EMOTION, THOUGHT, AND THERAPY:

A STUDY OF HUME, SPINOZA, AND FREUD ON
THOUGHT AND PASSION

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ABSTRACT
Hume and Spinoza are the most systematic representatives of two opposing traditions of argument about the relation of thought and feeling in the emotions. The Humeans treat emotions as essentially feelings (impressions or affects) with thoughts incidentally attached. The Spinozists say roughly the reverse, treating emotions as essentially thoughts ('ideas' or 'beliefs') with feelings incidentally attached. It is argued that the Spinozists are closer to the truth, that is, that thoughts are of greater importance than feelings (in the narrow sense of felt sensations) in the classification and discrimination of emotional states. It is then argued that if the Spinozists are closer to the truth, we have the beginning of an argument to show that Freudian or, more generally, analytic therapies make philosophic sense. That is, we can begin to understand how people's emotional lives might be transformed by consideration and interpretation of their memories, beliefs, etc.; how knowledge might help make one free.

CHAPTER ONE . . . HUME

Hume, as a physicist of the mental, attempts to explain all of our mental life on the basis of atomistic impressions and ideas and laws of association among them. He treats emotions as discrete and simple feelings with a complex causal history: that is, as impressions of reflexion (I). Pride, for example, is said to be the product of a mechanism of double association between the idea of the subject of pride and the idea of its object (self) and between the impression of pleasure occasioned by the source of pride and that pleasure which is pride itself (II). It is argued that this mechanism misrepresents the phenomena and even Hume's genuine insights, which are conceptual,
and that his meagre materials are inadequate to a reconstruction of emotional, let alone the rest of mental, life (III-XIV). The simplicity of emotion impressions is incompatible with the operation of the principle of association by resemblance (IV). If genuine comparison is to make sense, it will have to depend on features of the impressions outside of their simple essence (V). But then we could not learn to identify and discriminate emotions in the way we do, at least not if we restrict ourselves to their simple essence, which is meant to be all that is essential to the learning of emotion concepts and the classification of different emotional experiences (IV-V). Hume's mechanism for producing pride requires association between pleasant impressions and so requires an initial impression of pleasure. It is argued that though the sources of an emotion may all involve pleasure, pleasure cannot be treated as an impression (VI). The double association mechanism also requires an association between the idea of the subject of pride and its object. The 'idea of self' is problematical (VII), and it could not in any case emerge as the object of pride. It is involved in the idea of the cause and so is already present, so the object is not the effect either of the emotion itself or of whatever causes the emotion (VIII-IX). The object collapses into part of the cause of the emotion despite Hume's views of conflict of emotion (X), and places conceptual constraints. Without the association of ideas, the double association mechanism in turn collapses back into reliance on association of (simple) impressions, which in any case (even if possible) could not explain the production of uniform emotion impressions. That is, the feeling of a particular emotion (the meaning of an emotion concept)
would vary with each of its causes (VIII, X). The special relation of emotion to object helps bring out the thought-dependence of emotion (X-XI). The 'causal' force of objects is mediated by thoughts, and the classification of one's state (often) depends on one's beliefs about its cause. By not taking proper account of the role of thoughts, Hume comes to give a misleading picture of our knowledge of other minds, including those of animals (XII). He does recognize that emotions may involve very little felt turbulence, but he cannot really explain the nature of calm passions (XIII). Because the simplicity of impressions isolates emotions (violent as well as calm) as rigidly from their consequences in behaviour as from their objects, Hume cannot within his scheme account for the expression of emotion in action (XIII). But there must (contra Warnock) be place for calm passions, and if one understands that place, and the place of thought in emotion in general, one can see how reason can be more than the slave of the passions (XIV).

CHAPTER TWO . . . SPINOZA

Spinoza reconstructs the logic of the emotions on the basis of three primary emotions: pleasure, pain, and desire. All three must be understood in relation to his notion of the conatus, or the essential striving for self-maintenance by individuals (I, II). Desire and appetite, within the system, leave room for the notion of unconscious desire (I). A Spinozist analysis of an emotion (love) is contrasted with a Humean, especially in terms of the nature and place of pleasure and desire, and the notions of object and cause (II, VII). Emotions are treated as complex, rather than simple, and as essentially involving thoughts, especially thoughts about their causes (or explanation) (II).
Abstract

Emotions are distinguished on the basis of thoughts, and depending on their character and source the thoughts are adequate or inadequate and the associated emotions active or passive (III). There are elements within Spinoza's system that might lead one to take 'the intellectual love of God' as the only wholly active emotion, but Spinoza can be interpreted so as to allow for degrees of adequacy of thought and activity of emotion in relation to particular objects. One's emotional life can become more active, the individual more free, through the correction of the understanding (III, IV). Various mechanisms for transforming emotions, particularly through correcting our beliefs about their objects and recognizing the level (the sources and grounds for) our thoughts, are considered (V, VI). These mechanisms become especially clear if one considers the intellectual or social dimension of emotions made possible by the role of thought (VI), and if one considers the connections of emotion to action made intelligible if one does not isolate emotions (as though Humean simple feelings or impressions) from their behavioural consequences or constituents (VII).

CHAPTER THREE . . . THOUGHT, THEORY, AND THERAPY

Western therapies for psychological disorders can be ranged along a spectrum in accordance with the role they assign to thoughts. At the extreme ends can be placed drug and shock therapies, where no thoughts are involved, and Freudian psychoanalysis, where the patient's understanding of his suffering is essential to 'cure' (I, IX, X). In this context, shamanism seems to involve thoughts, but thoughts and a theory which need not be true. Is belief enough? Lévi-Strauss' story of Quesalid and analysis of shamanism are examined (III, IV, V).
His suggestions in terms of social consensus (once sorted out -- IV), and psychological coherence (insofar as suffering is suffering from unintelligibility -- V, IX) are found valuable, and extended to psychoanalysis. But his physiological correspondence account fails. Here a general suspicion of structuralist explanation is realized (V). The character of Erikson's claim about underlying forces is considered, and found more promising (VI, IX). The theories informing psychoanalysis and behaviour therapy are contrasted. Behaviour therapy must involve thoughts in at least some minimal way, obscured perhaps by the obviousness of their content (II). Difficulties in assessing effectiveness and explaining change are explored (II, IX). Common nosological terminology (e.g. 'phobia') may conceal important differences (VII). A critique of a behaviourist discussion of Little Hans is offered, and the richness of the psychoanalytic notion of 'displacement' as opposed to 'stimulus generalization' is argued (VII). General nosological issues are considered (VIII). Throughout, the advantages of a Spinozist theory of mind in understanding the role of thought and insight are emphasized. In particular, it is the two points of, first, the importance attached to thoughts in the identification and discrimination of emotions and, secondly, the consequent importance attached to reflexive knowledge in transforming emotions rather than Spinoza's more famous metaphysical doctrines about mind-body that are argued to be helpful.

CHAPTER FOUR ... THE AETIOLOGICAL ROLE OF THOUGHTS ACCORDING TO FREUD

Various sorts of evidence for the importance of thoughts, especially the removal and production of symptoms using hypnosis, are considered (I, II). The thoughts involved are often unconscious. Symptoms are
meaningfully related to the past, especially through thoughts (which help give the objects, at least the notional objects, of our past and present psychological states, including desires and emotions) (II, IX).

Idea and affect are separable by repression, which originally is treated as a conscious and intentional process. Detached affect or psychic energy can be converted into hysterical symptoms or displaced into obsessional ones. Ideas are especially important in determining which affects become pathological and the forms the abnormal discharges take (II). Cathartic cure requires reattaching a recovered idea to its affect and 'abreacting' it. But there are a number of theoretical difficulties with the notions of psychic energy and discharge involved in abreaction (III, V). Abreaction is actually a form of 'expression' of emotion and the identification of what energy is being discharged depends on the associated thoughts. So the need for 'abreaction' in addition to 'insight' is really a condition on the individual's beliefs about his states, including the state of discharge which is supposed to count as 'abreaction' (IV). The development of Freud's views about the relation of idea and affect and the sorts of ideas that matter in neurosis are traced (VI), and the importance of phantasy especially emphasized (VII). The place of thoughts in psychopathology and therapy is thus made clearer (VII). Phantasy (contra Sachs -- VIII) can have as serious aetiological consequences as experience of reality, precisely because it is through our perception and thoughts about it that reality is effective (IX). And it is (partly) because of this that we can understand why interpretation, the analysis of psyches, can be effective, even though 'insight' may not by itself be enough for 'cure' (see also Ch. Three, secs. IX and X).
CHAPTER FIVE . . . FREUD AND SPINOZA

Though Freud does not himself have an explicit theory of the emotions, except perhaps for certain inadequate general claims about quantities of psychic energy and the discharge of such energy, the central analytic effort is to transform the emotional life of a patient through an understanding of its causes and meanings, of how the past distorts the present. To appreciate how phantasy and memory can have the importance they do in symptom formation and the shaping of emotional life, and how interpretations in terms of phantasy and memory can be effective in the relief of emotional and psychological disorders, a Spinozist understanding of the role of thought in the nature of emotions is indispensable. We cannot understand claims even about the 'abreaction' of emotion or the 'discharge' of energy, let alone notions like displacement and unconscious emotion, unless thoughts are given their proper place in the analysis of emotions and emotional life (I). Freud offers an interesting speculation about the nature of the unconscious, as the realm of non-verbal thing-presentations, which connects with certain other interesting claims, but which also raises large problems connected with how one can discriminate unconscious thoughts and phantasies and so unconscious emotions (II). Certain comparisons of Spinozist and Freudian doctrine are considered and it is argued that they come together in their purposes and in the concept of mind which makes room for reason in the therapy of emotions (III).
PREFACE
Preface

My work on this thesis has been supported in a variety of ways by many institutions and people. Work was started under a Fulbright Scholarship to Oxford, and continued with the generous and unconstraining support of the Danforth Foundation. My thoughts first turned to the topic while an undergraduate at Princeton University, where discussions with and lectures by Stuart Hampshire provided an approach to the topic and a model for philosophic inquiry. My occasional references to his published writings cannot reveal the extent of my debt or the depth of my appreciation. At Oxford, I was supervised first by Peter Strawson, who helped me during an interlude as I ploughed through Kant. When I decided to work towards a D.Phil., David Pears became my supervisor and showed me extraordinary kindness and sympathetic understanding during what proved to be a very difficult year. Since then, Mr. Patrick Gardiner has been unfailing in his warm encouragement and gentle criticism. I value his guidance and his friendship highly. In 1971-72 I spent a fruitful year in Boston as a Special Student at Harvard University and a Guest Student at the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute. Dr. Paul Myerson and his colleagues at the Institute made my study of psychoanalytic theory a most enjoyable experience. At Harvard, Rogers Albritton raised troubling doubts about my treatment of Hume and Spinoza -- most of which I hope I have met. If I have not, needless to say, it is not his fault. Stanley Cavell shared his understanding of Freud and his very special personal style of philosophy. Since coming to teach at the University of California at Santa Cruz in Fall 1972, I have continued my study of psychoanalytic theory at the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute, where I have benefited from
the penetrating intellect of Robert Wallerstein and the encompassing wisdom of Erik Erikson. In Winter 1973, I taught a seminar on the topic of this thesis in Santa Cruz. The probing questions of the participants helped me clarify my thoughts. I am grateful to them and to the many colleagues and friends who here go unnamed but not unthought of.

A central theme of this essay is that 'knowledge will make you free'. I have been trying to understand what this might mean in relation to the passions, and in what ways it might be true. Perhaps Hume is ultimately right in thinking that 'reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions'. But it seems reason must have some power (however limited), it must because reason (or at least thought) is intimately involved in the very nature of the passions: the two realms are not totally distinct. And, as Spinoza assures us, even if one cannot transform a particular emotion, by standing back and examining it and the nature of the emotions in general, one is replacing suffering (for that period at least) with active thought. I have found that the study of the emotions can itself be liberating and a joy.

SANTA CRUZ, November 1973

Certain arguments in this thesis have been previously made public: Portions of Chapter Three have been presented to a seminar on Nosology at the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute (March, 1973) and a symposium on Images of Body States at the American Anthropological Association meeting in New Orleans (November, 1973). The substance of Chapter Four has been published as 'Fantasy and Memory: The Aetiological Role of Thoughts According to Freud', in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, LIV (part 4, 1973).
INTRODUCTION
The world of feeling and the world of thought are not unrelated. How they are related is a matter of dispute. I will be discussing Hume and Spinoza as the best and most systematic representatives of two different traditions of argument about their relation. The Humeans treat emotions as essentially affects ('feelings' or 'impressions') with thoughts incidentally attached. The Spinozists say roughly the reverse, treating emotions as essentially thoughts ('beliefs' or 'ideas') with affects incidentally attached. I think that strong arguments can be produced to show that the Spinozists are closer to the truth; that, for example, they can account for ranges of intellectuality among emotions and within particular emotions that Humeans have difficulty even in recognizing. It is no part of these arguments to deny the importance of affects or feelings or other elements constituting emotions, but an understanding of how these elements are connected with each other and an appreciation of the especial importance of thoughts in discriminating mental states from each other can lead to valuable new understanding.

The point of saying thoughts are 'essential' is not to deny any role to affects; it is to insist that what is important about my 'anger' (for example), important in the sense of making my state of mind 'anger' rather than some other state, is the belief (say) that someone has caused me harm, and it does not much matter whether my adrenalin is flowing or whether I feel any particular affects (whatever their physiological basis). Understanding how we discriminate and identify emotions may help us understand how we may (in some ways) change them.

The differences between Humeans and Spinozists on the nature of emotions have consequences elsewhere. For example, the theories yield
very different perspectives on the power of poetry. For the Humean, the poet can at best provide a new label for an old feeling. Where an emotion is essentially an affect, a mental feeling or sensation or (as on the James-Lange theory) the perception of a physiological change, there is no reason in the nature of things why all people (and even all animals, i.e., non-language users) should not be open (without special training or contexts) to all emotions. Gaps in feeling would be rather like gaps in sensation, requiring either wider experience or (like colour-blindness) medical treatment. The poet would have nothing special to offer. The situation is rather different on a Spinozist view. The poet, in giving you a new way of describing the world, could also be giving you a new way of conceiving and so experiencing the world: he could extend your emotional life. "We say a dog is afraid his master will beat him; but not, he is afraid his master will beat him tomorrow. Why not?" (Wittgenstein, PI, section 650). Conceptions of time depend on language, and so a creature without language will lack an emotional life extended in time. Where emotion is essentially characterized through thought, i.e., in the case of a creature with language, a new way of thinking can also be a new way of feeling. A person who was closed to certain sorts of understanding and perception, would also be closed to certain emotions. The poet might provide valuable therapy for such limitations (as Wordsworth did for Mill).

In this thesis, however, I will be concerned with the implications of Spinozist theory in another area. I think that it can contribute to showing that Freud makes philosophic sense. If thoughts or beliefs are essential constituents of emotions, we can go some way towards understanding how psychoanalytic therapies (as opposed to 'non-rational'
behaviourist manipulations) can alter emotional life by changing beliefs. This is not to argue that psychoanalysis works better than other therapies, or even that it works. It may well be that for some sorts of problems electrical shock, for example, is the most effective treatment available. But when shock works, its operation is a miracle. When psychoanalysis works, we may find in Spinoza the beginning of an understanding of how it works. Therapy through 'insight' depends importantly on the nature of unconscious thoughts and beliefs, and the role of thoughts in more ordinary emotion contexts may help explain that importance. We may be able to extend our ordinary model of the emotions to the cases dealt with by psychoanalysts. But before we can proceed to that, we must see to what sort of model our ordinary attitudes and dealings in emotions are amenable. The contrasting models I will explore are those spelled out by Spinoza and Hume. The Humean view is reflected, I think, in modern 'non-rational' psychological therapies. The theory that informs behaviour therapies involving conditioning and deconditioning, for example, apparently rejects reference to introspectable inner states (i.e., Humean impressions and ideas) but these states are simply (too simply) translated into external behaviour. The role of thoughts (thoughts which cannot simply be read off of behaviour) in discriminating mental states is not sufficiently appreciated. Hume himself neglects the importance of thoughts, in his case assimilating them, not to behaviour, but to feeling. The behaviourists in their turn assimilate both thought and feeling to their manifestations in behaviour. But when it comes to the model and mechanisms of the mind, the behaviour therapists are among the modern representatives of the Humean tradition of argument about the emotions.
My discussion will start with a detailed analysis of Hume and Spinoza. I will move on to a survey of psychological therapies and the spectrum of roles they assign to thoughts. I will then try to show how 'ideas' (or thoughts) find a way into Freudian theory and what sort of ideas they are. Next I shall try to see what sort of theory of affects and emotions can be extracted from Freud, and how (especially) it is related to the theory of therapeutic change. The central concern will be the role of 'insight' in producing change. Finally, I will compare Freud (the crypto-Spinozist) and Spinoza: emphasizing, in particular, the ways in which a Spinozist understanding of how thoughts are built into emotions can help us to understand Freudian theory and therapy.
CHAPTER ONE . . . HUME
Hume treats emotions as discrete simple experiences, essentially specific and peculiar particular feelings. Hume is not, however, a taxonimist of the passions. In his *A Treatise of Human Nature, BOOK II: Of the Passions*, he is not engaged in compiling a vast Baconian catalogue of mental flora and fauna and their nice distinctions. But if not natural history, his enterprise is not so different from that of the natural philosopher in the Newtonian tradition: taking human nature as his sphere. He is to be regarded, as he regards himself, as a physicist of the emotions. A careful observer of the phenomena, he seeks general hypotheses (what Newton would insist on calling experimental laws or principles) to explain their interconnections and motions. His observations and hypotheses are, of course, informed by his more general empiricist position. It is our own minds, our impressions and ideas, that we know most directly and most certainly and so these must be the terms at the ends of the emotional equations. His theory of knowledge also determines the form the connections may take: the principle of association of ideas is his universal law of gravitation. Does his general philosophy cause him to mis-perceive and mis-represent the phenomena and so render him incapable of answering the sorts of questions a philosophical theory of the emotions should? What sorts of possibilities for changing emotions does his approach allow?
I. Impressions of Reflexion

The contents of the mind are one and all perceptions. Passions undoubtedly being in the mind they must, for Hume, be perceptions: i.e., impressions ("our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul") or ideas ("the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning" -- THN I, p. 1). There is in general little to choose between these two (though Hume does sometimes contrast them in ways which can perhaps be traced to a lingering Hutchesonian position -- see Kemp Smith, p. 49 n. 1), ideas being less vivid versions of the impressions from which they derive. Within Hume's philosophy there is also, apparently, little to distinguish these two types of perception from 'belief', which on Hume's account seems to amount to very vivid perceptions (though sometimes, following Hutcheson, it is treated as a state of mind in the observing self -- a creature giving Hume no end of difficulty -- rather than a quality of each perception -- again, see Kemp Smith, p. 74 ff.). Impressions and ideas plus mechanical principles of association are a rather meagre equipment out of which to construct the whole of our mental and moral life. Hume has more. A doctrine of reflexion. Passions are not, it turns out, straightforwardly identified with impressions or ideas, rather they are thought of as 'impressions of reflexion'.

Impressions of reflexion, when first introduced, are explained as follows:

[Impressions of Reflexion are] derived in a great measure from our ideas, and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is
a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv'd from them . . . the impressions of reflexion, viz. passions, desires, and emotions, which principally deserve our attention, arise mostly from ideas . . . (THN I, pp. 7-8).

This is a genealogy. An impression is an impression of reflexion in virtue of its causal ancestry. Impressions of sensation ("all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures" -- THN II, p. 275), by way of contrast, arise "in the soul originally, from unknown causes" (THN I, p. 7). (Hume sometimes -- e.g., THN II, p. 275 -- describes the contrast as one between 'secondary' and 'original' impressions.) Taken in themselves, as impressions (which itself is a much broadened technical term in Hume), one would expect to perceive no difference between impressions of reflexion and of sensation -- unless, of course, they show their pedigree on their faces. But genealogical metaphor will not do here. The relation between impressions of reflexion and the ideas and impressions from which they derive must, in Hume's system, be causal. The problem for him is one of getting the causal story right in accounting for the origin of each emotion. We, however, must enquire whether emotions viewed as impressions with a peculiar causal history will do justice to the phenomena at all. And, given Hume's account of the nature of causality, whether it makes sense so to view them even within his system.
II. Pride and Double Association

An example and model of the sort of analysis Hume offers is his discussion of the four indirect passions: pride, humility, love and hate. Passions are divided into indirect and direct according to whether or not they involve other qualities in order to be derived from pleasure and pain (themselves viewed as impressions). The four indirect passions mentioned are central and Hume devotes considerable space to their discussion because they give full display to his principles of association and because of their connections with the passions of approval and disapproval so central to his moral theory.

Pride, one of the four indirect passions, is, like all passions, a "simple and uniform impression" (THN II, p. 277). It cannot be defined or analyzed into parts, it is a simple specific feeling which we recognize immediately and which cannot be other than as we perceive it. One can, however, specify "such circumstances as attend" it: causal conditions and consequences, and other externally related circumstances. The object of pride, Hume tells us, is always self. Of course, it is we who experience our pride, but this is not what is meant. In that sense we could be said to be the bearer of the passion, but all passions would be alike in that respect. (All my feelings are had by me.) What is meant by saying I am the object of pride, is that the feeling of pride is always and everywhere followed by the idea of myself. When we are proud, we think of ourselves.

Kenny mistakenly treats Hume's claim that the idea of self is the object of pride as an odd way of putting the claim that
whatever expression completes the sense of the verb ". . . is proud of . . ." must begin with "his own . . .", even if what a man is proud of is only his brother-in-law's acquaintance with the second cousin of a Duke (AEW, p. 23).

This claim is actually a misstatement of a truth, and a truth that Hume discusses in terms other than 'object'. A proper noun, for example, could quite properly be all that follows "is proud of . . ." -- but it is in fact required that the noun which serves as object of the preposition name someone or something closely related to the individual. It is just not required that this be represented by the presence of the phrase "his own . . .". The grammatical language Kenny uses misstates the fact, which is not really a fact of grammar at all (except perhaps 'logical grammar'). And the fact, about what might be called the 'prepositional object' of pride, is recognized by Hume in another form, and as a different sort of fact than Kenny's "must" might suggest. It has to do with what Hume considers to be the cause of pride. The difference between cause and object of passions is the difference "betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited" (THN II, p. 278).

The exciting causes of pride are many and various. "Every valuable quality" of mind and body and even of things in any way related to us can be a source of pride (THN II, p. 279). They have in common, however, first that it is always in virtue of some quality or characteristic which is in itself pleasant that the passion is excited, and secondly that the quality always inheres in a person or thing ('subject') somehow related to us:

Beauty, consider'd merely as such, unless plac'd upon something related to us, never produces any pride or vanity; and the strongest relation alone, without beauty, or something else in its place, has as little influence on that passion (THN II, p. 279).
Their joint presence is a necessary condition of pride. Hume envisages his compound cause as operating through a complex process of double association between impressions and ideas. The qualities which excite pride produce a separate pleasure, which by its resemblance to the agreeable sensation of pride itself leads to that feeling. The subjects in which the exciting qualities of pride inhere are "either parts of ourselves, or something nearly related to us" (THN II, p. 285), i.e., involve the idea of self which is the object of pride.

That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv'd. The one idea is easily converted into its cor-relative; and the one impression into that, which resembles and corresponds to it: With how much greater facility must this transition be made, where these movements mutually assist each other, and the mind receives a double impulse from the relations both of its impressions and ideas? (THN II, pp. 286-7).

CAUSE —————————————————————— > PASSION ———————————— OBJECT

quality (inhering—>) pleasure——>pleasant
in subject related sensation

Probably the most plausible way of interpreting this mechanism is to suppose that the initial pleasant impression calls forth all pleasant passions indiscriminately, but that the presence of an additional association leads to pride (in this case) being favoured above its fellows (Kemp Smith, p. 185 n. 3; Cf. THN II, pp. 305-6). In any case, the object emerges directly from the passion (mysteriously) and not via the association of ideas, whose role seems to end with bringing about the passion itself (THN II, p. 280). "Here then is a passion plac'd betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produc'd by it" (THN II, p. 278).
So we have

on the one hand, an association between the pleasure we take in (say) the beauty of our house and the agreeable sensation of pride itself; on the other, an association between the idea of what belongs to us (the house) and the idea of ourself (as the 'natural' object of all pride).

(Gardiner, pp. 37-38)

Thus "any thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object" (THN II, p. 288).

There are many objections that might be made to this picture, but many of them are irrelevant to our purposes. Some stem from the fact that pride in the eighteenth century may not be what pride is today. Where this is a matter of different qualities producing pleasure, and so pride, it does not concern us. Where this is meant to suggest that the raw felt quality of pride has altered, it seems untestable and perhaps undiscussable. A claim that pride may have been simply a feeling then but is something else or something more today, must give way to the prior question of whether it could ever have been a simple impression (even of reflexion). Other objections have to do with the many different uses of 'pride' and 'proud', some of which uses may seem very mysterious if we take Hume's analysis of the primary use (when describing an occurrent state of mind, immediately experienced) as correct (Ardal, pp. 19-22). I think, however, that a discussion of some of the problems within Hume's particular analysis may point to more fundamental difficulties in the whole approach, and so be the most fruitful procedure.
III. "Limitations"

Hume himself introduces some modifications or "limitations" into the general scheme "that all agreeable objects, related to ourselves, by an association of ideas and of impressions, produce pride, and disagreeable ones, humility" (THN II, p. 290 ff.). The modifications include that the agreeable object must be closely related to ourselves (otherwise only 'joy' and not pride is produced) and only to ourselves or at most to ourselves and a few others. One could add that the condition of closeness varies inversely with the extraordinariness of the causal quality (Ardal, p. 30). The pleasant object must also be obvious to others, and durable. It can, however, be efficacious in producing pride even if (because of "peculiarities of the health or temper") we derive no pleasure from it, providing there is a general rule that such objects are a sign of rank. Certainly these complications do not amount to the special propensities Hume appeals to elsewhere to bolster his associationist accounts. Whether or not the four "limitations" and one "enlargement" are deviations from Hume's program, they can be allowed by us. They can be viewed as more careful and precise specifications of the triggers to association. There are deeper flaws in Hume's associationist psychology of the passions.
IV. Association: Resemblance and Simplicity

At the heart of Hume's analysis are his principles of association:

... however changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule and method in their changes. The rule, by which they proceed, is to pass from one object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produc'd by it (THN II, p. 283).

According to his theory,

ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance (283).

The principle of orderly succession for impressions is first introduced in the second book of the Treatise, where the problem is one of accounting for the appearance of passions, i.e., impressions of reflexion. It plays no role in Book I, Of the Understanding, where various ideas are at issue.

Hume provides an example of the orderly displacement of emotions:

All resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be compleated (283).

We have in fact already seen the principle of association of impressions invoked in the account of the internal mechanism of pride: a pleasant quality inhering in a subject related to ourselves leads to the (resembling) pleasant sensation of pride. But it is difficult to see how simple impressions could be capable of relations of resemblance and so of association through resemblance: the intelligibility of Hume's theory is prior to the question of its truth.

The two impressions involved in pride are species of pleasure, but what then are their differentia and (whatever they are) do these not constitute discriminable aspects of the pleasant impressions they distinguish? And is not this complexity just the sort of thing meant to be excluded by
the alleged simplicity of the elements of Hume's system? The similarity
of two perceptions seems inconsistent with the simplicity of each of
them.\(^1\) Similarity or resemblance is an incomplete predicate. Resemblance

\(^1\) 

... Had the essence but in one;
Two distincts, division none ... 

Property was thus appalled,
That the self was not the same;
Single nature's double name
Neither two nor one was called.

Reason, in itself confounded,
Saw division grow together,
To themselves yet either neither,
Simple were so well compounded ... .

(Shakespeare, 'The Phoenix and Turtle')

is always resemblance in a certain respect: \(a\) is more like \(b\) with respect
to \(F\) than \(a\) is like \(c\) with respect to \(F\). Two objects can be said to be
similar only in a certain respect or from a certain point of view, and so,
if they really are different, there must be a further respect in which
they are not similar and in virtue of which they are different, and they
cannot, therefore, be simple. Part of the point of association by resem­
blance (and association in general) is to explain the emergence of complexity
out of simples. Mere numerical difference will not serve Hume's purposes
because two simple ideas, each qualitatively identical, would not together
constitute either a new simple idea or a new complex idea (Passmore, p. 110).

Hume insists (as he must) that one can characterize simple perceptions
as similar or dissimilar, that there need be no further aspect (and so
complexity) in order to establish a respect of comparison on which to base
difference. He argues (in a note in connection with abstract ideas):
'Tis evident, that even different simple ideas may have a similarity or resemblance to each other; nor is it necessary, that the point or circumstance of resemblance should be distinct or separable from that in which they differ. Blue and green are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue and scarlet; tho' their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation or distinction. 'Tis the same case with particular sounds, and tastes and smells. These admit of infinite resemblances upon the general appearance and comparison, without having any common circumstance the same. And of this we may be certain, even from the very abstract terms simple idea. They comprehend all simple ideas under them. These resemble each other in their simplicity. And yet from their very nature, which excludes all composition, this circumstance, in which they resemble, is not distinguishable nor separable from the rest. 'Tis the same case with all the degrees in any quality. They are all resembling, and yet the quality, in any individual, is not distinct from the degree (THN Appendix, p. 637).

Passmore responds:

Hume's argument is a very curious one: it amounts to saying that simple ideas must at least resemble one another in being simple, so that resemblance is compatible with simplicity. But, of course, if simplicity were genuinely a point of resemblance, the conclusion would rather be that there are no simple ideas: the least which can possibly confront us would be something simple, vivid (or faint) and, for example, blue, i.e., a complex idea (Passmore, p. 109).

I think this criticism sound, at least if one starts, as Hume appears to, with the notion of a 'simple idea' ('x idea') rather than an 'idea of a simple' ('idea of x', where x is in turn simple). Then one seems to be taking simplicity as genuinely a point of comparison, as itself a 'part', in which case simplicity seems clearly incompatible with resemblance in a certain respect. But Hume's position (in connection with emotions, at any rate) may require only a weaker concept: 'x is simple' may be merely a misleading way of saying that x cannot be characterized except as x (Passmore, p. 110), or 'x is a simple idea' may mean merely that it cannot be taken to pieces by definition and so cannot be acquired by acquiring the ideas of each of its pieces (Pears, private communication). We shall return to these naming and learning notions of simplicity in a moment.
Ardal tries to defend Hume against Passmore's attack. Part of his
defence is a repetition of Hume's point about colours (Ardal, p. 14).
But here my intuitions are different: it does not make "perfect sense"
to me to say that blue is more (or less) similar to green than scarlet,
where these are taken as simple impressions. My difficulty is that if
similarity is analyzed in terms of partial identity it requires at least
two parts in one of the items. One makes sense of the comparison at the
expense of viewing green as a mixture (containing blue), and therefore as
not simple. That this is a way in which we make the comparison can be
seen if we try to compare the primary colours (red, yellow, and blue) and
try to establish relative similarities among them. They are different
colours, but no pair is 'more like' than any other. I suspect that if
people did not know that one could produce green by combining blue and
yellow, they would not be tempted to say that blue is more like green
than red. If they were still so tempted, it might have to do with other
extraneous features of colours, such as their association with warmth
and cold. There is, however, another way one could make sense of com­
parison of simples, but it too seems to me to leave the compatibility of
simplicity and resemblance in question.

One might appeal to a spectrum or scale of degree. Thus, one could
achieve plausibility for a comparison of colours (as simples) by ranging
them on a scale and then judging in terms of distances on that scale.
First, we should note that conclusions from the case of colours are, in
any case, dangerous. Far from being typical, they are most peculiar, as
Hume himself recognizes in connection with the underived idea of blue in
the very first section of the Treatise (THN I, p. 6). Secondly, the scale
would indicate degree, but degree of what? For colours, we can imagine it
would be a spectrum in accordance with a measure of wavelength. Is there a natural analogue in the form of a spectrum of emotions? Hume's circle of associated impressions (grief-disappointment-anger-envy-malice-grief) assumes that there is. I would agree, but I doubt that it is based on similarities of feeling (except at the grossest level, e.g., as in a contrast between pleasant and painful emotions). I would argue (ultimately) that such a spectrum depends on the characteristic thoughts involved. (Thus regret, as involving a thought of loss, might be similar to remorse, as involving a thought of loss plus culpability. But the whole matter is enormously complex, and complex along more dimensions than just thought.)

Still, the notion of 'scale' brings us somewhat nearer to the most interesting point in Ardal's defense, the meaning of 'simple'. Is possession of a degree on a scale of magnitude incompatible with simplicity of an object? In a sense, obviously not. The scale is a framework outside the object, in which the object has a place. But it has a place because the degree is in the object. Hume claims, however, that the degree is not distinct or separable from the simple quality that constitutes the object. It is not clear that this is true. Certainly it is not distinguishable (perhaps not even discernible) on a single view comprising only the object. But a view encompassing several objects on the scale in which they are compared would show that they differ in respect of degree and perhaps even reveal the degree of the particular object. That the degree requires comparison amongst objects in order to be discovered (seen) does not imply that it is not a distinguishable characteristic of the supposedly simple object; despite the fact that Humean doctrine would suggest that all characteristics should be directly discernible (and imaginable in
isolation). The distinguishing in some cases just may require several steps and more encompassing views. Are such characteristics compatible with the simplicity of their objects?

Hume, I think, would say yes. He seems to argue, in the following 'globe of white marble' passage, that 'distinctions of reason' leave the ideas analyzed simple, because not really distinguished into parts which one can contemplate separately (i.e., imagine in isolation):

'Tis certain that the mind wou'd never have dream'd of distinguishing a figure from the body figur'd, as being in reality neither distinguishable, nor different, nor separable; did it not observe, that even in this simplicity there might be contain'd many different resemblances and relations. Thus when a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a white colour dispos'd in a certain form, nor are we able to separate and distinguish the colour from the form. But observing afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of white, and comparing them with our former object, we find two separate resemblances, in what formerly seem'd, and really is, perfectly inseparable. After a little more practice of this kind, we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour by a distinction of reason; that is, we consider the figure and colour together, since they are in effect the same and undistinguishable; but still view them in different aspects, according to the resemblances, of which they are susceptible. When we wou'd consider only the figure of the globe of white marble, we form in reality an idea both of the figure and colour, but tacitly carry our eye to its resemblance with the globe of black marble; And in the same manner, when we wou'd consider its colour only, we turn our view to its resemblance with the cube of white marble. By this means we accompany our ideas with a kind of reflexion, of which custom renders us, in a great measure, insensible. A person, who desires us to consider the figure of a globe of white marble without thinking on its colour, desires an impossibility; but his meaning is, that we shou'd consider the colour and figure together, but still keep in our eye the resemblance to the globe of black marble, or that to any other globe of whatever colour or substance (THN I, p. 25).

This would seem to support Ardal's view. As opposed to Passmore, who treats a simple idea as one which can only be named and not further described, Ardal takes the relevant sense of 'simple' to be: without parts, excluding all composition (Ardal, pp. 12-15). His argument is that the idea of a particular shade of blue is not 'composed' of vividness, blueness, and
simplicity. In explicating 'composed', he cites Moore as viewing the analysis of a complex idea as analysis into the ideas of its various parts in certain relations: so the idea of a horse would be composed of the ideas of its 'parts', namely, legs, head, heart, etc. (Ardal, pp. 7, 13-14). It is true that if one were making a blue patch, one would not have to (indeed, one would not be able to) add a dab of shade or degree of intensity to one's stroke of blue paint. Surely, a particular shade of blue is not 'composed' of vividness, blueness, simplicity, etc. These are not 'parts' on a level (as the legs, head, etc., of a horse might be). But (whatever Moore's view of analysis may be) it is not clear that this is the sort of composition that Hume means to exclude when he claims simplicity. Indeed, all of his talk of 'parts' may be merely metaphorical. I think that Passmore's argument (p. 109) shows that one must start with an 'idea of x', and then establish whether x is simple. If you start with 'x idea', you naturally have an entity that has other properties (vividness, simplicity, etc.), and whether or not they constitute 'parts', you cannot acquire the concept x through these other properties. And Hume's concern, in the globe of white marble passage and throughout, is really with the acquisition of concepts. His concept of simplicity is based on learning. Hence the difficulty of the counter-example, the missing shade of blue. Hence the idea of the white globe is simple (despite what would seem obvious 'parts') because one could not construct it from separate impressions of roundness and white underived from conglomerate impressions or ideas. One acquires distinct ideas of shape and colour only after seeing or imagining them together and then (in reflexion) making a 'distinction of reason'. Similarly, degree of intensity of a colour is
not imaginable separately from colour (and colour is not imaginable without some degree of intensity), and the place of a colour on a spectrum or scale of colours is not ascertainable independently of a view (or views) of that colour. So these characteristics of a simple idea do not conflict with its simplicity, because they are not separately imaginable and so could not be used to teach the idea to someone who did not already have it. A simple idea is one that cannot be taken to pieces by definition (and so cannot be acquired by acquiring the ideas of each of its pieces). Characteristics of an idea, such as simplicity and degree, even if they are in some sense 'parts' of an idea, do not constitute 'pieces' of the thing of which it is an idea and so cannot be used (by themselves at any rate) in acquiring or teaching the concept of that thing. It is the simplicity of the thing and not of the idea of the thing that really matters. The problem when we turn to emotions is that the thing itself is in the mind, so the distinction that allows one to preserve simplicity while making comparisons necessary for association collapses.

If we take Hume's concept of simplicity as based on learning, could emotions be 'simple' impressions? Could we make the classifications, discriminations, and identifications we do, and make them on the basis simply of the impressions, if emotions really were 'simple' impressions? More immediately, could emotions be produced by mechanisms involving association by resemblance of 'simples'? And, most immediately, could emotions (as simple impressions) be associated with each other (as in Hume's circle of passions) through resemblance?
V. Association: Simplicity and the Essential

Let us suppose that emotions are impressions (of reflexion), and that they have no constituent parts, or (more weakly) that they are indefinable or simple in the sense that there are no distinguishable constituents essential to their recognition or the acquisition of their corresponding ideas. If we say this, I think we will also have to say that if two impressions resemble it will always be in a respect that lies outside their simple essence, they will never be similar as impressions simpliciter. One must be able to specify the respect in which similarity is claimed, and to specify would be to distinguish, and whatever is distinguishable is distinct (even if the distinction is only a 'distinction of reason').

("Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination" -- THN Appendix, p. 634; cf. THN I, p. 18.) Shared determinables, such as 'colour' for red and blue, and 'flavour' for vanilla and chocolate, are not here in question. These are not the respects that would have to stand distinct from the essence of the simple being considered. But the length of a line, the shape of a red idea (or an idea of red), and the intensity of an emotion would all be quickly stripped away -- this despite the fact that they are not strictly 'separable' in that they cannot be imagined in isolation. Though they are not separately contemplatable, they can be distinguished (or abstracted) by reflexion; and determination of degree is not in general essential to acquisition of a concept (it is not part of a definition of a quantity or quality even if some determinate degree is always present in any given quantity or quality). We need not say that "if simplicity were genuinely a point of resemblance ... there are no simple ideas";
just that if simplicity were genuinely a point of resemblance, then simplicity would be extraneous to the essence of the simple ideas it characterizes. (This is a strategy which, I suspect, quickly leads to bare particulars.)

Ardal says,

It seems to me clear that it is not absurd to suggest that simplicity may be consistent with similarity, unless you want to define a simple idea as that which can only be named and not described in any sense of 'describe'. Hume does not use the term 'simple' in this way, and I see no very obvious reason for claiming that he ought to have done this (Ardal, p. 15).

I have been arguing that on Ardal's interpretation of 'simple' (as denial of component parts) simplicity is incompatible with resemblance in a certain respect (except where the respect refers to features external to the simple entity). I have been arguing further that Hume's notion of simplicity does exclude some (though not all) forms of description, in particular it excludes those forms that would allow for resemblance (again, they become external features). And Hume takes this line on simplicity because of his concern with problems of learning, understanding, and meaning of ideas.

Now Ardal may be right that "a simple perception is not just something that can only be pointed to and given a name" (Ardal, pp. 12, 15). He is right if the naming is meant to exclude any further description, of causal circumstances or consequences or whatever. (This is how I think Ardal reads Passmore.) But he is wrong if the naming is meant to exclude only additional conditions on or other ways of learning to distinguish and recognize the thing named (which conditions may well include causal circumstances and consequences and so on). On this account, causal
circumstances, etc., get excluded from further description of a simple perception only insofar as they are claimed to be essential to or sufficient for learning or acquiring the concept of the thing perceived. The simple impression by itself is supposed to be necessary and sufficient for that. And this account is how I think Hume is to be understood. He goes to considerable trouble to give "such circumstances as attend" the passions, and they can be compared and contrasted in strength, violence, vividness, etc. But the pleasant sensation of the exciting cause of pride is not similar to the pleasant sensation of the passion in degree of intensity or nature of attending circumstances; they are associated because of the similarity of the pleasures viewed in themselves. And it is not clear what this means. Taken in themselves, it would appear that 'X is simple' is merely "a misleading way of saying that X cannot be characterized except as X" (Passmore, p. 110), where this in turn is a way of saying that the concept of X can be acquired only by direct acquaintance and such acquaintance is all that is needed for acquisition and understanding.

In accounting for the emergence of pride, Hume takes certain 'facts' about the sources of pride and 'facts' about the object of pride and pride itself and relates them, and claims that it is those relations operating through the principles of association that account for the emergence of pride. Our argument about the incompatibility of similarity and simplicity suggests that if pride resembles its exciting quality in pleasantness, then its pleasantness will be a distinguishable characteristic (if only by a 'distinction of reason'), and so pleasantness cannot be its distinctive essence. But this, of course, is precisely what Hume claims: the peculiar and distinctive pleasure and pain of pride and humility.
constitute their very being and essence. Thus, pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility. Of this our very feeling convinces us; and beyond our feeling, 'tis here in vain to reason or dispute (THN II, p. 286).

The feeling is all there is to the emotion. Now there is a sense, of course, in which it is perfectly possible to say that the sensation of pride and the sensation of its cause resemble in being pleasant. They can both be pleasant sensations in the same way that blue and green are both colours. They share a common determinable. But what is required is that they resemble (be more or less alike than other members of the category) in respect of pleasantness (in felt quality), not merely as being pleasant; just as Hume claims blue and green resemble in respect of colour (as determinates of a shared determinable), not simply as being colours (as sharing a determinable). Otherwise (among other problems) why should a pleasant impression lead to any one other pleasant impression rather than another? The causes of pride are very various, involving many different sorts of pleasure, so they would presumably resemble and so lead to different impressions of reflexion. It would seem, therefore, that on this interpretation, each different cause of pride would be associated with a different impression of pride, that the pleasure of pride would vary with its causes. But this cannot be Hume's view. He emphatically insists that the pleasure of pride, as of each emotion, is a simple, distinctive, and uniform impression. One way around this difficulty is by interpreting the mechanism in the way suggested in section II, so that it is the double association of impressions and ideas, and not merely association of resembling impressions, that accounts for one pleasant impression rather than another being called up. The initial pleasant
impression calls forth all pleasant passions indiscriminately, but the presence of an additional association (of ideas) leads to pride (in certain cases) being favoured above its fellows. Though this must surely be the correct interpretation of the mechanism, and it leaves the pleasure of pride a simple and uniform impression, we must enquire whether we could acquire the concept, whether we could recognize and identify pride (distinguish it from other emotions) if it were such a simple impression. In fact, I think there is not enough discernible variation in our feelings (in a narrow, sensation, sense) to match and account for the subtlety in our distinctions and discriminations of feelings (in a broad, emotion, sense).^2

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^2 This is perhaps the most important point made by Cannon in his critique of the James-Lange theory of the emotions. It turns out that the same physiological changes occur in very different emotional states (e.g., adrenalin flows in rage, and fear, and joy). So emotion could not be, or at least could not simply be, the perception of those physiological changes. Put crudely, if all one had to go on were the tears, one would have no way of knowing whether one's tears were tears of joy or tears of sorrow.

Hume seems caught in a dilemma: Either simplicity is a matter of 'parts', in which case the sorts of resemblance it allows will not account for the learning of emotion concepts or the discrimination of particular emotion states; or simplicity is a matter of 'learning', in which case the elements included in an emotion must be more than would be allowed by a simple impression if we are to be able to identify and discriminate it from other emotions (i.e., if we are to acquire the concept of that emotion). Chocolate and vanilla may be 'simple' flavours, but they do not 'resemble' each other more than (say) chocolate and strawberry. Regret and remorse
may resemble, but they are not simple like vanilla and chocolate, or even complex in the (simple) way of vanilla fudge.

Even if Hume's mechanism for producing pride requires resemblance of impressions only in the way in which blue and green resemble in virtue of both being colours (i.e., in sharing a determinable), a metaphysical problem with simplicity might return if we pressed our earlier argument (using 'distinctions of reason' to separate off characteristics) until we reached bare particulars. But it is not clear how much of a loss Hume's theory would suffer if pleasantness (the relevant determinable) were external rather than internal (provided that everything else was as well). In any case, the substantive difficulty does not disappear quite so readily. The double association interpretation has to survive difficulties with the association of ideas (some similar to those with the association of impressions). We shall be discussing these difficulties, and the resulting interpretation may well rely on (an impossible) resemblance in respect of pleasantness simpliciter between simples. In any case, it is certainly required in the Humean account of a chain of emotions, like the circle cited by Hume when he introduces the notion of association of impressions.
VI. Impressions of Pleasure and Pleasant Impressions

In order for the association of impressions mechanism to be at all plausible, there must be impressions available at both ends of the machinery. The passion itself is, of course, thought by Hume to be an impression (of reflexion), but there must also be an initial impression which through association by resemblance yields the secondary impression. Hence Hume argues at length (THN II, i, sections 7 to 11) for a separate impression of pleasure with every subject of pride. In typical fashion, the argument is from the impossibility of definition to the awareness of an impression. The "power of producing pain and pleasure" is thus the "essence of beauty and deformity" (THN II, p. 299) as also of "wit" (297). But that impressions cannot be defined does not show that whatever cannot be defined is an impression. Even if pleasure is in each case somehow involved, it need not be an impression of pleasure in every case, indeed, it is not clear that it could be an impression of pleasure in any case. Given Hume's theory of meaning, it could be nothing else. Every meaningful expression has to be traced to its origin in a corresponding perception. All words (and perhaps propositions) are names acquiring their meaning, either directly or indirectly, by standing for impressions. This is not the place for a general critique of Hume's theory of meaning, but we can say something about how it affects his account of pleasure: it makes it inadequate.

What manner of impression is pleasure supposed to be? It is an original sensation, not an impression of reflexion. Though passions, direct and indirect, are derived from pleasure, it is not itself a passion.
At least this is true for bodily pleasures:

Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and considered by the mind; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceding thought or perception (THN II, p. 276).

But is this meant to be a general account? Certainly those pleasures which consist of sensations are sensations, but can all pleasures plausibly be viewed as consisting of sensations, as bodily? What sense can this help us make of the relation between pleasure and the things we take pleasure in, between enjoyment and the things we enjoy? To say that all pleasures are unconnected with "any preceding thought or perception" would be simply false. To call the relation of pleasure and its objects "original" would be simply to deny that the relation can be explained. To shift to the position that pleasure is an impression of reflexion would still leave the question whether it can (in all cases if in any) be an impression of any kind.

Hume seems to acknowledge that the objects of pleasure are very various, but takes the variety to amount only to differences of felt quality:

... 'tis evident, that under the term pleasure, we comprehend sensations, which are very different from each other, and which have only such a distant resemblance, as is requisite to make them be express'd by the same abstract term. A good composition of music and a bottle of good wine equally produce pleasure; and what is more, their goodness is determin'd merely by the pleasure. But shall we say upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour? (THN III, p. 472)

Particular emotions, such as pride, may be simple and uniform impressions of pleasure, but pleasure itself is various. Its varieties together constitute the set of pleasant emotions. But calling anything, including emotions, 'pleasant' should signify the accompanying presence of one of the (various but resembling) impressions of pleasure. We can perhaps
understand the word 'pleasant' in the phrase 'pleasant emotions' as referring to the pleasure in or constituting the emotion itself. But in general, a 'pleasant impression' (of a country scene, etc.) would be one accompanied by an additional, separate and distinct impression of pleasure. I do not see how Hume could avoid regarding this accompanying impression as an impression of reflexion, though now, in virtue of that fact, he might give the pleasure the name of a passion: joy, pride, love, ... But even those impressions of reflexion which are direct passions ('desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security' -- THN II, p. 277) are derived from or reactions to pleasure or pain, their 'directness' amounting only to the fact that they require no further associations (of ideas of cause and object, of 'self' in the case of pride) in order to be derived. Direct passions do not involve double association, but they still require an initial, separate and distinct pleasure or pain. It would appear that the impression of pleasure (leaving out the complications of pain for now) would have in each case to arise 'originally', and not by 'reflexion', from the pleasant object it accompanies. Perhaps 'original' connections here need be no more mysterious than connections of 'reflexion', so that impressions of pleasure arise on the basis of resemblance to the impressions they accompany, despite the fact that those impressions (e.g., music and wine) do not much resemble each other (and so the connection is no less mysterious). Perhaps we should take Hume, in these sorts of cases, as regarding pleasure as an impression of reflexion, despite the fact that his system seems to leave no room for any such (pleasure being always either original and bodily or itself a passion). But, in any case, pleasure as an accompanying impression, whether of
reflexion or not, will not give an adequate account of our concept.

First, pleasure, unlike bodily sensations is not always located, specifically or even as a pervasive feeling throughout the body. This should be enough to show that pleasure and pain cannot be understood as simple opposites, or extremes on a common scale. The point is not that pain, by contrast, is always localized. The point is, rather, that the matter is complex, and that an analysis that allows in only simple sensations and their felt differences is unlikely to do justice to the complexity. (See Ryle, 1954a; Penelhum, 1956-57, pp. 232-34; Trigg.)

Secondly, where pleasure is not simply a bodily sensation, it is very likely a reaction or response to something. It does not then take the form of an 'associated' localized sensation. That is, where it is not simply a localized sensation, it is also not simply added on to something else (which may or may not be a localized sensation) as a localized sensation, so that the two together constitute the pleasure. The difference between taking a walk which one enjoys and taking a walk to which one is indifferent, is a difference different from that between walking with a headache and walking without one (Ryle, 1954b). If pleasure is not a bodily sensation, it is also not a non-bodily or non-localized sensation or impression -- at least if we give these terms any reasonable force. I do not propose to give a comprehensive argument or analysis of pleasure here, so I will confine myself to a few points that bring us close to central difficulties in Hume.

Thirdly, if pleasure in a thing consisted of an independent impression of pleasure, one would expect that the enjoyment could be produced independently of the thing enjoyed. But one cannot get the pleasure of watching
a play or of playing tennis by swallowing a pill (Ryle, 1949, p. 132). And the point is that the problem is not merely technological. Whatever happened, whatever sensations or even 'pleasure' occurred, it would not be the pleasure of watching a play unless one at least believed that the pleasure derived from watching a play. One cannot have the pleasures of an activity without the activity, or at least a pseudo or notional activity. Whatever the mechanism of the pill, it would not be enough for it to produce a sensation (however titillating), it would have also to produce (if it is possible) some sort of belief connecting the feeling with a play. To believe, even mistakenly, that one is enjoying something, there must be some description under which one believes (even though mistakenly) that one is enjoying it. (See Williams, 1959, esp. p. 237, on types of belief and types of mistake.) The precise character of the belief involved need not be spelled out here. The important point is that whatever the normal mechanism of pleasure, there are conceptual constraints on how we can regard its products. Whether or not Hume brings out the mechanisms, it is certain that his language of impressions (even impressions of reflexion) cannot bring out the conceptual constraints on those mechanisms.

Fourthly, it is at least odd, if pleasure is an independent impression (however it might be produced by or associated with other impressions), that it cannot outlast its objects. The enjoyment of an activity is coterminus with that activity. One cannot enjoy a walk after it is over (though one might be pleased at 'having walked') (Ryle, 1954b, p. 198). And the force of the 'cannot' is again conceptual. Whatever happened, whatever independent impressions occurred, they would not constitute enjoyment of
the past activity -- even if they were a product or reaction to it. The more one considers points like these, the more compelling becomes the claim that if one is to make sense of pleasure in the language of impressions, it will have to be as an aspect of impressions, rather than as itself an independent impression.

Fifthly, even where pleasure is very clearly a sensation, what constitutes the pleasantness of the sensation? Is an impression of pleasure always pleasant? We have seen some of the problems raised within Hume's system by the converse question, 'Is a pleasant impression always an impression of pleasure?' The present question can be seen to continue those difficulties in at least two directions. Consider the parallel question, 'Is an impression of blue always blue?' This direction of questioning would take us into the nature of impressions. Just what are they? Are they the sorts of things that could be either blue or pleasant? Are they things? Avoiding those depths of difficulty, a second direction would take us back to the converse question. Is the pleasantness of a pleasant impression (at least where, unlike pleasant emotions, the impression is not itself an impression of pleasure) an additional impression? An additional pleasant impression? Here lies infinite regress. An additional impression of reflexion, e.g., desire? Could desire or other attitudes themselves be impressions (even of reflexion)? If the pleasantness of an impression is ever an attitude (e.g., of desire) towards an impression, is it always?

3 These sorts of problems are raised and explored by Ryle, 1954a; Penelhum, 1956-57, and others. Ryle also points out contrasts in our methods for identifying feelings and sensations as opposed to our methods
for identifying and describing pleasures. These contrasts are developed further by Gosling, 1969, Ch. II. There is also a literature on the question whether pain is necessarily unpleasant; e.g., Gardiner, 1964, Pitcher, 1970.

Sixthly and finally, one could adduce other arguments to show the inadequacy of viewing pleasure as an impression (even of reflexion), but the most interesting from our point of view are those which go to support the claim that pleasure is a form of effortless attention (enjoying is a form of attending). I will not rehearse the arguments here; but I think

They include such points as that enjoying something seems to require awareness of or attending to it, and that drawing attention to feelings while engaged in an activity can interfere with the enjoyment of that activity. The thesis is stated by Ryle:

The general point that I am trying to make is that the notion of attending or giving one's mind to is a polymorphous notion. The special point that I am trying to make is that the notion of enjoying is one variety in this genus, or one member of this clan, i.e., that the reason why I cannot, in logic, enjoy what I am oblivious of is the same as the reason why I cannot, in logic, spray my currant-bushes without gardening (1954b, p. 202).

The thesis is developed by Ryle, 1954b; Williams, 1959; Penelhum, 1964. For doubts, see Gosling, 1969, Ch. IV.

the claim is very plausible. In relation to Hume, the important point to add is that it is unlikely that one can account for attention in terms of impressions and ideas. Attention is rather an attitude towards impressions and ideas. Could one impression perceive or pay attention to another? Here one runs into Hume's problems with a perceiving self. Within his system, that self tends to collapse into the perceptions themselves -- there is little (nothing) else around to constitute the perceiver (THN Appendix, pp. 633-36; Hampshire, 1959, Ch. I). Bating those problems, it seems difficult to see what more paying attention to an impression could
mean within Hume's system than merely having it. Even vividness is not available to do duty for attention; it already has too heavy a burden in accounting for belief. Even if vividness were available, whenever one was attending to an idea the added intensity would put the idea in danger of becoming an impression. (We do not hallucinate every time we concentrate.) So if pleasure is a form of attention, and attention is an attitude towards impressions rather than itself an impression, it is unlikely that pleasure (in general) can be accounted an impression (even of reflexion) within Hume's system.

The narrowness of the system produces other, but not unrelated, problems. For example, when Hume claims that the "anticipation of pleasure is, in itself, a very considerable pleasure" (THN II, p. 315 — in connection with the pride derived from property and riches), it does not seem that he can treat this anticipation of pleasure as itself an impression of pleasure: for how could an impression contain the needed reference to the future?^5

^5 Cf. discussion of problems of tensed ideas in Holland, 1954; and Pears, 1967, pp. 29-31. Even a picture (taking ideas as images) containing a calendar with a date next week circled, need not be a picture (or an expectation or anticipation or prediction) of an event next week. The problem here connects with certain difficulties raised for psychoanalytic theory by the problem of giving phantasies a reference to time. And how is one to distinguish memory of phantasy from phantasy of memory? We shall leave these problems for now.

In the cases of 'beauty' and 'wit', and the other occasions of pride, I want to say Hume makes a mistake. Not simply the mistake (which he may also make) of failing to distinguish the conditions under which we call something 'beautiful' or someone 'witty' and what we mean when we call it
that (what would be the naturalistic fallacy in relation to 'good'), but a mistake in thinking those conditions include a sensation of pleasure. Even if finding a picture beautiful is to contemplate it with pleasure, is the pleasure a feeling or sensation or impression? It seems more likely that it is a form of attention, and so precisely not an impression, but at best an attitude towards or an aspect of impressions. And, as we have seen, Hume's mechanisms for explaining emotions require separate, distinct, and independent impressions of pleasure.
VII. Self and the Idea of Self

Hume's mechanism of double association to produce pride and the other indirect passions brings into play the association of ideas as well as of impressions. This adds the principles of association by contiguity and causality to the principle of association by resemblance allowed by impressions. It also brings additional difficulties of interpretation.

Sticking to the case of pride, the idea of self is introduced as its object. That the idea of myself is the object of pride is, for Hume, a fact of natural history (THN II, p. 280). It should, for him, be an awkward fact. He elsewhere denies, in connection with personal identity, that any such idea of self can be found (THN I, p. 252; Appendix pp. 633-36). And the problem becomes more acute in connection with Hume's doctrine of sympathy, where, needing a source of vivacity, it becomes "the idea, or rather impression of ourselves" (THN II, p. 317). When speaking of the object of pride, Hume sometimes expands "the idea of ourselves" into "self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (THN II, p. 277) and "self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious" (THN II, p. 286). But these expansions do not help.

Certainly such expansions are no help in relation to the problem of personal identity. Hume takes that problem to be one of finding a numerically and qualitatively constant impression in order to explain the continuity of identity through time. For that purpose, a complex set of impressions would be useless. Even if such a set could constitute our self at a particular time, it would have a constantly shifting membership, and so be no better than ever-changing single impressions for continuity of
self. In any case, Hume misconceives his problem. Constancy (whether real, imagined, or 'fictional') of impressions cannot serve as an analysis of numerical identity (Penelhum, 1955). Identity as a particular is always identity under a concept, and the notion of identity under a concept (the same tree, the same house, the same person) allows for change, the limits of change being defined by the concept (the child becomes a man, but they may still be the same person).

Hume's entire project of treating persons as disembodied collections of experiences is misconceived. No set of impressions (however complex) is sufficient to distinguish one person from another (see, e.g., Williams, 1973); though an egocentric statement of the problem of personal identity might help one think that it could be (Pears, 1963). Hume, I think, came to see that if self is to serve (among other things) as perceiver of one's impressions, it cannot itself be yet another impression or collection of them. Ardal suggests that such a collection could serve, at least as object of pride at a given moment (Ardal, pp. 44-45). Though this might iron out the internal inconsistency over an 'idea of self', I think Hume's failure is one of principle, and the amendment would not obviate the difficulties. Indeed, it might create additional ones. The substitution of a set of impressions for a simple idea would not leave Hume's claims quite unchanged. That an idea of self is the object of pride is the claim that there is a constant conjunction between the emotion and the object, with the first preceding the second as its sufficient condition. Just how the second conjunct is specified is crucial to any empirical confirmation of the claim. And it appears quite simply false that whenever I am proud there occurs to me whatever complex set of impressions constitutes myself
at that particular time, unless, of course, this means merely that I have whatever experiences I have at that time. But, in that sense, the idea of self is always present and it would be the object of every passion if it were the object of any.

Hume's doctrine of sympathy, in fact, requires "that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us" (THN II, pp. 317, 320, 340). But there is a difference between being ourselves and thinking of ourselves. The former we cannot avoid, the latter most of us can. Hume's analysis of mind as a set of impressions and ideas helps him assimilate identity to an idea of self (being ourselves to thinking of ourselves). It is this special idea of self which is supposed to emerge as the object of pride. How is it supposed to emerge? Certain problems about self may be peculiar to the objects of pride and humility, but the sense in which it is the object of an emotion (pride) is a problem for all emotions. I shall argue that if not omni-present, the idea of self is always present on all occasions of pride (at least), and so Hume's account of its 'emergence' cannot be accepted. And with that account goes much else.
VIII. Emotion and Object

I have above described the emotion-object relation in causal terms: the object is the effect of the emotion. In fact, Hume leaves the precise nature of the relation unclear. For in addition to being natural, the relation is said to be original, that is, unexplainable, that is, mysterious.

It is an empirical, but not further explicable, fact that self is the object of pride (THN II, pp. 280, 286). Invariably, the object follows on the occurrence of the emotion. The idea which is the object succeeds the impression which is the emotion. But why and how, and (more immediately) does it? Hume leaves unclear not only the mechanism of the following, but also its meaning. Passmore gives a good description of the confusion:

A particularly important problem arises out of his description of the passions -- which, after all, are only 'impressions' -- as having 'objects'. The fact is that Hume never really thinks out the relation between his epistemology and his theory of passions; sometimes 'the view' (whatever this is) 'fixes on ourselves', when pride 'actuates us' (T, 277); sometimes pride 'produces' the idea of the self (T, 287); sometimes pride is described as something which can never 'look beyond self' (T, 286). If what really happens is that pride 'produces' the idea of self, that idea will be its effect, not its object; if, on the other hand, pride itself views the self, this will involve a complete revision of Hume's epistemology. The consequences will be no less far-reaching if pride somehow provokes the mind to have an idea of itself; and in this case, too, that idea is in no sense the 'object' of pride, but only an idea which regularly occurs later than pride (Passmore, pp. 126-27).

So far as one can extract a considered and coherent notion of object from Hume, the last statement seems to come closest. At least it is his most frequent picture. It is not quite that the emotion of pride produces or provokes the mind to produce an idea of itself; rather, that idea "is always intimately present with us" (317 -- never minding problems of unperceived perceptions) and the passion "turns our view to ourselves" (287)
where it "fixes" (277) and "rests" (286). "Pride and humility, being once rais'd, immediately turn our attention to ourself, and regard that as their ultimate and final object" (THN II, p. 278). Self is the object of attention.

As we have seen, however, a Humean analysis of attending to an object would seem to allow for little more than merely having the impression or idea of it. So if I am angry at my uncle, this must mean merely that the idea of my uncle accompanies my anger. But let us imagine the wrong idea occurs, the wrong image pops into mind. On this account, it would still (necessarily) be the image of the object of my emotion (Cf. Pitcher, 1965, p. 328). There is no room for mistake. Whatever idea strays into view, if it is the object of my attention, it will be the object of my anger. The ordinary (and psychoanalytic) notion of displacement, the notions of mistake and recognition of mistake, become unintelligible. There is no real object other than whatever happens to draw my attention while (or after) in the grip of the emotion.

Even in the case of pride, with its invariable object, attention (on a Humean analysis) provides an inadequate understanding of the notion of object. When a man is proud of his son, he need not think of himself. Indeed, he is most likely to think of his son and concentrate on his outstanding qualities. So whatever point Hume is making by claiming that self is the invariable object of pride, it cannot be that thoughts of self always follow on the feeling -- at least insofar as his point is a true one.

And Hume does have a valid point to make. He has noticed a genuine feature of pride: it arises from reflexion on the valuable qualities of
things closely associated with ourselves. But on such occasions our attention is already directed to ourselves. Hume never states how the idea of self is involved in the idea of a 'subject' related to us or how (by resemblance, contiguity, or causation) it is supposed to be associated

6 Kemp Smith, pp. 185-6, says they are related causally, but this does not (cannot) mean that the ideas are associated through causation. In that case, the 'expectation' would be its own fulfillment. 'Causation' may find place, indeed a variety of places, in the analysis of emotions, but not here. We shall return to this point in the next section.

with the idea of self (which he calls its "cor-relative" -- THN II, p. 286) which is the object of pride. That it is involved is clear. Hume's point about the cause of pride is that it requires a pleasing quality inhering in a subject related to self. The existence of the thing is not enough, one must be aware of it and aware of it as related to self. One must have the idea of self in contemplating the thing and its pleasant quality if one is to experience pride (rather than mere joy), so the idea of self is involved in the very idea of the subject or cause of pride. But if it is involved at all it is present, and if it is present it need not arise (through a sensation of pride or any other means). No new idea of self emerges as object. If the idea of self is still said to be the object of pride, the relation may still be said to be causal, but now the 'object' must be seen as a part of the cause of the pleasant sensation which is pride, and not its effect.

Hume would, I am afraid, find this emendation to his notion of object devastating to his theory. He explicitly insists that the object of pride could not be its cause (THN II, pp. 277-78). We shall return to this point, but I wish first to explore what I think is devastating about the
emendation. I wish to claim that one is forced (on pain of more immediate incoherencies) to understand Hume's notion of object in such a way that the object is not an effect, neither of the emotion itself nor of the cause of the emotion, but rather is a cause of the emotion. That is, within Hume's system, the object collapses into the cause. And this is devastating to the whole system, (most importantly) because without an idea of an object distinct from the idea of the cause the association of ideas is lost and so the whole mechanism of double association collapses. And with that collapse, one is forced back on an interpretation which relies on association of impressions alone, which in turn allows for association only by resemblance. So one ends up with (an impossible) association by resemblance of simples as simples, which is in any case (even were it possible) inadequate to produce emotions which do not vary with their objects. So pride would have many-meanings, as many as it has possible causes and objects, instead of the single meaning Hume undertook to explain. (Pleasure is supposed to be a peculiar and varied impression, but pride -- like many other emotions -- is supposed to be a peculiar and uniform pleasure.)
IX. Object and Effect

If the object of an emotion were simply an effect, it would have to be the effect of the emotion itself and not of the cause of the emotion. Hume says outright and in a variety of ways that the idea which is the object of pride emerges (mysteriously) out of the impression of reflexion which constitutes the emotion. The alternative, within Hume's system, would be that the idea which is the object emerges through association with the idea of (the 'subject' part of) the cause. But this would leave the importance of the impression itself, the supposed essence, unclear. Perhaps it would still provide an essential emotional turbulence. But is 'turbulence' essential to emotion? We shall consider this issue when we come to discuss what Hume calls the 'calm passions'. It looks like it would, in any case, no longer be essential to the appearance of the object. Perhaps it could be argued that without the impression, the object would not be an 'object of emotion', that is, the impression is essential to the appearance of the idea (which arises through association) being the appearance of an object. But that would call for explication of the notion of object, and that explication would seem to call for more than what an object of attention calls for on a Humean account. So it would no longer be Hume's notion of object.

By what principles of association could the idea of an object arise from the idea of a cause (assuming it did not arise from the emotional impression directly and that it was not already involved in the very idea of the cause)? Since the association would be between ideas, the full arsenal of resemblance, contiguity, and causality would seem to be available. But here we must note a central ambiguity in Hume's language.
There is constant slippage in his discussion of association of ideas, between resemblance, contiguity, and causality among the ideas and resemblance, contiguity, and causality among the things they are ideas of. When ideas succeed each other in accordance with the principles of association, this should be in virtue of the properties of the things they are ideas of. But these properties can have no effect unless we are aware of them. And Hume's notion of awareness in terms of ideas understood as images tends to turn ideas into the things they represent. The represented properties seem to become properties of the representation, the idea. (The 'object' of an idea gets assimilated to the idea.) So association in virtue of resemblance, contiguity, and causality, tends to become resemblance, contiguity, and causality of the ideas themselves. Where one's interest is in the ideas as such (and it would seem that it is the idea of self, whether or not there is a self, that is the object of pride), these difficulties begin to make themselves disturbingly felt. Now we should say a bit more about the difficulties, and a bit more about whether one's interest in 'objects' of emotion is an interest in ideas as such.

Even if the idea of the object (or the idea which is the object) were the effect of the idea which (along with an impression of pleasure) causes the emotion itself, it would not be because they were associated by causation. Indeed, association by causation would preclude the object of the emotion being the effect of the cause of the emotion. To see this, consider association by contiguity. Spatial contiguity requires that ideas have spatial location. But if they are extended in space they then have (spatial) parts, and are not simple. But if they were not extended, how
could they combine to make up space? "Two points can never lie contiguous to one another, because to be contiguous they would have to touch only at a certain point; and a point cannot itself touch at a point except by being that point" (Passmore, p. 112). Association by contiguity would require that ideas be near without appearing near -- otherwise the emergence of the associated idea would not be explained, for it would be present already. And how can ideas have unperceived properties or relations?

Whatever Hume's ultimate doctrine on space, we can see that these difficulties extend to explaining the emergence of the idea of the object by association with the idea of the subject. Causation is, in fact, much the same as regular temporal contiguity of ideas. This does not preclude a causal analysis of the notion of object, but it does preclude a causal analysis in which the object appears as effect of an initial idea. In talking of objects, we must be clear whether we are referring to the perish­ing immediate objects of perception or to the independent existences of an external world. If we are talking of the object of an emotion as an idea which emerges, then we cannot explain the occurrence of that idea in suc­cession to another idea as in accordance with the rule by which ideas "pass from one object to what is . . . produc'd by it". That principle would add nothing to the phenomenon it putatively explains: one cannot explain why an idea (B) follows another idea (A) by saying that the first idea (A) 'produces' the idea which follows it (B). The claim that A pro­duces B is based on the observation that B follows it. In the present case the second idea is not just a causal expectation, but also a causal product. When one perceives an object A and then its effect B, the first perception does not cause the second perception, though each may be caused
by the event (A or B) perceived. One can step back into the mind to explain our belief in external causal relations, but there is no further place to step back to if one wishes to claim that external causal relations are explained by internal causal relations. When explaining the idea of expectation involved in causal belief, Hume uses the objective conjunction of two external events to explain the emergence of expectation after an impression of the first event. Where the second event is the appearance of the idea, the conjunction would be called upon to explain itself. This does not mean that thoughts cannot have causal relations, but one must be careful about what is supposed to be explaining what. What can it mean to say that the occurrence of an idea leads by a principle of association to an idea which is causally connected with it? Where the initial object is itself an idea, the association reduces to a restatement of the causal relation from which it is supposed to stem. In any case, in the end the object of the emotion collapses into the cause of the emotion, and so those 'two' items (at any rate) could not be causally related: an effect must be distinguishable from its cause.

Hume's notion of object is a technical one, and we shall be returning to some of its peculiarities, but I think we can resolve one ambiguity. If the notion is to have any connection with ordinary notions, it should be taken to refer to things in the world. When I am angry, I am generally angry at a person (or by extending my views of agency) a thing, or event. The notion of object reaches out from my mental state to attach it to things in the world. What exactly we should say when the world fails to contain any appropriate thing may be a very complex issue (see Wilson, Chs. XVI to XVIII), but we should be able to mark a distinction at least
between being angry at a thing and being angry at an idea. The latter is also possible. The very thought of so-and-so may make me angry, and in certain cases it may be only the thought which does. We should not collapse being angry at a thing into being angry at the idea of that thing. The objects of our attention are generally things not the ideas of things -- even if our interest must be mediated through thoughts (and, presumably, physiological mechanisms), it should not be confused with an interest in thoughts (or in physiological mechanisms). When Hume speaks of an idea as object, he should, in general, be understood to mean the idea of the object (which is itself a thing). (Spinoza's language allows one very neatly to refer to ideas when they are in fact themselves objects through the notion of 'ideas of ideas'.) With this understanding, we can then go on to get clearer on just what the role of thought and thoughts in emotion is.

If one insisted on assimilating all objects to ideas, disaster would follow. How could any two persons experience a passion with the same object? If particular ideas, and for Hume ideas are particulars, cannot be had by more than one person how could both John and Paul be angry at the same person, say Judas? The reply, of course, is that they are not angry at the idea. If one loves the idea 'Lola' one is in a very different state of mind than one who loves Lola, and both differ from one who loves 'the idea of Lola'. Focussing on the phenomenological embodiments of objects in ideas when considering our interest in objects may be as misleading as focussing on the physiological or anatomical embodiments of ideas and impressions (an enquiry which Descartes takes up, but Hume -- rightly-- eschews as the province of "the sciences of anatomy and
natural philosophy", THN II, p. 275-76). Our interest in objects is not an interest in ideas as such.

Bearing this in mind, we can begin to see some of the ways in which association by causation might find a place in a Humean account of the passions. We would look through the idea of the object to the object. Hence, for example, one might be able to explain the idea of a son as object of my anger by association through causation with the idea of the father (father being cause of son). Here the concrete objects give the principle a place to catch hold.
X. Object and Cause

I have mentioned that Hume insists that the cause and the object of an emotion are distinct. If the object could be the cause, or part of the cause, of the emotion, his whole complex machinery of double association would collapse. I have argued that within his system, object does collapse into cause and the machinery does collapse with it. Hume offers an argument to show that cause and object must be distinct. It is a bad argument, based on a faulty analysis of the nature of emotional conflict.

On his account, 'self' is the object of both pride and humility, and as these passions are directly contrary, and have the same object in common; were their object also their cause; it cou'd never produce any degree of the one passion, but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of the other; which opposition and contrariety must destroy both (THN II, p. 278).

This might be an effective argument against the object being the cause, but Hume himself insists that pride has a compound cause. The above offers no argument against the object (like the subject) being part of the cause of pride. Self by itself would in that case produce neither pride nor humility. But there is a deeper mistake. Hume's mechanical model of the mind leads him to view the passions as vectors which can cancel each other out:

'Tis impossible a man can at the same time be both proud and humble; and where he has different reasons for these passions, as frequently happens, the passions either take place alternately; or if they encounter, the one annihilates the other, as far as its strength goes, and the remainder only of that, which is superior, continues to operate upon the mind ... . To excite any passion, and at the same time raise an equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo what was done, and must leave the mind at last perfectly calm and indifferent (278).

The implausibility of this argument becomes plainer when it is repeated.
for the case of love and hatred, where the object of both is said to be
the same (some other person) and it is argued that it cannot, therefore,
be the cause of either (THN II, p. 330).

This picture of conflict of passions is untrue to our experience. There
are more possibilities than those of alternation of 'contrary' passions
and perfect calm: We are often subject to turbulence. How precisely to
describe this turbulence arising from conflict may involve difficulties, but there is reason to believe that simultaneous love and hate of the same object far from being inconceivable is, in fact, a familiar state.7

7 "The logical laws of thought do not apply in the id, and this is true above all of the law of contradiction. Contrary impulses exist side by side, without cancelling each other out or diminishing each other" (Freud, 1933a, p. 73).

A theory which yields such an unrealistic model of conflict of passions, one which sees no difference between the presence of two 'contrary' passions and no passion at all, is seriously defective.

Hume's theory is presented in terms of impressions or feelings. This makes the position even less plausible. For the elements of Hume's analysis are not the sorts of things which could serve as vectors to be mechanically summed. If passions are, in essence, feelings or sensations, how can they be said to have a direction, to be "directly contrary in their sensation" (THN II, p. 330)? Surely they can differ in sensation. Some are pleasant and some are painful. But pain and pleasure, as we have seen, are not to be simplistically contrasted as straightforward opposites. And even where we are careful in contrasting them, confining ourselves to where they appear on the same plane, e.g., where they can both be regarded as localized sensations, how is the difference to be interpreted as one of direction in the way required? Certainly pleasures and pains can be weighed (where would utilitarianism be if this were not possible), but they do not 'cancel' each other. We may feel both pleasure and pain, and where we feel more of one than the other it does not follow that we do not feel the lesser at all. Our mental life is not so neat.
We should perhaps note that Hume does later advance to a more plausible picture of conflict, at least for a narrow range of emotions. When accounting for the origins of fear and hope he turns to a chemical analogy -- 'oil and vinegar' vs. alkali and acid (THN II, p. 443). He allows that, where dealing with probabilities, contrary passions instead of alternating, producing calm, or one predominating can "both of them remain united in the mind" (441). "The contrary passions will both of them . . . produce a third impression" (442) and thus hope and fear will emerge from different proportions of grief and joy. (See also THN II, p. 421, where it is claimed that conflict of passions can actually result in increasing the force of one of the passions.)

Conflict of passions is thus no impediment to collapsing object into cause. But object and cause are meant to be distinct within Hume's system. That distinction is essential to his system because it brings into play the influence of association of ideas: between an aspect of the cause (the subject) and the object. Without that added association, Hume's mechanism must rely on association of impressions alone, and so on (an impossible) resemblance between simple impressions. One ends up, if this is the mechanism, with a different impression of pride for each cause. So the only mechanism that is available would produce results contrary to the theory. But if we do not insist on providing an added association, we may still be able to allow Hume a contrast "betwixt the cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited" (THN II, p. 278). We have rejected Hume's view of the idea of self as the effect of pride. There are defects in the particular idea, but more importantly it seems
empirically false that any such idea does regularly arise on occasions of pride or could be explained to arise (if it did) on Hume's associative model. But we have seen that some such idea is already present in what Hume takes to be the cause of pride. The argument from conflict discussed above is aimed mainly at the view that the object could be the cause, "or be sufficient alone to excite". The object on our present view is only a part of the cause, there must also be a separate pleasure or pain in order to produce pride or humility. We still have a causally related object of attention, but no longer posterior to the passionate sensation. And there is still some contrast between cause and object (which is only part of the cause). So the emendation is not by itself a total rejection of Hume's theory.

But the emendation calls for further qualifications to Hume's approach: the loss of the added association is a real loss. Having incorporated the object of pride in its cause, we can no longer make sense of Hume's mechanism of double association. We may still allow that the separate pleasure produced by the quality occasioning pride "calls up all other pleasant passions indiscriminately" (Kemp Smith, p. 185 n. 3), but there is no room for an additional principle of association to favour the pleasant passion of pride. So whence the peculiar feeling of pride? We are left without the second principle of association (between idea of subject and idea of object) because the object is already present in the very idea of the causal subject (in which the valuable quality inheres). That leaves us with association of impressions, degrees of resemblance among simples, and non-uniform impressions of reflexion. Alternatively, we could regard the simple presence of the object in the idea of the sub-
ject (without any further association) as sufficient to call forth the peculiar pleasure of pride from among its fellows. But this leaves the mechanism at this point as mysterious as the alleged emergence of the object out of pride itself (when it in its turn was supposed to come out of the double association that included one between subject and object). There is, I think, room for mystery in philosophy, but it is not needed here.

What sort of feature of the cause is its (what Hume calls the 'subject's') relation to self? If I am to be made proud by a chair, it is not enough that I regard it as simply a 'chair', however fine. I must think of it as 'my chair' or 'chair produced by me' or in some other way intimately related to myself (even if I cannot claim responsibility for its particular virtuous quality -- it may be taken to reflect on my worth in very devious ways). This is not because the chair appreciated simply as a chair cannot be the source of pleasure, and so perhaps joy, but because the word 'pride' would then be out of place. This is not what Hume would call an 'original' property. It is not a limitation on what we can feel, but on what we can say. That it is a conceptual point does not make it a negligible one. It reveals something about our resources for description and discrimination of states of mind and so something about the nature of those states. If it were merely a verbal agreement narrowing the class of pleasurable sensations classed as 'pride' to those with a certain sort of cause, it might be a not very revealing point. This is not to say it would have to be arbitrary. It might be a very reasonable limitation, there might not be any such peculiar sensations without such causes. The regularity in our verbal designations might
reflect a regularity in our experience. But pride (at least) is not (at least not always) simply a simple and peculiar pleasurable sensation. We are proud only when self is involved in the cause of our feeling, i.e., the feeling is identified as one of pride only in a particular causal context. The feeling of pride cannot occur outside this context because outside this context it could not be classified as pride: outside this context it is not a feeling of pride. Whatever feeling occurs, if I am to believe it is pride, I must believe it to have a certain sort of cause. The restrictions on the cause amount to a requirement of an appropriate object.

Perhaps there is no particular feeling constantly associated with pride at all, but that is not the point here. If someone says he is proud, but insists that he is simply proud without being proud of anything in particular (or only proud of himself and unable to say why), we will ask him to think again. Our demand would not be that he take a closer look at his feeling, but that he think whether he is using the word 'pride' as the rest of our language community uses it. If he persists in his deviant usage, we would have to conclude either that he does not know what 'pride' means, or, if he applies the word properly to others and himself on other occasions, so that we have grounds for believing he does know what the word means, that he has no reason for regarding his state of mind as 'pride' rather than a dozen other things in this particular case. And it is precisely his having certain sorts of reasons that makes his state what it is. My beliefs about the causes of my state of mind are built into my state of mind itself. In a sense, the effect (if it is an 'effect') depends on the recognition of the cause as the cause.
By emending Hume's notion of 'object', leaving out his second principle of association and so obviating his whole double-association mechanism, and recognizing the essential role of the 'object' (or, more generally, the believed context) in identifying the emotion and so making the feeling the particular emotional feeling that it is, we have in effect abandoned Hume's theory. Our main interest in Hume's theory is as the most articulated version of Humean theory, that is, as a thoroughly worked out example of a type of theory that emphasizes causal connections, associative mechanisms, and felt affects, while neglecting the role of thought and thoughts in the emotions. The particular defects in Hume's presentation do not necessarily condemn all versions of such theories, but the neglect of the importance of thoughts in emotions raises difficulties which are quite general. I will now explore a bit further the place of thought in the analysis of emotion and object, and then go on to consider some of the limitations in associationist approaches to the connection between emotion and behaviour and expression.
XI. Thought - Dependence

I should first note that I use the word 'thought' very broadly. In some contexts, perception, awareness, appraisal, suspicion, etc. might be the more natural expressions. Indeed, I usually use 'belief' interchangeably with 'thought', despite the fact that there are many propositions which we entertain or passing fancies which constitute thoughts which we have but do not believe. I use the word 'thought' as a blanket term to cover the cognitive element in emotions. 'Cognitive' does not preclude unconscious. Indeed, as will become evident, I believe that it is the requirement of an appropriate thought that leads psychoanalysts to postulate an unconscious thought, or unconscious belief, or unconscious phantasy, wherever behaviour and other grounds lead them to postulate an emotion in the (apparent) absence of the (normally) required thought. Some purposes might require greater care and finer distinctions than my usage of 'thought' allows, but it should be adequate for the purpose of bringing out the role and importance of a cognitive element in the recognition, classification, discrimination, and, therefore, change, of emotions. Now back to Hume.

Hume's notion of an object, taken as 'object of attention' (Ardal, pp. 18-19) or 'object of concern' (Gosling, 1965, p. 499), is meant to capture one of the consequences of experiencing an emotion. The object is one among "such circumstances as attend" it, in its train. If it is such a circumstance, we have been arguing that it is more plausible to suppose that it is a condition on the emotion rather than a consequence that follows upon it. The sense in which it is a 'condition', of course, requires further explication. It is important to see that Hume's notion
is not a simple intuitive or grammatical notion of object; else the object of pride would seem obviously to be whatever one was proud of (son, country, appearance, . . .) in a particular case, rather than, what Hume says it invariably is, self. Kenny, we said earlier, misstates Hume's point. We should now see that his misstatement comes close to what Hume's point should be: that belief in a relation to self is required if a thing or quality is to serve as a ground or source of pride.

Pride is a form of self-evaluation: "According as our idea of ourself is more or less advantageous, we feel either of those opposite affections, and are elated by pride, or dejected with humility" (THN II, p. 277). If all self-ascriptions of pride were recast in the form, "I am proud of myself because . . .", the justifying clause would always refer to some quality or object related to self. It may be because this relation is always present, because self is always the object of pride or even that we are always proud of ourselves, that the other element in the compound cause (the valuable quality) can sometimes stand alone as the prepositional object (without reference to the 'myself' which would in any case be an idea occurring prior to, not post, the pride itself). The point about relation to self is conceptual rather than causal. Hume misconstrues the nature of the constraint that an object puts on an emotion. It is not that without the object one would lack the double association needed to produce pride. Rather, without the object, whatever was produced would not count as pride. The nature of the constraint can be understood in terms of 'appropriateness', 'reasons', and the role of 'thought'.
Kenny presents a formula meant to provide a criterion for the 'object' of an emotion, such that emotions could be distinguished from sensations in virtue of (necessarily) having 'objects'.

The distinction between the cause and the object of an emotion is most easily made out by reference to the knowledge or beliefs of the subject. Faced with any sentence describing the occurrence of an emotion, of the form "A ^d because p", we must ask whether it is a necessary condition of the truth of this sentence that A should know or believe that p. If so, then the sentence contains an allusion to the object of the emotion; if not, to its cause (AEW, p. 75).

This formula has been much criticized. It does not apply in all cases (Gosling, 1965, pp. 492 ff.). Where it does apply, it will not always distinguish emotion and sensation (emotions can have causes, and some sensations it seems, e.g., hunger, can have objects). Indeed, it seems to rely on a prior distinction between emotion and sensation, and that distinction must be based on something other than the notion of object (Gosling, Ibid.; Wilson, p. 99). It needs amendment to deal with emotions which take agents as objects (e.g., anger -- Green, 1972, p. 29). And it is in many cases inconclusive (Green, 1972, p. 30). I would insist, however, that it does try to do something that moves in the right direction: it tries to bring out the knowledge, or belief, or (most generally) thought conditions on emotions. One need not argue, for our purposes, that the conditions brought out are non-causal. Within Hume's system, they would have to be causal (though, we have argued, a part of the cause rather than, as he presents it, the effect). Within Kenny's argument, they are assumed not to be causal. Despite that argument (and others), and without Hume's system, I think that they could be causal. Without claiming that they are causal, I would argue (following Pears, Wilson, and others) that they could be, that conceptual.
constraints do not preclude causal connections. (See Appendix A for discussion of this point and possible places for the notion of causation in the analysis of emotions.) But at this point I wish to emphasize that certain thoughts, whether or not they are causal conditions on emotions, are indeed conditions; that without the thought one cannot have the emotion. To attribute an emotion and deny the characteristic thought is to deny the emotion. Emotions are thought-dependent.

The point here is stronger than that emotions are mediated by thoughts, though that too is being claimed. The contents of the relevant thoughts help determine what one's state of mind is. Kenny puts this point in terms of the notion of 'formal object'. There are conceptual restrictions on the type of object which each emotion could have (AEW, p. 191).

The formal object of \( \phi \) is the object under that description which must apply to it if it is to be possible to \( \phi \) it. If only what is \( P \) can be \( \phi \), then "thing which is \( P \)" gives the formal object of \( \phi \). Descriptions of formal objects can be formed trivially simply by modalising the relevant verbs: only what is edible can be eaten, only what is inflammable can be burnt, only what is tangible can be touched. But there are other descriptions of formal objects which are not trivial in this way. Only what is dirty can be cleaned, only what is wet can be dried, only what is coloured can be seen . . . (AEW, p. 189).

This way of putting the point, however, may be a little misleading, partly because it obscures the place of thoughts and partly because it tends to reverse the order of dependence insofar as it does suggest a place. Where the formal object of an emotion is described in non-trivial fashion, where does that description come from? If the formal object of fear is things that are dangerous, this is not because we have noted that fear arises only in dangerous circumstances. One may be afraid in circumstances which are not dangerous, what matters is that one
believes them to be dangerous. So the formal object of fear would be things that are believed to be dangerous. And it is not until one has determined the content of the associated beliefs that one can be sure of the correct description of the emotional state of mind. "It is not so much that the emotion restricts the object, or the beliefs about the object. Rather it is that the object, or the beliefs about the object, restricts the emotion. That is, what emotion I can feel towards an item in the world is restricted by what I take to be true of that item" (Wilson, p. 101).

These points are of sufficient importance to warrant a closer look at Kenny's presentation. He claims that

*Emotional attitudes, like other mental attitudes, have formal objects . . . each of the emotions is appropriate -- logically, and not just morally appropriate -- only to certain restricted objects. One cannot be afraid of just anything, nor happy about anything whatsoever (AEW, pp. 191-92).*

In fact, one can be afraid of anything or happy about anything; all that is required, as revealed by the continuation of the quoted passage, is the appropriate beliefs:

If a man says that he is afraid of winning £10,000 in the pools, we want to ask him more: does he believe that money corrupts, or does he expect to lose his friends, or to be annoyed by begging letters, or what? If we can elicit from him only descriptions of the good aspects of the situation, then we cannot understand why he reports his emotion as fear and not as hope. Again, if a man says that he feels remorse for the actions of someone quite unconnected with him, or is envious of his own vices, we are at a loss to understand him (AEW, p. 192).

The gap must be supplied by appropriate beliefs. And Kenny does explicitly give place to them:

*It is not, of course, correct to say e.g., that the formal object of envy is another's good tout court: one must say that it is something believed to be good and believed to belong to another . . . The*
description of the formal object of a mental attitude such as an emotion, unlike a description of the formal object of a non-intensional action, must contain reference to belief. Only what is wet in fact can be dried; but something which is merely believed to be an insult may provoke anger (AEW, pp. 193-94).

But one may still wonder how formal objects, however notional, are fixed. What ties anger to insults and the like? Here I think it is helpful to consider that the description of a state of mind as a certain emotion is not independent of the subject's beliefs about its explanation. The 'state of mind' to be explained and the relevant thoughts bear a very complex relationship, which is merely pointed to when one says that emotions are 'mediated' by thoughts.

Gosling distinguishes three points:

first, I cannot be grateful, but to no one for nothing; second, I cannot realize I feel grateful, but have no idea of to whom or for what; and third, if I feel grateful it must be for some reason, which it will be possible to give in a "because clause," and the reason cited be believed. All three seem to hold with gratitude. None seems necessary with depression. With love the first one holds: I cannot just be in love and with no one. Perhaps the second: can I realize that I am in love but have no idea with whom? The third seems not to hold at all (Gosling, 1965, p. 499).

We are not concerned with precisely delimiting the scope of the concept 'emotion', and so we are not concerned with the usefulness or lack of usefulness of the concept of 'object' to that end. It does not matter that love and depression, or other mental states, may not seem to have objects in all the ways or with all the implications that gratitude seems to. Our concern is with certain mental states (typified by certain standard emotions) and the ways in which they are characterized or mediated or dependent upon thoughts. Gosling goes on to suggest an explanation for the applicability of Kenny's much criticized formula (where it does apply):

The third applies where it does . . . because of a feature of those feelings. With fear, anger, jealousy, pity and some others it seems
possible to give a list of characterizations of what is feared, raged at, envied, or pited such that only what is so characterized is reasonably so reacted to. Thus, roughly, fear is a reaction to danger, anger to offense, jealousy to preference being given to others, pity to the misfortunes of others.

The point, however, goes deeper than reasonableness. Even an unreasonable emotion cannot be the emotion it is unless the subject's relevant beliefs fall within the restrictions required by the formal object. If the beliefs are unreasonable, the emotion may be unreasonable also, but it will not be an unreasonable fear or anger or whatever, unless the beliefs are of the appropriate kind. An emotion cannot be misplaced if it cannot be had, and in most cases in order to have the emotion at all one must have the correlative concepts. In order to explicate jealousy, and explicate it in a way that shows what distinguishes it from mere anger, one would have to fill in a conceptual background. One could not recognize even a reasonable case of jealousy (let alone an unreasonable case), unless one were prepared to ascribe appropriate beliefs involving the relevant concepts. Where the emotion is unreasonable, the beliefs may be mistaken, but they are nonetheless essential to the characterization of the emotion.

For the concept fear being normally able to refer to a supposed danger seems a requirement for the application of this concept. Further, "that such and such is dangerous" is the "reason for" a person's fear. If it turns out not to be dangerous, he was still afraid, but unreasonably so. There are many complexities to this situation, but it is this feature of these feelings which makes it normal that there should be a "because p" available. Because danger is the reason for fear, offense for anger, and so on, normally it will be possible to say "A φ's because p" where p gives something characterized by the partial correlative of the feeling and A believes that p. Now there is no similar partial correlative with love. It is impossible to find any manageable characterization to which loved ones must be liable, except such non-informative ones as lovableness. Love is never reasonable -- though sometimes understandable -- because it is neither reasonable
nor unreasonable.

What makes Kenny's test work in some cases is that these are cases which have a partial correlative, and so usually "have a reason." The relevant "because clause" leads us to what is supposed to be characterized by the partial correlative. It is an interesting fact about some emotions that they have this feature, but it is not a universal feature of emotions (Gosling, 1965, p. 500).

But even love may exhibit the sort of thought-dependence we have been talking about: i.e., there are conceptual restrictions on what can count as love, beliefs that a lover must have if his state is to count as love. And this is true despite the fact, if it is a fact, that love can be neither reasonable nor unreasonable, or that its formal object is only trivially characterizable. First, it is notorious that 'love' is a word of many meanings. Without counting the ways in which one can love, it should be obvious that the differences in meaning depend very often on the beliefs (particularly as they relate to the desires) of the lover.

In certain romantic conceptions, love is not love if the subject would offer certain sorts of explanations for his state. Certain sorts of ulterior motives are excluded. Only certain sorts of characterizations of the loved object can enter into the account (great wealth cannot explain or enter into an account of this sort of love). Only certain qualities are allowed to matter. Secondly, without looking to special conceptions of love, one can see that love in general must meet certain conceptual restrictions. It is just that the conceptual restrictions enter at a different point, in particular in connection with action and desire. Love is thought-dependent in the way we are considering, not because it would otherwise be unreasonable, but because it otherwise would not be love. Beliefs and reasons are connected with emotions from two directions. There are the subject's beliefs about the explanation of
his state (which may amount to reasons), and there are the subject's (or agent's) beliefs about how his actions are explained by his state. The proper characterization of both his action and of his state will in general depend upon their explanations. Descriptions are correlated with explanations. Or, more strongly, what precisely one is explaining will in general depend on the available explanations. Both action and emotion depend on thought.

Gosling is right that there are many complexities here. We should try to sort out some of them. What he distinguishes as three different points about objects, suggesting that they all apply only where a non-trivial characterization of a formal object can be supplied, can be understood as different aspects of thought-dependence, which applies quite generally. In sum, thought-dependence here amounts to conceptual restrictions on what can count as a particular state of mind, i.e., certain thoughts or beliefs are required if one is to be properly described as in a certain state. As we have seen, the third point, about reasons, can be understood more broadly in terms of beliefs about explanations. Even love, even if it is never reasonable, places certain restrictions on explanations of the state itself or of actions (or dispositions to action) following from the state, if it is to be properly characterized as love. These sorts of beliefs are part of how we discriminate one state from another. But these are requirements for sorts of beliefs. The identification of a particular state may require more particular beliefs. Here there is an obvious ambiguity, indeed a double ambiguity. Is one interested in the identification of a state as a state of a particular kind, or as a particular state? These different interests
may require different beliefs. And (this is the second ambiguity) is one interested in identification of a mental state from a third-party standpoint, or in its recognition by the subject himself? Gosling tells us that "I cannot realize I feel grateful but have no idea of to whom or for what", and this may apply to love: "can I realize that I am in love but have no idea with whom?" In no case will one have fully identified the particular state if one has not supplied its object. And it may be that in some cases one cannot say what sort of state one is in if one cannot fully identify it (in the above sense). But this is not true absolutely in general. Certainly one can be afraid and know one is afraid without being able to specify the object of one's fear. (It is salutary to remember that thought is not the only constituent of emotion or the only way to identify it. Certain primitive states, including basic fears, may be most strongly characterized by physiological upsets and inclinations to behaviour, without any but the most general thoughts.) This aspect of identification holds even more widely when one thinks of it from a third-party point of view. Identifying an emotion, in the sense of telling what kind of emotion another person is having, does not require that one be able to specify the particular object though one must be able to specify the kind of object (this is perhaps redundant: in specifying the emotion as of a certain kind, one is restricting the range of appropriate objects). I may know that someone else is angry or afraid without knowing, or being sure, what in particular he is angry at or afraid of (though, whatever it is, I know that he will think it offensive or dangerous) (Wilson, pp. 47-50). In terms of thought-dependence, the interesting point about identification is the same as that about dis-
crimination (or classification), that even where one does not need to
know the specific object in order to know the type of state, one does
need to know the type of object. If one does not ascribe thoughts in
the appropriate range, if the formal or conceptual limits on objects
are not adhered to, one cannot ascribe an emotion of a particular type
to oneself or others.

Hampshire elaborates his notion of thought-dependence in a passage
about desire:

'Smith wants to buy the most expensive picture in the gallery.'
Suppose that I read, or hear, this statement, and want to know
whether it is true. It would be incorrect to say that the state­
ment, the truth of which I am inquiring into, is ambiguous; perhaps
it would not even be correct to say that it is, as quoted, in­
determinate in sense. But there are two or more distinct states of
affairs, or situations, which it might represent. It might be the
case that Smith had conceived the desire of buying whatever picture
happened to be the most expensive picture in the gallery. Or he
might have seen a picture, which he immediately liked and wanted,
and which happened to be the most expensive. In the second case,
his desire to buy the picture is unmediated by this, or by any other,
description of the picture: in the first case the desire to buy the
picture is mediated by the description, which is essential to the
desire, and specifies the exact nature of the desire. The two
desires are entirely different and reveal very different characters;
but the same form of words may truthfully represent both these
situations. And of course this form of words might represent
various other situations intermediate between these two (Hampshire,
1965, p. 46).

But it is misleading to think of this example as showing a contrast
between thought-dependent and non-thought-dependent desires. As Wollheim
argues, both may be regarded as thought-dependent, but dependent upon
different sorts of thoughts: "in the one case, Smith desired a picture
of a particular kind, and, in the other case, he desired a particular
picture, and in each case the desire could be identified through, or be
mediated by, the corresponding kind of thought" (Wollheim, 1967-68, p. 18).
We should reserve the term thought-dependent for this broad usage, and introduce a special expression, such as description-dependent, for those states which are dependent on thought of a particular as a thing of a particular kind. And it is this latter notion that Hampshire is interested in singling out, because he is concerned with that which is distinctively human, and the complications introduced into mental life through the (distinctively human) capacity to reflect on our own mental states. If we are prepared to ascribe certain desires (as opposed to bare needs) to non-language-users (e.g., animals and infants), we need not hesitate to ascribe certain thoughts to them as well. But the range of thoughts, and so of desires, may well be restricted. Where desires are formed desires, where they are deliberative desires, where the subject's conception of the object is essential to the characterization of the desire, there the subject has to be a language-user: otherwise the ascription of the required sorts of thoughts (and so desires) will not make sense. At least this may be so. Discriminating one description-dependent desire from another may require more than whatever is revealed in non-linguistic patterns of behaviour.

When a desire is description-dependent, the description would appear in a complete statement of one's reason for desiring; and it is only with the ability to reflect that the notion of having reasons for one's desires has place. Hence it is with the capacity to reflect, to the notions of becoming doubtful and reconsidering, that Hampshire links his account of what it is to have a reason. (See Neu, 'Hampshire on Reasons, Causes, and Counterfactuals', forthcoming.) To have a desire may be to have a reason for doing or pursuing whatever it is one desires, but we are
concerned with reasons for one's desire. One may have many reasons for
doing or pursuing things which are not reasons for wanting them (as
opposed to wanting that they be done or possessed). If description-
dependent desires are desires for something of a certain kind, it might
seem that they could not be peculiar to human beings because animals
seem to have desires for things of a certain kind, e.g., grass (rather
than particular tufts of grass -- Watling, p. 20). But these cases may
in fact terminate in their object. That is, the description does not
give the animal's reason for its desire. The desire is not for a thing
of a certain kind because it is of that kind: and that is the sort of
description-dependence intended. (The desire for grass may be thought-
dependent without being description-dependent.) Alternatively, one could
concede animals desires for things of a certain kind, but one would
then have to concede them reasons (for desire) as well. Watling (p. 21)
seems misled because he does not see that a desire in which a particular
ting is desired for a reason (e.g., the most expensive picture) is a
desire for a thing of a certain kind, not merely a desire for a particular
ting: it is a conditional desire, the reason gives the condition, and
the condition picks out a kind. Whether the concern is for a particular
or a kind cannot be determined by merely looking at the description one
uses to specify the desire. The connection with reasons is what matters.
What changes with what? If a horse's desire for grass is not belief-
dependent (as Watling seems to think, p. 21), then it is not a desire
for a thing of a certain kind, even if one specifies the desire in terms
which seem to characterize a kind rather than a particular. (If someone
says they want 'that', pointing to a picture, one does not (so far) know
whether it is a desire for a particular or a thing of a certain kind (though the item pointed to is doubtless a particular), unless one knows what the desire depends on.) Contra Watling, if a desire is not belief-dependent, it is not a desire for something for a reason.

In any case, we can allow 'description-dependent' to serve for those special sorts of cases which Hampshire (usually) singles out as 'mediated by a description'. The main point is that emotions are, in general, thought-dependent. There is some characteristic thought or thoughts essential to each emotion, such that one must ascribe the appropriate thought if the psychological state is to be correctly classified as a particular emotion. In some cases, of course, the thought may not reveal the reason for the state, and in those cases it is not description-dependent. A change in the description might leave the state unchanged. The person or thing which is the object may not be desired, or hated, or whatever, under any particular description. But in some cases the description may be essential to the specification of the state. This is especially clear in those cases where one is describing a conditional desire, or emotion; that is, a desire or emotion which has a condition built-into it and is not simply conditional on thoughts in the general manner of thought-dependence. In discussing hypotheticals like 'I would not have gone to the opera last night, if Callas had not been singing' Hampshire claims:

... the condition stated in the if-clause gives a reason which will serve as a partial explanation. At the same time the condition stated can be viewed as specifying more fully the intention, the desire, the fear, the belief, the state of mind. I may simply recall that my intention to go to the opera was in this way conditional (Hampshire, 1967, p. 9).
How do thoughts get built-into emotions? Certainly more than simultaneous occurrence is required. Where the thought is a thought about the explanation of the state, or of the rest of the state (excluding the thought itself), matters are relatively clear. But thoughts may 'mediate' emotions in a variety of ways. I will not attempt to delineate them here.

There is another dimension: thoughts can be active or passive. As we shall see when we come to Spinoza, the activity of a thought for him would have to do with the thought flowing from one's own nature, that is, being explainable in terms of previous states of the self rather than external circumstances. The model would be rational, especially logical or mathematical, thought. In more ordinary contexts, we distinguish between thoughts which simply occur and thoughts which we have. In extremes, thoughts which occur may be felt to be intruders, alien invaders. Just how we can make such a distinction, how we can give these spatial metaphors force raises difficult and fascinating questions. (Wollheim, 1969, suggests that the matter is linked with unconscious phantasies of incorporation.) Where a state is itself passive, a passion, it may be enough that the thought by reference to which the particular mental state is identified merely passively occur, without being actively thought (see Wollheim, 1967-68, pp. 23-24), so we may be able to avoid those questions for now.

How does a state, where it is thought-dependent, depend on thought? Partly, of course, it is a conceptual constraint. A state would not be the state one takes it to be if one did not have the appropriate beliefs. E.g., regret is said by Hampshire to be thought-impregnated or belief-
saturated in this way: a person who does not believe an action of his to have been mistaken does not regret that action. If the belief were to change, the state would change also, for the belief is an essential constituent.
Hume tends to assimilate belief to emotion. (It would also be a mistake to assimilate emotion to belief alone. See Appendix B.) The assimilation has serious distorting consequences on his account of our knowledge of other minds. There are differences between thinking of and having emotions. Humean mechanisms move inexorably from the idea to the impression, and, given his theory of the emotions, having moved so far one has come to an emotion.

Hume does not say much about belief outside of his discussion of one's expectation of an effect on presentation of the impression of a cause to consciousness. In that context, belief turns out to be a matter of vivid perceptions. It is perhaps unfair to generalize this into an account of belief in other contexts, but it can be revealing to do so. It helps make clearer what Hume takes to be the source and nature of our knowledge of 'other minds', and the prominence given to the mechanism of sympathy in that knowledge.

Belief, according to Hume, is in the eye of the beholder. Discussing ideas of memory as opposed to ideas of imagination, we are told that belief is vivacity of perceptions (a vivacity present in the former and absent in the latter). "To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the sense, or a repetition of that impression in the memory" (THN I, p. 86). To have an impression is to believe in it, and so (it would appear) to believe one is in a certain state is to be in it. (It would be interesting to know how Hume would hope to make sense of a person entertaining an idea precisely in order to decide whether he ought to believe it, for Hume that would seem to
amount to the same as his believing it. How could a person dissociate from a, perhaps obsessive, thought?) There is a scale of liveliness of perceptions, with ideas at one end, impressions at the other, and beliefs inbetween. Kemp Smith argues, despite explicit formulations to the contrary, that the difference between impressions and ideas should (at least often) be interpreted as a difference in kind, as great as "the difference betwixt feeling and thinking" (Kemp Smith, pp. 109-10), and not as a difference merely in degree of force and liveliness. His argument is not wholly convincing. For example, he claims that Hume thinks impressions can be 'confounded' with ideas and ideas 'mistaken' for impressions. And degrees of liveliness might not allow for such mistakes (Kemp Smith, p. 210). But the concepts of 'confounding' and 'mistaking' are Kemp Smith's, not Hume's. Hume thinks only that ideas and impressions are sometimes 'indistinguishable', and that requires only closeness of degree (as one would expect, scales have unclear borderlines) in some cases, not confusion of distinct kinds.

Whether or not Hume's theory of belief is, in general, a straightforward feeling theory of belief, it is such a theory in the area that concerns us. In connection with the passions, Hume does treat belief as a feeling theory would suggest:

... two points had to be made good: (1) that ideas are exact copies of impressions, and (2) that the difference being in the manner of their apprehension, a process of enlivening is all that is needed to induce the mind to adopt towards an idea the attitude which it instinctively adopts towards the corresponding impression. He is thus led to declare that belief itself consists in 'force and liveliness', and to interpret the phrase in a quite literal fashion. This, unquestionably, is how he himself interprets it in the course of his argument in Book II, in dealing with the passions (Kemp Smith, pp. 210-11).
In connection with Hume's account of causation, belief is defined as "a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression" (THN I, p. 96). Belief is, in degree of force and liveliness, almost an impression ("...'tis only a strong and steady conception of any idea, and such as approaches in some measure to an immediate impression")

In the context of causality, belief in the imminent emergence of the effect is excited by the 'present impression' of the cause (so it is "produced by a relation to a present impression" THN I, 97, the impression of course being different in each case, for each belief). Belief itself is an effect, but the sense in which it is 'produced' (the mechanics of the objects of our internal universe) would take us into Hume's analysis of causation. In connection with the passions, I think we need note only that belief (as defined in THN I, iii, sec. 7) is an (almost-) impression of reflexion.

Because of this reflexive element, differences in the content of beliefs need not be simply differences of feeling. But the essence of belief is feeling (here speaking of memory): "to believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or a repetition of that impression in the memory" (THN I, p. 86). If one believes, one infallibly knows one believes. If one is in an emotional state, one is infallibly aware that one is. For the belief and the state just are an awareness, a perception of impressions or almost-impressions.

... every impression, external and internal, passions, affections, sensations, pains and pleasures, are originally on the same footing; and that whatever other differences we may observe among them, they appear, all of them, in their true colours, as impressions or perceptions ... For since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear.
Every thing that enters the mind, being in reality perception, 'tis impossible any thing shou'd to feeling appear different. This were to suppose, that even where we are most intimately conscious, we might be mistaken (THN I, p. 190).

This seems to imply a very odd view of our knowledge or our own mental states. The only errors open to us would seem to be those (if any) open to us in regard to simple sensations. But it is a familiar fact that a person may well be the last to be aware of, and even then refuse to acknowledge, a state that others (lacking his preoccupations and prejudices) may be able to ascribe without difficulty (e.g., jealousy). In these cases his evidence may be no better, and in fact no different, from the evidence available to and used by others. We, like others, can be deceived in the nature of our emotional states, and if we cannot be deceived in "the nature of our impressions" perhaps this just goes to show that our emotions are not (or are not simply) impressions. And this is a problem that arises independently of psychoanalytical claims; though of course, those claims, in particular the doctrines of the unconscious and repression, make the difficulty even more acute: our unknowingness, our self-deception, can be even deeper than feeling theory and ordinary notions allow. Hume thinks that "the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known" (THN II, p. 366). If we take belief as simply a certain specific degree of force and liveliness, Hume is committed to a doctrine of privileged infallibleness in determining our emotional state and an extreme feeling theory of emotion: to have an impression is to believe one has it, and to believe one is in a certain state is to be in it.

Not only will certainty seem to arise with every emotion, but emotions would seem to arise with every occasion to think about them.
The meaning of a word is not the image of a thing. But if one follows Hume in thinking that it is, in understanding a word, one would be having the image, and in having the image — where the thing is an emotion — one would be having the thing itself. In thinking of grief, someone else's or no one in particular's, one would be feeling a little grief (and it could easily deepen through attachment to self).

Kemp Smith claims that Hume modified his doctrine of belief in certain connections, in particular in relation to perceptual knowledge of the external world (Kemp Smith, p. 222). But passions are not external, and do not require a doctrine of natural belief to carry one beyond one's impressions to the passions. But a problem does arise with other people's passions. Though they too are internal, they are internal to them not us, and so how do we have access to them? Instead of modifying his view of belief, Hume introduces his mechanism of sympathy: we know other people's feelings by feeling them, i.e., by making them our own. In causal inference an idea is enlivened by the impression with which it is associated and so achieves the status of belief (or expectation). In sympathy, a mere idea is enlivened by the ever-present "idea, or rather impression of self", and so achieves the status of passion.

What is the principle of sympathy? It is not yet another passion alongside benevolence and the rest. It is a principle of communication. No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own (THN II, p. 316).

Not surprisingly, opinions or beliefs of others can also be communicated
by sympathy (THN II, pp. 319, 427). We shall not discuss the importance of the principle of sympathy for Hume's moral theory (a task well done by Ardal). Our only access to other people's passions is through their outward behaviour:

When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and of those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection (THN II, p. 317).

This account calls for a source of 'force and vivacity' to convert the idea into an impression. (It also calls for discussion of the theory of expression, and the notion that external behaviour can be read as signs of inner states independently of the ascription of beliefs. That discussion will come in due course.) The highly questionable "idea, or rather impression of ourselves" is called in for the job (THN II, p. 354). But there is an obscurity earlier on. What is the antecedent of 'this idea' in the passage quoted? Clearly it is not the external signs; they merely lead us to infer the presence of a passion in another. The original affection in the other is of course an impression, we merely infer to an idea. But what idea? Say the person is proud. On Hume's own account he will be proud of himself. Will our idea of his passion be simply of pride or of his pride in himself (with his idea of himself as its object)? If our idea of a passion includes the fact that it is his (in the case of pride, this fact, deviously, is part of the cause and so object), enlivening the idea will not make the passion ours. (Cf. Passmore, p. 129, who muddies the point by treating 'sympathy' as a passion rather than a principle of knowledge by communication of passions.) And the fact does seem to be included: ". . . these move-
ments appear at first in our mind as mere ideas, and are conceiv'd to belong to another person . . ." (THN II, p. 319). In the case of pride the situation is complicated by the fact that the enlivening factor is also the standard cause of pride. But in general, can our communicated passion be the same as a third party's unless it has the same cause (and so object)? Do we share Hume's pride if we are not, like him, proud of Hume? Do we share Rousseau's fear, if we are not, like him, afraid of Hume? Of course not, but how can Hume's mechanism bring this about?

Presumably the original affection is an impression (of reflexion) and the idea which becomes an impression through sympathy is, like the original impression, simple too. How does it get its object? On our first reading of Hume it would have to emerge by an original principle from our enlivened idea. On our emended version it would have had to have been part of the cause of that enlivened idea. On Hume's doctrine of sympathy it presumably comes along with the simple idea which gets enlivened, though it itself remains an idea (it must in order to serve as object). In any case, Hume's principle must be more complicated and highly selective than it would first appear: the idea that it is his passion (i.e., associated with his idea of himself) must not be included, otherwise it admits too much; the idea which is the object must be included but not enlivened, otherwise it admits too little or the wrong sort of thing.

Though Hume modifies his account to accommodate the influences of comparison, resemblance, general principles, etc., in general two facts emerge: one's knowledge of another's emotional state is based on an
inference to a feeling from external behaviour, and the knowledge consists in oneself experiencing a (perhaps weaker) version of that state. To avoid this second conclusion Hume would have to explain why sympathy does not act more widely than it does (given that the enlivening impression of ourselves "is always intimately present with us") without saying that the idea that the passion is another's is sometimes included in our idea of another's passion (otherwise how would sympathy ever act in the way Hume claims). This yields some further odd consequences. For one thing, one could not know another was experiencing a certain passion unless one had experienced it oneself. Not surprisingly, Hume remarks: "Now 'tis obvious, that nature has preserv'd a great resemblance among all human creatures, and that we never remark any passion or principle in others, of which, in some degree or other, we may not find a parallel in ourselves" (THN II, p. 318). But someone might well know and understand that someone else feels remorse or is ashamed (as opposed, say to embarrassed) without ever having himself felt remorse or been ashamed. All he need grasp is concepts of loss and mistake in the one case, and of responsibility and guilt (roughly) in the other. No fine discrimination of sensations is called for and no personal experience of the passion is required. Another apparent consequence seems to be that animals are susceptible to the same full range of passions humans are. Hume discusses the pride and humility of animals (THN II, i, sec. 12) and infers that they too experience the peculiar impression of pride. "The very port and gait of a swan, or turkey, or peacock show the high idea he has entertain'd of himself, and his contempt of all others" (THN II, p. 326). Perhaps beliefs about the animal's own self-opinion
might be acknowledged by Hume to complicate the picture, but essentially he sees no reason why animals cannot feel what we feel and so have the same passions we have. Of course humans can speak, but their language (though admittedly something more than the signalling system some animals possess) only enables them to announce their passions in a way animals cannot, but that does not extend their emotional experience. On the contrary, however, humans, to cite but one example, have an emotional life extended in time. The reason, arguably, is that they have a language and time concepts. Consider Wittgenstein's famous remark:
"We say a dog is afraid his master will beat him; but not, he is afraid his master will beat him tomorrow. Why not?" (PI, section 650). The dog could cower and so we could ascribe a present fear (directed to the immediate future), but what could the dog do that would show it feared an event in the (extended) future? Hume could say it has an impression which is fear of tomorrow's beating. But how does the impression (or the idea which is its object) get its date? (Is it a picture of a stick coming down? Of a stick coming down with a calendar with tomorrow's date circled?) And if one could make an image do representative duty, what basis would one have for ascribing such a picture (as opposed to myriad others) to a creature without the ability to paint it (or discriminate it from others) in language? ('Language' here is not merely a matter of vocal cords.) Hume might regard the restriction here as one merely on the causes of fear. He recognizes such restrictions on pride because we have to make

a just allowance for our superior knowledge and understanding. Thus animals have little or no sense of virtue or vice; they quickly lose sight of the relations of blood; and are incapable of that of right and property; For which reason the causes of their pride and humility
must lie solely in the body, and can never be plac'd either in the mind or external objects (THN II, p. 326).

But the restrictions are not the result of narrowness of interests. Lacking certain conceptual equipment, animals cannot be concerned with relations of 'property'. If there is no appropriate way to ascribe such thoughts and such interests to them, it seems equally true that there are types of emotions that are not properly ascribable to animals at all, in virtue of the fact that the characteristic thoughts cannot be ascribed. Hume says "When self enters not into consideration, there is no room either for pride or humility" (THN II, p. 277). But what sort of fact is this? One cannot move from the 'very port and gait of a swan' to the claim that it has a concept of self. And if one cannot claim that, one cannot, in logic, claim that it feels pride. Indeed, even for humans, port and gait or other behaviour is only evidence of a particular emotion in the context of certain beliefs ascribed to the subject. As we shall argue, any behaviour (almost) can express any emotion. Even in a creature capable of a particular emotion (say anger), a bit of behaviour which might usually be typical of that emotion (say hitting), will only be an expression of that emotion under certain conditions, which include the thought behind it. (See discussion of MacIntyre, 1971, in Chapter Four.) What particular emotion is being expressed (if any) will depend on the particular thought; just as the character of an action depends on the intention. Indeed, if the behaviour can be done intentionally (e.g., a scowl) it must be if it is to count as expression (Wollheim, 1966-67, pp. 236, 243). So even if Hume's mechanism of sympathy were otherwise unobjectionable in its content and implications, it will not do because it does not show the place of thoughts
in the meaning of behaviour, the place of problems of interpretation in
the reading of external signs. 'Communication' of emotion is more
complex, and less a matter of feeling, than Hume suggests.
Hume makes a distinction between what he calls 'calm' and 'violent' passions. This distinction cuts across his other distinctions (e.g., direct vs. indirect) and covers the full range of passions. In the first examples Hume gives ("the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects" -- THN II, p. 276), calm passions are modes of approval and disapproval. (See Kemp Smith, p. 167.) Reason, as a calm passion which can move to action, is "a general calm determination of our passions, founded on some distant view or reflection" (THN III, p. 583). Of course, these calm passions, "the sense of beauty and deformity in action . . ." can be violent, witness the "raptures of poetry and music" referred to by Hume. But calm passions need not be modes of approval and disapproval or arise from a distant view (though they generally do: "The same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one" -- THN II, p. 419); there are soft versions (low emotional intensity) of ordinarily violent passions (THN II, p. 417, and see Ardal p. 94 ff.). A given passion on any particular occasion may be either 'calm' or 'violent', depending on the "disturbance in the soul" (cf. force and vivacity of an impression).

Turbulence is not necessary to an emotion. That certain passions regularly or generally "produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation" (THN II, p. 417)
leads us to classify them as 'calm passions'; but any passion, or almost any (not say 'terror', or 'panic', or 'rage', or other emotions where high intensity is built into the description), could on some occasions be 'calm'. Because such passions "cause no disorder in the soul" they are often mistaken for "the determinations of reason" (417). Hume is concerned to emphasize the contrast between such passions and reason (in the relevant section: THN II, iii, sec. 3), because he is (there) considering the motivation of human action and wishes to deny the power of reason to move. In fact, his examples of calm passions in this section are of desires or tendencies to action ("certain instincts originally planted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such.", p. 417). It is also important not to confuse the calm/violent distinction with the difference between 'strong' and 'weak' passions: it is a different difference. 'Calm' and 'violent' are ends of a scale of inner turbulence, a measure of physiological tumult. That Hume should recognize a 'calm' end of the scale at all, however, an end where "real passions . . . are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation", is significant. It contrasts sharply with his general view that an isolated impression constitutes the essence of each emotion. This is a point we shall have to return to. In connection with action, however, it is the difference between 'weak' and 'strong' that matters. These are measures of strength of motive. "'Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper . . . We must, therefore, distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt
a violent and a strong one" (THN II, pp. 418-19). The method of measuring motive is not clear, but because it is not just a matter of strength or intensity of sensation, violence of push, reason can enter in influencing passion and action. Where it enters in the form of a 'calm passion' we may expect connections between the description of the emotion (its specification or identity) and the description under which an action is motivated by it.

Calm passions are "more known by their effects". How is a calm passion, or for that matter, any passion, connected with behaviour? In the extreme case of calm passions, it seems that it is through their expression in behaviour rather than their feeling or sensation (which is "in a manner imperceptible", THN II, p. 276) that they are identified. But if an emotion is essentially an impression or feeling, what makes a piece of behaviour an expression of any particular emotion? Observed constant conjunction is the most likely Humean answer. But it clearly will not do for calm passions (where our access to, our awareness of, the 'cause' is through the 'effect'), and it is not clear that it will do at all. In his discussion of 'love and hatred' Hume comes close to recognizing the distortions introduced by treating what are conceptual relations as though they were simply causal. Passion is connected to action through desire, but the simplicity of passions isolates the feeling from its expression just as it isolates the feeling from its object. So, for example, the desire for the good of the beloved is extraneous to the love itself: "If nature had so pleas'd, love might have had the same effect as hatred, and hatred as love. I see no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annex'd to love, and of happiness to hatred"
But in fact an apparent case of love would be rejected as a case of love if we discovered that at the center of the passion was a wish for harm to the putatively beloved. We would say the feeling was ambivalent or redescribe the situation in terms of the subject's beliefs (e.g., that the 'harm' was not harm in his eyes). Hume himself notes:

The passions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoin'd with benevolence and anger. 'Tis this conjunction, which chiefly distinguishes these affections from pride and humility. For pride and humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action. But love and hatred are not compleated within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, which they produce, but carry the mind to something farther. Love is always follow'd by a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery: As hatred produces a desire of the misery and an aversion to the happiness of the person hated (THN II, p. 367).

So Hume begins "to be sensible, in some measure, of a misfortune". But ultimately Hume takes the misfortune to amount to complications rather than a contradiction in his system. The immediate problem is an obvious lack of parallelism with pride and humility. That a desire should always be annexed to love and hatred, a desire in addition to an object (idea of another), is certainly a contrast with pride and humility. But why should it call for drastic measures? Why should it not be just another causal effect of the passion itself? Presumably, the answer is that a difference in subjective feeling provides no grounds (of the usual associative sort) for an additional effect. Difference in effect requires difference in cause (a sufficient reason). Love and pride exhibit the same quota of impressions, ideas, and associations upon analysis. From whence comes an additional impression of desire (this 'end' over and above 'cause' and 'object') in the case of love? The first possibility Hume considers is that it is not additional: "the desire and aversion con-
stitute the very nature of love and hatred" (THN II, p. 367). He rejects this as "contrary to experience. For tho' 'tis certain we never love any person without desiring his happiness, nor hate any without wishing his misery, yet these desires arise only upon the ideas of the happiness or misery of our friend or enemy being presented by the imagination, and are not absolutely essential to love and hatred" (THN II, p. 367). The point, presumably, is that we can have the sensation of love without the sensation of desire, though if we do have a sensation of desire it will be for the happiness of the object of our love. The strange thing is that Hume's solution is to give the desires names (benevolence and anger) and say that they are conjoin'd with love and hatred "by the original constitution of the mind" (THN II, p. 368). But if the original contrast with pride was a problem, if there seemed to be an extra, (mechanically) inexplicable effect, why should saying nature makes it that way (sometimes, when the question of desire for another's happiness or misery arises at all) make it any less a problem?

Benevolence and anger re-raise the problems. Again one wants to know how emotion is related to action. Are benevolence and anger simply desires? If they are, what is it that makes some desires emotions? What is the connection of benevolence with love? Hume's chemistry of impressions (THN II, p. 366) would seem to abandon the notion that impressions are distinct existences with only associative relations. But even if we accept the chemistry of impressions in order to make sense of benevolence's intimate connection with love, that solves the problem of the relation of love to an 'end' only by shifting it to benevolence. How is benevolence related to the desire for the happiness of another? Unless it just is that
desire, why should the problem seem any less? That is, the desire is made by Hume somehow intrinsic to benevolence which in turn becomes contingently connected to love ("by the original constitution of the mind"). Is benevolence then still a simple impression? Perhaps it is simply the desire for the good of another, but then is desire simply a feeling or impression (as the passions are claimed to be)? To explore Hume's theory of desire would, however, take us too far afield.

We have already made some criticisms of what may be regarded as the Humean view of expression of emotion, as based on constant conjunction. At this point let us return to the calm passions and the special problems of their relation to action and behaviour.
It must be regarded as an important difficulty that Hume's theory of the emotions cannot accommodate his own recognition of the calm passions. Their existence seems incompatible with the demand that emotions be impressions, and Hume's description of their nature seems incompatible with his own doctrine of causation (which requires that cause and effect be independently possible, describable, and perceivable). The difficulty, I believe, is in Hume's system; not in the claim that some emotions are 'calm passions'. The distinction between calm and violent passions is crucial, I think, to the understanding of the emotions and the possibilities for their guidance and control, and so of human freedom and happiness. The distinction is in need of clarification and defense, and we shall attempt both. Most important in both projects is the recognition of the motivating force of the calm passions. That is the feature that led Hume to attempt to give them a place in his scheme. It will also be helpful to exhibit the scales within and among emotions (e.g., from animal objectless fear to intellectual fear, and from minimal physiological emotions to sophisticated cultural emotional responses) as being continuous, so that calm passions can be seen to have a place which is perhaps extreme but not isolated and mysterious in our mental life. They are at the belief-impregnated end of the scale, but emotions in general involve various forms of thought-dependence. We shall return to this theme in our discussion of Spinoza, who does much to clarify the connections. At this point, I shall defend the distinction between calm and violent passions against a particular criticism; a criticism that attempts to make too hard a separation between thought and affect and so tends to
isolate the emotions from the influence of reason.

Mary Warnock claims that the calm passions are not emotions at all (Warnock, 1957, p. 46). I am not at all concerned about the word 'emotion' and would be quite prepared to concede it to her. The dispute is only incidentally about classification, the issue is about the relation between calm passions and the standardly recognized emotions (fear, anger, grief, embarrassment, shame, disgust, elation, ...), in particular the importance of thought in their constitution (the level at which this does form the ground of classification). Certainly there are differences between thinking and feeling, there can be dispassionate thoughts and attitudes, and it would be a mistake to assimilate emotion to thought alone. But it does not follow that all emotions must always involve a felt inner turbulence. (See Appendix B.)

How different are calm passions as mental states from those mental states which Warnock is prepared to recognize as emotions? The proper emotions "have in common that they are all of them names for something in some degree agitating or disturbing" (p. 46). It must be conceded that calm passions are not names for such exciting feelings, but that is the point of calling them "calm". What is the point of calling them passions? Basically, the point Warnock herself recognizes, is that they often move to action.

Attitudes, which calm passions are thought to have more in common with than with emotions, do not move at all. At least, Warnock thinks that attitudes -- basically long-term opinions (p. 47) adopted towards general objects or to people or classes of people in frequent contact with one -- do not generally lead or lead directly to action. ("It may
be that our actions reveal what our attitudes are, but our attitudes do not function as motives for action in the way that Hume lays down that passions do" Warnock, p. 48.) Attitudes have another feature, they are more readily ascribed to others than to ourselves, which also serves to distinguish them from passions. In any case, Warnock notes that "any identification of the calm passions with attitudes must be wrong, since the calm passions certainly could be cited as one's reasons for acting, and were intended by Hume to be 'influencing motives of the will'" (p. 49).

But calm passions are like attitudes in a certain respect, a respect which leads to differences (claims Warnock) in the criticism and justification of calm as opposed to violent passions. Warnock's view with respect to emotions (violent passions) is "that we attempt to justify them not by stating any opinion we hold but by trying to show that the object of the emotion is really of the kind which is commonly allowed to stimulate such an emotion" (p. 58). The role of 'opinion' is what makes for the alleged differences between attitude and calm passion on the one hand and emotion on the other: attitudes and calm passions are matters of subjective opinion, emotions are matters of objective agreed fact. In justifying calm passions, one appeals to the former, in justifying emotions, one appeals to the latter. Emotions are (supposedly) open to a narrower range of criticisms.

One's first doubt about Warnock's argument is that her statement of her view does not seem to point a contrast in the way intended. For what is it to show that the object of an emotion is really of a certain kind but to justify an opinion (the very thing Warnock wishes to deny)? She must be using 'opinion' in some sense narrower than that of 'thought' or
'belief', the sense in which I would have thought 'opinion' is essential to attitude and calm passion. That she does have some very special, subjectivist, sense of 'opinion' in mind is confirmed by another passage, which would also be otherwise difficult to interpret:

It should be emphasised that to bring out the really hateful elements in an object is not to state a personal opinion of the object; or rather if it is that, it must be disguised. "I hate him, because I think he is a blackmailer" would not be a proper form in which to cast a justification of hatred [a violent passion] (Warnock, p. 57).

I would have thought that it is a perfectly proper form. The normal implication of 'I think' is not that the opinion expressed is peculiarly subjective and personal. The statement 'he is a blackmailer' would (without further qualifications) serve as an objective statement of fact with the implication that I believe it, my adding 'I think' indicates explicitly that I believe it to be a fact, and may also suggest that I do not think I am in possession of the best grounds possible (conclusive grounds) for my belief, but not that my belief is somehow more personal than other beliefs. (Personal opinion aims at truth; it can be unconcerned only at the cost of becoming mere prejudice.) Would leaving out the 'I think' make Warnock accept the statement as a proper justification for an emotion? She says,

The feeling can be justified only by being shown to have been caused by something which is generally permitted to inspire hatred, and therefore it must be cast in the form of an objective statement of agreed fact. This is a difference between justifying a feeling and justifying an attitude. For the justification of an attitude may quite openly rest on a personal opinion⁹ (p. 57).

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⁹ Ewing (in the same symposium, p. 73) is also puzzled by the supposed contrast between 'personal opinion' and 'objective statement of agreed fact'. He suggests that "in regard to emotions, attitudes and actions alike we may use 'justified': (1) in a stricter sense such that something
is only 'justified' if the facts are what the person in question believes them to be, or (2) in a sense in which they are 'justified' if his belief is reasonable in view of the evidence at his disposal, even though it may be in fact false . . ." In any case beliefs and their grounds are at issue (and so present).

Is there some special verbal 'form' or formula for objective statements of agreed fact? I doubt it. In any case, if 'I think he is a blackmailer' is not a justification for an emotion (of hatred), neither is it a justification for an attitude (unless the attitude is admitted to be irrational and so unjustified in any case). Even if Warnock could argue that (unusually) subjective beliefs can justify attitudes (though not emotions) I do not think she could show that calm passions are supported by such 'personal opinions'.

Perhaps love and hate are peculiar cases. Even though Warnock uses them as examples of violent emotions requiring objective support, she earlier (p. 51) casts suspicion on them: emotions, unlike moods and attitudes, may "be extremely fleeting and momentary, though this does not seem to apply to grief, love, and hatred, which perhaps should not be classed as emotions, for this reason." Perhaps they involve unusual amounts of stable belief, like attitudes. (But even the most fleeting emotions, e.g., amusement, involve beliefs; perhaps they are less liable to be wrong or open to correction because they have so little time to collect error. See Pears, 1962.) Indeed, love at least may appear peculiar from another direction. As Warnock notes (p. 57), it seems peculiarly unattached to justifying beliefs, stable or unstable, objective or subjective. The heart has reasons of its own, that are allowed to be independent of reasonableness. But, as we have argued, though love may not need to be reasonable, it is still thought-dependent in the sense that
concerns us. A special turbulence is not enough to make a feeling 'love'. What we are adding now is the suggestion that even without turbulence of any kind, a state may count as love, provided the appropriate beliefs, dispositions to behaviour, etc. are present.

Coming down to other cases, we still do not get the desired contrast. According to Warnock's concluding remarks, the proper form for a justification of emotion is "to show that the object of the emotion is really of the kind which is commonly allowed to stimulate such an emotion" (p. 58). But how does this differ from justifying an attitude, where "to defend it or justify it is to point to the correctness of his opinion of that towards which he has the attitude"\(^ {10} \) (p. 54)? And how does it differ from justifying a calm passion: "Justification of a calm passion must consist in showing that what I feel to be virtuous does really and in a recognisable way deserve praise" (p. 46)? In all these cases (avoiding quibbles over irrelevant detail), I cite beliefs relevant to the emotion or attitude or calm passion and try to show that I have good grounds for holding those beliefs. Though the involvement may differ, beliefs are involved in all, and justification is (largely) a matter of justifying those beliefs. But there are other dimensions of criticism. The beliefs may be justified, but not (in their turn) be appropriate to the emotion one feels. In which case one's state of mind may have been

\(^ {10} \) She continues her example: "To justify my attitude towards the Prime Minister would be to point out what I thought were the merits and demerits of his character, and to run through his activities, perhaps particularly emphasising anything that he has done to be personally. I must cite, that is, my view of the facts, the history and the value of the object, if I am called upon to justify my attitude."
misdescribed or confused, or otherwise inappropriate and unjustified. Or one's beliefs may be justified and one's feeling appropriate, but felt to the wrong degree, be too intense. But these added dimensions also apply (with suitable modifications) to all three states of mind. The last is least applicable to calm passions (though they may constitute too strong a motive in some cases), but that is partly why they are considered 'calm'. It is not an argument for not regarding them as passions. Degrees of turbulence provide a measure of intensity for emotions. If an emotion is too strongly felt, what may be meant is that it is out of proportion to the evidence for the relevant belief. The appropriate strength of the feeling may depend on the strength of the evidence ('too great a hope to build on such a slender reed'). More typically, for most emotions, the type of belief (not its certainty) will fix the appropriate strength of response (if 'outrage' is a point on a scale of anger -- though there is more involved than intensity of feeling -- it may be justified by murder but not by certain lesser offenses). Most typically, if all that comes into question is the strength of a feeling (and not at all its classification as a type of emotion, etc.), it will be a matter of what is statistically normal. An inoffensive remark may cause an irascible man to lose his temper. The remark does not deserve that reaction, because in most people it would not produce it. Now both the preceding statements may be causal. The difference is that the first is associated with quantification over occasions in a particular man's life, and the second with quantification over men. In fact 'irascible' is definable in terms of deviation from the normal threshold of reaction. Cf. 'the mild winter caused this sensitive plant to die'. (I owe this point to David Pears.)
But this is not the sort of justification Warnock focusses on, even for violent emotions. As we have seen, to justify an emotion is "to show that the object of the emotion is really of the kind which is commonly allowed to stimulate such an emotion" (p. 57). Now what is 'commonly allowed' may depend on statistical regularities. But elsewhere she says that "people are allowed by common ethical opinion to be angry in some reasonably well-defined situations" (p. 56). It is not clear that the permission of common ethical opinion does depend (merely) on what happens with observable regularity. Again, "the feeling can be justified only by being shown to have been caused by something which is generally permitted to inspire hatred, and therefore it must be cast in the form of an objective statement of agreed fact" (p. 57). This returns us to the contrast with 'personal opinion' (of the 'I think he is a blackmailer' kind), which we will not review (but instead regard as rejected), and though it is open to interpretation in terms of statistical causal facts, it opens another way. What is permitted or allowed to inspire hatred may depend on the nature of hatred. The importance of characteristic beliefs to classification of mental states seems to enter into the justification of violent passions in as many ways as it does into calm.

For calm passions, Warnock claims that "justification of one's calm passions would always consist in a description of the object of the passion, and an attempt to show that one's feelings were appropriate to their object" (p. 54). On Warnock's type of feeling (in the narrow, turbulence, affect, or sensation sense) theory of emotions, to show that one's feelings are appropriate to their object is "to show that the object of the emotion is really of the kind which is commonly allowed to stimulate
such an emotion". That, we have seen, is her formula for violent passions as well. The only sort of appropriateness in question is causal order, the order of natural law (statistical normality), and the danger to be averted is misnaming our feelings (we feel what we feel, but in certain circumstances we are more likely to feel what everyone else feels in such circumstances). The only other sort of failure amounts merely to eccentricity of feeling. Warnock puts the types of criticism differently. Speaking of nameless emotions, unspecified agitations, she says we may be called on to defend them "against the charge either of feeling any emotion at all, or of feeling too much" (p. 55). The defense may be to describe the object which causes one to feel as one does (she notes one may also try to specify more exactly what one feels). The justification may amount to an attempt to get the critic to share the feeling. But Warnock does not allow for other types of criticism and defense. She comes closest in the following passage:

Let us consider a case now where the charge is that the emotion is unjustified or unwarranted or irrational (in the sense used of hope and fear). Here there may well be more of a genuine justification. We may try to justify feeling the particular emotion at all, by explaining further what the object of it is, by pointing out just exactly what it is which makes us angry or afraid. But in this case there may be further disagreement. I may not only point out to you what the hairdresser said to make me angry, but go on to argue that it is right, or at any rate all right to get angry if people make remarks of this kind. Here justification has gone beyond the mere specification or description of the object of the emotion; it has proceeded to the point of stating that the object is worthy of the effect it produced (pp. 55-56).

And here is the oddity. How can an effect be 'worthy' of its cause?

How can there be argument here; the effect follows or it does not.

Warnock's example goes beyond her feeling theory and Hume's, for it requires a sense of appropriateness which goes beyond a regular relation
of stimulus and response. And even if one can give it a causal sense, as was done for 'deserve' in the case of the irascible man, and make it a matter of statistical normality, that will not work for all cases always; the principles of classification for mental states come into play (along with intensity, etc.). She gives an example of how the argument might continue: "I may argue, for instance, that a remark of such and such a kind is worth getting angry about because it reveals a total misunderstanding, or because it is a threat to some well-established relationship, and so on." I think she is perhaps right in saying that "this is not an attempted justification of our behaviour, or our opinions, but of our feeling something or other on some specific occasion, perhaps only for a moment" (p. 56). But it is not a justification for a bare feeling. The feeling depends on a characteristic thought, and it is to that thought that charges of "misunderstanding" etc. are relevant. To see this, imagine the argument taking a different course. I might stop at describing the hairdresser's remarks and say they constitute an insult, and then argue only about whether insults constitute appropriate objects of anger (leaving aside degree of anger, where Warnock's point about 'worthiness' may also have a place). Where someone is jealous, the justification of his emotion may just consist in justifying his opinion that he has been betrayed by one whose affections he had a right to believe were his own alone. Whether his behaviour and feelings might be shaken with his opinions is another and very large issue.

These points are also obscured because Warnock makes too much of the division between what she calls description and justification. She only concedes that we try to explain such feelings as love and hate "by pointing
out really lovable or hateful characteristics of the objects of the emotions, and this, as we saw, can sometimes be the first step towards justification" (p. 57). But what she regards as the further steps required seem to go beyond the question of degree (is it normal to feel this strongly) to the issue of appropriateness (justifying having this emotion at all, having this one rather than some other). Justification may sometimes be description, especially where the criticism is that the emotion is out of place, inappropriate, or unwarranted, and especially where the description is of the grounds of the opinion that makes the emotion what it is. In this violent emotions are more like calm passions than unlike.

Warnock wants to contrast the role of opinion in attitudes and calm passions with its role in emotion. "... the most important difference between attitudes and emotions (is) that attitudes depend on some degree of thought, some assessment or appraisal of that towards which the attitude is directed" (p. 52). We have been arguing that emotions too depend on thought of one type or another, the type of emotion depending on the content and nature of the thought involved, and assessment of the appropriateness of the object, or its influence on one's state, is of particular interest. In neither emotions nor attitudes need thought be restricted to some narrow form of 'personal opinion'. Warnock bases her contrast on the varying attacks that emotions as opposed to attitudes are open to: but though we may admit that 'uncalled for' is out of place as a criticism of attitudes, that does not show that (more spontaneous) emotions do not involve thought (e.g., they can be unwarranted as well as merely excessive; the wrong emotion as well as too strong). Warnock also suggests that because attitudes involve opinions they can be 'contradictory or illogical';
emotions, not involving thoughts, cannot: "At most they can be con-
flicting, but the conflict is between themselves" (p. 53). Here one
encounters the problem we met with Hume: how can feelings be given
vectors so that they can conflict? It is also unclear what the point
of "but the conflict is between themselves" is supposed to be. In the
case of attitudes, which can be contradictory or illogical, and where the
conflict is presumably not "between themselves", to say of someone's
attitude that it is contradictory or illogical "means that what he pro-
fesses as his opinion contradicts what one would infer his opinion to be
from the way he behaves, e.g., 'For a Communist, your attitude to the
Public Schools is most illogical!'" (p. 53). Here the conflict is pre-
sumably between opinions. But how is the story different for 'For someone
who professes to hate her, your jealousy is most illogical'? The same
tension between what is claimed in speech and what is revealed in action
appears. The man who has an attitude need profess his opinion no more
than one who has an emotion, and no more inference is needed to see that
the opinion revealed by the behaviour of the man with an emotion yields a
contradiction than for the man with an attitude. A divided mind of the
sort described, a conflict between professed opinion and behaviour, may
be more liable to be labelled 'insincerity' than 'illogicallity', but the
place of beliefs in emotions remains.

Hume himself allows reason (thought) small power in changing emotions,
mainly because he gives it no place in the nature of emotions. As we have
seen, he isolates emotions as impressions of reflexion from the points
where the place of thought can be most clearly seen: in connection with
object and action. He says explicitly:
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possess with the passion, and in that emotions have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent (THN II, p. 415).

It is a mistake to restrict thought to representation, but even with that restriction, it should be seen that thoughts have more of a role in emotions than in sensations. One's conception of one's state and of its causes are important elements in making one's state what it is and discriminating it from other states. One can make many errors here, and these mistakes are open to correction by reason. According to Hume, however, there are very few points and ways in which reason can enter:

passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are accompany'd with some judgment or opinion. According to this principle, which is so obvious and natural, 'tis only in two senses, that any affection can be call'd unreasonable. First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. . . . In short, a passion must be accompany'd with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable; and even then 'tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment (THN II, p. 416; cf. III, pp. 458-59).

An emotion being 'founded on' a thought, however, seems more intimate than its merely being 'accompany'd' by one. Within the passage the founding must bear a causal interpretation, but as we have seen, that an emotion has certain sorts of causes can be essential to its identity. If thoughts have no special place in emotions, then reasons should have no special place in
emotions, in which case criticisms in terms of the goodness or badness of a person's reasons for his emotion (warranted or unwarranted, justified or unjustified, reasonable or unreasonable) should have no more place with emotions than with sensations. But Hume acknowledges that they have (some, though limited) place. And he cannot explain that place if the thought is merely an accompaniment, even a causal accompaniment, of the emotion. For then bodily sensations might be deemed reasonable or unreasonable in the same way. "If my headache is caused by the belief that my fortune has been lost, no one would be tempted to judge my headache unreasonable on the grounds that my belief is so" (Pitcher, 1965, pp. 229-30). Even if reasons are (special forms of) causes, not all causes are reasons. Hume fails to reveal what is special about thoughts which cause emotions, and gives no hint at all that thoughts about what causes an emotion (our beliefs about the explanation of our state) are especially important.

In fact, Hume tries to deny that, speaking properly, emotions are reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified, at all. If they really were just sensations, it would make no sense to speak of them in that way. And, as Pitcher argues, this is ground for rejecting Hume's view: "the View does not allow the notions of reasonableness and justifiability to gain any foothold in the concept of an emotion" (Pitcher, 1965, p. 330). Hume's account of the foothold it does in fact have is thoroughly confused. Cases of misjudging the means required to achieve an end when putting an emotion into action (e.g., revenge), are not cases of 'unreasonable emotion'. And the other sort of intellectual mistake he allows, mistake about existence, is too narrow to cover the field. As
Pitcher argues, one may be mistaken about the existence of an object, but the emotion still not be unreasonable (one can have good grounds for believing something, but nonetheless be wrong). And more important, there are many other ways in which an emotion may be unreasonable, and however strictly one speaks, the emotion itself (as well as the judgment) may be called unreasonable. (In Pitcher's example of a spinster frightened of a non-existent threat: "her judgment is indeed unreasonable, but so is her fear. To be sure, the feelings of her stomach turning over and her heart racing cannot be called unreasonable, but neither are they her fear." ppo 330-31.) Pitcher catalogues some of the additional forms of unreasonableness (baseless or unfounded fear, irrational fear, superstitious fear, silly, vain or neurotic fear, abnormal or inordinate fear). There is no need to go through the matter in detail at this point. The Humean approach cannot account for the varieties of unreasonableness of emotions. It does not allow for the varieties of criticism and mistake that emotions are open to in virtue of involving beliefs, and so cannot allow reason an important place in changing emotions. This is especially clear where the emotion is inappropriate (e.g., fear of baby lambs) because the characteristic belief is absent or untenable.

It is perhaps worth repeating that a Humean, in the sense of causal, account of the emotion/object relation does not preclude all sorts of 'justification' for emotions. Some sorts are explicable within that scheme. (And I do not wish to object to that scheme except insofar as it is claimed to be a total account.) As with the anger of an irascible man, or exaggerated fear, we can make sense of an object not 'deserving' a particular emotional response in terms of its being outside of the
statistical norm. The response may be exaggerated in relation to how people usually respond to such provocations. Justification and appropriateness (in another sense) can also find place, as Hume suggests, if we bring in the creature's ends or purposes in action.

Consider first a non-emotional response. Suppose we ask whether or not a creature's behaviour in a particular situation is appropriate. The criteria of appropriateness will be determined by the creature's ends of action. As an approximation, the behaviour will be appropriate to the situation if behaving in that way in that situation is likely to achieve the creature's ends. . . . Where emotional responses to objects are concerned, the criteria of appropriateness may sometimes be partly determined by reference to the responder's ends. Thus fear of an object is reasonable or appropriate if the object is likely to harm the responder in some way. Of course in the case of most emotions, the criteria of appropriateness are not wholly determined by reference to ends, and in the case of responses to works of art, perhaps not at all. Nevertheless, whether the criteria can be applied does not depend on the response being causally undetermined (Wilson, pp. 86-87).

I think Wilson's point is largely correct, but if it is really a point about a functional sense of appropriateness, he makes it in a misleading manner when he continues:

. . . Here is one difference between an emotion produced by a work of art and an emotion produced by a drug. A drug produces an invariant effect, so there is no room for saying that one effect is more appropriate than another (p. 87).

It is not because the effects of art are erratic that there is room for appropriateness in art. (Indeed, the emotional qualities of art do not, in general, depend on its effects. A piece of music need not make me sad in order for it to be 'sad'.) The effects of drugs, whether invariant or not, may be as functionally appropriate or useful as those produced by other causes. If drugs produce emotions, it can only be by producing appropriate beliefs. If the appropriate beliefs are not involved (whether produced by a drug or not), a state would not be a particular emotion. The emotion produced will not be invariant unless the belief is. There
is a constraint placed on the causal manipulation of emotions by the cognitive element. This fact emerges clearly in the experimental work of Schacter and Singer (1962) and other psychologists. The state of mind a subject reports will depend importantly on his beliefs about its cause. Belief aims at truth, and certain explanations of how one came to be inclined to believe something are incompatible with one's regarding one's inclination as amounting to a belief (e.g., drug induced belief) (Hampshire, 1967, cf. 1965, p. 87 ff.). Any emotion depending on the belief being fully a belief will thereby be modified, and one's state will have to be redescribed as one dissociates from the 'belief' on which it depends.

Still, there is a functional sense of appropriateness, at least where emotions involve inclinations to action or states of readiness. As one writer puts it: "A man's emotions are reasonable when, in view of the man's beliefs, doubts, or conjectures, the form of readiness they involve is likely to be effective and necessary. When they involve inadequate or superfluous preparations, his feelings are unreasonable" (Thalberg, 1964, p. 222). As we shall see, this sense of appropriateness plays at least a part in Spinoza's notion of active emotion. But there are other ways in which emotions may be reasonable or unreasonable. This can be seen when certain aspects of the classification of emotions and the importance of beliefs are brought out. So reason need not be merely the slave of the passions. It may be a part of them, a part that can move the whole.
Hume's Classification of the Passions*

**Primary**
Sheerly instinctive passions arising from 'a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable' (439) and not from precedent perceptions of pleasure and pain:
Violent (i.e., not calm): 'the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites' (439)
Calm: 'benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children' (417)

**Secondary**
(Impressions of reflexion) founded on preceding impressions of pleasure and pain:

- **Direct**
  - Violent: 'desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security' (277)
  - Calm: 'the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such' (417)

  (Kemp Smith) moral and aesthetic sentiments as proceeding from the contemplation of actions and external objects 'the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects' (276)

- **Indirect**
  - Arising from preceding impressions of pleasure and pain, but by conjunction with additional qualities:
    - Violent: pride, humility, love, hatred, ambition, vanity, envy, pity, malice, generosity, 'with their dependents' (276-7)
    - Calm: (Ardal) approval and disapproval of persons

*See Kemp Smith, p. 168; and Ardal, pp. 10-11.
CHAPTER TWO . . . SPINOZA
When I speak of Spinoza's or the Spinozist view of the mind and the mental, I shall be referring to two main emphases: the importance of thought in the identification and discrimination of emotions and other mental states, and the importance of reflexive knowledge in changing those states. It is these two theses, and not some of Spinoza's more famous metaphysical doctrines, that I am concerned to explore.

I. Conatus and Unconscious Desire

Spinoza considers all emotions to be analyzable on the basis of three basic or primary emotions: pleasure, pain, and desire. Each of these concepts must be understood in the special sense given to it within his system, and to understand that sense one must understand that system (to a certain extent) as a whole. Behind each of the three central concepts, and so behind all emotion, is the notion of the conatus. Spinoza tells us: "Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persevere in its being" (E III, prop. 6). This claim about an 'endeavor' ('tendency' or 'effort') might be a straightforward empirical observation. Indeed, in other authors it generally is. In relation to man, at any rate, the observation of an interest in self-preservation is even a commonplace. But within the Spinozist system the conatus is far more than a Hobbesian 'first law of nature', it is a logical principle.¹ It applies

¹ Wolfson (II, p. 195) treats Spinoza's claim as one of a long series of recognitions of the first law. This despite the fact that he notices (p. 199 ff.) that Spinoza extends the principle beyond animals to the inanimate realm where it would seem to lack sense (or at least the sort
of sense it has in its narrower, merely empirical, application), and that the conatus and the thing itself are, according to Spinoza, not distinguishable.

to all things, and is in fact what distinguishes one thing from another (its 'actual essence').

But how can one deduce an 'effort' from a logic of individuation? The force of the argument is basically simple: What we have before us does not constitute a distinct individual unless it does exhibit a conatus, an effort to maintain itself as a coherent unit. The actual argument is more subtle and more difficult. In Proposition 7 the argument equating essence with conatus seems to be that whatever we do (actively), which by the previous proposition is equated with the conatus, must follow from our nature or essence (following from our nature or essence is what it means for us to actively do). If desires constitute our essence, then our actions must flow from our desires (if they are to be our actions, rather than passive responses). This has the virtue of putting the abstract point in words closer to our understanding of human behaviour. It has the further virtue of referring us back (for the proof of "nor are things able to do anything else than what necessarily follows from their determinate nature") to an earlier proposition (E I, prop. 29) where the distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata is introduced. (Incidentally, Spinoza tells us that emotions are part of natura naturata -- E I, prop. 31.) This distinction, I think, may make clearer how something static, as essence is traditionally thought to be, can yield dynamic effort. Perhaps they can be taken as two aspects or points of view, as part of a larger division under two aspects, of what is a single thing.
The nature of the conatus must, I am afraid, remain relatively obscure until its role in the system, in particular its relation to Spinoza's central distinction between the active and the passive, can be explained. Still, a bit more can be said at this point. The destruction of a thing is not something it can (actively) do to itself, it is something it must (passively) suffer as the effect of external causes (E III, prop. 4). If its essence (and all action must flow from essence) included its destruction, it would be self-contradictory and the thing could not exist at all. Given the essence, you must have the thing, so given the thing, you must have a thing which "in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persevere in its being". Hence this 'endeavor' is simply another name for the 'given' or 'actual' essence of the thing. Though it might seem implausible that given a thing it must be maintaining itself, it will seem less implausible if we remember that the endeavor at self-maintenance just is the thing (whatever it is) and anything else, including possible endeavors at self-destruction, must be regarded as external (outside its essence). Without the endeavor at self-maintenance, one would not have a distinct thing, there would be no clear way of marking off the boundaries that individuate it. Without the conatus, all might collapse into a whirl of constant interaction, into a disorganized flux. The conatus fits into Spinoza's scheme of finite modes (particular things) within a single all-embracing substance. At a more concrete level, the conatus can be understood in Spinoza's terms as a balance of motion-and-rest, and

in modern terms such as 'homeostasis'. Our concern is with the more abstract interpretation. As Hampshire explains it:

Each particular thing, interacting with other particular things within the common order of Nature, exhibits a characteristic tendency to cohesion and to the preservation of its identity, a 'striving (conatus), so far as it lies in itself to do so, to persist in its own being' (Ethics Pt. III. Prop. VI). This striving towards cohesion and the preservation of its own identity constitutes the essence of any particular thing, in the only sense in which particular things, which are not substances, can be said to have essences. Particular things, being dependent modes and not substances, are constantly undergoing changes of state as the effects of causes other than themselves; as they are not self-determining substances, their successive states cannot be deduced from their own essence alone, but must be explained partly by reference to the action upon them of other particular things. Each particular thing possesses a determinate nature of its own only in so far as it is active and not passive in relation to things other than itself, that is, only in so far as its states can be explained otherwise than as the effects of external causes; only so far as a thing is an originating cause -- can any individuality, any determinate nature of its own, be attributed to it. Its character and individuality depend on its necessarily limited power of self-maintenance. It can be distinguished as a unitary thing with a recognizable constancy of character in so far as, although a system of parts, it succeeds in maintaining its own characteristic coherence and balance of parts. (pp. 58-59). . . Within Spinoza's definitions, therefore, it is necessarily true that every finite thing, including a human being, endeavours to preserve itself and to increase its power of self-maintenance. The conatus is a necessary feature of everything in Nature, because this tendency to self-maintenance is involved in the definition of what it is to be a distinct and identifiable thing (Hampshire, 1956, p. 93).

In the case of man, the conatus takes the form of desire. Joachim expounds Spinoza's reasoning with some clarity:

Man is a particular thing, whose essence is constituted by modes of Extension and Thought. So far therefore as lies in him, man will tend to persist in his corporeal and mental being. And this 'conatus' is man's 'appetitus,' or 'will-to-be.' Thus man's 'appetitus' is simply his essence 'from which there necessarily follow all those actions which tend to his self-maintenance.' As man's essence is mental as well as corporeal, and as thought is by its very nature turned upon itself, this 'effort' in man is often an object of his consciousness: -- i.e., man not only tends to maintain his corporeal and mental being, but is (or may be) also conscious of this tendency. In order to mark this characteristic of man's 'conatus,' Spinoza uses the term 'cupiditas' (desire) in preference to 'appetitus.'
For the presence of self-consciousness, he thinks, makes no difference. 'Desire' -- like any blind effort -- is merely the tendency to self-affirmation which the essence of the desiring thing involves. Hence the term 'cupiditas' covers the whole range of human self-affirmation. It includes all so-called 'efforts, instincts, impulses, desires, and volitions.' (E III, 9 S.; III, Aff. Deff., 1 Expl.) (Joachim, p. 193.)

It is important that desire need not be self-conscious, when it is not, it is 'appetite'. In determining how far Spinoza can be regarded as an anticipator of Freud (though we shall be more concerned to look from the other direction, to see in what ways Freud is a crypto-Spinozist), we must remember that whatever Spinoza may say about unconscious desires he does not fit them into a larger theory of unconscious mental processes that explains their origins and mechanisms. Certainly he has no theory of repression and defence. Still, his system leaves room for the unconscious. Hume's, by way of contrast, does not. What sense can be made of unfelt feelings? In his terms, impressions of which we are unaware (and emotions are impressions) must be nonsense. Spinoza may not only leave room for the unconscious, he may even contribute to our understanding of the notion.

Unconscious desire or 'appetite' is a motive to action ("appetite is the essence itself of man in so far as it is determined to such acts as contribute to his preservation", E III, Definitions of the Emotions 1 expl., and III, prop. 9 note), and in this respect Spinoza sees no difference between human appetite and desire: "For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite . . .". It would be too hasty to conclude that consciousness and thought about desire (even unconscious desire) cannot affect desire; this is a large matter to which we shall have to return. It might also seem too hasty to allow that
Spinoza leaves a place for unconscious desire in his picture of man. He avoids defining desire solely in terms of appetite or determination to action in order to allow for the possibility of consciousness, and it might seem that in man (within Spinoza's system) the possibility is a necessity. 'Appetite' is a technical term in Spinoza, and though it may apply to some things other than men it might be that men have only appetites of which they are conscious, i.e., desires. It seems, by Pt. II, Prop. 23, that the mind is necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body. Spinoza, somewhat obscurely but still coherently, regards the human mind as the idea of the human body (E II, prop. 13). Without further explaining or elaborating this famous mind-body parallelism and its relation to Spinoza's metaphysics and epistemology, we can also note that he believes that "nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived by the mind" (E II, prop. 12). The mind is necessarily aware of the body's modifications. But this, so far, (in the cases which concern us) produces only appetite, which, Spinoza tells us (E III, prop. 9 note), is one of those terms which relates to both mind and body. We do not, so far, have self-consciousness. That requires a further step, ideas of ideas. And that step, while always possible to humans, may not be necessary.3

3 Perhaps bodily sensations are the obvious model for ideas of modifications of the body. Still, one can feel a difficulty over the nature of the level of awareness which is short of full consciousness (ideas of ideas). But I do not think we need to be detained by that difficulty here. As Curley (p. 126) points out, there is a mode of thought for every mode of extension, but "Spinoza's statements that 'all things are animate, though in different degrees', and 'there must be in God an idea of everything' (E II, prop. 13, note), does not imply that my watch has thoughts and sensations, any more than Aristotle's doctrine that plants have souls.
implies that flowers feel pain." I think that Curley is right, even if we do not interpret the thoughts corresponding to inanimate (in the ordinary sense) modes as Curley does (i.e., as true propositions about corresponding facts). He says "my body is a set of facts, my mind a set of propositions describing those facts; my mind must contain a proposition corresponding to every fact that constitutes my body, for the propositions simply are the facts, considered in a different way" (Curley, p. 127). One wonders how to make sense of the mind 'containing' a proposition. Perhaps one might get further by following Hampshire's notion that if you learn the physical basis of a thought, that thought is transformed into a perception of that physical fact (Hampshire, 1969). But in any case there is ample textual evidence that one 'perceives' but does not 'know' everything in the body. (See E II, props. 19 and 23.) That is, the mind does not know the body except insofar as it perceives itself or has ideas of ideas, or is conscious.

Instead of defining desire, as he does appetite, as straightforwardly "the essence itself of man in so far as it is considered as determined to any action", Spinoza complicates his definition by adding that it is the essence "in so far as it is conceived as determined to any action by any one of his modifications" (E III, Def. Emo. 1 expl.). The definition thus includes reference to the cause or condition of consciousness of appetite. By Pt. II, Prop. 23, the mind knows itself by perceiving the ideas of the modifications of the body. Though the ideas of the modifications of the body are part of the essence of the human mind, by the previous proposition, it is only the ideas of those ideas which constitute knowledge of the human mind, i.e., self-knowledge or self-consciousness or (in the cases which concern us) conscious desire. This second-order knowledge is always inadequate (E II, prop. 29), but our initial question still remains: is it necessary?

It might still seem that Spinoza is driven by his definitions, against his deeper intentions, to answer 'yes'. For according to Pt. II, Prop. 21, the idea of the mind has the same relation to the mind as the mind itself
has to the body and "it follows . . . that the idea of the mind and the mind itself exist . . . from the same necessity . . ." (And the point is repeated at the end of the demonstration of prop. 22.) So Spinoza does seem driven to the denial of desires unaccompanied by consciousness of those desires. But I believe that this position arises from incoherencies within the system, and I think an interpretation can be found which, while rejecting the inconsistent premises preserves the central insights. The notion that the idea of the mind and the mind itself are equally necessary is mistaken. Spinoza says it follows from the fact that "the idea of the mind . . . and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is considered under one and the same attribute, that of thought."

This putative fact is supposed to derive from the corresponding fact "that the idea of the body and the body, that is to say, the mind and the body, are one and the same individual which at one time is considered under the attribute of thought, and at another under that of extension". (Underlining added.) While I find this last fact obscure, the corresponding putative fact is wholly unintelligible: how can one thing appear different when viewed from a single point of view? Even were we to accept it (assuming we understand it), we could still doubt the apparent consequence that we are always conscious of our appetites; for this is presumably supposed to follow "... just as a person who knows anything by that very fact knows that he knows, and knows that he knows that he knows, and so on ad infinitum". This endless reflexive awareness of knowledge is arguably illusory (Woozley and others give the arguments), but in any case cannot be meant to entail an infinity of thoughts. According to Spinoza, "we can affirm an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we
cannot affirm an infinite number of things at once)" (E II, prop. 49, note).
So the infinity of thoughts would have to be consecutive. But then it appears we would still be engaged on thinking elaborations of some first thought. And there is no alternative to consecutiveness. Even if Spinoza allowed it, the thoughts could not be simultaneous either, for so many thoughts seem unthinkable. Perhaps one could have recourse here to the claim that they would all be aspects of one individual and so really one and the same thing. But that remains unintelligible for one must ask 'aspects of an individual what?' If the answer is an 'individual thought', additions of 'knows' and 'awareness' into the thoughts cannot leave them the same thoughts. So one must reject the iterated knowings on metaphysical, if not epistemological, grounds. So perhaps all Spinoza is committed to (though his formulation would then be at least misleading) is the openness of any idea or knowledge (of the body or otherwise) to awareness or knowledge, but not to the necessity of such higher order awareness or knowledge. (That the claim is about potentiality may be marked by Spinoza's use of the word "form" in the statement: "the idea of the mind, that is to say, the idea of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea in so far as this is considered as a mode of thought and without relation to the object . . ." E II, prop. 21, note.) Even mere openness will constitute a difficulty when we shift the discussion to psychoanalytical theory; for how accessible an unconscious idea or desire is to consciousness must depend (to some extent) on one's theory of how it came to be unconscious in the first place, and it may require quite special techniques and conditions to make the potential knowledge real and effective.
II. Pleasure and Pain and the Spinozist Analysis of Love

Pleasure and pain (laetitiae et tristitiae) can be understood as passive mental states of transition, increase or decrease of conatus or, more precisely, of power. The power (perfection or vitality) in question is basically the power of self-maintenance, i.e., the effectiveness of the conatus, in the case of man the power of thought and the parallel power of action. Change in one, within Spinoza's system, is inevitably also change in the other (E III, prop. 11). He defines pleasure as "man's passage from a less to a greater perfection" and pain as "man's passage from a greater to a less perfection" (E III, Def. Emo. 2 and 3). These states are produced as a result of the changing proportions of our thought, feeling, and behaviour that have explanations which trace back to our own nature as opposed to external causes.

These notions of pleasure and pain are to be distinguished from those more specific types of pleasure and pain which relate to the body. Spinoza speaks of 'pleasurable excitement' (titillatio) or 'cheerfulness' (hilaritas) and 'painful suffering' (dolor) or 'melancholy' (melancholia). These latter notions are much closer to Humean impressions, and seem to name localized sensations or (more pervasive) moods. Spinoza, by making distinctions, is able to avoid the difficulties which arise from the Humean assimilation of all types of pleasure to impressions of pleasure. By treating pleasure and pain as states of the whole individual, Spinoza also leaves open what one is to say on closer analysis of what pleasure is (form of attention, feeling, . . .).

Pleasure, pain, and desire are Spinoza's three primary emotions.
They are not primary or basic in the sense in which Hume takes impressions and ideas to be basic, for they are definable (as we have just seen). His claim is that all other emotions can be explained as arising out of these three. A Spinozist account of an emotion looks very different from a Humean. In the case of love, where Hume gives us a picture of a complex mechanism of double association of impressions and ideas producing a simple and undefinable indirect impression of reflexion which is the emotion, Spinoza tells us that love is "pleasure accompanied with the idea of an external cause" (E III, prop. 13, note and Def. Emo. 6). One way of appreciating the nature and implications of Spinoza's method of analysis will be by providing a more detailed contrast with Hume's.

It will be recalled that pleasure and pain were central to Hume's approach. The following can serve as a brief reminder of their specific place:

In outline the theory is simple. Pleasure and pain cause the direct passions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, grief and joy. When pleasure or pain is specially related to a particular person it produces an indirect passion, love or hatred if the particular person is someone else, pride or humility if it is oneself. The indirect passions are extended through sympathy to cover cases where the pleasures and pains are not our own. Finally, the variations in sympathy due to subjective factors and special circumstances are corrected by general rules, much as our judgments of colors, sizes, and shapes are corrected. Moral sentiments are species of love, hatred, pride, and shame, restricted to qualities of mind, extended by sympathy, and objectified by "general rules" (Macnabb, p. 127).

We have already noted that the sense of pleasure and pain involved, basically some specific sensation, is very different from Spinoza's.

There is also no effort in Hume to construct more complex emotions out of more simple constituent emotions, for each emotion is already as simple as it could be; is in fact a specific type of pleasure or pain distinguish-
able only on the basis of feeling. Pleasure and pain play a role in the
causal history of the emotion (except where the emotion is one of the
'primary' emotions), and appear again as the form of the emotion itself.
But in Spinoza, pleasure and pain are elements in the emotion, constituents,
and the discrimination of emotions depends on the type of thought involved.

The role of causality in the analyses is also very different. The
notion of 'cause' does not appear in Hume's analysis of the emotion itself,
for in itself the emotion is not analyzable at all, the causal relations
are just among the attending circumstances. Causal beliefs appear inside
rather than outside Spinoza's analysis, for the subject's idea of the
external cause is an essential constituent of his love. Ideas (beliefs,
or thoughts) appearing inside emotions must be distinguished from ideas
about emotions. These latter will be ideas of ideas, and even they do
not correspond precisely to Humean impressions of reflexion. One should
also not be misled by Spinoza's use of the word 'idea'. It is not an
image or feeling, and unlike a Humean impression or idea, it can express
a whole thought or proposition. (A contrast to be recalled in relation
to Freud, who seems to hover in his use of 'idea' between some concrete,
exorcizable, image and a more Spinozist notion corresponding to 'belief'.)
Where Hume's external causal relations brought in some sort of object of
the emotion, it was external and the 'object' of the emotion only in being
present and produced by it and so a concomitant object of attention. But
as we have seen, the thought of the loved object cannot simply accompany
some essential core of the emotion; the object, to be an 'object of
emotion', must be thought of as in some way the object of love, a part of
the explanation of one's state as a whole. In Spinoza's analysis, the
object of love appears in the idea of the cause and so is in some sense internal to the emotion. The problem of clarifying this concept of 'object' of emotion and the form of internality or intentionality it involves, may perhaps be reduced to the more general question of the intentionality of the constituent beliefs. And, as Pitcher argues (p. 339), to show that the problem is really part of a more general problem is, in a sense, to solve it. The important point for us is that Spinoza's approach brings out the dependence of the state and our characterization of the state, on the subject's beliefs, in particular his beliefs about the state. It is the main element of Spinoza's analysis that allows a role for reason in relation to the emotions. The place given to reason is perhaps the sharpest contrast with Hume, and the most illuminating in understanding the power and limits of Freud's technique.

Spinoza, like Hume, is interested in the laws of the working of the mind. There is a discoverable order to our emotions, and knowledge in this area is not only of intellectual interest, it is essential to our freedom and happiness. (Our beliefs about the nature of emotions may even affect what emotions we can have.) Spinoza, unlike Hume, does not confine himself to unanalyzable impressions and a mechanical association of ideas in his discussion of emotions and their laws. Hume is so restricted by his epistemology. Spinoza accords association its place. He acknowledges that ideas follow on the appearance of ideas that have accompanied them in the past, or on the appearance of similar ideas (E III, props. 14, 16 -- correspond to Hume's principles of association by contiguity and resemblance). As the result of such connections on the level of imagination, anything can come to seem a source of pleasure or pain.
(E III, prop. 15). Hence we can come to love what is associated with something which is in fact associated with pleasure, though we are mis­taken when we take the first thing as the external cause of our pleasure. Spinoza actually thinks that the succession of our ideas and emotions in accordance with the principles of imagination, the laws of association, is our normal (i.e., usual) condition. When this happens, however, we are suffering from our haphazard histories. Spinoza thinks this can, to some extent, be overcome. His epistemology provides for a contrasting state in which we are not the passive observers of impressions and ideas, the witnesses of our emotional lives. He derives from his distinction between inadequate ideas (imagination) and adequate ideas (intellect) his central distinction between active and passive emotion, a distinction that can find no place in the Humean scheme.
III. Active/Passive and the Intellectual Love of God

Descartes, in *The Passions of the Soul*, divides all thoughts into actions and passions of the soul. The will or desire, whether it has an abstract object or terminates in some motion of the body, is active. The ground for this classification of our desires is that "we find by experience that they proceed directly from our soul, and appear to depend on it alone" (PS I, art. 17). All other thoughts, which are perceptions, are passive "because it is often not our soul which makes them what they are, and because it always receives them from the things which are represented by them". According to Descartes, we are necessarily aware of our desires, "For it is certain that we cannot desire anything without perceiving by the same means that we desire it; and, although in regard to our soul it is an action to desire something, we may say that it is also one of its passions to perceive that it desires" (PS I, art. 19). The emotions, or passions strictly so called, are treated very much as Humean impressions; Descartes regards them as perceptions relating to the soul alone "whose effects we feel as though they were in the soul itself, and as to which we do not usually know any proximate cause to which we may relate them: such are the feelings of joy, anger, . . ." (PS I, art. 25). For Descartes, the emotions are one and all and always passive.

Spinoza's distinction between active and passive is importantly different. A type of emotion (e.g., love) may in particular cases be sometimes passive, sometimes active. But there is still an important connection with Descartes' distinction, and the differences can be seen to derive from deep metaphysical differences rather than superficial
disagreements in terminology. Actions are what I do. Descartes identifies the person with his thinking element (sum res cogitans) or soul as opposed to his body. I am my thoughts, but most centrally I am my will, for that alone is totally within my control and depends only upon my soul. So only desires are actions of mine, are attributable and ultimately explainable by reference only to my soul. Spinoza rejects Descartes' crude and unworkable mind-body dualism. Action, as opposed to passion, is still that which depends upon me, that which is ultimately explainable by reference to my nature, but my essence is no longer restricted to modes of the infinite attribute of thought, i.e., mind. The contrast is no longer between dependence on my soul and dependence on my body, but between explanation by reference to my nature as a person (an individual mind-body) and explanation by reference to causes in the external world.

The will, far from being the center of free activity, is dismissed by Spinoza as an illusion engendered by ignorance of causes. The contrast of volitions with other thoughts is illusory -- all are part of the necessary order of thought. Explanation is never-ending; an emotion is active not if its explanation terminates in some act of will, but if the chain of causes includes nothing external to my nature.

The last formulation may seem misleading, for if I love or fear some particular person or thing, must not the particular object of my love or fear appear in any complete account of my emotion, and would not that object be external to my nature? How can emotion ever be active?

Let us look more closely at the case of love. According to Spinoza, a man will be said to love a thing if he feels pleasure which he attributes to that thing as its cause. But a fuller understanding of the order of
nature would reveal that he and the object are but limited parts of nature, and that the thing is just one member of an infinite chain of causes and only one of an indefinite number of conditions necessary to his pleasure (or there may even be unthought of sufficient conditions outside of the object). There is no one thing which is the cause, the belief that there is is the result of the working of imagination and an inadequate knowledge of causes. Love, where the pleasure involved is pleasurable excitement, may be excessive (E IV, prop. 44); but the defect which arises from inadequate understanding is bondage to the passive play of phantasy in our emotional lives. Where we imagine the objects of our emotions to be free and self-determining sufficient causes, we are ourselves the unfree victims of contingent external causes. This is our situation when our emotions are directed towards particular things as their objects. But an awareness of the necessary incompleteness of our knowledge of causes contains within itself the beginnings of the materials for the transformation of our emotions into active states. Insofar as an emotion is constituted by the thought of an external cause, the rejection of that thought as false is the destruction of that emotion (E V, prop. 2 and III, prop. 48).

Within Spinoza's theory of knowledge, falsity is not a positive characteristic, rather it is a matter of degree. The recognition of a belief as false depends upon its contrast with a more comprehensive and coherent thought, false ideas simply being low level and partial perceptions of the truth. This notion of levels calls for explication, and the call becomes more urgent when we see the consequences of the epistemological position. In the case of love, the progressive addition to our idea of
the cause and its decreasing inadequacy, eventually transforms our pleasure from the love of a particular to the love of something else: ultimately, God or Nature. These interchangeable terms include the whole of the causal order, and insofar as we intuitively comprehend it (under the attribute of Thought) we, in our mental aspect (it is difficult to imagine what the necessary physical correlate would be), reflect and become assimilated to and identified with that whole. In this mystical state, what Spinoza calls "the intellectual love of God", we are truly free and self-determining and our emotion is wholly active. Other obscurities aside, however, in order to become active our love has had to cease to be the love of a particular. In order to flow fully from our own nature, we have had to assimilate the whole of Nature (under the aspect of Thought) and become our own object. In this case the object, the cause, the mind, and the emotion are all free for they are all one. So it looks as though the whole of nature may be the only object of active emotion, despite the fact that Spinoza seems to imply that the active emotions' could range more widely in their objects. It also looks as though active emotions may be limited to love, indeed, to this single mystical intellectual love. Spinoza has already argued (E III, prop. 59) that "amongst all the emotions which are related to the mind in so far as it acts, there are none which are not related to joy or desire" -- insofar as we contemplate the whole of God or Nature our only response can be pleasure (for our power of thought is then maximized), and insofar as that is the only object of an active emotion that emotion must be love. So it would appear that the active emotional life of a free man would be a life without hate, jealousy, fear, etc., but also without hope, devotion, compassion, pride, shame, regret, benevolence, etc., or even love of particular things.
IV. More Adequate Ideas and Activity

That is one interpretation of Spinoza's views concerning active emotions, and as a picture of the ultimate extrapolation of his principles it may even be a correct interpretation. But I think that a closer examination of some of his central notions will reveal that his principles can be more helpfully applied to our own emotional lives if the impossible extrapolation to the case of the wholly free man is ignored.

Perhaps the most central concept is that of an adequate idea or cause. I shall return to the idea of a cause in a moment, so we can here concentrate on the notion of an adequate idea. It is tempting to over-rationalize this notion, to require the strong sort of necessity that Spinoza continually associates with it. An adequate idea has within itself all the marks of truth (E II, def. 4). There is no need to check for a correspondence with some external object. From this, the closest modern notion would appear to be logical or analytic truth. But this interpretation would, I think, be too narrow. Most importantly, one must appreciate that there are degrees of adequacy and inadequacy (and logical truth is meant to be an all or nothing affair). In his clearest discussion of the distinction, that concerning our knowledge of the sun, this point is well illustrated. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, the more comprehensive and coherent the theory of which an idea forms a part the less inadequate it is; the confused images of sensation and imagination being most inadequate of all:

When we look at the sun, we imagine his distance from us to be about 200 feet; the error not consisting solely in the imagination, but arising from our not knowing what the true distance is when we imagine, and what are the causes of our imagination. For although we may afterwards know that the sun is more than 600 diameters of the earth
distant from us, we still imagine it near us, since we imagine it to be so near, not because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because a modification of our body involves the essence of the sun in so far as our body itself is affected by it (E II, prop. 35, note).

This has the important consequence that the displacement of inadequate ideas by more adequate ones, and so of passive emotions by more active ones, is not entirely simple. Inadequate ideas are not baseless and passive emotions are not without strength. There is the even more important consequence that the adequacy of our ideas and so the activity of our emotions depends on their relation to a more or less adequate system of beliefs about what we need or want as self-maintaining beings.

Perhaps absolute adequacy does require something like knowledge of what amounts to logical necessities forming an intuitive science, and so absolute freedom, as freedom from external causes, would also be freedom from emotions. But in striving for that (unattainable) state, freedom and adequacy must be matters of degree, and control of our emotional lives is connected to the requirements of human nature. So 'activity' is tied to our conatus, our desires and needs as self-maintaining individuals, and our more or less systematic beliefs about those desires and needs.

Spinoza's distinction between active and passive mental states derives directly from his epistemological distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas, and his understanding of the notion of 'cause' or 'explanation'. Inadequate ideas involve external causes -- unlike adequate ideas, we have to look outside the order of our thoughts (our natures as thinking beings) for an explanation of their occurrence and truth. Adequate ideas are the logical consequences of preceding ideas, they follow actively from our power as thinking beings.
I say that we act when anything is done, either within us or without us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is to say (by the preceding Def.), when from our nature anything follows either within us or without us, which by that nature alone can be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we suffer when anything is done within us, or when anything follows from our nature of which we are not the cause except partially (E III, def. 2).

Without unduly complicating the discussion at this point, it can be seen that in so far as the mind is constituted by adequate ideas it necessarily acts, and in so far as it is constituted by inadequate ideas it necessarily suffers. An adequate idea is self-explanatory, or follows as a logical consequence of other adequate ideas, and so far as our mind is constituted by a succession of adequate ideas we do not have to look outside our own mental natures for the adequate cause of that succession.

Some complication is called for. Active/passive corresponds to the distinction between what one does and what happens to one. For Descartes, one does only that which follows from one's will. For Spinoza, we do what depends on our nature alone (as finite modes, understandable under two attributes as mind and body). Adequate ideas are the actions of the mind, for they are explainable as elements in a series of logically related ideas and so dependent only on our nature as thinking beings. But there is a difficulty in identifying adequate ideas. First there is an ambiguity in 'ideas' -- it can cover single words such as 'motion' or complete thoughts such as 'the whole is not greater than the sum of its parts'. This ambiguity need not detain us because single words must be seen as functioning in sentences of an adequate theory; alone they are neither true nor false, and so neither adequate nor inadequate.¹ But,  

¹ That there should be this ambiguity is understandable because of the
development of terminology from 'common notions' or ultimate ideas such as 'equality' -- 'existence', 'duration', . . . -- to eternal truths or adequate ideas: e.g., 'things equal to the same thing are equal to one another'. See annotation to Letter IV, Correspondence, Wolf ed., p. 377.

secondly, can one call an idea adequate without knowing whose it is and on what grounds he holds it? Here there is a genuine difficulty of interpretation. The answer is apparently yes, because, we are told, adequate ideas bear their truth on their face; further, all who have adequate ideas will thereby know and hence know that they know. The answer is apparently no, because Spinoza indicates that we can have a thought (e.g., that involved in loving x), on either adequate or inadequate grounds. The thought remains the same. The truth, even logical truth of a thought does not guarantee that it is an adequately grounded idea (e.g., a mathematical truth might be believed on authority).

Though there are grounds for the former answer, I think that an understanding of the sort of transition involved in a move from passive to active emotion, the wider interpretation of 'adequacy' we have argued for (as a matter of role in theory rather than logical truth), and the fact that the possibility of knowing that one knows does not amount to its own realization, all require the view that it is not sufficient to have a thought (which is for some people adequate) for it to be adequate. Even if it were the case that if a person does have an idea on adequate grounds, it necessarily follows that he knows the idea to be adequate; inadequacy would still depend on relation to the individual mind of some person (E II, prop. 36). So one cannot tell that an idea is inadequate on its face, unless that face includes the owner's (which may happen where the idea is one that occurs to me and so the face is mine). The adequacy of an idea depends not only on its content, but also on whose it is and the grounds on which he holds it.
V. Transforming Emotions

In order to overcome fear, Spinoza prescribes that we "often enumerate and imagine the common dangers of life, and think upon the manner in which they can best be avoided and overcome by presence of mind and courage" (E V, prop. 10, note). In this case, the fear is got rid of. What is objectionable in the emotion is its impotence -- in the grip of fear one is disabled from action -- and the impotence of mind of which it is a sign. Both *Timor* (def. 39) and *Metus* (def. 13) are sometimes translated as 'fear', the quoted passage is concerned with the latter notion, which bears the sense of "an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue" (and becomes despair when the doubt is removed). Here freedom is properly freedom from. That is not to say that fear is always inappropriate: we may be confronted by something genuinely dangerous, something which might injure us by counteracting our efforts to maintain ourselves as thinking embodied beings. The more adequate our understanding of our natures and of what constitutes a threat (raging mobs do not help anyone's *conatus*) the more appropriate the emotion, but the emotion itself can never be active. As a matter of definition, fear is painful and so the mind's power of acting is lessened or limited, and so cannot be active (see E III, prop. 59). The notions of appropriateness and activity must be distinguished. The thought can be separated from the affect, so that an appropriate and adequate thought may be tied to an appropriate but passive affect. The free or active life makes more stringent demands than a life limited to appropriate emotions. There is a difference between an emotion being irrational and its being useless or ineffective from the point of
view of larger purposes. Simply from the point of view of the discrimina-
tion and identification of emotions, about which Spinoza has a great deal
to teach us, an emotion may be out of place, and it will then almost
certainly (barring vast coincidence) be undesirable, because the thought and
feeling are inappropriate or directed to an unreal situation. An active
emotion will, of course, necessarily be appropriate. As we have seen,
the notion of appropriateness can find no place in the Humean scheme,
while he can give a sense to the 'reasonableness' of emotions in terms of
their functional value. For Spinoza, appropriateness appears as a part
(though only a part) of adequacy and activity.

So far we can see that for Spinoza, coping with fear and all of the
dispositions based on pain is a matter of eliminating them. Where they are
based on true beliefs and so are appropriate, there will always be an
active emotion incorporating those true beliefs (e.g., recognizing the
danger but dwelling on the techniques of maintaining one's powers in the
face of them) which will better enable one to effectively meet difficulties
(in this case of fear, the corresponding active emotion would involve
"presence of mind and courage", in the case of hatred, it is to be con-
quered by love or generosity). It does, however, seem inevitable that
where one does suffer pain and has more or less adequate beliefs concerning
its sources that one will experience (an inevitably) passive emotion.
Spinoza seems to acknowledge this in the case of hatred or anger, but
points out, among other things, that if we appreciate "that man, like
other things, acts according to the necessity of nature, then the injury
or the hatred which usually arises from that necessity will occupy but
the least part of the imagination, and will be easily overcome ..."
In effect, he is suggesting a revision of belief about the operation of causes, so that the object of anger will be seen as just an element of a necessary structure, a change which inevitably alters the character of the emotion. And the intellectual activity, the search for and consideration of broader causes, is itself a pleasure and so alleviating.

But short of the elimination of useless or painful emotions and the development of an intellectual love of God, what happens when an emotion is transformed from passive to active through an increase in the adequacy of the associated ideas? Most basically, the object changes. The object, by contrast with Hume, is not merely an idea which occurs in conjunction with an impression, not even constant conjunction. The object is the believed cause of a change of state (\textit{conatus}). Spinoza holds a strong thesis of intentionality: "Modes of thought, such as love, desire, or the emotions of the mind, by whatever name they may be called, do not exist unless in the same individual exists the idea of a thing loved, desired, etc. But the idea may exist although no other modes of thinking exist" (E II, axiom 3). The basic emotions of pleasure and pain may be exceptions (the only exceptions among the emotions). But though there is no reference to an object in their definitions, there are grounds for thinking that the intentionality thesis is all-embracing. E.g., E III, prop. 56 indicates that as passive states, pleasure and pain must involve inadequate ideas and so external bodies: "The nature, therefore, of each passive state must necessarily be explained in such a manner that the nature of the object by which we are affected is expressed." This does not guarantee a conscious thought of an object, but objectless emotions
may turn out to be only apparently so (e.g., every time we are pleased, we must be pleased by something, and one should leave a placeholder for the object). That the object of desire and certain of its derivative emotions (e.g., regret, hope, emulation) is the 'believed cause' is not obvious, but it is also unclear whether these should be regarded as central cases of emotions at all. It is obvious that love and hatred and the emotions defined in terms of them and pleasure and pain do have believed causes as their objects (see E III, Def. Emo.).

The sense of 'cause' involved is not Humean. It is not a case of constant conjunction or implied general statements. Spinoza tells us that an adequate cause is one "whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived by means of the cause" (E III, def. 1) and, more generally, "From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows, and, on the other hand, if no determinate cause be given it is impossible that an effect can follow" (E I, axiom 3). The cause of something is its explanation, its necessary (and sufficient?) condition. Within Spinoza's scheme, the premises of a deductive argument can be said to be the 'cause' of the conclusion, i.e., its logical ground. Though this extends the modern usage of 'cause', assimilating 'cause' to 'logical ground' is itself actually part of a narrow interpretation corresponding to a narrow interpretation of adequacy. There is justification for it within Spinoza's scheme: "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes" (E II, prop. 9 Demo.) which derives from the claim that "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (E II, prop. 7) and ultimately from "the knowledge of an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of the cause" (E I,
This last has other important consequences, notably that we cannot ascribe an emotion to ourselves unless we can ascribe an object to the emotion. Still, there is a wider interpretation of 'cause', corresponding to our wider interpretation of adequacy. Though ultimately causes may have to be logical grounds, so that all effects can be seen as necessary consequences within an intuitive unified science, there are interim levels of understanding where the cause can be viewed as the explanation of the effect provided by the most comprehensive and coherent theory available in that area, or even merely the theory that someone happens to have.

The object of an emotion may not be the actual cause, for believed causes may involve false beliefs. Hence when our thought follows associative (mechanical) patterns rather than the laws of logic and science, our emotions may be misdirected. Spinoza's favoured word for a thought or belief involved in an emotion is 'idea'. He uses the word more widely than Hume ("By idea I understand a conception of the mind which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing." — E II, def. 3), and is careful to distinguish ideas from passive perceptions, and mental pictures or images ("dumb pictures on a tablet" — E III, prop. 49 cor. note; Cf. Correspondence, Wolf ed., p. 289, on imagining vs. conceiving God). Hence he can introduce grammatical complexity into 'ideas', and the 'idea of a cause' becomes ambiguous: it can mean the idea of an object which is a cause or the idea of an object as a cause (i.e., the thought that it is a cause). Where ideas are treated, in Humean fashion, as images, such complexity is not possible. So where our thought is in fact a succession of images, temporal and other discriminations become far more difficult and
other assimilations follow. Hence Spinoza argues that "a man is affected by the image of a past or future thing with the same emotion of joy or sorrow as that with which he is affected by the image of a present thing" (E III, prop. 18). The tense, or temporal reference, is left out unless "the image is connected with that of past or future time . . . the image of the thing considered in itself alone is the same whether it be related to future, past, or present time . . ." This has important psychological consequences, most important we can predict and see why emotional reactions to memories and phantasies can be as strong as responses to reality.

Recognizing a thought as a memory, as referring to the past, may change an emotion. Indeed, Spinoza suggests that such recognition weakens the hold of the emotion on us (E IV, props. 9 and 10). Contrast the notion that memories can be as powerful as present ideas with what one would expect on a Humean view, on which memories are treated as 'faded copies' (hardly likely to produce an impact comparable to live impressions).

Freud insists on the timelessness of primary process thinking and the (pre-linguistic) unconscious, and in Chapter IV we shall consider the mechanisms by which different sorts of thoughts or ideas (phantasies, memories, perceptions) come to contribute to and change one's emotional life.

The ambiguity in 'the idea of an external cause' is, I think, unresolved in Spinoza. I think, however, that it is generally to be taken in the strong sense of an idea of a cause as cause. It is clear that to have an idea is to have a belief. Spinoza allows no sense to the Cartesian notion of assenting to an idea as an act of will. ("In the mind there is no volition or affirmation and negation except that which the idea, in so
far as it is an idea, involves" — E II, prop. 49.) So if one associates a particular object with one's pleasure or pain as its cause, one, in effect, believes it is the cause and it is the object of one's emotion. (Though there is no separate step of assenting to a belief, Spinoza would allow that one could dissociate from a thought -- as in the sun case -- as one comes to learn that it is not a belief properly grounded in evidences of truth. This comes closer to the sort of passivity of thought which Freud discusses, where one may suffer from an alien or obsessive thought, despite having dissociated from it or refusing to incorporate it.)

What is less clear is what happens if there is an idea associated with one's pleasure or pain (one thinks of it immediately before or following the change), but it is not thought of qua cause. Presumably, the emotion then has no object (even if it does have a cause), and according to the definitions of the emotions must be regarded as a different emotion. An emotion that would have been love becomes an objectless pleasure if left unexplained, and can be transformed into love by the ascription of a cause by the subject. Less radical changes result from the correction of less radical defects. For example, if we become aware of a multiplicity and complexity of causes, the emotion will have many objects and we will be less affected towards each than if we had regarded one alone as the cause (E V, prop. 9). At the extreme other end of transformations, destruction of belief in the cause may destroy the emotion altogether.

The last situation may perhaps be illustrated by using Othello. Were Othello to be convinced that Desdemona had in fact been faithful,
and that the apparent evidence to the contrary was the result of the machinations of Iago, his jealousy would disappear. Of course, Othello has worked himself up into a state (sufficient to murder his wife) and there is no guarantee that that will automatically alter with the discovery of the falsity of his relevant beliefs (i.e., knowledge of the cause may not destroy all its effects), but it will have to be redescribed. Even if the thought of Desdemona's unfaithfulness continues, it will not persist as a belief, and that it be believed is essential to Othello's state being a straightforward case of jealousy. Given his new beliefs, he can no longer be simply jealous. The jealousy will disappear, as such, and (at worst) might continue in the form of pathological jealous thoughts. These may then be open to other forms of treatment. But rational argument certainly can take one part of the way. (There is no necessity to treat jealousy as though it were like a headache, something that comes and goes, but that there is no arguing with.) Given the following:

1. the recognition of the aetiology of the relevant beliefs, i.e., their inadequate grounding in the appropriate evidences of truth,
2. the conviction that the relevant beliefs are in fact false (i.e., one could believe something which is true for bad reasons, so that a belief is ill-founded is not sufficient to show that it is false),
3. the recognition of the inappropriateness of the emotion given the new understanding of the beliefs or thoughts,

then the state of mind, both for Othello and third parties, must be redescribed because the state of mind essentially involved those beliefs, and was dependent on their being (full-fledged) beliefs. He can no longer be said to be jealous, though he may well still be upset.
Spinoza displays particular psychological perspicacity in his discussion of the detailed structure of jealousy: "hatred toward a beloved object when joined with envy" arising when "I imagine that an object beloved by me is united to another person by the same or by a closer bond of friendship than that by which I myself alone held the object" (E III, prop. 35). The componential analysis readily reveals why one might wonder whether the capacity for jealousy is a sign of insecurity or a sign of love, and how it can involve both.

One could say that the object of Othello's jealousy is either Desdemona and her apparent lover (she being the object of the component hatred and he of the component envy) or their presumed relationship. In either case, the object would be what he regards as the source of his unhappiness and suffering. There is an apparent complexity because belief is essential to the character of his pain in two ways. Facts must be mediated by perception, i.e., jealousy will arise only if one is aware of (or believes in) a provoking situation. But a certain type of belief is also a logical condition on the proper characterization of suffering being jealousy, and the condition is built into Spinoza's definition of jealousy. Looking to the first sort of thought-dependence, Desdemona and lover together, or their relationship alone, would not produce pain in Othello without some awareness or belief on his part in their togetherness or relationship. So it might appear that 'the belief that x is the cause' is itself the cause of the emotion, that the emotion is self-fulfilling and this belief is its object. That this is only apparent can be seen by more carefully spelling out the situation. 'The belief that x is the cause' requires completion. It is 'the belief that x is the cause of Othello's
suffering'. But, where 'x' is the Desdemona-Cassio relationship, the essential belief is 'the belief that x is the case'. Given this belief, unhappiness will be produced in Othello. Given an awareness of the causal connection, a new belief arises, 'the belief that the belief that x is the case is the cause of Othello's suffering'. So 'the belief that x is the case' and not 'the belief that x is the cause' is the believed cause of Othello's suffering. (See discussion of Thalberg et al on thoughts as causes, and different senses of 'object', in Appendix A.) One may not want to say, however, even in a technical sense, that any 'thought' is the object of his jealousy, because it is not the ultimate believed cause: there is an embedded object, the object of the causally efficacious belief, i.e., 'that x is the case' or 'x'. To believe something is to assent to an idea, to entertain it (E II, prop. 49). Once the will is discarded as illusory, as a universal faculty improperly abstracted from individual (volitions and) ideas, the will in belief cannot be said to operate (pass judgment) on some further object other than the object of the idea. The object of belief is the object of the idea. "A true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea" (E I, axiom 6) and falsity consists in the privation of knowledge: "in ideas there is nothing positive on account of which they are called false" (E II, props. 35 and 33). The object of an idea is not its cause (E II, prop. 5 -- in Correspondence, ed. Wolf, p. 341, Spinoza reaffirms that the object of an idea is not its efficient cause in reference to this proposition); the cause must be another thought because causal relations hold only between objects seen under the same attribute (Thought or Extension -- E II, prop. 6). And the relation of mental and physical correlates is some form of
identity too intimate for causality. Hence the object of belief cannot be an object in the same sense as the object of emotion is, namely, a believed cause. The sense in which it is an object is obscure in Spinoza. He does offer a metaphysical guarantee that every idea will have a corresponding object in the realm of extension ("The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" — E II, prop. 7). The ideas constituting the human mind have as their object the component parts of the human body (E II, props. 13 and 15). External objects are known through the modifications they work on the human body (E II, props. 16, 17, and 26). So we are carried to the ultimate objects of the emotions (though in cases involving ideas of ideas, the object of an idea may be another idea and so the object of an emotion be an idea): the external objects.

We left Othello upset. Assuming the relevant beliefs have dissolved, and that Othello’s energies are not redirected as the result of new ideas (e.g., into hatred of Iago as the cause of unnecessary suffering and jealousy), we are left with a physiological residue, which will now, at the minimum, have a more complex explanation and so characterization. Following Spinoza, we have treated emotions as essentially characterized through thoughts. It is an important corrective to add that each of the ideas discussed is assumed by Spinoza to have a corresponding (though unspecified) physical correlate. Hume too was content to leave matters beyond the components of the mind, impressions and ideas, to "the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy". But Hume’s account gains much plausibility from its appeal to feeling where Spinoza appeals to thought (here our central arguments have taken place) and its treatment
of impressions and ideas as though they were themselves physiological rather than epistemological constructs. Emotions certainly are, in part, and on occasion, feelings. About Othello's violent unbalance of motion-and-rest in his bodily elements, Spinoza would presumably insist on a corresponding confusion of thought adding up to no definite emotion (unless pathological jealous thoughts continue to hold sway). What is important is not to deny the role of physiology, feeling, and affect, but to see how it differs from the role of thought. Following Spinoza in giving thought its place in the discrimination and identification of mental states puts us in a position to go further in understanding the power of reason in relation to the passions. Hampshire provides a helpful restatement of the central argument:

(1) The emotions and propositional attitudes are distinguished from each other principally by their actual and notional causes, where the notional cause is the subject's thought about the cause.
(2) The subject's thought of the object of the emotion (what he fears, is angry with and about) and of the propositional attitudes includes a thought about the cause or occasion: if his thought of the cause or occasion is substantially changed, his thought of the object will be changed; and if the subject's thought of the object is changed, his dispositions and behaviour are correspondingly changed.
(3) The subject of any emotion, or propositional attitude, which has an intentional object, has an authority, though not an overriding one, in determining what his state of mind is and what its object is (e.g., whether he fears and what specifically he fears): if he believes that he fears A, or is envious of B because of C, or that he is discouraged by D, or hopes for E because of F, this belief has to be included in any adequate account of his state of mind, even if the belief is erroneous. If the belief is erroneous, then his state of mind must be a confused and complex one (Hampshire, 1971c, p. 565).

The Spinozist approach is sometimes challenged on the basis of cases where we have a definite emotion but seem unable to find a similarly definite corresponding thought. We have argued that Hume lapses into self-contradiction and implausibility when he tries to make sense of the...
reverse cases the 'calm passions', but his sort of feeling theory is on stronger ground when confined to the range of emotions he calls 'violent' (though even here certain general confusions seem unavoidable given Hume's approach). Can Spinoza's theory provide a structure and a language through which all emotions, even where they seem to be essentially affect alone, can be understood? First, however one ultimately deals with so-called objectless emotions (that is, whether they have very general objects, or unconscious objects, are derivative from fuller states, or whatever), there is no reason to believe that one must fall into contradiction in using Spinozist language to describe them. He enables us to see that there is a scale within fear, from highly articulate and well-formulated fears involving explicit thoughts, to very basic and perhaps incoherent fears involving inadequate and confused thoughts. Even should there be some states involving no thoughts at all, there is no reason why a Spinozist would be forced to deny them. But it is highly unlikely that there is anything which is properly describable as an emotion which is not thought-dependent in at least one of the two ways we have discussed.

It is worth noting that our lengthy discussion of objects had little to do with the involved nature of Othello's passion; the situation remains much the same for the apparently more straightforward case of fear of a raging mob: without an intervening awareness that there is a raging mob, there is no fear of a raging mob. Whether Spinoza overintellectualizes the emotions depends in large measure on how much awareness is required, in particular whether it must reach the level of (conscious) causal beliefs. It is important here to distinguish between the sufferer and third-party points of view. The victim may be afraid and known by observers to be
afraid of the raging mob. The victim may know himself to be afraid by all sorts of, perhaps 'felt', signs (including cold sweat, inclination to run, trembling, etc.) but if he does not ascribe these to the mob's presence he does not know that he is afraid of the mob (though that is what he is in fact afraid of, for it is the actual cause of his symptoms and behaviour). Such ignorance is unlikely in such a case, but often (especially for emotions like jealousy) he, like third parties, may have to depend on such clues (which may be understood as clues to his unconscious thoughts and phantasies) to discover what his state of mind is (though it is not fully his state of mind till he makes the discovery -- a discovery which may in turn transform it), and third parties may in fact be in a better position to tell.

Looking back to the case of love, we can recall the other sort of thought-dependence (mediation by thought, and characterization by thought and level of thought). Spinoza is not over-intellectualizing love by building in the idea of the cause. A loved object gives pleasure and is desired for its own sake. He is not introducing a utilitarian calculation of value, but bringing out the commitments in a claim to 'love'. It places constraints on the possible explanations one can offer for his state (though of course he may be wrong, even within the constraints), and on the explanations for desire and action he can base on the state.
VI. Intellectual or Social Emotions

Spinoza's doctrines about the objects of the emotions reveal an intellectual (or social) dimension to our discrimination of emotions. In addition to the ranges within particular emotions (e.g., fear) from highly directed and thought-dependent, to apparently purely physiological and even objectless, there is a scale among emotions leading from the primitive to the highly thought-impregnated. Here the feeling of a particular emotion depends on the having of particular beliefs, or more accurately (to suggest the element that makes this a new dimension), the ascription of a certain state of mind (to oneself or others) depends on the existence (in the subject) of certain intellectual capacities including: the discrimination of cognitive levels (hope and regret both require recognition of the difference between what is in doubt and what is, at least relatively, certain) and the having of certain concepts (there is no shame without 'responsibility'). This is very far from the Humean world where one feels what one feels, and there is no inherent reason in the nature of emotion why one person should have a coarser or more limited power of discrimination among emotions. For a Humean, the closest parallel would be an emotion-blindness somewhat like colour-blindness. Intellectual capacity and reason have no place.

We have already seen that change of belief can lead to more than change in object of emotion, the very character of the emotion can be transformed. In fact, our first example (p. 136) was of a change from objectless pleasure to love by the ascription of a cause. Every change in object is in a sense a change in emotion (see E III, prop. 56). If this were not enough to guarantee the infinite variety and complexity of
human feeling and emotion, Spinoza also points out that "Different men may be affected by one and the same object in different ways, and the same man may be affected by one and the same object in different ways at different times" (E III, prop. 51, see also prop. 57).

So it is foolish to ask "how many emotions are there?" in expectation of a definite answer. It depends very much out of what interest the question is asked, for there are an indefinite number of grounds of classification, none of which can exhaust all the differences. Over-concern with definition in this area is a symptom and cause of false precision. Spinoza concludes his own long series of definitions by saying that many emotions have no names, and the point of his list is to show how emotions can be understood (at least in their mental aspect) as variations arising from the three basic emotions of desire, pleasure and pain, in accordance with his principles concerning the nature and operation of the mind. The confusion in the ordinary principles of classification makes the ordinary meanings of emotion words of little use in understanding the nature of the emotions. It is here worth recalling our initial observation that all the central words in the Ethics must be understood in the special senses provided by Spinoza. (Cf. E III, prop. 52, note, and def. emo. 31 explanation). Which does not mean that Spinoza is analyzing some artificial constructs rather than our emotional lives. He is providing what can be regarded as the system behind our confused perceptions. And the system can allow for variations in accordance with the conceptual schemes and concerns of different times and different cultures. It is the principles of distinction rather than the particular distinctions that matter. The finer discriminations and
subtleties that we should concern ourselves with here are suggested by
Spinoza's examples of "notions of love or desire, which explain the
nature of this or that emotion through the objects to which they are
related" (hence voluptuousness, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition,
etc. are discriminated through their objects -- E III, prop. 56, note),
and are embodied in the definitions Spinoza does supply.

The difference between shame and repentance according to Spinoza
is the difference between pain "with the accompanying idea of some action
which we imagine people blame" (cf. Hume on humility) and pain "with the
idea of something done which we believe has been done by a free decree
of our mind" (see defs. emo. 31 and 27, and E III, prop. 30, note). The
difference is a difference in belief. Shame arises if we imagine that
we have given just cause for the hatred another bears us (E III, prop.
40, note). Though shame is a limited virtue (E IV, prop. 58, note), the
important point is that the capacity to be ashamed depends on a prior
understanding of blame (the pain with which a person turns away from
another person's action, the purpose of which is to harm him). Without
this concept, one could have no reason for thinking one was ashamed
rather than merely repentant (which does not require awareness of our bad
intention by another, the bad effects repented of might not even involve
another). Even if we use 'shame' in its looser more modern sense, where
it is assimilated to Spinoza's use of 'repentence', one could not feel
shame (as opposed to, say, embarrassment, discomfort, or unease) unless
one had concepts like 'guilt' and 'responsibility' and was able to apply
them (even if misapplied on a particular occasion). One cannot feel shame
simpliciter. That is, if one is unable to say of what one is ashamed, it
cannot be proper to describe one's state of mind as 'shame'. If someone insists that he feels shame but can say no more, then an observer would have to conclude that either he does not know what shame means or (supposing there is evidence for understanding based on one's use of 'shame' on other occasions etc.) that he has no reason for regarding his state of mind, his discomfort and unease, as 'shame' rather than any of a dozen other things. Even the ascription of an object is not sufficient to justify the description of the emotion as 'shame'. If I merely insist that I am ashamed and, further, ashamed of, say, the ashtray before me, without being able to make any connection between the putative object and myself (other than the claim that it is the object), then the emotion remains unintelligible and it remains doubtful that I understand the word 'shame'. However my stomach may churn and hormones flow, and however the ashtray may obtrude itself on my consciousness, it is not enough to make my emotion shame (though it might be enough to make it 'fear').

But if I can tell a story, however implausible, suggesting or establishing the appropriate relations, then my emotion may become intelligible as shame: for example, I am an ashtray manufacturer and as part of a policy of planned obsolescence have so made the relevant object that it will disintegrate within a month, and therefore regard myself as responsible for its being defective. The shame may be unjustified, but it at least becomes intelligible as shame. I have reasons for describing my state of mind as 'shame' rather than in some other way, I have the sorts of beliefs (though the beliefs themselves may be unreasonable) which are appropriate to the emotion. (Consider a monkey making horrendous noises at a piano and wincing. Might it be 'achamed' of its piano playing? Cf. Wittgenstein
The social or intellectual end of the emotional scale is even more obviously open to change through change in belief than some of the cases we have considered, even more amenable to reason.

Change in belief should be sufficient to lead to change in emotion (the physical correlates should alter with the change in ideas, the order of things being the same as the order of ideas). The emotion is transformed not in virtue of the truth of the new thought, but because of its difference from the old.

We know that, when we groundlessly fear any evil, the fear vanishes when we hear correct intelligence; but we also know, on the other hand, that, when we fear an evil which will actually come upon us, the fear vanishes when we hear false intelligence, so that the imaginations do not disappear with the presence of the truth, in so far as it is true, but because other imaginations arise which are stronger and which exclude the present existence of the objects we imagine, as we have shown in Prop. 17; Pt. 2. (E IV, prop. 1, note.)

It is of course important to add that 'belief' has a normative aspect. If we know that a thought is inadequately grounded in evidences of truth, it is not fully a 'belief'. And where an emotion requires full-bodied belief (and not mere suspicion, or irrational fancy, or . . .), reflection on the source and grounds of a thought will affect that emotion. But Spinoza's remarks on the power of false intelligence, of phantasies and false beliefs are also important. Thoughts may be important in emotions, but their importance may not depend on their truth. This has important implications for our later discussions. We shall have to ask whether Freudian aetiologies must be true in order to be effective in changing emotional reactions, and even whether their effectiveness would be evidence of their truth. A Spinozist epistemology would suggest 'no' to both
questions. Spinoza's own therapy must take these complications into
account.

Ideas, even false imaginings, while not "pictures on a tablet", are
still entities and are not easily displaced. Their presence and persistence
will usually depend on external causes. A passive emotion is, by definition,
at least in part to be explained by causes outside our own nature and its
power will depend on the power of those causes as compared with our own
power (E IV, prop. 5). Ultimately, "an emotion cannot be restrained nor
removed unless by an opposed and stronger emotion" (E IV, prop. 7). But
the first and most important step in conquering a passive emotion is an
understanding of its causes. Knowledge of the grounds of a belief changes
that belief. If the grounds are adequate, the belief may stand but the
explanation of its being held is complicated by the knowledge of its
grounds. If the grounds are inadequate, that knowledge is the first step
towards rejecting the belief. The belief, or more accurately, the thought,
does not instantaneously disappear, for according to Spinoza there was
nothing positive in virtue of which it was false, so the knowledge of its
inadequacy leaves whatever was positive supported by its inadequate
grounds, but we now know the grounds as inadequate and the belief is
modified.

