

***Auxilia* and *clientelae*: military service and foreign *clientelae* reconsidered**

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Ernst Badian concludes *Foreign Clientelae* by observing that ‘The foreign *clientelae* of Roman individuals and families, for long a source of profit and prestige to the patron and an instrument of empire more solid than the legions, become instruments of domestic discord, as tension increases after 133.’ A few lines later, after expanding on the place of the Italians in that process, he adds, ‘Meanwhile overseas *clientelae* are thrown into the struggle for Rome, and Pompey first combines the client army and a network of *clientelae* spanning the Roman world into the bases of personal predominance.’¹ In the course of his work, Badian argues that the rise of the client army, in the time of Gaius Marius, was in due course furthered by the addition of military *clientelae* overseas. However, for Badian, neither Roman client armies nor (non-Roman) military *clientelae*, are of great significance until they impact directly upon internal Roman affairs in the late Republic. In the first part of the work, the essentially non-military role of Rome’s extra-Italian allies is repeatedly stressed: ‘their armies were not worth considering except for purely local defence’ (41). It was only with the civil war of 88 BC ‘that we find the military and political importance of the provinces decisively demonstrated’ (265). Before that, ‘the private army that Scipio Aemilianus took with him to Numantia in 134 [was] much more portentous’ (*sc.* than the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus), but also practically unique in Badian’s view (168 n. 2). After Marius, ‘We may sum up the new situation by saying that all types of foreign connexions suddenly acquire a new importance as reservoirs of military power that could be used by ambitious individuals against the Roman state’, and it was only at this point that ‘military *clientela* naturally emerged as a decisive weapon in internal power politics’ (272).

From the purely internal perspective of Roman politics, such an analysis would still be widely accepted (assuming that we reject the formal category of interstate *clientela*, and downplay the prominence of *clientela per se* in this process). Much more debateable is the highly reductive treatment of foreign military service prior to the end of the second century. For Badian, overseas ‘clientship founded by administration’ was far more significant (158), and his list of ways by which *clientela* might be established consists merely of ‘victory in war, administrative contacts, or the initiative of the state concerned (or of the Senate)’ (159). It is

¹ Badian 1958: 289-90.

telling, in this regard, to look at how Badian treats the case of Gaius Flaminius, son of the notorious Flaminius who died as consul for the second time at the battle of Lake Trasimene in 217 BC, as an early example of how overseas contacts could lead to permanent connexions over multiple generations. In 227 BC the elder Flaminius was the first of the new praetors sent to govern the Sicilians. In 195 BC the Sicilians, in honour of his memory, sent grain to the younger Flaminius who was then serving as aedile at Rome, which he was able to use to his personal advantage. However, what Badian chooses not to note (in line with his presumption that such provincial forces were of no value), is that when Flaminius the younger was subsequently sent to Spain as praetor in 193 BC, he took the opportunity, against the Senate's expectation, to levy troops from Sicily on his way out to Spain, surely exploiting that same connection once again.²

Given the extent to which Badian's claim for the existence of interstate *clientela* has been criticised,³ it is important to note that it is really the rise of the client army (i.e. personal clientship) post-133 and particularly post-Marius that he in fact emphasises. No less important for this discussion is the extent to which Badian downplays any military role for overseas clients prior to this final phase of the Roman Republic. These two aspects may of course not be unconnected in his reasoning, and are linked by his principal concern with Republican politics. This separation of personal and military *clientela* prior to the late Republic, as exemplified in his treatment of Gaius Flaminius, is significant because one of its consequences is to place greater emphasis, echoed in subsequent accounts, upon the (flawed) idea of interstate *clientela* in foreign relations, and substantially to underplay the role of what might be (but probably should not be) called *clientela* in the context of the raising and use of military forces in overseas contexts.⁴ The intention of this paper is to reevaluate the extent to which personal relations between Roman and non-Roman elites serve to facilitate, and are in

² Grain sent to C. Flaminius as aedile in 195 BC, Livy 33.42.8: *Eo anno aediles curules M. Fulvius Nobilior et C. Flaminius tritici deciens centena milia binis aeris populo discipserunt. Id C. Flamini honoris causa ipsius patrisque aduexerant Siculi Romam: Flaminius gratiam eius communicauerat cum collega.* Flaminius' levy in 193 BC, Livy 35.2.7-9: *si tumultus in Hispania esset, placere tumultuarios milites extra Italiam scribi a praetore. Mens ea senatus fuit ut in Hispania tumultuarii milites legerentur. Valerius Antias et in Siciliam nauigasse dilectus causa C. Flamini scribit et, ex Sicilia Hispaniam petentem, tempestate in Africam delatum uagos milites de exercitu P. Africani sacramento rogasse; his durarum prouinciarum dilectibus tertium in Hispania adiecisse.*

³ See, e.g., the various critiques in Burton 2003 and 2011 (esp. 3-6); Eilers 2002; Ferrary 1997; Gruen 1984: 158-200; and the chapter by Pina Polo in this volume.

⁴ See, e.g., Pina Polo 2008 for a specific critique of the application of *clientela* to the raising of provincial military forces at the very end of the Republican period.

turn developed by, military service on the part of non-Italian soldiers, i.e. *auxilia externa*.⁵

The importance of such relationships, and the military service that goes with them, deserves to be given a more central place in our analysis of Republican imperialism than either Badian, or the subsequent critiques of Badian, have allowed. In the loosest sense, these relationships might be called ‘foreign *clientelae*’, but not necessarily, nor to much advantage. In what follows I am solely concerned with inter-personal relations between members of the elite, however those relationships might play out on the international stage: it is not my aim in this discussion either to try to classify interstate relations, or to categorise any of the episodes which are discussed here specifically as *clientela*.

The observation that we should avoid the overuse or abuse of the category of *clientela* already emerges clearly in Peter Brunt’s classic essay.⁶ I have to date found only a single instance, prior to the civil wars of 49-31 BC, when foreign auxiliaries are explicitly termed *clientes*, and that is in Sallust’s report of the murder of Cn. Calpurnius Piso in Spain by Hispanic horsemen in 64 BC, who according to some were old and loyal clients of Pompey (*Cn. Pompeii veteres fidosque clientis*).⁷ The instance which Badian himself emphasises, that of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus gathering troops for Numantia in 134 BC, is cited because, in Appian’s account, it includes a group of ‘500 of his clients and friends, whom he joined in one body and called the troop of friends’.⁸ However, this particular group is clearly distinguished in Appian from the extensive force of overseas *auxilia* which Scipio also recruited ‘on the score of private friendship’; it is Badian who assumes that the term ‘clients’ can be extended to the foreign contingents. Furthermore, Badian also emphasises this inferred extension of clientship as a ‘prologue to a new era’, rather than in any way reflecting existing

⁵ Festus 16 L: *Auxiliares dicuntur in bello socii Romanorum exterarum nationum ...*; Varro, *Ling.* 5.90: *Auxilium appellatum ab auctu, cum accesserant ei qui adiumento essent alienigenae*; cf. Livy 22.37.7-8.

⁶ Brunt 1988: 382-442, e.g. 391, ‘clientship appears infinitely more often in modern than in ancient writings’; sections 2 and 7 of Brunt’s essay are of most direct relevance to this paper.

⁷ Sall. *Cat.* 19.3-5: *Sed is Piso in provincia ab equitibus Hispanis quos in exercitu ductabat iter faciens occisus est. Sunt qui ita dicant, imperia eius iniusta, superba, crudelia barbaros nequivisse pati; alii autem equites illos Cn. Pompei veteres fidosque clientis voluntate eius Pisonem aggressos; numquam Hispanos praeterea tale facinus fecisse, sed imperia saeva multa antea perpessos.*

⁸ App. *Hisp.* 84.365: οὕτω μὲν ὁ Σκιπίων αὐθις ὑπατεύων ἐς Νομαντίαν ἠπειγέτο, στρατιὰν δ’ ἐκ καταλόγου μὲν οὐκ ἔλαβεν, πολλῶν τε πολέμων ὄντων καὶ πολλῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν Ἰβηρία, ἐθελοντὰς δὲ τινὰς, ἕκ τε πόλεων καὶ βασιλέων ἐς χάριν ἰδίαν πεμφθέντας αὐτῷ, συγχωρούσης τῆς βουλῆς, ἐπηγάγετο καὶ πελάτας ἐκ Ῥώμης καὶ φίλους πεντακοσίους, οὓς ἐκ Ἰλην καταλέξας ἐκάλεϊ φίλων Ἰλην. πάντας δὲ ἐς τετρακισχιλίους γενομένους... (‘He did not take any army from the active-service-list, because many wars were being waged at the time, and because there were plenty of soldiers in Spain; but with the Senate’s consent he took a certain number of volunteers sent to him by cities and kings on the score of private friendship. To these were added 500 of his clients and friends, whom he joined in one body and called it the troop of friends. All these, being about 4000 in number ...’, Loeb. trans.). On this passage see Pina Polo 2001.

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recruitment practices.⁹ This is therefore a highly misleading assessment of patterns in recruitment of overseas manpower, *auxilia externa*, as well as a very tendentious extension of the role of *clientela*.

I can hardly claim to be the first to address the place of *auxilia* in this discussion. Above all, Tadasuke Yoshimura, in an article published in 1961, aimed precisely to fill in the perceived gap left by Badian. Yoshimura specifically identified Badian's failure to consider the importance of such troops for Roman imperial practice and military action, noting Badian's interest rather in their significance for domestic politics.¹⁰ There is much to recommend his analysis, although in following Premerstein in asserting the organic connection between military allegiance, personal, and political *clientela*, he retains a centrality for *clientela* that is undoubtedly overstated.¹¹ Yoshimura focuses, as almost all studies of auxiliaries do, upon the Caesarian civil wars, before using the examples of Scipio Africanus in Spain and Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia to push the analysis back into the Republican period. His core argument, albeit based upon little more than the case of Africanus in Hispania in the Hannibalic War, is that the role of *auxilia externa* was crucial to the Republican empire, and that individual Roman commanders played a crucial role in exploiting that resource.

Both those claims are entirely reasonable: the scale and significance of *auxilia externa* in Roman Republican imperialism have been almost universally ignored or underestimated.¹² By way of illustration, Figure 1 presents a global distribution map of attested instances of foreign units in Roman service in the two centuries prior to 49 BC. The map is intended to be no more than impressionistic, since the detailed presentation of the supporting evidence must be reserved for another time.¹³ Table 1 collects evidence for state interest in this resource, in the form of attested *senatus consulta* authorising overseas levies, such as those undertaken by Gaius Flaminius or Scipio Aemilianus, during the Republican period.¹⁴ The point to emphasise, given the extent of the phenomenon, is that any account which focuses (to the near

⁹ Badian 1958: 168 with n. 2.

¹⁰ Yoshimura 1961: 476.

¹¹ Yoshimura 1961: 475; see Brunt 1988: 435-8 especially; cf. Rouland 1979 for an attempt to deny any link between military service and *clientela*.

¹² The best general statements are Cheesman 1914: 7-11 and Ilari 1974: 25 n. 1. Specific studies of specific subsets of the evidence are: Afzelius 1944: 90-98 (Livian evidence for 200-167 BC); Hamdoune 1999: 7-104 (Numidians); McCall 2002: 100-113 (cavalry); Prag 2007 (Sicilians); and Cadiou 2008: 611-684 (Spain).

¹³ The map, and this discussion as a whole, prefigures a work-in-progress, provisionally entitled *Non-Italian Manpower: the role of auxilia externa in the Roman Republic*; see already Prag 2007, 2011a, 2011b.

¹⁴ And compare the senatorial restriction of 171 BC: Liv. 43.17.2; Polyb. 28.13.11, 28.16.1.

