Journal article icon

Journal article

Must metaethical realism make a semantic claim?

Abstract:

Mackie drew attention to the distinct semantic and metaphysical claims made by meta ethical realists, arguing that although our evaluative discourse is cognitive and objective, there are no objective evaluative facts. This distinction, however, also opens up a reverse possibility: that our evaluative discourse is antirealist, yet objective values do exist. I suggest that this seemingly far-fetched possibility merits serious attention; realism seems com mitted to its intelligibility, and, desp...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Publisher's version

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1163/174552412x628869

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, HUM, Philosophy, Philosophy NonPostholders
Publisher:
Brill Publisher's website
Journal:
The Journal of Moral Philosophy Journal website
Volume:
10
Issue:
2
Pages:
148-178
Publication date:
2012
DOI:
EISSN:
1745-5243
ISSN:
1740-4681
URN:
uuid:971b2112-cab8-4dae-959f-525d3924fb49
Source identifiers:
250446
Local pid:
pubs:250446

Terms of use


Metrics



If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP