Journal article icon

Journal article

Bounds on the cost of stabilizing a cooperative game

Abstract:

A key issue in cooperative game theory is coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core---the set of outcomes that are resistant to group deviations. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. We investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using subsidies. We consider scenarios where an external party that is interested in having the players work together offers a supplemental payment to the grand coal...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1613/jair.1.11270

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS Division
Department:
Computer Science
Oxford college:
Balliol College
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS Division
Department:
Mathematical Institute
Role:
Author
Expand authors...
More from this funder
Grant:
RO-1202/{11-1,12-1,14-1,14-2}
More from this funder
Grant:
Starting Grant ACCORD (Grant Agreement 639945)
More from this funder
Grant:
Horizon 2020 European Research In-frastructure project OpenDreamKit (Project ID 676541)
Expand funders...
Publisher:
AI Access Foundation Publisher's website
Journal:
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research Journal website
Volume:
63
Pages:
87–1023
Publication date:
2018-12-27
Acceptance date:
2018-11-28
DOI:
EISSN:
1943-5037
ISSN:
1076-9757
Pubs id:
pubs:951380
URN:
uri:95d2724e-9d0f-435f-825a-20ab20d832ef
UUID:
uuid:95d2724e-9d0f-435f-825a-20ab20d832ef
Local pid:
pubs:951380

Terms of use


Metrics


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP