Journal article icon

Journal article

Condorcet winning sets.

Abstract:

An alternative is said to be a Condorcet winner of an election if it is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. While this is a very attractive solution concept, many elections do not have a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we propose a set-valued relaxation of this concept, which we call a Condorcet winning set: such sets consist of alternatives that collectively dominate any other alternative. We also consider a more general version of this concept, where instead of domi...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted manuscript

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1007/s00355-014-0853-4

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, MPLS, Computer Science
Saffidine, A More by this author
Publisher:
Springer Verlag Publisher's website
Journal:
Social Choice and Welfare Journal website
Volume:
44
Issue:
3
Pages:
493-517
Publication date:
2014-10-14
DOI:
EISSN:
1432-217X
ISSN:
0176-1714
URN:
uuid:96752702-2ec4-4a0f-a09c-38fe0f489604
Source identifiers:
488243
Local pid:
pubs:488243

Terms of use


Metrics



If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP