DIVIDE AND RULE:
MANAGING MINORITIES IN INTERWAR POLAND

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Abstract

In this thesis I address the following puzzle: What explains the presence of the relatively high number of ethnic minority organizations in multinational states, particularly in cases where (a) relations between the titular and minority groups are hostile; (b) the state pursues discriminatory group-level policies vis-à-vis its minorities; (c) state capacity to repress is evident; and (d) the regime is governed by a dominant group, or what can be called a "core nation"? More specifically, the variation I seek to understand through this research is why some political organizations claiming to represent a restive ethnic minority group are *banned* by state authorities and excluded from public life, while others, which claim to represent the same ethnic group, are *allowed* to operate. Currently, well-established scholarly literature on state-ethnic minority group relations only focuses on part of the puzzle: it takes the point of view that repression is central in managing opposition, and accordingly has focused only on the reasons that states ban certain organizations. The intent of this study, however, is to change this dominant perspective by examining the question from a different angle, asking why states *allow* minority ethnic organizations to operate. Indeed, not always do repressive regimes that have the capacity to ban organizations representing a restive minority do—repression is relatively infrequent and selective. My contention instead is that if a multi-ethnic state is faced with a potentially hostile ethnic group, it *prefers* organizational pluralism which allows it to divide and rule the minority, even if repression is a viable option. This theory differs from existing ones by arguing that states *choose* to encourage organizational pluralism in ethnic minorities and that, if plurality is absent within an ethnic group, a state may even promote it. I test this hypothesis on the case of interwar Poland (1918-1939). I reconstruct the intentions of policy makers using process-tracing analysis and extensive archival research of the Ministry of Interior (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, or MSW), the main organ responsible for formulating minority policies, and its strategies for governing Ukrainian, Belarusian, German, and Jewish political organizations throughout the interwar period.

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List of Abbreviations

BIGK	Białoruski Instytut Gospodarki i Kultury (Belarusian Economic and Cultural Institute, 1926-1937)
Bund	Allgemejner Jidyszer Arbeter Bund, Powszechny Żydowski Związek Robotniczy (General Jewish Labour Bund, 1897-1939)
BWB	Bractwo Włościan Białorusinów (Brotherhood of Belarusian Peasants. 1922-1923)
BZChD	Białoruskie Zjednoczenie Chreścijańsko-Demokratyczne (Belarusian Christian-Democratic Union, 1924-1939)
DAP	Deutsche Arbeitspartei Polens (German Labour Party of Poland)
DKuWB	Deutsche Kultur- und Wirtschaftsbund (German Culture and Economic League)
DKVP	Deutsche Katholische Volkspartei (German Catholic People's Party)
DP	Deutsche Partei (German Party, proposed 1920, never founded)
DNV	Deutscher Nationalsozialistischer Verein fur Polen (1921-1928)
DSAP	Deutsche Sozialistische Arbeitspartei Polens (German Socialist Labour Party in Poland, 1925-1939)
DSP	Deutsche Sozialdemokratische Partei Polens (German Social Democratic Party in Poland, Bydgoszcz)
DV	Deutsche Vereinigung im Sejm und Senat (German Union in Sejm and Senate, 1923-1934)
DV	Deutsche Vereinigung in Westpolen (German Union in Western Poland, 1934-1939)
DVV	Deutscher Volksverband (German People's Union, 1924-1939)
FNJ	Front Jedności Narodowej (National United Front, 1933-1939)
KPZB	Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Białorusi (Communist Party of Western Belarus, 1923-1938)
KPZU	Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Ukrainy (Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919-1938)
JDP	Jungdeutsche Partei f*u*r Polen (Young German Party for Poland, Bielsko, 1929-1939)
OUN	Oragnizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, 1929-1939)
OZPP	Ogólnożydowska Partia Robotnicza, or Aldemene Jidysze Arbeter Partaj (All-Jewish Worker Party, 1931-1934)
PWN	Partia Wolności Narodu (Party of National Freedom, 1923-1926)
Sel-Sojuz	Ukraińskie Socialistyczne Objednannia--Selańskyj Sojuz (Ukrainian Socialist Union—Peasant's Union, 1924-1928))
Sel-Rob	Ukraińskie Chłopsko-Robotnicze Socjalistyczne Zjednoczenie (Ukrainian Peasants'-Workers' Socialist Union, 1921-1932)
USDP	Ukraińska Partia Socjal-Demokratyczna (Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party, 1899-1924; 1928-1939)
UPSR	Ukraińska Partia Socjalistyczno-Radykalna (Ukrainian Socialist-Radical Party, 1890-1939)
UPP	Ukraińska Partia Pracy (Ukrainian Work Party, 1927-1930)

UNDO	Ukraińskie Zjednoczenie Narodowo-Demokratyczne (Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance, 1925-1939)
UWO	Ukraińska Organizacja Wojskowa (Ukrainian Military Organization, 1920-1933)
VB	Volksbund (People's League, Upper Silesia, 1922-1939)
Zmahannie	Walka o Interesy Włościan i Robotników "Zmahannie" (Struggle for the Interests of Peasants and Workers "Strife," 1927-1930)

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Chapter 1: The Question

When dealing with minority populations, a state's policy spectrum is broad, ranging from the active promotion and institutionalization of a country's multicultural population, to destructive policies of ethnic cleansing and mass deportations. Existing social sciences literature, however, has traditionally only grappled with these two extremes—that is, either a state's decision to peacefully include, or violently exclude, a minority group. But the empirical reality is more nuanced: political elites possess a far wider range of policy options, and focusing on one or both ends of the spectrum does not explain the varying fates minority groups endure, both within and across states. Only in extreme and rare cases are *entire* ethnic groups targeted with state policies, and, even when they are, significant subgroup variation persists.

This sharp variation in state response becomes apparent only when disaggregating the level of analysis. Put otherwise, scholars have typically analyzed conditions under which a state suppresses or supports a particular minority *group*. But these approaches cannot account for the frequent instances where a single minority group—whether restive or pacifist—is subjected to different, often contradictory policies. In other words, a state can deem a minority population innocuous while simultaneously persecuting many of its members. Conversely, a state can oppress those belonging to a loyalist minority group. What explains this contradictory behaviour? In short, treating entire ethnic groups as key political actors—as the literature has done—is misrepresentative. Groups do not forge alliances with states, nor do they directly receive resources, carry out political demonstrations, encourage or stifle collective action:

organizations that represent them undertake such actions. Thus to fully understand the complex nature of state-minority group relations, we must first recognize and analyze the varying ways in which a state's ruling political elite interacts with organization*s* that represent minority group interests. Focusing solely on group-level analyses masks significant and unexplained variation.

As the literature on civil wars and political violence suggests, ethnic groups do not always act as homogenous actors, and treating them as defined units with fixed, impermeable boundaries and shared political beliefs is misleading.[1] Members of a single ethnic group can join multiple and often rival organizations, while other groups fail to achieve any sort of collective action.[2] Furthermore, ties that transcend ethnicity—such as ideology, class, or religion—may be more important in mobilizing or alienating individuals belonging to an ethnic group. Although the literature on civil wars and ethnic conflicts has recognized that ethnic masses do not act as a single unit, this insight is overlooked in the scant literature on state interaction with ethnic minorities.

I address the gap in the literature by disaggregating the level of analysis from the ethnic group to organization level.[3] More specifically, I focus on how state authorities interact with potentially hostile ethnic minority groups—populations seeking secession, autonomy, increased rights, are anti-state, or have links with aggressive foreign powers—by focusing on the state's response to ethnic minority organizations. The variation I seek to understand is why some political organizations claiming to represent a restive ethnic group are *banned* by state authorities and

[1] Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
[2] Lars-Erik Cederman and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Introduction to Special Issue on 'Disaggregating Civil War,'" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no.4 (2009):487-495.
[3] For a similar disaggregated approach see Giovanni Capoccia, Lawrence Saez, and Eline De Rooij, "When State Responses Fail: Religion and Secessionism in India 1952-2002," *The Journal of Politics* 74, no.4 (2012):1010-1022.

excluded from public life, while others, which claim to represent the same ethnic group, are *allowed* to operate. Currently, well-established scholarly literature on state-ethnic minority group relations focuses on part of the puzzle: it takes the point of view that repression is central in managing opposition, and accordingly has focused only on the reasons why states ban certain organizations. The intent of this study, however, is to change this dominant perspective by examining the question using a different angle, asking why states *allow* minority ethnic organizations to operate. Indeed, not always do repressive regimes that have the capacity to ban organizations representing a restive minority do—repression is relatively infrequent and selective. Why?

The Argument in Synthesis: Divide and Rule

My contention is that if a multi-ethnic state is faced with a potentially hostile ethnic group, it will adopt a logic of ethnic minority management that closest resembles the age-old maxim "divide and conquer" (from the Latin *"divide et impera"*). Put otherwise, I argue that states prefer organizational pluralism in ethnic minorities over repression of them, even if repression is a viable option. And if plurality lacks within an ethnic group, a state might even promote it. Though the term "divide and conquer" carries with it a commonly understood meaning, this aspect of state interaction with ethnic minorities remains under-theorized, used laxly as a placeholder for a more complex set of ideas, which differ in their implementation, mechanisms, and implications.

Broadly, the divide and conquer strategy involves maintaining control over subordinates or potential opponents by creating or encouraging dissent between them, thereby preventing alliances that could challenge the state. By viewing state-ethnic minority group relations through

this lens, we can better understand the considerable subgroup variation in how states treat ethnic minorities and the organizations that claim to represent them. Regardless of ethnic group characteristics, and even if they are not perceived to be perilous, the state will create the conditions for a regulated rivalry between multiple organizations claiming to represent one ethnic group. Repression is *not* the first port of call.

Four observable implications can be derived from this theory: first, within each ethnic minority, there should be a majority of organizations that are not repressed by the state. Second, state actors should promote and maintain competitive organizational pluralism within each ethnic minority by exploiting existing intra-group cleavages, actively attempting to pit organizations against one another. Third, the state should strive to increase organizational pluralism, generate new divisions, even create loyalist organizations if only opposition ones exist. Fourth, we would expect that non-violent and non-fifth column organizations should also be repressed if they seek to suppress organization pluralism within the ethnic minority, or they seek to create a united front against the state in the name of the ethnic group.

I test this hypothesis on the case of interwar Poland (1918-1939). Poland was reborn in the aftermath of World War I, with about a third of its 30 million citizens belonging to minority groups. The state pursued aggressive group-level policies to assimilate its Ukrainian and Belarusian populations and created unfavourable conditions for Germans and Jews to encourage emigration. But when we look at the state's relationships to minority political organizations, a different picture is presented: only 15 of 77 were banned, and this variation was consistent across minority groups. To understand this puzzle, I examine the Ministry of Interior (Ministerstwo

Spraw Wewnętrznych, or MSW), the main organ responsible for formulating minority policies, and its strategies for governing Ukrainian, Belarusian, German, and Jewish political organizations throughout the interwar period. I elaborate on my theory and methods in Chapter 2. The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, the relevant literature is reviewed, followed by a discussion of how this project intends to address the gap. The chapter concludes by laying out the road map for the rest of the study.

The Literature: How Do States Interact with their Minorities?

A state can interact with its minorities in a variety of ways. Although the term "minority" encompasses a wide range of interpretations, this project focuses solely on the relationship between *ethnic* minorities and the state that they inhabit. Further clarification and definition will follow, but for now let us turn to the literature. The way in which the literature explains state response to minority ethnic organizations can be broken down into roughly four categories: regime type, ethnic group characteristics, and intergroup relations. The fourth category is a small subset of literature that analyzes state response to opposition or "enemy" organizations—not necessarily ethnic ones.

Regime type

Regime type is perhaps the most commonly cited explanation for how a state treats its minority populations. Generally speaking, it is presumed that the more democratic a state, the more rights a minority group is granted. There is, however, significant variation, even between democratic states. To help conceptualize this relationship between democracy and minority rights, Sammy Smooha summarizes the way in which democracies manage their minorities by outlining five

types of democracies: individual-liberal, republican-liberal, multicultural, consociational, and ethnic democracies.[4] In the first, individual-liberal democracies, a society is comprised of individuals who are united solely through a common citizenship. This common citizenship does not presuppose any sense of community, loyalty, solidarity, or relationship between either the individuals or the state; it is a collection of citizens who possess individual, not collective, rights or identities. This type of democracy exists only in the abstract. Republican-liberal democracies, however, are easily observable in the world today. Also known as civic nation-states, these systems impose a common language, culture, and identity on the population. Though individual rights are guaranteed, collective rights are not. The lack of the latter (and the ensuing institutional mechanisms that allow for groups to exist separately within a state) result in high rates of assimilation: ethnic identities are stifled, and a common civic community is fostered. Pure consociationalism, on the other hand, features a neutral state that does not favour one group over another: minority rights are recognized and maximized, and distinct identities are freely cultivated.[5] We would expect no assimilation to take place in consociational states. On the spectrum between liberal and consociational democracies we have multicultural democracies. These systems are "grounded on the recognition of ethnic differences but without making them official and without institutionalizing the essential mechanisms of consociationalism (autonomy, proportionality, veto power and the like)."[6] Multicultural democracies experience medium rates of assimilation, depending on how successful a minority group is in maintaining cohesion in the absence of official state support. Finally, ethnic democracies are a combination of "democracy for all" with the ascendancy of a particular, eponymous, national group. These states are known

[4] Sammy Smooha, "Types of Democracy and Modes of Conflict Management in Ethnically Divided Societies," *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no.4 (2002):423-431.
[5] Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
[6] Smooha, "Types of Democracy," 425.

as ethnic nation-states. In such cases, ethnicity, not citizenry, forms the basis of state identity, and preferred status is accorded to the majority group. Minority rights are granted so long as the group is perceived as non-threatening to the majority. Rates of assimilation in ethnic democracies vary, depending on the nature of state-minority group relations and the distribution of civil liberties.

On the other side of the spectrum we have non-ethnic autocracies, regimes in which all ethnic groups are more or less equally repressed: there is no preferential ethnic group. Ethnic autocracies, on the other hand, are systems in which minorities are not recognized; one majority group takes ownership of the state and exploits its control to further its own interests, regardless of the grievances of minorities.[7]

In summation, liberal democracies possess solely individual, rather than collective, identities; republican democracies foster a civic nation-state identity at the expense of ethnic diversity; multicultural democracies recognize but do not institutionalize minority rights; consociationalism legislates minority rights, with all groups equal and the state being neutral; ethnic democracies favour one ethnic group while in theory providing individual and collective minority rights for others; autocracies repress all ethnic groups equally; and finally, ethnic autocracies recognize only the majority ethnic group, exploiting the rest. These categorizations are helpful as a starting point for understanding the different conditions which minority groups experience across diverse states. However, such classification places overwhelming emphasis on regime type as the determinant variable of policies toward minorities, and thus are ill suited to

[7] Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, "Beyond Dictatorship and Democracy: Rethinking National Minority Inclusion and Regime Type in Interwar Eastern Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no.8-9 (2010):1089-1118.

explain the frequent instances wherein similar authorities of the same regime type respond differently to their minority groups. In other words, while regime types often stay constant, levels of repression or accommodation fluctuate, with various groups being targeted at different times within the same state.

Ethnic Group Characteristics

Beyond regime type, other scholars focus on domestic factors such as state and minority group characteristics to explain minority policies. One theoretical framework draws from the concept of "organic" or "essentialist" nationalism.[8] According to this framework, political actors believe ethnic groups are inherently different from one another and thus conflicting, and emphasis is placed on ancient ethnic hatreds and atavistic attachments between groups as a cause for incompatibly. Proponents posit a direct link between ascriptive characteristics and ethnic identities, where the latter produces ethnic politics that ultimately lead to ethnic conflict.[9] As a result of group differences and the resulting tensions, the majority group becomes skeptical of the minority's allegiance to the state, fearing clandestine fifth column activity or rebellion. The state thus implements policies to exclude or repress potentially disloyal minority groups. We observe this dynamic particularly in cases wherein the minority group is a diaspora population and possesses transnational ethnic linkages, kin, or homelands. This theory would predict that all nation-states discriminate, repress, or exclude their national minorities—a notion that is quickly dismissed with a cursory glance at reality.

[8] Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Norman Naimark *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).
[9] Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict Since 1945," *International Political Science Review* 14, no. 2 (1993): 161-201; (Gurr 1993; Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 17-18.

A slightly different approach to explaining state policies towards minorities is rooted in perceptions of cultural distance between the titular and minority groups. Minorities that are perceived as "similar" to the titular group are considered easier to assimilate, and in turn the state pursues policies to eliminate these "minor" group differences. This is common in situations where groups share a closely related history, religion, language, or culture. On the other hand, the decision not to assimilate a particular minority is based on the assumption that the group in question is far too dissimilar from the majority. Because of these extreme differences, assimilating the minority group into the majority core nation is thought to be unlikely or impossible. It is therefore more straightforward to target the minority with policies meant to encourage or force emigration. In very extreme cases, state-led destructive demographic engineering is carried out in the form of ethnic cleansing or mass deportations. We see in countries that promote a strong civic rather than national identity, however, that diverse and "distant" ethnic groups are able to readily assimilate into the civic majority by making their ethnic identity secondary to their national one.[10] Thus, minority policies cannot be dictated simply by how similar a group is to the majority population.

Political scientists also argue that a minority group's intrinsic features, such as the ethnic group's size, territorial concentration, grievances, and rootedness, determine the likelihood that a group will challenge a state.[11] The pith of the argument is that indigenous, territorially concentrated,

[10] A "civic state" refers to "the state of and for all of its citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity," Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 105. A "nation state" can be understood as "a state of and for a particular ethnocultural 'core nation' whose language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare, and political hegemony must be protected and promoted by the state" Ibid., 103.

[11] See for example Rogers Brubaker, "Aftermaths of Empire and the unmixing of peoples: Historical and comparative perspectives," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18, no. 2 (1995): 189-218; Monica Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel," 1993; Lars-Erik Cederman et al., "Triangulating horizontal inequality," *Journal of*

and large ethnic groups are more likely to demand self-determination than small, dispersed, and recently resettled populations. In the case of the former, it is difficult for a state to ignore large, boisterous, and demanding groups that claim historical legitimacy to rule over "their" territory. These characteristics provoke a response from the state in the form of assimilation, repression, or cooperation: whichever variant is most likely to squelch resistance. In the latter case, wherein groups are dispersed across the territory, small in numbers, newly settled, and complacent, the minority population is less likely to demand self-determination. Consequently, the group is perceived as non-threatening and is tolerated or accommodated by the state.

Intrinsic features of a minority group are not the only proposed explanation that point to group characteristics. The number of ethnic minority groups, particularly those that demand the right of self-determination, is also said to influence state response: countries with several groups demanding increased rights are less likely to accommodate their minority groups than states with fewer such groups, so as not to set a precedent and disrupt the status quo. In other words, if one minority is granted autonomy, it is likely that other minority groups within the state will follow suit. Thus if a country has several groups demanding extended rights, recognizing one group could result in a domino effect that could threaten state unity or territorial integrity.[12] Nonetheless, considerable subnational variation shows that different groups sharing similar characteristics are often treated differently by the state, forcing us to search for a more satisfying explanation.

Peace Research 52, no.6 (2011): 806-821; Lars-Erik Cederman et al., *Inequality, grievances, and civil war* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[12] Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18, no.4 (1994): 5-39; Barbara Walter, "Bargaining Failures and Civil War," *Annual Review of Political Science,* no.12 (2009):243-261; Barbara Walter, *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts are so Violent* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Intergroup dynamics

Another theoretical framework points to intergroup dynamics, claiming that the relationship between majority and minority groups—and the ensuing state policies—is affected by a "status reversal."[13] A status reversal occurs in societies where a rearrangement of ethnic hierarchies results in a switch in power relationships, meaning that the group previously in power is now governed by the group it once dominated. This is characteristic of foreign occupations, where the occupier rearranges hierarchies, so that those previously subjugated are placed in positions of power. In other words, the oppressed becomes the oppressor.

Harris Mylonas, in deciphering minority policies in nation-building states, argues less along the lines of target group characteristics or minority-majority group dynamics.[14] Instead, focus is placed on the perceived relationship between the target group and foreign states. In contexts wherein a minority group is allied with a host state's enemy, the minority group is more likely than others to be targeted for exclusion or assimilation polices, depending on whether the host state seeks to maintain the status quo or revise territorial borders. Similarly, Rogers Brubaker examines the interplay between national minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands in what he coined a "triadic nexus."[15] Though helpful in understanding policies that states may choose to pursue vis-à-vis their ethnic minorities, these arguments treat entire groups as homogeneous political actors, therefore overlooking the significant subgroup variation. The subsequent sections elaborate on this shortcoming, and others, in the existing literature.

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[13] Roger Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
[14] Harris Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
[15] Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups.*

State Response to Opposition Organizations

To-date, the theoretical research on state repression of opposition movements has largely been rationalist and structuralist in nature. The rationalist argument posits that a state weighs the costs and benefits of coercive action, and if the costs exceed the benefits, repressive action will not take place. This is based, however, on the false assumption that the state is a purely rational actor, when it is not. Empirically, there are countless examples of when a state acts irrationally and against expectations. Similarly, work on state repression tends to be structuralist because it is held that certain political and economic contexts within which a state operates directly influence the state's "rational" decision-making calculus. The most typical structural characteristics cited include regime type (e.g. democracy, autocracy), international political context, group characteristics, and military capacity. Again, these structural explanations do not reflect the dynamic and complex empirical reality on the ground. Often, a regime's structural characteristics remain constant, yet repression fluctuates, or vice versa. Thus a purely rational cost-benefit analysis based on structural variables does not suffice in explaining state action.

There are two conditions generally agreed upon in the literature on state response to "enemy" organizations that result in an organization overstepping the parameters of what is permissible, and in turn is banned by the state. The first justification for repressing a political organization comes as no surprise: if an organization resorts to violence, the state will ban it. This is true across all regime types, whether democratic or otherwise. To repress an organization the government must have reason to believe that an organization is capable and willing to carry out violent tactics, and in order to do so, it bases its decision on available evidence such as: the

organization is structured along military lines and/or operates clandestinely or the organization uses violent, anti-state rhetoric. This rhetoric can be used by the organization's leaders in public speeches and rallies, outlined in the organization's doctrine, or used as part of their propaganda—all warranting state repression. The second justification for banning an organization is if the organization is supported or controlled by a foreign state—that is, it is a fifth column organization. Justifications for banning organizations for receiving outside support are rooted in the general principle of sovereignty. Organizations should be responsive to their followers in the state in which they operate, not to foreign powers. Outside control violates a state's right to self-rule.[16]

Indeed, perhaps the only agreed-upon finding in the literature is that threatened governments generally respond with force. This intuitively correct finding is robust across space, time, context, and has come to be known as the "Law of Coercive Responsiveness."[17] So although it is clear that authorities tend to respond to threats by banning an organization, it remains unclear how this process works. What precisely do authorities perceive? What are they responding to? And why are some seemingly threatening organizations not repressed, particularly those with foreign ties, yet ones that appear non-threatening are? It is tempting to selectively look into the past and claim *ex post facto* that an organization was banned for its threatening profile. History,

[16] For a comprehensive literature review on the use of legal restrictions on political expression and participation to curb extremist actors in democratic regimes see Giovanni Capoccia, "Militant Democracy: The Institutional Bases of Democratic Self-Preservation," *Annual Review of Law and Social Science,* vol.9 (2013):207-226; Nancy Rosenblum, *On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 426-28, 448. See also Samuel Issacharoff, *Fragile Democracies: contested power in the era of constitutional courts* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
[17] Christian Davenport, *State Repression and Domestic Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

however, should be read "forward" and not "backward."[18] Selecting on the dependent variable, working backwards, and asking why an organization was subjected to a specific policy will not necessarily yield the same answers as if we were to flip the question and instead ask why organizations that *could* have easily been targeted with the same state policies were not—i.e. we must examine "the dog that did not bark." By taking a systematic approach, one that considers a full spectrum of organizations and their relationship with the state, we will be better positioned to uncover what impacts a government's response to minority groups.

Though insightful, the arguments expounded in existing scholarship lose much of their explanatory power when the question of subgroup variation is introduced. By not addressing this significant variation in how states manage their minorities, our current understanding fails to explain the more nuanced reality. The reason for this gap is that scholars tend to conflate state policies targeted at minority organizations with ones directed at minority groups. Equating organization-level policies with group-level ones, however, is analytically misleading for several reasons. First, it assumes that the overwhelming majority of individuals "belonging" to an ethnic group support the organization targeted by the state. In reality, however, many or most individuals are ambivalent, neutral, or hold different or opposing views to that of the organization claiming to represent them. Overwhelming and unequivocal popular support by a group for one organization is atypical; indeed, a state's action towards a minority group organization is often met with indifference among the minority populace at large. [19] Second,

[18] Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, "The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond," *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no.8-9 (2010):931-968.
[19] For a discussion on the multidimensionality of identities see Peter A. Hall, "Preference Formation as a Political Process: The Case of Monetary Union in Europe," in *Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection Between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism,* eds. Ira Katzenlson and Barry R. Weingast (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005), 129-160.

ethnic groups do not act as a cohesive whole: they are fragmented, often containing different, competing factions. Thus it is incorrect to assume that by repressing, for example, one nationalist organization, a state is repressing an entire group; it is not necessarily the group that the state perceives as a threat, but rather that specific organization. Indeed, a state is often more willing to cooperate with one organization over another, even when both organizations claim to represent the same ethnic minority group.

Sometimes the inappropriate conflation of organization repression with group repression is partially the result of a historiography developed by individuals belonging to, or having connections with, persecuted organizations. Put otherwise, when the conversation is led by those who have been persecuted by the state "in the name of their ethnic group," biased historical accounts and unwarranted connections are forged between the suppression of an organization and the discriminatory treatment of the group as a whole. A partially distorted picture of history results: a repressed organization claims martyrdom for the entire ethnic group, when in actuality, there existed alternative organizations which, though their presence perhaps not as histrionic, experienced different fates, represented different segments of the population and had an alternative relationship with the state. These "details," however, are sometimes, perhaps often, overlooked in some historical accounts.

Similarly, it is incorrect to assume that banning a political party representing a minority ethnic group is an attack on the *entire* group. A political party, although marching under an ethnic banner, could be viewed by state authorities as dangerous for ideological—not ethnic—reasons. Likewise, a state's selective support for an ethnic minority group organization should not be

interpreted as support for the entire group, nor is it necessarily an attempt to co-opt, infiltrate, or influence the minority; states may seek accommodation with some organizations to undermine others. Finally, and most importantly, treating entire ethnic groups as key political actors—as the literature has done—is misrepresentative. Groups do not forge alliances with states, nor do they directly receive resources, carry out political demonstrations, encourage or stifle collective action: *organizations* that represent them undertake such actions. Therefore, the theoretical and empirical focus on group-level analyses has resulted in distorted conclusions and significant unexplained variation. To capture the complex nature of state-minority group relations, it is essential to understand the varying ways in which a state's ruling political elite interacts with organizations that represent minority group interests.

In sum, there is a clear benefit in disaggregating and differentiating between ethnic minority groups and organizations that claim to represent them. The mere paucity of literature on the relationship between the state and political organizations that represent ethnic minorities does not indicate that the research agenda should not move into this uncharted territory. Let us take the literature on ethnic conflict and civil wars as an example. This area of study has traditionally focused on macro-level explanations, pointing to the supposedly inherently competitive and antagonistic relations between ethnic groups as a cause of polarization and conflict. This literature, however, has evolved significantly in the last two decades, and, despite its scattered and oft-contradictory nature, has produced a wealth of new and important insights. One of the most influential developments was the micro-political turn in the study of political violence, which advocates for disaggregated, systematic empirical and theoretical research.[20] This research agenda has revealed that the dynamics of civil wars are far more nuanced and

[20] Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence in Civil War*.

complicated than we had previously believed. As a result, we now speak more cautiously when using group-level concepts, realizing that, though they are distinct categories, ripe for analysis, they can—and often do—oversimplify the more complicated dynamics driving political violence on the ground.

Similarly, to reach new and important insights in the study of state-minority group relations, we must go beyond macro, group-level approaches. Not only will this approach reveal previously unobserved and unexplained variation, as well as illuminate more precisely the inner workings of a state and its administration, it can also yield policy relevant insights. For one, states, relatively speaking, seldom pursue group-level policies when interacting with minorities. Once we have a better grasp on how states interact with minorities through organizations, we will be able to understand the impact of a state's minority policies, and thus be better equipped to answer questions like: what strategies work best in quelling tensions and preventing violence? What is the impact of state response on organization fate, and how does this influence state-ethnic group relations? What organizations are likely to promote inter-ethnic cooperation, and which are likely to fuel polarization? As mentioned above, current literature only takes us a certain distance in explaining how multi-ethnic states interact with minority organizations. The literature on state-ethnic group relations is not fine-grained enough, thus missing the unit of analysis, and the literature on state response to opposition organizations (not necessarily ethnic organizations) approaches the puzzle from the wrong perspective. The only way to answer these important questions is to shift the focus away from state-ethnic group relations, instead placing the emphasis on the dynamics between states and ethnic group organizations, asking why states

allow for them to exist. This project strives to accomplish just that using the case of Poland between the two World Wars.

The Plan of the Thesis

The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 will expand on my theory of state response to minority ethnic group organizations, as well as outline the hypotheses and observable implications of my theory and of rival explanations. The second part of Chapter 2 discusses my methodology. Chapter 3 will begin by providing the necessary historical context on the interwar Polish case. The rest of Chapter 3 is a quantitative analysis testing conventional theories of state response to organizations, preparing the reader for the core of the dissertation, which will be a historical-comparative analysis. Chapter 4 discusses group-level minority policies in the Eastern Borderlands, "the *kresy,"* territories inhabited by large numbers of Ukrainians and Belarusians. Chapters 4 through 8 are divided according to minority group, beginning with Ukrainians, followed by Belarusians, Germans, and Jews. These chapters are all structured similarly: first, they begin by outlining the minority group's political movement, followed by a discussion of the Polish state's response to their organizations. Then, using systematic process analysis, each historical-comparative chapter will test my theory of state response to minority group organizations against rival explanations. Chapter 9 is devoted to exploring the external validity of my findings and discussing how my results apply beyond the case of interwar Poland. I conclude by offering broader theoretical and methodological implications that can be derived from this study.

Chapter 2: Theory and Methods

Despite its centrality in understanding the true nature of state-ethnic group relations, government interaction with minority ethnic organizations remains under-theorized and under-described in the political science literature. This chapter presents a hypothesis which shifts focus away from entire ethnic groups, instead casting its focus on political organizations that claim to represent them. The theory seeks to explain why some organizations are banned, while others that claim to represent the same minority group are allowed to operate legally. I argue that in the case of multi-ethnic states—whether democratic or not—a state *prefers* a plurality of organizations representing one or each minority ethnic group, particularly if the minority group is restive. Using the logic of divide and conquer, states will encourage organizational plurality among a certain ethnic group in order to ensure a united opposition cannot legitimately threaten the state. Although I do not disagree with the cost-benefit logic that is at the basis of the repression literature, I argue that applying the logic of repression as a *first resort* for stifling restive ethnic minorities approaches the question from the wrong angle. I contend that the default state policy in a multi-ethnic state is plurality, not repression—that is, states seek pluralism, not repression, as a first resort. Viewing it from this perspective, repression is only a small part of the story: it is carried out in extreme cases, such as when minority ethnic organizations resort to violent tactics or are perceived as fifth column organizations.

Before venturing into the theoretical framework, this chapter begins by defining the dependent variable, terms, and scope of the dissertation. It then turns to the main hypothesis and observable

implications. The second part of the chapter is devoted to discussing research design and methodology.

Dependent Variable: Allow or Ban Ethnic Minority Organizations

State repression, in general, has been defined and conceptualized in several ways. For example, repressing an organization can involve the non-violent curtailment of its civil liberties (e.g. outlawing the organization, closing its headquarters, banning it from participation in elections). Such measures, on the whole, can be referred to as discriminatory policies. Though small-scale arrests of organization leadership may take place, sanctioned state violence is not always used. A more severe degree of repression involves extralegal violence, that is, the "actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices, or institutions."[1] Violent repression includes killings, kidnappings, violent interrogation, politically motivated mass arrests, large-scale deportations (internal and external), and essentially anything that involves the physical destruction or forced removal of an organization and its support base. Though all of these characteristics fall under the category of "repression," *violent* repression is extreme and more unusual than repression of the nonviolent variety. The most common form of state repression is simply to outlaw and exclude an organization from public life. This also applies to democratic regimes: in the words of Samuel Issacharoff, formal exclusion and "proscription of political parties that fail to accept some fundamental tenet of the social

[1] Christian Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," *Annual Review of Political Science,* vol. 10 (2007):2; RJ Goldstein, *Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present* (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1978).

order...has come to represent the typical response to antidemocratic threats."[2] Though I will note and discuss instances of violent state repression, this analysis focuses on the more common, non-violent, form of repression: banning an organization. In the case of interwar Poland, the Ministry of Interior would "liquidate" an organization that it banned. Most often this entailed outlawing the organization from public space, including meetings, rallies, press outlets; searching local offices and headquarters; searching the homes of organization members for incriminating evidence, such as "propaganda literature" or weapons; arresting members (though usually only the most active ones); orchestrating show trials for the most prominent organization activists; and in later years, political prisoners were sent to the Bereza Kartuska concentration camp, established in 1934. State violence was reserved for only the most severe cases, such as the 1930 "pacification" campaign carried out in Ukrainian-inhabited Eastern Galicia, yet even then, widespread violence was not officially sanctioned.

"Allowing" an organization to operate is self-explanatory. There are no laws in place to specifically obstruct the minority organization's legal activity. A state might monitor the organization, deem it suspicious, conduct searchers or use hostile rhetoric towards the organization, but it is never formally banned. Indeed, it is commonplace for states, democratic or otherwise, to monitor all organizations operating on its territory and such government action is not considered repressive for the purposes of this study. Legal organizations are thus allowed to form political parties and participate in elections, and governing authorities may even take into account propositions put forward by these organizations when forming policies. The state might cooperate with an organization, negotiate with its leaders, make concessions, or accommodate

[2] Samuel Issacharoff, *Fragile Democracies: contested power in the era of constitutional courts* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 78-9.

some or all of the organization's demands. Engagement, however, is not always necessary: the state could also take a laissez-faire approach to the organization's existence. Simply put, if an organization is not banned, it is allowed to operate.

Defining the Terms

Minority Group

The term "minority group" carries with it several unwarranted assumptions and inaccurate connotations. In this project I use the term "minority" to refer to a category of people that is differentiated from the social majority, or those who hold the bulk of positions of social power in a society. It is important to note that, defined this way, a minority group does not necessarily refer to a minority in terms of population size. I also limit myself to examining minority *ethnic* groups. In the narrower sense of the term, ethnic groups refer to individuals who share common attributes and origins, whether perceived or real, and others recognize these individuals as plausible members of the group to which they claim to belong.[3] These identities are therefore both self-ascribed and ascribed by others.[4] Relevant markers of ethnicity include, but are not limited to, religion, language, and culture. Ethnic groups are different from smaller units such as clans or kinship groups, because, like nations, they are "imagined communities," and their members "will never know most of their fellow members, meet them or even hear of them."[5]

[3] David Laitin, *Identity in Formation: the Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 17.
[4] Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Oslo:Universitetsforlaget, 1969), 11-13.
[5] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso,1983), 6.

Minority Political Organizations

Minority groups can organize themselves in several ways. They can have formal institutions such as cultural societies or political associations, or informal institutions such as family or clan networks, which can be more or less hierarchical and more or less cohesive.[6] This project focuses on political organizations and political parties, that is, organizations with a network that brings together individuals in a political context, characterized by a desire to further minority political[7] demands. These demands can be either territorial or non-territorial, and can be made in cooperation with or in opposition to the state within which they reside. While territorial claims include autonomy or secession,[8] non-territorial demands range from legislated minority rights to institutionalized political representation at the national level.

Focusing on ethnic political associations requires that we differentiate between political associations in general and ones that claim to represent ethnic minorities specifically. In short, a political party is "a group organized to contest for public office," meaning it seeks to participate in government, rather than influence or overthrow it. This distinguishes political parties from revolutionary movements, clandestine political associations, or interest groups.[9] When dealing with minority ethnic associations, however, we must alter this definition slightly. For one, minority ethnic political associations are generally not organized to govern; they do not seek to replace a government, but rather contest it in the interest of the ethnic group they claim to represent. Ethnic organizations aim to organize and mobilize social groups, appealing to their

[6] Michael Hechter, *Principles of Group Solidarity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
[7] Here I define political as "of or relating to government, a government, or the conduct of government." *Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online*, 2014, s.v. "political," http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/political.
[8] Harris Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 28.
[9] Nancy Rosenblum, *On the Side of the Angels: An appreciation of parties and partisanship* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 20.

partisan base by claiming to advocate the interests of their own group. The organization can advocate for the exclusion of other groups or be in staunch opposition to the state. Ethnic organizations compete for their share of public benefits and support, as well as to influence the government in their favour, demanding rights ranging from cultural to territorial autonomy.[10] I focus on political organizations because they are the chief mouthpiece and agitator for minority group demands and are an important point for minority mobilization as well as a major factor in minority politics. Minority political organizations operate in the public political arena—both covertly and overtly—and the puzzle I seek to solve is why some such organizations, many of which challenge and threaten the state—are not repressed, while other seemingly similar ones are not.

Though a distinction can be made between political "party" and "association," for the purposes of this study, both are included in the analysis because it is not always possible to decipher whether the organization intended to run for elections, especially if it was banned in its early years.[11] The selection criteria focus on all ethnic minority organizations that have a political purpose, that claim to represent the rights and interests of a particular ethnic minority, and that interact—whether violently or not, covertly or overtly—with the state. For the sake of convenience, the terms "political organization," "political association," "organization," and to a lesser extent "party," will be used interchangeably. Finally, when referring to "organizational pluralism" among minority ethnic groups, I am referring to the belief that there should be diverse

[10] Ibid., 417.
[11] For example, Capoccia, Saez, and de Rooij consider a regional political actor a "party" when a political "group" states its intention to run for a national election, "unless it only came into being a few years before its first election (thus clearly intending to be a party), or is banned from participating in elections, but would clearly do so if not banned" Giovanni Capoccia et al., "When State Responses Fail: Religion and Secessionism in India 1952-2002," *The Journal of Politics* 74, no.4 (2010): appendix.

and competing organizations operating within a state's political arena, and that several organizations should represent one ethnic group.

The State

There are three important points to consider when referring to "the state" in this project. First, I follow Weber's definition of a modern state as a political organization whose administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory, regardless of whether that legitimacy derives from charisma, law, or tradition.[12] Second, a common thread running through most of the explanations in the literature on state-minority ethnic group relations is the presence of a dominant group, or what can be called a "core nation" or "nation type." The dominant group, as defined by Rogers Brubaker, is the group that claims legitimate "ownership" over the state, conceiving it as a state "*of* and *for* the core nation."[13] The core nation is thus the principal reference population, whose identity is actively promoted as the state's dominant group, and the political strategies pursued by state actors serve first and foremost in the interest of the core nation. Third, when referring to the state, I indicate members of the ruling political organization that have the military and administrative capacity to enforce decisions within its state's borders. The terms "state," "state actors," "government," "authorities," and "ruling elite" will be used interchangeably.

Scope Conditions

From the above definitions, we can deduce some scope conditions. First, this analysis only applies to states with a "national core" or "dominant" group. In other words, the findings of this

[12] Max Weber, *Max Weber: Selections in Translation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
[13] Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1996), 5.

study apply to multi-national states in which there is a titular majority. The second scope condition is a general and obvious one: the state must possess an ethnic minority population, as well as at least one organization that claims to represent the non-core group. The analysis is indifferent to the size of the group or number of organizations that represent it, though the larger and more numerous, the more interesting and significant the variation tends to be. It is also important to note that I am specifically observing the dynamics between state and minority ethnic populations, and not necessarily between state and opposition groups in general. If an organization is in opposition to the state, I include it in the analysis only if the organization rallies along minority ethnic lines. Furthermore, I am interested in the entire spectrum of minority group organizations, both pro and anti-state.

Finally, the state must have the administrative and/or military capacity to carry out a set of minority policies within its borders. The concept of state capacity has provoked a range of competing interpretations.[14] Generally, state capacity is understood as "the capacity to create and maintain order over a sovereign territory, which in turn entails the capacity to enact measures to protect its sovereignty such as raising taxes, declaring war, and administering legal justice."[15] State capacity also depends on a state's "authority and legitimacy, wherein the state's right to make authoritative decisions is popularly accepted, and the state is still routinely viewed as the main organ through which problems are solved and society is steered." In terms of its

[14] For detailed analysis see Martin Painter and Jon Pierre, eds., *Challenges to State Policy Capacity: Global Trends and Comparative Perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); for conceptual discussion see Matthew Kocher, "State Capacity as a Conceptual Variable," *Yale Journal of International Affairs* Spring/Summer (2010):137-145.
[15] Felicity Matthews, "Governance and State Capacity," in *The Oxford Handbook of Governance,* ed. David Levi-Faur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

administrative capacity, a state should be able to "effectively achieve its chosen policy outcomes."[16]

State capacity can be measured by "the government's police and military capabilities and the reach of government institutions into rural areas."[17] Strong states are often identified with a centralized government, both territorially and administratively. Wealth and fiscal capacity, such as the ability to tax citizens, are also traits attributed to strong states.[18] The rationale is straightforward: accomplishing policy goals of almost any kind requires resources, legitimacy, and perhaps military or police force. Conversely, weak states are associated with ineffective political and bureaucratic systems as well as poverty.[19] It must be noted, however, that state capacity in my argument is not a structural explanatory variable (i.e. strong states will repress, weak ones will not) but rather, the state must possess enough capacity whereby repression of minority organizations is a viable option. In other words, it is not pluralism by default, but pluralism by preference.[20]

In short, though I am not necessarily interested in the outcomes of these policies, the feasibility to implement them is a necessary condition for the analysis. This requirement is meant to filter out cases of failed states, state collapse, civil war and violent internecine conflict, all of which

[16] Ibid., 281.
[17] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no.1 (2003):75-90.
[18] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 2000); Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back in,* eds., Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
[19] Ann Hironaka, *Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).
[20] Lucan Way, *Pluralism By Default* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015). Way argues that pluralism in "new democracies" is often grounded less in democratic leadership or emerging civil society and more in the failure of authoritarianism in post-Soviet states. Dynamic competition, according to Way, frequently emerges because autocrats lack the state capacity to steal elections, impose censorship, or repress opposition.

present very different conditions under which state-minority ethnic group relations develop and culminate. With the above definitions and scope conditions in mind, let us turn to the argument.

Divide and Rule: Hypothesis and Observable Implications

Chapter 1 discussed the shortcomings of the existing body of scholarship on government treatment of ethnic minorities. Indeed, this literature on state-ethnic minority relations focuses on group-level explanations and thus does not take into consideration variation at the level of individual organizations. The literature on state responses to opposition organizations—not necessarily to *ethnic* organizations—contends that states will repress an "enemy" organization under two conditions: first, if the organization uses violent tactics, and second, if it is perceived as a fifth column organization.[21] The latter two arguments emerge from a focus on *repression*: that is, a state will suppress an organization it deems a threat to national security, while tolerating the remaining organizations because repressing them all would be too costly or require too much state capacity. Yet, is a lack of state capacity the only factor limiting repression of all organizations that represent a certain ethnic minority? Do the preferences of state actors play any role in the management of ethnic diversity? In some cases, non-violent and non-fifth column organizations are also banned, raising further questions about state preference of ethnic minority organizations. The existing repression literature fails to capture this phenomenon, and these important questions merit further examination. I argue that the only way to understand this puzzle is to switch the theoretical angle from a near-exclusive focus on repression, to a broader

[21] For a comprehensive literature review on the use of legal restrictions on political expression and participation to curb extremist actors in democratic regimes see Giovanni Capoccia, "Militant Democracy: The Institutional Bases of Democratic Self-Preservation," *Annual Review of Law and Social Science,* vol.9 (2013):207-226; Nancy Rosenblum, *On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 426-28, 448. See also Samuel Issacharoff, *Fragile Democracies: contested power in the era of constitutional courts* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

one which includes state actors' preference towards the management of potentially hostile ethnic minorities.

The core of my argument is that states *prefer* organizational pluralism in ethnic minorities. Unlike traditional theories of state response to organizations and ethnic groups, I contend that the default state policy in a multi-ethnic state is plurality, not repression. And if a plurality of ethnic minority organizations does not exist, the state will promote it. The basic logic driving this is the same as the age-old divide and conquer strategy. In Book III, Chapter XI of *Discourses on Livy,* Niccolo Machiavelli concludes from the Roman example that:

> …when many powerful persons are united against one, who, although no match for the others collectively, is also powerful, the chances are more in favour of this single and less powerful person, than of the many who together are much stronger…it will always happen that, by exercising a little dexterity, the one will be able to divide the many, and weaken the force which was strong while it was united.

In this excerpt, Machiavelli captures the essence of divide and conquer. Julius Caesar famously used this tactic to defeat the Gauls during the Gaelic War, and European colonial powers employed it to foster discord and conflict among racial and ethnic groups they hoped to conquer, frequently exploiting class and religious cleavages. In seizing India, for instance, British imperialists exploited the animosity between Hindus and Muslims as a premeditated stratagem to weaken unity and neutralize collective resistance from Indians. In the African colonies of Rwanda and Burundi, Germany and Belgium were condemned for orchestrating and polarizing the divide between Tutsis and Hutus, which ultimately played a decisive and deadly role in genocide in those states in the 1990s. History is rife with examples of successful—if morally questionable—implementations of divide and conquer. In this study, I examine how this logic

fits at the subnational level.

In the context of managing ethnic diversity, the underlying logic of divide and conquer is that a state, when faced with a restive ethnic minority group, will strive to maintain, create, and encourage as many different organizations that claim to represent a single minority ethnic group as possible. Though claiming to represent the same ethnic group, these organizations often possess different ideological beliefs, political platforms, ideals, goals, and tactics. They may be loyal or oppositional to the regime, could receive different sources of funding and support, as well as petition the government for different demands, ranging from cultural autonomy to secession. The state's objective, then, is to pit such organizations against one another, diminishing the possibility that they unite in opposition to the government. The greater the number of different voices fighting to speak for one group, the more likely that intra-organization fragmentation and conflict will result. The more antagonism between the organizations—whether potential or real—the more beneficial it is for the state. The hypothesis I put forward, therefore, takes a new perspective on state-minority ethnic group relations. Rather than a state wanting to repress minority ethnic group organization, the logic of divide and conquer predicts the opposite. I contend that a state in fact *prefers* pluralism among minority ethnic groups and encourages it where it does not exist. In other words, a multi-national state will tend to use the divide and conquer strategy as its means of rule; repression will only be used in extreme circumstances.

Table 2.1. Main Hypothesis

Divide and Rule Hypothesis
Hypothesis: If the state is faced with a potentially hostile ethnic group it would prefer organizational pluralism to divide and conquer the minority, even if state repression is a viable option.

If the hypothesis put forward is correct, we should expect the following four main observable implications:

I. Within each ethnic minority, there should be a majority of organizations that are not repressed.

If a state prefers pluralism, it will not repress most of its ethnic minority organizations. This notion is also predicted by the literature on state response to opposition organizations, but sits uneasy with group-based literature, which does not address organization-level variation. Generally speaking, strong liberal democracies allow for anti-government activism, so long as rhetoric does not transform into violent upheaval, and provided that the organization does not have links with foreign enemies. Failing these two criteria, however, organizations should be allowed to operate freely—I expect states to ban minority organizations only when they resort to violence or are deemed fifth columns.

To accept the main hypothesis, we thus expect that the majority of non-violent, non-fifth column organizations will be allowed to operate. Two observable implications would falsify the main hypothesis: first, there is no evidence of organizational pluralism, and most non-violent, non-fifth column organizations are repressed. Second, there is clear process tracing evidence at the policy-making level that state actors seek to repress all or most organizations, but that their ability to do so is thwarted due to a lack of state capacity. It is important to note here that, although the proportions of repressed versus non-repressed organizations within each ethnic group may be observationally equivalent with theories of state repression, the reasons behind

these numbers can differ sharply. In other words, simply counting the number of minority organizations operating in a state will not suffice to explain *why* they are allowed to operate—that is, whether it is the result of a cost-benefit analysis or because state actors prefer plurality. Therefore, only detailed historical analysis via process tracing can falsify this hypothesis through uncovering the reasons behind the numbers.

II. State actors should foment and exploit existing divisions between organizations within an ethnic minority group.

III. State actors should create, support, or promote, new divisions in the minority, even creating loyalist organizations if none exist.

State actors should enact policies to create, support, promote, or maintain organizational pluralism within each ethnic minority. State actors can also create conflictual/competitive pluralism within each ethnic minority, pitting organizations against each other, by supporting organizations with antagonistic goals over existing ones, and even creating loyalist organizations if mainly enemy ones exist within a certain minority.

Dividing and conquering ethnic minority organizations thus entails two basic techniques: first, it requires encouraging or fostering feuds among smaller organizations to prevent them from offering a united front against the state; and second, the state should aid, promote, and create loyalist and pacifist factions that are willing to cooperate with the government. With regards to the former point, oftentimes the state need not create dissent, as significant intra-ethnic

competition between organizations may already be present. Indeed, there is nothing simpler than exploiting divisions that already exist. This kind of political maneuvering requires a comprehensive understanding of the organizations that are being manipulated. Indeed, to foster feuds, the state must understand the political and social histories of the organizations and the ethnic groups they claim to represent. It thus requires significant state capacity to monitor these organizations, to gather information about them, and to decipher and prevent probable allegiances, while simultaneously exploiting and promoting potential rifts. This policy calls for an understanding of which of the potentially many cleavages, when activated, are most likely prevent a unified effort that could challenge the state.

A common way of segmenting a cohesive community is by instigating distrust and confusion among rival organizations, since suspicion erodes unity. One of the most effective ways in creating suspicion among rival factions is to create situations in which one organization can accuse another of "collaborating" with the state. This, of course, only applies to opposition organizations, since receiving support from the state would compromise such an organization's claims of being "anti-state." Favouring one organization by providing it state resources, as well as by making concessions, releasing imprisoned members, assigning government positions if the organization is a political party, and infiltrating the organization with government agents, are but a few of the most effective ways a state can entice suspicion between rival opposition organizations representing the same ethnic group.

The same logic extends to radical opposition organizations. It is often assumed that a state does not repress an avowedly anti-state organization because it lacks capacity or funds to do so. But it

is important to look at this from a different angle: a state may curtail a potentially harmful organization, yet this does not necessarily indicate that the state seeks, yet is unable, to liquidate it altogether. Instead, the state may choose to moderate the organization's public influence while simultaneously allowing it to operate covertly. A radical organization, though fundamentally at odds with the state, can actually benefit a state's particularistic interests by helping to fuel intra-movement competition and fragmentation, chiefly between hardliners and moderates. Because radicals are, by definition, less willing to compromise on their political goals and methods, the presence of a radical organization and at least one additional organization representing the same ethnic group will ensure intra-organization conflict. This internal rift increases the organizations' vulnerability, sowing disunity and confusion not only among members of the organizations but also among the ethnic group at large, in turn hindering its ability to combat the state with an effective, unified front. Generally, the state might allow a radical organization to function if it supports its interest of promoting plurality, but, in other cases, when a radical organization is particularly threatening, the state may ban it officially, continue monitoring it closely, but allow it to operate covertly to keep the same effect described above.

Further, if plurality does not exist, we expect the state to encourage it. This could be done in several ways. First, the state can create organizations, either ones that are loyalist or that have antagonistic goals vis-à-vis existing organizations, particularly anti-state ones. Second, state actors can intervene and support an organization in critical moments if the organization's demise would endanger the existing plurality. The government can do so by funding the organization, providing it resources, cooperating with the organization, promoting it, or giving it legitimacy through granting government posts to its members. Such a policy would benefit a state in several

ways, both directly and indirectly. Directly, a co-opted organization can actively propagate a state's political goals and interests. More specifically, a pro-government organization can benefit a state by promoting state-minority group cooperation, state loyalty, assimilation, and/or by standing in opposition to minority groups advocating for self-determination, autonomy, or secession. Loyalist organizations can also willingly relinquish information to the state about the minority group's activity, as well as provide intelligence on rival organizations. The state could also create or infiltrate loyalist organizations in order to increase influence over the ethnic group as a whole by placing its own agents within the minority organizations.

Supporting or creating loyalist organizations, or allowing for radical ones to operate covertly, is not the only means through which a state can maintain or promote pluralism. Supporting or cooperating with moderate minority organizations also benefits the state, even if the organization's political goals are in opposition to state interests. Though not entirely radical in their goals, moderate organizations, even though they are not necessarily loyalist, may be tolerated by the state. Allowing a moderate organization or political party to operate gives minority groups an additional channel through which individuals can voice their concerns or demands. In the absence of moderate organizations, there is an increased risk that members of an ethnic group would support more radical, perhaps violent, movements, particularly if they are in opposition to the state. Therefore, it is in the state's interest to ensure the presence of moderate organizations, as it increases plurality and mitigates the chance that more extreme organizations will rise to prominence.

Several observable implications arise. First, we should be able to identify historical evidence of a state favouring organizational pluralism among minority ethnic groups. Evidence of this would be found in statements made by state actors, both in private and public discussions, where the notion of ethnic minority organizational pluralism is supported. Indirect evidence of a state's preference for plurality would be a state not disturbing it if it already exists. A second observable implication of this hypothesis is that a state actively creates or supports ethnic minority organizations. Evidence of this is clearly demonstrated through the presence of state-supported organizations: a state would not support or create ethnic minority organizations if it did not seek plurality. Third, we expect to identify active strategies of state actors pitting one organization against another. Once again, detailed process tracing is required. The intentions of state actors' decisions and actions must be clear: funding an organization, for example, may not only be evidence of organizational support, but also a strategy to create suspicion and dissent among organizations by siding with one organization over another, extending concessions to some while discriminating against others.

To falsify this hypothesis, we expect to find evidence of the opposite: a prevalent indication at the policy-making level of state actors not wanting pluralism; no examples of the state actively creating, supporting, promoting, or maintaining organizational pluralism within each ethnic minority; and no evidence of a state attempting to create dissent among organizations. To find confirmations of such policies, I consult de-classified state archival materials at the policy-making level.

IV. Non-violent, and non-fifth column organizations should also be repressed by the state if the organization seeks to suppress organizational pluralism within the ethnic minority, i.e. they want to create a united front for the minority.

Simply put, an organization that seeks to create a united front is antithetical to a state's divide and conquer stratagem and interferes with the state's desire for organizational pluralism. When I say "uniting organizations," I am not referring to loose coalitions or cooperation between organizations, but rather the merger of several organizations or their unification under a single umbrella organization. The result of formally consolidating organizations is often more enduring than forming loose coalitions or cooperation with other groups, since the latter forms of collaboration are comparatively more likely to fragment and dissolve, as ties between them are weaker. Indeed, merging into a single organization requires a single doctrine, a unified platform, and one administrative structure. In instances of coalition or cooperation, however, the alliance is not as enduring as a formal merger, since each organization will still claim to represent its own segment of the group's population. The most effective way of uniting a front is by merging several organizations into one. This does not necessary mean merging *all* ethnic minority organizations, but rather uniting a substantial majority that would render remaining rival ethnic minority organizations irrelevant. The organization's attempts to unify the ethnic minority must be a credible threat to end plurality.

The state must decide whether an organization has the ambition and ability to unite other organizations that claim to represent the minority ethnic group. This decision can also be preemptive, meaning that the state would sooner ban an organization that *may* produce a united

front, rather than one that already has—at which point repressing it could be too late. The state would thus generally err on the side of caution, choosing to ban an organization based on suspicion or inconclusive evidence, rather than waiting until the organization's "guilt" has been proven beyond doubt. In order to confirm this claim, however, there must be clear indication that the organization is feasibly pursuing a united front. This evidence can be found in an organization's doctrine, political platform, the rhetoric of its leaders, or from information gathered by state intelligence. Importantly, this information must be available to state officials and there must be concrete evidence that it informed the state actors' decision-making process to act preemptively.

Additional evidence that would confirm this hypothesis include examples of a state repressing not only an organization that is violent and has foreign ties, but also one that is non-violent and non-fifth column, but tries to unify the front by amalgamating minority ethnic organizations. To prove this, we would need clear documentation of an organization's intentions to unify the front, its ability to do so (e.g. rapid increase in membership, members of other organizations deserting and joining the uniting organization, competing organizations closing down or joining uniting organization) as well clear documentation stating the reasons behind state repression of that organization. Further observable implications derived from this hypothesis include laws put in place to preempt an organization from creating a unified front. A state could, for example, outlaw national-level ethnic minority organizations, permitting only those that are concentrated regionally. To falsify this hypothesis, we expect the opposite: states would only repress violent or fifth column organizations.

Table 2.2 Summary of observable implications of main hypothesis

Observable Implications	
Accept main hypothesis	**Reject main hypothesis**
The majority of ethnic organizations that are non-violent and non-fifth columns should not be banned.	*Most non-violent, non-fifth column organizations are repressed, if state capacity allows.*
*State actors should foment and exploit **existing divisions** between organizations within an ethnic minority group.*	*No evidence of state actors attempting to promote rivalry between organizations.*
*State actors should create, support, or promote **new divisions** in the minority, even creating loyalist organizations if none exist.*	*No examples of the state actively creating, supporting, promoting, or maintaining organizational pluralism within each ethnic minority. No examples of the state financing, supporting, or creating loyalist minority organizations.*
Organizations that aim or have the potential to create a united front for the minority (i.e. suppress organizational pluralism) should be banned, even if they are not violent or fifth columns.	*The state bans only violent or fifth column organizations.*

Alternative Explanations

To prove my argument, I also test alternative explanations found in the literature, discussed in Chapter 1, for why a state chooses to ban or allow a minority ethnic organization. Beyond the theory that a state will ban an organization because of foreign ties or violent tactics—which is the argument of the repression literature—we can use insights put forward in the literature on state-ethnic minority group relations to draw up possible rival hypotheses. These arguments can be divided into three: group-level, organizational-level, and regime-level explanations.

Group-Level Explanations

a. Organizations that represent ethnic groups that are indigenous, territorially concentrated, and large are more likely to be repressed than organizations that

represent small, dispersed, or recently resettled populations.

If the argument that group-level characteristics drive state response is correct, we should not see any variation in how a state responds to organizations representing a certain minority ethnic group: either all organizations are repressed, or all are allowed to operate. On the contrary, any variation in how a state treats minority organizations representing the same ethnic group will falsify this hypothesis, as well as rule out any other group-level explanations.

Organization-level Explanations

b. Large ethnic minority organizations are more likely to be repressed than smaller ones.

The argument that size matters draws from a more or less conventional notion that large organizations pose a more credible threat than smaller ones because of their support base and potential influence in the national political arena. Should this be the case, we expect the state to repress only organizations with a large membership or support base. It would be falsified with evidence that organizations of all sizes are repressed. On the other hand, conventional wisdom could argue that smaller organizations are more easily repressed compared to larger organizations and thus are more likely to face state crackdown. I explore both arguments.

c. Organizations propagating an ideology incompatible with that of the state are more likely to be repressed.

It is important to note that the content of an organization's ideology as such does not render it a threat to the government. What matters is "the relation of a party's ideology to the fundamental values of the specific regime in which it operates, rather than the objective content of the party's ideology per se and the political objects that it opposes."[22] For example, a populist rightwing ethnic based regime would likely repress organizations representing ethnic minorities. Anti-democratic organizations would likely be repressed in a democracy. Socialist governments that propagate class not ethnicity would tend to ban rightwing ethnic-based organizations. To accept this hypothesis, we would need evidence of ideologically-based repression of minority ethnic group organizations. If, however, there is substantial variation in how a state responds to organizations subscribing to the same ideology, this hypothesis can be rejected.

d. Secessionist minority ethnic organizations are more likely to be repressed by the state than other such ethnic organizations.

This hypothesis looks at an organization's goals as a determinant factor of state response. If a non-violent, non-fifth column organization advocates for secession, it will likely be repressed. If correct, we should see that all organizations that not just violently but even peacefully challenge the territorial integrity of a state would be repressed. To falsify this theory, organizations that demand self-determination would be allowed to operate, so long as they use peaceful tactics and do not have foreign links.

[22] Giovanni Capoccia, *Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 29-30.

Regime-level Explanations

e. Democratic regimes are more likely to allow minority ethnic organizations to operate, whereas authoritarian regimes are more likely to repress organizations.

This hypothesis contends that organizational plurality among ethnic minority groups is driven by regime type. Democracies allow for plurality, whereas authoritarian states repress it. We thus expect democracies to have several minority ethnic organizations, and authoritarian regimes to have fewer. The opposite would falsify this theory. Having outlined the hypotheses, the subsequent section explains how they will be tested.

Table 2.3. Summary of alternative explanations derived from the literature

	Group Level	Organizational Level	Regime Level
Hypothesis	a. Organizations that represent ethnic groups that are indigenous, territorially concentrated, and large are more likely to be repressed than organizations that represent small, dispersed, or recently resettled populations.	b. Small ethnic minority organizations are more likely to be repressed than larger ones.	e. Democratic regimes are more likely to allow minority ethnic organizations to operate, whereas authoritarian regimes are more likely to repress organizations.
		c. Organizations propagating an ideology incompatible to that of the state's are more likely to be repressed.	
		d. Secessionist minority ethnic organizations are more likely to be repressed by the state than other such ethnic organizations.	

Why Interwar Poland? Case and Methods

Interwar Poland had a less than stellar reputation for its treatment of minority ethnic groups,[23] which was cause for concern, considering that nearly a third of Poland's population was comprised of minorities—particularly Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews, and Germans. The 1931 Polish Census broke down the population by mother tongue, yielding the following division: Polish, Ukrainian, Ruthenian (i.e. Rusyn), Belarusian, Russian, Lithuanian, German, Yiddish, Hebrew, Local (*tutejszy)*, Other (*inny)*, and Not Declared. It follows that 68.9% of Poland's 32 million population was considered Polish, 13.9% Ukrainians, around 10% Jewish, 3.1% Belarusians, 2.3% Germans, and 2.8% were "other," including Lithuanians, Czechs, and Armenians. There were also several communities of Russians and Roma (Table 2.4).

Additionally, Poland was a nation of many religions (Table 2.5). According to the same census, almost 21 million citizens were Roman Catholics (mostly Poles), 3.3 million Greek Catholics (mostly Ukrainians), 3.8 million Orthodox (mostly Ukrainians and Belarusians living on territories formerly part of the Russian Empire), and 3.11 million were Jewish. By the end of the interwar period Poland had the second largest Jewish population in the world, with one-fifth of all of the world's Jews residing in Poland. My analysis will focus on the four largest minority groups: Ukrainians, Jews, Belarusians, and Germans.[24]

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[23] For example see Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 85-103; Andrzej Chojnowski, *Koncepcje Polityki Narodowościowej Rządów Polskich w Latach 1921-1939* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im Ossolińskich, 1979); Stephan Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919-1939, A Case Study* (New York: Vantage Press, 1961); *Ukraińcy, Białorusini, Litwini, i Niemcy w Polsce w latach 1918-1990* (Siedlce: Wyższa Szkoła Rolniczo-Pedagogiczna w Siedlcach, 1993); Mirosława Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa Ukraińska w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1922-1926* (Kraków: Wydaw. Literackie, 1979); Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia Ukraińska w Polityce III Rzeszy (1933-1945)* (Warszawa, Książka i Wiedza, 1972).

[24] Though I recognize that Judaism is a religion and technically not an ethnic group, I include Jews in the analysis because the Interwar Polish state considered Jews as a distinct ethnic minority group, alongside Ukrainians,

Table 2.4 Population by Religion (1931 Census)

Category	Number	Percent
Roman Catholic	20,670,051	64.8
Greek Catholic	3,336,164	10.5
Orthodox	3,762,484	11.8
Protestant Lutheran	424,216	1.3
Protestant Reformed	33,295	0.1
Protestant Unite	269,531	0.8
Protestant (gen.)	108,216	0.3
Other Christian	145,418	0.5
Judaism	3,113,933	9.8
Other non-Christian	6,750	0.02
Non-believers	6,058	0.02
Not declared	39,663	0.1
Total:	**31,915,779**	**100**

Source: 1931 Polish census

Table 2.5. Population by mother tongue (1931 Census)

Category	Number	Percent
Polish	21,993,444	68.9
Ukrainian	3,221,975	10.1
Ruthenian	1,219,647	3.8
Belarusian	989,852	3.1
Russian	138,713	0.4
Czech	38,097	0.1
Lithuanian	83,116	0.3
German	740,992	2.3
Yiddish	2,489,034	7.8
Hebrew	243,539	0.8
"Local"	707,088	2.2
Other	11,119	0.3
Not Declared	39,163	0.1
Total:	**31,915,779**	**100**

Source: 1931 Polish census

Germans, Belarusians, Russians, Lithuanians, and so on. Furthermore, in interwar Poland, religion was considered the chief marker of ethnicity. For example, an individual would be considered Polish if he or she was Roman Catholic, but if they converted to Greek Catholicism, for example, they would then be considered Ukrainian. This was typical of mixed marriages between Poles and Ukrainians, where one child could be baptized as Roman Catholic, and thus raised Polish, and another child baptized Greek Catholic, and thus considered Ukrainian, regardless of the language they spoke.

The way in which the Polish state managed its ethnic minority groups and organizations that represented them varied considerably over time and space. To examine this puzzle and test my explanation, I have compiled an original database, drawing from extensive archival research, which includes information on political ethnic minority organizations that operated during the interwar period in Poland. The results depict staggering variation. At minimum, there were 77 political organizations representing minority group interests throughout the interwar period in Poland. Of them, 28 were Ukrainian; 13 were Belarusian; 19 represented the Germans, and 17 were Jewish. All organizations demanded an increase in minority rights: 29 demanded cultural and/or political autonomy; 13 demanded territorial autonomy; while 26 deemed Polish rule illegitimate and struggled for secession. Still, despite the fundamentally antagonist relationship fostered by the Polish government's anti-minority policies and further exacerbated by the oft-aggressive anti-state attitudes of minority organizations, only 15 (19%) of these organizations were repressed by the state, and this variation was not confined to one ethnic group. Of those repressed, only three were entirely liquidated; others either continued to operate covertly, or more commonly, transformed into new organizations, or infiltrated or merged with others. The ideological spectrum was equally as broad: 37 were leftwing, 22 were centre, and 15 were rightwing. Some organizations lasted for under a year whereas others the entire interwar period, but less than half of them lasted until the outbreak of World War II. One in seven voluntarily disbanded. Thus it is clear that the interwar Polish case presents us with significant variation that traditional explanations of state response to ethnic groups, which focus on group characteristics, regime type, and intra-group relations, fail to account for.



Figure 2.1 Map of interwar Poland (1918-1939)

Interwar Poland also presents us with a unique opportunity to examine how different regime types manage their minorities. Poland's interwar years can be broken down into two periods: pre 1926 and post 1926. From 1918-1926, Poland was considered a democracy, holding relatively "free" elections in 1919 and 1922. Josef Piłsudski's military coup in 1926 ushered in an autocratic Polish government. Interestingly, in absolute terms more organizations were repressed pre-1926, when Poland was still considered a democracy, than after the military coup and the country's ensuing tilt towards autocracy. Temporally, the interwar period provides us with an interesting and manageable timeframe, with a variation of regime types and a logical starting point (the recreation of an independent Polish state in 1918), and a logical endpoint (the onset of World War II with the joint invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939).

Furthermore, the only way to gain a full understanding of how internal politics, decision making, and security operations function within a state, researchers must have access to declassified documents from the period in question. Only historical cases provide us with this unique opportunity.[25] Despite this advantage, historical cases still remain a major underutilized source for systematic social scientific research. While the fluid nature of ongoing or recent political events—particularly conflicts—makes reliable data collection challenging, historical cases provide researchers with a unique opportunity to conduct systematic research, triangulating a variety of evidentiary sources. In post-conflict years, previously classified archives have opened; pronounced partisanships and controversies have subsided, and a rich descriptive secondary literature has emerged. For these reasons, my project lends itself to a historical turn in the study of conflict. Although every case is unique in some respect, the assumption of comparative politics is that cases are examples of broader phenomena, and if analyzed properly, can shed light on other cases. Thus, the theoretical framework put forward in this study aims to have a broader scope beyond just Poland between the two World Wars.

Tracking all minority organizations and examining how Polish policy was directed toward them, however, is no straightforward task. Indeed, as pointed out by Cederman and Gleditsch in reference to disaggregating civil wars, systematically collecting data at the level of political organizations represents such a challenge that creating a global database is currently impossible. To mitigate this problem, it makes sense to restrict the selection of cases, which represents a

[25] Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, "The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond," *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no.8-9 (2010):931-968; Kurt Weyland, "Crafting Counterrevolution: How Reactionaries Learned to Combat Change in 1848," *American Political Science Review* 110, no.2 (2016:217).

smaller share of the larger universe of potential cases.[26] One importation question that arises, however, is where to draw the line. During the interwar period, countless cultural, social, and religious associations existed, and it would be a Herculean task to trace each and every one of them and how they interacted with the state. I therefore restrict myself to examining political minority ethnic organizations.

This project relies on extensive archival work carried out over nine months of fieldwork in Poland and Ukraine. During this time, over 23,000 documents have been digitized and catalogued, the majority of which are declassified government reports on interwar Polish minority policies. The most useful collection of documents is located in the Archiwum Akt Nowych (Central Archive of Modern Records, or AAN) in Warsaw. The interwar Ministry of Interior (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, or MSW) was the most central and complex department of the Second Republic, significantly impacting the socio-political situation in Poland.[27] The Ministry's main task was the overall management of the country, maintaining public order and safety, supervising local government, and compiling administrative statistics. Most relevant to this study is the Ministry's Political Department (Departament Polityczny), which is further broken down into three bureaus: Social and Political (Wydział Społeczno-Polityczny), National Minorities (Wydział Narodowościowy), and Security (Wydział Bezpeczeństwa). More specifically, the National Minorities bureau, formed in 1927, was "responsible for the supervision of the political and social lives of minority groups in Poland, as a means of keeping the government agencies informed, but also was responsible for the

[26] Lars-Erik Cederman and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Introduction to Special Issue on 'Disaggregating Civil War,'" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (2009): 492.
[27] Waldemar Kozyra, *Polityka Administracyjna Ministrów Spraw Wewnętrznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Latach 1918-1939* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskij, 2009).

preparation of and advisement on laws and other legal measures concerning minorities."[28] Overall, the Ministry's Political Department and its three divisions formulated, implemented, and extensively monitored minority group policies and their impact on the activities throughout all of Poland. The Central Archive of Modern Records in Warsaw holds the most extensive collection of the Ministry of Interiors now declassified documents. Although a significant portion of documents was destroyed during World War II, one of the most extensive collections of surviving documents belongs to the Political Department. They contain numerous—though often separate and scattered—sources concerning administrative policies carried out by the ministers of internal affairs in the sphere of social, political, ethnic minorities, and public safety. These files contain national and local level reports spanning the entire interwar period and are particularly useful in capturing and detailing pivotal episodes and decision-making processes, outlining where, when, and why certain policy choices were pursued. Drawing from this data, a very comprehensive description of state-minority group relations can be compiled.

There is no one methodological approach in social sciences that is optimal for assessing the validity of causal inferences. Thus, one of the strengths of this study is its use of mixed methods, both quantitative and qualitative. The first part of my research design is a quantitative analysis of state response to minority ethnic organizations in interwar Poland. More specifically, it tests the explanatory power of competing theories using a logistic regression. In order to conduct this analysis, I created an original database, and I limit the scope to Ukrainian, Belarusian, German, and Jewish political organizations for data collection feasibility. For each organization (the unit of analysis), I code: the ethnic group the organization claims to represent, foreign ties, violent

[28] Stephan Stach, "The Institute for Nationality Research (1921-1939): A Think-Tank for Minority Politics in Poland?" in *Religion in the Mirror of Law, Eastern European Perspectives from the Early Modern Period to 1939* eds. Yvonne Kleinmann, Stephan Stach, Tracie L. Wilson (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 2016), 158-9.

tactics, political demands, ideology, approximate size, under which regime it was created, as well the organization's fate. The binary dependent variable is whether the state allowed/banned the organization.

The database is useful in testing alternative explanations of why a state bans or allows an organization, as well as for providing rich descriptive statistics of the variation. The second and much more substantial part of my research design, however, goes beyond a focus on statistical correlations between independent and dependent variables.[29] The causal structure of the puzzle I seek to explain cannot be tested effectively by conventional statistical methods, and as a result I employ "process tracing." Bennett and George define process tracing as the use of "histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the casual process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case."[30] This methodological approach emphasizes "theory development, focusing on hypothesis formation and the historical explanation of individual cases, as well as the testing of general hypotheses."[31] More specifically, I will be using "systematic process analysis," or SPA.[32] SPA entails intensive investigation of a small number of cases and includes four basic steps: theory specification, deriving predictions from main and alternative theoretical arguments, testing hypotheses by observing their implications, and finally drawing conclusions. I expand briefly on these four steps below.

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[29] For more on the value of small *n* or case studies see: Andrew Bennett and Jeffry T. Checkel, *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005); John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Ingo Rohlfing, *Case Studies and Casual Inference: An Integrative Framework* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
[30] George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development Practices,* 6.
[31] Ibid., 13.
[32] Peter A. Hall, "Systematic process analysis: when and how to use it" *European Management Review* 3, no. 1 (2006):24-31.

Step one involves generating a theory that can elucidate the most important variables in a causal chain that explains the outcome in question. In my case, this is whether a state allows or represses a minority ethnic organization. Based on these theories I select explanatory variables that are theoretically informed, and I specify the rationale behind why and how each independent variable impacts the dependent variable. My theoretical insights are drawn from previous observations and existing scholarly literature. I refer to several theories that could plausibly explain the outcome, testing one theory against the other in order to increase the leverage and justify the credibility of my assumptions, as well as to ensure validity of my proposed theory. Both my and rival theoretical explanations are described in detail in Chapter 2. Step two of SPA consists of drawing out a set of hypotheses based on the theory I put forward and for alternative theoretical approaches. I formulate my hypotheses so that they are not only distinguishable from competing ones, but also as "brittle" as possible, meaning that they can be easily falsified using the data available. The third step is outlining observable implications of the theory. In other words, I make predictions on what I expect to see in my cases, should the theory I propose be correct or incorrect. To increase the credibility of my theory, I also draw out the observable implications predicted by rival theories. The final step involves drawing conclusions based on the congruence between the predictions of each of the theories, and the data found in the case. I will be balanced in my conclusions, discussing where and why some predictions were supported in the available data, and where others were contradicted. My in-depth fieldwork allows me to mitigate important issues of data reliability. Following the four steps outlined above, I will be able to make a solid judgment about the plausibility of my theory, the validity of my observations, and how these compare with rival explanations.[33] Through my methodological

[33] Ibid.

approach I hope to demonstrate how using a combination of quantitative analysis and intensive qualitative examination of a smaller number of cases using SPA is an appropriate research design that allows for a theory that is parsimonious enough to have general implications, yet retain a degree of complexity which best reflects the rich empirical reality we live in.

If the hypothesis put forward in this chapter is correct, important implications arise. First, such a theory demonstrates that, in understanding state response to minority ethnic group organizations, we should change our perspective and adopt a point of view of divide and conquer rather than repression as first resort. Based on current explanations, the assumption is that states do not repress organizations because the cost of doing so—either financially or reputationally—is too high, or state capacity is weak. I propose to turn the tables and view this from the opposite perspective: the state has an interest in having organizational plurality among minority ethnic groups. Thus we should readjust our angle of analysis and redirect our focus towards organizations and why the state allows them to operate, rather than overemphasize why organizations are banned. Explaining only one outcome does not necessarily explain the other. The primary tactic of governments in a multi-national state with a dominant ethnic group, therefore, is not necessarily repression, but can be divide and conquer. The subsequent chapters test this theory.

Chapter 3: State Response to Ethnic Minority Organizations in Interwar Poland

This chapter begins by placing the case of interwar Poland into historical context. Following the historical introduction, I turn to empirical analysis. I first test several of the theories outlined in Chapter 2, beginning with regime-level and ethnic group-level explanations. Second, I use statistical analysis to examine the explanatory power of organization-level theories. Although some of the insights put forth in the literature help to elucidate particular aspects of interwar Polish policy towards minority ethnic groups, the final third of this chapter discusses how the large majority of the variation remains unaddressed by conventional explanations. Further, the fate of some of the most relevant minority organizations in interwar Poland are incorrectly predicted by existing theories and cannot be explained through statistical analysis. I show how the hypothesis presented in my dissertation can help provide the missing pieces to the puzzle, in turn allowing us to better understand the complex dynamics of state-minority ethnic group relations.

Crafting a New State in the Name of a Nation

Following the end of World War I, the victorious Allies created a series of new states on the basis of national self-determination. As U.S. president Woodrow Wilson put it in a speech in February 1918, "[n]ational aspirations must be respected; people may now be dominated only by their own consent. 'Self-determination' is not a mere phrase; it is an imperative principle of

action."[1] Although it had won universal acceptance, Wilson's principle of national self-determination was not applied evenly: not all nations attained statehood, and, the states that were created, though many had a titular nationality, could hardly be considered "nation-states" given their heterogeneous demographics. As a result, residing within the borders of several new countries were restive ethnic minorities, many of which harbored resentment over their loss of the right to self-rule. It was unsurprising, then, that tensions which emerged between dominant ethnic groups and "disadvantaged" minorities escalated throughout the interwar period.[2]

The recreated Polish state epitomized the interwar oxymoron of a "multi-ethnic nation state." Indeed, Poland contained one of the highest percentages of ethnic minorities in all of Europe, yet was conceived as a "state *of*, and *for*, the ethno-linguistically (and ethno-religiously) Polish people."[3] According to interwar Polish census data, in 1921 about one-third of its 27 million inhabitants were Ukrainians, Jews, Belarusians, Germans, and other non-Poles. Yet the Poland of 1918 was very different from its previous incarnation, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which ceased to exist in 1795 after being partitioned thrice by its neighbours, the German, Russian, and Hapsburg Empires. In essence, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a loosely integrated polity with considerable ethno-linguistic and cultural diversity. Unlike in interwar Poland, however, in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the presence of multiple minority ethnic groups was not viewed as a major problem. Certainly, the Commonwealth was never thought of as a nation-state, and its ruling class never strove to transform it into one.

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[1] For full speech see: http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson's_Address_to_Congress,_Analyzing_German_and_Austrian_Peace_Utterances

[2] Winson Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2; Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six months that changed the word* (New York: Random House, 2003); Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A history* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 426.

[3] Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 85.

Instead, citizens were classified along social and political lines. The landowning *szlachta* (gentry), although overwhelmingly Polish in ethno-linguistic terms, stood at the top of the hierarchy, as they were considered superior to all non-privileged individuals—i.e. the poor peasantry. In a society thus structured, a Polish peasant, for example, was no higher up the social ladder than his equally desolate Ukrainian neighbour. Both were held firmly under the thumb of the ruling aristocracy; that is, until the age of nationalism dawned and shook the system at its core.

Over the 125 years of Polish statelessness the Polish national movement (re)defined itself. No longer was Polish nationhood understood as it was under the Commonwealth, in civic terms. The new defining criterion of "Polishness" was primarily based on linguistic, cultural and religious traditions of the dominant group.[4] On the one hand, because language transcends social strata, the potential membership base for inclusion into the Polish nation expanded. On the other hand, however, it narrowed by excluding those who did not identify with the Polish language. Redefined in this manner, the same Polish-speaking peasant who once was grouped together with his Ukrainian neighbour along socio-economic lines, was now placed into a new category. This brought him "closer" to the hitherto alien Polish nobleman, whilst simultaneously distancing him from his Ukrainian neighbour. Individuals were no longer perceived simply as workers, peasants, landowners, or the bourgeoisies; they were now first and foremost *Polish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, German, Jewish,* and so on. The drama of the interwar years largely unfolded from the emergence of this ethnocentric consciousness.

Poles, of course, were not the only ones to succumb to the wave of romantic nationalism

[4] Adam Zamoyski *Poland: A History* (London: Harper Press, 2009), 303.

sweeping nineteenth century Europe. Essentially all other ethnic groups inhabiting what was to become interwar Poland experienced national movements. This posed a problem, given Woodrow Wilson's promise of national self-determination. Following World War I, many of the intelligentsia leading their respective national movements took the rhetoric of Wilsonian national self-determination very seriously: they declared independence, created national councils, formed governments, wrote constitutions, and set out to pursue what they declared on paper. In such a historically intermixed region as Eastern Europe, however, granting national self-determination to every national (and subnational) group seeking autonomy was impossible: the proposed borders never aligned with the demographics. Figure 3.1 illustrates this well, depicting the many rival territorial claims in Eastern Europe.




Figure 3.1. **Rival Territorial Claims in Eastern Europe, c.1900.** *(Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 49.

In the end, Poland was granted its independence, despite protests and rival claims from other groups inhabiting the territory.[5] The Poland that emerged occupied an area of 388,600 square kilometers and included large Belarusian, Ukrainian, German, and Jewish minorities, but excluded over two million ethnic Poles who were left outside its boundaries.[6] As a national minority in interwar Poland, groups were, at least initially, guaranteed equality before the law, as well as the right to maintain their own schools and use their language in public life and in elementary schools. These rights were outlined in the treaties of Versailles (June 28, 1919) and Riga (March 18, 1921), as well as in the Polish constitution (Articles 108 and 109) promulgated on March 17, 1921.[7] These conditions were, for the most part, thrust upon a reluctant Poland by the Allied powers in exchange for recognizing Poland's independence. Thus, the existence of large minority groups in the newly created Polish state complicated the view of Poland as an ethnically homogenous country, and while Polish state actors could not completely ignore the aspirations of non-Poles, they did make sure that the centre of gravity in interwar Poland would be its ethnically Polish core.[8]

Group-Level Minority Policies

The "minority" or "nationality" question in interwar Poland has spurred considerable academic interest. Generally, however, existing scholarship is written from a national perspective, i.e. the German, Ukrainian, Belarusian, or Jewish experience. In addition, many such studies were written by those who experienced the events first hand, often leaving insufficient detachment for analysis. As a result, the literature tends to be politically charged, accusatory in nature, with the general consensus among non-Polish scholars being that interwar Poland was repressive vis-à-vis

[5] MacMillan. *Paris 1919,* 207-228.
[6] Zamoyski, *Poland,* 296.
[7] Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 583.
[8] Andrew Savchenko, *Belarus: A perpetual borderland* (Boston: Brill, 2009), 99.

its treatment of minority ethnic groups.[9] Interwar Polish policy is often portrayed as the exploitation of, for example, the "honest Ukrainian peasant." Much of the ethnically based historiography toes this line, adapting it to whatever group the author came from, with few national historians showing much patience for Polish compromisers.[10] These nationally charged accounts of Polish interwar minority policies, however, do stem from a rather truthful place. The National Democrats, who governed Poland in the early interwar years, "began from the idea that Polish traditions of toleration had doomed the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the eighteenth century, and that only ethnic Poles could be trusted."[11]

Most Belarusian and Ukrainian national historians view interwar Polish rule as "indubitably harsh," presenting the Eastern Borderlands as a scene of "unrelenting deliberately savage oppression of Belarusian [and Ukrainian] national movement against the background of dismal economic stagnation."[12] Nationalistically minded Polish historians disagree, often claiming that "minorities were not actively discriminated against," but rather, they benefited from "enlightened Polish policies."[13] Indeed, territories inhabited mostly by Ukrainians and Belarusians—particularly those of the former Russian Empire—were viewed as the backwaters of interwar

[9] For example see Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 85-103; Andrzej Chojnowski, *Koncepcje Polityki Narodowościowej Rządów Polskich w Latach 1921-1939* (Wrocław:Zakład Narodowy im Ossolińskich, 1979); Stephan Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919-1939, A Case Study* (New York: Vantage Press, 1961); *Ukraińcy, Białorusini, Litwini, i Niemcy w Polsce w latach 1918-1990* (Siedlce: Wyższa Szkoła Rolniczo-Pedagogiczna w Siedlcach, 1993); Mirosława Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa Ukraińska w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1922-1926* (Kraków: Wydaw. Literackie, 1979); Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia Ukraińska w Polityce III Rzeszy (1933-1945)* (Warszawa, Książka i Wiedza, 1972).
[10] For a rare account of a Polish "compromiser," see Timothy Snyder, *Sketches of a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
[11] Timothy Snyder, *Black Earth: the Holocaust as History and Warning* (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2015), 46.
[12] David R. Marples. *Belarus: A denationalized nation* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1999), 13; Savchenko, *Belarus,* 97.
[13] Savchenko, *Belarus,* 97; Zamoyski, *Poland,* 296.

Poland, home to an overwhelmingly illiterate peasant population.[14] The state believed, however, that if hordes of illiterate Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants could be taught Polish, then they could (and should) effectively *become* Polish. As Rogers Brubaker reminds us, Polish government authorities deemed Ukrainians and Belarusians to be culturally similar but less developed and civilized than Poles, and thus pursued assimilationist policies to eliminate group differences by molding them into Poles.[15] In the case of the Germans and Jews, however, assimilation "was generally viewed as unlikely (in the case of Germans, especially those living in territories ceded by Germany after the war) or undesirable (in the case of Jews)."[16] Policies toward Germans and Jews were therefore meant to encourage emigration, excluding them from positions of economic and political influence and instead ensuring Polish dominance of land, economy, and society. Overall, minority policies were such that in the rural Eastern Borderlands, the aim was to "polonize" or nationalize the Slavic population; in the cities and in the west, the goal was to nationalize the territory and economic life by replacing Germans and Jews with Poles in key economic and political position and by encouraging them to leave the country.[17]

The historical literature on interwar Polish policy towards ethnic minorities stops short at group-level dynamics. Disaggregating the analysis to organizations, however, we see a very different picture. Notwithstanding Poland's allegedly repressive minority policies, very few minority ethnic organizations were actually repressed by the state. Table 3.1 summarizes this empirical puzzle, and the next sections explore it further by applying theoretical insights.

[14] Kathryn Clare Ciancia, "Poland's Wild East: Imagined landscapes and everyday life in the Volhynian borderlands, 1918-1939" (Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 2011), 64; also see Chapter 4.
[15] Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed,* Chapter 4.
[16] Ibid., 86.
[17] Ibid.

Table 3.1. Percentage of Ethnic Minority Organizations Allowed or Banned by the State According to Ethnic Group.

	Ethnic Group				
State Response	Ukrainians	Belarusian	German	Jewish	**Total**
Allow	82 (23)	58 (7)	84 (16)	94 (16)	81 (62)
Repress	18 (5)	42 (5)	16 (4)	6 (1)	19 (15)
Total	*100 (28)*	*100 (12)*	*100 (20)*	*100 (17)*	*100 (77)*

Note: Number of cases in brackets.

State Capacity to Repress

Poland had the military and state capacity to repress organizations. Cramsey and Wittenberg argue that if the Polish army was strong enough to defeat the Bolsheviks and West Ukrainians in postwar border wars, surely it would be able to use state repression "against less formidable foes within Polish territory."[18] The authors also point to the fact that in the immediate post-WWII period, Poland carried out a "successful" internal mass deportation of its Ukrainian minority population, resulting in over 140,000 thousand people (75 percent of the Ukrainian population) forcibly resettled from south-eastern to northern and western Poland; that is, far away from the Polish-Ukrainian border to facilitate Ukrainian "Polonization" (assimilation). This operation, coined "Vistula," was carried out with under 20,000 men[19]— less than a tenth of the size of Poland's military during the interwar period.[20] Simultaneously, while carrying out mass deportation of its Ukrainian minority, Polish authorities squashed the formidable armed Ukrainian resistance, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Indeed, if the authorities were able to pursue large-scale forced expulsions and internal deportations in the post-WWII era with a

[18] S.A. Cramsey and J. Wittenberg, "Timing is Everything: Changing norms of minority rights and the making of a Polish Nation-state," *Comparative Political Studies* 49, no.11 (2016): 7; for more on border wars in the Eastern Borderlands see Chapter 4.
[19] Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 198-99.
[20] Cramsey and Wittenberg, "Timing is Everything," 7.

fraction of their interwar military force, the ability to simply ban a minority organization was surely an option on the table.

Second, the MSW, when necessary, *did* ban organizations—often the largest or most dangerous. As will be discussed below and further elaborated on in subsequent chapters, all violent minority organizations were banned by the state. Though not all were successfully liquidated (e.g. the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists continued to operate covertly until the outbreak of WWII), the organization's activity was significantly curtailed and largely kept under control by the Polish state. In the case of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the state launched a "massive and brutal" pacification campaign in the early 1930s that violently swept through Ukrainian-inhabited territories, in order to suppress the underground military organization.[21] Armed units "pacified" over 450 villages in 19 counties, arresting over 2,000 Ukrainians.[22] The campaign was, at the time, deemed a success by Polish authorities. The Ukrainian community protested to the League of Nations, yet the latter did nothing more than scold Poland and blame Ukrainian nationalists for provoking such action. Similar crackdowns on Ukrainian "terrorism" were carried out in 1934, and again in 1938-9.[23] Further, in 1934, the Polish government officially suspended the implementation of the Minorities' Treaty, thus disregarding the League of Nations' authority. That same year, on order of the President of Poland Ignacy Mościcki, the Bereza Kartuska concentration camp was established to imprison "socially dangerous elements."[24] Many Belarusian, Communist, but mostly Ukrainian political prisoners, found their

[21] Subtelny, *Ukraine,* 430; also see Chapter 6.
[22] Subtelny, *Ukraine,* 430.
[23] Peter D. Stachura, *Poland, 1918-1945: An Interpretive and Documentary History of the Second Republic* (London: Routledge, 2004), 83.
[24] Jan Zaprudnik, *Belarus: At a Crossroads in History* (Boulder:Westview Press, 1993), 85.

way to Bereza Kartuska.[25]

More, some of the banned, non-violent organizations were the largest and most influential organizations representing their minority group (e.g. the Belarusian Hromada discussed in Chapter 5). Thus if the state had capacity to repress violent as well as large and influential organizations, defy the wishes of the League of Nations, as well as create concentration camps for political prisoners, there is little reason to doubt that the MSW did not have the capacity to implement similar measures against smaller and less influential organizations. And indeed, when the MSW discussed banning organizations, the capacity to carry out repressive actions was not brought up as an issue.[26]

Finally, in 1930, the Ministry of Interior issued a series of classified documents outlining the procedures for state officials to follow in the event that Poland began mobilizing for war. Within these documents was a list of minority ethnic organizations that were to be liquidated immediately should Poland declare a state of emergency. Of the 19 German, Ukrainian, and Belarusian political organizations operating at that time, 15 were slated for repression. The remaining four organizations were either avowedly loyalist or creations of the state.[27] These documents, and the evidence outlined above, have important implications since they illustrate the state's capacity to repress ethnic minority organizations, if authorities felt the need to do so. But they did not because repression was seen as a last resort. This goes against one of the assumptions at the base of existing repression literature, which implies that states fail to repress enemy organizations solely because they do not have the capacity to do so. The document also indicates that all ethnic minority organizations—with the exception of state-backed and loyalist

[25] Subtelny, *Ukraine,* 430.
[26] See Chapters 4-8.
[27] Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Dopływ, syg. 988, s. 95-97.

ones—were deemed threatening to the state. Nonetheless, repression was only to be used in extreme cases, such as during a state of emergency or mobilization in preparation for war. In fact, none of the organizations on the list was ever actually repressed. In short, the coercive capacity of the Polish state is unlikely to have been a constraint in the interwar years.

Testing Alternative Explanations

The following section tests conventional explanations outlined in Chapter 2 by applying them to the case of interwar Poland. I begin by assessing regime and ethnic group-level explanations, followed by ones that focus on the organization-level (not necessarily ethnic organizations).

Regime Level Explanations

Regime level explanations argue that, generally, democratic regimes are more likely to allow minority ethnic organizations to operate, whereas authoritarian regimes are more likely to repress such organizations. Let us explore how this explanation fits with interwar Poland. Poland's independence was confirmed in the Treaty of Versailles of June 1919, and, following a series of border wars fought from 1918 to 1921,[28] it began its formal independence in 1921 with the adoption of a constitution. The Second Polish Republic, as it was formally called, based its political model on the French Third Republic, vesting the majority of power in the legislative body. It was a republic governed by an elected bicameral legislature consisting of a House of Deputies (*Sejm*) and Senate, which together chose the president for a term of seven years. Interwar Poland was therefore conceived of as a democracy. Proportional representation resulted in the creation of a plethora of political parties representing a multitude of ideologies, interests,

[28] Poland was victorious in the Polish-Soviet War (February 1919-March 1921), as well as in the Polish-West Ukrainian People's Republic War (November 1918-July 1919).

and voter bases. The 1922 parliamentary elections saw 31 parties enter the Sejm, none with over 20 percent of the vote, and most parties garnering no more than 10 percent. Parties were forced to merge into coalitions, though the multitude of single-interest parties meant that these coalitions were often weak, frequently dissolving over a single piece of legislature. In 1922 the Sejm contained 35 seats representing Jewish parties, 25 on behalf of Ukrainian interests, seventeen the German and 11 acting for the Belarusian minority.[29]

Table 3.2 Percentage State Response to Ethnic Minority Organizations Based on Regime Type

	Regime		
State Response	Democratic (pre 1926)	Non-Democratic (post 1926)	**Total**
Allow	83 (44)	79 (19)	82 (63)
Repress	17 (9)	21(5)	18 (14)
Total	*100 (53)*	*100 (24)*	*100 (77)*

Note: Number of cases in brackets.

Though highly ineffective in terms of governance, the time between 1921-1926 can be described as a democratic period in Poland's history, during which minorities enjoyed relative freedoms in the political arena.[30] This era lasted until the coup d'état by Marshal Jozef Piłsudski in May 1926, which ushered in a more authoritarian Polish government. For the next decade, Piłsudski dominated Polish affairs. As Poland moved to the right, its national minorities were increasingly presented as threats.[31] Based on this rightward shift, we would expect most organizations to be repressed after 1926, when Poland abandoned democracy for authoritarianism. Table 3.2, however, indicates that this was not the case: there was still a predominance of allowed

[29] Zamoyski, *Poland,* 299.
[30] Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities,* 74.
[31] Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War,* xv.


organizations. Indeed, only 21 percent were repressed, and this was only a marginal increase from the 17 percent of organizations repressed during Poland's democratic era. In absolute terms, of the 53 organizations created before 1926, nine were repressed. This figure is higher than during the authoritarian period, when only five organizations were repressed. Although the explanatory power of regime-level explanations is tested further in the second half of the chapter using statistical methods, based on these descriptive statistics, we are left with an unsatisfying clarification of the variation.

Ethnic Group Level Explanations


As outlined in Chapter 2, the general argument of ethnic group-level explanations can be synthesized as follows: indigenous, territorially concentrated, and large ethnic groups are most likely to demand national self-determination, and thus be repressed by the state. We can apply this logic to minority ethnic group organizations, hypothesizing that organizations representing such groups are more likely to be repressed. In the case of interwar Poland, Ukrainians, Germans, Belarusians, and Jews were all "indigenous." Each minority could lay legitimate claim to the land they inhabited, pointing to historiographies spanning several centuries. Based on the logic of being "rooted in the land," we therefore expect to see no difference in the way Polish state actors treated these four minority groups. Table 3.1, however, shows that this explanation does not hold in the case of interwar Poland: though the percentages of German and Ukrainian organizations were similar, 16 and 18 percent respectively, 38 percent of Belarusian organizations were repressed while only 6 percent of Jewish ones were. The variation between groups is too large to accept this hypothesis.

I now turn to explanations that focus on ethnic group size and territorial concentration. Figure 3.2 illustrates minority population concentration based on 1921 district-level census data. The maps illustrate districts in which over 2000 inhabitants identified with a particular minority group (the darker the gradient the higher the number). As far as demographics, Ukrainians and Belarusians were overwhelmingly concentrated in the eastern borderlands—the *kresy*. Ukrainians constituted almost 70 percent of the population of Wołyń and Tarnopol provinces, and about 40 percent of Lwów and Stanisławów. Belarusians made up over 60 percent of Polesie and about 40 percent of Nowogródek provinces. Germans were concentrated in the Western borderlands, where they comprised about 5 to 10 percent of the population of Silesian, Łódź, Poznań, and Pomeranian provinces. In the Wołyń province there were several dispersed German colonies. Jews, on the other hand, were not territorially concentrated and predominately resided in urban centers throughout Poland. According to interwar census data, 77 percent of Jews lived in cities, with only 23 percent in villages. This figure lies in stark contrast to Ukrainians and Belarusians, of whom over 80 percent lived in the countryside. Similarly, only about 30 percent of Poles were urban dwellers. Prior to World War II, approximately one-third of the city of Łódź's and of Poland's capital Warsaw's populations comprised of Jews; about a quarter of Kraków, and over 40 percent of Lwów (Lviv, now Ukraine) and Wilno (Vilnius, now Lithuania) was Jewish. In the eastern *kresy*, Jews made up anywhere from 50 to 70 percent of the population of smaller towns.


Figure 3.2. Minority group concentration based on 1921 census (district-level)




Ukrainians



Germans



Belarusians[32]



Jews[33]

[32] Also includes those that identified as "local" (*tutejszy)*.
[33] Note: missing data for urban centres (e.g. Warsaw, Lublin, Tarnopol).

Based on territorial concentration, then, we would expect that Ukrainian, Belarusian, and German organizations—which represented territorially concentrated populations—were repressed more than Jewish organizations, which represented a group dispersed across the country. Table 3.1 partially confirms this hypothesis: Jewish organizations were indeed repressed less than Ukrainian, Belarusian, or German organizations. This explanation, however, is incomplete. Although the theory may provide us with some insight as to why Jewish organizations were repressed less than other minority groups, it cannot account for the variation *between* Belarusian, German, and Ukrainian organizations, all of which represented territorially concentrated populations yet experienced varying levels of repression. More importantly for the purposes of this study, however, the theory cannot account for why *within* each ethnic group the majority of organizations were not repressed. Thus we cannot completely rely on theories of ethnic group concentration to explain the variation in state response to organizations.

As far as the size of ethnic groups, of approximately 32 million, Ukrainians comprised about 14 percent of the population, Jews about 10 percent, Belarusians about 3 percent, and Germans about 2.3 percent. Based on the argument that larger ethnic groups are more likely to suffer repression, we would expect the levels of repression to decline from Ukrainian to German organizations. If only the size of the group is taken into consideration, this prediction is not confirmed. Belarusian organizations were repressed the most (38%), followed by Ukrainian (18%), then German (16%), and lastly Jewish organizations (6%). None of the predictions align with the empirical evidence, and so we cannot accept the hypothesis based on ethnic group size.

Theories that focus less on intrinsic characteristics of an ethnic group, and instead focus on inter-group relations offer other potential explanations for the variation. The argument that a "status reversal" resulting from a rearrangement of power hierarchies—if applied to the organization level—predicts that organizations representing the once dominant group would suffer more repression because the previously dominated ethnic group would seek revenge. This change of position from ruler to subject only applied to German organizations in the Western territories that had previously formed part of the German Empire. Indeed, prior to World War I, interwar Polish territories were divided between the German, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian Empires. According to the "status reversal explanation," we would thus expect German organizations to be repressed more than Ukrainian, Belarusian, or Jewish ones. This, however, was not the case.

In sum, this section demonstrated that regime and group-level explanations of state response to ethnic minorities, when applied to the organization level, do not hold in the case of interwar Poland. Though providing helpful insights into the overall treatment of ethnic minority groups by a state, none of the explanations could fully elucidate the subgroup variation that this project seeks to explain. Only one of the theories outlined above partially predicted the variation, but strictly at the group-level: Jewish organizations may have been repressed less because they represented a population that was not territorially concentrated. The theory, however, could not account for the variation between German, Ukrainian, and Belarusian organizations, all of which represent territorially concentrated populations, nor could it account for why within each ethnic group a majority of organizations were allowed to operate. The puzzle still remains unclear. Therefore I now turn to organization-level explanations to further explore the reason for such unexpected variation.

Organization-level Explanations

The following section tests organization-level explanations using an original database of minority ethnic organizations in interwar Poland. The database was compiled largely from the Ministry of Interior's now declassified documents as well as secondary sources.[34] In order to elucidate the impact of relevant variables, I use a logistic regression to test the explanatory power of several independent variables on the dependent variable, that is, whether a state allowed or repressed a minority ethnic organization.[35] Drawing from the theories outlined in Chapter 2, I include the following variables into the model: regime type, organization demands (i.e. autonomy or secession), foreign ties (i.e. financing), revisionism (i.e. join USSR or Germany), organization size, ideology, and minority group.[36] Before delving into a discussion of organization demands and foreign ties, however, I first turn to an important variable that was not included in the statistical model because it did not vary: violence.

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[34] See Jerzy Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warszawa: Książka I Wiedza, 1974); Mieczysław Iwanicki, *Ukraińcy. Białorusini, Litwini i Niemcy w Polsce w latach 1918-1990* (Siedlce: Wydawnictwa Uczelniane WSRP w Siedlcach, 1993).

[35] It should be noted that once an organization was banned by the state, the decision was not reversed. If an organization was allowed to exist for several years and subsequently was banned, this was because the organization underwent a significant transformation (i.e. change in ideology, goals, tactics, merging with another organization, forging ties with foreign states). Therefore, when an organization underwent a transformation, I coded it as a new organization and noted the corresponding state response.

[36] Regime type is a dichotomous variable, coded as pre1926 (before Piłsudski's military, when Poland was a democracy), and post1926, that is, after the coup and Poland's ensuing tilt towards authoritarianism. The case was coded at the time the organization was created because state response to organizations occurred in the initial stages of its existence. Group demands are broken down into political autonomy or secession. These were fairly straightforward to code: each organization had clear platforms with regards to what they wanted from the state. The variable foreign ties was coded as a binary variable. Foreign ties included financial or political support, either from international organizations, a foreign state, governments-in-exile, or diaspora. Revisionism was coded as a binary variable, depending on whether the organization had links to the USSR (including Soviet Ukraine and Belarus, or Germany). The size of an organization was measured on a scale of small, medium, or large. Information on organization size was drawn from estimates produced in internal reports circulated throughout the Ministry of Interior, as well as the Research Institute of Nationalities. Ideology was also coded as left, centre, right. These were based on organization platforms, and classified according to objective criteria of leftist organizations promoting social equality and egalitarianism, rightist promoting social stratification based on ethnicity, and centrist organizations seeking a balance between the two and opposing significant shifts to either sides of the spectrum. Ethnic group variable was coded based on whether the organization represented Ukrainians, Belarusians, Germans, or Jews.

Violence

The literature on state response to enemy organizations argues that organizations that resort to violent tactics will be repressed. In interwar Poland only three organizations used violence against the state: the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukraińska Wojskowa Organizacja, UWO), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów, OUN), and the Brotherhood of Belarusians Peasants (Bractwo Włościan Białorusinów, BWB). All three were outlawed by the state.[37] The Ukrainian Military Organization, founded in 1920, promoted armed insurgency against Poland to create an independent Ukrainian state. The organization carried out several assassinations of prominent Polish politicians, as well as of Ukrainians pacifists. The UWO did not stop at assassinations: members bombed train stations, communication lines, railway tracks, police buildings and post offices. In 1922, around 300 anti-Polish and anti-state actions were carried out by the UWO.[38]

By 1925, the UWO had effectively merged with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. For its part, the OUN propagated that "only the complete removal of all occupiers from Ukrainian lands will allow for the general development of the Ukrainian Nation within its own state."[39] The Organization's chief goal was an independent Ukraine, to include all "Ukrainian territories" and only "Ukrainian people." Polish authorities deemed the Organization, which began as a fringe group but eventually garnered support among radicalized youth over the course of the interwar

[37] A fourth organization, the Ukrainian Socialist Democratic Party (USDP), though banned for threatening "peace and order," was not a paramilitary or terrorist organization like the ones above and will be discussed separately in Chapter 6 on Ukrainians. Similarly, the Communist Parties of Western Ukraine (KPZU) and Western Belarus (KPZB) used violent tactics during the initial uncertain postwar years when Poland's borders were still being decided, but once borders were set the organizations refrained from violent tactics.
[38] AAN, MSW, Dop., sygn. 1018, 91-92a.
[39] Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations,* 143.

period, an illegal terrorist movement. In July 1930, members of the OUN carried out sabotage actions in Eastern Galicia (the historical name given to Ukrainian-inhabited territories in Eastern Poland), destroying Polish properties and state infrastructure. The Ministry of Interior recorded over 200 "acts of terror" carried out by the group from July to November 1930 alone.[40] In response, Polish authorities launched a "pacification" campaign, sending army units into hundreds of villages in the Ukrainian-inhabited Eastern borderlands in search of nationalist agitators.[41] Though significantly curtailed, the OUN proved resilient to government crackdown and continued to operate as an illegal underground organization until the outbreak of WWII.

In the early 1920s, the eastern Polish borderland was also the scene of a Belarusian guerilla movement. Inspired by the Belarusian Party of Social Revolution and the Belarusian Democratic Republic's government-in-exile, the Brotherhood of Belarusian Peasants was a military organization whose goal was to unite Belarusian-inhabited lands that were divided between Soviet Belarus and Poland as a result of the Treaty or Riga. Similar to the UWO and OUN, the organization attacked communication lines, Polish homesteads, and local Polish authorities. In the summer of 1922, Polish secret police uncovered the organization's plan to stage a terrorist attack in the northeastern town of Grodno. Polish authorities acted swiftly and decisively, preempting the attack and liquidating the organization through mass arrests.[42] Violence is of course an important determinant of repression according to existing theories, and although it cannot be fitted into the regression model below, it does fit the Polish case. However, with only three observations and accounting for only 10 percent of state repression, this does not reveal much about the full variation across all organizations. Now I turn to testing the other

[40] AAN, MSW, Dop., sygn. 1073, s. 3; sygn1059, s., 19-20; sygn. 1065, s. 24, 31-33.
[41] Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War,* 75-76; Subtelny, *Ukraine,* 430-1.
[42] AAN, MSW, Dop., sygn. 1018, 97-97b.

organization level explanations using a logistic regression.

Results

Using a logistic regression and four models I test the explanatory power of seven independent variables: organization demands (autonomy or secession), regime type (pre-1926 i.e. democratic, post-1926 i.e. authoritarian), fifth column status/foreign ties (organization receives funding from a foreign, hostile state), ideology (left, centre, right), revisionist ties (the organization has ties with the USSR or Nazi Germany), organization size, and finally ethnic group. The dependent variable is binary, whether an organization is banned or allowed by the state.

Table 3.3. Logistic Regression Results. State Banning of Ethnic Minority Organizations in Interwar Poland

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
Variable	*Coeff.*	*SE*	*Coeff.*	*SE*	*Coeff.*	*SE*	*Coeff.*	*SE*
Regime (ref: Democratic)	-0.75	(0.87)	-0.01	(0.94)	-0.74	(0.87)	-0.98	0.93
Authoritarian								
Ethnic Group (ref: Ukrainian)								
Belarusian	0.60	(1.19)	1.29	(1.42)			0.40	(1.20)
German	-0.41	(1.56)	-0.78	(1.63)			-1.92	(1.45)
Jewish	0.59	(0.30)	1.33	(2.16)			-1.36	(1.50)
Ideology (ref: Left)								
Centre	-1.02	(1.40)	-0.63	(1.50)	-1.55	(1.26)	-1.51	(1.36)
Right	1.68	(1.18)	2.08	(1.31)	1.30	(0.92)	1.96	(1.22)
Size (ref: Small)								
Medium	-0.38	(1.31)	-0.43	(1.33)			-0.69	(1.33)
Large	0.33	(1.16)	1.33	(2.16)			0.20	(1.19)
Foreign ties (ref: No ties)	2.03*	(1.18)	1.61	(1.28)	2.05**	(1.02)	2.28*	(1.21)
Demands (ref: Autonomy)								
Secession	2.29	(1.40)	2.34*	(1.39)	2.02**	(0.98)		
Revisionist ties (ref: no ties)			1.18	(1.30)	0.21	(0.94)	0.90	(1.16)
Pseudo R^2		0.35		0.37		0.35		0.32
N		74		74		74		74

*p<.1. **p<.05. ***p<.01.

Table 3.3 outlines the results of the logistic regression. It should be noted that collinearity between variables was low.[43] Of the possible organization-level explanations, only two come up as statistically significant. First, an organization demanding secession is more likely to be repressed by the state than an organization demanding cultural or territorial autonomy. In other words, an ethnic minority organization threatening the territorial integrity of the state in which it operates provokes repression. The second statistically significant explanation supports the common argument put forward by the state response to opposition organization literature: organizations with foreign ties are more likely to be repressed by the state than organizations without such ties. Other explanations did not hold in the case of interwar Poland. Indeed, regime type, an organization's ideology, its size, or whether it had ties with revisionist neighbouring states did not affect interwar Polish policy towards minority organizations according to the models. Below I discuss the implications of the statistically significant results.

Organizational demands explained

Broadly speaking, minority ethnic organizations could demand autonomy or secession. Models 2 and 3 in Table 3.3 indicate that secessionist minority ethnic organizations are more likely to be repressed by the state than ethnic organizations demanding autonomy. By calling for secession, organizations pose an existential threat to Polish statehood, disputing its legitimacy to rule and instead promoting their own self-government. Maintaining territorial integrity was particularly acute in the case of interwar Poland, a land which consisted of regions that had never been governed as a single unit. In fact, in the first years of its existence, the Polish state had six currencies and nine fiscal systems, and Poland's two largest neighbours to the East and West—

[43] See appendix for results of collinearity tests.

Germany and the Soviet Union –were hostile and openly revisionist.[44] Indeed, "both Berlin and Moscow wanted to change the European order at the expense of Poland."[45] Squelching threats to Poland's peace or stability was therefore of critical importance. The data in Table 3.4 reflects these intuitions and reinforces the results of Model 3 and 4: only four percent of organizations (two organizations) advocating for autonomy were repressed, compared to the repression of 35 percent demanding secession (11 organizations).

Table 3.4 Frequency of State Repression based on Organization Demands

	Demands		
State Response	Autonomy	Secession	**Total**
Allow	96 (43)	65 (20)	83 (63)
Repress	4 (2)	35 (11)	17 (13)
Total	*100 (45)*	*100 (31)*	*100 (76)*

Note: Number of cases in brackets.

It is important to keep in mind that the interwar period was the age of national self-determination, wherein every nationality had, in theory, the right to govern itself. Thus, organizations demanding cultural autonomy were most often loyalist or pacifist, as they sought cooperation with the Polish state and were therefore least threatening; cultural autonomy was effectively the minimum rights that an ethnic organization could demand. Territorial autonomy was in the middle of the spectrum, often a compromise between minority and state actors, when the former fails to achieve independence. Comparatively speaking, then, these two demands are not perceived as threatening, given the third option of secession. The results that secessionist groups are more likely to be repressed, therefore, are not shocking. More surprising, though, is that 65 percent of organizations that demanded secession were *not* repressed. Why was this the

[44] Pers Anders Rudling, "The Battle Over Belarus: The rise and fall of the Belarusian national movement, 1906-1931" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Alberta, 2010), 121.
[45] Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 9.

case, given their direct challenge to state authority? We are missing an important part of the explanation. Indeed, the findings that most secessionist organizations were not repressed point to my main hypothesis throughout this study: states prefer pluralism.

Foreign Ties

The argument that foreign ties justify a state banning an organization is rooted in the principle of sovereignty. Organizations should serve the constituency within the state in which they operate, not represent outside powers. Thus we would expect minority ethnic organizations with ties to foreign powers to be repressed more readily than those without such ties. The opportunities for minority ethnic organizations operating in interwar Poland to receive foreign support was ample. Germans, Ukrainians, and Belarusians all had neighbouring kin states, and international Jewish organizations, particularly Zionist ones, supported organizations in Poland, not to mention diaspora communities and governments-in-exile. It is therefore unsurprising that half of minority ethnic organizations had foreign ties. German and Ukrainian organizations took the lead in this respect, with 84 and 68 percent respectively. Over half of Belarusian organizations received foreign funding (Table 3.5). The Soviet Union actively supported Ukrainian and Belarusian communist organizations, and moderate and rightwing organizations were known to have received funding from foreign states such as Germany and Lithuania, with the aim of destabilizing internal Polish politics. Almost all German organizations had ties to the Reich; throughout the interwar period, the German Foreign Ministry actively supported and funded German minority organizations in Poland.[46]

[46] Winson Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Table 3.5 Percentage of Ethnic Minority Organizations With Foreign Ties.

	Ethnic Group				
Foreign Ties	Ukrainians	Belarusian	German	Jewish	**Total**
Yes	68 (19)	54 (7)	84 (16)	35 (6)	49 (38)
No	32 (9)	46 (5)	16 (4)	65 (11)	51 (39)
Total	*100 (28)*	*100 (12)*	*100 (20)*	*100 (17)*	*100 (77)*

Note: Number of cases in brackets.

According to the foreign ties hypothesis, we would expect that German and Ukrainian organizations suffer the most state repression, with Belarusian and Jewish ones experiencing less. Yet this was not entirely the case: 42 percent of Belarusian organizations were banned, followed by 20 percent of German, 18 percent of Ukrainian, and 6 percent of Jewish organizations. Further, similar to the secessionist explanation, only a minority of the variation is explained through foreign ties. If 84 percent of German and 68 percent of Ukrainian organizations had foreign ties, for example, why was only 20 percent of German and 18 percent of Ukrainian organizations repressed? The theories confirmed by the statistical analysis provide us with important insights and part of the explanation, but going beyond regressions reveals a different reality. Indeed, there remains an unexpected theoretical gap. In the next section, I propose a way to explain such variation in the treatment of minority ethnic organizations.

Completing the Puzzle: Pluralism in Ethnic Minority Organizations

Though quantitative analysis illustrates important patterns in the empirical data, unanswered questions linger. Although I have demonstrated in this chapter that three of the proposed theories—violent organizations or organizations with secessionist ambitions or foreign ties—are good indicators of state repression, I have also highlighted a more puzzling aspect that remains: why was over 80 percent of ethnic minority organizations in interwar Poland—many of which

had foreign ties and/or harbored secessionist positions—allowed to operate? This is particularly interesting, given the generally hostile nature of state-minority ethnic group relations in Poland. Indeed, none of the explanations tested above can account for the pattern of allowed organizations, which is consistent across all categories and ethnic groups. Simply put, conventional theories do not focus on explaining this phenomenon. The empirical evidence, however, is compelling and deserves further investigation. I argue, therefore, that the only way to understand this puzzle *in its entirety* is to switch the theoretical perspective from a near exclusive focus on repression, to a broader one that includes state actors' preferences towards the management of ethnic minorities. Focusing on the relatively infrequent instances of repression will not explain the full variation, but viewing state-minority ethnic group organizations using the "divide and conquer" theory I put forward in this study will help make sense of this question. The theory highlights that, contrary to traditional explanations of state response to organizations and ethnic groups, states actually *prefer* organizational pluralism in ethnic minorities. Indeed, the default state policy in a multi-ethnic state is plurality, not repression.

Table 3.1 Percentage of Ethnic Minority Organizations Allowed or Banned by the State According to Ethnic Group.

	Ethnic Group				
State Response	Ukrainians	Belarusian	German	Jewish	**Total**
Allow	82 (23)	58 (7)	80 (16)	94 (16)	81 (62)
Ban	18 (5)	42 (5)	20 (4)	6 (1)	19 (15)
Total	*100 (28)*	*100 (12)*	*100 (20)*	*100 (17)*	*100 (77)*

Note: Number of cases in brackets.

If the theory that states prefer plurality in ethnic organizations is correct, we can hypothesize that within each minority there should be a majority of organizations that is not repressed. Table 3.1, presented at the beginning of this chapter and included again in this section, indicates that 94

percent of Jewish, 82 percent of Ukrainian, 80 percent of German and 58 percent of Belarusian organizations were allowed to operate in interwar Poland. Prima facie these numbers seem to confirm my predictions. Strictly quantitative analysis, however, at times can be misleading. And indeed, in the case of this hypothesis, the proportions of repressed versus non-repressed organizations within each ethnic group may be observationally equivalent with another, rival explanation. This alternative explanation contends that a state does not repress a majority of organizations because it does not have the capacity to do so. Therefore, whether it was due to state capacity, or whether it was the state's preference for plurality that resulted in a majority of minority ethnic groups not being repressed, can only be discerned using detailed process tracing.

Finally, the theories tested in this chapter do not account for an important facet of state-minority ethnic group relations, that non-violent organizations which seek to create a united front for a minority group, will invariably be repressed by the state. This is the reason I contend the organizations unexplained by conventional theories, outlined in Table 3.6, were banned. Whether these "united front" organizations were in fact stomped out because they were threatening to suppress pluralism in the ethnic minority or for some other reason can only be ascertained through process tracing and historical analysis of archival data, which I employ in the subsequent chapters. Still, the cases left unexplained by existing theories seem to favour the hypothesis that states prefer pluralism.

Table 3.6. Non-violent political minority organizations banned by the MSW

Organization	Minority Group	Years Active
Communist Party of Western Belarus* (Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Białorusi)	Belarusian	1923-1938 (operated covertly)
Belarusian Peasants' and Workers' Union "Hromada" (Białoruska Włościansko-Robotnicza Hromada)	Belarusian	1925-1927
Struggle for the Interest of the Peasants and Workers "Zmahannie" (Walki o interesy Włościan I Robotników "Zmahannie")	Belarusian	1927-1930
The School Committee, led by the Society of Belarusian Schools (Komitet Szkolny, Towarzystwie Szkoły Bialoruskiej)	Belarusian	1935
Communist Party of Western Ukraine* (Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Ukrainy)	Ukrainian	1919-1938 (operated covertly)
Sel-Rob Leftist/Unity (Sel-Rob Lewice/Jedność)	Ukrainian	1927-1932
Germandom League for the Protection of Minority Rights (Deutschtumsbund zur Wahrung der Minderheitenrechte)	German	1921-1923
League of Germans in Poland (Bund der Deutschen Polens)	German	1921, never authorized by MSW
League of Germans in Poland (Bund der Deutschen in Polen)	German	Proposed 1938-1939, never authorized by MSW
German Union (national level) (Deutsche Vereinigung)	German	Permission for organization to restructure into national organization denied in 1936—remained regional organization
All-Jewish Labour Party (Ogólnożydowska Partia Pracy),	Jewish	1931-1934

** Before Poland's borders were officially settled, Communists (in general) resorted to violent tactics, but this was before the KPZU and KPZB were formed.*

Conclusions

The above discussion emphasized important examples of how existing explanations do not account for important patterns and insights found in the empirical evidence. In each of the ethnic groups, the fate of some of the largest and most influential organizations dictating interwar minority policies was not correctly predicted by conventional theories (Table 3.6). Furthermore, none of the explanations tested in this chapter—though providing important clarification for some of the cases—were able to sufficiently account for why the *majority* of organizations (including among those posing secessionist demands and having foreign ties to hostile powers) in each ethnic group was allowed to operate. This reinforces the notion that shifting our angle of analysis to one that focuses on state preferences for pluralism will provide us with a more complete understanding of dynamics driving ethnic politics in multinational states. Because the subsequent chapters are divided based on ethnic groups, I briefly examine the Communist Parties of Western Belarus and Ukraine below, because their ideological similarities and cross-ethnic cooperation merit joint discussion. I offer this as a first example, before turning to independent chapters on each minority group.

A First Example: Communist Parties of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus

The historiographical literature almost unanimously assumes that Polish authorities repressed minority Communist organizations because they sought to annex Belarusian and Ukrainian-inhabited territories.[47] The theoretical literature supports this notion. But as I have demonstrated in the above sections, when taking the *full variation* of state response to minority organizations,

[47] See Chapters 4-6.

the explanatory power of these theories are put into question. Indeed, there were a number of organizations with "threatening" characteristics that were *not* banned.

Changing the way we approach the research question on state management of ethnic minority organizations will open up new insights and challenge conventional explanations that, upon closer examination, can be shown to be incomplete. The Communist Party of Western Belarus (Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Białorusi, or KPZB) and the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Ukrainy, or KPZU) are illustrative examples. Both of these parties were banned in the initial years of interwar Poland's existence. Drawing on existing theories, we can say that the Ukrainian and Belarusian Communist Parties were banned because they were secessionist organizations with foreign ties, and, relevant to the Polish case, these ties were with the irredentist neighbouring Soviet Union. These arguments, however, rest on a rather superficial understanding of the true nature of ethnic politics in interwar Poland. In other words, secessionist ambitions and foreign ties, though important and I do not dispute them entirely, only explain part of the reason why Polish authorities felt the need to repress the communist parties. Key questions remained unanswered. Why was "communism" a danger to Polish state authorities? Why were other communist organizations not banned immediately? If it was not ideology *per se*, nor was it fifth column ties or revisionist claims, what exactly did authorities perceive as threatening?

I argue that it was the ability of the Ukrainian and Belarusian Communist parties to unify the leftwing movements in each ethnic group that posed a serious threat to the Polish nation state. Communists successfully merged issues of national advancement with the improvement of social

and economic conditions and radical leftism, and enticed supporters to believe that life was better in the Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics (which, prior to the Soviet Union's forced collectivization polices, famines, and repression, did not seem farfetched, given the gloomy situation in Poland). Kopstein and Wittenberg summarize an interesting point made by Richard Burks, author of the *Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe*, finding that "within countries, the vote for the communists correlates not with class position (workers preferred, he maintains, the social democratic parties) but with ethnic marginality. In Poland, for example, areas containing a disproportionate number of Jews, Belarusians, and Ukrainians gave disproportionate support to communists."[48] These marginalized groups were considered "the losers of ethnic politics."[49] Indeed, as the economic situation worsened and anti-Polish sentiments increased in the eastern borderlands, support for the Communist Parties of West Belarus and Ukraine also increased, with promises of prosperity if Belarusian and Ukrainian peasantry united against the "bourgeoisie" Polish landowners.[50]

The fear of a *united* communist front—and not the ideology itself nor the political goals of the organization as such—is indicated throughout the Ministry of Interior's internal reports. During a congress of provincial leaders on August 8, 1922, the Minster of Interior made it clear that a united communist front must be prevented. Specifically, he cautioned against the use of state repression against non-communist "leftist and radical" parties, in fear that coercive action against the various leftist opposition groups would give them reason to unite, and drive smaller

[48] Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, "Who Voted Communist? Reconsidering the Social Bases of Radicalism in Interwar Poland," *Slavic Review* 62, no.1 (2003): 89-90.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Chapter 4 on "Dividing and Conquering the Eastern Borderlands" will explain in much greater detail the political situation in the eastern borderlands, and why it was unsurprising that this message would resonate among Belarusian and Ukrainian peasants; Per Anders Rudling, *The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 1906-1931* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 167; Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War,* 29.

opposition organizations into the hands of communists who sought a united front. The Minister stressed that "state authorities should treat all parties … equally by giving them legal protection."[51] "In particular," the Minister continued, "it is absolutely unacceptable to treat radical or leftist groups differently from other [moderate] organizations." In other words, radicals and leftist organizations, regardless of their claims or characteristics, were allowed to operate without state intervention so long as they worked within the legal framework of the state; they were "…not to be treated on equal footing with the Communists." The Minister provided reasons for this approach: "Mixing [radical and leftist] organizations with the Communists will, in every single instance, prove to be a mistake on our part, and be a gift for the Communists." Put otherwise, the state should not "push" opposition leftist organizations to unite under the Communists by antagonizing them with state repression. The general political strategy was thus outlined: "[O]ur entire policy in relation to the Communists…is to deepen the gap between the Communists and the rest of the Left… Following this strategy we have successfully forced the Communists to retreat from their 'united front' opposition to the state."[52]

The Ministry of Interior perceived the Communists' "united front" as most threatening: "Implementation of this ['unite the front'] slogan contains dangers which we should avoid. As a result, the loyal leftist opposition must be left separate at every step from the Communists: failing to make this distinction in each and every specific instance will automatically push the Left into the direction of a united front." Wanton repression was not the default policy: the "complete equality among all [political] parties" meant that any use of "state force" and "prosecution of crimes committed" will be in accordance to "normal court proceedings

[51] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1002, s. 34-34b.
[52] Ibid.

regardless of the party affiliations." In sum, the Minister of Interior outlined that repressive action against other leftist and radical parties cannot be pursued for it will drive them into the hands of the Communists who seek to create a united opposition. Instead, non-communist leftist organizations must be allowed to operate; organizational pluralism must be maintained; and the Communist "united front" thus prevented.

The strategy to selectively repress leftist opposition was also evident in the Ministry of Interior's decrees to squelch Communist May Day celebrations in 1926. Though Communist organizations were banned from carrying out demonstrations, other socialist organizations—such as the Jewish Poalej Sjon and Bund—were not stopped from holding rallies to celebrate the international labour holiday, so long as they did not display communist propaganda.[53] Authorities were apprehensive about such socialist holidays because they "increased the coordination efforts of communists,"[54] and as a result, the communists were banned from holding May Day parades.[55]

Thus, although the Communist Parties of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine were secessionist organizations with foreign ties to an irredentist state, we cannot overlook other important aspects that unmistakably informed the decision-making process of Polish state authorities. These nuances are pivotal in gaining a full understanding of how states manage ethnic diversity and can only be analyzed through systematic process analysis, which I employ in the core of this thesis, and turn to now.

[53] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg.980, s.97; AAN, MSW, Dop., syg.983, s. 58b.
[54] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1020, s. 1020 MSW, s. 59b.
[55] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 979, s.114.

Chapter 4: Dividing and Conquering the Eastern Borderlands ("the *Kresy*")

The following chapter outlines Poland's complex postwar political situation stemming from the Slavic minority "problem," that is, the Ukrainians and Belarusians inhabiting the eastern borderlands, also known as the *kresy.* I complicate the dominant historiographical literature, which emphasizes the assimilationist group-level policies Poland pursued vis-à-vis Ukrainians and Belarusians in the *kresy*, by shedding light on sub-group policy initiatives. I show how in order to realize the goals of group-level assimilationist policies, the Ministry of Interior (MSW) sought to exploit existing differences between and among Ukrainians and Belarusians, create new divisions by supporting state loyalism, and prevent the formation of a united Belarusian-Ukrainian opposition.

The chapter proceeds as follows. After outlining the context of the *kresy*, both leading up to and immediately following World War I, I briefly sketch the group-level minority policies pursued by government officials regarding the non-Polish Slavs. I then summarize the general strategy of divide and conquer in the *kresy,* which was formulated by the Ministry of Interior in the initial years of Polish independence. I conclude by showing that the tactic of divide and conquer—not state repression—was considered the surest strategy to assert control over the *kresy*. Chapters 5 and 6 will then delve into greater detail, illustrating how this strategy played out with regards to Belarusian and Ukrainian minority ethnic organizations.

National Self-Determination in the Ethnically Mixed *Kresy*

If a nation is its people, as the principle of self-determination suggests, then a nation-state's boundaries should extend to wherever "its people" are found. Though straightforward in theory and morally defensible by its proponents, the principle of national self-determination in practice rarely fits the contours of reality. Several questions arise. How is the principle applied to ethnically mixed territories? Which group is granted the right to self-rule: the numerical majority or those with historical precedence? Who decides the rightful ruling class? The victorious Entente powers did not carefully consider these questions before propagating every ethnic group's right to self-government;[1] the result was consequential.

The end of World War I (WWI) brought peace to the Western front, but battles waged on for another two years in East-Central Europe, where collapsed multi-ethnic empires left territories vacant for political actors to scrimmage over. Wars between Poland, the Bolsheviks, and the newly declared West Ukrainian National Republic ravaged the corridor which divides present day Poland and Ukraine. This corridor, known as the Eastern Borderlands, *Kresy Wschodnie* (Eastern Kresy) or simply *kresy* in Polish, was, prior to WWI, a territory like no other—a "confusing mosaic of cultures"[2] — where standardized notions of nations did not apply. In the age of national self-determination, this presented a uniquely difficult situation for those seeking to govern the *kresy*.

[1] Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2003).
[2] Kate Brown, *A Biography of No Place: from Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004).

During the interwar years, the *kresy* were defined as the six provinces that lay along the Polish-Soviet border, as well as the eastern parts of Lwów and Białystok provinces (Figure 4.1). The southern part of the *kresy*, where Ukrainians formed a majority, can also be referred to as Galicia, Eastern Galicia, Halychyna in Ukrainian, or Małopolska Wschodnia (Eastern Little Poland) in Polish. Northeast of Galicia, where Ukrainians also formed a majority, is the historic province of Volhynia (Wołyń in Polish or Volyn' in Ukrainian). These two territories were once part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but the partitions of the late 18th century saw



Figure 4.1 Map of Kresy (Eastern Borderlands)



Figure 4.2 Map of Galicia and Volhynia

Volhynia fall to the Russian Empire and Galicia to the Austrian. The historical narratives of these two Ukrainian-inhabited territories remained separate for over a century, converging only after WWI when they became a part of interwar Poland (Figure 4.2).

Belarusians, on the other hand, were mostly concentrated in the Polesie, Nowogródek, and Wilno territories, north of Volhynia, which was ceded entirely to Russia during the partitions. As a result, Belarusians never enjoyed the relative civil liberties that some of their Ukrainian counterparts experienced in the neighbouring Austrian Empire. Instead, they remained under repressive Russian rule until WWI—conditions that stifled the Belarusian national movement significantly. Dividing the *kresy* territorially, as I have done, is consistent with the literature but does not do justice to the complexities of the communities on the ground. The micro-level demographics were anything but clear-cut: dividing lines between ethnic groups were hazy; identities were ambiguous, constantly in flux and more often "local" rather than consistent with universal and theoretical conceptions of nationality.[3] People sooner identified with the village they lived in, the church they attended, or the "local" language they spoke, rather than claiming to belong to some larger abstract nation. The situation in the cities, where individuals and intelligentsia had a stronger familiarity with the notion of ethnic taxonomies, though different, was no less complicated.

Identity politics in the *kresy* were indeed multifaceted. The present-day capital of Lithuania illustrates this point well. Vilnius was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1795 following the third and final partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Until the destruction and ensuing ethnic cleansing brought on by World War II, Vilnius's demographics were striking, yet not uncommon for the region. On the eve of the First World War, Jews were the city's largest group; Polish was the language spoken on the streets and in theatres; Russian was the language of instruction in schools; churches were predominately Roman Catholic; the countryside surrounding the city was inhabited overwhelming by Orthodox Belarusian-speaking peasants;

[3] Ibid., 9.

and, despite the city being the former capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Lithuanians comprised only about two percent of the population. The picture presented is one of a single city with several irreconcilable identities: Russians ruled over "Vil'na;" Polish culture dominated "Wilno;" Jews considered "Vilne" a religious centre, yet Lithuanians envisioned "Vilnius" the future capital of their independent nation-state, as did Belarusians "Vil'nia."[4] Similarly, 700 kilometers south of Wilno, Lemberg (Lwów in Polish, Lviv in Ukrainian, pronounced Lemberik in Yiddish), a crown-land capital in the Austrian Empire, annexed in 1772 during the First Partition, was emblematic of the region's complex demographics. Poles dominated the Austro-Hungarian city in terms of size and cultural influence; Jews were the city's largest minority group, yet the surrounding countryside was inhabited mostly by Ukrainians. Religiously diverse, the city was the seat of a Roman Catholic, an Armenian, and a Greek Catholic archbishop.

The principle of national self-determination, however, did not make it clear whether Lemberg in the years following WWI should become the Polish regional capital of Lwów, or if it should be Lviv, the capital of a West Ukrainian independent state. Similarly, whether the Poles should relinquish Wilno to an independent Lithuania claiming Vilnius, or whether the Belarusians deserved Vil'nia as the capital of their sought after republic, was also uncertain. The fact that Austrians ruled over Lemberg for over a century, as did the Russians in Vilna, was beside the point. The *kresy's* cultural complexity sowed fertile grounds for competing territorial claims to emerge in the name of national self-determination. Ukrainians, Poles, and the Bolsheviks (among them Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, and Belarusians marching under a Communist banner while still adhering to ethnic taxonomies) considered the *kresy* rightfully "theirs," not to mention the

[4] Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 15,52.

Belarusians, Lithuanians, and Jews who, although not having large armies to charge their claims, also believed that the land they inhabited belonged to them. The principle of national self-determination, however, would only allow one ethnic group to claim these multi-ethnic cities and the lands that surrounded them.

The Poles, for the most part, prevailed. In 1919, they militarily defeated first the Ukrainians, and then, in 1921, the Bolsheviks. As a result of these victories Poland was granted the *kresy*. The Treaty of Riga was signed on March, 18, 1921, officially ending the Polish-Soviet war and settling Poland's eastern borders. But the conflict did not end at Riga. No one was entirely satisfied with the new borders, particularly the Ukrainians, who, although numbering in the millions, did not receive an independent state like the Poles, Czechs, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Albanians, and Romanians.[5] Ukrainian political leaders actively protested the Treaty of Riga, petitioning the League of Nations to enforce their hitherto shunned right to self-determination. Despite a concerted effort, Ukrainian demands fell on deaf ears, and in 1923 the League of Nations recognized Poland's permanent sovereignty over Galicia and Volhynia, on condition that it grant the region autonomous administration. This condition was in addition to the requirements outlined in the Minority Treaty signed in June 1919 between Poland and the League of Nations, which conferred basic rights on all individuals regardless of ethnicity or religion. The promises made by Poland to its minorities, however, were never fulfilled.

Despite defeating its foreign enemies in the fight over the *kresy*, Poland remained internally divided over the question of how to manage its newly acquired territories and the significant Slavic minority that came with it. In this respect, there were two prevailing but starkly opposing

[5] Anna Reid, *Borderland: A Journey Through the History of Ukraine* (London: Weidenfeld&Nicolson, 1997), 102.

views. Polish nationalists, led by Roman Dmowski's National Democratic party, favoured a policy of national assimilation that would make the borderlands and those inhabiting them unequivocally "Polish." Polish federalists, led by Józef Piłsudski and the Polish Socialist Party, on the other hand, favoured creating a federal structure inspired by the historic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The arrangement that Piłsudski sought entailed a Polish-led federation with Belarus and Ukraine, with the latter two acting as a buffer between Russia and Poland. Although Piłsudski and his army led the military defeats that brought Poland to the negotiation table, the delegation at Riga was primarily comprised of National Democrats, who, in the wake of the 1919 Polish elections, emerged as the largest political party. Piłsudski, to his dismay, sat grudgingly on the sidelines as he witnessed the National Democrats negotiate the Treaty in accordance with their nationalist ideologies. This ended all hopes of a revived political entity reminiscent of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

In delineating Poland's eastern borders, the National Democrats took on only what they considered a "manageable" non-Polish Slavic minority population, one that could have (and should have) been assimilated into a greater Polish nation-state. Pushing the borders too far east, particularly into territories where Polish culture did not dominate urban centers like it did throughout the *kresy*, would be overwhelming for the nascent Republic. As a result, the highly contested new border established by the Treaty of Riga reflected "no demographic or political realities, but rather an uneasy truce between warring powers."[6] Poland's main concern in the ensuing interwar years was therefore consolidating its newly granted independence, and particularly, (re)claiming the *kresy*.

[6] Brown, *Biography of No Place,* 7.

Assimilating the *Kresy* Through Divide and Conquer

In this section I first describe the postwar political landscape that motivated Polish policy choices in the *kresy*: geopolitical anxieties, poverty, indifference, and illiteracy—traits the Ministry of Interior attributed to the region's "backwardness." Attention is drawn to the difference between the various regions and populations. Second, I detail the group-level assimilationist policies pursued by Polish officials, illustrating that in order to successfully implement these policies, officials needed to tackle the threat of a united Ukrainian and Belarusian opposition. Finally, I outline the general divide and conquer strategy the MSW sought to implement in the *kresy*. This strategy included: exploiting existing diversity in the region; creating new divisions by supporting state loyalism; preventing the formation of a unified opposition; and dissuading the use of state repression.

The Eastern Political Landscape on the Ground

The greatest threat to interwar Poland's newfound independence, according to the Ministry of Interior (MSW), was the minority Slavic population—the Belarusians and Ukrainians—inhabiting its eastern borderlands.[7] More specifically, Polish authorities were concerned that "enemies of the Polish state, and above all Russia [the Soviet Union] will seek to annex the Eastern Borderlands." "Protection from this danger" was the "primary task of Polish politics" according to the MSW.[8] Indeed, incorporating the *kresy* was Poland's priority, its "raison d'État."[9] Authorities knew, however, that military and state capacity alone as a means of securing these lands would not suffice in warding off internal and external threats. The Polish state had to foster and create "strong, natural ties, permanently linking the eastern stretches of the

[7] Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Wydział Narodowościowy, syg. 938, s 1-19.
[8] Ibid.
[9] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s. 102-103.

Republic with the rest of the State." [10] To safeguard independence, authorities felt it was imperative that the *kresy* formed an integral *Polish* part of Poland.[11] In a letter to the Minister of Interior dated March 1, 1923 the Governor of Polesie stated: "in the era of emancipatory national movements and rampant nationalism, [state capacity/force] alone cannot ensure the protection of the nascent Polish state."[12] Warsaw agreed.

The task ahead was paramount. The *kresy* had an inherent tendency toward political instability, owing to the presence of its Slavic minorities, which was substantial enough to create a basis for irredentist politics while at the same time not large enough to effectively claim territorial autonomy.[13] To make matters worse, with its generally flat landscape, absent any natural landmarks such as mountains, valleys, or vast seas setting off its borders, the *kresy* was militarily indefensible and easily infiltrated by neighbouring revanchist powers. This led to significant geopolitical anxieties further aggravated by the region's reputation as "the most poor and backward" part of Poland, "in dire need of cultural and economic elevation."[14]

The people of the *kresy*, classified by state authorities as mostly poor and illiterate peasants were mostly concerned about their impoverished lifestyle, particularly the severe shortage of land plaguing their territory, and were generally disinterested in contemplating their right to national self-determination. In Galicia, the land problem was most acute, with 79 percent of peasant plots measuring less than 10 acres. Size, obviously, was crucial to the welfare of the individual farmer,

[10] AAN, WN, syg. 938, s.1-19.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Andrew Savchenko, *Belarus: a perpetual borderland* (Boston: Brill, 1999), 99.
[14] Brown, *Biography of No Place, 3;* Savchenko, *Belarus: a perpetual borderland,* 99-100; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Dopływ, syg. 100, s. 48b.

and so such small land plots made it difficult for farmers to earn a living. Indeed, contemporary observers conclude that properties less than twelve acres are generally inadequate to sustain a single family. In addition to not having enough land to live off of, the peasants of Galicia had to contend with the destruction of WWI, which left 20 percent of them without their homes or farm buildings, as well as 38 percent of their horses, 36 percent of cattle, and 77 percent of hogs destroyed.[15]

Volhynia fared far worse. It was the second largest region of Poland, "its fields, forests, and marshes scarcely marred by roads and rail links, its towns innocent of sewers."[16] Almost 90 percent of Volhynia's inhabitants worked the land. Indeed, "[b]y comparison with Volhynia, even proverbially backward Galicia looked quite European, and quite national."[17] Not a single city in Volhynia had a regulated network of streets, a sewage system, or effective municipal services. In total, there were only about 200 hospitals, only 58 percent of which was in the service of the state or local governments. In 1926, for every one doctor, there were 3,130 urban and 15,640 rural people.[18] There were barely 500 hospital beds across the entire province.[19] In the town of Sarny, a municipal centre, the first hospital was formed only in 1938.[20]

Illiteracy was widespread. In 1931, 70 percent of people over the age of ten in Volhynia were illiterate, and, on the eve of World War II, the percentage of children not attending school exceeded 25 percent. This lack of education, authorities believed, made the population in

[15] Paul Robert Magocsi, *A history of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 586.
[16] Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations,* 144-45.
[17] Ibid., 145.
[18] Władysław Filar, *Wołyń 1939-1944 Eksterminacja czy walki polsko-ukraińskie: Studium Historyczno-Wojskowe zmagań na Wołyniu w obronie polskości, wiary i godności* ludzkiej (Toruń: Wydawn. Adam Marszałek, 2003), 30.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.

Volhynia particularly susceptible to propaganda. The region also lacked traditional markers of "culture," in the Western European sense of the word. In all of Volhynia there was only one theatre (in Luck); Rowne had one museum, and substantial libraries could only be found in Dubno and Rozyszczac.[21] Volhynia also posed a different problem with regards to the national question. Galicia under the Austrian Empire became the centre of the Ukrainian national movement, where Ukrainian civil society grew and political parties formed. Ukrainian Galicians were mobilized by the Polish-Ukrainian War and the brief existence of an independent West Ukrainian National Republic. National movements in the impoverished Volhynia, however, were absent in the early 1920s.[22]

Economic reform, particularly in agriculture, became the most pressing post-WWI concern, "the political issue par excellence" in the *kresy*.[23] It was initially thought of as the most effective way of enticing the borderland population into state loyalty.[24] But Poles were not the only ones seeking to assert their control over the *kresy.* Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Soviet forces all had stakes in the contested borderlands, and all of them evoked the "national" question as a means of destabilizing the *kresy,* hoping to alienate the local population from the Polish state and instead draw supporters to their respective movements. Thus a strictly pragmatic and economically driven strategy to governing the *kresy* could not be adopted by the state—ethnicity could not be overlooked.[25] Issues, like the land shortage, were almost always politicized along ethnic lines (i.e. Poles were seen as the rich landowners, and Ukrainians and Belarusians the exploited

[21] Ibid., 31.
[22] Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations,* Chapter 7.
[23] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s. 105.
[24] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 938, s.13.

peasantry).[26] In Galicia, for example, while predominately Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants were desperate for land, about 2000 large estates, owned by Poles and sometimes consisting of 10,000 to 20,000 acres, controlled close to 25 percent of the land.[27] Political actors claiming to represent the Slavic minority thus effortlessly created a discourse of Polish landowners exploiting Ukrainian and Belarusian peasants (overlooking the fact that Polish peasants, of which there were many, were just as poor as their non-Polish peasant neighbours). Warsaw was well aware of the volatile nature of nationality in the *kresy* and treaded carefully. The Ministry of Interior urged government officials to treat the minority question with the "utmost circumspection" and above all to "avoid all methods that will polarize the population based on language, religion, as it will only distance them further from the state," spurring animosity and anti-state sentiments.[28]

On May 1, 1923, the Ministry of Interior issued highly classified general guidelines for governing the *kresy* and delivered them directly into the hands of provincial leaders. According to the Minister, acquiring the eastern borderlands was an "historic" victory for Poland, and only through a "uniform" government policy, coordinated both at the national and local levels, could the government successfully stabilize the political situation and "further the state's interests."[29] The proposed solution was straightforward: strengthen the "native Polish" element and "create loyal citizens" from "foreign" minorities. This was, in effect, two sides of the same coin: the most effective way of creating loyal Polish citizens, they believed, was to assimilate non-Poles

[26] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s. 104-5.
[27] Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine,* 586; For stats on Belarusians, see Per Anders Rudling, *The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 1906-1931* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 170.
[28] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1002, s. 48b.
[29] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s.102-103.

into *ethnic* Poles rather than creating Polish *citizens*.[30] Loyalty to the state was thus dictated by ethnicity. And indeed, Poland embarked on a nationalizing policy directed towards its Slavic minority with the goal of creating and deepening the conviction among the Ukrainian and Belarusian "masses" that they and the borderlands which they inhabited formed an integral and permanent part of "Motherland" Poland.[31]

According to MSW reports, following WWII the majority of the inhabitants in the *kresy*—including those considered Polish—"did not yet have a national or civic sense of identity."[32] Even local Poles, rather than promoting Polishness in the East, as central authorities had hoped, were "completely indifferent to the fate of the country" and did not manifest "national aspirations."[33] This sentiment was widespread. As late as 1931, the Polish census showed that, in the province of Polesie, 64 percent of the population (707,000 people) considered themselves "*tutejszy*," meaning "local," not identifying with any ethnic taxonomy. Although an outsider would consider most of those who declared themselves "local" as Belarusian, only 6.6 percent of Polesie's inhabitants agreed with this classification in 1931.[34] Thus the notion of turning ethnic Ukrainians or Belarusians into Poles, as if tearing them away from one ethnic group to remold and force them to identify with a different one, is not an entirely accurate depiction. Instead, the task at hand was more akin to convincing a largely indifferent population that they were Polish, that they belonged to Poland, and that any alternative to "Polishness" would, at minimum, relegate them to a status of second-class citizen, or at worst, label them a threat to the state.

[30] Waldemar Kozyra, *Polityka administracyjna Ministrów Spraw Wewnętrznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Latach 1918-1939* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2009).
[31] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s.104-5.
[32] Ibid.
[33] MSW report cited in Kathryn Clare Ciancia, "Poland's Wild East: Imagined landscapes and everyday life in the Volhynian borderlands, 1918-1939" (Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 2011), 46.
[34] Drugi Powszechny Spis Ludności 1931, *Statystyka Polski* (1931 Official Polish Census).

Those inhabiting the *kresy* found their national identity largely irrelevant; those seeking to dominate it, however, made it central. "In formulating a plan of action," stated the Governor of Polesie in 1923, "we must above all have a clear understanding of the situation….the peasant mass is the decisive factor [in conquering the *kresy*]."[35] Polish authorities were not alone in promoting this strategy. Organizations claiming to represent Belarusians and Ukrainians knew that if they were to succeed in conquering the *kresy*, they too needed to garner local support. It was thus a battle between the Polish state and Belarusian and Ukrainian ethnic minority organizations over which could convince the largely indifferent "masses" that ethnic politics mattered, and that, in this battle, individuals must declare allegiance to one side over another.

Group-level assimilationist policies in the kresy: Education and internal colonization

Poland's strategy was clear. National Democrat and Minister of Religious Beliefs and Public Education Stanisław Grabski believed that "the transformation of the state territory of the Republic into a Polish national territory is a necessary condition of maintaining our frontiers."[36] This was the consensus among the ruling National Democrats who embarked on policies aimed at making their minorities Polish. Much ink has been spilled over these repressive group-level minority policies pursued to govern the *kresy*, and, when discussed, attention is almost exclusively placed on two examples. The first is the Polish-dominated school system. Under the Minorities Treaty, Poland was obligated to provide minority language instruction in areas with significant minority populations, but it was not long before the ruling National Democrats amended this right and began "polonizing" the school system. Speaking on the minority question

[35] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 938, s.1-19.
[36] Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 100.

in 1919, Grabski stated that "[w]e want to base our relationships on love, but there is one kind of love for countrymen and another for aliens. Their percentage among us is definitely too high . . . Polish land for the Poles!"[37] The most effective way of decreasing the "foreign element" among the Slavs, the National Democrats thought, was through the assimilatory power of the education system.

In 1924, Grabski introduced the *Lex Grabski* legislation into the Sejm (parliament). When passed, the Polish school system in the *kresy* changed from one in which Ukrainian or Belarusian was the basic language of instruction to one in which Polish and either Ukrainian or Belarusian bilingual instruction became the norm (see Table 4.1 for Ukrainian schools).[38] Although the schools were officially bilingual, Polish was the primary language in use.[39] Similarly, Polish authorities between 1920 and 1925 closed 346 private Belarusian-language schools opened in 1918-19.[40] This effectively brought an end to state-funded minority language schools.[41] Speaking on this accomplishment at a 1925 meeting of eastern governors, Grabski maintained "that Poland's eastern school policy was part of a national battle in which Polish culture would be 'a magnetic influence' for the national minorities, whose culture was necessarily weaker."[42] In relation to Poland's assimilationist policies, another National Democrat cabinet member declared in 1925: "I assure you that in ten years you will not find, even with a candle, a single Belarusian

[37] *Deutsche Zeitung,* September 2, 1919, cited in Richard Blanke, "The German minority in interwar Poland and German foreign policy – Some reconsiderations," *Journal of Contemporary History* 25 (1990):89.
[38] Magocsi, *A history of Ukraine,* 254.
[39] Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: a History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 440-41.
[40], *Belarusian Nationalism,*169; Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations,* 65,282.
[41] S.A. Cramsey and J. Wittenberg, "Timing is Everything: Changing norms of minority rights and the making of a Polish Nation-state," *Comparative Political Studies* 49, no.11 (2016): 11.
[42] Cited in Kathryn Clare Ciancia, "Poland's Wild East: Imagined landscapes and everyday life in the Volhynian borderlands, 1918-1939" (Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 2011), 147.

in Poland."[43]

Table 4.1
Ukrainian-language and bilingual schools in interwar Poland, 1922-1938

	Ukrainian schools		Polish-Ukrainian schools	
	1922	1938	1928	1938
Galicia	2 426	352	1 635	2 485
Volhynia	443	8	652	520
Polessie	22	0	-	-

Source: Magocsi*, A history of Ukraine, 594.*

The second example brought up in the literature on repressive Polish minority policies is the state's official program in the early 1920s to colonize the *kresy* with "loyal" Poles from central Poland.[44] The result was an influx of Polish military veterans, border guards and Roman Catholic (Polish) priests, who were brought in from other parts of Poland and given land parceled out by the state. The military nature of the program stemmed from the *kresy's* geopolitically precarious position bordering the Soviet Union.[45] The military settlers, who, between 1922 and 1924 were given 3,432 plots of land in the otherwise land-starved Volhynia province,[46] constituted "ethnic Polish islands, outposts of Polish rule in the east."[47] Locals on the whole did not welcome the military settlers, whom they viewed as foreigners unjustly receiving preferential treatment and stealing land belonging to them.[48]

[43] Cited in Rudling, *Belarusian Nationalism,*
[44] Janina Smogorzewska, *Kresowe osadnictwo wojskowe, 1920-1945* (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Oficyna Wydawn. „Rym," 2003).
[45] Cramsey and Wittenberg, "Timing is Everything," 1489.
[46] Janina Stobniak-Smogorzewska, "Osadnictwo na Wołyniu 1921-1940," *Niepodległość i Pamięć* 15, no.1 (2008): 158.
[47] Pers Anders Rudling, "The Battle Over Belarus: The rise and fall of the Belarusian national movement, 1906-1931" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Alberta, 2010), 194.
[48] Smogorzewska, *„Osadnictwo na Wołyniu."*

Despite its negative portrayal in the literature, the goal of the language laws and colonization program, at least according to classified internal MSW documents, was to create conditions for the peaceful coexistence of the population,[49] and not necessarily to repress the minorities. This notion rested on the belief that "close contact"[50] between Poles and Belarusians and Ukrainians would eventually result in the cultural and national assimilation of the Slav minorities.[51] Similar to how Eastern Europe since the Enlightenment has been viewed as Western Europe's "uncivilized" counterpart,[52] there was a prevailing conviction of Polish civilizational superiority vis-à-vis Belarusians and Ukrainians.[53] It was believed that the *kresy* were economically and socially "backward," largely because of its demographic makeup, comprising mostly of "backward" non-Poles: if the state brought "culture" to the "uncivilized" eastern borderlands, both the economic and national questions plaguing the region would be resolved. Herding peasant masses through a Polish school system and surrounding them with "trustworthy" Poles brought in from central and western Poland would make the borderland people more Polish, European, and "civilized."[54] And why should they resist the gift of culture bestowed upon them? State authorities were puzzled when they saw that locals were not swallowing their spoon-fed Polishness. It turned out these people were not, as previously thought by authorities in Warsaw, a "black mass" of "ethnic raw material" ripe for Polonization.[55] A classified report dated February 1923 from the Governor of Polesie to the MSW stated: "We cannot treat the territory, once part of the Commonwealth, now attached to Poland, as a unified whole. From any and all

[49] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1002, s. 48.
[50] In Polish: "ścisle życiowe obcowanie," ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
[53] Ciancia, "Poland's Wild East."
[54] Ibid.
[55] Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations,* 179, 224.

perspectives they do not represent anything unified."[56] The situation was not what it used to be. Wilno, and other capitals of Polish culture, did not exude the same influence it once did. The glory days of the Polish gentry, with their royal courts and manor homes, had long passed.[57] The political arena had changed drastically since the Polish Kingdom's heyday and a new approach to managing minorities was needed in interwar Poland.

Dividing and Conquering the *Kresy:* The General Strategy

Warsaw eventually realized that "Polishness" could not be imposed from above. Countering the assimilationist minority policies were organizations that had a very different idea of what the borderlands were and what they should become. Although Polish minority policies were considered "harsh enough to make new enemies," they were "far from the sort of tyranny which might have stifled…civil society."[58] Scholars continuously claim that "Polish policy remained repressive throughout the 1920s and the 1930s," and, though the policies towards minorities were far from ideal, they do not explain the full picture of interwar Polish ethnic politics. In order for Poland to implement its policies, it had to quell minority ethnic group organizations that opposed the state. Although, on the surface the image is one of group-level assimilationist policies, the behind-the-scenes politics were very much focused on the dynamics between the state and minority ethnic organizations; group-level policies could not be implemented without considering the latter. Early discussion surrounding the minority language laws, for example, already saw the important role organizations could play, both in favour of and to the detriment of the state and its policy goals:

[56] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 938, s.1-19.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Snyder, *Reconstruction of Nations,* 144.

> The language act will raise concerns because it is based on a declarative system. The population must report adherence to this or any other nationality, they must request a school in this or any other language. [Ethnic minority organizations] will take advantage of this situation, propagate their goals and agitate the population…it would be unwise/reckless not to launch a counter-initiative. Propaganda, press, spoken word—this is the kind of action that must be taken on by Polish social organizations, and supported by state authorities.[59]

The approach taken to governing the *kresy* was one of divide and conquer. Broadly, this tactic involved: first, encouraging the intra-group divide within the Ukrainian population; second, ensuring that the Ukrainians and Belarusians did not present a united front against the state; third, coopting the comparatively weak Belarusian national movement; and forth, promoting organizational plurality by creating and sustaining loyalist organizations in the *kresy*. To carry out this plan, the state emphasized the importance of a united Polish front, and, contrary to what the literature portrays, discouraged the use of repression against minorities, even though the means were available.

This reflects the main hypothesis of my study that, when faced with potentially hostile minority groups, the state prefers pluralism. As the above sections have outlined, the political situation in the *kresy* did not allow for the simple implementation of group-level policies. Thus although the overall group-level policy was to assimilate Ukrainians and Belarusians into the titular Polish culture, to realize this goal the MSW had to take a strategy of divide and conquer first in order to squelch any opposition. I outline the four main observable implications (OIs) of my hypothesis in Table 4.2 to illustrate this more clearly. Though these observable implications are meant to showcase the policy preferences vis-à-vis minority ethnic organizations, they also illustrate the

[59] AAN, MSW, Dop. syg. 1002, s. 49.

more general approach the MSW sought when conquering the *kresy*. Drawing from classified MSW policy discussions, I provide brief examples for each OI below, after which the subsequent two chapters on Belarusian and Ukrainian organizations will expand on each in greater detail.

Table 4.2. Observable Implication of Divide and Conquer Hypothesis for the Kresy

Observable Implications	Outcome	
There should be a majority of organizations that are not banned.	✓	Repression should not be used for a majority of organizations
State actors should embark on actions that are functional to maintaining organizational pluralism within each ethnic minority, fomenting and exploiting ***existing divisions.***	✓	Exploit differences between and within Ukrainians and Belarusians.
State actors should create, support, or promote ***new divisions*** *in the minority.*	✓	Create and promote state loyalism. Coopt Belarusian population.
Organizations that suppress organizational pluralism within the ethnic minority should be banned, i.e. they are able to create a united front for the minority.	✓	Prevent formation of Ukrainian-Belarusian united opposition.

Encouraging and Exploiting Existing Divides

The allegedly "Polish" *kresy* were demographically non-Polish, and treating the multi-ethnic eastern borderlands as one unified entity was a grave misstep. "The so-called 'Eastern Borderlands' are not uniform in its character," stated a report to the MSW from the Governor of Polesie, "[o]ne of the most basic and common mistakes is treating the *kresy* as a whole, without realizing the differences that occur across its various regions…Each of these regions presents a completely different picture in terms of landscape, nature, living conditions, economic relations, and ethnographic and political life."[60] Authorities knew that it was imperative to recognize these differences and to understand the individual character of each province. Each region of the *kresy*, depending on their individual character, presented "a separate issue and separate task to

[60] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 938, s. 2.

solve."[61] The policy direction was clear: "the lands located south of the Wilno region [i.e. the *kresy*], are neither economically, politically nor ethnically unified, and we should exploit these differences to further Polish national interests. These differences should be considered beneficial, not detrimental, to the Polish nation and the Polish state. *The existing diversity should be maintained, strengthened, and exploited* [emphasis added]." [62]

With regards to the Ukrainian minority, the Minister of Interior stated: "[t]o formulate a unified and effective policy for governing the eastern borderlands, we must consider the deep divide between Ukrainians, because our policies depend on utilizing and exploiting these differences."[63] The Minister stressed the contrast between Volhynia and Galicia in particular, pointing to significant variation in religion, culture, and social tradition between the two. Most of these differences were attributed to the imperial legacies stemming from their divergent histories following the partitions in the late 18th century. This difference in the ethnically inhabited Ukrainian territories provided the Polish government with the opportunity to deepen the divide and prevent the consolidation and creation of one, unified Ukrainian nationalist front originating in Galicia.[64] Indeed, Polish officials and Ukrainian activists alike distinguished between Galician and Volhynian Ukrainians: "from a Ukrainian nationalist point of view Galicians were reliable and Volhynians good candidates for national agitation; from a Polish etatist point of view Galicians were unreliable and Volhynians good candidates for political assimilation."[65] Polish policy aimed to keep Ukrainian nationalists from creating a unified front.

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[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid., s. 1-19.
[63] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s.109.
[64] Ibid., s. 108a.
[65] Timothy Snyder, "The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943," *Past and Present 5,* no. 179 (2003): 144.

Creating New Divides and Supporting Loyalists

Broadly, to tackle the anti-Polish front, a policy of promoting organizational plurality was proposed by the MSW: "the government should actively pursue policies that systematically plan and produce" at first local level, and later national level, "loyalist Ukrainian and Belarusian organizations." The approach had to be different in Volhynia and Galicia.[66] In Volhynia, the land and its people had been affected more by WWI. They therefore tended to lack deeper cultural aspirations and sought only economic recovery. On the other hand, in Galicia, the short-lived Ukrainian West National Republic and the ensuing military loss to Poland whetted the appetite for full independence and produced a generation of frustrated Ukrainians. Galician claims were thus more cultural and political.[67]

In Volhynia in 1923, there were few political organization and no loyalist ones. Instead, there existed "more or less hostile, anti-state movements," which, according to the MSW, were "created by the Bolsheviks and Ukrainian nationalists" and to a large extent were "artificially induced, not based on true national consciousness."[68] To promote organizational plurality, it was important for the government to "find or create loyalist elements" in Volhynia, where the ground for propaganda was thought to be "very fertile."[69] One policy option put forward was to create and financially support a Ukrainian pro-state press outlet. Authorities believed that this would form a foundation for loyalist Ukrainian organizations to draw from and build upon (particularly,

[66] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s.108
[67] Ibid., s. 108-109.
[68] Ibid., s.109.
[69] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s. 109.

authorities had Minister Antin Wasyńczuk, a pacifist Ukrainian, and his supporters in mind for this project).[70]

In Galicia there already existed a relatively large number of Ukrainian minority organizations, and, though most of them were anti-state, the MSW noted (somewhat counter-intuitively) that creating loyalist organizations was in fact easier in Galicia because "the groundwork has already been laid by [pacifist organizations such as] the Ridnyj Kraj and Chlopska Prawda." There were a number of political figures and nascent organizations that were willing to work with the state—the "Chliboroby" being the largest and most suitable organization for Poland's policy of promoting loyalist organizations.[71] Authorities also believed that government intervention did not need to be overly imperious. Indeed, loyalist Ukrainian organizations had already declared a "war to the death" against exiled Ewhen Petruszewicz, the leader of the defeated West Ukrainian National Republic and staunch anti-Polish activist. Polish policymakers knew that even "without any initiative from the State, and without significant financial support for these [loyalist] organizations, the organizations themselves will discredit [the Ukrainian independence movement] and will not allow Petruszewicz to return to Poland to assume leadership [of the Ukrainian movement]. The Administration, using this to its benefit, should pay close attention to loyalist organizations and actively support them."[72] The Minister of Interior cautioned, however, that policymakers "must keep in mind the potential strength presented by the members of the [loyalist organization] Chliboroby and adopt tactical moves accordingly."[73] In other words, the

[70] Ibid., s. 109a.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid., 110a.
[73] Ibid., 109b.

organizations must be kept in check to insure that they remain loyal to the state and not accrue substantial independent power.

It was noted several years later, in 1935, that creating a plethora of state-backed organizations, however, was considered both costly and ineffective. Though the state aimed to support and "inspire" loyalist organizations, without genuine grassroots support, such organizations had little chance at survival. This was noted in a MSW study of the *kresy*: "[w]ith regards to state involvement in organizations, it should be emphasized that authorities can become overly involved, becoming official initiators and organizers instead of limiting themselves to inspiration…We have witnessed more than once the creation of an organization in the Eastern Kresy, the head of which is the local governor, and the members are there on government orders. Organizations of this type are never viable, because their creation and activity is artificial. The impact of these organizations is therefore counterproductive: rather than positive, they are harmful; they are seen as surrogate organizations, something imposed by state authorities onto the population."[74]

Preventing a United Belarusian-Ukrainian Front

When comparing the two, the Governor of Polesie described the Ukrainian national movement as "serious, strongly awakened and developed," whereas the Belarusian movement was seen as "weaker, poorly developed" but nonetheless "should not be underestimated."[75] Authorities did not set out to repress these movements with force, but rather to use state intervention to play the

[74] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 946, s. 33.
[75] AAN, MSW, WN, syg 938.

two movements off each other and weaken them.[76] One thing was certain: the Ukrainian and Belarusian national movements could not be left alone to unite.[77] The aim was, first and foremost, to exploit the "clearly visible cracks" in the Minority Bloc—that is, the attempt at a united front formed by minority ethnic organizations against the state.[78] In the early years of independence, Polish authorities believed that a steadfast way of breaking and deterring this united minority front, particularly between the Slavs, was to coopt the Belarusian movement. "The aim should be to bring the government closer to the indigenous peoples, particularly the Belarusians."[79] In the mostly-Belarusian inhabited province of Polesie, attention was to be placed exclusively on settling the economic needs of the region and supporting ethnically mixed economic organizations. There should be "significant support for mixed organizations, especially economic ones," stated a MSW report, "such as agricultural organizations, cooperatives, and organizations for farmers, rural youth, and housewives."[80] This approach, authorities thought, was the best way to gain the "trust" of locals: "they are nationally unconscious, thus winning them over [economically] will get us the support needed to stabilize the Belarusian-inhabited Borderlands."[81] Treading carefully around the nationality question always remained a priority: "In the field of culture and education, public policy should strive to meet the educational needs of the Belarusian population, but it should not be the government's task to raise awareness of the national consciousness of the Belarusian people, especially where people native to the area have no clear sense of national belonging, or are willing to identify as Polish."[82]

[76] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 938, s.4.
[77] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1002, s. 49b.
[78] Ibid.
[79] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 802, s.8.
[80] Ibid., s 8-9.
[81] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s. 110.
[82] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 802, s. 1-19.

By gaining the trust of the locals, they aimed to gain their loyalty, and loyalty to the state, as outlined above, was synonymous with strengthening the "Polish element." Indeed, strengthening Polishness was a priority, and the soundest opportunity for this was seen in the Belarusian population, as stated by the Minister of Interior: "[c]lose attention should especially be paid, gentlemen provincial governors, to sustain purely Polish influences, which in the northern part of the Borderlands declined from the time of its former splendor during the Commonwealth. Among the Belarusian population, particularly among low-nationally conscious and political passive peasant masses, it is a priority to create a pro-government movement." [83] Authorities believed that Belarusians did not have the capacity to organize themselves, even though pro-Polish sentiment was present. Thus, "the basis should be created by the government to organize Belarusian activists, expand them and re-organize them accordingly." [84]

The focus on coopting the weak Belarusian national movement and exploiting it to "help strengthen the Polish element" was strongly advocated by the Governor of Polesie, who believed that

"[i]n this way, Polesie, reinforced with a purely Polish element, will ensure that a wedge is placed between the Ukrainian and Belarusian movements… In no way should the government allow for a bridge to be formed between these two distinct nationalist movements, or for them to expand their territorial influence—on the contrary, the borderlands must be divided into two: Belarusian and Ukrainian. Herein, the divided and multi-ethnic character of the eastern borderlands can be exploited to the benefit of the state." [85]

[83] AAN, MSW, Dop. syg. 977, s. 110.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid., s. 110-11.

This point was further emphasized by the Governor: "[i]t would be reprehensible, a grave mistake, and negligence on the part of the Polish administration to allow for Belarusians and Ukrainians to 'shake hands over the river Pripyat.'"[86] The approach to the Belarusian and Ukrainian movements was therefore largely a preemptive one, with officials noting that, though the unification of the two movements is "the desire and goal of both sides," it has "not yet happened [in 1923]."[87] In short, the message was clear: the government must divide and conquer the *kresy*.

Dividing Minorities, Uniting the Poles

Just as they were aware of the need to break or prevent the Slavic minority's united front, the MSW made it abundantly clear that, for government policies to be effective, they themselves must present a unified front. The Minister of Interior stressed that "[o]fficials cannot govern according to sympathies, antipathies, public opinions, and above all by their own preferences or political ideologies."[88] They could not, under any circumstances, succumb to a disjointed, ineffective administration replete with heterogeneous opinions.[89] Any divergence from the unified policy imposed by the state would result in the termination of local officials, who would be replaced with new ones, as necessary, until loyal civil servants were found.[90] The MSW declared that "[a]ny conduct by state authorities in Eastern Poland that is not in accordance with the unified State-level policies has no place in governance."[91] Realizing the disparity in opinions and methods of governing across the various regions of Poland, the government made it

[86] The river Prypiat divided Ukrainian and Belarusian inhabited lands; AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 938, s. 4-5.
[87] Ibid.
[88] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1002, s. 33.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.
[91] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s. 112.

a priority to impose unity, [92] deeming that a fragmented government is weak and not respected by citizens.[93]

Unifying Polish organizations in the *kresy* was also a priority for government officials. In a policy report on governing the Eastern Kresy, an entire section was devoted to "Polish Organizations and Associations in the Eastern Territories."[94] The report described Polish society in the *kresy* as "fragmented," pointing out that even organizations belonging to the same political camp were divided. This fragmentation was especially harmful for the Polish intelligentsia, of whom there was few in the *kresy,* because it made "working together difficult" where "joint efforts" were needed. Indeed, existing Polish organizations were described as "inactive," limiting their efforts to "quarrelling with each other."[95] These organizations restricted themselves to cities, rarely looking to the countryside or initiating any work in villages. Their meetings were described as "gatherings of pompous and vain talkers." Officials urged that these organizations, "at the very least those that belong to the same political camp," must be "solidified into one whole organization, whether through a federation or by merging the organizations into one." Otherwise, unifying the Polish front in order to strengthen the Polish presence in the *kresy* would be impossible: "[o]bviously, when there are, for example, 25 organizations for 50 Poles, and oftentimes many of them belong to several organizations, there is no chance for productive work, only for ramblings and conflict based on the ambitions or imaginary authority of competing

[92] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 938, s. 10.
[93] Ibid., s. 5, 9.
[94] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 946, s. 30-33.
[95] Ibid.

organizations."[96] Cementing the Polish front at the government and organizational level was, then, understandably a top priority.

Preferring Plurality, Not Repression

Observable implication 1 will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent two chapters dealing specifically with Belarusian and Ukrainian organizations, but for now we can interpret this implication as a preference for pluralism, and not repression. Indeed, the overarching policy presented was one of dividing the *kresy's* minority representation and unifying the government and its loyalist organizations. This policy, however, was not to be realized through the widespread use of state repression, with one exception: the government knew that "if a party will fight the system with clubs, revolvers, and knives, then even the best-organized administration is helpless."[97] Thus only in extreme cases—particularly when an organization resorted to or promoted the use of violence—officials were to use repression. It is not surprising, however, that a government would not tolerate violent organizations.

Internal documents of the MSW show that repression was clearly not the default policy to be pursued in the *kresy*. On September 1, 1923 the Minister of Interior circulated a notice addressing the increase of anti-state demonstrations occurring in the *kresy*. These rallies were seen as "dangerous to the security of the entire state" as they "promise to overthrow the Government by force…calling for revolution and violent acts against citizens and property." The rallies could "absolutely not be tolerated." Repression, however, was only meant to be used if the rallies escalated out of control, and even then, a "clear report with exact explanations for

[96] Ibid., s. 30.
[97] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1002, s. 33.

the reasons of repressing the rally" with clear "reference to criminal violations" was to be provided.[98]

In another report dated December 12, 1922, the Minister of Interior banned all police searches of local political organizations, unless the police had explicit permission from the MSW to do so. The Minister argued that blindly repressing political organizations is counter-productive; it fuels "antagonism" when the goal should be to "mitigate [anti-state] moods."[99] Though this prohibition was later lifted on April 20, 1923, when the Minster felt that the anti-state disposition among political organizations had lightened, he urged officials "to use politically-motivated searches [of organizations] with utmost sensitivity and circumspection."[100]

The MSW cautioned governing officials that indiscriminate repression was counter-productive, and that the Slavic minority question in the *kresy* "requires a very balanced, reasonable and fair policy on the part of all government officials. The previous unconstitutional practices [i.e. repression] that took place in some administrative bodies must be exterminated, because they bring immeasurable damage to the state."[101] In other words, using repression would present Ukrainian and Belarusian organizations as "natural defenders of the oppressed population, whereas the Government, the guardian of the rule of law and the constitution, is given the role of perpetrator." [102] In a letter dated May 1, 1923 addressed to all provincial leaders, the Minister of

[98] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s, 59.
[99] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s. 100.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Ibid., s. 111.
[102] Ibid.

Interior asserted: "Today there is no place in the Borderlands for restricting the freedoms that individual citizens are guaranteed by the Constitution and applicable law."[103]

In another policy discussion meeting with provincial leaders in January 1925, the Minister of Interior reaffirmed that repression was not the first-choice policy option to deal with the *kresy* minorities. Using the example of Jews in Central Poland, he cited that the "decrease" in their numbers from the 18th century to 1918 was not the result of "state repression" but rather through the promotion of Polish organizations that strengthened the "Polish element" in turn "decreasing the number of Jews without any repression or administrative bans." Using this example, albeit sweeping and misinformed, the Minister contended that assimilating non-Poles can be achieved without repression, and the Ministry was therefore "against any other forms" of governing the *kresy*.[104] There is no question that widespread, indiscriminate repression in the *kresy* of ethnic minority organizations was *not* the default policy put forward by the MSW in the initial years of Polish independence.

Conclusions

This chapter set out to explain the complex nature of minority politics in the multi-ethnic *kresy*. Specifically, attention was cast on the interwar Polish policies vis-à-vis the minority Slavic population—the Ukrainians and Belarusians—inhabiting the territory bordering the Soviet Union. As outlined, the Polish government pursued a policy of assimilation with the aim of creating loyal ethnic Poles out of the "backward" and largely indifferent Ukrainian and

[103] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 977, s. 105.
[104] AAN, MSWN, Dop., syg. 1002, s. 53.

Belarusian "peasant masses." Conquering the *kresy* through assimilationist policies—particularly through Polonizing the education system and colonizing the eastern borderlands with "trustworthy" Polish military veterans—proved more difficult than anticipated. The government encountered significant resistance from Ukrainian and Belarusian minority ethnic organizations. To successfully implement group-level assimilationist policies, the Ukrainian and Belarusian national movements in the *kresy* had to be suppressed using not repression, but rather a divide and conquer approach. Thus in the early years of interwar Poland's independence, government officials pursued policies that prevented the consolidation of a minority ethnic front by promoting organizational pluralism. Pro-state organizations were to be created where they were absent; differences between organizations claiming to represent one ethnic group were to be emphasized; and any effective efforts for inter- or intra-ethnic organization unification were to be neutralized. Repression was a last resort. Having outlined the historical context as well as the initial divide and conquer policy pursued in the *kresy,* the subsequent two chapters will examine the dynamics between the state and minority ethnic organizations in greater detail by exploring first the Belarusian case, followed by the Ukrainian experience.

Chapter 5: Belarusian Political Organizations

Belarus is the forgotten Slavic sibling. Whereas Ukraine's history has been a relatively well-documented struggle against its aggressive Russian and, until very recently, patronizing Polish brethren, Belarus's history has largely been ignored. Rarely addressed in literature on the region, Belarus, when mentioned, is more often treated as a footnote to a broader and more "important" historical narrative, whether as part of the Kyivan Rus' in ancient times, the Polish Kingdom in the Middle Ages, or the Russian Empire and Soviet Union more recently.[1] It seems to be, in the words of Andrew Savchenko, a "perpetual borderland."[2] Indeed, Belarusians are always on the outskirts, never quite at the epicenter of power or attention.

Compared to its neighbours, Belarus has developed quite differently. It was, points out Per Anders Rudling, one of the last regions in east-central Europe to have its borders defined; language codified; national symbols, rituals, and traditions invented; and its inhabitants categorized and socialized into identifying with a national project.[3] As a result, few recognize Belarus's individuality, including those living within its borders. Even to this day, while neighbouring Ukraine experiences waves of mass revolutions, overthrowing governments in an

[1] Jan Zaprudnik, *Belarus: at a crossroads in history* (Boulder:Westview Press, 1993), xiv-xv.
[2] Andrew Savchenko, *Belarus: a perpetual borderland* (Boston: Brill, 2009).
[3] Per Anders Rudling, *The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 1906-1931* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015).

effort to shed its past and start anew, Belarus remains "the last dictatorship in Europe,"[4] obstinately clinging to its Soviet past, conflicted over its current national identity, its culture seldom differentiated from its neighbours, and its language spoken only by a small minority of its citizens.[5]

Little was different during the interwar period. Belarusian ethnic identity was ambiguous and national consciousness low. Census data, as discussed in Chapter 4, confirm this notion: many "should-be" Belarusians identified simply as "local" rather than as part of an ethnic group. The Ministry of Interior (MSW) often reported how most Belarusians did "not actually identify with being Belarusian" and did not have "a strong sense of national consciousness."[6] Many were more open to "identifying with the Polish majority."[7] This phenomenon was clearly witnessed in the area of general education, wherein as late as 1935 Belarusian peasants were largely indifferent to the creation of Belarusian schools. Instead, MSW reports from the time claim Belarusians preferred to send their children to Polish-language schools.[8] Although the demand for minority language education increased over time—largely due to organizations advocating in favour of it—Belarusian peasants remained predominantly passive in terms of political demands.

Despite the weak sense of Belarusian national consciousness and underdeveloped civil society, however, no fewer than 12 political organizations claimed to represent Belarusian minority interests in interwar Poland. Though most of these organizations shared similar goals,

[4] Andrew Wilson, *Belarus: The Last Dictatorship in Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).
[5] A survey conducted in September 2015 by the IISEPS, a Belarusian think-tank, reveals that less than 10 percent of Belarusians use Belarusian in their day-to-day life. The overwhelming majority use Russian (http://www.old.iiseps.org/etrend.html).
[6] Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Wydział Narodowościowy, syg. 946, s. 38.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.

particularly that of creating an independent Belarusian state, Belarusian political culture, particularly in the early interwar period was fragmented and deeply divided. Frequent restructuring and movement between organizations resulted from intra and inter organizational conflict, and consensus among them was rare. By the mid-1920s, however, the contours of a robust Belarusian civil society became visible. But as was characteristic of Belarusian political life, this positive trend was short-lived. By the outbreak of World War II, Belarusian civil society—as represented by political organizations—returned to disarray. Only one legal political organization remained active in the late 1930s, and it had very little influence or popular support. This sharp decline in Belarusian civil society was not, however, the direct result of state repression in the form of liquidating or banning all organizations. Indeed, the Polish state was responsible for actively banning only five of the 12 Belarusian political organizations. The remainder either disbanded voluntarily due to inactivity or irreconcilable differences, or merged with other existing organizations. Only one of the repressed organizations, the Brotherhood of Belarusian Peasants (Bractwo Włościań Białorusinów, or BWB), used violence and was repressed because of it. Formed in 1922, it was repressed by the state within a year for attempting an armed insurrection.[9] Four additional *non-violent* Belarusian organizations were targeted by the state for repression: the Hromada, its quasi-successor organization Zmahannie ("Strife"), and the Belarusian School Committee (the Communist Party of Western Belarus, the fourth banned organization, was addressed in Chapter 3). What explains this variation? The reason for the MSW's banning of these organizations lies in the their ability to unite the Belarusian front, a threatening prospect for the regime which led to its use of repression. The following chapter discusses the Ministry of Interior's divide and conquer strategy in managing the Belarusian minority.

[9] Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Dopływ., sygn. 1018, 97a-97b.

The chapter begins by describing the interwar Belarusian political movement and discussing alternative explanations that fall short in explaining state response to Belarusian organizations in interwar Poland. It demonstrates how in the early interwar years, Belarusian organizations were weak, fragmented, and conflicting. The organizational pluralism within the Belarusian minority meant that the MSW chose to intervene only once in the early interwar years, banning one organization that used violent tactics. Otherwise, the MSW maintained organizational pluralism among Belarusians until 1927, when the Belarusian "Hromada" organization was liquidated. Because of the organization's centrality, the main part of the chapter focuses on the MSW's banning of Hromada, the only political organization that succeeded in politicizing and uniting Belarusians against the Polish state. The closing sections of the chapter examine how further attempts at uniting the Belarusian front were also repressed by Polish authorities, who ultimately stomped out any formidable Belarusian opposition.

Belarusian Political Movement: Description and Addressing Alternative Explanations

Broadly, the Belarusian political movement in interwar Poland fell into two camps: the first and by far most influential was the socialist movement. At a distant second was the Christian Democratic movement, which was, when compared to other Christian Democratic movements around the world, decidedly more left leaning. There were also a small number of nationalist organizations and nascent peasant movements in the early interwar years, but these were generally short-lived and disjointed. In total, at least 12 political organizations claimed to represent the Belarusian minority in interwar Poland (Table 5.1). Their years of activity ranged

from one to 17 years. On average, a Belarusian political organization lasted for 6.2 years over the 20-year interwar period, with a median lifespan of only three years. The early years of Belarusian organizational life were particularly chaotic: ten organizations were formed in the initial postwar years, of which, by 1926, four had already either merged with other organizations or splintered and created new ones.

Over half of the organizations (eight organizations or 62 percent) were leftist, with the remainder being centre-left (three organizations or 23 percent) and centre (two organizations or 15 percent). It is important to note that, although traditional right-wing parties were absent in the Belarusian political movement, most Belarusian minority organizations included a "nationalist" agenda. Indeed, "national self-determination" and the "unification and creation of an independent" Belarusian state were popular claims among all Belarusian organizations—the difference between them lay in how those slogans for independence were interpreted. Centrist organizations opted for the unification of Belarusian lands, which they understood as complete independence while maintaining good relations with neighbouring countries, or alternatively, in the sense of annexing Belarusian territory from the USSR and connecting it to a resurrected Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[10] Leftist organizations, particularly those adhering to communism, called for the transfer of ethnically-inhabited Belarusian lands from Poland to the Soviet Union, thereby "unifying" West Belarus with the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic. Most non-communist socialist organizations rallied for a Belarusian state independent of the Soviet Union that would be governed by Belarusian peasants and workers.

[10] Mieczysław Iwanicki, *Ukraińcy. Białorusini, Litwini i Niemcy w Polsce w latach 1918-1990* (Siedlce: Wydawnictwa Uczelniane WSRP w Siedlcach, 1993), 100.

In terms of ideology, as mentioned above, socialism and Christian Democracy dominated the Belarusian political landscape. The Christian Democratic movement emerged in 1907 with the founding of the Belarusian newspaper "Krynica," but gained wider support in Western Belarusian lands only after 1919. In 1924, the Belarusian Union of Christian Democrats (Białoruskie Zjednoczenie Chreścijańsko-Demokratyczne, or BZChD),[11] the largest and most influential organization that represented the Belarusian Christian Democrat movement, was officially formed. In November 1927, the Orthodox Belarusian Democratic Union (Prawosławne Białoruskie Zjednoczenie Demokratyczne, or PBZD) was created, and in 1930 merged with BZChD. After 1935, the BZChD changed its name to the Belarusian People's Union (Białoruskie Zjednoczenie Ludowe) following its tilt to the left of the political spectrum.

Overall, the Belarusian Christian Democratic movement, as represented by the BZChD, characterized itself as the party of nationally conscious Belarusian Catholics. Its ideology was a combination of "liberalism, nationalism, and Christian idealism, mixed with socialist ideas of cooperatives and land redistribution."[12] While it published materials promoting the idea of an independent, democratic Belarus, the BZChD remained loyal to Lithuania, which provided substantial financial aid to the organization. The goal of the BZChD, as outlined at its party congress on October 24, 1926, was "to create an independent, democratic, united Belarusian state on ethnically inhabited Belarusian lands."[13] For some time, the party program advocated

[11] From 1924-1926 it was named the Union of Belarusian Catholics (Zjednoczenia Białorusinów Katolików). For more on their party platform, see Jerzy Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warszawa: Książka I Wiedza, 1974), 253-4, 554-5.
[12] Rudling, *Belarusian Nationalism,* 183.
[13] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 554.

"an independent Belarus in federation with its neighbours."[14] The movement was thus generally anti-Polish and staunchly anti-Soviet.[15]

The more popular ideological movement among Belarusians came from the radical left, which skillfully linked the issue of national advancement with "the improvement of the social situation of the poor and often landless Belarusian peasants."[16] This phenomenon of left-wing nationalism, which merged national rights with a class narrative to demand various forms of "people's socialism," was not unique to Belarusians (see also Chapter 5 on Ukrainians).[17] The Belarusian socialist movement dates back to 1903 with the creation of the Belarusian Revolutionary "Hromada" (Białoruska Rewolucyjna Hromada, or BRH), which, from 1905, was known as the Belarusian Socialist "Hromada" (Białoruska Socjalistyczna Hromada, or BSH). In the ensuing years, the socialist movement produced several new organizations, many of which splintered, merged, or fragmented and dissolved. A brief but dizzying description of the initial organizational years of Belarusian socialism conveys this organizational chaos and gives us good reason to understand why the MSW felt that intervention in the early years was unnecessarily.

During World War I, part of the BSH joined forces with the Russian Bolsheviks. A second faction of the BSH splintered and created the Party of Belarusian Socialist Revolutionaries (Partia Białoruskich Socjalistów-Rewolucjonistów, or PBSR) in 1917. A third group created, at the end of 1918, the Belarusian Social-Democratic Party (Białoruska Partia Socjal-Demokratyczna, or BPSD). In 1922, a splinter group of the PBSR created the Belarusian

[14] Rudling, *Belarusian Nationalism,* 185.
[15] Iwanicki. *Ukraińcy, Białorusini, Litwini i Niemcy w Polsce,* 101.
[16] Rudling, *Belarusian Nationalism,*190.
[17] Ibid.

Revolutionary Organization (Białoruska Organizacja Rewolucyjna, or BOW), which, in 1923, joined the Communist Party of Western Belarus (Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Białorusi, or KPZB). In January 1924, part of the BPSD, along with PBSR activists, created the Belarusian Party of Independent Socialists (Białoruska Partia Niezależnych Socjalistów, or BPNS).[18] The PBSR, BSDP, and BPNS all had similar party platforms. In fact, it is difficult to differentiate them—they were, in short, all socialist and advocated for the unification of Belarusian lands, as well as radical social reforms, especially in the agriculture sector and land redistribution.[19] The PBSR positioned itself towards cooperation with Lithuania, whereas the BSDP stood in opposition to the Polish state yet believed that compromise was possible. The BOW, on the other hand, called for the unification of Western Belarus with Soviet Belarus. Though initially skeptical of or outright hostile to the USSR, by 1924, the Belarusian socialist movement in general began looking more favourably towards Minsk and Moscow.[20] It must be kept in mind, however, that, although the socialist movement resonated among Belarusians, it in actuality found support from only a very small portion of the population. In relative terms, Belarusian political organizations in the early interwar years were weak, and their membership numbers negligible. Belarusian minority politics was run by a handful of intelligentsia, whose numbers were also small, with the majority of the Belarusian population disinterested.

The unstable and fragmented initial years of Belarusian political activity, coupled with the Belarusian population's indifference to the many claims charged by the dozen organizations fighting to represent them, gave little reason for the MSW to ban any Belarusian organizations in the early interwar years. So long as the organizations did not resort to violence, they did not

[18] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 256.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., 256-257.

present any plausible danger to the MSW or Polish government. Thus, despite their anti-state rhetoric, irredentist political goals, foreign ties, and "dangerous" socialist ideology—all perilous characteristics the literature would have us believe merit repression—Belarusian political organizations were largely left alone. Further, notwithstanding their small, weak, and fragmented nature—characteristics that make organizations less resilient to government crackdown—the MSW still chose not to outlaw most Belarusian organizations. Instead, the MSW preferred to maintain organizational pluralism among the minority group. It was not until the Belarusian Peasants' and Workers' Union Hromada (or simply "Hromada") appeared on the scene in 1925 and threatened this pluralism that Polish authorities took a keen interest in Belarusian political organizations. The subsequent section elaborates.

Table 5.1. Belarusian Political Organizations in Interwar Poland

Left		**Centre**
Left	**Centre-Left**	
Brotherhood of Belarusian Peasants†* (Bractwo Włościan Białorusinów, 1922-1923) **Communist Party of Western Belarus† (Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Białorusi, 1923-1938;banned 1923)** Party of Belarusian Socialist-Revolutionaries (Partia Białoruskich Socjalistów-Rewolucjonistów, 1918-1922) Belarusian Social-Democrat Party (Białoruska Partia Socjal-Demokratyczna, 1918-1925) Belarusian Party of Independent Socialists (Białoruska Partia Nezależnych Socjalistów, 1922-1925) Belarusian Revolutionary Organization (Białoruska Organizacja Rewolucyjna, 1921-1923) **Belarusian Peasants' and Workers' Union "Hromada" † (Białoruska Włościańsko-Robotnicza Hromada, 1925-1927)** **Struggle for the Interest of the Peasants and Workers "Zmahannie" † (Walki o interesy Włościań i Robotników, 1927-1930)**	Belarusian Union of Christian Democrats, after 1935 Belarusian People's Union (Białoruskie Zjednoczenie Chreścijańsko-Demokratyczne, after 1935 Białoruskie Zjednoczenie Ludowe, 1924-1939) Belarusian Peasants' Union (Białoruski Związek Włościański, 1925-1932)	Belarusian Orthodox Democratic Union (Prawosławne Białoruskie Zjednoczenie Demokratyczne, 1927-1930) Central Union of All Belarusian Cultural, Education, and Economic Organizations (Centralny Związek Wszystkich Białoruskich Organizacji Kulturalno-Oświatowych i Gospodarczych-Centrasajuz, 1930-1931) Belarusian National Committee in Vilnius (Białoruski Komitet Narodowy w Wilnie, 1928-1938)

*organization used violent tactics; †**organization was banned**; ‡ organization was pacifist/loyalist

Dividing and Conquering the Belarusian Minority

After an intensely fragmented beginning, Belarusian political life finally crystalized in 1925—a year of significant restructuring among Belarusian political organizations. On June 24, a faction of elected Belarusian socialists in the Polish Parliament (Sejm) formed a separate parliamentary

club and began organizing a new party. This party quickly evolved into the most important Belarusian political organization in interwar Poland—the Belarusian Peasants' and Workers' Union "Hromada" (Białoruska Włościańsko-Robotnicza Hromada—Hromada, or Hromada). Not all Belarusian parliamentarians supported the new political organization, however. On November 10, the remaining Belarusian parliamentarians formed a rival organization, the Belarusian Peasants' Union (Białoruski Związek Włościański, BZW). With this re-structuring resulting from Hromada's creation, all other pre-existing socialist parties effectively ceased to exist.[21] As a result, by 1926, the organizational pluralism that had previously kept state intervention out of Belarusian political affairs was threatened. Whereas in the early interwar years there were eight organizations, by 1926 only three legal Belarusian political organizations were operating: Hromada, its rival the Belarusian Peasants' Movement (BZW), and the Christian Democratic BZChD. The Communist Party of Western Belarus continued to operate covertly. Of all these Belarusian minority organizations, Hromada was by far the most influential and it wasted little time in uniting the Belarusian front, gaining unprecedented popular support among Belarusians, significantly decreasing organizational pluralism by merging all leftist Belarusian organizations and pushing out the remaining competing organizations. This threat to organization pluralism prompted intervention from the Ministry of Interior, thus pointing to the main hypothesis of this study, which contends that the default policy a state pursues, when faced with a troublesome minority group, is organizational pluralism. Table 5.2 summarizes the observable implications for my main hypothesis and how they relate to the Belarusian case. The following sections discuss these observable implications further.

[21] Ibid., 257.

Table 5.2 Divide and Conquer Hypothesis

Observable Implications		Outcome
Within the Belarusian minority, there should be a majority of organizations that are not banned.	✓	69% tolerated (not banned) 9/13 tolerated (not banned)
State actors should embark on actions that are functional to maintaining organizational pluralism within each ethnic minority, fomenting and exploiting ***existing divisions****.*	✓	The MSW did not ban organizations in the early interwar years—maintained organization pluralism.
State actors should create, support, or promote ***new divisions*** *in the minority.*	✓	See Chapter 4.
Organizations that suppress organizational pluralism within the ethnic minority should be banned, i.e. they are able to create a united front for the minority.	✓	The MSW banned "unite-the-front" organizations: Hromada, as well as Zmahannie and the Belarusian Society of Schools.

Breaking the Belarusian Front: State banning of Hromada

Hromada was formed in 1925, resulting from a split in the Club of Belarusian Deputies in the Sejm.[22] Its founding members—Bronisław Taraszkiewicz, Szymon Rak-Michajłowski, Piotr Miotła, and Paweł Wołoszyn—left the Club of Belarusian Deputies on June 24, 1925, over "ideological disagreements in regards to social and national policies."[23] A year later, on June 1, 1926, Hromada was registered as a legal party. It described itself as a "revolutionary socialist" movement, yet aimed to achieve its goals through "a legal, law-abiding struggle"; that is, they sought to further Belarusian interests only through government institutions and legal channels.[24] Within just a few months of its inception, Hromada became the largest and most influential political force representing Belarusians,[25] proclaiming itself a "mighty, unbreakable organization."[26] As quickly as the organization rose to power, however, its political life came to an abrupt end. In January 1927, just over a year and a half after forming, the Ministry of Interior liquidated the party. It was formally banned in March, and many of its activists were

[22] Iwanicki, *Ukraincy, Bialorusini,* 99.
[23] Rudling, *Belarusian Nationalism,* 190.
[24] Ibid., 191.
[25] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 259.
[26] Rudling, *Belarusian Nationalism,* 198.

imprisoned. After a year of investigations, in 1928, a political trial put 56 of Hromada's staunchest activists on the stand, convicting most of "subversive anti-Polish activities."[27] Why was an organization that did not resort to violence, and took pains to operate within the legal framework of the Polish constitution banned by the state? The literature claims Hromada was persecuted due to its alleged ties with the illegal Communist Party of Western Belarus. This explanation, however, is incomplete. Hromada was banned because it united the Belarusian political front, not because of its alleged ties to communism. As we saw in Chapter 3, and will see in subsequent chapters, ties to irredentist neighbouring states do not always merit state repression. Indeed, the fight against communism was used largely as a pretext by state authorities to break the united Belarusian front—communist ideology *per se* does not explain why Hromada was considered dangerous to the state and ultimately repressed. Rather, it was used as an excuse.

Hromada's Political Platform to Unite the Belarusian Front

Hromada was a threat to the MSW because of its clear rhetoric aiming to unite the Belarusian front. The following section will outline how Hromada's rhetoric was backed by the organization's ability to gain an unprecedented number of Belarusian members in a short period of time, and politicizing an otherwise indifferent population.[28] Additional cause for concern among MSW authorities was that the organization achieved a united Belarusian front through legal channels and institutions set up by the Polish state. I elaborate by beginning with Hromada's political platform.

[27] Ibid.
[28] For more on the political indifference at the local level in the Eastern Borderlands (*kresy*) see Chapter 4.

Hromada's political program was formulated in the second half of 1925. The organization "adhered to the principle of self-governance of the Belarusian people" and strove for a united, independent Belarusian republic ruled by workers and peasants.[29] Its party platform aspired to establish a "close socialist union of the European peoples," calling for a socialist transformation of Europe.[30] Hromada fought "for the full freedom of assembly, press, and the printed word, for freedom for political and economic organizations of the peasants, workers, and the laboring intelligentsia."[31] As a mass movement, it represented a variety of outlooks. For some Hromada activists, Belarusian independence was interpreted as detachment from Poland and unification with Soviet Belarus, whereas others called for a sovereign Belarus independent of the Soviet Union. The organization merged nationalism with radical leftism and democracy with revolution. As outlined in the final point of their official party platform, Hromada waged its battle against the state only through the use of legal methods based on the Polish Constitution and the rule of law.[32]

Because some of its organizers were also members of the illegal Communist Party of Western Belarus, though, Hromada is still unanimously condemned in the literature as a Communist puppet organization, whose sole purpose was to recruit partisans for the Soviet Union.[33] In light of newly available materials, however, Per Anders Rudling points out that such an interpretation lacks nuance. The Hromada leadership was not a blind servant of Minsk and Moscow. Instead, the movement represented significant diversity and developed its own ideological doctrines, influenced by national communism but also imbued with distinct local features. Hromada's

[29] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 257-258.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Rudling, *Belarusian Nationalism,* 191-192.
[32] Iwanicki, *Ukraińcy, Białorusini,* 101.
[33] Savchenko*, Belarus,* 107-8.

"leaders were agents with their own agendas and ambitions, some of which—but far from all—coincided with those of Minsk and Moscow."[34] Indeed, it was not necessarily Hromada's irredentist political goals, or even alleged ties to the Soviet Union that threatened the state—it was the unprecedented ability of the organization to politicize and unite the Belarusian political landscape, at the elite but also local level. The Belarusian masses, were, as reported by the MSW, "captivated by the organization's promises of material benefit."[35] Mass rallies helped Hromada attract popular support, while the participation of its activists in all of the major, legal Belarusian cultural organizations, namely the Society of Belarusian Schools (Towarzystwo Szkoły Bialoruskiej, or TSB), and also various publishing houses and charities, helped it garner support as well. Hromada was primarily responsible for the success of the TSB, which, by the end of 1926, had 3,500 members, organized nine community centers, opened 35 rural libraries, and inspired a number of local reading groups throughout Belarusian-inhabited territories in Poland.[36] The TSB became the most important and influential Belarusian cultural organization in interwar Poland.

Table 5.3. Number local Hromada party cells (hurtki) in 1926 in 27 counties

Month	Number of party cells	Number of members
June	19	569
July	122	3 114
August	561	12 529
September	1 062	30 828
October	1 374	43 570
November	1 658	62 092
Until December 10	1 720	66 996

Source: Bialoruski Kalendarz na rok 1927 (Belarusian Calendar for the year 1927)

[34] Rudling, *Belarusian Nationalism,* 199.
[35] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s.18.
[36] Iwanicki, *Ukraincy, Bialorusini,* 102.


Whereas all other Belarusian organizations struggled to keep afloat, Hromada attracted supporters from all walks of life. Indeed, Hromada's unprecedented rapid pace of development is a phenomenon worthy of further analysis. In June 1926 it had 950 members, in September 1926, 45,000 members, in November 68,000, January 1927 100,000 members, in February 1927, 117,000, and on April 22, 1927, right before its takeover by the government, Hromada had over 150,000 members.[37] By mid 1927, Hromada had about 1,800 local party cells in the eastern provinces, particularly in Nowgorodzki and Poleskie.[38] In just over six months in 1926, Hromada expanded from just 19 local level organization cells (*hurtki)* with 569 members to over 1,700 with almost 70,000 members (Table 5.3). This rapid development in membership was unmatched by any other minority ethnic organization in interwar Poland.


Hromada also attracted significant numbers of Belarusian supporters who had previously been members of other organizations, such as the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, or PPS) and the Polish People's Party "Wyzwolenie" (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe "Wyzwolenie", or PSL Wyzwolenie). The phenomenon of Belarusians defecting from other organizations to join Hromada was not uncommon throughout Belarusian-inhabited territories in Poland. The PPS affiliate in Navahrudak, for example, ceased to exist due to mass defections of its members to Hromada.[39] Indeed, Hromada was an all-encompassing organization that attracted peasants and the (undersized) intelligentsia alike. Based on the Polish census of 1921, which lists 1,041,700 Belarusians in Poland, in its short history, Hromada was able to mobilize over 15 percent of an otherwise passive Belarusian minority. This unparalleled accomplishment

[37] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1031, s. 2a; Iwanicki, *Ukrainci, Bialorusini,* 99; Rudling, *Belarusian Nationalism,* 196-7.
[38] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 18.
[39] Iwanicki, *Ukraincy, Bialorusini,* 99.

did not go unnoticed by Polish authorities and Hromada's rapid pace of development elicited fear among members of the Polish population.

Figure 5.1. Increase in Hromada membership and party cells six months prior to the organization's banning.





Media outlets warned of a possible armed Belarusian uprising and civil war. Fear mongering moved from the streets to parliament, where Hromada deputies attempted, sometimes

unsuccessfully, to repel accusations of conspiracy and terrorist planning.[40] Despite the tense political environment, Hromada's deputies kept their promise of relying only on legal means to advance the rights of the Belarusians whom it claimed to represent. The group used every opportunity to publicly present its demands and challenge the state. It was precisely the organization's unique abilities to consistently represent Belarusian interests and to quickly orient themselves in a chaotic political environment using only the parliamentary floor to legally fight the Polish government that further alarmed Polish officials and attracted Belarusian followers.

Alternative explanations in the literature do not fully explain Hromada's banning. First, Hromada's political platform, created in 1925, did not change from its inception until its repression, yet the government's stance towards it changed dramatically.[41] Polish authorities initially allowed Hromada activists to use the Parliament to sharply criticize the government and did not prevent the organization from presenting its plight to an international audience, particularly the League of Nations.[42] Thus organizational demands alone do not explain the timing of Hromada's outlawing. As the organization's influence and popular support grew, however, so too did government concern about Hromada. Most importantly, however, the group's rapid expansion pushed out rival Belarusian organizations from the political arena, resulting in a decrease in Belarusian organizational pluralism (Figure 5.2). This decrease in organizational pluralism is a key element in understanding the MSW's response to Hromoda. Indeed, Hromada sought to be the sole organization representing Belarusians in interwar Poland and it was evident that attaining this political goal was realistic.[43] As Hromada's popularity and

[40] Ibid.
[41] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna*, 558.
[42] Savchenko, *Belarus,* 108.
[43] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczn*a, 559.

influence grew, the already weak and relatively unpopular rival Belarusian organizations began to fall by the wayside.




Figure 5.2. Decrease in Belarusian Organization Pluralism as a Result of Hromada's Creation

With its swift success, Hromada's end was imminent. When the organization began uniting the Belarusian intelligentsia and the increasingly nationally conscious masses, Polish authorities recognized that, without state intervention, Hromada would become a serious political risk.[44] In his final speech in the Parliament on November 16, 1926, the leader of Hromada, Bronisław Taraszkewicz, was straightforward in addressing the Polish government: "You raise fears of a planned armed uprising. But you, Gentlemen Members of Parliament, are not afraid of an armed uprising, because these are not our tactics; Hromada does not propagate this. You are frightened because the [Belarusian] people have awakened, have demonstrated their strength, and created a

[44] Iwanicki, *Ukraincy i Bialorusini,* 102.

mass movement. It frightens you that we accomplished this through legal means."[45] In the months following, the Ministry of Interior led an active campaign to suppress Hromada and to break the uniting Belarusian front.

Breaking the United Belarusian Front: State Repression of Hromada

On November 13, 1926, the Popular National Union (Związek Ludowo-Narodowy, or ZLN), a Polish conservative and rightwing party, submitted a motion to parliament: "Parliament calls on the government to immediately liquidate the Belarusian Peasant-Workers Hromada and counteract the effects of its vicious activities."[46] The wheels were set in motion for Hromada's repression.

On the night of January 15, 1927, mass arrests were carried out in 20 counties (*powiats)* of the northeastern provinces of Poland, where Belarusians resided, alongside searches of all local organization and cultural organizations affiliated with Hromada, namely the Society of Belarusian Schools. Hromada had come to be regarded by authorities as an illegal organization (though officially it was not yet banned). Among the some 800 arrested were Hromada's leaders, Taraszkiewicz, Rak-Michajłowski, Miotła, and Wołoszyn.[47] These arrests were intensely debated in several meetings of the Parliament, where fellow socialist and Belarusian deputies, in addition to MPs with other ideological links, opposed the crackdown on Hromada. The debate mostly focused on the unconstitutionality of the revocation of Hromada MPs' parliamentary immunity, which led to their arrest. Several deputies declared that no evidence

[45] Quoted in ibid.
[46] Ibid..
[47] Ibid., 102-3.

was provided and no facts put forward to justify these actions; there was no basis on which the State could revoke their parliamentary immunity, and no precedent for such action. Although there were in fact no "preparations for an armed uprising" or "collective rebellion to be planned," and despite the lack of incriminating evidence, the majority of parliamentary deputies actually approved of the liquidation of Hromada and the mass arrests of its members. Hromada was officially banned on March 21, 1927, with 56 of its members detained from February 23 to May 22, 1928.[48] The Vilnius District Court sentenced Hromada leaders to 12 years in prison, but the Court of Appeal later decreased the sentence to six years.[49]

Overall, according to the MSW, Hromada's liquidation was carried out relatively peacefully. The vast majority of the rural population, who until then were "captivated by the organization's promises of material benefit," reacted "quite passively" towards Hromada's repression, and most of them voluntarily abandoned the organization.[50] In many cases, even Hromada members themselves voluntarily liquidated their local organizational branches, "handing in their membership cards en masse."[51] Already in January, just weeks after the crackdown began, in the county of Nieświeskim, for example, 20 local branches voluntarily liquidated their organization without direct orders from the state—notably following the arrest of Hromada's main activists but before the organization was officially banned. "Resistance to liquidation was rare," reported the MSW, "occurring primarily in the Grodno and Wolkowskym counties [*powiats*]."[52] The element most resistant to state repression was the "youth influenced by Communist methods."[53]

[48] Ibid., 103 .
[49] AAN, MSW, Dop., 1031, syg. , s. 2a.
[50] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 17.
[51] Ibid. 17-18.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.

At one mass protest in Kosowie, with over 3,000 peasants, police shot and killed four people and wounded 15.[54] Such violence was an exception, however, to an overall peaceful process. If Hromada and its significant support base were allegedly capable of instigating an armed uprising—as purported by its critics—the relative infrequency of violence goaded by state repression was telling.

The trial against Hromada, held in the Vilnius district court from February to May 1928 became known as the "Trial of the 56." Taraszkewicz, perhaps the most important defendant and leader of Hromada, used his concluding remarks to explain the rationale for his actions and used the court as a platform to outline his vision. He explained to the court that the Polish government and its discriminatory minority policies had convinced him of the need for a Belarusian mass party that united national and social issues:

> At that time, I not only wanted to work through parliament but also in connection with Polish society, through Polish-Belarusian cooperation, but this produced no results… In 1924 I travelled village to village to get to know the sentiments of the people, and, in that way, arrived at the conclusion that the absence of opposition leads nowhere. In 1924, the Grabski government issued the so-called language law [see Chapter 4 for more on group-level policies]. Thereafter I announced in parliament that on the basis of that law we would not receive any schools, but it could well be a foundation for the Belarusians from which they could send mass appeals for the creations of Belarusians schools. I believed that on the basis of that struggle for the schools from below a great political Belarusian force could be created… *My conviction was that Hromada needed to be that organization that could unite the national and the social movements*….The program of Hromada is not borrowed from the Comintern; it is not a transmission of a resolution of the Communist Party of Western Belarus, but an empirical program. All Hromada slogans are found in the programs of other radical parties. The Hromada program speaks of the *unity* of the people [emphasis added].[55]

[54] Iwanicki, *Ukraińcy, Białorusini, Litwini,* 103.
[55] Cited in Rudling, *Belarusian Nationalism,* 267-8.

It was precisely this unity that Hromada achieved among the Belarusian minority population that ultimately caused its demise.

Aftermath of a Broken Belarusian Front

A report by the Ministry of Internal Affairs for March 1927 reads:

> The most significant event in the life of the Belarusian society was the repression of the Belarusian Peasant-Workers "Hromada" and the arrest of its members. This, together with the Ministry of Interior Regulation of March 21, 1927 deeming Hromada an illegal organization provoked a very strong impression as well as a change in the mood among the Belarusian masses. First of all, it wrecked, in the eyes of the masses, the conviction of the legality of "Hromada" and impunity proclaimed by its rulers, which were previously strongly emphasized by party agitators.[56]

The rural population, previously attracted to Hromoda's slogans of "social and material benefits," due to fear of reprisals, backed away from active participation in political life after the organization's banning. This greatly weakened Hromada's rapidly developing local party cells and resulted in the decline of political life of the Belarusian village and the collapse of Hromada activists' influence in the countryside.[57] Repressing Hromada, noted the MSW, "dealt a severe blow to the national consciousness and development of Belarusian society,"[58] creating "widespread depression among members of Hromada and mass abandonment of its ranks by the

[56] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 17.
[57] AAN, MSW, Dop., sygn.. 1021, s. 49; „Nasza Sprawa" nr 2, 1 XII 1926.; AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 17.
[58] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 17.

rural population."[59] Hromada activists accused the state of "breaking the united front of workers" in the eastern borderlands.[60]

Though the Belarusian People's Republic government in exile (Białoruska Rada Narodowa, or BRN) welcomed the state's repression of Hromada, dubbing the organization's activities "imported by provocateurs" and "harmful for the interest of the Belarusian people,"[61] most other political organizations, even those in conflict with Hromada, were opposed to its forced liquidation. They viewed the crackdown as a state campaign to "discredit the Belarusian movement," and an attempt to "persecute the Belarusian movement under the pretext of combatting communism."[62] All Belarusian press outlets jointly condemned Polish authorities, deeming their actions illegal, particularly the arrests of MPs who were stripped of their legal immunity, a calculated move to discredit the Belarusian movement and its political activists.[63]

The scandal surrounding Hromada's repression and arrests of its members acted "as a springboard which led to the break in the Belarusian Club of Deputies [in the Polish Parliament] and in the national [Belarusian] front."[64] Although both the BZW and BZChD, rivals of Hromada, condemned state repression against the organization, this unified position did not lead to broader unity. Instead, the MSW reported that, according to Hromada, the BZW and BZChD used this opportunity to denounce the Polish government but did not actually genuinely "seek to defend the unified Belarusian front" because such a unified front among Belarusian

[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid., s. 19.
[61] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 17.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.

organizations "did not exist due to the significant difference in social programs."[65] Instead, rival organizations were pleased that Hromada's influence over the Belarusian minority was being neutralized by the state and sought to capitalize on this opportunity by filling that power vacuum left by Hromada.[66] These and other Belarusian organizations' attempts at attracting supporters of the banned Hromada failed, however. The Belarusian People's Republic Government in exile, for example, which responded to the arrests by issuing an official proclamation condemning the activities of Hromada as puppets of the Comintern, organized a number of rallies trying to win over supporters in the Nowgrodzkie province dominated by Hromada sympathizers. The organization ultimately failed to fill the void left by Hromoda by not gaining support from the masses and from suffering internal fragmentation. For example, a local branch of the NBR formed in January already disbanded on February 15 "due to internal friction";[67] indeed an illustrative example of Belarusian political life post-Hromada.

Preventing the resurgence of a united front: State banning of "Zmahannie," Inter-organizational fragmentation, and the Belarusian School Committee

In December 1927, leading activists of Hromada, who had managed to escape arrest, sought to reorganize the remnants of the movement into the "Struggle for the Interests of the Peasants and Workers" (Walka o Interesy Włościań i Robotników "Zmahannie," or Zmahannie, meaning "Strife"). This new organization quickly gained popularity among Belarusians, who viewed it as the continuation of Hromada. Zmahannie received 71,000 votes in the 1928 parliamentary

[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid., s.34.

elections and sent three deputies to the Sejm.[68] Polish authorities, concerned with a resurgence of a united Belarusian front, responded harshly to any attempts to reorganize the remnants of Hromada. The state thus banned Zmahannie from public space and from holding legal mass activities; in 1930, it liquidated the organization. That same year, another attempt at uniting the fragmented Belarusian front was made with the creation of the Central Union of All Belarusian Cultural, Educational, and Economic Organizations (Centralny Związek Wszystkich Białoruskich Organizacji Kulturno-Oświatowych i Gospodarczych—Centrasajuz, or Centrasajuz). Formed of the remnants of a few organizations, Centrasajuz had the goal of becoming an all-encompassing Belarusian political party, yet ultimately succumbed to internal conflicts and fragmentation. The organization voluntarily dissolved between 1931 and 1932.[69]

Belarusian political life never reached the same level of unity as it did during Hromada's peak. In the first half of the 1930s, following Hromada's demise, the Belarusian question was considered far less politically important than it had been in years prior. After the liquidation of Hromada, the united anti-state movements among Belarusians were largely halted. A MSW report from 1935 summarizes the general atmosphere of the post-Hromada years: "The low pulsating life of the Belarusian minority in Poland passed without any major events this year. Attempts at reviving political activity resulted in nothing, and, in fact, in the majority of cases it even spurred a negative reaction, revealing the indifference of masses to the actions of its so-called 'leaders.'"[70] Only economic issues impacted the "mood of the masses," which at times

[68] Johnson 1966, 211; Savchenko, *Belarus,* 108.
[69] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 561.
[70] AAN, MSW, WN, syg 961 0366*

radicalized Belarusian villages. These sentiments, however, were isolated events and "rarely occurred in an organized form," reported as "sporadic impulses."[71]

The remaining Belarusian political organizations, post-Hromada crackdown, failed to unite and suffered from significant inter and intra organizational divides: "the ongoing internal antagonisms that have long been present in Belarusian society continue to deepen," read a MSW report from 1935. Belarusian civil society is "barely surviving."[72] By 1935 the MSW reported that the only active Belarusian political party was the Christian Democrat BZChD. Its only sign of life was its press outlet "Belaruska Krynica," which the MSW reported was likely to have survived only because it received subsidies from the Lithuanian government.[73] In addition to its regular newspaper, the BZChD printed monthly magazines, also "probably with the financial help of Lithuania."[74] Interestingly, though receiving funds from a foreign state with which Poland had very hostile relations, the MSW did not ban the BZChD.[75] Still, the circulation of the apparently subsidized BZChD press was "negligible," and its content was "deficient/poor."[76] Beyond producing newsletters, the only "lively manifestations" of the BZChD were in defense of the use of the Belarusian language in church and during religious classes in public schools.[77] Other Belarusian groups spoke out in relative "unanimity" on this issue, and the Ministry of Interior took note of this unity, though a crackdown was not yet in order.[78] Already by 1936 the

[71] Ibid.
[72] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 963, s.8-9.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] See Chapter 4 and Chapter 9 on Poles in Lithuania for more on Polish-Lithuanian relations. In short, the two countries fought militarily over the city of Wilno/Vilnius post-WWI, with Poland winning, and subsequently severing all diplomatic ties and remaining officially at war over contested territories throughout the interwar period.
[76] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 963, s. 8.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.

MSW reported that efforts "quickly lost its momentum, yielding minimum results, even in a democratic sense."[79]

In 1935, the BZChD changed its name to the Belarusian People's Union (Białoruskie Zjednoczenie Ludowe),[80] following an internal rift in the Christian Democrat organization. In 1936, the MSW reported that the split was becoming "increasingly evident," and that "1936 in the Belarusian political and social life in Poland was marked by a further deepening in the internal discord observed consistently over the last few years, stemming mostly from ideological reasons."[81] Indeed, the BZChD's new "more radical" and left-leaning program, reflecting the organization's new name, spurred internal conflict. A group led by a BZChD member, Father Godlewski, opposed the "radicalization" of the BZChD, and began organizing a new party, the "Belarusian Front" in opposition to the "people's front" advocated by the new BZChD. Godlewski also reached out to Belarusian national socialists, who too were decidedly against the notion of a radical, socialist "people's front."[82] However, Father Godlewski and his followers, along with Belarusian national socialists, were small in number and "hardly had any influence [on political life]."[83] Admittedly, the newly renamed Belarusian People's Union (the former BZChD) was hardly more influential, but with its support from Lithuania, the group was able to at least publish their newsletters and to appear "generally a little more busy."[84] Conversely, Godlewski's rival Belarusian Front never got off the ground because he could not manage "organizational and financial difficulties."[85] In short, despite the efforts outlined above,

[79] Ibid., s. 318-319.
[80] Ibid., s. 176-177.
[81] Ibid., s. 445, 483.
[82] Ibid., s. 285, 319, 483.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid., s. 445.
[85] Ibid., s. 483.

Belarusian political life after the state repressed Hromada never recovered. There was, however, one brief exception: the Society of Belarusian Schools, discussed below.

The Society of Belarusian Schools (Towarzystwo Szkoły Bialoruskiej, or TSB) was the only Belarusian organization that prospered after Hromada's demise. I discussed in previous pages that under Hromada's guidance, the TSB became the largest Belarusian cultural organization in interwar Poland. It was no secret to MSW authorities that the TSB was under the "overwhelming influence" of Hromada, and, upon Hromada's liquidation, activists decided to focus their efforts on building up the TSB. This explained, asserted MSW reports, "the [strong] development of this organization, which by January in the eastern provinces had 250 branches with over 4000 members. The organizations territorial development coincided completely with the local of Hromada branches."[86]

Mainly, the TSB organization focused on the development of Belarusian culture and education – a topic less overtly political and perhaps less troublesome to government authorities. In the immediate years following Hromada's liquidation, the MSW reported that the TSB created six new schools in Poleskie county (*powiat*), nine in Nowgrodzkiem, and 14 in Wilenskiem county (*powiat*).[87] The MSW reported that the TSB leadership was willing to "continue to maintain the tradition of Hromada's political work."[88] The Belarusian Institute of Economic and Culture (Białoruski Instytut Gospodarki I Kultury, or BIGK), the other main Belarusian cultural

[86] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 20. 961 0364*
[87] Ibid., s. 34-35.
[88] Ibid.

organization, reported very little activity in this same time period. In fact, it was shutting down local branches due to lack of activity.[89]

The TSB, meanwhile, had some success as a uniting organization. In 1935, the "broken and warring groups" in Belarusian political life achieved "solidarity" on one issue—demand for Belarusian-language instruction. This issue quickly gained more attention in the second half of 1935, leading to "intense agitation to submit petitions demanding school in the Belarusian language."[90] The campaign was led by a specially formed School Committee (Komitet Szkolny), comprised of individuals from the TSB and BIGK but effectively led by TSB. The issue of Belarusian education thus presented a united front: "Because of the openly hostile anti-state nature of this campaign, which among other things confirmed that it was inspired by subversive factors, local authorities in Wilno Province were compelled to liquidate the School Committee, as well as the TSB and the BIGK."[91] Repression was carried out in early December and "very significantly affected the success of the Belarusian school campaign."[92] The school campaign was "clearly political" in nature, and so, in December the BIGK and TSB were suspended by state authorities. With the liquidation of the TSB and BIGK, the Belarusian school campaign and its Special School Committee quickly dissolved.[93] Once again, Polish authorities squelched a rising Belarusian united front, and as a result, the "low pulsating life of the Belarusian minority" continued on, unremarkably, for the remainder of the interwar period.

[89] Ibid., s. 35.
[90] Ibid.
[91] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 963, s. 444-445.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid., s. 484-485.

Conclusions

The Belarusian case differentiates itself from the Ukrainian, German, and Jewish cases in interwar Poland. Whereas the other minority groups had a more lively political culture and their organizations tended to be stronger, the Belarusian movement produced only one strong and uniting political organization. Beyond Hromada, there was no political organization that posed a serious threat to Polish authorities, and the organization's ability to politicize an indifferent minority group and unite the Belarusian front was cause for its repression. In its very short existence, Hromada gained an unprecedented membership at a rate unmatched by any other minority organization in interwar Poland, Belarusian or otherwise; its rise in popularity forced competing Belarusian organizations either to merge with Hromada (all leftist organizations) or liquidate because the high number of members defecting to Hromada shattered the support-base of competing organizations, effectively eliminating organizational pluralism among Belarusians. But it was not only organization size that mattered. In the next section I will demonstrate that indeed the largest Ukrainian opposition organization, the UNDO, was not repressed. But Hromada's banning also means that size is not an obstacle in pursuing repression—Hromada was a large organization by any standards. The fact that Hromada achieved this unifying support among the Belarusian elite and masses through legal means, and without the use of violence, made the organization all the more threatening to Polish authorities. As a result, Hromada was banned in 1927, less than two years following its founding.

Any subsequent attempts to pick up the pieces and re-unite the Belarusian front were quashed by Polish authorities, as demonstrated with the Zmahannie organization and the Belarusian Society of Schools. Thus two of the observable implications of this study's main hypothesis were clearly

seen in the Belarusian case: the majority of organizations were not banned, and any organization that threatened pluralism was banned by the state. The remaining two observable implications, that a state should foment existing divides between organizations or create new ones, were not as evident in the Belarusian case. But there is obvious reason for this. As discussed above, with the exception of Hromada, the Belarusian political movement was so weak that there was no need for direct state intervention, despite initial plans for widespread state support for loyalist organizations (see Chapter 4 for more on this policy of coopting the Belarusian population). As will be shown in the Ukrainian, German, and Jewish cases, the MSW had to create and foment inter-organizational divisions in order to balance the rivalry between organizations and ensure that no single organization would become dominant and unite the front. Indeed, this chapter demonstrated how in the case of Belarusians, once Hromada was out of the picture, the Belarusian movement never recovered. The remaining organizations were weak, fragmented, quarrelling, and unable to pose a challenge to the state—as they were in the initial interwar years before Hromada's rise to power. Even when organizations such as the BZChD were known to receive funding from hostile foreign powers, in this case from Lithuania, the MSW did ban the organization—there was no reason to. For one, it would decrease the pluralism of remaining Belarusian organizations, and second, the organization's influence was so negligible that state repression could only backfire by giving reason for Belarusian opposition to rise against a discriminatory regime. This way, Polish authorities chose to watch as the Belarusian movement petered away after Hromada's repression, only interfering when attempts to reunite the front become formidable. Finally, though it was the intention of MSW authorities to support loyalist Belarusian organizations, as discussed in Chapter 4, again, there was no need. With the exception

of the repressed Hromada, Belarusians were politically inactive—the MSW succeeded in dividing and conquering their national movement.

Chapter 6: Ukrainian Political Organizations

In interwar Poland there was a pronounced tendency toward political differentiation—not unification—among Ukrainians: 28 political organizations claimed to represent the over 5 million Ukrainians residing within Poland's borders, ranging politically from far left to extreme right. These organizations differed significantly not only in their ideological beliefs, but also in their political platforms, goals, tactics, and support-base, also reflecting the very different political traditions of Ukrainians living in Galicia, that is, territories formerly part of the Austrian Empire, as opposed to the Ukrainians of Volhynia, who lived on territories once part of the Russian Empire.[1]

Of all minority ethnic groups in interwar Poland, Ukrainians were considered the most problematic and thus a "central issue" for the Ministry of Interior (MSW).[2] Because of the Polish-Ukrainian War (1918-1919) there was a widespread notion among Ukrainians, particularly the intelligentsia, that Poles were the "occupiers" and that Ukrainians were robbed of their right to national self-determination.[3] It was against this backdrop that the strenuous relationship between Ukrainian political organizations and the Polish government developed throughout the interwar period.[4]

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[1] Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 435.
[2] Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Dopływ, syg. 1002, s. 50b.
[3] Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Wydział Narodowościowy, syg. 945, s. 11.
[4] For more on the political situation in the Eastern Borderlands, as well as the difference between Galicia/Volhynia, see Chapter 4. And background information.

The Ministry of Interior's policies towards Ukrainian organizations varied greatly. On the one hand, the MSW sought to win over the minority by allowing, even creating and supporting, certain Ukrainian organizations to operate. On the other hand, policies were developed to fragment and assimilate (or "polonize," make Polish) the Ukrainian movement. Despite its strength, both in terms of the number of organizations and population size (Ukrainians were by far the largest minority group within Poland, approximately 15% or 5 million, also making them the largest minority group in interwar Europe), the Ukrainian political movement, its struggle for independence, and the inherent anti-Polish political platform driving most Ukrainian goals proved not too difficult for the Ministry of Interior to contain. This was because Ukrainian political organizations were unstable, disjointed, constantly succumbing to inter and intra organizational conflict, and unable to present a united front against the state. The following chapter outlines how, in managing the Ukrainian minority population, the Ministry of Interior fueled and exploited this situation using a divide and rule logic.

I begin by describing the Ukrainian political movement in interwar Poland. Given that it was by far the largest of the minority movements in Poland, I give it considerable attention. I then turn to discussing predictions given by existing theories, and how they are unable to explain the MSW's policies of banning some Ukrainian organizations, yet allowing most to operate legally. To account for this unexplained variation, I introduce the main hypothesis of this study, and examine how the four observable implications apply to the Ukrainian case. Attention is placed on the considerable inter- and intra-organizational conflicts, particularly between the largest two Ukrainian organizations, the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (or UNDO) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party (or USRP). I then discuss how the MSW preferred

organization pluralism by creating loyalist Ukrainian organizations. Finally, I explain how the MSW banned Sel-Rob, the organization that was uniting the Ukrainian front in the province of Volhynia. All of this evidence points clearly to the MSW's preference for organizational pluralism, which divided the Ukrainian opposition.

Ukrainian Political Organizations: Description and Predictions

Description of Ukrainian Political Organizations

Of the 28 Ukrainian political organizations operating throughout the interwar period in Poland, the Ministry of Interior banned only five. These were the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU), the Ukrainian Socialist Democratic Party (USDP), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Military Organization (UWO), and the Ukrainian Workers'-Peasants' Socialist Union (Sel-Rob). All others were tolerated. Given the general hostility of Polish-Ukrainian relations, arguably the most polarized and antagonistic of any of state-minority group relations in Poland, the relative tolerance for Ukrainian political organizations is indeed puzzling. Why were only five organizations banned? Why were so many allowed to operate? Before tackling these questions, in this section I will describe the general trends and variation of state response to Ukrainian organizations. Following this I will examine the predictions offered by existing theories, outlining where they fall short, illuminating the questions they leave unanswered.

Table 6.1 presents a comprehensive summary of Ukrainian political organizations in interwar Poland. Although all Ukrainian political organizations wanted essentially the same thing—some

form of Ukrainian self-rule—they differed sharply in their understanding of what "self-rule" entailed, and disagreed even more on how to best achieve it. Based on their political platforms, Ukrainian organizations can be categorized into four broad groups:[5]

1) *Moderate organizations seeking to create an independent Ukrainian state*: Chiefly represented by the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO), a centrist organization that used moderate political tactics to further Ukrainian interests only through legal means.
2) *Leftist Organizations—Socialist-Radicals and Communists*: Socialist Radicals, represented by the Ukrainian Socialist-Radical Party which was in favour of an independent socialist Ukraine; and communists seeking to unite Western Ukrainian lands under Poland with the Soviet Union, represented by the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) and its various satellite organizations.
3) *Nationalist and extreme right organizations*: The Ukrainian Military Organization, which later transformed into the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, used violent tactics to further its goal of an independent Ukraine. The United National Front (Front Jedności Narodowy, or FNJ), formed in 1933, was an extreme rightwing party (labelled "fascist" by the MSW) but did not use violent tactics. The FNJ had a negative attitude towards other Ukrainian political organizations, especially the UNDO and those that sought cooperation with Poland.
4) *Cooperating parties seeking Ukrainian autonomy within Poland*: The remainder of the Ukrainian political parties was generally small, weak, and inclined to cooperate with the

[5] Mieczysław Iwanicki, *Ukraińcy, Białorusini, Litwini, i Niemcy w Polsce w latach 1918-1990* (Siedlce: Wydawnictwa Uczelniane WSRP w Siedlcach, 1993), 19; AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 945, s. 11.

> Polish government, seeking autonomy, not secession. These included: the Ukrainian People's Union (Ukraiński Związek Ludowy, or UNS) later named the Ukrainian Peasant Party (Ukraińska Partia Włościańska, or USP), and in Volhynia, the Volhynian Ukrainian Union, (Wołyńskie Zjednoczenie Ukraińskie, or WUO). This group also included Russophile organizations such as the Ruthenian Peasant and Ruthenian Agrarian Parties.[6]

Table 6.2 presents summary descriptive statistics of Ukrainian political organizations in interwar Poland. Representing the entire political spectrum from far left to far right, most organizations (15 or 54%) were leftist, seven of which were Communist sympathizers. Ten organizations (36%) were centrist, encompassing all loyalist and moderate Ukrainian political organizations. On the far right of the political spectrum were only three organizations (11%), two of which, the Ukrainian Military Organization and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, used violent tactics and were deemed terrorist organizations by the Ministry of Interior. Though numerous, Ukrainian political organizations were generally fickle. The average lifespan of an organization was 6.9 years out of a two-decade interwar period, with a range of one to 19 years and median of six years. By the outbreak of World War II, only a quarter of Ukrainian organizations were still legally operating. The remainder either voluntarily disbanded (six or 21%) because they lacked public support or underwent a significant transformation (eleven or 40%), that is, they splintered into two or more organizations or merged with existing ones. A very small number (two or 7%) were successfully liquidated by the state after being outlawed. The other outlawed organizations continued to operate covertly (2 or 7%) or transformed into a new organization (1 or 3.5%).

[6] Subtelny, *Ukraine,* 437.

Table 6.1. Ukrainian Political Organizations in Interwar Poland (in Polish)

Left		Centre	Right
Communist	**Socialist**		
Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Ukrainy*†* *(1919-1938)	Ukrainska Partja Socjal Demokratyczna (1899-1921;1928-1939)	Ukraińskie Zjednoczenie Narodowo-Demokratyczne (1925-1939)	***Ukraińska Organizacja Wojskowa*†* *(1920-1933)***
Partia Wolności Narodu (1923-1926)	Ukraińska Partia Radykalna (1890-1926)	Ukraińska Partia Włościańska "Chliborobi"‡ (1922-1926)	***Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów*†* *(1929-1939)***
Sel-Sojuz (1924-1928)	Ukraińska Partia Socjalistyczno-Radykalna (1926-1939)	Ukrainski Związek Ludowy‡ (1925-1933)	Front Jedności Narodowej (1933-1939)
Sel-Rob (1926-1927)	Ukraińska Partia Socjalistów-Rewolucjonistów, Wołyń (1917-1926)	Ukraińska Partia Ludowa (1922-1928)	
Sel-Rob Prawice (1927-1929)	Ukraińska Ludowa Partia Pracy / pre-1919, Ukraińska Partia Narodowo-Demokratyczna (1919-1925)	Ukraińska Partia Jedności Ludowej‡ (1922-1922?)	
Sel-Rob Lewice/Jednosc*† *(1927-1932)	Ukraińska Partia Pracy Narodowej (1924-1925)	Russka Organizacja Włościańska (previously Ludowa/Narodowa) ‡ (1921-1939)	
Ukrainska Partja Socjal Demokratyczna*†* *(1921-1924)	Ukraińska Partia Pracy (1927-1930)	Ukrainsko-Ruska Partia Rolników‡ (1925-1926)	
†		Organizacja Galicyjsko-Ruska‡ (1919-1923)	
		Wołyńskie Zjednoczenie Ukraińskie‡ (1931-1939)	
		Ukraińska Katolicka Partia Ludowa‡ (1930-1939)	

*organization used violent tactics; †**organization was banned**; ‡ organization was pacifist/loyalist

Organizational demands also range widely: six organizations demanded territorial autonomy; three demanded cultural autonomy; and the rest sought secession. It is unsurprising that the nine organizations which did not demand Ukrainian independence were also loyalist organizations, favouring cooperation with the Polish state. Only four organizations used violent tactics, and as a result were banned, as discussed below. We are thus presented with a puzzle: in an environment of hostile relations between the Polish State and the Ukrainian minority, the presence of several anti-state organizations, and the existence of state capacity to use repression and willingness to outlaw organizations, only a very small fraction of Ukrainian organizations were actually banned. Why? I explore potential answers below.

Table 6.2. Summary statistics of Ukrainian Organizations in Interwar Poland

Total number of organizations	28
Number banned	5 (19%)
Ideology	Left: 15 (7 communist) Centre: 10 Right: 3
Demands	Cultural Autonomy: 3 Territorial Autonomy: 6 Secession: 19
Duration	Average: 6.9 years Range: 1-19 years Median: 6
Fate	Survive: 7 Disband: 6 Merged/splintered: 11 Liquidated: 2 Operate covertly: 2
Violent tactics	4
Loyalist	9
Number banned	5

Predictions based on existing literature

The first potential explanation focuses on regime type, suggesting that an authoritarian regime is more likely to repress minority ethnic organizations than a democratic regime. Table 6.3

demonstrates that this was not the case. In the pre-1926 period, when Poland was considered a democracy, of the 18 Ukrainian organizations operating between 1918 and the May 1926 coup, only three were banned (17% of the total). A smaller absolute and relative number of organizations was banned after 1926, following Poland's tilt towards authoritarianism (2 or 10%). The explanation of state response to Ukrainian organizations must therefore lie beyond regime-type variables.

Table 6.3. Ukrainian organizations banned according to regime type.

Regime Type	Ukrainian Political Organizations	
	Number operating	Number banned
Democratic (pre1926)	18	3
Authoritarian (post1926)	20	2

Literature on "enemy organizations" predicts three scenarios wherein an organization will be banned by the state: the organization is perceived as a fifth-column; the organization threatens the state's territorial autonomy through secession; or the organization resorts to violent tactics against the state or civilians. Table 6.4 below summarizes how these predictions aligned with Ukrainian political organizations in interwar Poland. The explanation focusing on fifth-column status as a determinant of state repression over-predicted the Ukrainian case by 50%: ten Ukrainian organizations could have been perceived as fifth column organizations because they were known (or thought) to be receiving funding from foreign powers that wanted to de-stabilize Poland from within. Germany, Lithuania, and the Soviet Union funded several Ukrainian organizations.[7] Thus if the Ministry of Interior were to ban organizations deemed fifth columns,

[7] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1002, s. 54b.

we would expect ten organizations to be banned. This reasoning, however, over-predicted five organizations (50%) and is thus insufficient.

Table 6.4. Rival Explanations to State Banning of Organizations

Rival Explanations	Number of organizations banned		
	Predicted	Correctly predicted	Incorrectly Predicted
Fifth Column Organizations	10	5	5
Violent Organizations	4	4	1
Secessionist Organizations	19	5	14

Of the 28 total, 19 organizations sought secession, either Ukrainian independence or annexation of Galicia and Volhynia by the Soviet Union. The logic that secessionist organizations are more likely to be banned because they threaten the state's territorial integrity correctly predicted the five organizations that were in fact banned by the MSW. However, on a much larger scale, this theory incorrectly predicted the fate of 14 other organizations. In other words, of the 19 secessionist organizations, only 5 were banned. This significant over-prediction demonstrates that the logic pointing to organizational political demands as the main reason for state repression also falls short in explaining the case of Ukrainians in interwar Poland.

The notion that violent organizations are more likely to be banned by the state is the only rival explanation that predicted well: all four organizations that used violent tactics were banned, leaving only one unaccounted for organization. Given its accuracy, the subsequent section discusses violent Ukrainian organizations in interwar Poland.

Banning Violent Ukrainian Political Organizations

State Pacification of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

The Ukrainian Military Organization (UWO), founded in 1920, promoted armed insurgency against Poland to create an independent Ukrainian state and was composed largely of veterans of the Polish-Ukrainian War. [8] The organization carried out assassinations of several prominent Polish politicians, as well as of Ukrainians pacifists. The UWO did not stop at assassinations, however: members bombed train stations, communication lines, railway tracks, police buildings and post offices. In 1922, around 300 anti-Polish and anti-state actions were carried out by the UWO.[9] It is thus unsurprising that the MSW ultimately deemed the Ukrainian Military Organization an illegal organization.

By 1925, the UWO had effectively merged with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). For its part, the OUN insisted that "only the complete removal of all occupiers from Ukrainian lands will allow for the general development of the Ukrainian Nation within its own state."[10] The group's chief goal was an independent Ukraine, to include all "Ukrainian territories" and only "Ukrainian people."[11] From its inception, Polish authorities labelled the Organization, which began as a fringe group but eventually garnered support among radicalized youth over the course of the interwar period, an illegal terrorist movement. In July 1930, things came to a head; members of the OUN carried out large-scale sabotage actions across Galicia, destroying Polish properties and state infrastructure. The Ministry of Interior recorded over 200

[8] Iwanicki, *Ukraińcy, Białorusini,* 21.
[9] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1018, s. 91-92a.
[10] Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 143.
[11] Ibid.

"acts of terror" carried out by the group from July to November 1930 alone (Table 6.5).[12] In response, Polish authorities launched a "pacification" campaign, sending 1,000 police officers to search 450 villages in the Ukrainian-inhabited Eastern borderlands for nationalist agitators.[13] The MSW considered the pacification campaign a success, citing that "following the pacification, the number of sabotage acts decreased from 101 to 22 in October, 22 in November, and 8 in October."[14] Despite the initial optimism surrounding the MSW's victory over the OUN, the Organization proved resilient to government crackdown and continued to operate as an illegal underground organization until the outbreak of WWII.

Table 6.5 "Acts of Terror" perpetrated by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalist

Province (Voivodeship)	Month					Total acts of sabotage	Of which were directed at:	
	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI		State property (train stations, post offices, communication lines, etc.)	Private property (Polish-owned farmsteads, estates, homes, etc.)
Lwów	3	21	31	9	3	67	10	57
Stanisławów	2	8	14	5	5	34	5	29
Tarnopol	1	25	56	8	-	90	4	86
Total:	***6***	***54***	***101***	***22***	***8***	***191***	***19***	***172***

Source: AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1073, s. 6.

Banning the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party: A Threat to "Peace and Order"

The Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP) was a socialist workers' party founded on September 18, 1899 in Galicia by Ukrainian members of the Polish Social Democratic Party of Galicia and Silesia.[15] In 1921, after the Treaty of Riga partitioned Ukrainian lands between Poland and Soviet Ukraine, the USDP adopted a pro-Soviet Ukrainian-unification platform and

[12] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1073, s. 3; syg. 1059, s. 19-20; syg. 1065, s. 24, 31-33.
[13] Timothy Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 75-76.
[14] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1073, s. 6.
[15] Roman Senkus, *Encyclopaedia of Ukraine,* "Ukrainian Social Democratic Party," vol 5. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

remained openly hostile both to the Polish government and to supporters of the defunct West Ukrainian National Republic. In the early 1920s, members of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine infiltrated the USDP's upper echelons, and, by March 1923, the USDP had adopted an official communist platform. In November 1923, the organization met in the Volhynian city of Lutsk with other representatives of Ukrainian socialist organizations and established a united front, called the USDP of Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, the Kholm Region, Polisia, and Podlachia (listing all historical territories in Poland with Ukrainian inhabitants). Indeed, the MSW noted the USDP's "desire to form a united proletarian front"[16] though at this point its ability to unite the front was represented only in name, as it lacked any ability to attract far-reaching support. Instead, the organization was banned because it was deemed a threat to "peace and order," and, more specifically, because of its willingness to use violent tactics.[17]

On January 30, 1924, the Polish government proclaimed the USDP a threat to peace and order and outlawed the organization. The MSW report banning the organization reads: "The [USDP's] participation in militia and sabotage activities has been confirmed. As it emerged from interviews and judicial investigations, acts of sabotage have been organized across Eastern Galicia by the USDP…It is also certain that these actions are subsidized and led by Soviet Russia, and there is evidence that [USDP] receives support and assistance from outside the [Polish] State."[18] Receiving subsidizes from a foreign power, however, was not a sufficient explanation for the organization's banning, because as discussed in the previous section, several other organizations enjoyed financial and moral support from foreign enemy states. The MSW report continues to read: "In light of the above-mentioned facts, confirming USDP's aims to

[16] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1062, s. 1-5.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.

overthrow the social order through revolution and threaten the territorial integrity of the State by annexing part of its territory with the help of a foreign State, the Ministry of Interior has decided to liquidate the organization."[19] Again, other organizations that favoured Soviet annexation of Ukrainian lands were not banned by the MSW and so support for secession, in isolation, is not a complete explanation for the USDP's banning. Moreover, the organization's ties to communism, as discussed in Chapter 4, do not sufficiently explain why the organization was banned nor tell us anything about why communism was perceived as a threat in the first place. Thus by isolating these variables across a broad variation we are able to deduce that the main reason for USDP's banning was its "participation in militia and sabotage activities."[20]

Dividing and Conquering Ukrainian Political Organizations

I have established thus far that none of the rival explanations sufficiently explain the variation of state response to Ukrainian organizations in interwar Poland. Even though one explanation—that organizations which use violent tactics are likely to be banned—was able to explain why four organizations were outlawed, it was unable to tell us why Sel-Rob, a non-violent organization, was banned, nor does it illuminate why the majority of Ukrainian political organizations, many of which held hostile views towards the state, were tolerated. The reasoning behind this, I argue, is that, despite the government's overall reputation as repressive, the Ministry of Interior, the organ responsible for creating and implementing minority policies, preferred organizational pluralism among Ukrainians and used repression only as a last resort. Allowing organizational pluralism was in line with the MSW's logic of divide and conquer, a

[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.

logic used to better manage the fractious Ukrainian minority population and the numerous political organizations that sought to overthrow—or at very least impede—the Polish government.

To support my argument, the four main observable implications (OIs) of my hypothesis are outlined in Table 6.6 below. As the chart demonstrates, all four observable implications are seen in the case of Ukrainian minority organizations in interwar Poland, thus supporting my hypothesis that when a state is faced with a restive minority, it will prefer organizational pluralism in order to fend off the potential for a united front. Here I briefly summarize the observable implications before delving into each in greater detail below. The first OI contends that, if the state preferred organizational plurality, it should not ban a majority of organizations. This indeed was the case with Ukrainian organizations: the overwhelming majority (23 or 81%) of Ukrainian organizations were tolerated. The second OI states that actors should embark on actions that are functional to supporting, promoting, or maintaining existing divides between organizations within the Ukrainian minority. We see this in the MSW's decision not to suppress two of the most influential, anti-Polish Ukrainian organizations, the UNDO and USRP, because the rivalry between the two ensured that no Ukrainian united front would form. The third OI expects the state to create new divides within the Ukrainian minority. Again, we see this in the Ukrainian case: the MSW created, funded, and supported Ukrainian loyalist organizations throughout the interwar period. Finally, the fourth OI states that organizations that suppress organizational plurality within the Ukrainian minority should be banned because they are able to form a united front for the minority. We will see in subsequent sections that although there was no single organization that could unite the *entire* Ukrainian front, Sel-Rob, a communist

organization operating chiefly on lands formerly part of the Russian Empire, was successful in uniting the *Volhynian* Ukrainian front, in turn threatening the MSW's project to transform Volhynian Ukrainians into loyal Polish citizens. Thus it was Sel-Rob's ability to unite the Volhynian Ukrainian front and suppress organizational pluralism in the Volyn province—and not the organization's ties to the Soviet Union, as is often cited—that ultimately deemed the organization a credible threat to the MSW and consequently led to its illegalization.

Table 6.6. Observable Implications of the Divide and Conquer Hypothesis

Observable Implications		
Within the Ukrainian minority, there should be a majority of organizations that are not banned.	✓	81% tolerated (not banned) 23/28 tolerated (not banned)
State actors should embark on actions that are functional to maintaining organizational pluralism within each ethnic minority, fomenting and exploiting ***existing divisions****.*	✓	The MSW exploited and maintained cleavages between UNDO and USRP.
State actors should create, support, or promote ***new divisions*** *in the minority.*	✓	The MSW created, funded, and supported Ukrainian loyalist organizations.
Organizations that suppress organizational pluralism within the ethnic minority should be banned, i.e. they are able to create a united front for the minority.	✓	The MSW banned Sel-Rob, a "unite the front" organization in Volhynia.

Preventing a United Ukrainian Front by Maintaining Organizational Pluralism

We saw in Chapter 5 how Hromada was able to successfully unite the entire Belarusian front and, as a result, faced swift and severe crackdown from the Ministry of Interior. This was not the case with the Ukrainian organizations. The concern over a potential united front, however, is clearly evidenced in MSW internal documents. As noted in a classified MSW report summarizing state-minority ethnic group relations in Poland from 1936, less than three years

before the outbreak of WWII, "[a] united Ukrainian national front has never existed."[21] Similarly, a 1931 local report from the Zdołbunowski county reads: "...there is yet to be a Ukrainian organization that is able to unite Ukrainians across classes and groups…" Though taken from a local-level report, the observations in Zdołbunowski county were not in isolation, and their insights can be aggregated to make national-level generalizations. Indeed, the Ministry of Interior's internal classified reports on minority affairs are replete with descriptions of the divided Ukrainian movement throughout Poland, both over time and space. Here I will focus on two of the most important divides that plagued the Ukrainian movement and benefited the Polish state: first, the internal rifts within the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO), the largest and most influential Ukrainian organization; and second, the conflict between UNDO and the second most popular Ukrainian political organization in Poland, the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party (USRP), and particularly, the two organizations' inability to unite during parliamentary elections. Indeed, though both organizations—and especially the UNDO—posed a threat to Polish authorities, neither was strong enough to fully overtake the other and become the sole representative of Ukrainians in Poland. Indeed, banning one would tilt the scale in favour of the other competing organization. Banning both, on the other hand, would needlessly fuel already considerable Ukrainian anti-state sentiments; so long as there was pluralism, there was no united opposition. Even though the UNDO and USRP failed to unite Ukrainians, the MSW, as will be shown below, kept a close eye on unfolding events, proving that indeed the potential of a united Ukrainian front was seen as a threat to Poland that had to be averted.

[21] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 953, s.1.

The Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance, UNDO: Potential to Unite the Front

One Ukrainian political organization was larger and more influential than the rest combined: the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance, or as it is more commonly referred to by its Ukrainian acronym, UNDO (Ukrainske Nacjonalne Demoktratyczne Objednanie). UNDO was formed on July 11, 1925 following the merger of the Labor (Trudova) party, the Ukrainian Party of National Work (Ukrainska Partia Nacjonaly Roboty), and members of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation from Volhynia.[22] Despite officially being formed in 1925, the UNDO was the direct descendant of the prewar Ukrainian National Democratic Party, which formed in 1899 in Galicia and was the main force behind the short-lived West Ukrainian National Republic (1918-1919) before it was defeated by Polish armies in 1919.[23] The UNDO included within its ranks some of the most prominent figures of prewar Galician-Ukrainian life, whose political experience had been formed under the Austrian Empire. The organization also included younger activists who began their political work under Polish rule.[24] Because most Ukrainian activists, including the vast majority of the intelligentsia and clergy, belonged to UNDO, the organization was thought of as "the party of the West Ukrainian establishment."[25]

Essentially a liberal party, the UNDO was committed to constitutional democracy and, like its ideological predecessor, advocated for a Western Ukrainian state, with the eventual goal of uniting all Ukrainian-inhabited lands.[26] The UNDO did not recognize Polish authority over Galicia or Volhynia and was against cooperating with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

[22] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 6.
[23] Jerzy Holzer, *Mozaika polityczna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warzawa: Książka I Wiedza, 1974), 243.
[24] Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1996), 592.
[25] Ibid., 592-5.
[26] Subtelny, *Ukraine,* 435.

(though briefly in its initial years did look favourably towards Soviet Ukraine).[27] Often considered a nationalist party because of its principal aim of achieving Ukrainian statehood, the UNDO, beyond this ethnocentric objective, is better placed towards the centre of the political spectrum based on its moderate platform and tactics. While the ultimate goal was an independent Ukraine, in the interim, the UNDO made it a priority to obtain positive changes for Ukrainians in Poland through legal—not violent or covert—means.

The UNDO's popularity largely stemmed from the success of its affiliate organizations. Indeed, the UNDO and its members controlled many Ukrainian financial, cooperative, and cultural institutions, chiefly "Native School" (Ridna Szkola), "Enlightenment" (Proswita), and "Farmer" (Silskyj Hospodar) as well as the most influential West Ukrainian newspaper, *Dilo* ("Deed").[28] In preparation for a future independent Ukrainian state, the function of these UNDO-run organizations was to promote Ukrainian language and culture, as well as to teach economic self-sufficiency to Ukrainians by creating farmer cooperatives that operated independently of the Polish administration; "rely on your own resources!" was the cooperative movement's slogan.[29] The UNDO's popularity was reflected in its success in parliamentary elections. The party drew about 600 000 votes and won the vast majority of Ukrainian-held seats to parliament, consistently receiving the most votes among Ukrainians in each election.[30]

The UNDO was generally anti-Polish in its rhetoric, with the exception of a short period prior to the outbreak of WWII when the organization sought to "normalize," with little success, the

[27] Ibid.
[28] Iwanicki, *Ukraińcy, Białorusini,* 19.
[29] Cited in Subtelny, *Ukraine,* 323.
[30] Ibid., 435; Magocsi, *Ukraine,* 635.

increasingly tense (and violent) relations between Ukrainians and Poles.[31] With Polish state repression on the one hand, however, and Ukrainian nationalist extremists on the other, the UNDO found it difficult to maintain its middle-of-the road policies.[32] Notwithstanding its popularity among the Ukrainian minority, its anti-Polish disposition, and its status as the direct descendant of the main political force behind the West Ukrainian National Republic, the organization was never outright banned by the MSW and lasted from its inception in 1925 up until the outbreak of World War II in 1939.

A Promising Start to a Failed Mission: UNDO's Inability to Unite the Front

There was promising potential for a united Ukrainian front in the initial years after World War I. Following Ukrainian defeat at the hands of Poland, the resulting loss of the nascent independent Western Ukrainian state, and the virtual absence of international support for claims to national self-determination, Ukrainian political organizations in the early 1920s were driven by indignation and fervor against their Polish "occupiers." The Ministry of Interior's Department of Security confirmed this in a classified report dated March 22, 1922, stating that Ukrainian political organizations were "consolidating around a so-called united anti-Polish front."[33] They were united over their "non-recognition of the Polish state" and unified in their unwillingness to accept Polish "claims over Eastern Galicia." [34] Anti-state positions were "demonstrated at every step and at every opportunity" by the Ukrainian front.[35]

[31] Iwanicki, *Ukraińcy, Białorusini,* 19.
[32] Subtelny, *Ukraine, 323.*
[33] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1018, s. 5-6.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.

The initial penchant for a united anti-Polish Ukrainian front was short-lived; it was not long before the Ukrainian movement succumbed to severe inter and intra organizational conflicts. Already by 1923, the UNDO's precursor organization, the Ukrainian People's Worker Party (Ukraińska Ludowa Partia Pracy, UNTP), suffered from internal fragmentation and became divided into three competing factions: first, the extreme nationalists with a staunch anti-Polish and anti-Soviet disposition; second, supporters of compromise with Poland; and third, supporters for cooperation with the Soviet Union.[36] The internal conflict in the UNTP resulted in the practical breakup of the organization, and spurred the creation of a new organization, the Ukrainian Party of National Work (Ukraińska Partia Narodnoji Roboty, or UPPN). The UPPN opposed any compromise either with the Polish state or the USSR.[37] Thus, only two years after the MSW noted with apprehension the potential for a uniting anti-Polish Ukrainian front, UNTP, the main political force driving the movement, fragmented.

The fragmentation greatly hindered the Ukrainian national movement within Poland and, realizing this, the warring factions decided to try and set aside differences and "unite and consolidate internally."[38] The result was the creation of the UNDO in July 1925, which saw the merger between the competing UNTP (both factions) and the UPPN, along with delegates from the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation. A Ministry of Interior classified report dated August 1925 explained that the "consolidation" of the UNDO took place primarily because the "[f]ragementation of the UNTP into two conflicting factions and the creation of the Ukrainian Party of National Work significantly weakened the influence of the Ukrainian nationalists."[39]

[36] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 243.
[37] Ibid.
[38] AAN, MSW, Dop. syg. 1074, s. 33.
[39] Ibid.

With the UNDO emphasizing its aspirations of being the sole representative of Ukrainians in Poland,[40] the organization's creation resulted once again in "a united [Ukrainian] nationalist camp in Poland."[41] With the only other "nationalist" Ukrainian organization being the Ukrainian Military Organization, which at the time did not find much support among Ukrainians, the Ukrainian nationalist movement centered almost exclusively around the UNDO.[42] The MSW feared the resurgence of a united Ukrainian front, noting "that upon the consolidation of the Ukrainian nationalist camp…anti-Polish agents are gaining a broader base for operation."[43] As a result of this potential threat, the Ministry of Interior called for "urgent observation" by provincial governments "of all UNDO activities and that all findings immediately be communicated to the Ministry of Interior."[44]

The UNDO's momentum continued. During its Party Convention on May 13, 1926, the UNDO reported that it successfully founded local organization branches in 26 counties (*powiats*).[45] From August to November 1926, the UNDO intensified its organizational activities, increasing its number of branches from 26 to 42.[46] The UNDO was most successful in making inroads in the three Galician provinces: Tarnopol, where each county *(powiat)* had an organizational branch; Lwów, which had 16 branches; and Stanisławów which had 9. The reason for the significantly smaller number of branches in Stanisławów province was that it was dominated by the UNDO's main competitor, the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, a dynamic which I explain

[40] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 535.
[41] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1074, s. 33.
[42] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 531.
[43] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1074, s. 34.
[44] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 6-9b.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.

below. Despite their success in the Galician provinces of Tarnopol, Lwów, and Stanisławów, Volhynia was "completely resistant to UNDO's attempts to infiltrate."[47]

Though the UNDO's progress toward forming a united Ukrainian front troubled the MSW, at the same time the organization's internal conflicts were no secret to the Ministry. The MSW noted that the proliferation of the organization's network throughout Galicia underlined UNDO's need to "achieve greater party discipline and to remove all internal frictions, which threatened the breakdown of the organization."[48] These "internal divides and frictions in the UNDO camp" were clearly evident at the May 13, 1926 convention where members were unable to unanimously draft a party program. The UNDO was once again split between the already familiar three factions: one bloc viewed the Soviet Union critically but "considered it an important step towards the development of Ukrainian national life [because it was the closest they had to an independent Ukraine at the time];" the second group did not recognize Poland's authority over Ukrainian lands, but recognized the importance of defending Ukrainians' rights by participating in the legal political life of the Polish state; and the third faction sought territorial autonomy within Poland instead of secession.[49] It was clear that the organization's main purpose for being formed—to mitigate the tensions between Ukrainian pro-independence organizations and form a united front—was not achieved.

Initially unsuccessful, UNDO leadership agreed in November 1926 on the goal to "consolidate internally and eliminate internal friction within UNDO."[50] Their efforts failed once more, and

[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid., s. 6b.
[49] Ibid.
[50] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 42; AAN, MSW, WN, syg.961, s. 8.

the internal conflicts of the UNDO continued to polarize its membership, coming to a significant rift: the pro-Polish faction was expelled from UNDO in December 1926, and in April 1927 a much larger faction, one that was in favour of compromise with the Soviet Union, broke away and formed a new party, the Ukraińska Partia Pracy (UPP). The UNDO criticized UPP's decision to break away claiming that it was driven by "personal ambitions" and was not in the interest of the Ukrainian minority.[51] The UPP played a role in Ukrainian politics until it dissolved in 1930. An even more severe fragmentation of UNDO occurred in 1933 when a group of extreme rightwing nationalists left the UNDO and created the United National Front (Front Jedności Narodowej or FNJ), which remained vehemently critical of the UNDO for the remainder of the interwar period, criticizing the organization for being open to cooperation with Polish officials.[52]

Despite the UNDO's popularity and chiefly anti-state disposition, it was in the interest of Polish officials to allow the organization to continue operating, for at least three reasons. First, the UNDO was never able to credibly unite as an organization that would represent the entire Ukrainian minority. In spite of its promising start and several attempts at forming a united Ukrainian front, "internal differences and tensions"[53] plagued the organization throughout the interwar period. Much of the organization's time and energy were squandered on attempts at quelling internal conflicts, rather than effectively fighting the state. In assessing the UNDO's formative years, the MSW concluded that, "despite some minor successes, the party has lost much of its internal cohesion and [as a result] to a certain degree has lost its influence in the [Ukrainian] village."[54] Indeed, the "UNDO infighting" had "a negative impact on the

[51] AAN, MSN, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 71.
[52] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 531.
[53] In Polish: *"różnić I tarć w obozie UNDO,"* AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 6.
[54] Ibid., 43.

organization's development," reported the MSW, "especially in the Stanisławów province where its main competitor, [the] USRP, is working intensely to expand its organizational network."[55] Thus although the UNDO was the most popular Ukrainian organization, it was far from being able to unite the front and, as a result, was not banned by the MSW.

Second, the UNDO's internal conflicts splintered the organization on more than one occasion, resulting in the establishment of new, competing Ukrainian organizations. Several organizations were formed as a result of factions splintering from UNDO, in turn breaking the Ukrainian front and playing into the MSW's interests of increasing organizational pluralism. The more organizational pluralism that existed between conflicting groups, the less likely that a strong opposition would be formed.

Third, banning the UNDO would reduce Ukrainian organizational pluralism and would potentially have driven Ukrainians to support the second most popular organization, the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party (USRP), thus increasing the odds of a united front springing up around USRP. The UNDO also gave the Ukrainian minority a moderate political outlet through which it could voice their grievances. In the absence of moderate organizations, Ukrainians would have been more readily drawn to support extreme, rightwing violent organizations such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. In other words, so long as the UNDO was not able to unite the Ukrainian front, and intense inter-organizational competition existed among the Ukrainians, it was in the state's best interests to tolerate the organization and allow organizational pluralism. As will be discussed in the following section, the rivalry between the

[55] Ibid., s. 42.

two most popular Ukrainian organizations, the UNDO and the USRP, ensured that this competition would prevent a strong, united Ukrainian opposition.

Competing to Lead the Front: Rivalry between UNDO and USRP

Background on the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party

Socialist tendencies among Ukrainians in Poland were strong but fragmented. The leftist movement can be divided into two: Communists, who favoured cooperation with the Soviet Union, and Socialist-Radicals, who favoured the introduction of socialism but within the framework of an *independent* Ukrainian state, not part of the Soviet Union. The main representative of the latter movement was the Ukrainian Socialist-Radical Party (USRP, or simply the Socialist-Radical Party or Socialist-Radicals, or Radicals). The Socialist-Radicals emphasized their role as a workers' party that represented the Ukrainian masses. Their party program called for equitable land distribution among peasants, limits on private ownership, and secularization of Ukrainian life. The Socialist-Radicals emphasized that these goals could not be attained, however, without first creating an independent Ukrainian state. The Socialist Radicals were thus opposed both to Poland and the USSR, because both blocked Ukrainian independence.[56]

Formed in Galicia in 1890 as the Ukrainian Radical Party, the USRP was the oldest of all Ukrainian parties and second only to the UNDO in terms of popularity.[57] In the 1930s, the Radicals had about 20,000 members, most of whom were peasants, agricultural workers, and some intelligentsia. In the parliamentary election of 1928, the party received about 280,000

[56] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s.43; Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 247; Subtelny, *Ukraine,* 435.
[57] Subtelny, *Ukraine,* 435.

votes. Like the UNDO, the USRP was based in Galicia, and thus made a concerted effort to expand its influence into Volhynia, uniting in 1926 with the smaller Volhynian-based Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary party, which was created in 1917 when Volhynia was still part of the Russian Empire. Following this merger, the Radicals changed their name from the Ukrainian Radical Party to the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party.[58] Despite the USRP's efforts and the significant role it played in Ukrainian political life in Galicia alongside the national democratic UNDO, the socialist-radical movement was very weak beyond Galicia.[59]

Ensuring a Divided Front During Elections: UNDO vs USRP

Parliamentary elections were arguably the most important time for the Ukrainian minority to present a united front. Its success largely depended on whether the two largest Ukrainian political organizations—the UNDO and the USRP—could unite. Despite some efforts, and to the benefit of the MSW, however, Ukrainians never managed to present a united opposition during elections. Here I will use the March 1928 parliamentary election as an instructive example. These polls were significant because most pro-Ukrainian organizations boycotted prior elections, charging that participating in elections would imply their acceptance of the legitimacy of Polish rule over Galicia and Volhynia. By 1928, however, most Ukrainian organizations had accepted the need to work within the legal political framework of Poland to further their interests, and, as a result, contested seats in the parliamentary polls. These elections, however, were the last in interwar Poland to be considered mostly free and fair, as the country continued to move towards authoritarianism in the years leading up to WWII.[60]

[58] Ibid., 436.
[59] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg.1021, s.8; Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna*, 243.
[60] Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, "Beyond Dictatorship and Democracy: Rethinking National Minority Inclusion and Regime Type in Interwar Eastern Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no.8-9 (2010):1089-1118.

Reports indicate that the Ministry of Interior was well aware of Ukrainians' difficulty in uniting, and particularly, reveled over the rivalry between the UNDO and the USRP.[61] The MSW described how it benefited from longstanding internal differences in the Ukrainian political camp, which were evident in the months leading up to elections. Indeed, the Ukrainian election campaign was "extremely active and competition was severe."[62] This was especially true of anti-State organizations, which were "on the one hand forced into a competitive struggle between one another, while also counteracting the increasingly strengthening loyalist movement," the latter of which was heavily supported by the state.[63] In addition to the "fierce and bitter struggles between Ukrainian factions," the MSW observed "significant internal friction, conflicts, and divisions [within organizations]."[64] This infighting was, ironically, "most typical of organizations which, whether socialist or nationalist, rallied under the banner of creating a united front."[65]

In November 1927, the MSW noted that, aside from the few loyalist organizations, the majority of Ukrainian political organizations was "determinedly anti-state,"[66]and there were efforts to once again, in the months leading up to the parliamentary elections, suppress differences between organizations and consolidate under the slogan of a "united national front."[67] The UNDO led this initiative, proposing to form a broader cross-ethnic coalition between minority organizations—mostly Jewish and German—modelling this plan on the Minority Bloc formed

[61] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 44.
[62] Ibid., s. 364.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid., 166-167.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid., s. 278.
[67] Ibid.

during the 1922 parliamentary elections. The UNDO's plan was, however, a "complete failure" in Galicia, where most Ukrainian organizations rejected the UNDO's proposals to create a broader minority bloc against the state.[68] The UNDO's success at uniting the Ukrainian front was contingent on reaching an agreement with USRP, as it was the second most popular Ukrainian party in Galicia after the UNDO and enjoyed some influence in Volhynia. During negotiations, the USRP put forward specific conditions, namely that the UNDO break its bloc with Jewish organizations and remove candidates on the UNDO party list who showed tendencies to cooperate with Polish government officials.[69] The UNDO rejected these conditions, and negotiations between USRP and UNDO crumbled.[70] Once again, Ukrainians failed to present a united front.

In the January 1928 review of the Ukrainian press in Poland, the MSW noted that "the nationalist [Ukrainian] press regrets the fragmentation of the Ukrainian electorate."[71] In the months leading up to the March 1928 election, the UNDO had predicted that the pre-election political environment would give rise to three electoral groups: "the first, internationalist [communist], standing in the service of Moscow; the second, loyalist, supported by Warsaw; and third, the [Ukrainian] national group represented by UNDO-USRP-and Sel Sojuz."[72] In other words, the UNDO banked on a united Ukrainian nationalist front among "pro-Ukrainian" organizations. "These calculations, however, failed."[73] The MSW's press review elaborated on the

[68] Ibid., s. 364.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid. 363.
[71] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 958, s. 3-4; On October 10, 1926, Sel-Sojuz joined forces with the People's Will party to create Sel-Rob. A small group of Sel-Sojuz members refused to join the new organization and continued their independent activities as Sel-Sojuz until 1928; *Encyclopaedia of Ukraine,* "Ukrainian Social Democratic Party," vol 5, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
[72] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 958, s. 3-4.
[73] Ibid.

fragmentation of the Ukrainian front: "the leadership of USRP and Sel-Sojuz" was accused by the UNDO of "breaking the Ukrainian national front" because of "personal ambitions."[74] An article in the UNDO-supported newspaper *Dilo (*Nr.4/1928) read: "In a serious and dangerous situation, where a united pro-Polish bloc is forming on Ukrainian-inhabited lands, instead of moving towards the direction of uniting, the Ukrainian movement continues to fragment further, creating new groups and new parties."[75] The article went on to "bluntly write" that this danger was further exasperated by the formation of pro-Polish Ukrainian parties in Volhynia, which were "created by Polish officials for the purpose of breaking the Ukrainian front."[76] The UNDO criticized Ukrainian organizations, claiming that their inability to unite was a "national crime."[77]

Much of the blame for Ukrainian fragmentation was attributed to the Polish state. Indeed, the Ukrainian nationalist front "strongly attacked [criticized] the government" for using "Austrian methods of *divide et impera*" to "govern" Ukrainians.[78] Specifically, the government was criticized for "breaking apart Ukrainian society" by "creating various artificial pro-Polish groups, which are supported by government officials and placed in opposition to Ukrainian parties."[79] In an evaluation of government policy, dated September 30, 1927, the USRP made similar conclusions, stating that the MSW has "obtained considerable success in their efforts to weaken the Ukrainian movement."[80] According to the USRP, the MSW pursued two goals vis-à-vis Ukrainians: 1) to fragment existing Ukrainian parties; and 2) to gain direct "on the ground"

[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid., s. 3.
[76] Ibid.
[77] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 368.
[78] Ibid., s. 319.
[79] Ibid., s. 319-320.
[80] Ibid., s. 211.

contact with the Ukrainian masses.[81] The government succeeded, particularly "in breaking apart the UNDO by actively supporting loyalist factions."[82] Indeed, the MSW reported that "the breakdown of the united Ukrainian front" was one of the most "beneficial moments for the State"[83]

In the end, there was no united Ukrainian front in the March 1928 elections—organizations ran separately, and Ukrainian votes were split across the board. Following the elections, Ukrainian organizations once again raised the issue of forming a united front in 1930 but, as mentioned before, elections after 1928 could not be considered free and fair. The MSW reported: "It is characteristic of the Ukrainian national front to begin speaking of 'the importance of creating a united national leadership which could consolidate all the national organizations, so that we are ready to act when the time is right.'"[84] Though there were several occasions when the time was right, Ukrainian political organizations were never ready to act; they never overcame the pitfalls of organizational pluralism—which was, incidentally, by design of the Polish state.

Breaking the Front by Creating Loyalty: State-Sponsored Ukrainian Organizational Pluralism

The previous section discussed reasons that the Ministry of Interior maintained Ukrainian organizational pluralism, despite the government's repressive group-level policies, its authoritarian tendencies post 1926, and the formidable opposition presented by the UNDO and USRP, two of the most influential Ukrainian political organizations. The strong inter and intra

[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid., s. 163.
[84] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1073, s. 64.

organizational competition among Ukrainian political organizations ensured that no united front could be formed against the state. Indeed, though the state had the motives and capacity to pursue repressive policies, the MSW refrained from outlawing anti-state Ukrainian organizations, instead allowing them to weaken one another through inter and intra organizational skirmishes. In this section I discuss the third observable implication of my hypothesis, one that saw the government organ create and support new divisions within the Ukrainian minority. Specifically, these efforts were focused on creating and supporting loyalist organizations.

The MSW pursued divide and conquer policies in the 1930s aimed at eroding the unified Ukrainian ethnic identity, which was at the centre of the group's anti-state movement. Indeed, without a unified Ukrainian ethnic identity, calls for Ukrainian national self-determination would be less effective. This government program involved "intensely supporting" loyalist organizations that promoted Ukrainian regionalism and therefore encouraged the development of what were considered branches or subgroups of the Ukrainian ethnic group: the Hutsuls, Lemkos, and Old Ruthenians.[85] Similarly, in 1931, the state created the Volhynian-Ukrainian Union (Wołyńskie Zjednoczenie Ukraińskie), a political organization designed to promote a distinct Ukrainian identity in Volhynia. This deliberate strategy was meant to counteract the more anti-Polish and Ukrainian nationalist organizations originating from Galicia. The policy of supporting Ukrainian regional and sub-ethnic identities was not directed at the national level, but rather was disaggregated geographically, targeting specific counties (*gminas*) where the MSW feared "the expansion of the enemy's influence" and "more precisely, areas infiltrated by

[85] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 802, s.12-13.

Ukrainians and Communists."[86] The interwar years in Poland were thus marked by a heightened political struggle between Polish authorities and Ukrainian nationalists for the allegiance of these sub-groups.

Old Ruthenians: Supporting Russophile "Ukrainian" Organizations

Old Ruthenians (*starorusyny*) were representatives of a clerical, initially anti-Polish, pro-Austrian social-political current dominant in Galicia in the mid-19th century.[87] Their conception of national identity was ambiguous, varying on a spectrum between Ukrainian and Russian, though members of the group would also consider themselves as part of either of those groups. During the revolution of 1848–9 they mainly identified themselves as part of the Ukrainian nation, although, already by the end of the 19th century, some considered themselves closely related to, or even a part of, the Russian nation. Russian loyalty became increasingly significant in Old Ruthenian thinking as time passed, and, by the interwar period in Poland, they were known as Russophiles—that is, in favour of cooperating with Russia. Many Old Ruthenians also thought of themselves as part of a separate Ruthenian or Rusyn nation, a notion which applied to a sub-group of Ukrainians living in Galicia.[88] To complicate things further, Rusyn or Ruthenian was actually the term originally used to describe Ukrainians. It was not until around January 1928 that the MSW began using the term "Ukrainian" to refer to the more "nationalist"

[86] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1073, s. 76-80.
[87] John-Paul Himka and Ostap Sereda, *Encyclopaedia of Ukraine,* "Old Ruthenians," vol 5. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
[88] Ibid.

Ukrainians, and "Ruthenian" was thereafter used to discuss the smaller, Russophile sub-group.[89]

Since the fall of the Russian Empire, which supported the Old Ruthenian movement morally and materially, the movement experienced a steady decline throughout the interwar period, especially as Ukrainian national consciousness increasingly gained traction among the population. The Old Ruthenians generally had a negative attitude towards the Ukrainian opposition. During elections, their political organizations, the Ruthenian Agricultural Party and the Ruthenian Peasants' Party, were never willing to work with Ukrainian organizations, and their pro-Russian view and downplaying of Ukrainian ethnic distinctiveness made it all but impossible for them to cooperate with Ukrainian nationalists. Indeed, the MSW reported that Ruthenian organizations were only open to cooperating with pro-Polish Ukrainian organizations "for the good of the state, for the benefit of the two fraternal nations."[90] Thus it was in the Ministry of Interior's interest to ensure that the Ruthenian movement stayed afloat. The MSW maintained the movement largely by supporting Ruthenian organizations: "If this movement is to continue, it is necessary first and foremost to provide subsidies and loans for Ruthenian Organizations."[91] In the mid-1930s the MSW reported that "all Ruthenian cultural and economic institutions…are in a deplorable material standing," and that, without government "material help," they will be in "complete ruin."[92] A MSW report reveals that the Old Ruthenian movement "owes its existence only to the support of the Polish state."[93] If the MSW were to withdraw its financial support, "the movement would almost certainly disappear." The MSW contended that it was important to keep the movement going because "in particular villages it can be exploited as a diversion against

[89] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 363.
[90] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 945, s. 9.
[91] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1073, s. 76-80.
[92] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 945, s. 9.
[93] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1073, s. 76-80.

Ukrainianization."[94] The MSW was "fully aware that there was no real future in this movement," but allowing it to peter out was "undesirable" and "against the interests of the State."[95] In exchange, Ruthenian political organizations pledged their allegiance to the Polish state, and, although the MSW was aware that all resolutions of loyalty from Ruthenian political organizations, such as the one adopted by the Ruthenian Peasant Organization in December 1934, were "purely tactical and opportunistic,"[96] the MSW knew that it "must continue to support [the Ruthenian movement]" in order to ensure organizational pluralism among Ukrainians.[97]

Lemkos and Hutsuls: Creating Loyalist Groups

The MSW sought to undermine Ukrainian influence by supporting the notion of Lemko and Hutsul distinctiveness. Lemkos and Hutsuls are ethnographic groups of Ukrainians, territorially concentrated in the southernmost part of the Carpathian Mountains. Previously Russophile, in the 1920s, the Ukrainian national movement started to gain significant popularity among the Lemkos. This quickly became a "burning issue" for the MSW,[98] and action was taken to halt the spread of the Ukrainian movement among Lemkos. MSW authorities saw the situation as such: "In so far as Lemkos have been able to repel attempts at Ukrainianization [becoming Ukrainian/joining the unified Ukrainian movement], they owe it to their ethnic distinctiveness. Authorities must first and foremost go towards further isolating the territory and population based on ethnic lines."[99] Thus a policy was pursued of providing special economic, cultural, educational, and social assistance. This would allow the Lemkos, according to the MSW, to

[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 945, s. 9; Magocsi, *Ukraine,* 636.
[97] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1073, s. 79.
[98] Ibid., s. 78.
[99] Ibid., s. 77-78.

effectively continue to oppose "eager Ukrainian propaganda."[100] In the late 1930s Lemko dialects were therefore introduced into schools (which became officially bilingual in 1938); Polish patriotism was stressed; and affinity of Lemkos to Polish culture was overemphasized.[101] The authorities also supported the anti-Ukrainian organization Lemko-Sojuz and the pro-Polish weekly *Lemko* (1934–9).[102] Further, a program was introduced in 1938 to grant scholarships to Lemko youth because there was a "lack of [Lemko] intelligentsia, which would, on the one hand, increase sentiments of Lemko distinctiveness, thus differentiating the group from Ukrainians and Old Ruthenians, and on the other hand, could be exploited to carry out pro-government work on [Lemko-inhabited] territory."[103] The MSW believed that "[c]urrently, local intelligentsia consists either of Ukrainian activists with extreme anti-Polish and nationalist sentiments, or Old Ruthenians, who only for opportunistic reasons speak ostensibly for cooperation with the State, while the Polish element [loyalist sentiments] on Lemko-inhabited territories is weak and in a poor financial state."[104] The aim was to draw the Lemkos away from the Ukrainian movement and make them loyal to the Polish state.

Hutuls were also to be exploited. A MSW report from 1935 contended that the "Hutsul issue" was "very important and could bring the State several benefits."[105] Similar to the Lemko issue,"[t]he Hutsul issue essentially boiled down to eliminating the Ukrainian influence and achieving [State loyalist] influence."[106] To achieve this, the MSW created, among other things,

[100] Ibid.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Lemko Rusyns: Their Past and Present," *Carpatho-Rusyn American* 10, no.1 (1987).
[103] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 1058, s. 13-14.
[104] Ibid.
[105] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 946, s. 65.
[106] Ibid. 66.

the organization "Society of Friends of Hutsulshchyna [Hutsul-inhabited territory]."[107] The organization, however, was not a complete success. The main drawback of the organization was that, following its inception, it was "expanding too quickly, not because of grassroots support from the Hutsul people," but rather because of MSW support. "The organization is completely top-down driven," stated a local official in charge of reviewing the organization's operations. The official summarized how the organization was implemented at the local level: it began at the district level, where the governor gave an order to the mayor to create a Hutsul loyalist organization. The mayor then convened a meeting, discussed the various material benefits that Hutsuls would enjoy if they joined the organization and cooperated with the government. This approach, however, would "bring out feelings of bitterness that often overflowed into dislike or hatred [towards the State]." In the opinion of the official, the work of the Hutsuls should be conducted by social forces from below, de-linked from the authorities because the actions of the latter "arouse suspicion that these organizations conceal something that is necessary for the authorities and harmful to the citizens."[108] Furthermore, Hutsuls—traditionally apolitical—were not receptive to the organization's various forms of political propaganda (speeches, rallies, meetings). It was reported that the peasant Hutsul, being "very dark and primitive," regrets that the organization "does not go to him with real things." Efforts to woo the Hutsuls with political propaganda were particularly unsuccessful in areas where the Hutsul population suffered from food shortage, and this was "the case almost everywhere" stated the official. The Hutuls' voices were loud and clear: "We do not need your propaganda; we need only bread."[109]

[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid., s. 66-67.
[109] Ibid.

The above section demonstrated how the MSW pursued an active policy of breaking the Ukrainian ethnic identity by exploiting Ukrainian ethnographic subgroups—namely the Old Ruthenians, Lemkos, and Hutsuls. Organizations that were meant to emphasize the sub-groups' distinctiveness from Ukrainians and loyalty to the Polish state were created and financed by the MSW. Assessing the success of these policies implemented in the late 1930s is not possible, however, because they were cut short by the outbreak of World War II. The intent driving the policies, nevertheless, was clear: promote organizational pluralism to divide and rule the Ukrainian minority.

Repressing the United Volhynian Front: Outlawing Sel-Rob

The previous section explained how the Ministry of Interior actively pursued policies which created and supported loyalist organizations. These policies targeted the Hutsuls, Lemkos, and Old Ruthenians, subgroups of the Ukrainian identity. In this section, I turn my attention to the Ukrainian-inhabited province of Volhynia, which, as discussed in Chapter 4, was the site of intense power struggles between Communists, Ukrainian nationalists, and state loyalists for the support of the politically indifferent Volhynian-Ukrainians. The state's main challengers in Volhynia were the Ukrainian Communists—not Ukrainian nationalists, as was the case in Galicia. The final observable implication of my main hypothesis contends that the state will ban any organization that is able to suppress pluralism within the minority and unite the front against the state. This was the case with Sel-Rob, an organization that, although did not unite the entire Ukrainian minority, was successful in uniting *Volhynian* Ukrainians.[110]

[110] Chapter 4 discussed the important differences between Galicia and Volhynia, as well as how the MSW viewed these two territories as distinct from one another.

During the 1920s, pro-Soviet views spread rapidly among Ukrainians in Poland. Historian Orest Subtelny claims that, "[t]o a large extent, this was a reaction to the Western powers' favouritism of the Poles and to Poland's oppression of its minorities. Moreover, the Ukrainization policies in Soviet Ukraine as well as the resurgence of the peasantry under [the New Economic Policy] also appealed to West Ukrainians."[111] "To encourage these tendencies," Subtelny contends, the Soviets "tried to woo West Ukrainian intellectuals and students, boasting of Soviet Ukrainian achievement, and promising them responsible positions and a warm welcome in Ukraine."[112] This pro-Soviet sentiment among Ukrainians, particularly among segments of the UNDO, was short-lived, as news about the horrors of collectivization, the famine, and the purges filtered into Galicia and Volhynia from the USSR.[113]

In its ascendancy, however, pro-Soviet sentiments resulted in the formation of several socialist political organizations, both legal and illegal. In 1919, the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia was founded, renamed the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Ukrainy, KPZU) in 1923. Succumbing to pressure from the Communist International, the KPZU became an autonomous part of the Polish Communist Party. From its inception, the KPZU was banned by the MSW. In the 1930s, the KPZU had about 4,000 members, half of whom were Ukrainian, the rest Jews and Poles.[114]

[111] Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 436.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Magocsi, *Ukraine,* 635-6; Subtelny, *Ukraine,* 437.

Because it was an illegal, underground party, the KPZU had, under its influence, several legal front organizations, namely the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (1921- 1924, banned for violent tactics as earlier discussed in the chapter), Freedom Party (Partia Wolności, 1923-1926), Sel Sojuz (1924-1928), and the Ukrainian Workers'-Peasants' Socialist Union, "Sel-Rob" (1926-1932).[115] These organizations gave the KPZU legal access to the Polish political arena, and their ability to operate openly in public made it easier to reach the masses.[116] The KPZU's most successful front organization was the Ukrainian Workers'-Peasants' Socialist Union (Sel-Rob), created in 1926. Initially, the organization was wracked with internal conflicts, splitting in 1927 into a "Right faction," which supported Ukrainian national goals, and a "Left faction," which sided with Moscow. In the 1928 parliamentary elections, Sel-Rob's two factions had about 10,000 members and won almost 240,000 votes, the majority of which came from Volhynia. The two factions (Left and Right) reunited as Sel-Rob Unity (Sel-Rob Jedność) in 1929 in the interest of forming a united front.[117] In 1932, Sel-Rob Unity was banned by the MSW.[118]

It was no secret to the MSW that Sel-Rob was a front organization for the illegal Communist Party of Western Ukraine. In other words, the explanation that Sel-Rob was banned because it

[115] Sel-Sojuz was created on August 17, 1924. Its program called for an independent, socialist, Ukrainian state. It had hostile (*wrogie)* sentiments towards the Polish state, and was favourable (przychylny) to Soviet Ukraine. Sel-Sojuz's ideology was "clearly in the direction of Communism." After breaking negotiations with the USRP, Sel-Sojuz joined forces with the Communist organization "National Freedom" (Narodna Wolia) and at a summit in Brody in May 1926 a resolution was passed to merge the two organizations, officially implemented at a subsequent meeting in Lwów on October 10,1926. The new organization was named "Ukraińskie Selansko Robotnicze Socjalistyczne Objednanie" or Sel-Rob, which had pro-Bolshevik tendencies and cooperated with other Communist organizations. The Party of National Freedom was created in 1923 as a Russophile leftist organization. At its party summit on April 25, 1926 the organization proclaimed that it fights the class struggle, for liberation of Ukrainians, and joining Soviet Ukraine. The organization was not opposed to the illegal Communist Party of Western Ukraine, and, in fact, was reported to be under its influence. AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 15-16.
[116] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna*, 251.
[117] Ibid., 545. The "formal break-up" of Sel-Rob into two warring factions was reported in September 1927. AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s.170. Later reports monitored "efforts to mend the split between the two Sel-Rob factions." AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 290.
[118] Subtelny, *Ukraine,* 437.

was a Communist organization is partial at best: the MSW knew about the organization's ties with the KPZU several years before it was banned in 1932. Furthermore, the two organizations that originally merged to form Sel-Rob, the Party of National Freedom and Sel Sojuz, were known communist sympathizers, yet were not outlawed. Evidence of this is found in MSW documents: On January 4, 1927 the MSW sent out a report to all provincial governors warning them that on October 10, 1926, the Party of National Freedom and Sel Sojuz merged to form the Ukrainian Workers'-Peasants' Socialist Union, "Sel-Rob." Although "the newly formed party has not yet declared its official program… contacts with the KPZU [Communist Party of Western Ukraine] are *perfectly clear*."[119] The MSW requested that provincial governments "keep careful attention on the organization's activities."[120] Similarly, in another report dated 1927, the MSW outlined that Sel-Rob's "political direction" is "characterized by a pro-Bolshevik trend, which manifests itself in its cooperation with the KPZU and other organizations that stand on communist ground."[121] In a July 1927 report on national minorities, the MSW noted that "the KPZU considers Sel-Rob its [legal] branch and thus determines its political line."[122] Indeed, "both factions of Sel Rob are eager to work with the KPZU" stated a report from October 1927.[123] During the March 1928 election period, both factions of Sel Rob "eagerly cooperated with the KPZU,"[124] and "[the Leftist faction] will undoubtedly work hand in hand with the KPZU."[125] In short, the MSW knew long before its decision to outlaw Sel-Rob that the organization had ties to the KPZU. To understand why the MSW banned Sel-Rob, we must therefore look beyond the argument put forward in the literature that it was due to the

[119] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1074, s. 40. Emphasis added.
[120] Ibid., s. 40, 43.
[121] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 64.
[122] Ibid., s. 86.
[123] Ibid., s. 178.
[124] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 171.
[125] Ibid.

organization's ties to communism—this is not a complete explanation. To understand why Sel-Rob was banned, we must first recognize the important difference between the Ukrainian-inhabited territories of Galicia and Volhynia, which was discussed in Chapter 4, but will be briefly recapped below.

The MSW concluded: "Regarding the characteristics of this society, it should be noted that, despite the extraordinary efforts of Ukrainian political parties, their society is split into two factions: a faction in Lviv [capital of Galicia] and in Volhynia."[126] Galicia and Volhynia, though both inhabited by Ukrainians, were in fact distinct territories due to having been ruled by different empires. Poland inherited Volhynia from the Russian Empire after WWI; it was the poorest territory in Poland, experienced the most damage during WWI, was inhabited primarily by illiterate peasants, was plagued with severe land shortage, and had virtually no infrastructure. Unlike in the Austrian Empire, where Galician Ukrainians were able to develop a relatively robust civil society which promoted a Ukrainian national consciousness among the population at large, Volhynian Ukrainians were indifferent to the national question: they wanted land and food ahead of an independent state. Communist slogans of equality and land redistribution therefore resonated among the mostly rural population, whereas UNDO and USRP claims for Ukrainian national self-determination fell on deaf Volhynian ears. The MSW understood that Galicia was generally lost to an anti-Polish, pro-Ukrainian movement. Volhynia, on the other hand, was still contested and the population could, authorities thought, be molded into loyal Poles. I have already discussed in previous sections how Galicia was the support base for, and battle ground between, the UNDO and USRP. Neither organization, however, ever made significant inroads

[126] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1073, s. 65.

into Volhynia: Volhynia was Sel-Rob's political territory, and the organization's ability to master it threatened the MSW.[127]

Generally speaking, political life in Volhynia "was rather primitive in its forms" and the population "politically indifferent."[128] Only Sel-Rob was able to "pull the masses into their orbit of influence" through "skilfully…organizing economic, cultural and educational organizations."[129] Until it was banned by the state in 1932, "Sel-Rob Unity was undoubtedly the strongest political movement in [Volhynia]."[130] Within just a few years, the organization was able to completely supplant the influence of Ukrainian nationalist organizations in Volhynia, or at the very least decidedly outnumber them. A report by the governor of Volhynia reporting on political life in Volhynia confirms this point:

> To illustrate the current state of affairs one only needs to point to Sel Rob Unity in September 1932, that is, right before its liquidation, when there were 341 organizational branches across Volhynia, and more than 10,000 official members, while at the same time other political parties such as UNDO and USRP had barely a dozen or at most a few dozen organization branches, and only a few hundred members. The same situation existed with cultural organizations and cooperatives: right before its liquidation, Sel-Rob Unity had 80-85% of the cooperative movement under its influence.[131]

Outlawing Sel Rob put an end to this state of affairs. By the close of 1932, the situation in Volhynia was such that "Ukrainian political life in Volhynia, when it comes to the anti-government camp, has significantly weakened, if not completely been broken."[132]

[127] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 42, 215-216.
[128] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 1037, s. 1-6.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid., s. 1.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid., s.3.

At the end of 1932 the UNDO and USRP made a concerted effort to infiltrate Volhynia, hoping to fill the power vacuum left by Sel-Rob following its liquidation. Indeed, Ukrainian organizations from Galicia wasted little time in trying to "conquer Volhynia" in every sphere: economic, religious, education and politics.[133] Both organizations competed to gain dominance over the political, economic, and ideological lives of Volhynian Ukrainians. Both the UNDO and USRP agreed not to interfere with each other's affairs in Volhynia, but, given their poor track record for cooperation, it is unsurprising that the two organizations butted heads over trying to gain influence over Volhynian-Ukrainians. The USRP's success was "relatively modest," whereas the UNDO, on the other hand, directed its efforts more broadly, encompassing a wide range of issues and interests that would appeal to the masses in Volhynia, and was therefore more successful at gaining support. After the MSW completed liquidation of Sel Rob by March 1, 1933, the cooperatives under the influence of Sel-Rob fell from 80-85% to an average of 28% across Volhynia.[134] In individual counties, this percentage never reached over 50%.[135] Proportionally, the UNDO was most successful in picking up the pieces: from 7% of cooperatives being under UNDO's control before Sel-Rob was banned, by March 1, 1933, the percentage was closer to 20%.[136]

In the second half of 1933, not long after the outlawing of Sel-Rob, the MSW reported that Volhynia was once again "under attack" from Ukrainian political organizations from Galicia—specifically the UNDO and USRP—who sought to "break the Sokalski cordon," that is, the border dividing Galicia and Volhynia, in an effort to create a united Ukrainian front: "This attack

[133] Ibid., s. 2.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid., s.4.
[136] Ibid.

is being implemented broadly, particularly skilfully, and requires appropriate counteraction."[137] With Sel-Rob out of the picture, the MSW was left to compete only with the nationalists. Unlike in Galicia, however, simply "counting on even the most intense internal rifts within UNDO and the competition between UNDO and USRP will not suffice [in weakening the pro-Ukrainian factions' attempt at conquering Volhynia]—because in pulling Volhynia into Galicia's orbit of political interests, UNDO and USRP, despite their differences, are showing signs of cooperation."[138] To counteract this dynamic, rather than repressing the UNDO or USRP, the MSW decided to increase organizational pluralism by "supporting the regional Volhynian loyalist organization, the Volhynian Ukrainian Alliance."[139] The Governor of Volhynia and former Minister of Interior, Henryk Józewski created the Volhynian-Ukrainian Alliance in 1931. Józewski focused his efforts on improving relations between the Polish government and the Ukrainian minority.[140] The political organization was designed to promote a distinct Ukrainian identity in Volhynia, one that would oppose Ukrainian nationalism coming from Galicia, and Communism from the Soviet Union. Józweski's "Volhynian Experiment" was meant to foster a Ukrainian identity that was loyal to the Polish state in exchange for political autonomy.[141] "The organization's role is undoubtedly deserving of attention at a time when [the State] is forced to fight off a concerted attack of nationalism led by Galician organizations," reported the governor of Volhynia in a letter to the MSW. He continued: "It is particularity important to support this

[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid., s. 1-6.
[139] Ibid.
[140] See Timothy Snyder, *Sketches of a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
[141] Timothy Snyder, "The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943," *Past and Present 5,* no. 179 (2003): 196-234.

organization now because it has, relatively speaking, developed weakly and without continued state support it will not be able to change the situation [in Volhynia] on its own."[142]

Ukrainians, particularly the "nationalist camp" in Galicia, long sought to "create a united opinion among Poland's Ukrainian society," but Volhynia "always interfered [with the goal of creating a united Ukrainian front]" because, simply put, its land and its people were very different from Galicia.[143] Ultimately, Galician Ukrainians, as represented by the UNDO and USRP, "failed to efface" these differences.[144] On the other hand, the MSW and its policies of creating a Ukrainian identity in Volhynia that was pro-Polish also failed. In other words, the largely indifferent Volhynians, though eventually taking on a Ukrainian identity, did not become the pro-Polish citizens the MSW had hoped for.

Conclusions

The story of Ukrainian organizations in interwar Poland is largely one of repeated failed attempts at uniting the front. This story, however, could not have been told without the hand of the MSW and particularly its policy of promoting organizational pluralism, in turn ensuring that the Ukrainian front never succeeded in uniting. First, the majority of Ukrainian political organizations were not banned by the MSW. Second, the MSW's preference for plurality was evident because it did not repress the UNDO or USRP, though popular and anti-state Ukrainian political organizations, because the inter and intra organizational conflicts among these organizations made it all but impossible for them to unite to form a strong opposition, particularly during the 1928 parliamentary elections when it was most needed. Third, the MSW

[142] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 1037, s. 6.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid.

actively pursued policies that created, supported, and maintained loyalist Ukrainian parties. In other words, instead of banning organizations in order to combat the growing Ukrainian opposition, the MSW increased pluralism, even during its post-1926 authoritarian period, by ensuring that loyalist organizations existed. The state's project was most ambitious when it came to eroding the Ukrainian identity by promoting Ukrainian ethnographic subgroups—the Old Ruthenians, Hutsuls, and Lemkos—stressing their distinctiveness, financing their organizations, and in exchange demanding state loyalty. Attempts at dividing the Ukrainians were also visible in the province of Volhynia, where the MSW attempted to pull the Ukrainian population away from the influence of "nationalist" Ukrainian-Galicians by creating and financing loyalist Volhynian-Ukrainian organizations that emphasized allegiance to the Polish state. Finally, the MSW banned any organization that was able to credibly unite the Ukrainian front—this was the fate of Sel-Rob, the communist organization that was the MSW's only real competitor in gaining influence over the Ukrainian population in Volhynia. And so, largely through a divide and rule tactic, the Polish MSW was able to keep its restive Ukrainian population relatively at bay—a particularly impressive feat, given the Ukrainian minority's size and political force.

Chapter 7: German Political Organizations

Nineteen political organizations claimed to represent the 1.4 million Germans living in interwar Poland. Though critical of Poland and its repressive policies, German political organizations did not resort to violent tactics. They did, however, receive significant financial and moral support from the Reich. In the eyes of German minority leaders, these organizations would safeguard the rights outlined in the Minority Treaties, maintain links with their German homeland, and strengthen *volksich* (ethnic) unity within and across Poland's borders. The material and rhetorical support given to them was, in the opinion of the Reich, not only within the realm of Germany's rights, but in fact was the government's obligation to "protect" its ethnic kin abroad. Although census data is highly contested,[1] it can be said without hesitation that the number of Germans in Poland was substantial enough—roughly four percent of the total population[2]—to present problems for Polish authorities and give credence to German demands for border revision. Anxieties over German revisionism were further enflamed by the minority's territorial concentration along the Polish-German border.

[1] German publicists at the time clamed as many as 2.2 million Germans—more than 7 percent of the total population—in what had become Poland in 1921 (Richard Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles: the Germans in Western Poland, 1918-1939* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 3. The German population in formerly-German Poland depleted quickly by a major exodus (see Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* Chapter 2).

[2] The 1921 Polish national census counted1,059,194 Germans (without Upper Silesia which had not yet been added to Poland). This was also following the "Great Exodus" of Germans from Poznania and Pomerelia. With the formal inclusion of eastern Upper Silesian territories in July 1922, an additional 330,000 German-speakers were added; Winson Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 63.

From the Polish government's perspective, the Reich was an aggressive revanchist neighbour unjustly meddling in internal affairs. As such, the German minority was widely perceived as a dangerous fifth column seeking to destabilize Poland from within. Given such perceptions and that Polish authorities were allegedly repressive, it is surprising that the Polish Ministry of Interior (MSW) banned only four of the 19 organizations claiming to represent Germans inside Polish borders. Surely one would expect a repressive regime to outlaw more organizations, particularly since they were perceived as a threat to national security. Although Poland possessed the state capacity[3] and motives to take repressive action, it held back in cracking down on German organizations, defying expectations of rational behaviour. As I have shown thus far with the case of Ukrainian and Belarusian political organizations, this seemingly nonsensical behaviour vis-à-vis the German minority can be explained by portraying interwar Polish minority policies using the logic of divide and conquer. When faced with a restive minority, Polish authorities preferred to foster organizational pluralism in an effort to prevent the formation of a strong German opposition—the more German organizations struggled to represent their minority group, the less likely a strong and unified opposition could be formed. As this chapter outlines, the various German regional identities in Poland was the principal factor exploited by the Polish Ministry of Interior to ensure that Germans did not forge a united front, even if this meant tolerating hostile, fifth column organizations that played a hand in the September 1, 1939 Nazi invasion of Poland.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section will briefly describe the different German-inhabited regions in Poland and their corresponding organizations. I then turn to addressing alternative explanations in the literature that ultimately fall short in explaining MSW

[3] See Chapter 3, section on "State capacity to repress."

policies towards German organizations. The remainder of the chapter examines how the divide and conquer hypothesis and its observable implications best illustrate the dynamics between the Polish government and the German minority. Particularly, focus will be placed on the intra-ethnic group tensions stemming from German regionalism, that is, organizations claiming to represent the German minority across three regions in Poland: Western Poland (Poznania-Pomerelia), Upper Silesia, and Central Poland.

The Creation of a German *Volksgruppe* in Interwar Poland

After World War I, Poland inherited large portions of German-inhabited territories from three fallen empires. We can thus divide Germans in Poland roughly into three categories. First, Germans in Poznania and Pomerelia (Poznań and Pomorze in Polish, or Western Poland), home to the largest concentration of Germans in the immediate postwar period, were ceded from the German Empire (Prussia). For them, the reduction from titular ethnic group (*Staatsvolk)* to a minority (*Volksgruppe*) was particularly difficult to accept, given that they had enjoyed centuries of political dominance. Being ruled by Slavs, considered by many Germans as an inferior people, only added insult to injury. It is thus unsurprising that by 1921 roughly half the German population of Western Poland, almost 600,000 people, left for the Reich in an unprecedented "Great Exodus."[4] The ones who remained lamented Polish rule, claiming it a grave injustice, a "mistake" of history in need of correcting. Germans in Poznania and Pomerelia were, as a result, more vocal in their revisionist demands as compared with other German groups.[5]

[4] Mieczysław Iwanicki, *Ukraińcy, Białorusini, Litwini, i Niemcy w Polsce w latach 1918-1919* (Siedlce: Wydawnictwa Uczelniane WSRP w Siedlcach, 1993), 152; Also see Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* Chapter 2.
[5] Harald von Riekhoff, *German-Polish Relations, 1918-1933* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 206.

The second category of Germans lived in Central and Eastern Poland and viewed the postwar redrawing of Europe's map slightly differently. Coming from former Russian Imperial rule, for them the prospect of "anything-but-the-Russians" was seen as hopeful. Russian rule was not, to say the least, favourable for German political or cultural development. Germans in southeast Poland came from the formerly Austrian Empire and similarly were not as upset about the new post-war arrangements. They had already grown accustomed to holding minority status while under Polish local rule during the Hapsburg era. Overall, Germans in Austrian Galicia, similar to Germans in Russian Volhynia, did not devote much thought to issues of ethnicity, "Germanness," or the plight of repressed nationalities.[6]

The third major cluster of Germans was in Upper Silesia. Like Poznania and Pomerelia, these lands were transferred from the German Empire after WWI. While the first part of Poznania and Pomerelia came under Polish rule in 1918 following an armed insurrection and the remainder, known as the "Polish Corridor," was handed over in February 1920 after the Treaty of Versailles, Germans in Upper Silesia came under Polish rule in 1922 when the formerly Prussian province was divided by the Geneva Convention as a result of the 1921 plebiscite.[7] Their late arrival to Polish rule and different means of getting there separated Germans in Upper Silesia from the Germans in Poznania and Pomerelia.

Originating from different shattered empires, Germans living in Poland were sharply divided along regional lines, despite sharing the same ethnic category, and it remained as such throughout the interwar period. Consequently, Historian Winson Chu has challenged the

[6] Chu, *German Minority,* 3-5.
[7] Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* 9

standard narrative that tells a story of the "three German minorities" in Poland overcoming their historical differences and regional peculiarities over time to forge a single, united German front.[8] Instead, Chu focuses on the limits of national solidarity within the German minority by pointing to the group's fragmentation along regional lines, which only intensified over the interwar period, despite efforts, at least rhetorically, of German leaders to unite. Though Chu places the blame mostly on the German minority for its failure to unify, it is equally important to recognize the role that Polish authorities and the MSW played in promoting organizational pluralism and thereby undermining German solidarity.

German Political Organizations in Interwar Poland

German minority fragmentation along regional lines was reflected in the proliferation of at minimum nineteen political organizations. Describing them based on ideology, political tactics, size, or average duration, as I have done in other chapters for Ukrainians and Belarusians, does not reveal much variation. Unlike Slavic organizations, the Germans were relatively stable: the main organizations lasted from their inception in the early interwar years until the outbreak of World War II. With regards to tactics, they all remained within the legal limits set out by state laws—none was covert or used violence. When an organization was banned, it dissolved and did not continue its existence underground. Organization size too did not vary significantly, and nearly all received some form of funding from the Reich at one point or another in the interwar period and thus had ties with an aggressive foreign power. In terms of ideology, two organizations were socialist, with the remainder broadly conservative-nationalist, many veering to the extreme right following Hitler's rise to power in 1933. Indeed, when in 1933 Hitler

[8] Chu, *German Minority*.

banned all other political parties in Germany, organizations in Poland were left with the choice of either adhering to Hitler's National Socialism, or protesting, and, at the very least, losing Germany's financial and political support.[9] Most organizations followed the political current in Germany. Only one German organization was truly loyal to the Polish state (and funded by the Poles);[10] the rest were generally antagonistic[11] or shared a "common defensive orientation" towards Poland.[12]

If, generally speaking, German organizations had similar ideological outlooks, political platforms, tactics, sources of funding, and relationship to the Polish state, what explains the need for 19 organizations? The lack of differentiation between organizational characteristics reveals little about why four of these organizations—all with similar ideology, tactics, relationship to Germany and Poland, and size —were banned, while other organizations similar in these regards were tolerated. In short, as I have already alluded to, it was German regionalism and Poland's divide and conquer policy that explains the number and selective repression of German organizations. Put differently, the historical differences and varying imperial legacies of Germans in Poland were reflected in their organizations, which were otherwise quite similar.

It is therefore most appropriate to group German organizations based on their regional divides, resulting in three broad categories. Other German regional organizations either fell under their auspices or were relatively weak and did not play a huge role in national politics. A fourth

[9] Przemysław Hauser, "The German Minority in Poland in the Years 1918-1939, Reflections in the State of Research and Interpretation. Proposals for Further Research," *Polish Western Affairs* 32, no. 2 (1991): 33.
[10] Chu, *German Minority,*135.
[11] Iwanicki, *Ukraińcy, Białorusini,* 160.
[12] Von Riekhoff, *German-Polish Relations,* 206; see also Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Wydział Narodowościowy, syg. 973 for a comprehensive description of all German organizations prepared by the MSW.

organization, the Jungdeutsche Partei (Young German Party for Poland, or JDP), however, falls beyond these regional classifications. Originating in former Austrian Silesia, the JDP was the only group allowed to operate on the national level, for reasons discussed later in this chapter. The main German actors are outlined in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1. Main German Regional Organizations in Poland

Region in Poland	***Organization***	***Years Active***
Western Poland (Poznania and Pomerelia)	Deutsche Vereinigung im Sejm und Senat (German Union in Sejm and Senate)	1923-1939, from 1934 called Deutsche Vereinigung in Westpolen, German Union in Western Poland, i.e. Poznania and Pomerelia)
Central Poland	Deutscher Volksverband (German People's Union)	1924-1939
Upper Silesia	Deutscher Volksbund (German People's League)	1922-1939
All regions	After 1933, the Jungdeutsche Partei fur Polen (Young German Party for Poland)	1929-1939, from formerly Austrian Silesia, was active across all of Poland. [13]

Throughout the interwar period, there were several attempts by German minority and Reich leaders to unify these regional organizations politically, but all attempts failed or were quashed by the Polish state. Before delving into why this was the case, the subsequent section will tease out alternative explanations and demonstrate how, despite their predominance in the theoretical and empirical literature, they do not explain MSW policies towards German organizations in interwar Poland.

[13] Chu, *German Minority,*18.

Addressing Alternative Explanations: Shortfalls of Existing Theories

The Ministry of Interior formally repressed four German minority organizations by banning one and preventing the existence of three more by taking preemptive measures and not providing authorization. The four banned organizations are summarized in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2 German Organizations Banned by the Polish Ministry of Interior

Organization	***English Translation***	***Years Active***
Deutschtumsbund zur Wahrung der Minderheitenrechte	Germandom League for the Protection of Minority Rights	1921-1923[14]
Bund der Deutschen Polens	League of the Germans in Poland	1921, never authorized by MSW[15]
Bund der Deutschen in Polen	League of the Germans in Poland	Proposed 1938-1939, never authorized by MSW[16]
Deutsche Vereinigung	German Union	Permission for organization to restructure into national organization denied in 1936—remained regional organization

Existing scholarship sheds little light on this puzzle. To recap, the broader theoretical literature suggests that violent, secessionist and/or fifth column organizations are likely to be banned by the state. The first two arguments can be discarded without much discussion: no German political organization resorted to violent tactics,[17] and almost all German groups in Western Poland wanted to secede from Poland and "reunite" with Germany. The third argument, however, deserves greater attention because of its particular relevance to the case of Germans in Poland. Indeed, the German minority was notoriously labeled a fifth-column, accused of actively participating in a Reich-sponsored campaign to destabilize Poland from within.[18] Two

[14] Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* 73.
[15] Chu, *German Minority,* 125.
[16] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 1005, s. 110-111.
[17] Pre 1939.
[18] Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* 225.

additional alternative explanations, one that focuses on regime type and another on "status reversal" will also be explored below.[19]

Fifth Column/Irredentism

Polish and German scholars have long hotly contested the extent to which the German population in interwar Poland actively participated in "diversionist" and "sabotage" activities. Polish scholars tend to claim that "[t]he German minority was widely recruited for intelligence work…[and] took an active part in the September campaign on the side of the aggressor."[20] They "were indeed a revanchist fifth column from the outset…There is no doubt…[they were] ready, able, and anxious to perform tasks Berlin might request of them."[21] Studies have provided evidence of German alleged fifth column activity within Poland, citing many instances of pro-Nazi sentiments, desertion from the Polish army, and recruitment into the Wehrmacht after emigration to Germany, though specific examples of widespread espionage, sabotage, or anti-state violence within Poland are absent.[22]

German historians are, broadly speaking, just as unanimous in their view that, aside from a few exceptions, the vast majority of Germans, whatever their disposition towards Polish rule may have been, did not take part in fifth column activities. As one German historian claims: "There was no terror, no sabotage, no conspiracies. And there was also no fifth column."[23] Others deny that there is "even the slightest supporting evidence…[for] claims of disloyal activities

[19] Roger Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
[20] Marian M. Drozdowski, "The National Minorities in Poland in 1918-1939," *Acta Polonaiae Historica* 22, (1970): 235.
[21] Cited in Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* 226.
[22] Ibid., 226.
[23] Ibid., 227 fn 127

dangerous to the state" on the part of Polish Germans.[24] Focusing on the extent to which the German *population* in Poland was a fifth column, however, is a fruitless endeavor.

Wherever the truth may lie, Rogers Brubaker correctly points out that, either way, the German minority had "the misfortune to 'belong' by ethno-cultural nationality, if not legal citizenship to a powerful neighbouring state with unconcealed revisionist ambitions."[25] Indeed, German and Polish historians, though disagreeing on almost everything, can agree that Germany was "committed to supporting their diaspora, financially and morally, so that in the future they might be used as a pretext for revising the borders established at Versailles."[26] Though the Reich did not outright declare it, it was essentially "an open secret" that Germany was providing substantial political and financial support to the German minority, and specifically, to German political organizations.[27] That millions of dollars in subsidies were given to German organizations, even at a time when their economy had not yet recovered from the effects of war and hyperinflation, demonstrates the Reich's commitment to supporting its ethnic kin in Poland.[28]

From the outset of the interwar period, Poland was well aware of the Reich's substantial support for the German minority. Internal MSW reports from as early as August 1922 confirm this: "[all] German organizations in Poland are subsidized by the German Reich." [29] Further, many of these

[24] Ibid.
[25] Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 87.
[26] Hauser, "The German Minority in Poland," 15, fn 4.
[27] Chu, *German Minority,* 58-59; Von Riekhoff, *German-Polish Relations,* 212.
[28] Chu, *German Minority,* 59.
[29] "Organizacje niemieckie w Polsce są subwencjowane przez Niemców z Rzeszy niemieckiej." Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Dopływ, syg. 1018, s.80.

supported organizations were reported to have "separatist agendas."[30] Not only was there little question that German political organizations maintained political connections and sympathized with a hostile foreign power,[31] many of these groups viewed Poland's rule a "'national humiliation', unjustly imposed on a prostrate Germany."[32] This was particularly the case in Western Poland, known also as the "Polish corridor" which cut off the bulk of Germany from the German province of East Prussia. As a result, Polish authorities largely (and correctly) perceived German organizations, particularly those in Western Poland, as favouring, if not actively supporting, a restoration of German governance in the Western borderlands.[33]

The first port of call would naturally be to point to irredentist and fifth column activity to explain why the MSW banned certain German organizations and not others. Let us then look at the Deutschtumsbund, the only organization that was banned while it was actively operating (the other three being outlawed preemptively). Founded in 1921 from the amalgamation of the Zentral-Arbeits-Gemeinschaft (also Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft; Central Labour Community) and the Deutsche Partei – Vereinigung des Deutschen Volkstums, the Deutschtumsbund was outlawed and liquidated by the state in 1923. According to the historical literature, "Polish authorities disbanded the Deutschtumsbund on charge of espionage and diversionist activity."[34] The organization was "clearly revisionist, anti-Polish, worked illegally, and engaged in espionage activity in favor of Germany."[35] But claiming that Polish authorities attempted to halt irredentist activities through repression is inaccurate. The Deutschtumsbund was no more

[30] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s.5.
[31] Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* 231.
[32] Ibid., 87.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Jerzy Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warszawa: Książka I Wiedza, 1974), 276.
[35] Iwanicki, *Ukraińcy, Białorusini,* 161.

separatist, irredentist, or a fifth column than a number of other organizations Polish authorities tolerated, such as Deutsche Vereinigung im Sejm und Senat, or most notably the openly-Nazi JDP. Moreover, this approach cannot explain why the other three organizations— the Bund der Deutschen Polens (1921), the Bund der Deutschen in Polen, (1938-39) and the Deutsche Vereinigung (1936)—were banned preemptively, since they had not yet been fully formed and thus could not be persecuted for their actions. Despite its prevalence in the historical and theoretical literature, "fifth-column" status does not suffice as an explanation.

Regime Type and Relationship with Foreign Power

Two important dates can potentially shed light on the Ministry of Interior's policies towards Germany political organization. The first date points to regime type. Before 1926, Poland was considered a democracy. Following the May 1926 military coup, the new government under Józef Piłsudski and his successors veered increasingly towards authoritarianism. Thus, one could predict that German organizations were more likely to be banned post-1926, when Poland cracked down on civil liberties, and more specifically, introduced harsher assimilationist policies towards its minority ethnic groups. This explanation does not answer our questions. Because two organizations were banned while Poland was "democratic," and two were banned while it was "authoritarian," regime type cannot reliably explain this variation, nor can it explain why so many organizations were tolerated under authoritarianism.

The second important date that could have influenced Polish policies towards its German minority was the Polish-German non-aggression pact signed on January 26, 1934. It was no secret that relations between interwar Poland and Germany were strenuous, largely due to the

contested borders along the Western borderlands. This treaty effectively normalized the post-war relationship, at least diplomatically, between the two states. We can view the consequence of this on policies towards organizations from two angles, but with the same predicted outcome: first, following the non-aggression pact Germans were no longer perceived as threating and therefore organizations should be free to operate; or second, Germans were still considered a threat to Polish authorities, but because of the newly signed treaty, the MSW could not ban any organizations in fear of diplomatic backlash from Germany. If we accepted either interpretations, however, we would expect no organizations to be banned after the non aggression pact, and the bulk banned pre-treaty. As with regime-type, however, the prediction does not match the outcome: two organizations were banned pre-nonaggression pact, and two were banned post-pact.

Status-Reversal

The final alternative explanation explored here points to intergroup dynamics, claiming that the relationship between majority and minority groups—and the ensuing state policies—is affected by a "status reversal."[36] A status reversal occurs in societies wherein a rearrangement of ethnic hierarchies results in a switch in power relationships, meaning that the group previously in power comes to be governed by the group it once dominated. If the group that was previously in power treated its minority groups poorly, the rearrangement of hierarchies often results in the once-oppressed becoming the oppressor.

[36] Roger Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

The power relations between Poles and Germans in Western Poland prior to the interwar period were reversed for over a century. Specifically, ethnic Poles living in the Western borderland regions under Imperial German rule had endured "harsh, although ineffective, assimilation policies by the Prussian and German rulers."[37] These policies had succeeded only in "stimulating national solidarity and stiffening nationalist resistance among Poles."[38] Nonetheless, sustained (and openly acknowledged) German efforts to assimilate the German-Polish borderlands during the pre-WWI period provided a convenient rationale for analogous measures to be taken by Poles after the postwar change in power relations.[39] Thus, we should expect that German organizations, particularly those operating in former German Empire lands, would more likely be banned than their counterparts in other regions of Poland. This was not, however, the case.[40] As will be discussed further below, German organizations operating in formerly Prussian territories were no more likely to be banned. Thus, no theoretical insights from the literature provide us with a complete explanation. I now turn to the divide and conquer hypothesis, which I argue fills this gap.

Dividing and Ruling the German Minority: Hypothesis and Observable Implications

The Ministry of Interior's divide and conquer tactic becomes clear when we examine German political organizations in interwar Poland based on regions. Indeed, the MSW tolerated only *regional* German political organizations. When an organization had the ambition and the means, as did the four organizations that were formally repressed, to transform into a *national* German

[37] Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed,* 86-87.
[38] Ibid., 87.
[39] Ibid., 86-87.
[40] Though Poland undoubtedly pursued repressive dissimilationist policies vis-à-vis the German minority on the whole, as it did with the Jews (see Chapter 8), this did not correspond with the treatment towards German organizations.

political organization which united the minority across all regions of Poland, the MSW banned the organization in order to prevent a united German front. In other words, organizations that remained *within* their regional borders were free to operate. When an organization sought to go beyond representing its particular region and become a *national* German organization, though, the MSW intervened and outlawed it.

There were two exceptions to this rule. The German Social Democratic Party in Poland operated on a slightly more national level than other German organizations, but its weak following among the German minority meant that it did not pose a credible threat to the state.[41] The second exception was the Young German Party for Poland (JDP)—it was the only organization that the MSW granted permission to operate on a national level. At first glance the JDP, an openly "unite-the-front" organization in its rhetoric that gained considerable support by the end of the interwar period, could falsify the divide and conquer hypothesis, but in actuality, as will be discussed below, it strengthens it, since the JDP ensured a *broken* German front.

Observable Implications

The divide and conquer hypothesis predicts that if a government is faced with a potentially hostile ethnic group, it prefers organizational pluralism in order to divide and conquer the ethnic group, even when state repression is a viable option. There are four main observable implications of this hypothesis. First, the Polish government should not ban the majority of organizations

[41] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 581-82; Von Riekhoff, *German-Polish Relations,* 210.

representing the German minority. Second, the Polish state should embark on actions that maintain organizational pluralism within the German minority, including the creation or support of new organizations. Third, state actors should exploit and foment existing divisions between German organizations. And fourth, the Polish state should ban any German organization that suppresses organizational pluralism by forming a united front for the minority that could challenge the state. All four of these observable implications are seen in the case of German organizations in interwar Poland (Table 7.3).

As I have already shown, the first observable implication is easily confirmed: the majority of German organizations in interwar Poland was indeed tolerated—the Ministry of Interior banned only four of 19. Taking a closer look at the three other observable implications explains why this was the case.

Table 7.3 Divide and Conquer Hypothesis

Observable Implications		Outcome
Within the German minority, there should be a majority of organizations that are not banned.	✓	79% tolerated (not banned) 15/19 tolerated (not banned)
State actors should embark on actions that are functional to maintaining organizational pluralism within each ethnic minority, fomenting and exploiting ***existing divisions****.*	✓	The MSW only permitted regional German organization and exploited and encouraged regional German divisions.
State actors should create, support, or promote ***new divisions*** *in the minority.*	✓	Polish authorities funded the pacifist Deutscher Kultur- und Wirtschaftsbund (German Cultural and Economic Association).
Organizations that suppress organizational pluralism within the ethnic minority should be banned, i.e. they are able to create a united front for the minority.	✓	All four organizations banned by the MSW attempted to become national-level, uniting organizations.

Dividing and Conquering the German Minority in Poland

During the early postwar years, German minority leaders in Poland made a concerted effort to appear united. In a Ministry of Interior document summarizing minority activity from December 1926 to March 1927, government officials noted that it was "characteristic" for "German society [in Poland] to appear unified from the outside, regardless of their political and social beliefs."[42] The "internal organization of Germans in Poland, from the outside, is always presented as a single and unified bloc. Internal frictions…are carefully covered up and hidden from the external environment."[43] The main goal of German organizations in Poland was, according to the MSW, to isolate German life from the surrounding Polish environment and thus to allow Germans to develop independently from Polish life.[44] In an attempt to stave off Polish meddling in their affairs, "[i]n public speeches, representatives of German society [were] trying to give a semblance of loyalty to the [Polish] state…and the defense of their [minority] national rights do not exceed the limits of what is legal," noted the MSW, "which favourably distinguishes them from other minority groups, particularly Slavic."[45]

Behind this façade of unity, however, lurked regional divisions that severely undercut the German minority—divides that were no secret to the Ministry of Interior, even in the early interwar years when German leaders projected an image of unity. In 1926, the MSW saw that it was "characteristic of German life in Poland to lack uniformity in their methods of operating"

[42] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 5.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid., s. 3.
[45] Ibid.

between the different German-inhabited territories.[46] While in formerly Russian-Poland (i.e. Volhynia and former Congress Kingdom), "German life takes place mostly within political parties," in formerly German-Poland, in the provinces of Poznania and Pomerelia, Germans "operate mostly within social-political organizations, focusing on economic and [German-language] schooling."[47] In Central Poland, Germans were mostly "concerned with religious questions." In Silesia, however, because of the province's semi-autonomous status, "German life was developing in every field, both political and social."[48]

How, then, did Polish authorities take advantage of German regionalism in order to divide and rule? First, the Polish government fostered regional divisions by ensuring that formerly Prussian territories in Poland remained in voivodeships (provinces) that reflected their prewar provincial boundaries. These regions were not mixed with territories from the formerly Austrian or Russian partitions. Germans in what historically were two distinct Prussian regions, Poznania and Pomerelia, were far from homogenous themselves—in fact, they were historically known to have inter-regional squabbles. In the postwar period, however, they shared a sense of commonality relative to Germans living in other parts of Poland because of their shared experience under Imperial Germany prior to WWI. This fostered the formation of a new collective German identity in Poznania and Pomerelia. Polish authorities propagated and solidified this regional identity by grouping Poznania and Pomerelia into one unit administratively as well as categorically, when referring to them publically or in internal documents. Eventually, Germans in Poznania and Pomerelia also began identifying themselves as one regional group, the "Posen-

[46] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 6.
[47] Ibid., s. 2-6.
[48] Ibid.

Pommereller," a construct that did not exist in Imperial Germany.[49] The province of Upper Silesia, on the other hand, though also previously part of Prussia, was granted territorial autonomy under Poland and separated from other German-inhabited regions. Being subject to different laws and a different administration solidified an "Upper Silesian" Polish German identity, creating a competing center within the minority.

Generally, there existed a regionalized west to east hierarchy, with Germans in Western Poland considered better equipped to lead minority affairs. Further east, Germans were portrayed as less committed to the "German cause."[50] There was a "widespread belief that German minorities in Eastern Europe were somehow culturally contaminated" because of their Russian or Austrian past, and were often referred to by the stereotype of the ostensibly non-national "Lodzermensch" (Person of Łódź).[51] This was a reference to the former Russian-Polish city of Łódź, which acted as the heart of German minority activity in Central Poland.[52] Regional tensions between Poznania-Pomerelian, Upper Silesian, and Łódź Germans were thus encouraged and exploited throughout the interwar period by the MSW.

The second way in which Polish authorities exploited and encouraged regional divides was by refusing to authorize national-level organizations, that is, ban "unite the front" organizations. Although German regional antagonisms were often too pronounced for minority leaders to overcome and form a united front (for example, the failed effort to form a "Congress of Germans

[49] Chu, *German Minority,* 25.
[50] Winson Chu, "National Socialism and Hierarchical Regionalism," in *Heimat, Region, and Empire: Spatial Identities Under National Socialism,* eds. Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann and Maiken Umbach (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 75.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Chu, "Hierarchical Regionalism," 75.

in Poland" in 1921),[53] Polish authorities quickly crushed all attempts that were approaching success. By preventing pan-German organizations from operating at an inter-regional level, the MSW fomented and exploited existing antagonisms, ensuring that German identities remained confined to individual regions and conflicting. This explains why the following three organizations were never authorized by the MSW.

The first, in the early 1920s, the Bund der Deutschen Polens (League of the Germans in Poland)[54] was organized with Reich encouragement and financial support. Unlike its regional counterparts at the time, the Bund aspired to represent Germans throughout all of Poland. The MSW, however, refused to recognize a nationwide organization of Germans and thus did not permit the organization to register,[55] effectively stopping the organization from forming.

Similarly, attempts by the Deutsche Vereinigung (DV) to expand beyond Poznania and Pomerelia and "go national" in 1936 were also denied by the MSW, the second such case. This came as good news to other German organizations that felt threatened by the DV's intention to spread its influence to other German regions in Poland.[56] Indeed, the DV was arguably the only organization at that time with the means to dominate all other German organizations. By outlawing its expansion, though, the MSW maintained organizational pluralism. As a result, the DV's pan-German plans were dropped and it remained a regional organization. As will be discussed in the subsequent section, however, while the MSW withheld the DV's right to go

[53] Chu, *German Minority,* 70-77.
[54] Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* 56.
[55] Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* 56.
[56] Chu, *German Minority,* 195.

national, the Nazi "unite the front" organization, JDP, was given free rein to operate across Poland—the only organization with such privilege. We will explore why further in this chapter.

Despite the Polish-German non-aggression pact signed in 1934, MSW authorities remained sceptical of German loyalty to the state, as reported in the following MSW document excerpt:

> In relation to the Polish state, the [German] minority, standing officially on the basis of loyalty, diligently observe and take heed of [political] developments in the country, guard the rights guaranteed to them by [Polish] state law and particularly by international treaties, and upon any infringements on these rights they appeal directly to the international forum, forgoing the national arena. This German loyalty should rather be seen as a formalistic legality, which they have complied with since the reconstruction of the Polish state…. [yet] the German minority's position has strengthened since Hitler's rise to power, and…is entering the orbit of revisionist aspirations.[57]

The report goes on to outline "a number of new issues that have arisen," namely "an organizational trend to consolidate the German minority."[58] The report cautions that "[t]here are plans for a restructuring of German organizations in Poland into one pan-German political party…so as to guard against possible…[Polish] state repression….We must, therefore, within the framework of laws and regulations, prevent the consolidation of the German minority."[59] And indeed, a third and final attempt at creating a "unite the front" German organization in Poland in 1938-39, the Bund der Deutschen in Polen (League of the Germans in Poland, not to be confused with the earlier, different organization with a similar name), was not approved by the MSW.

[57] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1062, s. 36.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid., s. 37.

The fourth organization banned was the Deutschtumsbund zur Wahrung der Minderheitenrechte (Germandom League for the Protection of Minority Rights, or Deutschtumsbund, 1921-1923). It differed from the other three because it was the only organization that was fully operating at the time of its banning, as opposed to merely being a proposition for a new organization. The explanation, as discussed at the start of this chapter, that the Deutschumsbund was banned because of its alleged fifth column status is insufficient. The organization was prohibited because, although it began as a regional organization in Poznania and Pomerelia, the Deutschtumbsbund eventually sought to unite Germans throughout all of Poland.[60] It was the most developed German organization in Poland at the time, declaring that it represented all Germans and defended their interests[61] and served as a "coordination centre for various [German] organizations, including educational organizations, a women's club, occupational groups, a theatre group, as well as sports groups.[62] It developed very quickly and actively, and had ties with Berlin.[63] Because the Deutschtumsbund was a "unite the front" organization,[64] the MSW banned it in 1923.

Soon after it was outlawed by the state, the Deutschtumsbund regrouped into a new organization. The Deutsche Vereinigung in Sejm und Senat fur Posen, Netzegau und Pommerellen (German Union in Sejm and Senate for Posen, Neztgau, and Pomerelia, DV) "retained the leaders who had headed the Deutschtumsbund…and continued to pursue the same economic, financial, cultural,

[60] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 275.
[61] Ibid., 276-77, 280; AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1018, s. 67.
[62] Chu, *German Minority, 72*.
[63] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1018, s. 67.
[64] Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* 56.

and political activities as its outlawed predecessor."[65] Its headquarters were even in the same building.[66] But the re-configured organization was not banned by the MSW because it returned to its origin as a *regional* organization. Indeed, even the DV's full name—the DV for [the regions of] Poznania, Netzegau, and Pomerelia, expressed the organization's lack of pretension in becoming a Poland-wide organization, unlike its outlawed predecessor, the Deutschtumsbund for the Protection of [German] Minority Rights.[67] As one leader of the Deutschtubmsbund acknowledged, "without legal status the work of the organization is significantly impeded."[68] And thus, to escape outlawing, the DV shed its ambition of becoming a national, pan-German organization.

Tolerating A Fifth Column: The JDP as a "Front-Breaking" Organization

A speech by Rudolf Wiesner, the leader of the Nazi Jungdeutsche Partei (Young German Party in Poland, or JDP) in November 1934 reveals how the JDP was to balance regional divisions and create a united front with a single organization:

> Germandom in this state is not a uniform *Volksgruppe* that is closely tied together by centuries of history. Rather, it is derived from three different states that had followed different paths in their political, national, cultural and economic development…These three differently dispositioned German tribes are now to be combined and to be forged together into one inseparable bloc. Now they are to follow one path and to have one marching

[65] Von Riekhoff, *German-Polish Relations,*" 208-9.
[66] Chu, *German Minority,* 79.
[67] Ibid., 78.
[68] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1018, s. 72, 80.

> direction, in the future they are not to represent special interests, but rather to face the same fate and the same future.[69]

The spirit of the speech made clear that the JDP was to be the organization that united all Germans across Poland. Indeed, "[t]he Young German movement has made its goal to unite [*zusammenfassen*] all Germans in Poland in one *Volksgemeinschaft.* There shall be no more differences made between our national comrades in Volhynia, Galicia, Łódź, Silesia, Poznania and Pomerelia…We want to be Germans, and nothing but Germans."[70] The leader of the JDP, as reported in MSW internal documents, did not hide his intentions: "We [the JDP] now have the difficult task of reunification of the German people of the three districts. It is only after the consolidation of the German people, that we can begin to realize our plans."[71] The divide and conquer hypothesis would predict the MSW to ban the JDP. It was, after all, a "unite the front" organization which had gained considerable popularity among Polish Germans by the outbreak of WWII. Yet this did not happen.

The short explanation for the MSW's behaviour is that it strategically allowed for the JDP to operate precisely because it ensured a *broken* German front, despite its rhetoric about uniting it. The JDP began as a fringe regional group in 1921 in former Austrian Upper Silesia and did not gain relevance on the Polish political scene until 1933 following Hitler's rise to power in Germany. With the corresponding rise of the JDP, the three umbrella regional organizations, the Deutsche Vereinigung of Poznania and Pomerelia, the Deutscher Volksbund of Upper Silesia, and Deutscher Volksverband of Central Poland, came to be known as the "Old German

[69] Cited in Chu, "National Socialism and Hierarchical Regionalism," 77.
[70] Cited in ibid., 78.
[71] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 963, s. 10.

movement." The "Young German movement" was thus represented by the JDP which campaigned across German regions in Poland in opposition to the "Old" conservative-nationalist organizations.[72] The Old organizations, of course, were not willing to relinquish their dominance over the minority easily. The result was a fierce rivalry between the Old and the Young. To its strategic benefit, the MSW made it a priority to fuel this conflict.

A 1935 MSW quarterly reported that the struggle between the "Old" and "Young" camps continued to intensify: "[t]he year [1935] was marked by hitherto unseen…internal struggles and clashes of all sorts of antagonisms…" Further, the minority had "…not yet managed to rebuild the external unity of the German front…"[73] Reports discuss how "the battle between the Deutsche Vereinigung [the largest 'Old' organization]" resulted in "mutual disrupting of each others meetings, bloody fights, accusations of disloyalty to Poland or to National Socialism [Nazi Germany]." The frequency of such events led the report to describe them as being "on the daily agenda" of German organizations.[74]

A year later, the MSW continued to report on the "violent and brutal struggles between the 'Old' and 'Young.'"[75] It also noted that "a new symptom of the fight between the Old and New Germans" had arisen with "the tendency for certain Old organizations to attempt and move beyond their current regions, where they traditionally operate, and expand to all German-inhabited territories in Poland, so as to effectively oppose the 'universal' Jungdeutsche Partei."[76] But as we saw in the section prior, the MSW did not allow these "certain," (i.e. the DV) to "go

[72] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 580-82.
[73] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 963., s. 10.
[74] Ibid., s. 63.
[75] Ibid., s. 135, s. 285.
[76] Ibid., s. 63-64.

national." Yet it allowed the JDP to develop to ensure a divided minority. Even when two German representatives were added to the appointed Polish senate, Polish authorities made a point to give one seat to a DV ("Old") representative, and one to a JDP ("Young") representative.[77] Rival German activists willingly denounced their opponents to Polish authorities, so much so that "the Polish Police Minister had openly boasted that he no longer needed to spend money to pay German informants."[78] Though allowing the JDP to operate ensured a broken front, its increasing popularity and its potential to threaten organization pluralism did not go unnoticed by Polish officials. This was the attitude as it is seen in primary documents.

The Governor of the province of Poznan wrote in July 1936 to the Minister of Interior: "The political struggle between the DV and JDP should be assessed as a positive phenomenon, although it is undoubtedly important to also realize that this political struggle has indeed activated [politicized] the entire German minority."[79] The MSW had noted a year earlier that the inter-organizational conflict among German organizations resulted in "extremely lively propaganda" aimed at "recruiting" Germans and "soaking the idea of national socialism," successfully politicizing "even passive Germans."[80] The Governor of Poznania continued to share his anxieties: "However, too strong development of the JDP, which at the moment after a serious weakening of the DV due to orders of the authorities [i.e. not allowing the DV to operate nationally] is very likely, and in my view, is undesirable, as it leads to the predominance of the

[77] Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* 179.
[78] Blanke cited in Chu, *German Minority,* 183.
[79] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 1005, s. 3.
[80] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 963, s. 10.

JDP among the German minority."[81] He concluded with a suggestion to crack down on the JDP: "In connection with the above, sanctions should be applied in relation to the Jungdeutsche Partei." [82] The MSW initially rejected the Governor's requests to suppress the JDP, citing "the Ministry of Interior did not consider it appropriate at present to consent to the project of the Regional Offices."[83]

The JDP case provides us with a telling example. Contrary to the dominant theoretical predictions, Polish authorities allowed the Nazi organization to operate across the country. In the county-level report in Poznań, local authorities were ordered in March 1934 not to interfere with the JDP because the organization fueled considerable intra-ethnic conflict among German minority organizations, particularly with the influential DV. Allowing the JDP to operate broke any potential unity among the German "front."[84] Indeed, Reich officials suspected this purposeful Polish effort to support the JDP to undermine German unity.[85] Tolerating, even encouraging, the JDP, however, was a very costly move on the part of Polish state actors, because it intensified the Nazification of Germans living in Poland.[86] But breaking German unity was evidently worth the risk.

This divide and conquer tactic seemed to pay off, as the conflict did increase the vulnerability of all German minority organizations. The growing divisions were not just between the "Old" and "Young" Germans, yet also affected the three main regional organizations within the "Old"

[81] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 1005, s. 3
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid., s. 67.
[84] AAN, MSW, WN, sygn. 1005, k.1-4.
[85] Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* 179.
[86] Chu, *German Minority,* 183.

camp. The rhetoric of regional empowerment that was at the heart of the Old campaign against the JDP had fostered a new self-confidence among Germans elsewhere in Poland who had traditionally felt (and largely were) marginalized in the past. In Central Poland, for example, the German activists in Łódź began challenging both the JDP *and* the DV in their own bid to lead the entire German minority.[87] Such regional antagonisms continued to plague the German minority in the remaining years of the interwar period, resulting in the "three German minorities" being significantly more divided in 1939 than they were 20 years earlier.[88]

Creating New Divisions Through Supporting German Loyalists

Lastly, the final observable implication of the divide and conquer hypothesis would expect that the state not only fomented or exploited existing divisions, but also created new ones. The Deutscher Kultur- Und Wirtschaftsbund (German Cultural and Economic Association, or DKuWB), founded in 1929 in the Central Polish city Łódź, provides an example.[89] The DKuWB advanced itself as the only German organization that was truly loyal to the Polish state.[90] Cooperating with the Polish state "on a radically loyalist basis," the DKuWB accused other German political organizations, like the DV and DSAP, of supporting Germany's revisionist claims and warned that backlash from the Polish state would inevitably result.[91] The DKuWB has largely been used by scholars "as an example of the Polish government's 'undemocratic

[87] Chu, "National Socialism and Hierarchical Regionalism," 82.
[88] Ibid., 83.
[89] For more on the organization, see AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 1003.
[90] Chu, *German Minority,* 135.
[91] Ibid., 135-6.

measures' against the minority, with the goal of being divisive and assimilationist,"[92] labeling it a "collaborist organization…clearly a government front" funded by Poland.[93]

The DKuWB grew in the early 1930s, causing anxiety among the other German parties[94] who denounced the DKuWB as a "puppet organization,"[95] though supporters were drawn to the organization in protest to the "allegedly chauvinistic nationalism" that dominated German minority politics.[96] Nonetheless, the DKuWB was ultimately unsuccessful and failed to attract a large following: "After just a year and (and about one million złoty in state subsidies) officials conceded its failure and stopped funding it."[97] Indeed, official observers in Western Poland conceded that interest in the organization among the German population was "almost nil" with membership never rising "much above two hundred." Whatever the outcome, the intent of the organization was clear: to create a loyalist German party which further divided the minority group. If the MSW did not seek organizational pluralism, and if repression was the default state policy, support for the DKuWB would be completely inexplicable.

Conclusions

Accounts of German life under Polish rule vary sharply. One commonly cited interpretation put forward by many German scholars depicts a "loyal minority oppressed by Polish authorities" and places blame squarely on the Polish government for antagonizing relations between the two

[92] Petra Blachetta-Madajczyk cited in Chu, *German Minority,* 135.
[93] Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* 93.
[94] Hauser, "The German Minority in Poland," 31.
[95] Chu, *German Minority,* 137.
[96] Chu, *German Minority,* 137, 139; Hauser, "The German Minority in Poland," 31.
[97] Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles,* 93.

ethnic groups.[98] According to this narrative, the German minority was willing to cooperate with the Polish state, but repressive Polish policies made such collaboration impossible, thereby pushing the Germans into a defensive stance vis-à-vis the Poles and leaving them with no alternative but to demand the rights they were promised under the Minority Treaties yet were denied by the Polish state.

Polish historians (though by no means all), conversely, generally reject the notion of German loyalty, choosing instead to focus almost exclusively on the minority's irredentist activity and fifth-column links with the Reich.[99] Emphasis is placed on military diversions and espionage activity conducted by members of the German minority in the years leading up to World War II, illuminating their role in abetting the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. These two opposing views of the German-Polish interwar experience, though contrasting, are, in fact, correct in their own right. Polish policies were indeed a far cry from the ideals outlined in the Minority Treaties, festering resentment among the German minority. At the same time, however, Reich officials consistently took a keen interest in providing handsome financial and moral support for its ethnic kin, actions which Polish authorities deemed as unjust foreign meddling in internal politics. As a result, although proponents of the contrasting Polish and German accounts are right in their own way, they are, nonetheless, representing misconstrued versions of actual events. By fixing their gazes on opposite ends of the spectrum—that is, German irredentism and Polish repression—only a small part of the story is told; a more accurate depiction, as is often the case with polarized accounts of interethnic relations, lies somewhere in the middle. To reach this middle ground we must take an alternative view of the events, first and

[98] Hauser, "The German Minority in Poland," 13.
[99] Ibid., 14.

foremost by disaggregating the level of analysis from one that focuses on Polish-German *group* relations, to one which examines the dynamics between the state and *organizations* that claimed to represent the German minority, as this chapter has done. Departing from abstract group-level analyses will allow us to make sense of the contradictory accounts put forth in the current historiography, as well as to better understand the variation in Polish state policies towards the German minority in the interwar years.

Taking this approach will also address questions left unanswered in current scholarly work. If Polish policies were as repressive as the literature suggests, it is illogical that only four of 19 German organizations—none of which used violent tactics—were outlawed by the Polish Ministry of Interior. More perplexing is why Polish authorities did not ban the Jungdeutsche Partei fur Polen (Young German Party for Poland), a fifth column organization committed to uniting the entire German minority by spreading Nazi ideology among Germans in Poland. While the Ministry of Interior restricted other, more moderate, German organizations from operating beyond specific provinces, the JDP was free to operate as a national, Pan-German minority organization. This chapter argued that these contradictions are clarified when Polish state policies are viewed using the logic of divide and conquer, as summarized by the four observable implications of my main hypothesis: the majority of German political organizations were not banned; the MSW exploited existing regional German minority divides; Polish authorities created new divisions by funding loyalist minority organizations; and finally, the MSW banned any German organization that sought to go beyond regional representation and instead form a united, national, Pan-German front in Poland.

Chapter 8: Jewish Political Organizations

Technically not an ethnic group, Jews, unlike Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Germans, did not pose a direct, irredentist threat to Polish territorial integrity.[1] They were not a territorially concentrated group with border revision claims against the Polish state, nor was a neighbouring government prepared to intervene on their behalf. In this sense, Jews presented the least tangible threat to Polish national security.[2] Yet this chapter will illustrate that, despite the fundamental difference between Jews and other minorities, the Ministry of Interior (MSW) still pursued a divide and rule scenario with respect to Jewish political organizations—an insight overlooked in existing literature. I begin by outlining the Jewish political movement in interwar Poland and addressing alternative explanations.

Jewish Political Organizations: Overview and State Response

The historiography on interwar Polish Jewry is generally divided into a "Jewish" and a "Polish" camp.[3] The attitude of Jewish scholars, mostly of the older generation, is that interwar Poland

[1] Though I recognize that Judaism is a religion and technically not an ethnic group, I include Jews in the analysis because the interwar Polish state considered Jews as a distinct ethnic minority group, alongside Ukrainians, Germans, Belarusians, Russians, Lithuanians, and so on. Furthermore, in Interwar Poland, religion was considered the chief marker of ethnicity. For example, an individual would be considered Polish if he or she was Roman Catholic, but if they converted to Greek Catholicism, for example, they would then be considered Ukrainian. This was typical of mixed marriages between Poles and Ukrainians, where one child could be baptized as Roman Catholic, and thus raised Polish, and another child baptized Greek Catholic, and thus considered Ukrainian, regardless of the language they spoke.

[2] Laurence Weinbaum, *A Marriage of Convenience: The New Zionist Organization and the Polish Government, 1936-1939* (Boulder: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1993), 5.

[3] Of course, not all Jewish scholars belong to the former, nor do all Poles adhere to the latter. For comprehensive review of the historiography see Ezra Mendelsohn, "Interwar Poland: Good for the Jews or Bad for the Jews?" in *The Jews in Poland,* eds. Chimen Abramsky, Maciej Jachimczyk, and Antony Polonsky (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1986), 130-39; Ezra Mendelsohn, "Jewish Historiography on Polish Jewry in the Interwar Period," *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry* 8 (1994): 3-13; Ezra Mendelsohn, "Jewish Historiography on Polish Jewry in the Interwar Period," in

was an "extremely, perhaps even uniquely, anti-Semitic country."[4] Under these unfavourable conditions, Polish Jews were in a state of "constant and alarming decline," and by the 1930s Poland was waging a "war against the Jewish population."[5] The other predominant view among Jewish scholars emphasizes the "heroic" and "remarkable 'flourishing' of Jewish culture and Jewish political life," despite the pervasive discrimination in interwar Poland.[6] Strands of Jewish political culture that do not fit this mold, such as those that favoured assimilation into Polish culture, are often downplayed or criticized.[7] Another, "Polish," camp, takes a middle road, arguing that the "condition of Polish Jewry in the interwar period is often described out of context."[8] These scholars contend that "Jews of Poland were poor because they lived in a poor, underdeveloped country. Discrimination only marginally added to their poverty."[9]

None of these camps, however, is able to explain Polish policies towards Jewish political organizations. Given the discriminatory and anti-Semitic environment of interwar Poland, why was only one of approximately 17 Jewish political organizations banned by Polish authorities? Similarly, if Jewish political culture flourished during the interwar period, why do historians point out that all Jewish political projects in Poland "failed" (i.e "Autonomism, Yiddishism, Hebraism, Bundism, Agudism, and Zionism")?[10] Viewing this puzzle through the lens of divide

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Jews in Independent Poland, 1918-1939, eds. Antony Polonsky, Ezra Mendelsohn, and Jerzy Tomaszewski (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2004), 3-13.

[4] Mendelsohn, "Jewish Historiography," 4-5.

[5] Mendelsohn, "Jewish Historiography (1986)," 130-31.

[6] Mendelsohn, "Jewish Historiography," 5-6.

[7] Winson Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 7.

[8] Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland: Volume II: 1795 to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 190.

[9] Mendelsohn, "Jewish Historiography (1986)," 131-2.

[10] Ezra Mendelsohn, "Introduction: The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars—Myths and Reality," in *The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars,* ed. Yisrael Gutman (Hanover: Published for Brandeis University Press by University Press of New England, 1989), 19; Gershon C. Bacon, "Agudat Israel in Interwar Poland," in *The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars,* ed. Yisrael Gutman (Hanover: Published for Brandeis University Press by University Press of New England, 1989), 34.

and conquer, as I have done with the German, Ukrainian, and Belarusian cases, helps make sense of these inconsistencies. Polish policies were indeed harsh at the group-level, but it made little sense for the Polish Ministry of Interior to ban Jewish organizations, even if some were deemed a "threat to peace and security." Indeed, the MSW tolerated (strictly in the sense that organizations were not banned) the "flourishing" Jewish political culture precisely because the extremely competitive and conflictual nature of Jewish inter-organizational relations, the "fierce power struggles,"[11] ensured that no united front would be presented against the state. As a result, Jewish political projects in interwar Poland did not reach their full potential. The subsequent sections explain why this is the case, with particular emphasis on the role of the MSW's policies in diminishing influence of Jewish political organizations in interwar Poland.

In the initial interwar years, the MSW believed that, regardless of the differences between Jewish political organizations, all organizations stood in opposition to the Polish state. Demands for Jewish cultural and political autonomy demanded that Jewish organizations be seen as a threat to nascent Poland's "unity," "national security, and territorial integrity."[12] Similarly, "most Polish parties opposed Jewish national autonomy within Poland," and as a result their disposition fundamentally "pitted them against most Jewish…parties."[13] Though this attitude ebbed in later years, it is indicative of MSW political strategies that indeed only one organization was banned, and this was not until 1934.

[11] Stephan Stach, "The Institute for Nationality Research (1921-1939): A Think-Tank for Minority Politics in Poland?" in *Religion in the Mirror of Law, Eastern European Perspectives from the Early Modern Period to 1939* eds. Yvonne Kleinmann, Stephan Stach, Tracie L. Wilson (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 2016), 173.
[12]Waldemar Kozyra, *Polityka Administracyjna Ministrów Spraw Wewnętrznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Latach 1918-1939* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskij, 2009), 260, 280; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Dopływ, syg. 1017, s. 20.
[13] Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, "Deadly Communities: Local Political Milieus and the Persecution of Jews in Occupied Poland," *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 3 (2011): 263.

Deciphering the Jewish minority question was, according to the MSW, "the most complicated" of all minority groups.[14] Between the many different organizations "there lacked a harmonized direction."[15] The MSW surveilled the inter-organization tensions between Jews, paying close attention to their clashing ideological outlooks.[16] Broadly, Jewish political organizations were divided into four ideological categories by the MSW: rightwing (conservative), Zionist, leftist-liberal, and socialist.[17] In later years, as the Zionist movement took hold and Jewish emigration to Palestine was encouraged, the MSW also viewed Jewish organizations as either anti-Palestine (the Folkiści and Bund); pro-Palestine (all Zionist organizations); conservative (Orthodox organizations); or assimilationist (only the Zjednoczenie Polaków Wyznanie Mojrzeszowe).[18]

On the right were the Orthodox Jews, represented primarily by the Agudas Jisroel (Agudat Israel, Agudat Yisrael). Agudas advocated first and foremost for the protection of Jewish religious rights, the strengthening and promotion of religious principles, and the creation and subsidizing of Jewish religious schools.[19] Religion was to act as the basis for fostering Jewish nationality.[20] Agudas quickly demonstrated its popularity, securing second place (although distant) to the Zionists in Polish elections to the Sejm (Parliament), and held a dominant position in many local Jewish community councils, including in major Jewish centers like Warsaw and Łódź.[21] Though popular, and arguably the most stable of Jewish political organization, the Agudas never

[14] Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Wydział Narodowościowy, syg. 1002, s. 52.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Kozyra, *Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych,* 280.
[17] Jerzy Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warszawa: Książka I Wiedza, 1974); Mieczysław Iwanicki, *Ukraińcy. Białorusini, Litwini i Niemcy w Polsce w latach 1918-1990* (Siedlce: Wydawnictwa Uczelniane WSRP w Siedlcach, 1993).
[18] Kozyra, *Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych,* 359.
[19] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 1062, s. 2.
[20] Bacon, "Agudat Israel in Interwar Poland," 22-23.
[21] Ibid., 20; Gershon C. Bacon, *The Politics of Tradition: Agudat Yisrael in Poland, 1916-1939* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1996), 198.

Table 8.1. Jewish Political Organizations in Interwar Poland

Rightwing (conservative)	Zionist	Leftist-Liberal	Socialist
Agudas Jisrael (1912-1939)	Hitachdut (Mifleget ha-awodah ha-Cyjonit "Hitachdut," 1920-1939) Organizacja Syjonistyczna w Polsce (1915-1939) Al Hamiszmar (Na Staży, 1923-1939) El Liwnot (Czas Budować, 1923-1939) Centrum Duchowe (Mizrachi, 1918-1939) Jidysze Socjalistisz-Demokratisze Arbeter Partaj Poale Syjon (Poale Syjon, 1905-1920) Poale Syjon-Leftists (1920-1939) Poale Syjon-Rightists (1920-1939) Nowa Organizacja Syjonistyczna (1931-1939) Zjednocz. Part. Syjon.-Socjal. (Hitachdut+PS-Prawice, only in Galicia, 1933-1939)	Żydowska Partia Ludowa w Polsce (Jidysze Folkspartei in Pojlen, 1917-1929) Jidysze Partia Demokratisz-Fołkistisze Partaj in Pojlen (Wilno faction, 1926-1929) Jidysze Sockalistisz-Demokratisze Arbeter Partaj Farejnigte (1918-1922, 1929-1939)	Bund (Allgemejner Jidyszer Arbeter Bund, 1897-1939) Ogólnożydowska Partia Pracy (Aldemene Jidysze Arbeter Partaj, 1931-1934) †

† **organization was banned.** Note: Dates ending in 1939 simply mean that the organization lasted until the end of the interwar period and does not necessarily denote that the organization disbanded in 1939.

succeeded in uniting all Orthodox Jews, let alone the entire Jewish minority. Many traditional Orthodox Jews were against forming political organizations and thus did not take part in the Agudas. Caught between principle and pragmatism, such politicizations, they believed, ultimately presented too great a compromise with the secular values and ideologies which

Orthodox parties supposedly were created to combat.[22] As will be discussed further below, the Agudas was an organization that cooperated with Polish authorities.[23]

Also on the right were the Zionists. In the first years of Poland's independence, the government considered the Zionist program for "cultural-political autonomy for Jews in Poland" to be dangerous to Poland's national cohesion and territorial integrity.[24] But in spring 1926, when Zionists shifted their goals to promoting "a program for immigration of Jews from Poland to Palestine," meaning that the Zionist revolution was to take place beyond Poland's borders, the MSW changed its view from one of unease to one of support. Because the root of the movement was a desire to leave, rather than destroy, Poland, the MSW Council of Ministers declared on March 31, 1926 that: "The Government will not present obstacles for Zionist organizations, especially with regards to their emigration campaigns…"[25] Whereas authorities tried to assimilate the Belarusian and Ukrainian minority, they simply wanted the Jewish minority to leave, because Jews, like the Germans, were not considered appropriate candidates for Polish assimilation policies.[26]

The Zionist movement, despite being the strongest political current among Jews in Poland, was far from united.[27] On the left of the political spectrum, the Zionists were represented by the socialist Poale Syjon, which in 1920 splintered into two competing factions: the Poale Syjon Leftists (PS-Leftists) and Poale Syjon Rightists (PS-Rightists). Other factions of Poale Syjon

[22] Bacon, "Agudat Israel in Interwar Poland," 21.
[23] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 563.
[24] Kozyra, *Minsterstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych,* 280 fn 160.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 86.
[27] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 567.

broke off and joined the Communist Party of Poland (Komunistyczna Partia Robotnicza Polski).[28] After 1926, Zionists were mainly represented by the Orthodox Mizrachi and the Zionist Organization in Poland (Organizacja Syjonistyczna w Polsce, or Histadrut ha Cyjonit). In the second half of the 1920s Histadrut ha Cyjonit fragmented into three factions: Czas Budować (Et Liwnot, or "Time to Build"), Na Staży (Al Hamiszmar, or "On Guard") and Związek Syjonistów Rewizjonistów (or "Union of Revisionist Zionists.")[29] Indeed, as the years went on, the Zionist movement increasingly fragmented rather than united, as is often the case with movements that amass a large following: the more members, the more potential for divergent viewpoints.

Moving further left down the political spectrum the left-wing liberalists were represented by the relatively weak Folkists ("fołkiści" or "ludowcy") and their Jewish People's Party (Żydowska Partia Ludowa w Polsce, or Jidysze Folks-Partaj in Pojlen, or Folkspartei). The organization split in 1926 into a Warsaw faction and a Wilno (Vilnius) one.[30] The Folkspartei and its competing factions supported political and cultural autonomy for Jews within Poland, believing that Jews formed a distinct nationality (rather than just a religion).[31] Folkists staunchly opposed Zionism.[32] They also quarreled with the socialist and Orthodox movements. The Folkspartei, though enjoying popularity in the early interwar years, lost its meaning by the late 1920s-early 1930s, even after re-uniting their warring factions in an attempt to regain influence over Jewish

[28] Ibid., 272.
[29] Ibid., 565.
[30] Ibid., 263; AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 25; AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 28.
[31] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 87.
[32] Ibid., 89.

politics.[33] By 1935, the MSW reported the Folkists had effectively "vanished from the horizon of Jewish political life."[34]

Another staunch opponent to Zionism was the Bund, a far-left, internationalist socialist party that functioned in Yiddish. Unlike the Folkspartei, which believed that Jews were a nation that should strive for autonomy based on education, community, and culture, the Bund represented the Jewish working class and viewed the Jewish national struggle in class terms. The Bund held that only a complete transformation of the existing order could better the social standing of Jews. Although in principle the Bund stood for an international socialist revolution, it was no ally of the Soviet Union, where it had been dissolved by the Bolsheviks. [35] Polish authorities, however, remained suspicious of the organization and its ties to communism throughout the interwar period. The Bund believed that Jews in Poland deserved cultural and political autonomy, charging that Poland was their rightful home and that, as such, Jews were entitled to the same rights as all other citizens and minority groups in Poland.[36] They were steadfast in their commitment to dissuade Jews from emigrating to Palestine.

In 1927, the MSW categorized Jewish political organizations as "moderate" or "radical (subversive)."[37] Moderate Jewish organizations included the Zionists ("syjoniści właściwi"), the Folkists or "fołkiści (ludowcy)," and Orthodox (conservatives). The main subversive Jewish organizations were listed as: Bund, Poalej Syjon (Left and Right), and part of the Communist

[33] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 264.
[34] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 963, s. 113-114.
[35] Timothy Snyder, *Sketches of a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 67.
[36] MSW, AAN, Dop., syg. 1062, s. 14.; Abraham Brumberg, "The Bund and the Polish Socialist Party in the Late 1930s," in *The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars,* ed. Yisrael Gutman (Hanover: Published for Brandeis University Press by University Press of New England, 1989), 77.
[37] Kozyra, *Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych,* 260 fn 95.

Party of Poland (Komunistyczna Partia Robotnicza Polski).[38] Indeed, the Bund and PS-Leftists, who sought a socialist revolution, took a "decidedly hostile [*wrogie*] stance towards the Government."[39] Though seditious, none of the Jewish organizations listed in 1927 was in fact banned. The following section elaborates on the reason for such selective tolerance of Jewish political groupings.

Table 8.2. MSW Categorization of Jewish Political Organizations (1927)

"Moderate"	"Radical/Subversive"
Zionist organizations	Bund
Folkist organizations	Polalej Syjon (Left and Right)
Orthodox organizations	Part of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine

The Ministry of Interior and Jewish Political Organizations

Current theories of state response to minorities tell us very little about the Ministry of Interior's actions towards Jewish organizations, leaving key questions unanswered. Namely, given the MSW's group-level discriminatory policies, why was only one Jewish organization banned by the MSW?[40] The quick and easy answer given in the literature is that, in contrast to many Ukrainian, German, and Belarusian organizations, Jews were *not* seeking the territorial conquest of parts of Poland. This answer, as I have demonstrated in Chapter 3, is not useful: applying group-level logic cannot explain the significant variation in the way Polish authorities treated organizations representing one ethnic group. Certainly, the MSW consistently opposed some Jewish organizations (e.g. the Bund, PS-Leftists), while it nearly always viewed others (e.g.

[38] Ibid.
[39] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 27, 76.
[40] These alternative explanations are outlined in detail in Chapter 2, and have been addressed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Agudas Israel) in a more positive light. It is unclear, however, why only one, the All-Jewish Workers' Party (Ogólnożydowska Partia Pracy, or OZPP), was banned, and yet so many others were allowed to operate. Indeed, many right-wing Polish nationalists (and many Sanacja officials under Piłsudski) viewed politically active Jews as potential Soviet agents in disguise, seeking to overthrow the Second Republic and implement a Communist regime. In other words, they may have viewed Jews as an irredentist threat, and, as a result, banned the communist-influenced OZPP. But this explanation does not sufficiently explain the significant variation, as well as the timing of the MSW's banning—the OZPP was known to be a communist sympathizer for several years before it was actually banned. Further, the "threat of communism" and the idea that Jews were conspiring for the Soviet Union were consistently referenced by Polish officials, who labeled almost all leftist Jewish organizations as Soviet spies at some point or another during the interwar period. At its most extreme, the relationship between Jews and Communism "took on quasi-mythical proportions in the nationalist discourse of interwar Poland and can be conveniently summed up in the word *Żydokomuna* (Judeo-communism)—the idea that Jews above all other minorities were (and are) the main supporters of communism at the mass level and that communism was primarily a vehicle of a broader Jewish conspiracy to seize power."[41] Indeed, as pointed out by Kopstein and Wittenberg, "[t]here is little question that Poles and Jews were already polarized before the outbreak of the Second World War. Divided by religion and language, often enough each group also occupied different economic niches and social strata and passed down among themselves 'sins' of the other group…On the Polish side such differences were emphasized and nurtured by political parties such as the National Democrats…a powerful

[41] Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, "Who Voted Communist? Reconsidering the Social Bases of Radicalism in Interwar Poland," *Slavic Review* 62, no.1 (2003): 89-90.

right-wing Polish nationalist party that saw advantages in stoking antagonism."[42] Nonetheless, state outlawing of Jewish organizations was infrequent.

To address this puzzle, I show that the MSW's actions towards Jewish political organizations are consistent with the logic of divide and conquer. First, the MSW banned only one Jewish political organization and allowed the vast majority to operate legally—that is, organizational pluralism was preferred, and repression was not the default policy. Second, the MSW did not ban all organizations deemed "subversive," "extreme," "anti-Polish," or a "threat to peace and stability," even though repression was a viable option. This maintained organizational pluralism within the severely divided Jewish minority, ensuring that no united front could be formed. Had the MSW banned some of the subversive organizations, particularly the Bund, the likelihood of Jews uniting their opposition would have increased. Third, the MSW reinforced organizational pluralism by supporting new divisions through funding, and cooperating with, loyalist Jewish organizations, such as the Orthodox Agudas Israel and later the New Zionist Organization. Indeed, if Polish authorities had not hoped to encourage organizational pluralism, it would have made little sense for the MSW to support any Jewish organizations. Fourth, the MSW banned the All-Jewish Workers' Party (1931-1934), a communist organization operating in the eastern Polish borderlands (mainly in Galicia), because its quick rise in popularity among Jews in Galicia suppressed organizational pluralism in the Eastern Borderlands (the *kresy*) and was thus deemed a credible threat to authorities. These observable implications are summarized in Table 8.3 and elaborated on below.

[42] Kopstein and Wittenberg, "Deadly Communities," 262.

Table 8.3. Observable Implications of the Divide and Conquer Hypothesis

Observable Implications	Outcome	
Within the Jewish minority, there should be a majority of organizations that are not banned.	✓	16/17 tolerated (not banned) 94% tolerated (not banned)
State actors should embark on actions that are functional to maintaining organizational pluralism within each ethnic minority, fomenting and exploiting ***existing divisions****.*	✓	The MSW did not ban subversive organizations deemed a threat to "peace and security," though outlawing was a viable option.
State actors should create, support, or promote ***new divisions*** *in the minority.*	✓	The MSW supported organizations such as the Agudas Israel and the New Zionist Organization.
Organizations that suppress organizational pluralism within the ethnic minority should be banned, i.e. they are able to create a united front for the minority.	✓	The MSW banned the All-Jewish Workers' Party (Ogólnożydowska Partia Pracy), an organization that united socialist Jews in Galicia.

Dividing and Ruling the Jewish Minority

Maintaining Jewish Organizational Pluralism

Two characteristics of Jewish political organizations played directly into the hands of the Ministry of Interior's overall strategy of divide and conquer: Jewish organizations were fiercely fragmented, and they largely failed to connect with the Jewish "masses" whom they claimed to represent. Maintaining these inter-organizational dynamics was essential in ensuring a broken Jewish front. The most telling example of this strategy was the MSW's relations with the radical, socialist organization "the Bund."

The Ministry of Interior negatively viewed the leftist Jewish organization Bund, labeling it as an "anti-state, subversive revolutionary organization that threatened Poland's national security." The Bund's activities were "directed against the unity of the Polish state," making it appropriate for repression.[43] Indeed, the Bund was the most vocal of Jewish organizations demanding

[43] AAN, MSW, Dop., sygn 980; AAN, MSW, Dop., syg.1017, s.4.

cultural and political autonomy for Jews in Poland.[44] In 1924, however, when the Bund began openly opposing both Communism and Zionism, Polish authorities saw the benefit of allowing the organization to operate, since it "fragmented the ability for a unified action on the part of the Jewish community"[45] and hampered the spread of communism among the Jewish proletariat.[46] Further, with the Bund operating, there would "always be a split in the Jewish front."[47] As a result, the group was active throughout the entire interwar period. Indeed, no other Jewish political organization was as determined and steadfast to charge their claims, and no other party was as fiercely opposed to entering into even temporary alliances with other political movements, Jewish or otherwise.[48]

Jewish political culture was plagued with extreme divisiveness and factionalism.[49] In the early interwar years, when discussing the creation of Jewish counties (*gminas)*, a form of political autonomy all Jewish organizations sought, "substantial differences in opinions" plagued the various Jewish factions, with Orthodox organizations maintaining that autonomous Jewish counties were to be based on religion and in the absence of female participation in government positions, whereas the Zionists and Folkists were in favour of settling the matter of Jewish autonomous counties through a "democratic vote."[50] These disagreements were aired in Jewish press outlets, resulting in a fierce polemic monitored by the MSW. [51]

[44] Brumberg, "The Bund and the Polish Socialist Party in the Late 1930s," 75.
[45] AAN, MSW, Dop., sygn 980; AAN, MSW, Dop., syg.1017, s.4.
[46] For a discussion on why communism posed a threat to the MSW see final section of Chapter 3.
[47] AAN, MSW, Dop., sygn 980; AAN, MSW, Dop., syg.1017, s.4; Kozyra, *Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych,* 280.
[48] Brumberg, "The Bund and the Polish Socialist Party in the Late 1930s," 78.
[49] Mendelsohn, "The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars," 13.
[50] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 24.
[51] Ibid.

Similarly, during elections to local Jewish councils, votes were split among the varying factions, with no single Jewish bloc achieving an absolute majority.[52] In the 1924 elections to the influential Jewish community councils in Warsaw and Łódź, "occasional inter-party snipping became a full-scale battle" between the Orthodox Agudas and Zionist organizations, the latter campaigning on a promise to "deal Orthodoxy a 'death-blow.'"[53] The result was not the domination of any one political organization, but rather a fragmented local Jewish council: in Warsaw, of 50 mandates, 17 were won by the Orthodox Agudas, 14 went to the Zionists. In Łódź the Agudas claimed 13 of 35 mandates and Zionists took nine.[54] Cooperation between these warring organizations on further Jewish interests was elusive.

Table 8.4. Election Results for Warsaw Jewish Community Council, or Kehilla (1924)

Organization	Mandates
Agudas	17
Zionists	14
Mizrachi	5
Bund	5
Aleksander Hasidim	3
Folkists	3
Poalei Tsiyyon Left	2
Philanthropic Org.	1
Total	**50**

Table 8.5. Election Results for Łódź Jewish Community Council, or Kehilla (1924)

Organization	Mandates
Agudas	13
Zionists	9
Nonpartisan Religious	7
Bund	3
Poalei Tsiyyon	2
Folkists	1
Total	**50**

Source: Bacon, Politics of Tradition, 198.

There was endless splintering and squabbling over even the minutest points of doctrine. Bitter personal feuds prevailed. Yitzhak Gruenbaum, for example, accused the Galician Zionists of being "*shtadlanim"* (or intercessor, an extremely offensive word in Zionist circles) and went so

[52] Bacon, *The Politics of Tradition*, 199.
[53] Ibid.,191, 198-9; for more see Bacon, *The Politics of Tradition,* Chapter 8.
[54] Ibid.,198.

far as to call Leon Reich, leader of the Eastern Galician Zionist Federation, a "traitor" to Zionist principles.[55] MSW reports are replete with descriptions of Jewish inter-organizational conflicts: whether between the two most popular political organizations, the Zionists and Orthodox Agudas,[56] or documenting the rivalry between the socialist Bund and the Zionists, the former wanting Jews to stay in Poland with the latter propagating emigration.[57] In a summary of Jewish political organizations prepared by the MSW, attention was drawn to how virtually every organization, even those advocating similar claims, was in conflict with at least one other group.[58] Even physical violence between competing Jewish organizations (as opposed to verbal backbiting) became part of the Jewish political scene in the 1930s.[59]


Further, organizations advocating for similar policies failed to unite. A cursory glance at the Zionist movement—the most popular political movement among Jews in Poland—illustrates this point well: the movement was represented by the PS-Leftists, the PS-Rights, the Hitahdut, the Zerei Zion, the Dror, and several more. Figure 8.1 below shows this significant fragmentation. All of these organizations belonged to the Zionist movement, yet could not come together in the interest of their political goals.[60] On the whole, summarized Ezra Mendelsohn, Jewish politics in Poland resembled the proverbial "war of all against all."[61]

Organizations and political movements were also unstable. The influence of Zionism fluctuated throughout the interwar period: it advanced in the early 1920s, experienced a sharp decline between 1926-28, expanded again in the mid-1930s, and then became less powerful in the late

[55] Mendelsohn, "The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars," 14.
[56] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, s. 462.
[57] AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 1062, s. 7.
[58] Ibid., s. 3; Bacon, "Agudat Israel in Interwar Poland," 21.
[59] Mendelsohn, "The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars," 15.
[60] Mendelsohn, "The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars," 13.
[61] Ibid., 14.

1930s. The Folkspartei was a powerful force in the early interwar years, only to completely collapse by the 1930s. Even Agudas Israel, the most stable of all the Jewish organizations, lost considerable influence in the 1930s.[62] Similar stories can be told about the Bund and other Jewish organizations.

Figure 8.1. Fragmentation of Zionist movement in Interwar Poland



Source: http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/zionism_and_zionist_parties

Such inter-group conflict was reflected in the organizations' inability to amass enough "activists." Though there were a large number of organizations, many movements were run by a mere handful of stalwarts, and there was a deficit of people willing to "run the schools, the fun-raising campaigns, the party press."[63] As a result, the imprint of Jewish political organizations

[62] Ibid., 11 fn 5.
[63] Ibid., 17.

was often extremely superficial. Political organizations sprang to life during elections, only to lapse back into inactivity after the campaign. There were always those prepared to be candidates to run for Parliament and local Jewish community councils, but this by no means indicated widespread appeal.[64] The fluctuations in success of various Jewish organizations created an air of nihilism among the opposition, that the entire political enterprise was hollow and advancing political goals futile. Indeed, despite its largely homogenous social structure, the Jewish minority remained remarkably at odds with itself. The result was a politically weak minority.[65]

Had the MSW began outlawing organizations, it would have decreased the plurality and encouraged Jews to unite around a single camp. As a result, most members of Jewish organizations expended more energy on inter-organizational conflicts than on pressing the state for more autonomy—a clear benefit of a divide and rule policy.

Sponsoring Pluralism: The Agudas Israel and the New Zionist Organization

After the May coup,[66] the Ministry of Interior changed its view on Jewish political life. Before May 1926, the MSW considered the Jewish question on par with the Ukrainian as "the most dangerous for Poland's national security and public order."[67] But, with Piłsudski now in power, the Jewish "question" was no longer seen as such a pressing one. Indeed, Piłsudski "tended to value the traditions of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and to believe that its legacy of toleration was still applicable. He saw individuals as citizens of the state, with reciprocal

[64] Ibid., 12, 17; Kozyra, *Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych,* 377.
[65] Mendelsohn, "The Jews of Poland Between Two World War," 14.
[66] For brief discussion on the May Coup and regime types in Poland see Chapters 2 and 3.
[67] Kozyra, *Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych,* 357.

obligations."[68] The discussion shifted away from politics of autonomy and instead shifted to the economic welfare of Polish Jewry. No longer seen as a threat to national security, Polish-Jewish relations were set to improve.

In 1927, moderate Jewish organizations began advocating for a "tactical alliance" as a means of safeguarding Jewish interests.[69] As a result, Jewish political strategy in Poland took on two principal directions: cooperation and confrontation. With some exceptions, the Orthodox Agudas was most open to cooperation with the Polish government, along with Zionists in Galicia, while the Zionists in Central Poland (Congress Poland), the Bund, and the Folkists, continued to uphold oppositionist tactics in one form or another.[70] With the hope of marginalizing the influence of oppositionist Jewish organizations and gaining support among the Jewish population at large, the Piłsudski government (called "Sanacja") supported the Agudas Israel, thereby promoting organizational pluralism.[71] Agudas "became a bastion of support of [Piłsudski's] regime."[72] The result was a formal alliance between the Agudas and the Piłsudski government in the form of the Non-Partisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem, or BBWR) formed by Piłsudski in 1928. The Bloc consisted of several small parties with varying political outlooks, including several groups representing national minorities united in their support for the Piłsudski government.

[68] Timothy Snyder, *Black Earth: the Holocaust as History and Warning* (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2015), 47.
[69] AAN, MSW, Dop., syg. 1021, Spraw. za XII 1926-1927.
[70] Bacon, "Agudat Israel in Interwar Poland," 27.
[71] For more on relationship between Polish government and Agudas see Bacon, *Politics of Tradition*.
[72] Snyder, *Black Earth,* 48.

From a practical point of view, Agudas saw little future in the opposition Minorities Bloc (Blok Mniejszości Narodowych),[73] which, despite its electoral success in 1922, had modest legislative gains, and as a result Agudas saw its place in the Nonpartisan Bloc instead. Agudas believed that Jewish deputies, if they wanted success in parliament, should not enter government on a party list the Polish authorities regarded as hostile.[74] Agudas, however, also formed a Jewish National Bloc with the Folkists, seeking both accommodation with Polish authorities and voicing Jewish grievances as part of a broader Jewish organizational alliance. But this strategy backfired, and Agudas fell between two stools. Rival Jewish organizations, particularly the Zionists, labeled Agudas "traitors," and of all Jewish organizations running in the March 4, 1928 elections, Agudas lost the largest number of seats in parliament.

From the government's standpoint, though the alliance with Agudas did not "deliver the Jewish vote" as it had hoped, the creation of the Non-Partisan Bloc in Cooperation with the Government limited potential political gains for the opposition Minorities Bloc by splitting the vote and exacerbating already existing conflicts among the various minority organizations, including those that ran independently of both Blocs. The elections proved dismal for Jewish political parties: total Jewish representation fell from 35 in 1922 to 15 in 1928.[75] This downward spiral continued in the subsequent elections. In the 1930 Sejm elections, only three Jewish political organizations won mandates, and the total number of seats fell to seven: Galician Zionists (four),

[73] The Minorities bloc was a loose coalition of minority organizations (Ukrainian, Jewish, German, and Belarusian) that ran for parliamentary elections in 1922 (winning 66 mandates) and 1928 (44 mandates).
[74] Bacon, *The Politics of Tradition*, 266.
[75] Ibid., 266-8.

Congress Zionists (two), and Agudas (one).[76] The experience of the Jewish minority in Poland during this period provides an apt example of the inefficiency of a divided front.

Government Support for the New Zionist Organization

Another Jewish organization that enjoyed support from the Polish government was the New Zionist Organization, which promoted the notion of "Revisionist Zionism." The New Zionist Organization was formed in 1935 under the leadership of Ze'ev Jabotinsky (Vladimir Jabotinsky). Whereas "establishment" Zionism (or "General Zionism") was in favour of a more gradual colonization of Palestine, emphasizing the importance of economic development of Jewish Palestine, Revisionist Zionists were dissatisfied with the slow progress in carving out a Jewish national home in Palestine. The New Zionist Organization saw Zionism as a political issue, seeking, for example, to pressure the British to adopt a pro-Zionist policy and to expedite the emigration of Jews.[77] Jabotinsky and his organization "urged Jews in Europe to consider massive and rapid emigration while calling for the immediate creation of a State of Israel in the Mandates of both Palestine and Trans-Jordan… In June 1936, Jabotinsky presented his 'evacuation plan' to the Polish foreign ministry. He claimed that Palestine, over time, could absorb eight million Jews."[78] This form of Zionism, unsurprisingly, appealed to Poland's leaders.

In 1935, Jewish policymaking was largely transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[79] The two Ministries cooperated closely on the Jewish issue, but the transfer of many responsibilities to the Foreign Ministry signaled Poland's preference for solving

[76] Bacon, *The Politics of Tradition,* 271.
[77] Weinbaum, *A Marriage of Convenience,* 42.
[78] Snyder, *Black Earth,* 63.
[79] Ibid., 7.

the Jewish minority "problem" through mass emigration. There is much debate over the exact motives for Polish support for Zionism—whether it was genuine sympathy to the Zionist cause, or just a matter of pragmatism, with the mass exodus of Jews from Poland deemed positive for the country. Historian Pawel Korzec contends that "[c]onvergent interests led to cooperation between the Polish government and the Revisionist organization…The Polish government was indeed interested in such a development because it would result in Jewish disunity."[80] There is evidence in Ministry documents to support this contention. Jan Wagner, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs advisor and one of the main architects of Poland's relationship with the New Zionist Organization stated in a report:

> In particular, the aim of the unified action of the government should be:
>
> 1) Not to allow for the political consolidation of the Jews in Poland through the ascendency of a united representation of Polish Jewry, as well as through the strengthening of the New Zionist Organization, which should not, however, have a "government monopoly."
>
> 2) Support for protectionist relations to particular Jewish groups and organizations on the principle of *do ut des* not however on the principle of theoretical mutuality of interests. [81]

At a time when the appeal of Communism and the leftist Bund—which preached against emigration and sought a solution to the Jewish question through a radical reorganization of society, were on the rise among Jewish youth in Poland—the program preached by the Revisionist Zionists appeared to be an effective counter. Indeed, supporting the New Zionists

[80] Pawel Korzec, "Anti-Semitism in Poland as an intellectual, Social, and Political Movement," in *Studies of Polish Jewry,* ed. Joshua Fishmann (New York: Yivo Institute for Jewish Research, 1974), 92.
[81] Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, syg. 1004, s.17.

would help "separate Jews from the Communist movement,"[82] promote organization pluralism, and ensure a broken front.

Repressing Unification: State Banning of the All-Jewish Workers' Party (OZPP)

In 1931, opposition factions from within socialist parties that had criticized the Jewish Left's ineffective tactics and political program defected, primarily from the Bund and PS-Leftist, and merged to form their own organization: the All-Jewish Workers' Party (Ogólnożydowska Partia Pracy, or OZPP). The OZPP established its headquarters in Lwów, in Galicia, officially registering with authorities and quickly gaining popularity across the *kresy*.[83]

Scant existing literature posits that the OZPP was banned as a result of its communist ties.[84] Although the organization was set up under the influence and leadership of the illegal Communist Party of Western Ukraine, the OZPP was not banned until 1934, over three years after it was founded. The MSW, however, knew from the beginning that the OZPP had ties to the banned Communist party, reporting that, since its first meeting, the OZPP has been a "legal branch of the KPZU [Communist Party of Western Ukraine]." MSW security documents also discuss the close cooperation between the OZPP and KPZU, describing how the organization was reviving the communist movement in Western Ukraine.[85] Thus, ties to the Communist Party of Western Ukraine do not fully explain why it took the MSW until 1934 to ban the OZPP.

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[82] Weinbaum, *A Marriage of Convenience,* 12-13.
[83] For more on the eastern borderlands see Chapter 4.
[84] Holzer, *Mozaika Polityczna,* 567.
[85] J. Auerbach, "Ogólno-Żydowska Partia Pracy," *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historii,* no. 50 (1964): 47. MSW document cited, in Polish: ""kompartia wywiera na OZPP bezwzględny wpływ" [the Communist Party has an undeniable influence on the OZPP]." Note: there is almost no literature available on the OZPP. At most, the organization is mentioned in passing, usually just one line citing that the organization was banned in 1934. Auerbach

The OZPP was banned because it decreased organizational pluralism in Galicia among Jewish political parties. As was cited earlier, the MSW viewed the PS-Leftists and Bund organizations as the most "threatening" of radical and subversive Jewish organizations. Yet the two organizations were at odds with one another. Given that the OZPP largely attracted its membership from the PS-Leftists and Bund in Galicia, authorities were apprehensive about the OZPP's ability to bring together supporters from competing organizations and unite them under one umbrella.[86] On the other hand, the Central Jewish Bureau of the Communist Party of Poland (Centralne Biuro Żydowskie, or CBZ), the body that coordinated the creation of the OZPP, viewed the organization as a great success. Reports indicate that, in many localities, other Jewish political parties (both socialist and moderate organizations) were either forced to shut down or were weakened significantly because the rising popularity of the OZPP was diminishing their support-base.[87] Indeed, in July 1932, the Central Jewish Bureau commended the OZPP for weakening the Bund, PS-Leftists and Rightist, Zionists, and other "enemy" Jewish organizations in Galicia.[88]

The OZPP was unique in that, as a socialist party, it sought to unite the petty bourgeoisie (small-scale merchants) with proletarians in the fight for a socialist revolution, instead of only rallying workers, as did other Jewish leftist organizations. The group believed in the need for including, rather than rejecting, Jewish merchants in the struggle for socialism. This was a unique approach

(1964) is perhaps the only in-depth analysis on the organization to date. The article quotes, in length, MSW documents, which I cite in this section. Unfortunately, given the incredibly scattered nature of MSW archival documents I was not able to locate these same documents myself as the cataloging has changed since Auerbach wrote his article. I also only discovered Auerbach's article after my time in Warsaw, and lack of resources prevented me from returning to Warsaw to chase Auerbach's references myself.

[86] Auerbach, "Ogólno-Żydowska Partia Pracy," 46-7.

[87] Ibid., 40.

[88] Ibid.

that applied only to the Jewish minority; because discrimination throughout history against Jews prohibited them from taking up jobs as laborers, they were forced to find jobs as petty bourgeoisies and merchants.[89] Initially, the OZPP's approach of uniting the Jewish working and merchant class proved successful. The OZPP also tapped into a demographic—the Jewish merchants—previously shunned by other Jewish leftist organizations.

On February 10, 1934, the OZPP newspaper, the "Unzer Weg," published the organization's platform: to "establish a united front for a massive Jewish struggle for socialism and national liberation."[90] This publication was released just a few months before the MSW banned the organization. Though several Jewish organizations advocated for a "united front," the OZPP's quick rise in popularity in Galicia demonstrated that the organization had the potential to follow through on their word and unite the Jewish minority. Indeed, the group had already rapidly spread across Galicia in a short period.

The OZPP acted mainly in Galicia and by 1934 had seven offices in all major urban centres (Lwów, Stanisławów, Chełm, Drohobycz, Przemyśl, Kołomyja, Tarnopol).[91] The organization developed rapidly: in its first four months, the OZPP organized 30 local branches, and by July 1932, this number had increased to 40 local branches with 1,300 members. At the start of 1933, there were 2,000 registered members. By 1934, this number increased to 3,500, and, on the eve of the organization's banning, the OZPP had over 5,000 members across 100 local branches.[92] Police documents confirm that at a time when other Jewish political organizations were

[89] Ibid., 39-40.
[90] Ibid., 38.
[91] Ibid., 45.
[92] Ibid., 46.

stagnating, the OZPP's activity was expanding and the organization's membership was growing. Much of the organization's success was attributed to Communist aide in setting up local branches, thereby allowing structural form for the organization's expansion.[93]

The OZPP also had a significant number of trade unions under its influence.[94] Following its inception, the OZPP took over several trade unions previously under the influence of the Bund and PS-Leftists. In its short period of activity, the OZPP also created about 50 additional trade unions in Galicia with over 3,000 members, carrying out a number of coordinated strikes and protests calling for increased Jewish worker's rights across Galicia.[95]

In 1934 the MSW banned the OZPP. The MSW Political Department wrote to Provincial leaders in Galicia asking for a summary and characterization of the OZPP's activities, knowing that it was a legal branch of the KPZU. The governors of Lublin and Lwów believed that liquidating the organization was premature: the right-wing Jewish organizations would welcome the MSW's banning of the organization, adding that the organization has operated within the legal framework, and its actions are far from the revolutionary rhetoric it puts forward. Despite these recommendations from local officials, the MSW was intent on liquidating the organization as quickly as possible. On July 7, 1934 the MSW banned the OZPP, instructing the group to be dissolved by July 16, 1934.[96] The MSW justified its decision by stating that the OZPP operated to "expose leaders of other Jewish organizations" and prepare the "Jewish masses" for the

[93] Ibid.
[94] Power struggles between Jewish political organizations over trade unions were "fierce." See AAN, MSW, WN, syg. 961, s. 25.
[95] Auerbach, "Ogólno-Żydowska Partia Pracy," 50-51.
[96] Ibid., 57.

revolutionary "struggle for socialism." This was to be done through the "unification of all Jewish workers."[97]

Conclusions

The above discussion demonstrates that the Ministry of Interior's actions towards Jewish political organizations were consistent with the logic of divide and conquer. First, the MSW banned only one Jewish political organization—the All-Jewish Workers' Party (OZPP), while all other Jewish political organizations were allowed to operate. In other words, organizational pluralism was preferred, and repression was not the default policy. Second, the MSW did not ban all organizations deemed a "threat to peace and stability," even though repression was a viable option. By maintaining organizational pluralism, the Jewish movement became fiercely fragmented, thereby ensuring that no united front could be formed. Had the MSW banned some of the subversive organizations, particularly the Bund, which disagreed with virtually all other Jewish organizations, a united opposition would have been more likely to form. Third, the MSW reinforced organizational pluralism by supporting new divisions through funding, and cooperating with, Jewish organizations, such as the Orthodox Agudas Israel and the New Zionist Organization. Indeed, if the Polish government had not hoped to foster organizational plurality, the MSW would not have supported any Jewish organizations. Fourth, the MSW banned the All-Jewish Workers' Party (1931-1934), because it was able to unite the leftist Jewish opposition in Galicia, gaining a strong membership base largely by taking supporters away from the Bund and PS-Leftists and forcing many of their local branches to shut down because of membership defection to OZPP and decreasing organizational pluralism. In short, the MSW harbored divisions among Jewish minority groups in order to rule Jewish political organizations.

[97] Ibid.

Chapter 9: Beyond Interwar Poland

This chapter starts by discussing how the dissertation's findings can travel beyond interwar Poland, beginning with an examination of the Sudeten Germans in interwar Czechoslovakia. Infamously labeled a fifth column, Hitler's instrumental use of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia has given rise to a wealth of secondary literature on German political organizations that is unavailable for other cases. As a result, I use the German minority in interwar Czechoslovakia as a comparative case to test the dissertation's main hypothesis. Following the German case, I suggest how the logic of divide and rule can be applied more broadly by laying out four shadow cases, two taken from interwar eastern Europe, and two taken from a completely different context: contemporary Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The purpose is not to show conclusive evidence, because such a task is beyond the scope of the dissertation, but rather it is to demonstrate that the argument I put forward is plausible beyond interwar Poland. I conclude by reiterating the broader theoretical and methodological implications of this study.

Ethnic Minority Policies in Interwar Eastern Europe

Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia: The Puzzle

Like Poland, one-third of interwar Czechoslovakia's population comprised ethnic minorities (Table 9.1). Until recently, historians have broadly argued that interwar Czechoslovakia was "democratic," whereas Poland's government was "nationalist." In line with this supposition, minorities were assumed to have fared better under the former's rule. This crude analysis is no

longer conventional.[1] Indeed, the initial years of interwar Czechoslovakia did not usher in a government that purported minority rights. For one, the Czechoslovak constitution was created without the participation of *any* minority group, despite their large numbers. Further, before the first parliamentary elections in 1920, the leadership, including Premier Karel Kramar and Finance Minister Alois Rasin, came from the far-right nationalist National Democratic Party. Czechoslovakia's first Minister of Defense, Vaclav Klofac, was also the leader of the profoundly anti-German Czechoslovak National Socialist Party.[2]

In this newly created country, the Czechs and Slovaks, who, it was argued, were branches of the same ethnic group, represented the titular group, the "Czechoslovaks."[3] Unsurprisingly, this left several minority ethnic groups restive over the postwar political arrangement. They felt trapped within the borders of a state that refused to recognize their right to national self-determination and coerced them into becoming loyal subjects of the Czechoslovak nation-state.[4]

[1] J. King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); cited in Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, "Beyond Dictatorship and Democracy: Rethinking National Minority Inclusion and Regime Type in Interwar Eastern Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no.8-9 (2010):1089-1118.
[2] V. Benes, "Czechoslovak Democracy and Its Problems, 1918-1920," in *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1948,* eds. V.S. Mamatey and R. Luza (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 39-98; T.M. Kelly, *Without remorse: Czech National Socialism in late-Habsburg Austria* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2006); Kopstein and Wittenberg, "Beyond Dictatorship and Democracy," 1098.
[3] Nancy Merriwether Wingfield, *Minority Politics in a Multinational State: The German Social Democrats in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1989), xi.
[4] For more on the inter-ethnic tensions arising from a multi-ethnic state governed in the name of one dominant ethnic group, see Chapter 4.

Table 9.1. Population in Czechoslovakia by Ethnicity (Native Language)

	Census Year			
	1921[5]		1930	
Native Language	Population	%	Population	%
Czechoslovak	8,760,937	65.51	9,688,770	66.91
Ruthenian	461,849	3.45	549,169	3.79
German	3,123,568	23.36	3,231,688	22.32
Magyar	745,431	5.57	691,923	4.78
Polish	75,853	0.57	81,737	0.57
Hebrew-Yiddish	180,855	1.35	186,642	1.29
Other	25,871	0.19	49,636	0.34
Total	13,374,364	100	14,479,565	100

Source: Giovanni Capoccia, *Defending Democracy: Reactions to extremism in Interwar Europe* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005), 74.

Though the redrawing of Europe's post-World War I map left several minority ethnic groups within the borders of newly created Czechoslovakia—namely the Magyars (Hungarians), Ruthenians (Ukrainians), Poles, and Jews—it was the German minority, known as the Sudeten Germans, who presented the most salient challenge for Czechoslovak authorities. About 23 percent of Czechoslovakia's population was composed of German-speakers, concentrated in the frontier districts bordering Austria and Germany (Figure 9.1). Not only were they one of the largest minority groups in Europe, second only to the Ukrainians in Poland, but Germans in Czechoslovakia outnumbered even the Slovaks. Their sheer size and ties to an irredentist neighbouring state made it impossible for Czechoslovak authorities to ignore the German "minority question."

[5] The 1921 census is known to be biased in over counting Czechoslovaks at the expense of Germans, Kopstein and Wittenberg, "Beyond Dictatorship and Democracy," 1099.



Figure 9.1. Linguistic Map of Interwar Czechoslovakia. *Source: Wikimedia Commons*

From the beginning, the Sudeten Germans were portrayed as "outsiders and enemies of the new state, which belonged explicitly to the Czechs and Slovaks," and authorities took no pains in concealing their nationalist attitude towards the German minority.[6] The first President, Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, for example, asserted in his 1918 Christmas address that "our Germans" must "work with us" in building the new Czechoslovak state, adding that "[Czechoslovaks] have created the state and this determines the constitutional position of our Germans who originally entered the country as immigrants and colonists."[7] It was not long before German minority leaders began quoting President Masaryk, using his words as alleged proof of the deep-seated

[6] Erin Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 61.
[7] Quoted in Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining*, 61.

animosity Czechoslovaks held toward the "outsider" German minority[8] (despite his apparent "honest desire to see justice done both to Czechs and Germans").[9]

But the Czechoslovak government did not stop at words. Authorities wasted little time in affirming ownership over "their" state: the national bureaucracy and educational system were dominated overwhelmingly by ethnic Czechoslovaks; strict language laws were implemented to restrict the use of minority languages; and German manufactures were coerced into employing ethnic Czechoslovaks at the expense of German workers.[10] Further, land reforms saw predominately German and Hungarian estates parceled out to the benefit of Czechoslovak settlers. These latter policies shifted demographics, with Czechs moving into German towns to take German jobs, and settling onto land parceled out from German and Hungarian estates.[11]

Discrimination at the institutional level was also revealed when, after the first elections in 1920, despite garnering a significant number of votes, Germans (like all other minority parties) were excluded from government positions. The dominant Czechoslovak discourse held that Germans were fundamentally disloyal.[12] Having lost so much from the creation of the Czechoslovak state, Germans simply could not be trusted to take part in the Czechoslovak political process.[13] They were, after all, incorporated into Czechoslovakia against their will, and in the initial interwar years, German organizations, without exception, rallied around irredentist demands, even in spite

[8] Ibid.
[9] Johann Wolfgang Brugel, *Czechoslovakia before Munich; the German Minority Problem and British Appeasement Problem* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 60.
[10] Kopstein and Wittenberg, "Beyond Dictatorship and Democracy," 1098.
[11] Ibid.; J. Rothschild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 89-107.
[12] Kosptein and Wittenberg, "Beyond Dictatorship and Democracy," 1098.
[13] Ibid.

of strong economic disincentives for secession.[14] From the perspective of the German minority, Czechoslovaks would use their position of power to forcefully assimilate the Sudeten Germans.[15] This mutual resentment and suspicion pushed Germans to reject even "the more generous Czech suggestions of cooperation," opting instead to vehemently demand their right to self-determination.[16]

Thus we have a situation during the early interwar years, when hostile relations existed between Czechoslovaks and Germans. Although state officials pursued discriminatory group-level policies in order to safeguard the Czechoslovak "nation-state," these attitudes, interestingly, were not reflected in state policies towards German political organizations. Despite the "high perceived potential for repression" of minorities in the early years of Czechoslovak independence, Czechoslovak authorities waited 15 years until banning the first German organization.[17] Indeed, the interwar Czechoslovak government banned only two German political organizations, the German National Socialist Workers' Party (Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei, or DNSAP) and the German Nationalist Party (Deutsche Nationalpartei, or DNP), allowing the majority of organizations to operate legally. A third organization, the Sudeten German Party (Sudetendeutsche Partei, or SdP), was targeted with state repression in the mid-late 1930s, but, as will be discussed below, Czechoslovak authorities missed their window of opportunity to successfully crack down on the organization. As a result, they faced a formidable, organized, and united German front which withstood Czechoslovak

[14] Sheila Grant Duff, *German and Czech: A Threat to European Peace* (London: V. Gollancz Itd and the New Fabian Research Bureau, 1937), 26, 28; Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining,* 61.
[15] Ronald M Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem, 1933-1938: Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1975), 42.
[16] Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1967, 2nd ed.), 122.
[17] Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining,* 55.

repression and ultimately played a pivotal role in the eventual dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938 following the Munich Agreement. Unlike the experience in Poland, where Germans remained sharply divided between several regional organizations, Germans in Czechoslovakia, though sharply divided at first, by 1935 were able to unite under the umbrella of a single comprehensive party that successfully challenged the state.[18]

An interesting puzzle arises. If the state was willing to implement group-level discriminatory policies, such as intolerant language laws, exclusion of minority parties from government positions, prejudiced land reforms, as well as make clear that Czechoslovakia was to be a state governed in the interests of the titular ethnic group, it is surprising that no German political organization was banned until 1933, especially given the antagonistic, anti-state, and irredentist agendas put forth by all German organizations in the initial interwar years. To shed light on this puzzle I begin by briefly exploring alternative explanations, demonstrating that none suffice to explain state policies towards Sudeten German political organizations. I then turn to using the divide and rule hypothesis as a way addressing this gap.

Exploring Alternative Explanations

Traditional explanations shed little light on why three organizations were outlawed and the majority of Sudeten German political organizations were allowed to operate in interwar Czechoslovakia. Regime-type cannot explain this variation because Czechoslovakia remained a democracy throughout the entire interwar period, though the levels of repression fluctuated. Indeed, despite being a democracy, when officials deemed repression necessary, they followed

[18] Winson Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3.

suit, as demonstrated through their willingness to create laws to legally ban organizations they perceived as threatening. For example, when the Nazi DNSAP was labeled a threat in the early 1930s, the government enacted the law of October 25, 1933 "'concerning suspension of activities and dissolution of political parties."[19] This law was drafted using particularly vague language, and left significant room for interpretation in the hands of Czechoslovak officials. For one, political parties were defined broadly "to cover all sort of groups and associations."[20] Criteria for banning an organization were equally ambiguous: an organization could be outlawed if it threatened "the independence, the constitutional unity, the integrity, the democratic-republican form," or if "the security of the Czechoslovak Republic was gravely endangered."[21] Also, this all-encompassing law could be applied *ex post facto,* as was the case with the German Nationalists and Nazis, to validate repressive measures taken against an organization. The law of October 25, 1933, however, was not the only legal measure in place Czechoslovak authorities could have enacted (and did) in order to crack down on an organization. The "Law on the protection of the Republic" of 1923 was also used to indict members of organizations deemed subversive, and authorities, in order to ban the German Nazi and Nationalist Parties, even resorted to an old Austro-Hungarian law of 1867 on restricting the freedom of associations, which was still in force in Czechoslovakia.[22]

In sum, three important points merit emphasizing: first, authorities had at their disposal the laws required to outlaw organizations they deemed threatening. Second, the creation and use of such laws also indicate that Czechoslovak authorities were in fact willing to repress organizations

[19] Giovanni Capoccia. *Defending Democracy,* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005), 94.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Cited in ibid.
[22] Capoccia, *Defending Democracy,* 94.

when they deemed it necessary. Third, these laws tell us little about when their use actually became necessary. In other words, it is unclear what constitutes a "threat" to a state's "integrity," "unity," "security," "democracy," and so on. This ambiguity becomes particularly evident when we take into consideration the full variation of organizations that *could have* been banned based on their potentially "threatening" characteristics. Unanswered questions linger.

Shifting focus to organizational characteristics also cannot fully explain Czechoslovak actions towards German groups; several organizations shared similar ideologies and political platforms, all claiming to represent the same minority group, yet only a select few were banned. It is indeed puzzling that no German political organizations—all of which rejected the Czechoslovak constitution in the early interwar years, refused to cooperate with the government, and directly challenged the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak state—was banned before 1933. Surely these characteristics, as the literature expounds, would make all German political organizations in the initial interwar years suitable for state repression. Yet the government chose organizational pluralism as the preferred policy, rather than outlawing the German groups. Organization size and demands also reveal little. When banned, the DNSAP and DNP were not the largest German political organizations at the time. Conversely, Henlein's SHF/SdP, discussed in detail below, despite being the largest German political organization by far, was not banned for several years, until 1938. Further, organizational ideology and secessionist demands (particularly of DNSAP/DNP) remained consistent throughout the years, and thus cannot explain why they were not banned sooner. In short, current explanations offered in the literature and summarized in Table 9.2 below, are shown to be incomplete when the full variation of state response to German organizations is taken into account.

The reason that the Czechoslovak government chose not to outlaw the majority of German political organization can be explained using the logic of divide and rule. Despite the fact that all organizations essentially rallied around the same irredentist, anti-state claims, Germans in Czechoslovakia were unable to unite under one umbrella organization. Indeed, "[t]he most striking thing about the Sudeten Germans, politically, was the number of parties into which they had divided, and the squabbles between these groups."[23] All appeals for German minority unity failed in the early interwar years. Lacking a united, anti-state front, the German minority in Czechoslovakia could not pose a credible threat to authorities and therefore escaped state repression in the early interwar period. Only when an organization was able to unite a credible, anti-state German front did authorities intervene with repressive measures. The subsequent pages illustrate how taking this point of view sheds new light on Czechoslovak policies towards German political organizations.

[23] Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,*131.

Table 9.2. Summary of alternative explanations derived from the literature

Hypothesis	Accept/Reject Hypothesis	Evidence
Group-level a. Organizations that represent ethnic groups that are indigenous, territorially concentrated, and large are more likely to be repressed than organizations that represent small, dispersed, or recently resettled populations	Reject H_a	Only three Sudeten German political organizations were banned; the majority were allowed to operate. Sub-group variation left unexplained.
Organization-level b. Small ethnic minority organizations are more likely to be repressed than larger ones. c. Organizations propagating an ideology incompatible to that of the state's are more likely to be repressed. d. Secessionist minority ethnic organizations are more likely to be repressed by the state than other such ethnic organizations.	Reject H_b Reject H_c Reject H_d	When banned, the DNSAP and DNP were not the largest or smallest German political organizations at the time. Conversely, Henlein's SHF/SdP, despite being the largest German political organization by far, was not banned for several years, until 1938. At the time of its banning, however, it was by far the largest. Further, organization ideology and secessionist demands (particularly of DNSAP/DNP) remained consistent throughout the years, and thus cannot explain why they were not banned sooner.
Regime-level e. Democratic regimes are more likely to allow minority ethnic organizations to operate, whereas authoritarian regimes are more likely to repress organizations.	Reject H_e	Czechoslovakia remained democratic throughout the entire interwar period yet repression fluctuated.

Changing Tides: From 'Negativism' to 'Activism' and Back

By 1920, almost all German-speakers accepted that their foreseeable future was within the borders of Czechoslovakia. As a result, German organizations began, albeit resentfully, working within the legal framework of the Czechoslovak political system.[24] More than six German parties

[24] Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining,* 64.

participated in the first elections in 1920, all basing their campaigns on German national self-determination.[25]

The election results were favourable for German parties. In total, German parties won 67 seats, representing 25.6 percent of the Chamber of Deputies and 37 of 150 seats in the Senate (see Table 9.3).[26] The largest German party by a significant margin was the Social Democrats (31 seats), followed by the German Nazis and Nationalists (15 seats), the Agrarians (11 seats), and finally the Christian Socialists who ran with several smaller parties (10 seats).[27] Despite their substantial presence in parliament, however, Germans were not given a place in government. Instead, the country was governed by five Czechoslovak parties, know as "the Petka," or "the Five," made up of the left-wing Social Democrats, the right-wing National Democrats, the National Socialists, the Agrarians, and the Populists (Catholics).[28]

Although German leaders reluctantly accepted the necessity of working within the legal framework of the state, they still opposed the existence of Czechoslovakia, and a majority of political parties belonged to the so-called "negativist" bloc, which refused to cooperate with authorities.[29] To make this point clear, soon after the elections, on June 1, leaders of German political organizations declared in Parliament that the Czechoslovak State had been created against their will and that Germans would continue to push for national self-determination, rejecting the Czechoslovak constitution because it was drawn up without their participation.[30]

[25] Ibid., 67.
[26] Grant Duff, *German and Czech,* 29.
[27] Ibid., 30.
[28] Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining,* 67.
[29] Ibid., 68.
[30] Grant Duff, *Czech and German,* 29.

Table 9.3. German Seats in the Czechoslovak Lower Chamber, 1920-1935

Party Acronym	English Name	Seats in 1920		Seats in 1925		Seats in 1929		Seats in 1935	
		N	(%)*	*N*	(%)	*N*	(%)	*N*	(%)
BdL	Farmers' Federation (German Agrarians)	11	3.9	24	8	12	4	5	1.7
DCVP	German Christian Social Party	10	3.6	13	4.3	14	4.7	6	2
DSAP	German Social Democratic Party	31	11	17	5.7	21	7	11	3.7
DNP	German National Party (German Nationalists)	10	3.6	10	3.3	7	2.3	-	-
DNSAP	German National Socialist (German Nazis)	5	1.8	7	2.3	8	2.7	-	-
SdP	Sudeten German Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	44	14.7
	Smaller German Parties	5	1.8	-	-	4	1.3	-	-

Source: Capoccia, *Defending Democracy,* 75.
** Percent of total seats in lower chamber.*

The German minority hoped for Czechoslovakia's imminent collapse and the revision of borders. After 1922, however, when this hope faded and petitions to the League of Nations fell on deaf ears, German political organizations split into two camps. One camp, the "activists," concluded that the German minority's situation could best be improved through "sensible co-operation between Germans and Czechs."[31] The "negativist" camp, on the other hand, remained staunchly opposed to any form of cooperation.[32] The spirit of cooperation prevailed, and by 1929 the

[31] Franz Spina, leader of the German Agrarians, quoted in Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 132.
[32] Grant Duff, *German and Czech,* 29.

majority of German organizations was in favour of the so-called "activist" policy, including the German Social Democrats, the Agrarian Party, and the Christian Socialists in addition to a few smaller parties. Only the emphatically Nazi DNSAP and Nationalist DNP were left bitterly intransigent.[33] To the benefit of Czechoslovak authorities, the activist camp represented over 75 percent of the German electorate.[34] Indeed, with the majority of Germans newly hopeful about activism and open to cooperation with Czechoslovak authorities (or at the very least willing to give it a chance), the next few years of Czechoslovak-German relations were "prosperous and relatively easy."[35] German Ministers were even included in the Cabinet during this period.[36] The relatively amicable relations between Czechoslovak authorities and the vast majority of German political organizations left no need for state repression.

The German-Czechoslovak honeymoon, however, was short-lived. Within a year, a change in political temperament among Sudeten Germans could already be sensed, as they shifted away from activism and instead towards negativism. The pronounced change in mood was brought on by two inter-related factors: the world economic depression that broke out in 1929 and the resulting social, economic, and national grievances among Germans in Czechoslovakia, intensified by Nazi influence from Germany.[37] The Sudeten Germans, compared to the rest of Czechoslovakia, were hit particularly hard by the economic crisis.[38] With a sharp decline in exports, the industrial Sudeten region suffered tremendously and Germans made up more than 50 percent of unemployed in Czechoslovakia, while representing only about 20 percent of the


[33] Ibid., 26; Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 132, 134.
[34] Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich,* 63.
[35] Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 132.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Grant Duff, *Czech and German,* 31.
[38] Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining,* 75.

population.[39] The result was a significant shift from activism to negativism over a short period of time. Negativist German organizations, chiefly the DNSAP and DNP, took advantage of this shift in mood and increasingly began to unite the German opposition. Indeed, the economic crisis and grievances among Sudeten Germans quickly hardened the demarcation between German activism and negativism, with the latter gaining more momentum at the expense of the former.

Figure 9.2 illustrates this change in tide from activism to negativism well. We see that following the 1920, 1925, and 1928 elections, German "activists" overwhelming dominated the political arena and staunch negativists were kept at a manageable minority. By 1935, however, there was an almost complete reversal in this sentiment, with nearly 75 percent of German seats in parliament belonging to the "negativists." In other words, the opposition had united. Thus, it is unsurprising that government crackdown began in the 1930s when this change in sentiment was set in motion and a united German opposition was forming. The subsequent section explains how the increasing threat of a German uniting opposition spurred government crackdown.

[39] Ibid.

Figure 9.2. Proportion of German seats in Parliament in favour of cooperation with the state ("Activists") versus those against ("Negativists")



Suppressing the Uniting German Opposition: Outlawing the Nazis and Nationalists

Like its parallel movement in Germany, the Nazi German National Socialist Workers' Party (Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei, or DNSAP) in Czechoslovakia was "keenly anti-Semitic and anti-democratic."[40] It was "racialist and Pan-German, desiring the union of all German-speaking people in one Reich," even adopting the same banners and uniforms as their Nazi counterparts in Germany."[41] The "extremist and irredentist German National Party (DNP) and the German National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), a proto-Nazi organization, rejected

[40] Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 135.
[41] Ibid.

liberal democracy, preached anti-Semitism, and vilified the Czechoslovak state."[42] The DNSAP, along with its ally the DNP, was unmistakably inimical to the Czechoslovak Republic from every point of view since its founding in 1918. It is thus overly simplistic to claim that, in isolation, the German Nazi and Nationalist parties were outlawed for their ideology, or even as a result of Hitler's rise to power in Germany. Indeed, the DNSAP was, from its founding, consistently "negativist," with its irredentist party program of 1918 calling for the "unification of the whole German settlement area in Europe in a democratic, social German Reich;" this stance, irreconcilable with aims of the Czechoslovak government, remained unchanged throughout the interwar period.[43]

Yet the organizations were not banned until 1933 because, as will be shown, Czechoslovak authorities had a preference for organizational pluralism, not repression. Only when the German Nazis and Nationalists threatened this plurality by uniting the opposition did Czechoslovak authorities step in and outlaw the organizations. With negativist German organizations' quick rise to popularity over previously accepted activist German organizations, Czechoslovak authorities faced an increasingly united, and intransigent, opposition. While activist organizations represented over 75 percent of the electorate before 1929, by the mid 1930s, this had completely changed, with the negativist trend having gained almost 70 percent of Sudeten electoral German support in only a few years (Figure 9.2 above). It was, in short, the ability of the organizations to suppress organizational plurality among the German minority that caused the real threat and led to their outlawing.

[42] Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, "Does Familiarity Breed Contempt? Inter-Ethnic Contact and Support for Illiberal Parties," *The Journal of Politics* 71, no. 2 (2009): 417.
[43] Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem,* 51.

Until 1933, state authorities tolerated the DNSAP and DNP because, up until that point, the organizations were relatively small (representing under a quarter of the German electorate) and thus did not pose a significant threat to the Czechoslovak government, despite their staunchly anti-state rhetoric. The groups were also overshadowed by the majority of German political organizations which were, by the mid 1920s, willing to cooperate with the state. More importantly, however, the antagonistic relationship between the German Nazis and other German organizations ensured that there could be no united German minority front. The Sudeten Germans hoped that, if they could find expression through a "united front" organization, the German minority in Czechoslovakia could finally attain its goal of self-rule. It was, understandably, in the interest of Czechoslovak authorities to prevent the rise of such an organization, and the presence of the negativist DNSAP and DNP in the early interwar years was instrumental in ensuring this broken German front. From as early as the summer of 1919, German minority leaders "tried again and again to form a centralized organization to represent their whole people."[44] Invariably they had little success, "mainly for the quite understandable reason that the existing political parties on the Right [DNSAP and DNP], although approving in principle of such a unity organization, were unwilling to relinquish any of their political authority to such a body."[45] Indeed, though the Sudeten Nazis and Nationalists "emphasized Pan-German cultural unity," they lashed out endlessly at activist German organizations, and "other German parties blamed them as the group which put most obstacles [in the way of unifying the German front]."[46]

[44] Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem,* 43-44.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 135.

Because of their unwillingness to surrender their independence and identity, a centralized organization simply was not in the cards so long as the DNSAP and DNP were allowed to operate, and early attempts to create a united German organization, to represent all Sudeten Germans regardless of class or party affiliation, never came to fruition because of these inter-organizational divisions. As a result, there was little incentive for Czechoslovak authorities to ban the organizations – that is, until the economic world crisis hit in 1929 and led disenfranchised Sudeten Germans, who were arguably most effected by the crisis in Czechoslovakia, to seek change in representation in government. This was a pivotal moment in Czechoslovak-German relations. In the midst of the economic hardships, Sudeten Germans succumbed to the temptation to believe that they were suffering due to Czechoslovak neglect or, worse, a deliberate policy of government repression.[47] The Sudeten Nazis capitalized on this growing feeling of disenfranchisement among the German minority and began attracting significant support by pledging to fight "national oppression." In spite of Czechoslovak government attempts to address Germans' grievances, they were still drawn to the DNSAP, especially in areas that experienced the most economic downturn.[48] They were hungry for change that the government could not provide.

The German minority thus came to believe that the activists who had dominated German minority politics in Czechoslovakia until 1930 had been clearly unable to safeguard their interests and, as a result, were willing to throw their support behind the alternative, negativist, movement, represented by the DNSAP and DNP. This sentiment was reflected in Parliament, where their representation rose from five seats in 1920 to eight in 1929 (the largest increase in

[47] Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining,* 76
[48] Ibid.

representation of any German organization, most of which lost seats). Though perhaps a modest increase, this upward trend foreshadowed the changing political tide, with the activist camp continuing to lose and the negativists gaining an increasing following. Indeed, in the wake of the ever-growing misery and dissolution of the economic crisis, thousands of radicalized Sudeten Germans continued to flock to the DNSAP. Between 1930-1932, membership more than doubled from 30,000 to over 61,000. Reports claim that, in May 1932, there were 1,024 *Ortsgruppe* ("town groups") with 61,000 members and over 250,000 "sympathizers."[49] In the five months prior to June of 1932 alone, 14,000 new members were recruited, and 110 *Ortsgruppe* founded. Hitler's ascension to power served only to heighten the tension between Czechoslovaks and the German minority, bringing in "new waves of Sudeten Germans into the DNSAP in Czechoslovakia."[50]

Certainly, the more support the negativist front amassed at the expense of the activists, the more in danger it was of Czechoslovak repression. The long expected crackdown began in 1932 when the Czechoslovak government opened the highly publicized *Volkssport* trial, in which several leaders of the DNSAP's youth organization, most of them students, were "accused of having prepared armed rebellion in connection with a foreign Power, and with having planned the destruction of Czechoslovakia in order to bring about a Pan-German union."[51] The DNSAP was subjected to intensified surveillance and harassment. Eventually, leaders of the DNSAP *Volkssport* were tried and convicted for violating the Law for the Protection of the Republic.[52] By this point, it had become clear that the days of the DNSAP were numbered and that it was not

[49] Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem,* 52.
[50] Ibid., 53.
[51] Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 138-9.
[52] Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem,* 52.

long before the DNSAP was entirely banned by the state. On February 23, 1933, the House of Deputies lifted the parliamentary immunity of the DNSAP delegates by a vote of 120 to 44.[53] Throughout the spring and summer of 1933 DNSAP leaders were expecting any day that their party would be repressed and that they would be jailed. To forestall their imminent forced dissolution, on September 28, 1933, at an extraordinary meeting, the DNSAP voted to liquidate their party, and their leaders fled to Germany. DNP leaders followed suit.[54] In November 1933, the Czechoslovak government officially banned the organizations.[55] The DNP, though not nearly as popular as the DNSAP, was outlawed "in order to deprive the Nazis of a shelter which they would quite certainly have used."[56]

The story, as we know, did not end here. Once the Nazi and Nationalist parties were dissolved, there was no political organization left which could lawfully represent the "emphatically national" and negativist Sudeten Germans. The void left by the dissolution of both German radical parties on the right, however, with their ever-growing following, had to be filled in some way. In all likelihood, this space would be occupied by another major political organization.[57] The organization that carried on the torch, as will be discussed below, was the Sudeten German Home Front, later renamed the Sudeten German Party.

[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.; Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 199.
[55] Capoccia, *Defending Democracy,* 95.
[56] Brugel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich,* 106.
[57] Ibid.

A Fatal Mistake: Missed Opportunity to Repress the Uniting German Front

Almost immediately following the dissolution of the DNSAP and the DNP in September 1933, a new German organization claimed leadership of the Sudeten German nationalist camp: the Sudeten German Home Front (*Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront*, or SHF) led by Konrad Henlein. On October 1, 1933, Henlein, a "young, little-known instructor of gymnastics offered himself as the leader who would restore the unity of all Czechoslovak Germans."[58] He set out to establish a movement that would encompass all German organizations, parties, and unions, declaring that the Sudeten Germans "'must unite to protect our people, our homeland and our jobs and to rise again' as 'one.'"[59] Riding on the coattails of the dissolved DNSAP and DNP, Henlein continued to unite the disenfranchised Sudeten minority into one movement.

In less than six months after entering the political arena, over 300 SHF *Ortsgruppe* ("town groups") were founded, and their number continued to increase at an impressive rate of 100 per month. Membership had jumped from 9,500 in October 1933 to 13,000 in January 1934, and more than doubled in the subsequent three months: by April, the SHF membership was an estimated 32,000.[60] Further, contacts between Henlein and Nazi leaders, and above all the very short time period between the dissolution of the Sudeten Nazi and Nationalist parties and the founding of the SHF led Czechoslovak authorities to suspect that Henlein was "merely offering a surrogate for the dissolved Sudeten Nazi organization."[61] This perception was fueled by the fact that high proportions of old members of the outlawed German Nazi and Nationalist organizations

[58] Radomir Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: a Study of Czech-German Relations* (London: Routledge&K.Paul, 1964), 71.
[59] Quoted in Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining,* 77.
[60] Smelner, *The Sudeten Problem,* 82.
[61] Ibid., 56-57.

had joined the ranks of the SHF.[62] Given the authorities' treatment of the DNSAP and DNP, one could easily assume that the SHF would have shared a similar fate. The government, however, delayed in making a decision on the SHF, a move that proved to be detrimental to the Republic.[63]

It was largely Henlein's remarkable ability to play both sides that kept Czechoslovak repression at bay: while recruiting from, and uniting, the ever-increasing number of disgruntled negativists, Henlein made statements to the Czechoslovak public that in fact the SHF was to be regarded as an activist organization.[64] Aware of their vulnerability to state repression, Henlein and other SHF leaders were quick to distance themselves from the outlawed Nazi and Nationalist parties. First, they made clear that all SHF top officials lacked a political past, yet instead had originated from the traditionalist cultural organization, the Cultural Union (*Kameradschaftsbund,* or KB).[65] But it was mainly Henlein himself who had the desire and ability to win the confidence of Czechoslovak authorities. Through restrained rhetoric in his carefully crafted speeches, Henlein professed loyalty to Czechoslovakia, claiming to uphold the principles of democracy and the integrity of the Republic.[66] These claims were highlighted at Henlein's first press conference in Prague on October 8, 1933, where he painted the SHF as a loyalist, activist German organization:

> Fate has placed us in this place which has become our home, bound to us by a thousand years of history; and it is in this place—and therefore in this State—that we shall have to shape our destiny…Since we embrace the Czechoslovak State, we also embrace the principles of democracy, which guarantee the equal rights of nations…We are and shall remain Germans, but we embrace with the most profound conviction the task which has been allotted to us Sudeten Germans within the framework of the Czechoslovak State.[67]

[62] Wiskeman, *Czechs and Germans,* 202.
[63] Wingfield, *Minority Politics,* 124.
[64] Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 202-3.
[65] Ibid., 202.
[66] Luza, *The Transfer of Sudeten Germans,* 70-72.
[67] Quoted in ibid., 72.

On October 21, in his speech at Bohmisch Leipa (Ceska Lipa), Henlein developed more fully the "neo-activist" standpoint he had outlined at his press conference on October 8, 1933. He began by repudiating both Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism, claiming that the two movements would inevitably lead to war. He further claimed that "at a time when Sudeten Germans were disloyal and *desorientes*, the SHF had sprung into the breach, and, by pressing for co-operative in place of a coercive policy, had brought them back to allegiance to the State, while insisting, of course, that they could never cease to be Germans."[68] Finally, though calling for de-centralization of state power, Henlein reassured his audience that the country's unity was a priority.

The speech should have initiated new and promising co-operation between the Czechoslovaks and the German minority. Yet, from the very first days of Henlein's foray into Sudeten German politics, an uncomfortable feeling existed among Czechoslovak authorities that Henlein and his organization represented a compromise that was "so complicated and self-contradictory as to lack sufficient substance to exist."[69] Indeed, Henlein's movement primarily comprised the younger generation that stood against the impotence and compromises of the activist German organizations, as well as their failure to improve the conditions of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. Thus, Henlein's claims that the SHF was a loyalist organization seeking cooperation with Czechoslovakia was complicated by the fact that the organization's support largely drew from Sudeten Germans who grew tried of "cooperation" and "activism." To further complicate matters, the mounting hostility among Sudeten Germans at the growing economic and social grievances resulting from the world economic depression was combined with a mood

[68] Ibid.; Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 203.
[69] Wiskemann, 203-4.

of "hope derived from both intense Sudeten German nationalism and the triumph of Nazis in the Reich."[70] As a result, the overall atmosphere between Czechoslovaks and Germans increasingly "became suspicious and nervous."[71] It was thus difficult for Czechoslovak authorities to reconcile, on the one hand, Henlein's claims of loyalty and cooperation on the part of Sudeten Germans, when, on the other hand, many Czechoslovaks strongly suspected that the SHF, which drew most of its support from disenfranchised negativist Germans, was merely a Trojan horse for the real German objective: the annihilation of Czechoslovakia.[72]

Despite these mounting contradictions, Henlein still continued to stave off state repression and "allay fears of a new totalitarian movement."[73] One important political tactic he used involved making concessions with activist German parties in government. Realizing that they could not ignore Henlein's movement, to which they were losing significant popularity, some German activists, in exchange for concessions, acted as protectorates for the SHF against influential circles in government that lobbied for its outlawing.[74] Franz Spina, Health Minister and leader of the German Agrarian Party (Bund der Landwirte), played a large part in influencing Czechoslovak authorities to grant the SHF a probationary period. In exchange for this protection, Henlein had promised Spina that the SHF would not seek to organize German peasants, the main support-base of Spina's Agrarian Party.[75] Other German activist organizations, like the Christian Socialists, followed suit, making truces, for the time being, with the ever-expanding SHF.[76]

[70] Ibid., 69.
[71] Luza, *the Transfer of Sudeten Germans,* 72.
[72] Ibid., 72.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem,* 83.
[76] Ibid.

Czechoslovak government officials also seemed to decide that it was preferable to "keep the new radical movement out in the open where it could be better controlled and perhaps even be drawn into the inevitable compromises that go into making up legitimate political activity."[77] In 1934, it continued to appear as if Henlein's SHF movement even "might perform the valuable work of enrolling the negativist Germans behind an activist banner."[78] Outlawing the organization, authorities worried, would push it underground, resulting in a clandestine irredentist organization representing a radicalized German nationalist movement.[79] Further, Czechoslovak authorities noted that, despite the SHF's ability to unite Sudeten Germans on the ground, at its core, the organization was quite divided. The SHF's leadership originated from the cultural organization *Kameradschaftsbund*, known as the "traditionalists," who sought autonomy for Germans within Czechoslovakia. With the banning of the DNSAP and DNP, however, much if not most of the SHF's membership was made up of radicals who, in contrast to the traditionalists, strongly favoured irredentism.[80] Indeed, the real threat, "at least for the time being, did not come from outside the SHF, but from within."[81] With the founding of the united front under the SHF, antagonisms that had previously been fought out between several smaller organizations became internal factional quarrels within the single umbrella organization. Without a German Nationalist or Nazi party to go to, Sudeten radicals flocked to the SHF, often in the form of "vicious" and "subversive" factions that opposed the more moderate, traditionalist point of view of SHF leadership.[82] The fact that the SHF aspired to political leadership of the entire German minority in Czechoslovakia "gave these antagonisms a critical importance they otherwise might not have

[77] Ibid.
[78] Wiskeman, *Czechs and Germans,* 203.
[79] Smelser. *The Sudeten Problem,* 83.
[80] Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining,* 78.
[81] Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem,* 84.
[82] Ibid., 55.

had."[83] These SHF intra-organizational conflicts between radicals and traditionalists benefited Czechoslovak authorities. Because radical SHF factions sought to undermine their traditionalist opponents, they would often "deliver extremely compromising evidence to the Czechoslovak authorities, who were only too glad to have an excuse to crack down on Henlein."[84] Another technique used in the power struggle between traditionalists and radicals within the SHF "was to send a rival a compromising letter in the knowledge that it would be intercepted by the Czech authorities."[85] These internal conflicts were another reason that the Czechoslovaks delayed cracking down on the SHF, as it signaled that the organization was not as united internally as it seemed.

As the organization expanded during the latter half of 1934, however, it became increasingly difficult even for Henlein himself to reconcile the various factions and dissonant political viewpoints within the SHF. Pressured by the radical membership that formed the SHF's backbone to take a harder stance against Czechoslovak authorities, while still tempering his rhetoric to appease the suspicious Czechoslovaks, Henlein perpetuated a maelstrom of contradictions that threatened to break apart the organization. Ultimately, neither the Czechoslovaks, nor the radicals, "ever really trusted him."[86]

With the 1935 parliamentary elections fast approaching, the status of the SHF remained unresolved. [87] Despite SHF claims of loyalty, Czechoslovak authorities remained apprehensive about the overwhelming number of Sudeten Germans who answered Henlein's call for a unified

[83] Ibid., 84.
[84] Ibid., 91.
[85] Ibid., 91.
[86] Ibid., 117.
[87] Wingfield, *Minority Politics,* 124.

movement "with frenzied enthusiasm,"[88] and there was increasing clamor among Czechoslovak authorities to ban the SHF before the organization could participate in elections and solidify its position as a united Sudeten front. When the issue was finally brought to Czechoslovak Parliament in April 1935, the political committee, by a four-vote margin, banned the SHF from participating in the election. The ultimate decision, however, was left to President Masaryk, who, after some consultation, decided to allow the SHF to work within the Czechoslovak Parliament. This failure to take a firm stance against Henlein's movement "proved to be a fatal mistake."[89] Indeed, "while firm toward the wearied and leaderless DNSAP, Prague allowed free play to the new subversive party."[90] In April, the SHF received official permission to participate in the May election, on the condition that the organization change its name to the Sudeten German Party (*Sudetendeutsche Partei*, or SdP), replacing the militaristic term "front" from its original name.[91]

Perhaps underestimating the extent of the SHF's ability to unite the Sudeten Germans into one organization, the Czechoslovak government, by a very narrow margin, opted for a policy of organizational pluralism within the German minority, instead of outlawing the SHF. This divide and rule strategy became even more evident when authorities increased organizational pluralism prior to the election by lifting the ban on the DNP to create more electoral competition for the SHF. Indeed, "[a]llowing the participation of this party in the competition meant that there would be a rival for Henlein's SdP."[92] In dealing with the German opposition, Czechoslovak authorities exhibited a clear preference for organizational pluralism over repression.

[88] Luza, *The Transfer of Sudeten Germans,* 76.
[89] Ibid., 76.
[90] Ibid., 78.
[91] Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem,* 103.
[92] Capoccia, *Defending Democracy,* 95.

Elections of May 1935

The results of the elections of May 19, 1935 were remarkable and unexpected.[93] Though they revealed no great change among the Czechoslovak voters who still voted primarily for the Agrarians and Social Democrats, Henlein's SdP received over 60 percent of the German vote. There was no question that, by rejecting the German activist parties, which Sudeten Germans felt did not protect them from economic discrimination,[94] the "Germans had thrown their support behind a movement that was inimical to the present Republic."[95] All other Sudeten German parties suffered tremendous losses as a result: the Social Democrats, once "by far the largest and most firmly rooted [German] party," lost about 40 percent of their 1929 votes, and the German Catholic and Agrarian parties each lost about half of their electorate.[96] Not even the most popular Czechoslovak party was able to garner as many votes as the SdP.[97]

Initially, it seemed that the SdP would take seriously its mandate to work within the framework of the Czechoslovak Parliament.[98] But this was not the case. The traditionalist-radical schism discussed above made it impossible for a unified leadership to emerge from within the SdP, and even as late as 1936, this threatened to destroy the party altogether.[99] Despite the SdP's landslide victory in the 1935 elections, the traditionalist-nationalist feud within the organization remained salient, with radicals gaining more authority over time. As the German Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Walter Koch, pointed out after the 1935 elections, the new SHF deputies who took their places in the Czechoslovak parliament formed a hodgepodge of "practically all

[93] Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 206.
[94] Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining,* 79.
[95] Luza, *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans,* 81.
[96] Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich,* 107, 206.
[97] Capoccia, *Defending Democracy,* 71; Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem,* 120.
[98] Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem,* 131.
[99] Ibid., 140.

[political] shades…ranging from implicit loyalty to absolute rejection" of the Czechoslovak state.[100] The schism was only made worse by the significant degree of autonomy permitted to radical local cadres who opposed the traditionalist leadership of the party.[101]

Czechoslovak authorities, for their part, continued a policy of promoting organizational pluralism to combat the growing influence of the SdP. They "enacted a set of both repressive and inclusive strategies of systematic defense after 1935, which had a substantial impact in limiting the party's scope of action."[102] Most notably, Czechoslovak authorities made serious concessions to German minority demands, beginning with Prime Minister Hodza declaring officially in November 1936 that the government would implement new, positive minority policies.[103] This opportunity for negotiating minority policies, however, was extended primarily to the declining activist parties, and not the SdP. In what came to be known as the Agreement of February 18, 1937, Czechoslovak authorities and the German activist delegation sought to "achieve all-round ethnic justice, priority in relief-work allocation to areas hit by the [economic] crisis, a more equitable representation for Germans in the public service and linguistic concessions."[104] The reaction of Henlein and his party, as could only be expected, was to reject the February Agreement outright. In a speech at Aussig (Usti) on February 28, the SdP bitterly condemned the entire enterprise.[105]

[100] Ibid., 120.
[101] Ibid., 140.
[102] Capoccia, *Defending Democracy,* 72.
[103] Ibid., 99.
[104] Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich,* 148.
[105] Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans,* 257.

Though the February agreement did not produce any lasting success,[106] the implications for understanding how the Czechoslovaks dealt with the German minority are telling. Such agreements were deliberately pursued by Czechoslovak authorities to drive a wedge between the activist German parties, their supporters, and the SdP.[107] The government wanted to signal to the Sudeten Germans that the activist parties, unlike the SdP, possessed the political cache to introduce policies that would improve the German minority condition and, as a result, win back the majority of the Sudeten German electorate. [108] "Such accommodative strategies…had the clear goal of strengthening the position of the German activist parties and increasing their chances in the electoral struggle with Henlein's SdP."[109] The strategy, however, failed.

While Czechoslovak authorities were attempting to win over the German minority with policy concessions, the SdP had reconciled its internal differences. As the radicals within the SdP were gaining popularity, they became increasingly rebellious and disloyal to Henlein's more moderate, traditionalist line.[110] The schism within the SdP finally caught the eye of Berlin, where authorities increasingly viewed a united Sudeten front "as vital to the success of German maneuvers abroad" and thus could not afford to have it dissolved.[111] After all, the fate of a potentially very useful political organization, and in fact of the entire Sudeten political united front, was at stake.[112] Just as the party was about to split, the Reich brokered a pact between the traditionalist and radical leaders. This did little to quell unrest at the local level, however, where radicals continued to use, with great success, the widespread economic discontent to turn the

[106] Ibid.
[107] Capoccia, *Defending Democracy,* 98-9.
[108] Ibid., 99.
[109] Ibid., 91.
[110] Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining,* 81.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem,* 140.

Sudeten Germans against the SdP traditionalists and the Czechoslovak government.[113] Henlein and his fellow moderates eventually succumbed to their radical opponents. Now radicalized, the SdP vigorously campaigned against the activist "national traitors" with threats, business boycotts, intimidation, disruption of activist events, and an attack on activists who refused to join the SdP movement.[114]

SdP efforts to achieve complete ethnic solidarity only intensified after the *Anschluss.*[115] Indeed, the German annexation of Austria in March 1938 had major ramifications on the political situation of Sudeten Germans.[116] For one, it triggered defectionist tendencies among activists and impelled the German Agrarians and Clericals to join the SdP, leaving the Sudeten German Social Democrats as the lone activist party opposing the SdP.[117] By 1938, German activists had, for the most part, either joined the ranks of the SdP or left Czechoslovakia. In local elections held in May 1938, the SdP won about 90 percent of the German vote, and gained "credit as the main representative of the whole German minority."[118] By this point, organizational pluralism within the German minority was dead, and the SdP created a united, negativist front, portraying the Sudeten Germans as a repressed minority, which Hitler exploited to further his war aims.[119]

The political situation, both nationally and abroad, continued to deteriorate at a fast pace. The SdP took on a severely confrontational approach and began to stage a full-scale revolt against Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak government responded to the united negativist front by

[113] Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining,* 81.
[114] Ibid., 85.
[115] Ibid., 86.
[116] Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, 270-1.
[117] Ibid.; Capoccia, *Defending Democracy,* 104.
[118] Ibid., 105.
[119] Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining,* 87.

invoking martial law, suspending civil liberties, declaring a state of emergency and finally outlawing the SdP. The party's leaders fled to Hitler's Germany and organized military actions against Czechoslovakia from there. Ultimately, the German minority issue became an international one and on September 29, 1938, Germany, France, Italy, and Britain, forcing Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudeten territory to Germany, signed the Munich Agreement.

The policies of Czechoslovak authorities towards the Sudeten Germans during the interwar period lend support to the argument that the state preference was for organizational pluralism over repression. For one, a majority of German organizations was allowed to operate. Only three, the DNSAP, DNP, and finally the SdP, were outlawed. To assert that these parties were banned because of their ideological outlooks, irredentist claims, or anti-state rhetoric is an oversimplification which fails to take into account the full variation of organizations that *could* have been repressed for their apparent "threatening" characteristics. As I have demonstrated in the above sections, traditional explanations for why a state would ban a minority organization do not fully explain Czechoslovak minority policies. In the early interwar years, authorities maintained organizational pluralism among the German minority because, despite the fact that all organizations rejected the Czechoslovak constitution and demanded border revisions, inter-organizational competition ensured that no strong united German front could challenge the state. When, by the late 1920s, the vast majority of German organizations opted for an "activist" policy of cooperation with Czechoslovakia, authorities saw little reason for repression. It was not until the economic crisis hit and the German Nazi and Nationalist parties, the DNSAP and DNP, were able to change the political tides from activism to anti-state "negativism" that authorities stepped

in with repression. The ability of the DNSAP and DNP to quickly organize and unite the negativist front ultimately led to their outlawing in 1933.

With the DNSAP and DNP out of the picture, Henlein's SHF (later SdP) stepped in to fill the void. Czechoslovak authorities were apprehensive about the SHF, fearing that it was only a replacement for the negativist Nazi-Nationalist front. Henlein, however, masterfully united the negativist German front while assuring Czechoslovak authorities that the SHF was an activist organization loyal to the democratic state. Nonetheless, authorities remained apprehensive about the SHF's ability to unite the Sudeten German front and, as a result, barred the organization in April 1935 from participating in elections. President Masaryk, who believed the SHF deserved a chance to participate in the Czechoslovak parliament, overturned the decision—what turned out to be a fatal mistake. Over time, even by supporting organizational pluralism by making concessions with German activist parties and lifting the ban on the DNP, Henlein's SHF/SdP was able to unite the negativist German front. In the last democratic elections in May 1938 before the Nazi occupation, the SdP won almost 90 percent of the German vote.[120] The political situation by then had deteriorated to an irreparable point, and the decision to finally ban the SdP in September 1938 came far too late. By the end of the month, Hitler had annexed the Sudetenland.

In this section I examined how the Czechoslovak authorities pursued a divide and rule strategy towards Sudeten German political organizations. Czechoslovak authorities pursued a similar divide and rule policy vis-à-vis their second largest minority group, the Hungarians, who

[120] Ibid.

composed roughly 8.5 percent of the population according to 1921 census figures. Only disparate Hungarian political organizations were allowed to operate, and Hungarian attempts to unite into one umbrella organization in the late 1920s were thwarted after the Czechoslovak government outlawed the organization.[121] The study of Hungarian political organizations in interwar Czechoslovakia, however, remains superficial and vastly incomplete, and further analysis remains beyond the scope of this dissertation.[122] On the whole, the paucity of systematic secondary literature on minority ethnic organizations makes it difficult to fully test the divide and rule hypothesis using other cases without in-depth primary research. In the subsequent sections, however, I offer a few additional cases where the divide and rule hypothesis is plausible, based on the available literature, inviting further research on how the argument travels beyond the case of interwar Poland.

Four Shadow Cases

In the second part of this chapter I am going to lay out four shadow cases, two taken from interwar eastern Europe, and two taken from a completely different context, contemporary Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The purpose of this is not to show conclusive evidence on these cases because lack of space, secondary sources, and resources to conduct primary research prevent me from doing so within the confines of a dissertation. The purpose for this exercise is rather to show that once we adopt a different theoretical angle to the study of ethnic politics in multinational states—the one that I propose in this dissertation, which focuses on the allowance

[121] See Juliana Christa Elizabeth Fuzesi, "Explaining irredentism: the case of Hungary and its transborder minorities in Romania and Slovakia" (Doctoral Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2001), 257 for sources cited in Hungarian.
[122] Toth Szilard, "Hungarian Elites in the Romanian Parliament during the Interwar Period" *Studia Universitatis Cibiniensis. Series Historica* 9 (2012): 187.

rather than repression of parties and movements—then these cases, and the analysis of ethnic politics in multinational states in general, appear in a different light. I begin with the Hungarian minority in interwar Romania.

Hungarians in Interwar Romania

Similar patterns that lend support to the divide and rule hypothesis can be found in other multinational states in interwar Europe beyond Poland and Czechoslovakia. Romania, like Czechoslovakia and Poland, was a nationalizing state.[123] It was a country where "the state belongs to the majority, not to all of its citizens, and the majority uses the state as a means to advance its national interests and goals… it imposes various controls and restrictions on the minority in order to prevent subversions, disorder and instability."[124] Thus, "the minority encounters the hard problem of potential disloyalty to the state because it can neither be fully equal in nor fully identified with, the state."[125] Like most nationalizing states, Romania believed that its stability and survival was largely dependent on the neutralization or elimination of its minority "problem."[126] Indeed, despite minorities composing 33.5 percent of Romania's interwar population, the Constitution of 1923 rejected the country's multi-ethnic character, defining Romania as "a unitary and indivisible nation-state."[127]

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[123] Sammy Smooha, "Types of Democracy and Modes of Conflict in Ethnically Divided Societies," *Nations and Nationalism* 10, no.10 (2002):25; also see Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
[124] Smooha, "Types of Democracy and Modes of Conflict in Ethnically Divided Societies," 25.
[125] Ibid.; Fuzesi, "Explaining Irredentism," 257.
[126] Ibid., 253.
[127] Keith Hitchins, "Autonomies in Interwar Romania: Hungarians, Saxons, and Jews," *Yearbook of the "Gherghe Sincai" Institute for Social Science and Humanities of the Romanian Academy* no.15 (2012): 162; Pal Peter Toth, "Hungarians in the Successor States: From World War I to World War II," *Nationalities Papers* 24, no.3 (1996): 427-8.

Table 9.4. Population of Romania according to ethnic group in 1930

Ethnicity	Population	%
Romanians	12,981,324	71.9
Hungarians	1,425,507	7.9
Germans	745,421	4.1
Jews	728,115	4.0
Ruthenians and Ukrainians	582,115	3.2
Russians	409,150	2.3
Bulgarians	366,384	2.0
Romani	262,501	1.5
Turks	154,772	0.9
Gagauzians	105,750	0.6
Czechs and Slovaks	51,842	0.3
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes	51,062	0.3
Poles	48,310	0.3
Greeks	26,495	0.1
Tatars	22,141	0.1
Armenians	15,544	0.0
Hutsuls	12,456	0.0
Albanians	4,670	0.0
Others	56,355	0.3
Undeclared	7,114	0.0
Total	18,057,028	100.0

Source: 1930 Romanian Census

The Hungarians, interwar Romania's largest minority group, hovered around 8 percent of the population according to 1930 census data. Prior to World War I, Hungarians were the ruling ethnic group of the region, which made their postwar status as a minority group in a nationalizing Romanian state particularly difficult for them to accept. Relations between the ruling Romanians and minority Hungarians, on the whole, were suspicious and apprehensive, and the Hungarian minority was "viewed as a major danger and obstacle to the realization of Romanian interests."[128] As a result, throughout the interwar period Hungarians were subjected to assimilatory and discriminatory group-level policies that limited Hungarians' economic development, use of their own language, and religious freedom. Further, so-called "land

[128] Szilard, "Hungarians in the Successor States," 428.

reforms" in 1921 resulted in the expropriation of 84.5 percent of land owned by Hungarians or Saxon-Germans.[129]

Romanian officials also used an array of measures to repress Hungarian participation in politics. Elections in Transylvania, where a large number of Hungarians resided, were routinely rigged; voters were intimidated, their polling cards and ballots seized. Hungarian candidates were often disqualified for unspecified reasons, local party leaders arrested, and Hungarian electoral registers "lost" or rewritten.[130] Journalists who reported these and other irregularities faced legal prosecution and imprisonment.[131]

Despite the overall repressive nature of Romanian policies towards the Hungarian minority, the majority of Hungarian political organizations were in fact allowed to operate.[132] This puzzle is often overlooked in the historical literature, which overemphasizes the banning of the Hungarian Union (Uniunea Maghiara, or UM), using it as an illustrative example of Romanian repression.[133] The UM was founded in July 1921 and outlawed shortly after the March 1922 election. If, however, Romanian officials were so keen on using repressive measures against Hungarian organizations, why did authorities allow for the *majority* of Hungarian political organizations to operate? More interestingly, perhaps, is why the UM's successor organization, the Hungarian Party (Partidul Maghiar, or PM) was allowed to operate for the remainder of the

[129] Ibid., 428,430; Adrian Majuru, "Romanians and Hungarians. Legislation, everyday life and stereotypes in Interwar Transylvania," *Caietele Echinox* 4 (2003): 54-65.
[130] Cited in Fuzesi, "Explaining Irredentism," 256.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Milan Olejnik, "Political Development of the Hungarian Opposition Parties in the Interwar Czechoslovak," *Individual and Society* 19, no.2 (2016).
[133] Fuzesi, "Explaining Irredentism," 257; Toth, "Hungarian Elites in the Romanian Parliament," 196-7.

interwar period.[134] A brief sketch of Hungarian organizations sheds light on this puzzle, pointing to the possibility of a Romanian divide and rule strategy as a viable explanation.

In the early interwar years, the UM, which merged with the Hungarian Popular Party (Partidul Popular Maghiar, or PPM) in July 1921, appears to have been the only Hungarian political organization that was united against the state. Indeed, the National Democratic Hungarian-Szekler Party (Partidul National Democrat Maghiar-Secuiesc, PNDM-S), which called for the integration of Hungarians into the Romanian political system, was not banned. As the only anti-state Hungarian organization at the time, the UM presented a united opposition against Romanians. It did not recognize the 1918 Union of Transylvania with Romania, and as a result was disbanded on October 30, 1921.

Thus in the early interwar years in Romania, the political landscape was such that two organizations claimed to represent the Hungarian minority: the anti-state UM and the PNDM-S, which was willing to work within the Romanian political system. The argument that the UM was banned solely because of its anti-state disposition is, on its own, insufficient. After the banning of the UM, several other Hungarian organizations proliferated—many with anti-state outlooks—yet were not banned. The divide and rule hypothesis can help make sense of this. When the UM was banned, it was the only organization that posed a salient threat to the state; the absence of organizational pluralism within the Hungarian minority meant that the hostile UM spoke with a single, unified voice, not having to contend with other anti-state Hungarian organizations. After the banning of the UM, we witness that similar unity never arose within the Hungarian opposition, and as a result state intervention was not necessary: the organizational pluralism

[134] In 1938 all political organizations were formally banned when Romania became a royal dictatorship.

within the Hungarian minority ensured that no single organization would rise as a credible threat to the state.

The banning of the UM in 1921 led to further Hungarian organizational fragmentation. The Hungarian's People Party (PPM) was re-established on January 5, 1922, adopting a policy of integration into Romanian political life. At the same time, the National Magyar Party (Partidul National Magyar) was founded. Later that year in December 28, 1922, the Magyar Party was created as an attempt to unify the Hungarian opposition. The party, however, suffered from severe internal conflicts. Though the majority of the organization favoured participation in Romanian political life, several factions disagreed with this course of action and formed splinter organizations: the Independent Magyar Party (Partidul Maghiar Independent) in 1931, the Magyar Opposition (Opoziţia Maghiară) in 1933, the Union of Hungarian Workers of Romania (MADOSZ) in 1934, the Magyar Peasants' Party or the Smallholders' Party (Partidul Ţărănesc Maghiar / Partidul Micilor Gospodari) in 1935, and so on. In other words, with this relatively high number of organizations competing to represent the Hungarian minority, the divide and rule hypothesis suggests that the Romanian government preferred to maintain this pluralism to ensure that a united Hungarian opposition front did not rise against the state.

At present, there are no widely available scholarly studies in English on these organizations, and relying on scant secondary literature is insufficient. Nonetheless, the preliminary findings invite further investigation for the divide and rule hypothesis in this case. Despite the repressive and widespread group-level policies targeted at stifling the so-called Hungarian minority threat, Romanian authorities did not resort to repression as a first choice when dealing with Hungarian

political organizations. Indeed, the majority was tolerated, and the patterns in Romanian policy suggest that their inability to unite, and the persistence of intra-organization conflicts, splintering, and fragmentation, ensured that they escaped repression.[135]

Poles in Interwar Lithuania

On February 16, 1918, Lithuania declared independence. As discussed in Chapter 4, Poland and Lithuania engaged in a brief war over disputed border territories from spring 1919 to November 1920, with the Poles claiming victory. Lithuanians contended that the city of Vilnius, their newly declared capital, and its surrounding areas belonged to independent Lithuania. Poles, on the other hand, considered Wilno (the Polish spelling of Vilnius) a significant cultural capital and an integral part of the Polish heartland.[136] Although the Bolsheviks granted Lithuanians control of Vilnius in 1919, Poland seized the city through a military coup in 1920. To their chagrin, the newly created Lithuanian government was forced to move their capital "temporarily" to Kaunas. Poland's annexation of Vilnius/Wilno and surrounded territories was an act bitterly resented by Lithuanians throughout the interwar period and "resulted in the rekindling of long-standing hostilities between the former partners."[137] Lithuania severed all diplomatic ties with Poland until 1938.

Relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate over the interwar period, with Poland and Lithuania officially remaining at war over Wilno/Vilnius until 1938. Lithuania, like most other multinational states in interwar east-central Europe, had been a nationalizing state.

[135] Dieter Nohlen and Philip Stover, *Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook* (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2010), 1591,1609-1611.
[136] For more on these dynamics see Chapter 4.
[137] Cited in James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Lithuania Narrative," (Stanford University), http://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/LithuaniaRN1.3.pdf, 18.

Comparing Poland with Lithuania, Timothy Snyder states: "Both Lithuania and Poland educated their populations in the spirit of nationalism, both sought to minimize the influence of national minorities in national politics and culture. Both states resorted to physical repression of minority activists deemed a danger to the state, and both (although Poland more than Lithuania) were characterized by official anti-Semitism by the late 1930s."[138] Throughout the interwar period Lithuanian government officials warned the international community that Poland was the "greatest danger to peace in Europe."[139] Lithuanians felt that their culture, and thus their nationhood, was under threat from Poland; this concern, however, did not resonate among the international community.

Lithuania's hostile disposition toward Poland was problematic for the Polish population of around 250,000 who remained within the borders of Lithuania, composing about 10 percent of the total population.[140] Lithuanian nationalists resented demands by Poles for greater autonomy, contending that most self-identifying ethnic Poles living in Lithuania were actually Lithuanians who merely needed to be "reminded" of their Lithuanian roots. Resentments were exacerbated when Lithuanian Poles expressed explicit desires to "re-unite" with Poland.[141] As a result, the nationalizing Lithuanian state took measures to forcefully assimilate and repress the Polish minority, confiscating Polish-owned land, restricting Polish religious services, language use, schools, press, and voting rights.[142] Poles were often referred to in the press in this period as the "lice of the nation."[143] Although there was a crackdown on Polish cultural organizations in the

[138] Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 83.
[139] Ibid., 78.
[140] Fearon and Laitin, "Lithuania Narrative," 4.
[141] Ibid.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Ibid.

late 1930s, it is indeed perplexing why, given the hostile nature of Polish-Lithuanian relations and the willingness of Lithuanian authorities to use repression against opponents and to implement discriminatory group-level policies, so many Polish political organizations were allowed to operate. Looking at the 1926 elections to the Lithuanian Parliament, for example, we see at least seven Polish political parties represented (Table 9.5). It is plausible to hypothesize that the divide and rule argument put forward in this dissertation travels also to interwar Lithuanian management of the Polish minority. By allowing for organizational pluralism, the Polish minority would be less likely to form a strong, united front against the Lithuanian state to combat the discriminatory policies they were targeted with. Yet, as in all of the above cases, very little scholarly attention has been placed on minority organizations in interwar Lithuania, and further attention must be cast on this question to make a definitive conclusion about the applicability of my theory in that case.

Table 9.5. Polish Political Parties in Lithuanian Parliamentary Election, 1926

Party	Votes	%	Seats
Central Polish Electoral Committee	31,349	3.1	4
Party of Polish Workers, Artisans and Farmers	24,473	2.4	0
Poles of Jonava	431	0.0	0
Party of Polish Farmers and Workers	256	0.0	0
Party of Polish Workers	253	0.0	0
Polish Party "For Creed and Homeland"	149	0.0	0
Polish Catholic Party	116	0.0	0

Source: Dieter Nohlen and Philip Stover, *Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook* (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2010), 1201.

Shia and Sunni Dynamics in the Gulf States: Saudi Arabia

Moving beyond the geographic and temporal confines of interwar Europe, the logic of divide and rule can also be seen in other places like the Middle East, specifically in the Gulf states. The

Saudi Arabian monarchy, for example, has pursued a state-sponsored policy of divide and rule that has allowed the al-Saud family to maintain definitive political control over the country since 1932. According to the 2010 census, Saudi Arabia has roughly 27 million residents, of whom some 18.5 million are Saudi nationals. Though the government has not conducted a census based on religion, it is estimated that about 85-90 percent of the total Muslim population is Sunni, with around 10-15 percent making up the Shii minority. There is also a small number of Ismailis and Zaidis concentrated in southern parts of the country.[144] Due to al-Saud ruling family's centuries-old alliance with the strictly Sunni Wahhabi ulama, who do not consider Shias to be Muslims, it has long hoped to quell the political demands of the Shii population. Members of this population, often considered a fifth column of the state's Iranian rivalry, are banned from serving in the security services, face economic marginalization, and have limited ability to perform public religious rituals.

Saudi Arabia is one of the world's most authoritarian regimes with a longstanding tradition of heavily restricting civil society and repressing political opposition.[145] Traditionally, the literature on state management of opposition groups in "rentier" states—states that amass substantial oil wealth—such as Saudi Arabia, has argued that governing officials distribute handsome economic benefits in exchange for regime loyalty, thus placating would-be opponents.[146] In the words of

[144] "The Ismailis of Najran: Second-Class Citizens," Human Rights Watch, 2008, p. 10, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/saudiarabia0908web.pdf; Toby Matthiesen, "The Domestic Sources of Saudi Foreign Policy: Islamists and the State in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings," The Brookings Institution, Rethinking Political Islam Series, August 2015, p. 10, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/07/rethinking-political-islam/Saudi-Arabia_Matthiesen-FINALE.pdf?la=en.

[145] "Saudi Arabia," Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2015*, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/saudi-arabia.

[146] Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," in *The Rentier State*, eds. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (Routledge: London, 1987), 49-62; Matthew Gray, "A Theory of 'Late Rentierism' in the Arab States in the Gulf," Center for International and Regional Studies, Occasional Paper, no. 7 (2011),

Hazem Beblawi, a leading scholar of rentier theory, "with virtually no taxes, citizens are far less demanding in terms of political participation."[147] Yet, as pointed out by Madawi al-Rasheed, "the literature on the rentier state does not highlight other strategies that are often deployed to gain loyalty and force the population into submission." Al-Rasheed continues, "...it is too simplistic to reduce relations between the regime and the Shii minority to oppression alone."[148] Indeed, going beyond the argument that welfare distribution and state repression curtails opposition, we can see that, in its dealings with potentially restive opposition groups, Saudi governing officials use a divide and rule strategy. More specifically, by inflaming and politicizing sectarian divisions between and within the majority Sunnis and the Shii minority, the Saudi monarchy decreases the likelihood of a united opposition challenging the state.[149]

Though political parties are formally banned in Saudi Arabia, political organizations are oftentimes allowed to operate. Indeed, the government chooses a policy of balancing between allowing different amounts of freedom to different organizations in order to promote a divide and rule scenario between competing opposition groups: Sunni Islamists, who formed part of the Sahwa Movement calling for governmental reform in the 1990s, have now been co-opted to contain the Shias: "A worsening of relations between the Shiite and the Saudi ruling family then seems to be one of the outcomes of the rapprochement between King Salman and the Sunni

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https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/558291/CIRSOccasionalPaper7MatthewGray2011.pdf?sequence=5; Hussein Mahdavy, "The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M.A. Cook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 428-467.

[147] Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," 53.

[148] Madawi al-Rasheed, "Sectarianism as Counter-revolution: Saudi Responses to the Arab Spring," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, vol. 11, no. 3 (2011): p. 513-14.

[149] Marc Lynch, "The Entrepreneurs of Cynical Sectarianism" *Foreign Policy*, November 13, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/13/the-entrepreneurs-of-cynical-sectarianism/; See also Wehrey, *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf*, Part III, "Saudi Arabia," 103-156.

Islamists."[150]

By pitting opposition organizations against one another, the Saudi government seeks not only to weaken the opposition by fomenting intra-organizational competition, particularly between Shii opposition who are severely fragmented "based on locale, clerical pedigree, and family,"[151] but also to boast the regime's legitimacy over power by posing "as mediator and guarantor of stability."[152] Put otherwise, "[t]he regime fosters the impression that, without its intervention, the country will enter a Hobbesian state of nature where tribes, sects, and regions unleash their fanaticism and violence on each other and undermine the security of all Saudis, possibly inviting foreign military intervention to secure the energy sources that are so important not only to Saudis but also to the rest of the world."[153]

Saudi governing officials have "been quite skillful at fostering infighting amongst various political strands—notables, leftists, Islamists."[154] The result has been that Shii, Sunni, and cross-sectarian opposition organizations have all failed to create joint platforms for political mobilization against the state. Intra-group competition fostered by the Saudi regime prevents a united front, and the strategic use of inflaming sectarianism as the primary driver of political divisions reveals a more nuanced approach to quelling opposition beyond simply repression or distribution of rentier benefits.

[150] Matthiesen, "The Domestic Sources of Saudi Foreign Policy."
[151] Frederic M. Wehrey, *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: from the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014): 31.
[152] Andrew Hammond, The Islamic Utopia: The Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia (London: Pluto Press, 2012), p. 25.
[153] Al-Rasheed, "Sectarianism as Counter-revolution," p. 522.
[154] Toby Matthiesen, *The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 216.

Bahraini Divide and Rule Tradition

Bahrain, a small, resource rich country of about 1.3 million people, has also been the scene of a divide and rule government policy. Ruled by a Sunni monarchy, Bahrain is the only Arab Gulf state with a Shii majority.[155] Similarly, unlike most other Gulf states, Bahrain has a longstanding tradition of opposition movements rising against governing authorities.[156] In response to the relatively robust opposition, "the Bahraini government has long pursued a strategy of divide and rule as a means of preventing the country's various interest groups from uniting in their demands."[157]

Under British colonial rule, Bahrain's authorities typically used force when opposition factions "succeeded in building alliances that traversed interest groups which the government would ordinarily seek to play off against each other, including Islamists and secular-nationalists."[158] This government action is a clear observable implication of the divide and rule hypothesis: authorities seek to maintain organizational pluralism, resorting to repression only when an organization threatens plurality and presents a credible united opposition to the state. This was the fate of the National Union Committee (NUC), which emerged in 1954 as Bahrain's first cross-sectarian formal opposition organization. The organization "considered the national unity

[155] 1941 census puts the Shia citizens at 53 percent of the population. Since then, no official census based on religion has been conducted. Disparate estimates place the Bahraini Shias at between 55 and 75 percent of the 2015 population. These figures are much debated and highly divisive; Justin Gengler, *Group Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf: Rethinking the Rentier State* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 96.
[156] Kylie Moore-Gilbert, "Sectarian Divide and Rule in Bahrain: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?," *Middle East Institute,* January 19, 2016, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/sectarian-divide-and-rule-bahrain-self-fulfilling-prophecy.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid.; Falah Al-Mdaiers, "Shiʿism and Political Protest," *Digest of Middle East Studies* 11, no.1 (2002): 23.

of all Bahrainis the first requirement of their liberation."[159] It demanded parliamentary elections and freedom to establish trade unions. The organization quickly gained popularity among Sunnis and Shias, staging several protests with thousands attending rallies in Sanabis and the capital Manama in support of the NUC.

The regime's initial response was not outright repression. Instead, consistent with the divide and rule hypothesis, authorities sought to increase organizational pluralism to combat the rising popularity of the NUC. The al-Khalifa monarchy attempted to split the NUC by creating a parallel organization called the National Convention Committee (NCC) comprised of Shii merchants, notables, meant to serve as a sectarian alternative to the NUC.[160] The initiative failed to erode the NUC's cross-sectarian popularity, and, as a result, the British banned the NUC and exiled its leadership to prevent the emergence of further cross-sectarian political opposition unity. There are also numerous instances where ruling officials actively sought to create divisions and break apart cross-sectarian opposition blocs, by, for example, convincing Shii representatives to break away from cross-sectarian blocs by conceding to some of their political demands, or cracking down on Sunni reformers.[161] In these instances, the British pursued a successful tactic of divide and rule along sectarian lines, preventing the formation of a unified opposition.

In the post-independence Bahraini government, the al-Khalifa monarchy's ability to maintain its absolute grip on power since 1971 has largely been a result of continuing a divide and rule policy

[159] Khalaf, Abdulhadi "Contentious Politics in Bahrain: From Ethnic to National and Vice Versa," *Fourth Nordic Conference on Middle Eastern Studies*, Oslo 13-16 August 1998, http://org.uib.no/smi/pao/khalaf.htmlp.13, 9.
[160] Khalaf, "Contentious Politics in Bahrain," 9.
[161] Moore-Gilbert, "Sectarian Divide and Rule in Bahrain."

to prevent the emergence of cross-sectarian or Shii opposition movements.[162] Indeed, "inflaming sectarian animosities has long proven to be a useful method for dividing Bahrain's opposition factions and preventing nationalism from unifying cross-sectarian interests against unpopular government policies."[163] One example of the government's attack on uniting opposition was with the Constitutive Committee for the General Federation of Workers (CCGFW) formed in 1972. The CCGFW staged a number of large protests and general strikes, and, according to Shehabi, was "the first secular public coalition in Bahrain, where sect and religious issues did not play any notable role in its composition or goals."[164] As in the case of the NUC under colonial rule, the government feared that the united cross-sectarian CCGFW opposition posed a direct threat to absolute monarchical rule. The result was government crackdown on the organization. Further, in the midst of the Iraqi War, the ruling Al Khalafi family "tried to institutionalize the Shii opposition and blunt the appeal of more rejectionist elements. At the same time, it pursued a strategy of countering Shii activism by sponsoring the formation of a united Sunni Islamist bloc." [165] These were all clear strategies of using divide and rule tactics, not repression as first resort, that aimed to promote divisive sectarian politics and thwart the development of an effective cross-sectarian or unified Shii opposition movement, which ultimately would threaten the regime's survival.

[162] Wehrey, *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf*, 72.
[163] Moore-Gilbert, "Sectarian Divide and Rule in Bahrain."
[164] Ibid.
[165] For more see Wehrey, *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf,* Chapter Four "Sectarian Balancing, the Bahraini Sunnis and a Polarized Parliament."

The above discussion was by no means exhaustive. Its purpose was to suggest other plausible cases where the divide and rule hypothesis set out in this dissertation could help explain state management of restive minority opposition groups. Indeed, the theory presented in this dissertation requires very intense, fine-grained process tracing to truly reveal the preferences of state actors in how they manage minority groups. In the above sections, I have used secondary sources on other cases with varying historical and socio-political circumstance to demonstrate that, if armed with the correct theoretical lenses, the divide and rule hypothesis I propose is plausible beyond interwar Poland.

Chapter 10: Conclusions and Implications

Summary of Findings

In this thesis I addressed the following puzzle: What explains the presence of the relatively high number of ethnic minority organizations in multinational states, particularly in cases where (a) relations between the titular and minority groups are hostile; (b) the state pursues discriminatory group-level policies vis-à-vis its minorities; (c) state capacity to repress is evident; and (d) the regime is governed by a dominant group, or what can be called a "core nation"? More specifically, the variation I sought to understand through this research is why some political organizations claiming to represent a restive ethnic minority group are *banned* by state authorities and excluded from public life, while others, which claim to represent the same ethnic group, are *allowed* to operate. Currently, well-established scholarly literature on state-ethnic minority group relations focuses solely on part of this puzzle: it asserts that repression is the primary regime tool in managing opposition, and, as a result, has focused only on the reasons that states ban certain organizations. The intent of this study, however, was to change this dominant perspective by examining the question from a different angle, asking why states *allow* minority ethnic organizations to operate. Indeed, even those repressive regimes that have the capacity to ban organizations representing a restive minority do not always do so—repression is relatively infrequent and selective. My contention instead is that if a multi-ethnic state is faced with a potentially hostile ethnic group, it *prefers* organizational pluralism which allows state authorities to divide and rule the minority, even if repression is a viable option. This argument differs from existing ones by contending that states *choose* to encourage organizational pluralism

in ethnic minorities and that, if plurality is absent within an ethnic group, a state may even promote it.

I have addressed two shortcomings of the literature on state management of ethnic minority groups. First, one of the main goals of this study was to draw attention to the dearth of systematic examination of the dynamics between states and minority political organizations. I have sought to demonstrate that overwhelming scholarly attention has been placed on group-level dynamics and policies and that, as such, explanations offered in the established scholarly literature do not elucidate the variation I seek to explain. Indeed, treating entire ethnic groups as key political actors—as the literature has done—does not provide a full picture of state-minority group relations. Ethnic groups do not always behave as homogenous actors, and treating them as defined units with fixed, impermeable boundaries and shared political beliefs is misleading. Members of a single ethnic group can and often do join multiple and often rival organizations, while other groups fail to achieve any sort of collective action. Furthermore, such groups do not forge alliances with states, nor do they directly receive resources, carry out political demonstrations, encourage or stifle collective action: *organizations* that represent them undertake such actions. In short, the current literature on ethnic minority management does not consider variation at the level of organization and instead focuses on the level of the ethnic group. In this dissertation, however, in order to fully understand the complex nature of state-minority group relations, I analyzed the varying ways in which a state's ruling political elite interacts with organizations that represent minority group interests. Disaggregating to this level of analysis, as I have done, unveiled important variation and a theoretical gap.

Second, the body of literature that examines state responses to opposition organizations (not necessarily ethnic ones) is relatively underdeveloped. Generally, the assumption in this literature is that states use repression mainly against organizations that pose a threat to peace and security. This intuitively correct finding is robust across space, time, and context. Yet it remains unclear in existing scholarship what exactly constitutes a "threat" because conclusions are often drawn from analyses that select on the dependent variable; that is, scholars often selectively look into the past, claiming *ex post facto* that an organization was banned for its threatening profile, pointing to its ideology, its tactics, its size, the group it claims to represent, and so on, to justify the state use of repression. Indeed, these explanations often hold true if we examine only one or a few organizations in isolation, but this approach would not necessarily yield the same answers if we flipped the question to ask instead why organizations that *could* have easily been targeted with the same state policies were not—it is not uncommon for organizations to share similar "threatening" profiles yet experience varying state responses. By taking a systematic approach, that considers a full spectrum of organizations and their relationship with the state, however, we are better positioned to uncover what influences a government's response to minority groups. With this in mind, in this dissertation, I examined a full spectrum of minority organizations and asked: why are some seemingly threatening organizations not repressed, yet ones that appear non-threatening are? Further, why are organizations with similar characteristics—ones that could be considered threatening for reasons expounded in the literature—not universally repressed? By taking into consideration the full variation of organizations, I demonstrated that state repression is not necessarily the preferred option for regimes. Instead, state authorities can choose to follow a divide and rule logic, meaning that they *prefer* having a large number of organizations representing a single minority group, even encouraging pluralism where it does not exist. This

finding undermines several of the existing arguments in the literature that take their lead from a focus on the use of repression as a first resort to managing opposition.

I tested my hypothesis on the case of interwar Poland (1918-1939). Though the Polish government pursued aggressive and discriminatory group-level policies vis-à-vis its Ukrainian, Belarusian, German, and Jewish minority groups, which made up about a third of its 30 million citizens, these repressive policies were not necessarily reflected in the state's handling of minority political organizations. In fact, only 15 of 77 political organizations were banned, and this variation was consistent across ethnic groups. To understand this puzzle, I conducted extensive archival research and used process-tracing to examine the Ministry of Interior (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, or MSW), the main organ responsible for formulating minority policies, and its strategies for governing Ukrainian, Belarusian, German, and Jewish political organizations throughout the interwar period. Although I have demonstrated that violent organizations or those with secessionist ambitions or foreign ties are likely to face state repression, I have also highlighted a more puzzling aspect: why, in the case of interwar Poland, was 80 percent of ethnic minority organizations—many of which *had* foreign ties and/or harbored secessionist positions—allowed to operate? This is particularly interesting, given the generally hostile nature of state-minority ethnic group relations in Poland. Indeed, no conventional explanation in the literature could account for the pattern of allowed organizations, which is consistent across all categories and ethnic groups. Further, the fate of some of the most influential Ukrainian, Belarusian, German and Jewish organizations was not correctly predicted by existing theories.

To explain this puzzle, I demonstrated the divide and rule hypothesis to be superior to alternative explanations for the case of interwar Poland; several observable implications confirm this hypothesis. First, the majority of minority political organizations in interwar Poland was not repressed. Though this finding can also be predicted by existing literature on managing opposition organizations, which assumes that a state tolerates most opposition organizations if it lacks the capacity to repress them, the fact that a majority of organizations was not banned sits uneasily with group-based scholarship, which does not account for any sub-group variation in how organizations representing the same ethnic group are treated by the state. Second, state actors in interwar Poland took proactive steps to create, support, promote, or maintain organization pluralism within each ethnic minority, in addition to encouraging competitive pluralism within each minority, pitting organizations against each other, supporting organizations with antagonistic goals vis-à-vis existing ones, and creating loyalist organizations if mainly enemy ones existed within a certain minority. Here, the current literature has different predictions: no promotion or maintenance of organizational pluralism was expected. Third, non-violent, non-fifth column organizations were also repressed when they sought to suppress organizational pluralism within the ethnic minority (i.e. they wanted to create a united front for the whole minority). These organizations should not have been repressed, in principle, if we rely solely on conventional theories. Alternative conventional explanations that are more or less consistent with group-based theories, such as size of organization, ideological distance (other than ethnic) of the organization from the government, secessionist goals, and regime type (democracies repress less than non-democracies) were also shown to be incomplete explanations. Indeed, in light of the archival material referenced in this study, the Polish Ministry of Interior was well aware of the "anti-state" characteristics of all banned minority organizations well

before officially outlawing them. As a result, pointing solely to ideology, foreign ties, secessionist goals, and so on, as the literature has done, does not provide satisfying explanations, especially when considering the full variation of state response to organizations across and within minority groups.

In sum, if we fix our analytical gaze only on group-level policies, or over-emphasize the use of state repression as a tool for managing opposition, we miss a very large and important part of the puzzle. What I have shown in this dissertation is that the only way to understand state interaction with minority groups *in its entirety* is to switch the theoretical perspective from an almost exclusive focus on repression to a broader one that includes state actors' preferences towards the management of ethnic minorities. Concentrating on the relatively infrequent instances of repression, as the conventional literature does, will not explain the full variation, but viewing state-minority ethnic group organizations using the divide and rule argument which I put forward in this study will help make sense of this question.

Broader Implications for Further Theory Building

This dissertation discussed strategies which the Polish Ministry of Interior used to quell minority group opposition. In so doing, it went beyond common explanations offered in the historical literature that focus mainly on group-level assimilationist policies, namely the Polish-dominated school system and the official program in the early 1920s to colonize the Ukrainian-and Belarusian-inhabited eastern borderlands with "loyal" Poles from central Poland, or the dissimilationist policies that targeted Germans and Jews with the aim of creating unfavourable political and economic conditions to encourage their emigration. Instead, this study shed light on

Ministry of Interior policies which aimed at dividing and thereby weakening minority group opposition by exploiting the many cleavages among political organizations that claimed to represent these minority groups. This analysis involved a more nuanced approach in managing opposition; it was not simply universally repressed or assimilated, but rather strategically and selectively curbed.

The empirical puzzle that drove this study was what explains the presence of such a high number of minority ethnic organizations in interwar Poland, given the hostile majority-minority relations and the willingness and capacity for state authorities to use repression. This empirical puzzle, however, is not unique to interwar Poland: in Chapter 9 I discussed how the findings based on interwar Poland could easily apply to other cases. Understanding why authorities may opt for a divide and rule policy over other policy options can help us to also understand why repression is not always the default tool to manage opposition; instead, a divide and rule stratagem is perhaps more commonly pursued.

First, group-level discriminatory policies are generally overtly repressive and can spur retaliation among the targeted population. They are difficult to implement successfully, especially if the targeted ethnic group is indigenous, territorially concentrated, large, demands self-determination, or has ties with a foreign kin state. In the case of Poland, despite the aggressive assimilationist policies pursued by authorities vis-à-vis Ukrainians and Belarusians, the Slavic minorities were not successfully assimilated. Likewise, though many Jews and Germans left Poland because of the state's unfavourable economic and political policies intended to encourage their emigration, most stayed. Indeed, rather than quelling restive minority groups by either forcing them to

assimilate or leave, Poland's group-level policies achieved the opposite effect, antagonizing the minority populations and alienating them from the Polish state. Opposition organizations took full advantage of this political situation, exploiting grievances among the marginalized minority groups in order to rally support and increase anti-Polish sentiments. Political actors claiming to represent the Ukrainian, Belarusian, German, and Jewish minority groups—both within and outside of Poland's borders—thus effortlessly created a discourse of Polish state exploitation and discrimination, which they used to challenge Poland's legitimacy to rule.

Pursuing divide and rule tactics that target organizations instead of government campaigns targeting entire ethnic groups, on the other hand, can be pursued much more subtly and thus mitigate the chances that groups will feel threatened, repressed, and rebel against the state. In the case of Poland, state authorities never openly declared most of its divide and rule tactics. Instead, officials kept their discussions hidden behind closed doors and in confidential policy briefings, revealed only through the examination of now de-classified Ministry of Interior documents. Certainly, minority organizations at the time alleged that Polish authorities pursued divide and rule tactics, but these claims were more difficult to substantiate than pointing to overt group-level policies like the closing down of minority-language schools or distributing land to Polish settlers in an effort to colonize territories inhabited largely by minority populations. In other words, political tactics aimed at dividing and thereby weakening opposition organizations can be implemented in a muted and gradual manner and thus are less likely to antagonize the minority population than are group-level policies or other more drastic policy measures, like mass arrests or violent crackdown of opposition.

Second, pursuing a divide and conquer policy does not require significant state capacity, especially when compared to other policy options such as overt state repression or widespread discrimination of an entire populace. Dividing and conquering ethnic minority organizations entails two basic techniques: first, it requires encouraging or fostering feuds among smaller organizations to prevent them from offering a united front against the state; and second, the state should aid, promote, and create loyalist and pacifist factions that are willing to cooperate with the government. With regards to the former point, oftentimes the state need not create dissent, as significant intra-ethnic competition between organizations may already be present. This leads to another benefit of pursuing a divide and rule policy: because latent antagonisms are often present among organizations that are competing to represent a single minority group, authorities do not need to take great pains to foster conflictual dynamics between and within organizations representing a minority group, because they already exist. If, however, unity among the opposition is forming, a common way of segmenting it is by instigating distrust and confusion among the rival organizations. One of the most effective ways in creating suspicion among rival factions is to create situations in which one organization can accuse another of "collaborating" with the state. Authorities can favour one organization by providing it with financial resources, as well as by making concessions or assigning government positions if the organization is a political party. Again, these tactics take little capacity or effort on the part of the state, yet can have potentially dire consequences for opposition unity.

Third, pursuing divide and rule tactics can be less costly reputationally than overt repression of opposition. There is nothing illicit, *per se*, with pursuing divide and rule tactics—it is not equivalent to overt repression and thus, as discussed in the two points above, is more difficult to

condemn both by opposition within the state but also by the international community. Group-level discrimination, like curtailing minority rights, or widespread repression of opposition through imprisonment or state violence, on the other hand, carries with it a much greater cost: not only does it increase the risk of antagonizing the population targeted, it can also provoke the involvement of foreign governments. Take, for example, policies that restrict the use of minority languages or the formation and operation of minority political organizations—these are overtly discriminatory policies aimed at assimilating a minority and curbing opposition. If the targeted minority group has links to a foreign state, the foreign power could feel obliged to "protect" its ethnic kin. This could result in general condemnation from the international community and various forms of backlash, ranging from diplomatic denunciations, to economic sanctions, to extreme cases of military intervention when repression takes on a more violent form. It can also be used as a pretext for revanchist powers seeking to revise state borders and annex territories to legitimize their claims to invade and occupy territories. More subtle divide and rule tactics geared at organizations, on the other hand, can erode opposition yet do not carry with them the same potential political risks as other more severe and overt policy options; divide and rule tactics are difficult to identify and thus difficult to denounce, especially in comparison to outright repression.

This leads to a fourth point: though I have discussed why authorities may prefer to promote organizational pluralism over other policy options, adopting a divide and rule stratagem can be, and often is, pursued simultaneously with other policies. In other words, as discussed above, when a state pursues discriminatory group level policies, it likely antagonizes the population, and opposition mounts. For a state to implement its desired policies, then, authorities must weaken

political organizations that stand in the way because, as I have stressed in this study, *organizations* are the political actors that most commonly oppose government policies, and not necessarily entire minority groups. Political organizations are the chief mouthpiece and agitator for minority group demands and are an important point for minority mobilization as well as a major factor in minority politics: they instigate protests, compete for public office, advocate for the interests of the ethnic group they claim to represent, coordinate collective action, mobilize and politicize their constituencies, demanding cultural autonomy or even secession. If a state's goal is to implement group-level policies, it must first address the opposition, and if the opposition is unified, it is more difficult for authorities to overcome than a fragmented one. Repressing political organizations through mass arrests or blanket banning, however, would risk further fueling antagonisms among the minority population and can act as a rallying point around which opposition could unify. Pursuing more subtle divide and rule tactics, which I have outlined in this study, however, would mean that organizations would squander their time and energy on inter-organizational competition—without unity there can be no strong opposition, and without a strong opposition, the state has more freedom to pursue its preferred policies. It is, in a way, different means to the same end.

In sum, state authorities may prefer to promote conflictual organizational pluralism over other policy options for several reasons: first, it is not costly financially nor does it require significant state capacity; second, it is less costly reputationally; third, it is less likely to antagonize the targeted minority population than group-level discrimination or widespread repression of opposition; and finally it can be pursued simultaneously with other political strategies to weaken opposition. With this in mind, we can begin to understand why a preference for organizational

pluralism in order to divide and thereby weaken independent opposition groups can in fact be the default strategy of a state to manage minority opposition. As I have demonstrated in this study and emphasized in the above discussion, the benefits of maintaining pluralism within a minority group can far outweigh the potential costs. So long as pluralism is maintained, and the conflictual dynamics prevent a minority group from forming a united opposition, there is little need for the state to intervene. If this pluralism begins to decrease, and opposition strengthens and unites, perhaps more drastic measures can be pursued to squelch opposition. Though a preference for organizational pluralism within a minority may not be the default policy as such, repression certainly is not the first choice.

The hypothesis offered in this study is, of course, only an initial step. As mentioned, little systematic research has been conducted on how states interact with political organizations that represent minority groups. There is much left to examine in future research. I used a binary dependent variable in this dissertation, analyzing why states ban some organizations yet allow others that represent the same minority to operate. Future research should expand and introduce a more nuanced approach: state repression, in general, can be defined and conceptualized in several ways, far beyond just banning or tolerating an organization. For example, repressing an organization can involve the non-violent curtailment of its civil liberties (e.g. outlawing the organization, closing its headquarters, banning it from participation in elections). Such measures, on the whole, can be referred to as discriminatory policies. Though small-scale arrests of organization leadership may take place, sanctioned state violence is not always used. A more severe degree of repression involves extralegal violence, that is, the "actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization within the territorial jurisdiction of the

state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices, or institutions."[1] Violent repression includes killings, kidnappings, violent interrogation, politically motivated mass arrests, large-scale deportations (internal and external), and essentially anything that involves the physical destruction or forced removal of an organization and its support base. Though all of these policies fall under the category of "repression," *violent* repression is extreme and more unusual than repression of the nonviolent variety. In the case of interwar Poland I demonstrated that state violence was used mostly to combat the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, an organization that itself used violent tactics against the state. But outside of interwar Poland there are certainly instances where state violence is carried out against non-violent organizations. Under what conditions, then, do states pursue such action? Further research should consider a broader spectrum of policy options a state has at its disposal to manage minority political organizations, and apply this spectrum systematically to analyzing cases beyond interwar Poland. Also, the confines of the dissertation did not allow me to go beyond examining *political* minority organizations. But how do states interact with cultural, religious, or economic organizations that also claim to represent minority rights? When are such organizations viewed as a threat?

Another important avenue for further research is examining the long-term legacies of state-sponsored divide and rule tactics. Exploiting pre-existing divisions in a society, or fracturing an ethnic group by creating new divisions or activating sub-ethnic cleavages through the promotion of regional or ethnographic identities can have ominous reverberating consequences. Indeed,

[1] Christian Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," *Annual Review of Political Science,* vol. 10 (2007):2; RJ Goldstein, *Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present* (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1978).

creating new disputes or fostering old ones in order to break national solidarity can lead to political feuds that turn into violent upheavals. On the other hand, however, why is it that some minority groups can successfully resist a state's attempts to divide and rule? Are some minority groups more susceptible to state exploitation of intra-group conflict? We do not yet have complete answers to these questions.

The Importance of Reconstructing State Intentions

Given the intensive primary research required to fully test my hypothesis, I cannot, in the confines of a dissertation, go beyond the in-depth analysis of a single case. In Chapter 9, however, I showed that *prima facie*, my approach is plausible beyond Poland and can tackle the analysis of ethnic politics in multinational states more broadly. Important implications for further theory-building can be derived from this study and applied to further research far beyond interwar Poland. First, to reiterate what was highlighted above, we should abandon the over-emphasis on repression in the study of ethnic politics in multinational states—*repression is the exception, not the rule.* We should focus on what the state *does*, rather than what it *says* it does. In other words, state rhetoric promoted publically by government officials about suppressing terrorism and fifth columns, or waging ideological wars against anti-state elements, can simply be vague notions used largely as a pretext by state authorities to justify lawfully cracking down on organizations they deem threatening for very different reasons. I have shown that this was the case in interwar Poland. Despite public rhetoric stating otherwise, what authorities feared most, and ultimately led to its use of repression, was the credible threat presented by a united opposition within minority groups. This policy choice was demonstrated in the state's actions of promoting organizational pluralism and repressing minority organizations that threatened this

plurality. These state actions, however, were veiled by official claims of fighting extremist and secessionist organizations, or preventing the spread of dangerous ideologies that threatened the state, arguments that are perpetuated in the secondary historical literature. Closer examination of the full variation using the theoretical lens provided in this study, however, revealed a very different picture.

Using the correct theoretical lens, however, is only half the battle; there are also important methodological implications that can be derived from this study. In other words, if the focus should be moved away from state repression, how, then, do we study state *non*-repression? There are several challenges of reconstructing the process behind policymaking decisions.[2] As I have done in this dissertation, examining the reasons behind non-repression requires intensive analysis of primary documents found in the archives of government organs responsible for formulating and implementing minority policies. Archival research and process tracing are thus the most appropriate methodological approaches for reconstructing the intensions of state actors at the policy-making level. The key, however, is to rely on primary documents: Alexander George and Andrew Bennett warn us that scholars who use process-tracing ''should forgo the temptation to rely on a single, seemingly authoritative study of the case at hand by a historian.''[3] Relying solely on secondary literature—even if it is varied—will not yield the same insights as if a wide range of primary documents and policy briefings are reviewed. Though a tedious task involving sifting through often mundane reports, the examination of primary sources is critical; without access or reference to primary documents we can only speculate why states pursue the policies they do. I have shown in this dissertation that often public proclamations by governments are

[2] Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 94-99.
[3] Ibid., 95.

only a very small part of the puzzle—much goes on behind closed doors, even contradicting what is said to the public. The surest way to mitigate this challenge is to conduct extensive primary research and access a wide range of de-classified government documents. These documents, after all, were not meant for the public and are thus give the most accurate picture of the complex inner workings of the state as well as the decision making processes that go into implementing policies. In Poland, these documents are the de-classified collections of the interwar Ministry of Interior found at the Archives of New Acts (Archiwum Akt Nowych) in Warsaw. In other countries, such documents can be found in similar government institutions or state archives. In cases where power is decentralized, consulting regional archives may prove more fruitful. In essence, it is most important to consult documents that expound the inner-workings and classified policy discussions within government organs that are responsible for creating and implementing minority policies. What this points to more broadly is the value of studying historical cases in political science. While the fluid nature of ongoing or recent political events—particularly conflicts—makes reliable data collection challenging, historical cases provide researchers a unique opportunity to conduct systematic research, triangulating a variety of evidentiary sources. In post-conflict years, previously classified archives have opened; pronounced partisanships and controversies have subsided, and a rich descriptive secondary literature has emerged—only historical cases provide us with this unique opportunity.

A second methodological point that can be derived from this study is the crucial importance of deeply understanding and engaging with the data being analyzed. Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman summarize: "[q]ualitative methodologists have identified case study methods as having comparative advantages in developing internally valid and context-sensitive measures of concepts, heuristically identifying new variables through within-case analysis of deviant or other

cases, providing a potential check on spuriousness and endogeneity through within-case analysis, and testing and elaborating theories of path dependency and other types of complexity."[4] Similarly, George and Bennett argue that case study work is uniquely well positioned to uncover "variables that were otherwise left out in the initial model."[5] Indeed, any of the issues relating to data reliability can be mitigated through intensive primary research and analysis of a single or few cases can help generate new hypotheses and new thinking. This sort of meticulous research, however, is time consuming and does not lend itself to generating large-N statistical studies that dominate the field today. But in-depth knowledge of a case and commitment to engaging with the data—whether collecting it through extensive fieldwork, or deeply understanding the processes that went behind generating the data in the first place—will allow us to reach conclusions that are rooted more firmly in accurate empirical analysis, and thus are less likely to fall prey to false or misleading assumptions. Further, going beyond statistical patterns, though helpful generally, reveals that oftentimes significant and important variation is not captured or explained through the use of strictly quantitative methods. I demonstrated this shortcoming in Chapter 3, where I drew attention to the fact that the statistically significant findings could only explain a small part of the puzzle I was seeking to explain, and that the fates of arguably the most significant minority organizations were not fully explained using quantitative analysis. It is the examination of these "outliers" and looking beyond the general statistical trends that informed the basis of my theoretical and empirical investigation. Whereas on the surface findings can be considered observationally equivalent, the explanations behind such numbers can indeed vary dramatically. Put differently, in the case of this study, for example, the assumption in the literature has largely been that states do not repress the majority of minority ethnic organizations

[4] Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods 9, no.1 (2006): 473.
[5] George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development,* 20.

because it lacks capacity to do so; what I have done is demonstrate that this assumption is not necessarily true. The reason the state does not repress the majority of minority ethnic organizations is that it *prefers* pluralism. This finding, however, could only have been uncovered through detailed process-tracing and archival work.

It is often said that there is a trade-off between analyzing a small number of cases versus examining large datasets; what is gained in internal validity is lost in external generalizability. Yet what I have also attempted to demonstrate in this study is that very in-depth research of a single or few cases can just as well generate theories and hypotheses that are parsimonious enough to be applied to other cases, yet retain a degree of complexity that best reflects reality. Certainly, the logic of divide and rule is not a policy only witnessed in interwar Poland, yet, through the in-depth examination of this case, the broader theory behind the logic and the observable implications that can be derived from this hypothesis have been systemized and presented in a way that can be used to better understand similar political phenomena in very different contexts. As such, it is my hope that the insights offered in this dissertation will help reshape the way we think about ethnic politics in multinational states, or, at the very least, offer alternative theoretical and methodological angles that can be used to shed new light on old questions.

References

Archival Documents

Archival documents are cited according to the Archives of New Acts (Archiwum Akt Nowych, AAN) cataloguing scheme. Files are stored in Collections (Spis Zespół). In this dissertation I made use of the Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych Tom I (MSW) Collection and the Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych Dopływ (MSW, Dop.) Collection. Documents are further numbered and divided into Files (Sygnatura, or syg.). Each document is then numbered separately (stronica, or s.).

Archiwum Akt Nowych, Minsterstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Wydział Narodowościowy, Tom I

File Number (sygnatura)	**File Name**	**Year**
111	Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Wojewódzkich w Wilnie i Łucku, sprawozdania z działalności wojewody wileńskiego i wołyńskiego	1928-1931, 1934
129	[J.w. – województwo wołyńskie	
173	Sprawy Korpusu Ochrony Podgranicza /KOP/ Wzajemny stosunek z władzami administracji, kurs instruktorów oświaty	1932-1935
802	Tezy w dziedzinie narodowościowej. Uwagi do expose pana premiera M. Zyndram – Kościałkowskiego	I.1936
849	Polityczne Komunikaty Informacyjne Wydziału Politycznego MSW, n-ry 1-10, 43-45	1928, 1929
850	Polityczne Komunikaty Informacyjne Wydziału Społeczno-Politycznego MSW	1930-1932
853	J.w.	1935, 1936, 1937 I-III
854	Sprawozdania miesięczne z polskiego legalnego ruchu robotniczego Wydziału Społeczno-Politycznego MSW	IV-VII, IX, 1937
856	Sprawozdania kwartalne Wydziału Społeczno-Politycznego MSW z życia polskich legalnych związków i stowarzyszeń	1933
857	J.w.	1934
858	J.w.	1935, I, III, kw.
859	Sprawozdanie półroczne MSW z życia polskich legalnych stowarzyszeń i związków za okres od 1 stycznia do 30 czerwca 1936 roku	1936
886	Korespondencja w sprawie kompletowania materiałów dotyczących ziem wschodnich m.in. za pośrednictwem powiatowych komendantów PW	1936

894	Statut Organizacji Młodzieży Socjalistycznej „Życie”	b.d.
915	Ilościowe zestawienie zarządzonych represji prasowych z uwzględnieniem podziałów terytorialnego i językowego za czas od I-II 1928	1928
936	„Notatka w sprawie polskiej wewnętrznej polityki narodowościowej”	1936
938	„Zarys programu, zadań i prac państwowych na Polesiu” wojewody poleskiego St. Downarowicza	1.III.1923
941	Pismo Instytutu Badań Spraw Międzynarodowych do MSW z załączonym stenogramem dyskusji w angielskiej Izbie Lordów z czerwca 1931 na temat Gdańska, Górnego Śląska i mniejszości ukraińskiej w Polsce	22.II.1933
942	Pismo Instytutu Badań Spraw Międzynarodowych do MSW z załączonym protokołem konferencji w sprawie ankiety o międzynarodowej ochronie mniejszości, odbytej w dniach 12-13 lipca 1932 r.	6.X.1932
944	Materiały dotyczące spraw narodowościowych na terenie powiatów rówieńskiego i zdołbunowskiego	1931
945	Referat Michała Baczyńskiego p.t. „Kwestia mniejszościowa oraz rola i metody opozycji mniejszościowej w odrodzonej Polsce”	1935
946	Referat p.t. „Zagadnienia ziem wschodnich w świetle bezpośredniej obserwacji terenu”	1935
947	Sprawozdanie z działalności Instytutu Badań Spraw Narodowościowych	1930-1938
949	Pismo Prezydium Rady Ministrów do MSW z załączonymi memoriałami Towarzystwa Rozwoju Ziem Wschodnich w sprawach rozwoju gospodarczego tych ziem i wynaradawiania się Polaków w województwach południowo-wschodnich	6.XI.1936
950	Pismo Instytutu Badań Spraw Narodowościowych do MSW z załączonymi „Materiałami do artykułu Zagadnienie mniejszości narodowych w Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej, opublikowanego w n-rze 1 rocznika 1935, Spraw Narodowościowych” M. In. Wyciągi z protokołów posiedzeń Sejmu i Komisji Sejmowych z lat 1919-1920”	8.III.1937
951	Pismo Instytutu Badań Spraw Międzynarodowych z załączonym statutem Instytutu z roku 1928	9.II.1933
953	Memoriał w sprawie stosunków narodowościowych i wyznaniowych w województwach wschodnich i południowo-wschodnich Państwa Polskiego Ludwika Rogowicza	1936
958	Przegląd Prasy Narodowościowej Wydziały Narodowościowego MSW, n-ry: 1-37, 39-51	1928
959	J.w. [n-ry: 1-51]	1929
960	J.w. [n-ry: 1-52]	1930

961	Sprawozdania Wydziału Narodowościowego MSW z życia mniejszości narodowych w Polsce za okres od grudnia 1926 do grudnia 1927 r włącznie	1926-1927
963	Sprawozdania Wydziału Narodowościowego MSW z życia mniejszości narodowych za kwartały: IV 1935, I, III, IV, 1936	1936
967	J.w. [n-ry: 113-129, 149, 166, 171, 185-186]	1938
972	J.w. [n-ry: 140-1947, 151, 153, 164, 166-167, 170-175, 189-191-193-197, 199]	1939
973	Wykaz „Niemieckie ugrupowania polityczne w Polsce w dniu 1 maja 1927 roku”	18.XI.1937
974	Pismo MSZ do MSW z załączoną notatką z konferencji międzyministerialnej poświęconej sprawie „pewnych posunięć amnestyjnych w stosunku do mniejszości niemieckiej w Polsce”	18.XI.1937
977	Korespondencja w sprawie dostępu dzieci do szkół mniejszościowych niemieckich	1931
979	Korespondencja w sprawie memoriału Hasbacha b. Senotara w sprawie szkolnictwa niemieckiego, złożonego na ręce ministra Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego	1934
980	Informacje do działalności stowarzyszenia „Deutscher Schulverein in Polen”	1932-1937
983	Korespondencja w sprawie dowozu dzieci niemieckich do szkól	1938-1939
986	Pismo MSZ do MSW w sprawie wzmożonego napływy studentów narodowości niemieckiej, posiadających obywatelstwo polskie na uniwersytety niemieckie	14.VII.1936
988	Materiały dotyczące antypolskiej działalności pastorów i wydaleń ich z Polski	1936-1938
989	Pismo Urzędu Wojewódzkiego Pomorskiego do MSW w sprawie wrogiego nastawienia do polskości superintendenta z Bydgoszczy Assmanna	23.II.1939
990	Korespondencja i wycinki prasowe w sprawie sfałszowanego pisma woj. Pomorskiego do prezesa Okręgowego Urzędu Ziemskiego w Grudziądzu i sposobie wykonywania reformy rolnej i wywłaszczenia właścicieli ziemskich Niemców zamieszczonego w „Manchester Guardian” z 11.IX.1930	1930-1931
991	Korespondencja i sprawozdania w sprawie skarg mniejszości niemieckiej dotyczących udzielania koncesji monopolowych (alkoholowych i in.)	1932
993	Materiały w sprawie werbowania robotników z Polski do prac w Niemczech	1937-1937
1000	Pisma w sprawie przeniesienia z terenu województwa lubelskiego H. Hellwiga, buchaltera Oddziału BGK w Lublinie, nastawionego wrogo do państwa polskiego	VIII.1939

1001	Pisma Śląskiego Urzędu Wojewódzkiego do MSW z załączonymi materiałami dotyczącymi skargi Deutscher Volksbund fur Polnisch-Schlesien na zachowanie się władz polskich podczas przebiegu wyborów do Sejmu Śląskiego	1931
1002	Korespondencja w sprawie likwidacji Deutscher Volkverband	VII-VIII 1939
1003	Korespondencja w sprawach organizacji i działalności „Deutscher Kultur und Wirtschaftsbund" w Polsce	1931-1934
1004	Materiały w sprawie propagandy hitlerowskiej w Polsce oraz szkolenia członków NSDAP	1936
1005	Materiały w sprawie organizacji i działalności „Jungdeutsche Partei"	1936-1939
1010	Informacje na temat Danziger Privat Action Bank	1938
1017	Korespondencja w sprawie wizyt wzajemnych wojewody pomorskiego i prezesa rejencji kwidzyńskiej, charakteryzująca również ogólnie stan stosunków polsko-niemieckich na Pomorzu	1934-1935, 1937
1019	Korespondencja w sprawie kontaktów ambasady niemieckiej z niemiecką mniejszością w Polsce	1937
1020	Korespondencja w sprawie pobytu optantów niemieckich na Górnym Śląsku z związku u wygaśnięciem konwencji genewskiej	1937
1026	Materiały dotyczące Warmii i Mazur: sytuacja Polaków, budownictwo niemieckie, postulaty dotyczące wyrównania różnic gospodarczych między powiatami polskimi a graniczącymi obszarami Prus Wschodnich	1936-1937
1031	Korespondencja między Konsulatami RP w Królewcu i Olsztynie w sprawach akcji polskiej w Prussach Wschodnich i Niemczech	1923-1925, 1930
1033	Materiały dotyczące zjazdu niemieckiego w Elblagu i udziału w nim Niemców obywateli polskich	1932
1036	Referat Wydziału Narodowościowego MSW pt. „Ukraińskie i ruskie ugrupowanie w Polsce w dniu 1 kwietnia 1927 roku" oraz wykaz pod tymże tytułem	1927
1037	Pismo wojewody wołyńskiego do MSW przedstawiające „stan życia politycznego społeczeństwa ukraińskiego na Wołyniu."	1933
1039	Komunikaty Informacyjne Wydziału Narodowościowego MSW dotyczące ruchu ukraińskiego, n-ry 19-72	1931
1040	J.w. [n-ry 73-77, 6-55]	1932
1041	J.w. [n-ry 1-61]	1933
1048	Memoriał Ukraińskiej Parlamentarnej Reprezentacji Prawosławnych Posłów i Senatorów Wołynia do wojewody wołyńskiego w sprawie współpracy władz cerkiewnych i cywilnych	1934
1050	Okólnik Kancelarii Ukraińskiej Reprezentacji	18.IX.1929

	Parlamentarnej	
1054	Referat pt. Likwidacja spółdzielczości na Wołyniu”	Po 1932
1057	Fragment referatu pt Emigracja ukraińska w Niemczech	1937
1058	Materiały dotyczące Łemkowszczyzny: szkolnictwo, sprawy kulturalne, gospodarcze i in.	1937-1938
1059	Korespondencja w sprawie udzielenia stypendiów dla studentów Białorusinów	1936-1937
1062	Referat Wydziału Narodowościowego MSW pt. „Żydowskie ugrupowanie w Polsce w dniu 1 maja 1927 oraz wykaz pod tymże tytułem”	1927
1064	Pisma w sprawie działalności „Bundu” o okólniku w sprawie pomocy robotnikom hiszpańskim walczącym przeciwko wojskom Franco oraz o akcji wyborczej do gmin żydowskich	1936
1065	Fragment odezwy CK Bundu w związku z antysemickimi uchwałami Rady Naczelnej OZN-u	b.d.
1068	Materiały Komitetu dla Zbadania potrzeb gospodarczych ludności żydowskiej w Polsce dotyczące emigracji żydowskiej	1932-1936
1071	Pismo Ambasady RP w Waszyngtonie do MSZ z załączonym tekstem rezolucji Federacji Żydów Polskich	1936
1077	Kocept pisma MSW do MWRiOP z załączonym okólnikiem urzędu wojewódzkiego wołyńskiego do starostw w sprawie ruchu unickiego na Wołyniu	30.VII.1927
1080	Materiały w sprawie kształcenia alumnów dla Łemkowszczyzny	1938-1939
1081	Materiały dotyczące Światowego Zjazdu Baptystów w Berlinie	1933-1934
1249	Odpis broszury wydanej przez Wydział Propagandy UOW informującej o celach i zadaniach tej organizacji	b.d.
1250	Komunikaty Wydziały Bezpieczeństwa MSW n-ry: 2, 4, i 5 o działalności UOW	1929-1930
1251	Komunikat Wydziału Bezpieczeństwa MSW n 6 o działalności OUN (byłej UOW)	1931-1932
1252	Kronika wydarzeń w Małopolsce Wschodniej i na Wołyniu (wykaz aktów sabotażu, zamachów, dokonanych m.in. przez członków UON) oraz sprawozdania Wydziału Bezpieczeństwa MSW 1-3 o działalności UON)	1933-1934
1254	„Dyspozycja w sprawie prowadzenia wywiadu w terenie co do OUN dla kierowników referatów bezpieczeństwa, komendantów powiatowych i kierowników wydziałów śledczych województwa wołyńskiego”	B.d.
1255	Wniosek Wydziału Bezpieczeństwa o wszczęcie śledztwa przeciw Ukraińskiej Organizacji Wojskowej wraz ze szkicem dotychczasowego rozwoju tej organizacji	1930
1256	Korespondencja w sprawie zabezpieczenia przed	1931-21

	terrorystyczną akcją OUN	
1263	Pismo Wydziału Narodowościowego MSW do Wydziału Bezpieczeństwa informujące o akcji OUN na terenie Wołynia	7.IX.1934
1265	Korespondencja w sprawie ustalenia miejsca pobytu członka OUN J Baranowskiego	1934-1935

Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, Dopływ

File Number	**Title**	**Year**
973	Okólnik i rozkazy w sprawach organizacyjnych, porządkowych	1918
974	Okólnik dotycz rozkazy nadsyłania sprawozdań sytuacyjnych i stanu bezpieczeństwa	1920
975	Okólniki, Pisma Okólne dotycz: 1921	1921
976	Okólniki dotyczące: 1922	1922
977	Okólniki i Pisma Okólne	1923
978	Okólniki, Pisma Okólne, i Instrukcje	1924
979	Okólniki, instrukcje i wytyczne	1925
980	Zarządzenia i pisma okólne	1926
983	Instrukcje i pisma okólne	1929
986	Instrukcje i pisma okólne	1932
987	Instrukcje i pisma okólne	1933
988	Instrukcje i pisma okólne	1934
990	Instrukcje i pisma okólne	1936
991	Instrukcje i pisma okólne	1937
992	Zarządzenia i pisma okólne	1938
1001	Sprawozdanie z konferencji z wojewodami z Kresów wschodnich	1922
1002	Protokoły ze Zjazdów Wojewodów	1922, 1925, 1934
1007	Wykazy konfidentów i informatorów w sprawach komunistycznych i korespondencja towarzysząca	1932-1934, 1936-1937
1017	Sprawozdania dekadowe, miesięczne i kwartalne z życia społeczno-politycznego i stanu bezpieczeństwa za m-c I, IV-XI	1921
1018	Sprawozdania dwutygodniowe i miesięczne z życia społeczno-politycznego i stanu bezpieczeństwa za m-ce III, IV, VII, VIII	1922
1019	Sprawozdania dzienne z życia społeczno-politycznego i stanu bezpieczeństwa za okres od 21.I do 15. VII	1924
1020	Sprawozdania miesięczne i kwartalne z ruchu komunistycznego z IX 1926, za III i IV kwartał 1926 r oraz komplet za 1927 r.	1926-1927

1021	Sprawozdania miesięczne i okresowe z życia mniejszości narodowych w Polsce./ od VIII.1926.r. do VIII. 1928 r.	1926-1928, 1932
1024	Sprawozdania tygodniowe i kwartalne z ruchu zawodnego za I kwartał 1927 r oraz za m-ce II-XII 1928 r	1927-1928
1026	Sprawozdania kwartalne i półroczne z ruchu komunistycznego	1928
1030	Sprawozdania tygodniowe, dekadowe i półroczne z działalności Zjednoczonej Lewicy Chłopskiej „Samopomoc”	1928-1930
1031	Sprawozdanie tygodniowe, dekadowe i okresowe z działalności białoruskich organizacji	1928-1932
1036	Sprawozdania tygodniowe z ruchu komunistycznego	1929
1043	Sprawozdania miesięczne ze stanu bezpieczeństwa i życia społeczno-politycznego za m-ce XI-XII. 1931 r. I I-II, 1932 r.	1931-1932
1052	Sprawozdanie półroczne z życia polskich legalnych stowarzyszeń i związków	1936
1054	Sprawozdania tygodniowe z sytuacji politycznej, ruchu komunistycznego, spraw narodowościowych i wojskowych	1939
1057	Notatki informacyjne z przebiegu dnia 1 Maja	1921, 1924, 1926, 1928, 1930-1932, 1937
1062	Opracowanie dotyczące powstania i działalności USDP	1923-1924, 1927, 31, 1933
1066	Komunikat o przejawach działalności UOW	1929-1932
1068	Instrukcja Kominternu dotycząca agitacji komunistycznej w wojsku	1931, 1937
1071	Opracowanie dotycz zagadnienia personelu organizacji społecznych w Polsce	b.d.
1073	Uwagi Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych w związku z petycjami ukraińskimi, i itd.	1919-1935
1074	Informacje i meldunki	1920-21, 1923-28, 1930-36

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Appendix

Results of collinearity tests for each logistic regression model used in Chapter 3. Each table below demonstrates that multicollinearity between variables was low.

Table 1. Model 1 Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	Tolerance
Regime Type	1.08	0.93
Ethnic Group	1.87	0.55
Ideology	1.04	0.96
Foreign Ties	1.28	0.78
Secessionist Demands	1.89	0.53
Mean VIF	1.43	

Table 2. Model 2 Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	Tolerance
Regime Type	1.15	0.87
Secessionist Demands	1.89	0.53
Revisionist Ties	1.40	0.72
Foreign Ties	1.67	0.60
Ideology	1.04	0.96
Ethnic Group	1.90	0.53
Mean VIF	1.51	

Table 3. Model 3 Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	Tolerance
Regime Type	1.12	0.89
Secessionist Demands	1.07	0.93
Foreign Ties	1.40	0.72
Ideology	1.03	0.97
Revisionist Ties	1.37	0.73
Mean VIF	1.20	

Table 4. Model 4 Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	Tolerance
Regime Type	1.12	0.90
Revisionist Ties	1.36	0.73
Foreign Ties	1.44	0.69
Ideology	1.02	0.98
Ethnic Group	1.09	0.92
Mean VIF	1.20	