dummy variable for whether country experienced a domestic armed insurgency and/or civil war in given year	Gleditsch <i>et al.</i> (2002)

Appendix 3: World Values Survey responses, wave 1995-1998

Table A3.1: Attitude towards having a political system where the army rules

Country	Very good	Fairly good	Fairly bad	Very bad
<i>New Democracies</i>				
Albania	46.50%	35.50%	11.50%	6.40%
Argentina	3.40%	9.50%	27.90%	59.20%
Armenia	4.20%	14.40%	37.60%	43.80%
Bangladesh	1.00%	5.80%	23.10%	70.10%
Brazil	9.80%	35.60%	29.50%	25.10%
Bulgaria	5.50%	11.30%	35.30%	47.90%
Chile	4.20%	26.60%	39.50%	29.70%
Croatia	4.40%	9.90%	20.90%	64.80%
El Salvador	6.00%	33.10%	40.00%	21.00%
Germany	0.20%	1.30%	13.50%	85.10%
Hungary	1.80%	3.10%	16.70%	78.30%
Latvia	0.70%	4.50%	26.90%	67.90%
Philippines	10.10%	43.20%	34.30%	12.40%
Romania	6.60%	18.20%	24.30%	50.90%
Russian Federation	4.30%	16.70%	45.40%	33.60%
Slovakia	0.70%	4.20%	21.60%	73.50%
Slovenia	1.70%	4.70%	18.10%	75.50%
Spain	1.60%	7.50%	31.20%	59.70%
Turkey	7.90%	24.60%	43.70%	23.80%
Ukraine	2.60%	9.20%	39.70%	48.50%
Uruguay	2.00%	6.20%	42.30%	49.50%
<i>Average</i>	<i>5.96%</i>	<i>15.48%</i>	<i>29.67%</i>	<i>48.89%</i>
<i>Old democracies</i>				
Australia	1.20%	5.80%	17.80%	75.20%
Columbia	8.40%	25.20%	43.60%	22.70%
Finland	2.40%	9.00%	32.80%	55.80%
Great Britain	1.70%	4.60%	12.10%	81.60%
India	13.20%	23.40%	22.70%	40.60%
Japan	0.40%	2.20%	11.80%	85.60%
Republic of Korea	0.70%	4.40%	19.40%	75.50%
New Zealand	0.60%	1.80%	11.60%	86.10%
Norway	1.00%	3.60%	24.80%	70.60%
Sweden	0.50%	3.20%	24.20%	72.00%
Switzerland	1.50%	3.50%	26.00%	69.00%
Venezuela	11.10%	14.90%	33.90%	40.10%
United States	1.50%	5.00%	16.80%	76.60%
<i>Average</i>	<i>3.40%</i>	<i>8.20%</i>	<i>22.88%</i>	<i>65.49%</i>

Source: World Values Survey, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>

Appendix 4: Data appendix for Chapter 4

Table A4.1: Pooled regression estimates

Variable	(i) <i>HARSH</i>	(ii) <i>MILD</i>
<i>EVENTS</i>	0.011*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)
<i>REALGDPCAP</i>	-0.022 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.007)
<i>YRSELEC0</i>	-0.066 (0.137)	-0.134 (0.081)
<i>YRSELEC1</i>	-0.097 (0.111)	-0.083 (0.079)
<i>YRSELEC2</i>	0.149 (0.181)	-0.135* (0.080)
<i>GOVPARTYREP</i>	0.004 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.004)
<i>SECTERM</i>	-0.087 (0.179)	0.118 (0.110)
<i>FIRSTRDPER</i>	-0.004 (0.008)	0.002 (0.005)
PARTY coefficients:		
PDT	0.120 (0.150)	0.086 (0.053)
PFL	0.087 (0.124)	0.138* (0.078)
PL	0.180 (0.157)	0.321*** (0.083)
PMDB	0.031 (0.118)	0.072 (0.093)
PPB	-0.063 (0.085)	-0.008 (0.041)
PPR	0.107 (0.150)	0.180 (0.113)
PPS	-0.019 (0.101)	0.037 (0.057)
PSB	0.060 (0.082)	-0.007 (0.063)
PSDB	0.534** (0.228)	0.221** (0.105)
PSL	0.042* (0.079)	0.061** (0.026)
PTB	-0.069 (0.131)	0.091 (0.090)
Constant	-0.123 (0.484)	-0.255 (0.217)
R-squared	0.199	0.264
Number of observations	241	241

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Table A4.2: Regressions using separate repression measures

Variable	(i) Arrests	(ii) Physical beatings	(iii) Acts of torture	(iv) Murders	(v) Attempted murders
<i>EVENTS</i>	0.466*** (0.131)	0.217 (0.160)	0.033** (0.016)	0.001 (0.008)	0.023 (0.028)
<i>REALGDPCAP</i>	0.651 (1.637)	0.692 (2.663)	0.303 (0.318)	0.095 (0.207)	0.331 (0.398)
<i>YRSELECO</i>	-6.287 (4.579)	-13.72 (8.530)	-0.571 (0.664)	-0.290 (0.597)	-0.793 (0.863)
<i>YRSELEC1</i>	-5.303 (4.706)	-7.176 (8.361)	-0.780 (0.523)	-0.781 (0.498)	-0.634 (0.742)
<i>YRSELEC2</i>	-3.138 (4.402)	-13.18 (8.749)	0.136 (0.960)	-0.754 (0.486)	1.485 (1.340)
<i>GOVPARTYREP</i>	0.615*** (0.217)	0.895* (0.529)	0.104*** (0.038)	0.044* (0.025)	0.105** (0.053)
<i>SECTERM</i>	2.611 (3.817)	-8.309 (9.371)	0.02 (0.654)	-1.362** (0.640)	-1.123 (1.491)
<i>FIRSTRDPER</i>	0.024 (0.193)	0.882* (0.476)	0.059 (0.028)	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.01 (0.047)
PARTY coefficients:					
PDT	1.09 (6.843)	-3.064 (13.129)	0.482 (1.332)	1.236 (0.860)	3.011* (1.713)
PFL	6.373 (8.319)	-3.653 (7.158)	-0.021 (0.929)	-0.478 (0.512)	0.101 (1.186)
PL	20.298* (11.141)	58.784*** (15.79)	3.293** (1.353)	0.847 (0.673)	1.857 (1.792)
PMDB	-4.236 (4.229)	-2.019 (7.950)	-0.351 (0.769)	-0.269 (0.334)	-0.189 (0.842)
PPB	-13.383 (8.182)	-27.923 (14.087)	-2.323** (1.087)	-0.335 (0.624)	-0.406 (1.504)
PPR	4.176 (10.92)	-0.66 (9.882)	2.218* (1.323)	-0.694 (0.529)	0.055 (1.126)
PPS	12.848 (8.259)	5.737 (7.454)	0.968 (1.031)	-0.160 (0.566)	-0.502 (1.240)
PSB	2.460 (5.009)	-13.262 (22.682)	1.626 (1.068)	0.202** (0.503)	1.642 (1.153)
PSDB	-0.771 (7.843)	9.724 (10.214)	1.285 (1.061)	0.924 (0.448)	1.955 (1.337)
PSL	-3.054 (9.368)	-33.765* (19.599)	-1.198 (1.246)	-0.512 (0.793)	0.513 (2.456)
PTB	-11.429 (9.730)	-43.046* (22.859)	-2.268 (1.439)	-1.935** (0.953)	-0.979 (2.720)
Constant	-7.517 (15.483)	-49.54* (28.857)	-5.964** (2.906)	1.170 (1.732)	-2.074 (3.729)
R-squared	0.52	0.23	0.27	0.69	0.29
Number of observations	241	241	241	241	241

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Table A4.3: Fixed effect regressions with coalition representation

Variable	(i) <i>HARSH</i>	(ii) <i>MILD</i>
<i>EVENTS</i>	0.004 (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)
<i>REALGDPCAP</i>	0.066 (0.069)	0.014 (0.031)
<i>YRSELECO</i>	-0.148 (0.132)	-0.182** (0.087)
<i>YRSELEC1</i>	-0.177 (0.115)	-0.120 (0.080)
<i>YRSELEC2</i>	0.124 (0.190)	-0.141 (0.085)
<i>GOVPARTYREP</i>	0.027*** (0.010)	0.016*** (0.006)
<i>COALITIONREP</i>	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.003)
<i>SECTERM</i>	-0.151 (0.207)	-0.017 (0.084)
<i>FIRSTRDPER</i>	0.006 (0.008)	0.008 (0.006)
PARTY coefficients:		
PDT	0.494** (0.233)	-0.003 (0.137)
PFL	0.003 (0.179)	0.050 (0.110)
PL	0.015 (0.342)	0.585*** (0.203)
PMDB	-0.022 (0.143)	-0.054 (0.090)
PPB	-0.051 (0.223)	-0.337 (0.150)
PPR	0.02 (0.228)	0.029 (0.154)
PPS	-0.353 (0.275)	0.104 (0.178)
PSB	0.282 (0.183)	-0.079 (0.187)
PSDB	0.405* (0.225)	0.081 (0.160)
PSL	0.124 (0.339)	-0.260 (0.187)
PTB	-0.32 (0.370)	-0.459** (0.211)
Constant	-0.968 (0.655)	-0.723** (0.342)
R-squared	0.43	0.45
Number of observations	241	241

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Table A4.4: Regressions using re-election in place of second term

Variable	(i) <i>HARSH</i>	(ii) <i>MILD</i>
<i>EVENTS</i>	0.005 0.003 (0.066)	0.007*** (0.002)
<i>REALGDPCAP</i>	0.090 (0.066)	0.011 (0.026)
<i>YRSELEC0</i>	-0.131 (0.125)	-0.184** (0.087)
<i>YRSELEC1</i>	-0.16 (0.106)	-0.121 (0.083)
<i>YRSELEC2</i>	0.121 (0.191)	-0.14* (0.084)
<i>GOVPARTYREP</i>	0.019** (0.008)	0.016*** (0.005)
<i>REELECTION</i>	0.065 (0.110)	0.075 (0.075)
<i>FIRSTRDPER</i>	0.000 (0.007)	0.007 (0.005)
PARTY coefficients:		
PDT	0.479* (0.258)	-0.045 (0.134)
PFL	-0.054 (0.181)	0.016 (0.103)
PL	0.359 (0.278)	0.705*** (0.178)
PMDB	-0.043 (0.142)	-0.078 (0.088)
PPB	-0.191 (0.330)	-0.474** (0.226)
PPR	0.120 (0.184)	0.002 (0.142)
PPS	-0.149 (0.201)	0.114 (0.113)
PSB	0.244 (0.186)	-0.137 (0.202)
PSDB	0.305 (0.196)	0.032 (0.134)
PSL	0.169 (0.326)	-0.350* (0.202)
PTB	-0.202 (0.441)	-0.623** (0.299)
Constant	-1.007 (0.637)	-0.735 (0.336)
R-squared	0.42	0.45
Number of observations	241	241

Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.