In Search of Solidarity: International Solidarity Work between Canada and South Africa 1975-2010

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, October 5th 2011

Total Words: 100,000
This thesis provides an account of the work of Canadian organizations that took part in the global anti-apartheid movement and then continued political advocacy work in South Africa post-1994. My central research question is: What explains the rise and fall of international solidarity movements? I answer this question by exploring the factors that allowed the Canadian anti-apartheid network to grow into an international solidarity movement and explaining how a change in these factors sent the network into a period of decline post-1994. I use two organizations, the United Church of Canada and CUSO, as case studies for my analysis.

I argue that four factors were behind the growth of the Canadian solidarity network: the presence of large CSOs in Canada willing to become involved in solidarity work, the presence of radical spaces in these organizations from which activists could advocate for and carry out solidarity work, the frame resonance of the apartheid issue in Canada and the political incentives the apartheid state provided for South African activists to encourage Northern support. Post-1994 all of these factors shifted in ways that restricted the continuation of international solidarity work with South Africa. Accordingly I argue that the decline of the Canadian network was driven in part by specific South African factors, but was also connected to a more general stifling of the activist work of progressive Canadian CSOs over the 1990s. This reduction of capacity was driven by the ascent of neo-liberal policy in Canada and worldwide. Using examples from a wide swath of cases I outline this process and explain how all four factors drove the growth and decline of Canadian solidarity work towards South Africa.
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<td>1.13</td>
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### Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAM</td>
<td>Anti-Apartheid Movement (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAN</td>
<td>Anti-Apartheid Network (Vancouver)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Africa Canada Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDC</td>
<td>Alternative Information Development Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Africa National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>Anti-Privatization Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGMs</td>
<td>Annual General Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC/BCM</td>
<td>Black Consciousness/Black Consciousness Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIC</td>
<td>Canadian Coalition for International Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCODP</td>
<td>Canadian Catholic Organisation for Peace and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCSA</td>
<td>Canadians Concerned with Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Christian Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDMAA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDMMA</td>
<td>Centre for Information and Documentation for Mozambique &amp; South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLC</td>
<td>Canadian Labour Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Coalition of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUSA</td>
<td>Council of Unions of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUSO</td>
<td>Canadian University Services Overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Development Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Dutch Reformed Church (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWO</td>
<td>Division of World Outreach (UCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSA</td>
<td>Eastern Central and Southern African Region (CUSO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPSA</td>
<td>Ecumenical Monitoring Program for South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOSATU</td>
<td>Federation of South African Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAWGSA</td>
<td>Inter Agency Working Group on Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCAF</td>
<td>Inter-Church Coalition on Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAFSA</td>
<td>International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFEE</td>
<td>Independent Forum for Electoral Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkhata Freedom Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILRIG</td>
<td>International Labour Research and Information Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRM</td>
<td>Inter Regional Meetings (CUSO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JGER</td>
<td>Justice, Global and Ecumenical Relations Unit (UCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCBO</td>
<td>Liquor Control Board of Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLA</td>
<td>Lesotho Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPM</td>
<td>Landless People’s Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Umkhonto we Sizwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New-Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMSA</td>
<td>National Union of Metalworkers South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCR</td>
<td>Program to Combat Racism (World Council of Churches)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACC</td>
<td>South Africa Council of Churches</td>
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<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACTU</td>
<td>South African Congress of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
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<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAEP</td>
<td>South African Education Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARG</td>
<td>South African Reference Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Surplus Peoples’ Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>SACTU Solidarity Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>SU CO</td>
<td>Service Universitaire Canadien Outre-mer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWA PO</td>
<td>South West Africa People's Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treatment Action Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCCR</td>
<td>Taskforce for Church and Corporate Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCLPAC</td>
<td>Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal’s African Colonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCLSAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
</tr>
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<td>USW</td>
<td>United Steelworkers (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSO</td>
<td>Volunteer Service Overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSSD</td>
<td>United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YWCA</td>
<td>Young Women’s Christian Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African Peoples Union</td>
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Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the generosity, compassion and hard work of numerous individuals. First of whom would be my wife, Lisa Sookhoo, who provided emotional and spiritual support over the last 3 years, and was also the breadwinner for our family as we travelled across the world. Nothing I have achieved gives me the pride and honor that comes from our amazing marriage! Just as essential to the PHD was the combined work of many activists who served not only as sources, but more importantly as friends and supporters over the last few years. John Van Mossel and Gary Kenny were essential to helping me clarify my research topic, with John going above and beyond the call of duty in facilitating contacts for me, spending many long conversations giving advice and sending materials in my direction. Jim Kirkwood, whose lifelong commitment to Africa is a true inspiration, was also critical in making this thesis possible, answering questions, passing on material and even accompanying me to the UCC archives. David Beer, John Saxby, Doug Miller and Joan Anne Nolan also went out of their way to help me get connected with the CUSO network. I also must mention Judith Marshall and Paul Puritt, both of whom set up interviews for me and helped me to become fully acquainted with the dynamics of the Canadian labor movement. Thank yous are also in order for Jim Hodgson and Jeanne Moffat, who gave me access to their personal archives. In fact the list of supporters who aided me from CUSO-VSO and the UCC is too long to list in full, but I must give a heartfelt thank you to both organizations and specifically, Derek Allen and Omega Bula, for giving granting me access and institutional support in my research. John Saul, Linda Freeman and Joanne Fairthweather were also of great help to this thesis, not just for the advice they provided me personally, but for the top notch scholarship they have done on this topic. In regards to research in Ottawa, the loan of a car from my brother-in-law Sam Munsammy and the accommodation provided by the Hawkings family were godsends, thank you as well.

In South Africa Fatima Bhayat was an incredible help, without her my ability to understand the ANC’s involvement in Canadian anti-apartheid would have been very scant. Martha Molete was another great supporter within the country, opening her home to me for two weeks of fieldwork in Johannesburg. For our second trip to Johannesburg Ruth Muller was a gracious host to me and Lisa. Nigel Crawhall was also most patient with my multiple requests for interviews and provided some excellent primary data. I also must thank the staff of the Surplus People’s Project (SPP) and the International Research and Information Group (ILRIG) in Cape Town for allowing
me to spend time as part of their team and get a feel for what South African activism means today. Ricado Jacobs and Hercelle Milford at SPP and Lenny Gentle at ILRIG all went out of their way to help my research proceed smoothly. I am also greatly indebted to the Ithemba Farmer’s Association for teaching me what Canadian-South African solidarity means in the 21st century. Keep pushing forward comrades, a luta continua!

South Africa can be a difficult country to get orientated in, but luckily Lisa and I were surrounded by great company that made our time there a once in a lifetime experience, including Kurt Orderson, Kim Munsammy, Rueben and Mechelle Tafari, Sean Muller, Ferdie, Yohanna and Judah Brown. Daleel Lilla, Aunty Naz and Salih Solomon, also deserve a special mention, for helping provide us with accommodation and making sure we were well settled in the city. Truly the days spent in Cape Town were some of the happiest of our lives and it would not have been possible without the wonderful people we met. And I can’t forget the Johannesburg crew, thanks Vusi and Boogie for the great times, without Boogie’s driving expertise I would have been totally at a loss in navigating the city.

I must also acknowledge my academic supporters. Thank you Gavin Williams for challenging me to think deeper and more intensely about this topic than any other academic task I have encountered before. Thank you Nic Cheeseman for being an amazing co-supervisor/supervisor, helping to ensure my work had the rigor and clarity it needed. It was an honor to work with both of you. Thanks also to David Anderson and William Bienart for providing timely advice as I put this thesis together. Of course none of this would have been possible without the help of the Rhodes Trust, whose scholarship opened up a new world of opportunities to me. And a special mention to Eric Martin, for his top notch proof reading and patience with working through my grammatical failings.

Finally I have to thank those closest to me; those who have helped me grow into the man I am today. First and foremost are my parents, who instilled in me the work ethic, discipline and inquisitiveness that was necessary to finish such a work. Without their continued love, support, care and commitment I would not be here at Oxford University, pursuing the highest possible academic level of achievement. I would also thank my wonderful parents-in-law, Edwin and Rita, along with my extended family and close friends in Canada and worldwide. Your visits, emails, welcome back parties and phone calls gave me the fire to continue. Not only have I been blessed with an amazing family, but also the best crew of friends in the world. To my mentors Harry Oussoren, Barry Rieder and Pam Shime: thank you for providing me with the wisdom and guidance needed to keep focused on my true calling.
And to those supporters in the UK, who helped me and Lisa as we went through an emotionally and financially challenging final year in London, my heartfelt thanks. Eric, Tom, Dee, Jenna, Ruth, Hashi, Julie, Darren and Daphne and family, we will miss you all dearly as we move back to Canada. Truly I feel that I stand on the shoulders of giants, my success impossible without the love that has surrounded me through these years and the constant companionship of God, through whom anything is possible.
'To you, brother, we offer
and from you we expect
not the hand of charity
which mystifies and humiliates,
but the hand of solidarity
engaged, committed.

How can you refuse, brother from the West?

**Brother from the West, Jorge Rebelo of FRELIMO, 1972.**

‘Once again, as in the early years of the battle over apartheid, a counter-hegemonic discourse has emerged within Canadian civil society in solidarity with the concerns of the dispossessed in South Africa. Generally this position is promoted in Canada by old allies, remote from the corridors of power—churches, trade unions, non-governmental organizations and academics.’

**Linda Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion (1998), p. 303.**
Part 1

Conceptualizing International Solidarity as a Political Process
1 Introduction

1.1 Thesis overview

From the mid-1960s up until 1994, thousands of Canadians mobilized as part of the global anti-apartheid movement. Central to the discourse of these activists was the idea that the work they were doing, whether it was writing letters, marching in the streets, holding information sessions or hosting Southern African speakers, was an act of solidarity. The anti-apartheid movement was one of many international solidarity campaigns that existed in Canada over this period, which collectively covered a range of issues from Palestine to Nicaragua to Chile. After 1994, when apartheid officially ended, the South Africa movement, which had raised millions of dollars and garnered support from across the country, collapsed. Yet for many activists the liberation struggle was not over: civil-political rights had been achieved, but the scars of apartheid left pressing issues of social justice unresolved. Over the 1990s and into the 2000s these activists attempted to keep solidarity with South Africa alive, working within new networks focused on solidarity with the entire African continent. But in a climate of general decline for the progressive civil society organizations (CSOs) that led the fight against apartheid, only a handful of international solidarity activities took place.
This thesis seeks to deepen our understanding of transnational activism, a growing area of interest to academics.¹ It is specifically focused on activism that involves political actors from the Global North, working with those from the Global South. My work helps develop a more systematic approach to the study of international solidarity campaigns by examining a variety of ‘international solidarity relationships’ developed between Canadian and South African activists from 1975-2010, with a focus on two organizations, the United Church of Canada (UCC) and CUSO (known prior to 1981 as Canadian University Services Overseas). My overarching research question is thus:

What explains the rise and fall of international solidarity movements?

Within this broad focus I also pursue a series of sub-questions:

1) What were the factors that allowed Canadian activists to expand the Canadian anti-apartheid network into an international solidarity movement?

2) How did these factors change post-1994 and what was the result?

3) To what extent do the actions of individual activists drive the expansion or contraction of solidarity movements and to what extent are these processes driven by external factors?

To answer these questions I have combined theoretical insights from various transnational activist scholars, in order to explain how solidarity networks evolve and ground my understanding of international solidarity work as a political process. I also have also developed a history of Canadian-South African solidarity work, and created overviews of the physical composition and discourses present in the solidarity networks that existed in both periods. At the same time I identified four factors that explain both the success of the anti-apartheid network and why Canada-South Africa solidarity work diminished post-1994. By doing this I have broken new ground in an understudied area of academic

inquiry and developed building blocks to aid the development of a comprehensive model for thinking about this distinct form of transnational politics.

1.2. Rationale for choice of focus area

1.2.1. Why the terms international solidarity and global North-South?

As Alan Fowler writes, Global North and South are shorthand labels for, respectively: the twenty-one OECD countries providing aid and those countries receiving aid, also labelled as ‘the developing world.’ I have chosen to use these terms instead of developed and developing world mainly for one reason: they are the terms most widely used today by the activists in Canada I am interested in. This is the same argument for the use of international solidarity: while transnational activism or transnational advocacy may enjoy wider circulation among academics, these terms have little currency among activists doing such work. As one of my goals is to produce a deep history of political events, which deciphers the activist culture at the heart of international solidarity work, using and engaging with terms which are employed within this culture is critical.

There is a valid question about whether the solidarity activities I have studied are truly international, or would more appropriately be named bi-lateral. This is because almost all of the work presented in this thesis is confined to exchanges between activists in Canada and their counterparts in South Africa. Yet this is reflective of how the greater international anti-apartheid movement functioned, as Bob Skinner has written: ‘…at no point, therefore, was there a single transnational network of activists, and the anti-apartheid movement must therefore be understood both as a ‘movement of movements’

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which encompassed a variety of forms of social and political organization, but also as a series of intertwined, but often disconnected, strands of activism.\(^4\) Thus during the anti-apartheid period, this thesis presents a bi-lateral Canada-South Africa strand of an undoubtedly transnational movement, making the use of the term international solidarity conceptually appropriate. Further, the Canadian work I present encompasses international elements. For example the anti-apartheid work of CUSO Canada was driven by the work of activists who were physically located in various Southern African countries, primarily Zambia.\(^5\) Also groups like the UCC or the Canadian Labor Congress (CLC) did take part in some limited international solidarity activism through multinational bodies, such as the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). For all of these reasons then, the term international solidarity has been utilized as the central concept of this thesis.

1.2.3. Why this research topic?

Both my research question and focus area grew out of work done for my Master’s dissertation in African Studies at Oxford University. This dissertation explored the development partnership between the UCC and the Zambian NGO Women for Change. During the dissertation I became interested in a line of post-Marxist left thinking which argued that if NGOs are to be successful in achieving meaningful transformation in the South, they have to link their development interventions to an overarching radical analysis of the causes of underdevelopment, and a political program focused on the empowerment of marginalized groups towards the transformation of the state and market forces that cause poverty.\(^6\) As this worldview was present in both CSOs I studied, I became increasingly interested in exploring organizations that operated within this paradigm.

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It also became obvious during my Master’s research that the anti-apartheid movement was the seminal transnational movement for activists from Canada’s ‘baby-boom generation,’ who had worked in CSOs utilizing such progressive worldviews. I also observed that the work of this movement had shaped Canada’s transnational activism and development initiatives around Southern Africa in many ways. For example, Women for Change had actually been founded in 1985 by Canadian staff from the CUSO field office in Lusaka,7 which was the heart of CUSO liberation support work towards the ANC and the critical node for connecting Canadians to southern African liberation movements.8 This all made it clear that if I wished to explore the role of Canadian progressive CSOs in development and political change in Africa, then transnational activism and specifically the legacy of anti-apartheid was a rich area to explore.

But as I began to survey literature on the subject, it became apparent that while a host of studies have looked at transnational activism over the last decade, there has been little close examination of the relationships between organizations within such activist networks.9 Further, most authors present organizations as actors in these networks, neglecting the critical importance of individual activists and competing sub-groups that exist within CSOs. These gaps in the literature coincided with my academic speciality in studying the internal dynamics of policy development and collaboration within NGOs. Thus, by looking in-depth at how solidarity policies develop within organizations, searching for the mechanics that govern solidarity relationships between organizations and then connecting this to larger political trends domestically and internationally, my thesis will add needed depth to studies of transnational activism.

It also contributes to larger debates in International Relations, where the role of non-state actors in shaping global politics has been an understudied area, but one of growing interest.10 Equally neglected

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is the question of how state interests form, and the way in which domestic political factors and the work of domestic actors influences their formation. Christopher Clapham notes that both of these factors are of the utmost importance for understanding African foreign policy. This thesis shows that while the end of the Cold War and the end of apartheid were very important to the collapse of the Canadian solidarity movement around South Africa, we cannot fully explain it without also taking into account domestic factors, such as how changes in the Canadian government’s official support to CSOs led to such organizations becoming less likely to join future solidarity campaigns. My research thus adds important qualitative data to these International Relations debates about non-state actors and the interaction of domestic and global politics. By utilizing the theoretical work of transnational activist scholars like Sidney Tarrow, Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink, then grounding it within specific domestic and organizational histories, I am contributing a nuanced and detailed work to the growing field of transnational activist studies.

1.2.4. Why these cases and questions?

The choice of Canada and South Africa, over these two periods, is motivated by various factors. The anti-apartheid movement in Canada was a large national movement and thus presents a wide range of collaborations to study and numerous individuals to interview, along with a number of Canadian-South African partnerships that began during the anti-apartheid period and continue today. Additionally, the fact that millions of dollars and thousands of people mobilized around South Africa up to 1994, with many organizations expressing an interest in continuing the work around South Africa after the election, only to have the mobilization and connections quickly diminish, gives a clearly identifiable problem to explore. Researching why this change has taken place provides a way to discern some of the external variables which drive cycles of mobilization and demobilisation in solidarity movements.

Further, due to my past employment at the UCC and my MSc research, I had developed a series of strong personal connections with individuals in Canada from the anti-apartheid network, some retired and many still employed in CSOs working in Africa. Through these individuals I was uniquely placed to gain access to internal movement documents, head offices, contacts from both periods and partner organizations in South Africa. Thus one motivation for selecting this period and my focus organizations was ‘to maximize the utility of information [gained] from small samples,’14 something my access allowed me to do. My choice of CUSO and the UCC came for a variety of reasons. For one, CUSO and the UCC are very different organizations. One was a development NGO focused on sending volunteers overseas, the other a mainline Protestant church. These differences allow them to serve as representatives of some of the variety in the Canadian solidarity network. They also are two important Canadian CSOs. In the 1970s CUSO was the largest NGO in Canada,15 while the UCC is the country’s second largest faith organization. As my history chapter (Chp. 3) explains, they were also both critical players in the anti-apartheid movement. Further, both organizations continued to work in South Africa post-1994, allowing me to use examples of solidarity work from each group from both periods.

The domestic and international movements against apartheid are also some of the most important social movements of the 20th century.16 And today South Africa has continued to be a country with a significant activist community, who conduct advocacy work in a series of important fields including: HIV/AIDS, land reform, access to basic utilities, immigrant rights and debt relief.17 Thus while conclusions garnered from apartheid and post-apartheid international solidarity work in Canada may be limited in their applicability to other cases, the movement’s role as a quintessential international social movement makes it important enough to be studied on its own. Further while anti-apartheid is a unique

17 Ballard et al., Voices of Protest, p. 2.
case, current work between Canadian and South African activists provides needed insights for studies of
North-South activist collaboration in other emerging economies or post-liberation contexts.

Finally, my work contributes to areas neglected by academic study. As Hilary Sapire notes, the
contributions of the Nordic countries, the US and the UK, have been the focus of most anti-apartheid
studies, while the history of countries perceived as being less prominent in activism, like Canada, remains
an emerging area of study. In regards to Canadian anti-apartheid there does not exist one seminal text
on the subject. Linda Freeman has produced the most comprehensive work on Canadian foreign policy
around apartheid, with some attention paid to the role of Canadian civil society in shaping government
actions, while Renate Pratt has written a detailed history of the work of Canadian churches in the
Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR). Joane Fairweather meanwhile wrote
a chapter on the history of the Canadian movement in the anthology *The Road to Democracy in South
Africa* and academic John Saul is working on a chapter on Canadian solidarity work for an official South
African Development Community (SADC) history on Southern African liberation. My thesis adds to
these works by bringing a more detailed examination on the makeup of the Canadian solidarity network,
while adding a political science focus on political processes and the interaction of social and political
factors on solidarity work that is largely absent in the existing texts.

Within the larger literature of the global anti-apartheid movement my thesis also adds a unique
approach. Exhaustive histories of anti-apartheid do exist for many countries. Tor Sellstrom has produced
a multi-volume history of Swedish support for liberation in Southern Africa, Donald R. Culverson has
written on American anti-apartheid and recent works by Denis Herbst and Roger Feildhouse on the
International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) and the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) have furthered

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19 Linda Freeman, *The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney years* (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1997); Renate Pratt, *In Good Faith Canadian Churches Against Apartheid* (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 1997).
20 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle."; John Saul, "Against the Grain: Support-Work for
Southern African Liberation in Canada and the United States," in *Unreleased manuscript of forthcoming SADC volume on the
existing histories of anti-apartheid contention in the United Kingdom. 21 Hakan Thorn and Audie Klotz meanwhile are the major scholars who have looked at anti-apartheid through an international relations lens, helping to link cases from the period to the larger field of transnational activist studies. 22 My thesis in a way sits between these two existing approaches. My focused, historical analysis on the inner workings of two case study groups has similarities to Feildhouse’s detailed analysis of AAM, while my broader conclusions about how international solidarity functions as a political process has similarities with Thorn and Klotz’s research. The major difference is that none of these authors have attempted to extend their analysis in any detail to solidarity work subsequent to 1994. While South African scholars, notably in Richard Ballard’s ‘Voices of Protest,’ have considered how South African civil society changed between the apartheid and post-apartheid period 23 no authors have taken such a detailed approach to understanding change over the two periods within international solidarity movements.

To the best of my knowledge this thesis is the first study to ask why international solidarity work with South Africa, and certainly Canadian international solidarity work with South Africa, decreased so abruptly after 1994. One reason for this is that the change is perceived as being self explanatory: apartheid ended so solidarity work ended. Yet this assumption grossly simplifies history and ignores the fact that post-1994, various groups in Canada seemed to have the capacity, connections and inclination to continue working with South African counterparts in a politicized manner. 24 Movement veteran and Southern Africanist John Saul is one of the few academics to have given thought to this question. His argument, that the lack of an overtly socialist position within the movement led to activists not paying sufficient attention to the economic aspects of South African liberation, and settling for an incomplete ‘false decolonization’ after 1994 is intriguing. 25 But it’s far from a complete answer, as even groups like

22 Hakan Thorn, Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society (Basingstoke England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Audie Klotz (a), Norms in International Relations: The struggle against apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
23 Ballard et al., Voices of Protest.
24 Sutton, “Canadian Solidarity.”
25 John Saul (a), "General Research Directions: Liberation Support from beyond the War-Zone" (paper presented at the Hashim Mbita Project of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Dar es Salaam, 2009), p. 2.
the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern African Colonies (TCLSAC), which Saul led for many years and retained such an analysis, still ran out of energy by the early 2000s.26 Thus a systematic analysis of this decreased mobilization, like other social movement academics have done in studies of the dwindling of the American civil rights movement,27 is worthwhile. This is especially so given that some of the factors I have uncovered, such as changes in how the federal government views activist work by CSO’s, are highly relevant issues in contemporary Canada, in light of the KAIROS Canada controversy.28

1.3. Defining key terms

1.3.1. What is international solidarity?

As Hakan Thorn notes, solidarity was the ‘central identity concept’ shared by activists in the anti-apartheid movement, who perceived themselves as being connected through a collective identity centred on membership in an imagined community of ‘solidarity activists.’29 Today the term solidarity is less central in CSO discourse, replaced by the term partnership. But solidarity, specifically international solidarity, still remains a critical concept for groups who take on a more radical view of development.

Due to this fact the term is prevalent in studies of transnational activism, appearing in numerous works on the subject, including: *Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity; Collaboration with the South: Agents of aid or solidarity?;* and *Locating Transnational Activists: Solidarity with and beyond Propinquity.*30

Though solidarity is a term which is familiar to both activists and political scientists, ‘of all the concepts that form the constellation of modern political thought, surely solidarity is a strong candidate for

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26 Saul, “Against the Grain,” p. 10.
28 The KAIROS Canada scandal is described in Chapter 5, a recent issue where a Canadian NGO with roots in the anti-apartheid movement was controversially defunded by the Federal Government of Canada in 2010 for its solidarity work around Israel-Palestine.
29 Thorn, *Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society*, p. 207.
most challenging.’\textsuperscript{31} At once ‘both influential and under theorized, the concept of solidarity appears to function across a startling range of discourses.’\textsuperscript{32} Even if one was able to refine the search for a theory of international solidarity to exclusively within ‘solidarity movements,’ the ambiguity remains, partly because international solidarity movements are also woefully under-theorized.\textsuperscript{33}

Despite these barriers, finding a workable definition of international solidarity is possible. The first step to creating such a definition is to understand the history and origins of the term. Ideas of political solidarity first developed during the 19th century following the French revolution, influenced over time by Christian ethics, Enlightenment humanist values and socialist thinking.\textsuperscript{34} While Christians and humanist intellectuals were certainly involved in the precursors of contemporary international solidarity movements, such as the abolitionist movement or anti-imperialist groups, it was within the socialist tradition that the idea of international solidarity, or internationalism, truly developed in the early parts of the 20th century.\textsuperscript{35} Based on cosmopolitan values, turn of the century socialist movements, embodied best in the First and Second International Working Men’s Association (1864-1873 and 1889-1917), argued that nations were irrelevant to workers and called for workers of the world to unite.\textsuperscript{36} These original conceptions of international solidarity would mark the start of a form of global consciousness that would characterize future movements.\textsuperscript{37} Global working class solidarity would remain at ‘the heart of the left during most of the 20th century,’ motivating activities such as the International Brigades that served during the Spanish civil war.\textsuperscript{38}

In the 1970s, third world solidarity groups developed, of which the global anti-apartheid movement was one of the most important, concerning themselves with issues of development and the

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., pp. 8-9.
\textsuperscript{36} Olesen, \textit{International Zapatismo}, p. 103; Keck and Sikkink, \textit{Activists Beyond Borders}, p. 82.
\textsuperscript{37} Keck and Sikkink, \textit{Activists Beyond Borders}, p. 82.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
anti-colonial struggles in the Global South. Olesen notes that many of these organizations tended to have revolutionary aims and ‘considered themselves to be alternatives to established and state-led forms of development aid... solidarity work thus consisted in aiding revolutionary movements struggling for socialist social change in their home countries.’ Yet these ideas were not confined to socialist organizations. Over the 1970s and 1980s they became part of the lexicon of various groups working in the third world, and as Lister notes, ideas of international solidarity actually inspired the original use of the term ‘development partnership’ by NGOs.

Despite this proliferation of the term international solidarity, understanding what it exactly means is difficult. One reason is the fact that solidarity is both normative and descriptive. International solidarity can both describe a specific political phenomenon while also existing as a political ideal. It can capture both social reality and human desire. Different authors tend to stress different elements. Some scholars focus on defining international solidarity as a form of action, either as variety of tactics or a single idealized way for groups in the North to engage in joint political action with those in the South.

To others, international solidarity is a form of a consciousness. It is a mind state where individuals recognize their interconnection and interdependence and then decide to join together in common struggle around common goals, despite barriers of nationality. Other authors would define international solidarity as an expression of political altruism, distinct from the solidarity shown between individuals with shared struggles (like workers with a common employer), because activists in the North engage in political struggle around issues in the South they have no stake in, simply out of a sense of

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40 Olesen, *International Zapatismo*, p. 103.
moral or ethical responsibility. Hakan Thorn, when writing about international solidarity in the anti-apartheid movement, stresses how the concept of solidarity had a wide number of meanings to many different constituencies, reflecting the fact that the movement drew from individuals within ‘a whole galaxy of left wing or progressive movements.’ I will argue that despite the varied understandings of solidarity and international solidarity that exist, one can still produce a common definition, as long as this definition is flexible enough to recognize there are various streams of international solidarity discourse.

My thesis employs the working definition: *International solidarity is a form of international cooperation, involving activists in multiple countries, around the achievement of a specific political struggle. This usually involves co-operation between activists in the Global North and Global South, around a specific Southern issue, but is distinct from international development aid due to its political goals and relation to a shared solidarity discourse. Encompassing both normative and descriptive elements, international solidarity is both a form of political action and an idealized conception of transnational relations.*

1.3.2. International solidarity work as a political process

My approach to understanding international solidarity work is outlined in depth in Chapter 2. To start with I define the political struggles that international solidarity activists work on as international solidarity campaigns (such as the international campaign to prevent the 2003 Iraq War). Within a campaign, different organizations will work in collaboration to carry out a series international solidarity activities. The network of organizations that develops to support the campaign can either be classified as an international solidarity movement or an international solidarity advocacy network.

The concept of an international solidarity advocacy network is indebted to scholarship on transnational advocacy networks developed by Keck and Sikkink. They define advocacy networks as

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47 Thorn, *Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society*, pp. 1 and 41.
groups of citizens from around the world, who create linkages to share information in order to capitalize on public concern over a specific social issue, which then influences global norms and in turn state action.\textsuperscript{48} The concept of an international solidarity movement meanwhile builds on Tarrow’s ideas of transnational social movements, which he defines as ‘socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic order.’\textsuperscript{49} The difference between an advocacy network and a movement is thus partially one of tactics (information dissemination vs. more direct contentious action), but an even more crucial distinction has to do with the issue of participation.

Evalyn Tennant outlines this difference in her categorization of two forms of transnational activist networks, the professional and the participatory.\textsuperscript{50} Similar to Sikkink’s idea of transnational advocacy networks, Tennant defines a professional activist network as one centred around NGOs, that does not encompass a broad membership, and has most of its advocacy work done by professional staff, with activities generally restricted to NGO head offices in national capitals and key global cities.\textsuperscript{51} A participatory network meanwhile is much less hierarchal in its decision making structures, is based on a mass participation/membership and incorporates different grassroots organizations that are located across a domestic polity.\textsuperscript{52}

Combining elements of these ideas, I define an international solidarity advocacy network as a transnational network centred on professional activists, employed in CSOs, who attempt to use the dissemination of information and political advocacy to forward the goals of their solidarity campaign. An international solidarity movement meanwhile is a less centralized, broad based network, with a wide base of grassroots participants, filled with volunteers, who are actively involved in continuous political actions

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\textsuperscript{48} Keck and Sikkink, \textit{Activists Beyond Borders}, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{49} Della Porta and Tarrow, \textit{Transnational Protest and Global Activism}, p. 122.
\textsuperscript{50} Tennant, "Locating Transnational Activists," p. 2.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., pp. 10-12.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 22.
\end{footnotesize}
around a solidarity campaign. One way to conceptualize the different political spaces that can be involved in an international solidarity advocacy network or movement is the ‘solidarity chain,’ a term I introduce in Chapter 2, which describes solidarity activities as having four possible levels of action: grassroots level North, professional level North, professional level South and grassroots level South.

To understand how such networks change over time I utilize a modified version of Khagram, Riker and Sikkink’s theory of three stages of transnational activist network growth, along with Tarrow’s concept of protest cycles. Their theory argues that solidarity movements grow and decline in cycles; a cycle begins when individual CSOs come together to form an international solidarity advocacy network. At first this is a ‘dormant’ network, existing as a loose grouping of professionals exchanging information without a specific campaign. Such networks then can become activated by choosing to take on a specific solidarity campaign, coming together in greater collaboration and coordination in order to carry out the campaign. From this point it is possible that the network may expand to the point it no longer is an international solidarity advocacy network but a true international solidarity movement.

During anti-apartheid a true solidarity movement did exist in Canada, but post-apartheid the movement fell away, replaced by a loose international solidarity advocacy network of ‘progressive’ civil society groups that remained committed to supporting political struggles in the African continent. This shift will be outlined in Part 2 of my thesis, in Chapter 3, my history chapter and also in Chapter 4, where I describe in depth the different characteristics of the Canadian network in both periods. Whether it’s a solidarity advocacy network or a movement that gets involved in an international solidarity campaign, the endpoints are the same. Both seek to right a perceived injustice. This can be achieved through shifting global norms around an issue, which then leads to states changing their behaviour. Alternatively this end can be pursued through Northern partners advocating and lobbying their home governments, or directly supporting the capacity of their colleagues in the South to engage in domestic advocacy and direct action.

54 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 12.
I argue that movements are more viable networks for creating politically change than advocacy networks and that their creation is almost always desired by solidarity activists. The reasons are clear. For one, movements increase the chances of success in international solidarity campaigns because they are able to garner more legitimacy in the eyes of society and states. No activist wants to portray their cause as simply being fought for by professional CSO activists; instead, activists desire to portray their cause as being actively supported by a wide swath of the general public at home and in the Southern country. But along with the benefits around legitimacy, there are also practical advantages movements confer, namely their ability to allow solidarity activities to be launched from a wide variety of local spaces and their ability to gather large numbers of supporters for direct actions.

Before moving forward it is important to take note of the importance of individuals. While my work originally began with a focus on the organizational level, it soon became obvious that a handful of critical activists were at the heart of anti-apartheid activism in Canada, moving throughout their careers between different organizations. This was similar to Hakan Thorn’s observations about the importance of key individuals within the global anti-apartheid movement. These activists brought the contacts and the trust-based relationships with South Africans that were needed to link Canadian organizations to the South African liberation movements. These were activists who made international solidarity with South Africa their life work. Thus this thesis integrates a focus on individuals throughout every section, constantly working to show organizations are not homogenous entities, by displaying the role of subgroups and individual actors in driving solidarity policies.

1.4. Explaining change in the Canada-South Africa network

If solidarity movements grow and decline in cycles, moving from loose coalitions of organizations to broad movements, the question at the heart of this thesis is what drives such cycles. I will

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55 Thorn, *Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society*, p. 29.
argue that four factors drove the development of a strong anti-apartheid solidarity movement in Canada over the 1970s-1980s, all of which changed during the 1990s. They were:

1) The ability to utilize existing networks for solidarity work: The fact that large Canadian civil society organizations, with established national presences and broad memberships, became involved in the anti-apartheid struggle.

2) The existence of strong radical spaces: The fact that in the 1970s-1980s there existed radical spaces within various progressive civil society organizations in Canada, which supported key South African solidarity activists, who could then internally lobby for their own organizations involvement in the campaign and also carry out solidarity activities.

3) The existence of an issue with a high level of frame resonance: The fact apartheid could be framed in a way the Canadian public could engage with and support, as a struggle against racism for civil and political rights.

4) The existence of strong Southern partners seeking solidarity support: During apartheid there was a robust internal network of organizations in South Africa, loosely united by the common goal of regime change and driven to seek support from Canadian organizations by a lack of internal political opportunities for creating change.

While factors three and four, with their focus on well known changes in South Africa post-1994 are widely recognized, my research has revealed that domestic Canadian issues, namely my first two factors, are equally important to understanding the rise and fall of the Canada-South Africa solidarity movement. While there were many small ‘third world solidarity’ groups involved in the Canadian anti-apartheid network, much of the large scale organizing, fundraising and advocacy was done by groups not explicitly dedicated to solidarity work, such as churches, unions and development NGOs. The involvement of these organizations was critical to movement building as these groups, which the UCC and CUSO will serve as detailed examples of, tended to have members and offices spread across Canada.
Thus accessing these existing church, union and NGO networks was critical to allowing the network to become a participatory movement. The importance of these groups will be illustrated in Part 2 of the thesis, in Chapters 3 and 4.

But these groups were not preordained to become involved in the anti-apartheid movement: in fact in the case of CUSO and the UCC, there were members who actively resisted such involvement. Crucial to these groups actually becoming involved in anti-apartheid, then, was the work of sub-groups of activists within each organization, who lobbied for their groups to support the anti-apartheid campaign. Radical spaces within each organization, where activists could gain access to the resources needed to build support for solidarity work within their organization and then carry out solidarity activities, were essential to this process.

Over the 1990s a series of changes took place that led to the general decline of the progressive civil CSOs that were at the heart of the anti-apartheid struggle. This led to these same radical spaces losing resources and independence. This process will be explained in depth in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 outlines the larger societal changes that led to this decline of progressive organizations, namely the construction of a new funding regime for CSOs in Canada over the 1990s, formed by the ascent of a more depoliticized, professionalized approach to development work in Canada and major cuts in government funding for Canadian CSOs. Also, while the 1970s was a time when activists were energized from various contemporary social movements, by the 1990s there was a noted decline in such activity and especially support for traditional CSOs like churches and trade unions.

These changes made the 1990s neo-liberal era more stifling to international solidarity work than the previous Cold War era, where anti-communist rhetoric had been a major barrier to organizing solidarity work around South Africa. Chapter 6 details how these macro changes unfolded within CUSO and UCC, first demonstrating how radical space was critical to the development of each group’s international solidarity policies, then showing how the pressure of the 1990s led to weakening of radical
spaces in both groups. It also shows how activist choices influenced this process, as they balanced the trade-off between making their spaces more isolated and thus more independent within their organizations, with making them become more institutionalized and protected, but less free to peruse radical actions. Many activists chose the route of isolation, which greatly increased the vulnerability of radical spaces in the 1990s when an era of fiscal austerity dawned. The result was that during the 1990s, many large Canadian civil society organizations became much less capable or inclined to become part of international solidarity campaigns.

My third and fourth factors are considered in Chapter 7. Factor three, the ease of framing the apartheid issue to encourage Canadian mobilization, is the most obvious factor. Framing is a term to describe how activists present a political struggle to a wider audience.\footnote{Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, *Frames of Protest: Social movements and the framing perspective* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), p. 2.} When a frame is able to mobilize a large section of the public to action it is said to have a high level of ‘frame resonance.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 11.} Apartheid, with its blatant racism and denial of people’s civil and political rights, was easy to frame to Canadians as an injustice.\footnote{Interview Jim Kirkwood (d), Toronto, March 3rd, 2011; Interview John Saul (b), Toronto, September 28th 2010.} In contrast, the political struggles currently being waged in South Africa (on economic inequality, land reform or unemployment) are much more complex and tend to lack a simple master frame to bring them all together, and thus have proved less able to inspire Canadians to action.

With respect to factor four, South African activists had very few ways to bring pressure onto their state domestically during the apartheid period. South Africans accordingly reached out to activists beyond their borders, encouraging compatriots in the West to run solidarity campaigns which would force their own governments and private sector to apply pressure on the South African government, exemplifying what Keck and Sikkink call the ‘boomerang effect.’\footnote{Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, p. 12.} With the advent of democracy in 1994, the incentive to seek this support disappeared, and South Africans ceased to actively seek the formation of solidarity movements in Canada. At the same time civil society in South Africa went through a period of
demobilisation in the mid-1990s, then became highly fractured as CSOs fought over whether or not to begin campaigning against the ANC government in the late 1990s. This has made creating solidarity partnerships more complicated than during the anti-apartheid period, especially as the network of CSOs that became most interested in solidarity in the 2000s were much more politically radical than their Canadian counterparts.

1.5. Research methods and challenges

1.5.1 My methodology

This thesis is a heuristic or theory generating case study, which seeks to develop initial insights into understanding international solidarity work as a political process. While the focus of the research was on two specific cases, CUSO and the UCC, the evidence I gathered was not limited to these groups and thus empirical data is brought in from a variety of Canadian-South African solidarity relationships that took place over the apartheid and post apartheid periods. Expanding beyond the two cases was essential to the thesis because international solidarity takes place within networks and movements; to simply isolate the work of CUSO or the UCC from the wider networks they were a part of in each period would lose the essence of the work they did. In order to fully capture the nuances of international solidarity work I used an interdisciplinary approach, combining methods used in ethnographies of NGOs and case studies of development partnerships with the network level analysis of activist politics used by Sikkink, Tarrow and Della Porta. I also employed an element of historical analysis, specifically in my work with the CUSO and UCC archives.

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My first step was to equip myself with the theoretical tools needed for the thesis, by surveying the major writings from transnational activist studies. This was combined with a review of different case studies of North-South NGO partnerships and an analysis of what philosophers and political scientists had to say about the terms ‘solidarity’ and ‘international solidarity.’ Data collection then took on a variety of forms. Some was historical research of the Canadian anti-apartheid movement and its South African counterparts. This involved reviewing secondary literature on the subject and interviewing movement veterans from Canada and South Africa. At the same time I sought to fully explore my two case study groups. To this end, I utilized data from my Master’s thesis: 6 interviews with UCC staff, a wealth of internal UCC documents and participant observation from my time with the group. I then interviewed an additional 8 UCC activists involved with the anti-apartheid movement and consulted the archival data held for the church’s Department of Word Outreach (DWO). For CUSO I interviewed 19 CUSO activists, reviewed the limited writings about the NGO and explored the organization’s archives at the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa.

In order to gain an understanding of contemporary activist networks in each country, I performed ongoing interviews with Canadian activists over the phone and in Toronto during the summer of 2009. Then from July 2010 to October 2010 more interviews took place in Toronto and Ottawa. Fieldwork in South Africa took place between from January 2010 to July 2010, with work done in Cape Town and Johannesburg. While in South Africa I interned at two NGOs in Cape Town. One was the Surplus People’s Project (SPP), a group that had been supported by the UCC over both periods and by CUSO post-1994. The second was the International Labor Research and Information Group (ILRIG), a partner of the Canadian United Steel Workers Union (USW), which had initially been my third case study. While this third case was dropped as a major focus (due the group’s lack of archives and the difficulty arranging interviews with union members), my time at ILRIG was nevertheless fruitful as it allowed me to study contemporary South African activist networks in depth, through both participant observation and the drafting of a paper on social movements in South Africa. In total I conducted 91 interviews and two
focus groups, leading to data collection from 95 individuals in total: 45 South Africans and 50 Canadians. 62 of whom were activists from outside CUSO and the UCC. Of these, 37 were conducted by phone, and six of those interviews were then followed up by second interviews in person. Phone interviews of course have notable drawbacks, specifically the fact they do not allow the interviewer to pick up on the body language of interviewees. Unfortunately with a limited budget for travel and interview subjects in a total of six different countries, the 31 exclusively phone interviews were essential to collecting data from such a large group of primary sources.

Despite this large swathe of data, there are still gaps. Even though I conducted a detailed investigation at the CUSO-VSO office and at the National Archives of Canada, I was unable to locate any of CUSO’s archival documents for the period after 1982. The executive director of CUSO-VSO is currently unaware of where these files are. Thus my knowledge of the organization in the 1970s (augmented by an insider’s account written by ex-CUSO director Ian Smillie) is much more detailed than later periods. There are similar gaps with the UCC, as the DWO archives on South Africa ended around 1994. For periods where I couldn’t find documents I was forced to rely more on interviews as a source of empirical data.

1.5.2. Research challenges

In retrospect the combination of secondary literature, primary source interviews, archival research and participant observation I assembled was essential to creating an accurate recounting of events. A major reason was the politics of knowledge creation. Practically every secondary source written around my topic was created by an activist directly involved in the campaigns surveyed. This is a constant methodological challenge with studies of global activism, as there is a danger that activist academics, in search for new forms of resistance, exaggerate the impact or strength of movements they study.63 Thus a kind of triangulation was needed: comparing written histories to interviews with the authors, their

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contemporaries, those of opposing camps, and primary documents, made for a much more nuanced understanding of events. It is not to say that Canadian scholarship about anti-apartheid or international solidarity is sub-par or fatally flawed. Nor is it to say there is no value in people intimately connected to events writing histories of them. It is simply to acknowledge the difficulty faced by anyone attempting to write a detached academic history of events they dedicated their lives too.

During the interviews it also became clear that there were (as with all left-wing movements) divides between certain organizations and activists involved in anti-apartheid solidarity. Instead of shying away from such clashes, I paid close attention to these divisions, attempting to hear voices from both sides, along with third parties. It was mainly through this examination of conflict and friction in the movement that I was able to tease out the variations in discourses and tactics that existed within the international solidarity networks in Canada. Of course this author is also not immune to biases. In order to conduct my participant observation I involved myself directly in the work of both SPP and ILRIG. At the same time, I have been a member of the UCC my whole life and an activist within the church for many years. Further, in order to gain access to these networks of activists I formed strong friendships with many of these individuals. Part of my ‘participant observation’ was to immerse myself in these networks, especially those of the mainly retired anti-apartheid veterans. In fact, a major source of my success in fieldwork was a small group of former anti-apartheid activists who spent many hours on my behalf, calling up old contacts, finding documents for me, arranging meetings and sending over personal files. Thus for myself it’s been an ongoing task to look critically at the work I’ve been involved with and the friends I’ve made in the writing the thesis, in order to avoid the temptation to romanticize the work done by these organizations.

But the opposite of romanticism is an unyielding academic cynicism, a constant search to show the failings and weaknesses of the activities of groups involved in international co-operation. In fact at times it seems the incentives in academic institutions are placed towards producing such works. Quarles Van Ufford discusses this phenomena, noting how contemporary studies of NGOs have become so caught
up in debunking and deconstructing notions of development that they rarely can teach us anything about how to build on the successes some organizations do achieve. Writing this thesis has therefore involved balancing these different concerns, and striving to produce reflective writing that highlights the success of activists while honestly considering their failures as well.

In the spirit of such reflective writing I believe it’s important for me to acknowledge my personal convictions; I see myself as an activist as much as a scholar and am quite partial to the radical perspectives of global politics and transformation that are evident in discourses of international solidarity. These views are contestable and normative, but for me to deny them would be intellectually dishonest. Yet at the same time I acknowledge that such political causes are done no service by romantic analysis. Thus as a scholar I have tried to my best to produce a presentation of reality and a theory of international solidarity that is critical and honestly investigates the various forms of international solidarity work observed, in the hope that such information can lead to more thoughtful, meaningful and effective solidarity in the future.

1.6. Chapter descriptions

The thesis is situated around three parts. Part 1 (Chapters 1 to 2) focuses on developing my theory around international solidarity, starting with my Introduction. Chapter 2 further outlines the theories I utilize, grounded in a literature review of transnational activist studies. Part 2 (Chapters 3 and 4) outlines the history and nature of Canadian solidarity work with South Africa. Chapter 3 provides a brief history of Canadian-South African international solidarity work between 1975-2010, with a focus on presenting the specific organizational histories of CUSO and the UCC. Chapter 4 then gives a more detailed overview of the Canadian network over each period, using the solidarity chain to analyze the width, depth and density of the networks in both periods, while also comparing the different types of solidarity discourses present. Part 3 (Chapters 5 to 7) then deals with explaining why a movement was

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successfully built during anti-apartheid and then outlines the causes of the decline in Canadian solidarity activities around South Africa post-1994. Chapter 5 begins by presenting the larger shifts around the Canadian funding regime and political culture in Canada that led to the decline of ‘progressive’ NGOs. Chapter 6 focuses on how exactly these shifts played out within CUSO and UCC through the reduction of radical space. Chapter 7 then looks at specific changes that took place in South Africa after democratization, which reduced opportunities for meaningful solidarity partnerships.

My conclusion, Chapter 8, considers the normative side of international solidarity. It grapples with the tricky question of legitimacy, exploring how the pursuit of ‘legitimate solidarity relationships’ affected the Canadian network. My focus will be on how Canadian groups during anti-apartheid developed competing policies for relating to South African organizations, presenting the tensions this caused and the effects such policies had. Specifically I explore about how Canadian organizations decided to relate to SACTU and the ANC. I then offer some tentative conclusions on what the legacy of the Canadian anti-apartheid movement tells us about how solidarity networks can create truly legitimate North-South relationships.
Theorizing International Solidarity

2.1. Chapter overview

This chapter will establish my theoretical basis for conceptualizing international solidarity work. While transnational activism is an area of increasing interest to scholars in both international relations and sociology,\(^6\) there is no one single theory that is sufficiently robust to explain all of my research questions. Accordingly one of the major contributions of this chapter will be to blend existing transnational activist scholarship into a concise theory for understanding international solidarity as a political process. Scholars speak of two major types of transnational activist networks, which can roughly be divided between advocacy networks and social movements. Together these form the basis for my concepts of international solidarity advocacy networks and international solidarity movements. I will define these terms by combing ideas from Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink, Sidney Tarrow and Evalyn Tennant. This thesis will also utilize an adapted version of a model developed by Sikkink, Khagram and Riker for thinking about how trans-national activist networks grow and expand. Based on their ideas, I argue that international solidarity work begins with international solidarity advocacy networks, which become ‘activated’ around a campaign (what they call a transnational coalition), and if the campaign is successful

\(^6\) Klotz, "Transnational Activism and Global Transformations," p. 50.
enough, evolves into an international movement. I argue that solidarity movements are the assumed
goal for most activists, because movements’ broad participation bestows higher levels of legitimacy and
deeper commitments towards their chosen cause. Movements also allow a larger range of possible
solidarity activities, namely coordinated direct action. But the growth of international solidarity networks
is not linear; instead it goes through cycles of mobilization and demobilization. Sidney Tarrow names
this process ‘cycles of contention,’ an idea I will introduce to increase the explanatory power of Sikkink,
Khagram and Riker’s theory of movement growth.

This Chapter begins with an outline of my approach to understanding international solidarity as a
political process, which I start by presenting a brief history of transnational activist studies, followed by a
detailed discussion on the differences between international solidarity advocacy networks and
movements. Next is a review of the theories I use to explain how transnational activist networks grow
and contract, followed by an elaboration of the details of the solidarity chain. In my second section, I
consider the implications of my chosen theoretical framework with regards to how the thesis will
conceptualize the global justice ‘movement,’ the most discussed transnational activist network of the
1990s-2000s. I argue that my work is in opposition to some trans-national activist scholars who claimed
the existence of a wide, all encompassing global movement against neo-liberalism over this period, as the
empirical data does not fit the definition of an international solidarity movement that I set out in this
chapter. Following this section I briefly review the theoretical backing for the thesis’ focus on the
importance of large CSOs and key individual activists.

66 Khagram et al., Restructuring World Politics, p. 6.
67 Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social movements and contentious politics (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2.2. The mechanics of international solidarity networks

2.2.1. History of the field

Literature on transnational activism combines insights from the constructivist tradition in international relations, with its focus on norms and their impact on state action, with social movement theories from sociology.\(^{68}\) International relations was slow as a discipline to give attention to the actions of transnational activists and their social movements.\(^{69}\) Scholars’ initial interest focused on non-state actors, specifically corporations and multinational organizations, and then moved to domestic groups that related to increasing global economic integration, like business associations.\(^{70}\) During the 1990s, attention within the field began to shift to other non-state actors, such as NGOs and religious organizations, groups who often acted in ways realist theories of international relations and 'rational actor' models would not predict, e.g. instances where actors were primarily motivated by values and principles instead of material incentives or the fact that collective goods were being threatened.\(^{71}\) These actors included transnational activists.\(^{72}\)

It was Keck and Sikkink who brought the concept of ‘advocacy networks’ to international relations theory, groups of concerned citizens from around the world, who create networks to share information, in order to capitalize on public concern over social issues and influence global norms.\(^{73}\) Building on earlier work that had looked at how ‘epistemic communities’ (international networks of experts like scientists or specialists in think-tanks) influence state action through the dissemination of research, Keck and Sikkink defined advocacy networks as groups of activists who use first hand stories, normative arguments and less formal evidence to educate the public about issues of global concern, in

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\(^{69}\) Klotz, "Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The Anti-Apartheid and Abolitionist Experiences," p. 56.


\(^{71}\) Ibid., p. 22; Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, p. 2.

\(^{72}\) Alan Hudson, "NGOs’ Transnational Advocacy Networks: From ‘legitimacy’ to ‘political responsibility’?," *Global Networks* 1, no. 4 (2001), p. 334.

order to leverage influence over the policies of global institutions and states.\textsuperscript{74} Their focus on norms as a driver of state actions puts Keck and Sikkink, and other transnational activist scholars who build on their work, squarely in the constructivist tradition within international relations. Constructivism is distinct from the two other long standing traditions in international relations. These are the realist school, which focuses on military or ‘hard power’ and analyzing the competition between states in an anarchic international environment\textsuperscript{75} and the liberal internationalist school, which considers how global institutions shape international affairs.\textsuperscript{76} Constructivism meanwhile looks at the complex interactions that take place between actors in global politics, specifically focusing on ‘the inter-subjective construction of frames and meaning, and on the negotiation and malleability of identities and interests.’\textsuperscript{77}

Keck and Sikkink’s work is highly indebted to social movement theory, for while constructivism brought a methodology for thinking about the impact of norms and ideas on state actions, it had a very limited history of theorizing about non-state actors.\textsuperscript{78} Scholars of social movements meanwhile had been considering these questions for decades, through their focus on how social movements emerge and influence domestic politics.\textsuperscript{79} Social movement theory began to take its current form in the 1970s, centred on the US based, resource mobilization perspective, an approach which considered how movement entrepreneurs worked to assemble people and resources to contest specific issues.\textsuperscript{80} During the 1980s European scholars expanded studies of social movements by incorporating elements of social constructivism, which brought attention to the formation of identities and the interpretation of grievances within social movements.\textsuperscript{81} In \textit{Power in Movement} (1998), Sidney Tarrow incorporated elements of these ideas around a third key strand in social movement thinking, the idea of political opportunity structures.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} Diehl, \textit{The Politics of Global Governance}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{77} Keck and Sikkink, \textit{Activists Beyond Borders}, p.4.
\textsuperscript{78} Khagram, et al., \textit{Restructuring World Politics}, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{80} Olesen, \textit{International Zapatismo}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
Political opportunity structures are defined by Tarrow as ‘consistent but not necessarily formal or permanent national dimensions of the political environment that encourage or discourage people from using collective action.’

Thus today there exist three groups of scholars who study social movements, those who look at resource mobilization (how political entrepreneurs access new resources to build movements), those who focus on framing (how political causes are presented and constructed to encourage mobilization) and those who focus on political opportunities (how political openings spur movements).

In the 1990s, just as a sub-field began to grow within international relations around transnational activism, social movement theory also began to focus on transnational politics. As the media increasingly broadcast stories of ‘anti-globalization’ protests, like the ‘Battle of Seattle’ in 1999, authors like Tarrow took notice, shifting their analysis to the global level. Thus the 1990s saw a high degree of cross fertilization between the fields of international relations and social movement theory, but ‘there was a lack [of] a systematic integration of international relations and social movement theories for ‘architectural’ reasons, notably the clashes over structural versus individualist ontologies which have figured prominently in both fields.’

In the 2000s, new work began to bridge these differences, but it would still be fair to say that transnational activism is not so much its own field of study, but more a research area shared by these two respective disciplines.

### 2.2.2. International solidarity work and activist networks

Before outlining the thesis’s main theoretical concepts, it is worth reviewing my definition of international solidarity: *A form of international co-operation, involving activists in multiple countries, around the achievement of a specific political struggle. This usually involves co-operation between*

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85 Della Porta and Tarrow, *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*; Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism*.
86 Klotz, “Transnational Activism and Global Transformations,” p. 54.
87 Ibid.
activists in the Global North and Global South, around a specific Southern issue, but is distinct from international development aid due to its political goals and relation to a shared solidarity discourse. Encompassing both normative and descriptive elements, international solidarity is both a form of political action and an idealized conception of transnational relations. As my introduction noted, when activists engage in a specific political struggle, through joining or establishing an international solidarity campaign, they do so through transnational networks. These networks can consist of two varieties, international solidarity advocacy networks and international solidarity movements.

My concept of an international solidarity advocacy network comes from combining the work of Keck and Sikkink on advocacy networks with Tennant’s writings around anti-apartheid and the idea of professional transnational activism. Keck and Sikkink’s definition of advocacy networks will form the foundation for it, while Tennent’s work helps to expand their definition to take into account the structure of activist networks and the different political spaces where actors are located in such networks. Keck and Sikkink write that ‘a transnational advocacy network includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchanges of information and services.’

These networks tend to centre on NGOs but can also include foundations, the media, churches, trade unions, intellectuals and local social movements. The term network is used to specify the structure that these activist groupings take. Networks are a unique form of organization noted for ‘voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange,’ distinct from the types of hierarchal relations that may exist in organizations like businesses or states. As Keck and Sikkink elaborate:

Networks are communicative structures. To influence discourse, procedures and policy, activists may engage and become part of larger policy communities that group actors working on an issue from a variety of institutional and value perspectives. Transnational advocacy networks must

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89 Ibid., p. 9.
90 Ibid.
also be understood as political spaces, in which differently situated actors negotiate—formally or informally—the social, cultural and political meanings of their joint enterprise.91

Tennant focuses her analysis on the geography of these political spaces, presenting two ideal types of transnational activist networks, the participatory and the professional. Her ideas on the professional network are based heavily on the concept of advocacy networks, but look at who the political actors are in such networks and where they are located. She notes that professional networks are centred on NGO’s, who tend not to have a broad membership, with most of their advocacy work done by professional staff, who are geographically located around head offices in national capitals and key global cities.92 She also writes that relationships in such networks tend to be centralized through these professionals and have hierarchal relations to local grassroots groupings.93 Such an arrangement is clearly seen in the activist network around Africa that has taken shape in Canada post-1994, concentrated in the national capital of Ottawa and in Toronto. The anti-apartheid network in Canada up the mid 1970s was also a professional network, with Saul noting that its work until this point was centred on the activities of ‘elites’: senior church officials, NGO staff and academics.94 Thus by combining Tenant and Keck and Sikkink’s ideas I am able to produce a usable definition of an international solidarity advocacy network: a community of activists, joined together by shared values and dense webs of communication, working on a specific cause, who attempt to create change through the dissemination of information and advocacy, with civil society organizations and professional activists at the network’s centre and weak connections to grassroots formations.

A transnational social movement meanwhile is a very different type of network. Sydney Tarrow notes that domestic social movements exist when citizens create ‘collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.’95 A

91 Ibid., p. 3.
93 Ibid.
94 Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 27.
95 Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social movements and contentious politics, p. 3.
challenge is contentious when ‘it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, act in the name of new or unaccepted claims and behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others.’ A transnational social movement meanwhile is, ‘socially mobilized groups, with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power-holders in at least one state other than their own, or against a international institution, or a multinational economic order.’ Sikkink, Khagram and Riker define a transnational social movement as ‘sets of actors with a common purpose and solidarities linked across countries, that have the capacity to generate sustained social mobilization in more than one country to publicly influence social change’ with the ability ‘to mobilize their constituencies for collective action, through the use of protest or disruptive action.’

These definitions of a transnational social movement nicely complement Tennant’s concept of participatory networks, which she notes are less hierarchal in their decision making structures than professional networks, based on mass participation or membership and incorporate different grassroots organizations that are located across a state. As Tennant writes:

if network ties were forged between localities within as well as across national state borders, rather than merely between national movement representatives from different nation-states, and if such ties were the means by which relevant information was shared, strategies and tactics developed and pursued, and collective identities forged, then we do in fact have a transnational movement, rather than an advocacy network linking national movements.

Tennant uses the US anti-apartheid movement as an explicit example of a participatory network and I would argue that the dense network of activist organizations that stretched across Canada in the 1980s, which maintained various connections to Southern African activists from different political spaces, meets this criteria. Thus an international solidarity movement could be defined as a network of activists that

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96 Ibid., p. 2.
97 Della Porta and Tarrow, *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, p.122.
100 Ibid., p. 8.
involves a wide membership of volunteers and professionals, connected through a shared political struggle and collective identity, working in multiple countries, with decentralized, dense linkages stretching across and beyond national borders, who are able to mount sustained, contentious, collective action.

At this point it should be clear why I argue that activists seek to expand their international solidarity advocacy networks into movements. As Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink note, only movements can organize ongoing protest actions, which are the most visible signs of the legitimacy of a campaign and its widespread social backing. And according to Tenant, participatory networks, which give room for local decision making and initiative, are also much more likely to generate ongoing support and enthusiasm from volunteers, who tend to be limited to letter writing and making donations in professionally driven networks. In the anti-apartheid movement in Canada we can see clear indicators that activists were seeking to build a national movement, whether it’s the declaration from the 1982 anti-apartheid conference in Ottawa that called for the expansion of support and mobilization around anti-apartheid work across Canadian society, or in the learning resources groups like the UCC developed that showed activists how to launch their own grassroots anti-apartheid actions in churches across the country. Thus while creating transnational social movements may be extremely difficult and rarely is actually achieved, it’s easy to understand why they would be a goal activists aspire to.

2.2.3. The evolution of solidarity networks

While the theories previously reviewed help to classify the different types of international solidarity networks that exist, they don’t explain how advocacy networks evolve into movements. Sikkink, Khagram and Riker help to answer this in their theory for understanding global collective action,

101 Khagram et. al, Restructuring World Politics, p. 8.
103 Canadian Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa (a), "Canadian Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa Flyer," United Church of Canada Archives, Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 91.164C, Box 10-9, Toronto (1982), p. 2; Division of World Outreach," World Outreach: Resource Suggestions on Africa," United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 88.031C, Box 7-2, South African Education Project: Educational Material, Toronto (1980).
which presents a three step pattern of growth, from transnational advocacy networks, to transnational coalitions and then to transnational social movements.105 This model starts with a transnational advocacy network, in what could be called a dormant stage, where there exists professional staff loosely organized around areas of common interest, meeting occasionally while generating and sharing information.106 When these networks decide to take on a specific global campaign, they then move to a higher level of organization and sustained coordination of tactics for its duration.107 If successful, this campaign may be able to garner a mass following and carry out contentious collective action in multiple countries, demonstrating it has grown into a global social movement.108 Thus Sikkink, Khagram and Riker present a clear theory for how the growth of transnational activist networks takes place, with advocacy networks as the base from which social movements may eventually form.109

Yet the growth of solidarity movements is not linear. As Tarrow notes, social movement activity, rises and falls depending on the emergence of political opportunities and constraints, going through what he calls ‘cycles of contention.’110 Social movements go through periods of mobilization, where actions spread rapidly across society, then eventually enter periods of demobilisation as exhaustion, polarization, institutionalization of the movement, repression or even movement success, lead to contention dissipating.111 When one cycle ends and movements or networks collapse, they may even transfer their contention to new campaigns, helping to spur new periods of mobilization. For example Tarrow notes that in the late 1990s many activists and networks involved with protests around neo-liberal globalization ended up transferring their contention to the brief global movement that developed to contest the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.112 Tarrow’s understanding of cycles of contention thus adds some nuance to Sikkink, Khagram and Riker’s theory on the growth of transnational activist networks.

105 Khagram et al., Restructuring World Politics, p. 6.
106 Ibid., p. 7.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., p. 8.
109 Ibid., p. 9.
110 Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 141.
111 Ibid., pp. 144-149.
112 Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism, p. 17.
What the data presented in this thesis does, in turn, is provide some empirical grounding for Sikkink, Khagram and Riker’s model, while also presenting my own list of case specific factors (the four factors) for understanding what drove the cycles of mobilization and demobilization in the Canada-South Africa network. If Sikkink, Khagram and Riker’s framework is accurate than it would be assumed that the anti-apartheid movement in Canada should have started from a small, tight network of mainly professional activists, generally interested in South Africa and related causes, which then have gradually expanded as they perused a South Africa specific campaign, until a Canadian domestic movement was formed to join with the other national movements involved in anti-apartheid work the world over. If instead a broad based, grassroots movement began first in Canada, only to then to evolve into a small network of committed professional activists, concentrated in national capitals, than the assertions of this model would be seriously undermined.

The reality is that my empirical data supports their model, as a loose network of professional Southern African solidarity activists formed in Canada in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and then took on a series of specific campaigns around ending apartheid in the mid-1970s and eventually created a national movement by the mid-1980s. Following 1994 this movement fell away, leaving the core professional activists to remain in an international solidarity activist network around issues pertaining to the African continent. This network has occasionally mobilized around different campaigns with some relation to South Africa (such as work around HIV/AIDS) but has not been able to develop into an international solidarity movement around any of these campaigns. This outcome, the aftermath of a successful solidarity campaign, is something Sikkink, Khagram and Riker’s model doesn’t consider, but fits with Tarrow’s idea that social movements work in cycles.

My major departure from Tarrow’s analysis is that I argue this period of demobilization was driven by changes to the four factors I identified in Chapter 1 as driving the growth of the anti-apartheid movement in the first place. These factors expand beyond Tarrow’s political opportunities framework, which focuses exclusively on domestic or international ‘resources’ or ‘constraints’ that lower or raise the
social costs of carrying out contentious action.\textsuperscript{113} Instead I consider a mix of domestic and global framing concerns, political shifts and specific organizational attributes of Canadian CSOs.

These four factors are:

1) The ability to utilize existing networks for solidarity work.
2) The existence of strong radical spaces.
3) The existence of an issue with a high level of frame resonance.
4) The existence of strong Southern partners seeking solidarity support.

Thus my theoretical approach to conceptualizing the Canada-South Africa network from 1975-2010 utilizes a variety of concepts and processes from the major thinkers in the fields, but also incorporates my own nuances and additions to create a holistic understanding of the topic.

\textbf{2.2.4. How solidarity networks create political change}

After explaining how solidarity networks grow and contract I will now consider how solidarity networks create change. Although this thesis is not focused on creating methods for evaluating the success of solidarity movements, a holistic understanding of international solidarity movements requires at least a basic understanding of how such movements attempt to make political change. As Keck and Sikkink noted, the primary way trans-national advocacy can influence political action is by creating and utilizing global norms, leveraging a type of soft power that forces governments and international institutions, through global public opinion and expectations of what proper behaviour should be, to change their policies.\textsuperscript{114} Many analyses of anti-apartheid are focused on norms, such as Audie Klotz’s \textit{Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid} (1997). As Gerhart writes about her work, ‘Examining the anti-apartheid cause as a case where a moral norm took on a coercive and socializing force in its own right, this study challenges established realist approaches by looking at how

\textsuperscript{113} Tarrow, \textit{Power in Movement}, p. 20; Della Porta and Tarrow, \textit{Transnational Protest and Global Activism}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{114} Keck and Sikkink, \textit{Activists Beyond Borders}, p. 10; Khagram et al., \textit{Restructuring World Politics}, p. 4.
and why many countries defied conventional policymaking patterns in adopting sanctions against South Africa.\textsuperscript{115} This thesis does not restrict its understanding of how solidarity networks create change to just normative means, but nonetheless acknowledges the way in which the anti-apartheid movement influenced the Canadian state through the constructing and leveraging of norms.

Keck and Sikkink list several normative strategies that transnational activist networks can utilize:

1) Information politics: Quickly and credibly generating politically usable information about the issue and moving it to where it will have the most impact.

2) Symbolic politics: Making use of symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away from the source.

3) Leverage politics: The ability to call on more powerful forces to apply pressure in a situation where weaker members of the network are unlikely to have influence.

4) Accountability politics: Holding powerful actors accountable by utilizing their previously stated policies or principles against them.\textsuperscript{116}

Keck and Sikkink then describe a multi-step process for how norms influence states, outlined as a list of ascending levels of influence. Activists start by placing their frame in the public mind, or ‘creating an issue’ where there didn’t appear to be one. Once the group’s issue becomes part of the public agenda, an advocacy network can begin to apply influence on states, starting with getting them to change their discursive position to take account for the issue, and ending in them actually changing their behaviour.\textsuperscript{117}

Of course norm changing is no easy process, as it requires the information or values disseminated by a solidarity movement to not just spread widely, but to be adopted by a significant portion of the population. Such work could take many years and there seems to be no guarantee that even normative change on a massive scale can override the material or strategic interests of some states.


\textsuperscript{116} Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 25.
But there are two other ways that the Canadian movement worked to create change, distinct from normative means. One was through mobilizing financial, material or moral support to give to organizations in Southern Africa. Humanitarian support for the ANC was not about helping to shift norms; it was about aiding a liberation movement in its campaign of armed struggle. Similarly the work of Canadians who transferred packages across borders for the ANC or clandestinely smuggled monies to internal South Africa CSOs was not about changing norms, but empowering South African led activities. With respect to moral support different South African activists I interviewed commented on how the specific act of receiving letters from Canadians, or knowing that Canadians were holding prayer services for them, emboldened them to continue their struggle. The second way Canadians offered solidarity to South Africans beyond norm changing was through lobbying. As Chapter 4 will outline, professional activists in the Canadian network spent a good deal of time carrying out high level political advocacy around the apartheid issue with the Canadian government. Post-apartheid many of these activities continued, but to a much lesser extent. Thus my understanding of international solidarity work sees movements as having three complementary means of creating political change:

1) through shifting global norms and leveraging these norms to influence state actions.

2) through providing direct support to increase the capacity of activists in the South to carry out contentious action.

3) through political lobbying.

2.2.5. The solidarity chain

The categories of international solidarity advocacy networks and international solidarity movements bring attention to the different levels of political action that exist in international solidarity campaigns. To help better conceptualize the different levels from which solidarity activities can be launched, I have developed a framework called the solidarity chain. The solidarity chain encompasses

118 Interview Michael Lapsley (a), February 23rd 2010, Cape Town; Interview Eddie Makue; Interview Johnny Copelyn, Cape Town.
four possible political spaces that can be linked together in solidarity work. The first level is the grassroots level in the North. This would be the level of Canadian activists, mainly volunteers, who work in local spaces across the country. Then there is the professional level in the North, which is the space occupied by full time activists working in CSOs. This is paired with the professional level in the South where Southern activists work within civil society groups, or in the case of anti-apartheid, liberation movements. Finally there is the grassroots level in the South, which can be thought of as the level of those directly affected by the issues of a solidarity campaign.

Enlisting Tenant’s idea of a participatory network, a fully fledged international solidarity movement only exists if it is possible to identify activities taking place at all four levels of the solidarity chain, while an international solidarity advocacy network can exist as long as the professional levels are activated in both countries. As a defining characteristic of solidarity movements is broad based contentious action, active grassroots participation is a necessary condition to validating any claims of a movement’s existence. Often, relationships within solidarity movements or advocacy networks follow a linear route for communication, with Northern grassroots groups relating to larger Northern professional organizations, who in turn manage relations to Southern professionals, who then facilitate communication and information flows to the grassroots level in the South. But this is not always the case: as we shall see in Chapter 4, some relationships that were formed in the anti-apartheid period skipped levels, a feature which is more apparent in movements than in international solidarity advocacy networks.

One way to conceptualize political action within the solidarity chain is in terms of width, depth and density. The more levels that are activated, the greater the width an international solidarity campaign can be said to have. The more individual actors or organizations at each level, the more depth a campaign has. And the amount and frequency of communication and exchange between different groups within the network, across different levels, shows us the density of the network. As we shall see in Chapter 4, by the 1980s the Canadian anti-apartheid movement was involved in a campaign that was spread widely across all four levels, with deep participation within each level and dense web of communication between the
different levels. Still, the movement did have some notable limits to its density and width, as the locus of the movement, and the major facilitators of initial connections and continued interaction, were key activists and gatekeepers located at the professional level in Canada and South Africa.

2.3. When is a ‘movement’ really a movement?

It is important to this thesis that I take time to mention one key empirical debate in transnational activist studies for which my theoretical framework has implications. This is the debate about the global justice movement, specifically whether or not it is truly an international solidarity movement, as some scholars claim, or actually an international solidarity advocacy network. There is a prominent argument advanced by some transnational activist scholars that during the 1990s a new phase of increased transnational activism began, due to the advent of globalization, and the corresponding ‘anti-globalization’ protests held at WTO and G7/8 meetings around the world.\textsuperscript{119} It is argued that a new master frame for a global movement against neo-liberal globalization developed, called the global justice movement.\textsuperscript{120} This transnational movement was said to include multiple issues, including ‘specific concerns with women’s rights; labour issues, the defence of the environment and opposition to war… bridged together in the opposition against neo-liberal globalization.’\textsuperscript{121} Authors such as Lance Bennet further argued that by the 2000s there were two generations of transnational activists, an older generation of professional activists working in existing professional advocacy networks and a new generation of dynamic, young activists in the global justice movement, working on issues like the campaign against the Iraq War, in ‘multi-issue networks and untidy campaigns with less clear goals and political relationships to the target.’\textsuperscript{122} Yet it is far from obvious that the anti-globalization protests and various progressive networks active in 1990-2000s actually constituted a global movement. As my work is concerned with post-1994 international solidarity, and as many activists in South Africa and Canada who were involved

\textsuperscript{119} Tarrow, \textit{The New Transnational Activism}, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{120} Della Porta and Tarrow, \textit{Transnational Protest and Global Activism}, p. 12; Evans, “Counter Hegemonic Globalization,” p. 655.
\textsuperscript{121} Della Porta and Tarrow, \textit{Transnational Protest and Global Activism}, p. 12.
in anti-apartheid work went on to become involved in global justice causes like the Jubilee 2000 Debt Campaign or the 2002 march at the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, this is an important question to consider.

Using the definitions presented previously, the global justice movement cannot be said to constitute an international solidarity movement over the 1990s-2000s. While activists involved in promoting opposition to neo-liberal globalization may wish that such a movement existed, the evidence is weak. As Tarrow stresses, common purposes and collective identities are critical to social movements, as at their essence they are about ‘aggregating people with different demands and identities in different locations into concentrated campaigns of collective action.’123 While there was clearly a whole range of international solidarity campaigns and protest actions launched by progressive activists over the 1990s-2000s, it seems quite tenuous to say that such actions were truly united around one a common, ongoing struggle and collective identity. For example Peter Waterman attempts to define the global justice movement as encompassing protests at G7/8 summits in the 1990s, food riots in the South in the 1980s, ongoing protests against the ecological damage of dam projects, protests against the poll tax in Britain in 1990, the Zapatista’s uprising in Mexico and protests against privatization of government services in Europe.124 Because capitalism and neo-liberalism globalizations are presented as hegemonic forces by many of these activist scholars, it seems that they believe that all resistance to these forces can be conceptualized as one counter-hegemonic movement.125 Yet for this to make sense a very different conceptualization of a transnational movement must be adopted: accordingly the global justice movement has been defined as a ‘movement of movements’ which ‘seems to change size, shape, reach, scale, target

123 Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 3-4.
125 For example see Evans, "Counter hegemonic Globalization,"or Ibid.
and aims according to events,’ or ‘not a coalition around one leader, but a network of networks that constantly expands, diffuses and contracts in response to specific events and problems.’

While such claims make good political rhetoric they make poor theory. Utilizing such a loose, amorphous conception of what an international movement is makes it extremely difficult for scholars to define exactly when movements start and end, or what their necessary characteristics are. More importantly, by bunching all loosely ‘progressive’ networks together, such definitions imply that movements can exist with extremely low levels of coordination or coherence between the networks that comprise them. My definition, meanwhile, is much clearer in defining the boundaries of movements and stresses the absolute necessity of movements being coordinated around a common campaign. Interestingly, even supporters of the more open theorizations of the global justice movement question the reliability their approach: for example, while writing in support of such groups, Bennet openly ponders whether these second generation activist networks actually have the organizational coherence to create change or really count as social movements. Watermen, after presenting his expansive definition of the global justice movement, then steps back and notes that this “movement of movements” is as much an aspiration as an actuality, as much a becoming as a being. Peter Evans writes about the danger for activist scholarship in the age of globalization, when scholars let their political desire to find new change agents lead to exaggerations of the power and reach of new networks.

This is what seems to have happened in much of the scholarship around the global justice movement. For better or worse, wanting a global movement to exist does not make it so. This author has personally taken part in G20 Protests in London in 2009 and Toronto in 2010, classic instances of the global justice movement in action. What I witnessed were thousands of citizens marching simultaneously for global socialism, legalization of cannabis, a green economy, more jobs for auto-workers, more bike

lanes, establishment of a Marxist Iran, freedom for Falun Gong and countless other causes. There was almost no sign of a common purpose or political struggle tying these disparate different activist networks together. So, while such events may be significant gatherings of various progressive communities, they hardly seem to show a unified global movement against neo-liberalism.

Undoubtedly though, there is a massive international solidarity advocacy network that exists which relates to the concept of global justice, connected through venues like the World Social Forum and the litany of protests and counter summits that follow meetings of global leaders. Further, it’s obvious a discourse of opposition to neo-liberalism is very much present in the global left. And over the 1990s and 2000s this loose solidarity advocacy network (or networks) has come together around campaigns to form international movements. Tarrow uses the millions of people who took part in demonstrations in 2003 around opposition to the Iraq War as one major example. Or there is Jubilee 2000, a global campaign that brought together 66 national coalitions worldwide, garnered 24 million signatures for its petition to end Southern debt and has been called one of the most successful anti-poverty movements of the post-war period. These examples seem to be clear cases of international solidarity movements, but to say there has been an ongoing global justice movement over the last two decades, or even decade, is overstating the facts.

With respect to this thesis, none of the empirical data collected, including 90 activist interviews, provided evidence of an ongoing, worldwide international solidarity movement, post-1994, that Canadians and South Africans participated in. In fact what I encountered in South Africa were pointed critiques of the work of some domestic NGOs, who in the run up to the 2002 UN WSSD in Johannesburg, tried to prematurely globalize a new social movement for poor South Africans by attempting to

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130 Della Porta and Tarrow, *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, p. 177.
incorporate it into the larger global justice movement. In the end such activities were seen as having stifled local concerns and discourses and contributed to the subsequent disintegration of this nascent domestic movement. Further, in contrast to the narrative of the 1990s being the time of an information technology fueled, renaissance in international solidarity, this thesis paints a picture of the 1990s as a time for digression in international solidarity work and global activism in Canada, due to larger changes to the funding regime in Canada and cultural shifts I will outline in Chapter 5. Thus the definition of an international solidarity movement used in this thesis is much more cautious and specific than those seen in some of the wider literature, which leads to a rather critical approach to the conceptualization of the ‘global justice movement’ that exists in contemporary transnational activist scholarship.

2.4. Theorizing the actors within solidarity networks

The final theoretical issue to consider is a brief discussion of the major actors I focus on within solidarity movements: CSOs and individual activists. A major premise to this thesis is the critical role of large CSOs in solidarity networks. Over the following chapters the empirical evidence for this position will become obvious. But there is also theoretical support for this stance. Tarrow for example asserts that social movements come to life when pre-existing networks or institutions, what he calls ‘mobilizing structures,’ become politicized around a campaign. As he writes, ‘institutions are particularly economic ‘host’ settings in which movements can germinate.’ Tarrow speaks of how movements of the past, like the American civic movements which fought slavery, alcohol and advanced the cause of woman’s suffrage, made extensive use of the existing structures of everyday life, like churches and farmers co-operatives. By politicizing existing social structures these movements were able to make

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133 Interview Richard Pithouse, Grahamstown; Interview Stephen Faulkner, Johannesburg; Interview Mercia Andrews, Cape Town.
134 Tarrow, Power in Movement, p. 22.
135 Ibid., p. 128.
use of existing connections and latent ties between individuals to ‘mobilize supporters rapidly and put pressure on the state through existing institutions.’

Keck and Sikkink’s writings meanwhile note the central role NGOs play in the work of transnational activist networks. They argue that NGOs are crucial to these advocacy networks as they provide training, funding, expert research and established professional connections between various organizations. In general, the theme all three scholars seem to be touching on is how, by utilizing existing CSOs, movements are able to reduce the costs of carrying out campaigns. These theoretical arguments are supported by my empirical data. Over Chapters 3 and 4 it will become quite clear how the resources, networks and national presences that large Canadian CSOs had to offer made their participation critical to building the anti-apartheid movement. Even TCLSAC, the most important third world solidarity group involved in the anti-apartheid network, had to rely on a United Church of Canada congregation in order to gain office space.

But an argument posed by Lance Bennet is that perhaps this central role of CSOs was a characteristic of an older period of solidarity work. He suggests the advent of the internet and globalization in the 1990s fundamentally altered the way transnational activism worked, with networks made of loose, internet based activists able to replace these older CSOSs. I found little evidence for this. As Walkerman points out, even the World Social Forum, the classic manifestation of the ‘global justice movement,’ is supported at its core by a range of NGOs and trade unions. The same is true for the Jubilee 2000 campaign, which built on the earlier work of NGOs around debt issues and in Canada was primarily driven by Canadian churches, through the Canadian Ecumenical Jubilee Initiative. Thus

136 Ibid., p. 129.
137 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 9.
138 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
139 Interview John Saul (b).
while technology may remove the need for these large CSOs in international solidarity networks in the future, for my period of study they seem to have remained critical players.

While the roles played by CSOs are central to my understanding of international solidarity, the empirical evidence of this thesis also highlighted the critical role of individual activists. There is limited theoretical backing for this conclusion, but some authors present theoretical insights that help to understand why this might have been the case. As Tennant notes, face to face interactions between individuals in Northern groups with activists in South Africa were critical to the functioning of anti-apartheid network.\textsuperscript{142} But what was it that made these individuals and their personal ties so important? One major factor is trust. The commonality between all of the key activists in the Canadian network during anti-apartheid was that most functioned as gatekeepers, individuals who managed contacts between the Canadian movement and the South African liberation groups or internal CSOs. These were activists who had strong personal relationships with other key activists in South Africa and their organizations. Accordingly they had built a good deal of trust with the South African colleagues.

Different development studies authors talk about how groups can build effective North-South partnerships, with a major focus put on trust and strong personal relationships. As Sarah Lister notes, in North-South relationships like collaborative advocacy, the North-South power imbalance can create major tensions, but mutual trust and respect between individuals in each group can greatly increase the chance of overcoming such tensions.\textsuperscript{143} Alan Fowler argues that truly ‘equal’ and successful North-South partnerships are possible, but cautions that they are rare and take a lot of time and goodwill to achieve.\textsuperscript{144} He writes that one of the critical elements to actually achieving such relationships is strong relationships between individuals in both groups.\textsuperscript{145} David Lewis concurs with this point, noting equitable North-South partnerships are only achieved through a long term process of active listening, negotiation and

\textsuperscript{142} Tennant, "Locating Transnational Activists," p. 30.
\textsuperscript{143} Lister, "Power in Partnership?," p. 229.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
debate, which can build strong relationships. What is common to all these perspectives is a call for NGOs to shift focus from technical means for cementing partnerships, like creating exhaustive legal contracts, and instead to pay more attention to building strong personal relationships between individuals. It is further argued by Fowler that the stronger the relationships between individuals in Northern and Southern NGOs, the stronger the social capital, and accordingly the transaction cost of launching any sort of joint project is reduced.

Activists in the Canadian anti-apartheid movement, who had long histories of trust and friendship with South African leaders, became the custodians of this strong bond of social capital that existed between Canadian and South African organizations. The trust they had earned from South Africans, and trust they in turn had for their comrades in struggle, allowed for effective solidarity actions. It was this trust that led Canadian activists to defer important decisions on movement direction to South African activists, to permit flexibility around financial accountability and to fight in their own organizations for more support to anti-apartheid policies. In return trust from groups like the ANC allowed for all kinds of unique collaborations, as the history of CUSO’s liberation support office in Zambia, elaborated in the next two chapters, will demonstrate. Without individuals on both sides who held this mutual trust, it’s doubtful that Canadian solidarity work could have developed very far. It must also be remembered that anti-apartheid activism was not a risk free enterprise, apartheid agents were sent to infiltrate solidarity groups and NGOs, like infamous agent Craig Williamson who compromised the International University Exchange Fund. Thus liberation movements had to be extremely careful. They simply could not afford to work with anyone, so long term, trust based relationships, were doubly important to successful international-solidarity work. Over the rest of the thesis these points about the importance of large CSOs as mobilizing structures and the importance of key activists as trusted accomplices who linked

149 Thorn, Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society, p. 68.
organizations will become obvious, as I present the empirical data compiled about the Canada-South Africa network from 1975-2010.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter has covered a wide range of authors and theories, from a variety of schools. It has presented in detail the concepts that will guide my understanding of international solidarity as a political process over the thesis. It has outlined the different types of international solidarity networks that can exist: the international solidarity advocacy network and the international solidarity movement. It has presented a way for conceptualizing the way in which these different types of networks related to each other, with movements growing up from the base of more professionalized international solidarity advocacy networks. It has also considered how networks create change and provided a basic outline of how the solidarity chain functions.

The Chapter also examined what my theoretical understanding of international solidarity says about other authors’ views on the global justice movement. It argued that this network of progressive activists that existed over the 1900-2000s could more accurately be classified as an international solidarity advocacy network than a true global movement. And finally it spoke briefly about organizations and individuals, mentioning how Tarrow, Keck and Sikkink all highlighted the importance of CSOs as mobilizing structures for transnational activism and arguing that the existing evidence seems to support the idea that such large CSOs remained relevant to solidarity work during the 1990-2000s. It also proposed that it was the strong trust based relationships that individual activists in Canada and South Africa built up, which by extension increased social capital in the solidarity network, that made them so important to the functioning of the anti-apartheid movement.
Part 2

The ‘String of Pearls’: The Story of the Canada-South Africa Network
3

The History of Canadian-South African International Solidarity Work 1975-2010

3.1 Chapter overview

Starting in earnest in the late 1960s, the Canadian contribution to the global anti-apartheid movement was a decentralized network of activists that stretched across the world’s second largest country. Activist David Beer recollected that the Canadian network was referred to as ‘the string of pearls,’ a collection of local groups which went from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast, mobilizing thousands of supporters and raising millions of dollars.\textsuperscript{150} Shortly after the 1994 South African elections this network collapsed, with many of the key activists and organizations going on to become part of a contemporary international solidarity advocacy network, focused now on the entire African continent. As the 1990-2000s was a difficult time for progressive CSOs working overseas, contemporary examples of international solidarity with South Africa are few and far between.

\textsuperscript{150} Interview David Beer (b), Feb. 10th 2011, Cape Town.
Though a large country, Canada’s population has always been relatively small; there were 23,209,000 citizens in 1975 and 34,108,000 by 2010. Following the post-war ‘baby boom,’ population growth over the later part of the 20th century has been largely fuelled by immigration and the higher birth rates of immigrant communities, with Canada’s foreign born population moving from 15% per cent of the population in 1951 to 19.8% by 2010. Immigration from the 1960s onwards has increasingly been made up by visible minority immigrants, from Southern nations. Unlike some European countries involved in anti-apartheid activism, Canada did not have a significant socialist movement in the post-war period (outside of Quebec), but like much of the Western world, the 1960-70s was a time for the development of various social movements around human rights, nuclear disarmament and women’s liberation. It would be within these activist networks that the Canadian anti-apartheid movement would find its initial footing.

The first part of this chapter is divided into five historical periods (Pre-1975, 1975-80, 1980-85, 1985-94 and 1994-2010). Each section will provide a political history of the Canadian-South Africa network during those years, while also touching on the critical developments in South Africa during each period and the Canadian government’s response. Following this the second part will present a focused history of CUSO and the UCC, detailing their work around South Africa from anti-apartheid to today. Before beginning, it is important to note the focus of this chapter. The aim is to give a thorough timeline of

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156 It should be noted that while this history seeks to give a national focus, as almost all things Canadians, it runs into trouble in regards to the English-French divide. Due to constraints of language and distance, this history is very much Anglo-Canadian focused and in truth is concentrated on work of the major groups within the Quebec City-Windsor corridor, the most populated and economically important region in Canada.
Canada’s foreign policy towards South Africa, important political events in South Africa, the political activities of the Canadian Solidarity network and the general South African solidarity work of CUSO and the UCC. This chapter will not focus on cultural shifts in Canada, the inner workings of the Canadian network, solidarity discourses held by activists or a detailed explanation of the relationships between Canadian and South African groups. This will come in following chapters: Chapter 4 will provide a detailed account of the structure of the Canadian network and its discourses over both periods, Chapter 5 will focus on the cultural and political context in Canada during each period, and relations to liberation groups will be sketched in Chapters 4, 7 and 8. With this noted, I will now present a history of my case study groups and Canadian solidarity work towards South Africa.

3.2. The political history of Canadian-South African relations 1975-2010

3.2.1. Key events prior to 1975

In 1948 the National Party won national elections in South Africa on a platform of exclusive Afrikaner nationalism. This victory marked the formal birth of the apartheid system, which would be institutionalized through a series of draconian racial laws, which expanded the country’s earlier system of racial segregation. 1952 signified the start of influx control, a system of legislation meant to severely limit black presence in cities and control the movement of the African population through the use of pass books. In 1955 members of the Africa National Congress (ANC) met with members of the South Africa Indian Congress and the Colored People’s Congress outside Johannesburg, to sign the Freedom Charter. This document would provide inspiration for liberation politics in South Africa for the next forty years and be the basis for the ‘Congress Alliance’ of different organizations (including the South African Communist Party [SACP] and later COSATU) under the ANC. In 1952 the ANC had launched the Defiance Campaign, a program of non-violent resistance to discriminatory legislation, seeing its membership swell to a high point.

of 100,000.  

In 1957 a more ‘Africanist’ faction of the ANC Youth League broke away to create a rival organization, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). In 1959 PAC and the ANC launched protests against passes and influx control, which led to the 1960 massacre of 69 protestors in Sharpeville.

The Sharpeville massacre was a turning point for resistance politics in South Africa, as it convinced many, like the ANC’s Nelson Mandela, that violent struggle was needed for the black peoples of South Africa to achieve liberation. It also changed global perceptions about South Africa. It was at the 1961 Commonwealth meeting, where South Africa’s re-entry to the group after becoming a republic was debated, that Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker sided with non-white member states in speaking out against the racist policies of South Africa. During the Cold War period Canada’s major foreign policy motivations oscillated between trying to advance its humanitarian and liberal values in the world and the naked pursuit of national interests, what Allan Gotlieb describes as ‘a bipolar personality’ that swung between romanticism and realism. At the center of Canada’s foreign policy was its relations with the United States, inevitable due to the country’s dependence on trade with its much larger neighbor. But during the Cold War Canada would try to balance ‘alignment with activism,’ on issues like peacekeeping and human rights, mainly through its work in multi-lateral institutions like the UN. The golden age of such policy was between 1945 and 1960, when the weakness of post-war Europe elevated Canada’s global position. The major accomplishment of this period came in 1957, when Lester B. Pearson, then Foreign Minister, won the Nobel Peace Prize for developing UN Peacekeeping around the Suez crisis.

Due to this focus on Canada being a ‘helpful-fixer’ in international affairs, the maintenance of the Commonwealth was a primary concern for Canadian Prime Ministers, as it represented a space Canada had

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161 Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, p. 87.
162 Ibid., pp. 225 and 233.
163 Saul, “Against the Grain,” p. 23.
167 Hillmer, "Foreign Policy,"; MacLean, "Canadian Foreign Policy."
real influence in global issues. Thus in 1961, when John Deifenbaker broke with other white Commonwealth leaders and proposed the release of a communiqué that did not directly ban South Africa from the Commonwealth, but insisted that all members must uphold the principle of racial equality, he was setting a precedent other Prime Ministers would follow.

Time and again Canada would try to present itself as an ‘honest broker’ between the Commonwealth’s white and non-white states, when organizational unity was threatened by repeated ‘British acquiescence to white settler states in the region.’ In 1965 Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson helped find a compromise solution to quell controversy over the UK’s refusal to use force against the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and again in 1971, in Singapore, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau kept the group together despite Britain’s resumption of arms sales to South Africa. Unlike some of its allies, such as the UK, France and the United States, who invested heavily in the South African economy over the 1960s, Canada did not have a major economic stake with South Africa and thus was more willing, at least in words, to take an assertive stance towards the racist regime in Pretoria. Yet its role as a founding member of NATO and as a Western ‘Cold-Warrior’ meant there was a good deal of wavering around supporting ‘communist influenced’ liberation movements. This can be compared to the Nordic countries, who in the early 1960s were already actively meeting with ANC Secretary General Oliver Tambo. The Cold War mentality, along with Canada’s commitment to forwarding unrestricted trade and expansion of markets, made its role in anti-apartheid ‘complex, ambiguous and contradictory.’

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169 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p.3-4.
170 Ibid., p. 29.
171 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 831.
173 Hillmer, "Foreign Policy."
174 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 826.
176 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 5.
In December 1961, the ANC’s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), launched its first bombing campaign in South Africa, followed by 200 attacks over the next 18 months. Both the PAC and ANC carried out various military operations over the 1960s, but the conditions inside the country were not favorable to a guerrilla insurgency, and increased police oppression was able to all but stamp out internal resistance by the middle of the decade. Extra-judicial killings, torture, mass arrests and police brutality became the order of the day. At the same time white immigration and increased investment from Britain and the United States helped South Africa to achieve some of the highest growth rates in the world in the 1960s, averaging around 6% a year, surpassed only by Japan. With its internal networks crushed the ANC was forced into a prolonged period of exile politics, having to look to Soviet, Chinese, OAU and eventually Scandinavian support to maintain their organization. For PAC the exile experience left the movement ‘all but destroyed,’ due to infighting, assassinations and ineffectual alliances with supporters like China or the FNLA. At this point the apartheid government in South Africa seemed to be at the height of its power, separated from ‘black Africa’ by a series of white controlled buffer states (Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia).

In the 1960s Canada’s policies towards Southern Africa (outside its Commonwealth maneuvering) were rather contradictory. ‘During the Pearson years, Canada observed the economic sanctions imposed by the UN on Rhodesia, but made no move to restrict trade with South Africa or the Portuguese regimes in Mozambique and Angola. Moreover, it did nothing to discourage Canadian private investment in these countries.’ Further, while the government condemned racism in Southern Africa in statements and

177 Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, p. 23.
179 Ibid.
181 Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, p. 305.
182 Ibid., p. 306.
implemented the 1963 arms embargo against South Africa, it still allowed Canadian companies to provide arms and arms components to support Portugal’s colonial wars. 184

Within Canada, the 1960s was a time for the first initial mobilizations of a Southern African international solidarity advocacy network. 185 In 1962 a group formed at the University of Toronto to protest Nelson Mandela’s arrest, while a second group named the ‘Canadian Committee on Zimbabwe’ formed at the university during the same decade, led by professor Cranford Pratt (a socialist academic who had served as the first principal of University College in Tanzania). 186 Garth Legge, who ran the Africa Desk for the UCC’s Division of World Outreach (DWO) from 1966-76, was a founding member of the group. By the 1970s initial protest actions were reported: Clyde Sanger an activist and reporter based in Ottawa, remembers a march to the South African embassy organized in 1970, on the 10th anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre, where marchers placed rows of wooden coffins at the embassy’s steps. 187 He notes that it was women from the UCC who subsequently maintained pressure on the embassy, with candle light vigils held throughout the decade.

In May 1970 a workshop was attended by various Canadians connected to Africa at Carleton University in Ottawa, where a ‘wide consensus for a stronger Canadian policy surfaced strongly.’ 188 ‘Simultaneously [to the May workshop] a group was formed in Toronto calling itself The Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa. Its members include churchmen, officials of voluntary organizations, trade unionists, businessmen, academics and returned CUSO volunteers.’ 189 In 1970 Cranford Pratt, Garth Legge and returned CUSO volunteers Rick Williams and Hugh Windsor, produced ‘The Black Paper: An

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184 Ibid., p. 848.
185 A critical factor to keep in mind when considering this history is that while my focus is exclusively on South Africa, Canadian anti-apartheid work cannot be separated from the larger issue of Southern African liberation struggles. Both the Canadian government and activists themselves tended to view anti-apartheid work in relation to the larger issues of decolonization in the whole region.
187 Interview Clyde Sanger, Ottawa.
188 Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 27.
Alternative Policy for Canada Towards Southern Africa,’ in response to the newly released government White Paper, ‘Foreign Policy for Canadians.’ This document, produced by Foreign Affairs for the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau, called for a balancing between social justice and economic imperatives with respect to Southern Africa, defending trade with South Africa as an expression of the principle of ‘trade in peaceful goods to all countries and territories regardless of political considerations.’ ‘Foreign Policy for Canadians’ can be contextualized within Trudeau’s stated agenda to make trade the top motivator for foreign policy, diversify markets outside the United States and put national interest before the traditional helpful fixer approach.

In 1971 the Canadian government, as part of the White Paper process, held public hearings on Southern Africa. Eight different Canadian groups arrived to give deputations, but the committee only gave time to The Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa, the YWCA and CUSO. Following this initial advocacy the YWCA, in 1973, produced ‘Investment in Oppression’, one of the first publications to present the ‘Southern African issue and its Canadian connection clearly to a wider audience.’ Another pamphlet written in 1973, ‘South Africa: Some Questions for Canadians’, noted that various solidarity groups now existed across Canada, in Toronto, Vancouver, Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Ottawa and Montreal. It was that same year that the Trudeau government began to allow Canadian NGOs to provide humanitarian aid to Southern African liberation groups, in response to a UN resolution calling for such support. This move could be as much related to grassroots advocacy as to the fact the minority Trudeau government had shifted markedly to the left since 1972, due to its reliance on the social democratic New Democratic Party (NDP).

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190 Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 28.
191 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, pp. 5 and 46.
192 Hillmer, "Foreign Policy," Gotlieb, "Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy,” p. 20.
193 Saul (b), Revolutionary Traveller, p. 33.
During the 1970s, anti-apartheid activism was viewed as just one plank in the struggle for Southern African liberation. The Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal’s African Colonies (TCLPAC) was one of the leading groups working on this cause, its key activists travelling to the liberated areas of Mozambique and conferring with FRELIMO leadership during the 1970s.\textsuperscript{197} Interestingly it was at TCLPAC’s offices, which were located in St Paul’s Church on Avenue Road, Toronto (the UCC congregation of ex-Angolan missionary Murray McInnes) that the MPLA’s Agostino Neto, on tour in Canada, found out in 1974 that there had been coup in Portugal.\textsuperscript{198} When Mozambique became independent the following year, the two official representatives of Canada were TCLPAC members, John Saul and John Saxby (who later worked for CUSO).\textsuperscript{199} It was also during the 1970s that the ANC opened its first chapter in Canada. Yusuf Saloojee, who served as ANC representative to Canada for the next 20 years, arrived in Toronto in 1969, sent to mobilize anti-apartheid support in the country. The committee first met in 1970; Fatima Bhyat, one of the founding members, later described it as beginning with a group of no more than 20, mainly Indian and Coloured South African exiles.\textsuperscript{200}

It is important to mention that compared to other influential anti-apartheid movements like those in Sweden, the UK and the US, Canadian activists were 10 years behind. Activism started in the UK in 1952 in support of the ANC’s Defiance Campaign, and then accelerated after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 with the establishment of the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM).\textsuperscript{201} In the US initial mobilizations also began in the 1950s and in Sweden the first anti-apartheid committee was established in 1959.\textsuperscript{202} Yet in Canada it was not until the 1970s that the network began to mobilize beyond of a small cluster of senior church leaders, journalists and academics.\textsuperscript{203} Part of the explanation may have to do with the lower levels of support received by the Canadian movement from political elites. For example, in Eastern bloc countries, such as

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\item[\textsuperscript{197}] Saul, “Against the Grain,” p. 36.
\item[\textsuperscript{198}] Ibid., p. 38.
\item[\textsuperscript{199}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{200}] Interview Fatima Bhyat, Johannesburg.
\item[\textsuperscript{201}] Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal humanitarians and transnational activists in Britain and the United States, c.1919-64, pp. 11 and 156.
\item[\textsuperscript{202}] Ibid., p. 116; Sellstrom, “Retrospectives on Official Swedish and Nordic Support to the Anti-Apartheid Struggle,” pp. 2 and 10.
\item[\textsuperscript{203}] Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 27.
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East Germany, anti-apartheid work was state sanctioned activity from the very beginning. 204 In Sweden the Liberal Party and Social Democrat members set up a South African support committee in 1961, and an official government policy of direct support to liberation movements began in 1969. 205 In his work, Thorn compares the movements in Sweden to those in the UK, noting the dynamics facing the Swedish anti-apartheid movement were quite different as their government was seen as an ally, while for AAM government was the adversary. 206 Yet even though AAM had continual conflicts with sitting British Prime Ministers, it received support from its earliest years from both the Labour and Liberal parties. 207 While Labour ultimately disappointed AAM with its South Africa policy when it came into power in 1964, Labour leader Harold Wilson had denounced apartheid from an AAM platform at a rally in Trafalgar Square in 1963 and Labour MP’s Barbara Castle and David Ennals both served as heads of AAM during the 1960s. 208 In Canada neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals (the only two parties to ever hold power federally) had such close links to the anti-apartheid movement, though activists note there was strong support from the much smaller NDP. 209 Later in the 1970s and 1980s government support did come from sympathetic civil servants in Foreign Affairs and CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), 210 but no political elites began comparable engagement with activists until the Mulroney government began to reach out post-1985. This factor, and more importantly the fact that during the 1960s many of the activists who spearheaded Canadian anti-apartheid were living in Southern Africa, gaining the initial contacts and political awareness that spurred the movement in the 1970s, may explain Canada’s decade-long delay behind other movements.

Within South Africa the 1970s was also a time of renewed resistance, following the dark days of the 1960s. Independent trade unions were beginning to emerge and the Black Consciousness Movement

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206 Thorn, Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society, p. 80.
208 Thorn, Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society, p. 81-2.
209 Interview Fatima Bhyat; Interview Yusuf Salajoe, Muscat.
210 Interview Claus Spoerel, Oxford; Interview David Beer (b).
(BC/BCM) was inspiring a new generation of leaders. With respect to faith based opposition to apartheid the 1960s and early 1970s were also a time where mobilization began to slowly coalesce. Within the country the so called ‘English speaking churches,’ the Methodists, Congregationalists and Presbyterians, had all spoken out against apartheid from early on, significantly at the ecumenical 1949 Rosettenville Conference. But the white leadership and membership of the churches were hesitant to actively engage in political action against the state. Thus the international church, starting with missionary Trevor Huddelson’s 1956 Naught for Your Comfort, and local black church leaders, led faith based resistance to apartheid, with the support of a small core of radical white ministers.

In 1960, after the Sharpeville massacre, the World Council of Churches (WCC) attempted to hold a consultation with its South African members in Cottseloe, which led to the resignation of the Dutch Reformed Church’s (DRC) from the WCC. Afterwards the WCC became a leader for international church based resistance, forming the controversial Program to Combat Racism (PCR) in 1969, which in 1970 began to provide humanitarian aid to Southern African liberation groups. Within the country one of the first faith based organizations to resist the state was the Christian Institute (CI), led by DRC minister and theologian Bayers Naude (who was eventually de-frocked for his activism). Naude and Cedric Mayson launched the journal ‘Pro Veritate’ in 1962 and set up the CI to be ‘a multi-racial grouping, including Afrikaners, that would work transcend the divides of race and strive for social justice.’

With respect to trade unionism the 1973 Durban strikes were a watershed moment, as 10,000 largely non-unionized workers struck for better conditions in Natal, beginning a new wave of labor agitation. In the first 3 months of 1973 more than 61,000 workers would take to the picket lines, more than those involved

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212 Ibid., p. 60.
213 Ibid., pp. 66-68.
in strike action for the previous 8 years.217 The strikes were different than earlier trade union resistance in South Africa as they focused much more on specific worker’s demands and not larger political issues.218 A more overtly political form of trade unionism had characterized labor agitation in the 1950s, which was led by the Congress Alliance aligned South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). But by 1965 SACTU was effectively non-functioning in the country,219 though the organization continued to be very active in exile circles. Canadian unions were quite modest in their support for trade unionism in South Africa during the 1960s and early 1970s, John Saul attributes this to Cold War politics, which made the international departments of Northern trade unions hesitant to support unions who were not aligned to the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions).220

3.2.2. 1975-1980: The movement grows in strength

The 1974 coup in Portugal was a turning point for the South African government; it eroded the apartheid state’s confidence in its ability to crush domestic resistance and scuttled a foreign policy program that had been based on winning the support of conservative black governments in the region.221 With its ‘buffer states’ gone, following the liberation of Mozambique and Angola, the apartheid regime launched destabilization campaigns against its ‘Front Line State’ neighbours and invaded Angola in 1975.222 Internally, resistance came to a boiling point on June 16th 1976, when thousands of students, organized locally within schools and inspired by BC teachings, took to the streets in Soweto to protest against the use of Afrikaans over English in their classrooms. When 15,000 students converged on Orlando West Secondary School, the police opened fire, killing many, and setting off a chain reaction of school boycotts and uprisings that spread across the country.223

217 Baskin, Striking Back, p. 18.
218 Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, pp. 327-328.
219 Baskin, Striking Back, pp. 327-328.
223 Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, p. 328.
Thus between the years 1976-1977 the apartheid state faced its gravest crisis yet, as the Soweto uprising triggered an enduring firestorm of international condemnation and domestic strife, while in 1977 Steve Biko was assassinated and the first mandatory international sanctions were introduced.224 Between the years 1974-1978 military spending skyrocketed and when P. W Botha came into power in 1978 the apartheid government began to implement the Total Strategy, effectively subverting all areas under state control (economics, social policy, foreign policy) to the objective of defeating a perceived communist military onslaught.225 Within the country new internal strands of resistance began to pick up, with BCM becoming the dominant political ideology for black students by 1976, championed by groups like Biko’s South African Student’s Organization.226 But as BCM’s writings and ideas flourished, its main proponents found themselves coming under the same state oppression suffered by the Congress Alliance in the 1960s.227

During the Soweto uprising millions of workers joined in with the students, though their unions were still cautious about joining political campaigns officially.228 Nevertheless 1976 saw a series of bannings of trade union leaders. But unions continued to grow, forcing the government by 1979 to admit that some level of black trade unionism would have to be tolerated.229 Accordingly 1979 saw the founding of two important federations, FOSATU (Federation of South African Trade Unions) and CUSA (Council of Unions of South Africa). Church leaders also saw themselves coming under increasing repression during the late 1970s, as black ministers radicalized through Black Theology became more militant in their actions, and grew increasingly impatient with the hesitation of white membership and leadership in the major churches.230 The ANC meanwhile continued to work to consolidate its strength and garner international support, avoiding

229 Ibid., pp. 23 and 26.
major internal dissention (unlike the PAC), with Umkonto concerning itself in the later part of the decade with re-establishing lines of communication and infiltration into the country.231

Internationally, the East-West engagement of the early 1970s gave way to a period of heightened Cold War tension, due to US defeat in Vietnam and the outbreak of a plethora of third world revolutions.232 Yet with Jimmy Carter’s election victory in 1976, South Africa was faced with a US President who (though still constrained by Cold War imperatives) was much more assertive on human rights than the previous administrations.233 Thus in 1977 a new comprehensive arms embargo on South Africa was passed by the UN Security Council.234 But more extensive sanctions were not on the table, as the US still worried about Cuban troops in Angola, and in 1976 had 350 companies operating in South Africa, with 1.67 billion dollars invested.235 In Canada Pierre Trudeau, having failed in his pursuit of a ‘Third Option’ to reduce Canadian economic dependency on the US economy, now moved away from a foreign policy focused on Canadian interests to one more and more guided by moral causes.236 Having initially questioned the Commonwealth’s value, by the late 1970s Trudeau saw it as an important venue for one of his personal foreign policy interests, increasing engagement between the Global North and Global South, becoming the ‘leading tier-mondist and proponent of the north-south dialogue among the industrialized countries and in the Commonwealth.’237

In the context of this new foreign policy direction, the international outcry over the Soweto Uprising and growing domestic advocacy, Trudeau introduced a set of policies against the apartheid regime during 1977. Linda Freeman notes these changes were a ‘pivotal’ moment for Canadian anti-apartheid, but that they fell short of meaningful economic sanctions.238 Trudeau first focused on sport, an easy and highly symbolic area, playing a leading role in the banning of South Africa from international sporting competitions, agreed

234 Ibid.
236 Gotlieb, "Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy," p. 21.
to at the 1977 Commonwealth meeting.\footnote{Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 835.} The Canadian government also contributed significantly to multilateral programs for South Africa such as the UN Educational and Training Programme in Southern Africa, the Inter-University Exchange Fund and the UN Trust Fund for Southern Africa.\footnote{Ibid., p. 840.} Further, government funding was offered to NGOs doing humanitarian work with liberation groups, trade offices in South Africa closed and visa restrictions were placed on South African citizens.\footnote{Ibid., p. 849.} A code of conduct was also developed for corporations doing work in the country.\footnote{Ibid.}

Despite this, two-way trade doubled between Canada and South Africa by over the 1970s, as did foreign direct investment.\footnote{Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 59.} And by the mid 1970s it was estimated that Canadian banks had provided 636 million dollars in loans to the South African government and state agencies.\footnote{Pratt, In Good Faith Canadian Churches Against Apartheid, p. 28.} This policy inconsistency can be compared to Sweden, which by 1979 had instituted a ban on any new investments in South Africa.\footnote{Sellstrom, Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Volume 2, p. 8.} Of further concern to activists was the brief interruption of Trudeau rule, when Conservative Prime Minister Joe Clark came into power from June 4, 1979 to March 3, 1980. During his short time in control of the Federal Government Clark cut all CIDA funding to humanitarian work with liberation movements, funding which would not be resumed for many years.

It was during the latter half of the 1970s that anti-apartheid activism in Canada truly escalated, beginning its expansion towards an international solidarity movement by the mid-1980s. Following the collapse of Portugal’s African colonies, TCLPAC changed its name to TCLSAC (Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa), expanding its focus to Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, while also working (under FRELIMO instructions) with CUSO to recruit co-operators\footnote{Co-operant was the CUSO term for overseas volunteers.} to help build up newly independent Mozambique.\footnote{Interview John Saul (b).} TCLSAC’s work and its magazine (launched as TCLSAC Reports in 1977, later changed to Southern Africa Report) provided a critical role in information dissemination and leadership
throughout the next decades. Another group which was essential to the movement was the Taskforce for Church and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR). Launched in January 1975 by a range of Canadian churches, TCCR became the leading body advocating nationally for divestment and sanctions, staffed by Renata Pratt and advised by Bill Davis, the assistant treasurer of the UCC. Though apartheid was not the sole focus of the organization, it took on a predominant role in TCCR’s work. In 1976 TCCR distributed 50,000 copies of the flyer ‘Banking with Apartheid’, which illustrated to Canadians the role their banks had in supporting the apartheid state. At the same time the group organized churches and church members who were shareholders in companies and banks doing business in South Africa to attend shareholder meetings and call for divestment, as Pratt writes,

the new determination of the churches to exercise their shareholder rights in annual general meetings and to call attention to corporate decisions affecting social justice and human rights had raised eyebrows in the board rooms and angered prominent shareholders and a number of senior clergy. The novelty of the approach was all the more irritating as church questioners obeyed the rules and were without exception polite and deferential.

As church members mobilized across the country to complain to bank managers and remove savings from banks dealing with the apartheid state, a first victory was achieved on March 31st 1978, when the Royal Bank of Canada, Canada’s largest bank, announced an end of loans to South Africa. Churches, far more powerful in Canadian life in the 1970s then today, were able to garner large amounts of media attention for their work and even inspired a reactionary pro-apartheid group, the Confederation of Church and Business People, formed in 1976 to counter TCCR and the ‘self righteous leftist minority’ it was said to represent.

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248 Which included the Anglican Church of Canada, the Baptist Federation of Canada, the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Canadian Council of Churches (in a non-funding observer capacity), the Lutheran Church in America, Canada Section, the Presbyterian Church in Canada and the United Church of Canada.
250 Pratt, In Good Faith Canadian Churches Against Apartheid, p. 2.
251 Ibid., p. 27.
252 Ibid., p. 13.
253 Ibid., p. 28.
254 Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 86.
Activist work on divestment from apartheid was not limited to churches. By the late 1970s divestment groups were springing up on university campuses across Canada, pressing their administrations to end all investments. In 1979 Pat Baker (from the University of Toronto) was able to ‘speak as a representative of university disinvestment groups from across Canada to a New York meeting of the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid.’ Meanwhile, TCLSAC gained attention through members stuffing fake cheques into bank deposit stacks which read ‘pay to the order of John Balthasar Vorster, Prime Minister of South Africa, the sum of $50 million.’ During this period Canadian NGOs also began to organize funding to send to support liberation movements. ‘[B]y 1978 the value of contributions in cash and in kind... was estimated to be between C$150 000 and C$200 000 a year. These projects consisted mostly of the provision of supplies and equipment for agricultural, educational and medical purposes.’ Organizations such as the ‘Canadian Catholic Organisation for Peace and Development (CCODP), the Salvation Army and YWCA were in contact with partner organisations in Southern Africa and provided smaller amounts for humanitarian and development work.’ Over this period CUSO and OXFAM Canada emerged as two of the most important NGOs supporting anti-apartheid work in the region.

When black unions were legalised in the late 1970s, Canadian unions also became much more involved in ‘official’ support of unions, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) established direct contacts with FOSATU in 1979. In 1978 anti-apartheid activists Brenda Wall and Ken Luckhardt, who had worked on various ANC and anti-apartheid projects, were recruited by SACTU to write an official history for the group, Organize or Starve (1980). CUSO would provide them with financial support during the writing. South African exiles were also playing a role of growing importance in Canada. As Georgina Jaffee explains, in Toronto, there was a split in the South African community between the middle class professionals who had left the country for the stability of Canada and had little interest in politics, and those

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255 Ibid., p. 57.
256 Pratt, In Good Faith Canadian Churches Against Apartheid, p. 29.
258 Ibid.
259 Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 140.
who chose to be political active like herself. Further after 1976 ‘there were quite a lot of black exiles hanging around universities and the ANC office who were very marginalized from trauma or what they had been through, we always had someone sleeping on our floor, these networks of people who needed a place to be, who had left and were very disconnected from family ties. The Soweto Kids- lots of them in and out of our lives all the time.’ \(^{261}\)

By 1978 the community was strong enough in Toronto that the ANC office became a full time operation, with Yusuf Saloojee as the chief representative. Throughout the period the ANC was a critical node in the anti-apartheid network, organizing material aid drives, coordinating speakers, passing on information from ANC headquarters and working closely with Canadian based activist groups. As Fatima Bhyat commented, ‘We had massive campaigns to boycott South African products, it used to be in the middle of winter with us picketing outside the LCBOs.\(^{262}\) We would constantly say God was racist because we had to demonstrate in the ice and snow.’\(^{263}\) In 1975 a new solidarity organization Canadians Concerned with Southern Africa (CCSA) would be established following a trip to Canada by Yusuf Dadoo and John Gaetsewe.\(^{264}\) These ANC veterans actively encouraged the establishment of a national anti-apartheid organization similar to the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) in the UK. While CCSA never achieved this goal of becoming a centralized national body for Canadian anti-apartheid,\(^{265}\) it did emerge as an important Toronto based anti-apartheid group, supported heavily at first by the Communist Party of Canada, and many times serving as a bit of a competitor to TCLSAC.

Thus by the late 1970s ‘in most of the larger centres, churches and NGOs joined together in solidarity work, organising protest campaigns, conferences and anti-apartheid events which often involved the billeting of speakers from South Africa on cross-country tours.’\(^{266}\) But the creation of a single national movement did not happen, mainly due to the massive size of Canada, its regional diversity and the cost of

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\(^{261}\) Interview Georgine Jaffee, Johannesburg.
\(^{262}\) The Liquor Control Board of Ontario, the only licensed establishment that can sell Wine and Beer in the Province of Ontario.
\(^{263}\) Interview Fatima Bhyat.
\(^{264}\) Interview Peter Bunting, Johannesburg.
\(^{265}\) Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 46.
\(^{266}\) Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 860.
This can be compared to the UK, where AAM had chapters across Britain and worked to tightly control anti-apartheid work in the country. The late 1970s was a time for the expansion of anti-apartheid networks not only in Canada, but around the world. In the US, the late 1970s saw the voices of those pushing for constructive engagement with the apartheid regime being eclipsed by activist’s calls for sanctions, efforts which were boosted by the formation of the lobby group Trans Africa in 1977. Over the decade members of the Congressional Black Caucus (formed in 1971) and other Democratic senators provided ongoing support to the growing movement, which gained grassroots support through becoming linked with the Black Power Movement, seen in events like annual African Liberation Day Marches and the 1973 National Anti-Imperialist Conference in Solidarity with African Liberation.

3.2.3. 1980-1985 hard battles and the birth of a movement

Within South Africa the early 1980s was a time of continued resistance at campuses, schools and in workplaces. The legalization of black trade unions led to them growing rapidly (from 220,000 members in 1980 to 670,000 by 1983) and they became increasingly well organized and militant. In 1983 President Botha attempted to expand his ‘cosmetic facelifts to apartheid,’ with the creation of a tri-cameral parliament, with separate Colored and Indian houses. Resistance to this initiative was led by the newly formed United Democratic Front (UDF), a national coordinating body which brought together a variety of CSOs. When the new parliament opened in Sept. 1984, the townships in the Vaal triangle around Johannesburg erupted. ‘No longer willing to tolerate local apartheid controls and the economic crisis people took to the streets, setting up roadblocks, fighting the police and attacking municipal councillors…so began the most intense sustained mass struggle in the history of South Africa.’ For the next two years (1984-1986) resistance

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274 McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, p. 64.
raged across the nation. Botha’s attempts at reforms were over and instead the apartheid state unleashed a ‘brutal crackdown, including heavy-handed use of police tactics, the military occupation of resistive towns and blanket restrictions on civil liberties.’

During this period the ANC in exile was working to establish itself as the ‘sole legitimate representative’ of South African resistance internationally. This it achieved by 1984, despite the fact this unique status ignored the complexities of resistance inside the country. During the 1980s MK’s camps would swell with young people who had fled the country in the aftermath of Soweto, monetary support from Scandinavian government was secured, military support was received from Eastern European states and land was provided from sympathetic frontline states. This all allowed the organization to expand greatly, with diplomatic representatives established in 30 countries, hundreds of members studying in foreign universities, a large education complex in Tanzania and a growing headquarters in Zambia. Internally, MK sabotage began again and while the UDF was by no means ANC controlled, it was clearly ANC aligned.

But the apartheid state showed no signs of being cowed. By 1983 its military budget was equivalent to the entire GDP of Zimbabwe. And when efforts to recruit Frontline States into a subservient ‘constellation of states’ union were dashed, by the creation of SADC in 1979, the wrath of the South African Deference Force (SADF) was unleashed in a new wave of destabilization. ‘There were a number of large-scale invasions of Angolan territory; a raid against ANC residences in Matola near Maputo; a substantial increase in the level of activity by South African sponsored dissident groups, in particular the MNR and LLA; threats to turn Swaziland into a “second front,” backed up by a number of operations by South African agents against refugees; and assassinations of ANC personnel in a number of countries.’ The support for guerrilla movements in Mozambique and Angola helped inflame these countries in civilwar, with the

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275 Murray, Revolution Deferred, p. 9.
276 Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, p. 343; McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, p. 50-51.
277 McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, p. 56.
278 Ibid., p. 51.
279 Ibid., p. 60.
281 Ibid., p. 197.
282 Ibid.
Angolans estimating South African destabilization had cost them 10 billion dollars by 1985. By 1984 Mozambique was forced to sign the Nkomati Accord, a non-aggression pact, and remove ANC personnel from the country. Despite attempts at similar accords with Angola, by 1985 the conflict there was intensifying with regular military incursions taking place after June 1985, the same month the SADF attacked ANC camps in Botswana. By 1985 the flames of war and insurrection raged across Southern Africa, with the apartheid state seeming as strong as ever.

Within South Africa churchmen Frank Chikane, Desmond Tutu and Allan Boesak played critical roles in the UDF, and the South African Council of Churches (SACC) became “both the symbol of church resistance and a spearhead for the internal liberation struggle… and a major link to the resources of the wider ecumenical church beyond South Africa.” In 1985 a series of theologians in the Institute for Contextual Theology (a partner of the UCC) would release the KAIROS document. Not an official church document, it was a South African owned articulation of how the gospels called on Christians to resist the apartheid state, and its release helped to energize and strengthen church resistance internally, while also inspiring the international church community. Meanwhile between 1981 and 1984 unity talks were taking place between the emergent trade unions. On November 1985, 750 worker delegates came to the University of Natal, representing 33 unions and an estimated 460,000 organized workers. Cyril Ramaphosa was convenor, and the talks led to the creation of COSATU (the Congress of South African Trade Unions) in 1985.

Internationally, the rise of the neo-conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan helped to disrupt coordinated global action against the South African state. Reagan, upon assuming office in 1981, initiated a policy of constructive engagement with South Africa, which supported positive incentives and dialogue over sanctions and touted Botha as a reformer and ally against communist

284 Barber and Barratt, *South Africa’s Foreign Policy*, pp. 206 and 305.
285 Ibid., pp. 313 and 15.
286 De Gruchy and De Gruchy, *The Church Struggle in South Africa*.
288 Baskin, *Striking Back*, p. 34.
289 Ibid., p. 51.
290 Davies, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa," p. 204.
expansion.291 But by 1983 South Africa’s wanton aggression against its neighbours had caused even the Reagan administration to ask if such support was actually harming US interests in the region.292 For Canada 1977-1984 ‘marked a new low’ for official policy around apartheid, as ‘purported reforms masked a reaffirmed commitment to the interests of the Canadian private sector on one hand, and the larger strategic and material interests of the West on the other.’293 In 1982 Canada supported an infamous 1.07 billion dollar loan to South Africa, despite widespread condemnation and the fact it was directly related to defence spending.294 No movement was made around comprehensive sanctions or to build on Trudeau’s actions in 1977, and government funding to liberation movements remained cut. Such actions were unexpected, as Trudeau was noted for being distinctly out of place among the neo-liberal Thatcher and Reagan295 and it was actually Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who came into power in 1984, who took anti-apartheid policy to the next step.

Interestingly, Mulroney has been called the most ‘pro-American’ and North American focused of all Canadian Prime Ministers.296 A major element of his election campaign was to re-establish close relations with the US, which had been damaged under Trudeau.297 Yet despite his pro-Reagan policies, on Oct 23rd 1985 Mulroney delivered his famous address to the United Nations proclaiming, ‘My government has said to Canadians that if there are no fundamental changes in South Africa, we are prepared to invoke total sanctions against that country and its repressive regime.’298 Building on this theme, in 1985,

External Affairs announced a ban on loans to the South African government and its agencies and called on Canadian banks to apply such a ban. It also banned the sale of crude oil and refined products to South Africa; placed an embargo on air transport between Canada and South Africa;

293 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 126.
294 Ibid., p. 87.
297 Gotlieb, "Romanticism and Realism in Canada's Foreign Policy," p. 21.
298 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 850.
opened a register to monitor voluntary measures taken by the provinces, municipalities and private institutions, organisations and firms against South Africa. The government allocated a million dollars for humanitarian aid to assist the families of political prisoners and detainees in South Africa. It also tripled the funds to be made available for education and training of black South Africans.299

The new policies were introduced over a number of stages, with July 6th 1985 signalling the end of all promotion of commercial relations with South Africa, the end to the processing of Namibian uranium and a tightened arms embargo.300 Then by September voluntary sanctions were unveiled along with restrictions on oil and an embargo on air transport to South Africa.301 These Mulroney reforms were the biggest victory of the entire anti-apartheid struggle in Canada.

