The impact of international actors on domestic agricultural Policy: A comparison of cocoa and rice in Ghana

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

Jonas L. Heirman

Acknowledgements

I am forever grateful to those who guided, encouraged and patiently waited for me to complete this thesis.

I am very grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Raufu Mustapha, for his guidance and support, despite countless small hurdles along the way. I would also like to thank the Oxford Department for International Development for providing a wonderful place to study and learn, and particularly Dominique Attala for her unending optimism and willingness to guide me. I am also thankful for my fellow DPhil students, who inspired me to keep going no matter what.

I am thankful to Green Templeton College for welcoming and supporting me over the years. I am particularly grateful to the Future of Work programme for supporting me during my time at Oxford. I would also like to thank all of the college staff for assisting me at each stage of the doctoral programme.

Finally, I am forever thankful to my amazing wife, Neha Rai, for her love, encouragement and willingness to critique, without her this thesis never would have started or finished. I would also like to thank my mother, Dr. Marcia Heirman, for her unending support and willingness to read chapters. Last but not least, I would like to thank Reinhard Heirman, Charanjit Rai, Meena Rai, and all my family for their love, support and patience with me.

Thesis Abstract

The global financial and food crisis of 2007 and 2008 was followed by a surge in foreign interest and investment in African agriculture. Renewed global interest in African agriculture was also accompanied by an increase in international efforts to influence domestic agricultural policies, including in Ghana. In the context of an increasingly globalised food regime and integrated commodity markets, this thesis answers the question: to what extent do international actors impact domestic agricultural policies in Ghana?

Policy 'impact' is understood as the marked influence that international actors have on policy goals and the resources, institutions, and knowledge used for achieving them. This thesis compares case studies of cocoa and rice policy over two different periods in Ghana's recent history (1983-1995 and 2003-2012) to understand how international actors use their power and resources to impact agricultural policies. The comparison of cocoa and rice policy is used to address two gaps in existing literature by examining how the impact of international actors relates to: 1) the political economy for a specific crop; and 2) the interaction between actors at international, national and local levels. Findings from the comparative analysis are then used to test existing theories for how international actors influence government policy in Africa more generally. In particular, findings provide new insights into how the impact of international actors on African agricultural policies is strongly associated with the effect of policy decisions on the longer-term political economy for a particular crop.

Abbreviations:

ADC	**Agricultural Development Corporation of South Korea**
AgSSIP	**Agricultural Services Sub-sector Investment Project**
APCC	**Agricultural Policy Coordinating Committee (APCC)**
ASRP	**Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Project (1987)**
BADEA	**Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa**
ASAP	**Agricultural Sector Adjustment Programme**
CAADP	**Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme**
CDR	**Committees in Defence of the Revolution**
CPP	**Convention People's Party**
ERP	**Economic Recovery Programme**
GAP	**Ghana Agricultural Policy 1986-88**
GFDC	**Ghana Food Distribution Corporation**
GIDA	**Ghana Irrigation Development Authority**
GMP	**Guaranteed Minimum Price**
GoG	**Government of Ghana**
GSGDA	**Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda**
GWC	**Grain Warehousing Company**
IDA	**International Development Association**
IFI	**International financial institution**
IMF	**International Monetary Fund**
INCC	**Interim National Coordinating Committee**
KfW	**Kreditanstalt fur Wiedaraufbau**
MDG	**Millennium Development Goal**
MiDA	**Millennium Development Authority**
MOFA	**Ministry of Food and Agriculture**
MOFEP	**Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning**
MTADP	**Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme**
NAFCO	**National Food Buffer Stock Company**
NCD	**National Commission on Democracy**
NDC	**National Democratic Congress**
NMP	**National Mobilisation Programme**
PARDIC	**Public Administration Restructuring and Decentralisation Implementing Committee**
PCU	**Project Coordination Unit**
PDC	**People's Defence Committees**
PPF	**Project Planning Facility**
PPMED	**Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate, MOFA (sometimes called Department)**
PPP	**Public Private Partnership**
SAP	**Structural Adjustment Programme**
SOE	**State Owned Enterprise**
WCF	**World Cocoa Foundation**

Table of Contents:

Tables and Figures:

Chapter 1. Introduction: International involvement in African agriculture

The global financial and food crisis between 2007 and 2008 was followed by a surge in foreign investment and interest in African agriculture, both private and public (Cotula et al. 2009; Shapiro and Rosenquist 2004; WorldBank 2009). Renewed global interest in African agriculture caused an increase in international efforts to influence domestic agricultural policies, including the support of initiatives like the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) and Global Rice Science Partnership (GRISP) (IRRI et al. 2010; Kolavalli et al. 2010; NEPAD 2009). The collapse of western financial markets contributed to a spike in global commodity prices and pushed agricultural production onto international investment and development agendas. However, this was not the first time that a 'crisis' sparked international interest in agriculture (Berry 1984; Conway and Barbier 1988; Keeley and Scoones 1999; Tellez 2008).

In the 1960s foreign aid donors, private foundations, and corporations joined forces to pursue a 'Green Revolution' (Conway and Barbier 1988). Driven by fears for global food shortages, the Green Revolution promoted improved technologies, high-yield varieties (HVYs), and market deregulation as solutions for increasing agricultural productivity (Conway and Barbier 1988; Holt-Gimenez 2008; Kalita et al. 2012). However, as Gordon Conway and Edward Barbier observed, the Green Revolution did not benefit all farmers equally and had little impact in Africa, due to poor macro-economic policies (Conway and Barbier 1988). Coming to a similar conclusion about the macro-economic constraints preventing African development, the 'Washington Consensus' enabled international financial institutions (IFIs), primarily the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), to implement structural adjustment programmes that pushed for the implementation of more liberal economic and trade policies throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Commander 1989).

African agricultural production was largely neglected by IFIs and western donors during structural adjustment period (i.e. 1980s) and the decade that followed (World Bank 2007a; WorldBank 2009). While donor interest declined, the overall trend in international agendas for agriculture continued to promote commoditisation and financialization (Clapp 2014). The steady push to commoditise African agriculture has not been without critics. Eric Holt-Gimenez and Carol Thompson argue that the Green Revolution approach to development was in effect a way for multinational companies to take genetic material from developing countries and privatise it to make profit (Holt-Gimenez 2008; Thompson 2012). Responding to the ineffectiveness of the 1960's Green Revolution to boost production in Africa, Conway and others pushed for a new 'sustainable' or 'doubly' Green Revolution (Holt-Gimenez 2008). The African Green Revolution agenda received a boost with the launch of CAADP in 2003 and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in 2006, both of which were supported by multilateral, bilateral donors, African governments, and private foundations. After 2008, renewed fears over food security in African created a surge in donor interest and private investment agricultural commodities.

The increased global interest in African agriculture after the collapse of western financial markets represents a shift in the level of effort made by international actors to influence African agricultural policies. Yet, given the history of shifting global agendas, how do new international efforts affect African agricultural policies, and to what extent do international actors have any impact on policy decisions?

Before answering these questions it is first helpful to define the terms 'actor', 'policy', and 'impact'. Elinor Ostrom defines an 'actor' as an "individual or group of individuals, capable of weighing optional strategies and able to take action" (Ostrom, 1999). This definition is used by this thesis because it defines an 'actor' by its function as decision-maker in some form. In the context of African agricultural policy, actors can be individual (e.g. politicians) or corporate (e.g. an entire ministry involved in implementing policy).

Public, private, and non-governmental actors that exert influence across geographic and political boundaries have facilitated globalisation, including in the production of agriculture. Depending on the study, these global actors are referred to as ‘multinational’ (Mmieh and Owusu-Frimpong 2004), ‘international’ (Puplampu 2003), or ‘transnational’ (Rosenau 1995). For the purposes of this thesis the groups of individuals and organisations that function at this global level will be referred to as ‘international actors’. James Rosenau shows how the increasingly interconnected world has changed politics and ‘governance’, a term used to recognise the roles of state and non-state actors in the function of economic and political systems (Rosenau 1995).

The term ‘policy’ has many different meanings. It often gets used to refer to formal strategies and regulations as well as more general rules established to govern the function of public or private institutions. For this thesis the focus is on government policies. Robert Bates defines ‘agricultural policy’ as “government actions that affect the incomes of rural producers by influencing the prices these farmers confront in the major markets which determine their incomes”(Bates 1981: p. 3). By this definition agricultural policy can include tax or trade policies that do not explicitly focus solely on agriculture, which makes it too broad to be useful here. A more useful definition developed by William Jenkins, defines policy as “a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specific situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve” (Jenkins 1978: p. 15). This thesis uses Jenkins’ definition because it sets out clearly defined ways in which international actors could impact policy: a) by altering the ‘goals’ and ‘means’ selected, or b) by altering the ‘power’ or ability of governments to choose and implement them.

It is also helpful to differentiate between the terms policy ‘influence’ and policy ‘impact’. The two terms are often used interchangeably, as impact is by definition “a marked effect or influence” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2010). However, for the purpose of this thesis policy ‘impact’ is understood as a ‘marked’ influence or effect that is not already fully explained by other influences. Policy impact can also be unintentional, as is likely when donor neglect for African agriculture in the 1980s and 1990s had an impact on the nature and level of future investment.

Using this definition, the ‘impact’ of international actors on policy can be understood as their marked influence, whether intentional or unintentional, on a government’s goals and the means (e.g. resources, knowledge, etc.) used to achieve them. For example, international actors may be influential in moving government agendas away from goals like achieving self-sufficiency in food production towards goals such as achieving food security, whether that food is produced domestically or imported. In other cases, the impact of international actors could be observed in a shift from state-supported agricultural production and marketing to the liberalisation of markets and removal of state interference. In this case the goal of achieving growth in the agricultural sector could remain the same but the means for achieving the goal change. Finally, international actors could impact policy by assisting governments to restructure their own institutions and thereby altering future policy goals and means.

A large body of existing literature explores the ways in which international actors could theoretically impact African policies. Bilateral and multilateral donors of foreign aid are found to influence African government policies, as observed by Sara Berry, Simon Commander and Eboe Hutchful and many others (Berry 1993; Commander 1989; Hutchful 2002). Foreign aid, also known as official development assistance (ODA), consists of grants, loans and technical assistance provided by ‘donors’ to ‘recipients’, whether governments or private entities, in order to encourage social and economic development. Donors also use foreign aid to try and influence the policies implemented by recipient governments. When African countries faced economic crises in the

1970s and 1980s, IFIs used loan conditions to push through structural adjustment programmes, which often resulted in widespread and significant changes in African government institutions and policies (Commander 1989; Cornia et al. 1987; Hutchful 2002). During this period 'policy-based lending' became an important strategy for IFIs interested in promoting policies like reducing government spending and liberalising African economies (Mosley et al. 1995).

However, the ability of donors or IFIs to impact African policies as intended is debated (Killick et al. 1998; Mosley et al. 1995; Whitfield 2008). Studies examining the incentives and circumstances that are most likely to persuade governments to choose certain policies find that agreements are often never fully implemented as planned and that donors and recipients often accepted this as part of maintaining their relationships (Killick et al. 1998; Mosley et al. 1995). In a more recent study, Lindsay Whitfield et al finds that the relationships between donors and recipients is heavily influenced by "whether or not those [recipient] governments know that donors will not withdraw support if their conditions are not met and the degree to which those governments are willing to risk aid withdrawal in any case"(Whitfield 2008: p. 356). The findings by Mosley, Killick, Whitfield and many others point to the significant divergence between agreements on paper and policies implemented (Killick 1997; Mosley et al. 1995; Whitfield 2008).

African governments are not passive or powerless when it comes to choosing policies or complying with international agendas. As noted by Killick, "domestic political calculations dominate decisions about economic policy changes and donor agencies are relatively powerless in the face of this"(Killick et al. 1998: p. 149). The generally poor performance of structural adjustment programmes in Africa, in terms of achieving meaningful policy changes and development goals, has led many donors to revisit assumptions underpinning aid (Cornia et al. 1987; Noman et al. 2011). In the midst of this disillusionment, Craig Burnside and David Dollar found that foreign aid may still result in economic growth for countries with 'good' fiscal and trade policies (Burnside and Dollar 1997, 2004). These findings fuelled international interest in ‘good governance’ as a means towards achieving ‘aid effectiveness’ (Chandler 2010; Fosu et al. 2006; H. Hansen and Tarp 2000). It also led many optimistic academics and donors to increasingly focus on the relationship between policies, institutions, and economic growth, in the hopes of finding some technical solution to governance and development (Noman et al. 2011).

The 1990s represented a major shift in geopolitics and foreign aid paradigms. Whereas Cold War geo-political interest often overruled foreign aid agreements, the collapse of the Soviet Union potential altered the ability of donors to make credible demands from recipient governments according to Thad Dunning (Dunning 2004). The shift towards goals such as ‘good governance’ also changed the way in which donor-recipient relationships are perceived and discussed, as ‘recipients’ became ‘partners’ (DAC 2005/2008). As highlighted by Chandler (2010), in this “post-liberal” era, international actors increasingly focused on manipulating the function of government actors and institutions in partner countries, rather than prescribing specific policy solutions (Chandler 2010: p. 194). In practice this meant donors started exporting one-size-fits-all institutions instead of policies, according to Thandika Mkandawire (Noman et al. 2011: p. 102). “The fragmented aid system in the 1980s was transformed into a joint donor–government planning process by the 2000s,” observes Whitfield in an examination of the overall evolution of donor practices (Whitfield 2008: p. 353).

The word ‘partnership’ masks the fact that donors and governments often have very different interests. In *Reinventing Foreign Aid*, Todd Moss warns that “donors should be unambiguously aware that their assistance can have perverse effects on some of the very outcomes they hope to encourage”(Easterly 2008: p. 276). Examining the effectiveness of ‘democracy’ focused interventions, Danielle Resnick and Nicolas van de Walle conclude that “development aid can indirectly and unintentionally bolster the incumbent regime”, whether or not that regime is conducive to development (Resnick and Van de Walle 2013: p. 290). This is supported by Alice Sindzingre who argues that foreign aid actually promotes neo-patrimonial regimes (Bach and

Mamoudou 2013: pp. 104-05). All of these studies suggest that domestic politics and economic circumstances continue to overpower international agendas, even in a post-liberal world.

However, IFIs, bilateral donors, and transnational companies do not need to achieve development goals to impact agricultural policies or practices. Looking at the longer-term history of economic growth paradigms on generations of African policies, Benno Ndulu (2008) observes that international paradigms greatly influenced the "policy choices leaders make" (p. 323) and concludes "international multilateral agencies have played a disproportionately larger role in shaping African policy" (p. 339). Ndulu's findings point to a much more subtle way in which international actors can affect African policies by establishing the 'paradigms' that frame decisions. In addition, Whitfield finds that "technocrats in the Ministries of Finance in these countries seem to share a greater affinity with donors, partly due to their shared epistemic community in economics training and partly because they have usually developed a close working relationship with donors as the key negotiator"(Whitfield 2008: p. 351). Ndulu's and Whitfield's findings both suggest that the impact of international actors on African policy could have less to do with agreements or policies on paper, and more to do with the understandings, ideas or beliefs that shape government agendas and actions.

The dissemination of knowledge (expertise, ideology, worldviews, etc.) through international communities has also been found to influence agricultural policies and practices (Clapp 2014 ; Holt-Gimenez 2008; McMichael 2009). Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas use the term 'epistemic communities' to refer to the groups of actors that promote and build consensus for their understandings into agendas and policies globally (Adler and Haas 1992). The 1990s and 2000s saw the evolution of a global 'food regime' through the advent of flex crops (i.e. crops that have multiple uses like food and energy) and an increasing influence of middle income countries and financial institutions in global supply chains (Clapp 2014 ; McMichael 2009). This global shift towards the financialization of agriculture also sparked many counter-movements, such as ‘food sovereignty’ and ‘farmer voice’ agendas (Kalita et al. 2012).

As the global ‘food regime’ evolves, international actors are often forced to balance agendas like poverty reduction with opportunities for commercial agricultural production. While the overall importance of foreign aid declines as a percentage of recipient GDP and government income, many international actors increasingly view Africa as an investment opportunity (Cotula et al. 2009; Cotula and Berger 2014). The shift toward African agriculture as investment opportunity has coincided with growing international interest in ‘value chains’, which represent the sum of activities needed to “bring a product or service from conception… to final consumers, and final disposal after use”(Kaplinsky and Morris 2001: p. 4). The value chain approach to development shifts the agricultural development paradigm from local economics and politics to technical solutions for integrating farmers into global supply chains (McMichael 2013; Roduner 2007; Staritz 2012: p. 3). Despite often ignoring power asymmetries, value chain approaches are often implemented through public private partnerships (PPPs), which can establish new relationships between farmers, governments, donors and multinational companies.

The spread of PPPs in African agriculture raises many questions about the influence of multinational companies on international and domestic policy agendas. Elenita Daňo shows how private companies and foundations partner with donors and African governments to secure support for promoting the spread of their input technologies and financial services, thereby making farmers dependent on multinational companies (Daňo 2007). Philip McMichael observes how multinational companies and African elites often collaborate to improve food security by ‘deepening’ privatisation (McMichael 2013: p. 685). As described by Lorenzo Cotula and Thierry Berger, recent practices include establishing special contracts between African governments and multinational companies, called agriculture commercialisation concessions (ACCs), which go as far as giving companies “exclusive rights to commercialise a crop in the agreed geographic area”

(Cotula and Berger 2014). ACCs, in effect, give multinational companies direct control over agricultural production in Africa without any farmer's consent. However, as with aid, agreements on paper do not directly translate into practice, and PPPs encounter difficulties due to 'clashes' in culture and a lack of trust (Scoones and Thompson 2011: p. 6). Some observers also see PPPs as a deliberate government strategies for adjusting to neoliberalism, a tactic referred to as 'neostatism'[1] and 'neo-corporatism'[2] (Jessop 2002: p. 461).

The interplay between different private and public companies involved in African agriculture poses an interesting dilemma for understanding the impact of international actors on policy. In *The Risk of Inclusion*, Anna Laven examines how the partial liberalisation of cocoa in Ghana affected the ability of producers to move up the value chain (Laven 2010a). Laven finds the government to be more or less cooperative with multinational companies depending on the issue concerned. Laven suggests "the dominant role of the state in Ghana implies a need to discuss other more hybrid types of governance based on various forms of coordination and public-private-civil partnerships, and to move beyond the usual distinction between buyer, trader and producer-driven chains" (ibid: 196). When looking at the relationships between donors and private companies, Laven's observes that in Ghana these communities often use the same criteria for deciding whether to 'push for policy change (ibid: 103). Laven's work provides an important insight into how the formation of coalitions between donors, companies and African governments may give rise to policies that balance their interests in agriculture.

Overall, the observed evolving relationship between international actors and African governments points towards the importance of understanding how the politics and economics of agriculture shape power dynamics and policies. Multinational companies are clearly important to recent

[1] According to Jessop, "Neocorporatism involves a negotiated approach to restructuring by private, public, and third-sector actors and aims to balance competition and cooperation."
[2] According to Jessop, "Neostatism involves a market-conforming but state-sponsored approach to economic and social restructuring whereby the state seeks to guide market forces in support of a national economic strategy."

developments in African agriculture. On the one hand private companies can provide alternative resources for African governments and could potentially reduce the influence of both types of actors by creating a marketplace for support. On the other hand, donor's use of 'value chain' approaches suggests an alignment between many donor and multinational company interests. The combined power of multinational companies and donors could therefore greatly increase their influence over African agricultural policies.

Within this context there are many reasons to believe that international actors do impact African policies, though quite possibly in unintended and unobserved ways. As noted by Whitfield and others, country experiences are vastly different in terms of histories, institutions, relationships with donors, as well as the economics that define a particular sector or policy area (Berry 2009a; Mkandawire 2009; Whitfield 2008). These studies clearly show that: 1) interdependency between international actors and African governments affects the nature and length of relationships; and 2) relationships have many unintended consequences in terms of which policies get implemented and their development outcomes.

Yet, few studies examine how recent developments, such as the globalisation of agriculture and changing power structures within value chains, alter the ability of international actors to impact policies in Africa (Borras et al. 2013; Laven 2010a; Puplampu 2003; Scoones and Thompson 2011; Whitfield 2011a). And while existing studies on the politics of aid such as those by Mosley et al (1995), Killick et al (1998), Whitfield (2008), and Bach and Mamoudou (2013) are useful because they provide conceptual approaches for understanding how donors may impact recipients, they are also less useful for understanding whether their theories and findings are representative of the circumstances surrounding agricultural policies. This thesis fills two gaps: first, it examines how the impact of international actors on policy differs depending on the particular crops concerned; and second, it examines how impact is shaped by evolving relationships, institutions, and political economies at international, national, and local levels.

1.1. The Research Question

Exploring the politics of aid and agriculture in Africa in light of existing literature, there are reasons to assume that the impact of international actors on agricultural policy is highly dependent on country, context, time period and crop. Ghana's experience liberalising agricultural marketing shows export crops such as cocoa and food crops such as maize and rice have very different histories in terms of state control and willingness to change policies according to Shepherd and Onumah's comparison (Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 69). Likewise, Whitfield's analysis of horticulture in Ghana shows that elites are reluctant to support crops where they have no political strong-hold, even when there is donor backing (Whitfield 2011a). It is also evident that international influence depends on the availability of alternative sources of resources (Mosley et al. 1995; Resnick and Van de Walle 2013; Whitfield 2008).

Analysing the impact of international actors requires narrowing the focus to a manageable context and time frame given the possibility of many competing explanations for why governments implement observed agricultural policies in Africa. The latest period of declining international interest in African agriculture coincided with the structural adjustment programmes (1980 – 1995), and latest period of increasing interest began around the time of CAADP (2003). When examining the impact of international actors on agricultural policy it is therefore useful to examine the periods from 1983 to 1995 and 2003 to 2012. In addition, because the impact of international actors is likely to differ depending on the time period and crop concerned, it is necessary to narrow the analysis to a single country and a limited selection of crops.

Ghana provides a particularly useful case for this analysis because it has a long history of international involvement and has been subject to significant empirical research (Beckman 1976; Gyimah-Boadi 1989; Hill 1961; Hutchful 2002; Konings 1980; Sarpong and Gray 1989; Toye 1991; Van Hear 1984; Whitfield 2011a). Because past studies show how the history and politics of a given crop can differ significantly in Ghana this thesis is built around the comparison of cocoa and rice (Shepard and Onumah 1997). To better understand how the politics and economics of African agriculture shapes the ability of international actors to achieve desired policy changes, the main research question guiding this thesis is:

To what extent do international actors impact domestic agricultural policies in Ghana?

As previously discussed, to answer this question requires an analytical approach capable of identifying the relationships between actors and policies in contexts where there are many competing political, economic, and environmental influences. Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature examining why governments implement policies and the role of international actors in these processes. The literature review will provide the basis for selecting an analytical approach used in subsequent case studies and comparative analysis. However, before reviewing existing theory, it is helpful to reflect on the history of cocoa and rice policies in Ghana.

1.2. A brief history of cocoa and rice in Ghana

Even in its colonial period, cocoa was an important part of the Ghanaian economy. The British colonial government worked with farmers and chieftaincies to promote cocoa export. A 1938 colonial report states that “nearly 300,000 tons of cocoa is produced yearly, representing an average of approximately 69 per cent of the total value of domestic exports” (H.M. 1939: p. 1). Although migration occurred before cocoa was introduced, the prevalence of migrant farmers in southern Ghana’s forest regions increased significantly with the growing economic importance of cocoa, and was accompanied by new forms of land rights and capitalist farming patterns according to Polly Hill,(Hill 1961). The opportunity to grow cocoa encouraged labourers and migrant farmers to take advantage of the ‘abusa’ sharecropping system in Ashanti regions, in which cultivating farmers retained one-third of their production on a farmer’s land. Many cocoa labourers came from Ghana’s northern savannah, which also happens to be the region that traditionally cultivates rice.

Government agricultural services began as early as 1890 when the British created the Aburi Botanical Gardens and the Department of Agriculture (Puplampu 2003: p. 138). In 1936, European cocoa importers tried to reduce the price paid to cocoa farmers, which led to organised attempts by Ghanaian farmers to halt production (Dzorgbo 2001: p. 134). In response, the 1947 colonial government established the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) to stabilize and regulate producer prices. However, the CMB also generated foreign reserves, which were kept in London and invested in British securities (ibid). In effect, the CMB established an extractive form of cocoa governance, which impacted agricultural policies for many decades after independence.

Unlike cocoa, rice is native to Ghana. However, during the colonial period, Ghana’s northern rice-growing regions were valued more for labour than food cultivation (Amanor 2010: p. 6; Konings 1984: p. 113). As northern farmers moved south to work, northern farms could not produce enough rice to meet an increasing demand. Ghana was forced to import rice. In the 1920s the colonial government started making plans to reduce its dependency on rice imports, however, the agenda of using Ghana’s ‘Northern Territories’ for commercial food production only gained traction in the 1940s when the British were planning for post-World War II food shortages (Amanor 2010). Over subsequent generations, the governments’ policy agenda for reducing rice imports by increasing local production re-emerges again and again.

After Ghana gained its independence in 1957, President Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party (CPP) used government resources to start modernising agriculture (Amanor 2010: p. 6; Okoso-Amaa 1975: p. 1; Van Hear 1984: p. 44). Control over cocoa, and the GCMB, became a source of political contention between the CPP and existing licensed buying companies (LBCs). Wealthy farmers who set up LBCs under colonial rule had significant political influence in cocoa regions. To counter this threat, Nkrumah established the United Ghana Farmer's Council to demobilise "groups actually or potentially opposed to government policy" (Beckman 1976: p181; Berry 1984). Despite protests, farmers tolerated new state interventions because they also protected them from foreign competition (Beckman 1976: p234). In this manner, although independence altered power structures, institutions such as the GCMB remained intact and served new national government interests.

Between 1957 and 1962, rice imports accounted for 10.5% of Ghana's total trade deficit (Okoso-Amaa 1975: p. 33). These high levels of rice importation led the CPP government to impose a duty on imported rice in 1961, which generated revenue and encouraged local production (ibid: p52). In 1964, Nkrumah's Seven Year Development Plan set out a strategy for substituting rice imports with local production (Herbst 1993: p. 20; Okoso-Amaa 1975: p. 15). Implementing the Plan involved establishing cooperatives and state farms, as well as encouraging private farms to increase production. Northern regions were particularly suited for large-scale mechanised farming and the government's decision to vest northern land in the state, instead of in chieftaincies or native communities, made it easier for both public and private investment (Konings 1984: p. 97). In 1964, 15 rice mills were imported from West Germany and the first was installed in the northern city of Tamale (Okoso-Amaa 1975: p. 1). Despite efforts, Nkrumah never fully succeeded in establishing large-scale rice production in Ghana before the CPP was overthrown (Konings 1984: p. 97).

After Nkrumah was removed from government by a military coup in 1966, the institutions he helped develop became the basis for generations of future agricultural policies. When Dr. Kofi Busia's government was democratically elected in 1969, it promoted a liberal economic regime, including removing import tariffs and establishing food aid agreements. The Tamale rice mill was opened up to private processing and the United Ghana Farmers' Co-operative Council, which had been established to control cocoa, was disbanded (Okoso-Amaa 1975: p. 1). Despite efforts, problems were encountered in connecting production with markets. To better link grain farmers to markets, the Government established the Grains Development Board in 1969, and the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation (GFDC) in 1972 (Khor and Hormeku 2006: p. 7; Nyanteng and Seini 2003: p. 14). The GFDC provided farmers a guaranteed minimum price (GMP) for their crops (Khor and Hormeku 2006: p. 7). However, Busia's more 'liberal' economic policies were no more successful then Nkrumah's 'socialist' approach, and 50% to 70% of Ghana's rice was still imported between 1960 and 1970 (Konings 1984: p. 96).

When General Acheampong came to power through a coup in 1972, the newly established National Redemption Council came under pressure to address food security (Goody 1980: p. 138). In response, the government implemented 'Operation Feed Yourself' and 'Operation Feed Your Industries' (Ahwoi 2010: p. 6; Amanor 2010: p. 6; Van Hear 1984: p. 45). Commercial farms were given subsidised credit, guaranteed minimum prices, and subsidised equipment (Ansa-Asare 1985; Goody 1980: p. 138). Acheampong also implemented a Special Scheme for Participation in Agriculture that focused on attracting international companies to produce rice in Ghana (E. Hansen 1989: p. 211). By 1976, the government was subsidising 81% of the cost of fertilisers and 74% of the cost of agricultural services (Konings 1984: p. 97). All of these efforts eventually combined to produce a 'rice boom', during which period many bureaucrats and government officials invested in commercial rice farming (Goody 1980; Van Hear 1984: p. 45).

The 'rice boom' was supported by a large pool of daily workers in northern Ghana. However, as working conditions became more difficult and wages failed to keep up with inflation, farm labourers became disillusioned (Goody 1980; Konings 1984; Van Hear 1984: p. 54). Disillusionment culminated in protests and the burning of rice fields (Goody 1980: p. 151; Van Hear 1984: p. 53). Furthermore, the attractiveness of jobs on commercial rice farms also declined when several donor agencies began supporting smallholder rice projects (Van Hear 1984: p. 46).

In cocoa, the period between 1966 and 1981 saw the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (GCMB) evolve into an increasingly powerful and complex institution with many divisions. By 1983, the GCMB, cocoa institutes and parastatal enterprises employed between 109,000 and 120,000 staff (depending on the count), and controlled nearly every aspect of cocoa production (Stryker et al. 1990; Ton et al. 2008: p9). The increasing number of government institutions engaged in the cocoa sector corresponded with a steady decline in production and productivity after independence. John Toye aptly dissects the pattern of 'circular and cumulative causation' that led to declined investment in cocoa, decreased cocoa production, money printing and inflation, overvalued currency, rent-seeking, policy inaction, and eventual economic collapse (1991: p152-54). The global depression of the 1970s and early 1980s was accompanied by a collapse in commodity prices, and the combined impact of reduced export earnings and poor fiscal management led to economic collapse in Ghana (Puplampu, K. 2003: 136).

In 1979 and 1981, Lt. Jerry Rawlings led "accountability coups" to overthrow the government and replace the "statist-distributionist mode of governance" with a more market-oriented contract between society and the government (Whitfield, L. 2009: 53). Additionally, declining government revenue and inability to take policy action opened opportunities for international donors to become increasingly involved in cocoa governance reforms after 1983. Starting in 1983, Rawlings followed an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) supported by the World Bank and IMF, which was part of a wider structural adjustment programmes that altered the relationship between the government and donors, and the government and local constituencies. After initially focusing on balance of payments and export crops, between 1986 and 1988 the government initiated new attempts to make the country self-sufficient in food with limited success (Brooks et al. 2009: p. 424).

The relationship between commercial rice farming and donors became increasingly complicated in the 1980s and 1990s, as the government was pushed to reduce state-support for rice production and more and more donors supported smallholder projects. Structural adjustment greatly increased the government's reliance on external loans and official development assistance (ODA), and the growing debt burden became a significant driver of change in governance approaches. The debt burden led to the closing of many previously state-owned rural service providers (e.g. rural banks), and the combination of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) reforms and reductions in government capacity resulted in the stagnation of government support for agriculture production that lasted throughout the 1990s (Brooks et al. 2009). As mentioned before, government restructuring and reduced government services were accompanied by a large increase in the number of NGOs in Ghana, which jumped from 10 in 1960 to around 350 in 1991 (Puplampu, K. 2003: 143). NGOs also became an increasingly important way for the government and donors to support the agricultural sector.

Between 1992 and 1993, Ghana returned to a multiparty democracy despite Rawlings' objection to a form of governance he said breeds "corruption and elitism" (Ayee, J. 1994: 127). The new democratic government implemented significant policy changes, including the re-introduction of competition in areas such as cocoa production and marketing (Higazi, 2004). The new market-driven exchange rates led to a growth in exports and rising levels of foreign capital inflows (aid, remittances, etc.) (Brooks, J. et. al., 2009: 419). However, the overall effect of structural adjustment also led to neglect for agricultural productivity, especially for food crops like rice.

Interest in African agricultural production changed in the 2000s. In 2003, the government implemented new policies in line with the above-mentioned CAADP. After the 2007-2008 financial and food crises, increased concerns over food security and interests in commodities markets combined to boost international attention for African agriculture. By 2012, international actors and the government began actively exploring a large variety of policies and development projects to boost cocoa and rice productivity.

1.3. Introduction Conclusions

Cocoa production in Ghana has a long history as an export commodity and is particularly important to government revenue and multinational companies. Rice on the other hand has become an important staple for urban consumers. Both crops have been a part of Ghana's policy agendas since the early 1900s. Although the agriculture sector has reduced importance in terms of the percentage of GDP in more recent years, the politics of cocoa and rice still affect elections and policy changes.

However, the manner in which international, national and local actors, interests and resources combine during policy changes is complicated and under-explored in existing literature. The relationship between governments and international actors could be mutually beneficial and reinforcing, as highlighted by Mosley, Killick, and many others (Killick et al. 1998; Mosley et al. 1995). For example, Ghana may depend on loans and development assistance and international donors may require government partners to justify their existence.

To understand the impact of international actors on cocoa and rice policy in Ghana, this thesis carefully analyses policy change using an approach that positions governments between two broad levels (international and local) of actors, institutions and political economies. Chapter 2 uses existing theory to develop an analytical approach that can capture how and when international actors impact policy within the evolving political and economic context.

Chapter 2. Theory and Approach for Analysing Agricultural Policy

This chapter reviews literature to examine theories about how international actors may impact policies. Literature is reviewed according to a typology of analytical approaches, which hypothesize that international actors are likely to impact policies by influencing 1) actor choices, 2) the social structures around actors, or 3) the policy processes in which actors participate. This literature review is used as the basis for developing a model for how international actors may impact agricultural policy in each of the three areas of the typology. The model is then used as a basis for selecting an analytical approach using case studies and the comparative method to identify the impact of international actors on policy.

As discussed in Chapter 1, policy is understood as a government's goals and selected means for achieving them. Agricultural policies are influenced by many different actors that are also part of 'governance' systems which manage global 'supply chains' and 'food regimes'(Chandler 2010; Clapp 2014 ; McMichael 2009). Supply chain actors move between international, national, and local levels of governance and economic systems. Recognising that the movement of some actors are more constrained than others; international actors are defined in Chapter 1 as those able to cross national boundaries to promote their agendas and access resources (Mmieh and Owusu-Frimpong 2004; Puplampu 2003; Rosenau 1995).

The heterogeneity of actors and interests involved in agricultural production raises many questions about how they impact policy decisions. For example, by providing resources to governments during periods of economic crisis, international actors could enable them to maintain power when they would otherwise collapse (Pop-Eleches 2009). By providing training and technical assistance, international actors could determine the goals included in government policies (Ayuk and Marouani 2007). By providing the means for implementing some policies and not others, international actors could determine what government agendas are feasible (Killick et al. 1998; Mosley et al. 1995; Whitfield 2008).

Steven Lukes observes that the basis for all "talk of power is the notion that A in some way affects B", and that this is "non-trivial" (Lukes 2005: p. 30). This thesis tries to better understand whether or not international actors exercise power over African government actors and if so, do they impact policy decisions made by governments. Michel Foucault (1978) argues that the myriad of situations affecting decision making means the power of an actor is defined by a particular relationship and context. Contesting this understanding, Anthony Giddens observes that although power exists within a relationship it can also be replicated over time (Giddens 1984). For the purpose of selecting an analytical approach, it is helpful to briefly reflect on the implications that different concepts of power have for analysing policy impact.

Lukes argues that there are three distinct dimensions of power (Lukes 2005). One-dimensional power is the ability of an actor to make decisions against the will of others. It is possible, but unlikely, that international actors design policies for African governments who in turn implement them against their will. One-dimensional power is most likely to explain international impact when governments have no alternative but to use the resources provided by international actors in the manner intended (Dang et al. 2013; Pop-Eleches 2009). However, past studies show that African governments more often use international resources to implement policies in unintended ways (Mosley et al. 1995; Whitfield 2008).

Two-dimensional power encompasses 'decision-making' and 'non-decision-making' by recognising the ability of one actor to shape the actions of another by limiting their decision-making power in areas where there is an underlying conflict of interests (Lukes 2005: pp. 20-25). It is plausible that international actors exercise control over agricultural policy agendas in a way that limits room for disagreement, and encourages African governments to decide not to act against their agendas. Agendas like the 'Green Revolution' and public-private partnerships could be promoted by international actors in ways that limit debate to technical solutions for implementing them, ignoring the interests of farmers (Cotula and Berger 2014; Holt-Gimenez 2008). However, even if debates and agendas are controlled by international actors, it is unlikely that African governments would just give up and implement policies that undermine their own interest to remain in power (Laven 2010a; Whitfield 2008; T. Williams 2009).

Recognising the limitations of two-dimensional power, Lukes defines three-dimensional power as that which can “prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things”(Lukes 2005: p. 11). In the context of agricultural policy agendas, Lukes’ third dimension of power would not be observed in decisions or non-decisions relating to an individual policy. Instead it would occur when governments uphold international actors’ interests without necessarily intending to or being aware of doing so, but because they are indoctrinated into a particular worldview. An example of this third dimension of power could be an unwillingness to stop the commoditisation and financialization of agriculture in a geopolitical context where multinational companies, not African governments, benefit most from this form of development (McMichael 2009). If African governments truly believe their farmers must form part of a global ‘value chain’, then this worldview could overpower any contrary knowledge and other experiences.

Lukes’ dimensions of power highlight three broad ways international actors could impact African agricultural policies. First, international actors could use some form of incentive or coercion to persuade governments to make individual policy decisions. Second, international actors could manipulate agendas, rules and relationships to influence government policymaking in a manner that limits options to those upholding their interests. Third, international actors could perpetuate knowledge, structures, and processes that limit a government’s understanding of options to those which already align with international interests. These dimensions of power correspond to a large body of existing research examining how international actors influence policies in Africa. The following sections review literature on international relations and African agricultural politics to develop hypotheses for how international actors impact agricultural policies.

The literature review is organised according to a typology of analytical approaches that includes: 1) Policy as choice: where policies are individual choices made by rational actors; 2) Policy as the consequence of social structures: where policy is the result of evolving institutions and contexts; and 3) Policy as process: where policy is defined and redefined by evolving relationships between actors and structures. This typology is useful because it traverses schools such as political science or economic theory, which may inadvertently create silos that prevent an understanding of how multiple causal mechanisms explain the influence of an international actor on policy.

2.1. Policy as choice

The idea that actors weigh options, make decisions and act according to their best interests is the basis of 'rational choice' and 'public choice' theory (Arrow 1951; Bates 1981; D. Green and Shapiro 1994). Rational choice theory is strongly associated with the study of economics and 'new' political economy research (Ajakaiye et al. 2008; Arrow 1951; D. Green and Shapiro 1994). Over the years political economy research has been defined and redefined by competing schools of economic and political thought (G. Williams 2004). 'New' political economy research approaches policies as 'choices' arrived at by weighing their options for allocating economic and political resources (Ndulu et al. 2008).

As explained by Don Green and Ian Shapiro, there is no single 'rational choice theory.' The approach is characterised by the ideas of "utility maximization, the structure of preferences, decision making under conditions of uncertainty, and, more broadly, the centrality of individuals in the explanation of collective outcomes"(D. Green and Shapiro 1994). The basic idea behind rational and public choice theory is that individuals make choices they believe have the greatest value. Rational choice approaches use models, referred to as 'games', to understand how multiple actors manipulate outcomes in their favour (Maschler et al. 2013). Given the traditional dominance of economic theory in international development it is not surprising that many studies approach

African policy decisions as the outcome of rational choices. Past studies that test models of the relationship between international donors and governments are particularly relevant to this thesis (Dreher 2009; Killick 1997; Killick et al. 1998; Mosley 1987; Mosley et al. 1995; Mosley et al. 2003).

Paul Mosley developed a two-player bargaining game to explain the relationship between donors and recipient governments involved in structural adjustment programmes (Mosley 1987: pp. 12-13). In *Aid and Power,* Mosley et al use the game as a basis for analysing country cases and comparing tactics used by donors and recipients during negotiations (Mosley et al. 1995). Mosley's approach is particularly useful because it understands aid negotiations as "determined less by each party's forecasts of the other's behaviour than by each party's bargaining strength" (ibid: 17). Meaning, in essence, it is not the outcome of the agreement itself that determines the choices made, but the perceived benefit of that agreement to the actors involved.

Mosley's approach explicitly recognises that donors and recipients are fundamentally unable to predict each other's behaviour or observe all outcomes of their agreements. The inherent information asymmetries mean the actual benefit received is unobserved by either party. The observation that hidden actions affect whether governments uphold agreements led Tony Killick to propose that donor-recipient relationships are better explained by a 'principal-agent model' (Killick 1997; Killick et al. 1998).

Principal-agent approaches model the tactics used by a 'principal' to shape the action of 'agents' by establishing incentives and punishments. In *Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change,* Killick et al use a 'principal-agent' model as the basis for deriving fifteen hypotheses for how donors use 'constraints', 'rewards and punishments', and 'other influences' to shape the effectiveness of policy-based lending (Killick et al. 1998). Examining twenty-one country cases Killick et al find strong support for the hypotheses that: 1) the probability of implementation is a function of the extent to which recipients perceive benefits from compliance; 2) recipient calculations are sensitive to measures that affect incomes; 3) implementation is prejudiced by differences between donor and recipient objectives; and 4) 'ownership', as "an indicator of the extent of interest conflict", strongly influences implementation. In many ways these findings confirm those made by Mosley, and show that donors and recipients are willing to implement agreed upon policy measures only to the extent that it benefits them and upholds their interests.

Importantly, Killick et al were unable to find strong evidence for the hypothesis that longer-term relationships led to greater alignment between donor and recipient interests (ibid: 114). There are plenty of reasons to believe that over a period of time relationships will lead to a convergence around mutual goals and understanding. When trying to understand why the length of relationship between donors and recipients did not result in 'convergence', Killick et al posit that this could be because 1) donors more often have relationships with government technocrats instead of political elite, and 2) political elite may not be in power long enough for convergence (ibid: 116). These observations have important implications for understanding international impact. First, governments cannot be treated as single, unified actors. Second, the length of time the political elite are in power may affect the level of convergence with international agendas.

The rational or public choice approach predicts that governments choose policies promoted by international actors when the resources they provide benefit governments and shape their decisions, as described by Green (1994), Mosley (1995), Killick (1998), and many other studies,. The studies examined highlight many possible situations and variations in relationships that could explain when and why the resources provided by international actors do or do not have an intended impact. This approach fits well with Lukes (2005) first dimension of power where direct or indirect coercion forms the basis for the impact of one actor on another. Understanding policy as a rational choice made by government actors in response to international demands or agreements provides two hypotheses for explaining the impact of international actors on policy:

Hypothesis 1: Governments adhere to policies promoted by international actors as long as doing so provides them with greater benefit (such as access to political or economic resources) than alternative courses of action. Faced with domestic and international pressures, governments balance international agreements with domestic interest and adhere to any policy as long as it maximises utility given available alternatives (Killick et al. 1998; Mosley et al. 1995).

Hypothesis 2: Once agreements are made between governments and international actors, the severity of the threat of losing access to resources determines whether governments adhere to them. Both international actors and national governments are interested in maintaining relationships. The relative ease of ending the relationship, in terms of economic and political consequences, determines whether international actors or governments can ignore agreements made and thereby risk ending the relationship.

Overall, when it comes to explaining the impact of international actors, Mosley and Killick both show how focusing only on the choices made by governments in response to international actor demands or agreements cannot fully explain policy decisions. In particular, both find that many decisions made by governments are better explained by political and economic circumstances than by aid agreements.

2.2. Policy as a consequence of social structures

Like approaches examining policies as an outcome of rational choices, those that study policy as the ‘consequences’ of social structures vary a great deal. Structural explanations for policy choices are derived from observations about how human actions are influenced by both socially constructed (e.g. rules and norms) and inherited traits (e.g. culture and position in society) (Lukes 2005; Noman et al. 2011; North 1991; Roland 2004). Although these approaches uphold the importance of individual policymakers, they do not rely on individual choices to explain policy (Elster 1982).

Douglas North defines institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North 1991: p. 97). The definition used by North is helpful for distinguishing between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions (Hodgson 2006). However, Geoffrey Hodgson argues that many institutions are defined more by their effect on behaviour than any formal definition of rules. Hodgson therefore defines institutions “as durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions, rather than rules as such” (ibid: 13). This thesis uses Hodgson’s definition because it helps capture how institutions such as the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board can persist through generations of formal rules and governments. Therefore, in this thesis, an institution will be understood as the system of rules, norms and any other socially constructed constraints guiding human interaction, including policymaking.

When it comes to understanding the relationship between ‘policy’ and ‘institution’, Thad Dunning and Grigore Pop-Eleches suggest that “policies are best conceived as the official actions of individuals and/or organizations within the constraints of a given institutional framework”(Dunning and Pop-Eleches 2004: p. 6). Research on institutions can be largely grouped into two main approaches, those which focus on the “consequences that institutions may have for actors and actions within their domains” and those which focus on the “genesis of and transformation of institutional arrangements themselves” (Scharpf 2000: p. 763).

As highlighted in Chapter 1, the post-Cold War period in African history is characterised by a large number of countries transitioning to democratic forms of governance. Analysing across all African countries Dunning finds a statistically significant relationship between foreign aid and democracy, but only after the end of the Cold War. A common demand made by donors after the Cold War was establishing democracy. Dunning posits that during the Cold War donor threats to stop foreign aid if agreements were not implemented were undermined by geopolitical circumstances (Dunning 2004: p. 410). Foreign aid thereby became a ‘moral hazard’, where the threat of removing aid was not strong enough to persuade governments to implement desired policies. When the Cold War ended donors could cease aid without worry about losing allies, which meant agreements became ‘credible commitments’. Dunning concludes that geopolitics is ‘crucial’ to explaining “whether the threats of international donors to withdraw aid if democratic reforms are not adopted can be made credible and therefore effective” (422). Dunning’s work supports a hypothesis that geopolitical circumstances significantly affect the ability of international actors such as IFIs to have an impact on policies in Africa.

Further unpacking the relationship between donors and democracy in Africa, Resnick and Van de Walle examine the impact of aid on democratic “transitions” and “consolidation”(Resnick and Van de Walle 2013: p. 28). They define a transition as the “specific time period when a country shifts from a one-party regime to one where multiple parties are allowed to compete” as “deepening of Democracy” (ibid: 29-30). Reflecting on existing literature they identify three mechanisms through which donors may impact democracy: 1) the diffusion of norms and knowledge; 2) the use of incentives; and 3) coercion through the threat of ending aid (ibid: 31-34). Examining existing empirical evidence, they find that donor coordination, cultural linkages, and “congruence between the concerns of donors and those of domestic citizens” play an important role in effectiveness of donor efforts (ibid: 40). When looking at vertical accountability they find aid can also have an adverse effect on a government’s accountability by reducing the need to collect taxes, finance services, and bypass legislatures. Overall, the approach taken by Resnick and Van de Walle shows the value of applying their theoretical framework for how international actors may impact institutional change to existing empirical evidence. However, the large heterogeneity of country experiences points to the remaining importance of taking into consideration cultural, economic and political circumstances when examining institutional changes.

Focusing on the domestic consequences of international involvement in Africa, the work of Sara Berry shows that institutions should not be equated with a particular policy outcome (Berry 1984, 1989, 1992, 1998, 2009). Berry examines the policies that result from democratisation in the 1990s and argues that the “reinstitution of multi-party political competition reopened debates over criteria of eligibility for political participation and social entitlement”(Berry 2009b: p. 26). Berry posits that the need to define who is eligible to vote and stand for election leads societies to re-examine their territorial origins, and in turn causes the redefinition of property rights and authority within local communities. Berry compares histories and recent events in Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana to understand the process of defining land rights and the relationship between the state and society. By tracing the origins of observed state-society relations, Berry argues that “international pressures on African states to deregulate markets, privatize assets and democratize governance have stimulated some kinds of economic activity, depressed others, and led to widespread changes in governing structures and practices that both enabled and destabilized relations of authority and political participation” (ibid: 40). Berry’s approach is particularly relevant to this thesis because it shows that the institutional structures, authority and policies are defined and redefined over time.

Bates et al (2012) argue that once IFIs became aware of the link between institutions, policies and growth they sought to “alter political incentives, so that politicians would no longer regard such policies as politically impregnable”(503). Taking into account Dunning’s finding that foreign aid played a role in post-Cold War democratic transitions, Bates et al examine the link between institutions and economic growth (Bates et al. 2012). Bates et al test the Granger causality between democracy and income per capita and find that in Africa causality runs from democracy to increased individual income. Examining the statistical relationship between political institutions and total factor productivity in agriculture they find that competitively elected governments choose “policies that lower the costs, increase the earnings and strengthen the incentives for farmers” (ibid: 513). Overall they find that “changes in institutions led to changes in policy and to economic growth” (ibid: 519). Taken together, the findings form Dunning and Bates et al suggest that international actors can alter agricultural policies by affecting changes in institutional structures.

The works of Bates (1981), Hart (1982), Bates and Krueger (1993), and Berry (2009a) all show how African domestic policies are shaped by changes in international agendas and political economy. These studies challenge the usefulness of analytical approaches that ignore either international or local circumstances when explaining the impact of international actors. Thomas Callaghy et al argue that the gap between 'juridical sovereignty' and 'empirical sovereignty' means it is critical to question the significance of labels like 'foreign' or 'international'. Callaghy et al use the term 'order' to identify that which is produced by actors and institutions when defining boundaries around "what they do in the world" (ibid: 8).

One of the ways that actors define what they do in the world is in relation to their role in an economy. As discussed in Chapter 1, significant efforts are made by international actors to perpetuate the institutions and relationships needed to maintain food regimes or global value chains (i.e. global commodity chain) (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Giel et al. 2008; Kaplinsky 2004; McMichael 2009; Staritz 2012). International actors and national governments are seen as intermediaries governing and maintaining economic structures that move agricultural commodities from African farms to global supermarkets (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Ton et al. 2008). Depending on the value added by different actors, power gets concentrated in parts of the commodity chain. Food commodity chains tend to be 'buyer-driven' (Kaplinsky 2004). In the cocoa commodity chain, international chocolate manufacturers and grinders hold significant power globally and COCOBOD continues exercise control over production in Ghana (ibid: 25-26). Recent studies examining global commodity chains often adopt a 'value chain' approach to analysis. The 'value chain' analytical approach is rooted in the *filière*[3] analytical approaches of the 1970s, Michael Porter's work in the 1980s, and the global commodity chain (GCC) work of Gary Gereffi in the 1990s (Bair 2009; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Kaplinsky and Morris 2001;

[3] French word for industry or production activities.

McMichael 2013; Porter 1985; Raikes et al. 2011). An important focus of value chain analysis is the role that firms play in creating global production networks (Bair 2009).

In *The Risks of Inclusion,* Anna Laven analyses how "governance structures interact in creating opportunities and constraints for more inclusive upgrading among smallholder cocoa farmers in Ghana" (Laven 2010a: p. 42). Laven distinguishes three governance levels: 1) global cocoa chain governance; 2) state involvement in cocoa governance; and 3) local social structures. To examine interactions, Laven structures her research around four questions: 1) How are the main interests of global actors who currently govern the cocoa chain being manifested locally?; 2) How does the changing role of the state, of the other actors and of the institutions in the Ghanaian cocoa sector affect the conditions under which cocoa farmers operate and in turn define their opportunities and constraints for upgrading?; 3) How do upgrading strategies and the resulting interventions benefit different groups of cocoa farmers, and to what extent do these groups participate actively in the activities and initiate their 'own' strategies?; and 4) How do different governance structures interact in creating opportunities and constraints for upgrading among different groups of farmers? (ibid: 43-49). Laven argues that "analysing opportunities and constraints for upgrading among producers of primary export commodities requires a multilevel (i.e. disentangling and analysing the different processes that operate at different spatial scales) and dynamic perspective" (ibid: 42).

Laven finds that governments and policies are not 'external' to value chains, but that the government is itself a 'chain actor' (Laven 2010a: pp. 30, 198). Like Berry and Dunning, Laven's approach sees a role for international actors in the genesis of institutions and relationships between national governments and local farmers (Berry 2009a; Dunning 2004). She also does not assume relationships are stagnant and finds that "risks for supplier failure urge international processors and manufacturers to exercise more control on the supply side of the chain" (Laven 2010a: p. 201). Laven's findings suggest that the amount of effort made by international private-sector actors to influence African policies is dependent on the potential profit they can make by increasing productivity and reducing the cost of commodities.

The value chain approach highlights how international actors use power to create and maintain institutions and relationships perpetuating access to commodities that are both cheap and of sufficient quality to generate profit. However, the work of Berry, Roland, Mkandawire and Van de Walle all contest the idea that institutions have a one-to-one relationship with any behaviour or economic function (Berry 2009a; Noman et al. 2011; Resnick and Van de Walle 2013; Roland 2004). Mkandawire points out that “market economies are compatible with a diverse range of institutional arrangements, products of path dependence, serendipity, luck, and the force of unintended consequences of the actions of many agents” (Noman et al. 2011: p. 102). To try and explain why this may be the case, Roland argues that the functioning of fast moving institutions (e.g. democratic elections) is shaped and defined by slow-moving institutions (e.g. social norms) (Roland 2004). Roland further observes that “culture, world–views, and ideological commitment” are important for explaining the function of government institutions (Roland 2004: pp. 118-19). Roland’s observation is supported by Anne Krueger (2002) who argues to understand economic policies it is necessary to understand the “conditions in which those policies were formulated” as well as the “ideas emanating from economic thought at the time regarding development” (Krueger 2002: pp. 39-40). These observations point to a much greater problem with large cross-country statistical approaches to analysis, which is that labels like ‘democratic’ can ignore significant differences in the genesis and function of institutions and policies in individual countries.

Recognising that past studies “either fail to identify the mechanisms linking political institutions to policy choices or to provide empirical support for their arguments”, Macartan Humphreys and Robert Bates developed “logic that links institutional and economic constraints on the one hand to policy choices on the other” (Humphreys and Bates 2005: p. 408). Their logic is expressed in the form of a principal-agent model, where governments are the agents and ‘citizenry’ the principals.

In their model, governments ‘control’ public policy in order to retain office and enjoy benefits, while citizens evaluate government performance and determine whether to continue supporting it (ibid: 409). Citizenry, which can be the electorate or small elite, set the minimum acceptable level a government needs to perform to maintain office. Governments then try to maximise private benefit while also providing the minimum level of public goods to stay in office.

Applying their model to existing datasets, Humphreys and Bates arrive at three important findings for explaining the impact of international actors. First, they find that “policies, once chosen, tend to persist” (Humphreys and Bates 2005: p. 424). In light of the significant amount of research on institutional change supporting the idea of path dependencies this is not particularly surprising, but it once again points to the significance of the timing and duration of relationships when it comes to policy change and the ability of international actors to influence it (Roland 2004). Second, and related, is the finding that “higher levels of regime instability” are associated with “opportunistic policy making” (Humphreys and Bates 2005: p. 424). This finding has two implications for understanding policy impact: ‘opportunistic’ governments could be 1) more willing to undermine donor agreements; or 2) more willing to accept agreements and undermine local interests. However, they also find that explaining policy choices requires looking “at the structure of the economies”(Humphreys and Bates 2005: p. 425). Humphreys and Bates conclude that “much of the variation in policy choices in Africa still remains unaccounted for” (ibid).

Why African governments choose to support productive sectors or industry and what makes policies more or less successful are questions examined by Whitfield and Therkildsen (2011), Whitfield and Buur (2014) and Whitfield et al (2015). The Politics of Industrial Policy Framework developed by Whitfield et al builds on existing political economy and political settlements theory to identify conditions for successful industrial policy (Whitfield et al. 2015: p. 17). Industrial policies are successful if they create the right conditions for investments and uphold efficiency in a sector. The willingness of capitalists to invest in a sector depends on the risk to returns, which can be reduced by forming coalitions with ruling elites. Ruling elites are primarily interested in political survival and pursue whatever resources are easiest to obtain. Therefore, Whitfield and Buur (2014) argue “the size and type of financing that ruling elites have access to, combined with the characteristics of domestic capitalists, determines whether ruling elites have an interest in working with domestic capitalists” (ibid: 129). If ruling elites and capitalists do form a coalition, the success of policies depends on having bureaucrats with “relevant technical expertise and knowledge” (ibid).

Applying the Politics of Industrial Policy Framework to Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda, Whitfield et al argue mutual interests between ruling elite and capitalists in a particular industry are essential for industrial policies to be successful, but relations cannot be too close or state bureaucrats no longer have power to enforce policies (Whitfield et al. 2015: p. 289). They also argue the emergence of successful industrial policies depends on the following conditions: 1) vulnerability of ruling elites; 2) “degree of contestation” faced by ruling elites; 3) “degree of political influence or relevant capitalists”; and 4) “technological capabilities” of capitalists (ibid). In Ghana, Whitfield et al find government interest in maintaining smallholder production as a means of maintaining access to finance (from exporting cocoa beans) and voter support explains why governments have not adequately supported domestic processors (ibid: 295). In conclusion, Whitfield et al observe recent increases in foreign direct investment into agriculture have the potential to ‘catalyze a virtuous cycle’ by improving the conditions for the emergence of successful industrial policies.

Overall, analytical approaches that understand policy as the ‘consequence’ of structures point to the importance of knowledge, institutions, industries and global economies when trying to explain observed policy decisions. The above literature provides evidence to support an argument that international actors can impact African policies by altering the relationships between governments and local populations though promoting cultural linkages (i.e. worldviews) as well as institutions (e.g. democratic elections) (Berry 2009a; Resnick and Van de Walle 2013). It also shows how private international actors use their power within global economic structures (e.g. value chains) to access commodities and generate resources for themselves and African governments (Laven 2010a; Ton et al. 2008; Whitfield et al. 2015). The literature that explores policy as a consequence of structures points to an additional hypothesis for the impact of international actors on policy:

Hypothesis 3: Governments will implement internationally promoted policies in a manner that preserves formal and informal institutions they use to access political and economic resources. To the extent possible, governments will preserve institutions that uphold their access to resources (Whitfield and Buur 2014). Governments also rely on institutions to implement policies that preserve their position in local and global economic structures (Humphreys and Bates 2005; Laven 2010a). Because institutions are difficult to change (Berry 2009a; Mkandawire 2009), it will be easier for international actors to implement policies that break down institutions during periods of crisis, when governments are opportunistic (Pop-Eleches 2009; Van de Walle 2001). In addition, the observation that fast and slow moving institutions evolve in response to different stimuli suggests that the impact of international actors on policy will be both context and timing dependent.

Reflecting on Lukes' three dimensions of power, an international actor's ability to alter the African government's knowledge and social structures which inform policy still only suggests two-dimensional power, because it depends on the decisions of governments to act on known interests (Lukes 2005). To examine if international actors impact agricultural policies through a third-dimension of power requires moving beyond the relationship between individual actors and/or institutions to an examination of whether international actors are able to create and perpetuate a relationship where policies uphold the interests of international actors without the government's conscious compliance.

2.3. Policy as a process

As demonstrated by the first two approaches, the capacity of a government to choose or implement a policy depends on the resources, institutions and relationships established. The 'value chain approach' shows how local farmers, governments and transnational companies are all interdependent. The observation that relationships are constantly being redefined by the inclusion and exclusion of actors, ideas and resources means the power of an actor may also evolve over time depending on the reconfiguration of social structures (Laven 2010a; Whitfield and Buur 2014). Policy 'process' approaches observe how actors define and understand institutions, risks, and economies (Ayuk and Marouani 2007; Clay and Schaffer 1984; Keeley and Scoones 1999).

Models of the policy process can largely be divided into those which perceive it to be a linear series of events or those which perceive the process as iterative and continuously evolving (Sebatier, P. 1999). The 'linear' model presumes a context in which policymakers freely identify problems, establish agendas, select policy options, make decisions, mobilise resources and implement policies, and evaluate their outcomes in ordered stages (ibid). By contrast, 'iterative' models observe policymaking as a process that involves many actors, who are not always free to make decisions but are constrained by access to economic and political resources as well as institutions. A number of past studies have analysed the policy process in Africa to understand how actors, institution and knowledge interact (Ayuk and Marouani 2007; Clay and Schaffer 1984; Horowitz 1989; Keeley and Scoones 1999).

In *Room for Manoeuvre,* Edward Clay and Bernard Schaffer argue that a linear model of policymaking does not represent African country experiences (e.g. Clay and Schaffer, 1984). Analysing country experiences Clay and Schaffer find that policymaking is often chaotic and characterised by competing actors and interests (ibid). Overall they find that individuals involved in policy processes are often less worried about the effectiveness of policies than maintaining ‘continuity and stability’ in their roles and relationships (ibid: 28). The finding has important implications for understanding the impact of international actors on policy processes because it means individuals may have little incentive to make changes that threaten the stability of their roles. This means they are unlikely to meaningfully engage new stakeholders in policy stages if doing so may undermine their position, whether or not that position is particularly powerful.

Examining the possibility of a different ‘third-world’ policy process, Donald Horowitz finds that the “the nature of the constraints, the role of timing in innovation, and the respective parts played by interests and ideas in policy making all have analogues in the Third World and the West”(Horowitz 1989: pp. 207-08). Horowitz argues that policies have a ‘life cycle’, and that “underlying the irregular cadences of the process are the multiple permutations of such forces in tension and their changing relative importance over time” (ibid: 209). In many ways Horowitz’s account of the policy process has similarities to later theories of institutional path dependency and punctuated equilibriums (Ohemeng and Anebo 2012; Roland 2004). However, taking this perspective leaves little room for individual actors to impact policies outside of their roles in the existing chaotic policy processes.

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Paul Sebatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith explains policy cycles as a result of competing actor coalitions who use their shared beliefs and access to resources to pursue strategies for affecting policy (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994: p. 179). The ACF approach acknowledges the interaction between actors and institutions, governance levels, and short-term and long-term change processes. However, like rational choice theory, the ACF approach is optimistic about the power of actors to learn, choose strategies and make informed decisions.

Other approaches to examining policy processes as the outcome of social learning have been developed by Peter Hall (1993) and Covadonga Meseguer (2005). Moving beyond actors as the basis for explaining policy decisions, Emmanuel Adler and Peter Haas see ‘epistemic communities’ as part of a wider process of policy evolution that includes “policy innovation, diffusion, selection, and persistence” (Adler, E. and P. Haas, 1992: 373). The epistemic communities approach is useful for conceptualising the spread of ideas between countries and captures the persistence of policies once chosen. However, it also largely ignores the interdependence of economic and political systems and heterogeneity of formal and informal institutions.

To bridge actor-centred and institutional approaches to understanding policy processes, James Keeley and Ian Scoones posit that policy involves a “continuous interplay of discourse, political interests and the agency of multiple actors”(M. Foucault 1978; Keeley and Scoones 1999: p. 33). To “understand how received wisdoms find expression as policy”, Keeley and Scoones move beyond the traditional linear and iterative policy models and instead focus on the “relationship between knowledge, power and policy as the centre of analysis” (ibid: 5). In order to analyse how knowledge gets established into policy they examine existing schools of thought for policy change, with a particular focus on “roles for political interests, actor-networks and policy discourses” (ibid: 13). Their literature review of these three competing approaches for explaining how knowledge becomes policy leads them to identify two “essential conflicts”: 1) Does knowledge follow from interests, or are interests socially constructed, the product of free-floating discourses?; and 2) How much room, in the face of interests and discourses, do individuals have to make real choices? (ibid: 28). These two conflicts are essentially pointing to a chicken and egg analogy of agency and structure, where one is dependent on the existence of the other. To overcome these conflicts they propose following Giddens’ (1984) structuration approach, where “structure and agency continuously and recursively interact”.

Keeley and Scoones subsequently apply their analytical approach to the policymaking process in Ethiopia, Mali and Zimbabwe (Keeley and Scoones 2003). An important finding from their work is how the ‘internationalization’ of policy discourses and networks affects African policy processes. They find that despite internationalisation of agendas, “contingencies and uncertainties of local contexts must always impinge upon processes of implementation in particular places” (ibid: 170). However, even though the effectiveness of policies ultimately hinges on local context, the policy agendas-setting process in each case remained a top-down ‘technocratic exercise’ (ibid: 176). Furthermore, the approach taken by Keeley and Scoones is useful because it does not presuppose that any one group of actors is inherently more important in policymaking than another. Instead, by weaving a rich picture of the policy discourses, actors and networks involved, the politics of policymaking becomes much clearer. Like Horowitz, Keeley and Scoones find policies have ‘inertia’ and that change comes about through gradually breaking down ‘policy positions’, a process that can be helped by external events (ibid: 97).

A more recent study of policymaking in Africa was completed by Elias Ayuk and Mohamed Marouani (2007), who argue that donors play an important role in the policy processes of aid recipients. Ayuk and Marouani identify four channels for donor influence on policy: 1) ‘money aid’ used to pay governments to adopt donor policies; 2) ‘ideas aid’, which involves hiring consultants to design and implement policies; 3) building government capacity to use donor money and ideas; and 4) training African researchers to replicate donor ideas (ibid: p12). The prevalence of these four channels leads Ayuk and Marouani to argue that the policy process in Africa is dominated by donors (ibid: p19). However, as noted by Whitfield (2008: p. 99), African “civil servants often support donor initiatives in order to access the benefits of the aid industry, but they may also comply with the proclivities and preferences of donors because it makes life easier”. This observation means Ayuk and Marouani may be over confident about the effectiveness of foreign aid, foreign consultants, and foreign ideas.

Pulling together insights from both rational policy ‘choice’ and structural policy ‘consequences’ approaches, *The Politics of Aid* by Whitfield (ed) understands the process of negotiation in donor relationships with aid recipients as one which is open to many competing actors and interests (Whitfield 2008). Whitfield et al move beyond previous approaches in three important ways. First, they do not assume interests are necessarily “material, individualistic, or given”. Second, they analyse contemporary and historical institutional relationships. Third, they reject the idea of “self-evident ‘sound policies’ and ‘real national interests’ but instead accept that donors and recipients may have different interests (Whitfield 2008: pp. 37-38). They apply their approach to selected African case studies by identifying: 1) ‘ruptures’ and ‘disagreements’ over policy or process; 2) actors, institutions, and incentives for consensus and opportunities for debate; 3) interaction between aid system and domestic politics; and 4) recipient success at changing process of aid ‘negotiation’ and ‘delivery’ (ibid: 102).

Comparing across cases, Whitfield et al arrive at important insights for understanding policy processes. They find that many recipient countries have a “joint policy process” that runs in parallel to “official” policy processes (Whitfield 2008: p. 353). This observation is supported by Mkandawire (2009: p. 13) and is significant because it challenges the work of Ayuk and Marouani and any others who focus primarily on a formal policy processes. Observing that there are many competing processes and explanations for recipient strategies, Whitfield et al conclude that understanding government actions requires understanding the “economic, institutional, political, and ideological effects of two decades of aid” (Whitfield 2008: p. 361). As such, Whitfield supports Keeley and Scoones, Thad Dunning, Gavin Williams, Karl Marx and many others who perceive knowledge, politics, economics, and society as inseparably linked.

Taking into consideration findings from existing studies understanding policy as a process points to two additional hypotheses for how international actors may impact Ghana’s agricultural policies:

Hypothesis 4: African agricultural policies are impacted by knowledge (expertise and worldviews) gained from international actors about desirable policy goals as well as the resources, institutions and other means needed to achieve them. An actor's willingness to implement policies promoted by international actors is determined by their perception of risks (Dunning 2004), understanding of options (Ayuk and Marouani 2007), and entitlements (Berry 2009a). International actors can shape policy by promoting their understandings, or by promoting those actors who already share them into policy processes (Haas 1992; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994).

Hypothesis 5: International actors impact policies by establishing and reinforcing policy processes that include actors and institutions necessary for achieving their agendas. Policies are an outcome of actors interpreting social structures and are also used to alter the social structures which shape the agency of actors in the future (Giddens 1984; Keeley and Scoones 2003). Ensuring the continuation of policies requires creating policy processes that incorporate the actors, institutions and understandings necessary for maintaining desired social structures.

Overall, the policy 'process' approach is more flexible than either 'choice' or 'consequences' approaches because it can incorporate both actor centred and structural explanations for change. The policy process approach is also helpful for identifying whether international actors benefit from Lukes' third dimension of power by perpetuating a process of interactions between actors, knowledge, and institutions to dominate agendas and uphold international interests.

2.4. An analytical approach for assessing policy impact

The above literature review shows how policies are an outcome of complex interactions between actors, social structures, and processes. Overall, the impact of international actors on African policies appears to relate to their ability to shape government goals and to control the means for achieving them.

The capacity of international actors to impact policy is therefore likely to be explained by their control over the following:

1. **Resources (political and economic):** Resources are "money, materials, staff, and other assets that can be drawn on by a person or organization in order to function effectively"(Oxford Dictionaries 2015b). International actors can use their control over resources to persuade or coerce African governments to make particular policy decisions (Dunning 2004; Killick et al. 1998; Mosley et al. 1995);
2. **Institutions (rules, norms, social constructs):** Institutions are the rules, norms, and other socially constructed constraints guiding human interaction. International actors require governments to uphold particular rules, norms, contracts, and other social structures in order to maintain political legitimacy and/or participate in economies, determine the rights of governments and citizens, and determine who participates in policy processes (Berry 2009b; Laven 2010; Resnick and Van de Walle 2013);
3. **Knowledge (expertise and worldviews):** Knowledge is comprised of "facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education"(Oxford Dictionaries 2015a). International actors use knowledge, often in conjunction with resources, to persuade African governments to adopt policy approaches that uphold their understandings of the world and associated agendas (Haas 1992; Horowitz 1989; Keeley and Scoones 2003).

These three explanatory variables are derived from existing theory and empirical evidence about how actors exercise their power to impact African policies. Given the complex interaction between actors, resources, institutions, and knowledge involved in policymaking, a simplified model helps to clearly map out the interaction between variables identified. As noted by Gavin Williams, the point of any model is to "enable us to make better sense of particulars by thinking more clearly about the logics of the processes which shape them" (G. Williams 2004: p. 576). The model presented below is therefore not a representation of all actors and institutions involved in policymaking. Instead, its usefulness lies in how it explains the logic by which international actors could potentially impact national agricultural policies.

Figure 2.1 A Policymaking Model



As depicted in the model, the impact of international actors on policy depends on their ability to use control over **resources, institutions and knowledge** to influence a national government's policy **goals and the means** selected for achieving them (Keeley and Scoones 2003; Killick et al. 1998; Mkandawire 2009; Mosley et al. 1995; Whitfield 2008).

Because economic systems cross international, national, and local political boundaries, the impact of policies on local productivity can in turn affect the **political economy** of a given commodity or economic sector at all levels of a given value chain (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Kaplinsky 2004; Laven 2010a). The effectiveness of policies to alter the political and economic system within a country determines the extent to which international and local actors are able to access resources. Opportunities created by changes in the economy also determine the resources and knowledge international actors provide to ruling elite and governments in order to influence policies (Laven 2010a; Whitfield et al. 2015).

The flow of resources from an economy is channelled to individual and corporate actors who have influence at different levels in a global political and economic system (Callaghy et al. 2001; Laven 2010a; McMichael 2009). These actors use control over **political and economic resources** to form **partnerships and coalitions** that either contest or support **ruling elite** and the governments they lead (Bates 1981; Humphreys and Bates 2005; Whitfield and Buur 2014).

Ruling elite form coalitions and create institutions to access **resources** (e.g. taxes or foreign aid) and **knowledge** (e.g. technical expertise). The ruling elite prefer policies that **maximise benefit to themselves**, but to stay in power they also need to provide a minimum level of benefit to their supporters (Humphreys and Bates 2005). The interdependency between ruling elite and its supporters encourages governments to create policies that represent a balance of competing interests (Humphreys and Bates 2005; Keeley and Scoones 1999; Whitfield and Buur 2014).

National governments are composed of both **ruling elites and bureaucrats** (Clay and Schaffer 1984; Ostrom 2001; Whitfield and Buur 2014). Depending on the country and context, governments have a greater or lesser **capacity** to use policies as a way of influencing economic and political systems (Whitfield et al. 2015). A **government's capacity** to make and implement policy is largely dependent on bureaucrats, the strength of institutions (Ministries), and resources and knowledge (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994; Killick et al. 1998; Whitfield and Buur 2014). Resources and knowledge from within the country and international actors can be used to increase government capacity.

Policies goals and the **means** (e.g. resources and institutions) selected for achieving them are the outcome of an iterative policy process (Ayuk and Marouani 2007; Clay and Schaffer 1984; Horowitz 1989). Policies reflect a mediated understanding of how to achieve goals using the resources and knowledge available to the government within a given political and economic system (Adler and Haas 1992; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994; Keeley and Scoones 2003). Depending on the political system, structure of the economy, and the goal, a **policy process** can include any number of international actors, government bureaucrats or local actors (Bates et al. 2012; Keeley and Scoones 2003; Whitfield 2008; Whitfield and Buur 2014). International actors may attempt to shape the **inclusion of actors, agendas,** and **knowledge** to steer policy processes towards selecting the **goals and the means (resources and institutions)** used to achieve them (Keeley and Scoones 2003; Lukes 2005).

Bates argues that the idea that actors involved in policymaking have all of the information necessary to make rational decisions in strategic moments is “ludicrous”(Bates 1993: p. 1081). Each actor’s understanding of policy options is based on imperfect knowledge. Their access to **resources and knowledge** depends on their **role and position** within **political and economic systems** (e.g. global value chains) (Dunning 2004; D. Green and Shapiro 1994; Laven 2010a; Resnick and Van de Walle 2013; Whitfield 2008). Thus final policies represent a negotiated and imperfect understanding of how to achieve **goals** using the **means** available to a government and its supporters. Once implemented, policies have a lifecycle that exists beyond the control of any individual actor (Horowitz 1989; Humphreys and Bates 2005). Through a process of **structuration**, each policy decision therefore has the potential to impact subsequent policy goals and the means for achieving them (Giddens 1984; Humphreys and Bates 2005; Keeley and Scoones 1999).

Related to this iterative policymaking process, existing literature has also highlighted five hypotheses for how international actors are likely to impact African agricultural policies, as summarised in Table 2.2 below.

Table 2.2 Five hypotheses international impact on African policy

H1	Governments adhere to policies promoted by international actors as long as doing so provides them with greater benefit (such as access to political or economic resources) than alternative courses of action.
H2	Once agreements are made between governments and international actors, the severity of the threat of losing access to resources determines whether governments adhere to them.
H3	Governments will implement internationally promoted policies in a manner that preserves formal and informal institutions they use to access political and economic resources.
H4	African agricultural policies are impacted by knowledge (expertise and worldviews) gained from international actors about desirable policy goals as well as the resources, institutions, and other means needed to achieve them.
H5	International actors impact policies by establishing and reinforcing policy processes that include actors and institutions necessary for achieving their agendas.

2.5. A case-based comparative approach to examining policy impact

Selecting the best strategy for identifying when and how actors influence policy is a challenge given the many variables and competing explanations. Collier and Bates note that policies “do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis: they are highly multifaceted with no obvious procedure for aggregation, and they are often continuous but ordinal, lying on the qualitative spectrum better–worse”(Ndulu et al. 2008: p. 391). It is therefore not surprising that Sara Berry, Keeley and Scoones (2003), and Whitfield et al (2009) all analyse case studies as the basis for understanding government decisions and the processes that led to them.

Mushtaq Khan suggests one way of analysing policy is to “start from historical readings of processes of change and transformation in different countries and then attempt to build plausible theoretical models of historical change” (Noman et al. 2011: p. 53). However, as shown by Sara Berry (1992, 2009b) and Whitfield and Buur (2014), the genesis and outcome of policies is inherently country, economy and time dependent. Comparing the impact of international actors on a country's policies is therefore challenged by the need to examine the many context specific factors that provide possible explanations for why international actors impact policy goals, resources, and knowledge at a particular point in time. Therefore the strategy for identifying international impact must be capable of eliminating rival explanations for observed policies (i.e. confounding variables).

David Collier et al observe that "any study based on observational (i.e. non-experimental) data faces the fundamental inferential challenge of eliminating rival explanations"(Collier and Brady 2010: p. 23). One way of eliminating rival explanations is by using 'process tracing'. Andrew Bennett (Collier and Brady 2010), Collier (2011) and others suggest process tracing is useful for unpacking a series of events in such a way as to support or eliminate[4] hypotheses about the causality of their relationships (Collier and Brady 2010: p. 210). However, this thesis is not focused on explaining any single event. Instead, the focus of this thesis is on the process of interaction between levels shaped by the ability of actors to impact policy. Therefore, instead of eliminating competing hypotheses, this thesis builds on existing hypothesis for ways international actors impact policies by adding new insights from cocoa and rice in Ghana.

The phenomenon of interest for this thesis is the impact of international actors on agricultural policy. As explained above, an actor's power to effect policy is shaped by their own decisions as well as social structures and the interactions between them. As noted by Lukes (2005), Foucault (1978), and Giddens (1984), the interdependency between an actor's agency and structural explanations for their power in a given relationships leads to two possibilities: 1) that the sum of circumstances surrounding a given action (e.g. policy) limits the power of any actor to a single

[4]Bennett establishes four tests that establish whether they are necessary and sufficient to explain the process observed: 1) The 'Straw in the Wind' test is not sufficient or necessary to confirm or reject a hypothesis; 2) The 'Smoking Gun' is sufficient to confirm a hypothesis, but failing such a test does not eliminate it; 3) The 'Hoop' test is necessary for supporting the hypotheses but not sufficient to confirm; and 4) the 'Doubly Decisive' test, if passed, is sufficient to confirm the hypothesis and eliminate others.

unique situation; or 2) that structures created by an actor and their control over resources enables them to have power across actions over time.

In order to fully understand the extent to which international actors impact policy, it is necessary to control for the effects of circumstance and time on the processes through which international actors exert their influence by controlling recourse, institutions and knowledge. As highlighted by Lijphart and Kalleberg, the comparative method is particularly well suited for analysing a limited number of cases in order to identify causal relationships (Kalleberg 1966; Lijphart 1971: p. 683). For this thesis, the units or 'objects' of comparison are agricultural policies; specifically rice policies and cocoa policies. Policies are understood as goals, resources, and knowledge selected by governments to affect cocoa and rice sectors (Jenkins, 1978: 15).

The comparative method requires a consistent framework for analysing the 'objects' of interest, in this case, policies (Lijphart 1971). The four case studies of cocoa policy and rice policy developed in subsequent empirical chapters use the same internally consistent analytical approaches. Each case study examines cocoa and rice policies by answering the following questions:

- Policy decisions: What are the policy goals for a given crop and what resources, institutions, and knowledge are used to achieve them? Do governments use international sources of resources, knowledge, and institutions?
- Policy processes: How do the observed policies relate to changes in the policy process and the inclusion or exclusion of different actors?
- Political economy: How do observed policies and changes in the policy process relate to the political economy for a particular crop at the local, national and international actor level?

In Chapter 7, the four case studies are compared in order to assess the relative level of influence international actors had on policymaking during each period (Period 1: 1983 to 1995; and Period 2: 2003 to 2012) and for each crop.

To identify the influence of international actors each case study is re-assessed as follows:

- **Influence on policy goals and means (resources and institutions):** To what extent are policy goals and selected means aligned with those promoted by international actors? Which international actors?
- **Influence on policy knowledge (expertise and worldviews):** To what extent are policies upholding the theory, expertise and experience provided by international actors?
- **Influence on policy process:** How are stages of the policy process affected by international actors to involve different processes or to include or exclude different actors?
- **Influence on political economy:** How is the political and economic system influenced by international actors?

A five-point scale is used to measure the level of influence international actors have on each of the above areas:

1. **Very Weak:** International actors have no observable influence on government actions and policy outcomes are not aligned with international agendas;
2. **Weak:** International actors have a limited influence on government actions but policy outcomes are not aligned with international agendas;
3. **Medium:** International actors have a moderate influence on government actions and/or policy outcomes;
4. **Strong:** International actors are have some influence on government actions and policy outcomes;
5. **Very strong:** International actors significantly on government actions and the policy outcomes align with international agendas.

After assessing the level of influence international actors had on policies in each period, cases are compared to identify how impact was achieved. The first comparison looks for differences in how international actor's influenced the same crops over time. The second comparison looks for similarities between crops that help explain how international actors impact policies.

2.6. Data collection and methods of analysis

The theoretical model (Figure 2.1) and comparative approach outlined above provide the basis for the selection of methods and data collected. Analysis begins by establishing a historical sequence of cocoa and rice policies for each period. Government goals, means (resources, institutions and knowledge), policy processes, and the surrounding political economy are then each examined to identify likely causes for observed policies. In this manner the analytical approach is iterative, meaning data obtained determines the direction and manner in which additional data is collected. This process is used to support and contest the most likely causes for observed cocoa and rice policies and to identify the influence of international actors on them. Once complete, the four cases are then compared to identify differences and similarities that help to explain the impact international actors have over time and between crops. The different level of influence that international actors have on policy depending on the crop and timing also provides evidence for testing the five hypotheses presented in Table 2.2.

Empirical evidence used to examine policy decisions is derived from content analysis, semi-structured interviews, and available quantitative datasets. Because identifying policy impact requires observing the policy content, context, and social structures affecting decisions, evidence is triangulated from different sources to support the findings presented (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2011).

Data sources are prioritised according to their ability to assist in understanding cocoa and rice policies and the processes that preceded and followed their establishment. The information taken from texts, interviews, and existing datasets is inevitably biased by document availability, willingness of interviewees to participate, and measurement biases. However, bias is minimised by using different data sources and triangulating information.

The content analysis of documents is an important method used to generate evidence needed to analyse policies and related decisions. Documents have been collected from donors (e.g. proposals, reports, evaluations, etc.), government offices (e.g. policies, budgets and spending reviews), news articles and existing academic studies. Texts are used as positive information about decisions and events in recorded history. The validity of insights gained from texts is triangulated between different sources covering the same event and between texts and interviews with actors who claim an understanding of the event. However, in order to understand changes which are not explicit in texts (e.g. political relationships and ideologies that are not openly publicised) it has been necessary to conduct more interpretive discourse analysis to reveal structural information (i.e. logic used to support policy).

The term discourse analysis is used to denote a large range of methods that specifically focus on the structural information found within texts and conversations (Bhatia et al. 2008). Jacques Derrida (1966) pioneered the deconstruction of texts for the purpose of understanding relationships and belief systems. Derrida accomplishes this by identifying the beliefs which are purposely included (i.e. affirmed) or excluded (i.e. contested or omitted). By deconstructing which beliefs are promoted and omitted, texts can provide a clearer understanding of the core belief system and political interests of the authors. Similarly, Michel Foucault (1972; 1978) promotes the use of content analysis of texts to uncover information about power relationships and beliefs held by authors about their audience. Foucault (1972) used texts to understand moments in on-going dialogue processes, in which authors and audience are jointly establishing the intersubjective reality in which they function. Because texts are constructed by authors for a target audience, textual analysis has been used to understand both the understandings and power relationships between actors involved in policymaking.

However, it cannot be assumed that the dialogues observed within texts are necessarily representative of the perspective held by a majority of actors engaged in dialogue or the policy process at any given time. It also cannot be assumed that the dominance of a belief within the texts is indicative of the dominance of that actor over policy decisions. Derick Becker (2010) shows that political actors can hold different beliefs and use political discourse interactions to arrive at a mutually acceptable core (e.g. average), in which the middle ground is portrayed as the dominant belief. Therefore, texts are understood as providing a picture of both the ongoing political discourse and the power of actors whose beliefs are closest to the core, but are not assumed to give a complete understanding of opinions or power structures. To overcome the limitations of discourse and content analysis, insights gained through texts are triangulated with quantitative data and interviews.

Semi-structured interviews are used to supplement content analysis with insights from different actor perspectives. The selection of actors for interview was based upon three criteria: 1) their perceived (i.e. referenced within existing texts) relevance to, and understanding of, agricultural policy in Ghana; 2) their ability to provide additional information needed for developing the theoretical variables; and 3) their ability to provide insights into different perceptions of the process of agricultural policy change in Ghana. Given the theoretical grounding of this research, interviews were conducted using a semi-structured approach that focused on understanding the process of interaction and influences informing any a policy. A semi-structured approach also provided freedom for additional relevant information that had not previously been identified in texts or captured in the theoretical model.

Quantitative analysis does not form a significant part of the analysis for this thesis, but quantitative data is used for understanding economic trends surrounding rice and cocoa. A time series of available data for each commodity and period is used to examine changes and triangulate claims made in documents about crop production or other developments. Trends are analysed for crop production, commodity price, development assistance and trade to understand the level of political and economic interest in rice and cocoa. Production levels, including yield and total production data are used to observe changes that may result from policy or trigger new policy responses. Producer prices for each commodity are tracked to understand the economic opportunities that exist for farmers, who represent sources of political support (e.g. votes) and government finance (e.g. taxes or rents). International actors also often use the livelihood status of farmers as rationale for their development efforts.

Additionally, the level and direction of trade helps to support analysis of economic incentives that exist for international involvement in each commodity. Each timeline is constructed using data collected from existing sources, such as the World Bank and United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). It is recognised that the accuracy of data collected for the agriculture sector is often weak, but no analysis or claims are made solely on the basis of existing economic trends. Instead, trends are used as an additional source of information to triangulate claims made in texts or interviews.

2.7. Chapter Two Conclusions

Existing literature provides a strong basis for examining the impact of international actors on African agricultural policy. The following chapters develop four case studies of international influence on cocoa and rice policy over two periods (1983-1995 and 2003-2012). These case studies provide the basis for a comparative analysis in Chapter 7 that identifies what impact international actors had on policies for each crop, and how their impact differs between crops. The differences over time and similarities between crops are then used in Chapter 8 as the basis for testing existing hypotheses for the impact of international actors on policy.

Chapter 3. Cocoa Policy during Structural Adjustment (1983-1995)

This chapter is the first of four embedded case studies focusing on how international actors influence agricultural policies. It focuses on cocoa policy in a period when Ghana underwent structural adjustment. However, unlike most other sectors, cocoa policy changes did not result in fully liberalising the sector. This chapter examines cocoa policies between 1983 and 1995 to try and unpack how international actors influence observed policy changes and explain why cocoa was uniquely different from other crops and productive sectors.

3.1. Cocoa policy in the run-up to 1983

As discussed in Chapter 1, the period between Ghana's independence and the beginning of structural adjustment (1957-1983) was characterised by political unrest, economic decline and the gradual collapse of cocoa production. In relation to international actor involvement, the World Bank, IMF, UN organisations (UNCTAD, UNDP and UNFAO) and donors were all supporting aspects of cocoa production in Ghana in the run-up to 1983. In addition, international companies were actively promoting cocoa production in Ghana.

Immediately before Rawlings took control of the government in December 1981, a prefeasibility team consisting of World Bank and UNFAO staff carried out an assessment of Ghana's cocoa sector between June and October. This assessment was used as the basis for UNDP-led technical assistance (TA) provided between 1981 and 1984, which prepared the way for later cocoa sector reforms (PMM 1984b). The TA coincided with the government increasing cocoa producer prices between 1981 and 1982, as a result of "persistent Bank pressure" (World Bank 1984b: p. 18). However, the inability of the Limann Government to devalue the cedi resulted in the producer price for cocoa rising above the free on board (FOB) price achieved during sales, and placed the GCMB in debt (World Bank 1984b: p. 19). Thus, donor pressure to reform also played a role in the government's financial troubles immediately before Rawlings' government.

Between 1981 and 1982 the PNDC government attempted several ad-hoc cocoa policies without much success (e.g. mobilising university students to collect cocoa from remote areas) (Agyeman-Duah 1987: p. 630; Gyimah-Boadi 1989: p. 236). By 1983, both international donors and the PNDC Government concluded that cocoa sector rehabilitation and governance reform were necessary parts of an overarching structural adjustment programme. Between 1983 and 1995, the World Bank relied heavily on its past experiences as evidence for promoting cocoa policy changes. The Bank's strategy was to "deal with the issues in the cocoa sector on a broad-based, sectoral level; link it with macro-economic measures; and attempt to implement a comprehensive reform package"(World Bank 1984b: p. 27). These experiences led the World Bank and IMF to promote structural adjustments intended to address balance of payments, stabilise economies, and promote economic growth (Commander 1989). However, as highlighted by Commander (1989), Toye (1991), Hutchful (2002), and Whitfield (2011b), the extent to which World Bank agendas actually translated into policy is heavily shaped by domestic political actors and institutions, and sector specific constraints. The following sections introduce and then analyse policy changes to identify how international actors impacted cocoa policy in Ghana between 1983 and 1995.

3.2. Cocoa policies and projects implemented (1983-1995)

Cocoa policies promoted by international actors between 1983 and 1995 were largely directed at establishing a neoliberal policy regime in the sector. However, over time, a gradual transition from compliance with donor agendas toward the prioritisation of new domestic agendas is visible in the government's implementation record. As shown in Table 3.1 below, policy changes can largely be grouped into phases corresponding to changes in the underlying political economy for cocoa. Policies implemented between 1981 and 1985 focused on crisis management and stabilisation, including the initiation of donor supported cocoa sector rehabilitation.

Table 3.1 Major cocoa policy changes 1983 – 1995

Years	Policy Changes
Phase 1: 1981 - 1985 Crisis Management	In 1981 and 1982, the PNDC government implemented ad-hoc policies for evacuating cocoa and to address smuggling. The Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (GCMB) continued a reorganisation program that had been initiated by Limann and the UNDP, and the Aquafo Cheque system was created.
	In 1983, the PNDC launched the Economic Recovery Programme (Phase I 1983-86; Phase II 1986-88), which targeted the cocoa sector as a key driver for recovery. Conditions placed on IMF Structural Adjustment Credits pushed Government to reduce the cost of operating the GCMB and divest public plantations, etc. Export Rehabilitation projects and Import Credits supported policy implementation.
	In 1984, the GCMB was re-established as the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) by the Ghana Cocoa Board Act
Phase 2: 1985 – 1992 Political Support Building	In 1987 the World Bank and government launched the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project.
	In 1992, government accepted the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit Policy and was pressured to further privatise cocoa services and marketing. COCOBOD cut staff and state-held plantations were sold. The publicly held Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC) transitioned into a self-financing company, Produced Buying Company (PBC) was downsized, and Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) were introduced into internal marketing.
Phase 3: 1992 – 1995 Post-Election Support Strengthening	In 1993, COCOBOD began financing cocoa purchases through an offshore loan from commercial lenders, and ICA 1993 was agreed within the ICCO. COCOBOD merged extension services with the Ministry of Agriculture.
	In 1995, the Ghana Cocoa, Coffee and Sheanut Farmers Association took over input procurement and distribution, despite international opposition.

However, by 1985 the government's focus shifted to political consolidation and support building, with an eye on upcoming elections. Then, after 1992, the newly elected NDC government set about strengthening its political coalition within the cocoa sector. Thus, cocoa policy goals appear to fluctuate according to the vitality of the cocoa sector, pressures from international donors, and the political support needed by the PNDC at the time.

The PNDC government's attempt at crisis management appears to begin in December 1981. When Rawlings and the PNDC took control of the government in December 1981, they inherited a cocoa sector that had been declining in production since the 1960s (PMM 1984b: p. 1). The long-term deterioration of vehicles and infrastructure had led to cocoa being trapped in remote areas throughout Ghana's southern regions (Agyeman-Duah 1987: p. 629; Hutchful 2002: p. 35; Kraus

1991: p. 22). As the GCMB had been running on losses, one of the PNDC government's immediate goals was to increase access to finance and reduce costs, which it initially attempted by mobilising university students and supporters of the revolution to evacuate more than 82,400 tonnes of cocoa from around the country (Agyeman-Duah 1987: p. 630; Gyimah-Boadi 1989: p. 236). The relatively low prices paid by the GCMB to cocoa farmers had also encouraged smuggling to neighbouring countries, so to curb this practice the PNDC government issued the death penalty for anyone caught and set about closing borders (BBC 1982d).

The evacuation of cocoa and strong state enforcement of the formal marketing system both increased state access to cocoa and generated foreign exchange. These policies demonstrate a mix of authoritarian and populist policy approaches. An account made by the PNDC's Environmental Protection Council states:

> "Chairman Rawlings realizes both the importance of popular participation in community development and government's limited capacity to reach the large rural population. He has tried to implement democratic principles as they affect political decision-making; his stated aim is to decentralize power and ensure popular participation in the development process" (Dorm-Adzobu and Ampadu-Agyei 1991: p. 4).

The government harnessed popular support and combined community efforts with price incentives and strict enforcement measures to encourage production and to capture financial resources. As such, the use of producer price incentives relied on a private sector response to *state-controlled* incentives.

Between 1982 and 1983, Ghana witnessed its worst drought since independence, causing bush fires that destroyed a reported one third of the country's cocoa trees, and further compounding an already desperate situation (M. A. Novicki 1984). In a bid to harness local support and promote the employment, including for the 1 million Ghanaian refugees who returned from Nigeria and Togo between 1982 and 1983, the PNDC launched its National Mobilization Programme (NMP) and established 'mobi-squads' and 'nnoboa' to assist cocoa sector rehabilitation (Dorm-Adzobu and

Ampadu-Agyei 1991; Mikell 1989: p. 456). These measures helped to hold on to the PNDC's populist image of being connected to rural constituents.

Faced by additional crises, including the deportation of around one million Ghanaians from Nigeria, the PNDC government's continued to focus on addressing economic decline using any means available. However, the severe crisis and loss of cocoa production made it impossible for the PNDC government to rely on exports, and pushed the government to secure overseas development assistance (Gibbon et al. 1993; Hutchful 2002). With few other options, the PNDC government secured IMF and World Bank support in 1983 (Toye 1991).

However, it is important to highlight that neither the Rawlings revolution nor the political and economic turmoil curtailed already on-going international efforts to reform cocoa governance in Ghana (PMM 1984b; World Bank 1983a). When Rawlings took office, a UNDP Technical Assistance project was already underway inside the GCMB. The TA[5] was provided by Peat Marwick Management Consultants (PMM), with the main objective of institutional reorganization (World Bank 1983a: p. 35). Also, at the time the agreement was signed with PMM there was an explicit understanding that the project would support a pipeline of future World Bank cocoa projects (PMM 1984b: p. 2). Thus, the availability of international support enabled the continuation of pre-existing reform activities, even during a period characterised by the PNDC government implementing ad-hoc policies to address economic crisis.

Beginning in 1982, the government also began to explore and formulate policy options systematically. Dr. Joseph Abbey, economist from the University of Ghana, was hired to evaluate different approaches. Abbey concluded that it was essential for Ghana to devalue its currency and increase the producer price for cocoa because the overvalued cedi had been used to support

[5] 1981 UNDP TA objectives were: 1) to improve organisation of GCMB; 2) to train staff; 3) to improve financial control and accounting; and 4) to improve cocoa evacuation and vehicle maintenance (Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. and UNDP, 1984b).

previous corrupt governments and was damaging to farmers' livelihoods (Kulibaba 1993: p. 24). He also pointed out that potential donors (i.e. IFIs) were requiring similar conditions in return for assistance, thus providing financial resources for supporting this policy approach. The fact that Abbey promoted a policy agenda that coincided with donor ideologies may indicate that an agreement was reached between economists, whether or not they were Ghanaian, or it may simply have been pragmatic. Because exchange rates and producer prices initially remained under government control, these policies also continued using *state control* to change prices, in much the same way as previous governments (Kahler 1990: p. 46).

After the government announced its ERP in April 1983, ad-hoc policies were replaced by more structured cocoa rehabilitation and governance reform policies that mirrored plans included in the UNDP-TA. At that time, the PNDC government announced a series of policy changes intended to address inflation, revitalise exports, address budget deficits, and stimulate the economy (World Bank 1983c: p. 6). A key goal was "reversing the steady decline in cocoa output" (Bank of Ghana 1983: p. 44; Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 4). However, the resources and institutions available dictated the manner in which cocoa output could be increased. By accepting Structural Adjustment Credits (SAC I, II, and III), the Government was also required[6] to reduce the operating costs of the GCMB (from 32% to 15% of cocoa revenue by the 1988-89) and transfer many GCMB functions to the 'private sector' (Hutchful 2002: p. 67; Loxley 1991: p. 17). Despite appearing like an IMF and World Bank driven process, Secretary of Finance Botchwey was adamant that these policies fit existing PNDC agendas and were not selected because of conditions placed on assistance (M. A. Novicki 1984: p. 44).

[6] SAC I required the Ghana to: 1) reduce the operating costs of the GCMB from 32% to 15% of cocoa revenue by the 1988-89 season; 2) divest 52 cocoa plantations; 3) eliminate excess labour within the GCMB system; 4) rationalise processing plants; 5) withdraw from haulage; and 6) transfer many GCMB functions to the private sector.

In June 1983, the PNDC government launched its first coherent cocoa rehabilitation policy, with an overall goal of increasing production to 300,000 tonnes by 1987 (Bank of Ghana 1984: p. 5; World Bank 1984a: p. Xvi). The policy was initiated through a two-year "short term rehabilitation program"[7] focused on rehabilitating cocoa plantations, access to insecticide supplies, reducing the cost of operating the GCMB, and reviewing and increasing producer price on a regular basis (World Bank 1983a: p. 20). To avoid repeating past mistakes, the price increases were now combined with an elaborate system of export subsidies and import surcharges that resulted in a real devaluation of the cedi (Bank of Ghana 1983: p. 32). The government also transferred the GCMB's outstanding debt of 7.4 billion cedi to the central government, which allowed it to be covered by IMF credits and also centralised control over the GCMB (Bank of Ghana 1983: p. 13).

IFI support made it possible for the PNDC to devalue the cedi at the same time as increasing the producer price for cocoa, something which the previous Limann government had been politically unable to achieve (World Bank 1984b: p19). However, World Bank and IMF conditions also pushed cocoa policies toward becoming increasingly aligned with liberal economic policies, often referred to as 'neoliberal' development approaches, which *relied less on state institutions* and more on *markets* (Commander 1989). In many ways, the ERP signalled the beginning of a struggle between Ghana's historically statist development approaches and the growing prominence of neoliberalism amongst Western donors.

When the government began formulating its first cocoa policies after the ERP, the reasons cited for declining cocoa production were increasingly based on knowledge that was co-produced with IFIs, such as the World Bank. According to donor-financed sector analysis, the decline in production was caused by inadequate producer prices, inadequate input distribution, the spread of Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease (CSSVD), over-aged cocoa trees, deteriorating transportation,

[7] Ghana's 1983 rehabilitation programme focused on: 1) rehabilitating cocoa plantations and replanting; 2) increasing the producer price for cocoa (initial increase of c360 to c600); 3) increasing insecticide supplies from 1 to 4 million litres; and 4) providing 20,000 additional spraying machines.

and a lack of planning (World Bank 1984b: p. 1). None of these highlight any underlying social or political factors that may have encouraged deterioration, such as relationships between landowners and labourers, or the relationships between past governments and the sector. However, the World Bank did promote the theory that increasing the producer price would provide “an incentive to increase production and also to reduce the incidence of smuggling of cocoa beans to the neighbouring countries” (Bank of Ghana 1983: p. 2). Therefore, initial policies expected there would be a direct correlation between improving price incentives, reducing informal marketing activities, and improving livelihoods. In this manner, the government’s first cocoa policies fit well with neoliberal convictions that price incentives could address economic decline yet they also *maintained state control* over the producer price.

To rebuild farmer dependency on cocoa institutions and address smuggling, the Government established the “Akuafo Cheque” system to improve the reliability of payments to producers (Bank of Ghana 1983: pp. 3-4; Gyimah-Boadi 1989: p. 237; Jacobeit 1991: p. 225). This policy was intended to “check malpractices in payments to cocoa producers while at the same time cultivating banking habits among the rural population” (Bank of Ghana 1983: p. 45). This system made payments much more reliable and also helped to achieve production targets by directing more production through state institutions, even though production increases could only occur according to the maturation rate of new cocoa trees (Commander 1989: p. 121). The image promoted by the Akuafo cheque system is that of saving farmers from “malpractices” by providing formalised financial systems intended to improve their lives. It is also important to note that the Bank of Ghana chose to place the term “malpractices” in juxtaposition with “banking habits”, promoting a dichotomy in which the latter is viewed positively. However, formalising the purchasing processes also increased farmers’ dependency on state cocoa institutions, contradicting longer-term international agendas for reduced state involvement in cocoa marketing. Thus, initial policies focused on short-term goals for cocoa rehabilitation, with structural adjustment agendas pushing for reducing the cost of the GCMB.

Policies that relied on addressing producer price, instead of government spending, fit the severe financial crisis in Ghana at the time. However, additional finance was still needed to import goods required for rehabilitation. According to World Bank estimates at the time, Ghana needed $1billion (FOB) worth of imports to begin selected activities (World Bank 1983b: p. 17). To support rehabilitation, the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) agreed to provide a Reconstruction Import Credit for "essential" agricultural imports, such as fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides, sprayers, agricultural tools, spare parts and tires for agriculture machinery. In addition, the World Bank agreed to finance an Export Rehabilitation Project and connected Export Rehabilitation Project Technical Assistance (World Bank 1983a, 1983c). Thus, the Import Credit and Export Projects signalled an increase in Ghana's reliance on international finance for the procurement of foreign goods, as well as promoting primary exports (e.g. mainly cocoa, timber, and gold).

As planned, the 1983 Export Rehabilitation Project was closely linked to work already initiated by the 1981-1984 UNDP-TA. According to the World Bank's 1984 Completion Report for the 1975 Ashanti Project:

> "(The) principal lesson that emerges from the experience of this project are that it is almost impossible to ensure successful project implementation when major sector issues, which have a direct bearing on project success, remain unresolved and that small, geographically-confined projects are usually ineffective vehicles for addressing and resolving major sector issues" (World Bank 1984b: p. iv).

The World Bank used its earlier experience to promote the view that the cocoa sector required restructuring and sought to "deal with the major issues in the cocoa sector on a broad-based sectoral level"(World Bank 1983a: p. 20). In line with this agenda, the Export Rehabilitation Project goals included further increasing producer price, privatisation, ensuring the GCMB only retained 10% of foreign exchange earnings and, importantly, the restructuring the GCMB and Cocoa Services Division (CSD). As part of restructuring the GCMB, the IDA supported a five year staff retrenchment program and the privatization of cocoa plantations, factories, haulage, and marketing (World Bank 1983a: pp. 14-15). The associated Export Rehabilitation Technical Assistance focused more narrowly on providing management support, training staff, and conducting sector studies (World Bank 1983a: p. 33).

Given the involvement of the GCMB in nearly every aspect of cocoa production and marketing, it was impossible to implement sector-wide changes without addressing underlying institutions. The Export Rehabilitation Project was closely aligned with the conditions included in the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Credits (SAC) and, in particular, with the need to reduce the cost of operating the GCMB (Hutchful 2002: p67; Loxley 1991: p17; World Bank 1984b: p4). Government spending reductions were also promoted as essential components for increasing the cocoa producer’s share of FOB prices. The World Bank, and to some extent the government, came to the conclusion that reducing GCMB staff and privatising functions such as input provision and marketing were the most appropriate avenues for reducing operating costs and increasing efficiency. Plans for staff retrenchment had already been envisioned by a 1981 prefeasibility study, which promoted reducing staff by 20,000 (PMM 1984b: p. 16). By 1982, word of planned staff cuts began to circulate and the PNDC government tried to stop the spread of “false rumours about intended dismissals”(BBC 1982a).

However, rumours were soon confirmed, as government’s documents began to echo similar conclusion about the need to reform cocoa institutions. According to the Bank of Ghana:

> “Under the new structures approved in October 1983, the C.M.B. would operate as a holding company with a number of subsidiaries. These measures were part of plans to decentralise the Board's operations and enable it to function on a profit-making basis” (Bank of Ghana 1984: p. 45).

As stated, the government intended to improve GCMB efficiency by enabling it to become a "profit-making" organisation. The approach was supported by the World Bank, which saw turning cocoa marketing into a profit-making activity as essential for improving accountability and management (World Bank 1983a: p. 22).

One of the biggest changes to cocoa institutions during Ghana's structural adjustment came on May 3, 1984, when the PNDC government re-established the GCMB as the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) by passing the Ghana Cocoa Board Act (Ghana 1984; Hutchful 2002: p. 67). The Act placed COCOBOD more directly under control of the central government, and gave strict oversight responsibilities to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Along with establishing COCOBOD, the Government set out plans to cut its staff by 40% while simultaneously increasing cocoa production (Jacobeit 1991). Thus, rumours of staff retrenchment were publically confirmed, as 89,000 staff were dismissed between 1985 and 1995 (T. Williams 2009: p. 14).

As such, the policies promoted *upheld the role of the state* in both restructuring cocoa institutions and sector governance, but were increasingly based on liberal economic theory about the power of markets and prices to increase cocoa production. The increased prevalence of liberal economic reasoning in both donor and government policy documents is perhaps not surprising given that analysis used to inform cocoa policies was carried out by economists working for Western development organisations. For example, the Export Rehabilitation Project and Export Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project were based on an "audit" of past projects that found "macroeconomic and sectoral policy constraints were the major factors responsible for poor performance of the audited projects"(World Bank 1983c: p. 10). Given that these audits were approached through the same economic lens that concluded structural adjustment was necessary to begin with it, is not surprising that lessons learned pushed the government towards policy that aligned with their economic theories.

A second phase of cocoa policies appears to begin around 1985, during which concerns for maintaining ‘policy rents’ (e.g. finance provided by international actors) were balanced by a need to foster domestic political support (Hutchful 2002: p. 165; Whitfield 2011b: p. 17). By 1985 the PNDC government centralised power around Rawlings, greatly reduced the influence of all other revolutionary leaders and secured international support for structural adjustment (Hutchful 2002; Randal 1985; Whitfield 2011b). However, reforms had impacted heavily upon the cost of living in Ghana, especially in urban areas. Unrest and the alienation of any opposition to PNDC policies resulted in several attempted coups (1982 and 1983) and further increased the government’s need to bolster popular support.

Rawlings’ open opposition to rural and urban elite, including chiefs in cocoa regions, further increased the need to maintain a strong political presence in rural areas. In an effort to build public opinion among cocoa farmers was the establishment of a safety net in 1985 that was “similar to what pertains in the public service” (Bank of Ghana 1985: p. 49). Then, in 1986, a Cocoa Price Compensation Account was established to further protect farmers against price uncertainty. These measures were intended to both encourage production and reassure cocoa farmers that reforms would not have a negative impact their livelihoods.

Between 1984 and 1986, the government witnessed significant increases in nation-wide cocoa production. The government and donors attributed increased production to “the response of farmers to the increases in producer prices, since the inception of the ERP, and the provision of technical assistance” (Bank of Ghana 1986: p. 18). In this manner, success was linked to liberal economic theories that predicted raising producer prices would result in increased production. Reference to ‘technical assistance’ as a driver of change also promoted the idea that donor-supported economic planning and technical assistance was important for achieving cocoa policy success. However, the fact that *prices remained under state control* reflects the continuation of policies that did not align with donor agendas to fully liberalise marketing.

In July 1986, a new International Cocoa Agreement was finalised after a long delay, during which five sessions of negotiations were needed. However, the United States, Malaysia, and Indonesia remained outside of the agreement. Despite finally approving the 1986 ICCA, the ratio of global stocks to grindings rose and global cocoa prices continued to fall (Gibbon et al. 1993; Marcelo 1995). The buffer stocks established by the ICCA also faltered because, amongst other reasons, Cote d'Ivoire was unable to make agreed payments. The ineffectiveness of the 1986 ICCA compounded an already poor global market situation, and cocoa quickly became an unreliable source of foreign exchange.

Fortunately for the PNDC, by 1987 Ghana's early success at reducing inflation and cutting costs had created momentum within the international community to increase development assistance. At the time, an American economist in Accra stated "Ghana is beginning to pull in more and more because, frankly, most Western governments are looking for an African success story"(Brooks 1987). The image of success from structural adjustment made it easier for the World Bank to find international financial assistance for PNDC efforts. Therefore, the five year Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (CRP 1988-1993) was financed jointly by the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA), African Development Bank (ADB), Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), and European Union Stabilisation of Export Earnings Programme (STABEX) (World Bank 1992: p. XIV; 1997b).

The objective of the 1988 CRP was to meet the PNDC's cocoa production goal of 300,000 tonnes annually through improved technical services, research, cocoa marketing, and infrastructure (World Bank 1987e: p. 2). The CRP was also instrumental in introducing hybrid cocoa trees in Ghana (World Bank 1997b). It should be noted that plans for improving infrastructure (e.g. road, port, and rail) had also already been envisioned by the 1981 UNDP-TA project (Agyeman-Duah 1987: p. 632; PMM 1984b). However, the 300,000 tonne production goal was actually already achieved during the 1988 to 1989 season, the same year the CRP was launched (Commander 1989; Ghana Cocoa Board 1994: p. 44; World Bank 1997b: p. 11).

Despite cocoa production already reaching targeted levels by 1988, the CRP continued to promote an understanding that cocoa production was hindered by low producer prices, poor services, inefficient input supply, and state-controlled marketing (Seini 2002: p. 30). In relation to cocoa extension services, the World Bank was concerned with the high-level of involvement of government employees in weeding, spraying, harvesting, and other key on-farm activities, which were viewed as the farmers' or labourers' responsibilities. The CRP fit liberal economic theory regarding private sector efficiency but neglected underlying informal institutions, such as the 'abusa' system in which labour is provided for a portion of cocoa output (e.g. taxes).

In line with the World Bank's objective of reforming institutions by increasing management capacity and accountability, the CRP also set out clear guidelines for establishing a Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Research Department (PPMRD) within COCOBOD, and a Management Committee for the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) (World Bank 1988). Furthermore, the CRP set clear targets for reducing the size of the Cocoa Services Division (CSD), known previously as Cocoa Production Division, and ending its distribution activities by 1988 (World Bank 1988: Sched. 2(6)). As part of CSD restructuring, the CRP promoted a "new" policy that "was to have extension workers concentrate on providing advisory services and inputs to farmers, rather than on doing things for them"(World Bank 1987d: p. 8). Redefining the role of extension services was compatible with the drive to reduce the government's role in production, but assumed farmers' or landowners' willingness to increase their own labour. Thus, the CRP was aligned with the long-term goals set out by both the 1981 UNDP project and 1983 Export Projects, and international structural adjustment agendas.

The CRP also began to focus more on strengthening cocoa research. In addition to disease control and other more traditional research agendas, COCOBOD's research priorities[8] in 1988 included "agricultural economic research at farm level" (Ghana Cocoa Board 1989: pp. 13-14). Research "Thrusts"[9] at the CRIG also included "management" and development of "new products" (Ghana Cocoa Board 1994: p. 12). In this manner, changes in Ghana's cocoa research were aligned with the agenda of focusing government activities on facilitating private cocoa production. In 1989, the Cocoa Services Division and CRIG also began a joint farmer education program to reduce their reliance on the labour provided by cocoa extension services.

Overall, the CRP harnessed momentum from the perceived success of early development cooperation to try and address other major constraints identified by the World Bank (World Bank 1983a: p. 6; 1987d). Cocoa research fit comfortably with the World Bank's technocratic approach to development and was supported by observations that the "industry is faced with serious technological problems which would require intensified efforts by CRIG scientists to resolve"(World Bank 1987d: p. 7). The theory that cocoa production could be improved through "intensified" research efforts became a growing trend in donor-promoted cocoa efforts. Furthermore, the promoted research now included foci such as "agricultural economic research". Moving forward, Western policy prescriptions were increasingly paired with efforts to ensure the capacity of Ghanaian technocrats to use the same economic theories and analytical methods as donors.

Between 1983 and 1987, many World Bank promoted policies were based on economic models and the forecasted global demand for Ghana's cocoa exports. These methods were used to predict

[8] 1988 CRP Research Priorities were: 1) agricultural economic research at farm level; 2) controlling cocoa swollen shoot virus; 3) breeding for resistance to black pod, mealy bug, CSSV, and easy establishment; 4) capsid control; 5) chemical control of black pod; 6) cocoa establishment and agronomy; and 7) pesticides and the environment.

[9] CRIG research thrusts in 1988 were: 1) cocoa establishment; 2) management; 3) capsid control; 4) blackpod; 5) cocoa improvement; 6) Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus Disease (CSSV) protection; 7) post-harvest research; and 8) new products.

the economic rate of return (ERR) for investments made. The monetisation of development impact and the focus on global economic trends both fit with a neoliberal, outward-oriented model of development. However, predictions also proved incorrect, a failure deemed “criminal” by Gibbon et al (1993: p. 130). Starting in 1986, global cocoa prices fell, seemingly unexpectedly, for five years in a row. In 1989, projected government revenue also fell short by $180 million, raising questions about Ghana’s ability to pay back its rapidly rising debts (Jacobeit 1991: p. 228). At the same time, a slightly confusing fact is that the World Bank had actually predicted something like the observed drop in global cocoa prices, but took little heed as it continued promoting cocoa production in at least 12 exporting countries throughout the 1980s (ibid: p230).

The observed influence of the World Bank on policies that in turn affected the global cocoa prices raises many questions but also shows that, despite promoting a reduction in state involvement in production, it was not afraid to interfere with markets. It is unclear why the disconnect between World Bank support of cocoa projects and the economic predictions occurred, a failure openly admitted by the Bank (World Bank 1997b: p. 2). However, despite the World Bank’s failure to predict the crash of cocoa prices, the CRP was deemed ‘satisfactory’ because its ERR was 24% (World Bank 1997b: p. 12). The determination of the World Bank to predict, justify, and evaluate performance based on an ERR shaped many projects and, consequently, the feasibility of Ghana’s cocoa policies in the mid-1980s.

In 1987 new international donor agendas resulted in the launch of the Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD). PAMSCAD was a reaction to growing international pressure, from the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and others to mitigate the negative impacts of structural adjustment (Cornia et al. 1987). The increase in concern for Ghana’s poor also returned focus to Ghana’s northern rice growing regions, where livelihoods had remained precarious since colonial times. The widening of agricultural agendas also opened opportunities for the PNDC to reach out to new potential supporters.

PAMSCAD was strongly aligned with new donor agendas but it is unclear how the push for structural adjustment with a 'human face' actually altered cocoa policies. The growing heterogeneity of donor agendas may have reduced the influence of any one donor, including the World Bank. It is also possible that the government's increased caution towards liberalisation agendas was linked to the inability of the World Bank or IMF to successfully act upon economic predictions for cocoa market changes (Hutchful 2002: p. 69). However, as discussed in more detail below in the political economy section, it is also likely that agendas further reducing the role of the state were simply less attractive when the economy recovered and government agendas focused more on consolidating political support. Around this time, the PNDC also began to focus more on securing local political support than on meeting donor demands, as illustrated in 1988, when the PNDC government established District Assemblies in which one-third of the representatives were politically appointed by the PNDC (Callaghy 1990; Whitfield 2011b: p. 16).

In parallel to the initiation of new international poverty reduction projects, on-going structural adjustment efforts continued. Between 1989 and 1990, COCOBOD staff cuts continued and the publicly owned Cocoa Processing Company (CPC) was divested into a 'self-financing', independent company (Ghana Cocoa Board 1989: p. 16). In 1990, the Government launched its Medium Term Agricultural Development Strategy (MTADS), which on paper targeted privatisation, improving research, strengthening institutions, upgrading infrastructure, and decentralising investment decisions. By the time the Medium Term Agriculture Development Programme (MTADP) was launched global cocoa prices were falling. Therefore, the PNDC began to envision greater economic opportunities for other crops (Dapaah 1995: p. 19).

However, the late 1980s witnessed growing caution in government policies towards privatisation, as demonstrated by the change of plans to divest COCOBOD plantations. The divestiture of an initial 52 plantations was deemed a failure because they quickly began to deteriorate. Thus, from 1989 onwards, the government learned from this experience and its new policy focused on "consolidating existing farms pending further re-organization" and the establishment of "joint ventures"(Ghana Cocoa Board 1989: p. 14). The move towards "joint ventures" is another indication of *caution towards the removal of state* control in cocoa and the growing preference for what would later be known as 'public-private partnerships'. Similarly, the government originally committed to removing cocoa subsidies and privatising input supply by 1992/93, but COCOBOD's 1989 Corporate Plan states:

> "(There) can be no meaningful subsidy removal programme unless progress has been made in two main areas of privatisation of input distribution and farmers education to appreciate the need for the subsidy to be added to their producer prices for them to purchase the inputs at their prevailing market prices" (Ghana Cocoa Board 1989: p. 5).

This statement indicates a reluctance to blindly accept the theory that private actors and free markets in Ghana will ensure sufficient cocoa inputs for farmers, and also shows a determination to continue subsidising cocoa production through producer prices, if not through input subsidies. As such, COCOBOD's stance on this policy represents an increasingly determined case to *maintain state involvement* in the cocoa sector.

The post-1987 expansion of international focus outside of cocoa also justified increasing investment in other regions. Although Rawlings opposed multi-party elections, the increased international attention had also fostered support for the many interest groups not represented by the PNDC regime, and elections were quickly becoming inevitable. However, the shift in international focus outside of cocoa also enabled the PNDC to initiate development activities in new areas with potential supporters, and reduced the need to further liberalise the cocoa sector.

In 1990, the early successes of structural adjustment gave way to troubling signs of rising inflation (25.2% to 37.7%), declining cocoa earnings, and overall lower levels of agricultural output (Noble 1991). This "nose dive" was alarming for the PNDC government and international actors who had promoted structural adjustment. The World Bank and others placed part of the blame on the PNDC's slow implementation of reforms, such as divesting state enterprises, but despite concerns a third Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC III) was approved on May 7, 1991. However, one of the individuals involved in drafting the 1990 Medium Term Agriculture Development Strategy was equally alarmed by the rapid decline following the rapid removal of government subsidies (Interview GH27 2011):

> **Question:** "But in this process many people perceived these problems coming?"
>
> **Response:** "At that time, I think all of us believed in liberalisation, we had been schooled to think that a command economy was not the best. And, because of what happened in our first republic, in the 60s that was a very strong command economy, so everybody wanted to liberalise, so we really didn't reflect so much on that. But with hindsight I think that they did it too fast."

The above interview points to how the agricultural decline may have also led to wider disillusionment in liberalisation. The uncertainty surrounding the success of adjustment at this point also created opportunities for being more flexible with lending conditions and policies promoted.

Many adjustment goals promoted by SAC III were later viewed as "overly ambitious", even by the World Bank (World Bank 1995a: p. iv). The SAC III's ambitious goals also competed with much larger government concerns. In the run-up to elections, the PNDC government increased civil servant wages by 80%, and used its newly created 109 District Assemblies to bolster support. The allocation of resources was also increasingly targeted on promoting development in those Districts and Regions that supported Rawlings, an approach often used during Ghana's past (Republic of Ghana 1991). Additionally, because many cocoa farmers opposed Rawlings, reforms that would remove state control over the sector became difficult for the government to implement, despite international pressure to do so.

When Rawlings' and the new National Democratic Congress (NDC) won elections in 1992, Ghana's return to democracy welcomed a third phase of cocoa policies in which implementation became increasingly different from previous plans on paper. That same year, the government accepted the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (AgSAC), but COCOBOD employees took industrial action to protest plans for further staff retrenchment, costing the government an estimated 15.5 billion cedi in cocoa receipts (Bank of Ghana 1993: p. 24). Likewise, although the AgSAC pressured COCOBOD to move forward in identifying private sector alternatives for input supply, the new NDC government "aborted" its search for private alternatives and sold all inputs to the Ghana Cocoa, Coffee and Sheanut Farmers Association (GCCSFA) (Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 41; World Bank 1997a: p. 4; 1997b: p. 7). Starting in 1995, the GCCSFA took over responsibilities for input procurement and distribution and continued to subsidise inputs at 40% to 85%, which the World Bank believed pushed potential private sector providers out of markets (Giel et al. 2008: p. 10; World Bank 1997b: p. 6).

Largely to appease donors, the government eventually introduce LBCs into internal cocoa marketing in 1992, thus reverting to a marketing system more similar to colonial times, but still with strong state regulation. The introduction of LBCs reduced the Produce Buying Company's (PBC) share of total internal cocoa marketing activities to 75%, a less significant change than had been envisioned (Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 42; World Bank 1997a: p. 9). The new internal marketing system also required both LBCs and the PBC to deliver cocoa to designated centres, where they received reimbursement from COCOBOD (Bank of Ghana 1993: p. 56). In order to protect farmers from any unexpected shocks associated with the introduction of private sector activities, a 'mechanism' was established to compensate them when 'parameters' changed (World Bank 1997a: pp. 4-5). The "Akuafo Cheque" system was later revised further in 1994 to accompany the requirement that LBCs operate their own accounts through the rural banking system (Bank of Ghana 1994: p. 14). In this way, although internal marketing was more aligned with structural adjustment agendas on paper, in practice marketing remained firmly under government control.

Government justification for finally allowing LBCs to purchase cocoa was that it “increased competition and marketing efficiency” (Bank of Ghana 1993: p. 56). However, the fact remained that the PBC still retained a 75% share of marketing (Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 42; World Bank 1997a: p. 9). Thus, the LBC policy shows a clear compromise between neoliberal ideas about privatisation and the will of the government to stay engaged in cocoa. In 1995, COCOBOD’s decision to sell all of its inputs to the GCCSFA farmers association, thus preserving a monopoly in cocoa input supply and prolonging subsidisation, represented another move to maintain state control (World Bank 1997b: p. 6). The World Bank believed transferring responsibilities for cocoa inputs was “circumvention, rather than implementation” (ibid: p11). In this way, the PNDC government’s cocoa policies between 1992 and 1995 continued to represent a reticence towards further reduction of state control.

The year 1993 proved to be important for reducing Ghana’s dependence on the World Bank and IMF for financing cocoa policies. COCOBOD merged its extension services with the Ministry of Agriculture, a move intended to minimise the duplication of government efforts and reduce costs (Giel et al. 2008: p. 10). Then, a significant change occurred when COCOBOD secured its first syndicated pre-export loan at a lower interest rate than available from any donor or domestic source (Bank of Ghana 1994: p. 43; 1995: p. 10). COCOBOD’s subsequent loan repayment success allowed it to continue accessing private finance. Its ability to secure financing became a source of pride and increased independence, as noted by Mr. Isaac Osei, Chief Executive Officer of COCOBOD: “since 1993, COCOBOD has used syndicated pre-export finance and repayment history under this annual crop finance facility has been impeccable. It is the premier soft commodity transaction in Sub-Saharan Africa" (Osie 2008). Accessing this new source of finance also shifted dependency from development assistance and government-secured loans to COCOBOD-secured commercial loans.

Ghana also signed the new International Cocoa Agreement in 1993 (ICCA 1993). The ICCA focused on strengthening international cooperation, stabilizing the world cocoa prices, facilitating the expansion of cocoa trade, promoting transparency in the world cocoa economy, and also promoted scientific research and development (ICCO 1993: p. 1). However, as noted by Marcelo (1995), the ICCA was only able to achieve their target range for cocoa prices one out of the previous sixteen years. Cocoa exporting and importing countries jointly adopted the goals of the ICCA, but the means of achieving these goals was left to member states. The completion of the ICCA was followed by Ghana's signing on to the WTO GATT in 1994, a move that signalled the extent to which Ghana had successfully liberalised its national cocoa trade regime.

The CRP closed in 1996, two years later than planned. The Project represented 9 years of international efforts to promote national cocoa governance reform, liberalise input and output marketing, refocus research, and revitalize production. According to the World Bank, key challenges encountered included low-morale resulting from COCOBOD retrenchment, poor coordination and management, unexpected world cocoa price declines, a lack of fiscal discipline, the Cocoa Marketing Company's continued monopoly on marketing and export, the GCCSFA monopoly on input supply, and a lack of experience in the 'private' sector (World Bank 1997b: pp. 8-11). Of these challenges, those attributed to World Bank failure were the inability to secure political support from implementing agencies, insufficient efforts to take into account views of Ghanaian technical staff, and overall poor supervision. Thus, underlying economic theory and policies promoted were not criticised. By the end of structural adjustment, almost every aspect of cocoa production and marketing still involved direct government oversight and support. Still, the overall outcome of the "combined measures taken under the project and the subsequent AgSAC" was deemed “satisfactory” (World Bank 1997b: p. 12). This World Bank self-evaluation supports John Toye’s assertion that ‘slippage’ during the implementation of reforms was not always viewed negatively (Mosley et al. 1995).

Slippage during the implementation of donor agreements could be due to several reasons. As mentioned before it could be related to the government’s need to build political support. But, it could also be evidence of a change of mind and growing distrust in the effectiveness of original theories and policies. When the CRP closed in 1996, many donor-agreed cocoa policies had only been partially implemented. One of the big realisations made by the World Bank was that removing government involvement from markets did not automatically result in a well-functioning liberalised market economy:

> “The opportunities created by government's withdrawal from the domestic cocoa marketing as well as input marketing were not sufficiently taken up by the private sector due to lack of capital, facilities, logistics and training/experience. As a result, there is the risk that government would have to step in to fill the vacuum thus reverting the entire process to its original status”(World Bank 1997a: p. 33).

The Bank’s recognition that government withdrawal was not sufficient for increasing private sector activity fit well with the post-1989 Washington Consensus recognition of the need for both structural adjustment and support for economic growth (Sumner 2006). By 1995, the World Bank believed “action will be needed” to ensure progress is sustained in implementing agreements (World Bank 1997b: p. 10). The theory that achieving private involvement required additional inputs and training therefore *justified the continuation of state and donor support* to productive activities.

In this manner, the period between 1983 and 1995 witnessed a shift in Ghana’s cocoa sector from being a fully government funded and managed system, to one in which public support was provided to the ‘private sector’, but still largely managed by the state. As explained, cocoa policies went through three phases characterised by goals that moved from recovery, to building government support, and then consolidating support within Ghana's new democracy. The PNDC goal of increasing cocoa production above 300,000 was achieved, as was reducing the cost of operating the GCMB. The resources used for implementing cocoa policies changed from self-reliance to resorting to development assistance (1983 to 1993) and finally to COCOBOD accessing commercial loans (post 1993). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority of World Bank and IMF promoted cocoa policy changes were implemented during the first phase of policy changes, characterised by a focus on recovery and reliance on development assistance. However, the government continued to accept donor assistance for other sectors, which may have also reduced Ghana's dependency on cocoa taxation to fund public works. Thus, in addition to the continued involvement of different international actors (IFIs to commercial banks), there appear to have been several shifts in the economic and political reasoning underlining cocoa policies.

3.3. Cocoa policy process (1983-1995)

This section examines how the policy process for cocoa between 1983 and 1995 helps to explain the policy goals and associated resources, institutions and knowledge used. Cocoa policy processes in Ghana have to some extent always involved international actors in various stages due to Ghana's colonial past and the export focus of the sector. The establishment of the International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO) in 1972 further highlights the global nature of cocoa agendas feeding into policy processes. The ICCO provides a venue for cocoa producing and importing countries to meet to discuss changes in global cocoa markets and to establish agreements on how best to regulate the global market. Cocoa policies are in some manner always informed by regular interaction and discussion about global production and consumption. However, as indicated by the inability of the World Bank to predict future cocoa prices when establishing the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project, international actors are only partially capable of predicting or regulating global cocoa market (World Bank 1997b: p. 2). The following section examines the policy processes according to the actors included in each policy-making stage (e.g. *identifying policy* *problems, establishing agendas, selecting policy options, making policy decisions, mobilising resources, implementing policies, and evaluating policy outcomes*), to better understand how international involvement changes policy over time.

In terms of cocoa policy processes, decisions between 1957 and 1981 appear largely determined by national interests and institutional path-dependencies carried forward from colonialism, often with the support of international actors. In the 1970s cocoa policy processes began increasingly incorporating the interests of international donors in addressing the decline in cocoa production. Government interest in cocoa rehabilitation also led them to solicit more support from the World Bank, UNDP, BADEA, and others to mobilise resources for policy implementation. The provision of resources for cocoa sector rehabilitation also offered donors an in-road into problem identification and agenda setting processes. This was already visible in the World Bank's success in pressuring the Limann Government to increase cocoa producer price above the FOB price (World Bank 1984b: p. 19).

The PNDC inherited a declining cocoa sector as well as a Cocoa Marketing Board that was in debt, which many within the government viewed as ineffective (Bank of Ghana 1983: p. 13). The PNDC's initial approach to identifying policy problems, establishing agendas, and selecting options relied on in-country expertise. When the PNDC took control of the government, they pursued three alternatives for securing foreign support: 1) funding from non-OECD countries; 2) funding from OECD countries without IMF; and 3) IMF funding (Martin 1991: p. 241). Rawlings' commissioned Dr. Joseph Abbey to examine policy options for the cocoa sector, illustrating that there were capable individuals in Ghana at the time (Kulibaba 1993: p. 24). After exploring options for securing finance, PNDC advisors, including Minister of Finance, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey and Joseph Abbey, etc., viewed the IMF and World Bank as the only feasible option. The inability to secure alternative funding arrangements thus opened doors allowing the IMF and World Bank to engage more directly in cocoa policy processes, shifting internal relationships between policymakers. Those inside the PNDC government who opposed IMF reforms were subsequently connected to unsuccessful coups, leading Rawlings to "purge" the government of opposing voices (Hutchful 2002: pp. 40-41; Martin 1991: p. 241). In this way, Rawlings' ability to secure IMF and World Bank support visibly emboldened his dictatorial governance approach, but also alienated voices opposing neoliberalism.

The inclusion of Ghanaian academics and academic institutions into policy processes was and is a key part of the government's approach to cocoa policy design (GH9 and G10, 2011). In 1989, a National Workshop on the Ghana Cocoa Industry was held at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA), the outcome of which was used for the 'drawing of concrete action programmes' to inform aspects of implementation at the time of the CRP (Ghana Cocoa Board 1989: p. 7). The importance of Dr. Abbey and GIMPA workshops are only two of many examples where Ghanaian academic institutions, most often those engaged in agricultural economics or public policy research, fed the processes of identifying problems and policy options for the cocoa sector. However, in terms of cocoa research, the increased funding provided by donors also resulted in increasingly donor-driven research agendas (Hutchful 2002: p. 76). Furthermore, the promotion of cocoa research over other crops meant that an unequal level of finance was given to the CRIG. In this way, donors promoted the use of research in cocoa policy processes, but also impacted the type of research funded and evidence included into future policy selections.

When the government secured its first IMF standby loan in 1983, it also accepted the World Bank's Reconstruction Import Credit and launched the ERP (Bank of Ghana 1983; Jacobeit 1991; Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011). These three interconnected events set the PNDC government on a path that would fundamentally alter cocoa policy processes until at least 1993 and beyond. The first big change in policy processes came in the form of conditions attached to the new funding sources, which inherently shaped both policy agendas and the selection of options. The IMF and

World Bank set clearly defined conditions, which pressured the PNDC government to take measures to address inflation and government spending, to devalue the cedi, and to increasingly liberalize input and output markets. These pressures are visible in the cocoa policies which followed, although more evident on paper than during implementation (World Bank 1997b).

In addition to placing pressure on the government through lending conditions, donor-funded projects often blurred the lines between assistance and fully packaged national policies. The World Bank funded cocoa projects of the 1970s were primarily localised efforts to support specific rehabilitation efforts, such as replanting cocoa trees (World Bank 1984b). In contrast, the World Bank's Export Rehabilitation Project launched in 1984, had a much more ambitious objective of addressing macro-level governance constraints (World Bank 1983a: p. 20). The Export Rehabilitation Project included objectives that in other circumstances would seem strange as technical assistance, because they appear to override government policy process and mandate policy decisions, for example the GCMB only retained 10% of foreign exchange earnings. In this way, donor projects and conditions became mechanisms for identifying problems, establishing agendas, selecting policy options, and mobilising resources.

It cannot be assumed that donor funded projects were created without some support from the government. However, second-hand accounts of negotiations at the time (GH6 2011) suggest that the need for foreign financial support placed significant pressure on the government to accept donor policy agendas that may not otherwise have been tenable (Callaghy 1990: p. 286; Martin 1991). The internationalisation of Ghana's policy agenda setting processes is also acknowledged by the Bank of Ghana, which observed that the government's Import Programme launched on February 26, 1985 "was drawn up in consultation with the World Bank team which visited the country immediately after the Second Consultative Group meeting on Ghana was held in Paris in December 1984"(Bank of Ghana 1985: p. 9). The manner in which deliberations held in Paris were translated into a Ghanaian policy illustrates how the reliance on donor funding shifted aspects of policy agenda setting and selection to venues outside of the country. However, this may not have been new to the sector, as ICCO membership would also have involved policy deliberations within international venues. The difference is that now donors discussed options in international venues and then dictated national policy changes.

To a large extent, government policies and the donor projects supporting them existed on reform agendas promoted prior to Rawlings and the PNDC taking office. The CRP was based on a 1980 World Bank study that was "re-identified in 1985, prepared in 1986, and appraised in 1987" (ADB 2002; World Bank 1997b: p. v). The 1980 study upon which the CRP was based was undertaken while Ghana was under Limann control, which means that the evidence and agendas for cocoa policy decisions made under Rawlings were very similar to those envisioned by donors prior to his government. Likewise, the restructuring of the GCMB had already been envisioned by a 1981 prefeasibility study for the UNDP-led project, which also called for the retrenchment of 20,000 GCMB employees (PMM 1984b: p. 16). However, according to the World Bank the "proposal for restructuring of GCMB was conveyed to IDA by the government at negotiations" (World Bank 1983a: p22). This agenda therefore appears to have been promoted by the PNDC, even though it also fit previous donors' goals. Thus, the notion that the World Bank accepted a PNDC agenda indicates some level of interaction in World Bank promoted policy selection, albeit when agendas matched. The varying level of success witnessed in implementation suggests that matching agendas may be a key ingredient for achieving policy goals.

It is unclear if the proposal for restructuring GCMB represents a case of true re-identification or a more systematic implementation of an existing donor agenda over time. What it does indicate is how the agenda setting process driving the selection of many cocoa policies may have been influenced by agreement between international actors' agendas and the PNDC's agendas. However, many different national and international agendas existed at any given time, and not every stakeholder or donor who contributed to cocoa rehabilitation between 1983 and 1995 was equally represented. The Asian Development Bank was a main partner in the Cocoa Rehabilitation Project but felt its “ability to influence the design was limited as it did not participate from the start of the project identification and preparation” (ADB 2002: p. 2). Furthermore, ADB evaluators felt the CRP design process “was poor owing to lack of stakeholders’ participation in the early project design and formulation” (ibid). The observed lack of political support or stakeholder consultation in process of designing the CRP were conclusions supported by the World Bank’s own evaluation (World Bank 1997b: p. 12). The CRP thus highlights how specific stages, such as policy design, did not always include all funders or implementers, and illustrates the perceived importance of being included in early stages. However, the strict nature of structural adjustment, which required politically sensitive cuts in government spending, staffing, etc., provided a “disincentive to consultation, participation, and democracy”(Martin 1991: p. 257).

Another change to the processes of identifying policy problems and options, and implementation was the increasing importance of international consultants. In 1984, the World Bank stated that “the government's short-term rehabilitation program prepared with the assistance of IDA needs external technical and financial assistance” (World Bank 1984a: p. XX). Technical assistance usually involved international consultants who conducted feasibility studies and planning exercises funded by donor projects. Consultants also provided trainings intended to increase the capacity of government staff to implement reforms. Consultants were most often limited to providing services defined in donor and government designed terms of reference (TORs). However, a consultant’s presence within the government did result in the formation of working relationships that at times went beyond pre-defined TORs. During the UNDP-led TA project, PMM consultants were hired to provide “general assistance”, which gave them a mandate outside of a specific TOR. The relative freedom to provide support on request led PMM to back the Chief Executive of the GCMB in the procurement of $20 million from the EU STABEX fund, and to join a World Bank mission preparing the upcoming Export Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project (ERTP) (PMM 1984b:

p. 16). Thus, in practice consultants often supported both the government and donors according to needs at the time.

The inclusion of specific consultancy agencies in a cocoa project also increased the likelihood of their inclusion in subsequent activities. It is perhaps not surprising that PMM, who supported the preparation of the ERTP were subsequently contracted to support its implementation (PMM 1984a; World Bank 1983a: p. 35). In this way consultants appear to have been less affected by donor or government changes, because they were valued for having in-country experience and developing the following policies and projects. Also, their familiarity with bureaucracies such as the GCMB increased their ability to be found acceptable by all parties concerned. Despite being increasingly important to the identification and implementation or policies, it is difficult to know exactly how much influence consultants actually have on establishing agendas or selecting options. However, the fact that consultants carried out many studies which informed donor projects and government policies does suggest that they were at a minimum involved in identifying policy problems and options. Overall, the high number of expatriate consultants in Ghana was also cause for considerable antipathy from the many unemployed public and private sector local professionals (Callaghy 1990: p. 285).

In 1990, when the MTADS was being developed, the World Bank and government staff worked together intensely (GH7 and GH27, 2011). The relationship that developed between international and national staff was very close. According to the Bank, the “intensive collaboration...resulted in a high degree of consensus on sectoral policy and institutional reforms needed”(World Bank 1997a: p. 11). However, consensus is perhaps not surprising in light of the fact that the selection of personnel was required to meet World Bank approval. Given that the World Bank defined the expertise and criteria for personnel selection, it would have been stranger if approved project staff were significantly at odds with Bank agendas. What is interesting is that despite the high level of apparent “consensus”, both the government and more specifically COCOBOD, increasingly circumvented agreements made with the World Bank and IMF (World Bank 1997b: p. 11).

On paper, implementation and policy oversight was a key component of donor assistance in Ghana. Starting in 1983, the government was required to review cocoa prices “annually in consultation with IDA”, and to establish a Cocoa Producer Price Review Committee by January 31, 1984 (World Bank 1983a: pp. 14, 21). Similarly, when the government accepted the World Bank’s Export Rehabilitation projects an Inter-ministerial Export Rehabilitation Committee was established in the Office of the PNDC Coordinating Secretary (World Bank 1983a: p. 34). In 1984, when the GCMB was restructured as COCOBOD, implementation was increasingly subjected to oversight from the Ministry of Finance, and as a result financial management became much stricter. The overall increased oversight is visible when the government launched the CRP (1988). CRP implementation was overseen by a Project Coordinator and Project Coordinating Committee, a Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Research Department (PPMRD) within COCOBOD, and a Management Committee for CRIG (World Bank 1988). The CRP was also overseen by a newly established Agricultural Policy Coordination Committee (APCC) (World Bank 1987d: p. 3). However, despite all efforts made to ensure adequate oversight, in practice the CRP was only partially implemented. The partial implementation record was due to “the absence of clear lines of authority and responsibility and of an effective mechanism to coordinate project activities”(World Bank 1997b: p. 13). Also, the fact that the responsibility for project coordination was left to a “lone staff member at the Resident Mission” raises further questions as to whether the World Bank was actually concerned about overseeing implementation (ibid: p14).

The apparent disconnect between the levels of oversight mandated and the actually implementation record may also have been linked to political will. It must be noted that the increased oversight and committees required by donors also increasingly centralised the control that the PNDC held over governance within the cocoa sector (Hutchful 2002: p67). Increasingly, centralised control was an important objective of restructuring the GCMB in 1984 (Hutchful 2002: p67; Loxley 1991: p17; World Bank 1984b: p4). It also enabled the PNDC government to be selective in the manner and extent to which many donor commitments were implemented. The centralised control over the policymaking process, human capacity of senior government staff, and visible success in terms of economic recovery, all provided the PNDC with the ability to implement “flexible responses” to donor demands (Martin 1991: p. 248).

Further changes developed in relationship to Ghana’s return to democratic rule in 1992, albeit under the same government. That same year, the acceptance of the AgSAC required that the APCC be put in charge of reviewing budgets for all agriculture sub-sector government offices, including COCOBOD, and to “rationalize sector-wide allocations of resources” (World Bank 1997a: p. 5). Despite the new democratic governance system, most COCOBOD structures appear to have remained the same. The biggest changes that accompanied democracy were: 1) the increased input coming from the private sector, civil society, and media in policy planning; 2) increased involvement of the legislature in policy evaluation; and 3) an increased need to maintain democratic support (Hutchful 2002: p. 219).

After COCOBOD secured its first pre-export financing facility from commercial off-shore lenders, implementation of agreed reforms appears to have become even more flexible (Bank of Ghana 1994: p. 43; 1995: p. 10; Osie 2008). Despite pressure from donors, COCOBOD only partially introduced competition into cocoa input supply or marketing. In reference to COCOBOD reforms, the World Bank observed that “implementation of a project which was viewed by many of the agency's staff as threatening their jobs and which entailed a comparatively small amount of financial assistance was not high on the list of priorities”(World Bank 1997b: p.13). Here, “comparatively small amount of assistance” refers to the fact that the CRP provided COCOBOD with US$40 million, whereas its annual turnover was already US$300-400 million (ibid). Thus, it appears that at the time when COCOBOD was once again a self-financing institution it gained significant freedom in implementing policies agreed on paper. The link between financial independence and implementation illustrates differences that exist in the political economy for cocoa at the international, national, and local governance levels.

3.4. Multi-levelled political economy for cocoa (1983-1995)

This section examines the political economy of cocoa production in Ghana between 1983 and 1995. The focus is on understanding the motivation for observed policy changes. By examining the political and economic drivers of change that surrounded the policy decisions examined this section strives to further identify how international actors appear to have influenced some decisions and not others.

3.4.1. Local-level political economy of cocoa

As noted in the introduction, cocoa has been a key source of livelihood and power for landowners and farmers living in the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, and Western regions, where cocoa has been cultivated since 1891. After years of exponential growth in the early 1900s, cocoa production declined between1965 and 1983 (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011; Stryker et al. 1990). A gradual decline in world cocoa prices (with a steep fall in 1982) and the declining health of cocoa trees greatly reduced incentives for farmers to engage in cocoa production or rehabilitation. Domestic inflation in the late 1970s and early 1980s also led to an increase in food prices, making cocoa production relatively less attractive. It is therefore not surprising that many farmers were switching from cocoa production to food commodities such as maize, cassava, plantain and cocoyam and palm oil (Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board 1981: p. 5).

In addition to a relative reduction in the producer price for cocoa, the period leading up to 1983 witnessed an increase in the cost of production. According to the PNDC Secretariat for Economic Planning in 1984:

> "(What) happened to the labour from the northern part of Ghana was that just before the beginning of ARCP [Ashanti Region Cocoa Project] food (mainly grain crops) production had become so lucrative in that part of the country that this labour decided to stay and take advantage of the situation, rather than come down south to work on cocoa farms"(World Bank 1984b: p. 42).

This statement highlights the previously described tension between cocoa and food (including rice) production in Ghana. Furthermore, as discussed, many cocoa farmers only received one-third of their output, the other two-thirds of the profits taken by landowners, whereas traditional practice is to split food production in half.

For remaining cocoa farmers, labour prices increased by 200% between 1979 and 1981, largely driven by local inflation (Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board 1981: p. 1). Furthermore, even though the government was subsidising cocoa inputs at the time, supply shortages forced cocoa farmers to purchase inputs on open markets where prices were much higher as a result of inflation. The combination of high labour costs and high input prices made the returns to labour for cocoa farming less than the by-day wage rate in 1983, even though cocoa required overall lower labour than food crops (Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board 1981: p. 24). The result of the decreasing price incentives and rising input costs is visible in the decline in both production and yield in the decade preceding 1983.

Figure 3.3 Cocoa production and productivity in Ghana between 1983 and 1995 (UNFAO 2012)



In 1983, four major events altered the local-level political economy for cocoa production. First, the government devalued the cedi and increased producer prices, thus increasing cocoa price incentives more than food crops. Second, over 1 million Ghanaians returned from Nigeria in need of employment, which decreased the cost of labour. Third, the acceptance of World Bank and IMF support opened the doors for new imports (World Bank 1983c: p. 5). Fourth, prolonged drought made overall farming conditions difficult, but had a more severe impact on grain production (e.g. rice production fell nearly 50% between 1982 and 1983). The first three events increased the incentive for cocoa production by providing a higher price return and increasing the availability of labour and inputs. The poor weather was detrimental to all agricultural production, but relatively more detrimental to grain, thus increasing the incentive for cocoa production still further.

The series of cocoa-focused rehabilitation projects implemented between 1983 and 1985, following Ghana's acceptance of IMF and World Bank support, greatly increased incentives to produce cocoa. Projects increased access to inputs and cocoa services, and led to the replanting of cocoa trees that had passed their optimal age or burned during the drought. The result of government policies is visible in both yield and production increases between 1983 and 1995 (Figure 3.3). Furthermore, the government's decision to review the producer price annually ensured relative stability despite the high levels of inflation witnessed during the period.

Figure 3.4 Cocoa producer prices in Ghana between 1983 and 1995 (UNFAO 2012)



However, early gains in total cocoa production are misleading as they were partially fuelled by improved weather and reduced smuggling, not new trees. A four-village survey in the Ashanti Region was carried out for a study conducted by Commander (1989) in 1987 and helps to better illustrate changes visible on the ground at the time. Commander's study found that cocoa farmers were still facing challenges acquiring sufficient labour, and available land remained largely under-utilized (ibid: p118). Land-ownership was also highly skewed, and farms with more than 20 acres or more controlled 60% of total land and also tended to rent land (ibid: p119). The fact that smallholder farmers were disadvantaged was the type of evidence used by Rawlings to promote an image of creasing opportunities for poor farmers. However, government rhetoric aside, PNDC policies promoted between 1983 and 1987 benefitted large cocoa farmers and landowners much more than smallholder farmers (Commander 1989: p. 123; Jacobeit 1991: p. 226).

Despite large cocoa farmers benefitting relatively more than others, their relationship with the government remained strained. From its beginning in 1981, the PNDC government publicly identified chiefs, many who are also large cocoa farmers, as the cause of hardship faced by Ghana's rural poor. In 1982, when the PNDC was accused of planning to carry out staff cuts, it responded by stating "the only people who need fear this process are the corrupt chiefs who have been living off the sweat of the farmers and not the honest and patriotic workers" (BBC 1982a). The statement highlights how tensions around the size of the GCMB were diverted by rhetoric that focused on the historical tension between smallholder cocoa farmers and wealthy land-owning chiefs. Furthermore, the PNDCs' reputation as the "preserve of the Ewe", a people from the Volta region, did not help Rawlings' image in Ashanti regions (Agyeman-Duah 1987: p. 624). This statement in many ways foreshadowed the later decision to maintain COCOBOD over the bequest of donors promoting privatisation, which would have also likely benefitted large cocoa farmers, including chiefs, with capital to invest in new opportunities.

In addition to the PNDC's public antagonism toward chiefs in cocoa regions, the decline in global cocoa prices witnessed after 1986 lowered producer incentives and decreased trust in government marketing. The lower prices and simultaneous shift in government focus to other crops resulted in cocoa producer incentives improving much less after 1985. Furthermore, the PNDC policy of limiting private sector involvement in cocoa marketing and maintaining COCOBOD as a key governance institution is a combination that had been opposed by large cocoa farmers since Nkrumah (Beckman 1976). To capitalist and entrepreneurial farmers, COCOBOD represents state control over cocoa profit. Although the PNDC improved producer prices it also continued to control the opportunities available for local private investment in cocoa marketing and other activities. Finally, the PNDC's heavy-handed approach to ending smuggling, a practice that benefitted many cocoa farmers, may have also reduced popular support.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, when Ghana returned to democracy in 1992, cocoa farmers did not readily vote for Rawlings, particularly in the Ashanti region (Jeffries and Thomas 1993: pp. 355-56). The fact that the PNDC government successfully rehabilitated much of the cocoa sector without gaining support from cocoa farmers highlights the continued difficult relationship it had with producers. This strained relationship may also be part of the reason that, starting with the MTADP in 1990, the government increasingly focused on other crops and never fully liberalised the cocoa sector.

3.4.2. National-level political economy of cocoa

When Rawlings and the PNDC took office they envisioned leading a revolution that would alter Ghana's governance systems and development and promote improved livelihoods for the rural poor. A key reason that previous governments had been reluctant to restructure cocoa governance was that exports provided over one-third of total government revenue until 1981. However, by 1991 cocoa revenue dropped to less than 20% of total government revenue (Jacobeit 1991: p. 222;

World Bank 1983c: p. 19). The reduced importance of cocoa to government finances may not have been planned, but there appear to be several reasons why the PNDC government followed cocoa reforms in the manner observed.

First, the PNDC government faced an uphill battle to overcome the economic crisis facing the country at the time. Between 1981 and 1983 Ghana experienced extreme inflation, drought, forest fires, and financial loss due to the maintenance of over-staffed institutions including the GCMB. The drivers of this crisis were as much long-term and systemic as related to short-term shocks (Toye 1991). The PNDC was faced with little option but to seek ad-hoc approaches to address short-term problems until the time when they could address the underlying systemic issues. As soon as external financial support was secured from the IMF and World Bank, the focus shifted from evacuating cocoa and ending smuggling to reforming governance and rehabilitating cocoa production.

Because cocoa reform policies also benefitted farmers, they were easy to frame in a manner fitting the revolutionary agenda. Rawlings had gained popular support among farmers because he promised to "bring back the wealth in the country to where it belongs, in the rural areas" (Rawlings 1983). As was the case in many countries in Africa, cocoa marketing institutions had been used to tax Ghana's production and encourage urban development (Bates 2005). According to a letter written by the PNDC Secretariat of Economic Planning in reference to past cocoa governance approaches, "peasant cocoa farmers did not have an organised front to fight for their farming interests, so it should have been the responsibility of the Ministry of Cocoa Affairs and more effectively the GCMB, to have promoted on-farm production"(World Bank 1984b: p. 42). Reforming the GCMB was an attractive option from a revolutionary standpoint and the National Economic Review Committee (NERC), as well as Dr. Abbey and Minister Kwesi Botchwey, all saw reform as fitting comfortably with donors' structural adjustment agendas at the time (Kulibaba 1993: p. 24; Stryker et al. 1990).

Figure 3.5 Development assistance provided to Ghana by the World Bank and IMF between 1975 and 1995 (Global Development Finance 2012)



The IMF and World Bank were willing to finance many cocoa reform activities because they were aligned with their understanding of Ghana's structural adjustment needs, mainly ensuring the balance of payments. In 1983, the IMF was primarily concerned with Ghana's high levels of inflation and pushed heavily for devaluation of the cedi. Devaluation was also important for improving producer prices and the competitiveness of domestic cocoa production relative to food crops (Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board 1981: p. 25; Jacobeit 1991: p. 223). As a result of Ghana's early willingness to implement structural adjustment measures, the country began receiving more than $200 million in IDA credit annually starting in 1983 (Figure 3.5).

Many IDA credits were used to finance observed cocoa rehabilitation projects, thus minimising the burden of cocoa rehabilitation on constrained government budgets. At the same time that Ghana's dependency on cocoa for development finance was reduced, the initial increases in production also increased government access to foreign exchange (Hutchful 2002: p. 165). In this way, cocoa sector reform was not only a politically acceptable cost-cutting exercise, but its associated policies were also attached to donor resources for implementation.

Donor and PNDC-promoted cocoa reforms also cut government spending and formalised trade that had previously been subject to smuggling, thus increasing tax revenues and reducing costs. In the mid-1970s it was estimated that one-third of Ghana's cocoa was illegally smuggled over its borders (Margolis 1982: p. 25). In 1982, the PNDC government not only saw increasing producer prices as a way of curbing smuggling, but they also took strict measures to close borders (ibid). Furthermore, in 1983 it was estimated that GCMB and CSD managed plantations accounted for more than 20% of total GCMB operating costs, which meant the divestiture of 52 plantation and other cost-cutting reforms significantly reduced the cost of operation (World Bank 1983c: p. 23). In this manner, cocoa reform policies not only fit the PNDC's revolutionary image but also promised to reduce the burden of operating costs, which had recently placed the GCMB into debt.

When world cocoa prices fell after 1986, gold became Ghana's biggest foreign-exchange earning export (Boafo-Arthur 1999: p. 51). When asked why the government continued to encourage cocoa production at a time when global prices were dropping, COCOBOD Chief Executive Kwame Nini Owusu responded, "If you supply too much the price goes down. But in the short-term, what do you do? Do you stop producing? … In the long-run, other things, like coffee, pineapples, etc. … will have to take over from cocoa" (M. A. Novicki 1988: p. 28). Confusion over what to do in face of dropping global cocoa prices, as well as the growing need to foster domestic political support, appears to have spurred the PNDC to look towards developing alternative crops and regions, such as rice in northern Ghana.

Figure 3.6 Cocoa export earnings and quantities in Ghana between 1983 and 1995 (UNFAO 2012)



The drop in cocoa prices also corresponded with increasing pressure from donors and local interest groups to return Ghana to democracy (Boafo-Arthur 1999; Durotoye and Griffiths 1997). In 1988, the election of 109 District Assemblies marked a much stronger commitment to democratisation and a clear effort on behalf of the PNDC to build-up rural support (Callaghy 1990: p. 278; Whitfield 2011b). In anticipation of the upcoming transition, the government became increasingly cautious in managing public opinion between 1985 and 1992, and actively promoted Rawlings.

As noted by Odeefuo Boa Amponsem II in 1991, “many of our rural areas, Districts, and Regions alike, have been left undeveloped because of this party politics. All of us are aware that those areas which do not vote for the winning party are always discriminated against” (Republic of Ghana 1991: p. 1855). The practice of rewarding supporting districts can be seen in the manner that the PNDC government shifted focus towards developing new crops and new regions after 1985. However, as noted in the local political economy section, many cocoa farmers did not fully support PNDC reforms or its decision to maintain the GCMB by re-establishing the institution as COCOBOD.

After Rawlings won a close election in 1992, the NDC government focused on maintaining political and economic control. When Licensed Buying Companies were permitted into internal cocoa marketing, one of the most successful was Cashpro, a company controlled by top members of the PNDC elite (Whitfield 2011b: pp. 24-25). In return for receiving support for its business, Cashpro later became one the NDC's campaign financiers.

Similarly, COCOBOD board member Nana Frimpong Abebrese established the Kuapa Kokoo farmer's co-operative in 1993 (Shuman et al. 2009). Nana Frimpong represented cocoa farmers at COCOBOD and used his position to gain support from the Dutch NGO SNV and the British Third World Information Network (TWIN) to establish Kuapa Kokoo as an LBC. By 1995, Kuapa had become COCOBOD's "model buyer" (Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 43). Thus, by promoting increased donor, private sector, and NGO activity, the NDC government fostered the political and economic support it needed to survive in a democracy.

COCOBOD gained greater financial independence after it secured pre-export finance for the first time in 1993. This independence and public opposition to further restructuring both shifted the political economy for cocoa policies away from further reform. Furthermore, by 1994 the growing national debt not only forced Ghana to question their approach to structural adjustment, but also increasingly limited the ability of the government to implement policies. As stated by Ghana's representative to the United Nations, Mr. Asamoah, "Sub-Saharan Africa alone is overburdened with debt servicing to the tune of $200 billion representing 10 per cent of the total national income of the 43 countries involved" (United Nations 1994: p. 11). In this way, many governments began to see themselves as unified in their debt burden and looked towards international communities for further support in overcoming this new burden.

Although the PNDC's early commitment to donor-driven reforms created an image of Ghana as the token structural adjustment country, by 1995 the political economy for cocoa policies no longer allowed for implementing a perfect World Bank or IMF prescribed model. Furthermore, the model itself no longer appeared to uphold its promises of economic growth or stability. Instead of enabling Ghana to balance payments, increase economic development, and withstand shocks, the country remained susceptible to global cocoa market changes and was heavily indebted and experiencing an increasingly larger trade deficit.

3.4.3. International-level political economy of cocoa

Foreign agendas have influenced cocoa production in Ghana since it began in the late 1800s. For Ghana, cocoa has always been an export commodity, which means that many international companies and governments engaged with aspects of Ghana's cocoa sector. When Rawlings took control of the government he pursued bilateral relations with Libya, the Soviet Union, as well the World Bank and OECD (Ayee 1994). Although it appears countries like Libya were sympathetic to Rawlings' revolution, in the end Ghana was forced to rely on the IMF and World Bank to support its economic recovery. As a result, cocoa reform projects that had previously begun with support from the World Bank, UNDP, etc., continued largely as planned and informed subsequent activities. There also appear to be several key reasons that international actors maintained interest in Ghana's cocoa reforms between 1983 and 1995.

First, the IMF and World Bank saw cocoa as a vital sector for achieving speedy economic recovery. The concept of 'structural adjustment' was a package of policy changes and institutional reforms intended to overcome the systemic constraints preventing a country from achieving stable economic growth and enabling it to better withstand shocks (Commander 1989: p. 4). The IMF and World Bank were promoting their best understanding of an economic model and associated governance system for Africa and were under significant pressures to prove that structural adjustment could be successful. In Ghana, the importance of cocoa to government finance and economic development made the sector a focal point for international actors interested in assisting Ghana's adjustment to their 'neo-orthodox' adjustment policies (Kahler 1990; Toye 1991).

Prior to structural adjustment, donor assumptions about the constraints preventing cocoa development in Ghana had already formed through cocoa projects (PMM 1984b; World Bank 1983a). The World Bank, UNDP, UNFAO, and others had been involved in promoting reforms within Ghana's cocoa sector in the 1970s. They usually credited their past failures to larger macro-economic constraints and government implementation, instead of problems within their own approaches (World Bank 1984b: p. iv). As the removal of macroeconomic constraints was part of the structural adjustments promoted, it became increasingly important that lessons learned were translated into successful increases in cocoa productivity. The result was increased willingness to fund major infrastructure, research, and input procurement projects that at times also conflicted with the neoliberal theories used to promote liberalisation.

Ghana's early compliance and implementation record (i.e. 1983-1985) made it an attractive "test case" for structural adjustment (Hutchful 2002: p. 151; Martin 1991: p. 239). A key underlying assumption of many cocoa policies was that the best way of increasing production is through producer prices. Ghana's early success at devaluing the cedi and increasing producer prices appeared to uphold the theory, which further increased incentives for the IMF and World Bank to continue collaborating with the PNDC. The need to maintain friendly relations also resulted in increasing donor flexibility when Ghana's cocoa policy implementation record became less compliant after 1989 (Hutchful 2002; Martin 1991; Toye 1991).

Donors' inability to correctly predict what impact structural adjustment would have on cocoa in Ghana became apparent when models proved wrong and incentives declined. Observing these failures, Gibbon et al concluded that the donor approach used was "disastrous because there was only a single string in the bow of the World Bank's strategy for Ghanaian agriculture, namely cocoa sector reform, and criminal because no effects of a recovery in Ghanaian production on the world price of this demand-inelastic crop were predicted" (Gibbon et al. 1993: p. 130). It can be claimed that there were failures on the part of international actors who promoted their theories (e.g. liberal-market determined supply) but did not ensure compliance in activities funded (e.g. donor-funded cocoa production increases). However, as shown by Toye (1991), Commander (1989), the World Bank had a very limited ability to take into account all drivers of economic change or force the PNDC government to implement policies.

Cocoa also likely received more investment than other commodities, such as rice or maize, because it did not compete with any U.S. or European exports and thus provided a politically safe sector for donor support. The result of focusing international attention on improving sectors that did not directly compete with OECD imports into Ghana is visible in the growing trade deficit that accompanied Ghana's structural adjustment experience. In cocoa, spending on infrastructure, fertilizers, pesticides, and equipment that was primarily sourced through imported goods and services was used to fuel increased productivity in primary commodities (e.g. cocoa, timber, gold, etc.). The overall impact of increased importation of goods, services, and capital, and decline in the relative value of exports is visible in Figure 3.7.

Figure 3.7 Trade balance between Ghana and the World, the EU, and the USA between 1980 and 1995 (IMF DOT)



Despite not directly competing with many western exports, the U.S. consistently opposed international attempts to stabilise global cocoa prices. The International Cocoa Agreement (ICCA) process that began in the 1963 continued throughout structural adjustment. The first three ICCAs were intended to establish a global buffer stock, and the fourth added an export control clause that was never fully implemented (ICCO 1993; UN 1972). Despite the fact that Cote d'Ivoire, the world's largest cocoa producer, and the U.S. both refused to participate until all binding stabilisation mechanisms were removed (Gibson 2007: p. 22). Thus, International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO) attempts at stabilising global prices were essentially undermined because, according to U.S. Asst. Treas. Sec. Gerald L Parsky, they "inevitably result in higher prices for US and other consumers" (Dale 1976). Although the World Bank and IMF promoted outward focused development policies in Ghana, major cocoa importing countries were foremost concerned with maintaining low consumer prices.

Ghana’s relationship with other cocoa importing and producing countries did influence policy decisions between 1983 and 1995. In 1989, COCOBOD had become wary of Cote d’Ivoire’s ‘unorthodox marketing strategies’ which ‘prolonged withdrawals from the market followed by block sales of cocoa’ (Ghana Cocoa Board 1989: p. 8). Mounting disagreements between producers and consumers in the late 1980s had made the ICCO buffer stock and withholding scheme inoperable, increasing opportunities for unregulated trade. The period of disagreement within the ICCA community witnessed the steady decline of global cocoa market prices. After the finalisation of the ICCA 1993, Ghana again experienced a slight increase in revenue earned from cocoa exports in 1994 and 1995.

A key assumption about structural adjustment, including the reasoning behind cutting government spending and investing in increased production, is that the package of policies promoted would improve the balance of payments. In Ghana, growing dependency on imported goods, services, and foreign capital without sufficient export growth pushed the country into debt. Furthermore, global interest in lending to Ghana grew steadily after the acceptance of the first ERP, and thus external debt remained above 300% of export earnings until at least 1995. This meant that any increases experienced in export earnings were never greater than Ghana’s commitment to foreign lenders. However, in 1993 COCOBOD’s access to commercial loans also marked a new relationship with lenders, one in which the central government, World Bank, and IMF played less of a role.

Figure 3.8 Ghana's national debt between 1975 and 1995 in total and as a percentage of exports (Global Development Finance 2012)



It should be noted that Ghana's debt eventually became an important way for the World Bank, IMF, and other key international actors to maintain a strong presence in Ghana's policy processes. Immediately following the end of structural adjustment in 1996, Ghana's Highly Indebted Poor Country Status (HIPCS) provided new avenues for promoting international policy recommendations. In this manner, the limited success of countries such as Ghana to achieve economic growth, on the back of enormous international debts, embedded international actors into the governance regimes they established (Whitfield 2010). Yet, COCOBOD's financial independence and strong bureaucratic structure would prove increasingly resistant to promoted reforms (T. Williams 2009).

In addition to structural adjustment, trade, and financial interests influencing cocoa policy decisions in Ghana, other international actors were engaged in promoting alternative development agendas. A poverty reduction agenda began influencing policy in Ghana from around 1987 onwards, resulting in the PAMSCAD and a shift towards addressing the Social Dimensions of

Adjustment. The United Nations and other international organisations began promoting alternatives to the World Bank and IMF adjustment policies, such as UNECA's African Alternative Framework (Kahler 1990). However, as noted by Gibbon (1992) the PAMSCAD was more of a project 'shopping list' than a coherent anti-poverty programme (p203).

Connected to new social agendas, additional donors and international NGOs began engaging different aspects of cocoa in Ghana. As mentioned, the London-based Third World Information Network (TWIN) joined force with the Netherlands development cooperation (SNV) to assist Kuapa Kokoo in becoming a farmer's cooperative and licensed cocoa buyer. TWIN saw its mission as helping countries affected by "the imposition of structural adjustment"(TWIN 2012). However, by supporting a COCOBOD board member to establish a co-operative, the Kuapa Kokoo story illustrates how different international interests provided new avenues for the national government to strengthen its link to farmers in cocoa regions (Shuman et al. 2009). In addition to many different donors and NGOs, church groups became active early on during Rawlings' revolution. Faith-based development projects are primarily located in Ghana's northern regions rather than the relatively wealthier southern cocoa regions.

Overall, the international political economy for Ghana's cocoa appears to be shaped by claims of promoting economic development and actions that ultimately undermine intentions. When the PNDC took control of the government, the World Bank, UNDP, and many others made a concerted effort to support sector rehabilitation. However, the assumptions that improving the production of a single commodity would balance payments, solve trade imbalances, or help overcome future shocks were proven ill founded. Instead, liberalisation led to an enormous increase in debt and a cocoa sector that was less protected from global price changes. Fortunately for the government, the PNDC was prudent enough not to completely dissolve its marketing board when no private sector alternatives were readily available to take on many of its functions.

3.5. Chapter Three Conclusions

In reference to the impact of structural adjustment on agricultural policies, Bates notes that it is "highly unlikely that they [governments] will direct change in economic policy into channels which depart sharply from their preferred way of conducting business"(Commander 1989: p. 222). This statement appears very true in the case of cocoa in Ghana. Instead of being driven by international agendas, policies implemented during structural adjustment appear to be shaped by three key underlying tensions that existed before and after the 1983 to 1995 period.

First, the production of cocoa requires both labour and food for labourers. Ghana's northern regions can provide both of these inputs, so favouring either cocoa or grain production (e.g. rice, maize) can impact the viability of producing the other crop. PNDC policies initially favoured cocoa production at the cost of reduced rice production. Thus, when cocoa prices began to fall, the government refocused attention on rice and other food crops. International actors influenced these changes by providing resources and knowledge that increased the incentive for the PNDC government to focus on cocoa instead of food crops and by providing the imports needed to rehabilitate the sector and overcome food shortages (e.g. through imports and food aid).

Second, cocoa taxation provides government revenue, but taxation also reduces incentives for production and therefore encourages smuggling. The PNDC government was initially in desperate need of finance and focused on cocoa as a source of foreign exchange. However, after securing access to IMF and World Bank resources, the need for cocoa revenue reduced, allowing the government to increase producer prices and scale-back the size of COCOBOD. Improving prices and reducing taxation in turn increased producer incentives and reduced smuggling.

Third, the government's reliance on cocoa for foreign exchange increased incentives for it to maintain control over the sector, including over cocoa farmers. The World Bank and IMF provided the resources needed to restructure institutions and establish new relationships between the government and cocoa production. Cocoa producer prices were increased and the percentage of government revenue that came from cocoa was reduced. However, once the cocoa sector was stable, political tensions between elite cocoa farmers and the PNDC appears to prevent the government from fully liberalising the sector. As shown by Whitfield (2011b), the PNDC needed to build ties with Ghana's productive sectors in order to secure its political viability. After 1985 the focus shifted towards securing new political supporters and transitioning back to democracy. Instead of implementing all of the World Bank promoted structural adjustment policies, international resources were used to establish new PNDC-friendly cocoa cooperatives and buying companies.

Between 1983 and 1995 Ghana selected and implemented a series of policies that transformed the cocoa governance system and rehabilitated production. Policy changes marked a clear divergence from previous incremental changes. As noted, most of the changes witnessed between 1983 and 1985 had been set as policy goals by international actors and Ghanaian governments prior to Rawlings and the PNDC, implementation of the ERP, or the acceptance of IMF Structural Adjustment Credits, which are most often cited as the inspirations for observed governance changes (Fold 2002; Jacobeit 1991: p. 223; Kraus 1991: p. 19). When the government was unable to secure alternative sources for finance it accepted World Bank and IMF support. As a result, resources available were tightly connected with international agendas.

However, the implementation record of international agreements appears to fit the PNDC's goals of improving cocoa production, reforming the relationship between the government and rural communities, and reducing the cost of operating the GCMB. By 1988 the government had achieved its cocoa production goal of 300,000 tons per annum and global cocoa prices were in decline. From this point onwards the political economy of further cocoa reforms appears to have reduced incentives for fully implementing internationally promoted policies. Global cocoa prices declined and the government continued to implement some of the already agreed policies, but not fully. Then, from 1993 to 1995, the government appears to have circumvented several key internationally promoted policies, such as the full liberalization of cocoa marketing and input supply (World Bank 1997b: p. 11). It appears that even though the GCMB was transformed into a leaner more efficient COCOBOD, many aspects of the cocoa governance system remained unchanged. By 1995, the government still controlled external marketing, producer prices, and research.

Cocoa policies implemented only partially aligned with international actors in terms of the knowledge (e.g. theory and expertise) underpinning major changes. Between 1983 and 1993, the government committed to more structural adjustment policy goals than were actually achieved. The government did restructure the GCMB into COCOBOD and reduced the cost of operation. However, government support to cocoa production and marketing activities never fully terminated, despite significant pressure from international donors to do so. When COCOBOD was able to access finance from sources other than donors the government increasingly circumvented, rather than implemented, commitments made. By the end of structural adjustment policies in Ghana still *upheld a strong role for the state* in the cocoa sector.

The manner in which cocoa policy processes were affected by international actors, most prominently the World Bank, suggests that many observed changes were driven by international *agendas*. The venues used to select cocoa policies were also increasingly international (e.g. global conferences), especially between 1983 and 1993. These observations oversimplify the way changes occurred in the cocoa policy processes. National actors and institutions continued to play important roles in shaping which donor-promoted policies were actually *implemented*. Also, some of the biggest changes to the policy process appear to be the increasing importance that MFEP oversight played in COCOBOD as compared to the GCMB, and the increased involvement of international consultants, which provided evidence for *policy options* and supported *implementation.* Finally, as a result of donor-promoted reforms and significant restructuring, COCOBOD witnessed a dramatic increase in its capacity to effectively manage finance. There is little doubt that this improved management capacity became an important factor in its ability to secure private financial support from 1993 onwards.

Overall, fundamental changes are apparent in policy goals and resources, institutions, and knowledge used to achieve them, as well as the policy processes and the political economy for cocoa in Ghana between 1983 and 1995. To suggest that these changes were solely due to the involvement of international actors oversimplifies the process observed. International actors provided resources, knowledge, and other assistance to restructure institutions and achieve specific policy goals, but political elites and national government bureaucrats determined how policies were implemented. International actors inspired changes in cocoa policy and government institutions, but the outcome was a stronger and more independent government able to better resist donor pressure. Finally, the political economy of cocoa and the pressure on the government to access finance underpinned decisions to support or contest international policy agendas. In conclusion, international donors did influence policy changes observed, but in clearly Ghanaian ways.

Chapter 4. Rice Policy during Structural Adjustment (1983-1995)

Rice is a traditional, native food crop for many communities in Ghana, primarily in northern regions. However, because rice is locally produced and consumed it has posed challenges for governments interested in industrialising the sector. Until the 1980s, the government supported rice production through a variety of subsidies and other targeted programmes. Then, throughout the 1980s the government cut back on its support to rice as part of cost-cutting and structural adjustment policies. This chapter examines rice policies during structural adjustment to understand how international actors influenced observed changes.

4.1. Rice policy in the run-up to 1983

Although Ghana experienced repeated government changes after independence, rice policy remained focused on import substitution and state-sponsored modernisation up until structural adjustment in 1983, as discussed in Chapter 1. In the period between independence and structural adjustment key relationships between Ghana's rice farmers and the government also remained similar despite rhetorical juxtapositions between Nkrumah's (e.g. socialist or more often statist policies) and Busia's (e.g. market-oriented) ideological approaches to governance (Amanor 2010: p6; Okoso-Amaa 1975: p2; Van Hear 1984: p45).

In addition to trade-offs between the agenda to achieve food self-sufficiency and the demand for labour, international relations played a key role in shaping Ghana's rice policy decisions. In the 1950s and 1960s, Nkrumah and like-minded African leaders made efforts to establish economic and political unions between nation states, a movement known as Pan-Africanism (Ojo 1980). Although early attempts at integration were not always successful, they initiated a process that led to the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 (United Nations 1976). ECOWAS also became a venue for dealing with agricultural development and food security issues, and in 2003 it was given an implementing role within CAADP.

At the same time that Pan-Africanism facilitated discussions about agriculture and food security issues, a series of international efforts were made in the 1970s to improve agricultural productivity and food security as part of the “Green Revolution” (Wade 1975). Starting in 1943, the Rockefeller Foundation and Mexican government successfully increased wheat and maize production by developing new high-yield varieties (ibid). Success in Mexico encouraged other donors to establish a global network of International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs). In 1971, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) was created as a platform for funding and setting research agendas for IARCs (Evenson 2005; Wade 1975). Faced with the increasing need for rice importation, the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA) was established as an IARC in 1971 to “conduct trials of rice varieties with the aim of raising production and reaching self-sufficiency” (Wade 1975: p. 587; Walsh 1988). The assumption that food security and self-sufficiency could be achieved by using technology to increase yields continued to underline many rice development efforts in Ghana during and after structural adjustment.

In light of Ghana’s history, the period of structural adjustment between 1983 and 1995 is unique because it marked a shift in rice policy away from state-led modernisation towards more market-friendly development approaches. However, after 1995, Ghana experienced a period of dramatic decrease in domestic rice production and increase in the level of food importation. Kofi Dartey, a Government rice researcher stated "I believe if we used just 1% of what we spend in a year on importing rice to build up our own rice industry we could be self-sufficient" (Ross 2008). Ghana’s inability to maintain domestic rice production at a level that meets domestic demand can be linked to both the political economy of rice land and labour, and the influence of international actors on policy changes.

In the period leading up to structural adjustment, the Ghanaian government directly supported rice production through guaranteed minimum prices, subsidised inputs, and state-controlled marketing (Okoso-Amaa 1975: p.1 ; Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 16; Van Hear 1984: p. 45). The producer incentives promoted by Acheampong, Akuffo, and Limann Governments were linked to forms of corruption and inequality that motivated Rawlings-led coups in 1979 and 1981 (Ahiakpor 1991: p. 586; Herbst 1993: p. 26). Thus, following the overthrow of the Limann Government, Rawlings set about establishing a rice policy regime that he claimed would promote the interest of farmers. However, as noted by Gibbon (1992), structural adjustment efforts to remove corrupt state institutions were never accompanied by effective policies to address poverty and increase food security.

Several international development projects were already promoting rice production in Ghana prior to 1983. The Upper Region Agricultural Development Programme (URADEP), funded by the World Bank, was launched in 1976 and finished in 1984 (World Bank 1987c). Under the URADEP, "70% of gross benefits were expected to stem from increased production of cotton and rice", primarily through improved seeds and technology (ibid: ix). In 1977, USAID implemented its Managed Inputs Delivery and Agricultural Services (MIDAS, followed by MIDAS II) projects, which focused on improving smallholder farmer access to inputs, seed, and research (Essuman-Johnson 1991). However, as shown by Konings (1981: p. 36), such projects did little more than further aggravate smallholder rice farmers who had already grown tired of being manipulated by state-sponsored commercial farming activities.

The Volta Regional Agricultural Development programme (VORADEP) was modelled on the failed URADEP, and implemented by the World Bank International Development Association (IDA) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) between 1980 and 1988 (IFAD 2002). VORADEP had supposedly "learned" from URADEP and promoted changes that resulted in a 160% increase in the yield of highland rice (Dadson 1990: pp. 19-20). Likewise, the Canadian funded Northern Regional Rural Integrated Project (NORRIP) was initiated in 1980 to increase the administrative capacity of the regional ministry offices and to promote development in Ghana's primary rice growing region. Despite Rawlings implementation of new structural adjustment policies after 1983, these international development projects continued unhindered (Gibbon et al. 1993; Herbst 1993).

However, between 1983 and 1995, Ghana did experience fundamental changes in the government's policy goals as well as in the relationship between the state and rice farmers. Prior to 1983, the Government supported large-scale commercial rice production through a network of public institutions. Rice seed was provided by the state owned Ghana Seed Company. The Farmer Service's Company (FASCOM) directly supported rice production with inputs. Rice marketing was supported by the state owned Ghana Grain Marketing Corporation, Ghana Rice Company, Ghana Grains Board and the Ghana Food Distribution Company. Rice research was carried out through the government run Crops Research Institute, Savannah Agricultural Research Institute, and Soils Research Institute, as well as at many public universities. Overall, rice production was also supported by government-regulated prices, subsidised bank finance, and subsidised inputs such as seed and fertilizers. The beneficiaries of this large state-supported industry were primarily Ghana's political and economic elite, often originating from southern regions (Konings 1981; Van Hear 1984). But, between 1983 and 1995, both the forms of government support and the type of farmers supported changed dramatically.

4.2. Rice policies and projects implemented (1983-1995)

During structural adjustment, major economic policy changes were made to reduce the cost of government operations and to improve Ghana's balance of payments. Apart from cocoa, domestic agricultural production did not receive coherent policy attention in the early years of structural adjustment (Brooks et al. 2009: p. 423). However, the World Bank and IMF pushed to reduce government spending directly affected commercial rice production. As shown in Table 4.1, policy changes align with the underlying phases of crisis recovery and political consolidation that influenced nearly all PNDC decisions.

Table 4.1 Major rice policy changes 1983 – 1995

Year	Policy Change
1982 – 1985 Crisis Management	Between 1982 and 1983, Government increased the minimum support price for rice to 13,000 cedi per ton and maintained existing institutions.
	In 1983, Government launched its Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) with the support of the IMF and World Bank. Government established the Committee for the Pricing of Agricultural Produce
	Between 1983 and 1984, PNDC implemented ad-hoc programmes to mobilize resources (human and other) to increase the production of the major staples – including rice. Ministries were forced to close before 5 p.m. to enable staff to attend farms.
1985 – 1992 Political Support Building	Between 1984 and 1986, the PNDC government ended subsidisation of bank financing for rice, and launched its first Agricultural Policy - Action Plans and Strategies – which sought to achieve between 50% and 80% self-sufficiency in rice production.
	In 1985, the PNDC abolished the Pricing Committee and allowed markets to determine prices.
	In 1986, the PNDC implemented the Ghana Agricultural Policy (GAP), which focused on support improving research, extension, and irrigation, and policy planning, monitoring, evaluation.
	Between 1987 and 1991, the PNDC accepted a series of donor-funded projects which supported the GAP: World Bank's ASRP and NARP; USAID's APPP; IFAD's SRDP, etc. In 1987, the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation was restructured to distribute food aid, and the Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was implemented. In 1990, the Government elaborated and adopted the Medium Term Agricultural Development Strategy and Programme (MTADP). In 1991 the National Agricultural Research Project (NARP) was launched.
1992 – 1995 Post-Election Support Strengthening	In 1992, the Guaranteed minimum price (GMP) for rice was abolished. That same year the PNDC accepted the terms and conditions of the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (AgSAC), and Ghana transitioned back to Democracy.
	In 1994, Ghana signed the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA)

As shown in the table above, a combination of drought and economic crisis made food security an immediate concern for the new PNDC government. Between 1982 and 1983, the government increased the guaranteed minimum price for rice to 13,000 cedi in an attempt to encourage production (Ayee 1994: p. 106; World Bank 1984a: p. 39). The combination of offering subsidised bank credit and guaranteed minimum prices had been a potent policy approach for increasing commercial rice production throughout the 1970s. Even though Rawlings promised to change the relationship between the state and farmers, the increase of producer price using existing state institutions fit immediate food security goals and budget constraints at the time. Institutions such as the Ghana Rice Company and Ghana Food Distribution Company (GFDC) also made it relatively easy to adjust formal producer prices.

Increasing the producer price for rice was one of many ad-hoc policies intended to address food shortages. Rawlings ‘decreed’ that all villages should establish a community managed farm of 25 acres, and each district was to establish at least five demonstrations farms of 160 acres (Anyimadu 1993: p. 63). Community farms were managed by Committees for the Defence of the Revolution and directed to market produce through community shops supported by rural or farm service centres (Anyimadu 1993; E. Hansen 1989: p. 216). Members of People's Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers Defence Committees (WDCs), also referred to as “agents of the revolution”, were further encouraged to develop localised agricultural development programs (Anyimadu 1993: p. 63; Dapaah 1995: p. 12; E. Hansen 1989: p. 216; Hutchful 2002: p. 71). As a result of efforts made, the National Mobilisation Programme (NMP) eventually recorded 2000 farms, although observers claim that many were token farms, rather than actual functional farms.

The nature of the “ad-hoc” policies for rice implemented by the PNDC supports observations that the government at least considered “Marxist” or “Leninist” policy options, albeit possibly just to appease supporters (Ahiakpor 1991: p. 588; Toye 1991). Many early government initiatives were locally selected and implemented, harnessing communal efforts toward increasing agricultural production and food security (Anyimadu 1993: p. 63; Dapaah 1995: p. 12; Hutchful 2002: p. 71). Policies establishing “community farms” and “farm service centres” appear to be based on the idea of popular, as opposed to state, managed production (Anyimadu 1993: p. 63; E. Hansen 1989: p. 216).

By increasing the minimum price for rice, the PNDC was also using economic incentives instead of state control to increase production (Ahiakpor 1991: p. 586). Price control had been used as a means of influencing rice production since at least 1971 (Ansa-Asare 1985; Goody 1980: p. 138). Rawlings' and the PNDC had openly resented Acheampong's use of government-controlled rice prices to create opportunities for Ghana's economic elite in the 1970s (Ahiakpor 1991: p. 587). It may therefore seem surprising that the PNDC continued using these same policies, despite its revolutionary agenda. However, it is most likely that the PNDC simply used the observed combination of populist, statist and market-based policies because they could be implemented using existing resources and institutions.

Despite efforts to overcome the crisis, severe drought led to further economic collapse and the PNDC was forced to launch the IMF and World Bank sponsored ERP in 1983. In a sign of government solidarity with those affected by the food crisis, Ministries were closed at 5 p.m. to enable staff to attend to their own farms. The decision to have Ministry employees engage in their own food production supported the PNDC image of a populist regime (Dapaah 1995: p. 12). However, new sources of support came with significant pressure to reduce state spending and liberalise agricultural markets. In addition to new policies reducing incentives for banks to lend to rice farmers, rice had become risky because of poor loan repayment during the crisis (Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 9).

Faced with few other options, the PNDC requested additional support from the World Bank to finance agriculture revitalisation efforts. The World Bank's concerns over Ghana's rice production was made explicit in a 1984 report (World Bank 1984a: p. 39):

> The prices of major agricultural commodities in Ghana have deviated substantially from the levels that provide adequate incentives to the producers. To correct this distortion and stimulate the production of export and food crops, the Government has increased the... minimum support price for maize and rice maize to 05,000 per ton and 013,000 per ton respectively...An issue that needs to be examined is how much land and labor should be allocated to rice and maize production in Ghana.

The above statement shows how concerns about the link between food production and labour supply, which are very similar to those faced by the colonial government in 1936, re-emerge in World Bank agendas in 1984 (H.M. 1936; Mellor and Johnston 1984; World Bank 1984a). As indicated, the World Bank intended to "correct" a "distortion" by increasing the minimum price for rice. The concept of a market distortion is grounded in a neoclassical understanding of market economies, but the idea of correcting distortions through government-controlled prices reflects a continued need for *state control* over prices. Also, the fact that "market prices" were already above "controlled" prices raises questions about the effectiveness of government price controls and the extent to which low prices were actually hindering production (World Bank 1984a: p. 39). Both high market prices and low production levels for rice were connected to the overall crisis situation (e.g. political, economic and physical), but World Bank rationale focused solely on price differences, a practice common during structural adjustment (Commander 1989; Kahler 1990).

The World Bank provided a Reconstruction Import Credit to finance imports needed for economic rehabilitation and improving transportation. The Import Credit specifically targeted "maize and rice growing areas of the country, in accordance with the priority given to these two staple crops" (World Bank 1983b: p. 25). The Import Credit specifically supported the importation of fertilizers and chemicals, which "would be distributed through the existing retail outlets of such chemical companies as Bayer, ICI, Shell, etc."(ibid). By explicitly connecting support to multinational chemical companies, the structural adjustment policies promoted the private sector development as both a goal and means for increasing agricultural production.

Immediately after receiving the Import Credit, the PNDC government developed its first Ghana Agricultural Policy, Action Plans, and Strategies for the period 1984 to 1986. The Policy set goals for achieving 100% national self-sufficiency in food production, including 60% self-sufficiency in rice (DFID 1999: p. 6; E. Hansen 1989: p. 215; Kofi 1994: p. 10). The Action Plans focused on harnessing opportunities presented by adjusting exchange rates and providing better extension services. The liberalisation of input and output markets was initiated to bring domestic prices closer to world prices. The implementation of the PNDC's Action Plans was immediately followed by a period of increased rice production, largely due to improved weather conditions.

Although the policy goal remained increasing rice production, the means for achieving this goal was increasingly dependent on donor support. After 1984, the PNDC no longer relied on communal farming or government price controls. Instead, the government began to rely on the promise of private sector activity (E. Hansen 1989: 215). Policies after 1985 continued to promote the government's populist image, but without reference to Marxist or socialist theories for achieving policy goals (Ahiakpor 1991: pp. 598-99). Instead, policies increasingly focused on more neoliberal agendas such as removing *state interference* in markets for rice inputs and output.

A policy that clearly aligned with neoliberal agendas was the decision to end government-backed bank subsidies for rice producers (Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 9). This decision was made in response to conditions placed on IMF and World Bank financing to increase fiscal control and reduce the government's budget deficit. This shift was seen by some within the PNDC as a betrayal of previously professed philosophical standings (Hutchful 2002: p. 40). The fact that this primarily occurred after 1985 has also been linked to internal restructuring of the PNDC government and the exit of key Marxist-Leninist factions within Rawlings' revolutionary coalition (Whitfield 2011b: p. 14).

Others point out that Rawlings may have never held any real ideological commitments and was always focused on addressing the issues at hand by using any means possible (Ahiakpor 1991: p. 590). The view that Rawlings and the PNDC were acting more pragmatically than ideologically is supported by the type of donor-promoted policies implemented (Toye 1991: p. 155). The decision to end bank subsidies for rice negatively affected PNDC's opposition more than its supporters. Because smallholder farmers and communal farms were less affected by reduced access to bank loans, the policy did not directly contradict PNDC interests. It did, however, signal a further shift towards using *markets, instead of the state*, to incentivise rice production. It also signalled a more fundamental shift in government strategy from relying on its own resources and institutions to looking to international actors for development assistance.

PNDC efforts to overcome economic crisis did not benefit all Ghanaians equally. The collapse of domestic food production and the devaluation of the cedi led to food price inflation (Kraus 1991: p. 34; Reuter 1983). Ghanaians who were unable to produce their own food had to face a combination of increasing food costs and decreasing wages, a situation that significantly reduced popularity of the PNDC amongst those affected. After several coup attempts, the PNDC government focused on centralising control and rebuilding support. As a result, from 1985 onwards the PNDC became increasingly concerned with maintaining its newly acquired international financial support while simultaneously bolstering local political support (Whitfield 2011b).

A government review of the first phase of the ERP in 1985 and the World Bank's Agricultural Sector Review both encouraged the government to shift focus away from macro-economic stability and toward sector-specific concerns (Anyimadu 1993: p. 63; Dapaah 1995: p. 13; World Bank 1992). In 1986, the PNDC held national debates to inform its agricultural policy. The decision to hold debates shows at least some interest in building popular support, whether or not the debates actually impacted which policy goals were selected. The Ghana Agricultural Policy (GAP 1986) became the first comprehensive sector policy implemented by the PNDC government.

The GAP focused on improving public institutions and stabilising prices (Anyimadu 1993: p. 63; Brooks et al. 2007: p. 13; Dapaah 1995: p. 13). And achieving national self-sufficiency in rice was identified by the GAP as a priority (Ackah and Appleton 2007: p. 5; Brooks et al. 2007: p. 13). To achieve its goal, the GAP aimed to strengthen government capacity in research, extension, planning, monitoring, evaluation, and coordination of agricultural development assistance as well as to improve irrigation (Anyimadu 1993: p. 63; Dapaah 1995: p. 13; Sarris and Shams 1991: p. 14). While trying to increase private sector opportunities for investing in agricultural production, the GAP also focused on ensuring that adequate 'buffer stocks' were available to stabilise prices and ensure food security. The fact that the government promoted buffer stocks as a means for controlling prices indicates efforts to *maintain some state* control over the sector.

In 1987, the PNDC government announced further plans for increasing rice production. Adam Kaleem, Under-Secretary of Agriculture responsible for the Northern Region, announced plans for a 5.4% increase in the land area promoted for rice cultivation and new efforts to provide fertilizer, seed, and tractors (Xinhua 1987). In addition, a series of donor-funded projects and programmes were launched. The UNFAO provided experts to install a "highly-sophisticated" rice mill in Tamale. The World Bank IDA, German KFW, and the African Development Bank (AfDB) jointly initiated an Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Project (ASRP 1987-1994). The ASRP[10] was designed to strengthen government capacity for policy formulation, support privatization, improve research and extension, and fund studies that would support a Medium-to-long-Term Agricultural Development Strategy (Anyimadu 1993: p. 65; Dapaah 1995: p. 13; World Bank 1995b: pp. 1-2). As such, the ASRP not only provided the financial means for implementing the GAP, but also guided the development of subsequent agricultural policies and strategies.

Regarding rice research, the ASRP supported the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and Crops Research Institute (CRI) to develop rain-water harvesting (World Bank 1995b: p. 2). The research was connected to irrigation support initiatives and the disagreement between the Ghana Irrigation Development Authority (GIDA) and the CRI concerning which institutions

[10] 1987 ASRP focused on: 1) Strengthening the Government capacity for policy formulation, planning, monitoring and evaluation; 1) Implementing policy reforms focused on privatization; 3) Improving support for research, irrigation (e.g. the Irrigation Development Authority) and extension; and 4) Undertaking studies to support the development of a Medium-to-long-Term Agricultural Development Strategy (MTADS).

were ultimately responsible for trials resulted in a two-year delay. When research finally began, it focused on “agronomic practices for small farmer rice production” and assessed the “commercial viability of the responsive production operations” (World Bank 1995b: p. 5). The focus on ‘small farmer’ production was a big shift from the 1970s when large commercial farms were prioritised. Despite delays, rice research projects were considered an ASRP success because rice yields increased “from about 0.9 t/ha to about 2 t/ha; with break-even yield estimated at about 1.5 t/ha” (World Bank 1995b: p. iv). The ASRP report highlights how policy goals increasingly focused on productivity and the “realistic” costs associated with achieving “break-even” yields, at which point investment in productivity would become profitable (ibid).

The focus of donors and the government on research and irrigation fit well with more liberal economic theory regarding the state provision of ‘public’ goods. The agricultural policies and projects implemented after 1987 show continued commitment to technology-based solutions for rice development (e.g. the National Agricultural Research Programme) and government support of private production, an agenda carried forward from the Green Revolution (Conway and Barbier 1988). Even though the ASRP was a development “project”, it had a very clear links to the overall restructuring of government institutions (Dapaah 1995: p. 13; World Bank 1995b: pp. 1-2). The ASRP supported the government in the implementation of many public sector reforms laid out in the GAP, and thus donor projects were used to guide the *reform of government institutions*.

The ASRP opened the door for an increase in similar donor projects, enabling the continuation of foreign participation in Ghana’s rice policies and research. The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Agricultural Productivity Promotion Programme (APPP) was a “tail” onto the World Bank’s ASRP project (Weissman 1990: p. 1626). The APPP supported agricultural extension by providing training, equipment, and feeder road projects, and by promoting the development of Ghana’s seed industry (Anyimadu 1993: p. 67; Weissman 1990: p. 1626). Likewise, the International Fund for Agricultural Development’s (IFAD) Small-Holder

Rehabilitation and Development Programme (SRDP 1986) focused on providing smallholder farmers with inputs such as fertilizer (Anyimadu 1993: p. 67; IFAD 2002). Additional donor support increased the finance available for rice policies, but at the cost of accommodating donor development goals.

Donor projects that supported smallholder farmers in grain producing regions also aligned with PNDC's political interests. These were the same regions where the government benefitted from support, as opposed to cocoa regions where the government was less popular. Projects such as SRDP assisted smallholder farmers who had lost access to state support and agricultural inputs. In this way, the SRDP appears to have filled part of the growing void left by government restructuring. These donor projects also corresponded to growing international concern for the "human face" of structural adjustment (Cornia et al. 1987).

Donors' encouragement to further liberalise agricultural services and markets led to the divestiture of many state owned enterprises and the restructuring of the GFDC in 1987. The GFDC was originally established in 1971 as a key marketing institution, and it was charged with distributing maize, rice, and other grains throughout Ghana. A key function of the GFDC was to provide a last-resort market by purchasing rice at the guaranteed minimum price. However, when the GFDC was disbanded in 1987, its significance to the sector was already questionable given that it purchased, on average, less than 5% of rice produced in the country (Brooks et al. 2007: p. 13). The decision to dissolve the GFDC firmly aligned with economic theory that private markets, not government purchasing, should underpin prices (Brooks et al. 2007: p. 13).

The large-scale layoff of public sector employees during structural adjustment had a dramatic impact on livelihoods. As a result, in 1987, the PNDC government launched the aforementioned PAMSCAD to address the social consequences of structural adjustment (Anyimadu 1993: p. 68; Weissman 1990: p. 1627; World Bank 1992: p. XIV). PAMSCAD included twenty-three projects, two of which were intended to directly support agriculture. Although the PAMSCAD was not specifically focused on rice, it did provide a "stop-gap" measure to assist any former government employees who became rice farmers (Anyimadu 1993: p. 68). PAMSCAD was aligned with a growing international agenda that upheld a role for governments (and donors) in supporting people negatively affected by structural adjustment, including rice farmers (Kahler 1990: p. 50). PAMSCAD also fit the political economy for rice at the time by promoting an image of government concern for inflation and food prices (Asiedu-Saforo 1989: p. 369). As such, it became one of several growing efforts to enhance the PNDC's image as a government concerned with the welfare of Ghanaians at a time when elections were clearly on the horizon.

A Medium Term Agricultural Development Strategy and Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme (MTADP) were both developed using knowledge gained from the ASRP's "pilot programs, studies, sectoral and sub-sectoral plans and preparatory activities" (World Bank 1995b: p. 9). The decision to base policies on evidence generated through donor-funded pilot projects no doubt increased the likelihood that the knowledge used fit donor promoted theories and agendas. In this manner, the MTADP tried to remove any notion of separation between donor and government agendas.

The MTADP[11] was designed to guide agricultural investments, and promote the private sector as the source of economic development (Dapaah 1995: p. 14; Khor and Hormeku 2006: p5). To accomplish this, the MTADP encouraged the government to further divest state-owned enterprise and stressed the "importance of economising resource use and in mobilising also private initiatives for development breakthroughs" (World Bank 2000: p. 3). Only the Ghana Grain Marketing Corporation was retained to manage food aid, while private-sector "breakthroughs" were yet to be

[11] The MTADP focused on: 1) input trade liberalization (e.g. fertilizer, seed, etc.); 2) the full divestiture of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and reduction in government spending; 3) investment in extension and research; 4) government capacity building; 5) rural infrastructure development; 6) environmental management; and 7) increased private sector participation.

realised. The decision to divest state institutions that historically promoted the interest of elite rice farmers in the north and to promote development projects that focussed on smallholder farmers supported the PNDC government in its efforts to build-up popular support.

The MTADS and MTADP did not diverge significantly from the GAP and ASRP (Dapaah 1995: p. 14; Khor and Hormeku 2006: p. 5; World Bank 1995b: p. 9). All of these initiatives upheld the same basic assumptions, that: 1) international-actor promoted evidence can be successfully translated into domestic policies; 2) liberalising rice trade, marketing, and input supply would increase private sector participation and facilitate development; 3) government support should focus on research and extension and not manage production or distort markets; and 4) donor investments should be coordinated by the government, as opposed to being designed by or selected by the government (Dapaah 1995: p. 14; Hutchful 2002: p. 72; Khor and Hormeku 2006; World Bank 2000: p. 2).

The idea that state involvement in production and trade was detrimental to private sector development, that government spending needed to be reduced, and that free trade was necessary, were all pillars of structural adjustment and the ‘neo-orthodox’ agenda at the time (Callaghy 1990). The only policy which seemed to contradict the belief that the state should not manage marketing was the decision to keep the Ghana Grain Marketing Corporation as a distributor of food aid (Anyimadu 1993: p. 69). This decision may have come from the recognition that at a time when private sector development was nascent, the removal of all state distribution institutions would make it difficult to ensure access to food. The need for food aid also became a growing concern for the government, as private sector led production was not increasing fast enough to keep up with demand.

In line with efforts to improve agricultural research and access to technology, the World Bank and British ODA approved a National Agricultural Research Project (NARP) in 1991 (World Bank

1991). The NARP focused on improving Ghana's national agricultural research system (NARS) by developing management capacity, human resources, and facilities, as well as a National Agricultural Research Plan (GH26). However, the World Bank would later note that a fundamental flaw was the NARP's focus on the "maximization of returns to land, rather than on maximization of returns to labor or capital"(World Bank 2001: p. 23). This flaw was actually quite large, as land is readily available in Ghana, and labour and capital much more binding constraints. This flaw is also linked to the larger assumption that development approaches which focus on yield-increases, successful in Mexico and the Philippines, can simply be replicated in West Africa (Wade 1975; Walsh 1988). The NARP was also used by the government to establish Research Extension Liaison Committees (RELCs), which were venues where extension could provide feedback to researchers regarding farmers' needs. However, as noted by the World Bank "[RELCs] effectiveness was somewhat limited by the fact that nearly all available research funds were already allocated, so that were limited resources to initiate new priorities" (World Bank 2001: p. 22). This raises serious questions about the knowledge created and used, as donor funded research agendas increasingly informed both agricultural development projects and policies.

In 1991, the government ended the Guaranteed Minimum Price for rice (Brooks et al. 2007: p. 13; ISSER 2008: p. 8; Nyanteng and Seini 2003: p. 3; Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 9). The decision to abolish the guaranteed price for rice in 1991 was aligned with liberal economic theory that prices should correspond to a relationship between supply and demand (e.g. market driven). However, since most state purchasing institutions had already been dissolved, including the Agricultural Commodity Pricing Committee in 1985, this change probably had little real impact on the market for rice, which was more often set by informal not formal prices (Ewusi 1985).

A much bigger change came when the government initiated the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Programme (ASAP 1991-2000) and accepted the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (AgSAC). The World Bank-supported ASAP attempted to build on the 'comprehensive approach' envisioned by the MTADP and to remove any remaining state institutions preventing private sector involvement in rice (Hutchful 2002: pp. 72-73). To support this process, the AgSAC included many conditions designed to further implement efforts made to adjust the relationship between the government and private sector[12]. TechnoServe, a US based development consultancy, was hired to assist the private sector to acquire any remaining Farmer Service's Company (FASCOM) assets (Kapila and Mead 2002: p. 98). However, instead of complying with donor demands, the government and Ghana Ecumenical Church Loan Fund (ECLOF) supported the transfer of FASCOM assets to the Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen (GNAFF) (World Bank 1997a: p. 6). These actions highlight the increasing influence of NGOs and faith-based organisations that accompanied state divestiture.

When Ghana returned to democracy in 1992, Rawlings and the NDC won elections with support from the rural poor, including farmers in rice growing regions. In this manner, efforts made to establish the PNDC as a pro-farmer government appear to have paid off. After elections, many of the same policy approaches used during structural adjustment continued to be used, with new efforts to support commercial rice production visible after Ghana joined the World Trade Organization in 1994 (WTO 1994). The decision to sign the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and the associated Agreement on Agriculture (a.k.a. URAA) was coherent with the government's new liberal economic policies and the theory that free trade would support national economic development.

In 1994, the government also established the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre and began actively promoting Ghana as an attractive investment opportunity (Government of Ghana 1994). After a global tour promoting Ghana, the NDC government launched a public-private commercial rice partnership in the Volta Region. Following a corruption scandal involving the U.S. based

---

[12] The AgSAC required Ghana to: 1) stop providing a guaranteed minimum price for rice; 2) close down the GFDC's "uneconomical" rice mills; and 3) begin the divestiture of the Farmer Service's Company (FASCOM).

Quality Grains Co. Inc., the rice project eventually became commercially viable in 2009 (Afreh 2003). In this way, by 1995 the role of the government had become squarely focused on supporting rice research, extensions, infrastructure, and private-sector investment, which was a change from the state-controlled production of the 1960s and 1970s. However, the fact that the government continued supporting farmers associations and commercial producers means that the state was still clearly involved in many aspects of rice farming, albeit using alternative policy means.

Overall, between 1983 and 1995, the PNDC government heavily relied on international resources and knowledge to design and implement rice policies. Observed policies strongly aligned with Ghana’s structural adjustment programme and associated liberal economic theories. International agendas to *minimise government involvement* in rice production and related markets underpinned most policies during this period. To those supporters who believed Rawlings and the PNDC were establishing a populist, socialist, or communist regime these changes may have been surprising. However, for observers who take into consideration the economic circumstances encountered and policy means available, the changes appear pragmatic (P. Gibbon et al. 1993; Toye 1991; Whitfield 2011b). Later concerns over social welfare and livelihoods also led donors to fund many new development projects in Ghana. Although no single international actor or agenda dominated policy decisions between 1983 and 1995, the World Bank and IMF had significantly more influence than others.

4.3. Rice policy process (1983-1995)

This section examines the extent to which rice policy goals and the resources used to achieve them were accompanied by alterations in the policy process (e.g. *identifying policy problems, establishing agendas, selecting policy options, making policy decisions, mobilising resources, implementing policies, and evaluating policy outcomes*). When Rawlings and the PNDC took office, the policy process was transformed immediately. Rawlings declared that he wanted to create a "government of the people, by the people, and for the people" (Folson 1993: p. 79). To do so, parliamentary politics were abolished and new 'revolutionary' institutions were established for the purpose of *establishing policy agendas* and *implementing* policies.

Between 1981 and 1983, the policy process for rice in Ghana became dominated by national and local institutions, with international influence primarily coming from on-going negotiations for obtaining financial support from Libya, the USSR, and World Bank/IMF (Ayee 1994: p. 39; Boafo-Arthur 1989: p. 138; Hutchful 2002: p. 36). The first institution established to assist in policy making was the National Economic Review Committee, which was composed of a diverse group of 'technocrats' and 'left' minded ministers and academics who struggled to agree on any policy approaches (Ayee 1994: p. 37). Despite a lack of consensus, the PNDC and some of Rawlings' key military supporters directed the process of establishing agendas. The PNDC *selected* many populist policies supported by the June Fourth Movement, Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards, New Democratic Movement, African Youth Command and National Youth Organizing Commission (Agyeman-Duah 1987: p. 619; Ayee 1994: p. 106; Gyimah-Boadi and Essuman-Johnson 1993: p. 196).

Regarding *resource mobilisation* and *policy implementation,* the government initially relied on 'grassroots committees' and decentralised administration. The new system of governance was supported by a network of PDCs, located in all districts and regions, and WDC in every work place (Agyeman-Duah 1987: pp. 618-20; Ayee 1994: p. 107; Gyimah-Boadi and Essuman-Johnson 1993: p. 197). The PDCs and WDCs were given significant freedom to make policy decisions at local levels, mobilising resources by evacuating agricultural produce (e.g. cocoa) and forcefully overtaking businesses and markets (Ahiakpor 1991: p. 589). The PDCs and WDCs were linked to the central government through an Interim National Coordinating Committee (INCC), later renamed as the National Defence Committee. In some circumstances, policy implementation was also aided by the National Investigation Committee (NIC) and Citizens Vetting Committee

(CVC). Finally, in what was called a ‘dual power’ approach to governance, all of the newly created institutions operated in parallel to the existing governance institutions, such the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP), Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology (MIST) which continued to play a role in rice policy *implementation* (Hutchful 2002: p. 41).

On October 20, 1982, Secretary of Finance, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, openly declared that negotiations had begun with the IMF to secure economic support, although negotiations had actually started much earlier (Ayee 1994: p. 38; Folson 1993: p. 84). The negotiations marked a point at which the government began to rethink its populist uprising and the institutions that had been created by generations of rent-seeking governments (Ahiakpor 1991: p. 590; Ayee 1994: p. 108; Folson 1993: pp. 82-85). When the government developed the ERP, it initiated a larger process that would adjust the rice governance system. As set out by the World Bank in 1984, “careful sequencing and phasing of the adjustment process is essential in the case of Ghana, and the process of adjustment should entail three phases: (a) stabilization phase; (b) rehabilitation phase; and (c) liberalization and growth phase” (World Bank 1984a: p. Xvii). However, the initial ‘phase’ of ‘stabilization’ focused heavily on macro-economic policies and left room for rice policy options that did not adhere to World Bank or IMF thinking, at least before 1985. This freedom is apparent in the ‘crash’ or ‘ad-hoc’ rice policies which were implemented at the time, and which primarily relied on populist support (Anyimadu 1993: p. 63; Dapaah 1995: p. 12; E. Hansen 1989: p. 216; Hutchful 2002: p. 71). As such, although the IMF and World Bank were influencing *agendas,* rice policy *selection* and *implementation* was initially still under national and local government control.

The acceptance of the terms connected to the ERP created many divisions in the newly established governance system. Up until 1984, the PDCs and WDCs played a role alongside the MOFA, MOFED, and MEST, in *selecting policy options* and *implementing policies.* In response to the growing divisions within the ‘dual power’ system, Rawlings declared that a lack of “central authority” had caused “confusion and frustration” (Hutchful 2002: p. 41). In order to rectify the situation, PDCs and WDCs were re-designated as Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) and their powers were reduced (Agyeman-Duah 1987: pp. 621-22; Ho-Won 1995: p. 96; Hutchful 2002: pp. 41-42). The restructuring of the governance system reduced revolutionary institutions to bureaucracies that *implemented* policies, and created space for international actors in setting *policy agendas, selecting options,* and the *mobilisation of resources.*

The shift in policies away from a more decentralised, ‘populist’ approach is clear in the design and implementation of the Ghana Agricultural Policy (GAP 1986-88) and connected Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Project (ASRP), both funded by the World Bank IDA. The GAP 1986 and ASRP were closely aligned with each other in objectives and underlying philosophies, which already signified an increasingly close connection between the World Bank and government policy. In addition, the ASRP set out specific objectives that coincided with the ‘rehabilitation’ phase of structural adjustment and aimed at strengthening the newly re-centralised governance system.

In the rationale provided by the World Bank for funding the ASRP, it stated that:

> “The proposed project is an integral part of the Bank's portfolio of current operations in support of the Government's ERP. It extends the institutional reforms initiated at the macro-economic level down to the sectoral level (World Bank 1987b: p2).”

To accomplish extending reforms, the World Bank used “Actions Agreed Upon” to try and control the policy process within the agricultural sector:

> “In addition to the usual covenants, the following are key assurances obtained at negotiations: (i) the Government would set interim and long term staffing levels for the PPMED [Policy Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate] by December 31, 1987; the Government would submit to IDA at least three months prior to each fiscal year, the annual budgets and work programs of all MOA implementing units relevant to the project; (iii) the MOA would implement a

> phased program to reduce fertilizer subsidies and to privatize fertilizer handling, so that the subsidy is eliminated for the crop year 1990 by December 31, 1989, and the MOA's role in the import and distribution of fertilizer is terminated in 1991; (iv) the MOA would discontinue its wheeled tractor hire services by the end of 1987, combine harvester services by February 2 8, 1989 and land clearing services by June 30, 1991; and (v) the MOA would complete and have reviewed by IDA and other donors an agricultural research study and master plan by June 30, 1988" (World Bank 1987b: p. 3).

The 'usual covenants' refer to the conditions that the government needed to adhere to in order to receive funding. Conditions were part of every loan and grant provided by the World Bank, and they could be more or less flexible (Toye 1991: p. 170). However, the extent to which conditions were met or allowed to 'slip' appears to be linked to both the government's interests and the evolution of international agendas.

In terms of impact on long-term agricultural policy processes, one of the more important conditions included in the ASRP was the requirement to establish the Policy Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Department within the Ministry of Agriculture. The PPMED was created out of the Economic Research and Planning Services (ERPS) and given the responsibility to:

> "(a) [Develop] sustainable policies, monitor their impact and take the lead in developing a sector investment program including directing donor support; (b) review priorities in MOA's annual public expenditure budget; (c) improve project preparation and monitor implementation; (d) review the impact of tariff changes which will be set following the Trade Taxation and Tariff review scheduled for 1987; and (e) monitor pricing of industrial crops to assess relative incentives and comparative advantage, following a methodology to be agreed with the Bank" (World Bank 1987a: p. 11).

The strengthening of the PPMED helped to further centralise the policy process by providing a core team of technocrats to *select policies*, monitor *implementation*, and *evaluate* policies. The PPMED was also later charged with coordinating donor activities in the sector (GH4 and GH16, 2011). The PPMED, as an institution, established a clear venue for international donors to coordinate, monitor and *evaluate* their agricultural investments in Ghana.

A Project Coordination Unit (PCU) and APCC were intended to support the implementation of the ASRP. The PCU was in charge of administration and accounting during the implementation of the ASRP and other World Bank projects. However, creating a PCU proved to be more complicated than anticipated:

> "The PCU was not sufficiently equipped by the project to discharge its duties, and its records and other important project files need to be computerised, especially if the PCU is to service a number of other IDA-assisted projects as planned" (World Bank 1995b: p. 8).

The PCU was further supported by the APCC, which was established to meet the "the need for better inter-institutional coordination of policy affecting agriculture" (World Bank 1987a: p. 11). Membership of the APCC was determined as follows:

> "Membership will include MOA, the Ministries of Local Government, Finance and Economic Planning, Industry Science and Technology, Trade and Tourism, Transport and Communications, Roads and Highways, Lands and Natural Resources, COCOBOD and the Bank of Ghana. The Committee will be chaired by the MFEP with MOA acting as the secretariat. Assurances were obtained at negotiations that the Committee will be set up by December 31, 1987, will meet at least once a year, that its composition is acceptable to IDA, and that priority areas in its work program for the project years be acceptable to IDA." (World Bank 1987a: p. 11).

As indicated, the APCC was to be composed of government representatives and focus on priority areas that were "acceptable to IDA [World Bank]". Furthermore, the World Bank provided a list of "suggested priority areas" that fit the *policy agenda* promoted (ibid). Very little room remained for the government to manage any part of the agricultural policy process without the approval or involvement of international actors. It is also interesting to note that the Ministry of Finance was to chair the committee, despite the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture was in charge of implementing agricultural policies. Furthermore, the APCC included a sub-committee called the National Agricultural Research Committee (NARC), which was supposed to "rationalize [the] use of resources in agricultural research" (World Bank 1995b: p. iv). In this way, the 1987 ASRP set in motion changes that were carried forward by the National Agriculture Research Project in 1991 (World Bank 1991).

The ASRP also further promoted the importance of technical assistance (TA) in Ghana's agricultural policy processes. As stipulated by the World Bank IDA:

> "PPMED will be supported by a UNDP technical assistance project with IDA providing funds for studies under a cost sharing arrangement...At negotiations, assurances were obtained that (i) technical assistance staff to be appointed to the PPMED should have qualifications, experience and terms and conditions of employment acceptable to Government and IDA; and…The UNDP project in support of PPMED should be signed and TA staff selected is a condition of effectiveness" (World Bank 1987a: p. 11).

Technical assistance was viewed as a 'condition of effectiveness' for ensuring the implementation of agreements made between the government and World Bank. The importance of technical assistance to nearly every stage of the ASRP is highlighted by the "52 man-years" of "internationally recruited personnel" which were to be funded by the World Bank (World Bank 1987a: p. 19). The selection and sub-contracting of individuals to provide technical assistance was to be managed by an "international management consultancy firm specializing in Agriculture Planning" (ibid: p58). While it is unclear exactly how influential technical assistance is at altering policy, their presence as managers and implementers of projects was thought to increase donor's ability to control policy *implementation* (Callaghy 1990: p. 285).

The ASRP clearly illustrates a shift from a policy process dominated by national and local political agendas to a technocratic exercise dominated by international donors, consultants, and 'acceptable' Ghanaians. The process itself was further instituted into the governance system by use of projects such as the ASRP to inform the next policies. The 'agricultural research' mandated by the 1987 ASRP was used to generate evidence used to develop the Medium Term Agricultural Development Strategy and the National Agricultural Research Master Plan, and the latter likely informed the 1991 National Agricultural Research Project (Dapaah 1995: p. 14; Khor and Hormeku 2006: p. 5;

World Bank 1995b: p. 11). Policy evidence was also generated using research methods and research questions selected by international donors, thus illustrating how donors changed policy processes by funding the creation of ‘acceptable’ evidence used for *selecting policy options* and funding policy *implementation*.

Dr. Samuel Dapaah and Dr. Asenso-Okyere were two Ghanaians deemed ‘acceptable’ by the World Bank, and they were engaged in the development of the MTADS. Both Ghanaians were Western-educated, one studied in Canada and the other in the United States. Between 1986 and 1992, Dr. Dapaah became the Director of the newly established PPMED. Perhaps unsurprisingly, government representatives at the time found the working relationship with World Bank staff to be cordial (GH7 and GH27). In fact, many educated Ghanaians became respected voices within the international development community itself. Dr. Asenso-Okyere went on to become senior management at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Dr. Dapaah became a USAID Chief Technical Advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture. In this way, the ability of Ghanaians to work with international actors greatly affected relationships between the World Bank and government. As noted by John Toye (1991), international donors and the government increasingly worked in partnership to set agendas and implement policies, and ‘slippage’ from previously planned activities was often mutually accepted. These examples raise many questions about how the promotion of Western-educated individuals may have altered policy changes, and they support Peter Haas’ assertion that control over knowledge is a key dimension of power (Haas 1992).

The fact that the Ministry of Finance and not the Ministry of Agriculture chaired the Agricultural Policy Coordinating Committee also highlights the evolving relationship between Ministries and the agricultural sector. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP) became increasingly influential because of its importance to national budgeting, its direct oversight of the cocoa sector, and its close relationship with donors like the World Bank and IMF (Hutchful 2002:

p. 106; World Bank 1987a: p. 11). During the first phase of structural adjustment (SAC I) a Structural Adjustment Program Secretariat (SAPSEC) was established for coordinating overall implementation. In 1989, as part of SAC II, SAPSEC functions were transferred to MFEP (World Bank 1992: pp. 16-17). From 1989 onwards, the World Bank was to receive "quarterly reports from the Budget Division of MFEP in agreed format" (ibid: p74). In 1990, a National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) was established to help the government in identifying and selecting national policy options, and it was linked to MFEP through an inter-ministerial committee (Hutchful 2002: p. 111; World Bank 1992: p. 76). The NDPC was created on the recommendation of a report that was written by an international consultant hired by the UNDP, but was implemented because the PNDC saw value in generating evidence for its own agendas (ibid).

Another shift in the policy process occurred because of the increased importance given to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as implementers of donor and government projects or policies. The PNDC government was initially suspicious and sometimes hostile towards NGOs, however, by the time the Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) was implemented in 1987, relations had begun to change (Gary 1996: pp. 157-58). PAMSCAD was developed based on the recommendation of an international donor mission that determined that the divestiture of state owned enterprises (SOEs) needed to be accompanied by efforts to protect the unemployed. At the same time as PAMSCAD, donors increasingly relied on NGOs to fill gaps where the government was unable to provide basic services such as access to food, health, or education. The use of NGOs to supplement government services became an increasingly important part of governance itself. On the ground, local NGOs are viewed as part of a culture of 'self-help' and bottom-up development that is well placed to overcome any local distrust of top-down Government initiatives (Badu and Parker 1994: p. 30). However, because the Government also continued to exercise control over which NGOs received attention, NGO agendas were often altered through government-manipulated financial incentives (Gary 1996: pp. 159-60).

Finally, the last big shift in the policy process between 1983 and 1995 came with Ghana's push towards democratisation. The transition from military rule to a constitutional democracy began on paper in 1982, with the establishment of the National Commission for Democracy (NCD). However, the first draft of a new constitution was not published until August 12, 1991. On March 5, 1992, Rawlings announced the schedule for Ghana's transition. On May 18, Law 280 removed the ban on political parties, and on November 3, 1992, Rawlings won the general elections. At that point the policy process changed in order to fit the new constitution. However, Article 11 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana states that the "Laws of Ghana shall comprise... (b) enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established by this Constitution; (c) any Orders, Rule, and Regulations made by any person or authority under a power conferred by this Constitution; (d) existing law; and (e) common law" (Ghana 1992). Each Member of Parliament (MP) is required to participate in at least one committee of parliament, and Standing Committees and Select Committees were both established, of which the Select Committee on Food, Agriculture and Cocoa Affairs became closely linked to the Ministry of Agriculture. One of the roles of Committees is to hold public consultations when new laws are being considered. In this manner, the Parliament became part of the process of *identifying policy problems, establishing agendas, and selecting policy options.*

In 1992, the National Development Planning Commission was made part of the Ghana's Constitution through Articles 86 and 87. The enactment of these articles led to the National Development Planning Commission Act of 1994, which established the NDPC as a government body in charge of overseeing policy planning, including policies for agriculture, and thus rice. Donors, specifically the UNDP, had promoted the NDPC, but overlapping mandates and lack of clear direction prevented it from being active (deGrassi 2007: p18; Hutchful 2002: p112).

However, the NDPC had grown increasingly important to the Rawlings' regime as a tool for mobilising popular participation and support (Toye 1991: p. 185). Thus, it is likely that the decision to preserve institutions that served political mobilisation purposes fit the needs of the newly elected NDC government.

The period between 1983 and 1995 witnessed a major transition in both governance structures and the policy processes surrounding rice. When the PNDC took control of the government, they set out to establish a new populist government with locally selected and implemented policies. However, between 1983 and 1992, governance structures became decentralised (e.g. divestiture of SOEs and growing importance of NGOs) and policy decisions increasingly involved international actor agendas. The transition back to democratic rule in 1992 resulted in the inclusion of members of parliament into rice policy processes, but structures established under authoritarian rule remained largely unchanged. As noted by Whitfield (2010: p. 735), Ghana's increased dependency on overseas development assistance resulted in a reliance on consultants and donor procedures, adding another level of supervision on top of existing policy processes. However, it should be noted that consultants and development projects had already been part of the governance system prior to structural adjustment. It is therefore questionable how changes observed were fundamentally different. Overall, it appears that the biggest change was in the relationship between the government and rice farmers. The previous import-substitution focused regime was replaced by an outwardly focused, NGO and private sector dominated approach to national development policy. The following section examines how these policy changes are connected to the underlying political economy for rice in Ghana.

4.4. Multi-levelled political economy for rice (1983-1995)

This section examines the same structural adjustment period for developments in the underlying political economy for rice. During colonial rule, Ghana's northern rice farmers were valued as labour for southern cocoa production, which meant less attention was focused on rice farming itself. After a brief interest in the potential of domestic rice production around 1926, the government increasingly relied on imported rice to meet the food requirements of Ghana's growing population of waged labourers. After independence, numerous governments attempted to substitute imported rice with domestic production. In the decade immediately preceding 1981, the government's focus on domestic food production made commercial rice farming a lucrative business for Ghana's elite and almost completely replaced imports (Okoso-Amaa 1975; Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 16; Van Hear 1984: p. 45). However, by 1981, commercial rice farmers began to encounter problems maintaining access to wage labour (Van Hear 1984: p. 54). As structural adjustment was implemented, many commercial rice farms were unable to operate without government support, and Ghana's domestic rice production dropped from supplying 99.2% of rice consumed in 1976 to less than 50% in the early 2000s (ODI 2000: p. 8).

Overall, the political economy for rice between 1981 and 1995 appears to have been shaped by socio-cultural divides, tensions between formal and informal institutions, the value of labour (e.g. by-day wages and unemployment), environmental factors, and food prices. Over this period, the Ghanaian government, World Bank and IMF focused on liberalising producer prices and removing state-support to production. To try and understand how evolving political economies affected policy change, the following section examines the relationships between key policy decisions and the evolving political economy of rice at local, national, and international levels.

4.4.1. Local-Level political economy of rice

Rice is produced in Ghana's Northern, Western, Eastern, Brong Ahafo, Volta, Upper East and West, Ashanti, and Central regions. However, between 1978 and 1981, 61% of total rice production took place in the Northern Region (ODI 2000: p. 4). Since colonial rule, the government and international actors had used its control over rice growing regions to manipulate rice production as well as to supply food and labour to Ghana's southern regions. Because men were traditionally more mobile, subsistence rice farming was primarily the responsibility of women (Lokko 1995: p. 28).

In the 1980s, and still today, most smallholder farmers rely on rain-fed rice production and other food crops maximise the likelihood of having enough food throughout any given year. According to a more recent field study of the Bolgatanga region:

> "Government projects have brought new (varieties of) crops to the area. The reason for most farmers to use these is not because the crops are more adapted to the climate… But most farmers use them to spread their risks. When an old variety fails, a new variety may give a yield and the other way around" (Dietz and Millar 1999: p. 56).

This narrative highlights how state or donor provided inputs, such as seeds, are mostly used to diversify smallholder farmers' household risks. Smallholder farmers also sell rice in small quantities throughout the year, if and when their own food supply is secure. This type of self-reliance has made small rice farmers more resilient to government changes, but vulnerable to extreme shocks such as drought. It has also proven difficult to encourage farmers with this mind-set to conform to more commercial (e.g. focused on selling) rice production practices.

In the 1970s, the government used state control over land in northern regions to promoted large-scale commercial rice production for southern consumption. However, as highlighted by Piet Konings' 1981 study of the Vea Irrigation Project in the Upper Region:

> "Peasants were enraged about the transfer of their lands to strangers, and, even worse, Southerners, but should one of them dare confront one of the commercial farmers, he was told that the lands were "government lands"...Moreover, peasants were quite aware that commercial farmers were powerful and influential people in society with close links to the state apparatus and its instruments of force (some commercial farmers were police and army officers)" (Konings 1981: p. 24).

The government was able to re-allocate land as they pleased because of laws that stemmed from the time of colonial rule. Furthermore, when new commercial rice farms developed in northern regions, women took the opportunity to enter the labour market. However, as noted by Van Hear:

> “Women may have entered rice labouring to gain financial independence from their husbands, accepting the intensified total workload (i.e.: domestic plus wage work) in the first five years of capitalist rice farming as a reasonable exchange for their increased autonomy. When, after the withdrawal of men and the ensuing labour shortage, the opportunity came to reduce the intensity of their labour or the total length of the working day, the women were not slow to seize upon it” (Van Hear 1984: p. 48).

By the time Rawlings and the PNDC set up their government, northern rice farmers had grown resistant to southern, state-led commercial rice farming. Farm labourers (i.e. northern smallholder farmers) used the occasion of Rawlings’ revolution to express their grievances. The Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives, which included the Ghana Rice Growers Association, looked to the new PNDC government for increased ‘by-day’ wage rates (Van Hear 1984: p. 54). Expecting the worst, many commercial rice farmers “fled from the area during the 4th June Revolution" fearing that peasant-workers would call in soldiers to punish their oppressors and exploiters” (Konings 1981: p. 26). The PNDC’s open opposition to elite farmers, and their decision to abandon farms, also resulted in the failure of many commercial farmers to repay state-subsidised loans (Amanor 2010: p. 8). Thus, although it is true that many of Ghana’s previous governments had supported elite farmers, the changes observed in 1981 contradict Gibbons’ assertion that during structural adjustment the government used its power to maintain capitalist ‘absentee’ rice farmers in northern regions (Gibbon et al. 1993: p. 137).

In 1983, severe drought and bushfires resulted in a 500,000 metric tonne food shortage (Reuter 1983). During the same year, the Government accepted IMF and World Bank support, and was forced to devalue its currency. The bushfires combined with economic collapse and devaluation led to inflation of 171%, and forced attention on local food sources (Abdulai and Huffman 2000: p. 505). In January 1982, the chairman of the Ghana Rice Grower Association, Alhaji Iddrisu

Ibrahim, said that “given the right direction and support, the Association will produce enough rice for the Ghanaian market at a reasonable price”(BBC 1982b). However, promises of production increases were hinged on “support”, for which the government had little means to provide without donor agreement. High food prices and low wages increased incentives for farm labourers to return to producing rice for their own consumption. Thus, the collapse of state-support to rice production affected large commercial farmers and subsistence farmers very differently.

In addition, a tension between informal and formal institutions was also clear at the beginning of 1981. The government was focused on addressing corruption and inequality as well as economic recovery and food security. In October 1982, the Acting Northern Regional Secretary, Yudu Yahaya, “appealed to the Government to make fuel available to the Region to bring about a successful harvest season...and appealed to rice farmers to sell their produce to the Ghana Rice Company”(BBC 1982c). The appeal to farmers to sell their produce to the Ghana Rice Company was in response to Rawlings’ request to stop informal trade and smuggling across borders. Commercial rice farmers had become notoriously corrupt and often smuggled state-subsidised rice to the best available markets. To increase incentives for farmers to commit to formal trade, the PNDC also increased the producer price for rice. However, this could not alter informal market prices, which remained higher than guaranteed prices (Alderman 1991: p. 62).

Initially, stringent IMF oversight on government spending and overall lower level of support to agriculture meant that rice policies were forced to rely on regulation and market incentives, rather than subsidies or inputs. As such, the incentives for production were greatest for farmers who did not rely on mechanised production or imported inputs (e.g. fertilizers, pesticides, etc.). The result of using increases in producer price as an incentive for rice production is apparent in the relatively steady price for rice in US dollars terms, compared to the price inflation witnessed in local currency units (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.1 Rice producer prices in Ghana between 1983 and 1995 (FAO 2013)



Because the government was desperate to ensure enough food was available for domestic markets, rice was also increasingly imported and accepted from donors as food aid. However, consumer preferences varied greatly between regions, and the increased importation of rice towards the late 1980s had little effect on farmers producing local varieties for local consumption in northern regions (ODI 2000: p. 5).

By 1985, the government had an increased ability to harness donor projects toward improving rice productivity, as witnessed in the 1987 Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Project (ASRP). In 1991, the government implemented the Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme, at which time rice production reached a new high of 150,900 tonnes (Figure 4.2). The government's efforts to improve access to seeds, infrastructure, and extension led to increased production, but rice farming remained largely in the hands of smallholders (R. Al-Hassan and Poulton 2009: p. 5; ODI 2000: p. 6).

Furthermore, the government's openness to accept nearly all forms of international assistance resulted in an increase in the number of development projects in the northern rice-growing regions.

Organisations such as the Ghana National Association of Farmer and Fishermen (GNAFF) evolved out of many different projects and farmer associations originally formed by faith-based and NGO extension services. As explained by a representative of the Ecumenical Association for Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development (ECASARD) (GH24 2012):

> "And then with the SAP, the introduction of the Structural Adjustment, everything was killed, so that gave us more work to do. So the 80s structural adjustment introduced, killed agric, so we were doing more of the work and you see people were calling us and asking us to come to the community. So that was how ECASARD, 1991, we started working purely with the stations [government extension], and then the stations were servicing the farmers, but around 1999 and 2000, we realised that no, the stations became weak because there was no more getting the support from the donors as they should. So the donors tended that, oh, if we have established ECASARD then there wasn't much need to give more, so they would rather resource ECASARD so that we could do the work better."

The above interview shows how NGOs like ECASARD originally formed to support farmers in areas neglected during government cut backs. However, over time their relationship with the government and donors may have gradually reduced the importance of the government services which they were filling in to provide. This may not be inherently problematic, until the donors involved change their focus and cease to support NGOs that are providing essential services to poor farmers.

The increase in development projects targeting support to smallholder farmers may have also made private input companies (e.g. seed, chemical, fertiliser, etc.) reluctant to invest because of the risk that a new project would come and provide a free alternative to their goods or services (World Bank 1997a: p. 10).

Figure 4.2 Rice production in Ghana between 1970 and 1995 (FAO 2013)



In 1992, Rawlings was ‘democratically’ elected largely because of the NDC’s rural supporters, including those from rice growing regions (Jeffries and Thomas 1993). That same year, the AgSAC pressured the government to end its involvement in the provision of subsidised rice inputs and to divest any remaining SOEs. This process proved controversial, however, and eventually the government heeded the “demands from farmer representatives” and decided “against liquidating the FASCOMs [Farmer Service’s Companies]”(World Bank 1997a: p. 6). Instead, the Government sold FASCOM assets to the Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen (GNAFF), a move supported by the Ghana Ecumenical Church Loan Fund (ECLOF). The decision to side with farmers against the World Bank indicates the continued close relationship between the PNDC and its electorate at the time.

Between 1992 and 1995 the government sought new ways of revitalising commercial rice farming. Instead of simply returning to state-supported commercial farming in northern regions, the NDC government sought to encourage commercial rice farming in Eastern, Greater Accra, and Volta regions where donor and government funded projects were already underway (Fynn 2001). The Volta Region had been the focus of the PNDC, World Bank, and IFAD supported Volta Region Agricultural Development Project (VORADEP) (Donya 2000; World Bank 1995b). To encourage commercial rice production the NDC government made efforts to partner with private companies from the U.S. and elsewhere. However, it is unclear what impact these new efforts had, as some projects never started production until 2009 (Adoboe 2009).

This overview of the local-level political economy for rice illustrates how the relationship between large commercial rice farms in the north and the government deteriorated in the early 1980s, and how smallholder farmers increasingly supported Rawlings and the PNDC as a result of new opportunities and greater freedom. The political economy for rice was shaped by the removal of direct government support for previously exploitative commercial rice production and the increasing attention given to the northern poor by donor projects. At the same time, the collapse of Ghana's domestic food supply sparked political protest from urban consumers in the south and led to increased rice imports (S. Al-hassan 2008; ODI 2000). When Rawlings won the 1992 elections with the backing of many small farmer constituents, his resolve to maintain their support until at least 1995 is visible in decisions made to heed the farmers' demands, even when contradicting donor pressure (World Bank 1997a: p. 6).

4.4.2. National-Level political economy of rice

Before 1981, the existing rice production and governance systems favoured the political and economic elite and exploited poorer rural labourers. Export earnings used to finance subsidize rice production came from other sectors, primarily from cocoa exports and gold (Van Hear 1984). When the PNDC set out to reverse Ghana's economic decline and to end corruption, the rice support system collapsed. The end of support, in combination with severe drought, resulted in rice production dropping by nearly 63% to 36,000 tonnes in 1981/82 (Figure 4.1), at the same time overall inflation rose by 171% (Ahiakpor 1991: p. 588). The combination of collapsed production and inflation led to severe food shortages and no means of purchasing imported alternatives.

In October 1982, Rawlings made a clear indication that he saw the recovery of domestic food production as important for Ghana:

> "Flt-Lt Rawlings said the Northern Region alone should have been in a position to provide the country's cereal needs and for exports, to earn foreign exchange for the country. He was unhappy that despite the huge allocation of the country's foreign exchange for the importation of machinery and fertilizers to the Region, its returns to the economy are not encouraging. He observed that food produced in the Region is often smuggled out" (BBC 1982c).

In addition to wanting to confront smuggling, Rawlings and the PNDC's had a vision to modernise "peasant farmers" (BBC 1982c). The shift in thinking from supporting southern commercial farmers to modernising northern peasant farmers is indicative of the overall mind-set and rhetoric used during the Rawlings' revolution. However, the state of the economy and government finances did not accommodate ambitious plans. Instead, the government did its best to close borders, to crack down on smuggling and corruption, and to increase rice producer prices. In many ways, the desire to effect change and the need for identifying new means of implementing policies underpinned all PNDC's approaches to rice production. The need for access to finance quickly led the Government to accept IMF and World Bank support, and the accompanying structural adjustment packages shaped the subsequent selection of rice policies.

Prior to 1983, domestic and imported rice prices were both strictly controlled in order to protect farmers (Abdulai and Huffman 2000: p. 505). When the government accepted IMF support in 1983, the subsequent devaluation of the cedi resulted in domestic rice initially remaining 25% cheaper than imported rice (ibid). At the same time, the government was in dire need of foreign exchange and had very little means of importing food, thus increasing domestic food production was a clear necessity. The combination of the donor supported ERP, increased rice producer prices, improved weather conditions, and ad-hoc support measures led to an increase in domestic rice production between 1983 and 1985 (Figure 4.2). The government also claimed to promote food self-sufficiency, which fit both their pro-rural, nationalist or populist agenda, and their limited ability to import food (E. Hansen 1989: p. 215; Hutchful 2002: p. 71).

According to the World Bank, the combination of donor and government efforts between 1983 and 1987 led to the “noticeable increase in small scale production of rice in depressions and this could have resulted from a diffusion of the efforts of the small scale irrigation extensionists and continuing good price”(World Bank 1987c: p. 21). In this manner, the PNDC policies between 1983 and 1987 resulted in Rawlings’ support increasingly coming from the traditionally poor, rice growing areas where farmers were benefitting from improved prices and production. Rawlings’ decision to institute the Farmer Day Celebrations in 1985 further highlights the government’s efforts to promote an image as pro-farmer and thus foster rural support.

However, the Government’s decision to support by-day wages, cut spending, reduce subsidies, and liberalise trade all led to the collapse of the large commercial farms that once supplied rice to urban markets and southern regions (ODI 2000; Van Hear 1984). Thus, as seen in Figure 4.3, around 50% of rice consumed in Ghana was supplied by food-aid and imports throughout the structural adjustment period (Mikell 1989: p. 461) At the same time that Ghana experienced the collapse of local food production, the decreased value of the cedi led to price inflation and intense backlash from urban constituencies, ultimately sparking several coups attempts (Kraus 1991: p. 34; Reuter 1983). Even the gradual increase in rice production between 1984 and 1985 did not provide the quantity or type of rice demanded by the growing urban populations in southern regions. As a result, the growing rice demand, from an annual 7.0kg per capita in 1989 to 16.3kg to 1995, was mostly supplied through imports (S. Al-hassan 2008; ODI 2000: p. 23).

Figure 4.3 Comparison between rice imported, Food Aid rice received, and rice produced in Ghana between 1980 and 1995 (FAO 2013)



In 1987, the launch of the ASRP further altered the relationship between the national government and rice farmers. The reform of extension services involved reducing the role of the government in the provision of agricultural input and refocusing state activities on providing technical recommendations (Anyimadu 1993: p. 65; Dapaah 1995: p. 13; World Bank 1995b: pp. 1-2). However, this project did not appear to have an immediate impact on production, which had already reverted to primarily traditional, small-scale farming methods. But the increased focus on research and studies carried out would both inform the Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme (MTADP) and National Agricultural Research Project (NARP).

In 1991, the government began implementing the MTADP and, as seen in Figure 4.2, rice production reached a new high (FAO 2013; Mikell 1989: p464; World Bank 2012a). However, at that same time, both the World Bank and PNDC advisor, Dr. Jebbuni from the University of Ghana, came to the conclusion that rice production in Ghana had become uneconomical as a long-term, commercial investment (Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 25). The belief that rice was uneconomical was further evidence that the government should reduce direct investment into the sector. Thus, the 1992 AgSAC urged the Government to end its involvement in the provision of subsidised rice inputs and fully liberalise rice production.

However, between 1985 and 1992, Rawlings and the PNDC also became increasingly concerned with the process of democratisation. Rawlings had consistently claimed to promote the interests of rural constituencies, including smallholder rice farmers. The national elections were preceded and followed by a period during which the government became increasingly attentive to farmer interests and afraid of protest (Hutchful 2002: p. 220; World Bank 1997a: p. 6). In 1992, Hon. Ibrahim l. Adam, former Secretary of the Rice Farmers Association, became the Minister of Agriculture (Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 9). Also, instead of directly following plans agreed in AgSAC, the government supported GNAFF in its takeover of FASCOM assets. In this way, Rawlings appears to have remained true to his rural supporters even at the cost of potentially upsetting some international supporters. The elections and this incident also illustrate the increasing influence that public opinion had in policy processes after Ghana's return to democracy.

During the 1992 elections, Rawlings received above 50% of votes in every region except Ashanti, with strong support in rice producing regions, including Volta (93.3%), Northern (63.2%), and Brong Ahafo (61.9%), and overall greater support from "poorer" constituencies such as smallholder farmers (Jeffries and Thomas 1993: p. 355-56). One of Rawlings major claims was that he had improved the lives of rural populations through higher crop prices, extension, and rural infrastructure (ibid: 361). Although it is clear that large cocoa farmers benefitted much more than smallholder cocoa farmers (see Chapter 3), it also appears that elite rice farmers fared worse than smallholder rice farmers. Therefore, although northern subsistence rice farmers continued to remain poor and vulnerable to shocks such as drought, the fact that their condition was not significantly worse because of Rawlings, and that structural adjustment allowed them to benefit from new international poverty reduction efforts, appears to have led them to favour the PNDC over previous governments.

Part of the rationale for liberalising rice production and trade was that it would encourage new private investment in commercial farming. In 1994, Ghana joined the WTO and established the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (Government of Ghana 1994). That same year, Rawlings sent officials on a global tour to encourage private investments from other countries. After Finance Minister Kwame Prepah completed his U.S. tour a project was launched in partnership with U.S. based Quality Grain Co. Inc. to start a commercial rice farm in Aveyime, an area in the Volta Region. However, the Quality Grains project became part of an international corruption scandal and resulted in the imprisonment of Mr Prepah on charges of enabling Ms Juliet Cotton, a U.S. citizen, to misuse state finances (Afreh 2003). The sentences given to Mr Prepah and other government officials were later remitted in 2005, but not before years of investigations, trials, and imprisonment (GNA 2005). However, by 2009, Prairie Volta Ltd (PVL), the company that took over the Aveyime rice project, was finally becoming commercially viable (Adoboe 2009). This story illustrates how, despite policy changes made during structural adjustment, the link between the state and private rice farmers was never fully severed, and instead shifted in terms of geography and partners promoted.

Overall, when observing the period between 1981 and 1995, each policy change fit the national-level political economy for rice at the time. The government appears to have continually balanced the need to maintain access to international foreign assistance with its need to maintain local support (Hutchful 2002: p. 165; Whitfield 2011b: p. 17). When the government was unable to achieve self-sufficiency in rice production it appears to have promoted the interests of farm labourers and the rural poor, who were not reliant on commercial farm inputs. When the Government was faced with food crisis it liberalised trade and opened doors to food aid. Then, when the NDC won elections, the government promoted new partnerships with commercial rice farmers in areas that did not directly compete with farmers who supported Rawlings in the northern region.

4.4.3. International-Level political economy of rice

The international political economy for rice in Ghana was dominated by the difference in development ideologies and by global economic events. The ‘new orthodox agenda’ and ‘Washington Consensus’ had both begun to spread in the 1960s and 70s, but oil and food crises presented the IMF and World Bank a new opportunity to implement their theories through structural adjustment programmes throughout the 1980s (Kahler 1990). Between the 1950s and 1980s, Ghana had looked inwardly to design and implement development policies, which largely focused on import substitution. Crises in the late 1970s and early 1980s pushed the PNDC government to reflect on what appeared to be failed development approaches and to look for alternatives in the international development community.

In terms of food security and rice production, the 1960s and 1970s had been characterised by the Green Revolution, which focused on increasing agricultural productivity globally (Wade 1975: p. 587; Walsh 1988). The economic crisis in the 1970s had shifted focus towards ‘structural’ constraints, such as exchange rates, but food security did not fully disappear from agendas. In 1983, Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission of Africa (UNECA), saw food self-sufficiency as an essential element for ending the crisis:

> “The number one priority is the food sector.... It is projected, if present trends continue, that at the beginning of the next decade our food self-sufficiency ration will deteriorate further, which means that we will be spending an increasing proportion of our diminishing foreign exchange earnings buying food...Thanks to the U.S. Public Law 480 ["Food for Peace"], we have acquired tastes for goods that we can never produce due to our climatic conditions. And it is essential for us to be able to accustom our tastes to goods that our climate enables us to produce” (M. A. Novicki 1983).

This statement unfortunately made predictions that have increasingly been proven correct. However, neither the IMF nor World Bank seemed to prioritise domestic food self-sufficiency in their engagement with Ghana’s rice policies.

In the 1970s, the World Bank IDA had already attempted to force-start commercial rice production in northern Ghana through projects such as the Upper Region Agricultural Development Programme (URADEP) and to improve living conditions for smallholder farmers. The project tried to re-allocate land to local farmers that had been taken by elite 'absentee' farmers in the preceding decade and to instruct smallholder farmers about how to be commercial farmers. As noted by Konings, "IDA's attempt to establish a stable, undifferentiated, easily controlled, middle peasantry in the Vea project failed to a large extent"(Konings 1981: p. 46). The World Bank's failure to force socio-economic development in the 1970s may also explain part of their initial reluctance to finance similar development projects in the 1980s.

Instead of improving state support for rice production, the removal of 'structural' constraints, such as an overvalued currency, and free trade were promoted as the only sure way of facilitating development (Kahler 1990). This initial divide between agendas that prioritised food self-sufficiency and those promoting liberal markets as a cure-all for development is apparent in Ghana's shifting rhetoric and rice policies between 1982 and 1984 (e.g. rice self-sufficiency) and 1987 and 1995 (e.g. liberalise markets). In the end, the strongest ideology appears consistently to have been the one that was accompanied by the highest level of financial means for policy implementation.

Initially, many donors were reluctant to provide development finance to Ghana because of uncertainty surrounding the PNDC's political affiliation with countries such as Libya and the Soviet Union (Hutchful 2002: p. 39). The availability of international development assistance for Ghana was therefore dominated by international organisations promoting 'neo-orthodox' agendas and an interest in preventing the PNDC from forging stronger ties with the Soviet Union. However, this began to change after Ghana implemented its ERP in 1983, and by 1987, new donors saw an opportunity for providing development finance to a country with a potential for socio-economic growth. An increasingly larger portion of the new wave of finance was tied to agendas that focused on the ‘human cost’ of structural adjustment (Cornia et al. 1987; Gayi 1995). UNICEF is credited with pushing for greater protection of the poor and vulnerable, but their cause quickly sparked a larger movement of international actors with similar interests. In Ghana, this resulted in an exponential increase in NGOs promoting poverty reduction and related agendas.

The year 1987 also witnessed an increase in donor attention given to agricultural research in Ghana. The Agriculture Services Rehabilitation Project (ASRP) became the first in a series of new donor projects that focused on improving the technical capacity of the national agricultural research system (NARS). The most significant research-focused project was the National Agricultural Research Project (NARP). The increase in donor spending on research came at the same time that governments throughout Africa were forced to reduce spending, and the result was that donor control over finance for research increased from 34% in 1986 to 43% in 1991 (Pardey et al. 1995). In Ghana, the investment into the NARS grew by 4.8% between 1961 and 1971, dropped by 3.2% between 1971 and 1981, and then grew 14.4% between 1981 and 1991 (ibid: 15). The large increase in spending between 1981 and 1991 indicated strong commitment to research, however, by 1991 Ghana’s NARS was also receiving 35.9% of its funding from donors (ibid: 39). The increase in funding from donors made it increasingly difficult for Ghanaian research to fund projects that they felt were important for addressing farmers’ needs, as research was tied to donor projects (World Bank 2001: p. 22).

Another change supported by international actors was Ghana’s transition to democracy. For some observers, Ghana’s transition to democracy in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War in 1989 fit with global trends (Boafo-Arthur 1999). This period saw many donors using “political conditionality” to pressure governments to transition to democracies in exchange for continued development assistance (ibid). For the World Bank, the push towards democracy in Ghana was also driven by the disappointing response of Ghana’s private sector to the newly created market opportunities, which raised questions about the commercial environment created by the authoritarian PNDC government (Hutchful 2002: p. 199). Many churches and international NGOs in Ghana were concerned with a lack of representation for non-PNDC supporters, and for human rights. The combination of support from international actors and pressure from local constituencies led to the government's acceptance of transition to democracy between 1987 and 1992.

In addition to competing development ideologies and political agendas, trade itself may have been a driver of policy change, although not often formally discussed by promoters of structural adjustment policies. After Ghana signed the GATT in 1994, the government's open trade policies led to a sharp increase in rice imports, despite efforts to encourage foreign investment in rice production. As visible by the increased rice importation (Figure 4.4), the liberal trade agenda promoted by the IMF and World Bank was congruent with the trade interests of influential member states. The United States was, and is, one of the largest exporters of rice to Ghana, and also provided rice as food aid. It is thus perhaps not surprising that Ghana's rice production was increasingly seen as uneconomical, especially given the fact that global competition was dominated by countries with large, commercial, government-subsidised rice production (Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 25). Any move toward free trade was therefore opening the door for rice imports.

Figure 4.4 The value of rice imported into Ghana between 1989 and 1996 by source country (UN 2012; USDA 2012)



Overall, international interests in Ghana's rice sector appear to be peripheral to larger ideological debates. Many of the policies promoted were selected more on the basis of pre-established theories of the importance of liberal market systems than any serious consideration of the long-term impacts on rice producers or domestic food production. The later attempts made by UNICEF and like-minded NGOs to highlight the social costs of adjustment also focused more on human rights, constituent representation, environmental issues, and the protection of Ghana's smallholders, and less on the potential of domestic rice production to provide a local alternative to imports. In this way, the government's policy decisions appear to have found a middle ground between international agendas and local political pressures. By 1995, when further structural adjustment became politically difficult for the NDC, other donors appear to have provided development alternatives (e.g. protecting smallholder farmer interests).

4.5. Chapter Four Conclusions

Overall, international actors had significant influence on rice policies between 1983 and 1995. In line with structural adjustment, policies implemented used donor support to restructure institutions that provided state support to commercial rice production. The knowledge and theories promoted by international actors between 1983 and 1995 exhibit an overarching trend towards reduced state involvement in rice production and marketing (e.g. neoliberalism).

Early on, the PNDC attempted to establish communal farms and other more populist forms of governance. However, after initiating the ERP, the government ended subsidies and marketing activities. Government efforts were re-directed towards providing 'public' goods, such as research, and supporting private sector development.

Regarding changes in the policy processes, international actors designed, mandated, and managed significant changes in Ghana's agricultural governance system, which directly impacted rice policies. IMF, World Bank, and other donors increasingly tied their support to strictly defined policy agendas. Between 1983 and 1995, many of these conditions included clear *implementation* directions for restructuring and divesting existing agricultural governance institutions. New government institutions, such as PPMED, were established upon the request of donors to increase spending oversight and *evaluation* capacities. Many oversight committees and *implementation* bodies were also established to ensure financial accountability to donor demands. Donors oversaw the staffing of new government bodies by designing terms of reference and selecting candidates to fill roles created.

In addition to promoting policy changes and providing the resources needed for *implementation*, donors also requested specific studies be carried out using accepted research methods and consultants. These studies were then promoted as *evidence* for subsequent Government policy decisions. The entire process involved significant donor interaction as well as the contracting of many international consultants. The outcome of this high-level of international involvement is seen in the smaller and more efficient governance system with its strong capacity for managing and coordinating donor projects (GH4 and GH16, 2011). As highlighted by Whitfield's (2010) study of the later PRSP process, the intense direct engagement of donors in nearly all stages of policy later became the new status quo for the governance in Ghana.

However, when looking at the interactions between the political economy and rice policy decisions, it is important to note how the timing of policy decisions also aligned with PNDC interests in maintained sufficient local and international political support. When the PNDC first took control, policies promoted their populist, pro-rural development image. When the government was unable to secure alternative funding sources and accepted IMF and World Bank lending conditions, policies changed significantly. Cutting support to elite commercial rice farmers therefore served two purposes: first, a reduction in cost to the government, and second, the removal of institutions that exploited northern farmers resulting in increased political support for the PNDC. This supports the hypothesis that governments will adhere to international policies if doing so provides them greater benefit.

When donors and NGOs became increasingly concerned about the ‘human face’ of structural adjustment, the groups that were seen as victims in northern Ghana were often the same smallholder farmers that had been victims of previous state-sponsored, elite-run, commercial rice farming systems (Goody 1980; Van Hear 1984). In this way, the smallholder farmers were not only free from being labourers for elite southern farmers, but also gained increasing access to support from donor projects. Unsurprisingly, smallholder farmers increasingly supported the PNDC in the period immediately preceding elections. By 1995, funding and support from church groups and NGOs had also given northern farmers stronger institutions, such as GNAFF, to represent them in policy processes. These stronger institutions were also harnessed by the PNDC as avenues for maintaining farmers’ support, as seen in the government’s decision to transfer FASCOM assets to GNAFF.

After winning elections, the NDC government joined the WTO and sought new ways of benefiting from free trade. Efforts, such as the Quality Grains project, illustrate an ambition to harness private sector partnerships. However, the ensuing scandals indicate that the government may not have exercised adequate capacity or the will to prevent corruption.

In conclusion, between 1983 and 1995, international actors used their control over resources, institutions, and knowledge to influence nearly all aspects of Ghana’s rice policies. Also, the policy process itself was re-shaped by international actors who demanded changes in return for financial support. However, the timing and extent to which donor agendas were incorporated into policy also closely aligned with PNDC interests. Although the PNDC lost support from Ghana’s cocoa and rice farming elite, they maintained just enough support from international donors and northern smallholder farmers to hold power through the 1992 elections.

Chapter 5. Cocoa Policy between 2003 and 2012

This chapter examines the influence of international actors on cocoa policy between 2003 and 2012. The period is significant because it includes several major international and domestic factors that affect a number of cocoa policy changes. The most significant of these for cocoa were: 1) the increasing pressure to enforce quality and labour standards to ensure cocoa sustainability; 2) the 2008 elections returning power to the NDC; and 3) the increase in global commodity prices as a result of the 2007 to 2008 financial crises.

5.1. The 1990s and stagnation in Ghana's cocoa sector

As explored in detail in Chapter 3, structural adjustment policies implemented in the 1980s and 1990s altered, but also perpetuated, the long-standing relationship between the government and the cocoa sector. The Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board was restructured as a smaller and more efficient COCOBOD, and external marketing was placed under the control of Cocoa Marketing Company Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary (T. Williams 2009). This major government reform process took place while Ghana was under the authoritarian rule of Rawling's military government. However, Toye (1991) and Whitfield (2011b) argue that as Ghana returned to a multi-party democracy, the government was increasingly focused on the politics of winning elections. As a result of this change in focus, the reform process slowed significantly towards the latter half of Ghana's structural adjustment period (1983-1995).

The legacy of efforts made to reform and modernise the sector was visible decades later. The 1988 Cocoa Rehabilitation Project (CRP) was instrumental in introducing hybrid varieties of cocoa and increasing productivity (World Bank 1987e, 1997b). The use of hybrid trees also increased from approximately 10% during the CRP to 57% in 2002, and fertilizer use increased from 9% to 47% of farms between 1991 and 2003 (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 205). In addition to efforts focused on increasing production, Ghana developed a reputation for cocoa quality. The country also became a for-runner in the pursuit of fair trade labelling through support to cooperatives such as Kuapa Kokoo, which was established at the time of restructuring COCOBOD (Kolavalli and

Vigneri 2011: p. 213). The promotion of fair trade also fit the political image of a government concerned with farmer welfare, as the premium received is put into a trust fund that supports development projects (ibid). However, even with these positive developments, it appears that progress slowed significantly after Ghana returned to democracy.

Despite efforts made to introduce new technologies and restructure government institutions, the productivity of Ghana's cocoa farms remained average throughout the 1990s when compared to other cocoa producing countries (Ruf 2007: p. 2). Whitfield argues that the increasing availability of foreign aid in the later 1980s and 1990s decreased government incentives to promote productive sectors, which may partially explain the stalled efforts to increase productivity (Whitfield 2011b: pp. 13-14). It was found that despite some increases in total production, cocoa yield recorded a 12% decrease between 1993 and 2003 (Vigneri 2008: p. 18). Given the stagnant or declining yield, increases witnessed in total production were largely a result of expanded land-use for cocoa production, changing weather patterns, and smuggling from neighbouring countries, most significantly Cote d'Ivoire (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011; Vigneri 2008).

A steady increase in global cocoa prices between 1990 and 1998 aided Ghana's overall economic growth and made it easier to regularly raise the producer price for cocoa (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 208). Between 1997 and 1999 the producer price for cocoa was raised twice, going from 1.2 million cedi to 2.25 million cedi per tonne. The increase in price resulted in a sharp increase in recorded total cocoa production, culminating in a 'boom' in 2000 that returned production levels to that of the 1960s (Ruf 2007: p. 1). This boom came the same year that the government decided to further liberalise cocoa marketing by allowing LBCs to export 30% of the cocoa they purchase from farmers, subject to meeting certain conditions. However, very few companies, if any, were able to benefit from this change in policy.

Throughout the structural adjustment period IFIs and bilateral donors pushed Ghana to fully liberalise the cocoa sector. This pressure continued through the 1990s, and eventually came to a head around 1997. As explained by a former member of the Cocoa Sector Marketing Committee (COSMARC) (Interview GH27 2011):

> **Question:** And was there a standoff between the cocoa board and World Bank on whether to further liberalise?
>
> **Response:** "Even on the COSMARC, we thought they shouldn't liberalise the external marketing. That was our, the committee's view about it, and the board's view that we shouldn't liberalise. We had liberalised internal marketing, and there were still some problems, and we didn't want to further liberalise external marketing…"
>
> **Question:** Were there different people in the World Bank at that time?
>
> **Response:** "No, the World Bank, it's not the people; it's the policy of the Bank. At that time it was the policy of the Bank to just go ahead, liberalise, liberalise, liberalise. And I don't think they actually reflected that much on the type of liberalisation. And, this is what is still happening in Ghana. We have liberalised so much that, sometimes it is against development."

The difference of opinion between the government and World Bank expressed above is confirmed by Tracy Williams (2009: p. 19). Williams found that the Bank went as far as contracting the consultancy LMC to support their claim of benefits associated with further liberalisation, which produced a report confirming that benefits were uncertain. The government's resistance to liberalisation may also explain why some LBCs were not given permission to export cocoa, despite qualifying under the new 30% policy (Laven 2010b: pp. 85-86).

In spite of the government's refusal to fully liberalise cocoa marketing and relinquish price controls, farmers continued to benefit from steady increases in producer price. Poverty among cocoa farmers dropped from 60.1% in the early 1990s to 23.9 percent in 2005 (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 206). In 1998, a conference hosted by the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institution in Panama brought together cocoa stakeholders to discuss global production and sparked a movement that led to the 1999 "Paris Declaration" for cocoa, not to be confused with later aid effectiveness declarations, which signalled industry commitment to sustainable cocoa (Velarde and Tomich 2006). The 1999 ‘Paris Declaration’ for sustainable cocoa inspired efforts such as the Sustainable Cocoa Program (SCP), an initiative by the industry-funded American Cocoa Research Institute (ACRI) (UNCTAD/WTO 2001: p. 8).

In 1999 the first Ghana Cocoa Sector Development Strategy (CSDS I) was launched to re-focus government efforts on increasing production in Ghana. The CSDS I was developed by a ‘National Task Force’ of government, farmers, buyers and experts which focused on issues like production, marketing, research and extension, and processing (Ghana Cocoa Board 2013). The importance of cocoa to the government is captured by this statement made by President, Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings: “Our pledge to give our cocoa farmers their due share of the value of their produce continues to be fulfilled” (1999: p. 53). Rawling’s statement highlights how cocoa remained a very political issue even after structural adjustment and the return to democracy.

Unlike many other African countries where state marketing boards were abandoned, COCOBOD continued to operate in parallel to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture throughout the 1990s. In 1999 the government tried to reduce costs and the duplication of responsibilities, especially in the area of agricultural extension services. The Cocoa Services Division (CSD) merged its extension services with those provided by MoFA to form a new unified system (Laven 2010b: p. 89). However, the unified system was understaffed and criticised by many, which led to private sector companies increasingly relying on their own networks to distribute inputs and ensure that farmers received adequate advice (ibid).

At the same time that COCOBOD was reducing its involvement in extensions services, the 1999 cocoa ‘Declaration’ expressed growing industry concerns for the sustainability of cocoa supply. The Declaration was followed by the launch of the Sustainable Tree Crops Programme (STCP) in 2002, which worked in Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire to promote sustainable farming and new extension approaches (Casey and Mensah 2012). The STCP was supported by the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF), which was established in 2000 by industry stakeholders (Shapiro and Rosenquist 2004: p. 455). New approaches to extension services, such as farmer field schools (FFS), became a focus area for public-private partnerships and for the involvement of non-governmental organisations such as Conservation International (Laven 2010b: p. 92).

When global cocoa and gold prices collapsed in1998 and 1999 Ghana faced economic and political uncertainty. The simultaneous jump in oil prices shocked the Ghanaian economy and macroeconomic performance was greatly affected (World Bank 2004: p. 7). Cocoa producing countries blamed the collapse in cocoa prices on speculators over-estimating global cocoa production, which resulted in a drop in prices that was not substantiated by actual supply (Dzisah 1999; SEC 2000: p. 21). The drop in gold prices was also linked to an IMF decision to sell off gold in 1999 to make financing available for its new Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative (Shah 1999). The small size of Ghana's economy and its reliance on only a few major export commodities continued to make the country vulnerable to global price fluctuations (ibid: p24). In February 2000 cocoa prices were at their lowest level in 27 years. In an attempt to boost prices, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon pledged to destroy 250,000 tonnes of cocoa. The fall in global cocoa prices was later linked to decline in demand from Asia and Russia, as well as the reduced ability of governments to stabilise cocoa prices after structural adjustment (BBC 2000).

Then, in 2000 and 2001, BBC reports of the use of forced child labour in West African cocoa production sparked outrage amongst consumers. In response to allegations of child slavery, Cote d'Ivoire pointed to multinational companies as the primary reason that producer prices were too low to ensure decent labour practices (Hawksley 2001). The media reports also caught the attention of constituents and politicians in the United States, who pushed the UN International Labour Organization (ILO) to pass the 2001 "Protocol for the Growing and Processing of Cocoa Beans and their Derivative Products", known at the Harkin-Engel Protocol after the politicians involved. The Protocol subsequently prompted new global initiatives to tackle child labour in cocoa production, and from 2002 onwards the International Cocoa Initiative (ICI) was actively combating child labour in Ghana. To monitor implementation of the Protocol the United States Department of Labour (USDOL) funded the Payson Center for International Development to carry out surveys and studies in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire (Payson Center 2011). The fact that U.S. politicians were able to get the ILO to enact new policy as well as subsequently fund the monitoring of its implementation in Ghana illustrates the significant influence of transnational actors on domestic cocoa policy. The 2001 International Cocoa Agreement (ICA) also upheld the objective of "promoting a sustainable cocoa economy", which was in line with an increasingly global push to address both environmental and social development issues while simultaneously securing cocoa supply (ICCO 2001).

In the run-up to presidential elections in December 2000, Rawlings promised to stabilise the economy. However, intentions were not good enough to get the NDC re-elected and the NPP took office at a time of economic hardship, during which inflation peaked at 41% in March 2001 (Bank of Ghana 2002: p. 1). Economic difficulties were largely caused by high energy prices and the associated high cost of imports. When President Kufour took office, efforts were made to improve terms of trade by increasing exports, including cocoa. COCOBOD initiated a National Cocoa Diseases and Pest Control (CODAPEC) spraying programme that was cost free to farmers targeting diseases such as black pod. The programme was implemented by the newly created Cocoa National Disease and Pest Control Committee, which worked through regional offices (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 210; Laven 2007: p. 3). The spraying programme received mixed reviews from farmers, which was not helped by delays during implementation. Despite delays, a project coordinator at the time stated that the "farmers concerns are fine but spraying will go on as planned. Government thinks some spraying will be better than no spraying at all"(Sarpong-Akosa 2001). The programme was eventually widely accepted and 93% of cocoa farmers surveyed in

2002 “linked their yield improvements to the effects of the program”(Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 206). In addition to heavily promoting spraying, the Kufuor government committed to increasing the price per bag of cocoa by 14%, from $35 to $40.

As previously mentioned, the late 1990s saw a growing number of private sector companies interested in public-private partnerships. In the 1980s there were a greater number of different global cocoa traders, which held significant power over the cocoa value chain. However, this changed in the 1990s as several major grinders, such as Cargill and ADM, became increasingly dominant within the supply chain. The number of traders reduced dramatically, to the point where only two major traders remained significant at a global level, Continaf and Ed & F Man (Fold 2002). At the same time that the number of traders declined the Cocoa Association of London also merged with the AFCC from Paris to form the Federation of Cocoa Commerce (FCC), a new single trade association (FCC 2014). Alongside changes in the global supply chain, the influence of multinational companies in Ghana increased as international buyers became more dependent on reliable cocoa suppliers and storage (ibid). Public-private partnerships provided an avenue for creating a “joint governance system”, in which both the government (e.g. through COCOBOD) and international buyers worked to ensure stable cocoa supply (Laven 2010b: p. 93).

In many respects this move towards public-private partnerships and joint governance arrangements was not new to Ghana, as companies had been involved in steering the sector since the country was still a colony. However, the fact that private sector involvement was rekindled without the full liberalisation process promoted by structural adjustment programmes raises questions about the combination of actor interests which defined the new policy approaches. The following sections examine Ghana’s cocoa policies between 2003 and 2012 to see how international actors, including donors and private corporations, influenced policy goals by providing knowledge and means (e.g. resources and institutions) to the government.

5.2. Cocoa policies and projects implemented (2003-2012)

This section examines cocoa policy goals and the means used to achieve them to identify the influence of international actors between 2003 and 2012. As shown in Table 6.1 below, increasing the productivity and sustainability of cocoa production using COCOBOD were the main goals of cocoa policies between 2003 and 2012. These goals are significantly different from the major push to restructure government cocoa institutions between 1983 and 1995.

Table 5.1 Major cocoa policy changes 2003 – 2012

Years	Policy Changes
1999 – 2001	Ghana Cocoa Sector Development Strategy (CSDS I) had the goals of raising production to 700,000 tonnes, raising producer price by 70% and reducing cocoa export tax by 2004/5, and allow LBC to export 30% of purchases, end price discounts and come up with new ways of encouraging processing.
2001-2008	The 2001 International Cocoa Agreement, 2002 Sustainable Tree Crops Program (STCP), 2002 International Cocoa Initiative (ICI) and 2003 Cocoa High Tech programme all focused on increasing cocoa productivity while ensuring greater sustainability of production. This combined focus on increasing while sustaining cocoa also inspired the 2007 Roundtable for a Sustainable Cocoa Economy (RSCE) and related projects. By 2007 the government also formally opposes any plans for further restructuring COCOBOD or liberalising cocoa marketing. This period also saw the initiation of new private sector-funded development initiatives such as the 2007 WCF ECHOES (2007-2015) project.
2008-2012	After the 2008 financial crises Ghana's agriculture received even more private sector interest, and investments, which also affected cocoa. The 2008 Cadbury Cocoa Partnership (CCP) and 2009 WCF-Cocoa Livelihoods Programme (2009-2013) further promoted the agenda of increasing cocoa production while benefitting farmers. The government's 2010 Ghana Cocoa Sector Development Strategy II included issues such as certification, child labour and climate change and set goals for increasing production to one million tonnes and expanding marketing to the 'Far East'. By the end of this period issues like sustainability led to the 2012 Environmental Sustainability and Policy for Cocoa Production in Ghana and 2012 Global Cocoa Agenda.

In 2003 Ghana was still recovering from the economic shocks of the late 1990s. One of the tactics used by the government to improve terms of trade and access to foreign exchange was to support increases in cocoa production. In order to increase production the government used the tried and tested approach of increasing the producer price, which it raised by 45% between 2001 and 2004 (Teal et al. 2006: p. 5). Total recorded cocoa production doubled in response to higher producer prices, but this increase is at least partially credited to cocoa being smuggled from neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: pp. 204-05). Although Ghana may also have benefitted from exporting smuggled cocoa, regional instability also had a destabilising effect on the country (World Bank 2004: p. 24).

Government control over state institutions (e.g. COCOBOD) enabled the achievement of CSDS I goals of increasing producer prices and total cocoa production. The government used producer prices in combination with spraying programmes to increase total cocoa production (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011; Laven 2007). The continued direct government engagement in both cocoa production and in marketing highlights the *control of the state* in the sector. These policies contradict the type of 'free-market' economic theory promoted by donors during structural adjustment programmes. The policy decisions also seriously question whether the influence of international actors in the 1980s had any long-term impact on cocoa policies. However, after 2003, the decision to use direct government interventions in order to increase cocoa production and productivity was also not met with significant international protest.

The increase in total production that came as a result of price changes did not have the same effect on productivity, however, and increasing yields on cocoa farms proved much more challenging (Vigneri 2008: p. 32). The challenge of increasing cocoa yields in Ghana is compounded by the fact there are few incentives for producers to use inputs, and many farmers choose to farm new land instead of investing in productivity. In 2003, COCOBOD initiated the 'Cocoa High-Tech' programme with the objective of increasing fertilizer use to a minimum of 5 bags per hectare. Cocoa High-Tech gave farmers fertilizer loans, however, low repayment rates caused the programme to collapse after one year (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 210). Subsequent studies found that farmers may not realise enough difference in the price received from their cocoa after applying fertiliser to make these lending schemes viable (ibid).

In order to process the increase in cocoa production, a five year programme was initiated in 2004 with the goal of rehabilitating the Cocoa Processing Company and doubling its processing capacity (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 214). One of the risks of greatly increasing cocoa production, even by smuggling, is that cocoa quality can slip and jeopardise the 'Ghana premium' that the country's cocoa receives abroad. In order to ensure that quality was not eroded, COCOBOD implemented a new policy to pay half-price to LBCs for sub-standard 'purple' beans, which are starting in 2005 (Laven 2010b: p. 89). In this way, the pressure to ensure quality was largely passed on to LBCs, who were the ones penalised for collecting poor quality cocoa. To ensure quality, the LBCs in turn relied increasingly on the support of buyers' associations (ibid). Given the pressure on LBCs to establish strong relationships with producers and ensure quality, it is perhaps not surprising that in 2011the market was dominated by five buying companies with the expertise to manage these demands (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 209).

In addition to using price as an incentive to produce, the Kufour government continued to promote the uptake of new technologies and inputs increasingly through public-private partnerships. After the limited success of the 'Cocoa High-Tech' programme, Wienco Ghana Limited, an agro-input company, attempted its own approach called the "Abrabopa package", a package of agricultural inputs which proved successful at increasing cocoa yields under test conditions (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 210; Opoku et al. 2009). The Abrabopa package was tested in the Western Region of Ghana for two years, starting in 2006, before it led to the establishment of the Cocoa Abrabopa Association (CAA) in 2008 (CAA 2014).

It is difficult to attribute the rise of 'public-private partnerships' to any single political or economic theory or agenda (Schäferhoff et al. 2007). In many circumstances, PPPs aligned with international agendas to promote private sector development. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the term PPP denotes a wide range of different approaches and is often promoted because it is seen by many as middle ground, or ‘Third Way’, between those interested in promoting economic liberalisation and those wishing to uphold a role for the state in markets and production (Flinders 2005). The PPPs promoted by the government in the 2000s appear to be mostly neo-statist, which is not surprising given the strong state involvement in cocoa. In many ways, using PPPs as a means for achieving goals such as increased productivity and sustainability is also nothing new, considering that cocoa production in Ghana had originally been governed through a partnership between the colonial British government and private European cocoa industries (Beckman 1976; H.M. 1939).

In 2007, the sustainable cocoa agenda sparked new agreements and action on behalf of public and private stakeholders. The First ICCO Roundtable for a Sustainable Cocoa Economy (RSCE 1 2007) was hosted by the government and COCOBOD and held in Accra (ACC 2010: p. 4). The RSCE process linked back to the 2001 International Cocoa Agreement and brought together industry leaders and governments engaged in the cocoa industry. Commodity roundtables usually exclude governments in order to provide a more neutral venue for establishing industry standards, but the inclusion of governments in the RSCE 1 was uniquely different in this respect (Brassett et al. 2010). The RSCE 1 shows how strong an influence Ghana’s government has on the cocoa sector globally. The uniqueness of the cocoa sector having an industry roundtable where governments engage directly in setting industry standards is significant and illustrates the continuation of state control in the sector (Brassett et al. 2010).

The RSCE 1 resulted in the Accra Agenda for Enhancing a Sustainable Cocoa Economy, which initiated a process for promoting cocoa production based on three principles: “social responsiveness (people), sound environmental management (planet) and economic viability (profit)”(RSCE 2009). The RSCE 1 was followed by a second Roundtable in 2008 (RSCE 2) and a subsequent series of national roundtables (NRSCEs). Ghana’s first NRSCE, held in 2010, was supported by the Africa Cocoa Coalition (ACC), Netherlands based Tropical Commodities Coalition (TCC), COCOBOD and Armajaro International (UK), which shows how the ‘joint governance’ approach continued to evolve in cocoa (ACC 2010).

As a consequence of the sustainable cocoa production and quality control agendas, there was an increased focus on the traceability of cocoa from farm to consumer, as well as on fair trade, organic, and other certification schemes. The industry-supported World Cocoa Foundation (WCF) funded many projects in Ghana, including two phases of the Sustainable Tree Crops Programme (Phase I 2003-2006, Phase II 2007-2011). The Empowering Cocoa Households with Opportunities and Educational Solutions (ECHOES 2007-2015) initiative was jointly funded by the WCF and USAID to “strengthen cocoa-growing communities in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire by expanding opportunities for youth and young adults through relevant, gender-integrated education” (WCF 2012).

In many ways, the increasingly common ‘joint governance’ approach fits both the needs of the government and private international actors. For example, removing child labour from the cocoa supply chain requires serious consideration and improvement in the living standards of cocoa producers. Essentially the need to improve living standards requires some form of wealth redistribution, which could be accomplished by further increases in produce price and support to education. However, instead of implementing a series of new state-managed redistributive cocoa policies, the government increasingly partnered with private actors to support cocoa producers through projects such as ECHOES (WCF 2012). As was witnessed in rice in the 1980s, international actors increasingly provided the means needed to improve the lives of the poor. The only major difference is that in cocoa, in the 2000s, private companies instead of donors or NGOs increasingly filled this role.

Private sector engagement in Ghana's cocoa sector was also facilitated by international actors such as the IFC, which worked with banks such as Stanbic Ghana to ensure cocoa buying companies had access to credit (World Bank 2013a: p. 36). In 2009, the Cocoa Abrabopa Association became the first growers' organisation to received UTZ certification for sustainable cocoa farming, a certification scheme originating in South America (Nuwati 2010). The spread of certification schemes is another way in which international agendas, such as sustainability, were implemented by the private sector across cocoa producing countries.

International private actors led efforts to encourage sustainable cocoa production in Ghana that were largely in line with Government policy goals, but were not always sanctioned directly by COCOBOD. Wherever possible, private multinational companies were investing in their own future in Ghana. Companies such as Cadbury invested millions in the 2000s to sustain cocoa farming in Ghana (Laven 2010a: p. 67). To encourage multinational companies to move their cocoa processing operations to Ghana the government introduced a policy that local processers were able to purchase beans from the low season at a 20% discount (ibid: p178). Between 2004 and 2009 several major processing companies, including Barry Callebeut, Cargill and ADM invested in new grinding facilities in Ghana.

However, surveys carried out by Anne Laven in 2003 and 2005 found that despite companies moving operations closer to farmers, the government and COCOBOD remained firmly in control between local and international private actors (Laven 2010a: pp. 67-68). This policy was deliberate and companies that attempted to circumvent COCOBOD faced obstruction. This can be seen in an early attempt by non-state actors to introduce organic cocoa that was halted by COCOBOD. COCOBOD then later partnered with Agro Eco and the Louis Bolk Institute to facilitate the government-led introduction of organic certification in 2006 (ibid: p101). The Dutch Rabo Bank also faced similar opposition from COCOBOD when it attempted to introduce new credit facilities for cocoa in Ghana outside of government banking (Laven 2010a: pp. 168-69).

The policy of maintaining control over private initiatives illustrates that the government did not lose the will or means to intervene in the cocoa sector after structural adjustment. The government's decision to maintain control over cocoa may also explain why after 2003 it was decided to discontinue the further liberalisation of cocoa marketing. The decision to remain in control of cocoa marketing is partially explained by the "sizeable dividend transfers from the Cocoa Board" for its budget (World Bank 2010: p. 71). In this way, cocoa continued to be a source of necessary funding to implement a much wider range of agricultural and other policies, although, as discussed later in the political economy section, the relative importance of cocoa to the government budget had significantly reduced.

The global food and financial crises in 2007 and 2008 put significant pressure on the government to invest in domestic food production. After the 2008 food and finance crises, policies focused on non-export food commodities, such as rice, became increasingly important. One of the government's major responses to the food crises was the introduction of fertilizer vouchers. When introduced, care was taken to make sure that the vouchers would not qualify for the types of fertilizer used for cocoa, which did not meet food security policy goals (World Bank 2010: p. 18). However, the 2008 food and financial crises also resulted in a global surge of interest in agriculture as both an investment opportunity and driver of economic growth. As a result, cocoa, despite not being considered important to food security, received a boost from higher global commodities prices and new investors interested in diversifying their portfolio.

When NDC candidate John Atta Mills was elected as president in December 2008, policy priorities were slowly shifting towards food security and new opportunities presented by the discovery of oil. The Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA 2010-13) adopted an agriculture-led approach, but with the goal of moving away from cocoa dependency and towards cereals production (World Bank 2013b: p. 1).

However, cocoa also received a boost in government interest and support after the discovery of oil in 2007. Ghana became greatly concerned with the case of cocoa in Nigeria, a story which had also been part of the rationale for not dissolving COCOBOD, and oil loomed as both an opportunity and threat. In 2010, Minister of Finance Dr. Kwabena Duffour reflected on the decline of Nigeria's cocoa industry which he saw as a result of "massive increases in imports" and "large growth in non-farm employment" (Daily Guide 2010). As such, the further development of oil in Ghana was accompanied by measures, or at least intentions, to protect cocoa.

In light of new global agendas and domestic priorities, the government decided to review and develop a second Ghana Cocoa Sector Development Strategy (CSDS II) in 2010 (Ghana Cocoa Board 2013). The CSDS II was intended to be aligned with the GSGDA and FASDEP and set a goal for increasing production to one million tonnes and ensuring that 60% of cocoa was processed in Ghana by 2012-2013. However, the focus of CSDS II shifted away from topics like research and extension towards more politically sensitive areas including the traceability of cocoa, organic certification, climate change and the future impact of oil on the cocoa sector. In addition, international and governmental concerns for the sustainability of cocoa production and the need to address the negative image of child labour required the inclusion of these issues in the CSDS II (Ghana Cocoa Board 2013). New policy goals included expanding market opportunities in the 'Far East' and speciality cocoa.

Goals that carried over from CSDS I to CSDS II included the push to end preferable treatment for local processing companies, which included discounts for purchasing beans in the light season. The use of financial incentives to attract investment had been controversial amongst international actors and was listed in both Strategies (CSDS I and CSDS II) as an activity that needed to end (Ghana Cocoa Board 2013). However, the mere fact that the practice is referenced in both Strategies highlights how the policy had not changed for more than 10 years, which brings into question any serious resolve to stop. The government's decision to repeatedly include policy goals on paper that are then not implemented casts doubt about the government's intentions, leading to the suspicion that they may have been included only to appease other influential actors.

A policy that was no longer included in CSDS II was permitting licensed buying companies to export 30% of their purchases. Instead, the CSDS II upheld the Cocoa Marketing Company as one of the strengths in the sector. It is not very surprising that CSDS II makes no further mention of licensed buying companies being permitted to export cocoa (Ghana Cocoa Board 2013). In spite of the preferences of some donors and LBCs, the liberalisation of cocoa marketing appears to have already been on the decline since 2003 (Laven 2010a: pp. 85-86). In 2007, the discovery of oil may have slightly reduced the importance of cocoa in terms of future government resources, but it also increased pressure on the government to maintain some control over cocoa and to ensure that oil earnings would benefit cocoa farmers. The need to maintain government control over cocoa and oil both could easily have encouraged the government to *preserve state institutions* and to avoid further liberalisation.

In 2012, Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana both committed to the Global Cocoa Agenda, "Roadmap for Achieving a Sustainable World Cocoa Economy", which was the outcome of the 2012 World Cocoa Conference (ICCO 2012). The Agenda came out of a process that included RSCE 1, RSCE 2, and the 2010 International Cocoa Agreement. The Agenda intended to coordinate efforts by cocoa farmers, governments, the private sector, and civil society towards improving sustainability from production to consumption. After the Agenda was launched, efforts made to complete Ghana's CSDS II reflected these commitments but it is not clear that they altered any policy.

Overall, between 2003 and 2012, cocoa policy goals and the means used to achieve them changed significantly. Cocoa sector liberalisation, an agenda heavily promoted by international actors in the 1980s and 1990s, was largely abandoned by the government in the 2000s. An initial policy to allow licensed buying companies to export 30% of their purchases appears to have been a last attempt towards liberalisation. However, government involvement in the cocoa sector did not deter private sector investment, and PPPs became commonplace.

Pressure to increase production and productivity while simultaneously addressing issues like child labour and sustainability forced the government and private sector to work together. As a result, policy goals and the resources used to achieve them became increasingly linked to the interests of international cocoa processing and purchasing companies. However, when private actors tried to circumvent the government, COCOBOD reasserted its control. Therefore, despite the shift towards policies that were seemingly aligned with private agendas, the government maintained its position and *used state institutions* to control private activities. The following section takes a look at how this shift towards more neo-statist governance approaches involved changes in the inclusion or exclusion of different actor communities in cocoa policy processes.

5.3. Cocoa policy process (2003-2012)

This section looks at the 2003 to 2012 period to identify if and when new actors and communities were included in policy processes. The policy process is examined as interconnected stages (e.g. *identifying policy problems, establishing agendas, selecting policy options, making policy decisions, mobilising resources, implementing policies,* and *evaluating policy outcomes*) that occur in context with specific orders and involve groups of different actors. The biggest change that appears to have affected cocoa policy in Ghana was the growing concentration of power and resources in an increasingly smaller number of multinational cocoa trading, processing and purchasing companies. This section examines policy changes to see which policy process stages included or excluded private companies and other cocoa actors.

The governance structure put in place for cocoa under structural adjustment (see Chapter 4) was not altered much between 2003 and 2012. Cocoa agendas remained under the ultimate control of the elected government and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Implementation of cocoa policy remained the responsibility of COCOBOD, and its subsidiaries and divisions. However, the importance of cocoa to policy meant that policy decisions like setting the producer price were under close government scrutiny. As explained by a member of the Cocoa Pricing Review Committee (Interview GH27 2011):

> "Because COCOBOD is self-financing, it even gives money to government; the Board is quite powerful and decides on many issues. But, I also served on the cocoa sector, Cocoa Pricing Review Committee, which brings out the price. The government gets involved in that. Ok, the government doesn't leave it to only us. Anytime the things going to be announced, the last day when we have our meeting, the Ministry of Finance gets involved, to make sure that the decision that we arrive at it is politically correct and financially also good for the government and for cocoa board. So, there is quite a bit of involvement of the government, they don't leave it only to COCOBOD."

As explained above, COCOBOD, including the Pricing Committee, maintained a close relationship with the government. Policies such as changes to the producer price appear to serve two purposes: 1) ensure sufficient incentives for farmers, both in economic and political terms, and; 2) ensure that production and pricing continued to support the wider government budget. However, the continued use of COCOBOD for achieving economic and political policy goals did not prevent the government from fostering partnerships with the private sector.

International cocoa companies have played a role in identifying problems and establishing agendas since Ghana was still under colonial rule, and this did not end during the period examined. However, it does appear that the influence of IFIs reduced after 1995, which was at least partially due to COCOBOD's ability to access private finance. Yet it seems that policy agendas and selected options were increasingly reflected industry and government needs, including the need to uphold an image of ethical sourcing and sustainability.

After the 2000 reports of child labour being used in cocoa supply chains, companies were forced to find new ways of tracing and managing their relationship with farmers. The establishment of new foundations, farmer associations and certification schemes undoubtedly generated information and interest in the welfare of Ghana's cocoa farmers. However, it is unclear to what extent this altered policy decisions or the distribution of resources. The government's decision to host RSCE 1 seems to indicate a desire to promote a pro-active global image on issues such as sustainability. The RSCE process involved representatives "cocoa farmers, cooperatives, traders, exporters, processors, chocolate manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, governmental and non-governmental organizations, financial institutions, as well as donor agencies"(ICCO 2007). However, there is only limited evidence that this translated into policy decisions that focused on sustainability.

Stakeholders engaged in identifying policy problems for the first CSDS included representatives from "government officials, farmers, cocoa buyers, and experts in areas such as finance, processing and marketing"(Ghana Cocoa Board 2013). The outcome of this consultation process was a selection of policy issues that fit more traditional neoliberal agendas such as increasing competition in cocoa marketing. This would signify at least some level of continued influence from international agendas on the selection of Ghana's cocoa policy. Likewise, the second Cocoa Sector Development Strategy (CSDS 2), identified issues like ending child labour which was also heavily promoted by international actors, but the strategy faced significant delays in finalisation. However, the fact that Ghana both ceased to further liberalise cocoa marketing and that CSDS II faced serious delays raises questions about the extent to which externally driven agendas were actually translated into policy, beyond just on paper.

When the government faced economic hardship in the late 1990s, it reverted to policies such as the government-identified, selected, resourced, and implemented 'Cocoa High-tech' and mass spraying programmes that did not need donor support (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011; Laven 2007). Similarly, although the government appears to have attracted foreign direct investment for cocoa processing facilities, this does not appear to translate into a complete shift in power relationships between the government and private sector. Instead, COCOBOD appears to promote international private sector interests as long as they do not undermine government interests. This is demonstrated by the decisions to block private investment in areas such as organic certification until such time when COCOBOD itself was included in a ‘public-private partnership’(Laven 2010a, 2010b). Likewise, some licensed buying companies that desired more freedom to export were frustrated by the end to liberalisation after 2003 (Laven 2010b: pp. 86-87). The preference for public-private partnerships appears to have ensured that the government only implemented policies in a manner that adhered to their own agendas, even if that clashed with international private or donor interests.

Furthermore, the government’s relationship with farmers and cooperatives does not appear to have changed much since the end of structural adjustment. The farmer cooperative Kaupa Kokoo Limited, which had long received support from COCOBOD, continued to benefit from preferential treatment and their ability to obtain a fair trade label in the 2000s. Likewise, the Cocoa Abrabopa Association, which was initially set up by the private sector, also maintained relations with COCOBOD and became the first association to be permitted organic certification (Opoku et al. 2009). It therefore appears that the overall relationship between the government and farmer cooperatives continued to be mutually beneficial, as long as the cooperative was also promoted by COCOBOD.

However, many cocoa farmers in Ghana remain poor even though the cocoa they produce also funds government activities in other sectors, which begs the question whether Rawlings or any other government leaders were serious about giving farmers their “due share” (Breisinger et al. 2011: p. 6; Rawlings 1999). In this way, policy agendas and selected options appear to be only partially influenced by the needs of cocoa farmers, mostly in that they require a basic level of government or private sector support to maintain production. The practice of ‘stakeholder consultation’ continued in much the same way as it did during structural adjustment, which appears to be largely symbolic. It does not appear that the government became any more responsive to farmer needs than it had been before. Efforts to improve the lives of farmers by improving services like education seem to be backed by the government but financed by the private sector and the foundations they created (WCF 2012). The only clear efforts to get farmer support were the periodic increases in producer price, which were also largely aligned with election promises.

When the government came under pressure to increase access to foreign exchange, it did so by mobilising state support to cocoa production without solely relying on external support (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011; Laven 2007). However, when the government was forced to confront child labour in the cocoa supply chain it turned to the private sector and foundations for assistance. This preference for partnering with the private sector to mobilise resources to address policy agendas driven by international actors, such as the U.S. congress and UN-ILO which pushed to end child labour in cocoa, shows how the government chose to support international agendas only to the extent that it does not undermine its own interests in the sector (Payson Center 2011; WCF 2012). If cocoa industries wanted to promote an agenda in Ghana this was largely permitted so long as it did not challenge government interests or control over the sector.

The increased use of public-private partnerships represents a slight change in policy implementation. This mode of implementation was largely used in cases where the government and COCOBOD were comfortable allowing private sector involvement. Likewise, the decision to, at least temporarily, combine cocoa extension-services with those provided by the MOFA was a change in institutional arrangements from the previous implementation approach. However, because cocoa decision-making authority remained firmly under COCOBOD and the Ministry of Finance, the government's attempt to cut costs by combining extension services does not appear to have altered the overall policy process (World Bank 2010: p. 14). The power to start, change direction or stop policy implementation remained within COCOBOD and under the MOFEP.

Many of the donor and government-led evaluation processes stayed the same in Ghana during the period examined. Where development assistance was used in cocoa, whether through the government or NGOs, there remained strong international donor involvement. This is true for projects such as the Wienco and TechnoServe led Cocoa Abrabopa Association, which received funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and U.K. Department for International Development (DFID). The effect of Cocoa Abrabopa Association membership on Ghanaian farmers was subjected to an impact evaluation carried out by the University of Oxford's Centre for the Study of African Economies (Opoku et al. 2009). As such, the decision to evaluate remained tied to the interest of those funding interventions, and carried out by non-Ghanaian consultants.

However, increasing global concern over the use of child labour in cocoa also led to new efforts to monitor Ghana's compliance with international protocol. After the launch of the Harkin-Engel Protocol, which inspired the creation of an International Cocoa Initiative to end child labour, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) contracted Tulane University to provide "Oversight of Public and Private Initiatives to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child Labor in the Cocoa Sector in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana". This project involved the following activities:

> Since the start of the Tulane-USDOL collaboration in October 2006, Tulane has implemented several representative population-based household surveys of child labor in the cocoa sector, examined efforts by the international cocoa/chocolate industry and the governments of Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana to establish child labor monitoring, certification and verification systems, studied remediation activities and other interventions against…Tulane's research findings are reported in annual reports to the U.S. Congress, which are also made available on Tulane's project Website (Payson Center 2014).

As described, Tulane University was contracted to monitor progress towards implementing an international protocol that had strong backing from U.S. Congress. As such, failure to implement the protocol reflected badly on the reputation of companies purchasing cocoa from Ghana, and was a particularly pressing concern for companies selling cocoa to U.S. markets. The pressure felt by companies such as Hershey, who have a strong presence in the U.S., may explain why initiatives to provide education and improve the lives of cocoa farmers appear most prominently supported by the industry-funded World Cocoa Foundation. As such, private efforts to improve the lives of cocoa farmers in Ghana could also be motivated by consumer preferences in the U.S. and elsewhere.

Overall, the shifts in Ghana's cocoa policy process between 2003 and 2012 appear to be primarily linked to international pressures to ensure Ghana provided reliable and sustainable cocoa supply. Some of the most prominent changes are the increased involvement of private companies in designing and implementing initiatives to address the standards of living and the access to services for farmers through public-private partnerships. It appears that the government welcomed public-private partnerships, but was much less supportive of initiatives they were not participating in. The pressure on U.S. politicians and chocolate companies to address child labour appears to have introduced and strengthened the international governance of cocoa in Ghana. The growing pressure on companies to be able to trace cocoa from its source also appears to have motivated them to get more involved in cocoa policy implementation and evaluations. The following section examines the political economy for cocoa to better understand the incentives for the observed changes in policy and policy process.

5.4. Multi-levelled political economy for cocoa (2003-2012)

This section examines the key political economy changes observed at the local, national and international levels to better understand how economic drivers may have affected policy. In 2003 Ghana was at the tail end of a period of economic difficulty caused by high oil prices and low gold and cocoa prices. The effect of this is visible in the government's response, which included efforts to increase cocoa exports, a well-established approach to generating foreign exchange. However, growing concern for the threat posed by dependency on cocoa and gold exports also appears to shift policy agendas away from cocoa and towards becoming more food secure, and to diversifying foreign exchange revenue sources. Although the country did not benefit much from the discovery of oil during the period examined, the opportunity to move away from cocoa and gold dependency occurred at the same time that the government's approach to working with the private sector to improve cocoa production gradually softened.

5.4.1. Local-level political economy of cocoa

Despite restructuring the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board and liberalising domestic cocoa marketing, means of cocoa production did not change significantly. The majority of cocoa farmers remained small scale and increases in national production were linked more to expanding the area of cocoa production than to adopting modern techniques ford increased productivity. However, relative political stability and the continued effectiveness of COCOBOD enabled many cocoa farmers to escape poverty, although it is not clear that this was always as a direct result of cocoa-based income (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 206).

By 2005, there were an estimated four million cocoa growers in Ghana, and the sector accounted for as much as 60% of total employment in 2006 (T. Williams 2009: p. 15). Prevalence of poverty amongst cocoa farmers decreased by more than half between 1990 and 2005 and a study by Breisinger found that income generated by cocoa farming benefitted higher-income farms significantly more than poor farmers (Breisinger et al. 2011: pp. 6-7; Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011). Despite the reduction in poverty in Ghana overall, many cocoa farmers in Ghana remained too poor to afford the fertilizers or pesticides that would enable them to increase productivity. A 2004 study found that only between 3.5% and 7% of cocoa farmers adopted new technologies for cocoa disease control, and this low adoption rate was linked to low profitability of cocoa farming difficulties accessing credit (Laven 2010b: p. 90). Figure 6.1 shows how both productivity and total production began to shift significantly between 2002 and 2005.

Figure 5.1 Cocoa production and productivity in Ghana between 2003 and 2012 (UNFAO 2012)



The upswing in production is partially explained by the government's decision to increase the producer price 45% between 2001 and 2004 (Teal et al. 2006). However, given that cocoa trees require 6 years to reach full production, efforts to increase productivity were unlikely to result in such a quick jump in total production. This immediate rise in production is therefore at least partially explained by smuggling cocoa across borders from Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo (World Bank 2004: p. 24).

The growth in total production achieved between 2002 and 2004 was also linked to an expansion in the area planted, but it is interesting to note that this trend reversed between 2004 and 2006 (Breisinger et al. 2011: p. 4). The reversal in the trend towards expansion is partially linked to the efforts to increase productivity, such as the 2001 National Cocoa Diseases and Pest Control (CODAPEC) spraying programme and 2003 'Cocoa High-Tech' programme and subsequent "Abrabopa package" (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 210; Opoku et al. 2009). The steady increase in productivity after 2002 was also linked to the replacement of aging tree stocks, which contributed to nearly doubling yield in some regions which brought the country back in line with average global productivity levels (Ruf 2007: p. 2).

However, access to new technology and support from new initiatives did not benefit all farmers equally. The decisions to restructure cocoa extension services and place them under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture had implications on the relationship between the government and farmers. Although maintaining a separate Cocoa Services Division (CSD) may not have been cost-effective, the decision to combine extension with MOFA appears to have resulted in poorer services. A 2010 study found that extension workers themselves felt the system had been unfairly overburdened, and according to a MOFA representative:

> "MOFA did not ask for cocoa extension. It was thrown at the Ministry without any presidential letter or legislative instrument or parliamentary approval (in effect, it was illegal). MOFA requested for funds and staff to do cocoa extension, neither was provided" (Baah and Anchirinah 2010: p. 57).

The mismanagement of extension services may also help explain the rise of private sector and cooperative-led alternatives. Between 1995 and 2006 there were two major cocoa cooperatives in Ghana, the Kuapa Kokoo Farmer Union (KKFU) and GCCSFA. A 2010 study by Laven revealed issues with both cooperatives, KKFU had faced problems with embezzlement by leadership, and GCCSFA was representing farmers who did not even know they were considered members (Laven 2010a: p. 98). Despite past troubles, KKFU was able to overcome them and continued to gain popularity and recognition for its efforts in fair trade and organics.

The creation of the Cocoa Abrabopa Association (CAA) in 2006 was intended to provide groups of farmers with better access to inputs and training, as well as access to credit (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011; Opoku et al. 2009). However, despite ambitious targets for 50,000 members, CAA had only reached 11,000 farmers by 2008 and there were signs that the support provided was not sufficient to enable farmers to repay loans on time. As a result the CAA had a 40% dropout rate and nearly 17% of farmers were unable to repay debts (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 210; Opoku et al. 2009: p. 7). It also appears that dropout from the CAA was not solely caused by poor repayment rates, as more farmers dropped out than faced problems with repayment. After 2004, yield increases reached a plateaux (Figure 5.1), at least until 2011; and Vigneri and others have found that much of the variation in yield was due to allocation of family labour and weather patterns, and only partially linked to technology (Breisinger et al. 2011: p. 4). The fact that weather explains much of the observed changes in cocoa productivity raises serious questions about the effectiveness of government and private sector cocoa initiatives towards this end.

In addition to initiatives that focused on increasing productivity, much of the variation in total cocoa production is explained by producer prices. As shown in Figure 5.2 below, the price for cocoa dropped in dollar terms in 2000, but then steadily increased between 2000 and 2012. When Ghana decided to revalue the cedi in 2008, which was accomplished by setting a rate of 1 to 1000 for the new cedi, the cocoa producer price in local currency continued to closely follow the dollar value. However, this does not mean that inflation was not negatively affecting the purchasing power of the dollar.

Figure 5.2 Cocoa producer prices in Ghana between 1995 and 2012 (UNFAO 2012)



In an attempt to keep cocoa profitable, the government regularly increased the producer price for cocoa in accordance to its target of offering farmers 70% of the free on board (FOB) price. Yet, even when global prices dropped, the government often maintained higher producer prices, and in the 2004 to 2005 season farmers received 73 percent of FOB, which was above the government target (T. Williams 2009: p. 17). As discussed in the following section on the national-level political economy for cocoa, the producer price was often manipulated for political rather than economic reasons.

The difficulties encountered by COCOBOD and private initiatives when trying to modernise cocoa production and increase yield may also be explained by the relatively low profits achieved from cocoa farming. Increasing the use of inputs such as fertiliser also increases the cost of production. Interviews carried out a cocoa farmer in 2010 point to a perception amongst farmers that cocoa was becoming less profitable over time:

> "…when you compare the price of cocoa to the cost of production I can say the price increase is insignificant. During the time of our fathers a bag of cocoa could buy twenty bags of cement, these days you cannot buy even ten bags from that. My father's proceeds from four bags of cocoa could buy six aluminium roofing sheets; nowadays you cannot get four aluminium roofing sheets from ten bags" (Laven 2010a: p. 96).

As expressed by the farmer above, the increase in cocoa production and prices did not necessarily increase incentives to farm cocoa, as inflation and new economic opportunities pushed farmers to consider alternative sources of income. However, despite the fact that some farmers were struggling, global demand for cocoa increased by 17% between 2001 and 2006 (Breisinger et al. 2011). The high levels of demand were also compounded by continued crisis in Cote d'Ivoire, which increased prices achieved by Ghana and more politically stable producer countries (World Bank 2007: p. 52).

Interestingly, the steady increase in global demand for cocoa may have also decreased the incentive for cocoa farmers to modernise production or worry about quality. The partially liberalised marketing system meant that COCOBOD continued to control producer prices and the Produce Buying Company (PBC) remained a main source to market for many farmers (Laven 2010b). Any increase in competition between licensed buying companies was mostly due to their need to secure access to reliable cocoa suppliers to enable quick turn-around times, which required building strong ties with farmers. The domestic cocoa marketing system meant that farmers never lacked a buyer for their cocoa, no matter what the quality (Laven 2010b: p. 85); a fact which may also help explain why farmers were less concerned about using inputs or spraying their own farms, thus making government spraying programmes even more important.

Growing variability in cocoa quality also explains why COCOBOD and multinational companies became increasingly concerned with traceability and labelling, which are both ways of ensuring quality standards at a distance. COCOBOD's decision to pay less money for purple beans was made in direct response to concerns over the quality of cocoa. Furthermore, the decision by international chocolate companies to engage more directly in the cocoa supply chain, including engaging farmers, reflects a growing interest in exercising more control over production. This had implications for both COCOBOD and the wider community of stakeholders, both of which have interests in how supply chains are governed.

It is clear that the relationship between cocoa farmers and the government continued to evolve between 2003 and 2012. On the one hand, new programmes such as CODAPEC, 'Cocoa High Tech' and spraying programmes reinforced the types of relationships that were commonplace during and after Ghana's independence. However, the decision to stop providing extension through the Cocoa Services Division and increasing rely on public-private partnerships and farmer cooperatives to deliver support hints that the government was willing to further relax some of its control over the sector. The following section examines what changes in the national economy and politics altered the importance of different cocoa policy approaches.

5.4.2. National-level political economy of cocoa

The political economy for cocoa at the national level changed significantly between 2003 and 2012, largely because of the relative significance of cocoa to the economy. Over this period gold moved ahead of cocoa as the number one export for Ghana and the discovery of oil further changed the incentives for ensuring sustainable cocoa production. However, the continued importance of cocoa as a direct and indirect provider of jobs to millions of voters meant it remained important as an election issue. Additionally, growing global demand for cocoa increased the interest of private companies in Ghana's cocoa supply.

As shown in Figure 5.3 below, cocoa export continued to be a significant source of foreign exchange for Ghana between 2003 and 2012. However, the relative importance of cocoa to government income continued a downward trend, from 16% in the 1960s to around 5% as of 2005, but not including the additional cocoa related income tax (Breisinger et al. 2011: p. 6).

Figure 5.3 Cocoa export earnings and quantities in Ghana between 1995 and 2012 (UNFAO 2012)



Given the relative decline in importance of cocoa exports to the government budget, it can be assumed that cocoa production also became less important as a policy agenda, but this does not appear to be the case. The politics of cocoa came to the forefront of public debate during the 2004 and 2008 elections.

Since the return to a multi-party democracy in 1992, political parties have competed for voters in cocoa regions. During elections in the 1990s, the more populist NDC government was supported by many migrant cocoa farmers, who did not own land, while the NPP had greater support from wealthier cocoa land owners living in areas like Kumasi. However, these dividing lines do not appear to have been as strong as originally thought. During the 2004 elections the incumbent NPP was able to gain support from cocoa farmers, including in regions such as Amenfi West, where a majority where migrant farmers (Ghanaian Chronicle 2003b). At the time, an article in the Ghanaian Chronicle stated that:

> “The Sunyani Municipal Chief farmer, Nana Ben Kae, has stated that all farmers in the country, particularly the cocoa farmers would massively vote for the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) in the forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections…The chief farmer, in his appreciation for the government's on going mass cocoa spraying exercise, indicated that, the government's commitment to enhancing the welfare of the farmers had made them feel like they were working in air-conditioned offices”(Ghanaian Chronicle 2004).

This statement by a chief and farmer shows how the image of the NPP amongst cocoa farming communities may have been boosted by spraying programmes. It is unclear if the perspective of Nana Ben Kae is truly representative of all cocoa farmers, as other reports showed an increase in support for the opposing NDC party in traditional NPP areas such as Kumasi (Ghanaian Chronicle 2004b). However, the fact that the NPP won the 2004 elections would suggest that at least a significant number of cocoa farmers supported them.

The period immediately following the 2004 elections saw further increases in producer price, to 70% of FOB, as well as further measures to improve cocoa productivity. The government’s ability to increase the producer price for cocoa at election time was due to the manner in which export earnings get divided between the Ministry of Finance, COCOBOD, and the five public companies managing the sector (CMC, Produce Buying Company, CRIG, Quality Control Division, and Cocoa Processing Company). Whereas COCOBOD and the companies received a margin of the export value, the Ministry of Finance received a 'cocoa export duty' (Whitfield and Buur 2014: p. 136). When the government wanted to increase producer prices it did so by reducing the export duty.

Despite the relatively declining importance of cocoa to the government's budget, it still represented 85% of total government spending on agriculture in 2006 (ibid: p2). The NPP government's decision to prioritise investment in the sector is likely linked to the continued significance of the cocoa for political support, rather than only financial interests. However, it must be noted that few significant new cocoa policies were introduced under the NPP's second term in office. The pressure on the NPP to both increase and control cocoa export may have dissipated slightly with the discovery of new offshore oil fields in 2007. However, the discovery of oil also sparked fear amongst cocoa farmers that Ghana would go the way of Nigeria. In response to these fears the government promised significant new investment in the sector (Daily Guide 2010).

As mentioned earlier, the government's decision to host the RSCE in 2007 may have been linked to interest in maintaining its image as a proponent of cocoa farmers' wellbeing. The RSCE brought together more than 200 participants from 25 countries (ICCO 2007). The focus of the RSCE was widely defined as supporting sustainable cocoa but included specific efforts to address issues such as child labour, which are heavily influenced by international pressures and the Harkin-Engel Protocol. However, the CEO of COCOBOD, Mr. Isaac Osei, denied allegations of child labour in Ghana, stating that "[f]arms are expected to be passed on to another generation and it is therefore the responsibility of the present day farmers to make their children understand what goes on in a cocoa farm"(Ghanaian Chronicle 2007). This decision to both support global labour initiatives and deny claims of child labour fits with the image as a leader in setting cocoa agendas, rather than a complacent participant in externally controlled processes.

Despite rhetoric of being a strong supporter of cocoa farmers, the NPP's untimely decision to enact expansionary fiscal policies threatened Ghana's economic position (Mills 2009). This in turn gave the NDC government a new opportunity to build support and win the 2008 election. The next big wave of policies and programmes came after the NDC was re-elected. The global economic downturn between 2007 and 2008 may explain why not many new government-spending programmes were introduced in the NPP's second term. As shown in Figure 5.4, the 2007 to 2008 global financial and food crises had an effect on Ghana's GDP growth rate (purchasing power parity), which dropped from 5.86% in 2008 to 1.55% in 2009, followed by a recovery to 5.49% in 2010.

Figure 5.4 Development assistance provided to Ghana by the World Bank and IMF between 1995 and 2013 (Global Development Finance 2013)



As shown in Figure 5.4, the quick economic turn-around between 2009 and 2010 may have been helped by a significant increase in use of IMF credit in 2009. According to the IMF, the “macroeconomic environment deteriorated rapidly” in 2008 and as “fiscal deficits widened, inflation accelerated, interest rates rose to around 30%, investors became skittish and began to exit the debt market, and the exchange rate began to depreciate, thereby creating conditions for asset price deterioration”(IMF 2011: p. 14). When John Atta Mills took office in January 2009 he was immediately faced with the tough decision to call back the expansionary fiscal policy implemented by the NPP and focus on cutting spending. In his 2009 State of the Nation Address, President Mills said:

> “In recent months as the foreign exchange inflows have dried up the cedi has come under enormous pressure. Indeed, the decline in the value of the cedi is negating benefits which could otherwise have accrued from low world crude oil prices…We are resolved to achieve an early restoration of stability in the foreign exchange market. This requires that we expand our exports, cut down our import bill and manage our finances carefully and live within our means.”(Mills 2009).

In this address, President Mills clearly sets out the dual agenda of decreasing spending and increasing exports. In many ways this combination of agendas is reminiscent of the pressures faced by Ghana in 1983. However, as shown in Figure 5.5, this time with relative political stability and underlying political and economic structure that was ready to respond and benefit economic changes.

Figure 5.5 National debt between 1995 and 2012 as a percentage of exports (Global Development Finance 2012)



As shown in Figure 5.5, the decision to access IMF credit from 2009 onwards did not result in the levels of debt that had plagued Ghana up until it received HIPC status in the 1990s. After briefly rising to 98% in 2010 debt stock fell back to 74% of export income by 2012. As shown by the steady increase in both import and export activity after 2010, Ghana's positive economic growth was helped by high global prices for gold and cocoa. Cocoa earnings reached U.S. $1.2 billion in 2008, once again exceeding gold (World Bank 2013b: p. 1).

The importance of Ghana's cocoa to the global chocolate industry is also apparent by the steady increase in private sector-led initiatives between 2008 and 2012. As highlighted by Laven (2010b: pp. 86-87), the alliance between the government, COCOBOD and global cocoa buyers was upheld by mutual interest in maintaining a constant supply of cocoa exports. The government benefitted in terms of direct access to foreign exchange and domestic tax revenue. COCOBOD benefitted by maintaining its 5,500 employees and access to nearly 85% of government spending on agriculture. Global cocoa buyers benefitted from sustainable access to quality cocoa. In addition to investing in initiatives focused on the traceability of cocoa, international companies also became increasingly interested in the potential for cocoa processing in Ghana, and processed exports grew from U.S. $83.6 million to U.S. $152.9 million between 2004 and 2006 (Breisinger et al. 2011: p. 6).

The year 2011 marked a significant milestone for Ghana as the country achieved Lower Middle Income (LMIC) status. Achieving LMIC status after a decade of economic growth was significant, especially since it was accompanied with a decline in poverty from 52% in 1992 to 29% in 2006, and 23.6% in 2012. The World Bank credited this economic growth to "rural development and increasing urbanization", "increasing agricultural productivity (notably in cocoa)", and "rapidly growing urban areas characterized by growing service sectors, large numbers of the labour force, including migrants from rural areas" (World Bank 2013a: p. 1). As such, cocoa was re-affirmed as a significant sector for economic development and poverty reduction.

When looking at the national political economy situation overall it is clear that cocoa remained important for many reasons. Cocoa remained a useful source of government finance, albeit relatively less significant to the total government budget. When Ghana wanted to finance the Bui Dam project it used a 20 year sales agreement between COCOBOD and China Eximbank to finance the project (Brautigam 2011: p. 212). In addition, control over cocoa prices remained a useful tool for bolstering support from voters.

Events like the increase in global demand for cocoa, the move towards sustainable production, and private investment in cocoa processing all point to the continued influence of international political economy drivers on cocoa policy decisions. Ghana's continued economic growth and political stability also provided an increasingly attractive environment for private investment in cocoa. However, the government appears to have resisted allowing the private sector to replace COCOBOD in purchasing and service provision.

5.4.3. International-level political economy of cocoa

The international political economy for cocoa over the 2003 to 2012 period seems to be dominated by two related, but possibly competing agendas. First, there was pressure to increase production and keep cocoa prices both stable and low. Second, there was a need to address growing pressure to ensure that the cocoa supply chain was fair and sustainable, as well as free from child labour. This section examines global economic and policy changes to understand how these agendas shaped interest in Ghana's cocoa policies.

The global push to increase cocoa production in Ghana appears to be closely related to global prices and shifts in supply. As shown in Figure 5.6 below, global cocoa prices remained relatively stable and low from their high point in 1984 until around 2008.

Figure 5.6 Global Cocoa Prices between 1984 and 2012 (World Bank 2014)



One explanation for the drop in cocoa prices after 1984 is the push by IFIs and donors (primarily the World Bank) to increase cocoa production in many different countries at the same time in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as by Gibbon et al and in more detail in Chapter 4 (Gibbon et al. 1993: p. 130). However, past studies have also found that cocoa is subject to a 25 year cycle (Bateman et al. 1990). The structural adjustment period in Ghana (1983-1995) corresponded with expanding cocoa production in Africa and Asia and a subsequent 25-year period with overall lower cocoa prices (1984 to 2009). The low cocoa prices also made investment in cocoa production less attractive to the government, which resulted in overall lower productivity levels throughout the 1990s (Ruf 2007).

Lower global prices corresponded with a period of low levels of re-investing cocoa profits by either COCOBOD or the private sector, at least until the late 1990s and early 2000s. More recent work shows that following periods of high prices, including from 1976 to 1984, global production has rapidly increased three to five years later because of new plantings, and newly planted trees continue to produce for nearly thirty years (Bulir 1998: p. 6). Researchers attempting to explain shorter-term price fluctuations have also found a significant effect of policy changes and cocoa smuggling (ibid).

Between 2001 and 2002, global cocoa prices jumped in response to “continuing political and social crisis in the world’s leading cocoa producing country”, referring to Cote d’Ivoire (ICCO 2010: p. 8). After two years of high cocoa prices, the 2004 season saw prices drop as a result of “larger mid crops in West Africa and improving rain conditions” (ibid: p9). It is interesting to note that the liberalisation of marketing systems resulted in a global supply chain where “farm gate prices in most cocoa producing countries have been largely determined by international prices”, whereas those in Ghana are not (ICCO 2010: pp. 14-15). Unlike in liberalised marketing systems, farmers in Ghana received higher and lower than average global price increases depending on COCOBOD policy. The ability of COCOBOD to control prices served both a political (e.g. 2004 elections) and an economic function (e.g. keeping prices steady). Additionally, the international preference for Ghana’s cocoa, as compared to other countries, also remained strongly tied to the quality, maintained by COCOBOD and its ability to trace cocoa to buyers and farmers.

Tracing cocoa and monitoring for issues like child labour became increasingly important in the aftermath of the 2001 Protocol for the Growing and Processing of Cocoa Beans and their Derivative Products (a.k.a. Harkin-Engel Protocol). The Harkin-Engel Protocol was followed by the creation of new industry bodies, such as the World Cocoa Foundation, which is committed to “creating a sustainable cocoa economy by putting farmers first”(WCF 2014). The combination of incentives created by global quality standards, sustainability and human rights is visible in the increased “involvement of multinational companies in upstream activities, including internal marketing, shipping and local processing in cocoa producing countries”(ICCO 2010: p. 22). It also appears to have affected Ghanaian cocoa policy, at least on paper, as shown by the earlier comparisons of the first and second Cocoa Sector Development Strategy (CSDS I and II).

Because cocoa remains primarily a smallholder crop in Ghana, the ability to maintain quality and trace cocoa to its source is dependent on the relationship between cocoa buyers and many smallholder farmers. As noted by Cidell and Alberts (2006), the decision to maintain a strong relationship with farmers increased the ability of COCOBOD to trace supply, while its monopoly on purchasing enabled upholding quality standards (Cidell and Alberts 2006: p. 1002). Laven found that company representatives in 2010 believed the biggest threat to the cocoa industry was "unfounded and disqualifying accusations by consumer groups, NGOs and others concerning the supply of cocoa or other ingredients used in the production of chocolate products" (Laven 2010a: p. 61). The traceability of Ghanaian cocoa therefore benefitted companies concerned with their public image (WCF 2012). Company strategies for overcoming accusations and maintaining quality included moving their processing to Ghana, maintaining close relationships with COCOBOD, and supporting farmers through public-private partnerships and development programmes (Laven 2010b: p. 100-01).

A good example of private sector-led development programmes is the 2008 Cadbury Cocoa Partnership, a partnership between Cadbury and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to "secure its long-term sustainability" by investing in Ghanaian farmers (Business Monitor International 2008). It is interesting to note that multinational development organizations, such as the ILO and UNDP, and multinational companies, such as Cadbury, increasingly partnered to support farmers in Ghana. In many ways this represents a coordinated response to public pressures by both private and public actors. Coordination between donors, multinational development agencies and private sector companies has a long established tradition, as shown by the push towards privatisation during structural adjustment. However, the 2000s saw the rise of new partnerships between the government and multinational companies (e.g. public-private partnerships) that appear to provide a mutually beneficial response to global pressures.

The next big shift in the international political economy for cocoa came as a result of the 2007 to 2008 financial crisis. The financial crisis led to a jump in cocoa prices because "the performance of the commodity sector which had been excellent during 2007 prompted investors to continue pouring money into this sector in the hope of improving their returns and diversifying their portfolios"(ICCO 2010: p. 10). As shown in Figure 5.6, new investment in cocoa appears to be correlated with record high prices. This undoubtedly had implications for both cocoa producing countries and the chocolate industry, as the latter relies on access to cheap cocoa supplies. If speculation has a significant effect, this also questions the extent to which global cocoa price changes can be explained by demand and supply relationships.

When Ghana received Lower Middle Income Country status in 2011 the country was benefitting from high cocoa and gold prices, as well as initial oil exports. Despite this combination of positive economic trends the overall effect on Ghana's trade balance was not as positive, as shown in Figure 5.7.

Figure 5.7 Trade balance between Ghana and the World, the EU, and the USA between 1995 and 1995 (IMF DOT)



President Mills' decision to 'cut down' the 'import bill' starting in 2009 appears to have slowed, but not reversed, the steady decline in terms of trade (Mills 2009). Interestingly, Ghana's economic growth and LMIC status does not appear to have much effect on the country's access to development assistance (see Figure 5.4). Despite a decreasing level of debt, as compare to the percentage of GDP (Figure 5.5), Ghana continued to receive significant support in the form of World Bank IDA commitments and IMF credit. In addition, bilateral support, which totalled more than $1.44 billion in 2008, does not appear to have been affected by Ghana's strong economic growth (OECD 2010). The international development community appears maintain its commitment to Ghana irrespective of the relative poverty levels. There could be many reasons for this, but it appears that international interest in democracy and the image of effective development assistance encourages donors to continue providing support (Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah 2012; Zimmermann and Drechsler 2007). However, as discussed further in Chapter 7, continued development assistance may not have a great impact on cocoa, as development projects focus mostly on non-cocoa growing regions. This is not surprising given that Ghana's remaining poor live primarily in the northern regions, where rice and maize are grown.

Overall, the biggest changes in the international political economy for cocoa occurred because of a shift towards commodities as an investment alternative to financial markets and an increase in concern for the sustainability and ethics of cocoa production. The push for more oversight and control over sourcing and labour practices along the cocoa supply chain led private sector companies to get closer to producers and improve the traceability of cocoa. The 2008 financial crisis encouraged investment into cocoa because commodities were relatively safer investments. These changes had a visible effect on cocoa policy in Ghana. Private investment in cocoa development programmes was welcomed by COCOBOD, as long as they did not directly compete with government interest in maintaining control. Similarly, increases in cocoa prices made it easier for the government to justify increasing the producer prices in line with election promises.

However, shifts in international political economy do not appear to have altered incentives enough for the government to further liberalise cocoa production or allow private companies to replace COCOBOD in marketing or quality control. It is also very possible, as pointed out by Laven (Laven 2010a, 2010b), that maintaining COCOBOD is mutually beneficial to multinational companies and to the government, as both benefit from the existing strong relationships between COCOBOD and farmers, and both benefit from the ability to enforce quality standards.

5.5. Chapter Five Conclusions

This chapter examined the influence of international actors on cocoa policy between 2003 and 2012. The period is significant because events such as the global financial and food crises, and the discovery of oil in Ghana occurred. It is clear that cocoa policy goals and the resources, knowledge and institutions used for achieving them during this period were greatly affected by international actors as well as the political and economic circumstances in Ghana, including changes in the government's financial circumstances and elections.

When Ghana returned to democratic rule in 1992, governments were increasingly pressured to maintain voter support. After Rawlings was elected, cocoa policy goals and the means selected for implementing them remained more or less in line with those the government used at the end of structural adjustment in 1995. However, after Rawlings and the NDC lost elections in the year 2000, Ghana's policy changes appear to have become even more affected by the election cycle, supporting the argument made by Whitfield et al that the level of political contestation affects the interest and behaviour of ruling elites (Whitfield et al. 2015).

Government changes between 2003 and 2012 had an effect on policy, but did not result in the same kind of radical policy adjustments witnessed between 1983 and 1995. Policy changes between 2003 and 2012 further stalled any planned liberalisation. Decisions to halt the liberalisation of cocoa marketing; to re-enact policies that directly supported production (e.g.

cocoa spraying); and promises to redistribute oil revenues to benefit cocoa farmers were all strongly aligned with state-led, as opposed to market-led, developmental approaches.

The continued resilience of institutions like COCOBOD supports the theories of institutional path dependency (Roland 2004). It also attests COCOBOD's continued value as a means for accessing finance and political support (Whitfield and Buur 2014). The poor state of government finances when the NDC government was in 2009 caused the government to enact policies promoting cocoa exports and cutting import costs. In this manner, the survival of COCOBOD and its public companies supports the hypothesis that, if possible, governments will maintain those institutions that enable them to stay in power, even when doing so contradicts international agendas.

However, not all international agendas were ignored by the government. Agendas such as cocoa traceability and the Harkin-Engel Protocol informed debates (e.g. RSCE) and policies (e.g. CSDS I and II). But, instead of using government intervention to achieve these goals, the government increasingly relied on PPPs. The exception may be when looking at COCOBOD's efforts to protect its reputation by strictly enforcing cocoa quality.

The government's decision to use PPPs to achieve policy goals such as sustainable production or to address child labour point to continually evolving relationships that seem to align with the idea of 'neostatism' (Jessop 2002). However, the theory that 'neostatism' is a strategy for governments to withstand 'neoliberalism' does not explain why industry stakeholders continued to benefit from and to support both COCOBOD and the government in maintaining the quality and traceability of cocoa (Cidell and Alberts 2006; Laven 2010b). Instead, it appears that 'neo-statist' approaches to cocoa governance are beneficial to the government and private sector, domestic and international alike. As such, the period witnessed more policies that promoted an *increased role for the state* in cocoa sector governance, without any real decline in the importance of the international private sector.

Changes in the cocoa policy process also reflect the increasingly mutually beneficial relationship between the government and international private actors. The RSCE 1 and the consultation process used for developing the CSDS both represent the continued involvement of many different stakeholders in *identifying policy problems.* However, processes such as *selecting*, *resourcing* and *implementing* a mass spraying programme, show that the decision-making in each stage of the policy process remained firmly under state control. Where there appears to have been increasing international involvement in the policy processes is in *mobilisation of resources* for policies intended to improve sustainability and to end child labour, as well as for the *evaluation* of these same programmes and policies. It is notable that the government protected the power COCOBOD had over cocoa farmers by being selective when supporting international actors' initiatives. When necessary, COCOBOD also challenged initiatives it did not have control over, such as early attempts to introduce organic labels.

The importance of maintaining a strong relationship between COCOBOD and cocoa farmers is easiest to understand when examined through the multi-level political economy lens. At the *local level*, cocoa remains an important source of employment and economic activity for a large number of Ghanaians, which includes both wealthy and poorer cocoa farmers. Because cocoa has remained primarily a smallholder crop in Ghana it continues to support the livelihoods of a very large population (60% of national employment). At the *national level*, this population represents a significant source of political and economic support. The election process in Ghana is heavily influenced by the government's image and actions to support cocoa farmers and related industries, and both the 2004 and 2008 elections were characterised by promises of increases in producer prices. In addition, cocoa exports continued to be a source of foreign exchange earnings, which also increased incentives to maintain control over cocoa marketing.

At the *international level*, cocoa agendas were shaped by the need to maintain cheap supplies of high quality cocoa. The Harkin-Engel Protocol and RSCE processes also pushed Ghana and multinational companies to focus on the ethics and sustainability of cocoa production. In addition, the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 encouraged new investments in commodities markets, pushing cocoa prices even higher, which was beneficial to producer countries like Ghana. As such, changes in the *local, national,* and *international* political economy for cocoa all affected policy decisions. This is why, for example, the government encouraged private sector investment in cocoa processing while also using COCOBOD's control over prices to bolster political support during elections.

Overall, the government's need to balance local and international political economy pressures explains much about the selection of policy goals and means, the shift towards more 'neo-statist' policy approaches, and the inclusion of different actors in the policy process. However, the combination of policies implemented also aligned with international private sector interests in maintaining access to reliable, high-quality, and inexpensive sources of cocoa. The predominant goal of cocoa policies between 2003 and 2012 was to increase cocoa productivity and total production. Developing increased production benefitted international companies but it also supported the government by increasing exports and maintaining political support. To achieve this goal the government implemented a series of input support policies (e.g. mass spraying) and welcomed support from the international companies and foundations. PPPs provided a way for international companies to move closer to cocoa producers and for the government to show commitment to international agendas for human rights and sustainable cocoa production. At the same time, the decision not to further privatise cocoa marketing was important for maintaining control over a flexible source of finance and generating political support from smallholders. In conclusion, although the government maintained significant control over the cocoa sector, which opposed IFI and donor agendas, it did so in ways that clearly aligned with international private sector interests.

Chapter 6. Rice policy between 2003 and 2012

As highlighted in Chapter 4, structural adjustment policies and programmes fundamentally changed the relationship between the government of Ghana, rice producers, and international actors. State-supported rice farms collapsed and smallholder farmers maintained traditional subsistence farming practices. Formal support from extension services also increasingly relied on a growing network of donor-funded and NGO-managed extension programmes (Amanor 2010: p. 10; IFDC 2002: p. 17). To understand how changes made in the 1980s impacted longer- term policy processes, and assess the continued influence of international actors on policy changes, this chapter focuses on the 2003 to 2012 period.

6.1. Consequences of structural adjustment on rice policies in the 1990s

The government's decision to implement structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s led to an overall decrease in government support for Ghana's commercial rice farmers. As described in Chapter 4, structural adjustment included restructuring government institutions that had supported rice and ending subsidies for commercial rice production. These major policy changes significantly affected incentives for commercial rice production, and reduced support for smallholder rice farmers (Interview GH24 2011). Gaps in agricultural services left by state restructure were gradually filled by donor-funded programmes and an increasing number of NGOs (Puplampu 2003). Before looking at rice policy changes between 2003 and 2012, this section briefly highlights some major changes that occurred in the rice sector between1995 and 2003.

The increase involvement of NGO's and donor projects in rice production witnessed at the end of the structural adjustment may have reduced incentives for the government to support productive sectors (Whitfield 2011b: p. 13). The influx of development assistance was supported by new, sometimes contradictory, economic and political theories and altered the political economy for rice production by reducing dependency on domestic agriculture for revenue or food. However, the removal of state support for rice production also led to greater dependency on imported rice to meet domestic consumer demand and reduced the government's ability to adapt to changes in global commodity prices through subsidies or stockpiling. As explained in subsequent sections, the need to regain control over food prices explains many of the government's rice policies implemented after the food crises in the 2000s.

The increased vulnerability that accompanied the collapse of Ghana's commercial rice farms did not go unnoticed by international actors. Ghana's dependency on food imports qualified it as a low-income food deficit country (LIFDC), a category first created by the UN-FAO in the 1970s. Being an LIFDC country acknowledged that Ghana was vulnerable to changes in the cost of imported food and further qualified the country for special development programmes, such as the FAO Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS) which began in Ghana in December 1997 (Coche 1998; FAO 1997, 2003) Being an LIFDC meant the government had difficulties ensuring access to food without external support, but it also provided the country greater financial support. In some ways this is similar to when Ghana became defined as highly indebted (HIPC) and became eligible for great support.

As discussed in previous chapters, the NDC won the 1992 elections by supporting policies that promoted a pro-farmer image. In the run-up to the 1996 elections the NDC launched its Ghana Vision 2020 platform, which focused on increasing national food security:

> "With over two-thirds of the population resident in rural areas a major development goal is to reduce disparities between the incomes and standards of living of rural and urban populations. This will be achieved by judicious allocation of public investment in favour of rural areas to provide adequate economic and social infrastructure and to protect and improve the rural environment"(Republic of Ghana 1995: p. viii).

Whether or not Ghanaians were convinced by the Vision 2020 is uncertain, but Rawlings and the NDC won re-election in 1996.

The negative consequences of being a 'vulnerable' county were felt by the government when global cocoa and gold prices fell in 1998 and 1999 (Dzisah 1999; SEC 2000: p. 21). Despite the drivers of economic hardship being international (e.g. global price fluctuations), the loss of export earnings and a jump in oil prices resulted in significantly increased costs of food in Ghana (ibid). This also increased the cost of living. The rising cost of imports and steadily increasing demand from Ghana's urban consumers put domestic rice production firmly back on policy agendas. However, the restructuring of institutions and the liberalisation of markets made it much more difficult for the government to quickly increase domestic rice production.

In the run-up to the 2000 elections the NDC launched its Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy (AAGDS), which was designed to complement Vision 2020 and focus on improving agricultural production (AfDB 2002: p. 7). The goal of the AAGDS was to increase agricultural productivity by ensuring farmers can access markets for inputs, outputs, and new technology. The AAGDS was supported by the World Bank's Agricultural Services Sub-sector Investment Project (AgSSIP), which was eventually finalised by the NPP after the NDC lost the elections. While these initiatives were being launched in Ghana, the international development community established the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the first of which focused on food security. These events marked a shift in focus towards food security and agriculture both domestically and internationally.

In 2001, the newly-elected NPP government harnessed the agriculture and food agendas by selecting new policy goals for agriculture, and specifically for rice. Incoming Minister of Finance, Mr. Yaw Osafo Maafo, declared that "as far as I am concerned the Vision 2020 programme is dead", and he set out establishing a new development plan focused on food production and jobs (Accra Mail 2001b). However, in spite of rhetoric, radical changes in rice policy appear to have been minimised by the continuation of commitments to international donors and voters.

The change of government did delay the implementation of some donor projects. The funding agreement for AgSSIP, originally intended for approval in 2001, was postponed until 2004 (World Bank 2007). According to the World Bank, the new government "was not committed to the original AgSSIP as designed" and eventually the government "signed the DCA [development credit agreement] on the understanding that once signed, it would be easier to make modifications rather than to insist on an immediate redesign of AgSSIP" (World Bank 2007: p. 20). The government's ability to sign an agreement with the World Bank with the 'understanding' it would later influence the modification of projects implemented is representative of the kind of relationships it had with donors after structural adjustment.

In keeping with the NPP's push to increase food production, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture continued implementing the already planned AAGDS. The AAGDS fit the 'market friendly' approach to development that the NPP promoted and was guided by the principles such as "reliance on the private Sector" and "devolution of responsibilities from Central Government to District Assemblies" (FAO 2005: p. 10). The ultimate goal of the AAGDS was to increase the agricultural GDP growth rate by 6 percent, a goal that became increasingly common across Africa in the 2000s and enshrined in CAADP. The implementation of the AAGDS and AgSSIP, both of which were initiated under Rawlings, is further evidence of continuity in terms of agricultural policy and donor involvement. In addition to AgSSIP focusing on national agricultural production overall, projects like the Inland Valleys Rice Development Project (IVRDP), which was supported by the Africa Development Fund (ADF), focused[13] on improving rice production and livelihoods by working directly through Regional Agricultural Development Units (RADUs) and District Agricultural Development Units (DADUs) (ADF 2001). As such, the movement towards decentralisation was accompanied by international support for regional and local authorities charged with implementing donor-funded rice projects.

[13] IVRDP aimed to increase the production of rice and the incomes for smallholder rice producers, traders and processors in the project area and neighbouring areas. The project components are: 1) Land Management; 2) Credit for Crop Development; 3) Capacity Building; 4) Adaptive research and Surveys; and 5) Project management.

However, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Ghana's national debt continued to grow and accounted for "558 percent" of government revenue, or "77 percent of GDP", when the NPP took office (IMF 2001: p. 7). Ghana's large debt burden may also help explain the government's continued reliance on donor funding for development projects, as a significant portion of revenue was already allocated to debt servicing. Debt also qualified Ghana as an HIPC country (Harrison 2004). To receive debt relief under the HIPC process each country was required to draft a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP). Ghana developed an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP 2000-2002), which was followed by the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 2003-2005). Both the I-PRSP and GPRS were produced in close coordination with the World Bank, which strongly influenced which policies were included (Harrison 2004; Whitfield 2005).

Despite the World Bank's previous claims that rice production in Ghana was uneconomical (see Chapter 4), the 'pro-poor' focus of the GPRS made room for programmes[14] that included specific measures for rice production (NDPC 2004: pp. 62-64). In addition, the GPRS' Core Indicators, used for monitoring implementation progress, included reducing 'food price inflation', which was also "not achieved" by 2003 (ibid: p27). As shown in the next sections of this chapter, food security and rice production became increasingly important policy goals between 2003 and 2012 in Ghana. These goals were also incorporate in to policy agendas by a growing global interest in African agriculture.

The early 2000s witnessed growing global concerns for African agricultural production and food insecurity (NEPAD 2009; World Bank 2007a). Dissatisfied with stagnant and declining production, African leaders established a New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), as explained:

[14] GPRS programmes supporting rice included: 1) Rehabilitation of rice threshers as part of the Agricultural Engineering Services Directorate (AESD); 2) 'Smallholder Credit Input Supply and Marketing Project' (SCIMP) used to support individuals and companies to improve local rice processing, storage and marketing; and 3) the Food Crop Development Project (FCDP) which focused on supporting farmers cultivating cereals such as rice.

> “Faced with the failures of these plans, the ills of the structural adjustment programmes of modernisation and falling growth rates when other regions such as Asia were on the rise, 'a new breed of African leaders' entered the 21st century with proclamations of a re-birth for Africa. It is in this regard that the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is the result of three parallel initiatives… NEPAD was adopted by African Heads of State and Government of the OAU in 2001 and was ratified by the African Union (AU) in 2002”(NEPAD 2014).

The above statement made by NEPAD illustrates both the overarching objectives of the initiative and the dissatisfaction with ‘ills’ of the previous generation’s development programmes. It is interesting to note that despite openly attacking donor-supported structural adjustment programmes, NEPAD continued to receive donor support, which is not surprising given that donors themselves were disillusioned with previous efforts (Cornia et al. 1987).

In 2002, the 22nd FAO Regional Conference for Africa (ARC) set clearer objectives for NEPAD and launched the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme[15](FAO 2005). The 2003 Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security by African Union Assembly of Heads of State, known as the ‘Maputo Declaration’, provided political support for CAADP and committed governments to invest 10% of their national budgets in agriculture and rural development. Given its politicised origins, NEPAD and the CAADP became new symbols of African-led agriculture development.

Around the same time the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development, in Monterrey sparked the ‘aid effectiveness’ agenda, which promotes the idea that development cooperation is more effective if approached as a partnership, in which aid recipients ‘own’ donor-supported development programmes (High-Level Forum on Harmonisation 2003; United Nations 2002). In line with the aid effectiveness agenda, CAADP, an Africa-‘owned’ initiative, was supported by the World Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), World

[15] CAADP’s five pillars include: 1) Sustainable land development and reliable water control systems; 2) Improvement of rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for improved market access; 3) Enhancement of food supply and reduction of hunger; 4) Development of agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption; 5) Sustainable development of livestock, fisheries and forestry resources.

Food Programme (WFP), and UNFAO. According to a consultant to the UNFAO, linking CAADP with national government budget commitments also forced greater donor involvement, especially in countries where donor finance represents a significant portion of the government's agriculture budget (Interview GH18 2011). This reinforces findings from past studies that donor influence increases in relation to the importance of their financial support to governments (Clay and Schaffer 1984; Whitfield 2005).

Ghana initiated its own Food and Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (2002 FASDEP), the year before CAADP. However, as noted by NEPAD, a "review of FASDEP showed that most of the policy's ideas and principles were similar to the CAADP pillars, so it was fairly simple to align it with CAADP"(NEPAD 2011). The observation that policies were already aligned is perhaps not surprising if taken into consideration that the UNFAO was involved in the design of both Ghana's FASDEP and the selection of CAADP pillars (G18 2011). The 2002 FASDEP also provided a sector-wide strategy for combining many parallel development efforts under a single umbrella (Accra Mail 2001a; FAO 2005). The alignment between CAADP and FASDEP illustrates the ability of international actors like the UNFAO to simultaneously influence Africa-wide and country-level development initiatives.

As illustrated by this brief summary of events between 1995 and 2003, international actors (e.g. IFIs, donors, NGOs, etc.) continued influencing rice policies in Ghana, albeit during a decade of neglect for agriculture (World Bank 2009). However, the 2000s witnessed growing global concern for food security and agriculture in Africa, which had profound implications for rice policies in Ghana.

6.2. Rice policies and projects implemented (2003-2012)

This section examines Ghana's rice policy goals and the resources, institutions, and knowledge used to achieve them between 2003 and 2012. The 1990s witnessed growing disillusionment with international aid and purely market-led approaches to achieving development (see Chapter 1). During this period, donors also became increasingly concerned with the role of government institutions in the promotion of private sector development. The World Development Report 2002 claims that public institutions are a prerequisites for economic development (World Bank 2002). The shift from international ‘consensus’ regarding the role of the state in the 1980s to heterogeneous agendas in the 2000s correlates with governments selecting a growing variety of rice policy goals and means in Ghana.

As illustrated by Table 6.1 below, rice as a commercial crop is noticeably absent from policy agendas and donor projects until after 2008. The resurgence of domestic commercial rice production as a policy goal from 2009 onwards is significant in terms of international actor impact on policy changes.

Table 6.1 Major Rice Policy Changes 2003 – 2012

Year	**Policy Changes**
2003-2008	Policies goals focused on reducing the cost of rice imports (FASDEP, etc.), increasing the consumption of domestic rice (Home Grown School Feeding and Health, etc.), food security and improving the productivity and livelihoods of smallholder farmers. Means for achieving these goals largely relied on harnessing donor and government support towards increasing access to technologies (irrigation, new varieties – NERICA, draught tolerant, etc.).
2009 – 2012	The 2007/2008 food and financial crises sparked new interest in commercial rice production as an investment opportunity (e.g. CARD, RSSP, GNRDS, etc.). New challenges like climate and environmental challenges (e.g. saline resistant rice), urbanisation and youth unemployment also appeared in policies. Policy goals continued to focus on reducing the cost of rice imports (e.g. FASDEP II, etc.) and increasing productivity. However, means for achieving policy goals include the continued promotion of new technologies, but now also include the re-establishment of institutions (e.g. warehouse receipt systems, NAFCO buffer stocks, etc.) and organisations (e.g. professional bodies) and relationships (e.g. PPPs) that had not been used to promote domestic rice production since the 1970s.

The year 2008-2009 represents a significant turning point in Ghana’s rice policies. Throughout the 1990s, Ghana’s rice policy goals were subsumed within wider agricultural policies or strategies and mostly targeted towards poor farmers in northern Ghana. This pattern continued into the early 2000s and the first five years examined (2003-2008) witnessed less than half of the government and donor-led rice initiatives as the subsequent four years (2009-2012).

Between 2003 and 2008, the NPP government made little effort to target or directly support commercial rice farmers. Instead, most support to rice farmers came from donor projects. However, increasingly heterogeneous donor agendas meant that projects were also more diverse in terms of their goals and approaches. For example, the 2001 appraisal report for the African Development Fund supported Inland Valley Rice Development project states that it intended to "increase incomes of smallholder rice producers of both sexes, women and men rice traders and processors in the country by increasing the production of good quality local rice"(ADF 2001: p. iv). Environmental concerns became an increasingly common feature in agricultural development projects (Wiggins et al. 2004). And agendas such as gender equality and environmental sustainability were often added on when focusing on farmers in Africa.

In 2003, the government launched the NERICA Rice Dissemination Project (NRDP) to address food security by increasing farmers' access to high-yield rice varieties. New Rice for Africa (NERICA) refers to rice varieties developed in the 1990s by the Africa Rice Centre (AfricaRice), formerly the West Africa Rice Development Association (WARDA), by crossing African and Asian varieties. This process led to 18 NERICA lines, the development of which was funded by donors (primarily the World Bank, The Netherlands and Japan) (Somado et al. 2008). The release of NERICA varieties was supported by the Africa Rice Initiative (ARI), which focused on variety dissemination. NERICA gained recognition amongst donors, who in turn promoted it across much of Africa. However, claims made about NERICA have been questioned by observers who point to discrepancies between the science, developmental impacts, and donor narratives (Orr et al. 2008). Despite the limits of evidence supporting NERICA, donors and the government promoted the uptake of these varieties in Ghana, especially amongst smallholder farmers, as a way to improve food security in poor rural areas.

Interest in food security also led Ghana to participate in the Home Grown School Feeding and Health Programme (HGSFHP) (Republic of Ghana 2011). Following the organization of CAADP, NEPAD, UN-WFP and the Millennium Hunger Task Force, the HGSFHP programme was launched to improve food security and provide a market for small-hold farmers, including rice farmers in Ghana. Ghana was selected as a one of twelve 'pilot' countries. However, a 2007 assessment of the HGSFHP found that the ambition of providing a market to local farmers was largely undermined (ibid: 53):

> First, the decentralized procurement system proposed for the programme has been bypassed. Instead, suppliers and caterers are being used for procurement, with no input from the schools and communities about how the funds are utilized. As a result, the objective of ensuring that school feeding programme partners buy from local farmers to promote increased food production is not being achieved.

Reasons listed for why farmers were unable to benefit included poor access to technology, finance, and the lack of other inputs and infrastructure needed in order for farmers to expand production and take advantage of new market opportunities. Despite challenges, the Tibung community in northern Ghana was able to produce enough rice for schools in their local area, but this was an exception to the norm (WFP 2007: p. 35).

In line with efforts to increase food security for the rural poor in northern Ghana, the 2003 Food Security and Rice Producers Organization Project (FSRPOP) followed with a series of rice development projects financed by France (CSSF 2012: p. 2). FSRPOP intended to "improve the governance of the value chain at the national level through the creation of a rice commodity association assembling representatives of all the different stakeholders of the chain: the Ghana Rice Inter-professional Body" (CSSF 2012: p. 2). In this way, the concepts of 'good governance' and 'value chains' were combined to justify projects that explicitly focused on altering the relationship between the state and the private sector engaged in rice production.

FSRPOP tried to increase rice production by expanding access to irrigation, credit, and input and output markets for ‘farmer based organisations’ (FBOs) (CSSF 2012; Wilhemina 2010). FSRPOP also included a Parboiled Rice Quality Improvement Programme, which encouraged a type of rice processing preferred by northern consumers (ibid). However, because southern and urban consumers do not consume parboiled rice, low demand caused the project to underperform (Wilhemina 2010: p. 97). This failed attempt to link northern rice farmers with other markets illustrates the continued challenge posed by geographic and culinary differences in Ghana. It also illustrates why a ‘value chain’ approach is not always as simple as linking farmers to markets.

In addition to attempting value chain approaches, FSRPOP was also instrumental in setting up cooperative efforts in the form of the Ghana Rice Inter-professional Body (GRIB). GRIB was intended to be an ‘APEX’, or umbrella body, for FBOs and others engaged in the rice industry (Asibey-Bonsu 2012; CSSF 2012). Because GRIB is an umbrella body, members may also be part of the Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana (PFAG), Ghana National Association of Farmer and Fishermen (GNAFF), and many other farmer organisations that had already been established. A review of GRIB highlights that, although national in scope, had limited effect (e.g. two direct beneficiaries) on rice farmers (Inter-réseaux 2007).

The shift in donor preferences from supporting NGOs to FBOs is significant because it shows a gradual change in how farmers were perceived. Donors originally supported NGOs as a way of reaching poor communities in need of basic services and support to overcome economic hardships. By contrast, FBOs are promoted as a preferred way for governments, traders and banks to reach farmers with services and finance, and to access their productive capacity (WFP 2007). Starting in 2000, the World Bank, Department of Cooperatives (DOC) and MOFA all supported the creation of FBOs in Ghana (Salifu et al. 2012). The growing donor interest in value chains and FBOs fit the global push towards formalising and the financing the agricultural production. FBOs in Ghana were also supported by grants provided through a Farmer Based Organization

Development Fund[16] (FBODF), which sought to address "inadequate access to inputs, extension services, credit, marketing, and lack of management capacity" (World Bank 2007: p. 17). As indicated by its focus areas, the FBODF attempted to fill gaps in public extension as well as link farmers to financial institutions. Despite efforts, a 2012 IFPRI study found that the "bulk of the FBOs have not become bankable" (Salifu et al. 2012: p. 12; WFP 2007).

Ironically, the shift towards FBOs also resulted in NGOs such as the Ecumenical Association for Sustainable Agricultural and Rural Development (ECASARD) rebranding themselves as FBOs, as explained by a senior representative (Interview GH24 2011):

> **Question:** "How did you get involved with GNAFF [Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen] and the Peasant Farmers [Association of Ghana]?
>
> **Response:** "That's the point I was coming to. So, with this at the back, so now we have ECASARD here, and then ECASARD was made up of NGOs and then FBOs, farmer based organisations.
>
> Then, in 2002, or was it 2003, my colleagues attended World Food, FAO World Food Programme, FAO in Rome, and it was five years later. So that was when attention started shifting away from NGOs and then coming onto FBOs. So when they came back they said ok, now let us form the Farmers Network..."

As described by the interview, the NGO's interest in forming FBOs was largely motivated by observed opportunities for accessing support and resources. This observation is supported by a 2010 survey of 501 FBOs in Ghana finding that almost all had been formed because of an expectation that they would access financial support from donors or the government (Salifu et al. 2012: p. 5).

After winning re-election in 2004, the NPP finally implemented the delayed AgSSIP, which sought to "increase agricultural productivity and diversification at a rapid pace so that rural incomes will be raised, rural poverty reduced, food security improved and the basis for accelerated overall growth in the economy established on an environmentally sustainable

[16] 326 FBOs were supported by the FBODF.

basis”(World Bank 2007: p. 14). As described, the AgSSIP upheld similar goals as previous World Bank programmes (e.g. ASRP) aimed at increasing rural incomes (World Bank 1995b). However, AgSSIP also included objectives for improving “extension services” and establishing three “viable and operating industry/farmer owned companies” (World Bank 2007: pp. 7-12).

The decision to add extensions services and establish farmer-owned companies to AgSSIP is also significant because it reflects a worldview that re-affirms a role for state agricultural services. It also signals a gradual shift towards increasing government support to commercial agricultural production. As discussed in Chapter 1, growing awareness of the interdependency between good governance, state institutions, and economic growth appears in AgSSIP to have led to a focus on the role of the state in agricultural production. However, it should be noted that by 2007 no viable companies had been established using AgSSIP support.

Although the government and donors took an active role in supporting agricultural research and the spread of new technologies, the NPP made little effort to directly support rice farmers. CAADP encouraged governments to increase spending on agricultural research and technology to improve productivity. Ghana took a leadership role in “NEPAD/ CAADP’s agenda for agricultural technology generation and dissemination" and co-hosted the World Bank funded regional West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP) (World Bank 2007: p. 29). In Ghana, the WAAPP became part of the World Bank funded AgSSIP, and “provided the base for Ghana’s participation in the regional agricultural research agenda” (ibid).

Around 2004, Ghana qualified for funding from the US Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which is administered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) (MCC 2012). The Ministry of Finance and MCC worked together to develop an ‘acceptable’ proposal and established the controversial Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) to implement programmes. Both the NPP and MCC “wanted large visible activities for which they could take credit"(Whitfield 2011a: p. 33). Although not specifically targeted towards rice, MCA support[17] focused on supporting farmer enterprises, including FBOs, and upgrading infrastructure such as irrigation (MCC 2013).

In 2006, donors helped establish the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) (Holt-Gimenez et al. 2006; Orr et al. 2008). Like the first Green Revolution, AGRA was supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, this time in partnerships with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. However, AGRA was soon criticised for its apparent refusal to learn from the first Green Revolution (Holt-Gimenez et al. 2006). In particular, AGRA is accused of pushing Africa towards the use of genetically modified seed varieties (Thompson 2012). Regardless of criticisms, AGRA became an influential supporter of NERICA as well as of other certified seed varieties in Ghana. It also became increasingly involved in promoting the use of licensed agricultural inputs.

In many ways AGRA signalled a much firmer commitment amongst international donors and private foundation to focus on formalising and increasing agricultural production in Africa. Observers note that an important difference between AGRA and the previous Green Revolution is a "long-term intention to replace traditional seeds with new varieties, including genetically modified seeds, for which the patent rights lie with the multinational corporation" (Morvaridi 2012: p. 1197). However, AGRA is not the first attempt by international actors to formalise agricultural input markets. The International Center for Soil Fertility and Agricultural Development (IFDC), based in the United States, had found it increasingly difficult to explain why private sector-led development was not working in Ghana (IFDC 2002):

> Despite 10 years of private-sector involvement in certified seed production, there are a limited number of seed dealers in the system and few private wholesale/ retail traders in seeds for rice, beans, cowpea, groundnut, sorghum, and most

[17] By 2013, the MCA had agreed to fund a $203 million Agriculture Project and $74 million Rural Development Project.

> other crops. Consequently, the formal seed sector is supplying only about 10% of total seed demand, leaving the bulk (about 90%) of seed in the hands of the informal sector (p17).

Reasons listed for the failure of decades of donor efforts to support the private-sector include high seed prices, a "lack of proper awareness of the potential benefits" and "the absence of well-developed large-scale seed enterprises to aggressively promote improved materials" (ibid: p14). The slow uptake of certified seeds also reduced demand for agro-chemicals, meaning private-fertiliser companies were not benefitting from structural adjustment as expected (ibid: p28). The recognition that simply removing state institutions was not enough to create functioning agricultural markets inspired the creation of AGRA, which can function as a large-scale enterprise and establish 'agro-dealer infrastructure' (McMichael 2013: p. 676). AGRA's focus on support for privately owned technologies, such as hybrid seed, illustrates the persistence of capitalist development after structural adjustment, albeit with gradually more state support.

The same year AGRA was launched, the NPP also began implementing a successor to GPRS in 2006, which was re-named as the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II 2006-2009). A second Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II) quickly followed this new strategy in 2007. FASDEP II included goals[18] that explicitly aligned with the MDGs, GPRS II and CAADP (Republic of Ghana 2007: p. 21). FASDEP II goals were to be accomplished through policies that pursued "The New Direction", described as follows (ibid: 17):

> A value chain approach to agricultural development will be adopted with value addition and market access given more attention. Efforts will be intensified to build capacity towards meeting challenges of quality standards in the international market, with focus on increasing productivity along the value chain. While imports will not be controlled by quotas and tariffs; the use of standards to control imports of poor quality produce will be pursued.

[18] FASDEP II focused on: 1) Food security and emergency preparedness; 2) Improved growth in incomes; 3) Increased competitiveness and enhanced integration into domestic and international markets; 4) Sustainable management of land and environment; 5) Science and Technology Applied in food and agriculture development; and 6) Improved Institutional Coordination (ibid: p22).

FASDEP II's 'new direction' fits well with donor and NPP agendas to promote private sector development and ensure Ghana remained engaged in global supply chains.

However, FASDEP II also represents an increased mix of agendas and accepted knowledge about what is needed to promote agricultural development. It requires that all "sector policies and plans will be subjected to Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) while all projects are subjected to Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)" (Republic of Ghana 2007: p. 23). It further states that all "policies and programmes will be designed from a gender perspective, enabling the government to work towards greater gender equality in the agriculture sector"(Republic of Ghana 2007: p. 23). By combining value chains, environmental concerns, and gender equality, FASDEP II pulls together a range of international agendas into a single sector policy.

Between 2007 and 2008, the global financial and food crises also led to a significant jump in the price of rice (Aker et al. 2011). The NPP reacted to the global food crisis by focusing attention on how proceeds from recently discovered oil could be harnessed to benefit domestic agricultural production. NPP candidate Akufo-Addo made the following statement: "We have large chunks of the northern part of our country which could assure us food security in Ghana, if we also go about the planning of the agricultural development there properly"(M. Green 2008). Akufo-Addo's statement was an effort to bolster voter support in northern regions that traditionally supported the NDC.

The year 2008 witnessed a wave of new donor projects focused on increasing food production, including rice. The World Bank agreed to fund a series of four Agriculture Development Policy Operations (AgDPO 1,2,3 and 4), which were aligned with CAADP, METASIP, FASDEP II (World Bank 2013b: pp. 2-3). France also initiated a new Rice Sector Support Project (RSSP) to boost domestic production, a component of which extended support to GRIB. The African Development Bank and IFAD supported a Northern Rural Growth Programme that specifically targeted improvements in the food security and livelihoods of smallholder farmers in northern Ghana (IFAD 2007: p. 2). All of these provided new support to rice production.

In addition, the 2008 Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV) launched the Yokohama Action Plan, which bolstered donor support for CAADP (TICAD 2008). TICAD IV also launched the Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD), an initiative driven by Japan in partnership with AGRA whose main objective was doubling rice production across Africa (JICA 2009). The means selected for achieving CARD objectives were new technology and increased access to inputs such as fertilizer and improved varieties, which fit well with AGRA's mandate. In this manner the Tokyo conference significantly bolstered international support for rice production across Africa.

However, the observed change in NPP rhetoric and a new wave of donor projects was not enough to win over voters and the NDC won the 2008 elections. The combination of international interest in African rice production, the high price of rice imports, and the NDC's pro-farmer image offered a significant opportunity for the government to pursue new policies in 2009. The heterogeneity of donor agendas promoted in Ghana also meant the government had greater freedom to define policy goals and select means based on its own knowledge and agendas.

The change in government was immediately followed by a surge in new government-led investments in domestic rice production. In collaboration with CARD, the NDC government developed a National Rice Development Strategy (NRSD 2009) with the goal of doubling rice production in the country (Government of Ghana 2009). NRDS objectives[19] included increasing national food security, reducing poverty, and attaining "self-sufficiency from sustainable rice

[19] NRDS set objectives included: 1) increase production by 10% annually; 2) promote the consumption of local rice; and 3) promote stakeholder innovation capacity (Ghana 2009: p10).

production”(Government of Ghana 2009: p. 9). The approach[20] selected for accomplishing NRSD goals continued to focus on the ‘value chain’ and supporting ‘commercial’ opportunities for the private sector. Like FASDEP II, the NRSD also acknowledged wider development agendas, including MDGs and growing concerns for environmentally sustainable and equitable development.

The NRDS upheld the theory that access to improved technologies enables farmers to overcome production constraints. As such, the NRDS echoed past attempts by donors and governments to increase production during the first Green Revolution. NRDS’ focus on technology and research is perhaps not surprising given that the task force that wrote the strategy included Ghanaian researchers. However, the NRDS also recognized that land rights, gender inequality, cost and access to inputs, and many other factors were barriers to development (Government of Ghana 2009: p. 7). For example, the NRDS states that “women are the major actors at the small to medium scale [farmer] level” (Ghana 2009: p4-5). In many ways the NRDS upheld similar agendas as previous rice projects and FASDEP II.

However, despite using rhetoric that remained consistent with donor projects, the means selected by the NDC for achieving FASDEP II and NRSD became increasingly state-led. The food crisis created an opportunity for the government and Ghanaian public to openly question market-led policy approaches to increasing domestic agricultural production. A newspapers article at the time notes, the “‘market-based supply and demand’ rhetoric spouted by western institutions is seen to only apply to developing countries; the EU has supported its farmers for years, while the US has been quick to bail out its beleaguered financial system”(Business Monitor 2008). The

[20] NRSD seeks accomplish objectives by: (1) Adopting a value chain approach to agricultural development with emphasis on value addition and market access; (2) Building capacity to meet challenges of quality standards on the international market, whilst focusing on increasing productivity along the value chain; (3) Scale up appropriate land and water management practices in various farming systems; (4) Building stronger partnerships between government and the private sector; (5) Developing FBOs to improve small holder access to services; (6) Enhancing support to commercial farming ventures (Ghana 2009: p9).

obvious double standard between what a donor government promotes in Ghana and what the same government does in its own country to support agriculture directly affected the selection of new agricultural policies (Interview GH21 2011). The ensuing debate fuelled a nostalgic public demand for a return of state supported domestic food production.

A perfect example of the new wave policies that mirrored past state-led efforts is the Block Farm Program (BFP), established in 2009, with the goal of improving the livelihoods and food security of rural poor, specifically the youth, by maximising economies of scale in the mechanisation of farms and by providing subsidised inputs (Angelucci et al. 2013). The BFP began by focusing on a limited number of regions and specific crops, including rice, for which selected areas had a comparative advantage (Benin et al. 2011: p. 75). Although the programme intended to target youth, more than 80 percent of participants were adults above the age of 35, who, on average, farmed larger plots of land. Although the financial sustainability of this approach remained questionable, the programme was viewed as an early success due to increased productivity on farms (Benin et al. 2011: pp. 93-94).

The BFP was further supported by establishing the National Food Buffer Stock Company (NAFCO) in 2010 (Benin et al. 2011: p. 51). NAFCO was setup as an independent company to provide a guaranteed market for farmers growing food (maize, rice, and soya) and thereby increasing domestic production and food security. The consultation body assigned to create NAFCO borrowed ideas like using licensed buying companies (LBC) and a national pricing committee from COCOBOD (Interview GH21 2011). It also borrowed many ideas from its predecessor, the GFDC, and even used its warehouses (Gage et al. 2012: p. 36). By 2012 NAFCO had 73 LBCs that profited from a margin added to farm gate prices, taking into consideration “transportation, sacks, drying, bagging, sewing and handling” (National Development Planning Comission 2012: p. 68). Although NAFCO did not solely target rice, northern rice farmers immediately became a focus for the company (Interview GH21 2011). Importantly for the government, NAFCO also provided a guaranteed market for BFP farms (Angelucci et al. 2013: p. 18).

However, at the time NAFCO was established and began to purchase grain from farmers at guaranteed minimum prices, some donors were concerned that it undermined the viability of the warehouse receipt systems (Interview GH7 and GH21). This was contentious because donors such as USAID were promoting private warehouse receipt systems through the Ghana Grains Council (GGC). According to a USAID report, NAFCO made “traders justifiably wary” and could potentially “distort prices in the future if purchasing agents are allowed to speculate”(Gage et al. 2012: pp. 7, 26). When asked how the warehouse receipts system and NAFCO approach fit together, a USAID-employed consultant to the Ministry explained as follows (Interview GH7 2011):

> **Question:** “GGC is backed by USAID and NAFCO by the Government of Ghana, is there a discussion between NAFCO and GGC about how to make things compatible?”
>
> **Response:** “Well, what we are saying is that for now there is room for both, what we will be working towards eventually, you know, and I have a paper on that, is a commodity exchange. Now you need to put the building blocks, I mean you need to buy time with the NAFCO type of aid, to get the farmers to know how to increase productivity, the quality control and that sort of thing, because a commodity exchange has certain characteristics, which you must actually develop, it doesn’t come like that.”
>
> **Question:** “So, is the discussion between initiatives, because you are a middle man, would you ever talk to USAID about NAFCO?”
>
> **Response:** “Well yeah, sure, in fact, we have asked them to do an assessment of NAFCO. I mean, we operate a very transparent and open system, but we know that you cannot just control a commodity exchange, you need to develop it, you need to put a parameters, the right parameters, in the right place, over time, but we are not going to, since we are accelerating our main objective, our main objective is to accelerate the agriculture modernisation and commercialisation of agriculture. We are not at that point yet, to let everything, you know, leave everything to market forces, but we are moving towards that in a systematic way. We have asked USAID to evaluate the operations of NAFCO, but the thing is that we knew that it would help the process, so we put that in.”

The above interview demonstrates a deep scepticism for ‘market forces’ as a means for achieving ‘modernisation’. NAFCO buffer stock is portrayed as a necessary step towards building a sector capable of benefitting from a warehouse receipt system. However, this attempt to reconcile the two approaches does not address the fundamental issue that a commodity exchange cannot be profitable without market fluctuations.

In 2009, Ghana signed the ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) compact, deepening its commitment to CAADP. Under CAADP, regional economic communities (RECs) were charged with coordinating regional efforts. This included signing a ‘compact’ affirming the country’s commitment to allocating 10 percent of government spending on agriculture. The ECOWAP Compact also re-affirmed Ghana’s commitment to align government and donor efforts towards achieving policy goals under FASDEP II and the soon to be finalised Medium Term Agricultural Sector Investment Plan (METASIP) (Republic of Ghana 2009). In 2010, the government officially launched METASIP and the Accelerated Agricultural Modernization Policy 2011-2015. The METASIP further promoted investment in Ghana’s agriculture and upheld commitments to CAADP and the ECOWAP.

When the METASIP was finalised in 2010, NAFCO was included as one of the initiatives needed to prepare Ghana for ‘natural disasters’ and ‘emergencies’ (Ghana 2010: p. 25). In addition, the METASIP set out to achieve the CAADP goal of 6 percent annual sector GDP growth. The METASIP acknowledged thirteen donor-funded rice projects and set clear objectives for rice, including value addition, improving rice productivity, addressing nutritional deficiencies, reducing post-harvest losses, mechanisation, and import substitution (Ghana 2010). The means selected for achieving these goals involved access to improved technologies, investment in rice breeding, improved storage, facilitating private agricultural mechanisation service centres (AMSECs), and engaging more directly in marketing (ibid). As such, the METASIP helped increase government commitment to supporting domestic rice production even further.

In 2010, the GPRS II was replaced by the GSGDA (2010-2013). The World Bank viewed the GSGDA as an "agriculture-led strategy to diversify the economy away from its dependence on cocoa and toward cereals"(World Bank 2013b: p. 1). As explained by the World Bank, the GSGDA recognised that growth will come from "activity in the private sector, supported by adequate public investments, institutions, and policies"(World Bank 2013b: p. 1). By connecting private sector growth to state capacity, the PPP agenda was reinforced in rice policy. In reference to private sector inclusion, the GSGDA states that the "Government will assist the private sector to build capacity" and encourage partnerships "between the private sector and District Assemblies"(Republic of Ghana 2010b: pp. 35-36).

In line with the shifting perspectives on the role of the state and private sector in rice production, the Government's 2010 "Request for Financial Assistance" to support agriculture highlights its intentions to expand public services (Republic of Ghana 2010a: p. 3):

> The role of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) is necessarily changing as the Government's approach to development of the agriculture sector evolves. MOFA is broadening the range of its activities beyond its traditional application of research and provision of technical services and extension to farmers. MOFA is becoming increasingly concerned with farming systems. For example, the block farm programme is being implemented to introduce new technologies and increase productivity.

In this way, structural adjustment policies that reduced the role of the state to agricultural research and technical services became viewed as 'traditional', whereas much older approaches, such as state-subsidised block farms, became rebranded as the 'new' farming systems programmes. This return to the past highlights the change in both government and donor acceptance for a role of the state in rice and private sector development.

In addition to national policies and programmes, the NDC set up a Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) though the passing of ACT 805 in 2010. SADA was given a mandate to coordinate development efforts in targeted regions (Northern Region, Upper East and

Upper West Regions). These regions are historically the poorest and are also an important vote bank for the NDC. SADA's 2010 to 2030 Strategy and Work-plan provides the following description for how block farms will be used to increase access to agricultural services and inputs (SADA 2010: p. 40):

> Inputs and services (including mechanisation for land preparation and harvesting, primary and secondary processing) will be provided by the private sector with state support for the acquisition of seed, fertiliser and water in the case of irrigation.

This description of the block farm approach illustrates how the 'private sector' was viewed as something to be supported by the 'state'. In 2012, the World Bank and USAID approved the Ghana Commercial Agriculture project[21], which provided $100 million US dollars to support SADA and related projects in the Volta and Brong Ahafo regions (World Bank 2012).

However, importantly, the new-focus on public institutions did not stop the government from supporting private sector development, which remained a key agenda underlying many technology-led development approaches and the rise of PPPs (Kim and Lee 2013; Peck et al. 2012; Weihe 2008). One PPP that received significant attention was the 'Fievie Rice Project', a partnership between the government and Global Agri-Development Company (GADCO) (Ghana News Agency 2011; Quartey 2011). The Fieve project was set up near the Kpong Irrigation Scheme, originally established in 1959, and supported by donors throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, according to the African Development Bank, which funded the Kpong Scheme from 1990 to 2004, the performance of the program was "unsatisfactory for every component indicator"(African Development Fund 2005: Annex 7). As such, the GADCO's PPP is an attempt by private international actors to harness decades of donor and government investment in irrigation. GADCO received funding from both AGRA, which is financed by donors, and U.S.-

[21] SADA and the Ghana Commercial Agriculture project includes four components: 1) strengthening investment promotion infrastructure, facilitating secure access to land; 2) securing PPPs and small-holder linkages in the Accra Plains; 3) securing PPPs and small-holder linkages in the SADA Zone); 4) project management, including M&E (p38).

based Summit Capital (GADCO 2011). The Fieve Rice Project therefore represents a PPP fitting the NDC's interest in promoting commercial rice production and backed by international donors and private actors.

As argued by Sumberg, Heirman, Raboanarielina, and Kaboré the "emergence of the neo-liberal project, the participatory agenda and the environmental movement" changed how agricultural research was framed by international actors like the CGIAR (Sumberg et al. 2013: p. 233). Starting in 2008, the CGIAR network was restructured in line with new ideas regarding the role for 'agricultural research for development' (AR4D) and 'integrated agricultural research for development' (IAR4D) (Hawkins et al. 2009). In response to the 2008 food crisis, the Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR) organised a Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development (GCARD) in 2010, and a subsequent one (GCARD 2) in 2012. The ambition was to "transform the global AR4D system to achieve greater impact for poverty reduction, food and nutrition security, and environmental sustainability, with special reference to smallholder farmers"(GFAR 2010: p. 8). A series of consortium research programmes (CRPs) were launched by the CGIAR in response to its new focus on AR4D, one of which was the Global Rice Science Partnership (GRiSP) (IRRI et al. 2010). However, a 2011 assessment found that rice research in Ghana and at AfricaRice had not changed significantly as a result of the AR4D agenda (Sumberg et al. 2013). The disconnect between the ambition of GFAR and its donor supporters and the practices of rice researchers on the ground is not unique to GRiSP but is further evidence of a gap between many international agendas and implementation records.

Drought in 2011 brought new fears of food insecurity (Food Security Ghana 2011). That same year, the United Nations, FAO, and Japan agreed on a new project called "Dissemination of Improved Rice Production Systems with Emphasis on NERICA to Reduce Food Deficit and Improve Farmers Income in Ghana", which sought specifically to "contribute to food security and poverty alleviation of the rural population" (CARD 2013). In addition to addressing food security, the project continued to promote FBOs as means for increasing the use of NERICA and ensuring access to equipment and tools. As such, the donor projects continued to address food security and poverty constraints alongside government-led efforts to increase commercial rice production.

Overall, the period between 2003 and 2012 represents a major shift in the goals and resources, institutions, and underlying knowledge that informed rice policies. Between 2003 and 2008, the NPP government relied heavily on donor projects to support poor rice farmers. These donor projects focused on issues such as food security, but also increasingly addressed wider environmental and social issues. During this period, there were also already indications that the focus was beginning to shift away from helping smallholder farmer survive towards viewing them as small businesses and potential suppliers. Donor projects like AgSSIP and FSRPOP were donor attempts to harness the 'value chain' approach and increasingly included measures to increase state-support for farmers, often through FBOs. Despite this change in donor agendas, the NPP made few, if any, concerted efforts to use state-resources to increase domestic rice production.

Everything changed after the 2008 elections. Between 2009 and 2012, the NDC government used the opportunity presented by donor initiatives such as AGRA, CARD and the many private investors interested in African agriculture to significantly boost support for commercial rice farming. Exploiting 'value chain' and PPP rhetoric, the government was able to re-establish state institutions (e.g. BFP, NAFCO, etc.) that had been strongly opposed by donors during structural adjustment. This dramatic change in rice policies does not appear to have been driven by a change in goals, knowledge or ideology. If anything, it appears to have been possible because international agendas had become increasingly heterogeneous. Even while Ghana funded its own buffer stock initiative; USAID still attempted a parallel warehouse receipt system. Instead, the biggest change seems to have been access to means for implementing policies that were previously opposed by donors. The fact that donors had begun to view government institutions as essential for private sector development also made the observed shift to direct state support of commercial farming much easier. The following section examines how these changes related to changes in the policy process.

6.3. Rice policy processes (2003-2012)

The period between 2003 and 2012 witnessed a renewed focus on increasing rice production as well as the use of government resources, institutions, and knowledge to achieve policy goals. Changes made during structural adjustment, such as the reduction in size of the government's extension services, continued to affect how policies were implemented, including the reliance on NGOs and the private sector. Decentralisation, which began in earnest in the run-up to the 1992 elections, greatly affected the implementation of development initiatives. This section reflects on changes in the policy process to identify the inclusion of different actors (e.g. *identifying policy problems, establishing agendas, selecting policy options, making policy decisions, mobilising resources, implementing policies,* and *evaluating policy outcomes*).

The rice policy process in 2003 does not appear to have changed significantly from that of 1995, at least in terms of the actors involved in *identifying problems, setting agendas, selecting options,* and *mobilising resource.* As was the case during Rawlings' time in office, the *setting of policy agendas* in 2003 was characterised by negotiation between the government and donors. Regarding the process of negotiating the AgSSIP (2000-2007), which was initially rejected[22] by the NDC government, the World Bank observed that:

> Government's level of commitment improved after the project was finally modified to include activities it had called for from the start. This redesign of the components to include the new initiatives took over one year, as a consulting

[22] For more a more detailed account see: L. Whitfield, 'Political Challenges to Developing Non-Traditional Exports in Ghana: The Case of Horticulture Exports', *DIIS Working Paper 2011:29* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2011a).

> firm had to be selected to carry out feasibility studies and to undertake environmental assessments for these new activities (World Bank 2007: p. 20).

This statement illustrates how agenda setting in the 2000s still involved a balancing-act between donor and government priorities. The World Bank's decision to 'redesign' AgSSIP to include 'new' initiatives demonstrates the government's ability to alter donor interventions. However, the requirement that consultants undertake environmental assessments represents continued adherence to standard World Bank policy.

Increased global recognition of the poor performance of development projects inspired the 'aid effectiveness' agenda to promote 'harmonisation' and better coordination between donors and between governments (DAC 2005/2008; Tandon 2010). The design phase of the Food Security and Rice Producers Organization Project included a meeting organised to assemble the " main donors (AFD, BAD, CIDA, DFID, FAO, IFAD, JICA) and MoFA" in order to "exchange information on past, ongoing and planned projects"(David-Benz and Dugue 2005: p. 11). NEPAD inspired the creation of Africa-wide policy oversight mechanisms in the creation of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM was intended to "foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices" through " experience sharing"(APRM 2011: p. 2). NEPAD and the APRM became increasingly important to agricultural policies, including rice policy, after the launch of CAADP.

Donors also increasingly experimented with different 'aid modalities' including, but not limited to 'projects', 'programmes', and 'sector-wide approaches' (SWAPs). The aid effectiveness agenda promoted the use of 'budget support' as a means for encouraging recipient country 'ownership', but usually with strong donor oversight (Harrison 2004: p. 126). The World Bank's Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) provided budget support to fund the GPRS I and II, which were based on the idea that developmental cooperation should be a partnership with mutual accountability. Following the completion of the GPRS I in 2003, The Netherlands, European

Commission, UK's DFID, and World Bank began promoting multi-donor budget support (MDBS) and, after a positive reaction from the government, were joined in a 'Framework Memorandum' by the African Development Bank, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland and eventually France (Lawson et al. 2007: p. 32). In this way, *selecting policy options*, *mobilising resources*, and *evaluating policy* outcomes continued to be characterised by both donor and government involvement.

However, if there were expectations that budget support would lead to increased flexibility for the government during policy implementation, this was incorrect. The shift towards budget support also increased the need for stronger monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of government activities because project-level oversight was difficult without individual project management units (PMUs). Donor support to government M&E was based on the concept that "effectiveness needs to be measured in terms of budget outputs (more predictable budget financing, more efficient public spending, stronger budget process, stronger intra-government relations and accountability), and outcomes (enhanced capacity for poverty reduction, environment conducive to private sector development and growth, better delivery of public services) relative to government policy objectives" (Koeberle and Stavreski 2006: p. 18). Indicators for 'Improving performance of Rural Sector' were included in a Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) that accompanied the provision of MDBS. An evaluation of MDBS found that:

> …the use of the PAF both as a monitoring framework and as a conditionality mechanism created contradictory incentives in which GoG [Government of Ghana] sought to establish modest performance targets (so as to secure predictable levels of budget support) while MDBS partners pushed for more ambitious targets (Lawson et al. 2007: p. 8).

Instead of ownership, it was revealed that "the intertwining of the internal policy design and management function of the PAF with its external monitoring and fiduciary risk control function has given the MDBS partners a role, which we would judge to be more intrusive than is appropriate"(ibid: p51). Thus, both the GPRS and MDBS increased donor oversight of Ghana's policy processes without necessarily increasing 'ownership'.

The 'results' agenda gained new steam in the 2000s in response to disillusionment with aid and the growing need to prove the value of money spent (Easterly 2008; H. Hansen and Tarp 2000; Lawson et al. 2007). M&E had already been an integral part of policy processes in Ghana since the World Bank supported the creation of institutions like PPMED in MOFA (see Chapter 4). Looking at rice specifically, the 'results' agenda is deeply integrated in initiatives such as the UK-financed Evidence-Based Policy Making Project, IFPRI's Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System and the UK-based Overseas Development Institute's (ODI) Research and Policy in Development (RAPID) (deGrassi 2007: p. 1).

The decades-long relationship between the World Bank and PPMED may also explain the unusual situation in AgSSIP, where the PPMED Director was the "project coordinator" and there was no "separate project management unit" (World Bank 2007: p. 20). The importance of PPMED's existence within MOFA is supported by deGrassi (2007) who observes "there is a tendency among some staff to think that responsibilities for policy matters generally belong to higher officials and the Policy, Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation Department [Directorate]" (p18-19). In this manner, some institutions established with donor support during structural adjustment had become an increasingly important part of *policy selection, implementation,* and *evaluation.*

However, *monitoring and evaluation* had also become increasingly complicated due to the increasing layers of international actors and systems engaged in African rice development. For example, the AfricaRice Centre (known as WARDA until 2003) was responsible for implementing GRiSP in Africa by working with national agricultural research systems (e.g. CSIR) (Sumberg et al. 2012; Sumberg et al. 2013). To assess whether GRiSP was affecting research practices on the ground, the European Initiative for Agricultural Research for Development (EIARD) gave money to GFAR to commission the UK-based Institute of Development Studies (IDS) to assess rice research in Ghana (Sumberg et al. 2012). In this manner, a European donor coordination mechanism (EIARD) took responsibility for evaluating whether one international actor (GFAR) was having an impact on an international research system (CGIAR) in a manner that achieved results in Ghana. This example also illustrates how agendas such as participation and increasing the 'voice' of 'users' in 'product development' are implemented and evaluated in parallel to other donor and government initiatives.

The 'participatory' and 'voice' agendas are also visible in the efforts made by donors to include 'farmers' and 'farmer organisations' in the *implementation* of rice policies and projects. Individual companies, such as Wienco, established its own farmer organisations (Amanor 2010). The 2001 African Development Fund's Inland Valley Rice Development project was designed using a "participatory approach", meaning "wide consultation was undertaken with the operators of the rice industry (both female and male farmers, farm groups, millers, and traders)"(ADF 2001: p. 10). Similarly, AgSSIP brought farmer-based organisations into agricultural policy processes to "allow them to play a major role in shaping agricultural policy"(World Bank 2007: p. 15). The 2007 FASDEP II was also developed through an "extensive stakeholder consultation process" (Republic of Ghana 2007: p. 1). These examples of consultations did not always mean stakeholder voices were heard or made a difference, however, and when the government implemented the FASDEP II supported voucher program in 2008 agro-dealers still claimed it undermined their business interests (Amanor 2010: p. 18).

Donors also championed the participation of specific stakeholder communities they helped create. The Food Security and Rice Producers Organization Project (FSRPOP 2002-2008) focused on "supporting the producers' organizations that had already been created" (CSSF 2012: p. 2). Stakeholders get relabelled by their inclusion in new initiatives, as was with GRIB and the Ghana

Trade and Livelihoods Coalition. Observers found the creation of GRIB to be “somewhat hurried” and “top-down” (David-Benz and Dugue 2005: p. 13; deGrassi 2007: p. 29). During its formation a consultant “with long standing experience on rice sector, former director of LRDP, was hired by FSRPOP” and went on to become the “executive secretary of the GRIB”(David-Benz and Dugue 2005: p. 10). This example of GRIB illustrates how some donors promote their preferred stakeholders across generations of initiatives.

The inclusion of donor-preferred stakeholders did not necessarily improve the implementation record or outcomes achieved. A report by Inter-rèseaux found that the president of GRIB: 1) “benefited directly from the marketing pilot action,” 2) “was the only broker involved in the negotiation of marketing agreement,” 3)” is one of the two direct beneficiary of the marketing credit line” and 4) “is the manager of the color sorter (he was the only one who applied) which is hardly used by others than himself”(Inter-réseaux 2007: p. 10). It is difficult to determine whether the challenges faced by GRIB are the result of corruption or of poor planning. The fact that GRIB was *evaluated* and that these difficult findings were also published is indicative of the continued oversight that donors maintain in Ghana.

GRIB provides an example of how a donor-driven process to improve the business environment for rice in Ghana can be *implemented* with government consent but without necessarily benefitting either the government or the rice industry. Greater private sector inclusion in policy processes was also promoted by the World Bank’s Commercial Agriculture Project, which required the Project Steering Committee to include representation from the “Chief Executive Office of the Private Enterprise Foundation, and other relevant institutions that may be identified” (World Bank 2012: p. 16). The continued efforts by donors to ensure representation of the ‘private sector’ during policy *implementation* shows how ideas like ‘ownership’, ‘governance’ and ‘participation’ were used to promote private sector development in rice.

After agreeing to *agendas* and oversight mechanisms, both donors and the government rely on trusted individuals to *implement* selected policies, programmes, and projects. A 2007 study of Ghana's rice trade policy carried out by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) found that:

> Informal links and friendships potentially constitute important links, as well. For example, a former MOFA chief director was friends with several prominent ISSER staff. Associates of the Minister and MOFA officials also collaborated on the FASDEP policy. Friendships and associations are also sometimes important in finding people to invite to NGO- or government organized conferences. (deGrassi 2007: pp. 29-30)

The Institute of Statistical, Social & Economic Research (ISSER), located at the University of Ghana, is one of several academic faculties with long-standing relationships to government ministries. The selection of consultants and implementers based on familiarity is not unique to FASDEP or the government, as observed for both rice and cocoa during each period examined. The government and donors appear to rely on familiar individuals to oversee the *implementation* of policies.

Donor and government oversight must not be confused with donor control, as policy processes continue to leave significant room for national government and local actor influence. Despite employing trusted institutions and individuals, there is little indication that policy or project *implementation* was always on time or went according to plan. AgSSIP was considered "a problem project" due to "changes in government and review of the original project, unrealistic implementation schedule, weak financial management system and inefficient procurement and disbursement"(World Bank 2007: p. 21). However, neither donors nor the government had necessarily assumed policy implementation would be trouble free, and the Bank observed that the "use and subsequent enhancement of government systems by the project [AgSSIP] is felt to have off-set some of the initial implementation delays"(World Bank 2007: p. 21). Donor optimism about the value of their own projects, even when they fell short of stated goals, may also help explain why Ghana continued receiving significant support despite regularly diverting from agreements on paper.

In contrast to AgSSIP, which appeared to promote government 'ownership', the creation of MiDA was seen by some as a donor imposition (Whitfield 2011a). According to a 2012 press release made by the Millennium Challenge Corporation:

> Over the course of two administrations, the compact was developed and implemented by Ghanaians. The compact embodies Ghanaian priorities and embraces the MCC commitment to reduce poverty through economic growth and attract private sector investment (MCC 2012).

The above statement appears to hold true, in as much as 'Ghanaian priorities' included accessing MCC finance, but it is difficult to determine the extent to which the selection of investments were more in line with donor or government priorities. Some individuals involved in the proposal and setup phases of MiDA experienced the process as being heavily driven by the U.S. and "pressure from President Kufuor to get the deal done and signed" (Whitfield 2011a: p. 31). However, the inclusion of support for initiatives like food production, including rice, did fit the government's priorities as stated in FASDEP (ibid). Whether or not the entire setup of MiDA was only possible because it had Kufuor's support is unclear. What is clear, from Ghana's MCC experience, is that bilateral donors can have significant influence over selecting and implementing development projects that they fund, even when they claim their projects align with government priorities.

In many ways the policy process between 2003 and 2008 remained similar to the process at the end of structural adjustment in 1995, with strong donor involvement in every stage. However, the 2008 food crisis and presidential elections were followed by significant changes in the policy process for rice. Changes included: greater government control over policy stages, a change in attitude towards donors, and the involvement of new international actors in the rice sector.

After winning the election, the NDC government exercised much greater control over *establishing agendas, selecting policy options, making policy decisions, mobilising resources, implementing policies,* and for rice. For example, the 2008 NDC manifesto stated that the government will "Establish a Buffer Stock Management Agency for food security and competitive prices for farmers during gluts"(NDC 2008). Instead of gaining donor approval or support, the NDC pursued this policy goal and election commitment on its own. In 2009, the National Post Harvest Committee recommended that the government establish a company to manage the output from increased production on block farms (Benin et al. 2011). MOFA officials, PPMED, and local consultants were all involved in setting up NAFCO, with no direct donor involvement (Interview GH21 2011). After recommendations were approved by the Minister of Food and Agriculture, the government provided start-up money for establishing the government owned company and ensuring NAFCO could make its first purchases. To *implement* the policy NAFCO hired educated Ghanaians to manage the company, including appointing the son of a former GFDC employee as CEO (Interview GH21 2011). The government also used remaining GFDC infrastructure and rehabilitated rice mills that had been built by previous donor and government efforts. This entire process was government-led and occurred in parallel to donor projects that were taking more traditional private sector or NGO based approaches. The initial selection of crops (rice and maize) and regions was also clearly aligned with NDC interests in supporting its voters.

However, international actors were not visibly deterred by new government-led approaches to agricultural development and food security. Instead, the NDC also took a more active role in harmonising donor activities; and the Ministry of Finance established a Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy (2011-2015) to set specific guidelines for development cooperation (MOFEP 2010). In addition, a regionally-focused Agriculture Sector Working Group and Private Sector Development Working Group was established to reduce the "risk of coordination failure among the many donors that operated in the same value chains and in the SADA Zone (DFID, IFAD, AFD, CIDA, GIZ, USAID)" (World Bank 2012: pp. 20-21). In this manner, 'working groups' and committees provided venues for the government to work with donors to coordinate and oversee the *implementation* of projects.

After 2008, elite international capitalists, such as Bill Gates, also became increasingly interested in the challenge of integrating Ghana's farmers into global value chains (McMichael 2013; Morvaridi 2012). In addition to directly funding their own, sometimes parallel, agricultural development projects, philanthropic organisations try to influence policy processes by promoting their preferred development agendas at international forums. Initiatives such as AGRA and CARD were co-financed by private foundations and bilateral donors (GFAR 2011). AGRA, in turn, is directly involved in promoting the type of policies (e.g. certified seed) and practices (e.g. PPPs) needed to integrate of Ghana's farmers into global value chains (Holt-Gimenez 2008; Thompson 2012). The involvement of private actors in development not only influenced Ghana's agricultural policies but also the activities of other international actors (e.g. JICA) (JICA 2009). The efforts of international philanthropic, donor, and private sector actors to further opportunities for accessing Ghana's potential as a consumer of agriculture inputs (e.g. seeds, chemicals, etc.) and producer or rice is visible in both the NRSD and related research and agro-dealer projects funded by foundations.

Overall, the period between 2003 and 2012 is characterised by significant changes in government rice policies and associated policy processes. Donors remained heavily involved in nearly every stage of the policy process throughout the period. However, after 2008, the government took a much more active role in selecting and implementing policies (e.g. focusing on food security, etc.) and coordinating donor involvement. As in cocoa (see Chapter 5), the post-2008 period also saw a surge in new private sector efforts to influence policy and to further commercialise rice production in Ghana. The next section looks at how the ability of international actors to influence Ghana's rice policies was affected by the political economy for rice over the same period.

6.4. Multi-levelled political economy for rice (2003-2012)

The period between 2003 and 2012 is characterised by an increased focus on food security and rice production in Ghana, as shown in previous sections of this chapter. Between 2003 and 2008, the main policy agenda for rice was food security and poverty reduction. The global food and financial crises of 2007 and 2008 placed greater attention on food security but also increased interest in the cost of food importation (Islam 2011). Between 2009 and 2012 policy agendas expanded to focus on opportunities for commercial rice production and import substitution. The observed changes in rice policy priorities also coincide with a period when African development assistance became less important than private financial flows (Alonso and Ocampo 2012). Between 2000 and 2008, aid as a percentage of GDP in Ghana declined from 25.2% to 9.8% (MOFEP 2010: p. 11). The decreased importance of aid may partially explain why Ghana's 2011 Aid Policy required donors to better align with government priorities instead of simply harmonising donor priorities.

To understand if evolutions in the economic significance of rice affected the influence of international actors on policy, this section examines how the observed policy changes examined in previous sections correspond with shifts in local, national and international political economy for rice between 2003 and 2012.

6.4.1. Local-level political economy of rice

Throughout the 1990s Ghanaian rice farming was concentrated in the Upper East, Northern, and Volta regions (Donya 2000; Osei-Asare 2010; World Bank 2012b). Apart from a few commercial operations (e.g. Aveyime Farms, Avnash Industries, Brazil Agro-Investment Limited, Bok Nam Kim Farms, Prairie Volta Ltd etc.), the vast majority of rice producers in Ghana were smallholder, subsistence farmers (Osei-Asare 2010: p. 29). Increasingly larger amounts of rice were being imported to meet domestic demand despite consistent government rhetoric regarding the importance of achieving self-sufficiency in rice production. The overall result of these trends was that, by 2003, rice production was stagnant and Ghana was dependent on imported rice.

Reasons for the underperformance of rice farms in Ghana were linked to land rights, access to labour, technology and inputs, as well as the liberalisation of trade that followed structural adjustments (Osei-Asare 2010). Liberal economic policies and the end of government subsidies for fertilizer in the late 1980s and 1990s led to a situation where the "nominal price of fertilizer increased much faster than the increase in the price of rice", thus eroding producer incentives (Amanor 2010: p. 19). High fertiliser prices had a greater impact on commercial rice farmers than smallholder farmers as discussed in Chapter 4. Figure 6.1 shows the producer price received for rice between 2002 and 2011 to illustrate how the producer price for rice changed after 2003.

Figure 6.1 Rice producer prices in Ghana between 2002 and 2011 (FAO 2013)



As demonstrated by Figure 6.1, the producer price more than doubled between 2002 and 2008, with a sharp spike in 2008. Despite a positive trend in prices, a survey of rice farmers found that

66% had a negative return between 2002 and 2004 (FAO 2006: p. 4). Negative returns were linked to “low level of rice consumption, inadequate marketing facilities for local rice, rapid urbanization (growth rate of some 3.2%), and stagnation of local production”, “lack of credit and micro-finance facilities” and “a lack of well established distribution channels and of quality standards for local rice” (ibid). Of these grievances, inadequate marketing facilities, lack of credit and poor distribution channels are all outcomes of structural adjustment policies that restructured state institutions that once provided these services.

The fact that rice consumption had steadily increased through the 1980s and 1990s means that the ‘lack of rice consumption’ is likely due to consumer preference for a type of rice not commonly produced in Ghana rather than a real lack of demand for rice. As illustrated by Figure 6.2 below, after 2008 the higher producer prices were finally accompanied by a sustained increase in total rice production.

Figure 6.2 Rice production in Ghana between 2002 and 2012 (FAO 2013)



Figure 6.2 shows that between 2002 and 2007, rice production in Ghana remained stagnant between 200,000 and 300,000 tonnes despite increasing producer prices. After 2008, rice

production increased dramatically to 491,603 tonnes in 2010.

Low levels of rice production between 2002 and 2007 may be explained by the same list of grievances highlighted before. In addition, issues hindering success for the FSRPOP included: 1) a lack of 'honesty' amongst farmers declaring their yield; 2) lower than expected quality; 3) lower than expected recovery from rice processing; and 4) insufficient consumption by urban markets of the types of rice produced (Wilhemina 2010: p. 97). Smallholder farmers involved in the LRDP (1998-2003) and FSRPOP (2003-2008) were appreciative of support but reluctant to fully commit to new practices and cease subsistence farming. As captured by a perception survey, "farmers would want to store produce and sell when there are urgent needs for cash…This notwithstanding, farmers were willing to honour their contractual obligations if the price offer was attractive" (Wilhemina 2010: p. 96). Similar opinions were captured by a survey in the Bolgatanga region that showed farmers happily participate in development projects but also protect their livelihoods by maintaining traditional practices alongside (Dietz and Millar 1999: p. 56). The observed distrust amongst smallholder farmers for rice development projects could still be linked to past initiatives where farmers were subjected to undesirable working conditions imposed by government projects to commercialise rice farming (Konings 1980, 1984).

As discussed previously, the significant increase in Ghanaian rice production after 2008 coincides with a change in governments, growing donor concern over food security, and increased global interest in investing in commodities as alternative to financial markets. These also affected cocoa (see Chapter 5). This combination of events greatly altered rice production in Ghana, but it is unclear exactly which farmers benefitted most. The NDC implemented a large number of new government-led and donor-supported rice initiatives, which increased support for both smallholder and large rice farms and increasingly tried integrating smallholder farmers into 'value chains'.

NAFCO was setup in part to “serve as a driver to motivate farmers [to] produce more”(Benin et al. 2011). The first year NAFCO purchased rice from farmers in northern Ghana at a price that included a 10% profit on top of the estimated cost of production (Interview GH21 2011). In addition, NAFCO rehabilitated rice mills and worked through local farmer associations, women’s groups, and processors. When interviewed, women’s groups “revealed that their engagement with NAFCO has driven up their membership substantially…which the groups attributed to the increase in income they have been earning from parboiling rice for NAFCO”(Benin et al. 2011: p. 64). However, it should be noted that most of NAFCO’s early activities focused on northern regions where preferred rice varieties and processing techniques (parboiled) are quite different from consumer preferences in southern and urban regions. NAFCO was, therefore, looking for ways to increase the production of varieties with wider market potential, such as preferred rice variety Jasmine 85 (Interview GH21 2011).

In addition to producing local rice varieties that were not readily consumed by urban populations, Ghanaian farmers had to confront the perception that locally produced rice is low quality. According to a 2010 survey, 94% of the 390 consumers surveyed purchased aromatic rice varieties (which are usually imported) and 50% attributed their “non patronage of local rice to poor quality and the fact that local rice is not readily available on the urban market” (Diako et al. 2010: p. 16). Despite consumer perceptions to the contrary, Mr. Fidelis Avogo from GRIB blamed competition from imports for the difficulties faced by farmers (Ghana News Agency 2009).The perception of poor quality is likely connected to the fact that fewer than 10% of rice farmers used “improved seed” or “seed and fertiliser” packages (Amanor 2010: p. 19). Despite the many challenges listed above, persistent donors continued to support development projects targeting the productivity of smallholder farmers.

Initiatives like GRIB promoted commercial agriculture as a replacement for subsistence farming. According to Fidelis Avogo, Executive Director of GRIB, “for the farmer to produce quality local rice, meant that the latter must observe modern farm practices from beginning to the end, and must look at farming as a business, and work towards minimising costs and maximising profits"(Chronicle 2008). Whether GRIB truly represents the agenda of smallholder farmers is unclear, but its focus on commercialising farmers fit the donor agenda of integrating them into 'value chains'. However, if the trends were in any way comparable to the large-scale investments in commercial rice farming witnessed in the 1970s, smallholder farmers most likely benefitted less than investors (Goody 1980; Konings 1980, 1984).

In addition to improving market access and addressing production challenges such as irrigation, many new rice development projects focused on addressing gender issues. The apparent realisation that many poor smallholder farmers were women led donors and the Government to focus on meeting their 'needs.' This included "access to farm credit and technical logistics in rice production" through "pro-gender special crop interventions" (Yiadom-Boakye et al. 2013: p. 103). The 2007 block farms initiative and 2008 RSSP both claimed to promote 'pro-gender' equality. However, the extent to which female farmers benefitted from these initiatives is not clear.

Perhaps more important than government and donor projects was the increase in private investors interested in setting up large-scale commercial rice farms in Ghana. Toks Abimbola and Iggy Bassi, two former investment bankers for Lehman Brothers Holdings[23]established GADCO as a large-commercial rice production company. GADCO fit well with the PPP agenda and received a 30-year lease for 1000 acres in the Volta region from the government. Mr Amelorku, District Chief Executive of South Tongu District, Volta Region, said "the provision of the required machinery and promotion of Private-Public Partnership policy (PPP) had been intensified to enable the country to achieve the target to reduce rice importation"(GNA 2011). In addition to

[23] Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. was a global financial services company that went bankrupt during the financial crisis in 2008.

engaging in commercial farming, GADCO claims that its “flagship GADCO Smallholder Program (GSP) provides market access to smallholders on a scalable and equitable basis - particularly for women - the most vital actors in African agri-food markets” (ibid). The rhetoric used by GADCO shows how the smallholder and gender agendas moved beyond development projects and even became a part of private investment strategies. Starting in 2011, GADCO partnered with Finatrade (distribution partner) and Syngenta AG (technology partner) to produce, process, and market long-grain perfumed rice in Ghana (GADCO 2013). The selection of large multinational corporations Syngenta and Finatrade as partners made GADCO a bridge between Ghana’s smallholders and global markets.

The willingness of multinational corporations, donors and the government to join forces in order to integrate Ghanaian smallholders into global supply chains is a primary goal of ‘value chain’ and ‘public-private partnership’ agendas. However, by 2012 GADCO had only connected a small number of farmers and did not completely revolutionise rice farming in Ghana. The government’s decision to promote commercial farming in the Volta region, as opposed to northern rice growing regions, also raises many questions about government and international donor incentives. The following sections examine which changes within the national and international political economies for rice may also explain observed shifts in policy.

6.4.2. National-level political economy of rice

This section examines the political economy for rice from the national perspective of Ghana as a whole. In many ways Adebayo Adedeji’s fears that African countries would become trapped in a situation where they would spend a significant percentage of their foreign exchange on food came true for Ghana (M. A. Novicki 1983: p. 15). However, this was not a result of Africans having “acquired taste for goods that we can never produce” (ibid: p16). Instead, the collapse of government support for rice production led to import dependency for a crop that is producible in

Ghana.

The end of state-subsidised commercial rice farming in northern Ghana in the 1980s may have benefitted some smallholder farmers as highlighted in Chapter 3. However, while rice production trends declined or remained stagnant, consumption increased from 11 kilograms per capita per year in Ghana by 1999 to 28 kilograms per capita per year in Ghana by 2007 and to 50 kilograms per capita per year in Accra by 2007 (CSSF 2012: pp. 2-3; Diako et al. 2010). Although urban populations consumed more rice than other parts of the country, the associated cost of imported rice affected Ghana's economy as a whole.

Unsurprisingly, addressing the cost of rice imports became a focus of government policies. FASDEP I was intended to increase rice production to 370,000 tonnes and decrease rice imports by 30% by 2004 (Angelucci et al. 2013: p. 15). However, the rapid increase in rice imports between 2000 and 2002 was caused by "structural changes in consumers' behaviour" and a society that became "radically more urban in its way of living" (Lançon and Benz 2007: p. 8). The fact that taste, more than price, was the determinant of consumer preferences meant decades of donor support to smallholder farmers in northern regions did little to reduce rice imports (Kuwornu et al. 2011: p. 2; ODI 2000). By 2003 the quantity of rice imported rose to 316 percent of rice produced in Ghana, with a cost of USD$117 million (FAO 2013; ODI 2000). As shown in Figure 6.3 below, Ghana imported nearly 80 percent of its rice in 2003 before imports started declining after 2004.

Figure 6.3 Comparing rice imports, food-aid and production in Ghana (FAO 2013)



The large rice trade bill was no secret amongst Ghanaian voters or politicians. Political parties used the policy goal of food ‘self-sufficiency’ to boost their image amongst voters. In the run-up to the 2000 elections a Ghanaian Chronicle editorial stated “that while Ghana's capacity for food production is being killed and throwing people out of jobs, the unbridled trade liberalisation is leading to the creation and sustenance of jobs in other countries” (Ghanaian Chronicle 1999). By connecting the decline in food self-sufficiency to a loss of Ghanaian livelihoods, the above article created an image of the NDC as a government that killed agriculture by implementing structural adjustment programmes.

At the time that the NPP defeated the NDC in 2001, inflation had risen to 60 percent as a result of global increases in oil prices, the collapse of cocoa prices and the depreciation of the Ghanaian currency as discussed in Chapter 5 (deGrassi 2007: p. 16). In response to these economic shocks, the government went to donors for assistance in stabilising the economy (ibid). The need to secure support from donors likely influenced the government’s decision to accept and implement the previously rejected AgSSIP and to sanction donor projects that contradicted aid effectiveness agendas such as establishing MiDA (Whitfield 2011a). Despite NPP policies promoting agriculture development and food security on paper (for example FASDEP II), efforts made to increase rice production between 2000 and 2007 did not appear to be successful (see Figure 6.2 above). The inability of the NPP to increase rice production became a contentious issue during the 2005 and 2008 food crisis.

The NPP government launched a fertilizer subsidy programme to increase productivity in response to the 2008 food crisis (Benin et al. 2011: p. 34). However, not all subsidies reached intended beneficiaries and the effects of this policy were not immediately visible. The government also launched a Northern Rural Growth Programme, yet these efforts also did not result in immediate production increases. By the time of the 2008 elections the NPP had completed two terms in office without achieving goals set for increasing rice production or improving food security. When the government held the annual Farmers' Day celebrations in 2008, the Ghana Trade and Livelihoods Coalition (GTLC) accused the NPP of using the event to "cover up for their inefficiencies"(Africa News 2008). By the end of 2008 it was evident that Ghanaian farmers were becoming increasingly disillusioned with NPP promises.

When the NDC retook office in January 2009, cocoa and gold prices were high and Ghana was beginning to export oil. The growing importance of oil to policy agendas meant the "economic paradigm" shifted from an "agriculture-led to oil-led economy" (World Bank 2013b: p. 1). However, the government continued to focus on public opinion and institutionalised the annual Ghana Policy Fair to give opportunities for "Citizenry" to interact with ministries, agency and departments and discuss their views on government policy (Ghana News Agency 2010). (Ghana News Agency 2010). To meet public expectations for the development of agriculture and improvement of food security, Mr. Kwesi Ahwoi, the newly elected Minister of Agriculture, promised to make Ghana self-sufficient in rice production. To accomplish its goals, the government dramatically increased investment in agriculture, including extending subsidies, establishing block farms, and creating the NAFCO buffer stock (Benin et al. 2011).

NAFCO is fully government-owned and according to a recent evaluation "lessons from the erstwhile GFDC were incorporated in the design and setting up of NAFCO, from which it has supposedly learned lessons" (Benin et al. 2011: p. 56). Similarities are perhaps not surprising given that some of the same NDC government officials were involved in both the GFDC and NAFCO (G21 2011). Minister Ahwoi stated the following about NAFCO:

> The National Buffer Stock Company (NAFCO) has provided comfort to our farmers by assisting them to secure better prices through the minimum guaranteed price mechanism as well as hold emergency stocks of produce for the Ghanaian. It has also supplied the School Feeding Programme with locally grown rice in the last two years. Under the NPP our children were fed imported rice to develop the taste for foreign goods (MOFA 2012).

This statement illustrates the political sensitivities that informed agricultural policy, such as the desire to provide farmers a guaranteed market for their grains and the need to address the image that Ghana was not able to provide food for its own children. In terms of political economy, these pressures have much more to do with voter perceptions than government budget.

NAFCO is an example of a politically strategic, NDC government-led effort to increase rice production and improve food security. As discussed previously, NAFCO was not supported by donors (Interview GH7 2011, and Interview GH21 2011). However, it did have significant support from farmers in Ghana (Benin et al. 2011). Although NAFCO claimed to have a national focus, the first two years were solely focused on improving infrastructure and access to markets in northern regions. Farmers registered themselves to work with NAFCO using their voter identification, and although this took place post-elections, it was clearly aligned with building and maintaining political support (Interview GH21 2011). The government initially financed NAFCO without donor support (Interview GH7 and GH21 2011). However, by 2011, NAFCO started receiving attention from the UN World Food Programme (WFP), which purchased rice and maize, and, in 2012, it became part of the ECOWAS Regional Food Security Reserve (ECOWAS 2012). As such, NAFCO represents a politically motivated government-led initiative that later gained support amongst international actors.

In addition to making efforts to stabilise food prices and increase rice productivity, the NDC launched SADA along with a series of other initiatives to improve food security and livelihoods in northern regions. The overall mix of policies supported both smallholder and larger rice farmers, including PPPs such as GADCO. The increase in rice production witnessed after 2007 correlates with an overall reduction in rice imports, which could indicate that rice production also started meeting consumer demand. The NDC had failed to meet its objective of food self-sufficiency by 2012 but did increase production by 63 percent from 301,920 tonnes to 481,134 tonnes (see Figure 6.2).

Many policies implemented by Ghana's government were not fully aligned with donor agendas. The increased use of direct state support for rice production may partially be explained by: 1) the decreased importance of official development assistance and 2) the increased investment in African agriculture witnessed after the financial crisis. Newly developed Ghanaian service industries and the export of oil meant ODA represented a smaller percentage of the government's budget. This may have allowed for greater independence in policy decisions. The following section examines how changes in the international political economy for rice influenced domestic policy changes in Ghana.

6.4.3. International-level political economy for rice

International economic and political events played important roles in shaping Ghana's rice policies. Despite new international agreements focusing on food and agriculture, the period between 2003 and 2005 was characterised by a decline in official development assistance (ODA) to the sector (Islam 2011: p. 24). Renewed interest in food security and agriculture led to the 2000 MDGs making eradication of hunger a primary objective, and also to the establishment of CAADP in 2003 (NEPAD 2009). However, the MDGs and CAADP had little immediate influence on rice production in Ghana, which remained stagnant (see Figure 6.2). In fact Ghana's rapid increase in rice importation in the late 1990s fit the WTO definition for 'import surge' (UNFAO 2006: p. 1).

Throughout the 1990s Ghana primarily imported from the United States, Thailand and Vietnam, highlighting how the lack of domestic production actually supported commercial farmers in exporting countries (Business Monitor 2008; UNFAO 2006). However, as shown in Figure 6.4, after 2002 the U.S. was no longer a significant rice exporter to Ghana.

Figure 6.4 Ghanaian rice imports by value and country of origin (FAO 2013)



Starting in 2003, Thailand replaced the U.S. as the largest exporter of rice to Ghana, and the rapid increase in its market share after 2007 may be explained by bans put on rice export. The 2008 food crisis was caused by a rapid increase in the price of cereals, which was linked to a combination of rising oil prices, investment in bio-fuels, and major events such as rice export bans imposed by India and Vietnam to protect their own food security (Headey and Fan 2010). The financial and food crises shifted focus amongst international donors and private investors towards African agriculture. This shift is visible in a 10% increase in global ODA to agriculture between 2006 and 2008, despite an overall decrease in ODA during the same period (Islam 2011: p. 24). Rationale given by the World Bank for its new support to agriculture in Ghana included the need to address instabilities resulting from the 2008 crises and “mitigate potential Dutch disease effects” from oil exports (World Bank 2010: p. 8).

The period immediately following the crises also saw the launch of CARD and the NRDS which have clear connections to food security and agriculture development agendas (GFAR 2011; JICA 2009; Osei-Asare 2010). The collapse of many Western financial markets also led investors to focus on new opportunities for rice production in Ghana, similar to the increase in cocoa production cited in Chapter 5 (GADCO 2013). The overall jump in investment in African agriculture during this period sparked a phenomenon called ‘land grabbing’, in which international investors purchased the rights to productive lands whether or not they intended to farm them (Cotula et al. 2009; Cotula 2013).

The increased interest in Ghana’s agriculture potential also led international actors to focus on filling holes left by structural adjustment in sector services and marketing. GADCO, AGRA and other private-sector focused rice initiatives received funding from bilateral and private donors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF 2012). AGRA promoted hybrid seed research as well as private seed production and distribution in order to create opportunities for “large commercial private seed companies” (Amanor 2010: p. 19). Controversially, the Gates Foundation also purchased stock in global seed and agro-chemical companies that stood to benefit from opening African markets including Monsanto (Morvaridi 2012: p. 1197; Vidal 2010). It should be noted that these types of international investments are not new to Ghana, as donors and governments have supported private investors since before the country was independent. However, they did represent a stark increase in interest in rice production in Ghana, the likes of which had not been seen since before structural adjustment.

In addition to donors and foundations, many global companies also established business in Ghana (Amanor 2010: p. 18; IFDC 2002: p. 21). Ghana’s rice importation during this period was concentrated in the hands of five major companies[24], each of whom had established their own networks of distributors across the country (Angelucci et al. 2013). Multinational agro-chemical companies such as Syngenta supported rice development in Ghana through the Syngenta Foundation, which simultaneously increased access to their products (Syngenta Foundation 2013). Avnash Industries Limited, a company with roots in India, made large investments in rice production and processing in Ghana (AVIL 2013). This surge in large-scale private investments from different nations seems to have complemented government efforts to increase rice production and also fit donor agendas for private-sector development.

Alongside donor and private sector activities, West Africa's regional dynamics also affected Ghana's agricultural policies and development. In line with CAADP, the ECOWAS-ECOWAP signed in 2009 committed the government to investing 10 percent of its budget in agriculture (Republic of Ghana 2009: p. 10). ECOWAS also maintained a 0.5 percent levy on fertilizer imports which affects the cost of fertilizer for farmers in all member states (IFDC 2002: p. 27). Furthermore, the relaxed border security between neighbours made it easy for enterprising individuals to smuggle fertiliser that was obtained by using Ghana's new government subsidies (Business and Financial Times 2012). As such, regional issues shaped policy decisions and influenced the effectiveness of Ghana's policies.

Overall, the international political economy for rice in Ghana appears to have undergone several major shifts between 2003 and 2012. The first was driven by recognition of the ineffectiveness of structural adjustment at addressing poverty and food security issues. However, concerns over poverty and food security do not appear to be a great incentive for new international investments in Ghana's rice production. This changed after the 2008 food crisis when international donors and

[24] Ghana's five major rice importers were: Royal Bow Company Ltd.; CCTC; Cereal Investment Company Ghana Ltd; Olam; and Ezal Trading Ghana Ltd. Importers

private companies both shifted focus towards African agriculture. The result was a sharp increase in rice production and a decrease in Ghana's rice imports.

6.5. Chapter Six Conclusions

The case of rice policy between 2003 and 2012 supports an understanding of agricultural policy as an outcome of many competing international and national actors, interests and processes. Rice policies changed significantly in terms of goals and resources, institutions and knowledge used to achieve them. In addition, although the actors engaged were similar to those of previous decades, for the first time since the 1980s there was much greater divergence between donor-driven and government-led *policy processes* in the rice sector. Throughout the period, the impact of international actors on rice policy appear more closely related to international economic events and domestic political interests (e.g. voter support) than to donor-finance or promoted understandings of rice sector governance.

Between 2003 and 2008, rice policy *goals* largely focused on food security and the livelihoods of the rural poor. Resources available for implementing policies between 2003 and 2008 continued to rely heavily on donor support, including France (e.g. FSRPOP), World Bank (e.g. AgSSIP), JICA (e.g. NERICA dissemination) and other traditional donors in this sector. Although donor projects were already adopting 'value chain' approaches and focusing on FBOs, there was little concerted government effort to improve commercial rice production until after 2008.

Between 2009 and 2012, policy agendas such as addressing food security were combined with new goals, such as commercial rice production and import substitution. However, the biggest difference in this period is in the *means* selected for achieving policy goals. Fears over food security enabled the government to engage much more directly in supporting commercial rice production through PPPs and initiatives like 'block farms' and NAFCO. At the same time, development assistance to agriculture increased; and new foundations and companies started investing in Ghana’s rice production.

The change in the government’s use of resources to more directly engage in rice production corresponds with a shift in theories and knowledge promoted through new policies. Starting with structural adjustment and continuing up until 1990s, the most influential international actors promoted rice policies that fit liberal economic theories. As discussed in Chapter 1, in the late 1990s, many began to question the effectiveness of structural adjustment and donor efforts. The subsequent aid effectiveness, good governance, and ‘value chain’ agendas all opened avenues for new and different economic and political theories to be tested through projects and policies (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 2). These agendas are strongly represented in donor rice projects (e.g. AgSSIP, FSRPOP, GRIB, etc.) and government policies (e.g. FASDEP II, NRDS, etc.) throughout the period.

The widening range of development agendas and knowledge promoted by donors appears to have created room for the government to select policies that *reinforce the role of the state* in rice production. The policies selected by the NDC after 2009 increasingly resembled those used in the 1970s and 1960s, including fertiliser subsidies, direct government support for commercial rice production, and the establishment of a national buffer stock. It does not appear that new policies were immediately detrimental to macro-economic development, and, instead, they created investment opportunities for the private sector. The big question is whether the new generation of *state-led efforts* to increase commercialised rice farming in Ghana will do anything towards improving the lives of smallholders, something which past efforts failed to achieve.

Despite significant changes in the resources, institutions, and knowledge used to achieve rice policy goals, the policy process underwent fewer significant changes. Donors continued to directly engage in identifying problems, setting agendas, financing, and evaluating policies to promote their agendas and worldview. Monitoring and evaluating institutions, such as PPMED, also became an increasingly important part of initiatives like budget support, a modality heavily promoted by the aid effectiveness agenda. However, as found by Mkandawire (2009) and Whitfield (2008), rice policymaking also appears to have parallel donor-driven and government-led *policy processes.* The government also established block farmers, NAFCO, etc. in parallel to donor-led rice policies and initiatives. The same government ministries, departments, and agencies that support donor coordination also support the government in the design and implementation of parallel government-led initiatives. Therefore, when looking at rice policy, it is clear that donor effort to build government capacity (e.g. PPMED) supported future governments to pursue divergent policy agendas (e.g. NAFCO).

Donors also increasingly tried to create new avenues for private sector, NGOs and FBOs to participate in *policy processes* (e.g. GRIB). The 'governance' agenda was accompanied by a donor push for more stakeholder participation, which mostly consisted of consultations after agendas were set. Perhaps the biggest change in terms of policy implementation was a closer relationship between the government and new private companies interested in PPPs. The growing importance of private foundations also affected both policy agendas and the selection of implementing agencies.

The *political economy* for rice appears to have been influenced by different factors depending on the level of analysis. The *local level political economy* for rice appears to have been driven by the producer price and price of food, depending on whether individuals were influenced more by rural or urban concerns. After 2008, traditional rice-producing areas (e.g. northern regions) experienced another surge in government (e.g. NAFCO) and donor-led projects aiming to connect them with global value chains. Around the same time, PPP investments, reminiscent of those in the 1970s, were made in areas like the Volta Region to increase commercial rice production. The *national level political economy* for rice appears to have been motivated by different concerns before and after 2008. Until 2008, the government was more concerned with maintaining access to international donor support for its agricultural budget. In the aftermath of the 2008 food crisis, favourable economic trends (e.g. high gold and cocoa prices) and the discovery of oil focused the government on using its financial means to achieve the goal of rice ‘self-sufficiency’. Finally, the *international political economy* for rice underwent shifts during the same periods as the national political economy, but for different reasons. Between 2003 and 2008, donors focused on ‘governance’, aid effectiveness, and social issues more than on agriculture. However, the 2008 financial crisis reduced ODA levels for all sectors except agriculture, as donor agendas shifted towards food security. At the same time that ODA levels dropped, strong commodity prices increased private interest in the potential to earn profit from African agriculture. The donor and government push to increase rice production between 2009 and 2012 was accompanied by a jump in international investment in rice production in Ghana.