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or total exclusion of other evidence) on the most famous instances, such as Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia or Caesar and Pompeius in the civil wars, will risk encouraging the traditional interpretation of such actions as merely manifestations of the importance for the great dynasts of such *clientela*. Once it is accepted that this was a far more common phenomenon, that took place with much greater frequency across the empire and that was utilised frequently by a great many commanders in the field, the primary role of military *clientela*, or the domination of military clientship by certain individuals, becomes much harder to sustain. Very similar things might be said about the deeply misleading, but seemingly immovable traditional emphasis upon the significance of Marius' actions in recruitment of citizen volunteers in 107 BC.¹⁵

Table 1. Attested instances of senatorial permission to recruit overseas in the Republican period.

Date	Action	Principal source
207 BC	Permission to the consuls to levy troops from anywhere they pleased, and to transfer them from any province to wherever they pleased.	Livy 27.38.9-12
193 BC	Permission for the praetor assigned to Spain to conduct a tumultuary levy of troops <i>extra Italiam</i> .	Livy 35.2.7-9
191 BC	Permission for the consul assigned to Greece to levy up to 5000 troops <i>extra Italiam</i> .	Livy 36.1.8, cf. 36.4
178 BC	Consul instructed to cross into Gallia Cisalpina and levy as many troops as possible from the states there.	Livy 41.5.5 and 9.
171 BC	Permission for <i>auxilia</i> from Liguria, Crete and Numidia for the consul assigned to Macedonia.	Livy 42.35.6-7
154 BC	Senate writes to allies in Greece and Asia with permission to assist legates in restoring Ptolemy.	Polyb. 33.11.6-7
153 BC	Senate orders military contribution from Segeda in Spain, according to treaty.	App. <i>Hisp.</i> 44
147 BC	Permission for Scipio Aemilianus to write to the allied kings and states for volunteers for the war against Carthage.	App. <i>Pun.</i> 112
134 BC	Permission for Scipio Aemilianus to take foreign volunteers to Numantia.	App. <i>Hisp.</i> 84
109 BC	Permission for Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus to levy auxiliaries from abroad (specifically from the <i>reges</i>).	Sall. <i>Iug.</i> 43.3-4

¹⁵ See now Wolff 2010, gathering the other evidence for volunteers; and especially already Brunt 1971: 391-415 and 1988: 253-6 demonstrating the continuation of conscription post-Marius and the essential myth of the post-Marian professional army of volunteers.

107 BC	Permission for C. Marius to levy auxiliaries <i>a populis et regibus</i> .	Sall. <i>Iug.</i> 84.2-3
104 BC	Permission for C. Marius to levy troops from overseas against the Cimbri	Diod. Sic. 36.3.1
67 BC	Permission granted through the <i>lex Gabinia</i> for Pompeius Magnus to receive help from the peoples and kings overseas.	App. <i>Mith.</i> 94
51 BC	Permission for M. Bibulus to levy troops in Asia	Cic. <i>Fam.</i> 15.1.5 (SB 104)
51 BC	Permission for M. Cicero to levy <i>populorum liberorum regumque sociorum auxilia voluntaria</i> in Cilicia.	Cic. <i>Fam.</i> 15.4.3 (SB 110)
49 BC	Permission for Pompeius Magnus to levy troops from the peoples neighbouring Italy.	App. <i>B Civ.</i> 2.34

For the purposes of this discussion, however, it is Yoshimura's attempt to refine the model for *auxilia* recruitment that is of most immediate interest.¹⁶ The basis upon which *auxilia* are recruited into Roman service is remarkably hard to define.¹⁷ Past discussions have tended to focus upon formal status categories of the peoples providing this manpower as the best way to identify the basis for recruitment, such as allies (contributions), 'client kings' (contributions), subject peoples (forced levies), and mercenaries.¹⁸ Increasingly, however, our understanding of Republican imperialism runs counter to such attempts to place the Republican empire into rigid institutional boxes, and trying to define any of the first three of those groups in fixed constitutional terms is to miss the point. The extent of Roman use of mercenaries presents a problem of ideological discourse in the sources that would require a paper to itself.¹⁹

Yoshimura's advance was to think more specifically in terms of modalities of recruitment rather than prioritising underlying statuses, distinguishing between: (1) service for financial reward; (2) levies on the basis of *imperium*; and (3) appeals on the basis of private relationships of *gratia / auctoritas*. More recently, Paul Burton has suggested something similar within his wide-ranging attempt to reassess mid-Republican imperialism in terms of *amicitia*, rather than *clientela* – although he arguably understates the general phenomenon of auxiliary recruitment, considering it to be 'exceptional', and overstates the role of 'the logic of *amicitia*' (to the near exclusion, e.g., of *foedera*) in his desire to eliminate *clientela* from the discussion.²⁰ Unsurprisingly, given Burton's insistence on the inapplicability of Badian's *clientela* model to the interstate level, Burton's own emphasis is on *amicitia* as an interstate relationship, both in the specific realm of auxiliary recruitment and more generally. Burton

¹⁶ Yoshimura 1961: 479.

¹⁷ Cf. Prag 2011a: 16-22.

¹⁸ Cf. Cheesman 1914: 8; Brunt 1971: 169; Illari 1974: 25 n. 1.

¹⁹ Some initial discussion in Prag 2011b: 107-8.

