INDIAN HI-TECH IMMIGRANTS IN CANADA:

Emerging Gendered Divisions of Labour

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Abstract

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In this thesis, I draw on the particular experiences of Indian hi-tech immigrants arriving in a growing Canadian technological cluster, the Waterloo Region, located in south-western Ontario. This bilateral pattern of international labour migration between India and Canada reflects both nations' efforts to enhance their economic competitiveness in a global knowledge economy: India as a global exporter and Canada as an importer of knowledge professionals. The stereotypical association of Indian nationals with technology work brings both restrictions and opportunities for Indian hi-tech immigrants navigating a racialised as well as gendered technology labour market in the Waterloo Region. My main aim is to reveal a microcosm of gendered negotiations involving individual economic migrants, their skilled spouses, their employers and the welfare state, particularly in the guise of officials regulating migration and access to childcare. The complex set of individual behaviours, ideologies, attitudes and practices all contribute to the emergence and maintenance of, as well as challenges to, particular gendered divisions of productive and reproductive work among these new entrants to Canada, as they lose the significant employment, social and familial networks and supports that typically are available in India. These Indian newcomer families view their responsibilities to their family to be as significant as their engagement in the Canadian labour market, as well as the advancement of their individual careers. In practice, however, familial responsibilities remain a more significant aspect of women's lives, reproducing gendered divisions of both paid and unpaid work that mirror traditional gender roles and ideologies. The labour market participation of this particular group of Indian hi-tech immigrants, and especially professional immigrant mothers, is limited by the non-recognition of foreign credentials and cultural and/or racial discrimination but perhaps to an even greater extent by the lack of sufficient provisions for reproductive work under Canada's liberal welfare state.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: Migration, Work and Family Life **1**

Research questions 3

Made in India: Shaping workers for the demands of global knowledge markets 7

Canada, the land of opportunities: Patterns of international labour migration 11

Widening 'the immigrant question' 22

Outline of the thesis 24

CHAPTER 2: Putting together a theoretical toolkit **27**

The rise of the new economy: Creating demand for transnational knowledge workers 29

Why and how do migrants move in the era of new capitalism? 34

Using Pierre Bourdieu to understand immigrants' labour market performance 40

Iris Marion Young's arguments help where Bourdieu's theorisations fall short 47

Difference along an axis of gender 50

The gendered organisation of technology sectors 52

Combining work and family: A women's issue? 57

Who is responsible for care? 62

Canada's liberal welfare state 67

Concluding remarks 74

CHAPTER 3: 'You know what I mean': Researching as a partial insider **76**

The case study as a research strategy 77

The Waterloo Region - Canada's Technology Triangle: A case study 80

A reflexive approach to interviewing 86

Maintaining the integrity of multiple voices in the study 98

Crossing the permeable insider/outsider divide 101

CHAPTER 4: The construction of Indian hi-tech workers in the Waterloo cluster 111
Canada's race for the Indian technological talent 114
The devaluation of Indian hi-tech immigrants' social and cultural capital 122
Conversion Tactics: Playing Canada's technology field 131
Conclusions: Foot in the door or double-edged sword? 138

CHAPTER 5: At managers' discretion: The gendered organisation of work 144
Family-friendly or flexploitation 153
Highly demanding yet highly rewarding: The employees' perspectives 169
Conclusions: The ideal self-regulating disembodied worker 182

CHAPTER 6: 'I thought it would be easy': Negotiating the dual transition of settlement and parenthood 187
The gendered division of work among professional migrant couples 190
Beyond homo economicus: Deciding to move to Canada 196
Managing the second shift by putting together a childcare jigsaw 206
Who does the chores? 225
Conclusions: The concept of social care for transnational families in Canada 230

CHAPTER 7: Conclusions 236
Work-life balance of immigrant women in professional occupations 241
Making a case for widening 'the immigrant question' in Canada 246

APPENDIX 1: The organisations 249

APPENDIX 2: The technology companies 257

APPENDIX 3: The Indian hi-tech immigrant families 259

REFERENCES 263

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURES

Figure 1: The Waterloo Region, circle over Canada's Technology Triangle…….3

Figure 2: Number of immigrants and the immigration ratio, 1900 to 2010…….13

Figure 3: Immigrants to Canada by immigration category, 1981 to 2011……...15

Figure 4: Indian immigrants by immigration category, 1981-2009……...19

Figure 5: Location of the Waterloo Region in south-western Ontario……..81

TABLES

Table 4.1. Changes in industrial composition, Waterloo Region, 2000-2007……..119

Table 5.1. A profile of technology companies interviewed in 2010……...147

Table 6.1. Indian newcomer families' primary childcare arrangements, 2010…….224

CHAPTER 1

Migration, Work and Family Life

This is a thesis about immigration, work, both in the workplace, and the home, and family life. I draw on the particular experiences of Indian hi-tech professionals who navigate complex migration regulations to leave their homes and support networks in India to move to Canada, in search of better educational and employment opportunities and also to improve their families' standards of living in a new host country. After a long, complex and arduous immigration application process, numerous health and criminal checks in India, a twenty-four hour journey, biometric checks and countless signatures in one of Canada's ports of entry, these economic migrants see the "Welcome to Canada" sign and enter what is to become their new home. In the thesis, I investigate their transitions of settlement and parenthood in a new host society that is culturally and linguistically different from their own society. My aim is to explore the gendered divisions of paid and unpaid work in newcomer professional households that emerge as they, Indian hi-tech immigrants and their skilled spouses, enter a racialised and gendered technology labour market. I intend to reveal a microcosm of gendered negotiations, involving individual economic migrants, their families, their employers and the state in the guise of officials regulating migration and access to childcare.

Policy measures and responses to economic migrants' incorporation into Canadian society tend to be myopic in their focus on the individual migrant and their transition into local labour markets, in order to contribute to the host economy. This myopic focus is also reflected in the skills bias in Canada's migration regulations as the national economy transitions towards more knowledge-based industries. I argue

that there is a need to recognise migration as a family strategy based on the experiences of economic migrants who typically arrive with dependent family members and also who continue to maintain transnational familial relationships across national borders. Individuals' engagement with labour markets both influences and is influenced by their roles within their family. Academic investigations and policy measures directed towards the incorporation of economic migrants, therefore, need to recognise their labour market performance as well as their negotiations of familial obligations in a different host culture.

The case study at the heart of this thesis is located in the Waterloo Region, a growing technology concentration, also known as Canada's Technology Triangle, which includes the tri-city area of Kitchener, Cambridge and Waterloo (highlighted in the red circle in Figure 1). The region is becoming a significant secondary settlement area for skilled newcomers to Canada (as compared to the three most popular Canadian gateway cities Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal). In this first chapter, I identify the primary research questions. I then briefly discuss both India's and Canada's responses to the rise of a global knowledge-based economy, as a global exporter and importer of knowledge workers respectively. In conclusion, I provide an outline of the remaining chapters.

Figure 1: The Waterloo Region, circle over Canada's Technology Triangle.



Source: The Regional Municipality of Waterloo Locator. Snapshot adapted from http://maps.region.waterloo.on.ca/locator/locator.htm

Research questions

In the thesis, I focus on a particular segment of skilled economic migrants: Indian hi-tech workers who migrate to and settle in Canada. The bilateral pattern of international labour migration between India and Canada reflects both nations' efforts to enhance their economic competitiveness and in effect improve their respective positions in what has been identified by some academic commentators as the neoliberal knowledge-based global market economy (Beck, 2000; Carnoy, 2002; Castells, 1996; 2001; Sennett, 1998; 2006). In the following sections, I provide a more detailed discussion of this bilateral pattern of immigration. Despite the global economic recession, the Canadian federal government continues to selectively admit skilled immigrants to

contribute to the nation's developing knowledge-based economy. Ontario, the most populous province, is host to a growing number of hi-tech companies housed in one of three technology clusters (Toronto, Waterloo and Ottawa-Gatineau) (Lucas, Sands and Wolfe, 2009). The province receives about half of the total number of immigrants in any given year. In 2006, 55 percent of the total number of immigrants in Canada entered Ontario, of whom 14 percent were from Southern Asia (including India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal) (Statistics Canada, 2011).

India has responded strategically to the rise of knowledge-based industries and the global demand for Information Technology (IT) products and workers in countries in the global North in two ways. First, India developed a highly successful IT-Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) sector to capture a large share of global trade in software services, establishing its global reputation as the first stop for offshoring IT services. Indian workers could provide these services at a low-cost advantage and the Indian environment became a financially attractive location for large multinational technology companies who moved their back office functions and in some cases entire operations to the growing number of hi-tech cities in India (Aneesh, 2001; Arora et al., 2001; Dossani and Kenney, 2009; Khadria, 2001). Secondly, India targeted its national vocational framework to effectively train a mobile transnational class of professionals who contribute as skilled economic migrants to national economies in the global North. At the same time, this class of professionals actively construct a new India that is global in scope (Radhakrishnan, 2008; Vertovec, 2002). Although India's share of global software market revenues of over US$ 300-500 billion in 1999-2002 is still a tiny fraction (US$ 5.7 billion), India attracts a disproportionate share of interest as a source of software (Arora et al., 2001). The supply of low-cost software professionals is believed to be the key to India's success and dominance within its borders and in providing software services globally.

In the thesis, I draw on the experiences of this transnational class of professionals who arrive in Canada through skilled migration channels, often with equally skilled partners, who are also hoping to enter the Canadian workforce. Indian professionally qualified women are as likely as men to apply as principal applicants especially when their educational attainments exceed that of their male partners. I explore how Indian dual-earner newcomer families balance the competing demands from paid work and their familial obligations in the home. In order to develop an information-rich account, I intentionally restricted the analysis to one axis of difference, gender, by purposefully selecting a segment of immigrants that is homogenous in almost all other respects.

The group consists of men and women from similar socio-economic, religious and educational backgrounds who moved from large urban cities in India to the Waterloo Region in Canada as permanent residents or as internal company transfers from the Indian counterparts of global multinational companies with offices in Canada. All internal company transfers are automatically considered for permanent residency in Canada. The hi-tech multinational companies they work for sponsor their immigration applications as soon as they become eligible, that is, two years after joining of these Canadian companies. These economic migrants are now employed in hi-tech companies in the area. All participants are aged between 30 and 50 and so part of the age cohort most likely to have young families that require non-parental childcare arrangements if both parents are successful in gaining employment. I show how the complex set of individual behaviours, ideologies, attitudes and practices all contribute to the emergence and maintenance, as well as challenges to, particular gendered divisions of productive and reproductive work, especially as they lose significant employment, social and familial networks of supports typically available in India. In the thesis, I pose and answer a number of interrelated research questions.

1. How are Indian hi-tech professionals, admitted on the basis of their potential contribution to advancing Canada's position in a globalised, neoliberal, knowledge-based market economy, constructed in the Canadian labour market?

2. How does a stereotypical association of Indian nationals with high technology work affect Indian hi-tech immigrants' engagement with a racialised and gendered Canadian labour market?

3. How do dual-earner immigrant families of Indian-origin make the decision to migrate, enter the labour market and manage their reproductive roles within the family?
    a. What strategies and resources are employed by professional couples to manage their commitment, responsibilities and obligations to paid work in technology companies and their family?
    b. What gendered divisions of paid work and unpaid work in the home emerge when both spouses enter the Canadian workforce?
    c. What is the role of intergenerational transnational relationships?

4. What is the role of organisations, markets, charitable and voluntary sectors, and the welfare state in assisting with or providing alternatives for both childcare and other forms of reproductive work historically performed by individual women in their home?

These questions are at the heart of my empirical analysis and are the subject of chapters 4, 5, and 6.

Made in India: Shaping workers for the demands of global knowledge markets

India's decision to develop a national vocational framework that emphasises information technologies and software training was part of a two-pronged development strategy. The first aim was to produce a reliable national supply of highly skilled and low-cost workers to capture a significant portion of world trade in software, intended to increase national revenues and foreign direct investment in India. Starting in 1995, the practice of offshoring services in India began shifting the geography of global economic activity. Compared to Ireland and Israel that made similar efforts to capture a share of the global supply of IT and software, India maintains its dominant presence, having the largest number of people working in the industry, the highest rate of growth of revenue but also the lowest revenues per employee (Arora et al., 2001).

The deregulation of telecommunications in India in 2000 led to a dramatic increase in the digitisation of knowledge production, allowing Indian software vendors to offer services at significantly lower prices than their global competitors. Arora et al. (2001), in their overview of the Indian software services industry, found that despite India's dominance in software exports, the bulk of it is in fairly mundane services such as low-level programming and maintenance. In a more recent analysis, Dossani and Kenney (2009) found that Indian firms are expanding to higher value-added services supported by the emergence of a large multinational companies, including IBM and Accenture, who began moving operations to the India to benefit from the lower marginal costs of production. India's success in offshoring IT services parallels China's global dominance in manufacturing (Dossani and Kenney, 2009).

The second aim of India's two-pronged economic development strategy is to 'export' Indian-trained professionals to serve the growing numbers of knowledge industries in the global North. India hopes to raise the country's profile in the global

technology market and also encourage some successful Non-Resident Indians (NRI) to return with additional skills and knowledge from their labour market experiences and networks in the West in order to build successful ventures in India. In March 2007, there were more than 1.25 million Indians delivering software services remotely. In several of the IT multinational companies, numbers of Indian workers are greater than any other nation, except those born in the respective home countries (Arora et al., 2001; Dossani and Kenney, 2009).

One of the earliest avenues of India's supply of highly trained, low-cost professionals to global markets was through agency work known as 'body shopping', whereby local recruiters focussed on IT in India to supply on-site, just-in-time labour at a competitive price to employers in hi-tech companies worldwide (Aneesh, 2001; Xiang, 2001; 2007). These workers were typically men moving temporarily without their families, either individually or in groups, for short-term contracts. Practices of 'body shopping' in India have existed since the 1980s and have over time become increasingly more organised and ubiquitous (Khadria, 2001).

The success of India's 'body shopping' practices in IT sectors worldwide is attributable to a large extent to the short-term and project-based nature of IT work in general. Global employers could fairly easily delegate all monetary, administrative and legal responsibilities to intermediary agencies in India. These intermediary agencies are well networked amongst themselves, helping them to become quickly aware of labour market trends and in turn to better address employers' (technology firms worldwide) needs quickly while relieving them of the administrative challenges involved in the immigration process (e.g. applying for and acquiring visas) (Xiang, 2001; 2007). These agencies provide a well-informed buffer between the Indian technology labour market and global employers.

The pioneering and still the most established intermediary agency in India is Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), an outsourcing company for IT services and technological business operations. TCS established the first BPO service based in India and also began exporting the first groups of IT workers. Since TCS began operations in the 1970s, several smaller and medium-sized agencies have emerged across all major cities in India, 'body shopping' workers mainly to the United States and to a lesser extent to Europe (Arora et al., 2001; D'Costa, 2003; Schware, 1987). With the proliferation of many such body shops across India, some have been associated with various kinds of degrees of fraud, including corruption, bribery, falsifying workers' qualifications and claiming that positions exist but instead putting IT workers who travel to sit 'on the bench' in anticipation of specific demands from employers (Martin, 2002; Xiang, 2001; 2007).

Multinational technology companies, with headquarters mainly in the US and Europe, have developed laboratories in their technological counterparts in India including Bangalore, Hyderabad, New Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai. The entrepreneurial presence and success of Indians has been growing rapidly since the 1990s. Indians headed about three percent of the technology companies established globally between 1980 and 1984. By 2000, they were running about ten percent of the technology companies started in the 1990s (Saxenian, 2002). Arora et al. (2001) argued that the greatest impact of India's global presence in software services might well be indirect: its role as an entrepreneurial inspiration.

One of the most successful examples of India's entrepreneurial success and also one of the most well researched affluent Indian diaspora is comprised of Indian IT professionals in Silicon Valley in California. The long history of Indian migration to the US and the success of Indian migrants in acquiring permanent and influential positions in the Silicon Valley inevitably influenced economic development in India in two ways.

First, this successful group of migrants in the US were able to transfer technology know-how by returning to India to start new businesses. Secondly, influential and well-positioned members of this NRI group began to shape policies and the institutional environment in India, facilitating the nation's participation in the global technology market. Anna-Lee Saxenian (2006) called this growing group of US-educated but foreign-born entrepreneurs the new Argonauts - armed with knowledge and networks from global technology markets, placing them in a strong position to mobilise the necessary capital and labour for successful ventures in India and globally.

Between 2000 and 2006, the percentage of Indian science and engineering talent in the Silicon Valley grew from about 20 percent to 28 percent of the total workforce (Saxenian, 2006). Indian immigrants who were often excluded from established networks quickly created ethnic social and professional networks in order to support their career advancement and entrepreneurial success. The affluent US-based Indian diaspora was tempted to return and re-establish their position in India. They developed networks with companies, professionals and relevant policymakers in order to facilitate their new business ventures in India (Saxenian, 2002; 2006; Radhakrishnan, 2008).

In 1999, some of the most successful NRI entrepreneurs in the valley began actively building bridges in India and joined in the market successes of Indian firms like Infosys, Wipro and Satyam (Saxenian 2002). In 2000, Indian engineers were leaders in 972 Silicon-Valley based technology companies, accounting for approximately US$5 billion in sales and 25,811 jobs (Saxenian, 2006). Indian immigrants have founded some of the iconic Silicon Valley firms, including Sun Microsystems (Vinod Khosla), Brocade (Kumar Malavalli), Cirrus Logic (Suhas Patil) and Hotmail (Sabeer Bhatia). NRIs also played a significant role in deregulating the

telecommunications industry in India, 'improving' the local regulatory environment to cater for global technology interventions and investment.

Despite the long history of Indian technological presence in the US, the growing global recognition of Indian-trained IT professionals has led to other countries in the global North joining in the race for Indian talent. Canada has a long history of Indian immigration; however, in this thesis I will focus on the more recent arrivals of Indian IT professionals who are admitted through skilled immigration channels to contribute to technology clusters in Canada. Lucas, Sands and Wolfe (2009) identified eight distinct technology clusters in Canada. In comparison to the breadth and depth of research on the Silicon Valley, these technology clusters have been under-researched. The case study of Canada's Technology Triangle (Waterloo Region, Ontario) in this thesis contributes to filling this gap.

Canada, the land of opportunities: Patterns of international labour migration


Canada's levels of immigration continue surpass those of other member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In a recent OECD report on the number of immigrants and expatriates in its member countries, the percentage of foreign-born is highest in Canada (approximately 20 percent) (Dumont and Lemaitre, 2005). Canada has a long history of strategically using migration regulations to meet its economic objectives. During its formative years as a British dominion up until the record lows of immigration levels in the early 1940s, the federal government actively recruited farmers from the UK, the US and Western Europe to settle the western provinces and contribute exclusively to the then dominant resource-based economy.

Canadian immigration laws from 1885 until 1962 were explicitly racist in both wording and intent. The federal government used targeted policies to prohibit non-White and non-European migration to build a preferred Canadian identity as a White British settler colony in demographic, cultural and institutional terms (Abu-Laban, 1998; Taylor, 1991; Wayland, 1997).[1] The declining fertility rates and growing labour shortages in the post-World War II period led to three significant immigration policy changes. Some social theorists argue that these changes were to some extent the result of growing international political pressures from the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation, a multiracial commonwealth and national immigrant lobby groups to correct the inherent racism in historical Canadian immigration policy (Taylor, 1991). The gradual economic recovery of traditional source countries in Northwestern Europe dramatically reduced immigrant flow to Canada from these regions. Meanwhile, the onset of a sustained economic boom, ending in the 1960s, pushed the Canadian federal government to look elsewhere to compensate for these declining numbers of immigrants and the growing demand for foreign workers (Green and Green, 1995).

Figure 2 below shows the patterns of immigration using both the total numbers of immigrants (bars) and the immigration ratio (line) expressed as immigrants per 1,000 of the total population. It clearly shows that the total number of immigrants and immigration ratio has been relatively steady in the last four decades, showing no significant declines despite the current economic recession.

[1] Some examples of the Canadian federal government's racist and discriminatory immigration policies include the 1885 Chinese Immigration Act (placing a head tax exclusively on Chinese immigrants) and the 1906 Immigration Act permitting the government to effectively prohibit the landing of any immigrant group. A critical revision to the act in 1923 imposed an immigration tax and "single continuous journey" requirement affecting mainly immigrants from India and Sri Lanka.

Figure 2: Number of immigrants and the immigration ratio, 1900 to 2010



Source: Figures for Migration: International 2009 (Milan, 2011)

The first significant policy change in the post World War II period occurred in 1962, when the long-standing system of European preference was revoked. In 1966, the liberal government under Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson supported the White Paper on Immigration that proposed to develop a more universally applicable framework to determine admission. The second significant immigration policy change was the implementation of the Points System, in 1967, used to assess objectively the admissibility of applicants for permanent residency regardless of their place of origin or their ethnocultural similarities to the dominant construction of a White-European Canada.

Two noticeable trends began to emerge as a result of these ongoing policy changes to supposedly rectify the inherently discriminatory practices of Canada's immigration policy at the time (Abu-Laban, 1998; Hiebert and Pendakur, 2003). First,

these two policy changes contributed to the arrival of a large influx of economic migrants from what Canada considered to be traditionally non-preferred regions – Asia, Latin America and Africa. Secondly, under this system of admission, points are awarded on the basis of assumed adaptability to the Canadian economy and society. In response to perceived shortages, immigration policy started to be biased towards skilled migration. The Points System evaluates the individual applicants' education, age, language proficiency and targeted characteristics such as job arrangements prior to immigration and also whether they intended to enter occupations facing perceived shortages in Canada's labour markets.


Similar to other countries in the global north, Canada is moving towards what is identified as 'the new economy' in academic literature, policy documents and the media: where technological progress and human capital are seen as the basis of global economic competiveness and growth. Between 1971 and 2001, the percentage of the total workforce in knowledge occupations[2] in Canada had grown from 14 percent to 25 percent and between 1998 and 2007 the percentage grew by another 20 percent (Statistics Canada, 2010). The emergence of ICT industries in the 1990s significantly contributed to accelerating this growth (Baldwin and Beckstead, 2003).

The focus on economic migrants in the form of foreign professionals and international students inevitably raised the proportion of the labour force that has completed university-level qualifications and therefore, has the requisite qualifications and skills to contribute to the growing numbers of knowledge industries. More than half of all immigrants admitted to Canada every year since 1995 have entered through the economic category. In 2010, there was an upward shift in the planned range of

[2] Statistics Canada (2010) refers to knowledge occupations as those requiring higher levels of education, such as natural and applied sciences and related sectors; health; social science, education, government service and religion; art, culture, recreation and sport.

economic immigrants: preliminary data shows that about two-thirds (66.6 percent) of all immigrants arrived under skilled categories. This is in contrast to immigration levels in earlier periods of economic recession. For example, during the early 1980s economic immigrants were only permitted on the basis of pre-arranged employment and the share of immigrants entering through the family class was higher.

Figure 3: Immigrants to Canada by immigration category, 1981 to 2011.



Source: Adapted from Facts and figures 2010 Preliminary (CIC, 2010).

1. Shown in five-year intervals and as a percentage of total numbers of immigrants.
2. The category *Others* includes deferred removal order class, post-determination refugee claimants, temporary resident permit holders, humanitarian and compassionate cases, public policy cases and unknowns.

The third significant policy change occurred almost four decades later: the implementation of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) on June 28, 2002. The IPRA act was intended to increase the general levels of educational attainment and skills amongst new immigrants by excluding explicit occupational criteria and focussing on education, work experience, age, arranged employment and

knowledge of official languages (Iredale, 2005).[3] In the 2000s, Asia, including the Middle East, became a major source region for Canadian immigrants. Since 2004, China, India and the Philippines have consistently assumed the top three positions. Asian countries accounted for 57.1 percent of all immigrants to Canada in 2008 and 56.4 percent in 2009. China, India and the Philippines accounted for more than one-third of immigrants admitted to Canada in 2008 (34.1 percent) and 2009 (35.0 percent).

Indians have migrated to Canada since the early 1900s travelling with the British Army or working their way through Chinese and Japanese ports as merchant sailors (Buchignani, 1977). These groups primarily consisted of men settling in bachelor communities. Following India's independence from British colonial rule in 1947, and also Canada's efforts to remove the systemic racist bias in its immigration policy, Indians began to enter Canada through two main modes of entry: economic and family class.

India has been the second most common country of birth for immigrants arriving in Canada since 1995. It has been one of the top five source countries since at least 1980. Canada's recent industrial transition to a knowledge-based economy and the federal government's efforts to reshape migration regulations to welcome foreign-trained technology professionals in order to fill perceived skill shortages and raise Canada's global economic competitiveness is clearly evident in the changes to the mode of entry of Indian immigrants (Cooke and Schwartz, 2006; Gertler et al., 2002;

[3] The IRPA identifies four main categories under which permanent immigrants are admitted into the country: economic (skilled workers, business immigrants, live-in caregivers, provincial/territorial nominees, and since 2008, the Canadian experience workers and their dependents); family class (spouses, partners, children and other relatives of Canadian residents such as parents or grandparents); refugees (government assisted or privately sponsored refugees as well as refugees landed in Canada and dependents abroad); and other immigrants (immigrants admitted for humanitarian and compassionate or public policy reasons, temporary resident permit holders, immigrants facing deferred removal orders and post-refugee claimants).

Reitz, 2001; 2003). More than one in ten immigrants were from India in 2008 (11.3 percent) and 2009 (11.6 percent) (Statistics Canada, 2011).

Between 1997 and 2000, the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector in Canada grew at five times the rate of growth of the total economy. The number of skilled professionals arriving to work in technology occupations has grown from 876 individuals in 1990 to over 14,000 workers in 2002 (Novakowski and Tremblay, 2007). Two specific measures taken by the Canadian federal government and industries to incorporate the growing numbers of foreign professionals include the Special Program for Software Workers (a pilot project to fast track work permits for individuals applying in seven IT occupational categories) and the establishment of several professional associations with global networks, including the Information and Communication Technology Council (ICTC), the Information Technology Association of Canada (ITAC) and Canada's Associations of IT Professionals.

In a recent report, the ICTC (2011) did a comprehensive overview of the ICT sector in Canada, based on multiple sources of evidence including enrolment and immigration trends, econometric models of supply and demand of ICT skills, interviews with employers and workers and reviews of scholarly material. The ICTC predicted that Canada's ICT sector will encounter severe skills shortages over the next five years and that Canadian technology employers will need to hire approximately 106,335 workers over this period. Presently, the ICT workforce is younger than the overall labour force and continues to be primarily male-dominated. The share of women (approximately 25 percent) has not changed over the last decade. At a time of growing demand for ICT professionals, full-time undergraduate and college enrolments in mathematics and computer science have declined sharply. The bursting of the dot.com bubble between 2000 and 2001 triggered the decline. Enrolments bottomed out in 2007 to 2008.


This growing gap between local demand and supply of professionals contributes to the growing reliance on foreign-born and trained professionals to play a vital and increasing role in the national supply of ICT skills (ICTC, 2011). Based on 2006 census estimates, foreign professionals account for approximately 14 percent of the ICT labour force. Immigration of IT professionals peaked in 2005 with 9.670 persons immigrating to Canada who identified an ICT occupation as their intended field of work. The ICTC (2011) predicts that by 2015, 50 percent of Canada's ICT workforce is expected to come from outside Canada. Two countries contribute a disproportionate number of foreign-born and trained technology professionals: India and China. Here, I seek to explore to what extent India's dominant presence in the global technology market and the past successes of Indians in the Silicon Valley, that I have discussed earlier in the chapter, affect the performance of Indian hi-tech immigrants in Canada's ICT occupational sector.

In 2009, more than half of Indian immigrants entered under the economic category (54.2 percent) and 41.7 percent entered under the family class. Figure 4 clearly shows that the percentage of economic migrants from India began to surpass the percentage arriving through other modes of entry. Until the early 1990s, Indians arrived primarily through the family class category in compliance with the Canadian government's family reunification measures intended to compensate for historically racist immigration policies, which restricted the entry of women and children in fear of threats to the White-European identity. In order to assuage the growing dissent in the dominant South Asian communities across Canadian cities (primarily Sikhs in British Columbia), the government allowed the entry of a small number of women and children between 1920s and 1930s. The majority of these women were restricted to working in the home. The quota systems implemented in 1951 and eventually the Points System in 1967 allowed the historical Indian 'bachelor communities' to be

replaced gradually by economic migrants arriving as intact nuclear family units to settle permanently in Canada.

As I argued earlier, Canada's shaping of migration regulations in order to meet its economic objectives is reflected in the changes to the composition of Indian immigrants to Canada. The percentage of economic migrants from India as compared to the total number of Indian immigrants has grown from 18.1 percent in 1981 to 55.4 percent in 2009 and the percentage on Indian immigrants arriving through the family class has dropped from 81.5 percent in 1981 to 41.7 percent in 2009.

Figure 4: Indian immigrants by immigration category, 1981-2009.



Source: Adapted from Facts and figures 2010 Preliminary (CIC, 2010).

1. Shown in ten-year intervals.
2. The category *Others* includes deferred removal order class, post-determination refugee claimants, temporary resident permit holders, humanitarian and compassionate cases, public policy cases and unknowns.

At present, the main mode of entry for economic migrants of Indian-origin is the Skilled Worker and Professional Class, evaluating and admitting permanent residents on the basis of the Points System. Applicants must obtain 67 out of 100 points to be considered. Assisted relatives are allotted 15 bonus points if this threshold is not met. Applicants exceeding the threshold are assessed on a first-come first-served basis (Green and Green, 1995: 1009). More recently, amendments to the IRPA in 2008 resulted in the implementation of the new Canadian Experience Class (CEC) for applicants who can demonstrate at least two years of work experience and/or hold a degree from a Canadian post-secondary institution and who can demonstrate their knowledge of one of the official languages. About a quarter of the Indian hi-tech immigrant families in the study arrived on work permits as internal company transfers and at the time of the interview had acquired permanent residency through the CEC programme.

A significant overall finding of the ICTC (2011) report is that the specificity of employers' skill and experience requirements are central to the way that the ICT labour market in Canada operates. Causer and Jones (1993) found that professional organisations and national regulatory bodies attempting to formalise the IT field and specify a particular knowledge base or skill set have been relatively unsuccessful in monopolising access. ICT continues to be a technical field where self-learning and social networks are highly regarded. Global corporations issue internationally standardised certifications that are often more readily recognised (e.g. Sun Certified Java Programmer, Microsoft Certified Engineer, Cisco Certified Networking Associated, Systems, Applications and Products in Data Processing [SAP]). Nonetheless, the ICTC (2011) found that the consensus among Canadian employers is that universally recognised industrial certifications do not replace the importance of Canadian university or college degrees. In addition, the majority of ICT jobs required

three to eight years of relevant work experience (in this case, relevance is synonymous to Canadian).

This specific operation of the ICT labour market in Canada, emphasised by ICTC (2011), might explain the typical experience of foreign-educated and trained professionals whose credentials and work experience, acquired in their home countries, is not recognised by Canadian employers. Canadian scholars across the social sciences have found substantial evidence indicating that skilled newcomers admitted as economic migrants to contribute to the Canadian economy encounter significant barriers to entry to a racialised (Bauder, 2006; Reitz, 1988; Reitz and Banerjee, 2009) and gendered labour market (Boyd 1984; 2006; George and Ramkissoon, 1998; Ng, 2005). These barriers take the form of the non-recognition of foreign educational and professional credentials and work experience, rejections on the basis of lack of Canadian work experience, and instances of racial/cultural discrimination based on skin colour, foreign accents, gestures, cultural practices and workplace behaviours. Skilled newcomers' labour market disadvantage is reflected in their higher levels of unemployment, underemployment and the substantial wage gap between immigrants and their Canadian-born and educated counterparts (Hiebert and Pendakur, 2003; Li, 2000; Picot and Sweetman, 2005).

In the thesis, I explore the labour market experiences of Indian hi-tech immigrants. They would appear to be welcomed to Canada by the federal government to contribute to the national knowledge economy that is struggling to meet its growing demand because of a declining local supply of professionals. I pose the following questions. Do Indian hi-tech immigrants, stereotypically associated with knowledge work, face a similar labour market disadvantage? How do they overcome any barriers to labour market entry? Does a gendered division of labour market participation and paid work emerge? How is this gendered division of paid work related to the gendered

division of unpaid work in the home? How do newcomer professional couples of Indian origin negotiate the often competing demands from work and home? The significant policy contribution of this study is to encourage Canadian policy-makers to ask similar questions about the gendered division of paid and unpaid work in order to effectively provide assistance to the growing numbers of newcomers, addressing 'the immigrant question'.

Widening 'the immigrant question'

The immigrant question in Canada is both academically and politically charged. The question has gained prominence as a political platform on which conservatives and liberals across jurisdictional divides (federal, provincial and municipal) battle out which political party represents whom along the native-born and immigrant divide. The typical policy response to the disadvantages specific to migrants and the appropriate assistance for newcomers is focussed almost entirely on what is identified as an issue of brain drain. Policy makers are most concerned with the heavy economic losses incurred as a result of the underutilisation of the much-needed skills brought to Canada by foreign-born professionals. On the basis of national economic interests, Canada offers immediate help to immigrants upon arrival in the form of language instruction, evaluation of foreign credentials (done mainly by professional regulatory bodies for specific occupational fields) as well as the provision of organisations and employment agencies dedicated to immigrant placement and mentoring.

The policy question of what assistance might be given to new Canadians and immigrant communities re-emerges during every electoral process. During the recently held provincial elections in Ontario, for example, the present Liberal government proposed a highly controversial $10,000 tax credit for employers who hire a foreign-

born new Canadian citizen who has been in Canada for five years or less. To qualify the migrant must be highly educated, highly skilled and planning to enter professions in defined fields, including engineering, architecture, healthcare and law. The Conservatives argued that such a policy was unfair affirmative action and if implemented it would be at the expense of the province's unemployed tax-paying citizens. The debate on this issue has now stalled, perhaps until the next electoral campaign. In spite of the Canadian government's efforts, recent immigrants, despite their higher levels of education and skills compared to previous cohorts, encounter a more acute labour market disadvantage. The income gap between the immigrants and the Canadian-born population is also growing (Frenette and Morrisette, 2005; Grant, 1999; Penkadur and Pendakur, 1998; 2004; Picot, 2008; Reitz, 2001).

Based on empirical evidence from the experiences of Indian hi-tech immigrants, discussed in the main body of the thesis, I make a case for the need to widen policy responses and government assistance for newcomers and migrants beyond issues of credentialism, attempting to increase recognition of foreign education and work experience. Policy makers need to recognise that for economic migrants who arrive with dependent families, parenthood and other familial obligations are a significant component of immigrants' labour market disadvantage and settlement in the host society. In order to encourage full labour market participation from all income-earning adults in newcomer families, there is a need to provide support for reproductive work, traditionally restricted to the private or home sphere. Policy responses to the immigrant question need to extend beyond economic migrants' labour market integration to incorporate information about and access to support for reproductive work that might not be as readily available to newcomers as compared to their native-born Canadians counterparts.

Outline of the thesis

The rest of the thesis is divided into six chapters. In Chapter 2, I draw together a set of separate theoretical and conceptual frameworks and approaches to build a theoretical toolkit to both show where my research questions came from and to situate the findings from the empirical study, stressing the Canadian context. The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first part, I critically assess the claims of transformation theorists (Carnoy, 2002; Castells, 1996; 2001; Coyle, 1999; Sennett, 1998; 2006) who promote the notion of an unprecedented emergence of the new or knowledge-based economy. I argue that the rise of this new economy contributes to the construction of a race for talent in the global North (Shachar, 2006), reshaping the image of the ideal international labour migrant (Appadurai, 1990; Arat-Koc, 1999; Bauder, 2006; Sassen, 1999). Using the theoretical work of the French Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and Political Scientist Iris Marion Young, I explore the theoretical explanations for skilled newcomers' labour market (dis)advantage (building on recent contributions by Canadian scholars including Bauder (2003; 2006); Creese and Wiebe (2009); Erel (2010); Girard and Bauder (2007); Kelly and Lusis (2006).

In the second part of Chapter 2, I emphasise the gendered implications of the migratory process (Abu-Laban, 1998; Boyd, 1997; Mahler and Pessar, 2006; Piper, 2005; Ng, 1990) and the organisation of work in technology sectors that are conventionally constructed as masculine and male-dominated (Acker, 1990; 1998). By drawing on these theoretical contributions, I show that Indian hi-tech immigrants enter a racialised as well as gendered Canadian labour market. A central argument in the thesis is that this group of transnational knowledge workers behave as strategic migrant actors who carefully deliberate their decision to migrate within a sequence of decisions to coordinate the life cycles of different family members (i.e. migration as a

family strategy). In this section, I also draw on feminist scholarship on the division of unpaid work in the home (Fraser, 1997; Hochschild, 1989; 1997; McRae, 2003; Sullivan, 2000) and the indispensable role of the welfare state in assisting with reproductive work, traditionally performed by women in the home, especially as a growing numbers of women participate in the workforce (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Lewis, 1992; 2001). These bodies of literature are useful in posing questions about how Indian hi-tech immigrants in dual-earner households meet their needs for non-parental care alternatives to fully participate in the technology workforce in the Waterloo Region.

In Chapter 3, I outline the primary methodological approaches of the study including the case study as a research method, detailed information on the case study area, data collection and analysis. In conclusion, I reflect on my partial insider status as a researcher conducting a study in an immigrant community that I identify with. I also provide some discussion on the ethical dilemmas and methodological challenges that emerged as a result, showing how I attempted to navigate these challenges to develop a narrative of my participants' lived experiences.

In Chapter 4, the first empirical chapter, I investigate the ways in which Indian hi-tech immigrants are constructed as a segment of the labour force in Canada, especially as the economy pushes to become a globally recognised high-tech competitor. Drawing on interviews with thirty participants (16 men and 14 women), I show how they employ conversion tactics to overcome the barriers to entering the Canadian technology labour market. I argue that the stereotypical association of the Indian nationality and technology work that contributes to their *transnational habitus,* also acts as a double-edged sword for Indian skilled newcomers, providing both opportunities for and also restricting their access to employment in Canada.

In Chapter 5, I explore gendered divisions of paid work in technology companies in the Waterloo region by uncovering the gendered substructure that underlies their organisational culture, as reflected in their measures for work-life balance (seen as an effective HR tool to recruit and retain employees). Based on interviews with ten technology companies and thirty-five (21 men and 14 women) technology workers, I found that there is a clear set of gendered assumptions that assigns responsibilities for reproductive work to the individual female worker or the 'generic female parent' (Smithson and Stokoe, 2005). The technology companies perceive work-life conflict as a women's issue. Moreover, I argue that the gendered substructure in these technology companies promotes the ideal self-regulating disembodied male worker.

In Chapter 6, I investigate how professional couples of Indian-origin entering the Canadian labour market negotiate their commitment to paid work and their roles in the family. Drawing on separate interviews with income-earning adults in twenty-one dual-earner immigrant households of Indian origin, I show the gendered divisions of paid and unpaid work that emerge as a result of their dual transitions of settlement and parenthood, based on the complex negotiations between Indian hi-tech immigrants, their spouses, transnational families, employers and the liberal welfare state. Families must rely on market-based provision of childcare. In the concluding chapter, Chapter 7, I return to the research questions in this chapter and emphasise the significance of the study to understanding the work-life balance of professional migrant couples. I also make the case for widening 'the immigrant question' to better provide welfare for Canada's newest entrants and citizens.

CHAPTER 2

Putting together a theoretical toolkit

In writing the thesis and designing the research questions identified in the previous chapter, I have drawn on a number of separate theoretical traditions in order to develop a theoretical toolkit to explain how Indian hi-tech immigrants migrating with their spouses and children undertake the dual transition of settlement and parenthood, as they enter the workforce and wider society in Canada. These theoretical traditions include: the rise of the knowledge economy, migration, transnationalism and diasporas, the embodied worker (particularly the work of French Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and Political Scientist Iris Marion Young) and feminist theories about productive work (mainly in technology occupations), reproductive work and the role of the welfare state in assisting with forms of reproductive labour. I sought to reveal a microcosm of negotiations by multiple actors producing and maintaining gendered divisions of paid and unpaid work in the newcomer families who are making Canada their new home.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I critically assess the rise of the neoliberal, globalised knowledge-based economy reliant on technological advancement. I will show how the proliferation of knowledge-based industries in the global North is creating a growing demand for foreign-born professionals to fill perceived skills gaps in the respective national economies. Despite being recruited for what these governments project as vacancies, skilled immigrants encounter significant and unfair barriers to labour market entry. I draw specifically on the theoretical approaches of Pierre Bourdieu (1977; 1984; 1986) and Iris Marion Young (1990) to explain how this labour market disadvantage is produced and

maintained. In the empirical chapters, I show how their conceptual tools are also used to challenge and overcome this often baseless disadvantage. I also question whether Indian hi-tech immigrants who are entering an occupational sector that they are actively recruited for and who also could potentially benefit from India's reputation as a dominant global technological presence, might be positioned differently in a racialised technology labour market in Canada.

In the second section, I use evidence from feminist scholarship on the gendered organisation of technology sectors to show that Indian hi-tech immigrants enter the Canadian labour market. Furthermore, I elaborate on a central contribution of feminist scholars: the recognition that production and reproduction, employment and domestic obligations, affect each other and are not analytically separable. In order to establish the context for my empirical investigation into how childcare is (re)negotiated by professional migrant parents in Canada, I briefly review some of the previous research on gendered negotiations of childcare and the gendered division of household labour in the global North, as growing numbers of women started to enter the workforce, contributing to a rise in dual-earner families.

Using Esping-Andersen's (1990; 2002) typologies of the welfare state and drawing on feminist scholars' criticisms of his neglect of its gendered implications (Lewis, 1997; 2001; Siim, 1987; Wilson, 1977), I will show how the welfare state and market-based provisions for reproductive labour attempted to replace what was traditionally women's work performed in the home, as women entered the workforce. In my discussion of Canada's liberal welfare state, I demonstrate how the role of the welfare state has changed in Canada to respond to women's growing participation in the workforce. I also question however, whether the change has been sufficient to reduce women's labour market disadvantage and their disproportionate share of the double burden, double duty or second shift.

In my empirical chapters, I explore how Indian hi-tech immigrant couples negotiate their multiple roles at work and home with their spouses, employers, the Canadian liberal welfare state provisions and their transnational families. These previously separate theoretical traditions help me in answering my main research question: how do skilled immigrant men and women from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds, who might have different gender ideologies and household types, alter their domestic practices in Canada to participate in the workforce?

The rise of the new economy: Creating demand for transnational knowledge workers

Globalisation scholars use the growth of global markets, the rise of multinational and transnational industries, the existence of cross-border economic blocs reducing national sovereignty (for example the European Union at one end of the spectrum and the North American Free Trade Area at another) and the 'death of distance' as evidence of widespread changes to global production process and relations between capital and labour (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Friedman, 2005; Giddens, 2002). The extensity, intensity and velocity of global flows of capital and labour are predicted to have surpassed historical levels due to the rapid pace of technological advancement and digitised knowledge production (Bradley et al., 1993; Latham and Sassen, 2005; Saxenian, 2006) resulting in a space-time compression (Amin, 2002; Harvey, 1990; 2006; 2009; Massey, 1994). The terms new economy, knowledge-based economy and the era of new capitalism have been used synonymously in social science literatures to explain the widespread industrial shifts in the global economic landscape towards knowledge-based industries, driven by ongoing technological advancement.

The foundations of this transition to a knowledge economy were laid by the emergence of knowledge industries in the global North, as an effective response to the growing economic concerns during the 1970s. At the time, governments and industries were faced with severe economic deficits and a rapid decline in the productivity and profitability of traditional manufacturing industries. The invention of basic technologies, point to point communication between mainframe computers and terminals, decentralised systems of gathering large quantities of information, and the advent of the internet in the 1960s, seemed to provide governments and industries, who were in the midst of the OPEC oil crisis and in the depths of recession in the early 1980s, a rescue plan for the struggling economy (David and Foray, 2002; Gordon, 2000; Harris, 2001).

The creation of non-rival virtual objects in a digitised work environment with few infrastructural constraints, sunk costs and opportunity costs appeared to have the potential to generate employment and income. The struggling industries were encouraged to move towards the creation, production and distribution of knowledge and knowledge-based products in an economy oriented towards providing services rather than resources. The infinite expansibility of knowledge production contributed to the proliferation of jobs in production, processing and transfer of knowledge and information (knowledge occupations) in several countries across Europe and North America, from the 1970s onwards. Academic and political discourses during this time also emphasised the significant role of technology (Latour, 1987; Mackenzie, 1996; Wajcman, 2002). An ideal post-industrial economy producing and distributing a weightless product with no direct opportunity cost would imply the rejection of the neoclassical law of diminishing returns, which states that any factor of production will result in diminishing marginal productivity. Scholars started to envision ‘a weightless

world' and identified knowledge and information as key factors of production in the new economy (Coyle, 1997).

Sociologist Manuel Castells (1996, 2001), belonging to this group of thinkers, the transformation theorists (a label used by Linda McDowell, 2009), associated the increasingly globalised knowledge-based market economy with a heavy reliance on technological advancement, which in turn became the basis of global economic competitiveness (also supported by Beck, 2000; Carnoy, 2002; Sennett, 1998; 2006). He used the term 'Network Society' to argue for a 'new mode of social development' using technology as a master concept: he called this 'informationalism'. Despite the uninhibited faith of industries, governments and some popular academic commentators (cited above) in the infinite productivity of technological production, there is also a strong criticism and opposition to these ideas that is emerging in academic debates (some examples include David and Foray, 2002; Doogan, 2008; Gordon, 2000; Powell and Snellman, 2004).

In the previous chapter, I argued that at this time India also invested disproportionately in science, technology and engineering related sectors albeit motivated by a different rationale: to develop an independent and successful postcolonial economy. During the 1980s and through to the 1990s, it began to privatise, globalise and neoliberalise its previously state-led centrally planned economy. I develop this further in Chapter 4, in my discussion of the Indian hi-tech immigrants entering Canada's knowledge industries. It is not, however, the highly contested notion of infinite expansibility of knowledge production that explains the growing demand for Indian hi-tech immigrants in Canada and elsewhere in the global North. Instead, it relates to the simple but profound quote from Michael Polyani: "we know more than we can tell" (1966: 4).

To understand the basis of economic competitiveness in the new economy there is a need to distinguish between the terms *information* and *knowledge*. Information is characterised as passive and inert datasets, which can be replicated at little cost (equivalent to what would be the cost of making copies). On the other hand, knowledge involves cognitive capacity and is more difficult and expensive to transfer to others. Knowledge can be codified in a particular language and recorded in a particular medium to be transferred but ultimately what is articulated is not complete knowledge but a symbolic representation (Harris, 2001). The obsolete nature of technology is a well-documented characteristic of the knowledge economy, meaning that technological progress is contingent on continued learning and innovation. This shifts the logic of competition from the technology itself to the people, that is, the knowledge workers whose skills, abilities and capacities determine competition.

Economist Fritz Malchup (1962) coined the term 'knowledge industries' to represent the proliferation of forms of capital and labour that were dedicated to the production and reproduction of knowledge, increasingly using technological means. Peter Drucker (1969) adopted the term in order to distinguish the 'knowledge workers' as highly educated, technocratic and independent workers who are in control of their means of knowledge production, contributing to the subsequent construction of the ideal worker for the new economy: a highly skilled, individualised, flexible and adaptable worker with a 'mobile portfolio career'. These ideal knowledge workers should be accepting of frequent changes in job content and location due to the project-based nature of technology work. 'The location of the new economy is not in the technology, be it the microchip or global telecommunications network. It is in the human mind' (Webber, 1993: 27). Economic competitiveness and progress is determined by more than the infinite expansibility and non-rival nature of knowledge

production: economic growth is contingent on the availability of workers possessing tacit knowledge.

The convincing correlation established between economic growth and technological advancement by transformation theorists explains two significant features of knowledge economies in the global North: first, the increasing investments in IT and related sectors; secondly, the reshaping of migration regulations to encourage the arrival of growing numbers of foreign-born and educated professionals. Governments and industries accept that ongoing technological innovation is critical for economic progress, requiring a reliable supply of appropriate knowledge workers. This global demand is reflected in global population movements in the form of temporary and permanent international labour migration from the global South to the global North, discussed extensively by migration scholars (Arat-Koc, 1999; Bauder, 2006; Ley and Hiebert, 2001; Sassen, 1999).

In collaboration with and in support of the growing knowledge industries, governments regulating mechanisms of migration place an emphasis on skills in evaluating and admitting immigrants. Governments also began to compete amongst themselves in a global race for technological talent and consequently started to develop competitive migration programs to actively recruit highly-educated, young and skilled workers who could easily adopt to working in more fragmented, decentralised and deregulated forms of paid work. The impetus for importing foreign-trained professionals grew out of the need to fill perceived labour shortages in occupational sectors constructed as paradigmatic of the knowledge economy (including natural and applied sciences, engineering and ICT) and compensate for the skills gap created by insufficient numbers of local professionals and graduates (see ICTC (2011) for the Canadian context discussed in Chapter 1).

The central assumption made by governments implementing this skills bias in migration regulations across the global North is that highly educated and qualified foreign-professionals would potentially easily acquire country-specific knowledge rapidly and at little or no cost to the state, allowing them to quickly adapt to the local labour markets. Meric Gertler (2003), however, argues that the tacit knowledge carried by knowledge workers does not 'travel' easily and is based on spatial proximity, cultural affinity and institutional proximity (i.e. shared norms, conventions, values, expectations and routines arising from commonly experienced frameworks of institution). It is embedded in people possessing it and in social contexts, which is difficult to communicate given inadequacies of language. It is these characteristics of tacit knowledge carried by the embodied worker that might potentially explain the success of India's 'body shopping practices'. The spatial, cultural and institutional specificity of tacit knowledge might also explain to some extent why the skilled newcomers recruited to fill a specific skills gap also encounter a labour market disadvantage upon arrival in the host society, mainly in the form of the non-recognition of foreign credentials and instances of racial and cultural discrimination. In the next section, I discuss how economic migrants in this era of new capitalism are incorporated in both the labour markets and the wider society (with a lens on the Canadian context).

Why and how do migrants move in the era of new capitalism?

Migration scholars often use binaries to understand and explain why people move; including pairs of concepts such as push/pull factors, permanent/temporary and forced/voluntary migration. There is consensus amongst contemporary migration

scholars that processes of migration are complex, multidirectional and dynamic. Multiple axes of social difference including race/ethnicity, gender, class and age operate at multiple levels simultaneously. The decision to migrate is not solely based on national economic objectives reflected in immigration legislation or the economic concerns of an individual migrant (job opportunities and career advancement). Migration is often part of carefully deliberated and sequential series of decisions to coordinate the life cycles of different family members presenting migrants as strategic actors (Lauby and Stark, 1988; Ley and Kobayashi, 2005; Ong, 1999; Ong and Nonini, 1997; Silvey and Olson, 2006; Waters, 2003; 2008; Yeoh and Willis, 2004). In this thesis, I investigate the experiences of permanent economic migrants to Canada and provide some discussion of their reception in the host country, shaping their entry into labour markets and their engagement with the dominant host culture.

Migrants' mode of entry into the host country inevitably influences their ability to enter the labour market as well as their economic, social and cultural integration into the host society. The various forms of membership that are granted (or not granted) to immigrants (ranging from illegal migrants, permanent residents/landed immigrants to citizens) have been studied in great detail under the rubric of migration, transnationalism and diaspora studies. Scholars in this area have identified three approaches to immigrants' socio-cultural incorporation into the wider society of the host country: assimilation, segregation and integration/multiculturalism. Assimilation and segregation are two extremes on a continuum of participation of newcomers to the receiving society (Abu-Laban, 1998). Assimilation is also the basic premise and central assumption of ideologies of amalgamation, the melting pot (mainly in the US), and cultural pluralism that have influenced policy debates in Canada as well.

In the previous chapter, I discussed the Canadian government efforts during the 1960s to correct for the systemic racism in historical immigration policies, opening

Canada's national borders to allow for an influx of migrants from Asia, Latin America and Africa, which were traditionally non-preferred source regions because of the potential threat to a White-European national identity. At the same time, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau also announced Canada's first attempt at rectifying the racial, cultural and ethnic discrimination present in the wider society. The first relevant policy was implemented in 1971; subsequent amendments were made during much of the 1970s and 1980s. The beginnings of Canada's present multiculturalism approach to the socio-cultural incorporation of immigrants were in discussions of bilingualism and biculturalism during the 1960s (Lalande, 2006).

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (RCBB), formed by the Liberal Pearson Government in 1963, divided Canadian society into three categories: the Founding Nations (English and French), the First Nations, and other ethnic groups, of which Ukrainian-Canadians were the largest and best organised community. Rising demonstrations of French-Canadian nationalism, the emergence of a French-Canadian elite, the formation of the Front de Liberation and the Quiet Revolution, as well as, non-British and non-French and non-Aboriginal Canadians who objected to a 'bilingual and bicultural' Canada, all contributed significantly to Canada's present multicultural approach. Starting with a report by RCBB entitled "The Cultural Contribution of Other Ethnic Groups" (1963), there was a growing political recognition of the growing ethnic diversity in Canada's population, which to a large extent was the direct result of the changes to immigration policy occurring at the same time (Abu-Laban, 1998; Abu-Laban and Stasiulis, 1992).

The need to change expectations of Anglo-conformity became both politically and economically imperative. There was a growing need for a framework of inclusionary policies and practices that would apply to racial and ethnic groups other than the historically recognised British and French origin groups. This new framework

was critical to ensure that the growing numbers of economic migrants from traditionally non-preferred source countries were able to effectively contribute to the economy and in effect the shrinking national tax base. Multiculturalism in a bilingual framework was proposed as a constitutional alternative to biculturalism and was implemented in Section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 (Harles, 1997; Lalande, 2006).

The primary goal of the Multiculturalism policy, as identified by Prime Minister Trudeau, was to overcome discriminatory cultural barriers in Canadian society and provide all groups with an opportunity to share their cultural expressions and values (Lalande, 2006). These early attempts were motivated by the growing presence of people of colour who became an important part of Canada's population and its national identity. It is especially interesting to reflect on these constitutional provisions, in the later discussions on how skilled immigrants of colour enter a racialised and gendered labour market, encountering a labour market disadvantage on the basis of the very notions of cultural capital that the Multiculturalism Policy was intended to uphold and promote as part of Canada's identity.

Transforming the rhetoric of multiculturalism into concrete policies has proved to be most difficult. During the current financial crisis, a few governments across Europe have publicly abandoned multiculturalism and declared its failure in meeting societal needs in their respective countries (BBC, 2010; Evans, 2010; News Wires, 2011). The 'failure' of multiculturalism in this time of economic turmoil is perpetuating a backlash against foreign-born persons and migrants identified as being culturally and linguistically different to the dominant national cultural identity, contributing to the criminalisation of some racialised 'minority' groups and conflating their presence with religious extremism and global terrorism. In Canada, racialised immigrants arriving as permanent residents through legal systems of regulation and entitlement (the Points

System), often despite their legal status, continue to be overrepresented in the manual and "underclass" locations in social hierarchies across multiple sites in Canada, including labour markets and welfare state provisions. Immigrants of colour tend to have significantly higher levels of unemployment and underemployment than their White, native-born and educated counterparts (Bonilla- Silva, 2000).

This form of "new racism" in Canada is deeply embedded in its origins as a British Dominion, history of immigration and the formation of a relatively weak national identity based on the preferred White-European migrant and settler. Bonilla-Silva (2000) argues that the "old racism" based on biological racial inferiority has been overtaken by new or differentialist racism rooted in a discourse of cultural difference. This notion of new or differentialist racism is particularly relevant to understanding the labour market disadvantage of skilled newcomers of colour in Canada. In my thesis, I begin to question how cultural stereotyping, as a result of differentialist or new racism, operates for Indian hi-tech workers who might use the stereotypical association between technology work and Indian nationals to potentially overcome marginalisation in the labour market.

Immigrants facing marginalisation and forms of *new racism* often form what Stephen Castles (2002) calls a 'reactive ethnicity' through community solidarity in the host society (critical to the formation of ethnic businesses) and also by maintaining transnational ties. Migration scholars found that immigrants often maintain social, economic and political ties to their home country, as well as more than one destination country. Although such movements and relationships across borders have always existed, until recently, they had not acquired the critical mass and complexity that was necessary to speak of it as an emerging field (Portes, 1997; 1999; 2001; 2003; Westwood and Phizacklea, 2000). The term *transnationalism* was introduced to encompass the contemporary back and forth movements of transnational migrants.

Transnational scholars emphasise the dual lives of a growing number of persons who maintain regular contact across national borders and ask broader questions on national identities, citizenship regulations and processes of naturalisation (Basch, Glick-Schiller and Blanc-Szanton, 1994; Baubock, 1994; Bloemraad, 2000; Ong, 1999).

Anna Lee Saxenian (2006) found evidence of what Castles (2002) calls "reactive ethnicity" in her study of Indians in the Silicon Valley. New entrepreneurs who were excluded from existing professional networks used their transnational ties to establish ethnic social networks to support their advancement in the technology market in the US and globally. The Indian hi-tech immigrants in my study cannot be characterised as transnational communities to the same extent. Clifford (1994) argues that transnational communities are not attached to a specific territory but are characterised by multiple border crossings and multi-locale cultures, which are not defined by specific geopolitical boundaries. On the contrary, the Indian newcomers to Canada in my study are attached to a specific territory defined by geopolitical boundaries (the Canadian state) and the majority of them transform their permanent residency status to full citizenship in Canada. Their homes however, can be characterised as transnational social spaces where the linguistic and cultural differences from the normative Canadian identity are particularly distinguishable. In my study, I explore to some extent how the transnational home space evokes mixed feelings in relation to nationality, identity and citizenship (Dua et al., 2005), influencing the emerging gendered divisions of paid and unpaid work.

Transnational consciousness (Gilroy, 1993; Vertovec, 1999) and transnational identities (Ghosh and Wang, 2003) are the reflection of the reception in the host society and consequent challenges to work or settlement. The extent of hostility, discrimination and disadvantage faced by individual immigrants and their families can

influence their adoption of transnational strategies in order to recreate networks of support that they previously held. Is there any evidence of 'reactive ethnicity' among Indian IT workers moving to Canada's technological clusters? Do they continue to maintain transnational ties? If so, do these transnational ties transform into transnational activities? I reflect on these questions as I investigate how Indian hi-tech immigrants enter the Canadian labour market (mainly in Chapter 4) and the role of transnational relationships in the families where both adults/parents enter the Canadian workforce and negotiate their domestic and familial responsibilities including childcare and household work (mainly in Chapter 6). In the next section, I will review some of the theoretical approaches and empirical studies on how skilled immigrants enter the Canadian workforce and their poor performance compared to their native-born and educated counterparts.

Using Pierre Bourdieu to understand immigrants' labour market performance

Canadian social scientists have noted a substantial income gap (when comparing educational attainments to earnings) between immigrants and the native-born and educated population (Frenette and Morisette, 2005; Hiebert and Pendakur, 2003; Li, 2000). Picot and Sweetman (2005) found that in 2000, 27.5 percent of recent immigrants with university degrees were below the low-income cut-off, a rate seven times higher than that of their Canadian-born and educated counterparts. Some factors contributing to immigrants' diminished social and economic status includes the non-recognition of education and work experience acquired outside Canada, perceived linguistic abilities, racial and gender prejudices, the state of the local labour market, isolation and the loss of previous social memberships and networks. This under-

valuing of skilled immigrants' education and also their cultural and social attributes gives them a significant disadvantage in the Canadian labour market, often summarised by employers as the 'lack of Canadian experience'.

The racialised nature of this disadvantage is clear in the evidence provided by labour market analyses that control for differences in education, occupation and other human capital measures. In such analyses of immigrants' labour market performance, White immigrants fare better in the labour market than immigrants of colour (Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998; 2004; Tran, 2004). There is mounting evidence that the longer immigrants face a loss of employment status (in the form of unemployment or underemployment), the more likely that they will remain in a precarious situation. This disadvantage and the threat of precarity is often more acute for women (Bauder, 2003; 2005; Man, 2004; Mojab, 1999; Ng, 1990; 1998; Preston and Giles, 1997; Shamsuddin, 1997).

One theoretical approach to explaining immigrants' labour market disadvantage uses human capital theory (Borjas, 1999; Chiswick, 2005; Reitz, 2001). The theory was devised by neoclassical economists and assumes that 'the labour market provides for an equilibrium that allocates workers to job on the basis of their economic worth, as measured by education, skill, age, experience and past performance' (Hiebert, 1999: 340). The labour market is portrayed as neutral, in which employers are rational actors who are not affected by applicants' social characteristics, including race, ethnicity, skin colour, gender and sexuality. In using this market logic, superior skills and qualifications are awarded by high-paying occupations. This logic has come under increased scrutiny and subsequently been challenged by the persistent wage gap and higher levels of unemployment and underemployment for recent skilled immigrants despite their higher levels of human capital.

It might be argued that the notion of human capital that inadequately explains the labour market disadvantage of skilled migrants is a narrow and simplified version of the key theoretical contributions of French Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu's *theory of practice* was intended to explain the structure, reproduction and in some cases transformation of the social world. He showed how the formation of the social world is based on economic as well as social and cultural processes. In this thesis, I use Bourdieu's central concepts of *habitus* as a heuristic framework, providing a way to bring together migrants' lives and their actions that are both constrained by and at the same time constitutive of the deeper structures and circumstances that are not of their choosing (similar to the approach taken by Kelly and Lusis, (2006) in their study of Filipino migrants in Canada).

For Bourdieu, the *habitus* comprises the internalisation of objective structures and a process of accumulation of capitals - it is continually adjusting to the *field*, which he defines as the social arena or the game with specific rules (the objective reality). Different volumes and compositions of capital are valued and given different meanings in different social fields. This distribution and valuation of different forms of capital is not objectively given but socially constituted and the rules governing the valuation, accumulation, transmissibility, access and exchange of capitals is implicitly agreed upon by the dominant group in a particular social field. *Practice* is achieved through the process of adjustment between the dispositions of habitus and the constraints, opportunities and the demands of specific social fields (Reay, 2004). I am particularly interested in the *practice*s of Indian hi-tech immigrants entering the specific social field of the Canadian technology labour market.

Savage et al (2005) argue that it is the recognition that the economic cannot be isolated analytically from other determinants that set Bourdieu in a much better position theoretically to respond to the cultural turn. Bourdieu saw economic, cultural

and social processes as intricately bound with the reproduction of social classes. As a result, his notion of capitals avoids the pitfalls of the neoclassical human capital theory because he acknowledges that 'it is in fact impossible to account for the structure and functioning of the social world unless one reintroduces capital in all its forms and not solely in the one form recognised by economic theory' (Bourdieu, 1986: 46). For this reason, I use Bourdieu's different forms of capital that constitute the habitus in a specific social field to argue that strictly economic theorisations are insufficient in explaining how Indian hi-tech immigrants are positioned in Canada's labour market.

Bourdieu divides capital into four categories: economic, social, cultural and symbolic. Social scientists have extensively used his theorisations to explain economic migrants' engagement with labour markets in the host society. In particular, sociologists have developed the concept of social capital in reference to ethnic ties. Social capital refers to social networks, memberships in social groups and the social identities associated with that membership. Migrant groups, who are ethnically, culturally and linguistically different from the dominant White, Anglo-Saxon ethnic group in North America, often face exclusion and marginality from mainstream society. Scholars found that these racialised migrant groups often respond to this discrimination by developing competitive ethnic networks and memberships to overcome labour market disadvantages (Coleman 1990; 1998; Granovetter, 1985; Portes and Ruben, 1990; Putnam, 2000).

Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital has three subcategories: embodied cultural capital (corporeal presence, performance, accents and other cultural markers), objectified cultural capital (material status acquired through symbols such as art and fashion), and institutional cultural capital (institutional recognition in the form of diplomas, degrees and certificates) (Bourdieu, 1986). Canadian social scientists (mainly geographers and sociologists) have developed the concept of cultural capital

to show that migrants enter a socially, culturally and ethnically bound social field (Creese and Wiebe, 2009; Erel, 2010; Kelly and Lusis, 2006). The accumulation of cultural knowledge, skills, abilities and capacities is possessed, inherited and valued by privileged groups. These groups establish their dominance by limiting access to strategies for learning and acquiring the relevant forms of capital necessary for capital mobility. Thus, the culture of the ethnic community becomes a significant factor in explaining how a particular group fares both in the labour market and in the wider society in a host country (Anthias, 2007; Yosso, 2005; Yuval-Davis, 2006).

Social scientists have developed two approaches to using cultural capital (particularly embodied and institutional forms) to explain the persistence of immigrants' labour market disadvantage. I also use these two most commonly used forms in my case study of Indian hi-tech immigrants entering Canada's Technology Triangle. Some scholars have emphasised the role of professional regulatory bodies and employers, as members of the privileged groups, in dominating access to the appropriate institutional cultural capital needed to succeed in Canada's labour markets (Bauder, 2003; 2006; Girard and Bauder, 2007). They argue that the basis of skilled immigrants' labour market disadvantage lies in the devaluation of their institutional cultural capital, specific to a different social field (their countries of origin), which is considered to be of lower value than the institutional cultural capital specific to Canadian labour markets. In order to adjust their habitus to a new social field, skilled immigrants often undergo significant retraining in Canada (Anisef et al., 2010).

The second approach builds on the work of feminist scholars, who despite Bourdieu's largely gender-blind conceptualisations (except for Bourdieu, 2001), are keen to focus on the embodied nature of habitus (Adkins and Skeggs, 2004). Bourdieu shows how not only is the body in the social world but also the ways in which the social world is in the body (Bourdieu, 1977). Central to the concept of habitus,

constitutive of embodied cultural capital, is the incorporation of social expectations into bodily dispositions and also into value systems that are inscribed and interpreted through the body. Habitus is expressed in durable ways 'of standing, speaking, walking and thereby feeling and thinking' (Bourdieu and Waquant, 1990; quoted in Reay, 2004: 432). Some scholars have argued that the notion of embodied cultural capital (encompassing linguistic differences, foreign accents, workplace behaviours and gestures) embedded in their habitus is central to understanding migrants' downward occupational and social mobility (Creese and Wiebe, 2009; Erel, 2010).

However, I would add that it is not enough to show only how social and cultural capital contribute to skilled immigrants' labour market disadvantage in the host country. It is also analytically important to incorporate Bourdieu's recognition that agents are conditioned by their strategic behaviour and game-playing character to compete, collude, negotiate and contest their position in different social fields (Bourdieu, 1986). The capacity of skilled immigrants to exercise agency to contest, resist and transform the objective reality of their labour market disadvantage is what makes Bourdieu's theoretical approach particularly useful in this thesis. I show how migrants navigate the labour markets in which they enter and play the game. Capitals are not fixed assets or attributes but instead are convertible and circulate dynamically. As Bauder (2006) demonstrates, this exchange, however, occurs at a rate of exchange - forms of capital carried by immigrants (inscribed in their embodied habitus) are more likely to be degraded and devalued. In Chapter 4, I investigate how Indian hi-tech workers adjust their habitus to the Canadian social field by converting and exchanging their capitals to contest and possibly overcome their labour market disadvantage. In agreement with Bauder (2006), I find that this conversion occurs at a rate of exchange and the high financial and emotional costs of this transformation are borne entirely by the Indian newcomers and their transnational families. I would,

however, exercise some caution in extrapolating the outcomes of Indian hi-tech immigrants to other immigrant groups.

Just as Bourdieu stresses the mimetic nature of the adjustment between the habitus and the field, I identify three factors that might be specific to the adjustment of Indian hi-tech immigrants entering Canada's technology markets, providing an added level of complexity to explaining their labour market performance. First, previous studies on economic migrants' labour market performance have shown that disadvantages are often more acute for immigrants seeking to enter regulated professions such as health-related sectors, engineering and law, due to the structural gaps between a federally regulated immigration policy and provincially operated professional regulatory bodies (Bauder, 2006; Boyd, 1984; Reitz, 2001). In the ICT sector in Canada, professional bodies do not restrict entry through strict licensing requirements. On the contrary, organisations such as ICTC or Communitech Technology Association (specific to the Waterloo Region) behave more like informational rather than regulatory bodies. Moreover, the regulation of the ICT sector to some extent appears to operate at a global level rather than within national borders. Internationally standardised certifications provided by leading multinational companies may not replace university degrees acquired in Canada (ICTC, 2011) but could potentially position ICT migrants differently in Canada's technology labour market.

Secondly, an important determinant of newcomers' position in the workforce is the specific condition of the local or regional labour market. In the report by ICTC (2011) there is a clear call for foreign-trained technology professionals to fill the skills gap left by a growing demand from Canadian knowledge industries and an insufficient local supply of professionals. Indian hi-tech immigrants, therefore, would appear to be filling existing vacancies in the local workforces in technological clusters across Canada. Thirdly and finally, as I have stressed in Chapter 1 and in parts of this

chapter, India's global reputation as a software provider and also the entrepreneurial success of Indians in global technology industries might contribute to how Indian hi-tech immigrants are disadvantaged or possibly privileged in the Canada's technology labour markets as compared to economic migrants entering different occupational sectors in Canada.

As I have shown, previous studies use the concepts of social and cultural capital (particularly institutional and embodied forms) to explain immigrants' labour market position. I will demonstrate how Indian hi-tech immigrants convert capitals strategically to resist and overcome barriers to labour market entry. I find, however, that Bourdieu's class-based analysis of the reproduction of the bourgeoisie cannot explain the racial and gendered nature of skilled immigrants' disadvantage in the host country. For this reason, I now turn to Iris Marion Young's notion of cultural imperialism to compensate for the theoretical gaps left by Bourdieu in explaining how Indian hi-tech workers embodied social attributes are valued by a host society built on a White-European national identity.

Iris Marion Young's arguments help where Bourdieu's theorisations fall short

In her influential book *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (1990), Iris Marion Young asserts that the disadvantage of any particular socio-cultural group is the result of everyday practices and ordinary interactions of an often well-intentioned liberal society - embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, symbols and assumptions underlying institutional rules (p. 41). Injustice arises from two disabling constraints, oppression and domination, which manifest in five ways: through exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, violence and cultural imperialism. The underlying institutional rules

that governed inherently racist historical immigration policy, discouraging and prohibiting the entry of non-White, non-European migrants, legislated practices of racism and officiated the scaling of bodies, perpetuating the normative construction of the Canadian identity as White-European and all other groups as racial Others.

Since the 1960s, Canada appeared to make significant efforts to remove the systemic racism in immigration policy and added the rhetoric of multiculturalism into its constitution. The growing wage gap and labour market disadvantage of racialised newcomers as compared to their Canadian-born and educated counterparts proves that the normative gaze of even the most 'liberal-minded people who intend to treat everyone with equal respect' hierarchises bodies by a cultural logic (Young, 1990: 11). This cultural logic contributes to aversive and anxious reactions to the bodily presence of those constructed as Others. The growing presence of skilled immigrants from countries historically constructed as 'ethnoculturally dissimilar' inevitably contributes to their reception in the host society and entry into the workforce. The cultural logic that Young (1990) identified helps to explain why professional regulatory bodies and employers continue to be suspicious of the equivalence of foreign credentials and work experience. Moreover, Young's (1990) faces of oppression are particularly useful in showing how the dominant class (in this case the White Canadian-born and educated worker), that Bourdieu (1986) argues establish a virtual monopoly, is constructed and maintained. In particular, the notion of *cultural imperialism* explains how the universalisation of the dominant group's experience and culture creates structural and institutional barriers. These barriers restrict skilled immigrants' access to resources and concrete opportunities constructing a social division of work that places them at a disadvantage.

The White Canadian-born and educated worker is established as the norm and their perspectives and interpretations gain cultural status, culturally marking any

persons that deviate from these norms as Others. It would appear that racialised skilled immigrants' labour market disadvantage is not so much the result of their inability to demonstrate their capacity, which they have done through successful immigration applications. Instead, the stereotypes associated with foreign professionals based on their skin colour, accents, dress, stance, gestures, workplace behaviours and attitudes, marked on their bodies, might better explain the widening wage gap between immigrants and their native-born counterparts.

Interestingly, the dominant class(es) do not recognise themselves as a group but occupy an unmarked, neutral, universal point of reference, marking others and subjecting them to subjugation and discriminatory behaviour. Immigrant workers with particular accents, smells and gestures who appear to deviate from the socially constructed normative worker are ridiculed and restricted from entering occupational sectors they are trained for. Moreover, upon entering the labour market these economic migrants may be passed up for jobs and promotions. Immigrants facing such constructed norms affecting their day to day lives in a discriminatory host culture are often left with no choice but to adopt what W.E.B. Dubois calls 'double consciousness': the 'sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity' (1969: 45). In order to rectify the labour market injustice faced by skilled newcomers based on everyday manifestations of cultural imperialism, the norms governing entry into particular occupational sectors must not only meet the needs of what is constructed as a neutral or universal group (in effect just Canadian-born and educated workers). Labour market norms need to reflect the experiences of skilled immigrants who are welcomed by the Canadian government and industries based on their educational attainments and social characteristics.

Difference along an axis of gender

This second section of the chapter is divided into three sub-sections. First, I show how Indian hi-tech immigrants enter a racialised and gendered technology labour market. Secondly, I show how the male breadwinner-female caregiver model is being replaced by the dual-earner or adult worker model, as growing numbers of women enter the workforce in North America and across Europe. This change in the gender composition of the workforce has stimulated academic and policy discussions about emerging gendered divisions of household labour and childcare, traditionally performed by women in their homes. In my empirical chapters, I explore how dual-earner Indian couples, whose assumptions and gender ideologies might differ from that of Canadian workers, negotiate divisions of paid work and unpaid work in the home. In the final part of this section, I investigate to what extent the welfare state has evolved to accommodate the shift away from the breadwinner ideology and specifically examine the Canadian case.

Gender relations are critical to understanding the processes of migration and settlement for skilled immigrants entering both the labour markets and wider society in a new host country. In Canada, scholars have shown that regardless of immigrant women's mode of entry (skilled worker and family class categories), most women are relegated to a dependent status (Abu-Laban, 1998; Boyd, 1997; 2001; Thobani, 2000). Moreover, gendering practices and constructions of appropriate feminine roles restrict their labour market opportunities. These restrictions are evident especially in the cases of unskilled migrant women (both temporary and permanent) who are often concentrated in domestic work, caregiving and garment industries and in semi-skilled service occupations such as nursing or in family or ethnic businesses. Scholars have called this phenomenon of growing numbers of migrant women entering such

occupations the feminisation of international labour migration (Cheng, 2003; Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003; Kofman, 2004). Migrant women's dependent status reduces their access to settlement and employment services and reinforces their primary responsibility as parenting and family support (Lee and Roseman, 1999; Ng, 1990). There is less research on skilled and professional migrant women; however, the limited academic inquiry into them established that they often privilege their male partners' careers (Creese et al., 2008).

Institutional, organisational and structural constraints, gender ideologies, gender-role stereotypes and normative societal expectations shape women's ability to enter the workforce, attitudes to paid work and their self-expectations of the maternal role. The masculine image of technology work is a critical barrier to women's labour market attainments in traditionally male-dominated occupational sectors including science, engineering, technology and related sectors (Massey, 1995; Trauth, 2002; Wajcman, 2002). The dominant male population in technology sectors, in terms of sheer numbers and decision-making power, contributes to masculinist practices in the workplace, which further restrict women's opportunities in technology-related occupational categories. Moreover, women feel the constraints placed by familial responsibilities and obligations more acutely.

Later in the section, I show how despite their growing participation in the workforce and more specifically science, engineering and technology occupations, women continue to shoulder a disproportionate burden of caring duties and domestic work in the home. My aim is to show how these factors might interact to construct and maintain Indian hi-tech immigrant women's labour market disadvantage compared to their male partners and even more so when compared to the dominant group of Canadian-born and educated workers. It is also important to recognise that Indian hi-tech immigrant women are also entering an occupational sector that is traditionally

constructed as masculine. I speculate on why this unfair gendered division of paid and unpaid work persists by taking the role of organisations and the welfare state into consideration. In the next section, I will discuss the role of organisations, employers and co-workers in perpetuating a masculinist image in technology workplaces that contributes to women's unfair disadvantage in labour market attainments.

The gendered organisation of technology sectors

The idea that organisations and workplaces are infused with gender is well documented in historical and contemporary research, primarily by feminist scholars, on the functioning of labour markets. Max Weber (1946) provided one of the earliest and classic descriptions of inherently gendered bureaucratic forms. Almost thirty years later, in the landmark study, *Men and Women of the Corporation,* Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977) described a masculine ethic among top corporate managers. Another thirty years later, Gillian Rose (1993), in common with other feminist scholars at the time, argued that there is a need for a more relational approach to what is constructed as the masculine public and the feminised private, in order to expose that it is not nature but social and legal institutions which produce and maintain women's subordination in paid work. Britton (2000) adds that it is the artificial compartmentalisation of 'the social world into public and private spheres' that subjugates and banishes women to the realm of the family. 'A rationality premised on the existence of free, autonomous, impersonal individuals is a gendered rationality' (p. 421).

In the thesis, and mainly in Chapter 5, I draw extensively on Joan Acker's (1990; 1998) theory of gendered organisations. Now over two decades ago, Acker

(1990) argued that jobs and organisations exist in a larger cultural context where masculinity is both materially and ideologically privileged. This masculine bias and privilege provides the basis for a gendered substructure that reproduces gender divisions and inequalities, sometimes despite the best intentions of some men and women working in the organisations. Almost a decade after this seminal contribution, Acker (1998), demonstrated that these inherently gendered organisations are produced and maintained by the dual mechanisms of gendered organisational structures and the situated performance of gender by individual workers. In effect, this reproduces the assumption that an 'ordinary' worker is a man who has few obligations outside work. Acker (1990; 1998) argues that the gender substructure is not just ideological but is manifested in what are presented as gender-neutral practices and ordinary workplace activities across organisational boundaries, including the allocation of specific work tasks, responsibilities, promotion processes, performance assessment and wage setting procedures.

I use Acker's (1990; 1998) theory of gender organisation in two ways to explain the gendered organisation of work in technology companies in the Waterloo region. First, I show that organisations continue to be non-responsible for worker's familial obligations and see work-life conflict as a women's issue. Secondly, in Chapter 6, I show how Indian hi-tech professional couples working in these non-responsible technology companies balance the competing demands from a workplace that perpetuates the image of the ideal disembodied male worker and their obligations to their families, whilst adapting to a different culture in a new host country.

Empirical studies of women entering traditionally male-dominated occupations and organisations emphasise four sets of barriers to entry: gender stereotypes and attitudes, glass ceilings, tokenism and for many women working-time constraints as a result of family responsibilities. Women and men who are able to do equivalent work

are often segregated both occupationally and organisationally and if they do similar jobs, they tend not to hold the same job titles (Alvesson, 1998; Bielby and Baron, 1986; Martin, 2003). Women are often relegated to the bottom of organisational and professional hierarchies resulting in lower earnings, less authority and fewer opportunities for career progression, as compared to their male counterparts with similar levels of educational attainment (Davies-Netzley, 1998).

In an organisational context, these gender stereotypes are constructed and maintained through practices of paternalism, informalism and homosociality (i.e. men building networks on the basis of what are perceived as shared masculine interests) (Alvesson, 1998; Bird, 1996; Davies-Netzley, 1998). Bird (1996) found that some common homosocial practices of male workers to maintain masculine hegemony include associating emotional detachment and competitiveness with masculinity, speaking of women as sexual objects and drawing analogies between business and organised sport and also conducting business exchanges at sports venues perceived as being less accessible to or of less interest for women. Such social constructs positioning women as marginalised by ideology and organisational cultures are often kept in place by their male peers who are motivated by self-preservation. The male-dominated management is critical to maintaining male hegemony in workplaces and preserving economic advantages for male workers. The efforts are particularly effective when persons at the centre of decision making form 'old boys networks' making concrete women's exclusion in traditionally male-dominated occupational sectors (Moore, 1998; Ward et al, 1992).

These gendering practices construct women entering traditionally masculine occupational sectors as deviants despite their similar levels of educational attainments and sometimes work experience (Alvesson, 1998; Phillips and Imhoff, 1997; Yoder, 1991). Women in such situations often encounter isolation, lack of peer support,

sexual harassment, blocked mobilities, wage inequalities and can be involuntarily relegated to gender stereotyped roles (Yoder, 1991). Feminist scholars have argued that such constructions are based on cultural assumptions and early socialisation by parents, teachers and other significant life events (Trauth, 2002; Wajcman, 2002).

In particular reference to technology occupations, Judy Wajcman (2002) identifies a historical legacy that constructs engineering as a white, male and middle-class profession. Consequently, femininity is often interpreted as incompatible with technological pursuits. There is nothing natural or inevitable about the ways in which technology is associated with masculinity and a masculine image (Cockburn, 1985; 1992; Cockburn and Ormond, 1993; Wajcman, 2002). This dominant construction however, could provide part of the explanation for the under-representation of women in these contemporary occupational sectors including, engineering, scientific and technical institutions (Liu and Wilson, 2001; Massey, 1995; Trauth, 2002; Wajcman, 2002). Scholars have found similar gendered divisions in management, corporate and high level administrative and policy-making occupations (Bickley, 1996; Ward et al., 1992; Yoder, 1991). Similarly these studies emphasised that constructions of business as objective, rational and logical, also associated with masculinity, often result in the positioning of women in elite positions as 'outsiders in the inside' (David-Netzley, 1998).

The concept of a glass ceiling captures a more specific occurrence of gender-based (also ethnic/racial) discrimination that manifests in differential returns to equal investments in educational attainment and work experience. Cotter et al (2001) use the following definition: "a deep line of demarcation between those who prosper and those who are left behind. The glass ceiling is an unseen, yet unbreachable barrier that keeps minorities and women from rising to the upper rungs regardless of their qualifications". Glass ceilings and women's experiences of tokenism are shaped by

cultural assumptions and their effects are more strongly felt at the top of organisational hierarchies than at lower levels. The concept might be less relevant to understanding the experiences of Indian hi-tech immigrant women who are new to the Canadian labour market. It could however, explain the persistence of their disadvantage as they enter and then continue to navigate technology labour markets to advance their careers.

In the thesis, I am particularly interested in exploring the optimistic claims about the nature of work and the organisational culture of contemporary knowledge workplaces, as these arguments about gendered organisations and social practices have largely been ignored in this literature (Beck, 2000; Castells, 2001). Instead, these optimistic accounts emphasise increased autonomy for workers, new opportunities for self-fulfilment, flexibility, teamwork and individualism. Some scholars have noted that these characteristics ultimately shift the responsibility of attaining production goals from the organisation as a whole to the worker. This shift in responsibility contributes to a more intensive and demanding workplace. Practices in such demanding knowledge workplaces might create new forms of oppression that further undermine individual workers' commitments outside work and their emotional and psychological wellbeing (Bailyn, 2004; Green, 2004; Sennett, 1998; 2006; Thomas, 2007; Van Echtelt et al., 2006; 2009). It seems that flexibility in working time associated with the project-based nature of work in technology sectors may also be contributing to a 'long hours culture' where working anti-social hours is seen as essential for competitiveness (Green, 2004; Rubery et al., 1998; Van Echtelt et al., 2006; 2009).

I draw on interviews with technology companies and Indian hi-tech professionals working in the Waterloo Region to investigate these optimistic claims. My aim is to explore the extent to which these characteristics of contemporary workplaces in knowledge industries contribute to the erosion of boundaries between

personal time and work time, thereby increasing work-life conflict. In the next section, I review feminist contributions and empirical studies on combining work and family. My aim is to draw together the findings from both sections to question how Indian hi-tech immigrants with different gender ideologies alter their domestic practices in Canada to enter highly demanding contemporary knowledge workplaces.

Combining work and family: A women's issue?

As I mentioned earlier, empirical studies on the gendered organisation of work stress four factors that contribute to women's labour market disadvantage compared to their male counterparts. In the previous section, I discussed the importance of gender stereotypes and attitudes in perpetuating male hegemony in occupational sectors that are traditionally constructed as masculine. I also demonstrated the effects of glass ceilings and practices of tokenism; however, these might be less applicable to Indian hi-tech immigrants who are new to Canadian labour markets but may become more relevant as they make efforts to advance in their respective professions. In this section, I will draw attention to the constraints resulting from family responsibilities that affect an increasing number of women as they enter and progress in different occupational sectors.

The unprecedented growth in women's labour force participation during the 1960s and 1970s strengthened feminist challenges to the inherent masculine construction of paid work. The male breadwinner-female caregiver ideology started to be replaced by the dual-earner or adult-worker model (Brines, 1994; Greenstein, 2000). Negotiations of the gendered divisions of labour in both paid work performed in the public/work spheres and unpaid work performed predominantly in the private/home

spheres became central to academic inquires (Crompton, 2002; Crompton and Brockman, 2007; Fraser, 1997; Hakim, 2000; 2002; Hochschild, 1989; 1997; McRae, 2003; Pahl, 1989; 1999; Skinner, 2005; Warren and Johnson, 1995). The majority of these scholars found that despite women's increased entry into the workforce, they still retained the role of primary caregiver and continued to perform a disproportionate share of household work.

Constraints placed by familial responsibilities are explored extensively in research on work-life conflict, exploring a wide range of factors including gender role attitudes (Bielby and Baron, 1986; Britton, 2000; Yoder, 1991), career aspirations (Cassirer and Reskin, 2000; Looker and Magee, 2000), marital and family status, self-expectations of mothering (Duncan et al., 2003; May-Stewart, 1998) and the changing role of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 2002; Lewis, 1991; 2001; Pierson and Castles, 2007). Phrases such as dual burden, the second shift (Hochschild, 1989), the stalled revolution (Brines, 1994; Hochschild, 1989) have been developed in studies stressing women's disproportionate share of familial and domestic responsibilities compared to their male partners. A major point of contention in these debates is to what extent the gendered outcomes of women's decisions to combine work and family responsibilities is indicative of a distinct set of preferences and choices (Hakim, 1995; 2000; 2002) or the negotiated responses to constraints placed by income, time, support networks, local services and facilities, provisions through the welfare state and the market, societal and self-expectations of femininity and mothering, which changes over time (McDowell et al. 2006: 8).

Women continue to shoulder the primary responsibility for finding, choosing and managing non-work commitments in the family (Cinamon and Rich, 2002; Crompton, 2002; Skinner, 2005). This disproportionate share of duties and responsibilities affects their working lives to a greater extent than their male partners,

in the form of greater workloads, more sacrifices and higher levels of dissatisfaction in balancing work and family (Becker and Moen, 1999; Milkie and Peltola, 1999). Jane Lewis (1992; 2001) argued that the fundamental premise of societal and women's self-expectations of mothering is that an ideal worker and ideal mother are mutually exclusive. The separation of work and home continues to have greater value for male workers who are said to have no families.

The construction of 'good mothering' emerged out of inquiries into children's development, maintaining the pivotal and irreplaceable role of the mother and her responsibilities in raising competent and successful children (Smith, 1999; Weight, 2006). A commitment to the maternal role is often articulated as a moral position that contributes to feelings of guilt when women are perceived as being unable to conform to particular ideals of appropriate mothering (McDowell et al., 2006). Children's rates of delinquency are often used to identify and label those mothers who are unsuccessful in juggling multiple roles at their workplace and in their homes as inadequate parents (May-Stewart, 1998). For most women, daily life with children involves a set of compromises that tend to be justified on the basis of 'good enough mothering' (coined by Nancy Chodorow, 1978 and used by McDowell et al., 2006).

Investigations into the gendered division of household labour among heterosexual dual-earner couples found that women also continue to shoulder a disproportionate share of household work (Shaw, 1988; Irwin and Bottero, 2000; Sullivan, 2000). Social scientists attempting to explain the gender-based inequalities in the division of household labour developed four conceptual approaches, all of which assume that both partners' see housework as an undesirable task and both attempt to minimise the amount that needs to be done (adapted from Greenstein's (2000) review).

1) The economic dependency model suggests that housework is performed predominantly by women, as they are more likely to be economically dependent on their male partners and therefore expected to allocate more time to domestic work.
2) The time availability perspective draws on human capital theory and predicts a strong association between the number of hours women work outside the home with the number of hours of domestic work. Sociologist Janeen Baxter (1992) used the term 'breadwinner trap' to suggest that one reason men do less housework than their female partners is that they spend more time in paid work.
3) The relative resources/resource bargaining approach assumes an implicit exchange between partners over inputs/earnings and outcomes/who does housework.
4) The gender ideology approach argues that (non)performance of household tasks reflects the gender ideologies of both partners. Couples that hold more traditional beliefs about gender and marital roles will have a relatively traditional gendered division of labour and couples holding more egalitarian ideologies will have a more balanced division of labour.

Longitudinal evidence and the growing participation of women in the workforce suggests that economic dependency, relative resources and time availability does little to explain why housework continues to be women's work (Benjamin and Sullivan, 1999; Greenstein, 2000; Sullivan, 2000). In addition to a gendered division in the time spent on household labour between adults in heterosexual households, there is also a clear gendered pattern of who does what task and the time devoted to such tasks. The complex and dynamic negotiations are based on the meanings and definitions

associated with the different tasks. Men were in involved in far fewer activities than women. Also, their activities were more frequently labelled as leisure (gardening, short periods of childminding) as opposed to the more routine and mundane chores (such as laundry, cleaning and cooking) predominantly done by women. Furthermore, women continue to perform what are constructed as feminine tasks such as cooking, cleaning, caring for children and shopping while men perform 'masculine' tasks such as home repairs, finances and budgeting, requiring more physical strength or engagement with the socially constructed masculine public.

Empirical studies of middle-class dual earner couples' negotiations of work and family commitments find that work-family conflicts occur when men and women face competing demands from the different domains of their lives that are central to their self-concept. Scholars investigating the spatial and temporal constraints of work-life conflict (Kwan, 1999; Schwanen, 2008) found that dual-earner couples often develop adaptive or compensatory strategies. These compensatory strategies include the one-career/one-job or two-career marriages (Becker and Moen, 1999; Moen and Yu, 2000), postponing marriages and/or childbearing age and reducing family size (Debacker, 2008; Hyman et al., 2005).

Conflicts between work and family demands is associated with a number of debilitating outcomes including burnout, decreased family and occupational well-being, psychological costs and physical complaints and job and life dissatisfaction (Westman and Piotrkowski, 1999). These compensatory strategies are intended to balance the demand from both the work and family sides to construct a work-family equation that works. These strategies perpetuate the conventional gendered division of both paid and unpaid work (Becker and Moen, 1999; Duncan et al., 2003; Moen and Yu, 2000). Women also usually report feeling more conflict (Cinamon and Rich, 2002) and are more likely to experience anti-social personality disorders such as drug and alcohol

abuse (Lenon, 1987). In Chapter 6, I explore how these compensatory strategies manifest in Indian hi-tech immigrant families where both adults/parents look to enter the Canadian workforce.

Who is responsible for care? The role of the welfare state in knowledge economies

In the previous section, I discussed how individual workers negotiate reproductive responsibilities with their partners and their employers, as an increasing number of women enter the workforce, resulting in a shift away from the traditional male breadwinner-female caregiver to a dual-earner/adult-worker model of the family. In this section, I will show that care arrangements are negotiated between four main actors: men and women (as I have described above), the state and the market. Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990) used the three worlds of capitalism to explain the different ways in which these four actors divide the responsibility for providing care and other forms of reproductive work. He criticised the definition of welfare as a simple equation of state responsibility reflected in social expenditure. Moreover, he found that the exclusion of the market and the family's role in social provision is misleading. According to Lewis (1997; 2001), Esping-Andersen strove to define a relationship between work and welfare where work is defined as paid work and welfare as policies that permit, encourage or discourage the decommodification of labour. After an extensive survey of international variations in welfare state stratification, Esping-Andersen (1990) found three qualitatively different arrangements of the three cornerstones of welfare: state, market and family (or welfare, paid work and unpaid work as identified by Taylor-Gooby, (1991)).

The first welfare state regime identified by Esping-Anderson (1990) is the 'liberal' welfare state providing means-tested assistance and modest universal transfers or modest social insurance plans, benefiting mainly low-income and working-class groups and other state dependents. Entitlements and benefits in the liberal welfare state are often associated with stigma. The archetypical examples he includes are United States, Canada and Australia. The second welfare regime type is the historical corporatist-statist legacy, catering for the post-industrial class structure. Unlike the liberal model, which he describes as obsessed with market efficiency, the granting of social rights in this regime is taken for granted. The state replaces the market as provider of welfare. This regime is typically shaped by the Church and is committed to preservation of traditional familyhood. Under this regime, social insurance typically encourages motherhood. As a result, state-provided childcare or similar family services are underdeveloped. Examples of the historical corporatist-statist legacy regime typically include Austria, France, Germany and Italy. The third arrangement is the 'social democratic' regime where democracy is the dominant force behind social reform. This regime promotes principles of universalism and de-commodification. This model attempts to eliminate the dualism of the middle-class and working class by ensuring that "services and benefits are upgraded to levels commensurate to even the most discriminating tastes of the new middle classes" (Esping-Anderson 1990: 168). This model addresses the dual policy objectives of emancipation and maintaining the traditional family. It achieves these paradoxical objectives by socialising the costs of familyhood, ensuring that all workers can participate fully in the labour market. The social democratic regime fuses welfare and work. It encourages the right to work by offering income protection. The state maximises this income revenue to sustain a solidaristic, universalistic and de-commodified welfare system intended to minimize social problems.

Almost a decade later in *The Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*, Esping-Andersen (1999) suggested that there is a need to re-think the architecture of the welfare state regimes given the changing relations between the three cornerstones of welfare: state, market and family. The three regimes identified at the beginning of the 1990s were based on protecting the male breadwinner and assigning caring duties and other forms of unpaid reproductive labour to be performed by women in their families. This norm remained in place until the 1970s when women's behaviour with respect to paid work changed substantially and women entered paid work at higher rates, while still performing the bulk of unpaid reproductive work. I have identified the significance of this pattern earlier in the chapter using the terms dual-earner or adult-worker model of the family where all adults in the household participate in the labour market.

This change in the family model became central to policy positions on the organisation of welfare (Crompton 1999; Lewis 2001). Beginning with Elizabeth Wilson's (1977) pioneering account of British postwar settlement, feminist scholarship since the 1990s began to reveal the importance of gender relations to welfare or social policy and inevitably the organisation of welfare states. Women's employment was central to the transformation of post-industrial welfare states (Daly, 1994; Lewis, 1992; 1997; 2001; Sainsbury, 1994; Walby, 1990). The rationale for the regime change included the increased reliance on female labour in postindustrial service economies, rising wage inequalities, contradictory electoral demands for more personal services and fewer taxes, tensions between the gender division of labouring in paid and unpaid work, 'malfunctioning' of family based on child poverty rates, divorce rates and the more long-term concerns about an aging population and declining fertility rates (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Lewis, 2001; Shaver, 2002). Governments that held a long-

standing conviction that wages are the best form of welfare changed their focus towards providing services for working mothers (Esping-Andersen 2002).

Some significant observations made by Esping-Andersen (2002) included the accelerating pace of global integration and the emergence of knowledge-based economies biased towards professional and technical skills, ageing societies and declining fertility rates. Governments and industries use a similar rationale to justify the growing numbers of foreign-born professionals arriving through skilled migration streams. As I have argued earlier, migration needs to be seen as a family strategy, which contributes to a growing number of young newcomer families with young children. They are also susceptible to the same risks of family instability and have similar, if not a higher demand for resource needs as the growing number of atypical and vulnerable households, identified by Esping-Andersen (2002) in his analysis of the welfare state in knowledge-based economies.

Esping-Andersen (2002) argues that the modern family requires a modern welfare state that will provide appropriate services to avoid dependency on traditional income maintenance (the male breadwinner). Women's employment is emerging as a vital economic resource that is becoming increasingly necessary to sustain future welfare state finances. This need creates a strong case for a 'woman-friendly' social contract where decommodifaction of labour and defamilisalisation occurs at the same time (McLaughlin and Glendinning, 1994), promoting choice to get more women into the labour market (Luckhaus, 1994).

Esping-Anderson (2002) also shows that the principal policy challenge for a welfare state promoting gender equality is to ensure that parenthood is made to be compatible with careers for both men and women. This would require a new and more egalitarian equilibrium in men and women's lives in relation to both paid and unpaid work. Esping-Andersen (2002) promotes the new family policy. In this new model, the

government strengthens families by unburdening them of obligations that interfere with their full participation in the workforce. It increases citizens' independence by decommodifying their welfare through the provision of universal income guarantees, a generous income safety net, highly developed services for children, the elderly and the disabled.

The promotion of a 'gender-split' breadwinner model and the full participation of all citizens in the national economy are integral to maintaining individual entitlements to public sector provisions, financed through collective contributions to taxes. Esping-Andersen (2002) insists that investments in increasing women's job opportunities and pay would be considered an investment in family welfare. At the same time, the provision of high-quality and affordable care alternatives for small children and elderly is a key instrument for rectifying the complex social causes of family malfunctioning and would allow women to maximise their employment potential. Investments in and the consumption of family services are an effective employment multiplier and in the long term contribute to combating poverty and welfare dependency (Esping-Anderson, 2002).

Social provision for reproductive labour and defamilialisation is especially necessary for newcomer families where both adults need to join the workforce to sustain their families in a new host country with higher costs of living. In Canada, skilled immigrants also have the added costs of re-training to gain Canada-specific cultural capital to enter the workforce. In Chapter 6, I explore how Indian hi-tech immigrants make reproductive decisions as they both undergo re-training and/or enter the Canadian workforce. In my empirical chapters, I focus on Indian hi-tech professional families' use of the Canadian welfare state provisions for reproductive work as both adults enter the Canadian workforce. In my discussion in the next section on the Canadian liberal welfare state, I acknowledge that the role of the welfare state

in Canada has changed to support the increased numbers of women entering the workforce and the consequent emergence of higher numbers of dual-earner families. I question whether the change has been sufficient to rectify the disadvantages for women, more specifically for a particular segment of economic migrants and their dependent spouses, who arrive in greater numbers, as the Canadian government and knowledge industries actively recruit foreign-born knowledge workers to increase their economic competitiveness in a global market economy.

Canada's liberal welfare state

The Canadian welfare state falls within Esping-Andersen's (2002) modified liberal welfare model. Under this regime, countries continue to sponsor market solutions and private welfare provision as the norm and limit public involvement to instances of acute market or family failure. More generally in knowledge-based economies, markets are emerging as a significant source of welfare for citizens; however, they cannot generally guarantee affordable and high quality care when driven by a profit motive. At present, Canada has no national strategy to childcare. The ten provinces and three territories in Canada have their own approaches to early childhood education and care.

The federal government's role in childcare is mostly regulatory with a minor funding role. Childcare spaces are funded and regulated by provincial governments and delivered by municipal governments. Any financial support from municipal governments is limited and reserved for families in need, leaving all other families with no choice but to purchase care individually and privately (Mahon, 2005; Prentice, 2001; Rose, 1990). In almost all provinces (with the exception of Quebec), the

restrictive and limited public support and encouragement means that the majority of childcare spaces are based on market delivery. Childcare decisions, therefore, are shaped largely by the social and economic circumstances of the family.

The foundation of the Canadian liberal welfare model was laid immediately after the Second World War. The male-breadwinner model was incorporated into Canadian legislation with the establishment of the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) in 1966. The CAP opened the way for federal governments to share welfare expenditures with provincial governments who assumed primary responsibility for regulation and funding while municipal governments were assigned full responsibility for locally specific service delivery of childcare spaces and subsidies for those assessed to be in need (Mahon, 2005). The needs-based assessment by municipal governments limited childcare assistance to cases of family failure, that is, when the male breadwinner-female caregiver model could not be sustained since the male breadwinner was absent or could not provide for his family and female earnings were inadequate.

The federal government made some attempts to develop a national strategy for childcare between 1984 and 1995. Historical tensions between federal and provincial jurisdictions however, pushed the federal government to promote provincial domination. This change was put into legislation when the CAP was abolished in 1995 and replaced by the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). The federal government delegated primary responsibility for the provision of childcare services to provincial governments and freed itself from any cost-sharing or funding obligations.

CHST was developed as a block funding arrangement giving provincial governments more discretion over how these funds should be distributed among health care, post-secondary education and public assistance. The introduction of CHST placed childcare in competition with big-spending universal programs such as healthcare and education, all scrambling for federal dollars at provincial discretion

(Mahon, 2005). Under the CHST program, the federal government systematically reduced transfer payments to provinces to eliminate their deficit and in effect transferred all responsibility to provincial governments who were already grappling with their own deficits (Madore, 2003).

All provinces were obligated to reduce their overall provision of social services and as a result all regions in Canada are currently facing a 'crisis of care'. Childcare spaces provided directly by the different levels of government make up less than one-tenth of the country's spaces and can only be found in two of the ten provinces (Mahon, 2005). Despite constant lobbying by feminist activists, organised labour activists and urban reformers for a system of universally accessible childcare to avoid the marginalisation of families, the provision of childcare in all provinces and territories (except Quebec) remains a residual service organised at the local scale by municipalities. Municipal governments strained for resources and funding continue to push federal and provincial governments to increase the number of regulated childcare spaces (Rose, 1990). The ongoing circulation of welfare responsibilities and jurisdictional tensions has meant that despite these efforts by different stakeholders, childcare services are chaotic and disorganised. There is an insufficient supply of reliable, affordable and accessible childcare spaces to meet the growing demand for non-parental care.

The Canadian province Quebec provides the only model of a universal system of childcare and is probably the closest fit to Esping-Andersen's (2002) new family policy model (explained in the previous section). The Quebec Family Policy was established in 1997. The plan extended full-time kindergarten to five-year olds and provides full-time childcare for pre-school aged children at $5 a day. In a more critical assessment of the Quebec model, academics and policy-makers found that childcare provision under this universal system is based on a model family with particular

economic resources, often afforded by membership in the middle class, parents with standard or predictable work schedules and responsibilities and fitting the dominant cultural and linguistic group. The system is better prepared for children who are healthy, physically and mentally able (Friendly et al., 2002; Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008; Mahon, 2000). Families deviating from these characteristics continue to be excluded from state-sponsored benefits. The hours of operation of regulated childcare spaces are a severe obstacle for parents in finding regulated childcare spaces as over 40 percent of the Canadian workforce does not work a 'standard week' (Madsen, 2002). Quebec's system is also fraught with insufficient resources, which makes providing quality care difficult and well-resourced centres often have high additional 'program fees' charged to parents. Quality care therefore, becomes inaccessible and unaffordable to low-income families under a universal system of childcare (Campbell, 2006).

In Ontario, the federal government's role in childcare provision is limited to two measures provided under Section 63 of the Income Tax Act. First, the Childcare Expense Deduction allows families to deduct from the taxable income of the lower earning spouse the cost of childcare, up to a maximum of $7,000 per year for children under seven and $4,000 for children between eight and sixteen years. The second measure is the Canada Child Tax Benefit: a refundable tax credit targeted at working families earning less than $29,590 and paid in monthly increments to the primary caregiver of the child, which is presumed to be the female parent. Both measures have limitations that perpetuate women's disadvantage in entering the workforce. The Child Care Expense Deduction does not reflect the actual cost of childcare, which can be considerably more expensive. Additionally, the mechanism is regressive in that it delivers the greatest potential benefit to those in higher income tax brackets. Both measures do not consider women who cannot afford to participate in the labour force

because of the lack of provision of affordable and accessible childcare thereby exacerbating their already disadvantaged position in workforce and the wider society, potentially contributing to higher levels of family poverty.

In Ontario (similar to all other provinces and territories, except Quebec), early childhood education and childcare services are funded provincially, with some unpredictable and unreliable federal cost sharing. Maternity, parental and adoption leaves are regulated by provincial and territorial legislation. In Ontario, maternity benefits eligible to new mothers were included under the Unemployment Insurance Act in 1971, as large numbers of women began to enter the workforce. In order to be eligible for maternity and parental leave, women must be engaged in the formal labour market and have 600 hours of 'insurable earnings' over the previous fifty-two week period. These eligibility restrictions exclude women working in informal sectors (dominated by unskilled and semi-skilled migrant women), women who are employed part-time or seasonally as well as full-time students. Moreover, for women and men who qualify for these benefits, the compensation rate is 55 percent of insurable earnings. This would mean that it is inconceivable for those working in marginal or poorly paid employment without access to any or little income support from a spouse or partner, to take the benefit and sustain themselves (Madsen, 2002).

Madsen (2002) in her analysis of the recent amendments to the Employment Insurance Act found that the changes fundamentally undermine efforts towards gender parity and equality. There is a clear pattern in which parent take up parental leave options. Despite being available to men, parental leaves are predominantly taken up by women, reinforcing the traditional role of the mother as caregiver and preserving the traditional gender division of household labour. The supposed choice in taking up leaves is already confined to two-parent families where the spouse and partner can financially support the family if one parent is to take parental leave. Women are most

likely to choose parental leave with little compensation (55 percent of earnings) or to return to work in the absence of available and affordable regulated care options. Moreover, Madsen (2002) found that in this case some women were more likely to stay at home rather than turn to unregulated care alternatives.

In addition to the province's tax measures, there are a small number of subsidised childcare spaces available in Ontario, intended to assist lower income parents to remain in the labour force. Assistance ranges from full subsidies to small partial subsidies. In September 2000, Ontario tightened eligibility criteria for subsidised childcare. In addition, effective January 2007, Ontario introduced an income test to determine eligibility for childcare fee subsidies to replace the previous needs-based tests. The income test pegs eligibility too low to cover modest and middle-income families who do not qualify but still cannot afford regulated childcare. The limited number of subsidies means that many eligible parents are excluded. For these few eligible parents, subsidies that do not cover the whole fee leave a significant gap between the subsidy rate and what parents can pay.

Skilled immigrants entry into a racialised and gendered Canadian labour market is also restricted by a welfare state regime characterised by federal and provincial tensions and inequities in service distribution, placing a higher burden on parent-users (particularly mothers) who rely primarily on market-based provisions. Following the federal government relinquishing of any opportunity to shape the quality, affordability and availability of childcare services, there have been several reports and recommendations by specialised task forces recommending universally available and affordable childcare options as a way to increase gender equality and encourage full

participation in the workforce (e.g. Pascal Report in Ontario, 2009).[4] A constrained provincial government and under-resourced and underfunded municipal government tend to leave childcare provision to the private realm of the market and the family. What are the implications for newcomer families of Indian-origin with young children where both parents are looking to enter the Canadian workforce?

As I have discussed earlier in this chapter, skilled immigrants in Canada often experience higher levels of unemployment or underemployment and are more likely to be forced into part-time or contractual work. The growing financial pressures involved in settling in a new host country often requires both adults in a household to join the workforce to sustain their families. This could mean that newcomer professional families moving to the Waterloo Region may struggle to fit into the dual-earner policy model in Ontario, since one spouse or parent may not be able to financially support the family. Furthermore, foreign-born professionals could potentially fall through the gaps in the childcare provision in two ways. First, foreign professionals and new parents forced into part-time or contractual work would be excluded from the benefits of maternity, parental and adoption leave, as they would not meet the eligibility requirements in Ontario. Secondly, despite the significant wage gap compared to their Canadian-born and educated counterparts, foreign-born professionals could potentially be excluded from the provision of subsidised childcare spaces for two reasons. First, the income-test may disqualify them if they are both able to enter the labour market and make a modest income. Secondly, if the limited number of subsidies is distributed

[4] Charles E. Pascal (2009) in his report titled *With our best future in mind: Implementing Early Learning in Ontario*, suggests a plan of action for implementing a seamless and integrated system of care to support children from 0 to 12 years old and their families in the form of full-day kindergarten and learning for four and five year olds, provisions for before and after school care and activities to occupy children in the context of Ontario.

on a first-come, first-serve basis, they may not have the information upon arriving in a new host country to give them this first-mover's advantage.

Skilled immigrant couples and their families might also be acutely disadvantaged in a universal system of childcare provision like the Quebec model (or the proposed full-day kindergarten model in Ontario). Universal systems would continue to be based on middle-class families from the dominant cultural and linguistic group and also require parents to work a standard week. Newcomer dual-earner families will be linguistically and culturally different from the policy model of an ideal parent/family. In addition, foreign-born professional couples hoping to enter technology sectors are more likely to work unpredictable, atypical and long hours due to the project based nature of their jobs (discussed in detail in an earlier section). This might leave newcomer dual-earner families with little choice but to opt for unregulated care alternatives. Later in the thesis, (mainly in Chapter 6), I explore the gendered patterns of paid and unpaid work that emerge as professional couples of Indian-origin attempt to enter the Canadian workforce and investigate what non-parental care alternatives available to them.

Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I intended to build a theoretical toolkit using various separate theoretical traditions to serve two main purposes for the overall structure of the thesis: first, to explain where my research questions came from; secondly, to identify the conceptual basis for data collection and analysis (explained in more detail in the next chapter) and in writing the thesis. I divided this chapter into two sections, discussing bodies of literature that have, for the most part, evolved separately through the work of

different groups of scholars, neglecting different aspects of the Indian hi-tech immigrants' experiences that I explore in the thesis.

In the first section of this chapter, I critically assessed the rise of the knowledge economy and its role in changing the image of the ideal international labour migrant. I used Bourdieu's *theory of practice* (1977), particularly the concepts of habitus (1984) and capitals (1986) to explain the labour market disadvantage of skilled immigrants entering various occupational sectors in Canada. I would argue however, that Bourdieu's class-based analysis is not sufficient to explain the racialised nature of Canada's labour markets and also the wider society. Here, I employ Iris Marion Young's concept of *cultural imperialism* to show how the dominance and privilege of the Canadian-born and educated worker is constructed and maintained, restricting the entry of skilled newcomers who are actively recruited to fill skills gaps in Canada's knowledge economy.

As I have argued here, scholarship on the rise of the new economy has largely neglected the gendered implications of the new employment relations for workers. In the second section of the chapter, I introduce a different set of primarily feminist theories and empirical studies to stress the gendered implications of Indian hi-tech immigrants experiences of entering both the labour market and wider society in Canada. This section draws on scholarship on the gendered organisation of paid work, gendered divisions of unpaid work and the role of organisations and the welfare state. It is divided into four sub-sections: the gendered organisation of technology sectors, combining work and family life, the role of the welfare state and the Canada's liberal welfare state. These different theoretical approaches, when counter-posed provide a better insight into how these new immigrants negotiate their career aspirations and familial duties during the dual transitions of settlement and parenthood in a new host country and culture.

CHAPTER 3

'You know what I mean': Researching as a partial insider

My aim in the research was to explore the complex texture of the everyday lived experiences of a particular segment of Canadian newcomers who enter mainly technology occupations within knowledge industries, filling the vacancies constructed by the Canadian government and industries. As I have shown throughout the previous chapter, a focus on migrants raises interesting questions about the significance of culture, ethnicity, skin colour and previous experience for a study of the gendered division of labour in a newly emerging sector. I chose to study Indian hi-tech immigrants who are selected on the basis of their potential contribution to Canada's economic competitiveness in a global knowledge-based market economy. Many of these economic migrants arrive with their spouses (with similar educational attainments) also seeking to enter the Canadian workforce and young children who require non-parental care if both parents are to engage in full-time employment. I focus on this group: migrant parents.

I seek to explore the complex set of negotiations involved in their experiences of balancing competing demands from their commitment to work and family life and identify their strategies to manage any potential conflicts that may arise. In the thesis, I identify waged work as their engagement with technology workplaces, employers and co-workers and life as the responsibilities and obligations towards their spouses or partners, children and transnational families, which, of course, as feminist scholars have insisted, also involves 'work'. I also investigate the role of organisations and the liberal welfare state in assisting with these complex negotiations and the gendered divisions of paid and unpaid work that emerge as a result. In order to expose this

microcosm of negotiations involving multiple actors, my choice of research strategy is a case study of a growing technology cluster in Canada, the Waterloo Region (also known as Canada's Technology Triangle). In this chapter, I describe and justify this research strategy and the methods of data collection and analysis that I employed.

The case study as a research strategy

Robert K. Yin (1981; 1984) has written widely about the case study method, defining it as an empirical inquiry into a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. He argued that case studies are particularly appropriate when the boundary of the phenomenon may not be clearly evident and when multiple sources of evidence are necessary to show how the multiple realities are socially constructed. Case studies as a research tool allow for an in-depth study of the complexities of social life by beginning with an intersectional core (a single group, culture, event, concept or site) and working outwards to analytically unravel the influences of broader social processes (here including globalization, neoliberalism and international labour migration) and structures of inequality (e.g. race, gender, class, sexuality and age) (Fidel, 1984; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gerring, 2004; Yin 1981; 1984).

Fidel (1984) argues that case studies as a research method are particularly useful for investigating social phenomena where a large variety of factors and relationships need to be included. The case study achieves two relatively contradictory or mutually exclusive purposes. First, they permit a researcher to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the subject or event under study. Secondly, they simultaneously allow the development of a more general theoretical statement about regularities and patterns than other methods produce. Becker (1970) identified flexibility as an important and useful attribute of case studies as 'it prepares the

investigator to deal with unexpected findings and, indeed requires him (*sic*) to reorient his study in light of such developments. It forces him to consider, however crudely, the multiple interrelations of particular phenomena he involves' (quoted in Fidel 1984; 274).

Many social science researchers have used various typologies to categorise case studies including Miles' (1979) division between within-case, cross-case and within-site analysis; Yin's (1981) exploratory, descriptive and explanatory types; Gerring (2004) types I, II and III, which are contingent on whether the case study uses temporal or spatial variation, amongst others. Yin (1981) also distinguished between types of evidence (qualitative or quantitative), types of data collection methods (ethnographies, interviews and life histories) and research strategies (case studies). Here, I use an exploratory case study method, collecting primarily qualitative evidence through in-depth interviews (explained and justified later in the chapter).

Some of the canonical and seminal paradigms used in this thesis have been derived from case study research (Bourdieu, 1977; Hochschild, 1989; 1997; Kanter, 1977; McDowell, 1997; 2009). At the same time, case studies are often criticised for being subjective, not being generalisable and for permitting too much scope for the researcher's interpretations (see Flyvbjerg, (2006) and Yin, (1981)). For all the criticisms raised against case studies as a research strategy, they allow researchers to present a wealth of details and a nuanced view of reality with insights for understanding human behaviour. The case study as a research strategy is also important for researchers' own learning process and for developing good research skills (Flyvbjerg, 2006).

The advantages of the case study research method identified above made it an appropriate research strategy for uncovering the various relationships and negotiations involved as newcomer families of Indian-origin balanced the demands from paid work

in the workplace and unpaid work in the home. In addition, the two paradoxical purposes (Fidel, 1984) and the flexible approach (Becker, 1970) of the case study method allowed me to relate these negotiations (at the individual and household scale) to wider social processes such as neoliberalism, globalisation, international labour migration and larger structures of inequality such as gender.

I sought to develop an information-rich narrative (Clifford Geertz (1973) called it a thick description) of the experiences of Indian hi-tech immigrants for three reasons. First, despite India's long history of immigration to Canada, the participants in my study represent a relatively new class of Indian immigrants compared to earlier arrivals of mainly unskilled and semi-skilled workers, serving Canada's resource-driven economy. In the past, women and children arrived almost exclusively through the family class categories (see Figure 4 in Chapter 1). This professional class of Indian immigrants are admitted on the basis of their potential contribution to growing numbers of knowledge industries in Canada. Secondly, I am particularly interested in investigating whether India's global reputation as a supplier of reliable, high-skilled and relatively low-cost technology workers allows this segment of Canadian immigrants to overcome some of the typical labour market disadvantages experienced by new economic migrants (discussed in detail in Chapter 2). Thirdly, my own experience of migrating to Canada as a skilled dependent of an economic migrant motivated me to think about migration as a family strategy and also explains my research interest in the experiences of a racialised minority ethnic group that I identify with.

The majority of studies on immigration to Canada have focused on the three gateway cities, Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal (Bauder, 2005; Friendly et al., 2002; Hiebert, 1999; Hiebert et al., 2003; Ng, 1998; Preston and Giles, 1997; Waters, 2003; Young, 2007). More recently, scholars have identified a geographical shift in immigrant settlement away from typical immigrant gateway cities, calling it the 'new paradigm' in

international migration (Walton-Roberts, 2011; Wulff et al., 2008). This newer pattern of settlement is evident in several immigrant-receiving countries including Australia, New Zealand, USA (Light 2006; Wulff et al 2008) and Canada (Vatz Laaroussi and Walton-Roberts 2005). In Canada, the Waterloo Region (located in southwestern Ontario) has become a prominent secondary settlement area for immigrants skilled in natural sciences, engineering and technology due to its patterns of industrial change towards knowledge-based industries and growing reputation as a technology concentration. A case study of Indian technology newcomers in what has become popularly known as Canada's Technology Triangle is in itself of interest to scholars of economic location and migrant labour.

The Waterloo Region, Canada's Technology Triangle: A Case Study

The Waterloo Region, located in south-western Ontario, has rapidly earned the reputation of a technology concentration that attracts both technology firms and professionals. This technology cluster is located an hour west of Toronto (one of Canada's three immigrant gateway cities) and in the last decade has become a significant secondary settlement area. The region's strong technological presence is not dominated by any particular high-tech sector but houses more than 700 technology companies (ranging from small start-ups to large multinational firms) in a diversity of sectors including IT, biomedical, aerospace, environmental technology and advanced manufacturing. These companies employ more than 30,000 employees (Communitech, 2006).

Figure 5: Location of the Waterloo Region in Southwestern Ontario.



Source: Prepared by the University of Waterloo's Faculty of Environmental Studies, Mapping Analysis and Design, Cartography Unit (2011). Retrieved from http://www.lib.uwaterloo.ca/discipline/Cartography/campus/southont.gif

The foundations of the vibrant Information Technology (IT) cluster lie in three related factors: first, a strong industrial history of advanced manufacturing (attributable to historical patterns of migration); secondly, local universities (University of Waterloo, Wilfred-Laurier University) and colleges (Connestoga) focused on engineering, math and computer science; and thirdly, a civic culture that supports linkages between firms and public institutions, particularly universities (Lucas, Sands and Wolfe, 2009).

Bramwell, Nelles and Wolfe (2008) divide the industrial development of the Waterloo Region into roughly three periods based on the dominant types of industrial activities. From the turn of the 20th century to 1945, the regional industry was established on medium-scale manufacturing and the earliest industries to emerge in the region included brewing/food and beverage manufacturing, textiles, wood

processing and working and rubber manufacturing. Immigration became a significant source of the skilled labour needed to support the region's historical industrial development. During this period of industrial development, the region formed the urban centre of ethnic-German settlement in Ontario in the nineteenth century. This early group of ethnic German settlers brought technical expertise in engineering and artisanal manufacturing to the region needed to sustain the early industries in this period of industrial development.

Industrial development in the second period beginning in the inter-war years (between the First and the Second World War) was characterised by complex engineering, metalworking, automotive and food related industries, building on a foundation of traditional manufacturing. The key firms in the region included JM Schneider, Dare Biscuits, BF Goodrich, which are still dominant in the region today. The pioneering technology companies, which laid the foundations for the high tech cluster, also emerged during this second period. Electrohome Limited, a long-standing establishment in the region, founded in 1907 (in the first period of industrial development), transformed in this industrial period, contributing to the development of notable high-tech firms in the region today including Christie Digital, COMDEV and RIM. In the third period of industrial development from the end of World War II to 1975, the Waterloo Region's industrial activities expanded, largely due to the diversification of production by the key firms established over the previous industrial period, to include advanced manufacturing, early software applications and electrical and computer engineering. Bramwell, Nelles and Wolfe (2008) argue that this period was distinguished by local sources of innovation and competencies in a diversity of technology-related sectors.

Waterloo's first ICT firms were created in the early 1970s when a number of existing companies in the region began developing software and hardware to support

networking and communications applications. There was a significant increase in formalised cooperation as technology became critical for the growth and progress of other economic sectors. Civic and business associations arose to maximise the region's competitive potential, including institutional entities such as, Canada's Technology Triangle, Canada's Technology Triangle Accelerator Network and most recently the Communitech Technology Association. Communitech was created to represent the interests of Waterloo's high-tech companies to the different levels of government in Canada and provide networking opportunities intended to connect technology professionals and companies. Bramwell, Nelles and Wolfe (2004) found evidence of a strong and visible local community leadership. Local anchor firms affiliated with local institutions became community leaders and representatives of local investment capital. Walton-Roberts (2011) argues that the vision of the region as an organically innovative community with a philanthropic and collaborative spirit came to be expressed in the term 'The Waterloo Way'.

Motivated by the industrial race of the Cold War, the University of Waterloo was inaugurated in 1959 to fill the perceived educational gap that was needed to develop the region's technological capabilities and fill technical manpower shortages. Today, the university continues to serve the regional economy in two important ways: by providing a pool of local talent and by transferring cutting-edge knowledge, either in the form of entrepreneurial spin-off companies or through patenting, licensing, consulting or joint research projects (Bramwell, Nelles and Wolfe, 2004). Two of the earliest firms were both spin offs from the University of Waterloo in 1974. The continued emergence of such spin-offs had a strong demonstration effect for subsequent local start-ups in the 1980s and 1990s, such as Open Text and Research in Motion. Other educational institutions including, Wilfred Laurier University (1960), the University of Guelph (1964), and Conestoga College (1967) have also all produced

high tech spin-off companies. The universities and colleges in the Waterloo Region are thus an important provider of a robust local talent pool, R&D resources, spin-off activities and other formal and informal resources (Bramwell, Nelles and Wolfe, 2004; Walton-Roberts, 2011).

The underlying dimension of the competitive advantage in firms within the Waterloo technology cluster is the shared access to a growing knowledge base, particularly through formalised co-operations through civic and business institutions and global linkages as well as the flows of highly skilled professionals into the labour market from local universities and colleges and to a large extent through immigration to the region. Several geographers have discussed the importance of technology clusters for national economies competing in a global knowledge economy (Bathelt, Malmberg and Maskell, 2004a, b; Gertler, 1993; 2003; Gertler et al., 2002; Markusen, 1996; Maskell, 2001; Porter, 1998; Saxenian, 1994; Scott, 1988; 1998; Storper, 1997). Knowledge industries located in a spatial cluster, surrounded by other similar and related companies, can benefit significantly from local talent pools of workers who possess tacit or codified knowledge that they can share in the same local environment: the basis of economic competitiveness in a global knowledge-based economy (Gertler, 2003). In the Waterloo cluster, key customers, sources of supply, competitors, and important strategic partnerships for the majority of firms occur at the continental and/or global levels. While larger firms tend to be more focused on the global level, smaller firms, regardless of whether their key customers are currently in Canada, also have a growing global reach or aspirations. The attraction and retention of highly educated, potentially mobile workers is a central asset to holding firms in the region.

Foreign-born technology professionals are drawn to the multiple employment opportunities created by a dense network of local firms with global linkages (Lucas, Sands and Wolfe 2009). Immigration is a significant contributor to the region's

historical and contemporary population growth and industrial strength. According to the latest census conducted in 2006, immigrants accounted for 22.3 percent of the region's total population (Region of Waterloo, 2006). From 2001 to 2006, the immigrant population grew by 13.6 percent, almost twice the growth of the non-migrant population (i.e. citizens born in Canada). The region has become one of the top ten destinations for immigrants arriving in Canada and among the top five for immigrants entering Ontario. The Waterloo region has the fifth highest per capita immigrant population of all urban areas in Canada (Communitech, 2006).

The majority of immigrants used to be from Europe given the historical patterns of immigration and settlement of the largest ethnic-German population in Ontario. Oktoberfest continues to be a popular feature of the region's celebrations. The numbers of newcomers from Europe are declining rapidly; Asia and the Middle East now represent more than a quarter of Waterloo's immigrant population, becoming the most common places of birth for recent immigrants arriving in the last five years. Almost 40 percent of all immigrants residing in the region in 2006 have lived here for less than fifteen years and the number of immigrants who arrived in the five years from 2001 to 2006 was similar to the number who arrived over the previous ten-year periods (1971 to 1980 and 1981 to 1990). In 2006, 61,980 people in the region identified themselves as a 'visible minority'.[5] The region has the twelfth largest "visible minority" population in Canada and the seventh largest in Ontario (Region of Waterloo, 2006). 40 percent of newcomers originated in Southern Asia (including India). South Asians (Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans) are the largest 'visible minority' group. Immigrants skilled in engineering, technology and automotive fields

[5] Visible minority refers to belong to a visible minority group as defined by Employment and Equity Act, which defines a visible minority as "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour." The visible minority populations consists of mainly the following groups: Chinese, South Asian, Black, Arab, West Asian, Filipino, Southeast Asian, Latin American, Japanese and Korean (Statistics Canada, 2009).

favour the region as a secondary settlement region, based on its reputation as a technology concentration and the perceived employment opportunities, as well as the cheaper housing costs as compared to Toronto.

A reflexive approach to interviewing

In the previous sections, I explained my choice of a case study as my research strategy and provided some background information on the case study location, the Waterloo Region, also known as Canada's Technology Triangle. In this section, I justify my primary method of data collection: in-depth interviews. Yin (1981) recognised that the basic design feature of any case study is a relatively undefined conceptual framework, intended to capture the interactions of too many variables. Nonetheless, the narrative must be organised around specific propositions or a series of answers to a set of open-ended questions that inevitably will be modified as analysis progresses. Qualitative research is better suited to this basic design feature of case studies, revealing diversity, variation and heterogeneity as opposed to quantitative analysis that often by virtue of its research design promotes singularity, sameness and homogeneity (McCall, 2005; Ragin, 2005). Moreover, qualitative research approaches allow for an iterative research process to modify research design and questions as the study progresses. For these reasons, I opted for a qualitative approach in my case study of Indian hi-tech immigrants in the Waterloo Region.

The primary social research method used in this study is open-ended, semi-structured interviews. Herod (1993) identified two basic types of interviews that are frequently used in social science research. The more widely used one is the standardised survey interview in which the researcher poses questions that have closed-ended or fixed-alternate answers. The second type is the open-ended interview

used widely in anthropology and increasingly in geography. In the open-ended interview a number of questions are prepared in advance with a specific purpose in mind and then reformulated during the course of the interview as information is provided by the interviewee by selecting appropriate prompts or eliminating lines of questioning that are no longer appropriate or necessary. A general and important aim of my study was to highlight processes of meaning making; decision-making and how participants' everyday lived experiences are understood and negotiated. Open-ended interviews therefore, were best suited at encapsulating the complexities and subtleties of participants' lived experiences.

Interviews as a research method have been discussed and debated extensively by social science researchers. One of the popular and interesting debates on qualitative research methods and in particular interviews, was published in *The Professional Geographer* (1991-1992). The debate was between two economic Geographers Erica Schoenberger and Linda McDowell. Schoenberger (1991) suggested that the open-ended interview in economic geography is able to capture many of the subtle complexities underlying decision-making processes (Geertz, 1973 called this 'thick description') that may be missed by large-scale, standardised statistical analysis. McDowell (1992b) raised the notion of a reflexive approach to qualitative research, drawing on critical realism and emphasising the gendered nature of interviewing. Reflexivity as a research strategy marks knowledges as situated (Harding, 1991; Harraway, 1988; 1991; Rose, 1997) and ideally aims at providing a full understanding of the researcher, the researched and the research context. A reflexive approach to research takes into account our own position as researchers and that of our research participants, writing this into our research practice (McDowell, 1992). Schoenberger (1992) in her response agreed that 'gender makes a difference' but was unsure 'precisely what makes the difference' (p. 217).

This debate amongst others contributed to the widespread acknowledgement that social research is an ongoing intersubjective or dialogic activity. A research situation is as much structured by the researcher as the person being researched (England, 1994). Moser (2008) argued that individuals' personalities play a significant role in shaping power relations in all social encounters including that of the researcher and the researched. England (1994) recommends that fieldwork should be predicated on an unequivocal acceptance that the knowledge of the person being researched (at least regarding the particular questions being asked) is greater than that of the researcher. Interviews are a co-production (Mason, 2002) and may be treated as social events or social interactions within a particular social context (Davies and Dodd, 2002). England (1994), for example, might respond to Schoenberger's (1992) point by calling for a greater reflection on the part of the researcher to produce more inclusive, more flexible, yet philosophically informed methodologies that are sensitive to the power relations inherent in fieldwork.

Choosing appropriate sampling strategies

Qualitative research has often been criticised on the basis of what Tobin and Begley (2004) call the methodological trinity of reliability, validity and generalisation. Coyne (1997) argues that qualitative researchers are often criticised specifically for not describing their sampling strategies in sufficient detail making the interpretations of their findings difficult (validity) and also affecting the reliability of the study. Schatzman and Strauss (1973) provided one of the pioneering arguments for selective sampling as a practical necessity shaped by the conceptual framework selected by the researcher and researchers' temporal constraints.

Patton (1990) more than fifteen years later proposed the term 'purposeful sampling' to express a similar idea, promoting the logic and power of selecting information-rich cases for in-depth study. Although Patton (1990) argued that all types of sampling in qualitative research are encompassed under the umbrella term 'purposeful sampling', he identified fifteen different selection strategies used to fit a particular study. Social science researchers since have reduced these fifteen categories including Morse (1991) who suggests four types and Sandelowski (1995) and Marshall (1996) who recommend three broad types/categories, namely, convenience, judgment and theoretical sampling.

In general, purposeful sampling refers to decisions made prior to the beginning of the study to sample subjects according to a preconceived, but reasonable set of criteria known as a sampling frame. In this study, I employed a restrictive sampling frame to recruit a specific group of immigrants from similar ethnic/racial, religious, cultural and socio-economic backgrounds in an attempt to control for all axes of difference, drawing out the gendered implications of their negotiations of paid and unpaid work. Purposeful sampling methods were most useful and appropriate to select this specific group. I also wanted to include the perspectives not only of immigrants themselves but also various other stakeholders involved in work/life negotiations and whom migrants engage with upon arrival and during their process of settlement. My sampling frame included three sets of participants: organisations involved in immigrant settlement (based on a judgment sample), high-tech companies based in the Waterloo Region (using convenience sampling) and newly immigrated Indian hi-tech professional couples (snowball sampling from personal networks).

Sorell and Redmond (1995) argue that the manner in which interviewers evoke respondents' recall, expression and feelings has a direct impact on the quality of the data obtained from interviews. A skilled interviewer would use the responses from

participants to guide data collection and probe for further information as needed for depth or clarity. In such situations, the researcher maintains control over the interview with room for flexibility in the format, timing and sequence of questions, responding to the content of responses and general nonverbal cues from the participant. All interview guides for the three sets of participants were prepared in advance of reaching the field, with a specific interview in mind. Nonetheless, these guides were often reformulated during the course of the interview as interviewees provided information that made some questions inappropriate and irrelevant and new questions necessary.

Recruiting the organisations and technology companies

Before I started fieldwork in June 2009, I identified potential organisations and government offices that might provide expert information on the industrial development and patterns of immigration in the Waterloo Region. I identified six such organisations and conducted eight in-depth interviews: two interviews with the Communitech Technology Association, the Waterloo Region Immigrant Employment Network (WRIEN), two interviews with the Municipality of Waterloo Children's Services, Child Care Action Network (CCAN) and the Chair of Early Childhood Education (ECE) (see Appendix 1 for descriptions of the organisations and the interview guides). The interviews with organisations were between one to three hours long and took place in the offices of the respective organisations. Interviewees were asked about their primary objectives and organisational structure, sources of funding and their involvement with newcomers entering both the labour markets and wider society in the Waterloo region.

Interviews with technology companies served two main purposes for the study: first, to understand the labour market that Indian IT workers are entering upon arrival

to the region and secondly, to reveal the organisational culture and context in which Indian hi-tech professional couples negotiate their commitment to work in these technology companies and their responsibilities to their families (particularly dividing childcare and domestic work with their partners). I only contacted medium-sized and large technology companies (with over 100 employees) in the region. Initial contacts were made using a list compiled by Communitech of its member companies. The main challenge at this stage of the research process was convincing technology companies to participate in the study.

In many of the multinational companies in the region, I was unable to find the appropriate telephone number or email address to arrange an interview. I found myself transferred between departments for weeks before someone confirmed the final refusal to participate. I was unable to recruit the largest technology companies in the Waterloo cluster with global and Indian divisions because I was either unable to reach them due to a complex web of telephone numbers and emails or they refused to participate in the study without any explanation. The largest information and communications technologies company in the region, Research in Motion, considered a cornerstone of the technological cluster, refused to participate in the study after a month of follow-up phone calls and emails with five different departments in the company on the basis that they would not provide any information that was not publicly available on their website or press releases. Interestingly, just under half of the immigrant participants worked for this one company. They all found their job through an employment agency dedicated to placing newcomers in any one of the company's several telecommunication and software departments.

Despite these challenges, I managed to initiate contact with over thirty companies, of which ten medium- to large-sized technology companies (with 120-1000 employees) agreed to participate in the study (see Appendix 2 for company profiles

and interview guide). In these companies, I conducted interviews with Human Resources (HR) professionals on the basis that they would be most knowledgeable about demographics of employees, recruiting and hiring practices, the organisational culture and provisions targeted towards employees' work-life balance. The interviews were between forty minutes to an hour and held in the informants' offices. The interviewees were asked about why the company decided to locate in the Waterloo region, the company's main product and their productions processes, the number and demographic profile of employees, the company's understanding of work-life balance and measures directed towards this goal.

The companies chose the Waterloo region for one of three main reasons: they took over existing companies, the founders graduated from universities in the region (University of Waterloo or Wilfred-Laurier University) and finally the region's reputation as a technology cluster and the availability of a local pool of technology talent. Just under half of the companies were located in the University of Waterloo's Research and Technology Park.[6] During the interviews, some companies were reluctant to reveal ethnic/racial composition of employees even though the information provided would be confidential and anonymous. HR personnel were more likely to provide information about gender but did not comment on the number of employees that were Canadian citizens, permanent residents or on work permits and were careful in answering questions about maternity, parental or adoption leaves. Interviewees questioned me

[6] The University of Waterloo Research and Technology Park is an example of *the Waterloo Way* (Walton-Roberts, 2011). Recently renamed as the David Johnston Research and Technology Park, it is the result of a partnership between the University of Waterloo, the Government of Canada, Province of Ontario, the Region of Waterloo, the City of Waterloo, the Communitech Technology Association and Canada's Technology Triangle. The park provides 1.2 million square feet of office space reserved for the region's growing technology companies. The Accelerator Centre is a key feature of the park intended to encourage the growth of high-tech companies in the Waterloo Region by providing a broad range of services including IP management consultation, mentoring, access to professional service providers and community networking events. The Park currently houses a large gym and a for-profit childcare centre mostly catering to high-tech employees working in the vicinity (University of Waterloo, 2008).

on exactly how I would use any information provided and in some cases said they were unwilling to disclose such information during an interview with a student. As the interviews progressed, I adopted my interview guide to incorporate iterative questioning, probes and rephrased questions.

At the end of the interviews with HR professionals, I requested their help in recruiting company employees who fit the profile of Indian hi-tech professionals. None of the companies permitted me to advertise the study on the company premises or through company listservs. The different modes of recruitment meant that the technology companies and employees interviewed do not necessarily coincide and so the perspectives of employees are not specific to the companies, although there was some degree of overlap. Just under half of the Indian hi-tech professionals interviewed worked in any one of the ten technology companies. The study however was not intended to be a representative sample of the experiences of all employees and companies in the region or intended to target certain companies, instead my aim was to explore in detail their organisational cultures and the rational for professionals' decisions rather than general patterns in the workplace. Pseudonyms have been used for both firms and interviewees to maintain anonymity and confidentiality.

Interviewing Indian hi-tech immigrants

Research is dynamic and formed in the spaces between the researcher and participants. Feminist researchers have recognised that research relations are formative and on occasion these relationships may be fostered (Browne, 2005). Social networks of the researcher and respondents as channels of recruitment may be advantageous in some respects. They include those individuals or groups that may be ignored in studies relying on random or representative sampling. They are, however,

also some disadvantages to using social networks as a sampling strategy because the researcher can exclude those individuals who fall in between friendship groups. Snowball sampling uses social networks to access specific populations and uses interpersonal connections eventually including or excluding some individuals and groups.

Keeping these advantages and disadvantages in mind while carrying out the research, I used snowball sampling to recruit Indian hi-tech professionals who had recently immigrated to the Waterloo Region. I asked them to reflect on their experiences of work and life in Canada. I was particularly interested in immigrants who arrived in the last ten years with skilled dependent spouses and young children through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class or the Canadian Experience Class. One of the shortcomings of feminist social research on performing care is the inherently political and exclusive focus on problematising women's lives without addressing the perspectives and impacts of men (Graham, 1993; Hawkins et al., 1993; Hook, 2006). To circumvent this shortcoming, I included the perspectives and opinions of both men and women to develop a nuanced understanding of the decision-making and meaning-making involved in Indian professional couples' transitions of settlement and parenthood in the Waterloo Region. The reflections of this set of participants are the basis for all three of the empirical chapters.

I contacted the first set of participants through personal networks as a member of the same immigrant community. The remainder of respondents were recruited by snowballing from this initial group. Informants introduced me to other potential participants at informal gatherings, community events and temple visits for religious festivals. There has always been great interest at such gatherings to share migration experiences: they are able to discuss Canada's immigration policies and employers' mistreatment of newcomers. These gatherings also play an informational role in the

lives of newcomers and many newcomer families get information and advice from older members of the community about government or community resources available to them.

I found that during the interviews, some individuals who were vocal in such community gatherings and shared information in these informal spaces refused to participate in the study saying they did not have the time or did not want to talk about their personal problems publicly. Nonetheless, these discussions were useful in helping me improve my research approach and in particular the interview guide. Twenty-one couples agreed to participate in the study and I conducted forty separate interviews (see Appendix 3 for demographic information and interview guide). In the interviews, I asked respondents about their experiences with the immigration application, their education and work experience in India and their labour market experiences in Canada. I also asked a set of questions about household composition, income, the transition to parenthood and the division of childcare and household chores.

Previous studies about the gendered division of domestic labour and childcare in heterosexual households typically used large-scale surveys to identify changes over time (Shaw, 1988; Sullivan, 2000). These studies, however, have been criticised for their measurement bias in that people often give answers that appear to put them in a reasonable or positive light and exaggerate their contribution to household labour. Babbie (2001) identified the social desirability bias as the tendency of male subjects to convey a more pro-feminist view in the presence of a female researcher. This measurement/social desirability bias is reduced when household members are interviewed separately to check for discrepancies in individual accounts. Separate interviews with the professional couples were critical to providing an unbiased representation of the gendered division of paid work and household labour, ensuring

that informants were not influenced by the presence of their spouse. This proved to be more difficult in practice.

Some couples agreed to participate but were reluctant to do separate interviews, insisting that either of them could answer all necessary questions. In such cases, I maintained the importance of getting both their individual opinions convincing all couples except for one. I conducted interviews on the weekends, as it was the only free time for participants. The interviews were two to three hours long and took place in participants' homes. I scheduled both interviews during the same day or at least the same weekend. All interviews were conducted in the participants' homes. In some instances, partners who completed their interviews first would sometimes interrupt or rush informants. Interestingly, in the majority of interviews, men opted to be the first interview.

Some male informants were more likely to refuse to answer some questions on the division of household responsibilities by saying, "Haven't you already asked my wife?" or "will you be asking her the same questions? You don't trust me?" Male informants were also more likely to provide brief, monosyllabic answers to signal their discontent with some of the questions. They also often suggested that their spouse would be better suited to answer questions about childcare and housework, signalling a gender ideology that identifies domestic labour as women's work. In one instance, I was talking to a female informant after completing the interview with her partner and as I began to ask her about her experiences with negotiating childcare and household responsibilities, her husband walked into the room and accused me being inconsiderate with their time and for occupying their only free time during the week. At that point, I was prepared to bring the interview to a close; however, she apologised profusely and asked him to leave the room and we completed the interview.

There is always an ethical danger in appropriating and representing the choices of others as an expert on their lives. There is a need to recognize the positionality of the researcher and research participants to identify and explain the instances in which they foreground and background different aspects of their identity, conceal information and/or maintain silence during specific lines of questioning. Any participant that was approached was given the opportunity to refuse to participate to ensure that interviewees were genuinely willing to be a part of the study offer information freely. Before starting the interview, I provided informants with a brief background to my academic and research experience, a succinct explanation of the study, the structure of the interview and assured participants of the ethical measures taken to maintain confidentiality and anonymity.

Participants were encouraged to be frank at the outset of each session. Keeping with the time constraints of participants, interviews were couched between brief informal opening conversations to build a good rapport and closed with a short debrief session for both the participant and myself the researcher to get feedback and learn from the process of interviewing. As the interview progressed, respondents were also encouraged to introduce topics, interject and offer suggestions, new prompts or lines of questioning that they felt would provide important information for the study. At the end of the interviews, I requested an informal follow-up conversation in a later visit to get participants' opinions on the findings from my analysis of the information they provided during the interview. The majority declined.

Maintaining the integrity of multiple voices in the study

A substantial element of case studies is the narrative. Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that good narratives expose complexities and contradictions to uncover a rich problematic and 'good studies should be read as narratives in their entirety' (p. 241). In this penultimate section, I explain how I will construct the narrative from the interviews. Davies and Dodd (2002) recommend that researchers should continue to reflect on their relationship with participants as they interpret their responses in relation to the problematic or phenomenon under study. In analysing the data and writing the report, researchers should be attentive, empathetic, careful, sensitive, respectful, reflective, conscientious, engaged, aware and open. Researchers should provide a detailed description of interactions with participants to allow the reader to assess the social reality of the situations. In providing sufficient detail of the context of the fieldwork, the researcher allows the reader to assess whether findings emerge from the data rather than their predispositions (Shenton, 2004). The underlying difficulty in developing a thick description of the phenomenon under study and a reliable, valid and dependable narrative is in how to analyse the transcripts once the interviews have been completed (Burnard, 1991).

When Matthew Miles (1979) famously called qualitative data 'an attractive nuisance' he described mainly the challenge of constructing information-rich narratives given the difficulties with collecting and analysing information effectively. Simister (1995) claims that one of the problems inherent within the richness of interview data is that analysis is impractical without a reduction of this large amount of information. Data analysis constitutes this meaningful reduction of the data to draw conclusions. Burnard (1991) argued that it is essential that researchers know what method of analysis they are likely to be using while selecting the method of data collection and before

collecting data. In the thesis, I have used a form of thematic content analysis adapted from Glaser and Strauss' (1967) 'grounded theory'.

The grounded theory approach was developed as a rigorous method to systematically analyse qualitative data collected during social research to produce meaningful findings (Burnard, 1991; Coyne, 1997). This approach has evolved through work on content analysis (Babbie 1979) and other methods of analysing qualitative data (Bryman, 1988; Field and Morse, 1985). Recently, qualitative researchers have begun to use computer software to analyse interview transcripts, drawing on the basic principles of grounded theory approach. There are, however, limitations to using computer-aided data analysis (Blismas and Dainty, 2003). Although computer-aided solutions may appear to be more rigorous and robust, the main criticism is that they have a tendency to restrict the diversity of approaches available to a researcher, forcing a particular analytical route and imposing the analytic rationale of the software package. Such an approach would miss out on one of the key strengths of qualitative research, that is, the intuition and judgment of the researcher. Blismas and Dainty (2003) argue that qualitative research is contingent on human interpretation and understanding for meaningful analysis, which cannot be replaced by computers. I felt that these disadvantages of using computer-aided analysis outweighed its advantages and would restrict my capacity to draw on the interconnectedness of the themes emerging from the various perspectives of the different sets of participants.

All open-ended interviews conducted during the study were recorded in full and all recordings were transcribed. Although this was a time-consuming process, replaying the recordings several times while transferring them into electronic text format helped impress the information provided by participants in my mind. Upon completion of this process of converting the recordings to text, I coded these transcripts thematically. I grouped sections of the text from the various conversations

with the different research participants together, constructing descriptive and explanatory accounts set within the wider theoretical framework and social context in which the research took place, learning from similar approaches used by other social scientists (Dey, 1993; Legard et al., 2003; Miles and Huberman 1994).

The collection and analysis of the three sets of interviews conducted in the Waterloo Region inform the following empirical chapters of the thesis. In Chapter 4, I draw on the interviews with Indian hi-tech professionals to show how they adjust, strategise and navigate a racialised and gendered technology labour market. In Chapter 5, I use the information provided by technology companies and Indian hi-tech workers to explore the gendered nature of work in technology sectors. I also emphasise the implications of a gendered organisational culture for the emerging gendered divisions of paid and unpaid work among Indian hi-tech professionals working in technology companies based in Canada's Technology Triangle. In Chapter 6, I focus on how these gendered divisions of paid and unpaid work emerge from the complex gendered negotiations of Indian hi-tech professional couples. Drawing on the separate interviews with professional men and women of Indian origin, I show how both income-earning adults attempt to enter the technology companies in the Waterloo Region to advance their careers and also how they divide childcare and domestic work performed in the home.

Crossing the permeable insider/outsider divide

In this concluding section, I want to reflect on my identity and positionality as a researcher studying my own community, showing how it affected the different stages of the research process from the conception of the study, identifying research questions, conducting interviews, analysing transcripts and writing the final report. I am certainly not the only researcher who has been in this position. On the contrary, such experiences are central to the dominant methodological debates on voice and authority by geographers and feminist scholars (Dyck, 1993; Katz, 1994; Kobayashi, 1994; McDowell, 1992a; Miles and Crush, 1993; Rose, 1997) and also the debates on the insider/outsider status of researchers across the social sciences (Bridges, 2001; Ergu and Erdemir, 2010; Kusow, 2003; Merriam et al., 2001; Merton, 1972; Mullings, 1999; Sherif, 2001; Zinn, 1979). These debates are increasingly seen at the forefront of discussions of qualitative and to some extent quantitative research approaches.

The ideology of reflexive social enquiry has gained momentum and prominence especially in immigration scholarship, encouraging researchers to explore the epistemological, ontological, ethical, political and methodological implications of who can research whom. A large proportion of immigration scholarship is by academics who study their own immigrant communities. It would appear that immigration is producing many of the scholars who study it and who will tell its story (Rumbaut 1999: 1300). Researchers in this position tend to share similar cultural backgrounds to the groups they study, placing the politics of representation and authenticity at the core (Gans, 1997; Rumbaut, 1999). Throughout the research process, I was particularly interested in noting moments of inclusion and exclusion based on my positionality as a researcher and my relationship with my research participants.

Debates over voice and authority asked the critical question, 'who speaks for whom?'. The scholars participating in these debates observed issues of positionality and power in knowledge construction and ultimately representation of qualitative research (Dyck, 1993; Katz, 1994; Kobayashi, 1994; McDowell, 1992; Miles and Crush, 1993; Rose, 1997). Positionality in research is determined based on a de-facto construction of the informant as 'the other' and the researcher stands in relation (Banks, 1998). This de-facto construction draws on the particularities (such as race/ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality and age) of the researcher, the research participants and the social context in which the research takes place.

Feminist geographers encouraged researchers to reflect not only before they enter the field but also as they engage with subjects across the space of social engagement (Dyck 1993; Katz 1994; Kobayashi 1994; Rose 1997). Donna Harraway (1988; 1991) introduced the terminology of situated knowledge in that researchers' knowledge is always partial because of his or her positionality, shaped by his/her unique mix of race, class, gender, nationality, sexuality and other identifiers and also the location in time and space of interpretation. Similarly, Sandra Harding's (1991) standpoint theory argued that knowledge claims should be judged upon the social context of their production. Scholars participating in the insider/outsider debates show that although the informant always stands as the 'other' in relation to the researcher, researchers fall somewhere along this spectrum of 'othering' based on their degree of insiderness and outsiderness, contingent on the biological and socio-cultural particularities of researchers in comparison to the individuals and groups being researched. They also ask the question 'who can speak for whom?'

Merton (1972) in his classic paper titled, *Insiders and Outsiders: A chapter in the sociology of knowledge*, pioneered a methodological debate that is continued by contemporary scholars across several the social sciences. Merton (1972) was

responding mostly to the popular view among black scholars in the late 1960s and early 1970s that white scholars should be excluded from research in black communities. Historically, scholars studying minority communities (often disempowered groups) were defined as outsiders as they did not speak the language or share the cultural background of the ethnic groups they studied. Merton (1972) in response emphasised the pitfalls of a static understanding of insider and outsider, arguing that presenting them as mutually exclusive positions is deceptively simple and sociologically fallacious. He claimed that objective knowledge relies on researchers' ability to detach themselves from prejudices of social groups, that is, scientific transcendence through intellectual discipline and technical competence (Griffith, 1998).

During the 1960s and 1970s, African American, feminist, postcolonial and postmodern scholars began to criticise historical cultural anthropologists and ethnographers who they accused of retaining overtones of colonialism and imperialism when studying cultures with whom they had no shared affinities. Zinn (1979) amongst others criticised Merton's (1972) call for insiders and outsiders to reunite for not considering the larger context of race relations within which research is really carried out. Critics of outsider research argued that researchers who are not initiated in the cultural values of the minority community they are studying do not possess the sensibilities or empathetic understanding to represent them authentically or accurately (Sherif, 2001 provides a useful summary of these debates). Audrey Kobayashi (1994) astutely points out, however, that commonality is always partial and any form of essentialism has the potential to create new forms of difference and division.

Insider/outsider identities are not predetermined roles but the result of the topic under investigation, the unique combination of shared affinities of both the researcher and participants (based on shared gender, class, cultural identities, ethnicity,

language, religion and age) and local conditions in which the fieldwork takes place. Just as all social relations are fluid, unique and political in nature, the boundaries between researchers and researched are ambiguous (Sherif, 2001). Moreover, the researcher's self affects every aspect of the research process from conception to final interpretation. Researchers' relationship with their research participants cannot be determined a priori. Insiderness or outsiderness emerges through a collaborative process of meaning making involving the researcher and the research participants who are neither external nor internal to the particularities of the moment in which the fieldwork takes place (Kusow, 2003). The identities of researchers in the field are in constant negotiation with the informants. The nature of the interaction between researchers and informants are affected by class, nationality, race and ethnicity, religious background, age, gender, martial status and profession (Ergu and Erdemir, 2010; Merriam et al., 2001; Mullings, 1999).

The majority of scholars that continue to be engaged in the debates over insider/outsider status no longer stress that research by those socially constructed as outsiders should be comprehensively obstructed. Research in all contexts needs to be conducted under an appropriate set of principles and obligations and in the proper spirit (Bridges, 2001). Although scholars from within a community have access to a particular kind of understanding or attach a special interest, this does not automatically translate into special authority. Given the complexity of positionality it is nearly impossible for a researcher to achieve the status of a complete insider. As Harraway (1988; 1991) and Harding (1991) would argue, knowledge is always partial and should be interpreted within the social and geographical context in which it was produced.

All researchers lie along the spectrum of insider/outsider status and need to challenge prejudices that they bring with them throughout the research process. Even insider researchers can be susceptible to subtle but still critical exploitative behaviours

since their position as an academic or researcher in possession of sensitive information will inevitably set them apart from their informants (Bridges, 2001). The degree of a scholar's insiderness or the degree to which scholars manage to overcome their outsiderness is believed to determine easy access to informants and improve researchers' ability to ask more meaningful questions and read non-verbal cues when collecting data. These advantages are more likely to increase the reliability of collected data and to provide a more truthful and authentic understanding of the culture under study. The fieldwork might also be more successful because of the rapport built between researcher and participant, increasing respondents' willingness to share information (Merriam et al., 2001; Mullings, 1999).

Moments of insiderness and outsiderness

In a study of who does immigration research in the United States, Rumbaut (1999) found that unlike nascent scholarship on immigration at the turn of the past century, the present era has seen many immigrants themselves become leading scholars of immigration in certain disciplines. Moreover, children and especially grandchildren of immigrants are prominent immigration scholars. Despite some of the obvious limitations to Rumbaut's study, he made some interesting observations. Rumbaut (1999) found that the highest proportion of ethnic insiders is found among those scholars whose research focuses on gender and immigrant women, identity, media and popular culture. Lower insiderness is found mainly among anthropologists studying political and economic research themes that fall under the rubric of migration studies, such as refugee issues, transnationalism, diasporas, education, religion and health. Intermediate insiderness is found mostly in sociologists and historians studying topics of generations, children of immigrants, family, social mobility, and stratification.

I too belong to this stock of immigration researchers. Rumbaut (1999) might categorise me as an ethnic insider fitting well in his analysis, as my study is focussed on the intersections of gender and migration. Similar to other scholars in my position (Ergu and Erdemir, 2010; Kusow, 2003; Sherif, 2001), I could only identify with a partial insider status. In this section, I will draw on a selection of moments of inclusion and exclusion from my fieldwork experience. After immigrating to Canada in 2005, I became a part of the growing Indian community in the Waterloo Region and was involved in community gatherings and social events. As I have shown earlier in the section on recruitment, these gatherings provided a space in which newcomer families would discus the challenging settlement process. Some common topics of discussion included difficulties with getting their Indian qualifications recognised by employment agencies and employers, finding work and understanding the Canadian accent and being understood with their Indian accent in daily exchanges. The informal conversations resonated with me throughout the research process from planning the research to writing the thesis.

My partial insider status allowed me access to a wide personal network in the immigrant community from which to recruit participants for my study. Snowballing from this initial group meant that participants were inevitably part of the same friendship networks, contributing to some informants' reluctance to provide details of their experiences. Such respondents concealed specifically the information that they perceived would lead to stigmatisation or social exclusion by members of their extended family and/or the wider Indian community in the Waterloo Region. I became aware of these silences at later stages during the interview and analysis, when contradictions and discrepancies began to emerge in participants' accounts of their experiences. In the instance I will describe next, I was able to use my partial insider

status and experiences of immigrating to Canada to build a better rapport with the participant, increasing his willingness to offer information more easily and freely.

Dilraj completed his professional qualifications as a Chartered Accountant (CA) in India. Despite his five years work experience, he could not find a job commensurate to his qualifications and experience in the Waterloo Region. As he recalled his employment history in Canada, I noticed a significant gap in his account; however, upon probing he refused to answer any further questions. During the informal debrief session, when his wife joined us in more generally talking about my family's experiences in Canada, he admitted that he withheld some information during the interview but felt more comfortable talking about it now. He explained that he worked as a taxi driver while completing courses at a local college to gain Canada-specific training, education and skills to improve his chances of getting a job in his field. He insisted that he was taking a risk by telling me this and did not want anybody in the community to find out. He was especially concerned that his extended family or friendship networks in Canada would somehow relay this information to his father in India and he did not want his father to think that he had shamed or dishonoured his family.

Having been a member of the community prior to being a researcher in an academic institution placed me in a tricky position, almost a double-edged sword. I was privy to participants' opinions and experiences in informal gatherings outside of the relatively formal interview space, placing me in a better position to check for discrepancies, contradictions and falsehoods in participants' accounts. I was also in the difficult position of having to confront participants, encountering the ethical dilemma of what to do with participants who appeared to have radically different interpretations between the informal spaces of community gatherings and more formal interview settings. These instances of silences, concealment and discrepancies were

more likely to occur when informants were asked about their difficulties in getting jobs in relation to racial or cultural discrimination. They perceived these interpretations as popular in academic research and among immigrant lobby groups but insisted that it was not the reality for them. They often blamed other members of their community for using racial discrimination as an excuse for their own technical incompetence or lack of the appropriate qualifications.

In such situations, I used probes, rephrased questions and or introduced the topics again later in the interview. I was caught in an ethical dilemma when I felt my line of questioning was starting to challenge informants' existing indifferent or 'neutral' interpretations of their experiences in the Canadian labour market. I was wary of evoking feelings of uncertainty and discomfort by discussing more unsettling or negative views on racial or cultural discrimination. Sometimes, I found it necessary to change my line of questioning rather than risking informants cutting the conversation to a close. I had to be particularly careful to not put participants in a situation where they felt coerced into telling me what they thought I wanted to hear or leave them feeling unsettled or questioning their self. Although I asked for participants' permission before recording the interviews, sometimes being on record made participants feel uneasy in revealing personal and sensitive information (evident in the case of Dilraj described above). Recording interviews however was critical to data analysis, as I have explained earlier.

There was a gendered pattern to the discrepancies in informants' accounts. Men were more likely to explain their experiences in terms of racial discrimination in informal social gatherings. They passionately expressed their frustration with the Canadian government for acknowledging their qualifications and demanding exorbitant landing fees and at the same time neglecting the explicit racial profiling in job applications and for condoning the humiliating behaviour of employers and

employment agencies. During the interviews, the same participants refused to mention racial discrimination, however, upon probing, they often responded saying “I know what you want me to say but I won’t say it”. Women often did not vocalise such concerns in informal social gatherings and in some instances actively discouraged such discussions. One participant said, “bring all these Indians in one room and this is all they can talk about”. Women, however, were more likely to reveal their distress and frustration during interviews, knowing that their accounts would be kept anonymous and confidential.

Although my partial insider status did allow me a certain degree of easy access to participants, I had to rely on informants’ that had agreed to participate in the study to make referrals. Some participants whom I recruited from referrals had confidence in my abilities to carry forward their experiences. Bridges (2001) argued that the researcher is placed in the position of the receiver of a gift and he or she needs to recognise the elaborate ethical apparatus surrounding the receipt. I had to be careful in how I interpreted and presented the personal and sensitive accounts of respondents, through careful analysis and by maintaining confidentiality and anonymity. Other participants reluctantly agreed to be a part of the study out of respect for my parents or on the basis of referrals made by close friends. During the interview process, these participants were more likely to have quick responses, create doubts about the research itself or express their pessimism about the limits of such academic endeavours in making significant policy changes. In these situations, I interjected with some informal conversation and drew on my own experiences of migrating to Canada in order to build rapport. I also tried to evoke more confidence in the project by explaining the importance of their experiences, how I will use the information they provide and how I will disseminate my research widely.

The moments of inclusion and exclusion that I have discussed in this section were based on an ongoing negotiation between my research participants and myself (the researcher). The commonalities and differences in our positionalities in the context of the interview and the wider social and geographical context of the Indian community in the Waterloo Region were critical in accessing informants, building rapport facilitating reliable data collection and the overall success of the fieldwork. Although I am from a similar cultural, religious and ethnic background as my research participants (contributing to my insiderness), I had to overcome the outsiderness based on my age, unmarried status, profession, Canada-specific education and accent. My insider status was partial, ambiguous, permeable and fluid, meaning that I was neither unfamiliar nor fully familiar with the experiences of my informants in the field, contributing to moments of both inclusion and exclusion from the everyday lived experiences of my research participants, influencing the reliability, validity and authenticity of my understanding of their gendered cultural negotiations. I attempted to be aware of my positionality as I entered the field and also as I wrote my thesis. In conclusion, I would argue that despite the growing number of immigrants studying their own ethnic community, it would be naïve to assume that the research process is any easier. Immigration scholars studying their own communities, similar to their participants, make deliberate choices to highlight commonalities and downplay differences (working on the basis of partial insiderness) and they too are expected to carefully operate under the same ethical constraints as outsiders to adhere to their role as credible researchers.

CHAPTER 4

The construction of Indian hi-tech immigrants in the Waterloo cluster

This is the first of my empirical chapters where I begin to present the findings from my analysis of the information I collected about Indian hi-tech immigrants entering both the labour market and wider society in Canada. In this chapter, I focus primarily on their entry into the technology labour market in the Waterloo Region. I draw specifically on the interviews I conducted with the Waterloo Region Immigrant Employment Network (WRIEN), the Communitech Technology Association, technology companies based in the Waterloo Region and also with thirty Indian hi-tech professionals (16 men and 14 women), living and working in the Waterloo technological cluster, also known as Canada's Technology Triangle.

Based on these forty-two interviews, I look for answers to two of the research questions I posed in the first chapter of the thesis. First, how are Indian hi-tech professionals constructed in Canada's knowledge economy? Secondly, how does the stereotypical association of Indian nationals with high technology work affect these professionals' engagement with a racialised Canadian labour market? I show how as Indian hi-tech professionals entered the technology labour market in the Waterloo Region, they found themselves constructed as stereotyped IT workers: a construction that brought both advantages and disadvantages. Before explaining their particular position, however, I assess the claims of adherents of a global shift towards knowledge economies to explain the influx of Indian professionals recruited by the Canadian federal government in order to enhance Canada's global economic competitiveness.

The current economic narrative of unprecedented industrial and societal change draws on a highly debated, yet widely accepted, new form of capitalism, influencing the image of the ideal international labour migrant. Despite a growing backlash against immigration more generally in the global North, attributable to the conflation of foreign presence with both the failure of multiculturalism and the threat of global terrorism, governments continue to exercise their veto power to selectively admit immigrants who have the potential to aid the economic transition to a knowledge-based economy. Reputable academic commentators freely use rather nebulous terms such as knowledge, innovation, networks and flexibility to characterise the contemporary global economy: an economy that they claim is undergoing a significant transformation, including a transformation in the nature of waged work (Beck, 2000; Carnoy, 2002; Castells, 1996; 2001; Sennett, 1998; 2006). This new capitalist mode of development reflects the decline of traditional manufacturing industries, and promotes knowledge-based and highly polarised service economies marked by technological progress. The accumulation of knowledge capital and networks is becoming the key basis of economic competition in a global knowledge economy. In this section, I return to some key arguments that frame my findings on the experiences of Indian hi-tech immigrants entering Canada's knowledge industries.

Manuel Castells (1996; 2001) argues that national economies worldwide are being ushered into an 'information age', contributing to changing relations between labour and capital. Richard Sennett (1998; 2006) has written extensively about how these changes in capital and labour relations have resulted in an unprecedented transformation of waged work and the consequences for workers in what he calls 'modern capitalism'. He argues that 'the flexible firm' has replaced mass employment and nine-to-five work patterns. The potential economic benefits of widespread technological change and the increased mobility of both capital and labour is

encouraging industries to move towards the production of immaterial products such as information, knowledge, ideas and images (Sennett, 2006).

Feminist scholars in particular note that the analyses of this new mode of capitalism by transformation theorists, including Manuel Castells and Richard Sennett, are limited and neglect the differential impacts of these new employment relations for workers who are positioned along various axes of difference including race/ethnicity and gender. These differential impacts are captured by leading scholars also contributing to these debates, including Linda McDowell (2009), Leah Vosko (2000; 2010; Fuller and Vosko, 2008), Juliet Schor (1992; 1998) and others. In this chapter, I am specifically interested in the racial implications of Canada's shift towards knowledge-based industries for skilled newcomers of colour who appear to be actively recruited for vacancies in knowledge-based occupational sectors, based on a declining local supply of new graduates and professionals. In the next empirical chapter, I explore the gendered implications of the transformation of waged work for these racialised Indian hi-tech immigrants working in Canada's knowledge industries.

Kevin Doogan (2008) more recently critiqued transformation theorists for their unequivocal acceptance of an era of new capitalism. He challenges in particular the central assumptions that construct markets as autonomous, disembedded and immaterial and disputes the image of the global economic system as self-sustaining led by a blind pursuit of knowledge and technological advancement. Doogan (2008) argues that transformation theorists have overstated the role of technological change and the supposedly ghostly qualities of a deregulated global economy. This illusion needs to be deconstructed by 'reinstituting' the market and identifying the critical role of social regulation and government intervention (Doogan, 2008). In this chapter, I show one of the ways in which a supposedly extranational or supranational global market in fact echoes the rhythms of national economies and vice versa. In the next

section, I use the example of Indian technology workers seeking to enter Canada's technology sector in order to expose the national strategies of India and Canada, the first exporting workers, the second importing workers, both seeking to establish their position in a global knowledge economy.

Canada's race for the Indian technological talent

Industries and governments, like transformation theorists, also appear to indisputably accept and promote this global industrial shift towards a knowledge-based economy. This is reflected both in the growing number of knowledge industries within their borders that establish and maintain global linkages and in policy documents that promote the continuing growth of knowledge occupations and the ICT sector. National governments competing in this *information age* or era of *new/modern capitalism* employ various strategies to establish their position in a neoliberal global knowledge economy. These strategies include foreign direct investment and tax incentives to transnational and multinational companies to retain knowledge capital within their borders.

A primary strategy of countries in the global north, also the focus of this thesis, is shaping migration regulations to construct a need for foreign-born professionals in order to rectify the local mismatches in demand and supply of the necessary skills needed to promote and sustain national knowledge-based industries. This active search constructs a race for talent (Shachar, 2006) for a particular mould of an international labour migrant, highly skilled, innovative, adaptable, flexible and independent knowledge workers, thereby continuing to reduce immigrants to economic terms of trade, negotiated to gain comparative advantage in a global knowledge economy.

Historically, as I argued in chapter 1, Canada used its migration policies strategically to fill specific labour shortages, supporting national economic growth by turning the 'immigration tap' on and off. Reliance on this immigration tap has not changed during the more recent industrial transition from previous heavy manufacturing and resource-based industries to the emergence of knowledge industries. Generalised sensationalist claims in the media including statements such as 'Conservatives stick to plan of courting immigrants' or 'Government says high number of immigrants will help economic recovery', expose the strategic and selective governmental immigration schemes. Immigration Minister Jason Kenney confirmed these motivations in a fairly recent press release (CIC, 13.02.2011): 'Canada's post-recession economy demands a high level of economic immigration to keep our economy strong'.

India contributes a disproportionate number of low-cost and highly skilled IT workers to technology sectors in OECD countries and more recently Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) (Cornelius et al., 2001; Iredale et al., 2003; Kapur, 2001; Xiang, 2007). Indian professionals and students are wooed by national governments shopping for knowledge capital in the form of readily available foreign talent. This demand for foreign-born professionals can be explained by three related factors: India's excess supply of well-trained workers relative to domestic demand, shortages in domestically trained workers and more generally the critical demand for IT skills in every sector of any economy (see ICTC (2011) for the Canadian context). The exodus of Indian technology workers includes both fully trained professionals seeking employment and student migrants who plan prior to their studying or decide over their time as students to pursue employment opportunities and long-term residency (Khadria, 2001; Tremblay, 2005; Verbik and Lasanowski, 2007).

The foundations of the Indian software industry can be traced to the mid-1960s when science became integral to the establishment of postcolonial India's state-led market economy. India adopted a largely protectionist stance in order to build its self-reliance and invested heavily in science and technology developments. The national government dedicated a disproportionate amount of public resources towards high-tech sectors as well as to research and development in capital-intensive areas such as aerospace, nuclear power, electronics and software. In the 1980s, bureaucratic and political elites began to advocate the liberalisation of India's growing IT and software sectors. These industrial and political advocates also had support from international financial institutions such as the World Bank who put pressure on India to resolve its severe balance of payment crisis. These national and international advocates together pushed India to deconstruct its largely protectionist state and move in the direction of a more liberal economic model, encouraging the privatisation of its industries, especially the critical software industry (Cornelius et al., 2001).

Privatisation, globalisation and emigration contributed to the development of new economic, political and cultural networks being cultivated between the Indian state, domestic corporate actors, and non-resident Indians living in the West, especially in the United States. Diasporic networks established by Indian emigrants played an informational and reputational role. Global Indian diasporas maintained transnational ties with India in the form of financial and social remittances, reshaping individual and social preferences, social norms and expectations. This influence of affluent Indian diasporas worldwide had both political and economic consequences in India. The reputational role played by the global Indian diaspora is exemplified by the success of Indian-trained computer engineers in the Silicon Valley, influencing how India's technological capital and labour is viewed globally (Kapur, 2001; Khadria, 2001; Saxenian, 1999; 2002).

Xiang (2007) argued that the connection between Indian IT workers and US companies was so well established that their experiences became the reference standard to compare the pros and cons of different migration destinations. However, the highly sensationalised IT bust in 2001 that shook the foundations of the Silicon Valley as well as USA's restrictive settlement and naturalisation policies, had to some extent started to affect the popularity of the destination for Indian IT workers. The US has more recently had to compete with Canada, Australia and New Zealand for Indian technology talent. These countries have become attractive immigration destinations for Indian IT workers because of their reputation for having smaller but less volatile labour markets, relatively generous welfare policies and higher chances of successful permanent residency and citizenship applications (Xiang, 2007).

In this chapter, I focus on the growing presence of Indian hi-tech professionals in Canada, recruited strategically through economic migration schemes in order to contribute to Canada's economic transition towards a knowledge-based economy. Their migratory processes reflect national economic and political strategies in both India (explained above), which is continuing to expand its technology-related sectors, providing a reliable supply of low-cost and high-skilled knowledge workers to the global knowledge economy, and Canada, that made professional skilled immigrants a preferred target group, their recruitment an economic imperative and using migration regulations as the federal government's primary economic tool.

At present, about two-thirds of Canada's population growth comes from international migration. Despite the growing European crisis, the uneven recovery of Canada's dominant geographic neighbour and the decline in national employment rates, Canada continues to recruit high numbers of economic migrants. In 2009, employment in Canada had fallen by 400,000 from the peak in October 2008 (a loss of 2.3 percent). Unemployment rose from 6.3 percent to 8.6 percent. Nonetheless,

Canada admitted 252,179 immigrants in that year. Preliminary estimates of permanent residents by category in 2010 show that of the 280,636 new immigrants, 66 percent applied as economic immigrants of whom 67 percent arrived through the skilled worker category or the Canadian Experience Class (CIC, 2010). Canada draws these internationally educated professionals largely from India and China.

Canada's move towards a knowledge-based economy is not only reflected in the skills bias in its immigration intakes, but also in the changes in the ICT sector. Between 1997 and 2005, the total revenues of firms in the ICT sector increased from $97.3 to $135.6 billion and the total employment increased by over 100,000 persons (Conference Board of Canada, 2008). Between 2002 and 2008, total revenues grew from $130.8 to $255.3 billion at a rate of 2.9 percent annual growth (Industry Canada, 2009). Despite the onset of a global economic recession, in 2008, the ICT sector accounted for 4.8 percent of the Canadian GDP. The annual growth of this sector has been steady at 4.7 percent since 2002, twice the rate of the overall economy (2.4 percent) (Industry Canada, 2009). Federal and provincial governments in Canada identified the ICT sector as a key driver of national growth. ICT sector employment is characterised by a highly educated workforce: 42 percent of workers had a university degree in 2008 compared to the national average of 23.9 percent (Industry Canada, 2009). Proportionately more immigrants work in ICT and its related occupations than in all other occupational sectors in Canada (Habtu, 2003).

The development of the Waterloo technological cluster is primarily indicated in the changes in its industrial composition. Table 1 shows that between 2000 and 2007 there was a significant decline in employment in manufacturing and processing sectors, replaced by the rapid growth of employment in information, culture, natural and applied sciences.

Table 4.1: Changes in industrial composition, Waterloo Region, 2000-2007

	2000	2007	Percentage Change
Employment Growth	221,000	250,000	13.2
Employment by Industry			
Manufacturing	68,900	58,600	-17.6
Finance, insurance, real estate and leasing	14,300	18,400	28.7
Professional, scientific and technical services	10,600	13,600	28.3
Information, culture and recreation	7,600	10,100	32.9
Employment by Occupation			
Processing, manufacturing, utilities	36,000	27,400	-25
Natural and applied science	15,000	19,900	33
Management	16,300	22,100	26

Source: Canada's Technology Triangle (2009): Labour Force Characteristics

This industrial change in the Waterloo Region is also popularised in political debates and the media. *The Record*, the local newspaper in the region recently associated the growth of the region with the largest technology company in the area: "RIM's hope: The region's future: What's good for Research in Motion is good for the Waterloo Region" (20.04.2011). Research in Motion (RIM) (the makers of the Blackberry) is one of the largest technology companies in the region specialising in wireless solutions and is also a significant employer of technology newcomers to the region. As I argued earlier in the chapter, this industrial change is contributing to a growing demand for technology workers, being met by immigration into the region.

Evidence of the growth of ICT and related sectors and also the importance of skilled immigration to sustain this growth was collected in the one-off National Survey of Information Technology Occupations carried out by Statistics Canada in 2001. ICT represented almost three percent of all employed Canadians and almost 40 percent of those employed in natural and applied sciences related occupations (Habtu, 2003). In 2001, Ontario alone employed one in two ICT specialists in Canada. Occupations in

ICT and related sectors were predominantly male-dominated in both reputation and image. Just over a quarter of the ICT workers in 2001 in Canada were women; they had lower median earnings than their male counterparts. Immigrant women constituted eight percent of ICT workers, which is just under their nine percent participation in all occupations in 2001 (Habtu, 2003). It would appear that IT is not an exceptionally significant sector for Indian women: a question I explore in the following chapters.

In Canada, three trends in particular contribute to the construction of a need for ICT-skilled migrants. First, large-scale restructuring of the sector after the tech-bust in 2001 and perceptions of increased practices of offshoring, led to a number of skilled and experienced Canadian workers to switch career paths away from ICT sectors. Secondly, a perception among young Canadians of the industry as boring has resulted in declining enrolments in postsecondary programmes in computer science and technology, thereby reducing the long-run supply of recent graduates that is critical to recruitment (Ticoll, 2005). Thirdly, governments and industries calculate shortages in the IT industry on the basis of the gap between estimated demand for workers with particular skills and the number of workers available at that moment, not accounting for unemployed IT workers who could learn the requisite skills quickly (Xiang, 2007). Using this definition, critical skills shortages could be understood as a myth created by an industry that desires a constantly growing supply of ICT labour. In a sense, the shortage is more speculative, intangible and virtual; however, its effects on governments' migration regulations and investments, following from perceived industrial demands, are real and clearly evident.

Regardless of the speculative nature of these shortages, Canada continues to project a need for skilled immigration and through the Points System recognises a foreign-born applicant's educational credentials and work experience. The Canadian federal government, to meet its economic objectives, continues to court skilled

immigrants. Upon entering the country, however, foreign-trained professionals find that their skills and experience although valued by a system of admission, based on federal immigration objectives and regulations, are discredited and devalued by employers granting entry into the local labour market. Foreign-born professionals looking to enter Canada's labour markets encounter a significant labour market disadvantage.

Compared to the attainments of Canadian-born and educated workers with similar qualifications and experience, foreign-trained professionals tend to have lower incomes and higher levels of unemployment (Bauder, 2006; Hum and Simpson, 1999; Young, 2007). Academics perplexed by this paradox have attributed skilled immigrants' higher levels of unemployment and underemployment (both in terms of skills utilisation and involuntary part-time) to the complex interactions of several related factors. These factors include the non-recognition of foreign qualifications and experience, perceived linguistic abilities or a foreign accent, cultural stereotypes and discrimination based on different social characteristics, in particular, race, ethnicity, skin colour, gender and age. These factors are evaluated and associated with penalties in the labour market (Bauder, 2006; McDowell, 2009; Wills et al., 2009). Despite having relevant skills and work experience, many skilled immigrants suffer from deskilling, occupational downgrading and loss of previous labour market position and social status (Bauder, 2003; Man, 2004).

In Canada, skilled immigrants' labour market disadvantage draws academic, policy and media attention. The popularised image of the foreign-born and trained doctor driving a taxi has become a standard point of reference when typecasting skilled immigrants' experiences of entering the Canadian labour market. Canada acquires foreign-born professionals through economic migration schemes based on a Points System that assesses an individual applicants' potential economic contribution

using education, work experience, age and knowledge of official languages. As I argued earlier in Chapter 2, in Canadian labour markets, the supposed objectivity of the Points System manifests in a hierarchy of eligibility drawing on a complex notion of difference based on race/ethnicity, gender, class, nationality, culture and language, operating across multiple sites.

Governments, employers and professional regulatory bodies often inadvertently perpetuate this hierarchy of eligibility for different occupational positions. The devaluation of immigrants' credentials and their experiences of unemployment, underemployment and loss of occupational status is not part of a naturally occurring adjustment (as suggested by human capital theorists). On the contrary, it is the result of the intentional exclusion of or discrimination against immigrants by giving preference to Canadian-born and educated workers who are placed in a better position to access highly desired occupations. The discriminatory effects of such a hierarchy are more acute for immigrants entering regulated occupations such as medicine, healthcare, engineering and law. The onus is placed on immigrants to integrate, conform and assimilate to the economy and wider society.

The devaluation of Indian hi-tech immigrants' social and cultural capital

In the previous section, I provide a general discussion on how India's export of low-cost and highly skilled knowledge workers contributes to the perceived need for foreign-born professionals in Canada's growing knowledge-based economy. In this section, I focus on Indian hi-tech immigrants entering Canada's Technology Triangle and their efforts to overcome barriers to labour market entry. As explained in Chapter 2, I will use the theoretical traditions of Pierre Bourdieu and Iris Marion Young to frame the empirical findings in this chapter. First, I use Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and

embodied cultural capital and also Young's notion of cultural imperialism to show how Indian workers are disadvantaged by their embodied social attributes in Canada's knowledge economy, despite being recruited to fill specific skills shortages in the IT sector. Secondly, I show how these skilled newcomers use conversion tactics, mostly at a high cost of transformation, to acquire the legitimate forms of institutional cultural capital and social capital to enter the technology labour market. In conclusion, I argue that the stereotypical association of Indian nationals and technology work contributing to their transnational habitus might yield some advantage in Canada's technology labour markets (a foot in the door). This stereotypical association, however, could contribute to new forms of oppression and restrictions to labour market entry for Indian nationals seeking to enter occupational sectors other than IT: a form of "new or differentialist" racism, becoming a double-edge sword.

The Indian hi-tech immigrants in this study entered Canada through two economic migration schemes: the Skilled Worker and Professional Class (SWPC) and a newer immigration category known as Canadian Experience Class (CEC), allowing expedited permanent residency for temporary foreign workers with more than two years of work experience in Canada. Of the twenty-one professional couples interviewed for the study, five couples gained permanent residency status through the Canadian Experience Class (see Appendix 1). In this set of professional couples, male partners arrived as internal company transfers from Indian-based multinational companies to serve in the Canadian branches of the same company and were the principal applicants in the immigration applications.

At the time of the interviews, the group that arrived via the CEC had already been successful in getting expedited permanent residency after accumulating two years of Canadian work experience. Their wives were given an open work permit in Canada until they acquired permanent residency status as skilled dependents. In this

chapter, I focus exclusively on barriers to find a job in the Waterloo Region. For this reason I have excluded the male newcomers who arrived as internal company transfers; instead, I focus on the experiences of Indian hi-tech immigrants who entered through the SWPC category and the wives of the skilled newcomers who arrived through the CEC category (a total of thirty participants, 16 men and 14 women).

The majority of participants had at least a bachelor's degree in science, engineering or mathematics. Twelve participants had a master's degree; two of these participants acquired their degrees in the United States. Of all the participants, 14 men and 11 women had between five to fifteen years of work experience in the IT sector; the majority were in supervisory or managerial positions in one of India's high-tech cities – namely, Mumbai, Bangalore, Hyderabad and New Delhi. The remaining participants switched their career paths to IT after arriving in Canada. The majority of participants admitted to only seeking jobs in medium-sized or large companies that they perceived as having more experience with hiring foreign-educated and trained professionals. The majority of interviewees first landed in Toronto and moved to the Waterloo region because of its reputation as a technology concentration in their search for better employment opportunities.

> It is an emotional and complex subject because it transcends politics, the bringing together of different cultures. […] You only have to talk to them [internationally educated professionals] for a few minutes to know that they were very successful in their own country and about how they have been here for 18 months, gone through all of their money, done a number of things, and still are not employed commensurate with what they were doing when they left home. In most cases, it is less what they do and more of our system. So we want to be realistic, we want to get rid of this stigma of qualified people driving cabs. Delivering stigma that doesn't do anybody any good. We need to stop telling people come to Canada, it is a land of milk and honey, which in some cases it is but we didn't tell them that there are some barriers.

The quote above is from an interview with the director of WRIEN. In this quote, he describes the typical experience of skilled immigrants who face deskilling and loss of employment status upon arrival in Canada, incurring both financial and emotional costs. The director of WRIEN affirms the paradoxical outcome of Canada's migration regulations: immigrants are awarded entry based on qualifications and experience, which lose their worth when they attempt to gain entry into the labour market. The growing backlash against immigration more generally has also meant that the burden of adjustment is placed on immigrants themselves. In this chapter, I show how Indian technology workers manage this burden.

Although incorporating skilled immigrants to fill perceived labour shortages in the region is considered an economic imperative, the contentious and precarious nature of skilled immigrants' labour market status is often the direct result of the devaluation of their education and experience. The director of WRIEN further states:

> There have been a number of problems with finding new talent to fuel the growth of particularly high-tech companies. As a country, we have been inviting through the points system skilled and professional immigrants to come here from different countries in the world. Once they would get here, they would find that their qualifications were not recognised.

The overall message, as explained by the director of WRIEN, is that the aptitude of foreign professionals is a well-proven case. Despite Canada's attempts to eliminate the inherent racism in historical immigration policy through the implementation of the Points System in 1967, the director of WRIEN confirms that organisations involved in immigrants' integration are continuing to plead a similar case to that of historical immigrant lobby groups. He stressed:

> We don't say "please hire an immigrant". We simply say that the demographics are shifting around this and we understand that

> employers need is to hire the best talent they can with the resources they have and do they see and understand that the talent pool is changing significantly and are they ready for that. It is so they don't miss the best talent, and it doesn't matter whether it is from India. If they are to hire the best, they should have the policies, the tools, and the culture to embrace that.

Academic inquiries into the restrictions on foreign professionals' labour market entry have emphasised the effect of the non-recognition of foreign qualifications, training and work experiences (Bauder, 2006; Man, 2004). Canadian employers and provincial-level, self-governing professional regulatory bodies play a significant role in such practices of devaluation, contributing to foreign professionals' lower levels of income and higher levels of unemployment and underemployment. Professional regulatory bodies are responsible for issuing the necessary licenses to allow skilled immigrants to enter certain occupational sectors including engineering, medicine, health and medicine and law. In the IT sector in Canada, the first-stop organisation for newcomers intending to enter technology-related occupations is the Information and Communication Technology Council Canada (ICTC). This not-for-profit organisation provides a variety of services for foreign-born and trained professionals including accreditation and evaluation of foreign qualifications and professional credentials as well as programmes such as Bridge-to-Work and professional mentoring.

Professional regulatory bodies and employers also maintain a 'social criteria of acceptability' above and beyond technical expertise; they determine whether foreign professionals have the appropriate qualifications, work experience, skills and 'cultural fit' for the professions they intend to access. According to the ICTC, the criteria used to determine who is fit to enter Canada's technology sector includes technology skills, business-related expertise, experience and acumen, as well as interpersonal skills like teamwork, communication, leadership, initiative, creativity, adaptability and flexibility (Ticoll, 2005). There is little clarity provided on how ICTC evaluates business acumen

and interpersonal skills for foreign-born professionals coming from different educational, professional and cultural backgrounds with different working cultures and practices. This contributes significantly to foreign professionals' labour market disadvantage.

Employers often assess business acumen and interpersonal skills at the stage of interviews. Foreign professionals' job applications however are often instantly rejected because employers and employment agencies do not recognise or cannot judge their resume or curriculum vitae. In the interviews conducted with human resources professionals in technology companies based in the Waterloo Region, participants said that they were often suspicious of foreign work experience due to the lack of local contact with previous employers of potential job candidates and the lack of awareness of foreign business practices. Managerial and hiring staff would often read the 'lack of Canadian experience' as foreign professionals' lack of willingness or ability to understand what is required of a professional in Canada. They also read immigrants' accents as a lack of communication skills. During the interviews with Indian hi-tech immigrants, it was particularly interesting to compare their perspectives on what is needed to be a successful technology professional to the criteria of acceptability used by the ICTC and employers. Foreign professionals who were denied access appear to adhere to a similar image of an ideal worker as described by employers and professional regulatory bodies: a competitive, adaptable, creative and innovative worker.

> Your technical expertise is important but you have to blend your skills. Your attitude, the way you speak and your body movements is very important as well. If you want to survive in IT and move up in the career you need a good blending of your technical expertise and people skills. (Akash, male, computer engineer, arrived in 2003 through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class)

> The users and customers have become more and more demanding and you have to be competitive in the market and to do that you have to change with the technology, bring new technology to satisfy your customers and users and we as IT people need to adapt to those changes. You still have to accept that I might need to stay awake at night to finish a project or take an urgent call…the ultimate satisfaction is customer satisfaction (Neena, female, software developer, arrived in 2006 through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class)

Despite this common understanding of what is needed to be a successful technology worker, the Indian hi-tech immigrants interviewed in the study continued to face restrictions to entering their desired social field: Canada's technology labour market.

Deconstructing the 'lack of Canadian experience'

> Employers are always looking for Canadian experienced people. When an immigrant comes over here, a skilled professional then they will not have Canadian experience and if no employer or government agency allows skilled people to work in their organizations, how can they gain experience. (Rishi, male, computer programmer, arrived in 2007 through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class)

Both employers and the Indian IT workers whom I interviewed freely and frequently used the catchphrase 'lack of Canadian experience' to explain the labour market disadvantage of skilled newcomers entering the Canadian labour market (see Rishi mention it in the extract above). Here, I want to use Bourdieu's notion of capitals and Young's term 'cultural imperialism' to deconstruct the catchphrase 'lack of Canadian experience'. According to Bourdieu (1986), the notion of capital is a "*vis insita*, a force inscribed in objective or subjective structures, but it is also a *lex insita*, the principle underlying the immanent regularities of the social world" (p. 46). I argue that the 'lack of Canadian experience' is in fact the devaluation of newcomers' social and cultural capital (particularly institutional and embodied). Later in the chapter, I also show how

Indian hi-tech immigrants accumulate and convert different forms of capital, providing them with the opportunities to overcome this disadvantage.

From interviews with technology companies, I found that Canadian employers are often reluctant to contact foreign employers for references or accept their recommendations, as foreign employers are also constructed as being unfamiliar with Canadian requirements and standards. As a result, foreign-born professionals are not able to benefit from the social identities associated with their previous memberships in social networks or groups (social capital). At the same time, they are not given the opportunity to establish the necessary social networks to advance in the Canadian labour market. The ICTC's 'social criteria of acceptability' and employers' suspicion of foreign credentials and work experience therefore constitutes what Bourdieu (1986) called the 'icy water of egotistical calculation' (p. 47) maintaining the monopoly of the dominant class, which in this case is the Canadian born and educated worker and/or employer.

Another feature of the 'lack of Canadian experience' is the unwillingness of technology companies and employment agencies to recognise foreign professionals' education and training acquired elsewhere (i.e. institutional cultural capital). Anisef et al (2010), in a recent study of Canadian employers across different occupational sectors, confirmed the intentional non-acceptance of foreign qualifications gained from specified countries by numerous employers. They found that the employment rates of immigrants varied according to where they had gained their highest education credentials with the highest rates observed for immigrants educated in the United States and Europe and the lowest for those from Asian, African and Latin American countries. Anisef et al. (2010) also found that about two-thirds of newcomers to Canada in the early 2000s had plans to pursue Canada-specific education and training before finding employment. They also found that employers who are unfamiliar with

foreign-born professionals' foreign degrees and diplomas refused to acknowledge such forms of institutional recognition. Mohit, a computer programmer with more than fifteen years of work experience in the IT sector in India, described his surprise and frustration when seeking work in Canada:

> We were working for 15 years and we knew relations, people who worked in the same field and had contacts. But here, we don't have much contacts […] some people won't call [for interviews] if they see an ethnic name and also accent when you talk to them. There are lots of things they use to scan candidates and some think that from South country we don't know and we cannot perform as well. I say that because honestly they think we are coming from the dump. Some people have this impression. Someone actually asked me, 'do you get coca cola in India?'. So even after going out to lunch together, a Canadian colleague asked me if they prepare chicken wings in India so things like that. They think because you live in India you don't get chicken wings. That is the understanding they have so that kind of person takes the interview. (Mohit, male, computer programmer, arrived in 2006 through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class)

In this quote, Mohit also describes what Young (1990) called 'cultural imperialism'. Earlier in Chapter 2, I showed how the accent and workplace behaviours and attitudes of Canadian-born and educated workers gain cultural status: constructed as neutral, universal and taken for granted. Thus, foreign professionals' accents, dress, gestures and workplace behaviours, marked onto their bodies, constructs them as deviants from the norm (i.e. the Canadian-born and/or educated worker), placing them at a disadvantage in the internal labour markets of technology sectors. Employers and colleagues may also perceive Indian IT workers as lacking the cultural references required to conduct corporate exchanges in more informal corporate arenas, such as persuading clients over corndogs at a Blue Jays game, for example. Some respondents also talked about how employers often read the foreign accent (embodied cultural capital) of Indian IT workers as the lack of communication skills.

