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Functionalist interrelations amongst human psychological states inter se, ditto for Martians

Abstract:

One job for theories of mental representation is to distinguish between different kinds of mental representation: beliefs, desires, intentions, perceptual states, etc. What makes a mental state a belief that p rather than a desire that p or a visual representation that p? Functionalism is a leading approach for doing so: for individuating mental states. Functionalism is designed to allow that psychological states can be multiply realized. Mark Sprevak has argued that, for a functionalist ac...

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Publication status:
Accepted for publication
Peer review status:
Reviewed (other)

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Humanities Division
Department:
Philosophy
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0002-2032-5705

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Role:
Editor
Role:
Editor
Role:
Editor
Publisher:
Oxford University Press Publisher's website
Host title:
What Are Mental Representations?
Pubs id:
pubs:949884
URN:
uri:97ab450f-3ddc-4f31-bf06-e6525db2093f
UUID:
uuid:97ab450f-3ddc-4f31-bf06-e6525db2093f
Local pid:
pubs:949884

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