Understanding the impetus behind Mulroney’s actions is difficult. He was ideologically closer to Thatcher and Reagan than Trudeau and committed to strong relations with the US. But it is probably the case that South Africa simply was not important enough to either the US or Canada for Mulroney’s position to cause a rift in their newly repaired relationship, as by 1985 it was clear in Washington that supporting South Africa had become a losing cause.302 Also the early 1980s divestment campaign had spread across universities and pension funds in the United States303 and the groundswell of support led to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which was passed despite a veto attempt by Ronald Reagan.304 This policy, adopted a year after Mulroney’s, was more exhaustive in its restrictions, as were many of the sanctions policies adopted in the mid-1980 by many Canadian provincial and municipal governments.305

299 Ibid.
300 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 152.
301 Ibid., p. 154.
304 Thomson, "Incomplete Engagement," p. 84.
Thus in many ways Mulroney was simply reading the signs of the times, but it has also been reported that he had a personal commitment to the issue, despite resistance in his own cabinet to sanctions.306 Activist Paul Puritt noted that George Mwicigi, a Kenyan student who in 1959 had inspired himself to take action around apartheid, had also been Brian Mulroney’s roommate during his undergraduate degree and that Mulroney had personally confirmed to him that it was Mwicigi who had first educated him on the horrors of the South African regime.307 This focus on Mulroney’s personal convictions can be further informed by John Saul’s argument that Mulroney realized by 1985 that if the West didn’t act forcefully to end apartheid, the possibility of a communist revolution in the country would greatly increase.308 All of these factors can help explain part of why Mulroney gave the speech he did in 1985. But most likely the biggest factor was the rise of the Canadian anti-apartheid movement over the 1980s and the pressure it put on Mulroney. Jim Kirkwood of the UCC noted that the 1984 personal meeting between Desmond Tutu and Mulroney (which was arranged by ICCAF and the UCC) was critical to pushing Mulroney to break ranks with Thatcher and Reagan and act on his own convictions.309 Tutu himself reported to church leaders after the meeting that Mulroney had assured him a policy shift would be coming soon.310 But this was just one of hundreds of solidarity activities that took place over the early 1980s.

Understanding the dynamics of the anti-apartheid network post-1980 is very difficult, mainly because it became so large that capturing it in its totality is impossible. It was during the 1980s that the Canadian network fully grew into a social movement, as the mid-point of this decade saw major protest actions taking place and activist groups expanding rapidly. There are several reasons for this expansion. Within Canada there was an increased mobilization around international solidarity in general, especially around issues in Central America. The facts that South Africa remained as the last bastion of explicit state sanctioned white racism in Southern Africa, and that the media was now full of images of vigorous township

306 Pratt, In Good Faith Canadian Churches Against Apartheid, p. 278.
307 Interview Paul Puritt (a), Ottawa, November 13th 2009.
308 Interview John Saul (a), Toronto, June 10th 2009.
309 Interview Jim Kirkwood (c), Toronto, January 22nd 2011.
310 Pratt, In Good Faith Canadian Churches Against Apartheid, p. 163.
unrest, also helped the expansion of the Canadian anti-apartheid network.\textsuperscript{311} Canadian media coverage of the apartheid issue seems to have peaked by the mid 1980s in Canada, with the same trend happening in the United States, a point I will return to in more detail in Chapter 7.\textsuperscript{312}

As Renatta Pratt writes about TCCR, ‘from the early 1980s on, Canadian anti-apartheid organizations were growing steadily in number and strength. Enquiries into Canadian business links with South Africa multiplied as calls for consumer boycotts and disinvestment gained currency. There was in consequence increasing demand for specific information the Taskforce had to offer and a widening interest in the actions taken by its member churches.’\textsuperscript{313} During the 1980s educational resources were being steadily produced and distributed widely, with the newly formed, Montreal based, Centre for Information and Documentation for Mozambique & South Africa (CIDMAA) along with TCLSAC became critical sources for information.\textsuperscript{314} In May 7-9th 1982 the largest anti-apartheid conference in Canadian history, up to that point, took place in Ottawa. John Saul writes that ‘More than 500 people, representing a large cross-section of Canadian and Quebeçois organizations, met to discuss the latest developments in South Africa and Namibia, to investigate the role of the Canadian government, and to plan a course of action for future solidarity work.’\textsuperscript{315} Support came from a range of groups including TCLSAC, the CLC and the churches, with the editor of the UCC’s national magazine, Hugh McCullen, serving as a co-chair of the conference. Jim Kirkwood of the UCC also served as an executive member of the planning group. The conference’s stated purpose was to ‘mobilize support for the ANC (SA) and SWAPO on a Canada-wide scale and to analyze the role of the Canadian government as part of the ‘contact group’ of five western nations mediating between South Africa and SWAPO, and to examine the linkages between the Canadian and South African economies.’\textsuperscript{316} Speakers included Alfred Nzo, Thabo Mbeki and SWAPO’s Hidipo Hamutenya.\textsuperscript{317}

\begin{footnotes}
\item Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 50.
\item Pratt, In Good Faith Canadian Churches Against Apartheid, p. 339.
\item Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 146.
\item Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 68.
\item Canadian Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa (a), "Canadian Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa Flyer."
\end{footnotes}
South African speaking tours were also critical to the mobilization of Canadians. As Fairweather notes, ‘A steady stream of South African visitors spent time in Canadian cities and towns and travelled across the country speaking to church and student groups. For more than a decade, South Africa was a hot topic in Canadian churches, drawing audiences from a wide spectrum of the community. Well-known South African theologians and churchmen such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Dr. Allan Boesak and Rev. Beyers Naude filled large churches and auditoriums and were eagerly sought after as keynote speakers at conferences across Canada.’

In June 1980 IDAFSA Canada was established, a national branch of UK based Defence and Aid. During its eleven-year history, IDAFSA served as an important element of the Canadian movement, with a number of UCC and CUSO activists supporting its work. In the view of IDAF historian Denis Herbsttein, ‘Canada had one of the strongest national committees, being ‘the largest and most efficient Defence and Aid operation outside Britain.’ In 1983, a total of 350 Canadians in 140 towns and cities had become members. In 1986 the organisation had over 10,000 Canadian supporters.’ Al Cook, IDAFSA board member, notes that IDAFSA coordinator Anne Mitchell would travel all across Canada with the organization, in the end raising support from nearly 100,000 Canadians. During the 1980s TCCR lobbied all four of Canada’s big chartered banks to end lending (which was achieved by 1984), applied similar pressure on security firms and credit unions, monitored banks’ compliance to no loan policies, and lobbied Canadian corporations to disinvest from South Africa.

The ANC was a crucial node during this period, with the Toronto office at the centre, but smaller branches springing up in different parts of the country. Yusuf Saloojee traveled across Canada, speaking, attending meetings, helping coordinating guests from Canada and launching ANC specific aid campaigns.

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317 Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 68.
318 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 871.
319 Ibid., p. 880.
320 Ibid.
321 Interview Al Cook, Ottawa.
323 Interview Yusuf Saloojee.
Unfortunately many activists from the period also spoke of a less savoury side of his time leading the ANC office, noting a culture of sexism in the office and a lack of fiscal transparency. Yet despite these negative perceptions the ANC office was able to monopolize its role as the exclusive voice for South African liberation movements in Canada. CCSA meanwhile ran material aid campaigns, continued its boycotts and gained school board support to hold Toronto high school conferences in the mid 1980s, with workshops run by members of SWAPO and the ANC.  

During the 1980s there also existed in Toronto a number of smaller black organizations doing anti-apartheid work, but racial tension tended to keep them isolated from the larger, predominately white movement. As an example of this division Yola Grant, former chair of CCSA and one of the more prominent black activists in the movement, described the anger that took place in the early 1980s over CCSA running an event for African Liberation Day. Though the event was run at the request of the ANC office, the perception of a ‘white Marxist led’ group usurping the event from Toronto’s black community angered many activists. In light of such concerns, when the Anti-Apartheid Coalition of Toronto was formed at the impetus of CCSA in 1985, Zola and fellow black activist Clem Marshall were chosen as co-chairs, Clem representing the BCM tradition that was followed by many black Canadian activists.

As the 1980s progressed, NGOs increasingly became the centre of anti-apartheid coordination in Canada and started to meet to coordinate and plan strategy under the Inter Agency Working Group on Southern Africa (IAWGSA), begun as an informal group of activists in 1977 and later becoming a formal committee of the Canadian Coalition for International Co-operation (CCIC). In 1982 another coordinating body, ICCAF (the Inter-Church Coalition on Africa) was born. Over the decade ICCAF increasingly became the main coordinator for speaking trips of Christian activists to Canada, and other faith based anti-

324 Interview Lynda Lamberg, Toronto; Interview Yola Grant, Toronto.
325 Interview Yola Grant.
327 Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 158.
apartheid work. An important milestone for church activists came in June 1982 at a meeting of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches in Ottawa, when Allan Boesak was voted in as secretary general of the organization and apartheid was declared a heresy, leading to the DRC’s expulsion from the body.328

Within the labour movement two competing centres for anti-apartheid activism formed in the early 80s. One was the CLC International Affairs Department, with Paul Puritt, a long time anti-apartheid veteran coordinating the work with Southern African partners. The CLC was the focus of support to trade unions within South Africa, bringing FOSATU leaders to address its congress in 1982 and again in 1984 when Cyril Ramaphosa, general secretary of NUM (National Union of Mineworkers), visited Canada.329 Paul also established close links with COSATU soon after it was formed. Opposing the CLC was the SACTU Solidarity Committee (SSC), established in 1980 by Brenda Walla and Ken Luckhardt after they completed their text Organize or Starve, with veteran South African trade unionist George Poonen as the chair.330 In 1985, ‘Ken Traynor, who had just returned from volunteer work in Southern Africa [with CUSO], joined the SACTU team and played a major role in producing material for seminars and for sanctions campaigns. Their 1985 publication Trafficking in Apartheid: The Case for Canadian Sanctions against Apartheid was a key resource for the anti-apartheid campaign.’331 Luckhardt and Wall are said to have done excellent grassroots education and organizing within unions, fundraising for SACTU’s strike fund and bringing SACTU speakers to Canada.332 Wall notes that SSC rose over 250,000 dollars from unions.333 But the committee’s uncompromising stance that SACTU was the only legitimate representative of South African trade unions would cause constant battles with the CLC.334 The end result was the division of labour union activists between the two sides.335

328 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 870.
329 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 141.
331 Ibid.
332 Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 60.
333 Interview Brenda Wall, Toronto.
335 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 141.
3.2.4. 1985-1994: Urban insurrection and the democratic transition

From 1985-87 urban insurrection continued to rage in the townships, with strikes, boycotts, acts of defiance and confrontation with security forces continuing as the UDF and COSATU worked to keep the pressure up. From June 1985 to October 1986 a state of emergency was in place in the most volatile areas of the country. When it expired the UDF, ANC and COSATU were ‘riding high,’ believing they were pushing the state to the brink of collapse, or at least to the start of a people’s revolution. But in June 1986 the state of emergency was re-imposed on the entire country, with over 25,000 detained and thousands going into hiding. Torture, mass arrests and political assassination spread, as hawks took control of the state and decided to unleash the army, with its tactics in ‘low intensity warfare’ and ‘counter insurgency,’ honed in the destabilization of Mozambique, now used on their own civilian population.

As the leadership of the UDF and internal ANC were increasingly killed, arrested or forced into hiding, the state also worked to foster so-called ‘tribal violence’ between different ethnic communities. But while the security apparatuses continued to appear a seemingly unstoppable force in the late 1980s, there were signs that the apartheid state’s time was running out. The beginning of the end was Chase Manhattan’s (followed by other banks) 1985 refusal to roll over South Africa’s loans, which sent the rand plummeting. The business sector was thus the first part of the South African ruling class to see the writing on the wall, in 1986 sending representatives to Lusaka to start meetings with the ANC. At the same time even the United States was recognizing the ANC as the legitimate voice of black aspirations in the country, with ANC officials travelling across the globe from 1986-1988, meeting with top officials in the UK, Britain, Japan, US, Australia and Canada. Meanwhile members of the UDF, MDM (Mass Democratic Movement) and

336 Beinart, Twentieth-century South Africa, p. 262.
337 McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, p. 71.
338 Southall, Imperialism or Solidarity, p. 21.
339 Ibid.
341 Fairweather, “Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle,” p. 850.
342 Murray, Revolution Deferred, p. 10.
343 McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, p. 85.
COSATU were also making trips to Lusaka, connecting the old guard with the new leaders of resistance within the country.344

The SADF’s military defeat to Cuban forces in Cuito Cuanavale in 1987 was a tremendous setback for the South African government, leading to a 1988 peace agreement in Namibia and the pull out of South African and Cuban forces from Angola.345 In the townships another round of mass repression on internal resistance groups was launched in 1988, with local community based organizations, called civics, taking on an increasing role in coordinating resistance, and in providing basic services within areas effectively abandoned by the state.346 For the ANC, the late 1980s was a time of demoralization for the MK, as all bases in Angola were lost with the peace agreement and the collapse of the Soviet system in 1989 made the prospect of taking control of the state through armed struggle seem increasingly unlikely.347 In February 1989 F. W de Klerk was elected by a party caucus to replace ailing P.W Botha. Upon arrival in office the ‘combination of capital flight and drying up of international loans that starved local enterprises of investment funds... put unprecedented pressure on political elites to arrive at a workable solution to the long-standing political crisis of legitimacy, representation and rule.’348 His first move was in October 1989, when he released seven prominent resistance leaders from prison.349 Then a year after taking office, on February 2nd 1990 De Klerk went far beyond what was expected, overturning the thirty year old ban on the SACP, ANC and PAC, lifting the banning orders on 374 activists in country, relaxing the legal restrictions on the UDF and COSATU and pledging to carry out an unconditional release of Nelson Mandela.350 Immediately after Mandela’s release on February 11th 1990 the ANC moved to begin talks, starting with personal meetings between De Klerk and Mandela.351  

344 Murray, Revolution Deferred, p. 10.  
345 McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, p. 79.  
347 McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, pp. 81-8.  
348 Murray, Revolution Deferred, p. 9.  
350 Murray, Revolution Deferred, p. 7.  
351 McKinley, The ANC and the Liberation Struggle, p. 105.
As the first talks began on May 4th 1990 in Cape Town, violence continued to rage on the ground with ANC/UDF cadres in the townships coming under attack from Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) supporters, given assistance by the security forces.\textsuperscript{352} The negotiations took place therefore within a context of incredible tension, as a low level civil war raged in Kwa-Zulu Natal between the ANC and the IFP.\textsuperscript{353} Several groups become yet further polarized: while angry far right parties accused the National Party of selling out and threatened violence to disrupt negotiations, BCM, Africanist and socialist groups grew increasingly angry with the ANC’s perceived accommodation with the oppressor.\textsuperscript{354} When ANC leader Chris Hani was assassinated on April 10th 1993 the country held its breath, wondering if it would slide into civil war. But the ANC displayed tremendous unity, and in appointing Cyril Ramaphosa as general secretary, was able to create a more collective leadership that could promptly respond to the demands put on it.\textsuperscript{355} By November 1993 an interim constitution was agreed upon, with violence and provocations from all sides continuing.\textsuperscript{356} Yet through it all the transition process somehow was able to stay together, with the country holding its first democratic elections on April 26th 1994.

In Canada, while there had been much rejoicing within the anti-apartheid movement about Brian Mulroney’s 1985 move to implement sanctions, the euphoria was short lived. In many ways Mulroney’s policies epitomized the title of Linda Freeman’s 1997 book, \textit{The Ambiguous Champion}. It is true that after 1985 government policy towards South Africa changed fundamentally, losing all references to the need to balance economic interests with the cause of social justice in the region.\textsuperscript{357} And in June 1986, after the eminent persons visit to South Africa (which included Canadian Anglican Bishop Ted Scott), a third round of policies were unveiled, halting procurement of South African products by federal institutions and forcing tourism companies to stop promoting South Africa.\textsuperscript{358} But as Freeman writes, throughout the period the

\textsuperscript{352} Ibid., p. 107.
\textsuperscript{353} Ibid., p. 105.
\textsuperscript{354} Murray, \textit{Revolution Deferred}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., p. 15.
\textsuperscript{356} Beinart, \textit{Twentieth-century South Africa}, pp. 283-284.
\textsuperscript{357} Freeman, \textit{The Ambiguous Champion}, p. 129.
\textsuperscript{358} Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 852; Freeman, \textit{The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney years}, p. 157.
sanctions imposed by the Canadian government were ‘neither mandatory, nor comprehensive and the force of policy dwindled quite quickly.’

Critiques of Mulroney’s policy tend to focus on two areas. Firstly the government’s refusal to translate anti-apartheid policy into direct support to liberation movements. The second is the government’s backsliding on existing sanctions after 1987 and the substituting of expanded sanctions with increased development aid to Southern Africa.

While the popular accounts of Mulroney standing his ground on sanctions when he clashed with Margaret Thatcher at the 1986 Commonwealth meeting are true, by 1987, the Mulroney government had stalled on imposing tougher sanctions, despite the increased repression within South Africa. Foreign minister Joe Clarke began to speak about ‘sanctions fatigue’ and ‘used his role as chairperson of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa to stall initiatives promoting additional sanctions.’ When Mulroney failed to garner more support for sanctions at the 1987 G7 meeting in Venice, the Conservative Party’s sanction push finally came to a halt. The same year at the Commonwealth meeting in Vancouver both federal opposition parties pushed for full sanctions, but Foreign Minister Joe Clarke made it clear there would be no more new sanctions, but instead a focus on aid to Frontline States.

But in providing development aid to Southern Africa the Conservative party did take action, providing an average of 7 million dollars a year between 1985 and 1990, to programs for black South Africans, plus 196 million to SADC programmes in the region. Despite this aid, anti-apartheid activists soon found Canada’s minimalist approach to sanctions to be very underwhelming, with the only additional Southern Africa polices being the move to aid Zimbabwe militarily in 1988, and placing South Africa on the ‘Area Control list’ in 1989. This last policy, to restrict all high-technology exports to the country (specifically military technologies), was by far the most serious sanction Canada adopted, but ironically they

361 Ibid.
362 Ibid., p. 191.
365 Pratt, In Good Faith Canadian Churches Against Apartheid, p. 342.
would also be the first to be lifted, three years later in 1992.\textsuperscript{366} And in Sept 1989 Joe Clarke had to face the embarrassing situation of explaining to his Commonwealth counterparts how a Canadian bank was reported to be involved in negotiations around a 600 million dollar loan to a subsidiary of Anglo American.\textsuperscript{367} He also was called to account for the fact that while Canadian trade with South Africa had declined substantially in 1986, by the end of the 1980s ‘Canadian exports to South Africa as a percentage of total Canadian exports, had almost regained its 1985 level.’\textsuperscript{368} In January 1989 ‘Statistics Canada reported that Canadian imports from South Africa had totaled 149 million dollars in the first eleven months of 1988, an increase of 59 million dollars over the same period in 1987.’\textsuperscript{369} Thus sanctions had neither been total nor had they led to a consistent decline in trade with South Africa. Scrambling to explain the figure, Clark in 1989 established two industry/government working groups to examine the feasibility of replacing the ‘essential’ minerals Canada was importing from South Africa.\textsuperscript{370}

The second area of Canadian policy that frustrated activists was Mulroney’s stance towards liberation groups. As Fairweather writes ‘the major weakness of Mulroney’s policy was his failure to acknowledge the central importance of the liberation movements.’\textsuperscript{371} It wasn’t until 1987 that ANC leaders were able to gain meetings with the Prime Minister and senior officials, and Oliver Tambo reported that his meeting with Mulroney in 1987 mainly centred around Mulroney lecturing him around the ANC’s use of violence and the membership of communists in the ANC.\textsuperscript{372} Thus direct support to the liberation movements was avoided wherever possible by the Mulroney government, which can be compared to Nordic countries, for example Sweden, where from 1973 ‘direct cooperation with the African National Congress was the

\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., p. 317.
\textsuperscript{367} Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 857.
\textsuperscript{368} Pratt, \textit{In Good Faith Canadian Churches Against Apartheid}, p. 357.
\textsuperscript{369} Ibid., p.357.
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid., p. 357.
\textsuperscript{371} Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 903.
\textsuperscript{372} Pratt, \textit{In Good Faith Canadian Churches Against Apartheid}, p. 280.
cornerstone of the official Swedish support.'373 Sweden and Norway would contribute roughly 300 and 400 million dollars, respectively, to the ANC over the 1970s-1980s.374

The Conservative’s hesitation around the ANC was driven by their discomfort with armed struggle and specifically the SACP presence in the alliance. Freeman notes that part of the Conservative’s motivation for acting around South Africa was to exert a moderating influence on the liberation struggle, to help mitigate the socialist objectives of the movements and keep South Africa open to western business.375 In 1990 with the release of Mandela, government openness to the ANC changed dramatically, with Joe Clark flying to Lusaka to meet Mandela and Mulroney greeting him on the tarmac when he arrived in Ottawa that year.376 This change of face was surely driven by the 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the fact Mandela’s release made it obvious an ANC government in South Africa was now a real possibility. Perversely, when preparations were underway for a celebration of Mandela’s release in Wembley Stadium in London, Joe Clarke phoned Archbishop Trevor Huddleston to argue the celebration should be held in Canada due its record around anti-apartheid being much better than that of the United Kingdom!377

Starting in 1990 Canada gave 12 million dollars a year to the ANC, and was one of the few nations to consult with the ANC on when to lift sanctions.378 By 1991 the budget for Canadian programs working on South Africa had increased by 30% from 1990 and included scholarships, money for labor education done by the CLC, funds directly distributed by the embassy in Pretoria, money for inter-racial dialogue and funds to counter apartheid propaganda.379 Other government funding was sent to develop skills among black professionals for future work in both the public and business sectors, to help support the negotiations, and 2.5 million was given towards the holding of 1994 election.380 This odd mix of support and advocacy on one

373 Sellstrom, "Retrospectives on Official Swedish and Nordic Support to the Anti-Apartheid Struggle," p. 11.
375 Ibid., p. 131.
376 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 859.
377 Pratt, In Good Faith Canadian Churches Against Apartheid, p. 326.
380 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 279.
hand, and ‘sanctions fatigue’ and criticism of the ANC on the other, makes the record of Canadian policy from 1985 up to the democratic elections of 1994 truly ‘ambiguous’ anti-apartheid.

The global anti-apartheid movement peaked in the mid to late 1980s, becoming a truly international movement with thousands of groups organizing all over the world. In Canada anti-apartheid was no longer a movement on the fringe but part of the mainstream, as even the Federal Government became seen as an official supporter. Opinion polling also confirms this mainstreaming: in 1985 one poll found that only 50% of Canadians had heard of apartheid, by 1987 this had increased to 82% of people, with 70% of those polled saying their sympathies lay with black south Africans and only 6% saying it was with the white government. In the UK during the mid to late 1980s AAM’s Free Mandela campaign was being aggressively pursued, helping to turn the imprisoned leader into a global icon. In November 1985 there were massive demonstrations in London with upwards of 140,000 people taking to the streets. In the United States the Free South Africa Movement, launched in 1984, carried out a campaign of demonstrations and well publicized arrests of well known civil rights leaders and politicians in front of the South African Embassy during the mid 1980s, with a 1985 poll showing 70% of Americans who knew of the demonstrations sympathized with them. In Ireland the publicity around the Dunne’s Strikers, retail workers led by Mary Manning who refused to work as long as their employer had them sell South African products, led to Irish sanctions in 1986.

In Canada, the mid to late 1980s saw NGOs take centre stage in the network, as government money flowed into their coffers. Starting in 1986 CIDA developed a special development fund for NGOs, working to support organizations within South Africa doing work at the community level. As Fairweather

384 Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, p. 120.
385 Ibid., p. 76.
388 Marshall, "Keeping Pace."
389 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 278.
writes, anti-apartheid became increasingly institutionalized during the 1980s, with IAWGSA and the newly established South African Reference Group (SARG) working to coordinate the plethora of South Africa focused programs that were developed at the time. While most groups happily took on this funding, radical organizations like TCLSAC remained critical, complaining that this institutionalization might be part of a plan to subvert the revolutionary potential of the liberation struggle and co-opt organizations.

World University Services Canada was one of the biggest recipients of government aid during the late 1980s, receiving large amounts of cash to run a program for South African refugees to study in Canada. IDAFSA was also able to receive large CIDA matching grants throughout the 1980s. Having already raised 1 million dollars by 1986, the addition of CIDA funds allowed the group to finance the legal defence for 17,000 individuals awaiting trial. CUSO and Oxfam were also on the receiving end of much of this new government funding. The late 1980s also saw large-scale mobilizations within the network. In 1986 the largest anti-apartheid demonstration in Canadian history was held in Toronto, as 10,000 people paraded through the city and 15,000 then gathered in front of the legislature to hear Desmond Tutu speak. In 1987 two major conferences also took place. First was ‘Taking Sides in Southern Africa: A National Conference on Canada’s Role in International Action to End Apartheid and to Support SADC,’ held in Montreal in February and sponsored by the CCIC (with 445 delegates from every province in Canada and representing 197 organizations: trade unions, women’s groups, churches, non-governmental organizations and support groups, educational institutions and youth and community organizations). Next the Anti Apartheid Network in Vancouver hosted a parallel conference to the 1987 Commonwealth meeting in the city, which was addressed by Kenneth Kaunda and the foreign affairs minister of Mozambique. In 1988 1,200 people in Toronto, 600 in Montreal and 400 in Vancouver gathered to celebrate Mandela’s birthday.

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392 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 278.
393 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 885.
395 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 147.
396 Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 69.
397 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 900.
Then in May 1989 activists gathered in Ottawa to honour Peter Mahlangu, the new ANC representative to Canada, who replaced long time veteran Yusuf Saloojee.398

During the transition itself Canadian organizations continued to be involved in South Africa, now working directly inside the country to support different initiatives. With the release of Mandela some groups closed down, like IDAFSA, which after having garnered support from nearly 100,000 Canadians399 was reconstituted as Canada-South Africa Cooperation in 1992.400 During the election itself Canadians were present as election observers, many coming from the churches and participating in EMPSA (Ecumenical Monitoring Program for South Africa) which was coordinated by the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC). Within the labour movement, support for South Africa continued to grow, with most unions supporting full sanctions and endorsing the ANC.401 In 1986 COSATU head Jay Naidoo came to Canada to speak at a CLC national convention, where he received pledges of long term financial support from different unions.402 That year 30,000 Canadian workers, in coordination with Australian, Finish and Swedish workers refused post, airline or telephone business with South Africa for three days.403 In 1987 the CLC called for a boycott of Royal Dutch Shell due to its dealings in South Africa.404 Around the 1994 elections the CLC also provided support for election monitoring and education. At the same time as this work in wider labour community was ramping up, the SCC began to slow down its operations, effectively closing in 1988. As Brenda Wall explained, once a new SACTU representative was assigned to Canada in the late 1980s there was simply much less for them to do, as the SACTU representative took on their functions and began to incorporate SACTU work much closer with the ANC office.405 Relevant to this decision was the fact that COSATU had in many ways rendered the SACTU office in Lusaka irrelevant.

399 Interview Al Cook.
400 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 888.
402 Ibid.
403 Ibid.
404 Ibid.
405 Interview Brenda Wall.
For churches, the late 1980s and the democratic transition were also a time for increased activism. In 1987 ICCAF created the Education Project for South Africa (in part by absorbing the work of the United Church’s Southern African Education Project) to do comprehensive education work around apartheid.\textsuperscript{406} In 1989 CCODP was able to collect 120,000 signatures calling for full mandatory sanctions for South Africa.\textsuperscript{407} To push for total sanctions ICCAF formed the Canada-South Africa Crisis Coordinating Committee with the CCC.\textsuperscript{408} TCCR continued its lobbying right up to 1994, by 1989 having reduced the number of Canadian companies operating in South Africa to 4, from 35 in 1985.\textsuperscript{409} Also in 1989, a number of church leaders, including head of the SACC Frank Chikane, took part in the Stand for Truth march in Ottawa. ‘Leading the way in full ecclesiastical regalia were a large number of Canadian church leaders, including Bishop Edwin Lackey of Ottawa, Lois Wilson, the moderator of the United Church of Canada; the Primate of the Anglican Church and president of IDAFSA, Ted Scott, as well as local clergy and lay leaders.’\textsuperscript{410}

3.2.5. 1994-2010: Where do we go from here?

The first step to understanding post-apartheid Canada-South Africa solidarity history, a subject with no existing histories, is to briefly review the changes that have taken place in South Africa after the 1994 elections. Following 1994 the ANC ‘became the uncontested ruling party’ in South Africa ‘whose share of parliamentary seats increased in the three successive democratic elections.’\textsuperscript{411} South Africa post-1994 is a country with relatively strong institutions, an open democracy and the world’s most ‘progressive’ constitution, along with having Africa’s largest economy and modern infrastructure, all which seem to make the chances for transformative social policy quite viable.\textsuperscript{412} ‘On the other hand the legacy of race and class inequalities, the character of the negotiated transitions, and the contemporary context of neo-liberal

\textsuperscript{407} Ibid. p. 14.
\textsuperscript{408} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{409} Ibid. p. 12.
\textsuperscript{410} Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 872.
globalization circumscribes these possibilities.\textsuperscript{413} After their ascent to power the ANC launched the Reconstruction and Development Program, part of its 1994 election manifesto. It focused on large scale construction of homes and infrastructure for those dwelling in the townships. This policy was replaced in 1996 by GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution),

the result was shrinking national budgets in the second half of the 1990s, a trend only reversed at the start of the next decade. State rhetoric switched to the importance of growth enabled by economic liberalisation and improving the conditions for competitiveness. Little growth was achieved and it is widely recognised that poverty, inequality and unemployment have grown.\textsuperscript{414}

While there were some major policy successes carried out by the ANC, such as the child support grant, the implementation of pensions, large scale expansion of infrastructure delivery and limited land transfers, such successes were offset by massive job losses and millions being disconnected from water and electricity due to cost-recovery schemes.\textsuperscript{415} At the same time capital flight and the shifting of many top companies from the Johannesburg stock market to the London stock exchange dampened economic growth.\textsuperscript{416} In the early 2000s it was estimated that anywhere between 41-55\% of the country remained in poverty.\textsuperscript{417} This was compounded by the world’s highest number of HIV/AIDs cases\textsuperscript{418} and prevalent crime and sexual violence. The result was that many South Africans’ expectations of the post-apartheid nation were woefully unfulfilled.

Post-1994 has also been an unusual time for activism in South Africa. Immediately after apartheid ended South African CSOs had to grapple with a massive decline in foreign donor funding. With many

\textsuperscript{413} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{414} Ballard, “Social movements in post-apartheid South Africa,” p.78.
\textsuperscript{415} Ibid., p.82; Patrick Bond and George Dor, Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, development and social protest (London: Merlin Press, 2002), p. 4.
\textsuperscript{416} Ibid., p. 27.
donors moving on to new causes, organizations were sent into fiscal crisis and collapse over the 1990s.\textsuperscript{419} From 1994 to 1995 foreign aid to NGOs fell by almost 100\%, with a 1995 survey of 128 NGOs finding groups were facing, on average, a shortfall of two thirds of their operating budget for the coming year.\textsuperscript{420} With official aid now shifting to the South African state, large scale support for CSOs who were critical of the government was no longer a reality.\textsuperscript{421} At the same time many in civil society thought the adversarial struggle against the state was over; correspondingly the best and brightest from the activist community accepted jobs within the state, mass organizations were disbanded and NGOs began to compete for new government contracts.\textsuperscript{422}

Yet unlike many other transitional societies were liberation parties have enjoyed a ‘honeymoon’ period from popular dissent the ANC (though still holding high levels of electoral support) encountered growing popular resistance soon after 1994,\textsuperscript{423} mainly due to its increasingly neo-liberal policy framework. Initially COSATU (part of the ruling tri-partite alliance with the ANC and SACP) led popular protests against the regime, with its 1995 campaign against the Labour Relations Act and protests against the adoption of the GEAR policy.\textsuperscript{424} Yet COSATU failed to stop GEAR from being implemented and after a 1999 job summit between business, the union federation and the president’s office, COSATU came out endorsing the policy, signalling the beginning of a ‘post-GEAR consensus’ within the tri-partite alliance.\textsuperscript{425} Thus from the end of the 1990s onwards it would be the so called ‘new social movements,’ many of which developed during the later part of the decade, that would become the centre of resistance to state policy.\textsuperscript{426} One such movement was the Anti-Privatization Forum (APF) a grouping of over 22 community groups that

\textsuperscript{419} Caroline Kihato, \textit{Shifting Sands: The relationship between foreign donors and South Africa civil society during and after apartheid} (Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, 2001), pp. 8 and 10.
\textsuperscript{420} Ibid., p. 15.
\textsuperscript{421} Ibid., p. 21.
\textsuperscript{423} Ballard et al., \textit{Voices of Protest}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{425} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{426} Ballard, "Social movements in post-apartheid South Africa," p. 78.
was established in 2000 in response to the state’s growing privatization schemes. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), another of the widely known ‘new social movements’, was launched in 1998 in Nyanga. Soon it became a national movement that would lobby the Mbeki government around the issue of HIV/AIDS and pressure pharmaceutical companies to provide low cost anti-retrovirals. Through the early 2000’s TAC’s struggle with government and innovative methods of protest captured the public’s imagination. Other notable groups included Jubilee South Africa and the Durban based shack dwellers movement Abahlali baseMjondolo.

None of these social movements shared a common political ideology or platform, and there was a real diversity in their politics and approach to the state. For example the TAC and Abahlali repeatedly stressed they were not ‘anti-ANC’ and even had party members in their ranks, while the TAC never claimed to be committed to overthrowing capitalism. On the other end of the spectrum the APF was militantly anti-capitalist; refusing to associate with any group that supported neo-liberalism or capitalism. One way then to divide the movements is between those who based their claims and discourse in a language of rights (like the TAC) and those who presented a counter-hegemonic discourse, usually based in an anti-neo liberal politics. Despite these differences one thing the new social movements did have in common was a grassroots membership, with their rank and file being people directly affected by the social issues they were lobbying for, with heavy participation from women and the unemployed. The major milestone for the social movements was August 31st 2002 at the UN WSSD in Johannesburg, where 25,000 people gathered for The Social Movement’s United march from Alexandra Township to the posh suburb of Sandton, where the conference was being held. This unofficial social movement’s march was credited at having far more people involved than the 5000 that turned up for the officially sanctioned NGO march (which was supported

428 Ibid. p. 77.
431 McKinley, "Mobilizing for Change," p. 11.
432 Ballard et al., Voices of Protest, p. 400.
by COSATU). The unofficial march, timed with the launch of the LPM (Landless People’s Movement), gained international attention and proved quite embarrassing for the government, putting the spotlight of media and academic researchers on the ‘new social movements.’

But by 2010 the activist landscape had again shifted in South Africa. The general narrative I encountered was one of a substantial decline in the work and support for the so-called ‘new social movements’ seen at the 2002 WSSD, some arguing the decline took place only a few years after 2002. Infighting and political conflict had led to splits and schisms in almost all the movements. This theme of new social movement decline was a common discussion topic in the activist networks I was a part of in Cape Town between January to July 2010 and also was mentioned in social movement’s own internal documents, academic literature on the subject and in the responses of 11 activists I specifically interviewed around issues pertaining to social movements. Many observers claimed the ‘new social movements’ had been created in a top-down manner, formed by professional NGO staff with radical political orientations, who were looking to create anti-capitalist organizations that could join with international the anti-globalization movement, without paying sufficient time to building a strong base in the townships.

Yet it isn’t the case that social protest has stopped in South Africa, as it’s estimated that in 2009 over 10,000 protest actions had occurred in the townships. But these service delivery protests took place in almost total isolation from any of the established social movements and were based around people taking up highly localized issues (usually the lack of performance from local government authorities) toy-toying, burning tires and attacking government buildings in frustration. The simmering local anger seen in service

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435 Called new to distinguish their break from the ‘old’ anti-apartheid social movements, i.e. UDF, MDM.
437 Interview Richard Pithouse; Interview Mercia Andrews; Interview MP Giyose, Port Alfred; Interview Stephen Faulkner.
delivery protests can also explode in incredibly disturbing ways, as was witnessed in the wave of xenophobic attacks against black African immigrants in the townships in 2008.

Thus the post-1994 period can be described as a period where the ANC government remained firmly in control of the state, while South Africa became an increasingly unequal society with a range civil society groups providing the main opposition to state policy. It would be fair to say the state of activism in South Africa in 2010 was one of opposition without an overriding program or coherence, characterized by a strong professional NGO sector, which lacks connections to organized labor or a real mass membership on the ground, while thousands of localized protests are launched independently by township dwellers. Such a situation made it difficult for contemporary Canadian civil society organizations to determine which groups ‘truly spoke for the people,’ or what issues were most pressing to support, while those groups most interested in contesting the state tended to be much more politically radical than the average Canadian CSO; all of which made international solidarity much more complicated than during anti-apartheid.

Following the 1994 elections, the Canadian government began a hasty exit from South Africa. Certainly Canadian funding to the building of government institutions continued, with nearly 200 million dollars in aid being provided to the South African government over the last 20 years.¹⁴⁴⁰ The major change was that after 1994 funding for work between NGOs in Canada and South Africa dried up, replaced by bilateral aid to the new South African government.¹⁴⁴¹ In 2006 a bilateral development co-operation treaty was signed between both nations with a focus on HIV/AIDS, rural development, increasing government capacity and supporting South African regional initiatives to promote stability in the continent.¹⁴⁴² The Canadian government also played an important role in providing support around the drafting of new post-apartheid

¹⁴⁴¹ Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 889.
¹⁴⁴² Government of Canada, "Canada-South Africa Relations."
legislation, notably the 1996 South African Constitution and Bill of Rights, which are said to have drawn ‘heavily on Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms.’

But with apartheid gone South Africa is no longer a country of special interest. With a new Canadian trade office opened in Johannesburg just a month after sanctions were lifted, it was clear trade would be the major priority for future relations. Currently Canada is the sixth largest foreign investor in South Africa, with investments estimated at around 1.87 billion dollars. Two-way trade between the countries reached ‘approximately C$1.8 billion in 2008.’ But even considering these aspects of the relationship between the two countries, there is a huge break from the anti-apartheid period; today it’s almost impossible to speak of a ‘South African policy’ in Ottawa. This fits within a larger narrative of Canada as a ‘fading power’ in global affairs, with ODA having been severely restricted over the 1990s, especially to Africa, and a narrow focus on expanding business opportunities dominating government approaches to foreign policy.

But just as official government engagement with South Africa has diminished, so has civil society engagement. Gone are the strong relations between two national movements. In its place is a smaller Canadian international solidarity advocacy network, which is focused on all of Africa. As Chapter 5 will explain, the 1990s was a time for a major decline for the solidarity work of Canadian CSOs. Yet even accounting for that, the drop in South African solidarity is remarkable, especially in light of the strength of the bonds formed up to 1994. In 1991 a report on Canadian organizations working in South Africa wrote that ‘one of the greatest strengths of Canadian organizations and institutions currently appears to be the wealth of contacts, connections and relationships that have developed through their activities in South

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443 Ibid.
444 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 303.
445 Government of Canada, "Canada-South Africa Relations."
446 Ibid.
Africa. Yet within a few years this all began to disappear. A 1995 article by Southern African Report (probably the last exhaustive study to focus specifically on the work of Canadian organizations in South Africa) noted that,

some organizations have moved on to address the new challenges in South Africa, while others have folded. Some have undergone considerable changes, either devoting less energy to South Africa or broadening their focus to include all of Southern Africa... broadly speaking, agencies which came into being with apartheid as their sole focus have either disappeared or turned their attention to the parallel issue of racism within Canada.

The article also notes student groups, provincial coalitions and organizations working around South Africa outside the Toronto-Ottawa-Montreal axis had totally vanished. It goes on to mention that even groups like ICCAF or Oxfam ‘have now taken on a much wider sub-Saharan African focus with South Africa no longer gaining it’s special status.’ Despite these closures, the report is still able to list over 20 organizations that continued to do work in South Africa, with some anti-apartheid groups like CIDMAA, now transformed into development NGOs (in 1994 CIDMAA became the NGO Alternatives). Over the decade these reductions would continue.

Greg White gave a candid explanation of what this post-1994 change was like in ICCAF:

there had been a lot of talk leading up to elections and Mandela’s release that we would remain to be committed to the hard work that would have to happen around land reform, education and other things, but as soon as the election came there was a vote by the partner representatives that South Africa would no longer be a large focus from then on. But this was hard, we had this large established network out there which would have continued to do

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449 Sutton, "Canadian Solidarity."
450 Ibid.
work on these issues if there was a continuing push, but suddenly the string that held all the networks together disappeared.451

For TCLSAC there was a name change in 1993 to the Toronto Committee for Links between Southern Africa and Canada and an attempt to continue work with groups in South Africa.452 But while Southern African Report continued until 2000, the group itself gradually lost steam over the 1990s. TCCR meanwhile became part of KAIROS, a CSO formed in 2001 to combine all the different inter-church coalitions, including ICCAF. Today KAIROS continues doing development work and advocacy work which is strongly influenced by an international solidarity perspective, but the organization has no contemporary partners in South Africa.

But there are some places where solidarity work continued. One is in trade unions, where at least at the organizational level, the 1990s was a time for creating new partnerships. For example, Judith Marshall, long time anti-apartheid solidarity veteran (having worked with TCLSAC, OXFAM and as a CUSO cooperator in Mozambique) began to work for the United Steelworkers of Canada Humanity Fund in 1991. By 1996 she could write that while many relationships between Canada and South Africa had been reduced ‘for Canadian Steelworkers - and many others in the labour movement - I would argue that the ties with South African working people have never been stronger.’453 As Fairweather wrote, ‘unlike the former anti-apartheid solidarity relations between trade unions in Canada and South Africa, this new global situation was characterised by mutual learning: collective bargaining strategies, health and safety issues, training and worker education were all on the new agenda for both countries.’454

Marshall noted that post-apartheid, much of the work with South African unions was carried out by union’s special funds for international work, created by unions in the 1980s and 1990s to allow them to

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451 Interview Greg White, Hamilton.
452 Marshall, "Keeping Pace."
453 Judith Marshall, "Globalizing From Below."
454 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 904.
directly fund organizations overseas. For the Steelworkers, Marshall mentions that ties were strongest at first with NUM, where the humanity fund provided support around housing, workers education, strengthening NUMs legal department and supporting NUMs rural development. Marshall, building on her anti-apartheid links, expanded the Steelworker’s relationships with South African organizations over the 1990s, extending support to NUMSA (National Union of Metalworkers South Africa) and the radical think tank the International Labour Research and Information Group (ILRIG). Other major unions such as the Canadian Autoworkers would also continue working with unions in South Africa, while the CLC continued its support work to COSATU over the 1990s. Yet even though trade unions relations of this variety strove to include ‘worker to worker’ exchanges between shop stewards in their programming, the relationships formed were closer to development partnerships or the work of international advocacy networks, not international solidarity movements. Most of the co-operation is managed from within trade union head offices in both countries, and activities would rarely involve mass mobilization of rank and file trade unionists like anti-apartheid work did.

Two other places where there have been some connections between Canadian and South African activists were the Jubilee 2000 Campaign on debt forgiveness and HIV/AIDS. John Dillon, current staff person at KAIROS Canada and former staff person at the Ecumenical Coalition on Economic Justice, notes that South Africa had a strong committee around the Jubilee campaign and that quotes from South African leaders like Desmond Tutu and resources produced by organizations like Cape Town’s AIDC (Alternative Information Development Centre) were widely used in Canada during the campaign. He also noted that the ecumenical coalition brought over South African speakers like Dennis Brutus to speak about issues of debt. HIV/AIDS was another issue that was able to again mobilize Canadians in solidarity with people living in Southern Africa.

455 Marshall, “Globalizing From Below.”
456 Ibid.
457 Interview John Dillon, Toronto.
The Stephen Lewis foundation, created by its namesake, the former provincial NDP leader, Canadian Representative to the UN and UN Special Envoy for Aids, garnered a lot of attention in Canada. Formed in 2003 the foundation has been able to provide 39.7 million dollars in donations for work around HIV/Aids in Southern Africa.\(^{458}\) Perhaps it’s most famous program was the Grandmothers to Grandmothers Campaign, which was launched in 2006 and led to the formation of 240 groups of grandmothers across Canada who mobilized to raise funds and awareness about the burden placed on grandmothers in sub-Saharan Africa, who care for communities devastated by AIDs.\(^{459}\) Connecting grandmothers in Canada to grandmothers doing work around HIV/AIDs in Southern Africa, this initiative was usually the first response from informants when asked to give an example of Canadian solidarity with South Africa post-1994. The campaign names building solidarity between Grandmothers in Canada and Southern Africa as one of its main goals and engages in educational and awareness activities across the country.\(^{460}\) The campaign has a National Advocacy Committee that organizes the advocacy work of the campaign, which in 2006 committed to being the ‘voice for African grandmothers in Canada.’\(^{461}\) Thus while the Grandmothers to Grandmothers campaign is not focused on exclusively on South Africa, its focus on local grassroots groups driving the campaign, and its advocacy and education components, make it the clearest example of Canadian international solidarity work around South Africa post-1994.

But the Grandmothers Campaign seems to be a lone exception to the norm. The reality for Canadian CSOs is that current relations to South Africa have become so reduced that I found it impossible to pose the question to activists of ‘who are the major Canadian players in South Africa today?’ Instead the question had to be expanded to ‘who are the major Canadian players in Africa?’ in order to allow respondents to craft any meaningful response. Certainly there are a few Canadian NGOs and organizations that respondents

identified as maintaining a discourse of ‘development’ that is informed by international solidarity, currently working in Africa. These include KAIROS, the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, NGOs Mining Watch Canada, InterPares, OXFAM, Alternatives and the ETC group, along with some churches and the international funds of various unions. A few of these organizations can directly be traced to groups that operated in the anti-apartheid movement, others are new players. But for the most part these groups tend to be smaller NGOs with limited budgets, as respondents agreed that the biggest Canadian organizations working in Africa were the Canadian chapters of global NGOs like World Vision and Save the Children.

Most of these progressive Canadian organizations working in Africa have come together in the Africa Canada Forum (ACF), a committee of the CCIC. The ACF notes that it ‘brings together NGOs, churches, unions, and solidarity groups from across Canada, that have a specific interest in development issues and social justice in Sub-Saharan Africa.’\(^\text{462}\) It includes around 40 member organizations. The ACF holds periodic meetings where members strategize and try to coordinate their work around Africa. In 2008 the ACF unveiled a most telling strategy, a multi-year plan to try to bring Africa back into the Canadian policy agenda.\(^\text{463}\) As Molly Kane, ex-Chair of the ACF noted, ‘the fundamental issue here is that Canada is not that important to Africa’ due to the fact Canadian groups have such a marginal role in African development issues today.\(^\text{464}\)

Thus by 2010 it can be said that a small, mainly NGO based international solidarity advocacy network does exist in Canada, one that is oriented towards all of sub-Saharan Africa, with minimal connections to South African specific issues and disconnected from any grassroots base or social movement. While certainly many of the key activists involved with anti-apartheid work have continued to do admirable work around the region, like the collaboration of former TCLSAC and ICCAF activists in the African focused website AfricaFiles,\(^\text{465}\) the larger movement that was assembled in the 1980s was never reactivated.

\(^{463}\) Ibid.
\(^{464}\) Interview Molly Kane, Ottawa.
3.3. Organization histories

The UCC and CUSO were both major participants in the anti-apartheid movement, attested to by the fact that even from the start of anti-apartheid activism, with the production of ‘The Black Paper’ in 1970, three of the four writers were affiliated to these two organizations. But it’s fair to say CUSO was more important to the network. The groups shared some similarities. Both had internal clusters of activists who entered the organizations during the 1960-70s, who provided the impetus for their international solidarity work. And both, for very different reasons, went into decline during the 1990s. But they also were very different organizations, one a NGO focused on international development, the other a mainline church with a huge membership and a wide variety of ‘outreach’ programs. CUSO, for one thing, had a much more extensive presence overseas than the UCC. Further CUSO’s membership during the 1970s was by and large made up of ex-CUSO co-operants, people with an understanding and interest in issues of development and solidarity. The UCC meanwhile, as its own internal report stated, had a membership that was for the most part uninformed and conservative in its views towards international development issues. The reason CUSO became more prominent within the anti-apartheid network stems in a large part from these differences. Neither CUSO nor the UCC were created to do international solidarity work, but for CUSO the jump from ‘volunteer placement’ to liberation support was much less dramatic and took less time than for the UCC to shift from sending missionaries to Africa, to actively throwing its support behind Southern African freedom fighters. Further once the decision was made, CUSO had people on the ground, in direct contact with the movements, to actually carry out this work.

3.3.1 The United Church of Canada: from missionaries to anti-apartheid activists

Today the UCC is the second largest faith group in Canada with approximately 559,129 members in over 3,200 churches. The church was created in 1925 as a merger of the Methodist, Congregationalist and most of the Presbyterian churches. The UCC’s history of working in Africa goes back to the missionary

work of its founding churches. While Canada never had a colonial presence in the developing world, its missionary presence was substantial.\textsuperscript{467} Prior to 1952 the missionary work of the United Church and its founding churches was concentrated in the Pacific Region, India, Japan and Trinidad. In 1881 the first Congregationalist missionary was sent to Angola, which was the major focus of the UCC’s work in Africa until the 1950s. In 1953, due to the expulsion of missionaries from China and Portuguese refusal to renew missionary’s visas, the UCC decided to expand work in Africa with missionaries sent to work in Zambia.

During the 1960-1970s major changes took place within the UCC in how it regarded ‘mission work,’ with a transition from a more conservative evangelical outlook to a more liberal conception of mission related to social justice and development. This transition, to be discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, set the UCC up to be one of the key faith groups involved in the anti-apartheid movement, along with the Anglican Church and the CCODP. Interestingly the initial UCC activists around Southern African were returned missionaries, who became politically radicalized during their exposure to anti-colonial politics while posted in the region. The role of missionaries in anti-apartheid work was not simply a Canadian phenomenon, but a characteristic of the global anti-apartheid movement.\textsuperscript{468} Four ex-UCC African missionaries would be at the heart of UCC solidarity work, including TCLPAC founding member Murray McInness (Angola), Tad Mitsu (Lesotho) Jim Kirkwood (Zambia) and Garth Legge (Zambia) ‘the father’ of all other activist missionaries.\textsuperscript{469}

While there is little record of UCC anti-apartheid work in the 1960s, it is known that in 1970, when the PCR was formed, the UCC was the first Canadian church to throw its support behind it.\textsuperscript{470} A flyer distributed by the DWO in Dec. 1976, called ‘Human Rights in South Africa? What can we do?’ outlines some of the work the church was encouraging at the grass level, noting that members could:

1) support the bank campaign the UCC is promoting by writing a letter to their bank manager

\textsuperscript{469} Interview Jim Kirkwood (b), Toronto, Sept 10\textsuperscript{th} 2010.
\textsuperscript{470} Kenny, "Partners in Prophecy," p. 12.
2) pressure their local MP for Canada to use its forthcoming seat at the UN Security Council to press for action on South Africa

3) if they have stocks in companies in South Africa, press the companies to disinvest.\textsuperscript{471}

The UCC was also a major supporter of TCCR from its formation in 1975. That year it was difficult questions about relations with South Africa by UCC treasurer Bill Davis, at a Bank of Montreal shareholders meeting (where he was heckled by the crowd to ‘go back to Moscow’), that gained TCCR its first national media coverage.\textsuperscript{472} As Pratt notes ‘often the Taskforce board included several representatives from the United Church of Canada, each from a different division. Before major Taskforce decisions were taken, United Church board members consulted with their divisions and among themselves to seek agreement on the church's responses.’\textsuperscript{473} And as Chapter 4 will describe, by the 1970s grassroots work was happening in congregations across the UCC.

Complementing this work within Canada was the UCC’s direct work with South African partners. From 1977 onwards this area would become Jim Kirkwood’s primary responsibility, when he took over as Africa secretary from Garth Legge. Kirkwood, born in 1933 in Ballinafad Ontario, a small village outside of Toronto, had recently returned from 14 years working as a minister in Zambia.\textsuperscript{474} Coming into the position Kirkwood ‘inherited’ the relationships Legge had forged with the CI, dating back to his own time in Zambia. For most of the 1970s the CI served as the UCC’s major contact, providing them with information, recommending projects to be funded and coordinating visits of South Africans to Canada.\textsuperscript{475} Following the banning of the CI on Oct. 19\textsuperscript{th} 1977, the SACC would become the UCC’s major partner in the region, though Kirkwood worked to spread support to as many groups as possible, in case of possible banning orders. The PCR was also an important connection to the region, Kirkwood mentioning in a letter dated

\textsuperscript{471} Division of World Outreach,” Human Rights in South Africa? What can we do?," United Church of Canada Archives, Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 83.020C, Box 10-4, General : Articles, Newspaper Clippings, Reports and Resolutions 1974-1979, Toronto (Dec. 1976).
\textsuperscript{472} Pratt, In Good Faith Canadian Churches Against Apartheid, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{473} Ibid., p. 160.
\textsuperscript{474} Interview Jim Kirkwood (d).
\textsuperscript{475} Interview Jim Kirkwood (a), Toronto, February 20\textsuperscript{th} 2009.
May 16th 1979, to CUSO’s John Saxby, that the church had provided 72,000 dollars to the PCR that year, with 24,000 dollars marked specifically for South Africa. 476

In the winter of 1978-1979 a task force was appointed by the United Church’s General Council to study issues around South Africa, including Kirkwood and representatives of the General Council, Division of Mission in Canada, International Affairs, World Outreach and Business and Finance divisions. The report was adopted by the full executive of the General Council in April 1979. The report had a series of resolutions, one noting that the council recognized how the high level of economic alignment between Canada and the South African government strengthened the apartheid state. 477 The report also included a series of recommendations to the Canadian government, ‘including to publicly discourage new and expanding investments in South Africa’ and sections that resolved the church to work to convince the private sector to end all investments in South Africa, while also asking UCC members to evaluate their own relationship to apartheid through banking and investment. 478

Over the 1980s Jim Kirkwood emerged as one of the key nodes in the anti-apartheid network. Numerous interviewees would speak about his work behind the scenes in connecting and organizing events throughout the decade. Within the UCC, Kirkwood’s focus was on SAEP (South African Education Project), created as a result of the 1978-79 task force. SAEP was described by Krikwood as his way to link the UCC head office to the grassroots, and consisted of a newsletter that was sent out to over 100 key activists. The newsletter would be full of letters and writings from South African leaders like Boseak, Desmond Tutu and Father Michael Lapsley, ideas for local initiatives, accounts of actions happening all over the country and a list of educational resources that could be ordered. On February 13th 1981 SAEP sent out 115 questionnaires, which garnered 35 returned surveys. 479 Though a small sample they provide an

478 Ibid., p.: 863.
479 South African Education Project, "Re: Questionnaire Returned," United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 88.031C, Box 7-4 SAEP Key People, Direction Finder, Questionnaire and Results 1979-1983, Toronto (May 21 1982).
interesting glimpse into the United Church network at the time. The top resources used by activists surveyed were the SAEP newsletter and the *Investment in Oppression* resource. The most common forms of action carried out were: individual study, individual action like letter writing to government, bringing up concerns at church meetings and group study. Reviewing the findings Kirkwood and the SAEP team concluded that forming new groups around South Africa should be a very low priority, as this was extremely difficult to accomplish, but that instead, church activists should try to raise the issue within existing groups and meetings of the church.

With the creation of ICCAF in 1982 increasingly more of Kirkwood’s work around South Africa, like coordinating visits and national tours of South African speakers, would become part of ICCAF’s mandate, lessening his direct responsibilities. Tad Mitsui notes that himself (working in the CCC) Kirkwood and McInnes (working at the Anglican Church) were the ‘three musketeers’ for church work around South Africa in the 1980s. It was these ‘three musketeers’ who were behind the creation of ICCAF. As for funding, the UCC continued to closely support the SACC in the 1980s. The SACC and Jim’s existing South African contacts would also be suggesting groups inside the country support for ad-hoc support, with the UCC supporting everything from trade unions to AZAPO. An internal church document lists the following programs as receiving joint CIDA and UCC funding in 1980:

- South Africa, Dependents’ Conference: 22,000.00 CIDA and 11,000 UCC
- South Africa, Adult Education Program: 11,000 CIDA and 11,000 UCC
- South Africa, Community Arts Program: 3,300 CIDA and 3,300 UCC
- South Africa, Cultural Awareness Program (Film Festival): 22,000 CIDA and 5,500 UCC
- International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAFSA): 8,800 CIDA and UCC 3,300

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480 Ibid. “Personal Letter.”
481 Jim Kirkwood to SAEP Mailing list, “Personal Letter,” United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 88.031C, Box 7-4 SAEP Key People, Direction Finder, Questionnaire and Results 1979-1983, Toronto (Feb. 11th 1981).
482 Interview Tad Mitsui, Lethbridge.
483 Interview Jim Kirkwood (b).
Along with grants and work in advocacy and information dissemination, the UCC was also involved in the quintessential church practice: debating and crafting resolutions. Thus at its 1984 General Council the United Church officially declared apartheid a heresy, following suit with other churches worldwide. In 1987 Jim Kirkwood officially turned SAEP over to ICCAF. He knew the program would be in good hands, as his protégé Gary Kenny had joined ICCAF in fall 1987 to work with Joyce Dipale as joint coordinator for Southern Africa. By 1989 Gary had become Executive Director of ICCAF. Kenny had first begun to work with Kirkwood in 1985 as a volunteer writer for SAEP, when he was a recent university graduate working in the publishing industry. Eventually Kenny would go on to take Kirkwood’s role as the United Church staff person for Africa, a position he holds today.

Other UCC members likewise became directly involved in the running of ICCAF, with UCC minister Greg White becoming the co-chair of the South Africa sub-committee along with UCC member Patti Talbot. In 1990 White and Mitsui worked to organize moral support for Father Michael Lapsley, including letter writing and a service to pray for his recovery at the United Church head office. In 1991 Lapsley returned to Canada to thank Canadians for their role in his journey of healing, where he also produced a film with ICCAF called ‘Apartheid has Not Ended.’ The UCC would also support the ANC directly during the late 1980s. For example a 1987 letter from the Harare office of the ANC warmly thanks Kirkwood for a donation of four thousand dollars towards the work of their information and publicity department.

484 The United Church of Canada "CIDA Matching Grants," United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 83.031C, Box 12-2, African National Congress: Correspondence 1976-1984, Toronto (Feb. 28th 1980).
486 Lapsley was bombed just a week after his national tour of Canada and notes there was a “huge Canadian response” during his recovery, especially from the United Church. Interview Michael Lapsley(b), April 10th 2010, Cape Town; Interview Greg White.
In 1994 Jim Kirkwood went into a well deserved retirement. Over 1994 UCC staff, working with Eddie Makue at the SACC, would arrange UCC support for programs around democracy education and monitoring in the lead up to the 1994 election.\textsuperscript{488} Along with financial support, the UCC would also send long time anti-apartheid veteran and political science professor Doug Anglin to work as staff with Makue at the Independent Forum for Electoral Education. Here Anglin would produce documents for the ‘democracy education’ work of the SACC, attending with Makue meetings with the UDF and members of the ANC negotiating team. Together they authored a 34 page manual around the elections which would be widely used by the SACC. The UCC would also work to send some of its members to be part of EMPSA, like Margaret Sumadh and Tad Mitsui, who were assigned as an election monitors in Kwa-Zulu Natal.

In 1995 Sue Sutton’s overview of the Canadian network notes that the UCC was continuing to ‘support its partners, particularly the SACC and related sub-groups, in justice work, issues relating to women and youth, Reconstruction & Rehabilitation, environmental groups, academic and trade unions, publications, and the training of new leadership to replace those lost to government and private enterprise.’\textsuperscript{489} Eddie Makue, current General Secretary of the SACC, speaks about how the UCC was very involved post-1994 in helping the SACC build its capacity to deal with gender issues and handle the increased demands of funders around project evaluations and grant writing. The UCC also continued to send volunteers to take part in election monitoring through the SACC up to the 2009 election.

Today the UCC supports six partners in South Africa: AIDC, the Institute for Contextual Theology (ICT), the Institute for Healing of Memories, SACC, Surplus People’s Project (SPP) and the Uniting Christian Students’ Association of South Africa. All of the groups, especially SPP and the AIDC, could be described as operating under a more radical or politicized approach to development work. In most cases these partnerships have gone on for decades, the UCC supporting the SPP since the mid 1980s. But beyond financial support and occasional visits by Africa staff persons Gary Kenny, other UCC work around South

\textsuperscript{488} Interview Eddie Makue.
\textsuperscript{489} Sutton, "Canadian Solidarity."
Africa, specifically in the context of advocacy and activism, has been particularly lacking. HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa is a partial exception, as in December 2001 the UCC launched the Beads of Hope Campaign, a two year emergency appeal to raise funding and awareness for HIV/AIDS. The church notes there were ‘thousands of local initiatives—workshops, speakers, worship services, concerts, dinners, rockathons, loonie challenges, theatrical productions, quilts, contacts with Canadian AIDS Service organizations.’ Further 40,000 signatures were collected for a petition to be sent to parliament, which highlighted four areas the government could contribute to the global fight against AIDS and 2 million dollars were raised for partners working around HIV/AIDS. But construing this as South African solidarity is a bit of stretch, as South Africa was just one of 30 countries focused on in the appeal.

Another interesting example of continued solidarity between the UCC and South Africa is the case of Wesley Mambuza. Mambuza, who had been the executive director of the ICT from 1994 to 2000, and worked with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, was assigned as a missionary to the Toronto Conference of the UCC in 2001. Based for a year out of Midhurst United Church he travelled around giving workshops and trainings, based on the famous KAIROS document, as he attempted to aid the church in increasing its ability to have reconciliation and deeper relationships with Canadian indigenous peoples.

It’s also important to note though that for many in the UCC the real legacy of anti-apartheid is not through continued South African solidarity, but in the move over the 1990s to focus on the global justice movement and issues of economic justice. As part of this new focus for UCC overseas work, the church launched a campaign called ‘Living Faithfully in the Midst of Empire’ in 2006. The Empire campaign builds on work around globalization developed by the church during the 1990s, including participation in the Jubilee 2000 campaign. To the UCC Empire is defined as ‘the convergence of economic, political, cultural,

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492 Interview Jim Kirkwood (d).
geographic and military imperial interests, systems and networks that seek to dominate political power and economic wealth. It typically forces and facilitates the flow of wealth and power from vulnerable persons, communities and countries to the more powerful.' 493 As Empire has been adopted by the UCC as the church’s official position on the global economy, church activists have attempted to launch all international solidarity work under this broad doctrine, though there does not seem to be one single overriding goal of this campaign, beyond resisting Empire. And transferring the momentum from anti-apartheid to campaign around global economic justice has been quite difficult, as Kirkwood notes ‘Apartheid was a much easier cause to work on than economic justice, you can have a group of church people who are 100% against racism and apartheid, but really only 18% might be against capitalism.’ 494

3.3.2. CUSO: from bright eyed students to anti-imperialist radicals

Today the organization known first as Canadian University Service Overseas, then from 1981 onwards as simply CUSO, no longer exists. In 2008 the organization merged with the Canadian section of British Volunteer Service Overseas (VSO), reconstituted as a new organization CUSO-VSO. Combined, the two organizations have placed over 15,000 co-operants overseas, the vast majority having been CUSO co-operants. 495 Originally started with a focus on sending young Canadians overseas, by the 1970s-1980s CUSO became involved in project work and would increasingly focus on placing experienced volunteers in the South. 496 At its height in the 1970s CUSO was the biggest NGO in Canada; in 1970 the organization had 50 full time staff and 1,100 volunteers placed in forty two countries, with a network of regional offices in communities and on university campuses across Canada. 497 CUSO also had a semi-autonomous francophone cousin SUCO, which totally separated from the organization in 1980. 498

493 The United Church of Canada (b), Living Faithfully in the Midst of Empire: Report to the 39th General Council (Toronto: The United Church of Canada, 2007), p. 5.
494 Interview Jim Kirkwood (d)
497 Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p. 111.
498 Ibid., p. 307.
CUSO was founded at a 1961 meeting of civil servants, university officials and activists, who were trying to coordinate the work of the numerous emerging student volunteer groups in Canada, the most significant a group called Canadian Volunteers Overseas (CVO). In 1961 CVO, now a CUSO affiliate, sent out its first wave of 15 volunteers, with the UCC being one of its original supporters, paying for 3 volunteers in partnership with the Anglican Church. In 1965 government funding was achieved for the organization and the Royal Canadian Air Force was brought on board to provide free air fare for volunteers. With long term government funding secured the organization expanded massively in the ensuing decades.

CUSO, like the UCC, adopted an increasingly progressive, radical position in regards to its overseas work during the 1960-70s. For CUSO the impetus was returning volunteers, with over 1000 placed in Southern Africa by 1970, where they were exposed to the liberation groups and witnessed firsthand the struggle taking place across the region. ‘On their return to Canada, former volunteers pressed CUSO to recognise the political dimension of economic underdevelopment in Africa’ and ‘formed a powerful lobby group within their own organisation to establish “political units” to disseminate information, arrange speaking tours and raise funds in Canada.’ David Beer is an example of one such returned co-operant, born in 1941 and raised in Newmarket, a small town outside of Toronto, Beer was inspired by a teacher at his Quaker boarding school to volunteer in British Guyana from 1958-1959. He then helped found Canadian Commonwealth Volunteers, and served as a CUSO co-operant in Zambia starting in 1964. When he returned to Canada in 1967 he had been transformed, having become committed to Southern African liberation and working for the next 30 years with CUSO as a champion for their liberation support work. With young activists like Beer energizing CUSO, it was no surprise that when ‘the Canadian government announced in 1973 that it would be funding humanitarian aid for liberation movements in Southern Africa

499 Ibid., p. 17-18.
500 Ibid., p. 19 and 12.
501 Ibid., p. 110.
502 Interview David Beer (a), Cape Town, July 16th 2009.
503 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 862.
504 Ibid., p. 873.
through NGOs, CUSO and a number of other anti-apartheid organisations met to develop strategies,’ with CUSO proceeding to begin support for a number of liberation movement run humanitarian programs.\(^{505}\)

From 1975 to 1980 CUSO would be involved in numerous anti-apartheid activities in Canada and in Southern Africa, as part of a broad policy of support to OAU recognized Southern African liberation movements, which had been adopted in 1976.\(^{506}\) With a Development Education (DE) department created in 1975, led by Beer, CUSO also began to develop education resources relating to apartheid and administer grants for community based DE programs.\(^{507}\) CUSO internal documents note that prior to 1976 liberation support was done on ad hoc basis, with a program started to support an ANC 45 acre farm in Lusaka Zambia by the Zambia office in early 1976.\(^{508}\) Building on this momentum Dough Miller arrived in country in June 1976 to launch a liberation support program with a broad mandate ‘to support oppressed people struggling for social and political equality within highly exploitative and racist systems.’\(^{509}\) He writes that his job was to:

1) Provide administrative support in drafting humanitarian proposals and distributing them to donor agencies and providing evaluation reports

2) To actively fundraise for projects taken on

3) To promote DE in Canada around liberation movements

4) To maintain ongoing analysis of Southern Africa situation and find new places for Canadians to be involved

5) To strengthen links with like minded organizations\(^{510}\)

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\(^{505}\) Ibid., p. 874.

\(^{506}\) Ibid., p. 875.

\(^{507}\) Smillie, \textit{The Land of Lost Content}, p. 104.


\(^{510}\) Ibid.
On May 15th 1978 Miller wrote to the Secretary General of the ANC, noting that 38,050 dollars were allocated for the next year to go to seven ANC projects, with over 39,050 dollars having already been given during the previous two and a half years and the hope to give another 34,000 more plus manpower. These supported programs included an ANC poultry project, the ANC Morogoro school in Tanzania, support for the ANC women’s section, support for a trade union bulletin and an ANC tour of Canada. In fact total CUSO support for all liberation movements in Southern Africa for 1978-1979 was budgeted at 947,700.00 dollars, with 735,000 dollars being grants given to CUSO from other organizations (mainly CIDA) and 212,700 dollars provided from CUSO’s own budget. As Miller noted in a 1977 report, ‘The Lusaka Office has come to act as a liaison between Canadian agencies, and the movements as regards project formulation, fundraising and reporting. It has facilitated the visits of agency personnel to Lusaka and the movement personnel to Canada. Over the past year the office has been directly responsible for bringing over 200,000 in funds to the movements. Other amounts came indirectly as a result of the offices activities.’

But CUSO’s work in supporting liberation groups would not go unnoticed and soon began to attract negative publicity in the national media. A major scandal erupted in 1979 after the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka. During the meeting David Beer, now the Field Staff Officer in Zambia, arranged possible outings for Canadian dignitaries and media as part of a plan to build Canadian support for ZAPU. These outings included press visits to CUSO projects, the arranging of a Canadian Broadcasting Company interview with Joshua Nkomo and Foreign Affairs Minister Flora McDonald spending an afternoon with CUSO staff and visiting ZAPU’s Camp Victory. But the media coverage afterwards was exceptionally negative, with various papers attacking CUSO’s work. For example the Globe and Mail ran

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513 Ibid.
515 Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p. 221.
516 Ibid., p.221.
an article entitled ‘To CUSO, Guerrillas are not Terrorists’ noting, ‘Many Canadians think of all members of
the Patriotic Front as terrorists. Dave Beer, from Newmarket, has them over for dinner. He also hands over
lashing of Canadian government money to them.’517 While certainly not the first critique of Canadian work
with liberation movements, it did help set the stage for Joe Clark’s decision that year to end all CIDA aid
grants to support liberation groups through Canadian NGOs. As a result of this rescinding of government
funding in 1979, CUSO would form a solidarity fund to raise money directly from the Canadian public to
support their work with the ANC.518

Within Canada CUSO was also actively involved in a variety of areas. In 1976 CUSO helped
organize a tour for two ANC aligned women from Soweto to garner support for the liberation struggle. In
1977 CUSO withdrew all investments from the Royal Bank of Canada in protest to its loans to South Africa
and in 1978 CUSO started to fundraise in Canada directly for the ANC.519 Reporting on the extent of
grassroots level work done by CUSO following a national tour Ken Traynor wrote, ‘I was impressed with the
variety of contacts made by the local committees and regional offices and the variety of groups they arranged
for me to interact with. I see this as a very real strength of the organization, its diverse and widespread
Canadian base.’520

Following 1980, with Zimbabwe now independent, CUSO’s liberation support work became
devoted to anti-apartheid. Despite the loss of government funding CUSO’s liberation support work with the
ANC would expand over the 1980s, with relationships deepened by the three heads of the liberation support
program between the years 1978-1988, David Beer, then John Saxby and finally John Van Mossel.521
Support to the ANC would come to include joint work with the ANC’s Project Department, Women’s Unit,
Department of Publicity, Department of Arts and Cultural and Research Department.522 Within Canada

517 Ibid., p. 221.
519 Ibid., pp. 875 and 868.
521 Interview John Van Mossel (b), Ottawa, January 15th 2010.
522 Ibid.
many CUSO liberation support staff who returned in the early 1980s joined the SACTU solidarity committee (such as Doug Miller, Ken Traynor and Sue Godt) while CUSO regional branches increasingly become involved in local grassroots activities. CUSO activists would also continue to partake in national initiatives, like the 1982 Ottawa conference or in collaboration around speaking tours. Local initiatives were also closely supported by CUSO regional offices and through CUSO supported DE projects.

From 1988 onwards the task of running the liberation support office in Lusaka would fall on Joan Anne Nolan, who had worked before as a staff person on liberation support under John Van Mossel. During this period Joe Slovo’s wife Helena Dolny sat as a member of CUSO’s board and also had a workspace in their Lusaka liberation support office along with Bongi Njobe of the ANC, due to a shared ANC-CUSO agricultural program. With CUSO still being the only Canadian, or Western, organization with a physical office in Lusaka dedicated to liberation support, Joan Anne handled the administration and report writing for grants from a variety of Western NGOs. Tevor Cook, who began working around supporting South African organizations at the CCODP in 1988, noted he worked very closely with Nolan, recalling, ‘basically we sent funding to CUSO and they would administer it, then reports would come from ANC or SWAPO to CUSO and then it would be passed on to us.’ Joan Fairweather notes that CUSO would spend over 50,000 dollars a year of its own money for liberation support programs in Southern Africa during the 1980s, while continually trying to pressure CIDA to get involved wherever possible. In 1989 CUSO ‘obtained funding to produce a number of videos, including “Five Freedoms Forum” featuring the July 1989 meeting between the ANC and Afrikaner writers.’ In addition CUSO also worked with Inter Press in Rome on producing electronic and print information for solidarity groups and in 1987 a number of NGOs received a

523 Interview Joan Anne Nolan (c), Ottawa, September 15th 2010.
524 Interview Joan Anne Nolan (a), Ottawa, November 4th 2010.
525 Interview Trevor Cook, Brussels.
527 Ibid.
matching grant of 750,000 Euros from the European Economic Community towards the CUSO-administered ANC farm.\textsuperscript{528}

Once Mandela was released and the ANC began to move back to South Africa, CUSO began making plans to enter the country. Joan Anne Nolan notes there were a range of discussions within CUSO in the lead up, along with consultations with the ANC, as they tried to figure out where would be best to work.\textsuperscript{529} Nolan arrived in Johannesburg in 1992 to open the office and selected the first co-operant’s by using anti-apartheid networks to identify Canadians in the country, already working with civil society groups. One of the major projects initiated was an exchange between South Africans working in civil society with activists from organizations CUSO worked with from Latin America. And as before in Lusaka, CUSO provided a link for funding from the international community to the movements, ‘in 1992, CUSO administered more than C$800 000 in funds for ANC and SWAPO support projects with money from CIDA and a group of NGOs.’\textsuperscript{530} Thus by the time of the 1994 election the CUSO program within South Africa was already well established.

Following 1994 Joan Anne Nolan continued her work at the CUSO office in Johannesburg. After the election CUSO’s relationships with the ANC was changed, as Nolan notes ‘they didn’t need us anymore.’ Further CUSO felt that its role in the new South Africa would be to support a robust civil society, so CUSO’s focus turned to supporting various NGOs in the country. When Nolan left CUSO in 1996, South African Penny Narsoo was chosen to take her place. At this point CUSO co-operants had been placed in a variety of areas; some were supported to do work in new media like co-operant Hien Marias, others like Canadian Susan O’Leary, David Beer or Sam Bonti- Ankomah worked for NGOs in the land sector. Co-operant Nigel Crawhall had been placed to work with an indigenous language NGO, while Betsy Alkenbrack was one of a number of co-operants working in education: she was placed with the NGO the English Literacy Project. Others worked in housing, with CUSO supporting work done by NGO Rooftops Canada

\textsuperscript{528} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{529} Interview Joan Anne Nolan (b), Ottawa, March 20\textsuperscript{th} 2009.
\textsuperscript{530} Fairweather, “Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle,” p. 877.
around housing co-operatives. CUSO documents show that over 44 co-operants were assigned to South Africa while the office remained open, with placements in roles such as Training Manager for the National Community Radio Forum, HIV/AIDS web-site coordinator for the South African NGO Coalition or Social Housing Consultant for the Development Action Group.531

Upon taking over the office in 1996, Narsoo found the job to be very challenging. In an environment of ongoing cut-backs she found herself overwhelmed with the backlog of new forms and documents that were constantly being demanded from CIDA, lower quality of co-operants who needed greater mentorship and general lack of support from the Ottawa office.532 Eventually, due to the continued cut-backs CUSO was experiencing in Canada, the South African office was closed permanently in 2006. In 2008 CUSO Canada merged with British based VSO (Volunteer Services Overseas) and be re-established as a new organization CUSO-VSO. Today, though one can still see posters from the liberation struggle in South Africa covering the walls of the CUSO-VSO head office in Ottawa, the solidarity relationships with organizations and individuals in South Africa, nurtured over three decades, are over.

3.4. Conclusion

This Chapter has chronicled how Canadian activists, organizations and governments engaged with the political struggles of South Africans over the course of a generation. It showed how a small group of missionaries, academics and CSO activists organized and advocated over the late 1960s and 1970s, slowly building an ever larger and more connected national network. It highlighted the importance of large CSO’s within this work, organizations which came together to form coalitions like TCCR or coordinating bodies like IAWGSA, while also carrying out their own individual solidarity activities. It also gave an initial introduction to my case study organizations, sketching a brief history of the South African solidarity work of two of Canada’s largest CSOs. Throughout this history it was clear that in many ways Canada was ‘behind the curve’ in anti-apartheid activism, lagging decades behind the

531 CUSO-VSO (a), "List of CUSO placements to South Africa (provided as excel file to author)," CUSO-VSO (Ottawa: CUSO-VSO, 2010).
532 Interview Penny Narsoo, Johannesbug.
liberation support policies of the Scandinavian nations. For most of the apartheid period the Canadian state’s actions were cautious and incremental, always paying close attention to the interests of big business and strategic allies, mainly the United Kingdom and the United States. At the same time the Canadian solidarity network also followed the lead set by other nations.

Yet I’ve also showed that the Canadian contribution to anti-apartheid was not insignificant, as activists were able to build a robust movement that shifted national opinions, mobilized large amounts of financial aid and in the case of the CUSO liberation support office, served as a key connector between the ANC and the global solidarity movement. It is also worth noting that for a brief period in the mid 1980s, Canada showed real leadership on the global stage around sanctions. But the drop off in support for South African political struggles was both swift and substantial following 1994. As I have outlined, activists and their organizations struggled to find a place for Canadian solidarity in the ‘new South Africa.’ In the next chapter I will delve deeper into the Canadian network, helping to further contextualize the work of CUSO and the UCC, while giving a fuller picture of the scale and shape of Canadian solidarity work.
4

Understanding the Canadian Networks

4.1. Chapter overview

This chapter will provide a detailed and in-depth examination of the inner workings of the Canadian-South African solidarity networks that existed from 1975 to 2010. I focus exclusively on Canadian activities in this chapter, and also approach the network in a much more systematic way, describing in depth its different components, activities and ideologies. For the post-1994 period I will consider the Canadian international solidarity advocacy network oriented towards Africa in general, looking specifically at the ways this network has related to South African activists. Finally the chapter will outline the prominent discourses of solidarity that existed in the network in both periods. In section 4.2 I use the solidarity chain to map the Canadian network, providing examples of what international solidarity activity looked like at each level of the chain, in both periods, while discussing the depth, width and breadth of the pre and post-1994 networks. While carrying out this broad survey I will also contextualize the work of CUSO and the UCC with respect to the larger network. In Section 4.3 I will then consider the discourses that existed in the networks, with a focus on the three major conceptions of solidarity present during anti-apartheid: solidarity as charity, internationalist solidarity and revolutionary solidarity. Then in a brief section on the post-apartheid period discourses I will explain how the range of
solidarity discourses present in the network shrunk post-1994. Thus by the end of the chapter I will have presented an in-depth exploration of the Canadian network, which complements the political history of Chapter 3 to provide an exhaustive analysis of Canadian-South African solidarity work from 1975-2010.

4.2. Mapping the Canadian anti-apartheid movement

4.2.1. Network depth

I will begin my analysis of the anti-apartheid network by thinking about depth, specifically the question: how big was the movement in Canada? While there are no simple answers to this question, the data shows that the Canadian movement was a national phenomenon, with groups springing up far outside the Quebec City-Windsor Corridor. In Vancouver, over 4,500 kilometers away from Toronto and Ottawa, a number of solidarity groups ‘came together to form the Anti-Apartheid Network (AAN). The network included the South Africa Action Committee (SAAC), Oxfam-Canada, two unions (the British Columbia Teachers’ Federation and CAIMAW), other solidarity groups (Palestinian, Chile, Ireland) and a number of individual activists.’ When Stephen Gelb of TCLSAC sent out a letter to anti-apartheid organizations on February 28th 1980, to invite them to a Southern African conference at the Grindstone Island Centre, thirty three were invited, from cities including Halifax, Hamilton, Edmonton, Calgary, Kitchener-Waterloo, Winnipeg, Ottawa, Guelph and Montreal. A 1979 list of anti-apartheid movements in the CUSO archives lists groups in a range of cities from most of Canada’s provinces, usually with 5-20 members, engaging in a variety of activities such as public meetings, boycotts, picketing outside of liquor stores and visiting schools. By 1987 John Saul could claim that the ‘Taking Sides Conference’ had representatives present from every province in Canada. He further noted that one could think of the anti-apartheid movement as

533 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 899.
536 Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 69.
actually three overlapping networks, the church network, the NGO network and the French language network in Quebec, with a wide variety of grassroots groups whose work was connected to the major CSOs based in Ottawa.\textsuperscript{537} I would add that Toronto and Montreal, and the CSOs headquartered there, were important secondary nodes for the national network.

But how many groups were there in this national network? Linda Freeman calculates that 150 different organizations were involved in anti-apartheid work throughout the 1980s.\textsuperscript{538} At the ‘Taking Sides’ conference Saul claims 197 organizations were represented.\textsuperscript{539} I can thus tentatively place the number of organizations involved at somewhere under 200 groups nationally. But this number on its own doesn’t provide a full understanding of the depth of the network, as it probably under-represents local groupings that existed within larger organizations. For example, Jim Kirkwood estimates nearly 200 individual UCC congregations were involved with some sort of South African work; whether through holding workshops, doing local advocacy work, holding discussions on divestment, letter writing or hosting speakers.\textsuperscript{540} Only the most active of these congregations sent members to national conferences, and they would likely have been lumped together with other members of the UCC. But if we take this estimate of church involvement from the UCC, it would seem fair to then assume that between the Anglicans and Catholic churches (the other two big national churches in Canada) there could be at least another 200 churches that participated in some sort of anti-apartheid activism. From other interviews it was clear there was also a good deal of grassroots level activism within various trade union locals,\textsuperscript{541} public schools and universities.\textsuperscript{542} Certainly not all of these local formations would have been involved in continuous contentious activism, or sent reps to national conferences, so it seems safe to say the network had 150-200 groups at the core of the network, which were a mix of large professional CSOs and smaller localized groups, with hundreds of local grassroots groups across Canada who temporarily mobilized at different times to contribute to the movement.

\textsuperscript{537} Interview John Saul (b).
\textsuperscript{538} Freeman, \textit{The Ambiguous Champion}, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{539} Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 69.
\textsuperscript{540} Interview Jim Kirkwood (c).
\textsuperscript{541} Interview Ken Traynor, Toronto; Interview Brenda Wall.
\textsuperscript{542} Interview John Saul (a), Toronto, September 28\textsuperscript{th} 2010; Interview Yola Grant; Interview Lynda Lamberg.
The total number of people who contributed to the movement is impossible to accurately gauge, but again I have made rough estimates. IDAFSA Canada, the CSO that seems to have had the widest swathe of supporters, had over 10,000 listed ‘Canadian supporters’ by 1986.543 It is also known that Canadians cities were able to mobilize hundreds and sometimes thousands of people to take part in demonstrations, with the highpoint of 15,000 people in Toronto in 1986.544 And the two large solidarity conferences held in 1982 and 1987 both had a consistent number of around 500 activists. There was thus probably a core of 500 activists across Canada at the heart of anti-apartheid contention, with a smaller inner circle of maybe 50 or less key activists or gatekeepers, who were highly connected to Southern African liberation groups and lifelong supporters of the movement. Around this core were thousands of Canadians, who were mobilized at different points, around specific activities. These numbers can be compared to other national movements: AAM for example had at its peak in 1989 20,000 official members and 1,300 local groupings involved, with 1,135 members enrolled as early as 1963.545 Chapter 3 also mentioned the fact that protests in the UK were able to garner over 100,000 supporters in the 1980s. In regards to the United States, Donald Culverson writes that by 1990, 379 American organizations had made anti-apartheid work their primary focus while 600 other groups devoted significant time to the issue.546 These numbers illustrate that while the Canadian movement was a national phenomenon, it was small compared to its American and British counterparts, which is reasonable given the fact both countries have significantly larger populations.547

4.2.2. Network width and the density of connections at the grassroots level

The next area to consider is width and density, considering what solidarity work looked like at the four levels of the solidarity chain and how dense the connections were between these different levels. The Canadian side of the movement, though not a centralized network, certainly had a heavy reliance on

543 Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 880.
544 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 147.
gatekeepers at the professional level to facilitate communication. But there are examples of Canadian grassroots formations launching self-directed activities and creating links between themselves, and more importantly to South African groups, on their own. Groups working at the grassroots level in Canada shared specific characteristics: their activities were carried out primarily by unpaid volunteers, who lived within a geographic area small enough to facilitate ongoing face to face interactions, and such actions were grounded in local institutions and contexts.

One UCC example is the work of Emmanuel United Church in Waterloo Ontario. Anti-apartheid work began at Emmanuel when Jeanne Moffat joined the congregation in 1976. She quickly became involved with the church’s outreach committee, and on April 4th 1976 the group held its first event on South Africa, an educational evening on Canadian investments in Namibia. That same year the committee engaged in a letter writing campaign around the issue, held a workshop for the entire congregation on banking and apartheid on May 15th 1977 and in 1978 brought in Theo Kotze, of the now banned CI, to speak. From 1978 to 1981 the outreach committee fought to get the church to remove its savings account from the local branch of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), due to the bank’s involvement in Southern Africa. As Moffatt describes, this internal debate ended up nearly splitting the congregation, led to a committee member who worked for CIBC being cautioned by her superiors and in the end was ultimately unsuccessful, though it did marshal church support for a series of letters to senior bank management complaining about their South Africa policy. The tenacity of the committee’s work also caught the attention of staff members in the UCC and within TCCR, who created learning resources about how congregations could launch local banking campaigns based on the case of Emmanuel United, while Jeanne herself was recruited in the 1980s to join Jim Kirkwood and other UCC national office staff on SAEP.

548 Interview Jean Moffat, Toronto.
552 Ibid. pp. 3 and 6.
A letter in the Canadian National Archives provides an example of what grassroots level activism looked like for CUSO. On June 9th 1980 Lily Mah-Sen wrote to CUSO Ottawa to inform them that a theatre group, supported by CUSO DE money, based at a learning center in Edmonton, had carried out guerilla theatre in the Edmonton Centre Mall. While the De Beers store in the mall was celebrating its 75th anniversary two members, poising as affluent white South Africans, made racist comments and denigrated a black shopper (who was actually part of the group). When he refused to respond to their shouts of, ‘You boy, come here!’ the ‘South African’ man produced a noose from his bag and attached it to the man’s neck. When security tried to step in and say they couldn’t do this he replied, ‘Why? We do this all the time in South Africa!’ The man with the noose around his neck eventually fled the store, screaming ‘Freedom’ and was subsequently arrested by mall security. As a crowd gathered, activists handed out 2000 flyers titled ‘Diamonds for Blood.’ The entire event was recorded by a local journalist and then played the next day on a morning show with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

Such local activities, often undertaken by volunteers with little coordination from head offices in Ottawa or Toronto, would be an integral part of the anti-apartheid movement. Other examples of solidarity work based in the grassroots were the activities done by university divestment committees, or union locals. In Toronto, high school students from Oakwood Collegiate were known to have an active anti-apartheid committee and Yola Grant describes how students involved with CCSA in the mid-1980s pushed the organization to support a South African themed float to take part in Caribana, the city’s Caribbean Festival. Despite this notable self-direction, for the most part these grassroots formations depended on professionals in larger CSOs, or dedicated solidarity groups in Ottawa-Toronto-Montreal, to facilitate connections to South Africa. However this was not always the case, as sometimes local organizations did connect directly to both the South African professional and South African grassroots level. For example, there is the case of Welland Avenue United Church in St. Catherines Ontario. Led by minister Greg White,

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554 Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 58.
555 Interview Yola Grant.
Welland Avenue was twinned with the community of Imizamo Yethu, an informal settlement near Hout Bay, outside of Cape Town.\textsuperscript{556} While the twinning was facilitated by staff at the CCC, once it was formed Welland Avenue carried out the interactions on their own. White notes the twinning was a relationship that was largely ‘non-financial in nature’ which involved exchanges of letters and individuals between the two communities, with Imizamo Yethu community members coming to Canada for a speaking tour and members of Emmanuel United writing letters in support of the community to a local Hout Bay newspaper.

Thus while it was extremely difficult for the Canadian network to connect with those at the grassroots level in South Africa, such interactions did take place over the anti-apartheid period. Another example is the work done by Manitou Conference in the UCC. This church region, which included the North-Bay Sudbury area in Northern Ontario, was noted as a significant place for grassroots activism in the UCC.\textsuperscript{557} This is not surprising due to the area’s long history with trade unionism (due to cooper mines) and its historical connection to the NDP. During the 1980s activists from Manitou Conference began to organize their own trips to South Africa and speaking tours, independent of the church’s national office.\textsuperscript{558} Gille de Vlieg, a member of the Black Sash in Johannesburg, recollected how she and a group of church and NGO activists were recruited to come to Canada for a local speaking tour in the North Bay area, after meeting members from Manitou Conference in South Africa during the mid-1980s.\textsuperscript{559} Through examples like this it’s clear that the Canadian anti-apartheid movement had broad participation at the grassroots level, which was locally grounded and connected across different levels, exhibiting all the qualities of Tennant’s participatory transnational networks.\textsuperscript{560}

\textbf{4.2.3. Network depth and density of connections at the professional level}

Yet even with this robust Canadian grassroots involvement, the crux of the network was still at the professional level. Here resided many of the roughly 500 activists at the heart of the network and most

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{556} Interview Greg White.
\textsuperscript{557} Interview Jim Kirkwood (d).
\textsuperscript{558} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{559} Interview Gille de Vlieg, Cape Town.
\textsuperscript{560} Tennant, "Locating Transnational Activists," p. 22.
\end{footnotesize}
importantly the smaller group of key activists/gatekeepers. These gatekeepers tended to be individuals who were university educated (many being academics), had spent time living or working in Southern Africa and were overwhelmingly white Canadian, with a high proportion of male activists. Jim McKinnen described the Ottawa network in the late 1980s, noting that at its core were a handful of NGO and trade union insiders, who by this point had developed extensive contacts and connections with government and CIDA, what Hein Marias called ‘a little mafia of middle aged men with the inside track to CIDA for money, all progressive, some left wing and all very smart.’

One such insider and gate keeper is Paul Puritt. Puritt recollected that he first started supporting anti-apartheid work in 1959 while at the University of Toronto. After earning his PhD and working with John Saul, Cranford Pratt and other Canadian academics at University College in Tanzania, he returned to Canada to work for OXFAM from 1975-1984, travelling numerous times to the region, where he liaised with various liberation movements. At the same time he was a member of TCLPAC/TCLSAC. In 1982 he worked with Pierre Beaudet in Montreal to set up CIDMAA, serving as the group’s first coordinator. Starting in 1984 he joined the CLC’s International Department, where he established and expanded connections with local unions within South Africa. In 1990 he served as temporary director of the South African Education Trust Fund, chaired by Archbishop Ted Scott. From 1992 up to 1994 he was placed by the CLC in South Africa to work with their union partners such as COSATU. From this short career overview we see the classic gatekeeper career pattern; an activist who made South African solidarity central to their life’s work and then moved over the decades from organization to organization, bringing along a continually expanding roster of existing South African contacts. The gatekeepers and core activists who worked at the Canadian professional level (meaning they were working full time around solidarity work, within an established civil society organization or in a third world solidarity group) carried out a

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561 Yet it should be noted there were still a number of important female activists in the network such as: Renatta Pratt (TCCR), Judith Marshall (TCLSAC, OXFAM and United Steelworkers Humanity Fund head) or Brenda Wall (SACTU solidarity Committee).
562 Interview Jim MacKinnon, Ottawa.
563 Interview Hein Marais, Johannesburg; Ibid.
564 This short biography combines information gleaned from: Interview Paul Puritt (a); Interview Paul Puritt (b), September 11th 2010, Ottawa.
variety of functions and activities. These included relating to professional level partners in South Africa, leading high level advocacy with politicians, supporting grassroots formations and trying to increase coordination within the network. The rest of this section will provide detailed examples of what this professional level solidarity work looked like.

The role of CUSO staff in providing access and connections to the ANC, through their Liberation Support office in Zambia, has already been discussed in Chapter 3. CUSO staff were also key players in ongoing behind the scenes advocacy with the Canadian government, due to their long history of work with CIDA and the fact that many ex-co-operants went on to work in government. For example CUSO activist David Beer was part of a group of professional activists who lobbied officials in Ottawa for the resumption of humanitarian funding for liberation groups, following Joe Clarke’s suspension of the policy in 1979. On January 29th 1980 Beer reported to an IAWGSA meeting he had been personally involved in a meeting with the department of External Affairs to lobby them about resuming funding and had also notified ANC comrades about the new policy.565 IAWGSA agreed to create a sub-committee to work on supporting this lobbying. By March a report sent from this sub-committee to CUSO noted that different proposals from various agencies to do humanitarian work with the ANC had been turned down and that it now seemed that External Affairs was blocking all requests to CIDA around the ANC.566 A letter sent on May 6th 1980 from CIDA to Ian Smiley, CUSO’s executive director, acknowledges that CUSO’s leadership had also been making ongoing inquires about the issue.567 In the end, despite this behind the scenes advocacy, it became obvious to CUSO by late 1980 that the Trudeau government would not resume funding to the ANC.568

While such advocacy work from the professional level was frequently conducted behind the scenes, sometimes it was carried out publicly. In 1989 ICCAF and the CCC decided to come together to launch an

568 Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p. 244.
One element of this campaign was a series of high profile letter exchanges with Dr. Stuart E. Brown, General Secretary of the CCC, advocating Foreign Minister Joe Clarke for a more thorough Canadian sanctions policy. The first letter was sent on August 1st 1989 and the letters from this exchange were passed on to the press and garnered consistent coverage across Canada, serving as an excellent tool for keeping the apartheid issue alive in the public domain.

During the 1980s Jim Kirkwood was the major gatekeeper in the UCC for connecting to South African partners. According to Alan Boseak, ‘The church in Canada became known and loved across the country, almost due to one person only... if people respond in terms of seeing the Canadian church as a genuine partner in solidarity, that would be because of Jim Kirkwood.’ Kirkwood began his work interacting with South African professional activists in 1977, starting with a trip to the country coordinated by Beyers Naude and the Christian Institute. Kirkwood notes the experience was like a spy movie, with the need to meet secretly with the now banned Naude in his car, to avoid wire taps in the latter’s home. Following the trip Kirkwood found he was unable to gain a visa to return to South Africa until 1991, but he continued to be the lead person on the UCC’s South African connections, keeping in touch through mail correspondence and meetings in frontlines states or in Canada, such as a discussion held with Thabo Mbeki and other church leaders in Ottawa on May 8th 1982. Until the

572 Interview Allan Boesak, Stellenbosch.
574 Interview Jim Kirkwood (a).
575 The United Church of Canada, "Meeting of Church Delegation with the SWAPO and ANC Delegations to the Canadian Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa," United Church of Canada Archives, Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 91.164C, Box 10-9, Toronto (1982).
development of ICCAF, Kirkwood also accompanied many South African church leaders in Canadian tours, such as Alan Boesak.576

Kirkwood also took part in the typical gatekeeper task of being a behind the scenes connector between various segments of the Canadian network, seen clearly around the creation of IDFASA. When interviewed about it, neither IDAFSA founding members or Kirkwood himself recollected his involvement in the formation of IDAFSA Canada,577 but the archives hold a different story. As early as August 2nd 1978 Kirkwood was corresponding with Wilfred Grenville-Grey, assistant to IDAF head Cannon Collins, about whether it was the right time to open an IDAFSA chapter in Canada.578 These consultations continued over the next two years, with Kirkwood discussing the topic with other key activists and even arranging an initial meeting at UCC headquarters to discuss founding the group.579 Kirkwood would then help in providing the funding to hire IDAFSA’s first staff person Anne Mitchell, but interestingly, turned down an invitation to join the organization’s board.580

This is just one example of how key activists at the professional level were constantly involved in network building and expansion, working to coordinate and strengthen groups within the network, build connections and facilitate the flow of resources. CUSO was always a major player in coordinating groups in the network, an internal report for IAWGSA on the group’s origins (found in the CUSO archives, but unfortunately without a date on it) writes that it was a memo from the CUSO Field Office in Tanzania in

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576 The United Church of Canada, "Dr. Allan Boesak's Itinerary May 11th, May 16th, 1983," United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 91.164C, Box 5-4 Boesak (Dr. Allan): Correspondence & Papers 1982-1989, Toronto (1983).
577 Interview Jim Kirkwood (b); Interview Al Cook; Interview Clyde Sanger.
1977, requesting greater inter-network co-operation in Canada, which started the process that culminated in the creation of IAWGSA.581 Further, CUSO also worked to keep up-to-date database of the major grassroots groups across Canada.582 There is ample evidence of Professional Level collaboration between CUSO and UCC as well. One example is a letter Jim Kirkwood wrote in 1986 to a UCC member, Rich Hesch in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, attempting to recruit him to go as a CUSO volunteer for the ANC school in Tanzania.583 Another letter, from Joan Anne Nolan in Zambia to the CUSO education coordinator in Alberta, speaks about how the UCC and CUSO were working to coordinate a speaking tour for ANC Youth in Canada, as part of a host of long standing collaborations with the ANC.584

Through this section, the critical role played by professional level activists in the Canadian network around connecting people, gaining resources for the movement and advocating on its behalf has been described. I also showed how a small group of gatekeepers became the custodians of connections to South Africa. While some grassroots to grassroots connections did take place; for the most part it was activists like Jim Kirkwood or Paul Puritt who facilitated the Canadian connections to South African organizations. Thus, as was also shown in the previous chapter, large CSOs and the professional activists they employed were critical to the functioning of the Canadian movement. Overseas networks had some notable differences to the Canadian network. For example in the United Kingdom, just one professional organization, AAM, would assume hegemony over the entire movement and sought to maintain tight control over local groups.585 The United States network meanwhile, was decentralized with a large divide between the professional East Coast lobby groups like Trans Africa, the American Committee on Africa and the Washington Office on Africa and the myriad local groupings across the country.586 Supported by sympathetic congressmen the professional activists in these East Coast groups focused on media relations and directly lobbying

581 Laporte "IGAWSA meeting in Montreal on Dec. 11th."
582 Hurdle "Personal Letter."
policymakers, mainly reaching out to rank and file members in order to answer specific research questions or request financial assistance.\textsuperscript{587} In 1990, Kevin Danaher wrote about the professional vs. grassroots division in the American movement, crediting Canada and Scandinavia as being examples of movements where more purposeful activity had taken place to coordinate different CSOs in the network.\textsuperscript{588} Thus internationally there was a British network with much tighter coordination based on a single professional level organization, and an American network that was decentralized like in Canada, but possibly less coordinated.

4.2.4. South African professional and grassroots participation in the Canadian network

Defining the divide between professional activists and grassroots activists in South Africa is tricky and was also a major point of contention in the anti-apartheid era. Many external groups, specifically SACTU and the ANC, worked to position themselves as the exclusive voice of, or link to, the South Africa Grassroots.\textsuperscript{589} But there were also internal groups, NGOs, unions like FOSATU, and organizations like the SACC, who claimed to represent the South African people. This thesis categorizes individuals as being part of the professional level in South Africa whether they were from internal or external organizations, so long as they were leaders who worked full time in activism, within established groups with some international presence and were able to travel at some point to interact with the global anti-apartheid movement. As I shall demonstrate, for the most part it was this type of professional activist who would come to represent South Africans to the Canadian network.

The most significant way internally and externally based professionals engaged with Canadians was through speaking tours.\textsuperscript{590} But these tours were about more than public speaking; they also became chances for South African activists to discuss strategy, encourage specific policies, raise funds and win supporters. As Father Michael Lapsley notes, when he travelled to Canada he was there ‘to evangelize, to win souls to

\textsuperscript{587} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{588} Ibid, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{589} Saul, "Against the Grain," p. 60.
\textsuperscript{590} Fairweather, "Canadian Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle," p. 883.
support the ANC and its work." Lapsley himself traveled to Canada three times, first in 1983 as part of a joint SWAPO/ANC speaking tour, from October 26\textsuperscript{th} to December 9\textsuperscript{th}. As he wrote about the trip, ‘By the time we left Canada we had lost count of the number of TV appearances, radio and newspaper interviews, women’s, church, solidarity, worker, student and public meetings we had addressed.’ Allan Boesak was another traveler who made various trips to Canada, from May 11-16th 1983 he travelled across Canada to speak to mainly UCC congregations. As Boesak notes, ‘I mostly brought the message of what was happening in South Africa, which was not always clear to the outside world. And what would go out to media was almost always distorted and biased.’ As part of this information politics (to use Keck and Sikkink’s term) South African activists would also provide their Canadian counterparts with publications and resources: in 1976 Jim Kirkwood wrote to Theo Kotze to thank him for passing on the CI’s ‘Police State’ booklet. Trade unionists also made numerous trips back and forth to Canada, with SACTU’s Archie Sibeko aka Zole Zembe, working to build support for SACTU amongst local unions and strategize with the solidarity committee, while FOSATU’s international contact person in Europe, Mike Murphy, recollected how he would coordinate groups of young internal unionists to travel to Canada on study trips to increase their international exposure and build contacts in the labor movement.

For activists like Josette Cole, who had South African citizenship and landed immigrant status in Canada, travelling to Canada was also a way to garner aid for the local groups she worked with in Cape Town. As she noted, ‘I did not officially transfer money, but unofficially I was a conduit…. community people would come to me when they were hiding and I passed on funds. Jim Kirkwood provided some of that money and so did anti-apartheid movements all over the world. I was one of the key people in the

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591 Interview Michael Lapsley (b).
593 Ibid.
594 The United Church of Canada, "Dr. Allan Boesak's Itinerary May 11th, May 16th, 1983."
595 Interview Allan Boesak.
596 Jim Kirkwood to Theo Kotze, "Personal Letter," Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. 83.020C, Box 14-4 'The Christian Institute of South Africa,' Toronto (Nov. 25th 1976).
597 Interview Archie Sibeko, Joahnnesburg.
598 Interview Mike Murphy, Paris.

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Western Cape that did that.  Cole reported that Alan Boesak was another one of the major conveyors for such funds from churches in Canada. Of course, the most active professional activist in the Canadian network was Yusuf Salajoe, the ANC’s official representative in Toronto for the 1970s and much of the 1980s. Salajoe was tasked by headquarters in Lusaka to garner support for the ANC from any and every possible quarter of Canadian society and he travelled nationally to speak, organize material aid campaigns and give direction to the Canadian movement. Other South African exiles living in Canada also volunteered throughout the movement and helped facilitate communications, for example Georgina Jaffee described how she would smuggle documents into the country for the ANC office on her return visits to South Africa. But the activity of exiles in Canada was not as large as in the United Kingdom, where there was a more significant community, who had a major role in movement leadership.

As for the South African grassroots, the closed nature of the apartheid police state and the high cost of travel and international communication made direct connections to Canada difficult. Thus the majority of material aid and communications had to be sent through the Southern professional level. There were a few occasional exceptions to the rule. IDAFSA Canada was able to help build some grassroots to grassroots connections through its work, by allowing thousands of Canadians to connect to individuals in the townships through the exchange of letters and providing financial aid to these victims of apartheid policies. Also, occasionally Canadians would meet and invite South Africans to come back to Canada. Terry Groves Mathews, for example, was a lay leader who volunteered with the SACC, who met Gary Kenny of ICCAF at a SACC conference in 1990 and then was invited to be part of a speaking tour in Canada in October 1991.

Going into exile provided another means for grassroots activists to connect to Canada. Chapter 2 noted the swell of student refugees in Toronto post-1976. Another interesting example is the case of Abiel

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599 Interview Josette Cole, Cape Town.
601 Interview Georgina Jaffee.
602 Lodge, ”An ‘boks amach,” p. 38.
603 Interview Clyde and Penny Sanger.
604 Interview Terry Groves Mathews, Cape Town.
Khalema. As a Methodist minister in Kwa-Zulu Natal during the 1980s, Khalema had clandestinely supported the liberation movements, at times offering shelter in his church to fugitives or even hiding munitions. Later he worked for the SACC in Mapunglanga, where he passed on money for the legal defence of detained individuals. His work attracted the ire of the security services, including two assassination attempts and a four month detention period where he was tortured. Through the Methodist church head office in Durban, Khalema learned of the UCC and wrote to them in 1988 to see if they had any vacant positions and would be willing to sponsor him as an immigrant. In 1989 a position was found in Laklabesh, Alberta, and he and his family were able to flee South Africa. From these examples we see that there were many individuals from South Africa who connected to the Canadian network, whether through tours or correspondence, but that for the most part exchanges tended to centre on key activists, usually in leadership roles, from established South African professional organizations.

4.2.5. The post-apartheid network and the solidarity chain

The network around South Africa which took shape in Canada post-apartheid was only a shadow of the former national movement. With respect to depth Sue Sutton, in 1995, listed 25 groups that were doing work in South Africa with an element of international solidarity informing their activities. In 2010 it did not appear that the network extended much beyond this number, the closest indicator of its size being the Africa Canada Forum at the CCIC and its roughly 40 member organizations. The contemporary Canadian network around Africa is one that multiple interviewees described as being much less collaborative and coordinated than the anti-apartheid movement. That being said, most of the core gatekeepers or key activists from the anti-apartheid movement seem to have remained connected to South Africa post-1994. Nearly every activist I interviewed had continued doing solidarity or development work with CSOs after 1994, most working around Africa, though by 2010 many had retired or gone into development consultancy.

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605 Interview Abiel Khalema.
606 Sutton, "Canadian Solidarity."
607 Interview Sylvie Perras, Ottawa.
608 Interview Jim MacKinnon; Interview Lyse Blanchard, Ottawa.
Former CUSO staff person John Van Mossel spoke of a rich informal network that remained in Canada of professional and personnel links between anti-apartheid activists in Canada and colleagues in South Africa.609

But with the rare exception of work done around HIV/AIDS, there has been almost no Canadian grassroots involvement around South African solidarity work post-1994. The majority of activities that were conducted were between Canadian and South African professional activists, such as staff exchanges, conferences and joint research projects. At times these projects required the involvement of select individuals from the grassroots level in both countries, but there is little proof of ongoing engagement. The fact of the matter is that post-1994 financial transfers have been at the heart of Canadian-South African connections. CUSO, the Steelworkers, UCC and various other groups like the United Auto Workers, Habitat for Humanity, CCODP and OXFAM all continued to fund South African organizations post-1994.610 Thus underpinning all other activities was the context of donor-funder relationship. While Canadian groups were certainly just as active in providing funding during anti-apartheid, it seems that following apartheid, financial exchanges continued while non-monetary activities declined.

There is however one area where we do see some more consistent grassroots involvement in post-1994 solidarity work: within the labor movement. The USW is one such organization. While lacking an active anti-apartheid history, post-1994 the USW has had a series of exchanges with trade unionists in South Africa (facilitated by anti-apartheid veteran and gatekeeper Judith Marshall). Some of these included site visits by steelworkers to outreach programs that were run in South Africa by the different unions the USW supports.611 Steelworkers also travelled to Cape Town to take part in the Globalization School run by think-tank ILRIG.612 The steelworkers also brought members of the University of Cape Town’s workers forum to Canada to meet with workers at universities in Toronto.613 Another program involved exchanges to connect

609 Interview John van Mossel (a), Ottawa, Sept 17th 2009.
610 Sutton, “Canadian Solidarity,”; Interview Georgina Jaffee; Interview Trevor Cook; Interview Lenny Gentle, Cape Town.
611 Judith Marshall, “Globalization From Below.”
613 Interview Jonathan Grossman, Cape Town; Interview Thembisa Xeketwana, Cape Town.
workers from a plant in Edmonton Alberta with NUMSA shop stewards from a factory in Gauteng. In both plants workers share a common employer, Skaw Metals Group of South Africa. As management in both countries referred to workers in overseas branches as competitors for a fixed amount of work the company has to offer, the exchange was hoped to build workers’ solidarity to help contest these tactics. While one of the NUMSA shop stewards involved in the trip mentioned there was sporadic email communication between unionists in the two factories following the exchange, there was little evidence that this program led to long lasting or deep coordination between them.

CUSO’s post-1994 solidarity activities mainly took the form of placing co-operants, with many anti-apartheid activists taking on placements in South Africa, which was recounted in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 also mentioned the UCC’s staff exchanges with the ICT and SACC. The USW did similar work in 1990s, when a member of NUM’s legal department traveled to Canada and spent three months with the USW studying ‘labour law and the role of unions, corporations and governments in labour governance.’ Outside of funding and exchanges, the rest of UCC solidarity work centered on site visits by staff with partners and joint meetings at conferences. Gary Kenny, head of the UCC’s Africa Desk, makes regular trips to South Africa to visit partners and the UCC headquarters also occasionally host visits from its global partners, like the SPPs head of Research and Advocacy, Ricado Jacobs, in 2008. Occasionally, congregation members may also travel to the region and visit partners, and the UCC has continued to provide election monitors through the SACC, with one monitor, Thomas Leepile, sent to take part in the 2009 election.

Sometimes Canadian-South African exchanges post-1994 extended beyond visits and entailed collaborative research. For example, over 1999 Judith Marshall of the USW took part in a joint study program with a trade unionist from Mexico, a staff person from ILRIG, and a trade unionist from

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614 Interview Judith Marshall (c), Toronto, August 10th 2010.
615 Interview Sivato Nkomonye, Johannesburg.
616 Marshall, "Globalizing From Below."
617 Interview Ricado Jacobs, Cape Town.
618 Interview Gary Kenny (b), Toronto, April 3rd 2009.
Mozambique, to look at Export Process Zones (EPZs) in South Africa and Zimbabwe. A publication was produced out of this work called ‘Building solidarity between Southern Africa and the Americas’, which explored the ways different labor movements had contested EPZ’s. Similarly, in 2005 ILRIG researcher Anna Davies-van Es, worked with NUM and USW to create an international study on women in mining and the challenges they face. Doing research with NUM in the Gauteng region she then travelled with a NUM shop steward to Canada to discuss the research with colleagues there, tour a mine and attend a USW women’s conference. What all of these activities point to is the existence of an international solidarity advocacy network post-1994, driven by professional level activities and more focused on information exchange and joint learning then pursuit of specific international solidarity campaigns. So while relationships between individuals and even organizations may have extended after apartheid, the network as a whole contracted to a much smaller network of professionals in each country.

4.3. Solidarity discourses in the anti-apartheid network

After using the solidarity chain to analyze different aspects of the Canadian networks, I will now explore the ideological makeup of the networks. As my definition of international solidarity asserted, there are usually various, sometimes mutually competing international solidarity discourses that activists can adhere to. UCC activist Margaret Summat commented on this point, noting there were very different ways that activists in the anti-apartheid movement communicated to their constituents, with the narrative-driven, theological language used in churches being very distinct from the radical, intellectual discourse used by groups like TCLSAC. John Saul offered a scale for thinking about ideology in the movement, using the classic socialist categories of reformist and revolutionary, putting IDAFSA at the reformist end, OXFAM  

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620 Interview Anna Davies-van Es, Cape Town.
621 Interview Margaret Summat, Toronto.
Canada as exemplary of radical thinking and CUSO in the middle.\textsuperscript{622} My analysis is that there were three broad interpretations of solidarity present in the movement: Solidarity as Political Charity, Internationalist Solidarity and Revolutionary Solidarity. While describing these varieties of solidarity discourses I will place different groups within each category, but it’s important to recognize that these are generalizations, as it would be rare for a large CSO to exhibit one univocal discourse.

4.3.1. Solidarity as political charity

For most activists the antithesis of international solidarity was charity. Numerous interviewees talked about charity as a disempowering relationship between un-equals, which simply perpetuated existing power imbalances.\textsuperscript{623} As we shall see, to most international solidarity proponents, solidarity is about joint action between allies in a common struggle. Yet there is also an argument in the literature that international solidarity work is really an act of political altruism,\textsuperscript{624} as it constitutes individuals in the North engaging in political issues they have no shared connection to, strictly for ethical reasons. A discourse of solidarity as political altruism or charity would thus characterize international solidarity as an act of support or aid from individuals in the North to those suffering in the South, not due to shared interests or a larger ideology, but simply because it is the right thing to do when one has power and others are suffering.

During my fieldwork I asked all 40 Canadian interviewees to define what international solidarity meant to them. I didn’t encounter any activists who spoke of international solidarity work in such a way, except for the interesting case of IDAFSA Canada. During my interview with two key activists from IDAFSA, both individuals defined international solidarity as an alliance between people working together on a shared issue of concern, a discourse I label as internationalist solidarity.\textsuperscript{625} But when Al Cook, former IDAFSA President, spoke about how IDAFSA presented its work to Canadians, I was struck by how different it was from all other solidarity discourses I had encountered. Cook described the group as being a

\textsuperscript{622} Interview John Saul (b).
\textsuperscript{623} Interview Sue Godt, Ottawa; Interview Johnny Copelyn; Interview Tad Mitsui; Interview Muff Anderson, Johannesburg.
\textsuperscript{624} Giugni and Passy, \textit{Political Altruism?}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{625} Interview Al Cook; Interview Joan Fairweather, Ottawa.
fiercely non-partisan organization, which printed resources that were strictly factual, without reference to any larger ideological platform. He contrasted IDAFSA to TCLSAC, which he described as being known as highly dogmatic and rigid. He argued that if IDAFSA had taken on a politicized discourse like TCLSAC, instead of presenting itself as purely a humanitarian initiative to help victims of apartheid suffering from detention and political persecution, it would never have succeeded in gaining support from so many Canadians.

It seems then that IDAFSA strategically utilized a more neutral and altruistic definition of solidarity in order to appeal widely to Canadians in its fundraising, many of whom would be more sympathetic with such a characterization than a more overtly political one. From interviews with John Saul and the IDAFSA leadership it’s obvious this discursive approach (and IDAFA’s perceived closeness with the Federal Government) led to some tension between TCLSAC and IDAFSA. But as IDAFSA was widely supported in the network -- the UCC was a supporter, CUSO’s David Beer served as a vice-president-- it seems that the group wasn’t scorned for its use of this discourse. Thus IDAFSA provides an interesting example of how solidarity groups could have multiple discourses internally, and also of which discursive frames were effective at winning wide-scale financial backing for movements.

4.3.2. Internationalist solidarity

The majority of activists I spoke to, in Canada and South Africa, articulated a discourse of solidarity I define as internationalist solidarity. The major Canadian solidarity conference that took place in Ottawa in 1982 was premised on a classic internationalist definition of international solidarity, which it noted was affirmed by all attendees: ‘Solidarity is not an act of charity but mutual aid between forces fighting for the same objectives.’ Saul, in his reflection on his lifetime of activism, defined international solidarity as a state of mind where one identifies with the struggles of oppressed groups all over the world and then

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626 Interview Al Cook.
628 Canadian Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa (b). "Conference Final Declaration," United Church of Canada Archives, Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 91.164C, Box 10-9, Toronto (1982).
attempts to make this identification real through political action.\textsuperscript{629} Marshall gives a succinct definition in terms of international solidarity in the labour movement, arguing a discourse of solidarity means adopting an ideology that speaks about the common struggles shared by workers everywhere.\textsuperscript{630} Internationalist solidarity thus means acknowledging the interconnectedness between all people and then attempting to act on this understanding in support of a political struggle taking place in a country other than one’s own. Almost all activists in the network articulated perspectives on solidarity that fit with this definition, the real distinction being that some activists took this basic internationalist understanding and then merged it with revolutionary socialist politics, while others did not.

For the UCC, solidarity was a term widely used in church discourse, with correspondence from church leaders filled with affirmations of their ‘solidarity’ with their South Africa colleagues, church educational material calling for church members to write ‘letters of solidarity’ to those struggling against apartheid and text in the 1984 resolution on apartheid as heresy, asking the church to heed the WCC’s call to ‘deepen their solidarity with those forces-including liberation movements recognized by the UN- which oppose apartheid and racism and the struggle for liberation’\textsuperscript{631}. Solidarity was thus a familiar term in the UCC. And when interviewed, UCC activists from the time defined international solidarity in terms that fit squarely within the internationalist solidarity discourse.\textsuperscript{632} But for the UCC international solidarity was understood and discussed primarily in church language, as part of the concept of partnership in church mission overseas. A quotation from a 1977 letter from Garth Legge to CI member Theo Kotze demonstrates this melding of secular language and theology that took place in the UCC: ‘We are committed to solidarity

\begin{itemize}
  \item Saul (b), \textit{Revolutionary Traveller}, p. 11.
  \item Marshall, “Globalizing From Below.”
  \item Division of World Outreach United Church of Canada “SAEP Newsletter,” United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 88.031C, Box 9-3, Toronto (Nov. 24th 1981), p. 360; Jim Kirkwood to Desmond Tutu, “Personal Letter,” United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 91.164C, Box 4-5, Toronto (August 6th 1980); The United Church of Canada, \textit{General Council 30 Record of Proceedings}, p. 361.
  \item Interview Jeanne Moffat; Interview Greg White; Interview Tad Mitsui.
\end{itemize}
with Christ in His suffering with the oppressed and his indomitable commitment to the human rights of every last member of his human family.\textsuperscript{633}

UCC theology on ‘church mission’ can be broadly labeled as Concilar thinking; a label for Protestant churches connected to the WCC, whose theology of mission differs from evangelical thinking in that it bases itself on ‘low-Christology,’ an understanding of Jesus that stresses his work as a teacher and social actor and thus focuses more on the promotion of social justice than evangelism.\textsuperscript{634} For the UCC the widespread adoption of such thinking took place progressively from the 1960s onwards.\textsuperscript{635} A DWO report from 1977 described the church as having a dual mission in the world: one of doing justice work and one of doing mission work. Doing mission was defined as ‘work and witness with the world Christian family’ while justice work was achieved through working ‘with the human family.’\textsuperscript{636} As United Church Executive Minister and theologian Bruce Gregersen noted, by the 1980s these two ideas had fused within UCC thinking, so that the church’s mission in the world came to be seen as striving for social justice for all peoples.\textsuperscript{637}

Central to this modern theology of overseas mission was the idea of partnership, a term which served the same function in the UCC as international solidarity did in secular groups, which is not surprising as development partnership first entered development discourse in the 1980s as a term grounded in ideas of international solidarity.\textsuperscript{638} Kirkwood notes that church theology on partnership dominated thinking on overseas mission during the 1970-80s, with South African CSOs and liberation groups all seen as the church’s partners in mission.\textsuperscript{639} Contemporary UCC theology of partnership highlights the interconnectedness of all human beings as part of God’s family, affirms the equality of all partners in

\textsuperscript{633} Garth Legge to Theo Kotze, “Personal Letter,” United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 83.020C, Box 16-4, Toronto (June 7th 1977).
\textsuperscript{635} The United Church of Canada "History of the Division of World Outreach," Notes from Presentation by Chris Ferguson, DWO General Secretary, during the Mission Discernment Event (Dec. 2001).
\textsuperscript{636} The United Church of Canada, "General Council 27 Record of Proceedings" (Toronto: The United Church of Canada, 1977).
\textsuperscript{637} Interview Bruce Gregersen, Toronto.
\textsuperscript{638} Lewis, "Development NGOs and the Challenge of Partnership," p. 504.
\textsuperscript{639} Interview Jim Kirkwood (c).
overseas work and highlights the importance of those directly connected to the issue leading the struggles around it.\textsuperscript{640} Thus in UCC we see an example of a theologically based conception of international solidarity, which fits squarely within the internationalist camp.

With respect to CUSO, Smillie confirms that the driving theoretical concept for anti-apartheid activists in the group was international solidarity.\textsuperscript{641} As we shall see in Chapter 6, there were various competing discourses of development that existed in CUSO over the 1970s and 1980s. It was within the more politicized approaches to development, that CUSO’s internationalist and revolutionary solidarity discourses were grounded. An example of such a politicized discourse is former Executive Director Murray Thompson’s (1973-76) definition of development as ‘disturbance; disturbance to ourselves and our organization, it means trying to define, isolate and attack obstacles, barriers, roadblocks to real development: trade barriers, arms races, greedy MNCs, elites (including ourselves) which are screwing up the process.’\textsuperscript{642} In the CUSO Development Charter we see this more politicized perspective of development again. The charter calls for co-operants ‘to increase their awareness of the root causes of inequitable development in all countries of the world…. utilize this increased awareness in programmes designed to eliminate these inequalities… recognize that their own country may be culpable in the continuing exploitation of one country by another’ and ‘actively identify themselves with all peoples who seek to strengthen rights and responsibilities for their country’s social development, consistent with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’\textsuperscript{643}

Rosa Candia recollects that during demonstrations and events supported by the local CUSO office in Winnipeg, over the 1970s-1980s, members of the public would constantly ask CUSO members to define

\textsuperscript{641} Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p.132.
\textsuperscript{642} Ibid., p. 100.
what international solidarity meant and why it was important.\textsuperscript{644} The definition given by Candia and many other CUSO activists interviewed was broadly internationalist, defining international solidarity as a process of Northern people coming to work as equals with Southern peoples, around a political cause which the Northerners may have seemed disconnected from, but to which they were actually deeply connected to, through their common humanity and the inter-connectedness of the global economy.\textsuperscript{645} But for other CUSO staff their understanding of solidarity went beyond this, to link to an explicitly class based or Marxist world view, an understanding I will examine next.

4.3.3. Revolutionary solidarity

Drawing a line between Internationalist and Revolutionary solidarity is difficult, because they share the same foundation of defining solidarity as the antithesis of charity, and as a process through which individuals adopted a cosmopolitan world view that perceived apartheid as not a South African issue, but as a common human struggle. But for some activists international solidarity was also connected to a wider ideology of revolutionary socialism and anti-imperialist politics. As John Saul notes, while all activists shared common opposition to racism and the totalitarian nature of apartheid, class analysis and anti-imperialism were not universally shared.\textsuperscript{646} TCLSAC was one group that clearly connected its international solidarity work to a much larger anti-imperialist/revolutionary socialist politics, a stance which led to it being branded as being a radical or far left organization.\textsuperscript{647} Pierre Bedeaut of CIDMAA was also described as an activist who based his work in a larger anti-imperialist framework.\textsuperscript{648} The SACTU Solidarity Committee’s was another organization noted for its adherence to a solidarity perspective based in class analysis and a militant, Marxist perspective on social transformation.\textsuperscript{649}

\textsuperscript{644} Interview Rosa Candia, Ottawa.
\textsuperscript{645} Interview Sue Godt; Interview John Saxby, Ottawa; Interview Rosa Candia.
\textsuperscript{646} Interview John Saul (b).
\textsuperscript{647} Interview Margie Bruun-Meyer, Toronto.
\textsuperscript{648} Interview John Saul (b).
\textsuperscript{649} Interview Brenda Wall; Interview Joh van Mossel (b).
For CUSO activists like Doug Miller and Ken Traynor, it was this focus on class analysis within the SACTU solidarity committee that led them to join that group after returning to Canada.\textsuperscript{650} John Saxby notes that while radical or far-left perspectives were not the majority opinion in CUSO, there were definitely adherents to such perspectives and many did work in Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{651} For these individuals and groups solidarity was not just around a political struggle to end apartheid, solidarity was inherently linked to the larger global struggle to end Western imperialism and colonialism and then build world socialism. Thus for activists like Saul, the end of white domination and democratic elections in South Africa was seen as ‘liberation-lite,’\textsuperscript{652} as full liberation needed an accompanying socialist transformation of the economy and society, a goal not universally shared with other activists in the movement.

What is interesting about the Canadian case is that revolutionary ideology did not become a major point of contention, as radical groups like TCLSAC worked very closely with churches and mainstream CSOs. Thus while ideology did lead to some tensions (like those between TCLSAC and IDAFSA) it did not seem to impede collaboration. As I will discuss in the Conclusion, what did lead to divisions in the Canadian network were differences in tactics for working with the ANC and liberation movements. And in this case tactics did not flow from discourses, as Revolutionary Solidarity aligned SACTU took on policies of deference to liberation movements, while TCLSAC instead chose a relationship of critical support to the movements.

How did these ideological differences compare to other national movements? The divide between Revolutionary Solidarity and other more ‘reformist’ articulations of solidarity existed overseas, and in many cases seems to have been much more acute. In the UK AAM was constantly trying to keep anti-apartheid discourse in the political mainstream and reduce ‘far-left’ influence, which led to ongoing conflicts with different local groups, notably the City of London Anti-Apartheid Group (CLAAG).\textsuperscript{653} CLAAG’s ardent

\textsuperscript{650} Interview Doug Miller, Ottawa; Interview Ken Traynor.
\textsuperscript{651} Interview John Saxby.
\textsuperscript{653} Fieldhouse, \textit{Anti-Apartheid}, p. 226.
insistence during the 1980s that British anti-apartheid discourse be connected to wider anti-imperialist politics, along with its militant approach to organizing led to constant conflicts with AAM leadership, with the national committee withdrawing its recognition of the group in 1985. In Denmark Hans Erik Stolten notes there were similar tensions over ideological divides between the mainstream anti-apartheid groups and more militant socialist organizations. In the United States the strongest divides in ideology were between the lobby groups on the Eastern Seaboard, deeply connected to US Congress and mainstream politics, and those rank and file members who identified with the radical Black Nationalist politics of the Black Power Movement. The official politics articulated by these lobby organizations tended to focus on issues of racial equality and democracy, dropping the Pan-Africanist conceptualizations held by the more radical members of the movement. Thus Canada was not unique in its variety of conceptions of solidarity, just like other national movements it was a patchwork of activists with varying ideological beliefs, all united by an opposition to the apartheid regime.

4.3.4. Post-apartheid solidarity discourse

The post-1994 period has been a time of major ideological discontinuity from the apartheid period. Gone is the discursive diversity of the past. I found no evidence of any organizations within Canada that professed revolutionary solidarity perspectives, though some academics and individuals may still adhere to such views. When one looks at TCLSAC’s logo from the 1980s, with images of two Africans standing side by side, one holding a hoe the other an AK-47, it’s clear that anti-apartheid was indeed a very different era from today.

654 Ibid., pp. 219-25.
656 Klotz (b), "Norms Reconstituting Interests," p. 463.
657 Ibid., p. 466.
658 Geld "Generic Invitation Letter sent to CUSO Ottawa."
In 1995 Judith Marshall wrote about the new terms for trade union solidarity in Canada. She discussed how the older discourse of worker’s solidarity was now being forced to compete with two more prevalent, and much less progressive, discourses about international relations between workers: those of development and those of international competitiveness. For Marshall the challenge for activists in the 1990s was to try to define the new terms of solidarity in this post liberation context, which could stand in opposition to these two other streams of thought.

Certainly the ‘global justice movement’ provided some intellectual space to define and spread new ideas of international solidarity. But for the most part, and especially for Canadian NGOs, it seems that the response by progressive activists has been to simply try to absorb the ideals of solidarity within current conceptions of development. For example the CCIC’s Code of Ethics and Operational Standards, signed by all its members, who represent the majority of the Canadian civil society organizations doing development work in Africa, has a series of sections which harkens back to an internationalist solidarity discourse. The code mentions that development ‘partnerships should be built on shared visions and goals for society which imply mutual support and solidarity beyond the implementation of specific programs and projects’; that organizations should promote the development of a global movement of like minded organizations; that their

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659 Marshall, "Globalizing From Below."
focus should not simply be on technical interventions but also on the political causes of poverty; and that
groups should strive to create a new world order that addresses the unequal distribution of resources between
the North and South.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 4-5.} In her keynote address to the Annual Conference of the Canadian Association of
African Studies, Molly Kane (former head of the CCIC’s ACF) spoke of how ‘international solidarity is
necessary for local social solidarity, human dignity and survival’ and discussed how such ideals could inform
development relationships and the ways groups generate policy, hopefully leading to a more holistic and
political approach to international co-operation.\footnote{Kane, “Keynote Address”, pp. 1 and 4.} She noted ‘it is our challenge as citizen organizations
dedicated to global solidarity to engage with the aid system as advocates for public policy reform, while still
raising and sharing independent resources to support courageous, creative people and institutions working in
difficult circumstances for a better world for all of us.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 5.}

Thus international solidarity is still an idea that exists within the Canadian network, but it’s not clear
that it has been able to thrive over more technocratic understandings of international co-operation. The
UCC’s attempt to take solidarity ideals into the contemporary period is seen in their work around Empire.
By adopting a specific understanding of the global economy which stated that ‘now, more than ever, as we
experience a global intersection of neo-liberal economic interests and military might for the benefit of a few,
we are called to seek out alternative economic choices, ones that will uphold the common good’\footnote{The United Church of Canada (b), Living Faithfully in the Midst of Empire, p. 19.} the UCC
attempted to align itself with other progressive Christian groups and the global justice movement. And
though staff and senior leadership at the UCC stated their support for the Empire framework\footnote{Interview David Gulliano, Toronto; Interview Nora Sanders, Toronto.} the current
challenge has been to develop educational resources to build support in congregations.\footnote{Interview Omega Bula, Lusaka.} From August 13-19 2006 I was present at the United Church’s 39th General Council in Thunder Bay Ontario, where the
Empire report was discussed and voted on. During a consultation on the report I heard ministers from across
Canada discuss how they agreed with the report, but felt it would be a tremendous challenge to gain the

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support of their congregations for such discourses. With neo-liberal ideology exhibiting a strong hold in Canadian politics, this is the common challenge for all ‘progressive’ organizations today, to go against mainstream thought and find a ways to build support for discourses of international solidarity. In South Africa meanwhile the ideological terrain is very different. A strong network still exists of groups that support staunchly anti-neo liberal or anti-capitalist ideology and I found groups like ILRIG or SPP much more confident than CSOs in Canada in asserting views of solidarity that harkened back to apartheid discourses. This reality and the challenge these differences pose for the building of Canadian-South African movements will be discussed further in Chapter 8.

4.4. Conclusion

This Chapter has traced the make-up of the Canadian solidarity networks around South Africa. It mapped the network by utilizing the solidarity chain, a tool developed for this thesis, which helped structure empirical data in a way that demonstrated the varieties of solidarity activities at four levels, in periods during and subsequent to apartheid policy. Through the use of the chain, solidarity actions were able to be disaggregated to take into account the different political levels from which activists become involved. The chapter also considered discourses, presenting three ways in which Canadian anti-apartheid activists could articulate the idea of international solidarity. At the same time the chapter demonstrated how an international solidarity network possesses much less dynamism than a solidarity movement. Today activities between Canadians and South Africans are mainly limited to a small cluster of CSOs and take place between a handful of professional activists. Meanwhile the rich diversity of varying discourses of international solidarity that existed in the network during the 1970s and 1980s has been lost. Today activists wishing to articulate solidarity discourses must do so within the framework of international development, minimizing the radical implications of their ideas lest they scare off funders. Moving into Part 3 this thesis will explain

why these changes took place, outlining clearly what it was that led the Canadian network to contract from a movement with depth, width and density across all four levels of the solidarity chain, to a small professional advocacy network with little room to make overt calls for mutual international struggle.
Part 3

Factors that Drove Growth and Decline in the Canadian Network
5

How Neo-Liberalism Killed Solidarity: Activism Before and After the Cold War

5.1. Chapter overview

Part Three of this thesis is concerned with understanding the processes that explain change in the Canadian solidarity network towards South Africa. It will ask what influenced the protest cycles I have previously outlined, exploring the four factors which led to the development of a solidarity movement during the 1980s, and then demonstrating how changes to these factors drove a period of demobilization after 1994. The first two of the four factors I have identified, the ability of activists to utilize the networks of existing CSOs and the presence of strong radical spaces for activists in these same CSOs, highlight the importance of organizations like CUSO, OXFAM and the UCC to the anti-apartheid movement. While smaller groupings like CCSA, the SSC and TCLSAC were home to many key activists and had important leadership roles in the movement, they did not possess the resources, mass membership or national presence to create a social movement. For better or worse, national churches, trade unions and NGOs, organizations which were not specifically created to carry out international solidarity work, provided the resources and networks necessary for the anti-apartheid campaign to become a Canada wide movement.
In this Chapter I outline the domestic and international trends that impeded and enhanced the ability of these large, progressive Canadian CSOs to become involved in international solidarity work. I argue that my two periods of interest, the anti-apartheid and post-apartheid eras, are closely aligned with two political/ideological periods, the Cold War period and the neo-liberal period. Accordingly, from 1975-1990 Cold War politics provided a major barrier to movement growth, as CSOs seeking to engage in international solidarity with liberation groups like the ANC had to deny persistent accusations of supporting ‘communist’ movements. Yet the 1970s and 1980s also had strong factors supporting CSOs’ abilities to engage in anti-apartheid work. For one the funding regime of the period was amicable to activism. Katherine Scott describes funding regimes as ‘a unified set of values and regulations governing the relationship between the nonprofit and voluntary sector and their stakeholders, including funders.’668 As she notes funding regimes play a major role in shaping the activities and even structures of CSOs.669 During the 1970s and 1980s the federal government was the major supporter of voluntary work in Canada, especially for groups working overseas, and was not only consistently increasing the funding available to CSOs, but was also willing to support the use of government funding for activist and advocacy work. This funding regime meant this was a time of robust expansion of CSO work overseas and the growth of various activist groups in Canada. Further bolstering progressive CSOs was the presence of a whole cohort of Canadians passionate about activism, who had participated in social movements in the 1960s and early 70s, and were eager to work for and support these groups.

But as the 1980s progressed Canadian political culture began to shift and by the 1990s domestic and international trends began to hinder the ability of Canadian CSOs to participate in international solidarity work. With the fall of the Soviet Union, neo-liberal ideology was ascendant in Western culture, drastically changing popular understandings of the role of the state and CSOs. Civil society groups were increasingly viewed as alternative service providers for state services, and were encouraged to

669 Ibid.
professionalize, take on managerial systems from the private sector and compete with each other for funding. Meanwhile Canada was gripped by a small recession in the early 1990s and became politically focused on deficit reduction. In this context the entire funding regime for CSOs in Canada changed, as funding levels were drastically cut over most of the 1990s and CSOs found that the government was no longer interested in funding activism, and was now providing support through contracts with in-depth conditions on how the money should be spent. The result was that even when funding for CSO’s increased after the year 2000, most organizations had gone through drastic changes, severely limiting the space for activism or radical ideas. Further a new funding regime was now entrenched that discouraged CSOs from engaging in any political activism. At the same time the long term demographic trends of Canadians becoming increasingly disengaged CSOs and less open to activist politics also had negative impacts. While some of these factors may seem to be ‘apolitical’ in nature, all were inherently political in reality due to their ‘depoliticizing’ effect on civil society. Thus when all of these variables coincided in the 1990s they created a ‘perfect storm,’ which drove progressive CSOs into decline and proved to be much more stifling to international solidarity campaigns than past accusations of supporting communist terrorists had been. In Chapter 7 I explain how exactly these changes played out within CUSO and the UCC. For now I provide detail of the aforementioned general trends, beginning with the Cold War period, and then moving on to neo-liberal period.

5.2. The Cold War period

5.2.1. Canada and the Cold War

During the Cold War Canada was a staunch ally of the United States and NATO, and ‘Cold War thinking and Cold War assumptions shaped successive generations of Canadians, both in support and convictions.’670 Yet Cold War politics and anti-communism were by far at their highest point in the

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country in the 1940s and 50s, with Canada’s only major Cold War military engagement, the Korean
War, taking place from 1950 to 1953. Cold War tensions began in July 1946 in Ottawa, with the first
major Soviet spy defection of the Cold War, that of Igor Gouzenko, who revealed the presence of a large
Soviet spy ring in Canada. Following this revelation Ottawa pursued its own version of McCarthyism,
arresting, monitoring and black listing suspected communist sympathizers and agents across Canada.
But even during the 1940-50s, anti-communist fervour was less dramatic than in the United States, as
Cold War dynamics in Canada were intimately tied to the development of a post-World War national
identity, which was as much about defining Canada as being distinct from the communist world as being
distinct from the United States. Thus anti-Americanism had a major role in Canadian Cold War
politics and was exhibited most strongly in the Diefenbaker (57-63) and Trudeau administrations (68-79
and 80-84). Despite this, Canada still played the role of junior military partner to the US during the
Cold War, specifically through the NORAD defence system, which controversially involved the
placement of American nuclear weapons in Canada.

During the 1960s the first widespread questioning of Cold War politics and specifically of US
foreign policy began in Canada, spurred by the growth of Canadian nationalism and the emergence of a
domestic peace and anti-nuclear weapons movement. With the 1968 election of Pierre Trudeau, a man
who shaped Canadian politics for the next two decades, Canadians had a leader who sought both
increased independence from American influence and who wished to reduce Cold War tensions. Thus
Trudeau opened relations with China in 1970, had the Soviet leadership visit Ottawa in 1971, travelled to

672 Whitaker and Hewitt, Canada and the Cold War, p. 14.
673 Ibid., p. 19.
674 Cavell, Love, hate, and fear in Canada's Cold War, pp. 5 and 44.
675 J.L Granatstein, "Lessons of History: Canada and the Cold War," (paper presented at the CDA Institute's 10th Annual
Symposium, Royal Canadian Military College, Kingston, Ontario, October 26th 2007), http://www.cda-
676 Whitaker and Hewitt, Canada and the Cold War, p. 40.
677 Cavell, Love, hate, and fear in Canada's Cold War, p. 37.
678 Whitaker and Hewitt, Canada and the Cold War, p. 138.
Cuba in 1976, and continuously reduced Canada’s role in NATO through military cutbacks.\textsuperscript{679} Also during the 1970s the Trudeau government, and Canadian political life, turned much more inwards, dominated by the issue of Quebec separatism and Canada’s search for new economic partners beyond the US.\textsuperscript{680}

Thus while Canada still had its share of Cold Warriors and public crusaders against communism, and Cold War nationalism was built up during the famous 1972 hockey series against the Soviet Union,\textsuperscript{681} anti-communist discourse was reduced in this era compared to the 1940-50s. The 1980s marked another shift in Canadian politics, when Prime Minister Brian Mulroney came into power with a specific agenda to improve and tighten relations with the United States.\textsuperscript{682} While Chapter 3 mentioned Mulroney’s anti-communist convictions, and his close relationship with Ronald Reagan, the focus of Canadian politics during this period was less on the Cold War and more towards relations with the US, with the late 1980s debates around free trade agreements dominating political discussions.

\textbf{5.2.2. Freedom fighters or communist terrorists?\
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Despite the fact that Cold War politics were less central to government policy or popular society in the 1970s-1980s than during the 1940-1950s, anti-communism was still a part of Canadian political life, as in other Western nations. And for anti-apartheid activists, one of the biggest barriers to building support for the movement was the fact that the ANC was aligned with the SACP and was receiving aid from the Soviet Union. Thus activists spent a great deal of energy refuting and rebutting the idea that they were asking Canadians to support ‘African communist terrorists.’ This was not simply a question of the ANC’s international alliances though, as domestically the Canadian Communist Party (which was never a real force in Canadian politics) was a strong supporter of the ANC, mainly through participation in

\textsuperscript{680} Ibid., ibid.
\textsuperscript{681} Cavell, \textit{Love, hate, and fear in Canada's Cold War}, p. 44; Whitaker and Hewitt, \textit{Canada and the Cold War}, p. 185.
\textsuperscript{682} Cavell, \textit{Love, hate, and fear in Canada's Cold War}, p. 38.
Fatima Bhyat recalls her surprise upon arriving in Canada in the 1970s to see people’s hostility to the Communist Party, but notes that while anti-communism was present in the labor movement, this did not stop many unions from supporting the ANC. In other sectors anti-communist hostility was able to hamper ANC support, Lynda Lamberg recollected how CCSA in the early 1980s had to leave their role in planning anti-apartheid high school conferences with the Toronto District School Board, due to the fact their presence provided fuel for right wing critics, who painted the event as being about supporting communists and terrorists.

For churches anti-communism was a major issue both politically and due to the association of communism with atheism. Reflecting on his 1983 national tour of Canada, Father Michael Lapsley had this to say: ‘The “fear of communism,” a concept based on ignorance and fear, rather than knowledge or ideological commitment, befuddles the mind particularly among many rank and file religious people in North America and affects their ability to understand and support our struggle.’ In light of this, he makes it clear that a large part of his work involved rebutting anti-communist discourses in Canada, noting, ‘many people who had swallowed the propaganda line that the ANC is a communist, anti-religious organization had their stereotypes destroyed when they saw that I am a Christian priest and also a member of the ANC. This helped to underline the truly national character of our organization and our struggle.’ A series letters, exchanged over two years, between Jim Kirkwood and Howard Johnston, a Conservative Party Member of Parliament for Okanagan-Kootenay Letters, help to contextualize anti-communist debates of the time. In 1978 Johnston wrote to Kirkwood to express his extreme distress at the UCC’s support for the ANC, noting that in his mind the Canadian government was already too supportive of the Soviet Union in Africa and that the church actions were going even farther in this

683 Interview Fatima Bhyat; Interview Peter Bunting; Interview Yusuf Saloojee.
684 Interview Fatima Bhyat.
685 Interview Lynda Lamberg.
687 Interview Father Michael Lapsley (b).
support. In follow up letters he critiqued Kirkwood’s support for the one party state as a legitimate form of government in Africa and accused the church of attempting to help build Marxist dictatorships. In one of his responses, Kirkwood rebutted Johnston by claiming that ‘the Cold War mentality of the last 30 years seems to have driven so many of our foreign policy decision, and has become quite often little more than a reflex reaction for most people.’ He further argued that the church would not uncritically support any government, that the atheism of communism was not ‘congenial’ to ‘the African mind’ and stated that there was no proof that the majority of Southern Africans would support an authoritarian, Marxist-Leninist model of governance.

UCC activist Tad Mitsui recalled his shock upon his return to Canada, when he found that he and other church leaders in the anti-apartheid movement were branded by ‘right wing journalists’ as communists and non-Christians, noting Arch Bishop Ted Scott was called ‘The Red Bishop.’ A resolution passed by the UCC Executive Committee in support of the 1982 Solidarity Conference in Ottawa highlights how such accusations were addressed by the church. The resolution constantly references Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and notes the ANC has turned to the East for support simply because Western powers first refused to supply them with military aid. It further states that, ‘We feel these are not predominately Marxist groups, that there is also a Christian presence as well and that like most Africans, atheism is not congenial, though that will be the policy of some of the committed Marxist leadership.’ Finally the report argues that ‘Seeing the poor record of Russia in the rest of Africa, we are not afraid of their ideology, their economy or their atheism. We feel that Africans, particularly African Christians, can cope with these, can select what is useful to them and reject the rest, particularly the atheism.’ Thus with the help of prominent Christian ANC supporters like Tutu and Lapsley and constant

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688 Howard Johnston, Member of Parliament Okanagan-Kootenay, to Jim Kirkwood, “Personal Letter,” United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 91. 164C, Box 10-2, Toronto (Jan. 26th 1978).
689 Ibid., “Personal Letter,” United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 91. 164C, Box 10-2, Toronto (April 13th 1978); Ibid., “Personal Letter,” United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 91. 164C, Box 10-2, Toronto (Feb. 21st 1979).
690 Jim Kirkwood to Howard Johnston, Member of Parliament Okanagan-Kootenay, “Personal Letter,” United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 91. 164C, Box 10-2, Toronto (March. 23rd 1978).
691 Interview Tad Mitsui.
692 Canadian Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa (b), “Conference Final Declaration.”
references to a sort of essentialist argument about African culture and spirituality, church groups like the UCC were able to answer anti-communist critics. As Chapter 6 will outline though, the most forceful critics of the UCC’s work during the Cold War era were members of the church itself, who used anti-communism among other methods to try to dissuade the church from involvement in anti-apartheid activism.

For CUSO anti-communist attacks were even more forceful, as right wing commentators in the Canadian media attacked the group for its supposed closeness with communists and the Toronto Sun newspaper called CUSO, ‘a frightful body which attracts zealots and ideologues and armchair revolutionaries.’ A far right group, Citizens for Foreign Aid Reform, even made a pamphlet called ‘CUSO and Radicalism’ which discussed CUSO’s alleged support for terrorist groups and radical politics in Canada. Even former CUSO director Ian Smillie critiqued the ‘silence’ of CUSO staff and other liberal Canadians about the ANC’s communist influence, arguing that supporting the ANC actually hurt the movement by attracting constant media attention to its communist connections. Though Smillie was proven wrong by history, his comments highlight the constant pressure put on the organization by anti-communist commentators in Canada. As a more a personal example, CUSO activist David Beer recollected returning to his parent’s home outside Toronto during a trip home from Southern Africa, when his mother one morning finally gained the confidence to confront him over breakfast and ask, ‘David are you Communist?’ He responded by saying no, and then tried to explain he was more of a non-aligned Marxist. Thus the ANC’s communist affiliations were a constant issue that the movement had to face throughout the 1970s and 1980s, with responses developed to try to move discussions out of the Cold War paradigm to a discourse of racial injustice, human rights abuses and solidarity, the success of which is outlined in Chapter 8.

693 Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p. 220.
694 Miller, Aid as Peacemaker, p. 124.
695 Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p. 235-236.
696 Interview David Beer (b).
5.2.3. Building on the momentum of the 1960s

While anti-communism was clearly a threat to movement building, two domestic factors helped Canadian CSO’s solidarity work to thrive despite it. One was the fact that the early 1970s, when the anti-apartheid network was first generating national attention, was a period of high levels of social mobilization and the proliferation of radical thinking in Canada. The 1960s was the high point for such activities in Canada, in 1966 half of Canada’s population was under 24, and as these baby-boomers entered university in record numbers they spurred many new social movements. Over the 1960s and early 1970s there was an unprecedented growth in activist organizations, with civil liberties groups, groups for racial and ethnic minorities, gay rights organizations (Canada’s first such group was founded in 1964) and feminist organizations (for example British Colombia went from 2 feminist groups in 1969 to over 100 by 1974) growing across the country. Activist students helped energize a Canadian Peace Movement, Green Peace was founded in Vancouver in 1971, marking the start of the modern environmentalism, and major growth took place in organized labor. This was the time when Canada’s strong public sector unions formed, which put continued pressure on the Trudeau government for concessions, while other Canadian unions began to pull away from their more conservative American AFL-CIO affiliates.

Quebec was at the centre of Canadian radicalism both for students and labor. The 1960s was a time of dramatic changes in Quebec society: the role of the Catholic church was diminishing, a robust welfare state was developed and politics were realigned as a struggle between federalists and separatists, all part of a cultural shift known as the Quiet Revolution. The new found radical energy of the period fueled the separatist movement, and in 1970 one revolutionary separatist group, the FLQ (Front de

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698 Clement, "The Human Rights Movement,"; Clement (a), "I Believe in Human Rights, Not Women's Rights!", p. 112.
libération du Québec), carried out a campaign of over 100 bombings and in October the same year kidnapped the British trade commissioner and assassinated the Province’s Deputy Premier. 702 This led to the October Crisis, where Pierre Trudeau sent in troops and declared a state of emergency through the War Measures Act.

Many young activists of this period, working in groups like the Company of Young Canadians, the Student Union for Peace Action, and The Student Christian Movement, were influenced by New Left thinking. 703 The New Left critiqued both capitalism and Stalinist socialism, and was premised around building a new anti-authoritarian, democratic, anti-sexist socialism. 704 Yet a large scale radical movement did not develop in Canada, in part because many radical Canadian activists tended to be bystanders supporting the struggles of others (such as resistance to the Vietnam War, the American Civil Rights movement, the Black Power movement or Third World liberation) as opposed to fighting for causes specific to Canada. 705 At the party level, centre-left politics was the order of the day. Trudeau himself came into power promising to liberalize Canada through legislation, 706 and the centre-left Liberals were able to dominate electorally from the late 1960s to early 1980s. Socialism or communism meanwhile was not a strong force in Canadian politics, as the only communist MP in Canadian history, Fred Rose, was found guilty of espionage in the fallout of the Gouzenko spy scandal. 707 Subsequently the CCF (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation), Canada’s main social democratic party, worked very hard to purge itself of any communist influence over the 1940s and 1950s, thought it was still not able to garner much national support due to lingering suspicions of its communist leanings. 708 In 1961 the NDP, the successor to the CCF, was formed and after success in provincial elections, it was able to win enough seats in the

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707 Ibid., p. 42.
708 Ibid., p. 41.
1972 federal election to hold the balance of power over a Trudeau minority government, creating one of Canada’s most left leaning regimes in history.

While the 1960s and early 1970s was a time of student radicalism, a large percentage of young people remained apolitical or opposed radical politics. By the mid-1970s organized labor came under sustained attack from state restrictions and post-oil shock anti-inflationary measures. And as John Cleveland notes in his study of 1960s radical activists in Canada, most New Left or revolutionary groups began to disappear by the 1980s, as it was realized that the wider Canadian public had not warmed up to their vision of a socialist Canada. Still during the 1970s and into the 1980s remnants of the radicalism of the 1960s remained and provided a social base for anti-apartheid activists. Georgina Jaffee recollected how there was a small community of international solidarity activists in Toronto during the 1970s-1980s. A bar run by Greek exiles on Danforth Avenue, called The Trojan Horse, was a meeting place for these Southern African, Latin American and Greek solidarity activists and other like minded ‘bohemians.’ TCLSAC members spoke of the group’s Cinema of Solidarity series in Toronto, where they would hold screenings on Sunday evenings of films about Third World struggles, which regularly attracted a crowd of 300-400 people. Recollecting on the political culture for activists in Canada during the 1970s Judith Marshall writes,

The ‘certainties’ of the 1970s seem almost quaint viewed from the 1990's talk of ‘global competitiveness.’ ‘Imperialism’ as a world system was the problem. People's struggles in the third world - Vietnam, Mozambique, Angola, Nicaragua - were ‘lopping off its tentacles.’ The corporate elite was tapping into ‘open veins’ of the third world, sucking out mineral and agricultural resources for fabulous profits on the basis of cheap labour. The ‘development of

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709 Goldfield, "Canada's Workers Movement."
711 Goldfield, "Canada's Workers Movement."
713 Interview Georgina Jaffee.
714 Interview John Saul (a); Marshall, "Keeping Pace."
underdevelopment’ and ‘dependency theory’ were new concepts. Nationalist movements fought to control their own resources as the basis for self-sustained development. Solidarity work in the 1970s seemed straightforward.\textsuperscript{715}

And while radicalism may have been limited in its impact in Canada, the 1970s and 1980s were certainly a time for growing interest in the larger society about development issues, with more and more Canadians travelling overseas and national fundraising events like OXFAM’s Miles for Millions Marathon or 10 Days for Development taking place annually.\textsuperscript{716} Community based development learning centres also played an important role in raising awareness; by 1984 CUSO supported 30 such centres across Canada.\textsuperscript{717} In reference to the small city of Kitchener-Waterloo, Jeanne Moffat explains how Miles For Millions, and the establishment of a Global Community Center with CUSO funding, gave a real grounding for local activists interested in building support for issues of international development.\textsuperscript{718} All of these factors helped to make the 1970s a high point for solidarity discourses in Canadian society and helped to strengthen Canadian CSO’s involvement in solidarity work. But in general, following the 1960s, radical politics declined in Canadian society. And in 1984 Conservative Brian Mulroney won the general election, which effectively ended the Trudeau era and marked both a generational and ideological shift in Canada towards the political right.\textsuperscript{719}

5.2.4. The activist government and activist CSOs

While the radical energies of the 1960s had in many cases dwindled by the 1980s, this decade was a time for massive expansion and proliferation of NGOs in Canada. This was directly connected to the role of the Canadian state in supporting civil society. Post-World War 2 the Canadian government took part in a massive expansion of social programs, with social expenditures rising from 8.6 percent

\textsuperscript{715} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{716} Wendy Warburton, "How it was...: Miles for Millions considering a comeback.," Ottawa Citizen, April 15th 2006. http://www2.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/arts/story.html?id=42f11936-2163-4d80-a218-7b5bbf39a2d3; Interview Jeanne Moffat.
\textsuperscript{717} Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{718} Interview Jeanne Moffat.
\textsuperscript{719} Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion, p. 393.
of gross national product (GNP) in 1966-1967, to 17.1 per cent by 1987-88. During the 1970s and 1980s the Canadian economy expanded, with brief recessions around the first oil shock in the early 1970s and again in the early 1980s, but in general strong growth justified continued increases in spending.

Table 1: Canadian GDP Growth 1975-1994

![GDP Growth Chart 1975-1994](source)


Table 2: Canadian Public Spending 1945-1994

![Public Spending Chart 1945-1994](source)


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Civil society groups were a major beneficiary of this period of activist government, with the Federal Secretary of State providing funding to over 3,500 CSOs by the 1980s.\textsuperscript{721} Government spending on foreign aid also steadily increased, with Canadian ODA going through a period of non-stop growth between 1984-1989. During this period ODA became “the second fastest growing spending envelope in the entire federal budget.”\textsuperscript{722} In 1986-7 ODA would reach its highest level as a percentage of GDP, coming to 0.50% of the national GDP.\textsuperscript{723} This is of particular significance because a large percentage of this aid was being sent to CSO’s working overseas. In 1965 CIDA gave its first grant to a CSO, which was a 500,000 dollar grant to CUSO.\textsuperscript{724} In 1968 a division was created to manage relations with NGOs and by 1985 CIDA was giving grants to 4,984 projects.\textsuperscript{725} This led to an explosion in the amount of Canadian CSOs doing work overseas, from 20 in 1963 to 120 by 1973. Between the years 1984-1985 62.5 million dollars was given to CSOs, by 1990-1991 it was 106.65 million dollars, with 59 CSOs receiving grants of over 200,000 dollars.\textsuperscript{726} Both CUSO and the UCC were recipients of CIDA matching grants to do work in the South over the 1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{727}

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<tr>
<td>% of GNP</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.45</td>
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\textsuperscript{721}Clement, "The Human Rights Movement."
\textsuperscript{723}Morrison, \textit{Aid and Ebb Tide}, p. 454.
\textsuperscript{725}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{726}Ibid., p.17.
\textsuperscript{727}Interview John Saxby; Interview Jim Kirkwood (a).
Accordingly the 1980s has been described as the time of the rise of the NGOs.\textsuperscript{728} Over this period government funding for the work of Canadian development NGOs went from accounting for a third of all NGO funding in 1975 to half by 1985.\textsuperscript{729} So it is no surprise that Marshall wrote of the 1980s as a time where Ottawa based development NGOs came to dominate in the anti-apartheid network.\textsuperscript{730} But just as important as the quantity of funding in the 1970s-80s was the quality of funding. For during this period the Canadian government was willing to directly fund social activism. This relates to funding regimes: the written and unwritten rules, best practices and norms that exist in a country between funders and CSOs. As Scott writes, funding regimes cannot wholly account for the actions of CSOs, but funders certainly have their values and expectations embedded in the different funding mechanism available to groups and through this have a tremendous impact on the actions and make-up of groups.\textsuperscript{731} As Scott writes the funding regime of this ‘traditional period’ was one where CSOs were encouraged to co-operate, stay mission orientated and survive mainly through government funding.\textsuperscript{732} It was also a regime where social activism was tolerated, if not encouraged.

John Saxby, through his research into Canadian NGOs, believes a 1977 report commissioned by the Secretary of State called \textit{People in Action: Report of the National Advisory Council on Voluntary Action} is the best place to look for an official articulation of the Canadian government’s approach to the role of activism in Canadian civil society, prior to the neo-liberal period.\textsuperscript{733} This report clearly states that the government has a specific role to play in financially supporting civil society groups who took part in political activism and lobbying, and an obligation to respect the independence of all groups it supports.\textsuperscript{734}

\textsuperscript{730} Marshall, "Keeping Pace."
\textsuperscript{731} Scott, "Funding Matters," p. 13.
\textsuperscript{732} Ibid., p. 113.
\textsuperscript{733} Interview John Saxby.
In regards to funding groups who may criticize the government the report states that, ‘It is the Council’s view that funding an unelected opposition does not derive from any right of the opposition to such support. Rather, it is the responsibility of government to ensure that all possible voices are heard, including dissident voices: and that, on every issue warranting public debate, as many options as possible are presented, documented and considered. Such an approach is a basic condition for an effective democratic process.’ Susan Phillips summarized this ideological position as follows:

The rationale for government funding of public interest groups is embedded in the small-l liberal notion of the benefit of both a pluralist society and pluralist state. The presumption is that strong organizations of citizens have an intrinsic value and are essential for a healthy society … Therefore, government funding to these disadvantaged constituencies adds an element of fairness in the representation of the spectrum of interests in Canadian society. It allows organizations of women, Natives, official language minorities and poor people to be heard among the voices of the economically powerful.

While this view was certainly not hegemonic in government, without recognizing it, it becomes impossible to understand why the Canadian government supported the work of anti-apartheid organizations that constantly criticized government policies on South Africa and that worked with ‘radical’ liberation movements. Thus, despite the fact that Cold War rhetoric posed a difficulty for mobilizing support for anti-apartheid work, the combination of high levels of political mobilization in Canada and the existence of activists committed to 1960s and 1970s radical politics, along with a government that was actively supporting activist work, created an environment during the anti-apartheid period where international solidarity work could thrive.

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735 Ibid., p. 137.
736 ‘Small l liberal’ is a Canadian term to distinguish between ‘liberal’ as a political ideology, and the Liberal Party of Canada.
5.3. The neo-liberal period

5.3.1. Neo-conservatives on the rise

The divisions of apartheid/post-apartheid, and Cold War/Neo-liberal time periods is not a perfect match. Neo-liberal ideas were already taking hold in the West during the 1980s and the Cold War officially ended in 1989-1990, four years before apartheid ended. Still there are a number of reasons for presenting anti-apartheid work as having taken place in the Cold War period and post-apartheid solidarity work as having occurred in the neo-liberal period. For one, it was the ending of the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet system, which allowed neo-liberalism to achieve its hegemonic position in the Western economic thinking. Further, while Brian Mulroney’s conservatives may have been neo-conservative in outlook, specifically in their championing of free trade, it was really the 1990s debt crisis that led Canada’s Federal government to break with earlier periods and embark on an explicitly neo-liberal course. Thirdly, the ending of apartheid is also intimately linked to the fall of the Soviet Union and the ANC’s loss of their major military supporter. Thus while the two periods don’t perfectly match, it’s clear the early 1990s were at the crux of the major international and domestic political changes that took place over my time of study.

Neo-liberalism began its sweep across the world in the 1980s, as China abandoned socialist development, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher dismantled the welfare states in their countries and Southern nations fell into a period of heightened insecurity as the World Bank and IMF championed structural adjustment programs.738 Gradually, new ways of conceptualizing the state, development and the place of civil society took hold in Canada and abroad, coming into full swing in the early 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet Union and triumphant conservative commentators like Francis Fukuyama declaring victory for the West and the ‘end of history.’739 Neo-liberalism has a wide range of definitions, conceived alternatively as an ideological project by elites, a label for a specific group of policies or a distinct way of

conceiving the boundaries between the state, private sector and civil society. There are a variety of people credited with the creation of this school of thinking as well. Some cite Harry Johnson, former London Shool of Economics professor and University of Chicago Chair of Economics, while others credit earlier thinkers like Friedrich von Hayek and those involved in the Mont Pelerin Society, founded in 1947, which included economists like Milton Friedman. What is commonly accepted is that neo-liberal ideas developed in opposition to Keynesian economics, calling for an end to state intervention in national economies and affirming the supremacy of unregulated free markets in creating economic growth and prosperity. Birch and Mykhnenko write that there are four common elements of the neo-liberal political agenda: the privatization of state assets, liberalization of the trade in goods and capital, a monetarist focus on inflation control, deregulation of labour markets and the marketization of the society through programs like public-private partnerships.

Odd Arne Westad argues that the politics of the Cold War became the ‘central discourse’ that shaped international affairs for most of the 20th century. The evidence suggests that post-Cold War the discourse that defined discussions and framed political activities became neo-liberalism, both within the domestic context and in the international push to create a globalized economy. In Canada such ideas widely influenced various parties, one of the clearest examples being Mike Harris’s Conservative governments in the province of Ontario (1995-2002) with their neo-liberal platform, the ‘Common Sense Revolution.’

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744 Birch, ed., The Rise and Fall of Neo-Liberalism: The collapse of an economic order?, p. 5.
5.3.2. Neo-liberalism, NGOs and the state

Neo-liberal ideas have had detrimental and sometimes unintended consequences for civil society. In pursuit of their stated goal to decrease the role of the state in society, neo-liberal policies led in many countries to reductions in the state’s role in providing social services, creating a space that was increasingly filled by NGOs.\textsuperscript{747} Neo-liberal ideas also had new market based approaches to the role of CSOs in democracies and what constituted ‘effective’ development. Accordingly during the 1980s a movement to professionalize NGOs began to take place, as the market became increasingly viewed as the only efficient means for providing and allocating resources and ‘Government departments, NGO’s and private organisation active in the domains of development’ became ‘required to operate as if they are businesses’.\textsuperscript{748} As Quarles Van Ufford notes, the 1980s was a time when approaching development as a political enterprise was seen to have failed and a plethora of books and reports called for increased accountability and a technocratic focus on effectiveness and impacts.\textsuperscript{749} Thus what was said to constitute good policy for development work changed, with an increasing focus on quantifiable results driving policy development.

As Tennant notes, this move towards professionalization even took place in social movements the world over, as more ad hoc, volunteer based organizations were increasingly replaced with more professional, established organizations.\textsuperscript{750} Natasha Goudar writes that it was the end of the Cold War when this new discourse of civil society and development work, based on market principles, fully took hold around the world.\textsuperscript{751} Other scholars agree, noting that from the 1990s onwards a new managerialism for CSOs based on private sector principles became globally prevalent.\textsuperscript{752} As a result CSOs, not just in development work, but in various forms of social interventions, become increasingly technocratic and less

\textsuperscript{748} Quarles van Ufford et al., \textit{A Moral Critique of Development}, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{749} Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{751} Natasha Goudar, "NGOs, the De-politicization of Palestinian Women’s Movements and Learning in Struggle," (Dissertation for Masters of Education for University of Alberta, 2010), p. 50.
political. Different case studies have supported these conclusions. Sue Kenny, for example, conducted a survey of community development groups in Australia, Sweden, Russia and the UK in the early 2000s, noting that in all four countries community development workers spoke of how the push for professionalization and the time needed for the extra paperwork instituted in the name of accountability had turned them away from involvement in advocacy.\textsuperscript{753} Similar observations have been made about the de-politicization of the feminist movement,\textsuperscript{754} with Lisa Morkowtich’s survey of feminist groups in Latin America and the United States noting how the institutionalization and professionalization of these organizations has led them away from advocacy work, arguing that because of this general trend ‘the legitimacy of NGOs as agents of progressive social change came into question in the 1990s.’\textsuperscript{755}

5.3.3. Budget deficits and a new funding regime

Following global trends, it was in the late 1980s to early 1990s that the mantra of increasing the efficiency and the professionalism of CSOs took hold across Canadian civil society, driven in part by global ‘best practices’ and in part by new funding requirements the Canadian government began to impose on groups. As Scott writes a new funding regime had began to develop in Canada, which shaped civil society through its focus on program funding over funding for core organizational activities, a demand for measurable outcomes and a push for groups receiving funding to become more business-like in their operations.\textsuperscript{756} This was connected to the rise of the philosophy of New-Public Management (NPM) in government departments, a discourse clearly connected to the wider neo-liberal movement.\textsuperscript{757} As Phillips writes, ‘although the Government of Canada did not embrace NPM to the same extent as many other countries, it did expand contracting-out of services and shifted the basis of funding to voluntary organizations from unconditional grants for operations to conditional project-based funding

\textsuperscript{755} Markowitz, "Paradoxes of Professionalization," p. 946.
\textsuperscript{756} Scott, "Funding Matters," pp. 2, 103 and 56.
governed by contract-like ‘contribution agreements.’\(^7\) It was this new global paradigm on the need for professionalizing civil society and government, merged with a governmental preoccupation with fiscal austerity in the mid 1990-2000s that spawned the new funding regime of the 1990s.

### Table 4: Government Debt G-7 Countries, 1974-1994

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Italy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
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As Tables 4 shows, by 1994 the Canadian federal debt had ballooned, going from 20% of the GDP in 1974, to 30% during the 1982-3 recession, then to 50% by 1987 and finally reaching around 73% by 1994.\(^8\) Accordingly deficit reduction came to dominate both federal and provincial politics in Canada over the 1990s, with the political left totally ineffective in forming a coherent rebuttal to the logic of fiscal austerity.\(^9\) When the Federal Liberals came to power in 1993 under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, they promised to balance the budget and cut the deficit to 3% of GDP by 1997.\(^10\) This new fiscal reality of the

\(^7\) Ibid.


\(^10\) Martin, "The Canadian Experience in Reducing Budget Deficits and Debt."
1990s forced a fundamental reform in how the Canadian government viewed its role in society, with the civil services increasingly adopting NPM and its techniques for increasing efficiency and outsourcing services in response to the budget crisis. CIDA and development aid took major cuts during this period, like all Federal Ministries except Indian Affairs. CIDA cuts had already begun with Brian Mulroney’s government, but with the Liberals there were major cuts to CIDA in 1993 and 1995, with levels of funding for CIDA falling from 2.972 billion dollars in 1992 to 2.147 dollars by 1998.

**Table 5: Changes in Federal Department Spending 1997-98 relative to 1994-95**

![Graph showing changes in Federal Department Spending 1997-98 relative to 1994-95](http://www.gouvernance.ca/publications/99-05.pdf)


All of these changes had significant effects on CSO work, with Scott describing the early 1990s as a time where a confluence of both political and economic forces dramatically changed the way government supported civil society. The areas of CSO work that seems to have been hit the hardest by CIDA cuts were advocacy, activism and development education in Canada. Even in the 1980s, it was becoming clear that CIDA was becoming less open to funding political activism that would cause

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765 Ibid., p. 369-371.

controversy or critique Canadian foreign policy. CUSO’s French cousin, SUCO, for example lost all of its CIDA funding in 1984 for its radical politics and activist campaigning. Under austerity and the neo-liberal period this unease became a full scale attack.

As Morrisson describes, ‘the 1995 cuts cast adrift many community-based development education groups, undermined innovative experiments in North-South NGO coalition building’ and following these cuts, a decision was made to stop all funding for DE work done in Canada, leading to DE centres across Canada and events like 10 Days for Development closing. At the 1995 meeting of the Canadian Association of African Studies, academic Cranford Pratt noted that a full scale shift was happening, as political elites now saw any form of political activism or education pursued by NGOs as a threat to their continued survival, as opposed to being a part of a healthy democracy. Thus not just development education, but activist groups of all sorts were being cut, especially those who had been critical of CIDA’s neo-liberal shift over the 1980s. In terms of aid to Africa, ODA to the continent dropped by 30.4% between 1992 and 1997.

The result of this 1990s funding squeeze and new government funding policies was what Scott calls an ‘advocacy chill’ for Canadian CSOs, as organizations hobbled by cuts and forced to now compete with each other for contracts, found it simply too risky to continue being involved in advocacy work. Scott further notes that over the early 1990s political commentators had begun to focus critical articles and books on the government’s support for advocacy groups, hardening public opinion and leading to what she calls a disengagement of government from supporting activism. On top of this, Canadian civil society groups were already constrained in the activist work they could do, as Canadian tax law

767 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, p. 417.
769 Ibid., p. 417.
770 Ibid.
771 Ibid., p. 416.
772 Ibid.
773 Ibid., p. 417.
774 Ibid., p. 117.
775 Ibid., "Africa."
776 Scott, "Funding Matters," p. xv.
777 Ibid., p. 117.
prohibited non-profit organizations from spending more than 10% of revenues on political activity.\textsuperscript{775} Thus by 2003 she could say that, ‘overall, many nonprofit and voluntary organizations have stopped advocating, constrained by lack of volunteers and core funding, as well as fears of being marginalized in the competition for funds from governments, donors, foundations and the like.’\textsuperscript{776}

Yet the government’s focus on deficit reduction came to an end by the turn of the millennium, and in March 2000 Finance Minister Paul Martin announced that the budget would be balanced for the next five years, with new spending and tax cuts outlined.\textsuperscript{777} After a ‘decade of decline’ ODA increased from 2.6 billion dollars in 2000-01 to 4.1 billion dollars in 2004-05.\textsuperscript{778} Scott further notes that government funding in general to voluntary groups in Canada increased over the 2000s; but despite this the new funding regime had become entrenched in Canada and it was one oriented against activism.\textsuperscript{779} In the contemporary regime Scott describes an environment where funding is always uncertain and must be raised from project to project, where voluntary groups see each other as competitors and thus collaboration is reduced, where groups are saddled with onerous evaluation and accounting procedures and where groups are pushed to become more and more businesslike in their operations and focused on an economic bottom line.\textsuperscript{780} Central to this new regime is the growth of project funding, as it has became much rarer for groups to obtain core support that could cover day to day expenses. Instead the majority of the support available is for specific projects in areas decided by government, which radically reduces the policy space CSOs have.\textsuperscript{781} Accordingly Scott mentions that one can think of two very different types of Canadian CSOs, the traditional groups that thrived in the 1970s-1980s who were mission focused, co-operative, volunteer driven and fearful of the market, and the new wave of groups who are adapted to the

\textsuperscript{775} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{776} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{779} Scott, "Funding Matters," p. 78.
\textsuperscript{780} Ibid., p. 102, 56, 17.
\textsuperscript{781} Ibid., p. 2.
current funding regime, more entrepreneurial, specialized, business inspired, competitive and results oriented.\textsuperscript{782}

In such organizations there is less space for radical activists like the Jim Kirkwoods, Judith Marshalls and David Beers who ran solidarity work within larger CSOs during anti-apartheid. Lyse Blanchard, former CUSO Executive Director described the reality for groups today: ‘NGOs are now just so afraid of getting their funding cut. NGOs used to work together the CUSOs, the Oxfams, etc. Then they started to get afraid to associate with these radicals and the space for debate and analysis disappeared. Around the CCIC table now you have World Vision. World Vision! Excuse me I was on the CCIC board before World Vision came on and I would not have continued with the CCIC with them at the table. You have a world view and it’s not the World Vision view.’\textsuperscript{783}

5.3.4. The Harper government

Despite the difficulty of the contemporary funding regime, some groups still held onto their progressive roots and continued to try to implement international solidarity related policies over the 1990s-2000s. For these organizations, the ones who were so crucial to the anti-apartheid network, surviving the 1990s meant adapting to the new funding regime, with a focus on increasing their professionalism and bidding for project contracts from CIDA, while at the same time working to find funding and space for activism. Moving into the 2000s this balancing has become even harder. Despite the well known dangers of government funding, in 2003 60% of funding for voluntary groups in Canada still came from the government, similar levels to where it had been in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{784} But unlike the 1980s, the consensus that the government supports activism was gone. And when Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party of Canada won a minority government in 2006, ending 13 years of Liberal rule, a new paradigm was established. In the Harper regime funding to CSOs become almost wholly based on

\textsuperscript{782} Ibid., p. 113.  
\textsuperscript{783} Interview Joan Anne Nolan (b).  
\textsuperscript{784} Scott, "Funding Matters," p. 15.
partisan interests, with attacks launched on groups that espoused any stance differing from the Conservatives. For progressive NGOs this has been a disaster.

While information is difficult to obtain, one political blogger provides a list of 70 organizations the Harper government has defunded ranging from the Canadian Arab Federation, to the Climate Action Network, to the Law Reform Commission of Canada. Political commentator Brian Stewart wrote the following on the subject,

In the fields of justice, human rights and foreign aid, it seems that one non-governmental agency after another is being ‘de-funded’ into non-existence or near paralysis by the Harper government. For decades, I have covered human rights and aid groups here and around the world and have never seen such a chill as what is happening now in our own country. For when an NGO has its budget cut, apparently for speaking out, others fear the same fate. It brings to mind Winston Churchill's famous saying about grovelling before a fearsome power: ‘Each one hopes the crocodile will eat him last.’

Known for bringing partisan politics into various aspects of federal government policy, the Harper government has attacked a series of different groups, which has led to ongoing media coverage. As Gerald Caplan of the Globe and Mail writes,

The issue here is the reversal, by Stephen Harper, of a 60-year consensus shared by all previous governments about the central role of civil society in Canada. Every previous government has funded civil society groups and NGOs even when they espoused policies that contradicted the government’s own. Governments might have done so grudgingly and not as generously as some of us hoped. But it has been one of the quiet glories of Canadian democracy that our governments

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have often backed groups that criticized them or had competing priorities. No more. With Stephen Harper, you either buy the party line or you get slapped down.787

One anonymous staff person I interviewed from a prominent progressive Canadian NGO noted their shock that during a recent funding negotiating session with CIDA, officials asked their executive director, ‘Why should we fund you guys? Your people don’t vote for us.’788

Two of the most prominent groups cut in recent years are organizations which played important roles in the anti-apartheid network, KAIROS Canada and CCIC. With KAIROS a national scandal unfolded. While KAIROS originally was told its funding application was rejected in November 2009 on account of failing government criteria, Citizenship and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney told a conference in Israel that month that the reason for the cut was their political advocacy in support of a boycott campaign of Israel.789 At first, Minister for International Co-Operation Bev Oda denied that the defunding was a political decision, but instead one made by civil servants,790 only to be embarrassed when it was later revealed that KAIROS funding had been recommended by civil servants, with someone from her office inserting the words NOT onto the document.791 The controversy led to the Harper government being found in contempt of Parliament, for lying about the incident.792

For the CCIC, massive cuts to core funding hobbled the organization, forcing them to fire 17 of 24 staff.793 These controversies and cuts to other prominent groups like Rights and Democracy, led to the launching of the Voices coalition, where 153 Canadian groups came together to speak out against the

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788 Interview Anonymous (a).
790 Ibid.
793 Interview Sylvie Perras.
government cuts to funding. But with Prime Minister Harper winning a majority government on May 2nd 2010, it seems that such policies will be a fact of life for the near future. The motivation for Harper’s stance to civil society is not entirely clear, but it seems that progressive CSOs are viewed by his government as critics and ideological opponents, and the attack on them was simply part of an overarching strategy to use the Prime Minister’s office to hobble potential opponents in any way possible. Further, recent studies suggest Canadians are becoming increasingly wary of the ability of government to produce social change, and seem to be happy with a reduced state that only focuses on core tasks like delivering healthcare. Thus slashing government funding given to perceived ‘special interest groups’ is not just a policy supported by Harper’s conservative base, but also a policy that is unlikely to generate much opposition from mainstream voters. In short, what has happened in Canada over the neo-liberal period is a paradigm shift from an activist federal government supporting a politically activist civil society, to a fiscally conservative government that views CSOs as service providers competing for government grants, with absolutely no tolerance for political activism. This new funding regime, entrenched in the 1990s during the time of budget cuts and as the entire world moved to a new professionalized discourse of development, has made it extremely difficult for Canadian CSOs to take part in any type of solidarity activities.

5.3.5. Where did all the activists go?

While funding has been a major force leading to the decline of the progressive organizations that were at the heart of the anti-apartheid network, other factors also seem to have contributed. Different scholars assert that Canada, like the United States, has suffered an ongoing decline in social capital, with Robert Putman noting that declines in civic participation and trust in Canada and the US have been

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795 Caplan, "Stephen Harper’s worst enemy."
very similar.\textsuperscript{798} For Putman such changes have had major consequences, sapping the vitality from democracies as political engagement declines and society becomes more focused on individualistic pursuits than fostering the collective good.\textsuperscript{799} It is beyond the purview of this thesis to address such a broad assertion. Further Putman’s ideas about there being a general, ongoing, decline in civic life in the West have been critiqued by different scholars, one of the major critiques being that he measures participation in older forms of organizational life and has not taken into account newer forms of civic participation in the West.\textsuperscript{800} Yet even if this critique is accepted, that Putnam’s analysis applies only to older forms of organizing like trade unions, churches and NGOs, it is still of relevance to this work, for it is exactly these types of organizations that I have shown to be at the heart of anti-apartheid. And certainly in the case of churches and trade unions there has been an ongoing generational decline in participation.

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Percentage who attended church or synagogue \hline
1955 & 58\% \\
1960 & 56\% \\
1981 & 37\% \\
1991 & 31\% \\
2001 & 31\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
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\textit{Did you, yourself, happen to attend church or synagogue in the last seven days, or not?}

\textit{Canadian respondents saying ‘yes, attended.’}


For trade unions unionization rates have fallen for two decades, from 38% in the 1980s to below 30% by 2007. For churches it has been far more dramatic, with a generational shift from six in ten Canadians attending weekly services in 1950 to three in ten by 2000. Certainly this disengagement from church and union life has weakened the ability of these organizations to raise funds and mobilize members in the post-apartheid era, something we shall see in depth in the case of the UCC in the next chapter. Building any type of movement requires first and foremost people to mobilize and as Canadian society becomes more individualized and insular the task of mobilization becomes more difficult. Still, it could be argued that as these large CSOs of the past declined, they may have been replaced in the 1990s and 2000s by new, less formal, networks of internet based activists. This is the argument of scholars like Lance Bennet, which was presented in Chapter 2. Yet assertions about the ability of such networks to build solidarity movements are highly speculative. Bennet himself admits that it has not yet been proven whether such organizations have the cohesion required to actually create transnational movements. And as Johnston and Laxer point out in their study of Canadian contestation of the Multi-Lateral Agreement on Investment in the late 1990s (which has been labelled the first internet driven transnational campaigns), it was large civil society groups like the Council of Canadians and older advocacy networks from previous struggles against free trade that we are the heart of supporting the campaign. Thus this thesis has contended that large CSOs served as the most important ‘mobilizing structures’ utilized by international solidarity activists throughout my period of study, and as a result of the declining participation in such groups over this period, they were less and less able to serve in such a role.

Further, with the end of the Cold War, the politics of Third World Liberation also ended. While many Canadian activists from the international solidarity community found new homes in the anti-
globalization struggles of the 1990s, a constant theme of interviewees was a lament about the growing conservatism in Canada and a lack of support for the discourses that fed solidarity movements of the past. As CUSO activist Sue Godt noted,

I’m just so taken by the de-politicization of society that is going on, it’s horrifying coming back to Canada after 20 years to see the passivity that is going on here and this lack of connection and it’s in some ways ironic. Because we have much more communication and much more linkages, but somehow I see in the world that the walls have gone up amongst many and what I see now in general is a charity approach, it’s not a solidarity approach…. a lot of it is post-1990 to be honest and that’s had an impact where there is just a kind of wearing away at many of the critical groups, the NGO types. Even in Toronto you would always be in demos and have screaming fights with the Marxists and Leninists and I don’t see that anymore.

During a focus group with five former CUSO staff people in September 2010 similar fears arose, as activists spoke of the loss of politics in today’s work overseas, replaced by a depoliticized concept of development, without a larger vision for transformation to relate too. They spoke of the passionate debates on issues of social justice that existed within activist groupings in the 1960s to 1980s, and talked of how this too seems to have disappeared. Doug Miller of SACTU Solidarity and CUSO noted in his interview that today it seems more difficult to organize under a socialist ideology than it was during the height of the Cold War.

Though it’s hard to say exactly how widespread these changes are, data indicates that Canadians may be becoming more politically apathetic: voter participation in Canada is declining, reaching an all time low of 59.1% in the 2008 federal election and only 2% of Canadians currently participate in any sort

806 Marshall, "Keeping Pace."
807 Interview Jim Kirkwood (c); Interview Lyse Blanchard; Interview Rosa Candia.
808 Interview Sue Godt.
809 CUSO Focus Group, Ottawa.
810 Interview Doug Miller.
of Law/Politics/Advocacy organizations.\textsuperscript{811} Also some recent opinion surveys argue that the country has generally become more and more politically conservative over the last two decades.\textsuperscript{812} With even the NDP now seriously considering removing the words socialist from its manifesto in order to garner wider ‘mainstream support’ it would be fair to argue that radical politics has a much-reduced base in Canada compared with the past.\textsuperscript{813} Thus while a full analysis of the political culture of contemporary Canada is beyond the purview of this thesis, it is reasonable to assert that generally the CSOs that found support from radical and activist baby boomers in the 1970s now have much smaller constituencies to draw on. And this combination of factors, political disengagement, decreased participation in traditional organizations, more conservative political values, all served to weaken progressive CSOs in Canada over the 1990s. Combined with the new funding regime that has stifled activism by CSOs, the result is that the neo-liberal period has become an increasingly difficult time for solidarity campaigns.

\section*{5.4. Conclusion}

As we have seen, international solidarity movements are highly influenced by larger international and domestic political factors. The political context or more specifically the political paradigm that activists work within in many ways sets the terrain for political struggle. During the Cold War the rhetoric of anti-communism put severe restrictions on the types of discourses activists could employ and meant that activists had to constantly re-frame the discussion in a way that moved beyond the East vs. West rhetoric. Yet despite this barrier activists were able to create a national movement, in part because government and social support for activism was strong during the Cold War era. In the following two chapters we will see exactly how this developed within both the UCC and CUSO.

\begin{small}
\textsuperscript{812} Preston Manning, "The election of our discontent."
\end{small}
With the advent of neo-liberalism, the overt barrier of anti-communist resistance was replaced with a more indirect, yet far more debilitating force: the force of de-politicization. If there is one thing that separates discourses of solidarity from that of charity it is politics; solidarity is inherently political and bases all of its normative assumptions on a politicized understanding of international affairs. With the move towards a professionalization of development work and the funding regime that crystallized in the 1990s, a smothering of political activism has taken place. Of this there is no clearer example than the Harper government’s outright assault on progressive civil society, signalling a total refutation of the commitment to support a robust, activist civil society, as outlined in the 1977 People In Action Report. Yet de-politicization has not all been overt, as some of it was the unintended consequence of a new discourse of development and social interventions that swayed industry professionals and civil servants with its mantras of efficiency, results based policy and accountability.

Morrison points out that Canadian NGOs were not blameless in this process, as they are claimed to have had issues of territorialism and noted research deficits in the early 1990s. During this period CIDA also had to publicly intervene to help two of the country’s biggest NGOs, OXFAM Canada and WUSC, avert financial and managerial crises.814 Thus it may have been that Canadian civil society groups and NGOs were in need of reform in the 1990s. But an exercise that started out with laudable goals ended up having the unintended consequence of severely restricting the policy space available to civil society groups, replacing a previous culture of collaboration with competition and generally creating an environment where the building of future solidarity movements, around South Africa or any part of the world, has became incredibly difficult. In the next chapter, I shift my focus from the macro to the micro, looking at exactly how these two eras unfolded within CUSO and the UCC, and map out how the cuts and changes in thinking about Canadian civil society actually stifled the capacity for solidarity work inside these organizations.

814 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, pp. 360-2.
6

The Loss of Radical Space: Analyzing Battles between Activists and Institutionalists

6.1. Chapter overview

The last chapter considered how the new funding regime and societal trends of the 1990s led Canadian CSOs to become much less inclined to take part in activism than they had been during the 1970s and 1980s. But how did these paradigm shifts and social changes actually play out at the level of organizations? I will argue this process can best be understood through the concept of radical space and appreciating its role in inter-group power struggles within CSOs. International solidarity policies in large civil society groups develop out of a process of internal debate and conflict, with solidarity activists gaining support from the radical spaces that exist within the larger structures of their organizations. Both CUSO and the UCC saw their radical spaces decline during the 1990s, spurred by financial crises which empowered institutionalists within each organization. One of the main reasons these financial issues had such an effect was because solidarity work had not been institutionalized in either group, but was driven largely by a core of dedicated solidarity activists.

This common narrative was brought about by two distinct factors. For CUSO the compounding factor was their near total reliance on CIDA funding, which meant they had little choice but to react to the
new funding regime and the ongoing threat of CIDA cuts in a way that pleased CIDA and in turn damaged radical space. In the UCC, financial decline was exacerbated by the *politics of isolation*, a process through which activists had created radical spaces within the church that were highly disconnected from the general membership and thus lacked a base to protect themselves from cutbacks. To begin this chapter I start by defining the concept of radical space, and then I will explain why inter-group struggles are critical to the development of international solidarity activities. Next I look in-depth at how such struggles shaped anti-apartheid policies in the UCC and CUSO. Finally I present examples from the history of CUSO and the UCC in the 1990s-2000s, which demonstrate how radical spaces were slowly cut away.