Akash, a computer engineer who arrived in 2003, described his frustration with what he felt was employers' unfair assessment of his accent:

> Indians we do have accent and it is different. At the same time we have European colleagues and they cannot speak English very well. So if we think the Italian or Polish accent they are comfortable with that. Accent is an absolute factor in promotions and it is not really the accent, it is the accent, your culture, which country you belong to and lots of things. You what I mean right? You cannot change that thinking over a couple of days or years it will take some time. (Akash, male, computer engineer, arrived in 2003 through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class)

It would appear that the lack of Canadian experience barrier should be read as the lack of willingness of employers and regulatory bodies to offer employment rather than skilled immigrants' failure to obtain work.

Conversion Tactics: Playing Canada's technology field

> *The different types of capital can be derived from economic capital, but only at the cost of a more or less great effort of transformation, which is needed to produce the type of power effective in the field in question* (Bourdieu, 1986: 53-54)

In the previous section, I explained how skilled newcomers' labour market disadvantage is constructed and also perpetuated by employers and professional bodies who use the 'lack of Canadian experience' as the primary barrier to labour market entry, maintaining the privilege of Canadian-born and educated workers. In this study, the majority of participants had their foreign education assessed by one of the universities in the Waterloo Region to establish Canadian equivalency. Despite this process of accreditation, they still experienced some difficulty in getting to the interview stage of the hiring process for technology jobs in the region. In this section, I

draw on Bourdieu again to show how Indian technology workers used conversion tactics to stay in the game.

The majority of participants began their job searches online and also used recruitment and employment agencies. They found, however, that employment agencies were just as culpable as employers in undermining their foreign education, qualifications and work experience. Shalini had worked in India as a software analyst and expressed her dissatisfaction with Canadian employment agencies:

> They have to segregate according to qualifications and not their region…they kept on transferring my file from one person to another and then finally the head of the agency called me and said that nobody in the department could understand my resume. They don't know what job to look for me. (Shalini, female, software analyst, arrived in 2004 through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class)

Alka, a qualified computer engineer, expressed a similar disappointment, but implied that immigrants denied entry into the labour market by employers are left with little choice other than to get help from such employment agencies.

> Of course as a newcomer I don't know what all things are available so such an agency benefitted…they offered me 23 dollars per hour which I thought was less but my friends said it was good. The same job directly gets 30 to 32 dollars an hour so maybe they were taking that. But we cannot go directly so for newcomers at least we know what opportunities are there. As a newcomer I am happy because getting into the market is the first things and after getting experience I may not be happy with them but as a newcomer at least they are helping to get into the market. (Alka, female, computer engineer, arrived in 2008 through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class)

Just as Bourdieu (1986) suggested, the educational system has the potential to both reinforce and dispossess the dominant class of their monopoly over the transmission of power. Here, this dominant group consists of employers and

professional bodies privileging the Canadian-born and educated worker by devaluing the social and cultural capital of foreign-born professionals. A few participants, such as Aisha, got their first jobs after completing some form of Canada-specific qualification, thereby acquiring legitimate forms of institutional cultural capital. Aisha's first job in Canada was a government-sponsored internship in the Waterloo Region, which she obtained after completing a set of correspondence courses with the University of Alberta: "I applied for about thirty jobs before and I didn't get any interviews. After upgrading I got an internship just through an online application."

Like Aisha, participants such as Venkat began to use conversion tactics to gain legitimate forms of institutional cultural capital and social capital specific to the Canadian social field by transforming their economic capital acquired in India from previous jobs. The high costs of re-training added to the financial pressures on participants and their families. Participants who used such conversion tactics selectively pursued degree qualifications or certifications, which they perceived as being highly demanded by employers in order to increase their chances of success in Canada's labour markets. Dilraj, a computer engineer who trained in Canada, said, "you cannot survive in Canada without having Canadian qualifications or education."

Venkat completed his qualifications in India and moved briefly to Abu Dhabi where he worked as an IT engineer in a multinational software company. While in Abu Dhabi, he married Alka and soon after they both decided to move to Canada because she was unable to secure full time employment in Abu Dhabi, despite possessing the same qualifications as Venkat. Further, they both wished for their children to benefit from what they considered to be a reliable and prestigious educational system that they believed would contribute to better education and employment opportunities for their children in the future. Upon arrival in Canada as permanent residents, they both faced significant challenges. Venkat and Alka took turns to pursue globally recognised

software certifications specific to one of the largest technology companies in the Waterloo region. Venkat managed to circumvent the 'lack of Canadian experience' barrier by pursuing software certifications specific to a multinational company in the Waterloo Region. Alka is still struggling with finding childcare alternatives for her two sons to enable her to pursue full-time employment. I explore these gendered negotiations in more detail Chapter 6. Here is Venkat explaining his decision to acquire additional qualifications:

> The main problem in Canada is that even if you have worked on something they won't believe it. They will say you don't have the experience. When you get the certification they have nothing else to tell you because a person in Canada will have the same certification. So I just took a short cut to avoid this Canadian experience. I understood that you have to really on your guard for one to two years and it is really difficult to get a job in your field. I came with sufficient money to survive at least six months. So back home I put some money in reserve so if I need I could take it. (Venkat, male, IT engineer, arrived in 2008 through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class)

To save time and costs, participants such as Venkat either pursued universally recognised IT courses targeting particular multinational companies operating in the region or entered corporate training programmes for specific high-technology firms. This relates to what Causer and Jones (1993) identify as a particular feature of the technology labour market. They argued that professional organisations and national regulatory bodies who attempted to monopolise access by formalising the occupational sector and specifying a particular knowledge base or skill set have not been entirely successful. Unlike other occupational sectors that might rely entirely on degree qualifications and professional licences, technology employers often recognise internationally standardized certifications that are issued by global corporations (e.g. Sun Certified Java Programmer, Microsoft Certified Engineer, Cisco Certified

Networking Associated, Systems, Applications and Products in Data Processing [SAP]).

Participants also appeared to be adjusting their *habitus* to what they believed was a dynamic social field biased towards technology skills. Shashi arrived in Canada in 2006 and recounted giving up on his educational degrees and ten years of work experience as a finance manager to become a certified IT programmer: “It took me more than two years to find an appropriate job and in the mean time I had to do a tedious certification which gave me some benefit. I had to learn something that is more demanded in the Canadian job market and after that getting a job became easier.” Shashi, amongst others, was convinced that the IT sector was in demand and having some form of IT-related certification, not necessarily through university education alone, would increase Indian migrants’’ chances of entering and advancing in the Canadian labour market.

When Kajal first arrived in Canada, she had hoped to pursue her longstanding interest in social work. She had completed her Master’s in Social Work in India and also had work experience from India. When trying to enter an equivalent occupational sector in Canada, she realised that she would need to complete a four-year university degree in social work and show evidence of Canadian experience to be eligible for employment: “this Canadian experience and Canadian education is more demanding.” She decided that it would be cheaper and quicker to switch career paths instead. She pursued less than two years of Canada-specific certifications to become a software analyst. She said, “it is better to have technical knowledge then you won’t have such problems. My husband is in IT and I thought let me change my field.” At the time of the interview, Kajal was working as a software analyst in one of several companies in the Waterloo Region. Arpita also found herself in a similar situation with her work experience and qualifications as an electrical engineer:

> Someone told me why don't you continue studying for the master's when you do some kind of education in Canada it might help you…so I thought I am wasting my time so let's spend some quality time studying…my husband said let's do something with computers because that is the market. (Kajal, female, software analyst, arrived in 2005 through the Canadian Experience Class)

Some participants also used similar conversion tactics to exchange their economic capital to gain the necessary social capital to advance in Canada's internal technology markets. A number of participants began to volunteer in high-tech companies and organisations to develop the necessary social networks and gain useful memberships in order to advance their careers.

> Networking matters a lot in Canada and as a newcomer I didn't have those networking references so I was probably not successful…initial volunteer work experience in an office environment…I think that's a challenge, to expose people to what the work environment or work culture is like, so behavioural aspects of the job rather than skill set. Skill set is available in plenty for people who immigrate but other than that it is more about exposure. (Shashi, male, computer programmer, arrived in 2006 through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class)

Just as Bourdieu suggests, however, the convertibility of capitals comes at a cost of transformation that can be more or less demanding and expensive. In the case of participants like Shashi who employed such conversion tactics, they often came at a high transformation cost, demanding both financial and emotional costs. In Chapter 6, I look at the gendered implications of this cost of transformation and show how families incur both financial and emotional costs. Aisha, here talks about her conversion tactics but also hints at the costs.

> I started doing a lot of volunteer work. That is how I got this job because I got the experience but I wasn't getting any money but still that helped me get this job. So I had to suffer a lot working for free but I still do

> some volunteer work along with my current job. (Aisha, female, software analyst, arrived in 2004 through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class)

Unlike Venkat, Shashi and Aisha who were able to convert their economic capitals successfully in order to adjust to the social field they aspired to enter, some participants who did not possess similar financial resources were not able to sustain these deliberate conversion tactics, such as volunteerism or unpaid consulting. Instead, these participants started to work in what they considered to be survival jobs, which tended to be low-status, poorly paid and temporary, to compensate for the high costs of transforming their capitals and pursuing re-training. The majority of such part-time jobs were not commensurate with their qualifications but were generally in some way related to technology/knowledge work and this experience proved to be useful in overcoming the 'lack of Canadian experience or acceptance' barrier. These jobs allowed participants to accumulate the necessary economic capital that they converted to the necessary social and cultural capital to advance in the technology labour market in the region. Akash, a computer engineer trained in India, recounted his desperation while trying to secure his first 'Canadian experience'.

> I was almost hoping for any job in my line without Canadian experience. All the people I met were preparing to do that too. It could be KFC, McDonalds, Future Shop, anything just to gain Canadian experience and a few dollars an hour. You don't think that you are in the one country that doesn't appreciate qualifications and experience from other countries. (Akash, male, computer engineer, arrived in 2003 through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class)

Conclusions: Foot in the door or double-edged sword?

Bourdieu (1986) argued that social worlds are constructed and maintained by legitimating certain forms of capital that are appropriated exclusively by dominant groups. In this chapter, I have shown how the dominant group of Canadian employers and professional regulatory bodies devalue the social and cultural capitals of foreign-born professionals in order to privilege Canadian-born and educated workers. Bourdieu (1986) also added that outmoded forms of capital might disappear and lose their function in distinguishing between people. In this concluding section, I speculate whether Canada's growing demand for technology workers and India's efforts to strengthen its position as a key technological player might contribute to outmoding or eliminating the forms of capital that distinguish between the transnational habitus of the Indian technology worker and the collective habitus of the Canadian-born and educated worker. Both sets of workers enter national labour markets constitutive of multinational technology companies that are influenced by changes to the global knowledge economy. Here, I explore some particular implications of these transnational connections between technology and capital for Indian hi-tech immigrants entering various occupational sectors in Canada.

As I argued earlier in this chapter, India disproportionately contributes to the growing need for technology workers in Canada's knowledge-based economy and also to the knowledge industries in the Waterloo Region. At the same time, India's continued expansion of its technological infrastructure, the promotion of the nation's vast pool of highly trained, low wage labour, and the formalising of global capital and labour linkages between regional high tech growth areas and global counterparts, is transforming the objective reality of the global technology labour market. Based on my interviews, I found that a number of companies in the Waterloo Region had links to

Indian-based companies and have also used agencies such as Tata Consultancy Services to recruit Indian staff for short-term projects. These capital and labour relations might to some extent influence their understanding and valuation of Indian workers' skills and expertise. Moreover, India's global reputation as an exporter of software workers and their sheer presence in global technology concentrations, might suggest that Indian knowledge workers are entering national economies in the global north equipped with legitimate forms of capitals and a transnational habitus that is already adjusting to global technology demands.

One of India's many strategies to reproduce its global technological advantage is by exclusively appropriating the means to reproduce and legitimate forms of institutional cultural capital. One of these strategies is evident in the success of the National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT) in India. NIIT is the biggest training institute in Asia with 8000 staff and 600,000 students who are enrolled in 2,228 learning centres in 40 countries. The content of NIIT courses are based on latest technologies and global market trends derived from NIIT's research and development centres in New Delhi and Atlanta. NIIT has connections with Microsoft enabling them to obtain programmes one month before their public release to gain the critical 'first movers' advantage in the global technology market (Xiang, 2007).

In order to explore the effects of India's efforts to establish its global technological presence on Indian hi-tech immigrants in the Waterloo Region, I began to compare their disadvantages to what is described by academics studying skilled immigrants entering other occupational sectors in Canada, particularly regulated occupations such as engineering (Bauder, 2003; 2006; Reitz, 1988; 2001). I found that despite the difficulties faced by Indian hi-tech immigrants because of the devaluation of their capitals and also discrimination based on their social attributes, Indian technology workers might be regarded as a partial success. All Indian hi-tech

immigrants were at least able to find work in the same occupational sector in Canada that they had been working in while in India: the IT sector. India's global linkages and earlier successes in technology clusters such as the famous Silicon Valley in the USA might to some extent allow Indian hi-tech immigrants to overcome some of the permanent effects of marginalisation and exclusion unlike what is suggested by academic scholars (Hum and Simpson, 1999; Man, 2004; Pendakur and Pendakur; 1998; 2004).

In a Bourdieusian sense, habitus is constituted on an ongoing basis through a model of accumulation of the different forms of capital. This perhaps suggests that while the Indian workers' habitus was adjusting to the Canadian technology field, the collective habitus of technology workers in Canada was also adjusting to the a global social field, dominated by Indian software services and workers. Upon arrival in Canada, the Indian hi-tech immigrants interviewed in the study used conversion tactics to secure the critical first job that was more often than not in some way related but not commensurate to their technology-related qualifications and work experience acquired in India. This is different from the experiences of de-skilling faced by many skilled migrants arriving in western economies (Creese and Wiebe, 2009; Kofman and Raghuram, 2006; Man, 2004) and from the popular Canadian image of the doctor driving a taxi.

Despite the difficulties described in the chapter, the majority of respondents successfully found work and/or volunteered in low-level technical positions in the technology companies located in the Waterloo Region. This allowed them to develop relevant social networks for either an internal promotion within the same company or in one of the several other technology companies in the Waterloo cluster. As a result, they were able to advance their careers and to re-establish their employment status to a similar level to what they previously held in India, anywhere between three months to

five years after arriving in Canada. In some ways, these successes provided the basis for a model pathway for Indians immigrants who entered Canada, intending to find work in different occupational sectors. To a large extent based on hearsay, the relative success of Indian technology workers had a demonstration effect. I found that some participants decided to switch career paths and search for employment in technology-related occupations after their repeated failures to find jobs based on their previous qualifications and experience in different occupational sectors (including Kajal, Arpita and Shashi) and others (Madhoo and Anjali) were engaged in full-time study for IT occupations. All these participants were encouraged by the relative success of their partners who were able to find work with their background in the IT sector.

It is important to emphasise that there is a danger in uncritically replacing the narrative of marginalisation and exclusion by one of partial success. It is possible that Indian immigrants entering Canada might be involuntarily relegated to IT-related professions and technology/knowledge sectors because of their stereotypical construction: 'they are just so good at it'. Canada's economic imperative and India's established reputation as a supplier of 'knowledge capital' appears to provide Indian IT workers with a slight 'foot in the door' when entering the Canadian technology labour market. It is important, however, to note that they did not accomplish this without contest, resistance, negotiations and mobilisation (the effective conversion of capitals). There is clear evidence that forms of disadvantage common to all racialised newcomers to Canada, mainly the lack of Canadian experience, still persist in the case of Indian hi-tech immigrants entering a supposedly model occupation in which rational 'brain work' is the key characteristic that defines it in poplar discourse.

This 'foot in the door', allowing Indian hi-tech immigrants to regain their previous employment status, at a faster rate than skilled immigrants entering other occupational sectors (if at all), may also be read as a 'double-edged sword', relegating

them to fit another different norm. Any deviation from this norm based on cultural stereotyping might also leave them subject to deskilling, discrimination and blocked entry into the labour market. Indian immigrants hoping to enter other occupational sectors might not be able to transcend this stereotypical construction, potentially essentialising all Indian skilled immigrants as ideal IT workers. This effect is observed in the experiences of the skilled professionals who switched career paths to IT in order to improve their chances of labour market success.

Using Bourdieu's conceptual framework once again, I suggest that there is an imminent danger if the field (labour market) continues to be the precondition of habitus, especially in the case of skilled immigrants entering a racialised labour market in Canada. Skilled immigrants continue to be constructed in economic terms, potentially relieving the Canadian state and employers from addressing the existing sources of discrimination that contribute to immigrants' labour market disadvantage. The relative labour market successes of Indian IT professionals entering Canada's technology sectors (serving as a model occupation) potentially minimises the ongoing issues with the non-recognition of foreign credentials in other regulated occupational sectors. Indian hi-tech immigrants in the study still encountered labour market barriers based on Canadian experience and education as well as discrimination based on their social attributes (particularly their accent), similar to the experiences of skilled immigrants entering different occupational sectors in Canada.

Despite the persistence of an acute labour market disadvantage for the majority of skilled newcomers, Canada continues to recruit foreign talent to gain the first-movers advantage in a competitive global knowledge economy. Jason Kenney, Immigration Minister, recently addressed growing anti-immigrant sentiment using the argument that employers 'need' skilled immigrants to find their way out of the current economic crisis and every effort should be made to continue to attract 'the best and

the brightest'. Kenney recently told *The Globe and Mail* (17.02.2011): "while other western countries cut back on immigration during the recession, our government kept legal immigration levels high". With this statement, Kenney exemplifies Canada's perspective on the role that economic immigrants are intended to play: readily available workers whose presence serve the critical purpose of ensuring Canada attains and maintains a strong foothold in the neoliberal global economy.

I want to conclude this chapter by reiterating that the relative success of Indian IT workers that acts as a double-edged sword should be interpreted carefully. My research findings continue to support the growing academic evidence suggesting that Canadian governments and industries promote high levels of skilled immigration without taking sufficient measures to support the new entrants to Canada, and without rectifying foreign-born professionals' unfair labour market disadvantage. In effect, the burden to negotiate and adjust during the difficult process of settlement in the 'land of opportunities' continues to be the responsibility of foreign-born professionals themselves. Despite being admitted on the basis of their skills, education and work experience for what are constructed as vacancies, this particular segment of foreign-born professionals continue to encounter the devaluation of their educational and professional credentials and the loss of employment status, at least upon immediate arrival in Canada. Their entire families incur the financial and emotional costs of these difficulties in entering Canadian labour market and settling in a new host country.

CHAPTER 5

At managers' discretion: the gendered organisation of work

Some transformation theorists argue that the global economic shift towards knowledge production has contributed to a transformation of waged work - older patterns of bureaucratic, regimented, monotonous, nine-to-five employment for a single employer are being replaced by new patterns of work based on neoliberal ideals of freedom, individualism, innovation, creativity and flexibility. This change in paid work is what is responsible for workers' increasingly insecure, unstable and precarious attachment to the labour market, requiring them to hold a number of jobs over the lifetime for different employers (Beck, 2000; Sennett, 1998; 2006). In this chapter, I explore the gendered implications of this transformation of waged work, which as I argued earlier, has largely been ignored by transformation theorists. Drawing on the experiences of Indian hi-tech immigrants, I focus in on the negotiation of their working hours to accommodate their non-work commitments with employers and their take-up of work-life balance measures provided in technology companies in the Waterloo Region.

In the previous chapter, I showed how this group of Indian hi-tech immigrants use conversion tactics to gain entry into a racialised Canadian technology labour market. In this second empirical chapter, I begin to explore how they navigate a gendered as well as racialised labour market, revealing emerging gendered divisions of paid and unpaid work established by migrant households in a new place of employment and residence. I draw on the interviews I conducted with technology firms in the Waterloo Region and thirty-five Indian technology professionals (21 men and 14 women). In the next empirical chapter, I build on the findings from this chapter, focusing in more detail on how Indian professional couples negotiate the gendered

division of domestic labour, especially when both adults seek to enter the labour market in order to advance their individual careers but also out of economic necessity due to the high costs of settlement and living in a new host country.

Before delving into the particular gendered organisational cultures of the technology companies and the experiences of Indian hi-tech immigrants, however, I want to briefly return to some of the arguments for the transformation of waged work and the implications for work-life balance. Contemporary production processes, using technological means to produce largely immaterial objects, by virtue of their design, should allow a more individualised and flexible control of working time, permitting higher levels of autonomy for workers in technology and related sectors (Green, 2004; Sennett, 1998; 2006; Van Echtelt et al., 2006; 2009). Workers are able to substitute industrial clock time discipline with task time, allowing workers flexibility in deciding how to do the job, when to do it and how fast to do it (Bailyn, 2004). Ideally, individuals should be able to match their work times to their personal productivity and their family's temporal patterns, giving both men and women the opportunity to combine waged work, reproductive work and family time and obligations more effectively.

Critics of these positive speculations about contemporary workplaces found that despite the change in the nature of work, commitment in many industries including the financial sector, creative industries as well as hi-tech sectors, is still defined by a 'long hours culture' where working anti-social hours and unpaid overtime is seen as essential to economic competitiveness (Eikhof and Haunschild, 2006; Kunda, 2006; Leadbeater and Oakley, 1999; McRobbie, 2002; Rutherford, 2001; Wharton and Blair-Loy, 2002). This expectation of long hours exacerbates the time-greediness of organisations or what Van Echtelt et al. (2006; 2009) call the 'lumpiness of work', that is, employers do not forbid workers to adjust their working time but reducing work hours becomes difficult in practice because of how employers construct an obligation

to ‘be there’ or what has been termed ‘presenteeism’ (Hemp, 2004; Lack, 2011; Simpson, 1998). Employers and employees often negotiate a psychological contract in which a certain degree of trust and security is traded for greater commitment in the form of increased levels of work effort and working time (Green, 2004). Van Echtelt et al. (2009) also found that employees working overtime often explain it as an unintended cumulative consequence of small decisions to finish a project or help a teammate rather than a lack of choice between work and family or leisure time. Employees’ perceptions of work-life balance therefore, are determined to a large extent by the environment and culture of the workplace (O’Reilly III et al., 1991; Schoenberger, 1997; Sorensen, 2002).

As I argued in Chapter 2, the incompatibility of waged work and family life is a well-documented feature contributing in particular to women’s and mothers’ disadvantage in the workforce. Feminist scholars show how this disadvantage is both constructed and maintained by an organisational culture based on gendered assumptions of who is constructed as a competent and committed worker and who needs special treatment in order to combine work and non-work responsibilities (Acker, 1990; 1998; Britton, 2000; Kanter, 1977). The former set of assumptions disadvantage all women, whereas the latter act in particular to discriminate against mothers and increasingly women (and men) who care for elderly relatives.

In this chapter, I investigate the pervasive gendered assumptions that contribute to the particular organisational attitudes, culture and practices of technology companies in the Waterloo Region. In the interviews with Human Resources (HR) professionals in these firms that are characterised as contemporary knowledge-based workplaces, I assessed the implications on these firms’ particular interpretations of work-life balance for new entrants from India and especially for the women among them. Childcare is a particular issue for the relatively young workers in these

companies: the average age of employees was between 30 and 45 (see table 5.1). The technology companies had between 100 and 1000 employees: the majority of whom were men. Interestingly, all the HR professionals that I interviewed in these companies were women, showing the gendered construction of the HR occupation, reinforcing the notion that work-life balance is an issue for women; therefore, a woman would be better positioned to respond.

Table 5.1: A profile of technology companies interviewed in 2010

Name	Number of Employers	Percentage of Male Employees	Average Age of Employees
Cyberworlds	200	70	35
Digitech	343	84	36
DotcomTech	*	*	*
Imagine Inc	325	60	*
Infotech	200	66	45
iSoft	540	*	*
NiSoftware	1000	*	*
Phoenix	140	70	33
Soft Solutions	100	84	30
ULearn	120	77	35

Source: Approximations for this particular office location communicated during interviews with HR professionals.
* indicates information that interviewees were unable/unwilling to disclose this information.

Welfare state interventions to provide alternatives for reproductive labour for women who enter the labour market are supported by an argument using the virtuous cycle of economic generation. Proponents of this argument show that by relieving families of their reproductive responsibilities, all citizens (especially women) are encouraged to participate fully in the national economy, which in turn serves two purposes. First, these provisions act as an employment multiplier, and secondly, in the long term provisions for reproductive labour and increased levels of women's

employment might resolve social crises such as child and household poverty and welfare dependency (Daly, 1994; Esping-Andersen, 1999; 2002; Lewis, 2001; Sainsbury, 1994). Rosemary Crompton (2002) argued that organisations and workplaces are also starting to see the benefits of a virtuous cycle of economic regeneration through increased rates of women's employment. This is evident in changes in organisational cultures, promoting supportive or family-friendly workplaces, in order to assist employees, especially women, with care and other forms of reproductive unpaid work traditionally performed by women in their homes (Hochschild, 1997).

The main message in academic debates on work-life balance and well-being of workers is that there is a need for good or at least better work-life balance, especially for many women employees whose experiences of work-life conflict are often more acute than for their male partners and co-workers. Conflicts between waged work and family demands are associated with lower levels of job satisfaction, low career and life satisfaction and increased levels of stress, exhaustion and fatigue (Baptiste, 2008; Golden and Wiens-Tuers, 2008; Hoisie, Sevastos and Cooper, 2006; Sointu, 2005; Teasdale, 2006).

Working time is often identified as a significant point of intervention for policy makers and employers and the solution typically is assumed to lie within job re-design, better management directed towards humanising the workplace and rolling back time spent in the workplace. This, as I have argued earlier, is becoming increasingly difficult in contemporary workplaces that are characterised by time-greediness and the 'lumpiness of work' (Van Echtelt et al., 2006; 2009). Some critics of work-life balance debates suggest that the notion of a 'long hours culture' might in fact be overstated and instead waged work may be a source of escape, satisfaction and self-fulfilment for men, and increasingly for women (Eikhof et al, 2007; Hochschild, 1997; Isles, 2004;

Trinca and Fox, 2004). Later in the chapter, I evaluate the similarities and differences in how men and women, in the group of Indian hi-tech immigrants, interpret their working time and their ability to balance demands from their workplaces and their family life.

Warren and Johnson (1995) identified three types of coping resources provided by organisations to assist employees in coordinating demands from work and home: a family-friendly organisational culture, supportive supervisory practices and the availability of family-oriented benefits. In order to provide these coping resources, many organisations in Canada, hi-tech firms among them, have started adopting a broad range of family- or employee-friendly workplace practices, including flexible work arrangements and creating a 'fun' work environment (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Berg et al., 2003), while meeting the needs of 24/7 knowledge economy (Green, 2004). Fleetwood (2007) divides flexible working arrangements into employee friendly practices, including flexible start and finish times, voluntary part-time working, job-share, compressed working weeks such as nine-day fortnights, shift swapping, self-rostering, time off in lieu and sabbaticals or career breaks. He also stresses that in most cases, an employee-friendly rhetoric may disguise unfriendly exploitation or 'flexploitation' practices such as, involuntary part-time working with loss of pay, zero hour contracts, unsocial working hours such as twilight shifts, 24/7 rotations and unpaid overtime.

Employers are increasingly motivated to prioritise and promote work-life balance as a human resources tool to improve the recruitment, retention and productivity of workers, perhaps especially women, who are playing an increasingly significant role in post-industrial service economies (Lewis, 1992; 1997; 2001; Sainsbury, 1994; Walby, 1990). Technology companies, however, often 'cherry pick' work-life balance measures that might allow them to appear employee-friendly whilst

still meeting business demands for an immediate turn-around to orders. This push towards a particular interpretation of work-life balance in order to construct a favourable image is evident in companies' competition to appear on popular lists of the best places to work. Perhaps the most well-known list is *Fortune's* 100 Best Companies to Work For.[7] Joyce (2003), in a preliminary review of the websites of the 100 best companies on this list, found that employers boast of a fun work environment with benefits including employee development, diversity, work-life balance and employee wellness.

In this chapter, I draw on interviews with Human Resources (HR) professionals, with access to the most up-to-date information on formal and informal company policies and practices, to investigate the companies' particular interpretations of work-life balance, their efforts to accommodate worker's non-work commitments and provisions for assisting their employees with their reproductive responsibilities. The question addressed in the first part of this chapter is to what extent do technology companies in the Waterloo Region provide coping resources for their employees coordinating work and family demands? In later sections, I turn to the experiences of the hi-tech employees themselves.

In order to develop a basis of comparison, it is particularly useful to evaluate the efforts made by technology companies in Canada's Technology Triangle with the measures taken by the two frequent top performers on *Fortune's* list: globally renowned technology companies - Google and Microsoft. Google attributes its repeated appearances on *Fortune's* 100 Best to *The Google Culture* that covers all

[7] *Fortune's* 100 best are selected by The Great Place to Work Institute and includes firms with at least 1.000 full- and part-time US employees. The 100 Best are chosen based on a proprietary employee attitude survey, which the interested company distributes to at least 250 randomly selected employees. The score also incorporates the evaluation of materials submitted as part of the Great Place to Work Culture Audit. Interested companies will often nominate themselves to be on the list (Joyce, 2003).

dimensions that make a 'fun' work environment: "At lunchtime, almost everyone eats in the office café, sitting at whatever table has an opening and enjoying conversations with Googlers from different teams…we believe each Googler is an equally important part of our success, no one hesitates…in our weekly all-hands ("TGIF") meetings- or spike a volleyball across the net at a corporate officer" (Google, 2011). The non-hierarchical and convivial work environment described in this quote from their website represents their efforts towards creating a friendly work culture, distinguishing Google workplaces from the stereotypical image of white walls divided by cubicles where workers perform monotonous and routine work (often parodied in popular television shows including *The Office*). The *Google Culture* is intended to attract innovative and creative minds into a humanised workspace. The company's website also suggests several material objects and events that might be found in a Google workspace, including local expressions representing the regional personality, bicycles, dogs, lava lamps, massage chairs, large inflatable balls, laptops to allow for email and note-taking on the go, foosball, pool tables, volleyball courts, video games, yoga and dance classes, wine tastings, healthy lunches and a variety of snacks and drinks in the break rooms to keep Googlers going (Google, 2011).

WorkLife at Microsoft implements the notion of employee or family-friendly in a different way from Google. This company emphasises the 'family' component in their descriptions of flexible programmes and resources provided for employees that they describe as: 'our most valued asset'. 'Microsoft realises that happy, healthy employees make Microsoft a better place to work and a more productive company (Microsoft, 2011). Microsoft's *WorkLife* programmes are intended to cater for employees' commitments outside their workspace, easing time conflicts between workers' long hours spent in the office and their roles in their families. Microsoft provides assistance to workers in the form of flexible work arrangements, backup child-care programme,

child-care assistance, parenting resources and seminars, new mothers' rooms and long-term care for extended family members. There are also specific programmes for employee's health and convenience, ensuring that their time spent at work is productive. Such measures include ergonomics programmes, fitness benefits, smoking cessation programmes and weight management programmes, on-campus convenience shopping, dry cleaning and laundry service and dinners-to-go programmes (Microsoft, 2011).

Two of the largest global technology companies appear to have contrasting interpretations of what constitutes an employee or family-friendly organisational culture. The *Google Culture* appears to (re)produce the assumption of the typical worker as a single, disembodied, male with no familial obligations who could be enticed to work longer hours if forms of leisure were introduced into the workspace: video games, foosball or a friendly game of volleyball across the company's organisational hierarchy, catering for the masculine competitive spirit and helping workers to unwind. The company focuses its efforts on 'humanising' the workplace by bringing the home of a stereotypical bachelor into work so that workers do not have to choose between times spent at work and on leisure, especially if work itself can be made fun. Familial obligations or the gendered division of unpaid work primarily performed in the home do not come into question in Google's workplace culture, illustrating Acker's (1998) argument (discussed in chapter 2) about the existence of a gender substructure in work organisations. This substructure is not just ideological but is manifested in what are presented as gender-neutral practices and ordinary workplace activities across organisational boundaries.

Microsoft's organisational culture, on the other hand, appears to recognize that happy and healthy employees need help in meeting their familial obligations and demands and as a result provides assistance for workers managing and performing

everyday domestic work and childcare-related activities. It might be argued that these programmes are shaped by and representative of the capitalist interests of powerful corporations and the state, as well as the aims of an individual company. Promoting and maintaining a healthy and productive labour force benefits technology companies and increases their profits (an argument well developed by Vincente Navarro (1985) in the context of health and medicine in the United States).

So far in this chapter, I have discussed the transformation of waged work, the implications for work-life balance and the role of organisations in assisting employees coordinate their non-work commitments. I have also drawn on two specific examples, Google and Microsoft, to show how the two largest global technology companies interpret and implement the notion of an employee or family-friendly organisational culture. The rest of this chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I investigate how technology companies in the Waterloo Region implement the rhetoric of employee or family-friendly in their organisational cultures, evaluating both informal and formal workplace policies and practices. In the second section, I explore the experiences of Indian technology professionals negotiating non-work commitments with employers in these and other technology companies in the Waterloo Region.

Family-friendly or flexploitation?

All the technology companies in which I carried out interviews boasted of their flexible work arrangements as a practice that makes them a great company to work for. Employers also saw this practice of flexibility as essential to maintaining high levels of productivity in a highly competitive sector, giving workers the space and freedom to innovate and enhance the companies' economic competitiveness. As I probed further about how this flexibility is constructed, the HR professionals whom I interviewed

made it clear that employees were required to be present at the workplace during core hours (typically eight hours a day). The supposed flexibility, therefore, was in how and when employees chose to complete their work tasks outside core hours in order to meet project deadlines or coordinate team efforts (i.e. the flexibility was in how employees structured their hours beyond the official forty-hour week). Moreover, the flexibility afforded to employees was not just temporally but also spatially constrained: extra tasks typically had to be completed in the workplace.

In an interview with HR at Phoenix, a high-tech company providing e-learning for academic and non-academic purposes established in 1999, Charlotte told me that negotiations for flexible work arrangements are limited to brief transition times - primarily start and finish times and that core hours remain inflexible and non-negotiable.

> We have a general flexible hours policy here, there are not a lot of guidelines on that. There is a certain period wherein we expect people to be there but coming and going is flexible. There is a lot of flexibility there (Charlotte, HR professional, Phoenix).

Although these flexitime opportunities were intended to permit employees to manage their non-work obligations, they were awarded on the basis of a tacit agreement that workers would not allow their familial responsibilities to jeopardise the company's productivity or their commitment to work. DigiTech, founded in 2001 by graduates of Waterloo University, develops control solutions to manage traffic and congestion on broadband and wireless Internet services. DigiTech recognised employees' non-work commitments and negotiated flextime arrangements on an individual basis.

> What we term as flexible hours is making sure that they are here for the core business hours which are from 10am-4pm. However we do require that employees are on-site for eight hours. We do understand that

> people have obligations outside work like taking their kids to daycare so we ask their managers that if they are not able to get here then they make up that time during the day or another time. We allow it at manager's discretion (Natalie, HR professional, DigiTech).

Scholars investigating flexible work arrangements in contemporary knowledge workplaces note that employers often use trust, rapport, mutuality and fairness to manipulate and convince employees to work longer hours and unpaid overtime (Fleetwood, 2007; Green, 2004; Van Echtelt et al., 2006, 2009). Despite a rhetoric of trust in the firms in which I interviewed, HR personnel and managers emphasised that they are responsible for ensuring that employees do not abuse the privilege of flextime. In return for this privilege, employees are expected to work outside office hours to 'get the work done', meeting the often inflexible project deadlines set by client requirements and the companies' budget. The general and informal policy of flexitime is closely monitored, ensuring that the company's overall productivity or client/customer satisfaction is not compromised. ULearn, a company that develops accurate measurement technologies for medical, industrial and business solutions, explained this relatively common practice of close monitoring of employees' freedom, flexibility and adjustment of working times.

> Our policy is that we don't designate a number of days per year that employees are allowed to take. We found that if you give days they think that they are entitled to it, so they take them. We do monitor absences, so I can track and look for things […] tracking anything suspicious. It is trying to let employees know that we will be accommodating them and we know that they have family responsibilities but also making sure that they are aware of their responsibilities to work is clear as well and that they are not trying to take advantage of anything (Caroline, HR professional, ULearn).

The negotiations of flexitime revealed by HR professionals indicate that a clear majority of the technology companies adhered to a particular interpretation of flexible working practices that fits with neoliberal ideas of individualism, adaptability and flexibility and also represents the interests of the company. HR professionals were frank about the normative expectation that employees should be prepared to work outside office hours and office locations on an as-needed basis, which fluctuated between different projects, different teams and different team leaders, supervisors and managers. This expectation was easy to monitor in technology work. The mobile and digital nature of work makes it easy to transfer between different locations. Employees just need to take their laptop computers, Blackberries or other smart phones home to compensate for flextime or work overtime to complete project requirements. In the interview with ULearn, the designers of measurement technologies, the HR professional, Caroline, emphasised that working overtime is common and as far as she knew, acceptable to all employees.

> 37.5 hours is how long they are paid for, whether they work more than that, they don't get overtime but a lot of them put in additional hours but there is no overtime for that (Caroline, HR professional, ULearn).

The particular interpretation of flexible work arrangements in technology companies perpetuates the image of an ideal or competent worker as having no familial obligations, or at least not allowing such obligations to interfere with their commitment to completing work tasks. Interestingly, the HR personnel in all the companies where I interviewed were often quick to deny any responsibility for projecting a 'long hours culture' and instead attributed the demands placed on employees to work unpaid overtime as an inevitable feature of a highly demanding knowledge-based economy. Respondents often clarified that it was not an intentional

company policy but rather a consequence of the competitive nature of the IT sector that demands a high level of productivity, creativity and innovation, making long hours a typical feature of work.

iSoft, established in 1929, produces display technologies and solutions for a variety of industries including cinema, simulation, education and media. Sarah, the HR professional at iSoft attributed their 'long hours culture' to the price of working in the high-tech sector, where innovation and creativity demands that employees are available to pick up work at any time with little or no consideration for their non-work responsibilities and obligations.

> In a high-tech world in engineering they typically work 50 hours. Of course, they are signed up for 37.5 hours but many employees are engaged and they work more hours and partly because they are able to work at home it is hard to know how many [hours] someone works. It is not just that 50 hours are required but when they are engaged they want to put in the hours […] that is typical of our workforce because high-tech is that way (Sarah, HR professional, iSoft).

The expectation that employees should be prepared to work as the need arises promotes an organisational culture in which employees might well feel pressurised into working long hours and unpaid overtime both at their workplaces and at home. In this way, the intrusion of work into family life is encouraged and to some extent expected. Organisations, however, do not take any responsibility for workers' non-work commitments to the same extent, leading to feelings of stress and exhaustion from multiple role demands. Soft Solutions designs online business communities to facilitate collaboration and knowledge sharing amongst project teams that may be geographically dispersed. In the interview with their HR professional, Joanna, gave an example of the use of flexitime by an employee in the company. She recognised that work-life conflict is part of any

employee's experience and spoke admiringly about this particular employee's management of his demands from work and home. She stressed that the company expectation is that employees alone are responsible for managing their personal obligations in their own time, even if it comes at the expense of taking exceptional measures to work at home.

> It [flextime] is very adaptable to individual needs. I really look for the forty hours a week to be done but I look for output than input. So here is your deadline, here is what you need to do and here is what your teammates need you to do, get it done. I don't care how. I have one guy who has two small children. The wife works shifts in the Schneider plant so he has to pick the kids up and make dinner and does work later after the kids are in bed. So people do whatever they need to (Joanna, HR professional, Soft Solutions).

A woman's issue, not a concern for the majority

The companies' expectations from employees, using flexitime provisions, shows how workers are both encouraged and expected to demonstrate their greater commitment to the company, which they generally expressed by exceeding their contractual work hours and often working atypical hours in the office and sometimes from home, however, working from home was particularly discouraged by employers. Unsurprisingly, all the companies where I interviewed appeared to respond positively to the notion of work-life balance and did not hesitate to explain their reasons: first, to respond to the growing criticisms of the encroachment of work into employees' personal lives; and secondly, as a HR strategy to recruit and retain employees by projecting a family-friendly image, perhaps especially to women.

They all took great interest in maintaining the image of a family-friendly company and a 'best practice' organisation. Several firms mentioned prioritising

employee well being. For example, Isabel, the HR manager of NiSoftware, a designer and manufacturer of space hardware, explained:

> I think it is just realizing that it will make for happier employees and it will make the work life balance better because it is a trend now and people are looking for it in companies. So it is a great recruiting tool for a HR standpoint […] we care enough to offer resources that can make their lives easier. We are doing tons of things like that just responding to society to make sure that we are a best practice organization (Isabel, HR manager, NiSoftware).

Similarly, Jane, a HR professional in Cyberworlds, a multinational company with headquarters in California, producing mobile infrastructure and integration software solutions, acknowledged that the general well being of employees is inevitably tied to their ability to achieve work-life balance.

> Work-life balance is a concern for the company and we have been starting a number of wellness programmes for our employees to help them with their whole life, not just their work life to make sure that they are healthy and children come into that. We are proud of being a family-friendly company because we have so many activities and our flexible schedules. We do realise that employees have a life outside so we try to accommodate that as much as possible (Jane, HR professional, Cyberworlds).

During my conversations with HR personnel in the different technology companies, they all explained that the wellness of their employees is a company prerogative, reflected in the numerous initiatives they have introduced over time pushing for change in the organisational culture. Natalie, the HR representative at DigiTech was happy to share the thoughts of the CEO of the company who insists that employees must 'work hard and play hard' and ensures that 'people enjoy themselves not only at work but also outside work to have a full life'. Sarah, at iSoft, claims that the

company provides “fun things for employees in their downtime, like Wii games or shuffleboard”. Some of the wellness or ‘fun’ measures that technology companies had in common included massage therapy, eco-plans (e.g. bonus for not using cars to work), healthy options in the cafeteria (such as low-fat, low-sugar, low-sodium alternatives), subsidised gym memberships, ergonomics consultations and flu shots.

It would appear that the focus of the efforts by the companies to humanise the workplace and promote work-life balance fit with the notion of a fun work environment (similar to the workplace attitudes and culture promoted by the *Google Culture*) and also representing capitalist interests of organisations in maintaining a healthy and therefore productive workforce. Curiously, there was little mention of workers’ familial obligations or caring duties. When I re-oriented my line of questioning to probe the companies’ explanations of this particular understanding of work-life balance, Sarah, the HR personnel at iSoft insisted that work-life balance and employee wellness do not necessitate a sole focus on family responsibilities and obligations: “people always think it is the loudest one [assistance with familial care]. Home life balance is different from childcare.” She assured me that the company had drawn this conclusion from an employee opinion survey that found that employees did not consider childcare to be an issue that needs to be addressed through company provisions. She refused to comment on whether the gender composition of the company’s workforce had any influence on the findings from the employee survey. The predominantly male composition of the company’s workforce might explain this finding that appeared to have an uncanny fit with the company’s perspectives.

Joanna, the HR professional at Soft Solutions (a company with 100 employees of whom 84 percent are male) had an interesting response to questions about the company’s provisions for accommodating or assisting employees’ with familial responsibilities, particularly caring duties: “we treat our employees as professionals.

We don't want to babysit them and they don't want to be babysat. There is no great demand". In this quote, she stresses the notion of an ideal worker as the disembodied male professional without extra-work that might potentially interfere with his commitment to the firm. She intimates that it is part of a mutually agreed professional code of conduct that requires employees to display resourcefulness, individualism, autonomy and multi-tasking capacities. Workers should maintain high levels of productivity and efficiency whilst not making any unreasonable demands from their organisations and employers, perpetuating the organisations' lack of responsibility for human reproduction and maintaining the unrealistic and unsustainable separation of work and home spheres.

Only one of the ten firms had introduced a programme for employees who needed to organise full-time non-parental care for their young children. ULearn, in collaboration with a for-profit childcare care centre located in the University of Waterloo Research and Technology Park, provided employees with priority childcare spaces. This programme allowed employees of the company to jump the queue and get ahead on waiting lists but they were still responsible for paying full fees. Nonetheless, this was beneficial to employees and assisted them in overcoming one of the main challenges (accessibility to childcare spaces) for working parents in the Waterloo region. At the time of the interview however, this programme had been terminated when the centre began charging a membership fee to the company for accessing the benefit of using priority childcare spaces. The company no longer considered the arrangement feasible and subsequently cancelled its membership, thereby leaving the employees who used the service to find other alternatives. Despite my probing, the HR professional refused to give any further information on how many employees were using the programme, or employees' reactions following their

decision to withdraw their sponsorship or on the consequences for employees who were using the childcare service.

> Basically companies are affiliated with that and then your employees are allowed to bring their children. We were doing that and employees enjoyed it and it was close to their office. Then [Kids and Company] started charging the companies an outrageous fee per year in order to be affiliated so we decided the pros and cons and the amount of people that were using it. We didn't pay the fee anymore and lost the affiliation. When we first started the collaboration there wasn't a fee (Caroline, HR professional, ULearn).

This quote from Caroline, the HR professional at ULearn, echoes the responses of HR professionals across the ten firms in this study: non-work obligations of company employees, particularly assistance with caring duties, was not regarded as the responsibility of the organisation, shaping the organisational culture and general attitudes of HR departments and managers. The gender composition of the workforce (between 60-85 percent male, see Table 5.1) was often stressed as an explanation for this gendered organisational attitude and particular interpretation of work-life balance. At the managerial level, the percentage of men increases significantly: in the majority of firms their representation exceeded 90 percent. The idea that domestic and caring responsibilities are largely an issue for women was highly pervasive. Any investment towards accommodating and assisting employees with caring duties was therefore considered as serving the minority. Any cost-benefit analyses of such measures would indicate a financial disadvantage.

In this way, company policies and practices seemed to be based on a typical male breadwinner-female caregiver model and a gendered division of household labour whereby one member of the household (primarily the woman) retains primary responsibility for the home relieving their partner (typically a man) of such duties in

order to be fully available and oriented towards paid work. Using this logic, men should not have the same problems as women in balancing their commitment to work and their families. Since the workforce is primarily comprised of men, who would use these services if the company decided to provide them?

On-site childcare provision was considered especially problematic, as it would supposedly distract employees, so reducing their overall productivity and perhaps even exacerbate employees' feelings of work-life conflict. Sarah, the HR interviewee at iSoft claimed:

> It is a benefit for few and not for the majority. We put out benefit dollars for the majority. There have been few females who have asked about it, but we are 90percent male so there is impact because of this. The majority want flexible hours, flexible benefits, and things like that and not childcare. So our flexible hours bring home life balance more than childcare. […] The people who have asked for it want it onsite […] There are some issues with engagement of employees when children are here, they are more engaged with children than they are with their jobs. Most firms have said no to childcare in firms (Sarah, HR professional, iSoft).

Overall, the interviews in the ten companies revealed an underlying masculinist ethic in the conception of work-life balance and the related provisions, contributing to a gendered organisational culture.

Some scholars have acknowledged that employees may undergo a careful calculation of stigma or transactions costs versus benefits accrued when using supposedly family-friendly provisions (Currie, 2004; Patterson, 1993). In the technology companies where I conducted interviews, stigma associated with using supposedly family-friendly provisions was more acute for men. Caroline, the HR professional at ULearn spoke of one such instance when some male company employees requested assistance with childcare. ULearn's presumption that childcare

would only benefit a small percentage of the workforce (that is mainly women with children) was challenged when male employees, who were also parents, made requests to their managers for assistance in accessing and affording childcare in the region, either in the form of prioritised spaces, subsidies or vouchers.

HR personnel and managers considered these requests from male employees as irrational, unreasonable and an indication of their personal failure to negotiate their responsibilities. The company maintained its position on the separation of home and work, arguing that managing work-life conflicts remains the responsibility of the worker, continuing to insist that it is more an issue for women than for men. This finding was particularly interesting when Arlie Hochschild's (1997) observation, in her influential book *The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home Becomes Work,* is taken into consideration. She found that there has been a slight recasting of the notion of 'family man' in the workplace. The traditional definition as a good provider, who demonstrates his love for his wife and children, has been replaced by a question about workers' masculinity or seen as a lack of seriousness or commitment to work.

Caroline, the HR personnel at ULearn, insisted further that women are particularly apt at managing their non-work responsibilities without involving their employers and organisations. She presented a 'superwoman' image for female workers: women who do not compromise their commitment to work or to their role as wives and particularly mothers.

> It has been asked though for the company to help out in some way, you know, paying for, finding or sourcing childcare. It would probably be done on an individual basis, two or three people is not a big group at all.
> *Can you recall who made the requests?*
> I think they were males. In my experience it tends to be males to ask for that sort of thing. I think women deal with the reality of the situation that it would be very rare for a company to offer childcare onsite and they

> would think that we should be able to do it (Caroline, HR professional, ULearn).

Sarah, the HR professional at iSoft clarified that ideal parents and ideal workers are not mutually exclusive; however, she believed women are less likely to let their commitment to their organisations falter because they would miss the fast pace and intellectual engagement provided by highly-rewarding knowledge work (I explore this further in the next section by drawing on the experiences of female hi-tech workers of Indian-origin). She emphasises that despite the pressures from familial obligations, women 'choose' to come back to work as soon as possible, in part because of an economic incentive to do so.

> It is very difficult for women at the managerial level to take the full year in a high-tech company and feel like they are on top of things. I think they usually take only part of it because she wants to be back working, because she needs to or is bored because at the manager's level they are very involved and engaged and diapers just don't do it quite the same. You are at reduced wage too so it is costly, that is why I think so. Some women in the managerial level could make $100,000 a year but you only get $40,000 on EI [Employment Insurance] is that what you want to be at home for? (Sarah, HR professional, iSoft)

Men, by contrast, appear to have an economic disincentive when choosing to take up their responsibilities as a parent. The pervasive assumption that women are the default or 'natural' bearers of the domestic and familial responsibilities is clearly evident in assessments of more formal workplace policies and benefits, mainly the take-up of parental leave. Male employees feel discouraged from taking parental leave since they do not receive the same economic benefits as women. Isabel, the HR professional at NiSoftware said that few male employees in their company chose to take any part of their parental leave: "Unfortunately, men don't have the same benefits if they take parental leave, so they don't receive the top-up. They would be unpaid or

on employment insurance. That is a big component that they are not getting the same benefit." Moreover, Caroline, the HR professional at ULearn admitted that despite the existence of legislation allowing men to take paternity leave, male employees often still have to negotiate with employers for their right. "If a male asks for paternity leave then he is not given a top-up. He is just allowed to take time off, of course depending on the workload. We cannot deny him and try to be reasonable depending on how much the workload allows."

The different financial compensation for men and women choosing to take parental leave acts as a default economic disincentive, deterring fathers from taking up their parental leave entitlements. Women are more likely to take an extended leave following their maternity leave entitlements. This inevitably perpetuates a gendered division of caring duties and unpaid domestic labour that has profound implications for the gendered division of paid work and women's career advancement. Zhang (2010) found that women choosing to extend maternity leave sustain significant earnings losses. This 'family gap' in women's career is difficult to overcome due to stagnant gendered earnings gaps and the possibility of permanent lay-offs, despite this being illegal. Zhang (2010) also found that the impact on women's careers is often reduced when they are able to switch to part-time work with their current employer or if they retain reduced-hour versions of their full-time jobs. None of the companies I interviewed, however, provided such part-time or reduced-hour transitions for new parents. HR professionals once again made it clear that this was not the choice of the company but rather the constraints of a highly demanding knowledge economy. Sarah, in HR at iSoft, confirmed this:

> We don't have a way to easily facilitate replacing someone, either you are here or you are not because if you are not really here we have a full-time replacement. Coming for a day or two is difficult in the high-tech world. Where do you find someone? (Sarah, HR professional, iSoft)

Parenting at managers' discretion

In the previous sections, I have demonstrated that technology companies' family-friendly provisions, both informal policies such as flexible working arrangements as well as state-legislated formal workplace policies, are carefully monitored in order to ensure that employees are not abusing these privileges. On the contrary, workers are expected to work longer hours outside office hours and locations to demonstrate that they are not compromising their commitment to work or the company's productivity. From the company's perspective, employees' well-being lies in the creation of a convivial and fun workplace. The majority of companies agreed that childcare did not fall within their organisational responsibility, it was a women's issue, which was not a concern for the majority of their employees who were male, constructed as not having any parental obligations.

HR professionals in all the technology companies where I interviewed agreed that flexible work arrangements were the most appropriate work-life balance intervention, providing employees with the independence and autonomy to individually manage their domestic and caring duties outside of organisational boundaries. The informal nature of these policies however meant that they were negotiated privately and individually. Employees negotiated both formal and informal work-life balance measures privately with the HR department and their managers who assessed such requests on a case-by-case basis. This meant that there was no formal standard or precedent established for what workers could expect from their employers. The lack of formalisation or standardisation permitted employers to promote the image of a family-friendly workplace, giving employees no formal recourse to counter what could be seen as unreasonable intrusions from the workplace, including unpaid overtime and working from home. When asked about formalising flexible working practices, Isabel, the HR professional at NISoftware said,

> I am sure it would be up for consideration. I don't think they would to be honest. That is, it would have to be decided by the divisional president and then it would have to become policy (Isabel, HR professional, NISoftware)

Due to the informal and private nature of these negotiations of flextime, trust becomes a critical component (as identified in previous studies, see for example Adler (2001) and Green (2004)). Individual and private negotiations tend to advantage employees who have built a rapport with supervisors or managers or who have the appropriate social networks in place. The subjective nature of case-by-case decision-making means that racialised and gendered disadvantages may become more evident. Women and visible minority workers might not have the informal networks in place to negotiate successfully with managers, supervisors and team leaders who are predominantly white men, contributing to their exclusion from such benefits. I did not inquire about such exclusions during the interviews with companies but assessing this argument would make an interesting extension of this research.

Work commitments continue to take priority and employees can be denied leaves to which they are entitled if the projects demand their presence. In InfoTech, a multinational company that designs and manufactures self-service technologies, Lisa, the HR professional revealed the power dynamics in negotiations between employees and managers:

> Managers are the final call because they will be able to determine given the workload if they will be able to take the leave or not. Of course, sometimes we have to say no given the workload and need to meet objectives. We do ask them to try rejuggling work, usually for a specific period of time and depends on the situation. Reduced workweeks would be determined on a case-by-case basis (Lisa, HR professional, InfoTech).

A recurrent theme that emerged during the interviews is employers' rationale for having constrained flexible working arrangements and in some cases denying workers their entitlements: tough decisions taken as an inevitable consequence of a highly demanding but still highly rewarding occupational sector. They insisted that their expectations are neither unreasonable nor unique; on the contrary, it is part of the well-known price of a competitive profession (known to both employers and employees who choose this profession). The careful monitoring practices were intended to ensure that ultimately employees' commitment and efforts outweigh their use of benefits to make this family-friendly image economically feasible and profitable. Sarah, at iSoft, very astutely phrased this negotiation, "the manager manages that people do more than the hours they are paid for and not less."

Highly demanding yet highly rewarding: the employees' perspectives

So far in this chapter, I have argued that it is clear that the technology companies at the heart of this case study made certain assumptions about their employees and more generally about IT as an occupational sector: assumptions that benefit the company and its managers. In this second part of the chapter, I want to draw on the semi-structured interviews I carried out with IT newcomers working in these and other technology companies in the Waterloo Region. I talked to thirty-five Indian hi-tech immigrants (21 men and 14 women) about their experiences of negotiating their non-work commitments with their employers. In this section, I also explore the similarities and differences in men's and women's experiences, employees who were doing similar jobs in the companies.

All the interviewees were between 30-45 years old, living in dual-earner households: they all had pre- or school-aged children and agreed that their primary

non-work commitment is the negotiation of childcare during the normal working day, to cover their core work hours. I inquired specifically about the nature of their work, the existence of flexible work arrangements and whether they see themselves as successful in balancing the dual demands from their workplace and family life. At the time of the interviews, a few participants were simultaneously pursuing further certifications or technological upgrading as part of their non-work responsibilities, taken up outside their regular work hours. For these participants, time demands were particularly severe.

Performance rather than presence

In general, interviewees described their jobs as flexible, adaptable, mobile and innovative. They acknowledged that working in a sector that concentrates primarily on knowledge production and technological innovation entails becoming accustomed to a dynamic, unpredictable and sometimes volatile organisation of work, demanding that professionals choose between continuous self-learning to keep abreast of new technologies or risk becoming redundant or obsolete like the technology itself. The IT workers interviewed described themselves as individual, independent (despite working in teams on most projects) and committed, characteristics which they demonstrated to their employers by working outside office hours and locations when necessary to meet project deadlines. They believed that their employers valued this commitment and flexibility more than clocking in on a regular basis for an eight-hour working day.

Venkat, a male computer engineer, when asked about his obligations and organisation of time, said, “they just give you a job and you finish it”. Ishan, also a male computer engineer working in the same company as Venkat confirmed, “as long

as you are delivering your work they don't care about the time". Mohit, a male computer analyst, described the flexible nature of work in his company, saying that although he typically worked more hours than his contractual working week (37.5 to 40 hours), there was a great deal of flexibility in how he chose to work such extra hours to meet a project deadline. He said, "there is no hard and fast rule here. If you want to stay at home and work then you can. If you want to go anywhere there is no rule. I can go to the office and come back home as long as I deliver what I need to do". It is this feature of technology workplaces that ideally should provide workers with the autonomy and independence to choose when, where and how to complete their tasks with few temporal and spatial constraints (the flexible firm).

Theoretically, the flexible and mobile nature of technology work contributes to a less gendered organisation of work, as employees can effectively combine their commitment to their company and their personal or family lives. From the company's perspective however, as I discussed above, the 'flexibility' in such working arrangements is both spatially and temporally constrained, restricting workers' supposed autonomy. In the rest of the section, I explore how men and women working in technology companies perceive such 'flexible' working arrangements, and whether they are able to benefit from them.

Work in technology companies follows a just-in-time production process, where labour has to closely match demand (driven by client requirements), meaning that in the weeks that workers need to complete project deadlines they typically work several hours of unpaid overtime. Between projects, periods of lower demand and reduced workloads, they are more easily able to negotiate their working hours. The majority of participants described patterns of what might be termed 'binge working'. Shashi, a male computer programmer, explained the challenge in working in a dynamic and demanding industry pushing for 'lean and mean' knowledge production.

> The expectation keeps on changing everyday as IT in a company becomes changed with changes in business comes the measure of efficiency and effectiveness. As a company becomes more efficient and effective the expectation keeps on growing. The thing is that in IT the next challenge we deal with is the ever increasing expectation in terms of delivery, efficiency, reducing the amount of resources which could be human, time and money.

A few participants also linked these features of the technology sector to increased job insecurity and precariousness. Neena, a female software developer, when asked about how secure she feels in her present job, said, “I really wouldn’t say [secure] because I work in a technology field and with the changes in the technology you have to keep changing”. Irregular patterns of work demands and the need to multitask are also a source of stress and exhaustion for technology workers. Ishan said, “it is the type of job you are doing and that causes stress. In IT we need to resolve certain issues and one issue you are stuck on for four hours and other issues are coming in it causes stress. Multiple tasks cause stress”.

There was significant overlap in how men and women working in the IT sector described the nature of their jobs and the demands from a dynamic and progressive knowledge industry. All participants spoke excitedly about the challenge presented by the dynamic nature of technologies and the interesting nature of their work, which made the pressures from work both acceptable and in most cases enjoyable. They also suggested that these working practices are common among their colleagues and friends working in the same sector. IT professionals prioritise deadlines and the mobility afforded by a digitised knowledge product means that doing work outside the office is relatively easy when necessary. Namita, a female systems analyst, who has a ten-year old daughter, said, “I have to work after hours when I come home because I

have a company laptop so sometimes I need to work on Saturdays and Sundays. Mostly everybody puts some extra effort otherwise we cannot complete our deadlines".

Just like the HR professionals that I interviewed, the IT workers also rationalised their workloads, high-stress job environment, long and atypical work hours and unpaid overtime as part of the professional code of conduct in technology occupations and an inevitable consequence of the project-based nature of technology work rather than the particular expectations of their employers. Akash, a male computer engineer working in the largest technology company in the region, recounted, "I am supposed to work 40 hours but I work more than that. The company is not asking you to work more than that but it is how you manage your time". Van Echtelt (2006, 2009) called this the 'lumpiness of work' in contemporary workplaces where employers do not forbid workers to negotiate or reduce working hours but make it difficult to do in practice. Neena, a female software developer, working in the same company, said that as part of her job she must check on projects remotely and put in longer hours when the project demands it.

> Because of our professions sometimes you have to log into the computer on weekends to see if there are any disastrous things. Usually what happens is we do keep in touch with emails and such to see everything is working fine […] even if I have to stretch little more. Say maybe at night there is an emergency work, I do put another three to four hours of effort but I think that is still fine, I do whatever hours I have even if it is a stretch I am fine.

Returning to some of the arguments about the transformation of paid work in the new economy, that I introduced at the start of the chapter, IT workers are often depicted as working in relatively non-bureaucratic work environments with minimal direct supervision, allowing them to control their working times and patterns. Several scholars studying these supposedly non-

bureaucratic workplaces found that in practice, employees compensate for this autonomous status by working extra hours to complete project requirements, demonstrating their commitment to the company (Alvesson, 2000; Hyman et al., 2005; Kunda, 1992). Workers are more likely to have positive attitudes towards an organisation with a workplace culture that permits employers to have an accommodating approach towards the non-work commitments of employees. The flipside of this accommodating approach is that workers may feel pressured to extend their working day at home, creating a form of cultural control (Perlow, 1998; 2001). The above quote shows how the long hours culture is evident in the experiences of Indian hi-tech immigrant men and women but is also evidently self-imposed.

Constrained flexibility based on mutuality, fairness and trust

Negotiations between employees and employers to reasonably combine employment and familial obligations are often made on the basis of 'mutuality and fairness', or as I noted earlier, at managers' discretion. The majority of interviewees felt supported by their employers when managing their non-work responsibilities. They also confirmed that in exchange, they would work on weekends in the office or late evenings from home in order to compensate for any time taken out for familial obligations. They accepted that employers could demand their presence during core hours and agreed that they could only negotiate the brief periods before and after work and overtime hours in order to meet the demands from their family life. Respondents also said that mutuality, fairness and trust worked both ways.

Shaan, a male computer engineer, and his spouse Radha, a systems analyst, are both working in full-time positions in technology companies in the region, requiring them to arrange childcare for their two children aged three years and six weeks. At the time of the interview, Radha was on maternity leave. In my conversation with Shaan, he described his negotiations of flexible work arrangements with his supervisor in order to take his older daughter to day care and to take care of her outside of day care hours, allowing Radha to focus her entire attention on their newborn. Shaan explained, "I put in a lot of extra hours in work so it balances off. It's not one way that I take time off for emergencies and personal matters. I work a lot of extra hours but with a salary you don't get compensated for every hour you put in. it is well balanced". Yash also talked about the flexible nature of his work, allowing him to negotiate his workday to take care of his daughter outside core office hours. His spouse, Namita, makes a similar arrangement in her job; she starts later during the day and works later.

> It is computer based so if you can log in from home, the same things are available. They are very flexible and sometimes I have to take my daughter for vaccination or doctor's appointment. I will take one or two hours off and I make that up the same week or next week. That way work hours are flexible and start and end times are flexible. As long as I put in eight hours of work and I am there in the core business hours between 8am to 6pm.

All participants identified flexitime arrangements as a positive aspect of their companies and also the IT organisational culture in general. Women were more likely to mention their childcare and domestic responsibilities when explaining the benefits of flexible work arrangements in their companies (with the exception of Shaan and Yash quoted above); however, they were still not the majority. Neena, a female software developer, said:

> I think a big advantage of the job I am in is that you can sometimes make up the time and work from home. It's not that you get out from the office you are not doing that work anymore. Probably you just take an hour off and get back home and get everything settled and again you can join back and probably work sometimes at late hours to get work done. But there is no pressure from my top management or my immediate boss. It is a project given and you know the timing and you have to achieve those timings. I think they are absolutely understanding. I have had a few situations where I have had to rush back. I haven't had any problems in the sense I have to take care of my daughter or anything else as such or if I am not well or something like that. I can always take off that time and adjust it later.

Interviewees also stressed that their negotiations of flexible work arrangements were in some ways limited by managers and supervisors. Although most participants could negotiate working from home, it was highly discouraged and only negotiated on an individual basis (at managers' discretion). Akash, a male computer engineer, confirms, "working from home depends on the situation, if you are sick, family obligation then yes".

Employees often found that adjusting flexible hours meant that they work more hours outside of the office than they took out for personal or family reasons, maintained by the careful monitoring by managers, supervisors and human resources. Arpita, a female computer programmer, said, "flexible hours is always on the upper side and not the lower side like you work ten hours [instead of an eight-hour day] otherwise I don't think you can cope up with work". Since such arrangements are negotiated individually, privately and on an informal basis, employers have the authority to revoke such privileges at any time. Aisha, a female software analyst, described her experience:

> I feel they would be supportive according to the work because there is no one who can replace me or find someone to cover for me. My daughter just got sick a week and half back and I didn't ask for an off

> but told my manager she isn't well and he just nodded his head; he didn't say I could take off and I didn't ask either because I was new here. At present he is not very comfortable giving off I guess. Last time she got sick we were in the hospital all night and I had work the next day. Fridays I work only from 7am to 11am. At 6am we got back and I worked from 7 to 11am. Things worked out but I am not sure what I would be doing if it was during the week. We don't have a plan for that yet.

Trust, mutuality and fairness also re-emerged in the interviews with Indian hi-tech immigrants as a crucial component of negotiations for non-work commitments. Participants' success at negotiating flexible work arrangements was contingent on the rapport shared with their managers and their managers' trust in their commitment to the company. Namita, a female systems analyst, had difficulty negotiating her daughter's day care timings and had to convince her manager that she "will make up those hours on a Saturday or Sunday so she trusts me". Arpita, a female computer engineer, explained how her employer gives her the benefit of flexible working arrangement but has refused the same benefits to her colleagues, "she is very partial with so she is not saying for everybody but for me she really trusts me if I say I have to work from home. On the other hand I know some people she doesn't trust and she will say no".

Arpita's and Namita's positive experiences with negotiating with a female manager and the mistrust expressed by Aisha's male manager is not enough to draw definitive conclusions about the implications of gender when building trust and rapport to negotiate such arrangements successfully. One participant made a direct reference to the potential gendered implications of these negotiations. Akash, a male computer engineer, found in his ten years of working in technology sectors, that female managers and supervisors to be more understanding of work-life conflict. He said,

> I always liked to work under a female boss than a male boss. If I had a choice between male or female supervisor or manager. They [women] are more caring and understand your family problems and less ego problems, whereas, male boss or manager and you could have those kind of ego conflicts.

Regardless of the individual negotiations on the basis of fairness and trust, all interviewees agreed that project requirements and deadlines took precedence. Workers continued to feel responsible for managing their familial demands and ensuring that non-work commitments do not interfere with their productivity at work. Jyoti explains this, " I can take off they are OK with it as long as it doesn't affect the project and it usually doesn't because I balance everything and finish things before time".

Work as self-fulfilling

What makes these intrusions from work into employees' personal lives acceptable? During the interviews, I asked participants to compare their contracted working hours and their actual working hours to understand how they perceived the idea of a 'long hours culture' as an expression of their commitment to their job and the company. The majority of participants said that generally their actual work hours exceed contracted work hours; however, they emphasised their passion, commitment and interest in their jobs and the satisfaction they gained from resolving technical issues and keeping updated on the latest technologies. One interviewee compared the satisfaction he felt from successfully resolving technical issues in the software he implements to the fulfilment a surgeon feels after completing a successful surgery and saving a life.

Both men and women spoke with pride and excitement about the significance of their jobs, their importance in the companies and their commitment to do what it

takes to deliver projects. Jyoti, a female certified software tester, said, “I love software, I cannot think of any other field”. Karan, a male software engineer, described his genuine interest in what he does, particularly the interesting, challenging and dynamic nature of his work, “we don’t do the same thing over and over again which is good and IT industry is always changing”. When asked what is needed to be successful in the IT sector, participants frequently mentioned adaptability, willingness to change, time management, teamwork and knowledge sharing.

Men were more likely to acknowledge that long work hours, night shifts and the expectation to do work on an as-needed basis might be more difficult for women given their domestic responsibilities. Male respondents were also more likely to stress the gendered assumptions pervasive in the organisational culture in technology companies. Yash, a male software engineer, said, “IT sometimes demands your availability beyond office hours and for women that can be a bit difficult. If customers have issues in the middle of the night, men are available but for women it may not be so easy. Otherwise they have equal abilities in problem solving”. The only female participant who spoke about the gendered implications of technology work, Shruthi, a software engineer, said that the challenge was in managing parenting responsibilities with working anti-social hours. Shruthi also speculated about the impact this could have on women’s career progression.

> In IT side there is no differences between women and men. Anyone can do it. The only problem is when we work night time, sometimes we have to do late night or do it tomorrow if we don’t finish, and we have to take care of family. For men it’s OK but for women we have to take care of the house as well. Not everyday though. Men they can do it because no one will bother them but women they take care of kids. Only men get promotion very fast but I don’t know why?

Male technology workers described the IT sector as both male dominated and oriented, acknowledging women's disadvantage in such a gendered organisational culture. Rishi, a male computer engineer, explained, "this is a male-dominated society so it will take some time for women to compete in this world because the whole thought is created by men, you are competing with those old thoughts. It will take time". Vijay, a male IT engineer, stressed that work-life conflict is often more acute for women (by virtue of their default or traditional role as bearers of the double-duty), as they need to meet increasing work demands without increasing or equal participation from men in meeting family demands. He said, "it is only that naturally women have more responsibilities in the family and I can understand that there are some challenges in handling responsibilities. Men also have the same responsibilities but they don't carry so much on their shoulders". Here, 'nature', of course, works to the benefit of men.

Both men and women described paid work as something they want to do and enjoy doing: for these respondents, it is far more than an instrumental way of earning a living. Yash expressed this sentiment, "I take initiative and ownership of a task given to me". In comparison to the insights on work-life conflict expressed by male IT workers, women were much less likely to identify the gendered substructure of the IT work culture and recognise the consequences for women doing similar jobs to male co-workers. On the contrary, they continued to insist that the unpredictable working patterns were reasonable, stressing their sense of satisfaction; pleasure and fulfilment. Female technology workers emphasised their significant contributions to their respective companies. Namita, a female systems analyst, said, "passion to work I guess. I want to work and that is one thing that will keep pushing me to my deadlines". Shalini, a female software analyst, rationalised the demands of unpaid overtime on the basis of the importance of her contribution to her company. At the same time, she also

expressed her feelings of guilt when taking time off work for familial or personal obligations.

> I can work less hours because it is not like someone is pushing me to work extra hours but that problem is that I am the only person there and anything that is pending has to be done by me today or tomorrow. If things are piling up so I have to work at least minimum ten hours a day otherwise things will keep piling up which I don't think is a good idea when you are working.

A clear pattern that emerged in the interviews with IT professionals is that men appeared to be more sensitive and sympathetic than women to the experiences of work-life conflict, evident in the above quotes from the interviews with Yash, Vijay, Rishi and Akash. Male technology workers, however, continue to see this conflict as more of an issue for women to resolve because of the importance of the maternal role to children's development. Women talked about their experiences of work-life conflict but were also more likely to emphasise the satisfaction and fulfilment from their work. Women also rationalised the work-life conflicts that might arise by stressing the significance of their work for their self-concept as well as their important contribution to the company. Shalini added, "The only thing is that I am put in a responsible position and the systems I handle nobody other than me would know so I feel guilty. They [supervisors] are very helpful but I just won't go and ask them".

Conclusions: the ideal self-regulating disembodied worker

> *The relations of ruling are rationally organised. They are objectified, impersonal, claiming universality. Their gender subtext has been invisible […] Where there is society, there is gender and the gender division of labour is pervasive. Gender roles and relations are not tucked away in those zones called sexuality, the family, interpersonal relations, and the like, which are defined residually by the organization of paid work and the institutions of ruling"* (Smith 1987: 4-5).

This quote is from Dorothy E. Smith's (1987) influential book *The Everyday World as a Problematic*. Smith developed a convincing critique of the discipline of sociology as written from the standpoint of men. She introduced the term *gender subtext* to show that relations of ruling in institutional organisations and the regulating society, which appear to be abstract, rational, impersonal, objective and neutral, but in reality conceal class, racial and gender divisions visible in realms of paid and unpaid work (1987; 1989; 1990). Acker (1990; 1992a, b; 1998) used Smith's observations to argue that organisational contexts are characterised by complex constructs, and she introduced the notion of the disembodied worker, whose characteristics (highly qualified, work oriented and available at all times) are presented as abstract and neutral. She argues that the disembodied worker is certainly not neutral but instead corresponds with the characteristics of male workers rather than those of female workers, who continue to disproportionately bear responsibility for the family realm.

The ideal of the disembodied worker produces and is produced by the gender subtext, or as Acker (1998) calls it, the gender substructure in organisations. Benschop and Dooreward (1998) identified four main gendering processes that I argue might explain how a gendered substructure is produced and maintained in the technology companies described in this chapter. These four gendering processes include: structural arrangements and the allocation of personnel, organisational

culture, social interactions between men and women, and identity construction of men and women through the gender typing of occupations (Benschop and Dooreward, 1998). In this chapter, I have focussed primarily on one of these four processes, the organisation culture, which "pertains to the symbols, images, rules and values that explicitly and implicitly, justify and sometimes question gender distinctions in the organisation (what is perceived as 'normal' and what is not with regard to gender relations)" (p. 789).

In this chapter, I explored the gendered assumptions embedded in the organisational culture of technology companies in the Waterloo Region and also identified the different measures taken by technology companies to maintain an employee or family-friendly image. HR professionals in all the technology companies acknowledged that work-life balance and employees' well being is a critical HR tool to recruit and retain 'happy and healthy' employees. They focused their efforts on humanising the workplace by creating a 'fun workplace' with incentives such as Wii games, shuffleboards, gym memberships and healthy snacks in the cafeteria (similar to the *Google Culture* that I described earlier in the chapter).

Although the average age of employees was between 30-35 years and the majority had working partners and young children, there was little consideration for employees' roles as parents in technology companies' conceptualisations of a family-friendly company. The HR professionals that I interviewed explained that the underlying logic of this particular interpretation of 'employee-friendly' is that working constraints as a result of domestic and familial obligations is more of an issue for women. Based on the gender composition of the workforce (predominantly male) provisions for employees' caring duties or other forms of reproductive work would not serve the majority or be economically feasible. On the other hand, technology companies boasted of flexible work arrangements as a positive measure to assist

workers in achieving work-life balance, allowing for more flexibility and autonomy in their negotiations of their non-work commitments. It was made clear by HR professionals and technology workers, however, that the 'flexibility' as an informal company policy was both spatially and temporally constrained and also carefully monitored by managers and human resources. Moreover, male workers were more acutely stigmatised for using formal and informal provisions for work-life balance.

Juliet Schor (1992; 1998) argued that while workers felt pressurised for time, long working hours is unlikely to be the sole or even main reason for workers' stress and exhaustion. The feeling of being squeezed for time may result from domestic labour arrangements or changing aspirations for lifestyles and consumptions. I explore these arrangements and aspirations of Indian professional couples in greater detail in the next chapter. All the Indian technology workers that I interviewed admitted to exceeding their contractual work hours, binge patterns of working depending on project deadlines, working from home and experiences with constrained flexible working arrangements. Nonetheless, they all saw flexible work arrangements as a privilege that they negotiated privately and informally with their managers on the basis that they would work longer hours than they actually took off.

Male technology workers acknowledged that experiences of work-life conflict are more acute for women, particularly within a male-oriented organisational culture. Women doing similar jobs in these technology companies were more likely to rationalise their long hours and disproportionate share of the family realm by emphasising the importance of work for their self-concept and their significant contribution to their companies. All the technology workers whom I interviewed agreed that their roles in their families should be kept outside of their companies' organisational boundaries, maintaining their individual responsibility for non-work commitments.

The underlying gendered assumption in technology companies' interpretation of a family-friendly organisational culture and male and female technology workers' acceptance of the demanding nature of IT work is that women are 'naturally' better equipped to manage competing demands from multiple roles, promoting a 'superwoman' image. Both employers and technology workers attributed the intensification of work, long and atypical work hours, unpaid overtime and working from home to the highly demanding and competitive technology sector and as part of a tacitly agreed professional code of conduct rather than time-greedy organisations and employers.

I believe that the gendered assumptions underlying the organisational culture in technology companies is perpetuating the ideal of the disembodied worker as abstract, neutral, objective and impersonal and the non-responsibility of organisations that Acker (1992a; 1998) identified almost two decades ago. Returning to Dorothy E. Smith's quote at the start of this section, gendering processes and gender roles pervade the regulation of paid work and the gendered divisions that emerge as a consequence. Employers are not the only regulators of the gendered organisational culture in these technology companies, employees also appear to self-regulate to fit the ideal of the highly qualified and work-oriented employee who is available to work as needed, not letting their familial roles interfere with their commitment to work and their levels of productivity. There is little consideration for the gendered implications and emotional and financial costs, especially for women.

In concluding this chapter, I suggest that progress towards a gender conscious family-friendly organisational culture will only be achieved when reproduction in the home is brought into organisational responsibilities. Organisations need to take more proactive measures (e.g. childcare vouchers), enabling workers to better deal with instances of work-life conflict without stigma or repercussions on job advancements for

both women and men. Technology companies need to allow both male and female workers to transgress the gender boundary maintained by a gendered organisational culture. Organisations can only begin to do this by recognising that male employees with children are also parents who bear the same responsibilities as female employees who are mothers. Using this logic instead, work-life balance provisions for workers' caring duties will in fact benefit 'the majority', proving to be both economically feasible and profitable in the long run, as a HR tool to recruit and retain the growing numbers of working parents. This reasoning, however, is not as likely to be applied by technology companies in a period of economic austerity, as it might present a challenge to profits and a neoliberal environment that emphasises individual rather than collective solutions to work-life issues.

Chapter 6

'I thought it would be easy':

negotiating the dual transition of settlement and parenthood

Dev and Shalini Mishra, with their four-year old son Arnav, arrived as Canadian permanent residents through the Skilled Worker and Professional Class migration scheme in 2004. Dev and Shalini jointly took the decision to immigrate to Canada both to advance their careers and to provide Arnav with what they perceived to be the best educational and occupational opportunities for his future. While in India, Dev and Shalini had both worked full time as a senior accountant and a software analyst respectively. They shared their caring responsibilities with Dev's parents who were retired and lived with them in New Delhi. They also had a fulltime domestic helper for household chores.

Soon after arriving in Toronto, they both started their job search through online search engines and also contacted employment agencies. After three months of unemployment, Dev was able to find work as a caretaker of a small retail establishment responsible for maintaining basic accounts and inventory, experiencing significant downward social and occupational mobility compared to the managerial level position he had held in India. The family re-located from Toronto, where they first landed as new immigrants, to Sudbury for Dev's new job, meanwhile, Shalini continued to struggle with what she perceived to be uncooperative employment agencies and employers who refused to accept her qualifications and work experience in India. She was only able to find temporary, contractual, entry-level, low-skilled technical jobs and assumed full time caring duties for Arnav, who just started going to

pre-school activities. Arnav's school timings only gave Shalini a few hours in her day to pursue her job search for better and more permanent positions.

After six months of interrupted job searches and intermittent contractual work, Shalini secured a software analyst job in the one of the largest technology companies in Ontario, based in the Waterloo Region. This meant a second re-location for the family, this time for Shalini's new job. Dev also found a low-level managerial position in a multinational insurance company in the Waterloo Region on the basis of Canadian work experience (he was promoted soon after his start with this company). Shalini's job in Waterloo region's technology cluster came at the cost of atypical and relatively inflexible work hours. Dev had to assume primary responsibility for managing the household and taking care of their son Arnav. He explained how he carefully balanced his and Shalini's working hours, ensuring that one or the other parent would be available to take care of Arnav outside his school hours: "I was able to juggle a little time with my work and we would go out in the morning at 6am. I come home at 3pm and pick up my son, stay with him until 6pm or until my wife gets home and I go back to work until about 10 or 10.30pm". Shalini agreed, "Dev is mostly taking care of the kid these days. He drops him at school and takes care of him".

During my conversation with Shalini, she spoke confidently about her success in striking a reasonable balance between her commitment to work and her responsibilities towards Arnav and Dev.

> Yes, I am quite successful because my son is doing good at school and he is not watching TV all the time and if I take one day off work then everyone gets worried. I think my house is clean all the time and we cook dinner everyday and it is healthy.

As I probed further about how they divide the responsibilities for Arnav's care and household chores, Shalini, with some emotion, recounted feeling guilty about not being

there for Arnav. She found it particularly difficult not to be a part of her son's everyday life, especially his school activities. She also described feeling disappointed because Dev had to do more than his share of the housework and caring for Arnav. She explained that her working time and commitment to her company did not make her a negligent mother but a trusting wife who believes in her husband's ability to be a good father, taking responsibility for their son and keeping her informed about his development.

> OK maybe I wish I had a little more time with my family. Maybe I am eighty percent satisfied. I would like to spend more time with my son because either I am here or Dev is here. He gets to spend very little time with both of us. At night if Dev comes home late from work, my son will stay up to see him and in the morning he never sees me because I leave early. So either he sees me or he sees his dad. Anything my son is in for school like a play, award function, parent teacher meeting or any celebration, I missed those a lot. But I only do it because my husband is there to take care of him and it is not that I totally don't know what is going on. I keep checking with him.

Shalini also described not feeling as constrained for time in doing household chores such as cooking or cleaning, as she did in performing her caring duties. She explained how completing everyday household chores gave her a sense of satisfaction, ensuring that her contribution in this respect outweighs that of Dev, compensating for her inability to contribute to the same extent as him when it came to Arnav's care. Nonetheless, this sense of satisfaction did not replace or begin to compensate for her feelings of guilt and disappointment about not being present for Arnav's daily activities. She feels she might have lost her place in Arnav's life, as he sometimes now calls her *daddy*.

> I am pretty organised and I will have to clean my house everyday. Even if something is not clean in the middle of the night I will do it. I never leave anything pending and even with my son, Dev cannot do cleaning so I think I give more priority to my house, I just realized that […] I think I want to spend more time with my son on weekdays because sometimes he calls me daddy. I think it is because he just says daddy more so I want to change that and be with him more. That I would change definitely, many times he calls me daddy and these days it is starting to bother me because I used to take care of him really good before and sometimes with work it is like that. With the house things I don't think so. Everything is OK. I just want to spend more time with him.

The gendered division of work among professional migrant couples

My main aim in this thesis has been to reveal the problems new migrants face in gaining access to employment and to explore the emergence, maintenance of and challenges to particular gendered divisions of productive and reproductive work (childcare and household chores) among Indian professionally qualified immigrant men and women So far, in the first empirical chapter, Chapter 4, I have explored how Indian hi-tech immigrants use conversion tactics to overcome labour market disadvantages to enter the technology labour market in the Waterloo Region, a growing technological cluster, located in Ontario, Canada's most populous province, receiving the highest number of immigrants in any given year. In the second empirical chapter, Chapter 5, I showed how this group of Indian technology professionals navigate a racialised technology labour market. I drew on technology companies' particular interpretations of a family-friendly organisational culture as well as technology workers' experiences of negotiating non-work commitments with their employers, concluding that technology companies continue to promote the ideal disembodied worker with little or no familial obligations.

In this final empirical chapter, I build on the findings from the previous two empirical chapters, to explore how Indian families negotiate and re-negotiate their household responsibilities when undertaking the dual transitions of settlement and parenthood in a new host culture and society. Drawing specifically on the interviews I conducted with twenty-one professional migrant couples of Indian-origin (17 couples with children and 4 couples without), I seek to develop a narrative based on the microcosm of gendered negotiations that are undertaken by individuals, spouses, employers, transnational families and welfare state provisions for reproductive work, situating Indian households in a particular location within the Canadian economy and society. In this chapter, I provide some answers to the research questions that I set out in Chapter 1. They were as follows: How do professional migrant couples of Indian-origin make the decision to migrate, enter the labour market and at the same time manage their responsibilities to their spouses and children? What gendered divisions of paid and unpaid work in the home emerge in such migrant households? What is the role of the welfare state and intergenerational transnational relationships in assisting newcomer families with reproductive work as both parents enter the labour market?

The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, I investigate how professional couples make the decision to migrate. I have deliberately left this discussion to the final empirical chapter. Although this might seem paradoxical, I want to argue that the decision to migrate is not based on the rational calculation by an individual migrant based on their single career. On the contrary, decisions are in fact more complex and nuanced, involving several family and household members and so justifying the decision to turn to the migration decision at the end of the argument. In the second section, I explore the gendered division of childcare among professional migrant couples, especially after losing extended family

support and paid help, which were both more readily available and affordable in India than they are in Canada. In the third section, I investigate how migrant Indian families negotiate household work, investigating in particular the ways in which both men's and women's involvement in housework has adjusted to respond to changing socio-economic and socio-cultural circumstances after moving to Canada. In the concluding section, I use Daly and Lewis' (2000) concept of social care to argue that the structure and organisation of the welfare state needs to take into consideration the particular circumstances of transnational migrants to better provide support for the welfare of their new citizens.

Negotiating productive and reproductive work: (Re)producing women's disadvantage

As women started to enter the workforce in greater numbers since the 1960s, caring emerged as a focus of feminist research across most of Europe and North America in the 1970s and early 1980s (Angrist, Lave and Mickelsen, 1976; Graham, 1991; 1993). Marxist feminists at the time provided a materialist account of women's oppression based on their responsibility for domestic work (Fee, 1976; Gramm, 1974; Himmelweit and Mohun, 1977; Howell, 1975; Secombe, 1974). They argued that under a capitalist mode of production, domestic work in individual households remained an important part of the reproduction and maintenance of labour power; however, the socialisation of childcare and housework was not seen as profitable. Women were tied to reproduction in the domestic sphere through marriage and through the ties of 'love and affection' and male workers specifically benefited from women's role in the home (Gardiner, 1975: 49).

Feminist scholars established gender as the dominant system of social relations, shaping the organisation of both productive and reproductive work (Graham, 1991). Resourcing care through mainly informal means and through relations of marriage and kinship reproduced women's disadvantaged position within marriage, the labour market and the social security system. This informal organisation of care reinforced a gendered division of labour, (re)producing and maintaining women's disproportionate responsibility for the day-to-day work of keeping families going (Graham, 1993; Hawkins et al., 1993; 1994; Tuominen, 1994). These early studies did not distinguish between the experiences of migrant women who might not have the same level of access to the already limited forms of public and private support for reproductive work when entering a new host country, nor may they be able to draw on the support of family members, as typically, they remain in the home society.

The earliest studies of the intersection of gender, migration and caring/motherhood emerged in the 1980s, through to the 1990s, focussing primarily on the experiences of Jewish, Italian (Foner, 1998; 1999), Latin American (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992), Caribbean (Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991; Pessar, 1984; 1995) and Asian (Kibria, 1993; Lim, 1997; Min, 1992; Min and Foner, 1998) immigrant working mothers in the United States. A common observation in all these studies on immigrant families in North America is that men's declining contributions to the family economy after migrating to a new host country constructed a need for wives, who did not engage in labour markets in their home countries, to participate in waged work out of economic necessity. Sociologist Nancy Foner (1998) argued that migration changes women's status in complex and contradictory ways – for better and for worse.

Women's incorporation into the workforce enhances their sense of economic independence with their regular access to wages (Pessar, 1984; 1995), improving their position in the household and broadening their social horizons (Glenn et al., 1994; Hill

Collins, 1994). Childcare constraints however often limit women to low-paid jobs with flexible schedules, preserving, and in some ways intensifying, gendered divisions of childcare and housework (Foner, 1998; 1999; Grahame, 2003; Greenlees and Saenz, 1999; Min 1992; Moon, 2003). Studies on Asian middle-class professional migrant women in the U.S. found that wives continue to cope with the double burden of combining waged and reproductive work, doing a greater share of both childcare and housework (Min, 1992; Min and Foner, 1998; Moon, 2003).

Haddad and Lam's (1988; 1994) pioneering study of immigrant families in the Canadian context found that changes in domestic negotiations of family work are attributable to a large extent to the new socio-economic reality in Canada. They focussed primarily on men's involvement and identified three ideal types. The first type, the traditionalists, who refuse to increase their involvement in housework to compensate for their spouses' decrease in time available for family chores due to her participation in paid employment. Men rationalised their non-responsiveness (insensitivity) by qualifying such work as "women's work" and also maintaining that their wives' participation in paid work was simply a temporary measure until they themselves get better paying jobs. Moreover, they insisted that a sex-specific division of labour was natural and more efficient. The second ideal type, the situationalists, did a minimal amount of domestic labour especially as they felt that they had limited choice in the matter, given the "situational constraints" placed by their wives' participation in the workforce. The third group, "adaptors" or "prioritisers", felt that they were "forced" to do housework work because of the presence of pre-schoolers. They contributed primarily to work that could otherwise not wait for their full-time employed wives, such as feeding and nurturing children and cooking for themselves and their children.

Over two decades after her initial contributions to Marxist feminist debates about domestic labour, Jean Gardiner (1997) distinguished between aspects of domestic labour, in particular between childcare and housework. She argued that technological improvements have reduced the amount of labour needed for certain aspects of domestic labour, in particular, household chores such as cooking and cleaning. Similar improvements, however, were not possible in the parts of domestic labour that involve emotional care of others: here technological innovation was almost impossible. Gardiner (1997) insisted that mothers of small children may choose to be at home rather than participate in paid work because of the emotional needs of children – and as a consequence they probably do more housework. Their choices are determined by the personal nature of care rather than by the demands of mundane, routine and impersonal housework, which is made easier through technological improvements and also is fairly easy to allocate to paid help.

In this chapter, I investigate how professionally qualified men and women of Indian-origin from middle-class backgrounds reproduce their professional lives after migrating to a new host country, facing the new socio-economic reality in Canada (Haddad and Lam, 1988; 1994). A significant difference from migrant women in the earlier studies in the American context is that Indian women in my study participated in productive work prior to their migration to Canada. Whilst in India, both husband and wife in the professional couples whom I interviewed had worked full time, sharing their caring duties with extended family members, who in general lived in the same household. All twenty-one families also employed paid help to undertake household work: paid help, which in India was both easily accessible and affordable. In this chapter, I explore how these professional couples reproduce and maintain their professional working lives in Canada, while navigating a racialised and gendered labour market. I am particularly interested in investigating how they re-negotiate their

caring duties and household work after losing the support of extended family and access to affordable paid help with childcare and housework. I start my assessment of their changing lives in Canada with an analysis how these economic migrants made the decision to move.

Beyond *homo economicus*: Deciding to move to Canada

In general, migration scholars answering the questions about why and how people move rely on a complex mix of push/pull factors in the home/host countries. My interviews with newcomer families of Indian-origin similarly revealed a complex combination of factors, contributing to their decision to leave India, their motivations to move to Canada and their decision to stay in the Waterloo Region. Contemporary research by social scientists examining migrants' decision to move, however, portrays migrants as strategic actors who act beyond their self-interest and in accordance with the migratory and life course trajectories of their immediate and often transnational family members (Ley and Kobayashi, 2005; Ong, 1999; Ong and Nonini, 1997; Silvey and Olson, 2006), which means that researchers must look beyond an individual migrant.

Despite difficulties in entering the labour market due to the 'lack of Canadian experience' barrier that I analysed in Chapter 4, and settling in a new host culture, for most migrants in this research, the decision to remain in Canada extended beyond the economic considerations and career trajectories of the individual who applied as the principal applicant. In nineteen out of the twenty-one families, men applied under the Points System with their skilled spouses and children as dependents. Among these newcomers, the range of reasons that they gave me for their motivations for moving to Canada included better educational and employment opportunities (e.g. globally

recognised degrees, career advancement, higher levels of income, savings potential), improved lifestyles, enhanced welfare state benefits (universal healthcare, spouse/child benefits, etc), better environmental conditions (reduced air and noise pollution, overcrowding, etc), escaping conditions of political corruption and moving away from living in joint families.

Akash and Arpita Ghosh, for example, met in India while completing their Bachelor's degrees in Computer Engineering at Jadavpur University in Kolkata, India. After getting married, they both completed Master's degrees in similar fields and held successful careers working in managerial positions in India's technology industries. Their decision to move to Canada went beyond their individual aspirations to advance their careers in the West. Akash talked about his apprehension in making the decision to move to Canada. He said, "absolutely leaving the country [India], coming into a country where you don't know too much, managing everything by yourself […] definitely one of the toughest decision we took so far in our lives. We were young and we wanted to get out and make our family ourselves and working together in one place with a comfortable living."

In my interview with Arpita, she explained the difficulties of living in a joint family while maintaining her commitment to her professional life. She talked specifically about her strained relationship with her in-laws who felt that her long working hours in the office were interfering with her maternal role and her duties and responsibilities to her family. Despite, the help they both received from having grandparents in the house to share caring duties, they both decided jointly to move to Canada to build their own family and raise their son.

> [We moved] definitely because of our family. When we were both in India I was living with my in-laws. When my son was born I used to work and I would come late around 9pm. I had nannies because in India it is

> cheap. Everyday I had problems with something with the kid and I couldn't bear it. When I work ten to twelve hours and I come back home I need some peace. That part was missing and Akash was working hard at the time and he had no weekends. We lived in the same house and we didn't meet each other.

Sanjay and Anita Patel arrived in Toronto in 2003 with their daughter Jasmine. After completing his Chartered Accountancy (CA) qualifications in India, Sanjay worked as a mid-level manager for a multinational company in New Delhi. Anita, after completing her Bachelor's in Computer Sciences, had also worked in India as a systems analyst in a global technology company. Their decision to move and stay in Canada can be explained using a slightly different combination of factors. Sanjay applied for Canadian immigration in order to improve career opportunities for him and Anita and also to provide better educational opportunities for their daughter Jasmine. On arriving in Canada, they both experienced difficulties in entering the labour market and considered returning to India, especially as they both could use their short work experience in Canada to improve their previous occupational position in India. In 2005, however, they abandoned any thoughts of return migration, after the birth of their younger daughter, Aaliya. Sanjay and Anita took the decision to stay in Canada because they would not receive any welfare state support in India for Aaliya, who needs specialised medical attention due to her developmental difficulties since birth. They would not be able to afford Aaliya's specialised care in India because of its relatively underdeveloped welfare state and expensive privatised medical system. Sanjay recounted, "I think that it was not a really conscious decision, sometimes I think it was out of necessity."

The experiences of the two newcomer families presented above makes it clear that the decision to migrate is part of carefully deliberated and sequenced set of decisions, taking into consideration the life course trajectories of all family members,

especially the development and well-being of children. Although economic considerations alone did not explain newcomer families' decision to move to Canada, on arriving in Canada, both adults in newcomer families hoped to advance their careers but they soon experienced difficulties in entering the labour market, as I illustrated in Chapter 4. Moreover, the socio-economic circumstances in Canada required both adults in the family to contribute to the family economy to afford the higher costs of living as compared to India. Shashi Roy (male, computer programmer, arrived in 2006, married to Neena with a daughter) said:

> Within the Canadian socio-economic system I think both jobs are equally important. I think it is mutually complementary to each other. Here we don't feel fully confident of what is going to happen in the future. There is a level of uncertainty here so working for both of us becomes important.

Although all the Indian professional migrants had similar levels of educational attainment and work experience (see Appendix 3), the interviews conducted with them revealed gendered differences in men and women's engagement with paid work in Canada. In the next section, I explain how these differences emerged as a result of joint decision-making.

One person kept sacrificing

In their study of middle-class, dual-earner couples, Becker and Moen (1999) found that couples often choose to restructure their commitment to paid work over their life by negotiating and placing limits on partners' career progression. They identified two typologies of what they called scaling-back strategies. The first strategy was

maintaining a one-career - one-job marriage. The second strategy involved a more complex system of trade-off, readjusting the one-job - one-career towards a two-career marriage by scaling back when needed and managing over the life course to invest in two careers at different life stages. Despite the premise of egalitarian ideologies and a companionate model of marriage, Moen and Yu (2000) found that these scaling-back strategies often maintained conventional gendered roles. The one-career, one-job model usually follows conventional gender roles in that men retain the career focus and women invest more time in the domestic sphere. In the two-career strategy, women tend to scale back during the early child rearing phase, resulting in large gaps in their labour market participation. These gaps eventually affect their occupational outcomes, leaving them with no option but to continue to scale back disproportionately in order to balance work and family – constructed as a women's issue.

In adapting Moen and Yu's (2000) typologies, I was particularly interested in seeing how Indian professional couples, experiencing barriers to labour market entry and difficulties in accessing and affording childcare, negotiated the scaling-back of their involvement in paid work. Here, the majority of newcomer families adopted Moen and Yu's (2000) second scaling-back strategy. Their negotiations mirrored traditional gender roles, as women were more likely to assume primary care responsibilities, freeing up their male partners' to pursue fulltime work and study in order to overcome the 'lack of Canadian experience' barrier (explained in Chapter 4).

Typically, on arrival in Canada, both men and women made attempts to enter the labour market, eventually encountering two primary constraints: first, barriers to labour market entry and secondly, the lack of available and affordable childcare, allowing both parents to pursue full time work or study, especially, as I have demonstrated earlier, the majority of participants undergo some form of retraining after arriving in Canada. Women were more likely to be the first to opt out of the workforce

and for longer periods, prioritising the careers of their male partners, and therefore, assuming primary responsibilities for childcare and housework. Most newcomer families initially adopted this male breadwinner – female caregiver model or in some cases one-career – one-job strategy, as some women worked or volunteered part-time. These negotiations however were dynamic and the majority of families aspired towards a two-career marriage. Shalini Mishra described her experience.

> If you come as an immigrant both husband and wife should get into a city where they both can find a job of their qualification. Sometimes I ended up in a good job and he didn't and sometimes he ended up in a good job I didn't. Some one kept sacrificing and finally I think it takes a while and now both of us are in jobs as per what we need.

Both men and women rationalised the gendered pattern of such scaling-back strategies using men's greater economic contribution to family resources and expenses, ranging from 50 to 70 percent of the total family income. Men also argued that women were naturally better suited to perform caring duties and housework more efficiently and are also more likely to be successful at combining work and family demands (the 'superwoman' image resurfaces). Once again, 'nature' works to the benefit of men. Mehrotra and Calasanti (2010), in their study of Indian immigrant families in the US, found that relocation into a new culture makes ethnic identity salient for migrants as they perform work, reinforcing gender hierarchies within families. Feminist scholars emphasise the role of the family as an important source of material and emotional support in a new environment (Espiritu, 1999; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992; Kibria, 1993) – a source of strength and oppression. Mehrotra and Calasanti (2010) found that men continued to talk about domestic work as primarily women's responsibility.

Although the newcomer families seemed to aspire to a gender-divided breadwinner marriage and eventually a two-career marriage, women continued to be the ones making greater sacrifices. Rishi Mehta (male, computer engineer, arrived in 2007, married to Jyoti with one daughter) explained that the decision to adopt a one-career - one-job strategy was mutually beneficial to all members of his family, maintaining the conventional gendered division of familial roles. Rishi argued that Jyoti is better suited to provide a stable home environment necessary for their daughter's welfare during the difficult process of settling in a new country. He does, to some extent, demonstrate the premise of a companionate model of marriage, acknowledging the difficulties in settling in a new country and explaining this gendered negotiation is biased towards his interests.

> I give equal importance to my wife's job. The only thing is that she has to find a job every time I make move. I thought that one person can have a job with a good company so there is little bit of stability. There is a chance of more stability if one person is earning and the other person can adjust. She can also spend more time with my daughter in case if there is a problem, she can stay at home for some time. I know this is really hard on my wife because every time I get a transfer she has to look for a job.

Akash Ghosh (male computer engineer, arrived in 2003, married to Arpita with one son) rationalises the scaling-back strategies and particular gendered division of paid work in his family by speculating about Arpita's self-expectations of motherhood.

> Basically if something goes wrong or something happened and if we have to chose who will continue the job then probably I will decide to continue because I cannot do everything my wife can like managing the home and kid. Probably she is more comfortable doing that.

There was only one exception to this pattern out of all twenty-one families that I interviewed. Although Dev and Shalini, whose decisions were described at the start of this chapter, also used a similar trade-off in scaling-back strategies, in a reverse of the typical gendered pattern of the one-job – one-career marriage, Dev assumes the role of primary caregiver. It is interesting to note that in this family the economic contribution of the female partner outweighed the contribution of her spouse, adhering to a gender-split breadwinner and male caregiver model.

Added challenges to performing their parental role

All participants agreed that becoming a parent meant that all decisions regarding migration and paid work, as well as their contribution to their roles in the family, were taken jointly with their spouses, revolving around their children's growth, health, development, education and future. Aisha Agarwal (female, software analyst, arrived in 2004, married to Karan with one son) said, "everything has changed a lot because earlier we could do any job any time of the day. Now every decision around the house is now about him." Dev Mishra recounted, "oh yes [laughing] the housework has changed quite a bit actually. We became more responsible for things, which you would have never done before when you were single. I was not that responsible before he was born."

As I noted earlier in Chapter 4, several participants had to undergo expensive and time-consuming accreditation processes and retraining to improve their chances of success in entering the Canadian workforce. Even with accredited foreign qualifications, the majority of participants found low-level, entry-level, technical jobs, contributing to their occupational downward mobility and class dislocation (Creese and Wiebe, 2009). In the interviews, a few participants spoke about how parenting

responsibilities placed time constraints on their personal development. These constraints were particularly acute for newcomers already experiencing difficulties in entering the technology labour market. Neena Roy (female, software developer, arrived in 2006, married to Shashi with one daughter) described her experience of working in the technology sector:

> When were not parents we could spend a lot more time on our development and on our studies. I mean I am in a field where you need to spend a lot of time studying and keep updated with different skills. Once I became a parent the more priority comes on her development, her studies, her requirements, giving her some time.

When applying scaling-back strategies in situations where the cost of childcare exceeded the income or economic contribution of an additional income-earning adult, the individual working a survival job would forgo their labour market position (and also their opportunity to get Canadian work experience) to assume full time caring responsibilities - a common cost and benefit analysis used by participants. Female respondents were disproportionately found in survival and volunteer jobs, especially as they prioritised the careers of their spouse, at least when first entering the workforce. Women's incomes often were not sufficient to fund the childcare, especially for families with pre-school aged children. Men's income was used towards all other expenses in the family. In such situations, women had a tendency to opt out of the labour market and undertake primary responsibility for domestic labour.

Venkat and Alka are both qualified IT and Computer engineers respectively with similar levels of educational attainment and previous work experience. After arriving in Toronto in 2008 with their sons (aged 3 years and 2 years at the time) both attempted to enter Canada's growing technology labour market, managing to secure low-paid, entry-level, technical positions in different technology companies. Alka's job,

however, required a longer and more expensive commute, in addition to the fees for their sons' daycare. She said,

> I thought it will be easy as we can leave children in daycare and start working. I started searching for jobs and I got one also but it was in North York and I had to get a bus and go. I went there one day and I dropped them in daycare and after the first day I left the job because I could not do all the travelling. I can't do that to the children. I love working and since my graduation I was working all the time. I have to support my son's activities.

Venkat used any free time from his work to study full time in order to acquire additional certifications needed to compete for an internal company promotion to a managerial position. He rationalised his sense of guilt for not being able to spend enough time with his children by convincing himself that his hard work and long hours studying are for their longer-term benefit.

> Most of the time when I come back from work I feel completely off. When studying right after the kids will be really ignored. I feel a bit guilty sometimes when they watch cartoons and play video games. I should take them out. I can't refuse them though because I suffered a lot as a kid. I didn't even have a cycle and I don't want my kids to have that issue. If they go to school and someone says 'why don't you have this?' I don't want them to go through that.

After completing his certifications Venkat managed to find a managerial position in the largest technology company in the Waterloo Region, significantly increasing his annual income. Alka resumed her job search, with her previous experience in IT and re-training in company specific certifications similar to Venkat, she quickly found full-time work in the same company. Venkat's rise in pay and her own income placed them in a better economic position to afford unregulated home-based care for their sons, as they

both continued to work and study fulltime, staying updated in a constantly changing technology field.

Managing the second shift by putting together a childcare jigsaw

In the previous section, I described the scaling-back strategies used by professional migrant families to facilitate their participation in paid work, demonstrating how both men and women jointly take decisions that mirror conventional gender roles and ideologies. All newcomer families were coping with the same dilemma: attempting to overcome barriers to entry into the Canadian workforce, compounded by growing financial pressures from the rise in costs of living in Canada compared to India. Both parents had to work full time or retrain for the Canadian labour market, while simultaneously organising and managing non-parental arrangements for their young children.

Feminist scholars analysing the relation between gender, migration and mothering found that responsibilities for childcare constrain women's engagement in productive work to a greater extent than is the case for their male partners: limiting them to low-paid jobs with flexible schedules (Espiritu, 1997; 1999; Foner, 1998; 1999; Min, 1992; Min and Foner, 1998; Pessar, 1984; 1995). In these earlier studies on Jewish, Italian, Dominican, Korean and Vietnamese immigrant working mothers in the United States, researchers found that women retain primary responsibility for juggling shifts and most women use relatives, babysitters and to a much lesser extent state-provided or market daycare places (Foner, 1998; Kibria, 1993; Lim, 1997; Min 1992; Pessar, 1995). Angrist, Lave and Mickelsen (1976) found that professional women

primarily used paid help both inside and outside the home to manage their childcare responsibilities.

These studies focused primarily on women, who prior to migration, did not engage in paid work or contribute to the family economy and began working in the new host country out of economic necessity. Here, my focus is on women who had professional working lives prior to migrating to Canada and on arriving also look to advance their careers. Unlike the professional non-migrant women in Angrist, Lave and Mickelsen's (1976) study, discussed earlier in the chapter, the Indian professional migrant women that I interviewed did not only want to work out of preference but also out of economic necessity and the new socio-economic reality in Canada (Haddad and Lam, 1988; 1994). As I mentioned earlier, in India, the working parents in the study shared their childcare duties with extended family members such as grandparents, while living in joint families or relied on other female relatives living in the same city, combined with paid help with housework in the home.

In Canada, the Indian immigrant families used different combinations of four main strategies to coordinate their engagements at work and their responsibilities in the home over their time in Canada. First, some families used flexible working practices to work opposite shifts at work and home, ensuring that any non-work or free time is used to provide unpaid childcare in the home. Secondly, a small number of families used government-sponsored, not-for-profit or for-profit centre-based childcare spaces. Thirdly, a few participating families drew on their transnational relationships and arranged intergenerational transnational care, sending children to live with their grandparents in India or 'importing' their elderly parents to care for their children in Canada on a visitor or tourist visa. The fourth and most common childcare arrangement was the use of unregulated home-based care.

I made two observations about the childcare arrangements of the seventeen households in the study. First, in all households except one, women continue to undertake the role of organiser and manager, bearing the 'triple burden' of worker, manager of the multiple demands of all members of the family and primary care provider (Skinner, 2005). Secondly, immigrant families' childcare arrangements are flexible and open to negotiation and re-evaluation over time, changing in relation to different combinations of internal and external constraints. These constraints included the levels of actual and potential family income, gender ideologies of both adults in the family, the lack of coordinated support from partners, stated preferences to 'be there' for their children (generally expressed by women), intergenerational transnational relationships and the age of the children, especially as the cost and hours of non-parental care needed is indirectly proportional to the age of the child. All families relied on a web of social networks and multiple forms of care to complement inadequate market-based provision (as a result of challenges of affordability, accessibility and conflicts between work hours and hours of operations of centres). These constraints contributed to the construction of a complex 'childcare jigsaw' (a term borrowed from Skinner (2005). In this section of the chapter, I explore the particular childcare jigsaws of these newcomer families, employing multiple childcare arrangements over time and in some instances at the same time in order to meet their families' needs.

'Family comes first': juggling opposite shifts at work and home

Almost all participants after moving to Canada worked opposite shifts in paid work to benefit from their partners' free time for childcare. Such arrangements were most likely to be used by families immediately on arriving, as they struggled to enter the labour

market. Families adopted a one-career – one-job strategy. Although both men and women worked the same numbers of hours in a given work day, women were more likely to structure their shifts at work around their male partners' working times. This meant that mothers were also more likely to negotiate with their employers and use flextime provisions to work atypical hours (early mornings and late evening and night shifts) and work from home. Jyoti Mehta arrived with her husband Rishi and their daughter in 2007. She works as a certified software tester in a technology company in the Waterloo Region. She explained how she and Rishi negotiated flexitime with their respective employers to manage their childcare responsibilities, by doing opposite shifts at work and at home.

> What I do is because I have to commute more of a distance then my husband, he takes the morning part. He drops off my daughter in school and takes care of everything breakfast and all, and I go early to work so I can come back early and pick up my daughter. Then he can stay late in the evening. I go at 8am and leave by 4.30pm to pick her up at 5pm or 5.30pm. In the late evenings I work from home.

Arpita Ghosh (female, systems engineer) moved to Toronto in 2001 and immediately decided to opt out of the workforce, giving her husband Akash, the opportunity to re-certify in Canada, while she assumed all responsibilities for her son and their home. After Akash completed his re-training, she also decided to re-train in Canada to improve her chances of entering the Canadian workforce. Despite her qualifications and work experience as an electrical engineer in India, she thought that re-qualifying to work in the IT sector might give her a competitive edge and better job opportunities in Canada. During her two-year re-qualification process, she coordinated her classes to fit with Akash's work hours in order to ensure that one of them was always available to care for their son, especially since the costs of re-training for both

of them meant that they could not afford to purchase childcare. Arpita explained this complicated arrangement:

> I took a break from 2001 to 2006 but it was not a break. From 2001 to 2003 I took a complete break and from 2004 to 2006 I was doing my Master's in Concordia University in Montreal in Electronics and Computer Science so Electrical and Computer Engineering. I was studying full time. He was going to pre-school so my classes were in the evening and some projects in the morning. So mornings were fine because he was going to school and evenings my husband was taking care of him, so we were okay. In pre-kindergarten he went from 8.30am to 3pm to 5.30pm he was in extra-curricular activities. From 5pm to 9.30pm I was okay because Akash was home. I finished my master's in 2006. I was in my last semester before I joined Bombardia.

As I argued earlier, women were more likely to be more spatially and temporally constrained by such childcare arrangements than their male partners. Neena rationalised this by drawing on her acceptance of her maternal role and its responsibilities.

> I can work flexible hours and sometimes if my daughter isn't well or hasn't gone to school then I will work from home. Being a mother I would always like to work at a comfortable distance where probably I don't have to travel more than half an hour or maximum 40 minutes. If anything happens it takes a lot more time for me to get back to her.

This strategy of juggling shifts was not a long-term alternative: most families used it at some point after moving to Canada only to transition into other care arrangements. Participants described the challenge in carefully balancing the different family schedules, assigning every hour of the day between work, home and travelling to one or other parent. They expressed feelings of guilt, dissatisfaction, stress and exhaustion at home and at work contributing to the expansion of what Arlie Hochschild (1997) called the *third shift*. Hochschild distinguished between three different shifts

negotiated by income-earning adults in dual-earner families. The first shift at the workplace increasingly demands more time commitments from workers. The second shift at home as a result becomes hurried. The third shift is located somewhere between noticing, understanding and coping with the emotional consequences of the compressed second shift.

Respondents often spoke of the working week as non-negotiable and weekends as more flexible, giving them the extra hours they need to work overtime in order to meet urgent project deadlines and also compensate for the time not spent with the family during the working week. Viren Kapoor (male, computer engineer, arrived in 2005, married to Sadhna with two daughters) describes this trade-off between work and home and also managing the competing demands and expectations from both spheres within a finite number of hours in the day.

> The conflict is that in any industry you have to rise and to be successful you have to work more hours. If you want to work more hours, you have to put in more energy and there is a limited 24 hours right, so you have to take that hours from somewhere and somewhere is from your house.

Namita Sharma (female, systems analyst, arrived in 2006, married to Yash with one daughter) said that these well-intentioned, careful and deliberate negotiations begin to feel routine. She talked about the 'mechanical' functioning of her family as they all made efforts to keep to time-allocated social interactions, ensuring there is no wasted time. At the same time, she also described a sense of loss in her family's efficient functioning. In particular, she expressed her feelings of guilt and regret over neglecting her daughter's needs and not fulfilling her maternal responsibilities. In the quote below, she talks about the intensification of the third shift (Hochschild, 1997) and also that the only way she could contribute effectively to her family's life, is by leaving work behind.

> Once I come back home I need to forget about work and that way I contribute more to family life. All weekdays are mostly mechanical. Go to work, come back cook, eat and sleep. I really want to spend more time with my daughter, teaching her something. Only weekends I spend with her. Now I just buy books and ask her to do and schedule and plan something and ask her to do. I am not getting time to correct the things she is doing.

Indian professional women were more likely to mention such feelings of guilt, dissatisfaction and regret in their descriptions of managing their third shift (also described by other researchers of work-life conflict including Cuddy, Fiske and Glick, (2004); Elvin-Nowak, (1999) and Gilbert et al. (1991)). In the narrative about Dev and Shalini at the start of the chapter, Shalini compares the time that Dev is able to spend with their son Arnav as an indication of her inability to perform her role as mother to her satisfaction. Here, she explains her efforts to compensate by spending time with Arnav during the occasional commuting between his daycares and home, especially as Dev takes care of pick-up and drop-offs because his working hours are better suited to Arnav's daycare timings. Shalini also talks about the importance of the weekend to compensate for the time she loses with Arnav during the working week.

> Weekdays we never do anything other than work. I leave early I get to work around 6.30am and some days Dev picks up our son but some days he cannot so those days I have to get my son. I leave early from my work so around 5pm. So I would work from 6.30am in the morning till 5pm in the evening. Weekends I think we really enjoy. There are many times I have to work on weekends but I just manage. I wake up early and do it before my son wakes up. I work a couple of hours after he goes to bed or Dev takes him to the park. So I never work when my son is with me so I can spend time with the family. Family comes first, after all we are earning for them.

'I don't know how people accepted it'

At the time of the interviews, four newcomer families used centre-based daycare spaces as their primary childcare arrangement (one for-profit and the other not-for-profit). This fits with the findings of earlier studies on immigrant working mothers' negotiations of their caring duties; however, these studies provided little explanation for the relatively low level of utilisation of daycare centres (Foner, 1998). In all the interviews I conducted with immigrant families of Indian-origin, the consensus among all participants was that either a not-for-profit or government-sponsored childcare centre is their preferred option. This option, however, presented three main challenges: accessibility due to long waiting lists, affordability as most of the families were not eligible for needs-based subsidies and difficulties in negotiating the centres' hours of operation with the working times of both parents.

Shalini was intent on finding a government-sponsored or not-for-profit daycare for her son for two reasons: because of the better quality of early childhood education (especially since she was unable to spend the time herself) and also to avoid the exorbitant fees charged by for-profit providers. She expressed her frustration with the search to find an available and affordable option.

> You have to book four to five months ahead of time. You have to pay $1 for every minute that you are late and I pay everyday when I pick up my son. We have to pay this extra so almost $1050 for daycare; so much of my salary goes there. I don't know how people accepted it so many years and never worked out a plan. I would certainly like to work out a plan with my son growing up something that is flexible for working parents.

Mahesh Balan (male, computer engineer, arrived in 2003, married to Shruthi) also found himself in a similar position when arranging care for his daughter in order to

replace the help he was getting from visiting family members (a childcare arrangement that I will discuss in the next sub-section). Both he and Shruthi worked in the same technology company and had very unpredictable working times as a result of the project-based nature of their work, requiring them to be available to work on an as-needed basis. They found it increasingly difficult to negotiate their unpredictable work hours with the fixed hours of operation of the majority of daycare centres. At the time of our interview, Mahesh was in the process of negotiating an appropriate flexitime schedule with his manager to complement his daughter's daycare timings.

> We have to leave home at 7.30am and leave her at daycare at 8am and when we reach back it will be 8.30am and so then to pick up my daughter and my wife it will be around 6pm. So if the daycare does not allow long hours then I will have to come at 5pm and pick up my kid and compensate lost work hours in the weekend.

Despite the careful and deliberate attempts made by immigrant professional couples to manage their multiple role demands, the majority of participants and more so women, described a vicious cycle guilt and dissatisfaction. Participants felt that they were paying financial and emotional costs for 'choosing' to work fulltime and having young families. Namita Sharma (female, systems analyst, arrived in 2006, married to Yash with one daughter) found that despite the high costs, daycare arrangements were still unsatisfactory; she still could not 'be there' for her daughter. She compared this to her childcare arrangements in India where she was able to provide affordable, reliable and safe care in a familiar and comfortable environment for her daughter, using the support of her extended family other social networks (especially friends and neighbours).

> Here expenses are very high and I cannot save anything working here. I have to pay for my daughter's daycare and other things. It is more costly here. In India when I worked I had an elderly woman staying with me and taking care of my baby. I felt much safer going to work but here I have to put my daughter in someone else's hand. It is not like having a person at home.

Newcomer families using the next childcare arrangement to some extent attempt to replicate or regain such forms of family and social support by drawing on intergenerational transnational relationships.

'They cannot live here for longer than six months': drawing on transnational relationships

As I have argued earlier in this and previous chapters, a significant consequence of migrating to Canada for the newcomer families is the loss of employment and social networks. Over the last decade or so, there has been a growing body of research on how individuals who lead transnational lives negotiate their 'normative obligation' of care for children and the elderly (Baldassar, 2007; Denev, 2009, Phua and Kaufman, 2008; Treas and Mazumdar, 2004). Migrant families are reconfigured in different ways, involving complex webs of relationships across generations, locations and transnational family members at different stages of the life course (Ryan et al., 2009). Families, especially with the help of new communication technologies, develop new forms of support and also continue to sustain bonds of emotion across national borders (Baldassar, 2007).

Scholars have shown how migrant professional elites as well as low-income groups in different ethnic communities meet childcare needs through the use of intergenerational transnational relationships (Baldassar et al., 2007; Bryceson and Vuorela, 2002; Lie, 2010; Parrenas 2005). Financial support in the form of remittances

has long been identified as a key motivation for migration and also as a source of support exchanged by transnational families. Baldassar (2007) also adds practical support (babysitting, gardening, shopping and running errands), personal support (child and elder care) and emotional support. These more fluid forms of support are often dependent on capacity or ability, obligation expressed in terms of cultural expectation and negotiated commitments based on family relationships and migration histories. The specific combination of these factors explains the experiences of individual migrants and their families over their life course (Baldassar, 2007).

One form of practical and personal support that is particularly significant for new migrant families is the importing of elderly parents to provide care for their grandchildren and also to play a part in maintaining and transmitting cultural capital (Denev, 2009; Landolt and Da, 2005; Plaza 2000). Foreign-born grandparents play an important role in instructing their grandchildren in religious, cultural and family values, promoting bilingualism and introducing them to extended family members. Grandparents co-residing with their grandchildren often undertake substantial caring and domestic responsibilities (Phua and Kaufman, 2008). Transnational families strategically maximise resources and the temporariness of tourist visas. Treas (2008) found that despite the temporary nature of these arrangements, older visitors often have designated bedrooms and stay till the last day of a six-month visa. Moreover, the hallmark for elderly newcomers has become family interdependence rather than old age dependence; however they are sometimes susceptible to depression, loneliness and mental distress as a result of spending most of their time at home (Treas, 2008). Such transnational, globalised and flexible families who both maintain a sense of family connections across national borders and provide transnational intergenerational support are becoming increasingly prevalent in Canada (Mujahid et al., 2011).

At the time of the interviews, four out of seventeen households used such forms of intergenerational transnational care arrangements. Two of the families sent their children to India to live with their grandparents and extended family and two families arranged for their parents and in-laws to visit Canada on a visitor or a tourist visa. In all four families, grandparents assumed full time caring duties for their grandchildren and also for the majority of household chores, as both parents studied and worked full time in order to improve their competitive edge in Canada's demanding labour markets. The main advantage of these arrangements is that parents and particularly mothers could to some extent assuage their guilt and disappointment for not 'being there' for their children, especially since their children would be with family members at home as opposed to daycares, being taken care of by strangers in an unfamiliar environment. This allowed them to advance their careers in Canada without incurring the same level of financial costs as they would if they had to pay for childcare that is not as readily available through local market-based or welfare state provisions. The assessment of emotional costs incurred by families was a little more complex.

Anita was one of the mothers relying on intergenerational transnational family care. On arriving in Canada, Anita decided to opt out of the labour market (although she continued to work full-time in India until the day she left) to take care of her older daughter Jasmine. Sanjay's poorly paid job did not cover the family expenses and so she decided to start a part-time, low-paid survival job to contribute to the family economy. Both anticipated that this would be a temporary arrangement as they were expecting an addition to the family. Anita was not eligible for any employment insurance or maternity leave and Sanjay continued to struggle in the labour market, contributing to growing financial pressures on the family. Anita explained:

> While he was in Bombay he had visited sixteen countries. Because he had international experience we thought, it would be easy to find a good job. He had completed four-levels of CGA and his CPA from the U.S […] I did not want him to go for a labour job.

After about three months in an unsuccessful job, Anita convinced Sanjay to work part-time and study to gain Canada-specific qualifications while she found a full time position in shipping and receiving for UPS (despite holding a Master's degree and with at least five years of work experience). With both of them working and studying full time, it became increasingly difficult to ensure that there was always someone at home to care for both children. Also, their combined incomes were not enough to keep Jasmine in daycare, especially since they were already using a significant portion of their incomes for their younger daughter's special needs daycare space. Anita asked her father-in-law to visit for a few months and then decided it would be best for Jasmine to spend some time with her grandparents in India. They could give her the care she needed as they were both retired and missing their own children. Anita recounted: "my husband started working in July (2007) and I had to also keep my job, […] we called our father-in-law to take Jasmine with him so we could settle down."

During the seven months when Jasmine was in India, Anita secured a not-for-profit daycare space for her younger daughter while she and Sanjay both now worked full time – Anita completed her re-training in IT and found work as a software tester. Anita painfully recounted this period of separation and also her daughter's emotional detachment from her family in Canada and the long and emotional process of adjustment after Jasmine returned. Jasmine refused to recognise Sanjay and Anita as her parents and as Anita explained that she had to be reminded about her family. It was especially difficult for Anita when her daughter refused to communicate with her in Hindi. Anita and Sanjay are from different states in India with different official languages (Hindi in Uttar Pradesh and Gujrati in Gujrat). They decided that both

children should speak both languages. Jasmine, despite her fluency, would not speak Hindi to her mother, after living with her grandparents in Gujrat, whom she identified as her only family.

> My older daughter came back in March 2006. She was away for seven months. She was two years and two months when she left us. […] She didn't remember us, she thought her grandparents were her parents, we told her through photos and recordings. [*crying*] Because she stayed with her grandparents, she only spoke Gujrati, before that she spoke only Hindi. She would not respond if I didn't speak to her in Gujrati with her.

Ram and Madhoo opted for the reverse arrangement and replicated the care arrangements that they had in India in their home in Canada. They came to Canada in 2007 and similar to all the other couples to whom I spoke, they both sought jobs in Canada that were similar or at least comparable to positions they had held in India. Ram left his job as a project leader in India but was demoted to an entry-level, technical position in a technology company in Waterloo. Despite her extensive medical training in India, Madhoo found it difficult to enter Canada's health sector. She decided to undergo the difficult and expensive process of accreditation to Canadian standards but after six months and only half way through the process, she decided to switch career paths and venture into what she thought was a more highly demanded occupation: IT. She started a combination of courses to acquire company specific software certifications under Ram's guidance, preparing to work as a systems analyst and developer in the same company as him. After their daughter was born in 2008, Ram and Madhoo found it difficult to work and study full time but also could not afford infant daycare. Ram invited his parents to visit; however, the help they could provide was limited because of their visa restrictions. Madhoo then asked her parents to visit to help out for the next six months.

> My in-laws are taking care of her for three months. They may be ready to live for longer. The plan is to get them to help me out. They cannot live here for more than six months because they are here on a visitor pass. It was planned so that they take care of her during the day so we can both work/study and the baby is taken care of. After they leave, my parents will come to take care of her.

For the four couples who drew on their transnational relationships to organise childcare, these arrangements were contingent on the ability and willingness of elderly grandparents to care for their grandchildren, the histories and circumstances of migration, the extent to which parents 'kept in touch' with their extended family members in India and the migration restrictions placed by the Canadian government. Ram and Madhoo and Sanjay and Anita drew on their transnational lives to reconfigure their family and meet their childcare needs. While the options are to bring elderly parents on visit visas (restricted to six-month periods) to Canada or to send children to live with their grandparents in India, the respondents who used the latter strategy agreed that it entailed greater emotional costs. Similar to the care arrangements involving juggling opposite shifts at work and the home, such transnational care arrangements were always temporary and used primarily as a transitory arrangement before being able to afford locally available childcare.

'It is not really satisfactory': settling for unregulated, home-based care

I have argued earlier that childcare arrangements are dynamic and influenced by a variety of factors including, parents' employment status and combined incomes, their working hours, access to information about childcare options and also previous experiences with centres operating in the region, the availability of spaces, age of

children and ability to draw on transnational families support. The complex and dynamic nature of care arrangements is exemplified in the quote below from my interview with Shruthi Balan (female, computer engineer, arrived in 2003, married to Mahesh, with one daughter). Shruthi decided to return to full time work fairly soon after the birth of her daughter as the financial compensation provided under the Employment Insurance scheme (legislated and regulated by the Ontario provincial government) was not enough to cover the added expenses of a newborn. She was in the similar dilemma that I described at the start of this section: a complex assessment of the costs and benefits of opting out of the labour market or paying for childcare, compounded by issues of accessibility, affordability and fixed hours of operation of childcare centres. After a few months of searching for available and affordable infant care, Shruthi and Mahesh used both variations of the transnational care arrangement.

> I worked for nine months and then took maternity leave and went on EI. It was not enough. If the husband has a good job then it can be enough but if the husband is not making a lot then it is not enough to take care of the family because once you have a baby everything is expensive, diapers and everything. So, I don't think it is enough. After one year I went back to work full time. I left my daughter in India one year in 2006, after she was born. My mom took her and in 2007 she came back with my mom, so one year she was in India. Here it was very difficult, how to send her to daycare. My mom stayed and took her there and brought her back. It is a not a good idea to send a baby away. Now I tell people who are thinking about it that it is not good, even if it is difficult to drop them and pick them up. But with daycare at least one year we faced lots of problems but if we leave them in India we miss them more.

As I have already argued, newcomer families' use of the three different childcare arrangements that I have described so far in this section were limited for different reasons. The first arrangement that involved juggling opposite shifts at work and home in order to use partners' free childcare was unsustainable as a long-term strategy because of the unpredictability of parents' work hours and constrained

negotiations with employers. Transnational care arrangements were restricted on the basis of grandparents' ability and willingness to care for their grandchildren, as well as by government regulation of the tourist and visitor visas. Despite it being the preferred option, participants had great difficulty in finding accessible and affordable centre-based daycare spaces with hours of operation that did not conflict with their working times.

The most popular childcare arrangement that was more readily available, flexible, and affordable and also could be used as a longer-term strategy, was unregulated and unregistered home-based daycare spaces. At the time of the interviews, nine households used childcare spaces in unlicensed home-based daycare facilities. After their previous experience with a for-profit centre, Mahesh and Shruthi decided to opt for a home-based care space.

> I have had to compensate so leave early and then make up those hours later in the weekend so that has happened many times in the daycare because we joined our kid in Kids and Company and according to their rules and regulations they immediately call you at any time and you have to be prepared and take the kid home. That really annoyed me. I work for a research lab so I can't leave the experiment suddenly and go pick up my kid and then go home. I was there six months in that daycare and then I felt it was not a daycare at all. It was harassment for parents […] It is not a different daycare actually one of my friend's mother-in-law is here so I just kept my kid with her. I pick her up and drop her at my friend's place.

Neena explained her rationale for choosing a home-based care option to replace the not-for-profit space that she used when her daughter was younger. "It is a smaller private daycare. The bigger daycares didn't suit my timing requirements. I preferred this daycare because you had more flexibility. I am paying only 5% of my total income. There was a time when I was paying about 25% of my total income when she was much younger." Akash and Arpita also used a similar reasoning in explaining

their choice; but at the same time, expressed their dissatisfaction with the arrangement, as it was not their preferred option. Akash said, “he goes to a private daycare because I couldn’t find a spot in a government sponsored one. She is not registered but I had no choice. She lives very close to my house. Without it we could not both join the office.” Arpita clarified, “it is not really satisfactory. I would rather go for a professional daycare like YMCA but it is a long wait list and it has almost been one and half years.”

In the last two sections, I explored Indian professional couples’ decisions regarding entering paid work and organising childcare, as both parents pursue full time employment and/or study. The negative effects of their scaling-back strategies and also the difficulties in finding affordable and accessible childcare are disproportionately borne by women compared to their male partners. Women are more likely to opt-out of the labour market to assume full time caring duties in the absence of other childcare alternatives, affecting their career progression in Canada, which is especially difficult when they recall their successful professional working lives in India. Here, I found that the majority of women did manage to remain in or eventually return to paid work; however, at the cost of continuing to bear a greater share of the triple-burden than their male partners: worker, organiser and manager of childcare and the primary caregiver (Skinner, 2005).

In this section, I identified the four main childcare arrangements used by professional couples of Indian-origin. Table 3 provides some information on the couples and their primary childcare arrangement (also see Appendix 3).

Table 6.1: Indian newcomer families' primary childcare arrangements

Name	Migration Year and Mode of Entry	Number and ages of children	Primary Care Arrangement at Time of Interview
Yash and Namita Sharma	2006 SWPC	F (10)	Unregulated home-based care
Mahesh and Shruthi Balan	2003 SWPC	F (4)	Transnational Care in India and Canada
Rishi and Jyoti Mehta	2007 SWPC	F (7)	Using partners' free childcare
Vijay and Lalita Khanna	2002 SWPC	M (14), F (12), F (6)	Unregulated home-based care
Shaan and Radha Menon	2001 SWPC	F (3); F (6 weeks)	Centre-based daycare and maternity leave
Mohit and Aditi Shah	2006 SWPC	M (13); F (9)	Unregulated home-based care
Akash and Arpita Ghosh	2003 SWPC	M (8)	Unregulated home-based care
Ishan and Neha Chopra	2009 CEC	M (3)	Unregulated home-based care and partners' free childcare
Venkat and Alka Nair	2008 SWPC	M (5); M (3)	Unregulated home-based care
Aditya and Shilpa Kulkarni	2007 CEC	M (3)	Transnational care in Canada
Karan and Aisha Agarwal	2004 SWPC	M (2)	Unregulated home-based care
Dev and Shalini Mishra	2004 SWPC	M (8)	Centre-based daycare and partner's free childcare
Ram and Madhoo Pandit	2007 SWPC	F (2)	Transnational care in Canada
Viren and Sadhna Kohli	2005 SWPC	F (4); F (6 months)	Unregulated home-based care and maternity leave.
Dilraj and Jasmeet Singh	2005 SWPC	M (10); F (6)	Centre-based daycare
Sanjay and Anita Patel	2003 SWPC	F (7); F (4)	Centre-based daycare; Transnational Care in India
Shashi and Neena Roy	2006 SWPC	F (8)	Unregulated home-based care

Glossary:
SWPC: Skilled Worker and Professional Class
CEC: Canada Experience Class

F (number): Has a daughter, age in brackets
M (number): Has a son, age in brackets

The majority of participants emphasised the lack of choice in selecting these arrangements. Women were also more likely to express feelings of guilt and disappointment about not being there for their children. Towards the start of the chapter, I stressed the distinction between two components of domestic labour: childcare and housework. In the next section, I turn to the second component of domestic labour: the gendered division of household chores, acknowledging that there is a significant overlap between both childcare and household work.

Who does the chores?

Previous studies on the gendered division of housework, using large-scale surveys in Europe and North America, have found that despite women's increased participation in the workforce, there continues to be a relatively conventional gendered division of household labour: women do a greater share of household work than men (Cooke and Bailey, 1999; Devreux, 2007, Kitterod and Petersen, 2006; Sullivan, 2000). This gendered pattern persists even when women's contribution to the family economy exceeds the share of their male partners or even when male partner is unemployed (Greenstein, 2000). Earlier in Chapter 2, I argued that economic dependency, relative resources and time availability models do little to explain why this gendered division persists.

Researchers studying the sexual division of domestic labour in immigrant families suggest that pre-migration gender roles continue to affect migrant women's lives even after migrating to a new host society that has a different culture and also

perhaps different dominant gender ideologies (Foner, 1998; Grahame, 2003; Min, 1992; Pessar, 1995). Mehrotra and Calasanti (2010), in their study of Indian immigrant families in the US, found that the home is a site of both support and struggle, where gender and ethnic identities are negotiated in the context of roles within the family. They found that after migrating, immigrant Indians acquire more duties in the nuclear family, as extended family support is no longer available to help them in performing domestic labour. The gender hierarchy is reproduced, albeit in a somewhat different form now with both men and women doing more housework than previously (Mehrotra and Calasanti, 2010).

In this study, I found that despite men's increased participation in housework, especially considering their contribution was close to nothing in India because of the easy availability of paid help, both childcare and household work continues to be seen primarily as women's responsibility. I found little discrepancy in men and women's self-reported division of household work performed (expressed as a rough percentage ratio). The majority of participants agreed that the division was about 50-70 percent performed by women and 30-50 percent performed by men. Mehrotra and Calasanti (2010) found that men talked about their contribution to specific tasks rather than routine chores. The gender hierarchy was apparent in their ability to choose which tasks to perform and which tasks to leave out. In my interviews with Indian professional couples, I found that they often distinguished between tasks associated with childcare (doctor's visits, school activities, help with homework) and the upkeep and maintenance of the home, using the broad categories of cooking, cleaning, home repairs, shopping and household finances and budgeting. A clear gendered division of labour emerged in their descriptions of who does what tasks under these broad categories of maintaining the home, mirroring conventional gender roles and ideologies.

In all households, women continued to be responsible for everyday routine and mundane activities that are critical to the family's upkeep, whereas men's contributions were primarily occasional. Women exclusively did the cooking on a day-to-day basis, for example, and men would occasionally contribute making creative meals for special occasions such as festivals, family activities or evening meals with friends. Women also performed day-to-day cleaning, while men participated in occasional spring-cleaning activities, laundry and weekly vacuuming. I found that men talked about doing tasks that required 'outside work' such as garbage disposal, recycling and gardening. They also did any household work that would conventionally be constructed as masculine tasks, such as home maintenance work and car repairs. All major financial decisions including buying a house or car were taken jointly; however, men were more likely to be responsible for financial planning and investments and women undertook the tasks of setting a household budget, monitoring day-to-day family expenses and doing the shopping.

Some female interviewees compared their male partners' contribution to household tasks in India and in Canada. They all recognised that there has been a significant increase in their participation in domestic work after moving to Canada. All the men self-reported no participation at all in household tasks while in India. They had domestic help at home for all household chores and also the time-inflexible aspects of caring duties such as preparing meals, feeding and washing. Grandparents almost exclusively facilitated language training or other educational pursuits. The loss of this support from extended family and paid domestic workers to a large extent explained men's increased contribution to performing household tasks.

Aditi Shah (female, computer programmer, arrived in 2006, married to Mohit with one son and one daughter) said, "to be honest with you, here my husband is really more helpful than back home because there we had people to do things for us

and he was not worried because he knows that things are getting done without his help. But here he helps me a lot." Mehrotra and Colasanti (2010) found that Indian women often described themselves as lucky because their husbands were now demanding less and doing more. In my study, some women like Neena expressed some resistance to the persistent nature of the gendered division of labour, arguing that both she and Shashi reproduce it almost instinctively. She said,

> I think it naturally happened and my husband just gave into it. He is happy with it and fine with it. I sometimes complain that why can't you think what we have to eat. Why is it always me that has to think? But I think it is more natural and instinctive. I just took charge automatically and he accepted it.

The gendered division of domestic labour emerged more clearly in relation to childcare tasks, predominantly performed by the mother. Although both parents spent similar numbers of hours in productive work (typically between 55-60 hours in a working week), women continued to disproportionately take responsibility for organising children's activities such as choosing and managing daycares, afterschool and extracurricular activities, health checks, preparing meals, feeding and washing: the day-to-day caring and emotional labour. Men were more likely to be responsible for picking up and dropping off their children between different activities and also for playtime.

One family represented the only exception to this gendered division of domestic work, whose experiences I described at the start of the chapter. Shalini explained, "Dev is mostly taking care of the kid these days. He drops him at school and takes care of him. We decided whoever comes home first they cook and so he does that too." In this family, Dev took primary responsibility for organising and managing care for their son and performed the majority of household chores. It is interesting to note

that this family was also the exception in another respect. As I noted earlier, both Shalini's economic contribution to the family expenses and the hours she spent at work were greater than Dev's contribution.

In concluding this section, I want to return to Jean Gardiner's (1997) argument that I presented earlier in the chapter, using the information from a small number of interviews that I conducted with dual-earner households without children (four in total). Gardiner (1997) argued that housework could be distinguished from more emotional and caring activities, all of which are included under the umbrella terms domestic or reproductive labour. In order to provide some comparison of the gendered division of housework in dual-earner families, I used this small group of families with no children. More specifically, I wanted to ascertain whether dual-earner couples without spatially and temporally inflexible and non-negotiable parenting duties divide housework differently from the other couples in my study.

I found that in the dual-earner households without children, women undertook an even greater share of housework: roughly between 60 to 80 percent. Furthermore, the gendered hierarchy in the division of tasks and the associated meanings remained the same. Sooraj Modi (male, computer engineer, arrived in 2003, married to Gita) explained this division as follows,

> Trash oriented things, laundry and vacuuming I take care normally. I am still originally from back home and there I thought changing trashcans is a guy's job. It is not that you have to do it, it is a mutual understanding and I guess we like it. I think with kids there will have to be change, I don't know what.

Pooja Desai (Human Resources professional, arrived in 2007, married to Nihaal) who at the time of the interview was expecting her first child had been wondering about the

question that Sooraj had raised in his interview. She too anticipated some changes to the gendered division of household work with the arrival of their new baby.

> I do most of it now. I think with the baby coming it will change. He started helping me with a lot of doing dishes and more tidying up. I think it will take time but hopefully in a year or two it would be fine. Right now I would say I am doing 85 percent and he does 15 percent. I would like to see later on that it is seventy-thirty. 70 percent is me and 30 percent him [*laughing*].

In the last two sections, I provide evidence to support Jean Gardiner's (1997) argument that mothers' decisions about their engagement with productive work is better explained using the personal nature of caring duties and the maternal role and not household chores. Although women continued to perform a disproportionate amount of housework, they felt more constrained by their childcare responsibilities. The lack of affordable and accessible alternatives for childcare limited women's participation in paid work to a much greater extent than their disproportionate share of housework. On the other hand, participants like Shalini, who I talked about at the start of the chapter, might perhaps use their success in keeping a clean house to assuage their feelings of guilt and dissatisfaction about not 'being there' for their children.

Conclusions: the concept of social care for transnational families in Canada

The main message that emerges from the findings in this final empirical chapter is that economic migrants' contribution to Canada's knowledge-economy and its global economic competiveness is constrained by two significant factors. The first factor, discussed mainly in Chapter 4, is restricted entry to Canadian labour markets on the basis of the complex 'lack of Canadian experience' barrier. The second factor,

discussed mainly in this chapter, is the lack of accessible and affordable childcare, permitting both immigrant working parents to enter the labour market. As I have argued earlier in Chapter 2, the restrictive and limited public support for childcare and other forms of reproductive work under the Canadian liberal welfare state means that the majority of childcare spaces are based on market delivery and also shaped by the social and economic circumstances of the family. The cumulative effect of both factors is that these constraints are more acutely felt by immigrant women, who often arrive as skilled dependents, seeking to enter the workforce at the same time as their male partners, applying as the principal applicants in economic migration schemes. These constraints perpetuate a gendered division of productive and reproductive work, reflecting conventional gender roles and ideologies.

I want to conclude this chapter by suggesting that Mary Daly and Jane Lewis' (2000) argument for a concept of social care "that countenances and develops care as an activity and set of relations lying at the intersection of state, market and family relations" (used as the tile of this concluding section) (p. 281) is an appropriate way of thinking about how to better provide for the needs of migrant families, especially in their early years in Canada. Daly and Lewis (2000) proposed social care as a multidimensional concept that takes into consideration three important features of what Gardiner (1997) called the emotional, caring and personal aspects of domestic work. First, Daly and Lewis (2000) argued that care is a form of work and labour that draws attention to the indispensable role of the welfare state. Secondly, they demonstrated the importance of locating care within a normative framework of obligation and responsibility that is initiated and provided under conditions of social and/or familial relations and responsibilities. Thirdly, they identified care as an activity with both financial and emotional costs to be shared among individuals, families and the society at large (Daly and Lewis, 2000: 284).