For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine his distance from us
to be about 200 feet, and in this we are deceived so long as we re-
main in ignorance of the true distance. When this is known, the
error is removed, but not the imagination, that is to say, the idea
of the sun which manifests his nature in so far only as the body is
affected by him; so that, although we know his true distance, we
nevertheless imagine him close to us (E IV, prop. 1, note).

Awareness of inadequacy does not drive out or destroy the idea, but the
false belief gives way to an acknowledged imagination once we know the
causes of the thought. The thought persists but it knows its level. Insofar as such causal thoughts are constituents in emotions, changes in them are changes in the emotion. I may be in pain and regard Peter as the source of my pain, and so hate and be angry at Peter (anger, for Spinoza, being "the desire by which we are impelled, through hatred, to injure those whom we hate" -- def. emo. 36). But if I learn that he is not the cause of my suffering, though the suffering may remain, my state of mind can no longer be hatred and anger at Peter (E V, prop. 2). The removal of the suffering (the residue which remains once the beliefs which make it hate or anger cease to persist as beliefs) requires something more for its treatment:

Whenever ... the mind is agitated by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected with a modification by which its power of action is increased or diminished. Again, this modification of the body (prop. 5, pt. 4) receives from its own cause a power to persevere in its own being, a power, therefore, which cannot be restrained nor removed unless by a bodily cause (prop. 6, pt. 2 [see also prop. 17]) affecting the body with a modification contrary to the first (prop. 5, pt. 3), and stronger than it (axiom, pt. 4). (E V, prop. 7.)

Hence the total removal of an emotion requires another (opposed and stronger) emotion, but the correction of the understanding is sufficient for starting the process of transformation.
VII. Active Emotion and Action

Spinoza's general definition of the emotions at the end of Part III is actually a definition of the passions or passive emotions. Emotion need not depend on confused or inadequate ideas. A totally free being would perhaps be free of all emotion (E V, prop. 17). Be that as it may, Spinoza, while not neglecting the vast difficulties on the road to freedom, insists that emotions can be active (see E III, props. 58 and 59). But it is not entirely clear which emotions are to count as active. For example, fear of a raging mob, where it consists of a desire to flee, may well be rational — would it therefore be active? Where the desire springs from true knowledge of evil (danger to our conatus), it can be understood through our essence alone, and so follows in us in so far as we act. This at any rate is the position suggested by the argument in E IV, Prop. 15. (The definition of fear or timidity in III, def. 39 is closest to this concept of fear, but it is more complex and via the notion defined at 13 involves doubt.) But following from understanding something truly (contrary to the implication of E III, prop. 1), is not sufficient for activity. Or rather, if the thing understood is evil, it cannot be understood adequately, or more precisely, it cannot be understood through our essence alone (E IV, prop. 64). And this is directly contrary to the claim of Prop. 15, Pt. IV. Perhaps all that is needed is limitation of the earlier proposition in the light of the later. The later proposition (64) rests on the fact that passage to a less perfection cannot be understood through the essence itself of man (E III, props. 6 and 7). So pain is a passive state, and knowledge of evil, which is itself painful in so far as we are conscious of it (by E IV, prop. 8), can only
lead to passive states. (The desire to flee which we are discussing, unlike the fear, def. 13, discussed in E IV, prop. 63, is not itself a painful state and so might be active if it did not arise from knowledge of evil.) It is easy enough to concoct a version of the desire to flee which will be active, say if it arises out of knowledge of what is good, i.e., faced with a raging mob: fleeing (cf. E IV, prop. 63, note). In general, "to all actions to which we are determined by an emotion wherein the mind is passive we may, without the emotion, be determined by reason" (E IV, prop. 59). But this should presumably be read as 'without the passive emotion'. But which emotions are active? The question arises whether emotions of pleasure can be active. Emotions of pain cannot be active because pain is a lessening of the mind's power of acting, i.e., thinking (E III, prop. 59) and because such lessenings cannot be understood through the essence itself of man (E IV, prop. 64 and III, props. 4, 6, and 7). Can changes in the other direction, increases in the mind's power of acting be so understood? There are passages which suggest that states of change are passive in virtue of being states of change. What I think is troubling here is those elements in Spinoza's system which we have seen tend (along with other elements) towards making the intellectual love of God the only active emotion. Spinoza clearly thinks pleasure can be active: e.g., "in so far as pleasure is good, so far it agrees with reason (for it consists in this that a man's power of action is increased or assisted), and the mind is not passive therein unless in so far as man's power of action is not increased sufficiently for him to conceive adequately himself and his actions" (E IV, prop. 59, dem.). But when determined by reason, Spinoza adds (in the same prop.)
that we are determined "without the emotion". We have suggested an alternative way of reading this. But where the emotion has a particular external object (i.e., where it is not the intellectual love of God and does not arise, as in E III, prop. 58, from contemplation of one's own power of conceiving adequate ideas) must not an adequate understanding take into account the nature of the external body (which is what made pain passive, because weakening of conatus, by E III, prop. 4, brings external causes into account)? So it seems that activity should not be a matter of explainability in terms of one's own nature. These matters are complicated by Spinoza's view that perception of external causes reveals the constitution of one's own body. But I think we have already seen a way out. Activity is mainly a matter of adequate ideas, rationality rather than passive perception, ideas about one's own nature and the operation of causes. But these causes need not be confined to one's own essence because adequate ideas and their various associated emotions all lead to pleasure (E III, prop. 58) in the contemplation of the adequate ideas and our power, and this pleasure is part of what makes the associated emotion active.

The emotions also have a dynamic aspect which may seem slighted by an emphasis on the role of thought. Why do we have emotions? There is much Darwinian evolutionary thought (including a book by Darwin himself) on the function of the emotions. Spinoza does not, however, leave the emotions hanging as mysterious events in our lives. He does not assimilate emotions simply to thoughts, so that our relation to the world must appear as entirely contemplative. We have already seen that functional value is an aspect of activity. The answer to why we have emotions is to
be found by asking what we have when we have emotions. We do not simply have beliefs. Even if that were initially plausible, one would wonder what would differentiate beliefs that were emotions from intellectual beliefs (Hume has difficulties when he tries to work the assimilation the other way, i.e., treating beliefs as though they were emotions or feelings). (See Appendix B.) When one has an emotion, one has beliefs, but one may also have physiological affects, manifestations, expressions, desires, inclinations, motives, . . . For Spinoza, the dynamic aspect of the emotions is provided by the conatus. Man's essence is desire and the ends of his desire are fixed in his nature. That which preserves and maintains him as a finite thinking embodied being is desirable. Emotion has natural expressions and is tied to action through desire.

Some emotions simply are desires (which does not mean that the desires are themselves simple). Hence Spinoza defines anger as "the desire by which we are impelled, through hatred, to injure those whom we hate" (E III, def. emo. 36). There is no mystery about why we are inclined to strike or harm those we hate. As Spinoza explains (E III, prop. 39), to hate a person is to imagine him as a cause of pain, and pain always provides a self-explanatory (E III, prop. 28) motive for the removal of its source. We may have other motives for harming another, but then we are not acting out of anger. And if we are angry we have a motive for action (it is the having of a motive for action). The crucial, and rather less clear, step is the one tying an emotion which is not itself a desire to one which is. Must we always be angry at those we hate? Other things being equal, the Spinozist answer is yes. The emotions themselves have an internal logic, a dynamic that moves us from one to the other and to
action. Our conatus ensures (is) the endeavour to persevere in our
being, and pleasure and pain are changes in the state of our ability
to do this. Emotions are based on desire, pleasure, and pain; ultimately,
conatus. Where the emotions are not themselves desires, Spinoza argues
"we endeavor to bring into existence everything which we imagine conduces
to pleasure, and to remove or destroy everything opposed to it, or which
we imagine conduces to sorrow" (E III, prop. 28). The argument is based
on the desire to increase and maintain the mind's power of thought and the
body's power of action, i.e., the conatus. Pain and pleasure are motives
for action, and insofar as emotions are based on pleasure and pain they
contain motives for action -- the precise nature of the appropriate
action depending on the accompanying thoughts. What may make the suggestion
that we are always angry at those we hate seem implausible, is a confusion
between being and feeling. We need not feel angry (the stomach need not
churn, the adrenalin need not flow) in order to be angry (being 'furious'
is different); but we must, of course, have the relevant desire (and 'feel'
is sometimes used broadly to mean this, in which case we do 'feel' angry
though we may lack any angry 'feelings'). We shall come to the sense in
which we 'have' a desire when it is not a felt desire (though it need not
be unconscious).

The expressions of emotional states in action do not necessarily
follow from decisions, they follow from the states themselves.

Thus the infant believes that it is by free will that it seeks the
breast; the angry boy believes that by free will he wishes vengeance;
the timid man thinks it is with free will he seeks light; the drunkard
believes that by a free command of his mind he speaks the things which
when sober he wishes he had left unsaid. Thus the madman, the chatterer,
the boy, and others of the same kind, all believe that they
speak of a free command of the mind, whilst, in truth, they have no
power to restrain the impulse which they have to speak, so that experience itself, no less than reason, clearly teaches that men believe themselves to be free simply because they are conscious of their own actions, knowing nothing of the causes by which they are determined; it teaches, too, that the decrees of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which differ therefore according to the different temper of the body. For every man determines all things from his emotion; those who are agitated by contrary emotions do not know what they want, whilst those who are agitated by no emotion are easily driven hither and thither. All this plainly shows that the decree of the mind, the appetite, and determination of the body are coincident in Nature, or rather that they are one and the same thing which, when it is considered under the attribute of thought and manifested by that, is called a "decree," and when it is considered under the attribute of extension and is deduced from the laws of motion and rest is called a "determination" (E III, prop. 2, note).

If we would be free we must understand our emotions and rule them, or they will inevitably rule us.

An understanding of the way vengeance flows from anger sheds light on other relations between emotion and action. For example, contrast Hume's treatment of the relation of love to desire with Spinoza's. It will be recalled that this posed a serious problem for Hume's theory (THN II, pt. II, sec. 6) because the alleged simplicity of passions isolates the feeling from its expression. The desire for the good of the beloved must be regarded as extraneous to love itself, so the desire of producing misery could have been annexed to love without conceptual difficulty. But in fact we would regard apparent cases of love accompanied by harmful wishes as ambivalent or would redescribe the 'harmful' effects in terms of the agent's beliefs (which would, presumably, take the effects as not harmful). In the course of his discussion, Hume also denies that the desire for happiness is essential because we may not think about the happiness or misery of our friend at all. On this point he is of course correct, but then the initial problem
of the incompleteness of love without the accompanying desire seems illusory -- calling for neither assimilation of the two nor appeal to "the original constitution of the mind". Spinoza is more accurate, first in describing the associated desire and then in accounting for its relation to the passion. He treats love as pleasure with the accompanying idea of an external cause, and (by E III, prop. 13) argues that he who loves a thing necessarily endeavors to keep it before him and to preserve it. Hume's confusion stems from treating the desire as some sort of felt sensation, somehow identifiable as "a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery", and then realizing that on some occasions (perhaps we are too absorbed in the object of our love to think of its happiness) we have no such feeling (though this would still leave him with a residual problem of accounting for its occasional presence). Thus Hume is like those "authors who define love to be the will of the lover to unite himself to the beloved object, expressing not the essence of love but one of its properties" (E III, def. emo. 6, explanation). The accuracy of Spinoza's observation can be seen in his account of the associated desire:

I must observe, however, when I say that it is a property in a lover to will a union with the beloved object, that I do not understand by will a consent or deliberation or a free decree of the mind (for that this is a fiction we have demonstrated in prop. 48, pt. 2), nor even a desire of the lover to unite himself with the beloved object when it is absent, nor a desire to continue in its presence when it is present, for love can be conceived without either one or the other of these desires; but by will I understand the satisfaction that the beloved object produces in the lover by its presence by virtue of which the joy of the lover is strengthened or at any rate supported.

Here will (desire) is given a readily intelligible criterion (satisfaction), and it becomes clear how the absence of certain feelings need not show the
absence of desire. Though the feelings are not necessary, the desire (in this sense) is.

The expression of emotion in physical behaviour is important in understanding how we can explain action by reference to emotions, it is also important as a window into the mental life of others. We know another person's emotional life through its expression. That statement verges on tautology; it requires greater precision (Expression in what? -- behaviour, action, speech, . . . -- What is revealed about emotional life? Does expression contrast with other manifestations or is it our only source of insight?) and hence qualification. But even at this crude level certain observations can be made. We have seen that Hume's mechanism of 'sympathy' is implausible. We do not, in general, come to understand another's state of mind by ourselves having a weakened version of the same emotions (impressions of reflexion) on exposure to the visible manifestations of the real thing. Unlike Hume, Spinoza uses 'sympathy' in connection with association of ideas, the displacement of feeling from one object to an associated one lacking the appropriate characteristics (E III, prop. 15). (Spinoza specifically contrasts his use with an even earlier one where 'sympathy' was supposed to designate mysterious sources of attraction, a mysteriousness which Spinoza dispels with his associationist explanation.) More comparable to Hume's mechanism of emotional transfer and perhaps providing some help in explaining our knowledge of other minds is Spinoza's theory of 'imitation'. The central proposition is E III, Prop. 27:

Although we may not have been moved toward a thing by any emotion, yet if it is like ourselves, whenever we imagine it to be affected by any emotion, we are affected by the same.
Unfortunately, this can be no more help in explaining our knowledge of other minds than Hume's mechanism (though, as in his theory, it can explain various emotional transitions), for that depends on how we come to imagine another to be affected by an emotion. The theory of imitation just provides a further consequence of such recognition (namely, the production of a like emotion in ourselves). And even the explanation for the phenomenon offered contains an unconvincing assimilation: the perception of an emotional state in another is taken to be itself an emotional state, in fact a duplicate of the state observed. The argument moves from the claim that the ideas of those modifications of the human body which are images of external things involve the nature of our own body and of the external body to "If, therefore, the nature of the external body be like that of our body, then the idea of the external body which we imagine will involve a modification of our body like that of the external body." But there is no reason to believe that the modification will be importantly 'like' the object perceived. Certainly there must be something in virtue of which a perception is a perception of one thing rather than another, but the mode of representation need not be picturing let alone reproduction. The suggestion that it is is immediately implausible, especially where the external expression of the emotion is at any distance from what might be regarded as its core (why should the perception of a scowl of anger itself involve a scowl?). Even where it is most plausible, because most vague and general, in the perception of pleasure and pain, the suggestion that the perception of pain is itself painful quickly becomes implausible once made precise. The pain of seeing a man afraid (a form of pain) need in no way be a form of fear. Admittedly, Spinoza confines his theory of imitation
to cases like 'commiseration' and ' emulation' ("the desire which is engendered in us for anything because we imagine that other persons, who are like ourselves, possess the same desire"), but he offers no explanation of why the supposed mechanism does not operate more widely. The phenomena he discusses certainly occur, and his observations are often of interest, but the explanation he offers does not seem useful.

Spinoza offers a reason for not discussing what might be taken as the standard expressions of emotion:

As for the external modifications of the body which are observed in the emotions, such as trembling, paleness, sobbing, laughter, and the like, I have neglected to notice them because they belong to the body alone without any relationship to the mind (note before B III, def. emo.).

But if one follows Spinoza in recognizing that desires and dispositions to behaviour are built into certain emotions, one might be able to develop a theory of natural expression and gesture. Hampshire (1960c) does attempt to develop such a theory, treating natural expressions of emotion (shaking a fist in anger, etc.) as truncated actions. Indeed, he attempts to derive inner emotional life from dispositions to overt behaviour which become inhibited. The theory contains Spinozist and Freudian elements. Rather than considering it here, which would take us too far afield, I shall move on to the promised survey of psychological therapies, and to the place of thought in Freudian theory, and to the relation of Spinozist theory to Freudian theory.
CHAPTER THREE . . . THOUGHT, THEORY, AND THERAPY
Therapies for psychological disorders can be ranged along a spectrum in accordance with the role and importance attached to the sufferer's thoughts or beliefs in the effectiveness of the therapy. That role will, in general, be correlated with the aetiological theory behind the therapeutic technique: if part of the problem is ideogenic, then thoughts will likely be assigned a role in unravelling the problem. This does not, however, fix the character of the thoughts involved: whether they need retrace the development of the pathogenic thoughts, be conscious or unconscious, about the disorder itself or about other matters, . . . And the connection between aetiological and therapeutic theories is not a necessary one. A therapy may be effective even though the theory that informs it is either false or nonexistent. And, though what makes a problem or a disorder 'psychological' may be (partly) that it is ideogenic, the appropriate treatment might still be organic or 'physical'. Indeed, behind disputes about the aetiological role of thoughts may lie deeper differences about the nature of thoughts or, more broadly, 'the mental'.
I. Non-Analytical Therapies

Some therapies assign no role to thoughts. At this extreme end of the spectrum I would place certain drug and shock treatments. Insofar as these suggest a model of mind, it is mind as brain. Insofar as they are backed by an aetiological theory, it is the notion that somehow things (chemical or neurological) have become unbalanced. I do not wish to deny that such treatments work. It may well be that for certain sorts of problems the best thing one can do, the most effective treatment, is (say for severe depression) electric shock. This is an empirical question. But I do wish to suggest that when it works, why it works must be regarded as a miracle. Things somehow get juggled back into place, but we have no idea how. As with most miracles, however, we can expect the mystery to dissolve with the discovery of the causal mechanisms involved. What makes me place drug and shock treatments at the extreme non-thought end of our spectrum, is that it seems unlikely that special thoughts or beliefs in the patient (especially beliefs about the nature of the problem) will be included in an account of the mechanisms.

There is a further question which I would like at least to raise. Are such non-thought treatments 'therapies'? Torture may produce psychological and behavioural changes, but it is not regarded as 'therapy'. This is partly because of the content of the treatment (pain, etc.), but more importantly because of its purposes and the desires of the person who initiates it (who is not himself the patient or victim). It may also be in part because of the mechanisms involved. And if, for example, terror of the treatment itself is part of what contributes to non-thought 'cures', we may not wish to regard the 'changes' as 'therapy'. Perhaps
the terror of treatment forces the patient to overcome at least the overt manifestations of his problem. But is that 'cure' (even if the manifestations disappear permanently)? The treatment may produce change even when the patient does not desire it, or at least not because of a desire for change. Non-thought therapies (including behaviourist manipulations) are in a sense non-rational: they do not address themselves to the patient's thoughts and try to alter them through rational considerations. Whatever their virtues, non-thought therapies (that is, non-analytical techniques) do not treat problems in the terms in which they are problems for the patient; and, if the mechanisms are of certain kinds, their virtues may be thereby inherently limited.
II. Behaviour Therapy and 'Effectiveness'

Some therapies apparently assign no role to thoughts. Here I have in mind certain 'behaviour therapies'. Behaviour therapy is nicely illustrated, though perhaps caricatured, in Stanley Kubrick's film of Anthony Burgess' *A Clockwork Orange*. There old Alex is conditioned against sex and violence (and, incidentally, Beethoven's 9th Symphony) by being forced to watch films while nauseous from an injection. An actual case is the man who attacked handbags: he was (kept awake by amphetamine) presented with handbags and then made nauseous by injection of apomorphine, thus associating handbags as the conditioned stimulus with an unpleasant response (Eysenck, pp. 182-88). Such treatments for behavioural dysfunctions (e.g., handbag and pram 'fetishism') use a model of mind I would describe as crudely behaviourist -- the black box is at best an associative switchboard. But, again, I say this without wishing to deny that it 'works'. There is even something in the way of an aetiological theory to explain why it works: there is a history of learning and previous conditioning which must be undone. But since the relevant learning theory holds that early and all conditioning does not depend on thoughts, neither does the treatment. But I said above that behaviour therapy apparently assigns no role to thoughts. I said this because I would argue that thoughts must be assigned a role, though rather a limited one (which places it only a bit further along the spectrum), if we are to understand behaviour therapy.

Certainly the procedures are non-rational, in no way appealing to or addressing the patient's thoughts, thoughts are nonetheless (at least minimally) involved. The behaviourists recognize that conditioning
can involve delicate balances. Attacking handbags is dysfunctional in our society (the women and the police tend not to understand), but it would also be dysfunctional to always have to run at the sight of a handbag. So one needs the right degree of aversion. There are also, however, problems of stimulus specificity and generalization. Fine discriminations may be called for. For example, if one conditions a homosexual to avoid penises, what happens when he has to urinate? How do you condition the homosexual in relation to 'other penises' but not 'my penis'? The behaviourists have techniques for coping with such problems (Eysenck, p. 189 ff., on conditioning a transvestite against only himself in women's clothes), but the conceptual question is: 'How do you pick out the stimulus in the conditioning situation?' What is being conditioned? The behaviourists seem to assume it is given. But there is a need to specify those aspects of the context to be included in the stimulus. One cannot include everything, or the conditioning of the individual will be to only this particular dress or this particular handbag (for example) in these particular surroundings (and so not carry over into his outside life, where his problem is). I think the specification of the stimulus must depend on how the individual subject perceives the situation, and he can mis-perceive or, rather, perceive differently from the experimenters: Alex might respond only to the 'movie screen' rather than the images of violence on it (which he might see as abstract motions), or the transvestite to all women's clothes and not just himself in women's clothes, as 'stimulus'. He must selectively respond to the stimulus object under a certain description, and "we cannot control the property of a physical object to which an individual will respond" (we always present an object in a
context, and so there is no 'objective' notion of 'the stimulus')

The conditioners are conditioning something, supposedly behavioural
responses to environmental stimuli unmediated by thoughts. But if beliefs
do not appear to enter, perhaps it is because the beliefs involved are
generally obvious. In general, people have similar interests and one can
take it that the subject perceives the situation roughly as others
(notably the experimenters) do -- that is, the essential identifying
description of the stimulus would be the same for all. Still, one is
conditioning a response of the subject to the environment, as he perceives
it, i.e., as he believes it to be. But it must be admitted that the
subject's beliefs about the nature and source of his problem are left
out, they are taken to be irrelevant to the actual problem (which is a
behavioural 'dysfunction') and to the treatment of it. The patient need
not have any theory, let alone a correct one, about the nature of these
problems. So though thoughts have a role, it is a limited one.

It is worth adding that the importance of thought in specifying the
stimulus, aside from helping us place behaviour therapy along our spectrum,
can form part of a more comprehensive critique of the aetiological and
learning theory behind the therapy. For example, as Chomsky puts it,
"stimuli are not objectively identifiable independently of the resulting
behavior" (p. 552, n. 5). If one ignores the mediating role of thoughts,
one ends up discriminating 'stimuli' (and 'reinforcing conditions')
through the 'responses' to them. Hence A is specified only as 'the cause
of B'. And it is, of course, uninformative to be told that 'the cause of
B' caused B. Consider someone who claimed that 'the desire to do x caused
the doing of x'. If the 'doing of x' were the only criterion for 'desire': it would follow that people do only what they desire and that they desire whatever they do. Similarly, crude behaviourist definitions of 'stimulus', 'response', 'reinforcement', etc., create merely the illusion of understanding. If the notions are well and fixedly defined, then there are few (if any) lawlike relations between stimuli and responses (except for certain limited cases in rats -- Chomsky, p. 551). There are no simple laws of input and output that can bypass problems of identification (i.e., specifying 'stimulus', etc., under a description), intermediary thoughts, etc.

There is a clinical objection to behaviour therapy, namely that it treats only symptoms, and that there will always be an underlying problem that will re-emerge elsewhere. This seems to me an empirical issue, and, whatever one's suspicions, the evidence is not in. I think this is all one can say a priori about the empirical issue, but I think there are several conceptual problems connected with claims about effectiveness, about which at least a bit more should be said. So I will again digress before moving along our spectrum.

The effectiveness of a therapy is no guarantor of the truth of the theory of the therapy. The therapy may work for reasons having nothing to do with the theory behind the therapy (indeed, it may only appear to work because of extraneous forces that might have otherwise led to 'spontaneous' remission, or because of placebo effects). Or the theory of the therapy may show how pathological effects may be counteracted, without connecting that efficaciousness with a theory of the causal production of the symptoms. (Cf. Drinking milk or surgical procedures
which may alleviate the suffering from ulcers, but do not reverse the causal order or retrace the steps that led to the problem and thereby undo it. That is, it is 'symptomatic' rather than 'causal' therapy.)

The converse is often advanced against the claims of Freudian psychoanalysis. That is, it is argued that the ineffectiveness of Freudian psychoanalysis, or the indifference in effectiveness between it and other methods, reveals the untruth of Freudian theory.

First, what is 'effectiveness'? The notion of 'cure' is notoriously contentious, and the notion of 'cure-rate' inevitably shares the infection. Many, especially those who regard 'neurosis' as 'behavioural dysfunction', equate cure, or success, or recovery with 'removal of symptoms'. This does not advance the discussion as much as it might appear. What constitutes a 'symptom'? This may vary from society to society and even from individual to individual (e.g., what is 'normal' for the man who vomits every morning, but is otherwise sound and wonders when asked about it 'doesn't everybody?' -- A story of N. Reider's told by Erikson, 1968, p. 18). Even if the nature of a 'symptom' was otherwise clear, it is not at all clear that all (or even most) patients entering psychoanalysis exhibit gross symptoms the removal of which constitutes 'cure'. Many come seeking a form of understanding (or something else) which is not properly characterized as the 'removal of symptoms'. And even where the notion of 'removal of symptoms' seems applicable, it may make a huge difference how the symptoms are removed. Psychoanalysis and behaviour therapy may not simply contrast in effectiveness, but be actually incommensurable. Wallerstein speaks of the distinction between the outcome goals of analytic therapy conceptualized in terms of observable behavior and relationship changes and the process goals of analytic therapy conceptualized in metapsychological explanatory terms that posit at least implicitly a theory of therapy, of how analysis brings about change and reaches its outcome goals (Wallerstein, p. 768).
The second sort of changes, the process changes, may simply be closed to behaviour therapy. So even if behavioural symptoms disappear permanently and no new symptoms emerge, behaviour therapy may be inherently 'superficial'. Though various outcomes of analysis may be confirmable for the most part via observable behavioral referents, they nonetheless represent manifest end points, outcomes, of processes of intrapsychic, analytic change. Though phenomenologically similar, they are not dynamically identical with the same behavioral changes induced by other, non-psychoanalytic, means (Wallerstein, p. 754).

I will cite one example of treatment by rational alteration of desires (cited by Wallerstein for another purpose):

Gill, in comparing true structural change in the ego as wrought by classical psychoanalysis with the change consequent upon the 'corrective emotional experience' in Alexander's usage of that term, stated that 'dependent behavior is given up not because he has learned that if he acts too dependent he will be punished by a loss of therapy hours, but because despite the invitation to regress and the maintenance of the frequency of his hours he has come to feel and understand his dependency in such a way that he no longer needs it or wants it (p. 751).

We should recall these contrasts when we come to discuss the cases of Little Hans (and Peter) and Little Albert, and the very different aetiologies and treatments they are associated with.

Returning to 'effectiveness', if we (despite hesitations) take effectiveness as a matter of cure-rate (over the spontaneous rate), and we take 'cure' in the sense of 'removal of symptoms', one still must explain how to measure 'cure-rates'. The length of time a treatment takes is, I think, irrelevant. There may be difficulties about degrees of 'alleviation' of symptoms short of total removal. These too I do not wish to consider. But differences in the character of the symptoms removed, and in the initial selection of patients must be
considered. We are sometimes offered gross statistics said to reveal that it is a matter of indifference whether one is treated for a problem by Freudian psychoanalysis, a psychoanalytic therapy informed by another theory, a non-psychoanalytic therapy, or even nothing at all. The cure and relapse rates are said to be roughly comparable. But what is being cured? Different problems may be amenable to different methods, and their differences may be concealed by the statistical categories. Perhaps certain well-defined behavioural dysfunctions (e.g., phobias) are readily removed by conditioning techniques. Does this show that such techniques are equally effective in dealing with all the classical psychoneuroses? Do patients with such neuroses get treated by the conditioning techniques in the first place? Perhaps psychoanalytic institutes report cure rates roughly comparable to those of behavioural therapists. Here too there are problems in the nature and assessment of 'cure', and, what I wish to emphasize, initial selection of patients. (Even if all comers were taken, patients would to some extent self-select on the basis of their or their referring doctor's expectations from different techniques.) Such selection serves a variety of purposes. For example, psychoanalytic institutes are also training centres and research centres and therefore may take on patients where prognosis is not always certainly favourable. If however, their aim was to produce the highest possible cure-rate, careful initial selection of the patient population could presumably produce as high a rate as one pleases. The statistical categories tend to conceal problems and differences in the character of symptoms, and the nature and assessment of cures. Ideals of 'randomness' obscure just those issues that should be explored.
Thirdly, and most interesting for our purposes, the theories behind the therapies may be more or less powerful in terms of explaining the effectiveness (whatever its actual extent once all the relevant factors have been clarified) of other therapies as well as its own.
III. Lévi-Strauss and Quesalid

I now wish to focus on what I take to be the 'thought' end of the spectrum. Lévi-Strauss suggests that what is essential to the effectiveness of shamanism is the provision of a theory or conceptual scheme that enables the patient to reintegrate an otherwise alien experience. It does not matter that the understanding provided is 'mythical' or 'symbolic'. The shaman's theory need not be (literally) true, so long as the patient believes it and it is significant to him. The theory behind Freudian psychoanalysis might suggest quite other constraints on effective insight. In interpreting a symptom, an analyst is supposed to be retracing its actual history, i.e., its development. When it comes to it, I think Lévi-Strauss actually would insist on at least 'structural' correspondences over and above coherence for the effectiveness of symbols. And we shall have to examine the role assigned to 'phantasy' in psychoanalytic theory, and (at least) raise a number of questions (though most of the discussion will be left for Chapter Four): Why should insight have any effect? Is literal truth necessary to the effectiveness of insight? Might 'phantasy' be as effective as reality? Why? Would it matter whether it was memory of (earlier) phantasy or (current) phantasy of memory? Why is insight (even where 'insight' includes the notion of truth) not 'enough'? (That it is not enough is shown by the importance attached to abreaction, transference, and timing interpretations.)

First, let us see what Lévi-Strauss on the shaman (L-S) can tell us about psychoanalytic theory and what psychoanalytic theory can tell us about shamanism.

Lévi-Strauss tells the story of Quesalid. It is a fascinating and
instructive story. Quesalid was an unbeliever in shamanistic powers. So he undertook training as a shaman in order to refute their claims. But, much to his amazement, his use of the bizarre procedures (especially the technique of extracting a concealed tuft of bloodied down from his own mouth and claiming he had sucked out the pathological foreign body in the form of a bloody worm -- p. 175) produced cures. And he became the most powerful shaman of all. 

Now the initial undertaking, insofar as it was an effort to refute the shamans, is itself odd. What would Quesalid's failures contribute that a collection of the failures of established shamans would not? Indeed, on the face of it, such failures promise far less. A man who set out to refute astrology would gain nothing by himself mastering the techniques of astrology. It could be claimed that his failures counted only against him, not against the techniques. Similarly, if Quesalid had failed to cure, it would simply have shown that he had not mastered the techniques, that he was an inadequate shaman (not that shamanism was inadequate). This mode of defense would inevitably be open, and perhaps even more open for shamanism than astrology. Fellow astrologers might be sufficiently scientific in spirit so that they tried to replicate the critic's procedures with greater precision and success. The principles might be sufficiently objective, so that their application by the believers yielded the same results: false predictions. The shamans have an extra out. It may be one of the principles of the practice, that only a believer in the principles can effectively use them. Or if not a 'believer', someone infused with the proper 'spirit', one with a 'calling'. Quesalid's failure would only reveal him as a failed shaman,
not the failure of shamanism. Even if other shamans failed to succeed where he failed, they would have whatever outs would normally be available.

There is a problem about what distinguishes a routine failure from an 'anomaly', i.e., a failure arising in the context of a challenge or test of their powers. (What makes something a problem in what Kuhn calls 'normal science' rather than an anomaly leading to crisis and breakdown, and so revolution?) Two things to notice: Nothing is added to the confirmation or falsification situation by Quesalid's becoming a shaman, or an unbeliever becoming an astrologer. The same difficulties arise for the theory from the failures of professionals. Second, if the usual outs used to explain failures seem ad hoc (and the juggling seems more ad hoc should Quesalid's failures receive special explanations: he lacks the spirit, etc.), one still has to explain what makes a change or adjustment in theory seem ad hoc rather than a natural development or articulation or elaboration. Every theory has to accommodate awkward facts. But sometimes the accommodations become more awkward than the facts. When there are too many epicycles and an alternative theory is available, a shift is possible. What exactly, however, makes a theoretical claim or shift in theory a 'simplification' rather than 'ad hoc' raises many of the deepest questions in the philosophy of science (and some of the hardest disputes within scientific argument itself). I will leave these issues here. Quesalid did not manage a successful refutation of the shamans through failure. His was a different success, and raises different issues.

We should note that Quesalid's undertaking is not so odd if it was to understand rather than to refute the shamans. Indeed, many
psychoanalysts claim that critics cannot understand the character of psychoanalytic claims or the nature of the evidence for them without themselves being psychoanalyzed. It is not, however, necessary that critics themselves become psychoanalysts. But Qesalid was dealing with a practice that depends on concealment: to appreciate the character of magic it may well be necessary to practice it rather than simply experience its effects.
IV. Consensus and Curing

Lévi-Strauss tells the story of Quesalid mainly in order to emphasize the importance of belief by the community or group: cure by magic is a 'consensual' phenomenon. (L-S p. 169). There are a number of separable claims which may get confused under this description. The point here is different from that made by saying that what counts as a 'symptom' is a matter of the view of the society. Though that is (largely) true, once the character of sickness and health is fixed within a society, the transition from one to the other (cure) may not be achievable by change in public opinion (or anyone's beliefs). There are limits to the powers of consensus: a myth (of converging rivers, etc.) will not mend a broken bone, and faith will not turn an aspirin into a birth control pill. The point Lévi-Strauss wishes to make he puts as follows: "Quesalid did not become a great shaman because he cured his patients; he cured his patients because he had become a great shaman" (p. 180). Here, too, distinctions are necessary. We must distinguish group consensus in relation to the status of a sorcerer and in relation to the power of a sorcerer. Community belief may provide the criterion for a social role -- this is a logical or conceptual connection. On the other hand, community belief may produce the power associated with a social role -- this may be logical, but more interestingly may be an empirical connection. That social role and power can be separated is shown, in the cases of doctors and patients, by the fact that people may be able to actually heal or actually suffer independently of the opinion of their society. Confirmation by the community does, however, help determine who we are, whether doctor, shaman, or patient. Insofar as this is a matter of
social role, group consensus does indeed, meaning logically, determine who we are. This seems to be what is happening in the case of the Zuni boy who appears to become a witch in the course of his witchcraft trial (as his accusers and he too comes to believe he is one). If the relevant community believes it, it is true. Their belief is part of what constitutes its being true. Who counts as a shaman, a doctor, a patient depends (in this way) on group consensus. But group consensus may also operate causally. It might be called the 'Genet Effect'. Told at 10 that he was 'a thief', Genet conceived himself in that way and decided he must become one, and did. He realized the label in his life. (Cf. the development of 'patienthood' as an identity, e.g., in Dora. See Erikson, 1964, p. 173.) In the case of shamanism and healing, the mechanisms may be more devious. The community's belief in the shaman's powers may help produce those powers. The ways in which this comes about may be quite various and complex. Before I proceed to look at some of those ways, let me try in another way to bring out the contrast I have been trying to make.

Consider the case of a 'king'. All believe x is the king and therefore he is the king. But there may be place in the society for a distinction between de facto and de jure kings -- e.g., there may be constitutional conditions for kingship (direct descent from previous kings and ultimately God) that will hold whether or not the community believes them to hold, and which the community cannot make hold by believing. The case of the 'shaman' is importantly different from that of the de facto king. If all accept x is a shaman he may therefore be a shaman, have the social role and have the social powers of the position.
But unlike the king, all of whose powers are social, he may still lack the power to heal (though belief in that power may be what gave him community consensus to role in first place). That is, the doctor or shaman may not be the man who can heal. He is the man the community believes can heal. The title comes from belief in the power. The power, however, need not be a necessary condition of the belief; indeed, it may not exist prior to the belief. And it is possible that, in some cases, it arises as a result of the belief. If everyone believes 'x is king', he may have the power to rule in virtue of that belief. If everyone believes 'x is a shaman', he may still lack the power to heal. The interesting question is whether the acceptance can produce the power (where this is an empirical connection) and how.

Lévi-Strauss cites Cannon on the physiology of voodoo; and one can understand how the withdrawal of the community, the isolation produced by a voodoo curse in virtue of the community's accepting it, might lead to physical collapse. (Consider models for self-fulfilling prophecies.) Freud himself recognizes the importance of acceptance by the community. (Consider the importance of the title 'Professor' in Vienna.) Such recognition increases the 'authority' of the physician, and may contribute to the effectiveness of his technique. But it is not by itself sufficient explanation of effectiveness. As late as 1910 Freud could write

Hitherto, this authority, with its enormous weight of suggestion, has been against us. All our therapeutic successes have been achieved in the face of this suggestion: it is surprising that any successes at all could be gained in such circumstances. I must not let myself be led into describing my agreeable experiences during the period when I alone represented psychoanalysis. I can only say that when I assured my patients that I knew how to relieve them
permanently of their sufferings they looked round my modest abode, reflected on my lack of fame and title, and regarded me like the possessor of an infallible system at a gambling-resort, of whom people say that if he could do what he professes he would look very different himself. Nor was it really pleasant to carry out a psychical operation while the colleagues whose duty it should have been to assist took pleasure in spitting into the field of operation, and while at the first signs of blood or restlessness in the patient his relatives began threatening the operating surgeon. . . . Social suggestion is at present favourable to treating nervous patients by hydropathy, dieting and electrotherapy, but that does not enable such measures to get the better of neuroses. Time will show whether psycho-analytic treatment can accomplish more (Freud, 1910d, pp. 146-47).

Certainly cooperation from surrounding family and community is helpful and perhaps even necessary. Their belief, faith, recognition, etc., may yield such cooperation. But perhaps the essential element is the patient's acceptance of the doctor's authority. And belief by the community, consensus, may contribute to producing belief in the individual patient. But perhaps such belief can arise independently and still be effective. [Quesalid himself attributed his first success to the patient's faith. The treatment worked "because he (the sick person) believed strongly in his dream about me" (L-S, p. 176). Freud says that the patient need not enter treatment with any initial belief (1913c, p. 126). If it is necessary, it can develop in the course of treatment.] The question now becomes the relation of belief by the patient to the effectiveness of the therapy.

Lévi-Strauss, aside from emphasizing the consensual elements (without distinguishing the logical and causal) in shamanism, goes on to speculate about the mechanism by which shamanistic ritual and magical symbols produce cures. And he extends his account of the effectiveness of symbols to psychoanalysis. We will have to pay attention to the content of the rituals and symbols (not just their acceptance by the community), and it will be important to examine his claims on a level of some detail.
V. Structuralist Explanation: Coherence and Correspondence and Curing

There is ground for general suspicion of structuralist explanations: does being told that one thing we do not understand is similar in structure to another thing we do not understand help us understand either? The nature of the 'similarities' must be specified. We must look to the details of each such explanation offered to see what, if any, enlightenment can be found. Lévi-Strauss offers parallels between the shaman and the psychoanalyst, and between the theories of both and physiological theory.

Quesalid effects cures by his technique of the bloody down despite the fact that he knows it to be bogus: it is not connected with any known or believed aetiology ('sickness' is not really captured by bloodying a concealed tuft). But it works and even enables Quesalid to expose 'imposters'. (L-S, p. 178.) His success reveals that the therapist need not believe in order for the therapy to work. We shall have to explore the natural implication of this: if belief by the practitioner is not necessary, then perhaps truth is not necessary either.

Lévi-Strauss, in his discussion of shamanistic therapies in non-Western cultures, suggests that they work because they provide a way of understanding problems and the world. The patient is given a theory, a set of terms and relationships, that enable him to fit his experience into an intelligible order.

The system is valid precisely to the extent that it allows the coalescence or precipitation of these diffuse states, whose discontinuity also makes them painful. (L-S, p. 182.) The song seems to have as its principal aim the description of these pains to the sick woman and the naming of them, that is, their presentation to her
in a form accessible to conscious or unconscious thought. (p. 195.) That the mythology of the shaman does not correspond to an objective reality does not matter. The sick woman believes in the myth and belongs to a society which believes in it. The tutelary spirits and malevolent spirits, the supernatural monsters and magical animals, are all part of a coherent system on which the native conception of the universe is founded. The sick woman accepts these mythical beings or, more accurately, she has never questioned their existence. What she does not accept are the incoherent and arbitrary pains, which are an alien element in her system but which the shaman, calling upon myth, will re-integrate within a whole where everything is meaningful. (p. 197.)

For Lévi-Strauss the beliefs need not be true, because insofar as the problem is not understanding, any coherent story or theory will solve that problem (i.e., though of course it must not fail to correspond at key points with known realities) and so end the suffering which is a suffering from unintelligibility. Psychoanalysis may be the new mythology of our culture (p. 183). I think Lévi-Strauss' point sheds a certain light. Coherence matters because patients are partly suffering from incoherence, the alien unintelligibility of the experience. I think, however, that the Spinozist view of emotions and the mental would contribute much to a clearer understanding of the mechanisms, of how therapies which operate through beliefs can transform mental states. If we accept that emotions essentially involve beliefs, we can begin to see how changing beliefs can transform emotions. In the realm of the mental, understanding of the state becomes part of the state, because it is identified or specified through the associated beliefs. Where knowledge is self-reflexive, knowing can transform the thing known. Following this line, we may begin to see why insight is important, and we might come to see why insight is not enough. But Lévi-Strauss develops his theory in a different direction.

Lévi-Strauss thinks symbols are effective, not because they are
literally true but because they correspond with an underlying reality. (See Baudelaire on 'correspondances' and Eliot on 'objective correlatives'.)

The myth and the true account are similar in 'structure'. He speculates that the parallel in the case of a mythical incantation sung by the Cuna shaman to ease difficult childbirth is an underlying physiological reality. The myth is about a quest for the lost soul of the mother, a myth of passage through and over obstacles, and its elements correspond to or represent the vagina and uterus of the pregnant woman (p. 188). He goes on to speculate that psychoanalysis too hooks onto the same physiological reality:

Given this hypothesis or any other of the same type, the shamanistic cure and the psychoanalytic cure would become strictly parallel. It would be a matter, either way, of stimulating an organic transformation which would consist essentially in a structural reorganization, by inducing the patient intensively to live out a myth — either received or created by him — whose structure would be, at the unconscious level, analogous to the structure whose genesis is sought on the organic level. The effectiveness of symbols would consist precisely in this 'inductive property', by which formally homologous structures, built out of different materials at different levels of life — organic processes, unconscious mind, rational thought — are related to one another. Poetic metaphor provides a familiar example of this inductive process, but as a rule it does not transcend the unconscious level. Thus we note the significance of Rimbaud's intuition that metaphor can change the world (p. 201).

But this pays too little attention to the elements on either side of the parallel, and to the nature of 'induction' and of what he calls 'reliving' or 'abreaction'. Again I would look to Spinoza for a better understanding of the power of metaphor, at least where the world changed is the mental world. But Lévi-Strauss means to explain how the myth can produce physical, organic, changes or cures.

He mentions that "Freud seems to have suggested . . . that the description in psychological terms of the structure of psychoses and
neuroses must one day be replaced by physiological, or even biochemical concepts" (p. 201). This is true, but as the Project for a Scientific Psychology shows, the sort of reduction Freud had in mind was neurophysiological. (To be fair, the Project was published a year after the original publication of Lévi-Strauss' essay.) And neurophysiology is rather different from gross physiology: our mental states may be embodied, but they are not precisely 'paralleled' on a gross level. Indeed, in the specific case of hysteria, no reduction to the physiological is possible. As Freud insists: "Hysteria behaves as though anatomy did not exist or as though it had no knowledge of it" (Freud, 1893c, p. 169). And Lévi-Strauss does not notice the difference between 'reduction' and 'replacement'. The sort of reduction Freud envisaged did involve precise parallels, preserving psychoanalytic laws in different terms.¹ But the sort of

¹ Whether such parallels exist we still do not know. And it is not clear, even if such parallels exist, whether 'reductions' are possible. There is an enormous philosophical literature on the question of whether even 'sensations' could be 'brain processes'.

The importance of a distinction between 'reduction' and 'replacement' was first impressed on me by Alasdair MacIntyre.

biochemical basis Lévi-Strauss mentions (chemical basis for psychosis) would not provide parallels for psychoanalytic claims. Instead of reducing psychoanalytic theory, it would replace it. Indeed, it would leave the role of thoughts, their relevance, obscure. Why and in what way should ideas or thoughts provide a handle onto chemical forces? The term 'induction' covers the obscurity without clarifying it. How does 'inducing the patient intensively to live out a myth' help? Lévi-Strauss calls this 'abreaction' (pp. 102 ff., 169), but this living or reliving is not the
same as the early psychoanalytic notion (which involved 'energy discharge' and hence relief). In relation to the shaman's bloody worm rituals, etc., Lévi-Strauss actually speaks of the sorcerer abreacting for the silent patient (p. 183), which is without sense in psychoanalytic terms. And again, he does not explain why symbolic thoughts should provide a lever for producing physiological changes, except that the thoughts run 'parallel' to the physiology. But do they? And if they did, would that explain anything?

The difficulty may be brought out more clearly if we notice something Lévi-Strauss seems to notice but then neglects. He acknowledges at one point that the complicated itinerary of the Cuna song "is a true mythical anatomy, corresponding less to the real structure of the genital organs than to a kind of emotional geography, identifying each point of resistance and each thrust" (p. 195). What he fails to emphasize is that this means that what is paralleled is not actual anatomy, but, as with hysteria, a phantasy anatomy. I am in fact inclined to think that the therapy will be effective only if the difficulties are hysterical, i.e., ideogenic (Lévi-Strauss says the shaman cures 'true organic disorders' -- p. 199 -- but I doubt that the song could substitute for a necessary Caesarian section). But the deeper problem is that structuralist explanation will here, in any case, fail to explain. The general suspicion is here specifically realized: one process we do not understand is said to be similar to another process we do not understand, but this does not help us understand either of them. We cannot understand the process of psychoanalysis and the process of shamanism in terms of a third, underlying, process which they both parallel. We might begin if
there were a third underlying physiological process common to them, but they each parallel phantasy physiologies, and there is no reason to expect that phantasy physiologies (unlike actual human physiology) will be the same for different cultures and individuals. Even if there were parallels to a common anatomy, how would this explain the effectiveness of either shamanism or psychoanalysis? Lévi-Strauss thinks these psychological treatments have direct physiological consequences, but does not explain how. He says, "In our view, the song constitutes a psychological manipulation of the sick organ, and it is precisely from this manipulation that a cure is expected" (p. 192). Why should telling a story, even if parallel with actual anatomy, 'work', e.g., make obstructions disappear? We can see how giving unintelligible physiological processes meaning may ease our psychological pain, but why should it alter the physiological processes themselves?

Lévi-Strauss' account is inadequate. Mere parallels do not explain why changes in one branch should bring about changes in the other. Even if there were the claimed parallels, why should there be a necessity to preserve the parallel (through bodily changes as the song progresses)? His account should be restricted to shamanistic cures of hysterical disorders rather than of physical disorders in general. Indeed, the fact that a disorder was curable by shamanistic story-telling, etc., might be part of what shows it to be 'hysterical' (along with the absence of organic causes, dissimilarities in pattern of disorder, . . .). Non-hysterical disorders may lack even phantasy parallels (and hence lack symbolic meaning). Shamanistic cures are of three types, which are not, however, mutually exclusive.
The sick organ or member may be physically involved, through a manipulation or suction which aims at extracting the cause of the illness — usually a thorn, crystal, or feather made to appear at the opportune moment, as in tropical America, Australia, and Alaska. Curing may also revolve, as among the Araucanians, around a sham battle, waged in the hut and then outdoors, against harmful spirits. Or, as among the Navaho, the officiant may recite incantations and prescribe actions (such as placing the sick person on different parts of a painting traced on the ground with colored sands and pollens) which bear no direct relationship to the specific disturbance to be cured. In all these cases, the therapeutic method (which as we know is often effective) is difficult to interpret. When it deals directly with the unhealthy organ, it is too grossly concrete (generally, pure deceit) to be granted intrinsic value. And when it consists in the repetition of often highly abstract ritual, it is difficult for us to understand its direct bearing on the illness. It would be convenient to dismiss these difficulties by declaring that we are dealing with psychological cures. But this term will remain meaningless unless we can explain how specific psychological representations are invoked to combat equally specific physiological disturbances (p. 191).

But Lévi-Strauss' attempt to generalize from the text he considers fails. The phantasy anatomy that a psychoanalyst may confront may be different from the phantasy anatomy the myth deals with. So psychoanalysis is not parallel to shamanism (in this respect) for they are not parallel to the same third thing (actual anatomy). And many shamanistic cures are without 'correspondences' or physiological parallels. So Lévi-Strauss' account cannot be extended to cures in general. But the symbolic treatment he discusses also lacks real physiological parallel (even if it had it, the mechanism of change would not be clarified by merely pointing to the parallel). How relation to phantasy anatomy allows effects on actual anatomy depends, I think, on the original disturbances in anatomy being hysterical (i.e., also depending on phantasies of anatomy — though perhaps different ones). The importance of thought in therapy should be clarified by the importance of thoughts in aetiology. Psychoanalysis tries to explain ideogenesis. Lévi-Strauss seems to deny
or ignore it.

To summarize. Lévi-Strauss makes suggestions in terms of (social) consensus, (psychological) coherence, and (physiological) correspondence to explain the effectiveness of shamanistic symbols and magic, and extends his account to psychoanalytic treatment. Properly sorted out, I think the first two suggestions contain valuable insight, but that the third fails both for the particular case and in general.
VI. Psychoanalysis and Shamanism: The 'Same' Forces?

Let us reverse the account. What can psychoanalysis tell us about shamanism? Erik Erikson suggests that the shaman is dealing with the 'same forces':

In northern California I knew an old shaman woman who laughed merrily at my conception of mental disease, and then sincerely -- to the point of ceremonial tears -- told me of her way of sucking the "pains" out of her patients. She was as convinced of her ability to cure and to understand as I was of mine. While occupying extreme opposites in the history of American psychiatry we felt like colleagues. This feeling was based on some joint sense of the historical relativity of all psychotherapy: the relativity of the patient's outlook on his symptoms, of the role he assumes by dint of being a patient, of the kind of help which he seeks, and of the kinds of help which are eagerly offered or are available. The old shaman woman and I disagreed about the locus of emotional sickness, what it "was," and what specific methods would cure it. Yet, when she related the origin of a child's illness to the familial tensions existing within her tribe, when she attributed the "pain" (which had got "under a child's skin") to his grandmother's sorcery (ambivalence) I knew she dealt with the same forces, and with the same kinds of conviction, as I did in my professional nook. This experience has been repeated in discussion with colleagues who, although not necessarily more "primitive," are oriented toward different psychiatric persuasions (Erikson, 1958, p. 55).

What is the meaning or place of this claim about the 'same forces'?

Is this an advance on Lévi-Strauss' 'correspondences'? I think yes. There is more to Erikson's 'forces' than to Lévi-Strauss' rather vague gesture at physiology. But again one would have to discuss the nature of the 'forces' involved at a level of some detail. I will not do that here (though the quoted passage gives a place to start with the notion of 'ambivalence'), but rather I wish to suggest what it is that one would be looking to the details to reveal or confirm (and what sort of discoveries would be made). One way to put this is to say that 'same' in 'same forces', like 'similar' in 'similar structures', is an incomplete
predicate; and one must look to the accompanying noun ('forces', 'structures') to discover the criteria of applicability for the term. That is, 'similarity' is always 'similarity in a certain respect' or 'from a certain point of view'. One cannot say whether 'A is similar to B' is true or false until one is told in what respect they are thought to be similar. (Or rather, it will always be true for any A and for any B that there will always be some respect in which they are similar, and some respect in which they are not similar.) Part of the problem with Lévi-Strauss' claims is that the notion of 'structure' is itself insufficiently specific. It leaves unclear in what respect psychoanalysis and shamanism are said to be similar. When it is further specified (so the similarity or parallel is in terms of physiology), the details reveal the claim to be false or at least unpromising. Erikson too must specify what is the 'same' for the psychoanalyst and the shaman, i.e., they will be the same under a certain description or qua so-and-so, and here the 'so-and-so' is 'forces' or 'convictions' (though they still need to be further specified in terms of 'psychic energies' or 'physico-chemical quantities' or, perhaps most plausibly, 'emotions'). I think 'forces' a more specific notion than Lévi-Strauss'; and, more important, both the psychoanalysts and the shamans are more likely to know about them (especially where they are cashed in terms of 'emotions') than the physiology; and, most important, discussion of 'forces' (especially emotional forces) is more likely to lead to an understanding of the role of understanding in producing change than a mysterious 'inductive' process that connects change in one part of a parallel with change in another part. But before I pick up on this last point, I would like to
try to make my abstract point in another way.

What is Erikson saying when he says that the shaman and the psychoanalyst deal with the 'same forces'? Most simply, that they are using different words (and concepts) to talk about the same things. One must look to the details, i.e., to individual cases, to see whether this is true. One will not, however, discover that the terminologies mean the same -- they do not.² Using Frege's distinction between 'sense'

² I suspect that this is one of the things that is misleading about Lévi-Strauss' 'correspondences' -- they seem to call for sameness of, mythological, meaning. But perhaps this too can be interpreted as sameness of reference (sameness of thing represented or symbolized). In the discussion which follows, I read 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' as descriptions rather than proper names. But in any case I do not think it is necessary for me to go into the depths of theory of reference. My point is to deny a priori knowledge (an epistemological point), not to deny a necessary connection (a metaphysical point). So I need not get into the argument about the possibility of contingent identity statements (see Kripke).

and 'reference', the shaman's system of terms and the psychoanalyst's have different senses but the same reference. The same object can be picked out under different descriptions, and one must indicate or specify under what sort of description they are the 'same object'. Consider Frege's own example of 'the morning star' and 'the evening star'. They refer to the same planet, Venus, which is a physical object that can be re-identified under different descriptions. The important point is that the discovery that they have the same reference was an empirical discovery. It could not have been achieved by an a priori analysis of the meanings of the relevant terms: the expressions in fact have different 'senses' (e.g., the morning star can be seen only in the morning, the evening star only in
the evening) despite the fact that they refer to the same (astronomical) object. The criteria for identity here are provided by spatio-temporal continuity. To be sure that the shaman and the psychoanalyst refer to the same underlying forces, one would need some third way of describing the underlying 'reality',\(^3\) or, if not a third description, at least a

\(^3\) E.g., Freud's neurological quantity 'Q'. It is important that this would just be another way of describing it, and not a direct vision of the naked truth. Knowledge must be mediated through concepts, we cannot grasp any ding an sich (or underlying reality) through direct wordless intuition. (Which may connect with Freud's speculation about the unconscious being the realm of non-verbal 'thing presentations' isolated from 'word presentations'. Cf. Eliot, Sweeney Agonistes: 'I gotta use words when I talk to you.')

method for re-identifying the forces under the alternate shamanistic and psychoanalytical descriptions, for translating between them.
Will it turn out that everybody is talking about the same world and therefore really talking about ('referring to') the 'same forces'? No. (Our earlier contrast between reductions, which preserve entities and lawlike relations among them, and replacements, which displace prior conceptual and explanatory schemes, depended on the answer being no.) If the shaman and the psychoanalyst mean different things but refer to the same thing by their different words, one is tempted to say that the psychoanalyst and the behaviour therapist refer to the same thing but mean different things by their use of the same words. They may have a common nosological vocabulary, but the aetiological theories and the theories of change are so different that the phenomena they are used to describe may be importantly different. The things referred to are the same only at the rather superficial level of 'behaviour' (here recall Wallerstein's point).

Consider the contrasting cases of Little Hans and Little Albert. Both boys suffered from animal phobias. There the important similarities end. As Freud tells it, Little Hans' fear of being bitten by horses was essentially a displaced fear of his father. It developed out of an Oedipal constellation of ambivalent feelings, and was intimately and intricately connected with the birth of his little sister, masturbation, his sexual theories (especially the universality of 'widdlers' and a faecal theory of birth), and other fears (especially of horses falling down and his mother having another child). Little Albert, on the other hand, did not.
develop his own fear of white rats, it was produced in him experimentally by Watson. Watson used Pavlovian conditioning techniques (sight or touch of rats followed by loud noise) to produce a phobic fear of white rats in Little Albert. The eleven-month old orphan had previously been on quite friendly terms with the creatures. After, the fear response generalized to other furry animals, cotton wool, and even (it is said) men with beards.

The two cases are extraordinarily different, but many behavioural psychologists try to assimilate them. They argue that Freud went, illegitimately, beyond what the evidence would support: namely, a behaviourist account of the formation of phobias. They suggest Watson's conditioning model provides a more adequate alternative aetiology for Little Hans' problems, and makes 'desensitization' or 'deconditioning' a more appropriate treatment than 'interpretation' or 'analysis'. Unfortunately, the only thing they can see and so count as 'evidence' is 'behaviour' (narrowly described and conceived) and there are failures of understanding at every level.

Eysenck refers to the critique of Freud's case of Little Hans by Wolpe and Rachman as 'a classic' (Eysenck, p. 107). But it in fact contains so many misunderstandings that one hardly knows where to begin. Let us begin with their conclusion:

No confirmation by direct observation is obtained for any psychoanalytic theorem, though psychoanalysts have believed the contrary for 50 years. The demonstrations claimed are really interpretations that are treated as facts (W-R, p. 219).

Evidence in psychoanalysis must be based on inference, given the nature of the claims (about unconscious processes, etc.). The crude demand for
'confirmation by direct observation' is as misplaced as a demand to be shown electrons. And I suspect that behind it is an equally crude observational/theoretical distinction. 'Crude' because 'observations' and 'facts' are inevitably more-or-less theory-laden. Their theory blinds them to the very rich evidence Freud provides.

This is not the place for a thoroughgoing examination of their 'critique', and so a few examples will have to suffice. They attack the claim that, as they put it, "Hans had a sexual desire for his mother," saying:

That Hans derived satisfaction from his mother and enjoyed her presence we will not even attempt to dispute. But nowhere is there any evidence of his wish to copulate with her (W-R, p. 212).

It is virtually incredible that they should use such a narrow notion of the 'sexual'. (I am leaving aside such evidence as the 'borer' phantasy -- Freud, 1909b, p. 128.) In the very case under discussion, Freud goes to elaborate lengths to show that the 'sexual' desires of children are based on (sometimes bizarre) sexual theories, which in turn are based on their own level of bodily functioning. It would be remarkable if infantile sexual desires took the forms of normal adult sexuality (e.g., desire for genital union -- few four-year-olds can conceive of such union, let alone conceive of it as desirable). The sexual relations desired in Oedipal contexts must be understood more broadly. That they are none-
theless 'sexual' Freud demonstrates at length in his 'Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality'.

A central theme in Freud's account is that Little Hans' fear of horses was displaced fear of his father. Wolpe and Rachman claim that "there is no independent evidence that the boy feared or hated his father" (p. 213). If true, this point would be damaging. It is worth pausing for a moment to examine the evidential situation to see why it would be damaging. The psychoanalytic notion of 'displacement' is rather more sophisticated than what is sometimes thought to be its behaviourist equivalent: 'stimulus generalization'. When Little Albert's conditioned fear of white rats spread to other animals, the spread was said to be explained by generalization to "stimuli resembling the conditioned stimulus" (p. 216). This claim, though not false, is (without further specification) empty as explanation. As we noted earlier, any two objects can be said to 'resemble' each other in some respect or another. It does no good to be told that the additional objects feared are feared because they 'resemble' the original objects. Every object 'resembles' the original object, and some (in some respects) resemble it even 'more' than the additional (generalized) objects of fear. Whatever objects had in fact become elicitors of the fear response, that they had become elicitors could have been 'explained' by generalization. So generalization cannot explain why one object rather than another becomes an object of fear (by relation to a conditioned or unconditioned stimulus). Therefore 'generalization' is empty as explanation. Something that would explain everything explains nothing. It leaves out any significance in the further objects beyond 'association
by resemblance' — which is too widespread and non-selective to be of any use. The notion of 'displacement' is more informative because it places more stringent constraints on explanations involving it. A change can be seen as displacement (rather than mere 'change') only against a background of continuity. The continuities required in the case being considered are of at least two kinds: if Little Hans' fear of horses is to be displaced fear of his father then

a. he must fear his father (or have feared his father)

b. he must somehow identify horses with his father.

Notice that (b) is required to make horses suitable substitution objects, and 'identification' is a stricter notion than 'resemblance'. This sort of connection is also required because Hans' fear of horses might otherwise be merely another fear (in addition to his fear of his father) rather than a displaced fear. There may also be further background constraints, e.g., motivation for a change which is to count as displacement may have to be of a special sort (e.g., ambivalence towards first object). (Note that the behaviourist notion of 'generalization' shares the obscurity of 'stimulus'. Was Hans' father a 'stimulus' generalized by 'similarity' to horses? Again I suspect that behaviourist conceptualizations will yield only vacuous descriptions and explanations.)

Now let us return to the charge that the first condition is not met, that "there is no independent evidence that the boy feared or hated his father" (p. 213). Wolpe and Rachman notice (and reject) only one bit of evidence, Hans' symptomatic act of knocking over a toy horse (p. 213). They rightly regard this as an 'interpreted fact' involving a variety of assumptions, including that the horse represents Hans' father. They fail
to see that the underlying assumptions and the claim itself are supported by a number of other acts and correlations, and that there is an intricate and complex web of evidential support. For hostility, there are scenes where Little Hans alternately butts, bites, then strokes and kisses his father (a picture of ambivalence). For identification, Hans tells his father not to 'trot away from me' (Freud, 1909b, p. 45), parents are expected to have widdlers 'as large as a horse's', and his father had in fact played at being horse for Hans (Freud, 1909b, pp. 126-27). The identification with animals and hostility merge in the phantasy of the crumpled giraffe. The beautiful and subtle richness of Freud's account, its coherence, is lost on Wolpe and Rachman. On the horse representing Hans' father they say:

Hans consistently denied the relationship between the horse and his father. He was, he said, afraid of horses. The mysterious black around the horses' mouths and the things on their eyes were later discovered by the father to be horses' muzzles and blinkers. This discovery undermines the suggestion (made by Freud) that they were transposed moustaches and eye-glasses. There is no other evidence that the horses represented Hans' Father . . . .

The claim about 'other evidence' is simply false (see above). And the 'discovery' they say 'undermines' in fact confirms Freud's suggestion. It specifies more clearly those particular features which make particular horses more fearful than others for Hans; and they are precisely those features which make them resemble more closely Hans' father (by corresponding to his moustache and glasses). What better evidence for unconscious identification or symbolization could one have? If the muzzles and blinkers show something else, what is it? Why should muzzles and blinkers otherwise be significant? (Why should they be picked out as significant features in the total 'stimulus' situation?)
This brings us to a final point about Wolpe and Rachman. Their alternative behaviourist account suggests "that the incident to which Freud refers as merely the exciting cause of Hans' phobia was in fact the cause of the entire disorder" (p. 216). To suppose that Hans' witnessing the horse drawing the bus falling down could explain everything is to take a much too simple view of Hans' 'entire disorder'. It leaves too much out of account. But without going into the subtle interconnections that Freud elaborates, the behavioural conditioning explanation raises more questions than it answers (the latter number is very small in any case). What makes the horse falling down 'traumatic'? There is no suggestion that an experience or event that gets singled out might be connected with Hans' own interests, desires, and development at the time it occurred. If they do not matter, why shouldn't such incidents be traumatic for everyone, and why shouldn't other incidents (e.g., friend cutting foot) have been traumatic for little Hans? Why too did the symptom 'generalize' from horses 'falling' to horses 'biting'? Is this choice of one 'generalization' and rejection of others to be explained by 'resemblance'? 
VIII. Nosology and Anthropology

I want to return to the connection between these alternative aetiological theories with the theory of psychoanalytical therapy, and to pick up on my claim that the notion of underlying 'forces' is more promising than Levi-Strauss' notion of 'induction' in explaining the effectiveness of that therapy. But before I do these two things, I want to connect my contrast of behaviourist and psychoanalytical aetiologies for 'phobias' with some general nosological points.

Freud calls his case of Little Hans 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy'. But it is clear that he conceives of 'phobia' very differently from Wolpe and Rachman. They regard phobias as 'conditioned anxiety (fear) reactions', resulting from the accidental (i.e., meaningless) association of a 'neutral' stimulus with an occasion of fear (unconditioned stimulus) (W-R, p. 216). Freud sometimes epitomizes his view of phobia by saying "it is nothing else than an attempt at flight from the satisfaction of an instinct" (1920g, p. 42). To show how this formula applies to Little Hans would require more detail than is possible here. But we can now raise the question: Does 'phobia' as used by Freud mean the same as 'phobia' as used by the behaviour therapists? (Cf. The question whether the use of 'hysteria' in ancient Egypt and Greece [when symptoms were traced to physiology, a 'wandering womb'], in the early Freud, in the later Freud, and in contemporary psychoanalytic theory, are the same use. Note that even the womb theory suggests a connection with sexuality, whatever its other aetiological and treatment implications.) What we should now see is that one's answer matters less than being clear on the differences
and similarities that would go to justifying an answer. These same differences and similarities, here discussed in relation to 'meaning' or 'sense', would also be what gives body to dispute about changing 'realities' or 'worlds'.

I have suggested that the psychoanalytic and behaviourist accounts of 'phobia' have only their reference to avoidance behaviour in common. Do they refer to the 'same disorder'? (Same 'disease' might provide different criteria for 'identity', but it also raises too many further questions.) How many mental disorders are there? The questions and their answers are indeterminate, at least until one makes clear the interest out of which they are raised. What counts as a distinct type of 'disorder', like what counts as a distinct 'sense' of a word in general, may be illuminated by Wittgenstein's discussion of the 'uses' of hammers:

Do we use a hammer in two different ways when we hit a nail with it and, on the other hand, drive a peg into a hole? And do we use it in two different ways or in the same way when we drive this peg into this hole and, on the other hand, another peg into another hole? Or should we only call it different uses when in one case we drive something into something and in the other, say, we smash something? Or is this all using the hammer in one way and is it to be called a different way only when we use the hammer as a paper weight? -- In which cases are we to say that a word is used in two different ways and in which that it is used in one way? . . . (BB).

Perhaps it will appear that the case of 'phobias' is different because the differences in 'sense' would attach to different implications for 'treatment'. But perhaps someone would count a use of a hammer as 'different' only if it implied differences in design. One might design a hammer used as a paperweight differently (e.g., more flat surface) than one used for banging in nails. And then, one might design a hammer used for banging in wooden nails (a mallet) differently from one used for
banging in metal nails. All of these might therefore be 'different uses', but at least one's system of classification now has a clear rationale. The point is that what counts as a significant difference depends on one's purposes, whether the design of hammers or the treatment of mental disorders. Things do not come with labels on them. The world is not unequivocally divided into types of things. If we are to make sense of our classifications of diseases or mental disorders, we must recognize that it is we who do the classifying. There may be 'natural kinds' (certain common or overlapping groupings of features) that make one system of classification more suitable (a 'better fit') than another. That we must choose does not mean our choice must be arbitrary. We must pay attention to our rationale (whether explicit or implicit) for regarding certain differences as justifying or relevant to differences in classification.\(^5\) We must divide the world in accordance

\(^5\) Cf. Darwin on 'species' as genealogical categories. Even if a change in rationale does not change membership of categories directly, it can profoundly affect our approach. Consider the post-Darwinian discovery that changes are discontinuous (through mutation) and therefore species are clearly distinct. Cf. changes in psychoanalytical developmental theories, new emphasis on ego development, arrest and fixation points, etc. Objects may be of the same kind on different rationales, but then the kind itself may have changed. (So not seeing kinds as sets, determined by their members -- one might also say some ways of picking out sets do not pick out kinds, even if they pick out the same objects as would, on other grounds, constitute a kind.) Cf. W. V. Quine, 1969.

with our interests, and in dividing up diseases and mental disorders there are (as elsewhere) alternative competing and complementary rationales; we can divide them according to (for example) symptomatology, aetiological and developmental theories, prognosis, or the treatments they are amenable to. These alternative schemes may overlap, or similar cases may
fall under different names if we change the basis for our nosological scheme. What is important is to be aware of what we are calling what and why.

I said earlier that only the behaviour is the same in the psycho-analytical and behaviourist uses of 'phobia'. Wittgenstein may again be helpful. He states a distinction we have been using all along, and so puts us in a position to ask whether behaviour gives us 'symptoms' or 'criteria':

To the question 'How do you know that so-and-so is the case?', we sometimes answer by giving 'criteria' and sometimes by giving 'symptoms'. If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular case 'why do you say this man has got angina?' then the answer 'I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood' gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand the answer was, 'His throat is inflamed', this might give us a symptom of angina. I call 'symptom' a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion. Then to say 'A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him' is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition of 'angina'. But to say, 'A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat' is to make a hypothesis (BB).

I will not here explore the role of 'behaviour' in relation to 'phobias', but will mention two further points. To label a disorder as 'hysterical', or 'phobic', or 'neurotic', in the way we use the terms, has an hypothesis built into it. The 'facts' (here too) are theory-laden. There is no neutrally describable set of behaviours (that is, bodily movements) which is, as such, 'hysterical' or 'phobic' or 'neurotic'. In explaining

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6 Consider other cultures. 'Taboos' that to us may look like unreasonably exaggerated fears, i.e., phobias, may in another society be perfectly normal -- given the rest of their beliefs -- and not open to 'phobic' explanation on either the behaviourist or psychoanalytical pattern (at least internally). (But then, taboos too may be traceable
to renounced desires.) But the point is more than a cross-cultural difficulty. One cannot 'read' behaviour (or other 'manifestations' of inner states) without a background understanding of beliefs, intentions, etc. Consider our understanding of expressions of emotion (see MacIntyre, 1971): Imagine that 'A punches B'. Suppose that is all you know of their behaviour and relation. What emotion is A expressing? One is inclined to say 'anger' and perhaps 'jealousy' and other emotions in that range (i.e., unpleasant and hostile). But why not, say, 'gratitude'? Perhaps A is grateful to C who hates B, and expresses that gratitude by hitting B. Perhaps A is grateful to B, but B has strange ways of deriving pleasure (or at least A believes B derives pleasure in those strange ways). The point is that any bit of behaviour can express any emotion (almost). Given an action, a bit of behaviour, it is not yet determined what emotion (if any) is being expressed. It is not just that there may be cultural variations, even within a culture (as the example shows) there are ambiguities and so problems of interpretation. More is needed than the isolated action -- one must know the context: not the actual context, but the context as understood by the agent; his beliefs and his desires and his intentions, that is, his reasons for action. (The discussion could easily be extended to understanding expressions of emotion in pictorial representations, though 'context' of a somewhat different kind is needed. See Gombrich on Mondrian.) We shall return to these points about expression of emotion and connect them to psychoanalysis in the next chapter.

a neurotic symptom psychoanalytically we show it to be a neurotic symptom; i.e., if its explanation were purely physiological (for example) it would not be 'neurotic'. What sort of explanation is possible (available) determines what the thing to be explained is. The character of the thing to be explained is not 'given' independently of the possibilities of explanation (the explanation we offer). This connection of descriptions with explanations brings us to my second point. In deciding what are symptoms and what are criteria, we should beware of being too rigidly operationist in fixing our definitions. Discoveries about empirical correlations and new explanations may give us good grounds for shifting our definitions. Definitions themselves can function as correctable hypotheses. (See Putnam, 1962a, consider Freud's difficulties with early definitional objections to the 'unconscious mind'.) Wittgenstein himself is aware of the need for flexibility here:
In practice, if you were asked which phenomenon is the defining criterion and which is a symptom, you would in most cases be unable to answer this question except by making an arbitrary decision ad hoc. It may be practical to define a word by taking one phenomenon as the defining criterion, but we shall easily be persuaded to define the word by means of what, according to our first use, was a symptom. Doctors will use names of diseases without ever deciding which phenomena are to be taken as criteria and which as symptoms; and this need not be a deplorable lack of clarity. ... We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because we don't know their real definition, but because there is no real 'definition' to them. To suppose that there must be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules (BB).

Charges of shift in meaning should not be allowed to become obstacles to empirical discoveries. Awareness of differences and similarities should replace insistence on sharp divisions.7

7 See H. Putnam's penetrating critique of N. Malcolm (Putnam, 1962b). He provides a well-reasoned discussion of the theory of 'meaning' change. (See esp. discussion of natural kinds for which criteria are good but not perfect indicators. E.g., multiple sclerosis and virus, pp. 218-20.)

Debates about the reality of 'schizophrenia' may be understood as disputes about whether it denotes a natural kind or an odd conglomeration of symptoms. Is there a common aetiology (e.g., chemical) and so a common treatment (or at least a 'family resemblance' among schizophrenic aetiologies and treatments)? Different conclusions may be based on different predictions about the development of science.

Appreciation of these points may help clarify certain problems within anthropology. For example, Mildred Geertz (1968) suggests there is a paradox raised by Latah. 'Latah' is described as a psychological disorder with quite specific symptoms and limited distribution. The symptoms include involuntary obscenities, compulsive imitation, and compulsory obedience when teased, etc.; and seem to be confined to older women of the lower classes. The symptoms seem to be related with extraordinary directness to (and so be explainable by) certain features of Javanese
culture: "the value for elegant and polite speech, the concern over status, sexual prudery, and the dread of being startled". So it would seem one could explain the pattern of symptoms as a meaningful response to certain rigidities in the social structure. But Latah also seems to occur in cultures widely different from the Javanese -- so the culture-dependent aetiology that seems plausible for Java does not seem to hold for the disease in general. Geertz suggests that one must look for some broader cultural or sociological similarities to resolve the paradox. But perhaps the problem is of a different sort: as we have seen in the case of 'phobia', behaviourally similar symptomatologies may have quite different aetiologies (as different as aversion behaviour arising from behavioural conditioning and from Oedipal conflict). Perhaps 'Latah' does not denote the 'same disease' (in this sense) in the different cultures; so the different cultures in which Latah occurs need not count against its culture-dependent and perhaps culture-specific aetiology in Java. The same point could be made by saying that similar symptoms may have different 'meanings' in different cultures. The word 'meaning' can cover all the ambiguities (and then some) that we have indicated as different dimensions or rationales of nosology. So the problem may be one of nosology rather than of finding common cultural or sociological patterns in apparently diverse societies. So the distribution of what appears a single disease in diverse cultures is not necessarily paradoxical, and the appearance need not be either. Both within a particular society and cross-culturally, what looks like the same pattern of behaviour or symptoms may be produced by very different mechanisms and circumstances and so, depending on one's nosological principles, 'really' represent or
constitute 'different' diseases or disorders.

It is worth emphasizing that differential diagnosis can be extraordinarily difficult, even within a particular society or culture, and even within a particular theory (say, psychoanalytic) of mental disorder within that culture, and even when the diagnosing is done by medical people rather than anthropologists or philosophers. A patient suffering from stomach cancer may look very like a case of anorexia nervosa. A related complexity arises in connection with apparent diversity of symptoms: different observable patterns of disorder may be manifestations of the same mechanisms. Looking cross-time rather than cross-culture for our example, the person who exhibits classical hysterical conversion symptoms and the 'new hysteric' (e.g., the woman who fails to derive feelings of pleasure despite open and promiscuous sexual activity) may exhibit the same underlying processes in these (apparently) very different forms. Historical changes in culture may be related to changes in patterns of disorder in a way as revealing of the role of culture in mental disorder as the correlations of contemporary differences in culture with the character and distribution of disorder. Finally, we should be alert to the possibility that the same psychological mechanisms operate on different cultural materials in different ways (in part at least determined by the material itself) so as to produce the same (apparent) results. Globus hystericus can arise from a variety of circumstances, each suitable to its production in its own way. Here the search for broader similarities may well find a useful place.
The treatment of Little Hans by his father, in consultation with Freud, consisted mainly of interpretations plus 'enlightenment' about various sexual matters. One of the strands of the analysis took up the 'lump' theme (Freud, 1909b, pp. 126-131). It turned out that Little Hans equated his faeces with a child, and the whole complex was connected with his fear of his mother becoming pregnant again and producing another rival. He was cured.

Little Hans is not the only case where clearing up excremental and reproductive confusions has had dramatic impact. The confusions are in fact quite typical and the 'cures' quite common. Erikson reports the case of Little Peter. Peter was a four-year-old with an extraordinarily severe case of constipation:

... this little boy had a fantasy that he was filled with something precious and alive; that if he kept it, it would burst him and that if he released it, it might come out hurt or dead. In other words, he was pregnant. ... I felt 'surgical' action was called for. I came back to his love for little elephants and suggested that we draw elephants. ... I asked whether he knew where the elephant babies came from. Tensely he said he did not, although I had the impression that he merely wanted to lead me on. So I drew as well as I could a cross section of the elephant lady and of her inner compartments making it quite clear that there were two exits, one for the bowels and one for the babies. ... he had a superhuman bowel movement after I left. 8

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8 Erikson, 1950, p. 50. Another case: Winnicott's treatment of a little girl whose symptoms began with birth of brother -- no rivalry, fear of faeces, generalized fear of objects moving behind her -- and disappeared with enlightenment. She no longer feared her own power, her competition with mother.
On a behaviourist understanding, clearing up the facts of reproduction should be of no value in relation to a horse phobia. So why should such interpretations have any effect? Why should 'insight' matter? First, not all interpretations do have effects. Pointing out that a phobic object is not genuinely dangerous (e.g., Hans need not fear horses) will not dispel the fear; that is part of what makes a 'fear' a 'phobia', it is out of proportion to the danger and unreasonable. But some interpretations do have effects. Sticking to the very dramatic effects we have just mentioned, how were they produced? In these cases the fear was reattached to its original object. The fear that was inaccessible to reason in its displaced form, became manageable when correctly interpreted. So the content of the interpretation obviously makes a difference. On the behaviourist account this should not be so.

Wolpe and Rachman suggest Hans's recovery from the phobia may be explained on conditioning principles in a number of possible ways. . . The interpretations may have been irrelevant, or may even have retarded recovery by adding new threats and new fears to those already present. But since Hans does not seem to have been greatly upset by the interpretations, it is perhaps more likely that the therapy was actively helpful, for phobic stimuli were again and again presented to the child in a variety of emotional contexts that may have inhibited the anxiety and in consequence diminished its habit strength. The gradualness of Hans's recovery is consonant with an explanation of this kind (W-R, pp. 217-18).

But this behaviourist account does not offer the beginning of an understanding of why the gradual improvement of Little Hans was so directly correlated with the contents of the various steps in the progressive analysis, or why at certain points the changes were so dramatic. And again, the approach leaves out the intricate subtlety of the neurosis and Freud's understanding of it. And it implies what is plainly false,
that interpretations consisting of reassurances about the manifest phobic object should be as effective as interpretations uncovering the 'real' object and the reasons for the displacement. The contents of the thoughts matter to the process.

But still, why should insight matter? A proper answer would require more thorough discussion of the role of thoughts in the aetiology of neuroses. Non-thought theories will not illuminate the role of thoughts where their content makes a difference. (I am putting aside for the moment those cases where the content does not make a difference, and also those cases where actual truth may seem necessary in addition to belief or acceptance as truth.) Why should clearing up excremental and reproductive confusions help clear up neuroses?

The process may seem as 'magical' as the shamanistic cures. According to Freud,

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\ldots \text{the psychoneuroses are substitutive satisfactions of some instinct the presence of which one is obliged to deny to oneself and others. Their capacity to exist depends on this distortion and lack of recognition. When the riddle they present is solved and the solution is accepted by the patients these diseases cease to be able to exist. There is hardly anything like this in medicine, though in fairy tales you hear of evil spirits whose power is broken as soon as you can tell them their name -- the name which they have kept secret (1910d, p. 148).}
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But, of course, mere psychoanalytic diagnostic labelling does not have the magic power (of 'Rumpelstiltskin') to make the problem named disappear. In a way, however, interpretations can be seen as enormously elaborated 'diagnosis' (we have already seen that even the apparently descriptive diagnostic labels themselves already contain commitments to aetiological theories). One reason why they should have any force is suggested by the beginning of the quoted passage. If what lies behind psychoneuroses
are instincts and desires which have been repressed and emerged in distorted or displaced form, we can begin to see why discovering their original objects should help. We are then in a position to reattach our desires to their ends, to redirect our energies realistically, and to pursue the objects of our real needs. Recognizing the demands of our nature and condition can put us in a better position to meet them. This is one reason why I find Erikson's reference to 'forces' more promising than Lévi-Strauss' notion of 'induction'. 'Induction' leaves the nature of therapeutic changes magical.

I also wish to suggest (again) that a Spinozist view of the nature of the mental can help us understand how it is that knowledge makes us free, or at least 'freer'. If our state of mind has to be redescribed in accordance with changes in our understanding of its causes (and so objects), we can see how changing thoughts or beliefs can transform emotions. Sometimes we reason with an angry man, and show him that the object of his anger is somehow inappropriate or its degree exaggerated, in the expectation that convincing the man will change his emotion. One should also not neglect that the study of mind may itself be a joy and so replace the suffering it examines.

We have not explored the nature of 'insight'. On a Spinozist account, thoughts need not amount to 'insight', if insight must reflect true reality. We can overcome someone's fear of a harmless creature (if it is based on the belief that the creature is harmful) if we convince him that it is not dangerous. But this would happen whether our information was true or not. The content of interpretations are important, but they are not effective in virtue of being true (though that may be what
makes them acceptable and their being accepted is what makes them effective). Truth may contribute enormously to the acceptability of a belief, but the belief may produce changes in virtue of its acceptance rather than its truth. Here Lévi-Strauss' emphasis on a coherent narrative (which at least parallels the truth -- that is, at no important point fails to correspond with what is known) seems vindicated by a closer look at the mechanisms of transformation. One should examine the question of whether Freud would in fact insist that his therapy works because the theory behind it and the theory it provides the patient (they overlap but are not the same) are both true.
X. Insight Is Not Enough

But insight is not enough. On rare occasions, Freud was over-optimistic and thought that once an emotion was understood, once the unconscious was made conscious, it must dissolve:

Was there any guarantee, he [rat man] next enquired, of what one's attitude would be towards what was discovered? One man, he thought, would no doubt behave in such a way as to get the better of his self-reproach, but another would not. -- No, I said, it followed from the nature of the circumstances that in every case the affect would be overcome -- for the most part during the progress of the work itself. Every effort was made to preserve Pompeii, whereas people were anxious to be rid of tormenting ideas like his (Freud, 1909d, p. 177).

This is too optimistic. What follows from making the unconscious conscious is that forces that previously moved unconsciously are now surveyable and so the conflict is in a sense 'normal'. But there is no guarantee that it will be happily resolvable, or even that control will be possible. Beliefs are built into the nature of emotions, therefore reason is not powerless in the face of the passions, but it is not therefore omnipotent. Spinoza saw that sometimes only an emotion can overcome another emotion. Knowledge may put you in a position to become free, but circumstances may place limits on your freedom.

In discussing Little Hans, Freud suggests that when impulses become conscious, we can substitute conscious control for unconscious repression. Even this is not a guarantee that the 'now recognized energies will be liberated, the needs satisfied. But once rational control is substituted, some satisfaction may now be allowable where unconscious repression had been total and precluded recognition and so any (but distorted) satisfaction -- and the suffering (on top of unsatisfied desires) produced by
distorted compromise symptoms may thus be eliminated. The actual amount of satisfaction possible depends on reality. As Freud said (very early on):

> When I have promised my patients help or improvement by means of a cathartic treatment I have often been faced by this objection: 'Why, you tell me yourself that my illness is probably connected with my circumstances and the events of my life. You cannot alter these in any way. How do you propose to help me, then?' And I have been able to make this reply: 'No doubt fate would find it easier than I do to relieve you of your illness. But you will be able to convince yourself that much will be gained if we succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness. With a mental life that has been restored to health you will be better armed against that unhappiness (Freud, 1895d, p. 305).

Of course, this does not mean that psychoanalytic patients must resign themselves to unhappiness, or some other adaptation to given conditions. Psychoanalytic therapy can be a prelude to releasing energies for transforming the external world (Freud, 1910d, pp. 150-51).

But still, insight is not enough.

If knowledge about the unconscious were as important for the patient as people inexperienced in psychoanalysis imagine, listening to lectures or reading books would be enough to cure him. Such measures, however, have as much influence on the symptoms of nervous illness as a distribution of menu cards in a time of famine has upon hunger (Freud, 1910k, p. 225).

To discover why insight is not enough, I would examine what more is needed. Freud offered various answers (abreaction, etc.), some of which we shall explore in the next chapter. It would also be worth considering what factors go into the proper 'timing' of an interpretation. It is not sufficient for the issuance of an interpretation that the analyst believe it to be true. The discovery of what makes an interpretation effective, the timing good, should reveal the non-rational or non-thought factors in psychoanalytical transformations. Unfortunately when one turns to
psychoanalysts to learn what the relevant factors (outside of truth) in timing are, one is usually told only that one gives an interpretation when the patient is 'about to see it for himself'. The patient must be ready if insight is to take place. (Cf. Marx on social readiness for change and overcoming 'false consciousness'.)

At this point, an examination of the roles of transference, phantasy, anxiety, developmental theories, etc., in psychoanalysis would be necessary in order to take our understanding further. The interconnections of thought, theory, and therapy are too complex to hope that they can all be uncovered at once. Let us now move backwards a bit and examine how thought finds its place in Freudian theory and therapy.
CHAPTER FOUR . . .

THE AETIOLOGICAL ROLE OF THOUGHTS ACCORDING TO FREUD
'Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences.' This early formulation, though it underwent drastic revision as Freud's psychoanalytic thought developed, contains two elements which remained central. It places one source of psychological disorder in thoughts; and it treats the hysteric as somehow the victim of his/her past. The hysteric is unfree, a prisoner of his individual history. The maxim brings the past into play through thoughts, specifically, thoughts about the past, that is, memories. That our past can influence our present emotions and behaviour in devious ways is an important insight, that one of those ways is through thoughts is perhaps an even more important insight. A cluster of questions arises around these points. Is it actually our past, or (better) our actual past that influences our emotions and behaviour in the areas Freud discusses? How is one to distinguish the causal efficacy of reality and phantasy? Is their efficacy 'causal'? How and why is 'memory' brought in as intermediary? How is one to distinguish memory of reality, memory of phantasy, and phantasy of memory? And do any of these distinctions matter to the individual's unfreedom and the possibilities of overcoming it? In this thesis I am taking only some first steps towards answering these questions.
I. Hypnosis, Cure, and the Role of Thoughts

What were the grounds at the beginning of psychoanalysis for believing that there could be an 'analytical' therapy? Why should 'analysis', 'understanding', 'interpretation', 'insight' be of value in treatment? Part of the answer is to be found in the belief that certain disorders are psychological in origin. If thoughts lay behind problems, then unravelling thoughts might help solve those problems. The connections here are in fact very complex, and the character of the thoughts involved is so far left open, but we can start with this question: Why should thoughts be assigned a role in the production of certain disorders, in particular, why should hysteria be regarded as ideogenic?

According to the theory presented in Studies on Hysteria (Breuer and Freud, 1895d), undischarged affect leads to hysterical symptoms either because the associated experience occurred while the victim was in a susceptible, 'hypnoid', state or because the experience was 'incompatible' with the subject's self-image. Excess 'affect' (psychical energy) must be discharged. According to the 'principle of constancy': "The mental apparatus endeavours to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant" (Freud, 1920g, p. 9; cf. 1940d [1892], pp. 153-54). Affect is produced by experiencing events, and where the experience is so traumatic that the affect cannot be discharged as required by the principle of constancy, it can produce pathological results. We shall have to treat the question of what makes an experience 'traumatic' (it is not simply strength of intensity), and in particular the notion of 'incompatible ideas'. At this point, however,
the thing to emphasize is that it is the persisting memory of an actual event (from which affect arises) that is said to cause hysteria.

Charcot's use of hypnosis to remove hysterical symptoms was of therapeutic importance, but perhaps of greater theoretical importance was his discovery that it could be used to induce such symptoms in normal people. It could be argued that cures reveal nothing about the nature of hysteria, because hypnosis might simply introduce countervailing factors (and so alleviate symptoms) rather than remove exciting causes. (Just as the physical treatment of ulcers does not prove that ulcers are purely organic in origin.) The production of hysterical symptoms by hypnosis, on the other hand, provides convincing evidence that ideas (i.e., thoughts) can play a role in the production of mental disorder.

It has been charged that Charcot's demonstrations of hysteria were faked (Szasz, 1961, pp. 32-34). But these charges may apply only to the grand epileptoid hysterias of which he was the putative discoverer; and, whatever may have been the case with Charcot's demonstrations, it is clear that hysterical symptoms can be duplicated under hypnosis. There are, however, two further difficulties with this argument. First, what makes a symptom 'hysterical'? What is the justification for describing hypnotically induced behaviour as 'hysterical symptoms'? Given Freud's theory, to call a symptom 'hysterical' would be to imply that it is ideogenic. But the aetiological implication and consequent circularity which might later be involved in such a description do not arise at this early stage. The same justification could be provided for describing the hypnotically induced behaviour as hysterical as for the naturally occurring behaviour (in both cases reference being made only to the character of the
observable behaviour and, perhaps, the lack of organic disorder). Still, it is important to note that as used now the characterization of behaviour as 'hysterical' (or even 'neurotic') depends on the belief that a certain type of explanation -- namely, 'psychological' rather than 'physiological' -- holds. Indeed, certain behaviour will count as a 'symptom' only in the context of certain beliefs about its cause or explanation. The 'facts' are thus theory-laden. There is no neutrally describable set of behaviours which are, as such, hysterical. Freud did, however, at one time believe that there are specific (objective) hysterical symptoms (Freud, 1888-1889, p. 78 ff.; cf. Andersson, 1962, Ch. 3). This brings us to the second difficulty with the move from hypnotically induced hysteria to the role of ideas. There was dispute whether the mechanism of hypnosis was itself somatic (Charcot) or psychical (Bernheim and the 'suggestion' school), i.e., whether it was the result of physiological changes or the effect of ideas. Because of his belief in an objective symptomatology of hysteria, Freud argued against direct suggestion, but noted: "This does not imply any denial that the mechanism of hysterical manifestations is a psychical one: but it is not the mechanism of suggestion on the part of the physician" (Freud, 1888-89, p. 79). Freud went on to favor a form of 'suggestion' account of hypnosis (Freud, 1889a, pp. 97-98, 101), and eventually to offer a sexual theory of hypnosis (1905d, p. 150n., and 1921c, pp. 127-28). The essential thing from our point of view is that, whatever the mechanism, the content of ideas has to be assigned a role in the hypnotic process.

The ideas which Freud and Breuer focus on in their 'Preliminary Communication' are persisting memories. The 'persistence' is important.
for otherwise there might be no reason not to attribute the symptoms directly to the traumatic event, without appealing to memory or thoughts at all. They insist that "the psychical trauma -- or more precisely the memory of the trauma -- acts like a foreign body which long after its entry must continue to be regarded as an agent that is still at work" rather than an agent provocateur that merely releases the symptom, which then goes its own way (Breuer and Freud, p. 6). The evidence cited is the evidence of 'cure' (i.e., removal of symptoms). In treating hysteria, Freud (following Breuer) had from the very first made use of hypnosis in "another manner", apart from directly suggesting the disappearance of symptoms, he would use hypnosis in getting the patient to trace the origins of his symptoms (Freud, 1925d, p. 19):

... each individual hysterical symptom immediately and permanently disappeared when we had succeeded in bringing clearly to light the memory of the event by which it was provoked and in arousing its accompanying affect, and when the patient had described that event in the greatest possible detail and had put the affect into words. Recollection without affect almost invariably produces no result. (Breuer and Freud, p. 6).

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1 Cf. Freud's 'Lecture on Hysteria' of this period. He there argues that the memory is a 'direct' rather than 'releasing' cause by reversing the dictum "when the cause ceases the effect ceases" (Freud, 1893h, p. 35; the passage is paralleled in Breuer and Freud, p. 7, where the memory is called a 'directly releasing cause').

This is the classic pattern exhibited, for example, by the cure of Anna O.'s inability to drink by her recovery of the memory (with disgust) of her lady-companion allowing her dog to drink out of a glass (Breuer and Freud, pp. 34-35). We shall have to consider the importance of arousing accompanying affect, i.e., cathartic abreaction of emotion; but the
evidence of cure may again be of dubious value in any case. They say (speaking of a putatively epileptic girl who, hypnotized, had one of her attacks and relived the chase by a savage dog that had preceded her first attack): "The success of the treatment confirmed the choice of diagnosis" (Breuer and Freud, p. 14). But Breuer himself admits (in discussing Anna O.): "As regards the symptoms disappearing after being 'talked away', I cannot use this as evidence; it may very well be explained by suggestion" (Breuer and Freud, p. 43). In context, Breuer is referring to evidence for the truth of the patient's statements (not the doctor's diagnosis); but it is these statements which identify the 'precipitating cause' and so the quotation (and the difficulty) is applicable to the diagnosis as well.

Failures to cure, however, need not be devastating to the claims. Among other things, the situation can be complicated by new associations with an original trauma preventing complete cure by the cathartic procedure (Breuer and Freud, p. 74n. 2). But even where there is cure, and no question of suggestion, other countervailing factors, or untruthfulness, the production of a memory and subsequent relief of symptom are not sufficient to show that the symptom had its source in memory. The most radical difficulty for this argument for aetiology is that the memories produced may be only putative memories, or (at best) memories of putative events. This is the difficulty that led Freud to fruitful consideration of phantasy, instinct, and infantile sexuality. It is not a difficulty that calls for the rejection of the influence of ideas (phantasies are no less thoughts than memories) suggested by the efficacy of hypnosis (in eliminating and inducing symptoms) and by Breuer's cathartic method; but it does call for a re-examination of that influence.
II. Idea and Affect

The central explanatory notion in the Breuer-Freud theory of hysteria is that all types of hysteria (not just 'traumatic' hysteria or attacks where it is clear that the subject is hallucinating the event which provoked the original attack) have symptoms which are meaningful in the context of a precipitating trauma. Ideas are essentially involved because an emotion or behaviour can be understood as a response to a situation (i.e., as 'meaningful') only if the agent is aware (in some sense) of the situation. So far, however, this calls only for perception, not memory. But the event being responded to is in the past. The symptom makes sense as a reaction to an event. The symptom is pathological because one is responding to past reality rather than present reality. Hence, "hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences" (Breuer and Freud, p. 7) which are mistaken for present perceptions and responded to as such. This picture of Freud's early theory requires correction along several dimensions. Perhaps most important, the situation is complicated by the fact that in addition to the confusion of perception and memory, there is a contrast (and so a possible confusion) between the memory of an actual event and phantasy.

It is not strictly correct to say that symptoms are meaningfully related to the precipitating trauma because memories are mistaken for present perceptions and responded to as such. This for two reasons. First, the argument (for the role of ideas) required that 'meaning' be interpreted narrowly so that the symptom could be understood as an emotional or behavioural response to a situation as seen by the subject (e.g., as
flight is to danger, Breuer and Freud, p. 91). Though the Freud-Breuer theory certainly claims that the symptom is "strictly related to the precipitating trauma" (p. 4), the relation need not be that of an intentional response in order to be intelligible. The symptomatic behaviour might simply be associated with the original experience without being a rational reaction to it. For example:

A girl, watching beside a sick-bed in a torment of anxiety, fell into a twilight state and had a terrifying hallucination, while her right arm, which was hanging over the back of her chair, went to sleep; from this there developed a paresis of the same arm accompanied by contracture and anaesthesia (Breuer and Freud, p. 4).

Alternatively, the relation might be merely symbolic and the symptom a 'mnemic symbol' (Breuer and Freud, p. 90). "For instance, a neuralgia may follow upon mental pain or vomiting upon a feeling of moral disgust" (Breuer and Freud, p. 5). But whether a matter of response, association, or symbolism, some sort of awareness of the original situation is required and so (a slightly modified version of) the earlier argument for the role of ideas, whether the trauma is perceived, remembered, or phantasied, still follows through. The possibility of phantasy, however, brings us to the second point needing elaboration. The originating cause of the symptom may not be a 'precipitating trauma' if this is taken to involve an external event. There must be affect, but this may arise from instinct (i.e., an internal stimulus) rather than event (external stimulus). In either case, the vicissitudes and relations of affects and ideas must now be traced.

Together idea and affect, that is an affectively charged idea, will (usually) amount to an emotion (though psychological states other than emotions also consist of ideas plus affect). But the two can come apart.
and an emotional experience can have pathological consequences. Freud's views on idea and affect undergo considerable development. The 'affect' or 'sum of excitation' attached to an idea, however, remains an underlying hypothesis:

. . . the concept that in mental functions something is to be distinguished -- a quota of affect or sum of excitation -- which possesses all the characteristics of a quantity (though we have no means of measuring it), which is capable of increase, diminution, displacement and discharge, and which is spread over the memory-traces of ideas somewhat as an electric charge is spread over the surface of a body (Freud, 1894a, p. 60).

Sometimes Freud uses a mechanical rather than a field-theory model in his discussions of psychical energy. The underlying hypothesis is meant to be neurological, or at any rate physical-chemical-biological, but the ambiguity suggested by the psychological-feeling connotations of 'quota of affect' is also present in the theory.

The most important characteristic of the pathogenic idea (which, it must be remembered, is a thought rather than an isolated image) is that it is 'incompatible', that is, it conflicts with the set pattern of the person's life, what he believes or wants to believe. An idea may also be 'incompatible', and hence traumatic, because there is no adequate reaction "as in the case of the apparently irreparable loss of a loved person" or because social circumstances make a reaction impossible (Breuer and Freud, p. 10).

The idea is rejected. At this stage (e.g., Breuer and Freud, p. 116) Freud treats this rejection as an intentional repression. The patient has motives for 'forgetting' and these are what lead to the resistance to the recovery of the memory (Breuer and Freud, p. 111). There are, of course, problems with deliberate repression. All the problems of self-deception:
The editors of the Standard Edition note that the use of 'intentionally' and 'deliberately' to modify 'repressed' "is expanded by Freud in one place (1894a) where he states that the act of repression is 'introduced by an effort of will, for which the motive can be assigned'. Thus the word 'intentionally' merely indicates the existence of a motive and carries no implication of conscious intention" (Breuer and Freud, p. 10n.1). If this is so, what then is the 'effort of will'?

There is further, indirect, evidence that Freud means conscious intention when he says 'intentionally'. He insists that conscious awareness of conflict (of incompatible ideas) must occur before the repression involved in 'defence hysteria' can take place (Breuer and Freud, p. 167). In the context of the statement about intentionally repressing, he speaks of the patient as "determined to forget" (Breuer and Freud, p. 11). He also speaks of a patient's (Lucy's) "moral cowardice" ("the mechanism which produces hysteria represents on the one hand an act of moral cowardice and on the other a defensive measure which is at the disposal of the ego"), which seems inappropriate if the repression were not in the patient's control, i.e., 'intentional' (Breuer and Freud, p. 123). And at this stage, Freud's theory contains no notion of unconscious intentions, only unconscious memories.

of simultaneously knowing and not knowing. Intentional forgetting seems to require following a rule under conditions which do not allow you to knowingly follow it, in which case it becomes unclear in what sense you are (actively) following the rule rather than (merely) acting in accordance with it. (Cf. the child's playful injunction: 'don't think of elephants!') How can one deliberately forget? Must one also forget the forgetting? Perhaps Freud could simply allow that one forgets without effort the deliberate forgetting -- because once the affect is detached from the idea, no energy is needed to keep it from consciousness. Whether or not he would say that, these complications may have helped Freud move (later) to the view of repression as itself an unconscious process.

On this view the unconscious becomes a collection of individually repressed ideas, which form "a nucleus and centre of crystallization for the formation of a psychical group divorced from the ego -- a group
around which everything which would imply an acceptance of the incompatible idea subsequently collects. The splitting of consciousness . . . is accordingly a deliberate and intentional one" (Breuer and Freud, p. 123). The repression is intentional, but the unconscious ideas are memories and not intentions: no hint yet of dynamic ideas (impulses or desires) or the unconscious as process rather than isolated bundle. This may seem satisfactory where there is an obvious external trauma, independent of one's desires. But how could Freud believe this to be true in general? How could he even describe those cases which seem precisely the denial of desires, e.g., Lucy? Perhaps he would say that you can repress a desire, but the unconscious desire (e.g., Lucy's love?) does not act as a desire. The energy gets attached to an associated idea and converted into a symptom, not executed into a symptom (the desire is manifested, not expressed). But I suspect that the problem simply does not arise for Freud at this point because he does not think through all of his examples. It later does become a problem because the notions of infantile pleasure and desires force recognition that it is sometimes desires that become or are unconscious. But we shall return to these developments. Note also that the 'second consciousness' or bundle of thoughts formed by repression is rather different from the trauma-producing 'hypnoid states' that Freud came ultimately to reject (Freud, 1896c, pp. 194-95).

In the defence against the incompatible idea by repression, the affect is detached but remains to be dissipated. The idea is defused and safely hid. The form of disposal of affect varies, and with it the character of the disorder. "The hysterical method of defence . . . lies in the conversion of the excitation into a somatic innervation . . . " (Breuer and
Freud, p. 122). The affect now forms a symptom; the content of that symptom depends on the idea which has been repressed. The physical symptom may be a response, an association, or a symbol of that idea. The idea is a memory. But now we need a third correction. In an hysterical attack, the sufferer need not mistake the memory for a perception. First, the attack may in no sense be an active response to a perceived situation, even a mistakenly perceived one. And, secondly, even where it is such a response (e.g., Frau Emmy's 'Keep still! -- Don't say anything! -- Don't touch me!' formula; Breuer and Freud, pp. 56-57, 95), the sufferer may still be totally unconscious of the originating memory. Even where there is a memory with the force of an hallucination (e.g., Emmy, p. 49, and Anna, p. 34), it may be only a screen. But in all cases the symptom itself is, in a sense, a memory. Whatever its connection with the pathogenic incompatible idea, it is itself a mnemonic symbol (see Breuer and Freud, p. 90n.1). 3 So, for example, Emmy's pains are "memories of pains . . .

3 There may be a question whether symptoms which are not in some way repetitions of elements in the originating thoughts and circumstances (e.g., Emmy's 'Don't move!') should count as mnemonic symbols. But if a connection by association or symbolism is sufficient to make for 'repetition' it is not clear why a response (though not quite 'mnemonic' and certainly not a 'symbol') should not be included. Mnemonic symbols are basically substitutes for memories; and symptoms which are responses, associations, or directly symbolic all serve that function (see Freud, 1910a, pp. 16-17).

mnemonic symbols of the times of agitation" (Breuer and Freud, p. 90), and Miss Lucy's "consciousness [plagued by the smell of burnt pudding] now contains the physical reminiscence which has arisen through conversion . . . and suffers from the affect which is more or less clearly attached to
precisely that reminiscence" (pp. 122-23). The mechanism explains the symptom without appealing to a confusion between memory and perception, a confusion which is in some cases (no doubt) also present.

This does not leave ideas as odd appendages to some sort of truly pathogenic affect. According to the theory, it is the ideas which determine which affects must seek abnormal discharges (the usual paths of association, forgetting, and abreaction being unavailable). The theory of the ideogenic nature of hysteria is also the most secure element of Freud's early account. We rejected the evidence of hypnotic cure as uncertain, but the danger of interference from suggestion, at least, can be minimized. Initially, hypnotic therapy consisted entirely of suggestion, instructions from the doctor to the patient for the relief of symptoms. But with the development of the cathartic 'talking cure' (Breuer and Freud, p. 30), the content of hypnotic sessions surprised the doctors and the results were unexpected (at least by Breuer in the first case, that of Anna O. -- Breuer and Freud, pp. 7 and 46). We have already mentioned the confirmation provided by the duplication of hysterical symptoms under hypnosis. That cures continued to be effected by the cathartic procedure after Freud had given up the use of hypnosis (e.g., Miss Lucy R.) increases their evidential value still further. The 'pressure technique' and, even more, free association (where there is no command to trace memories to initial trauma) eliminate straightforward 'suggestion', and though it may re-enter in the form of 'transference' fresh evidence is also provided as one can observe the role of ideas in witnessing the process of development of symptoms in the transference relation. Stuart Hampshire provides a clear statement of the sort of
evidence (not depending on cure) for the importance of persisting memories in the neurotic:

to say that he recognizes the unconscious memory as the explanation of his inclination and conduct is not to attribute to him the discovery of a correlation between two classes of events. When the repressed memory is revived, there is an instant recognition of the continuity and unbrokenness of the memory discernible in a consistent misreading of situations confronting him. When the memory is recognized as a memory, he recognizes also the consistent superimposition of the notional past upon the present . . . with his now fully conscious memory of the past situation as he conceived it, the inclination to behave and act in the same way returns to him with the same force, even though now, recognizing the past as past and unalterable, he restrains himself (Hampshire, 1960b, pp. 173-74).

This sort of evidence, however, already takes a further step towards treating the discovery of memory as the discovery of 'a reason' or 'motive', the idea as object of impulse or part of the background of belief in which impulse operates, rather than a causal accompaniment of strangulated affect. Before we take that step, there is another type of evidence to consider. The role and influence of ideas in hysteria seems most definitely confirmed by that feature of hysterical symptoms which distinguishes them most clearly from organic symptoms: "hysteria behaves as though anatomy did not exist or as though it had no knowledge of it" (Freud, 1893c, p. 169). The symptoms are clearly ideogenic, for not only is there no evident organic cause for the disorder but it is the sufferer's ideas of the working of his body and not the facts of anatomy that determine the pattern of his disorder.

Or it would seem that hysteria must be ideogenic. For does the anatomical ignorance of hysteria depend on the ignorance of the hysterical? One would expect that if it is the sufferer's ideas that shape his symptoms, then more sophisticated hysterics (e.g., anatomists and medical students)
would have more sophisticated symptoms. The expectation is difficult
to confirm and its implications are not as clearcut as one might suppose.

To begin, classical conversion hysterias are now a clinical rarity. When
they do occur, it tends to be among the uneducated poor. Where, in a
rare instance, a medical student may exhibit a transient conversion
symptom, the report may be unsophisticated ('pain in my knee'), but we
cannot be certain of the relation of the report to the symptom. That is,
the level of reporting required or expected is important. Even with the
unlearned, one can elicit medically quite accurate and specific symptoms
(for, say, myasthenia gravis) by appropriate questioning. (Cf. the charge
that the symptoms of Charcot's hysterical patients were due to suggestion
and coaching -- Szasz.) It may be presumed that the medical student would
elaborate or correct his report of symptoms in accordance with medical
knowledge if he thought such detail expected. (Consistent ideology might
even force him to be cured by application of the usual, chemical, pro-
cedures.) Even if symptoms in medical students were persistently un-
sophisticated and medically implausible, it would in any case not show
that hysteria was not ideogenic. The operative ideas might be unconscious
phantasies. Indeed, it may be part of the nature of hysteria that dis-
placement and conversion occur at the unconscious level and so the ideas
invoked are necessarily some sort of phantasy. The unconscious remains
infantile and therefore unsophisticated even if the man no longer is.

Evidence concerning the effects of the sexual enlightenment of children
would tend to confirm this suggestion. Children may be informed of the
sexual facts of life and yet somehow forget. In a sense, the information
does not register and the sophisticated knowledge is unavailable or unused.
An informed 5 3/4 year-old can persist in the pumpkin seed theory (i.e., oral impregnation phantasy), at least in play: "The baby got in the doll because an elephant with long trunk squirted something in her mouth." Even medical students exhibit such regression to early 'knowledge': will talk of the vagina as 'a dirty, smelly hole', and make the same sexual and excremental confusions that so troubled Little Hans. 4

4 I am indebted to Dr. Paul Myerson and Dr. John Maltsberger for providing clinical information.

The aetiology goes through unconscious ideas, which are ideas nevertheless. This leaves a number of further questions. Among them, what is the character of the phantasies involved in unconscious knowledge? In what sense does one 'know' when knowledge is unconscious, and in what sense does one 'not know' when conscious knowledge is displaced by unconscious?

Finally, leaving this digression on the hysteria of anatomists, the existence of resistance to the recovery of memories and the interlocking and mutually supporting theories of repression and the unconscious provide evidence for the role of ideas at a more sophisticated level. That ideas are important in the genesis of hysteria is, I think, certain. How they are important and what sort of ideas they are is not yet entirely clear.
III. Affect and Abreaction (Discharge)

Reintegrating the 'incompatible' ideas into consciousness is not enough for cure. Breuer and Freud emphasized the need for 'arousing its accompanying affect'. Freud observed many years later, in his theoretical essay on 'The Unconscious', that "If we communicate to a patient some idea which he has at one time repressed but which we have discovered in him, our telling him makes at first no change in his mental condition" (Freud, 1915e, p. 175). And elsewhere, as we have seen, he says

If knowledge about the unconscious were as important for the patient as people inexperienced in psycho-analysis imagine, listening to lectures or reading books would be enough to cure him. Such measures, however, have as much influence on the symptoms of nervous illness as a distribution of menu-cards in a time of famine has upon hunger (Freud, 1910k, p. 225).

Insight is not enough. What more is needed? The early abreaction theory calls for affect. The difficulty brought on by the splitting off (of the incompatible idea) was that the affect originally attached to the idea could not be discharged in the usual ways (abreaction, association, etc.). The idea was weakened and removed from consciousness, but the affect remained, in the case of hysteria, to be 'converted' into symptoms. So it is not enough for cure that the repressed idea be retrieved, the affect must be reattached and then discharged. Here there are theoretical difficulties.

It seems that Breuer and Freud found that in most cases, the retrieval of the memory of the traumatic event was accompanied by an accentuation of the related symptom and then its disappearance (p. 37). But how is one to distinguish a new affective reaction from the abreaction of the original undischarged quantity? The relation of energy in the
symptom to the original undischarged affect is also problematical. The problem arises especially acutely when affect is not converted immediately into symptoms (i.e., there is a delay in first occurrence of symptoms) (Breuer and Freud, p. 168 ff.). Freud speaks in these cases of 'recollected affect' (Rosalia, p. 173), but the patient is not aware of it in the interval and it is unclear in what form it is preserved. What is the criterion of identity and individuation for affective energy? What happens once a sum of excitation has been put to another use, i.e., been converted? Why can it not be released or 'used up' in its new form? The trauma in Freud's 'Neuro-Psychoses of Defence' (1894a) remains a precipitating cause, but it is less clear whether it is still an agent at work or 'directly releasing cause'. That is, how detached is affect once it is put to a new use? Does it lead an independent life once its new form has been determined by the associated idea? Can it have an independent death? If it can, is the 'memory' then still essential to the existence of the neurosis (admitting its essentialness to the content), and need it be recovered in order to effect cure? If it cannot, why not? The start of an answer may perhaps be found in the notion of a 'psychical mnemonic symbol'. For insofar as the symptom is itself a memory, the energy may be no more open to release in its new form than in its original one -- it may just be more bearable. It becomes dischargeable through association, consolation, abreaction, etc., only once it becomes conscious memory. It is therefore the role of psychoanalysis to bring affect and idea together again. It is of course important that the conditions that kept the affect from being discharged in the original situation not be duplicated in the analytic situation (hence analyst must be accepting, etc.). Other constraints
should also be considered, but I doubt that further light is to be found until one has examined closely Freud's instinct theory and the nature of the connection between idea and affect within that theory. (See also 'Project', Freud, 1950a.)

There are further theoretical difficulties connected with the identification and re-identification of the energy involved in symptoms and abreaction. And psychic energy, or affect, might be compared — in some ways at any rate — with simple felt impressions. And some of the difficulties we have brought out and are going to bring out might be compared with difficulties we have brought out in relation to the Humean attempt to explain the identification, discrimination, and nature of emotions in terms of simple impressions. But first I wish to explore another aspect of the notion of abreaction.
IV. Abreaction and Expression

What sort of 'discharge' of emotional energy is 'abreaction'? Is the connection of energy involved in discharge behaviour to the emotion such that the emotion is the 'motive' of the behaviour? Must it be a conscious 'motive' or may it be unconscious (i.e., is abreaction necessarily conscious)? One way of approaching these questions is through another: Is 'abreaction' a species of 'manifestation' or of 'expression' of emotion?

That difference rests, I want to claim, on the intentionality of the behavour. Expression must depend on the subject's thoughts. The problem is whether those thoughts may be unconscious or must be conscious. One can manifest an unconscious emotion (meaning that the thought involved is unconscious -- whatever the status of the 'affect') in all sorts of ways: e.g., Elisabeth's love of her sister's husband manifested itself in somatic hysterical symptoms (especially localized in pains in the left thigh), intrusive thoughts ('Now he is free again and I can be his wife', at sister's deathbed, p. 156), and significant behaviour (e.g., overzealous defence of his appearance, Breuer and Freud, p. 158). The emotion could be said to be 'expressed' in as many ways, where 'expression' here equals 'manifestation', but she is not expressing the emotion on these occasions. For that to be true, she would have to know that she loves him, and intentionally do the relevant actions because of that love. Behaviour, if it can be intentional must be intentional to count as 'expression' (see Wollheim, 1966-67). To bring this out, imagine that 'A hits B'. Suppose that is all you know of their behaviour. What emotion is A expressing?
One might be inclined to say 'anger' and perhaps 'jealousy' and other emotions in that range (unpleasant and hostile). But why not, say, 'gratitude'? Perhaps A is grateful to C who hates B, and expresses that gratitude by hitting B. Perhaps A is grateful to B, but B has strange ways of deriving pleasure (or at least A believes B derives pleasure in those strange ways). The point is that any bit of behaviour, neutrally described, can express (almost) any emotion. But to know what emotion is being expressed, you must know the thought behind it, why the agent is doing it, you must know the intentional description of it as an action (see MacIntyre, 1971).

'Catharsis' might seem a matter of the discharge of neutrally described energy; but as embodied in the 'abreaction' theory, such an account cannot be adequate. Catharsis and abreaction as treated by Freud seem to be species of expression (despite many misleading statements), in the sense in which expression requires conscious intention. Because you do not discharge that particular energy, you do not abreact that particular emotion, unless your behaviour is intentional action (where the relevant intention involves expressing that emotion). Otherwise running around the block or other activity (or conversion into a symptom) should always be sufficient 'discharge' of any emotion. But it is a central claim of the abreaction theory that strangulated affect cannot be discharged in just any way, most particularly not by symptomatic actions. Incompatible ideas must be reintegrated back into consciousness, and reattached to their original affect, before the affect can be adequately discharged. General release of energy (e.g., from running) may bring relief by lowering the vitality of the entire system, and so lowering the level of suffering.
along with it, but it does not discharge the particular troublesome energy. To tell what emotion is being discharged or abreacted you must go through the patient's thoughts.

Our question was whether those thoughts may be unconscious. The answer is that they must be conscious for the emotion to be expressed rather than merely manifested, and it seems that 'abreaction' requires the thought to be conscious because it is a species or type of 'expression'. It might seem an empirical claim of the abreaction theory that the energy is not discharged unless discharged in connection with (the appropriate) conscious thought. I hope it is now clear that that is actually a conceptual point: we do not know what the energy is (what emotion is being expressed rather than merely manifested) except through the conscious thoughts. We identify the energy through the behaviour, which in turn we identify through the intention. That abreaction is a species of expression is a consequence of how we tell what emotion is being discharged or abreacted.

We can not discharge the energy of strangulated affect, unconscious emotion, until the associated idea is made conscious because 'discharge' really means 'express'. Symptoms can manifest unconscious feeling. But even if symptoms disappeared without the thought becoming conscious, the emotion would not have been 'abreacted'.
V. Affect and Abreaction Again

Further theoretical difficulties are raised by the need for an adequate reaction in order to discharge affect (Breuer and Freud, p. 8). This should be a quantitative notion. If a reaction is inadequate in the first place, the affect remains attached to the idea in memory. They become detached in the repression of the idea, and adequate reaction (or discharge) is thereafter impossible. The notion of adequacy becomes more than neatly quantitative, because the detached affect seems to require an 'appropriate' discharge. Appropriateness seems to be determined by the original associated idea, and so adequate reaction cannot be achieved until affect and idea are rejoined. No reaction, however great in magnitude, can achieve the adequate discharge of a detached and 'strangulated' affect. Again, this is a consequence of identifying (discharged, abreacted, or expressed) energy through behaviour as conceived by the subject. Appropriateness is also actually one of the constraints (the other is 'traumatic force') that Freud puts on aetiological claims: the content of a trauma and the nature of the symptom must be appropriately connected, the former must be a 'suitable' determinant of the latter before we can accord it a primary aetiological role (Freud, 1896c, pp. 193-94).

A final difficulty. Associative discharge, an alternative to motor discharge, also tends to obscure the economic or quantitative picture. Conscious ideas, according to Studies on Hysteria, are subject to "rectification by other ideas" (p. 9). This is very much like the correction of beliefs: "After an accident, for instance, the memory of the danger and the (mitigated) repetition of the fright becomes associated with the
memory of what happened afterwards -- rescue and the consciousness of present safety. Again, a person's memory of a humiliation is corrected by his putting the facts right, by considering his own worth, etc."

(Breuer and Freud, p. 9). So long as an idea is conscious, accompanying affect can be made to disappear through a process of association. But the economics of this process is not entirely clear. Is the affect somehow spread over the associated ideas, or is there some sort of cancelling affect (negative cathexis?) attached to the correcting ideas? How does the process differ from whatever occurs in the process of reasoning by which we correct non-affectively charged beliefs? And why does not a similar process bring relief in obsessional neurosis? According to Freud's early model, obsessional neurosis is produced by detached energy that gets displaced onto other ideas (rather than converted into physical symptoms as in hysteria). For example, the girl who suffered from obsessional self-reproaches for crimes she did not commit because of the displacement of her guilt from masturbation (Freud, 1894a, p. 55). Why do the displacement and associations to innocence not bring relief? Here there is not quite the same difficulty we saw earlier in re-identifying the affect in its different connections. In hysteria we are dealing with a neutral energy that gets converted, here we are dealing with 'affect' in the sense of an emotion (guilt) which gets displaced. So far as an emotion is identified through its object, however, to call a change in object 'displacement' would raise the same difficulty. A thing can be perceived as 'displaced' or 'converted' only against a background of continuity -- too much change (i.e., change in essential identifying respects) leaves it no longer the 'same thing'. In any case, the question remains of why the
affect cannot be successfully discharged in its displaced form. If there is an additional source of energy sustaining the symptom, what is it and why must it be re(?)-joined to the original idea?

A way out of this tangle may perhaps be found if we return to examine the original idea and its connection with affect -- which is what we shall do in the next two sections.
VI. The Seduction Theory

Is the hysteric responding to past reality? For some time (first

The occurrence of a phantasy can, of course, itself be called a 'real event'; but I shall, for the moment, be using 'reality' to refer to events as contrasted with phantasies of such events. (reference in letter of October 8, 1895; see Stewart, 1967, pp. 106-10)

Freud believed he must be. Freud was prepared to believe that in some cases the 'traumatic event' consisted of a sexual assault by the father on his innocent child. This 'seduction theory' was developed as part of a broader theory of the sexual aetiology and 'choice' of neurosis. The broader theory is based on a schematic picture of sexuality in chemical and quantitative terms. Neuroses arise, in accordance with an 'aetiological formula', from problems in the unburdening of the model of internal excitation. Hysteria is produced by the passive seduction by an adult of a child before age eight. A variant 'active' sexual experience leads to obsessional neurosis. These are two of the neuropsychoses of defence. They are distinguished from another group of 'actual' neuroses by the fact that the victim is (in a sense) aware of the instigating forces (and defending himself against them) and that the sexual factor belongs "to an epoch of life which is long past" (Freud, 1898a, p. 267). The actual neuroses, such as neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis, are supposed to be derived from "current deleterious sexual practices", such as masturbation and coitus interruptus. Here the symptoms are not symbolic or 'meaningful',

Stewart, 1967, p. 43. Dr. Stewart provides a detailed and careful account of the early theory of neurosis in Chapters 3 and 4 of his book.
but rather toxicological consequences of inadequate discharge. Freud did not correct the errors in his toxicological theory of anxiety until 1926 (see Freud, 1926d, p. 94); the difficulties in his 'seduction theory' became evident much sooner. It was a theory Freud tried to avoid, even admitting to having twice suppressed the identity of the seducer as the father. (Breuer and Freud, pp. 134n.2 and 170n.1. In the cases of both Rosalia and Katharina a 'bad uncle' is substituted.) But the theory had the virtue (as well as neatly fitting the physico-chemical aetiological formula) of avoiding infantile sexuality, i.e., impulses attributed to the child, even while having to admit sexual experiences as an infant or child. This, of course, led to grave theoretical difficulties. For example, the earlier events were said to act through the mediation of memories. But why should the memory of an infantile trauma be more serious in its consequences than the actual experience of it at the time (pre-puberty and, presumably, pre-sexuality)? Freud made efforts to explain how memories from a presexual period could become traumatic (Freud, 1896b, pp. 166-7n.), but was forced eventually to abandon the whole attempt to preserve the innocence of childhood. In a letter to Fliess (September 21, 1897) he announced that "I no longer believe in my neurotica" (Freud, 1950a, p. 259). The childhood seductions had always been implausible (especially in the numbers required), and became more implausible as his own father seemed implicated by the neuroses of his sisters (Jones, 1954, p. 354). Freud's own self-analysis (which he had just begun) and developments in technique (free association leading to sexual thoughts) also must have played a role in his growing doubts. Limited therapeutic success should also be mentioned, but most significant from our point of view,
the certain discovery that there are no indications of reality in
the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between the truth
and fiction that is cathexed with affect (Freud, 1950a, p. 260).

moved Freud to abandon the 'seduction theory'. The path was open to
the discovery of infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex, and the
understanding of pathogenic ideas as representations of wish and impulse
in childhood. The emphasis on phantasy is a step towards placing the
aetiology of neurosis in the persistence of unconscious (repressed) desires
rather than buried reminiscences. In rejecting the 'seduction theory',
Freud raises a further question, connected with the larger issue of the
objectivity of history, and that is whether it is necessary that the
phantasy should occur in childhood: "It seems to have become once again
arguable that it is only later experiences that give the impetus to
phantasies, which then hark back to childhood . . ." (Freud, 1950a, p.
260; cf. 1899a, pp. 321-22, and discussion of sexualizing the past in
Rat Man, 1909d, pp. 206-7n.). So history might be phantasy of memory
rather than memory of phantasy.
VII. Action and Abreaction

What did Freud discover when he abandoned his neurotica for unconscious phantasies? First, that the memories of traumatic seductions reported by his hysterics were false, or rather, they were not memories. Secondly, and more important, that they were the psychical representatives of instinct, i.e., the (distorted) representations of the object of unconscious wish. Originally, 'Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences.' The task of analytical treatment was to recover these memories so as to allow release of the associated affect (discharge through abreaction). But it became clear that there must have been an element of pleasure in the original attack (the experience is not simply 'neutral' or traumatically unpleasant) and so Freud came to reject the abreaction theory: "A hysterical attack is not a discharge but an action; and it retains the original characteristic of every action -- of being a means to the reproduction of pleasure" (Letter 52, 1896, Freud, 1950a, p. 239). The failure of the hysterical defence is not due to the failure to discharge inappropriately bound energy derived from an external trauma. It fails because it is a compromise between impulses derived from earlier impulses and forces of repression. Hence Freud's later formula, the neurotic 'repeats instead of remembering' (Freud, 1914g, p. 151). The task of analytical treatment becomes the working through of resistances in the transference relationship, to overcome frustration and repetitive 'acting-out' by recognizing present impulses and their relation to earlier impulses (repression and regression) -- not simply discharging old (external) energies in connection with recovered memories. The thoughts involved represent the objects
of impulses (or drives, or instincts, or wishes, or desires, or . . .), and the connection with affect is therefore more intimate (though idea and affect are still detachable) than the early theory seemed to suggest. The thoughts which get repressed are connected with wishes or desires (they are not merely charged memories).

The developments in Freud's thought that led to his abandoning his neurotica and to his emphasis on phantasy and wish-fulfillment can be traced in his Project for a Scientific Psychology and his correspondence with Fliess (1950a). In his 'Project', which he worked on just after the publication of Studies on Hysteria (1895), Freud's mechanical model for the operation of the mind had suggested that the 'primary process' of the brain leads to hallucinatory gratification. This provided the essential clue for the wish-fulfillment theory of dreams, and for the importance of phantasy. There is an initial or innate drive and preference for phantasy gratification. It is only the 'exigencies of life' and the need for 'specific actions' that lead to 'secondary process' thinking.

Phantasy gratification, or hallucinatory wish-fulfillment, has certain analogies with genuine 'satisfaction' (i.e., discharge of energy). First, there is some energy that is used up in over-cathecting an idea to hallucinatory force. Secondly, the desired object is perceived as present; but, of course, since it is not really present there is inevitable frustration. The instinctual needs keep pressing for genuine satisfaction which requires the presence of an appropriate external object and 'specific action' (e.g., sucking on breast) leading to discharge. It is the exigencies of life and frustration that lead to the secondary process. But the 'Project'
model fails to give a mechanical explanation of neurotic defence, of repression. Why should memories be repressed (p. 350)? Clinical experience seemed to show that repressed ideas were sexual and unpleasant -- but why should sex be unpleasant? The theory had it that the original sexual event was very early, pre-pubertal, and memory of it was triggered by a post-pubertal event causing retroactive traumatizing of the event, leading to displacement and repression. The intercession of puberty might explain the new forcefulness of the revived memory, but is that the same as unpleasantness? The energy of sexual awakening might be added to the original cathexis of the memory -- but why should this (mechanically) lead to repression? On the model, one would have thought that it would lead to hallucinatory strength rather than unconscious activity.

The revisions of the 'Project' psychopathology began almost immediately. Among them was the idea that the original event was not neutral, but unpleasant. This left a problem of explaining the initial unpleasure. Freud first speculated that shame and morality were the repressing forces and that they were organic in origin (pp. 221-22). But he recognized that the geography of the body (the proximity of the sexual and excremental organs) was inadequate to provide an explanation. Why should there be disgust at the excremental (children are quite happy to play with faeces -- see Letter 58), and why wouldn't there always be disgust at sex on this account (p. 222)? A full theory of sexuality was needed, but still, if the original event was experienced as unpleasurable, it must have been repressed right away. So instead of a later conscious (intentional) repression, the theory seems to call for a primary repression (which the patient does not remember and which
remains theoretical and is later connected with 'fixation'). When the memory is reawakened, there is a second repression. (pp. 222-23).

Freud's father died in October, 1896. Shortly after, Freud was putting a new emphasis on the element of pleasure in the original attack (pp. 236, 238). He had already noted the peculiar pleasure in the way patients sometimes recounted the event (Breuer and Freud, p. 137). The pleasure, being non-genital, seemed 'perverse'. The notion of sexual release being obtainable from many parts of the body in childhood led to the notion of 'erotogenic zones', and to hysteria as the 'negative' of perversion (the same impulses can lead to different results) (1950a, pp. 239, 243n.5). Most importantly, it led to the break with the abreaction (discharge) theory: "A hysterical attack is not a discharge but an action . . ." (p. 239).

The concept of 'phantasy' enabled Freud to connect the two disparate ideas of hysteria as the residue of an earlier event working through memory and hysteria as action to yield pleasure in the present ('the missing piece', Letter 59, Freud, 1950a). The phantasy was a way of harking back to the primal seduction scene; a fulfillment of the adult wish to return to that scene. So what is repressed is not memory, but impulse: "the psychical structures which, in hysteria, are affected by repression are not in reality memories -- since no one indulges in mnemonic activity without a motive -- but impulses which arise from the primal scenes" (Letter 61, May 2, 1897, Freud, 1950a, p. 247; cf. 1915e, p. 177). "Remembering is never a motive but only a way, a method. The first motive for the construction of symptoms is, chronologically, libido. Thus symptoms, like dreams, are the fulfillment of a wish" (Letter 64, May 31,
The motive for formation of symptoms is libido, symptoms are sexual activity aimed at producing pleasure. So hysterical symptoms are 'meaningful' in yet another sense: in the sense in which actions with a purpose behind them have a 'meaning' supplied by that purpose. A feeling revived from the original 'seduction' scene produces or revives an impulse. At this point the original scene might still have been regarded as real. But if symptoms and phantasy in the present represent instinctual impulse, why could not earlier impulses have taken the form of phantasies? This approach dooms belief in the original seductive attack. That was acceptable as long as the experience was viewed as neutral. But for an impulse to return to exist, it must have been pleasurable, so that the child must (insofar as pleasure is the satisfaction of impulse) have had sexual impulses to enjoy in the first place. If there was pleasure, given Freud's view of pleasure, there must have been discharge of energy, so the seduction scene must allow discharge of internal impulse and not merely the addition of unpleasurable tension from the outside. But if the child has its own impulses requiring discharge, there is no need to postulate or believe in an actual seduction. The child had its own desires to fulfill in phantasy and lead to symptoms in adulthood. The road to the full theory of infantile sexuality becomes clear, and it passes through the notion of 'phantasy'.

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7 I am indebted to Professor G. N. Izenberg for clarifying these developments, as well as other points, to me.

In this new context, Dora's 'cough' appears as an action (Freud, 1950e, pp. 46-52). This symptom is connected with her unconscious love
of Herr K. (the cough appearing during periods of his absence), but Freud also interprets it as a manifestation of unconscious phantasies of oral intercourse involving Frau K. and Dora's father and return to infantile pleasures of sucking (p. 51). The cough is a much distorted compromise satisfaction. Here as elsewhere we can see the contrast of abreaction and action (arising from inner conflict rather than external trauma). If the problem were one of abreaction (discharge) there is no reason why symptoms should not solve it, i.e., why they should not be a successful form of discharge. Freud's early theory doesn't really explain why they fail (the energy assumptions, besides being difficult to support, are not sufficient). The underlying theory of pleasure, as a form of discharge, is itself open to challenge. But in any case, if the problem is one of action, one can understand how reinterpretation and insight would help guide one's actions so that they more successfully achieve their ends (of pleasure in the face of a given, but changeable, reality), rather than result in unsuccessful symptomatic compromises.

What appeared as 'abreactive' catharsis may in fact have been but a part of the more complex process in which unconscious impulse is made conscious and seen to be inappropriate to present reality and to have led to distortion in perception and response to that reality.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) Consider, for example the Rat Man's transference rage against Freud (Freud, 1909d). Is it infantile rage against his father continuing or is it a new rage? Is there distortion in perception and unconscious beliefs as a result of dispositions and character-traits which cover (recurring) unconscious conflict? What is the status of such questions and their answers? Here one ought also to examine the nature of the more general psychoanalytic claim that later psychological failures are to be traced to disturbances in earlier development. Do empirical and statistical studies (e.g., of connection between toilet training and later 'anal' characteristics) miss the point of the hypotheses they are meant to test? Do they necessarily miss the point?
VIII. The Power of Phantasy

With the rejection of the 'seduction theory', Freud concluded that "as far as the neurosis was concerned, psychical reality was of more importance than material reality" (Freud, 1925d, p. 34). Many traumatic events that Freud had taken for reality had in fact been phantasies; the ideas or memories nonetheless had pathogenic force equal to what reality would have had. There is an important complication once the 'memories', whether veridical or phantasies, are seen to be not simply memories, but the embodiment of instinct and impulse. Once this is recognized the indifference in effectiveness of reality and phantasy may perhaps be explained if it is the underlying impulse or desire which is responsible for pathogenic force: so force may remain constant despite variations in the character of the associated ideas. And we may begin to understand why insight or recapturing memories is not enough for cure. But before we can discuss this complication, there is a prior question: is the indifference of which it would be a theoretical explanation a fact? In a recent article Oscar Sachs notes:

Pragmatically almost there seems to have developed an attitude that it made little difference whether a remembered traumatic event occurred or was fantasied; the latter, subjective, drive-dependent, experience came to be accorded the primary aetiologica significance (Sachs, 1967, p. 416).

He claims that it does make a difference. "There appears to be more masochism and guilt created from acts of reality than phantasy if these occur when superego formation is already well developed" (p. 421). But Sachs offers no theoretical reason for believing this to be true. A case is discussed in which, it is claimed, failure to distinguish reality from phantasy leads to regression into earlier obsessional symptoms. It is important that the failure is the analyst's. Other cases are cited where
the difference between phantasy and reality is indeed important. For example, a

patient, having witnessed an unsuccessful suicidal attempt by his mother when he was 3½, had been told that it had not actually happened, that he must have had a nightmare. The conflict between perception and parental denial, as well as the overwhelming affect involved, resulted in severe defects in distinguishing fantasy and reality and in consequent feelings of derealization (Sachs, p. 420).

But here the difficulty is the patient's, and so the case seems irrelevant to the question of the role of phantasy and reality in aetiology. For our question is: Given that the patient takes a certain event as having really occurred, does it make any difference to the development of symptoms or possibility of cure if the event was merely phantasy? The main case Sachs discusses is similar to the above in that, as he says, "an important element was that of parental lying and denial about reality events which had been more or less correctly perceived and understood by the child" (p. 421). This case might seem similarly irrelevant, because it speaks to the issue of: Given that the patient takes a certain event as having been mere phantasy (as a result of psychoanalytic treatment), does it make any difference to the development of symptoms or possibility of cure if the event was actual? This is the reverse of our former question, but an answer to it is not irrelevant because both ask for differences in the aetiological roles of phantasy and reality. Unfortunately, I think Sachs gives a misleading account of the force of his case. The case is of a young secretary who in an earlier analysis had reported on a visit as a 6½ year-old to the doctor with her mother:

She remained in the waiting room while mother was "next door". She had listened to the sounds, thinking something sexual was going on, with feelings of strong resentment, jealousy -- and excitement. At the time she told me of these happenings I had interpreted "the pattern" in terms of her experiences in her parents' bedroom, and
her later sexual fantasies stimulated by her uncle's medical books (Sachs, p. 420).

The patient accepted the interpretation of the event as part of the oedipal phantasy pattern, but a few years later she is troubled by anxiety and the obsessive question of 'should I tell' or 'may I tell' her fiancé about certain love affairs and a lie about age. These new symptoms are now traced, via dreams, identification, etc., to "an important sexual accusation against her mother, about which she had been strongly admonished not to tell." The event is the one described, but Sachs' account is misleading because it is not the reality of that event as opposed to its supposed phantasy status that leads to the re-emergence of symptoms. It is rather the admonition, the repressed admonition, that has force. It is the admonition which leads Sachs, as it had led the young girl, to accept the reality of the event.

I brought this incident back to her and suggested that the truth of her suspicions about her mother's affair must have been confirmed for her by a strong admonition from her mother not to tell anyone of the visit. The repressed element, her mother's command not to tell, had been the confirmation of the truth of her suspicions as a child as it was now essential for the analytical understanding and confirmation (Sachs, p. 420).

So the girl's confusion of phantasy and reality is important, as Sachs says:

The distinction in reality between who was lying, who was guilty of sexual misbehavior, she or mother, were vital to the resolution of her obsessional symptoms and her anxiety. Guilt had first to be distinguished from "borrowed guilt", and for this distinction, the reality had first to be understood and delineated from the patterns with which it had become interwoven (Sachs, p. 421).

Though the girl's confusion is important, the analyst's is not. What is significant is that taking the event as phantasy left his analysis incomplete, and the incompleteness of his analysis is what allowed him to treat the event as phantasy. The admonition is what makes the difference be-
between taking the event as real and as phantasy, but that the event is real is not what makes the difference to the case. It was the event plus the admonition to deny the event that led to regression. Is there any reason to suppose that the effects would have been different if both event and admonition (like most castration threats) had been phantasy? Sachs gives none, and his argument seems more a case of incomplete initial analysis than of traumatic reality reasserting itself.

It is worth noting, however, that though the status of the event as phantasy or reality seems not to matter, it does matter (as I have said) whether the patient thinks the event real or phantasy (or is confused), and it does matter in some ways (as should now be obvious) what the analyst believes the status of the event to be. But this last point is actually very complex, and differences in interpretation are only one dimension along which his beliefs will affect his procedure. For example, in Freud's case of the 18 year-old Dora, the initial reason for treatment was that the girl's father, for his own reasons (an affair with Frau K.) wanted her convinced that an actual seduction attempt, or attack (by Herr K.) had been a phantasy. Though Freud does not fall in with this scheme, he does fail to take proper account of the intolerable nature of the girl's actual circumstances. He badgers her with interpretations, failing to see that Dora may take him as a seducing Herr K. or threatening father figure. (E.g., he interprets a 'jewelcase' in a dream as female genitals -- she says 'I knew you would say that' -- and he interprets that as resistance. Freud, 1905e, p. 69.) He admits failing to interpret the transference, but the failure goes deeper than that. As Erikson suggests,

The nature and severity of Dora's pathological reaction make her, of course, the classical hysteric of her day; but her motivation for falling ill, and her lack of motivation for getting well, today seem
to call for developmental considerations which go beyond (although they include) the sexual conflicts then in the focus of Freud's studies. ... The question arises whether today we would consider the patient's active emphasis on the historical truth a mere matter of resistance to the inner truth; or whether we would discern in it also an adaptive pattern specific for her stage of life, challenged by her special conditions, and therefore subject to consideration in her treatment (Erikson, 1964, pp. 169-70).

This is just a hint at the rather different perspective object-relations theory might add. The main point is that Freud treated Dora's problem as too much an internal one, that is, arising merely from failures to adjust to instinct. (He even goes so far at one point as to suggest that he would regard her as hysterical even if she didn't exhibit symptoms simply because of her pure disgust at a sexual attack: "I should without question consider a person hysterical in whom an occasion for sexual excitement elicited feelings that were preponderantly or exclusively unpleasurable; and I should do so whether or not the person were capable of producing somatic symptoms" (Freud, 1905e, p. 28).

Why should there be no difference in the aetiological consequences of phantasy and reality, that is, between childhood experiences and childhood phantasies of such experiences or between those and later phantasies projected back into childhood? It should first be admitted that it is not quite true to say that there are no differences. The point of this admission is not to suggest that for any given account of the origin of a symptom in childhood experience an alternative account in terms of phantasies cannot be constructed. I wish to suggest that one always can. The point here is rather that experience counts. That is, what does actually happen in childhood does have important consequences. That these consequences can result from alternative causes does not mean that these causes are not different, and the difference need not be confined to the first link
in the causal chain. What actually happens in childhood is especially important because even though events might be plausibly reconstructed with the substitution of phantasy for reality, it is only in very few cases (the 'primal phantasies') that it is at all likely that the phantasies would actually have been constructed in the absence of the experience.
Finally, why should phantasies produce the same effects as memories had been alleged to? I have not shown, and it has not been shown, that the effects are in general equal. Perhaps actual traumas do (sometimes, or even always) produce more severe neuroses. That is an empirical issue. But we can speculate on how it is that phantasies can produce neuroses with the same content as those produced by actual traumas, and why they should be equally severe, if they are. It might simply be a matter of balancing of factors. The effects of deprivation in increasing the satisfactions of early phantasy and so chances of regression might just compensate for the facilitation by actual gratification of early impulses in leading to regression. But if thoughts are important, a more general explanation is possible.

Some events have effects bypassing our thoughts about them. If someone breaks their leg, it becomes more difficult for them to walk no matter what they think. But if it is the perception of an event that has effect, how a person sees the event becomes its privileged description. If the event is repressed, it is his view of what happened that is repressed, and there is no neutral description (however obtained) which is more important. It is the consciousness of the happening, rather than the actual happening that has causal efficacy. Of course, a person may distort the event in his perception, and the greater the distortion the more inclined we are to say it is a 'phantasy', though so long as there is some public event to which it maintains an intelligible relation, we are not forced to give it that description. (Conversely, phantasies are not necessarily 'false', in that, like certain accurate masturbation
phantasies, they can aim at and achieve the content of a veridical memory.) If the differences among thoughts (perceptions, phantasies, and memories) were themselves matters of degree of force or quantity of energy (in Humean fashion) we would expect differences in consequences based on type of thought and not just content of thought. Such an account is, however, arguably false. (But I leave the argument and the exploration of the nature of 'phantasy' for elsewhere.)

In the cases we have been considering, thoughts are important. But not because there is some event (perceived, remembered, or phantasized) which results in symptoms through our thoughts about it, but because there is an impulse (instinct, wish, desire, . . .) and that impulse essentially involves thoughts. In the absence of that impulse actual events would not have the pathogenic significance they do have. An assault might indeed be neutral rather than traumatic without a background of desires and beliefs. The unconscious phantasies to which Freud traces hysterical symptoms are real insofar as they embody impulse. The phantasies are the mental aspect of the impulse, which is to say that the impulse essentially involves thoughts, for we know our desires through our phantasies and other manifestations to which we can attach thoughts: we identify our desires (and emotions) through the associated thoughts (conscious and unconscious). The explanation of that involvement is the explanation of unconscious phantasy, and the beginning of an understanding of the nature of neurosis. An explanation of unconscious phantasy and the development of phantasy from primary process mental functioning would help us see why insight is necessary. We always act against a background of beliefs and memories which function in reasons and motives, which give
the objects of our desires. These desires or wishes are themselves emotions or connected with easily recognizable emotions (as in a Spinozist logic of emotion and disposition to action). Current impulse informed by unconscious memory or phantasy becomes repetition, or an attempt (unconsciously) to alter the past. The source of the thought (whether phantasy or memory) does not matter, it can play the same role in shaping emotion and in guiding impulse and action. Phantasy and memory may have comparable effects because they are not simply 'causes', that is, past experiences are not connected by general laws to present symptoms (or at least, that is not the Freudian claim), rather unconscious phantasy and memory provide the (unrecognized) motives and reasons for present conduct, inclinations, and symptoms. So long as they are unconscious, they can operate with equal force -- they can be equally inappropriate as perceptions of current reality and so as background for emotion and action. It is not the undischarged energy of earlier periods of childhood that persists, but the memories of earlier satisfactions and frustrations and the phantasies connected with them, and these become involved in giving direction to present energy. Accepting impulses, or changing attitudes towards them, may be an important therapeutic step. The discharge of externally derived (traumatic) energy would leave the equal influence of phantasy and memory a mystery, along with the mysteries of the identification, re-identification, and conditions for discharge of energy. With an appreciation of the relation of thought to emotion and impulse we can begin to understand the operation of insight as a force for change in analytic therapy.
CHAPTER FIVE . . . FREUD AND SPINOZA
It could be said that Freud does not himself have an explicit theory of the emotions. What is sometimes called 'psychoanalytic theory of affects' is more about undifferentiated states of energy charge or energy discharge than about the emotions as they are commonly understood. Freud offers no systematic discussion of the classification and discrimination of emotional states as such. Though he pays some attention to certain particular emotions, e.g. guilt, love, jealousy, his general theoretical writings tend to center mainly on undifferentiated states of anxiety. Emotion, when it appears under that heading, tends to be assimilated to generalized anxiety, finer discriminations not receiving theoretical treatment. But, on the other hand, what I believe is more important is that much analytic interpretation is concerned with the patient's understanding or explanation of his states, with uncovering the meaning (in emotional and other terms) of symptoms, thoughts, and behaviour. The central analytic effort is to transform the emotional life of a patient through an understanding of its causes and meanings. And the faith that knowledge will make you free, I have been arguing, here depends on something like a Spinozist view of the emotions. If beliefs are built into emotions, uncovering the levels of childish impulse and phantasy embedded in present emotions may help to transform those emotions and their accompanying inclinations to action. The Freudian extension of thoughts to an unconscious level is also an extension of our understanding of the emotions. In virtue of the role of thoughts in emotion, it can help us to understand how the underlying dynamics of emotion and emotions themselves can be unconscious.
... any individual is a psycho-physical organism with a quantity of undifferentiated energy that appears in consciousness as desire and, below the level of consciousness, as appetite. This is the instinctual energy that must find its outlet, however deformed and deflected it may be by its interactions with the environment. Desires and appetites are projected upon objects, as objects of love or of hate, in accordance, first, with the primary economic needs of the organism, as objects promoting or depressing its vitality, and secondly, upon objects that are derivatively associated, through the complex mechanisms of memory, with increase or depression of vitality. Following this conception of a person's undifferentiated energy of self-assertion, Spinoza's account of passive emotions, and of the laws of transference that govern them, is very close to Freud's mechanisms of projection, transference, displacement, and identification, in forming the objects of love and aggression. (Hampshire, 1960a, p. 205).

The movement from confused ideas and passive emotion to more adequate ideas and active emotion through the 'correction of the understanding' is very much like the movement towards freedom and self-determination through making the unconscious conscious. Spinoza and Freud come together in their purposes and their concept of mind.
I. Freud's 'Theory' of the Emotions

Freud's speculations about the nature of mind started from neurophysiology and with assumptions about psychic energy. In the early writings, emotion is treated as simply equivalent to that psychic energy. Emotion or affect is simply a quantity of energy, or cathexis, attached to an idea. This, we have seen, is open to many problems, including those of the identification and re-identification of psychic energy. There are other problems with the notion of 'psychic energy' (see, e.g. Shope), but even independent of them, it cannot be correct to equate emotion with psychic energy in general. There is more that goes on in the mind. There are instincts (drive cathexes) and thoughts (bound cathexes), which even assuming an underlying energy system, it would be only confusing to assimilate to emotions. It is better to recognize the special intimacy of idea and affect in those affectively charged ideas which constitute emotions. Freud himself recognizes the importance of phantasy as the wish-fulfilling representative of instinct, and this is a part of giving thoughts their proper place in emotions. And we have already seen how giving thoughts their proper place can help clarify our understanding of 'abreaction' of emotion and other aspects of the therapeutic process.

If one insists on extracting a general theory of the emotions from Freud, one must turn to his middle and later writings. There he equates emotion not with a quantity of psychic energy, but with the discharge of such energy:
I am compelled . . . to picture the release of affects as a centrifugal process directed towards the interior of the body and analogous to the processes of motor and secretory innervation (Freud, 1900a, pp. 467-68). . . . ideas are cathexes -- basically of memory-traces -- whilst affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feelings (Freud, 1915e, p. 178).

Hence felt affect requires that energy reach a threshold level of intensity (Brierley, 1937), that is, a threshold of discharge, and that its effects, mainly interior, be distinguished from those of other sorts of drives to action. When other forms of discharge are prevented, when there is conflict (whether with reality or internal conflict), affects serve as safety-valves. But again, felt discharge of energy can only be made sense of in terms of emotion if thought is given its proper place.

Rapaport (1953) points out that there is a third stage in Freud's theory of the affects. Freud's new theory of anxiety, the perspective of ego psychology, allowed that energy could be bound in such a way that affects could serve as 'signals' rather than 'safety-valves'. We may take these 'tamed' passions to correspond (in some ways) to what we have called 'calm' passions. Their influence on behaviour can be great and need not be disorganizing or disruptive. In any case, "Freud, in his development of the signal theory of anxiety, abandoned the theory of instinctual discharge as characteristic of all affects" (Pulver, p. 350). (I should perhaps note that Rapaport's discussions of Freud's theory of affects -- 1953, 1942 -- are not particularly helpful from our point of view. He is more concerned with the effects of feeling on thought processes than with the role of thought or cognition in feeling processes. And he in general takes the economic
point of view, talk of cathexes, countercathexes, and hypercathexes, too seriously; that is, more seriously than the theory requires or the evidence warrants.)

On a descriptive level, one can move to unconscious emotions quite readily if one starts from emotions in which feelings, as such, are unimportant. For example, we sometimes say that someone is afraid when they react immediately to a perceived danger by fleeing, even though at the time they might claim to be feeling nothing in particular, indeed, they might be too afraid to feel anything until after they stop running. We can come by this route (that is, cases of delayed affect) to distinguish between being afraid and feeling afraid (Mullane, 1965). The non-experiential aspects of emotional states are sometimes sufficient for their identification; and such emotions may be descriptively unconscious or preconscious. It is enough that we would experience the feeling under certain conditions, that it requires only an effort of attention to make us aware of it (see Pulver, pp. 350-51, for more examples). But what of a repressed emotion? Sometimes our unawareness of an emotion is the result of conflict of psychological forces, of defence. Sometimes there are distortions in behaviour and thought that will allow us to infer to (or which may be interpreted in terms of) unconscious thoughts and emotions. Little Hans' fear of horses masked his unconscious fear of his father. An affect may be displaced if felt at all. In some cases, we would feel anxious if our defences were weakened, if the unconscious were allowed to emerge, but if defences are lowered in the right context, e.g. where the therapeutic alliance provides supporting strength, anxiety
may be released and we may actually feel relieved. The development of insight in a particular area, in the context of an ongoing project of understanding, may help us to strengthen the ego in general (that is, in its general efforts to confront present reality rather than a world distorted by archaic emotions and phantasies).

We cannot really explore the realm of unconscious emotions properly here. But a few points can be made. If Freud followed Hume, the existence of unconscious emotions would seem senseless. Unfelt feelings can find no place in a Humean epistemology. As Freud puts it:

It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should be aware of it, i.e. that it should become known to consciousness. Thus the possibility of the attribute of unconsciouslyness would be completely excluded as far as emotions, feelings and affects are concerned (Freud, 1915e, p. 177).

But, of course, he immediately rejects this:

But in psycho-analytic practice we are accustomed to speak of unconscious love, hate, anger, etc., and find it impossible to avoid even the strange conjunction, 'unconscious consciousness of guilt', or a paradoxical 'unconscious anxiety'... it may happen that an affective or emotional impulse is perceived but misconstrued. Owing to the repression of its proper representative it has been forced to become connected with another idea, and is now regarded by consciousness as the manifestation of that idea. If we restore the true connection, we call the original affective impulse an 'unconscious' one. Yet its affect was never unconscious; all that had happened was that its idea had undergone repression. In general, the use of the terms 'unconscious affect' and 'unconscious emotion' has reference to the vicissitudes undergone, in consequence of repression, by the quantitative factor in the instinctual impulse. We know that three such vicissitudes are possible: either the affect remains, wholly or in part, as it is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively different quota of affect, above all into anxiety; or it is suppressed, i.e. it is prevented from developing at all. ... We know, too, that to suppress the development of affect is the true aim of repression and that its work is incomplete if this aim is not achieved. In every instance where repression has succeeded in inhibiting the development of affects, we term those affects (which we restore when we undo the work of repression) 'unconscious'. Thus it cannot be denied that the use of the terms in question is
consistent; but in comparison with unconscious ideas there is 
the important difference that unconscious ideas continue to 
exist after repression as actual structures in the system Ucs., 
whereas all that corresponds in that system to unconscious affects 
is a potential beginning which is prevented from developing 
(pp. 177-78).

One can perhaps give some sense even to unconscious affects as such 
(see Pulver). But here I wish to note only that Freud follows Brentano 
in what I have been arguing is also the Spinozist analysis of psycholog­ 
ical states as composed of idea and affect, with idea providing 
the object of the state. In relation to emotions, it is also impor­ 
tant to note that the associated idea is generally concerned with the 
cause of the state and is essential to the discrimination of the state 
from other states. We have seen that thought and feeling, idea and 
affect, can be separated off. They can have independent histories. 
(Both are taken by Freud to be instinctual representatives, and 
according to the early theory of anxiety later abandoned by Freud, the 
affect may be transformed directly into an emotion of anxiety -- 1915d, 
p. 153.) It should be clear, at any rate, how an emotion could be 
unconscious in virtue of the associated idea being unconscious. And 
it is arguable that the whole complex could be unconscious (see Pulver), 
though it is unlikely that it could then maintain its structural 
integrity (Freud, 1926d, p. 142n.).

Even at the catharsis or abreaction stages of Freud's theorizing, 
we have seen that thought is essential. It is essential in determining 
which affects are felt and which repressed, and essential in identifying 
which emotion is being 'expressed' or 'abreacted' when there is 
'discharge'.
It is only if we understand the role of thought that we can understand how phantasy and memory can have the consequences they do in symptom formation, and how interpretations in terms of phantasy and memory can be effective in the relief of emotional and psychological disorders. An understanding of the role of thought, including unconscious thought, could help us see the place of unconscious emotions in our lives, and how displacement, repression, reaction formation, and other mechanisms operate and how our lives might be led without the suffering that such defensive manoeuvres can bring. The recognition of the forces that govern our lives is the first step to discovering how we can control them (if we can), to discovering how we can be more active, self-determining, and free.
II. Unconscious Phantasy and Emotion

We have repeatedly noticed ways in which the capacity for certain emotions may depend on conceptual or linguistic capacities. A limit on one can be a limit on the other. Freud offers a fascinating speculation on the broader connection between the capacity for consciousness and linguistic capacity, on the connections of language with consciousness (Freud, 1915e, pp. 196-204). He suggests that the conscious and preconscious presentation ('Vorstellung') of an object consists of a presentation of a word and a presentation of a thing ('memory-images'). When the word-presentation becomes detached, the thing-presentation and so the idea is unconscious. To become conscious or even preconscious a thing must be connected with the word-presentation corresponding to it (Freud, 1923b, p. 20). This in turn connects well with an interesting speculative explanation of certain features of primary process (i.e., unconscious) thinking. That such thinking is free of time and contradiction, but subject to displacement and condensation may be due to the role of language:

It is language which builds up time and contradiction. Without spatial, verbal, and social bearings, comparisons of time length are uncertain. Outside language there are no contradictory terms or relationships, but different terms, different relationships, and that is why there is no time and no contradiction in the unconscious. Conversely, displacement and condensation exist in language itself. Trope, metonymy are displacements (etymology is in great part the history, 'diachrony' (Saussure, 1915) of such displacements), concepts and metaphors are condensations or both condensations and displacements. And that is why displacements and condensations are seen as positive attributes of the unconscious, since language uses them, whereas time and contradiction are seen as negative since they are built up by language (Benassy and Diatkine, p. 172).
If the unconscious were without words, without language, it would not be surprising that it is not subject to those laws which depend on language.

But if the discrimination of emotions depends on distinguishing thoughts, and distinguishing thoughts depends on their expression in linguistic form, how can one distinguish unconscious thoughts which precisely lack linguistic form? The question gives one an additional ground for expecting unconscious emotional structures to be unstable. And even were it answered, it might not make the speculative connection between consciousness and verbal forms especially helpful in relation to understanding the contrasts between conscious and unconscious emotions, at least insofar as unconscious emotions depend on unconscious affect or feelings (as such). Freud himself says that we come to speak, in a condensed and not entirely correct manner, of 'unconscious feelings', keeping up an analogy with unconscious ideas which is not altogether justifiable. Actually the difference is that, whereas with Ucs. ideas connecting links must be created before they can be brought into the Cs., with feelings, which are themselves transmitted directly, this does not occur. In other words: the distinction between Cs. and Pcs. has no meaning where feelings are concerned; the Pcs. here drops out -- and feelings are either conscious or unconscious. Even when they are attached to word-presentations, their becoming conscious is not due to that circumstance, but they become so directly (Freud, 1923b, pp. 22-23).

In all of which Freud may simply mean that affects are never, as such, unconscious, and to understand what it means to call emotions unconscious one must refer to the associated ideas, or the ideas which may have become detached in the course of displacement or some other process. Looking to the place of 'thing-presentations' might help us understand some of the constraints on effective insight, why telling alone is not enough (why word-presentations are not enough). Richfield (1954)
connects the constraint on insight, the special force of the acknowledgment needed for effective insight, with the contrast pointed by Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. And one might explore how this might be connected with the special therapeutic importance attached to interpretations concerned with the patient's immediate situation, i.e. transference interpretations (see, e.g., Strachey, 1934). But we must leave these problems here.

With them we also leave the problem raised by the question of discriminating unconscious thoughts. That question of course depends on the nature of the unconscious, the form of the unconscious, what it means for something to be unconscious. It also depends on the principles of inference by which one moves from conscious, or observable, 'manifestations' to the contents of the unconscious. That is a huge problem, but I would like to say just a bit here to help locate it.

How does one get, for example, to the notion of an unconscious phantasy? What happens when the notion of day-dream fantasy gets extended to the unconscious, where it becomes 'unconscious phantasy'? It is not a simple transposition. Starting with a conscious day-dream and subtracting the feature of consciousness does not yield Freud's notion of unconscious phantasy. A day-dream once totally forgotten, is not unconscious, it simply is not. A day-dream that remains recallable when no longer current, is not an unconscious phantasy either. Stored memories, whether of perceptions or daydreams, are merely descriptively unconscious, i.e. preconscious. The evidence for the existence of a descriptively unconscious day-dream is its emergence in conscious memory. The assumption is that the day-dream continues to exist in some more-or-less
unaltered form (unconscious memory) available to consciousness when called for. The assumption is on a level with that which we make when we assume that the table we are perceiving continues to exist even when unperceived by us, i.e. that it does not go out of and return to existence with our blink. The case is of small interest because the peculiarity of unconscious phantasy (like unconscious emotion) is that it is thought to be active, that it exerts an influence on our observable thought and behaviour rather than sitting in cold (preconscious) storage. But to say that it is active precisely when we are unaware of it, leaves us wanting to know what form it takes.

In order to refer to a particular phantasy, that is, in order to describe its content, to discriminate one unconscious phantasy from another, we must put it into words. ("I gotta use words when I talk to you" Sweeney Agonistes, T. S. Eliot.) It does not follow that that is the form the phantasy takes in the individual's experience. The problem is that, where the phantasy is unconscious, the phantasy is not (consciously) experienced at all. How then can we know what form the phantasy takes, or that it exists at all? Clearly we must make an inference. This does not necessarily make unconscious phantasies any worse off than a vast range of highly respectable (non-mental) entities such as electrons. It is indeed arguable that there is no 'given', and that even if not everything is known by inference, nothing is known without mediation (in one form or another). But such an argument would not solve any of our problems with unconscious phantasies. Even if there is no sharp division to be made between theoretical terms and observational terms, psychoanalytical claims about unconscious
phantasies (especially claims about pre-linguistic phantasies, of the
sort made by Kleinians) stand in need of support (both from above --
theory -- and below -- observation), and that all statements may (from
some point of view) require support provides them no special comfort.
We have noted that in order to speak of particular phantasies we must
verbalize them, but that it does not follow that those or any words
represent the form in which the phantasy is had. Freud makes a number
of suggestions (e.g., topographical and functional) concerning the
character of unconscious ideas, but perhaps the most interesting is the
one that we have looked at briefly: namely, that they are precisely
non-verbal, that unconscious ideas or phantasies involve thing-presen-
tations detached from word-presentations. We have already mentioned
that this suggestion connects with an interesting speculative explanation
of certain features of unconscious processes, and with certain other
interesting notions (and there are other connections as well, for
example, Freud relates his suggestion to the detachment from objects
and over-valuation of words in schizophrenia). I am afraid that we
cannot explore the suggestion, or its connections, or its problems, here.
There is no easy route. I think, from the manifestations of unconscious
phantasy to its form and content. But I do believe that there are routes
and that a full-scale consideration of unconscious phantasy and
unconscious thought is called for. It is necessary to a proper under-
standing of unconscious emotion. That it is necessary is one of the
things I hope we have brought out in emphasizing the importance of
thoughts (whether conscious or unconscious) in the understanding of
conscious emotion.
I have suggested a number of points at which an understanding of Spinoza might be helpful to someone interested in the underpinnings of psychoanalytical theory, to someone interested in the theory of mind that underlies or makes intelligible the role of analysis in therapy. In particular, I have emphasized the importance attached by Spinoza to thoughts in the discrimination of mental states, especially emotions, and the consequent importance attached to reflexive knowledge and its peculiarities in changing those states. An appreciation of the place of thoughts in the nature of the emotions can help one understand how the 'correction of the understanding' can help make one free, or at least freer. Reason can be seen to have a place in our efforts to control and to actively live our emotional lives. Reason need not be merely the slave of the passions. It makes sense to ask that our emotions be reasonable, i.e. appropriate to the realities with which we must cope; and an understanding of our nature, our situation, and the forces which move us can be a step towards making our emotions reasonable. We need not passively suffer our emotional lives, in Humean fashion, or as though all our experience and behaviour were the thoughtless product of conditioning (and amenable only to further conditioning), in behaviourist fashion.

Once we come to see that and how emotions involve thoughts, that affect must be understood in relation to thoughts, especially our thoughts about the causes of our states of feeling and our inclinations to action, we are in a better position to examine those states with a
view to shaping them into what they should be and what we would have them be. Knowing where we start, recognizing phantasy or imagination as phantasy or imagination, puts us in a position to correct our understanding and, with it, our emotions. Our thoughts must know their own level. As we have seen, that a thought be a full-fledged belief may be essential to the accompanying state being a particular emotion (say, regret). (See also Gordon, 1969, and Thalberg, 1973.) If we recognize the grounds of our thoughts as inadequate to their pretensions, they cease to operate as full-fledged beliefs and our state must be redescribed. (If after rejecting a belief characteristic of fear, a person still insists that he is afraid, this cannot be simply true. Not because it must be simply false, but because his state of mind must be complex.) Where beliefs or thoughts constitute or place constraints on our emotions, appreciation of the sources and character of our thoughts may help liberate them. Spinoza points out that, in certain contexts, diverse types of thoughts, memories and current perceptions, can have equal impact. Indeed, mere imaginings, mere phantasies, may have consequences comparable to those of perceptions of reality. We have seen, incidentally, that this contrasts sharply with what the Humean view of memory as faded copy would suggest about forcefulness (see also Appendix C). (Spinoza also seems to suggest that the operation of association in producing emotions depends upon the production of a memory which is not recognized as memory, or is indistinguishable from a perception of present reality -- E III, prop. 14.) We have seen that clinical observation and theory confirm the suggestion: that according to Freud, phantasy may be as etiologically important as reality. And we have seen that an appreciation of the role of thought in emotion
(and in desire and other mental states), can help us understand why and to overcome certain disabling consequences.

Comparisons between Spinoza and Freud are possible on many levels, ranging from their observations on particular emotions to broad sympathies of approach. I would here like to mention just a few of them, adding a few cautionary qualifications. Spinoza anticipates Freud's doctrine of ambivalence, the possibility and importance of contrary emotions felt towards a single object. (We have seen that Hume can find no room for the notion in his system.) But he does not explain the possibility of ambivalence in terms of conflict between the conscious and unconscious. Spinoza leaves room for unconscious desires, and the operation of confused and inadequate ideas is very like the operation of unconscious ones, but he does not have a theory of repression and the unconscious. Passive emotions may be due to (unconscious) processes of association, and ideas may be determined by other ideas of which the mind is not aware (E III, prop. 2 note), but it is not clear that Spinoza is operating with anything more than the notion of the not-conscious, rather than the unconscious. The latter is not a simple or isolated notion that might or might not have occurred to Spinoza, Descartes, Leibniz, or other philosophers. It is tied to a complex theory of mental functioning, to a theory of repression and defence and of primary process thinking.

Spinoza's psychology, like Freud's, is importantly dynamic. Indeed, the conatus has often been compared with Freudian libido (Rathbun, 1934; Hampshire, 1956, pp. 166-7). The comparison has point, but it must be understood within limitations. Spinoza's doctrine of the conatus or impulse toward self-preservation is comparable to libido, if one
takes libido (as Rathbun and Jung seem to) as including sexual and all other impulses. The two notions in any case mark the main driving forces behind human action, and fit into comparable economic models of mind as a homeostatic system seeking to maintain equilibrium in its interactions with the world outside its finite boundaries. But the two notions cannot be simply equated. Spinoza's conatus is, within his system, a unitary force (the only inner driving force). Freud, however, insists on distinguishing sexual libido from (what he calls) the ego or self-preservative instincts -- at least he so insists in his early theory. And Freud's instinct theory, despite its many changes, remains always determinedly dualistic (see Bibring). Dualism provides the key to inner conflict and inner conflict provides the key to neurosis. So, at first, Freud placed ego instincts beside libido. As libido expanded to cover ever more and more, so that eventually it came to represent all the life forces, the theory continued to provide for a second set of instinctual forces to oppose and conflict with it. In the end, beside the life instincts stand the death instincts. And Spinozistic conatus does not include a death instinct, indeed, Spinoza specifically excludes it (drives towards self-destruction must be outside man's essential nature).

Frustration of our central desires produces pain. Both Spinoza and Freud connect states of pleasure and pain with the power of instincts in action. Spinoza recognizes painful (passive) emotions (but, again, these are passive and do not amount to a death instinct). Spinoza treats pleasure as an increase in conatus, whereas Freud regards increase in libido (in instinctual tension) as painful (see earlier).
Freud does this for a number of reasons, including his belief that

Sensations of a pleasurable nature have not anything inherently
impelling about them, whereas unpleasurable ones have it in the
highest degree. The latter impel towards change, towards discharge,
and that is why we interpret unpleasure as implying a heightening
and pleasure a lowing of energetic cathexis (Freud, 1923b, p. 22).

But I think the contrast with Spinoza here is relatively superficial.

Freud apparently reverses Spinoza, but his notion of tension is, I
think, meant to be more literally physiological than the conatus.

When Spinoza speaks of pleasure, he means increase in vitality or capa-
bility of action (not psychic tension), and though this undoubtedly has
a physical embodiment, that is not the point. There are problems one
could raise with Freud's account in any case. For one thing, increase
in tension (e.g. in sex) is not always experienced as painful. Further-
more, if Freud wishes to insist that all emotions are discharge phe-
nomena, then 'discharge' should be taken as 'change of charge', because
there are painful emotions, and pain (on his account) involves increase
(not discharge) of charge. Perhaps there is some other way to distinguish
the sort of discharge which is pleasure and the sort of discharge
involved in unpleasant emotions. In any case, if emotion is a process
of discharge, one must emphasize the internal aspect of discharge, for
if one is not careful to distinguish types of discharge emotion might
seem to be involved in all action (assuming all action involves dis-
charge).

I will not here review the place of thoughts in Spinoza and Freud.
and the ways in which psychoanalytical concepts (and shamanistic concepts
as well) can help give one's emotional life an intelligible order and
open the possibility of reordering. We have seen that part of one's
suffering may be the passive subjection to unintelligible and seemingly
alien feelings. The roles of coherence and acceptance (as well as truth) in the effectiveness of interpretations are worthy of further exploration, as are the roles of non-rational factors (including transference and anxiety) in analytic therapy in general. There are also other suggestive parallels of detail (e.g., Freud's notion of the ego as primarily a body ego and Spinoza's notion of the mind as the idea of the human body) that one might explore.

Freud himself never refers to Spinoza's thought in any of his published writings. But from the beginning Spinoza was a presence in psychoanalytic thought. Lou Andreas-Salomé calls him "the philosopher of psychoanalysis."¹ In particular, she emphasizes the concept of physical and mental manifestations as 'representations' of one another, which she regards as a step beyond parallelism and beyond Freud who "has developed throughout a method of its own for the one of these two worlds, which can be grasped psychologically."

She emphasizes also the psychoanalytic concept of 'overdetermination':

"This insight, that everything is, nay must be psychically overdetermined if only one pursues it far enough, reaches far beyond the usual logical concept of determination, splits its one-sided concatenation, and ultimately turns it into a principle of universal reciprocity (p. 75)."

¹ The Freud Journal of Lou Andreas-Salomé, p. 75. She mentions a paper on Spinoza written by Victor Insk as early as 1907. The paper is now untraceable (Paul Roazen, private communication). Frau Lou's interest in Spinoza may also connect with the Spinozistic love of God, a God that does not love back (see Binion, Frau Lou).
'determinism', let alone 'overdetermination', are in fact problematical, and especially problematical in relation to the thought of Spinoza and Freud (see Hampshire, 1960a, p. 199ff.). The models of explanation and role of thoughts in explanation really need to be carefully considered.

In any case, Freud insists that no psychological state is without meaning (which may not be the same as saying that it has a 'cause' in a narrow Humean sense). And while Freud maintains a faith in an underlying neurophysiological reality, he recognizes that psychological phenomena must receive psychological explanations, at least until a reduction of the laws of psychology to material laws, or their replacement by such laws, is possible. ("Our psychical topography has for the present nothing to do with anatomy; it has reference not to anatomical localities, but to regions in the mental apparatus, wherever they may be situated in the body" -- Freud, 1915e, p. 175.) Spinoza treats mind and body as two aspects of what is in fact a single substance. The sense of this requires consideration. But in any case, explanation of thoughts must be done in the order of thoughts. Freud and Spinoza operate with common or at least overlapping notions of psychical determinism, and yet they recognize the power of understanding and of reflexive knowledge in relation to human freedom. Making the unconscious conscious may be compared in some ways with transforming confused ideas into adequate ones. Correcting our understanding can contribute to correcting our emotional disorders.

I do not wish to claim that Spinoza was an historical influence on Freud. My interest has been to show in what ways Spinoza provides a philosophical foundation for much in Freud. What I have mainly been
trying to argue is that if Spinoza is close to the truth about the mind and the mental, then it is the beginning of an argument to show that Freud, or more generally, analytic, therapies, make philosophical sense. Spinoza is the philosopher of psychoanalysis. Think far enough, correctly enough on any point at all and you hit upon him; you meet him waiting for you, standing ready at the side of the road (Lou Andreas Salomé, pp. 75-76).
APPENDIX A . . . ON OBJECTS AND CAUSES
Hume's argument for the distinctness of object and cause, as we have seen (Ch. One, Section X), is a bad argument, based on an unrealistic picture of conflict of emotions. There are other arguments to show that the object of an emotion could not be its cause. I wish to look briefly at a few of them. Not in order to give a definitive analysis of 'object'. Indeed, not in order to insist that the object of an emotion is its cause, but only to show that these arguments are not sufficient to show that the object could not be a cause, and, more importantly, to show that thoughts may play a causal role in thought-dependent states, even though thought-dependency is a point about the classification and discrimination of mental states and so a conceptual point. (I will not attempt to disentangle in just what way 'objects' are given in thoughts. But I would agree with Green, 1972, that between thoughts, desires, and other thoughts, they are indeed given.)

I may have a psychological response to a situation or object that does not, in fact, exist. "We can be as pleased by what we only believe to be the case and is not, as by what we know to be the case. Thus I may be pleased because (as I suppose) I have inherited a fortune, when I have not" (Williams, 1959, p. 225). But causes, to be effective, must exist; so if one is to give a causal analysis of "I am pleased because I have inherited a fortune" in those cases when I have not, the causation must be mediated by my belief: either the object or some thought or belief about it is the cause of the feeling. But if I am responding to my belief in those special cases (of ill-founded emotions), I must be responding to it (or through it) in all. My beliefs do not suddenly become efficacious in virtue of being false, in order to do duty for the
missing reality. "The causal account must hold that it is always my belief that is the cause, or at least the proximate cause, of my pleasure; and that the statement 'I am pleased because I have inherited a fortune' must be taken to mean 'I am pleased because I believe I have inherited a fortune'" (Williams, 1959, p. 227). Where my psychological state depends on what I am aware of, the effects of reality (whatever it may be) are mediated by my awareness. As Williams argues, if it was ever the belief that caused the pleasure

it was always the belief that caused the pleasure, even in those cases in which the thing I said I was pleased at really existed. For if not, the statement 'I am pleased because I have inherited a fortune' would express a causal hypothesis different from, and incompatible with, the hypothesis expressed by the statement 'I am pleased because I believe that I have inherited a fortune.' But it is evident that at the time of believing in the inheritance, I could have no grounds whatever for preferring the second of these hypotheses to the first, since it is logically impossible for me to distinguish between what (as I believe) is the case, and what I believe to be the case. Hence there will be two incompatible hypotheses about my pleasure which in principle I shall not be able to distinguish. But it is clear that my retrospective description of the situation as my 'being pleased because I believed . . . ,' and anyone else's description of it in these terms, are just based on my sincerely thinking or saying at the time 'I am pleased because I have . . . '; thus it appears that a necessary condition of the assertion of the true hypothesis would be my previous belief in or assertion of a false one, and this is absurd (Williams, 1959, p. 226-27).

Green distinguishes objects of emotion and what he calls 'occasions' of emotion. His concern is with the contrast between those cases in which the belief on which an emotion is founded is true and those cases in which it is false (Green, 1972, p. 36). If the object of my emotion does not exist, obviously it cannot be the cause of my emotion. So one shifts to a thought about the object, to the belief that it exists or is the case or whatever. As we have seen, the thought then must always be given
a causal role. (If Jones had not believed such and such, he would not feel so and so.) Green calls the thought the 'occasion' of the emotion. But when I am pleased because I believe I have inherited a fortune, the belief is not the object of my pleasure. Where it exists, the object of my emotion may be causally relevant to producing the belief which, in turn, is the occasion of my emotion; but the two remain distinct:

Where we have a description of an emotion of the form "A pd x because p," the object of the emotion may be non-propositionally indicated by x, while the thought which is the occasion of the emotion is expressed in the "because"-clause. In such cases, object and occasion are clearly distinct. Where we have descriptions of emotions of the form "A pd that p," the "that"-clause may both propositionally specify the object of the emotion and set out the thought which is its occasion. This does not mean that in such cases object and occasion are the same, however. If an M.P. is indignant that his bill was not passed, it is his thought that his bill was not passed which is the occasion of his emotion; but he is indignant, not that he thinks that his bill was not passed, but that the bill was not passed. (Green, 1972, p. 37).

If my belief ever plays a causal role it would appear that it must always play such a role. But can it ever play such a role? Thalberg (1964, p. 215) argues that the thoughts on which emotions are founded cannot 'cause' those emotions because "you must be able to gather evidence of the effect which is logically independent of your evidence of its putative cause", and one cannot do this for emotion and thought because "it appears that if we prove he is vexed that tickets are gone, we also prove that he thinks (believes, conjectures, doubts) that tickets are gone; therefore we cannot claim that his emotion is the effect of his thought."

Put more generally, causes and effects must be independently describable, otherwise it may not be the case (as a Humean account of causation requires) that it is logically possible that one should have existed and not the other. That is, there may not be two distinct items to be causally
Wilson points out that "if I am afraid of a dog, the dog and my fear are distinct items in any sense of the word" (p. 27), so object and emotion may be causally connected. He restricts objects to existing items (well-founded emotions), but my thought has the same object as my emotion, and even where I am afraid of something which (in fact) does not exist, my thought is certainly identifiable independently of my emotion. I describe my thought independently of any emotion it might be claimed to cause. (The same thought that in some circumstances might be associated with anger or fear, in other circumstances might produce neither.) The difficulty is more acute for causal theories of the relation of desire and action. It is sometimes claimed that there is a straight tautology of action: one cannot identify a desire without reference to the action of which it is the putative cause, the cause is not describable independently of the effect. (If the only criterion for a desire to pick a flower is the actual picking of the flower -- given the opportunity, etc. -- then it looks as though the existence of the cause depends on the existence of the effect and so one may not have two independent items.) It is arguable that we do have other handles onto desires to act, other than through the actions they putatively cause (see Pears, 1966-67), and it is in any case clear that Wilson is right that thoughts or objects and emotions are separable items. But this is too swift as a reply to the general difficulty. That objects are clearly independently describable meets only the demand that the cause be describable independently of the effect. But the effect must also be describable independently of the fact that it is caused by its cause. And this is more difficult, one must show that the effect (the emotion.)
is describable independent of the claim that it is caused by its object (or thought). If a relation to a certain object or thought is a logically necessary condition of the emotion being the emotion it is, how can the two be causally related?

The difficulty as raised by Thalberg is parallel to what has been called the 'backward tautology of action': desires cannot be causes of action because a bodily movement is not an 'action' unless it is produced by a desire (Hamlyn). 'Action', as opposed to mere bodily movement, is not (it is claimed) identifiable independently of desires; i.e., one must attribute a (desire) cause in specifying the (action) effect. By appealing to prolepsis, however, one can see how such specification is possible, and so reply to the backward tautology of action (Pears, 1966-67, pp. 92-93). Just as we can say that a man married his wife on such-and-such a day because his 'wife' can be independently identified under some other description (she is a 'woman', whether or not she becomes a wife), so we can say desires cause actions because the effect can be neutrally (i.e., independently of its cause) described as 'bodily movement which may or may not be an action'. Now the question becomes whether there is an alternative underlying description of the emotions parallel to Pears' description for actions. If there is, then one could reply to the backward tautology argument in terms of prolepsis. Now 'vexation which may or may not be vexation that tickets are gone' will not do, because insofar as it is not clear what is the determining thought it is not determinate what is the emotional state. The specification of the state at this point and at this level does depend on the thought. Whether it is 'vexation', as opposed to 'irritation', 'embarrassment', 'annoyance',
... may depend on the precise content of the thought. When Thalberg says an emotion is 'founded' on a thought, he means that the thought is a constituent in the emotion (if the thought is merely a reason for the emotion, then he says it 'grounds' it -- but we are saying that emotions are always 'founded' on their reasons through thoughts, i.e., I may have various grounds for a belief on which my emotion depends). Perhaps a broader description will do: 'mental state which may or may not be an emotion'. This gets closer to Pears' model: when the causal theorist says that thoughts cause emotions, he means that they cause mental states, which because they are so caused, are the particular emotions they are.

Pears' neutral description for the case of desire/action was 'bodily movement which may or may not be an action'. He could have added '. . . and which, if it is an action, may or may not be the particular action specified through the desire'. Exactly similarly, the man's vexation might be given any of the three following neutral descriptions: 'mental state which may or may not be an emotion', '. . . and which, if it is an emotion, may or may not be vexation', '. . . and which, if it is vexation, may or may not be vexation caused by that particular thought'.

To fully specify an action, you would have to do it through the desire. To fully specify an emotion, you would have to do it through the thought. Indeed, sometimes one would have to refer to the thought in order to determine even the type of emotion. But one could individuate both action and emotion, identify them in the sense of pick them out, short of saying anything about their causes (e.g., 'the emotion had by Jones at 3:01 p.m., . . .').

The situation may even be more complex for emotions than for actions,
in a way that is helpful to the causal theorist. Every action involves at least one bodily movement, and bodily movements are of a (relatively) uniform character. The notion of 'mental state' is very broad (and 'state' even broader), and encompasses all those components of an emotion exclusive of the thought which make it identifiable as the emotion it is (given the addition of the thought). These may be very diverse: e.g., involuntary and invisible bodily changes, involuntary bodily behaviour, sensations, inclinations to action and intentional behaviour, associated thoughts and feelings. Even if a thought is a logically necessary or essential constituent of an emotion, it will make sense to say it 'causes' the emotion if it causes the rest of the emotion, i.e., the other constituents. If \( E \) consists of \( P, Q, R, \ldots \) and \( P \) causes \( Q, R, \ldots \), then one can say, quite properly, that \( P \) causes \( E \). For example, 'the cause of the pile-up on the M4 was Smith's absent-mindedly running his car into the back of Jones' car', or 'the bombing of Pearl Harbour was the immediate cause of the war between the USA and Japan'. (These examples are due to J. M. Shorter.) In these cases, the cause is part of the effect. It would not have been quite the same pile-up (or war) if it had been started in a different way, but the other features of the two effects are nonetheless contingent consequents of the first event. In these cases we secure the contingency required for a causal analysis by omitting an element, and this will work for emotion even where a thought is part of what constitutes an emotion, provided it is only a part. If the thought is not itself a constituent, but gives one of the (causal) conditions of a state being described as a particular emotion, prolepsis allows us to fall back on a more generic description. As Green puts it,
... many descriptions are applicable only where a certain causal relation is supposed to hold. The causal relation is built into the meaning of such descriptions. Where this is the case, the fact that a logical connection obtains will not preclude the existence of a causal connection. For example, a burn is by definition an injury caused by contact with heat; thus, where there is a burn, of course there is contact with heat, but this hardly means that contact with heat is not the cause of the burn. The case of emotion words is similar: a given emotion word can be partially defined as an affective state caused by a thought of a certain sort. "Fear," for example, is an emotion word which can be partially defined as an affective state caused by the anticipation of some danger. This being the case, there is no reason to suppose that the logical relation between emotions and thoughts precludes a causal connection (Green, 1972, p. 38).

The point is quite general, and J. R. S. Wilson makes it with great persuasiveness in his book, Emotion and Object:

Sometimes two concepts are related in that any item which falls under one has a certain relation to some item falling under the other. Thus any item falling under the concept father has a certain relation to some item falling under the concept child; any item falling under the concept cause has a certain relation to some item falling under the concept effect. In some such cases it may be true that someone who did not know of this relation would not possess the concepts in question (Wilson, p. 25).

The conceptual connection of emotion of a certain sort with thought of a certain sort does not preclude the thought causing the emotion, any more than the conceptual constraints on 'fathers' and 'effects' precludes their being causally related to 'sons' and 'causes'.

What one can establish on conceptual grounds is that if any item belongs to one type, say T1, then it must have a certain relation, say R, to some item belonging to another type, say T2. That is, it may be necessary that if x is of type T1, then there is some y such that y is of type T2 and xRy. But to establish that x is of type T1 [fear, burn, father, effect, wife, . . .] one must establish that there is some other item of type T2, and that the relation between the two items is of the right kind, and to establish this may be a matter of induction (Wilson, pp. 25-26).

Even where it is not a matter of induction, this does not mean that the relation is not causal (despite the claims of Williams, 1959, p. 227, and
I may not need induction to know that I am vexed because (I believe) the tickets are gone, or that I am amused by a particular remark, and the absence of induction does not detract from the causal force of these claims. First-person reports of psychological states may be privileged in certain ways and still be reports with a causal force. A claim about a causal relation need not itself be a claim about how it came to be known, and it may have come to be known in a variety of ways.

The important commitment is to a general (or law-like) statement. This statement must be open to the evidence of induction, that is, it is refutable by the evidence of negative parallel instances. But it may be causal even if it is not based on the evidence of similar instances, or any 'evidence' at all. Sometimes one can assert physical causal statements without inductive evidence:

... in order to know that a singular causal statement is true, it is not necessary to know the truth of a law; it is necessary only to know that some law covering the events at hand exists. And it is far from evident that induction, and induction alone, yields the knowledge that a causal law satisfying certain conditions exists. Or, to put it differently, one case is often enough, as Hume admitted, to persuade us that a law exists, and this amounts to saying that we are persuaded, without direct inductive evidence, that a causal relation exists (Davidson, 1963, pp. 93-94).

Induction is not the only path to causal knowledge. What is important, what matters in terms of the knowledge being causal is not the path to it, but the commitment to a general statement. Hume saw this and tried to bring it out in terms of 'constant conjunction'. Without such conjunction, it is difficult to see how one would distinguish between the claim that one event followed another and the claim that the later was caused by the earlier. Davidson discusses the commitment in terms of causal laws or general statements; making the useful point that if one event causes
another, there must be descriptions of these events which figure in a true causal law, but that these descriptions need not be the descriptions under which you originally pick out the events (see Wilson, Ch. II). The general statement need not be a generalization about the events as described (ultimately, the law may hold only, say, on a neurophysiological level). All one need be sure of is that there is a law covering the case, even if one cannot state it at the moment. And this assurance need not arise from consideration of similar instances. But it will of course be open to the challenge of negative parallel instances, even if induction is not needed to establish it.

Causal claims do not require induction, nor do they require certain sorts of corrigibility or openness to error. But these points are well developed by Pears (1962) and Wilson.

There may still be reasons, even if one allows that the object of an emotion may be causally related to the emotion, for distinguishing between the cause (or occasion) of an emotion and its object. Any sophisticated causal theory will not claim that the object is the cause of the emotion (especially if one restricts 'causes' to events); perhaps it will usually be at most 'causally relevant', so this will not be the ground of the distinction. And there are many things which can be causes of emotions, or causally relevant, without being objects of the emotions. Donnellan adumbrates a three-fold-distinction between ordinary causes of emotions and a special sub-species of causes he calls 'producers of emotions', and between both of those and objects of emotions. (That 'objects' may be regarded as another special sub-species of causes is a complication that need not concern us at the moment.) He proposes two criteria for dis-
tinguishing producers of emotions from ordinary causes:

First, explanations in terms of producers of emotions require for their force that the subject of the emotion be aware of them, whereas this is not necessary for ordinary causes. . . . Second, and perhaps more importantly, knowing the producer of an emotion "rationalizes" the emotion as knowing the ordinary cause does not, and this is necessary also for its explanatory force (Donnellan, pp. 948-949).

Where Jones becomes afraid of what Smith will say next about him, after Smith has said "Sometimes I wonder about you", and after Jones has been drinking (where, had he been sober he would not have found Smith's remark ominous): what Smith will say next about him is the object of Jones' fear, his having drunk too much is the ordinary cause, and what Smith has just said is the producer of the emotion. In fact, I suspect that separate 'producers' will materialize only for fear and hope, and perhaps a few other emotions, where the object -- the thing feared or hoped for -- need not be "rationalizing". The object would be mentioned in a complete statement of one's reasons for being in the psychological state, but it need not itself materialize. The 'producer' takes the explanation a step further back, to one's reason for holding the beliefs characteristic of the emotion (that the object exists, or did or will exist, or that the object has the appropriate properties, or all of these). We need not be concerned with the examples or the details. Even if producers are distinct from objects, they still exemplify the special dependence on thoughts that we are concerned with. Not all causes of emotions are producers, and not all causes of emotions are objects, but both producers and objects (whether or not they are themselves 'causes') mark points at which thoughts enter into emotions. It is because of the importance of thoughts in the classification of mental states as particular emotions
that objects and producers enter (at their differing points) in the explanation of those states. Or rather, both producers and objects show that importance.
APPENDIX B . . . ON THOUGHTS AND EMOTIONS
We have tried (in Ch. One, Section XI) to give thought its proper place in the analysis of emotion. We have tried (in Appendix A) to show that it leaves room for causal connections. Perhaps a bit more should be said about the difficulty raised by the allegation of tautology, and how it is met. On a causal analysis, it must be true that 'if I did not have the thought, I would not have the emotion'. The difficulty is over the force of the 'would not'. If the statement were 'if I did not think that the tickets are gone, I would not be vexed that the tickets are gone', the connection would be analytic or tautologous. It is not enough to chop off the occurrence of the thought, where it specifies the object, and leave the name of the emotion by itself (vexation, anger, fear, ...). Even where there are no difficulties of fine discrimination between emotions, specifying the object through the thought may be essential to specifying the emotion. Simplifying by regarding fear as composed of a desire plus a thought, 'if I did not think that is an unruly mob and that unruly mobs are dangerous, I would not be afraid' (leaving off 'afraid of the unruly mob') the statement would still be arguably tautologous because a desire to run does not constitute fear unless it is desire to run in a situation viewed as dangerous. To avoid possible confusion, the very general notion of a mental state, which may be unambiguously picked out or identified (as a state, not an emotion) in general terms or by emotional constituents excluding thoughts, is brought in.

What if there are no constituents of an emotion excluding thoughts? In that case there would be no underlying description of the emotion and the causal theorist would be reduced to saying that the emotion causes
itself. Are there any emotions which do not just involve thoughts essentially (which we argue all do), but are essentially just thoughts? Certainly there is, in general, a distinction between thoughts which produce emotions and dispassionate thoughts. And even a thought which is characteristic of an emotion can occur without its giving rise to the emotion. It can occur alone, or it can occur in conjunction with other necessary conditions but in the face of countervailing conditions (or just in the absence of sufficient ones -- but part of the issue here is what constitutes sufficient conditions). Could an emotion consist of thought alone?

Not every thought-constituted emotion would be an embarrassment to the causal theorist. An emotion can affect the course of one's behaviour. Equally, it can affect the course of one's thoughts. The only effect of my jealousy may be to cause me to dwell on the faults of my rival. These thoughts do not cause, though they may in some sense constitute, my jealousy. (There may be nothing else to my jealousy but the thoughts on which, to use Thalberg's term, my emotion is 'founded'.) What Hume calls the 'calm passions' are another possible source of difficulty for the causal theorist. Certainly they create difficulty for his causal theory. Mary Warnock suggests they are not really emotions at all. But I believe that her claim is mistaken (see Chapter One, last section). However we settle that issue, the calm passions need not be pure thoughts. They may involve some agitation (though not much) and are known by their effects (on thoughts and behaviour -- they may serve as dispositions or motives to action). So, even if it is allowed that they are emotions (which I think they indeed are), they are in any case more than mere foundational thoughts.
The hypothesis Thalberg discusses is "that emotions with objects are effects of the convictions, doubts, or conjectures upon which these emotions are founded" (p. 214). Where the thoughts are incidental or coloured thoughts, not giving the object of the emotion, they do not cause any more difficulty for the causal theorist than emotions with non-thought elements. Calm passions with weak affects, or dispositions to behaviour, are also not a problem. But there are cases where the emotion seems to amount to nothing more than a belief.

Suppose that I truthfully say that I am frightened of German nationalism as a political force; I would in this case normally be taken to have revealed that I believe that German nationalism is in some way dangerous, unless I add that my fear is altogether irrational. The belief is the main constitutive element in the fear, which would disappear, or at least be modified, with the disappearance of the belief. If in this case the belief were abandoned, nothing would remain that would constitute fear. ... Just because the thought is in the normal case an element in the state of mind, together with the affect, one can intelligibly speak of being frightened of German nationalism, when the thought of danger is present, without the associated disagreeable affect (Hampshire, 1965, pp. 84, 97).

These sorts of 'calm' passions may involve thoughts of different types and involve them in different ways. Where 'belief' is used with its full normative force, so the thought of danger is not merely a passing thought or a phantasy, what makes the state of mind an emotion is (mainly) that the belief can be part of a motive to action (which is more than merely informing action as a part of the background). Sometimes however, the thoughts constituting emotions are not beliefs that I endorse. Even if a man dissociated himself from a thought, however, even if there is no element in addition to thought, there may be features of the thought that make one count it as an emotion: how the thoughts occur, or their source, or higher-order thoughts about the source. ... For example, an emotion
may consist of obsessive thought: "The man who is frightened of the dark may not believe that he is in danger; perhaps he knows that he is not; but at the same time he finds that the thought or idea of danger stays in his mind, and that he cannot rid himself of it" (Hampshire, 1965, p. 98). The state of mind may remain fear, despite the recognition of the irrationality of the relevant thought, but it is no longer simply fear; and one may now be in a position to operate on one's state of mind in other ways (i.e., now that one has gone as far as rational argument will take one). The thought of (though not belief in) danger is part of what makes it fear. But there remains a difference between having a thought and having an emotion. It would be a mistake if, in recognizing the importance(s) of thought, one were to assimilate emotions to mere thoughts (which is not to say that turbulence is necessary for an emotional state). (The ranges of thought-dependence, both within particular emotions such as fear and among types of emotion such as fear and shame, are explored in Ch. Two.) It is arguable that in many cases, when one says 'I am afraid of x' and, even more, 'I am afraid that e.g., it will rain', the emotion word introduces a belief or attitude rather than an emotion. Partly because the emotion word is not always detachable in the way it generally is in more basic cases, i.e., 'I am afraid of German nationalism' may not imply 'I am afraid' simpliciter; and it seems at least awkward to regard the belief as giving the rationalizing (in Davidson's sense) object: i.e., when 'I am afraid that it will rain' I am not 'afraid because it will rain' (it may not) or because 'I think it will rain' (because that belief, in this case, would be my fear, and it cannot cause itself). So the causal theorist may well wish to confine his argument to cases where rationalizing objects are given, and separate off states with non-
rationalizing objects, such as hope (and other forward-looking emotions -- see AEW, p. 72), desire that $p$, fear that $p$, wish that $p$. He might do this and still recognize their similarity to basic emotions in involving pro or con attitudes, but also their even more important similarities to neutral (non-rationalizing) states such as expecting that, suspecting that, and believing that $p$. (It might also be worth investigating a problem parallel to that raised by Davidson for beliefs and attitudes in relation to action: "a person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be the reason why he did it. Central to the relation between a reason and an action it explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the reason." For thought, object, and emotion: can one be angry that $p$, and believe that $p$, and yet not be angry -- hope, etc. -- because $p$? Non-rationalizing desire may provide a model for mental states with non-rationalizing objects, and so suggest further reasons for regarding mental states which reduce to beliefs as distinguishable and distinct from emotions.)
APPENDIX C . . . ON A HUMEAN VIEW OF PHANTASY
I have argued that the key to understanding emotions, conscious or unconscious, cannot be found in Hume. I have also said (Chapter Two, section V, and Chapter Four, section IX) that the key to understanding phantasy, conscious or unconscious, cannot be found in Hume. I would like here to do a bit more to sketch some of the arguments relating to phantasy hinted at in the text.

The difference between perceptions, memories and phantasies is not a matter of degree. They are all mental entities or processes or whatever (not to prejudge the nature of the mental), i.e. forms of thought. They may have the same content. Given a thought, and only a thought, there is no way of knowing whether it is a perception, a memory, or a phantasy. The strength or vividness of the thought will not differentiate them. The simplest refutation of such a Humean (degree-of-vividness) criterion is that it is phenomenologically false. Perceptions, on this view, should be vivid, memories dimmer (the older the dimmer), and phantasies dimmest. In fact, each comes in all degrees of brightness (assuming it is clear what one is measuring when one is measuring 'strength' or 'vividness' or 'brightness', and that each is the same quality in each). On a conceptual level, it becomes difficult to understand, using a Humean criterion, how we can have 'hallucinatory' phantasies or memories: that is, phantasies or memories which we take to be perceptions. It becomes impossible to describe the nature of the mistake involved, for to take a thought to be a perception must be (on a Humean criterion) to take it to have the force of a perception. But a thought has the force we take it to have; what we think is the criterion here. So if we take it to be a perception, though we can
make other mistakes, it must at least be a perception. If degree of force is what makes a thought a perception and we are the sole judges of force, we cannot have 'hallucinatory' phantasies or memories. At worst, we can be unsure of the force of a thought, in which case it is simply uncertain whether the thought is perception, phantasy or memory. Other conceptual paradoxes arise. Most relevant to our (psychoanalytical) concerns is what happens in the cases of mixed thoughts. Is a 'memory of phantasy' brighter than a phantasy? The question goes right to the underlying assumptions about energy. It seems natural that a memory should be dimmer than a perception because there should be loss, seepage, or fading of energy with time. The energy of the thought comes from the original perception. Where would the additional energy come from needed to lift a memory of phantasy up to the level of memory? If a memory of phantasy is less bright than a phantasy, one wonders how one distinguishes a memory of phantasy from a phantasy of memory and the latter from a very faded memory of phantasy. At what point do thoughts fade completely? Would a phantasy of memory be possible at all? The most radical difficulty with a Humean criterion is that there may be no aspect of the thought to which a notion of 'degree' can attach. So far we have assumed and accepted the narrow treatment of phantasies and perceptions as involving 'impressions' (or 'ideas' or 'sense-data'), mental pictures, some 'mental content' in addition to thought-content. The content of a thought is what is thought, the 'thought that so-and-so' or 'of so-and-so' is identified by the content of the so-and-so. (Even this is not quite accurate, various other circumstances must be taken into account for 'she hates me', even thought by one person on two almost
simultaneous occasions may once be the thought 'my mother hates me' and another time 'my wife hates me'. But the problems of propositional identity are notorious and not special to the cases which concern us.) The same thought may take various forms, e.g. it may consist of visual images or verbal representations. The same thought may even be embodied in different visual images, as when I twice remember going through a door on a particular occasion; one time from the point of view of me passing through the door, one time from the point of view of an onlooker seeing me emerge. But I may just be telling a story to someone and say, "and then I came through the door." And here I remember, but there is nothing of which it makes sense to ask, 'is it more intense?' The question does not arise. Here the form of my memory is its audible expression (there need not be any mental event of which it is a report), and it is not true that the louder my statement the more vivid the memory. If we shift the question of intensity to the feeling with which I remember 'that p' we do then have something we can measure, but we have shifted the question and the answer will not reveal anything essential to its being memory rather than perception.

The difference between perception and memory (where it is a memory of perception and a memory not simply that one has perceived, but of the perception) can be simply though unilluminatingly stated: it is a matter of time. A memory is a repetition of a perception after the occurrence of the perception, and, in some way, because of that perception, and is not its repetition a perception. (The circularity in the last clause of the formula is not readily avoidable; for one can remember a scene, for example, while seeing that scene again, without it being a
memory of -- a rather different thing -- having seen that scene. One may even call up a memory to check whether the scene has changed, or the scene may call up the memory. Think of the taste of Proust's madeleine.) There is no such simple formula (even an unilluminating one) for distinguishing phantasy from perception. The natural contrast to appeal to, truth vs. falsity, will not make the difference. A phantasy is not a false perception, it need not even be mistaken for a perception. A phantasy of perception might consist of thought of a pleasant experience of sexual intercourse. But the thoughts need not be false (in all ways), they may be of an actual pleasant experience of sexual intercourse. But is it not then a memory rather than a phantasy? Not necessarily. The recollection in this case may be more a reliving, and it is certainly itself pleasurable. Further, I may deliberately set myself to phantasize, and I may not be concerned about accuracy (as I would be if I had set myself to remember the experience), but then I may be (cf. certain masturbation phantasies). Note that I need not be deceived in any of this. It is as though I am having the experience now (that is why and what I have set out for), but I know that I am not and that I have had the experience in the past. Otherwise, in this case, it appears that there need be little difference between a phantasy and an experience remembered with pleasure. (Perhaps the difference between the date of the thought and the date of the content, and the role of these dates, is what is essential to a phantasy involving memory. Can one have a phantasy of an actual current experience?) From another direction, it is clear that there are many ways in which a perception can go wrong (be 'false') without thereby becoming a phantasy.
What of a phantasy of memory? That is, a current phantasy, projected back and given the status of memory. A phantasy of memory is not simply a false memory. Memories themselves admit of various degrees and kinds of error without ceasing to have the character of memory. One may make a simple mistake, for example, think one has left one's glasses on the table rather than on the desk. Here the thought retains the character of memory because it is about the past, about an actual event in the past known to one to have occurred, and the thought retains its reference to that past event because there is enough in the total situation to identify the event. (What, precisely, makes this so, like how do I know to whom you have referred when you say 'she hates me', is a nest of further problems.) All that is wrong is that 'x' has been substituted for 'y'. In another case, where one has a motivated error, for example, thinking that 'you apologized' rather than 'I apologized', the character of memory is retained for the same reasons. In this case, all that has been added has been an explanation for the mistake, but it is presumed even in the case of the simple mistake that there is some explanation. Where the error is more radical, where there is no identifiable event in the past which can be taken to be referred to by a thought, the thought must be regarded as, in a sense, an hallucination. So it is, in a sense, a phantasy. But it is so far unclear whether it would be a phantasy of memory or a memory of phantasy. The latter case is more or less straightforward. It is a memory of phantasy if the radically false thought (perception) occurred on some occasion prior to its present occurrence and its present occurrence is a (true) memory of that occurrence. The memory must, of course (if it is to be an hallucination) mistake the phantasy for a true perception.
Phantasy of memory calls for more in the way of mechanism than
memory of phantasy. This is partly because questions about memory which
have been sidestepped, must now be raised (though we will not be able to
answer them here). One wants to know how a phantasy gets any reference
to time (cf. Chapter One, section VI, note 5). For example, if the
phantasy is a picture of some scene, must the scene include a calendar?
Even if it does, does that have to be the date of the thought-content?
Not every thought about the past pretends to be a memory of a past
event (e.g., 'Brutus killed Caesar'). Even where a phantasy includes
the subject as a character in the tableau, even a child, need the age
of the subject in the thought correspond to the date of the thought?
What if the child is pictured as viewing some (actual) event in the
subject's later adult life? Even in the cases of greatest interest to
psychoanalysis, where the subject is included as a child in the phantasy
as a participant in some event presumably taking place in his childhood
(primal scenes), it is not always clear how the dating of narratives or
reconstructions is achieved. The possibility of projection back of
contemporary productions (i.e., of retrospective phantasies) is always
open. And vivid 'screen memories' and even ordinary childhood memories
tend to be distorted reproductions:

In the majority of significant and in other respects unimpeachable
childhood scenes the subject sees himself in the recollection
as a child, with the knowledge that this child is himself; he
sees this child, however, as an observer from outside the
scene would see him. . . . Now it is evident that such a pic­
ture cannot be an exact repetition of the impression that
was originally received. . . . It may indeed be questioned whether
we have any memories at all from our childhood: memories
relating to our childhood may be all that we possess (Freud,
Iboyja, pp. 321, 322).
Even 'relating' ideas (if viewed as images) to our past (or future) can be problematical.

In exploring the question of the nature of phantasy, I would connect it with notions of wish-fulfillment and certain forms of falsity and awareness of falsity. But that I cannot do here. I will turn now to a few remarks on a final issue connected with the question of the force of phantasy and unconscious phantasy.

The satisfactions of phantasy are not fleeting in genuinely psychotic states, where contact with reality is well and truly lost. According to the model of day-dream phantasy, one is (in day-dreams) in some sense aware of the contrast with reality. Hallucinatory wish-fulfillments are rather more like psychotic states. Are unconscious phantasies hallucinatory? As an approach, are infantile hallucinatory wish-fulfillments unconscious phantasies? Are they unconscious? It is not immediately clear what elements are and what elements are not unconscious. One must note that when Freud speaks of inhibiting the cathexis of a memory image, what happens on his Project model is that energy is kept from flowing into neurones. We are not aware of neurones and their energy states (as such). Consciousness has its own place in his apparatus. So when we inhibit the cathexis of memory and so prevent flow-back into the perceptual system, we are prevented (it would seem) from being conscious of the memory. There is, however, another mechanism by which we can become conscious of memories. i.e. perceive memories, without their becoming perceptions: attention. Freud treats the attention cathexis of consciousness as an organ of inner perception. But he also holds that there is no consciousness of energy shifts in the psyche,
except as pleasure and displeasure, until linguistic connections (Pcs.) are established (Freud, 1900a, p. 574). So in the case of the hallucinating infant it would seem that the memory is submerged except for its appearance as a delusory (hallucinatory) perception. So the phantasy is here conscious, but not as phantasy (because the infant is not aware of the falsity). So the hallucinatory wish-fulfillment is not a day-dream, but not obviously an unconscious phantasy either. The case of an adult hallucinatory wish-fulfillment would be still more difficult because it might bring in verbal connections and so consciousness of other elements. It is still arguable that in the case in hand we do have an unconscious phantasy. Perhaps one ought not to say that the hallucinatory perception is the phantasy and that the phantasy is therefore conscious. Perhaps the perception should be regarded as the manifestation of an unconscious wish, and it is that wish and not the hallucinatory perception which is the phantasy. We shall have to be prepared to distinguish unconscious phantasies from their conscious or visible manifestations, for it is only through such manifestations that we shall be able to come to know them. But at this point I think such distinctions and discussions can only confuse, and it is better to regard the sort of hallucinatory wish-fulfillments we have so far discussed as more like (conscious) psychotic states than unconscious phantasies.

The discussion of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment in terms of cathexes of energy might make it seem that Freud is offering (what we have seen to be untenable) a Humean criterion for distinguishing memory and perception by degree of intensity. But we should note that
we are not aware of these differences in intensity as differences of intensity; they provide the physiological background and explanation for what we are aware of: in the case considered, as hallucinatory perceptions. (Separate 'indications of reality' are what count.)

A Humean criterion would be particularly unfortunate within Freudian theory, for Freud regards psychic reality as of equal importance with material reality in the etiology of neuroses. A difference in strength or energy would be precisely the kind that should make an etiological difference in Freud's model, and so would leave the equivalence unexplained.

Freud does seem to treat the distinction between memory and perception as one that can be upset by too intense memory. But one must be careful, for that an unwonted degree of energy can upset the distinction does not show that the distinction was originally made in terms of degree of energy. (Freud even suggests that high energy quantity is needed only on one occasion to establish the facilitation over which 'flow-back' occurs -- Freud, 1950a, pp. 381-82). Specifically, a memory that becomes an hallucination by the addition of energy does not thereby become a perception in Freud's scheme, it is mistaken for a perception. The excessive energy explains the mistake, but if the distinction were in terms of energy there would be no mistake to explain. In any case, the 'mark of reality' is not 'intensity' but matching perception ('identity'), and later making disappear by action, that is special 'indications of reality'.
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