6.1.1. Defining radical space and internal power struggles

Understanding the term radical space involves turning our attention to sub-groups that exist within organizations. Traditionally this area has been a focus for scholars of organizational behaviour. Ian Banks notes that large organizations are filled with formal and informal sub-groups, identified by factors like shared communication networks, a sense of collective identity and purpose, shared goals, ongoing interaction and ability to act as a team. For almost all of the CSOs considered by this thesis, international solidarity work around South Africa was not seen as an essential or ‘core’ function of their organizations (though the few exceptions to this will be described shortly). Further, because international solidarity around South Africa required political action and the picking of sides in controversial debates - activities which could jeopardize other functions of these organizations - there was always resistance to such work. So the situation that was repeated over and over was of small groups of solidarity activists, usually paid staff, acting within larger organizations, where they had to lobby, advocate and struggle to get international solidarity work supported by their larger organizations.

Radical space is my term for these areas within organizations, or in connected inter- organizational coalitions, where solidarity activists group themselves to organize and advocate for the

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financial and institutional support needed to carry out their work, propagate their ideas and launch international solidarity activities. Radical space can thus be formal, easily definable departments within organizations where activists are employed and have access to resources, or it can refer to informal groups or networks within organizations where international solidarity supporters gather. As the 1990s progressed, these radical spaces would be cut, undermined and depoliticized in CSOs across Canada, denying activists the platforms needed to carry out their work.

The second element to understanding how international solidarity policies are developed in CSOs is to think about the inter-group power struggles that take place within organizations. The usual terrain for such struggles is within the head or regional offices of groups and inside other formal structures (standing committees, board meetings or Annual General Meetings [AGMs]). It is well known that most civil society organizations have internal divisions around the importance of political activism and that the adoption of such activities is hotly debated. Judith Marshall described three groups of employees and active volunteers within the USW.816 Using a model developed by union educator D’Arcy Martin, she spoke about one group, the majority of people, who are concerned primarily with the ‘politics of the ladder.’ This means they are interested with climbing up through the ranks of the union and the expansion of the organization. She then noted two groups that work outside the ‘politics of the ladder.’ First are those concerned with health and safety, who only get involved in politics of the ladder if doing so will help them forward a health and safety agenda. ‘Then the other place is international solidarity, whether linked to Cuba or whatever, here you have interesting and passionate activists who are working on different networks and issues. So there is a tolerance for that space. But if it challenged activities going on, on “the ladder”, it would be shut down immediately.’817

Describing the divisions within the UCC in his Master’s thesis, Dr. Barry Rieder, a UCC outreach minister, quoted Larry Derkach, who noted that,

816 Interview Judith Marshall (c).
817 Ibid.
the church exists as both gathered and dispersed... The gathered church lives out one part of the gospel through worship, pastoral care and education, and the experience of community. This part of the church is accepted, even valued, by society, and has bought into society by a large degree. The church dispersed sets at liberty those who are oppressed, and brings respite to the hurting. This work by its very nature calls to task a society that marginalized the weak. By doing so it also challenges the gathered church to transform, even revolutionize, the society with which it is so strongly identified.818

During my time travelling across the UCC and working within the national office (2006-2007), it became clear that there was an ongoing struggle between the gathered and dispersed wings of the church over the extent to which international solidarity work and even social justice in general was a core function of the organization. Ian Smiley also chronicles such divisions within CUSO, describing power struggles between ‘the pragmatists’ and ‘the socialist roaders’ over the future of CUSO policy.819

Building on the empirical evidence collected I believe there is a general narrative and logic to these disputes that is common to many CSOs. In most CSOs problems regularly arise from differing conceptions of what the core values of an organization are, and to what extent political activism is part of these core values. Activist sub-groups tend to argue for more political approaches and more expansive conceptions of the organization’s mandate. For example in CUSO a contingent of returned volunteers in the 1960s argued the group needed to actively support and promote political movements in the developing world, insisting that simply sending volunteers overseas under a humanitarian paradigm was not enough.820 This activist perspective tends to be opposed by a more technocratic sub-group, which presses for clearly defined, measurable activities that focus on ‘traditional’ core functions and organizational expansion. For example, there was a segment in CUSO who argued the group should remain true to its

819 Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, pp. 108 and 117.
820 Miller, Aid as Peacemaker, p. 126.
‘humanitarian roots’ and remain strictly apolitical and focused on volunteer sending. Along with these debates on core values, another element that influences such struggles is disputes on the correct balance between integrity and organizational health. Institutionalists tend to argue that political activities should not jeopardize the health of the CSO, while activists argue that putting institutional health over ethical stances fatally compromises the organization’s integrity.

These are not rigid, diametrically opposed positions; most actors within organizations tend to sit at different points between the two poles I have described. Many pragmatists straddle both positions, constantly trying to maintain both institutional health and organizational integrity. Then there are also staff members who simply opt out of these debates: for them their work in their CSO is just a job. The exceptions to this process are third world solidarity groups. For example TCLSAC’s membership was a small group of academics and highly politically aware activists, and accordingly the dynamics around crafting solidarity policies were totally different from those in large membership organizations. While debates certainly existed within third world solidarity groups, the small size of such organizations and the fact that solidarity with a specific cause was at the heart of their existence, made it possible to get a widely accepted internal position on solidarity.

But for larger NGOs, churches and trade unions, especially those with a large general membership, it is much more difficult to achieve this kind of ideological convergence. In these situations the core international solidarity activists tended to be paid staff persons, who held political views more radical than the general members. As Judith Marshall notes, her passion and connection to Southern Africa is exceptional in the Steelworkers, and actually the socialist views of the groups she has partnered the USW with in South Africa would probably be opposed by many union members. Gary Kenny, in

821 CUSO Saul College Committee et al., "Personal Letter."
822 Olesen, *International Zapatismo*, p. 103.
823 Interview Paul Puritt (b).
824 Interview Judith Marshall (c).
1989, chronicled the same division between activist church staff doing work on the anti-apartheid campaign and a less politically inclined general membership in Canadian churches.825

International solidarity policies thus develop through processes of internal lobbying and manoeuvring, with general membership, if it exists, playing an important role. Both solidarity activists and their opponents may attempt to gain the support from the general membership to give legitimacy to their position. In many cases though, activists decide such engagements are too time consuming, and a process of barricading radical spaces from outside interference develops, or activists move solidarity activities to extra-organizational coalitions, operating at arm’s length from their home CSO and removed from scrutiny or involvement from grassroots membership. Such a process, here termed the politics of isolation, happened in CUSO and even more so in the UCC. In the short term this more centralized approach to activism had benefits for the effectiveness of solidarity policies, but in the long term it shrunk the support base for such activities and meant international solidarity work was not institutionalized across the UCC or to a lesser extent within CUSO. This vulnerability meant that during the fiscal austerity both organizations suffered in the 1990s, radical spaces, isolated and long viewed by institutionalists as liabilities, were ripe for cutbacks.

6.2. Radical space in CUSO and the UCC

6.2.1. The UCC and its struggles around anti-apartheid activism

While the UCC today holds a reputation for being a progressive church committed to social justice causes,826 a thorough analysis of the organization reveals it was, and still remains, a church that contains a wide variety of political views. Thus the church’s involvement in anti-apartheid work was not a preordained outcome, but the product of intense internal advocacy and education. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the activists who spearheaded South African solidarity work were returned missionaries who

had developed deep personal connections with liberation movements in Southern Africa. Garth Legge, the ‘father’ of these missionaries, is a prime example, having interacted with a variety of regional liberation movement activists through serving on the board of the Mindolo Ecumenical Centre in Kitwe Zambia from 1959-1964. Similar experiences were had by Tad Mitsui and Murray McInnes. Mitsui was exposed to liberation politics and black theology while teaching with Desmond Tutu at a theological school in Lesotho from 1968-1975, where he also interacted with Steve Biko, through his work with black student Christian organizations. McInnes meanwhile came into contact with the MPLA while being posted in Angola.

This final generation of UCC missionaries to Africa had a very different experience from the missionaries of old, coming home inspired by liberation movements and anti-colonial politics and ready to mobilize support within their churches. These ‘radical missionaries’ were part of a larger cohort of radical churchmen and women that existed within the UCC during the 1960s-1970s. Chapter 4 described the shifts in thinking about ‘church overseas mission’ that happened in the church during this period, when it discussed how a uniquely Christian variety of internationalist solidarity discourse developed in the UCC. The turn to a more progressive interpretation of overseas mission was just one part of major changes taking place across the church during the 1960s-1970s, as Christian feminism began to play an increasing role in the UCC, interest in liberation theology spread and mission within Canada was reconceptualised. Church people of the period were creating new and daring ways to do outreach work, like at the radical, civil rights movement inspired Canadian Urban Training program, which trained outreach ministers with activities like ‘The Plunge,’ a 48 hour experience of surviving on the streets with only 5 Canadian dollars. Thus Jim Kirkwood, Legge and the other former missionaries were part of a larger network of progressive activists that was existed within the church during the 1960s-80s.

827 Interview Jim Kirkwood (c)
828 Interview Tad Mitsui.
But as Gary Kenny noted in 1989, much of this activism was concentrated among those employed by the UCC (church staff or ministers), who were exposed to new theological ideas and training, and thus held views that could be quite radical compared to the politics held by the average member. Knowing this, it’s not surprising that UCC anti-apartheid activism was concentrated, at first, around a network of church staff people. Kirkwood explains that it was the DWO network, which included staff with a world mission portfolio at the conference level and those involved with DWO committees, who formed the heart of UCC anti-apartheid activism. Most of the roughly 100 ‘key anti-apartheid activists’ that Kirkwood identified and communicated with through the SAEP newsletter came from this national DWO network. For Kirkwood, DWO AGMs were extremely important for coordinating anti-apartheid activism, as this is when all the main DWO supporters from across Canada gathered in Toronto. While the DWO was officially supposed to be focused on work overseas, Kirkwood soon brought United Church education staff into the fold. Pairing a meeting with UCC educators after each DWO annual general meeting, this would be a chance for Kirkwood and others to ‘turn the educators into activists’ by discussing the situation in South Africa, exposing them to written materials on the topic and encouraging them to go out and spread the word within the church. Thus the DWO and its structures at different administrative levels in the church provided the major radical space for anti-apartheid activists.

Following the 1978-1979 UCC General Council taskforce on South Africa, a division of labour with other departments was created: the DWO would focus on tours and popular education, the Department of Mission in Canada would handle domestic lobbying, and the Finance Department, through Treasurer Bill Davis, did work with TCCR on divestment. In the mid-1980s ICCAF, would increasingly supplant DWO as the major radical space in which UCC activists gathered, providing a place where activists from various churches could pool funds, resources and person power. But these professional level spaces were not the only radical spaces that existed. As noted in Chapter 4, there

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832 The UCC has three levels of bureaucracy: National, Conference and Presbytery. There are 13 Conferences, each representing different geographic regions of Canada, with numerous presbyteries under them.
833 Interview Jim Kirkwood (d).
834 Interview Jim Kirkwood (d).
existed a strong, grassroots level anti-apartheid network in the North Bay region of Manitou Conference. Kirkwood admitted that at the time he was a bit resentful and threatened by the self-initiative of this region, but after travelling there came to appreciate the strong local support activists were generating. Other hotspots for local activism included Edmonton Alberta, Vancouver British Colombia and the prairie province of Saskatchewan. Of course, Toronto was also a centre for activism, but Kirkwood notes that Toronto was also a centre for corporate led resistance within the UCC to anti-apartheid work.

This brings us to the issue of internal power struggles in the church. When church based activists first started doing anti-apartheid work, resistance in congregations was fierce. As Kirkwood notes, ‘I remember in 1970, the WCC created the Program to Combat Racism. The UCC was the first to support it, then the Anglicans. That happened in an atmosphere where it seemed like we were supporting terrorists. The prevailing ethos of the time was equivalent to if today you said, “we are going to support certain terrorist movements, not Al Qaeda, but other groups in Pakistan.” It was that explosive.’835 Those who actively opposed church activism around apartheid came mainly from two camps: pro-business opposition and theologically conservative opposition. It’s difficult to get a detailed picture of these groups: as the UCC’s sometimes stifling culture of politeness and avoidance of conflict meant interviewees were not eager to name critics, and almost no published material could be found in the archives. But through interviews and some data it is possible to paint a rough sketch of who the opponents were.

The centre of pro-business opposition was Timothy Eaton United Church, historically the wealthiest congregation in the UCC. Home to numerous business executives and corporate leaders, this congregation would become the home of (and even provide staff support for) the Confederation of Church and Business People, formed in 1976 to counter the divestment work done by TCCR.836 With their spokesperson, former UCC Moderator and missionary Dr. Robert McClure, the group published

835 Interview Jim Kirkwood (c).
material and hosted events to counter the work of the DWO and church based anti-apartheid activism in general.837 While there is little evidence to suggest the Confederation built a large following, it did tap into the general resistance many church members had to churches telling corporations how to spend their money. Such actions were seen by many as clearly outside of the core functions of what churches should be doing. The case of Emmanuel United Church, described in Chapter 4, where years of internal struggle over moving the church’s savings account out of the local CIBC Bank nearly split the congregation apart, is just one example of how controversial such ideas could be.838

For those who theologically opposed anti-apartheid activism the arguments were different. Here the idea was that the church should not be involved in any politics, especially the communist politics of liberation groups, but instead focus on winning people’s salvation.839 The best account of this opposition comes from Willem Saayman, a former DRC minister, and UDF and ICT member, who was brought by the DWO in 1983 to speak on the idea of apartheid as a heresy, in the lead up to the 1984 General Council. After arriving in Canada Willem first spoke at a meeting of the Atlantic Conference of the UCC, as he recounted:

So the Atlantic conference was more conservative than anybody else and lots of evangelicals there. And these guys were strictly, strictly 100% against any critical voice against South Africa. They would say ‘How can you say that, it’s unchristian!’ So that was why they brought me, I grew up very pious… and what I found at that stage, one weak point in Canada is these guys like Martin Rumscheidt and Jim Kirkwood tried to counter the faith based arguments raised by the evangelicals with secular arguments, but that does not work. They were always claiming ‘Ah so you are of the devil!’ or whatever. But they hadn’t expected it when I stood up and said ‘I believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and he is my personal savior’ and then I said that ‘apartheid is

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837 Ibid.
839 Interview Tad Mistui.
maintained in the name of Jesus my savior and I refuse to accept that he approves of apartheid, and that changed the whole argument… I completely shut the evangelicals up.

This one example of conservatism in the UCC is supported by a 1979 internal survey of church members across Canada called ‘Take Your Hand off My Head You are Holding Me Down.’ The study compiled views of church members on issues of social justice, and deemed that the vast majority of church members studied held extremely conservative views and had a low degree of ‘global consciousness.’

Despite this opposition it seems that from the mid 1970s up to 1984, when a majority of church delegates voted to declare apartheid a heresy at the 30th General Council in Morden Manitoba, the education and advocacy work did have the effect of building broad support for the anti-apartheid campaign. So much so that the Father Michael Lapsley, who toured Canada on three occasions over the 1980s, reported that it was United Church congregations who seemed the most knowledgeable and interested in anti-apartheid issues. This is not to say that the views of activists like Jim Kirkwood became majority opinion; as Gary Kenny noted in 1989, despite UCC policy expressing explicit support for the ANC, ‘large numbers of church constituents express disdain for the outlawed organization and its so-called "communist" and "terrorist" ways.’ Further, Jeanne Moffat noted that Kirkwood himself would often ‘despair at the church courts’ because they would never pass statements that were as strongly worded as he would have liked. Regardless, it’s clear that activists in the church were able to fend off critiques from pro-business interests, theological conservatives and those hoping to avoid political controversy. But these disputes demonstrate how internal struggles were part and parcel of solidarity policy development in the UCC and that the radical space offered by internal church structures, around the DWO, made it possible for activists to mobilize and advance their agenda.

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840 Interview Willem Saayman.
842 Interview Michael Lapsley(a).
844 Interview Jeanne Moffat.
6.2.3. CUSO internal battles

What is interesting about CUSO and the UCC is how similar the experiences were of the original activists who led the internal struggle for a more forceful anti-apartheid policy. In both cases it was Canadians who had formerly lived in Southern Africa, who directly witnessed the effects of white minority rule with their own eyes and created personal contacts in the region. The champions for anti-apartheid activism in CUSO were returned co-operants. As Dave Beer noted:

when people went overseas it’s not surprising they were touched, they went to Asia and the Vietnam War was on and went to Caribbean and black power was on, and went to Latin America and dictators were there and then to Southern Africa. So when those people came back, they, including me, where changed… there were annual meetings that were very alive and resolutions that came from the floor about these areas saying ‘Canada should do this and that’ and that there should be support for these liberation movements. But that did politicize CUSO, because people in universities and groups across country thought CUSO was just about recruiting kids to go overseas and now they were making these political statements and the CUSO committees were voting for it.845

Ian Smillie also described how CUSO AGM’s turned into ‘brawling assemblies of volunteers, often radicalized by their experience and the apathy they found on their return to Canada.’846 Thus it would be this first generation of co-operants, sent overseas during the 1960s and 1970s, who would work through AGMs, local committees or as paid staff, to lobby for an international solidarity informed vision of development in CUSO. Smillie writes that the radical activists in CUSO continually referenced their advocacy to the ‘imprecise principle of solidarity.’847 Like UCC anti-apartheid activism, this work in CUSO must be understood as part of a range of progressive causes that CUSO activists took on, such as solidarity work around Latin America, Palestine and gender issues. Comparing the UCC and CUSO

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845 Interview David Beer (b).
846 Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p. 111.
847 Ibid., p.132.
Judith Marshall noted, ‘thinking about David Beer, CUSO was his vehicle. So he helped shape the policies of that organization, he and a cluster of other people who had placements in Southern Africa at some point… same way with the churches and people who were missionaries.’

As CUSO’s John Saxby asserted: ‘it’s fair to say CUSO was never a radical organization, but there were pockets and they weren’t majority opinion.’ One pocket was in DE, originally led by David Beer upon his return to Ottawa from Zambia. DE was a compromise, emerging from the AGM’s of the early 1970s as a second choice for activists who were unable to get votes for a political education department. Ian Smillie, the constant antagonist of solidarity activists, places DE in the context of the larger competing perspectives in CUSO:

Like any large, social service organization, CUSO was a coalition of views and personalities. There were impatient radicals, some sustained by an intolerance bred of rigid doctrine—which rooted easily in the fertile soil of development education—and there were liberals, and there were more cautious individuals, for whom social activism was a totally new experience. As time passed, it was the impatient who came to dominate CUSO’s development education efforts; and they demanded organizational security be relegated to second place. Development education staff often found themselves on the fringe, aligned against those who feared that increasingly controversial public positions would damage the organization’s recruitment and fund-raising base, as well as its relationship with the government.

While the DE department certainly worked hard to disseminate anti-apartheid information, it was hamstrung by restrictions and a lack of support from CIDA. Thus the true heart of anti-apartheid activism in CUSO was located outside the Ottawa head office, in the regional offices in Africa and in local offices across Canada. The main radical space was within the Eastern Central and Southern African

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848 Interview Judith Marshall (c).
849 Interview John Saxby.
850 Miller, Aid as Peacemaker, p. 127; Interview David Beer.
851 Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p. 132.
852 Miller, Aid as Peacemaker, p. 127, Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p.136.
(ECSA) region structures, which included the Zambia field office and CUSO’s liberation support programs. Reading between the lines of Smillie’s account, it becomes clear ECSA was a major radical space in CUSO; he labels it as a place where staff would use local committees to force their radical politics on volunteers and where a hyper-politicized anti-imperialist, anti-colonial orientation would force some co-operants to repudiate their positions. Certainly there may have been some staff in the ECSA office that held hard left, overly doctrinal positions. John Saxby (himself once labeled as a ‘dangerous radical’) admits as much. But it is also undeniable that it was within the ECSA region structures that CUSO’s support for the ANC and other liberation movements developed. Further, CUSO’s members were comfortable enough with the group’s 1973 Dar Declaration, which was distributed and considered by committees across Canada, that it was adopted as part of CUSO’s mission statement, as the organization’s official ‘Development Charter.’

The story of regional offices within Canada was more difficult to gather data around. Several activists noted that Don Kossick, Regional Coordinator in Saskatchewan, was doing incredibly important activist organizing around Southern African solidarity, connecting local NGOs and grassroots mobilizations to CUSO’s work in Southern Africa. Penny Narsoo also spoke of how different Canadian local offices, officially set up for recruitment, in fact functioned as hubs for doing grassroots activism in Canada. But support for international solidarity work was not uniformly held across CUSO, as Smillie’s (above) quote about the ‘coalition of views and personalities’ in CUSO illustrates. Some offices, like the Thailand office and offices in the Latin American region, were known for their passion for international solidarity causes, while others like the South Pacific Region were known for being

853 Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p.106.
854 Ibid., p. 125.
855 Interview John Saxby.
857 CUSO Saul College Committee et al. "Personal Letter."
858 Interview John Saxby; Interview Penny Narsoo.
859 Interview Penny Narsoo.
apolitical, and each region would have a lobby of former co-operant supporters to advocate for it.\textsuperscript{860} Ex-CUSO Executive Director Murray Thompson described the splits between CUSO full time staff in Smillie’s text, speaking of how the head office became a battlefield for power struggles between ‘the pragmatists’ and the ‘socialist roaders.’\textsuperscript{861} So just like in the UCC, activists in CUSO had to do a fair bit of internal lobbying to get solidarity policies in place and frequently found South African solidarity mixed in with larger debates about the core functions of CUSO. During the 1970s the split between activists and those who adopted a less politicized view of development almost paralyzed the group, Smillie describing it as a period of ‘internecine warfare.’\textsuperscript{862}

In 1973 Murray Thompson, who came from the politicized Thailand office, became CUSO Executive Director.\textsuperscript{863} Before he came into power he organized a retreat with the five heads of the overseas regions, where they decided that one of them should try to return back to Ottawa and take control of the policy direction at head office.\textsuperscript{864} Thompson was a staunch international solidarity supporter, and once hired as ED he increased support to DE and attempted to decentralize power to regional offices.\textsuperscript{865} These moves greatly empowered the ability of the radical spaces that existed in the regional offices to influence the entire organization, as Inter-Regional Meetings (IRM) in Ottawa became places for regional staff to give input on policy direction.\textsuperscript{866} There was much disagreement about this experiment in decentralization. Smillie claims that the result of decentralization was that radical staff manipulated volunteers in the regional committees to push their own political agenda and produced lots of political rhetoric but little action.\textsuperscript{867} Smillie quotes Robin Wilson, who became Executive Director in 1976, as noting that the ‘IRM and “democratic decision making” had become the main tools in what looked increasingly like a takeover bid by a group of staff with militant leftist views; a guarantee, he

\textsuperscript{860} Interview Lyse Blanchard; Interview Penny Narsoo.
\textsuperscript{861} Smillie, \textit{The Land of Lost Content}, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{862} Ibid., p. 109.
\textsuperscript{863} Ibid., p. 98.
\textsuperscript{864} Ibid., p. 99.
\textsuperscript{865} Ibid., p. 101.
\textsuperscript{866} Ibid., pp. 101, 104 and 102.
\textsuperscript{867} Ibid., p. 112.
knew, of surefire disaster in the CIDA cheque-writing department. Based on Smillie’s critiques of DE, the ECSA office, and international solidarity work around South Africa, there is little doubt that these militants included CUSO’s anti-apartheid activists like David Beer.

By the late 1970s, these activist staff began to lobby for even more radical decentralization, in the form of making CUSO a worker’s controlled organization. More conservative staff, mindful that CUSO was almost solely dependent on government funding, and that since Thompson’s hiring CIDA had begun to pressure CUSO to lower costs and return to less political work, resisted this trend. In 1979 things reached a breaking point during the ‘basic strategies debate’ over CUSO’s core values and the worker’s control proposal. During this time Executive Director Robin Wilson attempted to regain power from the IRM’s, and in the process alienated both sides of the debate. His maneuvering resulted in him being fired by the board. This led to three board members resigning in protest and a rash of media attention, with negotiations for a new funding contract with CIDA grinding to a halt and the head of CIDA’s NGO Division declaring that CUSO had now been taken over by ‘Rads’ and ‘Trots.’ The result, in the end, was the creation of a new more ‘professional’, less political board and the hiring Ian Smillie as Executive Director, a decisive win for the institutionalists, which led to the resumption of CIDA funding.

All of these debates were highly relevant to CUSO anti-apartheid work, as the activists pushing for decentralized decision-making and more politicized views of development tended to be the same pro-solidarity group that pushed forward anti-apartheid policies. Many times those opposing them were also the individuals opposed to international solidarity work. Ian Smillie himself provides a clear example. He lambasted CUSO’s work with TCCR around divestment, and called their closing of their bank

868 Ibid., p. 113.
869 Ibid., p. 115.
870 Ibid., pp. 103-4 and 115.
871 Ibid., pp.115-11.
872 Ibid., p. 118.
873 Ibid.
874 Ibid., p. 119.
accounts with The Royal Bank of Canada a ‘meaningless gesture.’\footnote{Ibid., p. 136.} He attacked CUSO’s support for the ANC and SACTU as well because it generated bad publicity for CUSO.\footnote{Ibid., p. 233.} Calling CUSO solidarity activists gullible, he accused them of having a blinkered approach in their support to SACTU and the ANC, one that helped detractors to paint the situation in South Africa as a struggle between Christianity and Communism. \footnote{Ibid., p. 234-6.}

An interesting example of those opposed to CUSO taking on a more international solidarity based view of development comes from the CUSO archives. Here one can find a record of complaints that originated from the Saul College CUSO Committee, individuals who were angry at CUSO’s adoption of a modified version of ECSA’s Dar Declaration as the group’s official development charter.\footnote{CUSO Saul College Committee et al. "Personal Letter."} They were so angered that they actually lobbied to the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs to cut funding to CUSO. They call the charter ‘a poorly disguised incentive to revolutionary activity on the party of CUSO volunteers’ and they wished ‘to expose the conversion of CUSO’s objectives from humanitarian to revolutionary’ to the government.\footnote{Ibid."Personal Letter."} The charter itself does not seem overly radical, mentioning that CUSO aims to ‘participate in the global struggle for justice, equitable development, and human progress,’ recognize the West’s participation in oppression, identify the root causes of underdevelopment and actively identify themselves with all peoples who seek to strengthen human rights and forward their country’s social development.\footnote{Ibid."Personal Letter."} While not explicitly speaking to South Africa, clearly the liberation support program CUSO was developing at the time influenced this letter, and also fed the committee’s fear of CUSO’s new revolutionary turn.

It seems then that for some opponents, resistance originated from a perspective that CUSO’s work should be primarily apolitical and humanitarian, and responsive to CIDA. Thus the damage to the institution that could come from taking sides with revolutionary movements, plus the abandonment of an
apolitical stance to development, was seen to compromise the entire organization. As the Saul Committee wrote in a letter before the 1974 AGM, ‘If CUSO should choose to identify itself with a particular ideological bias and commit itself to political involvement as one of its ideals, we should have no choice but to withdraw our support.’ Murray Thompson provides further understanding of these differences:

There is no consensus within the constituency as we begin in 1974. A large segment of CUSO believes that we should continue to do what we have always done - promote high quality manpower to overseas countries - only do it better… Part of this segment too, supports development education as long as it does not jeopardize placements and projects…. Another large segment of CUSO is asking that we make a shift of direction and emphasis in 1974… Not a lurch or a drastic change but a shift towards more public identification with unrepresented of the world; the poor, the oppressed and the powerless.

Thus from the Saul Committee letter and Smillie’s insiders account we get an indication of the types of arguments against solidarity based policies that existed within CUSO and the substance of these critiques. Yet as within the UCC, resistance was not strong enough to prevent key activists from carrying out their solidarity work.

It’s clear then that CUSO and UCC have many commonalities in their struggles in the 1970s and 1980s, but also important differences. One difference relates to the politics of general members in both groups. CUSO’s membership base, made up of thousands of former co-operants and volunteers, was relatively small, while the UCC’s membership, which in 1976 was 940,226 people, was much larger. Furthermore CUSO’s members joined specifically out of a passion for development work, and many were politically aware of concepts of international solidarity and liberation movements, through their time overseas. It actually seems that in the early days many of the members were more radical than staff on

881 Ibid "Personal Letter."
882 Smillie, *The Land of Lost Content*, p. 298.
these issues. Thus the general membership was a resource that was much easier to tap into in CUSO and also a source of radical space. The opposite seems to hold true for the UCC, where staff tended to be drastically more knowledgeable and aware of Southern African issues than members. Thus sustained speaking tours, educational activities and workshops were needed to get members to support anti-apartheid activism.

6.3. The politics of isolation

6.3.1. Coalitions and exclusive radical spaces

As we have seen in the previous sections, in order to create international solidarity policies, activists must spend a good deal of time dealing with internal advocacy and debates. While such struggles are necessary they can be quite time consuming. Further, for groups like the UCC that had a large membership that was not overly familiar with international solidarity, the process of winning over the general membership could be a long and onerous one. This means that there is a great temptation for activists to keep solidarity work centralized in radical spaces located at the Northern professional level, with little control given to the Northern grassroots. This politics of isolation can take the form of shifting the responsibility for solidarity work to radical spaces in inter-agency coalitions or finding ways to restrict decision making power for such activities to spaces inside organization that are only open to activist experts and their close supporters. For both CUSO and UCC, coalitions and other inter-agency groups served as important sources of radical space. CUSO, as we outlined in Chapter 3, provided the impetus for and became a leading member of IAWGSA in the CCIC. The importance of ICCAF and TCCR to Canadian anti-apartheid and the UCC’s involvement in both groups has already been outlined as well. In fact the more one looks at the Canadian anti-apartheid network the more it becomes clear that many of the major international solidarity activities launched came not out of individual groups, but from inter-group partnerships or coalitions.

It would be inaccurate to say that activists seek to work in coalitions solely due to the politics of isolation. Coalitions can have many benefits, for example they allow activists to combine resources to fund larger scale activities than they could do otherwise. Further they can also greatly expand the pool of possible volunteers to recruit for activities. But it’s also true that coalitions are radical spaces in which like minded activists can operate largely outside the reach of solidarity opponents within their own organizations. In churches, such spaces are even more important than for NGOs. For CUSO activists, the benefits of developing radical space outside their organization were strong, but radical spaces also existed and could be nurtured within the internal membership as well. But for churches the dynamic is different. Churches, no matter how ‘liberal’ their theology, tend to value the work of the gathered church and its conventional functions (church building, pastoral care, congregational life) over social justice initiatives, while simultaneously feeling threatened by the way the dispersed, social justice based ministries, critique exiting social relations.885

Thus for churches, the incentive to bypass traditional institutional structures when barriers are thrown up and create new, more independent radical spaces, in coalitions with secular groups, or with activists from other churches, is quite powerful. Church activism within South Africa provides a clear example of this. Allan Boesak, who spoke about the challenge to the church in the 1970s to become involved in anti-apartheid activism noted that:

we had to go and learn to read the Bible differently, to preach differently, to do theology differently, before contextual theology was coined, that is what we were doing. We took this to the structures of the church and if they didn’t answer it you went around them and created your own structures and then went to the SACC with it. So by the 1980s there was a full debate in the church about these issues, but not from main structures of church but these alternative structures, which came around the official ones and created a place where they had to be debated. That was

the strategy: can we create a space where we can debate these fundamental issues, a space where we can be heard and possibly from where action can be launched?\textsuperscript{886}

This mainline church resistance to political activism explains why the leading groups around faith based resistance in South Africa were not denominations, but coalitions of church people, first the Christian Institute, then the Institute for Contextual Theology and the South African Council of Churches.

It is not surprising, then, that the most important faith based work in Canada started with the Ecumenical TCCR, and that by the early 1980s the UCC’s ‘three musketeers’ on Southern Africa (Jim Kirkwood, Tad Mitsui, Murray McGuiness) worked to created ICCAF, which eventually became the main source for Christian anti-apartheid mobilizing. But there are serious dangers for church activists when they turn to ecumenical coalitions. Immediately there is the tricky balancing act these coalitions much carry out around legitimacy. The legitimacy of coalitions comes almost exclusively from referencing back to the general membership they claim to represent, the membership within their individual churches. Thus to maintain legitimacy a successful ecumenical coalition must work to keep their work at the professional level linked with the grassroots level of church members in local congregations. All activists are aware of this need, but achieving it is difficult and requires time and energy. And when the choice is between working to create a widespread, engaged base that actually owns the solidarity work being carried out by coalitions, or launching solidarity activities that are desperately needed right away by ones colleagues in the South, many times the Canadian base suffers.

6.3.2. Keeping radical space exclusive

The politics of isolation is not simply an issue for coalitions. It can also be applied internally, by keeping radical spaces accessible only to a small clique of fellow activists. McDiarmid’s 1979 report describes this disconnection in the UCC in depth, claiming that UCC congregations had contracted out their overseas work to experts in the Church head office, and urges the church to begin a campaign to re-

\textsuperscript{886} Interview Allan Boesak.
engage members with overseas development work and expose them to alternative development discourse.\textsuperscript{887} For the DWO a major way it was historically able to remain separated from the rest of the church was the fact that the Department was able to independently decide on its own budget, being able to chose how it would be spent at its annual meetings, attended by its supporters and overseas partners.\textsuperscript{888} But again, as with the coalitions, activists in the DWO were aware of this separation from general members and did work to include others. For example Kirkwood added Jeanne Moffat to the SAEP team, specifically so they could have some participation on the committee from a non-staff person with experience in congregation level organizing.\textsuperscript{889} And there is a long record of attempts by DWO, specifically over the 1990s, to institute different programs, and even hire staff people, to specifically work on broadening the involvement of UCC members in work overseas.\textsuperscript{890}

Yet today, 30 years after McDairmid’s report, there has not been a substantial change in the UCC. Omega Bula, current head of the Justice Global and Ecumenical Relations (JGER) Unit (successor of the DWO), who was credited by Jim Kirkwood as leading the push to ‘popularize’ the UCC’s work overseas\textsuperscript{891} notes that every congregation and conference in the UCC has a core of active social justice volunteers, but that they are in the minority of total members.\textsuperscript{892} And as Harry Oussoren, former Executive Minister for the Congregational Educational and Community Ministries Unit (2005-2009) points out, the reality today is that for many in the church, JGER’s international solidarity based policies remain alienating.\textsuperscript{893} Thus former UCC Moderator (2006-2009) David Gulliano could state in 2008 that a good deal of resentment existed across the church that ‘staff experts’ were always dictating church policy, including overseas policy, and that there was a growing want for ‘general members’ to retake control.\textsuperscript{894}

\textsuperscript{888} Interview Wendy Gichuru, Toronto.
\textsuperscript{889} Interview Jeanne Moffat; Interview Jim Kirkwood (b).
\textsuperscript{890} Email Correspondence with Patricia Elson (Jan. 19th 2011).
\textsuperscript{891} Interview Jim Kirkwood (d).
\textsuperscript{892} Interview Omega Bula.
\textsuperscript{893} Interview Harry Oussoren, Toronto.
\textsuperscript{894} Interview David Gulliano.
Even CUSO, with its strong membership base, had similar problems of exclusive radical spaces. Especially since much of its solidarity work took place overseas and thus relied on the radical spaces created in overseas offices. As John Saxby noted, speaking about CUSO and Canadian NGO’s in general:

there are deep, deep problems of accountability, as a lot of the time organizations themselves give a lot of space to individuals and their program positions. But these people work like British commissioners in the colonial service, they are generalists and they do whatever the hell they want…. though CUSO had an institutional commitment to the ANC and to the various United Nation declarations, which acknowledged the ANC as the principal movement, the commitment was as much personal as it was institutional.895

Smillie also complained of this exclusive and personalized nature of CUSO solidarity work, noting that within CUSO the few staff activists who specialized on liberation support would have their recommendations unquestionably followed by the rest of the staff.896 It also appears that as time went on in CUSO, activists began to throw up barriers to cement the independence of their different sections of radical space. Lyse Blanchard explained that when she became Executive Director in 1994, even politically aligned regional offices like ECSA and the Latin American office were very disconnected from each other, each operating as autonomous zones within one organization.897

As I have argued, international solidarity work is made possible only through key activists. Many times these solidarity activists tend to form small tight-knit communities. As Penny Narsoo noted, the whole CUSO solidarity activist community in Southern Africa was a big extended family, and post-1994 the family moved to South Africa.898 But the danger is that if all the expertise, connections and knowledge around international solidarity work are concentrated in a few hands, in radical spaces that

895 Interview John Saxby.
896 Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p. 244.
897 Interview Lyse Blanchad.
898 Interview Penny Narsoo.
increasingly operate independently, these spaces and activities become disconnected from the support base needed to defend them when organizations go into periods of contraction.

But was the adoption of the politics of isolation forced by circumstance on activists or was it consciously adopted? I believe the answer is that while activists saw the value of expanding solidarity support across the grassroots level; they never had the inclination or resources to truly focus on this. The reality is that the radical spaces in CUSO and specifically the UCC were always exclusive in orientation. In fact the dominant model for CSOs doing international work in Canada actively supports this separation. It’s a model that is based on the hiring of ‘staff experts’ to do work on behalf of a larger group. People like Jim Kirkwood were hired specifically to be the ‘Africa experts,’ and their job position was designed for them to focus their time on working with partners in Africa, not building grassroots movements. In fact Kirkwood noted his boss, Garth Legge, would always push him to spend less time on education in Canada and more time working with partners. Thus it’s not surprising that Kirkwood notes he was at first a little resentful of the grassroots anti-apartheid coming out of Manitou conference, as the entire structure of UCC overseas work put the responsibility and primacy for international activities with him and his supporting committees.

Secondly, to actually gain the resources to build grassroots support would require a reorientation of how CSOs operate, with solidarity movement building becoming an institutionalized function. On their own small groups of activists, operating from within radical spaces, have little hope of building large scale movements. CUSO activists understood this in the 1970s, which explains why they fought to develop political education programs and make CUSO become a worker’s controlled organization. They realized that to build a real grassroots movement to support international solidarity work would mean that the entire organization would have to reorient itself. Over the 1990s the UCC also tried to increase participation of its grassroots members in work with partners, but the task was given to a small group of JGER staff, who had to attempt such mobilization while still managing overseas partnerships, all with

899 Interview Jim Kirkwood (d).
diminishing resources. In such situations there is a powerful incentive for activists to simply hunker down in their internal radical spaces, or in their interagency coalitions, and fight for their causes.

6.4. The shrinking of radical space

Now that we have explored radical space and looked at some of the issues that made radical spaces in CUSO and UCC vulnerable, we will now outline how, starting in the late 1980s, radical space was slowly squeezed out of CUSO and the UCC. Both exhibit a similar pattern: fiscal crises and corresponding budget cutbacks leading to a reduction in radical space. Both organizations also became less willing to take political stands on international issues, with institutionalists concerns becoming much more powerful than during days of good financial health in the 1970s-1980s. While in the past the two groups had more than enough money to spare on activist work, such work was seen as a liability, or at least a cost that needed to be reduced, during the 1990s period of fiscal austerity. Since international solidarity work had failed to become institutionalized across either organization, as these spaces began to disappear, so too did the organizations’ involvement in international solidarity.

6.4.1. CUSO post-1994: ‘When the financial tsunami hit- we didn’t have a clue’

For CUSO, the financial crises of the 1990s and changing funding regime were the major factors that drove the loss of radical space, much more than any use by activists of the politics of isolation. This stems from the fact that the vast majority of CUSOs operating expenses up to the 1990s had been covered by CIDA. Throughout its history CUSO had always had a tumultuous relationship with CIDA, with the government agency becoming a ‘favorite whipping boy’ for staff upset with Canadian aid policy. Yet CUSO depended on CIDA and did carry out its work in a manner that reflected this relationship to the government, spending a large amount of money in Canada and on recruitment of Canadians, and always

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900 Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p. 104.
keeping controversial work like DE on a ‘short leash.’

But it is also undeniable that CUSO constantly pushed the limits of this relationship.

Academic and activist John Saul reflected with amazement how CUSO, in the midst of the Cold War, could fund him with CIDA money in 1981-82 to go to Mozambique as a co-operant to teach in the faculty of Marxism and Leninism at the official FRELIMO party school in Maputo. Of course part of this is reflective of the funding regime that existed in the 1970 and 1980s. But part also comes from the work of CUSO staff, as Smilie notes, ‘CUSO guarded its independence from CIDA fiercely, despite being financially dependent on it; though frequent arguments often arose when CUSO resisted pressure to change polices of which CIDA disapproved.’ When I asked David Beer how CUSO could get away with the radical polices and positions it took around South Africa he replied, ‘It was a hell of a lot of hard work… there was a lot of work on strategy, about articulation of what we were doing in the language of development and the language that CIDA could understand. But there were also sympathetic people working in CIDA: ex-CUSOs.’ Further it must be remembered that in the late 1970s, when it was thought that radical activists were about to take over CUSO, CIDA funding was in jeopardy of being revoked.

There is also the case of SUCO, CUSO’s much more radical French cousin, which was continually causing controversy with its stances on Israel/Palestine, Quebec Separatism and its more hard-line Marxist approach to development. In 1980 CUSO and SUCO officially separated and then in 1984 CIDA announced it would cut all funding to SUCO, the first time CIDA had made such a move in its 15 years of working with NGOS. To Pierre Beaudet, who served as staff at SUCO and was a founder of the anti-apartheid organization CIDMAA, this decimating of SUCO was prophetic; a sign of things to come for all Canadian NGOs whose politics questioned the status quo.

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901 Ibid., p. 353.
902 Interview John Saul (b).
904 Interview David Beer (c).
905 Ibid., *The Land of Lost Content*, p. 357.
908 Interview Pierre Beaudet, Ottawa.
As Chapter 5 illustrated, by the early 1990s Canadian policy on aid was changing, and ODA was being cut savagely, especially to Africa. For CUSO the results of these shifts would be devastating. Morrison, in his history of CIDA aid, notes that CUSO was especially hard hit by the CIDA funding cuts that took place over 1991-2. But interviewees suggest it was with the cuts of 1995, where a program review led to a massive reduction in CIDA funding and Melanie McDonald was hired as Executive Director (ironically coming from working as Chief Financial Officer of the UCC), that institutionalist concerns came to dominate CUSO thinking and the organization went through a prolonged period of downsizing that gutted its radical space. There are several factors that contributed to this outcome.

One is the fact that in the late 1980s and up into the 1990s, the actual purpose of CUSO as an organization, and specifically the role of co-operants was unclear and being internally debated. John Saxby notes that in 1987 senior staff at CUSO tried to present the group to CIDA as a ‘multi-purpose development organization, where we would do projects and send co-operants, and try to do integrated forms of support to different organizations. We outlined a proposal for CIDA that would be for a four year grant and the co-operant program would be seen as a means not an end, and we would do education in Canada and various kinds of assistance to people in the South and be evaluated by objectives just like a bi-lateral project.’ But CIDA did not accept this plan and so debates on the future direction of CUSO continued to rage. Lyse Blanchard, CUSO Executive Director 1990 to 1994, and previously a staff person at CIDA’s NGO division explained the situation CUSO faced during the 1990s:

Canada was quite unique in the way that the government was funding non-governmental organizations, to the extent they were very comfortable and doing the work they wanted to do with some impunity. I was directing money to women’s groups when I was in CIDA and because

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910 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, p. 326.
911 Interview John Saxby; Interview Nigel Crawhall, Cape Town; Interview David Beer(b).
912 Interview Nigel Crawhall; Interview John Saxby.
913 Interview John Saxby.
I was a feminist, I supported feminist groups, so that they could do their work with great impunity. But then government started changing criteria for funding and this was very insidious for NGOs as in order to access government funding they had to change the way they wrote about themselves and presented themselves. They hoped this wouldn’t change them, but as you start saying things you don’t want to do this begins to reflect what actually happens.914

When Blanchard took on the Executive Director’s job in 1990, she found an organization in disarray, with major disputes between the union and management, a deficit that would lead to organizational collapse within a few years and crippling disputes between different camps of staff on the role of CUSO, working from disconnected departments and regional offices. As Saxby reflected, ‘I think it’s [CUSO’s] decentralized role had really strengthened our relationship to people in the South, but it meant we never had a strong centre with values in place, it was always more power to regions and less to the centre. So we weren’t really clear about what organization we wanted to be and when the financial tsunami hit- we didn’t have a clue.’915 Blanchard, herself a committed proponent of international solidarity, realized that without drastic, preemptive cuts, CUSO’s legacy of solidarity work, and the entire organization was in jeopardy. Thus she immediately brought in outside consultants from the United Way to take the group through an ‘on-site analysis,’ which would present the fiscal realities to the group and lead to discussions on organizational objectives.

What I was trying to do was reduce costs so CUSO could continue in the direction they had undertaken and that was the only way they could. And my logic was that if we can’t get funding for the kind of work we want to do, we need to get out of that business, as the last thing the world needs is another volunteer sending organization. So let’s became more efficient so we can do the

914 Interview Lyse Blanchard.
915 Interview John Saxby.
work we want to do, because if we take forward this top heavy organization we will be at the mercy of this funder and let’s try to get funding from other source.916

She also noted that, ‘when I got in there, there were 475 employees. By the time I left they were reduced by two thirds.’ Blanchard argued that during her time CUSO continued to try to convince CIDA that their work was more than just that of sending volunteers overseas, but these arguments fell on deaf ears. Thus the increased demands from CIDA for clear objectives and to meet specific criteria for funding (all part of the new funding regime of the 1990s), meant a reframing of CUSO’s work in limited, technocratic terms.

For CUSO when the criteria became directly related to the number of co-operants you send overseas, that now means the focus is on recruiting Canadians to go overseas, which is totally against where CUSO was at that time. So it seemed like it was going back to the 1960s. And that completely messes up the organization, as then the focus has to be on that. So now that becomes what we are trying to do and that’s how the resources are being used and it completely took away what we were evolving to.917

When Blanchard left in 1994, internal debates on what exactly was the core focus of CUSO’s work were unsettled, the battle to reduce costs still ongoing. Nigel Crawhall, a co-operant working in South Africa, was posted to the CUSO board in 1993. He describes it as being a time of major confrontations between board members, as round after round of cutbacks were being debated.918 One cut in 1993, that directly affected the solidarity work in South Africa, were the cuts to the ECSA office. David Beer, who was the regional director at the time, gathered his staff and through a democratic process, with participation from regional partners, created a plan for staff cut backs that would keep all the offices open.919 This was rejected by CUSO Ottawa. Instead all offices in the region were closed

916 Interview Lyse Blanchard.
917 Interview Lyse Blanchard.
918 Interview Nigel Crawhall.
919 Interview David Beer (b).
except in Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa, while the regional headquarters was moved to Johannesburg. To Beer it was ‘a betrayal’ of the principles of international solidarity, which had led to the development over the years of processes of decentralized decision making, done in tandem with Southern partners. Feeling the heart of ECSA, once one of CUSO’s leading radical spaces, had been cut out, Beer resigned in protest after over 30 years with the organization.

Subsequently, in 1994 Melanie McDonald was brought in as new executive director, Crawhall noting that she was ‘seriously out of step’ with the international solidarity based thinking in CUSO. He thought her hiring was part of a process of hiring managers whose jobs would primarily be to oversee cutbacks. As Blanchard recounted in frustration, ‘I don’t know who followed me, but I heard they hired “professionals.” I had a degree and stuff, but what, because I had beliefs, I was considered a hippy?’ Nigel notes his perception was that from this point onwards, ‘The administration drew back to what it felt was the convergence in what CIDA wanted and the administration wanted, which was to move the group to focus almost exclusively on the recruitment of volunteers and turn its back on its solidarity heritage.’

During the period Crawhall noted he tried to lobby with Southern board members, and on behalf of cooperants, for CUSO’s focus to remain on getting well trained volunteers, doing longer contracts and working to strengthen civil society through an international solidarity perspective on development. Unfortunately this perspective did not prevail.

Interestingly though, Crawhall cautioned against portraying the cuts in CUSO and the loss of radical spaces as a crude case of ‘Technocratic Professionals’ beating out ‘Politicized Activists.’ In his mind CUSO was an organization that was generally poorly managed, regardless of politics of its managers. Thus its internal disorganization and conflicts around its mission had left it ripe for the devastation of CUSO’s massive budget cuts. Going further, Crawhall argued that the suggestion that the new management brought in to oversee the cutbacks were somehow more ‘professional’ and somehow ‘more competent,’ than previous managers was totally false. In his mind there was actually a deskilling

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920 Interview Nigel Crawhall.
that took place in the Ottawa office because new management, hired from ‘professional NGO backgrounds’ were actually much less proficient in development work than his fellow co-operants on the ground in South Africa, who had years (or decades) of experience working first hand in Southern NGOs, in highly technical positions. Thus at a time when ‘partnerships’ with groups in the South and strategies to increase ‘participation’ of those receiving aid, in aid projects, were becoming watchwords in mainstream development thinking,921 groups like CUSO where actually reducing such capacity, after decades of developing these structures.

With CIDA funding threatened, CUSO in the mid-1990s was more than ever at the mercy of its government benefactor. In the rush to provide quantifiable results to justify continued funding, CUSO began to substitute the measuring of outputs (volunteers sent overseas) as a measurement for actually achieving development outcomes.922 In such a situation the process of ‘anti-politics’ James Ferguson famously outlined in the Anti-Politics Machine (1990) began to take place. CUSO’s work overseas became increasingly subverted to meeting limited technical goals set by government bureaucrats and lost any room for political analysis to inform policy. Another result of the 1990s cutbacks was the closing of many regional offices within Canada and pressure for the remaining offices to focus their time on recruitment. The same thing in many ways happened with overseas offices; facing reductions in staff and an new overriding focus on successful volunteer placement, there was little time or resources for these offices to be hubs for international solidarity activities as in the past. As Penny Narsoo observed from the South Africa office, ‘to honor their financial obligations to CIDA, CUSO instituted a stream of paperwork, they restructured the Ottawa office and the regional offices lost their solidarity functions… the Canadian regional officers were amazing people who would do a lot of activism paid for by the Canadian government… that’s great if you get paid to do that- but you don’t actually in the real world.’923

Another CUSO staff person noted that, ‘absolutely the closing of regional offices had an impact… all the

922 Interview Nigel Crawhall.
923 Interview Penny Narsoo.
components that had been able to make a national kind of movement were taken away."924 Going into the later years of the 1990s, Narsoo described a situation where she was increasingly burdened in the South African office by mounds of paper work, an inefficient bureaucracy back in Ottawa and volunteers who increasingly needed mentorship and micromanagement. So like the Canadian regional offices, the South Africa office was now starved of the resources and freedom that had allowed ECSA offices in the past to become radical spaces for the launching of international solidarity activities.

Another component to the loss of radical space in CUSO was how staffing and volunteer recruitment changed. Nigel Crawhall believes CIDA’s push for CUSO to reduce costs led to recruiting less experienced Canadian students, which in of itself violated the principles of international solidarity, as what Southern board members wanted were highly experienced, politically aware co-operants.925 This perception was disputed by other interviewees, but at least in South Africa there seems to be some evidence of this. When Joan Anne Nolan ran the South African office from 1992 to 1996 she purposefully recruited Canadians with a liberation struggle experience that were already in the country, in part to insure co-operants had a solidarity based understanding of development.926 Penny Narsoo attested that this practice was extremely disliked by the Ottawa head office, who felt threatened by overseas offices doing their own recruitment, as it encroached on their own territory, and thus she was given more and more inexperienced young volunteers straight from Canada.927 At the same time she noticed that faces in Ottawa were changing, claiming they ‘started adding more staff and executive directors that were less activists and more technocrats.’

One longtime CUSO staff person described the situation:

By the end of the 1990s the profile of volunteers we were receiving was a different kind of volunteer. The political astuteness wasn’t that strong. And when I came back I began to see that CUSO had changed from those times, being much more cautious and it seemed to be a new

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924 Interview Anonymous (b).
925 Interview Nigel Crawhall.
926 Interview Penny Narsoo.
927 Interview Penny Narsoo.
generation in charge there too…. I was part of a few selection committees for a few positions
over the years. And it caught my attention that when there would be a hiring in the 1960-80s the
people who were going to be hired needed to have a high level of knowledge, commitment and
understanding of issues of development and poverty, oppression and the idea of
underdevelopment. But by the time of the 1990s that component was probably 10-20% of the
rating that was given for a good candidate for filling in positions; so that shows totally different
mentalities.928

This same staff person linked this changing culture not just to generational shift, but also to the
increased push from CIDA for programs and perspectives around development that were in line with
government thinking. This transition in CUSO can be contextualized within the larger shifts in what
constituted ‘best practices’ for development work that took place during the 1990s, outlined in Chapter 5.
The result of all of these shifts outlined is that by the time CUSO merged with VSO in 2006, the radical
spaces both in South Africa and at home in Canada that had once allowed activists like David Beer, Doug
Miller and Joan Anne Nolan to work full time on solidarity projects and organize national support, were
already distant memories.

6.4.2. The cutting away of radical spaces in the UCC

‘The United Church has a strong history rooted in the Social Gospel movement. However, because of the
neo-conservative times, in which we live in, instead of strongly standing beside social justice ministries,
the institutional church is more preoccupied with the “preservation of the traditional congregational
models.”’ Dr. Barry Rieder, Jane and Finch Community Ministry 929

For the UCC the attack on radical space has been a slow, ongoing process. The cause of the
UCC’s financial decline was not the loss of a single outside donor, but the loss of many individual
donors, as membership in the church has continually fallen over the last thirty years. Within the church

928 Interview Anonymous (b).
today institutionalists and activists, faced with the prospect of organizational death within a generation, struggle to decide what programs are priorities to support. One outcome of these struggles has been the loss of resources and independence by JGER, the remaining radical space related to international solidarity work in the UCC, as the church’s focus shifts to trying to support struggling congregations. Further, due to the omnipresent fear of collapse, the institutionalists position that politics should not compromise organizational health, has gained traction over the 1990s, with church observers noting that church leaders and staff no longer take daring, radical stances on political issues.930 Thus as church activists tried over the 1990s to popularize involvement in overseas partnerships and forward ideas of international solidarity in their work around economic justice and the Empire campaign, they did so in the context of shrinking funds, a grassroots disconnected by the politics of isolation and a church leadership not eager to take on politically controversial causes.

It is undeniable that the UCC has suffered a longstanding decline. In 2006 the UCC had 558,129 members, less than the 609,729 individuals that were part of the church 80 years earlier in 1926931 when the Canadian population was only 9,451,000 million, compared to 32,623,490 in 2006. From a high point of 940,226 members in 1976, to 872,290 a decade later and then 713,195 by 1996 its clear the church has been contracting for a generation.932 Looking at how this directly affects solidarity work one can consider how the DWO budget has declined over the last 50 years. In 1967 the DWO budget was 2,911,158 dollars, approximately 17,993,259 dollars in 2007 prices.933 The actual budget for JGER (the successor of the old DWO) in 2007 was 7,812,446 dollars, which translates to a 56% decline in support for overseas work.934

930 Interview Jeanne Moffat.
932 Ibid.
934 The United Church of Canada (a), General Council 2008 Operating Budget & 2008 to 2010 Financial Projections (Toronto: The United Church of Canada, General Secretary’s Office, 2007), 7.
Clearly having less money and fewer members has hindered the ability of the UCC to take part in solidarity programs. But in 2010 the radical space for international solidarity work, mainly in the form of the JGER unit still remained. In that year JGER had 6 partners in South Africa, providing 100,000 dollars between all of them.935 Supported groups like the SPP and the AIDC, who I encountered during fieldwork in Cape Town, were widely seen as being a part of the network of radical, anti-capitalist, activist NGOs in the city. Further, ecumenical partners like the SACC and ICT continue to advance a more social justice based theology in light of the growth of conservative evangelical churches in country.936

But over the 1990s JGER’s budget for partner grants has decreased through ongoing cutbacks. In 2006, due to continual budget shortfalls, the national church office decided to cut its own budget from 40.2 million dollars in 2006 to 36.9 million dollars by 2010.937 The result was 27 staff being laid off and

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935 The United Church of Canada "List of JGER Partners in Africa and Budgets," Provided as excel file by Diane Mitchell, Program Assistant, Africa, Middle East Partnerships JGER Unit (2010).
936 Interview Nancy Heron, Johannesburg.
937 Mike Milne (a), "Changing priorities lead to big job cuts: Increased emphasis on congregations comes at the expense of justice work, critics say," The United Church Observer, September 2007.
major cuts to grants. 900,000 dollars was cut from the grants given by JGER to overseas partners.\textsuperscript{938} JGER also laid off 6 staff, including its entire social justice staff working in Canada. I was working in the national office during the 2006 cuts and was able to speak widely with staff, while also travelling across the church where I discussed the issue with local members. Many staff and members were outraged by the cuts to grants and the fact that that same year, in a clear example of the growing power of institutionalists in the UCC, a multi-million dollar church membership drive called Emerging Spirit was launched.\textsuperscript{939} A lobby group was formed in 2006 to try to overturn the JGER cuts, called United for Justice.\textsuperscript{940} Though it was able to get some coverage in the church media, the group was not successful, with Omega Bula noting that the whole group was the actually the same ‘DWO clique of the past,’ not a grassroots grouping of church members.\textsuperscript{941}

The larger issue at hand is not simply that budget cuts affected radical space in the UCC. Just as important is the fact that the culture in the church today is much less sympathetic to activists’ calls to support solidarity work than during the anti-apartheid movement. In 1989 Gary Kenny, writing from his position as executive director of ICCAF, sensed the signs of the times noting, ‘Fiscal deficits and budget cuts seem the order of the day. Concerns for justice are now rivaled by the challenges of austerity. Institutional survival, it seems, is quickly becoming the new ecclesiastical “bottom line”.’\textsuperscript{942} Maylanne Whittall noted that the result was that ‘Gains that were made in the ’80's in shifting the churches’ ministry among the poor and marginal people “from charity to justice” are giving way in the ’90's to economic pressures for congregational and institutional survival.’\textsuperscript{943}

Over 2006-2007, many church insiders I spoke to alluded to a conservative backlash in the UCC that was stifling social justice activism. They spoke in hushed, closed door conversations about two

\textsuperscript{938} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{939} Milne (a), "Changing priorities lead to big job cuts."
\textsuperscript{940} Mike Milne (b), "Identity Crisis: Cutbacks to United Church justice programs spark protest," The United Church Observer November 2007.
\textsuperscript{941} Interview Omega Bula.
\textsuperscript{943} Rieder, "Energy from the Edges," p. 10.
members of the church’s senior leadership team, its highest administrative body, who they saw as working specifically to undermine justice work. But such issues never made it out from behind closed doors and into general discussion in the organization. When the 2006 cuts were announced, the morale of all staff, but especially of those passionate about church activism, reached new lows. Activist staff I spoke to fatalistically mused that perhaps it was best for the entire UCC to collapse, as they had faith the gospel would not end and would find new places to inspire social justice work. One staff person even resigned due to conflicts with management over the cuts, confiding that they now realized the better place to fight to protect the international solidarity work of the church was through joining elected committees that shape church policy.

And this reality, the increased importance of the membership in determining church policy overseas, was clearly demonstrated by the cuts. When senior church leaders justified the cuts they adamantly asserted that the cuts were supported by the elected General Council Executive and in line with the priorities the church as a whole had identified at its last General Council, a gathering of over 600 voting members of the church.944 Further church leaders throughout 2006-2007 continually argued that the national office had to work to put its focus on rejuvenating its shrinking congregations. Even the new plan for JGER was to replace some of the fired Canadian outreach staff with two individuals focused on empowering the work of congregations.

While this increased focus on members might seem on the surface to aid the cause of movement building, the historical use of the politics of isolation means in the short term this doesn’t seem to be the case. Since international solidarity work was mainly the purvey of a small internal network, most congregations initial response to becoming involved in overseas work was to use charity based models. As Kirkwood noted, today United Church congregations are much more active in partnerships than the past, but the predominance of charity based approaches within congregations actually means solidarity

944 Interview David Gulliano; Interview Nora Sanders.
work has suffered from this. 945 Thus over the 1990s the long term consequences of the politics of isolation have became manifest, as members moved to take back control from 'staff experts’ 946 and in the process stifled radical space and international solidarity work.

One example of this retaking of control and the negative effect on solidarity work is how JGER controls its budget. As noted previously, the DWO’s old system gave the Department full control over how to allocate its prescribed budget. A system for including partners in budgeting decisions was then developed by the DWO in line with the *El Escorial Agreement on Ecumenical Sharing*. This document, created at a 1987 meeting of the WCC in Spain, attempted to create a new paradigm for church based partnerships, one that rejected the old donor mentality about sharing resources and created an alternative that would see mission work as a partnership between equals. 947 This document was adopted as a main pillar of the UCC’s theology on global partnerships. 948

But in 2000 things changed with the adoption of a Unit system at UCC head office, which gave the UCC a unified budget with all items discussed by the General Council Executive. To Wendy Gichuru, Program Coordinator for East & Central Africa, the way the 2006 JGER cuts were carried out, without meaningful partner consultation, violated the principles of the El Escorial Agreement. 949 Yet the two most senior leaders of the UCC, the Moderator and General Secretary, argued that since two partners were present when the cuts had been discussed, sufficient consultation had occurred. 950 But it’s hard to think two partners really constitutes true consultation in the sense of the El Escorial document, as it was only until after the cuts had been decided that JGER was able meet with a wide swath of partners to discuss the cuts in a meaningful way. 951 In light of this it’s easy to see why Gichuru named the cuts as a betrayal of these principles, and spoke of how the new budgeting system was impeding the ability of the

945 Interview Jim Kirkwood (d).
946 Interview David Gulliano.
948 The United Church of Canada, "History of the Division of World Outreach."
949 Interview Wendy Gichuru.
950 Interview Nora Sanders; Interview David Gulliano.
951 Interview Wendy Gichuru.
church to follow its stated values. But to Omega Bula the 2006 cuts primarily demonstrated how the old DWO model had failed to engage with the wider church, with church members not understanding or fully supporting JGER’s solidarity based perspective on global partnerships.\textsuperscript{952} There is much to be said for this point, as even though the \textit{El Escorial Agreement on Ecumenical Sharing} is official church policy, the amount of church members outside of JGER (even in senior leadership) who had ever read or heard of the document, seemed, in my experience, to be extremely low. Thus over the 1990s-2000s JGER has found financial cuts and reductions of its independence slowly eroding capacity to launch solidarity work.

Despite this, there are still some solidarity influenced policies that remain in JGER, even if the policies around collaborative budgeting have been reduced. One is the UCC policy of block grants: transferring monies without conditions, to partners in the South with an implicit understanding that partners know best how to spend the money.\textsuperscript{953} Sometimes these grants will be tied to a specific programmatic area, but it will be an area identified by the partner as needing support. The second policy is the implicit understanding that the UCC seeks to remain a long term partner with the groups it supports in the South.\textsuperscript{954} South African groups such as the SPP, SACC, ICT have been getting consistent UCC funding and support since the 1980s, a rare example of solidarity continuing long after the apartheid struggle ended. Support to the Institute for the Healing of Memories, led by Father Michael Lapsely, a major contact during anti-apartheid work, is another example of this long term commitment. Though seemingly minor policies, they do make a difference. In both Zambia and South Africa UCC partners all noted that the block grants, with no strings attached, along with the longstanding commitment to support in good and bad times, made the UCC unique amongst their Western partners.\textsuperscript{955} Together they represent an approach to development work that is qualitatively different than that of other organizations, and traceable to a distinct solidarity informed perspective on international co-operation. As Chapter 5 noted the dominant trend in CSO work in Canada today is project funding and to maintain their block funding

\textsuperscript{952} Interview Omega Bula.
\textsuperscript{953} Interview Omega Bula.
\textsuperscript{954} Interview Gary Kenny (b), Toronto, April 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2009.
\textsuperscript{955} Interview Emily Sikazwe, Lusaka; Interview Herchelle Milford, Cape Town; Interview Ricado Jacobs; Interview Nancy Heron.
and long term partnerships the UCC has had to resist pressures from CIDA, and other NGO colleagues to create more ‘professional’ funding relationships. But it may be that internal pressures prove to be even more of a threat.

In light of these cutbacks and reductions in independence, it seems that the lack of explicit solidarity activities from the UCC around South Africa, post-1994, is as much about a lack of capacity than anything else. Harry Oussoren, for example, spoke about the affect cuts to research staff has had on political advocacy, noting the church let go its entire research staff over the 1990s, making it extremely difficult today to create the thoroughly researched material needed in advocacy campaigns. When I shadowed Africa desk staff person Gary Kenny for part of his time in Cape Town March 2010, I went with him to a meeting of the Food Strategy Group of the Ecumenical Advocacy Alliance, from March 8-12. He brought along Ricado Jacobs, Research, Information and Advocacy Manager for the Cape Town based SPP, to give feedback as this network developed its forthcoming food advocacy campaign, ‘Food for Life.’ It was the only clear example I saw of the UCC being involved in some sort of solidarity work involving South Africa during my time 7 months in the country.

From Kenny and Jacobs comments on the conference and from the data gleaned from a focus group I conducted with Kenny, a group of SPP staff, and activists from a South African community based organization supported by SPP, it was clear there were political alignments between all parties around the issue of food security. SPP is committed to building a national social movement in South Africa around the concept of Food Sovereignty. Kenny himself noted his sympathy to this radical perspective on how global food systems would be structured. But even if Kenny wanted to organize UCC members involved in similar activism, for example around organic farming or ethical agriculture, to support this South African campaign, it’s not clear that he or anyone else at JGER had the time or resources to do so. JGER’s shrinking staff team is quite stretched in just maintaining its existing funding partnerships and

956 Interview Wendy Gichuru.
957 Interview Harry Oussoren.
958 Interview Gary Kenny (b); Interview Ricado Jacobs; SPP Focus Group, Cape Town.
959 Surplus Peoples Project, Agrarian Reform for Food Sovereignty Booklet 2009 (Cape Town: 2009 ), pg. 1.
now must put time into building links to congregations. Thus this radical space in the UCC is increasingly caught between a rock and hard place, unable to return to the older more exclusive model that allowed staff the freedom to forward the solidarity causes they were passionate about, while at the same time being caught in a climate of fiscal restraint that makes it difficult to build the kind of grassroots support for solidarity work that is needed. Still the unit continues to accomplish what it can, focusing on its new Empire campaign, hoping to be able to use educational resources and workshops to gain widespread support in the church for a more radical perspective on global trade and politics and create a more decentralized model for solidarity work.960 But even this is a challenge, with the head of the JGER unit noting that staff are constantly asked to ‘tone down’ the writing in documents used for the Empire Report or related materials as the language is seen by some church leaders as being too confrontational.961

These points highlight the fact that as much as the UCC needs to reengage its base with solidarity policies there is also an issue of leadership that hampers solidarity work today. As Jeanne Moffat, who served as KAIROS Canada’s executive director after working on anti-apartheid issues, lamented:

It was a different age, the churches at the national level in the 1970s and 1980s had prophetic leadership that we haven’t seen since. The Anglicans had it, the Catholics had it and the United Church had it. Those three churches had leaders who were willing to act on what they believed was their mandate and they moved out and people followed them. And that came crashing down around the late 1980s and early 1990s.962

Naming the cause as the divisive battles in the church over homosexuality in the 1980s and the related loss of some church members, Moffat characterizes church leaders today as being afraid to take a stand and possibly lose even more congregants. As she noted:

960 Interview Omega Bula; Interview Bruce Gregersen; Interview David Gulliano.
961 Interview Omega Bula.
962 Interview Jeanne Moffat.
the church membership started diminishing and then it actually started to affect the budgets of the United Church, and once the budgets started getting affected then the more conservative voices started to hold more sway and the churches started to panic about this loss of membership. And then what happened to the prophetic voice? It got coached in careful terminology and had to go through all these different consensus decisions till you boil it down to the lowest common denominator. So then you have leadership who are afraid to set out and make faith statements and say ‘were going here.’

With KAIROS (still a recipient of UCC funding) recently losing all of its CIDA funding due to its solidarity with the Palestinian people, and the churches who support it unwilling or unable to mount a sustained advocacy campaign to get the funding returned, it clearly is a different age for churches, one where concerns for survival increasingly trump calls for solidarity and justice.

6.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, we see that while they are different in their histories, both CUSO and the UCC share many commonalities, which tentatively can be generalized across Canadian civil society. During the anti-apartheid movement civil society and political activism was at a high point in Canada. Groups had full coffers and many idealistic young activists from Canada’s baby-boom generation. And there was a government who, in retrospect, was quite tolerant of funding activities which questioned the status quo. In such a situation activists had a lot of room to experiment, nurture and take risks with international solidarity policies.

But as the political climate changed and the economic base for these organizations was called into question, international solidarity work, which was politically controversial and dependant on isolated radical spaces, became greatly reduced. Judith Marshall’s earlier comments on the politics of the ladder help to articulate this contemporary reality; as long as international solidarity work doesn’t compromise the institutional realities of an organization (the politics of the ladder) it will be tolerated. But in times of
financial stress, when such work becomes perceived as a liability to organizational health, it gets crushed. It’s easy for a group like the UCC to claim support for a policy such as the El Escorial document in principle, but when such ideas actually run up against the realities of fiscal austerity, they will simply be thrown aside. Unless, of course, there is an organized segment of a CSO’s membership willing to advocate for such policies. But in the UCC this simply didn’t exist in 2006. And such support matters, as even during the 1990s when CIDA was tasked to massively cut NGOs, one factor that would temper the reductions was the extent to which NGOs actually had a constituency of supporters. But today solidarity supporters seem few and far between.

This then is the fundamental failing of not just the anti-apartheid network, but of all Canadian solidarity networks. The models they utilized for launching international solidarity were not sustainable. Though they were able to mobilize thousands around South African issues, they weren’t able to create deep seated, grassroots networks whose activities could be transferred to new causes. This is not to imply activist actions are the main cause of this loss of solidarity, as larger societal factors clearly drove these processes. Further solidarity activists themselves knew the importance of creating grassroots movements. Whether it was Judith Marshall bringing Canadian Steelworkers to visit NUMSA members who share a common employer, or Jim Kirkwood holding workshops across Canada, activists did work to build grassroots support for international solidarity action within Canada. Even today the UCC has a JGER staff person, Pat Elson, employed to work full time on JGERs attempt to increase congregational involvement in Global Partnerships.

But the reality is that these attempts have not succeeded in creating sustainable networks to support solidarity work. In 1985 Ian Smillie critiqued the development education work of Canadian NGOs, saying it had been totally ineffectual in engaging the Canadian public. Clearly he was wrong about this in regards to South Africa; there the anti-apartheid network was able to change public opinion.

963 Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide, p. 371.
965 Email Correspondence Patricia Elson.
966 Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p. 137.
But it is true that the broader values of international solidarity did not spread widely. And as solidarity activism became increasingly professionalized, carried out by staff experts, working within independent civil society organizations, it increasingly became fragile and isolated.

Thus while activists in CUSO and the UCC won the battle with institutionalists on the implementation of international solidarity policies around apartheid, in the long run they may have lost the war of converting their organizations into groups that adopted solidarity as a key value. Accordingly when CIDA cutbacks and demands for more accountability struck CUSO, the solidarity heritage was jettisoned in an attempt to streamline and professionalize. When the financial decline of the UCC became a reality in the 1990s, McDiarmid’s 1979 concerns about UCC outreach became prophetic; as a membership with a generally low global consciousness, along with institutionalist supporters, began to slowly and surely strip the staff experts of their financial base and their policy independence. The anti-apartheid campaign may indeed have been the perfect issue for creating an international solidarity movement in Canada, but the reality seems to be that even if apartheid was to return tomorrow, Canadian civil society, or at least CUSO and the UCC, would not have the strong radical spaces needed to replicate the movement of the past.
Apartheid as the Perfect Issue: Why Movement Building Became Harder After 1994

7.1. Chapter overview

The end of apartheid led to the end of the anti-apartheid movement. Such a statement is self-evident. But as we’ve seen in the preceding chapters, a confluence of various other factors, external to South Africa, must also be accounted for in order to understand why a Canadian solidarity movement did not develop around the new political issues of post-apartheid South Africa. In this Chapter, I turn my attention to domestic factors in South Africa which contributed to both the expansion and decline of the Canada-South Africa network, elaborating how exactly the end of apartheid altered the dynamics of international solidarity work with Canada. I will examine three factors: first is the issue of how apartheid had a much higher frame resonance than post-apartheid issues. The second two factors are both post-1994 changes in South African civil society that have minimized the possibilities for solidarity work: I will explain how the fragmentation and lack of political unity among CSOs post-1994, specifically the cleavages between radical and more pro-government groups, has made it harder for Canadians to build
solidarity partnerships; then I will consider the way democratization has removed the political incentive for South African groups to actively seek solidarity support from Canada.

In the section considering frame resonance, I will describe how the issue of apartheid was an almost perfect issue around which to organize international solidarity, as it touched on Canadian liberal and anti-racist beliefs, had a clear enemy directly linked to violence and repression and a short casual chain between the apartheid state’s actions and the economic involvement of Canadian companies in South Africa. In the post-apartheid period, activists had a variety of possible South African issues to advocate around, but none with the resonance of apartheid. Further most of these post-1994 issues—such as land distribution or poverty—dealt with questions of economic justice, which were much more difficult to frame in a way that resonated with the Canadian public.

Following an exploration of framing issues, I shall consider the changes South Africa civil society has gone through post-1994. I will argue that while civil society was once unified by a resistance to apartheid, it went through major periods of fragmentation and infighting in the post-apartheid era. This was driven in part by a loss of funding and a push to professionalize CSOs in South Africa that was similar to what Canadian groups faced in the 1990s. But more importantly, in the late 1990s civil society began to split between CSOs that supported the ANC government and those that opposed it. This later group, who launched activities to contest the state and its neoliberal policies, became the groups most interested in building post-apartheid international solidarity partnerships, through the ‘global justice movement.’ Yet their politics were generally much more radical than that of progressive Canadian CSOs (which led to some ideological friction) and they were also prone to sectarian infighting. Finally, I will show how democratization has removed the incentive that existed during apartheid for groups to promote movement building and solidarity partnerships in Canada. During the apartheid era, the closed nature of the South African state made Northern political support essential for those looking to change state behaviour. But post-1994, the value of such Northern support greatly diminished for South African groups, with South-South solidarity seeming much more practical. By examining these internal issues in
South Africa, this chapter will complete my exploration of the factors that drove the rise and fall of the Canadian solidarity movement with South Africa.

**7.2. Why apartheid was the perfect issue**

**7.2.1. Apartheid and Canadian values**

In Chapter 2, I briefly outlined the importance of frames and framing to mobilization for social movements. Johnston asserts that successful frames must either fit within the existing values of the culture they speak to, or find ways to ‘link new or unpopular ideas with existing themes or values in the cultural stock.’

Keck and Sikkink write that an effective frame must show that a state of affairs which activists desire to change is not ‘natural,’ but the result of specific intentional actions. At the same time a frame must identify those parties responsible for the situation and then propose credible solutions.

Accordingly a frame needs to present the political issue as not being a technical one, which can only be discussed and solved by experts, but a political issue average citizens can understand. Successful frames are also ones where the ‘casual chain’ between the perpetrator identified and the actual injustice is clear and concise.

On top of all these factors Keck and Sikkink argue that issues which affect people’s civil and political rights and/or involve physical violence, tend to have much higher resonance than other issues.

As Keck and Sikkink and Tarrow note, it takes a truly unique alignment of factors for an international social movement to occur. The anti-apartheid campaign was one such case, an exceptional moment where all the needed variables came together, one of the most important being the amazing level of frame resonance that the apartheid issue achieved worldwide and in Canada. One of the major reasons for this was how the anti-apartheid campaign spoke to Canadians’ perceptions of themselves as a people.
and nation opposed to racism. As John Saul asserted, ‘The strength [of the movement] was that we were all outraged at racial tyranny. I don’t think there was anyone in the movement who wasn’t outraged by racial oppression. So the dramatic and temporarily unyielding nature of the racist regimes in Southern Africa caught our attention… we dedicated countless hours and that is what held us together.’

He further argued that the failure of solidarity to extend into the post-1994 period came from this limited focus on racism: ‘When the anti-apartheid movement was able to get rid of the most overt racism [in South Africa] people left. We worked hard to make it about more than race, but it didn’t work.’

CUSO activists John Saxby and John Van Mossel spoke of how the ANC’s explicit presentation of itself as an anti-racist organization, one that united different races in a common fight for human rights, was a big factor in why the group was able to gain the overwhelming support of the Canadian movement. As Van Mossel noted,

The ANC had been created from the joining of four different organizations, and showed the idea that people of all races could work together and it was the regime that was racist and it was the regime that wanted to harm the future for all peoples... in Canadian circles and elsewhere there were things in the Freedom Charter, which spoke of all people being free, that related to Canadians of different backgrounds. In CUSO we produced a kit that took the Freedom Charter and turned it into the key element of an education package.

Jim MacKinnen of OXFAM agreed, stating that the simple racial binary people could construct around South Africa, of whites oppressing blacks, made promoting the campaign easy. Further, both Gille de Vlieg and Father Michael Lapsely reflected on how, during their respective speaking tours in Canada, audiences responded very positively to seeing white South Africans speaking on a shared platform with

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973 Interview John Saul (b).
974 Interview John Saxby; Interview John Van Mossel (b).
975 Ibid.
976 Interview Jim MacKinnen.
black South Africans about apartheid. Lapsley also noted that during his talks he explicitly worked to frame apartheid as a struggle by black South Africans to achieve the exact same human rights Canadians supported and took for granted.

But why did anti-racism and this related theme of human rights have such a strong resonance in Canada? As Barrington Walker and Constance Backhouse note, a particular feature of Canadian culture has been the belief that Canada is an inclusive, ‘raceless’ or racism-free society, with a ‘stupefying innocence’ to the existence of domestic racism. Historically this narrative of a ‘raceism-free society’ had been made by comparisons to the United States, with Canadians perceiving America as a country that has ‘real’ race issues and much more overt racism. Of course such narratives are rather a-historical; ignoring the fact racism was rampant in Canada in the first half of the 20th century, with notable examples such as the treatment of indigenous peoples, laws to restrict non-white immigration and the internment and attempt to deport Japanese Canadians during World War 2. Still, in the post war period there was a major break from elements of Canada’s racist past. In 1962 race based restrictions were removed from Canada’s immigration policy, and as Ninette Kelly notes, during the 1960s-1970s values of inclusivity and anti-racism began to become entrenched in Canada, just as record numbers of non-white immigrants entered the country. This built on work started in the 1950s by churches and other Canadian civil society groups to lobby for equitable treatment of immigrants and the enshrinement of human rights legislation in the legal system.

977 Lapsley "Draft of Article for Sechaba (ANC Magazine) on Tour of Canada," p. 1; Interview Gille de Vlieg.
978 Interview Michael Lapsley (b).
984 Ibid., p. 345.
In 1971 Pierre Trudeau officially declared that Canada was both a multicultural and bi-lingual nation, opening a new chapter in Canadian identity. Since the 1970s opinion polling has shown Canadians have become increasingly more tolerant in their beliefs. In 1975, 57% of Canadians approved of black-white interracial marriages and in 1974 68.6% of Canadians supported government sponsored multi-cultural programs; support for each of these issues grew to 81% for the former by 1995 and 93.9% for the latter by 1991. Thus the start of the anti-apartheid campaign in the 1970s coincided with a historical period where anti-racism and the myth of Canada as a nation free of racial discrimination were becoming firmly established in Canadian popular culture, views which would only increase with time. Pointedly by 1987 a national poll found 70% of Canadians said their sympathies lay with black South Africans while only 6% said it was with the white government.

Thus for many Canadians the apartheid issue, with its explicit examples of race based oppression, had a great deal of cultural resonance. This despite the fact the anti-apartheid movement was noted by different observers as not doing a good job of connecting its work to racism at home. Yet in the context of the Canadian mythology that racism is something that doesn’t happen here, but only ‘over there,’ this makes sense. Scholars write of a related process in the United States, noting that the anti-apartheid movement there became increasingly empowered over the 1980s as it became more and more successful at framing apartheid as a race or civil rights issue. Even conservative Republican law maker Bob Dole was quoted as saying that US congressional leaders had little choice but to support the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, due to the fact the issue was now seen as a ‘civil rights issue’, acknowledging no American politician could afford to be seen on the wrong side of a race issue.

989 Interview John Saul; Interview Yola Grant; Interview Lynda Lamberg; Interview Terry Groves Mathews; Interview Gille de Vlieg.
Thus like in the United States, Canadians were able to mobilize a good deal of support by presenting apartheid as one of the world’s last bastions of state sanctioned racism and the last great civil rights battle of the 20th century.

7.2.2. Clear enemy, clear casual chain

An additional strength of the apartheid issue, from a framing perspective, is that the apartheid state was a clear, definable enemy and there was a short casual chain that could be presented between actions in Canada and violence against black South Africans. Of course this connection had to be constructed by activists and thus was a focus for activists both in Canada and South Africa from the very start of the movement. Whether in TCCR’s bank campaign or in the YWCA’s 1973 Investment in Oppression flyer, activists worked to draw direct connections between Canadian companies and banks and the South African Regime. As Terry Groves Mathews recollected of her tour of Canada in 1991, ‘At that point I was trying to drum up support for the South African cause and I was trying to make the link between our oppression and the economic support of Canada to South Africa, and how that often aides and abets our oppression and how they collude with our government in our oppression.’992 So whether it was campaigning outside of liquor stores as shoppers went to buy South African wine or appearing at shareholder meetings to give speeches, activists continually found concrete ways to draw connections between Canadian economic activity and the ability of the apartheid government to say in power.

As part of this framing process, activists also worked hard to personalize the anti-apartheid issue, in order to demonstrate clearly the human toll the apartheid regime took on people. As noted earlier, linking an issue to physical violence or civil rights abuses is one of the most effective framing techniques. Thus the UCC used incidents like the bombing of Michael Lapsely as ways to highlight the violence of

992 Interview Terry Groves Mathews.
the regime. As Margaret Summat of the UCC explained, focusing on the human cost of apartheid helped to expand the issue to those who may have found the politics of anti-apartheid too radical, in the churches the cry was that apartheid was a heresy. That was the bottom line for that. That was very hard language and faith language. People in the pews found that very harsh, almost too strong to speak to. So the way it had to be told was through stories, explaining why it was a heresy and letting them know the history of apartheid a little bit. What did the separation laws mean in the townships? The story of women looking after white families, the story of the passes, it was the stories that appealed to people’s sense of right.

The anti-apartheid movement also had the persona of Nelson Mandela to rely on, whose years of incarceration became a potent symbol of apartheid’s human cost and was utilized often in events like the 1987 rallies in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver to celebrate his birthday. Thus the apartheid issue had major frame resonance in Canada, because of its fit with Canadian anti-racist values, its clear enemy and casual chain, and its obvious human toll.

7.2.3. The reduced resonance of post-apartheid issues

Following 1994, activists found it quite difficult to find issues relating to South Africa with the same frame resonance as apartheid. UCC activist Greg White recalled the following incident from immediately after the 1994 election. ‘I remember one day driving over the QEW [Queen Elizabeth Way] in Saint Catherine’s and someone had painted something on one of the bridges, thanking God for Nelson Mandela and the new South Africa. So for this to become that much a part of the community life and Canadian life, to be concerned about what was happening in South Africa, that was pretty remarkable.’ Yet across the board Canadian interviewees lamented how Canadian interest in South Africa plummeted after 1994. There is some quantitative data which corroborates these observations. I conducted a search

993 Interview Michael Lapsely; Interview Jim Kirkwood (b).
994 Interview Margaret Summat.
995 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 147.
996 Interview Greg White.
of the archives for the Toronto Star, the Canadian paper with the highest national circulation, looking for the number of front page articles per year, from 1975 to 2008, that included the words Apartheid or South Africa. The results are shown below.

Table 8: Toronto Star front page articles featuring the words ‘Apartheid’ or ‘South Africa’ 1975-2008


Toronto Star coverage spiked during the township insurrections of the mid-1980s and then gradually faded to no front page coverage at all by the mid 2000s. Donald Culverson notes that American media coverage also reached its highest point between 1985-6. The Toronto Star data gives a clear indication of the high level of frame resonance anti-apartheid had and the lower levels of frame resonance that came from post-1994 political issues in South Africa. Of course such a survey is not comprehensive, as it focuses on high profile issues that make front page headlines, and only within one newspaper. So it is quite possible that there were many more stories about South Africa or apartheid within The Star paper over these years. This being recognized, the fact that my data correlates with Culverson’s more

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exhaustive analysis of the American media, and the fact that front page articles do give us strong insight into what issues editors feel will garner the most interest, both suggest that coverage did indeed spike in the mid-1980s, and decreased over the post-apartheid period.

One of the major causes of this change in cultural resonance between the two periods was the loss of a clearly definable enemy that could be presented as the cause for all social justice issues in South Africa. As Jim MacKinnen of OXFAM conceded, ‘Solidarity is much easier when the issue is clear. And it was very, very clear around apartheid. It was black and white. And it made it very easy and indefensible, there was no way you could defend the apartheid regime as it was all completely indefensible.’ In post-apartheid South Africa there no longer existed a single unifying opponent to base political contention around, a situation reinforced by the shift towards seeing major social justice issues in the country as ‘development issues.’ As David Mayson, South African development consultant and former SPP staff explained, ‘For NGOs trying to build organizations around development issues, this is very different than just building groups around a single enemy: the state. But who is the enemy today?’ While activists can possibly talk about the enemy of ‘poverty,’ such an amorphous concept loses much of the clarity and also the political dynamics of being able to name a person or an institution as the target of solidarity work.

One possible alternative is to name the current government as this enemy. Ballard notes that for various groups of South African activists this has become their major mobilizing frame, the contestation of the ANC and its perceived corporate allies. But there are still major problems for Canadians in promoting campaigns that blame the ANC for issues like unequal land distribution, income disparities or HIV/AIDS. This is because there are serious ethical issues about the extent to which Canadians should involve themselves in contesting the policies of a democratically elected, sovereign, South African government. During anti-apartheid a key contention was that the apartheid state was illegitimate because

999 Interview Jim MacKinnon.
1000 Interview David Mayson, Cape Town.
1001 Ballard et al., Voices of Protest, p. 399.
it was not representative of the country’s population,\textsuperscript{1002} thus Canadians could feel confident in lobbying for policies that violated South Africa’s sovereignty. Today it is quite difficult to frame the ANC, the party of Nelson Mandela, the group anti-apartheid solidarity was framed around supporting and who have took over 60 per cent of the vote in the three post-apartheid national elections,\textsuperscript{1003} as being illegitimate. As Nigel Crawhall, current Director of the Cape Town based Secretariat of the Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee mentioned,

> I don’t think Canadians have a role to play, or a function to play, in internal South Africa debates around land or access to resources. Those are South African issues to be determined by them. But what I said earlier, which I think still applies, is that it was not that we had to resolve land issues, but South Africans were having trouble with information, with communication technology, with managerial issues or in working on models of social housing, so what they needed from Canada was input on what we had done already.\textsuperscript{1004}

For the most part this is the way Canadian groups chose to approach working in the new South Africa, with groups like CUSO and the UCC shifting from political collaboration with movements to working within a development framework to build the capacity of civil society groups, in order to indirectly help them pursue internal political struggles in South Africa.

Yet as was outlined in Chapter 5, development discourses, especially during the 1990s, had a powerful ability to depoliticize social issues. In many ways the reframing of the entire South African situation post-1994 as one of development has left solidarity perspectives in danger of becoming irrelevant. As Glenda Glover, Programme Development Manager for the South African NGO Rural Education Access Programme and former executive director of SPP pointed out, ‘During the whole decade of the 1980s there was solidarity in the international movement, so people said it’s your struggle

\textsuperscript{1002} Interview John Van Mossel (b).
\textsuperscript{1004} Interview Nigel Crawhall.
and we are with you in it and we will support you in it. But then the struggle was won and things changed. Same between groups in the country, when there was a struggle against something there was a lot of solidarity, then the struggle is won and it’s no longer against something and things change. So maybe solidarity is finite… maybe it is about a particular struggle and a moment?\(^{1005}\)

For activists who wished to continue solidarity work in South Africa, the answer adopted was to try and reframe the debate from a question of development to one of economic justice, as part of the larger ‘global justice movement.’ Yet here activists were faced with the fact that such frames lacked many of the qualities anti-apartheid had: they didn’t gel as easily with Canadian liberal values, the casual links between culprits and social injustices were less obvious, there were rarely clear examples of violence or the restriction of civil rights one could connect to a single target, and the enemy moved from being a fixed regime to the amorphous adversary of neo-liberal globalization. Jim Kirkwood summed up the issue for the UCC,

Apartheid was an easy target ethically and theologically. People could see scripturally and theologically that racism is evil, discrimination is a sin and is wrong. So we were able to get sermons and movements within the church, without much discussion on whether apartheid was a good thing…. Of course there was a bit of self righteousness, that ‘we aren’t racist over here and we would never do that.’ The issue that replaced it was the struggle against economic exploitation and capitalism and that one is not so clear in society and in the church. We don’t have racists in the church but we certainly have business people, and we are quite wealthy. So the issue that replaced apartheid was Empire, the code word for the power of money over the world... For 20 years now we are running this campaign against Empire and I don’t think it has gotten very far, it’s hard to sell.\(^{1006}\)

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\(^{1005}\) Interview Glenda Glover, Cape Town.

\(^{1006}\) Interview Jim Kirkwood (d).
John Saul extended this point from the perspective of TCLSAC, arguing that due to a lack of socialist perspectives in Canadian society, framing South African issues in a way that focused on economic injustice as much as racial injustice was very difficult. He notes that after 1994, ‘We were still asking the questions about the larger meaning of liberation in the Global South, but nobody wants to hear about it and they are quite comfortable with our relative global privilege, and we don’t want to query the roots of the systems that are creating the poverty.’\textsuperscript{1007}

Compounding these inherent limitations of the global justice master frame is the issue that this frame, by its very nature, encompassed a massive number of causes, from around the world, all equally calling for attention. Thus struggles for land reform in South Africa ended up competing with issues like Canadian mining companies work in Eastern Congo, deforestation in the Amazon, sweat-shop labor in South East Asia and farmer suicides in rural India. And since South Africa is viewed as a relatively ‘rich’ African country, capturing the attention of global activists has been difficult. This competition between numerous global causes led Steve Faulkner, staff person for the South African Municipal Worker’s Union International Division, to argue that today South Africa is simply not as ‘sexy’ an issue as it was in trade union circles before 1994 and thus it generates much less solidarity interest.\textsuperscript{1008} Margaret Summat, speaking from the church perspective, concurred with this point, noting that South African issues just can’t compete with the excitement that causes like Israel-Palestine generate today.\textsuperscript{1009} So despite the fact that the UCC’s theology called for commitment over the long haul with South Africa, it became very hard to maintain support for new South African struggles when more publicized and exciting issues arose and the attention of the world media was no longer focused on the country. While scholars like Patrick Bond have tried to frame the legacy of anti-apartheid as being directly connected to contemporary global justice issues, through utilizing terms like ‘Global Apartheid’,\textsuperscript{1010} the reality is that no South African frame has

\textsuperscript{1007} Interview John Saul (b).
\textsuperscript{1008} Interview Stephen Faulkner.
\textsuperscript{1009} Interview Margaret Summat.
developed after apartheid that has come remotely close to having the frame resonance in Canada that the anti-apartheid struggle did.

Still, there have been some frames around global issues, which touched on South Africa, that have generated support. The Jubilee 2000 debt campaign is probably the clearest example, when in the late 1990s millions of people around the world became involved in marches, petitions and letters, to pressure G7 nations to forgive the debt of the Global South. Jubilee 2000 in Canada was a firmly religious initiative, led by the Canadian Ecumenical Jubilee Initiative, one of the coalitions related to ICCAF that eventually became KAIROS Canada. In Chapter 3 I outlined how in Canada the campaign made use of South African educational resources and speakers. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of scholarly materials on Jubilee 2000 campaigning within Canada, but from my interviews and reviews of existing material I could not find any evidence that this campaign had the width or depth of the anti-apartheid campaign, which was able to engage nearly 200 organizations, mobilize thousands of volunteers and had one group, IDAFSA Canada, garner financial support from 100,000 Canadians.

Thus while Jubilee shows an example of how South African social justice issues could be fit into a post-1994 solidarity framework, it is safe to say that none of these issues had the frame resonance that the anti-apartheid master frame had. Further as I have made clear in earlier chapters, the 1990s and 2000s was a time when charity based frameworks of international co-operation gained additional traction in Canada, with World Vision Canada being the country’s biggest NGO working overseas in 2011 (while in the 1970s CUSO, at its radical height, was the country’s biggest NGO). When it is recognized that the Africa Canada Forum, a grouping of Canada’s most progressive development CSOs, needed to hold workshops over the 2000s to encourage its members to use less stereotypical images of Africans in their advertising and in 2008 had to develop a multi-year campaign on how to reinsert Africa into Canada’s

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1012 Pancella, "Educational Spotlight."
1013 Interview John Dillon.
political agenda, the weak resonance of contemporary politicized frames about social justice in Africa becomes obvious.\textsuperscript{1015} Thus analysis of the drop of South African solidarity work post-1994 leads to the recognition that apartheid was a truly unique issue, one with an almost unparalleled level of frame resonance in Canada.

7.3. Changes in South African civil society

There is an irony with South African civil society post-1994, as on one hand South Africa has one of the most robust civil societies in Africa, with well known NGOs like the TAC and thousands of service delivery protests taking place each year.\textsuperscript{1016} Yet on the other hand the make-up of South African civil society post-1994 has put a series of impediments to the development of international solidarity partnerships with Canada. In Chapter 3, I gave an overview of changes in South African civil society post-1994, discussing how civil society went through a fiscal crisis and a reduction in contentious politics immediately after 1994, only to see a resurgence of contention against the state when the ANC adopted GEAR in the late 1990s. The new social movements that developed in this period, which had their high point at the 2002 WSSD, subsequently failed to create a unified national movement for transformation and ended up collapsing in infighting over the mid 2000s.

This section describes how a few specific trends within this narrative affected international solidarity work, specifically how the infighting and lack of political unity in civil society made it very difficult for Canadian groups to partner with South African organizations. It will also discuss how the result of this infighting was the polarization of civil society, with the network of radical groups intent on contesting the ANC being the main CSOs left with ideologies that supported the global justice movement. Accordingly these CSOs were the most practical partners to take part in international solidarity campaigns. Unfortunately such groups became hamstrung by inter-network conflict, while their political


\textsuperscript{1016} Ngwane, "South Africa."
philosophies were so much more radical than contemporary Canadian CSOs that it would be a cause of tension.

7.3.1. The roots of disunity

To understand how South African civil society changed, going from a broad front of civics, trade unions, church groups and other CSOs, united in the 1980s in movements like the UDF or MDM, to a more fragmented network, we must start with the aftermath of the 1994 elections. In *Power in Movement*, Sidney Tarrow outlines how repressive regimes provide a major benefit to domestic activists by presenting them with a unified target for collective action. Apartheid provided this target and as Ballard writes, ‘whereas the need for adversarial struggle for state capture against the illegitimate apartheid state was clear, such unity of purpose does not emerge in the context of a democratically elected government.’ Thus Ballard notes a ‘hiatus’ in popular and radical political activity took place in the mid 1990s, as CSOs tried to institutionalize programs within the state to achieve social justice. During this time CSOs began consulting with government and taking on contracts, while many senior leaders accepted jobs with the ANC regime. Frank Chikane, who went from head of the SACC to become Thabo Mbeki’s Director General, is just one high profile example. As Adelle Wildschut, former Executive Director of SPP comments, ‘after 1994 it was never a question of, do we work with government or not? It was “hey this is what we were all working for, so we have to support the government and make things happen.” It was never an ideological question, it was a question of how do you do it.’

Along with this change in relations to government, civil society groups had to deal with a vastly different funding regime. As Caroline Kihato writes, ‘Relationships between donors and civil society during apartheid then were highly flexible, with donors adopting a highly accommodating attitude to local

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1017 Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, p. 92.
1019 Ibid., p. 16.
1020 Ibid., pp. 1-2 and 16; Bond, "Victories for South African activists."
1022 Interview Adele Wildschut, Cape Town.
demands. Local actors certainly had the upper hand in deciding which organisations should be funded, and how funds would be distributed. This relationship, characterised by high levels of trust, was extremely unusual. Not only was it unique to South Africa, it became an aberration in post-apartheid South Africa. With the end of apartheid this changed, with major consequences for organizations.\textsuperscript{1023} As David Mayson noted, ‘I mean here in the pre-1994 period I think it was easier, people just trusted you, they would say “here’s the money” and you spent it. I think when conditions are particularly bad and people are suffering money flows, but it’s when you are rebuilding, like we are trying to do now, solidarity is different. So solidarity to rebuild is different than helping blacks suffering under a racist dictatorial regimes.’\textsuperscript{1024} Glenda Glover expanded upon this point,

> Well the first thing that changed after 1994 [was that] it wasn’t any longer ‘we will support whatever you want to do and we all want to get rid of apartheid.’ Then it became, ‘now we have to develop South Africa.’ And a lot more of the agenda of the donors came through on what has to be done, and the World Bank was very prominent as well. You became aware you were part of a bigger agenda, which you probably didn’t like, but you were shaping up to that because you had to get money. The Germans were the best of it, they wanted you to plan for 2 years to get it right, and then you had to explain how you would deliver 6 boxes of tomatoes for the tomatoes project— but all that stuff actually doesn’t work. And a lot of NGOs shut down, there wasn’t the money, but they also couldn’t manage those kinds of relationships.\textsuperscript{1025}

Thus Kihato writes that a funding crisis engulfed South African civil society as organizations struggled to deal with the new conditions and the loss of funding.\textsuperscript{1026} With large amounts of funding to civil society now coming through government,\textsuperscript{1027} the South African state also had a large influence on the types of groups that would flourish. Kihato notes that the ANC government was highly skeptical of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1023} Kihato, \textit{Shifting Sands}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{1024} Interview David Mayson.
\textsuperscript{1025} Interview Glenda Glover.
\textsuperscript{1026} Kihato, \textit{Shifting Sands}, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{1027} Ibid., pp. 10-11.
\end{footnotesize}
NGOs playing a ‘watchdog’ role, and instead encouraged and bolstered more technical, non-political, urban and professionalized organizations that could aid in service delivery.\textsuperscript{1028} Patrick Bond goes even further, arguing that post-1994 the ANC government engaged in a purposefully demobilization of civil society.\textsuperscript{1029}

This professionalized and competitive funding environment, where groups were increasingly reliant on government contracts for income, meant organizations in general became much less inclined to get involved in international solidarity campaigns with Northern partners. The process has striking similarities to what happened at this time in Canada, described in Chapter 5, which reinforces my assertion that this was a global process. Thus the mid-1990s was a time where the older conception of international solidarity had little relevance domestically in South Africa, which helps explain why we didn’t see Canadians involved in any campaigns around South Africa in this period.

7.3.2. The rise of conflict and fragmentation in civil society

But in the late 1990s things began to shift. As outlined in Chapter 3, many civil society groups in South Africa began to take on an oppositional role against the ANC government.\textsuperscript{1030} But the move from pro-government to opposition did not come without high levels of internal tension and friction, which helped to spread disunity both inside CSOs and within civil society. The organization at which I interned during my time in South Africa, SPP, is such an example, where conflicts on relations to the state combined with racial conflicts. Ricado Jacobs of SPP, spoke about how this conflict developed, noting that when he joined the organization staff were overwhelming pro-ANC and management was almost exclusively white, while fieldworkers were all from black and coloured backgrounds.\textsuperscript{1031} Over the late

\textsuperscript{1028} Ibid., pp. 19-20.
\textsuperscript{1030} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1031} Interview Ricado Jacobs.
1990s and into the 2000s conflict came to consume SPP, as black staff pushed for black leadership in management and many began to lobby for more militant policies around land reform.\textsuperscript{1032}

Andele Mngxitama described how this conflict took place within other NGOs involved in the national coalition that SPP was a part of, the National Land Committee (NLC). Within the NLC head office, management that worked within a liberal tradition came into conflict with more militant staff around issues of land occupations, a desire to end collaboration with the government led land reform process and the rise of the Landless People’s Movement.\textsuperscript{1033} Ricado Jacobs noted that during this conflict different NLC affiliates created a field-workers union, which carried out militant actions such as locking the executive of the NLC (including then SPP executive director Glenda Glover) in a conference room until their demands were met.\textsuperscript{1034} One staff person at SPP said the early 2000 conflicts in the organization were the worst time of his life, and the end result was that all of the white staff left the group and the organization took on much more militant approach to land reform and a more conformational stance towards the ANC government.\textsuperscript{1035} In the NLC, these conflicts led to the dissolution of the organization.

Such internal conflicts are relevant to Canadian solidarity work. For example over, the period of these conflicts at least three CUSO co-operants had been placed in SPP and Joan Anne Nolan, David Beer and Sam Bonti-Akomah all worked at the NLC as co-operants/staff. Thus while these organizations were being rocked by internal conflict, Canadians were doing their best to try to support such groups without getting embroiled in their internal issues. Achieving solidarity in such situations is not easy, as partner groups’ policies are constantly changing and established personal contacts may suddenly disappear as power shifts. Judith Marshall spoke of how such internal conflicts impeded solidarity work from the trade union perspective, noting that in 2006, when the ANC was being consumed by the succession struggle

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Interview Herchelle Milford; Interview Glenda Glover.
\item Interview Ricado Jacobs; Interview Glenda Glover.
\item Interview David Mayson; Interview Herchelle Milford; Interview Ricado Jacobs.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
between Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki, she found it extremely difficult to coordinate solidarity work with her colleagues in NUMSA.1036

By 2002, the internal conflicts in civil society led to a clear break in the CSO network, seen in the WSSD rally, where some groups chose to stand with the government and its affiliated umbrella group The South African National NGO Coalition by joining the officially sanctioned march (which included COSATU and SACC), while others joined the Social Movement Indaba march against neo-liberalism and ANC policies.1037 Today the result is that a section of civil society in South Africa has explicitly broken from working with the state, organizing under anti-capitalist or anti-neoliberal politics and many times clearly aligning themselves with the ‘global justice movement’ and groupings like the African Social Forum. Mngxitama categorizes contemporary South African NGOs in three streams, those NGOs which are active promoters of neo-liberalism through taking contracts from the World Bank and development organizations like USAID, ‘reformist NGOs which receive middle range funding from private social democratic foundations and progressive local or regional governments to fund ameliorative projects and to correct the excesses of the free market’ and radical NGOs which are involved in anti-globalization, anti-racist, anti-sexist solidarity movements.1038 It is this later group that became the most obvious partners for Canadian activists looking to do solidarity work in South Africa, within the confines of the existing global-justice network. Yet such partnerships had a variety of problems.

For one this network of radical groups in South Africa has had a fractious and sectarian history over the 2000s, with attempts to create unity between such groups in the national organization Social Movement Indaba, once labeled ‘the most promising effort to build a national coalition of social movements,’1039 having collapsed into infighting between various social movements and their NGO allies.1040 The decline of this umbrella group took place after social movements Abhalali

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1036 Interview Judith Marshall (b).
baseMjondolo and the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign broke away from the coalition during a December 2006 meeting in Durban, after they toy-toyed and held a sit-in to disrupt the meeting. At the core of the conflict were concerns that radical leaning NGOs were dominating the space and appropriating the voice and leadership of grassroots social movements. This split was still having ramifications when I was in South Africa, with activists aligned with the two camps having heated arguments through the Durban based Centre for Civil Society’s list-serve, while rival academics produced papers critiquing social movements they were not affiliated with and accusing other academics of vanguardism and manipulation. The situation around Social Movement Indaba was indicative of the larger divisions and fragmentations within the South African left I observed in 2010. Stigmatized by the ANC as ultra-leftist movements, the struggles of such radical NGOs and social-movements to work together (for example in Cape Town alone there were 12 different competing Trotskyist groups) or to connect with the township level service delivery protests taking place every day in the country provide major blocks to solidarity work.

7.3.c Too radical for solidarity?

There is also an ideological rift between Canadian CSOs and these radical organizations to consider. One example is the think tank ILRIG, part of this radical network and supported by the USW and the CCODP. ILRIG is committed to a staunch anti-capitalist program, one which would have very little popular support in Canada. As Judith Marshall of the USW noted, while the individual Steelworkers who take part in solidarity programs with ILRIG may be sympathetic to such views, the

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1042 The following two articles are examples of this conflict, with Heinrich Bohmke of the Center for Civil Society attacking the legitimacy of the social movement Abahlali Base Mjondolo, which has linkages to Richard Pithouse, who left the CCS during the internal conflicts of 2006: Heinrich Bohmke (b), "The Branding of Social Movements in South Africa," Dispositions 1, no. 1 (2010); Heinrich Bohmke (a), "Between the Halo and the Panga: Accounts of Abahlali Base Mjondolo on 26th September 2009," Dispositions July (2010); Interview Richard Pithouse.
1044 These are Socialist Initiative, Workers International Vanguard League, Socialist Alternative, Comrades for a Workers Government, Marxist Workers’ Tendency, Keep Left, Radical Left Network, Unity Movement, Socialist Initiative, Break away Socialist Initiative, WOSA: Workers of South Africa.
1046 Interview Lenny Gentle; Interview Ana Van Davies.
larger membership would find such positions disconcerting. The CCODP has also come under fire from right wing Catholic bloggers in Canada for its collaboration with ‘Marxist’ and ‘pro-abortion’ ILRIG. Such ideological differences really limit the extent to which solidarity relationships can grow.

I witnessed a similar incongruity of views at the Ecumenical Advocacy Alliance Consultation in Cape Town on March 9th 2010, where SPP staff member Ricado Jacobs described his surprise at the conservatism of Northern groups, noting that staff members from European CSOs present were shocked by his anti-capitalist perspective on questions of food security. Even in organized labor such divisions exist. Hlokoza Motau of NUMSA’s international department noted that while ‘comrades from Northern unions’ speak of social democracy, members of his union adamantly argue that they are fighting not for social democracy, but socialism. Jim Hodgson of the UCC was quite upfront about the challenge this ideological distance poses to UCC staff today, noting that staff must at times censor the messages partners wish to communicate to church members for fear it would be seen as too angry or radical and lead to the ending of the partnerships. While such ideological differences are not insurmountable and partnerships have continued despite them, they bring into question the extent to which there is common ground for expanding the existing international solidarity advocacy network into a real movement.

7.4. Disappearing incentives to seek political solidarity

The final post-1994 domestic change that has hindered the formation of an international solidarity movement between Canada and South Africa is the fact that post-1994, activists in South Africa have had little incentive to actually approach Canadian groups to create international solidarity partnerships. What was crucial to the creation of the Canadian anti-apartheid movement in the 1970-80s was the fact that South Africans were actively working to promote and encourage the development of such a network in

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1047 Interview Judith Marshall (a).
1049 Interview Ricado Jacobs.
1050 Interview Hlokoza Motau, Johnnesburg.
1051 Interview Jim Hodgson, Toronto.
Canada. Looking at the situation from the perspective of social movement scholars who utilize a political opportunities perspective, it is clear that apartheid provided a classic example of the boomerang effect. The boomerang effect is an example of what Della Porta and Tarrow call externalization, and is used to help explain the interaction of international and domestic political opportunities on transnational activism.\(^\text{1052}\) It describes the phenomenon where national movements look to the international context and international institutions to mobilize resources that can be used at home.\(^\text{1053}\) The major motivation for this is when channels for advocating change between domestic groups and their government are blocked and activists must turn to foreign activists for support, who will then put pressure on their own home governments, which will in turn apply bi-lateral pressure against the domestic government in question.\(^\text{1054}\) Keck and Sikkink note this situation is one instance where major incentives exist for Southern activists to seek the support of transnational activist networks.\(^\text{1055}\) In this case the closed and totalitarian nature of apartheid severely restricted the ability of activists to generate change domestically, so South African activists went to transnational solidarity networks and organizations like the United Nations to generate external pressure to put against the apartheid government. Hakkan Thorn writes about this phenomenon, noting that for liberation movements, having local solidarity groups to speak with, or for them, was critical to achieving Western support, as on their own the stigma of being ‘foreign’ or black’ groups would have limited their political efficacy in the West.\(^\text{1056}\)

Due to these domestic political realities, South Africans actively worked to partner with or even create solidarity networks overseas, the most successful at this being the ANC. From the early 1970s, with the establishment of their office in Toronto, the ANC sought to build Canadian support.\(^\text{1057}\) This continued when Yusuf Dadoo and John Gaetsewe came to Canada in 1974 to try to create a national

\(^{1052}\) Della Porta and Tarrow, *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, p. 5.
\(^{1053}\) Khagram et al., *Restructuring World Politics*, p. 19.
\(^{1054}\) Ibid., p. 6.
\(^{1057}\) Interview Yusuf Saloojee.
movement similar to AAM, which instead ended up in the formation of CCSA. And Linda Freeman notes that again in the late 1980s ANC supporters unsuccessfully attempted to create a national body to unify the Canadian anti-apartheid movement under the Congress Alliance’s direction.

Thus throughout apartheid ANC activists were not just trying to connect with a Canadian movement, they were actively encouraging its development and some would argue also attempting to control it. As Lynda Lamberg of CCSA recalls, ‘We had constant communication with the ANC office and I was regularly invited by Yusuf to come in and organize something, on the phone or at each other’s houses. I would say when things really started cooking we would meet more than once a week. An example: when Oliver Tambo came in ‘87 I had taken a few months off to have the baby, and myself Lennox and another activist were organized to come in and organize a rally for Oliver Tambo and we got 5000 people. We would get these requests and then we would just do it.’

John Van Mossel notes that one of the major reasons that the ANC got so much support was the fact they had well developed plans and resources dedicated to garnering international support. He said, ‘It was doable to talk about South Africa and get ANC people to come speak and they had materials ready and they were prevalent. Maybe they were monopolizing it [solidarity] and being exclusionary. But it was easier to work with a machine like that than the PAC.’ Archie Simbeko of SACTU confirms that his organization was similarly working to build support in Canada with the creation of SACTU Solidarity Committee. This work by the ANC will be discussed more in the next chapter, but for now its sufficient to note that due to the closed nature of the apartheid state, liberation groups, along with internal South African CSOs as well, had strong incentives to put time, resources and effort into movement development in Canada over the 1970s and 1980s.

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1058 Interview Peter Bunting.
1059 Freeman, The Ambiguous Champion, p. 188.
1060 Interview Lynda Lamberg.
1061 Interview John Van Mossel (b).
1062 Interview Archie Sibeko.
But with the democratic elections of 1994, the political incentives totally changed. Seeing new
democratic openings at home, activists in South Africa had no reason to seek Canadian political support,
though they certainly still had incentives to continue to seek financial aid. Both Keck and Sikkink and
Sara Mitchell discuss this, noting how Southern CSOs gain access to resources, prestige and increased
legitimacy through joining international networks with Northern CSOs. 1063 These factors remained post-
1994, though as my earlier chapters have outlined, the financial squeeze of the 1990s meant there were
fewer resources for South African groups working with Canadian CSOs to receive. But what changed
even more acutely was the ability of Canadian CSOs to offer South African CSOs any potent advantage
in their struggles to change the policies of the South African state. The ANC was not simply reaching out
to Canadians during the 1970-1980s as a fundraising initiative, they were also genuinely seeking to
mobilize political action in Canada and shift political opinions in Canada, in order to get the Canadian
state to support sanctions, isolate the apartheid regime and possibly recognize the validity of their
movement. Thus these engagements were qualitatively different than fundraising, as they were
specifically seeking to build up international political support.

Accordingly a major reason there hasn’t been many joint solidarity activities post-1994 is because
South Africans do not have reasons to prioritize this type of activity. Put simply they are no longer
asking for political support. Nigel Crawhall notes that while he is a supporter of international solidarity,
the reality is that on most domestic political issues he hasn’t heard any South African activists speak of a
need for Canadian involvement. 1064 And while leaders from SPP and ILRIG spoke of the crucial role
Canadian funding played in their daily activities, there was no indication in interviews that these
organizations felt political support was needed or would even be very helpful. 1065 As Gary Kenny noted
about the UCC, at the moment the JGER Unit has a fairly limited advocacy budget and since South

1063 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 12-13; Sarah Michael, Undermining Development: The absence of power
among local NGOs in Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), p. 44.
1064 Interview Nigel Crawhall.
1065 Interview Lenny Gentle; Interview Herchelle Milford.
African partners have not requested advocacy support, the UCC advocacy focus has shifted to areas of the world where such support is actively requested.\(^{1066}\)

In fact the main form of contemporary international solidarity South African activists mentioned in interviews was building solidarity with other African nations and other developing countries.\(^{1067}\) Over the last two decades a variety of initiatives have developed to facilitate South-South solidarity, the African Social Forum being just one group South African CSOs participate in.\(^{1068}\) Part of this desire for South-South solidarity over South-North solidarity may arise from the fact there is more ideological similarity between groups in South Africa and other developing countries, especially around radical politics. Part may also come from simple economic and social commonalities. Sivato Nkomonye, a NUMSA shop-steward who travelled to Canada in a USW ‘worker to worker’ exchange, noted that after the trip he came to believe that solidarity between Canadian and South African unions was simply not possible today, due to Canadian workers’ collective bargaining agreements which prevent them from engaging in solidarity strikes around South African political causes, and the massive difference in social and economic conditions between the two countries.\(^{1069}\) He noted that while South African workers are fighting for basic human needs, Canadian workers have already received the material benefits South African workers are fighting for. Thus he felt solidarity work in collaboration with other Southern unions, who were fighting similar struggles, was much more feasible. Jonathan Grossman made similar comments about the UCT Workers Forum in Cape Town, noting that while they appreciated a visit from Canadian Steelworkers, there was a much deeper and immediate feeling of connection when a unionist from Mozambique, who came with the Canadians, addressed the group about their struggle.\(^{1070}\)

Such observations are entirely rational, as on numerous issues today other Southern countries face political struggles that are much more similar to contemporary South African issues than to struggles in

\(^{1066}\) Interview Gary Kenny.
\(^{1067}\) Interview Herchelle Milford; Interview Ricado Jacobs.
\(^{1068}\) Brill, "Exploring the emerging social movements in Africa at the Third African Social Forum."
\(^{1069}\) Interview Sivato Nkomonye.
\(^{1070}\) Interview Jonathan Grossman.
the North. Thus it’s not hard to imagine why international solidarity, if it is understood as mutual struggle between allies, seems to be much more relevant with other Southern groups. The perception today then is that Southern CSOs have more to teach South African CSOs than Canadian CSOs, and that the mutual learning and exchange that could come from these relationships makes them more of a priority. This was true during apartheid as well, and South African groups did seek support from Southern groups like the Organization for African Unity, but the closed political situation at home and the influence Western countries had on the apartheid state, meant the incentives for externalizing contention through gaining Northern solidarity were quite strong. This doesn’t mean South Africa groups are against North-South solidarity, but CSOs have limited time and resources, and building Northern solidarity partnerships can be time consuming and expensive, and thus in the post-apartheid period such activities were no longer top priorities. During the early 1990s TCLSAC acknowledged this new solidarity reality and tried to reconfigure itself as an organization that would help to promote South-South collaboration, hoping to create a ‘South-South-North Network,’ though in the end this initiative met with limited success.

Thus while post-1994 funding realities mean South African groups today must maintain Northern partnerships in a donor-client context, without the political incentives of before, there is little reason for them to seek to expand this into political partnerships. Even in the financial sense, groups like ILRIG seemed to have more natural relationships with European funders more clearly connected to radical politics, like the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Germany or the various international funds of socialist unions in continental Europe they work with, than Canadian organizations who exist in a funding environment where such overt radicalism would not be tolerated. While different activists saw the issue of climate change as possible common ground for new North-South solidarity, and while the global justice movement tires to present the fight against neo-liberalism as a space for such political

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1073 Interview Nigel Crawhall; Interview Herchelle Milford.
collaboration, political incentives post-1994 do not seem to have pushed South African organizations to seek such relationships with Canadians.

7.5. Conclusion

It’s clear then that after 1994, major domestic barriers existed in South Africa to international solidarity movement creation, despite the many social struggles that were taking place in the country. One of the most important contributions of this chapter has been highlighting how many of the same forces that made Canadian groups less able to take part in solidarity during the 1990s, such as reductions in funding, domestic governments working to limit activism and the ‘professionalized approach to development,’ also occurred in South Africa. Such similarities help reinforce my assertion that neoliberalism and its approach to how people perceived development work, was a force that influenced politics in various parts of the world. The chapter also highlighted how very localized forces, such as the nature of the South African state and the specific types of social justice issues that replaced the struggle for state control, had equally important impacts on solidarity work.

While this thesis has approached the research question from a predominantly Canadian point of view, this chapter reinforces the importance of the domestic context in the South to any type of North-South international solidarity relationship. It seems quite probable that South African factors may have even trumped domestic issues in Canada as being the driving forces behind movement decline. Without the incentive for South African activists to seek Canadian support and without the existence of issues in South Africa that had high levels of frame resonance in Canada, creating an international solidarity movement around South Africa appears to have been an incredibly difficult task.

This caveat notwithstanding, the four factors I have identified: the existence of large civil society groups in Canada able to join the anti-apartheid campaign, radical space within these groups, the frame resonance of apartheid and the fact South Africa had a strong network of activist groups actively seeking support, were all necessary conditions for the growth of the Canadian-South African solidarity advocacy
network into a movement. On their own the South African factors seem to have been sufficient for the launching of an international solidarity campaign within an international solidarity activist network in Canada. But the Canadian factors were the means through which the campaign was able to grow into a true movement. So their presence was necessary for activists to be able to take advantage of the opportunity of an issue with high frame resonance and willing Southern partners. Thus without any of the four it’s difficult to imagine how a national movement could have developed in Canada and the absence or attenuation of all the factors during the post-apartheid period explains why contention was not transferred from the anti-apartheid campaign into another post-apartheid struggle in South Africa.
8

Conclusion

8.1. Thesis Review

Over seven chapters I have chronicled the work of the Canadian anti-apartheid movement and its post-1994 legacy, presenting a series of answers to the question: What explains the rise and fall of international solidarity movements? In Part 1 of the thesis I introduced the concepts and theories that would guide my analysis. By incorporating ideas of Keck and Sikink, Sidney Tarrow, Evalyn Tennant and others, I was able to present a theoretical basis for thinking about international solidarity as a political process, based around the concepts of international solidarity advocacy networks and international solidarity movements, with my analysis guided by the solidarity chain. In Part 2, I presented a history of Canadian international solidarity work and an overview of the make-up of the network in the pre- and post-1994 periods, examining its width, density and depth, along with the solidarity discourses present. Within this section the solidarity histories of CUSO and the UCC were presented, the importance of large CSOs and individual activists was illustrated and the transition of the Canadian network from a robust international solidarity movement in the 1980s, to a loose international solidarity advocacy network around Africa post-1994, was explained. Finally, in Part 3 I illustrated four critical factors which drove movement formation during the anti-apartheid period, all of which changed after 1994. In Chapters 5 and 6 I discussed how a new funding regime in Canada, the rise of neo-liberal ideas and the adoption of the politics of isolation by activists, all led to progressive
Canadian CSOs slowly losing their radical spaces, and becoming less able to take part in international solidarity campaigns. Then in Chapter 7 I explored how the frame resonance of the apartheid issue in Canada and the political incentives for South African activists to externalize their contention during the 1970-80s spurred movement growth. With the end of apartheid these factors shifted as well, as no single issue emerged in South Africa with comparable frame resonance, and the democratic transition left South African civil society fractured and inward focused.

Through this detailed case study of the Canadian networks and two specific CSOs, I have provided a basis for future comparative research into the mechanics of international solidarity movements. Further studies may find it fruitful to test some of the key empirical insights of this thesis with a wider range of cases, to see if they are anomalies or are general traits common to transnational activism. Questions that should guide such future work include:

1) Do funding regimes have the same role in determining the possibilities for CSOs to engage in international activism in other countries as was demonstrated in Canada?

2) Is radical space a universal phenomenon in the development of international solidarity policies, or does it only apply under specific conditions?

3) Did neo-liberalism also stifle transnational activist possibilities in other nations during the 1990s? If so, are there domestic political/economic factors that made some countries more vulnerable to this than others?

4) How did other national anti-apartheid networks change to adapt to the post-apartheid context? Is the Canadian case the norm or an anomaly?

Along with providing new avenues for further research towards a more comprehensive theory of international solidarity movements, my work also impacts existing scholarship. It confirmed Keck and Sikkink’s assertions about the centrality of NGOs in transnational networks,\textsuperscript{1074} while expanding these ideas to include trade unions and large churches as well. It also helped to provide empirical backing for Khagram,
Sikkink and Riker’s theory about transnational social movement growth. The anti-apartheid movement in Canada was clearly a case where a solidarity movement grew out of an advocacy network, as the result of the successful implementation of a global campaign. What this thesis adds to this theory is a demonstration that solidarity networks can also go backwards through this process, returning to general advocacy networks once a campaign is finished, waiting to be activated again by new campaigns. My work also showed that transnational activist scholars should pay attention to micro factors, such as the role of individual activists and the role of intra-group power struggles, in order to fully grasp when and why organizations engage in solidarity networks.

This conclusion though, will not further repeat my key points or their research implications. Instead I will consider a dimension of solidarity that this thesis has been mainly silent around. For seven chapters I have focused on the objective elements of international solidarity. But the definition of international solidarity I proposed also acknowledged that solidarity exists in a normative or subjective sense. So I will conclude this thesis with a consideration of the subjective. But instead of engaging in theology or philosophy, I will consider how the pursuit of the normative goals of international solidarity actually influenced the functioning of the network. I will do this by focusing on one normative end: legitimacy. Legitimacy of course is also a practical end, without it gaining support for solidarity activities is extremely difficult. But the pursuit of legitimacy was also one of the clearest ways that activists attempted to make their actions match their stated values. I will thus compare the different policies used to build legitimacy by Canadian CSOs with South African organizations, specifically the ANC and SACTU. Then I will discuss the affects of these tactical decisions. This topic is pertinent not only because the normative claims of international solidarity discourses make legitimacy an issue which cannot be ignored, but also because these differing tactics became the biggest sources of tension and outright hostilities in the Canadian network.

In the following sections, I first discuss generally what legitimacy means for international solidarity movements, then compare the two major tactics for building solidarity used in the Canadian network.

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1075 Khagram et al., *Restructuring World Politics*, p. 6.
(deferential and critical solidarity) and finally discuss how competing claims of legitimacy shaped the conflict between the SACTU Solidarity Committee and the CLC. I will show that the Canadian anti-apartheid movement provides two important lessons about legitimacy and North-South relations: first, that it is possible for Northern groups, through an ideological commitment, to create relationships that minimize the North-South power imbalance in transnational movements, and secondly, that doing this by simply deferring all decisions to a Southern professional level partner, is no guarantee that activities will be truly responsive to the needs of those at the Southern grassroots level.

8.2. The quest for legitimacy

8.2.1. What is legitimacy for solidarity movements?

For international solidarity activists, legitimacy is a crucial concern. As my definition emphasized, international solidarity is both a form of a political activity as well as an idealized conception of what North-South co-operation should look like. Alan Hudson and Paul Nelson both assert that a common feature of transnational activist networks is for the activists within them to argue that their networks should function as new models of participation and equity.\(^{1076}\) As Hudson notes, since this is a core value for Northern activists, and because they often speak on behalf of the poor and marginalized in the South, there is an onus on them to establish their legitimacy to do so.\(^{1077}\) This pressure was keenly felt by Canadian activists during anti-apartheid; with some interviewees even arguing that the power imbalance between Canada and South Africa made it impossible for there to be truly equitable, and accordingly legitimate, solidarity relationships.

For example, CUSO field office staff person Penny Narsoo and ex-SPP executive director Josette Cole both argued that the anti-apartheid struggle and the post-1994 struggles for social justice in South Africa were ultimately South African owned issues, and complained that the international solidarity discourses of CUSO activists led them at times to overstep their legitimate roles as allies, whether in


\(^{1077}\) Hudson, "NGOs’ Transnational Advocacy Networks," p. 335.
speaking for South Africans, or in taking on inappropriate leadership roles in the struggle. This view was also held by some members of the ANC, who noted that while Canadians were great comrades and even risked their lives for the movement, at times they let their solidarity beliefs lead them to think erroneously that they could direct South Africans on how to carry out their own struggle. Activist Linda Freeman, from a Canadian perspective, questioned the entire ideology of solidarity she once adhered to, noting she now believes activists fundamentally misunderstood what was going in South Africa and at times were guilty of co-opting the voice of South African activists. She concluded that, ‘this whole notion of solidarity is really thin on the ground, the struggle is really theirs and what you do is bear witness.’

Canadian activists were well aware of such concerns and so employed different tactics to ensure solidarity activities with South Africans encompassed the equity and representation their discourses espoused. But this was no easy task. As Hudson writes, legitimacy is a social construct, which can be perceived quite differently by different stakeholders within transnational networks. The dilemma then is whose perception of legitimacy to privilege; Hudson’s solution is for Northern CSOs to focus primarily on gaining legitimacy in the eyes of Southern stakeholders. Lisa Jordan and Peter Van Tuijl support this line of thinking and have created a model for trying to rank legitimacy in transnational activist networks, by analyzing the extent to which each aspect of network activities are carried out in a manner that maximizes Southern agency. Canadian activists mainly took a similar approach, trying to create policies that would maximize their legitimacy in the eyes of their Southern colleagues.

Yet such tactics were still fraught with difficulty, namely because Canadian anti-apartheid activists were claiming not to just be in solidarity with one group, but that they were fighting on behalf of ‘the people of South Africa.’ Unfortunately, no single Southern CSO can be a totally unbiased representative of the

1078 Interview Penny Narsoo; Interview Josette Cole.
1079 Interview Yusuf Saloojee; Interview Muff Anderson.
1080 Interview Linda Freeman, Ottawa.
1082 Ibid.
entire grassroots of their country, as CSOs have their own interests as well. As Keck and Sikkink write, a major benefit for Southern organizations in joining trans-national advocacy networks is gaining access to Northern resources and support.\textsuperscript{1084} And a familiar critique from development studies argues that the incentives to maximize access to such resources in North-South collaborations will lead to patron-client scenarios, where Southern groups focus on building and protecting financial connections to the North over providing quality services.\textsuperscript{1085} Even if this doesn’t happen, the reality is that all CSOs, Northern or Southern, are concerned with their self preservation, which can influence policy decisions.\textsuperscript{1086} Thus the challenge that shaped the Canadian pursuit of legitimacy during the anti-apartheid movement was not just around how to gain legitimacy from South African partner organizations, but also in picking the most representative organizations to build this legitimacy with.

During the anti-apartheid movement two strategies were used for gaining legitimacy: critical solidarity and deferential solidarity. While Chapter 4 mentioned that there were some ideologically based tensions in the Canadian network, these were nothing compared to the cleavages that existed over the most legitimate ways to relate with South African partners. As Hein Marias noted, the biggest divide in the movement was between, ‘those who were critical of the ANC, who saw the need to support it, but were very interested in connecting with the internal opposition and saw that as the most democratic, and potentially the most progressive way forward…and on the other side those who were saying let’s just support the ANC, they have been doing it since 1912, they are the voice of the people, they are the people.’\textsuperscript{1087} John Saul concurred, noting that while all groups in the network were united in the fight against apartheid, there were serious divisions between groups on tactics.\textsuperscript{1088} These divisions were not just in regard to the ANC, but also SACTU. Over the next two sections I shall outline the divisions that emerged and their consequences.

\textsuperscript{1084} Keck and Sikkink, \textit{Activists Beyond Borders}, pp. 12-13.
\textsuperscript{1086} Tennant, "Locating Transnational Activists," p. 12.
\textsuperscript{1087} Interview Hein Marais.
\textsuperscript{1088} Interview John Saul (b).
8.2.2. Critical solidarity

The perspective held by a minority in the movement was critical solidarity, the perspective long held by TLCSAC. TCLSAC did work with the ANC, but their official policy was named ‘critical support.’ As Margie Bruun-Meyer explained, this was part of their identity as being ‘independent left,’ radical, but not wedded to one specific ideology or organization.1089 John Saul describes critical support as meaning TCLSAC would support the ANC, but also felt empowered to occasionally criticize the group and would not accept the argument that the ANC was the only legitimate expression of the popular will of South Africans.1090 This can be contrasted to the other major Toronto-based Southern African solidarity group, CCSA, which maintained a rigid program of deference to the ANC.

TCLSAC’s stance was highly criticized by members of the ANC chapter in Toronto, as it was seen as Canadians overstepping their role in the movement and being linked to a perceived desire to find a ‘third way’ to South African liberation outside of the ANC.1091 CCSA founder Peter Bunting recollected that, ‘TCLSAC was a bit of a thorn in the ANC’s side and ANC was a bit of a thorn in TCLSAC’s side,’ arguing that critical support came from TCLSAC’s anti-communist leanings.1092 Yusuf Saloojee stated that,

The ANC in particular had reservations about the support from TCLSAC. We felt it wasn’t just support, since they were highly intellectual; they were concerned about how we should conduct our struggle. With CCSA that part was to come from ANC and SWAPO, TCLSAC meanwhile tried to tell us what is good and what is not good. They wanted to give guidance to the struggle, while with CCSA it was unqualified… we understood that, you know, their leadership was a bunch of highly developed intellectuals and they thought, since being such intellectuals, they had the qualifications to provide advice and guidance on how to conduct our operations.1093

1089 Interview Margie Bruun-Meyer.
1090 Interview John Saul (b).
1091 Interview Yusuf Saloojee; Interview Fatima Bhyat.
1092 Interview Peter Bunting.
1093 Interview Yusuf Saloojee.
John Saul responded to accusations of TCLSAC seeking a ‘third way’:

The idea we were looking for an alternative to the ANC is bullshit, we said the ANC was important, but they’re not the only game in town. So we didn’t have much choice about saying the ANC was the premier movement, as it was either them or the PAC or even the Unity Movement. And the ANC was much more progressive than the PAC. It was when UDF and COSATU began to become a force, that people started to think maybe the ANC is claiming too much for itself. So in TCLSAC we saw the dangers of the ANC claiming extreme speaking rights around the movement.1094

Saul also pointed out that TCLSAC had a range of internal connections in South Africa, outside of the ANC, who provided information that led them to question the ANC’s assertion that they were behind all domestic contention, especially in the labor movement union.

In terms of policy, critical support meant that while TCLSAC was involved in most national anti-apartheid initiatives, they would still print critical reflections on the movement and profile non-ANC groups in their monthly magazine Southern African Report. They also would not take direction from the ANC on how to conduct their solidarity work. An open letter sent to various groups in the anti-apartheid network, found in the UCC archives, demonstrates a conflict TCLSAC had with the SSC around TCLSAC’s profiling of independent trade unionism in South Africa in Southern African Report. In the letter TCLSAC strongly refutes the SSC’s critiques, noting that while the SSC argue it is inappropriate politically for Canadians to have direct links to South Africa, they believe the direct opposite and were told personally by South African trade unionists to continue such connections.1095 Another way TCLSAC was a critical supporter was in its resistance to the creation of any sort of national coordinating body for the anti-apartheid movement (like AAM in the UK) which would be directed by the ANC.1096 Peter Bunting confirmed that the original

1094 Interview John Saul (b).
1095 TCLSAC to SACTU Solidarity Committee cc'd to Jim Kirkwood, "Personal Letter," United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 88.031C, Box 12-9, Toronto (Oct. 27th 1983).
1096 Interview John Saul (a).
intention behind CCSA was to become such a body, but that TCLSAC activists invited to the first meetings were some of the leading voices who argued against this format. Despite this, TCLSAC, the ANC and CCSA would come together to support common anti-apartheid projects, but an ongoing tension existed between the groups.

Critical support was not exclusive to TCLSAC, as the policy was also held by individual activists who refrained from only supporting or promoting the ANC. Paul Puritt was one such activist. He noted that at the 1982 Solidarity Conference in Ottawa he and Pierre Beaduet led resistance to attempts by Communist Party of Canada members to provide pre-drafted resolutions to be voted on. They felt these ANC aligned activists were subverting the democratic process by not letting the actual conference attendees draft their own resolutions. Puritt further noted in his interview that the unfortunate truth about Southern African solidarity was that partners would lie to their Northern colleagues in order to advance their causes, and thus a degree of distance and critical engagement was needed in his work. And as we shall see in the section on SACTU, Puritt’s critical approach ended up having a major influence on the CLC’s policy of critical support to trade unions. Thus for activists who employed critical solidarity, legitimacy in international solidarity work meant that an organization could not unquestionably support a single South African CSO, but had to reserve a right for critical engagement and always be open to supporting other, more representative formations that might arise.

8.2.3. Deferential solidarity

For other activists, critical engagement and questioning of movements was not seen as something to be lauded. At best it was a compromise of the values of solidarity, which affirmed the right of those most affected by an issue to lead the struggle, at worse it was a sign of Western paternalism and arrogance. As John Saxby of CUSO explained, while critical solidarity made sense theoretically, it became much more difficult in application when the critic was a white, privileged Northerner, trying to tell South African

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1097 Interview Peter Butning.
1098 Interview Lynda Lamberg.
1099 Interview Paul Puritt (a).
liberation groups how to carry out their struggle. ¹¹⁰⁰ Doug Miller of CUSO notes that during his time in Zambia, as CUSO’s liberation support work was being established, he had a ZAPU member, Mshana Mcumbe, write a paper for CUSO on international solidarity. ¹¹⁰¹ The paper defined ‘pure solidarity’ as full and total support to movements, distinct from the more qualified support of churches and the much disdained critical support of TCLSAC or the CLC, which was seen as being rooted in anti-communism. For CUSO (and most of the network) it would be a variation of this idea of pure solidarity, what I call deferential solidarity, which would be seen as the most legitimate way to work with the ANC. As Smille notes, CUSO liberation staff supported the ANC and SACTU to an almost total exclusion of other groups. ¹¹⁰² Hein Marias stated that, ‘in the Canadian political network there were more nuanced views, but CUSO was always the more dogmatic of that crowd, no doubt about that. They loved the ANC, and they loved SACTU.’ ¹¹⁰³ Joan Anne Nolan confirmed this perception, noting others in the network sometimes thought CUSO activists were a little naïve in their support of the ANC. ¹¹⁰⁴

But what did deferentially supporting the ANC mean in practice for CUSO? First and foremost it meant consulting with and taking the lead from the ANC on liberation support policies and the deep involvement of ANC members in the implementation of programs. ¹¹⁰⁵ John Van Mossel recollected how, during his tenure running the liberation support office, he would be in close contact with Thabo Mbeki about CUSO’s work, once asking Mbeki whether he approved of CUSO agreeing to a proposal from PAC to support one of their programs with refugees. ¹¹⁰⁶ Mbeki’s response was that if it was humanitarian aid for South Africans and did not involve politically recognizing the PAC, then in this case it would be fine, but in other instances CUSO refused proposals from PAC due to their policy of exclusively recognizing the ANC. ¹¹⁰⁷ David Beer also recollected how ANC members in Lusaka were brought in to do introductory

workshops for newly arrived co-operants, while Joan Anne Nolan mentioned how CUSO held formal consultations with the ANC before opening their Johannesburg office, to get input on what work CUSO should be doing inside the country.\textsuperscript{1108}

Within Canada CUSO worked closely with the ANC office. Beer noted that while they were not allowed to fund the office, they would support it by doing things like printing materials for them and having staff accompany Yusuf Salajoe when he went to lobby government officials in Ottawa. An interesting example of the power and influence the ANC exerted in the relationship comes from a letter sent by Joan Anne Nolan to a CUSO staff person in Edmonton Alberta, but copied to a number of ANC and CUSO officials and Jim Kirkwood. Attached to the letter is a handwritten note for Kirkwood in which Nolan writes, ‘Thought I’d copy to chief reps office as Yusuf recently rapped my knuckles for failure to report there what I’m doing here!’\textsuperscript{1109} In the context of a contemporary North-South relationships and ongoing critiques about Northern funders abusing their power, it’s quite extraordinary to see a case where a Southern recipient was actually able to reprimand their Northern funder on their reporting practices. But this is because CUSO activists didn’t see themselves as being a Northern funder, but as comrades supporting the ANC in their struggle.

Through this deferential support, CUSO was able to gain the trust necessary to serve as the key gatekeeper for the Canadian movement to the ANC in Lusaka. Such relations led CUSO co-operative Stuart Cryer to be placed within the ANC in 1986 to help train their video unit, where he was given a green ANC Identity card upon arrival in Lusaka, making him effectively a member of the organization.\textsuperscript{1110} Such closeness also led David Beer to take a break from CUSO in 1990 to work as a volunteer with the ANC head office around organizational development.\textsuperscript{1111} This deferential support also extended to SACTU, with CUSO providing ongoing support to the SSC including: financial support to Wall and Luckhardt during the

\textsuperscript{1108} Interview Joan Anne Nolan (b).
\textsuperscript{1109} Nolan "Personal Letter."
\textsuperscript{1110} Interview Stuart Cryer, Subbury.
\textsuperscript{1111} Interview David Beer.
writing of their book, small grants for the committees ongoing work and indirect support through the ex-CUSO staff, like Ken Traynor, who become key members of the committee upon their return to Canada.1112

But such deferential relations could extend yet further, at the most extreme end including the active participation of CUSO members in the underground activities of the ANC. For some CUSO members living in Southern Africa, this simply meant extending safe houses to ANC operatives when needed.1113 In the case of Martha Molete, this extended into actual participation in ANC military structures. After taking part in CUSO-CIDMAA solidarity tour of Southern Africa in 1988, Molete was recruited in Canada to work smuggling weapons for the ordnance division of the MK.1114 She carried this role out while living in Zimbabwe, from 1989-1991, and as a CUSO co-operant in South Africa from 1991-1994, supplying ANC cadres battling with IFP fighters in Kwa-Zulu Natal. Her commander, Muff Anderson, mentions that Martha was one of a whole cohort of Canadians who did similar work, though she wouldn’t reveal numbers.1115

Deferential solidarity to the ANC was not restricted to CUSO, but common within the whole movement. For example the 1982 Canadian solidarity conference in Ottawa clearly stated that this was not a conference in solidarity with all the liberation movements of South Africa, but was being held to ‘mobilize support for the ANC (SA) and SWAPO on a Canada-wide scale.’1116 Jim Kirkwood, part of executive planning committee, describes how PAC and BCM supporters in Canada had come to them and requested a place at the table at the event, but at the urging of the ANC office this request was denied.1117 This deference to the ANC was apparent with the UCC as well. Certainly they were not as absolutist in their position as CUSO, as the UCC always had a large variety of groups it supported in South Africa and Kirkwood noted that the SACC and CI were their primary partners. But UCC documents demonstrate a high degree of deference to the ANC. Saloojee himself praised the UCC’s support, writing in 1985 that the UCC was a

1112 Interview Ken Traynor; Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, p. 245.
1113 Interview Sue Godt; Interview David Beer.
1114 Interview Martha Molete, Johannesburg.
1115 Interview Muff Anderson.
1116 Canadian Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa (a), "Canadian Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa Flyer," p. 2.
1117 Interview Jim Kirkwood (b).
‘formidable supporter to the ANC’ and asserting in 2010 that they always offered ‘unqualified support.’

From as early as 1982, the UCC’s executive council was passing resolutions drafted by the DWO which stated that, ‘the United Church feels that the South West Africa People’s Organization and the African National Congress represents the greatest hope for the peaceful change in those countries towards majority rule.’

But the most interesting element about this deferential support is the lengths to which the UCC was willing to continue to support the ANC regardless of its conduct. For example, there are a series of letters in the archives where Jim Kirkwood’s frustration with the ANC’s financial accounting is obvious, one stating, ‘I would also like to request again, as I have been doing for at least two or three years now, some written financial information of what the Canadian office has done in the past years or any budget for this year or next year- ANYTHING would be welcome.’ In another letter, Kirkwood noted his disappointment with Yusuf Salajoe, who had asked him to raise money from Canadian churches for an ANC event, only to have the money requested with ‘zero notice’ to be transferred to a totally different event, the Call of Islam Tour. The letter ended with a statement of Kirkwood’s disappointment, ‘So I have been forced again to make this large contribution, without knowing what anyone else will contribute, if anything. I guess I am feeling taken for granted and wish these things could be coordinated much better.’ Despite these ongoing concerns Kirkwood never ended the financial support, with letters from 1984 revealing he was even passing on funding ‘under the table’ to the ANC office by making donations to TCLSAC, which they would then pass on to the ANC. As Kirkwood himself admits, ‘maybe we didn’t visit enough, or were too liberal and didn’t ask them for enough financial standards. I was never very good in handling partners who were

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1119 Canadian Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa (b),” Conference Final Declaration,”p. 7.
1120 Jim Kirkwood to Peter Mahlangu, “Personal Letter,” United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 91.164C, Box 9-2, Toronto (Dec. 12th 1989).
1122 Jim Kirkwood to TCLSAC Office, “Personal Letter,” United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 88.031C, Box 12-9, Toronto (March 22nd 1984); Ibid., “Personal Letter,” United Church of Canada Archives: Division of World Outreach, Area Secretary, Africa, Acc. No. 88.031C, Box 12-9, Toronto (Feb. 23 1984).
abusing money, I probably never even knew. It was the independence period and the name of the game from the 1960s on was to trust leaders, give them slack, and depend on their own people to criticize them.\textsuperscript{1123} Looking at such issues from the post-apartheid period—a time of contractual relations between funding partners, full transparency and in-depth reporting mechanisms—such unqualified support seems almost unbelievable. But for activists at the time, any other relationship would have been a compromise of the lofty ideals of international solidarity and a much less legitimate way to carry out transnational activism.

8.2.4. The case of SACTU solidarity

The conflict that is most emblematic of the splits in the Canadian network over critical and deferential solidarity is the division during the early 1980s over whether activists should support SACTU or the new unions on the ground in the country, such as those in FOSATU. As Brenda Wall recalled, when she and Ken Luckhardt returned to Canada in 1980 they were charged by SACTU to open a committee to promote the organization. She explained, ‘We weren’t just another solidarity committee, it was difficult for other anti-apartheid groups to understand, but SACTU clearly gave us the ability to represent them.’\textsuperscript{1124} As such the SSC went about doing excellent grassroots education with Canadian unions,\textsuperscript{1125} but also became Canadian champions for SACTU’s global campaign to establish themselves as the sole legitimate representative of, and connection to, the South African working class.\textsuperscript{1126} This led to fierce battles with the CLC, which was affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) while SACTU was aligned to the communist World Federation of Trade Unions.

Paul Purrit, explaining the CLC’s position of supporting unions like FOSATU, stated that ‘our decisions were always based on who actually represents workers. SACTU was not representing anyone, they lived in exile, they didn’t represent workers, didn’t organize them, they were political types not trade

\textsuperscript{1123} Interview Jim Kirkwood (c).
\textsuperscript{1124} Interview Brenda Wall.
\textsuperscript{1125} Interview Judith Marshall (a).
\textsuperscript{1126} Southall, \textit{Imperialism or Solidarity?}, pp. 28 and 169.
unionist. He noted this was not only what he was hearing from trade unionists overseas, but what South Africans told him directly when he travelled to South Africa and the frontline states in the late 1970s and early 1980s with OXFAM. SACTU supporters meanwhile were adamant in stating that the CLC’s resistance to the SACTU was due to anti-communist politics, with the head of the international department, John Harker, named by different activists as being a staunch ‘cold warrior.’

Thus a real battle ensued with both the CLC and SACTU Solidarity Committee trying to win over individual Canadian unions to support their South African partner unions and boycott their opposing ones, the SSC’s biggest success being gaining the support of the influential Canadian Auto Workers Union. SACTU leader Archie Sibeko aka Zola Zembe, would make various trips to Canada to drum up support for the SSC, including one where he told unionists they could give money to Paul Puritt and the CLC or throw their money into the sea, most likely the money thrown to the sea would reach South African workers first.

While Harker and Puritt rejected the anti-communist accusations levelled at them, movement scholars like John Saul claim that anti-communism did motivate the CLC’s spurning of SACTU, but argue that despite this, the CLC got it right in supporting internal unions, even if it was for the wrong reason. The real question is whether SACTU was being honest when it claimed to be the leading voice for South African workers. Archie Simbeko of SACTU argued that SACTU operatives were very active in South Africa, clandestinely working behind the scenes to support movement building. Johnny Copelyn, former secretary general of FOSATU, noted that SACTU activists were indeed active, but claims he didn’t see any money donated from their strike fund going to South African workers and that he believed their main work was in infiltrating unions and making sure they aligned themselves to the ANC. Meanwhile Roger

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1127 Interview Paul Puritt (a).
1128 Interview Ken Traynor; Interview John Saul (a).
1130 Interview Archie Sibeko.
1131 Interview John Harker, Sydney (Nova Scotia); Interview Paul Puritt(a).
1133 Interview Archie Sibeko.
1134 Interview Johnny Copelyn.
Southfeild convincingly argued SACTU was functionally dead in South Africa after 1964, and Hugh McMillion has recounted the shock the SACTU leadership had in 1986 when COSATU delegations arrived in Lusaka and they realized how disconnected they were from events in the country. Thus Linda Freeman seems to be correct in arguing that while the SACTU Solidarity Committee’s did do important solidarity work, their actions also proved divisive to the labour movement and prevented Canadian support from being extended to the emerging trade unions which desperately needed it at the time.

Interestingly, the SSC had a very contentious relationship with the ANC office, while the CLC remained on good terms with the ANC. Yusuf Salajoee asserts that he felt the leadership of the SSC had overstepped the appropriate roles for Canadian activists, in how they spoke in the name of SACTU and notes that he personally requested a new SACTU representative be sent to Canada to reign the committee in. It was this representative’s arrival which led to the committees’ activities winding down over the late 1980s. Different reasons were suggested by activists for this split, including suggestions that Salajoee represented a much more conservative wing of the tripartite alliance versus the more Marxist SACTU and arguments that Salajoee saw the SACTU Solidarity Committee as a liability to the ANC gaining mainstream and government acceptance in Canada, due to their alleged communist connections and constant battles with the CLC. What is clear that the SACTU Solidarity Committee sought to build legitimacy exclusively with SACTU, with little concern for the consequences this had with the rest of the Canadian movement or even the ANC. Unfortunately, such a strategy seems to have worked against a significant section of the South African working class they were claiming to represent.

1138 Interview Ken Traynor; Interview Brenda Wall.
1139 Interview Yusuf Salajoee.
1140 Interview Brenda Wall.
1141 Interview Archie Sibeko; Interview Doug Miller; Interview Ken Traynor.
1142 Interview Ken Traynor; Interview Georgina Jaffee.
8.2.5. The international context

In many ways, the Canadian experience described here is not unique. Clear examples of deferential solidarity can be seen in the experience of the AAM in Britain. Feildhouse writes that from its creation, right up to 1999, AAM ‘publicly accepted its subservient role’ to the ANC, taking direction from the liberation group at regular meetings held with them throughout the 1970s-1980s.\textsuperscript{1143} Genevieve Klein notes the constant frustration PAC had towards AAM, which officially recognized PAC, but constantly marginalized it at the ANC’s behest.\textsuperscript{1144} For example, in 1981 AAM convinced the British Labour Part to withdraw the platform extended to a PAC speaker at their national conference.\textsuperscript{1145} Klein also explains how AAM’s publication, Anti-Apartheid News, would constantly portray the ANC as the monolithic leader of all resistance in South Africa, downplaying the role of the PAC and totally ignoring the significance of BCM.\textsuperscript{1146}

In regards to SACTU, AAM was equally deferential, profiling the group, naming it publically as the sole representative of worker’s in South Africa, and creating guidelines in July 1981 around how links should be made with South African trade unions, which stressed that all outreach must be done through SACTU.\textsuperscript{1147} The AAM leadership also worked to subvert attempts by AAM members to encourage building links with FOSATU.\textsuperscript{1148} In Sweden, the situation with respect to SACTU was similar to Canada, as the country’s largest labour bodies, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation and the Central Organization of Salaried Employees, were all supportive of the ANC but highly sceptical of SACTU.\textsuperscript{1149} Both the trade unions and the Swedish Labour Party preferred to support internal unions through the ICFTU, which led to SACTU Secretary General John Nkadimeng to state in 1984 that, ‘there are determined efforts by the ICFTU-affiliated unions, like the Swedish LO/TCO, Dutch FNV, Canadian Labour Congress and others, to

\textsuperscript{1143} Fieldhouse, \textit{Anti-Apartheid}, pp. 271 and 273.
\textsuperscript{1145} Ibid., pp. 263.
\textsuperscript{1146} Ibid., pp. 265 and 270.
\textsuperscript{1147} Ibid., pp. 276 and 280.
\textsuperscript{1148} Ibid., p. 279.
undermine and divert the revolutionary path of struggle followed by the militant working class.” Thus it would be accurate to state that neither the tactics of deferential solidarity or critical solidarity, nor conflicts around support for SACTU, was a uniquely Canadian phenomenon.

8.3. In search of solidarity: building legitimate solidarity movements

Post-apartheid, deferential solidarity all but disappeared. As soon as CUSO opened their South African office they worked to align themselves with civil society organizations, no longer supporting the ANC. At first the organizations they worked with generally supported the ANC, but as the 1990s wore on and civil society groups began to enter more antagonistic relationships with the state, like the NLC, CUSO remained a steadfast supporter of them. The UCC followed a similar course, throwing its weight behind civil society, while activists like Jim Kirkwood grew increasingly disappointed in the ANC’s economic policies. Jim McKinnen of OXFAM said that 1994 was the end of an era, as by that point Canadian CSO’s had learned the hard way from past experiences in Eritrea, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia, that continued support for liberation groups post-liberation was disastrous, and that if there was any role for Canadian organizations in solidarity work in Africa, it was through a critical engagement that focused on civil society groups. Further, the funding regime of the 1990s, with its focus on accountability and effective development partnerships, provided no room for groups to transfer the older model of deferential support to these new civil society relationships.

But the post-apartheid period had its own legitimacy issues as well. Over the 1990s CSOs in the West came under increasing scrutiny from academics, the media and government about how representative they truly were. This pressure and the advent of democracy in South Africa created the expectation that solidarity work by Canadian CSOs would now include direct grassroots participation by South Africans. Yet doing this from progressive CSOs with dwindling budgets, running limited activities within an international

1150 Ibid., p. 449.
1151 Interview John Van Mossel.
1152 Interview Jim Kirkwood (b).
1153 Interview Jim MacKinnon.
solidarity advocacy network, was quite difficult. One answer has been to for Canadian CSOs to bring grassroots leaders on exchange visits, or have them participate in conferences and policy development events. Yet my own interviews with two South African shop stewards and one local social movement leader who had participated in such events led me to question their value. In all cases it was clear the activists enjoyed the experiences, but also found them quite overwhelming, being plucked out of their context and dropped for a few days into a world of middle class, white, and highly professional Western CSO members and staff.  

1155 In such one-time exchanges there seems to be the danger of tokenism. Richard Pithouse discusses other dangers of South African grassroots participation in international solidarity networks. He notes that Northern groups, due to the difficulty of working with local movements, often revert to substituting Southern professional level activists for grassroots activists, distorting the entire process. 1156 Or through misguided outreach, they inadvertently create patron client situations, where grassroots movements fight each other to gain access to the funding that comes from taking part in international solidarity networks, and local leaders who are proficient at speaking the language of anti-neo-liberalism are turned into ‘global justice celebrities,’ travelling across the world to conferences, but increasingly disconnected from their own base. 1157

Yet it is also clear that true legitimacy in solidarity work must somehow involve an attention to the needs of the Southern grassroots. As Jordan and van Tuijl argue, the most politically responsible transnational advocacy campaign is one where all activities are maximized to benefit those most affected by the issue. 1158 But as it’s impossible for a Northern CSO to form a relationship, let alone a legitimate one, with every grassroots formation in a Southern nation, there are real questions about how this can be achieved. Clearly international solidarity will never escape the need for ‘proxy’ groups in the South who serve as representatives for larger communities. But it’s also clear there is an onus on Northern groups to ensure the proxies they choose are representative. In acknowledging this, it must be asked: can activists

1155 Interview Rose Mtofu, Johannesburg; Interview Thembisa Xeketwana; Interview Davine Witbooi, Cape Town.
1157 Interview Richard Pithouse.
really create legitimate international solidarity relationships and if so, what does the legacy of anti-apartheid have to teach us about doing it? I believe the legacy makes it clear that legitimate solidarity work is possible, but that there are no easy solutions.

Despite the fact that the ANC was obviously working to crowd other groups out and at times may have abused some of the trust given to it by Canadian activists, it is extremely difficult to say that such support was wrong or was not in the best interest of those most affected by apartheid. Though not the only group that fought for liberation, the ANC did ultimately lead the talks to end apartheid and gained the support of 62.2 per cent of the popular vote in 1994. These are fairly strong indicators that it was legitimately representing the aspirations of most South Africans. Though most of the activists I spoke to in Canada felt some regret about the ANC’s neo-liberal shift post-1994, none argued that supporting the group had been a mistake. And in the context of today’s critiques of development, against which it seems impossible for Northern and Southern groups to work together in a non-paternalistic fashion, the way in which Canadians willingly let go of their power and simply trusted ANC comrades is actually quite impressive. In retrospect deferential solidarity may have been naïve or overly romantic, but it shows that ideological and ethical commitment can lead to the creation of rather equitable North-South partnerships. And when deference is given to the right Southern partners, it can yield transformative results.

Yet as the case of the SACTU Solidarity Committee shows, deferential solidarity given to the wrong group can have exceedingly negative results, as despite whatever good intentions existed, deference to SACTU meant resources which could have gone to South African workers struggling in emerging trade unions didn’t get to them. Thus the answer seems to be that international solidarity work can be legitimate, but to be legitimate and successful what is required is both deferential relations that build the trust of Southern groups, along with room for critical engagement, where Northern partners can question their Southern partners on the extent to which their work truly speaks for the grassroots. Such an achievement cannot come from one policy, but a constant process of reflection and North-South dialogue, one that most likely can only

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1159 Manuel Álvarez-Rivera, "Election Resources on the Internet."
take place within a relationship built over many years, cemented by mutual respect between both parties. Unfortunately, it is hard to see how such relationships can be built within the current environment, where the existing funding regime continues to squeeze progressive politics out of Canadian overseas work, the general public seems to have little interest in regenerating progressive CSOs and institutionalist concerns drown out activist’s cries of solidarity. But the history of Canadian-South African solidarity work highlights a set of critical points: that the ideals of international solidarity can inspire global movements, that relationships can be built that defy North-South power dynamics, and finally, that for this to happen larger political and social forces must shift, or new organizational models must be developed that can replace traditional progressive CSOs. By shedding light on these realities, this thesis provides guidance for a new generation of transnational activists, who will hopefully seek to build 21st century movements that align with the ideals of their predecessors.
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Interviews

Canada

Allen, Derek, September 17th 2010, Ottawa, Interview in Person

Background: Allen is the current Executive Director of CUSO-VSO.

Alkenbrak, Betsy, November 3rd 2009, Toronto, Phone Interview

Background: Alkenbrak began her anti-apartheid activism when she was placed as a volunteer in Lesotho in 1978 with Canadian Crossroads International. There she worked to support local ANC groups in the country. She then returned to Canada and spent two years working for TCLSAC and volunteering with various groups in the movement. In 1990 she moved to South Africa to work with the NGO the English Literacy Project, becoming a CUSO co-operant the same year.

Beaudet, Pierre, September 23rd 2010, Ottawa, Interview in Person

Background: Currently a professor at the University of Ottawa, Beaudet was a former SUCO board member, a founder of the NGO CIDMAA and an anti-apartheid movement scholar.

Blanchard, Lyse, December 1st 2010, Ottawa, Phone Interview

Background: Blanchard was the Executive Director of CUSO from 1990 to 1994.

Bruun-Meyer, Margie, September 18th 2009, Toronto, Phone Interview

Background: Bruun-Meyer moved to Toronto from South Africa in 1975, and began volunteering with TCLSAC, working as a photographer and graphic designer for Southern African Report and other movement publications. In the early 1980s she travelled to South Africa to carry out a report for CUSO on the implications of supporting CSOs inside the country.

Candia, Rosa, September 21st 2010, Ottawa, Interview in Person

Background: A long time volunteer and staff person with CUSO, Candia is currently the Diaspora Volunteer Program Coordinator for CUSO-VSO.

Cook, Al, September 8th 2010, Ottawa, Interview In Person

Background: Cook was a founding member of IDAFSA and was former President of the organization.

Cryer, Stuart, September 15th 2010, Sudbury, Phone Interview

Background: In the 1980s Cryer was a community college teacher and trade union activist in Sudbury Ontario. He was recruited by CUSO to travel to Lusaka and support the ANC’s Video Unit, where he carried out training on the use of audio-visual equipment between Sept. 1986 to May 1987 and then from Oct. 1988 to May 1989.
Dillon, John, August 26th 2010, Toronto, Interview In Person

Background: Dillon was a former staff person for the Ecumenical Coalition on Economic Justice and currently works as the Global Economic Justice Research, Program Coordinator with the sustainability team at KAIROS Canada.

Elson, Patricia, January 19th 2011, Toronto, Email Correspondence

Background: Elson is the UCC’s Program Coordinator, for People in Partnership and Asia Partnerships.

Fairweather, Joan, September 8th 2010, Interview in Person

Background: Fairweather was an active member of IDAFSA Canada and is one of the main scholars of the Canadian movement. She wrote the chapter on Canadian solidarity with South Africa in the publication *The Road to Democracy in South Africa* (2004).

Falconer, Roger, November 6th 2009, Toronto, Phone Interview

Background: Falconer was a member of the USW who from 1981-1985. He worked in East Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia running a workers education program with the ICFTU, his position funded by the CLC. From 1985-87 he was involved with a program around skills training for South Africa trade unionists, 25 of whom he accompanied on a study tour to a trade union education centre in Turin Italy.

Freeman, Linda, September 11th 2010, Ottawa, Interview in Person

Background: Freeman is the leading scholar on Canada’s foreign policy towards South Africa during the apartheid period. She was a long time contributor to Southern African Report, author of *The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney years* (1997) and currently teaches in the African Studies department at Carleton University.

Gichuru, Wendy, February 28th 2008, Toronto (MSc dissertation interview), Phone Interview

Background: Gichuru is the UCC’s Program Coordinator for East and Central Africa and the Middle East.

Godt, Sue, September 16th 2010, Ottawa, In Person

Background: In 1972 Godt began to work at the CUSO office in Ottawa, volunteering at the same time with the Southern Africa Information Group. She was then placed as a CUSO co-operant in Papa New Guinea, followed by a placement in Botswana starting in 1981. She spent four years in the country. There she became involved in supporting the work of the local ANC’s Women’s Group. In 1985 she returned to Canada and volunteered with the SACTU Solidarity Committee. After working for CUSO in Zimbabwe in the late 1980s, she moved to South Africa in 1990 and became the first CUSO co-operant in the country.

Grant, Yola, October 23rd 2009, Toronto, Phone Interview

Background: Grant joined CCSA in 1980 and served as a volunteer and Chair for the group. She was also co-chair of the Anti-Apartheid Coalition of Toronto, when it was first formed in 1985.

Gregersen, Bruce, Feb 14 2008th (MSc dissertation interview), Toronto, Phone Interview

Background: Gregersen is the General Council Minister, Programs for Mission and Ministry, at the United Church of Canada head office.
Background: The Very Reverend David Gulliano was the 39th Moderator of the UCC, from 2006 to 2010.

Background: Harker was in charge of the CLC’s International Division over the 1980s.

Background: Hodgson was a former staff person at the CCC, from 1988 until the early 1990s, working as the Associate Secretary for Ecumenical Education and Communication. During the 1994 elections in South Africa he was sent to be part of EMPSA, supporting the organization around its public relations work. He is currently the Co-ordinator of Caribbean, Central American and Colombian partnerships at the UCC.

Background: Molly Kane is the former Director of the NGO Inter-Pares and is also a former Chair of the CCIC’s Africa Canada Forum. She currently works as program staff with the ETC Group.

Background: Kenny was a protégé of the UCC’s Jim Kirkwood, beginning his anti-apartheid activism by working as an editor and article writer for SAEP. In 1987 Kenny would join ICCAF as the coordinator for its South Africa program, in 1989 he came became the Executive Director of the coalition. He currently is the UCC’s Program Co-ordinator for Southern Africa and Emergency Response.

Background: Khalema was a minister with the Methodist church in South Africa, who worked with the SACC during the 1980s. In 1989 he went into exile in Canada, becoming a minister for a UCC congregation in Laklabesh Alberta. Today he works at the head office of the UCC in Toronto.

Background: Born in 1933 in Ballinafad Ontario, Jim Kirkwood studied theology at the University of Toronto and served as a United Church of Canada missionary to multiple rural congregations in Zambia between 1962 and 1976. Upon his return to Canada he took up the role of running the Africa Desk for the UCC’s Division of World Outreach from 1977 to 1994, serving as the church’s main staff person for relating to Southern African partners and the anti-apartheid movement.
Background: Lamberg is a Canadian academic who served both as a Chair and a member of CCSA. She was involved in various projects during the 1980s, including CCSA’s work with the Toronto District School Board and the 1987 rally for Oliver Tambo.

MacKinnon, Jim, September 15th 2010, Ottawa, Interview in Person

Background: In 1989 McKinnon returned to Canada after three years of living in Zimbabwe, joining OXFAM Canada and becoming part of the anti-apartheid network in Ottawa. Today McKinnon is the Manager for the Southern Africa Program for OXFAM Canada.

Marshall, Judith (a), June 15th 2009, Toronto, Interview in Person

Marshall, Judith (b), Sept. 17th 2009, Toronto, Phone Interview

Marshall, Judith (c), August 10th 2010, Toronto, Interview in Person

Background: A career Southern African liberation activist, Marshall was a founding member of TCLPAC/TCLSAC and worked in Southern Africa from 1978 to 1984 with OXFAM Canada. In the mid-1980s she conducted her PHD for the University of Toronto, looking at illiteracy in rural Mozambique. In the late 1980s she worked as a freelance consultant for Canadian NGOs receiving aid money for humanitarian work in the Front Line States. In 1991 she began working with the United Steel Workers of Canada, for their Humanity Funding, building the group’s connections with the unions NUM and NUMSA and various other CSOs in South Africa.

Maxwell, Charlotte, September 2nd 2010, Toronto, Interview In Person

Background: A long time anti-apartheid activist, Maxwell worked with OXFAM Canada during the early 1970s. In the mid 1970s she and a group of OXFAM colleagues ran a short lived news service called South African News. In 1981 she began working for the Anglican Church with the Primates Fund for development, serving various functions within this organization over the 1980-90s.

Miller, Doug, November 24th 2009, Ottawa, Phone Interview

Background: A long time activist, Miller was involved with the South African Information Group in Ottawa between 1972 and 1975. In 1976 he was sent by CUSO to Zambia to set up their liberation support office. In 1979 he returned to Canada and became a volunteer with the SACTU Solidarity Committee, serving as their Quebec liaison.

Mitsui, Tad, November 25th 2009, Lethbridge, Phone Interview

Background: Mitsui was sent as a UCC missionary to teach theology, in Lesotho with Desmond Tutu from 1968-1975. He also worked with various South African student groups, including Steve Biko’s SASO. Following his time in Lesotho he worked in Geneva with the World University Service until 1979. He was a church activist around anti-apartheid work in Canada during the 1980s, with a 3 year stint as a consultant at the WCC in Geneva from 1985-88. In 1988 he returned to Canada to work on issues around Africa and the Middle East as a staff person at the CCC.

Moffat, Jeanne, September 30th 2010, Toronto, Interview in Person

Background: Moffat began her involvement in anti-apartheid work in 1976, through the outreach committee at her local church in the city of Waterloo. In the early 1980s she became a member of the UCC’s SAEP, serving as a representative for lay people in congregations. In 2001 she would become the
interim director for KARIOS Canada, helping to combine the multiple ecumenical coalitions which came
together to form this new CSO.

Nolan, Joan Anne (a), March 20th 2009, Ottawa, Phone Interview

Nolan, Joan Anne (b), November 4th 2009, Ottawa, Phone Interview

Nolan, Joan Anne(c), September 15th 2010, Ottawa, Phone Interview

Background: During the mid 1980s Nolan worked for CUSO Ottawa around liberation support work from
within Canada. In 1988 she moved to Zambia to lead CUSO’s liberation support program with the ANC
and SWAPO. In 1992 she moved to South Africa to open the CUSO office in the country. From 1996-
2001 she worked with the National Land Committee in Johannesburg.

Oussoren, Harry, February 20 2008, Toronto (MSc dissertation interview), Phone Interview

Background: Oussoren is the former Executive Minister Congregational, Educational, and Community
Ministries Unit (2005-2009) at the UCC’s head office.

Perras, Sylvie, September 20th 2010, Ottawa, Interview in Person

Background: Perras is the staff person at the CCIC who manages the Africa Canada Forum.

Puritt, Paul (a), November 13th 2009, Ottawa, Phone Interview

Puritt, Paul (a), August 11th 2010, In Person

Background: Puritt began anti-apartheid work in 1959 as a student activist at the University of Toronto.
Along with other radical Canadian academics he taught at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania
during the 1960s. He was a member of TLPAC and TCLSAC and from 1975-1984 he worked as a staff
person for OXFAM Canada in Southern Africa. He helped with the founding of CIDMMA in 1982. From
1984 to his retirement he worked at the International Department of the CLC, managing relationships with
South African trade unionists. He also served as temporary director of the South African Education Trust
Fund in 1990 and from 1992-1994 he lived in South Africa, liaising with the CLC’s partner unions.

Sanders, Nora, February 12th 2009, Toronto (MSc dissertation interview), Phone Interview

Background: Beginning in 2006, Sanders became the General Secretary of the United Church of Canada.

Sanger, Clyde and Penny Sanger, September 22nd 2010, Ottawa, Interview in Person

Background: Both Sanger’s were journalists who had spent time in Southern Africa in the late 1950s and
early 1960s. Clyde was a correspondent with The Guardian and later The Globe and Mail. After moving to
Ottawa in 1969, they were both involved with local anti-apartheid activism in the city and the founding and
running of IDAFSA Canada.

Saul, John (a), June 10th 2009, Toronto, Interview in Person

Saul, John (b), September 28th 2010, Toronto, Interview in Person

Background: John S. Saul is Professor Emeritus in Politics at York University, Toronto. Born in 1938, he
was one of a number of Canadian academics who taught at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania
during the 1960s. Saul was a founder and guiding force behind TLPAC and TCLSAC. He was one of
two Canadians invited by FRELIMO to Mozambique’s independence ceremony in 1975. A leading anti-apartheid activist, he served as an editor and contributor to TCLSAC’s magazine Southern African Report, was a board member with OXFAM Canada and served as a CUSO co-operant in Mozambique teaching at the FRELIMO party school. He is currently writing an official SADC history of the Southern African solidarity movements in Canada and the United States.

Saxby, John, September 17th 2010, Ottawa, Interview in Person

Background: Saxby was a long time Southern African solidarity activist, first living in Zambia from 1969 to 1971. He did his doctoral thesis on the politics of education in Zambia between 1973-8. In 1979 he started to manage CUSO’s East Southern and Central African desk. In 1982 he returned to Zambia to run CUSO’s liberation support program, then until 1988 was the CUSO field manager for East, Southern and Central African. From 1988 to 1994 he returned to Canada and worked at the CUSO head office in Ottawa.

Summat, Margaret, November 3rd 2010, Toronto, Phone Interview

Background: Margaret was an active volunteer in the UCC’s anti-apartheid work, mainly through ICCAF. In 1993 she was sent to Kwa-Zulu Natal as an election monitor with EMPSA.

Traynor, Ken, November 2nd 2009, Toronto, Phone Interview

Background: Traynor was a CUSO staff person who worked on various CUSO liberation support programs in Botswana and Zambia during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1982 he returned to Canada from Southern Africa to join the SACTU Solidarity Committee, working full time with the committee for the next five years.

Van Moseel, John (a), Sept 17th 2009, Ottawa, Phone Interview

Van Moseel, John (b), January 15th 2010, Ottawa, Phone Interview

Background: Van Moseel was a long time CUSO staff person (1981-1999). As Country Director in Botswana (1982-1985) he worked directly with the various Southern African liberation movements in the country. He then ran CUSO’s liberation support office in Zambia from 1986-1988. Following this he worked as management at the CUSO head office in Ottawa.

Wall, Brenda, March 12th 2010, Toronto, Phone Interview

Background: Wall came to Canada from Australia in the early 1970s to study anthropology. She and her then partner Ken Luckhardt began doing local anti-apartheid work in Edmonton Alberta in 1976. They were then both recruited by SACTU to write the organizations history, Organize or Starve (1980) between 1978-1980. Starting in 1980 they were instructed to open up a SACTU Solidarity Committee, which they led until its work petered out in the late 1980s.

White, Greg, August 31st 2010, Hamilton, Phone Interview

Background: White was a UCC minister who became a volunteer with ICCAF and in the late 1980s served as co-chair for ICCAF’s South Africa Committee. His congregation of Welland Avenue United Church would also become involved in a twinning program with the Imizamo Yethu Community outside of Hout Bay, South Africa.
South Africa

Anderson, Muff, March 26th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Anderson joined the ANC in 1980, eventually travelling to Eastern Europe to receive military training. She served in the MK’s High Command structure for the Ordnance Division, focusing on supplying arms to units operating within South Africa. As part of this position she travelled across the world, including various trips to Canada, to recruit Westerners to help with moving weaponry into the country.

Andrews, Mercia, July 10th 2010, Cape Town, Interview In Person

Background: Andrews is the current executive director of the Trust for Community Outreach and Education and is a former President of the South African National NGO Coalition.

Beer, David (a), Cape Town, July 16th 2009, Phone Interview

David Beer (b), Cape Town, Feb 10th 2010, Interview in Person

David Beer (c), Cape Town, March 12th 2010, Interview in Person

Background: Born in 1941, Beer went to a Quaker boarding school outside of Toronto. A career solidarity activist his passion began with a trip to British Guyana in 1958-9. He then helped launch an organization called Canadian Commonwealth Volunteer services and was placed in Jamaica from 1963-4. In 1964 he was sent to Zambia as a CUSO volunteer. He then returned to Canada in 1967 to work with the CUSO Ottawa office, but was sent back to Zambia the same year, working for CUSO Zambia until 1974. Following this he ran CUSO’s Development Education program in Ottawa, and from 1982 to 1989 coordinated the Africa Desk for CUSO Ottawa. He also served as a vice president of IDAFSA Canada in the late 1980s. In 1990 he returned to Zambia to volunteer with the ANC, and then ran the CUSO ECSA office until 1994, when he resigned. Following this he took on a position as a CUSO co-operant with SPP, then in 1997 began work with the NLC in Johannesburg.

Bhyat, Fatima, November 2009, Johannesburg, Phone Interview

Background: A nurse by training, Bhyat left South Africa for Canada in 1970. She was a founding member of both the ANC office and CCSA. She was active around building support for the anti-apartheid movement in organized labour throughout the 1970-80s.

Boesak, Allan, May 25th 2010, Stellenbosch, Interview in Person

Background: Reverend Alan Boesak was a leading church figure in the anti-apartheid movement. He became internationally renowned as a liberation theologian with the publishing of his doctoral thesis in 1976. He was elected head of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches in 1982 a position he held until 1991. He served as a patron of the UDF, and was a prominent member of the ANC and then COPE. In 2000 he was jailed for one year after being found guilty of fraud.

Bunting, Peter, July 16th 2010, Johannesburg, Phone Interview

Background: Bunting, who came from a family with deep roots in the SACP, had to go into exile following his parent’s receiving a banning order in the early 1960s. He left South Africa for London UK in 1964. He then married a Canadian and immigrated to Canada in 1969. He moved to Toronto in 1974 and
joined the ANC Chapter, and in 1975 was involved in the founding of CCSA and became the first Chair of the organization.

Cassiem, Ashref, July 15th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Cassiem is the Chair of the South African social movement, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign.

Cole, Josette, May 14th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Cole was born in South Africa, but her family immigrated to Canada in the early 1960s. Involved in anti-apartheid work in Canada with the Student Christian Movement, she decided to return to South Africa in 1975. There she became deeply involved in local activism with people in informal settlements, working first with the Cape Flats Committee for Intern Accommodation. Through her ability to move between South Africa and Canada she served as a major connector between the Canadian and South African movements, and also took part in speaking tours across Canada. She was founder and former executive director of the NGO SPP, which she worked with up until 1996.

Copelyn, Johnny, February 11th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Copelyn served as a General-Secretary for various South African unions from 1976 to 1994, and also served on the executive leadership of FOSATU. From 1994-1997 Copelyn served as a Member of Parliament for the ANC and currently is the Chief Executive Officer for Hosken Consolidated Investment.

Crawhall, Nigel, February 10th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Crawhall was one of the first CUSO co-operants in South Africa, moving to the country from Zimbabwe in 1991, working for an NGO specializing in language rights and the transformation of the school system. He was also the first international co-operant chosen to sit on the CUSO board, serving from 1993-6. He is currently the Director of the Secretariat of the Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee.

Davies-van Es, Anna, June 4th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Davies-van Es is a researcher at ILRIG. In 2005 she conducted a joint research project with NUM, ILRIG and the USW, which involved a trip to Canada to tour a mine and attend a Steelworker women’s conference.

de Vlieg, Gille, February 18th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: De Vlieg was a member of the Black Sash chapter in Johannesburg during the 1980s. She helped receive a delegation of UCC members at their office in the mid-1980s and was then invited to come and take part in a speaking tour of churches in the North Bay region in Northern Ontario.

Faulkner, Stephen, May 3rd 2010, Johannesburg, Interview in Person

Background: A former official with the Commonwealth Trade Union Council in the United Kingdom, Faulkner now serves as the International Officer for the South African Municipal Workers' Union.

Gentle, Lenny, June 1st 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Gentle is the current executive director with the think tank ILRIG in Cape Town.
Giyose, MP, July 14th 2010, Fort Alfred, Phone Interview

Background: MP was an anti-apartheid activist affiliated with the Unity Movement, who went on to serve as the National Chairman of Jubilee South Africa.

Glover, Glenda, February 18th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Glover is a former Black Sash activist who served as management with SPP over the 1990s, including being the Executive Director from 2000-2001. She is the current Programme Development Manager for the NGO Rural Education Access Programme.

Grossman, Jonathan, July 8th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Grossman is a lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cape Town. He is a member of the support committee for the UCT Workers’ Forum.

Groves Matthews, Terry, February 2nd 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Matthews was a lay leader within the SACC during the 1980s. In 1990 she met Gary Kenny at a SACC conference and was invited to come and do a speaking tour of Atlantic Canada in October 1991.

Hattingh, Shawn, May 31st 2010, Cape Town, Interview In Person

Background: Hattingh is a researcher with the South African NGO ILRIG.

Heron, Nancy, March 25th 2010, Johannesburg, Interview in Person

Background: Heron is the current Director of the Institute for Contextual Theology.

Jacobs, Ricado, April 23rd 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Jacobs is the Research, Information and Advocacy Manager at the NGO SPP. In 2008 he travelled to Canada and visited the UCC head office.

Jaffee, Georgina, March 22nd 2010, Johannesburg, Interview in Person

Background: Jaffee left South Africa to move to Toronto in 1976. She joined TCLSAC and was a member of the SACTU Solidarity Committee. She also worked to support the anti-apartheid activities of various groups including the ANC office. In 1990 she returned to South Africa to work in civil society around housing issues.

Kritzinger, Kilippies, March 23rd 2010, Pretoria, Interview in Person

Background: Kritzinger is a professor of theology at the University of South Africa who was part of the Institute for Contextual Theology in the 1980s.

Lapsley, Michael (a), February 23rd 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Lapsley, Michael (b), April 10th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Father Michael Lapsley, born in New Zealand, was placed as a missionary in South Africa starting in 1973. After speaking out against the apartheid government in reaction to the Soweto Uprising of
1976, he was banned from the country and joined the ANC in exile. He would travel the world as a spokesperson for the group, organizing support for the Congress Alliance. During the anti-apartheid movement he took part in three speaking tours of Canada. Over the 2000s his Institute for the Healing of Memories has been a recipient of UCC funding.

Makonea, Joyce, March 25th 2010, Johannesburg, Interview in Person

Background: Joyce was a long time staff person for the SACC head office, who in 1992 travelled to Canada for an exposure trip with the United Church of Canada.

Makue, Eddie, March 25th 2010, Johannesburg, Interview in Person

Biography: Makue is the current General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches.

Mayson, David, February 23rd 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Mayson is a South African development consultant who worked for many years as a manager at SPP.

Marias, Hein, May 6th 2010, Johannesburg, Interview in Person

Background: Political author and journalist, Marias was born in South Africa but travelled to Canada for graduate studies in 1984. While in the country he participated in the anti-apartheid movement in Ottawa, and worked for OXFAM Canada from 1988-9. Upon returning to South Africa in 1992 he became a CUSO co-operant with multiple placements, working for BUSH Radio, New Era Magazine and as an independent researcher while finishing the writing of a book on the democratic transition.

Milford, Herchelle, April 22nd 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Milford is the current director of the South African NGO SPP.

Molete, Martha, May 20th 2010, Johannesburg, Interview in Person

Background: Molete was recruited by the MK in 1989 at the age of 22, when she was a student studying journalism at Carleton University in Ottawa. Molete had been involved in activism on campus and had previously toured Southern Africa with a CIDMMA/CUSO exposure trip in 1988. After a brief stop off in London, she was sent to Zimbabwe where she took on the cover of a teacher. She was then trained to smuggle arms for the Ordnance Division of the MK. After her work in Zimbabwe was finished she was sent to South Africa, where she aided the smuggling of arms into the country, which was done as part of a larger operation involving transporting ordnance into the country with safari tours.

Motau, Hlokoza, June 18th 2010, Johannesburg, Phone Interview

Background: Motau is the current head of the International Department for NUMSA.

Mtofu, Rose, June 9th 2010, Johannesburg, Phone Interview

Background: Mtofu is a shop steward with the National Union of Mineworkers, who took part in a joint research project on women in mining conducted by ILRIG, funded by the USW in 2005. She accompanied Anna Davies-van Es of ILRIG when they took part in an exchange trip to Canada, where they visited a USW mine and attended a Steelworkers women’s conference.

Narsoo, Penny, March 26th 2010, Johannesburg, Interview in Person
Background: Narsoo managed the CUSO Office in South Africa from 1996 until its closing in 2006.

Nkomonye, Sivato, May 5th 2010, Johannesburg, Interview in Person

Background: Nkomonye is a shop steward with NUMSA at a plant owned by Skaw Metals in Gauteng. On June 3rd 2009 he traveled to Canada to take part in a ‘worker to worker’ exchange with United Steelworkers at a plant in Edmonton, Alberta, also owned by Skaw, visiting the plant and attending a union summer school.

Pithouse, Richard, July 17th 2010, Grahamstown, Phone Interview

Background: Pithouse is a lecturer at Rhodes University and a supporter of the social movement Abahlali baseMjondolo.

Saayman, Willem, March 23rd 2010, Johannesburg, Interview in Person

Background: Saayman was a minister with the DRC’s Mission Church, who in the mid-1980s became a part of the UDF and ICT. He took part in the drafting of the KAIROS document in 1985. After surviving two assassination attempts in the late 1980s he would go on to become the chair of the first ANC Chapter opened in Pretoria Centre, in the lead up to the 1994 elections. Willem toured Canada in 1983 and was a speaker at the UCC’s 30th General Council in 1984, where the church declared apartheid as a heresy.

Sibeko, Archie, March 22nd 2010, Johannesburg, Interview in Person

Background: Sibeko, also known by the alias Zola Zembe, was a founding member of SACTU and long time member of the ANC. He served as a commander of the MK’s first camp in Tanzania and then was deployed to the UK to work as SACTU’s representative in Western Europe. During the 1980s he served as one of the SACTU Solidarity Committee’s main contact persons.

Wesso, Roland, June 6th 2010, Cape Town, Interview In Person

Background: Wesso was a former researcher with ILRIG and now works in the Research, Information and Advocacy department at SPP.

Wildschut, Adele, March 10th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Wildschut was the former coordinator of SPP (1987-8) and a long time board member of the group, who in the early 1990s served as SPP’s representative on the NLC.

Witbooi, Davine, March 9th 2010, Cape Town, Interview In Person

Background: Witbooi is a grassroots activist based in Lutzville, Western Cape, who works with the Campaign for Food Sovereignty and Agrarian Reform, an emerging social movement linked to SPP. She is a former leader of the campaign and was a panelist at the March 9th 2010 consultation by the Food Strategy Group of the Ecumenical Advocacy Alliance (of which the UCC is a member) in Cape Town.

Xeketwana, Thembisa, June 14th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person

Background: Xeketwana works for Metro Cleaning Services as support staff at the University of Cape Town and has been part of the UCT Workers’ Forum since 2005. In October 2008 she took part in a worker to worker exchange to Toronto, to meet with United Steelworkers in Local 1998 at the University of Toronto. She also attended a Steelworker women’s school.
Other Countries

Bula, Omega, February 14th 2008, Lusaka, Zambia (MSc dissertation interview), Interview In Person

Background: Bula is the current Executive Minister in charge of the UCC’s JGER Unit. In 1994 she took over the Africa Desk at the UCC from Jim Kirkwood.

Cook, Tevor, September 29th 2009, Brussels, Belgium, Phone Interview

Background: Cook is a Canadian who had a long history of working with and volunteering for CUSO from 1976 to 1993. This began with collaborations with the CUSO Chapter at McGill University in 1976 as part of his work with the McGill anti-apartheid committee. He eventually served as a board member with the organization, and when he started working with the CCODP in 1988, in the role of supporting the organization’s programs around South Africa, he worked directly with the CUSO liberation support office in Zambia.

Murphy, Mike, March 3rd 2010, Paris, France, Phone Interview

Background: Murphy was a South African activist involved in both church and trade union activism. Leaving South Africa for Europe in 1977, Murphy served as an international contact person for unions affiliated with the Trade Unions Advisory and Coordinating body (TUAC) and then FOSATU. Liaising with western unions and labour federations, he worked as fundraiser and campaigner for these emerging South African unions.

Sikazwe, Emily, April 2nd 2008, Lusaka, Zambia (MSc dissertation interview), Interview in Person

Background: Sikazwe is Executive Director of Women for Change, a long time UCC partner in Zambia.

Spoerel, Claus, December 11th 2009, Oxford, United Kingdom, Interview in Person

Background: A career civil servant working with the Canadian foreign service, Spoerel is the head of the Southern Africa Desk for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada.

Yusuf, Salajoe, December 16th 2009, Muscat, Oman, Phone Interview

Background: Salajoe was the ANC’s Chief Representative to Canada from 1970 to 1989. He was first sent to Toronto in 1969, tasked with building support in the country for the tripartite alliance. In 1970 the first ANC chapter was established, in 1978 it became a full time operation with Salajoe as the chief representative. Through his role with the office he would travel the country speaking and gathering material and political support for the ANC and SWAPO. He is currently the South African ambassador to Oman.

Focus Groups

CUSO Focus Group, September 21st 2010, Ottawa, Interview In Person

Participants: Carol Shepard, Lyse Blanchard, Joan Anne Nolan, Sam Bonti-Akomah, Sue Godt, Rosa Candia.

Background: Akomah was a CUSO co-operant who in 1996 was placed in South Africa to work with the Farm Worker’s Research and Resource Project and then the NLC. Sheppard was a long time CUSO
program officer. Please see individual interview references above for Nolan, Godt, Blanchard and Candia’s background.

SPP Focus Group, March 13th 2010, Cape Town, Interview in Person:

Participants: Gary Kenny, Ricado Jacobs, Herchelle Milford, Craig Jonkers, Nombeko Nonti, Trevor Lodewyk.

Background: Nonti, Jonkers and Lodewyk are all members of the executive of the Ithemba Farmer’s Association, a local grouping of small holder farmers who have occupied land on the outskirts of Cape Town. Please see individual interview references above for Jacobs, Milford and Kenny’s background.