‘The Second Reform Act and the Politics of Empire’

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Abstract

This article examines the role played by imperial issues in the debates over the Second Reform Act. It argues that contemporaries did not readily associate the empire with domestic constitutional reform in the 1860s; that relatively few references were made to imperial questions in the course of the debates; and that those references were of limited significance to the framing and interpretation of the legislation. It suggests, moreover, that the Act exercised minimal influence on the ways in which the empire was discussed immediately after 1867. The article goes on to argue that this lack of connection between visions of domestic constitutional reform and visions of empire in the 1860s had a number of roots, but that it was in large part a consequence of the resolution of specific anxieties about imperial policy, which had made empire a topic of sustained debate between the late 1820s and early 1850s.

Keywords: 1867; colonies; constitution; empire; imperialism; reform; second reform act

Existing scholarship on the Second Reform Act is polarised about the significance of the Act’s imperial contexts. Either they were of immense importance, or they were an irrelevance. Whichever view is taken, historians have paid almost no attention to the larger question of *why* the debates over the Act might have been more or less imperially inflected. This article aims to pinpoint the kinds of connections contemporaries drew between the Second Reform Act and the British empire; to give a sense of how much these connections actually mattered in the wider reform debates; and to situate them within the broader context of nineteenth-century controversies over imperial policy and domestic constitutional reform. The argument, in short,

is that contemporaries made very few explicit links between the Act and the empire, and that those they did articulate were for the most part rote and insignificant. This was partly because of the specific parameters of the reform debates, and partly because of the nature of imperial politics and policy in the 1860s. The article, then, also engages with the more fundamental question of what it was that made empire matter in Victorian political debate.

Historians have proposed several ways of setting the Second Reform Act and the British empire within the same analytic frame. A number of studies have drawn links between the reform agitation and the controversy over the actions of Governor Edward Eyre, scourge of the Jamaican 'rebellion' of 1865. Bernard Semmel's classic study of the Morant Bay controversy claims that Britain's 'respectable classes' identified the Hyde Park rabble with Jamaican rebels, and that there were intimate connections between contemporary attitudes towards the reform agitation and the attempts to prosecute Eyre ('What could be more natural than to identify the two causes?').[1] But he provides no evidence to demonstrate that contemporaries actually *did* make these analogies. Rande Kostal's more recent study of the same debate, similarly, suggests that franchise reform and the Eyre controversy revolved around the same basic issue: the nature of legal accountability in a constitutional state. Kostal provides an example of a contemporary (Scottish) newspaper suggesting that the government's actions in Hyde Park represented the application of West Indian practices to England, but he concedes that, generally speaking, this connection was not 'carefully articulated'.[2] A different approach was proposed by Freda Harcourt, who argued in the 1980s that Disraeli sought to use 'imperialism' (in the shape of an Abyssinian expedition) as a way to bind together a nation disordered by political tumult in 1866-8.[3] Harcourt makes a series of contentions about the significance of the late 1860s as a point of departure for 'imperial' political culture in Britain, and about the imperial strategies politicians deployed to discipline a growing electorate after 1867. But as she herself admits, much of what she says is speculative.[4] Elsewhere, Duncan Bell has argued that the Second and

Third Reform Acts, in advancing 'democracy', inspired anxiety over the future of the empire among advocates of imperial federation;[5] while Miles Taylor has written suggestively about how a number of pivotal figures in the revived debate over parliamentary reform may have been influenced by earlier controversies about colonial constitutions in the wake of the 1848 revolutions.[6] What these studies have in common is a tendency to infer the connection between constitutional reform at home and imperial controversy. There may be something in some or all of these arguments: but they tell us little about what contemporaries actually said.

The most strident (and controversial) statements about the relationship between the Second Reform Act and the empire come from scholars associated with the 'new' imperial history. These historians argue that ideas about the constitution and notions of citizenship were tied inextricably to visions of empire, and that the two made no sense without one another. As Catherine Hall, the historian most closely associated with this approach, puts it: 'it was impossible to think about the "mother country" and its specificities without reference to the colonies'.[7] Hall's writings on the Second Reform Act, however, are concerned more with the intellectual atmosphere in which reform took place, than with the language of the debates themselves.[8] Again, there may be something in her juxtapositions; but beyond a few particularly juicy quotations, all they really demonstrate is that imperial and domestic issues were being discussed publicly at the same time. Hall's supporters have tended to be less subtle. Antoinette Burton simply asserts that 'imperial power' was 'visible' in the Second Reform Act, even more so than in the legislation of 1832; Anna Clark sees 1867 as defining the vote in increasingly 'imperialist' terms; and James Vernon concludes, partly on the basis of Hall's work, that the making of the Second Reform Act (and indeed of the English constitution in general) was fundamentally a product of the colonial encounter.[9] Hall's arguments also receive a typically more measured endorsement from Andrew Thompson.[10]

This approach has not gone unchallenged. Richard Price notes that Hall's argument is based on 'inferential and contextual' rather than 'direct and immediate' connections between empire and ideas of citizenship, and that its superiority to established interpretations is 'not… obvious'; Robert Saunders comments that Hall and her allies fail to make connections between climates of opinion and the actual legislative process, and that they focus too much on ideas about citizenship and character to the detriment of other major issues in the mid-Victorian reform debates.[11] Saunders here highlights a crucial flaw in this body of work: it makes no attempt to discern the *relative* importance of imperial concerns as against other issues and factors.[12]

These issues perhaps help to explain why the main tradition of scholarship on the Second Reform Act has remained stubbornly resistant to the empire. Historians concerned primarily with the domestic politics of the Act either omit to discuss imperial issues at all, mention them only in passing, or disavow their relevance. Maurice Cowling said nothing about empire.[13] F.B. Smith, based in Melbourne, noted some parliamentary references to Australia, but offered no discussion of any possible conceptual implications.[14] Saunders' recent authoritative history of the shaping of the Second Reform Act states that comparisons with the colonies 'would add little to the present work'.[15] This lack of interest in the empire does not rest on the assumption that external contexts of any kind were irrelevant to the shaping of parliamentary reform. It is well known that the examples of America and France, as the most advanced contemporary 'democracies', were debated endlessly in the 1850s and 1860s, as well as in earlier decades.[16] Miles Taylor has highlighted how concerns about colonial representation, imperial retrenchment, anti-slavery, and the renewal of the East India Company's Charter, were all present in the debates over the 1832 Reform Act.[17] All this can be seen as part of a growing interest among historians in situating major episodes of nineteenth-century constitutional

reform, and languages of constitutionalism, in transnational cultural and intellectual contexts.[18] But evidence of concrete connections between 1867 and the empire is still thin on the ground.

