French Foreign Policy towards Poland (1989-1993)

Andrea M. Dangelmayer
St. Antony's College
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis sets out to examine France's foreign policy with regard to Poland between 1989 and 1993. While some scholars, such as Ayache, have analysed French policy approaches towards Central and Eastern Europe in general during this period, none have focused on French foreign policy towards Poland in particular.[1] Poland has also been chosen for this analysis of French foreign policy towards a Central Eastern European state after the Cold War, by virtue of its geopolitical and geostrategic position as a comparatively strong middle power in Central Eastern Europe and because it had been a traditional ally of France in political, economic and cultural fields.[2]

This thesis attempts to analyse why and how France transformed her foreign policy and her approach towards Poland, in the context of post-Cold War changes in Europe beginning in autumn 1989.[3] It analyses and explains the transformation of French foreign policy as well as the increasing multilateralisation of Franco-Polish relations within the context of the European Community (EC). 'Multilateralisation' is used here to explain how

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[1] Ayache, Georges et al., La conquête de l'Est: la France dans le nouvel ordre international, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1991. Various distinctions have been made in the existing literature according to geographical, political or economic (or a conjunction of these) characteristics, such as the PHARE-(Poland, Hungary aid for economic reconstruction), the Association Agreement or the Visegrad (Poland, Hungary, Slovaque and Czech Republics) group.

[2] *Cold War* refers to the period starting in 1945 when, at the allied conference of Yalta (February 1945) the foundations were laid for the creation of an Eastern, Soviet-dominated bloc and a Western, USA-dominated bloc, up to the second half of 1989 when the political, military and economic division of Europe disintegrated with revolutionary transformations in Central and Eastern European states and the USSR. *Central and Eastern Europe* refers to the eight Central and Eastern European countries Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (Czech and Slovak Republics since April 1990), Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia, whereby Czechoslovakia (Czech and Slovak Republics), Poland and Hungary are refered to as *Central Eastern European* countries. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) is a special case as it belonged during the Cold War to the Eastern bloc, was unified with West Germany in October 1991 but underwent similar transformations to other Central Eastern European states. *Eastern Europe* refers to Central and Eastern European states and the Soviet Union (the Eastern bloc) during the Cold War. Although, obviously, relations between the Soviet Union (Community of Independent States/CIS since December 1991) and Western Europe also affected post-Cold War relations, referrence will be to Central and Eastern Europe as the shifts in inter-state relations between Western and Central and Eastern Europe are most relevant to this thesis.

[3] Autumn 1989 has been chosen as a starting point for the analysis, since the first non-communist government (with the exception of four ministries) was formed in Poland in September 1989. At the same time revolutionary movements took place in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR culminating in the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989.

France pursued policies towards Poland through the EC so as to achieve her policy aims at home as well as in Poland. In order to account for the shifts in French foreign policy this thesis will examine how both the changing external environment, as well as domestic pressure groups influenced French foreign policy towards Poland and forced the French government to multilateralise Franco-Polish relations. On the basis of these findings, the modalities of multilateralisation, that is *how* France pursued her approach towards Poland in the European Community context, will then be discussed.

The central hypothesis underlying this thesis is France, since 1989, has increasingly used a multilateral approach to Poland as an instrument and an alternative to French national strategies and that this was the product of external constraints and the pressures from specific domestic interest groups. An outline of the traditional principles of French foreign policy and France's policies towards Poland during the Cold War will introduce this argument and establish the historical context (chapter I). However, the main focus of this study is on French national strategies and their multilateral dimension in the post-1989 period. Chapters II and III examine two critical factors causing this increased mulitlateralisation: namely external and domestic constraints. Chapter II analyses the ways in which French foreign policy developed between 1989 and 1993. The focus will be on Franco-Polish relations, although these will be examined within a broader international context which includes the political, economic and military transformations in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union/CIS, German unification and the central role of the EC during these post-Cold War transitions. Chapter III looks at the pressures exercised within France by specific interest groups and why these encouraged French political leaders to turn to the EC. These pressure groups represented interests that would themselves be influenced by major economic/commercial changes in Europe. The French agricultural and industrial pressure groups, in particular, were a major cause of the increasing multilateralisation of Franco-Polish relations. Taking into account these domestic pressures, chapter IV examines the ways in which France looked to the EC, and

especially to the Association Agreement (Europe Agreement), to effect policy change.[4] This last is used as a case study of France's multilateral strategy, since it constitutes the most extensive multilateral agreement affecting France's relations with Poland. As it is a major concern of this thesis to demonstrate that the EC became an instrument in France's relations with Poland, chapter IV shows how French political leaders used the instrument of EC policy-making to both deal with domestic problems and extend their policy reach with regard to Poland. Furthermore, it will be shown that the multilateral approach itself affected France's policy goals with regard to Poland.

The realist and liberal institutionalist analyses will show that France pursued a multilateral foreign policy approach in the context of the EC which was complementary to bilateral strategies. After the end of the Cold War, Community strategies became an integral part of France's relations with Poland. The Community's operation and the functions and policies which the Community represented were a useful instrument for France in its pursuit of relations with Poland. This policy strategy allowed France to continue to focus on Western Europe whilst at the same time responding to the changing environment of Eastern and Western European relations. But multilateralisation has not signalled an end to national interest politics. Indeed this thesis will demonstrate the persistence of national interest politics in the context of multilateral approaches. Increasing multilateralisation was a pragmatic political solution in response to interest group pressures and did not represent a 'u-turn' in French foreign policy strategies.

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[4]The Agreement was negotiated between Poland, the European Commission and EC member states between December 1990 and November 1991; signed in December 1991 and ratified by the French Parliament in July 1993, the Polish Parliament in July 1992 and the European Parliament in September 1992 and is in force since 01.02.1994. The EC concluded Association Agreements with Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics, which are generally treated as a group, but as they were negotiated with each country individually and concluded as independent treaties, reference will only be made to the Association Agreement between Poland and the EC in this thesis. Although the aims and the structure of each Agreement are similar, they differ in content according to the particular situation in each country. For the Agreement see, OJ L 348, 31.12.1993; see also, Journal Officiel de la République Française, Accord Européen, 01.06.1994.

This study will focus on the period between autumn 1989 and the end of the French Socialist government in April 1993. It is beyond the scope of this work to look at the policy approaches of the Balladur government of 1993-1995 and the developments related to the association process of Poland to the EC. References to other EC member states, especially Germany, are intended to substantiate the argument but not to open up a comparative debate. Economic aspects of the issue under consideration will only be analysed in as much as they were relevant to political relations.

This thesis does not set out to examine Poland's foreign policies or the EC's relations with Poland. The EC is merely analysed as a mediator. However, a more extensive analysis of the Community's policies towards Poland or of the Polish position would complement and sharpen the insights into the subject. An examination of sectoral and promotional interests at the European level would serve to substantiate the analysis of domestic pressures. These aspects are beyond the scope of this thesis, but would represent interesting areas for further research.

Given the absence of comprehensive secondary sources, this thesis is based to a large extent on primary sources. These include the debates of the *Assemblée Nationale* and the *Sénat*, official documents of the *Assemblée*, treaties, speeches, communiqués, transcripts of the Commission for External Affairs of the *Assemblée* and European Community documents. In addition, a wide range of general studies and articles on French foreign policy covering the period during and after the Cold War was used, as were secondary sources on French relations with Central and Eastern Europe since the Cold War, the domestic environment, and the Europe agreements. Further sources include newspaper cuttings and interviews with Frederic Billet, the official responsible for Central and Eastern European affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, Etienne Pinte, the deputy of the *Assemblée Nationale* and *rapporteur* for Franco-Polish relations, and Tomasz Orlowski, a consultant to the Polish ambassador to France.

CHAPTER I.

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS POLAND WITHIN THE YALTA ORDER

> "*Yalta is the reality that stipulates the hierarchy of our responsibilities and interests.*"
>
> François Mitterrand[5]

Introduction

The thesis commences with an outline of traditional features of French foreign policy, as well as a brief historical analysis of foreign policy relations with Poland during the Cold War in order to underline the recent transformation of Franco-Polish relations. The central argument of this chapter is that the divisions brought about by the Cold War determined the margins of manoeuvre and influenced the goals and principles of French foreign policy towards Poland. The first section will examine traditional, Gaullist, foreign policy principles in order to demonstrate in the subsequent sections how these policy features defined French policies towards Poland. A short overview of Franco-Polish relations during the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) is added to demonstrate the influence of the intensification of the East-West conflict on French policy towards Poland, although the analysis is focused on the Fifth Republic. The following sections examine the foreign policies with regard to Poland of successive presidents of the Fifth Republic and demonstrate that despite different emphases they all followed Gaullist foreign policy

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[5] "*Yalta, cette realité nous dicte la hiérarchie de nos devoirs et des nos intérêts.*" (author's translation, as are all the following translations in this thesis), see, Mitterrand, François, Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France: introduction à vingt-cinq discours, 1981-85, Fayard, Paris, 1985, p. 12.

principles in their approaches towards Poland and implemented their policies within the logic of the Yalta order.[6] Moreover, it will be shown that bilateralism was the dominant form of foreign policy implementation.

1.1 Traditional French foreign policy

French foreign policy and its strategy were anchored in the Yalta order. The division between an Eastern and a Western bloc provided a framework and at the same time defined the margins of manoeuvre for French foreign policy. The dominating influence of the superpowers, the perceived threat from the Eastern bloc and the integration of France in the Western Alliance generally limited her room of manoeuvre in external relations. The bloc system furthermore functioned as the "fundamental tenet" and determined the formulation and choice of the principles and goals of French foreign policy.[7] Gaullist imperatives of French foreign policy, such as national independence and European integration, were to a large extent conditioned by the Cold War division.

Independence was a "key reference" in French foreign policy as it related to the concept of national sovereignty and the realisation of national interest politics.[8] Independence of action was regarded as necessary in order to preserve French political distinctiveness in relation to the other West European states and particularly to the two superpowers. Independence would also permit France to play a special mediating role between Western and Eastern Europe. As a result, French political leaders emphasised the centrality of independence in French foreign policy and particularly in defense policy. However, the extent to which independence could be asserted was restricted by the

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[6] *Yalta order* refers to the military, political, economic and ideological division of Europe that was created at the Yalta conference in February 1945 and reflects the opposition and latent conflict between the Eastern and the Western bloc.

[7] Vernet, Daniel, 'The dilemma of French foreign policy', International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 4, October 1992, p. 655.

[8] Grosser, Alfred, Affaires Extérieures, La Politique de la France 1944-1989, Flammarion, Paris, 1989.

policies of the superpowers and France's integration into Western Europe. France was well entrenched in the political, military and economic structures and policies of the Western Alliance and could, hence, only play a limited independent or mediating role.

Moreover, France's focus on European integration can itself be explained as a strategy to maximise national influence during the Cold War. The EC represented an instrument and a mechanism by which French policy objectives could be advanced and domestic interests served.[9] The policies and the bargaining structures allowed France to respond to domestic interests, particularly agricultural and economic interests, and establish protection vis-à-vis third countries. Furthermore, European integration allowed for the supervision of West Germany and represented a counterweight to US domination. At the same time it contributed to the security of France from the Soviet threat and complemented the member states' commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. However, Gaullist concepts of European integration attempted to limit any transfer of sovereignty if it did not provide further benefits to France.

The apparent contradiction between a strong emphasis on independence of action and a strong commitment to European integration, was resolved by an adjustment of goals to what was deemed achievable. Given the bloc partition and the hegemony of the two superpowers, Western Europe and the EC represented the main "playing field" on which France could seek to enhance her influence. France's geopolitical position and her role allowed her to apply these foreign policy principles so as to achieve political leadership within the EC and Western Europe. France's political and security dominance over the other member states of the EC, notably the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, permitted her to exercise a degree of influence disproportionate to her political and economic capacity.[10] This leadership role was greatly facilitated by France's political

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[9]See for instance, Hoffmann, Stanley, 'French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe', Keohane, Robert O. et al. (eds.), After the Cold War, International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Harvard University Press, London, 1993, p. 129.

[10]See for instance, Cerny, Philip. G., The politics of grandeur, Ideological aspects of De Gaulle's foreign policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, p. 94.

primacy over West Germany and the marginalisation of Britain in Europe. This predominance was reinforced by the establishment of the Franco-German Treaty of 1963.[11]

Hence, within the margins of manoeuvre set by the bloc partition and the policies of the superpowers, the Yalta order underpinned France's role and influence. The Atlantic Alliance and West European integration provided a framework within which the principles of French foreign policy were pursued and enhanced France's position. The division of Europe allowed for a strengthening of France's political leadership role, since the only potential threat came from Eastern Europe. Thus, French political leaders did not set out to alter the structures of the Yalta system, despite rhetoric to the contrary. Within this framework of French European foreign policy French political leaders implemented policies with regard to Poland.

1.2 Franco-Polish relations during the Cold War

The defining principles and goals of France's foreign policy also determined her approach towards Poland during the Cold War. In several regards Poland held a key position. As a consequence of the Cold War division Poland formed a persistent focus for French foreign policy towards Central and Eastern Europe in political, economic and cultural terms. Poland's geopolitical and geostrategic situation made it an "exceptional case" in French Central and Eastern European policies.[12] Aside from traditional ties, it attracted French interests as a politically and economically relatively important satellite within the Warsaw Pact, situated as it was between the two Germanys and the Soviet Union.[13] However, the scope of French foreign policy approaches towards Poland was

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[11] The Franco-German Treaty of 1963 instituted a close cooperation between the two states.

[12] See, Hassner, Pierre, 'The view from Paris', Gordon, Lincoln et al. (eds.), Eroding Empire, Western Relations with Eastern Europe, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1987, p. 215.

[13] *Warsaw Pact* refers to the military alliance of all Central and Eastern European countries (including the GDR, Albania left the Pact in 1968) under the domination of the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact

set by the political, military, economic and ideological division of Europe and the influence of the superpowers. Furthermore, French approaches towards Poland were constrained by French political and economic interests. The political and economic differences between the two countries only allowed for limited cooperation.

1.3 Franco-Polish relations under Fourth Republic

Following the absorption of Poland into the Soviet zone of influence and the beginnings of West European integration, Franco-Polish relations deteriorated rapidly.[14] French attempts to revive relations in 1946/47 through economic and cultural contacts were designed to secure French influence in Poland and to relaunch France's economic recovery.[15] Increasing Cold War tensions, however, forced France to concentrate on West European integration. Hence, France integrated her foreign policy approach towards Poland into the general Cold War pattern of her Eastern European foreign policies. With Eastern Europe as a whole being perceived as a threat, there was little scope for good Franco-Polish relations. The situation was aggravated by the closure of cultural institutions, by a series of arrests of high ranking officials and diplomats on both sides in 1949, as well as in declining trade between the two.

Only from 1953, against the background of 'peaceful coexistence' between the superpowers, did France start to reconsider her foreign policy approach towards Poland. Political contacts, as well as economic and cultural cooperation, was revived as French political leaders attempted to keep a margin of manoeuvre for French European policy.

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was formed in 1955 as a multilateral organisation in response to the formation of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO, 1949) and particularly the integration of Germany in NATO and the West European Union (WEU) in 1955, increasing the bloc partition.

[14] For a discussion of Franco-Polish relations in this period see in particular, Le Goff, Barbara, Les relations diplomatiques franco-polonaises 1944-1948, Mémoire de Maitrise, Université Paris X, Paris, 1989; see also, Castagné, Jadwiga, 'Les relations franco-polonaises (1945-1972)', Notes et Etudes Documentaires, no. 3922, Paris, 1972.

[15] France concluded an agreement on exports of Polish coal, for example, in August 1946 to support economic recovery in France.

Nevertheless, relations with Poland remained tense and limited. It was only under de Gaulle that bilateral relations changed as the result of his "new *Ostpolitik*".[16]

1.4 French policies towards Poland under de Gaulle

During General de Gaulle's presidency (1958-1969), French policy towards Poland was significantly transformed. His understanding of the concept of Europe and the role he accorded France within this *grand design* totally changed France's foreign policy approach towards Poland. A cornerstone of his foreign policy was to achieve a *détente* in East-West relations. This strategy of *rapprochement* with Eastern Europe was aimed firstly at enhancing France's political influence, and thereby establishing a leadership role in all of Europe, and secondly at increasing France's independence of action, both within Western Europe and in relation to the superpowers. In fact, the General launched his Eastern European policies in 1963 in order to liberate French foreign policy from the growing constraints posed by European political, economic and military integration. It is significant that by this time the difficulties linked to decolonisation, particularly the Algerian decolonisation, which had pushed France to the brink of civil war, had ceased to be a major preoccupation, as the former colonies, like Algeria in 1962, became independent.

Utilising traditional ties, Poland became a particular focus in de Gaulle's policies towards Eastern Europe. As a member of the Warsaw Pact and an immediate neighbour of the Soviet Union and East Germany, Poland was a "useful card" for his European foreign policy.[17] Franco-Polish cooperation was a step towards his aim of conferring upon France a leadership role in the context of a European *détente*, and Poland was to play an important part in his European foreign policy. Poland became an ally and an instrument in

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[16]Hassner, 'The view from Paris', p. 195. Hassner used the term *Ostpolitik* to refer in retrospect to the Eastern European policies of the Federal Republic of Germany, by which the government of Willy Brandt set out to normalise relations with countries of the Eastern bloc between 1969 and 1973.

[17]Moïsi, Dominique, 'French policy towards Central and Eastern Europe', Griffith, William E. (ed.), Central and Eastern Europe: the opening curtain?, Westview Boulder, London, 1989, p. 355.

French attempts to counterbalance other European powers, particularly West Germany, but also the USSR, and thereby increase French influence within Europe. Although de Gaulle intended France to act as a mediator between West Germany and Poland, he saw Poland primarily as a part of his foreign policy strategy aimed at containing West Germany.[18] By recognising the Oder-Neisse frontier in 1958 and by pursuing an active policy towards Poland, de Gaulle strengthened French independence and her leadership role in the Franco-German alliance. The border recognition in particular gave France an important asset in reviving relations with Poland some years later.

However, not even de Gaulle could escape from Cold War realities. As a consequence of heightening Cold War tensions, manifested in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for example, when the USA and the USSR came close to military confrontation, it was only from 1964 that Franco-Polish relations were revived. Following the visit of the head of the Polish Council, Joseph Cyrankiewicz, to Paris in 1965, regular political consultations were established, leading from 1965/66 onwards to an improvement of relations with Poland. However, the determining influence of the Yalta division and the limits of de Gaulle's Eastern European policies were revealed again in 1968, with the invasion of Prague by Soviet troops. This led to a temporary interruption of regular political consultations, which had been agreed during de Gaulle's visit to Poland in 1967.

Moreover, even though de Gaulle's foreign policy goals with regard to Poland exceeded the modest intentions he had towards other Central and Eastern European countries, Poland's bloc affiliation constrained his policy goals with regard to Poland and limited the impact of Franco-Polish relations as a means for the achievement of wider French foreign policy aims. For reasons elaborated above, he did not as is often argued

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[18] See for instance, Hassner, 'The view from Paris', p. 195. As part of this strategy de Gaulle had already strongly supported the idea of a Polish state not affiliated to the Eastern bloc in allied negotiations in 1944 and in talks with Stalin during his trip to Moscow in December 1945. Schreiber, Thomas, 'Les relations de la France avec les pays de l'Est (1944-1980)', Notes et Etudes Documentaires, no. 4569-4570, Paris, 1980, p. 60.

use Poland as part of a strategy to overcome the bloc structure.[19] Nonetheless, by encouraging Polish autonomy and national independence, de Gaulle sought to expand the margins of manoeuvre for French foreign policy. Considering the crucial position and influence of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis its satellites, de Gaulle declared the improvement of Franco-Polish relations to be an integral part of achieving better relations with Moscow.[20] De Gaulle's visit to Poland in 1967, for example, represented an effort towards French *rapprochement* with Eastern Europe as a whole. However, the limits of his efforts to improve Franco-Polish relations became apparent when the Polish Prime Minister, Wladyslaw Gomulka, reaffirmed Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union during de Gaulle's visit.[21]

Thus, de Gaulle's foreign policy approach towards Poland never moved beyond a *rapprochement* and a normalisation of relations, as France's room of manoeuvre with regard to Poland was constrained by Soviet-Polish, as well as Soviet-US, relations. Moreover, despite an attempt by France to play down the role of ideology (Communism versus Western democracy), the political, military, ideological and economic differences between France and Poland obviously imposed a limit to Franco-Polish relations. French integration into Western Europe proved stronger and more important than relations with Poland. Hence, French policies towards Central and Eastern Europe were subordinated to French EC policies and to relations with the Soviet Union, which were given priority in her Eastern European relations. Relations with Poland never detached France from the constraints of West European integration or Cold War politics.

Yet, de Gaulle did set an effective pattern of French policy goals and approaches towards Poland, with bilateral political relations being regarded as the key. Trade

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[19] For an analysis of the awareness of de Gaulle and political leaders of the limits of French Eastern policies see for instance, Lacouture, Jean et al., De Gaulle, 2nd edn., Collins Harvill, London, 1993, p. 394.

[20] See, Kulski, Wladyslaw W., De Gaulle and the World, The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic, 1st edn., Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 1966, p. 307.

[21] See in particular, Castagné, 'Les relations franco-polonaises (1945-1972)', p. 19 following (henceforth: f.).

agreements, technical, scientific and cultural cooperation were viewed as tools serving bilateral political relations and corresponding to the idea of an independent French foreign policy.

1.5 Franco-Polish relations in the 1970s - strengthening cooperation

De Gaulle's successor to the presidency in 1969, his erstwhile Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou, did not change the General's policy towards Poland. He accepted the *status quo* and the role of the superpowers in foreign policy towards Poland and did not try to detach her from the Soviet bloc. Pompidou did accord Poland importance in his attempts to pursue an East-West mediating role and in his strategy of containing West Germany. The latter became even more important since his foreign policy with regard to Poland was strongly influenced by West Germany's revised approach towards Eastern Europe. Following the West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's (1969-1973) significant policy departure vis-à-vis the Eastern bloc known as "*Ostpolitik*", France lost her "Eastern mandate".[22] Stronger political and economic cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland resulted in a decline of France's relative position there. France was concerned about Brandt's initiatives and responded to the *rapprochement* between West Germany and Poland by according greater importance to French foreign policy towards Poland. Pompidou's visit to Warsaw in 1970, as well as the stay of the Polish Prime Minister, Edward Gierek, in Paris in 1972, and their emphasis on a mutual "convergence of views" witness to this.

Like de Gaulle, Pompidou implemented bilateral strategies, notably in the political, economic, technical, scientific and cultural sphere. These aimed at achieving French political and economic objectives with regard to Poland. Bilateral economic relations with

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[22] "*ostpolitisches Mandat*", see, Woyke, Wichard, Frankreichs Außenpolitik von de Gaulle bis Mitterrand, Leske + Budrich, Opladen, 1987, p. 76.

Poland acquired a significance in their own right, whereas for de Gaulle economic and cultural approaches had been primarily to serve political aims. Extending trade relations with Poland was particularly important for France in the 1970s, since exports to Poland helped, albeit to a limited extend, to counterbalance the effects of the stagnation of demand in Western economies following the oil crisis of 1973 and the ensuing global economic depression, which lasted throughout the decade.[23] Moreover, Poland was of economic interest as a supplier for raw materials.[24]

That a bilateral approach was the only viable possibility, was demonstrated by the failure of multilateral approaches. In 1974, the EC attempted to reach trade agreements with Eastern European countries in the framework of its Common Commercial Policy (CCP).[25] However, these multilateral efforts to improve trade relations with Poland foundered on Soviet opposition to the EC, the political and economic differences between the blocs and the EC's general lack of experience and competence in external relations. Thus, only limited sectoral arrangements were achieved.

The Centrist Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Pompidou's successor in 1974, attempted to intensify cooperation with Eastern Europe and Poland in particular, again following Gaullist concepts. By so doing, he hoped to increase France's margin of manoeuvre, to counterbalance an increasingly "self-confident" Germany and to take advantage of the domestic consensus on Gaullist European foreign policies.[26] His first visit to an Eastern European country was to Poland in 1975, followed by further visits in 1976 and 1978.

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[23] Analysing Schreiber's analyses of French exports to Central and East European markets and on French exports to Poland, a major part of French exports was directed to Poland. See, Schreiber, 'Les relations de la France avec les pays de l'Est (1944-1980)', p. 94f. and 103f.

[24] See, Schreiber, 'Les relations de la France avec les pays de l'Est (1944-1980)', p. 96f.

[25] For an extensive analysis of relations between the EC and Comecon see for instance, Maresceau, Marc (ed.), The political and legal framework of trade relations between the European Community and Eastern Europe, Dordrecht 1989; see also, Marsh, Peter, 'The European Community and East-West economic relations', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 23, no. 1, September 1984, pp. 1-13; see also, Commission of the European Communities, 'The European Community's relations with Comecon and its East European members', Europe Information Series, European Commission publication, 1989. For CCP see art. 110-116 of the EEC Treaty.

[26] See, Woyke, Frankreichs Außenpolitik, p. 88. (Note: for second references books will be identified by short titles).

Giscard d'Estaing aimed at establishing Franco-Polish relations as a model in the context of the Cold War by consolidating the pattern of bilateral approaches set by his predecessors. Thus, political, economic and cultural relations were intensified. This was also the result of close personal contacts between Giscard d'Estaing and the Polish Prime Minister Gierek. Political considerations influenced the terms of economic agreements, which emphasised France's economic interests in expanding trade with Poland. Thus, the special political attention given to Poland as compared to other Central and Eastern European states also began to lead to a special economic relationship.

Giscard d'Estaing's attitude was not significantly affected by the first attempts at democratisation led by the Solidarity movement in Poland in 1980/81. As part of his reaction to the exacerbation of the interbloc conflict at the end of the 1970s, Giscard d'Estaing followed a regime-stabilising policy by supporting the Gierek government during the early stages of the Polish crisis in both financial and political terms.[27] He thereby attempted to pursue a mediating role for France in East-West relations and to increase French independence in external relations by a foreign policy approach that followed the logic of the Yalta system.

1.6 Mitterrand's policies towards Poland

The Socialist François Mitterrand, who became President in May 1981, also followed Gaullist foreign policy approaches towards Poland during the Cold War. With the increase in Cold War tensions in the early 1980s, to which the Polish crisis of 1981 contributed, the new President pursued up to 1984 a dual policy of rhetorical condemnation of the actions taken by the Polish government and the USSR and the

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[27] See for instance, Liczma'nski, Ryszard, Pologne-France, Agence Polonaise Interpress, Warsaw, 1985, p. 21. What is described as the 'Polish crisis' stands for the reform movement led by the workers' union Solidarity (*Solidarnoscz*) which induced the Polish government, pressurised by Moscow, to crush the democratisation attempts by imposing martial law on December 13, 1981.

pursuit of traditional Gaullist policies towards Eastern European.[28] His government critizised the Polish government and the Soviet Union on the installation of martial law in Poland in 1981, and the French Socialist party encouraged the Socialist International to condemn the repressive actions in Poland. Moreover, attempts were made to improve cultural influence by establishing links with Polish dissident counter-elites and the Catholic Church. However, the political dialogue between France and Poland was suspended until 1984, and financial credits and the re-negotiation of the Polish debt were stopped, as France's margin of manoeuvre was again constrained by the policies of the superpowers.

Hence, the Gaullist strategy to pursue French Polish policies according to the logic of the East-West conflict and the Yalta order, did determine France's policy approach up to 1984. In his actual policy approach Mitterrand reflected the view of his Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson on December 13, 1981, who stated quite candidly that "Of course, we shall do nothing".[29] The desire not to harm France's alleged East-West mediating role and foreign policy trade and economic interests, particularly with regard to the Soviet Union, prevailed. France continued the implementation of exisiting economic agreements with Poland, and shortly after the declaration of martial law in Poland, signed the Urengoi gas pipeline agreement with the Soviet Union, which provided France with energy.[30]

Starting in 1984 with a meeting of the foreign ministers of France and Poland, Mitterrand revived an active policy towards Poland in order to normalise relations with Eastern Europe and thereby to increase French influence in Europe. The French President

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[28] For a discussion of France's policies with regard to Poland during the Polish crisis see in particular, Moïsi, Dominique, 'France and the Polish crisis', SAIS Review, Summer 1982, pp. 99-104.

[29] See interview with the French Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, Newsweek, 01.03.1982.

[30] According to Cohen though the timing of the signing of the agreement was the result of bureaucratic procedures. See, Cohen, Samy, La Monarchie nucléaire: les coulisses de la politique étrangère sous la Ve Republique, Hachette, Paris, 1986, pp. 228-232. Though as Hassner remarks, Mitterrand made no attempts to reverse the agreement, see, Hassner, 'The view from Paris', p. 201, footnote 16. Imports of Polish coal, for example, decreased substantially in 1981, but were rising again strongly in 1982. See, Ministère de l'Economie, Institut Nationale de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, INSEE, (henceforth: INSEE), Paris, 1986, p. 499.

was able to set out to revive Franco-Polish relations and attempt to mediate between East and West, because tensions between the superpowers had reached a stalemate.[31] Mitterrand was the first Western Head of state, to receive the Poland Head of state, General Jaruzelski in December 1985. This was followed by the visit of Michel Baylet, the French undersecretary of state, to Warsaw. Furthermore, in the second half of the 1980s, bilateral economic relations were revived in order to support the political dialogue, but, more importantly, to promote national economic interests, as Poland was a supplier of raw materials and a market for French industrial products.[32]

Bilateral political, economic and cultural approaches also prevailed under Mitterrand up to the end of the Cold War. Only sectoral economic agreements between Poland and the EC were signed in the early 1980s and attempts at politically motivated multilateral approaches, such as the German proposal to send an EC delegation to Poland in early 1982, were opposed by France. The only exception to this was the grant of special food aid, which was organised multilaterally via the EC in autumn 1981.

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated that French foreign policy towards Poland up to 1989 was broadly characterised by Gaullist foreign policy principles and determined by the political, military, economic and ideological implications of the division of Europe by the Cold War. Whereas under de Gaulle the primacy of political relations prevailed, economic aspects in Franco-Polish relations began to acquire more genuine significance in the 1970s under Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing. Moreover, even though de Gaulle and Pompidou

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[31] The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the Polish crisis, President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (1983) and the failure of arms-limitations talks (1983) increased tensions between the superpowers and the blocs. It was only with Gorbatchev taking over the leadership in the Soviet Union in March 1985 that the intensification of the bloc confrontation decreased. Martial law in Poland was suspended on 28.06.1983.

[32] France importet a considerable amount of Polish coal, for example, as compared to imports from other countries. See, INSEE, 1986, p. 499.

attempted to emphasise the role of Poland as part of a strategy to enhance French independence of action and to counterbalance West Germany, and Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand attempted to emphasise France's East-West mediating role in their policies towards Poland, all Fifth Republic presidents ultimately followed Gaullist tracks in their approaches towards Poland. Nevertheless, the scope and success of France's foreign policies towards Poland were constrained by the Yalta order. Therefore, Franco-Polish relations could only serve the goal of enhancing France's East-West mediating role and her foreign policy independence in Europe to a very limited extent.

Bilateral foreign policy strategies in France's relations with Poland were the dominant form of policy implementation during the Cold War. This corresponded to the Gaullist concept of independence of action and reflected the implications of the political, military, economic and ideological bloc partition. It also reflected the deficiencies of the first multilateral approaches to the Eastern bloc by the EC. The following analysis of post-Cold War challenges will explain the transformation of Franco-Polish relations following the end of the Cold War.

CHAPTER II.

EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND RESULTANT TRANSFORMATIONS OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS POLAND FOLLOWING THE END OF THE COLD WAR

"Always more of Europe. With regard to the transformations in the East and their consequences: more of Europe."

François Mitterrand[33]

Introduction

The major aim of this chapter is to analyse and explain the challenges posed to traditional French policy towards Poland by the end of the Cold War and France's subsequent response. It will be argued that French foreign policy with regard to Poland underwent major transformations following the developments of 1989, as France's policy vis-à-vis Poland was re-defined against the background of post-Cold War changes and her approaches increasingly multilateralised. These changes were implemented incrementally.[34] The first section will illustrate how the shifts in European inter-state relations following the end of the Cold War called into question the bases of traditional Franco-Polish relations. Against this background the perception of French interests with regard to Poland was revised, as will be discussed in section two. Section three will examine how existing bilateral policies were incrementally adapted to the changing environment and how multilateral approaches were increasingly followed. In order to

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[33]"*Toujours plus d'Europe. Face aux changements à l'Est et à leurs conséquences: plus d'Europe.*" L'Expansion, 17.10.1990.

[34]For a detailed chronology of the events between 1989-1993, see, appendix.

explain the reasons for multilateralisation as a response to external constraints we will analyse in section four the adjustment of the underlying principles of Gaullist foreign policy to the changes in interstate-relations in Europe. This will demonstrate that traditional EC integration remained a focus and a constraint of French foreign policy, which explains why Franco-Polish relations were increasingly multilateralised.

2.1 The impact of post-Cold War challenges

The collapse of Soviet hegemony, the political, economic and social transformations in Central and Eastern European states and the unification of Germany in October 1990 ended the bipolar partition of Europe and the Cold War. The beginning of democratisation in Poland, particularly in 1989, and the acquiescence of the USSR opened the way for reforms in other Central and Eastern European states. Inter-state relations throughout Europe were no longer defined by differing political, military and economic systems and a mutual threat perception. The end of the Soviet Union's domination of the external and internal affairs of Central and Eastern European states led these states to reorient their external relations towards Western Europe. Hence, the internal political, economic, and military transformations within most Central and Eastern European states were followed by far-reaching changes in the relations between Western and Central and Eastern European states. Post-Cold War state relations between the latter were to be increasingly defined by wide-ranging political and economic cooperation. Hence, French Polish policy was challenged as the margin of manoeuvre for French policies towards Poland was no longer limited by the Yalta partition and the tensions between the superpowers. Furthermore, these post-1989 developments rendered Gaullist strategies using Poland as a mediator between the blocs redundant.

Hence, these post-1989 developments undermined Gaullist Cold War objectives with regard to Poland, as Warsaw rapidly became independent of Soviet political,

ideological, economic and military influence. Poland's transition to a democratic, pluralist and market-oriented state with a more independent foreign policy that was stronly inclined towards Western Europe and the EC in particular, inevitably changed her relations with her Western partners.[35] As a consequence of these developments, political and economic relations between Poland, on the one hand, and France and the EC, on the other hand, were, as we shall see, improved. Hence, Franco-Polish relations after 1989 were no longer constrained and defined by the political, military, economic and ideological differences of the systems.

Moreover, traditional French Polish policy was called into question, as the new post-Cold War order radically altered the context in which Gaullist foreign policy principles had been implemented (see chapter 1.1). Moreover, the role, legitimacy and importance of Cold War institutional frameworks, such as the EC, WEU or NATO were called into question.[36] This ended the situation in which France could apply the principle of independence from the superpowers and the West European context so as to increase her influence. On the contrary, Mitterrand's post-1989 attempts to follow the quest of independence, as reflected in his suggestion to replace NATO by European security structures failed due to the lack of support from other states.[37] Hence, the significance of Poland as part of the French strategy to enhance French independence of action was altered as the larger Cold War context no longer existed.

This section has shown that traditional French foreign policy towards Poland was called into question following the events of 1989. Earlier policy goals were no longer applicable as the termination of the political, military, economic and ideological partition

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[35]For the transformation process in Poland see for instance, Connor, Walter D. et al. (eds.), The Polish road from Socialism, The economics, sociology and politics of transition, Sharpe Armok, London, 1992; see also, Staar, Richard F, Transition to democracy in Poland, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993.

[36]See for instance, Williams, Andrew J., Reorganising Eastern Europe, European Institutions and the Refashioning of Europe's Security Architecture, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1994.

[37]See, Heuser, Beatrice, 'Mitterrand's Gaullism: Cold War Policies for the Post-Cold War World?', Varsori, Antonio (ed.), Europe 1945-1990s: the end of an era?, Macmillan, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995, p. 355f.

of Europe and the resultant changes in inter-state relations changed the context and the constraints on policy implementation. These changes forced a re-definition of French interests and objectives with regard to Poland, which will be examined in the following section.

2.2 French interests in Poland after the Cold War

Following the end of the Cold War, Poland was not only a useful ally in the achievement of French foreign policy goals, but a revived and enhanced focus of interest. French interests in Poland were primarily of a political nature, although France also set out to pursue relations in the areas of politics, economics, finance, social matters and culture.[38] Firstly, political relations were of interest for France as Poland was arguably a strong middle-power with an important geopolitical position between the united Germany and the USSR/CIS. Secondly, increasing political cooperation with Poland - a Central European, non-EC member state - was of interest to contribute to the strategy of enhancing French independence, albeit in a new context. Hence, it was France's objective to stabilise democratisation in Poland, to prevent the processes of disintegration of Polish society and the Polish state by means of Franco-Polish cooperation.[39]

Political interests were also defined in response to Germany's political and economic policies towards Poland and in particular German unification. French attempts to pursue an appropriate political and economic 'policy of counterbalance' (*politique de contrepoids*)

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[38] Journal Officiel de la Republique Française (henceforth: JORF), Traité d'amitié et de solidarité entre la Republique française et la Republique de Pologne (henceforth: Traité), no. 2665, 30.04.1992, p. 7,8, art. 5,6.

[39] See, Aide-mémoire pour la Presse, Service de Presse de l'Elysée, 28.09.1989, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction de la Presse, de l'Information et de la Communication (ed.), La Politique Etrangère de la France, (henceforth: La Politique Etrangère), Paris, September 1989, p. 71: "France supports the transition to democracy as well as economic and social progress in Poland" (*"La France favorise la marche de la Pologne ... vers la democratie et le progrès économique et social"*). See also, JORF, Déclaration du gouvernement, no. 1225, 10.04.1990, p. 9: "associate in order to consolidate the success of the reforms" (*"associer pour consolider le succès des réformes"*).

became a persistent element in its relations with Poland, as the German economic presence in Poland became stronger.[40] Germany's relative economic power and its geographical position were a starting-point for a strong German economic involvement in Poland. Thus, Bonn's policy towards Poland was also regarded as a reason to relaunch Franco-Polish cooperation, as the growing German economic and political cooperation with Poland affected French interests of her influence and role there. This 'policy of counterbalance' in political and economic terms developed continuously after 1989, but was particularly noticeable in response to specific events, such as the negotiations on German unification starting in March 1990, which eventually legitimised a fully sovereign and therefore politically stronger Germany. France supported Polish interests in the negotiations on German unification - especially concerning the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border.[41] France came to view Warsaw as a "natural ally" against Germany, due to France's ambitions to contain Germany and thereby to increase her own influence.[42] The end of the Yalta partition renewed this aspect of traditional French foreign policy towards Poland. Indeed, German unification and the ending of a mutual military threat made it more important. Hence, after the Cold War, French interests with regard to Poland could again be explained by French concerns about Germany.

Besides political interests, France also had an incentive to pursue closer economic relations with Poland. These were not only regarded as a strategy to support external

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[40] See, Haggard, Stephen et al., 'Integrating the Two Halves of Europe: Theories of Interests, Bargaining, and Institutions', Keohane, After the Cold War, International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Harvard University Press, London, 1993, p. 177. Poland has been ambivalent about German economic presence in Poland. Warsaw was not interested in a strong and influential German economic presence, due to historical reasons. Nevertheless, Poland had strong interests to pursue economic relations with Germany. In 1990 Germany's share of exports to Poland was 25.1% (imports 20.1), in 1991 29.4% (imports 26.5%), whereas that of France was only 3.2% (imports 3.0%) in 1990 and 3.8% (imports 3.6%) in 1991. See, Bak, Henry et al., 'Re-integration of Poland into Western Europe by intenal and external liberalisation', World Economy Research Institute, Working Papers, no. 48, Warsaw, 1992, p. 28; see also, see also, World Economy Research Institute, Poland, International Economic Report, 1991/1992, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, 1992, p.105.

[41] There was an official visit by the Polish President, General Jaruzelski, and his Prime Minsiter, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, in Paris before the "2+4" conference in March 1991 and by the Foreign Minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, in July 1991.

[42] Moïsi, 'French policy towards Central and Eastern Europe', p. 354. For official statements on the French position on Franco-Polish relations regarding Germany's policies see, JORF, Rapport sur le Traité, no. 2783, 11.06.1992, p. 6, 21.

political relations, but were also motivated by genuine economic goals. The marketisation of the Polish economy offered long-term prospects of exports and investment for French industry. This aspect, and the extent to which French economic interests were affected by Poland's export capacity will be examined in detail in chapter III. French economic interests with regard to Poland and the fact that France was Poland's biggest creditor, also explained French attempts to stabilise the economic transformation in Poland.[43]

In summary, the shifts in political and economic relations between Eastern and Western Europe increased the significance of French political and economic interests in Poland. The latter were re-defined against the background of post-Cold War changes. Specific traditional French interests were with relations revived, with Poland, for instance, being seen as part of a strategy to enhance French independence and to counterbalance Germany. In the following section it will be shown how France transformed her policies and her approaches with regard to Poland in order to respond to the aforementioned challenges and newly defined interests.

2.3 The adjustment of bilateral policies and increasing multilateralistion

Against the background of the challenges and revised interests in Poland, France's earlier Gaullist policies towards Poland were incrementally adjusted and traditional approaches increasingly multilateralised. French policy was adapted to the process of internal and external transformations in Poland, in Central and Eastern Europe in general and the repercussions these developments had on relations between European and particularly EC member states.[44] The strategies of French foreign policy vis-à-vis Poland

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[43] JORF, Débat (if not stated otherwise: Assemblée Nationale), Francis Geng, 23.11.1989, p. 5576; as Geng stated, out of a total debt of 39 thousand million $, France credited 30 thousand million $.

[44] In the Parliamentary Commission for External Affairs, the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, stated:"Mitterrand and the government attempt to adjust France's policies to the transformations" (*"Mitterrand et le gouvernement cherchent à adapter ... la politique de la France à des changements"*), see, Assemblée Nationale, Commission des Affaires Etrangères de l'Assemblée Nationale, Bulletin des Commissions, (henceforth: Commission, Bulletin), vol. 3, no.11, Paris,

were re-defined with regard to external constraints, and largely shaped by the new international environment. Firstly, we will examine *how* French bilateral policies were incrementally adapted to the changes and *how* multilateral approaches were pursued increasingly from the end of the Cold War. The adjustment of the underlying principles of Gaullist foreign policies to external constraints, which will be analysed in section four, will demonstrate *why* Franco-Polish relations were increasingly multilateralised.

In the immediate post-Cold War period (1989 and 1990) French policies with regard to Poland were characterized, as the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas stated, by urgent, short-term and mainly economic and technical "efforts" designed to help Poland to "tackle the most pressing demands of transformation".[45] However, these did not constitute a coherent strategy reflecting and implementing France's interests and policy objectives with regard to Poland (see section two). France concluded an agreement on investments, and followed policies establishing technical cooperation and assistance for education, such as the "*Fondation France-Pologne*" (Franco-Polish Foundation).[46] While in Poland profound and rapid changes of the political system and the institutional framework progressing towards a democratic and pluralist political system and a free-market economy had taken place in the second half of 1989 and in early 1990, France concentrated on policies, which did not respond to both the long-term process of democratisation *and* economic reform.[47] France's immediate post-Cold War policies fell

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06.06.1990, p. 1211.

[45] "*efforts*", see, JORF, Débat, Dumas, 23.11.1989, p. 5587. "*aider les Polonais à faire face à leurs besoins les plus urgents*", see, JORF, Débat, Edwige Avice (Junior Minister for Foreign Affairs), 23.11.1989, p. 5574.

[46] For "*Fondation France-Pologne*" (established on 17.11.1989) see, Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union Européenne, 'La Fondation France-Pologne', Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union Européenne, no. 369, June 1993, p. 568. For Investment Agreement see, JORF, Projet de Loi, no. 990, 09.11.1989; see also, Rapport, no. 1028, 23.11.1989. The Agreement was signed on 14.02.1989 and discussed in the Assemblée Nationale on 23.11.1989, see, JORF, Débat, 23.11.1989, p. 5572f. Following earlier agreements concerning cultural and educational policies, such as the "Accord sur les échanges des jeunes" (14.06.1989); JORF, 21.3.1990 and the "Accord dans le domaine de la formation des cadres d'éntreprises"(14.06.1989); JORF, 22.03.1990, France concluded on September 9th, 1990 an agreement concerning professional exchanges ("Accord relatif aux échanges de stagiaires professionelles"), see JORF, 28.07.1991.

[47] Installation of a government consisting with the exception of four portfolios of non-communists (September 1989), opposition-led Sejm (second chamber), 35% (as agreed in the round-table negotiations) opposition representation in Parliament, overwhelming non-communist representation in local government elections (May 1990), constitutional revisions, starting of economic "shock therapy"

short of the government's claim to engage in a policy with regard to Poland that reflected French political interests and "transforms profoundly the Polish economy".[48] Although the French government claimed to follow an "urgent response" policy in order to prevent political and economic destabilisation in Poland, the ambiguity between the urgent policy stance and the incremental adaptation was solved in favour of the latter.[49] This gave French foreign policy towards Poland the character of a "dissected policy".[50] The opposition criticised this in the debate on the government's policies towards Central and Eastern Europe in November 1989 and demanded to develop a programme clarifying France's policies vis-à-vis Poland.[51] In further debates in the *Assemblée* the incremental adaptation of France's policies with regard to Poland was criticised by the opposition as a *status quo* policy, as an excessively slow reaction and as a foreign policy characterised by "vague concepts", like Dumas' notion of a "privileged association" for Central and Eastern European countries.[52] However, incremental policy change was at this stage both inevitable and prudent, as it was almost impossible for European leaders to keep up with, let alone define, the chain of events in Europe.

Even though the French government spoke, from the beginning of the post-Cold War period, of a "French *plan* for Poland", the adjustment of France's bilateral policies towards Poland was in effect incremental.[53] This was because Mitterrand attempted to preserve traditional, Gaullist, policy approaches and tried to minimize the effects of the changes in inter-state relations on France's influence and role.[54] Moreover, the piecemeal

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programme (January 1990).

48 "*rénover en profondeur son économie*", JORF, Débat, Avice, 23.11.1989, p. 5574.

49 "*réponse urgente*", JORF, Débat, Jean Gaubert, 03.11.1992, p. 4695.

50 "*politique dissequée*", see, Ayache, La conquête de l'Est, p. 18.

51 See, JORF, Débat, Sénat, 20.11.1989. For a discussion of the incremental adaptation of French policy towards Central and Eastern Europe see for instance, Ayache, La conquête de l'Est, p. 21f. The question of a programme for Poland was brought up in the *Assemblée Nationale*, see, JORF, Débat, Geng, 23.11.1989, p. 5576.

52 "*concepts flous*", JORF, Débat, Jacques Chirac, 10.04.1990, p. 214. Dumas proposed an "*association privilegié*" in a debate of the Sénat, see, JORF, Sénat, 20.11.1989, p. 3484.

53 JORF, Assemblée Nationale, Question actuelle, Dumas (response), 07.11.1989, p. 4677, (own emphasis).

54 See in particular, Marian, Michel, 'France-Europe de l'Est: les rendez-vous manqués', Politique Internationale, no. 56, Summer 1992, p. 90; see also, Robin, Gabriel, 'Mitterrand, portrait d'une diplomatie', Revue des Deux Mondes, no. 4, April 1993, p. 96.

adjustment reflected underlying uncertainties in France about developments in Poland.[55] As was demonstrated in several *Assemblée Nationale* debates, there was a general, cross-party concern about the instability of political, economic and social developments and the success of internal and external transformations in Poland and Central and Eastern Europe in general.[56] Despite the continuity of the political, economic and social dynamics of the transition process in Poland, there remained concern in France about whether the democratisation process and the economic reforms in Poland would be succesful. Although a return to communism was generally regarded as unlikely, it was not clear whether the transitions would lead to stable democratic institutions and market economic structures. The transition process in Poland was characterised by the lack of an established and stable party system, shortlived governmental coalitions, constitutional uncertainties and a critical economic situation.[57] Hence, France pursued an approach that was "reactive" insofar as the political, economic and social transitions in Poland led to a revision of French policies.[58]

French bilateral policies with regard to Poland were not only responding 'positively' but also 'negatively' in the sense that relations between the two countries declined as the transition process in Poland became increasingly unstable.[59] This was particularly the case at the beginning in the second half of 1992, when under the governments of Jan Olszewski and Waldemar Pawlak, political and economic instability became rampant. The decline of

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[55] See, JORF, Question actuelle, Assemblée Nationale, Alain Vivien (response), 11.10.1991, p. 4460.

[56] See for instance, JORF, Débat, Etienne Pinte (*'rapporteur'* in the *Assemblée Nationale* for the 'Treaty of Solidarity and Friendship' with Poland), 19.06.1992, p. 2605: "transformations characterised by uncertainties" (*"transformations... porteuse d'incertitudes"*); see also, JORF, Débat, Dumas, 08.11.1990, p. 4964: "The post-Yalta order will not be without risks... There is a risk that the instabilities multiply" (*"L'après Yalta ne sera pas sans dangers... .Les causes d'instabilité risquent de se multiplier"*); see also, Chirac, Jacques, 'L'après Yalta', Conference prononcée devant l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris, 08.11.1989, Politique Etrangère, no. 4, 1989, p. 747:"who can guarantee that the changes in the East are irreversible?" (*"qui peut garantir.. que les changements à l'Est sont irréversibles*?").

[57] See for instance, Connor, The Polish road from Socialism. For transitions see, chronology, appendix.

[58] Paolini, Jérôme, 'Les deux politiques européennes de François Mitterrand', Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, no. 9, Spring 1993, p. 124. The principle of French foreign policy to react to developments in Poland was also emphasised by Frederic Billet, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction d'Europe Continentale, Sousdirection d'Europe orientale, centrale et balte, author's interview, 25.10.1994.

[59] See, Paolini, 'Les deux politiques européennes de François Mitterrand', p. 124.

French attention to Poland between February and September 1992 was also a "response" to the new Polish government's economic programme which slowed down the economic reform programme started in January 1990. Compared with earlier post-Cold War attention by France, the importance of Poland within French foreign policy declined at the end of 1991 and in 1992. The committment to the economic austerity programme however was reinstalled with the government of Hanna Suchocka in September 1992. Franco-Polish relations revived in September 1992, once it became clear that the Suchocka government was committed to the economic austerity programme devised by Poland's first non-communist government.[60]

Alongside this continuation and adaption of bilateral policies, France also resorted to *'communautarisation'* - that is on a growing tendency to pursue policies with regard to Poland via the EC.[61] France and the other EC member states transferred responsibilities and resources to the European Commission at the G7 summit in Paris in July 1989, so as to enable the EC to organise policies towards Central and Eastern Europe. In December 1989 both the PHARE programme (Poland and Hungary aid for economic restructuring) and the Agreement on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation (henceforth: Trade Agreement) between the EC and Poland were launched.[62] The PHARE programme as a 'first generation agreement' provided for food aid, agricultural restructuring, improved

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[60] See, chronology, appendix.

[61] The term *'communautarisation'* (literally communitarisation, hence, multilateralisation) is used in French literature to refer to the fact that "French officiels see the necessity to set French policies, economic policies in particular, with regard to Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the EC" (*"tous les interlocuteurs institutionnels français insistaient sur la nécessité d'inscrire la politique de la France a l'égard de PECO dans le cadre de l'action de la Communauté européenne"*); see, Bayou, Céline, 'La présence économique française en Europe centrale et orientale au seuil de 1993', Le Courrier des Pays de l'Est, no. 379, May 1993, p. 4. In a round-table discussion Etienne de Poncins (Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières au Ministére des Affaires Etrangères) stated that "we try to multilateralise to a maximum what we can do for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, avoiding bilateral relations in the area of economic relations" (*"nous essayons de communautariser au maximum ce que l'on peut faire pour le pays de l'Est en évitant les actions bilatérales pour ce qui concerne les actions économiques"*). See, Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural, des Eaux et des Forêts (Paris, Nancy) (ed.), Europe de l'Est: la grande mutation: transition et perspectives, Romillat, Paris, 1992, p. 183f.

[62] The European Commission agreed to assume responsibility to coordinate PHARE and therefore also to coordinate the Europe Agreements, see, Commission of the European Communities, Bulletin of the European Communities, Brussels, (henceforth: EC, Bulletin), 7/8-1989, 1.1.1-6, and 12-1989 2.2.23. For Trade Agreement see, EC, Bulletin, 9-1989 2.2.11 and OJ L 339, 22.11.1989.

access to EC markets, and the promotion of investment. It introduced gradual trade liberalisation of products subject to quantitive restrictions and the suspension of non-specific restrictions. Likewise the Agreement between the EC and Poland on trade and commercial and economic cooperation was intended to eliminate quantitive restrictions.[63] The main features of the Association Agreement ('second generation agreement') were already set during the French presidency of the EC in the second half of 1989, and clarified by the Council and the Commision in August 1990, setting the policy directions for France's multilateral approach vis-à-vis Poland.[64] France was furthermore involved in multilateral financial cooperation with Central and Eastern European states in the framework of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which was instituted in April 1990. Moreover, Franco-German cooperation was extended by the institution of 'Troika' meetings with Poland.[65] The cooperation between France, Germany and Poland was consistent with a 'policy of counterbalance' and a strategy designed not to "leave Germany alone to be in charge of" Poland.[66] Hence, from the immediate end of the Cold War France was involved in multilateral approaches towards Poland.

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[63] See, Commission of the European Communities, XIIIrd General Report of the activities of the European Communities, Brussels, 1989, point 752, 786, 787. See furthermore, OJL 326 11.11.1989 and OJC 362 12.12.1989.

[64] It is difficult to say when the principles for the Agreement were defined first, since in a meeting of the Commission for External Affairs of the *Assemblée Nationale* in October 1990, Jean-Yves Le Deaut's question whether there was any possibility of associating Poland was denied by Jean Seitlinger ("*pas de question d'associer ... il faut d'abord assurer la cohésion interne de la Communauté*" ("there is no question of an association .. in the near future it is foremost necessary to strengthen the internal cohesion of the EC")), see, Commission, Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 21, 26.10.1989, p. 2559- 2563, nevertheless, Pinte stated in an interview that the principles of the Agreement were already laid down during the French presidency, author's interview, 27.10.1994. The European Council (Strasbourg) of December 1989 made reference to the Agreement and decided to set up the Agreement in February 1990. See, EC, Bulletin, 12-1989 1.1.14. For principles of the Agreement see, Commission of the European Communities, Communication to the Council on the conclusion of Association Agreements, COM (90) 398 final, 27.08.1990. For details of the character and aims of the Agreement see chapter IV.

[65] Weimar meeting of 29.08.1991; following-up meeting at Bérgérac 24.04.1992. The three countries regarded cooperation among them as important since they "exercise a decisive role in the development of the future structures of inter-state relations in Europe" ("*exercent une responsabilité determinante dans la reussite de structures porteuses d'avenir pour les relations des voisinage en Europe*"); Déclaration commune des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères de France, de Pologne et d'Allemagne, Weimar, 29.08.1991, see, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (ed.), Documents d'Actualité Internationale (henceforth: Documents), Documentation Française, Paris, 1991, no. 21, p. 413. The declaration of the Bergerac meeting (24.04.1992) went even further on their common role for the construction of Europe and European integration.

[66] "*ne pas laisser l'Allemagne seule en charge*", see, Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural, des Eaux et des Forêts, Europe de l'Est, p. 183.

French bilateral and multilateral policies were set by the end of 1991 when the Association Agreement, the most important bilateral economic, technical and cultural agreements, and in particular the bilateral 'Treaty of Friendship and Solidarity' were concluded.[67] With the end of the negotiation phase for the Association Agreement in December 1991 French foreign policy towards Poland concentrated on the "operational implementation" of bilateral and multilateral approaches and less on the initiation of new approaches or policies.[68] Thereafter French policy only re-shaped and continued existing bilateral and multilateral policies. In February 1993, for example, the French and Polish ministers of finance signed several bilateral financial agreements, which were based on earlier financial agreements and, hence, only re-shaped existing policies. Hence, once the period of the most crucial transformations and of the shaping of French foreign policy was over, France concentrated on the continuation and implementation of policy choices.[69]

2.4 The adjustment of Gaullist foreign policy principles

To demonstrate the reasons for increasing multilateralisation of post-Cold War Franco-Polish relations we will now analyse the adjustment of Gaullist foreign policy principles, in particular those concerning European integration. In this section it will be argued that France's post-Cold War approach vis-à-vis Poland was re-shaped to take account of the changing relations between European and particularly EC member states but there was no alteration of the Gaullist principles of French foreign policy. Traditional foreign policy principles (European integration, independence of action, and the quest to

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[67]The Treaty was signed on 09.04.1991, discussed in the *Assemblée Nationale* on 19.06.1992, see, JORF, Débat, 19.06.1992, p. 2602f.; see also, JORF, Traité, no. 2665, 20.04.1992; see furthermore, JORF, Rapport, no. 2783, 11.06.1992; Germany signed a bilateral treaty with Poland on 17.06.1991 ("*Vertrag über gutnachbarliche und freundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit*", ("Treaty for neighbourly and friendly cooperation")).

[68]"*operative Umsetzung*". For a discussion of this phase of Mitterrand's foreign policy see for instance, Schrader, Lutz, 'Mitterrands Europapolitik oder der lange Abschied vom Gaullismus', 'Frankreich in den neunziger Jahren', Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, vol. 32, August 1993, p. 33.

[69]See, JORF, Débat, Elisabeth Guigou, 03.11.1992, p. 4690.

pursue a mediating role between Eastern and Western Europe) were merely adapted to the post-Cold War situation.

France's post-Cold War approach towards Poland was constrained by existing policy commitments and approaches, particularly French integration within the EC which remained a focus of French foreign policy. Following the events of 1989 France's influence in the EC declined as a consequence of the changes in Franco-German relations. During the Cold War, Germany's limited sovereignty functioned as a counterbalance to her economic strength.[70] The unified, fully sovereign Germany could, by contrast, add a political dimension to her economic supremacy over France. This opened up new French fears of German policies more independent of the EC as well as German domination of the EC. Continuous strains in the alliance, to which, for example Mitterrand's reserved attitude to German unification contributed, resulted in a declining significance of the alliance for both states and hence a diminuition of France's influence within the EC.[71] Therefore, France set out to continue traditional EC integration as exemplified in Franco-German initiatives, such as the Kohl-Mitterrand letter of December, 6, 1990, and in the intergovernmental conferences leading to the Maastricht Treaty of February 1992. Thereby France could set out to maintain her influence and contain Germany's growing influence. Hence, earlier Gaullist policy commitments lived on into the new order, as traditional European integration continued to be a cornerstone of French foreign policy.[72]

As the EC remained a policy context in which France could seek to enhance her influence, attempts to increase French independence from the EC context were limited in the post-Cold War period. Up to the summer of 1991 France's policies towards Central

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[70] See for instance, Vernet, 'The dilemma of French foreign policy', p. 656.

[71] See for instance, ibd., p. 656f.

[72] For the perception of French political leaders of the effects of the developments in Central and Eastern Europe on the EC and France see, JORF, Avis, 12.10.1989, no. 923, p. 29. The importance of 'deepening' European integration in conjuction with the developments in Central and Eastern Europe was emphasised by President Mitterrand at a press conference on 03.11.1989, see, La Politique Etrangère, Mitterrand, November 1989, p. 4:"The faster the transitions develop, the more we have to progress and reinforce the European Community" ("*Plus les événements en Europe vont vite, plus nous devons accélérer et renforcer la Communauté européenne*").

and Eastern Europe in general were characterised by a search for different concepts, in which France attempted to pursue a policy more independent of the EC framework. This was reflected, for example, in Mitterrand's idea of a *confédération* (confederation), which would re-organise the larger Europe by loosely linking Central and Eastern European states with Western Europe but would exclude the United States.[73] However, this suggestion fell flat at the conference in Prague in June 1991, where Mitterrand planned to attract support for the project, as it was neither taken up by the Central and Eastern European states nor by the major EC member states whose cooperation France would have needed to realise it.[74] Hence, the continuing focus on the EC limited to an extent French freedom of manoeuvre.

French attempts to play a coordinating role between Central Eastern and Western Europe, thereby increasing French independence of action, and any French aspiration to become an "advocate" of Poland could only be followed in the context of the EC.[75] French initiatives, such as the formation of the EBRD and the extraordinary European Council meeting of November 18th, 1989 (the latter was initiated by France in order to discuss relations between the EC and Central and Eastern Europe), were pursued in the EC context, and therefore required the agreement of other member states.[76] In the second half of 1989 France played a 'mediating role' *(role charnière)* in the framework of the EC with regard to Poland by coordinating the interests of the EC member states and Poland whilst holding the presidency of the European Council. This made her play, as André Delehedde has stated, a "particular role" in the shaping of revised relations with Poland.[77] France regarded the presidency of the EC Council as a means of influencing relations with

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[73] See for instance, Heuser, 'Mitterrand's Gaullism: Cold War Policies for the Post-Cold War World?', p. 362. See also, Ayache, La conquête de l'Est, p. 21.

[74] Ibd., p. 140. At this conference 32 European states, Canada and the United States participated to discuss relations between Western and Central and Eastern Europe.

[75] "*l'avocat de la Pologne*", see, JORF, Assemblée Nationale, Question actuelle, Dumas (response), 07.11.1989, p. 4678; see also, JORF, Assemblée Nationale, Question Actuelle, Le Deaut, 07.11.1989, p. 4678:"France should foremost play the role of an advocate" ("*La France ... doi(t) dorénavant jouer le rôle de tuteurs*").

[76] For meeting in Paris see, EC, Bulletin, 11-1989, 2.2.15.

[77] JORF, Débat, André Delehedde, 07.11.1989, p. 4655.

Poland.[78] Hence, the EC provided a framework in which France could increase her influence with regard to Poland relative to and in conjunction with other member states.

France's continuing focus on traditional European integration led Franco-Polish relations to be increasingly multilateralised within the EC framework. The Association Agreements served French interests of linking continuing EC integration and responding to the developments in Central and Eastern Europe. This characterised Mitterrand's "binominal policy".[79] France's increasingly multilateral approach towards Poland represented the attempt to fuse France's Eastern European policies with her policies towards the EC.[80] Although such a fusion did lead to an internal contradiction in French foreign policy between the desire to pursue a bilateral foreign policy increasing French independence and the pursuance of European strategies, it does appear to have served French interests in both Western and Central and Eastern Europe.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the above analysis has shown, that French foreign policy towards Poland underwent major transformations after the Cold War and was increasingly multilaterised as a response to external constraints. The shifts in inter-state relations following the events of 1989 called into question traditional French Polish policy, since relations were no longer defined and constrained by the principles of the Yalta partition. As a consequence, French political and economic policy objectives with regard to Poland changed according to the transformation of inter-state relations. Specific traditional French interests in Poland, such as the fact that Poland was part of a strategy to counterbalance German political and economic influence, were revived.

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[78] JORF, Débat, Michel Vauzelle, 10.04.1990, p. 206.
[79] "*binôme mitterrandien*", see for instance, Ayache, La conquête de l'Est, p. 36.
[80] See, Kramer, Heinz, The European Community's response to the new Eastern Europe, paper presented to the EPRU/UACES/Goethe Institute joint conference on nationalism and supranationalism in Europe, Manchester, 09.-10.10.1992, p. 84.

Against this background French policies were transformed. Bilateral policies were incrementally adapted to the developments in Poland and shaped until 1991. In the immediate post-Cold War period they did not, however, represent a coherent policy strategy reflecting French interests and objectives. Multilateral approaches, on the other hand, were pursued increasingly from the end of the Cold War. This increasing multilateralisation can be explained in terms of the adjustment of Gaullist foreign policy principles responding to external constraints. French foreign policy after the Cold War focused on the continuation of traditional European integration. The shifts in post-1989 inter-state relations rendered the EC a suitable context in which France could maintain to enhance her influence. Hence, adopting a multilateral approach to Franco-Polish relations served French interests of focusing on Western Europe and at the same time responding to the changes in Poland and Central and Eastern Europe in general. Such external factors were not solely responsible for France's adoption of a multilateral approach. The following chapter will therefore examine the domestic factors which also pushed France towards the '*communautarisation*' of Franco-Polish relations.

CHAPTER III.

DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS AND RESULTANT TRANSFORMATIONS OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS POLAND

> *"The negotiations (on the Europe agreement) we pursue ... with the unshakable will not to harm the interests of our producers"*
>
> Roland Dumas[81]

Introduction

The previous chapter has shown that French foreign policy towards Poland was transformed after the Cold War and that in particular it was increasingly multilateralised in response to external challenges. However, the aim of this chapter is to illustrate that this "*communautarisation*" of French foreign policy with regard to Poland was a response not only to external, but also to domestic pressures. It will be argued that multilateralisation was primarily a political solution to domestic economic and political constraints. It allowed the French government to free itself from these pressures to an extent. The first section of this chapter will argue that French pressure groups in general had the potential to influence foreign policy towards Poland. This will be demonstrated in detail by an analysis of pressures exerted by agricultural and industrial interest groups (section two and three), because their interests were directly affected by the shifts in relations with Poland in the context of the PHARE programme, the Trade Agreement and the Association Agreement. On the basis of these findings, the government's motivation to increasingly multilateralise its policy will be shown in section four. The latter section

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[81] "*Ces négociations, nous les menons .. avec la volonté tout aussi inébranable de ne pas lèser les interêts de nos producteurs*", La Politique Etrangère, November 1991, p. 14.

argues that a multilateral approach through the EC represented a policy option designed to respond to demands by the pressure groups for both protectionism and trade liberalisation. The focus will be on the events in 1990 and 1991, as interest group pressures were strongest during this time.

3.1 Interest group politics and French foreign policy

French pressure group politics is generally characterised by diffused interest articulation and a comparatively distant relationship between the state and the interest organisations (in contrast to the situation in Germany, for example).[82] This is a consequence of the character of French interest groups, their modes of interaction with the state, and the attitude of the state itself. French interest groups are generally divided and they retain a large degree of autonomy. Furthermore, they are largely unrepresentative and relatively politicised. Interest groups are fragmented within sectors, representing "functional sub-interests", and along political, socio-economic and, to a minor extent, ideological cleavages.[83] Relations with the state are generally characterised by its predominance.[84] Moreover, the involvement of interest groups in policy-making is generally limited due to a strong tradition of direct protest, which has become a regular and potent feature of pluralist politics in France. At times protests can pose a considerable threat to public order. As Hall argued, the operation of organised interests in France has always aroused "suspicion and controversy".[85]

Nevertheless, interest groups exert influence on foreign policy within the network of organised interests, which is one of the principal features of the French political system.

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[82] For Germany, see for instance, Richardson, Jeremy J. (ed.), Pressure Groups, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993.

[83] Hall, Peter A., 'Pluralism and Pressure Politics', Hall, Peter A. et al. (eds.), Developments in French Politics, Macmillan, London, 1990, p. 81.

[84] Reasons for this are the dependence on financial support or official recognition, for example. See, ibd., p. 79.

[85] Ibd., p. 77.

They affect foreign policies by expressing their interests to the government, particularly to ministerial *cabinets* and the administration. These are more important contacts than those with parties and Parliament. As Marguerite found in a study on interest group politics in France, interest group leaders regard formal and informal contacts with governmental agencies as the most effective method of influencing policy, because these agencies effectively formulate policy. Agricultural and business interest groups, in particular, use these mostly informal, and very effective channels of influence.[86] Moreover, ministries exercise *tutelles* (supervisory relationships of ministries over interest groups) in order to both supervise the groups' activities and take into account their interests. Another example would be their attempts to secure objectives by exploiting divisions within the French state, which furthermore provides interest groups with an influence on policy-making.[87]

The interests of pressure groups are furthermore transmitted to the government by the *Conseil économique et social* (Economic and Social Council), which is composed essentially of representatives of employers', farmers' and workers' organisations. The Economic and Social Council, which stands at the apex of state advisory institutions, is "powerless but positioned".[88] It functions as an advocate for the views of social and economic groups with regard to governmental policies. Although its place is peripheral in the policy-making process, it nevertheless serves as a "barometer of social and economic group opinion".[89] Still, consultative committees of this sort are only regarded as useful by groups, such as the agricultural interest groups, which generally enjoy an influential position anyway.

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[86] See, Regan, Marguerite et al., 'Interest group politics in France and Ireland: Comparative Perspectives on neo-corporatism', West European Politics, vol. 9, no. 3, July 1986, p. 398. See also, Ehrmann, Henry W. et al., Politics in France, Harper Collins, New York, 1992, p. 193,194; see also, Duverger, Maurice, Party politics and pressure groups, A comparative introduction, transl. by Wagner, Robert, Nelson, London, 1972, p. 122.

[87] See, Hayward, Jack, 'Pressure groups and pressured groups in Franco-British perspective', Kavanagh, Dennis et al. (eds.), Comparative Government and Politics: essays in honour of S. E. Finer, Heinemann, London, 1984, p. 95f.

[88] Hall, 'Pluralism and Pressure Politics', p. 80.

[89] Hayward, Jack, quoted in Wright, Vincent, The Government and Politics of France, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 270.

The French political context of 1989-1991 meant that governmental sensitivity towards interest group pressures in France's foreign policy towards Poland increased. The government was weakened as a consequence of the political and financial scandals of 1991.[90] Furthermore, in the course of the negotiations on the Association Agreement with Poland between December 1990 and November 1991, political circumstances worsened for Mitterrand and his government. His Central and Eastern European policies, were criticised, particularly his policy stance towards these states expressed at the Prague conference in June 1991, as well as his hasty recognition of the leaders of the 'Moscow coup' of August 1991.[91] As has been shown in chapter II for the case of Poland, Mitterrand's Central and Eastern European foreign policies were not suitable for the situation in Central and Eastern Europe at the time. It can be argued that the French government's position remained weak up to the conclusion of the negotiations on both the Association Agreement in December 1991 and the Interim Agreement in February 1992.[92] The Cresson government had to face no-confidence votes in June, October and November 1991 and by the end of 1991 the popularity of the government was declining rapidly.[93]

National electoral politics influenced the government's sensitivity to interest group pressures. Moravcsik has argued that European integration itself has rarely been an issue of electoral importance.[94] However, the Association Agreement and the Interim Agreement, being negotiated between December 1990 and November 1991 and February 1992 for the latter, were to implement trade liberalisations. These, like the liberalisations of the PHARE programme and the Trade Agreement (see chapter II), clearly had a direct impact on agriculture and industry. The trade liberalisations in the context of the PHARE

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[90] Such as the scandal of contaminated blood; the arrival of the leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who was believed to be behind terrorism in the Middle-East, Georges Habache, in France; or the financial scandal "Urba".

[91] For Prague conference see also chapter 2.4.

[92] The Interim Agreement was part of the Association Agreement and covered all trade and trade-related matters. It was negotiated until February 1992 and came into force in March 1992. See, OJ L 144, 30.04.1992.

[93] Prime Minister Edith Cresson was forced to resign in April 1992.

[94] Moravcsik, Andrew, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', Keohane, Robert et al. (eds.), The new European Community, Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, Westview Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 73.

programme and the Trade Agreement were showing its effects already in 1990 and 1991 before the forthcoming local elections in March 1992 and legislative elections in 1993.[95] With elections imminent, the groups' interests were taken into account by the government. This was all the more so as the government was, as aforementioned, weakened and desparate for support. Thus, as Moravcsik has suggested, the autonomy of heads of government in pursuing an EC policy was constrained by interests within their domestic partisan base.[96] Even though farmers make up an increasingly small proportion of the electorate and although the agricultural sector only accounts for 3.5% of GNP, they enjoyed a disproportionate electoral importance.[97] This was mainly because they represented a socio-professional group, which had traditionally been influential. Industrial interests, on the other hand, were regarded as an important electoral base due to their continuing and real significance in the economy. Hence, the French Socialist government could not be aloof from societal interests, in its policy towards Poland as a consequence of the government's weakened position and forthcoming elections.

French pressure groups thus had the potential to influence French foreign policy. In France, farming and business interest groups were most affected by the shifts in relations between the EC and Central and Eastern Europe. This will be shown in detail in the following sections, alongside examples of how the character and interests of agricultural and industrial interest groups affected French policy in relations to Poland. It will then be argued in section four that the government responded with an increasing multilateralisation of Franco-Polish relations.

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[95]The effects of trade liberalisation will be analysed in the following sections in detail.
[96]Moravcsik, Andrew, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', p. 71.
[97]3,5% in 1990, see, Eck, Jean-François, Histoire de l'économie française depuis 1945, 3rd edn., Armand Colin, Paris, 1992.

3.2 Agricultural interests and constraints

The character of the agricultural pressure groups in France contributed to their relative impact on foreign policy vis-à-vis Poland. However, it must be noted that the strength of agricultural groups is generally weakened by deep divisions within every sector, with rival groups competing for the right to represent agricultural interests. The *Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles* (FNSEA), the most powerful French farmers' union is rivaled by smaller groups, such as, the *Fédération Française de l'Agriculture* (FFA), the *Mouvement pour la Coordination et la Défense de l'Exploitation Familiale* (MODEF) or the *Confédération Nationale des Syndicats des Travailleurs Paysans* (CNSTP). Despite these divisions, agricultural pressures were able to exert a comparatively strong influence on French foreign policy towards Poland. Associations in the farming sector are typically less divided along partisan lines than those other socio-professional groups, and their degree of representativness is relatively high.[98] Moreover, agricultural interests in France are an "object of national consensus" and are a politically sensitive issue due to firstly, their aforementioned traditional social significance and secondly, to the fact that France is the EC's primary agricultural producer.[99]

The ability of French agricultural pressure groups to exploit their strategic position is recognised by the state. The FNSEA had been granted quasi-official status under the Fifth Republic and obtained privileged, even exclusive, access to many agencies and commissions concerned with agricultural policy. As Keeler argued, the privileged informal access to the government and the administration provides the FNSEA with "gains in both influence and competitive advantage".[100] It benefits from an arguably hegemonic position.

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[98] See, Wright, The Government and Politics, p. 278.

[99] "*fait l'objet d'un consensus national*"; Dupré, Jean-Yves et. al., 'La crise agricole', Notes et études documentaires, no. 4930, Paris, 1991, p. 5. The final agricultural output of French agricultural production was in 1990 48.357 Mio ECU (followed by Germany 27.556 Mio ECU), for further details see, European Communities, Eurostat, Agriculture, Statistical Yearbook 1994, European Communities (henceforth: Eurostat), Brussels, 1994, p. 175f., 193.

[100] Keeler, John T.S., Neocorporatism in France: Farmers, the State, and Agricultural Policy-making in the Fifth Republic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, p. 112.

Despite the traditional reluctance of political elites to grant interest groups access to the state, the FNSEA has been noted for its symbiotic relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture, for example. In certain circumstances, this position made the FNSEA a guarantor of social order and a channel for information and advice for the government. Moreover, farming pressures are well organised at parliamentary level by the *Amicale Parlementaire Agricole et Rurale* (Friends of Agricultural and Rural interests in Parliament) which include members of all parties. Thus, the character of agricultural interest groups provided them with a strong potential to influence the government's policies with regard to Poland between 1989 and 1993.

Shifts in relations with Poland in the context of the PHARE programme and the Trade Agreement jeopardised French interests in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).[101] The French agricultural market within the CAP was heavily protected from international competition by levies, customs duties and guaranteed (higher) prices for its products (Community preference). Moreover, the CAP had sustained surplus production - a fact which in conjunction with the CAP price support system had largely maintained farm incomes. The CAP was particularly important for France, given its agricultural role in the EC. The CAP debate was re-opened in the EC by developments in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989. CAP reform had been supressed, or at least only modestly pursued, until then. Coming on top of long-standing and much-debated factors, like budgetary pressures, to reform the CAP, the re-organisation of relations with Central and Eastern European states in the context of the PHARE programme, the Trade Agreement and the Association Agreement with Poland helped to re-open the CAP reform debate in the EC and increased the pressure for decisions to be taken.[102] Imports from Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries aggravated the state of EC agricultural markets, and contributed to a sharp drop in export prices of EC products, thereby worsening the CAP's budgetary imbalances and jeopardising its mechanisms. The price

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[101] For CAP see, art. 38-47 of the EEC Treaty.

[102] In November 1990, for example, EC agriculture ministers decided to reduce subsidies for farmers by 30% over the next ten years.

support system was further threatened as agricultural prices were pushed to artificially higher levels relative than those of imported products.[103] Hence, although the size of the agricultural sector in the Polish economy only amounted to 7% of GNP, and the scope for modernisation of production methods was considerable, Polish imports nevertheless contributed to re-open the topic of CAP reform.[104] Given the significance of the CAP for French agriculture, even a comparatively marginal effect of trade liberalisation with Poland was regarded as likely to affect the interests of French farmers considerably.

Facilitated agricultural imports from Poland contributed to further strains in the French agricultural sector.[105] The situation of French agriculture in 1989/90 and 1991 was characterised by an increase of production resulting in surpluses, particularly in the 'agro-alimentary' sector.[106] However, pressures on agricultural prices and the increasing debts of farmers worsened their economic situation and lowered their competitiveness. Moreover, agricultural production in general has been badly hit by drought in the summer of 1990. In comparison with other Central and Eastern European countries (with the exception of the USSR/CIS), agricultural imports from Poland were most damaging for the French agricultural market. Although the amount of imports from Poland as compared to the total amount of agricultural imports was small, Polish imports had an influence on particularly sensitive French sectors. Sectors of Polish agriculture which were competitive and expansionary challenged those sectors of French agriculture which were experiencing economic difficulties. Although Poland's agricultural export potential did not jeopardise French agriculture in general, specific French sectors had to face increased competition.[107]

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[103] See, Dinan, Desmond, Ever closer Union?, An introduction to the European Community, Macmillan, London, 1994, p. 331.

[104] See for instance, Michalski, Anna et. al., The European Community: The Challenge of Enlargement, European Programme Special Paper, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1992, p. 10. 7% (1994), see, Mahé, L.-P. et al., L'agriculture et l'elargissement de l'Union Européenne aux pays d'EuropeCentrale et Orientale, Ecole Nationale Supérieure Agronomique de Rennes, December 1994, p. 9.

[105] For the most recent and detailed study on the effects of trade liberalisation on the agricultural sectors of the EC, see, Mahé, L'agriculture et l'elargissement de l'Union Européenne aux pays d'Europe Centrale et Orientale.

[106] *Agro-alimentary* (*Industries Agro-Alimentaires*, IAA) refers to the industry that "transforms primary biological products, essentially of agricultural origin, in order to satisfy alimentary needs of human beings and animals". See, INSEE, 1991/1992, p. 516.

[107] See, JORF, Conseil Economique et Social, Cazals, André (*rapporteur*), 'La contribution de

In the sector of meat production, for example, in which France was dominant within the EC, Polish competition was, as the *Assemblée permanente des Chambres d'Agricultures*, (APCA, Permanent Assembly of Agricultural Associations), put it, "not unimportant" and contributed further to the difficulties of French producers.[108] The fact that the European Commission proposed to increase imports in the sector of cattle farming, for example, threatened the interests of French farmers further, since at the time French cattle meat production was already endangered by an increase in EC production (particularly in Germany and Ireland).[109] An increase of imports damaged regions which had specialised in cattle-farming; a sector which was already fragile, the market price having dropped by 10% from 1989 to 1991.[110] Another example was the sheep farming sector for which the Council of Ministers had decided in March 1990 to suspend levies for Polish imports. Hence, sectors of French farming had to face increasing competition, facilitated by EC trade concessions. Furthermore, even though the effects of imports from Poland in some sectors like poultry farming were regarded as negligeable, the pressures on the prices of French products imposed by Polish exports were increased by the practice of "dumping". Hence, the *Chambre d'Agriculture*, for example, considered Poland to present an "considerable risk" for the small and medium-sized 'agro-alimentary' production sector.[111] As an official of the Ministry for Agriculture, Hervé Durand, pointed out, the developments in Central and Eastern Europe had become a major concern for French farmers.[112]

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l'agriculture aux grands équilibres de la nation', no. 4223 (henceforth: Conseil Economique et Social no. 4223), Paris, 1993, p. 128. See furthermore, JORF, Conseil Economique et Social, Gauthier, Michel (*rapporteur*), 'La place de l'agriculture dans la balance commercial française', no. 4203 (henceforth: Conseil Economique et Sociale no. 4203), Paris, 1993.

108 "*non négligeables*", in the sector of cattle farming, for instance, France's production amounted to 2,003,000 million tonnes, whereas Poland's production accounted for 649,000 million tonnes in 1988. See, Chambres d'Agriculture,'L'agriculture française et les pays de l'Est: surmonter les contradictions', Chambres d'Agrigulture, Publication de l'Assemblée des Chambres d'Agriculture, supplément au no. 778, May 1990, p. 52. The final animal output in 1990, for example, was for France 22.030 Mio ECU (Germany following with 17.744 Mio ECU). For further figures showing that France was the EC's primary producer in the meat sector in 1989-1992, see, Eurostat, 1994, p. 85, 175, 193.

109 Chambres d'Agriculture, 'L'agriculture française et les pays de l'Est: surmonter les contradictions', p. 52.

110 Ibd., p. 52.

111 "*risque élevé*", ibd., p. 4.

112 See, Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural, des Eaux et des Forêts, Europe de l'Est, p. 190f.

The interests of farmers were therefore focused on protectionist measures. French agricultural groups put pressure on the government to "refuse to allow Eastern countries concessions regarding agricultural imports into the EC, which would further weaken French sectors of production".[113] French farmers pressed for imports from Central and Eastern Europe to be prevented from disturbing market sectors in which the equilibrium was already fragile. As Hassner argued, there was considerable resistance in France to opening markets to products from Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in those few sectors where Poland was competitive.[114] The principal concern in meat production, for example, was that the difference in the costs of production between the two countries would adversely affect the prices of French products. Thus, since agricultural interest groups regarded Poland as a "present or potential competitor", which furthermore received structural and financial assistance in the context of the PHARE programme, it was the primary objective of French farmers to preserve their interests within the EC market by demanding a revision of concessions made to Central and Eastern European countries.[115] French agricultural pressure groups regarded the CAP as a tool to protect French agriculture; they demanded that this be maintained.[116] As Raymond Lacombe, the president of the FNSEA, has pointed out, agricultural interest groups wanted a "reinforcement" of the CAP in order to "discuss" matters with Central and Eastern Europe and requested the government to advocate in Brussels a genuine Common Agricultural Policy.[117]

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[113] "*refuser d'octroyer aux pays de l'Est des concessions d'importations agricoles dans la Communauté qui fragiliseraient encore davantage les secteures français de production*", see, Chambres d'Agriculture, 'L'agriculture française et les pays de l'Est: surmonter les contradictions', p. 52.

[114] Hassner, Pierre, 'La situation géopolitique de l'Europe centrale', L'Autre Europe, no. 28-29, 1994, p. 121,122.

[115] For a point of view of French farmers' interest groups see also the statements of the Director of the *Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d'Agriculture* (APCA), Denis Badre, Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural, des Eaux et des Forêts, Europe de l'Est, p. 192f.

[116] Chambres d'Agriculture, 'L'agriculture française et les pays de l'Est: surmonter les contradictions', p. 4.

[117] Liberation, 06.12.1991 .

However, Poland was also regarded as a potential market for French agricultural exports.[118] Indeed, a large portion of French agricultural exports were already directed towards Poland.[119] Overproduction in some French agricultural sectors, particularly in the 'agro-alimentary' sector, created an incentive to look for new markets. The surplus capacity and the net commodity export structure of certain sectors induced French farmers to demand sectoral trade liberalisation in order to export their products to Poland. This was the case for cereal in which France was the primary producer in the EC.[120] Furthermore, in sectors, like wine production, in which there was no competition from Poland, French producers demanded measures to facilitate exports to Poland in order to expand their export markets. This also corresponded to a particular concern not to lose markets, especially to German competitiors. In fact, German trade exchanges with Poland were considerably higher than French.[121] The requests for sectoral trade liberalisation which were advocated by the APCA, for example, were taken up by ministerial officials.[122]

The relative weight of the kind of pressure which agricultural interest groups brought to bear on the French government is difficult to document. Therefore this analysis will focus on pressures placed on the government and its policy stance with regard to Poland and the EC, both, by direct action and through the Social and Economic Council. The position of the French government in the negotiations on the Association Agreement, which will be examined in detail in chapter IV, will further demonstrate that the government responded to agricultural pressures. Furthermore it is important to notice,

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[118] See, Conseil Economique et Social, no. 4203, p. 161. Also see, Conseil Economique et Social, no. 4223, p. 128.

[119] Chambres d'Agriculture, 'L'agriculture française et les pays de l'Est: surmonter les contradictions', p. 48f.

[120] In 1992 France produced 35% of the EC's cereal production (followed by Germany 20%), see, Eurostat, 1994, p. 182f.

[121] Chambres d'Agriculture, 'L'agriculture française et les pays de l'Est: surmonter les contradictions', p. 4. For Germany's trade exchanges with Poland see chapter II, footnote 8.

[122] As Nathalie Esnault, Ministry of Agriculture (Direction Générale de l'Alimentation au Ministrère de l'Agriculture et Forêt) pointed out in a round table discussion: "For companies as in the agro-alimentary sector, Central and Eastern Europe represents an immense reservoir with new consumers" (*"Pour les entreprises d'un secteur comme celui de l'agroalimentaire, l'Europe de l'Est représente un immense réservoir de nouveaux consommateurs*); see, Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural, des Eaux et des Forêts, Europe de l'Est, p. 187f.

that as a characteristic of French agricultural interests, specific interests (with regard to Poland in this case) were often mixed with more general interests towards Central and Eastern Europe or the EC.[123]

French agricultural groups, and the FNSEA in particular, added to the pressures on the government by resorting to direct action. Increased Polish imports influenced farmers' readiness for extra-institutional action, which is a key resource of agricultural interest groups in France. A wave of protest movements swept France in August 1990 and in autumn 1991. Tensions between agricultural interest groups and the state became particularly acute in September 1991, during a crucial stage of the negotiations on the Association Agreement with Poland, as the effects of trade liberalisation in the context of the PHARE programme and the Trade Agreement were becoming evident. The FNSEA and the CNJA (*Centre National des Jeunes Agriculteurs*), led the campaigns to defend, as Lacombe put it, the "fundamental role" of the farmers.[124] French farmers were, for instance, angered by falling meat prices. As a consequence they seized and destroyed shipments of Central and Eastern European agricultural products to try and dissuade their government from making concessions on EC quotas on agricultural imports. Increased meat imports from Central and Eastern Europe posed a "far from trivial problem" for French agricultural interest groups, as the extent of protest illustrated: the FNSEA mobilised more than 200,000 supporters for the September demonstrations.[125] Through these very public manifestations of discontent, it was the aim of the groups to extract concessions whilst pressurising and discrediting the government.

Agricultural interests were also transmitted by the Economic and Social Council to the government. The Economic and Social Council prepared reports in 1992 and 1993 on

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[123]This is particularly important with regard to farmers' demonstrations and agricultural interests in conjunction with party politics.

[124]"*Les paysans ont un rôle fundamental*", 29.09.1991, quoted in Presse Universitaire Française (ed.), L'Année Politique, Economique, Sociale et Diplomatique en France, 1991, Presse Universitaire Française, Paris, 1991, p. 74.

[125]Herald Tribune, 01.10.1991.

French agricultural interests against the backdrop of the transformations in Central and Eastern Europe and called for the farmers to be protected. It concluded that developments in Central and Eastern Europe would "affect French agriculture to the highest degree".[126] However, the reports also pointed to the possibility of new markets. The conclusions of the Economic and Social Council only increased pressure on the Socialist government to protect agriculture and demand trade liberalisation in certain sectors.

The pressures by the agricultural groups had an influence on party politics. The agricultural protests of 1990/91 were taken into consideration by all parties. Thus the agricultural discontent caused increased domestic political conflict. The agricultural pressure groups had strong ties to the right-wing opposition parties. Hence, coalitions between the interest groups and the opposition parties were formed forcing the government to look for new policy alternatives. Already in October 1990, in an extraordinary discussion following the debate on the structural crisis of French meat production, the opposition strongly criticised the government and demanded action in favour of farmers.[127] The government's policies were attacked and the benefits of EC policies for French agriculture were questioned. On a more general level, during the September negotiations in 1991 all political parties, with the exception of the Socialists, openly supported the farmers' interests. The pressure on the government was exacerbated when at the end of the mass demonstrations in autumn 1990 Mitterrand stood up for the French farmers thereby directly contradicting and further dividing his own government.[128] Agricultural interest politics finally threatened the very survival of the government, when in May 1992, the opposition parties proposed a vote-of-no-confidence concerning the

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[126] "*affecte au plus haut point l'agriculture*", see, Conseil Economique et Social, no. 4223, p. 122. See also, Conseil Economique et Sociale no. 4203.

[127] The President of the Commission for Economic Affairs, Jean-François Poncet and the President of the Commission for Finance, Christian Poncelet advocated the criticisms of the opposition. See, Presse Universitaire Française, L'Année Politique, 1990, p. 134.

[128] At Poitiers he advised not to "*mettre le couteau sur la gorge des agriculteurs*" (literally: put a knife to farmers' throats), quoted in, Presse Universitaire Française, L'Année Politique, 1990, p. 380.

CAP against the Socialist government of Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy. The no-confidence motion failed by 3 votes.

Faced with continuing mass agricultural protests and oppositional pressures, the government was eventually forced to give subsidies to the producers, which reflected a degree of dependence on these interests. Since agricultural interest groups engaged in direct action, the government was partly conceding to their demands in order to limit the effects upon the political system as a whole. As it was a characteristic of French agricultural interest politics that sectoral disturbances had effects on wider agricultural interest politics, as the scope of the demonstrations in September 1991 showed, the government engaged in efforts to maintain order and diminish the political effects of the protests. This was particularly important in 1991, when the government was as aforementioned weakened. In August and September 1990, the Minister for Agriculture, Henri Nallet, had announced further subsidies for farmers as a reaction to the protests of autumn 1990. Similarly, the government reacted in autumn 1991 by granting further subsidies to the farmers.[129] Hence, there was a direct link between the protest movements and governmental actions in favour of subsidies. Governmental expenditure on agriculture generally increased considerably at this time, particularly between 1990 and 1991.[130] Thus, direct action by French agricultural pressure groups represented a means of influencing the government.

In summary, French agricultural interest groups exerted strong pressure on the government. Although the shifts in relations with Poland affected their interests only marginally they set out to press the government to pursue protectionist and trade liberalising policies by means of direct protest, via the Economic and Social Council and through interest organisations such as the APCA . Moreover, their interests had effects on

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[129]The Junior Finance Minister, Michel Charasse, announced subsidies. See, Presse Universitaire Française, L'Année Politique, 1991, p. 459.

[130]1989: 134.249, 1990:135.621, 1991: 143.530 millions of French francs; see, INSEE (1990/1991), p. 426.

party politics increasing pressure on the government. Administrative officials took into account their interests and political leaders responded to agricultural interests with regard to Poland by granting subsidies. The analysis of the negotitations of the Association Agreement will further demonstrate how the French government responded to agricultural interests in relation to Poland. Before demonstrating how multilateralisation was regarded by the French government as a solution to respond to these pressures we must first analyse industrial pressures.

3.3 Industrial interests and constraints

We will now examine the character, interests and relative influence of industrial pressure groups, as they stood in 1990 and 1991, since their interests were also important for Franco-Polish relations and induced the government to multilateralise relations. As with the agricultural pressure groups, the character of the business community in France contributes to its relative influence on French foreign policy. In the industrial, as in the farming sector, multiple organisations, representing small and medium sized business, local chambers of commerce and trade associations, compete for support. Apart from the *Conseil National du Patronat Français* (CNPF), the umbrella union for public and private employers, the *Association des Grandes Entreprises Françaises faisant appel a l'épargne* (AGREF) or the *Syndicat National des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises* (SNPMI), for example, also represent industrial interests. Sectoral and structural affiliations, representing genuine interests, divide the business community. The CNPF, the most important representation of business interests, for example, is deeply divided, since it embraces highly disparate groups. It is decentralised and represents trade organisations, insisting on their genuine interests. This weakens the ability of this interest group to express interests and its overall capacity to collaborate with the state. Despite these weaknesses, employers' organisations in business and industry were powerful enough to transmit their interests and to exert pressure on French policy-makers. Some sectoral

groupings, like the federation of chemical industries, as well as some large individual firms, are relatively powerful pressure groups and have close relations with the state. Despite its internal divisions, the CNPF, was a strong interest representation for big business, which dominated other interests within the organisation. Moreover, the industrial community generally enjoyed the support and encouragement of the French state due to its aforementioned economic significance.

The situation of French industry in 1989/90 was characterised in general by stagnation, and by outright recession in some branches, like the textile industry.[131] The general external trade deficit increased during 1990.[132] Many sectors of French industry were facing long-term decline and/or a cyclical downturn and a productivity crisis. The car industry, for example, stagnated in 1991 and strongly decreased in 1992 (-7,2%) due to decreasing domestic demand.[133] As in agriculture, certain French industrial sectors, like steel, were characterised by a fall in production due to the general slow-down of the French economy and increasing external competition.[134] As a consequence unemployment rose, particularly in the textile sector, which was facing a heavy external deficit. Hence, increasing trade liberalisation with Poland in the framework of the trade agreement and the PHARE programme primarily affected sectoral interests. Poland increased its exports to the EC in the iron and steel sector between 1990 and 1991 by 125%, for clothing by 56% and knitted clothing by 93%.[135] The competitiveness and the export capacity of Poland's industry was mainly focused on specific industrial sectors (textile, steel, or wood and wood products, for example).

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[131] See, INSEE (1991/1992), p. 516.

[132] Ibd., p. 454, 516.

[133] In 1992 PSA Peugeot-Citroën only increased its profit marginally (12,26% in 1993, 12,18% in 1992) and Renault achieved positive results on the French market but its position in Europe (10,5% in 1993, 10,6% in 1992), ibd., p. 574.

[134] For steel see, ibd., p. 530.

[135] See, Bak, 'Re-integration of Poland into Western Europe by intenal and external liberalisation', p. 31b, 31c. Even though these figures account for the EC market in general, obviously these imports also increased pressures on the French market. The European Commission provides the following numbers: The share in total imports from Poland to the EC was rising for clothing and footwear (1987:14.9; 1992: 17.0) and for wood and wood products (1987: 9.6; 1992: 11.6), and the annual growth rate of imports of textiles was in 1991 36%. See, Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Economy, Trade Liberalisation with Central and Eastern Europe, Supplement A, no. 7, July 1994, p. 4f.

French industry, like agriculture, was firmly set within the EC context and the EC market, which implies that the EC was a focus of interest for French industrial groups. However, only in specific French industrial sectors did the EC intervene as extensively as it did in the French agricultural sector. France's steel and textile industries, as declining sectors with difficulties adjusting to changed economic and trade conditions, were given special attention by EC policies. Up to 1985, the EC intervened directly by restructuring the industry and establishing a cartel which instituted price controls, import restrictions and mandatory curbs on production.[136] From 1985, price controls and cartels were eliminated by the "Davignon plan", although bilateral special agreements further restricted imports.[137] The textile sector was equally protected by agreements that restricted imports (Multifibre Agreement MFA) and given special attention by specific measures to assist restructuring the industry.[138]

Given the situation of the French economy and its links with EC policies, French industrial interests were partly focused on protection. As with agricultural interest groups, industrial sectors facing increased competition, such as the textile or the steel industry, for example, had an interest in increasing protection of their industries.[139] However, French industrial interest groups as a whole were generally more favourable towards trade liberalisation with Poland than were their agricultural counterparts, since French industry had become increasingly dependent on foreign trade, and trade liberalisation would therefore be more beneficial for industrial sectors. Sectors, like the car industry, had an interest in expanding their export share of new markets in order to compensate for decreasing or stagnating internal or EC demand.

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[136]Commission of the European Communities, The European Community's Industrial Strategy, Luxembourg, OOP, 1983, quoted in Dinan Ever Closer Union?, p. 364.

[137]Etienne Davignon was European Commission Vice President for industrial affairs between 1981/85.

[138]See, Sheperd, Geoffrey (ed.), Europe's Industries, Public and Private Strategies for Change, Cornell University Press, Ithace, New York, 1983, quoted in Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, p. 365.

[139]See for instance, Meyer, Anne, 'La Communauté européenne face aux pays d'Europe centrale et orientale: de l'ambition politique à la conciliation des intérêts commerciaux', Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, no. 11, Autumn 1993, p. 183.

French industrial interest pressure is different from agricultural interest articulation, in that industrial interests generally exert pressure and articulate their interests through the institutionalised system of interest mediation. Big business exerts pressure mainly through its links with ministries and the administration. Hence, there was no resort to direct action over revised trade relations with Poland. This was, of course, partly due to the nature of industrial interests, which favoured trade liberalisation to a greater extent than did agricultural interest groups. The nature of interest articulation of industrial groups makes the analysis of personalised pressure in this sector even more difficult. However, there is evidence that industrial pressure influenced the government on its policy stance with regard to Poland if one considers the French position in the negotiations on the Association Agreement. As the procedure and the French position during the negotiations will be discussed in detail in chapter IV, we will only analyse the government's position in as much as it is relevant to prove that industrial interests were taken into account. Some of the most important firms had direct access to the centres of decision-making and thereby influenced the government. *Régie Renault*, the public sector car group, exercised considerable influence within the state due to its position and through its "monopoly of legitimate expertise".[140] In the negotiations France exerted pressure in favour of *Renault* to allow imports to Poland even though Renault planned to establish a factory in Poland. Similarly, the government defended the interests of the *Chambre Syndicale de la Sidérurgie Française* (CSSF), the trade association representing the steel industry, a sector which since 1978 had been under state control anyway. In the negotiations with Poland over the Association Agreement France vehemently demanded the inclusion of quantitative restrictions and self-limiting arrangements.[141] Sectoral pressure on the government therefore aimed at both, protection and trade liberalisation, depending on the specific circumstances different sectors found themselves in.

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[140]Wright, The Government and Politics of France, p. 255.
[141]See, JORF, Rapport, no. 2587, p. 36.

Moreover, the accessibility of the structures of the French state enhanced the CNPF's ability to influence the policy stance of the government. The CNPF operated through a network of close personal relations with the state. The organisation had always preferred informal discussion as opposed to public demonstrations, knowing that the cause of big business was unlikely to command mass sympathy and support. The CNPF and the government discussed French industrial interests with regard to Central and Eastern Europe, for example, in a meeting between the CNPF, French business circles and the Prime Minister in February 1990. Mitterrand met the president of the CNPF, François Perigot, in May 1990, for a discussion on the competitiveness of French industry. Moreover, Perigot met with Prime Minister Michel Rocard in August 1990.

Thus, French industrial interest groups influenced the government in its policy stance towards Poland, as did agricultural pressure groups. They pressured for trade liberalisation and protection according to the situation of specific sectors as the government's stance in the negotiations on the Association Agreement has shown. In the following section, the reasons for multilateralisation will be analysed against the background of this influence.

3.4 The need to multilateralise

The developments in relations with Poland ensured newly articulated and stronger interest group pressures, because revised trade and economic relations from 1989 directly affected the interests of the French agricultural and industrial community. The changing international environment after 1989 affected both governmental policies and the positions taken by interest groups within countries. These interest groups in turn, tried to influence the outcome of new government policies. The government had therefore to reconsider the impact of change upon both their external policies and upon a shifting domestic environment. Hence, the strong agricultural and industrial constraints explained the

willingness of French political leaders to compromise and engage in policy solutions adapted to domestic interests. Agricultural and industrial constraints created and legitimised pressure for coordinated market protection and trade liberalisation at the European level. This in turn made a strong EC policy towards Central and Eastern Europe appear all the more essential. As Charles Josselin (Socialist Party) stated in a report on relations between the EC and the Central and Eastern European states, France regarded the "role of economic and political integration of the EC as still more indispensable now than it was one year ago".[142]

Multilateralisation thus reflected the interest of the French government in minimizing the impact of external factors on domestic interests. EC policies, in particular the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and the Common Customs Tariff (CCT), which defined the terms of trade of the member states and, hence, constituted the framework for the Association Agreement, provided for protection mechanisms, such as customs duties or safeguard clauses with regard to third countries. They represented a means to both create a new trade regime and satisfy the pressures for protection of domestic interest groups. Hence, France engaged in the organisation of a protection of the French agricultural and industrial market in the framework of the EC, as Prime Minister Edith Cresson stated in June 1991.[143] The sectoral effects of revised trade relations with Poland could be minimised due to EC protective measures. This served French interests by postponing and minimising the domestic economic and political adjustments necessitated by the change. To an extent, France was bound in her external economic relations by the mechanisms and policies of the EC, in particular the CCP, which limited her margin of manoeuvre for potential bilateral trade agreements or the possibility of abstention from EC policies. The CCP as well as the CCT obliged member states to act a a unit in

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142 "*Le rôle d'integration économique et politique ... de la Communauté nous parait, davantage encore aujourd' hui qu'il y a un an, indispensable*", see, JORF, Rapport, no. 1536, 27.06.1990, p. 29.

143 Quoted in Presse Universitaire Française, L'Année Politique, 1991, p. 425. Pinte confirmed in an interview that France feared competition particularly from Poland in specific sectors, such as textiles, car industry, steel and agriculture and therefore the French government attempted to avoid that the Agreement disturbs the domestic market, author's interview, 27.10.1994.

international trading negotiations.[144] Given that a great part of the Association Agreement with Poland covered commercial issues, France's policy and role was partly pre-determined.

Furthermore, against the pressure of agricultural and industrial interest groups, the increasingly multilateral foreign policy approach towards Poland was motivated by French interests in the Common/Single Market, the EC's policies related to it and the CAP. As the EC's external policies are related to its internal economic policies and since the French economy was closely linked to the EC market and its policies, only a common policy towards to Poland allowed for a continuation of existing internal market policies. Independent, bilateral negotiations and agreements on economic and trade relations, on the other hand, would have jeopardised the integrity of the Common Market within the EC.[145] The prevention of EC member states gaining competitive advantages over each other through increased trade with Poland, for example, was a necessary pre-condition for the Single Market project.

The EC's aforementioned external trade policies allowed for a combination of protection and trade liberalisation and thereby served French interests to respond to domestic pressures. The coordination of trade liberalisation and protection served the interests of the expanding export capacity of some sectors and the demand for protection in others. Since the French economy was relatively dependent on sectoral exports (for example in the car industry), the French government was seeking support for trade liberalisation for specific sectors. Hence, it advocated protection *and* liberalisation in the context of multilateralisation as a response to domestic pressures. The increasing multilateralisation of Franco-Polish relations offered to balance market share losses against further export gains. Liberalising measures could pay off against protectionist provisions in the context of Community policies. Thus, the benefits of cooperation were

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[144] See for instance, Nugent, Neill, The government and Politics of the European Community, 2nd edn., Macmillan, London, 1994, p. 263.

[145] Haggard, 'Integrating the Two Halves of Europe: Theories of Interests, Bargaining and Institutions', p.183.

perceived by the French government as preferable to bilateral solutions or abstention from EC policies. The conflict between trade liberalisation and protection could be solved on the EC level, as the CCP and the CCT, provide for mechanisms allowing individual member states to seek protectionist measures in the framework of the EC's decision-making process in conjunction with trade liberalisation. This was furthermore possible, because Poland had little bargaining leverage due to the structural weaknesses of her economy.

As multilateralisation helped to balance the losses and gains of trade liberalisation viable domestic coalitions in favour of trade liberalisation, which was the primary aim of the Association Agreement (see chapter IV), could be created. Hence, multilateralisation was a means to overcome to an extent the domestic pressures exerted by agricultural and industrial groups more successfully. These were, as was shown in earlier sections, agricultural and industrial interests disadvantaged by policy coordination, notably increasing liberalisation of trade. However, EC measures could help the French government become more independent of domestic pressures. The relatively high level of acceptance of the agricultural interest groups demonstrated this, as did, for example, Lacombe's reaction to the interim solution on the restriction of meat imports from Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics, reached in the Council negotiations on the Association Agreement in September 1991.[146] The EC reversed the stalemate in the September negotiations by a bargaining solution that helped France to sell the idea of a multilateralisation of Franco-Polish relations to its farmers, who were worried about competition from Poland and Central and Eastern Europe in general.[147] Moreover, according to the president of the APCA, Denis Badre, France's policy stance was seen to

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[146] See, Presse Universitaire Française, L'Année Politique, 1991, p. 459; see also, Le Monde, 02.10.1991. Joined by Ireland and Belgium; the three countries vetoed an agreement to increase EC imports by 500 tons of beef and 900 tons of lamb a year (the total turnover of the EC meat markets is 7,000,000 tons a year) from the associated countries. Brada, Josef C., 'The European Community and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland', Europolitique, Centre d'Information et de Documentation Internationale et Contemporaine (CIDIC), Documentation Française, Paris, 06.12.1991, p. 3. An interim solution was reached, which took into account French interests. This will be analysed in more detail in chapter IV.

[147] Herald Tribune, 01.10.1991

defend the interests of the French farmers.[148] Hence, multilateralistion permitted the French government to pursue a policy of cooperation with Poland despite interest group opposition. Moreover, there was a financial incentive for the French government to become more independent of domestic constraints. The reaction of the government to the agricultural demonstrations in 1990 and the decision to grant further subsidies to the farmers was a costly concession, which could only increase the pressures on the French budget. Thus, while on the one hand the granting of subsidies showed that French political leaders tried to avoid alienating agricultural interest groups and downplay opposition to liberalisation, on the other hand, the fact that the government had been forced to adapt its policies increased the incentive to multilateralise. To avoid further costs the government sought paradoxically to become more independent of the arable interests disadvantaged by EC policies by multilateralising its policies.

Conclusion

In summary, the chapter has illustrated that multilateralisation of Franco-Polish relations enabled the French government to respond to domestic agricultural and industrial pressures. The interests of the agricultural and the industrial pressure groups were primarily determined by the agricultural and industrial effects of new economic relations with Poland, which nevertheless always remained imbalanced in favour of France. This led to an increasing demand for both, protection and trade liberalisation. As we mentioned before, it is difficult to demonstrate the influences of such pressure groups. However, the government's reactions to farmers' and industrial interests, as exemplified in governmental policies and the reaction of administrative officials, or the government's position in the negotiations on the Association Agreement, showed that the government responded to such pressures. The costs and benefits as perceived by the agricultural and industrial pressure groups induced the government to multilateralise Franco-Polish relations. France

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[148]Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural, des Eaux et des Forêts, Europe de l'Est, p. 193.

engaged in multilateral approaches as the EC's external trade policies offered an instrument to satisfy protectionist interests, but also a means to supply the trade liberalisation demanded by French agricultural and industrial pressure groups. Hence, '*Communautarisation*' offered greater benefits than losses for the French government. The following chapter will examine how multilateralisation pursued within the EC served as an instrument to respond to domestic pressures analysed in this chapter as well as external constraints we examined in chapter II.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MODALITIES OF MULTILATERALISATION OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS POLAND

"..we pursue a policy ... mediated by the European Community".

Elisabeth Guigou[149]

Introduction

The two previous chapters have shown that France increasingly engaged in multilateral approaches towards Poland in response to domestic and external constraints. The aim of chapter four is to analyse the modalities of this policy, that is the way in which France multilateralised her approach and used the EC as an instrument in Franco-Polish relations. It will be argued that the EC became firstly a means to respond to domestic and external pressures and secondly a medium to multiply France's policy reach towards Poland. The argument of this chapter reinforces the view that increasing multilateralisation became an alternative to national strategies and therefore a means to pursue French foreign policy goals. '*Communautarisation*' of Franco-Polish relations became a policy strategy complementing and substituting bilateralism. The chapter starts off with an analysis of the role and character of the Association Agreement in order to demonstrate how Franco-Polish relations were organised through the EC. This leads to an examination of the role of the EC in Franco-Polish relations in section two. On this basis we will examine the negotiation process in the third section, to show that the EC served as an instrument for France to respond to domestic pressures, external constraints and

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149".. *nous menons une politique ... par l'intermédiaire de la Communauté européenne*", see, JORF, Débat, 05.11.1991, p. 5505.

opportunities. The analysis of the aims and instruments of the Agreement in section four will demonstrate that the EC also served as an instrument to extend France's foreign policy reach by following a pragmatic multilateral approach towards Poland. This implies that France could use the EC in her multilateral approach according to the capacities of the EC. This approach served French interests to pursue relations with Poland according to French policy objectives and domestic pressures. Lastly, in order to present a comprehensive analysis of the multilateralisation of French strategies, it will be shown that the multilateral approach itself affected French policy objectives towards Poland through the institutional authority, the policies and the bargaining procedures of the EC.

4.1 The role and character of the Association Agreement

The Association Agreement greatly re-organised relations between France and Poland via the EC against the background of post-Cold War challenges. Thereby, it became an integral part of French policy with regard to Poland. Following the aforementioned mandate given by the G 7 summit and the EC member states, the European Commission and the member states concluded the Europe Agreement on date. This superseded the Trade Agreement with Poland and the PHARE programme, neither of which was regarded as a sufficient response to changes in Poland. The Association Agreement organised relations on a broader basis and thereby represented a "*global* strategy of cooperation" based on revised interests and relations.[150] The provisions of the Agreement were relatively "broad-reaching", representing the multifaceted organisation of relations with Poland.[151] It defined French economic, political, financial and cultural

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[150] "*strategie globale de coopération*" (own emphasis), JORF, Rapport, no. 1536, 27.06.1990, p. 23. See also, JORF, Débat, Cresson, 03.11.1992, p. 4688: "The Agreements represent an instrument for economic, technical and political cooperation"("*Les accords d'association ... offriront les moyens d'une cooperation commerciale, technique et politique*").

[151] See, Nicolaïdis, Kalypso, 'East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions Matter?', Keohane, Robert et al., After the Cold War, International Institutions and State strategies in Europe 1989-1991, Harvard University Press, London, 1993, p. 222. Compared to precedent Association Agreements, the Europe Agreement with Poland was going further in its provisions. See, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 'The Association process, making it work:

relations with Poland via the EC by covering several policy areas: the liberalisation of industrial and agricultural goods; political and cultural cooperation; competition policy; technical and financial cooperation and the approximation of Polish laws to their EC equivalents.[152] Hence, the Agreement organised Franco-Polish relations on a broad basis through the EC.

The Association Agreement *linked* Poland to the European Community and its member states by a legal framework. This satisfied the demands of French political leaders to link Central and Eastern European countries (hence, also Poland) to France by permanent structures, as the French foreign minister, Roland Dumas pointed out in the Commission for External Affairs of the *Assemblée Nationale*.[153] However, significantly, the Agreement led to a "relation of association" but not to "associated membership". This also served French interests, as it set limits to the association of Poland with the EC.[154] 'Association' meant tying Poland to the EC and its member states but not integrating her. An example of this understanding is the limited guidance the Agreement provided regarding the implementation of legal and regulatory rules as well as its complete neglect of the *acquis communautaire*. Legislative differentiation and obstacles to the association of Poland were kept in favour of the EC.[155] Thus, the Association Agreement merely established a "closer, multilaterally sanctioned relationship".[156] This limited association ensured that EC member states retained the power to define the depth of relations.

Central Europe and the European Community', Centre for Economic Policy Research, Occasional papers, no. 11, November 1992, p. 3.

[152] The aims and instruments of the Agreement will be analysed in detail in the following sections.

[153] Dumas emphasised in a session of the Commission for External Affairs of the *Assemblée Nationale* the necessity to establish "*structures permanentes*", see, Commission, Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 1, 04.01.90, p. 14.

[154] "*Assoziationsverhältnis*" (a relation of association); "*assoziierte Mitgliedschaft*" (associated membership), see, Hedri, Gabriella I., 'Die EG und die Staaten des "Visegrader Dreiecks": zu den Assoziierungsabkommen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft mit Polen, der Tschechoslowakei und insbesondere Ungarn', Osteuropa, vol. 43, no. 2, February 1993, p.155. See also, preamble of the Association Agreement, JORF, Accord Européen (henceforth: Accord), 01.06.1994, p. 38003.

[155] Kennedy, David et al., 'The limits of integration: Eastern Europe and the European Communities', Common Market Law Review, vol. 30, no. 6, December 1993, p. 1112.

[156] Haggard, 'Integrating the Two Halves of Europe: Theories of Interests, Bargaining and Institutions', p. 182.

Clearly, the Agreement took the form of a strategic short-term concept; corresponding to French interests in an incremental adaptation of relations with Poland. The short-term orientation of the Agreement implied that its "immediate purpose" was to facilitate trade and economic cooperation, and importantly, to protect French industry and agriculture and prevent overly close relations in the short-term.[157] Thus, the short-term concept of association reflected France's attempt to balance interests in Poland against domestic constraints. Even if the effect of supplementary imports from Poland on the French economy was arguably marginal, the character of the Agreement responded to French domestic pressures to protect these sectors at least in the short-term. The aforementioned negotiations over steel imports, for example, showed that France felt it to be in her interest that certain Polish sectors were excluded from trade on the short-term. Even more advantageous from a French point of view was the vagueness and flexibility of the Agreement's long-term provisions. These offered the possibility for extensive free trade between Poland and the EC, but only as an objective which would gradually be attained.[158] This reflected the French belief that the Polish market would only be a valuable market for exports of some sectors of French industry on a long-term rather than a short-term basis. The low absorption capacity of the Polish market, foreign exchange shortages and exchange rate policies limited Poland's ability to import.[159]

Hence, as Guigou pointed out, the Agreement followed a "progressive" and pragmatic approach to association which served French interests.[160] She furthermore pointed out that it represented an "interim solution" while the right-wing deputy Xavier

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[157] Weydenthal, Jan B. de, 'Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland gain associate membership in the EC', Radio Free Europe, no. 7121, February 1992, p. 24.

[158] See, Commission, Bulletin, vol. 4. no. 21, 14.07.1991, Dumas, p. 1871: "in the meantime it is necessary to establish specific links by negotiating Association Agreements, which represent the most flexible form of association" ("*Dans l'intervalle, il faudra créer des liens particulier en négociant des accord d'association, qui constituent la forme la plus souple*").

[159] Nicolaïdis,'East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions Matter?', p. 218.

[160] "*préparer petit à petit une future adhésion*", Guigou, Elisabeth, 'Les réponses françaises aux besoins des pays d'Europe centrale', Revue Politique et Parlementaire, no. 956, November/December 1991, p. 10. "*methode progressive*", see, ibd., p.10.

Deniau referred to the Agreement as "intermediate framework".[161] French political leaders understood it as such. This concept of Franco-Polish relations reflected a piecemeal strategy of cooperation which controlled the dynamics of the association process. This implied that inbuilt mechanisms, such as the transitory periods for trade liberalisation and the fact that the process of association was divided into two stages, which are defined in title II, article 6 of the Agreement, constrained the scope of relations. The incremental approach was further underlined by the fact that the time-scaled provisions of the Agreement (for example the further reduction of tariffs and quantitative restrictions, or the regulation that within ten years of the entry into force of the Agreement a free trade area would be created) were made dependent on economic and political progress in Poland.[162] In fact, the short-term orientation and the piecemeal, "organic approach" of the Agreement underlined the attempt to protect the EC market and reflected the concern about possible setbacks to the political, economic and social transformations in Poland.[163]

The concept of 'conditionality', which implied that the conclusion and "full implementation of the association" was linked to and built on the basis of progress in the transformation process in Poland, served French interests in a piecemeal association.[164] Conditionality was multifaceted as it was not only policy-related but also process-related. The political conditions required democratic and pluralist structures. The economic conditions were linked to the development of a market economy. Thus, the Agreement's approach to "achieve liberalisation of trade" was a function of "the development of the

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[161] "*solution transitoire*", see, Commission, Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 20, Guigou, 09.07.1991. "*cadre intermediaire*", see, JORF, Débat, Jean-François Deniau, RPR (*Rassemblement pour la République*), 07.11.1989, p. 4670.

[162] At the Edinburgh summit (December 1992) the meaning of the EC's policy of conditionality was defined more precisely by extending the requirements to be fulfilled by Poland in order to become a member of the EC. See, Kennedy, 'The limits of integration: Eastern Europe and the European Communities', p. 1107.

[163] "*organische(r) Weg*", Kramer, Heinz, 'Die EG und die Stabilisierung Europas', Aussenpolitik, vol. 43, no. 1, first trimester 1992, p. 14.

[164] Kramer, Heinz, 'The European Community's response to the "New Eastern Europe"', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 2, June 1993, p. 228. The treaty states: "Considering the attachement of the Community, its member states and Poland to the reinforcement of political and economic liberties, which present the foundation of the association" ("*Considérant l'attachement de la Communauté, de ses états membres et de la Pologne au renforcement des libertés politiques et économiques qui constituent le fondement même de l'association*), see, JORF; Accord, 01.06.1994 p. 38003.

situation and reforms" in Poland.[165] It is arguable that the application of the principle of conditionality preserved the flexibility of French foreign policy: the EC and the member states could define the scope of relations. This allowed an indirect French influence in Poland's internal policy. Kennedy and Webb have called this a "carrot and stick" approach.[166]

Hence, it has been shown that the Association Agreement organised Franco-Polish relations through the European Community by an adaptation of relations, which served French interests well. The Agreement became part of France's foreign policy strategy towards Poland, as it partially determined Franco-Polish relations. The character of the Association Agreement showed that multilateralisation of Franco-Polish relations was limited and incremental. On the basis of this analysis we can now examine the functions and the role of the EC in Franco-Polish relations. This will also explain how the EC both extended and became an alternative to French national foreign policy strategies.

4.2 The role of the EC in Franco-Polish relations

The EC as an organising concept for Franco-Polish relations provided a framework for cooperation and thereby filled a vacuum in post-Cold War relations with Poland.[167] This approach corresponded to French attempts to use the EC as an "antidote" to the possible consequences of post-Cold War transformations in Europe.[168] The Europe Agreement institutionalised Franco-Polish relations and regulated them by EC policies and

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[165]"*parvenir au libre échange*", "*l'évolution de la situation et des reformes*", JORF, Rapport, no. 1536, 27.06.1990, p. 24. For 'conditionality' see also, JORF, Avis, no. 922, p.21.

[166]Kennedy, 'The limits of integration: Eastern Europe and the European Communities', p. 1105.

[167]"*entrainer la Communauté*" JORF, Débat, Dumas, 23.11.1989, p. 5578. For a discussion of the role of the EC in France's external relations see JORF, Rapport, no. 1222, 06.04.1990, p. 26; JORF, Débat,12.12.1989, p. 6380. The Commission agreed to assume responsibility to coordinate Western aid to Poland and Hungary (PHARE, first generation agreement). EC, Bulletin 7/8-1989,1.1.1-6. See also, JORF, Débat, 22.11.1989 p. 5480, 5485. See furthermore, JORF, Rapport, no. 1536, 27.06.1990, p. 23, p. 27.EC relations with Poland were also debated: JORF, Débat, 10.04.1990, p. 205f.

[168]See, Snyder, Jack, 'Averting Anarchy in the new Europe', International Security, vol. 14, no. 4, Spring 1990, p. 6.

structures, on the basis of article 238 of the Treaty of Rome and in the framework of the Common Commercial Policy and European Political Cooperation (EPC). The primarily economic orientation of the EC facilitated its involvement in post-Cold War relations between Western and Central and Eastern Europe, as a great deal of the revised relations covered commercial fields. The role of the EC was therefore enhanced. Furthermore, this had a major effect on the orientation of Polish foreign policy. The EC became a focal point for Poland's external policy and the institutionalisation of her political and economic relationships with the EC clearly became her top priority.

Nevertheless, the role of the EC and, hence, its significance for French policy strategies with regard to Poland, was limited. As Ayache argued, the EC was not an entirely "successful concept" to deal with the post-Cold War changes.[169] The EC's ability to cope with the changes was restricted as its "existence and character" was linked to the Yalta order.[170] The Cold War legitimacy of the EC constrained its capacity to adjust to the new situation, since its structural and policy characteristics were not designed to engage in post-Cold War East-West relations. Inevitably, the EC's post-1989 relations with Poland were characterised by a lack of experience and contact. The policies of association had to be adapted to the demands of the political, economic and social transformations in Central and Eastern Europe.[171] However, this very lack of experience gave a particular advantage to France which had entertained comparatively stronger bilateral relations with Poland during the Cold War (see chapter I) and so could now carry out a leading role.

The fact that the regulation of relations with Poland was decided primarily by the EC member states in conjunction with the European Commission, limited the latter's authority in the context of the Association Agreement (aside from that granted by the member states). This in turn increased the influence of France as one of the dominant

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169"*concept gagnant*", Ayache, La conquête de l'Est, p. 35.
170See for instance, Williams, Reorganising Eastern Europe, p. 21.
171This was reflected, for example, in the aforementioned concept of conditionality.

member states.[172] The EC's involvment in relations with Poland depended on the mandate given by its member states and the bargaining processes among them. The negotiations were carried out by representatives of member state governments and representatives of the European Commission. As the nature and character of the provisions of the Association Agreement, that is primarily trade liberalisation, were closely linked to the domestic situations of individual member states (see chapter III), the EC's capacity to act was constrained. This again increased France's influence. The European Commission's mandate and its role were tightly defined and member states were able to maintain control over future changes in the scope of EC activities with regard to Poland. The traditional reluctance of member states to transfer further political sovereignty to the EC, for example, limited the latter's efforts to establish a process of extensive political cooperation with Poland. The European Commission did not have the mandate to include provisions in the Agreement which would address deeper political cooperation.[173] External political relations with Poland were handled within the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC). EPC was characterised by policy and decision-making processes that were strictly intergovernmental and bypassed the usual EC institutions and mechanisms. This meant that the EC was further hampered by divisions between EPC and the economic/commercial dimensions of the EC's external policies, which were managed by the European Commission. These limitations placed on the EC's role, left space for the bilateral political cooperation of France with Poland.

The EC only played a "precursor role" in Franco-Polish relations. It coordinated national strategies and functioned as the "longer arm" of national governments. Although the EC organised and regulated the association process, the European Commission was not the initiator for policy action with regard to Poland but functioned as the "catalyst for action" of member states.[174] The limited EC mandate, the weakness of political structures

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[172] Allen, David et al., 'Western Europe's presence in the contemporary international arena', Review of International Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, 1990, p. 34. For a discussion of interstate bargaining in the EC see in particular, Moravcsik, Andrew, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', pp. 41-85.

[173] See, Williams, Reorganising Eastern Europe, p. 34.

[174] For the role of the EC see for instance, Defarges, Philippe M., 'L'unification communautaire et les

and democratic procedures as well as the inadequacy of foreign policy coordination of the EC left margins of manoeuvre for France. France and other member states were able to maintain a defining position in relations with Poland.[175] The margin for French action within the process of multilateralisation which had been maintained was clearly demonstrated, for example, by the extraordinary Council meeting of November 1989.[176] This meeting, a French initiative agreed to by other member states, set out to examine the developments in Central and Eastern Europe and set up guidelines for future EC policies. Its most notable success was the decision taken to institute the EBRD. The meeting was an example of how France could combine a degree of foreign policy leadership with multilateralisation.

This section has illustrated that the EC's role was focused on structuring and organising Franco-Polish. But the restricted capabilities of the EC limited its significance as an instrument of French policy towards Poland. On the other hand, the EC's limited mandate to organise relations with Poland increased the scope for France, as a large member state, to influence, and thereby use, the EC. *How* the EC served France as an instrument in Franco-Polish relations will be analysed in the following two sections.

4.3 The EC as an instrument to respond to domestic pressures and external constraints

The multilateralisation of French foreign policy towards Poland revealed that France took an instrumentalist view of the EC. The French government pursued, as Guigou has

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bouleversemendts du paysage européen', Politique Etrangère, no. 1, 1990, p. 143; see also, Williams, Reorganising Eastern Europe, p. 21.

175 "*rôle précurseur*" Débat, Dumas, 10.04.1990, p. 200.

176 See, JORF, Débat, Dumas, 22.11.1989, p. 5485:"The President took the initiative to discuss the new developments without waiting for the reunion of the Council in Strasbourg. The dinner at the Elysée was necessary" ("*Le Président a pris l'initiative d'inviter ... a examiner les developpements nouveaux sans attendre la réunion du Conseil européen de Strasbourg. Le dinér de l'Elysée était nécessaire*"). Josselin stated that the meeting "has strongly contributed to faciltiate the coordination of the policies of the EC with regard to these [Central and Eastern European] countries" ("*a fortement contribué a faciliter l'action rapide de la Communauté à l'égard de ces états*"), see, JORF, Rapport, no. 1222, 06.04.1990, p. 20.

stated, a foreign policy towards Poland primarily "by using the EC as an intermediary tool".[177] The EC as an institution became an "indispensable means towards goals" in French foreign policy vis-à-vis Poland.[178] But what were the practical benefits of this multilateralisation of French policy? In order to answer this question we will first analyse the way in which the EC was used to respond to domestic pressures, as this is related to the elaboration of the Agreement, before turning in section four to a detailed analysis of the aims and instruments of the Europe Agreement, which will demonstrate the wider implications of the EC as an instrument for France in her relations with Poland.

Multilateralisation as a foreign policy strategy was linked to the pursuit of domestic interests. The Association Agreement helped maximise domestic French support for the government's policies towards Poland, as it provided a policy strategy to pursue the primary French aim of limiting trade and economic relations with Poland in sensitive economic sectors, while increasing trade in sectors ripe for expansion and thus in need of new markets. An analysis of the French position and bargaining strategy during the negotiations will show how France attempted to obtain these policy goals.

At the outset of the negotiations in December 1990 France held a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis Poland and was therefore in a favourable position to use the EC for its own goals. The principles of the Association Agreement had been laid down unilaterally by EC member states during the French presidency of the EC (second half of 1989). However, it is difficult to assess the degree of France's influence on the initial elaboration of the Agreement principles.[179] Inter-state bargaining within the EC institutions seems to have permitted France to transform her position of general influence within the EC into specific policy influence in the negotiations of the Association Agreement. The position of

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[177] "*par l'intérmediaire de la Communauté européenne*", see, JORF, Débat, Hélène Mignon, 05.11.1991, p. 5505.

[178] Hoffmann, 'French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe', p. 142; see also, JORF, Débat, Bernard Bosson, 10.10.1990, p. 3564: "European integration has become indispensible" ("*la construction communautaire ... est devenue indispénsable*").

[179] Pinte stated that France played an important role in the elaboration of the grand principles of the Agreement; author's interview 27.10.1994.

national governments to exercise control and influence on EC processes, in particular France's comparatively strong position within the EC, ensured that France could apply a "calculating use" of the EC in the negotiations on the Agreement.[180] The "balance of bargaining power" generally favoured France vis-à-vis Poland, as Poland was not a member state at all.[181] Poland's position was that of a *demandeur*, eager to stabilise her political and economic situation through closer cooperation with the EC and in particular through the integration of the Polish economy into the EC's regulatory framework and market.[182]

The development of the French bargaining strategy in the course of the negotiations illustrated the French government's desire to use the EC to appease domestic critics. Short-term bargains were considered most important if long-term bargains could not be achieved. The most striking examples reflecting this bargaining strategy, were the aforementioned negotiations in the European Council in September 1991. France, joined by Ireland and Belgium vetoed a proposal designed to increase the quotas of meat imports from associated countries.[183] As Guigou pointed out, France hoped by such tactics to obtain guarantees on agricultural matters from the European Commission. Given the limited significance of the quantities of meat imports in question, the French position on this case was clearly a matter of principle, intended to demonstrate both the government's support for French farmers and the strength of France's bargaining position.[184] The immediate effect of this French action was to provoke the withdrawal of Poland from the talks and their temporary suspension. In the longer term, however, French tactics underlined the weakness of the Polish bargaining position and the strength of her own

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[180] See, Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', p. 68f.; see furthermore, Keohane, Robert, O. et al., 'Conclusion: Structure, Strategy, and Institutional Roles', Keohane, Robert et al., After the Cold War, International Institutions and State strategies in Europe 1989-1991, Harvard University Press, London, 1993, p. 395.

[181] Haggard, 'Integrating the Two Halves of Europe: Theories of Interests, Bargaining and Institutions', p. 176.

[182] See, Michalski, The European Community: The Challenge of Enlargement, p. 48.

[183] See, chapter III, footnote 146.

[184] See, Commission, Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 22, Guigou, 1991, p. 2061: "France attempted to get guarantees in the agricultural sector" ("*la France souhaitait obtenir des garanties en matière agricole*").

stance. At the insistence of other dominant EC member states and in the aftermath of the August putsch in the Soviet Union negotiations were resumed.[185] Against these pressures France accepted a short-term compromise, which allowed her to respond to domestic constraints.[186] It became clear that French willingness to jeopardise the success of the negotiations on the Agreement made other member states renounce to the principle of lowest-common-denominator bargaining. The threat of longer-term suspension or even a failure of the negotiations induced other member states and the European Commission to make concessions and support French interests. Thus, on September 30th, it was agreed to increase the countries' quota for meat export to the EC by only 10% a year over five years and to introduce stricter EC controls over illegal meat imports by the inclusion of a safeguard clause and by the diversion of Polish meat exports from the EC to the Soviet Union. As the French government had hoped since the beginning of the negotiation crisis, acceptance of this triangular trade proved a successful tactic and argument for limiting Polish market access to the EC.

The final results of the negotiation talks generally differed little from the European Commission's initial mandate. France was able to maintain an influential bargaining position vis-à-vis Poland and other member states, and remained an influential bargaining partner, gaining victories in those areas where its economic interests were directly affected (such as meat imports). Indeed, the principal points of disagreement with Poland, concerning economic relations and the access of products to EC markets, reflected the importance which France accorded to certain domestic interests.[187] For example, France led a vehement opposition within the EC to the "abolition of possibilities of quantitative restriction and the renunciation of self-limiting arrangements" of steel imports from

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[185] See in particular, Nicolaïdis, 'East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions Matter?', p. 225. The putsch in the Soviet Union causing internal and external instabilities was followed by the disintegration of the USSR and a change of leadership (Boris Jelzin taking over from Michail Gorbatchev).

[186] See, Brada, 'The European Community and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland', p. 3; see also, Nicolaïdis, 'East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions Matter?', p. 230.

[187] JORF, Rapport, no. 2587, p. 32.

Central and Eastern European countries, successfully obtaining tariff protection (under protocol II) for a limited period.[188] Similarly, French demands that car imports from Poland be limited were met: the section relating to car imports was eliminated from the Agreement and it was decided that this was a subject for re-negotiation.[189]

Thus, it can be seen that the institutional authority of the EC, with the support and consent of other member states, functioned as an instrument for France to achieve policy goals and to respond to domestic pressures. The EC played the role of "agent" and mediator for France, but only that of "interlocutor" for Poland.[190] The EC not only mediated between France and Poland but also between France and other member states in their common relations with Poland.[191] This was most relevant in policy areas where French domestic influences were particularly strong. In the case of Renault car exports, for example, France could protect and promote its economic interests through the EC. Poland originally intended to allow imports of 30,000 cars to be made by Volkswagen, Fiat and General Motors (Opel) but not by Renault, since Renault planned to establish a factory in Poland. However, the European Commission and other member states pressed for a solution in France's favour, since further negotiation on the subject would have threatened the entry into force of the Trade Agreement (Interim Agreement). As mentioned above, the Interim Agreement was part of the Association Agreement, covering all trade and trade-related matters. It came already into force in March 1992. French demands were met, as France could justifiably point to the regulations of the CCP, which outlawed discriminatory quotas in favour of certain member states. Hence, through

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[188] See Nicolaïdis, 'East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions Matter?', p. 227. See also, JORF, Rapport, no. 2587, p. 36: "elimination of possible quantitative restrictions and the elimination of mechanisms of autolimitation" ("*suppression de toute possibilité de limitation quantitative et (..) l'abandon des arrangements d'autolimitation*".

[189] JORF, Rapport, no. 2587, p. 38, ("*la partie "automobile" de l'accord a-t-elle dissocié,..., à la demande française,et ne pourra entrer en vigeur que lorsqu'une solution aura été* négocié").

[190] For a discussion of the institutional support see for instance, Wright, Vincent, Continuity and change in France, G. Allen & Unwin, London, 1994, p. 232. For the role of the EC see also, Nicolaïdis, 'East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions Matter?', p. 244, see furthermore, JORF, Rapport, no. 1222, 06.04.1990, p. 8.

[191] Nicolaïdis, 'East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions Matter?', p. 244.

the EC France was able to achieve policy goals which would have been difficult to obtain bilaterally.

In summary, the instrumental use of the EC permitted France to pursue protectionist policies (even though they were often only short-term), which were strongly demanded by the agricultural lobby and certain sectors of French industry. At the same time multilateralisation of Franco-Polish relations through the EC allowed for increasing trade liberalisation in other more advantageous sectors. Thus, French foreign policy towards Poland through the EC constitutes an example of how France could adapt to changing inter-state relations and simultaneously take into account domestic pressures. Hence, the conclusion of the Association Agreement was supported by France since it represented a means to achieve French interests.[192] The analysis of the the aims and instruments of the Agreement will demonstrate how it corresponded to French attempts to apply an instrumentalist view of the EC, and served as an instrument to extend relations with Poland.

4.4 The EC as an instrument in the pursuit of a pragmatic multilateral approach

The aims and instruments of the Agreement allowed for a pragmatic instrumentalist approach via the EC.[193] This implied that multilateralisation served French policy objectives, against the background of domestic pressures and the perception of France's interests in Poland. Furthermore, the "nature and capacities", that is the external policies of the EC determined the scope of Franco-Polish relations regulated by the EC.[194] The capacity and the degree of institutionalisation of any given policy area of the EC also

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[192] Commission, Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 22, 1991, Guigou, p. 2061.

[193] For a discussion on the approach to '*communautarisation*' of French foreign policy see, round table discussion of high-ranking officials/civil servants, see, Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural, des Eaux et des Forêts, Europe de l'Est, p. 183 f.

[194] Spar, Debora, 'Foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe', Keohane, Robert et al., After the Cold War, International Institutions and State strategies in Europe 1989-1991, Harvard University Press, London, 1993, p. 307.

determined the state strategy pursued. Hence, in areas such as economic relations, French foreign policy could be extensively multilateralised. Whereas in policy areas where EC powers were less developed, bilateral strategies prevailed. Hence, multilateralisation involved a transformation of the balance between French bilateral foreign policy strategies and France's multilateral policy approaches towards Poland. The Association Agreement represented a framework linking French bilateral and multilateral foreign policy relations with Poland and thereby extending the dimension of France's relations with Poland.

The Association Agreement allowed France to use the EC as a complement to bilateral strategies in policy areas where the capacity and the degree of institutionalisation on the part of the EC was minimal. In the area of investment, for example, there was a "distinct lack" of external institutional involvment.[195] EC direct foreign investment was organised by the European Investment Bank (EIB). Nevertheless, since the bulk of the EIB's task was directed towards EC member states, the EC could not extensively establish or transfer investment policies and provisions to Poland in the context of the Association Agreement. A larger forum, the EBRD, involving all states of the PHARE/G-24 programme (among others), was created to compensate for the limited reach of the EC and the EIB. However, given France's economic and financial interests in Poland, Paris also had an incentive to go beyond EBRD action. France's bilateral Investment Agreement therefore supplemented the provisions on "financial cooperation" in the Association Agreement. Finance, is thus a good example of a sector in which bilateral strategies were more important than the instrumental use of the EC.

Another area in which the instrumental use of the EC by France in the context of the Agreement was limited, was that of cultural and educational policies, since the EC was characterised by a lack of responsibility in these areas. Cultural cooperation (title VII of the Agreement) and education were given little importance in the Association Agreement

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[195]For a discussion on bi- and multilateral approaches of investment policy after the cold war see in particular Spar, 'Foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe'. For the provisions on investment in the Europe Agreement see, JORF, Accord, 01.06.1994, title VIII, p. 38016.

and it was only in 1990 that the TEMPUS programme and a European Training Foundation were set up in the EC context.[196] As a result, France pursued extensive cultural relations independently of the EC. This was especially true with respect to Poland. Thus, these policy areas were extensively dealt with bilaterally in the form of the establisment of the "Franco-Polish Foundation" (*Fondation France-Pologne*) and bilateral cultural cooperation.

French bilateral political cooperation with Poland was also more extensive than multilateral cooperation, due to the EC's weak competencies in external political relations and as a consequence of the intergovernmental decision-making processes used for political cooperation. The Association Agreement provided for a limited "structured political dialogue" and limited Franco-Polish political cooperation via the European Community. Political dialogue had not been included in some of the previous Association Agreements, for example with the EFTA (European Free Trade Area) member states. The institutional provisions of the Agreement showed that the EC's intention was to establish weak political links with Poland. These weak links corresponded to France's aim of supporting developments in Poland, facilitating cooperation with Western Europe and generally enhancing political stability in Europe as a whole but without compromising EC freedom of action.[197] The Agreement only established a political dialogue and cooperation to ensure "a *certain* degree of participation in the EC".[198] The immediate aim was to "normalise" political consultation.[199] There was no linkage between the Agreement and the bargaining and decision-making forums of the EC. Moreover, it did not provide for a Polish voice in the elaboration of EC policies. France and other member states thereby

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[196] See, Rapport, JORF, no. 1760, 22.11.1990, p. 96. See also, EC, Bulletin, 11-1989, 2.2.17.

[197] See, JORF, Rapport, 2587, p. 34, see also, World Economy Research Institute, Poland, International Economic Report, 1991/1992, p.165.

[198] "*une certaine participation au régime communautaire*" (own emphasis), Mayras, M. quoted in Benyon, F. S., 'Les "accords européens" avec la Hongrie, la Pologne et la Tchécoslvaquie', Revue du Marché Unique Européen, no. 2, 1992, p. 31.

[199] Kennedy, 'The limits of integration: Eastern Europe and the European Communities', p. 1111; Kennedy et al. state as an example art. 3 ("consultations are organised according to demands" ("*Des consultations sont organisées, en fonction des besoins*")), see, JORF, Accords, 01.07.1994, p. 38004.

refused to make Poland an "insider".[200] Institutional links were relatively "weak" and based on "simple institutional structures".[201] Therefore, the Association Council had a largely undefined mandate and only limited authority. The Parliamentary Association Committee was instituted as a forum for exchange of opinion and discussions between members of the European Parliament and Polish members of Parliament. The political power of this forum was limited to the rigth to as questions of and make recommendations to the Association Council and to be informed of new decisions (article 109). However, French interests in political cooperation with Warsaw, meant that French bilateral strategies, regulated in article 4 of the 'Treaty of Friendship and Solidarity', were more extensively pursued. They were linked to, and complemented EC political relations with Poland.[202] The 'Treaty for Solidarity and Friendship' was mainly intended to establish close political relations with Poland and therefore provided for regular political consultations in order to establish a network of close political links and to institutionalise a political dialogue.[203] Hence, France only used the EC for political cooperation to a limited extent.

In policy areas, in which the EC had an extensive role, such as trade and economic cooperation, French national strategies with regard to Poland were largely "superseded by EC efforts".[204] In these cases the EC served as an important instrument in Franco-Polish relations. As the establishment of a free trade area was at the core of the Association Agreement (article 7) and since the emphasis of the Agreement was mainly economic, France could extend the dimensions of Franco-Polish relations by an instrumentalist use of the EC. The development of economic ties was considered more important than political

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[200] Kennedy, 'The limits of integration: Eastern Europe and the European Communities', p. 1110.

[201] Ibd., p. 1111.The Association Council has the task of examining any major issues or problems (i.e. relating to its implementation) arising within the framework of the Agreement; it furthermore has the power to take decisions and make recommendations in those areas specified by the Agreement. The Council is composed of representatives of the Eureopean Commission, the European Council of Ministers and the Polish government. An Association Committee, composed of civil servants from these three (art. 105) assists the Association Council.

[202] JORF, Traité, no. 2665, art. 4, p. 7

[203] See, JORF, Traité, no. 2665, 30.04.1992, article 4, aliena 1: "a mecanism of regular consultations" ("*un mecanisme de consultations regulières*"). See also, JORF, Débat, Pinte, 19.06.1992, p. 2605.

[204] "*relayées par un effort communautaire*", see, La Politique Etrangère, October 1989, p. 107.

integration. Thus, the Agreement primarily focused on the definition of the principles of trade and economic cooperation. In fact, it was the first global trade agreement between the EC and Poland.[205] As was illustrated in chapter III, trade and economic relations in particular were being multilateralised to a great extent due to French domestic industrial and agricultural pressures. As the head of the Direction of Economic and Financial Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, Etienne de Poncins, pointed out, France "multilateralised as much as possible, avoiding bilateral relations in the area of economic relations".[206] The EC was characterised by a strong economic functional orientation in external relations, as provided for in the CCP and the CCT. Thus, the core of economic co-operation between France and Poland was to be carried out via the European Community.[207] In fact, the Association Agreement was the only instrument within French policy towards Poland that broadly covered trade relations and economic cooperation in a legally regulated way. The provisions for economic cooperation in article V of the 'Treaty of Solidarity and Friendship', on the other hand, were more general in character. Hence, in the area of trade and economic cooperation, EC action reinforced French bilateral relations to the point of nearly substituting them.

The fact that the Agreement liberalised economic relations between Poland and France via the EC in a limited and selective way served French interests to in an incremental adaptation to the shifts in inter-state relations.[208] Liberalisation of trade was limited to specific sectors and was pursued incrementally (see above). The limitation of trade liberalisation was furthermore reflected by the maintenance of protective instruments and safeguard measures. The protection of economic, and thus also politically "sensitive" areas was an essential principle of the Agreement. The most prominent protective measure (*clause de sauvegarde*) provided for the possibility of restricting imports from Poland

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[205] Only sectorial arrangements, such as those which relate to textile or steel products of Poland had been achieved.

[206] See, Etienne de Porcin (Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères), Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural, des Eaux et des Forêts, Europe de l'Est, p. 183.

[207] JORF, Avis, no. 1637, 10.10.1990, p. 15.

[208] See, for instance, Hopkinson, Nicholas, Enlarging the EU in Northern, Central and Eastern Europe, Wilton Park Paper, no. 81, London, 1994, p. 19.

when an increase in imports looked likely to provoke serious disadvantages for domestic producers or severe imbalances in a particular sector of the economy or a particular region. Its flexible interpretation allowed France to respond to domestic political and economic pressures. As Guigou pointed out, the safeguard clause was a tool to protect sectors of French industry.[209] Moreover, the different categories of tariff barrier elimination (immediate, progressive, protection) reflected the importance and the influence of specific French domestic constraints.[210] The instruments of the Agreement to constrain France's economic relations with Poland were generally long-term barriers.[211] The possibilites of anti-dumping and safeguard actions allowed France to obtain "additional longer-run effects" for the protection of French sectors.[212]

The Agreement contained only very little trade liberalisation in the field of agriculture. It served French interests to limit multilateralisation according to domestic pressures in this sector. Because agricultural products were more protected than industrial goods, France could bow to domestic pressures and internal political interests. In the areas of agriculture, textile, steel and raw materials, in which Poland had comparative advantages (they accounted for 40% of Polish exports) the process of liberalisation was to be slow.[213] For textiles, clothing, iron and steel special rules or protective measures, such as quantitative restrictions, rules of origin, antidumping laws and tariffs applied. Lastly, the free movement of workers (title IV of the Agreement) was also strictly limited; this served French interests in protecting the domestic employment market.[214]

In summary, the EC provided an instrument for French policy towards Poland as French bilateral policies were reinforced or complemented by EC policies. This section

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[209] JORF, Débat, Guigou, 08.11.1990, p. 5007.
[210] JORF, Rapport, no. 2587, p. 37.
[211] Kennedy, 'The limits of integration: Eastern Europe and the European Communities', p. 1105.
[212] Centre for Economic Policy Research, 'The Association process, making it work', p. 22.
[213] Wysokinska, Zofia, 'Assozierungsabkommen zwischen Polen und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: Richtungen der Liberalisierung der Handelsumsätze', Osteuropa-Wirtschaft, vol. 39, no. 1, March 1994, see tables p. 60, 61.
[214] The Community did not guarantee any access to workers from Poland to its labour market beyond what is guaranteed bilaterally by its member states and freedom of establishment is also limited.

has illustrated that multilateral strategies became according to the policy area an alternative to French bilateral relations. These last were integrated in or linked to multilateral strategies of the EC, but did not counteract EC policy.[215] The Association Agreement was an operational framework which complemented and partly substituted France's bilateral relations with Poland. Thus, the EC presented an instrument and an "arena" allowing France to influence foreign policy vis-à-vis Poland, as Keohane and Nye have argued, and thereby enhance her external reach.[216] The EC was a "multiplier of influence" vis-à-vis external relations, notably Poland, and therefore a "necessary field of action".[217] Thus, French commitment to "support the development of close relations between Poland and the EC" was directed towards amplifying the pursuit of French policy objectives with regard to Poland.[218] It has furthermore been shown that the Agreement enabled France to adapt incrementally to the transformation of post-Cold War inter-state relations with Poland, as the Agreement only provided for selective integration (as member states did not want to upset the existing operations and achievements of the EC). Nevertheless, France also pursued bilateral approaches with regard to Poland in order to preserve a French margin of independence and influence. Bilateral approaches towards Poland were relatively modest as they served the objective to pursue particular interests. The French government followed bilateral approaches in order to maintain a degree of flexibility and to shape arrangements according to her interests.

The interrelation of French national strategies and institutional approaches suggests that institutional processes also influenced French foreign policy towards Poland. In order to give a comprehensive picture of the modalities, that is the characteristics of the

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[215] See, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Documents, no. 12, Mitterrand, Press conference, 15.06.1991, p. 223.

[216] For a detailed discussion on the instrumental use of the EC by France see in particular, Keohane, 'Conclusion: Structure, Strategy, and Institutional Roles', p. 9f.

[217] "*mulitplicateur d'influence vers l'extérieur*", Gautron, Jean-Claude (ed.), Les relations Communauté européenne-Europe de l'Est, Economica, Paris 1991, p. 10, "necessary field of action", Hoffmann, 'French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe', p. 142.

[218] "*favoriser le developpement de relations étroites entre la Republique de Pologne et les Communautés européennes*", see, JORF, Traité, no. 2665, 30.04.1992, p. 7, art. 2.

"*communautarisation*" of French approaches, the following section will examine how multilateralisation affected French Polish policy.

4.5 Institutional effects on French foreign policy

The '*communautarisation*' of French foreign policy, as exemplified by the Association Agreement, influenced French foreign policy on an institutional level. The EC not only provided a "framework" for Franco-Polish relations, but it directly affected French policy.[219] This implies that policy goals were partly redefined in the context of the EC.[220] The EC revised French policy objectives which were stronly determined by the influence of domestic pressures. Nevertheless, due to the lack of authority of the EC (see above), its institutional influence was restrained. It did not lead to a redefinition of French *interests* or a revision of *strategies*.[221] Thus, the EC was "involved" but became by no means "integral" to the process of policy formulation.[222]

The EC revised French foreign policy goals with regard to Poland because of its institutional power and impact, despite the limits of its institutional authority and influence. The EC influenced French policy objectives in that the European Commission promoted the EC's position. In the context of the negotiations on steel imports, for example, the European Commission resisted French demands to reduce steel imports from Central and Eastern European countries. Taking up a demand by the Federation of West European steel producers, Eurofer, France (supported by Spain, Italy and Portugal) called for the inclusion of voluntary export restraints by the associated countries in the Agreement. Although the compromise solution included safeguard clauses that would

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[219] See, JORF, Débat, Deniau, 07.11.1989, p. 4670; see also, JORF, Débat, Sénat, Ladislaw Poniatowski, 20.11.1989, p. 3498.
[220] See, Ladrech, Robert, 'Europeanisation of domestic politics and institutions, the case of France', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 32, no. 1, March 1994, p. 69.
[221] Keohane, 'Conclusion: Structure, Strategy, and Institutional Roles', p. 9.
[222] Spar, 'Foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe', p. 306.

permit France to reduce steel imports from Poland in the short-term, the European Commission restrained French interests in accordance with EC policy which did not allow the use of voluntary export restraints.[223] This shows that institutional influence effectively reshaped policy objectives with regard to EC interests.

However, it was not so much the Commission as an authority, that played a direct role in shaping French policy goals with regard to Poland, but the policies and the bargaining processes of the EC.[224] France adapted her foreign policy goals with regard to existing EC practices and policies and defined her policy approach "in the light of the rules and practices" of the EC.[225] This implied, that France adjusted bilateral policies in advance. French bilateral investment assistance, for example, was adapted to EC investment policies and practices in advance.[226]

Moreover, the EC's operations and its bargaining processes had effects on France's bargaining position, and finally, on the achievement of her policy goals. The power differential between France, the EC and Poland decreased to the disadvantage of France in the course of the negotiations. France lost potential bargaining power during the course of the negotiation process. Even though the EC played an important role, particularly for policy areas of French foreign policy, such as certain industries and agriculture, where domestic influence was strong and interests conflicted with those of other member states, as the analysis of the instrumental use of the EC has suggested, this argument has to be refined. The aforementioned examples of negotiations show, that the multilateralisation of Franco-Polish relations also implied a loss of leverage and of bargaining position on France's part both, with regard to Poland and to other member states. France often had to make short-term or long-term concessions in the Association Agreement. The short-term

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[223] AFP, September 18, 1991, quoted in Brada, 'The European Community and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland', p. 29.
[224] Spar, 'Foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe', p. 308.
[225] Keohane, 'Conclusion: Structure, Strategy, and Institutional Roles', p 9.
[226] See, Investment Agreement between France and Poland JORF, no. 990, 09.11.1989 and JORF, Rapport, no. 1028; and Association Agreeement, JORF, Accord, 01.06.1994, art. 60,61, 73 and 96-101.

orientation of many policy goals limited her bargaining power and thus potential influence. France often proved unable to strike bargains to her advantage for the long-term. The fact that France often had to accept short-term bargains showed that, with regard to certain long-term aims of the Agreement, the influence of the European Commission or of other member states prevailed. Thus, the principle of lowest-common-denominator bargaining had to be renounced, at times, by France. The threat of exclusion from the negotiations induced France to make concessions. Hence, the negotiations witnessed an adjustment and adaptation of French foreign policy towards Poland, so as to confer more importance on short-term bargains and solutions. This reflected the motivation to preserve domestic interests, at least in the short run.[227] France had to give way in several areas to the interests of the Polish government, in comparison to initial French demands. This was, for example, the case in provisions on the entry of several categories of industrial goods from Poland into the EC market.[228]

Furthermore, Poland became a more autonomous bargaining partner in the process of the establishment of post-Cold War cooperation, and had adapted both, her primary aim to "strike a bargain" through the Association Agreement and her negotiation strategy, to France's bargaining strategy.[229] Poland, in total contrast to France, renounced short-term concessions, accepting long-term bargains instead. As Stawarska argued, the Association Agreement talks were a "learning process" for the Polish side.[230] Although the EC and France originally did not want to make any reference to future membership, for example, the EC and France partly conceded to Polish demands for this.[231] Thus, the

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[227] See, Documentation Française, Europolitique, Centre d'Information et de Documentation Internationale et Contemporaine (CIDIC), Documentation Française, Paris, no. 1690, 03.07.1991.

[228] This was the case for the electronic industries, caoutchuc, chemical, jewelery, footware, paper and wood industry, automobile and steel sectors, (*"industries electriques ..., caoutchouc, chimie, parfumerie, bijouterie, chaussure, papeterie, bois, ...automobile, acier."*), see, JORF, Rapport, no. 2587, p. 38. But also from the Polish point of view important elements have not been attained (labour, agriculture, sensitive industrial production).

[229] Nicolaïdis, 'East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions Matter?', p. 208.

[230] See, Stawarska, Renata, 'Poland's association with the EC', Polish Western Affairs., vol. 33, no. 1, 1992, p. 81.

[231] The EC and France agreed to include the ambiguous statement, that it is "it is the objective of Poland .. to become a member of the Community and that the present agreement contributes, according the the opinion of the concluding parties, to achieve this objective" (*"l'objectif de la Pologne (..) de*

adaptation of Poland's bargaining strategy and the country's increasing bargaining power contributed to partial revision of French policy goals.

Moreover, due to the changes of state relations within the EC, interstate bargains became more difficult in the course of the negotiations. Whereas in the July session of the negotiations France had German support in opposing any proposal designed to facilitate Polish exports in the meat sector, France lost that support in the September European Council meeting. Despite a great convergence of domestic policy preferences among the largest member states, France had at times to form alliances with smaller member states in order to safeguard at least a minimum of her policy goals (as the bargaining on steel imports suggested).[232] Thus, within the EC context French foreign policy towards Poland was influenced by the fact that other member states, but also the European Commission pushed for greater trade liberalisation. If concessions had been left solely to France, this would not have occured.[233] As aforementioned examples have suggested, it was in policy areas where French agricultural and industrial pressures were strongest that objectives were influenced and revised. Thus, '*communautarisation*' limited France's bargaining position and hence her possiblity to achieve foreign policy goals with regard to Poland. The EC's policy commitments, and the bargaining process, moderated France's position and shaped policies that in a purely bilateral context, would not have emerged.[234] Nevertheless, even though French policy goals were revised, short-term bargains allowed France to respond to domestic pressures and to incrementally adapt to the shifts in inter-state relations. Moreover, the fact that specific goals could not be achieved was balanced by the advantage of generally combining protection with trade liberalisation.

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devenir membre de la Communauté et que la présente association contribuera, selon l'avis des parties, a atteindre cet objectif"), see, JORF, Accord, 01.06.1994, p. 38004.

[232] Author's interview, Pinte, 27.10.1994.

[233] Nicolaïdis, 'East European Trade in the Aftermath of 1989: Did International Institutions Matter?', p. 243.

[234] Haggard, 'Integrating the Two Halves of Europe: Theories of Interests, Bargaining and Institutions', p. 175f..

The EC also affected France's interests with regard to Poland by creating "opportunities" to extend Franco-Polish relations.[235] The process of political dialogue, for example, begun in October 1992 with a ministerial meeting of the EC and the Visegrad Group, and was followed by a meeting of heads of state and government.[236] This was before the Association Agreement had been ratified by all EC member states and reflected the way in which the pressure of external events had forced the EC to go beyond parts of the Agreement.

Conclusion

In summary, the chapter has illustrated that Franco-Polish relations were to a great extent organised through the European Community. The EC thereby became an integral part of French foreign policy with regard to Poland. The extent of multilateralisation of French foreign policy towards Poland after the Cold War illustrates that France has considerably changed her foreign policy strategy in order to pursue relations with a non-EC country undergoing a process of profound transition. Firstly the EC was an instrument in Franco-Polish relations used to respond to domestic pressures. France could obtain policy objectives in the bargaining process with other member states and the European Commission. Secondly, the EC served as an instrument for France to extend relations with Poland and thereby to multiply her foreign policy influence. The multilateral approach reflected the capacity and the degree of institutionalisation of the EC, but also important domestic pressures of France. Hence, in issue-areas in which the member states did not agree to pursue relations with Poland via the EC, but in which France had particular interests (political and cultural relations, for example) French bilateral policies complemented the EC approach. In turn, economic cooperation and trade relations were at the core of the Agreement, due to the primarily economic orientation of the EC. The

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[235]Keohane, 'Conclusion: Structure, Strategy, and Institutional Roles', p. 7.
[236]Williams, Reorganising Eastern Europe, p. 30.

Agreement was in fact the only economic framework that broadly organised trade and commercial relations between France and Poland. This also explains how the Agreement and hence, the multilateralisation of relations served as an instrument to respond to domestic pressures. The analysis of the bargaining processes during the negotiation of the Agreement, as well as the Agreement's aims and character, demonstrated that the advantages of multilateralisation outweighed the constraints and limits imposed on French policy by the EC. Hence, multilateralisation reflects the degree to which EC membership has become part of the French interest calculation.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has shown that French foreign policy towards Poland underwent major changes following the end of the Cold War and in particular that the EC became an alternative avenue by which to pursue policies towards Poland. Following the developments of 1989, French approaches and policies towards Poland were no longer constrained by the bloc partition during the Cold War. For, until the end of the Cold War France's margin of manouevre in her policies vis-à-vis Poland was limited and the goals and principles of Franco-Polish relations were adjusted to the logic of the Yalta partition. From 1989 French interests and policy goals with regard to Poland had to be re-defined against the background of the changes in relations between Western and Central and Eastern Europe.

First, this thesis demonstrated that '*communautarisation*' was a response to external challenges. Although the Cold War constraints on Franco-Polish relations disappeared after 1989, traditional policy preferences, particularly European integration, which were adjusted to the post-Cold War changes, influenced post-1989 approaches. As a consequence of the shifts in post-1989 inter-state relations and particularly German unification, France's role and influence in the EC declined. However, the EC remained the focus of her West European policies since it provided a framework in which France could attempt to enhance her influence. Although the focus on EC integration limited French independence of action, the former provided a framework in which France could shape and at times coordinate EC policies towards Poland. Hence, multilateralisation of Franco-Polish relations as exemplified by the Association Agreements served French interests to focus on the EC and engage in relations with Poland. French foreign policy was increasingly multilateralised as she chose to work through the EC rather than bilaterally. Multilateral approaches were followed increasingly from the end of the Cold War, whereas bilateral policies were incrementally adapted and pursued.

Second, this thesis has shown that the increasing multilateralisation of French foreign policy vis-a-vis Poland also appeared as a political response to pressures from domestic social groups. This is somewhat ironic, as it was initially change in the international environment (the end of the Cold War) not change in the domestic environment that brought about the Association Agreement. The character of the pressure groups, the nature of their interests and their relative influence determined their arguably extensive impact on foreign policy with regard to Poland. Agricultural and industrial interest groups pressed French authorities to present a response adapted to domestic constraints. These groups within France were anxious to continue to promote their own interests in an international environment which began to appear more threatening to them. At the same time the shifts in post-1989 inter-state relations offered them possibilites to extend their trade and improve their economic situation. The external trade policies of the EC offered an option for the government to adhere to these demands. Moreover, multilateralisation represented a means for the French government to become to an extent more independent of these pressures, as the gains and losses of trade liberalisation and protection created viable domestic coalitions in favour of multilateralisation. Hence, the underlying motivation for governmental multilateralistion was in part political concessions to the agricultural and industrial interests in France.

The Association Agreement, reflecting the role of the EC in Franco-Polish relations, served as an exemplary case study to show how France used the EC to pursue policies towards Poland in the context of the EC. It became an instrument and an alternative to national strategies towards Poland. Firstly, it has been demonstrated that the EC represented an instrument to respond to domestic pressures and external constraints. The bargaining operations and the policies of the EC allowed for its instrumental use in relations with Poland and thereby provided for a political solution to domestic and external pressures. The government used the Agreement in their own material interest by limiting economic relations with Poland to protect French interests while at the same time gradually liberalising trade relations. Hence, joint foreign policy action as developed by

the Association Agreement, its objectives and directions reflected the attempt to respond to French domestic exigencies as well as to external constraints and opportunities. The EC was a hinge, both enabling France to pursue its preferred national policies, but also protecting the government itself form the consquences that might ensure from a bilateral policy that might be deemed harmful to French agricultural and industrial interests.

Secondly, the multilateralisation of Franco-Polish relations served to extend external policy reach with regard to Poland, as the Agreement presented an alternative to bilateral relations organising Franco-Polish relations through the EC. The scope of multilateralisation dependend on the capacity and the degree of institutionalisation of any given policy area of the EC. Hence, multilateralism was most extensive in trade and economic relations, which were at the core of the Agreement. Bilateral relations on the other hand, prevailed, for example in cultural and political policies, as France had a particular interest to pursue relations in these issue-areas. Hence, the Association Agreement illustrated that the increasing multilateralisation of French foreign policy towards Poland was pursued complementary to bilateral relations. Bilateral policies with regard to Poland were intertwined with multilateral strategies and operated within the multilateral framework. This clearly served French interests most. Thus, the EC reflected an alternative option for Franco-Polish relations as well as an arena to multiply and enhance relations with regard to Poland.

Nevertheless, multilateralisation also implied that French policy objectives towards Poland were affected through the institutional authority, the policies and the bargaining processes of the EC. Multilateralisation limited to a certain extent France's capacity to influence developments as specific policy goals were not achieved. Nevertheless, the gains of '*communautarisation*' outhweighed its constraints on French foreign policy. Multilateralisation as exemplified by the Association Agreement was for France to a great extent a successful alternative policy option in the short-term. It corresponded to a great extent to French policy objectives with regard to Poland. Nevertheless, given that France

had to revise specific policy goals and often merely obtained a short-term bargain in order to respond to domestic constraints, suggests that multilaterialisation is not as much a successful policy concept for the long-term as it was in the short-term.

The changes of French foreign policy and its increasing multilateralisation in this particular case demonstrate the emphasis that France continued to place on Western Europe and European integration following the end of the Cold War. Despite the significance of the changes in relations with Central and Eastern Europe the focus of French European policies remained Western Europe. In contrast to Germany, for example, France did not set out particularly to upgrade bilateral relations with Poland in the post-Cold War era. For France, the sustenance of her Eastern European position, and the need to satisfy powerful domestic pressure groups which were threatened by new competition in Poland, all pointed towards a policy that would enhance the role of the EC, and with it, hopfully, France's own power-political position.

Appendix

Chronology[237]

1989

12 September	*Formation of non-communist government (except four ministries) in Poland (Mazowiecki, Prime Minister)*
14 September	European Parliament debate on situation in Poland
19 September	Trade Agreement between EC and Poland signed
14-15 October	Council meeting of foreign ministers (Esclimont), ministers agree to study bases for future relations with Central and Eastern Europe
21-24 October	French delegation visits Poland (managers, bankers, deputies, previous centrist ministers, President of the 'Parliamentary Group of Franco-Polish Friendship', Geng)
25 Octover	Mitterrand addresses European Parliament
13 November	Minister of Industry, Fauroux, invites French business to engage in relations with Central and Eastern Europe
17 November	'Foundation France-Poland' (*Fondation France-Pologne*) established
17-18 November	Delors, President of European Commission (henceforth: Commission) and Dumas, Foreign Minister, in Poland
18 November	Extraordinary meeting of the European Council in Paris, EBRD initiated
20 November	Senate approves a general declaration of the government on its policy vis-à-vis the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
20 November	Giscard d'Estaing demands Marshall plan for Central and Eastern Europe
22 November	Mitterrand addresses European Parliament
30 November	Minister of Agriculture, Nallet, visits Poland
8-9 December	European Council (Strasbourg), decides to set up EBRD and makes reference to Association Agreement
18 December	EC Council regulation to launch PHARE
21 December	Mauroy and delegation of the Socialist Party in Poland
27 December	Commission adopted proposal for Council decision on the conclusion of an agreement (exchange of letters) between EC and Poland amending the Trade Agreement
29 December	*Polish Parliament abolishes the leading role of the Communist Party and suppresses the reference to socialism in the constitution, concludes law for rapid transition to market economy ('Balcerowicz plan')*
31 December	Mitterrand announces concept of a '*confédération*' in New Years message

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[237] For a detailed chronolology of Franco-Polish relations during the Cold War see in particular Liczma'nski, Pologne-France, see also, Castagné, 'Les relations franco-polonaises (1945-1972)'. Note: events in Poland are italicized.

1990

1 January	*Devaluation of the Polish zloty, followed by dramatic price increases*
4 January	Kohl-Mitterrand meeting (Latché), talks on the idea of confederation and EC integration
18 January	Commission communication adopted on impact of recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe and EC's relations with these countries
18 January	European Parliament resolution on Central and Eastern Europe, invites Council to consider structures for future association
20 January	Further guidelines adopted following the informal meeting of foreign ministers (Dublin); Council of Ministers agrees that Commission would prepare a paper on the question of concluding Association Agreement with the Central and East European countries
28 January	President of the Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission and of the Parliamentary Group of Solidarity, Geremek, meets Foreign Minister, Dumas (Paris)
30 January	Polish Prime Minister, Mazowiecki demands the admission of Poland to the Council of Europe
1-2 February	Mazowiecki and delegation visit the Commission
2 February	Adoption of a communication of the Commission on future relations of EC with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
5 February	Reunion of EC foreign ministers (Bruxelles), discussing relations between EC and Eastern Europe, decision to set up Association Agreement
12 February	Council adopts conclusion of an agreement in the form of exchange of letters, suspension of the provisions on agricultural concessions set out in Trade Agreement
15 February	European Parliament resolution on political aspects of situation in Poland and economic and trade relations between EC and Poland
28 February	CNPF invites French business circles for a reunion with Minister of Economy, Bérégovoy, discussing economic relations with Central and Eastern Europe
9 March	Visit of Polish President, General Jaruzelski, and Prime Minister, Mazowiecki, in Paris
14 March	Beginning of '2+4' conference on German unification
9 April	Institution of EBRD
19 April	Franco-German joint messag asking members of the EC to hasten work on the Intergovernmental Conference (Maastricht)
20//25 April	Farmers strikes at Besancon
28 April	European Council (Dublin) approves of Association Agreement
5 May	Minister of Industry, Fauroux, in Poland, signing energy cooperation agreement
10 May	Mitterrand receives Perigot (CNPF)
16/17 May	Weimar meeting of French, German and Polish foreign ministers
25/26 May	Minister of Defence, Chevènement, in Poland
27 May	*First fully free elections for local councils in Poland give Solidarity clear lead*
28/29 May	Polish Prime Minister, Mazowiecki, in Paris

25/26 June	European Council meeting (Dublin), prompted mainly by France and Germany, agreed to grant more credits for Central and Eastern Europe
17-19 July	Polish Foreign Minister, Skubiszewski, in Paris, takes part in negotiations for the '2+4' conference
17 July	'2+4' conference on German unification
27 July	Council adopts that import quotas were to be opened by the member-states, quantitative restricitons applied at Community level gradually liberalised with regard to Visegrad countries
August	Several demonstrations of farmers
1 August	Commission publishes communication to Parliament and Council outlining objectives and requirements for future Association Agreement
20 August	Perigot (CNPF) meets Prime Minister Rocard
27 August	Commission presents Association Agreement, approved in principle by the Commission on 01.08. and formally adopted on 27.08., Commission communication to Council on the conclusion of Association Agreeements, communication gives further details of aims and content of Agreement
27 August	Polish Minister of Foreign Economic Cooperation, Swiecicki, gives presentation about the economic situation in Poland to managers of French companies
September	Several demonstrations of farmers
12 September	Signing of '2+4' treaty in Moscow
28/29 September	Polish Minister of Employment in Paris
1 October	*President General Jaruzelski steps down*
3 October	German political unification
27/28 October	European Council (Rome)
7 November	Recommendations for Council decision authorizing the Commission to negotiate Association Agreement
10 November	CSCE conference in Paris
19-21 November	Second CSCE conference (Paris); 'Treaty of Paris' signed
20 November	EC ministers of agriculture decide to reduce subsidies for farmers by 30% over the next ten years, followed by several demonstrations of French farmers
23 November	European Parliament resolution on Association Agreement
6 December	Kohl-Mitterrand letter on furthering EC integration
9 December	*Walesa elected President of the Republic of Poland*
14/15 December	European Council (Rome)
18 December	Council adopts directives concerning the Europe Agreement enabling the Commission to enter the phase of negotiations with Poland
19 December	Vote-of-no-confidence against Rocard government failes
22 December	First round of negotiations on Association Agreement with Poland

1991

5 January	*Formation of new government in Poland, Bielecki Prime Minister*
12 February	Second round of negotiations on Association Agreement
15 February	Poland signs Visegrad declaration
15 February	Poland confirms wish to join EC

21/22 February	Secretary of State for International Cultural Relations, de Beauce in Poland
15 March	Poland wins agreement on rescheduling 50% of its foreign debts
18/19 March	Third round of negotiations on Association Agreement
28 March	Polish Minister for External Economic Relations, Ledworowski, addresses to French managers gathered by CNPF
3 April	Walesa visits the Commission
9-11 April	Walesa in Paris signing 'Treaty of Friendship and Solidarity'
15 April	Council conclusion on Community position in the negotiations for Association Agreement adopted by the Council relaxing negotiation directives to the Commission
18 April	European Parliament adopts resolution on Association Agreement
22/23 April	Fourth round of negotiations on Association Agreement
15 May	Prime Minister Rocard resigns, Cresson becomes Prime Minister
12 June	Fifth round of negotiations on Association Agreement
12-14 June	Mitterrand and President of Czechoslovakia, Havel invite 32 European states, Canada and US to International Conference in Prague Mitterand's Eastern policies are criticised in France
17 June	Vote-of-no-confidence against Cresson government fails
1 July	Warsaw Pact dissolved by its member states
2/3 July	Walesa in Brussels
9-11 July	Sixth round of negotiations on Association Agreement
10 July	New proposals to reform CAP adopted by the Commission
19-21August	Coup attempt in Moscow, Mitterrand television speech
29 August	Weimar meeting of heads of state and government of France, Germany, Poland
September	Several demonstrations by farmers
4 September	Commission communication on the resumption of negotiations for Asssociation Agreement adopted, following breakdown of intra-EC (Council) trade talks due to French objections to an increase of meat imports from Poland
8 September	Poland suspends negotiations with EC
6 September	Meeting of EC foreign ministers in Brussels to discuss issues relating EC and Eastern Europe
30 September	European Council meeting, compromise reached between France and EC partners on Association Agreement, Council relaxes negotiating directives given to the Commission, Council agreement to the re-opening of negotiations
4 October	Minister for European Affairs, Guigou, in Poland
9 October	Polish Prime Minister, Bielecki, visits the Commission
9 October	Following continuous agricultural protests against intended EC agricultural reform, Mermaz, Minister of Agriculture, announces financial measures in favour of farmers
16 October	Kohl-Mitterrand initiative on European Union
21 October	France lifts its opposition to reform CAP
21/22 October	Seventh round of negotiations on Association Agreement
24 October	Vote-of-no-confidence against Cresson government fails
27 October	*First fully free multi-party legislative elections in Poland*
15 November	Eighth round of negotiations on Association Agreement
16/17 November	Ninth round and closure of negotiations on Association Agreement
18 November	Vote-of-no-confidence against Cresson government fails
22 November	Association Agreement initialled

26 November	Poland accepted to Council of Europe
11-12 December	Maastricht summit
16 December	Association Agreement between EC and Poland signed
23 December	*Formation of new government in Poland, Olszewski, Prime Minister*

1992

4 February	Walesa addresses Council of Europe
25 February	Conclusion of Interim Agreement between EC and Poland on trade and trade-related matters
1 March	Interim Agreement between the EC and Poland comes into force
18/19 March	Polish Prime Minister, Olszewski, in Paris
22/29 March	Regional elections in France
2 April	Prime Minister Cresson resigns, Bérégovoy, new Prime Minister
24 April	Weimar following-up meeting of heads of government and state of France, Germany, Poland at Bérgérac
21 May	Council reaches agreement on CAP reform
1 June	Vote of no-confidence against Bérégovoy government concerning CAP reform fails
5 June	*Political crisis in Poland, Pawlak replaces Olszewski as Prime Minister*
15 June	Polish Minister of Defence, Oryszkiewicz, holds talks in Paris with French Minister of Defence, Jox
26/27 June	European Council (Lisbon)
29/30 June	First joint committee meeting set up under Interim Agreement (Brussels)
5 July	*Ratification of Association Agreement in Polish Parliament*
10 July	*Suchocka replaces Pawlak as Prime Minister in Poland*
16 September	European Parliament ratifies Association Agreement
5 October	Meeting of Visegrad and EC foreign ministers (Brussels)
8-10 October	Junior Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kiejman, in Poland
7 November	Entry into force of 'Treaty of Friendship and Solidarity'
12/13 November	Secretary of State of Veterans of War, Mexandeau, in Poland

1993

18 January	Polish Foreign Minister, Skubiszewski, meets Foreign Minister, Dumas (Paris)
29 January	Former Polish Prime Minister, Mazowiecki, meets Junior Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kiejman (Paris)
1 February	Minister of Economics and Finances, Sapin, and Polish Minister of Finances, Osiatynski, sign agreement based on agreement (1990) to stabilise Polish currency and restructure banking system
21/22 February	Minister of Defence, Joxe, in Poland
21/28 March	Legislative elections in France
29 March	Formation of RPR/UDF government

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