²⁰ Burton 2011: 172-187.

distinguishes between occasions (1) when auxiliary help was completely voluntary and unsolicited by Rome; (2) when mutual agreements on the provision of troops were worked out informally in the field with Roman commanders; and (3) when Roman commanders or the senate officially and unilaterally solicited military contingents from their *amici*. Both categories (2) and (3) are however downplayed in the subsequent discussion, perhaps because (2) prioritises interpersonal relationships, and (3) does not admit of a discourse of friendship. Moreover, it is notable that once examples are discussed, categories (1) and (2) are in fact difficult to distinguish in practice, and few of the instances offered by Burton under (1) can really be described as independent voluntary acts. Inevitably, the exclusion of all evidence after 146 BC imposes limits on the analysis, as we shall see from the examples discussed below. The differences between the models of Yoshimura and Burton are significant: Yoshimura prioritises the role of the individual (through *gratia* or *auctoritas*), where mercenary recruitment (passed over by Burton) or simple imperial orders are not at work; Burton by contrast emphasises interstate *amicitia*, reading the majority of instances he discusses as ‘a manifestation of the practical logics of unequal *amicitia*, which compel partners to deploy equalization strategies’.²¹

What is true is that the number of attested examples of auxiliary recruitment that are determined explicitly by personal relationships, however defined, remain few, and are principally associated with the two Scipiones: to take one example from each, Scipio Africanus’ treatment of Hispanic chieftains, and in particular of the Celtiberian Allucius, in the aftermath of the capture of New Carthage is presented in terms of personal *beneficia* by Livy;²² while the ability of Scipio Aemilianus to facilitate the recruitment of foreign soldiers, both on the basis of his inherited personal connections with Massinissa and his own influence, is reported by Appian and Valerius Maximus.²³ It is, moreover, undeniable that most of the

²¹ Burton 2011: 178. Burton has a notably optimistic view of the impact of all of this upon Rome’s ‘friends’, concluding this section of his work with the claim that ‘the burden of service under Roman *amicitia* was not terribly onerous, and Rome’s foreign relations were more truly consultative than those of other states’ (205).

²² Livy 26.50 (New Carthage, 210 BC): Scipio restores the captured fiancée of Allucius to him, emphasising the care he has taken to show her all due respect and urging, on the basis of his own *fides* that ‘In return for that gift, I ask only this – be a friend of the Roman people’ (*hanc mercedem unam pro eo munere paciscor: amicus populo Romano sis*). The conclusion of the episode is that ‘Allucius then held a troop-levy amongst his dependants (*dilectu clientium habito*), and within a few days returned to Scipio with 1,400 handpicked horsemen’ (trans. Yardley); cf. Polyb. 10.19-20 and 10.34-35.2.

²³ Val. Max. 5.2 ext. 4 (Scipio Aemilianus in Numidia and Celtiberia, 151/0 BC): *ille cum gravi Carthaginiensium bello premeretur ac vix tutelae imperii sui sufficeret, tamen Scipioni Aemiliano, quia nepos Africani erat, bonam magnamque partem Numidici exercitus, quam <ad> Lucullum consulem, a quo auxilia petenda missus fuerat, in Hispaniam duceret, promptissima mente tradidit, praesentique periculo respectum pristini beneficii anteposuit* (‘Hard pressed by a major war with the Carthaginians and scarcely equal to the

explicit evidence for this sort of service is to be found in the civil war narratives associated with the late Republican dynasts and triumvirs. In a great many more instances, as with the example cited above of C. Flaminius the younger, the personal connection is left implicit. This lack of explicit evidence for the personal role of the commander doubtless justifies the absence of personal relations from Burton's discussion (notwithstanding any desire to emphasise interstate relations on his part), in contrast to Yoshimura, and Burton essentially restricts instances of what he considers an 'informal battlefield agreement' to those cases where troops are attested as present but we do not have any evidence for how they were recruited in the first place. However, in the vast majority of cases we lack any explicit evidence at all for modes of recruitment, and it should be unsurprising that detailed accounts of the actions of commanders in this regard survive only occasionally in our sources, and then only for the great figures of Republican history such as the two Scipiones. The enormous quantity of actual evidence for the use of auxiliaries, illustrated above in Figure 1 and Table 1, might encourage us to imagine that these rare occasions when the details are recounted in our sources are in fact emblematic of wider patterns of practice; and yet, it must be conceded that such an argument can only ever be speculative.

What is nonetheless unsurprising and undeniable is the role played in auxiliary recruitment and usage by elite individuals on both the Roman and non-Roman sides. The much-emphasised status and autonomy of the Roman commander in the field is, at one remove, echoed in the figure of the auxiliary commander, since auxiliary units were self-contained and under their own native commanders, to a greater extent even than those of the Italian allies.²⁴ Very occasionally, as in the case of the Celtiberian Allucius aiding Scipio Africanus (above), or with the Allobrogian cavalry commanders Roucillus and Egus serving under Julius Caesar, we can see this double relationship explicitly rendered in terms of the native commander assembling his own *clientes*.²⁵ However, here too this is more usually left implicit in the treatment of auxiliary commanders: they are, for example, given high status as participants in the Roman general's *consilium*, or rewarded publicly in front of their own troops *in*

protection of his own power, he (*sc.* Massinissa) nonetheless very readily handed over to Scipio Aemilianus, because he was Africanus' grandson, a good large part of the Numidian army to be conducted by him to consul Lucullus, by whom he had been sent to ask for reinforcements, in Spain; thus placing regard for a former benefaction above present jeopardy', trans. Shackleton Bailey), cf. App. *Pun.* 71-2; App. *Pun.* 124 (Carthage, 147 BC): 'Finally, five ships of the people of Side, which followed out of friendship for Scipio, dropped their anchors in the sea ...' (μέχρι νῆες Σιδητῶν πέντε, αἱ φίλῃ Σκιπίωνος ἔποντο...).

²⁴ Prag 2011b: 105-110.

²⁵ Livy 26.50 (*dilectu clientium habito*); Caes. *B Civ.* 3.59-61 (reference to the *clientes* and the *magnus comitatus* of Roucillus and Egus).

contione.²⁶ Their status among their own people plays out in turn in the honours that they receive from their own troops, sometimes explicitly presented as honours following upon Roman honours.²⁷ The nexus of *auctoritas* and *gratia*, to use Yoshimura's terms, which such activities generate, can only serve to reinforce connections and future obligations. Not perhaps *clientela*, nor very obviously *amicitia*, but certainly a perfectly recognisable nexus of interpersonal relations, founded upon status and *beneficia*.

More generally, military service, whether initiated through a personal connection or otherwise, is one very obvious context in which such personal relationships develop. Deiotarus' service with Cicero in Cilicia in 51 BC is, unsurprisingly, never expressed in terms other than his loyalty to the Roman state in the course of Cicero's letters from Cilicia, and we have already noted above (Table 1), that Cicero was formally authorised by the Senate to levy local auxiliaries. Howsoever the service was negotiated or demanded, Cicero nevertheless entrusted his son and nephew to the tetrarch during the campaign; and after that campaign Cicero could, at least in the context of public oratory at Rome, appeal to the personal ties that resulted.²⁸ The young Attalus II served regularly with Pergamene troops alongside Roman forces in the 190s and 180s BC: the personal connections resulting from his service, and

²⁶ Participation at *consilia*: Liv. 34.26.4-6 (*principes Graeciae at consilium* of T. Flamininus, 195 BC), cf. 34.33.5 (*sociorum etiam principibus adhibitibus habuit consilium*); Liv. 44.36.8 (*legati circa imperatorem ducesque externi erant...* with L. Aemilius Paullus at Pydna, 168 BC). Rewards in *contione*: Liv. 42.60.8-10 (after the Roman defeat near Sykyrion in Thessaly, 171 BC): *et in consilio apud consulem pro se quisque in Aetolos conferebant causam: ab iis fugae terrorisque principium ortum; secutos pauorem Aetolorum et ceteros socios Graecorum populorum. quinque principes Aetolorum, qui primi terga uertentes conspecti dicebantur, Romam missi. Thessali pro contione laudati, ducesque eorum etiam uirtutis causa donati.* ('And in the conference before the consul each in his own defence assigned the blame to the Aetolians; the beginning they said of the flight and panic had been made by them; the other allies from the peoples of Greece had also followed the rout of the Aetolians. Five chiefs of the Aetolians, who were the first said to have been seen turning their backs, were sent to Rome. The Thessalians were praised before an assembly, and their leaders were also awarded presents for valour.' Loeb transl.; cf. Polyb. 27.15.14, App. *Mac.* 12.) Note also the rewards for Celtiberian cavalry *in castris* recorded on the bronze from Asculum of 89 BC (*CIL* I².709 = *ILLRP* 515); and the treatment of Iugurtha (Sall. *Iug.* 8, quoted below). On military rewards for auxiliaries, see Prag 2011a: 27.

²⁷ For example, *Syll.*³ 744 (Aetolians honour Ladames of Calydon, c. 84 BC): [τὸ κοινὸν τῶν] Αἰτωλῶν Λαδά[μεια -- Καλυδόνιο]ν ἄρε[τ]ῆς ἔνεκεν καὶ εὐε[ργεσίας τῆς εἰς | αὐτό], στρατευσάμενον, τιμ[α]θέντα δόρατι | ὑπὸ Λευκίου Κορνηλίου Σύλλα καὶ σ[τ]ρατιωτικοῖς || δώροισ ἐπ' ἄ]νδραγαθία ('The *koinon* of the Aetolians (honours) Ladames [son of ?] the Calydonian, for his excellence and his goodwill towards them, after he had served in the army and been honoured with a spear by Lucius Cornelius Sulla and with military prizes for his courage.' My transl.). On the uncertain restoration of the end of line 3, which could also be πολιτεία, i.e. citizenship, see Cousin 1886: 183-5.

²⁸ Cic. *Fam.* 15.2.2 (= SB 105, to the Senate, Sept. 51 BC): '...and that I should have King Deiotarus close at hand, a most faithful and friendly ally to our country, whose advice and material support might be of service to the commonwealth'; Cic. *Att.* 5.20.9 (= SB 113, Dec. 51 BC): 'Deiotarus from whom I have had a large military contingent has written that he will come to me at Laodicea with the boys' (i.e. the young Cicerones, entrusted to him during the campaign); Cic. *Deiot.* 39: 'public life has bound me to him in friendship, mutual regard in hospitality, intercourse in intimacy; while his great services to me and to my army (*summam vero necessitudinem magna eius officia in me et in exercitum meum effecerunt*) have created the strongest of bonds between us' (all Loeb transl., with modifications).

indeed from *contubernalia* with members of the Roman elite during the campaigns, played a direct role in the politics of his visit to Rome in 167 BC.²⁹ Famously, the young Iugurtha served under Scipio Aemilianus at Numantia in 134/3 BC and developed a close relationship with Scipio and others, while also learning Latin.³⁰

This last instance has prompted interesting reflections from Andrea Raggi which are pertinent to this theme. After rewarding Iugurtha *in contione*, says Sallust, Scipio took Iugurtha into his tent, and advised him ‘to cultivate the friendship of the Roman people as a body, rather than that of private individuals, and not to form the habit of bribery.’ Scipio’s subsequent promise to Micipsa to raise Iugurtha’s standing with the Senate and People of Rome, has echoes of the public honours Scipio the Elder ensured were confirmed upon Massinissa.³¹ Raggi’s point, echoing Scipio’s, is the significant difference between formalised public relations and the much more shadowy area of private, informal elite relationships, which present hazards as well as potential benefits for both sides. Sallust may or may not be deliberately exploiting an implicit comparison with the practices of Scipio Africanus the Elder; the perils of such one-to-one relationships for inter-state relations were entirely familiar to Polybius, who as an official representative of the Achaeans called to his defence a *senatus consultum* requiring senatorial authority for requisitioning when pressed by Q. Marcius Philippus,³² and are no less visible in the political manoeuvres surrounding both Attalus II and Iugurtha.

As Raggi and Burton have emphasised, the primary category for the formalisation of these relations, as it is represented in our sources, is not *clientela* but *amicitia*. The formal grant of

²⁹ Polyb. 30.1.2: (Attalus, brother of Eumenes) came to Rome ‘with the hope of receiving some marks of attention, as they had fought side by side (συμπεπολεμηκέναι) with the Romans and loyally shared all their dangers. ... He was very cordially received on all sides since they had become intimate with him in camp... (διὰ τε τὴν ἐν τῇ στρατείᾳ γεγενημένην συνήθειαν)’ (trans. Paton); cf. 30.3.1: ‘Attalus ... solicited their favour in return for his kind offices and ready assistance in the war with Perseus.’ See also Polyb. 21.33.2: 21.39.5.

³⁰ Sall. *Iug.* 7.2-9.1 (Numantia, 134/3 BC): ‘Therefore, when Micipsa sent cavalry and infantry to aid the Romans in the war with Numantia (*equitum atque peditum auxilia mitteret*), he gave Iugurtha command of the Numidians whom he sent to Spain (*praefecti Numidis quos in Hispaniam mittebat*)... he shortly acquired such a reputation that he became very popular with our soldiers and a great terror to the Numantians... Therefore Scipio relied upon Iugurtha for almost all difficult undertakings...’ (Loeb trans.); *Iug.* 101.6 for learning Latin; cf. Vell. Pat. 2.9.4; App. *Hisp.* 89; and see next note.

³¹ Raggi 2008: 104; Sall. *Iug.* 8.2: ‘Now when Numantia had been destroyed and P. Scipio determined to disband his auxiliary troops and return to Rome himself, after giving Iugurtha gifts and commending him in the highest terms before the assembled soldiers, he took him into his tent and advised him to cultivate the friendship of the Roman people as a body, rather than that of private individuals, and not to form the habit of bribery...’; 9.1

‘After speaking in this way, Scipio dismissed the young man with a letter to be delivered to Micipsa: ... To us he is dear because of his services, and we shall use our best efforts to make him beloved also by the Senate and People of Rome...’ (Loeb trans.); cf. Liv. 30.17.7-14 for Massinissa.

³² Polyb. 28.13.

amicitia populi Romani to individuals – as well as states – is most familiar from the *SC de Asclepiade* of 78 BC, for Asclepias and two other Greek navarchs active in the service of Rome, but an earlier example in Livy takes us back to the Third Macedonian War, and the figure of a Macedonian noble who supported the Roman cause.³³ Raggi collects the other eastern examples, but to these one could add, for example, the repeated attestations in Caesar of Gallic chieftains to whom the formal position of *amicus* had been awarded by the Senate, and whose descendants played a key role in the Gallic campaigns.³⁴ *Amicitia* does not, of course, arise solely in the context of military aid, but it is clear that military service was a significant route by which such aid, and its future expectation, could be formalised. The place of *amici populi Romani* is clearly asserted, for example, at the end of the second century BC in the *lex de provinciis praetoriis*, with its emphasis upon the safety of Romans, allies, Latins, and the friends of the Roman people.³⁵ Among other things, such formalisation of status serves, as already noted, to reduce the significance of any interpersonal relationships that might inevitably arise within the context of military service. But the existence of formal status categories hardly eliminates the place of private relationships, and both state and personal friendship would naturally function side-by-side, with greater or lesser success according to circumstance (witness the civil wars).

³³ Raggi 2008 specifically collects and discusses examples of such individual grants in the East. Burton mentions in passing the phenomenon of individual grants, but only because it ‘confirms the conceptual slippage between interpersonal and international *amicitia*’ and therefore justifies his treatment of *amicitia* for international relations (intended as pointed contrast to Badian’s presumption of the same slippage for *clientela*); he does not discuss individual cases (2011: 82-3). On the *SC de Asclepiade* (78 BC, *CIL* I².588 = *ILLRP* 513 = Sherk, *RDGE* 22), see Raggi 2001. For the Macedonian, Onesimus son of Python, see Liv. 44.16.5-7 (169 BC): *ea introductus in curiam cum memorasset, senatus in formulam sociorum eum referri iussit, locum lautia praeberi, agri Tarentini qui publicus populi Romani esset ducenta iugera dari, et aedes Tarenti emi* (‘On being introduced to the Senate, he recited these facts, and the Senate ordered that he be enrolled in the *formula sociorum*, that a residence and entertainment be provided for him, that 200 *iugera* of *ager publicus* in the territory of Tarentum be given him, and that a house be bought for him at Tarentum’ (Loeb trans.); cf. Raggi 2008: 106).

³⁴ *Caes. B Gall.* 1.43 (Ariovistus, speech of 59 BC): *Caesar initio orationis sua senatusque in eum beneficia commemoravit, quod rex appellatus esset a senatu, quod amicus, quod munera amplissime missa; quam rem et paucis contigisse et pro magnis hominum officiis consuesse tribui docebat* (‘Caesar began his speech by relating the benefits conferred upon Ariovistus by himself and by the Senate; the Senate had called him king and friend and had sent gifts with a most lavish hand. This privilege, as he pointed out, had fallen to the lot of but few, and was usually granted in consideration of great personal services’, trans. Loeb); *B Gall.* 4.12 (55/4 BC): *In eo proelio ex equitibus nostris interficiuntur quattuor et septuaginta, in his vir fortissimus Piso Aquitanus, amplissimo genere natus, cuius avus in civitate sua regnum obtinuerat, amicus ab senatu nostro appellatus* (‘In that engagement were slain seventy-four of our cavalry, and among them the gallant Piso of Aquitanita, the scion of a most distinguished line, whose grandfather had held the sovereignty in his own state, and had been saluted as Friend by the Roman Senate’, trans. Loeb); *B Gall.* 7.31: *Interim Teutomatus, Olloviconis filius, rex Nitiobrigum, cuius pater ab senatu nostro amicus erat appellatus, cum magno equitum suorum numero ... ad eum pervenit* (‘Teutomatus, the son of Ollovico and king of the Nitiobriges, whose father had been saluted as Friend by the Roman Senate, came to Vercingetorix with a large number of horsemen...’, Loeb trans.); cf. 8.44.