More general studies of both Victorian politics and Victorian imperial thinking have also been reluctant to link the Second Reform Act and the empire. Synthetic and monographic works of political history which deal with the period of the Act never say anything about the (potential) relationship.[19] Perhaps more surprisingly, studies of late-nineteenth-century imperial thought almost invariably overlook the possible influence of the Second Reform Act on conceptions of empire. This is despite the Act's proximity to a number of turning points in Britain's imperial politics in the late 1860s. Those historians who see in this era 'the climax of anti-imperialism', as well as those who see a 'rise of empire sentiment' at this point, have been equally uninterested in the Reform Act.[20] It does not occur to historians of the Colonial Society of 1868, and rarely to those of the Imperial Federation movement which found its feet in the late 1860s, to connect their subjects with the new political world created by reform.[21] Historians of other aspects of late-nineteenth-century imperial political thinking have been equally inattentive.[22] Strikingly, a recent article by Richard Huzzey on the relationship between British imperial culture and anti-slavery, focusing specifically on the year 1867, does not mention the Reform Act.[23] So we are faced with a clear division. Certain historians hypothesise intimate connections between the Second Reform Act and visions of empire; yet most mainstream work on Victorian politics and imperial ideas does not perceive any connection at all. What unites these groups is that neither pays detailed attention to the issue.

This article seeks to offer a more forensic take on the relationship between the Second Reform Act and the empire. Based on a thorough scouring of the most prominent media of public debate – parliamentary debates, newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets – it seeks to offer a sense of how, where, and with what impact the empire was deployed in the debates over reform, between

1852 and 1867 (concentrating on the climactic years after 1865). This relatively 'flat' approach does no violence to the material, since the nature of references to empire in connection with parliamentary reform did not change substantially over the course of the period. It may have been the case, of course, that empire was so fundamental to domestic political thinking that contemporaries did not feel compelled explicitly to articulate its significance, and that a profoundly 'imperial' mindset underlay everything that was said about reform. This article claims only that what *was* actually articulated has to be an important, indeed a primary, part of the picture; and it works from the basis that nothing has yet been written which demonstrates conclusively the formative 'silent' influence of empire.

The article is divided into three parts. The first examines in what ways, and with what frequency, imperial issues were raised in the debates over the Second Reform Act. The second asks what we can learn from this about the broader relationship between debates about domestic constitutional reform, and those about empire, over the course of the nineteenth century, especially in comparison to the controversies over the First and Third Reform Acts. The final part offers some concluding observations. 'Empire' and 'imperial' are used throughout to refer to the full array of Britain's overseas possessions, including India; 'colonies' and 'colonial' to the empire excluding India. Ireland is not included in any of these categories, because of its constitutional status as part of the United Kingdom.

I

There are, it might be suggested, four main ways in which the empire *could* have fitted in to the debates over the Second Reform Act. First, the empire could have been a source of useful precedents for, or lessons about, constitutional reform; second, analogies could have been detected between policies pursued in the empire and policies pursued at home; third, the empire could have presented reasons, concrete or abstract, why parliamentary reform was necessary;

and finally, the empire could have been an arena in which changes were expected in the aftermath of reform.[24] This section works through each of these categories in turn.

First, however, it is necessary to touch on what contemporaries understood to be the most serious imperial issues facing Britain in the 1860s.[25] Major imperial developments and crises were certainly not lacking. There was the Ashanti war in 1863; a series of Maori wars in New Zealand; various stand-offs over the imposition of tariffs in Australian colonies; the achievement of confederation among the British North American colonies in 1867; the withdrawal of British troops from most of the settler colonies from 1869; and most celebrated of all, the controversy over Governor Eyre in the years after 1865. Except for Eyre, however, none of these developments attracted much sustained public discussion in Britain – and what discussion there was did not tend to highlight connections between imperial developments and domestic politics. Most public writing on the colonial empire in the 1860s was less commentary on events, than description of colonial conditions. What serious analytical writing there was, mostly in highbrow periodicals, largely dwelt on the problem of the empire's costs and benefits that had so exercised commentators in the late 1840s and early 1850s. So it was not the case that the debates over the Second Reform Act were conducted in a climate of intense public anxiety over the state and future of the empire. For most people, for most of the 1860s, the empire was not a front-rank political issue.

The first, and by far the most common, route by which the empire was brought rhetorically into connection with the Second Reform Act was through questions of precedent and example. This fell within a small compass, focusing almost exclusively on the fact that certain settler colonies had more 'advanced' constitutional arrangements than Britain, particularly the Australian colonies.[26] India and the Crown colonies were not raised in this context at all.[27] The ways in which these precedents were deployed was typical of the way overseas examples were used in

Victorian political debate. For advocates of reform, the colonies could represent a means of pointing out contradictions in Britain's policy. Various Radicals and advanced Liberals can be found complaining about 'the inconsistency of refusing to our fellow-subjects at home – rights which we freely confer upon them in the colonies'.[28] Henry Fawcett noted that labourers had been encouraged to emigrate to Canada or Australia in order to enjoy the full privileges of citizenship.[29] References to other points of colonial progressiveness can also be found: in 1854 the colonies' more advanced position with regard to members' property qualifications was mentioned, as was colonial legislatures' willingness to admit Jews in 1858.[30] More idiosyncratically, John Stuart Mill supported his ideas about 'personal representation' with references to Australia.[31] All this was sometimes built into a wider (though never a fully-developed) case that the apparently effective working of a wider franchise and more liberal institutions in certain settler colonies demonstrated that these innovations could safely be introduced in Britain.[32]

Opponents of reform read the lessons of colonial politics rather differently. As James Fitzjames Stephen noted, there was a tendency among those who disliked the idea of reform to gesture towards the deterioration of politics in America and the great English colonies.[33] Those who disdained colonial democracy argued that Australia, in particular, was distinguished for short-sighted legislation, not least the imposition of tariffs.[34] Mechanical constitutional failings were also sometimes detected: Robert Lowe complained that in Australia (and America) the assemblies no longer worked in harmony with the executive, a central pillar of the British system of government.[35]

Comfortably the most regular association made between the empire and proposals for British constitutional reform between the mid-1850s and the mid-1870s, however, was the precedent of the secret ballot in Australia.[36] Again, advocates claimed that the success of this mechanism

in a British community, operating British institutions, was the best recommendation it could find; critics simply denied that it had worked, or claimed that it had lowered the tone of politics disastrously. One particularly devastating indictment of its operation in Victoria noted that a representative had (allegedly) taken his seat in shirtsleeves.[37]

Such claims were accompanied by standard disagreements over the utility of overseas examples to Britain. Some claimed that the Australians had the same instincts and prejudices as the English, and that the working class in England would exercise its power in the same way.[38] Others argued that the gulf between different national characters, economic arrangements, histories, and institutions meant that foreign and colonial examples were of minimal value.[39] But most commentators seemed to agree, at least to some extent, with Lord Russell, who insisted that 'our object should be not to copy the institutions of other countries, but to improve our own'.[40]

Some contributors to the reform debates, then, thought colonial precedents worth citing (or refuting). Indeed Hall has already collected many of the most striking and apropos quotations of this nature, particularly from John Bright and Robert Lowe.[41] But Bright and Lowe were unrepresentative of political society in the 1860s in the sustained interest they took in colonial issues. More important than the fact that these links were made at all, is their relative significance within the debates: and the fact is that colonial precedents mattered vastly less than American and French ones. Exponentially more articles and speeches discussed America and France than any of the colonies, including Australia, and they did so in vastly greater detail.[42] Furthermore, *most* mentions of the colonies, in parliament and in the press, were no more than passing ones in the midst of more thorough dissections of these more compelling foreign countries. All the potential advantages and disadvantages of colonial democracy seemed to exist in America too, and were explored in more depth in the American context.[43]

It did not escape contemporaries that colonial precedents seemed to carry relatively little weight. Lowe suggested that this was because the colonies were 'in a transition state', whereas in France and America democracy had already reached its ultimate limits.[44] For others the problem was thought to be one of information: while the American constitution had been subject to the scrutiny of travellers and statesmen for decades, Australian institutions were still 'very imperfectly known' to the British public.[45] Whatever the reason, colonial precedents simply cannot be seen as having any great independent power in the debates over reform.[46] Insofar as they did anything, they strengthened arguments made in more depth in reflections on other countries.

The second possible role for empire in the reform debates lay in the possibility that policies pursued in different parts in the empire, as distinct from constitutional arrangements, might cast light on the nature of the reform agitation at home. This can be disposed of more swiftly. Given that the settler colonies were perceived from the early 1850s to govern themselves, few commentators thought that there was much to be gleaned about the political leanings of the mother country from what went on there. Again, Indian policy – particularly fiscal and financial arrangements, the major topic of subcontinental policy discussion in the 1860s – was not seen to have any relevance to domestic reform.[47] From Semmel and Kostal, we might expect numerous links to have been drawn between the issues raised by Jamaica – questions of violence and martial law under Eyre, and the extinction of its constitution in 1866 – and the progress of reform. But in fact such links were very rare indeed. Only one parliamentary speech seriously connects Jamaica and reform, with Peter Taylor asking whether the banning of political meetings in Hyde Park represented an application of Jamaican doctrines of martial law to Britain.[48] Suggestions were made in the press that belief in the maxim 'might makes right' could link support for Eyre and opposition to reform, but such comments were extremely atypical.[49] Imagined links between Jamaica and reform were simply not a significant part of

the debate, and no analogies with policies in other colonies appear to have been made at all. It is interesting to note, furthermore, that discussion of race – a topic of primary significance to Hall – was equally rare in the reform debates. One of the very few writers to mention it, indeed, argued that in England ‘we have no aristocracy of race or colour’, and that in Britain, unlike in America, black people and Hindus were qualified to exercise the franchise and to sit in either house of parliament.[50]

The third potential place for the empire in the reform debates was as a source of arguments for or against reform. A number of these had been deployed in 1830-2: running in favour were the need to retrench colonial spending, anti-slavery sentiment, and the need to reform the East India Company; running against were the need to retain a system of virtual colonial representation, and the desire to maintain the integrity of the empire.[51] Far less was said about any of these things in the debates over the Second Reform Act. It was only in sarcasm that opponents of the government ever claimed that the Jamaican difficulties, the New Zealand war, and invasion fears in Canada would be cured by a new reform bill.[52] Even passing references to the idea that reform would give Britain the political strength to keep the empire together are hard to find.[53]

More common were rote references to the grandeur of the imperial interests with which the British parliament had to deal. Britain possessed ‘the greatest, the most complicated empire the world had ever seen’; the colonies were a source of pride as ‘centres of a civilization equal to our own’.[54] This position could be used as the basis of an argument against reform. Britain, as ‘the centre of a vast colonial empire’, required a ‘prudent and consistent’ policy essentially incompatible with democracy.[55] As Stafford Northcote put it, considering ‘the great extent of our empire and the large portions of the world's surface, as well as the large fractions of the world's population over whom we in this country have to bear sway’, it was essential ‘to

consider very seriously how far those to whom we entrust the responsible office of choosing the most important branch of our Legislature are capable of exercising the delicate functions we commit to them'.[56] But again: very few commentators made these points, and when they did it was invariably as one of a battery of smaller arguments against reform, rather than as issues they considered decisive.

Scattered references to colonial representation can also be found, variously in the form of complaints that 1832 had done away with the virtual representation of the colonies;[57] or that the disfranchisement of small boroughs would make it difficult for colonial and Indian interests to gain a voice;[58] or assertions that colonial interests should somehow be represented at home, either in parliament[59] or in an imperial council.[60] But the idea of colonial representation was a staple of Victorian political argument, recurring throughout the century and never getting anywhere. It is hard to believe that the re-articulation of these arguments weighed very heavily with anyone in the reform debates; and in any case, considerably less attention was paid to the idea of imperial representation in the 1860s than had been the case in the 1830s and 1840s, or would be again in the 1870s.[61] So the empire did virtually nothing either to apply or to alleviate pressure for reform.

The final way in which the empire could have featured in these debates was as an arena in which changes might be expected as a consequence of reform. Such sentiments are virtually impossible to detect, either before or after the passage of the Act. Unlike in 1830-2, nobody seems to have felt that a new parliament and a new electorate would require any rethinking of imperial policy.[62] The architects of the companion volume to the celebrated *Essays on Reform*, *Questions for a Reformed Parliament*, did not consider the condition or future of the empire a significant enough question to merit any discussion.[63] Prognostications about how British politics and policy might change after reform almost never extended to the empire. Nor did

such reflections suddenly crop up following the bill's passage. After 1867 there was no sudden increase in the regularity of speaking or writing about empire, nor any discussion of how imperial policy should be reframed for an enlarged electorate.[64] The most significant imperial controversy to unfold in the years immediately after the Second Reform Act – about the Gladstone government's recall of British troops from several of the settler colonies, throwing the burden of defence onto the colonial assemblies – was based on arguments that had been thoroughly developed well before reform, and nobody suggested that the Reform Act had in any way changed the discursive or political terrain.[65] Governments did not suddenly start using the empire to appeal to the newly enfranchised: of eighty reasons offered to vote Liberal in a pamphlet of 1870, only one related to the empire.[66] The major achievement of responsible government in South Africa in 1872 was barely reported at home, and nobody linked it to the legacy of reform, while Imperial Federalists in the early 1870s did not look back to the Second Reform Act as a missed opportunity to reconstruct the imperial constitution. Such examples could be multiplied. The overall picture of the reform debates, then, is one in which the empire was a topic of very limited significance. Connections of various kinds *were* made; but there were not many of them, and they were all but submerged by other arguments and concerns.

II

Why, then, did contemporaries draw so few connections between the Second Reform Act and the empire? There are several possible answers. One might be that empire *never* mattered very much in nineteenth-century debates over constitutional reform. There is certainly a case to be made that Taylor overemphasises the significance of empire in the 1830-2 agitation, because he does not discuss the relative importance of his imperial pressures.[67] One might note that Tory interest in colonial representation in the early 1830s was not deeply rooted, and that the Reform government took little interest in publicising its colonial policy after 1832. But it is

undoubtedly true that considerably *more* was made of the empire in the reform debates of 1830-2 than in those of 1852-67. Moreover, the Great Reform Act created a political paradigm within which, for a short period, imperial issues came to matter much more systematically in British politics. In the two decades after 1832, what governments did in the empire was seen to furnish clues as to what they might do at home, if they could get away with it; bids for domestic popularity, equally, could be made through moves in imperial policy.[68] Writers on Indian and colonial matters increasingly connected imperial reform to cultures of reform at home in the 1830s and 1840s. So an entirely sceptical view of the relationship between reform and empire is difficult to sustain. The question must rather be, why did the empire matter *less* in the debates over the Second Reform Act than in those over the first?

A necessary part of the explanation must be the fundamental differences in the political circumstances surrounding the two reform acts. 1830-2 was a political crisis of massive proportions, serving to connect an extraordinarily diverse range of political issues with the demand for (or agitation against) reform.[69] Such expansiveness was nowhere to be seen in the renewed debates on reform after 1852. As the *Saturday Review* put it in 1867, the most striking contrast between the agitations for the First and Second Reform Acts was 'the practical character of the latter, and the more limited range of its expectations when compared with the dreams of a political millennium which roused the energies of the last generation'.[70] *Blackwood's* suggested that readers 'might as well compare a lonely mountain-tarn to the Atlantic, or a penny squib to an eruption of Mount Vesuvius'.[71] Under such circumstances, it is no surprise that the debate rarely touched second-string political issues like empire. There were further structural reasons why colonial issues were of reduced interest Because most people agreed on the basic idea of reform, there was much less grasping around for reasons to reject it wholesale.[72] Because the debate was focused on the franchise rather than on the distribution of seats, there was much less reason to give serious attention to the question of

colonial representation. And as far as the relative absence of *post facto* reflection on the imperial impact of the Act goes, we might note that public politics in the years after 1867 was not generally so suffused with reflections on the consequences of parliamentary reform as had been the case after 1832.[73]

Perhaps even more important, however, was the fact that the problems with the government and organisation of the empire which had been the cause of such heated controversy in the decades following the Great Reform Act were now understood to have been solved. The reopening of the reform debate in the early 1850s coincided almost precisely with a sharp decline in anxiety about the workings of Britain's imperial system.[74] In the 1860s, colonial policy was generally seen to be essentially apolitical (or at least to be outside of partisan politics), to work on the basis of fixed principles, and ultimately to be of limited interest.[75] The *Saturday Review* commented in 1862 that there was 'no department of our administration in which changes of national policy are less violent and sudden than in that which regulates the relations between Great Britain and her dependencies'.[76] The consequence of settler self-government, and of the domestic parties' agreement on it, was that the colonies' political troubles 'may generally be regarded with dispassionate curiosity'.[77] Through all the vicissitudes of later-Victorian imperial politics, too, it continued to be maintained that the system of colonial government had been re-founded on a sounder basis at mid-century.[78]

The result was that no question relating to the colonies agitated politics in the 1850s and 1860s in anything like the same ways, or to anything like the same extent, as in the preceding decades. Contemporaries were aware of this change. Robert Lowe wrote in 1861 that 'from a muddling tyrant the Colonial Office has sunk into a mere parasite of the Colonies,' and that 'there is more danger of dismembering the empire by over-indulgence than by over-interference'.[79] The Earl of Kimberley observed the next year that 'there have been no colonial questions' since Lord

Grey's administration of the colonial office in 1846-52, 'because the colonies are now wisely left to govern themselves'.[80] The Marquess of Sligo contrasted the 'loyalty and contentment' of the colonies in 1864 'with the state of feeling which I remember five and twenty years ago, when the mother country was always spoken of as an unjust and wicked stepmother'.[81] There were simply not that many perceived problems in the empire which *could* have been connected with constitutional reform; and earlier narratives about the tyranny of the Colonial Office, which had served as the central point of connection between imperial and domestic politics, had lost their power. In short, the debates over the Second Reform Act fell at a moment when it was no longer straightforward to connect parliamentary reform with empire.

How do the debates on the Third Reform Act compare? Briefly, they look more like those over the Second than those over the First. Empire was certainly a more prominent theme in British politics in the 1880s than it had been in the 1860s; but, again, it was not prominent in a way that made it easy to connect with constitutional reform. The increasingly technical nature of debate over reform was a major factor here, serving to keep the issue relatively separate from other political concerns.[82] The empire did not feature at all in the debates over the 1883 Corrupt Practices legislation; and where connections were made between empire and reform in 1884-5, they were in much the same vein as those outlined in the previous section. The same points about the desirability (or otherwise) of assimilating British institutions and practices to those of Australia (or America) cropped up again;[83] as did debates about whether overseas examples were worth studying;[84] as did the points about the globe-spanning imperial interests of the house of commons requiring electors to be properly chosen;[85] as did desultory interest in promoting colonial emigration.[86] There were a few novelties. Unlike in the debates around the Second Reform Act, some anxiety was expressed that newly enfranchised working-class electors might be indifferent to imperial interests and might not support imperial wars, and attempts were made to reframe the question of imperial unity as a working man's one.[87] Some

supporters of the Imperial Federation movement hoped that the opportunity might be taken to advance what was described as the 'intimate and unexpected connection' between federation and parliamentary reform.[88] So points of connection were identified in the 1880s that had not been in the 1860s. But much more importantly, they were still desultory, and extremely limited in number and significance. This underlines the exceptionality of 1830-2 even more strongly.

It is hard to see, then, that the empire was integrally related to Victorian debates about parliamentary (and/or constitutional) reform. A particular set of circumstances in 1830-2 had made imperial issues *more* relevant: but the Second and Third Reform Acts were conceived and debated in very different, and considerably calmer, political circumstances. After the early 1850s the major threats to the empire were seen to come from outside, rather than from inside, the British political system; and the empire mattered less in reform debates because it had benefited from, and contributed to, a general refurbishment of the image of the British state.[89]

III

This article has argued that those who write about the Second Reform Act without taking much account of the empire have solid grounds for doing so – at least, in so far as we can tell from the language used in the debates over reform. The empire was not a subject of frequent reference or analogy, and what references and analogies were made were not particularly powerful or persuasive. Discussion of imperial precedents clearly mattered far less than discussion of American and French ones, and there was no expectation that reform would precipitate changes in imperial policy. This helps to account for the absence of any discernible shift in the way the empire was debated immediately after 1867. While it is possible to assemble a set of quotations which demonstrate that *some* contemporaries were thinking seriously about the empire when they talked about reform, when we take the reform debates as a whole the imperial component appears insignificant.

The debates over the Second Reform Act, moreover, were clearly less 'imperial' than those over the First and even the Third Acts. This is not to say that the empire mattered *very* much in any of these conjunctures of constitutional reform. But in the 1860s, imperial problems were connected much less readily with prominent themes and issues in domestic politics than was the case in the 1830s or even the 1880s. Arguments about franchise extension couched in imperial terms were less likely to suggest themselves and less likely to carry persuasive force. This highlights a need for historians to be clearer about how they conceive the relationships between 'background' discussion of imperial issues, and the mechanisms by which those discussions could come to influence mainstream politics. But the basic point that this article has sought to make is much less abstract: as far as we can tell from the writings and speeches of contemporary politicians and commentators, the Second Reform Act did not have much to do with the empire.

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[1] Bernard Semmel, *Jamaican Blood and Victorian Conscience: the Governor Eyre Controversy* (Westport, 1976), 81-5, 134-5.

[2] R.W. Kostal, *A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law* (Oxford, 2005), 162-3, 133. Kostal also makes important points about the organisational overlaps between the Reform League and the Jamaica Committee: 177-8, 185-6.

[3] Freda Harcourt, 'Disraeli's Imperialism, 1866-1868: a Question of Timing', *HJ*, xxiii (1980), 87-109. See also Freda Harcourt, 'The Queen, the Sultan, and the Viceroy: a Victorian State Occasion', *The London Journal*, v (1979), 35-56; Freda Harcourt, 'Gladstone, Monarchism, and the 'New' Imperialism', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, xiv (1985), 20-51.

[4] For criticisms see C.C. Eldridge, *Disraeli and the Rise of a New Imperialism* (Cardiff, 1996), ch. 3, and Nini Rodgers, 'The Abyssinian Expedition of 1867-1868: Disraeli's Imperialism or James Murray's War?', *HJ*, xxvii (1984), 129-49.

[5] Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900* (Princeton, 2007), 2, 26-7, 40-6.

[6] Miles Taylor, 'The 1848 Revolutions and the British Empire', *Past and Present*, clxvi (2000), 146-80, at 176, 178-9. See also Mira Matikkala, *Empire and Imperial Ambition: Liberty, Englishness and Anti-Imperialism in Late Victorian Britain* (London; New York, 2011), 10, which suggests that Robert Lowe's distaste for 'imperialism' in the 1870s was 'a logical development on the line he had taken when opposing the Reform Bill in 1866'.

[7] Catherine Hall, '"The Nation Within and Without"', in *Defining the Victorian Nation: Class, Race, Gender and the British Reform Act of 1867*, Catherine Hall, Keith McClelland, and Jane Rendall (Cambridge, 2000), 179-233, at 180.

[8] See also the earlier and more Birmingham-centric version of the essay, Catherine Hall, 'Rethinking Imperial Histories: the Reform Act of 1867', *New Left Review*, ccviii (1994), 3-29. For a methodologically similar take on the Great Reform Act see Catherine Hall, 'The Rule of Difference: Gender, Class, and Empire in the Making of the 1832 Reform Act', in *Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century*, ed. Ida Blom, Karen Hagemann, and Catherine Hall (Oxford; New York, 2000), 107-35.

[9] Antoinette Burton, 'New Narratives of Imperial Politics in the Nineteenth Century', in *At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World*, ed. Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, (Cambridge, 2006), 212-29, at 213-6; Anna Clark, 'Gender, Class and the Constitution: Franchise Reform in England, 1832-1928', in *Re-Reading the Constitution: New Narratives in the Political History of England's Long Nineteenth Century*, ed. James Vernon (Cambridge, 1996), 230-53, at 237; James Vernon, 'Notes towards an introduction', in *Re-reading the constitution*, ed. Vernon, 1-21, at 10-12. See also Karuna Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton; Oxford, 2010), 38; and *Politics and Empire in Victorian Britain: a Reader*, ed. Antoinette Burton (Basingstoke, 2001).

[10] Andrew Thompson, *The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Harlow, 2005), 127-9.

[11] Richard Price, 'One Big Thing: Britain, its Empire, and their Imperial Culture', *Journal of British Studies*, xlv (2006), 602-27, at 619; Robert Saunders, *Democracy and the Vote in British Politics, 1848-1867: the Making of the Second Reform Act* (Farnham, 2011), 19-21.

[12] On this point see also Bernard Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain* (Oxford, 2004), xiii.

[13] Beyond mentioning colonies in potted biographies where appropriate, and highlighting when politicians were associated with the Colonial and India Offices: Maurice Cowling, *1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution:*

the Passing of the Second Reform Bill (Cambridge , 1967). More recent studies which omit the empire include Thomas F. Gallagher, 'The second reform movement, 1848-1867', *Albion*, xii (1980), 147-63; Janice Carlisle, *Picturing Reform in Victorian Britain* (Cambridge, 2012).

[14] F.B. Smith, *The Making of the Second Reform Bill* (Cambridge, 1966), 76-8, 230.

[15] Saunders, *Democracy and the vote*, 24.

[16] Saunders, *Democracy and the vote*, ch. 5; Robert Saunders, '"Let America be the Test": Democracy and Reform in Britain, 1832-1867', in *The American Experiment and the Idea of Democracy in British Culture, 1776-1914*, ed. Ella Dzelzaines and Ruth Livesey (Farnham, 2013), 79-91; Jonathan Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830-1886* (Cambridge , 2006), 243-9; Georgios Varouxakis, *Victorian Political Thought on France and the French* (Basingstoke, 2002), chs 3-4.

[17] Miles Taylor, 'Empire and Parliamentary Reform: the 1832 Reform Act Revisited', in *Rethinking the Age of Reform: Britain 1780-1850*, ed. Arthur Burns and Joanna Innes (Cambridge, 2003), 295-311.

[18] *Re-Imagining Democracy in the Age of Revolutions: America, France, Britain, Ireland 1750-1850*, ed. Joanna Innes and Mark Philp (Oxford, 2013; see also Richard Huzzey's remarks on the language of 'slavery' with regard to suffrage, in his *Freedom Burning: Anti-Slavery and Empire in Victorian Britain* (Ithaca, 2012), 78-81.

[19] E.g. Jonathan Parry, *The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain* (New Haven, 1993), 207-17. Angus Hawkins, *Victorian Political Culture: 'Habits of Heart and Mind'* (Oxford, 2015), 245-71, offers only a passing mention of Robert Lowe referring to Australia alongside other popular electorates, at 252. We also find no mention of any possible connection between reform and empire in seminal works like Eugenio Biagini, *Liberty, Retrenchment, and Reform: Popular Liberalism in the Age of Gladstone, 1860-1880* (Cambridge, 1992); Jon Lawrence, *Speaking for the People: Party, Language, and Popular Politics in England, 1867-1914* (Cambridge, 1998); James Vernon , *Politics and the People: a Study in English Political Culture, c. 1815-1867* (Cambridge, 1993).

[20] C.C. Eldridge, *England's Mission: the Imperial Idea in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-1880* (London; Basingstoke, 1973), chs 1-3; R. Koebner and H.D. Schmidt, *Imperialism: the Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840-1960* (Cambridge, 1964), ch. 4.

[21] Edward Beasley, *Empire as the Triumph of Theory: Imperialism, Information, and the Colonial Society of 1868* (Abingdon, 2005); Edward Beasley, *Mid-Victorian Imperialists: British Gentlemen and the Empire of the Mind* (Abingdon, 2005); Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain*.

[22] E.g. Gregory Claeys, *Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850-1920* (Cambridge, 2010).

[23] Richard Huzzey, 'Minding Civilization and Humanity in 1867: a Case Study in British Imperial Culture and Victorian Anti-Slavery', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, xl (2012), 807-25.

[24] It is mainly the third and fourth of these categories that Taylor sees as operative in 1830-2: Taylor, 'Empire and Parliamentary Reform'.

[25] The fullest existing study of public opinion on this theme is Stanley R. Stembridge, *Parliament, the Press, and the Colonies, 1846-1880* (New York; London, 1982), chs 3-5.

[26] Canada barely featured in the reform debates on its own account, except as part of a more general category of 'free colonies'. Those who did mention it tended to have spent time there (e.g. Goldwin Smith, *Address Delivered by Goldwin Smith, M.A., to the Members of the Oxford Reform League and their Friends, in the Council Chamber, Oxford, on Tuesday, July 17, 1866*, 16).

[27] The only substantive parliamentary mention of India in the reform debates came when John Bright read a letter from a working man highlighting the sacrifices his order made for the good of the country, including the death of his youngest brother in an Indian war: Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., cliii, col. 790: 24 Mar. 1859.

[28] Joshua Walmsley, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., cxx, col. 98: 25 Mar. 1852. For the same point later on see e.g. W.E. Forster, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxviii, col. 1649: 8 May 1865; *Speech of Edmond Beales, Esq., M.A., President of the Reform League, at the Meeting at St Martin's Hall, in Support of the League, May 13, 1865* (London, 1865), 8.

[29] Henry Fawcett, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxii, col. 208: 13 Mar. 1866; and see also John Bright, col. 224.

[30] Henry Tufnell, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., cxxx, col. 520: 13 Feb. 1854; Lord Lyndhurst, Hansard, *Lords Debates*, 3rd ser., cxlix, cols 1775-6: 27 Apr. 1858.

[31] John Stuart Mill, *Personal Representation* (London, 1867), reprints Mill's House of Commons speech on the subject and adds appendices about (among other places) New South Wales and Victoria.

[32] Some of the most thorough parliamentary analyses of Australia are to be found in Henry Berkeley, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., cl, cols 1739-40: 8 June 1858; Alexander Beresford Hope, cols 1757-8.

[33] Leslie Stephen, 'On the Choice of Representatives by Popular Constituencies', in *Essays on reform*, 85-126, at 92.

[34] William Gregory, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxviii, cols 1624-5: 8 May 1865; Viscount Cranbourne, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxii, cols 231-2: 13 Mar. 1866; Samuel Laing, Hansard,

Commons Debates, 3rd ser., clxxxii, col. 1318: 13 Apr. 1866; Robert Lowe, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxii, cols 2105-6: 26 Apr. 1866.

[35] Robert Lowe, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxii, col. 159: 13 Mar. 1866.

[36] The historian of the ballot is surprisingly uninterested in Australia: Bruce L. Kinzer, *The Ballot Question in Nineteenth-Century English Politics* (New York; London, 1982).

[37] E.g. John Bonham-Carter, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clvi, cols 784-5: 9 Feb. 1860; versus Matthew Marsh, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., cl, cols 1766-7: 8 June 1858.

[38] William Gregory, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxviii, col. 1625: 8 May 1865. See also Kenneth Macaulay, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clviii, cols 538-4: 3 May 1860; Earl Grey, Hansard, *Lords Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxviii, cols 1816-17: 22 July 1867.

[39] George Goschen, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxii, col. 1966: 23 Apr. 1866; [W.F. Rae], 'The Future of Reform', *Westminster Review*, xxxii (1867), 161-88, at 162; *Examiner*, 28 Apr. 1866, [257]; William Gladstone, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clviii, col. 644: 3 May 1860.

[40] Earl Russell, Hansard, *Lords Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxiv, col. 659: 26 June 1866.

[41] Hall, '"The Nation Within and Without"'.

[42] One of the fullest analyses of Australian institutions presented during the Reform debates is to be found in a chapter in *Essays on reform*, but the battery of reviewers who took on the *Essays* rarely said anything about it: C.H. Pearson, 'On the Working of Australian Institutions', in *Essays on Reform* (London, 1867), 191-216. For the reception see Christopher Harvie, *The Lights of Liberalism: University Liberals and the Challenge of Democracy, 1860-86* (London, 1976), 138, and see ch. 6 for the context in which the two collections were written. Another of the most sustained 1860s discussions of what Australian politics might teach England postdates the Reform Act: [Sheldon Amos], 'Democratic Government in Victoria', *Westminster Review*, xxxiii (1868), 480-523.

[43] E.g. Edward Bulwer Lytton, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., cliii, col. 554: 22 Mar 1859.

[44] Robert Lowe, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxii, col. 2104: 26 Apr. 1866.

[45] [Robert Thynne], 'The Australian Colonies', *Edinburgh Review*, cxxi (1865), 349-83, at 351.

[46] It is unclear on what grounds F.B. Smith declares that Australian examples were 'compelling for those members who were averse to Reform', but he rightly notes that 'the lessons from France and America aroused more immediate reactions': Smith, *Second Reform Bill*, 78.

[47] Nor had it done when Indian government was being recast between 1857-9, at the same time as Reform was again assuming political prominence. It is possible to find only passing references, e.g. Colonel Sykes, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., cxlviii, cols 1631-2: 18 Feb. 1858.

[48] Peter Taylor, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxvi, cols 1984-5: 3 May 1867.

[49] See e.g. [Abraham Hayward], 'The Reform League and the Parks', *Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country*, lxxiv (1866), 404-10, at 404.

[50] James Manning, *Thoughts upon Subjects Connected with Parliamentary Reform* (London, 1866), 5.

[51] Taylor, 'Empire and Parliamentary Reform'.

[52] General Peel, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxii, cols 1208-9: 12 Apr. 1866.

[53] 'Why We Want a Reform Bill', *Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country*, lxxiv (1866), [545]-63, at 553.

[54] Lord Harrowby, Hansard, *Lords Debates*, 3rd ser., cxxi, col. 1182: 27 May 1852; Henry Fawcett, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxii, col. 204: 13 Mar. 1866.

[55] Samuel Laing, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxii, col. 1319: 13 Apr. 1866.

[56] Stafford Northcote, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxii, cols 1819-20: 20 Apr. 1866. Also Lord Robert Montagu, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxiii, cols 1492-3: 30 May 1866; and in the other direction Lord John Russell, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clvi, col. 2058: 1 Mar. 1860.

[57] Lord Harrowby, Hansard, *Lords Debates*, 3rd ser., cxxi, cols 1182-3, 1185-6: 27 May 1852.

[58] James Wilson, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., cliii, cols 538-9: 22 Mar. 1859; Benjamin Disraeli, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxiii, cols 877-80: 14 May 1866, and clxxxvi, col. 659: 26 Mar. 1867. Others objected that men connected with the colonies had been able to achieve election for larger constituencies: e.g. Edward Cardwell, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxiii, cols 904-5: 14 May 1866, gave various examples including Gorst's election at Cambridge; William Gladstone, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxiii, cols 1885-6: 4 June 1866; Kinnear, 'Australian Institutions', 122-3.

[59] Lord Derby, Hansard, *Lords Debates*, 3rd ser., cxxi, cols 1187, 1191-2: 27 May 1852; Charles Newdegate, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., cliii, col. 475, 21 Mar. 1859; Henry Brookes, *The Peers and the People, and the Coming Reform* (London, 1859), 70-3.

[60] Duke of Manchester, Hansard, *Lords Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxxviii, cols 5-6: 18 June 1867 (but not a 2RA debate). Fuller schemes for how colonial representation might actually work were considerably rarer. Some took the climax of the reform debates in 1866-7 as an opportunity to republish pamphlets on the subject already disseminated in the 1850s: e.g. Colonel Henry Clinton, *A Reform Bill: a Fair and Full Representation, in the*

Parliament of England, for the whole English Empire (London, 1866). Others continued to roll out arguments they had been making for years: e.g. Joseph Howe, *The Organisation of the Empire* (London, 1866), 15-22.

[61] Cf. Ged Martin, 'Empire Federalism and Imperial Parliamentary Union, 1820-1870', *HJ*, xvi (1973), 65-92, and Michael Burgess, 'Imperial Federation: Continuity and Change in British Imperial Ideas, 1869-1871', *New Zealand Journal of History*, xvii (1983), 60-80.

[62] Though Hall mentions that assisted emigration was identified in Birmingham after the act had passed as one of the social and political questions likely to face the new electors: Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867* (Cambridge, 2002), 426-7.

[63] *Questions for a Reformed Parliament* (London, 1867).

[64] Even the promisingly-titled Thomas Briggs, *Proposals for an Indian policy under the new Reform parliament: the development of the dormant wealth of the British colonies and possessions* (1868), does not actually mention reform.

[65] Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism*, 272-4.

[66] 'Because their Colonial Policy encourages Self-Government and so encourages Loyalty and Contentment': *The Reason Why You Should Vote for the Liberal Candidates* (London, 1870), 3.

[67] Taylor, 'Empire and parliamentary reform'.

[68] See also Miles Taylor, 'Imperium et Libertas? Rethinking the Radical Critique of Imperialism during the Nineteenth Century', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, xix (1991), 1-23.

[69] Parry, *The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government*, chs 2-4; and see recently Robert Saunders, 'God and the Great Reform Act: Preaching Against Reform, 1831-32', *Journal of British Studies*, liii (2014), 378-99.

[70] *Saturday Review*, 29 June 1867, 813.

[71] [G.R. Gleig], 'The Bill As It Is', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, cii (1867), 245-56, at 245. For agreement from the other end of the political spectrum see [F.M. Drummond-Davies], 'Democracy', *Westminster Review*, xxxii (1867), 479-505, at 481.

[72] Robert Saunders, 'The Politics of Reform and the Making of the Second Reform Act, 1848-1867', *HJ*, l (2007), 571-91.

[73] For some hints about the relatively gradual emergence of the notion of the Second Reform Act as a political watershed see Robert Saunders, 'Democracy', in, *Languages of Politics in Nineteenth-Century Britain*, ed. David Craig and James Thompson (Basingstoke, 2013), 142-67, at 153, and 165 n. 61.

[74] Stembridge suggests that 1854 was the year in which colonial problems seemed to contemporaries to be at an end: Stembridge, *Parliament, the Press, and the Colonies*, 275.

[75] E.g. [Henry Reeve], 'Sir Charles Adderley on Colonial Policy', *Edinburgh Review*, cxxxi (1870), 98-122, at 99-100; [John Martineau], 'New Zealand and our Colonial Empire', *Quarterly Review*, cxxviii (1870), 134-62, at 134-6. Taylor notes the lighter-touch relations between the metropolis and the colonies after 1860: Miles Taylor, 'Colonial Representation at Westminster, c. 1800-65', in *Parliaments, Nations and Identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660-1850*, ed. Julian Hoppit (Manchester, 2003), 206-19, partic. 209.

[76] *Saturday Review*, 23 Aug. 1862, 209.

[77] *Saturday Review*, 23 Sept. 1865, 376. For similar mid-1860s heedlessness of Indian affairs see e.g. *London Review*, 31 Mar. 1866, 356; though cf. the always idiosyncratic Francis W. Newman, *English Institutions and their Most Necessary Reforms* (London, 1865), 10-20.

[78] Henry Reeve later argued that the years of the Melbourne administration had inaugurated 'a new and beneficent era of Colonial Government': [Henry Reeve], 'Lord Broughton's *Recollections of a Long Life*', *Edinburgh Review*, cxxxiii (1871), 287-337, at 317. For a very late-nineteenth-century articulation of this notion see Edward Salmon, 'The Colonial Empire of 1837', *Fortnightly Review*, lxi (1897), 862-90; and for the early twentieth century see Hugh Edward Egerton, ed., *Selected speeches of Sir William Molesworth, Bart., P.C., M.P., on Questions Relating to Colonial Policy* (London, 1903), xvi.

[79] Robert Lowe to Charles Adderley, 31 Dec. 1861, in William S. Childe-Pemberton, *Life of Lord Norton (Right Hon. Sir Charles Adderley, K.C.M.G., M.P.), 1814-1905, Statesman & Philanthropist* (London, 1909), 178.

[80] Earl of Kimberley, 6 May 1862, in *The Journal of John Wodehouse, First Earl of Kimberley, for 1862-1902*, eds Angus Hawkins and John Powell (Cambridge, 1997), 45. For further praise of Grey on this account see Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (London, 1867), 137.

[81] Marquess of Sligo, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., clxxiii, col. 16: 4 Feb. 1864.

[82] Jonathan Parry, 'The Decline of Institutional Reform in Nineteenth-Century Britain', in *Structures and Transformations in Modern British History*, eds David Feldman and Jon Lawrence (Cambridge, 2011), 164-86, at 182-3.

[83] E.g. William Baxter, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., cclxxxvi, col. 660: 24 Mar. 1884.

[84] E.g. Leonard Courtney, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., ccxciv, col. 666: 4 Dec. 1884; 'Representative Government in our Colonies', *Westminster Review*, cxxv (1886), 50-70.

[85] See e.g., again, Stafford Northcote, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., cclxxxvi, col. 1895, 7 Apr. 1884.

[86] John Boyd Kinnear, *Reform Questions in 1884* (London, 1884), 12-13.

[87] James Bryce, Hansard, *Commons Debates*, 3rd ser., 294:1518, 26 Feb. 1885; G.J. Goschen, *The New Democracy, its Duties at Home & Abroad* (Edinburgh, [1885]), 22-6. See also John D. Mayne, *The Coming Reform* (London, 1884), 6, which argued that working men could not be bothered to master information about the colonies.

[88] *Imperial Federation and Parliamentary Reform* (1884), 4.

[89] On the general point see Parry, 'The Decline of Institutional Reform'.