It is difficult to determine the full extent of influence international actors had on rice policy during the 2003 to 2012 period. On the one hand, donors continued to provide a significant source of government finance for agricultural policies and projects. Agricultural policies selected by the NPP between 2003 and 2008 are largely an amalgamation of existing donor agendas, and little if any efforts were made to directly support rice. After the 2008 crisis, the NDC was not only able to take greater control over its agricultural policies; it also financed initiatives without donor support. However, even after 2008, the kinds of policies and investments made in rice production aligned with efforts to link farmers to global value chains, a core international donor and private sector agenda.

In conclusion, it is clear that there was much greater heterogeneity amongst international agendas (e.g. donor and private sector) between 2003 and 2012 in comparison to the structural adjustment period. The plethora of actors and interests involved in Ghana after 2008 also appears to have created greater room for the government to select and implement policies that were nearly impossible during previous decades. However, none of these changes would have enabled the NDC government to go against donor agendas and to self-finance its own policy initiatives without there having also been significant improvements in the government's fiscal situation in 2009. The fact that donor reactions to these policies were to increase their financial support in parallel, often contradictory (e.g. GGC), projects mean they, too, were less concerned with government actions than with the international political economy at the time. These findings support Mosley (1995) and Killick (1998) in their hypothesis that donor influence relates to the relative significance of ODA and the salience of the threat that donors could end it, neither which was very significant for rice after 2009.

Chapter 7. Comparing the impact of international actors on cocoa and rice policy

The previous chapters carefully analysed policy decisions made in Ghana for two different crops, cocoa and rice, and over two different time periods (1983-1995 and 2003-2012). This chapter compares the four cases to understand if and how international influence had any impact on policies for these two crops. The chapter begins by briefly reflecting on the comparative method and the approach employed before comparing the cases.

Previous chapters developed case studies of the influence of international actors on cocoa and rice policies in Ghana during specific periods in time (1983-1995 and 2003-2012). However, assessing the impact of international actors on agricultural policies by looking at individual agreements over short periods in time risks ignoring the possibility that observed behaviours and choices are themselves an outcome of longer-term structural changes or processes which could result in overemphasising the power of individual actors. As argued by Lukes, an actor does not need to overtly control another in order to exercise power over them (Lukes 2005). International actors can impact policies by limiting government choices or by creating incentive structures that lead to the observed future policy choices. Establishing and reinforcing structures can also alter generations of policies through a continued process of structuration (Giddens 1984; Keeley and Scoones 2003). Identification of the overall impact of international actors on policies therefore requires an examination of how their influence on decisions and structures over time relates to future policy decisions.

Policy impact is understood as the marked influence that international actors have on policy, which cannot be explained by other actors, structures and circumstances (see Chapter 2). The analytical approach used for each case study is based on existing theory showing that an actor's impact on policy is related to its influence through resources, knowledge, and institutions (Giddens 1984; Keeley and Scoones 2003; Mosley et al. 1995; Noman et al. 2011). This chapter uses evidence generated by the four case studies of cocoa and rice policy in Ghana as the basis for assessing the level of influence international actors had on policy using the five point scale[25] established in Chapter 2, where 1 is very weak and 5 very strong.

After assessing the level of influence international actors had on policies during each period, a comparative analysis is used to understand if influence in one period had longer-term impacts on policies for the same crop. Then cocoa and rice are compared with each other to identify similarities in the way impact is achieved that are not crop specific. Findings from the comparative analyses are subsequently used in Chapter 8 to test existing hypotheses concerning how international actors impact African policy.

7.1. Impact of international actors on cocoa policy over time

International actors have been involved with cocoa production and policies in Ghana since colonial times (Beckman 1976; H.M. 1925, 1936, 1939). Between 1957 and 1981, Ghana witnessed many changes in government without significant changes in policy (Beckman 1976; Berry 2009b; Hill 1961; Toye 1991). However, starting in 1983, and with the help of IFIs, cocoa institutions were restructured. The restructured institutions subsequently survived in a similar form until at least 2012. The following sections examine the level of influence international actors had on cocoa policy over time.

7.1.1. Cocoa policy goals and means (resources and institutions)

In 1983, Ghana was in economic crisis and approached IFIs and other international actors for resources. After exhausting other potential options, the government accepted the package of

[25] **1. Very Weak:** International actors have no observable influence on government actions and policy outcomes are not aligned with international agendas; **2.Weak:** International actors have a limited influence on government actions but policy outcomes are not aligned with international agendas; **3. Medium:** International actors have a moderate influence on government actions and/or policy outcomes; **4. Strong:** International actors are have some influence on government actions and policy outcomes; **5. Very strong:** International actors significantly on government actions and the policy outcomes align with international agendas.

policy-based lending that was provided by IFIs. Even though the Economic Recovery Programme was not fully aligned with PNDC supporter interests; it was initially implemented as dictated by international actors. During this period, the national government and IFIs had both identified cocoa rehabilitation as important for addressing economic crisis in Ghana. The most influential international actors at the time were IFIs, specifically the World Bank and IMF. The major goal for both IFIs and the national government at the time was economic recovery; and cocoa rehabilitation was seen as important for achieving it (Bank of Ghana 1984: p. 5; World Bank 1984a: p. Xvi). The resources selected by IFIs for rehabilitating the cocoa sector included: 1) government cost reduction and restructuring; 2) increasing the cocoa producer price; and 3) improving access to agricultural inputs. To a large extent the goals and means selected appear to have been mutually endorsed by international actors and the government.

After 1987, the government's policy goals and resources became less politically aligned with IFI agendas. Whereas elected politicians used control over cocoa prices to bolster political support from farmers, COCOBOD's bureaucrats increasingly protected their institutions from further restructuring (Whitfield and Buur 2014). As a result, between 1987 and 1995 government actions no longer reflected policy goals or resources agreed upon with the IFIs. Consequently, since international actors initially influenced the selection of policy goals, but governments then circumvented these agreed policies, the overall degree of international influence is best characterised as ***medium***.

Between 1995 and 2003, Ghana's cocoa production had been stagnant due to an overall decline in productivity. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the government once again selected the policy goal of increasing cocoa exports through improved productivity. Private companies interested in maintaining stable world cocoa prices and the quality of cocoa supplies welcomed the government's goal of increased production. IFIs and other traditional development donors, however, appear to have been less interested or involved. With the exception of a thrust to end child labour and ensure ethical sourcing few donor agreements or projects targeted the cocoa sector (Hawksley 2001; Payson Center 2011).

Perhaps unexpectedly, after 2003, the international actors that appear most concerned with more traditional ‘development’ issues in the cocoa sector, such as welfare and education, were foundations like the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF 2012, 2014). Policy goals including sustainable, ethical, and fair sourcing were promoted by multinational companies and fit nicely with the government’s pro-farmer rhetoric (Daily Guide 2010; Ghanaian Chronicle 2003a, 2004a). A key difference between IFI efforts in the 1980s and the public-private partnerships in the 2000s appears to be that latter efforts were less restrictive regarding the resources used by governments to achieve goals. Higher cocoa prices post-2008 meant that the government was able to achieve policy goals by using direct government intervention (e.g. mass spraying), which had previously been opposed by IFIs in the 1980s.

The government maintained significant control over the cocoa sector after 1995 and even blocked private initiatives that were not sanctioned or supported by the existing policies and institutions (Laven 2010a: pp. 67-68). This ability to select cocoa policy goals and resources, including blocking some international efforts, shows that international actors had significantly less influence in the 2000s than the 1980s. It does appear, however, that the continued involvement of IFIs, donors and multilateral organisations such as the UN-ILO shaped government rhetoric and government support for processes such as RSCE. Thus, due to the government’s continued reliance on partnerships with transnational companies, and its involvement in international cocoa initiatives, the influence of international actors between 2003 and 2012 remained ***medium.***

7.1.2. Cocoa policy knowledge (expertise and worldview)

The structural adjustment programmes and related government policies between 1983 and 1995 are often referred to as neoliberal or neo-orthodox depending on the study (Callaghy 1990; Kahler

1990). Promoted as part of structural adjustment, these policies upheld a worldview that governments should not directly interfere in production or private markets (Bates 2005; Commander 1989; Gibbon 2002; Toye 1991). After initial failed attempts at more ad-hoc policies, Rawlings and the PNDC adopted the liberal economic policy agendas promoted by donors and IFIs (Agyeman-Duah 1987: p. 630; Gyimah-Boadi 1989: p. 236; Hutchful 2002). Yet, not all of the cocoa policies implemented between 1983 and 1995 were aligned with IFI promoted knowledge regarding the role of the state in promoting agricultural development (See Chapter 3).

The World Bank and IMF pushed for full market liberalisation and helped the government reduce the size of bureaucracies such as the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, but they did not successfully end government control over input provision or cocoa marketing. Policies implemented never fully adhered to any one economic theory or worldview. Despite these divergences, COCOBOD's restructure became viewed as a 'success' (T. Williams 2009).

The failure of IFIs to fully liberalise the cocoa sector does not mean international agendas were unsuccessful in influencing how Ghana designed and defended its cocoa policies however. When the government chose to stop further liberalising the cocoa sector, it defended this decision using the same kind of economic theory and evidence as IFIs (T. Williams 2009). Considering how the government defended its policies using IFI promoted economic theory, the impact of international actors on cocoa policy knowledge was ***strong***.

By 2003, the goal of increased cocoa production was still being achieved through COCOBOD, one of the few African marketing boards that survived structural adjustment. Policies such as government-led mass spraying programmes and subsidies for transnational companies willing to set up cocoa processing in Ghana are unabashedly contrary to the neoliberal economic theory promoted by IFIs in the 1980s. However, a dichotomy between statist policies on the one hand

and neoliberal on the other does not adequately portray the similarities inherent in the goals of IFIs, private sector actors, and the government in Ghana.

Insomuch as state-led initiatives were creating opportunities for private sector investment, they still upheld the interests of those actors who previously pushed for market liberalisation (Jessop 2002). Continued government involvement in cocoa marketing does not appear to be driven by ideology or by a different economic theory. Instead, state involvement in cocoa benefits the government and its supporters, as well as the transnational companies that purchase Ghana's cocoa. The use of cocoa to fund state budgets, bolster political support, and maintain control over production and marketing are consistent with state-led development approaches used before, during, and after structural adjustment. The decision to openly oppose any international actors' economic or political theories that did not align with government's policy goals between 2003 and 2012 reveals that the influence of international actors on cocoa policy was ***very weak***.

7.1.3. Cocoa policy processes

Between 1983 and 1995, international actors made significant efforts to alter policy processes and bring them in line with IFI and western donor expectations. This assertion is most strongly supported by the strict conditions that were attached to loans and donor projects stipulating both the types of policies and the actors to be involved in the *selection*, *funding*, *implementation* and *evaluat*ion *processes* (Bank of Ghana 1983; Callaghy 1990; Jacobeit 1991; Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011; Martin 1991). The most significant examples of international actors' influence on the policy process for cocoa were their involvement in restructuring GCMB into COCOBOD and their support in the establishment of new government institutions for cocoa pricing, monitoring and evaluation.

It should be noted that donor and IFI involvement in Ghana's cocoa policy during the 1980s was not new, as these actors were providing technical assistance and funding development projects prior to, during and after structural adjustment (ADB 2002; World Bank 1997b: p. v). Donor-funded international technical consultants were not the only source of expertise, however, as the government also made use of both domestic and international experts for the identification of problems and the selection of policy options (Ghana Cocoa Board 1989; Hutchful 2002; PMM 1984a, 1984b). The observation that much of what was agreed on paper changed significantly during the *implementation* of policies reveals that the influence of technical assistance depended on other drivers of change.

The fact that donor agreements were prone to ‘slippage’ during implementation was to some extent acceptable to the government and to international actors, according to other observers (Toye 1991; World Bank 1997b). The relative flexibility with which IFIs and donors accepted changes during the implementation of agreements is also evidenced by the optimism with which divergence is treated in *evaluation* (ADB 2002; Inter-réseaux 2007; Mosley et al. 1995; World Bank 1997b: p. 12). Generally, international actors were an essential source of support for the government in its efforts to restructure the GCMB into COCOBOD, even if this was a shared goal. The fact that the restructure was not significant in terms of liberalisation means that the government was likely in greater control over the process than were the international actors, which may mean that international actors had more influence on discourse and behaviour than they did on the actual policy outcomes. For this reason international actor influence on cocoa policy was ***medium*** during this period.

By 2003, the government acted significantly more independent from IFIs and donors in terms of the selection and implementation of cocoa policies. Many institutions, such as the Cocoa Pricing Review Committee established in the 1980s, remained influential into the 2000s. In actuality, the extent to which these institutions altered the policy selection processes, for instance in the case of pricing, is questionable given that the elected government through Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning largely held power (Interview GH27 2011).

Where international actors appear to have been most influential in shaping cocoa policy processes in the 2000s was in the establishment of new international cocoa governance processes (e.g. Roundtable for a Sustainable Cocoa Economy) and laws (e.g. Harkin-Engle Protocol) (Payson Center 2011; RSCE 2009; UNILO 1999; WCF 2012). Efforts to end child slavery and to make cocoa production ethical and sustainable also led to an increase in international involvement in *monitoring and evaluating* the efforts made by the government to implement the agreement protocol.

Another change observed in cocoa policy processes after 2003 was the increased inclusion of private international actors in new sustainable sourcing practices and in the provision of services such as education (WCF 2012). It is important to note that international private sector actors have been involved in providing services to cocoa farmers since colonial times (Alence 2001; Dzorgbo 2001). Even after taking into account new internationally funded services, the international actors' actual influence on cocoa policy processes still appears to have substantially decreased in the 2000s. The most significant efforts were more focused on building relationships with multinational companies than on restructuring the government or its relationship to the cocoa sector. This meant the overall influence of international actors during this period was relatively ***weak,*** as the government maintained significant control over the cocoa policy process**.**

7.1.4. Cocoa political economy

Between 1983 and 1995, the biggest driver of policy change was Ghana's economic crisis (Hutchful 2002; M. A. Novicki 1984; Toye 1991). Although international actors did not cause Ghana's economic crises, they do appear influential in shaping incentives during recovery. When Rawlings was unable to find viable alternative sources of finance (Ayee 1994), the acceptance of financial support from the IMF and World Bank came with a structural adjustment programme attached.

Evidence suggests that Rawlings and the PNDC used the image of fighting corruption and improving the lives of cocoa farmers as a way to justify the hardships many faced during structural adjustment (Kulibaba 1993: p. 24; Stryker et al. 1990). This pro-cocoa image was essential for maintaining control of the government given the importance of cocoa and farming to Ghana's local populations. As keeping a pro-farmer image was essential for maintaining control of the government, it is not surprising that the PNDC was forced to balance international agreements on paper with demands from local farmers. Where the influence of international actors was perhaps greatest was in the promotion of a multiparty democracy, which had much wider implications for cocoa. The return to democracy at the end of structural adjustment pushed governments to generate support from voters by promising increases in cocoa prices.

The international political economy of Ghana's structural adjustment programme was also tied to wider Cold War geopolitics, which made Ghana a 'test case' for the Washington Consensus on Development (Hutchful 2002: p. 151; Kahler 1990; Martin 1991: p. 239). Ghana's compliance with donor-promoted policy changes helped endear the government to the international donor community and provided increased access to development assistance. The mutual benefits associated with Ghana's relationship to donors may also explain the previously mentioned flexibilities during implementation.

By the end of structural adjustment the government was disillusioned with the idea of further liberalizing cocoa, especially when world cocoa prices started to fall. The effort made by IFIs and donors to increase cocoa production in many countries simultaneously was perhaps the most significant way in which international actors influenced cocoa production (Gibbon et al. 1993). The collapse of world cocoa prices after 1987 was followed by a decrease in government support for cocoa productivity throughout the 1990s (Vigneri 2008: p18). International actors' ability to shape political and economic incentives for government involvement in cocoa production and their effect on world cocoa prices illustrate that their impact on the political economy for cocoa was ***strong*** between 1983 and 1995.

The influence of international actors on the political economy for cocoa between 2003 and 2012 was very different from that in previous decades. Cocoa prices began to rise again in the 2000s, which coincided with both the productivity of cocoa trees and a growth in global demand (Breisinger et al. 2011; Bulir 1998: p. 6; Commander 1989: p. 121). However, instead of a new wave of World Bank or donor-funded cocoa programmes, the government increasingly partnered with the private sector to address cocoa productivity (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 210; Opoku et al. 2009). It is unclear exactly why the government preferred private partnerships, but this was likely because they involved fewer requests for the change of government institutions. Given that cocoa regions were relatively well off, the overall reduction in donor-supported cocoa projects could also have been linked to donors shifting their focus and support to poorer regions.

The financial and food crises significantly altered the political economy for cocoa after 2008. At the same time that commodity markets became attractive alternatives for investors, donors switched their focus towards food insecure populations in northern Ghana, which do not grow cocoa (see Chapter 6). Despite the dramatic shift in the political economy for agriculture, the importance of cocoa to local Ghanaians remained high, as the cocoa sector continued employing 60% of the population (T. Williams 2009: p. 15). The significance of cocoa employment also secured its importance as an agenda item during elections and encouraged the government to use cocoa policies as a campaign tool (Ghanaian Chronicle 2004b). Although local and national political economic changes had more influence on cocoa policies than did international, the continued involvement of transnational companies and investors between 2003 and 2012 shows how international influence remained ***medium.***

7.1.5. Overall impact of international actors on cocoa policy between 1983 and 2012

It is clear that international actors did have an impact on cocoa policies in Ghana over the period examined. As shown in Table 7.3 below it also appears that donors and IFIs had greater influence on cocoa policies between 1983 and 1987 than in the following years. However, just because international influence diminished after structural adjustment does not mean international actors stopped having an impact on policy. Most importantly, the types of policy changes made in the 1980s meant that both the government and its international private sector partners remained an important part of the cocoa supply chain between 1983 and 2012.

Table 7.1 Impact of international actors on cocoa policy

Variables	1983-1995	2003-2012
Influence on policy goals and means (resources and institutions): To what extent were policy goals and selected means aligned with those promoted by international actors? Which international actors?	Medium (3); Primarily IFIs and donors	Medium (3); Primarily private sector actors
Influence on policy knowledge: To what extent were policies upholding the theory, expertise and experience provided by international actors?	Strong (4)	Very Weak (1)
Influence on policy process: How were stages of the policy process affected by international actors to involve different processes or to include or exclude different actors?	Medium (3)	Weak (2)
Influence on political economy: How was the political and economic system influenced by international actors?	Strong (4)	Medium (3)
Overall impact of international actors on cocoa policy:	**Medium/ Strong (3.5)**	**Weak/Medium (2.3)**

As shown in Table 7.1, a comparison of the influence of international actors on policy seems to imply that they became less important to Ghana's cocoa sector. However, this is simply not true. In the 1980s, international support to Ghana made possible cocoa policy changes that had previously been too difficult for governments to achieve. Prior to 1983, governments had been unable to devalue the currency and push through the types of policy change and institutional restructuring needed in order to cut government costs; increase producer prices; increase productivity; and protect cocoa quality. Alignment between IFIs and government agendas from 1983 and 1987 made it possible to restructure the GCMB into COCOBOD.

It can be argued that the government already desired the policy changes that were enabled by international actors. If this is true, then international influence did not impact cocoa policy, as the government would likely have implemented the same policies regardless. However, it is very unlikely that the government could have implemented exactly the same cocoa policies without IFI support. Prior to the support of IFIs, governments had been unable to devalue Ghana's currency and restructure the GCMB. When the PNDC government came into power, it explored communist and other policy approaches that would have reduced rather than increased private sector involvement in the cocoa sector. Not only did international actors make cocoa policy change possible, by only funding options that adhered to a particular economic paradigm, but they also helped define how policy goals were achieved.

After 1993, COCOBOD's ability to finance activities with loans from international private financial institutions to a large extent protected it from further restructuring by elected politicians and foreign aid donors (Whitfield and Buur 2014). Although donors and IFIs became less important to COCOBOD, its relationship with cocoa traders, processors and chocolate producing companies remained important (Laven 2010a). Whereas IFIs and donors focused on goals like good governance and poverty reduction, transitional companies were much more concerned with the quality and traceability (e.g. from farmer to market) of cocoa beans (Fold 2002). Private sector actors maintained a close relationship between COCOBOD and its subsidiaries (e.g. CMC) (Laven 2010b: p. 93). In turn, the close relationship between private international actors and COCOBOD meant that international agendas, such as preservation of the ethical image of Ghanaian cocoa, became opportunities for collaborative efforts (Fold 2002; Hawksley 2001; Payson Center 2011).

As long as the COCOBOD maintained a steady supply of quality cocoa beans, private international actors did not need to intervene in policy or cocoa governance system. When supply was threatened, international actors supported changes using the existing COCOBOD-managed system, for example by introducing new high-yielding varieties or ensuring grading (Fold 2002). However, when COCOBOD was threatened by international involvement in areas like processing, the government maintained control over the Ghanaian cocoa sector using whatever means possible, including blocking private efforts (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2011: p. 210; Laven 2007: p. 3; Whitfield and Buur 2014).

Reflecting on the relationship between international actors and Ghana's cocoa policies, the impact of international actors stems from their continued support for a system of governance and cocoa production that upheld their economic interests. Low global cocoa prices in the late 1970s helped create the economic instability that made possible political change in the 1980s. IFIs used structural adjustment to support government changes that increased cocoa production in many countries simultaneously and kept the global price of cocoa low. In the 1990s and 2000s, international efforts changed in line with global agendas towards quality and traceability. When IFI goals, such as fully liberalising the cocoa sector, became too demanding, private sector interests in predictable levels of quality cocoa beans were upheld by COCOBOD.

In each period examined, IFI recommendations appear to be based on neo-liberal theory regarding economic and political systems. By contrast, international private actors in Ghana's cocoa sector appear more flexible and focused on economic opportunities. COCOBOD's ability to maintain control over production and quality assurance gives it significant bargaining power with private international actors and with domestic politicians. Therefore, the impact of international actors on cocoa policy is strongly related to their ability to create and maintain economic relationships that benefit the government and the cocoa supply chain.

7.2. Impact of international actors on rice policy

The changes observed in rice policies over the periods examined were much more dramatic than those in cocoa policies. Prior to 1983, governments experimented with various policies to promote domestic commercial rice production (Goody 1980; Konings 1980). During structural adjustment, rice subsidies were cut and commercial rice farming collapsed (see Chapter 4). However, the collapse of commercial rice farms did not reduce the demand for rice, which continued to grow in urban areas (FAO 2013; ODI 2000). The combination of dependency on rice imports and the 2008 global food crisis led to significant new government and international investments in the rice sector between 2003 and 2012 (see Chapter 6). To understand the level of international impact on rice policies, the following sections first compare the international influence over time.

7.2.1. Rice policy goals and means (resources and institutions)

When Rawlings and the PNDC first took control of the government, they attempted a variety of alternative rice production policies and programs, including 'community farms', without much success (Anyimadu 1993: p. 63; E. Hansen 1989: p. 216). After initial failed efforts, the government agreed to accept IFI support. Subsequent efforts focused on addressing the acute food shortage by cutting government spending and liberalising markets (Ayee 1994: p. 106; Shepard and Onumah 1997; World Bank 1984a: p. 39).

Structural adjustment involved cutting many government programmes that supported commercial rice farming. Policies selected used rhetoric, such as achieving food 'self-sufficiency', but prevented the government from directly supporting production (DFID 1999: p6; Hansen 1989: p215; Kofi 1994: p10). Means for achieving policy goals were limited to research, technical support, and increased opportunities for private input suppliers (Anyimadu 1993: p. 65; Dapaah 1995: p. 13; World Bank 1995b: pp. 1-2).

By the end of structural adjustment, the ‘social cost’ of liberalising markets and cutting government support had led to growing unease among the international donor community (e.g. adjustment with a human face) (Cornia et al. 1987). The result was a series of new donor initiatives (e.g. PAMSCAD, etc.) that had goals for addressing the needs of the poor (Anyimadu 1993: p. 68; Weissman 1990: p. 1627; World Bank 1992: p. XIV). However, because government institutions had largely collapsed, new donor initiatives relied on NGOs for the achievement of their goals. By 1995, both international donors and the government were increasingly using donor projects and NGOs to achieve policy goals, albeit with little success in terms of rice production. Because rice policy goals and means were mutually aligned with IFI and donor agreements, it is evident that international actors had a ***very strong*** influence on policies between 1983 and 1995.

By 2003, stagnant food production in Ghana made the country vulnerable to changing commodity prices. The costs associated with importing rice were a burden on Ghana’s trade balance (FAO 2013; ODI 2000). This situation encouraged the government to begin pairing the policy goal of food self-sufficiency with new means for achieving it (see Chapter 6). After 2008, the government selected and implemented the types of policies (e.g. fertiliser subsidies, block farms, NAFCO buffer stock, etc.) which had been disbanded under structural adjustment (Angelucci et al. 2013; Benin et al. 2013). At the same time, international actors, including new donors such as the Gates Foundation, became increasingly supportive of rice production in Ghana.

In the 2000s Ghana witnessed an increase in international private investment in rice production programs. As private interests increased, rice policies increasingly contradicted donor agendas (e.g. the use of buffer stocks, etc.). Many of the policy stipulations, such as gender equality and environmental sustainability, continued to mirror donor agendas but this does not appear to have significantly changed government actions (Ghana 2009: p4-5). This suggests that donors and IFIs had less influence on rice policies in the 2000s than they did during structural adjustment. Government’s adherence to CAADP; its promotion of NERICA rice; and its decision to partner with international private companies, however, all demonstrate ways in which international actors continued to have some influence on policy. Therefore, international actors are best characterised as having a ***medium*** influence between 2003 and 2012.

7.2.2. Rice policy knowledge (expertise and worldview)

Between 1983 and 1995, the restructuring of government services and the liberalisation of rice marketing adhered to neoliberal theories of the desired relationship between the state and productive sectors (Callaghy 1990). The government's decision to implement the ERP helped remove any doubt about the economic and political ideas underpinning agricultural policies (see Chapter 3). Whether or not the shift toward liberal economic policies was a betrayal to Rawlings' communist supporters is debatable, but it does highlight that knowledge or ideology was unlikely the biggest driver of the PNDC decisions (Hutchful 2002: p. 40).

After 1983, rice policies also became more consistently aligned with technology-based development approaches promoted by donors (see Chapter 4). Policies increasingly focused on supporting and creating space for private sector investment in rice (E. Hansen 1989: p. 215). Given that the overall trend across rice policies between 1983 and 1995 was increased alignment with agendas and policy approaches promoted by IFIs and donors, the influence of these understandings on Ghana's rice policy appears ***very strong.***

By 2003, 'neo-orthodoxy' and the Washington Consensus of the 1980s had given way to many divergent policy agendas (e.g. environmental sustainability, gender, etc.) (Government of Ghana 2009; Kahler 1990). The increased number of donors led to greater concern over coordinated efforts, which may have actually reduced the influence of any single donor agenda on policies, as is seen in the case of Sector-Wide Approaches (Harrison 2004: p. 126). At the same time, Ghana's steady economic growth and the reduced importance of official development assistance may have created more room to select policies that diverged from liberal economic theory and neoliberal agendas. This increased ‘room to manoeuvre’ appears to represent a significant change from the conditions placed on aid in the 1980s (Clay and Schaffer 1984).

Even though alternative options may have been available, between 2003 and 2008 the NPP pursued policy approaches that upheld private sector led development approaches similar to those implemented during structural adjustment (e.g. achieving rice production through support to research and extension). However, after 2009 the retuning NDC’s decisions to set up block farms, national buffer stock (e.g. NAFCO), and to provide new fertilizer subsidies all showed a clear return to *state-led rice development* policies (Benin et al. 2011; Benin et al. 2013).

Despite pursuing new state-led development approaches, the government also continued to use international donor and private-sector support (GADCO 2011; Syngenta Foundation 2013). As a result, initiatives like the National Rice Development Strategy used rhetoric that was aligned with the same technology-first, private sector development approach as before (Government of Ghana 2009; JICA 2009; Syngenta Foundation 2013). However, although donor projects continued to uphold international agendas, rice policies between 2003 and 2012 did not align with any single ideology or worldview about development or the role of the state. Therefore, it appears that the influence of international actors on knowledge used in policies was ***weak*** during this period.

7.2.3. Rice policy process

The period between 1983 and 1995 witnessed significant changes in government institutions as related to rice production. Prior to structural adjustment the government had established institutions to directly support all stages of rice production: from inputs to the provision of a guaranteed market, as outlined in Chapter 4, (Brooks et al. 2007: p. 13; Konings 2002; Van Hear 1984). During the few years before the PNDC government began structural adjustment, many local actors were already involved in the rice policy process (see Chapter 4). Supporting rice was costly, however; and during the ERP, donors decided that rice was not commercially viable in Ghana and pushed the government to restructure (Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 25).

Restructuring institutions that supported rice involved disbanding functions like rice marketing as well as introducing new institutions and functions to meet international donor requirements, such as the PPMED in the Ministry of Agriculture. Institutions like PPMED increased the ability of the government and of donors to monitor and track spending and to take on a coordination role for the growing number of donors interested in funding projects in Ghana (World Bank 1987b: p11). The heavy involvement of international actors directly in the restructuring of government institutions illustrates how their influence on rice policy processes was ***very strong*** over this period.

When observing changes in the rice policy process between 2003 and 2012, it is apparent that the involvement of many actors and institutions remained unchanged after structural adjustment. Donors such as the World Bank, United Kingdom, United States, and others remained influential in the selection of rice policy goals and means. The PPMED continued to oversee monitoring and evaluation and took on the role of coordinating donors (see Chapter 6).

It is notable that donor involvement was at times problematic. The *selection* of policies as well as their *implementation* became a negotiation process that could delay projects for years, as was the case with AgSSIP (World Bank 2007: p. 20). Although it could be argued that the lengthy delays were a result of the government becoming firmer in its own positions. The plethora of donors supporting agriculture (e.g. at least 13 donors in 2011) also meant that having individual project implementation units for each project was no longer productive; and the ‘Aid Effectiveness’ agenda pushed donors to start coordinating efforts in recipient countries and using modalities such as budget support (Tandon 2010). The shift towards budget support re-focused international attention on monitoring and financial management (Lawson et al. 2007: p. 8).

The observation that the government had increased control over the rice policy process, especially after the NDC was re-elected in December 2008, is supported by interviews and the government's selection and implementation of policies such as the NAFCO buffer stock (Benin et al. 2011). However, there are also instances where donors still influenced the inclusion of actors during policy implementation, as was the case when the French pushed to support FBOs it had established in previous projects (CSSF 2012: p. 2). In addition, donors were still able to influence the establishment of new institutions such as the U.S. backed MiDA (Whitfield 2011a). Because both the government and the donors were able to affect stages of the policy process at different times, depending on the initiative concerned, the influence of international actors on the policy processes between 2003 and 2012 was overall ***strong*** rather than very strong.

7.2.4. Rice political economy

During the structural adjustment period, the government was primarily concerned with increasing its access to foreign exchange (see Chapter 3 and 4). When the government secured support from IFIs, it reduced support to commercial rice farming activities (Ahiakpor 1991: p. 588). At the same time, good weather and demand for food led to an increase in smallholder farmers' rice production (Abdulai and Huffman 2000: p505). The transition from state-supported commercial rice production to 'liberalised' peasant farming (see Chapter 4) illustrates how international actors appear to have influenced the political economy for rice in three ways. First, financial assistance was tied to policy approaches that prevented the continuation of state funding to commercial farms. Second, structural adjustment corresponded with an increase in food insecurity and the steady increase in donor projects supporting the poor farmers, including those growing rice. Third, donors provided food aid and access to imports as a means of addressing food shortage, which further reduced incentives for commercial investors and increased reliance on imported rice.

It is difficult to determine whether it was international actors or the national political economy of rice at the time that led the PNDC to select observed policies. Ending subsidies to commercial rice farms benefitted the government by decreasing spending. Rawlings and the PNDC also benefitted from the support of northern farmers who had previously protested state-supported commercial rice farms (Goody 1980; Konings 1980). Because international actors required these policy changes as part of the structural adjustment programmes, their influence on the political economy for rice between 1983 and 1995 was ***very strong***.

The political economy for rice between 2003 and 2012 was dominated at the national level by an increase in Ghana's urban rice consumption and at the international level by the 2008 food crisis (CSSF 2012: pp. 2-3; Diako et al. 2010). Domestic pressure to reduce the cost of imported rice led the government to take stronger policy actions (Government of Ghana 2009). After 2008, the government's policies focused directly on increasing production, unlike those during structural adjustment. This is likely due to the fact that the government was less reliant on IFIs and donors' support (Benin et al. 2011). The government's ability to select its own rice policies was probably aided by Ghana's overall improved economy and financial situation, which included increased interest from private international investors.

Although government response was largely driven by domestic pressure, it was still accompanied by international support. Donors promoted the agenda for increasing rice production and gave financial support to improve conditions for commercial farming (GFAR 2011; JICA 2009; Osei-Asare 2010). In addition, public and private investors increasingly saw African agriculture, including rice, as an attractive investment (Cotula et al. 2009; Cotula 2013; GADCO 2011, 2013). These new investments appear to have encouraged the government to implement rice policies that supported commercial rice farmers, including through public-private partnerships. Government efforts to balance domestic demands with international interests show that the overall influence of international actors on the political economy for rice was ***medium*** over this period.

7.2.5. The overall impact of international actors on rice policy between 1983 and 2012

Rice policies were greatly influenced by international actors in each period examined. Between 1983 and 1995, IFIs set goals and provided means for selected rice policies. The disbanding of many institutions associated with state-supported commercial rice production in the 1970s and the collapse of agricultural extension services both reshaped the relationship between the government and the sector. Strict adherence to policies promoted by IFIs in the 1980s was followed by decades of stagnant rice production in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Similar to cocoa policies, rice policies fit both international and national government agendas and the political economy at the time they were implemented. Disbanding government institutions cut government expenditures and terminated support of commercial farmers that were widely unpopular amongst PNDC supporters in northern regions. The government was therefore able to implement IFI promoted rice policies while simultaneously keeping a pro-farmer appearance, at least until the collapse of agricultural extensions services. As shown in Table 7.2, international actors had an overall very strong influence on rice policies in the 1980s.

Table 7.2 Impact of international actors on rice policy

Variables	1983-1995	2003-2012
Influence on policy goals and means (resources and institutions): To what extent were policy goals and selected means aligned with those promoted by international actors? Which international actors?	Very Strong (5); Primarily IFIs and donors	Medium (3); Primarily donors and private sector
Influence on policy knowledge: To what extent were policies upholding the theory, expertise and experience provided by international actors?	Very Strong (5)	Very Weak (1)
Influence on policy process: How were stages of the policy process affected by international actors to involve different processes or to include or exclude different actors?	Very Strong (5)	Strong (4)
Influence on political economy: How was the political and economic system influenced by international actors?	Very Strong (5)	Medium (3)
Overall impact of international actors on rice Policy:	**Very Strong (5)**	**Medium/Weak (2.8)**

As shown in Table 7.2, changes in the level of international influence on rice policies over time related more too evolving knowledge and political economy than to any other area examined. By 2003, there was no longer a strong donor consensus regarding which policies worked best to ensure food security or what the role of governments should be in supporting agricultural production (Kalita et al. 2012; Sumner 2006). The lack of international consensus meant that when the NDC wanted to increase rice production it was more constrained by the available institutions and supporters than by any ideology (Clapp 2014 ; McMichael 2009). The government in the 2000s also faced new challenges when it came to supporting farmers because of its earlier decisions to disband institutions in the 1980s. In many ways the decline in donor influence in the 2000s could therefore be seen as a reaction to the IFI supported policies that had resulted in the collapse of rice production and related institutions previously.

Faced with rapidly increasing import costs and the 2008 food crisis, the NDC government re-established agricultural support institutions, subsidies and price controls to boost domestic food production. However, whereas efforts in the 1970s largely benefited Ghana’s southern capitalists, NDC efforts in the 2000s targeted both international and domestic investors. International agro-chemical and financial companies worked through initiatives like AGRA and directly with governments to fill institutional voids and to establish public-private partnerships. As a result, the overall impact of international actors on rice policy related to the long-term outcomes of policies promoted by IFIs in the 1980s, and the effect they had on the institutional structures and political economy for rice production in the 2000s.

7.3. Comparing the impact of international actors on cocoa and rice policy

Examining the impact that international actors have on cocoa policies and rice policies over a period of time provides a basis for identifying what similarities exist that are not crop specific. Cocoa and rice policies affect very different actors in Ghana and internationally. The history of cocoa as an export commodity makes it particularly important to the government and international companies involved in cocoa supply chain (see Chapter 1, 3, and 5). By contrast, the history of rice as an imported commodity makes it important to different actors in Ghana and internationally.

As shown in Table 7.3, there was a decrease in the influence of international actors on both cocoa and rice policy over time (scores of -1.3 for cocoa vs. -2.3 for rice). Twenty years after structural adjustment, the biggest difference between crops was observed in the policy process (international influence score of 2 for cocoa and 4 for rice). Whereas cocoa institutions survived structural adjustment largely intact, rice institutions were dismantled. When the government refocused on rice production it set up new institutions (e.g. NAFCO buffer stocks), worked with donors interested in supporting rice (e.g. AGRA, France, Gates, JICA, USAID etc.) and partnered with new private investors (e.g. GADCO), as explained in Chapter 6. Two of these options involved international actors whose overall influence was much greater. By contrast, cocoa policy remained firmly under government control.

Table 7.3 Comparing Cocoa and Rice over Time

Impact of international actors on cocoa and rice policy					
Crops:	**Policy goals and means:**	**Policy Knowledge:**	**Policy process:**	**Political economy:**	**Average Effect:**
		1983 to 1995			
Cocoa:	3.0	4.0	3.0	4.0	3.5
Rice:	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Difference between crops:	*-2.0*	*-1.0*	*-2.0*	*-1.0*	-1.5
Average:	*4.0*	*4.5*	*4.0*	*4.5*	4.3
		2003 to 2012			
Cocoa:	3.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	2.3
Rice:	3.0	1.0	4.0	3.0	2.8
Difference between crops:	*0.0*	*0.0*	*-2.0*	*0.0*	-0.5
Average:	*3.0*	*1.0*	*3.0*	*3.0*	2.5
Difference over time in cocoa:	0.0	-3.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.3
Difference over time in rice:	-2.0	-4.0	-1.0	-2.0	-2.3

Despite many differences, there were also important similarities in the impact of international actors impacted on policies for each crop. When looking at policy goals, the availability of alternative sources of finance decreased the impact of international actors on both cocoa and rice policies. Ghana's use of international loans and development assistance to overcome economic crisis in the 1980s was correlated with the government's selection of policy goals that aligned with international agendas. When government dependency on foreign aid lessened, which for cocoa was after 1993 and rice after 2008, policy goals for both crops no longer closely resembled IFI or donor agendas.

The importance of consensus amongst international actors was another key similarity that explains international impact. As depicted in Figure 7.4 below, there was a correlation between donor consensus and their influence on policy observed.

Figure 7.4 Correlation between consensus and influence

	Authoritarian national government 1983-1992	**Democratic national government 1993 onwards**
Consensus amongst international agendas	⇧ Strong alignment – Example: Ghana 1980-1987 and implementation of ERP	⇳ International actor advantage – Example: End to child slavery in cocoa
Plurality of international agendas	⇳ National actor advantage Example: Ghana 1987-1995 and stalled liberalisation of cocoa marketing	⇩ Poor alignment – Example: Return to state subsidies for rice

Strong donor consensus in the 1980s corresponded with international actors having significantly more impact on agricultural policies. The lack of consensus amongst international donors in the 2000s corresponded with heterogeneity in cocoa and rice policies. Heterogeneity also corresponded with weak international influence on the policy knowledge promoted (see Table 7.3).

Furthermore, international involvement in reshaping policy processes had long-term impacts on policy. Before accepting IFI support the PNDC government considered a wide range of different economic policies (see Chapter 4). When the government accepted the ERP, the subsequent restructuring of institutions removed many dissenting voices from policy processes (Agyeman-Duah 1987: pp. 621-22; Ho-Won 1995: p. 96; Hutchful 2002: pp. 41-42). Individuals selected to design cocoa and rice policies were vetted by IFIs and appointed based on their ability to analyse policies using the economic and political approaches promoted by donors.

International involvement in policy processers eventually led to institutional entanglement between donors and recipient governments (Whitfield 2008). This was also seen in the importance of international venues for setting agendas for cocoa and rice policies. Industry roundtables became important venues for discussing child labour in cocoa (RSCE 2009). Similarly, Ghana's national rice strategy was motivated by an international meeting in Japan (JICA 2009). In this way, international influence on policy processes in the 1980s enabled international actors to have a long-term impact by establishing institutional structures that shaped future policies.

The influence of international actors on policies also had long-term impacts on the political economy for cocoa and rice. For cocoa, the World Bank's push to increase cocoa production in many countries at the same time led to a drop in world cocoa prices in the late 1980s. The decline in world prices decreased incentives for the government and farmers to invest in cocoa. Stagnant productivity levels eventually led to new international efforts to increase cocoa production in Ghana in the 2000s. Simultaneously, IFI-funded economic analyses in the 1980s was used as a basis for the decision that rice production was uneconomical which led the government to disband institutions and neglect rice production (Shepard and Onumah 1997: p. 25). In the 2000s the lack of domestic rice production led to new fears over the cost of imported rice and food security which, in turn, inspired the recreation of institutions that had been previously disbanded. In this manner, both cocoa and rice policies in the 2000s were directly affected by the international influence of previous decades.

Finally, international involvement in Ghana's return to democracy changed the political economy for both cocoa and rice (see Chapter 3 and 4). As observed by Mkandawire, the creation of donor-supported technocratic 'enclaves' on the one hand and parallel elected governments on the other created a dual policymaking system (Mkandawire 2009: p. 13). Elections focused attention on both cocoa and rice prices, which in turn became battlegrounds for competing political parties (Dzisah 1999; Food Security Ghana 2011). Politicians used cocoa producer prices as voter incentives, which the government afforded by reducing its own share of export earnings (Whitfield and Buur 2014). Politicians also promised increased rice production as a means to achieve food self-sufficiency. In this manner, Ghana's return to democracy reduced the ability of international actors to influence policies, at least in ways that contradicted voter opinion.

7.4. Chapter Seven Conclusions: The impact of international actors on cocoa and rice policy

Overall, it is clear that international actors had an impact on cocoa and rice policies in Ghana. The influence of donors and IFIs on cocoa and rice policies appears to have gradually declined while the influence of private sector actors increased. These findings highlight the importance of examining both public and private activities at international, national, and local levels when examining agricultural policies. The comparative analysis of cocoa and rice policies uncovered at least four explanations for predicting when international actors will or will not impact domestic agricultural policies.

First, governments constantly balance domestic and international pressure when making policy decisions. These pressures include political processes like elections and major events like crises. It appears that a government's ability to maintain control is linked to its skill in negotiating a position that maintains sufficient international and local support. International impact is therefore determined by the relative importance of what they offer in terms of resources, institutions and knowledge to the government in relationship to domestic pressure.

Second, the lifecycle of a policy appears to be influenced more by a government's experience than by new knowledge, theory, or ideology. Governments explore a wide range of policy options and sources of support, as illustrated by the PNDC's initial search for Western and communist support in the early 1980s (Ayee 1994: p. 39; Boafo-Arthur 1989: p. 138; Hutchful 2002: p. 36). Governments also implement policies recommended to them when they perceive them to have potential benefits in overcoming political and economic pressure. For example, when Ghana was in the middle of economic crisis, the government implemented the ERP as planned until at least 1987. However, when global cocoa prices declined in the late 1980s and neighbouring countries faced difficulty maintaining production the PNDC no longer followed international policy recommendations. Therefore, the decision to continue a policy supported by international actors is related to the experience gained or observed from its implementation.

Third, significant efforts are made by international actors and governments to maintain mutually beneficial partnerships. This is seen in government partnerships with donors, NGOs and multinational companies for both cocoa and rice. The nature of these partnerships means that both parties must often remain flexible during policy implementation. The extent of international actors' impact on policies appears to be directly related to their ability to maintain these partnerships over long periods thus maximising their opportunities to influence individual decisions.

Fourth, the impact that an international actor has on agricultural policy is related to whether the changes they influence have long-term effects on the political economy for a given crop. The development of cocoa and rice policies in Ghana shows that the level of government support for the production of a crop in one period has a long-term impact on the pressures faced by future governments. In the case of rice, international actors encouraged changing policies and removing institutions in the 1980s only for them to be recreated after 2009 by governments facing political and economic pressure to increase domestic rice production. Therefore, the impact of international actors is determined by whether the policies they promote support the longer-term needs of the government to maintain access to political and economic resources.

These four explanations for the degree of international impact on domestic agricultural policies show that governments are not passive or compliant recipients of international agendas and support. Instead of exercising direct control, international actors use resources, institutions, knowledge, and relationships to shape government actions in the near and distant future. Therefore, the impact of international actors on agricultural policies is determined by their ability to perpetuate political and economic relationships that support governments to stay in power.

Chapter 8. Conclusions and Contributions to Theory

Foreign governments and private companies have influenced agricultural production in Ghana since colonial times (Berry 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 1989). However, recent decades witnessed a rollercoaster of increasing and decreasing international efforts and interests in African agricultural production and related national government policies. The efforts of IFIs to liberalise agriculture across Africa in the 1980s were followed by twenty years of relative donor neglect until financial and food crises in the 2000s inspired a surge in international interest and investments. By comparing cocoa and rice policies in Ghana, this thesis begins to address two gaps in existing literature and theory regarding how international actors impact agricultural policy in Africa.

First, past studies find that policy decisions and the power of different actors to influence them greatly depends on the economy, industry and crops concerned (Humphreys and Bates 2005: p. 425; Whitfield et al. 2015). Studies also show that agricultural economics is greatly influenced by the relationships between local producers and traders, and international input suppliers, processors, and investors (Laven 2010a; McMichael 2009). Despite recognising that power structures and political economies differ for specific crops (Gyimah-Boadi 1989; Shepard and Onumah 1997; Whitfield 2011a; Whitfield et al. 2015), few studies examine how these differences affect the ability of international actors to impact policies. This thesis fills this gap by examining how the evolving political economy for cocoa and rice in Ghana determines the level of impact international actors have on policies in any given period. In particular, the thesis shows that although the government maintained control over cocoa policies throughout the period examined, the political economy for rice revealed that international actors maintained significant influence on policies for decades until fears sparked renewed government interest in directly supporting domestic rice production with or without international donor support.

Second, many studies focus on either the international (Gibbon et al. 1993; Killick et al. 1998; Mosley et al. 1995) or the domestic explanations for observed policies (Bates 1981; Berry 1989; Shepard and Onumah 1997). However, other studies provide evidence to suggest that global geo-political circumstances (Dunning 2004) and domestic circumstances (Humphreys and Bates 2005; Pop-Eleches 2009) are both equally important for explaining the impact of international actors on policy. Despite recognising that these levels of institutions, actors, and the political economy are in fact inseparable (Berry 2009a; Clapham 1996; Ferguson 2006), very few studies look at the interaction between both in order to understand government decisions (Callaghy et al. 2001; Whitfield 2008). This thesis fills a second gap by examining how the impact of actors is shaped by international, national, and local political and economic systems. By filling these gaps this thesis also provides new evidence that can be used to test existing hypotheses for how international actors impact policies in Africa.

8.1. Testing existing hypotheses for the impact of international actors on policy

The analytical approach used to develop case studies of cocoa and rice policy, as explained earlier, is based on past studies that approach government policies as: a) government choices (Bates 1981; Killick et al. 1998; Mosley et al. 1995); b) the consequences of structures outside of any individual actor's control (Humphreys and Bates 2005; Laven 2010a; Resnick and Van de Walle 2013; Van de Walle et al. 2003); and c) policy processes (Ayuk and Marouani 2007; Clay and Schaffer 1984; Keeley and Scoones 2003). Existing studies also helped identify five hypotheses that could explain how international actors impact agricultural policies. Using evidence from case studies and the comparison of cocoa and rice policies, it is now possible to test these hypotheses by examining when, where, and how they are supported or contested by Ghana's experience with cocoa and rice.

Hypothesis 1: Governments adhere to policies promoted by international actors as long as doing so provides them with greater benefit (such as access to political or economic resources) than alternative courses of action.

Public and rational choice theory upholds the premise that governments balance alternative options and select those which provide them with greatest utility (Dreher 2009; D. Green and Shapiro 1994; Kahler 1990). If true, then governments adhere to internationally promoted or supported policies so long as those choices benefit them the most. When circumstances change to make it difficult to adhere to an agreement, past studies find that international actors can do little to enforce their agreements (Killick et al. 1998; Mosley et al. 1995). The observation that governments weigh the importance of international support against many competing domestic interests also results in aid having unintended consequences, as the finances or support provided are not always used as originally planned or agreed upon (Easterly 2008; Killick et al. 1998).

This hypothesis is, for the most part, supported by Ghana's mixed track record of implementing cocoa and rice policies and agreements with international actors. In the 1980s, the government was unable to secure financial support from any other source than IFIs, which meant that adhering to the policy conditions attached to the Economic Recovery Programme became an important way of securing foreign exchange. As a result, between 1983 and 1987, cocoa and rice policies closely mirrored international agreements. However, when alternative resources are became available, which occurred for cocoa after 1993 and for rice after 2008, government policies increasingly diverged from the original agreements with donors.

However, it is important to note that the observed divergence from donor agreements was at least partially explained by the actions of other international actors. COCOBOD's ability to secure loans from private international banks at least partially explains its ability to circumvent IFI agreements and focus on domestic politics (Whitfield and Buur 2014; T. Williams 2009).

Likewise, COCOBOD's relationship with transnational companies that manage the global cocoa supply chain also helps to explain why its marketing and quality assurance institutions survived domestic economic and political changes by continuing to access foreign markets (Laven 2010a; Ton et al. 2008; Whitfield and Buur 2014). The observation that support from private international actors helps to explain government divergence from donor agreements is different from the claim that domestic circumstances alone explain such divergences. It also helps to explain why the timing of increasing divergence from donor agreements for each crop (post-1993 for cocoa and post-2008 for rice) coincides with changes in international private sector interests. Finally, for donors interested in creating opportunities for private sector development, increasing private sector involvement or investment would also reduce the need for them to continue pursuing particular policy changes. Even if subsequent policies no longer align with donor agreements or agendas on paper, the fact that a country is receiving greater investment from international companies can still be highlighted as a success if donors are funding value chain and other similar private sector development projects.

Hypothesis 2: Once agreements are made between governments and international actors, the severity of the threat of losing access to resources determines whether governments adhere to them.

Past studies show that the threat of losing donor support can explain much about the extent to which governments adhere to agreements (Dunning and Pop-Eleches 2004; Killick et al. 1998; Whitfield 2008). This also appears true for cocoa and rice policy agreements in Ghana. Significant effort was made by international actors and governments to develop and maintain partnerships for agricultural development. The nature of these partnerships meant that both parties were fairly flexible during policy implementation. IFI assessments of their support to Ghana during structural adjustment were very forgiving of results that were not achieved (World Bank 1987c, 1995a, 1997b). As proposed by Killick (1998), the flexibility with which donors interpreted results and their willingness to continue providing support regardless of the results helps to explain why the government was not afraid of losing support and less worried about upholding agreements.

However, the argument that the threat of withdrawing international support increased after the collapse of the Soviet Union is harder to support when looking solely at cocoa and rice policies in Ghana (Dunning 2004). It is true that Ghana underwent a process of democratisation after the Cold War, which could be explained by increased donor pressure at that point. Yet if the decision to return to democracy was due to an increased threat that donors would withdraw aid, then international actors should have been able to either continue enforcing agreements or withdraw their aid after Ghana returned to democracy. Neither scenario played out in Ghana. International support continued to grow after the Cold War despite increasing divergence between policies and donor agreements. In fact, the return to democracy increased the likelihood of governments using agricultural policies for domestic political gains, rather than to implement international agreements.

Instead of increasing the threat of donors to withdraw aid, the collapse of the Soviet Union increased the heterogeneity of international agendas and the availability of alternative sources of international support (see Chapter 7 on the effect of reduced international consensus). The growing heterogeneity of donor and private sector agendas after the Cold War meant that the threat of any individual actor or group became less severe. As proposed by Adler and Haas (Adler and Haas 1992; Haas 1992), the severity of the threat that any group could make became a function of the size and power of the coalition behind that threat. As demonstrated by requirements for child labour reform in cocoa production, the strength of international coalitions to influence policies increased when both public and private actors backed the same agenda (see Chapter 5).

Hypothesis 3: Governments will implement internationally promoted policies in a manner that preserves formal and informal institutions used to access political and economic resources.

The willingness of a government to alter institutions is likely depends on whether the institution is important for maintaining access to resources (Humphreys and Bates 2005; Noman et al. 2011; Roland 2004; Van de Walle 2001). This is supported by the examination of cocoa and rice policies in Ghana. To begin with, international actors had an easy time convincing the government to reform the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board into COCOBOD and to disband rice institutions. However, when further privatisation of the cocoa sector began to threaten influential government bureaucrats, international actors were no longer able to achieve their policy goals (Laven 2007; Whitfield and Buur 2014; T. Williams 2009). Rice institutions, on the other hand, were never a source of income for the government; and international actors had a relatively easy time dismantling them (see Chapter 4).

The void left by removing institutions that supported food production was filled by NGOs and donor projects, which mostly targeted support to smallholder farmers. Few concerted government efforts were made to recreate institutions that supported commercial food production until after 2008.It is particularly striking that Ghana's historical institutions, such as GFDC which was disbanded in 1987, were used as inspiration for the establishment of institutions in 2009 (GH21).

NAFCO was directly inspired by Ghana's past experience supporting domestic food production. Furthermore, NAFCO was solely funded by the government instead of donor support, which may explain why it was only feasible after Ghana had achieved significant economic growth (see Chapter 7). The recreation of institutions to support food production and marketing suggests that international efforts to dismantle institutions were only temporarily successful. This implies that the long-term impact of international efforts to dismantle institutions depends greatly upon the extent to which future policymakers face political or economic circumstances that encourage their recreation. Both the history and physical infrastructure (e.g. GFDC warehouses) associated with past institutions appears to affect the potential for them to be re-established.

Hypothesis 4: African agricultural policies are impacted by knowledge (expertise and worldviews) gained from international actors about desirable policy goals as well as the resources, institutions, and other means needed to achieve them.

Past studies find that the impact of international actors on policies is explained by an actors' ability to convince others of the value of their knowledge, expertise, worldview, or ideas (Adler and Haas 1992; Haas 1992; Keeley and Scoones 2003). When reflecting on Ghana's experience with cocoa and rice policies, this appears to partially explain why governments were willing to try policies that were promoted. Before 1983, the PNDC explored a wide range of international options for support (Ayee 1994: p. 39; Boafo-Arthur 1989: p. 138; Hutchful 2002: p. 36). When the government accepted the ERP and its associated package of structural adjustment policies, the IFIs mandated that both the consultants hired and the staff within new ministry bodies (e.g. PPMED) understood their economic and political ideas and methods of analysis. As a result, Ghana's bureaucrats developed close relationships with international organisations and the staff members who moved to join them. In addition, international actors became entwined in domestic policy processes.

However, when faced with changing circumstances, the government was pressed to take actions that often contradicted international agendas. This was the case when Ghana ignored agreements to further liberalise cocoa and instead established NAFCO to set a minimum price for rice. These decisions to go against international agendas were not due to a lack of understanding of the economic theory behind donor promoted policies. Instead, they were conscious decisions to implement policies that would best uphold upheld government interests at times when both the international and domestic political and economic contexts awarded greater flexibility. Shifts in the global economic system, such as the 2008 food crisis, also created opportunities for changing policies. Ghana’s position as a rice importer meant that high global commodity prices and new international investments created opportunities to pursue import substitution. Fully aware of competing economic theories (Interview GH7 2011, and Interview GH21 2011), the government selected and defended policies based upon their potential to achieve goals instead of their ideological or epistemological grounding.

Hypothesis 5: International actors impact national agricultural policies by establishing and reinforcing processes that shape the involvement of actors, resources, institutions, and knowledge in a way that determines agendas and actions.

Studies that approach policy as a process focus on how interdependencies between actors and institutions shape iterative stages through which goals, means, knowledge, and power relationships are established (Ayuk and Marouani 2007; Clay and Schaffer 1984; Keeley and Scoones 2003). International actors could potentially shape cocoa and rice policies by influencing policy processes in order to reinforce their agendas and worldview. In both cocoa and rice policies , there are many examples of international efforts that attempt to shape policy processes, such as the establishment of international venues for agenda setting for both cocoa (e.g. RSCE) and rice (e.g. TICAD) and the creation of transnational institutions for the promotion of agricultural production (e.g. AGRA). Within Ghana, further examples include the creation of ministry departments for managing and monitoring donor funds (e.g. PPMED) and the organization of domestic farmer (GNAFF) and industry bodies (GRIB) to advocate for policies. The outcome of these institutions is discernible in the involvement of international actors in nearly every stage of the agricultural policy process in Ghana.

However, there is little evidence to suggest that donor-funded NGOs, FBOs or other organisations strongly influence the government’s selection of cocoa and rice policies in Ghana.

Instead, international efforts and government policies are shaped by Ghana's position within the evolving agricultural supply chains and political economy for each crop. The extent of the international actors' impact on policies appears to be strongly related to their ability to remain part of the policy processes long enough to influence changes when economic and political systems allow.

8.2. Contributions to theory about policy impact

The comparison of cocoa and rice policies in Ghana identified at least four explanations for the impact of international actors (see Chapter 7). First, governments constantly balance domestic and international pressure when making policy decisions. These pressures include political processes like elections and events like crises. It therefore appears that the ability of governments to maintain control is linked to their skill in negotiating a position that maintains sufficient international and local support. International influence is therefore determined by the relative importance of what is offered to the government in relationship to domestic pressure.

Second, a government's assessment of available options appears to be based more on the actors' experience than on ideology or knowledge. Governments explored a wide range of international options for support, as illustrated Rawling's dealings with IMF and World Bank support for structural adjustment (see Chapter 3). Governments also try policies recommended to them if they perceive them to provide benefits, such as reducing government expenses. However, when subsequent events press for more immediate action they often return to past policies that proved successful, some of which contradict the efforts of international actors.

Third, significant efforts are made by international actors and governments to maintain mutually beneficial relationships. This is seen in government partnerships with donors, NGOs and multinational companies for both cocoa and rice. The nature of these partnerships means that both parties are often flexible during policy implementation. The extent of international actors' impact on policies appears to be related to their ability to maintain these partnerships over longer periods, thus maximising opportunities for influencing individual decisions.

Fourth, the extent of impact that international actors have on agricultural policies is related to whether or not the changes they influence have long-term effects on the political economy for a given crop. Ghana's experience with both cocoa and rice shows that the level of government support in one period has a long lasting impact on the pressures faced by future governments. The impact of international actors therefore depends on whether their promoted policies also withstand future pressures created by the political economy for a given crop.

Three of these four explanations are largely supported by existing literature, which approaches policies as choices, structural consequences, or processes (Berry 2009a; Humphreys and Bates 2005; Killick et al. 1998; Mosley et al. 1995; Ndulu et al. 2008). The fourth explanation is based on observed interactions between government policies and the political economy for cocoa and rice. In cocoa, the simultaneous increase in cocoa productivity in many countries during the 1980s led to a collapse in global cocoa prices, contributing to a shift in Ghana's stance on cocoa liberalisation from 1987 onwards (see Chapter 3). In rice, disbanding institutions that supported commercial rice production in the 1980s led to the collapse of domestic commercial rice production and an increased dependency on imported rice (see Chapters 4 and 6). In both cases, international actors influenced policy choices that had long-term impacts on the political economy and future policies for each crop.

Understanding the long-term impact of short-term policy decisions requires combining insights from rational choice, structural consequences, and policy process approaches to policy analysis (see Chapter 2). As observed by Horowitz (1989), policies like the full liberalisation of agriculture appear to have some kind of 'lifecycle'. When tracing policies for the same crop over a longer period of time, these lifecycles do not appear random or free from actors' influence.

Incremental changes in policies could simply be understood as a series of pragmatic rational choices made by governments that learned what works over time (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Hall 1993; Meseguer 2005). This understanding is helpful because it acknowledges that governments are not helpless or passive in the selection or implementation of policies. However, the decisions to completely disband and then to resurrect very similar institutions (e.g. GFDC and NAFCO) do not support the theory of an incremental change or learning process. Instead, it appears that policies such as liberalization succumb to political and economic circumstances.

If policy choices are not rational, another explanation could be found in the institutions created (Berry 2009a; Mkandawire 2009; Noman et al. 2011; North 1991). As depicted by Roland (2004), policies implemented to meet international demands can be understood as fast moving institutions layered upon slow moving institutions. Using this reasoning, the mismatch of some policies to the existing underlying social, economic, and political system may explain why these only last until a government is able to recreate institutions better fitting the country's political and economic circumstances. However, this understanding implies that governments need to create the correct institutional structures for a given economic or political system. The assumption of a one-to-one relationship between institutions and social outcomes is contested by Mkandawire, who observes that any number of different institutional structures create similar behaviours and economic and political systems (Noman et al. 2011). Therefore, it is unlikely that the observed vacillation between different agricultural policies is solely explained by mismatched institutions.

Instead, the long-term impact of international actors on cocoa and rice policies is best explained by the interdependency between government policies and the political economy for each crop, as supported by Gavin Williams (2004), Dunning (2004) and Humphreys and Bates (2005). IFI supported policy changes in the 1980s resulted in the restructuring of institutions and altered crop production. Subsequent changes in global cocoa and rice prices created new incentives for governments to revisit their policies.

Governments are incentivised to protect their access to resources and uphold the interests of their supporters when making policies, as noted by Whitfield and Buur (2014). In the cocoa sub-sector, this was achieved by preserving COCOBOD. Historically, one way to protect consumer rice prices was to establish institutions that set a minimum producer price, thereby reducing the risk to investors and increasing commercial production (Goody 1980; Konings 1980). In the 1980s IFIs had been instrumental in removing the state institutions that governments used to set a minimum producer price for rice. After 2008, the government was pressured by consumers and voters to protect consumer rice prices. The government's decision to return to policies and re-establish institutions that had previously been successful is understandable given the incentives and circumstances.

Existing theory suggests governments will adhere to international agendas as long as international actors provide needed resources and there is a great enough threat of losing these resources should the government not comply with agreements (Dunning 2004; Mosley et al. 1995; Whitfield 2008). For both cocoa and rice policies, when the government moved away from the agendas promoted by IFIs and other donors it was done by using alternative resources. In the case of cocoa, resources were provided by other private international actors (e.g. banks): and in the case of rice, government revenue was used to leverage support from private investors and mutually interested private foundations.

Overall, the extent to which IFI supported policies were upheld by governments depended on the long-term political economy for each crop. When changes in the political or economic system meant IFI policies no longer supported the government's efforts to access resources or to maintain support, the government either halted their implementation or returned to previous policies. Understanding the impact of international actors on policies over time therefore requires examining the long-term economic and political outcomes from the shorter-term policy decisions they influence. This finding supports the theory of structuration promoted by Giddens (1984) and

Keeley and Scoones (2003), which argues that policy decisions affect the social structures determining future policy decisions. It also support Horowitz (1989) and Humphreys and Bates (2005) who find that policies have a lifecycle. However, unlike Hall (1993), Meseguer (2005) and others who view policies as the result of an evolution through stages of learning over time, the cases of cocoa and rice policies in Ghana do not uphold any linear or progressive understanding of policymaking. Instead, they support a model where the power of any actor hinges on their position within a continuously evolving economic and political system.

8.3. Limitations of approach and methods

The analytical approach taken for this thesis is plagued by many of the problems associated with observational and qualitative research. On the positive side, focusing narrowly on one country and two crops enables a very detailed and in-depth analysis of policy over time and the impact of international actors on this process. Furthermore, the decision to use a comparative analytical approach to identify and understand international impact on policy greatly reduced the likelihood that observations are relevant only to a particular crop, policy, or moment in time.

In terms of limitations, the decision to use evidence from interviews, existing texts, and secondary economic data means insights gained were limited to the perspectives and measures available, and that not all perspectives could be obtained. However, to the extent possible, evidence presented has been triangulated using different sources and types of data. For example, government claims about increasing production are triangulated with available data for production, productivity and prices. Likewise, documents claiming a policy stance are triangulated with interview data and other texts to identify whether statements are corroborated by actions. Finally, despite all efforts to maintain rigour and objectivity, this thesis does not have particularly strong external validity. To understand if the insights gained about how international actors impact policy are valid outside of cocoa and rice policy changes in Ghana, it would be helpful to re-apply the same lens to new country contexts and sectors.

8.4. Conclusion and scope for future research

This thesis shows how international actors use resources, institutions, and knowledge to impact policies by supporting Ghanaian governments to overcome economic and political pressure and to stay in power. However, in spite of many government and policy changes, Ghana has maintained a surprisingly consistent position in global agricultural supply chains. Ghana's position as an exporter of cocoa beans and importer of rice has been perpetuated by both international actors and national governments. Lukes argues that "the bias of the system is not sustained simply by a series of individually chosen acts, but also, most importantly, by the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of institutions, which may indeed be manifested by individuals' inaction"(Lukes 2005: p. 26). The patterns of behaviour that maintain Ghana's position in global supply chains are visible in the actions or lack thereof of both international actors and national governments. Overcoming the inertia created by global economies appears nearly as challenging as overcoming the slow moving institutions that define domestic politics. Understanding policies therefore requires examining the interaction between these two powerful forces over time.

Finally, this thesis only begins to unpack how global economic systems, international actors, and domestic politics interact to shape agricultural policies. Many questions remain unanswered concerning the true interests and power of actors involved. In many ways, international actors and African governments appear trapped in a struggle to deal with continuously evolving, often uncontrollable political and economic systems. To better understand whether the insights gained are representative of more general rules, rather than the narrow focus presented here, would require refining and reapplying a similar analytical approach to new country contexts and sectors.

Interviews:

Code	Position	Affiliation	Interview Date
GH1	Manager	CMC	11-Nov-10
GH2	Economist	NRI	10-Feb-11
GH3	Director	CSIR-STEPRI	11-Mar-11
GH4	Ass. Director	MOFA/PPMED	15-Mar-11
GH5	Director	GMAG	20-Mar-11
GH6	Head of Dep.	UG Legon	21-Mar-11
GH7	Technical Advisor	MOFA/USAID	22-Mar-11
GH8	COP	USAID ATP	25-Mar-11
GH9	Research Officer	COCOBOD	01-Apr-11
GH10	Deputy Director	COCOBOD	01-Apr-11
GH11	Manager	GIZ	02-Apr-11
GH12	Snr. Consultant	SEM	04-Apr-11
GH13	Natl Secretary	GNAFF	05-Apr-11
GH14	Snr. Lecturer	UG Legon	06-Apr-11
GH15	Manager	PFAG	11-Apr-11
GH16	Deputy Director	MOFA	12-Apr-11
GH17	Professor	UG Legon	12-Apr-11
GH18	Consultant	FAO	13-Apr-11
GH19	Co-owner	Blue Skies	14-Apr-11
GH20	Economist	AGRA	19-Apr-11
GH21	CEO	NAFCO	19-Apr-11
GH22	Country Director	SEND	19-Apr-11
GH23	Dir. Of Partnerships	FARA	20-Apr-11
GH24	President	GFAP	21-Apr-11
GH25	Professor	UG Legon	21-Apr-11
GH26	Economist	CSIR	03-May-11
GH27	Snr. Management	IFPRI	03-May-11
GH28	Prgm. Coordinator	World Bank	06-Jun-11
GH29	Snr. Economist	World Bank	07-Jun-11

References:

Abdulai, Awudu and Huffman, Wallace (2000), 'Structural Adjustment and Economic Efficiency of Rice Farmers in Northern Ghana', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 48 (3), 503-20.

ACC (2010), 'Report on the Firtst National Roundtable on Sustainable Cocoa Economy in Ghana', (Madina: Africa Cocoa Coalition (ACC)).

Accra Mail (2001a), 'Agricultural Fund, Commission to Be Established Soon', *Africa News*, August 2, 2001 Thursday.

Accra Mail (2001b), 'Vision 2020 is dead - Finance Min.', *Accra Mail*, Monday, 1 October 2001, sec. General News

Ackah, C. and Appleton, S. (2007), 'Food Price Changes and Consumer Welfare in Ghana in the 1990s', *CREDIT Research Paper 07/03* (Nottingham: University of Nottingham).

ADB (2002), 'Government of Ghana Cocoa Rehabilitation Project Performance Evaluation Report (B/GHAAGR/88/013) (F/GHA/AGR/88/8)', in Operations Evaluation Department (ed.), (African Development Bank).

ADF (2001), 'Republic of Ghana Inland Valleys Rice Development Project Appraisal Report', (Abidjan: African Development Fund).

Adler, E. and Haas, P.M. (1992), 'Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program', *International Organization*, 46 (1), 367-90.

Adoboe, J.L. 'Quality Aveyime rice hits market in August', *Ghana News* (updated 13 July 2009) <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=165285>.

AfDB (2002), 'Ghana - Agricultural Sector Rehabilitation Programme: Program Performance Evaluation Report (PPER)', in Operations Evaluation Department (ed.), (Abidjan: African Development Bank Group).

Afreh, J.S.C. (2003), 'THE REPUBLIC v. IBRAHIM ADAM, DR. SAMUEL DAPAAH, KWAME PEPRAH, DR. GEORGE YANKEY AND ATO DADZIE [28/4/03] NO.FT/MISC. 2/2000', *Judgments of the Superior Courts* (SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE; Accra), 59.

Africa News (2008), 'Ghana; Farmers' Day Celebration is a Cover-Up for Gov't's Inefficiencies -GTLC', *Africa News*, October 20, 2008 Monday, sec. Public Agenda.

African Development Fund (2005), 'Ghana: Kpong Irrigation Project', *Project Completion Report* (Abidjan Africa Development Bank).

Agyeman-Duah, B. (1987), 'Ghana, 1982-6: The Politics of the P.N.D.C', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25 (4), 613-42.

Ahiakpor, J.C.W. (1991), 'Rawlings, Economic Policy Reform, and the Poor: Consistency or Betrayal?', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 29 (4), 583-600.

Ahwoi, Kwesi (2010), 'Government's Role in Attracting Viable Agricultural Investment: Experiences from Ghana.', *THE WORLD BANK ANNUAL BANK CONFERENCE ON LAND POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION* (Washington, DC: World Bank).

Ajakaiye, Olu, Drazen, Allan, and Karugia, Joseph (2008), 'Political Economy and Economic Development in Africa: An Overview', *J Afr Econ*, 17 (suppl_1), 3-17.
Aker, J.C., et al. (2011), 'West African Experience with the World Rice Crisis, 2007–2008', (Working Paper 242; Washington D.C.: Centre for Global Development).
Al-Hassan, R. and Poulton, C. (2009), 'Agriculture and Social Protection in Ghana', *FAC Working Paper No. SP04* (Future Agricultures and Centre for Social Protection).
Al-hassan, S. (2008), 'Technical Efficiency of Rice Farmers in Northern Ghana', *AERC Research Paper 178* (Nairobi: African Economic Research Consortium).
Alderman, H. (1991), *Downturn and Economic Recovery in Ghana: Impacts on the Poor* (MONOGRAPH 10: CORNELL FOOD AND NUTRITION POLICY PROGRAM; Ithaca: Cornell University).
Alence, Rod (2001), 'Colonial Government, Social Conflict and State Involvement in Africa's Open Economies: The Origins of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, 1939-46', *The Journal of African History*, 42 (3), 397-416.
Alonso, J. A. and Ocampo, J. A. (2012), *Development Cooperation in Times of Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press).
Amanor, K.S. (2010), 'Participation, Commercialisation and Actor Networks: The Political Economy of Cereal Seed Production Systems in Ghana', *Working Paper 016* (Future Agricultures Consortium.).
Angelucci, F., Asante-Poku, A. , and Anaadumba, P. (2013), 'Analysis of incentives and disincentives for rice in Ghana', *Technical notes series, MAFAP* (Rome: FAO).
Ansa-Asare, K. (1985), 'Legislative History of the Legal Regime of Price Control in Ghana', *Journal of African Law*, 29 (2), 103-17.
Anyimadu, A. (1993), 'Some Institutional Aspects of Agricultural Development Policy under the PNDC', in Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi (ed.), *GHANA Under PNDC Rule* (CODESRIA), 60-73.
APRM (2011), '2011 Annual Report: African Peer Review Mechanism', (NEPAD and AU).
Arrow, Joseph (1951), *Social choice and individual values* (New York, London: Wiley; Chapman and Hall).
Asibey-Bonsu, P. (2012), 'Farmer's organizations in West and Central Africa: high expectations, hard realities: Ghana Country report', (FARM Foundation).
Asiedu-Saforo, Kwame (1989), 'Economic reform programmes and agricultural development: Macro policy sequencing in Ghana, 1983–1988', *Food Policy*, 14 (4), 359-70.
AVIL (2013), 'Avnash Industries Ghana Limited (AVIL)', <http://www.avnashindustriesghana.com/#>, accessed 12 January 2013.
Ayee, J.R.A. (1994), *An anatomy of public policy implementation : the case of decentralization policies in Ghana* (The making of modern Africa; Aldershot, England: Ashgate) xii, 244 p.
Ayuk, Elias and Marouani, Mohamed Ali (2007), *The policy paradox in Africa : strengthening links between economic research and policymaking* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press) xii, 307 p.
Baah, F. and Anchirinah, V. (2010), 'Looking For Convergence: Stakeholders' Perceptions of Cocoa Extension Constraints in Ghana', *Journal of Science and Technology*, 30 (3), 51-63.

Bach, D. and Mamoudou, G. (eds.) (2013), *Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond* (London: Routledge).
Badu, Y. and Parker, A. (1994), 'The Role of Non-governmental Organisations in Rural Development: The Case of the Voluntary Workcamps Association of Ghana', *Social Development in Africa*, 9 (1), 27-39.
Bair, J. (ed.), (2009), *Frontiers of Commodity Chain Research* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Bank of Ghana (1983), 'REPORT OF THE BANK OF GHANA FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 30TH JUNE, 1983', (Accra: Bank of Ghana).
Bank of Ghana (1984), 'Annual Report for the Financial Year Ended 30th June, 1984', (Accra: Bank of Ghana).
Bank of Ghana (1985), 'Annual Report for the Financial Year Ended 30th June, 1985', (Accra: Bank of Ghana).
Bank of Ghana (1986), 'Annual Report for the Financial Year Ended 30th June, 1986', (Accra,: Bank of Ghana,).
Bank of Ghana (1993), 'ANNUAL REPORT 1993', (Accra: Bank of Ghana,).
Bank of Ghana (1994), 'ANNUAL REPORT 1994', (Accra: Bank of Ghana,).
Bank of Ghana (1995), 'ANNUAL REPORT 1995', (Accra: Bank of Ghana,).
Bank of Ghana (2002), 'Bank of Ghana Annual Report 2002', (Accra: Bank of Ghana).
Bateman, M. , et al. (1990), 'Ghana's Cocoa Pricing Policy', *Policy Research, and Extemal Affairs: Working Papers; Agricultural Policies* (World Bank,).
Bates, R. H. (1981), *Markets and states in tropical Africa : the political basis of agricultural policies* (Berkeley University of California Press).
Bates, R. H. (1993), 'A Reply', *World Development*, 21 (6), 1077-81.
Bates, R. H. (2005), *Markets and states in tropical Africa : the political basis of agricultural policies* (Berkeley ; London: University of California Press) xvii, 178 p.
Bates, R. H., et al. (2012), 'The New Institutionalism and Africa ', *Journal of African Economies*, 22 (4), 499-522.
Bates, R. H. and Krueger, A. O. (eds.) (1993), *Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform* (Oxford Blackwell).
BBC (1982a), 'GHANA; THE COCOA MARKETING BOARD', *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, January 11, 1983, sec. Part 4 The Middle East and Africa.
--- (1982b), 'Rice growers' promise of co-operation', *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Part 4 The Middle East and Africa; United Kingdom: BBC).
--- (1982c), 'GHANA; RAWLINGS ON FOOD PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION ', *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (Part 4 The Middle East and Africa; United Kingdom: BBC).
Death penalty for Ghana cocoa smugglers (1982d) (BBC, February 9, 1982, Tuesday) Part 4 The Middle East and Africa.
--- (2000), 'Cocoa destroyed to boost price', (London: BBC).
Becker, D. (2010), 'The neoliberal moment: Communicative interaction and a discursive analysis of the global political economy', *International Politics* 47, 251-68.
Beckman, B. (1976), *Organising the Farmers: Cocoa Policies and National Development in Ghana* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies).

Benin, S., et al. (2011), 'Evaluation of Four Special Initiatives of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of Ghana: Fertilizer Subsidy; Agricultural Mechanization; Block Farms and Youth in Agriculture; National Buffer Stock Company (NAFCO)', (Accra and Washington D.C.: IFRPI).

Benin, S., et al. (2013), 'Revisiting Agricultural Input and Farm Support Subsidies in Africa The Case of Ghana's Mechanization, Fertilizer, Block Farms, and Marketing Programs', *IFPRI Discussion Paper 01300* (Washington D.C. : International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)).

Berry, S. (1984), 'The Food Crisis and Agrarian Change in Africa: A Review Essay', *African Studies Review,* 27 (2), 59-112.

Berry, S. (1989), 'Social Institutions and Access to Resources', *Journal of the International African Institute*

59 (1), 41 - 55.

Berry, S. (1993), 'Understanding Agricultural Policy in Africa: The Contributions of Robert Bates ', *World Development,* 21 (6), 1055-62.

Berry, S. (1998), 'Unsettled Accounts: Stool Debts, Chieftaincy Disputes and the Question of Asante Constitutionalism', *The Journal of African History,* 39 (1), 39-62.

Berry, S. (2009a), 'Property, Authority and Citizenship: Land Claims, Politics and the Dynamics of Social Division in West Africa', *Development and Change,* 40 (1), 23-45.

Berry, S. (2009b), 'Building for the Future? Investment, Land Reform and the Contingencies of Ownership in Contemporary Ghana', *World Development,* 37 (8), 1370–78.

Bhatia, V., Flowerdew, J., and Jones, R. (2008), *Advances in Discourse Studies* (Abingdon: Routledge).

BMGF (2012), 'Developing the rice industry in Africa', (Seattle: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation).

Boafo-Arthur, K. (1989), 'Trends in Ghana's Foreign Policy After Nkrumah', in E. Hansen and K. Ninsin (eds.), *The State Development and Politics in Ghana* (London: CODESRIA).

Boafo-Arthur, K. (1999), 'Ghana: Structural Adjustment, Democratization, and the Politics of Continuity', *African Studies Review,* 42 (2), 41-72.

Borras, Saturnino, Franco, Jennifer, and Wang, Chunyu (2013), 'The Challenge of Global Governance of Land Grabbing: Changing International Agricultural Context and Competing Political Views and Strategies', *Globalizations*, 10 (1), 161-79.

Brassett, J., Richardson, B., and Smith, W. (2010), 'Experimentalist governance, deliberation and democracy: A case study of primary commodity roundtables', *CSGR Working Paper 270/10* (Coventry Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick).

Brautigam, D. (2011), 'Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, where, why, and how much?', in J. Golley and L. Song (eds.), *Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities* (Canberra: ANU Press).

Breisinger, C. , et al. (2011), 'THE ROLE OF COCOA IN GHANA'S FUTURE DEVELOPMENT', (Washington D.C.: IFPRI).

Brooks, J. (1987), 'Ghana Embraces Change (E.g. A Stock Exchange)', *New York Times,* May 13, 1987, p. pg. A4.
Brooks, J., Croppenstedt, A., and Aggrey-Fynn, E. (2007), 'Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Ghana', *Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 47* (World Bank).
Brooks, J., Croppenstedt, A., and Aggrey-Fynn, E. (2009), 'Ghana', in Kym Anderson and W.A. Masters (eds.), *Distortions to Agricutlural Incentives in Africa* (World Bank), 413-40.
Bulir, Ales (1998), 'The Price Incentive to Smuggle and the Cocoa Supply in Ghana, 1950-96', *IMF Working Paper* (WP/98/88: International Monetary Fund).
Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (1997), 'Aid, Policies, and Growth', *World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper* (1777; Washington D.C.: World Bank).
Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (2004), 'Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence', *World Bank Policy Research Paper* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank).
Business and Financial Times (2012), 'Fertiliser subsidy fuels smuggling', *Business and Financial Times,* 7 September 2012.
Business Monitor (2008), 'Fertiliser Subsidies To Help Rice Industry Grow', *Business Monitor Online,* November 4, 2008 Tuesday.
Business Monitor International (2008), 'Firms Increasing Cooperation With Local Farmers', *Business Monitor International* May 8, 2008, sec. BMI Middle East and Africa Food and Drinks Insights.
CAA (2014), 'About Us', <http://www.abrabopa.com/about-us>, accessed 8 February, 2014.
Callaghy, T. (1990), 'Lost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria', in J. M. Nelson (ed.), *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World* (Oxford: Princeton University Press).
Callaghy, T., Kassimir, R., and Latham, R. (2001), *Intervention and transnationalism in Africa : global-local networks of power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
CARD (2013), 'GH-17: GCSP/GHA/028/UNO – Dissemination of Improved Rice Production Systems with Emphasis on Nerica to Reduce Food Deficit and Improve Farmers Income in Ghana (UN-FAO/UNIDO-JAPAN GOV'T)', <http://www.riceforafrica.org/beta/card-countries/g1/guinea?id=967:gh-17>, accessed December 16.
Casey, J. and Mensah, J. (2012), 'The Sustainable Tree Crops Program (STCP): Phase II Report', (Ibadan: STCP and IITA).
Chandler, David (2010), *International Statebuilding: the Rise of Post-Liberal Governance.* (Critical Issues in Global Politics; Hoboken: Taylor and Francis).
Chronicle, Ghanaian (2008), 'Ghana: Country Needs 700,000 Tonnes of Rice Annually', *Ghanaian Chronicle,* 2008, sec. Africa News.
Cidell, J. L. and Alberts, H. C. (2006), 'Constructing quality: The multinational histories of chocolate', *Geoforum,* 37, 999–1007.
Clapham, Christopher S. (1996), *Africa and the international system : the politics of state survival* (Cambridge studies in international relations; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) xii, 340 p.

Clapp, J. (2014), 'Financialization, distance and global food politics', *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 41 (5), 797-814.
Clay, E. J. and Schaffer, B. B. (1984), *Room for Manoeuvre: An Exploration of Public Policy in Agriculture and Rural Development* (London: Heinemann Educational Books).
Coche, André G. (1998), 'SUPPORTING AQUACULTURE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: RESEARCH NETWORK ON INTEGRATION OF AQUACULTURE AND IRRIGATION; A report prepared for the Inland Water Resources and Aquaculture Service of the FAO Fisheries Department', (Accra: UNFAO).
Collier, David (2011), 'Understanding Process Tracing', *PS: Political Science and Politics* 44 (4), 823-30.
Collier, David and Brady, Henry (eds.) (2010), *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Second Edition edn., Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield).
Commander, S. (1989), *Structural adjustment & agriculture: theory & practise in Africa & Latin America* (London: Overseas Development Institute).
Conway, G. and Barbier, E. (1988), 'After The Green Revolution: Sustainable and equitable agricultural development ', *FUTURES*, (December), 651-69.
Cornia, Giovanni Andrea, Jolly, Richard, and Stewart, Frances (1987), *Adjustment with a human face*, 2 vols. (1; Oxford Oxford University Press).
Cotula, L. (2013), *The Great African Land Grab? Agricultural Investments and the Global Food System* (London: Zed books).
Cotula, L. and Berger, Thierry (2014), 'Agricultureal commercialisation contracts: concessions over people?', in iied (ed.), *Briefing* (London: iied).
Cotula, L., et al. (2009), *Land grab or development opportunity? : agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa* (London [etc.]. [International institute for environment and development (IIED) : with FAO) viii, 120 p.
CSSF (2012), 'Marketing and quality assurance, essential keys to rice production increases in Ghana', *Analysis* (Division of Statistics and Strategic Foresight, Centre for Studies and Strategic Foresight).
DAC (2005/2008), 'The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action', (Paris: OECD).
Dadson, J. A. (1990), 'Evaluation of rural development experiences in Africa: The case of Ghana', (Addis Ababa: UNECA).
Daily Guide (2010), "Oil Could Threaten Cocoa Sector", *Daily Guide* sec. Business and Finance, .
Dale, E. (1976)*New York Times*, January 16, 1976, sec. Column 6.
Dang, H. , Knack, S., and Rogers, F. H. (2013), 'International aid and financial crises in donor countries', *European Journal of Political Economy*, 32, 232–50.
Daňo, E (2007), 'Unmasking the New Green Revolution in Africa: Motives, Players and Dynamics', (Penang: Third World Network, Church Development Service (EED), and African Centre for Biosafety).
Dapaah, S.K. (1995), 'Empirical Analysis of the Likely Future Evolution on Agriculture in Ghana and how it will Affect the Prospects for Longer Term Growth of Agriculture, the Food Syste and the Broader Economy', *Workshop on Agricultural Transformation in Africa* (Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire: Dept. Of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University).

David-Benz, H. and Dugue, M. (2005), 'Food Security and Rice Producers’ Organisations Project (FSRPOP): Midterm review', (Paris: CIEPAC and CIRAD).
deGrassi, A. (2007), 'Linking research and policy: The case of Ghana’s rice trade policy', *Ghana Strategy Support Program (GSSP)* (Background Paper No. GSSP 0010; Washington D.C. : IFPRI).
Derrida, J. (1966), 'The decentring event in social thought', in A. Bass (ed.), *Writing the difference* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 278-82.
DFID (1999), 'IMPROVING THE COMPETITIVENESS AND MARKETABILITY OF LOCALLY-PRODUCED RICE IN GHANA: FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT', *CROP POSTHARVEST PROGRAMME* (DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (DFID)).
Diako, C. , et al. (2010), 'Consumer Perceptions, Knowledge and Preferences for Aromatic Rice Types in Ghana', *Nature and Science,* 8 (12), 12-19.
Dietz, T. and Millar, D. (1999), 'Coping with Climate Change in Dryland Ghana: The Case of Bolgatanga', *Netherlands Research Programme on Climate Change* (Amsterdam, Leiden, and Utrecht: IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN DRYLANDS (ICCD)).
Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (1996), 'Who Learns What From Whom: a Review of the Policy Transfer Literature', *Political Studies* 44 (2), 343-57.
Donya, D. (2000), 'PAPER 3 : CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADITIONAL RICE PRODUCTION IN GHANA', *NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON RICE PRODUCTION IN GHANA* (Ho, Upper East Region, Ghana: ODI and UDS), 14-22.
Dorm-Adzobu, C. and Ampadu-Agyei, O. (1991), 'Community Insitutions in Resource Management: Agroforestry by Mobisquads in Ghana', (Washington D.C. : World Resource Insitute (WRI)).
Dreher, Axel (2009), 'IMF conditionality: theory and evidence', *Public Choice,* (141), 233-67.
Dunning, Thad (2004), 'Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa', *International Organization,* 58 (Spring), 409-23.
Dunning, Thad and Pop-Eleches, Grigore (2004), 'From Transplants to Hybrids: Exploring Institutional Pathways to Growth', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 38 (4), 3-29.
Durotoye, Yomi and Griffiths, Robert J. (1997), 'Civilianizing Military Rule: Conditions and Processes of Political Transmutation in Ghana and Nigeria', *African Studies Review,* 40 (3), 133-60.
Dzisah, M. (1999), 'Cote d'Ivoire Blames Speculators For Cocoa Price Fall', *Panafrican News Agency,* 29 May 1999.
Dzorgbo, D.B. (2001), *Ghana in Search of Development: The challenge of governance, economic management and institution building* (Burlington Ashgate).
Easterly, W. (ed.), (2008), *Reinventing Foreign Aid* (Cambridge: MIT Press).
ECOWAS (2012), 'Regional Food Security Reserve', (Abuja).
Elster, Jon (1982), 'The Case for Methodological Individualism', *Theory and Society,* 11 (4), 453-82.

Essuman-Johnson, A. (1991), 'Influencing a country's political and economic decision making with food: the case of Ghana', *Research Review*, 7 (1&2), 45-60.
Evenson, R. (2005), 'Besting Malthus: The Green Revolution', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 149 (4), 469-86.
Ewusi, K. (1985), 'Administered Prices and Agricultural Development in Ghana', *ISSER Discussion Paper No. 22* (No. 22; Legon: Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, University of Ghana).
FAO (1997), 'Food supply situation and crop prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa - May 1997', *Food Supply Situation and Crop Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Rome: UNFAO).
--- (2003), 'THE SPECIAL PROGRAMME FOR FOOD SECURITY: Responding to New Challenges', (Rome: UNFAO).
--- (2005), 'Government of the Republic of Ghana: Support to NEPAD-CAADP Implementation', (Volume I of III).
--- (2006), 'Ghana: rice, poultry and tomato paste', *FAO Briefs on Import Surges* (5).
--- (2013), 'FAOSTAT: Updated: 05 August 2011 ', in FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (UNFAO) (ed.).
FCC (2014), 'About the FCC', <http://www.cocoafederation.com/about/index.jsp>, accessed 8 February
Ferguson, J. (2006), 'Transnational Topographies of Power: Beyond the "the State" and "Civil Society" in the Study of African Politics', in B. Maurer and G. Schwab (eds.), *Accelerating Possession: Global Futures of Property and Personhood.* (New York: Columbia University Press).
Flinders, M. (2005), 'The Politics of Public–Private Partnerships', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 7 (2), 215-39.
Fold, N. (2002), 'Lead Firms and Competition in ‘Bi-polar’ Commodity Chains: Grinders and Branders in the Global Cocoa–chocolate Industry', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 2 (2), 228-47.
Folson, K. G. (1993), 'Ideology, Revolution and Development - The Years of Jerry John Rawlings', in E. Gyimah-Boadi (ed.), *GHANA Under PNDC Rule* (CODESRIA).
Food Security Ghana (2013), 'Rice and Politics in Ghana', (updated 5 September 2011) <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=217837>, accessed 1 Dec 2013.
Fosu, Augustin, Bates, Robert, and Hoeffler, Anke (2006), 'Institutions, Governance and Economic Development in Africa: An Overview', *J Afr Econ*, 15 (suppl_1), 1-9.
Foucault, M. (1978), 'Power and knowledge ', in R. Hurley (ed.), *The history of sexuality* (An introduction edn., 1; New York: Vintage Books), 92-102.
Foucault, M. (1972), *The Archaeology of Knowledge: And the Discourse on Language* (New York: Pantheon Books).
Fynn, D. (2001), 'Rice expert testifies in Quality Grain case', *Modern Ghana*, 25 September 2001.
GADCO 'GADCO Announces Equity Investment from Summit Capital', (updated 13 January 2011) <http://www.prlog.org/11218660-gadco-announces-equity-investment-from-summit-capital.html>.
--- (2013), 'What We Do', <http://gadcompany.com/whatwedo.php>, accessed 6 January

Gage, D., et al. (2012), 'The Market for Maize, Rice, Soy, and Warehousing in Northern Ghana', (Washington D.C.: USAID and EAT).
Gary, I. (1996), 'Confrontation, Co-operation or Co-Optation: NGOs and the Ghanaian State during Structural Adjustment', *Review of African Political Economy,* 23 (68), 149-68.
Gayi, Samuel K. (1995), 'Adjusting to the social costs of adjustment in Ghana: Problems and prospects', *The European Journal of Development Research,* 7 (1), 77-100.
Gereffi, G. and Korzeniewicz, M. (eds.) (1994), *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism* (Westport: Greenwood).
GFAR (2010), 'GCARD 2010 SYNTHESIS REPORT: Transforming Agricultural Research for Development', (Rome: UNFAO).
--- (2011), *The GCARD Road Map: Transforming Agricultural Research for Development (AR4D) Systems for Global Impact* (Rome: GFAR / FAO).
Ghana Cocoa Board (1989), 'Up-Dated Corporate Plan: Revision II: 1989/90 - 1991/92', (Accra: Ghana Cocoa Board,).
Ghana Cocoa Board (1994), 'Republic of Ghana Cocoa Rehabilitation Project: Report on the External Review of the Cocoa Research Insitute of Ghana (CRIG)', (Accra: Ghana Cocoa Board).
Ghana Cocoa Board (2013), 'PRESENTATION ON GHANA'S NATIONAL COCOA PLAN', 23 September 2013.
Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (1981), 'BACKGROUND PAPER A COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF COCOA VERSUS OTHER CROPS', *Pre-feasibility study for the rehabilitation of the cocoa industry in Ghana* (Government of Ghana).
Ghana, Government of (1984), 'GHANA COCOA BOARD ACT', in Government of Ghana (ed.), *PNDCL 81*.
Ghana, Government of (1992), 'THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA'.
Ghana, Government of (2010), 'Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (METASIP) 2011 – 2015', (Accra: Ministry of Food and Agriculure).
Ghana News Agency (2009), 'Ghana: Over-Liberalised Trade Affecting Rice Industry - Grib', *Ghana News Agency,* 22 January 2009.
Ghana News Agency (2010), 'Better Ghana agenda would not be a nine-day wonder - President Mills', Friday, 30 April 2010.
Ghana News Agency (2011), 'Ghana to increase rice production by 2012', *Ghana News Agency,* 30 June 2011.
Ghanaian Chronicle (1999), 'Gov't can't be serious! (Editorial)', *Ghanaian Chronicle,* October 22, 1999, sec. Africa News.
Ghanaian Chronicle (2003a), 'Government to Pay 69% World Price to Cocoa Farmers', *Ghanaian Chronicle*, July 23, 2003 Wednesday.
Ghanaian Chronicle (2003b), 'NDC to Push for Probe into District Assembly Finances', *Ghanaian Chronicle,* April 28, 2003 Monday.
Ghanaian Chronicle (2004a), 'NPP Performance Wins Over Farmers', *Ghanaian Chronicle*, August 17, 2004 Tuesday.
Ghanaian Chronicle (2004b), 'How NDC Stirred Kumasi', *Ghanaian Chronicle,* August 2, 2004 Monday.

Ghanaian Chronicle (2007), 'There Are No Child Labourers in Cocoa Farms - Cocobod', *Ghanaian Chronicle*,, August 29, 2007 Wednesday.
Gibbon, P. (1992), 'The World Bank and African Poverty, 1973-91', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30 (2), 193-220.
Gibbon, P. (2002), 'Present - Day Capitalism, the New International Trade Regime & Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 29 (91), 95 - 112.
Gibbon, P., Havnevik, K. J., and Hermele, K. (1993), *A blighted harvest : the World Bank & African agriculture in the 1980s* (London ; Trenton, NJ: J. Currey ; Africa World Press) viii, 168 p.
Gibson, J. (2007), 'Consistently Inconsistent: Addressing income volatility among cocoa producers in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire', *Tackling Commodity Price Volatility* (Winnepeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)).
Giddens, A. (1984), *The Constitution of Society: An Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
Giel, T. , et al. (2008), 'Chain governance, sector policies and economic sustainability in cocoa: A comparative analysis of Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ecuador', *Markets, Chains and Sustainable Development: Strategy & Policy paper #12* (Wageningen Wageningen UR).
GNA (2013), 'Presidential remission fell short - NDC', <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=76526>, accessed 30 Jan.
--- (2011), 'Ghana to become leading rice producer in West Africa', *Ghana News Agency*, August 3.
Goody, J. (1980), 'Rice burning and the green revolution in northern Ghana', *Journal of Development Studies*, 16 (2), 136-55.
Government of Ghana (1994), 'GHANA INVESTMENT PROMOTION CENTRE ACT, 1994 ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS', (ACT 478 Accra: Government of Ghana).
Government of Ghana (2009), 'National Rice Development Strategy (NRDS)', in Ministry of Food and Agriculture (ed.), (Accra: The Republic of Ghana).
Green, D. and Shapiro, I. (1994), *Pathologies of rational choice theory : a critique of applications in political science* (New Haven: Yale University Press).
Green, M. (2008), 'Ghana seeks to convert price spikes to profit', *Financial Times*, August 27, 2008.
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1989), 'Policies and Politics of Export Agriculture', in E. Hansen and K. Ninsin (eds.), *The State Development and Politics in Ghana* (London: CODESRIA), 222-41.
Gyimah-Boadi, E. and Essuman-Johnson, A. (1993), 'The PNDC and Organised Labour: The Anatomy of Political Control', in E. Gyimah-Boadi (ed.), *Ghana Under PNDC Rule* (CODESRIA).
Gyimah-Boadi, E. and Yakah, T. (2012), 'Ghana: The Limits of External Democracy Assistance', *Working Paper No. 2012/40* (Helsinki: UNU-WIDER).
H.M. (1925), 'Gold Coast: Report for 1923-24', (London).
--- (1936), 'Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the: Gold Coast, 1934-35', *COLONIAL REPORTS-ANNUAL* (London).

--- (1939), 'Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the: GOLD COAST, 1938-39', (London: HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE).

Haas, P.M. (1992), 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', *International Organization*, 46 (1), 1-35.

Hall, P. A. (1993), 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain', *Comparative Politics*, 25 (3), 275-96.

Hansen, E. (1989), 'The State and Food Agriculture', in E. Hansen and K. Ninsin (eds.), *The State Development and Politics in Ghana* (London: CODESRIA).

Hansen, Henrik and Tarp, Finn (2000), 'Policy Arena: Aid Effectiveness Disputed', *Journal of International Development*, (12), 375-98.

Harrison, G. (2004), 'HIPC & the Architecture of Governance', *Review of African Political Economy*, 31 (99), 125-28.

Hart, Keith (1982), *The political economy of West African agriculture* (Cambridge studies in social anthropology; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) ix, 226 p.

Hawkins, R., et al. (2009), *Integrated Agricultural Research for Development (IAR4D). A Concept Paper for the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) Sub-Saharan Africa Challenge Programme (SSA CP)* (Accra, Ghana: FARA) 92.

Hawksley, H. (2001), 'Ivory Coast accuses chocolate companies', (London: BBC).

Headey, D. and Fan, S. (2010), 'Reflections on the Global Food Crisis: How Did It Happen? How Has It Hurt? And How Can We Prevent the Next One?', *RESEARCH MONOGRAPH* (165; Washington D.C. : IFRPI).

Herbst, J. (1993), *The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991* (Berkeley and Oxford: University of California Press).

Hesse-Biber, S. and Leavy, P. (2011), *The Practice of Qualitative Research* (Second Edition edn.; London: Sage).

High-Level Forum on Harmonisation (2003), 'Rome Declaration on Harmonization', February 25, 2003.

Hill, P. (1961), 'The Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana', *Journal of the International African Institute*, 31 (3), 209-30.

Ho-Won, J. (1995), 'Liberal Economic Reform in Ghana: A Contested Political Agenda', *Africa Today*, 42 (4), 82-104.

Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2006), 'What Are Institutions?', *Journal of Economic Issues*, XL (1), 1-25.

Holt-Gimenez, E. (2008), 'Out of AGRA: The Green Revolution returns to Africa', *Development* 51 (4), 464-71.

Holt-Gimenez, E., Altieri, M., and Rosset, P. (2006), 'Ten Reasons Why the Rockefeller and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations' Alliance for Another Green Revolution Will Not Solve the Problems of Poverty and Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Food First Policy Brief* (12; Oakland: Food First).

Horowitz, D. (1989), 'Is There a Third-World Policy Process?', *Policy Sciences*, 22 (3/4), 197-212.

Humphreys, M. and Bates, R. (2005), 'Political Institutions and Economic Policies: Lessons from Africa', *British Journal of Political Science*, 35 (03), 403-28.

Hutchful, E. (2002), *Ghana's adjustment experience : the paradox of reform* (Oxford: UNRISD; In association with James Currey; Heinemann; Woeli Pub. Services) xv, 268 p.
ICCO (1993), 'International Cocoa Agreement', (International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO)).
--- (2001), 'International Cocoa Agreement', in International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO) (ed.).
--- (2007), 'Report of the Round Table on a Sustainable World Cocoa Economy Accra, 3-6 October 2007', (Accra).
--- (2010), 'THE WORLD COCOA ECONOMY: PAST AND PRESENT', *EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: One hundred and forty-second meeting Bloomsbury House, 2-3 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2RL; 14 – 17 September 2010.* (London: ICCO).
--- (2012), 'Global Cocoa Agenda for the World Cocoa Conference 2012: Roadmap for Achieving a Sustainable World Cocoa Economy', *Strategic Document* (London: International Cocoa Organization).
IFAD (2002), 'Ghana: Review of Results and Impact', (Rome: IFAD).
--- (2007), 'President’s report; Proposed loan and grant to the Republic of Ghana for the Northern Rural Growth Programme', (Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development).
IFDC (2002), 'An Action Plan for Developing Agricultural Input Markets in Ghana', (Muscle Shoals: An International Center for Soil Fertility and Agricultural Development (IFDC)), 66.
IMF (2001), 'GHANA: Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative – Preliminary Document', (International Monetary Fund).
--- (2011), 'Ghana: Financial System Stability Assessment Update', (Washington D.C. : International Monetary Fund).
Inter-réseaux (2007), 'GHANA RICE INTERPROFESSIONAL BODY (GRIB) STRUCTURING PROCESS, MAIN ACHIEVEMENT AND MAJOR ISSUES RAISED', (Paris: Inter-réseaux Développement rural (IR)).
IRRI, AfricaRice, and CIAT (2010), *Global Rice Science Partnership (GRiSP)* (Manilla: IRRI).
Islam, N. (2011), 'Foreign Aid to Agriculture: Review of Facts and Analysis', *IFPRI Discussion Paper 01053* (Washington D.C. : IFPRI).
ISSER (2008), 'State of Competition Regime in Ghana: Preliminary Country Paper', (Legon: ISSER, University of Ghana).
Jacobeit, C. (1991), 'Reviving Cocoa: Policies and Perspectives on Structural Adjustment in Ghana's Key Agricultural Sector', in D. Rothchild (ed.), *The Political Economy of Recovery* (London: Lynne Rienner).
Jeffries, Richard and Thomas, Clare (1993), 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992', *African Affairs,* 92 (368), 331-66.
Jenkins-Smith, H. and Sabatier, P. (1994), 'Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework', *Journal of Public Policy,* 14 (2), 175-203.
Jenkins, W. (1978), *Policy Analysis: A Political and Organizational Perspective* (London: Martin Robertson).

Jessop, B. (2002), 'Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A State-Theoretical Perspective', *Antipode*, 34 (3), 452-72.

JICA (2009), 'Coalition for African Rice Development：CARD', (Tokyo: JICA).

Kahler, M. (1990), 'Orthodoxy and Its Alternatives: Explaining Approaches to Stabilization and Adjustment', in J. M. Nelson (ed.), *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World* (Oxford: Princeton University Press).

Kalita, D., M'Cormack, F., and Heirman, J. (2012), 'Working Paper 3: A Literature Review on Farmer Voice', *ALINe* (Brighton: IDS).

Kalleberg, A. (1966), 'The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems', *World Politics*, 19 (1), 69-82.

Kapila, S. and Mead, D. (2002), *Building businesses with small producers: Successful business development services in Africa, Asia and Latin America* (Ottowa: IDRC).

Kaplinsky, R. (2004), 'Competitions Policy and the Global Coffee and Cocoa Value Chains', *Paper prepared for United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD)* (Institute of Development Studies and Centre for Research and Innovation Management).

Kaplinsky, R. and Morris, M. (2001), 'A Handbook for Value Chain Research', (Ottowa: IDRC).

Keeley, J. and Scoones, I. (1999), 'Understanding Environmental Policy Processes: A Review', *IDS Working Paper* 89.

Keeley, J. and Scoones, I. (2003), *Understanding environmental policy processes [electronic resource] : cases from Africa* (London: Earthscan).

Khor, M. and Hormeku, T. (2006), 'THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION AND LIBERALISATION ON AGRICULTURE AND SMALL FARMERS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE EXPERIENCE OF GHANA', *Impact of Globalisation and Trade Liberalisation on Poor Rural Producers – Evidence from the Field and Recommendations for Action* (Third World Network).

Killick, T. (1997), 'Principals, Agents and the Failings of Conditionality', *Journal of International Development*, 9 (4), 483-96.

Killick, T., Gunatilaka, R., and Marr, A. (eds.) (1998), *Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change* (London: Routledge).

Kim, E. M. and Lee, J. E. (2013), 'Bused and Beyond: South Korea and the Transition from Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness', *Journal of International Development*, 25, 787–801.

Koeberle, S. and Stavreski, Z. (2006), *Budget Support as More Effective Aid?: Recent Experiences and Emerging Lessons* (Washington D.C. : The World Bank).

Kofi, T. (1994), 'Structural Adjustment in Africa; A Performance Review of World Bank Policies under Uncertainty in Commodity Price Trends: The Case of Ghana', *Research for Action* (UNU/WIDER).

Kolavalli, S. and Vigneri, M. (2011), 'CHAPTER 12: COCOA IN GHANA: SHAPING THE SUCCESS OF AN ECONOMY', in P. Chuhan-Pole and M. Angwafo (eds.), *Yes Africa Can* (World Bank,).

Kolavalli, S., et al. (2010), 'Do Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) Processes Make a Difference to Country Commitments to Develop Agriculture?: The Case of Ghana', *Discussion Paper* (01006: IFPRI).

Konings, P. (1980), 'Capitalist rice farming and peasant communities in the Builsa Area of Ghana', (Leiden: Afrika Studiecentrum).
Konings, P. (1981), 'The example of the Vea Irrigation Project in the Upper Region of Ghana', *Peasantry and State in Ghana* (5; Leiden: African Studies Centre).
Konings, P. (1984), 'Capitalist Rice Farming and Land Allocation in Northern Ghana', *Journal of legal pluralism,* 22, 1-28.
Konings, P. (2002), 'Structural adjustment and trade unions in Africa: the case of Ghana', (London/New York: Routledge).
Kraus, Jon (1991), 'The Struggle over Structural Adjustment in Ghana', *Africa Today,* 38 (4), 19-37.
Krueger, A. O. (2002), *Political Economy of Policy Reform in Developing Countries* (Cambridge: MIT Press).
Kulibaba, N. (1993), 'IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM IN AFRICA: COCOA MARKETING REFORM IN GHANA', *Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II (APAP II)* (Cambridge: Abt Associates Inc. and USAID).
Kuwornu, J., Izideen, M., and Osei-Asare, Y. B. (2011), 'Supply Response of Rice in Ghana: A Co-integration Analysis', *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development,* 2 (6), 14.
Lançon, F. and Benz, H. D. (2007), 'Rice imports in West Africa: trade regimes and food policy formulation', *Poster prepared for presentation at the 106th seminar of the EAAE: Pro-poor development in low income countries: Food, agriculture, trade, and environment* (Montpellier, France).
Laven, A. (2007), 'Marketing reforms in Ghana's cocoa sector: Partial liberalisation, partial benefits?', *Background Note* (London: Overseas Development Institute).
Laven, A. (2010a), *The risks of inclusion: Shifts in governance processes and upgrading opportunities for cocoa farmers in Ghana* (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute (KIT)).
Laven, A. (2010b), *The risky business of cocoa in Ghana: Local entrepreneurs in a buyer-driven chain* (Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences; Amsterdam: UvA).
Lawson, A., et al. (2007), 'Joint Evaluation of Multi-Donor Budget Support to Ghana: Based on OECD-DAC methodology; Volume One: Evaluation Results and Recommendations on Future Design & Management of Ghana MDBS', (London and Accra: ODI and CDD).
Lijphart, A. (1971), 'Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method', *The American Political Science Review,* 65 (3), 682-93.
Lokko, Carl Roderick (1995), 'Dimensions of Poverty and Famine in the Upper Eastern Region of Ghana', *New Global Development*, 11 (1), 26-34.
Loxley, John (1991), 'Ghana: The long road to recovery 1983-90', (Ottawa: Noth-South Institute).
Lukes, S. (2005), *Power: a radical view* (Second edn.; New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
Marcelo, R. (1995), *Rise and demise of commodity agreements : an investigation into the breakdown of international commodity agreements* (Cambridge: Woodhead).
Margolis, J. (1982), 'Africa Report', *African Update,* November-December 1982.

Martin, M. (1991), 'Negotiating Adjustment and External Finance: Ghana and the International Community, 1982-1989', in D. Rothchild (ed.), *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery* (London: Lynne Rienner).
Maschler, Michael, Solan, Eilon, and Zamir, Shmuel (2013), *Game Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press).
MCC (2013), 'MCC Completes Successful Five-Year Compact with Ghana', <http://www.mcc.gov/pages/press/release/release-021511-ghana>, accessed 28 December
--- (2013), 'Ghana Compact: Sowing the Seeds of Sustainable Growth', (Washington D.C. : Millennium Challenge Corporation).
McMichael, P. (2009), 'A food regime genealogy', *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36 (1), 139-69.
McMichael, P. (2013), 'Value-chain Agriculture and Debt Relations: contradictory outcomes', *Third World Quarterly*, 34 (4), 671-90.
Mellor, J. and Johnston, B. (1984), 'The World Food Equation: Interrelations Among Development, Employment, and Food Consumption ', *Journal of Economic Literature*, 22 (2), 531-74.
Meseguer, C. (2005), 'Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order', *In Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 598 (The Rise of Regulatory Capitalism: The Global Diffusion of a New Order), 67-82.
Mikell, G. (1989), 'Peasant Politicisation and Economic Recuperation in Ghana: Local and National Dilemmas', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27 (3), 455-78.
Mills, John Atta (2009), 'State of the Nation Address by His Excellency John Evans Atta Mills, President of the Rebublic of Ghana', (Accra).
Mkandawire, Thandika (2009), 'Institutional Monocropping and Monotasking in Africa ', *Democracy, Governance and Well-Being* (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development).
Mmieh, Frederick and Owusu-Frimpong, Nana (2004), 'State policies and the challenges in attracting foreign direct investment: A review of the Ghana experience', *Thunderbird International Business Review*, 46 (5), 575-99.
MOFA (2014), 'Address By Hon. Kwesi Ahwoi, At The 28th National Farmers Day Celebration', (updated Friday, November 2nd, 2012) <http://mofa.gov.gh/site/?p=11256>, accessed 05 January 2014.
MOFEP (2010), 'Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy 2011-2015', (Accra: Government of the Republic of Ghana).
Morvaridi, B. (2012), 'Capitalist Philanthropy and Hegemonic Partnerships', *Third World Quarterly*, 33 (7), 1191-210.
Mosley, P. (1987), 'Conditionality as Bargaining Process: Structural-Adjustment Lending, 1980-86', *Essays in International Finance*, October (168).
Mosley, P., Noorbakhsh, F., and Paloni, A. (2003), 'Compliance with World Bank Conditionality: Implications for the Selectivity Approach to Policy-Based Lending and the Design of Conditionality', *CREDIT Research Paper* (Nottingham).
Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., and Toye, J. (eds.) (1995), *Aid and power : the World Bank and policy-based lending* (Volume 1; London: Routledge).

National Development Planning Comission (2012), '2011 Annual Progress Report', *The Implementation of the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA), 2010-2013* (Accra).
NDC (2008), 'Manifesto for a Better Ghana: Overview ', (Accra).
NDPC (2004), 'Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy: 2003 Annual Progress Report', (Accra: National Development Planning Comission).
Ndulu, B. J., et al. (eds.) (2008), *The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000* (1; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
NEPAD (2009), 'Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP): Annual Report 2008', (NEPAD).
--- (2011), 'Enhancing stakeholder engagement', *SUCCESS STORIES 2: GHANA*.
--- (2014), 'History', <http://www.nepad.org/history>, accessed 9 May 2014.
Noble, K. (1991), 'Ghana Falters After Years of Growth', *New York Times*, Jun 24, 1991, p. D5.
Noman, Akbar, et al. (eds.) (2011), *Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
North, D. (1991), 'Institutions', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5(1).
Novicki, M. A. (1984), 'The Economics of the Rawlings Revolution', *Africa Report*, 29 (5), 42-47.
Novicki, M. A. (1988), 'Balancing Food and Export Production: Interviews with Steve G. Obimpeh and Kwame Nini Owusu', *Africa Report*, 33 (5).
Novicki, M. A. (1983), 'Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Africa', *Africa Report*, 28 (5), 12-16.
Nuwati, B (2014), 'Ghanaian cocoa farmers to benefit from becoming UTZ CERTIFIED', (updated 26 February 2010) <http://www.modernghana.com/news/265666/1/ghanaian-cocoa-farmers-to-benefit-from-becoming-ut.html>, accessed 22 February
Nyanteng, V.K. and Seini, W. (2003), 'AFRINT MACRO STUDY: GHANA REPORT (REVISED)', (Legon: ISSER, University of Ghana).
ODI (2000), 'National Workshop on Rice Production in Ghana', *Ghana National Worhops At Ho* (Ho, Upper East Region, Ghana: ODI and UDS).
OECD 'OECD International Development Statistics', <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/data/detailed-aid-statistics_dev-aid-stat-data-en>.
Ohemeng, F. and Anebo, F. (2012), 'The Politics of Administrative Reforms in Ghana: Perspectives from Path Dependency and Punctuated Equilibrium Theories', *International Journal of Public Administration*, 35 (3), 161-76.
Ojo, O. (1980), 'Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS', *International Organization*, 34 (4), 571-604.
Okoso-Amaa, K. (1975), *Rice Marketing in Ghana: An Analysis of Government Intervention in Business* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies) 118.
Opoku, E. , et al. (2009), 'Improving productivity through group lending: Report on the Impact Evaluation of the Cocoa Abrabopa Initiative', (Accra: COCOBOD and Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford).
Orr, S., et al. (2008), 'Funding international agricultural research and the need to be noticed: A case study of NERICA rice', *Outlook on Agriculture*, 37 (3), 159-68.

Osei-Asare, Yaw B. (2010), 'Mapping of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Sector Strategies and Policies Related to Rice Development in Ghana', (Nairobi, Kenya: Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD). AGRA).

Osie, I. (2012), 'Standard Chartered is joint lead-arranger for a USD1billion syndicated facility for the Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocobod)', <http://www.standardchartered.com/gh/latest-news/09-08-is-joint-lead-arranger-for/en/>, accessed August 14th, 2012.

Ostrom, E. (2001), *Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation* (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)).

Oxford Dictionaries (2015), 'knowledge', <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/knowledge>, accessed 29 Sep.

Oxford Dictionaries (2015), 'resource', <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/resource>, accessed 29 Sep

Pardey, G.P., Roseboom, J., and Beintema, N.M. (1995), 'Investments in African Agricutlural Research', *EPTD Discussion Paper No.14* (Washington and The Hague: IFPRI and ISNAR).

Payson Center (2011), 'Oversight of Public and Private Initiatives to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child Labor in the Cocoa Sector in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana', *International Cocoa Initiative (ICI)* (New Orleans: Payson Center for International Development, Tulane University).

Payson Center (2014), 'Project Summary ', *Child Labor in the Cocoa Sector* <http://www.childlabor-payson.org/>, accessed 15 March.

Peck, J., Theodore, N., and Brenner, N. (2012), 'Neoliberalism Resurgent? Market Rule after the Great Recession', *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 111 (2), 265-87.

PMM (1984a), 'CONSULTING SERVICES FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND STUDIES FOR THE GHANA COCOA COMPONENT OF THE EXPORT REHABILITATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT', (London: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.).

--- (1984b), 'UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO GHANA COCOA MARKETING BOARD JUNE 1981 TO JUNE 1984 - FINAL REPORT', (Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. and UNDP).

Pop-Eleches, G. (2009), *From Economic Crisis TO REFORM: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe.* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press).

Porter, M. E. (1985), *Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance* (New York: The Free Press).

Puplampu, Korbla P. (2003), 'State-NGO Relations and Agricultural Sector Development', in Wisdom Tettey, Puplampu, Korbla P., Berman, Bruce (ed.), *Critical Perspectives on Politics and Socio-Economic Development in Ghana* (Leiden: Brill).

Quartey, Lawrence 'Ghana to lead rice production in West Africa? ', (updated Thursday, 30 June 2011 17:29) <http://www.theafricareport.com/News-Analysis/ghana-to-lead-rice-production-in-west-africa.html>, accessed 11 May 2014.

Raikes , P., Jensen, M. F. , and Ponte, S. (2011), 'Global commodity chain analysis and the French filière approach: comparison and critique', *Economy and Society*, 29 (3), 390-417.

Rawlings, J. J. (1983), 'Address to the Ghana Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives on February 2, 1983. ', *Selected Speeches of Flt. Lt. J. J. Rawlings: Forging ahead* (2; Tema), 43.

Rawlings, J. J. (1999), 'The Sessional Address', *Parliamentary Debates; Official Report; Thursday 14 January 1999* (Accra: Republic of Ghana).

Republic of Ghana (1991), 'Proceedings Of The Consultative Assembly 1991', (Consultative Assembly).

Republic of Ghana (1995), 'GHANA – VISION 2020 (THE FIRST STEP: 1996-2000)', *PRESIDENTIAL REPORT On COORDINATED PROGRAMME OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIOL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES* (Accra: Government of Ghana).

Republic of Ghana (2007), 'Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II)', (Accra).

Republic of Ghana (2009), 'ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP)/ Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)', (Accra).

Republic of Ghana (2010a), 'Request from the Government of Ghana for Financial Assistance for a Value Chain Development Project under its Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan ', *Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme* (Accra).

Republic of Ghana (2010b), 'Medium Term National Development Policy Framework: Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA), 2010-2013', in Volume 1: Policy Framework (ed.), (Accra).

Republic of Ghana (2011), 'Home Grown School Feeding: Technical Assistance Plan', (Accra: Partnership for Child Development and HGSF).

Resnick, Danielle and Van de Walle, Nicolas (2013), *Democratic Trajectories in Africa: Unravelling the Impact of Foreign Aid* (Oxford: Oxford).

Reuter (1983), 'Budget protests threaten control of Ghana regime', *The Globe and Mail*, 19 May 1983, p. p14.

Roduner, D. (2007), 'Donor Interventions in Value Chain Development', (Berne: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)).

Roland, G. (2004), 'Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving and Slow-Moving Institutions', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 38 (4), 109-31.

Rosenau, James N. (1995), 'Governance in the Twenty-first Century', *Global Governance*, 1 (1), 13-43.

Ross, Will (2012), 'Ghana's 'hybrid' rice dilemma', *BBC News Ghana* (updated Thursday, 17 April 2008) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7350856.stm>, accessed Nov 29.

RSCE (2009), 'Draft Principles for a Sustainable Cocoa Economy', *RSCE2/7* (London: Roundtable for a Sustainable Cocoa Economy (RSCE)).

Ruf, F. (2007), 'The cocoa sector: Expansion, or green and double green revolutions', *Background Note* (London: ODI).

SADA (2010), 'Strategy and Work plan (2010 – 2030): MAIN DOCUMENT', (Accra: Savannah Accelerated Development Authority, Government of Ghana).

Salifu, Adam, et al. (2012), 'Farmer Based Organizations in Ghana', *GHANA Strategy Support Program* (Working Paper 31; Washington D.C.: IFPRI).
Sarpong-Akosa, K. (2001), 'Ghana sprays for bumper cocoa crop', *BBC,* 16 October, 2001.
Sarpong, K. K. and Gray, S. J. (1989), 'SOCIAL INCOME AND PUBLIC SECTOR CORPORATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE GHANA FOOD DISTRIBUTION CORPORATION', *Financial Accountability & Management,* 5 (4), 245-57.
Sarris, A. and Shams, H. (1991), *Ghana Under Structural Adjustment: the Impacct on Agriculture and the Rural Poor* (New York: New York University Press for IFAD).
Schäferhoff, M. , Campe, S. , and Kaan, C. (2007), 'Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in International Relations: Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks and Results', *SFB-Governance Working Paper Series* (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin).
Scharpf, F. (2000), 'Institutions in Comparative Policy Research', *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (6), 760-92.
Scoones, I. and Thompson, J. (2011), 'The Politics of Seed in Africa's GreenRevolution: Alternative Narratives and Competing Pathways', *IDS Bulletin,* 42 (4), 1-23.
SEC (2000), 'Annual Report 2000', *Ghana Securities and Exchange Commission* (Accra: Ghana Securities and Exchange Commission).
Seini, A. W. (2002), 'AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS UNDER POLICY REFORMS IN GHANA', *TECHNICAL PUBLICATION NO. 61* (Legon: ISSER, University of Legon).
Shah, S. (1999), 'Debt relief for poorest could be only weeks away, says Brown', *The Times,* September 24, 1999.
Shapiro, H. and Rosenquist, E. M. (2004), 'Public/private partnerships in agroforestry: the example of working together to improve cocoa sustainability', *Agroforestry Systems,* (61), 453–62.
Shepard, A. and Onumah, G. (1997), 'Liberalised Agricultural Markets in Ghana', *The Role of Governments in Adjusting Economies Paper 12* (Development Administration Group (DAG), University of Birmingham).
Shuman, M., Barron, A. , and Wasserman, W. (2009), 'Kuapo Kokoo', *Community Food Enterprise: Local Success in a Global Marketplace* (Arlington: Wallace Center at Winrock International).
Somado, E.A., Guei, R.G., and Keya, S.O (2008), *NERICA : the New Rice for Africa – a Compendium* (Cotonou: Africa Rice Centre (WARDA)).
Staritz, C. (2012), 'Value Chains for Development? Potentials and Limitations of Global Value Chain Approaches in Donor Interventions', *Working Paper 31* (Vienna: Austrian Research Foundation for International Development).
Stryker, J., et al. (1990), 'Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agricultural Pricing Policies in Ghana', *World Bank Comparative Studies* (Washington D.C. : World Bank).
Sumberg, J., Heirman, J., and Raboanarielina, C. (2012), 'Strengthening User Feedback within Large-Scale AR4D: Final Report', (Cotonou, Brighton: ALINe, GFAR, AfricaRice, IDS).

Sumberg, J., et al. (2013), 'From agricultural research to 'product development': What role for user feedback and feedback loops?', *Outlook On Agriculture,* 42 (4), 233-42.
Sumner, Andrew (2006), 'In Search of the Post-Washington (Dis)Consensus: The 'Missing' Content of PRSPs', *Third World Quarterly,* 27 (8), 1401-12.
Syngenta Foundation (2015), 'Rice intensification in West Africa', <http://www.syngentafoundation.org/index.cfm?pageID=558>, accessed 14 January 2015.
Tandon, Y. (2010), 'The Paris Declaration and aid effectiveness', *Pambazuka News,* Issue 379.
Teal, F., Zeitlin, A., and Maamah, H. (2006), 'Ghana Cocoa Farmers Survey 2004: Report to Ghana Cocoa Board', (Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford).
Tellez, Viviana Muñoz (2008), 'Lessons From the Food Crisis: Patchwork Will Not Mend Our Vulnerable System', *SOUTH BULLETIN,* (17).
Thompson, C. (2012), 'Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA): advancing the theft of African genetic wealth', *Review of African Political Economy,* 39 (132), 345-50.
TICAD (2008), 'Yokohama Action Plan', *TICAD IV* (Yokohama).
Ton, G., et al. (2008), 'Chain governance, sector policies and economic sustainability in cocoa: A comparative analysis of Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ecuador', *Markets, Chains and Sustainable Development Strategy & Policy paper #12* (Stichting DLO: Wageningen).
Toye, J. (1991), 'Ghana', in Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan, and John Toye (eds.), *Aid And Power: The World Bank & Policy-based Lending* (Volume 2 Case Studies; London: Routledge).
TWIN (2013), 'History and Achievements', accessed January 13, 2013.
UN (1972), 'International Cocoa Agreement', in United Nations (ed.), *No. 12652* (Geneva: United Nations).
--- (2012), 'Comtrade', in United Nations Statistics Division (ed.).
UNCTAD/WTO (2001), 'Cocoa: A guide to trade practices', (Geneva: International Trade Centre).
UNFAO (2006), 'No. 5 Ghana: rice, poultry, and tomato paste', *FAO Briefs on Import Surges* (Rome: UNFAO).
--- (2012), 'FAOSTAT', (Rome: Statistics Division UNFAO).
UNILO (1999), 'CONVENTION CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION AND IMMEDIATE ACTION FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOUR', in International Labour Organisation (ed.), *Convention 182* (182; Geneva: UNILO).
United Nations (1976), 'Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)', *Treaty Series* (United Nations).
United Nations (1994), '19th Meeting: Wednesday, 5 October 1994, 3 p.m. New York', *General Assembly: Forty-ninth Session* (New York: United Nations,).
United Nations (2002), 'Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development', *International Conference on Financing for*

Development (Monterrey, Mexico: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs).
USDA (2012), 'Global Agricultural Trade System', in United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agriculture Services (ed.), (Washington D.C.).
Van de Walle, Nicolas (2001), *African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979-1999* (Political economy of institutions and decisions; New York: Cambridge University Press) xii, 291 p.
Van de Walle, Nicolas, Ball, Nicole, and Ramachandran, V. (eds.) (2003), *Beyond Structural Adjustment : The Institutional Context of African Development* (New York Palgrave Macmillan).
Van Hear, N. (1984), "By-Day' Boys and Dariga Men: Casual Labour versus Agrarian Capital in Northern Ghana', *Review of African Political Economy*, (31), 44-56.
Velarde, S. and Tomich, T. (2006), 'Sustainable Tree Crops Programme in Africa: ASB Impact Cases 1', (Nairobi: ASB-Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins and World Agroforestry Centre).
Vidal, J. (2013), 'Why is the Gates foundation investing in GM giant Monsanto?', *POVERTYMATTERS BLOG* (updated Wednesday 29 September 2010) <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2010/sep/29/gates-foundation-gm-monsanto>, accessed 11 January 2013.
Vigneri, M. (2008), 'Drivers of Change in Ghana's Cocoa Sector', *Ghana Strategy Support Program (GSSP)* (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI).
Wade, N. (1975), 'International Agricultural Research', *Science*, 188 (4188), 585-89.
Walsh, J. (1988), 'Second Chance for Rice Research Center', *Science*, 239 (4843), 969-70.
WARDA (2007), 'Celebrating 35 Years of Research Partnership: Africa Rice Center (WARDA)/NARS Collaboration', *Biennial Africa Rice Center/NARS Experts: Committee Meeting Report No. 5* (Cotonou, Benin: WARDA and CGIAR).
WCF (2014), 'Sustainable Cocoa Economy: WCF Perspective', <http://biblioteca.catie.ac.cr/inaforesta/descargas/simposio_2012/7-Sustainable_Cocoa_Economy_WCF_Perspective.pdf>, accessed 9 February 2014.
--- 'History and Mission', <http://worldcocoafoundation.org/about-wcf/history-mission/>, accessed 21 April 2014.
Weihe, GuDriD (2008), 'Ordering Disorder – On the Perplexities of the Partnership Literature', *The Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 67 (4), 430–42.
Weissman, S.R. (1990), 'Structural adjustment in Africa: Insights from the experiences of Ghana and Senegal', *World Development*, 18 (12), 1621-34.
WFP (2007), 'GHANA: Home-Grown School Feeding field case study', (Rome: WFP).
Whitfield, L. (2005), 'Trustees of development from conditionality to governance: poverty reduction strategy papers in Ghana', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43 (04), 641-64.
Whitfield, L. (2010), 'The State Elite, PRSPs and Policy Implementation in Aid-dependent Ghana', *Third World Quarterly*, 31 (5), 721-37.
Whitfield, L. (2011a), 'Political Challenges to Developing Non-Traditional Exports in Ghana: The Case of Horticulture Exports', *DIIS Working Paper 2011:29* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies).

Whitfield, L. (2011b), 'Competitive Clientelism, Easy Financing and Weak Capitalists: The Contemporary Political Settlement in Ghana', *Danish Institute for International Studies,* DIIS Working Paper
Whitfield, L. and Therkildsen, O. (2011), 'What Drives States to Support the Development of Productive Sectors? Strategies ruling elites pursue for political survival and their policy implications', *Danish Institute for International Studies,* DIIS Working Paper 2011:15
Whitfield, L. and Buur, L. (2014), 'The politics of industrial policy: ruling elites and their alliances', *Third World Quarterly,* 35 (1), 126-44.
Whitfield, L., et al. (2015), *The Politics of African Industrial Policy: A Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Whitfield, L. (ed.), (2008), *The Politics of Aid : African Strategies for Dealing with Donors: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors* (Oxford: OUP).
Wiggins, S. , Marfo, K. , and Anchirinah, V. (2004), 'Protecting the Forest or the People? Environmental Policies and Livelihoods in the Forest Margins of Southern Ghana', *World Development,* 32 (11), 1939–55.
Wilhemina, Q. (2010), 'Building the Capacity of Farmer Based Organisation for Sustainable Rice Farming in Northern Ghana', *Journal of Agricultural Science,* 2 (1), 93-106.
Williams, Gavin (2004), 'Political Economies & the Study of Africa: Critical Considerations', *Review of African Political Economy,* 31 (102), 571-83.
Williams, T. (2009), 'An African Success Story: Ghana’s Cocoa Marketing System', *Working Paper* (Brighton: IDS).
World Bank (1983a), 'Report and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a proposed credit of SDR 16.2 million to the Republic of Ghana for an Export Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project', *Report No. P-3696-GB* (World Bank,).
World Bank (1983b), 'Report and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a proposed credit of SDR 37.0 million to the Republic of Ghana for a Reconstruction Import Credit', *Report No. P-3554-GH* (World Bank).
World Bank (1983c), 'Report and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a proposed credit of SDR 71.8 million to the Republic of Ghana for an Export Rehabilitation Project', *Report No. P-3695-GH* (World Bank).
World Bank (1984a), 'Ghana: Policies and Programs for Adjustment', (Washington, D.C. : World Bank).
World Bank (1984b), 'Project Completion Report Ghana Ashanti Region Cocoa Project (LOAN 118 1-GH)', *Report No. 5092* (World Bank).
World Bank (1987a), 'STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT: GHANA: AGRICULTURAL SERVICES REHABILITATION PROJECT: April 22, 1987'.
World Bank (1987b), 'MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT OF SDR 13.3 MILLION TO GHANA FOR THE AGRICULTURAL SERVICES REHABILITATION PROJECT April 29, 1987', (The World Bank).

World Bank (1987c), 'Project completion report Ghana Upper Region Agricultural Development Project (Loan 1291-T-GH)', *Report No. 6755* (Washington D.C.: World Bank).
World Bank (1987d), 'STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT GHANA COCOA REHABILITATION PROJECT October 19, 1987', *Report No. 6818-GH* (Washington D.C. : World Bank).
World Bank (1987e), 'MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT OF SDR 31.3 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA FOR A COCOA REHABILITATION PROJECT', *Report No. P-4631-GH* (World Bank).
World Bank (1988), '(Cocoa Rehabilitation Project) between INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION and GHANA COCOA BOARD', *CONFORMED COPY* (Dated February 18, 1988: World Bank,).
World Bank (1991), 'Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of Ghana: National Agricultural Research Project', (World Bank: West African Department).
World Bank (1992), 'PROGRAM PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT: GHANA; FIRST AND SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT CREDITS (CREDITS 1777, A-025, A-025-1-GH AND 2005, 2005-1, 2005-2-GH)', (Washington, D.C. : The World Bank).
World Bank (1995a), 'Project Completion Report; Ghana; Private Investment and Sustained Development Promotion Credit or Third Structural Adjustment Credit', (Washington D.C.: The World Bank).
World Bank (1995b), 'AGRICULTURAL SERVICES REHABILITATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1801-GH): Implementation Completion Report', (Washington, D.C.: World Bank).
World Bank (1997a), 'IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GHANA AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT (Credit 2345-GH)', *Report No. 16502* (World Bank).
World Bank (1997b), 'IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GHANA COCOA REHABILITATION PROJECT (Credit 1854-GH)', (World Bank,).
World Bank (2000), 'AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PERFORMANCE REVIEW AND ACCOUNTABILITY IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTS: For The Republic of Ghana', (Washington, D.C. : World Bank).
World Bank (2001), 'Performance Audit Reports and Sectoral Overview: Ghana: National Agricultural Research Project', (Washington D.C. : World Bank: Sector and Thematic Studies Group).
World Bank (2002), 'World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets', (Washington D.C.: World Bank).
World Bank (2004), 'MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESIDENT OFTHE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGY OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP FOR THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA ', (Washington D.C. : World Bank).

World Bank (2007), 'Implementation Completion and Results Report on an Adaptable Program Credit in the amount of US$67 million equivalent to the Republic of Ghana for an Agricultural Services Subsector Investment Project ', (Washington D.C. : The World Bank).
World Bank (2007a), 'Agriculture for Development: world development report 2008', (World Bank).
World Bank (2009), 'Awakening Africa's sleeping giant : prospects for commercial agriculture in the Guinea Savannah zone and beyond', *Directions in development. Agriculture and rural development* (Washington, DC and Rome, Italy: World Bank and FAO : Cooperazione italiana allo sviluppo), xii, 218 p.
World Bank (2010), 'Internatinoal Development Association; Program Document for a Proposed Credit; In the Amount of SDR 16.5 million (US$25 MILLION EQUIVALENT) to Republic of Ghana for a Second Agriculture Development Policy Operation', (Washington D.C.: World Bank IDA).
World Bank (2012), 'Project Appraisal Document on a Preposed Credit in the amount of SDR 64.5 million (US$100 million equivalent) to the Republic of Ghana for a Commercial Agriculture Project', (Washington D.C.: World Bank).
World Bank (2013a), 'International Development Association; International Finance Corporation; Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency; Country Partnership Strategy for The Republic of Ghana: For the Period FY13-FY16', (Washington D.C.: World Bank).
World Bank (2013b), 'Implementation Completion and Results Report; IDA-49390; on a credit in the amound of SDR 36 million (US$ 57 million equivalent) and in the amount of SDR 32.3 million (US$ 50 million equivalent) to the Republic of Ghana for a Third Agriculture Develolpment Policy Operation (P122796) and a Fourth Agriculture Development Policy Operation (P122808); September 23, 2013', (Washington D.C. : World Bank).
WorldBank (2009), *Awakening Africa's sleeping giant : prospects for commercial agriculture in the Guinea Savannah zone and beyond* (Directions in development Agriculture and rural development; Washington, DC
Rome, Italy: World Bank ;
FAO : Cooperazione italiana allo sviluppo) xii, 218 p.
WTO (1994), 'General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994: Agreement on Agriculture', in WTO (ed.), (1994 edn.; Geneva: WTO).
Xinhua (1987), 'Ghana makes efforts to boost rice production ', *Xinhua General News Service*, November 29.
Yiadom-Boakye, E., et al. (2013), 'Gender, resource use and technical efficiency among rice farmers in the Ashanti Region, Ghana', *Journal of Agricultural Economics and Development*, 2 (3), 102-10.
Zimmermann, F. and Drechsler, D. (2007), 'Facing Complexity in Development Finance: Challenges for a Donor Darling', *Policy Insights* (40; Paris: OECD).