At present in Canada, all provinces and territories in Canada are facing a 'crisis of care'. Childcare provision under a liberal welfare state (using Esping-Andersen's (1990; 1998) typologies) continues to be limited by a federal government that has relinquished any responsibility for providing quality, affordable and accessible childcare and a provincial government that is underfunded and under-resourced (Campbell, 2006; Madsen, 2002; Mahon, 2000; 2005). As a result, childcare continues to be a residual service provided by constrained municipal governments: constructing a patchwork of childcare provision across all Canadian provinces and territories, except Quebec, the only province to provide universal childcare.

These historical jurisdictional problems also plague provisions for childcare in the Waterloo Region. The Ontario provincial government funds all childcare provisions in the region with some intermittent financial support from the federal government. These services are regulated under The Day Nurseries Act and provided exclusively by the Municipality of the Region of Waterloo. According to the director of Waterloo Children's Services, the region operates five childcare centres and partners with and funds a total of 124 centres, including not-for-profit and private for-profit providers (19 in total), spread throughout the region (encompassing three cities, Cambridge, Kitchener and Waterloo as well as four townships, North Dumfries, Wellesley, Wilmot and Woolwich).

All parents in the Waterloo Region rely on the market and voluntary sectors for childcare spaces. There are about 1500 private, for-profit spaces (16 infant, 206 toddler, 800 pre-school; 246 junior kindergarten and 84 school-age spaces) and about 5100 not-for-profit spaces (71 infants, 456 toddlers, 2000 pre-school, 800 junior kindergarten, 125 senior kindergarten and 1600 school-age spaces). The five government-sponsored centres provide 250 spaces, comprising less than four percent of the total number of childcare spaces in the region. In any given year, the

municipality dedicates $14 million towards needs-tested fee-subsidies and $8 million to enhance salaries for Early Childhood Educators (an additional $10,000 per staff per year).

The director of Waterloo Children's Services found that the two main challenges to childcare provision in the region are: availability "we have one space for every ten children who would require a space" and affordability. She said that,

> In order to qualify [for subsidies] your financial situations is obviously considered and so the middle-class or the folks who are earning just enough who do not qualify are paying the true fee [that] can be quite costly and put stress on the family. It is those people in the middle that are underserviced.

In my interview with the Chair of Early Childhood Education, she talked about how the municipality is scrambling for provincial and federal dollars and "the funding available for childcare is offset and subsidised by parent fees and childcare centres are often in a position where they have to juggle and balance operating costs and weave parent fees into that."

Newcomer families may find it particularly difficult to gain access to such centre-based spaces because of a combination of factors including lack of information, a limited number of spaces, long waiting lists and also the high parent fees, especially when added on to the high costs of migrating, settling in a new country with higher costs of living than their home countries and the expensive process of re-training in Canada that all participants underwent (to a greater or lesser extent). They often had to rely on unregulated, home-based paid help. As I have shown earlier, this reliance exacerbated their feelings of guilt and disappointment about entering the labour market both to advance their careers and also out of economic necessity, meaning they cannot be there for their children.

In my interview with the director of the Child Care Action Network (CCAN), a lobby group that is no longer in operation, she said that the 'crisis of care' in the Waterloo Region extended beyond just issues of accessibility and affordability. She identified the primary objective of the group to be to raise the profile of childcare beyond a women's issue and work towards representing it more as a province-wide challenge that has economic, social justice and poverty reduction implications. In particular, as she explained, childcare is a difficult issue to advocate for three main reasons. First, childcare is always a critical issue for a transient group at a particular stage of their life course. Secondly, conventionally held beliefs in appropriate gender roles contribute to Early Childhood Education being an undervalued profession with a high attrition rate. Thirdly, it is particularly challenging to measure the immediate economic returns from such provisions, making it difficult to make a business case for childcare provision. She argued that in addition to the interrelated challenges of availability, accessibility, affordability and gender ideologies (childcare is seen as a woman's issue), the lack of a vision also plays a significant role, maintaining the stagnant and underfunded status of childcare provision in the region, as municipal governments scramble for dwindling funds. In her experience with the network, she found that:

> For the first two or three years of the childcare debate [it] came down to where should women be. It took me a long time to counter that argument. Finally, I had to come up with a new theory. I had to go with the economic argument and people understand that. The challenge is to get stakeholders to understand that by doing a little bit more there are huge payoffs down the line. You don't see the result in your four-year political term and that is a major obstacle in care […] social and economic return will be in five to ten years down the line and it is hard to measure something like that. It is not just about the money but also the recognition for their [ECEs] work. They see first hand the children who are being denied care and they see the ratios are not working for kids."

The complex decision to migrate revealed that newcomer families viewed their responsibilities to their family to be as significant as their engagement in the Canadian labour market and the advancement of their individual careers. In practice however, it remains a more significant aspect of women's lives. I suggest that this is not a naturally occurring gendered disadvantage but rather the cumulative consequence of gendered negotiations in the home, the workplace and the constraints placed by the lack of available and affordable childcare alternatives outside relations of kinship and marriage. Care will continue to be located within familial and kinship relations unless it is brought into organisational boundaries (as I argued in Chapter 5) and until it is supported to a greater extent by provisions under the welfare state. In this chapter, I have shown the consequences of this lack of provision for newcomer families, perpetuating the cumulative disadvantage of immigrant professional women with children, who in growing numbers are seeking to enter Canada's labour markets.

This is not a new argument but one that needs reiteration as this study provides yet more evidence that there continues to be little significant change in the nature and provision of care, continuing to rely disproportionately on women in the family and in paid help. As suggested by Daly and Lewis (2000), care needs to be located within a normative framework of obligation and responsibility, and be shared by individuals (both men and women), families, employers and the wider society. As I have shown here, the financial and emotional costs of the gendered divisions of productive and reproductive labour in the spheres of paid work and the home are heightened by migration across national boundaries. The particular circumstances of transnational migrants need to be taken into account as states consider how to better provide for the welfare of their newest entrants and citizens.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusions

Several Canadian geographers have noted the influence of a growing number of Asian immigrants in Canada, re-orienting the nation's political, economic and cultural focus towards a new sending 'area' (Hiebert, 1994; 1999; Ley, 1995; Mitchell, 1993). Indian immigration continues to be a relatively under-researched part of the Asian diaspora in Canada. This is a thesis about a particular form of Indian middle-class mobility: Indian hi-tech immigrants arriving as economic migrants to contribute to Canada's technological clusters - the hubs of the national knowledge economy. Historical groups of Indian immigrants in Canada were concentrated both socially and geographically in the home and host countries – mainly working-class male Jat Sikhs from Punjab, drawn to British Columbia to work in the traditional resource industries (Johnston, 1984; Walton-Roberts, 2003). Indian immigration has evolved significantly since the late 1960s. During more recent waves of immigration, Canada has admitted Indians from different socio-economic and religious backgrounds and also from different regions in India (Buchignani, 1987; Sharma, 1997). I suggest that these new economic entrants from India continue to be occupationally, socially and geographically concentrated in both India and Canada.

After gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1947, India adopted a largely protectionist stance and began developing its national knowledge industries and global technological potential. In the 1990s, India privatised its software industry and rapidly established the reputation of a global supplier of highly skilled yet low-cost knowledge workers (Aneesh, 2001; Arora et al., 2001; D'Costa, 2003; Dossani and Kenney, 2009; Khadria, 2001). Scholars have documented the success of affluent and

well-connected Indian diasporas, especially in the famous Silicon Valley (Radhakrishnan, 2008; Saxenian, 1999; 2002; 2006; Vertovec, 2002). Less is known however, about similar groups of Indian immigrants, from primarily middle-class and professional backgrounds, who move from hi-tech cities in India to the popular gateway cities in Canada, admitted on the basis of their skills and education, seeking to enter Canada's growing knowledge industries.

Canada is a relatively new destination for Indian technology workers. After the dot.com crash in 2001, Indian IT workers became attracted to destinations other than the US because of their smaller and less volatile tech markets as well as their relatively generous welfare policies and easier immigration and naturalisation processes (Xiang, 2007). I found that the stereotypical association between Indian nationals and technology work provides Indian technology workers in Canada with some added advantage in overcoming the well-documented labour market disadvantage of skilled immigrants (Bauder, 2006; Boyd, 1984; Reitz, 1988; George and Ramkissoon, 1998; Ng, 2005). Although Indian hi-tech immigrants still encountered the complex 'lack of Canadian experience' barrier, they were able to effectively use conversion tactics to find lower-paid, entry-level positions in any one of the several technology companies in the Waterloo Region, advancing eventually to positions commensurate to those that they had held in India. Their experiences in some ways contradicts the notion of a persistent labour market disadvantage, reflected in other studies of skilled immigrants' higher levels of unemployment and underemployment compared to their Canadian-born and educated counterparts (Hiebert and Pendakur, 2003; Hum and Simpson, 1999; Li, 2000; Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998; 2004; Picot and Sweetman, 2005).

I have argued here that there are two particular factors that contribute to Indian hi-tech workers' partial success in Canada's technology labour market. First, Indian hi-

tech immigrants are specifically recruited by federal governments to fill perceived skill shortages in a sector identified as a key driver of national economic growth (ICTC, 2011; Ticoll, 2005). Secondly, the proliferation of technology companies in the Waterloo Region and their growing demand for technology workers to fill upcoming vacancies might to some extent explain their ability to find some form of work in their chosen field: the IT sector. The majority of respondents arrived in one of Canada's popular immigrant gateway cities, Toronto, but moved to the Waterloo Region mainly because of its reputation as a technology concentration and in anticipation of improving their chances of finding a job.

The dramatic growth and success of the Silicon Valley and its reinvention in other parts of the globe including Canada, sparked economic geographers' interest in the process of cluster development in the knowledge economy (Kenney, 2000; Lee et al., 2000). Knowledge production is less spatially constrained; however, knowledge itself is more difficult and tacit – 'we know more than we can tell' (Polyani, 1966: 4) – and knowledge exchange continues to be dependent on the spatial and institutional proximity of the actors involved (Gertler, 2003). This feature of knowledge production explains the success of India's body shopping practices and at the same time, the paradox of the 'lack of Canadian experience' barrier for Indian hi-tech immigrants in the Waterloo Region.

Localised, or regionally based, knowledge production and innovation has become the basis of economic competitiveness in a largely deregulated and decentralised global knowledge economy – a paradoxical consequence of globalisation (Acs et al., 1996; Bathelt, Malmberg and Maskell, 2004; Lucas, Sands and Wolfe, 2009; Morgan, 2004). Researchers studying innovation have for some time acknowledged the significance of interaction and competition across several firms (Porter, 1990; 1998) to better harness the value of tacit knowledge possessed by

knowledge workers, acting as an incentive for innovation and product differentiation (Freeman, 1982; 1991; Gertler, 1993; 1995; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Lundvall, 1988; Rosenberg, 1982).

Canadian ICT companies are small compared to the global industry as a whole but they too are concentrated in a small number of geographical clusters, being both "regionally embedded" but also effectively linked into global networks. Lucas, Sands and Wolfe (2009) identified eight distinct technological clusters accounting for a large share of Canada's ICT sector. The Waterloo Region is the fourth largest cluster of technology companies and comprises a diverse mix of firms in software, wireless technologies and advanced manufacturing. Lucas, Sands and Wolfe (2009) identify two features that distinguish the Waterloo cluster: the significant contribution of the post-secondary and civic institutions to the development of the technology potential of the cluster, Walton-Roberts (2011) calls this *the Waterloo way*, as well as a relatively even distribution between technology-related manufacturing and services (Lucas, Sands and Wolfe, 2009).

The Waterloo Region has the second highest location quotient for manufacturing compared to all other ICT clusters, reflecting a strong history of advanced manufacturing brought by earlier waves of primarily Ethno-German immigrants to the region. Immigration continues to be critical in shaping the industrial and ethnic composition of the region. I would argue that the contemporary industrial shift towards knowledge industries is being shaped by contemporary waves of mainly South Asian economic migrants, who are ethno-culturally different from earlier groups of White-European settlers and are looking to enter technology companies in the Waterloo cluster. Despite the immateriality of the product (knowledge) the embodied characteristics of workers remain a significant factor in explaining who gets which jobs.

Unlike previous periods of economic austerity, Canada continues to admit growing numbers of foreign-born professionals to contribute to its national knowledge economy. India contributes a disproportionate share of technology workers and Indian technology workers, navigating a racialised as well gendered Canadian labour market, to some extent benefit from India's strong technological presence. Indian technology workers in this study arrived primarily through two different economic categories: Skilled Worker and Professional Category, based entirely on an assessment through the Points System, and the Canadian Experience Class, providing expedited entry for foreign students and temporary workers after two-years of Canadian work experience.

During the present period of economic crisis, the federal government might be inclined to allow higher numbers of temporary workers and/or international students to transition to permanent residency in Canada instead of admitting skilled professionals based on their skills and experience acquired in their home countries. Indian technology workers and students arriving through the Canadian Experience Class are better positioned to circumvent the 'lack of Canadian experience' barrier, allowing the Canadian government to rectify the issue of brain drain and underutilisation of the skills of foreign-born professionals without making efforts to correct the unfair labour market disadvantage of skilled immigrants entering different occupational sectors in the Canadian economy. I emphasised this in my discussion of how Indian technology workers are constructed in the Canadian labour markets: a construction that allows them a 'foot in the door' into technology work but also presents a double-edged sword for Indian professionals seeking to enter occupational sectors other than IT.

This study provides only exploratory insights into the contributions of these contemporary waves of immigrants to shaping the Waterloo cluster and provides a limited representation of India's technological presence in Canada: some questions remain to be investigated. The in-depth study of Indian investment and employment in

the Silicon Valley might usefully be replicated for the rapidly growing Canadian technology clusters, investigating links to Indian-based companies, entrepreneurial networks and body shopping practices. Scholars have documented the influence of early Indian immigrants in transforming the agricultural economy in Punjab (Johnston, 1984; Walton-Roberts, 2003). It would also be interesting to trace the influence of these new members of the Indo-Canadian diaspora, from different class and professional backgrounds, in maintaining India's global reputation as a key technology player and also in actively constructing what is called modern India (Alvares, 1980; Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Srinivas, 1995). It also may be that return migrants, newly endowed with 'Canadian' know-how and experience, become crucial to the growth of India's indigenous hi-tech sector, contributing to firms in Indian hi-tech cities including Bangalore, Hyderabad and Bombay.

Work-life balance of immigrant women in professional occupations

Lewis and Cooper (2005) traced the notion of work-life balance to the 1960s when a growing number of women in the global North entered the workforce. The notion of work-life balance came under scrutiny for its implicit assumption of a simple trade-off between the two spheres, home and work, encouraging quick fix solutions that have a tendency to perpetuate fundamental gender inequalities (Burke, 2004; Lewis et al., 2007). In this thesis, I used the term work-life conflict that I argue is able to capture the inherent tension in these negotiations. Traditionally work-life balance was seen exclusively through the lens of White, middle-class women entering paid employment in countries across Europe and North America and concerned with their experiences of work-family stress. This research began to intersect with scholarship on the feminisation of international labour migration. The increased mobility of mainly

unskilled migrant women began to meet the labour demands in multiple sites and contexts in the global north, including 'global factories' and domestic services. Care demands are both being created and met through women's employment, demonstrating the complex causal relations that tie together migration, gendered labour and state care regimes (Kofman and Raghuram, 2009).

Arlie Hochschild (2000) identified these global chains of care, varying in both number and connective strength, as being driven by the increased labour force participation of middle-income and affluent women in the global North, creating a demand for domestic workers, fulfilled by the physical and emotional labour of low-skilled women from the global South. Research on global chains of care have privileged notions of transnational motherhood (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 1997) and also given primacy to care arrangements in non-migrant households in destination countries. The research on care arrangements in migrant households in the American context found that immigrant working mothers, participating in the workforce out of economic necessity, juggle shifts with their relatives, babysitters and less often use day care centres or paid help to combine waged and reproductive work (Foner, 1999; Grahame, 2003; Greenlees and Saenz, 1999; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1992; Kibria, 1993; Lim, 1997; Min 1992; Moon, 2003; Pessar, 1984; 1995).

Yeoh and Khoo (1998) argued that skilled labour migration is strongly gendered and studies of labour market participation (Boyle et al., 2000; Cooke and Bailey, 1999), employment (Lee and Roseman, 1999; Lichter, 1980) and attitudes to work (Spitze, 1984) find that there is a clear gendered negative effect. Economic rationality as a representation of migrants' decision-making has limited purchase in most studies of migration, including this one. The focus on the individual experience of skilled immigrants in the international labour market circuit tends to make invisible the

gendered outcomes of the migration process for their skilled dependents: so called trailing wives, who, as I have shown relatively quickly become professional employees after their arrival in Canada. Relatively little is known about how professional migrant couples, both seeking professional employment, make decisions about migration, labour market participation and reproductive work. I revealed that gendered patterns of negotiations are contingent on migrant professionals' household and parental status.

The Indian foreign-born professional women in this study differed from these earlier groups of migrant women studied by social scientists cited above: they were highly skilled and educated, typically from middle-class backgrounds and had successful professional working lives in India. These professional migrant women face contradictory pressures to develop their careers while coping with new socio-economic realities in the host country and the normative societal and self-expectations of good mothering. In India, all families combined paid work and domestic labour with the support of extended family and easily accessible and affordable domestic workers. Despite men's increased involvement in domestic work (both childcare and housework) as compared to their contributions in India (close to zero), their participation does not compensate for the loss of familial and community support and paid help available in India, exacerbating women's feelings of work-life conflict. I found that immigrant mothers in well-paid and skilled professional occupations continue to prioritise the careers of their male partners and continue to bear a disproportionate share of the second shift, indeed even shouldering a third shift, involving heightened feelings of guilt, regret and disappointment about not being there for their children (Hochschild, 1997).

Work-life balance has re-emerged as a central topic for academics, organisations and governments in the context of the knowledge economy that allows for the extension of the temporal and spatial boundaries of paid work (Gambles et al.,

2006; Gregory and Milner, 2009; Perrons, 2003; Watts, 2009). Childcare has become an issue for governments determined to raise labour participation rates in general and to exploit the skills and talents of their migrant workforce. Official policies, however, do not yet recognise and compensate for the existing gendered patterns of work beyond the workplace. In the technology companies that I interviewed, the underlying gendered assumption is that work-life conflict is primarily a women's issue and therefore not a concern of the majority. Similar to Smithson and Stokoe (2005), I also found that the gender-neutral language in official discourses on work-life balance as well as the organisational culture continues to promote a 'generic female parent'.

I believe that masking and minimising gender differences within gender-neutral language, as a strategy to correct the existing gender disadvantage for women, is a counterproductive approach. In this way, the technology companies in the Waterloo Region keep non-work commitments outside organisational boundaries and responsibilities and also implement a particular interpretation of a family-friendly workplace, maintaining that gender makes no difference within their organisations. The stigma associated with using organisational work-life measures is simply moved from mothers to parents. I found that fathers encounter higher levels of stigma as well as financial disincentive in using work-life balance measures to increase their parental involvement in their families. Negotiations of flextime, promoted as a positive feature of technology work, are constrained and left to managers' discretion. Since such informal policies are negotiated privately and individually, newcomers to a company and the wider technology market such as foreign-born professionals, who might lack information about such measures and access to informal networks to build trust and rapport, might be excluded from these limited benefits.

The construction of the 'generic female parent', the limited access to work-life balance measures and also the stigma associated with such benefits restrict

professional immigrant mothers' ability to advance in the workforce to a greater extent than their male partners. Under a Canadian liberal welfare state, immigrant working mothers rely almost exclusively on markets for non-parental childcare alternatives; however, the limited provision, long waiting lists, high parent fees and conflicts with working times restrict their choice to unregulated and unlicensed home-based care. Since women continue to bear a disproportionate share of the double burden, their dissatisfaction with such arrangements exacerbates feelings of guilt about neglecting their maternal role and its responsibilities.

Unlike the migrant households described by earlier studies, where women enter productive work only after migrating to the new host country in order to compensate for the declining contributions from their male partners (Foner, 1998; Kibria, 1993; Lim, 1997; Min, 1992; 1998; Pessar, 1984), the Indian professionally-qualified women whom I interviewed, worked not only out of economic necessity but also for non-economic reasons, such as to maintain professional skills, to advance their career and also because they enjoy working. Childcare constraints often limited the earlier groups of migrant women to mainly low-paid, unskilled and semi-skilled jobs with flexible schedules. These highly skilled immigrant women also receive financial remuneration for their labour market participation that most likely exceeds the rewards of the earlier groups of migrant women. These women, despite being from the global South and also who are considered to be outside the construct of global care chains, may find themselves employing other migrant women as carers and domestic workers, therefore, challenging the stereotypical representations of migrant women.

To summarise, this thesis contributes to geographical scholarship in two ways. First, I show that the paradoxical clustering of knowledge capital and production might also explain the spatial concentration of immigrants, intending to enter specific occupational sectors, in targeted secondary settlement areas, supporting the new

paradigm of international migration (Walton-Roberts, 2011; Wulff et al., 2008). Here, Indian hi-tech immigrants favour a growing secondary settlement area, instead of settling in the popular gateway city, Toronto, in search of better employment opportunities. Moreover, the location quotient of this secondary settlement area, with its high concentration of technology capital, also explains some of their labour market success – so much so that it has a demonstration effect on other Indian skilled immigrants who had initially intended to enter occupations in Canada other than IT. Secondly, as I have shown in this section, the skilled immigrant women in the study, who sought to reproduce their successful professional working lives in India within the Canadian context, are changing the stereotypical representations of women in the geographical literature on the feminisation of international labour migration and the construction of global chains of care.

Making a case for widening 'the immigrant question' in Canada

Canadian political debates addressing concerns about care and the question of the place of immigrants in the economy and society have evolved separately. In this concluding section, I argue for the importance of political efforts that address both issues in combination in order to improve the welfare of Canada's most recent citizens. At present, the immigrant question in Canada is myopic in its focus on the issue of brain drain and the underutilisation of the immigrants' skills. Canada's position on the issues of work-life balance and the crisis of care was summarised in a relatively recent report supported by the Human Resources and Development Canada's Labour Program. In this report, based on a sample of over 30,000 Canadian employees and 100 companies (40 private, 22 public and 38 not-for-profit), Duxbury et al. (2003) found that work-life balance is a critical issue for the majority of Canadian workers and

involves the efforts of a number of partners: the worker, the organisation, the family and the wider society and is contingent on the mutual understanding and respect between these players. This report, however, does not distinguish between the experiences of Canadian newcomers for whom, as I have shown here, experiences of work-life conflict are exacerbated after migrating across national borders and losing the support of their extended family and the wider community.

Skilled newcomers undertaking the dual transitions of settlement and parenthood face the two interrelated challenges of labour market entry and the lack of affordable and available childcare. The assistance provided to newcomers therefore needs to extend beyond language instruction and mentoring in order to take into consideration that many migrants move in intact family units and may be constrained to a greater extent by their roles in the family. Immigrant women, with professional credentials, entering primarily as skilled dependents, find it particularly difficult to reproduce their working lives in the new host country, not only because they find their skills and experience under-valued but also because of the limited access to non-parental alternatives for their reproductive responsibilities.

Some participants in this study drew on their transnational ties for assistance with their caring duties, contributing a Canada-specific example to similar studies of professional migrant families in different ethnic communities across North America and Europe (including Bulgarian Muslim immigrants in Spain (Denev, 2009), Chinese and Bangladeshi in the UK (Lie, 2010), Polish migrants in London (Ryan et al., 2009) and foreign-born professionals in the US (Treas, 2008)). I found that such arrangements were more common among the Indian families in Canada who previously have lived in multi-generational households, attempting to replicate the support of extended family that they greatly benefited from in India and that also provided them will valuable assistance in combining the commitments to work and family. Policy measures based on transnational care arrangements, such as, expedited processing of limited-time

family visas for transnational extended family caregivers, allowing them to stay for longer than the six-month restriction on tourist or visitor visas, would be mutually beneficial for newcomers as well as the Canadian economy. This would allow newcomer families to replicate the support of extended family available in India within the Canadian context, reducing the demands placed on the already limited childcare spaces provided by the state and the market. Policy measures such as this example, however, would still place the burden on newcomers to negotiate childcare individually and with their family, who would in effect continue to incur the entire financial and emotional costs of reproduction.

A clear message for policy makers that emerges throughout this thesis is that if Canada continues to admit high numbers of skilled immigrants without rectifying the underlying discrimination in labour markets, then the difficulties addressed here will only be exacerbated, especially if the economic downturn begins to affect hi-tech industries. Canada's present policies of language instruction, mentoring and accreditation services have had relatively little effect in improving the opportunities and living standards of recent migrants, and especially the troubling conclusions that scholars have identified for over four decades now.

My contribution to the immigrant question is that economic migrants' entry into the labour market is not only restricted by the non-recognition of foreign credentials and cultural and/or racial discrimination. Foreign-born professionals', especially skilled migrant women's, contribution to the Canadian economy is limited to the same extent (if not more) by the lack of sufficient provisions for reproductive work under Canada's liberal welfare state. Both the issue of the underutilisation of skills and the crisis of care operate simultaneously to negatively influence skilled immigrants' settlement in Canada; therefore, Canada needs to address 'the immigrant question' in relation to work-life balance to improve the welfare of these new entrants looking to make this 'land of opportunities' their new home.

APPENDIX 1: The organisations

1. Communitech Technology Association

Company Website: www.communitech.ca

Communitech is a not-for-profit organisation that promotes the interests of technology companies based in the Waterloo Region to the different levels of government in Canada and also globally. Beginning with a group of company executives from the Waterloo Region's growing technology firms called the Atlas Group in the 1980s, Communitech (previously known as Waterloo and Area Technology Association) evolved into a full-scale organization in 1997 and now has a membership of over 600 technology companies based in Canada's Technology Triangle. The organisation is a key player in commercialising the region as a technology concentration and working with various stakeholders in the region to encourage employers to draw not only from the local talent pool but also attract and retain foreign technology professionals. Communitech was a key resource for locating and contacting technology companies in the region for the study.

Interview Guide:

1. What motivated the collaboration and the development of the Communitech?
2. How many people work in the organisation (paid/voluntary)?
3. What are your main sources of funding?
4. What would you describe as successes for Communitech so far? What would you describe as setbacks or challenges?
5. What are the current projects being undertaken by the organisation? What are the challenges to these projects?
6. How do you view the network/organization developing? What are your future projects?
7. Do you carry out an evaluation of utilisation of your services?
8. Who is benefiting from and/or losing out from the services you provide?
9. What are appropriate measures to include the previously mentioned excluded groups consist of?

10. Have there been any initiatives taken by the organization specific to the growing number of immigrants skilled in information and communication technology? Networks? Recruitment? Are there any challenges to increasing the participation of immigrants in the tech triangle?

2. The Waterloo Region Immigrant Employment Network (WRIEN)

Company Website: www.wrien.com

WRIEN is a community initiative hosted by the Greater Kitchener Waterloo Chamber of Commerce to assist and support employers in hiring internationally trained professionals. WRIEN is the outcome of collaboration between the Ontario government, the Municipality of Waterloo and other local organisations. The organisation is designed as a policy tool intended to increase employment networks for internationally trained and educated professionals arriving in the region and to provide them with occupation specific language training and various other newcomer support services.

The organisation is funded by federal and provincial dollars to enhance immigrants' labour market participation. It does this by bringing together various stakeholders in the region to promote immigrant talent and encourage employers in the Waterloo Region to recruit and select immigrants. The organisation has five work groups focusing on different aspects of immigrants' economic integration: 1) a steering committee; 2) a group focused on employment initiatives encouraging employers to recruit, hire and retain foreign talent in the region; 3) an employer engagement strategy to introduce them to professional immigrants; 4) a committee to facilitate credential and qualification recognition; and 5) a group to support immigrants to overcome systemic employment barriers.

Interview Guide:

The organisation:

1. What motivated the collaboration and the development of the WRIEN?
2. How many people work in the organisation (paid/voluntary)?
3. How are the initiatives listed under immigrant and employment support funded?
4. What services will be provided as part of your qualification recognition initiatives?
5. Of all the initiatives taken thus far, what would you describe as successes for WRIEN? From the evaluation of services provided by WRIEN, what has been identified as setbacks or challenges? Are there any challenges particular to specific initiatives?
6. In the current projects being undertaken, what have been the challenges? Which initiatives in particular would you say have worked incredibly well to help skilled immigrants do better?
7. Is the skilled immigrant unemployment/underemployment situation different in any way from other regions in Ontario and in Canada?
8. How do you view the network/organization developing? What are your future projects? What do you perceive as difficulties to developing future WRIEN projects/initiatives?

The skilled immigrant question

9. Who are the major stakeholders in the employment of skilled immigrants in the region? Which stakeholders are currently involved in the initiatives taken by WRIEN? Are there any stakeholders that you would like to see more involved in the initiatives?
10. Where are the gaps in ensuring that skilled immigrants find work commensurate to their qualifications?
11. Who is benefiting from and/or losing out of the current utilization?
12. Are there particular vulnerable groups (i.e. have most difficulty in being placed in the region's labour market) among skilled immigrant professionals? Who are these groups? What contributes to their vulnerability? Are there particular initiatives WRIEN is taking to address the concerns of these groups? What are the barriers/challenges to implementing the aforementioned measures/solutions?
13. Are there particular groups that do better than others? Who are these groups? What contributes to their success?
14. Are there particular industries in the region that hire a larger number of immigrants?
15. What are the persistent problems that skilled immigrants face in the labour market? Who can be targeted the resolve these issues? What are the challenges to the aforementioned solutions?

16. Are employment agencies in the region trained to understand/evaluate skilled immigrant credentials and place them in jobs commensurate to their qualifications?
17. Does the current rate of unemployment affect immigrants more severely? Is the problem of skilled immigrant unemployment/underemployment improving or worsening?
18. Is there anything you would like to add to help me understand the issues I have covered better? Do you have any suggestions for others that I can speak to about the work-life balance of newly arrived immigrants?

3. The Child Care Action Network (CCAN)

CCAN is a childcare lobby group, founded in 2004, as an active counterpart of the Ontario Coalition for Better Childcare (OCBCC). The OCBCC, founded in 1981, is an advocacy and public awareness group for universally accessible, high quality, not-for-profit, regulated childcare in the province of Ontario (OCBCC, 2011). The primary objective of CCAN, as identified by the director of the program, is to raise the profile of childcare beyond a women's issue. The group sought to promote the provision of childcare as a province-wide challenge that has economic, social justice and poverty reduction implications. At the time of the interview, CCAN's main source of funding was through the Status of Women Fund provided through the OCBCC. The organization shut down a year after the interview due to spending cuts proposed by the federal-Conservative government.

Interview Guide:

1. What motivated this collaboration and the development of the CCAN?
2. What is the primary objective/mandate/goal of the CCAN?
3. What is the organisational structure? How many people work in the organization (paid/voluntary)?
4. What are your main sources of funding?
5. What are the initiatives that have been taken by the CCAN so far? What would you describe as successes for CCAN so far?
6. What are the current projects being undertaken by the organisation? What are the challenges to these projects?
7. How do you view the network developing? What are your future projects?
8. Who do you view as the major stakeholders in the childcare issue in the region? Who are currently involved?

9. What are the main issues with the current provision of childcare within the region? Who is benefiting from and/or losing out of the current utilisation of childcare provision and resources?
10. Are there persons who are excluded from current childcare provisions?
11. What are the barriers to implementing these solutions to include excluded groups?
12. Is the demand for childcare increasing/changing with the rise in immigration to the region? Should childcare provisions evolve in relation to the changing ethnic composition of the parents demanding childcare? If yes, how should provision change? Who has the ability to implement these changes? What are the difficulties/challenges in implementing such changes? If no, why not?
13. What are the difficulties and challenges with childcare provision in the region?
14. Who would you like to get involved in these efforts/solutions?
15. How can these issues be resolved?
16. Who would you like/want/need/aspire to include in this network and in your efforts?
17. Universal Childcare:
    i. Would you like to the province to implement universal childcare? Would this operate at the federal/provincial or local level?
    ii. Quebec's universal childcare is not without its challenges, what could be done differently to rectify these challenges? How would a system prevent social exclusion? Who would be excluded? How could these excluded persons be involved?
    iii. What would the barriers to universal childcare be? Whose responsibility is it to get this plan into action?
    iv. Who would be responsible for regulation/funding/operation of the universal system of childcare?
    v. Are there steps being taken in the direction of universal childcare? If so, what are these steps? Who is taking these steps? What is not being done and who is lagging?
    vi. If you were asked for your "pitch" for universal childcare for the region, what would you emphasise?
18. Is there any material you would provide me with to better understand the issues with childcare in the region that we have not covered in these interviews?
19. Is there anything you would like to add?
20. Would it be possible to contact you for further information after I have the opportunity to review my notes? Is phone/email more convenient for you?

4. Child Care Network: Chair of Early Childhood Education, Waterloo Region

Website: info@ccnwr.com

The Child Care Network of Waterloo Region is comprised of administrators and supervisors of the various childcare organisations in the region. It developed out of the Waterloo Region Non-Profit Childcare network. In June 1990, it had twelve representatives from non-profit organisations in the Waterloo Region and now includes for-profit centres and other childcare organisations including the Ontario Association of Early Childhood Educators, the Ontario Coalition for Better Child Care and the Early Childhood Educators and Teachers Network of Ontario. Child Care Connection is an information and advisory service for parents, guardians and caregivers with an extensive database of licensed childcare programs in the region.

Interview Guide:

The Childcare Issue:

1. What are your duties and responsibilities as the Chair of Early Childhood Education?
2. What are the main issues/challenges with the current provision of childcare in the region?
3. Are there any groups losing out in the current utilization of childcare and resources for parents?
4. What are the appropriate measures to include the previously mentioned excluded groups consist of?
5. What are the barriers/challenges to implementing these measures/solutions to include excluded groups?
6. Who do you view as the major stakeholders involved in childcare? Are all the stakeholders actively participating in improving childcare provision and utilisation? If not all, who else should be involved in childcare?
7. Is the growing immigrant population being accounted for in discussions of childcare in the region?
8. Is/should childcare provisions evolve in relation to the changing ethnic composition of the parents demanding childcare? If yes, how should provision change?
9. Who has the ability to implement these changes? What are the difficulties/challenges in implementing such changes? If no, why not?

Full-Day Learning- The Pascal Report:

10. What is your perspective on the full-day learning model proposed in the Pascal report submitted to the provincial government?
11. Does the report suggest plausible/practical solutions to combining the efforts of early childhood educators, childcare providers and teachers for the best interest of the children? Would there be resistance to these efforts?
12. What do you see as the difficulties in applying the model?
13. Are there any challenges particular to the Waterloo region in implementing such a program?
14. In your opinion, will the implementation of this model resolve some of the persistent problems with child care provision?

Universal Childcare:

15. Do you feel that universal childcare is in Ontario's future?
16. What would the barriers to universal childcare be?
17. Whose responsibility is it to get this plan into action?
18. Would universal childcare be implemented at the federal/provincial or local level?
19. Who would be responsible for regulation/funding/operation of the universal system of childcare?
20. Quebec's universal childcare is not without its challenges, what could be done differently to rectify these challenges?
21. How would a system prevent social exclusion?
22. Are there steps being taken in the direction of universal childcare? If so, what are these steps? Who is taking these steps? What is not being done and who is lagging?
23. Does the Pascal report push the province towards universal childcare?

5. Waterloo Children's Services, Municipality of Waterloo Region

This division of the Municipality of Waterloo is responsible for delivering state-provided childcare spaces and subsidies, under the direction of the Government of Ontario.

1. What is the current provision for childcare within the region? What do these current provisions consist of? What ages of children do these services provide for?
2. How many childcare spaces are provided directly by the Waterloo Children's Services?
3. What are the primary roles of the organisation?

4. How would you describe the demand for childcare in the region? What are the efforts taken by WCS to meet these demands? What are the options for increasing childcare spaces in the region?
5. Do you keep any record of who uses these provisions? Roughly, what is the catchment area for these services? (Ask for access to records for the final report)
6. Are there any groups that maybe excluded from using these provisions? If yes, how could these groups be involved?
7. Do you carry out any evaluation for the utilisation of these services? Are these services utilised as expected? If not, what would you cite as the reasons for under/over-utilization of these services?
8. Is the demand for childcare increasing/changing with the rise in immigration to the region? Is/should childcare provisions evolve in relation to the changing ethnic composition of the parents demanding childcare? If yes, how should provision change? Who has the ability to implement these changes? What are the difficulties/challenges in implementing such changes? If no, why not?
9. What are the typical hours of operation of these services? How are the hours of operation established (e.g. typical parent work hours) and are they flexible?
10. How is the eligibility for use of these provisions determined?
11. What would you describe as the challenges to the provision of care? How can these challenges be overcome? Who needs to be involved in the process of overcoming these challenges? Who is needed to take action? Who would you like to see involved in improving the provision of childcare?
12. How do you see the Waterloo Children's Services developing? What would you describe as the past successes/current and future projects?
13. Is there anything you would like to add?
14. Would it be possible to contact you for further information after I have the opportunity to review my notes? Is phone/email more convenient for you?

APPENDIX 2: The technology companies

Name	Interviewees	Number of Employers	Percentage of Male Employees	Average Age of Employees
Cyberworlds	Jane	200	70%	35
Digitech	Natalie	343	84%	36
DotcomTech	Susan	n/a	n/a	n/a
Imagine Inc	Victoria	325	60%	n/a
Infotech	Lisa	200	66%	45
iSoft	Sarah	540	n/a	n/a
NiSoftware	Isabel	1000	n/a	n/a
Phoenix	Charlotte	140	70%	33
Soft Solutions	Joanna	100	84%	30
ULearn	Caroline	120	77%	35

Interview guide for HR professionals

1. When did this branch/company begin operations in the Waterloo region?
2. Why did the company select this region?
3. What is the total number of employees that work in this company location?
4. What percentage of these employees are in managerial/supervisory or senior technical positions?
5. What are the age range/gender distribution/ethnic composition managerial/senior or supervisory technical positions?
6. Provisions for childcare in the organization: if no, have there been any requests for it? Who has made requests? Would you consider having on-site childcare? Why not?
   If yes,
   a. What are these provisions?
   b. What motivated the decision to start providing childcare within the organisation? (e.g. demand expressed by employees?)
   c. When did you start these services?
   d. What is the capacity of the facilities?
   e. How many full-time/part-time/voluntary people are employed to run the facilities?
   f. Who is eligible to use these facilities?

    g. How long are employees eligible to use these facilities?
    h. How are these facilities funded? Are there any employee/parent fees?
    i. What are the hours of operation of these facilities? Are there any after hour provisions for employees?
7. Family/leave policies:
    a. What are the typical/average work hours for employees? (For managerial/senior technical positions)
    b. Can employees work flexible hours? Do employees have the opportunity to work from home?
    c. What is the company's policy on maternity/parental leave? Are there any top-ups provided to the parents?
    d. Is there provision for part-time work for new parents to slowly transition back into full-time work?
8. Accommodation of employees with families:
    a. Does the firm organize events/activities for employees with families?
    b. Does the firm subsidize childcare in other facilities in the region?
    c. Does the firm collaborate with other childcare services for their employees?
9. Are there any employee wellness initiatives taken by the firm?
10. Is there anything you would like to add?
11. Would it be possible to contact you for further information after I have the opportunity to review my notes? Is phone/email more convenient for you?

APPENDIX 3: The Indian hi-tech immigrant families

Name	Migration Year and Mode of Entry	Age	Highest Degree	Occupation	Children	Primary Care Arrangement at Time of Interview
Milind and Kajal Mehra	2005 CEC	33;32	BSc; MA	Computer Programmer; Software Analyst	None	N/A
Sooraj and Gita Modi	2003 CEC	38;30	MSc;MSc	Computer Engineer; Network Analyst	None	N/A
Nihaal and Pooja Desai	2007 CEC	31;29	BE; CHRP	Computer Engineer; Human Resources	None	N/A
Debasish and Anjali Banerjee	2005 CEC	33;31	BE; BPharm	Computer Engineer; Full-time study (IT)	None	N/A
Yash and Namita Sharma	2006 SWPC	44;34	MSc;MSc	Software Engineer; Systems Analyst	F (10)	Unregulated home-based care
Mahesh and Shruthi Balan	2003 SWPC	40;34	BE; MSc	Computer Engineer; Computer Engineer	F (4)	Transnational Care in India and Canada
Rishi and Jyoti Mehta	2007 SWPC	40;39	BE; BE	Computer Engineer; Software Tester	F (7)	Using partners' free childcare
Vijay and Lalita Khanna	2002 SWPC	46; *	BSc; BSc	IT Engineer; Retail Representative	M, F, F (14,12,6)	Unregulated home-based care
Shaan and Radha Menon	2001 SWPC	38;34	BSc; BSc	Computer Engineer; Systems Analyst	F (3) F (6 Wks)	Centre-based daycare and maternity leave
Mohit and Aditi Shah	2006 SWPC	43; *	BSc; BSc	Computer Programmer; Computer Programmer	M (13) F (9)	Unregulated home-based care
Akash and Arpita Ghosh	2003 SWPC	41;37	BE; MSc	Computer Engineer; Systems Engineer	M (8)	Unregulated home-based care
Ishan and Neha Chopra	2009 CEC	*; *	BE; MSc	Computer Engineer; Software Tester	M (3)	Unregulated home-based care and partners' free childcare
Venkat and Alka Nair	2008 SWPC	41;40	BSc; BE	IT Engineer; Computer Engineer	M (5) M (3)	Unregulated home-based care
Aditya and Shilpa Kulkarni	2007 CEC	35;36	ME; MBA	Computer Engineer; Retail	M (3)	Transnational care in Canada

				Representative		
Karan and Aisha Agarwal	2004 SWPC	34;32	MSc; MA	Software Engineer; Software Analyst	M (2)	Unregulated home-based care
Dev and Shalini Mishra	2004 SWPC	35; *	CA; MSc	Finance Manager; Software Analyst	M (8)	Centre-based daycare and partner's free childcare
Ram and Madhoo Pandit	2007 SWPC	*; *	BE; BSc	Computer Engineer; Full-time study (IT)	F (2)	Transnational care in Canada
Viren and Sadhna Kohli	2005 SWPC	*; *	BE; MSc	Computer Engineer; Software Tester	F (4) F (6 Mts)	Unregulated home-based care and maternity leave.
Dilraj and Jasmeet Singh	2005 SWPC	41;38	CA; BA	Computer Engineer; Paralegal	M (10) F (6)	Centre-based daycare
Sanjay and Anita Patel	2003 SWPC	37; *	BSc; MSc	Computer Engineer; Software Tester	F (7) F (4)	Centre-based daycare; Transnational Care in India
Shashi and Neena Roy	2006 SWPC	*; *	MBA; ME	Computer Programmer; Software Developer	F (8)	Unregulated home-based care

Glossary:
SWPC: Skilled Worker and Professional Class
CEC: Canada Experience Class
F (number): Has a daughter, age in brackets
M (number): Has a son, age in brackets
* Respondents did not wish to disclose

Interview guide

General questions on immigrating to Canada

1. When did you immigrate to Canada?
2. How and when did you hear about Canadian immigration?
3. How long were you married before you migrated to Canada?
4. When did you first think about immigrating to Canada?
5. What motivated your decision to migrate?
6. How long did the immigration application process take?
7. How did you come to the decision of who will apply as the principal applicant?
8. Did you know anyone in Canada prior to immigrating? If yes, how are they related to you (friend, immediate family, extended family), have you kept in touch with them?
9. How long have been in the Waterloo Region? What made you select this region? Have you lived/worked in any other Canadian cities?

10. Did you have initial difficulties in “adapting” to Canada? (Presented as an open question for the respondent to interpret)

Educational qualifications and work experience

11. What is your highest post-secondary degree?
12. Where did you receive your post-secondary education?
13. What is your employment history? How long did you work in India? What type of work, what position have you held? What were your key duties and responsibilities? What were your typical work hours? How much were you earning in your last job before you migrated to Canada?
14. Did you start finding a job/working immediately after arriving to Canada? If not, what motivated your decision to find a job? What types of jobs were you expecting?
15. How long did it take you to find a job here?
16. How did you go about the job search process?
17. Have you participated in any re-qualification/bridging programs in Canada? If yes, who organised these programs? How useful/successful were these programs? Are there ways in which these programs could be improved?
18. Have you used any services in Kitchener to help you with job placement? If yes, what services were these, what did these services offer, what were you expecting to get out of these services, did you benefit from these services, if so, how, if not, how can these services be improved?
19. What were would you describe as being the main barriers to the job search process?
20. How did you go about breaking through the above-mentioned barriers?
21. What types of jobs have you held in Canada, what were your main duties and responsibilities, what position did you hold?
22. How long is the average commute to work? Is your commute directly to and from home or do you pool activities in your travel?
23. What are your typical work hours? (Less/more than 39/45 hours a week)
24. Please point to how much are you earning currently (respondents will be presented a card with income bands).
25. How would you compare you position in Canada to your position in India?
26. Couples’ job security: spouse’s job is more important; respondent’s job is more important; both are equally important
27. Job insecurity- how likely do you think it is that you will be temporarily laid off from your job in the next year? How likely do you think it is that you will lose your current job during the next year and have to look for a new one?
28. How supportive would you consider your supervisor to be?
29. Gap between actual and ideal work hours:
    - Want to work fewer hours (actual hours exceed desired hours)
    - Satisfied with current hours (no difference between actual and desired)
    - Want to work more hours (ideal hours exceed actual hours)

Income and household budgeting

30. What are the different sources of total household income? Roughly, how much do you receive from wages (including percentage of husband and wives contributions), workplace benefits, government assistance/benefits (e.g. childcare subsidies), assistance from other family members, etc?
31. What would describe as the major household expenses? How is/who sets the household budget set? How is the total household income distributed to household expenses?

Parenthood

32. To what extent has parenthood reshaped employment and housework for you and you husband/wife? (Open question to be followed by prompts)

Household characteristics

33. What is your date of birth?
34. How long have you been married?
35. When did you have your first child? (Also ask about other children)
36. What is the total number of members living in the household? Who is living in this household? How many income-earning adults are there in the household? How many children are living in the household? What are the ages of the children in the household?

Childcare and housework

37. How did you manage childcare in India?
38. How did you divide household and domestic responsibilities in India? More specifically, home maintenance, home improvement, routine housework (doing dishes, tidying up, vacuuming, cleaning windows, cooking meals, shopping, take-away meals, washing clothes, ironing clothes, cleaning lavatory) and child care (bathing children, changing nappies, nursing children, collecting from school, parent meetings, doctor visits, hair cuts)?
39. Have these arrangements changed since you have been in Canada? (Asked for each individual tasks in question 38)
40. What factors go into your decision on which care-giving options to choose?
41. What would you describe are major family decisions? How are these major family decisions taken?
42. Do you feel that you do a fair share, more than a fair share or less than fair share of household tasks/ child care tasks? Why? Should the division of tasks be different? How would you like to see the division of tasks change?
43. Is there anything you would like to add?
44. Would it be possible to contact you for further information after I have the opportunity to review my notes? Is phone/email more convenient for you?

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