³⁵ Crawford 1996: no. 12, Cnidos Copy, col. III, lines 31-35: ...ὥστε τοὺς πολίτας Ῥωμαίων καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους Λατίνους τε τῶν τε ἐκτὸς ἔθνῶν, οἵτινες ἐν τῇ φιλίας τοῦ δήμου Ῥωμαίων εἰσὶν, μετ’ ἀσφαλείας πλοῖζεσθαι δύνωνται... (‘...that the citizens of Rome and the allies and the Latins, and those of the foreign nations who are in a relationship of friendship with the Roman people, may sail in safety...’).

However, it is not a story of *amicitia* alone: the formal category of ‘friend’ sits alongside an alternative form of reward and formalisation of status for military service, which is the granting of citizenship, *virtutis causa*.³⁶ Grants to individuals on this basis are a familiar practice in the Roman Republic (Cicero’s *pro Balbo* is the *locus classicus*). The practice was traditionally (already in Cato the Elder) traced back to the grant to L. Mamilius of Tusculum in 458 BC, for his defence of the Capitol, with further examples known from the fourth and third centuries; the most famous instances are perhaps Marius’ notorious grant to the Camertes, and the grant to Celtiberian cavalry by Pompeius Strabo in the Social War, recorded on the Asculum bronze of 89 BC.³⁷ It is commonly asserted that such grants by individual commanders in the field were a recent development, with Marius again the focal point for presumed innovation.³⁸ However, this is to ignore the broader set of evidence, and indeed Cicero’s own claims for the extent of the practice (e.g. *pro Balbo* 24), as well as to overprivilege the specific instance of the Camertes enfranchised by Marius and the unique survival of the Asculum bronze. The enfranchisement of the Camertine cohorts provoked a reaction because of its scale (two whole cohorts, suggested to be as many as 1,000 men) and because of Camerinum’s existing *foedus* with Rome, not because of the underlying principle of grants *virtutis causa*. The fact that the Asculum grant took place explicitly under the terms of the recent *lex Iulia* should not lead us to infer that the basic practice of *viritim* grants by generals was itself novel: as has been pointed out several times, a fragment of Sisenna almost certainly refers to the existence of a preceding *lex Calpurnia* which already conceded such grants (and given that this *lex* was making that concession, it should not, I think, be thought to innovate on the principle);³⁹ and the fact that such grants were increasingly being regulated at

³⁶ Raggi 2008: 102-3 notes the potential overlap with *amicitia* privileges in relation to (the apparent absence of) citizenship grants in the Greek East, for which see also Ferrary 2005; Burton 2011, in line with his focus on interstate relations only, appears not to take citizenship grants into consideration.

³⁷ L. Mamilius in 458 BC (Cato the Elder, *FRHist* Cato F25 = Peter F25, from book 1 of the *origines*: *Nam de omni Tusculuana civitate soli Lucii Mamiliii beneficium gratum fuit*, ‘For of all the Tusculuan community, only the service rendered by Lucius Mamilius was welcome’, on which *FRHist* vol. III, p. 76, ‘the first known example of a personal grant of this type, and it is evidently to this event that the fragment refers’; cf. Liv. 3.29.6, with Ogilvie 1965: 445, accepting the notice); 300 Campanian *equites* in 340 BC (Liv. 8.11.15-16, discussed and accepted in Oakley 1998: 513-515); 300 Campanian *equites* in 215 BC (Liv. 23.31.10-11); compare the reward of citizenship in 212 BC for the slaves enrolled during the Hannibalic War (Liv. 25.6.21, cf. 24.16.9); Moericus the Iberian and Sosis the Syracusan in 211 BC (Liv. 26.21.9-13); Muttines the Numidian in 210 BC (Liv. 27.5.6-7, cf. *Syll.*³ 585, line 32); the Camertes in 101 BC (Cic. *Balb.* 46, Val. Max. 5.2.8, Plut. *Mar.* 28, *Mor.* 202c); Celtiberians at Asculum, 89 BC (*CIL* I².709 = *ILLRP* 515). Collections of relevant material in O’Brien-Moore 1942: 38 and Badian 1958: 302-308 (focusing on the late Republic).

³⁸ So, e.g., Badian 1958: 259, speaks of ‘new and revolutionary extensions ... due to Marius.’

³⁹ *FRHist* Sisenna F71 (= Peter F120), from book 4: *milites, ut lex Calpurnia concesserat, virtutis ergo civitate donari* (‘that the soliders to be granted citizenship because of their courage, as the Calpurnian law had allowed’). *FRHist*, vol. III, p. 396-7 concludes that it should most likely be distinguished from the *lex Calpurnia* of the

a moment of crisis such as the Social War hardly proves that they did not take place before, especially when other evidence clearly shows that they did. Cicero in the *pro Balbo* unsurprisingly privileges examples from the preceding generation, as is his wont, and in particular the examples of Marius and Pompeius, but that can hardly be taken as proof of the absence of the practice before then. On the other hand, the point has rightly been made that trying to map specific patron-client networks on the basis of the presumed onomastic traces left by such citizenship grants is a deeply flawed idea, and should be abandoned.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, by way of conclusion, we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater. I noted at the outset that explicit statements of *clientela* in the context of military service are extremely rare (and, it should be added, those of state *clientela* are non-existent, if we ignore the modern category of ‘client-kings’⁴¹); I have traced briefly some of the evidence for the importance of interpersonal relations between Roman and local elites in the exploitation of *auxilia externa*; and I have noted some of the evidence for the reward of these troops through the formalisation of status in relation to the Roman state, whether through the formal category of *amicus populi Romani*, or the granting of Roman citizenship. However, the role of the individual, as noted, is hardly likely to be eliminated through such formal grants, and it is through the individual, and often through military service, finally, that *clientela* returns, as can clearly be seen in several examples. Towards the end of the second century BC, Menippos of Colophon was honoured by his city for his many actions on its behalf, not least because he was ‘Elected general of the hoplites in time of war and with the presence of the Roman armies, and having immediately carried out the same magistracy a second time, he received himself those of the Romans who came into the city...’. Later on, the decree continues, ‘Consequently, being recommended to the most important Romans on account of his excellence in all things, and himself going on embassies on their behalf and being judged worthy of their trust, he became famous in many Greek cities, and having made these men genuine *patroni* (πάτρωνας) of the city he became extremely useful for the people before the authorities, to whom is brought everyone’s most compelling business.’⁴² Quintus Oppius,

Social War, which provided for the creation of new tribes, and that it need not even belong to 90 BC; cf. Gabba 1976: 90-91, likewise suggesting it was a distinct law, perhaps of the first months of 90 BC, and Crawford 2010: 98, suggesting that ‘the statute may in any case be of any date before late 90 BC’.

⁴⁰ Pina Polo 2011; in Badian’s defence, he actually rejected the idea, based on the false analogy of occasional grants *virtutis causa*, of extensive citizenship grants in the Republican period (1958: 259-60); but his successors have not been so cautious.

⁴¹ Convenient recent overview of the subject in Hekster 2012: 185-6.

⁴² Robert and Robert 1989: Menippos decree, col. II, lines 7-18: στρατηγός χειροτονηθείς ἐπὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν ἐμ πολέμῳ καὶ παρουσίᾳ στρατοπέδων ῥωμαϊκῶν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν λαβὼν, τοὺς τε

captured by Mithridates in 88 BC, but aided by the city of Aphrodisias, which had undertaken military action on his behalf, in turn agreed to take up the position of patron for the city.⁴³ Lastly, the *demos* and *neoi* of Ilium honoured Pompeius Magnus as patron in or after 62 BC, for releasing the men of the city both from the barbarian wars and the dangers of the pirates.⁴⁴ In other words, one might argue that, alongside the formalisation of the individual or community's status, the interpersonal relationship on the Roman side, which often emerged from a military context, was indeed consolidated over time in the acceptance of a role as formal *patronus*. I would not wish to suggest that any of this is specific to military service on the part of foreign peoples, but it is very clear that recruitment and service of non-Italian people as *auxilia externa* under a Roman commander provides a clear channel through which such relations, both formal and informal, evolve, and that their place in our understanding of Roman imperial control needs much greater emphasis than Badian's study, with its inward emphasis upon *clientelae*, allowed.

παραγινόμενους εἰς τὴν πόλιν Ῥωμαίων αὐτὸς ἐξεδέχετο, τὰς τῶν πολιτῶν οἰκίας ἀνεπισταθμεύτους ποιῶν, τοῦ τε κοινῆι συμφέροντος τὴν πλείστην ἐποιεῖτο πρόνοιαν τὰς δαπάνας συναρῶν; and col. III, lines 5-13: τοιγαροῦν διὰ τὴν ἐμ πᾶσιν ἀρετὴν τοῖς μεγίστοις Ῥωμαίων συσταθεὶς αὐτὸς τε πρεσβεύων ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ πίστεως ἀξιούμενος ἐπίσημος γέγονε παρὰ πολλαῖς τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, τῆς τε πόλεως γνησίους αὐτοὺς πεποικῶς πάτρωνας χρησιμώτατος παρὰ τοῖς ἡγουμένοις γέγονε τῷ δήμῳ παρ' οἷς ἀναγκαιότατοι πᾶσιν εἰσὶν ἀνθρώποις χρεῖαι. The translation is mine, but borrows from both Robert and Robert 1989: 101 and Eilers 2002: 125.

⁴³ Reynolds 1983: doc. 3, lines 21-29, 49-57: καθ' ὃν γὰρ καιρὸν ἐκ Λαοδικῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔπεμψα γράμματα ὄψω[ς] στρατιώτας πρὸς με ἀποσ[τέ]λητε, ἐν πρώτοις ἀπεστε[ί]λατε, τοῦτο δὲ ἐποιήσατε κ[α]θὼς ἐπέβαλλεν συμμα[χ]οῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ φίλοις δήμου Ῥωμαίων ποιῆσαι ... οἱ αὐτοὶ πρεσβεῖς παρεκάλεσαν ὅπως ἔξη τῇ [ἐ]μῇ πατρωνίᾳ καὶ ὑμεῖν χρῆσθαι· τούτους ἐγὼ ἀνεδεξάμην, καταλογῆς ἔνεκεν τὴν ὑμετέρας πόλεως, ἐμὲ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ ὑμετέρου πάτρωνα ἔσεσθαι ('For on the occasion when I wrote to you from Laodicea that you should send me soldiers, you were among the first to send them and your conduct was exactly what was due from good allies and friends of the Roman people; ... the same ambassadors begged that you too should be allowed to enjoy my patronage. I accepted because of my regard for your city and undertook the position of patron of your People', trans. Reynolds).

⁴⁴ SEG 46.1565: ὁ δῆμος κα[ὶ] οἱ νεοί | [Γναῖον Πο]μπήιον, Γναίου [υ]ίου, Μάγνον, τὸ τρίτον | [αὐτοκράτ]ορα, τὸν πάτρωνα καὶ εὐεργέτην τῆς πόλεως | [εὐσεβεία]ς ἔνεκεν τῆς πρὸς τὴν θεὸν τὴν οὖσαν αὐτῷ | [- -]ν καὶ εὐνοίας τῆς πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, ἀπολύσαντα | [μὲν τοὺς ἀ]νθρώπους ἀπὸ τε τῶν βαρβαρικῶν πολέμων | [καὶ τῶν π]ιρατικῶν κινδύνων, ἀποκαθεστακότα δὲ | [τὴν εἰρ]ήνην καὶ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ('The demos and the *neoi* (honour) Gnaeus Pompeius Gn.f. Magnus, *imperator* III, patron and benefactor of the city, for his piety towards the goddess being for him [---] and for his good will towards the demos, after he released (or discharged?) the men both from the barbarian wars and the dangers of the pirates, and established peace and security through land and sea.' My trans.).

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


Figure 1. Distribution map of attested instances ($n = 327$) of the deployment of *auxilia externa* in the period 264-49 BC (a soldier indicates land forces; a ship, naval forces). Evidence is derived from literary and epigraphic sources. Marked geographical locations are often very approximate.

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