‘Christian Civilisation’, ‘Modern Secularisation’, and the Revolutionary Re-Imagination of British Modernity, 1954-1965

Abstract

This essay argues that essentialist models of modernity are always ideological, and that Britain’s dominant ideology of modernity was transformed from the mid-1950s, with revolutionary consequences for British Christianity and secularisation. Before the mid-1950s ‘Christian civilisation’ was commonly considered *more* advanced than secularity, which was associated with Stalin’s Soviet Union. The mid-1950s global crisis, however, created widespread belief in an unprecedented new ‘modern world’. This perception rapidly legitimated the further belief, promoted by radical Christians, that ‘the modern world’ is inherently ‘secular’. Once accepted by the national media, these ideological beliefs about modernity made possible the 1960s ‘secular revolution’.

Keywords: Christianity, modernity, Cold War, postsecular, Sixties, secularisation

Introduction

Since the 1960s, the historiography of twentieth-century British Christianity has routinely been written within a Euronormative ideology of modernity, which insists that modernity specifically favours secularity, rather than Christianity or Islam.[1] In the 1970s and 1980s, this assumption was articulated using the classical secularization paradigm, which

linked ‘secularization’ to ‘modernization’ so strongly that it backdated the origins of mass British secularization to the industrial revolution.[2] In 2001 Callum Brown’s *The Death of Christian Britain* famously challenged the assumption that modernity naturally favours secularity, only to replace it with the assumption that postmodernity naturally favours secularity.[3] Recent revisions of the secularization paradigm have attributed ‘religious decline’ to democratization, or to the decline of confessional politics, or to the arrival of mass affluence, but have done little to disturb the underlying premise that modernity intrinsically favours secularity.[4] Since the mid-noughties, however, all these interpretations have been radically undermined by the postcolonial determination to decentre the European experience.[5] On the empirical level, this perspective reveals that many global cultures have found ‘religion’ perfectly compatible with ‘modernity’; on the theoretical level, it implies that global modernities are inherently multiple and diverse, such that monist visions of modernity are always ethnocentric.[6] Modernity, in this view, inherently favours neither secularity nor ‘religion’.[7] As Jeffrey Cox noted in 2006, however, since the historiography of twentieth-century British Christianity has long assumed that modernity does encourage secularity, the revelation of multiple modernities exposes that historiography to radical critique.[8] If teleological approaches are ethnocentric, then nuancing them, however sensitively, is the wrong approach: rather, we need a radically anti-teleological strategy for explaining the dramatic rise of secularity in twentieth-century Britain.[9]

This article suggests that these challenges can be overcome by redefining ‘modernity’ as an emic category, such that large-scale cultural shifts are explained by focussing, not on putatively essential characteristics of modernity, but on local ideological visions of what it means to be ‘modern’.[10] In a society with a strong collective ideology of modernity, most people will be culturally predisposed to favour whichever beliefs and practices they classify as modern: and so how twentieth-century Britons conceptualised modernity, how they

understood modernity to relate to Christianity and secularity, and how these understandings shifted across the century, are questions of central importance for historians of twentieth-century Britain. This cultural-structuralist approach fully acknowledges the local variability and personal specificity of belief and practice. It does, however, insist that personal decisions occur in dialogue with dominant ideological frameworks, which is why collective trends exist, and that abrupt changes in these ideological frameworks, once slowly and complexly worked out in lived experience, cannot avoid eventually creating widespread social change.[11] This methodology is 'strongly' culturalist in the sense that it depicts culture as an independent variable, rather than a simple function of socio-economic realities.[12] It is also non-teleological, believing with Max Weber that history is best conceptualised as an unending and unpredictable struggle between rival ideological paradigms, some of which may arbitrarily privilege themselves by claiming to represent 'modernity' or 'postmodernity'.[13] Finally, this methodology is postsecular, in the sense that it sees secularity as an ideological project in its own right: it therefore defines 'secularisation' differently from 'Christian decline', as the acceptance and enactment of secularity's cultural beliefs, especially secularity's belief in the possibility of permanently post-ideological societies, a belief which presupposes a particular monist vision of modernity.[14]

This article applies this culturalist methodology to postwar Britain by arguing that dominant public understandings of modernity shifted radically from the mid-1950s, and that this shift was a necessary precondition of the 'secular revolution' that occurred in the early 1960s.[15] This cultural shift introduced a powerful teleological vision of modernity into British public discussion, ensuring that localities and individuals made cultural decisions against a very different imagined backdrop in 1970 than they had in 1950.[16] This transformation was common to most Western cultures, but is explored only in the British case here.[17] In the first half of the twentieth century, numerous networks of 'modernist' intellectuals and artists

identified twentieth-century Western societies as witnessing a radical break from humanity's past: John Carter Wood explores one such network in this special issue.[18] Stadial theories of human development were also offered by Comtean Positivism and by Marxism.[19] Nonetheless, from the 1920s to the early 1950s, the commanding heights of British public discussion were still dominated by an older, 'civilisation' ideology of modernity, which denied the existence of a radical break between 'tradition' and 'modernity' by identifying 'Western civilisation' as a two and a half thousand year old ideological project founded upon the Greco-Roman inheritance and Christianity. Britain's 'civilisation' ideology powerfully privileged Christianity by insisting that it was essential to the stability and prosperity of contemporary Western societies; conversely, it forcefully denigrated secularity by portraying it as a regressive phenomenon that ultimately created backward tyrannies such as the Soviet Union. Consequently, mass British 'secularisation' (as opposed to Christian decline) could not be enacted until Britain's 'civilisation' ideology had lost its cultural dominance.[20] From the mid-1950s, however, Britain's 'civilisation' ideology was dramatically overthrown by a 'modernisation' ideology of modernity, which retrospectively invented a radical break between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies. This alternative ideology of modernity offered a radically different account of the fate of collective belief-systems in 'advanced' societies. According to the 'civilisation' perspective, collective belief-systems were an intrinsic feature of the modern world; the strength of any society was proportionate to its people's faith in its collective values, and so societies that allowed their collective belief-systems to fall into decline were risking take-over by fanatical alternatives. According to the 'modernisation' perspective, by contrast, humanity's long centuries of ideological warfare belonged to the 'traditional' past: 'modern' societies were moving into a post-ideological future, and so the maintenance of collective systems of belief or morality was no longer important – or even, in stronger versions of this view, no longer possible.[21] Consequently, British secularity's

foundational assumptions – that there had been an irreversible breakthrough to modernity at some point since 1500, that the Christian and classical inheritances were therefore obsolete, and that the societies of the future would not require a collective faith in anything – were all radically different, even morally repugnant, to the British conventional wisdom of the 1940s and early 1950s. It would require a revolutionary reframing of British conceptions of modernity, triggered by some major historical cause, for large numbers of British people to start believing that secularity was more advanced than Christianity, such that they would be willing to enact widespread 'secularisation'.[22]

This article offers a basic overview of this reframing of Britain's dominant ideology of modernity as it concerned Christianity and secularity in the late 1950s and early 1960s, locating the decisive developments as occurring within the public sphere, rather than spontaneously amongst 'the people'.[23] This argument follows the revisionist interpretation of Britain's Sixties by denying the existence of a massive postwar social transformation until at least the late 1960s.[24] It also follows recent research that describes a radical revolution in dominant metanarratives created in the late 1950s and early 1960s by privileged elites, who had the cultural power to disseminate their ideas through the mass media in ways typically denied to 'ordinary' people.[25] The argument depicts British public culture's revolutionary reframing of moral issues as occurring across three overlapping phases. First, early assertions of an unprecedented new era in recent history, apparently wrought by science and technology, first gained momentum in the mid-1940s, and then again in the mid-1950s, being chiefly occasioned by acute anxieties about the future of 'Western civilisation' prompted by the Second World War, the atom bomb, and, especially, the hydrogen bomb, the first full-scale tests of which occurred in 1954.[26] Nonetheless, given that Britain was still a predominantly Christian culture in the 1940s and early 1950s, this 'technological revolution' discussion largely restricted itself to asserting a permanent transformation in the material

rather than the moral sphere, and to suggesting policies for the radical 'modernisation' of the British economy.[27] Second, however, these debates then gave a platform for radical commentators within the British clergy, a body widely considered to be possessed of special moral expertise, to draw on their radical re-readings of Christian eschatology, and to argue that there had been a recent irreversible transformation, not only of the technological environment, but also of human nature, such that 'modern man' was intrinsically 'secular', in this term's new sense of being permanently post-ideological and post-'religious'. These radical Christian arguments originated in the 1940s, but the transformation of British understandings of modernity from the mid-1950s gave them an unexpected salience in the public sphere in the early 1960s.[28] Finally, the acceptance of these arguments in British public discussion in the early- and mid-1960s enabled the rapid creation of the newly dominant metanarrative of 'modern secularisation', which narrated Britain's transition from the 'traditional' condition of 'religion' into the 'modern' condition of post-ideological secularity – an ethnocentric metanarrative that British historiography swiftly internalised and retrospectively imposed on nineteenth-century Britain.[29] This teleological vision of 'secularisation' as the natural fate of modern societies then underpinned Britain's newly dominant culture of secularity: 'secularisation' was swiftly enacted by the commanding heights of British culture, and gradually and complexly carried out in British social life, always whilst masquerading as the growth of post-ideological neutrality.[30] In these ways, this article argues, it was a revolutionary ideology of 'modernisation' that achieved dominance in the mid-twentieth century, not a real process of 'modernisation' dating from the eighteenth century, that provided the essential cultural precondition for Britain's 'secular revolution' in the early 1960s. When present-day historians narrate British Christianity's natural decline in the face of the essential secularity of 'modernity' or 'postmodernity', they are imposing a

Sixties ideological framework onto a pre-Sixties culture, which would have emphatically refused to frame itself in those terms.[31]

Christianity, 'Christian civilisation', and Britain's dominant ideology of modernity, 1939-1954

Amidst the upheavals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many European states embraced some form of modernist project, from the various nationalisms to Italian Fascism to Soviet Communism.[32] In Britain, by contrast, 'gentlemanly' elites ensured their continuing dominance through a combination of relative economic prosperity, gradual franchise reform, imperial ideology, relative religious homogeneity, and victorious participation in total wars – Ireland, of course, being the exception that illustrates the rule.[33] Consequently, although modernisms were certainly present in early twentieth-century Britain, in fields as diverse as theology, art, literature, architecture, futurology, and science fiction, they were by no means dominant.[34] Instead, up until the early 1950s, the commanding heights of the British public sphere still operated according to a 'civilisation' ideology of human development, which had been deeply embedded in elite British ideology since the eighteenth century.[35] Britain's 'civilisation' ideology conceptualised 'Western civilisation' as a two-and-a-half-thousand-year ideological odyssey that dated back to the classical inheritance and the foundation of Christianity, and it therefore saw no difficulty in applying ancient terminology to modern situations.[36] Throughout the interwar period, British observers conceptualised their Soviet and Nazi rivals as 'barbarians' and 'pagans', and they frequently expressed anxiety that 'Western civilisation' might collapse in the manner of the Roman Empire, thus unleashing a new 'Dark Ages'.[37] Civilisation ideology employed a foundational distinction between 'barbaric' and 'civilised' societies, which was quite different from the later view implied by

modernisation ideology's distinction between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies. As John Stuart Mill's essay 'Civilisation' had explained the logic in 1836, civilisation ideology insisted that the basic variable governing the long-term success of human societies was not the sophistication of their technology, but their inhabitants' ongoing ability to co-operate with each other. In this view, the basic difference between 'barbaric' and 'civilised' societies was not material but cultural: 'barbaric' societies comprised headstrong individualists who fought incessantly amongst themselves, and who therefore failed to achieve significant economic or technological progress; but 'civilised' societies comprised people who had acquired self-discipline, civility, and respect for the rule of law, and who therefore organised themselves into stable, ordered, and progress-achieving hierarchies.[38] A clear implication, less emphasised during the late Victorian period, but widely accepted in the interwar years, was that 'civilisation' was reversible: 'civilised' peoples could, if led astray by false ideologies, lose their ingrained habits of mutual co-operation, and experience a catastrophic collapse back into barbarism, a fate considered especially terrible in societies possessing advanced technology.[39]

In the interwar period, as the Western democracies faced ideological threats from the Soviet Union and then Nazi Germany, it became commonplace to speak of 'Western civilisation', rather than simply of 'civilisation', as being reliant on the three ancient pillars of Greece, Rome, and Christianity. The 'chief strands' of Western civilisation, observed the historian Roger Lloyd in 1936, 'can be found in every text-book. They are Christianity, with its theology, ethic, and worship; Greek art, science, and philosophy… and Roman law and politics.'[40] 'We westerners,' declared *The Times* in 1945, staking out Western ideological territory at the dawn of the Cold War, 'think of "western civilisation" as the heritage of Greek thought, Roman law, and the Christian religion. We are proud and grateful of this heritage, and we sometimes contrast it with the despotism of the east, with the Mongol and Byzantine

traditions which formed Tsarist Russia and the totalitarian system of the Soviet Union'.[41] 'Every civilisation has its roots in the past,' argued the classicist and public intellectual Gilbert Murray in a BBC Home Service talk in 1953. 'Rome gave us the framework, as Athens and Jerusalem… gave us the inner content, of our living Christian civilisation'.[42]

By 1939, the idea that the cultural foundations of 'Western civilisation' had been laid in antiquity was deeply embedded in elite British social life. British institutions were largely run by Oxbridge graduates, who until 1960 were required to demonstrate proficiency in Latin as a condition of matriculation, regardless of degree subject.[43] Many Oxbridge graduates had also been to public school, where Latinisms were part of everyday life. The rhetoric of the British Empire was replete with classical imagery, not least in its idea of its 'civilising mission'; from 1868 until the 1960s, the Empire was administered amidst the columns and statues of George Gilbert Scott's classically-styled Foreign Office.[44] Interwar school textbooks routinely assumed that the foundational events in English history had occurred prior to the birth of Christ.[45] By 1930, this 'civilisation' model of English history was sufficiently commonplace to be affectionately satirised by Sellar and Yeatman's *1066 And All That*, which argued that 'the first date in English History', and the only date apart from 1066 that anyone could remember, was 55 BC, the year Julius Caesar had invaded Britain, thereby bringing Britons into sustained contact with civilisation for the first time.[46] The 'civilisation' understanding of history, with its accompanying absence of belief in a radical break between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies, was also persistently reiterated in British academic historiography.[47] Interwar historians routinely assumed that modern cultures were governed by the same rules as ancient ones: J.D. Unwin's massive *Sex and Culture* (1934), for example, thought nothing of comparing 'the Sumerians, Babylonians, Athenians, Romans, Anglo-Saxons, and Protestant English'.[48] Arnold Toynbee's *A Study of History*, published to great acclaim in ten volumes between 1934 and 1954, compared 28 historic

'civilisations', and worried extensively about whether modern 'Western civilisation' might decline and fall, as its Greek and Roman predecessors had done.[49] In 1954, *The European Inheritance,* a major collaborative history commissioned by the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, informed Anglophone sixth-formers that the classical era of 800 BC and 476 AD had 'laid the "foundations" – alike in religion and philosophy, in literature and art, and in law and institutions – on which our civilisation is still very largely based.'[50] Since almost everyone had been educated in this understanding of Western modernity, these tropes routinely appeared in the British media. In 1930, the self-consciously demotic *Daily Mirror* could speak of 'the Greeks, on whose ideas modern civilisation is so largely based'.[51] In 1945, *The Times* could argue that Allied military leaders had been inspired by 'the same virtues' advocated 'by HOMER and THUCYDIDES and PLUTARCH, by CICERO and VIRGIL'.[52]

From 1939, as Christian Britain began its mortal struggle against 'pagan' Nazism, British discussion pervasively drew on this 'civilisation' framework to position Christianity as a necessary foundation of Western modernity.[53] 'I believe from my heart,' George VI told the listeners of his 1939 Christmas broadcast, 'that the cause which binds together my peoples and our gallant and faithful Allies is the cause of Christian civilisation. On no other basis can true civilisation be built.'[54] 'Is this to be the inglorious end of civilisation and Christianity?' demanded the *Daily Mirror* in May 1940, during the darkest days of the Battle of France. 'A thousand times NO!'[55] 'The Battle of Britain is about to begin,' announced Winston Churchill in June 1940. 'Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilisation. If we fail, then the whole world… will fall into the abyss of a new dark age.'[56] 'Religion has been the most powerful of all formative influences on western civilisation,' argued the *Manchester Guardian* columnist Artifex in January 1945, and 'the present state of Europe seems to me to be very evidently the result of the practical rejection by many people of the moral and intellectual control of religion'.[57] In May 1945, British newspapers

celebrated VE Day by praising 'Christian civilisation' and quoting from the Bible.[58] By August 1945, 'the need for moral and spiritual training to be based on the principles and standards of Christianity', and 'the influence of Christianity… on the development of western civilisation', were being inscribed by the National Union of Teachers onto newly-created national school syllabi.[59] This language was not controversial, because in 1939 about 95 per cent of the British population categorised themselves as Christians.[60] In this cultural context, it seemed perfectly natural for the government to organise National Days of Prayer in support of Britain's war effort, and for these occasions to involve 'a very high proportion of the population'.[61]

These assertions that Christianity provided a necessary foundation for Western modernity did not disappear after 1945, but were rapidly adapted for deployment in Britain's Cold War against the atheistic Soviet Union.[62] Faith in 'the risen CHRIST', argued *The Times* in 1946, 'was the faith of all western Europe once, and on it the civilisation of to-day is founded'.[63] 'We [can] maintain the structure of European civilisation,' the thousand attendants of the 1947 Empire Youth Sunday service at Westminster Abbey were told, 'only if we returned to its source, the Christian way of life'.[64] 'There is no more urgent need to-day,' observed Prime Minister Attlee in 1948, 'than the reaffirmation of the absolute moral values on which our Christian civilisation is based.'[65] In 1950, George VI flatly stated that 'our civilisation has a religious basis', and that 'our tradition is a Christian tradition'.[66] In 1952, the Lord Mayor of London spoke of 'that Christian civilisation on which the greatness of this country [is] based'.[67] In 1961, Harold Macmillan could still tell a Conservative party rally that 'the world today is torn by one of its great doctrinal struggles… between Communist ideology and our own Christian philosophy'.[68]

These arguments were also widely heard further down the social hierarchy, even if people and churches did not always agree about what counted as true Christianity.[69] 'If we do

not wish to see this land of ours, and many other lands, vanish in a shower of atom bombs, we have got to learn from God the true and only way to peace,' argued an ex-serviceman, in a letter highlighted by the *Mirror* as a 'star letter' in March 1948.[70] 'Our civilisation will sink into ruin, as so many before it, unless we start to rediscover spiritual values and realise again that Jesus Christ is the Way, the Truth, and the Life,' argued another *Mirror* letter-writer in 1950.[71] The Butler Education Act of 1944 mandated that English and Welsh county and voluntary schools should always begin the school day with a collective act of worship, as part of a deliberate effort to strengthen Britain's 'Christian civilisation'.[72] Even in the mid-1960s, opinion pollsters NOP and ORC found that 80 per cent of respondents considered Britain to be a Christian country, and thought it important that it remained so.[73]

Between 1939 and 1954, this 'civilisation' model of modernity, with its thorough-going denial of any sharp break between 'tradition' and 'modernity', ensured that most British commentators refused to imagine any irreversible decline of 'religion', but instead considered faith and belief to be permanently powerful forces in modern geopolitics. 'History knows no example of a civilisation created by people lacking a burning faith,' commented the historian and National Labour peer Godfrey Elton, writing in the *Daily Mail* in 1941. 'The paganism of the Nazis, let us not forget – false, cruel, and barbaric though it be – is nevertheless a *faith,* for which tens of thousands of young Germans are ready to practise every austerity, to shoulder every sacrifice… A nation which has once lost its faith is dying'.[74] Nazism, argued a *Times* correspondent in 1945, being an 'evil philosophy' that 'had usurped the place of Christianity', could only have been defeated by 'a union of peoples bound together by a faith as definite and more powerful than that which threatened them'.[75] This consensus about the enduring power of faith and belief continued into the early Cold War. 'Communism', observed Clement Attlee in 1947, was 'fanatical', 'and that gave it a tremendous driving force'.[76] Communism's 'attractiveness', argued a *Daily Mail* focus group

in September 1948, was partly because it 'has the appeal of a religion. It gives a sense of serving, of something outside and larger than oneself, something to which allegiance can be sworn'.[77] In October 1948, Anthony Eden told the Conservative party conference that 'those who held the Communist creed held it with a fervour that was almost a religion. If [Britons] were to defeat them, they must believe just as fervently in their faith and themselves… Their success would depend on the vigour with which they championed their own faith'.[78] 'Belief gives to men the inner force by which their lives become effective,' argued *The Times* in 1950. 'This has been rediscovered to-day in the beliefs which colour the whole lives of the supporters of totalitarian régimes'.[79] 'All over the world,' commented Attlee again in 1950, 'we are face to face with fanatics who believe in their creed… Let us, then, arm ourselves against evil with an equal enthusiasm to preserve and protect the higher creeds in which we believe'.[80] Whilst British commentators were keenly aware of the decline of British Christianity, there was little sense of any permanent decline of 'religion': rather, these commentators were worried about what horrific religion-substitute might come to dominate Britain in place of Christianity.[81]

These fears were most influentially disseminated by leading articles in *The Times*, Britain's newspaper of record, as part of Christian Britain's wider ideological struggle against the Soviet Union.[82] In the first place, it was suggested, post-ideological societies would necessarily struggle to motivate their citizens to co-operate around a common cause. 'A completely secular society is already being found to be unworkable,' a *Times* article argued in 1952. 'It cannot supply the necessary incentive… Without some ultimate religious sanction, society can evoke no motivation strong enough to enlist devotion to the common interest'.[83] For 'life which is based upon merely secular ideals and premises must be both barren and without hope, and its end frustration and despair'.[84] Secondly, it was thought, such a 'secular society', following its initial slide into division and apathy, would eventually find

this condition intolerable, and would therefore either invent a religion-substitute, or else be hijacked by one: one way or another, it was thought, such a society would eventually be 'compelled to deify itself, erecting its own claims into moral absolutes'.[85] In interwar Europe, *The Times* argued in 1946, this had actually happened: the 'secular humanism' of 'the late nineteenth and early twentieth century', inoffensive in of itself, had been mercilessly overpowered by 'new national religions', such as Nazism, 'with a power and a grip on the souls of men far surpassing that of the gentle and humane rationalist appeal'.[86] Third, however, it was thought that these new secular faiths would then struggle to implement their programmes: being secular, they would necessarily consist of political rather than spiritual dogma, but their attempts to impose political dogma would always end in frustration, because human reality was, in its intrinsic nature, too complex for simplistic political dogma to be successfully achieved in practice. 'The enemies of liberty in the twentieth century,' argued *The Times* in 1954, have been 'rebels against reality who have tried to impose on human affairs a simple order of which they are not capable.'[87] By contrast, 'the [political] spirit of Christianity, unlike that of most secular ideologies, is startlingly experimental', because Christianity united and inspired people using spiritual dogma, which allowed it to be flexible about political dogma.[88] Finally, this further failure would then unleash the fully persecutory state, which by this point would have no influential churches left to qualify its claims to total spiritual supremacy.[89] This condition was thought to have been reached, thirty-five years after Russia's secular revolution, by the quasi-religion of Stalinism. 'To-day,' declared *The Times* in 1951, 'Europe is threatened by the [Communist] heresy, which claims the whole of life for politics and the State, and aims at realizing social perfection by the sword alone.'[90] In the perfectionist state, 'men's significance' would inevitably be measured, not by their value before God, but 'by their economic and social contribution' to the collective good, with all the inequality and anti-humanism that that measurement implied.[91] The ironic result, argued

the *Daily Mail* in 1950, was an 'entirely ruthless' Communist regime, 'worshipping no god except STALIN, recognising no creed other than that of expediency'.[92] 'If you will not have God,' remarked TS Eliot in 1939, you should pay your respects to Hitler or Stalin'.[93] Only supernaturalist Christianity, it was argued, with its doctrine of the immortal soul, ultimately guaranteed respect for the individual.[94]

Until the mid-1950s, this deeply-embedded ideology of 'Western civilisation', with its insistence on the necessity of collective 'religion', and on the superiority of Christian 'religion', severely inhibited the growth of 'secular' personal and national identities. Although Christian practice had long been declining, Christian Britain's pervasive ability to imply that outright non-religiosity was an unstable and regressive condition, far less civilised than Christianity, rather foreign, and perhaps Communist, constituted a powerful cultural weapon in its favour.[95] Even in the early 1960s, surveys found that at least 93 per cent of Britons identified themselves as Christians: the proportion positively defining themselves as outrightly 'non-religious' was certainly no more than six per cent, and probably closer to one or two per cent.[96] Given these entrenched cultural assumptions, and given Britain's ideological struggle against the Soviet Union, it would require a revolutionary reframing of Britain's ideology of modernity for mainstream British culture to decide that 'secular' societies were not only viable, but actually more advanced than Christian ones.[97]

Hiroshima, Castle Bravo, and the sudden reframing of Britain's ideology of modernity, 1954-1965

The first step in this paradigm-shift began in the mid-1950s, when British discussion suddenly became convinced that it was entering a completely new stage in human history. This trope had been articulated by various cultural minorities in the Edwardian and interwar

periods, and it had attracted increasing interest during the Second World War, but it first commanded mainstream acceptance in August 1945, as shocked British commentators reacted to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and therefore to the knowledge that humanity now possessed the technical ability to extinguish life on earth.[98] 'The bomb that has changed the world', cried the *Daily Express*.[99] 'Atomic age begins', announced the *Daily Mail*.[100] 'Fantastic visions open up,' commented the *Manchester Guardian*, 'of an utterly changed world'.[101] By 1946, it had become commonplace to declare that atomic technology had pushed humanity into a 'new age'.[102]

These ideas decisively regained momentum in March 1954, when news broke of the United States' successful test of a full-scale hydrogen bomb, reckoned about 1,000 times more powerful than that used at Hiroshima.[103] As Matthew Grant has argued, official British discourse in the late 1940s and early 1950s had emphasised the survivability of atomic warfare given sufficient levels of collective bravery, but the Castle Bravo tests made it abundantly clear that thermonuclear warfare would not be survivable, and this made 1954 a crucial turning-point in British public discussions about the future of 'civilisation'.[104] 'Reactions from many parts of the world,' commented *The Times* in April 1954, 'have shown similar concern and awareness that a new era has opened.'[105] 'We face to-day a new situation in history', argued Clement Attlee four days later, opening the Commons debate on hydrogen bombs.[106] 'With the discovery of nuclear fission', echoed the Conservative leader of the House of Lords in May 1954, 'a new era has opened for mankind'.[107] 'Nineteen-sixty means to me *anno* 15 p.H., where "p" stands for *post*… and "H" stands for Hiroshima' declared the public intellectual Arthur Koestler in February 1960, speaking on the Third Programme. 'My feeling [is] that all that happened before 1945 belongs to a quasi-historical epoch'.[108]

This shocking sense that atomic technology was totally transformative was quickly expanded to include its civilian uses.[109] 'The coming of nuclear power marks the beginning

of a new era', declared the Churchill government's 1955 White Paper, announcing an ambitious programme of atomic power-station construction. 'The final reward will be immeasurable.'[110] 'For many years now we have been aware that atomic scientists, by a series of brilliant discoveries, have brought us to the threshold of a new age', argued Elizabeth II in October 1956, opening Calder Hall, the world's first industrial-scale nuclear power-station.[111] These early visions of an atomic 'new age' were at least partly materialist, because they insisted on the transformative power, not of culture or human agency, but of technology itself.

As the Cold War deepened, however, this crisis-driven vision of an 'atomic age' soon expanded into a wider vision, repeated across the political spectrum, of British society's imminent transformation by a 'scientific' or 'technological' revolution. In March 1955, the Conservative minister of education, David Eccles, hailed a coming 'scientific revolution', arguing that it was 'hard fully to imagine… the opportunities that would flow from the cornucopia of the atomic age'.[112] 'We are moving into a new age,' declared Prime Minister Eden in May 1955, 'a scientific revolution as decisive as the industrial revolution of many years ago'.[113] As the *Manchester Guardian* reported in May, both major parties now argued that 'the coming of atomic power has pointed the way to a period in which industry will undergo a major technological revolution'.[114] 'Many people say', the same newspaper reiterated in June, 'we are in the middle of a technological revolution'.[115] In July 1955 the Duke of Edinburgh, who enjoyed a reputation as a moderniser, organised a conference on 'how we can adapt our societies to the new technological revolution'.[116] Two weeks later, the *Daily Mirror* excitedly foresaw a 'Robot Revolution', arguing that 'AUTOMATION' will 'transform social and working life in Britain'.[117] In 1959, C.P. Snow's 'Two Cultures' lecture identified a present-day 'scientific revolution' which had been inaugurated by the use of atomic particles in industry.[118] By the early 1960s, this vision was beginning to reshape

national politics. In his famous 1963 Scarborough speech, unveiling the policy document *Labour and the Scientific Revolution*, Harold Wilson famously argued that the period 1960-75 would witness 'a period of technical change, particularly in industrial methods, greater than in the whole industrial revolution of the last 250 years', and that embracing 'the white heat of this revolution' would require 'far-reaching changes in economic and social attitudes which permeate our whole system of society'.[119] British governments attempted to enact this dramatic vision in various ways, including the ambitious railway 'Modernisation Plan' (1955), the atomic energy programme (1955), and Harold Wilson's Ministry of Technology (1964) - not always, it has to be said, with outstanding success.[120]

As the perception of a recent technological revolution entered British conventional wisdom, the term 'modern' began to acquire new meanings: its conventional, weak sense of 'belonging to recent times' was now increasingly supplanted by a new, stronger meaning, of 'belonging after the technological revolution'.[121] This linguistic shift was subtle but important, because it implied that technology had recently transformed Western society, and that technology might therefore be more basic than culture. In the mid-1950s, at least, the new technological 'modern age' seemed to have commenced only a few decades earlier: in March 1955, for example, the *Mirror*'s 'Vicky' cartoonist drew a five-panel 'short history of the modern world' which began in 1940.[122] 'It is impossible for men born into a world of gaslight, hansom cabs and mutton-chop whiskers to comprehend fully what is happening in these modern times,' argued the *Mirror* in August 1955, attacking Churchill, Attlee, and Archbishop Fisher, thereby positioning the commencement of 'modern times' at some point after 1900. 'The face of the earth has changed in their lifetime. They have survived into an age of miracles… the modern world is being fashioned by men of youth and vigour'.[123] In August 1955, the *Observer* called for the 'modernisation' of Britain's trades unions, to adapt them to 'the requirements of the new age', since there had been 'revolutionary changes

introduced into our social structure during and since the last war', thus dating the commencement of the 'new age' to about 1939.[124]

The 'modernising' critique of conventional British politics and economics intensified in the early 1960s, as declinist commentators blamed a wide range of targets for Britain's failure to enter the promised 'modern' technological utopia, as other countries seemed to be doing.[125] In 1961, Michael Shanks' *The Stagnant Society* insisted that Britain could 'live with the modern world' only by embracing ambitious and radical programmes for economic growth.[126] The Labour party, argued the *Daily Mirror* in 1961, urgently needed 'a plan to make Britain a truly MODERN country with a leading place in the MODERN world'.[127] These 'modernising' critiques often included attacks on Britain's longstanding 'civilisation' culture, on the grounds that they were impeding Britain's entry into the technological utopia. 'The hereditary Establishment', declared Sampson's *The Anatomy of Britain* (1962), 'has lost touch with the new worlds of science, industrial management and technology, and yet tries to apply old amateur ideals into technical worlds where they won't fit'.[128] 'We would certainly all prefer to be Greeks,' conceded Arthur Koestler in his introduction to *Suicide of a Nation?* (1963), 'but Piccadilly is no *agora,* commuter trains are not chariots, and Lord Russell is no Socrates… since not only the Germans but the French and the Italians too have had their economic miracles, the Graeco-Roman analogy has become arrogant nonsense'. For believers in this new age of technology, it made no sense for Britain's elites to be 'thoroughly immersed in Homer's universe, but not the universe of Newton'.[129] In London, the rising 'modernising' culture was symbolised by new buildings such as the *Daily Mirror*'s Holborn Circus building (1961), Millbank Tower (1963), the GPO Tower (1964), and Centre Point (1966).[130] At the same time, British historiography suddenly rejected civilisation ideology's insistence on evolving continuity in British history, and instead began to invent a tradition for 'the modern world', by identifying British modernity's origins, not in the ancient world, but

in a revolutionary transition that had apparently happened at some point between 1500 and 1950.[131] Revisiting his *Anatomy of Britain* in 1965, Anthony Sampson observed that 'after three years… the changes seem quite spectacular'. 'Younger men', he commented, were much less likely to treat 'their work as if it were an extension of Greek verse'. 'Change is being urged everywhere, and every day new changes are announced'.[132]

From a 'religious' history perspective, however, the crucial point is that these early visions of a new 'modern age', whilst introducing the idea of Britain's entry into a radical new stage of development, did not make decisive interventions on the subjects of religion or morality, and did not attempt to do so, because they were expressly intended to focus on questions of economics and technology.[133] This focus reflected Christian Britain's longstanding distinction between 'religious' and 'secular' spheres of expertise, which ultimately stemmed from Western Christendom's monotheistic insistence on the distinction between spiritual and temporal modes of knowledge.[134] 'It is not within the scope of this book, which is concerned with temporal powers, to examine the character of the Churches,' conceded Sampson's *Anatomy of Britain* in 1962.[135] 'The real values of the West,' declared Shanks' *The Stagnant Society* in 1961, are 'its spiritual heritage of freedom, love of God, and reverence for truth', and so 'the main justification for pressing forward with material progress is to protect this heritage'.[136] Consequently, these early visions of technological transformation were only weakly materialist: they thought that technology could be economically and socially transformative, but they did not go so far as to argue that technology was transforming Britain's moral character, and still less Britons' human nature.

For this reason, there was no non-clerical consensus on the moral and religious implications of the imagined 'modern' technological revolution in the years down to 1963. Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic*, first translated into English in 1930, had famously argued that Protestantism was actually good for economic growth, and this argument was still being

developed by American modernisation theorists in the late 1950s.[137] In 1951, the Festival of Britain showcased British technology, but only after a special service of dedication at St Paul's Cathedral.[138] In 1955, the anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer's *Exploring English Character* argued that, though British Christianity had declined, this had merely caused the proliferation of non-theistic spiritual beliefs, such as in reincarnation, ghosts, and the efficacy of lucky mascots.[139] In 1957, Richard Hoggart's *The Uses of Literacy* argued that working-class people still believed in God, the 'after-life', and the importance of obeying 'Christ's teaching', along with significant doses of 'superstition and myth'.[140] In 1961, the sociologist Ferdynand Zweig's *The Worker in an Affluent Society* talked of British workers possessing 'a new mode of life and a new ethos', marked by 'all the gadgets of the new age', but this 'new ethos' merely consisted of British workers becoming 'more conformist than ever'.[141] Ideas about God, Zweig argued, though increasingly incoherent and ambivalent, continued to play a significant role in people's lives.[142] 'The Verdict of Youth - frank and uninhibited - is that the great majority of Britain's youngsters accept the Church, its teaching and its beliefs,' reported a *Daily Mail* survey in 1962.[143] As these examples suggest, belief in the 'modern' transformation of the British economy did not automatically translate into the belief that Christian Britain was essentially obsolete. It would require an extra step to imagine 'the modern world' as intrinsically 'secular'.

British Christianity and the invention of 'modern secular man', 1954-1965

At the same time, the era of mass death was also being interpreted and reinterpreted by the networks that *did* have the cultural authority to pronounce on issues of religion and morality: the British churches.[144] In 1941, for example, the *Christian News-Letter*, a fortnightly Christian periodical with a circulation of about 10,000, argued that 'a radical change is taking

place in the conditions of human existence, and it is in that fact that all our problems centre'.[145] This ecclesiastical conversation often went further than its non-ecclesiastical counterparts, in that it frequently embraced a strong materialism, by arguing that God might be using modern technology to transform human nature.[146] 'An event so stupendous in the physical world as the disclosure of the secret of the atom,' argued the British Council of Churches' *The Era of Atomic Power* report, hastily commissioned in 1945 and published in 1946, 'may well demand and evoke a corresponding change in the human mind'.[147] 'Through the advances of science and technics,' argued the ecumenical networker J.H. Oldham in 1948, writing in the official preparation volumes for the first assembly of the World Council of Churches, 'we are witnessing to-day not only extraordinary changes on the surface of the globe, but, at a deeper level, a new type of man coming into being'.[148] In 1953, the English translation of the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer's *Letters and Papers from Prison*, whose original version had been written in a Nazi jail, told British Christians about how twentieth-century 'mankind' had, 'in our time', 'come of age', become 'grown-up', and entered a 'newly matured world', and was therefore, unlike the humans of the last nineteen hundred years, 'radically without religion'.[149] Nonetheless, for as long as Britain's 'civilisation' ideology of modernity maintained its cultural dominance, these radical Christian visions of a permanently transformed humanity remained subcultural.[150]

From the mid-1950s, however, the widespread perception of a dramatic 'modern' revolution in recent Western history provided an unexpected opportunity for radical Christian thinkers to disseminate their visions of human transformation much more widely. 'Saturation with modern technology,' argued Clifford Rhodes, the editor of the *Church of England Newspaper*, in 1956, 'brings about a change in the structure of the human personality, rendering it incapable of responding to *any* presentation of the supernatural'.[151] An influential early contribution to this debate was E.R. Wickham's *Church and People in an Industrial*

City (1957), which 'was widely accepted in the 1960s and 1970s as a decisive intervention' in the field of secularisation studies, and which routinely appeared on late twentieth-century undergraduate reading-lists.[152] Wickham had been ordained as an Anglican priest in 1939; he wrote *Church and People*, not in a sociology department, but at Sheffield University's Department of Biblical Studies, whilst on a research fellowship reserved for clergymen.[153] Since Wickham was writing at an early stage of the debate, he did not use the terms 'modernisation' or 'secularisation', but his account was nonetheless wholly premised on the newly-conventional idea of a recent social transformation, which, he argued, had permanently abolished 'modern' people's need for 'religion'. In the last 'seven or eight generations', his introduction declared, thereby backdating the commencement of modernity to about 1750, 'the profoundest revolutions of history have taken place', 'in which a wholly new world has been in making'.[154] Wickham later referred to this 'wholly new world' as 'the modern world'.[155] This choice of 1750 as witnessing the dawn of modernity, rather than 1900 or 1939, was influenced by Wickham's identification of modernity with industrialisation, which, he argued, had utterly transformed the material environment, and therefore human nature.[156] The material changes wrought by industrialisation had, he thought, created 'the emergence of a new type of man, with a new structure of thought and a new mode of apprehending reality'.[157] This vision of a transformed humanity allowed Wickham to characterise this 'new type of man' as 'secular', in this term's new sense of having permanently departed from 'religion'. Modern 'man', he argued, was by definition focussed on 'the improvement of this life… by material means', which is why 'he' existed in a 'secular atmosphere', and thought with a 'secular mind'.[158] Indeed, Wickham hinted, science and technology had caused 'modern men throughout the world' to be post-ideological: they rejected 'strict orthodoxy' because they believed only in 'Science' as 'the available Providence for men'.[159] Underlying this apparently materialist account of technology

reshaping human nature was Wickham's radical re-reading of Christian eschatology, which held that God was deliberately orchestrating this transformtion.[160]

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, this radical vision of 'modern man' permanently escaping 'religion' and collective ideology was widely discussed in the British churches, and by Christian commentators in the British media.[161] Most famously, it was expounded by Bishop John Robinson's bestseller *Honest to God* (1963), which sold over a million copies, reaffirmed the national fame of its author, and was by far the most widely-read British work of the 1960s to deal with 'secularisation'.[162] 'Modern man', Robinson wrote in his widely-read *Observer* article, had reached 'the stage of being radically without religion', which meant that 'the period of religion is over'. Consequently, he concluded, in a formulation that implied that this new stage in human development had commenced forty or fifty years ago, 'we of our generation are secular men'. Like Wickham's, Robinson's thought was ultimately theological: he thought the new 'secular' humanity had been specially created by God, and that 'secularisation' was 'a God-given fact'.[163] By 1965, in large part due to these Christian interventions, the idea that modernity itself was making British society irreversibly 'secular' had entered British common-sense.[164] This impression was strengthened by American theological and sociological works such as Harvey Cox's *The Secular City* (1965) and Peter Berger's *The Sacred Canopy* (1967); it was further reinforced by Bryan Wilson's *Religion in Secular Society* (1966), which instantly made its author a leading figure in the British sociology of religion. In these ways, the foundational belief in an unprecedented new 'modern age' made possible the secondary belief that the 'modern age' was permanently secular.

The ideological belief that modernity naturally favours secularity was so radical that it immediately began to have real-life consequences. During the 'secular revolution' of the 1960s, much of British moral legislation was abruptly reframed to operate on an avowedly

'secular' basis – a basis which, only a few years earlier, had been widely deemed potentially totalitarian.[165] In the realm of everyday social life, by contrast, the enactment of 'secularisation' occurred much more slowly, as different localities and personalities adapted to living within the new cultural paradigm.[166] As David Reagles' research has shown, thousands of 'ordinary' British Christians in the 1970s internalised the belief that they lived in an irreversibly 'secular age', and adapted their spiritual expectations accordingly, a process that was often experienced as painful.[167] As a result, the gradual ecclesiastical declines of the interwar years were replaced by the much steeper ecclesiastical declines of the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.[168] Conversely, as Brown's work on non-religionism has shown, the numbers of avowedly non-religious Britons began to experience long-term growth, from perhaps 1 or 2 percent during the 1950s to 15 percent by 2001, with large-scale increases thereafter.[169] For these reasons, the belief that modernity instrinsically favours secularity cannot be regarded as a neutral sociologial observation, but must be understood as a devastating ideological weapon in the culture wars of the long 1960s, which created its own important social legacy.[170]

Nonetheless, by the early twenty-first century, there were increasing signs that secularity's claims to represent the natural outcome of modernity were not ageing well. In 2001, the 9/11 attacks forcibly reminded Western observers that Western secularity might actually be a local phenomenon.[171] The idea that Western cultures exemplify humanity's one true modernity had long been attacked by postcolonial theorists as Eurocentric, and this critique only intensified during the massive 'global turn' in twenty-first-century Western historiography.[172] Most important in the British context, however, was Britain's 'postsecular' recognition of its specifically religious minorities, through measures such as the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations (2003), the Racial and Religious Hatred Act (2006), and the Equality Act (2010).[173] In an avowedly multicultural and multi-religious

public sphere, it would always eventually appear problematic for secular theorists to imply that British Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and Jews are remnants of a bygone stage of human social development.[174] Once the equality of religious minorities was recognised, it was only a matter of time before secularity's belief that modernity naturally favours secularity was subjected to radical challenge.[175]

Conclusion

This article has argued that mid-twentieth-century Britain was the site of cultural struggle between two rival visions of modernity, and that subsequent British historiography naïvely internalised the ideological metanarrative of the winners.[176] This account portrays the idea of a radically post-traditional 'modern world', which gradually emerges at some point after 1750 and ultimately subverts all older cultures, as an ideological combat-concept, which gained decisive cultural power only from the mid-1950s, and which played a central role in the abrupt cultural defeat of 'Christian civilisation' in the early 1960s.[177] This defeat was so far-reaching that Christian civilisation's status as a modernity is widely denied even today.[178] Indeed, secular ideology has penetrated twentieth-century British historiography so deeply that historians still find it easy to characterise economic development as naturally favouring secularity, rather than merely reshaping the battle-ground on which rival ideologies fought for cultural dominance.[179] A truly empirical account, by contrast, would rehabilitate Britain's 'Christian civilisation' as a modernity in its own right, which was marginalized only because it lost control of the dominant metanarrative, rather than being naturally marginalized by inherent characteristics of 'modernity' or 'postmodernity'.

These arguments suggest the need for a radically anti-ethnocentric historiography of postwar British Christianity and secularity, which would jettison all essentialist accounts of

modernity and postmodernity, and would instead reinterpret mainstream British culture as trying to enact its particular vision of modernity, which for particular contingent reasons dramatically changed during the cultural revolution of 1954 to 1970.[180] This historicisation of the 1960s vision of "the modern world" involves quite a radical historiographical revision, because that vision's underlying assumptions remain deeply embedded in British historiography's theoretical common-sense today. First and foremost, the rejection of ethnocentricity implies reinterpreting Western secularity as a local ideological culture, not as a post-ideological condition enabled by the final stage of human social development.[181] Second, it implies interpreting the West's 'secular revolution' of the 1960s as a local revolution, comparable in this limited sense to the revolutions of 1776, 1789 and 1917, rather than as a move into a new phase of universal history.[182] Third, it implies that Britain's 'secular revolution' was not caused by universal logics of 'modernisation' or 'postmodernity', but was instead, like the classic revolutions of Western modernity, the contingent creation of human revolutionaries – especially, in this case, of Britain's prophets of irreversible 'secularisation', who, by decisively reframing Britain's ideology of modernity as it related to 'religion', enabled the rapid growth of a new and explicitly 'secular' dominant moral culture.[183] Fourth, this new approach implies that late twentieth-century British 'secularisation' historiography needs to be re-interpreted as a fairly typical revolutionary historiography, comparable to orthodox French and Russian revolutionary historiographies in the sense that it instinctively refuses to recognise the contingency of its own revolution, preferring instead to mythologise the process of its creation as natural, permanent, and world-historically significant.[184] More widely, the metanarrative of irreversible 'secularisation' needs to be reinterpreted as a powerfully self-fulfilling prophecy, whose ideological effect was to conceal the fragility of a local and humanly-invented revolution by endowing it with an aura of universal metahistorical naturalness and backdating its existence to earlier

centuries.[185] Fifth, this anti-ethnocentric approach would emphasise the central role of profound crises, rather than metahistorical 'processes' or 'stages', in triggering revolutionary paradigm-shifts in British culture.[186] Just as revolutionary France could not have existed in the 1790s without the crop failures and state bankruptcy of 1789, and the Soviet Union could not have existed in the 1920s without the First World War, so, on this reading, 'secular Britain' could not have existed in the 1960s without the memory of the Second World War and the terrors of the early Cold War, because there would have been no widely-accepted stadial ideology of modernity on which to construct the culture of secularity.[187] Finally, and centrally for this special issue's purposes, this provincialised historiography would depict postwar British Christians primarily as adapting, not to 'modernity' *per se*, but to changes in Britain's dominant ideology of modernity, central elements of which had actually been formatively shaped by particular kinds of Christians. This historicisation and relativisation of British secularity might seem radical, but it is a necessary consequence of renouncing ethnocentric ways of thinking. When any moral culture refuses to acknowledge that it is built on specific ideological presuppositions, but instead positions itself as post-ideological neutrality, the gulf between critical and uncritical histories of that culture will always be relatively significant.[188]

Notes

1. Clark, "Secularization and Modernization," 161.
2. See for examples Gilbert, *Religion and Society*; Gilbert, *Post-Christian Britain*.
3. Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*, 176. For an earlier example see Davie, *Religion in Britain*, 191-3, though Davie states that modernity also causes problems for 'religion'.
4. See for examples Green, *Passing of Protestant England*, 311, 316; McLeod, *Religious Crisis*, 257. For this conclusion see Pollack, "Varieties of Secularization Theories", 73.

5. Chakrabarty, *Provincialising Europe*, is a central work.

6. Berger, *Desecularisation of the World*; Davie, *Europe: The Exceptional Case*; Cox, "Provincializing Christendom," 123-4. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities"; Dietze, "History on Equal Terms", 77-78; Symes, "Talk about Modernity", 723; Bhambra, *Rethinking Modernity.*

7. Davie, *Sociology of Religion,* 1.

8. Cox, "Provincializing Christendom," 123-4, 128-9. See also Vaidyanathan and Smith, "Multiple Modernities and Religion."

9. Brewitt-Taylor, "Postsecular History."

10. This argument follows Charles Taylor's "cultural" approach to theorizing modernity: Taylor, "Two Theories of Modernity."

11. Alexander, *Meanings of Social Life*, 3-4. Conversely, historiography that focusses on local variability without considering the collective dimension is often unable to explain widespread cultural change convincingly.

12. For 'strong' culturalist approaches, see ibid., 12-25. See also Brown, "Revisionist Approach", 55-56.

13. Weber, "Science as a Vocation", 23, 27; Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities', 2. Essentialist models of 'postmodernity' are theoretically self-contradictory, because they create a metanarrative about the death of metanarratives: see for example Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*, 176, 196.

14. Nash, "Believing in Secularisation", 506. This postsecular methodology is elaborated in Brewitt-Taylor, "Postsecular History."

15. The idea of a 1960s 'secular revolution' was first proposed in Brown, *Demographic Revolution*, 252-3, but is repurposed here.

16. For this argument in more detail, see Brewitt-Taylor, *Christian Radicalism*, 5-10. For some of the social consequences, see Robinson et al., "Post-War Britain".
17. For France, see Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies*, 4ff.
18. Levenson, "Introduction."
19. For the former, see Wright, *Religion of Humanity*.
20. For the distinction between 'Christian decline' and 'secularisation', see Brewitt-Taylor, "Postsecular History".
21. Wilson, *Religion in Sociological Perspective*, 164.
22. 'Secularisation' had been discussed prior to the mid-1950s, but it was not placed within a teleological framework, and was therefore not considered irreversible: cf. Morris, "Enemy Within?," 186.
23. *Pace* Brown, "Religious Crisis?," 478.
24. For an overview of this literature see Brewitt-Taylor, *Christian Radicalism*, 11-13.
25. Ibid., 15-17.
26. For nuclear fears in the late 1950s, see Barnett, "H-Bomb," 280; Bingham, "'The Monster'?," 617; Hogg, "British Nuclear Culture," 541.
27. For the pre-eminence of Christianity in the 1940s and 1950s, see Brown, *Battle for Christian Britain*, 29-146.
28. Brewitt-Taylor, "'Secular Society'?," 337-43.
29. See for example Gilbert, *Making of Post-Christian Britain*, and the examples collated in Larsen, *Crisis of Doubt*, chapter 1.
30. For social enactment, see Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*, 188-92.
31. For recent appeals to essentialist visions of modernity and/or postmodernity, see Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*, 176; Green, *Passing of Protestant England*, 32, 316, although more implicitly in this case; Bruce, *Secularisation*, ch. 2.

32. Conversi, “Modernism and Nationalism”; Griffin, *Facism and Modernism*; Arnason, “Communism and Modernity,” 70-71.

33. Lawrence, “British Path to Modernity”; Rubinstein, “Britain’s Elites”; Collins, “English Gentleman”, 91.

34. Sherry, ed. *Cambridge History of Modernism*.

35. Pagden, “‘Defence of Civilisation’,” 35; Mandler, *English National Character*, 27-28; Lawrence, “British Path to Modernity,” 155-6.

36. For all societies needing ‘religion’, see Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 322; 1930. “Science and Happy Marriages.” *Daily Mirror*, May 6; Eliot, “Thoughts After Lambeth,” 13; Toynbee, *Prospects of Western Civilization*, 87-88.

37. Overy, *Morbid Age*, 22ff.

38. Mill, “Civilisation,” 120, 122.

39. Overy, *Morbid Age*, 24-27.

40. Lloyd, *Christianity, History, and Civilisation*, 181.

41. 1945. “The New Europe.” *The Times*, August 23. See also 1947. “The Humanities To-Day.” *The Times*, April 17.

42. Gilbert Murray. 1953. “The Christian Tradition.” *The Listener*, April 16.

43. Forrest, “Abolition of Compulsory Latin,” 42.

44. Cain, “Mission to Civilise,” 559, 562.

45. See for examples Belloc, *History of England*; Carrington and Jackson, *History of England*; Rayner, *History of England*; Webb, *History of England*.

46. Sellars and Yeatman, *1066 and All That*, 1-3.

47. Macfarlane, *Culture of Capitalism*, ix-x. See for example Toynbee’s 1948 contention that his and Thucydides’ worlds were ‘philosophically contemporary’: Toynbee, *Civilisation on Trial*, 8.

48. Unwin, *Sex and Culture*, 381.

49. Hutton, "Belated Return for Christ?," 405-6.

50. Barker, "Review and Epilogue," 324-5.

51. Kathleen O'Brien. 1930. "Let's Cling to Clothes." *Daily Mirror*, December 8.

52. 1945. "Sword and Gown," *The Times*, October 26 (capitals in the original).

53. Williamson, "Christian Conservatives", 609; Robbins, "'Christian Civilisation'," 197-202; McLeod, *Religious Crisis*, 31-2.

54. 1939. "Empire Motto a Mystery." *Daily Mirror*, December 27.

55. 1940. "Our Day of Prayer." *Daily Mirror*, May 25.

56. 1940. "Premier's Speech." *Daily Express*, June 19.

57. Artifex. 1945. "The World's Need To-Day." *Manchester Guardian*, January 2.

58. Chapman, "International Context of Secularisation," 167.

59. 1945. "Christian Teaching in Schools," *The Times*, August 6.

60. Field, *Britain's Last Religious Revival*, 19, table 2.2

61. Williamson, "National Days of Prayer", 326-7.

62. For the religious dimensions of the Cold War, see Kirby, "Introduction," 1-2. For further examples see 1945. "Religion in Education." *Manchester Guardian*, March 20.

63. 1946. "Easter after War." *The Times*, April 18.

64. 1947. "National Character Threatened." *The Times*, May 19.

65. 1946. "Churchill's Fears of Soviet: Suggests Anglo-U.S. pact." *Daily Mirror*, March 6.

66. 1950. "Our Christian Heritage," *The Times*, June 22.

67. 1952. "No Time for Talk of Disestablishment," *The Times*, June 20.

68. 1961. "Warning of a doctrinal struggle." *The Guardian*, October 16.

69. Williams, *Religious Belief and Popular Culture*, 164.

70. 1948. "Look Up and Live." *Daily Mirror*, March 16.

71. 1950. “Live Letters.” *Daily Mirror*, February 3.

72. Sundermann, *Education Act*, 1-2. For Butler’s thoughts on this subject, see R.A. Butler. 1941. “Establishing a Christian Civilisation.” *The Listener*, January 2.

73. Field, “Another Window,” 213.

74. 1941. “Are You a Christian?” *Daily Mail*, November 7 (emphasis in the original). See also 1944. “Faith and Force.” *Daily Mail*, September 9.

75. 1945. “Unity through Faith.” *The Times*, October 27.

76. 1948. “Attlee tells Stalin ‘Give Up This Idea’.” *Daily Mirror*, January 24.

77. Ann Temple. 1948. “Communism: Can It Happen Here?” *Daily Mail*, September 16.

78. 1948. “European Unity.” *The Times*, October 9.

79. 1950. “Overcoming the world.” *The Times*, April 15.

80. 1950. “Mr Attlee’s Call to the Nation.” *The Times*, July 31.

81. Morris, “Enemy Within?”, 185; Brewitt-Taylor, “Postsecular History”.

82. For context, see Deighton, “Cold War,” 124-5.

83. 1952. “The Two Cities.” *The Times*, March 22. This fear was so widespread that even Bryan Wilson worried about whether it might be justified: Wilson, *Religion in Secular Society*, 211-212.

84. 1951. “Divine Aid.” *The Times*, June 9.

85. 1952. “The Two Cities.” *The Times*, March 22.

86. 1946. “Easter after War.” *The Times*, April 18.

87. 1954. “Christian Realism.” *The Times*, May 22.

88. 1952. “Christian Duty.” *The Times*, December 24. The distinction between “pragmatic” and “messianic” politics was influentially argued in Talmon, *Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, 254-5.

89. Jerrold, *Lie about the West*, 52, 60.

90. 1951. “Easter.” *The Times,* March 24.

91. 1952. “The Two Cities.” *The Times,* March 22.

92. 1950. “To Relight the Lamps.” *Daily Mail,* August 3.

93. Eliot, *Idea of a Christian Society*, 63.

94. Lloyd, *Christianity, History, and Civilisation*, 130; 1945. “Think Again, My Lord!” *Daily Mirror*, May 22; 1945. “Victory.” *The Times*, May 8; 1950. “Answer to New Barbarism,” *The Guardian*, July 19; 1950. “A Faith for the West,” *The Times,* December 23; Jerrold, *Lie about the West*, 57.

95. Brewitt-Taylor, “Postsecular History.” See for example Brown, “Unholy Mrs Knight,” 365.

96. Field, *Religious Revival?,* 19, table 2.2; Brown, *Demographic Revolution,* 62. The ambiguity arises because, in this Christian culture, surveys typically asked ‘What religious denomination do you belong to?’ (see for example Gallup, *Great Britain 1937-1975*, I, 404), but answering ‘none’ to this question does not necessarily imply total disavowal of ‘religion’. Bruce, “Religion in Banbury,” 204, gives 1950 figures of 2.3% for ‘no denomination,’ but 0.6% for ‘agnostic/atheist,’ which implies (admittedly on the basis of a small sample) that the latter may have numbered about a quarter of the former.

97. For the significance of Christianity to British national identity in the 1950s, see Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*, 9; Weight, *Patriots*, 223-6.

98. Nehring, *Politics of Security*, 18, 21. For popular opinion, see Langhamer, “Mass Observing.” For some Christian reactions, see Brewitt-Taylor, *Christian Radicalism*, ch. 1.

99. 1945. “The Bomb that has Changed the World.” *Daily Express,* August 7.

100. J.F.C. Fuller. 1945. “Good-Bye to All These.” *Daily Mail,* August 8.

101. 1945. “London Correspondence: Atomic Nightmare.” *Manchester Guardian,* August 8.

102. 1946. “Atomic Bomb’s Life-or-Death Warning.” *Manchester Guardian*, January 11; 1946. “English Channel No Longer the World’s Safeguard,” *Manchester Guardian*, August 15.
103. Later figures gave 15 kilotons for Hiroshima, and 15 megatons for Castle Bravo. Barnett, “‘H-Bomb’.”
104. Grant, “Images of Survival,” 13-14.
105. 1954. “A Wise Decision.” *The Times,* April 1.
106. 1954. “Prime Minister’s Disclosure on Atom Bomb.” *The Times*, April 6.
107. 1954. “Future Uses of Atomic Energy.” *The Times*, May 12.
108. Arthur Koestler. 1960. “The Age of Discretion.” *The Listener*, February 25.
109. Hogg, “British Nuclear Culture.” 541-543.
110. 1955. “£300m plan to build 12 Atom Power Stations.” *Daily Telegraph*, February 16.
111. 1956. “Looking 20 Years Ahead Under Nuclear Power.” *Manchester Guardian*, October 18. See also 1956. “The Queen Opens a New Age.” *Daily Mirror*, October 18.
112. 1955. “Minister’s Warning on Technical Needs.” *The Times,* March 3.
113. 1955. “General Election Broadcasts.” *The Listener*, May 12.
114. 1955. “Scientific Politics.” *Manchester Guardian*, May 13.
115. 1955. “A Big Jump.” *Manchester Guardian*, June 15.
116. 1955. “The Duke’s Conference.” *Manchester Guardian*, July 19.
117. 1955. “The Robot Revolution.” *Daily Mirror*, June 24 (capitals in the original).
118. Snow, *Two Cultures*, 30.
119. Wilson, “Opening the Science Debate,” 15, 27.
120. Williams, *Nuclear Power Decisions*, 18-19; Gourvish, *British Railways*, 256-7; Edgerton, *Warfare State*, 246-256.

121. For this strong/weak distinction, see Dierks and Knott, “Question of ‘Modernity’,” 631-632.

122. 1955. “Vicky’s Outline of a Short History of the Modern World.” *Daily Mirror*, March 4.

123. 1955. “The Wilderness of Whiskers.” *Daily Mirror*, August 5.

124. 1955. “A New Spirit in the Unions.” *Observer*, August 28.

125. Tomlinson, *Politics of Decline*, 33-37, 54-55: Grant, “Penguin Specials”; Ortolano, “‘Decline’ as a Weapon”; Collins, “English Gentleman,” 102-106; Thomas, “Establishment and Society,” 15-16, 20.

126. Shanks, *Stagnant Society*, 29, 234.

127. 1961. “No Time to Lose!” *Daily Mirror*, June 15 (emphasis in the original).

128. Sampson, *Anatomy of Britain*, 632.

129. Koestler, “Introduction,” 11-14.

130. Rycroft, *Swinging City*, 76-77.

131. Macfarlane, *Culture of Capitalism*, vii-xi. See for examples Hill, *Century of Revolution*, 1, 310; Laslett, *World We Have Lost*, 21.

132. Sampson, *Anatomy of Britain Today*, 668, 671, 675.

133. For economics-focussed demands for cultural change, see Shanks, *Stagnant Society*, 29; Koestler, “Introduction,” 13, 638.

134. For a brief defence of the ancientness of this distinction, see Berlinerblau, “Political Secularism,” 86.

135. Sampson, *Anatomy of Britain*, 160.

136. Shanks, *Stagnant Society*, 28-29.

137. Weber, *Protestant Ethic*; Gilman, *Modernisation Theory*, 92, 99.

138. 1951. “Festival Opened by the King.” *The Times*, May 4.

139. Gorer, *English Character*, 259-65.

140. Hoggart, *Uses of Literacy*, 29-30, 95-97.

141. Zweig, *Affluent Society*, 205-212.

142. Ibid., 203.

143. 1962. "Verdict of Youth", *Daily Mirror*, May 28.

144. For clerical influence, see Brown, *Religion and Society*, 177-182.

145. J.H. Oldham. 1941. "The Predicament of Society and the Way Out – II." Supplement to *Christian News-Letter*, 1 July. For more on the *Christian News-Letter*, see John Wood's article in this issue.

146. Brewitt-Taylor, *Christian Radicalism*, chs. 1, 5.

147. British Council of Churches, *Era of Atomic Power*, 22.

148. Oldham, "A Responsible Society," 121–123. Oldham was referring here to humanity in general.

149. Bonhoeffer, *Papers from Prison*, 122, 145-147 (30 April 1944; 8 June 1944).

150. For further such visions, see Brewitt-Taylor, *Christian Radicalism*, 61-72, 155-8.

151. Rhodes, "Prospects before Liberal Christianity," 110 (emphasis in the original).

152. Morris, "Secularization and Religious Experience," 198. Cf. Williams, "Language of Belief," 304.

153. Clines and Moore, *Auguries*, 319; Porter and Malcolm, "Anthony C. Thiselton," 1.

154. Wickham, *Church and People*, 12.

155. Ibid., 221.

156. Ibid., 12.

157. Ibid., 205. Wickham's gendered language is retained here from the original.

158. Ibid., 205, 222, 228, 235-236.

159. Ibid., 205.

160. Ibid., 221, 233-234; Brewitt-Taylor, *Christian Radicalism*, 138-9.

161. Brewitt-Taylor, "'Secular Society'?," 337-343.

162. Ibid., 341. Robinson was previously known for his role in the *Lady Chatterley* trial of 1960.

163. John Robinson. 1963. "Our Image of God Must Go." *The Observer*, March 17.

164. Green, *Passing of Protestant England*, 294; Brewitt-Taylor, "'Secular Society'?," 343-4.

165. Brown, *Religion and the Demographic Revolution*, 252ff.; Brewitt-Taylor, "'Secular Society'?", 343-4, 346-9; Brewitt-Taylor, "Sexual Revolution," 530-544; Grimley, "Church of England and Wolfenden," 739-740; McLeod, *Religious Crisis*, ch. 10; Brown, *Battle for Christian Britain*, 147-283.

166. For this phenomenon amongst English Catholics, see Harris, *Faith in the Family*.

167. Reagles, "Secularisation and Spiritual Self-Fashioning", 31.

168. Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*, 188-90; McLeod, *Religious Crisis*, 188-207.

169. These numbers are approximate, due to problems with the data, but, as Brown observes, the overall trend seems clear: Brown, *Demographic Revolution*, 62, 116-7; Brown, "People of No Religion," 56.

170. Assumed, for example, in Gilbert, *Making of Post-Christian Britain*.

171. Davie, "Religion, Territory, and Choice," 312.

172. Berg, "Global History," 3.

173. "Postsecular" in the political sense (as distinct from the historiographical sense) denotes those forms of multiculturalism which see religious minorities as permanent and rights-bearing features of the social landscape.

174. For a devastating critique of stadial views of history, see Martin, *Religion and Power*, 15-20.

175. See for example Davie, *Sociology of Religion*, 1-5.

176. This is common to Western historiography more generally: as Charles Taylor remarked in 1995, "the overwhelming weight of interpretation in our culture… tends to the acultural [theory of modernity]." Taylor, "Two Theories", 25.

177. This notion of a 'combat-concept' is taken from Hunter, "Secularisation."

178. The key work to recover British Christianity's compatibility with modernity was Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*, first published in 2001, but this pulled the same ideological trick in a different way by insisting on Christianity's incompatibility with 'the era of postmodernity'.

179. See for example McLeod, *Religious Crisis*, 257; Brown, *Battle for Christian Britain*, 25.

180. This call echoes Cox, "Provincializing Christendom."

181. *Pace* Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*, 176.

182. *Pace* Brown, "Religious Crisis?," 470; Pasture, "Legacy of the Sixties", 113.

183. Sewell, *Logics of History*, 250-251.

184. Bruce, *Secularization*, 1, opens by insisting that secularisation is "one of the greatest changes in social structure and culture". By way of comparison, see Doyle, *French Revolution*, 447-450; Kolonitskii, "Russian Historiography," 35, 37-38.

185. *Pace* Bruce, "Critical Sociology," 207.

186. Sewell, *Logics of History*, 228-232.

187. It is perhaps not coincidental that conventional treatments of postwar British 'secularisation' almost never mention the Cold War: cf. Brown, *Death of Christian Britain*; Green, *Passing of Protestant England*.

188. Cf. Alexander, *Meanings of Social Life*, 3-4.

[Acknowledgements, notes on contributor, etc., are in the accompanying title page file to protect anonymity].

Bibliography

Alexander, Jeffrey. *The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology*. Oxford: OUP, 2003.

Arnason, Johann. "Communism and Modernity." *Daedalus* 129, no. 1 (2000): 61-90.

Barker, Ernest. "Review and Epilogue." In *The European Inheritance,* edited by idem et al., iii: 293-355. 3 vols. 1954. Oxford: Clarendon.

Barnett, Nicholas. "'No Protection against the H-Bomb': Press and Popular Reactions to the Coventry Civil Defence Controversy, 1954." *Cold War History* 15, no. 3 (2014): 1-24.

Belloc, Hilaire. *The Dark Ages: B.C. 55 to A.D. 1066*. Vol. 1 of *A History of England.* London: Methuen, 1925.

Berg, Maxine. "Global History: Approaches and New Directions." *Writing the History of the Global: Challenges for the Twenty-First Century*. Oxford: OUP, 2013.

Berger, Stefan. *The Desecularisation of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics.* Grand Rapids, MA: Eerdmans, 1999.

Berlinerblau, Jacques. "Political Secularism." In *The Oxford Handbook of Secularism,* edited by Phil Zuckerman and John R. Shook, 85-96. Oxford: OUP, 2017.

Bhambra, Gurminder. *Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007.

Bingham, Adrian. "'The Monster?' The British Popular Press and Nuclear Culture, 1945-early 1960s." *British Journal for the History of Science* 45, no. 4 (2012): 609-624.

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. *Letters and Papers from Prison*. Translated by Reginald Fuller. London: SCM Press, 1953.

Brewitt-Taylor, Sam. "The Invention of a "Secular Society"? Christianity and the Sudden Appearance of Secularization Discourses in the British National Media, 1961-4." *Twentieth Century British History* 24,3 (2013), 327-350.

Brewitt-Taylor, Sam. "Christianity and the Invention of the Sexual Revolution in Britain, 1963-1967." *Historical Journal* 60, no. 2 (2017), 519-546.

Brewitt-Taylor, Sam. *Christian Radicalism in the Church of England and the Invention of the British Sixties, 1957-1970: The Hope of a World Transformed*. Oxford: OUP, 2018.

Brewitt-Taylor, Sam. "Notes Toward a Postsecular History of Modern British Secularisation," *Journal of British Studies*, forthcoming.

British Council of Churches, *The Era of Atomic Power: Report of a Commission Appointed by the British Council of Churches*. London: SCM Press, 1946.

Brown, Callum. “A Revisionist Approach to Religious Change.” In *Religion and Modernisation: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularisation Thesis*, edited by Steve Bruce, 31-58. Oxford: Clarendon, 1992.

Brown, Callum. *The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation 1800-2000.* London: Routledge, 2001.

Brown, Callum. *Religion and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain*. Harlow: Longman, 2006.

Brown, Callum. “What Was the Religious Crisis of the 1960s?” *Journal of Religious History* 34, no. 4 (2010): 468-479.

Brown, Callum. “The People of No Religion: The Demographics of Secularisation in the English-Speaking World since c. 1900.” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 51 (2011): 37-61.

Brown, Callum. *Religion and the Demographic Revolution*: *Women and Secularisation in Canada, Ireland, UK, and USA since the 1960s*. Woodbridge: Boydell, 2012.

Brown, Callum. “‘The Unholy Mrs Knight’ and the BBC: Secular Humanism and the Threat to the ‘Christian Nation’, c.1945–60,” *English Historical Review* CXXVII (2012), 345-76.

Brown, Callum. *The Battle for Christian Britain: Sex, Humanists, and Secularisation, 1945-1980.* Cambridge: CUP, 2019.

Bruce, Steve. “A Sociological Classic Revisited: Religion in Banbury.” *The Sociological Review* 59, no. 2 (2011): 201-222.

Bruce, Steve. *Secularization: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory*. Oxford: OUP, 2015.

Bruce, Steve, “A British Perspective on the Critical Sociology of Religion: A Response to Mary Jo Neitz.” *Critical Research on Religion* 3, no. 2 (2015): 206-216.

Cain, P.J., “Character, “Ordered Liberty,” and Mission to Civilise: British Moral Justification of Empire, 1870-1914.” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 40, no. 4 (2012): 557-578.

Carrington, C.E. and J.H. Jackson. *A History of England.* Cambridge: CUP, 1932.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. *Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: PUP, 2000.

Chapman, Alister. “The International Context of Secularisation in England: The End of Empire, Immigration, and the Decline of Christian National Identity, 1945-1970,” *Journal of British Studies* 54, no. 1 (2015): 163-189.

Clark, J.C.D., “Secularization and Modernization: The Failure of a ‘Grand Narrative’,” *The Historical Journal* 55, no. 1 (2012): 161-194.

Clines, David and Stephen Moore, eds. *Auguries: The Jubilee Volume of the Sheffield Department of Biblical Studies.* Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998.

Collins, Marcus. "The Fall of the English Gentleman: The National Character in Decline, c. 1918-1970." *Historical Research* 75 (2002): 90-111.

Conversi, Daniele. "Modernism and Nationalism." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 17 (2012): 13-34.

Cox, Jeffrey. "Provincialising Christendom: The Case of Great Britain," *Church History* 75, no. 1 (2006), 120-130.

Davie, Grace. *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

Davie, Grace. *Europe: The Exceptional Case: Parameters of Faith in the Modern World*. London: Darton Longman & Todd, 2002.

Davie, Grace. *The Sociology of Religion.* Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2007.

Davie, Grace. "Religion, Territory, and Choice: Contrasting Configurations, 1970-2015." *Secularization and Religious Innovation in the North Atlantic World*, ed. David Hempton and Hugh McLeod. Oxford: OUP, 2017: 309-328.

Deighton, Anne. “Britain and the Cold War, 1945–1955.” *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume I, Origins*. Cambridge: CUP, 2020: 112-132.

Dierks, Konstantin and Sarah Knott, “Historians and the question of “modernity.”” *American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (2011): 631–637.

Dietze, Carola. “Toward a History on Equal Terms: A Discussion of ‘Provincialising Europe.’” *History and Theory* 47, no. 1 (2008): 69-84.

Doyle, William. *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*. Oxford: OUP, 2002.

Durkheim, Émile. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.* Translated by Carol Cosman. Oxford: OUP, 2001.

Edgerton, David. *Warfare State: Britain 1920-1970*. Cambridge: CUP, 2006.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel. “Multiple Modernities.” *Daedalus* 129, no. 1 (2000), 1-29.

Eliot, T.S. “Thoughts After Lambeth.” *Criterion Miscellany* 30 (1930).

Eliot, T.S. *The Idea of a Christian Society*. London: Faber and Faber, 1939.

Field, Clive, “Another Window on British Secularization: Public Attitudes to Church and Clergy Since the 1960s.” *Contemporary British History* 28, no. 2 (2014), 190-218.

Field, Clive, *Britain's Last Religious Revival: Quantifying Belonging, Behaving, and Believing in the Long 1960s*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Forrest, Martin. "The Abolition of Compulsory Latin and its Consequences." *Greece & Rome* 50 (2003): 42-66.

Gallup, George. *The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain, 1937-1975.* 2 vols. New York: Random House, 1976.

Gilbert, Alan. *Religion and Society in Industrial England: Church, Chapel and Social Change, 1740-1914*. London: Longman, 1976.

Gilbert, Alan. *The Making of Post-Christian Britain*: *A History of the Secularisation of Modern Society*. London: Longman, 1980.

Gilman, Nils. *Mandarins of the Future: Modernisation Theory in Cold War America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.

Gorer, Geoffrey. *Exploring English Character*. London: Cresset Press, 1955.

Gourvish, Terence. *British Railways, 1948-73: A Business History*. Cambridge: CUP, 1986.

Grant, Matthew. "Historians, the Penguin Specials and the "State-of-the-Nation" Literature, 1958-64," *Contemporary British History* 17, no. 3 (2003): 29-54.

Grant, Matthew. “Images of Survival, Stories of Destruction: Nuclear War on British screens from 1945 to the early 1960s.” *Journal of British Cinema and Television* 10, no. 1 (2013): 7-26.

Green, Simon. *The Passing of Protestant England: Secularisation and Social Change, c. 1920-1960*. Cambridge: CUP, 2011.

Griffin, Roger. *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Grimley, Matthew. “The Church of England and the Wolfenden Report: Law, Morality, and Secularisation, 1954-1967.” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 60 (2009): 725-741.

Harris, Alana. *Faith in the Family: A Lived Religious History of English Catholicism, 1945-1982*. Manchester: MUP, 2013.

Hill, Christopher. *The Century of Revolution*. New York: Norton, 1980.

Hogg, Jonathan. “‘The Family that Feared Tomorrow’: British Nuclear Culture and Individual Experience in the late 1950s.” *British Journal for the History of Science* 45, no. 4 (2012): 535-549.

Hoggart, Richard. *The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working-Class Life, with Special Reference to Publications and Entertainments*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1957.

Hunter, Ian. “Secularisation: The Birth of a Modern Combat Concept”, *Modern Intellectual History* 12, no. 1 (2015), 1-32.

Hutton, Alexander. “‘A Belated Return for Christ?’: The Reception of Arnold J. Toynbee’s *A Study of History* in a British context, 1935-1961.” *European Review of History* 21, no. 3 (2014): 405-424.

Jerrold, Douglas. *The Lie about the West*: *A Response to Professor Toynbee’s Challenge*. London: Dent, 1954.

Kirby, Dianne. “Religion and the Cold War: An Introduction.” In *Religion and the Cold War*, edited by Dianne Kirby, 1-22. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Koestler, Arthur. “Introduction: The Lion and the Ostrich.” In *Suicide of a Nation? An Enquiry into the State of Britain Today,* edited by Arthur Koestler, 7-14. London: Hutchinson, 1963.

Kolonitskii, Boris. “Russian Historiography of the 1917 Revolution: New Challenges to Old Paradigms?” *History and Memory* 21, no. 2 (2009), 34-59.

Langhamer, Claire. “Mass Observing the Atom Bomb: The Emotional Politics of August 1945,” *Contemporary British History* 33, no. 2 (2019), 208-225.

Larsen, Timothy. *Crisis of Doubt: Honest Faith in Nineteenth-Century England*. Oxford: OUP, 2006.

Laslett, Peter. *The World We Have Lost*. London: Methuen, 1965.

Lawrence, Jon. "Paternalism, Class, and the British Path to Modernity." In *The Peculiarities of Liberal Modernity in Modern Britain*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011, pp. 147-164.

Levenson, Michael. "Introduction." In idem. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Modernism*. Cambridge: CUP, 1999, pp. 1-8.

Lloyd, Roger. *Christianity, History, and Civilisation*. London: Dickson & Thompson, 1936.

Macfarlane, Alan. *The Culture of Capitalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.

Mandler, Peter. *The English National Character: The History of an Idea from Edmund Burke to Tony Blair*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

Martin, David. *Religion and Power: No Logos without Mythos.* Farnham: Ashgate, 2014.

McLeod, Hugh. *The Religious Crisis of the 1960s.* Oxford: OUP, 2007.

Mill, John Stuart. "Civilisation." In *John Stuart Mill: Essays on Politics and Society*, edited by John Robson: 117-147. London: Routledge, 1996.

Morris, Jeremy. “Secularisation and Religious Experience: Arguments in the Historiography of Modern British Religion.” *Historical Journal* 55, no. 1 (2012), 195-219.

Morris, Jeremy. “Enemy Within? The Appeal of the Discipline of Sociology to Religious Professionals in Post-War Britain.” *Journal of Religion in Europe* 9, nos. 2-3 (2016), 177-200.

Nash, David. “Believing in Secularisation: Stories of Decline, Potential, and Resurgence.” *Journal of Religious History* 41, no. 4 (2017), 505-531.

Nehring, Holger. *Politics of Security: British and West German Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945-1970*. Oxford: OUP, 2013.

Ortolano, Guy. “‘Decline’ as a Weapon in Cultural Politics.” In *Penultimate Adventures with Britannia,* edited by Wm. Roger Louis, 201-214. London: Tauris, 2008.

Overy, Richard. *The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilisation, 1919-1939* (London: Penguin, 2010.

Pagden, Anthony. “The Defence of “Civilisation” in Eighteenth-Century Social Theory,” *History of the Human Sciences* 1, no. 1 (1988), 33-45.

Pasture, Patrick. “Christendom and the Legacy of the Sixties: Between the Secular City and the Age of Aquarius.” *Revue D’Histoire Ecclésiastique* 99, no. 1 (2004): 82-117.

Pollack, Detlef, "Varieties of Secularization Theories and Their Indispensable Core," *The Germanic Review* 90, no. 1 (2015), 60-79.

Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944.

Porter, Stanley and Matthew Malcolm. "The Life and Work of Anthony C. Thiselton." In *Horizons in Hermeneutics: A Festschrift in Honour of Anthony C. Thiselton*, edited by Stanley Porter and Matthew Malcolm, 1-14. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013.

Rayner, Robert. *A Middle School History of England*. 4 vols. London: Murray, 1933.

Reagles, David. "Reading Religious Decline: Secularisation and Spiritual Self-Fashioning in the Fans of Malcolm Muggeridge, c. 1966–1982," *Journal of Religious History* 44, no. 1 (2020), 27-48.

Rhodes, Clifford. "Prospects before Liberal Christianity," *Modern Churchman* 46, no. 2 (1956): 101–112.

Robbins, Keith. "Britain, 1940, and 'Christian civilisation.'" Chap. 14 in *History, Religion and Identity in Modern Britain*. London: Hambledon, 1993.

Robinson, Emily et al., "Telling Stories about Post-war Britain: Popular Individualism and the 'Crisis' of the 1970s", *Twentieth Century British History* 28, no. 2 (2017), 268-304.

Ross, Kristin. *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.

Rubinstein, W.D. "Britain's Elites in the Interwar Period 1918-1939," *Contemporary British History* 12, no. 1 (1998), 1-18.

Rycroft, Simon. *Swinging City: A Cultural Geography of London, 1950-1974.* Farnham: Ashgate, 2010.

Sampson, Anthony. *Anatomy of Britain*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1962.

Sampson, Anthony. *Anatomy of Britain Today*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965.

Shonfield, Andrew. *British Economic Policy since the War*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958.

Sellars, W.C. and R.J. Yeatman, *1066 And All That: A Memorable History of England.* London: Methuen, 1930.

Shanks, Michael. *The Stagnant Society: A Warning*. Baltimore: Penguin, 1961.

Sherry, Vincent. *The Cambridge History of Modernism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Smith, Christian and Brandon Vaidyanathan, “Multiple Modernities and Religion.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Religious Diversity*, edited by Chad Meister. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Snow, C.P. *The Two Cultures*. London: CUP, 1993.

Sundermann, Elizabeth. *For God and Country: Butler’s 1944 Education Act.* Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2015.

Symes, Carol. “When We Talk About Modernity.” *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (2011): 715-726.

Talmon, Jacob. *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*. London: Secker & Warburg, 1952.

Taylor, Charles. “Two Theories of Modernity.” *The Hastings Centre Report* 25, no. 2 (1995): 24-33.

Thomas, Hugh. “The Establishment and Society.” In *The Establishment*, edited by Hugh Thomas, 9-20.

Tomlinson, Jim. *The Politics of Decline: Understanding Post-War Britain.* Harlow: Longman, 2000.

Toynbee, Arnold. *Civilisation on Trial*. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1948.

Toynbee, Arnold. *The Prospects of Western Civilization*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949.

Unwin, J. D. *Sex and Culture*. Oxford: OUP, 1934.

Webb, Edmund. *A History of England for the Use of Schools and Colleges*. London: Allman & Son, 1936.

Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Translated by Talcott Parsons. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965.

Weber, Max. "Science as a Vocation." In *Max Weber's 'Science as a Vocation'*, edited by Peter Lassman and Irving Velody, 3-30. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.

Weight, Richard. *Patriots: National Identity in Britain, 1940-2000*. London: Macmillan, 2002.

Wickham, E.R. *Church and People in an Industrial City.* London: Lutterworth, 1957.

Williams, Roger. *The Nuclear Power Decisions: British Policies, 1953-78*. London: Croom Helm, 1980.

Williams, Sarah. "The Language of Belief: An Alternative Agenda for the Study of Victorian Working-Class Religion." *Journal of Victorian Culture* 1, no. 2 (1996): 303-317.

Williams, Sarah. *Religious Belief and Popular Culture in Southwark, c. 1880-1939*. Oxford: OUP, 1999.

Williamson, Philip. "Christian Conservatives and the Totalitarian Challenge, 1933-1940", *English Historical Review* 115, no. 462 (2000), 607-642.

Williamson, Philip. "National Days of Prayer: The Churches, the State and Public Worship in Britain, 1899-1957", *English Historical Review* 128, no. 531 (2013), 323-366.

Wilson, Bryan, *Religion in Sociological Perspective.* Oxford: OUP, 1982.

Wilson, Bryan and Steve Bruce, *Religion in Secular Society: Fifty Years On*. Oxford: OUP, 2016.

Wilson, Harold. "Speech Opening the Science debate at the party's annual conference, Scarborough, 1963." In *Purpose in Politics: Selected Speeches by Harold Wilson*, 14-28. London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1964.

Wright, Terence. *The Religion of Humanity: The Impact of Comtean Positivism on Victorian Britain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Zweig, Ferdynand. *The Worker in an Affluent Society: Family Life and Industry*. London: Heinemann, 1961.